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REASON, RELIGION, AND DEMOCRACY
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REASON, RELIGION, AND DEMOCRACY
The rise of religious fundamentalism in different parts of the world in recent years and its association with terrorism has led to a renewed interest in the nature of religion and its compatibility with Western institutions. Much of the focus of this new interest has contrasted religion and science as two different systems of knowledge. This book also emphasizes the difference between religion and science as a means for understanding causal relationships, but it focuses more on the challenge religious extremism poses for liberal democratic institutions. This book contains a discussion of human psychology, describes the salient characteristics of all religions, and contrasts religion and science as systems of thought. Historical sketches are used to link modernity and the use of the human capacity for reasoning to advance human welfare. The book describes the conditions under which democratic institutions can advance human welfare and the nature of constitutional rights as protectors of individual freedoms. Extremist religions are shown to pose a threat to liberal democracy, a threat that has implications for immigration, education policies, and the definition of citizenship. Dennis C. Mueller is professor emeritus of economics at the University of Vienna. His main research interests are public choice, industrial economics, and constitutional political economy. He has held positions at the University of Maryland and Cornell University and is the author of many articles and several books, including Public Choice III (Cambridge University Press, 2003), The Corporation (2003), and Constitutional Democracy (1996). Mueller is a past president of the Public Choice Society, the Southern Economic Association, the Industrial Organization Society, the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (E.A.R.I.E.), the International Joseph A. Schumpeter Society, and the European Public Choice Society.
Reason, Religion, and Democracy DENNIS C. MUELLER University of Vienna
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521115018 © Dennis C. Mueller 2009 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published in print format 2009 ISBN-13
978-0-511-65168-7
eBook (NetLibrary)
ISBN-13
978-0-521-11501-8
Hardback
ISBN-13
978-0-521-13273-2
Paperback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
To Laurence, Jacob, and Adrienne
Contents
Preface 1
page ix
Liberal Democracy
1
PART I. FUNDAMENTALS: EVOLUTION, PSYCHOLOGY, REASONING, AND RELIGION
2
Evolution, Psychology, and Reason
31
3
Religion
51
PART II. A HISTORICAL LOOK AT THE STATE, DEMOCRACY, AND RELIGION
4
The First States
79
5
Athens and Rome
93
6
The Caliphate
116
7
The Renaissance
136
8
The Enlightenment
159
9
Religion and Democracy After the French Revolution
197
Epilogue to Part Two
235
PART III. THE INSTITUTIONS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
10
Democracy and Citizenship
239
11
Rights
271
12
Education, Citizenship, Immigration, and Democracy
316
vii
viii
Contents PART IV. CHALLENGES TO LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
13
Democracy and Religion
355
14
Building and Protecting Liberal Democracy
400
References
419
Author Index
437
Subject Index
442
Preface
Shortly after the completion of the final revisions to this book, a front-page article appeared in the Austrian newspaper Die Presse reporting estimates of some 250 million Christians worldwide threatened by violence or death for their beliefs. Most of the countries where this repression is taking place are not democracies – for example, Iran, Vietnam, China. Some countries such as India and Turkey are certainly democracies, but cannot be called liberal democracies because of the violations of religious freedom rights that occur within them. These instances of religious persecution illustrate a major theme of this book – the incompatibility of strong religious views and liberal democracy. Most of the countries in which religious persecution is taking place can be characterized as nonmodern, traditionalist societies – for example, Pakistan, Burma, Yemen, Kenya. Traditionalism and religion go hand in hand, as does to a large extent traditionalism and dictatorship. The examples of India and Turkey indicate, however, that democracy is no guarantee of liberalism. Wherever extremist religious beliefs exist, liberalism is at peril. It was the growing importance of religious extremism in the United States, South America, the Middle East, and other parts of the world and the potential for religious extremism to arise even in Europe that led me to write this book. No one who values liberalism and democracy should assume that they are invulnerable to attack from religious extremists. In several places, data have been taken from Internet websites with the website addresses given as sources. These website addresses change from time to time, so we cannot guarantee that the address given is still current. Alan Hamlin and an anonymous referee offered some helpful comments on an early draft of the book. Bob Tollison and Roger Congleton read the book thoroughly, and made many suggestions for improvement. Jacob Mueller, my son, also read the manuscript and caught many errors of style ix
x
Preface
and substance. Elizabeth Raab gave it a careful reading and made many suggestions for improving word choice and punctuation. To all of these people, I am most grateful. Finally, I would like to thank my secretary for the last fifteen years, Heidi Wurm, for her diligent effort to bring the manuscript into shape for the publisher. She made my side of the project immensely easier. One often adds a perfunctory disclaimer to such acknowledgments of help to the effect that the previously named do not necessarily share all views of the author. In this case, the disclaimer is definitely needed and is not perfunctory. If this book has any positive impact, it may alert some people to the dangers traditionalism and religion pose for liberal democracy and help protect it against these threats, thereby producing a better future. With this hope for the future in mind, I am dedicating this book to my children. Dennis C. Mueller Vienna, Austria May 2009
ONE
Liberal Democracy
As in other matters of this kind, we immediately come up against a stumbling-block of terminology. This is to be expected since the objective investigations that we are making require an objective terminology, whereas the subjective discussions customary in these matters are served well enough by a subjective terminology drawn from everyday language. For example, everyone recognizes that at the present time ‘democracy’ is tending to become the political system of all civilized peoples. But what is the precise meaning of this term ‘democracy’? It is even more vague than the vaguest of terms, ‘religion.’ (Vilfredo Pareto, 1916)1
The richest countries today are, with very few exceptions, liberal democracies. They are liberal in the sense that their citizens possess rights that guarantee them the freedom to go and do as they wish. They are democracies in that their citizens exercise significant control over the state. In the poorest countries, one or both attributes of liberal democracy are often missing. With the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and in the Soviet Union two years later, it appeared that capitalism and liberal democracy had triumphed over planned economies and dictatorial governments. The speed with which the former communist countries adopted market and democratic institutions suggested that their citizens believed that these institutions were best suited for meeting their needs and improving their welfare. As poor countries develop, they too could be expected to become liberal democracies. Today, liberal democracy’s triumph seems less certain. Under President Vladimir Putin, Russian newspapers and television stations that were independent and sometimes critical of the state were closed down; political 1
The quote is from The General Treatise on Sociology, and is taken from Finer (1966, p. 266).
1
2
Liberal Democracy
demonstrations against the government were brutally suppressed; persons deemed a threat to the government have been imprisoned on trumped-up charges; government critics mysteriously disappeared or were assassinated. Yet, Putin continued to obtain 80 percent approval ratings right up until he exchanged his role as president for the post of prime minister. It appears that a large majority of Russians are indifferent as to whether liberal democracy survives in Russia. A similar observation can be made with respect to Hugo Chavez’s destruction of liberal democratic institutions in Venezuela and his continued popularity with vast numbers of Venezuelans. Oil has brought prosperity to several Middle Eastern countries, but this prosperity has been accompanied by neither an expansion of liberal freedoms nor democracy. Moreover, the attacks (September 11, 2001, in the United States; March 11, 2004, in Spain; July 2005 in London; and the many failed terrorist attacks) reveal that there are quite a few people who not only do not want their own countries to be liberal democracies, but would also like to injure and ideally destroy liberal democratic institutions elsewhere. China has become a capitalist country in all but name, and its income per capita has grown at a spectacular 10 percent or more per year. Yet there is little sign that it is about to join the liberal democracies of the West. Prosperity has also not spawned liberal democracy in Singapore. Thus, considerable evidence indicates that people in large parts of the world have either rejected liberal democracy as a form of government, or feel that they can get along fairly well without it. This rejection or indifference to liberal democracy may partly be because of a perception that democratic institutions “fail to deliver the goods.” Many countries in South America, Africa, and other parts of the world have adopted democratic institutions and not experienced the economic growth and improvements in welfare that they had hoped to achieve. Many have reverted back to dictatorship, often, as in Russia and Venezuela, without their populations seeming to care. One question addressed in this book is why democracy is tried and then discarded in many developing countries, or why it is never tried at all.
I. Declining Support for Politics and Politicians in Western Democracies One possible answer to the question as to why democracy fails to get adopted or survive in developing countries is that they are too poor. Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) was among the first to argue that democracy can only emerge after a country obtains a certain level of economic development. The link
I. Declining Support for Politics and Politicians in Western Democracies
3
between economic development and democracy has been documented by Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) and Przeworski and Limongi (1997). One advantage from higher incomes is that citizens may spend less time working and have more time to participate in the democratic process. More importantly, however, economic prosperity provides resources to educate a country’s citizenry, which in turn should improve the quality of the collective decisions they make in a democracy. Carles Boix claims that it is not only the level of income that a country reaches that determines whether it democratizes, but also its distribution. More specifically, he identifies two prerequisites for democracy: Democracy prevails when either economic equality or capital mobility are high in a given country. On the one hand, economic equality promotes democracy. As the distribution of assets and incomes becomes more balanced among individuals, the redistributive impact of democracy diminishes and the probability of a peaceful transition from an authoritarian regime to universal suffrage increases. On the other hand, a decline in the specificity of capital, that is, a reduction in the cost of moving capital away from its country of origin, curbs the redistributive pressures from noncapital holders. As capital becomes more mobile, democratic governments must curb taxes – if the taxes were too high, capital would escape abroad. Accordingly, the extent of political conflict among capital holders and nonholders diminishes, and the likelihood of democracy rises. By contrast, authoritarianism predominates in those countries in which both the level of inequality and the lack of capital mobility are high. (Boix, 2003, p. 3)
Although the association between both income and income equality and democracy is well established, these two variables are only part of the story; otherwise Singapore would already be a democracy, and China would be rapidly approaching becoming one. The United States at the end of the eighteenth century and the budding democracies in Europe in the late nineteenth century were poorer than many South American and Asian countries today, which have had spotty records as democracies. So too, of course, was Ancient Greece. Moreover, Greece and late-eighteenth-century United States were also largely agricultural economies like many developing countries. More than high incomes and equal distribution is needed to make a democracy successful. In addition, liberal democracy does not seem to be fairing that well, even in the richest countries of the world. Performing an Internet search on the words – poll, trust, and politicians – on a hot day in July, 2007 yielded the following headlines: A BBC poll shows 80% of [British] voters do not trust politicians. Canadians have grown increasingly dissatisfied with all politicians.
4
Liberal Democracy A record 88% of Japanese in a fresh public opinion poll are dissatisfied with politics. Americans’ distrust of politicians and business leaders has reached epidemic level. Britons trust politicians less than car salesmen.
America’s politicians could obtain some solace, however; they were trusted more than car salesmen. A poll placed House of Representatives members in next-to-last place, just above car salesmen. A year later, however, Congress’s approval rating had sunk to a lowly 14 percent, beneath even that of President George W. Bush, who had the lowest approval rating of any president since World War II.2 In the summer of 2008, 86 percent of the Chinese citizens polled by the Pew Foundation said they were satisfied with the direction in which their country was going; at the same time, some 80 percent of Americans thought that their country was headed in the wrong direction.3 How can so many people in a country with a heavy-handed dictatorship be satisfied with the direction of their country, and so many in the world’s “oldest democracy” be dissatisfied? It would appear that America’s exalted democratic political system is not living up to its citizens’ expectations. The United States is not alone in this respect. During the last fifty years, “feelings that politicians care what people think” have declined in Austria, France, Germany, Sweden, and the United States, reaching levels between 20 and 30 percent by the late 1990s. Trends in confidence in politicians and government have been uniformly negative in all highly developed democracies with the exception of the Netherlands.4 On the other hand, people continue to exhibit pride in their countries and believe that democracy is the best form of government.5 Citizens appear to love their countries and their democratic institutions, and yet they despise the people whom they elect to govern them. Logically, there can be only three explanations for why a democracy fails to satisfy its citizens: (1) There is some form of institutional failure that prevents the government from providing the policies that the citizens want; (2) citizens mistakenly choose bad leaders or bad policies that lead to public 2 3 4 5
Economist, July 26, 2008b. The 2008 Pew Global Attitudes Survey in China, www.perglobal.org, and Economist, July 26, 2008a. See Dalton (2004, ch. 1), and Putnam, Pharr, and Dalton (2000). See Norris (1999, pp. 16–21).
I. Declining Support for Politics and Politicians in Western Democracies
5
dissatisfaction; or (3) citizens’ preferences are such that it is impossible for the government to provide a set of policies that satisfies all citizens. All three possibilities are discussed in this book.6 The emphasis is, however, on the second and third explanations. Computer scientists have an expression: “garbage in, garbage out.” The same adage is appropriate for democratic institutions. The political outcomes from a democratic process in terms of the people elected to serve in government and the policies it implements depend crucially on the inputs from voters. This statement seems so obvious that one is embarrassed to make it. Yet, many who would admit its validity fail to understand its implications. Many appear to believe that all that is needed to have a wellfunctioning democracy is that all residents within a country have the right to vote, and that most exercise this right. How they vote does not matter. This book challenges this assumption. It argues that democratic institutions will be more successful at satisfying citizens’ preferences: (1) the more homogeneous these preferences are, and (2) the more intelligent and wellinformed voters are. No government can satisfy all voters, if half desire one thing and the other half its antithesis. No government is likely to implement the proper policies for dealing with climate change, globalization, and demographic changes, if its citizens are incapable of understanding these issues or are unwilling to devote the time needed to understand them. These propositions have important implications for determining who should be allowed to vote, and how citizens are educated. Thus, this book questions the popular beliefs that democracies function best if there is universal suffrage, that rich democratic countries should have liberal immigration policies, and that immigrants should be granted voting rights soon after they arrive in a country. Such policies lead to heterogeneous electorates with large numbers of voters who are either uninformed about the issues facing their country or incapable of understanding them even when they are informed. Governments in heterogeneous societies have more difficulty satisfying their citizens, because the citizens disagree over what their governments should be doing. It may help to highlight the importance of these differences by looking more closely at two countries: one a highly successful liberal democracy and the other a failed democracy. Their incomes differ greatly in the expected way, but, as we shall see, this is only part of the story. 6
For additional discussion see, Norris (1999), Dalton (2004), and the collection of essays in Pharr and Putnam (2000).
6
Liberal Democracy
II. Profiles of Two Countries A. Switzerland Switzerland is a small, mountainous country in Central Europe. Some facts about it are presented in Table 1.1. Switzerland has one of the highest incomes per capita in the world, virtually a 100 percent literacy rate, and a life expectancy of more than eighty years. It also has some of the strongest democratic institutions in the world. These can be traced back as far as 1291, the traditional date given for its founding, when citizens from the rural communities of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden met in the meadow, R¨utli, and signed a pact to defend one another in case of attack. In doing so, they hoped to free themselves from domination by the Habsburgs. Although the event definitely took place, its importance for the development of Switzerland – let alone the supposed role William Tell played in it – has been questioned.7 This being said, the Oath of R¨utli does appear to be an early instance of cooperation among diverse sets of people, and a form of founding constitutional contract for what later would grow into the republic of Switzerland. Table 1.1. Statistics on Switzerland, 2005 Population Population annual growth rate (1990–2005) Gross national income per capita (US $) Life expectancy at birth Distribution of population by language German French Italian Romanic Other Distribution of population by religion Roman Catholic Protestant Other
7,252,000 0.4% 54,930 81 Total population 65% 18% 12% 1% 4%
Swiss nationals 74% 20% 4% 1% 1%
47.6% 44.3% 8.1%
Sources: http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/switzerland statistics.html; and http://www.about .ch/statistics/index.html.
The mountains of Switzerland divide the country into small, separated valleys. Historically, the chief occupation in these mountainous 7
See discussion and references in Steinberg (1996, pp. 14–18).
II. Profiles of Two Countries
7
communities was herding cows, which led to a population of independent and rather rugged individuals accustomed to being free from outside domination. Each valley came to be organized as a commune, which was compelled to make collective decisions regarding the maintenance of the common pastures, marketing cattle, and the like. Democracy in Switzerland was thus fostered in part because of its physical characteristics.8 Swiss history reads like the history of much of the rest of Europe.9 The sixteenth century brought the Protestant Reformation and religious war. The eighteenth century brought the Enlightenment; the nineteenth brought revolution. The Bolsheviks’ victory in Russia at the start of the twentieth century inspired socialists in Switzerland – as in Austria and other parts of Europe – to launch a general strike in 1918 in the hopes of bringing socialism to their country. The pragmatism of the Swiss, and perhaps a bit of luck, resulted in less violent and destructive consequences to these events, however, than occurred elsewhere in Europe. This pragmatism has been conspicuous throughout Switzerland’s history. Although Swiss Protestants and Catholics went to war in 1529 and again in 1531, their casualties were minuscule compared to Germany and France. The two sides soon ceased hostilities and concentrated on making money by feeding the warring factions in neighboring countries. The Swiss revolution or civil war of 1848 lasted about a month and produced fewer than two hundred casualties – a mere Hasanschiessen (hare shoot), in the words of Otto von Bismarck.10 Out of the revolution came a new constitution, ostensibly patterned in part on the U.S. Constitution, which created the strong federalist structure that survives to this day.
B. Nigeria Nigeria lies on the western coast of Africa. Some facts about it are presented in Table 1.2. Prior to the arrival of the Arabs and Europeans, the area of what is now, Nigeria, was occupied by tribal kingdoms such as the Hausa in the north and the Yoruba in the southeast. The Arabs arrived in the north in the thirteenth century and began to convert the population to Islam. The Portuguese, followed by other Europeans, arrived in the fifteenth century. Nigeria was recognized as a British colony by the rest of Europe in 1885 and obtained its independence in 1960, when parliamentary democracy was 8 9 10
See further discussion in Steinberg (1996, chs. 2 and 3). The discussion in this paragraph draws heavily on Steinberg (1996, ch. 2). Steinberg (1996, p. 46).
8
Liberal Democracy Table 1.2. Statistics on Nigeria, 2005 Population Population annual growth rate (1990–2005) Gross national income per capita (US $) Life expectancy at birth Literacy∗ (male) Literacy (female)
131,500,000 2.4% 560 43.8 75.7% 60.6%
Distribution of population by ethnic group Hausa and Fulani Yoruba Igbo (Ibo) Ijaw Kanuri Ibibio Tiv 250 other ethnic groups
29% 21% 18% 10% 4% 3.5% 2.5% 12%
Distribution of population by religion Muslim Christian Indigenous
50% 40% 10%
∗
Ages 15 and older can read and write. Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-facook/ index.html.
introduced along with a federalist structure. In 1962, Governor Awolowo, of the western province, tried to introduce a radical form of socialism into Nigeria. Rioting ensued and the prime minister resigned. Nigeria’s politics have been turbulent ever since.11 In 1966, the Christian Igbo people of the southeast staged a military coup. Muslim mobs in the north then massacred the Igbo, and Muslim officers staged a counter-coup. The Igbo then massacred northerners in the eastern cities, and the eastern region voted to secede from Nigeria and create the Republic of Biafra. A civil war ensued and lasted until 1970. An estimated one million to three million people died during the fighting or from the famine and diseases that the war caused. Military coups occurred in 1975 and 1985. In 1996, a United Nations report stated that Nigeria’s “problems and human rights are terrible and the political problems are terrifying.” By 1997, Nigeria’s income per capita had sunk to the thirteenth lowest in the world; it had been thirty-third from the 11
Taken from a variety of sources including: http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107847.html, and Economist, April 28, 2007.
II. Profiles of Two Countries
9
top a little more than twenty years earlier. In 2007, Umaru Yar’Adua was elected president with an “astonishing” 70 percent of the vote. International observers declared the results fraudulent; Nigeria’s independent observers called them a “sham.”12
C. Discussion Switzerland and Nigeria seem to illustrate the links between income and democracy, and between income distribution and democracy. Switzerland is rich; Nigeria is poor. Democracy first appears in Switzerland in the alpine cantons where herding was the dominant economic activity, because it did not afford large concentrations of wealth. In contrast, in the flat parts of Switzerland, as elsewhere in Europe, feudalism existed and wealth concentrated in the cities of Zurich, Bern, Basel, and Geneva, all of which had oligarchical political structures that did not give way to more democratic institutions until the European revolutions of 1848 and the new constitution that they produced.13 Nigeria’s main source of wealth is its oil – a very immobile source of wealth – and thus its economy is not well-suited for the emergence and survival of democracy.14 Yet why is Switzerland so wealthy and Nigeria so poor? Historically, being landlocked has been an economic disadvantage, because it is more difficult to engage in international trade. Natural resources such as minerals and fertile plains are obviously a great economic advantage. Observing the geography of both countries and their command over natural resources, one might predict that Nigeria would be rich and Switzerland poor. Landlocked Switzerland’s mountains do not contain vast quantities of copper as do Chile’s or iron ore as in China. It has no great reserves of oil as does Nigeria. Yet income per capita is roughly 100 times higher in Switzerland than in Nigeria. Many economists agree with Douglass North that institutional differences are the most important determinants of economic development.15 Countries that establish property rights and market institutions, give individuals 12 13 14 15
Economist, April 28, 2007, p. 45. Boix (2003, pp. 111–18). Boix (2003, p. 85) finds an inverse correlation between democratization and the importance of the oil sector using cross-national data. See North and Thomas (1973) and North (1990). Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) stress the importance of access to the Atlantic Ocean and political institutions that constrained the monarchy and protected commercial interests from arbitrary confiscations of property in explaining the much more rapid growth of Great Britain and the Netherlands between 1500 and 1850 in comparison with Spain, Portugal, and France.
10
Liberal Democracy
incentives to acquire human and physical capital, to innovate, and to engage in trade, experience sustained economic growth. Switzerland, historically a nation of cow herders, now hosts companies that are world leaders in banking, chemicals, food products, pharmaceuticals, watch making, and other areas. Nigeria, although home to some of the richest oil deposits on earth, remains mired in poverty for the most part. The focus of this book is not on economic growth, but on democracy. Political institutions can foster economic growth or hinder it. In Nigeria, they have hindered it. When the world price of oil has been high, Nigeria’s politicians have either channeled oil revenues into their own bank accounts or wasted them on luxury government cars, helicopters, and other perks of office. Another important factor explaining Nigeria’s lack of economic development is its high population growth rate −2.4 percent as opposed to 0.4 percent in Switzerland. This rapid growth rate results in more than 42 percent of Nigerians being fourteen years old or younger. Given the waste in government, the country cannot properly educate its rapidly growing population, thus helping to perpetuate poverty. It does not take huge investments and complicated technologies to control population growth, but it does take intelligently designed policies focused on this goal. Not only has Nigeria failed to introduce such policies, the state hinders people from preventing births by using contraception or other means. Abortions are only available to save a pregnant woman’s life and anyone assisting in an abortion can be imprisoned for up to fourteen years. Knowledge of contraception is limited. Economists define a public good as one that all members of the community consume in equal quantity at zero marginal cost. Examples of public goods are national defense, police and fire protection, highways, and clean air and water. Because all members of a community consume the same bundle of public goods and services, it will be easier for the state to satisfy its citizens if they have similar preferences for public goods and services. Democratic institutions are perceived as functioning more poorly in countries with heterogeneous populations. Both Switzerland and Nigeria have heterogeneous populations compared to, for example, Sweden. Heterogeneity within Switzerland, however, is minuscule compared to Nigeria, which has more than 250 different ethnic groups speaking more than 200 languages. Switzerland has four language groups. Switzerland fought its wars over religion in the sixteenth century, and today religious differences in Switzerland are a matter of little concern. Nigeria’s Muslims and Christians have been fighting their religious wars over issues such as the use of Shari’a law over the last half century.
II. Profiles of Two Countries
11
The best way to accommodate heterogeneity is to organize a democracy as a federation. Local communities are typically more homogeneous than the nation as a whole, and the more public goods and services are supplied at the local level, the more closely they match the preferences of their citizens. Switzerland’s federalist institutions are among the strongest in the world. Indeed, since World War II, while most federalist states have become more centralized, Switzerland has gradually become more decentralized.16 Its central government is perhaps the weakest of any rich, democratic country. In place of a powerful prime minister or president, executive power in Switzerland is in the hands of a committee composed of leaders of the major parties, a committee that traditionally has sought to reach collective decisions by consensus. The power of politicians at all government levels is further curtailed by the rights Swiss citizens have to initiate referenda to reverse actions taken by their elected representatives. Nigeria is also organized as a federalist state. However, like its African neighbors, Nigeria has a presidential (“big man”) form of government, in which the president possesses strong powers even when democratically elected. Because the state’s main source of revenue is oil, decisions at the central level as to how these revenues are shared and spent make the identity of the president of great importance. Thus, the distribution of oil revenue rather than the provision of public goods becomes the primary concern of the central government. Because the president is from one ethnic (tribal) group and of one religion, and he owes his office to the support of these groups, it becomes almost obligatory to reward them for their support by diverting oil revenue, thus alienating other tribal and religious elements of the population. Rent seeking – be it by tribal and religious interest groups or corrupt politicians – forms the main activity of the state.17 This preoccupation with rent seeking, as opposed to providing public goods, helps explain Nigeria’s turbulent political history and disappointing governmental performance. Oil revenues either flow into the pockets of corrupt politicians and public officials or are dissipated in wasteful public expenditures. In a federalist democracy, citizens at all levels of government need to take an active part in deciding what goods and services are provided or in choosing representatives who make those decisions. In addition, citizens have to possess the capability to make intelligent choices. Switzerland has 16 17
See Blankart (2000). See again, Economist, April 28, 2007. This article also gives an example of one Nigerian state, Cross Rivers, where its governor – without any oil revenue – has done an effective job of providing goods and services to its citizens. Federalism could work even in Nigeria with the right political leadership.
12
Liberal Democracy
a highly educated population with much experience with the democratic process. More than 42 percent of Nigeria’s population is less than age 15, and 30 percent of those ages 15 and older cannot read and write. Thus, in a developing country like Nigeria, many citizens are likely to be incapable of making intelligent collective decisions. Switzerland is a prime example of a modern, progressive society. Its population is not only highly literate, but has also been exposed to and largely accepted the ideas of the Enlightenment. These concepts include a commitment to scientific progress; a respect for the rights of individuals to engage in market exchange; to exercise free speech, freedom of assembly, and the other basic freedoms associated with Enlightenment thinking. Nigeria, in contrast, is a prime example of a traditional society. Tribal loyalties remain strong, and many Nigerians still adhere to tribal customs and traditions and hold superstitious beliefs. Belonging to one of the universal religions (Islam and Christianity) becomes another source of identity for engaging in rent seeking and civil strife. Like almost all traditional societies, Nigeria is caught in a Malthusian trap in which increases in income from oil revenues or other sources are dissipated because of population growth. Instead of income per capita growing, the population grows and much of the population remains in poverty. The contrast and conflict between progressivism and traditionalism is one theme of this book. Becoming one of the rich, democratic countries of the world requires the abandonment of traditional modes of thought and institutions for those of modern societies. Although it is sometimes helpful to classify countries as either modern or traditional, all progressive countries contain traditional elements that seek to undermine the ideas and institutions of the modern, liberal democratic state. The same is true of traditional societies, which contain some people who would like to see their countries discard those traditional elements that prevent them from entering the modern world and escaping poverty. Switzerland and Nigeria were chosen as examples of modern and traditional states, but many other countries could have been chosen. Switzerland is rather extreme in its use of direct democracy, but other rich countries are also committed to the principles of the modern, progressive state. These include investing in scientific and technological progress, educating their populations, and protecting democratic freedoms and political institutions. Kenya is another example of a traditional society with great, unrealized potential for economic growth. It has access to the sea, natural resources, and some of the most spectacular wildlife preserves in Africa. However, it, like Nigeria, has let its population grow at a rate that negates whatever
III. What is Liberal Democracy?
13
economic progress it makes (population in 1900, 1 million; 1963, 8 million; 2007, 35 million). Kenya’s politics, like that of Nigeria, have been plagued by tribal rivalries. When Kenyans vote, they do not choose the candidates who would be best for Kenya, but rather they vote along tribal lines. Whichever tribe wins the presidency prospers through graft and corruption at the expense of the losers. This aspect of Kenyan politics was vividly illustrated following the December 27, 2007, presidential election. Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, had been widely expected to lose to Raila Odinga, whose main support comes from the Luo and Kalenjin. Kibaki claimed to have won the election; Odinga challenged this claim. Anticipating serious consequences for themselves, the supporters of each turned upon one another, which led to hundreds of deaths and thousands of displaced persons. Although Kenya has been more of a dictatorship than a democracy since its independence in 1963, this election result illustrates that the absence of an educated electorate, which understands that democracy only works when it benefits all citizens, makes it unlikely that the country would achieve much better outcomes with less corrupt and authoritarian leaders.18 Similar examples exist in other parts of the world (Sri Lanka, Nicaragua) as well.
III. What is Liberal Democracy? Democracy is a political system in which a nontrivial portion of a community participates in a process that determines what the government does. Their participation may directly determine the collective choices of the community, as in ancient Athens or some modern-day Swiss Gemeinden, or indirectly through the election of representatives. The key criterion is that there is a link between what the citizens want and what they get from the state. In a liberal democracy, citizens not only participate in a democratic process, but they also enjoy great freedom to think and do as they please. This freedom is protected by a set of constitutional rights enforced by the judiciary. Thus, liberal democracy requires two sets of institutions: voting rules and electoral laws that enable the state to provide goods and services that benefit the citizens, and constitutional rights and a judiciary that protect certain individual freedoms from the state. Democracy and liberalism can both be defined over a continuum. It is obvious that eighteenth-century tsarist Russia was not a democracy, and fifth-century BCE Athens was, but between these two extremes there exists a 18
See discussion in Economist, June 9, 2007.
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Liberal Democracy
vast array of institutional structures that are more or less responsive to citizen preferences and good at satisfying their wants. Russia today is less democratic than Switzerland, but more democratic than it was in the eighteenth century. Americans enjoy greater free speech rights than Germans, although both countries fall into the category of liberal democracies. My definition of democracy requires that a portion of the community participate in the political process, but that leaves open how large that portion must be other than excluding rule by a single person or a handful of persons. It is customary today when defining democracy to impose the criterion that a large fraction – ideally all – of the adult population in a community have the right to vote.19 Using this criterion, some scholars reject the idea that Ancient Athens was a democracy, because it contained large numbers of foreign-born adults who were not citizens and therefore not eligible to participate in politics. Women and slaves were also excluded.20 Slavery existed in most parts of the world well into the nineteenth century, however, and in some parts into the twentieth century. Although it seems obvious today that slavery was an objectionable institution, it was not so obvious to people in the past. Even a rather intelligent and not morally depraved person like Aristotle could believe that some people were destined to be slaves by their very nature. St. Augustine thought that it was God’s punishment for sin. If democracy requires the absence of slavery and universal suffrage of both men and women, then democracy did not exist anywhere prior to the twentieth century. Certainly it did not exist in the United States at its founding, because slavery existed in the South and women could not vote anywhere. Using full universal suffrage as a criterion for democracy transforms George Washington from being the first elected president of one of the world’s first democratic republics into just another retired general at the head of an oligarchy. I find this definition far too narrow, and prefer to think of suffrage as one aspect of democracy, but not a defining criterion. Indeed, an important issue facing a democratic community is how to define citizenship so that its democratic institutions produce desirable outcomes. Thus, the focus of this book is not solely on the nature of political institutions in a liberal democracy but also on the characteristics of the participants in the political process. How well a set of democratic institutions does in producing outcomes that match the preferences of the community and advance their welfare depends on the nature of these preferences and how they are expressed. Emphasis on the quality of citizens is not new to discussions of democracy, although it has largely fallen out of vogue recently. 19 20
Dahl (1998, pp. 37–8) and Tilly (2007, pp. 7–11). Tilly (2007, pp. 26–9).
IV. Citizenship and Liberal Democracy
15
It is sufficiently important to the arguments of this book that we briefly discuss the issue in the next section, and devote a chapter to it later.
IV. Citizenship and Liberal Democracy The salient physical characteristic separating humans from other animals is the size of their brains. The salient behavioral characteristic separating humans from other animals is our capacity for reasoning. Human evolution consists of the continual development of this capacity. This development was greatly advanced by the invention of language and later of writing. Throughout much of human history following the invention of writing, the ability to read and write was confined to small minorities – elites who typically governed in a more or less authoritarian manner. Democracy – rule by the citizens – only became possible when the capability to read, write, and reason became widespread in the community. In the fields of political science and public choice, it is often assumed that citizens are rational actors when modeling political institutions. What is less often stressed is that a normative justification for democratic political institutions requires that citizens act rationally and responsibly when carrying out their civic duties. The Ancient Greeks exposed the great potential of the human mind most vividly. The accomplishments of a small band of thinkers to the fields of philosophy, science, mathematics, medicine, drama, and art are nothing short of astonishing. And, of course, they gave the world the first set of effective democratic institutions. The simultaneous appearance of a passion for logical thinking and democracy in a society was no accident. If the Athenians had been incapable of governing themselves in a way that benefited the entire community, Athenian democracy could not have survived as long as it did. Important to the success of Athenian democracy were the existence of a shared identity and a shared set of goals. In the absence of such common interests, democracy (or any other form of government for that matter) cannot advance the interests of the entire community. The success of the Athenian democracy was also because of – to use Aristotle’s language – a virtuous citizenry. The Athenian citizen needed to commit himself to fulfilling the responsibilities of citizenship – participation in the Assembly, holding office when called upon, going to war when necessary. For Aristotle, the virtues of “the good citizen [were to] know how to govern like a freeman, and how to obey like a freeman.”21 21
Aristotle, Politics, Book III, Sec. 4; McKeon (1941, p. 1182).
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Tocqueville also recognized the importance of citizen virtue for the success of the American experiment in democracy. He claimed that: American moralists do not profess that men ought to sacrifice themselves for their fellow creatures because it is noble to make such sacrifices, but they boldly aver that such sacrifices are as necessary to him who imposes them upon himself as to him for whose sake they are made . . . They therefore do not deny that every man may follow his own interest, but they endeavor to prove that it is the interest of every man to be virtuous. (de Tocqueville, [1840]1945, pp. 129–30, emphasis in the original)
Elsewhere, when describing public spirit in the United States, de Tocqueville first describes a “kind of patriotism” that takes the form of an “instinctive passion.” He then goes on to discuss: . . . another species of attachment to country which is more rational than the one I have been describing. It is perhaps less generous and less ardent, but it is more fruitful and more lasting: it springs from knowledge; it is nurtured by the laws; it grows by the exercise of civil rights; and, in the end, it is confounded with the personal interests of the citizen. A man comprehends the influence which the wellbeing of his country has upon his own; he is aware that the laws permit him to contribute to that prosperity, and he labors to promote it, first because it benefits him, and secondly because it is in part his own work.22
Thus, de Tocqueville saw the success of America’s early experiment with democracy resting in part on a sense of public spirit among its citizens that led them to realize that their personal prosperity was tied to that of their community. When they as citizens acted to promote the welfare of the community, they also promoted their own welfare. A similar sense of public spirit was essential to the success of Athenian democracy, and the Venetian Republic as discussed later. It has also been an important contributor to the success of democracy in Switzerland. An educated and intelligent electorate with common interests, a shared identity, and a commitment to the community have all been elements in successful democracies. When these elements are missing, democracy has generally been unsuccessful. Tribal and religious differences in Nigeria and Kenya have precluded the development of a sense of identity to the country, a common set of interests, and a willingness among the citizenry to see these common interests advanced. The consequence has been a history of rent seeking and internal strife. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, it would have seemed that the Iraqi people shared an interest in bringing peace and prosperity to their country and an interest in sharing the country’s enormous oil wealth for the good of 22
Tocqueville ([1835]1945, p. 251). See also de Tocqueville ([1840]1945, pp. 150–1).
V. Threats to Liberal Democracy
17
all. Sensing these common interests, the Iraqis would have voted for the most capable and honest leaders who would introduce the policies necessary for achieving these common goals. However, the Iraqi peoples did not vote this way. Instead, they voted along ethnic and religious lines, and rent seeking and internal strife have been the fate of this country ever since. Although the United States partly is to blame for the violence following Hussein’s deposing, the makeup of the elected government would have led to factional conflicts without the United States’ help. Voting along religious lines has also contributed to the violent history of Lebanon’s democracy, despite its having a reasonably well-educated and religiously tolerant population. Conventional wisdom claims that full-fledged democracy requires universal suffrage. Denying people the privilege of voting because they are uninformed about public issues or illiterate is regarded as undemocratic. However, people who are uninformed about political issues or illiterate are more vulnerable to believing the outlandish promises of populist politicians. The combination of high illiteracy rates and extreme income differences in Latin America helps to explain the periodic elections of demagogues like Juan Peron and Hugo Chavez. It also helps explain why democracy has been less stable in Latin America than in Canada or Australia, for example, over the last fifty years, and why democracy has been less successful in advancing the collective interests of Latin Americans when it has existed. One of the issues that has troubled observers of politics from Plato and Aristotle to William Galston (1991) and Eamonn Callan (1997) is the extent to which democracy must be tempered with aristocracy for it to function properly. In this context, aristocracy can be thought of in two senses: (1) the citizen body elects a political elite (an elite with more expertise and intelligence than the body of citizens) to govern for them, or (2) that only an elite subset of the citizens (those with more education or loyalty to the state, for example) forms the electorate. Most democracies today are of the first type. We shall argue that there are advantages to having the second form of democratic aristocracy in some cases.
V. Threats to Liberal Democracy A. Threats to Liberalism I use the term liberalism in the sense that John Stuart Mill ([1859]1939) used it – the liberty to do, think, and say what one wants so long as the exercise of such a liberty does not cause undue harm to others. The latter qualification is necessary to distinguish actions that cause significant harm – like
18
Liberal Democracy
running over someone with an automobile – from those that cause modest harm, such as brushing against someone as one exits a bus. Until recently, most restrictions on liberty have been justified in cases in which the harm to others from an action was physical. Free speech can be curtailed if it incites others to riot, or even to a panicked exit from a crowded theater. More recently, however, basic freedoms have come under attack when their exercise is perceived to cause psychological harm. Someone contemplates the suffering of a cow when it is slaughtered, and demands that the practice be stopped. A comedian tells an ethnic joke and is sued by members of the ethnic group who claim grave psychological pain upon hearing the joke. Although it is fairly easy to determine whether or not someone has been physically harmed, psychological suffering is difficult to measure. The increasing tendency to invoke psychological harms to curb the exercise of traditional freedoms constitutes one of the greatest threats to liberalism today. These threats come from all corners of society, from intellectuals on the left to religious fanatics on the right. A remarkable example of the former was the pressure exerted by the Harvard faculty to remove the president of the university a few years ago, because he had dared to speculate that the under-representation of women in the natural sciences might be caused by genetically determined differences in brain structures between men and women. An equally remarkable example of an attack on liberalism – this time coming from the Religious Right – was the widespread rioting that occurred following the publication of cartoons featuring the Prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper. Both the Harvard professors who voted to oust their president and the Muslims who rioted and killed in anger over the cartoons agreed that there are some questions that cannot be posed and things that cannot be said simply because others find them upsetting. The rise of liberalism in the nineteenth century built on Enlightenment thinking of the eighteenth century, which was stimulated by the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century. The Scientific Revolution was driven by the willingness of people like Galileo and Newton to question the conventional wisdom of their day. During the Enlightenment every dogma and institution could be questioned, from the divine right of kings to the authority of the Church. Even God’s existence was questioned. Many people were offended by the impertinence of Enlightenment thinkers to question the authority of the state and Church, to challenge the institution of slavery, and to advocate equal rights for women. Yet it was through these questions and challenges that our liberal democratic institutions arose. Once we
V. Threats to Liberal Democracy
19
begin to forbid the asking of certain questions and other acts of free speech because they offend some groups, we risk repudiating the very principles on which a liberal democracy must rest.
B. Threats to Democracy Tocqueville placed great importance on the role that New England town meetings played in America’s democratic system, and how participation in these meetings developed the knowledge and virtue needed for good citizenship. . . . municipal institutions constitute the strength of free nations. Town meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they bring it within the people’s reach, they teach men how to use and how to enjoy it. A nation may establish a free government, but without municipal institutions it cannot have the spirit of liberty. (de Tocqueville, [1835]1945, p. 63)
During the nineteenth century, most of the state’s activity that was important to Americans was decided at the local level. Even as late as 1929, total federal expenditures accounted for only 3 percent of national income, and barely 40 percent of state and local expenditures. Today, the relative sizes of the federal and state and local sectors are reversed.23 This shifting of economic activity from state and local levels to the federal level has reduced the ability of citizens to control their government. Moreover, it has shifted the work of government from the most trusted level – the local level – to the least trusted level.24 With the notable exception of Switzerland, things are worse in Europe. Here local governments typically have little taxation and expenditure authority. Although former House Majority Leader Tip O’Neill’s remark that “all politics is local” was an exaggeration, it certainly applies more to the United States than to most European countries. In Europe, it is more accurate to say that “all politics is national,” and increasingly multinational as the European Union (EU) takes on more responsibilities from its members. The result is a so-called democratic deficit at both the EU and the member states’ levels. The danger of this happening was recognized by the perceptive de Tocqueville. Although he saw the basic equality of the early colonists in America 23 24
See Economic Report of the President, 1985, tables B-1 and B-82, and 2007 table B-82. See Matsusaka (2004, ch. 6).
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Liberal Democracy
as an important contributor to the development of democracy,25 he also believed: . . . that it is easier to establish an absolute and despotic government among a people in which the conditions of society are equal than among any other; and I think that if such a government were once established among such a people, it not only would oppress men, but would eventually strip each of them of several of the highest qualities of humanity. Despotism, therefore, appears to me peculiarly to be dreaded in democratic times. I should have loved freedom, I believe, at all times, but in the time in which we live I am ready to worship it. (de Tocqueville, [1840]1945, p. 340)
It is worth quoting de Tocqueville’s description and analysis of democratic despotism at length. The first thing that strikes the observation is an innumerable multitude of men, all equal and alike, incessantly endeavoring to procure the petty and paltry pleasures with which they glut their lives. Each of them, living apart, is as a stranger to the fate of all the rest; his children and his private friends constitute to him the whole of mankind. As for the rest of his fellow citizens, he is close to them, but does not see them; he touches them, but he does not feel them; he exists only in himself and for himself alone; and if his kindred still remain to him, he may be said at any rate to have lost his country. Above this race of men stands an immense and tutelary power, which takes upon itself alone to secure their gratifications and to watch over their fate. That power is absolute, minute, regular, provident, and mild. It would be like the authority of a parent if, like that authority, its object was to prepare men for manhood; but it seeks, on the contrary, to keep them in perpetual childhood: it is well content that the people should rejoice, provided they think of nothing but rejoicing. For their happiness such a government willingly labors, but it chooses to be the sole agent and the only arbiter of that happiness; it provides for their security, foresees and supplies their necessities, facilitates their pleasures, manages their principal concerns, directs their industry, regulates the descent of property, and subdivides their inheritances: what remains, but to spare them all the care of thinking and all the trouble of living? Thus it every day renders the exercise of the free agency of man less useful and less frequent; it circumscribes the will within a narrower range and gradually robs a man of all the uses of himself. The principle of equality has prepared men for these things; it has predisposed men to endure them and often to look on them as benefits. After having thus successively taken each member of the community in its powerful grasp and fashioned him at will, the supreme power then extends its arm over the whole community. It covers the surface of society with a network of small complicated rules, minute and uniform, through which the most original minds and the most energetic characters cannot penetrate, to rise above the crowd. The will of man is not shattered, but softened, bent, and guided; men are seldom forced by it to act, but they are constantly restrained from acting. Such a power does not destroy, but it 25
Tocqueville ([1835]1945, vol. 1, pp. 48–56).
V. Threats to Liberal Democracy
21
prevents existence; it does not tyrannize, but it compresses, enervates, extinguishes, and stupefies a people, till each nation is reduced to nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the shepherd. Our contemporaries are constantly excited by two conflicting passions: they want to be led, and they wish to remain free. As they cannot destroy either the one or the other of these contrary propensities, they strive to satisfy them both at once. They devise a sole, tutelary, and all-powerful form of government, but elected by the people. They combine the principle of centralization and that of popular sovereignty; this gives them a respite: they console themselves for being in tutelage by the reflection that they have chosen their own guardians. Every man allows himself to be put in leading-strings, because he sees that it is not a person or a class of persons, but the people at large who hold the end of his chain. By this system the people shake off their state of dependence just long enough to select their master and then relapse into it again. A great many persons at the present day are quite contented with this sort of compromise between administrative despotism and the sovereignty of the people; and they think they have done enough for the protection of individual freedom when they have surrendered it to the power of the nation at large. (de Tocqueville, [1840]1945, pp. 336–8)
What European can disagree that his or her government treats him or her like a child when it comes to deciding whether to smoke, what to drink or eat, the content of television commercials, and in countless other ways? The extent to which democratic despotism exists in Europe was dramatically revealed by the chain of events surrounding the writing and adoption of a constitution for the European Union. The delegates to the drafting convention were selected by the political elites in each member state and in Brussels. Few citizens even knew the names of their delegates, and few followed the deliberations of the convention. The document the convention produced ran to an unwieldy 350 pages and obviously was not intended to be something that the average EU citizen would ever read, let alone understand and identify with. Despite the fact that citizens had little if any input into its drafting, most member-state governments also decided not to involve their citizens in the constitution’s ratification. In de Tocqueville’s words, they chose “to spare them all the care of thinking” about the constitution. However, the political leaders of France and the Netherlands made the mistake of asking their citizens to ratify the constitution. When they refused to do so, the EU’s political elite was temporarily put into a self-defined crisis. The EU locomotive was in danger of derailment. EU leaders had essentially three options: (1) scrap the constitution and forge ahead with the existing rules from previous treaties, (2) undertake a major redrafting of the constitution and create a much shorter and easier-to-understand document that would be approved by EU citizens, or (3) make modest alterations to the constitution, rename it a
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treaty, and adopt it without placing it before EU citizens. Naturally, EU leaders chose the third option. Ironically, one of the draft constitution’s major weaknesses – its length and complexity – now became a virtue. As Giuliano Amato, a vice-chairman of the constitutional convention, put it, “Look, you see, it’s absolutely unreadable, it’s a typical Brussels treaty, nothing new, no need for a referendum.”26 One can be sure that the EU’s political elite will never again ask its children citizens to think about something as important as a constitution for the European Union. The European Union is an extreme form of the democratic despotism that de Tocqueville feared. “The network of small complicated rules, minute and uniform” flowing out of Brussels is woven by a body of unelected commissioners. The most powerful voting body in the EU is the Council in which member states are represented. However, the election of its delegates is based on their positions and records on national issues, not on the basis of policy proposals at the EU level. Few EU policy issues ever figure in national elections; no EU policy issue has ever been the subject of simultaneous political debate across the whole EU. The ratification of the constitution was a golden opportunity to hold such a debate, but most member-state governments chose not to take such a risk. Despite the constitutional convention having been convened with the intent of closing “the democratic deficit” in the EU, the procedure by which it was written, its rejection by citizens of two founding member countries, and the subsequent sleight of hand to implement the constitution/treaty without the approval of EU citizens has produced an even wider and more apparent democratic deficit than ever before.27 When citizens do not exercise their civic obligations responsibly, democratic despotism may slide into undemocratic despotism. Here again, de Tocqueville exhibited an almost uncanny ability to predict the future. There is indeed, a most dangerous passage in the history of a democratic people. When the taste for physical gratifications among them has grown more rapidly than their education and their experience of free institutions, the time will come when men are carried away and lose all self-restraint at the sight of the new possessions they are about to obtain. . . . As the citizens who labor do not care to attend to public affairs, and as the class which might devote its leisure to these duties has ceased to exist, the place of the government is, as it were, unfilled. If at that critical moment some able and ambitious man grasps the supreme power, he will find the road to every kind of usurpation open before him. If he attends for some time only to the material prosperity of the country, 26 27
Economist, August 11, 2007. Ireland has rejected the treaty in a referendum, so it still might not take effect, although many politicians from other countries would prefer having the treaty and kicking Ireland out of the European Union to not having it.
VI. A Clash Between What and What?
23
no more will be demanded of him. Above all, he must ensure public tranquillity: men who are possessed by the passion for physical gratification generally find out that the turmoil of freedom disturbs their welfare before they discover how freedom itself serves to promote it. If the slightest rumor of public commotion intrudes into the petty pleasures of private life, they are aroused and alarmed by it. The fear of anarchy perpetually haunts them, and they are always ready to fling away their freedom at the first disturbance. (de Tocqueville, [1840]1945, pp. 336–8)
This passage recollects Germany in the early 1930s, where citizens watched their constitution be violated and democracy destroyed, but accepted these developments in exchange for improving economic conditions. It makes one think of Putin in Russia and Chavez in Venezuela, who both remained immensely popular despite their attacks on democracy, because of the relative economic stability and prosperity that rising energy prices brought to their countries. In addition, it also brings to mind that “ambitious man,” George W. Bush, who seized the “critical moment” following September 11, 2001, to greatly expand the powers of the presidency and limit the freedoms of U.S. citizens, but did not pay a political price, because a majority of Americans thought that they were trading their freedoms for security against terrorism. Democracy means rule by the people, and the quality of a democracy depends on the quality of its citizens – their knowledge of public issues, their willingness to participate actively in the political process and, if need be, to risk their lives and freedom to defend its institutions. Occasionally casting ballots is not enough.
VI. A Clash Between What and What? Several recent books have themes related to this book. Perhaps the most influential, and certainly the most discussed, is Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations (1996). Huntington sees conflict between Western countries with their liberal democratic institutions and scientific orientation and several competing and often hostile civilizations – Orthodox Christian, Latin American, traditionalist (Sub-Saharan Africa), Hindu, Sinic (countries with large Chinese populations like Taiwan and Singapore, or those influenced by its culture like Korea and Vietnam), Japan, and Buddhist countries. The greatest threat to Western countries and civilization is perceived to come from the Sinic culture, especially China with its rapid economic growth and growing political influence, and the Muslim countries. Anthony Pagden (2008) reduces the conflict to a struggle between the West and the East, a struggle dating back to Athens’ wars with the Persians. Pagden describes how the West was able to shed its superstitions and
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irrational beliefs and emerge as the highly science-oriented, liberal democracies that exist today, whereas countries in the East have failed to join the Scientific Revolution and continue to be despotisms in the mold of ancient Persia, entrapped by their superstitious beliefs. Although there is much in common between these two theses and the arguments in this book, I emphasize the clash between modernism or progressivism and traditionalism. This conflict is not only a cross-border battle between the United States, Europe, and a few more Western countries on one side, and China or Iran and their fellow Eastern despotisms on the other. The conflict is also taking place within both the West and the East. In virtually every country, modernists can be found who champion scientific progress and liberal, democratic values. Opposed to modernity are traditionalists whose beliefs and values are shaped by religion. In some countries, like the United States, the traditionalists are extremist Christians; in others, extremist Muslims, Hindus, Jews, or Buddhists. In many African countries, the traditionalists are a mixture of followers of local religions and customs, like voodooism, Christianity, and Islam. Thus, the clash between modernity and traditionalism is much more pervasive than some recent studies might lead one to believe, and thus more troubling. Although traditionalism can encompass many beliefs that are not religious, religion is typically a central component of any traditionalist society. Religion is thus an obstacle to progressivism and modernity. The rise of religious extremism in recent years has brought forth several books attacking religious thinking, most notably perhaps, Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion (2006), and Christopher Hitchens’ God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything (2007). These books focus on the nonscientific aspects of religion, and thus its opposition to modernity and progress in the form of scientific progress. While I too am critical of this aspect of religion, my focus is much more on how religion, in its extremist form, poses a threat to liberal democracy. Among the recent books dealing with religion, John Gray’s Black Mass (2007) is probably closest to this book in subject matter, but in many ways is its antithesis. Where I emphasize the importance of Enlightenment thinking in paving the way for liberal democracy in Europe, North America, and other former British colonies, Gray blames the Enlightenment for communism and Nazism.28 According to Gray, “the Enlightenment project [was to remake] society on an ideal model.”29 Liberal democracy in Gray’s hands 28 29
See especially Gray (2007, ch. 2). Gray (2007, p. 33).
VII. Plan of the Book
25
becomes a utopian dream propagated by Enlightenment thinkers. This misreads several important aspects of history. First, as discussed in Chapter 8, it is misleading to speak of an Enlightenment project because Enlightenment thinkers differed greatly in their ideas about reforms. Second, if European Enlightenment thinkers had a project at all, it was to enlighten European monarchs, not to introduce democracy. The most notable European advocate of democracy during the eighteenth century was Rousseau, but he opposed the Enlightenment and is better regarded as an early Romantic. It was American Enlightenment thinkers – Jefferson, Madison, Franklin, and so on – who forged the link between Enlightenment ideas and democracy. However, they were far from being utopians. Indeed, they were well aware of the human weaknesses upon which Gray places so much weight. The whole purpose of the famous checks-and-balance elements in the U.S. Constitution is to protect its democratic institutions from these human weaknesses. Switzerland is not utopia, but it is a nice place to live. However, it did not become a nice place by chance. The origins of its democratic institutions stretch back seven centuries to the communes in its mountain valleys. Its constitution dates back to the 1848 Revolution, and reflects Enlightenment thinking in both Europe and the United States. The success and durability of Swiss democracy owes much to its citizens’ commitment to the constitution and to the Enlightenment ideas it embodies. One of the points stressed in this book is that such citizen commitment is essential for liberal democracy to appear and survive. I agree with Gray that the West should not try to force liberal democracy on the rest of the world as the Bush administration attempted to do in the Middle East. Liberal democracy (indeed any form of democracy) may be impossible in Nigeria because of the ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity of its population. Theocracy may be better suited than liberal democracy to a highly religious country like Iran. China has achieved spectacular growth without democracy. What one can say is that far more people from around the world try to enter – sometimes at great peril – Switzerland, Sweden, the United States, and the other liberal democracies than are fleeing from them to Iran, China, and other countries, which are not liberal democracies. When people vote with their feet, they vote for liberal democracy. This is not a utopian dream, but a statement of fact.
VII. Plan of the Book This book is divided into four parts. Good democratic outcomes require citizens who are intelligent, well informed, and willing to sacrifice some time
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and effort to make democracy work. Given the importance of this condition, Chapter 2 discusses the extent to which humans can be regarded as reasoning beings, and delves into psychology and especially evolutionary psychology to answer this question. Although humans are not the superrational calculating machines that most economists and some other social scientists assume they are, they are capable of behaving rationally, as such behavior is commonly understood. Indeed, the development of the faculty of reasoning is the great, evolutionary achievement of mankind. The power of reasoning is most vividly displayed in the sciences, both natural and social. Human understanding of natural and social phenomena has expanded over time through the formulation and testing of hypotheses about causal relationships and through the application of scientific method to all forms of questions. Science provides one way to understand nature and the universe; religion provides another. Chapter 3 discusses the similarities and differences between science and religion as explanations for natural phenomena. It is these differences that lie at the heart of the distinction between progressivism and traditionalism. Today’s leading scientific theory may be discarded tomorrow, because new evidence contradicts it. New evidence can never contradict “the word of God” as it appears in a religion’s holy book. This distinction constitutes a fundamental difference between modern, progressive societies and traditional ones. Chapters 2 and 3 constitute Part One and form the building blocks for the rest of the book. The book emphasizes the link between human capability to reason and the appearance of both modernism and its political correlate liberal democracy. Part Two provides a selective overview of history from the first appearance of the state in Sumer (Chapter 4) to the first democratic state in Ancient Greece (Chapter 5) to the Caliphate in the Middle East (Chapter 6) and on to the Renaissance and Enlightenment (Chapters 7 and 8). Chapter 9 extends the narrative into the twentieth century. Democracy’s first appearance in Ancient Greece and its reappearance in the Renaissance and Enlightenment were not mere coincidences. Ancient Greece was arguably the world’s first modern state. It shared with the Renaissance a focus on improving and understanding life on this earth rather than focusing on an afterlife, and with the Enlightenment, a great trust and optimism about the human power of reasoning. Throughout history, traditional societies have typically been dictatorships; democracies have had important elements of modernity. Having explored where democracy came from and where it has flourished, we are ready to describe the characteristics of political institutions that are needed to obtain a well-functioning democracy. This is the task of Part Three. Chapter 10 discusses the characteristics of the democratic
VIII. A Caveat
27
institutions that are needed to ensure they serve the goal of advancing the welfare of the citizenry. Given the importance of the majority rule in all modern political systems, it is discussed at length. Chapter 11 defines constitutional rights, describes their characteristics, and discusses their role in a liberal democracy. It then contrasts this notion of constitutional rights with other rights concepts like natural, human, cosmopolitan, and moral rights. Good democracy requires good citizens – good in the sense of being intelligent enough to make wise decisions for the community and conscientious enough to gather sufficient information to make wise choices. No matter how well designed a country’s democratic institutions are, they will not yield desirable outcomes if citizens do not vote intelligently and responsibly. Chapter 12 explores the implication of this observation for the criteria defining citizenship and for the design of their education. Here we confront a tension between the idea that liberalism implies a freedom to educate one’s children as one pleases, and the relationship between the quality and type of education citizens have and the quality of the outcomes of the democratic process. A community that wants its democratic institutions to produce desirable outcomes cannot be indifferent to how its citizens are chosen and educated. The question of choosing a community’s members arises most prominently with regard to immigration policies, and thus these also warrant discussion in Chapter 12. Part Four returns to the issues raised in this chapter and discusses the challenges facing liberal democracy today. Why have so many countries not adopted it? Why has it often failed in developing countries? Why are so many people disenchanted with democracy in the rich, developed countries? Just as traditionalism is the opposite of progressivism, religion is the antithesis of science in a fundamental sense, and theocracy the antithesis of liberal democracy. More generally, a basic tension exists between religion in its more extreme forms and liberal democracy. This tension is described in Chapter 13. The final chapter summarizes the argument for why liberal democracy can fail and reviews the challenges facing it today. To meet these challenges, it argues that developed democracies should complete the Enlightenment’s program of reforms. Developing countries need to adopt it.
VIII. A Caveat I am neither a psychologist nor an historian. Nevertheless, I have placed the questions of progressivism, reasoning, and democracy in a historical
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Liberal Democracy
context, and thus delved into these enormous literatures. In doing so, I hope to have given accurate, if selective, accounts of what is known about each subject. I have quoted directly from my sources to a far greater extent than I usually do, to impress upon the reader that I am reporting the views about the Renaissance or Pope Pius XII of those who have devoted great amounts of time to each subject, and who, based on my limited knowledge of the topic, seem to have the weight of evidence on their side. Some topics – like the pope’s behavior during World War II – are so controversial even today that I am sure that there will be those who violently disagree with me. All I can say in defense is that a reasonable case can be made for the interpretations I present throughout this book.
PART I
FUNDAMENTALS: EVOLUTION, PSYCHOLOGY, REASONING, AND RELIGION
TWO
Evolution, Psychology, and Reason
. . . it is the understanding that sets man above the rest of sensible beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion which he has over them . . . (John Locke)1 How so many absurd rules of conduct, as well as so many absurd religious beliefs, have originated, we do not know; nor how it is that they have become, in all quarters of the world, so deeply impressed on the minds of men; but it is worthy of remark that a belief constantly inculcated during the early years of life, while the brain is impressionable, appears to acquire almost the nature of an instinct; and the very essence of an instinct is that it is followed independently of reason. Charles Darwin2
This book traces the evolution of a human’s power to reason, and the link between this power and the potential for organizing societies as democracies. It is common today in economics and other branches of the social sciences to assume that individuals are rational actors. Like many assumptions made to simplify scientific modeling, the assumption of individual rationality is only partially accurate. Human psychology is far more complex than rational actor models presume. We begin, therefore, by examining human psychology.
I. Behavioral Psychology Perhaps the simplest of all models of human psychology is that of behavioral psychology or operant behaviorism.3 Operant behaviorism provides a theory of learning that is quite similar to the selfish gene account of natural 1 2 3
Locke (1690a, p. 244); emphasis in original. Darwin (1874, p. 122). Operant behaviorism is the term used to describe the branch of psychology launched by B. F. Skinner. See, Catania and Harnad (1988).
31
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selection. The theory of natural selection assumes that nature randomly distributes genes across individuals. Those genes that increase fitness and reproductive success are selected over those that do not. Operant behaviorism assumes that individuals randomly undertake actions. Actions followed by rewards increase in frequency; actions followed by punishments decline in frequency. In the one case, the environment selects for genes; in the other, for actions. Operant behaviorism takes the assumption of narrow self-interest, which underlies most of economics, to the extreme. Individuals are pure hedonists seeking rewards and avoiding pains. In this regard, behavioral psychology’s premises are quite compatible with those underlying not only rational actor models but also the philosophies of Hobbes and Bentham. Operant conditioning – rewarding certain actions and punishing others – has been used in laboratories to train rats to push levers, pigeons to peck buttons, and thousands of other animal tricks. The kind of behavior that can be conditioned is partly constrained by our genetic makeup. Pecking comes naturally to pigeons and chickens so they can be conditioned to peck a red button to get seeds or water, but they cannot be trained to push a lever like rats can. Operant conditioning is used in the home to get Rover to sit and fetch the ball, and to get Junior to eat his soup with a spoon and his peas with a fork. We are all creatures of habit committing many actions each day, like smiling and saying hello almost unconsciously to people we meet, because such actions have been rewarded in the past. Operant conditioning relies on a rather primitive cause-and-effect association that animals and people make, often unconsciously. Action A is followed by reward R, and the individual associates the action with the reward and repeats the action. When action A does cause reward R, this behavior is functional and thus accords with what we would expect a rational person to do. Thus, well-conditioned individuals might behave as if they were consciously choosing actions to maximize an objective or utility function, even when they were unconsciously making a conditioned response to stimuli. The well-conditioned consumer buys more of a good at a lower price, because she has been rewarded for such actions in the past. Rats in the laboratory behave as if they were maximizing a utility function that includes water. Rats, like humans, have negative sloped demand curves. The more effort that a rat must expend to obtain a sip of water, the less water it consumes (Staddon, 1983). Correlation does not always imply causation, however, and some actions are followed by rewards that they did not bring about. This possibility explains why some habits are not functional or even harmful. A football
I. Behavioral Psychology
33
player unconsciously dons mismatched socks on a day when he scores three goals, and from then on, he consciously chooses to wear mismatched socks. Millions of people consult the horoscope sections of their newspapers everyday to see what the stars have in store for them. On any given day, some will experience the good fortune forecast for them in the morning paper. They will “thank their lucky stars,” and the habit of reading their horoscope will be reinforced and sustained. The pleasure a smoker experiences while smoking a cigarette maintains a habit, which in the long run, is deleterious to the health. The possibility that nonfunctional or even dysfunctional behavior can be conditioned was dramatically revealed in experiments by B. F. Skinner (1948). Pigeons were randomly rewarded with food pellets preceded by a click. Thus, if the pigeon happened to have lifted its left wing when the click occurred, lifting its left wing was reinforced. If it happened to have its right leg raised, then standing on its left leg was reinforced. Skinner was able to induce bizarre behavior in the pigeons by administering random rewards. Thus, operant behaviorism offers a plausible account for much of animal and human behavior. It assumes animals are creatures of habit with habits being formed by past rewards and punishments. Sharon purchases Coca-Cola at the supermarket without weighing carefully its price and the expected satisfaction she will get from it against other cola brands. She has been rewarded for buying Coke in the past by experiencing greater satisfaction from the drink than the money she paid for it. Coke is “her brand,” and she buys it essentially by habit. One of the conundrums for rational-actor models is the prisoners’ dilemma (PD). An example of a PD game is presented in Matrix 2.1. Two farmers live next to one another. If each attends to his own cornfields, the optimal combination of work effort and income from corn sales yields utility payoffs to each of ten (box 1). If farmer R, the row player, devotes some of his time to stealing from farmer C, however, he can obtain more corn than by devoting the same time to his own field. His utility rises to thirteen, assuming farmer C continues to devote the same effort to his field. Farmer C’s utility payoff falls to six, however, because he loses some of his corn to R (box 2). If C steals and R does not steal, the utility payoffs are reversed (box 3). When they both steal, each experiences a utility payoff of only seven (box 4). Thus, both are worse off if they steal; nevertheless, stealing is the dominant strategy for both farmers – each experiences a higher utility payoff if he steals independently of the strategy choice of the other farmer (thirteen instead of ten, seven instead of six). Thus, the prisoners’ dilemma leads to the paradoxical outcome that independently rational behavior produces
34
Evolution, Psychology, and Reason Matrix 2.1. A prisoner’s dilemma game Farmer C Does not steal
Farmer R
Does not steal Steals
Steals
1 10
3 10
6
6
7
2 13
13 4 7
a collective outcome that is worse for both parties than another feasible outcome. One example of a PD game is voluntary contributions to provide a public good. All members of the community would benefit from a new bridge, but if one tried to finance it by relying on users voluntarily tossing money into baskets at each end, everyone has an incentive to drive by and toss in nothing. Numerous experiments have been conducted to see in fact whether people do not contribute – free ride – in one-shot PD games.4 Each participant is given, $10 say, to contribute to the provision of a hypothetical public good. At the end of the game, each player receives half of 150 percent of the total contribution plus what she did not contribute. Thus, if both participants contribute the full $10, each receives $15. On the other hand, if one player contributed $10 and the other nothing, the free rider would receive $17.50. Thus, both should contribute nothing if they are rationally maximizing their payoffs, yet experiment after experiment has shown that while some people do contribute nothing, others contribute the full $10, and still others contribute something in between.5 Such everyday actions as voting or buying stocks and insurance often also seem to violate basic predictions of rational actor models. Operant behaviorism can explain why many people cooperate in PD situations. If people have been rewarded for cooperative behavior in the past – by their parents, teachers, or peers – cooperating by not stealing when an opportunity presents itself (by voting or contributing to charities) may occur because people do not carefully weigh the benefits and costs of 4 5
When a PD game is repeated indefinitely, cooperation can become an individually optimal strategy if it induces the other player to cooperate. See, surveys of experimental literature by Davis and Holt (1993), Roth (1995), Ledyard (1995), Ostrom and Walker (1997), and Hoffman (1997).
III. Evolutionary Psychology
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such actions. They cooperate out of habit. The most successful way to induce an opposing player to cooperate in a repeated PD appears to be to adopt the “tit-for-tat” strategy – reward cooperation in one period by cooperating in the next; punish noncooperation in one period by not cooperating in the next (Axelrod, 1984). The tit-for-tat strategy might have been developed in one of B. F. Skinner’s laboratories.
II. Cognitive Psychology Operant behaviorism does not explain all actions. When one confronts a grizzly bear in the woods, turning and running is generally not a good strategy for staying alive. Indeed, there is no sure strategy for accomplishing this end, but standing one’s ground and staring down the bear is more likely to get it to walk away than turning and running. Yet how would the first person who confronted a grizzly have known to stand his ground rather than run? Many actions that individuals undertake appear not to be because of past rewards for similar actions, but because of a reasoning process in which the actor foresees the consequences of the action. An individual will learn not to hold her hand in a fire the first time she does so. Yet how does she know to run or move her camp when she sees smoke from a distant brush fire? She deduces that the smoke is caused by a large fire, that the wind is blowing the fire in her direction, and that she had better move if she wishes to escape the flames. Humans appear capable of far more complex cognitive processes than presumed under the operant behavioral model.
III. Evolutionary Psychology The most dramatic difference between humans and other animals – even other primates – is the large size of the human brain. “The brain is a biological organ just like the pancreas, the liver, or any other specialized organ,”6 and like these other organs, it has evolved to serve specific functions. Its main function is to process information that could be used to help humans survive during the Pleistocene.7 It owes its size to the fact that during its evolution, it has added one functional capacity to another – the ability to see and recognize depth of field, the ability to sense danger (approaching a precipice, a snake), the ability to recognize faces, the ability 6 7
Ramachandran (1990, p. 24). Tooby and Cosmides (1992, p. 66).
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to imitate and learn from others, and numerous others.8 Thus, both its size and the way in which it functions are the products of natural selection. The two psychological processes discussed previously take place in different parts of the brain and are related to different stages of the brain’s evolutionary development. The striatem, near the brain’s core, and the brainstem are early developments in the brain’s evolution, and their basic structure is common to other animals. These portions of the brain are responsible for the conditioned responses that characterize operant behaviorism. Deliberative thought and abstract reasoning, on the other hand, appear to take place in the prefrontal cortex, the outer portion of the brain that developed late in the evolution of Homo sapiens.9
A. Understanding Causality An extremely important cognitive development was the ability to understand complex causal relationships and to generalize about them. The advantages for survival from understanding causality are obvious. The first person who stuck a stick into a cactus and obtained water must have been quite surprised. Piercing cacti to obtain water would be positively reinforced, and beneficial for survival. Yet so too would the capacity to generalize and deduce that if cacti contain liquids, so too probably other plants and trees, and that some of these might also be tapped and put to good use. This capacity to generalize is common to all humans and exists even in very young children. Once we see that one cactus contains water, we infer that all cacti contain water. We assume that the insides of all pigeons look the same, even though we do not have a good idea of how they actually look.10 Of particular importance is our ability to generalize about the behavior of animals and other humans. Once we are told that an aardvark is an animal, we know that it is alive and has offspring, even though we may not know whether it has its offspring by laying eggs or through live births. Moreover, the fact that it is an animal tells us that it is an intentional being. It will search for food, avoid danger, and mate as other animals do. When we observe animals, we unconsciously infer what they are thinking and what their motivation is. When we see a lion running toward a gazelle, we infer that it is hungry, and that it intends to kill and eat the gazelle. When we see 8 9 10
See, Tooby and Cosmides (1992, p. 113) and Pinker (1997, pp. 183–4, 193–4). See, Cohen (2005, pp. 8–10), and Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec (2005, pp. 15–23), and references therein. This discussion draws on Boyer (2001).
III. Evolutionary Psychology
37
the gazelle run away from the lion, we infer that it knows the lion is coming after it, and that it is in grave danger. Similar processes of inference occur in our dealings with other people. To get along in a tribal community, early humans had to infer the intentions of their fellow tribesmen, and predict their reactions to different actions. Will X get angry if I borrow his ax without asking him? Will he attack me? Will he attack me if I sleep with his mate? Will she tell him if I sleep with her? To help us answer these questions, our brains have evolved processes for predicting the behavior of other humans. Perhaps most important of all, is our ability to recognize faces. It is easier to predict the behavior of someone if we recognize that we have had past dealings with this person and can recall her past behavior. Humans are also adept at reading faces. Human facial expressions for anger, sorrow, surprise, and other emotions are similar in all human groups. A European can identify these emotions when seeing pictures of facial expressions of Amazon tribe members, just as the tribe members can identify emotions when looking at pictures of Europeans.11 Another great aid in our reasoning process is our ability to have decoupled or separate thoughts. We can imagine being somewhere else at another time, other people being with us, and even imagine being someone else.12 The ability to have decoupled thoughts allows us to make plans. I can imagine what will happen if I go hunting tomorrow on the other side of the river, what will happen if X goes with me, what X will do if we meet a pride of lions, what I should do. Again this reasoning process is greatly aided by my intuitive knowledge of lions as animals and X as a human, and if I know X well, by my person-specific knowledge of him.
B. Inducing Cooperation Cooperation in hunting large animals or fighting other tribes would obviously have increased our ancestors’ chances for success and survival. Activities such as hunting and fishing take on the form of a prisoners’ dilemma; my chances of survival increase if my tribe defeats the neighboring tribe in battle. However, they are even higher if I can somehow avoid having to participate in the battle. Cooperation among tribe members was so important for survival during the Pleistocene that we have inherited genetic dispositions to several modes of behavior that strengthen cooperation. Sometimes, 11 12
Pinker (1997, pp. 365–6, 414–16). Boyer (2001, ch. 3).
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Evolution, Psychology, and Reason
however, they may seem “irrational.”13 Here are two of these so-called irrational characteristics: 1. A propensity to cooperate. One explanation for the seemingly irrational propensity for people to cooperate in one-shot PD games is that the two players perceive that they are in a social situation in which cooperation benefits the group, and that they have a genetically inherited propensity to cooperate in such situations. Repetition of the game can condition a player not to cooperate, but an individual’s first instinctive reaction is to cooperate.14 Voting is another action that is seemingly irrational from an individual point of view. Many people say they vote out of a sense of civic duty or because it is ethically the “right thing to do.”15 Thus, voting may also be partly engendered by our genetic makeup. 2. A disposition to punish cheaters. One way to ensure cooperation in a group is to punish defectors severely. Here again, humans seem to have a genetic disposition to detect and punish defectors and to punish those who do not punish defectors. People in a long line to get tickets or exit a highway feel an instant sense of rage when someone cuts ahead of them. During the gasoline crisis of the 1970s in the United States, there were long lines to get gas, and some line cutters were even shot and killed by irate drivers further back in the line. Unfortunately, not all of the mental processes that aid survival on the African savanna have positive value in a twenty-first-century, postindustrial society. If a pickpocket takes your wallet and you detect it, an instinctive reaction is irate rage. Many people will give chase to the pickpocket and risk their lives from a heart attack or a knife wound, even though the financial loss from the theft is rather modest. “It’s not the money, but the principle of the thing” is often heard. Having one’s pocket picked or apartment burgled sets off a violent reaction in most people. They feel personally violated, and often react violently – they often overreact. 13 14
15
See, Dawkins ([1976]1989), Axelrod (1984), Trivers (1985), Tooby and Cosmides (1992), Pinker (1997, pp. 502–6), and Boyer (2001). See, again references in footnote 3. Paul Rubin (2002, ch. 3) reviews the evidence on the genetic causes for cooperation. Field (2001) reviews the evidence that cooperation and other behaviors that favor group survival are selected for at the group level. See, discussion and references in Mueller (2003, ch. 14).
III. Evolutionary Psychology
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For people living on the edge of survival, theft can be very costly. The loss of a bit of food may be the difference between life and death. Violent reactions to theft, to free riding, and to other forms of noncooperative people might well deter such behavior and increase survival chances. Such instinctive and uncontrollable reactions are likely to be genetically triggered.16
C. Group Loyalty A willingness to fight, kill, and if need be die for one’s tribe would have increased the probabilities of the tribe’s success in battle with other tribes and of the survival of its members. Loyalty to one’s own tribe and animosity toward other tribes is also genetically determined in part.17 Of course, before one can defend fellow tribe members one must be able to recognize who they are. This would have been easy fifty thousand years ago, but is less so in our polyglot societies of today. Race is an obvious clue, as are language and religion, and history is replete with social conflicts and wars over race, language, and religion. Yet even more subtle differences can lead to strife. Dividing boys at a summer camp into two groups for the purpose of sports and other activities can lead to animosity and violent confrontations between those who were arbitrarily assigned red jerseys and those assigned blue. Even separating people by a coin flip can lead to strong loyalties among “the heads.”18 During the Pleistocene, our ancestors lived in constant danger of death from predators or attacks from other tribes. Today, most people in developed countries do not face such dangers. In times of war, however, those chosen to fight are in the same kind of life-and-death situation as their Pleistocene ancestors. During a war, it is common for one side to view the other as inferior or subhuman in some way, and to refer to them using pejorative names – “gooks,” “Japs,” “krauts.” Some soldiers commit horrible atrocities during wars. Indeed, the same soldiers who undertake heroic acts to save their buddies may commit horrendous acts against the enemy. On March 16, 1968, for example, American soldiers in My Lai, Vietnam, opened fire on unarmed villagers and killed hundreds of men, women, and children. Similar atrocities, although on a lesser scale, have been reported during the war in Iraq. On such occasions, the offending troops appear “to go berserk.” Such behavior is easier to understand (although not excuse) if one recognizes 16 17 18
See Trivers (1971, 1985) and Pinker (1997, pp. 404–5). Pinker (1997, ch. 7, esp. pp. 513–17). See discussion and references in Pinker (1997, pp. 513–17).
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Evolution, Psychology, and Reason
that these soldiers have probably subconsciously come to believe that the people they are killing are inferior or subhuman to them in some sense. Numerous examples exist of people living peacefully together for many years and then some event divides them into separate groups, and they begin to hate and attack one another. One such event was the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 along religious lines into India and Pakistan. Until then, Hindus and Muslims had lived relatively peacefully together on the Indian subcontinent. The partition was, in part, a response to the wishes of Muslims like the poet and philosopher Mohammad Iqbal. He feared that Islam would not survive on the subcontinent once India became an independent nation if Hindus and Muslims continued to live together. There were just too many Hindus relative to Muslims. The partition succeeded in preserving Islam, but not without considerable cost. The mass migrations needed to separate the two religious communities were accompanied by much violence and murder with estimates of lives lost ranging to two million. The partition produced new senses of identity, which now combined religion and nationalism, and fostered suspicion and animosity between Indians and Pakistanis. The countries have gone to war several times since the partition, and occasional acts of terrorism continue to cost many lives. Both countries are now nuclear powers and view one another with a mixture of fear and hatred.19 Roger Peterson (2002) presents a series of case studies of ethnic violence in Eastern Europe. One involves Jews and Lithuanians. After World War I, Lithuania broke away from Russia, and Jews and Lithuanians at first worked together to establish an independent Lithuania. Gradually, however, the Lithuanians asserted themselves and the Jews became a lower status minority. In 1940, the Russians occupied Lithuania. During the occupation, the Russians placed several Jews in positions in the local government, and the Jews rose in status in both their own eyes and those of the Lithuanians. When the Russians withdrew June 1941, Lithuania was thrown into a state of anarchy for several days until the Germans arrived and established order. During this period, the Lithuanians launched a pogrom (Yiddish for destruction) against the Jews, making them do demeaning tasks like cleanup manure with their bare hands and then beating them to death. Although Jews and Lithuanians had lived together peacefully since the nineteenth century, suddenly a surge of ethnic violence by Lithuanians against the Jews broke out. Peterson (2002, pp. 95–116) attributes this outbreak to the rise in Jews’ status during the Russian occupation, which was greatly resented by Lithuanians. When 19
See the interesting account in Khan (2007).
III. Evolutionary Psychology
41
the opportunity arose to reverse the situation, the Lithuanians seized it. Resentment aroused by changes in status of different ethnic groups appears to have been a key element in most of the cases Peterson examined. The drive for status also has genetic roots.20 When rapid changes in status are combined with group loyalties, the results can be explosive. Most students of politics are familiar with James Madison’s discussion of the evils of “factions” in Federalist 10. Madison’s analysis was preceded, however, by David Hume. As much as legislators and founders of states ought to be honoured and respected among men, as much ought the founders of sects and factions to be detested and hated; because the influence of faction is directly contrary to that of laws. Factions subvert government, render laws impotent, and beget the fiercest animosities among men of the same nation, who ought to give mutual assistance and protection to each other. And what should render the founders of parties more odious is, the difficulty of extirpating these weeds, when once they have taken root in any state. (Hume, 1742, Part I, Essay VIII, “Of Parties in General”)21
Hume goes on to say that Factions may be divided into PERSONAL and REAL; that is, into factions, founded on personal friendship or animosity among such as compose the contending parties, and into those founded on some real difference of sentiment or interest. (Hume, 1742, Part I, Essay VIII, “Of Parties in General”)22
As examples of factions based on personal differences, Hume cited “the remarkable dissension between two [Roman] tribes, the POLLIA and PAPIRIA, which continued for the space of near three hundred years (p. 57),” and “the civil wars which arose some few years ago in MOROCCO, between the blacks and whites, merely on account of their complexion . . . ” (p. 59, emphasis in original). Anticipating experiments conducted more than two hundred years later, Hume noted, When men are once enlisted on opposite sides, they contract an affection to the persons with whom they are united, and an animosity against their antagonists: And these passions they often transmit to their prosperity. (Hume, 1742, Part I, Essay VIII, “Of Parties in General”)23 20 21 22 23
Pinker (1997, pp. 493–502). See, http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com staticxt&staticfile=show.php% 3Ftitle=704&chapter=137476&layout=html. See, http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com staticxt&staticfile=show.php% 3Ftitle=704&chapter=137476&layout=html. See, http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com staticxt&staticfile=show.php% 3Ftitle=704&chapter=137476&layout=html.
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One of the themes emphasized in this book is the potential cost to democratic communities from heterogeneity that triggers feelings of group identity and fosters group animosities. In addition to psychological identification to a group, Hume listed the following passions to which humans are susceptible: “the intolerant adherence to abstract principle, inherited animosity, love of imitation, psychological infatuation with a leader . . . craving for approval, anger, envy, fear, grief, shame, depression, melancholy, and anxiety.”24 Virtually every item on this list is likely to be genetically driven in part.
D. A Sense of Fairness In the ultimatum game, player X is given $10, say, and can offer part of it to player Y. If Y accepts the offer, Y gets the amount that X offered, and X keeps the rest. If Y rejects the offer, both get nothing. Usually, the two players are separated and unknown to one another. Narrow self-interest should lead X to offer Y a token amount – say $1 – and Y to accept it, because $1 is better than nothing. Typically, however, Xs make more generous offers, and Ys routinely reject offers of less than $3 or $4. Why? Note that the explanation cannot be one of altruism, because Y might be richer than X for all that X knows. One possible explanation is that both players have a sense of fairness. X knows that he obtained the right to make the offer merely by chance, and this leads him to be more generous than is selfishly optimal. Y’s sense of fairness leads her to punish unfairness even though it costs her something. A sense of fairness is likely to have developed genetically. Tribal members engage in many forms of exchange. Each comes to expect something of roughly equal value in an exchange. If a tribe member shares his catch with another member on a day when the latter has not had success in hunting, the first tribe member expects to share the catch of the second when their situations are reversed. If the Webers invite the Schmidts to dinner, the Schmidts feel that they “owe” the Webers a dinner. If X buys you a lunch, you feel that you owe X a lunch. Buying X a lunch because he gave you a BMW will not be seen as fair by either you or X. Once again, reactions to being treated unfairly can often be quite violent. Our genetic heritage can thus be regarded as somewhat of a mixed bag. On the positive side, we have our evolved big brains and cognitive abilities. We are capable of reasoning in a manner that would justify the assumptions 24
I have taken this list from Holmes (1995, p. 55), who cites several of Hume’s works from which the list was drawn.
IV. The Evolution of Human Psychology
43
of rational actor models, and the accumulated miracles of science attest to the scope of these abilities. Furthermore, we could add our innate tendencies to cooperate and behave altruistically. However, our genetic baggage also has its darker, more problematic side. Our group loyalties, cravings for approval, love of imitation, and infatuation with leaders make us prone to racist and bigoted behaviour. It makes us willing to follow a leader who tells us that we are better than others and to march off into war to prove our superiority. As Stephen Holmes (1995) has stressed, much writing by philosophers and social scientists – not to mention novelists, playwrights, and poets – has been concerned with the problem of constraining the irrational, destructive, and even self- destructive emotions of individuals.25 The challenge humans face today is the same one that they have always faced – how to harness the creative powers of the brain to make our lives better, while avoiding the self-destructive impulses that we all share.
IV. The Evolution of Human Psychology This book stresses the importance of the evolution of human cognitive capabilities for the development of democratic institutions. It will be useful for the later discussions to review how these cognitive powers have evolved. Merlin Donald (1991) describes this evolutionary process at some length. He sees the evolution of “the modern mind” as going through four stages: episodic culture, mimetic culture, mythic culture, and theoretic culture.
A. Episodic Culture All primates, including humans, live in groups. To survive, they must learn when a particular action is likely to bring forth hostile responses by other members of the group and when it will bring forth friendly responses; which chimpanzees will reciprocate acts of grooming and which will not; what the male hierarchy is. Migratory groups would have to learn when certain trees would bear fruit and when water holes would be dry. Donald (1991, ch. 5) calls the capability to recognize and respond to these situational clues episodic culture. Both birds and mammals have these capabilities, and they are most highly developed in the great apes. The learning process that characterizes episodic culture is well-characterized by behavioral psychology. Animals respond to stimuli and learn 25
See, also, Hirschman (1977).
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which actions will be rewarded and which will be punished. The advantages of this kind of knowledge for survival are obvious. Some human behavior resembles that of the great apes and can be classified as part of the episodic culture. Characteristics that are useful for survival do not disappear as a species evolves; they are complemented by additional useful characteristics. Humans evolved beyond the stage of apes by acquiring greater cognitive powers.
B. Mimetic Culture Prior to the invention of language, humans appear to have communicated with one another by acting out their thoughts. Donald refers to this as mimetic skill. Mimetic skill or mimesis rests on the ability to produce conscious, self-initiated, representational acts that are intentional but not linguistic. These mimetic acts are defined primarily in terms of their representational function . . . mimesis is fundamentally different from imitation and mimicry in that it involves the invention of intentional representations. When there is an audience to interpret the action, mimesis also serves the purpose of communication. However, mimesis may simply represent the event to oneself, for the purpose of rehearsing and refining a skill . . . (Donald, 1991, pp. 168–9, emphasis in original)
Mimetic culture appears during the period in which Homo erectus lived, starting roughly 1.5 million years ago. Mimesis would have been used to coordinate actions in hunting and fighting with other groups; to teach making fires, huts, weapons, and tools; to teach how to fight and hunt; and in ritual dancing and game playing. Thus, by the end of the period in which Homo erectus lived, his communities would have many of the characteristics that we associate with human society except for an elaborately developed language. Felipe Fern´andez-Armesto (2004) argues forcefully that Homo sapiens cannot be separated from other primates like chimpanzees and the great apes, because they too make limited use of tools, engage in coordinated activities, and even make various sounds to communicate with one another. Although this is true, the cognitive achievements of Homo sapiens and the complexity of their social structures have far surpassed those of the other primates, making it legitimate to claim that the other primates alive today live largely within an episodic culture.
C. Mythic Culture Somewhere between one hundred thousand years and two hundred thousand years ago, modern humans – Homo sapiens – appeared. They
IV. The Evolution of Human Psychology
45
possessed several important evolutionary advantages over Homo erectus, the most important being a brain that was on average 20 percent larger, and a supralaryngeal vocal apparatus, which contained a soft palate and a highly flexible tongue. This vocal apparatus differentiated Homo sapiens from both Homo erectus and the Neanderthalers, who existed alongside Homo sapiens until their extinction around thirty-five thousand years ago. Both Homo erectus and the Neanderthalers must have possessed some capabilities for oral communication. Indeed, the selection process that resulted in Homo sapiens must have built on these capabilities. The Neanderthal brain was comparable in size or even slightly larger than that of Homo sapiens, but the shape and positioning of their larynx and other features of their vocal apparatus would have made oral communication much more limited than that of Homo sapiens. This may have been a contributing factor to their extinction.26 Once again, Fern´andez-Armesto (2004) underplays the importance of this difference between the Neanderthals and Homo sapiens. Speech gave humans a tremendous evolutionary advantage over their predecessor Homo erectus. Although Homo erectus had succeeded through the use of mimesis to engage in a great deal of coordinated social activities – hunting, gathering, tool making – speech made “humans . . . better and faster at everything: social coordination, tool manufacture, systemic war, finding and building shelter, gathering and hunting food.”27 The invention of speech was accompanied by many other cognitive developments. Simultaneously with the appearance of speech there appeared a whole constellation of thought skills that are associated with language and are, broadly speaking, linear, analytic, rule-governed, and segmented. Semiotic cultures also triggered completely new forms of information processing and storage: semantic memory, propositional memory, discourse comprehension, analytic thought, induction, and verification, among others. (Donald, 1991, p. 212)
The increasing complexity of social life and the difficulty of expressing complex thoughts through mimesis must have spurred the invention of language. Each word is a symbol for some thing, action, or attribute, and thus the invention of language also entailed the invention of many symbols. “The invention of a symbol requires a capacity for thought,” and their existence extends the boundaries for rational thought.28 The invention of language thus brought with it a great expansion in humans’ capacity to reason. 26 27 28
Lieberman (1975, 1984); Donald (1991, pp. 115–19, 204–8). Donald (1991, p. 210). Donald (1991, p. 219).
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As Mokyr (2002, p. 16) observes, “Curiosity [is] an essential human trait without which no historical theory of useful knowledge makes sense.” Of particular importance for the acquisition of knowledge is curiosity about causal relationships. Within the episodic culture, an understanding of causal relationships could have been acquired through the recognition of sequences of events. Act A is followed by reward R. The expansion of humans’ cognitive powers that accompanied the invention of language expanded their ability to recognize more complex causal relationships. It is natural to assume that every event has a cause. The fire cooks the meat; water extinguishes the fire. When obvious causes such as these are not available, more remote causes must be sought. It is in this way that myths and superstitions first arose in the early Homo sapiens who invented languages. Donald describes the role played by myths for the !Kung of Africa. As in most early religions, their god myths are closely tied to their idea of causality: gods cause pain and death, create life and the heavens, cause rain and thunder. The eland, identified with moon through the creation myth, was also important in the ceremonial celebration of a young girl’s first menstruation, since they knew of the correlation between the duration of the menstrual cycle and the lunar cycle. Their mythical thought, in our terms, might be regarded as a unified, collectively held system of explanatory and regulatory metaphors. The mind has expanded its reach beyond the episodic perception of events, beyond the mimetic reconstruction of episodes, to a comprehensive modeling of the entire human universe. Causal explanation, prediction, control – myth constitutes an attempt at all three, and every aspect of life is permeated by myth. (Donald, 1991, p. 214)
All known hunter-and-gatherer communities possess such myths, and all possess language. An important function of language in early Homo sapiens’ societies was to allow them “to construct conceptual models of the human universe.” Donald (1991, p. 215) claims that this use of language was initially more important than its role in creating new social technologies and organizational structures. So important is the role of myth in the cultures of the first talking humans that Donald names this stage in human development the mythic culture.
D. Theoretic Culture Although all human social groups developed language, only a comparatively few succeeded in inventing writing. Credit for writing’s invention is generally given to the Sumerians who appear to have used written symbols about ten thousand years ago.29 The earliest symbols recorded transactions – numbers 29
Donald (1991, p. 285).
V. Learning
47
of sheep traded, quantities of wheat and barley stored. Eventually, however, humans learned how to express words and ideas through writing and developed mathematical symbols, geometry, and maps. The advent of writing greatly expanded humans’ capacity to store data and information. Although its invention was not accompanied by any further expansion of the brain’s size, the use of visual symbols required changes in human cognition at least comparable to those accompanying the invention of language.30 Writing also allowed humans to extend the length of a chain of reasoning. When ideas can be written down, each can be examined individually. They can be modified or replaced, supplemented, and their order changed. Such manipulations without the aid of visual representations of ideas are severely limited by the mind’s capacity to retain and recall ideas. Thus, the invention of writing and other means of visual representation allowed humans to expand their ability to reason. Writing facilitated the construction of abstract models of natural phenomena and eventually the development of what we now call scientific method, which is why Donald names this phase in human evolution, the theoretic culture.
V. Learning David Hume emphasized the crucial importance of causal relationships in human understanding and devoted large portions of both An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and A Treatise of Human Nature to the topic. In the Treatise, we find the following discussion: I find in the first place, that whatever objects are consider’d as causes or effects, are contiguous and that nothing can operate in a time and place, which is ever so little remov’d from those of its existence . . . The second relation I shall observe as essential to causes and effects . . . t’is that of PRIORITY of time in the cause before the effect. (Hume, 1739, Book I, Part III, pp. 75–6)
Hume’s discussion of causality captures the commonsense way in which humans come to understand causality through everyday observations. A rabbit stops eating and runs away. What caused it to run away? Was it the sound made by your stepping on a stick lying on the ground? This action could not have caused the rabbit to run if you were two miles away from it. It could not have caused the rabbit to run if you stepped on the stick after it had already run away. Cultural anthropologists speak of abductive and deductive causal inference. With abductive causal inference, people learn by “putting forward 30
Donald (1991, ch. 8).
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conjectural assumptions that, if true, would account for the data observed.” Thus, abduction resembles scientific induction in the service of explanation. “The main purpose of abduction is to make surprising data unsurprising by positing an assumption, of which the data would be a normal consequence.”31 Deductive inference involves the abstract formulation of hypotheses about causal relationships through which a hypothesis becomes the end product of a logical chain of reasoning. As every good empirical researcher knows, correlation does not always imply causation. Determining when it does is often a difficult and sometimes impossible task. What is difficult for the modern social scientist with a doctorate from a leading university must have been extremely challenging for her ancestors fifty thousand years ago. A few members of a tribe happen across a berry bush that they have never seen before. One eats some of the berries, and dies that night. Surviving tribe members assume that the death was caused by the berries. A taboo against eating these berries arises and no member eats them again. If the bush’s berries are poisonous and the tribe member died from them, then the tribe has made a good inference. If the tribe had been incapable of making this causal inference and continued to eat the poisonous berries, presumably all of its members would have died and it would not constitute part of our ancestry. This example explains why human evolution has been accompanied by an expanded capacity for making correct causal inferences. However, the causal inference in this example may have been incorrect. Perhaps, the berries were harmless or even highly nutritious, and the person died of an unobserved bite from a poisonous spider. The tribe would forego the beneficial effects of the berries because of a false inference. Thus, we can expect that our early ancestors made both correct and false causal inferences, sometimes mistaking spatial and temporal proximity for causation. Taboos and customs evolved that were both functional – that is, based on a correct understanding of a causal relationship, which has beneficial effects for the community – and what I shall call afunctional – based on an incorrect inference about a causal relationship. The tribe commits or refrains from certain actions that have no beneficial or adverse effects on its welfare. It is also possible that mistakes regarding causal relationships are dysfunctional, as would be a taboo on eating the berries if they were nutritious. These examples lead us to expect that the mores, habits, and culture of a particular community will rest on a series of causal inferences about the 31
See, Boyer (1994, pp. 146–7).
VI. Conclusions
49
effects of certain actions. Some of these causal inferences will be correct. If so, the community will benefit from prohibiting a certain action or from requiring that it be performed. Other causal inferences will be incorrect but will have no harmful effects on the community other than people will be forbidden to do something that is harmless or required to do something that has no beneficial effects. Finally, there may persist certain habits, customs, and taboos that are positively harmful to the community. People are allowed or required to do things that injure their health or that of others or are prevented from doing things that would benefit them or the community. Scientific progress consists of rejecting false hypotheses and developing new, correct ones and of discarding false causal inferences and retaining correct ones. The adoption of deductive causal inference has greatly accelerated scientific progress. Cultural evolution proceeds in much the same way as science does. As a community learns, it discards its false causal inferences and adds to its stock of correct ones. The accumulation of knowledge of correct causal relationships increases the community’s health and welfare. Cultural evolution as defined here consists in precisely this expanding stock of knowledge concerning correct causal inferences about the environment. Scientific and cultural progress requires that the validity of a particular causal relationship be established. A tribe that bans the eating of a particular berry makes contact with another tribe that eats and enjoys the berry. This leads some members of the first tribe to question whether it was in fact the berry that originally caused the person’s death. One member of the tribe decides to eat some of the berries to test whether they are poisonous. She does not die, and more tribe members begin to question the taboo against the berries. With time and enough evidence, the taboo disappears. There are certain causal inferences that cannot be tested, however, and thus can never be verified or refuted. Mores and taboos that are based on these causal inferences are obviously going to be much more resistant to change.
VI. Conclusions The difficulty in developing complicated hypotheses about causal relationships without the aid of writing is so great that all societies without writing have remained at the mythical stage. These fall into the category of traditional societies. The difficulty in falsifying myths and taboos contributes to their longevity, and a society remains entrapped by the chance events of the past that led to its particular set of myths and taboos.
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Writing can thus be regarded as necessary for the development of a modern, progressive society. Without it no society can harness the human potential for reasoning and scientific discovery, and put them to use testing and falsifying erroneous beliefs about causality and developing new theories that are better able to explain natural and social phenomena. However, writing is certainly not a sufficient condition for modernity. Simply writing down myths and taboos, memorizing them, and blindly believing and following them is not going to liberate a society from the erroneous beliefs of its past. Some members of the society must be willing to defy the prevailing myths and taboos, dare to propose and test different hypotheses about nature and human behavior, and the rest of society must be sufficiently open to new ideas to recognize when its long-held beliefs have been falsified and discard them. In Chapter 4, we begin to examine the histories of different societies to see which have been able to take this important step. Before turning to this question, we shall examine the properties of religions, because they serve to institutionalize and legitimatize myths and taboos, and thus constitute the main obstacles to the modernization of societies.
THREE
Religion
I shall venture to add an observation, that the argument [that a Supreme Being exists] a priori has seldom been found very convincing, except to people of a metaphysical head, who have accustomed themselves to abstract reasoning, and who finding from Mathematica, that the understanding frequently leads to truth, through obscurity, and contrary to first appearances, have transferred the same habit of thinking to subjects, where it would not to have place. Other people, even of good sense and best inclined to religion, feel always some deficiency in such arguments, though they are not always perhaps able to explain distinctly where it lies. A certain proof, that men ever did, and ever will derive their religion from other sources than from this species of reasoning. (David Hume [1779]1939, p. 736) And they that make little, or no inquiry into the natural causes of things, yet from the fear that proceeds from the ignorance itself, of what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm, are inclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, several kinds of powers invisible; and to stand in awe of their own imaginations; and in time of distress to invoke them; as also in the time of an unexpected good success, to give them thanks; making the creatures of their own fancy, their gods. By which it hath come to pass, that from the innumerable variety of fancy, men have created in the world innumerable sorts of gods. And thus fear of things invisible, is the natural seed of that, which every one in himself calleth religion; and in them that worship, or fear that power otherwise than they do, superstition. (Thomas Hobbes [1651]1946, p. 69)
Every community past and present has had some sort of religion, and today one finds people practicing several different religions in most countries. In many states, religion is given special treatment in the form of freedom from taxation or tax breaks for contributors to religious institutions. In some countries, like Germany and Austria, the state assists in the collection of revenue for religious institutions from individuals who are employed. The opening lines of the Constitution of Greece proclaim Greece to be a 51
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Religion
Greek Orthodox state, and state religions of this type exist in numerous other countries. Such widespread popular and state support for religion suggests that it must provide positive benefits to communities that justify collective actions to support religious institutions. I claim the reverse. Although religion may make some individuals better citizens, it can also have the reverse effect. Moreover, it should be possible to create good citizens through a secular education without having to construct the elaborate and often implausible belief systems that characterize most religions. Before taking up this argument, we need to examine the origins and characteristics of religions.
I. Religion and Causality Two tribesmen are chasing an antelope across the plains of Africa. It is hot and they have been running a long time. Suddenly, one falls to the ground clutching his chest and complaining of pain. After a few minutes he is dead. What caused his death? There must be a cause. People do not simply fall over dead for no reason. The dead man had not eaten or drunk anything just before dying, there is no sign of a deadly snake or spider bite. The surviving hunter has seen men die in battle when a spear enters their chests. Because the dead hunter clutched his chest in pain, something must have entered his chest and caused both the pain and the man’s death. Yet what could have entered his chest? There is no cut, hole, or other sign of anything entering. Something invisible must have entered his chest – an evil spirit. Why did it choose to enter his chest and not that of the surviving hunter? Ah, the survivor donned a necklace that morning made of the horns of an antelope that he killed last week. The necklace protected him from the evil spirit. Our surviving hunter is well on his way to inventing a theory about spirits that kill hunters, and a protection against these evil spirits. This example illustrates how myths and superstitions can arise. Our minds are always seeking causal explanations for events. Had the hunter been bitten by a poisonous snake or attacked by a lion, the cause of his death would have been obvious. Lacking such a visible cause, the surviving hunter needed to invent an invisible cause. His first thought was of an evil spirit, but he could have hypothesized many other causes. For example, if his tribe hunted with poison arrows, the hunter might have hypothesized that a spirit shot an invisible poison arrow that penetrated his companion’s chest. If the surviving hunter had seen a blackbird watching them from a nearby tree, he might have hypothesized that the bird killed his companion with an evil look or perhaps by launching an invisible, internal organ that penetrated
I. Religion and Causality
53
the chest.1 The number of possible causes of death that the surviving hunter could imagine is large, and thus we might not expect any two hunters to hit on exactly the same cause. This superabundance of possible causes helps explain the many varieties of religious beliefs that exist. In some cases, the invisible spirits and gods take on a human form; in others, they are animals or birds. One thing we can say with considerable certainty, however, is that it is unlikely that the hunter would hypothesize that a nearby stone killed his companion. Stones are inanimate objects. They do not move, are not alive, and presumably do not think. Events like the death of a companion must be caused by some intentional being, like a human or some other type of animal, an intentional being that wanted to kill the hunter. Humans and animals are alive and act with intent. Someone – some invisible one – intended that the hunter die, and the surviving hunter must guess who or what this invisible someone was. This example also illustrates the importance of language in the propagation of religions. The two men would have been able to coordinate their actions in hunting during the mimetic period, and the same event could have taken place then. The surviving hunter might have suspected that something entered the other hunter’s chest and could have acted out what happened, but it would have been difficult to convey his hypothesis about the cause of death in the absence of language. With language, he could describe the suspicious looking blackbird that watched him and his hypothesis that the blackbird killed his companion. A myth about blackbirds being evil would be started. If some other misfortune were to occur in the presence of a blackbird, the myth would be reinforced. With enough such coincidences, a belief in the evil powers of blackbirds becomes part of this tribe’s religion. B. F. Skinner’s experiments with a pigeon, described in Chapter Two, were interpreted by him as accounting for how superstitions arise. Random rewards following meaningless actions reinforce these actions and lead to the belief that the actions cause the rewards. The idea that religion came about as a means for explaining causal relationships dates back at least to Thomas Hobbes. At the beginning of his chapter Of Religion, we find: And first, it is peculiar to the nature of man, to be inquisitive into the causes of events they see, some more, some less; but all men so much as to be curious in the search of the causes of their own good and evil fortune. 1
An African tribe called the Fang believes that some people possess an internal organ called an evur, which allows them to launch invisible attacks on other people (Boyer, 2001, pp. 66–7).
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Religion
Secondly, upon the sight of any thing that hath a beginning, to think also it had a cause, which determined the same begin, then when it did, rather sooner than later . . . man observeth how one event hath been produced by another; and remembereth in them antecedence and consequence; and when he cannot assure himself of the true causes of things (for the causes of good and evil fortune for the most part are invisible), he supposes causes of them, either such as his own fancy suggesteth; or trusteth the authority of other men, such as he thinks to be his friends, and wiser than himself. (Thomas Hobbes, [1651]1946, pp. 69–70)
Hobbes goes on to discuss how man invents gods and spirits to explain what he cannot explain, and then concludes: And in these four things, opinion of ghosts, ignorance of second causes, devotion towards what men fear, and taking things casual for prognostics, consisteth the natural seed of religion; which by reason of the different fancies, judgments, and passions of several men, hath grown up into ceremonies so different, that those which are used by one man, are for the most part ridiculous to another. (Thomas Hobbes, [1651]1946, p. 72, emphasis in the original; see opening quote as well)
II. Religion and Death The ritualization of death is an ancient human activity that predates the development of language.2 Losing someone dear is a traumatic emotional experience, and has been so for all people for as long as humans have existed. Our minds recognize other people as both living animals and beings, unique persons with specific personalities. When someone dies, we recognize that this person has stopped breathing, stopped living, and soon will decay like all other animals. Our instinctive aversion to pollution tells us that the body of the deceased must be disposed of before it begins to rot. At the same time, our mind finds it difficult to accept that the person whom we knew – with whom we talked, laughed, and cried – is no more. Our mind tells us that the spirit of the person must still exist. Thus, arises the notion of dualism – we possess both a body and a soul, and they are separate things. The body dies, but the soul lives on. Spirits of the dead are the most common form of supernatural agents across all cultures.3 In many communities, spirits of the dead are assumed to watch over the community and intervene in its daily activity. Religion then takes the form of ancestor worship. Prayers and sacrifices are offered to induce the ancestors to intervene on behalf of the community or for specific individuals. These 2 3
Boyer (2001, p. 203). Boyer (2001, p. 227).
III. Religion and Morality
55
prayers and sacrifices must always be performed in particular ways to be effective. Thus arises the need for intermediaries – shamans and priests – who are experts in performing the necessary rituals. Ghosts of the dead, angels, devils, and gods all share common characteristics. They are conscious, intentional agents; it is possible to make inferences about what they are thinking, their intentions, and what it takes to please or offend them. Unlike the intentional agents that we meet everyday, however, spirits and gods inevitably possess some supernatural properties – they are immortal, omniscient, invisible, can pass through brick walls, and so on. The combination of being both familiar agents and wondrous, otherworldly beings makes a vivid impression on the mind – a lasting impression.
III. Religion and Morality No one has recorded how our earliest ancestors developed the notions of gods and spirits. Did someone first hypothesize the existence of an invisible spirit to explain a perplexing event, and later the tribe hit upon the idea that these spirits were the ghosts of deceased tribe members? Or did the tribe first conceive of the notion that the souls of people lived on after their bodies died, and these living souls were the invisible causes of puzzling events? For our purposes, the answers to these questions are unimportant. Conceivably, spirits were invented for one reason in some tribes, and for another in other tribes. Once invented, however, spirits take on active roles in all tribal societies. They intervene in the daily lives of tribal members. Individuals believe that they see spirits occasionally, communicate with them, and do things that please or anger them. The challenge of surviving in the Pleistocene placed a premium on cooperative behavior. As in all communities, children learned from their parents and elders which actions were right and wrong. Guilt and pride appear to be part of our inherited emotional response kit.4 All people thus grow up believing that their elders know right from wrong, and that they punish or reward our actions accordingly. It is quite natural, therefore, to assume that our elders remain concerned about whether we are doing right or wrong after they die. Thus, we find in tribes that engage in ancestor worship that their spirits are preoccupied with the behavior of the tribe. Moreover, unlike living parents and elders, ancestor spirits see everything, and thus it is impossible to get away with an immoral act without being caught. In 4
Boyer (2001, ch. 5).
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this way, a link between religion and morality arises. Although spirits and ghosts were perhaps invented for other reasons – to account for inexplicable events, to help people cope with the trauma of the death of dear ones – once invented they take on the task of monitoring the living to ensure that they behave morally and in ways that benefit the community and not just themselves. People untrained in mathematics can nevertheless understand general principles of probability. They learn that lightning is more likely during summer than in winter and that rain is more likely in early winter than in summer. At the same time, however, the concept of pure chance is difficult to comprehend.5 Why did my daughter get struck by lightning during a summer storm and not a tree, or my neighbor’s son, or me? She must have done something wrong. But she is too young and innocent to have done something wrong. I must have done something wrong. The need for a causal explanation for every event, a lack of understanding of pure chance, and the belief that our ancestors watch our every move and punish us when we do wrong combine to produce a belief in direct links between actions on earth, the spirits’ and gods’ responses to these actions, and subsequent earthly events. Fear of punishment (hope for reward) leads people to behave morally, and to interpret good fortune as a reward for good deeds and misfortune as punishment for wrongdoing
IV. Religion as an Exchange Relationship Humans are endowed with intuitive notions of fairness. If you share your kill with me, then I know that I should share my kill with you next time. When we exchange a weapon for a tool, we know that the two objects should be of roughly equal value in terms of the time spent making them. Our tribal ancestors would have understood these notions of fairness well, and would also have known that you usually do not get something for nothing – there are no free lunches. It would be natural for them, therefore, to think that their spirit-ancestors would want something in exchange for doing them a favor – the performance of a prayer, a dance, or the sacrifice of a lamb. 5
Boyer (2001, pp. 195–6) challenges the idea that tribal societies do not understand the concept of chance: “Anthropologists know that people the world over are rather good at detecting statistical regularities in their environment.” He then goes on, however, to give examples indicating that individuals do not in fact understand pure chance. The African tribe Fang, for example, understands that people die of biological causes like tuberculosis, but still want to know why a particular person “was chosen” to die of this disease (Boyer, 2001, p. 196). Dennett (2006) observes that people have difficulty with the concept of pure chance.
IV. Religion as an Exchange Relationship
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All religions have this exchange-relationship characteristic. The community facing a drought prays for rain, the expectant father prays for a healthy baby and that his wife survives childbirth. The tribe sacrifices a goat for success in battle. The terminal cancer patient prays to be taken into Heaven. If the spirits and gods could not “deliver the goods,” there would not be much point in praying to them. In early human history, a pressing need in most societies was having enough to eat and drink. Humans craved food, and it was plausible to assume that their ancestors or gods did also. Sacrifices of food were common religious rituals. One supposes that the first sacrificial lambs were left to rot on the sacrificial alters. The people making the sacrifices would be sure to have observed, however, that the gods did not seem to eat the lambs. Because food was scarce, a pragmatic community would modify the ritual to avoid such waste. Thus, it was typical that only the head or the heart of an animal would be sacrificed, and the sacrificial lambs and grains would be eaten by the community as part of the religious ceremony.6 Meat was the primary source of protein in most societies, and meat was a favored object of sacrifice. Human sacrifices to win favors from the gods were also common. Children and prisoners of war were particularly popular. Neither is productive, and it is costly to feed them.7 Humans, like sheep and cattle, are a good source of protein and thus cannibalism was common, particularly where there was a shortage of large domesticated animals. The Aztecs provide an extreme example. They had no domesticated cows, sheep, or pigs. Their main sources of proteins were insects, small rodents, and a few breeds of fowl. The Aztecs craved protein and thus presumed that their gods did also. They sacrificed prisoners of war to the gods. The heart would be cut out of a live prisoner; his still-beating heart would then be presented to a god. The rest of the body would then be eaten by the participants in the ceremony. The remains of hundreds of thousands of human sacrifices have been found in Aztec ruins. The Aztecs were a people continually at war. Both their warlike nature and their religious practice of cannibalism can be explained by their need for protein. The Aztecs provide a vivid example of how religious beliefs have been shaped to meet the needs of the community.8 Religious rituals always have a particular goal behind them – success in battle, in love, in the hunt, to get well, to have a happy afterlife. To be 6 7 8
Harris (1989, p. 415); Boyer (2001, p. 230). Harris (1989, pp. 418–19, 422–5). Harris (1989, pp. 428–36).
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Religion
effective, rituals must typically be performed in certain ways. The ancestors would not be pleased if just any old goat was sacrificed. It must be a white goat, washed three times by a virgin or perhaps a woman past menopause because the monthly periods make a woman unclean, and the neck of the goat must be slit from left to right.9 The rituals’ complexity often required certain persons to perform them – a shaman, witch doctor, or priest. Each shaman had to have a certain bag of “tricks” to impress his clients. They were, therefore, a bit like magicians. Here again, we see how the juxtaposition of events can give rise to an erroneous inference of causality. Following a particular ritual, some people will get well or have luck in the hunt, and this reinforces the belief that the ritual caused the event. Moreover, belief in the powers of the shaman may increase the confidence of the hunter and thereby the likelihood of his success, or increase the belief of the sick person that she will get well. Modern medical experience shows that ill people who intensely believe that they will get well have higher probabilities of recovery.10 Because religious rituals require a belief in the supernatural, shamans, witch doctors, and priests must themselves be unnatural in some way. When an epileptic has a seizure, he behaves in a most unnatural way, as if perhaps seized by a spirit. Epileptics frequently became shamans. Others became shamans because they could put themselves into a trance or feign one. As religions evolved, shamans were replaced by priests who obtained their “powers of magic” through training or by adopting unusual lifestyles like celibacy.
V. Summary of Local Religions Religion first appeared among the hunters and gatherers from whom we are descended. To understand what religion is and why it is important to so many people, we must understand why it was invented. Rather than use a possibly pejorative term like tribal or primitive religions, I choose to call them local religions in contrast to the universal religions discussed later. These early religions were truly local in that the nature of the spirits and gods and a tribe’s beliefs about them would typically differ from one tribe to 9
10
See discussion in Boyer (2001, ch. 7). Boyer (2001, pp. 238–9) notes the similarities between the behavior prescribed in religious rituals and the behavior of people with obsessive-compulsive behavior (think of Jack Nicholson in As Good As It Gets). In both cases, there is often a great fear of pollution and thus ritualistic washing of the hands; a mindless repetition of certain actions; and a fear of great danger should the acts not be performed properly – the goat has not been washed three times, the obsessive-compulsive steps on a crack in the sidewalk. Harris (1989, pp. 411–12).
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the next. Some features are common to almost all religions, however, from the earliest known tribes to modern postindustrial states.11 1. The belief that “a nonphysical component of persons can survive after death and remain an intentional being.” 2. The belief that “certain people are especially likely to receive direct inspiration or messages from extranatural agencies, such as gods and spirits.” 3. The belief that “performing certain ritual ‘recipes’ in the exact way and order prescribed can bring about changes in physical states of affairs.” These beliefs arise as attempts to explain events that cannot be explained with the information and knowledge at hand.12 Because the known causes of events are familiar objects – the lion kills the antelope, rain causes grass and flowers to sprout, the sun parches the grass – causes invented to explain events for which no obvious explanation exists take on the shapes of familiar objects. To my knowledge, no tribe or society has ever invented a god who was a heptagon or cylinder. Once again, the chance juxtaposition of events may lead to an inference of causality. A hunter finds a stone in the stomach of an antelope and soon thereafter has particularly good luck in his hunting. He attributes his good luck to a spirit lodged in the stone.13 A tribe has particularly good luck hunting by a full moon and begins to pray to the moon. Hunting tribes frequently have had moon gods. Because hunting was carried out by the men, moon gods were male. Tribes that were more dependent on farming or gathering had sun gods, because the sun is more important than the moon for growing plants. Because tending crops and gathering grains and berries was the work of the women of the tribe, sun gods have been female.14 Humans love and hate, laugh and cry, and so too, therefore, do ghosts, spirits, and gods. Some even make love and get drunk. Thus, although humans have invented supernatural beings to explain that which they could 11 12
13
14
Boyer (1994, p. 5). Stark (2004, ch. 1) reviews the different definitions of religion that have been given, and opts for a narrower concept than offered here, instead focusing on the explanatory role of the supernatural in religion. The Aguaruna in the Amazon region believe that certain stones have magical properties – some make one successful at hunting, some in love, some in war, etc. If one has a stone that one thinks would make one successful in war, but then has great success in hunting, one might reclassify it as a yuka, the kind of stone that brings success in hunting (Boyer, 1994, pp. 142–6). See Quigley (1979, pp. 176–77).
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not explain by natural causes, because humans have no firsthand knowledge of these beings, they have endowed them with emotions and characteristics familiar to all humans. Supernatural beings are intentional beings with many of the same wants and desires as humans. They differ from humans in a few important ways – they are immortal, and they observe everything humans do. Religious rituals can be thought of as both causal and abductive.15 Belief in the efficacy of religious rituals rests on three assumptions.16 1. An assumption about a particular episode (e.g., “This is a properly performed instance of ritual x”). 2. An explanatory conjecture about a particular person (e.g., “This person is a member of category y”). 3. A causal conjecture (e.g., “It is because this person is a member of category y that the person performed x successfully”). Because the purpose of every religious ritual – indeed, of all religions – is to get something (success at the hunt, a place in Heaven), a shaman’s ability “to keep his customers” depends in part on his ability “to deliver the goods.” A long stretch of poor hunting or drought may rob a shaman of his followers. To summarize, the challenge faced by every society is to understand the causal relationships present in their environment, and make use of this understanding. When the juxtaposition of events gives rise to a commonsense inference of causality, this inference is adopted. When no commonsense explanation for an event exists, other explanations must be sought. Human societies have often invoked the supernatural to explain that which could not be accounted for by natural causes. Superstition and religion can be viewed as theoretical constructs for explaining phenomena for which no natural causes have been found.
VI. Universal Religions Local religions are oriented toward the present life. They explain certain events, help people cope with the trauma of death, and reinforce the mores of the community; this in turn helps produce cooperation and a better communal life, and allows individuals to engage in exchange with their ancestors or gods to bring about good health here on earth, success in 15 16
Boyer (1994, ch. 8; 2001, ch. 7). Boyer (1994, p. 240).
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hunting, or success in battle. Although a particular tribe’s members may expect to join their ancestors when they die, they typically have vague ideas about what this afterlife will be like. The ancestors are assumed to observe the living members of the tribe, and punish and reward them for certain actions. Ancestors are not presumed to have a particularly happy afterlife, however, and thus the actions of tribe members are not motivated toward rewards in the afterlife. In contrast, the universal religions are heavily focused on the afterlife and the rewards and punishments that await one there. The first of Buddhism’s Four Noble Truths emphasizes human suffering (dukha). All humans are caught in a cycle of life and rebirth that entails much suffering. The second Noble Truth deals with the cause of human suffering. Here we see a direct correspondence with local religions. The spirits and gods of local religions offer explanations for certain, often tragic events. Buddhism offers an explanation for why we suffer. The third and fourth Noble Truths, however, offer hope. The cycle of suffering can be broken by following the Eightfold Path of (1) right views, (2) right intentions, (3) right speech, (4) right conduct, (5) right livelihood, (6) right effort, (7) right mindfulness, and (8) right concentration. Following this path is no easy thing, however. Besides faith (saddha or panna), one needs training in concentration and meditation (samadhi), and various ethical and disciplinary practices (sali). Those who follow the Eightfold Path successfully are able to break the cycle of suffering and enter into nirvana (the state of freedom, rest, and salvation). Christianity’s Ten Commandments are also a set of proscriptions forbidding certain actions on earth with the promise of Heaven awaiting those who live in accordance with the Commandments. Much speculation and theorizing in Christianity has been concerned with characterizing life in Heaven – or Hell. At first glance, Islam might be thought to be an exception in this regard because the Koran is not otherworldly oriented, but rather very much focused on life on earth and what we should do here. The word Islam means submission, however, and the Koran describes in great detail what each individual should and should not do in her daily life. Many of its proscriptions – from praying five times a day to fasting during Ramadan – require the sacrifice of certain earthly pleasures with the promise of later rewards in Heaven, as with Christianity and Buddhism. In this respect, Islam is very similar to the other major universal religions. As knowledge advanced and societies became more complex and sophisticated, understanding of causality increased and the need to invent supernatural causes for events declined. As trade and communications expanded, individuals came into contact with other religions, and began to notice the
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strange if not bizarre beliefs of some other groups. These developments favored the invention of universal religions. A universal religion must by definition be essentially the same in every community where it is practiced – in farming as well as hunting communities. A universal religion, therefore, cannot easily accommodate local peculiarities and conditions. It cannot offer a female sun god to a farming community and a male moon god to a hunting community. Replacing the multitude of gods and spirits with a single god (or at most, a handful of gods) is thus a necessary step in the creation of a universal religion. Heterogeneity across communities also makes it difficult to orient a universal religion toward providing rewards and penalties in this life, because the needs of communities differ greatly. It is also likely that individuals in more complex societies became skeptical about the powers of shamans and priests to cure diseases, chase away evil spirits, and bring success in battle as knowledge and understanding of causality and chance grew. Thus, another logical step in the development of a universal religion is to reorient exchange relationships between gods and humans away from providing rewards on earth to providing them in Heaven. This shift in orientation also has the advantage of making verification of the provision of the rewards impossible.17 Although universal religions are less concerned with explaining daily events than are local religions, they too can be used to explain the otherwise inexplicable even today. Thus, we have the explanation by Sheikh Yousef Al-Qaradawi, head of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, as to why the 2004 earthquake in the Indian Ocean that caused a tsunami that killed thousands of people occurred where it did. People must ask themselves why this earthquake occurred in this area and not in others. Why did it occur at this time and not another? Why? Whoever examines these areas discovers that they are tourism areas. Tourism areas are areas where the forbidden acts are widespread, as well as alcohol consumption, drug use, and acts of abomination. Whoever knows about tourism in our age knows this. These areas were notorious because of this modern tourism, which has become known as “sex tourism” . . . Don’t they deserve punishment from Allah?18
After September 11, 2001, evangelist preacher Jerry Falwell also concluded that the attacks on the World trade Center were God’s punishment for America’s sins. 17 18
This property of being unverifiable makes religion a form of “credence” good. See Ekelund and Tollison (2008), and Ekelund, Tollison, and Vasilescu (2008). As quoted in Klausen (2005, p. 210).
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I really believe that the pagans, and the abortionists, and the feminists, and the gays and the lesbians who are actively trying to make that an alternative lifestyle . . . all of them who have tried to secularize America. I point a finger in their face and say “you helped it happen.”19
The big advantage of universal religions over local religions as far as causal explanations is concerned, however, is that they offer answers to the big questions such as how was the universe created? Who created man? The answers offered to these questions again have the advantage of being unverifiable.20 Thus, universal religions have all of the salient characteristics of local religions. They provide answers to puzzling questions; they proscribe certain immoral actions and prescribe certain moral ones; they contain rituals, which allow individuals to obtain particular rewards and avoid certain punishments; and they are greatly concerned with death and the passage into the afterlife. Equally important, however, is the way in which universal and local religions differ. Universal religions provide answers to different sorts of questions, such as who created the earth? They replace all-knowing ancestors and spirits with an all-knowing single god. Where the rewards and punishments meted out by a tribe’s ancestors alter individuals’ lives on earth, the rewards and punishments of a universal religion’s omniscient god are experienced in the afterlife. The difference between universal and local religions is nicely illustrated by the African tribe, the Fang.21 The Fang are in daily contact with their ancestors, and pray and make sacrifices to them to obtain favors here on earth and to avoid misfortunes. They also believe in a god known as Mebeghe who is far more powerful than any living person or deceased spirit, and who created the earth and heavens, animals and humans. This god was followed by another, Nzame, who invented tools, clothing, and other artifacts, and taught humans to hunt and farm. Although Mebeghe and Nzame are in one sense more powerful than the Fang’s ancestral spirits, they do not pray or make sacrifices to them. The Fang do not believe that Mebeghe and Nzame observe each individual’s every action and reward good and punish bad behavior. They are thus irrelevant for the Fang’s everyday life. One assumes that the Fang first invented the notion of spirit-ancestors and developed the practices of praying and sacrificing to them to help them to control their everyday lives. Mebeghe and Nzame were invented later to answer more 19 20 21
See http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/14/Falwell.apology/. Falwell later bowed to heavy criticism and apologized for his remarks. Dennett (2006, p. 164) stresses the importance of propositions in religion that cannot be refuted. See discussion in Boyer (2001, p. 141).
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abstract questions about the origins of life and manmade artefacts. Because the Fang already knew how to ensure good health, adequate rainfall, and so on, by performing certain rituals to please their ancestors, there was no reason to hypothesize that these creator-gods could supply the same benefits, and thus no reason to pray and make sacrifices to them. The death of a universal religion’s founder (Buddha, Christ, Mohammed) creates a crisis for his followers – how to continue to spread his teachings. Compilations of his teachings are put together, and his followers set out to convert others to the religion. Out of this group of initial missionaries emerges a set of experts on the religion, which Boyer refers to as a guild.22 Guild members become the official interpreters of the religion’s doctrines and performers of its rituals. Like all guilds, religious guilds abhor competition and thus attempt to eliminate it. It is no accident that the first of the Ten Commandments prohibits belief in “false” gods. Each universal religion claims that it alone can promise salvation, nirvana, or other forms of eternal happiness, and thus encourages people to join the one true faith and discourages defection.23 The shamans and priests of local religions are assumed to possess mystical powers, with which they were either born or received from the spirits. On the other hand, the priests of universal religions acquire their powers through study. The Catholic Church has also tried to set its clergy apart from the Church’s membership by requiring priests and nuns to take vows of celibacy. In principle anyone could study and become a priest24 or practice celibacy, so guild members are very vulnerable to entry and competition. Thus, religious guilds inevitably seek protection from competition by teaming up with the state.25 One effective way to protect a monopoly is to create a brand image. Religious brands take the form of doctrines that are specific to a particular religion. Thus, religious doctrines play a great role in the development of universal religions while being largely absent from local religions. Religious doctrines are easier to standardize and promulgate if they can be written down. Thus, the emergence of both universal religions and writing and literacy in more complex societies is not by pure chance. Without a written 22 23
24 25
See discussion in Boyer (2001, ch. 8). Ekelund, H´ebert, and Tollison (2006) discuss at great the length the methods that the once-monopolistic Catholic Church used to ward off competition. See also, Ekelund and Tollison (2008), and Ekelund, Tollison, and Vasilescu (2008). In several religions, this anyone must be a male. In Book V of The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith (1776) discusses the practices used by religions to maintain market power and the costs to society from religious monopolies. See discussion in Ekelund, H´ebert, and Tollison (2006, p. 14ff.).
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version of a religious doctrine, it would not be possible to guarantee that it was the same in every community. Passing a religious doctrine on by word of mouth would inevitably lead to alterations in content. With writing, one can ensure that the same doctrines are taught and the same rituals performed in every community. Thus, universal religions can be regarded as the first form of brand creation and franchising. Just as a McDonald’s customer can expect the same size and quality of a Big Mac in China, France, and California, a Catholic can expect the ritual of the mass to be much the same in China, France, and California. All universal religions seek to be monopolies and some, like the Catholic Church in Europe from the Middle Ages until the beginning of the sixteenth century, have come close. Yet none seems capable of sustaining a monopoly on dogma indefinitely. One reason for this is that no founder of any universal religion has had the time or inclination to write down his teachings in detail and codify them. Thus, codifications took place after the founders’ deaths and were undertaken by their followers. Because different followers had different recollections and interpretations of the founder’s teachings, disagreement over the exact wording of the religion’s authentic doctrine was inevitable. All universal religions, therefore, have been plagued by schisms. In addition to competition from within, universal religions face competition from without – from other universal and local religions. Many religious doctrines are rather abstract – think of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, that there is one God, but he consists of three parts, two of which have a father-son relationship. Although accounts of events in the lives of Buddha, Christ, and Mohammed are inspiring when first heard, these too may lose their power to excite over time. Behavioral psychology teaches us that habits are more easily established and maintained when rewards follow actions immediately than when they are delayed. A problem all universal religions face is that their greatest rewards are delayed until after death. On the other hand, the rewards individuals perceive that they get from local religions occur here on earth. Thus, universal religions often have to bend to accommodate local religious customs. . . . many Hindu scholars contrast what they call shastrik elements of the religion, the belief and practices supposed to be the definition of Hinduism, with the lautik or local, popular and contextual versions. The shastrik elements should apply everywhere . . . People always add to or distort doctrine. The same phenomenon is found in Buddhism, where scholars are scandalized by the many pagan practices they must witness, tolerate and in which they are sometimes forced to participate. The history of early Christianity also includes many difficult conflicts between the competing claims of a still fragile Church with considerable political backing and a host of local
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cults that somehow deviate from doctrine . . . In some ways, Hinduism achieved a more balanced equilibrium between the general, literate version and the inevitable local variants and additions. This was realized mostly through the convenient division between great gods of cosmic significance and local deities, more generally goddesses, that were mainly relevant at the local level. More or less every settlement has its own goddess who is specially concerned with the inhabitants of that special place. (Boyer, 2001, pp. 281–2)
Today, many Italian towns and cities still have their patron saint whose birthday is celebrated each year with a parade and festival. These local saints play a similar role as local gods in Hinduism. The celebrations serve to strengthen ties among community members and thus, hopefully, produce more cooperative and socially oriented behavior as do the celebrations and dances of local religions. Good examples of the blending of universal and local religious practices can be found in Africa. According to Na Honoun, a voodoo priestess, Christians in Benin go to church on Sunday, but visit the voodoo priests and priestesses the rest of the week.26 In Benin, day-to-day exchange relationships with the spirits appear to remain just as or even more important than the relationship with the more remote Christian God. A similar pattern exists in Asia. Many Asians go to a Brahman priest to seek rewards in the afterlife, and to local magicians to obtain immediate, worldly benefits.27 Evangelical movements may also arise to fulfill the desires of people to have local religions that cater to their specific and immediate needs. As with all local religions, evangelical movements come in many forms. Religious services are typically not the solemn rituals of the mainstream universal churches, but emotional affairs with much singing and chanting just as in the rituals of local religions. As with other local religions, Christian evangelical movements often stress the exchange relationship between believers and God, with God expected to deliver immediate rewards – physical health, peace of mind – in exchange for prayers and the not insignificant contributions to the wealth of the evangelist preacher.28
VII. The Origin of Universal Religions Of the five great universal religions – Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism – Hinduism’s ties to local religions are the most apparent. Hinduism’s many gods can be explained by its having absorbed 26 27 28
Economist, January 28, 2006. Stark (2004, p. 19). See discussion in Dennett (2006, pp. 190–1, 225–6) and references to other works.
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local gods as it expanded. The same explanation accounts for the polytheism of the Ancient Greeks. The rituals that take place in Hindu temples also resemble in many respects rituals of local religions. A statue of a god is thought to be that god. He or she must be awakened, washed, and fed like any other being. Similar rituals are also performed in the home where an image of a “family” god is kept. As economic life on the Indian subcontinent became more complex and society became more urbanized, a division of labor arose as in all complex economic systems. The Indian caste system formalizes this division by making each occupational group effectively a guild protected from competition and entry by the marriage restrictions that characterize the caste system.29 The instinctive aversion to pollution that exists in all human societies is reflected in the caste system by the requirement that members of the lowest class – the untouchables – be restricted to occupations dealing with unclean objects. The highest caste – the Brahmins – is of course reserved for priests. Buddhism builds on Hinduism and adopts its central idea of a cycle of life. Its founder Siddhartha (circa 560–480 bce), like Jesus, is reputed to be the product of divine conception. A white elephant entered Siddhartha’s mother’s womb while she slept. In his early thirties, Siddhartha traveled about northern India seeking enlightenment. One evening he sat down under a pipal tree and meditated. When dawn came he had become the Supreme Buddha. Buddhism shares its belief in the cycle of life and rebirth with Hinduism. In this respect, both universal religions share with local religions a concern about the passage from this life into the next. Both also contain lists of things people should do during their lives. Unlike with local religions, however, performance of these duties is not intended to make one’s life on earth better, but to break the cycle of life. The ultimate goal of Buddhism and Hinduism is not so much to enjoy the present life but to permanently leave it for a better afterlife. Judaism’s great invention was monotheism. As with Hinduism, one cannot identify a single person, like Siddhartha or Mohammed, who founded the religion or propounded the idea of there being but one god. According to the Torah, God revealed himself to the Jewish patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and informed them that He was the one true God. Judaism’s account of the Jews’ early history is filled with meetings between God and
29
Mancur Olson (1982) characterizes the castes as forms of guilds.
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prophets like Moses, and miracles such as the Red Sea’s parting to allow the Jews to escape from Egypt. Christianity and Islam both build on Judaism. Christianity claims that Jesus was the Messiah long awaited by the Jews. Islam claims that Mohammed was a prophet, indeed the Prophet, who was visited by the archangel Gabriel and instructed to lead the Arab people back to the one true religion. Both are monotheistic, although Christianity adds the complication of the Holy Trinity, or God being of three parts. Although these five universal religions differ in important ways from local religions, they retain their essential elements and indeed those of all religions. Hinduism and Buddhism are greatly concerned with death and afterlife. Siddhartha and Jesus appeared to be born of woman like any other man, but were products of immaculate conceptions. Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Moses were visited by God; Mohammed by an angel. These gods and angels are all intentional beings who speak to the persons with whom they meet for the purpose of getting them to do their will. Some people possess charisma, but most do not. Religious sects and cults are started by those possessing sufficient charisma to convince a group of people to follow them down a new religious path. Siddhartha, Jesus, and Mohammed appear to have been men with great charisma judging from the effect that they had on those who came into contact with them. However, no one has a monopoly on charisma, and so we find religious history filled with charismatic figures from Martin Luther to Martin Luther King. In some cases, these founders of new religions or religious sects have borrowed elements from the great universal religions. Today the Mormon Church is one of the fastest growing and most prosperous religious movements. Its founder Joseph Smith Jr. was visited by the prophet Moroni in 1830, just as Mohammad was visited by the archangel Gabriel. Moroni showed Smith where the Book of Mormon was buried – a book that purportedly contained the teachings of one of the lost tribes of Israel and was buried in New England in the fourth century ce. With God’s help, Smith translated it into English and it became the holy book for the Mormon religion.
VIII. Contrasting the Theoretical Systems of Modern and Traditional Societies In an extremely interesting essay, Robin Horton (1982) draws a contrast between the theoretical systems of modern and traditional societies, which
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is similar to the one made here.30 By modern, he means Western; by traditional, African, although the latter designation could apply to all tribal societies. Modern societies make considerable use of formal scientific methods to achieve an understanding of causal relationships, whereas traditional societies rely largely on abductive methods, as described in Chapter 2. Both societies, however, possess “theoretical systems whose basic raison d’ˆetre [is] the extension of the magnificent but none the less limited causal vision of everyday commonsense thinking” (p. 201). Both theoretical systems can be divided into two parts. Primary theory refers to the commonsense causal relationships people infer from the close juxtaposition of natural events, what I, following Boyer (1994), have referred to as abductive theory. This everyday commonsense thinking constitutes the kind of causal inferences that come from experience as stressed by Hume. Knowledge is accumulated through primary theory in much the same way in all societies and cultures. Secondary theory consists of the mental constructs that people employ to explain those phenomena that cannot be explained by primary theory. Although primary theories are similar across cultures, secondary theories “possess startling differences . . . between community and community, culture and culture” (p. 228). In one important respect, however, they are similar – secondary theories in both systems rely on entities and processes that are in some sense “hidden” to the human observer, whereas these entities and processes are directly observable in the primary theories (p. 229). Hidden entities in the secondary theories of traditional societies are ghosts, spirits, and gods, and thus are personal in the sense that they take on the shapes of humans or animals and are intentional beings like humans and animals. In contrast, the hidden entities in the secondary theories of modern Western society are inanimate objects and thus impersonal or mechanistic, for example, atoms, electrons, sound waves, and gravitational forces (p. 229). Horton also discusses the following important differences between cultures: traditionalist versus progressive; consensual versus competitive (pp. 238–48). In a traditionalist society, people believe that wisdom was discovered by the ancients and has been passed down to the present. This wisdom provides a true picture of the world, mainly because it has the authority of the ancients behind it, but also because it has withstood the test of time. Its account of events is not so out of line with experience as to 30
All page references in this section are to Horton (1982) unless otherwise noted.
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call the wisdom of the ancients into question. Edmund Burke, whose work is discussed in Chapter 8, will be seen to have been the perfect embodiment of a traditionalist. Progressives place little stock in the teachings of the past. We know more today than we did yesterday, we will know more tomorrow than we do today. Thus, progressives are inherently optimistic about man’s ability to acquire knowledge and about the future. Tomorrow will be a better day, because we will know more then than we do now. Immanuel Kant’s ([1795]1949) World Peace captures this optimism perfectly, but many other works from the Enlightenment might also be cited. A consensual society reinforces the conservatism of a traditional society. With all members of society sharing a common set of beliefs, a common Weltanschauung, there is no one to point out the inconsistencies in these beliefs and their failures to account for certain phenomena. In a society in which belief systems and theoretical models compete, proponents of one system continually point out the inadequacies of their competitors, and competitors strive to improve their performance in explaining and predicting events. A more rapid accumulation of knowledge can thus be expected in a progressive and competitive system than in a traditionalist, consensual system. Horton also claims that the cultural homogeneity that existed in precolonial Africa and Medieval Europe is more conducive to traditionalism than the kind of melting pot, frontier societies that existed in sixth century bce, Greece, or the Netherlands at the beginning of the Scientific Revolution, where the inconsistencies and of traditional beliefs would be continually exposed (pp. 254–6). Because much of this book emphasizes the importance of reasoning and the distinction between progressive and traditional societies, it is perhaps worthwhile to conclude this discussion by commenting on whether traditional societies with their superstitious and religious beliefs are less rational or might even be called irrational alongside their modern counterparts. This is essentially a semantic issue, but in this case I think that the semantics are important. Today, we would say that a belief that the sun goes around the earth is irrational. We know that the earth circles the sun, and that it only appears that the sun is circling the earth. However, five thousand years ago, one’s only basis for judging whether the earth circles the sun or the sun the earth was personal observations. If the earth were flat and stationary and the sun were circling it, then we would predict that the sun would be visible only part of the time, which is what we observe. Moreover, because no object would ever have been observed to remain in motion indefinitely, it would have
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been reasonable to further assume that some invisible spirit or god must be pulling the sun. If our religion postulated that we were god’s chosen people, it would add further plausibility to the hypothesis that the sun – and by implication all of the stars – circled the earth, and that the earth was the center of the universe. If the earth were circling the sun, we would expect to see the sun all of the time. The hypothesis that the earth was a ball and both rotating and circling the sun would have been difficult to formulate with the knowledge stock of five thousand years ago. Thus, it would not have been irrational then to maintain the hypothesis that the sun circles the earth, only erroneous. Today, we would probably call someone from an advanced industrial country who believes that the sun circles the earth irrational. Why the difference? The difference is, of course, that our knowledge of the laws of gravity, physics, and astronomy is much greater today than five thousand years ago, as is our capacity to observe stars and planets in motion. To maintain the hypothesis today that the sun circles the earth is to discard overwhelming evidence to the contrary, and discarding factual scientific evidence is irrational. Analogously, it would not be inherently irrational five thousand years ago to believe that someone who suddenly died of no apparent reason had been killed by an evil spirit – or for that matter today in a traditional society. Man’s understanding of the causes of death was and is much weaker in these environments than in modern society. Today, an autopsy can be performed and a probable cause of death determined. What would be irrational today is to assume that a middle-aged man who died while running a long distance in the sun and was diagnosed as having had a heart attack died because of an evil spirit. Superstitions and religions arise to offer explanations for the inexplicable and predictions for the unpredictable. They arise in much the same way as other statements of causal relationships. As such, their maintenance is not inherently irrational, any more than the belief that the sun circles the earth was five thousand years ago. These beliefs only become irrational to hold as evidence against them accumulates.31 Horton’s traditional societies belong to Donald’s mythic culture. They possess language and the capability to reason, but lack writing and thus are unable to store and accumulate knowledge to the same degree as modern societies. So-called theories of traditional societies about the origins of humans, whether there is life after death, and whether dead people reappear as ghosts are stories made up to fill gaps in their knowledge of the world 31
For further discussion of the rationality of these beliefs, see Sperber (1982).
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about them. The invention of writing allowed humans to replace these traditional myths and stories with hypotheses that involved abstract concepts like gravitational forces, atoms, electrical charges, and sound waves. Models of nature could be constructed and predictions verified. Scientific theories of the modern age could replace the mythic stories of traditional societies. Thus, the invention of writing made it possible for societies to enter the modern age, but only a few chose to take advantage of this opportunity.
IX. Science and Religion Understanding causal relationships is essential to human understanding of the world and of our ability to survive in it. It is no surprise that in his An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, David Hume focused upon causal relationships. . . . if there be any relation among objects which it imports to us to know perfectly, it is that of cause and effect. On this are founded all our reasonings concerning matter of fact or existence. By means alone of it we attain any assurance concerning objects which are removed from the present testimony of our memory and senses. The only immediate utility of all sciences, is to teach us, how to control and regulate future events by their causes. (Hume [1748]1939, p. 631)
Religion and science offer two alternative strategies for understanding causal relationships. As we saw in the previous section, both build on assumptions about unseen agents or forces. They differ fundamentally, however, in that scientific explanations for natural phenomena can be tested and rejected by data while religious accounts can never be tested. Scientific progress consists of rejecting false hypotheses and developing new, correct ones; of discarding false causal inferences and retaining correct ones. Cultural evolution proceeds in much the same way. As a community learns, it discards its false causal inferences and adds to its stock of correct ones, and the community’s health and welfare should increase. Such learning can be of both natural and social phenomena. Our understanding today of how market exchange benefits all members of a community has helped to produce the prosperity that most countries with market economies enjoy. Cultural evolution, as defined here, consists in precisely this expanding stock of knowledge concerning correct causal inferences about natural and social phenomena. To benefit from science, a community must both foster its development and be open to the new ideas that it produces. Resources must be devoted to education in the sciences and scientific research. Here there are real
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differences between the modern countries generally referred to as part of the West, and countries more or less tied to tradition. In some cases, countries simply lack the resources to educate most of their population in the sciences or any other subject. In others, however, science is deemphasized as a matter of choice. Saudi Arabia and Iran are not poor countries by any measure of comparison. Yet students in these countries from grammar school through university spend countless hours studying religion and thus have less time for science and other modern subjects. Moreover, the study of religion consists largely of rote learning – memorization of long passages of religious text. This is true, of course, of nearly all religious instruction. Students are not, indeed cannot be taught to question the validity of religious texts and claims or to challenge their teachers, because these texts are purportedly the word of God, and thus must be valid. Education systems in countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran confine their young people to traditional modes of thought and behavior through both their methods of teaching and what is taught. A culture that places a heavy emphasis on science must be progressive to a certain degree. New and more effective medicines replace ineffective remedies; new means of communication replace old methods. It is difficult to be open to new ideas in one area and closed to them in others. Thus, the spread of new ideas in open societies affects other spheres of knowledge like history, art, and even moral philosophy. Here again the contrast between Western, secular societies and those where religion plays a dominant role is stark. The devout believer must inherently be conservative. She must be continually looking back to the time when the religion’s founder lived and brought truth to the earth. His teachings, as written down and interpreted by his followers centuries ago, determine even today how a person should behave, dress, and think. In this respect, the differences between a Western country such as Sweden and a Saudi Arabia are apparent in how people dress, what they study, and perhaps most conspicuously, in the liberties people have to do and think what they want, be it a woman’s desire to drive a car, or a man’s desire to convert to Catholicism. Yet these differences should not be overemphasized. Where the Saudis ban alcohol because the Koran forbids it, the Swedes tax it heavily and place strict restrictions on its sale. The purported justification for such policies in Sweden today is that they promote health and safety, but their origin dates back to the nineteenth century’s prohibition movement, which was heavily influenced by religion. It was not too long ago when the Religious Right succeeded in prohibiting the sale of alcohol in the United States. Under George W. Bush’s administration, the Religious Right
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succeeded in restricting scientific research in certain areas because of beliefs about what the Bible allows. Thus, there are many in the West who would take us back in time and restrict what people can do and think, just as there are those in the Middle East and other parts of the world not generally regarded as part of the West, who wish to see their societies become more liberal and progressive. The struggle between liberalism and conservatism, progressivism and traditionalism has gone on for centuries, as the next few chapters briefly recount, and is far from over.
X. Religion, Identity, and Values Religion’s role has been stressed in providing explanations of causal relationships because this function best explains religion’s origin. The important contrast between religion and science turns on their differences in accounting for causal relationships. However, religions have other important attributes. Chief among these are that religion can be a determinant of an individual’s sense of self-identity, and form the basis of a person’s value system. Although religions certainly can and often do serve these functions, it must be stressed that neither can account for a religion’s coming into being. Members of a particular tribe did not sit down one day and say that they were lacking a sense of identity, and thus needed to create a set of beliefs about the world that was peculiar to their tribe. Its beliefs about the world emerged over time through chance events and inferences about causality that were in part unique to the tribe. Thus, eventually a sense of identity based on the tribe’s history and customs came into being. As myths regarding the causes of certain events, the roles of ancestors and spirits in the tribe’s life, and the rituals needed to engage in exchange with the spirits developed, they became part of the tribe’s culture and a determinant of its sense of identity. A local religion’s role in defining self-identity arises after or at best while its religion comes into existence for other reasons. Similarly, Mohammed did not recount his meetings with the archangel Gabriel and the messages that the angel brought, because he thought that the Arabs lacked a sense of identity. He thought that he was hearing the word of God and wished to bring the Arabs back to the one true religion. The Muslims’ sense of identity arose after the Arabs (and later other ethnic groups) accepted Mohammed’s teachings about God. As previously discussed, both local and universal religions contain strictures against antisocial actions like stealing and ways of rewarding pro-social
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actions. These obviously form a part of a religious community’s value system. Beyond these moral strictures, the value system of a community is shaped by its particular history and social and physical environment. A community with an extreme shortage of sources of protein that adopts human sacrifice and cannibalism as part of its religion acquires a different value system than one rich in protein, which can afford to sacrifice other types of animals. A religion that allows polygamy implies a different value system regarding the roles of men and women in society and family structure than one that demands monogamy. Such differences, like all religious differences, are determined by a combination of chance, past events, and the physical environment in which the society evolved. These historical differences lead to different sets of values and personal identities across societies that are partly reflected in and determined by their religious beliefs. Because our focus is on the relationship between religion and democracy, the obvious question arises as to whether a particular religious identity or value system is more or less conducive to the creation and maintenance of liberal democracy. Do religious values strengthen liberal democracy or undermine it? Do religious people make better citizens in a liberal democracy or worse? The answers to these questions are important in and of themselves, but they also have implications regarding the optimal relationship between church and state – a question that has been debated for centuries in Western Europe, and that we shall consider later in the book.
XI. Religion and Traditionalism All societies have their customs and traditions. American families gather to eat turkey at Thanksgiving because that is supposedly what the first pilgrims ate. Germans gather on New Year’s Eve to eat carp, because it is supposed to bring wealth. It is also customary in Germany to toss molten lead into cold water on New Year’s to predict the future from the shape that the lead takes on hitting the water. Such happenings with their associated traditions are harmless or even beneficial. Fond memories of earlier Thanksgivings and New Year’s Eve gatherings are kindled, and family ties are renewed. Other customs and traditions are less benign. Beliefs in the magical powers of gorillas’ paws and rhinoceroses’ horns have produced an industry of illegal poachers and traders and have sped along the extinction of these animals. The custom of female circumcision causes great pain to young girls and risks their lives.
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By there very nature religions are tradition-bound and conservative. The beliefs of a member of a local religion reflect the tribal myths handed down from one generation to the next. The beliefs of a member of a universal religion reflect hours of instruction and memorization of holy texts written centuries ago. Such reverence for the past makes it difficult for many people to have an open mind about present-day discoveries – particularly when they challenge aspects of religious teachings. Although there is a tension between scientific progress and nearly all forms of tradition, this conflict is particularly strong with respect to religion because of the intensity of many people’s religious beliefs. Few Germans today believe that they can predict the future from cooled lead in a pan of water, and those who still do could probably be made aware of the implausibility of this belief in a relatively short time. No amount of logical argument, on the other hand, can weaken some people’s beliefs in the virgin births of Jesus and Siddhartha. It is because of this steadfast resistance to logical argument and scientific evidence that we regard the conflict between modern, progressive societies and traditional societies as largely a conflict between science and reasoning on one side and religion on the other. As the following chapters show, this conflict is as old as recorded human history.
PART II
A HISTORICAL LOOK AT THE STATE, DEMOCRACY, AND RELIGION
FOUR
The First States
For the Lord will not forsake his people for his great name’s sake; because it hath pleased the Lord to make you his people. Moreover as for me [King Samuel], God forbid that I should sin against the Lord in ceasing to pray for you; but I will teach you the good and the right way; Only fear the Lord, and serve him in truth with all your heart; for consider how great things he hath done for you. But if ye shall still do wickedly; ye shall be consumed, both ye and your king. (1 Samuel, Chapter 12)
True democracies have been rare in history. Even today, when there are more countries under democratic rule than at any other time, at best half of the world’s population can be said to live in democracies. Thus, it is important to understand how and why democratic states come into being, and why they are so rare. This book does not purport to be a history of the state, and so our examination of state origins will be highly selective. The goal is to highlight the conditions that give rise to democratic states and contrast them with those associated with nondemocratic ones. Those wishing a fuller historical treatment of the state are encouraged to consult the resource on which I have heavily relied – S. E. Finer’s (1997) magisterial History of Government.
I. Tribal Societies As discussed in Chapter Two, the most important aspect of human evolution was the development of the brain. As it grew, humans became better able to cope with the environment in which they lived, and in particular to interact and cooperate with other humans so to better their survival rates. The narrowly selfish, nasty brute living in isolation that one might 79
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expect to find from Hobbes’s description of anarchy does not seem to have ever existed. Within the band or tribe in which early humans lived, theft and homicide appear to have been relatively rare. This is perhaps not very surprising, because a group in which stealing and murder were rife would not survive for very long. What is perhaps more surprising – at least to those weaned on models of humans as rational, selfish utility maximizers – is that sharing and cooperation within these early societies was quite common. Indeed, although sharing is rare among other primates, Wilson (1975, p. 551) regards it as one of man’s “strongest social traits.” Cosmides and Tooby (1992) describe the cooperative behavior that evolved in tribal societies as a kind of “social contract.” Hunter/gatherer societies have been egalitarian. In part, this is probably because they were nomadic and thus it was almost physically impossible to accumulate great amounts of property perhaps because of the effects of the sharing norms just discussed. Given their egalitarian character, one expects that their political structure – if this term is appropriate for a tribe or band – was democratic. Although it is impossible to know for sure, it seems most likely that some band of European hunters fifty thousand or so years ago, when confronted with the question of whether to hunt on the east side of a hill or on the west side, would have resolved the question with a show of hands. Taking a vote is such an obvious way to make a collective decision that its first application must have long predated Athenian democracy. Indeed, one wonders whether the widespread belief in the fairness of the simple majority rule might to some extent be hardwired as are other notions of fairness. With the increase in brain size came an increase in the capacity to reason and eventually the utilization of this capacity – the development of tools, language, and culture. It is possible that a dog looks at the sun and asks itself who made it, or asks, “Where did I come from?” Yet one suspects that it does not. As humans began to utilize their capacity to reason, they began to pose such questions. Once they invented language, they could ask these questions out loud and discuss them with their fellow tribe members. As we have seen, their first answers to these questions took the form of stories (myths) filled with spirits, ghosts, and gods. Each tribe had its own myths and gods. A tribe’s first myth, one assumes, was invented by a particularly bright and imaginative tribe member. If he was very good at inventing myths, he probably rose to a position of some status. If he was particularly entrepreneurial, he might begin to offer not only explanations for the past and present, but also predictions of the future. If one or more gods were part of his set of explanations, then he might begin to intervene between the tribe
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and the god(s), and to call forth spirits to try not only to predict the future but even to change it. In this way, we suspect, the medicine man, shaman, and eventually priest first came into existence, and religion was born.1
II. The Sumerian City-State As tribal societies evolved, some took on characteristics that are closer to what we associate with states. Chiefs became more like kings, and shamans and medicine men became more like priests. Because we have no written record of this period, however, it is difficult to single out the institutional innovations of particular tribes for special attention. Thus, most historians identify the birth of the state with the advent of writing at end of the fourth, beginning of the third millennium bce in Mesopotamia and Egypt. In this section we briefly overview the case of Mesopotamia.
A. Background As human society evolved, gathering nuts, fruits, berries, and the seeds of wild grains was supplemented and eventually replaced by domesticating grains; hunting wild animals gave way to herding domesticated ones. Evidence of grains being ground to make flour dates back to at least 23,000 bce, and was fairly common in the Fertile Crescent by the twelfth century.2 In the sixth millennium, a stocky, round-headed people with clipped hair and no beards lived in the highlands above the Fertile Crescent. These “Sumerians” survived by growing grains and herding domesticated animals. When their crops depleted the soil in one area, they moved on to a different one. At some time during the fifth or fourth millennia, they migrated into Mesopotamia, “the land between the two rivers,” the two rivers being the Tigris and Euphrates. The plains between these rivers flooded from time to time, depositing silt to replenish the soil. Thus, it was no longer necessary to migrate in search of fertile soil and the Sumerians settled in Mesopotamia.
B. Origin of the Sumerian City-State Mesopotamia was characterized by too much water when the floods came, and too little during the dry season – perfect conditions for irrigation 1
2
Ekelund and Tollison (2008), and Ekelund, Tollison, and Vasilescu (2008) emphasize the importance of entrepreneurship on the part of the apostles and priests in the spread of Christianity. Economist, August 7, 2004. All dates in this and the next three sections are bce.
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farming, and the Sumerians developed an elaborate irrigation system, the first of its kind in the world. An irrigation system is a form of public good from which all of the community benefits, but it could only be provided if the community coordinated its efforts and resources. It is a primary candidate for being the public good, which led to the creation of the Sumerian city-state. In early Sumerian society, men tended domesticated animals, and women took care of the crops. Herders have much time to contemplate the heavens, and thus it is not surprising that Sumerians developed both astrology and astronomy. They divided the constellations of stars into twelve parts, and it is to them that we owe the signs of the Zodiac, which many people still believe have predictive power. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that at some point in time one or more of these heaven gazers noticed a relationship between the sun’s position in the sky and the onset of the floods and dry seasons. This knowledge would then become the foundation for regulating the availability of water for crops throughout the year. Political anthropologists and historians differ over how this innovation came into being. One group envisages an egalitarian, partially democratic tribal system of the type described earlier with an assembly of tribal members or elders collectively agreeing to introduce irrigation techniques. This interpretation nicely fits the kind of democratic leap from anarchy that has characterized the contractarian literature from Hobbes to the present. The second interpretation assumes a more hierarchically structured society. A priest class first took control of the process of cereal production. Among its priestly functions was the study of the stars. The priests used their knowledge of the stars to interpret and predict events on earth. The ideas underlying the introduction of irrigation would most likely have arisen among this professional class of heaven gazers, and they commanded that the innovation be introduced, supervised its introduction, and claimed all of the agricultural surplus that it generated. Any champion of democracy, contractarian or otherwise, would hope that the first interpretation is the correct one. Unfortunately, Finer claims, “It is not supported by the slightest shred of evidence,” and makes a very convincing case for the second interpretation.3 In any event, the characteristics of the Sumerian city-state in its developed form seem much more consistent with the second interpretation. 3
See Finer (1997, pp. 111–12) and references therein. Haas (1982) also contains an interesting discussion of the debate, describing it as one between liberals (conservative anthropologists) and Marxists.
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C. Characteristics of the Sumerian City-State4 One might expect that the bureaucracy governing the first-known state in history would be loosely organized and inefficient, and that the development of efficient, hierarchical bureaucratic structures would take centuries. Such was not the case. In the Sumerian city-states, bureaucracy was developed to a high degree and controlled nearly every aspect of economic and social life. The entire society shared a set of morals, beliefs, and expectations that were determined by their religion as interpreted by the class of priests. The state was an absolute monarchy with religion for an ideology. The king was god’s representative on earth, and immediately beneath him were the priests. Together they ran the state with the help of a fairly large bureaucracy and a small number of scribes. The role of the masses was to serve god, which in effect meant to serve the king. The power of the king was absolute. The economy was based on agriculture. The class of priests, with the help of the bureaucracy, directed the planting and harvesting of crops. Harvested crops were taken to the temples to be stored and redistributed. Outside of the class of priests there was no private ownership of land, nor much in the way of other private property.5 The Code of Hammurabi punishes theft so people must have had some private possessions, although this provision of the Code probably was also intended to punish stealing of grain from the state warehouses. The Sumerian economy was what we today call a command economy. The Sumerians invented writing. A large fraction of the early writing tablets that have been found contain counts of items traded or deposited in the state granaries.6 Without the aid of writing, it is unlikely that the Sumerian state could have grown to the size that it did, and to have survived as long as it did. The capability to read and write was confined to the ruling class of priests, and they used writing to direct and control the state.
D. Appraisal Carroll Quigley (1979, p. 193) described the Sumerians as “the most important group of humans who ever lived.” There is much evidence that can be garnered to back up this claim. In addition to an elaborate writing system, the Sumerians appear to have either invented or made important advances 4 5 6
The discussion in this and the next subsections draws heavily on Finer (1977, pp. 104–31) and McNeill (1963, pp. 18–166). Barzel (2002) argues that market exchange emerges very early in the evolution of states, but this was not the case in Sumer. Donald (1991, p. 285).
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in agriculture (irrigation, the plow, wheeled carts, draft animals), metallurgy (brass and copper smelting), pottery manufacturing (the potter’s wheel), transportation (the sail boat), astronomy, and of course, the state. The quality of the last invention is attested to by the length of time that the Sumerian city-state survived – anywhere from eight hundred to fifteen hundred years depending on one’s choice of starting and ending points.7 Finer (1997, p. 29) attributes longevity in a state to a congruence between a society’s belief system and its social and political structure. In the Sumerian city-state, this congruence was as close as it could possibly come. “In no other antique society did religion occupy such a prominent position . . . the religious ideas promoted by the Sumerians played an extraordinary part in the public and private life of the Mesopotamians, modeling their institutions, colouring their works of art and literature, pervading every form of activity.”8 Moreover, the Sumerian city-state’s disappearance came about not because of some internal breakdown, but because of the development of superior military power by its neighboring states. With the invention of writing came the first use of theoretical reasoning. Donald (1991, p. 340) speculates that “astronomy was probably the earliest example of widespread, socially important theoretic development in human history.” It involves data storage and the formation of mental models of time and space. The development of calendars and maps are also examples of early theoretical advances. However, by and large, the thought processes and inventions of the Sumerians, however remarkable they seem, do not reflect the kind of theoretical reasoning processes that we associate with modern science. One reason why the development of the theoretical mode of thinking was slow in Sumer may have been that the ability to read and write was confined to the relatively small ruling class of priests. They had a vested interest in keeping the Sumerian city-state at the mythical stage of development, where everyday life was dominated by religion. Keeping the mass of illiterate citizens at the mythical stage would have served the priests’ interests well. This structure – a small educated elite governing uneducated masses – repeats itself through most of history. The salient characteristics of the Sumerian city-state can be found in Egypt, Persia, and the other major states of the ancient world – monarchy, absolutism, a primary role for religion – and they will not, therefore, be 7 8
Finer (1997, 99, 127–8). Roux (1980, p. 91) as quoted in Finer (1997, p. 115).
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discussed here. One partial exception to this generalization is the Jewish state, and thus we pause briefly to consider its contribution to the development of political institutions.
III. The Jewish State A. Origin Like the Sumerian city-states, the Jewish state evolved from nomadic tribes that settled in particular areas and took up agriculture. With agriculture came an accumulation of wealth, and the need to defend this wealth from attacks from other tribes and states. Defense can be identified as the or at least a primary justification for the creation of the Jewish state and, indeed, all other ancient states in the Middle East. The defining moment in the creation of the Jewish people, if not the Jewish state, came following the exodus from Egypt. After enduring years of slavery, Moses led a band of Jews out of Egypt. Having been slaves for many years, they lacked a social structure and needed a moral code to establish social order and cohesion. This they obtained at Mount Sinai where Moses allegedly met with their god, Yahweh, who gave Moses a set of laws. The meeting at Mount Sinai established a covenant between Yahweh and the Jewish people, a covenant that would, in the minds of the Jews, come to set them apart from other peoples, a covenant that made them “God’s chosen people.” This covenant was not a social contract among equals, however, as conceived by Hobbes, Locke, and the other contractarians, but rather more of a feudal contract between the lord of the manor and his serfs, between the shepherd and his sheep. It defined the required conduct of the Jews, but placed no constraints or obligations on “the lawgiver.”9 As a god, Yahweh was typical of other gods of nomadic, hunting, maledominated societies – a masculine god of war. At first he competed with various feminine fertility goddesses found in the areas settled by the Jews and typical of agriculture societies. However, one of the commandments that Yahweh gave to Moses was that the Jewish people “should have no false idols before them.” Thus, as the Jews accumulated wealth and were continually forced to protect it in war, Yahweh, a god of war, grew in importance and his commandment forbidding false idols produced a monotheist religion.10 9 10
Finer (1997, p. 247). See discussion in McNeill (1963, pp. 158–62).
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B. Characteristics The Jewish state in full blossom was a monarchy, and in this respect resembled its neighbors. It was, however, the first limited monarchy, in that its citizens were obligated to obey the laws given to them by God. The king was not the lawgiver as in other states at that time – God was. In other states, laws were promulgated by the king or pharaoh, who was above the law. Jewish kings were not above God’s laws. Their authority was restricted to heading the state’s bureaucracy and leading their people in war. The king, aristocracy, priests, peasants, and slaves were all equally obligated to obey God’s laws. Thus, the Jewish state can rightfully be identified as the first state in which the rule of law as we think of it today existed. Everyone from king on down was subject to God’s laws. Equality under God and under the law led to a more egalitarian society than found in other contemporary states with a free peasantry.
C. Appraisal The history of the Jewish state is extremely short compared to that of Mesopotamia or Egypt, and it made no substantive innovations in the way of establishing democratic institutions. It remained more or less at the level of societies with mythic cultures. It was important, however, in establishing a form of separation of church and state for the first time. With respect to the laws governing human behaviour, it was a theocracy with God being the lawgiver, but in other matters it was a secular state with kings being free to do what they wished as long as they did not violate God’s laws. Finer (1997, p. 239) calls Judaism the first “historic religion” in contrast to the “archaic religions” of all previous states and of the Jewish state’s contemporaries. Under the archaic religions, the masses were not active participants in the religious rituals, but rather mere spectators observing the priests perform. Under Judaism, however, the masses became part of a congregation and were expected to participate actively. Moreover, each individual was directly accountable to God. In this respect, Judaism introduced an important element of individualism into the structure of society. The Jewish state vanished fairly quickly, and does not seem to have had a direct impact on the development of the Greek city-state or any of its other immediate followers. During the Middle Ages, however, the Bible and Old Testament were the most frequently read books in Europe. Jewish ideas of secular government, limited monarchy, and individualism then came
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to have an important influence on the development of Western political institutions.11
IV. The Chinese State The link between conservatism and autocracy is no better illustrated than in the Chinese state. Because our interest is in democratic institutions instead of autocratic ones, we devote little space to the Chinese state. Yet it is worth a brief look, because the absence of the characteristics that we deem essential for democracy is clearly there, and thus the importance of them is indirectly illustrated.
A. Origin of the State The Chinese state was formed in much the same way as the Sumerian state – by tribes migrating into a river valley, in this case the Yellow River. Although legends tell of great kings living in China before the Shang kingdom (1766– 1122, all dates in this section are bce), it was this one that invented writing and, thus, the history of the Chinese state begins with it. Cities also appeared during the Shang kingdom as did other inventions seen in the Sumerian city-state like bronze casting and the chariot.
B. Confucianism The “Spring and Autumn” period between 722 and 481 was one of considerable turmoil in China with continuous warfare among its various kingdoms. Apparently troubled by this instability, the scholar Confucius (551–479) wrote several texts that proffered advice as to how to end these conflicts. He then set out to visit the courts of different monarchies in an effort to sell his ideas. He does not appear to have had much success in his lifetime, but his teachings, along with those of his followers, did have great influence on later political leaders in China and the eventual structure of the Chinese state. Confucius’ main message was that the warring states had to reclaim or rediscover the wisdom of an earlier, idolized era. In a tradition-bound land characterized by ancestor worship, his message found a certain resonance. Finer (1997, pp. 458–9) identifies four main elements in Confucian thought: 11
Finer (1997, pp. 272–3).
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1. Mankind is divided into “superior” and “mean” men. Superior men follow what essentially amounts to the “golden rule” and cooperate with other men. Only by becoming a superior man does one become fully human. Everyone possesses the potential to become a superior man, but few realize this potential. 2. Men achieve their humanity through education. 3. The family is the supreme institution of society. Sons owe respect to their fathers; the wife to her husband; the younger brother to the older brother; the younger friend to the older friend; all family members owe respect to the ruler. 4. Good government is based on its having good rulers, not good laws. Good rulers are themselves virtuous and choose virtuous ministers. An implication of elements 1, 2, and 4 is that ministers should be chosen on the basis of their educational accomplishments, that is, that the ideal state should be a meritocracy.
C. Legalism A second reaction to the anarchy of the “Spring and Autumn” period was the development of legalism. Legalism was entirely antithetical to Confucianism. It derived no wisdom from the past and ridiculed filial duties. Legalists were: . . . forward-looking, practical and ruthless . . . [they] viewed the mass of humanity as irrevocably stupid and base and susceptible only to the carrot and the stick. Theirs is a philosophy of power vested in an absolute monarch who rules by severe punishments, through iron codes of law which apply to high and low alike, without any exceptions save the ruler himself, since he alone makes the law and therefore only he is dispensed from it. (Finer, 1997, pp. 466–7)
A more cynical view of human potential is difficult to imagine, and it led naturally enough to a philosophical underpinning for absolute despotism. The ruler was bound by neither law (because he made them) nor ethics (because ethics has nothing to do with politics). And what was to be the substance of the laws that the ruler promulgated? These were to be “directed solely at the benefit of the state as a whole.”12 Advice similar to that offered by the legalists would be offered to the prince some two thousand years later by Machiavelli. 12
Finer (1997, p. 468).
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D. The Han Empire The legalists’ advice was put into practice during the Ch’in state (361–206) from which China derives its name. Of more interest for us, however, is the Han Empire, which followed it and lasted more than four centuries because “the Han Empire . . . set the pattern for all future Chinese government up to and including the present day.”13 It established a large bureaucracy to administer a highly centralized state. In this its chief innovation was that the bureaucracy was filled with educated scholars. Here we see the influence of Confucianism. However, the empire also had a rigid and harsh legal code that reflected the influence of legalism and functioned as a two-stratum state. At the top were the educated bureaucrats, a kind of aristocracy of the intelligentsia. At the bottom were the illiterate masses deferring to those of rank and obeying the legal code. Each person knew her position in society, to whom she owed obedience, and who owed obedience to her. Thus, in its social and political structure the Chinese state, of which the Han Empire was the embodiment, can be classified as an “organic state” in which individuals qua individuals do not appear. In the Chinese state, “the prevalent belief systems, and the social structure all came to support one another as never since the high days of Mesopotamian and Egyptian government and emphatically as never in the West.”14 This mutual reinforcement of ideology and social and political structures explains the great longevity of the Chinese state, but also the total lack of democracy during its long history.
E. Appraisal The Chinese state in its various forms is in many ways as remarkable as that of Sumer. It also invented writing and made many other technological advances. Its art and literature reached high levels of artistic quality and sophistication. Its state apparatus was built on “the largest bureaucracy in human history,” and in terms of longevity, the Shang kingdom and Han Empire compare favorably with those in the West and in other parts of the world.15 At the same time, China never fulfilled the promise of its early history. In an influential essay, Mancur Olson (1993) described the rise of the state in China as occurring when “stationary bandits” replaced the kind 13 14 15
Finer (1997, p. 524). Finer (1997, p. 442). Donald (1991, p. 295).
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of “roving bandits” depicted in the film The Seven Samurai. Peasants have little incentive to accumulate stores of grain and other forms of wealth if a roving bandit can always come by and take it away from them. Stationary bandits allowed peasants to keep some of the wealth that they generated and thus provided them a greater incentive to invest in their land. The increased productivity of the land made both peasant and bandit/ruler better off. Peasantry and ruler settle into a form of partnership. Over time, roving bandits disappeared and so too wars between local rulers. Ironically, the ensuing stability may explain why China never achieved the potential of its early technological and administrative successes. While revolutions and civil wars can destroy property and lives, they also shake up class structures and present opportunities to innovators. As peace and prosperity settled into China, its innovative leadership disappeared, and its political institutions atrophied into bureaucratically run despotism.16 China is an archetypical traditionalist society.17 Homage is paid to the wisdom of the ancients; the wisdom of the elderly dominates the ideas of the young. The eldest member of a family receives the most respect. The emperor’s authority derives from both his ability to mete out rewards and punishments and the veneration traditionally due him because of his office. When one recognizes the important role played by iconoclasts and the young in advancing science, it is unsurprising that scientific progress lagged in a society such as China’s with its traditionalist bent. In the West, innovation is a bottom-up process driven by the curiosity of the scientist or inventor and the daring of the entrepreneur. In China, on the other hand, innovation has often been a top-down process with the state introducing the innovations. The inherent conservatism of a bureaucratic state would have been a further hindrance to innovation in China. Thus, the weight of traditionalism on China prevented it from following up on its many, early technological advances and developing into a modern, progressive state with a thriving scientific community. An important handicap to the development of democracy in China, if not to science, was the form of writing it invented. Chinese writing consists of thousands of ideograms and unlike Western and most other languages, is not truly phonetic. Learning how to write in Chinese is thus a long process, and has historically been restricted to a small elite. A large illiterate population is not a fertile ground for the development of democratic institutions. 16 17
Pagden (2008, pp. 298–302). As, for example, defined by Horton (1982).
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V. Conclusions Sumer, Egypt, Persia, China, and some of the other empires of the ancient world made many important and sometimes amazing technological and social innovations. Some of their surviving works of art and architecture – like the pyramids of Egypt – inspire awe even today. The most important innovation of this time for the future of human society, however, was without question the invention of writing. Although first invented as a tool for keeping records of transactions as an aid to accounting, it eventually became an aid to reasoning and allowed humans to construct abstract theoretical models. First, signs of this potential use of theoretical reasoning can be seen in the astronomical charts, clocks, and maps that were developed in these ancient societies to improve agriculture, navigation, and of course, warfare. However, a realization of the full potential of man’s powers of reason would have to await the appearance of the Greek city-states – so too would the appearance of democracy. Most of the ancient empires might well be characterized as theocracies. An emperor or pharaoh is either a god himself or the emissary of the gods. He and his band of priests both govern the state and serve as intermediaries between the gods and the citizen masses. The latter can scarcely be called citizens under the modern interpretation of this concept, because they possessed little in the way of rights and no institutions through which they could express their preferences about what the state should be doing. Thus, everyday life and beliefs in the first states were, except for a privileged few, not much different after the invention of writing than before. Myths and religious beliefs played dominant roles in everyday life, and the class of priests could be relied on to predict the future, produce good harvests, and make sure that one enjoyed a good time in the afterlife. An important exception to this pattern was China. Although the basic social structure in China was similar to that in Sumer, Egypt, and Persia – a despot at the top, a ruling, educated elite immediately beneath him, and a mass of illiterate subjects at the bottom – it differed from these other states in that religion did not play the kind of legitimating role that it did in the other empires. Confucianism and legalism do not posit the existence of supernatural agents and an afterlife, and thus do not qualify as religions as we have defined them. They do represent systems of values, however, and certainly helped to shape the Chinese sense of identity. Confucianism and legalism preached honor and obedience to the ancients, one’s elders, and most of all to the emperor, and thereby made China a traditionalist society, like
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Sumer, Egypt, and the other states where religion underpinned the power of the rulers. Instead of priests, the Chinese emperor ruled with the help of an educated intelligentsia, who manned the great bureaucracy that defined the Chinese state. How different this state was from the ones that grew up in Greece.
FIVE
Athens and Rome
The only good is knowledge and the only evil is ignorance. (Socrates) We are lovers of beauty without extravagance, and lovers of wisdom without unmanliness. Wealth to us is not mere material for vainglory but an opportunity for achievement; and poverty we think is no disgrace to acknowledge but a real degradation to make no effort to overcome. Our citizens attend both to public and private duties, and do not allow absorption in their own various affairs to interfere with their knowledge of the city’s. We differ from other states in regarding the man who holds aloof from public life not as “quiet” but as useless; we decide or debate, carefully and in person, all matters of policy, holding, not that words and deeds go ill together, but that acts are foredoomed to failure when undertaken undiscussed. For we are noted for being at once most adventurous in action and most reflective beforehand. (Pericles as presented in Thucydides, 1943, p. 113)
Starting about 800 bce, a society emerged around the Aegean Sea unlike any before it, a society that “had a totally new conception of what human life was for, and showed for the first time what the human mind was for.”1 It organized itself into city-states, but except for their territoriality, they bore no resemblance to the city-states of Mesopotamia. They were democratic to a degree unknown until that time and almost unknown since. As such, they contain important lessons for every student of democracy. In a meaningful sense, the city-state can be said to be the most important innovation of the Ancient Greeks. It was not simply a set of institutions by which the Greeks organized their political life; it shaped and defined all aspects of their everyday life – political, economic, social, and cultural. “The city-state was the means by which the Greek consciously strove to make the 1
Kitto (1957, p. 7).
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life both of the community and of the individual more excellent than it was before.”2 This goal for the city-state resembles that set forth for the state in Chapter One – advancing the interests of all of its members. As noted there, the word interests need not – and by me certainly is not – interpreted to mean narrow, material interests. If individuals have lofty goals, then the state should help them achieve these goals. By today’s standards, the Greeks had very lofty goals. “Excellence to the Greek, aretˆe, meant excelling in intellectual, physical, practical, and moral activities, it meant achieving the utmost of man’s potential as man.”3 In this chapter, we review the history and accomplishments of the Greeks and describe the democratic institutions that they created. We then very briefly turn to a discussion of the Roman Empire and its institutions.
I. The Greek City-State – Background As with other ancient civilizations, Greek society was formed by migrating bands that probably arrived in the Balkan Peninsula around 2000 bce.4 Over the next few centuries, the Mycenaean Empire arose, whose archaeological remains suggest strongly fortified cities with a warlike people. The Mycenae was invaded by Doric Greeks probably as early as 1200 and fully concurred by them by around 1100, after which a “Dark Ages” ensued for roughly three centuries. The area occupied by the Greeks consisted of many islands, and even the mainland was broken up into pockets of inhabitable, arable land by its mountains, water, and rocky terrain. Thus, the physical characteristics of the area occupied by the Greeks favored the development of small, isolated, fairly autonomous communities, much as the mountains and valleys of Switzerland were to do centuries later. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Greek states were small in both geographic expanse and population. Geographic differences help explain why some city-states like Athens became democracies and others like Sparta remained autocracies. The dry, hilly, rocky terrain around Athens favored growing olives. Yields from olive trees vary greatly depending on labor inputs. Thus, there were high payoffs in Athens to providing farmers with strong incentives for putting effort into tending olive trees. Such efforts could be forthcoming if individual farmers had rights to specific pieces of property and the products of their efforts. To secure these rights, it was necessary to share political power with the 2 3 4
Kitto (1957, p. 11). Kitto (1957, pp. 171–2). All future dates referring to Greece in this chapter are bce.
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citizens. Thus, property rights and the suffrage of citizen-farmers emerged in Athens in part because of the physical characteristics of the land and the type of economic activity that they fostered.5 In contrast, the fertile plains surrounding Sparta lent themselves to large grain farms worked by disenfranchised serfs whose efforts could be easily monitored. Sparta thus remained an oligarchy run by rich owners of large estates, whereas Athens resembled more closely a community of yeomen farmers. The more egalitarian distribution of income that emerged in Athens because of its terrain and mode of agricultural production is also consistent with Boix’s (2003) thesis that democracy only emerges in communities with fairly egalitarian distributions of wealth. In Athens, citizenship carried with it the obligation to equip oneself as a soldier and fight in battle. The possession of property by the citizens added to their incentive to fight to defend Athens or add to its wealth and territory. Indeed, the emergence of individual property rights probably increased the sense of territoriality among the Athenians, which became very important in the development of their concept of citizenship.6 Because our focus is on democratic institutions, we concentrate on the Athenian city-state’s salient features when describing the political institutions of Ancient Greece. However, first let us review its intellectual accomplishments and the role of religion in Greek society.
II. The Birth of Science and Reasoning Between 1100 and 700, the Greeks acquired their alphabet through trade with the Phoenicians. It consisted of twenty-two consonants. The Greeks supplemented these with symbols for vowels, added three new consonants, and created the first truly phonetic script. This first Greek alphabet would become the basis for all later Indo-European alphabets. The invention of the phonetic alphabet reduced the memory load imposed by reading skill and allowed a much wider diffusion of literacy. Instead of remembering six or seven hundred hieroglyphs or cuneiforms, or several thousand ideograms, the reader of the early Greek alphabet could achieve literacy with about two dozen phonograms, or letters. The main advantage of the alphabet was the economy and precision with which it allowed the reader to map visual displays of symbols onto spoken language . . . Judging from the measurable success of writing systems – ease 5 6
See Fleck and Hanssen (2006). Lyttkens (2006) emphasizes the importance of the emergence of territorial boundaries and territorial identifications in the development of legal and political institutions in the Greek city-states.
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of use, speed, and popularity – the alphabet is by far the most successful method of writing ever invented. (Donald, 1991, pp. 297–8)
Thus, although the Greeks did not invent writing and external storage systems, their alphabet allowed them to enter and retrieve items from external storage much more quickly and easily. This in turn allowed them to greatly expand the content of these external storage systems and to develop the theoretic attitude. Until writing could be combined with other visual symbolic media, the theoretic attitude, that is, the deliberate analytic use of symbolic thought, had little chance to develop. Ancient Greece, from around 700 b.c., was undoubtedly the birthplace of theoretic civilization. In Greece, human thought suddenly came into its own simultaneously in a number of fields: philosophy, mathematics, geometry, biology, and geography to name a few . . . In effect, the Greeks were the first to fully exploit the new cognitive architecture that had been made possible by visual symbolism . . . The critical innovation was the simple habit of recording speculative ideas – that is, of externalizing the process of oral commentary of events. Undoubtedly, the Greeks had brilliant forebears in Mesopotamia, China, and Egypt, but none of these civilizations developed the habit of recording the verbalizations and speculations, the oral discourses revealing the process itself in action. The great discovery here was that, by entering ideas, even incomplete ideas, into the public record, they could later be improved and refined. Written literature for the first time contained long tracks of speculation – often very loose speculation – on a variety of fundamental questions. The very existence of these books meant that ideas were being stored and transmitted in a more robust, permanent form than was possible in an oral tradition. Ideas on every subject, from law and morality to the structure of the universe, were written down, studied by generations of students, and debated, refined, and modified. A collective process of examination, creation, and verification was founded. The process was taken out of biological memory and placed in the public arena, out there in the media and structure of the ESS [external storage system]. What the Greeks created was much more than a symbolic invention, like the alphabet, or a specific external memory medium, such as improved paper or printing. They founded the process of externally encoded cognitive exchange and discovery. (Donald, 1991, pp. 340–3, emphasis in original)
The collective process of accumulating knowledge invented by the Greeks is perhaps most transparent and best known to us from the dialectics employed by Aristotle, Plato, and the other great Greek philosophers. Rhetoric, a particular form of search for knowledge, can also be included in the list of Greek inventions, and their philosophers used it to great effect. The “collective process of examination, creation, and verification” also constitutes the basis of scientific method, which was first employed on a wide and systematic scale by the Greeks. This development was greatly facilitated because “the process of demythologization was well advanced
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in Greece, perhaps more so than in any society until two millennia later, during the European Enlightenment.”7 At last, scientific thought reached a climax with the brilliant intellectual freedom of Greece. The Greek mind was remarkably free of transcendental restrictions, which would reserve hazy areas to mysterious action of the gods. The Greeks lived in the here and now, in a lucid world open to human action and human perception; their gods on Olympus were part of the Greek landscape and Greek life, an intimate part of their cultural scenery. The feeling of powerless before the elementary forces of nature was lifted. The observation of nature became imbued with a pantheistic sense of poetry; science became a facet of philosophical thought. The leap from the mythological cultures of the ancient East to the world-minded Greek culture raised science from a level of scattered empirical observations to the order of a consistent natural philosophy, with cosmology its main object. The Greek mind was the first to replace a mythical, or religious, view of the cosmos with rational interpretations; the first therewith to expand the scope of science to the dimensions of the universe. In this sense, the popular idea that science began with the Greeks is justified. Even if respectable though scattered beginnings [what Mokyr (2002, pp. 18–19) refers to as “singletons”] had preceded the Greeks by some three thousand years, we may think of Greek science as the first systematic and inclusive attempt to explain the entire natural cosmos. (Goldstein, 1995, pp. 45–6)
Goldstein’s observation is nicely illustrated in the work of Thales. The “Greeks, practical men that they were, had a passion for asking useless questions.”8 Where did we come from? What is the world made of? What is virtue? Truth? Although other peoples had posed such questions before, none had posed so many or pursued the answers as far as the Greeks. Thales was one of those who posed in typical Greek style the question, “What is the world made of?” The answer he gave to this question “was based on nothing but abstract reasoning . . . [completely free] from any form of religious mysticism, such as one might reasonably expect from a thinker whose predecessors had all expressed themselves in mythological terms.”9 “As he saw it, cosmos and earth had been formed by a natural process, no longer through an act of the gods.”10 Even if we do not today accept Thales’ answer – that the whole world was made of water – his method for finding the answer is still in use today. Thus, the distinguishing feature of the Greeks might well have been their “firm belief in Reason.”11 In Ancient Greece, rational thought moved to 7 8 9 10 11
Donald (1991, p. 342). Kitto (1957, p. 178). Kitto (1957, pp. 179–80). Goldstein (1995, p. 49). Kitto (1957, p. 176).
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center stage. We can identify the development of two quite different variants of rational thought processes in Greece, variants that continue to exist and to divide scholars to the present day. The first was a faith in the power of pure a priori reasoning. They believed that truth can be found by reasoning alone; knowledge gained from the senses or from observing the real world would only lead one away from the truth. Underlying the apparent complexity and variety observed in the real world lay a few, simple universal laws that, when understood, explained the workings of the universe. This line of reasoning led to the development of both metaphysics and mathematics and to major contributions in each. One need only mention the names of a few proponents of this approach – Euclid, Zeno, Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato – to realize the extent of its development and the importance of its contributions. Abstract reasoning was carried to its extreme limits by Pythagoras and his followers. Pythagoras saw an intrinsic natural order in the world, an order that took a mathematical form. His vision of the world was one of “a mathematically structured cosmos, evolving according to basically simple laws of inner and outer harmony; a cosmic projection of the Greek sense of the underlying dynamic harmony of all being.”12 Goldstein goes on to observe that “Pythagoras’ vision of the world . . . has influenced our thinking to this day.” Although pure a priori reasoning can take one to heights that an empiricist could never reach, a wrong turn along a logical path can also lead one far astray. To give but one example, having discovered a relationship between sound and numbers, namely that a note one octave above another was created by a string half as long as that creating the first note, the Pythagoreans jumped to the conclusion that there must be a mathematical basis for everything – the universe, art, sculpture, even religion and morality. Thus, the Good became the number one, Justice four, and other moral concepts appeared as higher squares of whole numbers. The other variant of a rational thought process that can be attributed to the Greeks is what we call today scientific method – a succession of hypothesis formulation, testing, reformulation, and further testing – logical inference informed by observing and gathering data from the real world. The word hypothesis is appropriately of Greek origin. This form of reasoning comes closest to that previously described by Merlin Donald. The first name here would, of course, be Aristotle, but we might also mention the great 12
Goldstein (1995, p. 54).
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mathematician Archimedes. Even if we do not accept the story of his testing his famous principle of buoyancy by hopping into a bathtub, the usefulness of the inventions that followed from his ideas, like the Archimedes’ screw, suggests a concern on his part with more than just the elegance of a mathematical proof. Thus, at the head of the list of the innovations owed to the Ancient Greeks must go the process of logical reasoning. The Greeks posed the most profound questions that mankind faces, and then went about answering them unencumbered by the superstitions and myths that previous societies had relied on for answers. Although not all of the answers that they came up with have stood the test of time, their methods of finding them certainly have.
III. The Role of Religion in Greece In politics, philosophy, mathematics, astronomy, art, and literature, the Greeks produced giants whose stature remains undiminished even today. Yet its religion was a pygmy by modern standards. How could a people who produced an Aristotle and Plato adhere to an animistic polytheism filled with preposterous myths? Why was some form of monotheism not invented by the Greeks? It would take us too far afield to try to offer full answers to these questions, but because the tension between religion and democracy is one of the issues raised in this book, the questions cannot simply be ignored. The Greeks’ polytheism is easy to explain. They were an amalgam of different peoples and had simply appropriated the various gods of the peoples absorbed into their culture. Because they had no overarching religion, the Greeks found it easy to abandon or neglect religion. We have already emphasized the Greeks’ inquisitive nature. The myths and their associated gods offered answers to questions concerning the origin of the Greeks, the sun and the sea. At the beginning of their history these answers might have satisfied most Greeks, but as their powers of reasoning developed, they would prove less and less satisfactory. Here we might cite again the example of Thales. A Greek god was not a Supreme Being who could do no wrong and had to be obeyed unquestioningly. Greek gods were bigger-than-life humans with the same passions and foibles as humans. Because they were human-like, their actions could be measured by the same powers of reasoning as applied to man. “This form of religion induced the thinking Greek into something that Egyptians, Sumerians, Babylonians, Assyrians, and Jews were
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incapable of: applying rational and indeed secular calculation to nature and to man himself.”13 Greek religion reflected human weaknesses. It provided the Greeks with a theology of sorts, but unlike Judaism, not with a morality. Therefore, the Greeks did not turn to the gods for moral guidance because they were incapable of providing it. Nor could they turn to an organized priesthood, for there was none. They had to provide answers to the great moral questions themselves with the help of great thinkers like Homer, Aeschylus, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. In this respect, it is legitimate to call Athens a secular state because religion played no role in its public decisions. The Greeks would turn to the gods for help in battle after they had decided to go to war, but the decision to go to battle they made themselves in the assembly in which all citizens could and which a majority did participate. Nevertheless, myths and superstitions die hard in all societies, and this was true even of Ancient Greece. For example, Hippocrates, the founder of professional medicine, had to struggle to separate the teaching of medicine from religion at his school in Cos as late as the fourth century bce.14 The unimportance of religion in Greek life is perhaps best symbolized by Pericles’ funeral oration to celebrate the memory of those fallen in battle. On such an occasion today, no American politician and most likely no European politician could refrain from making references to God and beliefs that the souls of the departed find peace in Heaven. In the more than seven pages that Thucydides devotes to Pericles’ oration, there is not one reference to any gods or to an afterlife. Instead, Pericles chooses the occasion to describe Athenian society and contrast it with Sparta and its other neighbors. He explains to those gathered to mourn the dead what it was they died for: Therefore I do not mourn with the parents of the dead who are here with us. I will rather comfort them. For they know that they have been born into a world of manifold chances and that he is to be accounted happy to whom the best lot falls – the best sorrow, such as yours to-day, or the best death, such as fell to these, for whom life and happiness were cut to the same measure. (Thucydides, 1943, p. 116)
IV. Politics in Greece A. Structural Characteristics Throughout its history, the Greek state consisted of three strata:15 13 14 15
Finer (1997, p. 328). Donald (1991, p. 342). See Finer (1997, pp. 330–1).
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Table 5.1. Structural characteristics of the Greek state Structure of the Greek state Homeric times King (basileus) Council of elders (gerontes) Assembly of warriors (agora)
Fifth century Magistrate Elected council (boule) Assembly of citizens
At first kingship was hereditary, and the council of elders were members of the aristocracy. Over time, the hereditary king was replaced by elected “tyrants” and eventually by magistrates who served for one year and were usually selected by lot except where expertise was important, as with generals and admirals, who were elected. The first major step toward democracy in Greece was Solon’s freeing the serfs in 594. This action turned Attica into a land of small landholders, and produced a relatively even distribution of wealth across the area, thereby producing Boix’s (2003) key prerequisite for democracy. Although slavery existed in Greece, it did not take the form of the large latifunda worked by slaves in the Roman Empire, or the plantations of the Old South in the United States. Keeping slaves to work the small plots of land that each citizen owned was uneconomical, because the slaves would eat as much food as they could grow. Each citizen owned only a few slaves and typically used them as house servants.16 Once they became landowners, the citizens of Athens had something to protect against – foreign invasion. Each citizen knew that the defense of Athens and his property depended on his willingness to defend it, and thus the link between citizenship and serving in the military developed with the Solon reforms. An additional reform of Solon was to create a council of four hundred to prepare business for the popular assembly, a reform that Hornblower (1992, pp. 4–5) designates as the first political innovation in European history.
B. The Cleisthenes’ Reforms The Athenian city-state of the fifth century is not only the first example of a true democracy, it is the first and to this day one of the few examples of a set of political institutions consciously designed and created to achieve a democratic objective. During the seventh and sixth centuries, Athens was 16
Kitto (1957, pp. 131–2).
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ruled in turn by various tyrants and aristocratic oligarchies. As wealth accumulated, different factions formed among the aristocracy based on tribal lineage, geographic location, or occupation. These factions engaged in the kinds of distributional struggles that James Madison described so well in Federalist 10. Today we would call these factions rent-seeking coalitions. Toward the end of the sixth century, Cleisthenes – himself an aristocrat – put an end to the divisive rent seeking “by inventing a preposterous paperconstitution which in fact worked perfectly.”17 The genius in Cleisthenes’ design was to break up the existing coalitions into ten divisions (phylae) that cut across the previous ethnic, economic, and geographic lines. In turn, each phyle was broken into several smaller units called deme. Citizenship was largely based on heredity but was not automatic. Citizenship was granted first of all in the deme and then extended to the polity as a whole, and thus, because of their small number, members of a deme could easily determine whether a son of one of its members deserved citizenship on reaching age eighteen. Each phyle was named after an Athenian hero, had its own corporate identity, its own source of revenue from rents, and its own assembly.18 Thus, Cleisthenes’ constitution introduced a decentralized structure, which gave each citizen a strong incentive to participate in the democratic process. Moreover, because membership in a phyle cut across ethnic, class, economic, and geographic lines, each citizen’s welfare was tied to that of the greater community rather than to a narrowly defined faction or interest group. “A new Kleisthenic tribe was not a bunch of docile voters in the pocket of a great family; instead, it was a chimera, made up of bits from the three regional parts of Attica, and so much harder to bribe or coerce. Its members trained as soldiers together, they might act together as a pressure group in the law courts, and they served together as ‘tribe in prytany’ for an annual month of presidency over the assembly.”19 Thus, Cleisthenes’ constitution changed individual incentives away from zero-sum redistributions of wealth to positive sum improvements in the general welfare.20 Under Cleisthenes’ constitution, the assembly of citizens was the main decision-making body, with the council still playing an agenda-setting role. The council then had five hundred members selected by lot, fifty from each
17 18 19 20
Kitto (1957, p. 106). Finer (1997, p. 344). See Hornblower (1992, p. 9). The literature seems to be equally divided about whether the great Greek reformer’s name should be written with a C or a K. Pagden (2008, pp. 17–18).
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of the ten phylae into which the polity was divided. Every citizen had the obligation to attend assembly meetings, although not all did. In principle, every citizen could be selected to serve in the council for a year or to be a magistrate for a year. The assembly met only from time to time, but the council was in continual session. Each day it elected one of its members to be its foreman, which was equivalent to being the president of the republic. He would preside over the council’s meeting or, if the assembly was in session, the assembly. Thus, every citizen of Athens had the possibility of being the president of the republic, and many over the course of their lifetimes assumed this role. The Athenians were also the first to introduce term limits, and of a most stringent form. An elected foreman served for only one day and could never be reelected – such was the fear of the Athenians at the peak of their democratic era of leaders usurping power. The structure of the Council of Five Hundred was the key to Cleisthenes’ reforms. “The Council of Five Hundred was a way of involving all of Attica in decision-making, not just the city population which found it easiest to attend political meetings. The words for the regional equality thus produced was [sic] isegoria or ‘equality of speaking’ (in the council, that is). That word, and perhaps demokratia (quite literally, ‘people-power’), are the only slogans we can associate with Kleithenes himself . . . ”21
C. Citizenship Like the Hebrews, the Greeks thought of themselves as different from all other peoples, different not in the sense that they had a privileged relationship to God, but in the sense that they had a privileged relationship to one another – they were Greeks and not barbarians (non-Greeks). And what was distinctive about being a Greek? He was a free man, free not necessarily in living in a democracy, but in the sense of being a citizen who had certain rights who was ruled by laws. “Greek Tragedy is built on the faith that in human affairs it is Law that reigns, not chance.”22 Moreover, the laws that reigned were not dictated from above by a god or sacred king, but arose from the collective decisions of the citizens themselves. The Greek citizen was free to seek redress from the courts if he felt that he had been injured, and defend himself in front of the courts if he was accused of injuring someone. And there he would be tried by juries of his citizen peers.23 21 22 23
Hornblower (1992, p. 8). Kitto (1957, p. 176). See Kitto (1957, pp. 7–9) and Finer (1997, pp. 354–7).
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The purpose of the polis was to express and secure the good of its citizens.24 The polis was a boundary. The word itself derives from a root meaning “wall.” This boundary was not merely a mark of security from external coercion . . . at Athens the creation of the boundary was directed inward, spurred by the need to institutionalize an intention not to practise or be subject to coercion. The ancient polis created a space between slavery and tyranny. This was not, as Plato’s Glaucon suggests, a cynical compromise, but a glorious achievement. The boundary that distinguished citizen (polites) from noncitizen marked out a realm of personal efficacy, order, and relative equality. Slavery and tyranny were genuine threats. Citizenship in the polis offered tangible benefits: freedom, the security of one’s own good, the opportunity to win honour by guiding and defending the community. The polis was an instrument of justice; the rule of law was meant to ensure that each man received his due. Politics was the expression of the freedom to participate in ordering one’s own life, a freedom denied to women or slaves and unavailable to indentured peasants. The polis was quite literally the guarantor and the boundary of this freedom. By its very nature, then, citizenship in the polis was both intimately connected to personal well-being and discontinuous with personal characteristics. Political status abstracted from personal attributes, including one’s place in a social or economic hierarchy. The citizen occupied a place formally set off from the household world of production and reproduction inhabited by slaves and women. (Farrar, 1992, pp. 18–19)
No people have ever taken citizenship more seriously than the Greeks.25 The same word, politeia, stood for citizenship, the body of all citizens, and the constitution. State and citizens were synonymous; the quality of the state (polis) depended on the quality of the citizens. To the Greek rhetorician Isoscrates, this symbiosis between citizenship and constitution was the soul of the polis.26 Greeks cherished their citizenship and did not bestow it lightly, at least when Greek democracy was most vibrant. Citizenship could be withdrawn in toto or in part by taking away some of a citizen’s rights. Thus, several levels of citizenship existed, with the highest level carrying with it the right to participate in the public assembly and hold public office. Sons of Greek citizens would generally become citizens in time, but this was not automatic. Foreigners could acquire citizenship by service to the state. Even slaves were sometimes granted citizenship in exchange for fighting in a war. Citizenship carried with it the obligation to serve in the 24 25 26
Farrar (1992, p. 17). The discussion in the next few paragraphs draws heavily from Ehrenberg (1969, pp. 38–48), and MacDowell (1978, pp. 67–83). See also Kitto (1957). Isocrates (1929, VII at 13, 14).
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military, and to equip oneself for battle. Thus, in Ancient Greece, soldier and citizen were one. This link helps explain why women were not citizens – they did not serve as soldiers. Therefore, in Athens obligations to the state and benefits from it were closely entwined. Being a Greek meant being a citizen with all of the rights and obligations that this implied. This aspect of Greek citizenship is nicely illustrated in the following passage from the same funeral oration quoted earlier, as attributed to Pericles by Thucydides (1943, II, §37). For our government is not copied from those of our neighbors: we are an example to them rather than they to us. Our constitution is named a democracy, because it is in the hands not of the few but of the many. But our laws secure equal justice for all in their private disputes, and our public opinion welcomes and honours talent in every branch of achievement, not for any sectional reason but on grounds of excellence alone. And as we give free play to all in our public life, so we carry the same spirit into to our daily relations with one another. We have no black looks or angry words for our neighbor if he enjoys himself in his own way, and we abstain from the little acts of churlishness, though they leave no mark, yet cause annoyance to whoso notes them. Open and friendly in our private intercourse, in our public acts we keep strictly within the control of law. We acknowledge the restraint of reverence; we are obedient to whomsoever is set in authority, and to the laws, more especially to those which offer protection to the oppressed and those unwritten ordinances whose transgression brings admitted shame.
What is particularly striking in this paragraph is the way Pericles intertwines Athens’ democratic institutions and its cultural traits that, by implication, both foster and are fostered by them. No distinction was made between a citizen’s private and public life, as the quotation that opens this chapter makes clear. The “man who holds aloof from public life” was regarded as “useless.”27 Contained in this notion of citizenship was the assumption that a citizen was capable of exercising his public duties. This assumption was explicit in the obligation to serve in the military and to be able to equip oneself for battle, but was also implicit in the obligation to serve in the assembly or the Council of Five Hundred – and to do so intelligently and conscientiously. Thus, implicit in the notion of Greek citizenship, and the creation of Greek democracy was an assumption that citizens had the capacity to not only make decisions for themselves in their private lives but also for the community. Moreover, collective decisions would seek to promote the good of the community. Thus, it is no coincidence that democracy first appears in the first society capable of engaging in the kind of rational thinking associated 27
Thucydides (1943, p. 113).
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with modern science and, more generally, modernity. It was also no coincidence that this society invented an alphabet, which extended to a far greater fraction of the population the power to acquire knowledge. At its zenith, Athenian democracy came as close to embodying the fundamental attributes of democracy as any political system has. What we should learn from this first flowering of democracy is that good government does not come cheaply. It requires the active participation of a body of citizens who possess the knowledge and mental capacity to carry out their responsibilities as citizens, and who are willing to bear the costs in time, money, and energy of discharging these responsibilities.
V. Appraisal of the Contributions of Ancient Greece “This [the Greek] polity is extraordinary. It was a miracle of ingenuity and design, one of the most successful, perhaps the most successful, of political artefacts in the history of government.”28 It is difficult not to share Finer’s judgment. When one contemplates the Greeks’ contributions to architecture, astronomy, mathematics, philosophy, science, sculpture, the arts in general, and theater, one stands in awe. All of these came about because for the first time in human history man’s mind was freed from superstition to follow whatever path it chose. Of all the Greek gifts to mankind, perhaps the most important was the demonstration of the human potential for rational thought, the power of reason. Nowhere is this power more evident than in Cleisthenes’ constitution: an “artefact” of the mind that transformed a society of rent seekers into the first and, until today, one of the most successful democracies of all time. Here it is worth correcting an error that many, including James Madison, seem to have made about Athenian democracy. “Hence it is that such [pure] democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.”29 In Athens, however, taxation was by modern standards quite light and such major redistribution measures as canceling debts or redistributing land were never “even contemplated there.”30 Madison was grossly in error, therefore, if he had Athens in mind when he castigated pure democracies. 28 29 30
Finer (1997, pp. 367–8). Madison (1937, p. 58). Finer (1997, pp. 364–5).
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Nor can one claim that the Athenian democracy was short-lived. It survived with two brief interruptions from 510 to 322 – longer than any of today’s Western democracies save for the United States. Moreover, it perished not because of internal strife and turbulence caused by the excesses of a raving, democratic mob, but because the Athenian city-state, despite its many virtues as a place to live, was too small to defend itself against its neighbors.31 The last point to stress is the Greeks’ great optimism – optimism about man’s capacity to reason and optimism about the potential for selfgovernment. Where today suggestions to adopt novel political institutions tend to be treated with much scepticism – particularly among political scientists – for the Greeks the novelty of Cleisthenes’ constitution was, if anything, a point in its favor, such was the confidence of the Greeks in the creative powers of the human mind and enthusiasm for what was new.32 Such optimism tends to be associated with liberalism, as this term is used today in the United States or to some extent as it was used in Europe in the nineteenth century. Liberals are optimistic about man’s capacity to reason, and thus tend to be optimistic about the future outcomes that will come from democratic action. They are the progressives in Horton’s (1982) dichotomy. Conservatives, on the other hand, are traditionalists, pessimistic about man’s capacity to reason and thus fear the outcomes that will come from democratic action.33 Thus, one can associate optimism about human nature with liberalism, which in turn is associated with support for (belief in) democratic institutions. Conservatism, on the other hand, is associated with a pessimistic outlook regarding man’s capacities and support for more authoritarian political structures. Cleisthenes and Pericles symbolize the liberal democrat in Ancient Athens: Plato, the conservative, autocratic mind-set.34
VI. Rome In many ways, Rome surpassed the Greek city-states in both its achievements during its existence and in its influence on Europe’s future development. At its peak, the Roman Empire stretched from the Iberian Peninsula in the west 31 32 33 34
Finer (1997, pp. 347–8, 367–8). Kitto (1957, pp. 106–7). For further discussion of the links between optimism and liberalism, and pessimism and conservatism, see Mueller (1990, pp. 423–7). Karl Popper (1945) most famously exposes the authoritarianism of Plato, although one can argue that Popper’s objectivity was distorted by the world events at the time that he wrote.
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to the British Isles in the North, as far east as the Caspian Sea and around the eastern part of the Mediterranean across northern Africa. It gave birth to Christianity, which became the religion of the West. In part because of the spread of Christianity, the Roman language – Latin – also became the common language of scholars for more than a millennium and the foundation for the Romance languages. Our interest is in the development of rational thinking, however, and its relationship to democracy. In these areas, Rome’s accomplishments are much more modest. The leap from a mythical to a theoretical culture had already been made by the Greeks. Rome had some great minds in the fields of history and rhetoric – Cato, Cicero, Polybius, and Plutarch to mention a few. However, the Greeks invented the fields of history and rhetoric, and the great Roman thinkers did not eclipse Thucydides, Socrates, Aristotle, and Plato. Rome never became nor ever attempted to be a democracy. For these reasons, the discussion of Rome is briefer than for the Greeks.
A. Politics in Rome Where Greece’s rugged countryside favored small farms worked by their owners, the broad and rich plains surrounding Rome combined with the institution of slavery favored the large latifunda. These led to considerably more income inequality in Rome than in Athens and the other Greek citystates and to the rise of an aristocracy. The Roman aristocracy had much to protect, and it used the political process to do so. During the period of the Republic, 509 to 82 bce, Rome was essentially an oligarchy controlled by the aristocracy.35 The structure of Rome’s political institutions resembled those of the Greek city-state. There were magistrates, a council (Senate), and popular assemblies. The role of the Senate was supposed to be purely advisory, with the authority to pass legislation and elect the magistrates lying entirely with the assemblies. However, a member of an assembly could neither propose legislation nor offer amendments. Proposals were placed before the assemblies by a magistrate and had to be voted up or down. Thus, the magistrates along with the Senate were the agenda setters, and generally used their positions to great advantage. Magistrates came from the aristocracy; the Senate was also drawn from the leading aristocratic families, plus former magistrates, making the Roman Republic a de facto aristocracy. 35
Finer (1997, pp. 385, 432–5) favors these dates. In the discussion of the Roman Republic, I once again rely heavily on Finer.
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The Republic’s constitution was riddled with various checks and balances. Certain magistrates were empowered to veto actions by an assembly, but other magistrates could block such a veto. In 494 bce, a new category of magistrate was created – the tribune – and an additional assembly to which he submitted legislation. This development was in response to a rebellion by the plebs – Roman citizens who were not patricians (members of the aristocracy by birth). The richest plebs in particular wished to share the power of the patricians, and achieved this goal by opening up the office of tribune to themselves. A tribune, like other magistrates, could unilaterally block the legislation of an assembly. In response to pressure from the plebs, several later reforms strengthened their political power in the Republic. Thus, by 134 bce, the Roman constitution consisted “of two systems, or better, a system and an anti-system, for the one was designed to check the other.”36 Each system in turn contained its own set of veto players who could block its actions. Unlike the case of the United States, the checks and balances in the Roman constitution did not arise as part of a coherent design of political institutions with specific outcome objectives in mind. They arose in an ad hoc manner over time in response to the numerous crises that plagued the Republic. Each new crisis resulted in the creation of a new institution, designed to check the institution that caused the recent crisis. The end result was a bewildering political structure with multiple assemblies of citizens, small decision-making councils, and numerous veto players. Given the Roman constitution’s bizarre formal structure, it is a wonder that the whole system did not collapse out of pure inertia. Yet it did not, at least not until the first century bce. Indeed, it functioned admirably until the end of the second century bce; although an oligarchy, it was a limited one because of its many checks and balances. Moreover, the rights of the aristocracy carried with them obligations. For example, until late in the Republic’s life, military service was restricted to those with property except for situations of extreme emergency. The values most esteemed by Romans were: gravitas – sobriety, judiciousness, prudence; pietas – dutifulness, acting rightly or properly; simplicitas – a plain frugal way of living.37 These qualities, along with the goals of glory, honor, and reputation that the aristocracy shared, led aristocrats to perform their offices responsibly for roughly the first four hundred years of the Republic. Although the formal constitutional structure created numerous obstacles to good government, 36 37
Finer (1997, p. 397). Finer (1997, p. 392) and Pagden (2008, p. 61).
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various informal conventions allowed the aristocracy to circumvent these obstacles for the good of themselves and of Rome.38 The system of government worked to the benefit of rich and poor alike, and was viewed as legitimate by all classes until the end of the second century bce. At that time, the wealth pouring back into Rome began to create great inequalities. The continual launching of new campaigns required more and more men to be drafted into the army. The requirement that soldiers own property was dropped and the army became filled with men with no stake in the country who simply wished to make money. The virtue of frugality gave way to the vice of greed, oratory to bribery, and the aristocracy degenerated into rival factions quarreling over the spoils of battle and office. In 82 bce, the general Sulla abandoned the constitution and the Republic was essentially at an end, although it lived on in name only through another fifty years of civil war.
B. Roman Citizenship One democratic institution adopted from the Greeks was the notion of citizenship. Citizenship in Rome, as in Greece, was divided into categories with the highest categories carrying the right to vote for one’s leaders and hold office. Where Greek citizenship was tied to the polis and given out stingily, Romans were more liberal in granting citizenship. Allowing people in the conquered lands to become Roman citizens was one way of winning their loyalty. Thus, one could be a Roman citizen and a Gaul, Greek, or Jew at the same time. Being a Roman was not an ethnic designation, but rather “more a status and state of mind.”39 In the Roman Empire, the idea first appears that individuals possess certain rights. A Roman was a citizen of the Civitas and this conferred on him rights like habeas corpus protection. Of course, such rights would be worthless without a judicial system to enforce them, therefore, codified Roman law and the justice system became important complements to Roman citizenship.40 One had to be physically present in Rome to vote in the Assembly, so that as a practical matter, participation in the political process was restricted to citizens living in or near Rome. As noted in the previous section, during the early years of the Republic, people took pride at being a Roman citizen and were willing to make sacrifices for the state in the form of paying taxes and fighting in the army to defend and expand the state. As the Republic collapsed, this willingness to sacrifice for the state gave way to selfish greed. 38 39 40
See Finer (1997, pp. 388, 396–8, 413). Finer (1997, p. 389). Pagden (2008, pp. 89–94).
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C. Religion in Rome The Romans were a very superstitious people. In the Republic’s early years, they believed their lives were governed by supernatural forces embodied in stones, rivers, trees, and plants. Later, these spirits lodged in natural objects were replaced by human ones when the Romans assimilated the Etruscan and Greek gods. As in many tribal societies, Romans believed that the future could be predicted and altered by performing certain rituals and paying heed to various omens. “Developed Roman religion became, above all else, a network of elaborate spells, incantations, rituals, and sacrifices, each performed with exactitude. . . . ”41 These incantations and rituals had to be performed by priests who were members of certain “colleges.” These priests were drawn from the aristocracy and, given how superstitious the Romans were, played an important role in the day-to-day life of Rome. Here we have another important difference between Ancient Rome and Greece where a class of priests did not exist. Because virtually every public act required the performance of a certain ritual, priests exercised considerable power over the state. For example, a priest could postpone a meeting of the Assembly to decide some important issue by merely pronouncing that there were bad omens at the present time. Because priests, senators, and magistrates all came from the aristocracy, religion tended to cement the aristocracy’s control over the people. When one thinks of Rome and religion today, one thinks not of the pagan religion that reigned during the Republic, but of Christianity, which captured Rome long after the Republic disappeared. At first it seems surprising that Christianity took hold in the Hellenistic world of the Roman Empire and not in Palestine where Jesus and his disciples lived. This development becomes less surprising when one recognizes the important role of superstition (religion) and ritual in Roman life. Moreover, by the time Paul and Christ’s other followers began preaching, a large proletariat without property existed in the Roman world. Christianity’s messages – that the poor shall inherit the earth, that a glorious afterlife awaited the devout Christian, and that Jesus was soon to return to earth to take all good Christians back to Heaven – fell on ears eager for reasons to hope.42 Another important cause of Christianity’s success was its egalitarianism. Religious practices were not restricted to a small subset of the aristocracy as was true in Rome when Christianity first appeared, but were open to 41 42
Finer (1997, p. 391). Ekelund and Tollison (2008), and Ekelund, Tollison, and Vasilescu (2008) emphasize the importance of this feature of Christianity in getting converts to this new religion.
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all – even women. Women’s greater status under Christianity made them devout followers of the religion, and because of the important role they played in raising and educating children, key figures in the religion’s spread. These factors help explain the demand for the new religion on the part of Romans. Ekelund and Tollison (2008) have a supply-side explanation for why the empire adopted Christianity. They claim that Christian ethics provided certain benefits for the Roman state in the form of lower policing costs and lower outlays for the poor. The relatively unified nature of the Christian religion also helped unify the quarreling factions in the empire by giving all Romans a common religion. Thus, more probably laid behind Emperor Constantine’s conversion to Christianity in 313 ce than just having seen the light of divine revelation. In closing this discussion of Rome, it is perhaps appropriate to consider Edward Gibbon’s explanation for the rise of Christianity and its contribution to the fall of the Roman Empire. Gibbon gave five reasons for Christianity’s success: I. The inflexible and, if we may use the expression, the intolerant zeal of the Christians – derived, it is true, from the Jewish religion but purified from the narrow and unsocial spirit which, instead of inviting, had deterred the Gentiles from embracing the law of Moses. II. The doctrine of a future life, improved by every additional circumstance which could give weight and efficacy to that important truth. III. The miraculous powers ascribed to the primitive church. IV. The pure and austere morals of the Christians. V. The union and discipline of Christian republic, which gradually formed an independent and increasing state in the heart of the Roman Empire. (Gibbon, 1952, pp. 261–2)
Gibbon places particular emphasis on the importance of a belief in an afterlife. When the promise of eternal happiness was proposed to mankind on condition of adopting the faith and of observing the precepts of the Gospel, it is no wonder that so advantageous an offer should have been accepted by great numbers of every religion, of every rank, and of every province in the Roman empire. The ancient Christians were animated by a contempt for their present existence and by a just confidence of immortality, of which the doubtful and imperfect faith of modern ages cannot give us any adequate notion. In the primitive church the influence of truth was very powerfully strengthened by an opinion, which however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, has not been found agreeable to experience. It was universally believed that the end of the world and the kingdom of heaven were at hand. The near approach of this wonderful event had been predicted by the apostles; the tradition of it was preserved by their earliest disciples; and those who understood in their literal sense the discourses of Christ himself were obliged to expect the second and glorious coming of the Son of Man in the
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clouds before that generation was totally extinguished . . . Whilst the happiness and glory of a temporal reign were promised to the disciples of Christ, the most dreadful calamities were denounced against an unbelieving world. (Gibbon, 1952, pp. 276–7, footnote omitted)
With respect to the early church’s miraculous powers, Gibbon had this to say: Besides the occasional prodigies, which might sometimes be effected by the immediate interposition of the Deity when he suspended the laws of Nature for the service of religion, the Christian church, from the time of the apostles and their disciples, has claimed an uninterrupted succession of miraculous powers, the gift of tongues, of vision, and of prophecy, the power of expelling demons, of healing the sick, and of raising the dead. (Gibbon, 1952, pp. 279–80)
Gibbon then goes on to illustrate the egalitarian nature of the early church, which made it so popular among the poor and especially among women. The divine inspiration, whether it was conceived in the form of a walking or sleeping vision, is described as a favour very literally bestowed on all ranks of the faithful, on women as on elders, on boys as well upon bishops. When their devout minds were sufficiently prepared by a course of prayer, of fasting, and of vigils to receive the extraordinary impulse, they were transported out of their senses and delivered in ecstasy that was inspired, being mere organs of the Holy Spirit . . . (Gibbon, 1952, p. 280)
This passage is followed by a description of publicly performed exorcisms at which “the vanquished demon was heard to confess,” and resurrections of the dead. He notes wryly the case of a bishop of Antioch who refused a challenge from a noble Grecian to produce someone who had been raised from the dead, even though the Grecian had promised to convert immediately to Christianity if the bishop were able to do so. Gibbon devotes considerable space to the austerity of the early Christians and their adverseness to both the world of business and “the pleasures of this world.” The acquisition of knowledge, the exercise of our reason or fancy, and the cheerful flow of unguarded conversation may employ the leisure of the liberal mind. Such amusements, however, were rejected with abhorrence or admitted with utmost caution by the severity of the fathers, who despised all knowledge that was not useful to salvation and who considered all levity of discourse as a criminal abuse of the gift of speech. (Gibbon, 1952, pp. 286–7)
Many factors played a role in the fall of the Roman Empire including, according to Gibbon, Christianity.
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As the happiness of a future life is the great object of religion, we may hear without surprise or scandal that the introduction, or at least the abuse, of Christianity had some influence on the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. The clergy successfully preached the doctrines of patience and pusillanimity; the active virtues of society were discouraged; and the last remains of military spirit were buried in the cloister. A large portion of public and private wealth was consecrated to the specious demands of charity and devotion, and the soldiers’ pay was lavished on the useless of multitudes of both sexes who could only plead the merits of abstinence and charity. Faith, zeal, curiosity, and more earthly passions of malice and ambition kindled the flame of theological discord; the church and even the state were distracted by religious factions, whose conflicts were sometimes bloody and always implacable; the attention of the emperors was diverted from camps to synods; the Roman world was oppressed by a new species of tyranny, and the persecuted sects became the secret enemies of their country. (Gibbon, 1952, pp. 622–3, emphasis in the original)
Gibbon’s description of the Roman citizen after his conversion to Christianity contrasts starkly with Pericles’ description of the Greek citizen. Where the Greek citizen concentrated on the present life and was willing to make sacrifices for the state to improve the present life, the Christian Roman withdrew his support for the state and concentrated on the afterlife.
VII. Conclusions No one epitomized the Athenian spirit better than Socrates, the “gadfly” who questioned everything. It is highly appropriate that teaching by questioning is still today called the Socratic method. However, anyone who questions everything – the power of the establishment, the social and political status quo – is bound to make enemies as Socrates did. His trial and conviction for corrupting the minds of youth by questioning tradition is a sobering reminder of the powerful role traditionalism can play even in societies as progressive as Ancient Athens. Condorcet ([1795]1955, p. 45) claimed that “the death of Socrates . . . was the first crime that marked the beginning of the war between philosophy and superstition, a war which is still being waged amongst us between this same philosophy and the oppressors of humanity. . . . ” Although the Greeks achieved some important victories in this war, by the time of Rome’s fall and Christianity’s triumph, the battle was almost completely lost. Gibbon’s description of the early Christians – despising all knowledge that was not useful for salvation and considering levity as a criminal abuse of the gift of speech – could not be further from the character of the Athenians at their best. For the thinking Greek, all knowledge was useful and he sought it in every conceivable branch of learning. Moreover,
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the whole purpose of acquiring knowledge was to understand and improve the present life. Although religion played a more important role in Roman life prior to the adoption of Christianity than in Greek life, Roman religion was a pagan religion and like all local religions was concerned with the present life. Rituals and sacrifices were intended to secure benefits or avoid misfortunes in this life. The priesthood served as intermediaries between the gods and spirits in this endeavor. Christianity’s spread throughout Europe caused a profound reorientation of intellectual activity. The concept of original sin – totally foreign to Greek and Roman society – implied that life on this earth must be one of suffering and atonement. The collapse of the Roman Empire literally brought an end to civilization as it had been understood for a millennium, and reinforced the view that the present life was destined to be one of misery. Thus, the main thrust of intellectual activity shifted toward understanding what the afterlife would be like and to discovering what must be done in this life to ensure happiness in the next. The powers of reason were diverted from the study of nature and man on this earth to the study of God and the afterlife. The “Dark Ages” were a period of prolonged economic contraction. Although it is wrong to think of this period as one of total intellectual atrophy – technological advances continued to be made in agriculture, military affairs, architecture, and other applied arts – it is correct to say that the potential for major advances in science, mathematics, engineering, philosophy, and so many other branches of knowledge that arose in Greek society failed to be realized in the roughly one thousand years after the fall of Rome. Significant progress in these areas only resumed when European minds rediscovered the great works of Ancient Greece and Rome, and reoriented themselves back toward life on earth instead of in Heaven.
SIX
The Caliphate
The recompense of those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger and do mischief in the land is only that they shall be killed or crucified or their hands and their feet be cut off on the opposite sides, or be exiled from the land. That is their disgrace in this world, and a great torment is theirs in the Hereafter. (Koran 5:33)1
I. The Rise of Islam A. The Revelations In the early seventh century ce, a wealthy merchant in Mecca by the name of Mohammed would frequently retire to the cave of Hira to pray and meditate. He is reputed to have remained in the cave until he ran out of food and then return after replenishing his provisions. Around 610, he began to have dreams that purportedly anticipated the events of the following day. These were followed by visions, which he interpreted as visits from the archangel Gabriel. Sometimes the angel appeared as a man, twice “in the form in which he was created – with 600 wings.”2 The visitations had an immense emotional impact on Mohammed and at one point he is said to have exclaimed, “I fear that I have gone mad.”3 The conditions under which Mohammed experienced his revelations are not unique. Stark (2004, ch. 5) identifies the following circumstances under which revelations can profoundly affect a religion’s founding: (1) They occur in periods of social crisis, (2) They occur at a time when there is widespread belief in the existence of revelations. (3) The person experiencing the 1 2 3
As-Sallaabee (2005, p. 1475). As-Sallaabee (2005, pp. 127–43). As-Sallaabee (2005, p. 143).
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revelations knows other persons who have had visions or experienced revelations, or (4) The initial account of the person experiencing the revelations is believed by the immediate circle to which he relates them. Stark claims that all of these conditions were satisfied for Moses, Jesus, Mohammed, and Joseph Smith Jr., founder of the Mormon religion. A cousin of Mohammed’s wife, Waraqa ibn Naufal, had visions predicting the coming of an Arabian prophet. Smith’s father also had visions. The father of Jesus’ good friend John the Baptist was visited by the archangel Gabriel announcing the Baptist’s birth and, of course, the same angel visited Mary to announce the coming of Jesus. Mohammed’s visits to the cave recall Christ’s forty days in the desert following his baptism. As with Mohammed’s time alone in the cave, Christ’s stay in the desert must have created considerable emotional and psychological stress. Where Mohammed was visited by the archangel Gabriel, Christ was visited and tempted by the devil. Upon emerging from the desert, Christ begins to preach the word of God, just as Mohammed does following his experience in the cave. The religion of Arabia at that time was a pagan polytheism. Major elements of Mohammed’s message were that there was but one God – Allah – and that a Day of Judgment was soon to come when Allah would appear on earth, the dead would rise from their graves, and Allah would decide who would travel to Heaven or descend into Hell. To avoid the latter fate, one had to obey the will of Allah as revealed by the prophet Mohammed. The religion of the day was well suited for a nomadic, rural people, but a large fraction of the Arab population by the seventh century was urbanized and had difficulty reconciling tribal traditions with urban life. Mohammed’s message appealed to an urban people and prescribed rituals suited for urban living – communal prayer on Fridays, calls to prayer from a nearby mosque’s minaret, and the Ramadan, a month of fasting broken by recuperative evening meals.4 Mohammed, like Jesus, was obviously a charismatic figure. Edward Gibbon gives the following description of him: According to the tradition of his companions, Mohammed was distinguished by the beauty of his person . . . Before he spoke, the orator engaged on his side the affections of a public or private audience. They applauded his commanding presence, his majestic aspect, his piercing eye, his gracious smile, his flowing beard, his continence that painted every sensation of the soul, and his gestures that enforced each expression of the tongue. In the familiar offices of life he scrupulously adhered to the grave and ceremonious politeness of his country; his respectful attention to the rich and powerful was dignified by his condescension and affability to the poorest 4
McNeill (1963, p. 424) and Finer (1997, p. 681).
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citizens of Mecca; the frankness of his manner concealed the artifice of his views; and the habits of courtesy were imputed to personal friendship or universal benevolence. His memory was capacious and retentive; his wit easy and social; his imagination sublime; his judgment clear, rapid, and decisive. He possessed the courage both of thought and action; and although his designs might gradually expand with his success, the first idea which he entertained of his divine mission bears the stamp of an original and superior genius. (Gibbon, 1952, pp. 651–2)
B. The Spread of Islam In the twenty years of his life that remained after he began preaching, Mohammed won many followers, and Islam spread on the backs of its armed converts. In addition to being a charismatic leader, Mohammed was a brilliant military strategist. At one of the early and most important battles at Badr 624 ce,5 he had his troops line up in rows, “just as they are lined up for prayer.”6 This strategy was new to Arab warfare and proved quite effective. Even the ritual of praying to Allah five times a day in a carefully prescribed way tended to serve the same purpose as marching drills do – to develop discipline in the army.7 According to Islamic tradition and the Koran, the Muslims’ religion played a more direct role in the victory at Badr. Allah sent angels to fight at their sides: And Allah has already made you victorious at Badr, when you were a weak little force. So fear Allah much (abstain from all kinds of sins and evil deeds which He has forbidden and love Allah much, perform all kinds of good deeds which He has ordained) that you may be grateful. (Remember) when you (Mohammed) said to the believers, “It is not enough for you that your Lord (Allah) should help you with three thousand angels; sent down?” “Yes, if you hold on to patience and piety, and the enemy comes rushing at you; your Lord will help you with five thousand angels having marks (of distinction).” Allah made it not but as a message of good news for you and as an assistance to your hearts. And there is no victory except from Allah, the All-Mighty, the All-Wise. (Koran 3:123–6)8
Some four centuries later, the fickle angels would join the side of the Christians during the First Crusade and help them to victory over a Muslim army at Antioch – at least, this was the explanation given by the Christians for their surprise victory.9 5 6 7 8 9
All dates in this chapter are ce. As-Sallaabee (2005, p. 972). McNeill (1963, p. 428, n.). See As-Sallaabee (2005, p. 984). Pagden (2008, pp. 188–9).
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Many verses of the Koran recount Mohammed’s exhortations to his soldiers before battles. Some are designed to instill hope (as in the previous verse promising support from angels) so that his soldiers fight bravely, others to instill fear of the consequences of turning tail and running. O Prophet (Mohammed)! Urge the believers to fight. If there are twenty steadfast persons amongst you, they will overcome two hundred, and if there be a hundred steadfast persons, they will overcome a thousand of those who disbelieve, because they (the disbelievers) are people who do not understand. (Koran 8:65)10 Then fight (Mohammed) in the Cause of Allah, you are not asked (held responsible) except for yourself, and incite the believers (to fight along you), it may be that Allah will restrain the evil might of the disbelievers. And Allah is Stronger in Might and Stronger in punishing. (Koran 4:84)11 The fire; they are exposed to it, morning and afternoon, and on the Day when the Hour will be established (it will be said to the angels): Cause Pharaoh people to enter the severest torment! (Koran 40:46)12 Think not of those who are killed in the way of Allah as dead. Nay, they are alive, with their Lord, and they have provision (Koran 3:169)13 O you who believe! What is the matter with you, that you are asked to march forth in the Cause of Allah (i.e., Jihad) you cling heavily to earth? Are you pleased with the life of this world rather than the Hereafter? But little is the enjoyment of the life of this world as compared with the Hereafter. Koran 9:38)14
Mohammed is purported to have made the following exhortation to his soldiers just before the battle of Uhud (625): O people, what Allah commanded me to do in his Book, I command you to do (now): Work in His obedience and desist from the matters that he forbade. Indeed, today you are in a place of reward savings (i.e., reward that you are saving for the Hereafter), at least for those among you who know their responsibilities and then prepare themselves to fulfill them, upon patience, certainly (of faith), seriousness, and activeness. For indeed, fighting against the enemy is hard and unpleasant; few are those who patiently do it. For indeed, Allah is with those who obey Him, and the devil is with those who disobey Allah. So begin your deeds with patience upon jihad, and in doing so, search out for what Allah promised you. And you must follow what I command you to do, for indeed, I ardently want you to do what is right. And indeed, discord, disagreement, and losing heart are part of what it means to be incapable and weak, which Allah does not love, and for which Allah grants neither help nor victory.15 10 11 12 13 14 15
See As-Sallaabee (2005, p. 975). See As-Sallaabee (2005, p. 975). See As-Sallaabee (2005, p. 990). See As-Sallaabee (2005, p. 990). See As-Sallaabee (2005, p. 1827). See As-Sallaabee (2005, p. 1114).
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Although this speech suggests that Mohammed believed victory depended on the bravery and discipline of his troops, some verses of the Koran make it clear that the Muslims’ victories were entirely due to the intervention of Allah. You Killed them not, but Allah killed them. And you (Mohammed) threw not when you did throw but Allah threw, that He might test the believers by a fair trial from Him. Verily, Allah is All-Hearer, All-Knower. (Koran 8:17)16 If Allah helps you, none can overcome you; and if He forsakes you, who is there after Him that can help you? And in Allah (Alone) let believers put their trust. (Koran 3:160)17
Following the victory at Badr, a debate ensued over what to do with the prisoners. One proposal was to demand ransom from them, another was to behead them. The Prophet opted for a pragmatic compromise – those that paid ransom would be set free, the rest would be beheaded. Given these sorts of options, it is little wonder that many polytheistic Arabs chose to convert to Islam rather than risk defeat in battle against it.
C. Miracles Mohammed’s life, like that of Jesus, was filled with miracles. We list but a few to give the reader their flavor, beginning with those already mentioned. 1. Mohammed has dreams predicting future events. 2. Mohammed is visited by the archangel Gabriel. 3. Three (five) thousand angels fight on the side of the Muslims at Badr. 4. During the battle of Badr, enemy heads are seen falling to the ground without having been struck by a sword, apparently the work of the angels.18 5. During the battle of Badr, Ukkaashah ibn Maihsin’s sword breaks. The Prophet gives him a piece of wood, which immediately turned into “a long, powerful white sword.” Ukkaashah ibn Maihsin continues to use the sword for years after the battle.19 6. While alone and unarmed, Mohammed is approached by the leader of the Muhaarib tribe who carries a sword. He asks, “‘Mohammed, who will protect you from me today?’ The Prophet responded, ‘Allah,’ at which point [the archangel Gabriel] pushed [the tribal leader’s] chest 16 17 18 19
See As-Sallaabee (2005, p. 1041). See As-Sallaabee (2005, p. 1208). See As-Sallaabee (2005, p. 986). See As-Sallaabee (2005, p. 1053).
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causing his sword to fall to the ground.” Mohammed picks up the sword and the tribal leader prudently decides to become one of his followers.20 7. At the so-called Battle of the Confederates (Clans) before Mount Sal, Allah sends “a cold, violent wind along with angels to cast terror in the hearts of the enemy.”21 8. Digging of trenches before the Battle of the Confederates is halted because of “a large piece of solid, hard earth.” Mohammed strikes it with a pickax and it immediately turns to dust.22 9. At the Battle of Hunain (630), Allah sends angels to help the Muslims. Mohammed tosses two handfuls of pebbles and dirt toward the polytheists. Pebbles and pieces of dirt enter “the eyes of every single person from the opposing army.”23 10. Reminiscent of Jesus feeding a large crowd with a few fish and loaves of bread, Mohammed performed similar feats on numerous occasions: on one such occasion, a large number of troops is fed with bread made from four handfuls of barley and a slaughtered baby goat; on another, they are fed with a handful of dates; on the way to the battle of Tabuk (632), the Prophet calls to Allah for rain to quench his soldiers’ thirst, and it rains; on the same march, he feeds his soldiers with small quantities of bread, corn, and other foodstuffs.24 What is interesting about these and other miracles in the life of Mohammed, in contrast with those that supposedly surrounded the life of Christ, is that they so often helped the Muslims win battles or saved Mohammed’s life.
D. Appraisal In a short time – much shorter than was true for Rome – the Islamic Empire spread ro extend from western India and China to the most western part of Europe. This remarkably rapid expansion attests to the prowess and courage of the Islamic soldier, which stemmed in no small part from his religion. Where Christianity’s symbol is the suffering Godhead, Islam’s is the armed Prophet.25 Mohammed urged his followers to fight in the name 20 21 22 23 24 25
See As-Sallaabee (2005, p. 1061). See As-Sallaabee (2005, p. 1381). See As-Sallaabee (2005, p. 1395). See As-Sallaabee (2005, p. 1758). See As-Sallaabee (2005, pp. 1395–7, 1845, 1849). Finer (1997, p. 666).
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of Islam, and assured them that martyrdom in the pursuit of this cause would take them to Heaven.26 This belief, along with the belief that the Day of Judgment was imminent, played an important role in getting Islamic fighters to kill and die for Islam. Moreover, each victory on the battlefield provided evidence of Allah’s greatness, and the knowledge that he was fighting on the Muslim side stimulated further acts of courage.27 Although students of history might question the accuracy of the estimated number of angels fighting on the Muslim side at Badr, what is important about this story is that the Muslims themselves believed it, and that many Muslims still do so today. On September 12, 2006, Pope Benedict XVI gave a speech at the University of Regensburg in which he quoted Manuel II, a fourteenth century Byzantine emperor: “Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.”28 Rioting ensued in Muslim countries and at least one person was killed, an Italian nun in Somalia. Although the speech cannot be regarded as the pope’s finest ecumenical moment, it is difficult to discount the importance of the sword for the rapid advance of Islam. The passages of the Koran quoted earlier depict an Allah who took a keen interest in the Muslims’ performance on the battlefield and counseled his Messenger as to how to be victorious. Jihad in the name of Islam at the empire’s founding certainly meant armed fighting on the battlefield. Death in battle meant martyrdom and a free pass to Heaven. For Gibbon, the remarkable thing about the empire was not the speed at which it grew, but its longevity: The talents of Mohammed are entitled to our applause, but his success has perhaps too strongly attracted our admiration. Are we surprised that a multitude of proselytes should embrace the doctrine and the passions of an eloquent fanatic? In the heresies of the church the same seduction has been tried and repeated from the time of the apostles to that of the reformers. Does it seem incredible that a private citizen should grasp the sword and the sceptre, subdue his native country, and erect a monarchy by his victorious aims? In the moving picture of the dynasties of the East, a hundred fortunate usurpers have risen from a baser origin, surmounted more 26
27 28
See Esposito (2002, p. 33). Given Islam’s history, it is understandable that Pope Benedict XVI was surprised by the critical reaction of many Muslim clerics and politicians to a speech he delivered in September 2006 in which he quoted critical remarks by a medieval Christian scholar about the way in which the Muslim religion was introduced across the Middle East. McNeill (1963, p. 426). See http://catholicanalysis.blogspot.com/2006/09/full-text-of-popes-regensburg-speech 18.html.
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formidable obstacles, and filled a larger scope of empire and conquest. Mohammed was alike instructed to preach and to fight; and the union of these opposite qualities, while it enhanced his merit, contributed to his success. The operation of force and persuasion, of enthusiasm and fear, continually acted on each other till every barrier yielded to their irresistible power. His voice invited the Arabs to freedom and victory, to arms and rapine, to the indulgence of their darling passions in this world and the other; the restraints which he imposed were requisite to establish the credit of the prophet and to exercise the obedience of the people; and the only objection to his success was his rational creed of the unity and perfections of God. It is not the propagation but the permanency of his religion that deserves our wonder . . . (Gibbon, 1952, pp. 658–9)
Although the religion that Mohammed founded proved to be durable, the empire he launched did not. The Caliphate did not last as long as the Roman Empire that preceded it, the Ottoman Empire that followed it, or its closest neighbor and contemporary rival, the Byzantine Empire. It disintegrated some three hundred years after Mohammed’s death. We now review the Caliphate’s religious, political, and scientific achievements.
II. The Religion of the Caliphate – Islam Islam, like the other historic religions of the Middle Ages – Christianity in the remnants of the Roman Empire and Europe, neo-Zoroastrianism in Iran, and Buddhism in India and China – claims that only its followers worship the one, true God. Therefore, only its followers can enter Heaven. Each of these religions is confessional, consisting of communities of believers, each of whom is personally responsible through his actions for whether or not he ascends into Heaven. Under Islam, this community is called the umma. Because salvation was restricted to members of the faith, in each area in which one of the historic religions reigned, the leaders of the state sought to impose their religion on their subjects often using torture and death to convert nonbelievers and punish heretics. Compared to Christianity and neo-Zoroastrianism, Islam was relatively tame in this respect. Throughout most of the empire, non-Muslims were allowed to live and practice their religions, although they possessed fewer rights than Muslims and had to pay a special tax to the state.29 Mohammed believed that Jesus, Moses, and some of the other major figures in Jewish history were also prophets, but that the Jews and 29
See the discussion in McNeill (1963, p. 424), Finer (1997, pp. 613–16), and Lewis (2000, p. 56).
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Christians had lost God’s Divine message, and thus God had spoken to him, Mohammed, to bring this message back to earth. Islam was the one true religion of Abraham. After Mohammed’s death, it was necessary to collect his teachings so that they could be used to obtain more converts to Islam. Some six thousand verses attributed to Mohammed were brought together in the Koran. Although composed by Mohammed, the verses were taken to be the word of Allah, and thus the Koran “was uncreated, hence coeval and co-eternal and co-immutable with God himself.”30 Islam rests on the so-called Five Pillars. The first is to utter the shahada before witnesses: “I testify that there is no God but Allah, and I testify that Mohammed is the Prophet of Allah.” The second – the salat – is to pray five times a day in a position demonstrating obeisance to Allah and facing Mecca. The sakat requires obligatory contributions to charity. The fourth – the sawm – is an annual fast during the month of Ramadan, and the fifth – the hajj – is to make a pilgrimage to Mecca. “The Muslim aim was to serve God as He wished to be served, utterly without reservation. In practice this meant unquestioning obedience to Mohammed, God’s messenger.”31 In addition to the basic obligations of the Five Pillars, the Koran contains a plethora of prescriptions governing in minute detail almost every aspect of daily life. No other religion before or since has placed so many and exacting constraints on individual behavior. With time, these strictures on individual behavior came to be called the Shari’a – the Sacred Law. Only two Muslim countries from the Middle East and North Africa – Lebanon and Turkey – have legal systems that make no reference to the Shari’a. In all other Muslim countries, the laws are inspired to various degrees by the Shari’a. The objective behind the Five Pillars and Koran’s prescriptions is to ensure that one gets into Heaven. Life on earth is oriented toward obtaining life in Heaven. Each individual has the power to secure a place in Heaven if she follows the dictates of the Koran. They are there for everyone to read and practice. Thus, Islam has no need for a clergy to perform rituals to aid the faithful in their quest for Heaven or to intervene between God and the individual follower of the faith. Under Islam, each individual is personally responsible for following the proscribed rituals and communicates directly through prayer with God. Islam has, therefore, no hierarchical structure of clergy as does the Catholic Church, although over time a body of interpreters 30 31
Finer (1997, p. 667). McNeill (1963, p. 422).
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of the Shari’a – the ulema – has developed. Ironically, the Islamic Republic of Iran has created a hierarchical religious structure resembling that of the medieval Catholic Church “with the functional equivalents of a pontificate, a college of cardinals, a bench of bishops, and, especially, an inquisition, all previously alien to Islam.”32 Each of Islam’s two predecessors, Judaism and Christianity, rose to importance without being a state religion. After fleeing Egypt, the children of Israel wandered in the wilderness for forty years before entering the Promised Land and their leader Moses never did enter it. Jesus was crucified and his followers persecuted for centuries, until the Roman Emperor Constantine adopted Christianity and it became a kind of state religion. In stark contrast, Mohammed was both the Prophet and the leader of the Islamic state, and led much of its expansion during his lifetime. Thus, church and state have been combined under Islam from its inception and remain so in the minds of most Muslims today. Where schisms within Judaism and Christianity have been precipitated by divergent interpretations of scripture and the proper role of the clergy, schisms within Islam have typically not been because of differences in interpretation of holy text, but have instead been caused by power struggles within the empire. The Shiites, for example, came into existence following the assassination of Ali in 661. Ali was the cousin and son-in-law of Mohammed and had become caliph in 656 following the assassination of Othman. Ali’s blood ties to Mohammed were thought to legitimize his claim to be caliph, but not all potential claimants agreed; hence, his assassination and the splintering off of his followers. The Sunnites descend from the time of al-Mahdi’s rule as caliph, 775–85. In an effort to legitimize the caliph’s authority in matters of state, al-Mahdi proposed creating two spheres of law. One was to pertain to matters of daily life and be governed by the Shari’a as interpreted by the ulema; the other to matters of state, like taxation, where the word of the caliph was to be law. This compromise raised the status of the ulema and thus won their support. Muslims who accepted this compromise came to be called Sunnites. Still later, a mystical dimension was added to Islam by the Sufists.33 The Caliphate was subject to far more political unrest in the form of mutinies and territorial revolts than, say, its neighbor Byzantium – by one count there were forty-two uprisings between 632 and 944.34 Although religion was not the sole factor in many of these, it was a factor in all 32 33 34
Lewis (2002, p. 122, footnote omitted). See discussion in McNeill (1963, pp. 432–40) and Lewis (2000, pp. 51–85; 2002, pp. 112–13). Finer (1997, pp. 701–4).
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of them. It must also be said, however, that the political structure of the Caliphate lent itself to rebellions and civil wars.
III. The Politics of the Caliphate Finer (1997, pp. 674–9) classifies the Caliphate as a “Palace-type polity” along with the Chinese, late Roman, and Byzantine empires. He identifies four salient characteristics of it: 1. The authority of the caliph was supposed to be conferred by Allah, making him “the shadow of Allah on earth.” Many caliphs claimed to be descended from Mohammed.35 This claim was often difficult to verify, however, and could be made by others, which led to frequent struggles for control of the Caliphate upon a caliph’s natural death or murder. 2. All state decisions were made by the caliph in the palace. Unlike in most palace polities, however, the decision as to who should be the caliph was not made in the palace, as say when there was a clear hereditary line. Decisions regarding succession were made outside of the palace and were a continuing cause for rebellion and political unrest. 3. The policies of the Caliphate were implemented by a state bureaucracy, and the state was protected by an army. To a large extent, the bureaucracy governing a particular territory was the same one that was in place when the Caliphate conquered it. Thus, much of the bureaucracy that governed the Caliphate was in the hands of Christians, Byzantines, and Sassanids, not Muslims. 4. Following the compromise introduced by al-Mahdi, and to some extent even before, there were no legal or procedural restraints on the caliph regarding state matters, and he was a true despot. In practice, however, the status of the Shari’a placed some constraints on him, as did the need to retain the loyalty and cooperation of local elites. The Caliphate was organized as a loose federation of governorships. A governorship, like say Egypt, would have its own governor, bureaucracy, and army. It would be responsible for raising taxes to cover its own expenses and to pay tribute to the central Caliphate. Much of the wealth of the Caliphate, which at its zenith was immense, was obtained through conquest and pillage. However, it was also one giant common market that encouraged trade and the accumulation of wealth. 35
van Creveld (1999, p. 38).
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Once the empire stopped growing, the first source of wealth disappeared. To maintain the many palaces and lavish lifestyle of the caliph and his entourage, taxes needed to be continuously raised, eventually producing much discontent. Within the Caliphate there was no sense of public purpose. It expanded by conquest and lived like a parasite off the peoples it conquered, always taking more from the people than it gave back.36 Taxation was a kind of extortion of the citizenry, with tax collectors descending on villages and expecting to be fed and housed free of charge. Often villagers were forced to sell their grains or livestock quickly to pay their taxes, and thus did not receive fair value for them. Those unable to pay were subject to sometimes quite brutal punishment.37 Corruption has probably existed as long as the state has existed, but the Caliphate raised it to a new level. Indeed, institutionalizing corruption might be described as the major (if not the only) political innovation of the Caliphate. The most important person in the empire, other than the caliph, was his vizier. Among the vizier’s duties was ensuring that taxes were dutifully collected across the empire and that the revenue flowed into the palace’s coffers. Candidates for vizier had to bid for the post. They raised funds for their bids by promising attractive posts as tax farmers to financial backers, and striking bargains with those who already had high-ranking positions. Once a vizier took office, all members of the “winning coalition” recouped their bets by skimming off tax revenue on its way to the palace. Because each new appointment of a vizier brought a fresh flow of bribes into the caliph’s privy purse, frequent hiring and firing of viziers became common. A new vizier fined or arrested the outgoing vizier and all of his appointees, and sometimes obtained the funds he needed by the threat of torture. Once they had paid up, however, members of the previous ruling clique became eligible to bid for other positions: “What we see, in fact, is quite extraordinary. It is not just a thoroughly corrupt fiscal system, for that is quite common in a large number of Third World states today, [but] it amounts in effect to a privatization of public administration based on systemized corruption.”38 Just as the existence of corruption is a major obstacle to economic growth in Third World countries today, the scale of corruption in the Caliphate contributed greatly to its economic decline. For example, wheeled vehicles all but disappeared in the Middle East during the 36 37 38
Finer (1997, p. 675). Finer (1997, pp. 722–3). Finer (1997, p. 723), emphasis in the original. The discussion in this paragraph draws on Finer (1997, pp. 723–4).
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Middle Ages, because they were a conspicuous example of wealth that could be easily seized by local authorities.39 Subjects under the Caliphate – it is difficult to call them citizens – had no rights against it. Although they suffered most from this lack of rights when it came to taxation and the state’s appropriation of their property, the caliph’s authority could and was exercised arbitrarily in other areas.40 Over time, discontent with the Caliphate grew. Because of the empire’s great size, it could take months for an army to reach a remote province to squash a rebellion. Because these provinces had their own armies and administrations, rebellion was tempting. The desire to rebel grew with the tax burden on the provinces and was further fed by the many religious differences that divided Muslims from non-Muslims, and the schisms within Islam itself. In the middle of the tenth century, the Islamic Empire fell apart, never to return again.41
IV. Science in the Caliphate The Islamic Empire absorbed a wide spectrum of cultures. This intermingling of different peoples, languages, and religions stimulated a flowering of Islamic culture. The wealth generated by the empire’s large common market provided Muslim scholars with the leisure to engage in intellectual pursuits.42 Moreover, the importance of commercial life in the empire influenced the direction in which Arab science developed. Where Western science came to unite itself with the strong technological bent of the northern-European people, Islamic science was primarily colored by social and commercial interests. Where Western science . . . evolved from the beginning within a tight framework of theoretical thought, Islamic science was essentially marked by a happy-go-lucky diversity of philosophical views, reflecting the crazy-quilt pattern of its various component cultures. Islamic science . . . seemed to lack the need for a consistent intellectual framework – a compelling need the West inherited from traditional Medieval philosophy. Science in the Muslim world was inspired by the pleasurable observation of nature’s diversity and the uses of its bounty for the enhancement of life. It had little concern for establishing a mastery of the mind over nature through tight philosophical systems, or for proving human power through the relentless technological transformation of the natural environment . . . (Goldstein, 1995, p. 99)
39 40 41 42
Lewis (2002, pp. 175–6). Finer (1997, p. 720). Lewis (2000, pp. 80–2). McNeill (1963, p. 434); Goldstein (1995, ch. 4).
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The Koran encourages its readers to study and try to understand nature and “to listen to the words of the scientist.” Thus, at the empire’s beginning, Islamic scholars studied all branches of science and philosophy. Much Islamic science at this time resembled the kind of humanism that appeared in Europe centuries later, with its concentration on unlocking and understanding the wisdom of the Greeks. Islamic scholars translated the scientific treatises of the Greeks into Arabic. Many of these translations found their way into the Arabs’ libraries in Spain and were discovered by the Spanish when the Arabs had to withdraw. They were an important contribution to the Renaissance in Europe.43 By the close of the ninth century . . . savants began to produce original works very much in the ancient Hellenistic spirit. The fusion of Indian and perhaps Babylonian with Hellenistic ideas stimulated fresh discoveries and the development of some important scientific devices, such as accurate balances, the astrolabe, and alembics. (McNeill, 1963, p. 438, footnotes omitted)
One of the most important ideas adapted from India and Babylonia was the number system, first used by the mathematician al-Khwarizmi in the early ninth century and passed on to us as the Arabic number system. Arabic numbers are far easier to manipulate than Roman numbers, and their adoption was a great advantage for both commerce and science. AlKhwarizmi also introduced the equation into mathematics.44 One of the many impressive advances made by the Greeks was in medicine: “Instead of regarding [illness] as an incomprehensible disaster, the work of evil spirits, as primitive cultures do, the Greeks had recognized that disease is a natural process, part and parcel of the physiological patterns of the human body. . . . ”45 Once the Arabs discovered and translated the major Greek works on medicine, they too began to regard disease as a natural process and began to develop cures. They invented various surgical instruments, and can be said to have invented hospitals, yet another invention passed on to the West.46 Although the Islamic state did not provide public goods like hospitals and schools, the Koran’s stricture that every individual engage in charitable giving resulted in the founding of hospitals and schools by charities. A thirteenth-century Syrian physician Ibn al-Nafis wrote a medical treatise on the circulation of blood that largely anticipated William Harvey’s work four centuries later. It remained almost unknown, however, and had no influence on Harvey’s research. 43 44 45 46
McNeill (1963, pp. 437–8); Goldstein (1995, ch. 4). Goldstein (1995, pp. 123–4). Goldstein (1995, p. 102). Goldstein (1995, p. 99).
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Astronomy was taken up by the Arabs after the translation of works by Aristotle and Ptolemy on astronomy. Although the Arabs made no important theoretical advances in astronomy of the type that Copernicus, Kepler, and Newton were later to make, their advances in optics and measurement instruments made it possible to make more accurate charts of the movements of the planets and stars, and these astronomical observations were an important input into later breakthroughs in astronomy in Western Europe.47 Thus, the bulk of the Arabs’ scientific advances relied on what we have termed first-level causal inference rather than the theoretical model building characteristic of the second level of science. Islamic science had a “bent toward the empirical, the specific, the emphatically concrete,” and this bent led to a host of inventions of practical importance. Many of these served as inputs to the theoretical advances that would later take place in Europe. In addition to Greek works in science, the Arabs were, of course, also familiar with the Greek philosophers’ writings. “The Greek emphasis – whether pagan or Christian – upon logical argument and syllogistic reasoning constituted a standing challenge to a faith based solely on the Koran and the Traditions.”48 Nevertheless, particularly after the great compromise under Abbasid rule in the ninth century, when the Caliph transferred the handling of matters of religion over to the ulema, some scholars were allowed to follow the philosophic-rationalistic ideal. Until the breakup of the empire, they were to be found in the caliph’s court and the high society that surrounded it. Notable among these was “the polymath al-Farabi (d. 952), who explicitly rejected all forms of revealed religion and made the reconciliation of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy his life work.”49 One might have expected that the breakup of the empire would have brought an end to the cultural and scientific advances in its territories. Quite to the contrary, however; if anything, it gave them a boost. Instead of only one seat of power and wealth at which an iconoclastic savant could reside, there were now many, and thus the possibilities for patronage were in fact greatly increased.50 By the beginning of the fourteenth century, however, the study of science in the Muslim world had gone into decline. Historians differ as to the cause of this decline, and there is almost certainly no single cause, but there can be no question that it occurred and that the Islamic world has never recovered from it. Part of the explanation for the 47 48 49 50
Goldstein (1995, p. 103). McNeill (1963, p. 435). McNeill (1963, p. 438). McNeill (1963, p. 440).
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eclipse of science in the Muslim world must lie in the basic incompatibility of religion and science – between believing and questioning. Although the Koran encourages its readers to use their powers of reasoning, Islam also teaches that the Koran is the revealed word of God and cannot be challenged. Truth can be discovered either through the study of nature or the study of the Koran, and the Islamic world has largely given up the former for the latter. Thus, we find Islamic scholars today looking for scientific advances in the pages of the Koran: “Relativity, quantum mechanics, Big Bang theory, embryology, and much of modern geology has now been ‘discovered’ in the Koran.”51
V. Appraisal Finer summarizes the achievements and failures of the Caliphate as follows: The great historic accomplishments of the Caliphate were that, first, it acted as a kind of factory for converting its subjects and also the eastern pagan barbarians – notably the Turks – to Islam. Next, it maintained an immense common market, which moreover, controlled the Golden Road to Central Asia and distant Cathay. Finally, inside this area it stamped a common social structure and way of life on its subjects and created a cultural universe where, as in medieval Europe, scholars and pilgrims could wander and root themselves freely anywhere between Atlantic Oxus and Indus, within a common idiom of arts, learning, and literature. The Caliphate was in these respects a momentous and irreversible turning-point in world history, and all the more stupendous for being so unexpected and immediate. But in respect to any advances in governmental practice, or political thought, or individual liberties, or the prosperity of the peasantry, or finally the sheer, simple power to survive, the Caliphate was a conspicuous failure. (Finer, 1997, p. 725)
Our interest is in the links among rational thinking, religion, an orientation toward improving life on this earth, and democracy. In this context, the Caliphate and the Islamic religion that underpinned it are somewhat of an anomaly. On the one hand, unlike Christianity, which focuses heavily on the nature of one’s religious beliefs, Islam focuses on one’s actions. Thus, while Christian scholars were occupied during the Middle Ages debating the fine points of life in Heaven, Mohammed and his followers were preoccupied with changing the behavior of individuals in this life. Goldstein (1995, ch. 4) places great emphasis on the importance of Islam’s this-world orientation for its many significant advances in the arts and sciences. Still, the main point in controlling an individual’s behavior in this life was to ensure that she would be able to enjoy the next one. 51
Sardar (2007, p. 133), spelling of “Koran” changed.
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In Sumer, the state and religion were combined, and religion was used to solidify the subjects’ support for the state. This was also true in the Caliphates of the Umayyads. ‘Abd al-Malik (685–705), for example, had the Dome of the Rock built on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem to symbolize to Christians and Jews the triumph of Islam as a religion and the Caliphate as a state. Many inscriptions on the Dome convey this message. The following one is directed at the Jews: God bear witness that there is no other God but he, and so too the angels, those who possess knowledge, and stand firm in justice. There is no God but he, the omnipotent, the omniscient. God’s religion is Islam . . . Let whoever disbelieves in the signs of God beware, for God is swift in reckoning. (Koran, 3:18–19)
After quoting this part of the Koran, Lewis goes on to observe: The meaning of all this is at once political and religious. Only religion can justify empire. Only empire can justify religion. Through his apostle Muhammad and his vice regent the caliph, God has given a new dispensation and a new order to the world. In this first great religious structure dedicated to the new faith, its worldly head, the caliph ‘Abd al-Malik, asserted Islam’s connection with the precursor religions, and at the same time made clear that the new dispensation had come to correct their errors and to supersede them. (Lewis, 2000, p. 70)
After the compromise under the Abbasids, however, religion and the state effectively became separate. Support for the state then rested entirely upon the fear of punishment. Because the subjects had no legal protection against the state, this fear was very real. Caliphs did, of course, continue to attempt to use religion to strengthen their position by claiming that their authority was conferred by Allah or that they descended from Mohammed. Neither claim was totally convincing, however, and thus the empire’s leadership lacked legitimacy, which explains the continual and violent struggles when a new caliph was selected. This legitimacy-vacuum was the empire’s essential vice of origin. Islam was incompatible with anything but a theocratic ruler or college. So, reacting to the surliness or active hostility of parts of the population, the caliphs responded by putting it under something not far removed from a military occupation. (Finer, 1997, p. 726)
The separation of religion and state after the compromise helps explain the extent of corruption in the late part of the Caliphate. The Koran minutely defined what a Muslim was to do in his private life. The caliph, vizier, or tax farmer who said his prayers five times, did not eat pork or drink alcohol, and fasted during the Ramadan might reasonably think that his place in
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Heaven was secured, and that he was free to offer or take bribes, and torture those who failed to pay their taxes. As Finer notes, Islam seems to be only compatible with a theocracy. The Koran defines so explicitly what each person should do that it is not clear what is left for citizens to vote on. Still, bridges must be built, roads constructed, and other public services provided, and so one could imagine a role for democracy even in an Islamic state. No notable thinker appears to have had such thoughts under the Caliphate, even though the Muslims’ knowledge of Greek writings must have made them aware of the properties of a democratic state. We have emphasized the distinction between progressive and traditional societies in earlier chapters. Progressive societies are forward-looking, science-based, and oriented toward improving welfare in this life. Traditional societies look to the past for guidance and revere the wisdom of the sages of yesteryear. The extremely important role the Koran played in defining the culture of the Caliphate and continues to play in all Islamic societies today makes both essentially traditional. After quoting “Sayyid Qutb, the godfather of modern revolutionary Islam,” to the effect that Muslims should return to their roots, Esposito comments: This statement by Sayyid Qutb illustrates the extent to which Muslims rely heavily on the past for meaning and guidance in the present. Many non-Muslims might be prepared to understand a believer’s return to the Quran and Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad for guidance, but they would be astonished to learn the extent to which the ideas of medieval and pre-modern theologians and movements directly impact the world of Islam today. Both modern reformers and radical extremists draw (often selectively) on the teachings and examples of early Islamic revivalist thinkers and activist movements to justify their contemporary jihads, their holy and unholy wars. (Esposito, 2002, pp. 43–4)
A clearer description of a traditionalist society is difficult to find. Today, there is much speculation over why Muslim societies have fallen so far behind the West, and have even been passed by recently poor countries like South Korea and Taiwan. Equally conspicuous is the absence of democracy in most Muslim countries. The characteristics we associate with modern states – high incomes, market oriented, science oriented, democratic, and secular – all seem to be missing in Muslim countries except for the high incomes in the oil-rich Muslim countries. It is difficult not to attribute these features of the Muslim world to the role Islam plays in it. Church and state were fused at Islam’s inception and continue to be intertwined in many Muslim countries today. The education systems of most Muslim countries, with their heavy emphasis on rote learning and the study of the Koran, are
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not conducive to developing the inquisitive, iconoclastic mind of a scientist. Even the ritual of daily prayer must continually draw a Muslim’s mind back to the origins of his faith centuries ago, and remind her of the many things she is not allowed to question. Turkey is the conspicuous exception to these generalizations and is also the exception that proves the rule. Following World War I, Ataturk realized that Turkey could only be brought into the modern world by wrenching it out of the Muslim world. Arabic writing was replaced with a Western alphabet, schools were forbidden to teach religion, head scarves and fezzes were banned, and a new constitution created a completely secular state. And, to a large degree, it worked. In recent decades, its economy has grown at an Asian-tiger pace. New, private universities offer educational programs comparable to those of the United States and the rich countries of Europe. Its record as a democracy is behind that of, say, Canada and Sweden, but miles ahead of its Muslim neighbors in the Middle East. Its progress on both the economic and democratic fronts makes it a legitimate candidate for entry into the European Union. At the same time, Turkey illustrates the conflict between modernity and traditionalism. Despite the often heavy-handed methods of the military to prevent Islamic parties from capturing the state and turning back the clock, political Islam has been on the rise in Turkey. At the time of this writing (July 2008), an Islamic party controls the government. The mere existence of a party that defines its identity by its religion underlines the tension between liberal democracy and religion. Do Muslims have different views about the need for a bridge or more spending on fire protection than non-Muslims? Do their religious convictions lead them to favor bigger government deficits or higher taxes? The raison d’ˆetre of a religious party must be to implement policies that reflect and advance the interests of its religious supporters. The current Turkish government has attempted to do this by passing a law that would allow women to wear head scarves at university – a symbolic break with the secularism that has existed in Turkey since the time of Ataturk. The Turkish high court overruled the government on this occasion, but the conflict between secularists and Muslims is far from over in this country. How this conflict unfolds in Turkey will go a long way toward answering the question of whether Islam and liberal democracy can successfully coexist. Will the advance of Islam in Turkey be able to reverse Ataturk’s reforms and carry it back into the Muslim world, or is the pull of modernism with its promise of prosperity and individual freedom strong enough to keep Turkey on the path that Ataturk started it on?
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Although there are those in Turkey who would like to take it back a century to before Ataturk, other more radical elements in Iran and other parts of the Muslim world would like to go still further back in time. They see the problems of their world stemming from too much modernism and “the abandonment of the divine heritage of Islam” and advocate “a return to a real or imagined past.”52 Osama bin Laden even calls for a reestablishment of the Caliphate. When one contemplates its history, one wonders which of its features he and his followers seek to restore – the prosperity brought by the giant common market and the flowering of the arts and sciences that this prosperity for a brief period allowed or the brutal repression of the average subject in the Caliphate and the total corruption of its leaders? Thus, more than two hundred years after Condorcet ([1795] 1955, p. 45) lamented that the war between philosophy and superstition that began with the death of Socrates was “still being waged amongst us between this same philosophy and the oppressors of humanity,” we see that the oppressors of humanity have yet to be defeated, and the war is still far from over. 52
Lewis (2002, pp. 176–7).
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. . . whence it follows that the entire fabric of human reason which we employ in the inquisition of nature, is badly put together and built up, and like some magnificent structure without any foundation. For while men are occupied in admiring and applauding the false powers of the mind, they pass by and throw away those true powers, which, if it be supplied with the proper aids and can itself be content to wait upon nature instead of vainly affecting to overrule her, are within its reach. There was but one course left, therefore, – to try the whole thing anew upon a better plan, and to commence a total reconstruction of sciences, arts, and all human knowledge, raised upon the proper foundations. (Francis Bacon)1
The period between the fall of the Roman Empire and the Renaissance is commonly referred to as the Dark Ages. It was a period of prolonged economic contraction during which scientific and technological progress, as well as learning in the humanities, appeared to stand still. Most modern historians reject the notion that a great awakening occurred with the coming of the Renaissance.2 For example, many features of the humanism that we associate with the Italian Renaissance can be observed in the Carolingian Renaissance of the eighth and ninth centuries. Nevertheless, the dominance of the Church and its interest in propagating canon law greatly limited the scope for the study of the so-called pagan literature until the late Middle Ages when a dramatic change began to take place, particularly in Italy, in the way people viewed the world and their attitudes toward nature.3 The Italian Renaissance came forth in two stages. The first extended from the eleventh century to about 1300, the second from the late thirteenth to the late 1 2 3
Bacon (1620, pp. 5–6). Nauert (1995, pp. 1–7). Goldstein (1995, p. 43), Nauert (1995, pp. 8–13), Mann (1996, pp. 2–5).
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sixteenth centuries. In the first stage, social energies – economics, politics, a vibrant demography – were primary and foremost; in the second, the lead went to cultural energies . . . In their respective strengths, the two stages were not afterward to be surpassed, whether in matters of invention (as in business technique), bold inquiry, or enduring addition to the history of Europe. (Martines, 1988, p. 332)
These changes were stimulated to a great degree by the revival of economic activity during the late Middle Ages and the expansion of international trade that helped foster it. These, in turn, led to population growth and migration from the countryside into the towns and cities.4 From the end of the eleventh to the late fifteenth century, Italian ships ruled the Mediterranean. The wealth of Genoa and Venice derived from trade with the Eastern Mediterranean and Asia (Levant). Contact with the Levant stimulated artistic and intellectual creativity, and led to the rise of the city-state culture.5 The concept of civility became associated with living in towns and urban life: “In whatever context it was used, the key element in the notion of civility was the imposition of rational principles of nurture on an originally untamed nature.”6 The profound shift in mentality in the Renaissance is symbolized by the rise of humanism. Humanist thought was historically conditioned and the rise of a new sense of history was the crucial innovation associated with the Renaissance, underlying the “rediscovery” and reinterpretation of classic texts, the emphasis on “practical” rather than ‘speculative’ knowledge, the keen sense of the limits of human reason, and in general the whole revulsion from medieval tradition which became the most striking trait of Renaissance thinkers. (Nauert, 1995, p. 19)7
Although modern historians may question whether the Renaissance constituted a dramatic break with the Middle Ages, Renaissance humanists thought they were living in a “New Age.” The sense of being deeply engaged in the restoration of true civilization after many centuries of barbarian darkness finds its first clear statements in the works of Petrarch, and some claim is common to virtually all of those writers (Salutati, Poggio, Valla, Ficino, Erasmus) whom historians identify as the crucial figures in the history of humanism . . . It was the defining characteristic of Renaissance humanism. (Nauert, 1995, pp. 20–1) 4 5 6 7
Martines (1988, p. 9), Goldstein (1995, pp. 60–1). McNeill (1963, p. 546). Hale (1993, p. 365). See also, Mann’s (1996, p. 2) definition of humanism, and the discussion in Reeve (1996, pp. 21–3).
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Perhaps, the most read of the classical writers was Cicero, whose studia humanitatis gave rise to the term humanism. Cicero appealed to Renaissance humanists, because he, like they, took active civic life for granted: “Moral philosophy for the Romans represented the art of observing the highest ethical standards while living usefully and enjoyably within a large community.”8 Cicero’s studia humanitatis – the study of the liberal arts – became the model for the humanists’ educational program. This program included the study of history, art, ethics, poetry, and virtually all branches of what we think of today as the humanities. It is exemplified in the work of Petrarch, “often considered to be the father of humanism.”9 We now discuss developments in this period in religion, science, and politics.
I. Religion St. Augustine’s thought epitomizes the religious thinking of the Middle (Dark) Ages. A profound concern for the afterlife, and almost a disdain for everyday life on earth is evident in his writings: When . . . the question is asked what we are to believe in regard to religion, it is not necessary to probe into the nature of things, as was done by those whom the Greeks call physici; nor need we be in alarm lest the Christian should be ignorant of the force and number of the elements – the motion and order of the eclipses of the heavenly bodies; the form of the heavens; the species and nature of animals, plants, stones, fountains, rivers, mountains; about chronology and distances; the signs of coming storms; and a thousand other things which those philosophers either have found out or think they have found out . . . It is enough for the Christian to believe that the only cause of all created things . . . whether heavenly or earthly . . . is the goodness of the Creator, the one true God.10
In this brief statement, Augustine nicely encapsulated the friction between Christian belief and scientific knowledge that has characterized Christianity since its beginning. Although Thomas Aquinas attempted to reconcile the gap between the medieval scholar’s focus upon the spiritual world and people’s increasing concern in the late Middle Ages with the present world, he too wished to constrain freedom of inquiry: 8 9 10
Hale (1993, p. 358). Mann (1996, pp. 8–9). St. Augustine, Enchiridion, J. F. Shaw, trans., Edinburgh, 1872, ch. 9, as quoted in Goldstein (1995, p. 57).
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Yet pry not into that secret, and meddle not in the mystery of the birth of the infinite, nor presume to grasp that which is the summit of understanding: but understand that there are things thou canst not grasp.11
Medieval religious thinking was dominated by scholasticism – the application of abstract reasoning (Platonism) to questions of faith. A famous example of such reasoning during the eleventh century was St. Anslem’s ontological proof of the existence of God – because God is the highest form of being that we are capable of contemplating, he must exist. Scholastic debates could be long, pedantic, and sterile. It was against this sterility that the humanists revolted. “On the whole . . . the attack on scholasticism, the matter and manner of medieval university teaching, was restricted to its emphasis on training the mind without affecting the heart. Too much time was devoted to ingenious riddles. . . . ”12 Thus, it cannot be said that logical or rational modes of thought were absent during the Middle Ages. Quite the contrary, they were developed to an excruciatingly high degree. Because no hypothesis could be tested and refuted, medieval religious scholars were free to construct extremely elaborate theories about life in Heaven, the attributes and behavior of devils and angels, and almost anything else that caught their fancy. Because the medieval Christian mind focused on Heaven and life after death, the scholarship of the Middle Ages produced little knowledge that would ease human life on earth. This proclivity to ignore the world around them is perhaps understandable, because the world around the medieval scholar seemed chaotic and barbaric after the fall of Rome, an event that many thought had brought an end to civilized life. Humanism shifted the focus of intellectual inquiry to the present world. The humanists sought to understand this world through a careful analysis of classic Roman and Greek texts. This understanding would eventually lead to discoveries that improved present life. Humanists sought to achieve this goal by educating the social and political elite. From the histories of Rome and Greece, urban elites would learn how to govern and how to behave properly in their newly-formed civil societies. As noted in Chapter Five, rhetoric and dialectic were invented by the Greeks and were an important part of the writings of Cicero, Virgil, and other Roman scholars. Rhetoric and dialectic were also widely used by the scholastics to advance their theories about Heaven and Hell. Humanists continued the emphasis on rhetoric and dialectic, because they were engaged in the task 11 12
Summa contra gentiles, Book I, ch. VIII, as quoted in Goldstein (1995, p. 249, n.). Hale (1993, p 197).
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of educating the political elite, for which rhetoric was a valuable tool of persuasion.13 Humanism “sought through the didactic force of historical study to turn political men into better statesmen and statesmen into more moral men. It urged the study of moral philosophy so as to school citizens in their obligations.”14 Humanists were not antireligious and some, like Erasmus, placed great emphasis on moral teaching.15 Indeed, so strong was the Church’s hold on the humanists’ minds that they did not turn the critical powers of analysis they applied to Greek and Roman texts onto the Bible until relatively late in the Renaissance (late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries).16 The humanists’ emphasis on critical analysis – first of the ancient texts, later of the Bible – did, perhaps, give rise to a willingness to question and challenge authority and thus paved the way for the popular acceptance of criticism of the Church that came with the Reformation. The humanists’ emphasis on life on this earth was also at odds with the teachings of the Church.17 By the late Renaissance, humanism’s emphasis on criticism led some of its proponents to religious skepticism – most notably Franciso Sanches (c. 1550–1623) and Michel de Montaigne (1533–92). Montaigne, for example, observed that both one’s religion and the language one speaks are accidents of where one was born.18 Although humanism’s emphasis on understanding the natural world led to advances in art, history, mathematics, medicine, anatomy, and the natural sciences, mystic beliefs and faith in the predictive powers of the stars remained strong throughout the Renaissance. . . . belief in the occult flourished exceedingly in the fifteenth century and showed little sign of decrease in the sixteenth. This was the height of the witchcraft delusion, especially in Germany. It was a great age of magic and demonolatry: the age of Faust. Astrology . . . was made available to the masses . . . (Hall, 1994, p. 20)
By the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Catholic Church was a powerful, hierarchical organization with its own laws and courts. Power corrupts all, however, even men of God, and many had grown rich selling places in Heaven to the aristocracy. Many had also adopted lifestyles inappropriate to pious Christians. In 1517, when tradition claims that Martin Luther nailed his ninety-five theses to the church door in Wittenberg, the Christian world 13 14 15 16 17 18
Martines (1988, pp. 191–9), Mack (1996). Martines (1988, p. 210). Nauert (1995, p. 163). Hamilton (1996). Nauert (1995, pp. 55–6). Nauert (1995, pp. 211–12). See also, Grafton (1996, pp. 205–6).
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was ripe for revolution. Although much of the support for the Reformation came from people who were disgusted by corruption within the Church and the decadent life styles of many of its clergy, according to Nauert (1995, p. 163), “For Luther and his most perceptive followers, the real issue of the Reformation was not crooked priests or even superstitious ceremonies, but true doctrine.” The Reformation set off a competition between the Protestant and Catholic Churches over who had knowledge of the true doctrine. Each side had to prove that it represented and espoused the true teachings of Christ. The result both of Protestant zeal and reactive Catholic rigour was to increase awareness of sinfulness among the sensitive of both faiths. For fear of contamination and to parade their own orthodoxy neighbors turned informer to an increasingly overworked Inquisition . . . It was the jumpiness and inflexibility within the tautened religious convictions of both Protestants and Catholics that brought denunciation and burning of witches to epidemic proportions. Psychological depression, characterized as ‘melancholy,’ was a condition medical literature had discussed since antiquity. But never before had so much attention been paid to this expression of hopeless, undealable with inner confusion, that followed the introduction of the Reforms. (Hale, 1993, pp. 462–3)
Although witchcraft was already a crime in the fifteenth century, punishments for witchcraft increased in frequency and severity during the Reformation. Some one hundred thousand people were put to death. Eighty percent were widows and spinsters who, as loners in the community, could be easily targeted and accused by their neighbors.19 Between 1587 and 1593, 368 persons were burned as witches in Toulouse alone; 260 were burned in the village of Ellwangen, Germany, in just two years.20 Neither branch of Christianity was adverse to killing to protect their doctrinal purity. Protecting doctrinal purity was also the goal behind much Church censorship. Inquisitors – another overworked corps of repressors – rarely showed more interest in convincing unimportant suspects of their doctrinal errors than in swiftly and if necessary cruelly extorting blanket vows of obedience. ‘I confess and believe,’ ran one formula to be sworn to, ‘that the Holy Roman Church is the true church and communion of the faithful, outside of which there is no salvation.’ . . . The prohibition was not only against sensual suggestiveness but also narrative detail that distracted from the work’s doctrinal import . . . (Hale, 1993, p. 474) 19 20
Hale (1993, pp. 446–7). Hale (1993, p. 448).
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At its outset, the Reformation was both an attack on the Catholic clergy’s corruption and decadence, and on its belief that the clergy were the true and only source of religious authority. For the Protestants, religious authority stemmed from the word of God as contained in the Bible. With time, however, the Protestant clergy began to espouse the word of God just as dogmatically as the Catholic clergy, and it became ever as much authoritarian and totalitarian in its ways dictating, in the case of Calvinism, not only the clothes one was allowed to wear but also the names one could give to one’s children.21 The Reformation was supposed to reestablish the word of God as revealed in the Bible. The Bible teaches mercy and forgiveness. Neither branch of Christianity showed much mercy or forgiveness to the many accused of heresy and witchcraft that were tortured and burned to death. Neither branch seemed cognizant of the Fifth Commandment as both sent troops off to kill and be killed during the many religious wars that began in the sixteenth century. As with so many wars, the lives of innocent subjects were sacrificed for the ideological beliefs and goals of their leaders – the only difference in this case was that the leaders were men of God who sent their followers off to die in the name of God.
II. Science As attention shifted in the late Middle Ages from contemplating life in Heaven to life on Earth, people’s curiosity about the world about them reawakened. As early as the twelfth century, the study of natural philosophy was established in France at the School of Chartres. During that century science supplanted the liberal arts at Chartres as the main focus of study. The term natural philosopher stood for scientist until the 1830s, when the latter term came into use.22 “Seven centuries of Christian teaching about the place of nature in the scheme of God were being challenged at the School of Chartres.”23 The Chartres naturalists questioned the view of the Church and St. Augustine that all creation took place in six days; Thierry of Chartres reinterpreted the Book of Genesis. William of Conches conceived of nature as a system “distinguished by three features: first, by the very fact that it represented indeed a consistent system; second, by the dynamic conception on which it was based; third, by his singular grasp of nature’s essential 21 22 23
McNeill (1963, pp. 589–90). Mokyr (2002, p. 63). Goldstein (1995, p. 69).
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autonomy, which, as he realized, made it accessible to the rational mind. Each one of these aspects was of fundamental significance.”24 The proposition that there are laws of nature “accessible to the rational mind” was also central to Francis Bacon’s thinking (see quotation at the beginning of this chapter). Bacon believed that nature could be tamed by understanding it and then using it for the benefit of mankind. He “foresaw an age of science, some six or seven hundred years yet to come, with a sharpness of vision that is stunning in its prophetic detail.”25 Thus, even before the Renaissance began, a rise of rational, scientific thinking could be discerned. Nevertheless, the hold of mysticism and superstition was strong. Many great scientific names of the era – Bacon, Dee, Brahe, Galileo, Kepler, Newton, Albertus Magnus, Napier – combined rational thought in some areas with mystic, superstitious beliefs in others. Bacon and Newton practiced alchemy. Dee, Brahe, Galileo, and Kepler believed in astrology. Kepler, the great astronomer, even supported himself mainly by working as an astrologer designing calendars and writing horoscopes.26 In 1595, he used the stars to predict famine, a peasant uprising, and a war with the Ottomans – all of which came to pass.27 His writings in astronomy were so full of mysticism that the importance of his scientific contributions only became apparent long after his death. Yet slowly, rational thought triumphed over superstition and mysticism. Alchemy gave way to chemistry; astrology to astronomy; numerology to mathematics. The central preoccupation of Renaissance humanists was the recovery and restoration of classic Greek and Roman texts.28 By concentrating exclusively on dissecting the wisdom of the past, the humanists could be accused of failing to use their intellectual powers to develop new knowledge that would advance the welfare of mankind. The humanist Montaigne leveled such a criticism at his contemporaries, and Bacon and Descartes were even harsher. Bacon treated Renaissance humanism, like scholasticism before it, as a fatal disease of learning. The humanists had failed to see that the world had changed, that modern voyages were more extended, modern empires more far-flung and modern technology more powerful than those of the ancients. They had confused the ‘antiquity’ of the Greeks and Romans – the fact that their texts had existed for a long time – with the authority that can be invested only in people, who continue to learn as 24 25 26 27 28
Goldstein (1995, p. 83). Goldstein (1995, p. 83). Hall (1994, p. 288). Hall (1994, pp. 169–70). Hall (1994, p. 18).
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they age, not in books, which are impervious to experience (if not to damage). The philology of the humanists, with its obsessive citation and imitation of authorities, had been an intellectual distraction from the thinker’s true mission of extending man’s empire. The humanists had entirely failed to see how much they could have learned from the practical men of their own day, whose theories about the natural world rested on practical experience, not mere textual exegesis . . . (Grafton, 1996, p. 205)
Although the humanists were mainly concerned with classical contributions to the humanities, the movement awakened an interest in all Greek and Roman texts, including those dealing with mathematics and science. Ptolemy’s Geography, translated in 1410, described the Earth as a sphere and gave a spark to both the study of geography and astronomy. Galen’s book on anatomy, published in the second century ce, gave impetus to the study of anatomy.29 Pliny’s Natural History “fascinated the humanists.”30 More generally, the rediscovery of Pythagoras’ writings at the beginning of the twelfth century had a profound influence on the natural philosophers of the late Middle Ages and Renaissance. His belief that the universe followed natural (mathematical) laws found expression in the work of Copernicus and Kepler, who described laws concerning the movement of the planets. Pythagoras’ “universal mathematics” is reborn in the seventeenth century in the work of Descartes.31 Many classical texts were discovered in the libraries that the Muslims left behind as they withdrew from Europe.32 As we saw in the previous chapter, Muslims made important contributions in several branches of science, and the Europeans built on their work. The Muslims’ inventions and scientific advances were largely confined to the first level of reasoning. This can also be said of many developments in Europe during the late Middle Ages and Renaissance. For example, even Leonardo da Vinci was not so much a contributor to the growth of scientific knowledge but rather was first and foremost an extremely talented inventor.33 However, thanks in part to the influence of Pythagoras and Plato and to the scholastic tradition inherited from the Middle Ages with its emphasis on abstraction, science also advanced on the second, propositional level of knowledge during the Renaissance. 29 30 31 32 33
Hall (1994, p. 129). Grafton (1996, p. 214). Goldstein (1995, p. 54). Goldstein (1995, ch. 4). Goldstein (1995, p. 232).
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Theoretical reasoning and the application of mathematics were nowhere more evident than in astronomy. When he wrote De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium Libri Sex (Six Books on the Revolution of the Celestial Orbs), Copernicus did not set out to revolutionize astronomy, but only to correct some inaccuracies in Ptolemy’s Almagest. De Revolutionibus follows the structure of the Almagest, but Copernicus substituted Pythagorean mathematics for Ptolemaic and thereby produced a revolutionary work.34 Johannes Kepler was also concerned by discrepancies between the observed positions of planets and predictions made under the assumption – which went back to the Greeks – that their orbits were circles. Kepler, like his Greek predecessors, believed that the cosmos obeyed mathematical laws, and he toiled to discover them. He was the first to establish that planets’ orbits are elliptical, and that there is a relationship between a planet’s speed and the size of its orbit.35 During the Middle Ages, scientific advances were mostly made in the monasteries and there was a tendency to keep them secret. An important development of the Renaissance was the creation of an international community of scientists who shared ideas. This development arose in part because of the invention and spread of the printing press and in part because of changing attitudes toward knowledge by those making scientific advances. This change is most famously illustrated by Galileo Galilei, who championed the scientist’s right to speculate about the true laws of nature and to communicate these speculations without interference. Galileo failed to retain this right for himself, but in the end won it for his followers.36 The theoretical contributions of Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo paved the way for the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century. Indeed, Kepler’s work was so mystical that it became widely known only after Isaac Newton discovered and disseminated it. With the work of Newton, Descartes, and the other giants of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, theoretical reasoning became dominant in science. The Scientific Revolution that began in the Renaissance laid the foundation for the Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.37 The history of science from the late Middle Ages to the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century is one of a gradual displacement of superstition and mysticism with rational, scientific analysis. This development was 34 35 36 37
For further discussion, see Hall (1994, ch. 3). For further discussion, see Hall (1994, ch. 10). For further discussion, see Hall (1994, ch. 11). Mokyr (2002, ch. 2).
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spurred by the shift in focus from the spiritual world, which could not be observed, to the actual observable world. Clearly, this adjustment of vision was the most important experience of the Western mind in its emergence from the Middle Ages – possibly in its entire history . . . Science, in this profoundly unsettling (and profoundly stimulating) process, was cast in a particular strategic role. Increasingly, the ‘scientific approach’ came to exemplify the modern outlook, focused on the concrete objects of the world, to the exclusion of everything that is not observable with senses or demonstrable through impeccable rational argument. (Goldstein, 1995, p. 170)
The medieval alchemist believed (hypothesized) that there were invisible, primary substances – like phlogiston – that underlay all matter and sought to uncover their secrets in his laboratory. He shared with astrologers the “belief that terrestrial nature, from man to minerals, was intimately connected with the wider nature of the universe. . . . ”38 The chemists who eventually displaced the alchemists accepted only those hypotheses that could be verified by experimentation, just as the astronomers abandoned the astrologers’ charts to predict the movements of stars and planets in favor of the theories of Kepler and Galileo. Similar transformations took place in medicine and other sciences. The triumph of rational, scientific thought over mystical and superstitious beliefs was not without struggle and some bloodshed. Although Copernicus died too soon after the publication of De Revolutionibus to get into trouble with the Church, eventually both the Catholic and Protestant branches came to regard Copernicanism as heresy. Galileo’s main adversary was Pope Paul V, who “was no friend to scientists and literary men, disliked ingenious subtleties, and was inclined to think that Galileo’s opinions must be pernicious and heretical, since they were scientific, literary, and ingenious.”39 Pope Paul V issued an edict in 1616 forbidding Galileo to defend and teach Copernican theory. Galileo believed, however, that it was still possible to discuss Copernican theory in a hypothetical manner and took up the latter again in his Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief Systems of the World published in 1632. The Church banned the book – a ban not lifted for more than two hundred years – and famously forced Galileo to recant publicly his belief that the Earth circled the sun or face banishment from the Church and possibly torture and death. Galileo bowed to the Church. In the end, however, the Church proved incapable of defending scripture 38 39
Hale (1993, p. 566). Hall (1994, pp. 329–30).
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against scientific discovery, and Copernicanism and the other advances in astronomy and the sciences during the Renaissance were accepted.
III. Politics A. The Feudal State Following the collapse of the Roman Empire, Europe entered into a period with elements of Hobbes’ state of anarchy. In many parts, institutions that could impose order were lacking. At roughly the beginning of the second millennium after Christ, an institution that did impose some order emerged – feudalism.40 The organizational chart of a feudal state would look something like that of a modern corporation. At the top, where the president would be in a corporation, was the king. Below him were a set of vice-presidents – barons or their equivalent – who were the feudal state’s chief tenants. Each chief tenant administered a portion of the king’s lands. A chief tenant in turn apportioned “his lands” among lower order tenants. At the bottom of the pyramid, where a foreman or crew chief might be in a factory, were the knights who also had their tenants to work the land. They were joined by freeholders with a contractual relationship to the knight, but also villeins who had no rights vis-´a-vis the lord of the manor. However, villeins did have certain rights and obligations to the rest of the community. With the possible exception of the villeins, all members of the system were free to alter their contractual status. Although a feudal state’s organizational chart resembled that of a modern corporation, a better analogy would be a franchise system because each member was tied to the others by contracts that specified the rights and obligations of all parties. The king’s primary obligation was to protect his tenants. They possessed a right to protection, but had obligations to offer their military services to the king when demanded. These rights and obligations were protected by a set of legal institutions with a court of the chief tenants resolving disputes. Each party to a contract, except for the villeins, was free under certain conditions to break the contract and form a new one with someone else. As with marriage contracts, such ruptures did not always transpire smoothly, however, and many led to violence. All members of the system (save for the villeins) recognized the voluntary nature of the associations, and even the 40
Throughout this section all dates are ce.
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villeins would eventually be able to find freedom by seeking refuge in one of the towns that developed alongside of feudalism.41 Not surprisingly, these personal freedoms under feudalism gave rise to notions of individualism and reinforced other developments during the late medieval period that replaced the rather organic conception of community that existed prior to 1100 ce with a more individualistic one.42
B. West European City-States Although the contractual/egal structure of a feudal state provided order within its domain, wars between states remained common. Even within states, violence often erupted when members broke their contractual relationships. In some places like France, this led to the evolution of a centralized state with a king who had the authority to impose order. Where a centralized state did not develop, as in Germany and Italy, a political vacuum existed that allowed some villages to evolve into towns, which eventually became autonomous city-states. Where the economic lifeblood of feudal states was agriculture, the town’s economic lifeblood was commerce. Everyone residing in a town for a year and a day became free with the right to possess alienable property. Within the towns, wealth could thus be amassed by skilled artisans as well as traders. Trade both within, but more importantly, between towns became an important source of wealth, and a town-based merchant class arose to rival the land-based aristocracy of the feudal system. While feudalism continued in the countryside, a political vacuum of sorts existed in the cities. In Germany and Italy, cities declared themselves to be free of the kings and knights who ruled the countryside, a freedom symbolized by the German word Freistadt (free city) that arose to describe this new form of political structure, and by the Italian expression populus libre (free people) that captured the concept of local sovereignty that evolved in the thirteenth century.43 In Italy between 1070 and 1140, an urbanized aristocracy founded the first communes in Pisa, Lucca, Milan, and the other, major northern cities. The commune was an association of men bound together by an oath and common interests. They swore to aid and defend one another; they pooled their prestige and 41 42 43
For further discussion of the key characteristics of feudalism, see Vinogradoff ([1951] 1905) and Finer (1997, pp. 855–95). Black (1988). Martines (1988, p. 62).
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minute jurisdictions, if they had any; and they invested their consuls, the official heads of the association, with executive and judicial powers. The associates – that is, the members of the commune – swore to obey and follow the consuls, who in turn swore to defend and uphold the association in all its rights and interests. (Martines, 1988, p. 27)
Collective decisions were made by a general assembly composed of all members of the commune. Full membership in a commune remained highly restricted, however, until the advent of the popolo (populace) at the end of the twelfth and beginning of the thirteenth centuries. The popolo included members of guilds, skilled craftsmen, and merchants. They demanded and obtained a broad expansion of membership in most communes. In most cities, the legislative assembles (Parlemento) contained a mixture of nobles and normal citizens. In some – like Siena – the nobility was explicitly excluded from the general assembly.44 The rise of the popolo led to great expansions in the assemblies’ sizes – the legislative council in Pavia expanded from 150 to 1,000 during the first half of the thirteenth century, and in Milan from 400 to 900.45 In 1496, the general council in Florence had 3,300 members; in 1510 in Vicenza, it had 629, roughly 13 percent of adult males; in Siena it ranged from 12 to 15 percent of the adult male population.46 These percentages seem small by today’s definitions of democracy, but for the time implied rather broad-based representation of the citizenry. Thus, the rise of the popolo can be said to have made the Italian city-states considerably more democratic, even though many city dwellers could not participate in the general assembly.47 Moreover, the extension of the voting franchise beyond a narrow, hereditary aristocracy greatly altered the mentality of the city dwellers and of the whole Renaissance period. The popolo made for the richest movement of men and issues in all the commune’s history. It transformed perceptions of reality. The art of Giotto and his followers would have been impossible without the psychological stamp of the popolo . . . The popolo, however, by its sustained assaults on authority, altered the political and social organization of the old urban space and changed the disposition and thrust of values. This, in turn, had a pervasive effect upon the imaginative literature, political thought, and historical writing. (Martines, 1988, pp. 58–9)
The popolo dominated the life of the city-states for only a short period, however. They used violence to take and maintain power. Italian cities were divided into neighborhoods built around towers and controlled by leagues 44 45 46 47
Shaw (2006, ch. 7). Martines (1988, p. 27). Shaw (2006, pp. 171–5). See discussion in Martines (1988, ch. 3).
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of families or guilds sworn to defend one another to the death. Internal conflict was common, as were external attacks of one city on another. The general councils proved to be unwieldy and slow to reach decisions – a particularly costly defect in time of conflict. It became difficult to keep important decisions secret, which sometimes compromised a city’s army. The general councils were often unwilling to impose the taxes needed to support the army. During the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, these deficiencies led to a shift in power from the general councils to smaller committees such as the Ten in Venice and the Council of One Hundred in Florence (later of Seventy, still later of Eighty). These smaller decision-making bodies typically had a greater representation of the nobility, who were thought to have the knowledge and time to run the city. Thus, power shifted from the popolo to the nobility, and the great city-states of Florence, Venice, Lucca, Siena, Genoa, and Perugia all became effectively constitutional oligarchies.48 With the important exception of Venice, however, membership in their ruling aristocracies was based on wealth rather than inheritance, and so, in principle, was open to all. Moreover, the notion that political power ought to be open to all remained strong well into the sixteenth century. A Bolognese lawyer thought that “the basic definition of citizenship was participation in public power, that is, participation in the burdens and the honors of the city.” As late as 1575, Silvestro Facio of Genoa used the occasion of the coronation of a new head of the city-state (doge) to stress the continued importance of the popolo: “He who betrays the popolo, betrays the republic, because public affairs, as they do not belong to any private individual, of necessity belong to all, to the great and the small, the rich and the poor.” The doge’s duty was to implement “the general will [volere universale] that can easily be learned from the Great Council, that represents the will of all.”49 Here we see a very Greek conception of citizenship and the state. Participation in the “burdens of the city” was the chief criterion for citizenship, and the state and its leaders were to follow the “will of the people” as expressed directly by them in the general assembly.
C. Venice Where the other city-states began as democracies of sorts with citizens exercising authority through the town assembly and then later transformed 48 49
Martines (1988, chs. 5, 9) uses the term constitutional oligarchy. See also, Shaw (2006, ch. 8). Shaw (2006, pp. 306–7).
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themselves into oligarchies and eventually were displaced or taken over by monarchies, Venice followed the opposite path by evolving from a monarchy to a democracy, albeit one that was quite unlike that of Athens. Venice existed as an independent state from roughly 500 to 1800. At the beginning of this period, it resembled many other states in their early phases, including the Greek city-state, with a king (doge) at the top with considerable authority, a Great Council to advise him, and an assembly of citizens. Over time, the doge’s powers were stripped away until he became little more than a figurehead, and the role of the assembly to elect members to the Great Council was abolished so that the assembly also disappeared. The year 1297 is often regarded as a defining moment in Venice’s political history – the closing (Serrata) of membership in the Great Council. From then on, membership was made to depend on birth rather than election by the assembly of citizens. Gerhard R¨osch (2000) has questioned this interpretation, however, arguing that the transformation took place over the span of years from 1286 to 1323. Moreover, at least two more Serrata occurred at the beginning of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when the definitions of persons eligible for membership in the Great Council were altered.50 In the first of these two Serrata, for example, thirty new families were added to the Great Council’s membership, thereby mitigating some of the potential dangers of stagnation and decay from rule by a hereditary aristocracy. Over the next two and a half centuries, all of Venice’s doges were drawn from these thirty families.51 Despite these changes in membership in the Great Council, it must be recognized that Venice was essentially unique among the Renaissance citystates in Italy in never providing a direct role in governance to the popolo. Venice is often compared to Florence and in many ways they were similar, especially with respect to the role of the aristocracy. Yet in one very important way they were quite different. Just as Rome’s constitution was a product of incremental changes with no overall logical structure, Florence’s constitution also evolved in response to political power struggles and lacked coherence. Both the Roman and Florentine constitutions had an abundance of checks and balances. In Florence, these arose to protect one group of aristocratic families from another. Executive positions were for short durations and were filled from among the aristocracy by lot. The result was an unwieldy and ineffective constitutional structure whose weaknesses were perhaps best revealed by contrasting the performance of the republic with 50 51
Chojnacki (2000). Kindleberger (1996, p. 59).
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that of Florence under Lorenzo Medici after its republican structure was discarded.52 In contrast to Florence, Venice’s constitution had clearly delineated lines of authority, with decisions made by various small committees elected by the Great Council. All officers were elected rather than chosen by lot. The amount of thought that went into the constitution’s design is perhaps best illustrated by the elaborate procedure for choosing a new doge. It was designed to ensure that no faction (group of families) could control the doge’s selection. It also consisted of a long, complicated process in which the selection committee was first expanded and then contracted through a series of steps involving both voting and random selection. Although the procedure looks arcane, it clearly demonstrates that the Venetian constitution was the product of rational if somewhat convoluted design.53 Finer wrote, “The most arresting, attractive, and significant feature of this [Venetian] society was its civic sense . . . the Venetian combined a tenacious patriotism with a deep respect for the law, and together these generated a sense of state and civic dedication, a gravity and realism in public affairs that existed nowhere else in Italy.”54 The Venetians were Catholics to be sure, but they did not let their religious beliefs color their judgments on civic matters, a fact that Pope Pius II lamented, “they [the Venetians] are hypocrites. They wish to appear Christian before the world but in reality they never think of God and, except for the state, which they regard as a deity, they hold nothing sacred, nothing holy.”55 Thus, one can say that Venice, like Ancient Athens, was a secular state. Finer (1997, p. 983) asserts that “Florence was never a democracy,” because political power lay with its aristocracy, and the same might be said of the other Italian republics – Lucca, Siena, Genoa, and Perugia.56 It follows a fortiori that Venice was never a democracy, because its power base was even narrower than in Florence. I do not share this judgment, because we should not think of democracy as a 0/1 variable. Following Aristotle, we might say that rule by one is monarchy, rule by one hundred oligarchy, and rule by all democracy. But then what should we call rule by 20 percent of the population – democracy or oligarchy? In a country of one hundred thousand, 20 percent is twenty thousand people, far too many to gather in 52 53 54 55 56
See Finer (1997, pp. 964–85). For descriptions of the procedure, see Finer (1997, pp. 998–9) and Coggins and Perali (1998). Finer (1997, p. 992). Taken from Finer (1997, p. 1019), original source Gilbert (1968, p. 467, n. 3). See also, Canning (1988, pp. 353–4) and Martines (1988, p. 148).
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a smoke-filled room; in the United States today it would be roughly sixty million people. If democracy means that everyone older than age eighteen is eligible to vote, then neither the United States in 1800 nor Great Britain in 1900 were democracies. Indeed, by this criterion the United States did not become a democracy until 1920 when women obtained the right to vote or perhaps not until the 1960s, when blacks in the South obtained the de facto right to vote thereby giving practical effect to the de jure right they received a hundred years earlier. Rather than say that none of these countries were true democracies, I would rather say they were all democracies with, in some cases, narrow definitions of the voting franchise. The fraction of the population that ruled Venice for five hundred years was similar to that eligible to vote in the United States at its founding.57 An issue explored later is whether democracies with broad voting franchises perform best. Regardless of whether one describes Venice as an oligarchy with a broad base or a democracy with a narrow franchise, one cannot deny that it was a success. Finer (1997, p. 1016) passed an unequivocal judgment. From the fourteenth to the eighteenth-century Venice’s government “was the best in the world.”58 Voting franchise aside, it fulfilled all of the criteria one might set for a democracy. Its citizens – aristocrat and commoner alike – possessed rights to association, mobility, free speech, and religious tolerance and enjoyed equality before the law: “The justice of Venice was famous throughout the whole of Europe.”59 It was one of Europe’s richest states and its government was popularly supported. Although citizen uprisings were common in other city-states, they did not occur in Venice, and no standing army or large police force was needed to maintain order. If democracy’s goal is to protect and advance the welfare of the citizens, then Venice with its limited franchise fulfilled this goal to a measure that few states have accomplished – and did so for five hundred years. Why ? Luck perhaps, but other states could have emulated the Venetians’ luck. Its commercial success was certainly an important factor, because it reduced the incentive to focus politics on zero-sum redistributions. With ample opportunities to become rich by engaging in trade, a Venetian did not have to try to lay claim to his neighbor’s wealth. The popolo never became strong in Venice, and thus it was spared the internal strife that accompanied 57 58
59
Finer (1997, p. 1016) estimates that Venice was ruled by about 2.5 percent of the population; the figure in the United States in the 1790s might have been 3 percent. Not all historians are as enamored with the achievements of the Republic of Venice as Finer, however. See, for example, Martin and Romano (2000b), and contributions in Martin and Romano (2000a). Finer (1997, p. 1017).
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their rise in other Italian republics: “The high offices in Venice were regularly occupied by men who were peers both socially and economically.”60 Because eligible voters were drawn from the peers of the community, they were better educated than the average citizen and thus capable of making better collective choices for the community, if they so chose. But why did they so choose? Why did the aristocracy not use its power after 1297 to exploit the nonenfranchised majority of the population? Why did a Machiavellian doge not scheme to usurp power in the five hundred years after the Constitution of 1297 went into effect? Luck again perhaps, but luck that had a logical basis. Although the electorate of twelve hundred to fifteen hundred persons at the beginning of the thirteenth century constituted a small fraction of the citizenry, it was far too large to be easily melded into a tight coalition bent on exploiting the non-voting population. Large fractions of the Great Council must have always existed that would have opposed such moves. On the other hand, the Great Council was small enough to overcome free-riding. The fate of Venice lay in the hands of a permanent group of families; the physical scale of Venice was such that they would have known most other members personally. Because each member of the Great Council knew that he and his descendants would remain in office indefinitely, Venetian politics could avoid the focus on short-run political gains that characterizes all modern democracies. Although it would not be inevitable for a joint sense of responsibility to arise in such a group, it is immanently possible that one would. Here one must add the Venetian’s “civic sense, . . . tenacious patriotism, [and] . . . sense of solidarity under the laws,”61 which would supply the intrinsic motivation to govern wisely and fairly for all of the community. These qualities of character existed in Athens at its height and in Rome at the height of its republic; perhaps they are essential qualities in a citizenry for successful democracy.62
D. The Dutch Republic Although quite different from Venice in many ways, the Dutch Republic (which lasted for roughly two centuries from the end of the sixteenth century to the end of the eighteenth century) was another important political innovation emerging out of the Renaissance. The Netherlands was part of 60 61 62
Martines (1988, p. 159). Finer (1997, p. 992). On the similarity between Venice and Rome, when “the [Roman] Republic was at its best,” see Finer (1997, p. 993).
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the northern Renaissance with Erasmus its most well-known contributor to this movement. The Protestant Reformation was particularly successful in the northern part of the Lowlands during the sixteenth century. Unfortunately for the Dutch, the Lowlands were also a good location from which to launch attacks on France and thus were coveted and controlled for much of the sixteenth century by the Habsburgs. In the middle of the sixteenth century, the Habsburg Philip, king of Catholic Spain, decided to suppress the rise of Protestantism in the Netherlands. All Protestant sects were declared heretic, and the Spanish Inquisition set up shop in the Netherlands. The Dutch rebelled, but their rebellion collapsed in April 1567. Philip sent Don ´ Fernando Alvarez de Toledo, third duke of Alva, to govern the defeated Dutch. Alva “was one of the principal nobles of Castile and unswerving, even fanatical, in his detestation of Protestant heresy. His reputation was of a man of iron . . . coldly austere and rigidly authoritarian with a streak of harsh irritability in his makeup.”63 Under Alva, Protestant repression resumed between 1567 and 1572 with 8,950 Dutch citizens sentenced for treason or heresy of which 1,000 were executed. Adding insult to injury, the Spanish also increased the tax burden on the Dutch. In effect, they were asked to pay higher taxes to support an army that occupied their country and persecuted its citizens. The Dutch again rebelled and, this time under the leadership of William of the House of Orange, were successful.64 The Dutch Republic took form during the period 1588–90. It was organized as a confederation of the seven provinces. Each province got one vote in the States General, the republic’s legislative body, although the provinces could send more than one delegate to a meeting of the States General. Delegates were elected by provincial assemblies and city councils, some for limited terms of office and others for life. The central government was largely constrained to defending the Republic in time of war. It collected only about one-fifth of the tax revenues in the Republic.65 In addition to the legislative bodies that governed the Dutch Republic at both the provincial and central levels, there often existed a post called the Stadholder. Stadholders were a kind of governors of the provinces, responsible for appointing judges and a small number of other administrative tasks. Their most important role, however, was to command the armies in time of conflict. In times of peace, therefore, many provinces chose not to have a Stadholder as, for example, during the relatively peaceful period from 63 64 65
Israel (1995, p. 155). Israel (1995, chs. 8, 9). Israel (1995, p. 285).
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1658 to 1672. When war with England, Germany, and France broke out in 1672, the Stadholder reappeared. In time of war, just as during the rebellion against the Spanish at the end of the sixteenth century, the Dutch invariably turned to the House of Orange for a Stadholder to lead them in battle, and they did so again in 1674 at Utrecht when they selected William III as Stadholder for Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Gelderland, and Overijssel, and hereditary captain-admiral-general of the Republic. When William III died in 1702, however, another long period without a Stadholder commenced (1702–47). In 1747, for the first time in its history, there was a single Stadholder for the entire Republic – William IV of the House of Orange.66 The Dutch Republic, like Venice, had an elected chief executive – when it had one at all – and was effectively ruled by those citizens who could participate in the city councils and elect, or be elected to, the States General. The nobility were an important component of this electorate, but, unlike in Venice, voting was not restricted to the nobility. After the revolt against the Spanish, successful merchants and even skilled artisans could participate in politics.67 The Netherlands was also similar to Venice in having a relatively open economy based on trade. The country grew prosperous through international commerce particularly during the seventeenth century. Compared at least to its neighbors, the Dutch Republic was also tolerant of new, even radical ideas. Religious tolerance was part of William of Orange’s revolutionary agenda in the revolt against Spain and, except with respect to Catholics in the north occasionally, existed throughout the Republic. Descartes, Hobbes, Rousseau, Voltaire, and Locke all sought refuge in the Netherlands at some time. Indeed, Roger Congleton (2008) argues that the revolt against the Spanish, the confederation founded after the revolt, and the toleration of free speech and religion found within the Republic all directly or indirectly influenced events and thinking in the American colonies two hundred years after the Dutch revolt. Although the Dutch Republic was certainly an important step in the development of democratic and liberal institutions, it was not without its blemishes. As it went into decline during the eighteenth century, income inequalities grew large and citizen revolts appeared – unlike in the Republic of Venice. Although arguably a highly successful example of republican government, the House of Orange always stood ready to lend one of its leading sons – always named William – to take over as a kind of elected monarch when the Republic was in military difficulty. The House of Orange 66 67
Arblaster (2006, ch. 4). Israel (1995, pp. 341–51).
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even lent one of its Williams to Great Britain at the end of the seventeenth century to take over the throne from the unpopular Catholic monarch James II. Thus, the Dutch Republic often exhibited many of the features of a constitutional monarchy. Tellingly, when Napoleon was defeated and the French king he had imposed on the country was removed, the Netherlands did not revert back to being a Republic, but became a monarchy with yet another William of Orange as its first king.68
IV. Conclusions As the second millennium enfolded, the Church gradually lost some of its grip on the minds of Europeans. Attention turned away from the world of God and life after death toward the present world and life upon it. This change in perspective had enormous consequences for all branches of learning and for Europe’s social and political structure. The most profound changes occurred in the arts and humanities. The rediscovery of nature changed the way artists depicted both nature and humans. Humans became more lifelike. Nature’s rediscovery and renewed interest in the works of Greek and Roman scholars also significantly affected the development of the sciences. The great discoveries in astronomy are perhaps the most famous and conspicuous of the scientific advances during the Renaissance, and the ones that brought science in most direct conflict with the Church, but progress could be observed across virtually all branches of science. Indeed, one of the most important scientific developments of this period was the invention of the scientific method itself as, for example, in the work of Francis Bacon. The developments in science in the late Middle Ages and Renaissance illustrate the slow triumph of practical reasoning over mysticism and superstition during this period. Although humanism was not antireligious and many of the great humanists like Erasmus were very religious, the reorientation of interest toward nature and contemporary life did introduce an important degree of secularism into intellectual circles. This secularism helps explain the rise of science. As Goldstein (1995, p. 43) observed, “ . . . the most consistent and fertile scientific endeavors are nourished by what one may call a ‘secular’ attitude – one in which the immediate sense of perception plays a central 68
For a discussion of the Dutch Republic, see the encyclopedic Israel (1995) or the much shorter Arblaster (2006). Congleton (2008) shows the close links between the events creating the Dutch Republic and its institutions and the events and institutions of the first American Republic under the Articles of Confederation.
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and fully recognized role. . . . Science seems to grow most luxuriantly in cultures with a positive attitude to the world of the senses; it appears to wither in cultures with an emphatically spiritual, other worldly bent.” The ancient world had a great appreciation for nature and the enjoyment of life. This spirit was lost during the Middle Ages bit reemerged in Italy with the rise of humanism. The growth of secularism is also conspicuous in the politics of the period. City-states in Italy and Germany were centers of manufacturing and commerce. Their political institutions were intended to advance and protect the interests of the merchant and commercial aristocracy that created the wealth of the cities, and this economic aristocracy controlled the city-states’ political institutions. In some cases, most notably Venice, the aristocracy ruled in such an enlightened manner that the entire community – not just the aristocracy – benefited. Thus during the Renaissance, Europe returned to the course first set by the Greeks of becoming a modern, science-based society with secular democratic institutions. Only glimpses of what was yet to come could be seen in Venice, some other city-states, and the Dutch Republic, but the direction of movement was clear. Nevertheless, superstition and traditionalism continued to exercise a strong hold on much of Europe. During the first part of the Renaissance, many places in Europe were engaged in hunting down witches and exorcizing demons. After the Reformation, both Catholics and Protestants could turn their attention toward torturing and burning those charged with heresy by each sect. Although the Church was not particularly troubled by the early discoveries of Copernicus and other scientists, following the schism and the rise of Protestantism it became a reactionary force in defense of its dogmas. Thus, the Renaissance also vividly illustrates the conflict between modernity and progress on one side and tradition and superstition on the other. This conflict can even be seen in the thinking of some Renaissance scholars like Kepler who could not separate his logical, mathematical reasoning about the movements of stars and planets from his mystical belief in some grand design for the universe. By the seventeenth century though, science had begun to win its battle against superstition and traditionalism, and philosophy emerged from the confines of the monastery to resume the place of prestige it obtained in Ancient Greece. The work of Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, and most notably John Locke would have great impact on Enlightenment thinkers of the eighteenth century as would the discoveries of Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, and especially Isaac Newton. They had set the stage for the greatest attack on superstition and traditionalism since that launched by the Greeks.
EIGHT
The Enlightenment
The sole foundation for the belief in the natural sciences is this idea, that the general laws directing the phenomena of the universe, known or unknown, are necessary and constant. Why should this principle be any less true for the development of the intellectual and moral faculties of man than for the other operations of nature? (Marquis de Condorcet [1795]1955)1
During the Enlightenment (also called the Age of Reason), man’s confidence in his ability to reason rose to heights not seen since the Ancient Greeks and arguably unsurpassed to this day. Although the term is typically used to describe eighteenth-century intellectual developments, the Enlightenment is largely an extension and expansion of seventeenth-century thinking. We begin, therefore, by reviewing some of the major intellectual developments of the seventeenth century.
I. Seventeenth-Century Foundations of the Enlightenment A. Rationalism, Empiricism, and Scientific Methodology During the Renaissance, the attention of scholars focused heavily on the humanities. By the middle of the sixteenth century, “the awakening” that demarcates the Renaissance had fully spread to the sciences. A Scientific Revolution began that continued through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and it has continued more or less uninterrupted until the present day. We have already discussed the advances in astronomy by Kepler and Galileo at the beginning of the seventeenth century. In the life sciences, the major accomplishment was William Harvey’s discovery of the circulation of blood (De Moto cordis et sanguinis, 1628). Just as improvements in telescopes 1
As quoted in Henry (2004), pp. 24–5.
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advanced the work of Galileo and other astronomers, improvements in microscopes led to advances in life sciences by Robert Hooke, Nehemiah Grew, Antoni van Leeuwenhoek, and Jan Swammerdam and in chemistry Robert Boyle (1627–91). Mokyr (2002, pp. 36–7) states that “the Industrial Enlightenment’s debt to the scientific revolution consists of three closely interrelated phenomena: scientific method, scientific mentality, and scientific culture.” Henry (2004) also emphasizes the importance of the development of scientific methodology during the Scientific Revolution. The real legacy of the Scientific Revolution was not simply a bundle of newly established knowledge. Its importance was to show how yet more discoveries might be made, and how new truths about the world and everything in it could be established and understood. In short, the Scientific Revolution pointed the way to progress, and the new methodology of science became a major factor in the development of Enlightenment optimism. (Henry, 2004, p. 11)
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, two quite different approaches to science were put forward, approaches that had their antecedents in the work of Pythagoras and Aristotle and their followers. The French approach emphasized purely rational thinking and was epitomized by Ren´e Descartes (1596–1650). Descartes can also be said to have launched modern philosophy and was certainly the most important philosopher since the Greeks.2 His logical proof of God’s existence began by questioning everything – that I am sitting in this room and not just dreaming, that the objects that I think I see are real, and not just reflections or illusions. One thing was certain, however: I am having these thoughts. Thus, I must exist – cogito ergo sum – I think, therefore I am. Although Descartes’ proof of God’s existence was not new strictly speaking, when combined with the rest of his rationalistic philosophy it was nothing short of revolutionary. If a thinking man sitting before the fire in his bedroom could logically demonstrate God’s existence, then God existed. No appeals to holy men or holy books were needed. Although Descartes, a practicing Catholic, no doubt believed that his proof buttressed Catholic dogma, in the long run it undermined it. If one person could offer a proof of God’s existence, so could others – and many did. Moreover, it opened the door to someone logically proving that God does not exist. Indeed, Descartes was attacked by Protestants, because they believed that his views led to atheism.3 2 3
Russell (1945, pp. 557–8). Russell (1945, p. 559).
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Descartes’ ambitions extended beyond establishing a rational foundation for the existence of God. He sought to develop a complete, logical system from first principles, a science “that would explain metaphysical, physical, biological, and psychological reality with all the certainty of a geometrical demonstration.”4 Here the similarities between Descartes and the Pythagoreans, who believed that there was a mathematical basis for everything, are most apparent. If the Enlightenment was the Age of Reason, then Descartes must be regarded as one of its most important precursors, because no philosopher has placed more faith in the power of reasoning than Descartes. For him, true knowledge could only be obtained through reason. The foundation of Descartes’ theoretical system was the supposition that all matter was composed of tiny, unobservable particles in constant motion. It offered a more plausible explanation of natural phenomena than Aristotelian theory, which was still being taught at universities, and completely displaced Aristotelian theory on the Continent over the course of the seventeenth century. Yet Descartes’ system was pure speculation, or as Voltaire characterized it, “ingenious romance.”5 Isaac Newton’s Philosophae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (1687) destroyed Cartesian physics and turned scholars away from Cartesian philosophy.6 The alternative to the French approach to science was the English approach put forward by Francis Bacon in The Great Instauration and Novum Organum. Baconian scientific method is the polar opposite from Cartesian. Bacon eschewed hypothesis formulation and theorizing. For him, scientific understanding came through observing the natural world and running experiments. Boyle’s research on vacuums and other experiments of the seventeenth century gave dramatic testimony to the value of Bacon’s purely inductive approach. It would be Isaac Newton, however, who would combine the abstract reasoning of Descartes with Bacon’s empiricism to produce what we think of as the modern scientific method. Newton showed that a single set of laws explained the motions of both the planets in the heavens and objects on earth. Moreover, these laws could be expressed in relatively simple mathematical terms, and their predictions empirically verified. No one after Newton could question the existence of the so-called laws of nature, nor man’s capability of discovering these laws. He had demonstrated both. 4 5 6
McNeill (1963, p. 683). See Henry (2004, pp. 14–15). McNeill (1963, p. 684).
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Although Newton’s research focused on discovering the laws of nature governing inanimate objects, others were quick to conclude that human behavior must also be governed by natural laws and began to search for those laws, as the quote of Condorcet that opens this chapter reveals.
B. Contractarianism 1. John Locke. The idea of political communities emerging out of a state of nature through a social contract can be found in the work of Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) and more famously of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). Hobbes used the metaphor of a social contract to construct a defense of monarchy – life in anarchy was “nasty, brutish, and short,” and only a monarch could bring order to a community. John Locke (1632–1704), in contrast, used the metaphor to undermine the notion that kings ruled by divine right and thus paved the way for monarchies to be replaced by republican forms of government. Like Descartes, Locke had great faith in humans’ powers of reason. At birth, the human mind is a tabula rasa – blank slate – that can acquire knowledge and the capacity to reason through education. With their powers of reasoning, humans are capable of discovering the laws of nature. Isaac Newton had proved that such laws existed. Locke assumed that they applied to both inanimate objects and humans.7 For Locke, political power was “a right of making laws . . . for the common good.”8 To understand the nature of political power, one needed to understand the state of nature. To understand political power aright, and derive it from its original, we must consider what state all men are naturally in, and that is a state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they see fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending on the will of any other man. A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection . . . (Locke, [1690b]1939, I, §4, p. 404) 7 8
Locke’s ideas about human capacities to reason are developed in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding ([1690a]1939). Locke ([1690b]1939, p. 404).
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Thus, Locke used the state of nature to establish an extreme form of equality across all individuals. Starting from such a state of equality, it would obviously be difficult to develop an argument for why one individual should be master over all others. Hobbes’s argument relied on the extreme violence present in the state of nature. Locke’s state of nature was quite different from Hobbes’s, however. Though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence . . . The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone; and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that, being all equal and independent, no one might harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions. (Locke, [1690b]1939, p. 405)
Thus, individuals in Locke’s state of nature are governed by a law of nature that teaches them – we might say commands them – not to harm one another. Given that everyone is governed by reason in the state of nature and obeys laws of nature that forbid harming the “life, health, liberty, or possessions” of others, a reason for leaving the state of nature is less obvious in Locke than in Hobbes. Locke is clear, however, that the act of leaving is by mutual consent. Men being . . . by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subject to the political power of another, without his own consent, which is done by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any that are not of it. This any number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left as they were in the liberty of the state of nature. When any number of men have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority have the right to act and conclude the rest. (Locke, [1690b]1939, VIII, §95, p. 441)
Here Locke hints that life in anarchy may not be all that peaceful after all, and that government might contribute to the community’s “comfortable, safe, and peaceable living.” A more modern justification for forming a state is that there are certain public goods that benefit all members of a community – roads, schools, bridges, and dams – and thus institutions for making collective decisions are required. Such collective decisions are unlikely to emerge spontaneously out of a state of anarchy. Locke also slips in, almost as an aside, that collective decisions in the new political community will be made using the simple majority rule without addressing the issue of whether the use of this will not destroy the equality that existed in the
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state of nature by giving a majority of citizens the right to tyrannize over a minority. Later, Locke states in the same spirit, “Any political society is nothing but the consent of any number of free men capable of a majority to unite and incorporate into such a society. And this is that, and that only, which did or could give beginning to any lawful government in the world.”9 There is considerable ambiguity about whether Locke believed that a state of nature as he described it once existed, and the first states were formed by free men joining a social contract but were subsequently corrupted and transformed into tyrannies, or that he merely used the concepts of a state of nature and social contract to form a logical underpinning for his attack on monarchy. If we view these concepts in the latter way, and argue that a state of nature and social contract as Locke described them never existed, then the implication of the earlier quote would be that all governments up until then had been unlawful. Indeed, the first government in history to come close to satisfying the conditions laid down by Locke would be the American government created by the Constitution of 1787. American revolutionaries and the less radical of the French revolutionaries were both greatly influenced by Locke. The most radical French revolutionaries were followers of Rousseau, however, and because they eventually dictated the French Revolution’s course, we shall briefly examine Rousseau’s social contract. 2. Jean Jacques Rousseau. Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–78) belongs in neither this section nor this chapter. He does not belong in this section, because he was not a seventeenth-century precursor of the Enlightenment having lived in the eighteenth century; he does not belong in this chapter, because despite living during the Enlightenment, he opposed most of its ideas. Indeed, he is better thought of as the father of the Romantic movement.10 Nevertheless, I discuss him here because his political theory builds on the idea of a social contract, and his ideas had a powerful influence on the most important political event of the eighteenth century – the French Revolution. Rousseau was antithetical to two of the Enlightenment program’s major components – the importance of science and education.11 He was also a bitter enemy of Voltaire, the French embodiment of the Enlightenment. Where Voltaire used his acute powers of reasoning to question religious doctrines, 9 10 11
Locke ([1690b]1939, p. 442). Russell (1945, p. 684). Russell (1945, p. 687). At the same time, it is difficult to argue that Rousseau’s thinking was totally at odds with the Enlightenment (Munck, 2000).
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Rousseau argued that reasoning could not establish God’s existence. Proof of God’s existence had to be sought in the heart, not the mind.12 Rousseau’s The Social Contract (1762) can be regarded as part of the Enlightenment agenda, however, because it was both an attack on the divine right of kings and a defense of democracy. It was recognized as such when it appeared, and forced Rousseau to flee France and prevented him from returning to his homeland Switzerland.13 Many later commentators, taking into account its influence on the radicals of the French Revolution and later advocates of tyranny, have judged The Social Contract to be an apology for despotism. This judgment is unfair. True, it contains so many obscure if not outright contradictory passages that it is open to multiple interpretations, and thus no one can claim to know with certainty what Rousseau really meant to say. Yet it is possible to offer a more benign interpretation. In reading The Social Contract, one must always keep in mind that Rousseau grew up in Geneva. When he thinks of “the state,” he is thinking of an eighteenth century, Swiss city-state like Bern or Geneva, and not Napoleonic France, much less a Nazi Germany. Rousseau reveals this by referring to himself on the title page as a “citizen of Geneva,” and on the first page of text states, “I was born a member of a free state. . . . And I am happy to say that I never turn my attention to governments without constantly discovering . . . added reasons for cherishing that of my country.”14 He also asserts that Bern and Geneva would never have fallen for “all the absurdities that a crafty scoundrel or spell-binder [like Cromwell or the Duke of Beaufort] could pass off on the people of Paris or London” (p. 163). I identify four main components to his argument. Each summary of an idea is followed by quoted passages to support the argument. 1. The social contract is joined to lift individuals out of a state of nature much like that described by Hobbes. Everyone gains by joining the social contract. (a) It is not true that the individuals, in entering into and fulfilling the social contract, are making any real sacrifice. (b) Their situation is actually better as a result of the contract than it was before. (c) They have not given anything away, but made what is purely and simply a profitable exchange; an uncertain and precarious way of life for one that is better, more secure; natural independence 12 13 14
Russell (1945, pp. 691–4). Russell (1945, p. 690). P. 1, emphasis in the original. All future page references in this section refer to The Social Contract unless otherwise noted.
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2. As everyone benefits from joining the social contract, the decision to join is unanimous. There is only one law, in the very nature of the case, requires unanimous consent, namely, the social compact itself. For the act by which people join together in civil society is, of all acts in the world, the most completely voluntary. (p. 167)
3. The purpose of government is to advance the common good. Each citizen has a set of private preferences, which conflict with one another, and a view of the common good. When citizens participate in the collective decision process, they should express their judgments regarding the common good. The aggregation of these judgments is the general will. Implementation of the general will advances the common good. A number of men assembled together has a single will, looking to their common preservation and general well-being, just to the extent to they think of themselves as a single body. The state, where men do so think of themselves, draws its energies from sources that are potent and pure; its principles are clear and unmistakable. It contains no interests that get in one another’s way, or conflict. The common good reveals itself plainly so that nobody with a little good sense can possibly fail to see it. It offers, in a word, maximum guarantee against error on the part of the general will. (p. 162, emphasis in original) When a law is proposed in the assembly of the people, the individual members are not, by any means, asked whether they approve or disapprove of the proposal, [i.e., what their private preferences are] but rather this: Does it or does it not conform to the general will, which is their own? This is the question on which the individual expresses his opinion when he votes, and it is from the totaling of such votes that a declaration of the general will emerges. If then the view contrary to my own carries the day, that merely proves that I was mistaken, and that what I took to be the general will was not. (p. 169, emphasis in original)
4. The common good is sacrificed as citizens’ private preferences come to dominate their judgments about the common good. Let us suppose now a state in which the social bond has begun to ware thin. It has, we assume, entered upon its decline; particular interests have begun to make themselves felt in it, and narrower associations to affect decisions of the wider group. The common interest, in such a state, is clouded over, and
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encounters opposition; votes cease to be unanimous; the general will is no longer the will of everybody. (p. 164, emphasis in original) The better ordered the state, the more do public affairs crowd private ones out of the minds of the citizens, so that the very incidence of private affairs is a great deal smaller . . . Under a bad government, by contrast, every last citizen begrudges the steps that carry him toward the meeting-place, for the following reasons: (a) the business transacted there excites nobody’s interest, (b) the citizen knows beforehand that the general will is not going to prevail, and, finally, (c) everyone’s time is completely mortgaged to his domestic concerns. Good laws make for better laws, bad laws for worse ones. And you can write any state off as lost as of the moment when some citizen, in speaking of its affairs, asks the question: “What difference does it make to me?” (p. 148, emphasis in original)
These quotations reveal a view of the state remarkably close to that of pioneers of public choice like Knut Wicksell ([1896]1967) and James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962). The state comes into existence to increase the welfare of all individuals; once formed, its collective decisions should also increase the common good. The first quotation under 3 suggests that when the citizens’ judgments of the common good are close enough together, the unanimity rule can be used to reveal the common good (general will). The second quotation under 3 resembles the argument contained in Condorcet’s Jury Theorem discussed more fully in Chapter Ten. All citizens want to advance the common good, but they have different judgments of what laws will achieve this end. An implicit assumption in Rousseau’s argument, explicit in Condorcet’s proof, is that the probability of any citizen making a correct judgment about the common good exceeds 0.5. If this is the case, aggregation of individual judgments using the simple majority rule leads to the correct judgment with a probability that approaches one, as the community’s size increases. If the decision goes against a single voter, then she was wrong in her judgment about the common good. The second thing to note is that Rousseau had a conception of citizenship similar to that of Ancient Athens. The citizen is concerned with advancing and discovering the common good. Social bonds are strong, and “public affairs crowd private ones out of the minds of the citizens,” reducing the sphere of private decisions. Given this interpretation, one might expect Rousseau to have been a fan of Athenian democracy. Alas, no; such consistency cannot be found in Rousseau. It was Sparta to which he was partial. This partiality sends up a red flag for those who suspect Rousseau’s motivations.
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Most of the earlier quotations are from later parts of The Social Contract. In the early parts, the notion of the general will is often vague and it is unclear how it is revealed. If one assumes that the general will is not related to individual citizens’ preferences, then the concept becomes worrisome, because Rousseau sees citizens as sacrificing their personal freedoms to the general will. Whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the entire body politic, which is only another way of saying that his fellows shall force him to be free. For this is the undertaking that dedicates each citizen to the fatherland, and thus insures each citizen against personal dependence of any kind. (p. 25)
If one assumes that the general will is revealed by the Communist Party or an Adolph Hitler, then phrases like forcing citizens to be free and dedicating them to the fatherland conjure up frightening images from more recent times. If, on the other hand, one thinks of the general will as a set of laws that have been adopted unanimously for the purpose of advancing the common good, then being free implies living in a community in which one has participated in creating the laws. In such a community, Rousseau can be seen as saying – to obtain the common good, citizens must be constrained to obey the laws, which they helped write. Bertrand Russell (1945, p. 699) objected strenuously to the following sentence from The Social Contract: “It is therefore essential, if the general will is to be able to express itself, that there should be no partial society within the State, and that each citizen should think only his own thoughts.” Russell complains that this would eliminate all associations – such as political parties, trade unions, and church clubs. “The result is obviously the Corporate or Totalitarian State, in which the individual citizen is powerless.” A more benign interpretation of the passage would be simply that Rousseau was anticipating James Madison’s warnings in Federalist 10 of the dangers to democracy from factions. Here it is perhaps also worth noting that the attractive normative properties of the Condorcet Jury Theorem rest on the assumption “that each citizen should think only his own thoughts.” Rousseau also is less protective of property than Locke – it would be difficult to have been more protective – and places considerable emphasis on income equality. Here too, one can read illiberal meanings into The Social Contract. Without denying the merit of some of the more sinister interpretations, I believe the most accurate interpretation of the book is as a spirited attack on monarchy and defense of a rather extreme form of democracy.
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II. Religion in the Enlightenment A. Attacks on Christianity Descartes’ rationalism and the wondrous success of Newton’s empiricism gave rise to great trust in the powers of reason. No proposition was to be accepted purely on the basis of authority – be it of a great thinker like Aristotle, the Church, or the State. Every proposition had to be put under the microscope of logical reasoning, and when possible, empirical testing. Individuals had to be free to allow their powers of reasoning to take them anywhere. Those who adopted this attitude were called freethinkers. A prominent freethinker himself, Anthony Collins (1676–1729) “defined freethinking as the impartial use of the understanding to: (a) determine the meaning of propositions; (b) access the evidence for and against them; and (c) judge their truth or falsity, their probability or improbability on the apparent strength or weakness of that evidence.”15 Note here the similarity between freethinking and scientific method – hypothesis (proposition) formulation, weighing of evidence for and against, and acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis. Freethinkers claimed that all propositions, including religious ones, should be subject to the same standards of justification. Locke expressed this position in the following way: “He that takes away reason, to make way for revelation, puts out the light of both, and does much-what the same, as if he would persuade a man to put out his eye, the better to receive the remote light of an invisible star by a telescope.”16 For Locke, revelation passed the test of reason: “Revelation is natural religion enlarged by a new set of discoveries communicated by God immediately, which reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and proofs it gives, that they come from God.”17 However, not everyone was willing to put Christian doctrines to such an easy test. Thus, during the Enlightenment, Christianity came under attack from both critics outside the Church like Hobbes and Spinoza and indirectly from those within it like Collins and Samuel Clarke (1675–1729). Collins and Clarke accepted that some Christian doctrines could not withstand close, logical scrutiny, but believed that 15 16 17
As quoted in Dybikowski (2004, p. 45). Locke ([1689]1980, p. 397). Locke ([1689]1980, p. 397).
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when all of its doctrines were considered, reasoning would confirm Christianity’s basic truth. However, by giving ground to critics in some areas, its defenders undermined confidence in the whole Christian edifice.18 One focus of attack was the claim that the Bible contained divine revelations. Critics pointed out that the Old Testament had many authors, and diverse versions existed making it difficult to know which text God had wished to communicate. Similarly, because the New Testament was written many years after Christ’s death based on recollections of those who knew him, passed down by word of mouth, its account of his life and teachings was vulnerable to the same kinds of distortions that characterize all oral accounts of events. Christianity’s claims regarding miracles came under particular attack.19 Hume’s was especially devastating: It is no miracle that a man, seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden . . . But it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to life; because that has never been observed in any age or country. There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed, or a miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite proof, which is superior. (Hume, [1748]1939, pp. 656–7, emphasis in the original, footnote omitted)
Hume goes on to present four reasons for not accepting miracles on the basis of testimony by supposed witnesses: First, there is not to be found, in all history, any miracle attested by a sufficient number of men, or of such unquestioned good sense, education, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in themselves; . . . Secondly . . . The passion of surprise and wonder, arising from miracles, being an agreeable emotion, gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of those events, from which it is derived. And this goes so far, that even those who cannot enjoy this pleasure immediately, nor can believe those miraculous events, of which they are informed, yet love to partake of the satisfaction, at second hand or rebound . . . Thirdly. It forms a strong presumption against all supernatural and miraculous relations, that they are observed chiefly to abound among ignorant and barbarous nations . . . a fourth reason, which diminishes the authority of prodigies, [is] that there is no testimony for any, even those which have not been expressly detected, that is not opposed by an infinite number of witnesses. (Hume, [1748]1939, pp. 657–61, emphasis in the original) 18 19
See discussion in Dybikowski (2004, pp. 41–7). In addition to Hume, Spinoza and Voltaire also zeroed in on miracles. See discussion in Dybikowski (2004, p. 50).
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These various criticisms led thinking persons of the Enlightenment to more abstract concepts of religion and God. Newton had uncovered a universe governed by a single set of natural laws – mathematical laws that could be discovered and understood by man. The beauty of these laws led many to believe that God must have created the universe – God’s omniscience includes a solid understanding of mathematics. The universe that he created is so perfect that it cannot be improved upon. Thus, it is futile to pray to God to intervene in its running, because this would imply that it was not perfect to begin with, that God had somehow made a mistake. However, this in turn would undermine the proposition that God is infallible. By such a line of reasoning, many Enlightenment scholars came to some sort of Deism – God the clockmaker created the universe and set it on its way ticking, and it would continue on the course he set forever. Using a broad definition of Deism, one can list among the British, Charles Blount, Anthony Collins, David Hume, the Earl of Shaftesbury, Adam Smith, Matthew Tindahl, and John Tolland as leading Deists; among the French, Pierre Bayle and Voltaire; among the Americans, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine, and George Washington; among the Germans, Frederick the Great and Immanuel Kant; and the Dutchman Baruch Spinoza.
B. Materialism In the discussion of local religions, we noted a distinction between mind and matter, or body and soul, as a common human response to death. A loved one’s body deteriorates, but her spirit or soul lives on. Such dualism was accepted in most Greek and Roman philosophies, and is central to all universal religions including Christianity. Materialism – the belief that matter can think – constituted a major challenge to all universal religions. Once again, Locke anticipated this development in Enlightenment thinking: We have the ideas of matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know whether [any mere material thing] thinks or no; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas without revelation, to discover whether Omnipotency, has given to some systems of matter, fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to matter, so disposed, a thinking immaterial substance: it being, in respect to our notions, not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive that God can, if He pleases, superadd to matter a faculty of thinking, than that he should superadd to it another substance with a faculty of thinking . . . (Locke, [1689]1980, Book III, p. 329)
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Perhaps recognizing the slippery slope before him, Locke did not pursue the possibility of matter thinking, but left it as a hypothetical possibility if God so chose. Others, less deferent to God’s omnipotence than Locke, explored the implications of matter’s thinking. Most prominent among these was Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1709–51). In L’Homme Machine (Man a Machine, 1748), he argued that humans, animals, and plants are all machines of a sort, with humans being merely more sophisticated machines than animals and plants. “Man is not moulded [sic] out of more precious clay than they.”20 Epicurus had also rejected the dualism between mind and matter, arguing that . . . the world was a swirling mass of atoms which comprised both body and soul. The soul, in other words, was not a substance apart; nor was it intended for an afterlife. When one accepted this basic truth, Epicurus argued, one could dispel the false fears of divine punishment or eternal damnation that caused us continual anxiety and pain, allowing us to focus instead on the more enlightened goal of attaining pleasure in this world. (McMahon, 2004, p. 171)
Although Epicurus anticipated La Mettrie’s materialism by some two millennia, even during the Age of Reason it was pretty explosive stuff, and forced La Mettrie to seek refuge at the court of Frederick the Great, the great Enlightenment figure. Today, it is commonplace that matter – the brain – thinks, and we can even identify which parts “think” which thoughts, and which parts experience which pleasures. Epicurus, La Mettrie, and perhaps even Locke conjectured that this was so long before instruments existed to monitor the brain’s activities.
C. Atheism Deism eliminates any reason to pray to God to improve things in this life, because God is either unable or disinclined to intervene in the course of the universe. Materialism eliminates any reason to pray to God to improve things in the afterlife, because mind and matter are intertwined and the first expires with the second, presumably taking the soul with it. Having dispensed with all reasons to pray to God, the next logical step was to dispense with God himself. A few brave iconoclasts took this last, logical step during the Enlightenment. Because atheism was still a crime punishable by death in the eighteenth century, very few were brave enough to state openly that they were atheists, although many were willing to accuse others of being atheists. One of the 20
As quoted in McMahon (2004, p. 171). This section draws heavily on McMahon’s essay.
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most influential atheists was Paul-Henri Thiry, Baron d’Holbach (1723–89). In his underground best seller Syst`eme de la Nature (The System of Nature, 1770), d’Holbach described nature as a system of matter in motion. Because motion was a primary quality of matter, there was no need for a separate force – the mind – in the system nor any need for a Supreme Being.21 La Mettrie, d’Holbach, Voltaire, and other Enlightenment critics of religion were a small minority of the population, of course, which explains why almost everyone mentioned in this section at some time sought refuge from persecution for their ideas in another country. The average European or American remained committed to the basic dogmas of Christianity. Descriptions from many parts of Europe suggest that for a great number of churchgoers religion consisted of a mixture of assorted fragments of memorized catechism, combined with simple (sometimes almost animistic) values not far removed from paganism. Divine favour could be bought or ensured through the performance of certain rituals, and everyday events were readily interpreted in terms which the philosophes would come to regard as pure superstition. (Munck, 2000, p. 29)
Thus, for the average person during the eighteenth century, Christian religion continued to be an exchange of rituals for divine favors. However, church attendance and the performance of religious rituals like Easter communion declined over the century, and men increasingly sought male sociability in the local tavern rather than in church.22
III. The Pursuit of Happiness Happiness has often been associated with luck. The Greek word for happiness endaimonia is formed by combining the word for good, en, with the word for god or spirit, daimon. To be happy, the gods had to smile upon one. The German word Gl¨uck translates as both (good) luck and happiness, and the French word for happiness bonheur derives from the Old French word for luck or chance heur.23 To be happy, one had to be lucky. Once again, Epicurus – skeptic, materialist – was in tune with Enlightenment thinking in making happiness the ultimate human goal. Yet for Epicurus, happiness was not a gift from the gods to the lucky but a reward for a virtuous life. Epicurus and his followers, the Platonists, Aristotelians, 21 22 23
See discussion in McMahon (2004, pp. 172–4). Munck (2000, pp. 30–2). For other examples and discussion, see McMahon (2004, pp. 164–5).
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Stoics, and Zeno, all thought of happiness as a reward for virtue – a reward one enjoyed in this life not in some afterlife.24 Christianity shifted the focus to the afterlife. Thanks to Adam and Eve, man was born with the burden of original sin for which he had to atone. Christ suffered and made the ultimate sacrifice for human salvation, and humans needed to suffer and sacrifice to join him in Heaven. Man’s lot was to be patient, endure the evils of the present life, and wait for the true happiness that awaited him in the next life. And as we do not as yet possess a present, but look for a future salvation, so is it with our happiness, and this “with patience;” for we are encompassed with evils, which we ought patiently to endure, until we come to the ineffable enjoyment of unmixed good; for there shall be no longer anything to endure. Salvation, such as it shall be in the world to come, shall itself be our final happiness. (St. Augustine)25
The Renaissance shifted attention back to the present, and the Enlightenment continued this transformation. Locke again is a major figure developing this line of Enlightenment thinking. By arguing that the human mind at birth was a tabula rasa, Locke wiped the slate clean of not only all prior knowledge but all prior sin. Freed from sin, humans could fill up their minds as they pleased, and pursue whatever goal they so chose. And what should the goal in life be? The pursuit of happiness: “The highest perfection of intellectual nature lies in a careful and constant pursuit of true and solid happiness.”26 Although Locke’s devout Christianity prevented him from equating happiness with hedonistic pleasure, this next logical step was made by others like the materialist La Mettrie.27 Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) replaced happiness as the goal of human action with utility, an amalgam of pleasures and pains that could be measured, compared across individuals, and added. Bentham’s famous prescription for society was to maximize the sum of utilities over all of its members. Much of his writings consisted of policy proposals to achieve this goal. During the first half of the twentieth century, the idea that one could measure and compare utilities across individuals fell out of favor with economists, and a great deal of effort went into demonstrating that economics’ main propositions could be derived without the concept of measurable utility or indeed without any notion of utility. Recent writing has 24 25 26 27
McMahon (2004, p. 165). St. Augustine, City of God and Christian Doctrine, book 19, ch. 4, as it appears at http:// www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf102.toc.html. John Locke ([1690a]1939, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, XXI, §52). McMahon (2004, pp. 171–2).
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reintroduced the concept of happiness, however, in large part because it is believed to be measurable.28 Thus, the idea broached by Epicurus and advanced by Locke that the pursuit of happiness is “the highest perfection of intellectual nature” has come full circle.
IV. The Enlightenment Agenda It is difficult to write of the Enlightenment agenda because there were many different currents of thought with some philosophes advocating one set of reforms and others a different set. In addition, there were figures like Rousseau, who in some areas, was a leading critic of the Enlightenment and in others went further than many of his contemporaries in advocating Enlightenment ideals.29 Nevertheless, enough overlap in ideas existed to allow one to speak of an Enlightenment “programme.”30 Locke’s ideas, both with respect to the human mind and knowledge as set out in the Essay and to natural law and the social contract in the Second Treatise, again provided the inspiration – if not the foundation – for much of the Enlightenment program.
A. Education Being a tabula rasa, the human mind, like any other blank slate, could be written upon. A great deal of The Essay is devoted to the acquisition of knowledge through experience. Only by developing their capacity to reason can humans acquire the ability to control their passions, distinguish good from evil, and engage in moral and political thinking. Thus, Locke’s characterization of the human mind and the importance of knowledge became the basis for the Enlightenment’s emphasis on education.31 Those stressing education’s importance fell into three groups. Locke, Joseph Priestly (1733–1804), and Claude Adrien Helv´etius maintained that one learns from others, and thus wished to improve the quality of schools and teachers. Rousseau, champion of the noble savage, and his followers thought that children must be isolated from society to avoid exposure to bad ideas and instead must learn from nature. A third group, which included 28 29 30 31
See Frey and Stutzer (2002a,b), Kahneman and Krueger (2006), and Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006). For a discussion of the complicated relationship between Rousseau and the Enlightenment, see Furniss (2004). Finer (1997, pp. 1434–8). See discussion in Finer (1997, p. 435) and Parry (2004, pp. 217–19).
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Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746–1836) and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), combined ideas from the first two. Kant, for example, opens his essay “What Is Enlightenment?” as follows: Enlightenment is man’s leaving his self-caused immaturity. Immaturity is the incapacity to use one’s intelligence without the guidance of another. Such immaturity is self-caused if it is not caused by lack of intelligence, by lack of determination and courage to use one’s own intelligence without being guided by another. Sapere Aude! Have the courage to use your own intelligence! is therefore the motto of the enlightenment. (Kant, 1784, p. 132, emphasis in original)
Here we see very clearly the influence of Rousseau. Elsewhere, however, Kant argues that a child must be taught how to work at the task of acquiring knowledge.32 Thus, the Enlightenment program embraced an important tenet of liberalism – through education the individual can develop the capacity to think and act for herself.
B. Religion and the Church The Protestant Reformation dispersed religious sects across Europe and led to demands for religious toleration by minority religious groups as early as the middle of the sixteenth century. Particularly effective in pressing the case for religious tolerance were the Huguenot pamphleteers who became active in France during the reign of Louis XIV.33 The Enlightenment argument for religious toleration built on Locke’s idea of the mind as a blank slate and all men being equal in the state of nature with equal natural rights. The accumulation of knowledge would lead people in different directions, and each individual had a right to his own interpretation of God. Kant directly linked the idea of a social contract to the acquisition of knowledge about religion: But should a society of clergymen, for instance an ecclesiastical assembly, be entitled to commit itself by oath to a certain unalterable doctrine in order to perpetuate an endless guardianship over each of its members and through them over the people? I answer that this is quite inconceivable. Such a contract which would be concluded in order to keep humanity forever from all further enlightenment is absolutely impossible, even should it be confirmed by the highest authority through parliaments and the most solemn peace treaties. An age cannot conclude a pact and take an oath upon it to commit the succeeding age to a situation in which it would be impossible for the latter to enlarge even its most important knowledge, to eliminate error and altogether to progress in enlightenment. Such a thing would 32 33
Parry (2004, pp. 223–35). Simonutti (2004).
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be a crime against human nature, the original destiny of which consists in such progress. Succeeding generations are entirely justified in discarding such decisions as unauthorized and criminal. (Kant, [1784]1949, p. 136)
In addition to a strong justification for each generation’s right to form its own judgments about religion, we see here Kant’s great optimism about intellectual progress, so characteristic of the Enlightenment, and the assertion that each generation must be free to write its own social contract – an assertion to be repeated by Thomas Jefferson with respect to the right of each generation to write its own constitution. Kant’s defense of religious freedom also contains a backhand slap at the professional clergy. The rigid dogmas of the Catholic Church clearly conflicted with the Enlightenment’s commitment to free inquiry, and not surprisingly, the Church came under considerable attack. Demands were made, and to some degree carried out, to reduce the number of monasteries, confiscate Church lands, and even tax the Church. Thus, the Enlightenment forced the Church to retreat on both doctrinal matters and with respect to its status and influence in society.34 Due to shortages in funding, the pace at which educational reforms were introduced as laws and edicts far exceeded the speed at which they were implemented, and universities remained almost untouched by the reform movement. Nevertheless, the desire to be able to read and participate in the intellectual debates of the day led to increases in literacy across all of Europe and a dramatic increase in the circulation of newspapers and pamphlets.35
C. Civil Liberties Freethinking was demanded not only with respect to religion, but to all social and civil matters, including the right to criticize the state. State censorship was common at the beginning of the eighteenth century and changes in the laws were slow to come and modest. However, the emphasis placed on freedom of expression by the philosophes did lead to a significant de facto relaxation of censorship in many places.36 34 35 36
Finer (1997, pp. 1436–7), Munck (2000, pp. 8, 139–42), Dybikowski (2004, p. 47). Munck (2000, pp. 42–59, chs. 4, 5). See Finer (1997, p. 1437) and Munck (2000, pp. 142–6). The French word philosophe means philosopher, but during the eighteenth century became a general term to describe all intellectuals who emphasized the importance of applying reason to all problems.
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Not only were individuals supposed to be free to think what they wanted, they were supposed to be free to do what they wanted. Both serfdom and slavery came under attack during the Enlightenment.37 To reduce a man to slavery, to buy, sell and keep him enslaved, are real crimes, crimes far worse than robbery. In effect, you are depriving the slave not only of all personal property, and wealth, but of the ability ever to acquire ownership of everything that nature has given him to survive and to satisfy his needs. To all this you are adding the further wrong of taking away the slave’s right to ownership of his own person. (Marquis de Condorcet, [1781]1999, pp. 308–9)
Woman’s suffrage was, of course, a long way off in both Europe and North America, but the obvious inference that if serfs and blacks should be free and equal, why not also women, occurred to some, like again Condorcet. Yet the strongest advocates for equality between the sexes were, unsurprisingly, women. Marie Olympe Aubry de Gouges (1748–93), a revolutionary activist, became a successful dramatist, novelist, journalist, and pamphleteer despite being illiterate. Within two years of the appearance of The Rights of Man, her The Rights of Woman was published. Its first two articles read as follows. Article I. Woman is born free and remains man’s equal in the matter of rights. Social distinctions can be based only on usefulness to the community. Article II. The goal of all political associations is the preservation of the natural and inalienable rights of woman and man. These are the rights to liberty, property, security and above all the right to resist oppression. (Gouges, [1791]1999, p. 320)
Revolutionary stuff even in revolutionary France and still revolutionary in many parts of the world today.
D. Law and Justice At the Enlightenment’s start, legal authority derived from both the state and the Church. The ceremonies practiced in courts, the rituals observed there, were meant to inspire reverence. The authorities intoned the familiar biblical injunctions about the origin of law in God’s decrees, and spoke of the necessity of obedience as an antidote to human sin. The repeated public spectacles of terrible punishments served to reinforce this message. Rulers relied upon the frequent return to these solemn events to overawe the lower orders. (McGowen, 2004, p. 504) 37
See also, Munck (2000, pp. 186–92).
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The Enlightenment’s movement to reduce the Church’s influence on social life carried over into the legal domain and led to efforts to find another basis for law than “God’s decrees.” Two lines of argument can be discerned. One finds its origin in the writing of the seventeenth-century Dutch jurist Grotius (1583–1645). Grotius argued that the principles of law were derived from natural law, not divine law. These principles could be discovered by reasoning. The diverse and confusing array of existing laws could be reduced and simplified by bringing them into line with natural law. Like many Enlightenment figures who followed him, Grotius replaced God with nature and in particular God’s law with natural law. Direct followers of Grotius in this respect were Samuel Pufendorf (1632–94) and Christian Thomasius (1655–1728). Others like Leibniz (1646–1716) and Christian Wolff (1679–1754) continued to maintain, however, that the basis of natural law was God’s law.38 The four most important Enlightenment writers on jurisprudence were Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu (1689–1755), Cesare Bonesana Beccaria (1738–94), William Blackstone, and Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832). Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws (1748) was a best seller even in his lifetime. He also believed that human reason was the basis of law, but unlike many natural law theorists, did not conclude that there was a universal set of laws discoverable by reason. Law in general is human reason insofar as it governs all the peoples of the earth; and the political and civil laws of each nation should be only the particular cases to which human reason is applied. Laws should be so appropriate to the people for whom they are made that it is very unlikely that the laws of one nation can suit another. Laws must relate to the nature and the principle of government that is established or that one wants to establish, whether those laws form it as do political laws, or maintain it, as do civil laws. They should be related to the physical aspect of the country; to the climate, be it freezing, torrid, or temperate; to the properties of the terrain, its location and extent; to the way of life of the peoples, be they plowmen, hunters, or herdsmen; they should relate to the degree of liberty that the constitution can sustain, to the religion of the inhabitants, their inclinations, their wealth, their number, their commerce, their mores and their manners; finally, the laws are related to one another, to their origin, to the purpose of the legislator, and to the order of things on which they are established. (Montesquieu, [1748]1999, pp. 250–1)
Beccaria’s On Crime and Punishment ([1764]1999) was also hugely popular: “Beccaria challenged a legal system that was particularistic and reflective of a deeply hierarchical society. He proposed to replace it with a 38
McGowen (2004, pp. 508–9).
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code grounded in a particular understanding of human psychological laws. Superstition, ignorance, and laziness were the enemies he sought to combat, the sources of the mischievous measures that littered the criminal code.”39 Beccaria’s use of psychological laws is illustrated in his proposal to make “the punishment fit the crime.” Given men’s need to come together, and given the compacts which necessarily arise from the very opposition of private interests, we can make out a scale of wrong actions, of which the highest grade consists in those which spell the immediate destruction of society, and the lowest those which involve the smallest possible injustice to its private participants. Between these two extremes are distributed in imperceptible gradations from the highest to the lowest, all the actions which are inimical to the public good and which can be called crimes. If it were possible to measure all the infinite and untoward combinations of human actions geometrically, then there should be a corresponding scale of punishments running from the harshest to the mildest. But it is enough that the wise lawgiver signposts the main stages, without confusing the order and not reserving for the crimes of the highest grade the punishments of the lowest. If there were an exact and universal scale of crimes and punishments, we should have an approximate and common measure of the gradations of tyranny and liberty, and of the basic humanity and evil of different nations. Any action which does not fall between the two limits noted above, cannot be called a crime, nor be punished as such . . . (Beccaria, [1764]1999, pp. 445–6)
Note the assumption, present in many quotations in this chapter, that the community is formed by a social contract. In wanting to “measure . . . human actions geometrically,” Beccaria anticipated Bentham’s efforts to find a scientific basis for the law in utility calculations. Where continental writers, like Beccaria, sought coherence in the law through an enlightened codification, William Blackstone sought coherence in “the genius of the common law.”40 Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765–69, four volumes) had a profound effect on judicial thinking in England far beyond the Enlightenment. For Jeremy Bentham, natural law and natural rights theories were “nonsense on stilts.” Laws were created by men in the legislature. Thus, Bentham, in contrast to Blackstone, was a champion of codified law. When writing the laws, the legislature needed to follow the objective of maximizing the sum of human happiness. This would give laws a scientific foundation. Bentham spent much of his life articulating the kinds of laws and public policies that would accomplish this goal. 39 40
McGowen (2004, p. 511). McGowen (2004, p. 513).
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The Enlightenment’s judicial program was more successful in some countries than in others, and in no country was it a complete success.41 Nevertheless, most legal codes were rationalized and simplified, and laws were more fairly and consistently applied. Scales of punishment were brought into line with the severity of the crime, and in several countries torture as a means of interrogation was eliminated.
E. Politics The two main targets of Enlightenment reforms were the Church and the monarchy. Dispelling the notion that a monarch rules because of a divine right was Locke’s main objective in the Essay on Civil Government. The concept of a social contract was widely accepted as an ideal if not a historical fact, and carried with it a strong implication of equality between sovereign and subjects. The widespread acceptance of these ideas caused some monarchs to offer new justifications for their rule and to attempt to rule in a more enlightened way. During the eighteenth century, a form of enlightened absolutism emerged. It is a matter of some controversy just how enlightened eighteenthcentury monarchs were, and how many of the political changes during the century were influenced by the philosophes. Indeed, some historians eschew the term enlightened absolutism entirely.42 For one thing, political reforms in Europe already began during the Renaissance, and one can speak of an “early Enlightenment” in France under Louis XIV.43 Nevertheless, there was a noticeable difference in both the thinking and the style of government of a Frederick the Great and the monarchs of the seventeenth and earlier centuries. Frederick the Great (1712–86), Prussia’s monarch, was a true man of letters. A freethinker and Deist, he was familiar with the works of Descartes, Bayle, Locke, and Voltaire, and made his own contributions to Enlightenment thinking, most notably in Antimachiavell (1739–40) and Essai sur les formes de government et sur les devoirs des souverains (1777).44 In the latter, he developed a defense of monarchy based on a social contract between the monarch and his subjects, which resembled Hobbes’s social contract in many ways. The monarch was obligated to protect his subjects from external threats, guarantee domestic peace and the rule of law, and more generally 41 42 43 44
Munck (2000, pp. 146–56). See discussion and references in Hellmuth (2004, pp. 442–4). Fitzpatrick (2004). Hellmuth (2004, p. 444).
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improve his subjects’ welfare. They, in turn, “unconditionally and irrevocably ceded sovereignty to the ruler.”45 He described the monarch as “the first servant of the state,” and it can be said with considerable justification that he both tried and succeeded to live up to this title. He was a tireless worker, dictating over 100,000 Ordres (effectively laws) during his reign.46 He was also a champion of religious tolerance: “Pagans, deists, agnostics, even Jesuits were tolerated; and Jews also were left alone.”47 Freedom of thought and speech existed in Frederick the Great’s Prussia, and many freethinkers sought refuge at his court when their writings and actions got them into trouble. Under his rule, the Prussian judicial system and laws were systematized and rationalized. Thus, for many both within and outside of Prussia, Frederick the Great was the embodiment of the Enlightenment. The question may now be put: do we live at present in an enlightened age? The answer is: No, but in an age of enlightenment. Much still prevents men from being placed in a position or even being placed into position to use their own minds securely and well in matters of religion. But we do have definite indications that this field of endeavor is being opened up for men to work freely and reduce gradually the hindrances preventing a general enlightenment and an escape from self-caused immaturity. In this sense, this age is the age of enlightenment and the age of Frederick (the Great). (Kant, [1784]1949, p. 138)
In addition to these reforms, which clearly fit the Enlightenment programme, Frederick the Great undertook many actions that any monarch might have undertaken in any age. He was, for example, an energetic state builder seizing neighboring territories, promoting industries like shipbuilding and mining, draining swamps, and building canals.48 Under Frederick the Great, Prussia emerged as one of Europe’s more powerful states. Although Frederick the Great arguably was the most successful of the enlightened despots of the eighteenth century, he was not alone in introducing parts of the Enlightenment programme. The Habsburg emperors, Joseph II and Leopold II, Catherine the Great of Russia, Gustav III of Sweden, Charles III of Spain, and several rulers of smaller states also joined the Enlightenment reform movement. One can again question the success of these rulers in implementing their reforms.49 Joseph II’s reform program, for example, was a total disaster, both because of strong opposition from 45 46 47 48 49
Hellmuth (2004, p. 445). Hellmuth (2004, pp. 445–6). Finer (1997, p. 1448). Finer (1997, p. 1449). Finer (1997, pp. 1447–55), Hellmuth (2004, pp. 448–54).
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various interests and because the Austrian bureaucracy was incapable of implementing the thousands of edicts flooding out of Vienna.50 The Enlightenment’s program was largely for reforming monarchy, not abolishing it. Apropos of this, in Louis-S´ebastien Mercier’s novel set in Paris in the year 2440, the government is not a democracy but rather an enlightened monarchy. In the six centuries following the Enlightenment, monarchs had at last been “prevailed on to listen to the voice of philosophy.”51 However, a few Enlightenment figures went beyond proffering advice to monarchs. David Hume ([1752]1987), for example, presented an outline for a constitution for a “perfect commonwealth” that placed an elected senate at the top of the executive, not a monarch and, of course, Rousseau’s Social Contract was a radical plea for democracy. However, these writings were the exceptions. Most Enlightenment thinkers either shied from advocating the revolutions needed to displace monarchy with democracy or in fact preferred enlightened monarchy to a democracy. In “Homeland,” for example, Voltaire offers what appears at first to be a defense of democracy against monarchy: Now, is it better for your homeland to be a monarchical state or a republican state? . . . If you ask the rich for a solution, they will all prefer an aristocratic system; ask the people, and they will want democracy. Our kings prefer monarchies. How is it possible, therefore, for almost the entire world to be ruled by monarchies? Ask the rats who proposed to bell the cat. (Voltaire, [1764]1999, p. 180)
A spirited defense of democracy? Not really, for the paragraph closes with the sentence, “But in truth the real reason is, as has been said before, that men are very rarely fit to rule themselves.” This skepticism about the people’s fitness to rule themselves explains why so much of the European Enlightenment programme was directed at enlightening monarchs as opposed to actually introducing democracy as in North America. This difference in attitudes toward “the people” can still be seen today with European politicians being much more elitist in their approach to politics than American politicians.
F. Economics Part of the Enlightenment’s Zeitgeist was a belief in natural laws governing all things – the movements of the planets, of physical objects on earth, and human behavior. Much of Hume’s work was devoted to discovering these laws, and the title of one of his essays (That Politics may be Reduced to a 50 51
Finer (1997, pp. 1453–4), Hellmuth (2004, p. 449). Jackson (2004, p. 191).
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Science, 1741) is symbolic in this regard. It was during the Enlightenment that the science of modern economics can reasonably be said to have been launched. Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733) once complained that “one of the greatest Reasons why so few People understand themselves, is, that most Writers are always teaching Men what they should be, and hardly ever trouble their heads with telling them what they really are.”52 Mandeville wanted to understand human behavior, and he did not shrink from describing its seamy side. In the Fable of the Bees (1714, 1723) appears one of the first arguments that greed is good, and that private vice and avarice by stimulating economic activity lead to public benefits. Mandeville stressed that the aggregation of individual actions produced an integrated economic system and that care must be taken when changing one part of the system, because the change is likely to affect other parts. From this he concluded that one should not try to eliminate poverty. The dismal science had been launched. One can discern three schools of economic thought in the eighteenth century: mercantilism, physiocracy, and Scottish political economy.53 Mercantilism had been the prevailing economic orthodoxy for the previous two centuries. The wealth of a nation was increased by promoting and protecting domestic monopolies, restricting imports, and maintaining hard currencies – gold and silver. Both the physiocrats and the Scottish political economists challenged this orthodoxy. Both favored laissez-faire domestic policies and free international trade. Both groups also linked historical progress to the evolution of economic activity. Scottish political economists identified four stages of economic evolution: hunting, pastoral, agricultural, and commercial. For French physiocrats, not surprisingly, history stopped with the agricultural stage and commerce was but an appendage to agriculture. For the physiocrats, the source of a nation’s wealth lay in its agricultural sector.54 The Scottish Enlightenment was led by Hume, Lord Kames, William Robertson, Adam Ferguson, John Millar, and Adam Smith. Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations was published in 1776 (the year of Hume’s death and the United States’ birth) and was the most influential work of the Scottish Enlightenment. However, many of its important ideas – the role of the division of labor in economic prosperity, the invisible hand argument – can be found in earlier works by Hume, Ferguson, 52 53 54
Quotation taken from Knellwolf (2004, p. 196). See discussion and references in Sutherland (2004). The leading physiocrats were the freethinkers Franc¸ois Quesnay, Victor de Riqueti, Marquis de Mirabeau, and Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot. See Sutherland (2004, pp. 476–8).
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and other Scottish writers. The main lessons of the Scottish Enlightenment fit well into the broader Enlightenment program. There are laws by which economies function and these can be learned. Economic progress is possible and poverty can be eliminated. In the Scottish Enlightenment, the dismal science sounded an optimistic note.
V. The French Revolution Chronologically, the American Revolution preceded the French, but we have focused so intently on the European Enlightenment that it is appropriate to consider it first. Finer (1997, p. 1517) thought that “The French Revolution is the most important single event in the entire history of government.” It brought an end to the Ancien R´egime in France, and sounded a death knell for monarchy in Europe. In little more than one century after the French Revolution, all European countries would witness either a peaceful shift of power away from the monarchs to elected parliaments or a complete end to monarchy. Our interest is not in the Revolution per se but in the ideas underlying it. Suffice it to say, therefore, that eighteenth-century France, the fountain of Enlightenment ideas, was ruled by two of Europe’s least enlightened monarchs. Both Louis XV and Louis XVI maintained that they ruled by divine right, and both ruled with indolence and incompetence. In the end, even the French aristocracy turned against the monarchy.55 The most important political legacy of the French Revolution was the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, enacted by the National Assembly on August 26, 1789:56 The Representatives of the French People constituted in National Assembly, Considering that ignorance, forgetfulness or contempt of the rights of man are the sole cause of public misfortune and governmental depravity, Have resolved to expound in a solemn declaration the natural inalienable and sacred rights of man, So that this declaration, perpetually present to all members of the body social, shall be a constant reminder to them of their rights and duties; So that, since it will be possible at any moment to compare the acts of the legislative authority and those of the executive authority with the final end of all political institutions, those acts shall thereby be the more respected; 55 56
For a brief and readable summary of the events of the Revolution, see Finer (1997, pp. 1517–38). As contained in Finer (1997, pp. 1538–40).
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So that the claims of the citizenry, founded henceforth on simple and incontestable principles, shall always tend to the support of the constitution and to the common good. Consequently the National Assembly recognizes and declares in the presence and under the auspices of the Supreme Being the following rights of man and of the citizen: 1. In respect of their rights, men are born and remain free and equal. The only permissible basis for social distinctions is public utility. 2. The final end of every political institution is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression. 3. The basis of all sovereignty lies essentially in the Nation. No corporation nor individual may exercise any authority that is not expressly derived therefrom. 4. Liberty is the capacity to do anything that does no harm to others. Hence the only limitations on the individual’s exercise of his natural rights are those which ensure the enjoyment of these same rights to all other individuals. These limits can be established only by legislation. 5. Legislation is entitled to forbid only those actions which are harmful to society. Nothing not forbidden by legislation may be prohibited nor may any individual be compelled to do anything that legislation has not prescribed. 6. Legislation is the expression of the general will. All citizens have a right o participate in shaping it either in person, or through their representatives. It must be the same for all, whether it punishes or protects. Since all citizens are equal in its eyes, all are equally eligible for all positions, posts and public employment in accordance with their abilities and with no other distinction than those provided by their virtues and their talents. 7. No individual may be accused, arrested, or detained except in the cases prescribed by legislation and according to the procedures it has laid down. Those who solicit, further, execute or arrange for the execution of arbitrary commands must be punished; but every citizen charged or detained by virtue of legislation must immediately obey, resistance renders him culpable. 8. The only punishments established by legislation must be ones that are strictly and obviously necessary, and no individual may be punished except by virtue of a law passed and promulgated prior to the crime and applied in due legal form. 9. Since every individual is presumed innocent until found guilty, legislation must severely repress all use of force beyond that which is necessary to secure his person in those cases where it is deemed indispensable to arrest him. 10. Nobody must be persecuted on account of his opinions including religious ones, provided the manifestation of these does not disturb the public order established by legislation. 11. The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the most precious rights of man; hence every citizen may speak, write and publish freely, save that he must answer for any abuse of such freedom according to the cases established by legislation. 12. [Necessity for a police force.]
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13. [Upkeep of police and administration necessitates taxation.] This must be borne by all citizens equally, according to their means. 14. [Citizens’ right to query need for taxation, freely accept it and monitor its expenditure.] 15. Society possesses the right to demand from every public servant an account of his administration. 16. A society in which rights are not secured nor the separation of powers established is a society without a constitution. 17. Since property is an inviolable and sacred right, no individual may be deprived of it unless some public necessity, legally certified as such, clearly requires it; and subject always to a just an previously determined compensation. (Finer, 1997, pp. 1538–40)
The Rights of Man is inundated with Enlightenment thinking. Man possesses “natural inalienable and sacred rights”; they include “liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression”; “men are born and remain free and equal.” Locke could easily have agreed to most of the Rights of Man. Interpreted literally it expresses the ideals of every democratic society and “with the possible exception of the doctrine of the inviolability of private property, the entire document is so obviously the blueprint of virtually all modern states.”57 The Rights of Man is clearly not a constitution, but more a preamble to a constitution combined with an American-style Bill of Rights. As such, it contains several ambiguities that would have to be cleared up before one could use it as a basis for a constitution. Article 3, for example, states that “The basis of all sovereignty lies essentially in the Nation.” What is the word essentially supposed to signify? Does it imply exceptions? What is the Nation? The drafters of the Rights of Man had obviously read their Rousseau. Article 6 states that “Legislation is the expression of the general will.” For Finer, this gives rise to “an inherent and lethal contradiction. It states that all authority flows from the general will; but it also declares that man possesses natural and imprescriptible rights, and the two are not compatible. . . . As it stands it gives license to any petty tyrant to rise to power on the basis, usually factitious, of a supposed general will to see him as its supreme embodiment.”58 I admit that this is one possible interpretation of the Rights of Man, but it is not the only one. As discussed earlier, the notion of a general will is open to more benign interpretations. The Rights of Man obviously envisages a republican form 57 58
Finer (1997, p. 1541). Finer (1997, p. 1541, emphasis in original).
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of government with an elected legislature. One way of interpreting Article 6 is that the legislature expresses “the general will” of the people. The Rights of Man leaves open how the legislature does this, but conceivably it would use a voting rule, perhaps the simple majority rule. This in turn raises the question of what happens when the general will, as expressed by the legislature, clashes with a citizen’s “natural inalienable and sacred rights”? The Rights of Man is silent on this issue. In this it is not alone, however. All majoritarian democracies must wrestle with it, and it has been a concern to many scholars.59 One solution – the American one – is that citizen rights “trump” the will of the people as expressed by the legislature. For this to happen, an independent judiciary with the authority to rule legislative acts null and void is needed. Article 16 speaks of a separation of powers, and can be interpreted as implying an independent judiciary. Indeed, one can interpret the Rights of Man as seeking to create a German Rechtsstaat or as Finer (1997, p. 1540) describes it, “law-boundedness.” The rule of law appears in nine of the seventeen articles. Given the Enlightenment’s emphasis on judicial reform, it is difficult to imagine that the drafters of the Rights of Man would emphasize citizens’ rights without a powerful and independent judiciary in mind. The judiciary’s status is only one important constitutional issue left open in the Rights of Man. How is the legislature selected? What voting rule does it use? Despite these ambiguities, I do not think that it would be difficult for some constitutional lawyers and political scientists to take the Rights of Man and draft a constitution embodying its ideals in such a way as to avoid the risk of falling prey to petty tyrants. The French Revolution did, of course, fall prey to tyrants who used the concept of a general will to justify taking both property and lives, but this probably would have happened had the Rights of Man never been drafted. Taken at face value, it captures the ideals and political aspirations of the Enlightenment, and goes beyond merely reforming monarchy to replacing it with republican government. This did not immediately happen in France, but eventually it and most of the rest of Europe did adopt forms of representative government that captured much of the spirit of the Rights of Man.
VI. The American Revolution When in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another and to assume among 59
E.g., Bickel (1962).
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the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Natures’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation. We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. – That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, – That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security. (The Declaration of Independence, http://www.ushistory.org/)
The opening paragraphs of the Declaration of Independence, like the Rights of Man, are filled with Lockean and Enlightenment ideas from the law of nature to the pursuit of happiness. It was also common during the Enlightenment for freethinkers to replace God as the ultimate creator with nature. Jefferson does not go this far but, interestingly, does refer to nature’s God, not simply to God or to the God who created nature. The American revolutionaries had an easier time of it than the French did. Their oppressor was thousands of miles away by sea, and embroiled in conflict with France. Democratic institutions of sorts already existed in the colonies, including a separation of powers with each colony electing legislatures and the Crown appointing a governor. The colonists also were used to being governed by the rule of law. Thus, it was not necessary, as in France, to pull up all institutions of government root and branch to create a democratic republic. Disagreement exists over the U.S. Constitution. Alexis de Tocqueville thought that the Philadelphia convention “contained the finest minds and the noblest characters that had ever appeared in the New World.”60 Charles Beard ([1913]1968) thought it a cabal of slave traders and debtors out to protect their narrow interests. Most Americans today look on the Constitution with considerable reverence, but some see it as “a patchwork sewn together under pressure of both time and events.”61 As almost always, truth 60 61
Tocqueville (1835, p. 118). Quote is from John R. Roche (1968) as quoted in Finer (1997, p. 1496).
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lies somewhere in between. Certainly, everyone must agree that it contains some awful compromises. The Senate is an affront to the basic democratic principle of one-man one-vote. The Electoral College is a bizarre institution, which can and has denied the presidential candidate with the most votes victory. Nevertheless, partly by design, partly by skillful adaptation, partly perhaps by luck, it has withstood the test of time, and the American people have prospered under it. Finer (1997, pp. 1501–16) identifies six major inventions in the U.S. Constitution and constitutional process: a constitutional convention, a written constitution, a bill of rights, the separation of powers, judicial review, and federalism. All had been thought of before, however, and in some cases had even been implemented. The Levelers, for example, had proposed a written constitution for England as early as 1647.62 American colonies were often formed by compacts signed before the colonists left Europe, like the famous Mayflower Compact. The idea of a separation of powers appears in both Locke and Montesquieu, and the Iroquois Indians of northeast America were organized as a federation long before the convention met in Philadelphia. Yet, no country had ever implemented these institutions on the scale that the United States did and shown that they could work as well as they have. Henry Steele Commager (1978) claimed that Europe created the Enlightenment but did not succeed in implementing its ideas, whereas the United States did succeed. To the extent that replacing monarchy with democracy was an important part of the Enlightenment agenda, this certainly was the case. We have seen, however, that European monarchies did implement many reforms, although often in a piecemeal fashion. The U.S. Constitution with its Bill of Rights succeeded with one fell swoop to create a republican form of government with a constrained executive and the religious tolerance, free speech, and other liberties that the philosophes sought.63 In this respect, the American Revolution and U.S. Constitution did transplant and implement the programme of the Enlightenment – with one very important exception. The abolition of slavery was a central component of the Enlightenment programme as we saw in the quotation from Condorcet. The U.S. Constitution not only failed to guarantee this particular freedom, it actually guaranteed the perpetuation of this “peculiar institution.” This failure coupled with the ambiguous status of a state’s right to secede from the Union led to a bloody Civil War less than a century after the Union was formed, 62 63
Wootton (1990). Finer (1997, p. 1487).
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a fact that cannot be overlooked when assessing the success of America’s constitutional experiment.
VII. An Assessment of the Enlightenment A. The Enlightenment Zeitgeist: Reason, Optimism, and Progress After discussing the many different intellectual currents running through the Enlightenment, David Garrioch summarized its impact as follows: What the philosophes did have in common was the conviction that the basis of knowledge was observation and human reason, and that it was legitimate to apply this method not only to the natural world but also to the analysis of religion, law, politics and society. This was a direct challenge to religion in an age when most people believed that the source of truth and morality was above all revelation. It was a radical stance in other areas, too, where the antiquity of a practice was universally viewed as the source of its legitimacy. Until the middle of the eighteenth century, almost all writers evoked classical antecedents, religious authorities or custom as the basis for their arguments, even when in reality they were inventing new ones! The philosophes asserted boldly that scientific observation and reasoned argument were the sources of truth. Although they drew on principles established by seventeenthcentury scientists, the application of these ideas to society, government, religion and history represented a shift in thinking of revolutionary proportions. It led them to widely varying conclusions about human nature, history and metaphysics, although also to some shared convictions about reform. The widespread adoption of many of their ideas and their own growing reputation encouraged another of the tenets that all of the philosophes held dear: the belief that the improvement of humanity was possible, and that enlightened writers had a central role in this process by dispelling ignorance and encouraging the application of reason to every aspect of human endeavour. Theirs was an activist philosophy. (Garrioch, 2004, p. 437)
The Enlightenment thinkers’ faith in the power of reason led to their intense optimism and confidence in progress. Indeed, the word optimism is itself a neologism of the Enlightenment coined by Leibniz. It stems from the word optimum, and reflects Leibniz’s belief that our universe was “better than every other possible universe,” and that happiness consisted of “a perpetual progress to new pleasures and new perfections.”64 Although Leibniz was perhaps extreme in his optimism, he was by no means alone. Condorcet, Ferguson, Adam Smith, Kant, and many other Enlightenment figures thought similarly. Condorcet’s great optimism is revealed in his last work Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progr`es de l’esprit humain (Sketch 64
Jackson (2004, p. 185).
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for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Spirit, 1795), in which he sees human progress leading to “a secular benevolent state, strengthened by legal and educational reform, and prospering under a system of tolerance and economic freedom.”65 Condorcet wrote this essay while in hiding from the Jacobins. He was eventually caught and died in prison.66 We have already seen Kant’s optimism in What Is Enlightenment? Kant expressed more optimism in Eternal Peace, where he envisaged a republican constitution as a form of social contract unanimously agreed to by all citizens.67 He then argued: . . . that the republican constitution does offer the prospect of . . . eternal peace, and the reason is as follows: If, as is necessarily the case under the constitution, the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide whether there should be war or not, nothing is more natural than that those who would have to decide to undergo all deprivations of war will very much hesitate to start such an evil game. (Kant, [1795]1949, p. 438)
The belief that democracies are less prone to go to war has many adherents today. Later in the essay, Kant introduces the concept of a law of nations (V¨olkerrecht) “based upon a federalism of free states.”68 This federalism arises through a contract whose purpose is to maintain and “secure the freedom of each state by and for itself and at the same time of the other states thus allied with each other.”69 Kant then explains how eternal peace can come about: It can be demonstrated that this idea of federalization possesses objective reality, that it can be realized by a gradual extension to all states, leading to eternal peace. For if good fortune brings it to pass that a powerful and enlightened people develops a republican form of government which by nature is inclined toward peace, then such a republic will provide the central core for the federal union of other states. For they can join this republic and can thus make secure among themselves the state of peace according to the idea of a law of nations, and can gradually extend themselves by additional connections of this sort. (Kant, [1795]1949, p. 444, emphasis in original)
With the creation of the European Union, Kant’s federalization possess appears to have finally begun and will hopefully lead to eternal peace for its members.70 65 66 67 68 69 70
Munck (2000, p. 218). It is generally believed that he committed suicide, but he may instead have been murdered. Kant ([1795]1949, p. 437). Kant ([1795]1949, p. 441, emphasis in original). Kant ([1795]1949, p. 444, emphasis in original). Peter Bernholz (1985) has given a Kantian description of how the European Union could become the vehicle for world peace.
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Not all voices during the Enlightenment were so optimistic. Rousseau had little faith in social progress. The morality of the “noble savage” was far superior to that of the refined and reasoning European who had been corrupted by civilization.71 Somewhat more surprisingly, Voltaire – icon of the Enlightenment – was also less optimistic than his fellow philosophes. His optimism appears to have been shaken by the Lisbon earthquake of 1755, which killed some thirty thousand people. It led him to write a poem questioning divine providence. This poem elicited Rousseau’s wrath and led to the two becoming permanent enemies. Rousseau, for his part, saw nothing particularly troublesome about the earthquake, because he thought it was good from time to time if a number of people were killed.72 Voltaire’s strongest doubts about providence appear in Candide or Optimism ([1759]2005) in which the hapless Dr. Pangloss, a caricature of Leibniz, goes from one catastrophe to another always maintaining, nevertheless, that “this is the best of all possible worlds.” Notice, however, that it was a natural event that shook Voltaire’s optimism, and that his belief in divine providence was shaken, not in scientific progress. A stronger attack on the Enlightenment’s faith in reason, optimism, and progress was by Edmund Burke.
B. Burke’s Challenge to the Enlightenment If the Enlightenment embodied the spirit of progressivism, Edmund Burke (1729–97) was the embodiment of traditionalism. His Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) is at once a defense of inherited monarchies, and in particular the British monarchy; a critique of the French Revolution; and an attack on the Enlightenment. Early in the Reflections, Burke rewrites the history of the Glorious Revolution of 1688. The Revolution’s main events were a flight from England by the monarch James II when both political parties and his own army began to oppose him; the Parliament’s subsequent vote that his departure constituted an abdication of the throne; and the installation of William and Mary as the new monarchs of England. For Burke, these events did not constitute the people’s removal of a monarch and replacement with a new one, but rather an orderly transmission of royal rule in accordance with the British Constitution.73 Moreover, unlike what many people – including members of the Revolution Society – thought, according to Burke the Glorious Revolution did not result in a transfer 71 72 73
Jackson (2004, p. 179). See Russell (1945, p. 689) and Jackson (2004, pp. 188–9). Ferguson (2004, pp. 615–17).
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of political power from the monarchy to the people as represented in the Parliament, nor had the British people acquired through the Revolution, the right: 1. “To choose our own governors,” 2. “To cashier them for misconduct,” 3. “To frame a government for ourselves.” This new, and hitherto unheard-of, bill of rights, though made in the name of the whole people, belongs to those gentleman and their faction only [members of the Revolution Society]. The body of the people of England have no share of it. They utterly disclaim it. They will resist the practical assertion of it with their lives and fortunes. They are bound to do so by the laws of their country, made at the time of that very Revolution which is appealed to in favour of the factitious rights claimed by the Society which abuses its name. (Burke, [1790]1960, p. 352)
Thus, under Burke’s interpretation, the people of England not only did not obtain the right to self-rule with the Glorious Revolution they signed this right away, and would not have accepted it if it had been offered to them. For Burke, social and political culture was a strong conservative force, which in the British case, served to maintain the monarchy. “In his account, governments ought to recognize that their central role is to maintain their own continuity, to make it possible for persons to feel that their circumstances are never open to their choice.”74 Needless to say, given Burke’s desire for continuity, he was appalled by the French Revolution. Once again, he takes liberties with history in ignoring the incompetence of Louis XVI, the plight of the French people under his rule, and Marie Antoinette’s indifference to their plight. His affection for Marie Antoinette is most moving: It is now sixteen or seventeen years since I saw the queen of France . . . I saw her just above the horizon, decorating and cheering the elevated sphere she just began to move in, – glittering like a morning star, full of life, and splendour, and joy. Oh! what a revolution! . . . I thought ten thousand swords must have leaped from their scabbards to avenge even a look that threatened her with insult. But the age of chivalry is gone. That of sophisters, economists, and calculators, has succeeded; and the glory of Europe is extinguished for ever. Never, never more shall we behold the generous loyalty to rank and sex, that proud submission, that dignified obedience, that subordination of the heart, which kept alive, even in servitude itself, the spirit of an exalted freedom. (Burke, [1790]1960, pp. 386–7)
Later he expresses the belief that the disappearance of “the old feudal and chivalrous spirit of fealty” will lead to tyranny.75 74 75
Ferguson (2004, p. 617). Burke ([1790]1960, p. 389).
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Burke’s fear of political change and democracy stemmed from a view of human nature that was quite at odds with Enlightenment thinking. Men were not rational actors capable of making choices in the market or in politics, but creatures filled with prejudices: . . . in this enlightened age I am bold enough to confess, that we are generally men of untaught feeling; that instead of casting away all our old prejudices, we cherish them to a very considerable degree, and, to take more shame to ourselves, we cherish them because they are prejudices; and the longer they have lasted, and the more generally they have prevailed, the more we cherish them. We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason; because we expect that this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and of ages. (Burke, [1790]1960, p. 397)
Given this skepticism about man’s powers of reasoning, it is not surprising that reason was not the basis for society; for Burke, religion was.76 I have quoted Burke at length, because many believe he was correct in his assessment of the French Revolution and of its causes. It is possible to agree with Burke on the importance of history and culture in determining a nation’s political and economic institutions and how well they function without sharing his view that history and culture preclude change – even perhaps radical changes – in political and economic institutions. Indeed, Burke’s own logic implies that the success of Britain’s political and economic institutions cannot be used against the reforms proposed by French revolutionaries, because France had a different history and culture from Britain’s. Nor can the French Revolution’s degeneration condemn all revolutions or be used as a defense of French despotism or any other form of despotism. If, as Burke believed, the central role of governments ought to be to maintain their own continuity and to make it possible for persons to feel that their circumstances are never open to their choice, then the communist regimes of the twentieth century would have constituted ideal forms of government, and the citizens who sought change in 1989 would have been just as wrong as French citizens were in 1789.
C. The Legacy of the Enlightenment Some see the emphasis on reason by Enlightenment thinkers as the first step toward national planning. Enlightenment thinkers thought that they could redesign Europe’s political and social institutions to improve the welfare of its citizens, and then move on to bring reason and civilization to the rest of 76
Burke ([1790]1960, p. 397).
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the world.77 For these, the French Revolution is a colossal example of the folly of trying to design social and political institutions. Social progress is a slow, evolutionary process of unplanned incremental changes.78 Although a few Enlightenment thinkers, like the Comte de Buffon, may have been closet social planners, certainly all were not.79 Adam Smith, Hume, and other members of the Scottish Enlightenment were certainly also part of the European Enlightenment, and they believed firmly in the power of “invisible hands” guiding social interaction, not state planning. James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and the other Founding Fathers were also prototypes of Enlightenment thinking. The U.S. Constitution is far closer to a design of political institutions than the Rights of Man, and might be regarded as evidence that rational individuals are capable of learning from the past and using their powers of reason to shape a better future. One cannot blame the French Revolution on Enlightenment thinking without acknowledging that the American Revolution and the constitutional republic that grew out of it were just as much products of Enlightenment thinking. Moreover, while some, like Finer (1997, pp. 1434–8), write about “The Enlightenment ‘Programme,’” others, like Garrioch (2004, p. 439), assert that “the philosophes had no programme.” Both agree, however, that numerous common themes ran through the Enlightenment, even though the philosophes disagreed about the importance or even validity of certain Enlightenment ideas. Thus, it is best to think of the Enlightenment as casting up a host of proposals for social and political reform, each of which might be thought of as an incremental change rather than a specific, integrated design for a form of utopia. In the next chapter, we conclude our historical account and examine the extent to which the Enlightenment reforms have been adopted during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and why they have often failed to be adopted. 77 78 79
See, for example, Easterly (2006, p. 23). Hayek (1973–9) is the obvious reference here, but this could also be interpreted as Burke’s ([1790]1960) position. See also, Easterly (2006, ch. 1). Easterly (2006, p. 23) cites de Buffon when criticizing Enlightenment thinking.
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Religion and Democracy After the French Revolution
Our religion is Christ, our politics Fatherland! (Hans Schemm, Head of National Socialist Teachers’ League)1
Anyone gazing forward circa 1791 might well have been quite optimistic about the future course of human history. During the previous century, reason had triumphed over ignorance and superstition among the intelligentsia on both sides of the Atlantic. Its further dissemination was merely a matter of educating entire populations rather than tiny elites. Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, had demonstrated the benefits of liberalizing domestic markets and international trade. The American Revolution, launched in the same year, created a truly democratic republic. The newly underway French Revolution promised a similar development in Europe. The stage seemed set for the spread of liberal democratic and economic institutions, underpinned by intelligent and rational actors. Of course, history did not follow this course.
I. The Resurgence of Religion in Early-Nineteenth-Century Europe As the ever astute Alexis de Tocqueville observed, the French Revolution became a kind of political religion itself, equally single-minded in its pursuits, equally intolerant of conflicting ideas, equally violent in its repression of heretics. Because the Revolution seemed to be striving for the regeneration of the human race even more than for the reform of France, it lit a passion which the most violent political revolutions had never before been able to produce. It inspired conversions and generated propaganda. Thus, in the end, it took on the appearance of a religious 1
As quoted in Steigmann-Gall (2003, p. 24).
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revolution which so astonished contemporaries. Or rather, it itself became a new kind of religion, an incomplete religion, it is true, without God, without ritual, and without life after death, but one which nevertheless, like Islam, flooded the earth with its soldiers, apostles, and martyrs. (Alexis de Tocqueville)2
Like all religions, the Revolution had its own morality and sought to remake man according to its own Puritanical code. It was zealous in attacking established religion. Anticipating the Russian Revolution, it converted churches into “Houses of Reason,” monasteries and convents not engaged in useful work were closed, and monks and nuns were forced to renounce their vows.3 The anarchy and increasing violence of the Revolution eventually gave rise to Napoleon. With the Concordat of 1801, Napoleon made peace with the Catholic Church and sought thereby to elicit its support for his cause. This strategy met with considerable success within France, much to the chagrin of Tocqueville who remarked, “I am saddened and concerned more than I ever have been before when I see in so many Catholics this aspiration toward tyranny, this attraction to servitude, this love of force, of the police, of the censor, the gallows.”4 In the rest of Europe, however, France was still associated with the Revolution’s hostility to the Church, and Napoleon himself was regarded as the Corsican Anti-Christ. Thus, when they faced Napoleon’s armies the rest of Europe believed it was defending not only its own territories from a tyrant but Christianity from atheism. The Revolution’s attack on religion combined with Napoleon’s attacks on Europe thus fostered a religious revival in the early nineteenth century. As the century progressed, however, church attendance waned, secularism increased in strength, and demands for the separation of church and state were again heard.5
II. The Church, Modernism, and Democracy Throughout much of the second millennium, Church and State worked together. Kings derived their divine rights from the Church and in return the State protected the Church’s property and revenue sources. This partnership became strained during the eighteenth century when Enlightenment ideals led to attacks on both the Protestant and Catholic branches of Christianity. The discrediting of Enlightenment thinking during the nineteenth century 2 3 4 5
As quoted in Burleigh (2005, p. 3). Burleigh (2005, ch. 2). Burleigh (2005, p. 210). See discussion in Blackbourn (1998, pp. 283–302) and Burleigh (2005).
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brought with it a revival of the Church and State partnership. The State once again became the protectorate of the Church, and the Church reciprocated by leading the chorus of “God Save the King.” Thus, during the early nineteenth century, “the Roman Church everywhere appeared as a pillar of reaction, rivaled in its stalwart conservatism only by the Protestant state churches.”6 In 1831, for example, Pope Gregory XVI posed the question, “Does the Holy Law of God permit rebellion against the legitimate temporal sovereign?” His answer: “No, never, because the temporal power comes from God.”7 Thus, as late as 1831 the Church was still defending the divine rights of kings. As the revolutionary currents of the nineteenth century rose, fear of anarchy increased and the clergy perceived a danger that anarchy would breed immorality. Opposition to the State was equated with treason. Here again is Pope Gregory XVI in his encyclical Mirari of 1832: We have learned that certain teachings are being spread among the common people in writings which attack the trust and submission due to princes; the torches of treason are being lit everywhere . . . both divine and human laws cry out against those who strive by treason and sedition to drive people from confidence in their princes and from their government.8
While some revolutionists, like Marx and Engels, were preoccupied with supplanting capitalism with Socialism, still others wished to see democracy replace the monarchies. Christianity’s conservative defense of the political status quo during the nineteenth century thus pitted it against reformers who wished to establish democratic institutions. As late as the beginning of the twentieth century, Pope Pius X, now Saint Pius X, still railed against “modernists” who espoused such “insanities of the modern world” as science and democracy.9 The Catholic Church’s first Index Librorum Prohibitorum (Index of Forbidden Books) appeared in the sixteenth century, and was updated periodically until 1948 when the thirty-second edition appeared. This final list ran to some 211 pages with over four thousand entries. Table 9.1 lists some of the better-known authors who still graced the Index as late as 1948 and the dates when they entered the list. Some works had remained on the Index for more than three centuries. 6 7 8 9
McNeill (1963, p. 748). As quoted in Burleigh (2005, p. 116). As quoted in Burleigh (2005, p. 116). Burleigh (2005, p. 432).
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Table 9.1. Selected entries from Index Librorum Prohibitorum (Index of Forbidden Books, 1948) Author Acton, Lord Bacon, Francis Balzac, Honor´e de Beccaria, Cesare Bentham, Jeremy Bergson, Henri Berkeley, George Browne, Thomas Bruno, Giordano Calvin, John Comte, Auguste Condorcet, Marie-JeanAntoine-Nicolas de D’Alembert, Jean le Rond Darwin, Erasmus Defoe, Daniel Descartes, Ren´e Diderot, Denis Dumas, Alexandre Flaubert, Gustave France, Anatole Frederick II of Prussia Gibbon, Edward
Works
2 1 complete works 1 4 3 1 1 1 1 1 Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind 2 1 History (Political) of the Devil 7 2 including Encyclopedia 3 2 including Madame Bovary complete works 1 History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire Gioberti, Vincenzi complete works Grotius, Hugo 9 Heine, Heinrich 4 Hobbes, Thomas complete works Hugo, Victor Notre-Dame de Paris, Les Mis´erables Hume, David complete works Kant, Immanuel Critique of Pure Reason Kollar, Adam F. 1 Lamennais, Hughes-Felicit´e- 7 Robert de Larousse, Pierre Grand Dictionnaire Universel du XIXe Si`ecle Leti, Gregorio 22 Locke, John 3 including An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Maeterlinck, Maurice complete works Maimonides, Moses 1
Year added to Index 1871 1668 1841 1766 1819–35 1914 1742 1645 1600 1659 1864 1827 1767 1817 1743 1663–1720 1804 1863–80 1864 1922 1760 1783 1849 1626–1757 1836–45 1649 1834–64 1761 1827 1764 1834–46 1873 1656–82 1734–7 1914 1717
II. The Church, Modernism, and Democracy
Author Malebranche, Nicolas Manderville, Bernard de Michelet, Jules Mill, John Stuart Milton, John Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, Baron de Pascal, Blaise Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph Pufendorf, Samuel von Renan, Ernest Richardson, Samuel Rousseau, Jean-Jacques Spinoza, Baruch de Stendahl, Henri Beyle de Sterne, Laurence Swedenborg, Emanuel Van de Velde, Theodoor Hendrik Voltaire ´ Zola, Emile
Works 7 Thoughts (Free) on Religion The Fable of the Bees 6 Principles of Political Economy 1 2 including Spirit of the Laws 2 including Pens´ees complete works 5 19 Pamela 6 including Emile and The Social Contract 3 including The Theological-Political Treatise 1 A Sentimental Journey through France and Italy 1 complete works 39 complete works
201
Year added to Index 1689–1712 1732–1744 1815–96 1856 1694 1751–62 1657–1789 1852 1692–1753 1859–92 1744 1762–1806 1679–90 1828 1819 1738 1931 1752–1804 1894
Source: http://www.cvm.qc.ca/gconti/905/BABEL/Index%20Librorum%20Prohibitorum-1948.htm.
Presumably, a good Catholic would not read any of the forbidden works. If that were so, then up until the middle of the twentieth century good Catholics remained ignorant of Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Victor Hugo’s Les Mis´erables, John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws, all of the works of Hobbes and Hume, and the many other entries in the Index. Other well-known names that made it onto earlier lists of books banned by the Church include Erasmus, Galileo Galilei, Andr´e Gide, Martin Luther, Machiavelli, Rabelais, George Sand, Jean-Paul Sartre, Jonathan Swift, and Zwingli. One shudders to think what the development of Western thought would have been like had the Catholic Church succeeded in preventing the publication of all works that it banned. The Index of Forbidden Books illustrates better than any other single document the Catholic Church’s long-standing resistance to progress and the advance of knowledge.
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III. Religion and Liberalism The nineteenth-century religious revival also revived religious conflict. The Catholic Church reinstated the Inquisition with so-called subversives receiving the death penalty. Discrimination took place against Catholics in Protestant Germany and against Jews almost everywhere.10 The rise of Romanticism in the nineteenth century came at the expense of Enlightenment ideas. The Church strongly resisted the liberal notion that the individual could judge right and wrong. Pope Pius IX attacked modernist thinking in much the same vein as Pius X would some forty years later: For you well know, venerable brethren, that at this time men are found not a few who, applying to civil society the impious and absurd principle of “naturalism,” as they call it, dare to teach that “the best constitution of public society and (also) civil progress altogether require that human society be conducted and governed without regard being had to religion any more than if it did not exist; or, at least, without any distinction being made between the true religion and false ones.” And, against the doctrine of Scripture, of the Church, and of the Holy Fathers, they do not hesitate to assert that “that is the best condition of civil society, in which no duty is recognized, as attached to the civil power, of restraining by enacted penalties, offenders against the Catholic religion, except so far as public peace may require.” From which totally false idea of social government they do not fear to foster that erroneous opinion, most fatal in its effects on the Catholic Church and the salvation of souls, called by Our Predecessor, Gregory XVI, an “insanity,” viz., that “liberty of conscience and worship is each man’s personal right, which ought to be legally proclaimed and asserted in every rightly constituted society; and that a right resides in the citizens to an absolute liberty, which should be restrained by no authority whether ecclesiastical or civil, whereby they may be able openly and publicly to manifest and declare any of their ideas whatever, either by word of mouth, by the press, or in any other way.” But, while they rashly affirm this, they do not think and consider that they are preaching “liberty of perdition;” and that “if human arguments are always allowed free room for discussion, there will never be wanting men who will dare to resist truth, and to trust in the flowing speech of human wisdom; whereas we know, from the very teaching of our Lord Jesus Christ, how carefully Christian faith and wisdom should avoid this most injurious babbling.”11 (St. Leo, epistle 14 (133), sect. 2, edit. Ball., as in Pope Pius IX, 1864)
Attached to the Quanta Cura was a Syllabus listing eighty errors of modernists and other social reformers according to the pope. Article 18 stated the error that “Protestantism is nothing more than another form of the same true Christian religion, in which form it is given to please God equally 10 11
Fulbrook (1992, ch. 5) and Blackbourn (1998, pp. 307–8, 436–40). http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Pius09/p9quanta.htm.
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as in the Catholic Church.” Thus, as seen by the pope, the struggle between Catholicism and Protestantism was still alive and well in 1864. More generally, Article 15 of the Syllabus denied individuals the capacity and freedom to choose their religion. It was an error to believe that “every man is free to embrace and profess that religion which, guided by the light of reason, he shall consider true.” Article 15 nicely captures the Quanta Cura’s flavor, but it is the last article, 80, that expresses the Syllabus’s spirit the best. Pius IX thought that it was an error to think that “the Roman Pontiff can, and ought to, reconcile himself, and come to terms with progress, liberalism, and modern civilization.” While Pius IX was highly skeptical about ordinary humans’ capacity to reason, he expressed no reservations about his own capability. The First Vatican Council of 1870 (in)famously proclaimed the pope’s judgment of the meaning and interpretation of Christian scriptures and doctrines to be infallible. A mere mortal whose judgment on moral matters could not be trusted prior to his election as pope became infallible once chosen by – presumably – a college of fallible cardinals. The Catholic Church’s suspicion of democracy lingered into the twentieth century, and was officially repudiated only in 1962–5 by the Second Vatican Council. Nevertheless, as late as 1993, we find Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Veritatis Splendor expressing concern over “the risk of an alliance between democracy and ethical relativism.”12
IV. The Rise of Liberal Democracy in the Nineteenth Century The French Revolution destroyed the link between God and the state and proved that men could both destroy and create a state. The old order was over and during the nineteenth century, the belief grew that the state should serve the interests of citizens. Democratic thinking spread across Europe throughout the nineteenth century, sometimes weakening the state’s power as in Austria-Hungary, sometimes being successfully exploited to buttress the state as in Prussia.13 At the nineteenth century’s beginning, no European country was a liberal democracy. Despite the Church’s opposition to both democracy and liberalism, by 1920 almost all European countries could be said to be democracies of one form or another with, of course, the important exception of Russia. Liberal democracy’s triumph proceeded at different 12 13
http://www.vatican.va/holy father/john paul ii/encyclicals/documents/hf jpii enc 06081993 veritatissplendor en.html. Emphasis in the original. See McNeill (1963, p. 749–50).
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speeds and in different sequences. The main elements of the transformation were roughly the same all over Europe, however: (1) Political power shifted from the monarchies to parliaments sometimes gradually as in Great Britain, sometimes suddenly as following the revolutions of 1848. In Germany, Austria/Hungary, and Turkey, it required the jolt of defeat in World War I to completely destroy the monarchies. (2) Suffrage was extended from a small fraction of the male population to universal suffrage for both men and women. (3) As a result of the expansion of suffrage and other reforms, for example, the reduction in the power of the House of Lords in Great Britain, parliaments became more representative of the entire populations and not just upper-class elites. (4) The separation between church and state became more firmly established. (5) State schools supplanted religious schools. (6) Compulsory, universal education was introduced. In contrast to Europe, the United States could be called a democracy at the beginning of the nineteenth century – if one does not place heavy emphasis on the criterion of universal suffrage. Today, the U.S. Constitution is thought by many to be a model for liberal democracy. It is sobering, therefore, to consider that for many of the Founding Fathers the motivation for writing the Constitution and abandoning the Articles of Confederation was to weaken the control of the populace over the government and eliminate or at least reduce the evils of, in Alexander Hamilton’s words, “an excess of democracy.”14 Edmund Randolph, a participant in the Constitutional Convention, complained that “the evils under which the U.S. laboured” after the Revolution were due to “the turbulence and follies of democracy.” For George Mason, another participant in the convention, the problem was that state legislatures were “too democratic.”15 The chief complaint against state legislatures was that many had relieved debtors from the obligation of repaying their debts. Seven of the thirteen colonies printed money, which led to inflation and reduced the value of debtors’ and taxpayers’ obligations. These measures were undertaken in response to demands from debtors and taxpayers who could not meet their obligations. Following the Revolution, the U.S. economy went into recession. Gold and silver were in short supply and a serious deflation ensued. As with all deflations, bondholders gained at the expense of debtors. Most of the original bondholders were veterans of the Revolution, who had been paid with bonds instead of hard currency, or others who had supplied credit to the 14 15
The quote is from Holton (2007, p. 5). The classic source on the events leading up to the writing of the constitution is Wood (1969). Holton (2007, p. 14).
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government during the Revolution. Many had sold their bonds to buy food and clothing for their families. The value of state bonds had declined dramatically because state legislatures had been slow to pay interest. Most bonds thus wound up in the hands of speculators. If the states paid the interest on the bonds, they would have to do so out of revenue raised mostly from property and head taxes. This often forced poor farmers and artisans to sell their furniture, livestock, and even their farms to pay their taxes. Hence, this led to the pressure to forgive debt or inflate prices. Uncertainty surrounding the value of debt made it almost impossible for individuals and businessmen to raise funds for investment, further contributing to the economy’s weakness. A major goal for many at the Convention, including James Madison, was to restore the creditworthiness of the American economy. Part of the justice that the preamble to the Constitution promised was justice for creditors. Section 10 of Article I explicitly forbade states from coining money, allowing paper money to be used in payment of debts, and from passing any “law impairing the obligation of contracts,” which, of course, included debt contracts. Thus, an important goal for the new Constitution was to remove some legislative authority from the states, where it was perceived to have been abused because of the states’ excessive deference to popular pressure. A second was to isolate the national government from “the turbulence and follies of democracy.” Several features of the Constitution were designed to achieve this second goal. 1. The indirect election of the president by means of the Electoral College. Members of the Electoral College were to be chosen by state legislatures and were expected to serve as a safeguard against the citizens’ choosing a demagogue. If the popular vote produced such an outcome, the responsible persons chosen to the Electoral College were supposed to ignore the popular vote and select someone else. 2. An indirectly elected Senate. Election by state legislatures was expected to isolate senators from popular pressures. James Madison hoped that the Senate would, like the British House of Lords, represent America’s version of an aristocracy – wealthy landowners. George Mason wanted property requirements for election to the Senate. Others would accomplish the same end by having senators be unpaid. Benjamin Franklin wanted all representatives to work without pay.16 16
Holton (2007, pp. 193–4).
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3. Six-year staggered terms in the Senate to protect senators from populist pressures. Madison originally proposed nine years: Hamilton wanted lifetime appointments.17 4. Two-year terms in the House. Most states at the time had one-year terms for lower-house representatives. Madison wanted four-year terms. 5. The presidential veto, which could only be overridden by two-thirds’ majorities in both houses, as a protection against a populist wave swamping both Houses of Congress. James Wilson, another delegate to the Convention, favored a no-override provision. Hamilton again wanted a lifetime appointment for the president.18 6. Many delegates wanted to restrict the voting franchise to adult, male property holders, but because some states already had universal male suffrage, this would have taken the vote away from some citizens, aroused their anger, and thereby risked the Constitution’s failure at the ratification stage. To avoid this, qualifications for voting were left to the states. John Adams, the second president, expressed the logic behind this strategy as early as 1776 in a letter to James Sullivan. Depend upon it, Sir, it is dangerous to open so fruitful a source of controversy and altercation as would be opened by attempting to alter the qualifications of voters; there will be no end of it. New claims will arise; women will demand the vote; lads from twelve to twenty-one will think their rights not enough attended to; and every man who has not a farthing, will demand an equal voice with any other, in all acts of state. It tends to confound and destroy all distinctions and prostrate all ranks to one common level.19
At the founding, the qualifications for voting varied considerably across states. In the six New England states, blacks were allowed to vote; in some states they were explicitly prohibited from voting. In some states one could not vote if one denied the existence of God; in some, Jews could not vote.20 Thus, there was considerable distrust at the founding about the average citizen’s capacity as a voter. Europeans were also cautious about handing out voting rights at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It seemed obvious to advocates of democracy that suffrage should be limited to persons possessing sufficient education and a strong enough interest in the activities of the state to acquit their duties as citizens responsibly. Property requirements for suffrage were 17 18 19 20
Holton (2007, p. 194). Holton (2007, p. 192). Quoted in Levin (1992, p. 86). Levin (1992, pp. 3–9).
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common. If a man possessed property, it implied that he had a financial stake in the success of the polity and implicitly a degree of intelligence or education that allowed him to accumulate or at least retain some property. Thus, property was thought to lead to responsible citizenship. John Stuart Mill expressed the logic for such requirements in 1865. [It is] important that the assembly which votes the taxes, either general or local, should be elected exclusively by those who pay something toward the taxes imposed. Those who pay no taxes, disposing by their votes of other people’s money, have every motive to be lavish and none to economize. As far as money matters are concerned, any power of voting possessed by them is a violation of the fundamental principle of free government – a severance of the power of control from the interest in its beneficial exercise. It amounts to allowing them to put their hands into other people’s pockets for any purpose which they think fit to call a public one . . . (John Stuart Mill, [1861]1958, p. 133)
It is perhaps worth noting that Mill, in addition to being one of the great intellects of the nineteenth century, was somewhat of a left-wing radical for his day. He was an early advocate of women’s suffrage and favored proportional representation because he believed that minorities deserved fair representation. Yet he felt that successful democracy required a responsible citizenry, one with a financial stake in the polity. At the nineteenth century’s start, only a small fraction of the British male population could vote. Throughout the century, property and taxpayment qualifications were relaxed and the electorate grew. The first major attempt at reforms was defeated in the House of Lords in 1831 due to widespread opposition from the Tories and nearly unanimous opposition from the twenty-three bishops who held seats in the House because of their rank in the Church of England. Rioting ensued and somewhat modified reforms subsequently went through in 1832. Although these reforms doubled the percentage of adult males who could vote in Britain, this figure still amounted to no more than 7 percent of the adult male population. Additional major reforms took place in 1867, 1884, and 1918. Only with the 1918 reforms was full universal male suffrage achieved.21 John Stuart Mill, as a member of Parliament, first introduced a bill to extend suffrage to women in 1867, but only in 1918 did women obtain the right to vote in Britain because of their efforts during World War I. Even then, this right was restricted to women over age thirty. Equal suffrage with men was another ten years off. The secret ballot was also introduced with the 1918 reforms. Other important milestones in Britain’s march to 21
Levin (1992, pp. 25–33).
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democracy include the introduction of compulsory schooling in 1870–2 and curtailment of the House of Lords’ veto powers in 1911. The liberal reform movement in the early 1830s helped form the Liberal Party, which remained a major force in British politics until the end of World War I. The Liberal Party’s dominance of British politics coincided, unsurprisingly, with the dominance of liberal ideas in Britain. Mainstream Liberalism . . . aspired to see central and local affairs administered by a propertied but socially diverse, rational and civilized elite, assiduous in promoting economy and developing Christian and industrious qualities in the population at large. It sought a constitutional system which would perpetuate the dominance of those groups and values while imposing checks on arbitrary rule and winning the confidence of the politicized nation. Meanwhile it attempted to secure open trade and respect for British influence in important regions overseas, which would benefit the country’s economic interests, project an inspiring image of national purpose and rally a wide range of domestic opinion to government.22
An informed and conscientious citizenry is needed if democracy is to produce desirable outcomes. Restricting suffrage to property owners and taxpayers ensured that most British voters were educated and had an important economic interest in the policies of the state. The 1870s’ education reforms eventually allowed an extension of suffrage without severely endangering the quality of political outcomes. Nevertheless, the liberal reforms that figured so importantly in the Liberal Party’s political agenda over the nineteenth century eventually led to its eclipse, as a preponderance of those added to the voting lists came to favor the Labour Party. The Venetian and Dutch Republics illustrate that good government is possible with a small, well-educated electorate committed to the welfare of the community. Great Britain of the nineteenth century might be offered as another example. After remarking that “Britain in 1867 was not a democracy” because of the restricted voting franchise, Pearce and Stewart (2002, p. 16) go on to comment, “While this limited franchise fell short of true democracy, it can be argued that the British system was successful in providing certain elements of a modern political system: stability without stasis, dynamism without destruction. There was security for property-owners yet hope of betterment for the poor, and pride for all in belonging to what was acknowledged to be the world’s most successful community.” Although liberal nineteenth-century Britain fell short of the modern definition of a democracy, it scored well along most other dimensions.23 22 23
Parry (1993, p. 304). For further discussion of nineteenth-century Britain, see Levin (1992, pp. 25–33), Parry (1993), Machin (2001), Pearce and Stewart (2002), and Congleton (forthcoming, chs. 12 and 13).
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Over the nineteenth century, France experimented with being a republic, an inherited monarchy, and an elected monarchy. Defeat by the Prussians in 1870 brought an end to the second Napoleonic Empire, and led to the Third Republic and a new constitution in 1875. The Third Republic survived until France fell to the Nazis. Suffrage requirements ebbed and flowed as France bounced back and forth between republic and monarchy. The first constitution of revolutionary France in 1791 restricted suffrage to males over age twenty-five who paid taxes of at least three days’ wages. These suffrage requirements were quickly relaxed so that by 1793, France had effectively introduced universal male suffrage, although this reform was never implemented. Tax-payment requirements for voting characterized the period following the collapse of Napoleon’s Empire until universal male suffrage was once again introduced and this time implemented for good at the beginning of the Third Republic. French women would have to wait until 1944, however, before they were allowed to vote.24 The turbulence in France between the Revolution and the Third Republic was anything but a strong endorsement for the superiority of democratic institutions and the wisdom of the common man. France’s example undoubtedly slowed the implementation of liberal forms elsewhere at least until the revolutions of 1848, because it seemed to confirm the nobility’s fear of the dangers of unconstrained democracy. Indeed, when French citizens were allowed to express their preferences directly, they invariably opted for dictatorship. Napoleon’s seizure of power in 1799 was ratified in a plebiscite by a vote of more than 3,000,000 to 1,500. A second plebiscite in 1802 made him First Consul (de facto dictator) for life. Following the Revolution of 1848, Napoleon’s nephew Louis was elected president with more than 70 percent of the nearly 5.5 million votes cast. Although his term of office was to be for four years, Louis Napoleon circumvented this difficulty by dissolving the National Assembly and engaging in mass arrests of his opponents of which several hundred were killed. Napoleon reintroduced universal male suffrage so that his seizure of power could be ratified, which it was, overwhelmingly, in two separate plebiscites.25 Having been a republic for nearly two centuries, the Netherlands entered the nineteenth century as a monarchy with Napoleon’s brother Louis as its king. Following Napoleon’s defeat, the Netherlands chose to remain a monarchy but with a Dutch king. This choice must seem puzzling to all advocates of democracy. Having been one of Europe’s earliest and longest-lived republics, the Netherlands chose to return to monarchy at the beginning of 24 25
Levin (1992, pp. 9–17). Ibid.
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the century in which most European countries chose to abandon monarchy or significantly constrain it. The Dutch Constitution of 1815 created a bicameral parliament modeled to some extent after Great Britain. The upper house was appointed by the king from the nobility and held office for life. The lower house was elected in much the same way as the U.S. Senate originally was – by the provincial governments. The North and South parts of the Netherlands each had fiftyfive seats in the lower house, although the North contained only about 40 percent of the population. Napoleon’s defeat caused a Protestant reawakening in the Netherlands as in much of Europe. Opposition to Enlightenment ideas was popular, and the Protestant king, William I, sought to suppress a Catholic revival. Dutch was proclaimed the official language, which alienated the Frenchspeaking part of the country. An economic downturn in 1830 led to further dissatisfaction in the Catholic South with the government and its secession from the kingdom. France and Britain were quick to recognize the new Belgium state in 1831. Under the first Belgian constitution, the voting franchise was restricted according to one’s tax payments, so that only 2 percent of the adult population could vote. Belgium’s Liberal Party was founded in 1847, and during the second half of the nineteenth century, liberalism flourished in Belgium. Subsidies to church schools were stopped and public education was introduced. As the century drew to a close, socialist movements increased in strength and liberalism faded. Universal male suffrage appeared in Belgium in 1893, but female suffrage had to wait until 1948. The 1848 revolutions in France, Germany, the Czech lands, and Hungary led William II to propose a new, liberal constitution for the Netherlands. The upper house, where the nobility was represented, was abolished and the previous lower house effectively became the upper house. A new popularly elected lower house was created. Suffrage was still based on tax payments, however, so that at most 10 percent of the voting-age male population could vote. Universal male suffrage did not come until 1917; female suffrage followed a year later. Liberalism also triumphed in the Netherlands during the latter half of the nineteenth century with the Liberal Party being founded in 1870.26 The Liberal Party championed the expansion of suffrage throughout the nineteenth century, as was the case in Great Britain. The newly enfranchised voters opted for other parties, however, and the Dutch 26
For further discussion of nineteenth-century Belgium and Holland, see Kossmann (1978), Arblaster (2006), and Congleton (forthcoming, ch. 15).
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Liberal Party ceased to be an important political force in the twentieth century. The last millennium saw a gradual shift in political power from the royalty to the aristocracy, and then on to the commoners. To protect itself during this transition, the aristocracy often sought to hold onto political power by retaining a disproportionate share of voting power in representative assemblies. Often, as in Britain and the Netherlands, this was accomplished through a bicameral parliament with the nobility exclusively represented in a second chamber. Sweden carried this idea to the extreme with a fourchamber parliament with the nobility, clergy, guilds (burghers), and farmers each being represented in separate chambers. This arrangement, which dated back to the Middle Ages, was embedded in the 1810 constitution. As the nineteenth century progressed, membership in the various chambers expanded, but the structure remained intact until a new constitution was written in 1866. It contained two chambers. Wealth replaced birth as the qualification for both sitting in and voting for the upper chamber. To vote for the lower chamber, one needed to be a male Lutheran taxpayer. Universal suffrage for both men and women did not arrive in Sweden until the postwar reforms of 1918–20.27 The revolutions of 1848 also led to reforms in Prussia. Its 1850 constitution provided for two houses of parliament with the nobility represented in the upper house as in Great Britain. It introduced universal male suffrage for lower house elections, which made Prussia the first European country with universal male suffrage. However, universal suffrage came with an ingenious twist. Parliament was divided into three equal parts. The wealthiest Prussians, who accounted for only 4 percent of the adult male population but one-third of direct tax payments, elected one-third of the parliament; those paying the next third of direct taxes (14 percent of the adult male population) also elected one-third of the parliament, and the remaining 82 percent of the adult male population elected representatives to fill the last third of the seats. In this way, the 1850 constitution limited the poorest citizens’ ability “to put their hands in the pockets” of the rich. Liberal reforms, particularly of an economic sort, appeared in the individual German states in the early nineteenth century and in the unified state at the end of the century. Its liberal party – the National Liberal Party – was founded in 1867. Both Wilhelm I and Wilhelm II ceded power to the parliament slowly, however, so that Germany did not become a full-fledged 27
For further discussion of nineteenth-century Sweden, see Verney (1957) and Congleton (forthcoming, ch. 13).
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parliamentary democracy until the collapse of the monarchy following Germany’s defeat in World War I.28 The 1848 revolution in Vienna, led by university students, came close to toppling the regime and produced more substantial reforms in Austria than in Prussia. Liberals came to power in 1860 and for almost forty years Austria functioned as a modern, liberal constitutional republic. Enlightenment ideas, with their heavy emphasis on rational thought, were put into effect. Vienna was rebuilt and became home to a thriving intellectual and artistic community. In the sciences (including economics), psychiatry, art, architecture, literature, philosophy, and music, Vienna was on the forefront of Western culture. The Liberal Party in Austria, like its brethren elsewhere in Europe, dominated Austrian politics thanks to a voting franchise that limited voting to the upper middle class. As the nineteenth century drew to a close, however, the voting franchise was broadened and new political parties appeared – Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, German Nationalists. Liberalism came to be equated with capitalism, and capitalism with Jews. Liberalism then gave way to Marxism, Catholicism, nationalism, and eventually anti-Semitism. Two of the leaders of the new political movements, Georg Ritter von Sch¨onerer and Karl Lueger, were former liberals who embraced anti-Semitism to gain political power. Both became political role models for Adolph Hitler.29 Indeed, the rise of Nazism in Germany in the twentieth century may also have been because of the rapid expansion of the voting franchise. Although universal male suffrage existed throughout the last quarter of the nineteenth century in Germany, voter turnouts remained low into the twentieth century at about 10 percent, rising to some 15 percent in 1907 and 19 percent in 1912. After World War I, turnouts rose to 50 and 60 percent.30 This great expansion of voter turnout reduced the education level of the average voter. Although the Nazi Party can be categorized as a middle-class party, it drew its support from “the least educated and intelligent groups of the middle class.” Many who voted for it in the last, crucial elections before Hitler took over had never voted before.31 Thus, as the voting franchise expanded in Austria, Germany, France (where anti-Semitism also was popular at the end of the nineteenth century), and elsewhere in Continental Europe, countries became more democratic 28 29 30 31
For further discussion of nineteenth-century Germany, see Fulbrook (1992), Blackbourn (1998), Congleton (forthcoming, ch. 16), and the readings in Fulbrook (1997). Schorske (1981). Dahrendorf (1969, pp. 68–9). Dahrendorf (1969, pp. 373–4).
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but also less liberal. Liberalism’s triumph in nineteenth-century Europe took place during a brief window of opportunity between the eighteenth-century Enlightenment and the rise of Socialism, Fascism, and Communism in the twentieth century. Monarchy gave way to parliamentary democracy, but during the initial phases, the voting franchise remained with an educated, moderately wealthy elite. Although this elite looked out for its own interests, its agenda included many liberal reforms – such as free trade and universal education – that benefited the entire population. The liberal agenda also included expansion of the voting franchise, which, ironically, eventually led to liberalism’s demise.
V. The Rise of Political Identification in the Nineteenth Century As the Industrial Revolution ground on, demands by workers for better treatment increased and socialist ideas took hold. Socialism’s rise came, of course, at the expense of economic liberalism. The Industrial Revolution demonstrated to many the individual’s vulnerability to the forces of the market and capitalism, and the state would have to redress the balance. Thus, that peculiarly Continental European trust in the state’s wisdom and benevolence appears in the nineteenth century. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was perhaps the most influential proponent of this view. Like Hobbes, Hegel saw the state’s most important characteristic and the one in which it differed from other organizations as its sovereignty. Unlike Hobbes, he did not see this sovereignty merely as an instrument for imposing law and order but endowed it with high ethical content. Acknowledging no superior, alone of all institutions on earth the state possessed the freedom to develop in accordance with its own nature, a freedom which it bestowed on its citizens (so long as they cooperated with it) and which provided it with its justification. From a machine designed to serve this purpose or that, the state was elevated into nothing less than “the echo of God’s footsteps on earth.” (van Creveld, 1999, pp. 195–6)
The historian Heinrich von Treitschke expressed the same thought more succinctly: “For us the state is not, as it is for the Americans, a power to be constrained so that the will of the individual may remain uninhibited, but rather a cultural power from which we expect positive achievements in all areas of national life.”32 Remarkably, despite the excesses of European states over the twentieth century, this trust in the state’s omniscience over the intelligence of the individual consumer and citizen remains unshaken in the minds of most members of Europe’s political elites even to this day. 32
As quoted in Burleigh (2005, p. 327).
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The socialist movement was multifaceted. One variant was anticlerical, “scientific,” and promised a form of salvation from the hardships caused by the Industrial Revolution. This movement was heavily influenced by Marxism and is symbolized by the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), the largest anticlerical Socialist Party in Continental Europe at the end of the nineteenth century. In 1909–10, the SPD had 7,310,000 members, “comfortably more than the major socialist parties of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK combined.”33 In the 1912 election, the SPD captured more than one-third of the vote and became the largest party in the Reichstag.34 Many people like to think of movements like Social Democracy as forms of so-called secular religions that arose to replace traditional religions during the nineteenth century as the latter faded in importance in Europe. I do not like to think of such ideological movements as religions, because they did not possess the main features of a religion – belief in invisible spirits, an afterlife, and so on. These secular movements did, however, succeed in fulfilling an important function of traditional religions – providing their members with a sense of identity. During the nineteenth century, religious and ethnic identities and loyalties were replaced by loyalty to a political party rooted in a social class: “Social Democracy was not merely a political party together with a closely allied and subordinate trade union movement, but a way of life, consisting of a self-contained subculture that thrived in working-class quarters of big cities.”35 A “scion of a Berlin socialist household” phrased it this way: In the solidarisitic identification of the individual with the whole, they built the powerful organizations and communities which, like great religions, placed people under their spell. They gave them a view of the world, a country and a home. Here people did not only take part in politics: they also sang and drank, celebrated and made friendships. What was impossible elsewhere was possible here: you could be a human being. (Burleigh, 2005, p. 267)
Communism was the most extreme form of secular Socialism, but other nineteenth-century utopian movements had similar characteristics. A second strain of Socialism attempted to incorporate Christianity. Christ, with his love for the poor, was depicted as the first socialist, and these movements attempted to combine and transpose attachments to religion into loyalty to socialist causes. Christian Socialism was reinforced 33 34 35
Blackbourn (1998, p. 412). Blackbourn (1998, p. 413). Burleigh (2005, p. 266).
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by nineteenth-century Romanticism. Reason went out of fashion and, for some, religion came back into vogue: “Christianity [was identified] as the original source of socialist virtues, and the early Christians as prototypical of incipient socialist organization.”36 Thus, economic class – sometimes joined with religion, sometimes not – became an important group identifier during the nineteenth century, and led to the rise of the class-based political parties – Labour, Socialist, Social Democratic, Communist, Conservative – that dominated European politics throughout the twentieth century. Political parties also developed in the United States during the nineteenth century, but they were less class-based. The prototypical American party arose in New York between 1820 and 1860. The Empire State was then “the citadel of democracy.”37 Martin Van Buren led what was known as the Albany Regency, which “became the backbone of the new Democratic party.” Although the political views of the leading figures in the Albany Regency spanned the full ideological spectrum, . . . they agreed that the Democratic Party in New York must be a united center party. This they effected by a system of rewards and punishments, through control of the state senate and so (under the constitution of 1821) of appointive offices. They extended their organization into every town and county, which afforded them an unparalleled political intelligence service. By supporting winning presidential candidates in 1828, 1832, and 1836, they got a stranglehold on the federal patronage as well. Van Buren and his friends, regarding themselves as champions of “the people” against “special interests,” advocated making former appointive offices elective since they could select the candidates in party conventions, they honestly believed that “the people,” to prevail against organized wealth, must be led by bosses and kept in line by the spoils system. (Morison, 1965, pp. 488–9)
The Albany Regency’s political model “spread throughout the Union, although issues differed from state to state. Party organization in the Jackson era settled into a pattern that has changed little since.”38 Although workers, farmers, and businesspeople have been drawn to one or another party at different times, American political parties have generally been less ideological than European parties. The key feature of the American democratic system, which has existed in different degrees throughout its history, has been a form of party politics that rewards party members and their friends, whether it be through patronage or pork-barrel projects. This often has resulted in the interests of politicians and their supporters getting satisfied 36 37 38
Burleigh (2005, p. 262). Morison (1965, ch. 31). Morison (1965, p. 490).
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at the expense of the wider public, a feature of American politics that helps explain why Americans hold their elected officials in such low repute. Because the United States was spared the harshest social consequences of the Industrial Revolution, counterrevolutionary movements like Socialism and Communism never gained the strength that they enjoyed in Europe. This meant that American political parties remained far less ideological, and explains why Americans during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries continued to find their personal identities in traditional religions rather than in new, ideologically driven political movements. The other important group identifier that arose in Europe during the nineteenth century, and again was of less importance in the United Sates, was nationalism. Awareness of national identify developed prior to the nineteenth century in countries like England and France that were already nation states, but it was the French Revolution and the reign of Napoleon that fused national identity and loyalty to the state. France was the first to introduce compulsory military service at the time of Napoleon, and it was decisive in harnessing nationalistic sentiments to the service of the state. Famous as they were, the writings of Rousseau, Herder, Fichte, Hegel and the like were read by only a relative handful. It was only when the French state, after the Revolution, instituted the lev´ee en masse – in which respect it was followed by other states – that the Great Transformation took place to nationalism, fostered by every means at the authorities’ disposal, was turned into the dominant ideology of the nineteenth century. (van Creveld, 1999, pp. 336–7)
Nationalism advanced in Germany and Italy during the nineteenth century as they, for the first time, began to be recognized as nation-states both within and outside of their borders. Nationalist movements also gained strength in countries like France and Austria. In Germany, Austria, and France, nationalism also became entwined with anti-Semitism. The economic crisis of 1873 in Germany led to a search for scapegoats, as economic crises often do. Many Jews had climbed aboard the liberal bandwagon during the nineteenth century and obtained leading positions in such conspicuous sectors as banking. Thus, Jews became the obvious scapegoats for the 1873 economic crisis. Anti-Semitism became a rallying issue in Germany and Austria for new extremist parties on both the right and left, but its popularity among voters also led major parties to include it in their rhetoric. The German Kaiser’s blatant anti-Semitism served to reinforce its popularity.39 Anti-Semitism was not confined to Germany and Austria between 1870 and 39
Schorske (1981), Fulbrook (1992, ch. 5), and Blackbourn (1998, pp. 307–10, 436–40).
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World War I, however; it was rampant in France, Russia, and in varying degrees across much of Europe. Liberalism is an ideology that appeals to the human faculty of reasoning. It is unsurprising, therefore, that nineteenth-century liberals were drawn from the educated and wealthier strata of European society, and that liberalism could survive politically only so long as the electorate was largely drawn from the same strata. Liberalism could not compete with ideologies that appealed more closely to tribal instincts, and thus gave way to Socialism and nationalism as the voting franchise expanded over the nineteenth century, and political parties became better organized and in search of issues that stirred voters’ passions. These twin identifiers of group solidarity – Socialism and nationalism – also helped fan the passions that resulted in the Russian Revolution and World War I at the start of the twentieth century.
VI. Religion and the Third Reich The rise of Communism and Fascism was certainly the most momentous world event of the first half of the twentieth century. Each mounted a challenge against liberal democracy, and each succeeded in conquering it for a time. Each raised a host of moral issues. In particular, one wants to know how a movement like Fascism – so alien to common notions of morality – could take root in Christian countries like Italy and Germany. Pushing further, one wants to know about the relationship between the Christian churches in these countries and the Fascist movements. For many, this issue remains emotionally charged and to take it up is to enter a veritable minefield. Nevertheless, the question of the links between religion and politics is so central to this book that we cannot avoid examining the Christian churches’ roles in resisting – or abetting – Fascism. Given its importance within the Fascist movement, we concentrate on National Socialism in Germany, and begin with two interrelated questions: (1) To what extent was National Socialism anti-Christian? (2) To what extent were leading Nazis also Christians, and Christians also Nazis? Following a discussion of these issues, the relationship between the Vatican and Fascism and in particular National Socialism are examined.
A. The Weltanschauung of National Socialism In Roger Petersen’s (2002) studies of ethnic violence in Eastern Europe, the pattern was nearly always the same. An ethnic group’s status suddenly drops relative to that of another ethnic group and it later takes revenge by turning
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on the second group with fierce violence. One way to understand National Socialism’s rise in Germany is as another example of a violent reaction of an ethnic group to a sudden decline in status. During the nineteenth century, Germany rose to become the second most powerful country in Europe following Britain, and in its own eyes, perhaps, second to none. Unification made it both an economic and a military power. Its military power was demonstrated by its victory in the Franco-Prussian War. Its growing economic power became more and more evident as Great Britain entered into decline. At the outbreak of World War I, the Germans were amply justified in thinking of themselves as Europe’s number one power if not the world’s. Defeat and the severe and humiliating conditions imposed by the victors produced a sudden reversal of Germany’s status. Who to blame? The socalled international Jewish conspiracy was the obvious culprit. Blaming Jews merely rekindled the anti-Semitism present during much of the nineteenth century. Linking Jews to an international conspiracy made it seem as if they were somehow behind the painful sanctions imposed on Germany after the war. The program of the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeitspartiei (NSDAP, or National Socialist German Workers’ Party) was announced at a large party meeting in Munich on February 25, 1920. It outlined the NSDAP’s conception of Germany’s future political development in a twentyfive-point program. Article 1 demanded “the unification of all Germans in the Greater Germany on the basis of the right of self-determination of peoples,” while Article 2 demanded “abrogation of the peace treaties of Versailles and St. Germain.” The prominence given to abrogation of the treaties indicates the importance of their harsh terms for the Nazi program. Excerpts from additional articles that capture key elements of the program follow: 10. The first obligation of every citizen must be to work both spiritually and physically. The activity of individuals is not to counteract the interests of the universality, but must have its result within the framework of the whole for the benefit of all. Consequently we demand: 11. Abolition of unearned (work and labor) incomes. Breaking rent-slavery. 13. . . . nationalization of all (previous) associated industries (trusts). 14. . . . a division of profits of all heavy industries. 18. We demand struggle without consideration against those whose activity is injurious to the general interest. Common national criminals, usurers, racketeers [Schieber] and so forth are to be punished with death, without consideration of confession or race. 23. We demand legal opposition to known lies and their promulgation through the press. In order to enable the provision of a German press, we demand, that: a. All writers and employees of the newspapers appearing in the German
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language be members of the race . . . Publications which are counter to the general good are to be forbidden. We demand legal persecution of artistic and literary forms which exert a destructive influence on our national life . . . 24. We demand freedom of religion for all religious denominations within the state so long as they do not endanger its existence or oppose the moral senses of the German race. The Party as such advocates the standpoint of a positive Christianity without binding itself confessionally to any denomination. It combats the Jewish-materialistic spirit within and around us, and is convinced that a lasting recovery of our nation can only succeed from within on the framework: The good of the state before the good of the individual. 25. For the execution of all this we demand the formation of a strong central power in the Reich. . . . 40
Article 24 appears to guarantee freedom of religion – except for Jews – but it, along with Article 10, clearly reveal that the interests of the individual are to be subservient to those of the state. Basic liberties like private property and freedom of speech and the press would only be allowed if they did not run “counter to the general good” as determined by the NSDAP. Alfred Rosenberg (1893–1946) played an important role in defining the NSDAP’s Weltanschauung. He was a prolific writer, with Der Mythos des 20 Jahrhunderts (The Myth of the Twentieth Century, [1935], first published in 1930 with several later editions) being his most influential work. Rosenberg saw history as a Darwinian struggle between races in which a superior race – the Aryans – was destined to win over inferior races like the Jews and black Africans. Each race had its own myth, which defined its culture: Racial history is therefore natural history and the mysticism of the soul at one and the same time; but the history of the religion of the blood, conversely, is the great world story of the rise and downfall of peoples, their heroes and thinkers, their inventors and artists.41
Although Rosenberg was strongly anti-Christian and The Myth can be regarded as a representation of the anti-Christian thinking in National Socialism, he used religious metaphors and symbolism to advance the case for National Socialism. Today a new faith is stirring: the myth of blood, the faith that along with blood we are defending the divine nature of man as a whole. The belief, incarnate with the most lucid knowledge, that Nordic blood represents that mystery which has replaced and overcome the old sacraments.42 40 41
42
The complete text of the NSDAP program can be obtained at http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/National Socialist Program#The full text of the 25 point program. Taken from chapter 13 of Fest (1970) as it appeared on December 15, 2006, at http:// ourcivilization.com/smartboard/shop/festjc/chap13.htm; see also http://web.archive.org/ web/20020211174958/http://www.ety.com/HRP/booksonline/mythos/mythostoc.htm. Ibid; emphasis in original.
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This passage clearly reveals that Nazism, as Rosenberg conceived of it, sought to create another form of traditionalism as an underpinning of the state. “The myth of blood” would replace religious myths in creating a sense of identity for citizens of Nazi Germany. Adolph Hitler was not as outspoken in his opposition to Christianity as Rosenberg. In 1933, he concluded a concordat with the Catholic Church that purported to protect its members and property from the state within Germany, and he never formally renounced his membership from the Church. Yet these and other actions appear to have been strategic maneuvers to avoid confrontations that might undermine support for the Nazi Party among German Christians. Piper (2007, p. 51), for example, quotes Hitler as saying, “Once the war is over, that’s the end of the Concordat,” and even before the war began, the Third Reich’s violations of the Concordat were sufficiently frequent and serious to elicit an encyclical from the Vatican in 1937 protesting the treatment of Catholics and the Church in Germany (see subsection C below). These and other examples indicate that National Socialism was not a proponent of or in partnership with Christianity. Rather, in the minds of many of its leading figures, it was an opposing ideology that would do away with the Christian churches once the war was won.43 Just as Social Democracy has been called a secular religion, Nazism and Communism are often described as “political religions.”44 At best, the term is a metaphor pointing to some similarities between these political movements and religious movements; at worst, it ignores important differences between their underlying ideologies and beliefs.45 The common elements of religions are belief (1) in supernatural, intentional beings, (2) that one can communicate with and engage in exchange with these supernatural beings, and (3) in an afterlife and great concern about the passage from this life to the next.46 National Socialism and Communism contain none of these elements. Like most religions, they required great sacrifices for the movement, but the rewards for these sacrifices would not come in an afterlife but rather here on Earth – after the proletariat triumphed over the capitalists, or in the Third Reich’s thousand-year reign. Both Communism and National Socialism were very much this-world oriented. In this respect, they represented more closely early, local religions than the universal religions. Indeed, many leading Nazis have been characterized more as “paganists” than Christians.47 43 44 45 46 47
See Piper (2007) and Hexham (2007). See discussion in Burleigh (2005, pp. 2–4). See discussion in Stowers (2007). See Chapter Three. Steigmann-Gall (2003).
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The metaphor political religion does apply, however, when one compares the methods that religions and political movements use to recruit members and retain their loyalty. We return to this later, and thus only mention here the tendency within National Socialism to make Hitler appear as a godlike figure. Hitler seems to have believed in a God, the creator of Heaven and Earth. Mein Kampf contains many references to God, but God for Hitler was a providential God. Rissmann (2001), in fact, argues that Hitler saw himself as a kind of Messiah chosen by God to lead the German people to victory over their enemies. Although Hitler did not think of himself as God, the creator of Heaven and Earth, he perhaps did see himself as a kind of God on Earth, and many of his followers thought of him in that way. Here one is reminded of the early empires in Sumer and Egypt, where the dictatorial leader claimed to be a god. Neither Hitler nor Rosenberg nor other leading Nazis seem to have believed that National Socialism was a religion in the strictest sense of the word, but they did use religion’s symbolism and language to maintain support for their cause including, for example, creating a whole set of national holidays to supplant existing religious holidays. More generally, many leading Nazis, including Hitler, clearly believed that National Socialism would someday – after the victory over the allies – substitute for the Christian religions.
B. Christians as Nazis, Nazis as Christians In The Holy Reich, Richard Steigmann-Gall advances the thesis that “Christianity, in the final analysis, did not constitute a barrier to Nazism.” Quite the opposite: For many of the subjects of his study, the battles waged against Germany’s enemies constituted a war in the name of Christianity.48 Steigmann-Gall justifies this claim by quoting many important members of the National Socialist Party who were Christians:49 1. Dietrich Eckart (1868–1923), early ideologue in the Nazi movement. “Christ stands never otherwise than upright . . . eyes flashing in the midst of the creeping Jewish rabble.” He had an important influence on Hitler, as evidenced by the tribute to Eckart at the end of Mein Kampf. 2. Artur Dinter (1876–1948), ideologue and novelist, suggested removing the Old Testament from Christian doctrine, because it reflected “the 48 49
Steigmann-Gall (2003, p. 261). Steigmann-Gall (2003, pp. 17–26).
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religious thinking of the Jews, which is based upon lies and betrayal, business and profit.” 3. Dietrich Klagges (1891–1971), first Nazi to obtain ministerial office, and responsible for Hitler’s obtaining German citizenship, which allowed him to run for elected office; author of the book The Original Gospel of Jesus. 4. Walter Buch (1883–1949), president of the Nazi Party’s Supreme Court. Buch was an advocate of positive Christianity. Positive Christianity is mentioned in Article 24 of the NSDAP program. It was also stressed by Rosenberg. Where negative Christianity was associated with the Old Testament and such Christian values as love, forgiveness, and charity, positive Christianity was a more active form of belief emphasizing honor and heroism. Buch claimed that “Christ preached struggle as did no other,” and thereby drew a link between Christianity and the Nazis’ struggle for power. 5. Hans Schemm (1891–1935), head of National Socialist Teachers’ League, quoted at the beginning of this chapter. In addition to Nazis, who thought of themselves as good Christians, some members of established churches were active in the Nazi Party.50 Erich Koch (1896–1996) was district leader in East Prussia and elected president of the provincial Protestant church synod before World War II. Koch was sentenced to death after the war for crimes committed while he was Reichskommisar in charge of Poland, East Prussia, and the Ukraine, although the sentence was never carried out. Steigmann-Gall has received much criticism.51 One critic notes that “All the Nazi protagonists belonged to a generation born between 1880 and 1910 into an empire oriented towards Christianity. What other religious-philosophical influences could they be expected to bring with them . . . ?”52 Another dismisses the example of Dietrich Eckart on the grounds that he “was above all an antisemite.”53 However, these criticisms seem to miss an important part of Steigmann-Gall’s story. The Nazis did not invent anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism was an important part of the German/Christian environment of the nineteenth century,54 and indeed, was present to various degrees in most Christian countries over much of the 50 51 52 53 54
Steigmann-Gall (2003, pp. 1–2). See the symposium on it in the Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 42(1), 2007. Gailus (2007, p. 38). Piper (2007, p. 47). Burleigh (2005, ch. 9).
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last millennium. If that were not the case, the Nazis would not have been able to exploit this emotion so easily. Although one can question whether the Christian dimension to the Nazi program was as important as SteigmannGall suggests, one cannot challenge the fact that Christian thinking and Germany being an overwhelmingly Christian country did not prevent the Nazi takeover. Moreover, once the Nazis began to implement their program, people who professed to be Christians filled the administrative posts and army ranks of the regime just as readily as any other group, except for the Jews. Perhaps, the strongest evidence in support for this argument is presented by Doris Bergen: The overwhelming majority of Germans remained baptized, tax-paying members of the official Christian Churches throughout the 12 years of nazi rule. In hindsight, it may seem impossible to reconcile the vicious hatreds of nazism with Christianity’s injunction to ‘turn the other cheek’ or to square the circle of nazi antisemitism with Christianity’s obvious origins in Judaism. But the vast majority of Germans – over 95 percent by the last count in 1939 – evidently had no problem doing so. That fact alone speaks for a coexistence of Christianity and National Socialism. (Bergen, 2007, p. 29)
C. The Vatican and Fascism During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, both Pius IX and Pius X had been outspoken in their criticisms of modernism and democracy. As the twentieth century proceeded, the political dimensions of modernism took still newer forms with the triumph of Communism in Russia, and Fascism in Italy, Germany, and Spain. Would the Church speak out as forcefully against these political developments as it did against democracy in the nineteenth century? With respect to Communism, the answer is an emphatic yes. The Church had already noticed the threat posed by “godless Communism” in the nineteenth century and remained steadfast in its opposition to Communism in the twentieth century. For example, in 1937 Pius XI issued an encyclical Divini Redemptoris,55 in which the following attack on modernism appears: This modern revolution . . . has actually broken out or threatens everywhere, and it exceeds in amplitude and violence anything yet experienced in the preceding persecutions launched against the Church. Entire peoples find themselves in danger of falling back into a barbarism worse than that which oppressed the greater part of the word at the coming of the Redeemer (Article 2). 55
http://www.vatican.va/holy father/pius xi/encyclicals/documents/hf pxi enc 19031937 divini-redemptoris en.html.
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Given that this was written in 1937 when Fascist regimes in Italy and Germany were firmly established, that many perceived them to be antiChristian, and that their goals and means for achieving them were becoming apparent, one might have guessed that the references to “violence” and “barbarism” referred to Nazism and Fascism. But no, Divini Redemptoris continues: 3. This all too imminent danger, Venerable Brethren, as you have already surmised, is bolshevistic and atheistic Communism, which aims at upsetting the social order and at undermining the very foundations of Christian civilization. 4. In the face of such a threat, the Catholic Church could not and does not remain silent. The Apostolic See, above all, has not refrained from raising its voice, for it knows that its proper and social mission is to defend truth, justice and all those eternal values which Communism ignores or attacks. Ever since the days when groups of “intellectuals” were formed in an arrogant attempt to free civilization from the bonds of morality and religion, Our Predecessors overtly and explicitly drew the attention of the world to the consequences of the dechristianization of human society. With reference to Communism, Our Venerable Predecessor, Pius IX . . . as early as 1846 pronounced a solemn condemnation . . . directed against “that infamous doctrine of so-called Communism which is absolutely contrary to the natural law itself, . . . ”
Despite the death and destruction caused by the Fascist regimes in Italy and Germany, the Vatican never chose to “raise its voice” against Fascism as “overtly and explicitly” as it did against Communism on this or any other occasion. Why this is so continues to be hotly debated. Part of the answer undoubtedly lies in the Vatican’s abhorrence of Communism. “By and large, the Vatican got along well with Mussolini’s Fascist regime. Frightened by the specter of bolshevism in Italy, many leading Catholics welcomed the March on Rome” that led to the Fascist takeover of power in Italy.56 Many Catholics (including most likely Pope Pius XII who had a great fear of Communism) saw Fascism as a bulwark against Communism. Part of the reason that the Vatican did not speak out against the Fascists’ treatment of Jews was that the Church itself had long discriminated against them. Prior to the seizure of papal lands in 1870 by the newly formed Italian state, Jews living on papal lands were restricted both as to where they could live and the occupations they could pursue. Many discriminatory laws initiated by Mussolini were reinstatements of restrictions on Jews formerly imposed by the Church. Although the Vatican objected to some of these laws – as, for example, those restricting Jews from marrying Catholics – it 56
Delzell (1967).
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and many Catholic officials were sympathetic to separating Jews and Christians. On October 10, 1938, the Italian ambassador to the Holy See stated that “the recent deliberations of the Grand Council [approving the Declaration of Race] have not found, overall, an unfavorable welcome at the Vatican.”57 (The Declaration of Race was a set of anti-Jewish measures originally proposed by Mussolini and subsequently enacted into law.) Zuccotti (2000, ch. 2) cites numerous articles published in Catholic periodicals from the 1890s into the 1930s that reveal the extent of anti-Judaism among official representatives of the Catholic Church. This twentiethcentury anti-Judaism differed from earlier Catholic strictures against Jews, however, in that it was not motivated by blame for murdering Christ, but by the Church’s dislike for modernism (“liberalism, democracy, constitutionalism, capitalist exploitation, excessive Nationalism, Socialism, Communism”), and the belief that Jews were somehow behind these modern developments.58 On July 20, 1933, the Vatican attempted to make peace with the new government in Germany. The concordat issued on that date begins as follows: His Holiness Pope Pius XI and the President of the German Reich, moved by a common desire to consolidate and enhance the friendly relations existing between the Holy See and the German Reich, . . . 59
This might strike the reader as a remarkably cordial opening to an agreement between the Catholic Church and the Nazi regime, an agreement reached just as the Nazis were introducing their first discriminatory measures against Jews.60 The goal of the concordat, however, was to protect Catholics and Catholic institutions from the Third Reich. As of 1933, the Vatican showed little interest in the fate of Jews in Germany. However, the concordat failed to protect priests in Germany from attacks, churches from vandalism, Catholic schools from being closed, and still other affronts to the Church. Thus, in 1937 the Vatican felt compelled to issue an encyclical Mit Brennender Sorge (With Burning Concern), in which it complained about the Third Reich’s violations of the concordat and, most significantly, castigated the regime’s underlying premises. 8. Whoever exalts race, or the people, or the State, or a particular form of State, or the depositories of power, or any other fundamental value of the human community – however necessary and honorable be their function in worldly things – whoever 57 58 59 60
Zuccotti (2000, p. 52). Zuccotti (2000, pp. 14–15). http://www.newadvent.org/library/docs ss33co.htm. Zuccotti (2000, p. 8).
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raises these notions above their standard value and divinizes them to an idolatrous level, distorts and perverts an order of the world planned and created by God; he is far from the true faith in God and from the concept of life which that faith upholds. None but superficial minds could stumble into concepts of a national God, of a national religion; or attempt to lock within the frontiers of a single people, within the narrow limits of a single race, God, the Creator of the universe, King and Legislator of all nations before whose immensity they are “as a drop of a bucket” (Isaiah xI, 15).61
Thus, by 1937 Pope Pius XI appeared to recognize the Third Reich’s character and the danger it posed. Still, condemnations of it remained less specific than earlier condemnations of Communism, and Pius XI failed to mention either National Socialism or Nazism explicitly. Nor were Jews mentioned explicitly. Indeed, Mit Brennender Sorge revealed an important difference between the position of the Nazis with respect to Jews and that of the Church. The Nazis persecuted Jews because they were an inferior race. The Catholic Church vigorously opposed the idea of superior and inferior races, however – anyone could be baptized and become a Catholic and enter Heaven. Catholic discrimination against Jews was based on their religion – they were not Catholics, but rather freethinkers behind modernism and its attacks on the Church.62 Pius XII became pope in 1938. He purportedly had a hand in drafting Mit Brennender Sorge, but his relationship to Fascism and the Hitler regime is nevertheless highly controversial. On one extreme, some see him as basically a Fascist himself, and little more than a stooge of Hitler.63 Pius XII’s defenders, on the other hand, see him suffering in silence during the war to prevent still worse Fascist tragedies and as a valuable protector of Jews.64 Pius XII’s Christmas message of 1942 is often cited as an instance of his speaking out against Nazism and the Holocaust. Although the pope explicitly condemned “Marxist Socialism” and “positivism and utilitarianism” in this message, his references to Nazism and the Holocaust were much more elliptical. He refers to the war as a “universal disaster,” and laments that “hundreds of thousands of persons . . . without any fault on their part, sometimes only because of nationality or race, have been consigned to death or slow decline.”65 Thus, 61 62 63 64 65
http://www.vatican.va/holy father/pius xi/encyclicals/documents/hf pxi enc 14031937 mitbrennendersorge en.html. See discussion in Zuccotti (2000, pp. 15–17, 29–46). Perhaps the most extreme of this group is Cornwall (1999). See, for example, the book by Nun Margherita Marchione (2000) and discussion (Zuccotti, 2000, pp. 311–17). http://www.ewtn.com/library/PAPALDOC/P12CH42.HTM.
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once again the pope chose to condemn killing because of race, but not because of religion. No explicit mention of Jews is made, and the words Nazism or Fascism never appear. Why did Popes Pius XI and XII not speak out early and forcefully against Mussolini and Hitler? For example, once it was known that Nazis were murdering Jews and one could guess that they intended to exterminate them, why did Pius XII not announce that any Catholic who participated in the killing of Jews would be excommunicated? Had he done so, he would have sent a signal to the entire world that what was happening in Italy and Germany was morally wrong. It might have caused some Catholics and other Christians in the Fascist regimes to reconsider their loyalties, strengthened the resolve of those opposed to the regimes and, at a minimum, would have provided a clear warning to all Jews in Europe of the dangers that faced them. As it stood, the position of the Church was that a Catholic would be excommunicated for converting to Judaism, but not for murdering hundreds or thousands of Jews. The priorities of the Vatican during the Fascist period appear to have been as follows:66 1. Protect the autonomy of the Vatican and above all else prevent its occupation by the Nazis (Mussolini would never have considered such a move) and the abduction of the pope. 2. Protect Catholic institutions and clergy in Italy, Germany, and the occupied countries. 3. Avoid alienating Catholics and driving them from the Church as, for example, by excommunicating them. 4. Protect Jews who had converted to Catholicism, or those who had married Catholics. Protecting Jews who had not converted appears to have been of low priority. Zuccotti (2000, p. 323) offers this additional explanation for why the Vatican did so little to help save Jews: The handful of decision-makers [in the Vatican] . . . were diplomats who, without the distractions of wives and children, were single-mindedly devoted to their careers and their institutions, and unwilling to risk either. Most of them, also, believed that the “preponderant Jews,” in the traditional phrase of La Civit`a Cattolica [an official publication of the Church], were a well-organized and well-financed international 66
The discussion here is based on the well-researched historical account by Zuccotti (2000).
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force, able to take care of themselves. The Vatican must concentrate its resources and energies on the Catholic faithful, so threatened by the modern world.
Ironically, this interpretation resembles the arguments of leading Nazis like Adolf Eichmann in defense of their role in the Holocaust – they were just bureaucrats following orders.67 The top officials in the Vatican were bureaucrats also, and just like many Nazi bureaucrats, they too were timid in taking risks to prevent the killing of Jews.
D. An Interpretation In trying to make the case that Nazism contained a strong Christian component, Richard Steigmann-Gall claims that Alfred Rosenberg, whom we have depicted as a major architect of the Nazi Weltanschauung, had little influence on either Hitler or the general public. This claim is difficult to justify.68 The Myth had a cumulative circulation of close to one million copies over its many editions, and two subsequent books by Rosenberg sold more than 600,000 copies each. It is inconceivable that these books went unread. Upon the National Socialist Party’s takeover in 1933, Hitler also sent a thank-you letter to Rosenberg, which began: My dear Comrade Rosenberg! One of the first conditions necessary for the National Socialist movement to be victorious was the spiritual destruction of the hostile world of ideas opposing us. Since the era of Dietrich Eckart, not only have you, my dear Comrade Rosenberg, unflinchingly led the assault against this world of ideas but you have also contributed in an extraordinary way, by your political and philosophical leadership of the Party’s central organization, to ensuring the all-permeating philosophical unity of our political campaign.69
Piper (2007) argues that religion was part of the hostile world of ideas that National Socialism attempted to conquer. Further evidence of Hitler’s appreciation of the contribution of Rosenberg to the Nazi cause is his decision to select Rosenberg to be the first recipient of the National Prize for Art and Science, awarded at the Party Congress in 1937.70 Hexham (2007, p. 76) cautions against dismissing the importance of Rosenberg’s The Myth of the Twentieth Century just because it is rambling and fails to meet professional standards for rational argument. He cites the 67 68 69 70
Arendt (1963). Piper (2007). Piper (2007). Hexham (2007, p. 71).
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Book of Mormon, works of Madam Blavatsky (founder of Theosophy), L. Ron Hubbard (Scientology), Sun Myung Moon (Unification Church), Sri Bagwan Rajneesh (Osho movement), and Maharishi Mahesh Yogi (Transcendental Meditation movement) as having similar failings.71 He might have added Karl Marx’s Das Kapital, the Bible, Koran, the Vedas, and Bhagavad Git¯a of Hinduism and still others. All are rambling in places and fail to meet professional standards of rational argument. In judging the importance of these sorts of works for a political or religious movement, it is useful to distinguish between two phases of a movement – an early phase when the movement is attempting to win converts and a mature phase when the movement is well established and its main goal is to retain membership. Initiation rites are common in many religions and other organizations. Often they take the form of an act of heroism. Many U.S. college fraternities require that pledges undergo hazing rituals before being admitted. On some occasions, these have led to injury and even the death of the candidate. Street gangs often also require acts of bravery – like committing a crime – to be accepted. By such actions the new member proves he is worthy of membership. Acceptance of an obscure or implausible text can also be a form of initiation rite. Consider, for example, this introduction to a chapter of the Book of Tao entitled The Utility of Not-Being: Thirty spokes unite around the nave; From their not-being (loss of their individuality) Arises the utility of the wheel. Mold clay into a vessel; From its not-being (in the vessel’s hollow) Arises the utility of the vessel. Cut out doors and windows in the house (-wall), From their not-being (empty space) Arises the utility of the house. Therefore by the existence of things we profit. And by the non-existence of things we are served.72
Is this a profound insight into the mysteries of life or mystical nonsense? Certainly its meaning is more obscure that the statement “Windows are useful because they let in light.” In the introduction to The Wisdom of Laotse, its editor writes, “The first reaction of anyone scanning the Book of Tao is laughter; the second reaction, laughter at one’s own laughter; and the 71 72
Hexham (2007, p. 77). Yutang (1948, p. 87).
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third, a feeling that this sort of teaching is very much needed today.”73 He then goes on quoting Laotse, author of the Book of Tao: When the highest type of men hear the Tao (truth) They try hard to live in accordance with it. When the mediocre hear the Tao, They seem to be aware and yet unaware of it When the lowest type hear of Tao, They break into loud laughter – If it were not laughed at, it would not be Tao.
Here the meaning is quite clear. Although the text of the Book of Tao may seem trite or obscure at first, its profound meaning can be found by reading and rereading it. Once one understands and lives by it, one becomes one of the highest types of men; so to join the highest types of men, one better keep reading and rereading it until one understands it – or feels that one can claim to understand it. Thus, the very obscurity of the text makes the assertion that one understands a kind of initiation rite into Taoism. Two individuals who claim to understand the Book of Tao share a comradery in the belief that they have joined the ranks of the highest men. Although the logic underlying Rosenberg’s account of the evolution of races might be difficult to follow and accept, there is no doubt when reading the book who the good and bad guys are. The economic logic underlying Marx’s theory is dense and obscure, but his colorful use of adjectives makes it easy to identify the capitalists and bourgeoisie as the villains of the day and the workers as heroes. In both cases, the claim to understand the logic of the argument in the early days of the Nazi and Marxist movements admitted one into a select circle making the same claim. The obscurity of both texts made it impossible to prove that one understood them, and thereby removed the necessity of doing so. The claims that God made the universe and all living animals including humans in six days; that the Red Sea parted to let the Jews across (would the bottom not be too muddy to wade through?); and that Noah captured pairs of polar bears, Indian and African elephants, alligators and crocodiles, kangaroos, and every species of bird and butterfly seem incredulous. Nor are parts of the New Testament easier to accept – walking on water, rising from the dead, turning water into wine? Rosenberg’s claims about racial differences and Marx’s claims about class struggles pale in comparison to those in the Bible. A key difference between them, however, is that the former claims can be tested and refuted with the passage of time, whereas 73
Yutang (1948, p. 5).
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the Bible’s claims are untestable. Thus, when a political or religious movement is starting, obscurity and incredulity in its basic texts can actually be an advantage by providing a kind of admission test for the movement. By claiming to understand and believe the text’s obscure or preposterous arguments, one proves to the movement’s members that one “is one of us.” The logic of membership is much different in a well-established movement. A citizen in a Bavarian village is Catholic not because he has read the Bible, the Koran, the Bhagavad Git¯a, and other religious texts and after much reflection decided that Catholicism gives the most plausible account of the world’s creation and God’s nature. He is Catholic because his parents and neighbors are Catholics and because his parents took him to a Catholic church when he was a child. For similar reasons, a citizen of a small town in Schleswig-Holstein is likely to be Lutheran. When a particular belief system is dominant in a community, it benefits from the tendency for individuals to think what other people in the community think. Numerous experiments have established the strength of innate desires to conform to a group. In one such experiment, individuals were asked to compare a line on a card with three other lines, and choose the line that is closest in length to the one on the card. The experimenter planted participants in the group who deliberately chose the wrong lines and had the subjects of the experiment choose after the planted participants chose. Substantial numbers of the actual subjects followed the planted participants in choosing a line that was obviously not of the same length as the line on the card. When asked later why they made this choice, they said that they did not want to go against the group.74 If group pressure can be strong enough in the presence of strangers to lead people to make obviously wrong choices about the lengths of lines, how strong must it be among family and friends about something as important as religion or politics? How many people will have the courage or audacity to say that they reject the religion of their parents and community? Clearly not many, otherwise Italy would not be overwhelmingly Catholic and Saudi Arabia Muslim. As the 1930s progressed, National Socialism became the dominant political ideology in Germany. To speak out against National Socialism would be to question the collective wisdom of the group and to risk ostracism, just as one would risk ostracism by speaking out against the Catholic Church in southern Germany and against Protestantism in the north. By 1938, the good 74
See the discussion of this and other experiments in Asch (1952).
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German would attend a Nazi rally on Saturday shouting out “Sieg Heil,” and church services on Sunday intoning Amens. She did so almost unthinkingly, without questioning the plausibility of each’s doctrines. Christianity and National Socialism were able to coexist happily in Germany because each was sustained by a similar, unquestioning acceptance of the predominant belief systems in the community. The successes and excesses of Nazism and Communism during the twentieth century illustrate that religions are not the only isms antithetical to liberal democracy. Successful liberal democracy requires a well-educated citizenry with sufficient commitment to community welfare to become informed and participate responsibly in its democratic process. Ignorance, superstition, and civic laziness are liberal democracy’s prime enemies. Ignorance and superstition can take many forms. In the case of Communism, it was the belief that individual incentives could be destroyed in the workplace and community without harming the economy and social environment. In Nazism’s case, the major failure was acceptance of the claim that the Germanic people were a master race destined to rule Europe, if not the entire world, for a thousand years. An additional failing in Germany, Austria. and Italy was that the citizens in these countries were not sufficiently committed to preserving their democratic institutions to take risks to protect them. The National Socialists promised to restore the prosperity and pride that existed prior to World War I, and citizens in Germany relinquished their newly acquired democratic institutions in the hope that this promise would be fulfilled, as did Austrians and Italians. Russians cannot be blamed for not defending democracy, because it did not exist at the revolution. Yet even the Russians might have known from history that dictatorships seldom place the interests of common citizens above those of the dictator and elite keeping him in power. Thus, a lesson from the twentieth century is certainly that political belief systems – like Fascism and Communism – can destroy democratic institutions and lower social welfare just as easily as religious belief systems can. My reason for not focusing on political belief systems in this book is not because they are unimportant, but rather because their danger for democracy is so obvious and well known. Only a handful of deranged individuals could possibly believe today that Fascism and Communism are compatible with democracy or likely to improve welfare. On the other hand, many believe that the major universal religions – and presumably by implication – most of their less popular variants are compatible with liberal democracy and lead to improvements in community welfare. Thus, the need arises to show that this proposition is certainly not universally and perhaps never true.
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The Fascist period further demonstrates that religious people are not morally superior to irreligious people. Many Nazis had no difficulty being good Nazis and good Christians; many persons of the cloth threw their moral weight behind the war effort of the Fascist regimes; and the Vatican – symbol of the moral force of the Catholic Church – stood passively aside as millions were exterminated. This is not to say that no Christians behaved morally during the Fascist period. Zuccotti (2000) reports numerous instances of Jews being saved by the heroism of lower level Catholic clergy and laypersons. Whether these efforts arose because of the religious convictions of the actors or because of the natural tendency in some humans to have compassion for others is not clear, however. What is certain is that, during a period in which moral principles and moral courage were in most need, religion’s record in supplying this morality gets a very mixed score.
VII. Liberalism, Democracy, and Religion Following the French Revolution By 1920, almost all Western European countries and several Anglophile countries like Canada and the United States were democracies by the definition commonly used today, which includes universal suffrage. The great transformation to democracy took place despite the Catholic Church’s persistent opposition to it and other manifestations of modernism. Indeed, to the extent that religion played a role at all in this transformation, it was Protestantism, in countries like Germany, because it was anticlerical and opposed the reactionary stance of the Catholic Church.75 Yet this link between Protestantism and liberalism did not play an important role in the triumph of liberalism and democracy during the nineteenth century. If anything, religion tended to hinder the transformation. The apparent triumph of liberalism and democracy in Europe circa 1920 was to prove short lived. Within twenty years both vanished in Austria, Germany, Italy, and Spain, and the rest of Europe would have to curtail liberal freedoms and even suspend democracy in some cases, as in Great Britain, because of World War II. Thus, we have the irony that no European country qualified as a democracy in 1860 by today’s standard, and yet the next thirty years constituted a golden age for liberalism and progress in most countries, while the thirty years after 1920 were a dark nightmare. Democracy’s triumph in Europe did not bring with it the peace and prosperity usually claimed for this form of government. 75
Blackbourn (1998, p. 282).
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Was there a causal link between democracy’s rise and subsequent events in Europe? It would certainly be wrong to claim that the rise of democracy over the nineteenth century caused World Wars I or II, but it is equally wrong to dismiss any link between the two. The expansion of the franchise tremendously increased the number of poorly educated voters and paved the way for Populist parties on both the right and left. Would Fascist parties in Austria and Germany have been as successful if the voting franchise in 1930 had been the same as in 1870? I doubt it. The lesson from events in the first half of the twentieth century is not that voting should always be restricted to a small elite. These events show, however, that allowing everyone to vote does not guarantee good outcomes. The economic situation was particularly difficult in the late 1920s and 1930s in the defeated countries of World War I, in part because of the harsh settlements imposed by the victors. Most citizens had little experience with democracy and were easy prey to the demagoguery that so often is appealing in difficult times. The Great Depression also produced its share of successful demagogues in the United States such as Huey Long of Louisiana. The mass electorates in Austria and Germany were simply incapable of making the correct choices in the environment of the 1930s. The same is true today in many developing countries.
Epilogue to Part Two
Our brief look at the historical record has revealed that democracy has been quite rare over the course of human history. Indeed, by modern definitions of democracy it only came into existence at the start of the twentieth century. We do not adopt such a narrow definition of democracy and thus regard Ancient Athens, the Republics of Venice and the Netherlands, and the United States from the time of the country’s founding as all democracies of one form or another but with limited voting franchises. These early manifestations of democracy all had certain elements in common. Most importantly, perhaps, they might all be called secular. The Greeks had their myths and gods, of course; the Venetians were Catholics, the Dutch a mixture of Catholics and Protestants; the Americans mostly Puritans and other Protestant sects. Yet, in each case, religion does not appear to have had an important influence on the polity’s collective decision making. The Greeks trusted their own powers of reasoning when making collective decisions, not their gods; the Venetians held “nothing sacred, nothing holy” save for the state; the Dutch Republic was one of the most liberal and tolerant of all European states; and the Americans created a secular state by constitutional design. All of the democracies can in this respect also be termed modern as opposed to traditional. In contrast, the states that were despotisms of one sort or another were nearly all traditional societies, placing more faith in the wisdom of the past than in potential for progress based on knowledge acquired in the present. Some despotisms – Sumer, Egypt, China, the Caliphate – made important, even revolutionary advances in technology and the applied sciences, but the weight of traditionalism in their societies eventually snuffed out the kind of iconoclastic approach to the pursuit of knowledge that is necessary to sustain innovation and scientific progress. None of these societies placed 235
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enough trust in man’s ability to reason to even approach introducing some form of democracy. Trust in man’s ability to reason was, of course, a salient characteristic of the Greek city-state, and it reemerged during the Enlightenment. Thus, despite the Romantic reaction against the Enlightenment and the continued opposition of the Church, the Enlightenment reform agenda gradually was implemented over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, first in Europe and its colonial offshoots in America and the Far Pacific, and following World War II in fits and starts across the globe. For those who believe that a country cannot be a true democracy unless there is universal suffrage for all men and women in the country above a certain age, the history of Europe over the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century presents somewhat of a challenge. Essentially no European country approached universal suffrage until the beginning of the twentieth century, and some did not obtain it until World War II. Yet for many countries, notably Britain, Germany, Austria, and Holland among others, the second half of the nineteenth century comes much closer to being a golden age of liberalism and economic and social progress than does the first half of the twentieth. For Germany and Austria, the extension of the voting franchise was arguably a contributing factor in liberal democracy’s succumbing to Fascist totalitarianism. With the end of World War II, and in particular, the collapse of Communism in 1989 and 1991, liberal democracy’s triumph would seem to be complete. The 1950s and 1960s constituted a golden age for essentially all of Europe’s democracies and their offshoots in America and elsewhere. Yet, as we saw in Chapter One, citizens in these countries do not seem to be ecstatic about the outcomes of democratic processes in their countries – quite to the contrary. Nor have the transplants of democratic institutions into South America, Asia, Africa, and most recently the Middle East led to the kinds of economic prosperity and political satisfaction that one might expect “the best possible system of government” to have produced. The remainder of this book discusses why this might be so. To understand why democracy might fail, we need to examine the conditions necessary for it to succeed. This examination requires that a deeper analysis of democratic institutions be undertaken than just whether or not elections are free and fair with broad voter franchises. This is the task of Part Three.
PART III
THE INSTITUTIONS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
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During the contest of opinion through which we have passed, the animation of discussions and of exertions has sometimes worn an aspect which might impose on strangers unused to think freely and to speak and to write what they think; but this being now decided by the voice of the nation, announced according to the rules of the constitution, all will, of course, arrange themselves under the will of the law, and unite in common efforts for the common good. All, too, will bear in mind this sacred principle, that though the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be reasonable; that the minority possess their equal rights, which equal laws must protect, and to violate which would be oppression. (Thomas Jefferson, Inauguration Address)1
Starting with the United States’ successful introduction of democracy at the end of the eighteenth century, democracy has spread throughout what is generally referred to as the West, and now can be found in one form or another on all continents save Antarctica. Today democracy is widely believed to be the best form of government, with even petty tyrants holding sham elections to justify their office. Their examples show, however, that democracy’s triumph has been incomplete. Even where tried, it has not always lasted or been seen as a success. The success of democracy depends on both what (whom) citizens vote for and how these votes are aggregated. To understand why this is so, we must go beyond simply thinking of democracy as a political system in which some people vote, and examine both their motives for voting and the institutions for aggregating these votes. To aid us in the latter, we introduce a bit of formal structure into the analysis. We begin with an essentially normative exercise. Under what conditions will democratic institutions accomplish the goal of advancing the interests of all members of the community? In the spirit of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, 1
Jefferson ([March 4, 1801]1944, pp. 321–2).
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we shall assume that individuals form the state to achieve this collective goal. Once we understand the conditions needed to achieve the goal, we can understand why it so often is not achieved.
I. Why Democracy? To improve citizens’ welfare, or increase their happiness in Enlightenment terms, the state must supply goods and services that citizens want and cannot achieve on their own. Three such public policies are the provision of public goods, alleviation of undesirable effects from externalities, and income and wealth redistribution to achieve specific normative goals. We discuss each in turn.
A. The Optimal Provision of a Public Good A public good, when supplied to one person, must (may) be supplied to others at zero (falling) marginal costs. For the purest public goods, the words must and zero are applicable. Defense against foreign invasion is an example. If some citizens are protected, all must be protected. The additional cost of protecting one more citizen is zero. The verb may applies to a public good like a bridge. Once built, it is possible (but not necessary) to let additional people cross the bridge at zero social cost. People can be excluded from the bridge. Once traffic reaches a level at which crowding occurs, an additional person imposes a cost on other users. On the margin, social costs may still be falling but are no longer zero.2 The characteristics of a public good – falling or zero marginal costs and the inability to exclude people from consuming it – often imply that no private firm or individual finds it profitable to supply the public good. Although all people in a city benefit from street lighting, no private firm supplies it because it could not find a way to charge people for the benefits. State provision of street lighting solves this market failure and can benefit all citizens. Because everyone must consume the same quantity of a public good, individuals receive fewer benefits from public goods in a community with heterogeneous preferences than they would, ceteris paribus, living in a community with homogeneous preferences. If a statue is to be erected in the town square, and one group of citizens favors a statue of Adam Smith and another group favors a statue of Karl Marx, one group of citizens must 2
For further discussion and references to the literature, see Mueller (2003, pp. 9–22).
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be worse off with the choice than if all had the same preferences. Obvious compromises – statues of both or no statue – leave all citizens worse off than they would be if all had the same preferences for a statue. Here is an important difference between public and private goods. With private goods, preference heterogeneity need not matter. Each consumer can choose the make and model of car she most prefers. With public goods, however, preference heterogeneity always leads to lower utility than when preferences are homogeneous. Thus, state provision of public goods can make all members of the community better off, but the more heterogeneous their preferences for public goods are the less they gain from their provision.
B. The Optimal Amount of a Private Good in the Presence of an Externality 1. Physical Externalities. A physical externality occurs when A’s action unintentionally changes B’s welfare. If B’s welfare improves, we have a positive externality; if it worsens, a negative externality. Flowers in window boxes are an example of a positive externality. The person planting the flowers does so presumably because he enjoys seeing them. Passersby also benefit from seeing the flowers, and so they create a positive externality. A market failure arises because people ignore the benefits to others from the flowers they plant, and thus too few flowers are planted. This market failure might be corrected by subsidizing the planting of flowers or by an ordinance requiring people to hang flower boxes from their windows. Positive externalities resemble public goods. A park is a good example of a public good. It is a place where the community provides flowers, trees, and shrubs that benefit all members. As with all public goods, activities creating positive externalities tend to be underprovided or not provided at all. When this market failure is corrected, everyone becomes better off. Everyone benefits from living in a community where people plant flowers in their window boxes, and do so taking into account the benefits to others. This characteristic of positive externalities makes them quite different from negative externalities. Here is an example of a negative externality. A stream runs through the ranches of both Alfred and Bernard. Alfred lives upstream from Bernard, and in dry years there is not enough water to satisfy both ranchers’ needs. Because Alfred has first crack at the water, he can satisfy his needs even in dry years. He does so, let us suppose, not to injure Bernard, but simply to benefit himself.
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Alfred’s water consumption imposes a negative externality on Bernard. Who should have a right to the water? In de facto states of anarchy, this question has often been answered through violent confrontations. Examples can be found in the American West of the nineteenth century, the dry bush lands of Australia, and the savannas of Africa. An important role of the state in all of these places has been to define and then enforce water rights. Although both are examples of market failures, there is a significant difference between positive and negative externalities. If the person planting flowers lives in total isolation, he and he alone benefits from them and there is no externality. If someone now moves next door, that person benefits from the flowers and the planter loses nothing. With positive externalities, bringing people together raises the welfare of some without harming anyone. This is not the case with negative externalities. With only one rancher, the stream can provide all of his needs. The appearance of a second rancher upstream must almost certainly make the first worse off, even when an optimal distribution of water can be found. One or both ranchers must be worse off if two share the water than if only one lived on the stream. Thus, when the actions of people cause negative externalities, bringing them together will make some or all worse off even when the consequences of the externalities are resolved efficiently. 2. Psychological Externalities. Arlene is a member of a religious sect that requires everyone to dress in black. Red in particular is regarded as the color of the devil. Arlene sees Betsy, who is not a member of the sect, dressed in red. Arlene is incensed. She has suffered a psychological externality. Although some people are vegetarians in the West for reasons of health or concern for animals, many Indians are vegetarians out of religious conviction. Indian vegetarians are often victims of a negative externality caused by their neighbors’ eating meat. Vinod Gupta, leader of Maharashtra Gopolan Samiti, a vegetarian movement in Mumbai, described his suffering in vivid terms: “Even the sight of someone eating meat is revolting. It’s not just a matter of principle, I have a sense of physical revulsion. I wonder how they can behave that way.” (Other Indians fear that a person eating meat can cause a physical externality by endangering others. As one Indian housewife put it, “A non-vegetarian person eats hot blood and it makes him hot-blooded; he might not keep control of his emotions.”)3 Psychological externalities have become increasing sources of conflict in recent years. As suggested by the quote from Vinod Gupta, the mental 3
Gentleman (2007).
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suffering of someone experiencing a psychological externality may be just as great or greater than a person experiences from a physical externality such as breathing the smoke from a nearby factory. Once again, the state may be needed to curb the negative effects from a psychological externality. Psychological externalities share with physical externalities the characteristic that one person’s action unintentionally changes the welfare of another, but they also differ in one important respect. With a physical externality, the loss to the injured party can be easily recognized and more or less objectively measured. It is obvious that a ranch in a dry area needs water, and the cost of not having it can be calculated. However, how does one measure Arlene’s suffering when she sees a woman dressed in red or Vinod Gupta’s when he thinks of someone eating meat? Psychological externalities are problematic in a liberal democratic society for two reasons. First, they are unbounded with respect to number and intensity. Arlene suffers when seeing women in red, Vinod Gupta when thinking about people eating meat, Cathy when thinking about fetuses being aborted, David when he sees two men kissing on a street corner. The list is seemingly endless, and the question of how to deal with these sorts of psychological externalities is most difficult. The important point to note is that psychological externalities are likely to be much greater in number and more troublesome to resolve in heterogeneous communities. Arlene would not suffer if everyone was a member of her religion and wore black. Vinod Gupta’s suffering would cease if everyone in his community was a vegetarian. Psychological externalities most often arise when cultural or religious practices and beliefs clash. Such clashes are more likely in heterogeneous communities. The second difficulty with psychological externalities arises because their severity depends not only on the action causing the externality, but also on how the other person reacts. This is generally not the case with physical externalities. The downstream rancher can do nothing to replenish water taken by the upstream rancher. Arlene could, however, simply avert her eyes and not look at Betsy’s red dress, or shrug her shoulders and say a prayer for Betsy’s salvation. Arlene is not compelled to go into a rage, and whether or not she does depends as much on her psychological makeup as on what Betsy chooses to wear.
C. Redistribution We think of the state as existing to improve the welfare of all citizens. Redistribution is a major activity of the state that seems to benefit one group
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at the expense of another. However, there are two categories of redistribution that benefit both the givers and the receivers – and thus I refer to them as redistribution as giving. We begin by discussing these and then return to the more conventional kind of redistribution – redistribution as taking. 1. Redistribution as Altruism. It is common to feel empathy with someone in trouble. Such feelings are in part genetically ingrained and served in our tribal past to maintain loyalty. We are hardwired to act altruistically in certain situations.4 Such behavior can be modeled by assuming a rich person obtains utility, not only from her own private goods consumption, but also from the private goods consumption of a poor person. Giving money to the poor person makes the rich person better off. If all rich people are altruistic in this way, collective decisions to redistribute income from the rich to the poor can be unanimous.5 2. Redistribution as Insurance. All insurance involves ex post redistribution. Auto insurance redistributes income from safe or lucky drivers to unsafe and unlucky drivers; health insurance from the healthy to the sick; unemployment insurance from the employed to the unemployed. People enter into many insurance contracts voluntarily, and these are thus forms of unanimous agreements to engage in redistribution. They increase the utility of all parties by reducing ex ante risks. Some forms of state-provided insurance, like unemployment insurance, might also receive unanimous support if all persons were uncertain about the possibility of losing their jobs.6 3. Redistribution as Taking. Both forms of redistribution as giving transfer money from the fortunate to the unfortunate – from rich to poor, from employed to unemployed. Many forms of public-sector redistribution do not have this characteristic, however, and thus cannot be rationalized by either of these normative theories. The largest item in the European Union’s budget today, as it has always been, is subsidies to agriculture, even though European farmers on average have higher incomes than the average taxpayer. Moreover, the preponderance of the subsidies go to the richest farmers. Nor can one rationalize these subsidies as a kind of insurance – becoming a 4 5 6
Trivers (1971), Pinker (1997, pp. 404–6, 505–7), Rubin (2002, ch. 3). Redistribution of this kind was first modeled by Hochman and Rodgers (1969). See discussion in Mueller (2003, pp. 47–9). See discussion in Mueller (2003, pp. 45–7).
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farmer is not an accident caused by fate, but the conscious choice of an individual. Although state pensions often are categorized as insurance, they too cannot be justified by either normative theory of redistribution. At a single point in time, redistribution is from the working to the nonworking, not from rich to poor. Many contributors to pension funds are poorer than some recipients of these transfers. Over people’s life cycles, transfers go from those who die young to those who live long – from the unlucky to the lucky. Not what one expects from an insurance scheme. Growing old is a predictable event. It happens to us all – if we are lucky. The average worker has some forty years to prepare for the shock of growing old and retiring. Retirees and farmers are particularly successful in getting money from the state, but they are not alone. Much redistribution occurs not for altruistic or insurance reasons, but simply for old-fashioned selfish reasons. One group succeeds in getting the state to make it better off at some other group’s expense. 4. Redistribution and Heterogeneity. The adage “charity begins at home” is highly descriptive. People are more willing to give money to a close relative than to a distant one; more willing to give to a relative than to someone who is not related; more willing to give to a neighbor than to a stranger; to a member of their own ethnic group than to other ethnic groups. This hierarchy of giving is not surprising given the genetic roots of altruistic behavior. I give to my tribe members, because I expect them to help me when I am in need. The more similar a person is to me, the more likely I am to think of him unconsciously as of part of my tribe. Dryzek and Goodin (1986) have linked the creation of the welfare state in Britain after World War II to the sense of solidarity among Britons that the war created. Being under common attack kindled the kind of loyalty “to one’s tribe” that fosters a willingness to engage in redistribution. These considerations lead us to expect more redistribution for altruistic and insurance reasons in homogeneous rather than in heterogeneous communities. It is easier to put oneself in the other fellow’s shoes the more similar he is. Martin Gilens (1999) has argued that Americans (a majority of which who are white) “hate welfare,” because they believe that it largely goes to blacks. Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2001) offer a similar explanation for the absence of a European-style welfare state in the United States.7 Ethnic, 7
For additional evidence that heterogeneity leads to less altruistic redistribution, see Lind (2007).
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religious, or linguistic heterogeneity may not only reduce redistribution as giving, but also increase redistribution as taking as one group exploits a numerical majority to transfer income and wealth from another.
II. Revealing Preferences To provide the optimal amount of a public good or redistribution, citizens’ preferences must be known. Democracy’s major advantage should come through revealing citizens’ preferences. If the state limited itself to making all citizens better off – providing public goods, redistributing wealth to benefit both givers and recipients – in principle the unanimity rule could be used to reveal preferences. All public goods and redistribution would be to everyone’s benefit. Therefore, those who believe that the state ought to confine itself to activities that benefit all have generally advocated the unanimity rule.8 The usual argument against the unanimity rule is that it takes too long to reach a decision. When choosing a voting rule, however, one must consider more than just the time needed to make a decision. If time were the only factor to consider, dictatorship would be the optimal form of government. As Buchanan and Tullock (1962, pp. 63–9) first argued, one must also take into account the external costs of collective decision-making – the cost imposed on an individual when the community makes a decision that lowers her welfare. The optimal voting rule should minimize the sum of these two costs.9 Much of Buchanan and Tullock’s The Calculus of Consent is devoted to showing that the simple majority rule is not always or even often likely to be the optimal voting rule (see again footnote 9). Several justifications for the use of the simple majority rule have been given. We examine two.
A. The Condorcet Jury Theorem Our first demonstration of the attractiveness of the simple majority rule – indeed of democracy itself – is due appropriately enough to the great Enlightenment figure the Marquis de Condorcet. The theorem assumes that a community must make a binary choice – did John rob the bank or not? All members of the community have the same goal, which is to find John guilty if he robbed the bank, innocent if he did not. The probability that any one citizen’s judgment is correct is p, 0.5 < p < 1. The Jury Theorem 8 9
See Wicksell ([1896]1967) and Buchanan and Tullock (1962). See Buchanan and Tullock (1962, pp. 63–91) and Mueller (2003, pp. 74–8).
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states that if John’s guilt is decided using the simple majority rule, then the probability that the correct judgment is made approaches one as the community’s size grows.10 The theorem is obviously a defense of the simple majority rule, but can also be thought of more generally as a defense of two-party majoritarian democracy. Under this interpretation, each of the theorem’s assumptions becomes crucial. The community must choose a party to run the state. All in the community share the same goal – to pick the party most capable of running the state. This assumption implies a consensus over what the state should be doing – controlling crime, building roads, maintaining full employment. All that is at issue is the relative competence of the two parties in achieving these common goals. Citizens are conscientious enough to gather information so that they raise the probability of making a correct judgment to more than 0.5 – they do not simply vote by flipping coins. In a large electorate, this assumption implies a sense of civic duty among the citizenry. Because the probability of any one person’s vote affecting the outcome is near zero with a large electorate, rational, self-interested voters should not bother to become informed or even to vote. If they do, then their sense of obligation or loyalty to the community must be sufficiently strong to overcome the incentive not to participate. The assumptions underlying the Jury Theorem are more likely to be met in a small, homogeneous community than in a large, heterogeneous one. A homogeneous community is more likely to agree on what the state should do. The key issue is to determine which party is more capable at running the government. Similarly, the sense of identification will be stronger in a homogeneous community, and citizens’ subconscious tribal loyalties are more likely to be transferred to the civic community and lead them to active political participation.
B. Rae’s Theorem Condorcet’s Jury Theorem posits a consensus among citizens about the goal of politics – to make the correct decision about guilt or innocence, to select the party most competent for governing – but uncertainty about which choice will meet this goal. The simple majority rule serves as a sampling mechanism for obtaining the correct answer. Buchanan and Tullock also assumed that a consensus was possible, because a collective decision was being made that could make everyone better off. Douglas Rae (1969) 10
See Young (1997) and Mueller (2003, pp. 128–33).
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presented an argument for the simple majority rule that sees political choices in quite a different light. For Rae, politics is a clash of interests, a resolution of conflict issues. Consensus is never possible.11 A community is writing a constitution, and it is assumed to be uncertain about the issues that will come up in the future and the likely positions of its members on these issues. Rae assumes, as did Condorcet, that all future collective decisions will be binary choices.12 To crystallize our thinking, assume that there will be two types of individuals in the future, the Blues and the Purples. All Blues have identical preferences as do all Purples, but the preferences of the two groups differ. One type of future collective decision is whether to ban an action by one group, say the Blues, which causes an externality that harms the Purples. At the constitutional stage, all individuals can envisage the utility gain (µ) to a Blue from undertaking the action and the loss (ε) to a Purple from the externality. All individuals are uncertain, however, over whether they will be Blues or Purples and over the future numbers of Blues and Purples. At the constitutional stage, each individual would like to choose a voting rule for deciding this issue that maximizes her expected utility. E (U ) = n B µ − n P ε
(10.1)
where nB and nP are the numbers of Blues and Purples in the future. A ban of the action by the Blues will be optimal if the expected utility in Equation 10.1 is negative. This condition is equivalent to n B /n P < e/µ
(10.2)
Inequality 10.2 can be used to determine the optimal voting rule because ε and µ are assumed to be known. If ε, the loss to the Purples from Blues’ action, were, for example, one half of µ, then a ban of the action would be optimal only if at least two-thirds of the voters supported the ban. A two-thirds’ majority rule is the optimal voting rule for determining the ban. For the simple majority rule to be the optimal voting rule, ε = µ, the loss to a Purple from a Blue’s action must equal the gain to a Blue.13 Thus, 11 12
13
The proof of the theorem that I sketch is somewhat different from Taylor’s (1969), but contains the same basic elements. See Mueller (2001, 2003, ch. 26) for a formal proof. The assumption of binary choices is popular among proponents of the simple majority rule, because it allows them to present a normative case for the use of this voting rule without having to address the issue of what happens when there is a voting cycle, which is quite likely with three or more choices. The importance of assuming equal intensities on both sides of an issue has also been noted by Kendall (1941, p. 117) and Buchanan and Tullock (1962, pp. 128–30). Rae (1969,
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if the simple majority rule is used to ban smoking in public places, one has implicitly assumed that the loss to a smoker from the ban equals the gain to a nonsmoker. Although a smoking ban might reasonably satisfy the equal intensity condition, many collective decisions are unlikely to do so. In particular, redistribution decisions motivated by altruism or insurance should never satisfy the condition. The implicit assumption behind these decisions is that the utility loss to a rich or employed person from a euro transfer is much less than the utility gain to the poor or unemployed person. If the loss to the giver equals the gain to the recipient, why make the transfer? If the Blues and Purples were ethnic or religious groups whose identities never changed, the assumption of uncertainty over future position at the constitutional stage would be implausible. A Blue would know she is a Blue. She will always be a Blue and her children will be Blues. Uncertainty over future position thus requires that the composition of the two groups changes over time. On one issue, a person is the one wishing to undertake a particular action; on another, he is the person hurt by someone else’s action. Over time, one wins on some issues and loses on others. If in the long run the probability of being on the winning side equals the probability of being on the losing side – an assumption explicitly made by Rae (1969) – then this coupled with the equal intensity assumption implies zero net gains from collective decisions. Politics is a zero-sum game. Yet if it is, why play it? The assumptions involved in proving that the simple majority rule is the best rule for making collective choices in conflict situations undermine the case for making any collective choices in these situations.
III. Good Politics Requires Good Citizens Wicksell and Buchanan and Tullock assumed that the state confined itself to activities that make all citizens better off and thus favored the unanimity rule. Rae assumed that the state focused on conflict issues and favored the simple majority rule. In practice, of course, states do both and typically use the simple majority rule to decide both types of issues. It is worth keeping in mind that much of what states do does resemble the issues for which unanimous agreement could (nearly) be reached. If referendums were held today in the United States and France over whether to stop providing police protection or unemployment insurance, vast majorities would vote to keep p. 41, n. 6) also makes it. It is implicit in May’s (1952) theorem, because a normative justification of his anonymity and neutrality axioms requires that one assume equal intensities on both sides of the issue to be decided. See discussion in Mueller (2003, pp. 133–6).
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these programs. Let us assume, for the moment, that all state activities are of this type. Much of the public choice literature assumes that individuals vote according to their narrowly defined self-interest. Individual A votes for Party X only if she expects to be materially better off if X runs the government. Considerable survey evidence, however, suggests that this is not the way most citizens vote. Voters tend to reward parties that achieve good macroeconomic results like low inflation and unemployment, and punish them if they do not. Several studies report evidence that voters’ decisions are not driven by whether they personally suffered from inflation or unemployment during a party’s reign, but rather out of concern about the welfare of the country.14 Still others have found that a citizen’s own experience and a general concern for the country’s welfare influenced how she voted.15 To the extent that citizens vote in this sociotropic way, they behave as assumed under the Condorcet Jury Theorem, and majoritarian democracy can be expected to produce policies that advance the interests of all citizens. The Jury Theorem assumes not only that citizens share a common goal for the state, but also that they become informed about the issue to be decided or about the parties in an electoral contest. Voters choose parties not policies, but their choices still must reflect an understanding of the policies or voters will not choose the right parties. We live in a complex age. How serious is the threat of global warming? What should be done about it? Does U.S. support for Israel help the war on terrorism or produce more terrorists? Answers to these questions are not easy even for experts; they seem very demanding for the average citizen on the street. What the Jury Theorem requires, however, is not that every citizen be capable of giving correct answers to each question, but that she is intelligent and informed enough to know which party is more likely to have the better answers. This too requires effort to become informed, but it is not beyond the capacity of most citizens in the rich democracies. Thus, the Condorcet Jury Theorem can be interpreted as implying that majoritarian democracy is capable of advancing the welfare of all citizens, if there is a substantial consensus among them over the ends of the state, and if they are sufficiently well-educated and well-motivated to discharge their duties as citizens intelligently. 14 15
Kinder and Kiewiet (1979, 1981), Hibbing (1987), Lewis-Beck (1988), and Markus (1988). See Fiorina (1978, 1981), Kiewiet (1981, 1983), and Kirchg¨assner (1985). For a dissenting view, see Kramer (1983). Fiorina (1997, pp. 407–9) reviews the evidence.
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IV. Bad Politics We conclude that majoritarian democracy could advance the interests of all citizens if the state confined itself to activities that benefit all citizens. However, states do not do this because citizens demand more from them. They demand actions that advance the interests of small subsets of the population. An interest group’s interests are by definition always special. If a group’s interests were not particular to itself, it would not need to organize to get the state to satisfy them. All general interests will be satisfied by the state as part of its general mandate. Special interests will only be satisfied if a group provides a party sufficient additional votes or money to win an election. Thus, instead of parties competing with programs that advance the interests of all citizens, they compete by making offers to interest groups. Over the last half century, a vast array of interest groups has appeared in all developed democracies. Fifty years ago the main interest groups represented economic interests – labor unions, and business and professional associations – and voters were mainly concerned about economic security and prosperity. The rise of postmaterial values has added a plethora of new issues to the political agenda, and the passage of time has allowed individuals to form pressure groups to lobby for their particular causes.16 Today, we have interest groups for environmental issues, animal rights, children’s rights, gay rights, women’s rights, right-to-lifers and right-to-choosers, immigrant rights, pensioners, religious groups, and ethnic minorities to mention but a few. When the state meets one group’s demands, it generally harms others. If places at universities are reserved for blacks, whites and other ethnic groups are denied these spaces. When right-to-lifers win, those defending a woman’s right to choose lose. The end result is that many people feel that the state is not satisfying their needs. Former New Jersey Senator Bill Bradley has described the problem nicely. They [interest groups] seek to convince us not that some of our interests and opinions are in conflict, nor that some of our ideals require compromise, but simply that we are not getting what we want from government because government itself is corrupt, dishonest, out of control, controlled by corporate interests, controlled by those dependent on ‘the welfare state,’ dominated by liberals, or dominated by conservatives. They don’t help us think of ourselves as citizens who are part of a democratic dialogue, or to think of government as something of which we’re a part and have power to change. Most certainly they don’t encourage us to think of ourselves as citizens who think of the general interest . . . In the end, our democracy is losing its most essential ingredient: the willingness of citizens to accept the results 16
Dalton (2000).
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of the process itself, especially if they are not complete winners. (Bradley, 1999, p. xix)17
It is striking that Bradley identifies the exact same problem that concerned Rousseau. Let us suppose now a state in which the social bond has begun to ware thin. It has, we assume, entered upon its decline; particular interests have begun to make themselves felt in it, and narrower associations to affect decisions of the wider group. The common interest, in such a state, is clouded over, and encounters opposition; votes cease to be unanimous; the general will is no longer the will of everybody.18
The subversion of the public interest to special interests is a direct consequence of both interest groups’ strength and diversity, and the use of the simple majority rule to make collective decisions. The Jury Theorem tells us that the majority rule yields desirable outcomes if all voters share the same goal. Yet interest groups do not have shared goals. Each has its own narrow goal. When one gets what it wants, the rest of the country loses. Interest groups’ importance in the United States is accentuated by its system of geographic representation combined with weak party loyalty and discipline. Each member of Congress is responsible for his or her own reelection campaign. Limits on how much money a candidate can raise from any one person or interest group force candidates to court large numbers of interest groups. An indication of this activity’s importance is the large number of earmarks attached to legislation. An earmark is a provision to finance a special project in a congressional district or state. A recent earmark was a federal grant of $300,000 to renovate the Buffalo Theater in Pawnee, Oklahoma. Did all Americans benefit from this renovation, a majority, even 1 percent? Earmarks represent a large and growing portion of the U.S. federal budget. In 2005, there were 16,072 earmarks totaling more than $52 billion, up from 4,203 earmarks in 1994, which cost American taxpayers only a bit more than $27 billion. Energy and Water Development Appropriations alone contained 2,313 earmarks in 2005, which constituted 17.3 percent of the total appropriations.19 In addition to drafting legislation favorable to particular interest groups and local constituencies, members of Congress devote a great deal of time to ombudsman services – intervening with a government agency on behalf 17 18 19
As quoted in Dalton (2004, p. 196), emphasis in the original. Rousseau ([1762] 1954, p. 164), emphasis in original. Figures are from the Congressional Research Service dated January 26, 2006, http://www. fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/m012606.pdf.
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of a constituent. The result is that “Congress [has become] composed of professional officeholders oblivious to the changing political sentiments of the country.”20 The fact that members of Congress neglect the national interest while catering to special interests and the wants of their constituents explains why voters in a given district think that their representative does a good job while holding the entire Congress in very low esteem. If interest groups are strong in the United States, they are even stronger in Europe. To buy legislation in the United States, an interest group must buy the votes of at least 218 members of the House, 51 senators and, if it does not want the president to veto the legislation, it had better give something to his campaign. In most Continental European countries, an interest group must buy the votes of only two or three parties to succeed. Although the vote of a member of Congress is certainly cheaper than the votes of a party in Europe, total outlays in the United States must exceed what is needed in Europe. Because Europeans vote for parties while Americans vote for persons, European interest groups have an additional advantage. Members of Congress die, retire, and even on occasion get defeated. When one leaves Congress, an interest group’s past investments are wiped out, and it must start anew trying to buy the vote of a replacement. European parties seldom die. While a loss of seats in an election is often treated as a defeat, most parties live on and may still join a coalition to form the government. Once an interest group has established a relationship to a party, it can maintain it indefinitely. In the United States, Western Europe, and the other developed democracies, the outcomes of the democratic process become corrupted as groups use the political process to advance their common interests at the expense of the rest of the community. In other countries, democracy may be undermined by factions based on blood ties. Kathleen Collins (2006, pp. 175–92) recounts the interesting case of Kyrgyzstan, whose promising transition to democracy at the beginning of the 1990s was undermined by powerful clans: “A clan is an informal organization comprising a network of individuals linked by kin and fictive kin identities.”21 Where state and market institutions function poorly, as was the case in Kyrgyzstan under Soviet colonization, clan leaders can fill the gap by settling contract and other sorts of disputes, obtaining loans for members, helping members get jobs, and the like. The creation of a democratic state in Kyrgyzstan opened the door for the clans to use the state to benefit their members. Patronage, clientelism, 20 21
Fiorina (1977, p. 14), emphasis in original. Collins (2006, p. 17).
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nepotism, and outright corruption followed, and Kyrgyzstan’s fledgling democracy suffered the consequences.22 Even in an advanced democracy like Italy, clanlike relationships – particularly in the south – have led to a similar pattern of patronage, clientelism, nepotism, and corruption.23 Many golden ages of democracies followed an event that focused collective decisions on policies that benefit all of the community. Cleisthenes’ constitution was such an event in Athens. The Glorious Revolution had a similar effect in Great Britain. Prior to the revolution, local interests dominated British politics, which was focused heavily on rent seeking. The revolution strengthened Parliament’s powers, thereby centralizing political control in London.24 . . . in the medium run, centralization led to the shift in rent-seeking activities from a fragmented but highly local provincial structure to a national system in which local patronage operated through members of Parliament (MPs). In the long run, this very same system allowed for a shift from locally directed patronage to distributional struggles that were more broadly focused on national concerns. In other words, the long-term institutional transformation of Britain between the Glorious Revolution and the 1867 Reform Act went through distinct stages. First a change of locus occurred, then, as a new ideology took root and a new power structure emerged, rent-seeking itself was put on the defensive. (Mokyr and Nye, 2007, p. 61)25
The shift during the eighteenth century from narrowly focused, geographically defined rent seeking to policies benefiting all of Britain was greatly influenced by Enlightenment ideas and in particular by the Scottish Enlightenment. Thus, over the course of the eighteenth century, mercantilism in Britain gave way to open markets and free trade.26 Following World War II, Europe needed rebuilding, and the United States and Canada had suffered economic shortages because of the Great Depression and the war. Europeans were happy to get on with rebuilding their countries and North Americans with enjoying a great consumption boom. The postwar economic recovery brought a kind of economic golden age, and governments in America and Europe were given credit for the prosperity. In 1958, nearly 70 percent of Americans believed that they could 22 23 24 25 26
Collins (2006, pp. 224–50). Chubb (1982, 1989), Putnam (1993), and Collins (2006, pp. 320–9). North and Weingast (1989). Mokyr and Nye (2007, p. 61). The 1867 Reform Act introduced universal suffrage for adult male citizens in Britain. Mokyr and Nye (2007, pp. 63–9).
IV. Bad Politics
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trust their government to do right. By 1980, the figure had fallen to 25 percent. Although it recovered some after 1980, it remained around or less than 40 percent until September 11, 2001. Following the 9/11 attacks, Americans’ trust in government surged. This support soon waned, however, and fell back to pre-9/11 levels already during the Bush administration.27 As observed in Chapter One, similar, if not as dramatic, declines have occurred in other Western democracies.28 Although there seems to be no single cause for this development, the corrosive effects of zero-sum, interest-group politics appear to be an important part of the explanation.29 Newton and Norris (2000, pp. 55–8), for example, report relatively modest declines in citizens’ confidence in the police and no declines in support for educational institutions – two government activities that fit the definition of a public good. Dramatic declines in confidence in parliaments have occurred, presumably because citizens hold them responsible for all of the other things governments do that do not benefit all citizens. In this regard, the surge in confidence in government in the United States following the 9/11 attacks is telling. For a while, Americans perceived that their government was doing something that benefited them all – hunting terrorists. One can liken the life cycle of a country following events like the Great Depression and World War II to that of a young couple. After they fall in love, they must make major decisions – to marry or not, to live near where he works or where she works, to have children, how many? After twenty-five years – if they are still living together – the decisions they face have changed – to go to the movies tonight, what to eat for supper, is it time to trade in the SUV? Following World War II, roads and schools needed to be rebuilt in Europe and built anew in America to adjust to both the great migration into the cities and the increasing mobility of Americans in the age of automobiles. Governments on both sides of the Atlantic responded to these demands. Once interstate highway systems and schools have been built, however, they only need to be maintained. If a broad consensus exists about the characteristics and levels of spending needed to maintain roads, schools, police forces, and other public goods, good government reduces to simply meeting these maintenance needs – not terribly exciting stuff. In a well-run, mature democracy, when the opposition asks what has the government done 27 28 29
Dalton (2004, pp. 25–6). The Netherlands appears to be an exception. See Putnam, Pharr, and Dalton (2000) and Dalton (2004, pp. 27–31). Dalton (2004, ch. 9) and Zakaria (2003, ch. 5).
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in the last four years, an election-winning answer should be – not much, because things were going so well, little had to be done. And the opposition, if willing to admit it, should acknowledge that they would not have done much differently. Such an electoral debate is unlikely to spur many citizens to vote, however. Thus, once the important things that everyone agrees should be done in a country have been done, majoritarian politics turns to issues over which there is no consensus, but about which some groups feel very strongly because it is these issues that can get people to vote for and contribute to political parties.30 Surveys in the United States indicate that citizens trust their local governments more than their state governments and their state governments more than the national government.31 These differences probably reflect the greater homogeneity of local communities, which makes it easier for them to match their policies to voter preferences. Local communities also focus on things like education, police and fire protection, and other public goods that all citizens want, while avoiding the kinds of divisive issues that often dominate national politics. The lack of trust and support for the European Union among European citizens parallels the survey findings for the United States. We have stressed the importance of group loyalty. When it is directed toward one’s political community (as it was in Britain during and immediately after World War II), it can reinforce the political bonds that unite citizens and strengthen a community’s democratic institutions. Many participants in the anti-Vietnam War movement and student protests of the 1960s experienced a similar, if less intense, bonding with their fellow protestors. The same can be said of participants in the civil rights marches of the 1960s, and is probably true to some extent for most interest groups that require active participation by their members. When, however, the cause of the interest group is narrow and conflicts with the preferences of a large part of the community, feelings of group solidarity sparked by an interest group’s 30
31
See Alesina and Wacziarg (2000). Mancur Olson (1982) argued that the better economic performance of the losers in World War II, Germany, Italy, and Japan, compared to the winners, the United States and Great Britain, was a result of the war’s having destroyed interest groups in the losing countries, whereas in the United States and Great Britain they remained strong and engaged in growth-inhibiting rent seeking. An Olsonian explanation for the reversal of growth performances over the last thirty years would be that interest groups have recovered their strengths in Germany, Italy, and Japan, while the Reagan and Thatcher revolutions greatly weakened interest groups in the United States and Great Britain. Olson focused on economic interest groups, like trade associations and labor unions. My arguments apply to all forms of interest groups. Matsusaka (2004, ch. 4).
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activities can undermine the political bonds that do or should unite all citizens. This seems to have happened in nearly all Western democracies over the past few decades. Thus, the potential costs in a democracy of a heterogeneous population appear again. Ethnically defined interest groups will not form in a country of homogeneous ethnicity; religious interest groups will not form where there is only one religion. Most strident clashes in recent years – over abortion, gay rights, euthanasia, stem cell research – have religious origins or overtones. Almost any difference between people can become a reason to form an interest group and a source of conflict if people choose to make it one. The competitive democratic process gives politicians in search of votes an incentive to seek out and cater to these diverse interests.
V. Democratic Failure Successful democratic government requires an educated and informed electorate capable of choosing the best parties and persons to run the government. For many developing countries, it is this condition that prevents them from becoming successful democracies. Someone who cannot read and write is likely to have difficulty learning about and understanding the proposals of competing parties and candidates. Populist proposals to increase spending and cut taxes are more likely to win votes if the electorate lacks the education to understand that these policies are a road to economic disaster. Table 10.1 presents the rankings of the World Audit according to the quality of a country’s democratic institutions. The rankings are based on ratings of political rights, civil liberties, press freedom, rule of law, corruption, and human rights. What we would like as a measure of the quality of democratic institutions is, of course, an index of how well a country does advancing its citizens’ welfare, but this is more difficult to measure so we use these other characteristics as a proxy. Part A of the table lists the twenty countries with the highest democracy rankings. All but one is in Europe or is a highly developed, former British colony. The exception is Chile. The two right-hand-side columns list the fraction of the female population that is illiterate and of the university-age female population attending university. Figures for males present a similar picture. The first thing to note is that the United Nations does not even report illiteracy figures for nineteen of the twenty best democracies because they are so small. Only Chile’s illiteracy rate is reported. It is 4 percent,
Table 10.1. Democracy, illiteracy, and university education Ranka
Country
Women’s illiteracyb
Women’s university enrollmentc
Part A. Twenty countries with highest democracy rankings 1 Finland 2 Denmark 3 New Zealand 4 Sweden 5 Switzerland 6 Norway 7 Netherlands 8 Australia 9 UK 10 Canada 11 Austria 11 Germany 13 Belgium 14 Ireland 14 USA 16 France 17 Portugal 18 Chile 4.4 19 Spain 20 Estonia
65 56 94 60 62 41 64 80
Average
0.2
70
18.5 8.6 2.1 17.2 88.1 22.9 74.5 13.5 2.9 9.5 2.5 19.7 71.5
4 24 9 7
Part B. Twenty countries ranked 41–60 41 Botswana 42 Jamaica 43 Trinidad & Tobago 43 Namibia 45 Mali 46 El Salvador 47 Benin 48 Brazil 48 Croatia 50 Thailand 51 Mongolia 51 Peru 51 Senegal 54 Papua New Guinea 55 Mexico 56 Lesotho 56 Dominican Republic 58 India 59 Philippines 59 Bolivia Averages a b c
11.3 9.7 12.7 7.3 19.3 18.5
95 73 90 93 39 90 59 82 70 66 53
18 1 21 39 38 44 31
21 3 9 35 20
World Audit; http://www.worldaudit.org/. Years 2000–4, adults 15 and older as a percent of population; http:// unstats.un.org/. Women enrolled at university as a percent of university-age population; http://unstats.un.org/.
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small compared to countries lower down in the rankings. The average university attendance for women in the best democracies was 70 percent of the university-age population with only Chile and Switzerland having figures less than 50 percent. Part B of the table lists the twenty countries ranked forty-one to sixty. I have dropped down this far to be certain that we are looking at weaker democracies than in Part A. I have not gone any lower because it becomes more questionable as one moves down in the World Audit’s rankings to claim that a country is a democracy. All countries in Part B hold regular, reasonably fair elections and are likely to be considered democracies by both their own citizens and outside observers. Only one of the twenty is in Europe, former Communist Croatia. The mean illiteracy rate for women in countries for which the UN publishes figures is 18.5 percent; three African countries (Benin, Nambia, and Senegal) have rates more than 70 percent. Female university attendance also varies greatly, ranging from a high of 44 percent for Mongolia to a low of 3 percent for Lesotho. On average, only 20 percent of the university-age population attends college in these lower-ranked democratic countries. India has been a democracy for sixty years. Until very recently, it has had limited success improving its population’s welfare, and even recent economic growth has benefited only a small fraction of the population. Voter participation rates have risen steadily since its independence, and so by this criterion India has been becoming more and more democratic.32 As voter participation levels have risen, however, the average education of Indian voters has fallen, with the result that India “has become less tolerant, less secular, less law-abiding, less liberal.”33 Greater participation of lower educated classes has led to the rise of the fundamentalist Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which has successfully exploited Hindu–Muslim tensions for political gain. When it controlled the local government in Gujarat in 2005, it “allowed and even assisted in the massacre of thousands of innocent Muslim men, women, and children and the ethnic cleansing of tens of thousands from their neighbors and towns. . . . Most troubling, all evidence suggests that it has helped the BJP with its Hindu base.”34 India was a much better run and more liberal country during the early years of its democracy when voter turnouts were low than it is today with greater political participation. 32 33 34
Vanhanen (1997, pp. 202, 252). Zakaria (2003, p. 106). Zakaria (2003, p. 109).
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Before Robert Mugabe decided to destroy the Zimbabwean economy, a survey was conducted to discover what Zimbabweans wanted in their new constitution. One question frequently raised concerned the political status of witch doctors under the new constitution. Sixty percent of the Benin population believes in voodoo. John Togb´e, a teacher, explained why he believed in voodoo: “Voodoo is everything to me, it helps me get whatever I want. If I have a problem I go to the voodoo chief, who makes sacrifices for me, and afterwards my problem is resolved. For example, my wife and I couldn’t have children for many years. I asked the spirits for a child, and three years later my child was born.” Christians in Benin go to church on Sunday, but visit the voodoo priests and priestesses the rest of the week, according to Na Honoun, a voodoo priestess.35 Citizens in Europe, the United States, Australia, and other developed democracies also have superstitions and erroneous beliefs, of course. Nevertheless, the gap between them and citizens in Zimbabwe, Benin, and most other African countries seems enormous. To assume that their citizens would make wise democratic choices if given a chance, which many have not been given, seems highly optimistic. Proof of literacy has often been used as a qualification for voting. The trend, however, has been to drop such tests. Literacy is not a requirement for voting in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, where illiteracy rates are respectively, 19.3, 10.3, and 19.7 percent of the population. Moreover, each of these countries has compulsory voting with the penalties for not voting in Bolivia and Peru being quite severe. Thus, these countries not only allow illiterates to vote, they compel them to do so. It is difficult to see how this policy is likely to improve the quality of the democratic process; nor do the experiences with democracy in the three countries suggest that they have. All three have been military dictatorships at one time or another, and more often than not during their interludes of democratic rule have been led by presidents who have either had dictatorial tendencies or been incompetent or both. In none of the three can one say that democracy has led to great improvements in the welfare of the citizens. The same can be said more or less for the rest of Central and South America, and here too we generally find high illiteracy and low education rates. The average female illiteracy rate for the sixteen Central and South American countries for which the UN Social Indicators reports figures is 35
See Economist, January 28, 2006.
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12.6 percent.36 In contrast, the three Central and South American countries placing in the top thirty democracies in the World Audit – Chile (ranked eighteenth), Uruguay (twenty-third) and Costa Rica (twenty-seventh) – had female illiteracy rates of 4.4, 1.9, and 4.1 percent, respectively. Coincidence, perhaps, but the burden of proof should fall on those who believe that there is no correlation between the quality of inputs into the democratic process and the quality of outputs. In an important study, Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000, hereafter PACL) investigated the relationship between democracy and development over the period 1950–90. They found that the probability that a democracy would be replaced by a dictatorship in any year was inversely related to a country’s income per capita and level of education. Presidential systems were more likely to give way to autocracy and religious heterogeneity combined with a presidential system significantly increased the probability of a democracy becoming an autocracy.37 Table 10.2 lists the countries with a period of democracy of five years or less, which changed from democracy to dictatorship between 1950 and 1990. Following the starting and ending dates for each spell of democracy appear PACL’s regime classifications. Mixed is a combination presidential and parliamentary system. It is readily apparent that most short-lived democracies were relatively poor. With few exceptions, they also had quite low adult literacy rates (defined for citizens ages fifteen and older). As late as the 1980s, only four of the twenty-one countries had literacy rates of 90 percent or more. Only Argentina probably had a literacy rate of 90 percent or more during its four short periods of democratic government between 1950 and 1970. In Ghana, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sudan, and probably Panama, only one in five adults was literate when the countries tried their democratic experiments. In Sierra Leone, the figure was closer to one in ten. Although these numbers do not prove that low levels of literacy lead to short-lived democracies, it is difficult not to believe that the chances of these fledgling democracies surviving would not have been higher if they had restricted suffrage to the literate portion of the population. At first glance, Botswana seems to contradict the claim that education and literacy are important for preserving democratic institutions. It became a democracy in 1966 and has held free elections ever since. Its growth has averaged around 6 percent, one of the highest rates in the world. Easterly (2006, pp. 28–9) attributes its spectacular growth to its democratic 36 37
This average does not include scores for the Caribbean Islands. Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000, ch. 2).
Table 10.2. Short-lived democracies and literacy (1950–1990) Country
Start
End
Type
Argentina
1950 1958 1963 1973 1979 1963 1961 1960 1970 1979 1974 1950 1958 1957 1971 1955 1954 1960 1960 1979 1950 1972 1950 1956 1963 1961 1960 1956 1965 1975 1988 1975 1980
1954 1961 1965 1975 1979 1963 1962 1962 1971 1980 1978 1953 1962 1962 1971 1956 1958 1961 1965 1982 1955 1976 1950 1961 1967 1966 1960 1959 1968 1979 1989 1975 1984
Presidential Presidential Presidential Presidential Presidential Presidential Mixed Presidential Parliamentary Presidential Parliamentary Presidential Presidential Presidential Presidential Parliamentary Parliamentary Parliamentary Parliamentary Presidential Parliamentary Mixed Presidential Presidential Presidential Presidential Parliamentary Parliamentary Parliamentary Parliamentary Mixed Parliamentary Presidential
Bolivia Brazil Congo Ghana Grenada Guatemala Honduras Indonesia Laos Myanmar (Burma) Nigeria Pakistan Panama Peru Sierra Leone South Korea Sudan Suriname Thailand Uganda
Adult literacy rates percent (year) 93 (1970)
94 (1984)
61 (1960)
68 (1970)
63 (1985) 74 (1985)
25 (1960)
42 (1970) 30 (1970)
56 (1980) 45 (1980)
29 (1950)
38 (1969)
85 (1985) 51 (1980)
50 (1960)
52 (1970)
60 (1980)
39 (1960)
54 (1970)
24 (1970)
74 (1980) 45 (1980) 78 (1983) 42 (1985)
21 (1970)
24 (1986)
27 (1960)
19 (1970) 70 (1970)
90 (1987) 85 (1985)
7 (1960) 22 (1945) 23 (1956)
13 (1970) 88 (1970) 17 (1970)
24 (1980) 94 (1980) 22 (1980) 90 (1985)
68 (1960)
79 (1970) 41 (1970)
88 (1983) 50 (1980)
Notes: Transition dates and type of democracy are taken from PACL (2000, appendix 1.2, pp. 59–69). All adult literacy figures for the 1980s are from the Lexicon Universal Encyclopedia (1988). Other literacy figures are from: Argentina, 1970 (average male and female): http://www.animalinfo.org/country/argentin.htm Brazil: http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid =S0034–89101972000400008&=sci arttext Congo (average of male and female): http://www.animalinfo.org/country/zaire.htm Ghana: http://www.photius.com/countries/ghana/society/ghana society adult education.html Guatemala: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0003/000372/037284eo.pdf Honduras, 1960: http://sanpedrosula.usvpp.gov/usaid2.html Honduras, 1970 (average of male and female): http://www.animalinfo.org/country/honduras.htm Indonesia, 1960: http://www.newint.org/issue116/facts.htm Indonesia, 1970: http://www.animalinfo.org/country/indones.htm Nigeria, 1970 (average of male and female): http://www.animalinfo.org/country/nigeria.htm Pakistan, 1970: http://www.country-studies.com/pakistan/education.html Panama, 1960 and 1970: http://www.mapsofworld.com/south-america/education/panama.html Peru, 1970 (average of male and female): http://www.animalinfo.org/country/peru.htm Sierra Leone, 1960: http://www.gdnet.org/pdf/davies.pdf Sierra Leone, 1970 (average male and female): http://www.animalinfo.org/country/sierra l.htm South Korea, 1948 and 1970: http://www.country-studies.com/south-korea/education.html Sudan, 1956: http://countrystudies.us/sudan/51.htm Sudan, 1970 (average of male and female): http://www.animalinfo.org/country/sudan.htm Thailand, 1960 and 1970: http://web.nso.go.th/eng/en/stat/poph/popt5.htm Uganda, 1970: http://www.animalinfo.org/country/uganda.htm
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institutions. Yet at the time it became a democracy, its literacy rate was at best around 40 percent and was still in the low eighties some fifteen years later.38 How can this be? Of course, one success story does not necessarily cancel out twenty or so failures, but there are additional reasons to doubt whether Botswana is an important counterexample. First, it has a lot of things going for it that many other developing, and in particular African, countries do not enjoy – low population density, temperate climate, and a lot of diamonds. More importantly, however, it has a fairly homogeneous population. Roughly 80 percent of Botswanians are Tswanas and speak the same language; 72 percent are Christians with the remaining denominations being local religions. These figures might be compared with those of Nigeria presented in Chapter One – some 250 ethnic groups, a correspondingly large number of languages, and a 50/40 split between Christians and Muslims. Literacy aside, the prerequisites for successful democracy are much better represented in Botswana. The most important reason to discount Botswana’s success as a democracy, however, is that it is not clear that it is a democracy. In the fortyplus years since it started to hold elections in 1966, one party has won all elections – the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). Such electoral success is undoubtedly due in part to the country’s outstanding economic performance, but in any Western democracy one would expect the BDP to lose at least one election over forty years because of pure boredom on the part of voters. Because there has never been a change in government in Botswana, PACL do not even categorize Botswana as a democracy, reasoning that it is not obvious that the BDP would relinquish office if it did lose an election.39 Thus, Botswana seems more like Singapore than say Taiwan, once Taiwan became a full-fledged democracy (PACL classify both Botswana and Singapore as bureaucratic dictatorships). Its leaders stay in office until they choose to retire or die. Botswana’s first head of state Seretse Khama was president from the first democratic election in 1966 until he died in 1980. He was followed by his deputy Questt Masire, who was president until he retired in 1998 and passed the presidency on to his vice president Festus Mogae. Mogae ruled until 2008, when he stepped down from the presidency and was replaced by his vice president, Ian Khama. Unlike the Nigerians, 38 39
The earliest figures I could find were for 1970 and 1971, which were around 40 percent. My Lexicon Universal Encyclopedia gives a figure of 52 percent in 1981. See discussion in Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000, pp. 23–8).
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Kenyans, and so many others in Africa, however, the Botswanans have been fortunate in that their de facto dictators have been both somewhat enlightened and benevolent and have not simply used their time in office to rob the country. As is true today in China and Russia, many Botswanans do not seem concerned about the fact that theirs is not a very competitive democracy, so long as the good times roll. Literacy tests have a bad reputation in the United States, because they were used by southern states to prevent blacks from voting. If such tests are used in a discriminatory way to prevent people from a particular minority who are literate from voting, then they obviously cannot be defended. Yet what if they are administered in a nondiscriminatory way and protect the community from populist leaders? The issue becomes more complicated if illiteracy is concentrated in particular minority groups, as it is today in many Central and South American countries. Elites of European descendants ruled most Latin and Central American countries during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In many cases, they exploited the indigenous population shamefully. When democracy is combined with restricted suffrage based on literacy, this exploitation tends to continue because illiteracy is concentrated in the indigenous population. Because the economic/literacy division coincides with an ethnic/linguistic division, the European elites do not identify with the indigenous part of the population, and do not make the investments in education and rural infrastructure to lift them out of poverty. Universal suffrage might then improve the indigenous population’s lot by giving it more political clout. If, on the other hand, it simply leads to a shift from corrupt and incompetent politicians drawn from the European elite replaced by corrupt and incompetent politicians drawn from the indigenous population, the plight of the poor might even worsen. Universal suffrage in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru has brought neither impressive leadership nor policies that have greatly benefited the indigenous population. In such countries, where wide economic gaps coincide with ethnic and linguistic differences, winner-takes-all majoritarian democracy may be incapable of producing benefits for the entire population. Thus, some new democracies face a difficult choice. The euphoria of introducing democratic institutions will be significantly dampened if some segments of the population are not allowed to vote. On the other hand, if a large part of the population is poorly educated, universal suffrage may produce populist leaders who are either incompetent or corrupt and who may not be committed to maintaining the country’s democracy. Many of the short interludes of democracy listed in Table 10.2 fit this scenario.
VI. Is Literacy Enough?
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VI. Is Literacy Enough? Although literacy rates approach 100 percent in the United States and other highly developed countries, these numbers unfortunately disguise the fact that large fractions of the populations of these countries remain functionally illiterate, that is they do no possess sufficient literacy skills to read a newspaper and correctly answer questions about its content. A 2003 study by the National Assessment of Adult Literacy found that 14 percent (30 million) of adult Americans ages sixteen and older lacked basic literacy skills (i.e., they could not pass simple functional literacy tests). Another 29 percent (63 million) could barely pass them. Given the complexity of issues today, one might argue that citizens need still higher comprehension levels to perform their duties adequately. If this is the case, then at least 14 percent and perhaps as many as 43 percent of Americans would be denied the privilege of voting if America required that citizens be able to read and understand the issues in an election before they were allowed to vote.40 Unfortunately, a lack of basic reading skills is not unique to America. Tests for functional literacy in twelve countries reveal large fractions of adults scoring in the lowest two of five literacy categories (see Table 10.3). Table 10.3. Percentages of adults scoring in the lowest two levels of an international literacy test Country Poland Ireland United Kingdom United States Switzerland (German) Belgium (Flemish) New Zealand Switzerland (French) Australia Canada The Netherlands Sweden
Level 1
Level 2
42.6 22.6 21.8 20.7 19.3 18.4 18.4 17.6 17.0 16.6 10.5 7.5
34.5 29.8 30.3 25.9 35.7 28.2 27.3 33.7 27.1 25.6 30.1 20.3
Source: http://www.nifl.gov/nifl/facts/IALS.html.
Both Ireland and the United Kingdom had higher percentages of adults in the lowest level, and Switzerland, Belgium, New Zealand, Australia, and 40
See http://nces.ed.gov/naal/kf demographics.asp#3.
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Canada were arguably rather close to the United States. If one thought that citizens should score above the lowest two levels before they could vote, then in every country except Sweden more than 40 percent of the adult population would be disenfranchised. In Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland, the figure would be more than 50 percent, in poor Poland more than 75 percent. As discussed in Chapter One, many political scientists today require universal suffrage before they are even willing to consider a country a democracy and ignore the quality of the outcomes of the political process or whether its outcomes match the preferences of voters or advance their welfare.41 For example, Tatu Vanhanen (1997) has calculated an Index of Democracy, ID, which gives equal weight to the competitiveness of a country’s political system, C, and the fraction of the total population that votes, P. C equals 100 minus the fraction of the total vote in an election going to the largest party, and ID = P × C / 100. The logic behind the measure of competitiveness is clear – a country in which the major party routinely wins 80 to 90 percent of the votes does not have a very competitive political system. The measure has the unfortunate attribute, however, that multiparty systems tend to be judged to be inherently more competitive than two-party systems. The largest party in a two-party system usually gets close to 50 percent of the vote while the share of the vote going to the largest party in multiparty systems seldom reaches this level. Hence, C is almost certain to be higher in a multiparty system. If one thinks of competitive political systems as resulting in changes in the ruling parties over time, then one might argue that it is two-party systems that are really more competitive. In many multiparty systems – like Italy during the second half of the twentieth century – new elections often bring only a minor reshuffling of the ruling parties rather than a complete change. Table 10.4 reports the values of C, P, and ID for parliamentary, or where noted, presidential elections in the early 1990s for selected countries. Belgium, which has a fractionalized party structure in part because of its linguistic division and compulsory voting, turns out to be one of the most democratic countries in the world, while Switzerland, because of its much lower voter turnouts, is judged to be less democratic than Albania, Ecuador, and the Ukraine. The United States cannot even match Switzerland, but does manage to tie Russia. If one inquired as to how well each country’s political system satisfies voter preferences, on the other hand, a much different picture would emerge. Because of its highly decentralized political 41
Dahl (1998) and Tilly (2007).
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Table 10.4. Competitiveness, participation, and indexes of democracy in selected countries, circa 1990 Country Belgium Czech Republic Romania United Kingdom Turkey Moldova Croatia Canada South Korea Ecuador Argentina Ukraine Albania Switzerland Russia United States Mongolia Venezuela India
Year
C
P
ID
1991 1992 1992 1992 1991 1990 1992 1988 1992 1992 1993 1991a 1991 1991 1991a 1992a 1992 1993 1991
76 66 72 58 73 30 56 57 62 73 58 38 44 79 43 57 43 72 55
62 61 48 58 43 55 54 51 47 39 47 59 59 30 54 41 45 27 32
47 40 35 34 33 33 30 29 29 28 27 27 26 24 23 23 19 19 18
a Presidential election; all other elections are for legislature. C = Competitiveness, P = Voter Participation, ID = Index of Democracy, ID = C × P / 100. Source: Vanhanen (1997, pp. 176–207).
structure and heavy use of direct democracy, Swiss voters have far more control over their governments than in any other country in the world. Doubling the voter turnout in Switzerland would not obviously improve the outcomes from the democratic process.42 The lesson to be learned from this discussion is not that voting should be limited to a tiny, highly educated elite but rather that when it comes to voter participation, more does not always imply better.
VII. Conclusions No people in history have taken citizenship more seriously than the Athenians. They were stingy in granting it, and expected much from those upon 42
For a discussion of the desirable properties of the Swiss political system see Steinberg (1966) and Kirchg¨assner, Feld, and Savioz (1999).
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whom it was conferred – to fight in battle when called on and to participate actively and often in the political process. The requirement that a citizen be capable of equipping himself in battle ensured that a Greek citizen was a man of at least modest substance and had a financial stake in the polity. As Pericles’ funeral oration quoted in Chapter Five makes clear, the concepts of citizenship and the character of an Athenian were closely entwined as were the concepts of public and private life. He who stayed aloof from public life was useless. Among present-day democracies, Switzerland comes closest to Athens in the importance placed on citizenship. As in Athens, a Swiss obtains citizenship at the local level; historically has been expected to be prepared to fight for his country; and is frequently called upon to discharge his or her obligations as a voter. As in Athens, the Swiss have been relatively stingy granting citizenship – only 60 percent of the residents of Switzerland are citizens. The nature of Switzerland’s democracy and its success, as for Athens’, cannot be separated from the importance placed on citizenship. The Venetian citizen also identified closely with his city-state. Although voting was confined to a smallish fraction of the population, it was not smaller than the fractions enfranchised in the United States at the end of the eighteenth century or in European countries when they first became parliamentary democracies. Moreover, the aristocratic background of Venice’s voting population ensured that they were both educated and had a considerable financial stake in the polity. All Venetians prospered during the five hundred years of democratic/aristocratic rule. Despite the passionate rhetoric of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, the definition of citizen in the French Constitution of 1791 was quite conservative by today’s standards. It contained two classes of citizens; those who could vote and those who possessed only the civil liberties enumerated in the constitution. Voting citizenship was restricted to “French males over the age of 25 who paid a certain amount in annual taxation and who registered for the National Guard.”43 This restricted the voting population to about 15 percent of the total, a figure not far from the fraction of voters in the Venetian Republic. Thus, at the Revolution’s start, the Republic’s constitution contained the main elements of Athenian citizenship – a form of property requirement and a willingness to fight for one’s country. As the Revolution progressed, voting rights were extended to all adult males and the quality of public debate and collective decision-making declined. How far they had declined by September 1792 is reflected in Charles Barbaroux’s
43
Munck (2000, p. 204).
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description of the deliberations of the electoral assembly in Avignon, an assembly that he chaired. Imagine an assemblage of 900 people, mostly ignorant, having difficulty in making themselves listen to those with any sense, but giving themselves over to the seething hotheads, and, in this assembly, a crowd of men avid for money and preferment, eternal denouncers, who dream up trouble (or exaggerate it) in order to gain lucrative commissions; intriguers quick at disseminating calumnies, little distrustful minds, a few virtuous but unenlightened men; some who were enlightened but lacked courage; a great many patriots, but without balance and without philosophy; ˆ such was the electoral body of the d´epartment of Bouches-du-Rhone. One event describes it better than this very imperfect sketch: on hearing the news of the massacres of 2 September, the hall responded with applause. (Chabaud, [1822]1936, p. 168)44
Here one might usefully compare Barbaroux’s description of the French citizens gathered to determine the fate of their country with Pericles’ description of the Greek citizens who died in defense of theirs. Barbaroux penned these reflections while awaiting execution for his participation in one of the political factions that had fallen out of favor (the Girondins). No one event can be said to have caused the Revolution’s degeneration into tyranny and barbarity but the rapid spread of the voting franchise to those ill equipped for making collective choices certainly played an important role. In Athens and Venice, concern for the common good dominated narrow self-interest, and the conditions necessary for Condorcet’s Jury Theorem might reasonably be said to have been met. The Founders of the American Republic also were greatly concerned about whether citizens would pursue the common good, as James Madison’s discussion of factions in Federalist 10 illustrates. Citizens of the United Kingdom and other countries have also on occasion placed the public’s welfare above their own. Today, it is difficult to recognize a concern for the common good in the developed democracies. Interest group politics reign, and the interests of pressure groups are so diverse that it is impossible to satisfy them all. As they try to meet the demands of pressure groups, democratic governments reinforce the incentives of these groups to make more demands and contribute to the growing alienation among citizens who believe that the state is not doing enough to advance their interests. A ballot box is not a magic box that allows one to place any sort of messages in it, producing outcomes that satisfy everyone in the community. It might achieve this magic if everyone made the same demands on the state, but 44
Chabaud (1936, p. 168) as quoted in Munck (2000, p. 209).
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the incentives of majoritarian democracy operate against such agreement on common ends. Moreover, in democracies with large electorates, citizens have little incentive to become informed about public issues. In developing countries, they may lack the education to become informed even if they would wish to. For democracy to work its wonders, an educated and conscientious citizenry is needed, a citizenry that shares a set of goals, the most important of which, perhaps, is the desire to live in a liberal democracy. When these conditions are met, democracy can and has advanced the welfare of the community in many instances. Switzerland serves as a good example. When they have not been met, democracy has on occasion produced much bloodshed and suffering. Here it is perhaps worth reminding the reader that both protagonists in the American Civil War had democratically elected governments.
ELEVEN
Rights
Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense – nonsense upon stilts. (Jeremy Bentham, 1843)
In the previous chapter, we discussed how political institutions might be used to determine public policies that advance the interests of all citizens. We saw that under certain special conditions, the simple majority rule is the optimal rule for revealing individual preferences. It is also the voting rule that is almost universally used by legislatures and other collective decisionmaking bodies. For many people, democracy is equivalent to majoritarian democracy. Most countries also have lists of individual rights as parts of their constitutions, and courts sometimes overturn acts by the legislature that are deemed to violate these rights. Constitutional rights allow a small subset of the population to negate the will of the people as expressed using the simple majority rule in the legislature. This feature of constitutional rights has puzzled some scholars.1 In this chapter, we discuss the nature of constitutional rights and their role in advancing the welfare of citizens in a liberal democracy. We then go on to contrast them with various other notions of rights like natural and cosmopolitan rights.2
I. The Choice of Voting Rule A constitutional convention must address many issues – whether to establish a federalist or unitary state, whether to create a two-party or a multiparty system, and so on. We ignore these questions here to concentrate on the choice of a voting rule to make future collective decisions, an issue touched 1 2
See, for example, Bickel (1962). Parts of this chapter reproduce arguments from Mueller (1996a, ch. 14).
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upon in the previous chapter. Perhaps the easiest way to think about this question is to assume that the polity is sufficiently small so that each citizen can represent her preferences directly as in a town meeting; thus, questions of federalism and representation need not be addressed. The only question the first assembly of citizens must decide is what voting rule to use to make future collective choices. The simplest and most familiar class of voting rules take the form that an issue x defeats alternative y if the fraction of the community voting for x is equal to or greater than m, 0 < m ≤ 1. The task of the constitutional convention then boils down to choosing m. When making this choice, an individual at the constitutional stage must weigh the gain from a higher m, which increases the likelihood that she benefits from the collective decision, against the decision-making costs of achieving greater consensus. The probability that an individual is on the winning side of an issue increases with m. Call this probability p(m). Call s the gain an individual expects if she is on the winning side of an issue, with u(s) the utility from this gain, and t the loss if she is on the losing side, with v(t) being the disutility of this loss. If s were a cash subsidy and t a tax, we could write v(t) as u(−t), but we wish to allow for the possibility that gains and losses from collective decisions are of different kinds than just cash transfers. Let d(m) be the anticipated decision-making costs measured in units commensurate with u and v. It is reasonable to assume that decision-making costs rise with m, and that marginal decision-making costs increase as the collective decision rule approaches the unanimity rule as depicted in Figure 11.1.3 The closer the group gets to unanimous agreement, the greater the potential gain to someone from holding out for a better outcome, and the longer it takes to reach the required majority. Marginal decision-making costs, d (m), increase over the range from m = 0.5 to m = 1.0. Were m to be less than 0.5, say 0.4, mutually inconsistent issues could pass. A measure to increase spending on police could obtain 45 percent of the votes and pass, as could a proposal to decrease spending on police. This awkward possibility is avoided by limiting the decision rule to the range 0.5 < m ≤ 1.0. All individuals at the constitutional stage wish to choose political institutions that will advance their welfare. We depict this as a choice of m that maximizes a participant’s expected utility. All individuals are uncertain of whether they will be on the winning or losing side of an issue. One participant’s expected utility thus equals the probability that she is on the winning 3
Formally, we assume d (m) > 0 and d (m) > 0. With respect to the other functions, we assume p (m) > 0, p (m) < 0, u (s) > 0, u (s) < 0, v(t) > 0, and v (t) > 0.
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Marginal benefits and costs
g4
d’(m)
g3
g2
g1 0
0.5
m 1.0
Figure 11.1. Possible optimal majorities.
side multiplied by the gain if she wins minus the probability that she is on the losing side multiplied by her loss if she loses, minus the decision-making costs. E (U ) = p(m)u(s ) − [1 − p(m)]v(t) − d(m)
(11.1)
At the optimum, the marginal gain from increasing the likelihood of winning by increasing m just offsets the increase in decision-making costs when m increases. Formally, this is given by: p (m)[u(s ) + v(t)] = d (m)
(11.2)
In Figure 11.1 the gi curves represent the marginal gains from increasing m, the left-hand side of (11.2). Because d (m) is undefined for m less than 0.5, no solution to (11.2), m∗ , less than 0.5 is allowable. If d (m) declined continuously to the left of m = 0.5, as it rises to the right of this point, curves like g1 and g2 would imply m∗ s < 0.5. One way to interpret this possibility is that if it were not for the possibility of mutually inconsistent proposals passing, the optimal majority in these situations would be less than 0.5. We assume in these cases that the constitution framers choose the simple majority rule – the minimum majority that avoids mutually inconsistent
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proposals passing.4 With marginal gains given by g3 , m∗ is determined by the intersection of g3 and the d (m) curve, and m∗ > 0.5. The positions of the gi curves obviously depend on the relative magnitudes of s and t. To see what effects of varying t and s have, assume that t is proportional to s. t = bs ,
with b ≥ 0
(11.3)
It can be shown that m∗ increases with b.5 Increasing the size of the loss, if one is on the losing side of an issue relative to the gain, if one is on the winning side, shifts the marginal gain curve, gi in Figure 11.1, to the right. For a large group of issues for which the harm done to the losers, t, is expected to be small relative to the gains to the winners, the optimal majority is the simple majority. However, as the loss from being on the losing side increases relative to the gain from being on the winning side, the optimal majority eventually exceeds 0.5. With a sufficiently large t relative to s, the optimal voting rule becomes the unanimity rule. Individuals writing a constitution who (1) envisaged the same sorts of future decisions and (2) assumed that all had the same probability of being on the winning or losing side could unanimously agree on the voting rules to be used.6 Of course, it will not be possible at the constitutional stage to envisage every future collective choice and devise a separate voting rule for each. Yet it is reasonable that the different types of collective decisions a polity will face can be anticipated in a general way. The previous analysis then implies that future collective decisions be divided into different categories. For decisions with an expected loss to losers that is large relative to the gain for the winners, a higher majority should be required to pass an issue. For a category of collective decisions, the loss to someone on the losing side may be so large relative to the gain to a winner that from behind the veil of ignorance where no one knows if she will be on the winning or the losing side, the community assigns this issue to the category to be decided using the unanimity rule.
II. From the Constitutional Voting Rule to Constitutional Rights A right defines an individual’s inviolable freedom to undertake a particular action or to refrain from such an action without interference or coercion 4 5
6
Reimer (1951). Let z = p (m)[u(s) + v(bs)] − d (m). Then the sign of ∂m∗ /∂c, where c is any parameter in z, is the same as the sign of ∂z/∂c. Because ∂z/∂b = p (m)v (s)s > 0, we know that m∗ increases with b. On this see the discussion by Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Rae (1969).
II. From the Constitutional Voting Rule to Constitutional Rights
275
from other individuals or institutions, including the state.7 One could of course define an action as the act of doing nothing and omit the “refrain from action” portion of the definition, but it is important to make explicit that rights can simply protect a freedom not to act, as most conspicuously in the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment, which protects the freedom to remain silent so as not to incriminate oneself.8 Constitutional rights protect what philosophers refer to as negative liberties.9 If a community had the authority to ban the publication of a specific book, then an individual in the community would find it impossible to read this book. A constitutional article guaranteeing free speech prevents a majority of the community from passing a law banning a book. Now consider the simple action of scratching one’s ear. The person undertaking the action experiences a small benefit, and no one else is harmed. If someone were not allowed to scratch his ear without the community voting on it, this would certainly be the kind of collective decision that would optimally be made using the simple majority rule. Most of the community would probably abstain or vote with the person wishing to scratch his ear out of empathy, and the issue would pass. There are countless actions like this – scratching one’s elbow, wiggling one’s toes – and it would absorb all of the community’s time if each person’s action required a vote of the community. To avoid these transaction costs, implicit if not explicit in the constitution should be, therefore, the freedom to do as one pleases unless an action is explicitly prohibited by a collective decision of the community. Such exceptions are in some cases socially optimal. Burning trash in a densely populated community may be one such exception. The loss, t, imposed on the person wishing to burn trash might reasonably be assumed to be small relative to the gain, s, to others from not having to inhale the fumes from the burning trash. Laws governing trash disposal and other actions creating negative externalities in densely populated areas are the kinds of collective actions that individuals at the constitutional stage will wish to allow the polity to make using the simple majority rule or some other qualified majority rule. Now consider an example in which the loss to someone prevented from acting, t, is very large, and the gains from preventing this action, s, are 7
8 9
In previous expositions of this theory, I have defined a right as an unconditional freedom to act. As noted later, however, all rights are conditional in the sense that they depend on the exact definition of the action. Given this definition, the word inviolable captures the meaning better. Although all rights need not be thought of as actions, there are some analytic advantages in doing so. See Kavka (1986, pp. 297–8). See Steiner (1994, ch. 2) and references therein.
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relatively small. Rachel practices one religion and everyone else practices other religions. Rachel’s religion commands her not to comb her hair. Rachel’s uncombed hair causes other members of the community some slight irritation. The unhappiness Rachel or any other member of the community would experience if she had to violate a command of her religion is quite large, however. As in the trash burning example, we confront a negative externality situation. However, with t sufficiently large relative to s, the optimal majority equals one. If the community were to make a formal collective decision in externality situations such as this, the optimal voting rule would be the unanimity rule. Using the unanimity rule in situations of this type is equivalent to giving Rachel a veto over any collective action another citizen or group might propose. Rachel could be compelled to violate her religion’s dictate against combing her hair only if she willingly agreed to do so. One possible course of action, given these considerations, is for the constitution framers to include restrictions on religious practices among the collective actions requiring unanimous agreement. That is, to recognize that such actions can involve externalities and thus require collective action but because of the large expected asymmetries in the benefits and costs involved to require that collective action to ban a religious practice be taken only if the community is unanimous. The person whose religious practice causes an externality must agree to the collective decision, whatever it is, regarding the externality caused by this religious practice. Presumably, a group would vote to ban one of its religion’s practices only if it were compensated (bribed) in some way. Something like this occurred when Utah entered the United States. In exchange for statehood, the Mormons agreed to give up polygamy.10 If the expected gain from curbing an action of a religious minority (s) is generally expected to be quite small, however, the community is unlikely to offer a sufficient bribe to convince the minority to incur the large cost t. The likely outcome under the unanimity rule will be that the minority does not cast its votes with the community. It uses its veto under the unanimity rule to allow it to obey its religion’s dictates. Thus, if the constitution framers anticipate that all or nearly all future conflicts over religious practices will involve extremely large losses for anyone prevented from following a religious dictate, and relatively small gains for everyone else, they can effectuate the likely outcome from the application of the unanimity 10
Strictly speaking, polygamy is not a part of the Mormon religion, but it might be regarded as a former part of the culture of Mormons.
III. Salient Characteristics of Constitutional Rights
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rule by specifically granting each citizen the right to practice the religion of her choosing. Such a constitutional right removes restrictions on religious conduct from the community’s future collective action agendas. A constitutional right to undertake certain actions provides the same protection, with lower decision-making costs, as the implicit veto each citizen possesses under the unanimity rule. The citizen need not exercise the right, so that both potential outcomes from the application of the unanimity rule are still possible. We can now answer a question central to the debate between the Federalists and the anti-Federalists of why an explicit enumeration of certain inviolable rights in the Constitution was desirable.11 Almost any action has the potential of altering another person’s welfare, that is, of creating an externality. When an action creates a negative externality for a large number of individuals, a collective decision curbing the individual’s right to undertake this action may advance community welfare. For most actions involving externalities, the relative gains and losses are such that the optimal voting rule for introducing constraints on individuals (e.g., laws against burning trash, speeding, and littering) is the simple majority rule, or some qualified majority less than unanimity. Religious practices, a public speech, a printed book, even reading a book12 can have negative external effects, and could thus precipitate an attempt to curb the offending action. Restraints on actions are not in the community’s interests, however, when the welfare loss of the individual whose activity is curbed is quite large relative to the gain experienced by others from such a restriction. Explicitly protecting an individual’s right to act in these situations is one way to raise the costs on the rest of the community of curbing these actions.
III. Salient Characteristics of Constitutional Rights Several features of constitutional rights as defined by this theory are worth pointing out. First, rights need to be explicitly protected in a constitution only with respect to actions that might cause negative externalities and thus be challenged by future legislative majorities. No matter how much enjoyment individuals experience from scratching their ears, an explicit right to scratch one’s ear need not be in the constitution, because it is difficult to imagine anyone proposing a law to ban ear scratching. We know from 11 12
Rutland (1985) and Storing (1985). See Sen’s (1970a,b) infamous example.
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history that majorities have curtailed the rights of religious minorities, and thus if the constitution framers wish to protect the freedom of all persons to practice their religions, they will do so by explicitly placing a right to practice one’s religion in the constitution.13 A second feature of constitutional rights is that their main target is not individuals or even groups acting in their private capacities, so much as groups acting collectively through the state. If someone tries physically to prevent me from going to the movies, I call the police and the person is arrested for violating some local ordinance. I do not need to appeal to my constitutional rights, and the police and courts would undoubtedly not invoke the constitution when arresting and convicting this person. The same would be true if the person tried to prevent me from going to church. The purpose of a constitutional right protecting the freedom to attend religious services is not to protect people from being physically prevented by other citizens from practicing their religions, but rather to protect them from future legislative majorities that might pass laws prohibiting certain religious practices. We now see why constitutional rights do and should conflict with the normative principles underlying majoritarian democracy. The conflict arises in situations involving great asymmetries in expected utilities between the person whose action is protected by the right and those who are possibly adversely affected by the action. This extreme asymmetry draws a link between our theory of constitutional rights and various normative theories of rights. Perhaps not surprisingly, one of the closest links is to John Stuart Mill’s conception of rights as presented in his essay Utilitarianism. When we call anything a person’s right, we mean that he has a valid claim on society to protect him in the possession of it, either by the force of law, or by education and opinion . . . To have a right, then is, I conceive, to have something which society ought to defend me in the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask, why it ought? I can give him no other reason than general utility. (Mill, [1863]1962, Book V, p. 309)
Thus, Mill is thinking of rights as advancing general utility, which in turn could be defined as the sum of all individual utilities. This is exactly what is maximized in our theory at the constitutional stage, where each person is uncertain over his future position in the community. Although Mill speaks of protecting possessions rather than actions, and in particular of protecting security, he clearly has in mind the kind of extreme asymmetries in utilities that underlies our theory. Defending a right receives: 13
Cass Sunstein (1996, p. 226) also makes this point.
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. . . its moral justification, from the extraordinarily important and impressive kind of utility which is concerned . . . Our notion, therefore, of the claim we have on our fellow-creatures to join in making safe for us the very groundwork of our existence, gathers feelings around it so much more intense than those concerned in any of the more common cases of utility, that the difference in degree (as is often the case in psychology) becomes a real difference in kind. The claim assumes that character of absoluteness, that apparent infinity, and incommensurability with all other considerations, which constitute the distinction between the feeling of right and wrong and that of ordinary expediency and inexpediency. The feelings concerned are so powerful, and we count so positively on finding responsive feeling in others (all being alike interested), that ought and should grow into must, and recognized indispensability becomes a moral necessity. . . . (Mill, [1863]1962, Book V, p. 310,