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REASON, RELIGION, AND DEMOCRACY
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REASON, RELIGION, AND DEMOCRACY
The rise of religious fundamentalism in different parts of the world in recent years and its association with terrorism has led to a renewed interest in the nature of religion and its compatibility with Western institutions. Much of the focus of this new interest has contrasted religion and science as two different systems of knowledge. This book also emphasizes the difference between religion and science as a means for understanding causal relationships, but it focuses more on the challenge religious extremism poses for liberal democratic institutions. This book contains a discussion of human psychology, describes the salient characteristics of all religions, and contrasts religion and science as systems of thought. Historical sketches are used to link modernity and the use of the human capacity for reasoning to advance human welfare. The book describes the conditions under which democratic institutions can advance human welfare and the nature of constitutional rights as protectors of individual freedoms. Extremist religions are shown to pose a threat to liberal democracy, a threat that has implications for immigration, education policies, and the definition of citizenship. Dennis C. Mueller is professor emeritus of economics at the University of Vienna. His main research interests are public choice, industrial economics, and constitutional political economy. He has held positions at the University of Maryland and Cornell University and is the author of many articles and several books, including Public Choice III (Cambridge University Press, 2003), The Corporation (2003), and Constitutional Democracy (1996). Mueller is a past president of the Public Choice Society, the Southern Economic Association, the Industrial Organization Society, the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (E.A.R.I.E.), the International Joseph A. Schumpeter Society, and the European Public Choice Society.
Reason, Religion, and Democracy DENNIS C. MUELLER University of Vienna
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521115018 © Dennis C. Mueller 2009 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published in print format 2009 ISBN-13
978-0-511-65168-7
eBook (NetLibrary)
ISBN-13
978-0-521-11501-8
Hardback
ISBN-13
978-0-521-13273-2
Paperback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
To Laurence, Jacob, and Adrienne
Contents
Preface 1
page ix
Liberal Democracy
1
PART I. FUNDAMENTALS: EVOLUTION, PSYCHOLOGY, REASONING, AND RELIGION
2
Evolution, Psychology, and Reason
31
3
Religion
51
PART II. A HISTORICAL LOOK AT THE STATE, DEMOCRACY, AND RELIGION
4
The First States
79
5
Athens and Rome
93
6
The Caliphate
116
7
The Renaissance
136
8
The Enlightenment
159
9
Religion and Democracy After the French Revolution
197
Epilogue to Part Two
235
PART III. THE INSTITUTIONS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
10
Democracy and Citizenship
239
11
Rights
271
12
Education, Citizenship, Immigration, and Democracy
316
vii
viii
Contents PART IV. CHALLENGES TO LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
13
Democracy and Religion
355
14
Building and Protecting Liberal Democracy
400
References
419
Author Index
437
Subject Index
442
Preface
Shortly after the completion of the final revisions to this book, a front-page article appeared in the Austrian newspaper Die Presse reporting estimates of some 250 million Christians worldwide threatened by violence or death for their beliefs. Most of the countries where this repression is taking place are not democracies – for example, Iran, Vietnam, China. Some countries such as India and Turkey are certainly democracies, but cannot be called liberal democracies because of the violations of religious freedom rights that occur within them. These instances of religious persecution illustrate a major theme of this book – the incompatibility of strong religious views and liberal democracy. Most of the countries in which religious persecution is taking place can be characterized as nonmodern, traditionalist societies – for example, Pakistan, Burma, Yemen, Kenya. Traditionalism and religion go hand in hand, as does to a large extent traditionalism and dictatorship. The examples of India and Turkey indicate, however, that democracy is no guarantee of liberalism. Wherever extremist religious beliefs exist, liberalism is at peril. It was the growing importance of religious extremism in the United States, South America, the Middle East, and other parts of the world and the potential for religious extremism to arise even in Europe that led me to write this book. No one who values liberalism and democracy should assume that they are invulnerable to attack from religious extremists. In several places, data have been taken from Internet websites with the website addresses given as sources. These website addresses change from time to time, so we cannot guarantee that the address given is still current. Alan Hamlin and an anonymous referee offered some helpful comments on an early draft of the book. Bob Tollison and Roger Congleton read the book thoroughly, and made many suggestions for improvement. Jacob Mueller, my son, also read the manuscript and caught many errors of style ix
x
Preface
and substance. Elizabeth Raab gave it a careful reading and made many suggestions for improving word choice and punctuation. To all of these people, I am most grateful. Finally, I would like to thank my secretary for the last fifteen years, Heidi Wurm, for her diligent effort to bring the manuscript into shape for the publisher. She made my side of the project immensely easier. One often adds a perfunctory disclaimer to such acknowledgments of help to the effect that the previously named do not necessarily share all views of the author. In this case, the disclaimer is definitely needed and is not perfunctory. If this book has any positive impact, it may alert some people to the dangers traditionalism and religion pose for liberal democracy and help protect it against these threats, thereby producing a better future. With this hope for the future in mind, I am dedicating this book to my children. Dennis C. Mueller Vienna, Austria May 2009
ONE
Liberal Democracy
As in other matters of this kind, we immediately come up against a stumbling-block of terminology. This is to be expected since the objective investigations that we are making require an objective terminology, whereas the subjective discussions customary in these matters are served well enough by a subjective terminology drawn from everyday language. For example, everyone recognizes that at the present time ‘democracy’ is tending to become the political system of all civilized peoples. But what is the precise meaning of this term ‘democracy’? It is even more vague than the vaguest of terms, ‘religion.’ (Vilfredo Pareto, 1916)1
The richest countries today are, with very few exceptions, liberal democracies. They are liberal in the sense that their citizens possess rights that guarantee them the freedom to go and do as they wish. They are democracies in that their citizens exercise significant control over the state. In the poorest countries, one or both attributes of liberal democracy are often missing. With the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and in the Soviet Union two years later, it appeared that capitalism and liberal democracy had triumphed over planned economies and dictatorial governments. The speed with which the former communist countries adopted market and democratic institutions suggested that their citizens believed that these institutions were best suited for meeting their needs and improving their welfare. As poor countries develop, they too could be expected to become liberal democracies. Today, liberal democracy’s triumph seems less certain. Under President Vladimir Putin, Russian newspapers and television stations that were independent and sometimes critical of the state were closed down; political 1
The quote is from The General Treatise on Sociology, and is taken from Finer (1966, p. 266).
1
2
Liberal Democracy
demonstrations against the government were brutally suppressed; persons deemed a threat to the government have been imprisoned on trumped-up charges; government critics mysteriously disappeared or were assassinated. Yet, Putin continued to obtain 80 percent approval ratings right up until he exchanged his role as president for the post of prime minister. It appears that a large majority of Russians are indifferent as to whether liberal democracy survives in Russia. A similar observation can be made with respect to Hugo Chavez’s destruction of liberal democratic institutions in Venezuela and his continued popularity with vast numbers of Venezuelans. Oil has brought prosperity to several Middle Eastern countries, but this prosperity has been accompanied by neither an expansion of liberal freedoms nor democracy. Moreover, the attacks (September 11, 2001, in the United States; March 11, 2004, in Spain; July 2005 in London; and the many failed terrorist attacks) reveal that there are quite a few people who not only do not want their own countries to be liberal democracies, but would also like to injure and ideally destroy liberal democratic institutions elsewhere. China has become a capitalist country in all but name, and its income per capita has grown at a spectacular 10 percent or more per year. Yet there is little sign that it is about to join the liberal democracies of the West. Prosperity has also not spawned liberal democracy in Singapore. Thus, considerable evidence indicates that people in large parts of the world have either rejected liberal democracy as a form of government, or feel that they can get along fairly well without it. This rejection or indifference to liberal democracy may partly be because of a perception that democratic institutions “fail to deliver the goods.” Many countries in South America, Africa, and other parts of the world have adopted democratic institutions and not experienced the economic growth and improvements in welfare that they had hoped to achieve. Many have reverted back to dictatorship, often, as in Russia and Venezuela, without their populations seeming to care. One question addressed in this book is why democracy is tried and then discarded in many developing countries, or why it is never tried at all.
I. Declining Support for Politics and Politicians in Western Democracies One possible answer to the question as to why democracy fails to get adopted or survive in developing countries is that they are too poor. Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) was among the first to argue that democracy can only emerge after a country obtains a certain level of economic development. The link
I. Declining Support for Politics and Politicians in Western Democracies
3
between economic development and democracy has been documented by Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) and Przeworski and Limongi (1997). One advantage from higher incomes is that citizens may spend less time working and have more time to participate in the democratic process. More importantly, however, economic prosperity provides resources to educate a country’s citizenry, which in turn should improve the quality of the collective decisions they make in a democracy. Carles Boix claims that it is not only the level of income that a country reaches that determines whether it democratizes, but also its distribution. More specifically, he identifies two prerequisites for democracy: Democracy prevails when either economic equality or capital mobility are high in a given country. On the one hand, economic equality promotes democracy. As the distribution of assets and incomes becomes more balanced among individuals, the redistributive impact of democracy diminishes and the probability of a peaceful transition from an authoritarian regime to universal suffrage increases. On the other hand, a decline in the specificity of capital, that is, a reduction in the cost of moving capital away from its country of origin, curbs the redistributive pressures from noncapital holders. As capital becomes more mobile, democratic governments must curb taxes – if the taxes were too high, capital would escape abroad. Accordingly, the extent of political conflict among capital holders and nonholders diminishes, and the likelihood of democracy rises. By contrast, authoritarianism predominates in those countries in which both the level of inequality and the lack of capital mobility are high. (Boix, 2003, p. 3)
Although the association between both income and income equality and democracy is well established, these two variables are only part of the story; otherwise Singapore would already be a democracy, and China would be rapidly approaching becoming one. The United States at the end of the eighteenth century and the budding democracies in Europe in the late nineteenth century were poorer than many South American and Asian countries today, which have had spotty records as democracies. So too, of course, was Ancient Greece. Moreover, Greece and late-eighteenth-century United States were also largely agricultural economies like many developing countries. More than high incomes and equal distribution is needed to make a democracy successful. In addition, liberal democracy does not seem to be fairing that well, even in the richest countries of the world. Performing an Internet search on the words – poll, trust, and politicians – on a hot day in July, 2007 yielded the following headlines: A BBC poll shows 80% of [British] voters do not trust politicians. Canadians have grown increasingly dissatisfied with all politicians.
4
Liberal Democracy A record 88% of Japanese in a fresh public opinion poll are dissatisfied with politics. Americans’ distrust of politicians and business leaders has reached epidemic level. Britons trust politicians less than car salesmen.
America’s politicians could obtain some solace, however; they were trusted more than car salesmen. A poll placed House of Representatives members in next-to-last place, just above car salesmen. A year later, however, Congress’s approval rating had sunk to a lowly 14 percent, beneath even that of President George W. Bush, who had the lowest approval rating of any president since World War II.2 In the summer of 2008, 86 percent of the Chinese citizens polled by the Pew Foundation said they were satisfied with the direction in which their country was going; at the same time, some 80 percent of Americans thought that their country was headed in the wrong direction.3 How can so many people in a country with a heavy-handed dictatorship be satisfied with the direction of their country, and so many in the world’s “oldest democracy” be dissatisfied? It would appear that America’s exalted democratic political system is not living up to its citizens’ expectations. The United States is not alone in this respect. During the last fifty years, “feelings that politicians care what people think” have declined in Austria, France, Germany, Sweden, and the United States, reaching levels between 20 and 30 percent by the late 1990s. Trends in confidence in politicians and government have been uniformly negative in all highly developed democracies with the exception of the Netherlands.4 On the other hand, people continue to exhibit pride in their countries and believe that democracy is the best form of government.5 Citizens appear to love their countries and their democratic institutions, and yet they despise the people whom they elect to govern them. Logically, there can be only three explanations for why a democracy fails to satisfy its citizens: (1) There is some form of institutional failure that prevents the government from providing the policies that the citizens want; (2) citizens mistakenly choose bad leaders or bad policies that lead to public 2 3 4 5
Economist, July 26, 2008b. The 2008 Pew Global Attitudes Survey in China, www.perglobal.org, and Economist, July 26, 2008a. See Dalton (2004, ch. 1), and Putnam, Pharr, and Dalton (2000). See Norris (1999, pp. 16–21).
I. Declining Support for Politics and Politicians in Western Democracies
5
dissatisfaction; or (3) citizens’ preferences are such that it is impossible for the government to provide a set of policies that satisfies all citizens. All three possibilities are discussed in this book.6 The emphasis is, however, on the second and third explanations. Computer scientists have an expression: “garbage in, garbage out.” The same adage is appropriate for democratic institutions. The political outcomes from a democratic process in terms of the people elected to serve in government and the policies it implements depend crucially on the inputs from voters. This statement seems so obvious that one is embarrassed to make it. Yet, many who would admit its validity fail to understand its implications. Many appear to believe that all that is needed to have a wellfunctioning democracy is that all residents within a country have the right to vote, and that most exercise this right. How they vote does not matter. This book challenges this assumption. It argues that democratic institutions will be more successful at satisfying citizens’ preferences: (1) the more homogeneous these preferences are, and (2) the more intelligent and wellinformed voters are. No government can satisfy all voters, if half desire one thing and the other half its antithesis. No government is likely to implement the proper policies for dealing with climate change, globalization, and demographic changes, if its citizens are incapable of understanding these issues or are unwilling to devote the time needed to understand them. These propositions have important implications for determining who should be allowed to vote, and how citizens are educated. Thus, this book questions the popular beliefs that democracies function best if there is universal suffrage, that rich democratic countries should have liberal immigration policies, and that immigrants should be granted voting rights soon after they arrive in a country. Such policies lead to heterogeneous electorates with large numbers of voters who are either uninformed about the issues facing their country or incapable of understanding them even when they are informed. Governments in heterogeneous societies have more difficulty satisfying their citizens, because the citizens disagree over what their governments should be doing. It may help to highlight the importance of these differences by looking more closely at two countries: one a highly successful liberal democracy and the other a failed democracy. Their incomes differ greatly in the expected way, but, as we shall see, this is only part of the story. 6
For additional discussion see, Norris (1999), Dalton (2004), and the collection of essays in Pharr and Putnam (2000).
6
Liberal Democracy
II. Profiles of Two Countries A. Switzerland Switzerland is a small, mountainous country in Central Europe. Some facts about it are presented in Table 1.1. Switzerland has one of the highest incomes per capita in the world, virtually a 100 percent literacy rate, and a life expectancy of more than eighty years. It also has some of the strongest democratic institutions in the world. These can be traced back as far as 1291, the traditional date given for its founding, when citizens from the rural communities of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden met in the meadow, R¨utli, and signed a pact to defend one another in case of attack. In doing so, they hoped to free themselves from domination by the Habsburgs. Although the event definitely took place, its importance for the development of Switzerland – let alone the supposed role William Tell played in it – has been questioned.7 This being said, the Oath of R¨utli does appear to be an early instance of cooperation among diverse sets of people, and a form of founding constitutional contract for what later would grow into the republic of Switzerland. Table 1.1. Statistics on Switzerland, 2005 Population Population annual growth rate (1990–2005) Gross national income per capita (US $) Life expectancy at birth Distribution of population by language German French Italian Romanic Other Distribution of population by religion Roman Catholic Protestant Other
7,252,000 0.4% 54,930 81 Total population 65% 18% 12% 1% 4%
Swiss nationals 74% 20% 4% 1% 1%
47.6% 44.3% 8.1%
Sources: http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/switzerland statistics.html; and http://www.about .ch/statistics/index.html.
The mountains of Switzerland divide the country into small, separated valleys. Historically, the chief occupation in these mountainous 7
See discussion and references in Steinberg (1996, pp. 14–18).
II. Profiles of Two Countries
7
communities was herding cows, which led to a population of independent and rather rugged individuals accustomed to being free from outside domination. Each valley came to be organized as a commune, which was compelled to make collective decisions regarding the maintenance of the common pastures, marketing cattle, and the like. Democracy in Switzerland was thus fostered in part because of its physical characteristics.8 Swiss history reads like the history of much of the rest of Europe.9 The sixteenth century brought the Protestant Reformation and religious war. The eighteenth century brought the Enlightenment; the nineteenth brought revolution. The Bolsheviks’ victory in Russia at the start of the twentieth century inspired socialists in Switzerland – as in Austria and other parts of Europe – to launch a general strike in 1918 in the hopes of bringing socialism to their country. The pragmatism of the Swiss, and perhaps a bit of luck, resulted in less violent and destructive consequences to these events, however, than occurred elsewhere in Europe. This pragmatism has been conspicuous throughout Switzerland’s history. Although Swiss Protestants and Catholics went to war in 1529 and again in 1531, their casualties were minuscule compared to Germany and France. The two sides soon ceased hostilities and concentrated on making money by feeding the warring factions in neighboring countries. The Swiss revolution or civil war of 1848 lasted about a month and produced fewer than two hundred casualties – a mere Hasanschiessen (hare shoot), in the words of Otto von Bismarck.10 Out of the revolution came a new constitution, ostensibly patterned in part on the U.S. Constitution, which created the strong federalist structure that survives to this day.
B. Nigeria Nigeria lies on the western coast of Africa. Some facts about it are presented in Table 1.2. Prior to the arrival of the Arabs and Europeans, the area of what is now, Nigeria, was occupied by tribal kingdoms such as the Hausa in the north and the Yoruba in the southeast. The Arabs arrived in the north in the thirteenth century and began to convert the population to Islam. The Portuguese, followed by other Europeans, arrived in the fifteenth century. Nigeria was recognized as a British colony by the rest of Europe in 1885 and obtained its independence in 1960, when parliamentary democracy was 8 9 10
See further discussion in Steinberg (1996, chs. 2 and 3). The discussion in this paragraph draws heavily on Steinberg (1996, ch. 2). Steinberg (1996, p. 46).
8
Liberal Democracy Table 1.2. Statistics on Nigeria, 2005 Population Population annual growth rate (1990–2005) Gross national income per capita (US $) Life expectancy at birth Literacy∗ (male) Literacy (female)
131,500,000 2.4% 560 43.8 75.7% 60.6%
Distribution of population by ethnic group Hausa and Fulani Yoruba Igbo (Ibo) Ijaw Kanuri Ibibio Tiv 250 other ethnic groups
29% 21% 18% 10% 4% 3.5% 2.5% 12%
Distribution of population by religion Muslim Christian Indigenous
50% 40% 10%
∗
Ages 15 and older can read and write. Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-facook/ index.html.
introduced along with a federalist structure. In 1962, Governor Awolowo, of the western province, tried to introduce a radical form of socialism into Nigeria. Rioting ensued and the prime minister resigned. Nigeria’s politics have been turbulent ever since.11 In 1966, the Christian Igbo people of the southeast staged a military coup. Muslim mobs in the north then massacred the Igbo, and Muslim officers staged a counter-coup. The Igbo then massacred northerners in the eastern cities, and the eastern region voted to secede from Nigeria and create the Republic of Biafra. A civil war ensued and lasted until 1970. An estimated one million to three million people died during the fighting or from the famine and diseases that the war caused. Military coups occurred in 1975 and 1985. In 1996, a United Nations report stated that Nigeria’s “problems and human rights are terrible and the political problems are terrifying.” By 1997, Nigeria’s income per capita had sunk to the thirteenth lowest in the world; it had been thirty-third from the 11
Taken from a variety of sources including: http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107847.html, and Economist, April 28, 2007.
II. Profiles of Two Countries
9
top a little more than twenty years earlier. In 2007, Umaru Yar’Adua was elected president with an “astonishing” 70 percent of the vote. International observers declared the results fraudulent; Nigeria’s independent observers called them a “sham.”12
C. Discussion Switzerland and Nigeria seem to illustrate the links between income and democracy, and between income distribution and democracy. Switzerland is rich; Nigeria is poor. Democracy first appears in Switzerland in the alpine cantons where herding was the dominant economic activity, because it did not afford large concentrations of wealth. In contrast, in the flat parts of Switzerland, as elsewhere in Europe, feudalism existed and wealth concentrated in the cities of Zurich, Bern, Basel, and Geneva, all of which had oligarchical political structures that did not give way to more democratic institutions until the European revolutions of 1848 and the new constitution that they produced.13 Nigeria’s main source of wealth is its oil – a very immobile source of wealth – and thus its economy is not well-suited for the emergence and survival of democracy.14 Yet why is Switzerland so wealthy and Nigeria so poor? Historically, being landlocked has been an economic disadvantage, because it is more difficult to engage in international trade. Natural resources such as minerals and fertile plains are obviously a great economic advantage. Observing the geography of both countries and their command over natural resources, one might predict that Nigeria would be rich and Switzerland poor. Landlocked Switzerland’s mountains do not contain vast quantities of copper as do Chile’s or iron ore as in China. It has no great reserves of oil as does Nigeria. Yet income per capita is roughly 100 times higher in Switzerland than in Nigeria. Many economists agree with Douglass North that institutional differences are the most important determinants of economic development.15 Countries that establish property rights and market institutions, give individuals 12 13 14 15
Economist, April 28, 2007, p. 45. Boix (2003, pp. 111–18). Boix (2003, p. 85) finds an inverse correlation between democratization and the importance of the oil sector using cross-national data. See North and Thomas (1973) and North (1990). Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) stress the importance of access to the Atlantic Ocean and political institutions that constrained the monarchy and protected commercial interests from arbitrary confiscations of property in explaining the much more rapid growth of Great Britain and the Netherlands between 1500 and 1850 in comparison with Spain, Portugal, and France.
10
Liberal Democracy
incentives to acquire human and physical capital, to innovate, and to engage in trade, experience sustained economic growth. Switzerland, historically a nation of cow herders, now hosts companies that are world leaders in banking, chemicals, food products, pharmaceuticals, watch making, and other areas. Nigeria, although home to some of the richest oil deposits on earth, remains mired in poverty for the most part. The focus of this book is not on economic growth, but on democracy. Political institutions can foster economic growth or hinder it. In Nigeria, they have hindered it. When the world price of oil has been high, Nigeria’s politicians have either channeled oil revenues into their own bank accounts or wasted them on luxury government cars, helicopters, and other perks of office. Another important factor explaining Nigeria’s lack of economic development is its high population growth rate −2.4 percent as opposed to 0.4 percent in Switzerland. This rapid growth rate results in more than 42 percent of Nigerians being fourteen years old or younger. Given the waste in government, the country cannot properly educate its rapidly growing population, thus helping to perpetuate poverty. It does not take huge investments and complicated technologies to control population growth, but it does take intelligently designed policies focused on this goal. Not only has Nigeria failed to introduce such policies, the state hinders people from preventing births by using contraception or other means. Abortions are only available to save a pregnant woman’s life and anyone assisting in an abortion can be imprisoned for up to fourteen years. Knowledge of contraception is limited. Economists define a public good as one that all members of the community consume in equal quantity at zero marginal cost. Examples of public goods are national defense, police and fire protection, highways, and clean air and water. Because all members of a community consume the same bundle of public goods and services, it will be easier for the state to satisfy its citizens if they have similar preferences for public goods and services. Democratic institutions are perceived as functioning more poorly in countries with heterogeneous populations. Both Switzerland and Nigeria have heterogeneous populations compared to, for example, Sweden. Heterogeneity within Switzerland, however, is minuscule compared to Nigeria, which has more than 250 different ethnic groups speaking more than 200 languages. Switzerland has four language groups. Switzerland fought its wars over religion in the sixteenth century, and today religious differences in Switzerland are a matter of little concern. Nigeria’s Muslims and Christians have been fighting their religious wars over issues such as the use of Shari’a law over the last half century.
II. Profiles of Two Countries
11
The best way to accommodate heterogeneity is to organize a democracy as a federation. Local communities are typically more homogeneous than the nation as a whole, and the more public goods and services are supplied at the local level, the more closely they match the preferences of their citizens. Switzerland’s federalist institutions are among the strongest in the world. Indeed, since World War II, while most federalist states have become more centralized, Switzerland has gradually become more decentralized.16 Its central government is perhaps the weakest of any rich, democratic country. In place of a powerful prime minister or president, executive power in Switzerland is in the hands of a committee composed of leaders of the major parties, a committee that traditionally has sought to reach collective decisions by consensus. The power of politicians at all government levels is further curtailed by the rights Swiss citizens have to initiate referenda to reverse actions taken by their elected representatives. Nigeria is also organized as a federalist state. However, like its African neighbors, Nigeria has a presidential (“big man”) form of government, in which the president possesses strong powers even when democratically elected. Because the state’s main source of revenue is oil, decisions at the central level as to how these revenues are shared and spent make the identity of the president of great importance. Thus, the distribution of oil revenue rather than the provision of public goods becomes the primary concern of the central government. Because the president is from one ethnic (tribal) group and of one religion, and he owes his office to the support of these groups, it becomes almost obligatory to reward them for their support by diverting oil revenue, thus alienating other tribal and religious elements of the population. Rent seeking – be it by tribal and religious interest groups or corrupt politicians – forms the main activity of the state.17 This preoccupation with rent seeking, as opposed to providing public goods, helps explain Nigeria’s turbulent political history and disappointing governmental performance. Oil revenues either flow into the pockets of corrupt politicians and public officials or are dissipated in wasteful public expenditures. In a federalist democracy, citizens at all levels of government need to take an active part in deciding what goods and services are provided or in choosing representatives who make those decisions. In addition, citizens have to possess the capability to make intelligent choices. Switzerland has 16 17
See Blankart (2000). See again, Economist, April 28, 2007. This article also gives an example of one Nigerian state, Cross Rivers, where its governor – without any oil revenue – has done an effective job of providing goods and services to its citizens. Federalism could work even in Nigeria with the right political leadership.
12
Liberal Democracy
a highly educated population with much experience with the democratic process. More than 42 percent of Nigeria’s population is less than age 15, and 30 percent of those ages 15 and older cannot read and write. Thus, in a developing country like Nigeria, many citizens are likely to be incapable of making intelligent collective decisions. Switzerland is a prime example of a modern, progressive society. Its population is not only highly literate, but has also been exposed to and largely accepted the ideas of the Enlightenment. These concepts include a commitment to scientific progress; a respect for the rights of individuals to engage in market exchange; to exercise free speech, freedom of assembly, and the other basic freedoms associated with Enlightenment thinking. Nigeria, in contrast, is a prime example of a traditional society. Tribal loyalties remain strong, and many Nigerians still adhere to tribal customs and traditions and hold superstitious beliefs. Belonging to one of the universal religions (Islam and Christianity) becomes another source of identity for engaging in rent seeking and civil strife. Like almost all traditional societies, Nigeria is caught in a Malthusian trap in which increases in income from oil revenues or other sources are dissipated because of population growth. Instead of income per capita growing, the population grows and much of the population remains in poverty. The contrast and conflict between progressivism and traditionalism is one theme of this book. Becoming one of the rich, democratic countries of the world requires the abandonment of traditional modes of thought and institutions for those of modern societies. Although it is sometimes helpful to classify countries as either modern or traditional, all progressive countries contain traditional elements that seek to undermine the ideas and institutions of the modern, liberal democratic state. The same is true of traditional societies, which contain some people who would like to see their countries discard those traditional elements that prevent them from entering the modern world and escaping poverty. Switzerland and Nigeria were chosen as examples of modern and traditional states, but many other countries could have been chosen. Switzerland is rather extreme in its use of direct democracy, but other rich countries are also committed to the principles of the modern, progressive state. These include investing in scientific and technological progress, educating their populations, and protecting democratic freedoms and political institutions. Kenya is another example of a traditional society with great, unrealized potential for economic growth. It has access to the sea, natural resources, and some of the most spectacular wildlife preserves in Africa. However, it, like Nigeria, has let its population grow at a rate that negates whatever
III. What is Liberal Democracy?
13
economic progress it makes (population in 1900, 1 million; 1963, 8 million; 2007, 35 million). Kenya’s politics, like that of Nigeria, have been plagued by tribal rivalries. When Kenyans vote, they do not choose the candidates who would be best for Kenya, but rather they vote along tribal lines. Whichever tribe wins the presidency prospers through graft and corruption at the expense of the losers. This aspect of Kenyan politics was vividly illustrated following the December 27, 2007, presidential election. Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, had been widely expected to lose to Raila Odinga, whose main support comes from the Luo and Kalenjin. Kibaki claimed to have won the election; Odinga challenged this claim. Anticipating serious consequences for themselves, the supporters of each turned upon one another, which led to hundreds of deaths and thousands of displaced persons. Although Kenya has been more of a dictatorship than a democracy since its independence in 1963, this election result illustrates that the absence of an educated electorate, which understands that democracy only works when it benefits all citizens, makes it unlikely that the country would achieve much better outcomes with less corrupt and authoritarian leaders.18 Similar examples exist in other parts of the world (Sri Lanka, Nicaragua) as well.
III. What is Liberal Democracy? Democracy is a political system in which a nontrivial portion of a community participates in a process that determines what the government does. Their participation may directly determine the collective choices of the community, as in ancient Athens or some modern-day Swiss Gemeinden, or indirectly through the election of representatives. The key criterion is that there is a link between what the citizens want and what they get from the state. In a liberal democracy, citizens not only participate in a democratic process, but they also enjoy great freedom to think and do as they please. This freedom is protected by a set of constitutional rights enforced by the judiciary. Thus, liberal democracy requires two sets of institutions: voting rules and electoral laws that enable the state to provide goods and services that benefit the citizens, and constitutional rights and a judiciary that protect certain individual freedoms from the state. Democracy and liberalism can both be defined over a continuum. It is obvious that eighteenth-century tsarist Russia was not a democracy, and fifth-century BCE Athens was, but between these two extremes there exists a 18
See discussion in Economist, June 9, 2007.
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Liberal Democracy
vast array of institutional structures that are more or less responsive to citizen preferences and good at satisfying their wants. Russia today is less democratic than Switzerland, but more democratic than it was in the eighteenth century. Americans enjoy greater free speech rights than Germans, although both countries fall into the category of liberal democracies. My definition of democracy requires that a portion of the community participate in the political process, but that leaves open how large that portion must be other than excluding rule by a single person or a handful of persons. It is customary today when defining democracy to impose the criterion that a large fraction – ideally all – of the adult population in a community have the right to vote.19 Using this criterion, some scholars reject the idea that Ancient Athens was a democracy, because it contained large numbers of foreign-born adults who were not citizens and therefore not eligible to participate in politics. Women and slaves were also excluded.20 Slavery existed in most parts of the world well into the nineteenth century, however, and in some parts into the twentieth century. Although it seems obvious today that slavery was an objectionable institution, it was not so obvious to people in the past. Even a rather intelligent and not morally depraved person like Aristotle could believe that some people were destined to be slaves by their very nature. St. Augustine thought that it was God’s punishment for sin. If democracy requires the absence of slavery and universal suffrage of both men and women, then democracy did not exist anywhere prior to the twentieth century. Certainly it did not exist in the United States at its founding, because slavery existed in the South and women could not vote anywhere. Using full universal suffrage as a criterion for democracy transforms George Washington from being the first elected president of one of the world’s first democratic republics into just another retired general at the head of an oligarchy. I find this definition far too narrow, and prefer to think of suffrage as one aspect of democracy, but not a defining criterion. Indeed, an important issue facing a democratic community is how to define citizenship so that its democratic institutions produce desirable outcomes. Thus, the focus of this book is not solely on the nature of political institutions in a liberal democracy but also on the characteristics of the participants in the political process. How well a set of democratic institutions does in producing outcomes that match the preferences of the community and advance their welfare depends on the nature of these preferences and how they are expressed. Emphasis on the quality of citizens is not new to discussions of democracy, although it has largely fallen out of vogue recently. 19 20
Dahl (1998, pp. 37–8) and Tilly (2007, pp. 7–11). Tilly (2007, pp. 26–9).
IV. Citizenship and Liberal Democracy
15
It is sufficiently important to the arguments of this book that we briefly discuss the issue in the next section, and devote a chapter to it later.
IV. Citizenship and Liberal Democracy The salient physical characteristic separating humans from other animals is the size of their brains. The salient behavioral characteristic separating humans from other animals is our capacity for reasoning. Human evolution consists of the continual development of this capacity. This development was greatly advanced by the invention of language and later of writing. Throughout much of human history following the invention of writing, the ability to read and write was confined to small minorities – elites who typically governed in a more or less authoritarian manner. Democracy – rule by the citizens – only became possible when the capability to read, write, and reason became widespread in the community. In the fields of political science and public choice, it is often assumed that citizens are rational actors when modeling political institutions. What is less often stressed is that a normative justification for democratic political institutions requires that citizens act rationally and responsibly when carrying out their civic duties. The Ancient Greeks exposed the great potential of the human mind most vividly. The accomplishments of a small band of thinkers to the fields of philosophy, science, mathematics, medicine, drama, and art are nothing short of astonishing. And, of course, they gave the world the first set of effective democratic institutions. The simultaneous appearance of a passion for logical thinking and democracy in a society was no accident. If the Athenians had been incapable of governing themselves in a way that benefited the entire community, Athenian democracy could not have survived as long as it did. Important to the success of Athenian democracy were the existence of a shared identity and a shared set of goals. In the absence of such common interests, democracy (or any other form of government for that matter) cannot advance the interests of the entire community. The success of the Athenian democracy was also because of – to use Aristotle’s language – a virtuous citizenry. The Athenian citizen needed to commit himself to fulfilling the responsibilities of citizenship – participation in the Assembly, holding office when called upon, going to war when necessary. For Aristotle, the virtues of “the good citizen [were to] know how to govern like a freeman, and how to obey like a freeman.”21 21
Aristotle, Politics, Book III, Sec. 4; McKeon (1941, p. 1182).
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Tocqueville also recognized the importance of citizen virtue for the success of the American experiment in democracy. He claimed that: American moralists do not profess that men ought to sacrifice themselves for their fellow creatures because it is noble to make such sacrifices, but they boldly aver that such sacrifices are as necessary to him who imposes them upon himself as to him for whose sake they are made . . . They therefore do not deny that every man may follow his own interest, but they endeavor to prove that it is the interest of every man to be virtuous. (de Tocqueville, [1840]1945, pp. 129–30, emphasis in the original)
Elsewhere, when describing public spirit in the United States, de Tocqueville first describes a “kind of patriotism” that takes the form of an “instinctive passion.” He then goes on to discuss: . . . another species of attachment to country which is more rational than the one I have been describing. It is perhaps less generous and less ardent, but it is more fruitful and more lasting: it springs from knowledge; it is nurtured by the laws; it grows by the exercise of civil rights; and, in the end, it is confounded with the personal interests of the citizen. A man comprehends the influence which the wellbeing of his country has upon his own; he is aware that the laws permit him to contribute to that prosperity, and he labors to promote it, first because it benefits him, and secondly because it is in part his own work.22
Thus, de Tocqueville saw the success of America’s early experiment with democracy resting in part on a sense of public spirit among its citizens that led them to realize that their personal prosperity was tied to that of their community. When they as citizens acted to promote the welfare of the community, they also promoted their own welfare. A similar sense of public spirit was essential to the success of Athenian democracy, and the Venetian Republic as discussed later. It has also been an important contributor to the success of democracy in Switzerland. An educated and intelligent electorate with common interests, a shared identity, and a commitment to the community have all been elements in successful democracies. When these elements are missing, democracy has generally been unsuccessful. Tribal and religious differences in Nigeria and Kenya have precluded the development of a sense of identity to the country, a common set of interests, and a willingness among the citizenry to see these common interests advanced. The consequence has been a history of rent seeking and internal strife. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, it would have seemed that the Iraqi people shared an interest in bringing peace and prosperity to their country and an interest in sharing the country’s enormous oil wealth for the good of 22
Tocqueville ([1835]1945, p. 251). See also de Tocqueville ([1840]1945, pp. 150–1).
V. Threats to Liberal Democracy
17
all. Sensing these common interests, the Iraqis would have voted for the most capable and honest leaders who would introduce the policies necessary for achieving these common goals. However, the Iraqi peoples did not vote this way. Instead, they voted along ethnic and religious lines, and rent seeking and internal strife have been the fate of this country ever since. Although the United States partly is to blame for the violence following Hussein’s deposing, the makeup of the elected government would have led to factional conflicts without the United States’ help. Voting along religious lines has also contributed to the violent history of Lebanon’s democracy, despite its having a reasonably well-educated and religiously tolerant population. Conventional wisdom claims that full-fledged democracy requires universal suffrage. Denying people the privilege of voting because they are uninformed about public issues or illiterate is regarded as undemocratic. However, people who are uninformed about political issues or illiterate are more vulnerable to believing the outlandish promises of populist politicians. The combination of high illiteracy rates and extreme income differences in Latin America helps to explain the periodic elections of demagogues like Juan Peron and Hugo Chavez. It also helps explain why democracy has been less stable in Latin America than in Canada or Australia, for example, over the last fifty years, and why democracy has been less successful in advancing the collective interests of Latin Americans when it has existed. One of the issues that has troubled observers of politics from Plato and Aristotle to William Galston (1991) and Eamonn Callan (1997) is the extent to which democracy must be tempered with aristocracy for it to function properly. In this context, aristocracy can be thought of in two senses: (1) the citizen body elects a political elite (an elite with more expertise and intelligence than the body of citizens) to govern for them, or (2) that only an elite subset of the citizens (those with more education or loyalty to the state, for example) forms the electorate. Most democracies today are of the first type. We shall argue that there are advantages to having the second form of democratic aristocracy in some cases.
V. Threats to Liberal Democracy A. Threats to Liberalism I use the term liberalism in the sense that John Stuart Mill ([1859]1939) used it – the liberty to do, think, and say what one wants so long as the exercise of such a liberty does not cause undue harm to others. The latter qualification is necessary to distinguish actions that cause significant harm – like
18
Liberal Democracy
running over someone with an automobile – from those that cause modest harm, such as brushing against someone as one exits a bus. Until recently, most restrictions on liberty have been justified in cases in which the harm to others from an action was physical. Free speech can be curtailed if it incites others to riot, or even to a panicked exit from a crowded theater. More recently, however, basic freedoms have come under attack when their exercise is perceived to cause psychological harm. Someone contemplates the suffering of a cow when it is slaughtered, and demands that the practice be stopped. A comedian tells an ethnic joke and is sued by members of the ethnic group who claim grave psychological pain upon hearing the joke. Although it is fairly easy to determine whether or not someone has been physically harmed, psychological suffering is difficult to measure. The increasing tendency to invoke psychological harms to curb the exercise of traditional freedoms constitutes one of the greatest threats to liberalism today. These threats come from all corners of society, from intellectuals on the left to religious fanatics on the right. A remarkable example of the former was the pressure exerted by the Harvard faculty to remove the president of the university a few years ago, because he had dared to speculate that the under-representation of women in the natural sciences might be caused by genetically determined differences in brain structures between men and women. An equally remarkable example of an attack on liberalism – this time coming from the Religious Right – was the widespread rioting that occurred following the publication of cartoons featuring the Prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper. Both the Harvard professors who voted to oust their president and the Muslims who rioted and killed in anger over the cartoons agreed that there are some questions that cannot be posed and things that cannot be said simply because others find them upsetting. The rise of liberalism in the nineteenth century built on Enlightenment thinking of the eighteenth century, which was stimulated by the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century. The Scientific Revolution was driven by the willingness of people like Galileo and Newton to question the conventional wisdom of their day. During the Enlightenment every dogma and institution could be questioned, from the divine right of kings to the authority of the Church. Even God’s existence was questioned. Many people were offended by the impertinence of Enlightenment thinkers to question the authority of the state and Church, to challenge the institution of slavery, and to advocate equal rights for women. Yet it was through these questions and challenges that our liberal democratic institutions arose. Once we
V. Threats to Liberal Democracy
19
begin to forbid the asking of certain questions and other acts of free speech because they offend some groups, we risk repudiating the very principles on which a liberal democracy must rest.
B. Threats to Democracy Tocqueville placed great importance on the role that New England town meetings played in America’s democratic system, and how participation in these meetings developed the knowledge and virtue needed for good citizenship. . . . municipal institutions constitute the strength of free nations. Town meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they bring it within the people’s reach, they teach men how to use and how to enjoy it. A nation may establish a free government, but without municipal institutions it cannot have the spirit of liberty. (de Tocqueville, [1835]1945, p. 63)
During the nineteenth century, most of the state’s activity that was important to Americans was decided at the local level. Even as late as 1929, total federal expenditures accounted for only 3 percent of national income, and barely 40 percent of state and local expenditures. Today, the relative sizes of the federal and state and local sectors are reversed.23 This shifting of economic activity from state and local levels to the federal level has reduced the ability of citizens to control their government. Moreover, it has shifted the work of government from the most trusted level – the local level – to the least trusted level.24 With the notable exception of Switzerland, things are worse in Europe. Here local governments typically have little taxation and expenditure authority. Although former House Majority Leader Tip O’Neill’s remark that “all politics is local” was an exaggeration, it certainly applies more to the United States than to most European countries. In Europe, it is more accurate to say that “all politics is national,” and increasingly multinational as the European Union (EU) takes on more responsibilities from its members. The result is a so-called democratic deficit at both the EU and the member states’ levels. The danger of this happening was recognized by the perceptive de Tocqueville. Although he saw the basic equality of the early colonists in America 23 24
See Economic Report of the President, 1985, tables B-1 and B-82, and 2007 table B-82. See Matsusaka (2004, ch. 6).
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Liberal Democracy
as an important contributor to the development of democracy,25 he also believed: . . . that it is easier to establish an absolute and despotic government among a people in which the conditions of society are equal than among any other; and I think that if such a government were once established among such a people, it not only would oppress men, but would eventually strip each of them of several of the highest qualities of humanity. Despotism, therefore, appears to me peculiarly to be dreaded in democratic times. I should have loved freedom, I believe, at all times, but in the time in which we live I am ready to worship it. (de Tocqueville, [1840]1945, p. 340)
It is worth quoting de Tocqueville’s description and analysis of democratic despotism at length. The first thing that strikes the observation is an innumerable multitude of men, all equal and alike, incessantly endeavoring to procure the petty and paltry pleasures with which they glut their lives. Each of them, living apart, is as a stranger to the fate of all the rest; his children and his private friends constitute to him the whole of mankind. As for the rest of his fellow citizens, he is close to them, but does not see them; he touches them, but he does not feel them; he exists only in himself and for himself alone; and if his kindred still remain to him, he may be said at any rate to have lost his country. Above this race of men stands an immense and tutelary power, which takes upon itself alone to secure their gratifications and to watch over their fate. That power is absolute, minute, regular, provident, and mild. It would be like the authority of a parent if, like that authority, its object was to prepare men for manhood; but it seeks, on the contrary, to keep them in perpetual childhood: it is well content that the people should rejoice, provided they think of nothing but rejoicing. For their happiness such a government willingly labors, but it chooses to be the sole agent and the only arbiter of that happiness; it provides for their security, foresees and supplies their necessities, facilitates their pleasures, manages their principal concerns, directs their industry, regulates the descent of property, and subdivides their inheritances: what remains, but to spare them all the care of thinking and all the trouble of living? Thus it every day renders the exercise of the free agency of man less useful and less frequent; it circumscribes the will within a narrower range and gradually robs a man of all the uses of himself. The principle of equality has prepared men for these things; it has predisposed men to endure them and often to look on them as benefits. After having thus successively taken each member of the community in its powerful grasp and fashioned him at will, the supreme power then extends its arm over the whole community. It covers the surface of society with a network of small complicated rules, minute and uniform, through which the most original minds and the most energetic characters cannot penetrate, to rise above the crowd. The will of man is not shattered, but softened, bent, and guided; men are seldom forced by it to act, but they are constantly restrained from acting. Such a power does not destroy, but it 25
Tocqueville ([1835]1945, vol. 1, pp. 48–56).
V. Threats to Liberal Democracy
21
prevents existence; it does not tyrannize, but it compresses, enervates, extinguishes, and stupefies a people, till each nation is reduced to nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the shepherd. Our contemporaries are constantly excited by two conflicting passions: they want to be led, and they wish to remain free. As they cannot destroy either the one or the other of these contrary propensities, they strive to satisfy them both at once. They devise a sole, tutelary, and all-powerful form of government, but elected by the people. They combine the principle of centralization and that of popular sovereignty; this gives them a respite: they console themselves for being in tutelage by the reflection that they have chosen their own guardians. Every man allows himself to be put in leading-strings, because he sees that it is not a person or a class of persons, but the people at large who hold the end of his chain. By this system the people shake off their state of dependence just long enough to select their master and then relapse into it again. A great many persons at the present day are quite contented with this sort of compromise between administrative despotism and the sovereignty of the people; and they think they have done enough for the protection of individual freedom when they have surrendered it to the power of the nation at large. (de Tocqueville, [1840]1945, pp. 336–8)
What European can disagree that his or her government treats him or her like a child when it comes to deciding whether to smoke, what to drink or eat, the content of television commercials, and in countless other ways? The extent to which democratic despotism exists in Europe was dramatically revealed by the chain of events surrounding the writing and adoption of a constitution for the European Union. The delegates to the drafting convention were selected by the political elites in each member state and in Brussels. Few citizens even knew the names of their delegates, and few followed the deliberations of the convention. The document the convention produced ran to an unwieldy 350 pages and obviously was not intended to be something that the average EU citizen would ever read, let alone understand and identify with. Despite the fact that citizens had little if any input into its drafting, most member-state governments also decided not to involve their citizens in the constitution’s ratification. In de Tocqueville’s words, they chose “to spare them all the care of thinking” about the constitution. However, the political leaders of France and the Netherlands made the mistake of asking their citizens to ratify the constitution. When they refused to do so, the EU’s political elite was temporarily put into a self-defined crisis. The EU locomotive was in danger of derailment. EU leaders had essentially three options: (1) scrap the constitution and forge ahead with the existing rules from previous treaties, (2) undertake a major redrafting of the constitution and create a much shorter and easier-to-understand document that would be approved by EU citizens, or (3) make modest alterations to the constitution, rename it a
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treaty, and adopt it without placing it before EU citizens. Naturally, EU leaders chose the third option. Ironically, one of the draft constitution’s major weaknesses – its length and complexity – now became a virtue. As Giuliano Amato, a vice-chairman of the constitutional convention, put it, “Look, you see, it’s absolutely unreadable, it’s a typical Brussels treaty, nothing new, no need for a referendum.”26 One can be sure that the EU’s political elite will never again ask its children citizens to think about something as important as a constitution for the European Union. The European Union is an extreme form of the democratic despotism that de Tocqueville feared. “The network of small complicated rules, minute and uniform” flowing out of Brussels is woven by a body of unelected commissioners. The most powerful voting body in the EU is the Council in which member states are represented. However, the election of its delegates is based on their positions and records on national issues, not on the basis of policy proposals at the EU level. Few EU policy issues ever figure in national elections; no EU policy issue has ever been the subject of simultaneous political debate across the whole EU. The ratification of the constitution was a golden opportunity to hold such a debate, but most member-state governments chose not to take such a risk. Despite the constitutional convention having been convened with the intent of closing “the democratic deficit” in the EU, the procedure by which it was written, its rejection by citizens of two founding member countries, and the subsequent sleight of hand to implement the constitution/treaty without the approval of EU citizens has produced an even wider and more apparent democratic deficit than ever before.27 When citizens do not exercise their civic obligations responsibly, democratic despotism may slide into undemocratic despotism. Here again, de Tocqueville exhibited an almost uncanny ability to predict the future. There is indeed, a most dangerous passage in the history of a democratic people. When the taste for physical gratifications among them has grown more rapidly than their education and their experience of free institutions, the time will come when men are carried away and lose all self-restraint at the sight of the new possessions they are about to obtain. . . . As the citizens who labor do not care to attend to public affairs, and as the class which might devote its leisure to these duties has ceased to exist, the place of the government is, as it were, unfilled. If at that critical moment some able and ambitious man grasps the supreme power, he will find the road to every kind of usurpation open before him. If he attends for some time only to the material prosperity of the country, 26 27
Economist, August 11, 2007. Ireland has rejected the treaty in a referendum, so it still might not take effect, although many politicians from other countries would prefer having the treaty and kicking Ireland out of the European Union to not having it.
VI. A Clash Between What and What?
23
no more will be demanded of him. Above all, he must ensure public tranquillity: men who are possessed by the passion for physical gratification generally find out that the turmoil of freedom disturbs their welfare before they discover how freedom itself serves to promote it. If the slightest rumor of public commotion intrudes into the petty pleasures of private life, they are aroused and alarmed by it. The fear of anarchy perpetually haunts them, and they are always ready to fling away their freedom at the first disturbance. (de Tocqueville, [1840]1945, pp. 336–8)
This passage recollects Germany in the early 1930s, where citizens watched their constitution be violated and democracy destroyed, but accepted these developments in exchange for improving economic conditions. It makes one think of Putin in Russia and Chavez in Venezuela, who both remained immensely popular despite their attacks on democracy, because of the relative economic stability and prosperity that rising energy prices brought to their countries. In addition, it also brings to mind that “ambitious man,” George W. Bush, who seized the “critical moment” following September 11, 2001, to greatly expand the powers of the presidency and limit the freedoms of U.S. citizens, but did not pay a political price, because a majority of Americans thought that they were trading their freedoms for security against terrorism. Democracy means rule by the people, and the quality of a democracy depends on the quality of its citizens – their knowledge of public issues, their willingness to participate actively in the political process and, if need be, to risk their lives and freedom to defend its institutions. Occasionally casting ballots is not enough.
VI. A Clash Between What and What? Several recent books have themes related to this book. Perhaps the most influential, and certainly the most discussed, is Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations (1996). Huntington sees conflict between Western countries with their liberal democratic institutions and scientific orientation and several competing and often hostile civilizations – Orthodox Christian, Latin American, traditionalist (Sub-Saharan Africa), Hindu, Sinic (countries with large Chinese populations like Taiwan and Singapore, or those influenced by its culture like Korea and Vietnam), Japan, and Buddhist countries. The greatest threat to Western countries and civilization is perceived to come from the Sinic culture, especially China with its rapid economic growth and growing political influence, and the Muslim countries. Anthony Pagden (2008) reduces the conflict to a struggle between the West and the East, a struggle dating back to Athens’ wars with the Persians. Pagden describes how the West was able to shed its superstitions and
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irrational beliefs and emerge as the highly science-oriented, liberal democracies that exist today, whereas countries in the East have failed to join the Scientific Revolution and continue to be despotisms in the mold of ancient Persia, entrapped by their superstitious beliefs. Although there is much in common between these two theses and the arguments in this book, I emphasize the clash between modernism or progressivism and traditionalism. This conflict is not only a cross-border battle between the United States, Europe, and a few more Western countries on one side, and China or Iran and their fellow Eastern despotisms on the other. The conflict is also taking place within both the West and the East. In virtually every country, modernists can be found who champion scientific progress and liberal, democratic values. Opposed to modernity are traditionalists whose beliefs and values are shaped by religion. In some countries, like the United States, the traditionalists are extremist Christians; in others, extremist Muslims, Hindus, Jews, or Buddhists. In many African countries, the traditionalists are a mixture of followers of local religions and customs, like voodooism, Christianity, and Islam. Thus, the clash between modernity and traditionalism is much more pervasive than some recent studies might lead one to believe, and thus more troubling. Although traditionalism can encompass many beliefs that are not religious, religion is typically a central component of any traditionalist society. Religion is thus an obstacle to progressivism and modernity. The rise of religious extremism in recent years has brought forth several books attacking religious thinking, most notably perhaps, Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion (2006), and Christopher Hitchens’ God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything (2007). These books focus on the nonscientific aspects of religion, and thus its opposition to modernity and progress in the form of scientific progress. While I too am critical of this aspect of religion, my focus is much more on how religion, in its extremist form, poses a threat to liberal democracy. Among the recent books dealing with religion, John Gray’s Black Mass (2007) is probably closest to this book in subject matter, but in many ways is its antithesis. Where I emphasize the importance of Enlightenment thinking in paving the way for liberal democracy in Europe, North America, and other former British colonies, Gray blames the Enlightenment for communism and Nazism.28 According to Gray, “the Enlightenment project [was to remake] society on an ideal model.”29 Liberal democracy in Gray’s hands 28 29
See especially Gray (2007, ch. 2). Gray (2007, p. 33).
VII. Plan of the Book
25
becomes a utopian dream propagated by Enlightenment thinkers. This misreads several important aspects of history. First, as discussed in Chapter 8, it is misleading to speak of an Enlightenment project because Enlightenment thinkers differed greatly in their ideas about reforms. Second, if European Enlightenment thinkers had a project at all, it was to enlighten European monarchs, not to introduce democracy. The most notable European advocate of democracy during the eighteenth century was Rousseau, but he opposed the Enlightenment and is better regarded as an early Romantic. It was American Enlightenment thinkers – Jefferson, Madison, Franklin, and so on – who forged the link between Enlightenment ideas and democracy. However, they were far from being utopians. Indeed, they were well aware of the human weaknesses upon which Gray places so much weight. The whole purpose of the famous checks-and-balance elements in the U.S. Constitution is to protect its democratic institutions from these human weaknesses. Switzerland is not utopia, but it is a nice place to live. However, it did not become a nice place by chance. The origins of its democratic institutions stretch back seven centuries to the communes in its mountain valleys. Its constitution dates back to the 1848 Revolution, and reflects Enlightenment thinking in both Europe and the United States. The success and durability of Swiss democracy owes much to its citizens’ commitment to the constitution and to the Enlightenment ideas it embodies. One of the points stressed in this book is that such citizen commitment is essential for liberal democracy to appear and survive. I agree with Gray that the West should not try to force liberal democracy on the rest of the world as the Bush administration attempted to do in the Middle East. Liberal democracy (indeed any form of democracy) may be impossible in Nigeria because of the ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity of its population. Theocracy may be better suited than liberal democracy to a highly religious country like Iran. China has achieved spectacular growth without democracy. What one can say is that far more people from around the world try to enter – sometimes at great peril – Switzerland, Sweden, the United States, and the other liberal democracies than are fleeing from them to Iran, China, and other countries, which are not liberal democracies. When people vote with their feet, they vote for liberal democracy. This is not a utopian dream, but a statement of fact.
VII. Plan of the Book This book is divided into four parts. Good democratic outcomes require citizens who are intelligent, well informed, and willing to sacrifice some time
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and effort to make democracy work. Given the importance of this condition, Chapter 2 discusses the extent to which humans can be regarded as reasoning beings, and delves into psychology and especially evolutionary psychology to answer this question. Although humans are not the superrational calculating machines that most economists and some other social scientists assume they are, they are capable of behaving rationally, as such behavior is commonly understood. Indeed, the development of the faculty of reasoning is the great, evolutionary achievement of mankind. The power of reasoning is most vividly displayed in the sciences, both natural and social. Human understanding of natural and social phenomena has expanded over time through the formulation and testing of hypotheses about causal relationships and through the application of scientific method to all forms of questions. Science provides one way to understand nature and the universe; religion provides another. Chapter 3 discusses the similarities and differences between science and religion as explanations for natural phenomena. It is these differences that lie at the heart of the distinction between progressivism and traditionalism. Today’s leading scientific theory may be discarded tomorrow, because new evidence contradicts it. New evidence can never contradict “the word of God” as it appears in a religion’s holy book. This distinction constitutes a fundamental difference between modern, progressive societies and traditional ones. Chapters 2 and 3 constitute Part One and form the building blocks for the rest of the book. The book emphasizes the link between human capability to reason and the appearance of both modernism and its political correlate liberal democracy. Part Two provides a selective overview of history from the first appearance of the state in Sumer (Chapter 4) to the first democratic state in Ancient Greece (Chapter 5) to the Caliphate in the Middle East (Chapter 6) and on to the Renaissance and Enlightenment (Chapters 7 and 8). Chapter 9 extends the narrative into the twentieth century. Democracy’s first appearance in Ancient Greece and its reappearance in the Renaissance and Enlightenment were not mere coincidences. Ancient Greece was arguably the world’s first modern state. It shared with the Renaissance a focus on improving and understanding life on this earth rather than focusing on an afterlife, and with the Enlightenment, a great trust and optimism about the human power of reasoning. Throughout history, traditional societies have typically been dictatorships; democracies have had important elements of modernity. Having explored where democracy came from and where it has flourished, we are ready to describe the characteristics of political institutions that are needed to obtain a well-functioning democracy. This is the task of Part Three. Chapter 10 discusses the characteristics of the democratic
VIII. A Caveat
27
institutions that are needed to ensure they serve the goal of advancing the welfare of the citizenry. Given the importance of the majority rule in all modern political systems, it is discussed at length. Chapter 11 defines constitutional rights, describes their characteristics, and discusses their role in a liberal democracy. It then contrasts this notion of constitutional rights with other rights concepts like natural, human, cosmopolitan, and moral rights. Good democracy requires good citizens – good in the sense of being intelligent enough to make wise decisions for the community and conscientious enough to gather sufficient information to make wise choices. No matter how well designed a country’s democratic institutions are, they will not yield desirable outcomes if citizens do not vote intelligently and responsibly. Chapter 12 explores the implication of this observation for the criteria defining citizenship and for the design of their education. Here we confront a tension between the idea that liberalism implies a freedom to educate one’s children as one pleases, and the relationship between the quality and type of education citizens have and the quality of the outcomes of the democratic process. A community that wants its democratic institutions to produce desirable outcomes cannot be indifferent to how its citizens are chosen and educated. The question of choosing a community’s members arises most prominently with regard to immigration policies, and thus these also warrant discussion in Chapter 12. Part Four returns to the issues raised in this chapter and discusses the challenges facing liberal democracy today. Why have so many countries not adopted it? Why has it often failed in developing countries? Why are so many people disenchanted with democracy in the rich, developed countries? Just as traditionalism is the opposite of progressivism, religion is the antithesis of science in a fundamental sense, and theocracy the antithesis of liberal democracy. More generally, a basic tension exists between religion in its more extreme forms and liberal democracy. This tension is described in Chapter 13. The final chapter summarizes the argument for why liberal democracy can fail and reviews the challenges facing it today. To meet these challenges, it argues that developed democracies should complete the Enlightenment’s program of reforms. Developing countries need to adopt it.
VIII. A Caveat I am neither a psychologist nor an historian. Nevertheless, I have placed the questions of progressivism, reasoning, and democracy in a historical
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Liberal Democracy
context, and thus delved into these enormous literatures. In doing so, I hope to have given accurate, if selective, accounts of what is known about each subject. I have quoted directly from my sources to a far greater extent than I usually do, to impress upon the reader that I am reporting the views about the Renaissance or Pope Pius XII of those who have devoted great amounts of time to each subject, and who, based on my limited knowledge of the topic, seem to have the weight of evidence on their side. Some topics – like the pope’s behavior during World War II – are so controversial even today that I am sure that there will be those who violently disagree with me. All I can say in defense is that a reasonable case can be made for the interpretations I present throughout this book.
PART I
FUNDAMENTALS: EVOLUTION, PSYCHOLOGY, REASONING, AND RELIGION
TWO
Evolution, Psychology, and Reason
. . . it is the understanding that sets man above the rest of sensible beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion which he has over them . . . (John Locke)1 How so many absurd rules of conduct, as well as so many absurd religious beliefs, have originated, we do not know; nor how it is that they have become, in all quarters of the world, so deeply impressed on the minds of men; but it is worthy of remark that a belief constantly inculcated during the early years of life, while the brain is impressionable, appears to acquire almost the nature of an instinct; and the very essence of an instinct is that it is followed independently of reason. Charles Darwin2
This book traces the evolution of a human’s power to reason, and the link between this power and the potential for organizing societies as democracies. It is common today in economics and other branches of the social sciences to assume that individuals are rational actors. Like many assumptions made to simplify scientific modeling, the assumption of individual rationality is only partially accurate. Human psychology is far more complex than rational actor models presume. We begin, therefore, by examining human psychology.
I. Behavioral Psychology Perhaps the simplest of all models of human psychology is that of behavioral psychology or operant behaviorism.3 Operant behaviorism provides a theory of learning that is quite similar to the selfish gene account of natural 1 2 3
Locke (1690a, p. 244); emphasis in original. Darwin (1874, p. 122). Operant behaviorism is the term used to describe the branch of psychology launched by B. F. Skinner. See, Catania and Harnad (1988).
31
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selection. The theory of natural selection assumes that nature randomly distributes genes across individuals. Those genes that increase fitness and reproductive success are selected over those that do not. Operant behaviorism assumes that individuals randomly undertake actions. Actions followed by rewards increase in frequency; actions followed by punishments decline in frequency. In the one case, the environment selects for genes; in the other, for actions. Operant behaviorism takes the assumption of narrow self-interest, which underlies most of economics, to the extreme. Individuals are pure hedonists seeking rewards and avoiding pains. In this regard, behavioral psychology’s premises are quite compatible with those underlying not only rational actor models but also the philosophies of Hobbes and Bentham. Operant conditioning – rewarding certain actions and punishing others – has been used in laboratories to train rats to push levers, pigeons to peck buttons, and thousands of other animal tricks. The kind of behavior that can be conditioned is partly constrained by our genetic makeup. Pecking comes naturally to pigeons and chickens so they can be conditioned to peck a red button to get seeds or water, but they cannot be trained to push a lever like rats can. Operant conditioning is used in the home to get Rover to sit and fetch the ball, and to get Junior to eat his soup with a spoon and his peas with a fork. We are all creatures of habit committing many actions each day, like smiling and saying hello almost unconsciously to people we meet, because such actions have been rewarded in the past. Operant conditioning relies on a rather primitive cause-and-effect association that animals and people make, often unconsciously. Action A is followed by reward R, and the individual associates the action with the reward and repeats the action. When action A does cause reward R, this behavior is functional and thus accords with what we would expect a rational person to do. Thus, well-conditioned individuals might behave as if they were consciously choosing actions to maximize an objective or utility function, even when they were unconsciously making a conditioned response to stimuli. The well-conditioned consumer buys more of a good at a lower price, because she has been rewarded for such actions in the past. Rats in the laboratory behave as if they were maximizing a utility function that includes water. Rats, like humans, have negative sloped demand curves. The more effort that a rat must expend to obtain a sip of water, the less water it consumes (Staddon, 1983). Correlation does not always imply causation, however, and some actions are followed by rewards that they did not bring about. This possibility explains why some habits are not functional or even harmful. A football
I. Behavioral Psychology
33
player unconsciously dons mismatched socks on a day when he scores three goals, and from then on, he consciously chooses to wear mismatched socks. Millions of people consult the horoscope sections of their newspapers everyday to see what the stars have in store for them. On any given day, some will experience the good fortune forecast for them in the morning paper. They will “thank their lucky stars,” and the habit of reading their horoscope will be reinforced and sustained. The pleasure a smoker experiences while smoking a cigarette maintains a habit, which in the long run, is deleterious to the health. The possibility that nonfunctional or even dysfunctional behavior can be conditioned was dramatically revealed in experiments by B. F. Skinner (1948). Pigeons were randomly rewarded with food pellets preceded by a click. Thus, if the pigeon happened to have lifted its left wing when the click occurred, lifting its left wing was reinforced. If it happened to have its right leg raised, then standing on its left leg was reinforced. Skinner was able to induce bizarre behavior in the pigeons by administering random rewards. Thus, operant behaviorism offers a plausible account for much of animal and human behavior. It assumes animals are creatures of habit with habits being formed by past rewards and punishments. Sharon purchases Coca-Cola at the supermarket without weighing carefully its price and the expected satisfaction she will get from it against other cola brands. She has been rewarded for buying Coke in the past by experiencing greater satisfaction from the drink than the money she paid for it. Coke is “her brand,” and she buys it essentially by habit. One of the conundrums for rational-actor models is the prisoners’ dilemma (PD). An example of a PD game is presented in Matrix 2.1. Two farmers live next to one another. If each attends to his own cornfields, the optimal combination of work effort and income from corn sales yields utility payoffs to each of ten (box 1). If farmer R, the row player, devotes some of his time to stealing from farmer C, however, he can obtain more corn than by devoting the same time to his own field. His utility rises to thirteen, assuming farmer C continues to devote the same effort to his field. Farmer C’s utility payoff falls to six, however, because he loses some of his corn to R (box 2). If C steals and R does not steal, the utility payoffs are reversed (box 3). When they both steal, each experiences a utility payoff of only seven (box 4). Thus, both are worse off if they steal; nevertheless, stealing is the dominant strategy for both farmers – each experiences a higher utility payoff if he steals independently of the strategy choice of the other farmer (thirteen instead of ten, seven instead of six). Thus, the prisoners’ dilemma leads to the paradoxical outcome that independently rational behavior produces
34
Evolution, Psychology, and Reason Matrix 2.1. A prisoner’s dilemma game Farmer C Does not steal
Farmer R
Does not steal Steals
Steals
1 10
3 10
6
6
7
2 13
13 4 7
a collective outcome that is worse for both parties than another feasible outcome. One example of a PD game is voluntary contributions to provide a public good. All members of the community would benefit from a new bridge, but if one tried to finance it by relying on users voluntarily tossing money into baskets at each end, everyone has an incentive to drive by and toss in nothing. Numerous experiments have been conducted to see in fact whether people do not contribute – free ride – in one-shot PD games.4 Each participant is given, $10 say, to contribute to the provision of a hypothetical public good. At the end of the game, each player receives half of 150 percent of the total contribution plus what she did not contribute. Thus, if both participants contribute the full $10, each receives $15. On the other hand, if one player contributed $10 and the other nothing, the free rider would receive $17.50. Thus, both should contribute nothing if they are rationally maximizing their payoffs, yet experiment after experiment has shown that while some people do contribute nothing, others contribute the full $10, and still others contribute something in between.5 Such everyday actions as voting or buying stocks and insurance often also seem to violate basic predictions of rational actor models. Operant behaviorism can explain why many people cooperate in PD situations. If people have been rewarded for cooperative behavior in the past – by their parents, teachers, or peers – cooperating by not stealing when an opportunity presents itself (by voting or contributing to charities) may occur because people do not carefully weigh the benefits and costs of 4 5
When a PD game is repeated indefinitely, cooperation can become an individually optimal strategy if it induces the other player to cooperate. See, surveys of experimental literature by Davis and Holt (1993), Roth (1995), Ledyard (1995), Ostrom and Walker (1997), and Hoffman (1997).
III. Evolutionary Psychology
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such actions. They cooperate out of habit. The most successful way to induce an opposing player to cooperate in a repeated PD appears to be to adopt the “tit-for-tat” strategy – reward cooperation in one period by cooperating in the next; punish noncooperation in one period by not cooperating in the next (Axelrod, 1984). The tit-for-tat strategy might have been developed in one of B. F. Skinner’s laboratories.
II. Cognitive Psychology Operant behaviorism does not explain all actions. When one confronts a grizzly bear in the woods, turning and running is generally not a good strategy for staying alive. Indeed, there is no sure strategy for accomplishing this end, but standing one’s ground and staring down the bear is more likely to get it to walk away than turning and running. Yet how would the first person who confronted a grizzly have known to stand his ground rather than run? Many actions that individuals undertake appear not to be because of past rewards for similar actions, but because of a reasoning process in which the actor foresees the consequences of the action. An individual will learn not to hold her hand in a fire the first time she does so. Yet how does she know to run or move her camp when she sees smoke from a distant brush fire? She deduces that the smoke is caused by a large fire, that the wind is blowing the fire in her direction, and that she had better move if she wishes to escape the flames. Humans appear capable of far more complex cognitive processes than presumed under the operant behavioral model.
III. Evolutionary Psychology The most dramatic difference between humans and other animals – even other primates – is the large size of the human brain. “The brain is a biological organ just like the pancreas, the liver, or any other specialized organ,”6 and like these other organs, it has evolved to serve specific functions. Its main function is to process information that could be used to help humans survive during the Pleistocene.7 It owes its size to the fact that during its evolution, it has added one functional capacity to another – the ability to see and recognize depth of field, the ability to sense danger (approaching a precipice, a snake), the ability to recognize faces, the ability 6 7
Ramachandran (1990, p. 24). Tooby and Cosmides (1992, p. 66).
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to imitate and learn from others, and numerous others.8 Thus, both its size and the way in which it functions are the products of natural selection. The two psychological processes discussed previously take place in different parts of the brain and are related to different stages of the brain’s evolutionary development. The striatem, near the brain’s core, and the brainstem are early developments in the brain’s evolution, and their basic structure is common to other animals. These portions of the brain are responsible for the conditioned responses that characterize operant behaviorism. Deliberative thought and abstract reasoning, on the other hand, appear to take place in the prefrontal cortex, the outer portion of the brain that developed late in the evolution of Homo sapiens.9
A. Understanding Causality An extremely important cognitive development was the ability to understand complex causal relationships and to generalize about them. The advantages for survival from understanding causality are obvious. The first person who stuck a stick into a cactus and obtained water must have been quite surprised. Piercing cacti to obtain water would be positively reinforced, and beneficial for survival. Yet so too would the capacity to generalize and deduce that if cacti contain liquids, so too probably other plants and trees, and that some of these might also be tapped and put to good use. This capacity to generalize is common to all humans and exists even in very young children. Once we see that one cactus contains water, we infer that all cacti contain water. We assume that the insides of all pigeons look the same, even though we do not have a good idea of how they actually look.10 Of particular importance is our ability to generalize about the behavior of animals and other humans. Once we are told that an aardvark is an animal, we know that it is alive and has offspring, even though we may not know whether it has its offspring by laying eggs or through live births. Moreover, the fact that it is an animal tells us that it is an intentional being. It will search for food, avoid danger, and mate as other animals do. When we observe animals, we unconsciously infer what they are thinking and what their motivation is. When we see a lion running toward a gazelle, we infer that it is hungry, and that it intends to kill and eat the gazelle. When we see 8 9 10
See, Tooby and Cosmides (1992, p. 113) and Pinker (1997, pp. 183–4, 193–4). See, Cohen (2005, pp. 8–10), and Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec (2005, pp. 15–23), and references therein. This discussion draws on Boyer (2001).
III. Evolutionary Psychology
37
the gazelle run away from the lion, we infer that it knows the lion is coming after it, and that it is in grave danger. Similar processes of inference occur in our dealings with other people. To get along in a tribal community, early humans had to infer the intentions of their fellow tribesmen, and predict their reactions to different actions. Will X get angry if I borrow his ax without asking him? Will he attack me? Will he attack me if I sleep with his mate? Will she tell him if I sleep with her? To help us answer these questions, our brains have evolved processes for predicting the behavior of other humans. Perhaps most important of all, is our ability to recognize faces. It is easier to predict the behavior of someone if we recognize that we have had past dealings with this person and can recall her past behavior. Humans are also adept at reading faces. Human facial expressions for anger, sorrow, surprise, and other emotions are similar in all human groups. A European can identify these emotions when seeing pictures of facial expressions of Amazon tribe members, just as the tribe members can identify emotions when looking at pictures of Europeans.11 Another great aid in our reasoning process is our ability to have decoupled or separate thoughts. We can imagine being somewhere else at another time, other people being with us, and even imagine being someone else.12 The ability to have decoupled thoughts allows us to make plans. I can imagine what will happen if I go hunting tomorrow on the other side of the river, what will happen if X goes with me, what X will do if we meet a pride of lions, what I should do. Again this reasoning process is greatly aided by my intuitive knowledge of lions as animals and X as a human, and if I know X well, by my person-specific knowledge of him.
B. Inducing Cooperation Cooperation in hunting large animals or fighting other tribes would obviously have increased our ancestors’ chances for success and survival. Activities such as hunting and fishing take on the form of a prisoners’ dilemma; my chances of survival increase if my tribe defeats the neighboring tribe in battle. However, they are even higher if I can somehow avoid having to participate in the battle. Cooperation among tribe members was so important for survival during the Pleistocene that we have inherited genetic dispositions to several modes of behavior that strengthen cooperation. Sometimes, 11 12
Pinker (1997, pp. 365–6, 414–16). Boyer (2001, ch. 3).
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Evolution, Psychology, and Reason
however, they may seem “irrational.”13 Here are two of these so-called irrational characteristics: 1. A propensity to cooperate. One explanation for the seemingly irrational propensity for people to cooperate in one-shot PD games is that the two players perceive that they are in a social situation in which cooperation benefits the group, and that they have a genetically inherited propensity to cooperate in such situations. Repetition of the game can condition a player not to cooperate, but an individual’s first instinctive reaction is to cooperate.14 Voting is another action that is seemingly irrational from an individual point of view. Many people say they vote out of a sense of civic duty or because it is ethically the “right thing to do.”15 Thus, voting may also be partly engendered by our genetic makeup. 2. A disposition to punish cheaters. One way to ensure cooperation in a group is to punish defectors severely. Here again, humans seem to have a genetic disposition to detect and punish defectors and to punish those who do not punish defectors. People in a long line to get tickets or exit a highway feel an instant sense of rage when someone cuts ahead of them. During the gasoline crisis of the 1970s in the United States, there were long lines to get gas, and some line cutters were even shot and killed by irate drivers further back in the line. Unfortunately, not all of the mental processes that aid survival on the African savanna have positive value in a twenty-first-century, postindustrial society. If a pickpocket takes your wallet and you detect it, an instinctive reaction is irate rage. Many people will give chase to the pickpocket and risk their lives from a heart attack or a knife wound, even though the financial loss from the theft is rather modest. “It’s not the money, but the principle of the thing” is often heard. Having one’s pocket picked or apartment burgled sets off a violent reaction in most people. They feel personally violated, and often react violently – they often overreact. 13 14
15
See, Dawkins ([1976]1989), Axelrod (1984), Trivers (1985), Tooby and Cosmides (1992), Pinker (1997, pp. 502–6), and Boyer (2001). See, again references in footnote 3. Paul Rubin (2002, ch. 3) reviews the evidence on the genetic causes for cooperation. Field (2001) reviews the evidence that cooperation and other behaviors that favor group survival are selected for at the group level. See, discussion and references in Mueller (2003, ch. 14).
III. Evolutionary Psychology
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For people living on the edge of survival, theft can be very costly. The loss of a bit of food may be the difference between life and death. Violent reactions to theft, to free riding, and to other forms of noncooperative people might well deter such behavior and increase survival chances. Such instinctive and uncontrollable reactions are likely to be genetically triggered.16
C. Group Loyalty A willingness to fight, kill, and if need be die for one’s tribe would have increased the probabilities of the tribe’s success in battle with other tribes and of the survival of its members. Loyalty to one’s own tribe and animosity toward other tribes is also genetically determined in part.17 Of course, before one can defend fellow tribe members one must be able to recognize who they are. This would have been easy fifty thousand years ago, but is less so in our polyglot societies of today. Race is an obvious clue, as are language and religion, and history is replete with social conflicts and wars over race, language, and religion. Yet even more subtle differences can lead to strife. Dividing boys at a summer camp into two groups for the purpose of sports and other activities can lead to animosity and violent confrontations between those who were arbitrarily assigned red jerseys and those assigned blue. Even separating people by a coin flip can lead to strong loyalties among “the heads.”18 During the Pleistocene, our ancestors lived in constant danger of death from predators or attacks from other tribes. Today, most people in developed countries do not face such dangers. In times of war, however, those chosen to fight are in the same kind of life-and-death situation as their Pleistocene ancestors. During a war, it is common for one side to view the other as inferior or subhuman in some way, and to refer to them using pejorative names – “gooks,” “Japs,” “krauts.” Some soldiers commit horrible atrocities during wars. Indeed, the same soldiers who undertake heroic acts to save their buddies may commit horrendous acts against the enemy. On March 16, 1968, for example, American soldiers in My Lai, Vietnam, opened fire on unarmed villagers and killed hundreds of men, women, and children. Similar atrocities, although on a lesser scale, have been reported during the war in Iraq. On such occasions, the offending troops appear “to go berserk.” Such behavior is easier to understand (although not excuse) if one recognizes 16 17 18
See Trivers (1971, 1985) and Pinker (1997, pp. 404–5). Pinker (1997, ch. 7, esp. pp. 513–17). See discussion and references in Pinker (1997, pp. 513–17).
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Evolution, Psychology, and Reason
that these soldiers have probably subconsciously come to believe that the people they are killing are inferior or subhuman to them in some sense. Numerous examples exist of people living peacefully together for many years and then some event divides them into separate groups, and they begin to hate and attack one another. One such event was the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 along religious lines into India and Pakistan. Until then, Hindus and Muslims had lived relatively peacefully together on the Indian subcontinent. The partition was, in part, a response to the wishes of Muslims like the poet and philosopher Mohammad Iqbal. He feared that Islam would not survive on the subcontinent once India became an independent nation if Hindus and Muslims continued to live together. There were just too many Hindus relative to Muslims. The partition succeeded in preserving Islam, but not without considerable cost. The mass migrations needed to separate the two religious communities were accompanied by much violence and murder with estimates of lives lost ranging to two million. The partition produced new senses of identity, which now combined religion and nationalism, and fostered suspicion and animosity between Indians and Pakistanis. The countries have gone to war several times since the partition, and occasional acts of terrorism continue to cost many lives. Both countries are now nuclear powers and view one another with a mixture of fear and hatred.19 Roger Peterson (2002) presents a series of case studies of ethnic violence in Eastern Europe. One involves Jews and Lithuanians. After World War I, Lithuania broke away from Russia, and Jews and Lithuanians at first worked together to establish an independent Lithuania. Gradually, however, the Lithuanians asserted themselves and the Jews became a lower status minority. In 1940, the Russians occupied Lithuania. During the occupation, the Russians placed several Jews in positions in the local government, and the Jews rose in status in both their own eyes and those of the Lithuanians. When the Russians withdrew June 1941, Lithuania was thrown into a state of anarchy for several days until the Germans arrived and established order. During this period, the Lithuanians launched a pogrom (Yiddish for destruction) against the Jews, making them do demeaning tasks like cleanup manure with their bare hands and then beating them to death. Although Jews and Lithuanians had lived together peacefully since the nineteenth century, suddenly a surge of ethnic violence by Lithuanians against the Jews broke out. Peterson (2002, pp. 95–116) attributes this outbreak to the rise in Jews’ status during the Russian occupation, which was greatly resented by Lithuanians. When 19
See the interesting account in Khan (2007).
III. Evolutionary Psychology
41
the opportunity arose to reverse the situation, the Lithuanians seized it. Resentment aroused by changes in status of different ethnic groups appears to have been a key element in most of the cases Peterson examined. The drive for status also has genetic roots.20 When rapid changes in status are combined with group loyalties, the results can be explosive. Most students of politics are familiar with James Madison’s discussion of the evils of “factions” in Federalist 10. Madison’s analysis was preceded, however, by David Hume. As much as legislators and founders of states ought to be honoured and respected among men, as much ought the founders of sects and factions to be detested and hated; because the influence of faction is directly contrary to that of laws. Factions subvert government, render laws impotent, and beget the fiercest animosities among men of the same nation, who ought to give mutual assistance and protection to each other. And what should render the founders of parties more odious is, the difficulty of extirpating these weeds, when once they have taken root in any state. (Hume, 1742, Part I, Essay VIII, “Of Parties in General”)21
Hume goes on to say that Factions may be divided into PERSONAL and REAL; that is, into factions, founded on personal friendship or animosity among such as compose the contending parties, and into those founded on some real difference of sentiment or interest. (Hume, 1742, Part I, Essay VIII, “Of Parties in General”)22
As examples of factions based on personal differences, Hume cited “the remarkable dissension between two [Roman] tribes, the POLLIA and PAPIRIA, which continued for the space of near three hundred years (p. 57),” and “the civil wars which arose some few years ago in MOROCCO, between the blacks and whites, merely on account of their complexion . . . ” (p. 59, emphasis in original). Anticipating experiments conducted more than two hundred years later, Hume noted, When men are once enlisted on opposite sides, they contract an affection to the persons with whom they are united, and an animosity against their antagonists: And these passions they often transmit to their prosperity. (Hume, 1742, Part I, Essay VIII, “Of Parties in General”)23 20 21 22 23
Pinker (1997, pp. 493–502). See, http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com staticxt&staticfile=show.php% 3Ftitle=704&chapter=137476&layout=html. See, http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com staticxt&staticfile=show.php% 3Ftitle=704&chapter=137476&layout=html. See, http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com staticxt&staticfile=show.php% 3Ftitle=704&chapter=137476&layout=html.
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One of the themes emphasized in this book is the potential cost to democratic communities from heterogeneity that triggers feelings of group identity and fosters group animosities. In addition to psychological identification to a group, Hume listed the following passions to which humans are susceptible: “the intolerant adherence to abstract principle, inherited animosity, love of imitation, psychological infatuation with a leader . . . craving for approval, anger, envy, fear, grief, shame, depression, melancholy, and anxiety.”24 Virtually every item on this list is likely to be genetically driven in part.
D. A Sense of Fairness In the ultimatum game, player X is given $10, say, and can offer part of it to player Y. If Y accepts the offer, Y gets the amount that X offered, and X keeps the rest. If Y rejects the offer, both get nothing. Usually, the two players are separated and unknown to one another. Narrow self-interest should lead X to offer Y a token amount – say $1 – and Y to accept it, because $1 is better than nothing. Typically, however, Xs make more generous offers, and Ys routinely reject offers of less than $3 or $4. Why? Note that the explanation cannot be one of altruism, because Y might be richer than X for all that X knows. One possible explanation is that both players have a sense of fairness. X knows that he obtained the right to make the offer merely by chance, and this leads him to be more generous than is selfishly optimal. Y’s sense of fairness leads her to punish unfairness even though it costs her something. A sense of fairness is likely to have developed genetically. Tribal members engage in many forms of exchange. Each comes to expect something of roughly equal value in an exchange. If a tribe member shares his catch with another member on a day when the latter has not had success in hunting, the first tribe member expects to share the catch of the second when their situations are reversed. If the Webers invite the Schmidts to dinner, the Schmidts feel that they “owe” the Webers a dinner. If X buys you a lunch, you feel that you owe X a lunch. Buying X a lunch because he gave you a BMW will not be seen as fair by either you or X. Once again, reactions to being treated unfairly can often be quite violent. Our genetic heritage can thus be regarded as somewhat of a mixed bag. On the positive side, we have our evolved big brains and cognitive abilities. We are capable of reasoning in a manner that would justify the assumptions 24
I have taken this list from Holmes (1995, p. 55), who cites several of Hume’s works from which the list was drawn.
IV. The Evolution of Human Psychology
43
of rational actor models, and the accumulated miracles of science attest to the scope of these abilities. Furthermore, we could add our innate tendencies to cooperate and behave altruistically. However, our genetic baggage also has its darker, more problematic side. Our group loyalties, cravings for approval, love of imitation, and infatuation with leaders make us prone to racist and bigoted behaviour. It makes us willing to follow a leader who tells us that we are better than others and to march off into war to prove our superiority. As Stephen Holmes (1995) has stressed, much writing by philosophers and social scientists – not to mention novelists, playwrights, and poets – has been concerned with the problem of constraining the irrational, destructive, and even self- destructive emotions of individuals.25 The challenge humans face today is the same one that they have always faced – how to harness the creative powers of the brain to make our lives better, while avoiding the self-destructive impulses that we all share.
IV. The Evolution of Human Psychology This book stresses the importance of the evolution of human cognitive capabilities for the development of democratic institutions. It will be useful for the later discussions to review how these cognitive powers have evolved. Merlin Donald (1991) describes this evolutionary process at some length. He sees the evolution of “the modern mind” as going through four stages: episodic culture, mimetic culture, mythic culture, and theoretic culture.
A. Episodic Culture All primates, including humans, live in groups. To survive, they must learn when a particular action is likely to bring forth hostile responses by other members of the group and when it will bring forth friendly responses; which chimpanzees will reciprocate acts of grooming and which will not; what the male hierarchy is. Migratory groups would have to learn when certain trees would bear fruit and when water holes would be dry. Donald (1991, ch. 5) calls the capability to recognize and respond to these situational clues episodic culture. Both birds and mammals have these capabilities, and they are most highly developed in the great apes. The learning process that characterizes episodic culture is well-characterized by behavioral psychology. Animals respond to stimuli and learn 25
See, also, Hirschman (1977).
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which actions will be rewarded and which will be punished. The advantages of this kind of knowledge for survival are obvious. Some human behavior resembles that of the great apes and can be classified as part of the episodic culture. Characteristics that are useful for survival do not disappear as a species evolves; they are complemented by additional useful characteristics. Humans evolved beyond the stage of apes by acquiring greater cognitive powers.
B. Mimetic Culture Prior to the invention of language, humans appear to have communicated with one another by acting out their thoughts. Donald refers to this as mimetic skill. Mimetic skill or mimesis rests on the ability to produce conscious, self-initiated, representational acts that are intentional but not linguistic. These mimetic acts are defined primarily in terms of their representational function . . . mimesis is fundamentally different from imitation and mimicry in that it involves the invention of intentional representations. When there is an audience to interpret the action, mimesis also serves the purpose of communication. However, mimesis may simply represent the event to oneself, for the purpose of rehearsing and refining a skill . . . (Donald, 1991, pp. 168–9, emphasis in original)
Mimetic culture appears during the period in which Homo erectus lived, starting roughly 1.5 million years ago. Mimesis would have been used to coordinate actions in hunting and fighting with other groups; to teach making fires, huts, weapons, and tools; to teach how to fight and hunt; and in ritual dancing and game playing. Thus, by the end of the period in which Homo erectus lived, his communities would have many of the characteristics that we associate with human society except for an elaborately developed language. Felipe Fern´andez-Armesto (2004) argues forcefully that Homo sapiens cannot be separated from other primates like chimpanzees and the great apes, because they too make limited use of tools, engage in coordinated activities, and even make various sounds to communicate with one another. Although this is true, the cognitive achievements of Homo sapiens and the complexity of their social structures have far surpassed those of the other primates, making it legitimate to claim that the other primates alive today live largely within an episodic culture.
C. Mythic Culture Somewhere between one hundred thousand years and two hundred thousand years ago, modern humans – Homo sapiens – appeared. They
IV. The Evolution of Human Psychology
45
possessed several important evolutionary advantages over Homo erectus, the most important being a brain that was on average 20 percent larger, and a supralaryngeal vocal apparatus, which contained a soft palate and a highly flexible tongue. This vocal apparatus differentiated Homo sapiens from both Homo erectus and the Neanderthalers, who existed alongside Homo sapiens until their extinction around thirty-five thousand years ago. Both Homo erectus and the Neanderthalers must have possessed some capabilities for oral communication. Indeed, the selection process that resulted in Homo sapiens must have built on these capabilities. The Neanderthal brain was comparable in size or even slightly larger than that of Homo sapiens, but the shape and positioning of their larynx and other features of their vocal apparatus would have made oral communication much more limited than that of Homo sapiens. This may have been a contributing factor to their extinction.26 Once again, Fern´andez-Armesto (2004) underplays the importance of this difference between the Neanderthals and Homo sapiens. Speech gave humans a tremendous evolutionary advantage over their predecessor Homo erectus. Although Homo erectus had succeeded through the use of mimesis to engage in a great deal of coordinated social activities – hunting, gathering, tool making – speech made “humans . . . better and faster at everything: social coordination, tool manufacture, systemic war, finding and building shelter, gathering and hunting food.”27 The invention of speech was accompanied by many other cognitive developments. Simultaneously with the appearance of speech there appeared a whole constellation of thought skills that are associated with language and are, broadly speaking, linear, analytic, rule-governed, and segmented. Semiotic cultures also triggered completely new forms of information processing and storage: semantic memory, propositional memory, discourse comprehension, analytic thought, induction, and verification, among others. (Donald, 1991, p. 212)
The increasing complexity of social life and the difficulty of expressing complex thoughts through mimesis must have spurred the invention of language. Each word is a symbol for some thing, action, or attribute, and thus the invention of language also entailed the invention of many symbols. “The invention of a symbol requires a capacity for thought,” and their existence extends the boundaries for rational thought.28 The invention of language thus brought with it a great expansion in humans’ capacity to reason. 26 27 28
Lieberman (1975, 1984); Donald (1991, pp. 115–19, 204–8). Donald (1991, p. 210). Donald (1991, p. 219).
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As Mokyr (2002, p. 16) observes, “Curiosity [is] an essential human trait without which no historical theory of useful knowledge makes sense.” Of particular importance for the acquisition of knowledge is curiosity about causal relationships. Within the episodic culture, an understanding of causal relationships could have been acquired through the recognition of sequences of events. Act A is followed by reward R. The expansion of humans’ cognitive powers that accompanied the invention of language expanded their ability to recognize more complex causal relationships. It is natural to assume that every event has a cause. The fire cooks the meat; water extinguishes the fire. When obvious causes such as these are not available, more remote causes must be sought. It is in this way that myths and superstitions first arose in the early Homo sapiens who invented languages. Donald describes the role played by myths for the !Kung of Africa. As in most early religions, their god myths are closely tied to their idea of causality: gods cause pain and death, create life and the heavens, cause rain and thunder. The eland, identified with moon through the creation myth, was also important in the ceremonial celebration of a young girl’s first menstruation, since they knew of the correlation between the duration of the menstrual cycle and the lunar cycle. Their mythical thought, in our terms, might be regarded as a unified, collectively held system of explanatory and regulatory metaphors. The mind has expanded its reach beyond the episodic perception of events, beyond the mimetic reconstruction of episodes, to a comprehensive modeling of the entire human universe. Causal explanation, prediction, control – myth constitutes an attempt at all three, and every aspect of life is permeated by myth. (Donald, 1991, p. 214)
All known hunter-and-gatherer communities possess such myths, and all possess language. An important function of language in early Homo sapiens’ societies was to allow them “to construct conceptual models of the human universe.” Donald (1991, p. 215) claims that this use of language was initially more important than its role in creating new social technologies and organizational structures. So important is the role of myth in the cultures of the first talking humans that Donald names this stage in human development the mythic culture.
D. Theoretic Culture Although all human social groups developed language, only a comparatively few succeeded in inventing writing. Credit for writing’s invention is generally given to the Sumerians who appear to have used written symbols about ten thousand years ago.29 The earliest symbols recorded transactions – numbers 29
Donald (1991, p. 285).
V. Learning
47
of sheep traded, quantities of wheat and barley stored. Eventually, however, humans learned how to express words and ideas through writing and developed mathematical symbols, geometry, and maps. The advent of writing greatly expanded humans’ capacity to store data and information. Although its invention was not accompanied by any further expansion of the brain’s size, the use of visual symbols required changes in human cognition at least comparable to those accompanying the invention of language.30 Writing also allowed humans to extend the length of a chain of reasoning. When ideas can be written down, each can be examined individually. They can be modified or replaced, supplemented, and their order changed. Such manipulations without the aid of visual representations of ideas are severely limited by the mind’s capacity to retain and recall ideas. Thus, the invention of writing and other means of visual representation allowed humans to expand their ability to reason. Writing facilitated the construction of abstract models of natural phenomena and eventually the development of what we now call scientific method, which is why Donald names this phase in human evolution, the theoretic culture.
V. Learning David Hume emphasized the crucial importance of causal relationships in human understanding and devoted large portions of both An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and A Treatise of Human Nature to the topic. In the Treatise, we find the following discussion: I find in the first place, that whatever objects are consider’d as causes or effects, are contiguous and that nothing can operate in a time and place, which is ever so little remov’d from those of its existence . . . The second relation I shall observe as essential to causes and effects . . . t’is that of PRIORITY of time in the cause before the effect. (Hume, 1739, Book I, Part III, pp. 75–6)
Hume’s discussion of causality captures the commonsense way in which humans come to understand causality through everyday observations. A rabbit stops eating and runs away. What caused it to run away? Was it the sound made by your stepping on a stick lying on the ground? This action could not have caused the rabbit to run if you were two miles away from it. It could not have caused the rabbit to run if you stepped on the stick after it had already run away. Cultural anthropologists speak of abductive and deductive causal inference. With abductive causal inference, people learn by “putting forward 30
Donald (1991, ch. 8).
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conjectural assumptions that, if true, would account for the data observed.” Thus, abduction resembles scientific induction in the service of explanation. “The main purpose of abduction is to make surprising data unsurprising by positing an assumption, of which the data would be a normal consequence.”31 Deductive inference involves the abstract formulation of hypotheses about causal relationships through which a hypothesis becomes the end product of a logical chain of reasoning. As every good empirical researcher knows, correlation does not always imply causation. Determining when it does is often a difficult and sometimes impossible task. What is difficult for the modern social scientist with a doctorate from a leading university must have been extremely challenging for her ancestors fifty thousand years ago. A few members of a tribe happen across a berry bush that they have never seen before. One eats some of the berries, and dies that night. Surviving tribe members assume that the death was caused by the berries. A taboo against eating these berries arises and no member eats them again. If the bush’s berries are poisonous and the tribe member died from them, then the tribe has made a good inference. If the tribe had been incapable of making this causal inference and continued to eat the poisonous berries, presumably all of its members would have died and it would not constitute part of our ancestry. This example explains why human evolution has been accompanied by an expanded capacity for making correct causal inferences. However, the causal inference in this example may have been incorrect. Perhaps, the berries were harmless or even highly nutritious, and the person died of an unobserved bite from a poisonous spider. The tribe would forego the beneficial effects of the berries because of a false inference. Thus, we can expect that our early ancestors made both correct and false causal inferences, sometimes mistaking spatial and temporal proximity for causation. Taboos and customs evolved that were both functional – that is, based on a correct understanding of a causal relationship, which has beneficial effects for the community – and what I shall call afunctional – based on an incorrect inference about a causal relationship. The tribe commits or refrains from certain actions that have no beneficial or adverse effects on its welfare. It is also possible that mistakes regarding causal relationships are dysfunctional, as would be a taboo on eating the berries if they were nutritious. These examples lead us to expect that the mores, habits, and culture of a particular community will rest on a series of causal inferences about the 31
See, Boyer (1994, pp. 146–7).
VI. Conclusions
49
effects of certain actions. Some of these causal inferences will be correct. If so, the community will benefit from prohibiting a certain action or from requiring that it be performed. Other causal inferences will be incorrect but will have no harmful effects on the community other than people will be forbidden to do something that is harmless or required to do something that has no beneficial effects. Finally, there may persist certain habits, customs, and taboos that are positively harmful to the community. People are allowed or required to do things that injure their health or that of others or are prevented from doing things that would benefit them or the community. Scientific progress consists of rejecting false hypotheses and developing new, correct ones and of discarding false causal inferences and retaining correct ones. The adoption of deductive causal inference has greatly accelerated scientific progress. Cultural evolution proceeds in much the same way as science does. As a community learns, it discards its false causal inferences and adds to its stock of correct ones. The accumulation of knowledge of correct causal relationships increases the community’s health and welfare. Cultural evolution as defined here consists in precisely this expanding stock of knowledge concerning correct causal inferences about the environment. Scientific and cultural progress requires that the validity of a particular causal relationship be established. A tribe that bans the eating of a particular berry makes contact with another tribe that eats and enjoys the berry. This leads some members of the first tribe to question whether it was in fact the berry that originally caused the person’s death. One member of the tribe decides to eat some of the berries to test whether they are poisonous. She does not die, and more tribe members begin to question the taboo against the berries. With time and enough evidence, the taboo disappears. There are certain causal inferences that cannot be tested, however, and thus can never be verified or refuted. Mores and taboos that are based on these causal inferences are obviously going to be much more resistant to change.
VI. Conclusions The difficulty in developing complicated hypotheses about causal relationships without the aid of writing is so great that all societies without writing have remained at the mythical stage. These fall into the category of traditional societies. The difficulty in falsifying myths and taboos contributes to their longevity, and a society remains entrapped by the chance events of the past that led to its particular set of myths and taboos.
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Writing can thus be regarded as necessary for the development of a modern, progressive society. Without it no society can harness the human potential for reasoning and scientific discovery, and put them to use testing and falsifying erroneous beliefs about causality and developing new theories that are better able to explain natural and social phenomena. However, writing is certainly not a sufficient condition for modernity. Simply writing down myths and taboos, memorizing them, and blindly believing and following them is not going to liberate a society from the erroneous beliefs of its past. Some members of the society must be willing to defy the prevailing myths and taboos, dare to propose and test different hypotheses about nature and human behavior, and the rest of society must be sufficiently open to new ideas to recognize when its long-held beliefs have been falsified and discard them. In Chapter 4, we begin to examine the histories of different societies to see which have been able to take this important step. Before turning to this question, we shall examine the properties of religions, because they serve to institutionalize and legitimatize myths and taboos, and thus constitute the main obstacles to the modernization of societies.
THREE
Religion
I shall venture to add an observation, that the argument [that a Supreme Being exists] a priori has seldom been found very convincing, except to people of a metaphysical head, who have accustomed themselves to abstract reasoning, and who finding from Mathematica, that the understanding frequently leads to truth, through obscurity, and contrary to first appearances, have transferred the same habit of thinking to subjects, where it would not to have place. Other people, even of good sense and best inclined to religion, feel always some deficiency in such arguments, though they are not always perhaps able to explain distinctly where it lies. A certain proof, that men ever did, and ever will derive their religion from other sources than from this species of reasoning. (David Hume [1779]1939, p. 736) And they that make little, or no inquiry into the natural causes of things, yet from the fear that proceeds from the ignorance itself, of what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm, are inclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, several kinds of powers invisible; and to stand in awe of their own imaginations; and in time of distress to invoke them; as also in the time of an unexpected good success, to give them thanks; making the creatures of their own fancy, their gods. By which it hath come to pass, that from the innumerable variety of fancy, men have created in the world innumerable sorts of gods. And thus fear of things invisible, is the natural seed of that, which every one in himself calleth religion; and in them that worship, or fear that power otherwise than they do, superstition. (Thomas Hobbes [1651]1946, p. 69)
Every community past and present has had some sort of religion, and today one finds people practicing several different religions in most countries. In many states, religion is given special treatment in the form of freedom from taxation or tax breaks for contributors to religious institutions. In some countries, like Germany and Austria, the state assists in the collection of revenue for religious institutions from individuals who are employed. The opening lines of the Constitution of Greece proclaim Greece to be a 51
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Religion
Greek Orthodox state, and state religions of this type exist in numerous other countries. Such widespread popular and state support for religion suggests that it must provide positive benefits to communities that justify collective actions to support religious institutions. I claim the reverse. Although religion may make some individuals better citizens, it can also have the reverse effect. Moreover, it should be possible to create good citizens through a secular education without having to construct the elaborate and often implausible belief systems that characterize most religions. Before taking up this argument, we need to examine the origins and characteristics of religions.
I. Religion and Causality Two tribesmen are chasing an antelope across the plains of Africa. It is hot and they have been running a long time. Suddenly, one falls to the ground clutching his chest and complaining of pain. After a few minutes he is dead. What caused his death? There must be a cause. People do not simply fall over dead for no reason. The dead man had not eaten or drunk anything just before dying, there is no sign of a deadly snake or spider bite. The surviving hunter has seen men die in battle when a spear enters their chests. Because the dead hunter clutched his chest in pain, something must have entered his chest and caused both the pain and the man’s death. Yet what could have entered his chest? There is no cut, hole, or other sign of anything entering. Something invisible must have entered his chest – an evil spirit. Why did it choose to enter his chest and not that of the surviving hunter? Ah, the survivor donned a necklace that morning made of the horns of an antelope that he killed last week. The necklace protected him from the evil spirit. Our surviving hunter is well on his way to inventing a theory about spirits that kill hunters, and a protection against these evil spirits. This example illustrates how myths and superstitions can arise. Our minds are always seeking causal explanations for events. Had the hunter been bitten by a poisonous snake or attacked by a lion, the cause of his death would have been obvious. Lacking such a visible cause, the surviving hunter needed to invent an invisible cause. His first thought was of an evil spirit, but he could have hypothesized many other causes. For example, if his tribe hunted with poison arrows, the hunter might have hypothesized that a spirit shot an invisible poison arrow that penetrated his companion’s chest. If the surviving hunter had seen a blackbird watching them from a nearby tree, he might have hypothesized that the bird killed his companion with an evil look or perhaps by launching an invisible, internal organ that penetrated
I. Religion and Causality
53
the chest.1 The number of possible causes of death that the surviving hunter could imagine is large, and thus we might not expect any two hunters to hit on exactly the same cause. This superabundance of possible causes helps explain the many varieties of religious beliefs that exist. In some cases, the invisible spirits and gods take on a human form; in others, they are animals or birds. One thing we can say with considerable certainty, however, is that it is unlikely that the hunter would hypothesize that a nearby stone killed his companion. Stones are inanimate objects. They do not move, are not alive, and presumably do not think. Events like the death of a companion must be caused by some intentional being, like a human or some other type of animal, an intentional being that wanted to kill the hunter. Humans and animals are alive and act with intent. Someone – some invisible one – intended that the hunter die, and the surviving hunter must guess who or what this invisible someone was. This example also illustrates the importance of language in the propagation of religions. The two men would have been able to coordinate their actions in hunting during the mimetic period, and the same event could have taken place then. The surviving hunter might have suspected that something entered the other hunter’s chest and could have acted out what happened, but it would have been difficult to convey his hypothesis about the cause of death in the absence of language. With language, he could describe the suspicious looking blackbird that watched him and his hypothesis that the blackbird killed his companion. A myth about blackbirds being evil would be started. If some other misfortune were to occur in the presence of a blackbird, the myth would be reinforced. With enough such coincidences, a belief in the evil powers of blackbirds becomes part of this tribe’s religion. B. F. Skinner’s experiments with a pigeon, described in Chapter Two, were interpreted by him as accounting for how superstitions arise. Random rewards following meaningless actions reinforce these actions and lead to the belief that the actions cause the rewards. The idea that religion came about as a means for explaining causal relationships dates back at least to Thomas Hobbes. At the beginning of his chapter Of Religion, we find: And first, it is peculiar to the nature of man, to be inquisitive into the causes of events they see, some more, some less; but all men so much as to be curious in the search of the causes of their own good and evil fortune. 1
An African tribe called the Fang believes that some people possess an internal organ called an evur, which allows them to launch invisible attacks on other people (Boyer, 2001, pp. 66–7).
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Religion
Secondly, upon the sight of any thing that hath a beginning, to think also it had a cause, which determined the same begin, then when it did, rather sooner than later . . . man observeth how one event hath been produced by another; and remembereth in them antecedence and consequence; and when he cannot assure himself of the true causes of things (for the causes of good and evil fortune for the most part are invisible), he supposes causes of them, either such as his own fancy suggesteth; or trusteth the authority of other men, such as he thinks to be his friends, and wiser than himself. (Thomas Hobbes, [1651]1946, pp. 69–70)
Hobbes goes on to discuss how man invents gods and spirits to explain what he cannot explain, and then concludes: And in these four things, opinion of ghosts, ignorance of second causes, devotion towards what men fear, and taking things casual for prognostics, consisteth the natural seed of religion; which by reason of the different fancies, judgments, and passions of several men, hath grown up into ceremonies so different, that those which are used by one man, are for the most part ridiculous to another. (Thomas Hobbes, [1651]1946, p. 72, emphasis in the original; see opening quote as well)
II. Religion and Death The ritualization of death is an ancient human activity that predates the development of language.2 Losing someone dear is a traumatic emotional experience, and has been so for all people for as long as humans have existed. Our minds recognize other people as both living animals and beings, unique persons with specific personalities. When someone dies, we recognize that this person has stopped breathing, stopped living, and soon will decay like all other animals. Our instinctive aversion to pollution tells us that the body of the deceased must be disposed of before it begins to rot. At the same time, our mind finds it difficult to accept that the person whom we knew – with whom we talked, laughed, and cried – is no more. Our mind tells us that the spirit of the person must still exist. Thus, arises the notion of dualism – we possess both a body and a soul, and they are separate things. The body dies, but the soul lives on. Spirits of the dead are the most common form of supernatural agents across all cultures.3 In many communities, spirits of the dead are assumed to watch over the community and intervene in its daily activity. Religion then takes the form of ancestor worship. Prayers and sacrifices are offered to induce the ancestors to intervene on behalf of the community or for specific individuals. These 2 3
Boyer (2001, p. 203). Boyer (2001, p. 227).
III. Religion and Morality
55
prayers and sacrifices must always be performed in particular ways to be effective. Thus arises the need for intermediaries – shamans and priests – who are experts in performing the necessary rituals. Ghosts of the dead, angels, devils, and gods all share common characteristics. They are conscious, intentional agents; it is possible to make inferences about what they are thinking, their intentions, and what it takes to please or offend them. Unlike the intentional agents that we meet everyday, however, spirits and gods inevitably possess some supernatural properties – they are immortal, omniscient, invisible, can pass through brick walls, and so on. The combination of being both familiar agents and wondrous, otherworldly beings makes a vivid impression on the mind – a lasting impression.
III. Religion and Morality No one has recorded how our earliest ancestors developed the notions of gods and spirits. Did someone first hypothesize the existence of an invisible spirit to explain a perplexing event, and later the tribe hit upon the idea that these spirits were the ghosts of deceased tribe members? Or did the tribe first conceive of the notion that the souls of people lived on after their bodies died, and these living souls were the invisible causes of puzzling events? For our purposes, the answers to these questions are unimportant. Conceivably, spirits were invented for one reason in some tribes, and for another in other tribes. Once invented, however, spirits take on active roles in all tribal societies. They intervene in the daily lives of tribal members. Individuals believe that they see spirits occasionally, communicate with them, and do things that please or anger them. The challenge of surviving in the Pleistocene placed a premium on cooperative behavior. As in all communities, children learned from their parents and elders which actions were right and wrong. Guilt and pride appear to be part of our inherited emotional response kit.4 All people thus grow up believing that their elders know right from wrong, and that they punish or reward our actions accordingly. It is quite natural, therefore, to assume that our elders remain concerned about whether we are doing right or wrong after they die. Thus, we find in tribes that engage in ancestor worship that their spirits are preoccupied with the behavior of the tribe. Moreover, unlike living parents and elders, ancestor spirits see everything, and thus it is impossible to get away with an immoral act without being caught. In 4
Boyer (2001, ch. 5).
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this way, a link between religion and morality arises. Although spirits and ghosts were perhaps invented for other reasons – to account for inexplicable events, to help people cope with the trauma of the death of dear ones – once invented they take on the task of monitoring the living to ensure that they behave morally and in ways that benefit the community and not just themselves. People untrained in mathematics can nevertheless understand general principles of probability. They learn that lightning is more likely during summer than in winter and that rain is more likely in early winter than in summer. At the same time, however, the concept of pure chance is difficult to comprehend.5 Why did my daughter get struck by lightning during a summer storm and not a tree, or my neighbor’s son, or me? She must have done something wrong. But she is too young and innocent to have done something wrong. I must have done something wrong. The need for a causal explanation for every event, a lack of understanding of pure chance, and the belief that our ancestors watch our every move and punish us when we do wrong combine to produce a belief in direct links between actions on earth, the spirits’ and gods’ responses to these actions, and subsequent earthly events. Fear of punishment (hope for reward) leads people to behave morally, and to interpret good fortune as a reward for good deeds and misfortune as punishment for wrongdoing
IV. Religion as an Exchange Relationship Humans are endowed with intuitive notions of fairness. If you share your kill with me, then I know that I should share my kill with you next time. When we exchange a weapon for a tool, we know that the two objects should be of roughly equal value in terms of the time spent making them. Our tribal ancestors would have understood these notions of fairness well, and would also have known that you usually do not get something for nothing – there are no free lunches. It would be natural for them, therefore, to think that their spirit-ancestors would want something in exchange for doing them a favor – the performance of a prayer, a dance, or the sacrifice of a lamb. 5
Boyer (2001, pp. 195–6) challenges the idea that tribal societies do not understand the concept of chance: “Anthropologists know that people the world over are rather good at detecting statistical regularities in their environment.” He then goes on, however, to give examples indicating that individuals do not in fact understand pure chance. The African tribe Fang, for example, understands that people die of biological causes like tuberculosis, but still want to know why a particular person “was chosen” to die of this disease (Boyer, 2001, p. 196). Dennett (2006) observes that people have difficulty with the concept of pure chance.
IV. Religion as an Exchange Relationship
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All religions have this exchange-relationship characteristic. The community facing a drought prays for rain, the expectant father prays for a healthy baby and that his wife survives childbirth. The tribe sacrifices a goat for success in battle. The terminal cancer patient prays to be taken into Heaven. If the spirits and gods could not “deliver the goods,” there would not be much point in praying to them. In early human history, a pressing need in most societies was having enough to eat and drink. Humans craved food, and it was plausible to assume that their ancestors or gods did also. Sacrifices of food were common religious rituals. One supposes that the first sacrificial lambs were left to rot on the sacrificial alters. The people making the sacrifices would be sure to have observed, however, that the gods did not seem to eat the lambs. Because food was scarce, a pragmatic community would modify the ritual to avoid such waste. Thus, it was typical that only the head or the heart of an animal would be sacrificed, and the sacrificial lambs and grains would be eaten by the community as part of the religious ceremony.6 Meat was the primary source of protein in most societies, and meat was a favored object of sacrifice. Human sacrifices to win favors from the gods were also common. Children and prisoners of war were particularly popular. Neither is productive, and it is costly to feed them.7 Humans, like sheep and cattle, are a good source of protein and thus cannibalism was common, particularly where there was a shortage of large domesticated animals. The Aztecs provide an extreme example. They had no domesticated cows, sheep, or pigs. Their main sources of proteins were insects, small rodents, and a few breeds of fowl. The Aztecs craved protein and thus presumed that their gods did also. They sacrificed prisoners of war to the gods. The heart would be cut out of a live prisoner; his still-beating heart would then be presented to a god. The rest of the body would then be eaten by the participants in the ceremony. The remains of hundreds of thousands of human sacrifices have been found in Aztec ruins. The Aztecs were a people continually at war. Both their warlike nature and their religious practice of cannibalism can be explained by their need for protein. The Aztecs provide a vivid example of how religious beliefs have been shaped to meet the needs of the community.8 Religious rituals always have a particular goal behind them – success in battle, in love, in the hunt, to get well, to have a happy afterlife. To be 6 7 8
Harris (1989, p. 415); Boyer (2001, p. 230). Harris (1989, pp. 418–19, 422–5). Harris (1989, pp. 428–36).
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Religion
effective, rituals must typically be performed in certain ways. The ancestors would not be pleased if just any old goat was sacrificed. It must be a white goat, washed three times by a virgin or perhaps a woman past menopause because the monthly periods make a woman unclean, and the neck of the goat must be slit from left to right.9 The rituals’ complexity often required certain persons to perform them – a shaman, witch doctor, or priest. Each shaman had to have a certain bag of “tricks” to impress his clients. They were, therefore, a bit like magicians. Here again, we see how the juxtaposition of events can give rise to an erroneous inference of causality. Following a particular ritual, some people will get well or have luck in the hunt, and this reinforces the belief that the ritual caused the event. Moreover, belief in the powers of the shaman may increase the confidence of the hunter and thereby the likelihood of his success, or increase the belief of the sick person that she will get well. Modern medical experience shows that ill people who intensely believe that they will get well have higher probabilities of recovery.10 Because religious rituals require a belief in the supernatural, shamans, witch doctors, and priests must themselves be unnatural in some way. When an epileptic has a seizure, he behaves in a most unnatural way, as if perhaps seized by a spirit. Epileptics frequently became shamans. Others became shamans because they could put themselves into a trance or feign one. As religions evolved, shamans were replaced by priests who obtained their “powers of magic” through training or by adopting unusual lifestyles like celibacy.
V. Summary of Local Religions Religion first appeared among the hunters and gatherers from whom we are descended. To understand what religion is and why it is important to so many people, we must understand why it was invented. Rather than use a possibly pejorative term like tribal or primitive religions, I choose to call them local religions in contrast to the universal religions discussed later. These early religions were truly local in that the nature of the spirits and gods and a tribe’s beliefs about them would typically differ from one tribe to 9
10
See discussion in Boyer (2001, ch. 7). Boyer (2001, pp. 238–9) notes the similarities between the behavior prescribed in religious rituals and the behavior of people with obsessive-compulsive behavior (think of Jack Nicholson in As Good As It Gets). In both cases, there is often a great fear of pollution and thus ritualistic washing of the hands; a mindless repetition of certain actions; and a fear of great danger should the acts not be performed properly – the goat has not been washed three times, the obsessive-compulsive steps on a crack in the sidewalk. Harris (1989, pp. 411–12).
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the next. Some features are common to almost all religions, however, from the earliest known tribes to modern postindustrial states.11 1. The belief that “a nonphysical component of persons can survive after death and remain an intentional being.” 2. The belief that “certain people are especially likely to receive direct inspiration or messages from extranatural agencies, such as gods and spirits.” 3. The belief that “performing certain ritual ‘recipes’ in the exact way and order prescribed can bring about changes in physical states of affairs.” These beliefs arise as attempts to explain events that cannot be explained with the information and knowledge at hand.12 Because the known causes of events are familiar objects – the lion kills the antelope, rain causes grass and flowers to sprout, the sun parches the grass – causes invented to explain events for which no obvious explanation exists take on the shapes of familiar objects. To my knowledge, no tribe or society has ever invented a god who was a heptagon or cylinder. Once again, the chance juxtaposition of events may lead to an inference of causality. A hunter finds a stone in the stomach of an antelope and soon thereafter has particularly good luck in his hunting. He attributes his good luck to a spirit lodged in the stone.13 A tribe has particularly good luck hunting by a full moon and begins to pray to the moon. Hunting tribes frequently have had moon gods. Because hunting was carried out by the men, moon gods were male. Tribes that were more dependent on farming or gathering had sun gods, because the sun is more important than the moon for growing plants. Because tending crops and gathering grains and berries was the work of the women of the tribe, sun gods have been female.14 Humans love and hate, laugh and cry, and so too, therefore, do ghosts, spirits, and gods. Some even make love and get drunk. Thus, although humans have invented supernatural beings to explain that which they could 11 12
13
14
Boyer (1994, p. 5). Stark (2004, ch. 1) reviews the different definitions of religion that have been given, and opts for a narrower concept than offered here, instead focusing on the explanatory role of the supernatural in religion. The Aguaruna in the Amazon region believe that certain stones have magical properties – some make one successful at hunting, some in love, some in war, etc. If one has a stone that one thinks would make one successful in war, but then has great success in hunting, one might reclassify it as a yuka, the kind of stone that brings success in hunting (Boyer, 1994, pp. 142–6). See Quigley (1979, pp. 176–77).
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not explain by natural causes, because humans have no firsthand knowledge of these beings, they have endowed them with emotions and characteristics familiar to all humans. Supernatural beings are intentional beings with many of the same wants and desires as humans. They differ from humans in a few important ways – they are immortal, and they observe everything humans do. Religious rituals can be thought of as both causal and abductive.15 Belief in the efficacy of religious rituals rests on three assumptions.16 1. An assumption about a particular episode (e.g., “This is a properly performed instance of ritual x”). 2. An explanatory conjecture about a particular person (e.g., “This person is a member of category y”). 3. A causal conjecture (e.g., “It is because this person is a member of category y that the person performed x successfully”). Because the purpose of every religious ritual – indeed, of all religions – is to get something (success at the hunt, a place in Heaven), a shaman’s ability “to keep his customers” depends in part on his ability “to deliver the goods.” A long stretch of poor hunting or drought may rob a shaman of his followers. To summarize, the challenge faced by every society is to understand the causal relationships present in their environment, and make use of this understanding. When the juxtaposition of events gives rise to a commonsense inference of causality, this inference is adopted. When no commonsense explanation for an event exists, other explanations must be sought. Human societies have often invoked the supernatural to explain that which could not be accounted for by natural causes. Superstition and religion can be viewed as theoretical constructs for explaining phenomena for which no natural causes have been found.
VI. Universal Religions Local religions are oriented toward the present life. They explain certain events, help people cope with the trauma of death, and reinforce the mores of the community; this in turn helps produce cooperation and a better communal life, and allows individuals to engage in exchange with their ancestors or gods to bring about good health here on earth, success in 15 16
Boyer (1994, ch. 8; 2001, ch. 7). Boyer (1994, p. 240).
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hunting, or success in battle. Although a particular tribe’s members may expect to join their ancestors when they die, they typically have vague ideas about what this afterlife will be like. The ancestors are assumed to observe the living members of the tribe, and punish and reward them for certain actions. Ancestors are not presumed to have a particularly happy afterlife, however, and thus the actions of tribe members are not motivated toward rewards in the afterlife. In contrast, the universal religions are heavily focused on the afterlife and the rewards and punishments that await one there. The first of Buddhism’s Four Noble Truths emphasizes human suffering (dukha). All humans are caught in a cycle of life and rebirth that entails much suffering. The second Noble Truth deals with the cause of human suffering. Here we see a direct correspondence with local religions. The spirits and gods of local religions offer explanations for certain, often tragic events. Buddhism offers an explanation for why we suffer. The third and fourth Noble Truths, however, offer hope. The cycle of suffering can be broken by following the Eightfold Path of (1) right views, (2) right intentions, (3) right speech, (4) right conduct, (5) right livelihood, (6) right effort, (7) right mindfulness, and (8) right concentration. Following this path is no easy thing, however. Besides faith (saddha or panna), one needs training in concentration and meditation (samadhi), and various ethical and disciplinary practices (sali). Those who follow the Eightfold Path successfully are able to break the cycle of suffering and enter into nirvana (the state of freedom, rest, and salvation). Christianity’s Ten Commandments are also a set of proscriptions forbidding certain actions on earth with the promise of Heaven awaiting those who live in accordance with the Commandments. Much speculation and theorizing in Christianity has been concerned with characterizing life in Heaven – or Hell. At first glance, Islam might be thought to be an exception in this regard because the Koran is not otherworldly oriented, but rather very much focused on life on earth and what we should do here. The word Islam means submission, however, and the Koran describes in great detail what each individual should and should not do in her daily life. Many of its proscriptions – from praying five times a day to fasting during Ramadan – require the sacrifice of certain earthly pleasures with the promise of later rewards in Heaven, as with Christianity and Buddhism. In this respect, Islam is very similar to the other major universal religions. As knowledge advanced and societies became more complex and sophisticated, understanding of causality increased and the need to invent supernatural causes for events declined. As trade and communications expanded, individuals came into contact with other religions, and began to notice the
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strange if not bizarre beliefs of some other groups. These developments favored the invention of universal religions. A universal religion must by definition be essentially the same in every community where it is practiced – in farming as well as hunting communities. A universal religion, therefore, cannot easily accommodate local peculiarities and conditions. It cannot offer a female sun god to a farming community and a male moon god to a hunting community. Replacing the multitude of gods and spirits with a single god (or at most, a handful of gods) is thus a necessary step in the creation of a universal religion. Heterogeneity across communities also makes it difficult to orient a universal religion toward providing rewards and penalties in this life, because the needs of communities differ greatly. It is also likely that individuals in more complex societies became skeptical about the powers of shamans and priests to cure diseases, chase away evil spirits, and bring success in battle as knowledge and understanding of causality and chance grew. Thus, another logical step in the development of a universal religion is to reorient exchange relationships between gods and humans away from providing rewards on earth to providing them in Heaven. This shift in orientation also has the advantage of making verification of the provision of the rewards impossible.17 Although universal religions are less concerned with explaining daily events than are local religions, they too can be used to explain the otherwise inexplicable even today. Thus, we have the explanation by Sheikh Yousef Al-Qaradawi, head of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, as to why the 2004 earthquake in the Indian Ocean that caused a tsunami that killed thousands of people occurred where it did. People must ask themselves why this earthquake occurred in this area and not in others. Why did it occur at this time and not another? Why? Whoever examines these areas discovers that they are tourism areas. Tourism areas are areas where the forbidden acts are widespread, as well as alcohol consumption, drug use, and acts of abomination. Whoever knows about tourism in our age knows this. These areas were notorious because of this modern tourism, which has become known as “sex tourism” . . . Don’t they deserve punishment from Allah?18
After September 11, 2001, evangelist preacher Jerry Falwell also concluded that the attacks on the World trade Center were God’s punishment for America’s sins. 17 18
This property of being unverifiable makes religion a form of “credence” good. See Ekelund and Tollison (2008), and Ekelund, Tollison, and Vasilescu (2008). As quoted in Klausen (2005, p. 210).
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I really believe that the pagans, and the abortionists, and the feminists, and the gays and the lesbians who are actively trying to make that an alternative lifestyle . . . all of them who have tried to secularize America. I point a finger in their face and say “you helped it happen.”19
The big advantage of universal religions over local religions as far as causal explanations is concerned, however, is that they offer answers to the big questions such as how was the universe created? Who created man? The answers offered to these questions again have the advantage of being unverifiable.20 Thus, universal religions have all of the salient characteristics of local religions. They provide answers to puzzling questions; they proscribe certain immoral actions and prescribe certain moral ones; they contain rituals, which allow individuals to obtain particular rewards and avoid certain punishments; and they are greatly concerned with death and the passage into the afterlife. Equally important, however, is the way in which universal and local religions differ. Universal religions provide answers to different sorts of questions, such as who created the earth? They replace all-knowing ancestors and spirits with an all-knowing single god. Where the rewards and punishments meted out by a tribe’s ancestors alter individuals’ lives on earth, the rewards and punishments of a universal religion’s omniscient god are experienced in the afterlife. The difference between universal and local religions is nicely illustrated by the African tribe, the Fang.21 The Fang are in daily contact with their ancestors, and pray and make sacrifices to them to obtain favors here on earth and to avoid misfortunes. They also believe in a god known as Mebeghe who is far more powerful than any living person or deceased spirit, and who created the earth and heavens, animals and humans. This god was followed by another, Nzame, who invented tools, clothing, and other artifacts, and taught humans to hunt and farm. Although Mebeghe and Nzame are in one sense more powerful than the Fang’s ancestral spirits, they do not pray or make sacrifices to them. The Fang do not believe that Mebeghe and Nzame observe each individual’s every action and reward good and punish bad behavior. They are thus irrelevant for the Fang’s everyday life. One assumes that the Fang first invented the notion of spirit-ancestors and developed the practices of praying and sacrificing to them to help them to control their everyday lives. Mebeghe and Nzame were invented later to answer more 19 20 21
See http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/14/Falwell.apology/. Falwell later bowed to heavy criticism and apologized for his remarks. Dennett (2006, p. 164) stresses the importance of propositions in religion that cannot be refuted. See discussion in Boyer (2001, p. 141).
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abstract questions about the origins of life and manmade artefacts. Because the Fang already knew how to ensure good health, adequate rainfall, and so on, by performing certain rituals to please their ancestors, there was no reason to hypothesize that these creator-gods could supply the same benefits, and thus no reason to pray and make sacrifices to them. The death of a universal religion’s founder (Buddha, Christ, Mohammed) creates a crisis for his followers – how to continue to spread his teachings. Compilations of his teachings are put together, and his followers set out to convert others to the religion. Out of this group of initial missionaries emerges a set of experts on the religion, which Boyer refers to as a guild.22 Guild members become the official interpreters of the religion’s doctrines and performers of its rituals. Like all guilds, religious guilds abhor competition and thus attempt to eliminate it. It is no accident that the first of the Ten Commandments prohibits belief in “false” gods. Each universal religion claims that it alone can promise salvation, nirvana, or other forms of eternal happiness, and thus encourages people to join the one true faith and discourages defection.23 The shamans and priests of local religions are assumed to possess mystical powers, with which they were either born or received from the spirits. On the other hand, the priests of universal religions acquire their powers through study. The Catholic Church has also tried to set its clergy apart from the Church’s membership by requiring priests and nuns to take vows of celibacy. In principle anyone could study and become a priest24 or practice celibacy, so guild members are very vulnerable to entry and competition. Thus, religious guilds inevitably seek protection from competition by teaming up with the state.25 One effective way to protect a monopoly is to create a brand image. Religious brands take the form of doctrines that are specific to a particular religion. Thus, religious doctrines play a great role in the development of universal religions while being largely absent from local religions. Religious doctrines are easier to standardize and promulgate if they can be written down. Thus, the emergence of both universal religions and writing and literacy in more complex societies is not by pure chance. Without a written 22 23
24 25
See discussion in Boyer (2001, ch. 8). Ekelund, H´ebert, and Tollison (2006) discuss at great the length the methods that the once-monopolistic Catholic Church used to ward off competition. See also, Ekelund and Tollison (2008), and Ekelund, Tollison, and Vasilescu (2008). In several religions, this anyone must be a male. In Book V of The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith (1776) discusses the practices used by religions to maintain market power and the costs to society from religious monopolies. See discussion in Ekelund, H´ebert, and Tollison (2006, p. 14ff.).
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version of a religious doctrine, it would not be possible to guarantee that it was the same in every community. Passing a religious doctrine on by word of mouth would inevitably lead to alterations in content. With writing, one can ensure that the same doctrines are taught and the same rituals performed in every community. Thus, universal religions can be regarded as the first form of brand creation and franchising. Just as a McDonald’s customer can expect the same size and quality of a Big Mac in China, France, and California, a Catholic can expect the ritual of the mass to be much the same in China, France, and California. All universal religions seek to be monopolies and some, like the Catholic Church in Europe from the Middle Ages until the beginning of the sixteenth century, have come close. Yet none seems capable of sustaining a monopoly on dogma indefinitely. One reason for this is that no founder of any universal religion has had the time or inclination to write down his teachings in detail and codify them. Thus, codifications took place after the founders’ deaths and were undertaken by their followers. Because different followers had different recollections and interpretations of the founder’s teachings, disagreement over the exact wording of the religion’s authentic doctrine was inevitable. All universal religions, therefore, have been plagued by schisms. In addition to competition from within, universal religions face competition from without – from other universal and local religions. Many religious doctrines are rather abstract – think of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, that there is one God, but he consists of three parts, two of which have a father-son relationship. Although accounts of events in the lives of Buddha, Christ, and Mohammed are inspiring when first heard, these too may lose their power to excite over time. Behavioral psychology teaches us that habits are more easily established and maintained when rewards follow actions immediately than when they are delayed. A problem all universal religions face is that their greatest rewards are delayed until after death. On the other hand, the rewards individuals perceive that they get from local religions occur here on earth. Thus, universal religions often have to bend to accommodate local religious customs. . . . many Hindu scholars contrast what they call shastrik elements of the religion, the belief and practices supposed to be the definition of Hinduism, with the lautik or local, popular and contextual versions. The shastrik elements should apply everywhere . . . People always add to or distort doctrine. The same phenomenon is found in Buddhism, where scholars are scandalized by the many pagan practices they must witness, tolerate and in which they are sometimes forced to participate. The history of early Christianity also includes many difficult conflicts between the competing claims of a still fragile Church with considerable political backing and a host of local
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cults that somehow deviate from doctrine . . . In some ways, Hinduism achieved a more balanced equilibrium between the general, literate version and the inevitable local variants and additions. This was realized mostly through the convenient division between great gods of cosmic significance and local deities, more generally goddesses, that were mainly relevant at the local level. More or less every settlement has its own goddess who is specially concerned with the inhabitants of that special place. (Boyer, 2001, pp. 281–2)
Today, many Italian towns and cities still have their patron saint whose birthday is celebrated each year with a parade and festival. These local saints play a similar role as local gods in Hinduism. The celebrations serve to strengthen ties among community members and thus, hopefully, produce more cooperative and socially oriented behavior as do the celebrations and dances of local religions. Good examples of the blending of universal and local religious practices can be found in Africa. According to Na Honoun, a voodoo priestess, Christians in Benin go to church on Sunday, but visit the voodoo priests and priestesses the rest of the week.26 In Benin, day-to-day exchange relationships with the spirits appear to remain just as or even more important than the relationship with the more remote Christian God. A similar pattern exists in Asia. Many Asians go to a Brahman priest to seek rewards in the afterlife, and to local magicians to obtain immediate, worldly benefits.27 Evangelical movements may also arise to fulfill the desires of people to have local religions that cater to their specific and immediate needs. As with all local religions, evangelical movements come in many forms. Religious services are typically not the solemn rituals of the mainstream universal churches, but emotional affairs with much singing and chanting just as in the rituals of local religions. As with other local religions, Christian evangelical movements often stress the exchange relationship between believers and God, with God expected to deliver immediate rewards – physical health, peace of mind – in exchange for prayers and the not insignificant contributions to the wealth of the evangelist preacher.28
VII. The Origin of Universal Religions Of the five great universal religions – Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism – Hinduism’s ties to local religions are the most apparent. Hinduism’s many gods can be explained by its having absorbed 26 27 28
Economist, January 28, 2006. Stark (2004, p. 19). See discussion in Dennett (2006, pp. 190–1, 225–6) and references to other works.
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local gods as it expanded. The same explanation accounts for the polytheism of the Ancient Greeks. The rituals that take place in Hindu temples also resemble in many respects rituals of local religions. A statue of a god is thought to be that god. He or she must be awakened, washed, and fed like any other being. Similar rituals are also performed in the home where an image of a “family” god is kept. As economic life on the Indian subcontinent became more complex and society became more urbanized, a division of labor arose as in all complex economic systems. The Indian caste system formalizes this division by making each occupational group effectively a guild protected from competition and entry by the marriage restrictions that characterize the caste system.29 The instinctive aversion to pollution that exists in all human societies is reflected in the caste system by the requirement that members of the lowest class – the untouchables – be restricted to occupations dealing with unclean objects. The highest caste – the Brahmins – is of course reserved for priests. Buddhism builds on Hinduism and adopts its central idea of a cycle of life. Its founder Siddhartha (circa 560–480 bce), like Jesus, is reputed to be the product of divine conception. A white elephant entered Siddhartha’s mother’s womb while she slept. In his early thirties, Siddhartha traveled about northern India seeking enlightenment. One evening he sat down under a pipal tree and meditated. When dawn came he had become the Supreme Buddha. Buddhism shares its belief in the cycle of life and rebirth with Hinduism. In this respect, both universal religions share with local religions a concern about the passage from this life into the next. Both also contain lists of things people should do during their lives. Unlike with local religions, however, performance of these duties is not intended to make one’s life on earth better, but to break the cycle of life. The ultimate goal of Buddhism and Hinduism is not so much to enjoy the present life but to permanently leave it for a better afterlife. Judaism’s great invention was monotheism. As with Hinduism, one cannot identify a single person, like Siddhartha or Mohammed, who founded the religion or propounded the idea of there being but one god. According to the Torah, God revealed himself to the Jewish patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and informed them that He was the one true God. Judaism’s account of the Jews’ early history is filled with meetings between God and
29
Mancur Olson (1982) characterizes the castes as forms of guilds.
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prophets like Moses, and miracles such as the Red Sea’s parting to allow the Jews to escape from Egypt. Christianity and Islam both build on Judaism. Christianity claims that Jesus was the Messiah long awaited by the Jews. Islam claims that Mohammed was a prophet, indeed the Prophet, who was visited by the archangel Gabriel and instructed to lead the Arab people back to the one true religion. Both are monotheistic, although Christianity adds the complication of the Holy Trinity, or God being of three parts. Although these five universal religions differ in important ways from local religions, they retain their essential elements and indeed those of all religions. Hinduism and Buddhism are greatly concerned with death and afterlife. Siddhartha and Jesus appeared to be born of woman like any other man, but were products of immaculate conceptions. Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Moses were visited by God; Mohammed by an angel. These gods and angels are all intentional beings who speak to the persons with whom they meet for the purpose of getting them to do their will. Some people possess charisma, but most do not. Religious sects and cults are started by those possessing sufficient charisma to convince a group of people to follow them down a new religious path. Siddhartha, Jesus, and Mohammed appear to have been men with great charisma judging from the effect that they had on those who came into contact with them. However, no one has a monopoly on charisma, and so we find religious history filled with charismatic figures from Martin Luther to Martin Luther King. In some cases, these founders of new religions or religious sects have borrowed elements from the great universal religions. Today the Mormon Church is one of the fastest growing and most prosperous religious movements. Its founder Joseph Smith Jr. was visited by the prophet Moroni in 1830, just as Mohammad was visited by the archangel Gabriel. Moroni showed Smith where the Book of Mormon was buried – a book that purportedly contained the teachings of one of the lost tribes of Israel and was buried in New England in the fourth century ce. With God’s help, Smith translated it into English and it became the holy book for the Mormon religion.
VIII. Contrasting the Theoretical Systems of Modern and Traditional Societies In an extremely interesting essay, Robin Horton (1982) draws a contrast between the theoretical systems of modern and traditional societies, which
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is similar to the one made here.30 By modern, he means Western; by traditional, African, although the latter designation could apply to all tribal societies. Modern societies make considerable use of formal scientific methods to achieve an understanding of causal relationships, whereas traditional societies rely largely on abductive methods, as described in Chapter 2. Both societies, however, possess “theoretical systems whose basic raison d’ˆetre [is] the extension of the magnificent but none the less limited causal vision of everyday commonsense thinking” (p. 201). Both theoretical systems can be divided into two parts. Primary theory refers to the commonsense causal relationships people infer from the close juxtaposition of natural events, what I, following Boyer (1994), have referred to as abductive theory. This everyday commonsense thinking constitutes the kind of causal inferences that come from experience as stressed by Hume. Knowledge is accumulated through primary theory in much the same way in all societies and cultures. Secondary theory consists of the mental constructs that people employ to explain those phenomena that cannot be explained by primary theory. Although primary theories are similar across cultures, secondary theories “possess startling differences . . . between community and community, culture and culture” (p. 228). In one important respect, however, they are similar – secondary theories in both systems rely on entities and processes that are in some sense “hidden” to the human observer, whereas these entities and processes are directly observable in the primary theories (p. 229). Hidden entities in the secondary theories of traditional societies are ghosts, spirits, and gods, and thus are personal in the sense that they take on the shapes of humans or animals and are intentional beings like humans and animals. In contrast, the hidden entities in the secondary theories of modern Western society are inanimate objects and thus impersonal or mechanistic, for example, atoms, electrons, sound waves, and gravitational forces (p. 229). Horton also discusses the following important differences between cultures: traditionalist versus progressive; consensual versus competitive (pp. 238–48). In a traditionalist society, people believe that wisdom was discovered by the ancients and has been passed down to the present. This wisdom provides a true picture of the world, mainly because it has the authority of the ancients behind it, but also because it has withstood the test of time. Its account of events is not so out of line with experience as to 30
All page references in this section are to Horton (1982) unless otherwise noted.
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call the wisdom of the ancients into question. Edmund Burke, whose work is discussed in Chapter 8, will be seen to have been the perfect embodiment of a traditionalist. Progressives place little stock in the teachings of the past. We know more today than we did yesterday, we will know more tomorrow than we do today. Thus, progressives are inherently optimistic about man’s ability to acquire knowledge and about the future. Tomorrow will be a better day, because we will know more then than we do now. Immanuel Kant’s ([1795]1949) World Peace captures this optimism perfectly, but many other works from the Enlightenment might also be cited. A consensual society reinforces the conservatism of a traditional society. With all members of society sharing a common set of beliefs, a common Weltanschauung, there is no one to point out the inconsistencies in these beliefs and their failures to account for certain phenomena. In a society in which belief systems and theoretical models compete, proponents of one system continually point out the inadequacies of their competitors, and competitors strive to improve their performance in explaining and predicting events. A more rapid accumulation of knowledge can thus be expected in a progressive and competitive system than in a traditionalist, consensual system. Horton also claims that the cultural homogeneity that existed in precolonial Africa and Medieval Europe is more conducive to traditionalism than the kind of melting pot, frontier societies that existed in sixth century bce, Greece, or the Netherlands at the beginning of the Scientific Revolution, where the inconsistencies and of traditional beliefs would be continually exposed (pp. 254–6). Because much of this book emphasizes the importance of reasoning and the distinction between progressive and traditional societies, it is perhaps worthwhile to conclude this discussion by commenting on whether traditional societies with their superstitious and religious beliefs are less rational or might even be called irrational alongside their modern counterparts. This is essentially a semantic issue, but in this case I think that the semantics are important. Today, we would say that a belief that the sun goes around the earth is irrational. We know that the earth circles the sun, and that it only appears that the sun is circling the earth. However, five thousand years ago, one’s only basis for judging whether the earth circles the sun or the sun the earth was personal observations. If the earth were flat and stationary and the sun were circling it, then we would predict that the sun would be visible only part of the time, which is what we observe. Moreover, because no object would ever have been observed to remain in motion indefinitely, it would have
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been reasonable to further assume that some invisible spirit or god must be pulling the sun. If our religion postulated that we were god’s chosen people, it would add further plausibility to the hypothesis that the sun – and by implication all of the stars – circled the earth, and that the earth was the center of the universe. If the earth were circling the sun, we would expect to see the sun all of the time. The hypothesis that the earth was a ball and both rotating and circling the sun would have been difficult to formulate with the knowledge stock of five thousand years ago. Thus, it would not have been irrational then to maintain the hypothesis that the sun circles the earth, only erroneous. Today, we would probably call someone from an advanced industrial country who believes that the sun circles the earth irrational. Why the difference? The difference is, of course, that our knowledge of the laws of gravity, physics, and astronomy is much greater today than five thousand years ago, as is our capacity to observe stars and planets in motion. To maintain the hypothesis today that the sun circles the earth is to discard overwhelming evidence to the contrary, and discarding factual scientific evidence is irrational. Analogously, it would not be inherently irrational five thousand years ago to believe that someone who suddenly died of no apparent reason had been killed by an evil spirit – or for that matter today in a traditional society. Man’s understanding of the causes of death was and is much weaker in these environments than in modern society. Today, an autopsy can be performed and a probable cause of death determined. What would be irrational today is to assume that a middle-aged man who died while running a long distance in the sun and was diagnosed as having had a heart attack died because of an evil spirit. Superstitions and religions arise to offer explanations for the inexplicable and predictions for the unpredictable. They arise in much the same way as other statements of causal relationships. As such, their maintenance is not inherently irrational, any more than the belief that the sun circles the earth was five thousand years ago. These beliefs only become irrational to hold as evidence against them accumulates.31 Horton’s traditional societies belong to Donald’s mythic culture. They possess language and the capability to reason, but lack writing and thus are unable to store and accumulate knowledge to the same degree as modern societies. So-called theories of traditional societies about the origins of humans, whether there is life after death, and whether dead people reappear as ghosts are stories made up to fill gaps in their knowledge of the world 31
For further discussion of the rationality of these beliefs, see Sperber (1982).
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about them. The invention of writing allowed humans to replace these traditional myths and stories with hypotheses that involved abstract concepts like gravitational forces, atoms, electrical charges, and sound waves. Models of nature could be constructed and predictions verified. Scientific theories of the modern age could replace the mythic stories of traditional societies. Thus, the invention of writing made it possible for societies to enter the modern age, but only a few chose to take advantage of this opportunity.
IX. Science and Religion Understanding causal relationships is essential to human understanding of the world and of our ability to survive in it. It is no surprise that in his An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, David Hume focused upon causal relationships. . . . if there be any relation among objects which it imports to us to know perfectly, it is that of cause and effect. On this are founded all our reasonings concerning matter of fact or existence. By means alone of it we attain any assurance concerning objects which are removed from the present testimony of our memory and senses. The only immediate utility of all sciences, is to teach us, how to control and regulate future events by their causes. (Hume [1748]1939, p. 631)
Religion and science offer two alternative strategies for understanding causal relationships. As we saw in the previous section, both build on assumptions about unseen agents or forces. They differ fundamentally, however, in that scientific explanations for natural phenomena can be tested and rejected by data while religious accounts can never be tested. Scientific progress consists of rejecting false hypotheses and developing new, correct ones; of discarding false causal inferences and retaining correct ones. Cultural evolution proceeds in much the same way. As a community learns, it discards its false causal inferences and adds to its stock of correct ones, and the community’s health and welfare should increase. Such learning can be of both natural and social phenomena. Our understanding today of how market exchange benefits all members of a community has helped to produce the prosperity that most countries with market economies enjoy. Cultural evolution, as defined here, consists in precisely this expanding stock of knowledge concerning correct causal inferences about natural and social phenomena. To benefit from science, a community must both foster its development and be open to the new ideas that it produces. Resources must be devoted to education in the sciences and scientific research. Here there are real
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differences between the modern countries generally referred to as part of the West, and countries more or less tied to tradition. In some cases, countries simply lack the resources to educate most of their population in the sciences or any other subject. In others, however, science is deemphasized as a matter of choice. Saudi Arabia and Iran are not poor countries by any measure of comparison. Yet students in these countries from grammar school through university spend countless hours studying religion and thus have less time for science and other modern subjects. Moreover, the study of religion consists largely of rote learning – memorization of long passages of religious text. This is true, of course, of nearly all religious instruction. Students are not, indeed cannot be taught to question the validity of religious texts and claims or to challenge their teachers, because these texts are purportedly the word of God, and thus must be valid. Education systems in countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran confine their young people to traditional modes of thought and behavior through both their methods of teaching and what is taught. A culture that places a heavy emphasis on science must be progressive to a certain degree. New and more effective medicines replace ineffective remedies; new means of communication replace old methods. It is difficult to be open to new ideas in one area and closed to them in others. Thus, the spread of new ideas in open societies affects other spheres of knowledge like history, art, and even moral philosophy. Here again the contrast between Western, secular societies and those where religion plays a dominant role is stark. The devout believer must inherently be conservative. She must be continually looking back to the time when the religion’s founder lived and brought truth to the earth. His teachings, as written down and interpreted by his followers centuries ago, determine even today how a person should behave, dress, and think. In this respect, the differences between a Western country such as Sweden and a Saudi Arabia are apparent in how people dress, what they study, and perhaps most conspicuously, in the liberties people have to do and think what they want, be it a woman’s desire to drive a car, or a man’s desire to convert to Catholicism. Yet these differences should not be overemphasized. Where the Saudis ban alcohol because the Koran forbids it, the Swedes tax it heavily and place strict restrictions on its sale. The purported justification for such policies in Sweden today is that they promote health and safety, but their origin dates back to the nineteenth century’s prohibition movement, which was heavily influenced by religion. It was not too long ago when the Religious Right succeeded in prohibiting the sale of alcohol in the United States. Under George W. Bush’s administration, the Religious Right
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succeeded in restricting scientific research in certain areas because of beliefs about what the Bible allows. Thus, there are many in the West who would take us back in time and restrict what people can do and think, just as there are those in the Middle East and other parts of the world not generally regarded as part of the West, who wish to see their societies become more liberal and progressive. The struggle between liberalism and conservatism, progressivism and traditionalism has gone on for centuries, as the next few chapters briefly recount, and is far from over.
X. Religion, Identity, and Values Religion’s role has been stressed in providing explanations of causal relationships because this function best explains religion’s origin. The important contrast between religion and science turns on their differences in accounting for causal relationships. However, religions have other important attributes. Chief among these are that religion can be a determinant of an individual’s sense of self-identity, and form the basis of a person’s value system. Although religions certainly can and often do serve these functions, it must be stressed that neither can account for a religion’s coming into being. Members of a particular tribe did not sit down one day and say that they were lacking a sense of identity, and thus needed to create a set of beliefs about the world that was peculiar to their tribe. Its beliefs about the world emerged over time through chance events and inferences about causality that were in part unique to the tribe. Thus, eventually a sense of identity based on the tribe’s history and customs came into being. As myths regarding the causes of certain events, the roles of ancestors and spirits in the tribe’s life, and the rituals needed to engage in exchange with the spirits developed, they became part of the tribe’s culture and a determinant of its sense of identity. A local religion’s role in defining self-identity arises after or at best while its religion comes into existence for other reasons. Similarly, Mohammed did not recount his meetings with the archangel Gabriel and the messages that the angel brought, because he thought that the Arabs lacked a sense of identity. He thought that he was hearing the word of God and wished to bring the Arabs back to the one true religion. The Muslims’ sense of identity arose after the Arabs (and later other ethnic groups) accepted Mohammed’s teachings about God. As previously discussed, both local and universal religions contain strictures against antisocial actions like stealing and ways of rewarding pro-social
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actions. These obviously form a part of a religious community’s value system. Beyond these moral strictures, the value system of a community is shaped by its particular history and social and physical environment. A community with an extreme shortage of sources of protein that adopts human sacrifice and cannibalism as part of its religion acquires a different value system than one rich in protein, which can afford to sacrifice other types of animals. A religion that allows polygamy implies a different value system regarding the roles of men and women in society and family structure than one that demands monogamy. Such differences, like all religious differences, are determined by a combination of chance, past events, and the physical environment in which the society evolved. These historical differences lead to different sets of values and personal identities across societies that are partly reflected in and determined by their religious beliefs. Because our focus is on the relationship between religion and democracy, the obvious question arises as to whether a particular religious identity or value system is more or less conducive to the creation and maintenance of liberal democracy. Do religious values strengthen liberal democracy or undermine it? Do religious people make better citizens in a liberal democracy or worse? The answers to these questions are important in and of themselves, but they also have implications regarding the optimal relationship between church and state – a question that has been debated for centuries in Western Europe, and that we shall consider later in the book.
XI. Religion and Traditionalism All societies have their customs and traditions. American families gather to eat turkey at Thanksgiving because that is supposedly what the first pilgrims ate. Germans gather on New Year’s Eve to eat carp, because it is supposed to bring wealth. It is also customary in Germany to toss molten lead into cold water on New Year’s to predict the future from the shape that the lead takes on hitting the water. Such happenings with their associated traditions are harmless or even beneficial. Fond memories of earlier Thanksgivings and New Year’s Eve gatherings are kindled, and family ties are renewed. Other customs and traditions are less benign. Beliefs in the magical powers of gorillas’ paws and rhinoceroses’ horns have produced an industry of illegal poachers and traders and have sped along the extinction of these animals. The custom of female circumcision causes great pain to young girls and risks their lives.
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By there very nature religions are tradition-bound and conservative. The beliefs of a member of a local religion reflect the tribal myths handed down from one generation to the next. The beliefs of a member of a universal religion reflect hours of instruction and memorization of holy texts written centuries ago. Such reverence for the past makes it difficult for many people to have an open mind about present-day discoveries – particularly when they challenge aspects of religious teachings. Although there is a tension between scientific progress and nearly all forms of tradition, this conflict is particularly strong with respect to religion because of the intensity of many people’s religious beliefs. Few Germans today believe that they can predict the future from cooled lead in a pan of water, and those who still do could probably be made aware of the implausibility of this belief in a relatively short time. No amount of logical argument, on the other hand, can weaken some people’s beliefs in the virgin births of Jesus and Siddhartha. It is because of this steadfast resistance to logical argument and scientific evidence that we regard the conflict between modern, progressive societies and traditional societies as largely a conflict between science and reasoning on one side and religion on the other. As the following chapters show, this conflict is as old as recorded human history.
PART II
A HISTORICAL LOOK AT THE STATE, DEMOCRACY, AND RELIGION
FOUR
The First States
For the Lord will not forsake his people for his great name’s sake; because it hath pleased the Lord to make you his people. Moreover as for me [King Samuel], God forbid that I should sin against the Lord in ceasing to pray for you; but I will teach you the good and the right way; Only fear the Lord, and serve him in truth with all your heart; for consider how great things he hath done for you. But if ye shall still do wickedly; ye shall be consumed, both ye and your king. (1 Samuel, Chapter 12)
True democracies have been rare in history. Even today, when there are more countries under democratic rule than at any other time, at best half of the world’s population can be said to live in democracies. Thus, it is important to understand how and why democratic states come into being, and why they are so rare. This book does not purport to be a history of the state, and so our examination of state origins will be highly selective. The goal is to highlight the conditions that give rise to democratic states and contrast them with those associated with nondemocratic ones. Those wishing a fuller historical treatment of the state are encouraged to consult the resource on which I have heavily relied – S. E. Finer’s (1997) magisterial History of Government.
I. Tribal Societies As discussed in Chapter Two, the most important aspect of human evolution was the development of the brain. As it grew, humans became better able to cope with the environment in which they lived, and in particular to interact and cooperate with other humans so to better their survival rates. The narrowly selfish, nasty brute living in isolation that one might 79
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expect to find from Hobbes’s description of anarchy does not seem to have ever existed. Within the band or tribe in which early humans lived, theft and homicide appear to have been relatively rare. This is perhaps not very surprising, because a group in which stealing and murder were rife would not survive for very long. What is perhaps more surprising – at least to those weaned on models of humans as rational, selfish utility maximizers – is that sharing and cooperation within these early societies was quite common. Indeed, although sharing is rare among other primates, Wilson (1975, p. 551) regards it as one of man’s “strongest social traits.” Cosmides and Tooby (1992) describe the cooperative behavior that evolved in tribal societies as a kind of “social contract.” Hunter/gatherer societies have been egalitarian. In part, this is probably because they were nomadic and thus it was almost physically impossible to accumulate great amounts of property perhaps because of the effects of the sharing norms just discussed. Given their egalitarian character, one expects that their political structure – if this term is appropriate for a tribe or band – was democratic. Although it is impossible to know for sure, it seems most likely that some band of European hunters fifty thousand or so years ago, when confronted with the question of whether to hunt on the east side of a hill or on the west side, would have resolved the question with a show of hands. Taking a vote is such an obvious way to make a collective decision that its first application must have long predated Athenian democracy. Indeed, one wonders whether the widespread belief in the fairness of the simple majority rule might to some extent be hardwired as are other notions of fairness. With the increase in brain size came an increase in the capacity to reason and eventually the utilization of this capacity – the development of tools, language, and culture. It is possible that a dog looks at the sun and asks itself who made it, or asks, “Where did I come from?” Yet one suspects that it does not. As humans began to utilize their capacity to reason, they began to pose such questions. Once they invented language, they could ask these questions out loud and discuss them with their fellow tribe members. As we have seen, their first answers to these questions took the form of stories (myths) filled with spirits, ghosts, and gods. Each tribe had its own myths and gods. A tribe’s first myth, one assumes, was invented by a particularly bright and imaginative tribe member. If he was very good at inventing myths, he probably rose to a position of some status. If he was particularly entrepreneurial, he might begin to offer not only explanations for the past and present, but also predictions of the future. If one or more gods were part of his set of explanations, then he might begin to intervene between the tribe
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and the god(s), and to call forth spirits to try not only to predict the future but even to change it. In this way, we suspect, the medicine man, shaman, and eventually priest first came into existence, and religion was born.1
II. The Sumerian City-State As tribal societies evolved, some took on characteristics that are closer to what we associate with states. Chiefs became more like kings, and shamans and medicine men became more like priests. Because we have no written record of this period, however, it is difficult to single out the institutional innovations of particular tribes for special attention. Thus, most historians identify the birth of the state with the advent of writing at end of the fourth, beginning of the third millennium bce in Mesopotamia and Egypt. In this section we briefly overview the case of Mesopotamia.
A. Background As human society evolved, gathering nuts, fruits, berries, and the seeds of wild grains was supplemented and eventually replaced by domesticating grains; hunting wild animals gave way to herding domesticated ones. Evidence of grains being ground to make flour dates back to at least 23,000 bce, and was fairly common in the Fertile Crescent by the twelfth century.2 In the sixth millennium, a stocky, round-headed people with clipped hair and no beards lived in the highlands above the Fertile Crescent. These “Sumerians” survived by growing grains and herding domesticated animals. When their crops depleted the soil in one area, they moved on to a different one. At some time during the fifth or fourth millennia, they migrated into Mesopotamia, “the land between the two rivers,” the two rivers being the Tigris and Euphrates. The plains between these rivers flooded from time to time, depositing silt to replenish the soil. Thus, it was no longer necessary to migrate in search of fertile soil and the Sumerians settled in Mesopotamia.
B. Origin of the Sumerian City-State Mesopotamia was characterized by too much water when the floods came, and too little during the dry season – perfect conditions for irrigation 1
2
Ekelund and Tollison (2008), and Ekelund, Tollison, and Vasilescu (2008) emphasize the importance of entrepreneurship on the part of the apostles and priests in the spread of Christianity. Economist, August 7, 2004. All dates in this and the next three sections are bce.
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farming, and the Sumerians developed an elaborate irrigation system, the first of its kind in the world. An irrigation system is a form of public good from which all of the community benefits, but it could only be provided if the community coordinated its efforts and resources. It is a primary candidate for being the public good, which led to the creation of the Sumerian city-state. In early Sumerian society, men tended domesticated animals, and women took care of the crops. Herders have much time to contemplate the heavens, and thus it is not surprising that Sumerians developed both astrology and astronomy. They divided the constellations of stars into twelve parts, and it is to them that we owe the signs of the Zodiac, which many people still believe have predictive power. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that at some point in time one or more of these heaven gazers noticed a relationship between the sun’s position in the sky and the onset of the floods and dry seasons. This knowledge would then become the foundation for regulating the availability of water for crops throughout the year. Political anthropologists and historians differ over how this innovation came into being. One group envisages an egalitarian, partially democratic tribal system of the type described earlier with an assembly of tribal members or elders collectively agreeing to introduce irrigation techniques. This interpretation nicely fits the kind of democratic leap from anarchy that has characterized the contractarian literature from Hobbes to the present. The second interpretation assumes a more hierarchically structured society. A priest class first took control of the process of cereal production. Among its priestly functions was the study of the stars. The priests used their knowledge of the stars to interpret and predict events on earth. The ideas underlying the introduction of irrigation would most likely have arisen among this professional class of heaven gazers, and they commanded that the innovation be introduced, supervised its introduction, and claimed all of the agricultural surplus that it generated. Any champion of democracy, contractarian or otherwise, would hope that the first interpretation is the correct one. Unfortunately, Finer claims, “It is not supported by the slightest shred of evidence,” and makes a very convincing case for the second interpretation.3 In any event, the characteristics of the Sumerian city-state in its developed form seem much more consistent with the second interpretation. 3
See Finer (1997, pp. 111–12) and references therein. Haas (1982) also contains an interesting discussion of the debate, describing it as one between liberals (conservative anthropologists) and Marxists.
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C. Characteristics of the Sumerian City-State4 One might expect that the bureaucracy governing the first-known state in history would be loosely organized and inefficient, and that the development of efficient, hierarchical bureaucratic structures would take centuries. Such was not the case. In the Sumerian city-states, bureaucracy was developed to a high degree and controlled nearly every aspect of economic and social life. The entire society shared a set of morals, beliefs, and expectations that were determined by their religion as interpreted by the class of priests. The state was an absolute monarchy with religion for an ideology. The king was god’s representative on earth, and immediately beneath him were the priests. Together they ran the state with the help of a fairly large bureaucracy and a small number of scribes. The role of the masses was to serve god, which in effect meant to serve the king. The power of the king was absolute. The economy was based on agriculture. The class of priests, with the help of the bureaucracy, directed the planting and harvesting of crops. Harvested crops were taken to the temples to be stored and redistributed. Outside of the class of priests there was no private ownership of land, nor much in the way of other private property.5 The Code of Hammurabi punishes theft so people must have had some private possessions, although this provision of the Code probably was also intended to punish stealing of grain from the state warehouses. The Sumerian economy was what we today call a command economy. The Sumerians invented writing. A large fraction of the early writing tablets that have been found contain counts of items traded or deposited in the state granaries.6 Without the aid of writing, it is unlikely that the Sumerian state could have grown to the size that it did, and to have survived as long as it did. The capability to read and write was confined to the ruling class of priests, and they used writing to direct and control the state.
D. Appraisal Carroll Quigley (1979, p. 193) described the Sumerians as “the most important group of humans who ever lived.” There is much evidence that can be garnered to back up this claim. In addition to an elaborate writing system, the Sumerians appear to have either invented or made important advances 4 5 6
The discussion in this and the next subsections draws heavily on Finer (1977, pp. 104–31) and McNeill (1963, pp. 18–166). Barzel (2002) argues that market exchange emerges very early in the evolution of states, but this was not the case in Sumer. Donald (1991, p. 285).
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in agriculture (irrigation, the plow, wheeled carts, draft animals), metallurgy (brass and copper smelting), pottery manufacturing (the potter’s wheel), transportation (the sail boat), astronomy, and of course, the state. The quality of the last invention is attested to by the length of time that the Sumerian city-state survived – anywhere from eight hundred to fifteen hundred years depending on one’s choice of starting and ending points.7 Finer (1997, p. 29) attributes longevity in a state to a congruence between a society’s belief system and its social and political structure. In the Sumerian city-state, this congruence was as close as it could possibly come. “In no other antique society did religion occupy such a prominent position . . . the religious ideas promoted by the Sumerians played an extraordinary part in the public and private life of the Mesopotamians, modeling their institutions, colouring their works of art and literature, pervading every form of activity.”8 Moreover, the Sumerian city-state’s disappearance came about not because of some internal breakdown, but because of the development of superior military power by its neighboring states. With the invention of writing came the first use of theoretical reasoning. Donald (1991, p. 340) speculates that “astronomy was probably the earliest example of widespread, socially important theoretic development in human history.” It involves data storage and the formation of mental models of time and space. The development of calendars and maps are also examples of early theoretical advances. However, by and large, the thought processes and inventions of the Sumerians, however remarkable they seem, do not reflect the kind of theoretical reasoning processes that we associate with modern science. One reason why the development of the theoretical mode of thinking was slow in Sumer may have been that the ability to read and write was confined to the relatively small ruling class of priests. They had a vested interest in keeping the Sumerian city-state at the mythical stage of development, where everyday life was dominated by religion. Keeping the mass of illiterate citizens at the mythical stage would have served the priests’ interests well. This structure – a small educated elite governing uneducated masses – repeats itself through most of history. The salient characteristics of the Sumerian city-state can be found in Egypt, Persia, and the other major states of the ancient world – monarchy, absolutism, a primary role for religion – and they will not, therefore, be 7 8
Finer (1997, 99, 127–8). Roux (1980, p. 91) as quoted in Finer (1997, p. 115).
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discussed here. One partial exception to this generalization is the Jewish state, and thus we pause briefly to consider its contribution to the development of political institutions.
III. The Jewish State A. Origin Like the Sumerian city-states, the Jewish state evolved from nomadic tribes that settled in particular areas and took up agriculture. With agriculture came an accumulation of wealth, and the need to defend this wealth from attacks from other tribes and states. Defense can be identified as the or at least a primary justification for the creation of the Jewish state and, indeed, all other ancient states in the Middle East. The defining moment in the creation of the Jewish people, if not the Jewish state, came following the exodus from Egypt. After enduring years of slavery, Moses led a band of Jews out of Egypt. Having been slaves for many years, they lacked a social structure and needed a moral code to establish social order and cohesion. This they obtained at Mount Sinai where Moses allegedly met with their god, Yahweh, who gave Moses a set of laws. The meeting at Mount Sinai established a covenant between Yahweh and the Jewish people, a covenant that would, in the minds of the Jews, come to set them apart from other peoples, a covenant that made them “God’s chosen people.” This covenant was not a social contract among equals, however, as conceived by Hobbes, Locke, and the other contractarians, but rather more of a feudal contract between the lord of the manor and his serfs, between the shepherd and his sheep. It defined the required conduct of the Jews, but placed no constraints or obligations on “the lawgiver.”9 As a god, Yahweh was typical of other gods of nomadic, hunting, maledominated societies – a masculine god of war. At first he competed with various feminine fertility goddesses found in the areas settled by the Jews and typical of agriculture societies. However, one of the commandments that Yahweh gave to Moses was that the Jewish people “should have no false idols before them.” Thus, as the Jews accumulated wealth and were continually forced to protect it in war, Yahweh, a god of war, grew in importance and his commandment forbidding false idols produced a monotheist religion.10 9 10
Finer (1997, p. 247). See discussion in McNeill (1963, pp. 158–62).
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B. Characteristics The Jewish state in full blossom was a monarchy, and in this respect resembled its neighbors. It was, however, the first limited monarchy, in that its citizens were obligated to obey the laws given to them by God. The king was not the lawgiver as in other states at that time – God was. In other states, laws were promulgated by the king or pharaoh, who was above the law. Jewish kings were not above God’s laws. Their authority was restricted to heading the state’s bureaucracy and leading their people in war. The king, aristocracy, priests, peasants, and slaves were all equally obligated to obey God’s laws. Thus, the Jewish state can rightfully be identified as the first state in which the rule of law as we think of it today existed. Everyone from king on down was subject to God’s laws. Equality under God and under the law led to a more egalitarian society than found in other contemporary states with a free peasantry.
C. Appraisal The history of the Jewish state is extremely short compared to that of Mesopotamia or Egypt, and it made no substantive innovations in the way of establishing democratic institutions. It remained more or less at the level of societies with mythic cultures. It was important, however, in establishing a form of separation of church and state for the first time. With respect to the laws governing human behaviour, it was a theocracy with God being the lawgiver, but in other matters it was a secular state with kings being free to do what they wished as long as they did not violate God’s laws. Finer (1997, p. 239) calls Judaism the first “historic religion” in contrast to the “archaic religions” of all previous states and of the Jewish state’s contemporaries. Under the archaic religions, the masses were not active participants in the religious rituals, but rather mere spectators observing the priests perform. Under Judaism, however, the masses became part of a congregation and were expected to participate actively. Moreover, each individual was directly accountable to God. In this respect, Judaism introduced an important element of individualism into the structure of society. The Jewish state vanished fairly quickly, and does not seem to have had a direct impact on the development of the Greek city-state or any of its other immediate followers. During the Middle Ages, however, the Bible and Old Testament were the most frequently read books in Europe. Jewish ideas of secular government, limited monarchy, and individualism then came
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to have an important influence on the development of Western political institutions.11
IV. The Chinese State The link between conservatism and autocracy is no better illustrated than in the Chinese state. Because our interest is in democratic institutions instead of autocratic ones, we devote little space to the Chinese state. Yet it is worth a brief look, because the absence of the characteristics that we deem essential for democracy is clearly there, and thus the importance of them is indirectly illustrated.
A. Origin of the State The Chinese state was formed in much the same way as the Sumerian state – by tribes migrating into a river valley, in this case the Yellow River. Although legends tell of great kings living in China before the Shang kingdom (1766– 1122, all dates in this section are bce), it was this one that invented writing and, thus, the history of the Chinese state begins with it. Cities also appeared during the Shang kingdom as did other inventions seen in the Sumerian city-state like bronze casting and the chariot.
B. Confucianism The “Spring and Autumn” period between 722 and 481 was one of considerable turmoil in China with continuous warfare among its various kingdoms. Apparently troubled by this instability, the scholar Confucius (551–479) wrote several texts that proffered advice as to how to end these conflicts. He then set out to visit the courts of different monarchies in an effort to sell his ideas. He does not appear to have had much success in his lifetime, but his teachings, along with those of his followers, did have great influence on later political leaders in China and the eventual structure of the Chinese state. Confucius’ main message was that the warring states had to reclaim or rediscover the wisdom of an earlier, idolized era. In a tradition-bound land characterized by ancestor worship, his message found a certain resonance. Finer (1997, pp. 458–9) identifies four main elements in Confucian thought: 11
Finer (1997, pp. 272–3).
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1. Mankind is divided into “superior” and “mean” men. Superior men follow what essentially amounts to the “golden rule” and cooperate with other men. Only by becoming a superior man does one become fully human. Everyone possesses the potential to become a superior man, but few realize this potential. 2. Men achieve their humanity through education. 3. The family is the supreme institution of society. Sons owe respect to their fathers; the wife to her husband; the younger brother to the older brother; the younger friend to the older friend; all family members owe respect to the ruler. 4. Good government is based on its having good rulers, not good laws. Good rulers are themselves virtuous and choose virtuous ministers. An implication of elements 1, 2, and 4 is that ministers should be chosen on the basis of their educational accomplishments, that is, that the ideal state should be a meritocracy.
C. Legalism A second reaction to the anarchy of the “Spring and Autumn” period was the development of legalism. Legalism was entirely antithetical to Confucianism. It derived no wisdom from the past and ridiculed filial duties. Legalists were: . . . forward-looking, practical and ruthless . . . [they] viewed the mass of humanity as irrevocably stupid and base and susceptible only to the carrot and the stick. Theirs is a philosophy of power vested in an absolute monarch who rules by severe punishments, through iron codes of law which apply to high and low alike, without any exceptions save the ruler himself, since he alone makes the law and therefore only he is dispensed from it. (Finer, 1997, pp. 466–7)
A more cynical view of human potential is difficult to imagine, and it led naturally enough to a philosophical underpinning for absolute despotism. The ruler was bound by neither law (because he made them) nor ethics (because ethics has nothing to do with politics). And what was to be the substance of the laws that the ruler promulgated? These were to be “directed solely at the benefit of the state as a whole.”12 Advice similar to that offered by the legalists would be offered to the prince some two thousand years later by Machiavelli. 12
Finer (1997, p. 468).
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D. The Han Empire The legalists’ advice was put into practice during the Ch’in state (361–206) from which China derives its name. Of more interest for us, however, is the Han Empire, which followed it and lasted more than four centuries because “the Han Empire . . . set the pattern for all future Chinese government up to and including the present day.”13 It established a large bureaucracy to administer a highly centralized state. In this its chief innovation was that the bureaucracy was filled with educated scholars. Here we see the influence of Confucianism. However, the empire also had a rigid and harsh legal code that reflected the influence of legalism and functioned as a two-stratum state. At the top were the educated bureaucrats, a kind of aristocracy of the intelligentsia. At the bottom were the illiterate masses deferring to those of rank and obeying the legal code. Each person knew her position in society, to whom she owed obedience, and who owed obedience to her. Thus, in its social and political structure the Chinese state, of which the Han Empire was the embodiment, can be classified as an “organic state” in which individuals qua individuals do not appear. In the Chinese state, “the prevalent belief systems, and the social structure all came to support one another as never since the high days of Mesopotamian and Egyptian government and emphatically as never in the West.”14 This mutual reinforcement of ideology and social and political structures explains the great longevity of the Chinese state, but also the total lack of democracy during its long history.
E. Appraisal The Chinese state in its various forms is in many ways as remarkable as that of Sumer. It also invented writing and made many other technological advances. Its art and literature reached high levels of artistic quality and sophistication. Its state apparatus was built on “the largest bureaucracy in human history,” and in terms of longevity, the Shang kingdom and Han Empire compare favorably with those in the West and in other parts of the world.15 At the same time, China never fulfilled the promise of its early history. In an influential essay, Mancur Olson (1993) described the rise of the state in China as occurring when “stationary bandits” replaced the kind 13 14 15
Finer (1997, p. 524). Finer (1997, p. 442). Donald (1991, p. 295).
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of “roving bandits” depicted in the film The Seven Samurai. Peasants have little incentive to accumulate stores of grain and other forms of wealth if a roving bandit can always come by and take it away from them. Stationary bandits allowed peasants to keep some of the wealth that they generated and thus provided them a greater incentive to invest in their land. The increased productivity of the land made both peasant and bandit/ruler better off. Peasantry and ruler settle into a form of partnership. Over time, roving bandits disappeared and so too wars between local rulers. Ironically, the ensuing stability may explain why China never achieved the potential of its early technological and administrative successes. While revolutions and civil wars can destroy property and lives, they also shake up class structures and present opportunities to innovators. As peace and prosperity settled into China, its innovative leadership disappeared, and its political institutions atrophied into bureaucratically run despotism.16 China is an archetypical traditionalist society.17 Homage is paid to the wisdom of the ancients; the wisdom of the elderly dominates the ideas of the young. The eldest member of a family receives the most respect. The emperor’s authority derives from both his ability to mete out rewards and punishments and the veneration traditionally due him because of his office. When one recognizes the important role played by iconoclasts and the young in advancing science, it is unsurprising that scientific progress lagged in a society such as China’s with its traditionalist bent. In the West, innovation is a bottom-up process driven by the curiosity of the scientist or inventor and the daring of the entrepreneur. In China, on the other hand, innovation has often been a top-down process with the state introducing the innovations. The inherent conservatism of a bureaucratic state would have been a further hindrance to innovation in China. Thus, the weight of traditionalism on China prevented it from following up on its many, early technological advances and developing into a modern, progressive state with a thriving scientific community. An important handicap to the development of democracy in China, if not to science, was the form of writing it invented. Chinese writing consists of thousands of ideograms and unlike Western and most other languages, is not truly phonetic. Learning how to write in Chinese is thus a long process, and has historically been restricted to a small elite. A large illiterate population is not a fertile ground for the development of democratic institutions. 16 17
Pagden (2008, pp. 298–302). As, for example, defined by Horton (1982).
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V. Conclusions Sumer, Egypt, Persia, China, and some of the other empires of the ancient world made many important and sometimes amazing technological and social innovations. Some of their surviving works of art and architecture – like the pyramids of Egypt – inspire awe even today. The most important innovation of this time for the future of human society, however, was without question the invention of writing. Although first invented as a tool for keeping records of transactions as an aid to accounting, it eventually became an aid to reasoning and allowed humans to construct abstract theoretical models. First, signs of this potential use of theoretical reasoning can be seen in the astronomical charts, clocks, and maps that were developed in these ancient societies to improve agriculture, navigation, and of course, warfare. However, a realization of the full potential of man’s powers of reason would have to await the appearance of the Greek city-states – so too would the appearance of democracy. Most of the ancient empires might well be characterized as theocracies. An emperor or pharaoh is either a god himself or the emissary of the gods. He and his band of priests both govern the state and serve as intermediaries between the gods and the citizen masses. The latter can scarcely be called citizens under the modern interpretation of this concept, because they possessed little in the way of rights and no institutions through which they could express their preferences about what the state should be doing. Thus, everyday life and beliefs in the first states were, except for a privileged few, not much different after the invention of writing than before. Myths and religious beliefs played dominant roles in everyday life, and the class of priests could be relied on to predict the future, produce good harvests, and make sure that one enjoyed a good time in the afterlife. An important exception to this pattern was China. Although the basic social structure in China was similar to that in Sumer, Egypt, and Persia – a despot at the top, a ruling, educated elite immediately beneath him, and a mass of illiterate subjects at the bottom – it differed from these other states in that religion did not play the kind of legitimating role that it did in the other empires. Confucianism and legalism do not posit the existence of supernatural agents and an afterlife, and thus do not qualify as religions as we have defined them. They do represent systems of values, however, and certainly helped to shape the Chinese sense of identity. Confucianism and legalism preached honor and obedience to the ancients, one’s elders, and most of all to the emperor, and thereby made China a traditionalist society, like
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Sumer, Egypt, and the other states where religion underpinned the power of the rulers. Instead of priests, the Chinese emperor ruled with the help of an educated intelligentsia, who manned the great bureaucracy that defined the Chinese state. How different this state was from the ones that grew up in Greece.
FIVE
Athens and Rome
The only good is knowledge and the only evil is ignorance. (Socrates) We are lovers of beauty without extravagance, and lovers of wisdom without unmanliness. Wealth to us is not mere material for vainglory but an opportunity for achievement; and poverty we think is no disgrace to acknowledge but a real degradation to make no effort to overcome. Our citizens attend both to public and private duties, and do not allow absorption in their own various affairs to interfere with their knowledge of the city’s. We differ from other states in regarding the man who holds aloof from public life not as “quiet” but as useless; we decide or debate, carefully and in person, all matters of policy, holding, not that words and deeds go ill together, but that acts are foredoomed to failure when undertaken undiscussed. For we are noted for being at once most adventurous in action and most reflective beforehand. (Pericles as presented in Thucydides, 1943, p. 113)
Starting about 800 bce, a society emerged around the Aegean Sea unlike any before it, a society that “had a totally new conception of what human life was for, and showed for the first time what the human mind was for.”1 It organized itself into city-states, but except for their territoriality, they bore no resemblance to the city-states of Mesopotamia. They were democratic to a degree unknown until that time and almost unknown since. As such, they contain important lessons for every student of democracy. In a meaningful sense, the city-state can be said to be the most important innovation of the Ancient Greeks. It was not simply a set of institutions by which the Greeks organized their political life; it shaped and defined all aspects of their everyday life – political, economic, social, and cultural. “The city-state was the means by which the Greek consciously strove to make the 1
Kitto (1957, p. 7).
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life both of the community and of the individual more excellent than it was before.”2 This goal for the city-state resembles that set forth for the state in Chapter One – advancing the interests of all of its members. As noted there, the word interests need not – and by me certainly is not – interpreted to mean narrow, material interests. If individuals have lofty goals, then the state should help them achieve these goals. By today’s standards, the Greeks had very lofty goals. “Excellence to the Greek, aretˆe, meant excelling in intellectual, physical, practical, and moral activities, it meant achieving the utmost of man’s potential as man.”3 In this chapter, we review the history and accomplishments of the Greeks and describe the democratic institutions that they created. We then very briefly turn to a discussion of the Roman Empire and its institutions.
I. The Greek City-State – Background As with other ancient civilizations, Greek society was formed by migrating bands that probably arrived in the Balkan Peninsula around 2000 bce.4 Over the next few centuries, the Mycenaean Empire arose, whose archaeological remains suggest strongly fortified cities with a warlike people. The Mycenae was invaded by Doric Greeks probably as early as 1200 and fully concurred by them by around 1100, after which a “Dark Ages” ensued for roughly three centuries. The area occupied by the Greeks consisted of many islands, and even the mainland was broken up into pockets of inhabitable, arable land by its mountains, water, and rocky terrain. Thus, the physical characteristics of the area occupied by the Greeks favored the development of small, isolated, fairly autonomous communities, much as the mountains and valleys of Switzerland were to do centuries later. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Greek states were small in both geographic expanse and population. Geographic differences help explain why some city-states like Athens became democracies and others like Sparta remained autocracies. The dry, hilly, rocky terrain around Athens favored growing olives. Yields from olive trees vary greatly depending on labor inputs. Thus, there were high payoffs in Athens to providing farmers with strong incentives for putting effort into tending olive trees. Such efforts could be forthcoming if individual farmers had rights to specific pieces of property and the products of their efforts. To secure these rights, it was necessary to share political power with the 2 3 4
Kitto (1957, p. 11). Kitto (1957, pp. 171–2). All future dates referring to Greece in this chapter are bce.
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citizens. Thus, property rights and the suffrage of citizen-farmers emerged in Athens in part because of the physical characteristics of the land and the type of economic activity that they fostered.5 In contrast, the fertile plains surrounding Sparta lent themselves to large grain farms worked by disenfranchised serfs whose efforts could be easily monitored. Sparta thus remained an oligarchy run by rich owners of large estates, whereas Athens resembled more closely a community of yeomen farmers. The more egalitarian distribution of income that emerged in Athens because of its terrain and mode of agricultural production is also consistent with Boix’s (2003) thesis that democracy only emerges in communities with fairly egalitarian distributions of wealth. In Athens, citizenship carried with it the obligation to equip oneself as a soldier and fight in battle. The possession of property by the citizens added to their incentive to fight to defend Athens or add to its wealth and territory. Indeed, the emergence of individual property rights probably increased the sense of territoriality among the Athenians, which became very important in the development of their concept of citizenship.6 Because our focus is on democratic institutions, we concentrate on the Athenian city-state’s salient features when describing the political institutions of Ancient Greece. However, first let us review its intellectual accomplishments and the role of religion in Greek society.
II. The Birth of Science and Reasoning Between 1100 and 700, the Greeks acquired their alphabet through trade with the Phoenicians. It consisted of twenty-two consonants. The Greeks supplemented these with symbols for vowels, added three new consonants, and created the first truly phonetic script. This first Greek alphabet would become the basis for all later Indo-European alphabets. The invention of the phonetic alphabet reduced the memory load imposed by reading skill and allowed a much wider diffusion of literacy. Instead of remembering six or seven hundred hieroglyphs or cuneiforms, or several thousand ideograms, the reader of the early Greek alphabet could achieve literacy with about two dozen phonograms, or letters. The main advantage of the alphabet was the economy and precision with which it allowed the reader to map visual displays of symbols onto spoken language . . . Judging from the measurable success of writing systems – ease 5 6
See Fleck and Hanssen (2006). Lyttkens (2006) emphasizes the importance of the emergence of territorial boundaries and territorial identifications in the development of legal and political institutions in the Greek city-states.
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of use, speed, and popularity – the alphabet is by far the most successful method of writing ever invented. (Donald, 1991, pp. 297–8)
Thus, although the Greeks did not invent writing and external storage systems, their alphabet allowed them to enter and retrieve items from external storage much more quickly and easily. This in turn allowed them to greatly expand the content of these external storage systems and to develop the theoretic attitude. Until writing could be combined with other visual symbolic media, the theoretic attitude, that is, the deliberate analytic use of symbolic thought, had little chance to develop. Ancient Greece, from around 700 b.c., was undoubtedly the birthplace of theoretic civilization. In Greece, human thought suddenly came into its own simultaneously in a number of fields: philosophy, mathematics, geometry, biology, and geography to name a few . . . In effect, the Greeks were the first to fully exploit the new cognitive architecture that had been made possible by visual symbolism . . . The critical innovation was the simple habit of recording speculative ideas – that is, of externalizing the process of oral commentary of events. Undoubtedly, the Greeks had brilliant forebears in Mesopotamia, China, and Egypt, but none of these civilizations developed the habit of recording the verbalizations and speculations, the oral discourses revealing the process itself in action. The great discovery here was that, by entering ideas, even incomplete ideas, into the public record, they could later be improved and refined. Written literature for the first time contained long tracks of speculation – often very loose speculation – on a variety of fundamental questions. The very existence of these books meant that ideas were being stored and transmitted in a more robust, permanent form than was possible in an oral tradition. Ideas on every subject, from law and morality to the structure of the universe, were written down, studied by generations of students, and debated, refined, and modified. A collective process of examination, creation, and verification was founded. The process was taken out of biological memory and placed in the public arena, out there in the media and structure of the ESS [external storage system]. What the Greeks created was much more than a symbolic invention, like the alphabet, or a specific external memory medium, such as improved paper or printing. They founded the process of externally encoded cognitive exchange and discovery. (Donald, 1991, pp. 340–3, emphasis in original)
The collective process of accumulating knowledge invented by the Greeks is perhaps most transparent and best known to us from the dialectics employed by Aristotle, Plato, and the other great Greek philosophers. Rhetoric, a particular form of search for knowledge, can also be included in the list of Greek inventions, and their philosophers used it to great effect. The “collective process of examination, creation, and verification” also constitutes the basis of scientific method, which was first employed on a wide and systematic scale by the Greeks. This development was greatly facilitated because “the process of demythologization was well advanced
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in Greece, perhaps more so than in any society until two millennia later, during the European Enlightenment.”7 At last, scientific thought reached a climax with the brilliant intellectual freedom of Greece. The Greek mind was remarkably free of transcendental restrictions, which would reserve hazy areas to mysterious action of the gods. The Greeks lived in the here and now, in a lucid world open to human action and human perception; their gods on Olympus were part of the Greek landscape and Greek life, an intimate part of their cultural scenery. The feeling of powerless before the elementary forces of nature was lifted. The observation of nature became imbued with a pantheistic sense of poetry; science became a facet of philosophical thought. The leap from the mythological cultures of the ancient East to the world-minded Greek culture raised science from a level of scattered empirical observations to the order of a consistent natural philosophy, with cosmology its main object. The Greek mind was the first to replace a mythical, or religious, view of the cosmos with rational interpretations; the first therewith to expand the scope of science to the dimensions of the universe. In this sense, the popular idea that science began with the Greeks is justified. Even if respectable though scattered beginnings [what Mokyr (2002, pp. 18–19) refers to as “singletons”] had preceded the Greeks by some three thousand years, we may think of Greek science as the first systematic and inclusive attempt to explain the entire natural cosmos. (Goldstein, 1995, pp. 45–6)
Goldstein’s observation is nicely illustrated in the work of Thales. The “Greeks, practical men that they were, had a passion for asking useless questions.”8 Where did we come from? What is the world made of? What is virtue? Truth? Although other peoples had posed such questions before, none had posed so many or pursued the answers as far as the Greeks. Thales was one of those who posed in typical Greek style the question, “What is the world made of?” The answer he gave to this question “was based on nothing but abstract reasoning . . . [completely free] from any form of religious mysticism, such as one might reasonably expect from a thinker whose predecessors had all expressed themselves in mythological terms.”9 “As he saw it, cosmos and earth had been formed by a natural process, no longer through an act of the gods.”10 Even if we do not today accept Thales’ answer – that the whole world was made of water – his method for finding the answer is still in use today. Thus, the distinguishing feature of the Greeks might well have been their “firm belief in Reason.”11 In Ancient Greece, rational thought moved to 7 8 9 10 11
Donald (1991, p. 342). Kitto (1957, p. 178). Kitto (1957, pp. 179–80). Goldstein (1995, p. 49). Kitto (1957, p. 176).
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center stage. We can identify the development of two quite different variants of rational thought processes in Greece, variants that continue to exist and to divide scholars to the present day. The first was a faith in the power of pure a priori reasoning. They believed that truth can be found by reasoning alone; knowledge gained from the senses or from observing the real world would only lead one away from the truth. Underlying the apparent complexity and variety observed in the real world lay a few, simple universal laws that, when understood, explained the workings of the universe. This line of reasoning led to the development of both metaphysics and mathematics and to major contributions in each. One need only mention the names of a few proponents of this approach – Euclid, Zeno, Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato – to realize the extent of its development and the importance of its contributions. Abstract reasoning was carried to its extreme limits by Pythagoras and his followers. Pythagoras saw an intrinsic natural order in the world, an order that took a mathematical form. His vision of the world was one of “a mathematically structured cosmos, evolving according to basically simple laws of inner and outer harmony; a cosmic projection of the Greek sense of the underlying dynamic harmony of all being.”12 Goldstein goes on to observe that “Pythagoras’ vision of the world . . . has influenced our thinking to this day.” Although pure a priori reasoning can take one to heights that an empiricist could never reach, a wrong turn along a logical path can also lead one far astray. To give but one example, having discovered a relationship between sound and numbers, namely that a note one octave above another was created by a string half as long as that creating the first note, the Pythagoreans jumped to the conclusion that there must be a mathematical basis for everything – the universe, art, sculpture, even religion and morality. Thus, the Good became the number one, Justice four, and other moral concepts appeared as higher squares of whole numbers. The other variant of a rational thought process that can be attributed to the Greeks is what we call today scientific method – a succession of hypothesis formulation, testing, reformulation, and further testing – logical inference informed by observing and gathering data from the real world. The word hypothesis is appropriately of Greek origin. This form of reasoning comes closest to that previously described by Merlin Donald. The first name here would, of course, be Aristotle, but we might also mention the great 12
Goldstein (1995, p. 54).
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mathematician Archimedes. Even if we do not accept the story of his testing his famous principle of buoyancy by hopping into a bathtub, the usefulness of the inventions that followed from his ideas, like the Archimedes’ screw, suggests a concern on his part with more than just the elegance of a mathematical proof. Thus, at the head of the list of the innovations owed to the Ancient Greeks must go the process of logical reasoning. The Greeks posed the most profound questions that mankind faces, and then went about answering them unencumbered by the superstitions and myths that previous societies had relied on for answers. Although not all of the answers that they came up with have stood the test of time, their methods of finding them certainly have.
III. The Role of Religion in Greece In politics, philosophy, mathematics, astronomy, art, and literature, the Greeks produced giants whose stature remains undiminished even today. Yet its religion was a pygmy by modern standards. How could a people who produced an Aristotle and Plato adhere to an animistic polytheism filled with preposterous myths? Why was some form of monotheism not invented by the Greeks? It would take us too far afield to try to offer full answers to these questions, but because the tension between religion and democracy is one of the issues raised in this book, the questions cannot simply be ignored. The Greeks’ polytheism is easy to explain. They were an amalgam of different peoples and had simply appropriated the various gods of the peoples absorbed into their culture. Because they had no overarching religion, the Greeks found it easy to abandon or neglect religion. We have already emphasized the Greeks’ inquisitive nature. The myths and their associated gods offered answers to questions concerning the origin of the Greeks, the sun and the sea. At the beginning of their history these answers might have satisfied most Greeks, but as their powers of reasoning developed, they would prove less and less satisfactory. Here we might cite again the example of Thales. A Greek god was not a Supreme Being who could do no wrong and had to be obeyed unquestioningly. Greek gods were bigger-than-life humans with the same passions and foibles as humans. Because they were human-like, their actions could be measured by the same powers of reasoning as applied to man. “This form of religion induced the thinking Greek into something that Egyptians, Sumerians, Babylonians, Assyrians, and Jews were
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incapable of: applying rational and indeed secular calculation to nature and to man himself.”13 Greek religion reflected human weaknesses. It provided the Greeks with a theology of sorts, but unlike Judaism, not with a morality. Therefore, the Greeks did not turn to the gods for moral guidance because they were incapable of providing it. Nor could they turn to an organized priesthood, for there was none. They had to provide answers to the great moral questions themselves with the help of great thinkers like Homer, Aeschylus, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. In this respect, it is legitimate to call Athens a secular state because religion played no role in its public decisions. The Greeks would turn to the gods for help in battle after they had decided to go to war, but the decision to go to battle they made themselves in the assembly in which all citizens could and which a majority did participate. Nevertheless, myths and superstitions die hard in all societies, and this was true even of Ancient Greece. For example, Hippocrates, the founder of professional medicine, had to struggle to separate the teaching of medicine from religion at his school in Cos as late as the fourth century bce.14 The unimportance of religion in Greek life is perhaps best symbolized by Pericles’ funeral oration to celebrate the memory of those fallen in battle. On such an occasion today, no American politician and most likely no European politician could refrain from making references to God and beliefs that the souls of the departed find peace in Heaven. In the more than seven pages that Thucydides devotes to Pericles’ oration, there is not one reference to any gods or to an afterlife. Instead, Pericles chooses the occasion to describe Athenian society and contrast it with Sparta and its other neighbors. He explains to those gathered to mourn the dead what it was they died for: Therefore I do not mourn with the parents of the dead who are here with us. I will rather comfort them. For they know that they have been born into a world of manifold chances and that he is to be accounted happy to whom the best lot falls – the best sorrow, such as yours to-day, or the best death, such as fell to these, for whom life and happiness were cut to the same measure. (Thucydides, 1943, p. 116)
IV. Politics in Greece A. Structural Characteristics Throughout its history, the Greek state consisted of three strata:15 13 14 15
Finer (1997, p. 328). Donald (1991, p. 342). See Finer (1997, pp. 330–1).
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Table 5.1. Structural characteristics of the Greek state Structure of the Greek state Homeric times King (basileus) Council of elders (gerontes) Assembly of warriors (agora)
Fifth century Magistrate Elected council (boule) Assembly of citizens
At first kingship was hereditary, and the council of elders were members of the aristocracy. Over time, the hereditary king was replaced by elected “tyrants” and eventually by magistrates who served for one year and were usually selected by lot except where expertise was important, as with generals and admirals, who were elected. The first major step toward democracy in Greece was Solon’s freeing the serfs in 594. This action turned Attica into a land of small landholders, and produced a relatively even distribution of wealth across the area, thereby producing Boix’s (2003) key prerequisite for democracy. Although slavery existed in Greece, it did not take the form of the large latifunda worked by slaves in the Roman Empire, or the plantations of the Old South in the United States. Keeping slaves to work the small plots of land that each citizen owned was uneconomical, because the slaves would eat as much food as they could grow. Each citizen owned only a few slaves and typically used them as house servants.16 Once they became landowners, the citizens of Athens had something to protect against – foreign invasion. Each citizen knew that the defense of Athens and his property depended on his willingness to defend it, and thus the link between citizenship and serving in the military developed with the Solon reforms. An additional reform of Solon was to create a council of four hundred to prepare business for the popular assembly, a reform that Hornblower (1992, pp. 4–5) designates as the first political innovation in European history.
B. The Cleisthenes’ Reforms The Athenian city-state of the fifth century is not only the first example of a true democracy, it is the first and to this day one of the few examples of a set of political institutions consciously designed and created to achieve a democratic objective. During the seventh and sixth centuries, Athens was 16
Kitto (1957, pp. 131–2).
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ruled in turn by various tyrants and aristocratic oligarchies. As wealth accumulated, different factions formed among the aristocracy based on tribal lineage, geographic location, or occupation. These factions engaged in the kinds of distributional struggles that James Madison described so well in Federalist 10. Today we would call these factions rent-seeking coalitions. Toward the end of the sixth century, Cleisthenes – himself an aristocrat – put an end to the divisive rent seeking “by inventing a preposterous paperconstitution which in fact worked perfectly.”17 The genius in Cleisthenes’ design was to break up the existing coalitions into ten divisions (phylae) that cut across the previous ethnic, economic, and geographic lines. In turn, each phyle was broken into several smaller units called deme. Citizenship was largely based on heredity but was not automatic. Citizenship was granted first of all in the deme and then extended to the polity as a whole, and thus, because of their small number, members of a deme could easily determine whether a son of one of its members deserved citizenship on reaching age eighteen. Each phyle was named after an Athenian hero, had its own corporate identity, its own source of revenue from rents, and its own assembly.18 Thus, Cleisthenes’ constitution introduced a decentralized structure, which gave each citizen a strong incentive to participate in the democratic process. Moreover, because membership in a phyle cut across ethnic, class, economic, and geographic lines, each citizen’s welfare was tied to that of the greater community rather than to a narrowly defined faction or interest group. “A new Kleisthenic tribe was not a bunch of docile voters in the pocket of a great family; instead, it was a chimera, made up of bits from the three regional parts of Attica, and so much harder to bribe or coerce. Its members trained as soldiers together, they might act together as a pressure group in the law courts, and they served together as ‘tribe in prytany’ for an annual month of presidency over the assembly.”19 Thus, Cleisthenes’ constitution changed individual incentives away from zero-sum redistributions of wealth to positive sum improvements in the general welfare.20 Under Cleisthenes’ constitution, the assembly of citizens was the main decision-making body, with the council still playing an agenda-setting role. The council then had five hundred members selected by lot, fifty from each
17 18 19 20
Kitto (1957, p. 106). Finer (1997, p. 344). See Hornblower (1992, p. 9). The literature seems to be equally divided about whether the great Greek reformer’s name should be written with a C or a K. Pagden (2008, pp. 17–18).
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of the ten phylae into which the polity was divided. Every citizen had the obligation to attend assembly meetings, although not all did. In principle, every citizen could be selected to serve in the council for a year or to be a magistrate for a year. The assembly met only from time to time, but the council was in continual session. Each day it elected one of its members to be its foreman, which was equivalent to being the president of the republic. He would preside over the council’s meeting or, if the assembly was in session, the assembly. Thus, every citizen of Athens had the possibility of being the president of the republic, and many over the course of their lifetimes assumed this role. The Athenians were also the first to introduce term limits, and of a most stringent form. An elected foreman served for only one day and could never be reelected – such was the fear of the Athenians at the peak of their democratic era of leaders usurping power. The structure of the Council of Five Hundred was the key to Cleisthenes’ reforms. “The Council of Five Hundred was a way of involving all of Attica in decision-making, not just the city population which found it easiest to attend political meetings. The words for the regional equality thus produced was [sic] isegoria or ‘equality of speaking’ (in the council, that is). That word, and perhaps demokratia (quite literally, ‘people-power’), are the only slogans we can associate with Kleithenes himself . . . ”21
C. Citizenship Like the Hebrews, the Greeks thought of themselves as different from all other peoples, different not in the sense that they had a privileged relationship to God, but in the sense that they had a privileged relationship to one another – they were Greeks and not barbarians (non-Greeks). And what was distinctive about being a Greek? He was a free man, free not necessarily in living in a democracy, but in the sense of being a citizen who had certain rights who was ruled by laws. “Greek Tragedy is built on the faith that in human affairs it is Law that reigns, not chance.”22 Moreover, the laws that reigned were not dictated from above by a god or sacred king, but arose from the collective decisions of the citizens themselves. The Greek citizen was free to seek redress from the courts if he felt that he had been injured, and defend himself in front of the courts if he was accused of injuring someone. And there he would be tried by juries of his citizen peers.23 21 22 23
Hornblower (1992, p. 8). Kitto (1957, p. 176). See Kitto (1957, pp. 7–9) and Finer (1997, pp. 354–7).
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The purpose of the polis was to express and secure the good of its citizens.24 The polis was a boundary. The word itself derives from a root meaning “wall.” This boundary was not merely a mark of security from external coercion . . . at Athens the creation of the boundary was directed inward, spurred by the need to institutionalize an intention not to practise or be subject to coercion. The ancient polis created a space between slavery and tyranny. This was not, as Plato’s Glaucon suggests, a cynical compromise, but a glorious achievement. The boundary that distinguished citizen (polites) from noncitizen marked out a realm of personal efficacy, order, and relative equality. Slavery and tyranny were genuine threats. Citizenship in the polis offered tangible benefits: freedom, the security of one’s own good, the opportunity to win honour by guiding and defending the community. The polis was an instrument of justice; the rule of law was meant to ensure that each man received his due. Politics was the expression of the freedom to participate in ordering one’s own life, a freedom denied to women or slaves and unavailable to indentured peasants. The polis was quite literally the guarantor and the boundary of this freedom. By its very nature, then, citizenship in the polis was both intimately connected to personal well-being and discontinuous with personal characteristics. Political status abstracted from personal attributes, including one’s place in a social or economic hierarchy. The citizen occupied a place formally set off from the household world of production and reproduction inhabited by slaves and women. (Farrar, 1992, pp. 18–19)
No people have ever taken citizenship more seriously than the Greeks.25 The same word, politeia, stood for citizenship, the body of all citizens, and the constitution. State and citizens were synonymous; the quality of the state (polis) depended on the quality of the citizens. To the Greek rhetorician Isoscrates, this symbiosis between citizenship and constitution was the soul of the polis.26 Greeks cherished their citizenship and did not bestow it lightly, at least when Greek democracy was most vibrant. Citizenship could be withdrawn in toto or in part by taking away some of a citizen’s rights. Thus, several levels of citizenship existed, with the highest level carrying with it the right to participate in the public assembly and hold public office. Sons of Greek citizens would generally become citizens in time, but this was not automatic. Foreigners could acquire citizenship by service to the state. Even slaves were sometimes granted citizenship in exchange for fighting in a war. Citizenship carried with it the obligation to serve in the 24 25 26
Farrar (1992, p. 17). The discussion in the next few paragraphs draws heavily from Ehrenberg (1969, pp. 38–48), and MacDowell (1978, pp. 67–83). See also Kitto (1957). Isocrates (1929, VII at 13, 14).
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military, and to equip oneself for battle. Thus, in Ancient Greece, soldier and citizen were one. This link helps explain why women were not citizens – they did not serve as soldiers. Therefore, in Athens obligations to the state and benefits from it were closely entwined. Being a Greek meant being a citizen with all of the rights and obligations that this implied. This aspect of Greek citizenship is nicely illustrated in the following passage from the same funeral oration quoted earlier, as attributed to Pericles by Thucydides (1943, II, §37). For our government is not copied from those of our neighbors: we are an example to them rather than they to us. Our constitution is named a democracy, because it is in the hands not of the few but of the many. But our laws secure equal justice for all in their private disputes, and our public opinion welcomes and honours talent in every branch of achievement, not for any sectional reason but on grounds of excellence alone. And as we give free play to all in our public life, so we carry the same spirit into to our daily relations with one another. We have no black looks or angry words for our neighbor if he enjoys himself in his own way, and we abstain from the little acts of churlishness, though they leave no mark, yet cause annoyance to whoso notes them. Open and friendly in our private intercourse, in our public acts we keep strictly within the control of law. We acknowledge the restraint of reverence; we are obedient to whomsoever is set in authority, and to the laws, more especially to those which offer protection to the oppressed and those unwritten ordinances whose transgression brings admitted shame.
What is particularly striking in this paragraph is the way Pericles intertwines Athens’ democratic institutions and its cultural traits that, by implication, both foster and are fostered by them. No distinction was made between a citizen’s private and public life, as the quotation that opens this chapter makes clear. The “man who holds aloof from public life” was regarded as “useless.”27 Contained in this notion of citizenship was the assumption that a citizen was capable of exercising his public duties. This assumption was explicit in the obligation to serve in the military and to be able to equip oneself for battle, but was also implicit in the obligation to serve in the assembly or the Council of Five Hundred – and to do so intelligently and conscientiously. Thus, implicit in the notion of Greek citizenship, and the creation of Greek democracy was an assumption that citizens had the capacity to not only make decisions for themselves in their private lives but also for the community. Moreover, collective decisions would seek to promote the good of the community. Thus, it is no coincidence that democracy first appears in the first society capable of engaging in the kind of rational thinking associated 27
Thucydides (1943, p. 113).
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with modern science and, more generally, modernity. It was also no coincidence that this society invented an alphabet, which extended to a far greater fraction of the population the power to acquire knowledge. At its zenith, Athenian democracy came as close to embodying the fundamental attributes of democracy as any political system has. What we should learn from this first flowering of democracy is that good government does not come cheaply. It requires the active participation of a body of citizens who possess the knowledge and mental capacity to carry out their responsibilities as citizens, and who are willing to bear the costs in time, money, and energy of discharging these responsibilities.
V. Appraisal of the Contributions of Ancient Greece “This [the Greek] polity is extraordinary. It was a miracle of ingenuity and design, one of the most successful, perhaps the most successful, of political artefacts in the history of government.”28 It is difficult not to share Finer’s judgment. When one contemplates the Greeks’ contributions to architecture, astronomy, mathematics, philosophy, science, sculpture, the arts in general, and theater, one stands in awe. All of these came about because for the first time in human history man’s mind was freed from superstition to follow whatever path it chose. Of all the Greek gifts to mankind, perhaps the most important was the demonstration of the human potential for rational thought, the power of reason. Nowhere is this power more evident than in Cleisthenes’ constitution: an “artefact” of the mind that transformed a society of rent seekers into the first and, until today, one of the most successful democracies of all time. Here it is worth correcting an error that many, including James Madison, seem to have made about Athenian democracy. “Hence it is that such [pure] democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.”29 In Athens, however, taxation was by modern standards quite light and such major redistribution measures as canceling debts or redistributing land were never “even contemplated there.”30 Madison was grossly in error, therefore, if he had Athens in mind when he castigated pure democracies. 28 29 30
Finer (1997, pp. 367–8). Madison (1937, p. 58). Finer (1997, pp. 364–5).
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Nor can one claim that the Athenian democracy was short-lived. It survived with two brief interruptions from 510 to 322 – longer than any of today’s Western democracies save for the United States. Moreover, it perished not because of internal strife and turbulence caused by the excesses of a raving, democratic mob, but because the Athenian city-state, despite its many virtues as a place to live, was too small to defend itself against its neighbors.31 The last point to stress is the Greeks’ great optimism – optimism about man’s capacity to reason and optimism about the potential for selfgovernment. Where today suggestions to adopt novel political institutions tend to be treated with much scepticism – particularly among political scientists – for the Greeks the novelty of Cleisthenes’ constitution was, if anything, a point in its favor, such was the confidence of the Greeks in the creative powers of the human mind and enthusiasm for what was new.32 Such optimism tends to be associated with liberalism, as this term is used today in the United States or to some extent as it was used in Europe in the nineteenth century. Liberals are optimistic about man’s capacity to reason, and thus tend to be optimistic about the future outcomes that will come from democratic action. They are the progressives in Horton’s (1982) dichotomy. Conservatives, on the other hand, are traditionalists, pessimistic about man’s capacity to reason and thus fear the outcomes that will come from democratic action.33 Thus, one can associate optimism about human nature with liberalism, which in turn is associated with support for (belief in) democratic institutions. Conservatism, on the other hand, is associated with a pessimistic outlook regarding man’s capacities and support for more authoritarian political structures. Cleisthenes and Pericles symbolize the liberal democrat in Ancient Athens: Plato, the conservative, autocratic mind-set.34
VI. Rome In many ways, Rome surpassed the Greek city-states in both its achievements during its existence and in its influence on Europe’s future development. At its peak, the Roman Empire stretched from the Iberian Peninsula in the west 31 32 33 34
Finer (1997, pp. 347–8, 367–8). Kitto (1957, pp. 106–7). For further discussion of the links between optimism and liberalism, and pessimism and conservatism, see Mueller (1990, pp. 423–7). Karl Popper (1945) most famously exposes the authoritarianism of Plato, although one can argue that Popper’s objectivity was distorted by the world events at the time that he wrote.
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to the British Isles in the North, as far east as the Caspian Sea and around the eastern part of the Mediterranean across northern Africa. It gave birth to Christianity, which became the religion of the West. In part because of the spread of Christianity, the Roman language – Latin – also became the common language of scholars for more than a millennium and the foundation for the Romance languages. Our interest is in the development of rational thinking, however, and its relationship to democracy. In these areas, Rome’s accomplishments are much more modest. The leap from a mythical to a theoretical culture had already been made by the Greeks. Rome had some great minds in the fields of history and rhetoric – Cato, Cicero, Polybius, and Plutarch to mention a few. However, the Greeks invented the fields of history and rhetoric, and the great Roman thinkers did not eclipse Thucydides, Socrates, Aristotle, and Plato. Rome never became nor ever attempted to be a democracy. For these reasons, the discussion of Rome is briefer than for the Greeks.
A. Politics in Rome Where Greece’s rugged countryside favored small farms worked by their owners, the broad and rich plains surrounding Rome combined with the institution of slavery favored the large latifunda. These led to considerably more income inequality in Rome than in Athens and the other Greek citystates and to the rise of an aristocracy. The Roman aristocracy had much to protect, and it used the political process to do so. During the period of the Republic, 509 to 82 bce, Rome was essentially an oligarchy controlled by the aristocracy.35 The structure of Rome’s political institutions resembled those of the Greek city-state. There were magistrates, a council (Senate), and popular assemblies. The role of the Senate was supposed to be purely advisory, with the authority to pass legislation and elect the magistrates lying entirely with the assemblies. However, a member of an assembly could neither propose legislation nor offer amendments. Proposals were placed before the assemblies by a magistrate and had to be voted up or down. Thus, the magistrates along with the Senate were the agenda setters, and generally used their positions to great advantage. Magistrates came from the aristocracy; the Senate was also drawn from the leading aristocratic families, plus former magistrates, making the Roman Republic a de facto aristocracy. 35
Finer (1997, pp. 385, 432–5) favors these dates. In the discussion of the Roman Republic, I once again rely heavily on Finer.
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The Republic’s constitution was riddled with various checks and balances. Certain magistrates were empowered to veto actions by an assembly, but other magistrates could block such a veto. In 494 bce, a new category of magistrate was created – the tribune – and an additional assembly to which he submitted legislation. This development was in response to a rebellion by the plebs – Roman citizens who were not patricians (members of the aristocracy by birth). The richest plebs in particular wished to share the power of the patricians, and achieved this goal by opening up the office of tribune to themselves. A tribune, like other magistrates, could unilaterally block the legislation of an assembly. In response to pressure from the plebs, several later reforms strengthened their political power in the Republic. Thus, by 134 bce, the Roman constitution consisted “of two systems, or better, a system and an anti-system, for the one was designed to check the other.”36 Each system in turn contained its own set of veto players who could block its actions. Unlike the case of the United States, the checks and balances in the Roman constitution did not arise as part of a coherent design of political institutions with specific outcome objectives in mind. They arose in an ad hoc manner over time in response to the numerous crises that plagued the Republic. Each new crisis resulted in the creation of a new institution, designed to check the institution that caused the recent crisis. The end result was a bewildering political structure with multiple assemblies of citizens, small decision-making councils, and numerous veto players. Given the Roman constitution’s bizarre formal structure, it is a wonder that the whole system did not collapse out of pure inertia. Yet it did not, at least not until the first century bce. Indeed, it functioned admirably until the end of the second century bce; although an oligarchy, it was a limited one because of its many checks and balances. Moreover, the rights of the aristocracy carried with them obligations. For example, until late in the Republic’s life, military service was restricted to those with property except for situations of extreme emergency. The values most esteemed by Romans were: gravitas – sobriety, judiciousness, prudence; pietas – dutifulness, acting rightly or properly; simplicitas – a plain frugal way of living.37 These qualities, along with the goals of glory, honor, and reputation that the aristocracy shared, led aristocrats to perform their offices responsibly for roughly the first four hundred years of the Republic. Although the formal constitutional structure created numerous obstacles to good government, 36 37
Finer (1997, p. 397). Finer (1997, p. 392) and Pagden (2008, p. 61).
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various informal conventions allowed the aristocracy to circumvent these obstacles for the good of themselves and of Rome.38 The system of government worked to the benefit of rich and poor alike, and was viewed as legitimate by all classes until the end of the second century bce. At that time, the wealth pouring back into Rome began to create great inequalities. The continual launching of new campaigns required more and more men to be drafted into the army. The requirement that soldiers own property was dropped and the army became filled with men with no stake in the country who simply wished to make money. The virtue of frugality gave way to the vice of greed, oratory to bribery, and the aristocracy degenerated into rival factions quarreling over the spoils of battle and office. In 82 bce, the general Sulla abandoned the constitution and the Republic was essentially at an end, although it lived on in name only through another fifty years of civil war.
B. Roman Citizenship One democratic institution adopted from the Greeks was the notion of citizenship. Citizenship in Rome, as in Greece, was divided into categories with the highest categories carrying the right to vote for one’s leaders and hold office. Where Greek citizenship was tied to the polis and given out stingily, Romans were more liberal in granting citizenship. Allowing people in the conquered lands to become Roman citizens was one way of winning their loyalty. Thus, one could be a Roman citizen and a Gaul, Greek, or Jew at the same time. Being a Roman was not an ethnic designation, but rather “more a status and state of mind.”39 In the Roman Empire, the idea first appears that individuals possess certain rights. A Roman was a citizen of the Civitas and this conferred on him rights like habeas corpus protection. Of course, such rights would be worthless without a judicial system to enforce them, therefore, codified Roman law and the justice system became important complements to Roman citizenship.40 One had to be physically present in Rome to vote in the Assembly, so that as a practical matter, participation in the political process was restricted to citizens living in or near Rome. As noted in the previous section, during the early years of the Republic, people took pride at being a Roman citizen and were willing to make sacrifices for the state in the form of paying taxes and fighting in the army to defend and expand the state. As the Republic collapsed, this willingness to sacrifice for the state gave way to selfish greed. 38 39 40
See Finer (1997, pp. 388, 396–8, 413). Finer (1997, p. 389). Pagden (2008, pp. 89–94).
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C. Religion in Rome The Romans were a very superstitious people. In the Republic’s early years, they believed their lives were governed by supernatural forces embodied in stones, rivers, trees, and plants. Later, these spirits lodged in natural objects were replaced by human ones when the Romans assimilated the Etruscan and Greek gods. As in many tribal societies, Romans believed that the future could be predicted and altered by performing certain rituals and paying heed to various omens. “Developed Roman religion became, above all else, a network of elaborate spells, incantations, rituals, and sacrifices, each performed with exactitude. . . . ”41 These incantations and rituals had to be performed by priests who were members of certain “colleges.” These priests were drawn from the aristocracy and, given how superstitious the Romans were, played an important role in the day-to-day life of Rome. Here we have another important difference between Ancient Rome and Greece where a class of priests did not exist. Because virtually every public act required the performance of a certain ritual, priests exercised considerable power over the state. For example, a priest could postpone a meeting of the Assembly to decide some important issue by merely pronouncing that there were bad omens at the present time. Because priests, senators, and magistrates all came from the aristocracy, religion tended to cement the aristocracy’s control over the people. When one thinks of Rome and religion today, one thinks not of the pagan religion that reigned during the Republic, but of Christianity, which captured Rome long after the Republic disappeared. At first it seems surprising that Christianity took hold in the Hellenistic world of the Roman Empire and not in Palestine where Jesus and his disciples lived. This development becomes less surprising when one recognizes the important role of superstition (religion) and ritual in Roman life. Moreover, by the time Paul and Christ’s other followers began preaching, a large proletariat without property existed in the Roman world. Christianity’s messages – that the poor shall inherit the earth, that a glorious afterlife awaited the devout Christian, and that Jesus was soon to return to earth to take all good Christians back to Heaven – fell on ears eager for reasons to hope.42 Another important cause of Christianity’s success was its egalitarianism. Religious practices were not restricted to a small subset of the aristocracy as was true in Rome when Christianity first appeared, but were open to 41 42
Finer (1997, p. 391). Ekelund and Tollison (2008), and Ekelund, Tollison, and Vasilescu (2008) emphasize the importance of this feature of Christianity in getting converts to this new religion.
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all – even women. Women’s greater status under Christianity made them devout followers of the religion, and because of the important role they played in raising and educating children, key figures in the religion’s spread. These factors help explain the demand for the new religion on the part of Romans. Ekelund and Tollison (2008) have a supply-side explanation for why the empire adopted Christianity. They claim that Christian ethics provided certain benefits for the Roman state in the form of lower policing costs and lower outlays for the poor. The relatively unified nature of the Christian religion also helped unify the quarreling factions in the empire by giving all Romans a common religion. Thus, more probably laid behind Emperor Constantine’s conversion to Christianity in 313 ce than just having seen the light of divine revelation. In closing this discussion of Rome, it is perhaps appropriate to consider Edward Gibbon’s explanation for the rise of Christianity and its contribution to the fall of the Roman Empire. Gibbon gave five reasons for Christianity’s success: I. The inflexible and, if we may use the expression, the intolerant zeal of the Christians – derived, it is true, from the Jewish religion but purified from the narrow and unsocial spirit which, instead of inviting, had deterred the Gentiles from embracing the law of Moses. II. The doctrine of a future life, improved by every additional circumstance which could give weight and efficacy to that important truth. III. The miraculous powers ascribed to the primitive church. IV. The pure and austere morals of the Christians. V. The union and discipline of Christian republic, which gradually formed an independent and increasing state in the heart of the Roman Empire. (Gibbon, 1952, pp. 261–2)
Gibbon places particular emphasis on the importance of a belief in an afterlife. When the promise of eternal happiness was proposed to mankind on condition of adopting the faith and of observing the precepts of the Gospel, it is no wonder that so advantageous an offer should have been accepted by great numbers of every religion, of every rank, and of every province in the Roman empire. The ancient Christians were animated by a contempt for their present existence and by a just confidence of immortality, of which the doubtful and imperfect faith of modern ages cannot give us any adequate notion. In the primitive church the influence of truth was very powerfully strengthened by an opinion, which however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, has not been found agreeable to experience. It was universally believed that the end of the world and the kingdom of heaven were at hand. The near approach of this wonderful event had been predicted by the apostles; the tradition of it was preserved by their earliest disciples; and those who understood in their literal sense the discourses of Christ himself were obliged to expect the second and glorious coming of the Son of Man in the
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clouds before that generation was totally extinguished . . . Whilst the happiness and glory of a temporal reign were promised to the disciples of Christ, the most dreadful calamities were denounced against an unbelieving world. (Gibbon, 1952, pp. 276–7, footnote omitted)
With respect to the early church’s miraculous powers, Gibbon had this to say: Besides the occasional prodigies, which might sometimes be effected by the immediate interposition of the Deity when he suspended the laws of Nature for the service of religion, the Christian church, from the time of the apostles and their disciples, has claimed an uninterrupted succession of miraculous powers, the gift of tongues, of vision, and of prophecy, the power of expelling demons, of healing the sick, and of raising the dead. (Gibbon, 1952, pp. 279–80)
Gibbon then goes on to illustrate the egalitarian nature of the early church, which made it so popular among the poor and especially among women. The divine inspiration, whether it was conceived in the form of a walking or sleeping vision, is described as a favour very literally bestowed on all ranks of the faithful, on women as on elders, on boys as well upon bishops. When their devout minds were sufficiently prepared by a course of prayer, of fasting, and of vigils to receive the extraordinary impulse, they were transported out of their senses and delivered in ecstasy that was inspired, being mere organs of the Holy Spirit . . . (Gibbon, 1952, p. 280)
This passage is followed by a description of publicly performed exorcisms at which “the vanquished demon was heard to confess,” and resurrections of the dead. He notes wryly the case of a bishop of Antioch who refused a challenge from a noble Grecian to produce someone who had been raised from the dead, even though the Grecian had promised to convert immediately to Christianity if the bishop were able to do so. Gibbon devotes considerable space to the austerity of the early Christians and their adverseness to both the world of business and “the pleasures of this world.” The acquisition of knowledge, the exercise of our reason or fancy, and the cheerful flow of unguarded conversation may employ the leisure of the liberal mind. Such amusements, however, were rejected with abhorrence or admitted with utmost caution by the severity of the fathers, who despised all knowledge that was not useful to salvation and who considered all levity of discourse as a criminal abuse of the gift of speech. (Gibbon, 1952, pp. 286–7)
Many factors played a role in the fall of the Roman Empire including, according to Gibbon, Christianity.
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As the happiness of a future life is the great object of religion, we may hear without surprise or scandal that the introduction, or at least the abuse, of Christianity had some influence on the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. The clergy successfully preached the doctrines of patience and pusillanimity; the active virtues of society were discouraged; and the last remains of military spirit were buried in the cloister. A large portion of public and private wealth was consecrated to the specious demands of charity and devotion, and the soldiers’ pay was lavished on the useless of multitudes of both sexes who could only plead the merits of abstinence and charity. Faith, zeal, curiosity, and more earthly passions of malice and ambition kindled the flame of theological discord; the church and even the state were distracted by religious factions, whose conflicts were sometimes bloody and always implacable; the attention of the emperors was diverted from camps to synods; the Roman world was oppressed by a new species of tyranny, and the persecuted sects became the secret enemies of their country. (Gibbon, 1952, pp. 622–3, emphasis in the original)
Gibbon’s description of the Roman citizen after his conversion to Christianity contrasts starkly with Pericles’ description of the Greek citizen. Where the Greek citizen concentrated on the present life and was willing to make sacrifices for the state to improve the present life, the Christian Roman withdrew his support for the state and concentrated on the afterlife.
VII. Conclusions No one epitomized the Athenian spirit better than Socrates, the “gadfly” who questioned everything. It is highly appropriate that teaching by questioning is still today called the Socratic method. However, anyone who questions everything – the power of the establishment, the social and political status quo – is bound to make enemies as Socrates did. His trial and conviction for corrupting the minds of youth by questioning tradition is a sobering reminder of the powerful role traditionalism can play even in societies as progressive as Ancient Athens. Condorcet ([1795]1955, p. 45) claimed that “the death of Socrates . . . was the first crime that marked the beginning of the war between philosophy and superstition, a war which is still being waged amongst us between this same philosophy and the oppressors of humanity. . . . ” Although the Greeks achieved some important victories in this war, by the time of Rome’s fall and Christianity’s triumph, the battle was almost completely lost. Gibbon’s description of the early Christians – despising all knowledge that was not useful for salvation and considering levity as a criminal abuse of the gift of speech – could not be further from the character of the Athenians at their best. For the thinking Greek, all knowledge was useful and he sought it in every conceivable branch of learning. Moreover,
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the whole purpose of acquiring knowledge was to understand and improve the present life. Although religion played a more important role in Roman life prior to the adoption of Christianity than in Greek life, Roman religion was a pagan religion and like all local religions was concerned with the present life. Rituals and sacrifices were intended to secure benefits or avoid misfortunes in this life. The priesthood served as intermediaries between the gods and spirits in this endeavor. Christianity’s spread throughout Europe caused a profound reorientation of intellectual activity. The concept of original sin – totally foreign to Greek and Roman society – implied that life on this earth must be one of suffering and atonement. The collapse of the Roman Empire literally brought an end to civilization as it had been understood for a millennium, and reinforced the view that the present life was destined to be one of misery. Thus, the main thrust of intellectual activity shifted toward understanding what the afterlife would be like and to discovering what must be done in this life to ensure happiness in the next. The powers of reason were diverted from the study of nature and man on this earth to the study of God and the afterlife. The “Dark Ages” were a period of prolonged economic contraction. Although it is wrong to think of this period as one of total intellectual atrophy – technological advances continued to be made in agriculture, military affairs, architecture, and other applied arts – it is correct to say that the potential for major advances in science, mathematics, engineering, philosophy, and so many other branches of knowledge that arose in Greek society failed to be realized in the roughly one thousand years after the fall of Rome. Significant progress in these areas only resumed when European minds rediscovered the great works of Ancient Greece and Rome, and reoriented themselves back toward life on earth instead of in Heaven.
SIX
The Caliphate
The recompense of those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger and do mischief in the land is only that they shall be killed or crucified or their hands and their feet be cut off on the opposite sides, or be exiled from the land. That is their disgrace in this world, and a great torment is theirs in the Hereafter. (Koran 5:33)1
I. The Rise of Islam A. The Revelations In the early seventh century ce, a wealthy merchant in Mecca by the name of Mohammed would frequently retire to the cave of Hira to pray and meditate. He is reputed to have remained in the cave until he ran out of food and then return after replenishing his provisions. Around 610, he began to have dreams that purportedly anticipated the events of the following day. These were followed by visions, which he interpreted as visits from the archangel Gabriel. Sometimes the angel appeared as a man, twice “in the form in which he was created – with 600 wings.”2 The visitations had an immense emotional impact on Mohammed and at one point he is said to have exclaimed, “I fear that I have gone mad.”3 The conditions under which Mohammed experienced his revelations are not unique. Stark (2004, ch. 5) identifies the following circumstances under which revelations can profoundly affect a religion’s founding: (1) They occur in periods of social crisis, (2) They occur at a time when there is widespread belief in the existence of revelations. (3) The person experiencing the 1 2 3
As-Sallaabee (2005, p. 1475). As-Sallaabee (2005, pp. 127–43). As-Sallaabee (2005, p. 143).
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revelations knows other persons who have had visions or experienced revelations, or (4) The initial account of the person experiencing the revelations is believed by the immediate circle to which he relates them. Stark claims that all of these conditions were satisfied for Moses, Jesus, Mohammed, and Joseph Smith Jr., founder of the Mormon religion. A cousin of Mohammed’s wife, Waraqa ibn Naufal, had visions predicting the coming of an Arabian prophet. Smith’s father also had visions. The father of Jesus’ good friend John the Baptist was visited by the archangel Gabriel announcing the Baptist’s birth and, of course, the same angel visited Mary to announce the coming of Jesus. Mohammed’s visits to the cave recall Christ’s forty days in the desert following his baptism. As with Mohammed’s time alone in the cave, Christ’s stay in the desert must have created considerable emotional and psychological stress. Where Mohammed was visited by the archangel Gabriel, Christ was visited and tempted by the devil. Upon emerging from the desert, Christ begins to preach the word of God, just as Mohammed does following his experience in the cave. The religion of Arabia at that time was a pagan polytheism. Major elements of Mohammed’s message were that there was but one God – Allah – and that a Day of Judgment was soon to come when Allah would appear on earth, the dead would rise from their graves, and Allah would decide who would travel to Heaven or descend into Hell. To avoid the latter fate, one had to obey the will of Allah as revealed by the prophet Mohammed. The religion of the day was well suited for a nomadic, rural people, but a large fraction of the Arab population by the seventh century was urbanized and had difficulty reconciling tribal traditions with urban life. Mohammed’s message appealed to an urban people and prescribed rituals suited for urban living – communal prayer on Fridays, calls to prayer from a nearby mosque’s minaret, and the Ramadan, a month of fasting broken by recuperative evening meals.4 Mohammed, like Jesus, was obviously a charismatic figure. Edward Gibbon gives the following description of him: According to the tradition of his companions, Mohammed was distinguished by the beauty of his person . . . Before he spoke, the orator engaged on his side the affections of a public or private audience. They applauded his commanding presence, his majestic aspect, his piercing eye, his gracious smile, his flowing beard, his continence that painted every sensation of the soul, and his gestures that enforced each expression of the tongue. In the familiar offices of life he scrupulously adhered to the grave and ceremonious politeness of his country; his respectful attention to the rich and powerful was dignified by his condescension and affability to the poorest 4
McNeill (1963, p. 424) and Finer (1997, p. 681).
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citizens of Mecca; the frankness of his manner concealed the artifice of his views; and the habits of courtesy were imputed to personal friendship or universal benevolence. His memory was capacious and retentive; his wit easy and social; his imagination sublime; his judgment clear, rapid, and decisive. He possessed the courage both of thought and action; and although his designs might gradually expand with his success, the first idea which he entertained of his divine mission bears the stamp of an original and superior genius. (Gibbon, 1952, pp. 651–2)
B. The Spread of Islam In the twenty years of his life that remained after he began preaching, Mohammed won many followers, and Islam spread on the backs of its armed converts. In addition to being a charismatic leader, Mohammed was a brilliant military strategist. At one of the early and most important battles at Badr 624 ce,5 he had his troops line up in rows, “just as they are lined up for prayer.”6 This strategy was new to Arab warfare and proved quite effective. Even the ritual of praying to Allah five times a day in a carefully prescribed way tended to serve the same purpose as marching drills do – to develop discipline in the army.7 According to Islamic tradition and the Koran, the Muslims’ religion played a more direct role in the victory at Badr. Allah sent angels to fight at their sides: And Allah has already made you victorious at Badr, when you were a weak little force. So fear Allah much (abstain from all kinds of sins and evil deeds which He has forbidden and love Allah much, perform all kinds of good deeds which He has ordained) that you may be grateful. (Remember) when you (Mohammed) said to the believers, “It is not enough for you that your Lord (Allah) should help you with three thousand angels; sent down?” “Yes, if you hold on to patience and piety, and the enemy comes rushing at you; your Lord will help you with five thousand angels having marks (of distinction).” Allah made it not but as a message of good news for you and as an assistance to your hearts. And there is no victory except from Allah, the All-Mighty, the All-Wise. (Koran 3:123–6)8
Some four centuries later, the fickle angels would join the side of the Christians during the First Crusade and help them to victory over a Muslim army at Antioch – at least, this was the explanation given by the Christians for their surprise victory.9 5 6 7 8 9
All dates in this chapter are ce. As-Sallaabee (2005, p. 972). McNeill (1963, p. 428, n.). See As-Sallaabee (2005, p. 984). Pagden (2008, pp. 188–9).
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Many verses of the Koran recount Mohammed’s exhortations to his soldiers before battles. Some are designed to instill hope (as in the previous verse promising support from angels) so that his soldiers fight bravely, others to instill fear of the consequences of turning tail and running. O Prophet (Mohammed)! Urge the believers to fight. If there are twenty steadfast persons amongst you, they will overcome two hundred, and if there be a hundred steadfast persons, they will overcome a thousand of those who disbelieve, because they (the disbelievers) are people who do not understand. (Koran 8:65)10 Then fight (Mohammed) in the Cause of Allah, you are not asked (held responsible) except for yourself, and incite the believers (to fight along you), it may be that Allah will restrain the evil might of the disbelievers. And Allah is Stronger in Might and Stronger in punishing. (Koran 4:84)11 The fire; they are exposed to it, morning and afternoon, and on the Day when the Hour will be established (it will be said to the angels): Cause Pharaoh people to enter the severest torment! (Koran 40:46)12 Think not of those who are killed in the way of Allah as dead. Nay, they are alive, with their Lord, and they have provision (Koran 3:169)13 O you who believe! What is the matter with you, that you are asked to march forth in the Cause of Allah (i.e., Jihad) you cling heavily to earth? Are you pleased with the life of this world rather than the Hereafter? But little is the enjoyment of the life of this world as compared with the Hereafter. Koran 9:38)14
Mohammed is purported to have made the following exhortation to his soldiers just before the battle of Uhud (625): O people, what Allah commanded me to do in his Book, I command you to do (now): Work in His obedience and desist from the matters that he forbade. Indeed, today you are in a place of reward savings (i.e., reward that you are saving for the Hereafter), at least for those among you who know their responsibilities and then prepare themselves to fulfill them, upon patience, certainly (of faith), seriousness, and activeness. For indeed, fighting against the enemy is hard and unpleasant; few are those who patiently do it. For indeed, Allah is with those who obey Him, and the devil is with those who disobey Allah. So begin your deeds with patience upon jihad, and in doing so, search out for what Allah promised you. And you must follow what I command you to do, for indeed, I ardently want you to do what is right. And indeed, discord, disagreement, and losing heart are part of what it means to be incapable and weak, which Allah does not love, and for which Allah grants neither help nor victory.15 10 11 12 13 14 15
See As-Sallaabee (2005, p. 975). See As-Sallaabee (2005, p. 975). See As-Sallaabee (2005, p. 990). See As-Sallaabee (2005, p. 990). See As-Sallaabee (2005, p. 1827). See As-Sallaabee (2005, p. 1114).
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