Reading Song Lyrics
137
Internationale Forschungen zur Allgemeinen und Vergleichenden Literaturwissenschaft
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Reading Song Lyrics
137
Internationale Forschungen zur Allgemeinen und Vergleichenden Literaturwissenschaft
In Verbindung mit Norbert Bachleitner (Universität Wien), Dietrich Briesemeister (Friedrich Schiller-Universität Jena), Francis Claudon (Université Paris XII), Joachim Knape (Universität Tübingen), Klaus Ley (Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz), John A. McCarthy (Vanderbilt University), Alfred Noe (Universität Wien), Manfred Pfister (Freie Universität Berlin), Sven H. Rossel (Universität Wien)
herausgegeben von
Alberto Martino (Universität Wien)
Redaktion: Paul Ferstl und Rudolf Pölzer Anschrift der Redaktion: Institut für Vergleichende Literaturwissenschaft, Berggasse 11/5, A-1090 Wien
Reading Song Lyrics
Lars Eckstein
Amsterdam - New York, NY 2010
Le papier sur lequel le présent ouvrage est imprimé remplit les prescriptions de “ISO 9706:1994, Information et documentation - Papier pour documents Prescriptions pour la permanence”. The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of “ISO 9706:1994, Information and documentation - Paper for documents - Requirements for permanence”. Die Reihe “Internationale Forschungen zur Allgemeinen und Vergleichenden Literaturwissenschaft” wird ab dem Jahr 2005 gemeinsam von Editions Rodopi, Amsterdam – New York und dem Weidler Buchverlag, Berlin herausgegeben. Die Veröffentlichungen in deutscher Sprache erscheinen im Weidler Buchverlag, alle anderen bei Editions Rodopi. From 2005 onward, the series “Internationale Forschungen zur Allgemeinen und Vergleichenden Literaturwissenschaft” will appear as a joint publication by Editions Rodopi, Amsterdam – New York and Weidler Buchverlag, Berlin. The German editions will be published by Weidler Buchverlag, all other publications by Editions Rodopi. ISBN: 978-90-420-3035-0 E-Book ISBN: 978-90-420-3036-7 © Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam - New York, NY 2010 Printed in The Netherlands
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction
9
Part I: Toward a Cultural Rhetoric of Lyrics 2. Performativity and Performance
23
3. Generic Conventions and Cultural Capital
43
4. Sound and Songfulness
67
5. Mediality and Musical Multimedia
87
6. Bridge: Song and National Culture
113
Part II: Case Studies: Performing Englishness 7. Love is in the Ayre (1597)
127
8. Broadsides and Backsides (1811)
171
9. Toasting the English (2000)
215
10. Conclusion
267
11. Works Cited
271
1. Introduction In their November issue of 2007, Blender, a US magazine billing itself as “the ultimate guide to music and more” with a reputation for ranking everything from the “Hottest Women in Music,” “The Filthiest Lyrics of All Times” to “The Worst Rock Star Plane Crashes” came up with a new list, this time lambasting “The 40 Worst Lyricists in Rock.” The assembly contains more likely candidates (Noel Gallagher of Oasis comes fourth on account of being “incapable of following a metaphor through a single line, let alone a whole verse”) and less predictable ones (Paul McCartney lands on 38, given that after The Beatles his verse “descended into weedhead whimsy and sentimental cotton candy”); the top spot as “worst lyricist ever,” however, is reserved for former Police front man Sting. Here is how the authors argue their case: It didn’t have to turn out this way. In the Police, Sting wore ripped T-shirts and wrote catchy new-wave songs about hookers. Sure, he name-dropped Nabokov in “Don’t Stand So Close to Me,” but he balanced it with the awesomely post-lingual “De Do Do Do, De Da Da Da.” But once publications labeled [sic] him “The Thinking Woman’s Sex Symbol,” a low-watt lightbulb popped on in his head, illuminating the way toward a self-serious future. Sting would go on to rip off Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales, St. Augustine’s Confessions … even Shakespeare. After the Police split, Sting pursued a second career liberating soccer moms from their “soul cages.” Jazz musicians were involved. A lute was purchased. Volvo bumper stickers were quoted (“If you love someone, set them free”). Surveying the Cold War, he found the West “conditioned to respond to all the threats / In the rhetorical speeches of the Soviets.” His rage at Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet was so heated, he castigated the scoundrel in Spanish. Holy frijoles, was Sting mad! These searing insights befit a sociopolitical seer “cursed with X-ray vision” – and capable of doing folkloric parables about seventh sons and mystical fisherman and taking us on journeys from the battlefields of World War I to the ancient kingdoms of “the high Sahara.” But does Sting care? He doth not. He’s the King of Pain, kids. And no pain, no gain. (Dolan et al. 2007)
What is it really here that makes Sting the “worst lyricist in rock” ever (for the authors of Blender, at least)? Surely, quoting Nabokov or Shakespeare and speaking out against inhuman dictators is not too ‘bad’ in itself, and as poetry on paper, many of Sting’s lyrics would probably not fare too badly compared with the lyrical output of other rock musicians. Song lyrics are not poetry, however, and it seems that the authors’ problems with Sting have precisely something to do with the fact that they are not. Where is the difference, then?
10
Reading Song Lyrics
Lyrics and poetry are similar; they both employ verbal language, often using characteristic rhetorical and stylistic devices, to tell tales (in the ballad tradition), to propose ideas about life and the world, sometimes to illustrate the limits of language in negotiations between ‘subject’ and ‘world’ (as in The Police’s “De Do Do Do, De Da Da Da”). Yet they are also different in at least one respect: while the voice in poetry is generally perceived as an internalised one encoded in the medium of writing, the voice of lyrics is by definition external. Lyrics, this is to say, cannot be conceived outside of the context of their vocal (and musical) actualisation – i.e. their performance. Mark W. Booth remarks: “The existence of songs in sound, in time, is the simplest distinction between them and written verse. Song words are only given once in a performance and then are gone, carried along by the music and succeeded implacably by the next words” (Booth 1981, 7). We may encounter songs in a myriad of medial formats and generic situations – in an aristocratic chamber, a Victorian parlour, in a concert hall, a football stadium, on TV, in a pub, a shopping mall, on YouTube, on the street through iPod ear phones – yet in all cases, language is given the body of a voice and saturated in musical sound; and when it is not, as in printed lyrics, it is meant to be sounded. The art of lyrics is fundamentally, therefore, a “performance art” which implies, in Christopher Small’s words, that “its meaning lies not in created objects but in the acts of creating, displaying and perceiving”; it is an art in which “we think with our bodies” (Small 1998, 140), and one firmly embedded in continually changing, yet always particular and actual “performance arenas” (Foley 1995, 47). Whereas the intellectual and institutional history of reading poetry over the course of the 20th century has been dominated by an emphasis on the autonomy of the text based on its graphemic medial core – from Russian formalism to Anglo-American new criticism to French and American structuralism and post-structuralism – and has only more recently yielded again to a renewed interest in reader- and context-oriented approaches, textual autonomy is much harder to postulate for song lyrics. Based on the vocal and musical embodiment in actual sound, performed by flesh-and-blood persons and situated in concrete historical and spatial contexts (even if recording technology has increasingly emancipated sounds from their production context to travel freely across time and space since the late 19th century), lyrics more readily resist the temptations of formalist dissection and indeed invite readings which take vocal embodiment, institutional framing and processes of social distinction (Bourdieu 1984) as integral to the production of meaning. It does not really come as a surprise, therefore, that the above lambasting of Sting’s lyrics is overtly ideological, and joyfully expressive of a few writers’ rather idiosyncratic musical taste (or rather distaste). Sting’s ill fate is
Introduction
11
obviously that his critics interpret his lyrics by adhering to a specific “genrenormative mod[e] of listening” (Stockfelt 2004, 383) which tacitly pledges to a (punk-inflected) rock ethos in which the performance of excessive intellectualism is not too well taken – things are still good when Sting writes “catchy new-wave songs about hookers” (“Roxanne”), but once the subcultural capital (Thornton 1996) of straight-forward anti-bourgeois entertainment is exchanged for various assets of high-cultural respectability, things start to go wrong. Meddling with Chaucer and Shakespeare is not for the authentic rock lyricist, nor is meddling with world politics or musical genres that demonstratively exceed three-chord complexity. Sting, for the writers in Blender, is a traitor to the unwritten conventions of a brand of rock still represented by The Police whose only intellectual pursuit, it seems, was the artful performance of catchy and danceable straight-forwardness. Rather than the actual quality of Sting’s lyrics themselves, the Blender ranking thus really reveals much more about their interpreters’ tacit understanding of what decent rock lyrics are supposed to do, or rather not to do, in a song. Surly, we can take issue with these assumptions – my point is, however, that such tacit understandings by specific interpretive communities are inevitably influential in any interpretation of lyrics (or poetry for that matter, despite all famous claims to the contrary), and that they manifestly frame or condition the function of lyrics in specific cultural performances. A plurality of ‘texts’ across disciplinary boundaries matter in the emergence of lyrical meaning in songs. There are the lyrics themselves, of course, yet the words do not amount to autonomous ‘works’ of art; much more obviously than in printed poetry, they are continually inflected by surrounding medial, spatial and historical ‘textures’ and conventionalised ‘scripts’ of performance. Trying to do academic justice to such ‘texts’ comes with the challenge of having to answer what Jacques Attali in a related context phrased as a “call for theoretical indiscipline” (Attali 1985, 5, italics in the original). Like few other art forms, lyrics fall between disciplinary chairs, which may explain why to this day hardly any veritable academic study has taken on song lyrics as its central subject. 1 In pursuit of a ‘cultural rhetoric of lyrics’, I have accordingly rather liberally marauded across the institutional boundaries of literary, cultural, and postcolonial studies (my academic home ground, if you like) and took whatever I found helpful from musicology, linguistics, sociology and ethnography all the way to media, theatre and performance studies. Such trespassing comes at the risk of occasionally dabbling in ideas 1
A notable exception is Mark W. Booth’s excellent 1981 yet relatively unsystematic The Experience of Songs, which presents exemplary readings of lyrics from Old English song to 20th-century advertising jingle.
12
Reading Song Lyrics
and theories with insufficient grounding to which I admit; yet it is a risk that can hardly be avoided in trying to come to terms with a cultural practice that cares little for institutional demarcations. Part of the inspiration to write this book was my experience teaching in an English department where students increasingly propose song lyrics rather than ‘conventional’ poetry for reading lists and exam topics. There is no good reason, I believe, to discourage such choices – after all, the emphatic dissociation of (written) poetry and (performed) lyrics in English literature is essentially a relatively late cultural invention. It only took hold after Wyatt’s introduction of Petrarch’s sonnets in the first half of the 16th century and the concomitant gradual establishment of iambic pentameter in place of the more ‘songly’ four-stressed line as the dominant mode of English verse. Antony Easthope remarks: Promoted into dominance by the new courtly culture, pentameter is an historically constituted institution. It is not natural to English poetry but is a specific cultural phenomenon, a discursive form. […][T]wo forms – the [medieval] ballad and the Renaissance courtly poem – exemplify opposed kinds of discourse: one collective, popular, intersubjective, accepting the text as a poem to be performed; the other individualist, elitist, privatized, offering the text as a representation of a voice speaking. (Easthope 1983, 55, 77)
Under the ensuing hegemony of the new brand of ‘writerly’ poetry, performed lyrics of course never disappeared from the scene, even if the Western canonisation of poetry in the academy often suggests as much. While poetry serves as a “paradigm of modernity” (Iser 1964; Reinfandt 2003; Jahraus 2003) in critical assessments of social and cultural differentiation that allows to exemplarily trace the increasing individualisation, self-referentiality and professional specialisation of modern discourses – culminating in the often obscure, isolated and fragmentary language games of Modernism and Postmodernism that so many students shy away from – it never replaced alternative forms of lyrical communication. Instead, it relegated them to a “subordinate or oppositional position” (Easthope 1983, 65): forms valorising alternative models of inter-subjectivity and mediatisation have largely, but not exclusively, thrived and survived in the realm of popular culture. 2 As opposed to an increasing elitism, hermeticism, and monologism which Mikhail Bakhtin (2000) attributes to the genre of poetry, ‘popular’ song lyrics have 2
Easton et al. conceive of the emergence of popular culture in three periods: “First the emergence of a separate popular culture in the period c.1500-1700, second, the hardening of that culture into distinct, although regional cultures of the poor from approximately 1700-1850, and third the creation of a national popular culture beginning perhaps as early as 1800 but not coming into its full force until after 1914” (Easton et al. 1988, 27).
Introduction
13
tended to remain strongly rooted in antiphony, collective experience and communal performance. Still, it would be wrong to construct a history of binary opposition between (written) poetry and (performed) lyrics, or between the elite culture of modernity and a popular counterculture more generally; most lyrical practices have always occupied an interstitial position between elite and popular discourses which became further complicated by the advent of sound recording and the mass-production, reproduction, and distribution of song in the 20th century. This is true in several ways: lyrics encompass a vast discursive field covering, today, a myriad of genres all trading their own cultural capital between the poles of what Simon Frith refers to as the bourgeois, folk, and pop “music worlds” (cf. Frith 1998, 35-42), while even at the ‘purist’ ideological ends, there is necessary diffusion. Art music culture, for instance, has tended to emphatically draw on canonical written poetry as a resource for lyrics since around the 19th century, yet a poem turned embodied Lied and entered into the intersubjective situation of performance inevitably takes on aspects of the popular (which the performative conventions regulating the staging of art songs – such as an ‘impersonal’ singing style, a strict separation of performer and audience, a strict etiquette of quiet and restraint – again seek to repress, cf. Cone 1974, 71-80 and Small 1987 and 1998). Conversely, the ideology of folk music culture emerging in the late 18th and 19th century emphasises immediacy, the oral transmission of lyrics and collective experience against the alienating effects of print culture and industrialisation – yet ironically, the staging of an “imagined community” (Anderson 1991) of the ‘people’ through songs had from the start been dependent on mechanical reproduction in print and, later, recording culture to keep the modern ‘folk’ together. The advent of an overtly commercial music culture over the course of the 20th century celebrating massmedial reproduction eventually bridged ideological schisms by offering “collective individuality” (Reinfandt 2003, 278), a synthesis, however, which comes with its own bag of problems and in turn fuelled the diffusion of generic hybrids in-between the angles of art, folk and pop that marks our time. Nevertheless, the particular validity of lyrics in the culture of modernity remains that they present an integral cultural complement to readings which see the evolution of poetic discourse exclusively based on what Walter Ong called “the technologizing of the word” (1982) and a concomitant ideology of increasing individuation and textual autonomy. Surely, poetry has produced its own counter-discourse to the increasing solipsism of the literary system under modern conditions, namely the discourse formation commonly referred to as ‘romantic’. Yet while writers from John Donne to William Wordsworth to Linton Kwesi Johnson (the poet) attempt to redeem modern alienation and
14
Reading Song Lyrics
an increasing loss of ‘world’ in a mediatised culture by strategies of feigned orality, immediacy, or communalism encoded in the medium of writing, people like Renaissance song writer John Dowland, Romantic street balladeers or dub artist Linton Kwesi Johnson (the performer) provide the material for actual orality, sonic immediacy and – in a live context – communalism. Seen in this light, lyrics provide a paradigmatic case of “romantic communication” (Reinfandt 2003) which is again challenged, of course, by medial changes from music printing to the advent of analogue recording technology and mechanical reproduction to digital recording, reproduction and sampling. Lyrics are, no more and no less, the other tradition of modern poetry which has been notoriously neglected by a prevailing focus on graphemic artefacts. Any literary or cultural history that excludes lyrics from its scope presents a dramatically lopsided view of verbal art, and, by extension, modern culture. If lyrics matter, why then have they so persistently fallen through the nets of academic fishing? Surely the afore-mentioned institutional particularisms come into play here, yet especially from a literary studies perspective, the blame lies fundamentally with a stubborn bias towards the written word and a persistent refusal to work with a concept of ‘embodied’ language. Without a doubt, most lyrics come across as banal on paper and fail according to the standards of received literary analysis and aesthetic judgement. Such readings, however, overlook that what is negligible as a poem may be intricately functional at the intersection of sonic, social, bodily and medial discourses. This is not denying that there are still as many awful lyrics in the world as there are mediocre poems – but aesthetic value judgements are not what I am after in this book, nor is this an instruction manual for struggling songwriters to sex up their lyrical game. What this book tries to perform, instead, is first, a systematic approximation to the question of how lyrics are implicated in the emergence of meaning in songs – in particular performative contexts, specific generic conventions, musical structures, and medial situations. In a second step, I then try to illustrate, via three extended case studies from around 1600, 1800 and 2000 respectively, how such meaning in turn matters in relation to larger ideological discourse formations. My specific interest, here, is in how songs ambivalently perform in the formation of a ‘national culture’ between institutional pedagogy and potentially subversive, individual signifying practices. The first part of this book, titled Toward a Cultural Rhetoric of Lyrics, accordingly outlines an encompassing analytical framework for the interpretation of lyrics. It unavoidably comes along with quite a load of theory, but attempts to always counterbalance theoretical abstraction with exemplary readings of a single song which each chapter addresses from a relevant theoretical angle, progressively adding levels of lyrical complexity. I picked
Introduction
15
“Scarborough Fair” for these purposes, a song which forms part of a group of traditional ballads that Francis James Child collected under the title “The Elfin Knight” in his English and Scottish Popular Ballads (Child 1957, I, 714), and which was re-popularised during the British folk revival in the 1960s by the English folk singer Martin Carthy. Carthy recorded a version of the song on his debut album in 1965, and the tune was subsequently adopted by Marianne Faithfull in early 1966. It was left to Paul Simon, however, to make it perhaps the most popular (and commercial) English folk song in recent history by including his own take on Simon and Garfunkel’s 1966 album Parsley Sage Rosemary and Thyme, and republishing it on the soundtrack album to Mike Nichols’s Oscar-winning film The Graduate (1967). From here, “Scarborough Fair” entered almost every imaginable musical genre and was performed by innumerable artists, of which I will only consider Sérgio Mendes in some detail who entered the charts with a bossa-pop version in 1968. My reasons for picking “Scarborough Fair” were, on the one hand, its status as a modern ‘classic’ which most people should be familiar with in one way or the other; on the other hand, “Scarborough Fair” lends itself extremely well to illustrating how the same verbal material can take on vastly different meaning in shifting contexts of performance, generic framing, musical realisation and medial presentation. Chapter 2 dealing with “Performance and Performativity” begins by unravelling the genealogy of “Scarborough Fair” over the past centuries and traces the lyrical transformations that it underwent until Martin Carthy recorded it in 1965. From here, I investigate how lyrics more generally ‘perform’ by first reviewing linguistic approaches in speech act theory, pragmatics and deconstruction, then juxtaposing these to notions of performance in cultural studies, and finally offering a synthesis of the two with the help of relevant research in ethnopoetics. The critical vocabulary offered here such as “performance arena,” “register” and “communicative economy” (Foley 1995, 47-56) is then tested with Martin Carthy’s 1965 recording. Chapter 3 turns to “Generic Conventions and Cultural Capital” in order to account for the vastly different practices of performative “framing” (Goffman 1974) on the musical scene. In a first step, different aspects of song genre are outlined, from communicative conventions (affecting, among other things, the shifting agency between lyrical author and performer), via social and ideological conventions (crucially involving Pierre Bourdieu’s notions of “distinction” and “cultural capital”), all the way to economic and juridical conventions. In a second step, I take up these aspects in order to chart the larger field of lyrical practice between the art, folk, and commercial “music worlds” drawing especially on Simon Frith’s seminal study of Performing Rites (1998, esp. 35-42), before offering short readings of the transformative
16
Reading Song Lyrics
power of generic conventions in Marianne Faithfull and Simon and Garfunkel’s performances of “Scarborough Fair” respectively. Chapter 4, “Sound and Songfulness,” tries to tackle the intricate question of how the music affects verbal meaning in songs. Since there is so much critical disagreement about whether music means anything beyond itself at all, and if it does, how and what in particular, I found it necessary to begin by fundamentally sussing out what sounds may mean before trying to answer how such meaning affects verbal signifying. The chapter consequently takes a shot at debunking ‘myths of musical meaning’ in a somewhat daring sweep from Plato to Hanslick and beyond in order to propose an alternative, ‘trialectical’ model of how musical meaning emerges every time anew at the crossroads of cognitive, social and bodily dynamics. I then try to trace one possible effect of such dynamics and its interaction with verbal language in a comparative reading of Martin Carthy and Sérgio Mendes’s versions of “Scarborough Fair,” illustrating with the help of Lawrence Kramer’s concept of “songfulness” (Kramer 2002, 51-67) how verbal meaning is effectively suspended by musical meaning in Mendes’s take. Chapter 5 finally addresses “Mediality and Musical Multimedia.” It begins by charting the field of medial performance by applying changing modes of technological saturation (from print to analogue to digital recording culture) to changing modes of performance visibility. From here I discuss the continuing validity of ‘liveness’ in a culture dominated by the mass media, discussing the relation of live performance to different kinds of ‘recordedness’ from printed songs to (digital) music video, touching, among other things, also on the cover art of some albums featuring “Scarborough Fair.” The final extended reading of “Scarborough Fair,” however, is offered in the context of Mike Nichols’s The Graduate (1967), often credited with being the first film to use pre-recorded popular songs instead of post-production scoring, and investigates how the generation of lyrical meaning is affected by the multimedial dynamics of film or video. Chapter 6, titled “Bridge: Song and National Culture,” then provides the transition to the second part of this book. It again briefly takes up “Scarborough Fair” and its ideological implications in the romantic nationalisms which underwrote the projects of ballad collectors such as Johann Gottfried Herder or Francis James Child, only to inquire more generally into what ‘national culture’ could be and how it is constituted. Arguing against Antony Easthope’s (1999) notion that there is something like a deep-structural core structuring the ‘Englishness’ of English discourse formations, I propose that notions of Englishness are rather constantly produced and reproduced (often with a difference) through multiple discursive practices fluctuating between what Homi Bhabha refers to as the “two times of the nation” (Bhabha
Introduction
17
1990b). Such practices are always performed against, or, indeed, from positions of cultural ‘otherness’ which produce ambivalent desires of belonging (or unbelonging). The case studies in Part II of this book, titled Performing Englishness, accordingly offer extended readings of three exemplary songs covering very different musical genres and historical times (yet all located in London) where lyrics intersect in ambivalent ways with ideas of ‘national culture’. Chapter 7 investigates to which ends so much melancholic “Love is in the Ayre” in John Dowland’s lute songs. It takes “Come again” as its starting point, a song printed in Dowland’s First Booke of Songes in 1597, the first songbook of its kind to be published in England. Through “Come again,” I venture to interpret John Dowland’s presumably ‘very English’ melancholy in a different light than musicologist have hitherto tended to do, namely as a strategic sonic and lyrical trademark Dowland consciously put on in order to pursue his desire for courtly recognition. Barred from a position at the court of Queen Elizabeth I – and thus from the epicentre of national culture – by his Catholicism (or at least so he thought), he used the mask of the disappointed Petrarchan lover to set extremely ambiguous and often subversive panegyric lyrics to music, and failing to achieve his goals as a traditional ‘musicus’, intriguingly employed the rapidly shifting institutional, legal and medial contexts of Elizabethan and Jacobean musicking for the purpose of lobbying the court. If Dowland consequently ‘sounds English’, his Englishness is indeed a performative inscription of his ambivalent desire to nationally and professionally belong. Chapter 8, titled “Broadsides and Backsides,” jumps to the year 1811, and highlights the validity of broadside ballads for the study of culture. As one of the few types of (performed) literature that was affordable to all classes ever since the early Renaissance until the mid-19th century, street ballads provide rare insights into the reception of cultural phenomena beyond bourgeois discourses. As I will argue in this chapter, such insight is particularly instructive in the spectacular case of Sara Baartman: Baartman, a Khoisan woman from the Southern Cape, was a cause célèbre in London where she was exhibited at Piccadilly Street as “The Hottentot Venus” between autumn 1810 and spring 1811, then toured the British provinces and was eventually moved to Paris where she fatefully fell into the hands of French anthropologists shortly before her death in 1814. Since the mid-1980s, Sara Baartman has become something of a ‘master trope’ in gender and postcolonial studies; the recent “critical industry” (Magubane 2001, 816) surrounding Baartman, however, tends to reiterate a number of sweeping statements about her person, gender and race which hardly stand the test of historical verification. My interest in this chapter, therefore, is to explore the actual popular reception of Sara
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Reading Song Lyrics
Baartman during her London sojourn through the corrective lens of a broadside ballad titled “The Hottentot Venus; A New Song,” a song which invites linking her ambivalent iconic status less to questions of race and sexuality, but to the rise of “illegitimate theatre” (Moody 2000) during the Romantic period and the perceived demise of a ‘national’ theatre culture. Chapter 9, finally, turns from the early whiffs of “imperial melancholy” which enmeshed Sara Baartman’s stage career to the “postcolonial melancholia” which, according to Paul Gilroy (2004), haunts contemporary life in Britain. My particular focus in this context is on pre-millennial manifestations of such melancholia in the mediatisation of rock bands like Blur and Oasis, and New Labour’s populist love affair with so-called Britpop in the process of ‘rebranding’ Britain as ‘Cool Britannia’ before and after the landslide election victory of 1997. Under the title “Toasting the English,” this chapter more specifically investigates how the emerging Asian British music scene has located itself in the midst of such discourses, and I again focus on a single song which tackles Tony Blair’s music populism head-on. My reading of the song “Real Great Britain” (2000) by ‘Asian punk jungelist’ collective Asian Dub Foundation (ADF) is, in this sense, particularly interested in how lyrics function as a ‘romantic’ antithesis to a thoroughly ‘modernist’, digitally sampled sonic fundament. The relevance of this dynamics lies in the fact that it provides a model with larger reverberations for the study of postcolonial culture: it implies how syncretistic, planetary allegiances may be forged through strategic ‘mis-uses’ of late capitalist flows of commodities and technologies, while at the same time a highly localised grassroots politics may be retained which fends off the grip of “corporate multiculturalism” (Gilroy 2001, 52). The chapter closes with an outlook on the politics of Asian British lyrical practices in the altered landscape after the events of 9/11, focussing in particular on the immensely controversial song “Cookbook D.I.Y.” (2006) by Fun^da^mental, and a more inspiring play on post-9/11 anxiety by Sri LankanBritish artist M.I.A. Before getting seriously started, I should perhaps state that I have deliberately tried to avoid writing on lyrics as a fan – which in a way is a contradiction in terms after I have opened by arguing that personal taste and the dynamics of social distinction are inevitably at play in any interpretation of lyrics. So let me come clean: my choice of lyrical examples for the most part consciously drew on material that I am relatively dispassionate about – none of the recordings I have picked in the first part of this study is terribly close to my heart, even if it may transpire that I find Paul Simon a slightly less impressive character than Martin Carthy, Marianne Faithfull or Sérgio Mendes. As regards the second part, I have encountered John Dowland and Romantic street balladeers with very little previous knowledge or exposition to their art,
Introduction
19
working my way into the critical discourse more or less from scratch; still, I have emerged with a great deal of fascination, and especially in the case of Dowland, a certain affection. Things are slightly different for the Asian Dub Foundation, as I was attracted to their sounds long before I started writing this book. Jungle and trip hop more generally formed part of the soundtrack of my undergrad years and have stayed with me since, and such affinities may show. Nevertheless, I have constantly tried to check my own preconceptions and predilections throughout this volume, to be open to all genres and sounds, and to interrogate all of their tacit conventions with a similar sense of critical distance. Still, I hope that this book manages to transmit some of my own fascination with and affection for this “performed literature” (Bowden 2001) which most academic text books shamelessly pass over. Poetry as it is usually anthologised and taught is notoriously conceived as difficult, opaque and inaccessible (at least by my own students), and it is time to realise that there is more poetry than there is in the Norton Anthology, and that most of us take pleasure immersing ourselves in it every day. Yet lyrics also need to be encountered on their own critical terms: the following pages try to carve out the transdisciplinary framework which may help to better understand how song lyrics matter.
Part I Toward a Cultural Rhetoric of Lyrics
Construe my meaning, wrest not my method (Giles Farnaby, 1598)
2. Performativity and Performance Lyrics are not poetry, and their study therefore requires a different set of analytical tools from that which is conventionally applied to poetry. In the subsequent chapters, I will try to successively outline a ‘cultural rhetoric of lyrics’, by addressing notions of ‘performativity’ and its relation to performance, the dynamics of generic convention and social distinction, the interrelation of verbal and musical experience in songs, and, finally, issues of mediality and multimedial dialogue. My choice of speaking of ‘a cultural rhetoric’ takes its cue in part from Wayne C. Booth’s important study The Rhetoric of Fiction (1983). But while I, like Booth and modern rhetoric more generally, take an interest in the generation of meaning between producers, (performed) texts, and audiences which finds expression in textual traces and structures, the following chapters contradict Booth when it comes to claims that such meaning is essentially a product of (implied) authorial agency which eventually guarantees the moral coherence and value of the ‘work’. Not only is authorial agency in the performance art of lyrics severely complicated by the fact that it is (often unevenly) divided between author and public performer (even when both are the same person); but more importantly, such agency is continually checked and balanced by the material and medial conditions of embodied lyrical communication in ever shifting contexts. The medium surely is not the message as McLuhan would have it, but the message invariably bears the traces of the medium, and each message is shaped by social and institutional discourses that frame its performance, as much as by receptive strategies by specific audiences. The term ‘cultural rhetoric’ accordingly proposes a synthesis of cultural and rhetorical perspectives; its specific heuristic value, following Thomas Rosteck, lies in the realisation “that every discourse is an action upon an audience; that it occurs within a specific material context; and that it reproduces this context in its structures and in its assumptions about what ‘discourse’ and what ‘audiences’ are” (Rosteck 2001, 54). But before delving into the abysses of theory and to avoid the drags of excessive abstraction, let us begin with a practical example which I will continually come back to in the course of the following five chapters.
Scarborough Fair (I): Historical Transformations In the early 1960s, British folk singer Martin Carthy had a piece in his repertoire which he considered as “basically [his] song” (Carthy 2003) at the time, a tune called “Scarborough Fair.” In his own account, he came across it
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Reading Song Lyrics
in a songbook compiled by the older folk singers Ewan MacColl and Peggy Seeger (1960, cf. Carthy 2001), who in turn seem to have adapted it from Francis James Child’s seminal late-19th-century collection of English and Scottish Popular Ballads. These are the lyrics of “Scarborough Fair” as recorded by Carthy on his debut album in 1965: Scarborough Fair Are you going to Scarborough Fair Parsley, sage, rosemary, and thyme Remember me to one who lives there For once she was a true love of mine Tell her to make me a cambric shirt Parsley, sage, rosemary, and thyme Without no seam or fine needlework And then she’ll be a true love of mine Tell her to find me an acre of land Parsley, sage, rosemary, and thyme Between the salt water and the sea strand And then she’ll be a true love of mine Tell her to plough it with a lamb’s horn Parsley, sage, rosemary, and thyme And to sow it all o’er with one peppercorn And then she’ll be a true love of mine Tell her to reap it with a sickle of leather Parsley, sage, rosemary, and thyme And to thrash it out with a bunch of heather And then she’ll be a true love of mine (printed in Carthy 1987)
The bare meaning of the words, here, is not quite as straight forward as one would expect from a popular ballad at first sight, and one may as well try to start out by trying to make better sense of them as one would with a printed poem – by looking at the quality of the rhetorical form, argument and imagery, or for instance by looking at the ballad’s tradition and intertexts. The latter option seems particularly promising, as “Scarborough Fair,” like many songs that were re-popularised in the British folk revival of the 1960s, is a ballad which comes with a considerable bag of history. As Francis James Child minutely illustrates in his English and Scottish Popular Ballads (1882-1898), it is part of a vast legacy of ‘riddle’ songs which abound in the folk traditions not only of Scotland and England, but also of Germany, South Siberia, Tibet, India, Persia, Greece and Iceland, among others (Child 1957, I, 7-14). The core argumentative structure of such songs usually consists of a
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suitor, often a prince, and a maid who will have to satisfyingly solve a number of riddles to become his wife, or vice versa. In the British context specifically, as A.L. Lloyd puts forth, one can make out three subtypes of this model, which he labels “supernatural,” “homilectic” and “amatory” (Lloyd 1967, 163). The supernatural versions almost certainly date back to medieval lore, and propose the suitor to be a demon in disguise; the lady who has unwittingly called forth the spirit will usually counter his riddles by posing her own which the demon fails to answer. The homilectic versions move from paganism to Christianity by modifying the suitor into the devil, and an innocent maid proves to be rightly God’s by answering all riddles correctly. The amatory ballads, finally, are secular, and their suitors are luckily what they seem (i.e. desirable men or women throughout) who win over the other sex by cleverly mastering their questions. 1 The peculiar place of “Scarborough Fair,” in this context, is that it has apparently shifted from originally supernatural to later amatory implications. “Scarborough Fair” is a version of a group of ballads which Child collected under the title “The Elfin Knight” (Child no. 2). The first written record of these was found bound at the end of a book printed in Edinburgh in 1673, but it is very likely that variations of the same song had been circulating in the oral memory far earlier than that, probably as early as the 14th century. Half of the written records collected by Child (A-E) open with the rather medieval motif of a fairy knight who is summoned by a lady, as the 1673 version (Child no. 2 A) may illustrate: The elphin knight sits on yon hill, Ba, ba, ba, lilli ba He blows his horn both lowd and shrill. The wind hath blown my plaid awa […] ‘I whish that horn were in my kist, Ba, ba, ba, lilli ba Yea, and the knight in my arms two.’ The wind hath blown my plaid awa She had no sooner these words said Ba, ba, ba, lilli ba When that the knight came to her bed The wind hath blown my plaid awa (Child 1957, I, 15)
1
Prominent examples from the Child corpus would be “Riddles Wisely Expounded,” Child no. 1 (see 1957, I, 1-6); or “Captain Wedderburn’s Courtship,” Child no. 46 (see 1957, I, 414-25).
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What follows are first riddles posed by the demon, which are then countered with new riddles by the lady – including, clearly, those that Martin Carthy presents us with in his verses 2-5 of “Scarborough Fair.” The outcome, invariably, is that the fairy backs off, and the maid continues to enjoy her virginity: “‘My maidenhead I’l then keep still, / Ba, ba, ba, lilli ba / Let the Elphin knight do what he will’” (ibid.). The earliest written records of the ballad that come close to “Scarborough Fair” as sung by Carthy only date to the early 19th century (Child no. 2 F, G and J), and the closest versions by far, listed in Child’s “Additions and Corrections” section of English and Scottish Popular Ballads (ibid., 496-97), were set down in written form still later. These are, first, a version related to Child by his colleague Frank Kidson in 1884 (“‘Oh where are you going?’ ‘To Scarbro fair.’”), and second, a version published by J. Collingwood Bruce and John Stokoe in their Northumbrian Minstrelsy (1882) (“Are you going to Whittingham fair?”). The latter version is related to a manuscript by Thomas Hepple which already dates to around 1855, but deviates in some detail from the Bruce and Stokoe publication. It is again likely, of course, that these versions circulated in the oral tradition long before and coexisted alongside the ‘elfin’ versions; the most obvious indication of this is that the Scarborough Fair, a huge trade event starting in mid-August and lasting an exceptional 45 days, was no longer held after 1788, and has a history reaching back into the 13th century. Nevertheless, there are aspects of the later “Scarbrough Fair” ballads which make them distinctly more ‘modern’ than the earlier variants. The first thing to note, here, is that the opening involving the summoning of an elf or similar demon is eclipsed. They are replaced, instead, by an opening stanza presenting a speaker in the first person addressing an anonymous traveller or a group of travellers in the first line, who are then directed to “remember” the speaker to his or her ex-lover who lives in the town of the travellers’ destination in the third and fourth lines. The effect of this new beginning is three-fold: first, it at first sight displaces all associations with the supernatural pervading the ‘elfin’ models. A.L. Lloyd ventures to explain this type of shift with changing social realities of the British peasant communities and links it to the gradual disappearance of the epic in the oral tradition. Ballads such as the “Elfin Knight,” he argues, were detached from epic tales but initially retained some of their “intense heroism and magic” (Lloyd 1967, 164). With the shift from tribal and feudal to capitalist systems, however, these ballads became outdated due to society’s “new tempo, outlook and demands” and had to be adapted to new standards, which involved, among other things, a more immediate awareness of the “audience and the need to win it, a need that had hardly existed in a close-knit and homogeneous society” (ibid., 165).
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The latter observation is indeed particularly relevant in view of the 19thcentury versions of “Whittingham Fair” or “Scarborough Fair” and points to the second effect of their revised openings: by introducing a speaker and an addressee (or a group of addressees), they provide a narrative frame which – contrary to the ‘elfin’ models – invites the listeners’ immediate participation and even calls for their mediation between the speaker and his or her beloved. The clever shift to addressing the listener in the second person (“Are you going,” “Remember me,” “Tell her” etc.) forces the audience to pay careful attention to the riddles that are subsequently posed. This mediation through a narrative frame set in the present moreover establishes a third effect, which is the introduction of a rather complex temporal relation of past, present and future. The listeners no longer follow a fresh course of love, but are presented with an affair that is already past, while they learn nothing immediate about the relationship, nor why it finally went to pieces. The only obvious source of speculation are the riddles themselves which are subsequently posed; the riddles, however, offer ambiguous implications at best pointing not only to the past quality of the lovers’ affair (“For once she was …”), but also to their future chance of a reunion (“And then she’ll be …”). They range, basically, between the notion of a serious attempt to win back the ex-lover through riddles proving his or her truthfulness on the one hand (in the tradition of conventional amatory ballads such as “Riddles Wisely Expounded,” Child no. 1), and a much more ‘modern’, disillusioned, or even sarcastic view of love and truthfulness on the other. It is important to note in this context that other than in Martin Carthy’s version of “Scarborough Fair,” the earlier versions feature two speakers and voices instead of just one: after the first three riddles, the ex-lover comes in and turns the argument around, as in the “Whittingham Fair” version collected by Thomas Hepple: Three hard questions he has putten to me Parsley sage grow merry in time But I’ll match him with other three Before he shall be a true lover of mine (Hepple 2004)
This shift in voices, of course, on the one hand complicates the narrative situation considerably; as the two ex-lovers cannot be in the same place (she, after all, is meant to be in Whittingham, isn’t she, and he someplace else) the situation demands either a degree of spatial, or of temporal abstraction from the listeners. On the other hand, it rather indicates a playful game of love leading to a happy reunion and leaves less interpretive space for resignation, frustration or sarcasm. Indeed, the reduction to just one speaking voice as in Carthy’s version seems almost prerequisite to fully exploit the song’s poten-
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tial of emotional ambiguity and melancholy. While two perspectives point towards a playful dialogue, a singular perspective complies much more thoroughly with the demands of romantic subjectivity and emotional depth which fascinatingly resists external verification, and thus invites all sorts of speculation about the lovers’ past. A last innovation of the “Scarboro” and “Whittingham Fair” ballads which Carthy’s version is obviously heavily indebted to, finally, is the new type of refrain. The list of four herbs, “parsley, sage, rosemary, and thyme,” certainly strikes as rather cryptic in the context of the ex-lovers’ plight at first sight, and audiences in the 1960s surely would have found it quite hard to make sense of them. There is some indication in fact that this was already the case for the ballads’ 19th-century singers and audiences, as only two recorded versions feature the refrain as Carthy sings it – “Whittingham Fair” printed by Bruce and Stokoe, as well as Child no. 2 G (dating to 1810) –, while the others use variations such as “Savoury, sage, rosemary, and thyme” (the Child version related by Kidson), “parsley, sage, grow merry in time” (Hepple’s “Whittingham Fair”), “Sober and grave grows merry in time” (Child no. 2 F), or “Every rose grows merry wi thyme” (Child no. 2 H). There is clearly a pattern at work here that drives at a more obvious relationship with the amatory meaning of the rest of the ballad in a process which highlights the flexibility of oral tradition. The homophones ‘rosemary’ / ‘(g)rows merry’ and ‘thyme’ / ‘time’ offer a tempting semantic effect at little phonetic cost, and the latter three refrains clearly soothingly imply that time will eventually heal the lovers’ wounds (it is very likely that “thyme” in Child 2 H is a transcription error and should actually be “time”). On the whole, there are three ways of coming to terms with “parsley, sage, rosemary, and thyme” in Carthy’s version. The first would be to follow the renowned folklorist Maud Karpeles, who notes on the use of refrain in her Introduction to English Folk Song that it “may be external, occurring at the end of the stanza or, more usually, internal, being interspersed between the narrative lines,” and continues: “Sometimes it consists of words that have a connection with the ballad or song […] At other times it has no connection, but appears to consist of words arbitrarily introduced, such as [in] ‘Scarborough Fair’” (Karpeles 1973, 43-44). As such, the refrain would mainly be used for its sound rather than meaning, and work on a similar level as the “Ba, ba, ba, lilli ba” of the early “Elfin Knight” documents. Alternatively, it may be assumed that the refrain survived from much older days when herbology was less a matter of alternative medicine than popular knowledge. This again offers two roads of interpretation: the first is to read the herbs as symbols of the lovers’ amatory quest. According to De Jong, parsley was often employed to sooth bitterness (both culinary and
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emotional) in medieval discourses, sage was associated with strength, rosemary symbolised faithfulness and remembrance, while thyme was thought to engender courage (in men) and, to round things off, fertility (in women) (De Jong 2003). The refrain may thus be read as a thinly veiled invitation to overcome the bitterness of separation, and find the strength, love and courage to get back together again for a (possibly reproductive) happy ending. The third option, however, is to interpret the herbs in the supernatural rather than amatory context, and to see them as a remnant of the precursors of “Scarborough Fair” involving the elfin knight and maid. It should be noted that there is some evidence that calls such a reading into question; after all, the “parsley, sage, etc.” refrain is exclusively documented in versions where the opening stanza’s summoning of a fairy knight is either missing or substituted with the new “Are you going etc.” type of opening, while the 18thcentury records still explicitly featuring the demon mostly stick to variations of “Ba, ba, ba, lilli ba” or “Blaw, blaw, blaw winds, blaw” (Child no. 2 B-E). It is true nevertheless that all four herbs were associated with the supernatural. This is particularly stressed by Martin Carthy himself, who insists in the liner notes of his debut album Martin Carthy: Folklorists and students of plant mythology are well aware that certain herbs were held to have magical significance and were used by sorcerers in their spells and conversely as counter-spells by those who wished to outwit them. The herbs mentioned in the refrain of this song (parsley, sage, rosemary and thyme) are all known to have been closely associated with death and also as charms against the evil eye. (Carthy 1965)
Carthy takes this as a cue to argue against a purely amatory reading of “Scarborogh Fair” and emphasises a continuation with the supernatural tradition, quoting in support Sir Walter Scott, Anne Gilchrist and Lucy Broadwood who believes, in Carthy’s words, “that the refrain might be the survival of an incantation against such a [demonic] suitor” (ibid.). Carthy’s insistence on the supernatural implications of the herbs in the refrain poses some difficulties in view of the version of “Scarborough Fair” that he selected. After all, his choice of an opening stanza introducing a rather complex spatial and temporal relationship between a lover and his beloved, the fate of which the lover puts in the hands of an anonymous traveller (travellers, the audience), actually opens up possibilities of reading the ballad in less than merely sentimental terms, but in terms of a much more complex conception of love. This and the reduction to just one perspective and speaking voice invite a view of love that involves varying associations of emotional ambiguity, frustration, melancholy, sarcasm, intense longing or despair – all of which makes little sense, of course, if we read the speaker as a stock demon in pursuit of an innocent maid.
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Yet while it makes little sense to take the elfin knight lore and its mythical background literally, it may nevertheless make good sense to instead insist on the symbolic implications of the supernatural tale. Ballads such as the “Elfin Knight,” or alternative variations such as “Lady Isabel and the ElfKnight” (Child no. 4, see 1957, I, 22-62), are, of course, cultural manifestations which both dramatise and sanction (female) sexuality. One need not be a Freudian to suspect that what is actually happening in these early ballads is that the sexual desire of young maidens is, quite literally, ‘demonised’, and that all those elfs are in fact mythically veiled, externalised and embodied fantasy structures that are called forth unwittingly by ‘impure thoughts’. Read in this sense, the cultural validity of the older models suddenly becomes very effective again for the later versions of “Scarborough Fair”: to call upon the elfin tradition’s emphasis on sexuality and desire – rather than sense and sensibility – is actually very much in tune again with the reading of the interhuman relationship in “Scarborough Fair” proposed above, and may give some suggestions as to why the lovers’ affair is in need of magic mending. What we would end up with is a reading of the refrain not as an incantation against the evil eye, but against the rather worldly pains of amorous betrayal. Read as a poem on paper, the lyrics of Carthy’s version thus seem to revolve around the following semantic field in the widest sense: the anger, anguish, or pain of a single – presumably male – speaker trying to come to terms with the loss of a female lover, whereby the reason for the their separation seems to have a lot to do with that lover’s sexual expressivity or, perhaps, promiscuity. As I have stated at the outset, though, the quest for the possible ‘meaning’ of “Scarborough Fair” does not end here; in fact, this is only where it begins. The verbal content of words, lines and stanzas is certainly important – but what lyrics indeed ‘mean’ involves more than just language. This fundamentally has to do with the fact that other than the words of printed poems, lyrics are always ‘actualised’ in the sense that they are given the body of a voice and set in relation to musical sound. As a performance art, they are always ‘situated’, spatially, temporally, socially, physically and medially, in a particular arena in which they are performed. Let us in the following investigate some of the theoretical and practical implications.
Performativity: Linguistic Perspectives Surely, to argue that the words of Martin Carthy’s “Scarborough Fair” and indeed all lyrics can only be interpreted by addressing the particular contexts of performance sounds like stating the obvious after what has been termed the ‘performative turn’ in the humanities: according to the new credo, all
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cultural practices, or all uses of language for that matter, are already performative per se. There has been an inflationary use of the term ‘performative’ ever since John L. Austin coined it for his language philosophy in the mid 50s, and it has been appropriated into many contexts and given various implications by different disciplines and critical camps – from philosophy and linguistics to sociology and ethnology to theatre studies and musicology. As a result, the meaning of ‘performative’ has become irrevocably multiple and blurred (cf. Parker and Sedgwick 1995, Fischer-Lichte and Wulf 2001; Wirth 2002; Carlson 2003). For a theoretical basis of the discussion of lyrics, it is therefore promising to begin by highlighting some of the critical developments of the terms ‘performance’ and ‘performativity’, and to sort out which approaches are in fact useful when we talk about the performance and performativity of lyrics. The starting point of all discussions of performativity is John L. Austin’s distinction between two different types of language use in the first of his seminal lectures which were later published under the title How to Do Things with Words. Here, Austin calls attention to a particular type of utterances which do not actually ‘state’ something, but instead perform an action. He uses the category of “constatives” for the class of utterances forming statements, and introduces the term “performatives” to label the other (Austin 1975, 2-8). This latter class, instead of expressing something that may either be ‘true’ or ‘false’ according to semantic truth values, performs “conventional procedures” in which, according to Austin, truth conditions are actually irrelevant. The most famous examples Austin gives are, for instance, the declaration of a minister marrying a couple by uttering “I now pronounce you man and wife,” or the naming a ship by uttering “I hereby christen this ship ‘Queen Elizabeth’.” Rather than the mere description of things, what matters here is whether the action performed is successfully completed in the real world and changes the state of the world via the use of words (the partners are married, the ship has a name). For Austin, the meaning of “performatives” relies on a mix of verbal and contextual givens. On the one hand, performative verbs such as “declare,” “christen” or “promise” are self-referentially descriptive of what they actually ‘do’, and the act of uttering them already forms a part of what the verb describes. On the other hand, the success of performative utterances also relies on aspects of the contextual situation depending, first, on the “seriousness” of the speaker, and second on “institutional conditions.” Thus, the marrying partners must not be married already, they must be of a certain age etc., and it has to be a minister, registrar or captain who pronounces their marriage. If not, Austin more generally remarks, “the utterance is then, we may say, not indeed false but in general unhappy [or ‘infelicitous’]” (Austin 1975,
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14, italics in the original). “Infelicity,” he moreover holds, “is an ill to which all acts are heir which have the general character of ritual or ceremonial, all ceremonial acts” (ibid., 18-19, italics in the original). It is here that Austin’s (first) lectures become interesting for the interpretation of lyrics: if we also read the act of performing songs as similarly embedded in ritual or ceremonial contexts, lyrics may similarly ‘do’ something rather than merely ‘mean’ – but let us for now further trace the critical history of Austin’s ideas. The afterlife of Austin’s use of the term ‘performative’ in speech act theory is basically the story of its disappearance. In his following lectures, Austin himself begins to sacrifice the label “performative” in favour of a more global theory of ‘illocution’, in a step that was then strictly consolidated by Austin’s student and self-proclaimed administrator of his legacy, John R. Searle (1969 and 1976). In a first step, Austin draws our attention to performative utterances which do not feature performative verbs, such as in “Go away.” He labels these implicit performatives as opposed to explicit ones (such as “I order you to go away”). In a second step, however, this leads to the realisation that also conventional statements (and thus all utterances) may be considered implicit performatives, as they may be read as acts of assertion, description, or reporting; and Austin consequently self-confidently suggests to recognise “that they are speech acts no less than all these other speech acts that we have been mentioning and talking about as performative” (Austin 1979, 249). In place of the dichotomy of performatives and constatives, he develops (from lecture VIII onwards) a more encompassing notion of speech acts in which any utterance may be read on three different levels – first, on the level of the locutionary act, which involves notions of ‘sense’ and ‘reference’, second, the level of the illocutionary act, which focuses on the conventional ‘force’ of an utterance in a discursive situation, and third, the perlocutionary act, which focuses on the effect on the hearer. It is here that John R. Searle takes over and develops a theory of Speech Acts which primarily focuses on the aspect of illocutionary force as a language universal. Without going into detail, it is important to note that Searle clearly departs from Austin’s interest in particular situations to formulate a general theory in which it is less contextual circumstances which determine what an utterance ‘does’, but rather language itself: a theory of language, as Searle sees it, is a theory of words and action as “a rule-governed form of behaviour” (Searle 1969, 17). 2 This focus on illocution as a conventional force rather than on aspects of perlocution and context has allowed theorists such as Karl-Otto Apel (1976a 2
It should be noted, however, that Searle re-emphasises the importance of social context in his later writings (see Searle 1989 and 1995).
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and 1976b) and Jürgen Habermas (1970 and 1984/1987) to associate notions of the performative in speech act theory with Noam Chomsky’s entirely different notion of performance as the surface structure of language in everyday use, which is but a ‘distorted’ and ‘particular’ manifestation of a universal deep structure forming our language competence (see Chomsky 1965). Apel and Habermas expand Chomsky’s narrow focus on syntax to ethical concerns of communication and action and posit an ideal pragmatic deep structure which governs the interplay of arguments in social interaction. Both Apel and Habermas assume that this tacit pragmatic competence allows us to identify and avoid ‘performative contradictions’, i.e. floutings of rules which are seen as the constitutional prerequisite of social practices and discourses, even if actual communicative performances are usually distorted by the ideologies of particular social contexts. While all this may seem of little relevance to the performances of lyrics at first sight, it is important to trace the critical trajectory from Austin to Searle and on to Apel and Habermas in order to understand the deconstructivist criticism of the term ‘performative’. The deconstructivists’ first point of attack, here, is of course Apel and Habermas’s underlying assumption that communication conventionally aims at and results in consensus and agreement, and that ‘performative contradictions’ are therefore to be avoided. From a poststructuralist perspective, this type of universal rationalism is thoroughly at odds with the dissensual and agonistic nature of language itself; thus, for Derrida, Kristeva, de Man and others, it makes no sense, as Martin Jay puts it, “to charge someone with performative contradiction, when such a crime is the original sin of all language” (Jay 1989, 184). Jacques Derrida’s critique of Austin’s ‘performatives’ in his “Signature, Event, Context” has perhaps been the most influential critique of Austin and Searle’s language philosophy (Derrida 1982) in this vein. As most post-structuralist readings of Austin, Derrida particularly grapples with the following passage in How to Do Things with Words: a performative utterance will, for example be in a peculiar way hollow or void if said by an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy. This applies in a similar manner to any and every utterance – a sea-change in special circumstances. Language in such circumstances is in special ways – intelligibly – used not seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its normal use – ways which fall under the doctrine of the etiolations of language. All this we are excluding from consideration. (Austin 1975, 22, emphases in the original) 3´
3
See Parker and Sedgwick for a discussion of the implications of ‘etiolate’ (1995, 1-18).
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Derrida fundamentally questions Austin’s distinction of a “normal” and “parasitic” language use, and of “happy” and “unhappy” speech acts. The crucial twist in his argument is that he charges Austin with working with an ideal concept of language which does not take its “graphemic” core into account. Other than Austin, Derrida approaches the problem of performativity from the angle of writing and representation, assuming that a more general theory of communication is closely tied to his particular notion of writing. From this perspective, an utterance is neither bound to the subject or “scriptor” who produced it, nor to the original context that it was produced in, nor to a particular addressee; it may instead be infinitely quoted in other contexts without losing its basic functionality. 4 Thus confronting Austin’s concept of performativity with the notion of an infinite “iterability” of utterances, Derrida elevates those cases that are labelled ‘parasitic’ in Austin’s example – the ‘quoted’ or ‘staged’ uses of performatives in theatres, poetry or fiction – as perfectly ordinary rather than peculiar. In Derrida’s view, all language uses after all simply rely on mechanisms of repetition (with a difference), and all texts are thus ‘parasitic’. 5 This matters with regard to the performance and performativity of song lyrics, as Derrida crucially proposes that it makes little sense indeed to locate the peformative thrust of language in any conventional force of a certain verbal or (universal) social competence, neither for linguistic (Searle) nor ethical (Habermas) reasons or purposes. Instead, the notion of a general iterability of verbal expression (and thus also of lyrics) in changing and shifting verbal, but above all also communicative, social and ideological contexts (which Derrida admittedly takes little interest in), suffices as a general fundament to account for pragmatic effects. Drawing on Derrida’s notion of ‘iterability’, a focus on song lyrics, however, also requires a good deal of reservation against Derridean predilections for an anonymous, disembodied concept of language adhering to the universal metaphor or ‘writing’. The problem is probably less Derrida’s insistence on a graphemic base of verbal behaviour, but rather the impression that through the notion of iterability, we may sidetrack the notion of subjectivity in communication altogether. Mikhail Bakhtin’s 4
5
In Derrida’s words, “one can always lift a written syntagma from the interlocking chain in which it is caught or given without making it lose every possibility of functioning, if not every possibility of ‘communicating,’ precisely. Eventually, one may recognize other such possibilities in it by inscribing or grafting it into other chains. No context can enclose it. Nor can any code, the code being here both the possibility and impossibility of writing, of its essential iterability (repetition/alterity)” (Derrida 1982, 317, italics in the original). As Roland Barthes puts it elsewhere, “the citations which go to make up a text are anonymous, untraceable, and yet already read: they are quotation marks without inverted commas” (Barthes 1977, 160, italics in the original).
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intersubjective theory of dialogism (see esp. Bakhtin 2000) – unjustly appropriated by Julia Kristava into a theory of ‘anonymous’ intertextuality (see esp. Kristeva 1980) – may serve as a helpful corrective here, as it always insists on the “contact of personalities” within the “dialogic contact between texts” (Bakhtin 1986, 161). The intersubjectivity of interaction between singer and audience is surely highly relevant in performances of song lyrics. A certain chain of syntagmas such as those forming the lyrics of “Scarborough Fair” is marked by their very iterability and, as in the case of “Scarborough Fair,” has been cited in multiple variations and contexts over the preceding centuries by various singers; and even a single singer like Martin Carthy will re-cite the words anew in shifting contexts every time he performs the song. Yet while the alienating effects of différance and iteration do matter and constantly work against notions of a simplistic intentionality, the actual materiality and mediality of the words at the very moment of their performance, as well as the specific dialogic and generic context of their utterance are equally crucial. To get at these contexts it is necessary to momentarily set the abstractions of linguistic and literary approaches aside, and to turn to notions of ‘performance’ as developed by disciplines in the cultural studies tradition.
Performance: Cultural Perspectives The shift from the notion of ‘performativity’ as a rule-governed force to cultural notions of ‘performance’ goes hand in hand with a critical interrogation of what Sybille Krämer calls a “two-worlds-ontology” in the humanities. Krämer critically reviews the academic preference of representation rather than presence (in a vast trajectory from Plato to Chomsky, Searle and Habermas), which results in a preoccupation with universal or ideal structures rather than questions of their actual realisation. The everyday use of language, in turn, is more often than not seen as deficient and distorted. This emphasis on ‘virtual’ language is countered by the notion of an ‘embodied’ language, which insists that “there is no language outside of the spatially and temporally situated execution of its vocal, written or gesticulatory articulation” (Krämer 2002, 331, my tr.). To work with a notion of embodied language demands, first, foregrounding the materiality and mediality of language which shapes its meaning in a way that is neither intentional nor fully controlled by the speaker. Rather than perpetuating McLuhan’s credo that the medium is the message, Krämer assumes that a message invariably bears the traces of the medium (cf. Krämer 1998), and that on these grounds written texts ‘do’ very different things than
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spoken texts do. The second major implication of working with a concept of embodied language is a re-alignment of Derrida’s fundamental notion of iteration with an understanding of the larger social embeddedness of language. Michel Foucault quite early prepared the ground for this in The Archaeology of Knowledge where he claims that an historical statement (énoncé) is less defined by its content, but by its situatedness in certain discourse formations. The mere historical fact of an utterance – as substantial, in a certain medium, at a certain place, at a certain time – provides genuine indices which are paramount in Foucault’s notion of discourse analysis, and take away much of the arbitrariness of Derrida’s disembodied notion of iterability (see Foucault 1982, 79-88). Let us try to come to some sort of conclusion on these grounds, then, regarding the relationship between the performativity of lyrics in Austin’s sense of ‘doing’ something, and performance as a form of mediatising and staging an event. 6 It is helpful in this context to turn to ethnological research and its particular interest in the performance of rituals. Certainly, performances of songs in both formal (concert) and informal settings (sessions etc.) fall under the category of ritual, at least in Stanley J. Tambiah’s rather inclusive definition of the term: Tambiah conceives of ritual as a “culturally constructed system of symbolic communication” which is “constituted of patterned and ordered sequences of words and acts, often expressed in multiple media, whose content and arrangement are characterised in varying degree by formality (conventionality), stereotypy (rigidity), condensation (fusion), and redundance (repetition)” (Tambiah 1979, 119). For Tambiah, rituals are set in a particular dualism between formulaic repetition and sameness on the one hand, and difference which is produced by evolving actualisations in specific situations at specific dates and places on the other. Thus taking account of both the iterative foundation, and of the actual mediality, social embeddedness and spatio-temporal framing of ritual events, Tambiah goes on to describe rituals as performative in at least three senses:
6
My account of the relation of performativity and performance may seem conspicuous in bypassing the seminal work of Judith Butler. In “Critically Queer,” Butler puts forth that “performance as a bounded ‘act’ is distinguished from performativity insofar as the latter consists in a reiteration of norms which precede, constrain and exceed the performer and in that sense cannot be taken as the fabrication of the performer’s ‘will’ or ‘choice’” (Butler 1993, 24). Butler’s precise notion of performativity, here, fully ties in with the scope of this study. Her notion of performance as, roughly an act of ‘deliberate self-fashioning’, however, clashes with the more specific and quite literal notion of the ‘performance of songs’ as a ritually framed ‘sounding’ of lyrics.
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in the Austinian sense of performative wherein saying something is also doing something as a conventional act; in the quite different sense of a staged performance that uses multiple media by which the participants experience the event intensely; and in the third sense of indexical values […] being attached to and inferred by actors during the performance. (ibid.)
Tambiah’s recourse to Austin and the notion of “conventional acts,” here, ignores the later legitimation of such acts in linguistic conventions, and instead aligns their force with the enabling tradition of material performances and their always renewed indexical positioning in larger discursive formations. Indeed, developing Austin’s ideas in very different directions from those of Searle and Habermas should be seen as perfectly legitimate, and critics like Shoshana Felman (1983) even argue that one is invited to do so by Austin himself, whose undogmatic and almost carnivalistic choice of examples and argumentation has little of the rigidity of the later administrators of his speech act theory. 7 The step that Tambiah encourages us to take here is to emancipate performativity from the notion of illocution, and to consequently shift the issue of the ‘felicity’ of ritual acts entirely towards questions of their successful medial embodiment and staging – i.e. questions of their successful performance. Whether a performance is perceived as successful or not will then very much depend on ideological formations and conventions prefiguring particular types of ritual events (a rock event typically works with a very different performance ideology than concerts of classical or folk music). The performativity of lyrics, one can conclude on these grounds, is firmly embedded in the larger frames of performance of which both performers and audiences have a tacit understanding, and what lyrics ‘do’ may range considerably according to particular performing conventions. Tambiah’s third implication of the performative in rituals, the “indexical value,” thus proves a crucial link between performativity and performance. An ‘indexical value’ expresses more or less what Umberto Eco refers to as “ostentation,” which he calls the “most basic instance of performance” (Eco 1977, 110): the ostentative function of words simply signifies the fact that they are enacted by specific performers in specific contextual situations. Ostentation is related to Erving Goffman’s notions of framing and keying (1974), as every act of ostentation serves as a ‘key’ to mark specific relations between audiences and performers, which in turn help to ‘frame’ a specific ritual or theatrical context. What Charles S. Pierce calls ‘genuine’ indices are thus transformed into ‘degenerated’ indices (cf. Wirth 2002, 37) which take 7
In a memorable reading of Austin’s How to Do Things with Words against Molière’s Don Juan, Shoshana Felman charges Austin of a latent “Don-Juanism.” For a critical discussion and perspectives see Krämer and Stahlhut 2001, 41-45, or Carlson 1996, 63-65.
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over specific theatrical functions as “performative gestures” (Fischer-Lichte 1983, 65-67). The particular context of performances, this is to say, not only enables the performativity of words and sound, but performances at the same time rely on performative input to keep up or establish a theatrical or ritual frame. The interpretation of lyrics thus involves much more than their verbal content – it involves the iterability as well as the mediality of language, it involves questions of style and musical context, of social embeddedness and cultural value, and it demands an understanding of the reciprocal relationship between (embodied) verbal input and performance ideology. While these issues have been given little attention so far in literary studies, a basic blueprint for the study of lyrics may instead be found in the field of ethnopoetics. Without being able to do justice to the great diversity of ethnological and ethnopoetical approaches to performance (see Carlson 1996, 13-33 for an introduction), let me selectively focus on two texts which I find the most helpful in this context: 8 Richard Baumann’s Verbal Art as Performance (1977) which already expresses much of what has been developed in this chapter, and its more recent reception by John Miles Foley in The Singer of Tales in Performance (1995). 9 Foley introduces three core categories (drawing heavily on Baumann) to capture the dynamics of verbal art in oral traditions and cultures, namely the notions of “performance arena,” “register” and “communicative economy” (Foley 1995, 47-56). The concept of performance arena, to begin with, refers to the “locus in which some specialised form of communication is uniquely licensed to take place” (ibid., 8). The spatial metaphor of the arena, here, refers both to very real locations of performance, and to the more abstract conventions and traditions of framing, or in Baumann’s words, “patterning” them (see Baumann 1977, 25-35). For Baumann, this involves questions of genre and the typical structure of events relating to them, “including setting, act sequence, and ground rules of performance” (ibid., 28), as well as the typical roles taken by performers and the audience. The relevance of the performance arena for the interpretation of lyrics may become clearer when
8
9
“If some grammarians have confused matters by lumping together what does not interest them under ‘performance’,” Dell Hymes memorably put it, “cultural anthropologists and folklorists have not done much to clarify the situation. We have tended to lump what does interest us under ‘performance’” (Hymes 1975, 13, emphasis in the original). Baumann and Foley’s focus, of course, is not (lyrical) songs, but oral narratives in contemporary and ancient societies. Both writers are heavily influenced by Albert B. Lord’s groundbreaking study The Singer of Tales (1960).
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briefly applied to the practical example that will guide us through the first part of this study. Our starting point, Carthy’s performance of “Scarborough Fair,” is unmistakeably positioned in the genre of folk music. Even though we are dealing with a recorded song on LP (or, reissued, on CD) which is thus not directly linked to a live setting, Carthy’s tune is thus evocative of a certain kind of (imagined) performance arena which conforms to the conventions of what Simon Frith termed the “folk music world” (Frith 1998, 39, see the following chapter 3; for the problem of liveness vs. recordedness see chapter 5). A conventional setting within the folk scene as it presents itself in Britain after the early 1960s comprises informal club scenes, sessions or festivals, whose informality, as Niall MacKinnon points out, is generally a carefully constructed one (see MacKinnon 1993, esp. 77-98). One of the core conventions is to avoid, if ever possible, PA (public address systems, i.e. amplification) which in turn requires a certain quiet and attentiveness on the audience’s side, where for instance ordering drinks is fine (to keep things informal), but loud conversations are discouraged. On the other hand, audience input is very welcome musically when it comes to joining the singer in the chorus, in a rather dialogic and democratic performance structure which is also mirrored in the performer’s role and status. The singer is ideologically conceived of as ‘one of the people’ and ideally no higher in status than the audience (which is underlined by often having ‘floor singers’ who share the stage with booked artists). All these unspoken conventions and traditions come together to form a ‘performance arena’ which, in Baumann’s words, “sets up, or represents, an interpretive frame within which the messages being communicated are to be understood, and […] this frame contrasts with at least one other frame, the literal” (Baumann 1977, 9). In order to signal and maintain this interpretive frame, performances rely on a certain indexical ‘register’, or, in Dell Hymes’s definition, on “major speech styles associated with recurrent types of situations” (Hymes 1989, 440). The ‘register’ of a performance is closely associated with what Baumann, referring to Goffman, calls the “keying of performance” (Baumann 1977, 15-24). He argues that each speech community will make use of a structured set of distinctive communicative means from among its resources in culturally conventualized and culture-specific ways to key the performance frame, such that all communication that takes place within that frame is to be understood as performance within that community. (ibid., 16)
In Carthy’s “Scarborough Fair,” for instance, one may observe a number of performative ‘keys’ which come into play: among the more obvious is of course the language itself with its archaisms (such as in “cambric shirt” or in
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the obsolete reference to the Scarborough Fair), which provide references to a much older tradition of balladry. This is sustained by the ballad’s typical form, and particularly so by the refrain in the second and fourth lines of each stanza which would rarely be tolerated in written poetry but is essential in a folk context to key audience participation. A similar phatic key is provided by the opening stanza’s address (“Are you going etc.”) which is not to be read/heard as a purely rhetorical question in a folk context, but rather establishes a dialogue between singer and audience and marks the singer as an accessible and ordinary member of the group. It is interesting to note again that the recorded history of “Scarborough Fair” indicates that the opening stanza probably only came into play in the late 18th or early 19th century – and thus at a time when the effects of social stratification and the loss of communal coherence may have troubled an easy equation of performer and ‘ordinary folk’. With regard to the British folk revival of the 1960s and after, of course, the resulting need to key ‘ordinariness’ is even stronger. As Neill MacKinnon observes in an empirical survey of The British Folk Scene, the “search to revive the ‘music of the people’ resulted in a movement of intellectuals and the middle class,” the ultimate irony being “that the ‘music of the people’ cannot be readily taken back to them. It does not fit into working men’s clubs for instance, and has to remain the refuge of the folk clubs” (MacKinnon 1993, 59). Certainly, the low and rustic farming imagery in the riddles of “Scarborough Fair” is therefore rather alien to the lifeworld of today’s folk audiences, and ordinariness and authenticity are by no means given but need to be carefully staged. A sense of ‘ordinariness’ is particularly keyed by the choice of vocal quality and sound in this context: Carthy sings at an ordinary middle pitch with a full and expressive, yet conversational voice avoiding sterile perfection and artificiality. Apart from some hall reverb, moreover, the input of recording technique seems comparatively small, and the attempt to avoid the register of amplified sound is palpable. If Carthy in effect establishes an impression of honesty, immediacy, and a continuity with the musical tradition of the ‘folk’, these are performed notions that are far from universal and certainly not an inherent part of the lyrics or music. Rather, Carthy’s performance is firmly entwined with the British folk clubs of the 1960s, and his performing ideology can only be understood by taking the larger context of the folk revival and its distinctive practices into account. The interplay between a register and its particular ‘keys’ with the social formation of the performance arena, finally, is captured by the notion of a ‘communicative economy’. In Fowley’s words, communicative economy “speaks of the dedicated, focused relationship between the register and its traditional, performance-centred array of meanings” (Fowley 1995, 53),
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while it posits an habitual and efficient exchange of meaning between real performers and real audiences once relevant keys have been decoded. Two problems need to be briefly addressed in this context: first, the focus on the communicative economies of certain performing traditions does not rule out innovation. Richard Baumann therefore speaks about the “emergent quality of performance resid[ing] in the interplay between communicative resources, individual competence, and the goals of participants, within the context of particular situations” (Baumann 1977, 38, my emphasis) in order to express the mutability and dynamics of generic frames. John J. MacAloon surely has a point when he claims that “there is no performance without preformance” (MacAloon 1984, 9); yet performing traditions are nevertheless not to be seen as structuring confines, but rather as blueprints that are open to active renewal, transformation or even transcendence. Alastair Pennycook puts it succinctly when he writes that we need, on the one hand, to avoid the pull of performance as open-ended free display […] and, on the other, the pull towards oversedimentation (we can only perform what has been prescripted): to some extent, the performative is always along the lines that have been laid down, and yet performativity can also be about refashioning futures. (Pennycook 2007, 77)
Carthy’s version of “Scarborogh Fair,” for instance, works as a folk song precisely because it actively adapts an older model to changing social contexts. According to MacKinnon, the British folk revival has often treaded a borderline between a sense of “re-enaction” (or, frankly, parody) where the structuring ethos is a “suspension of the present,” and a sense of “revival,” which “also requires that the past be ‘entered’ in some symbolic way […] but allows continuity through a process of artistic evolution” (MacKinnon 1993, 63). Carthy, I think, clearly revives rather than re-enacts an old textual source in new contexts, as his keying of an ‘authentic’ and ‘honest’ performance of an old British traditional for ‘ordinary’ people does not aim backwards, really, but forward. Carthy’s vocal performance and idiosyncratic guitar style do not, or at least not exclusively, appeal to nostalgia, but are positioned against the rigidity of much contemporary art songs as much as against the commercial alienations in pop and rock. 10 The communicative economy of 10
Carthy explains that “what we have [in the revival] is the song in a stage of its development. […]. It’s not a finished article. I think that the attitude of the people who are listening to the Brittens and the Vaughan Williamses, is that what they are being presented with is a finished polished article, and that’s not what I think” (Carthy qtd. in MacKinnon 1993, 97). On the issue of commercialisation Carthy tends to be more drastic: “the music industry is a pack of dogs, fuck em! They just look at it as you being a product and that’s all there is to it; I don’t think that’s the way to treat music” (Carthy qtd. in Folkmaster 2001).
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lyrics, this implies, not only relies on its own performance arena and corresponding register in social isolation, but on processes of social distinction against the competition of other social arenas and their registers. The second point to make, here, is that the ‘communicative economy’ surely facilitates certain aspects of verbal meaning, but does not fully displace the basic polyvalence of language which Derrida among others attested against the notions of a conventionalist language philosophy. Lyrics, this is to say, remain informed by their iterative history despite or rather because of the fact that performances are always embedded in particular frames of interpretation. While the communicative economy within a performance arena may help to emphasise certain possibilities of interpretation, these are hardly definitive and always embattled by other performances and readings. Thus, Martin Carthy certainly expected that his (ideal) audiences is familiar with the tradition of ‘riddle songs’ that “Scarborough Fair” forms a part of, and perhaps even with its early supernatural contexts (he exclusively foregrounded the supernatural implications in the liner notes in case they are not). Additionally, the folk music world does not allow for the isolation of the singer, who is always meant to perform as an egalitarian part of the community. All this works against readings of “Scarborough Fair” as the innocent lament of an helplessly lonely lover. It facilitates, on the contrary, readings which foreground notions of a partly self-reflexive and pensive, partly (self)mocking disappointment, and a concept of love which is informed by the earlier ‘demonic’ aspects and their coding of female sexuality and desire. This is enabled precisely because there is a sense of emotional distancing from the amorous or supernatural content of the lyrics, as the artist does not perform the role of confessional poet here, but rather assumes the mediating role of communal storyteller. Still, all this does by no means rule out conflicting readings of the song, nor does it fully resolve its ambiguities (“parsley, sage, rosemary, and thyme,” for instance, will always remain something of an obstacle in any interpretation). The entire business is complicated, moreover, by the song’s recordedness and medial availability, which means that it is by no means bound to its original (folk) performance arena but basically free to encounter any array of new contexts across the globe at any time after its release. This way, Carthy’s recording could not only travel to very different performance arenas and be exposed to a wide array of “genre-normative modes of listening” (Stockfelt 2004, 383), but has also been available to innumerable other performing and recording artists who work with very different genric frames and ideologies. The different musical genres and their typical registers and performance arenas (many if not most of which “Scarborough Fair” has entered after Carthy) merit some closer attention in the following chapter.
3. Generic Conventions and Cultural Capital As the discussion of Martin Carthy’s version of “Scarborough Fair” has shown, the type of performance arena a song is grounded in and the register that it draws upon are intimately linked to questions of musical genre. Let us probe more deeply, therefore, into how the distinction of genres and their different conventions affect the interpretation of lyrics. For our purposes, the most comprehensive and systematic approach to this issue was provided by Franco Fabbri: he defines musical genres as “a set of musical events (real or possible) whose course is governed by a set of socially accepted rules” (Fabbri 1981, 51). Before turning to what Fabbri refers to as different types of “generic rules” which come into play, though, I should briefly note that I find Fabbri’s use of the term ‘rules’ somewhat problematic. It suggests two things: first, that there is something like an ideal ‘deep structure’ of genre types which governs actual performances, and second, that there is a prescriptive rigidity which prevents transformation and development (even if Fabbri explicitly deals with generic change). In the previous chapter, I have proposed that Derrida’s notion of iterability, combined with the notion of an ‘embodied’ language suffices to replace the notion of ideal types and ‘rules’. There is good sense, therefore, in speaking of performing ‘conventions’ (resulting from repeated acts of embodiment) rather than ‘rules’ in the context of musical genre. In John Fiske’s terms, such “[c]onventions are the structural elements of genre that are shared between producers and audiences. They embody the crucial ideological concerns of the time in which they are popular and are central to the pleasures a genre offers its audience” (Fiske 1987, 114). In this view, generic conventions are essentially the product of what Tzvetan Todorov (1990) would label a ‘metadiscursive discourse’ on specific musical events that is negotiated between active combatants (musicians, audiences, institutions, etc.) in ever changing social contexts, and accordingly generic frames are not bound to any ‘ideal’ types, but are both fuzzy and highly mutable products of cultural practices. Still, Fabbri’s approach to musical genre must be given credit for precisely shifting the perspective on genre from the traditional interest in textual or musical form to a wider interest in matters of performance (see Fabbri 1981, esp. 54-59).
Aspects of Generic Convention For Fabbri, “formal and technical” conventions (‘rules’, in Fabbri’s terms) are only the first in a set of several aspects of genre. Formal and technical
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conventions essentially determine how we differentiate music from noise by organising sounds according to familiar principles and aural characteristics. The organisation of sound involves matters as diverse as the particular use of instruments and musical skills that are required to adequately play them, the relationship between voice and music, typical rhythmic, harmonic and melodic qualities, the type of technical processing (acoustic or amplified), and so forth. There is more at stake, however, than the quality of sound and form (which present particular problems and merit a separate discussion in the following chapter). Musical genres are also marked by what can be more generally termed conventions of communication. 1 Conventions of communication address the issue of how those involved in a performance position themselves first, towards the musical sounds and content, and second, towards each other. The latter focus for instance concerns the typical spatial arrangement of a performance arena and the resulting proximity or distance between performers and listeners – an informal club setting differs widely from both a rock venue or the seating arrangements and hierarchies in a formal concert hall, for example. Accordingly, there are very different conventions of audience involvement, as well as of performers’ attitudes towards the crowd. Fabbri speaks of “gestural-mimic codes” (Fabbri 1981, 57) here, i.e. conventions of bodily interaction during performances, which moreover forge role expectations that are attributed to performers and audiences. In terms of the communication of contents, Fabbri primarily refers to Roman Jacobson’s communicative functions and how a performer’s foregrounding of, for instance, phatic, emotional, poetic or metalinguistic aspects affects musical meaning and thus genre. Something he does not discuss, though, are different generic notion of authorship and creative authority in the communication of songs. These are indeed of paramount importance for the interpretations of lyrics. The communicative system of songs crucially differs from that of written poetry. Certainly, written poetic communication is already polyphonous in itself, in that the written word may bear several layers of (internalised, as it were) ‘voices’: conventionally, literary studies distinguish the voice of the (historical or implied) author; that of the (fictional) speaker whose voice may (in lyrical poetry) or may not (e.g the persona in dramatic monologues) be more or less congruent with that of the authorial voice; and possibly those of fictional characters (in epic or dramatic poems) – the voices roughly corresponding to T.S. Eliot’s “three voices of poetry” (Eliot 1953). As a written 1
Fabbri refers to “semiotic” and “behavioural” rules, here; both labels, however, are slightly misleading in their linguistic and sociological overtones.
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poem, “Scarborough Fair,” for example, simultaneously presents us, first, with the ‘voice’ of an author(function) whose historical origins are unknown to us, but whose lines have been adapted and changed over the centuries by a multitude of co-writers, giving the ‘voice’ a collective rather than individual provenience; and second, that of a fictional speaker addressing a fictional addressee. The third level, the voice of dramatic characters, has been lost over the centuries, but was clearly present in the elfin knight precursors where fairy and maid ‘speak’ in dialogue. The move from poetry to lyrics, however, dramatically complicates this communicative system by adding at least two further ‘voices’: that of ‘music’ in the widest sense, and the actual, ‘embodied’ voice of the performer. The first comes with its own bag of problems, and the debate about what the ‘voice of music’ means or ‘says’ has to be relegated to the following chapter; suffice it to say at this stage that the musical arrangement is of course authored just as the lyrics are, that the writer(s) of music and text may be identical or not, that either text or music may come first, and that text and/or music may have been conceived independently of, or specifically designed for the song at stake (see Cone 1974, 41-80). But let us focus on the second voice – that of the performer – and its alignment with the internalised ‘voices’ of a lyric or poem. The classical source to turn to, here, is Edward T. Cone’s study of The Composer’s Voice (1974). According to Cone (and the bias toward art music is obvious, here), there are two ways of ‘interpreting’ – i.e. singing – lyrics: a “legitimate interpretation, the ‘faithful’ interpretation for which every singer should strive,” and an “illegitimate interpretation.” In the ‘legitimate’ case, the two aspects of person and persona fuse. The physical presence and the vitality of the singer turn the persona of the poetic-musical text into an actual, immediate, living being: the person of the singer invests the persona of the song with personality. If the impersonation is successful, if the illusion is complete, we hear this embodied persona as “composing” his part – as living through the experience of the song. The vocal persona may be of various kinds – protagonist, character, etc., but […] the persona is never identical with the singer. (ibid., 62, emphases in the original)
The last qualification is crucial, here: in Cone’s definition of a ‘legitimate’ interpretation, the singer’s “person” – i.e. his or her biography, character, media image – is meant to step out of the way; rather, singers ideally are empty vessels of sorts who are readily filled with the ‘voice’ of the speaker or persona of the lyrics and music (the “poetic-musical text”) just as designed by the indisputable authority of the composer/poet. Performances, this means, ideally re-create an authorial blueprint in such a way that they feign a live “experience” of the original composition. The title of Cone’s study is far
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from accidental in this sense, as it is indeed “the composer’s voice” which has been granted maximum authority in art music discourses since the late 18th century. The preference for the “composer’s voice” as opposed to that of the performer, though, is a generic convention rather than an universal musical given, as Cone’s definition of ‘illegitimate’ performance suggests. Here, not the vocal persona but the singer – Mr. X or Miss Y there on the stage – becomes the “composer,” the experiencing subject of the song. […] This misappropriation can occur when a singer performs songs of his own composition, if – as is often the case with pop singers – the emphasis is entirely on immediate performance. I do not mean to imply that there is anything morally, or even esthetically, wrong about this practice. I merely insist that what one is listening to in such cases – as in many virtuoso performances of “serious” music – is not the piece being performed, but the performance itself. (ibid., 62-63)
Despite his claims to the opposite, there is of course an ideological bias against popular styles in Cone’s evaluation, and the distinction between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ interpretations is certainly less categorical than Cone tends to suggest. His notion of legitimacy is, as Cone occasionally admits, rather a prescriptive ideal rather than a description of the practical habits of reception marking the ritualised framework of art song performances. But let us return to the remaining items on Fabbri’s list of generic conventions. Fabbri insists that formal and communicative conventions are embedded in larger social, political, economical and juridical formations. His notion of “social and ideological” implications of genre remains somewhat undeveloped, yet it implicitly comprises what Pierre Bourdieu has captured with the notions of “distinction” and “cultural capital.” At the risk of simplifying, Bourdieu’s core argument in Distinction (1984) is that there is no such thing as intrinsic aesthetic value (in a Kantian tradition), but that such value is socially constructed and attributed in the inverse interaction of economic capital (informing social class) and cultural capital (informing lifestyle). Taste, and by extension, genre preference, is therefore informed by social determinants such as family background, income, education, gender, age group or ethnicity, and genre politics express certain groups’ battles over the ‘distinction’ from the cultural practices and preferences marking the taste of other life styles and class fractions. In Bourdieu’s approach, the degree of agency in this processes is closely entwined with social background: while ‘popular taste’ (which Bourdieu basically locates among the working classes) is seen as obliged to dominant models with little chances for individual aesthetic decision-making, ‘middle brow’ taste is marked by an anxiety over status often leading to cultural docility, even if Bourdieu accounts for a diversity of choices among the petit bourgeoisie. Only the ‘legitimate taste’ informing the
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practices of the cultural elite, however, is allowed a “playful seriousness” (Bourdieu 1985, 54) in its aesthetic choices. One may deduce a strong and a week hypothesis from Bourdieu’s empirical evidence and arguments. The strong hypothesis – to which I do not subscribe – is basically Bourdieu’s own; it argues that taste and aesthetic judgement are exclusively social in nature, and that they are moreover functional in a ‘field’ which, while allowing for some mobility, more or less constantly reproduces the status quo of social hierarchies (see also Bourdieu and Passeron 1977 on the notion of ‘reproduction’). This hypothesis is questionable on several grounds: first, its relies on data collected in 1970s France which cannot be fully representative of other places or times. Second, Bourdieu’s argument borders on social determinism, despite his claims to the opposite. It diminishes the importance of individual input and psychology, and particularly so in what he refers to as the ‘popular’ realm.2 Finally, it is questionable that aesthetic judgement in general, and of songs and lyrics in particular, is indeed a purely social affair. Rather, I will propose in the following chapter that we are rather dealing with a complex negotiation of social, but also of cognitive and bodily dispositions. The weak hypothesis, however, shall be fully endorsed, which is that taste and distinction are key elements of our social identity formation and consequently also of genre formations. A musical genre is inevitably expressive of cultural capital which is used in processes of distinction between social groups. It is important to note in this context that the cultural capital embodied by musical genres is hardly ever singular but may range considerably between different groups and accommodate various ideologies. The example of punk may be a case in point: as Susanne Rupp (2006) has shown, the cultural validity of punk has been assessed very differently in retrospective views. Different ideologies of the rise and fall of punk have, for instance, been proposed by Dick Hebdige in his influential Subculture: The Meaning of Style (1997 ), Simon Frith in The Sociology of Rock (1978) and Jon Savage in England’s Dreaming (2001). Hebdige takes a neo-Marxist stand interpreting punk as the expression of working class sentiment and the reaction of English youth in the face of rising unemployment in the 70s. Frith, in turn, sees such social explanations surrounding issues of class and economy as too simplistic and instead highlights musical trajectories; punk is explained as a reaction against major label mainstream rock and its ‘arty’ pretensions. Jon Savage, finally, disagrees with Frith’s positioning of punk within the larger 2
Richard Jenkins complains that Bourdieu’s model cannot account for radical generic transgressions such as, for instance, Bob Dylan’s first electric performances: “There is rebellion in this model,” Jenkins concludes, “but, alas, no revolution” (Jenkins 2002, 137).
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field of rock, and instead elevates it to an independent genre which is not for the masses, but for a cultural elite. Focussing on the Sex Pistols and the man behind them (art school drop-out Malcom McLaren), he highlights punk as a carefully calculated avant-garde movement which only collapsed when commercial success arrived in 1977 with “God Save the Queen.” Despite their very different focuses it would be wrong, I believe, to exclusively prefer one of these narratives of punk to the others. Rather, the conflicting narratives highlight that genres are highly heterogenous formations which allow for multiple points of entry opened up through the complex intersections of class and lifestyle. It is important to see, finally, that questions of taste are firmly embedded in complex economies of cultural production and consumption (as Frith and Savage’s readings of punk indicate). Songs are usually rooted in specific institutional frameworks, and Fabbri takes account of these by referring to “commercial and juridical” aspects of musical genres. Musical events and recordings, this is to say, are part of a larger market system, and generic conventions are informed by specific market segments and their specific legal and economic demands. This involves the labour organisation of musical events, the influence of record companies, promotion processes, marketing and distribution, as well as overarching legal issues involving the ownership of music (see Negus 1999). Such issues may have crucial effects, as an example from the world of professional pop may suffice to illustrate: as Avron Levine White explains, contracts in the commercial music world often assigned 50 per cent of the publishing royalties to the writer of the music and 50 per cent to the writer of the lyrics. Once this is discovered, White argues, bands often no longer work in groups, but band leaders instead tend to “work in pairs or alone in order to monopolise the copyright” (White 1987, 165), while session musicians are hired for studio jobs and live performances. Such changes in the communicative structure within bands clearly affect issues of performance ideology, and are likely to affect the formal and aural quality of the music itself. The various aspects of genre – form and sound, rhetorical and communicative structures, social and ideological dimensions, institutional frameworks –, this example again serves to point out, are indeed to be seen as an interdependent and dynamic whole which is open to constant negotiation and change.
Music Worlds between Art, Folk and Pop In view of the different aspects and complexities of genre, it should now be possible to more clearly map out a discursive frame or field in which musical
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genres move and evolve. The focus will be less on intrinsic musical or textual form, but on the communicative, social, ideological and institutional conventions outlined above. The resource to turn to here is Simon Frith’s seminal study Performing Rites (1998), which establishes the notion of three core types of discursive practice which are linked to three different types of musical ‘art worlds’. For a sociological grounding, Frith draws heavily on Bourdieu’s notion of cultural capital, and combines it with Howard S. Becker’s notion of Art Worlds (1982) that allows for a more thorough institutional perspective on how certain socially accepted responses to works of art are created. The three core art worlds or “taste groups” Frith discerns are the bourgeois or “art music world,” the “folk music world,” and the commercial or “pop music world” (see Frith 1998, 35-42). 3 The origins of the art music world (as well as of the pop and folk music worlds, arguably) lie in the late 18th and the 19th century which have witnessed, according to Peter Van der Merwe, a very gradual “divorce between classical and popular styles” (Van der Merve 1989, 18). Van der Merwe assesses the development of European music according to the criteria of musical literacy, social class and aesthetic status, and notes how “from around 1790, the classical tradition gradually pulled away from a mass of middleand lowbrow music” (ibid., 17). The key momentum is a shift in attitude toward ‘popular’ influences on bourgeois music, which coincides with the growth of an aspiring industrial elite (which hoped to cash in their economic capital for cultural capital) on the one hand, and a growing urban working and lower middle class (which enhanced an increasing commercialisation of popular music) on the other. Whereas in the 18th century, processes of distinction between popular music and the ‘high’ arts seem to have been less a question of aesthetic or ideological criteria, but rather of musical literacy and training (cf. Weber 1975), art music composers of the 19th century tended to increasingly emancipate themselves from popular influences. Even though professional musicians for a long time continued to inhabit the spheres of both the popular world of parlour music and the world of art music, composers, music entrepreneurs and bourgeois audiences sought to distinguish new modes of refinement and exclusiveness. The development of a cult of musical genius and the idea of a transcendent ‘absoluteness’ (see Dahlhaus 1989) in music (both of which originate in German Romanticism) have done their turn to elevate the art music world from the everyday. In the long run, moreover, transcendence and genius were easier to allocate to the great composers of 3
Frith’s primary differentiation of art, folk and pop is quite common and has been made on slightly different grounds, for instance, by Van der Merwe (1989 and 2005), Booth and Koch (1990) and Bruhn and Rösing (1998).
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the past rather than to living artists, which led to the gradual establishment of a fairly restrictive classical canon with little space for an avant-garde and even less space for the contemporary. As a result, “‘classical’ music […] was rapidly becoming predominantly the music of the past” (Van der Merwe 1989, 20): while between 1817 and 1827, the ratio of works by living and dead composers performed by the Philharmonic Society of London was 56% to 43%, this significantly shifted to 30% to 70% in the period between 1856 and 1862 (cf. Weber 1994). The generic conventions of the art music world as it presents itself today have been intriguingly assessed by Christopher Small (1987 and 1998) in his encompassing studies of the ‘ritual’ nature of symphony concerts, which are certainly valid also for typical performances of art songs or Lieder. The communicative conventions marking such performances are crucially shaped by a performing space which if ever possible shuts off auditory or visual connections to the outside world. Also, there is usually no direct access to the concert hall itself; instead, a transitional ante-room is employed, first, to secure that only paying and thus ‘entitled’ guest may attend, and second, to provide a space in which socialisation between the audience may occur. In the ‘sanctuary’ of the concert hall itself, any obvious interaction between the audience is strongly discouraged, and the same is true for the interaction between audiences and performers – the only exception are strictly coded responses at the end of pieces or sets, when the crowd is allowed to abandon the ideal of motion- and noiseless contemplation to choose from a set repertoire of clapping, rising, and bravos. Similarly, the communicative involvement of performers is also restricted. While singers and musicians are in fact invited to discretely enact the emotional content of songs by coded mimic and gesticulatory means, they are nevertheless expected to show dignity and restraint both in dress and movement. By and large, the interaction with the audience is kept to a minimum: there is usually no verbal exchange between pieces or sets, performers enter through separate doors, and they remain out of sight when they do not perform. The overall ideology of all these conventions, as Small puts it, is to “depersonalise the performers and to emphasize the universality and timelessness of the proceedings” (Small 1987, 11). This depersonalisation is crucial to foreground what Cone calls “the composer’s voice” whose unfailing genius the rituals of art music concerts worship, and whose creative authority is not to be blemished by the vanities of individual performers. 4 4
There is good reason to suggest that the author-function in Western art music discourse is similarly a product of the turn from the 18th to the 19th century as it is for literary discourses in Michel Foucault’s famous assessment (Foucault 1977). As Small notes: “per-
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Far from exclusively owing to the aural quality of the song, the transcendent ideal of art music performances is thus a carefully staged one which is moreover strongly indebted to economic and institutional conventions. For an art music performance to run smoothly, a whole commercial apparatus is at work ranging from the notoriously underpaid “built-in proletariat of the concert hall” (ibid., 9) to the highly unionised musicians and on to the often notoriously overpaid star conductors and managers. Performances of art music in renowned locations are usually subsidised, but of course additionally finance themselves through their audiences’ willingness to pay for status (which finds expression in either a gallery or stalls seat). To ensure quality and exclusiveness for money, an entire institutional framework is at work. Music conservatories and university departments single out talents through processes of competitive selection and ensure lengthy spells of ‘apprenticeship’ before performers are allowed on stage. But the academia is also instrumental in the process of consumption: as Frith notes, “the bourgeois art world depends on scholarship, on the accumulation of knowledge of musical history and the compositional process without which score and performance cannot be understood” (Frith 1998, 38). On the one hand, this knowledge is essential in the elitist establishment of a canon, but it also has to be broken down and packaged (in liner notes, journals, radio programmes, reviews, etc) on the other, so that a more general and less tutored audience can access the art world that classical music inhabits. Nevertheless, the classical world remains strictly hierarchical: “There is a clear distinction, that is, between the composer of a work and its performers, between the performers and their audiences; and the central bourgeois music event, the concert, offers (in its ideal) a transcendent experience, something special, something apart from the everyday world” (ibid., 39). The second cornerstone in a triangular discursive field of musical genres is the commercial or pop music world. Again, the origins of pop as a distinct art world are usually seen in the 19th century. In an approach very much in line with the Birmingham School, Richard Middleton sees the evolution of the commercial music world as rooted in three “situational changes” forming musicians, even eminent concert and operatic soloists may go through an entire career without ever making a musical gesture they can call their own. This situation would strike musicians of the past [before 1800], including many of those who created the scores on which modern performers depend, as strange indeed. In the first place, it seems unlikely that those musicians would feel much interest in the first of those objectives, having little or no interests in the preservation of musical compositions, not even their own and certainly not over centuries. Dissemination, yes, for which a score is well suited; but preservation, no, and in that respect they have more in common with today’s pop musicians making records than with contemporary concert musicians” (Small 1998, 111).
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(Middleton 1985, 10-14; see also 1990). Emphasising, with Antonio Gramsci (1971) a relative autonomy of cultural practices within contexts of economic and social hegemony, Middleton’s first situational change is the “bourgeois revolution” which he locates in phases between the late 18th century and roughly the 1840s in Britain. These were “marked by complex and overt class struggle within cultural fields, by the permeation of the market system through almost all musical activities, and by the development and eventual predominance of new musical types associated with the ruling class” (Middleton 1985, 10). Middleton then takes little interest in the development of the Victorian parlour and music hall culture (see Russell 1987 and Scott 1989 for an introduction), and instead sees the next crucial situational change in the arrival of “mass culture running from the late 19th century to around 1930” (Middleton 1985, 10). This phase is characterised by the development of monopoly capitalism, both with regard to an emerging American hegemony on the British market (seen in the impact of ragtime, jazz and later Tin Pan Alley songs), and to the new modes of mass production and distribution. Finally, the third situational change arrives after 1945 and is labelled the moment of “pop culture” (ibid., 12). It marks the starting point for a diffusion of multiple styles and subcultures which came along with the development of new media (television, tape, digital recording, video, etc.) and particularly with the discovery of teenage audiences as a crucial market segment. Simon Frith, conversely, argues that there is no room in purely commercial pop for subcultural distinction: “Pop does not have a specific or subcultural, communal market/culture. It is designed to appeal to everyone. Pop doesn’t come from any particular place or marks off any particular taste” (Frith 2001, 95). He defines today’s world of contemporary pop as follows on these grounds: Pop is not driven by any significant ambition except profit and commercial reward. Its history is a history of serial or standardised production and, in musical terms, it is essentially conservative. Pop is about giving people what they already know they want rather than pushing up against technological constraints or aesthetic conventions. […] Pop is music provided from on high (by record companies, radio programmers and concert promoters) rather than being made from below. […] Pop is not an art but a craft. (Frith 2001, 96)
The performance arenas of pop are consequently to be seen in the everyday intersections of business and entertainment, and there are clear trajectories from music hall to today’s disco and pop concerts in the public, and from sheet music in Victorian parlours to MP3 files ringing in iPod ear phones in the private realm. As regards the public spaces of pop performances, the most obvious aspect they share with typical art music performances is the obligation to pay good money to gain entrance. This apart, their communicative and
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social conventions have very little in common. At pop concerts, interaction among the audience as well as between performers and the crowd is absolutely encouraged, and kinaesthetic response to the music is expected and expressed in dancing. The position of the singer in pop in relation to the lyrics he or she sings and to the audiences he or she entertains is a peculiar one in this context. The communicative dynamics of pop appear to be paradigmatically based on what Cone calls “illegitimate interpretation”; or in other words – the authorial voice of pop is not that of the composer/poet, but almost exclusively that of the performing singer. What Cone refers to as the musical “persona” – say, the speaker’s voice in “Scarborough Fair” – tends to be fully appropriated by and readily identified with the personality (or rather the media image) of the performer. Frith thus proposes that “the pop performer draws attention to performance itself, to the relationship between performer and work,” and that pop songs “clearly ‘belong’ to their singers, not their writers. Interpretation in this context does not mean realizing what the composer (or, rather the music) meant, but using the music to show what interpretation means” (Frith 1998, 200-01). In cultural practice, the pop music world therefore developed an economic system where songs are specifically designed, written and produced for singers and specific performances, all the while the cultural authority of the multiple ‘composing voices’ backing the singers is eclipsed by the singular authority of the performance. As Frith shows, since the 1940s, pop singers have more or less ceased to write their own material but almost fully depended on professional writers and producers in a process that is strictly oriented at the singers’ media image and the demands of the market. While the production process of a pop song is thus almost paradigmatically ‘postmodern’ or late capitalist (cf. Jameson 1991) in nature – in terms of multiple authorship, assemblage rather than organic creation, and an aesthetic scope that bows to strictly economic imperatives – its reception, however, continues to work along rather romantic lines. As Will Straw notes, pop audiences still typically “evaluate a musical recording or concert as the output of a single individual or integrated group,” and “the precise input of composers, producers, engineers, and back-up musicians is, most of the time, unclear” (Straw 1999, 200). In reception, thus a sense of organic creation and integrity oddly prevails: pop lyrics and pop songs, it can be argued on these grounds, are “to a large extent carefully calculated postmodern simulations of the romantic authenticity which the market demands” (Eckstein 2009, 242), and seem to work on the basis of a certain willing suspension of disbelief on all sides. This arrangement, moreover, only works if it is based on a particular kind of relationship between audiences and performers which is paradoxically
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marked by intimacy and accessability on the one hand, and a simultaneous sense of remoteness and unattainability on the other. Pop artists are expected to express and share very personal themes that audiences can identify with, yet they are never really part of their mundane world, both literally and figuratively. Literally, pop performers inhabit the stage and back-stage areas to which audiences have no access (contrary to folk performers, who tend to sit and drink with the crowd before and after gigs). Figuratively, the advent of the star system – which fully took hold only after WW II when singers and vocal music had almost entirely replaced band leaders and instrumental music – demanded that artists increasingly serve as unattainable foils for intimate projections of fantasy and desire. Sexual love and desire (almost anathema in the art music world, as Christopher Small is careful to point out, which instead favours untainted transcendent love; see Small 1987, 25) have consequently not always had a firm place in popular music. During the 19th century, popular songs could embrace many themes, and the shift towards an almost exclusive preoccupation with sentimental or sexual love only occurred with major changes in the technological processing of songs. The perhaps most important change is marked by the introduction of the electric microphone in pop recordings, which opened up entirely new dimensions of vocal embodiment and intimacy. Furthermore, there is a more general shift of popular music from the public sphere into the private, from collective experiences fed by the 19thcentury sheet music industry to highly individual modes of consumption brought about by ever new recording and storing devices. If the themes of pop songs nowadays tend to mostly revolve around rather narcissistic one to one relationships between two individuals, the new scope for intimacy both in sound production and consumption certainly plays a role. The third cornerstone in a triangular field of genres, finally, is the folk music world. Folk music is essentially seen as the music of the people devoid of artistic pretension and commercial devaluation; as Frith puts it, the core argument, here, is that “the value of music has to be understood in terms of cultural necessity – ideally, there is no separation of art and life” (Frith 1998, 39). While folk music is thus perhaps as old as mankind, folk music discourse is certainly not; instead, it is very much a product of the 19th century again. The present usage of the word ‘folk’ only originates in the Romantic period (deriving from the German ‘Volk’), and the great collectors of folk songs such as Francis James Child or Cecil Sharp enter the stage at a time when the ‘music of the people’ was perceived to be in danger of vanishing (in the second half of the 19th and early 20th century); Richard Middleton accordingly states that “[f]olk song is usually seen as the authentic expression
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of a way of life now, past or about to disappear (or in some cases, to be preserved or somehow revived)” (Middleton 1990, 127). One consequence of this is that the performing conventions of ‘folk’ are valued primarily against the conflicting values of the commercial music world. Similar to the workings of art music discourses, the folk world heavily relies on scholarship and institutional frameworks which research the musical tradition and distribute their knowledge in liner notes and scholarly magazines. The emphasis, however, is a different one, as it is placed “less on history and the accumulation of knowledge, than on ‘purity’ and the correct (traditional) way of doing things. Folk music is thus evaluated […] according to concepts of unchanging musical ‘truth’” (Frith 1998, 40). Such ‘truths’ are usually retrospectively seen as endangered already during the Renaissance period when the ‘traditional’ rural songs and ballads were confronted with urban ballads, written by professional writers and commercially distributed on what could be called the first mass medium of music distribution, the broadside. Early folklorists such as Francis Child were full of disdain for the commodified versions of balladry and insisted on the ‘true’ popular ballad as an independent literary type; but as Dave Harker has put forth, this view owes very much to a ‘ballad consensus’ (Harker 2004) and is hardly grounded on stringent criteria with which folk and commercial ballads may be differentiated. 5 It is rather likely, in fact, that rural and urban traditions have mutually influenced each other from very early on, and the folk music world’s romantic obsession with ‘purity’ and musical ‘truth’ against the progress of ‘alienated’ pop is thus problematic, to say the least. As Richard Middleton is careful to emphasise, “the voice of the people is always plural, hybrid, compromised.” This, however, does not divest folk music culture of a vital discursive power; instead, folk has functioned as “a ‘counterculture of modernity’: it is constitutive of modernity itself (modernity as it actually developed), its role not only reactive but also productive, not only responsible to but also responsible for (that is, dialectically implicated in) its own apparent negation” (Middleton 2006, 23, emphasis in the original). The folk music world needs to be taken serious on these grounds as a deliberate and productive counterforce to the art and pop music discourses, and as a generic model that has established its very own social, communicative and ideological performing conventions. I will not go into detail, here, as I have dealt with much of what is to say in the previous chapter with reference to Martin Carthy’s version of “Scarborough Fair” – covering the 5
In an engaging study of the 17th-century professional ballad writer Laurence Price, Dave Harker (1987) shows how commercial ballads have entered the Child canon.
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elaborate construction of informality within typical performance arenas such as the folk festival or folk club, the ideally egalitarian sharing of stage and floor between performers and audiences, and the immersion in a tradition that may either be ‘re-enacted’ or ‘revived’. I have also already touched upon the preferred distribution of communicative authority in folk discourses, where singers are – quite like in the art music world – to grant authority to the “persona” of the song, rather than appropriate it as pop artists typically would; yet of course what is ‘worshiped’ here is not the genius of “the composer’s voice,” but the presumed ‘authenticity’ of popular heritage and the tradition of communal storytelling. Ideally, therefore, there is no single voice that ‘owns’ a song – neither that of a composer, nor that of the artist; folk songs, rather, are the common property of the entire folk community, and violations against this unspoken convention tend to be punished by excommunication (the popular history of “Scarborough Fair” indeed provides a model case for such an excommunication, but more about this later). Art Music World
Lieder Jazz
Progressive Rock Indie
City Blues Disco Country Blues Folk Music World Folk Rock
Commercial (Pop) Music World
Fig. 1: Field of generic distinction
For now, it needs to be emphasised that what has been outlined so far in terms of art, pop and folk music worlds is not to be seen as three independent categories of cultural practice. On the contrary, as Frith puts it, “what is involved here is not the creation and maintainance of three distinct, autonomous music worlds but, rather, the play of three historically evolving discourses across a single field” (Frith 1998, 42). Musical discourses and genre formations, this is to say, are situated in a field of conflicting ideologies pulling either toward artistic refinement and exclusiveness (art),
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commercialisation and entertainment (pop), or authenticity and communal practice (folk). What is more, the most interesting genre formations are probably those that are located in the hybrid space in-between the core art worlds outlined above (see fig. 1, which only situates a few representative examples). I will in the following briefly address some of these – drawing, very selectively only, from an almost unending list of possible subcultures and genres of the extremely differentiated post-World War Western music scene. Our underlying example of “Scarborough Fair” is a particularly handy one in this context, as there are perhaps only few other songs that have travelled in as many different versions and in as many different genres since the mid-60s. Let us take a break then and turn to the story of its late popularity.
Scarborough Fair (II): Generic Transformations The English folk clubs of the 1960 were very popular not only among young and aspiring British musicians and singers such as Marianne Faithfull, but also among American folk artists such as Bob Dylan and Paul Simon. All three of them knew Martin Carthy and heard him perform “Scarborough Fair” in London, and all three of them seem to have been touched in some way or the other, as they clearly made use of the song in their own careers. Bob Dylan is the earliest and perhaps least obvious case, but his “Girl from the North Country” released on The Freewheelin’ Bob Dylan (1963) draws heavily on “Scarborough Fair” in terms of lyrics: “Well, if you’re travelin’ in the north country fair, / Where the winds hit heavy on the borderline, / Remember me to one who lives there. / She once was a true love of mine.” 6 Dylan must have heard the song during his first trip to London in winter 1962, yet he hardly acknowledged the debt, withdrawing instead to clichés of romantic inspirationalism. As Nat Hentoff writes in the liner notes: “‘Girl from the North Country’ was first conceived by Bob Dylan about three years before he finally wrote it down in December 1962. ‘That often happens,’ he explains, ‘I carry a song in my head for a long time and then it comes bursting out’.” There is some irony, then, in the fact that the first version of “Scarborough Fair” to be recorded and released after Martin Carthy’s debut appeared on an album titled North Country Maid (1966) by Marianne Faithfull. 7
6
7
As Patrick Humphries (2003) argues, moreover, the melody of “Scarborough Fair” has significantly affected Dylan’s “Boots of Spanish Lether” and “Don’t Think Twice, It’s Allright.” Faithfull’s “Scarborough Fair” was recorded already in September 1965.
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The generic frame of Faithfull’s version is located somewhere in the hybrid space between the folk and pop music world, as can already be seen in the album’s eclectic blend of traditional folk tunes with cover versions of popular songs by Donovan or Tom Paxton. Faithfull, who had her first hit with a version of The Stones’s “As Tears Go By,” did not write or arrange her own material, and was pretty much of a typical pop singer in this respect (her guitarist Jon Mark is credited for the arrangement of “Scarborough Fair”). Without going into the details of sound organisation at this stage, the vocal performance and instrumentation suggest a register and performance arena that draw equally on folk as well as on pop conventions. On the one hand, the restrained accompaniment on a single acoustic guitar is clearly oriented at the folk world; on the other hand, Faithfull’s voice is much more heavily processed than Martin Carthy’s, and operates with a softer and more intimate vocal embodiment. The communicative economy resulting from this register is such that there is a clear privileging of intimate melancholy and sentimental love. This is underlined by the particular choice of text, which differs from Martin Carthy’s version in some significant details: most crucially, there is an apparent shift from a triangular constellation involving the fictional speaker, his or her lover, and a mediating addressee in the first three stanzas (“Have you been to Scarborough Fair? / Parsley, sage, rosemary, and thyme / Remember me to one that lives there / For once she was a true lover of mine // Tell her to make me new cambric shirt […]”), to a dual constellation where addressee and (potential) lover suddenly become one: Ah, can you find me an acre of land Parsley, sage, rosemary, and thyme Between the salt sea and the sea sand Or never be a true lover of mine.
This shift crucially works toward the identification of speaker and singer in the last three stanzas: whereas in the first stanzas, a heterosexual context requires some fictional abstraction (the beloved, after all, is a she, and so is the actual singer), the final three stanzas suddenly allow both male and female listeners to feel directly addressed as potential lovers by the young and desirable media persona of Marianne Faithfull. There is a clear movement, then, not only in terms of performing conventions, but also in the rhetoric structure of the lyrics themselves, from a communal folk-appeal to the privacy and erotic pseudo-intimacy of pop. But even if “Scarborough Fair” has been canonised among Marianne Faithfull’s greatest hits (e.g. 1987), it is of course Paul Simon who is crucially to blame for perhaps making it the best known English folk song in the
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Western world by translating it into the rhetoric of rock. Simon came to England and played in local clubs after having recorded his first LP Wednesday Morning, 3 A.M. (1964) with Art Garfunkel. The fact that the album, which drew on the duo’s immersion in the New York folk scene and combined folk with a close singing style inspired by the Everly Brothers, basically flopped after its release did not exactly encourage Simon to leave Britain, and he consequently toured England with a folk repertoire some of which he recorded on The Paul Simon Songbook (1965). It is during that time, also, that Simon came across Martin Carthy; as the latter relates: “[Paul Simon] heard about ‘Scarborough Fair’, and he came up to me […] and I sang it and he liked it. And during the course of the evening I wrote the song down for him and he went off happy as a sound boy. The rest is history, folks” (Carthy 2003). This history has not been an untroubled one, but let us see first how “Scarborough Fair” made it into the international billboard charts. The story requires a brief detour via another Simon and Garfunkel hit, “The Sound of Silence,” which Simon wrote in the aftermath of the Kennedy murder. The song already featured on Wednesday Morning, 3 A.M. (and on Simon’s solo Songbook) in acoustic folk style, but it was only after the duo’s US producer Tom Wilson dubbed electric guitars, bass and drums to the song and re-released it as a single that it eventually hit no. 1 in the US in December 1965. Even though Simon and Garfunkel did not approve of Wilson’s arbitrary move, they nevertheless readily reunited, abandoned acoustic folk and (re)jumped onto the bandwagon of rock with their succeeding releases; Paul Simon’s version of “Scarborough Fair” became the title track of their third album, Parsley, Sage, Rosemary and Thyme (1966), and fully made it to the masses by its inclusion on the original soundtrack of Mike Nichols’s Oscar-winning motion picture The Graduate (1967). The distinction between rock and pop is a much contested one, and may need some clarification in this context. Keir Keightley puts it most straight forwardly, I think, when he notes that from a rock perspective, “[p]op is understood as popular music that isn’t (or doesn’t have to be, or can’t possibly be) ‘taken seriously’. Rock, in contrast, is mainstream music that is (or ought to be, or must be) taken seriously” (Keightley 2001, 128). As the inverted commas indicate, ‘seriousness’ is a highly subjective category at the crossroads of musical practices and musical preference (Bourdieu’s ‘taste’), and one should indeed rather conceive of a continuum between rock and pop than of a binary opposition. The focus on seriousness is helpful, however, to question limiting associations of rock with rebellion against dominant social values, and to highlight that “rock’s oppositionality operates in the […] systematic stratifications of capitalist consumer society” (ibid., 129, see also
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Frith 1978). This notwithstanding, the ideology of rock is rooted in an awareness of popular music’s complicity with late capitalism, and the value of ‘serious’ rock is thus seen in a refusal of artistic and ethical compromises and commercial sell out. Rock artists typically author their own songs, and propagate an awareness of their social and political role in society. As Keightley puts forth, there are moreover two essential roads to stage a sense of ‘authenticity’ that elevates rock from the pop music world: the first road is to go for what Keightley calls “Romantic authenticity,” which basically consists of importing folk values into the pop music world – key values include tradition, community, populism, sincerity and hiding musical technology (most of the singer/songwriter genre is to be located here). The second road is to perform what Keightley calls a sense of “Modernist authenticity,” which, crudely spoken, imports values from the more progressive branches of the art music world – values listed by Keightley are experimentation, artistry, elitism, irony or obliqueness, and celebrating technology (Keightley 2001, 137). Paul Simon and Art Garfunkel’s performance of “Scarborough Fair” intriguingly integrates features of both folk and art music. The foundation of Simon and Garfunkel’s version is Martin Carthy’s folk arrangement for guitar and Carthy’s lyrics (leaving out, ironically, stanza four, proceeding immediately to reaping without ploughing and sowing, so to speak). This arrangement is complicated, however, by the interlacing of a vocal countermelody, referred to as ‘canticle’ in the song title (“Scarborough Fair/Canticle”) setting in with the second stanza. There are clear allusions to classical music discourse, here – not only in the effective use of counterpoint, but also in terms of instrumentation by adding floating (synthesised) harpsichord arpeggios to the acoustic guitar. The lyrics of the ‘canticle’ part originate in a song called “The Side of a Hill” which Simon recorded earlier on his Paul Simon Songbook in England, but were substantially revised to fit “Scarborough Fair.” While “The Side of a Hill” is a – frankly – rather pathetic song about a sevenyear-old boy killed by a soldier (presumably in Vietnam), 8 the canticle part in “Scarborough Fair” has not only been adjusted to contrapuntal requirements of metre and length, but also uses much more elaborate imagery clearly oriented at romantic models, giving it a Lieder appeal. The words are not always
8
“On the side of a hill / In a land called somewhere / A little boy lays asleep in the earth / While down in the valley a cruel war rages / And people forget what a child’s life is worth // On the side of a hill a little cloud weeps / And waters the grave with its silent tears / While a soldier cleans and polishes a gun / That ended a life at the age of seven years // And the war rages on in a land called somewhere / And generals order their men to kill / And to fight for a cause they’ve long ago forgotten / While a little cloud weeps on the side of a hill” (Simon 1965).
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easy to make out beneath the dominant vocal layer of the folk song, but here are the lyrics: On the side of a hill in the deep forest green, Tracing of sparrow on snowcrested brown. Blankets and bed-clothes, the child of the mountain, Sleeps unaware of the clarion call. On the side of a hill there’s a sprinkling of leaves, Washes the grave with silvery tears. A soldier cleans and polishes a gun. War bellows blazing in scarlet battalions, Generals order their soldiers to kill, And to fight for a cause they’ve long ago forgotten. (printed in Simon n.d., no 19)
Both folk and art music components are integrated in a register which is to be counted, overall, among the variants of rock. Apart from the institutional mechanisms of major label production and mass market distribution, the most telling key, here, is the type and quality of the vocal performance. Particularly Art Garfunkel’s disembodied and effeminate singing style is firmly embedded in the rock conventions of the time. 9 The rather thin vocal tracks are heavily processed, i.e. sexed up with an overdose of reverb and an extensive use of overdubbing, 10 and thus key generic conventions which facilitate a reading of the lyrics as the intimate expression of sentimental love, quite similar to Marianne Faithfull’s version. Such a reading, however, is of course contested by the lyrical content of the canticle part, which ranges somewhere in-between conventions of art music and the protest song as a folk variant. Consequently, the interpretation of the lyrics of “Scarborough Fair” in Simon and Garfunkel’s performance very much depends on individual recipients and their own generic preferences. While neither folk nor art music purists will take to the song too well, someone with a less exclusive taste for classical music will probably foreground keys such as the contrapuntal arrangement and harpsichord instrumentation which invite a reading of “Scar9
10
“The high voice is heard as a young voice, and rock is a youth form,” Simon Frith holds, and explains moreover that “one of the lasting effects of doo-wop was to break the male voice up into its components such that a combination of all its sounds, from high to low, defined masculinity” (Frith 1998, 195, emphasis in the original). Art Garfunkel explained in an interview: “We probably did two-part harmony on the melody and then doubled it. So that gives a kind of turbular, strong, commercial sound to the front. Then on the ‘Canticle’ part, Paul takes some of those lines and I take the others that are higher. And we double that melody. So there’s one voice unharmonized in the background but that one voice is doubled” (Zollo 1997b, 48).
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borough Fair” in an art music frame. The concept of love in the ballad’s lyrics is then likely to be read in the Petrarchan vein where love is, by definition, unrequited, transcendent, and peppered with the knowledge of the transience of human affairs. A listener more steeped in the ideologies of folk rock will instead focus on very different keys, presumably, and recognise the alignment of folk tradition with collective social protest in the light of models such as Guthrie or Baez. This would imply to more thoroughly try and negotiate the semantic field of war in the canticle part with the ballad’s concept of love, and to see how they shed light on each other. Love is thus affected by notions of senseless battle, and in true protest song fashion, the failure of love as expressed in the cryptic riddles in turn highlights the futility of war. Most listeners, however, probably do not bother about any of that, and take the song as a good piece of pop entertainment, enjoying and foregrounding the intimate harmonies of Simon and Garfunkel’s close singing and the slightly psychedelic touch owing to the vocal processing and ‘exotic’ instrumentation in 6/8 time. These listeners will probably relegate the irritating parts of the lyrics to the background, highlight the “and then she’ll be a true lover of mine” bit, and appropriate the entire package into the generic conventions of the torch song. There are in fact several reasons to suggest that the last option – to read Simon and Garfunkel’s take on “Scarborough Fair” as tending towards the pop-angle in the triangular continuum between pop, folk and art – is the culturally dominant one, and not only because of the musical keying and huge mainstream success that the song enjoyed after its inclusion on The Original Graduate Soundtrack (to which I will come back in more detail in chapter 5). This also has to do with a faux pas at the crossroads of communicative, economic and legal generic conventions Simon committed and which all but meant his excommunication from the British folk scene for many years to come. What’s the story? Either out of neglect, vanity, greed, or because he thought his own contribution to “Scarborough Fair” as a composer significant enough (in terms of the added countermelody), Simon credited the song as his own composition both on Parsley, Sage, Rosemary and Thyme (1966), and on the soundtrack album to The Graduate (1967), neither signalling his debt to Martin Carthy’s arrangement, nor to the fact that “Scarborough Fair” is a ‘traditional’, i.e. common folk property. English folk singer Ralph McTell remarks that “there is a story that Simon copyrighted the arrangement the day after Martin wrote it down for him. Whether it is true or not, what incenses me is that Simon and Garfunkel took the credit for a traditional song featuring Martin’s arrangement” (McTell, qtd. in Cooper 2004). McTell, Bert Jansch and other folk greats have to this day been unforgiving of Simon’s ‘theft’, whereas Carthy himself made his peace with
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Simon some 35 years later in 2000, when he followed Simon’s invitation to perform “Scarborough Fair” together at the Hammersmith Apollo – yet this only happened after Carthy took legal action and achieved a settlement in 1970 (see Cooper 2004), and after Simon publicly admitted his debt to Carthy in an much later interview. 11 The damage, by then, had of course been done, and for many fans, the cultural capital which Simon still entertained in the 1960 – that of a folk, or later ‘authentic’ rock singer – was in shambles (and also troubled his later success as an avatar of ‘world music’). 12 All this indicates two things, really: first, that the conventions of genre and social distinction may be tacit, yet can be very powerful and unforgiving; and second, that this has nevertheless rarely prevented songs from being bended into all sorts of generic conventions and appropriated into all sorts of musical and social contexts. This is particularly unfortunate for Martin Carthy, as his arrangement of “Scarborough Fair” could have made him a very rich man indeed had Paul Simon only acknowledged his debt; for after Simon and Garfunkel made it a global hit, “Scarborough Fair” became most probably the most widely covered folk song of all times and entered the repertoire of many if not most musical cultures. The ongoing popularity of the song ranges from Europop and Schlager (e.g. Sandy Shaw, Nana Mouskouri and many more) to soul/pop (e.g. Harry Belafonte) and jazz (Wes Montgomery) to folk rock (e.g. Pentangle) and heavy metal (e.g. Queensrÿche) all the way to pop goes classical (e.g. Sarah Brightman) or classical goes pop (e.g. the Vienna Choir Boys, Lesley Garrett and may more). In all cases, the lyrics are framed in typical generic conventions and ideologies, and it would explode this chapter to go into detail of how all these affect aspects of verbal meaning. 13 I would instead like to close this chapter by briefly lingering with 11
12
13
The lines read: “Well, that was a beautiful song. I learned it from Martin Carthy. ‘Scarborough Fair’ is like three hundred years old. Martin Carthy had a beautiful arrangement of it, and my arrangement is like my memory of his arrangement. He was a wonderful guitarist and singer. Very popular and still playing” (Zollo 1998b, 108). Simon Frith notes: “What is it about a record that makes us say, ‘I just don’t believe it!’ (my reaction to Paul Simon’s Graceland, for example)? This is obviously related somehow to the ways in which we judge people’s sincerity generally; it is a human as well as a musical judgement. And it also reflects our extra-musical beliefs – what I already knew about Paul Simon obviously had an effect on how I heard his music” (Frith 1998, 71). The ensuing controversy over Paul Simon’s Graceland album in many ways underscored the notion of ‘insincerity’ in his dealings with Carthy. What is at stake is a well-intended and benevolent, but at the end of the day ego- and Eurocentric appropriation of South African music culture, indicated not least by the fact that Simon retained the exclusive copyright for the final product of his collaboration with South African artists (cf. Lipsitz 1997, 56-60 for an introduction). Just take the liner notes of two albums featuring “Scarborough Fair” to see how readily generic ideologies and clichés are confirmed. In Seattle metal band Queensrÿche’s liners, for
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one of the earliest cover version of Simon and Garfunkel’s take on “Scarborough Fair,” namely by Brazilian pianist and arranger Sérgio Mendes (1968), as Mendes’s version serves to highlight an aspect of genre evolution which has not been sufficiently acknowledged so far, which is the cultural hybridity (Bhahba 1994) of musical formations. Music has always been a product of what Mary Louise Pratt refers to as the cultural “contact zone,” a term originally coined to denote “the space of colonial encounters, the space in which people geographically and historically separated came into contact with each other and established ongoing relations, usually involving conditions of coercion, radical inequality, and intractable conflict” (Pratt 1992, 6), yet one which has more recently gained more encompassing currency as a “metaphor [which] includes all kinds of cultural encounters from the colonial days to the ubiquitous exchanges in today’s globalised world” (Eckstein 2006, 14). The Oriental cultural hegemony during the middle ages, for instance, not only affected Sub-Saharan African folk music styles, but also European aristocratic and in turn folk music to a considerable degree (see e.g. Rösing 1998b, Van der Merwe 1989, 11-14). All of these musical styles travelled back and forth across the Atlantic and elsewhere since the multiple voluntary and forceful migrations of aristocrats, merchants, labourers or slaves ever since the colonial expansions of the Renaissance, where they continually came in contact with each other as well as with new musical ideas. While almost all music is thus – ontologically, so to speak – hybrid, the ideological and institutional politics of genre formations do not equally acknowledge or encourage syncretism and transcultural dialogue. While the folk music world’s obsession with purity and the art music world’s emphasis on individual genius, universality and transcendence tend to negate processes of syncretistic ‘dilution’, this has less been the case for commercial music. instance, Paul Suter wallows in rock ideology when he writes that “none of their longtime fans was crying ‘sellout,’ as is so often the case with rock bands finally achieving longoverdue commercial success. Queensrÿche had evolved as a band but had not compromised, and the success of Empire was a just reward for all their hard work” (Queensrÿche 1990; for a brilliant resource on heavy metal discourse, see Walser 1993). In a very different genre, star soprano Lesley Garrett readily confirms Christopher Small’s observation that classical music discourse tends to “depersonalise the performers and to emphasize the universality and timelessness of the proceedings” (Small 1987, 11) and affirms the authority of what Edward T. Cone calls the “composer’s voice” when she claims: “I have no idea where music comes from. When I sing, all I know is that I’m a vessel, a conduit, for something much, much greater than any of us know. My faith in this great spirit is total and unquestioning. When it leaves, then so will I” (Garrett 2002; paradoxically, of course, the booklet features a total of 9 photos of the humble ‘vessel’ in changing settings and opulent costumes…).
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One may briefly illustrate some of the problems in this context by taking a look at jazz, which has historically travelled between folk, pop and art music discourses. 14 While there was hardly ever an argument about the deeply transcultural foundation of jazz owing to a negotiation of European, African and later also Oriental and other musical elements and communicative modes (see esp. Schuller 1986), the jazz world has been torn between two conflicting ideological positions or camps since around the 1990: a first camp of critics insists on the continuing transcultural openness of jazz to ever new influences and mutations. For Cornel West, for instance, jazz bears a “critical and democratic sensibility [that] flies in the face of any policing of borders and boundaries of ‘blackness,’ ‘maleness,’ ‘femaleness,’ or ‘whiteness’” (West 1993, 105). This attitude, however, has lost much institutional ground to a powerful neo-conservative camp around trumpeter Wynton Marsalis and his mentor Stanley Crouch, who basically reject any musical innovations starting with the 1960’s free jazz movement, propagate ‘respectability’ (black suit and tie are expected) and demand a sense of musical traditionalism (acoustic, walking-bass and blues-oriented performance). Jazz is thus elevated from ‘popular’ to ‘bourgeois’ realms, and implicitly reduced to a distinct national and primarily ethnic (African American) phenomenon in a dominantly male tradition. 15 The politics and boundaries of the discursive formations called genres, this again testifies, are always contested and fluid, and whether Sérgio Mendes’s performance of “Scarborough Fair” falls under the genre of jazz may consequently be answered very differently by different people. Whatever it is, Mendes’s “Scarborough Fair” thoroughly transforms Simon and Garfunkel’s version by fusing generic models taken from Brazilian folk, North14
15
The secular 19th-century precursors of jazz such as the country blues, work songs and field hollers largely inhabited the folk music world (drawing heavily on a call-and-response dynamic between performers and audiences derived from West African models), and early urban jazz at the turn of the century similarly worked in communal contexts. The social and institutional conditions of the so-called swing era of the 20s and 30s, then, were such that much of jazz was appropriated into the commercial music world, with almost exclusively white band leaders and entrepreneurs at the forefront. The bebop and later free jazz movements consciously incorporated conventions of the art music world by cultivating an aura of connoisseurship and musical genius to regain a sense of artistic agency, while at the same time deliberately returning to the blues roots and complex African poly-rhythms of earlier folk modes (see esp. Jost 2003, more generally Campbell 1996 or Tirro 1993). The canon favoured by Crouch and Marsalis is perhaps best documented in Geoffrey C. Ward’s Jazz: A History of America’s Music (based on a popular documentary film by Ken Burns), featuring contributions by Crouch, Marsalis and Albert Murray and clearly representing their ideas of “Great American Music” (Ward 2000). Broecking (1995) provides an excellent compilation of responses to Marsalis’ influence on the jazz scene among musicians.
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American variants of jazz and Euro-American popular as well as art music. Mendes transposes the tune from 6/8 into 4/4 time and creates a heavily syncopated rhythmic and antiphonal melodic structure for a percussion-based bossa nova setup plus an entire string orchestra. What is interesting for our context is that the bulk of the lyrics seemingly did not go along with this scheme: Mendes gets rid of both the canticle part and all stanzas of “Scarborough Fair” except the first (“Are you going to Scarborough Fair / Parsley, sage, rosemary and thyme / Remember me to the one who lives there / He once was a true love of mine”) which is instead simply repeated four times over. One could reasonably expect that the song loses much of its appeal on these grounds, and that the verbal repetitiveness should be rather annoying; this is, however, not necessarily so. Other than in the folk context of, for instance, Martin Carthy’s performance where lyrical content and story play a crucial role, the embodiment of language in Mendes’s “Scarborough Fair” seems to rely less on verbal content than work with the musical quality of the voices themselves – with the voice as a musical instrument. Generic frames indeed also matter when it comes to the typical relationship between words and music in songs; but the issue of verbal and musical meaning is a complex one, and it takes a new chapter to address what is at stake.
4. Sound and Songfulness Song lyrics, as I have argued in the previous two chapters, rely on the embodiment of language in specific situations of performance, and their meaning is affected by generic conventions which shape the lyrical register and performance arena with regard to communicative, social, ideological, economic and juridical conventions. What has not been addressed in any detail so far is how the particular organisation of sound in songs (Fabbri’s first aspect of musical genre) comes into play in all this. The most distinctive marker that distinguishes song lyrics from written poetry, after all, is that they are sung and that the verbal meaning of the words is set in relation to the musical meaning of their vocal embodiment and, if applicable, musical accompaniment. The words of songs, that is to say, are always doubly encoded, as both verbal and musical referents. Within this double coding, moreover, the balance between musical and verbal relevance may shift according to generic conventions, as the comparison of Martin Carthy and Sérgio Mendes’s versions of “Scarborough Fair” indicates. While the first seems to rely heavily on verbal referents in the construction of meaning – the ‘story’ of the riddle song is of paramount importance to Carthy, and the music is rather to supplement it – Mendes relies much more heavily on musical meaning, which largely ‘swallows’ the importance of verbal content. There is something, then, that music can ‘do’ to words to alter their performative value, something that I will approach by turning to Lawrence Kramer’s notion of ‘songfulness’ later in this chapter. Yet a discussion of how ‘musical meaning’ affects verbal meaning first requires a sorting out of what we possibly mean when we talk about what music ‘means’. While there is wide-spread agreement about the fact that words carry meaning, the case is much less straight forward for music. What exactly is the meaning of music, and how, or in how far, does music mean anything in particular? When Aristotle claims in his Politics that “[i]t is not easy to determine the nature of music, or why any one should have a knowledge of it” (Aristotle 1990, vii, 7), he hits the nail pretty much on the head. For centuries, philosophers have tried to come to terms with what it exactly is that music can tell us, and possible answers have varied widely between all sorts of philosophical camps. In fact, rather than putting forth what music actually is or does, it is easier to start out with what music most likely is or does not, by reviewing some of the traditional positions of music philosophy. I will do so by briefly addressing a number of commonplace positions which I will call, somewhat
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daringly, ‘myths’ of musical meaning – the mimesis myth, the idealist myth, and the formalist myth. 1
Myths of Musical Meaning The ‘mimesis myth’ proclaims that music is capable of more or less objectively imitating the real world or, alternatively, its ‘ideal’ essence, and accordingly evoke a set of emotional states with which human beings respond to real world experiences. The earliest Western philosophical endeavours in this vein date back to Pythagoras, whose theories start from empirical evidence – the most famous being the discovery of the relationship between pitch and the length of vibrating bodies – but extend into highly speculative and metaphysical realms. Pythagoras put forth that planets and stars emit different pitches which result in a vast music of the spheres producing a cosmic harmony grounded in particular numerical, rational relations. Since such numerical relations provide the hidden essence of perceived reality, profane musicking that similarly employs measured modulations and corresponding harmonic patters may therefore “affect changes in human character, so that moral and spiritual life [are] intimately wed to musical phenomena” (Bowman 1998, 25). The Pythagorean school substantially influenced Plato’s ideas, in which music – conceived in a much more encompassing sense than we think of it today, uniting poetry and song – partakes in the imitation of universal and essential ideals. Platonic attitudes to music tend to have a slightly schizophrenic edge, as music, on the one hand, is lauded as a gift that allows us fleeting insights into the perfection of ideal harmony (“poets are a divine race and often in their strains, by the aid of the Muses and the Graces, they attain truth” qtd. in Bowman 1998, 29), but more often, on the other hand, alienates us from the ideal by appealing to pleasure and cheap appetites in mindless imitations. Music is therefore only partly desirable in Plato’s ideal state, as “even in mere melodies there is an imitation of character” (ibid., 55), and not all kinds of music are welcome. Among the Greek harmonai, the Dorian mode, for instance, was considered ethically sound by Plato, as it expresses “stern resolve,” and was, together with the ‘temperate’ Phrygian, to be tolerated. Melodies in Ionian and Lydian, which expose, for Plato, softness and 1
My reference to ‘myth’ draws on Roland Barthes’s notion of ‘mythical speech’, which he conceives of as an ideological endeavour to ‘naturalise’ meaning: “Myth consists in overturning culture into nature or, at least, the social, the cultural, the ideological, the historical into the ‘natural’” (Barthes 1977, 165).
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indolence, as well as the Mixolydian mode, expressing lamentation and sorrow were in turn to be banned. Plato similarly posits set relations of other features of sound organisation (such as timbre, rhythm, or instrumental quailties – the shrillness of reeds and flutes, for instance, or the confusing polyphony of panharmonic instruments were undesirable) with predictable social and moral effects on the listeners. The assumption that music, through a certain mimetic capability, produces specific, rationally predictable effects has been taken up by modern philosophers and still reverberates in contemporary commonplaces about music. There is, however, what may be called a watershed between medieval and (early) modern conceptions of music: whereas the latter tended to conceive of music as part of the artes mathematicae (by emphasising the importance of numerical relations in a larger cosmology), modern scholars began to allocate music to the artes dicendi, implicating a shift of interest to the purposeful generation of specific effects in specific listeners (Bray 1995a and 1995b). Athanasius Kirchner, for instance, assumed in his Musurgia universalis (1650) that [t]here are eight main affects which music may express: First, love; second, mourning and lament; third, happiness and exultation; fourth, fury and indignation; fifth, mercy and sorrow; sixth, fear and affliction; seventh, resolve and courage; eighth, astonishment; all remaining emotional dispositions can easily be traced back to them. (Kirchner 1650, 598, my tr.)
Kirchner’s theory of ‘affections’ thus basically transforms Plato’s largely socio- and cosmological argument into a psycho-physiological one: he holds that the numerical relations of sound within musical compositions (involving intervals, chords, keys, time, rhythm, tempo, pitch and dynamics) are sympathetically or antipathetically related to the listeners’ temperaments, whose sensory perception of the measured sounds affects the physical movement of nerves and organs resulting in tears, laughter or pain; affects producing sadness and tears, for instance, can be measured in minor keys, small, descending tonal movements (or else by dissonant augmented or diminished intervals), combined with slow tempi and a restrained dynamics (cf. Ruf 2002, 508). The overall argument, which is duly exemplified in analyses of contemporary compositions (by Palestrina and others), is that the meaning and emotional effect of music is a singular, rationally predictable, and universally valid affair. To call the mimetic powers of music a myth on these grounds is not to doubt that music has the power to call forth emotions and associate specific ideas such as ‘sadness’ etc. What is highly questionable, rather, is of course the claim to a rational, direct relation between musical quality and social, psychological or conceptual effect. Shakespeare’s Jessica, after all, famously held that “I am never merry when I hear sweet music” (in The Merchant of
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Venice; V.i.69) – but even beyond questions of individual disposition, what mimetic theories of music essentially gloss over is that musical effects will vary considerably in shifting contexts with varying performing conventions and receptive attributions forged by specific interpretive communities. The fundamental criticism that the value and evaluation of music is neither an (exclusively) intrinsic, nor a purely mental affair, but relies heavily on contextual attribution is also the main criticism levelled against what I refer to as the ‘idealist myth’, and has been, for instance, formulated by Pierre Bourdieu against the Kantian legacy of interpreting the arts, as already indicated in the last chapter. Kantian music philosophy draws on Immanuel Kant’s more general views on aesthetic judgement, which commonly assume that judgements of beauty are ideally unaffected by either social constraints or bodily appetites, and thus exclusively based on “delight and aversion apart from any interest” (Kant 1952, § 5, 50). Second, such judgements are, other than rational or ethical judgements, not based on mental concepts, but conceptless; in a blend of empiricist and rationalist arguments, aesthetic beauty is perceived to be located in the object itself, yet nevertheless in need of being processed by human understanding in disinterested fashion to be properly acknowledged. Third, this effects the universality of aesthetic judgements, which – as our minds work identically and the process of perception is ideally ‘free’ and disinterested – are eternally valid irrespective of cultural variation and change. Music only acquires significance, it can be concluded on these grounds, when ‘natural’ beauty is autonomously mapped onto our cognitive faculties and is set into free play with universal imaginative and conceptual prefigurations. The particular consequences of the Kantian legacy for the interpretation of music have been far-reaching in received Western cultural practices, and implicitly affected Western school syllabuses at least far into the second half of the 20th century (see e.g. Cook 2000). This concerns less Kant’s rating of music below poetry, which he sees more apt to “invigorat[e] the mind by letting it feel its faculty – free, spontaneous, and independent of determination by nature” (ibid., § 53, 191-2); music, for Kant, is too transient and fleeting to achieve lasting food for reflection. 2 What has been more influential is the promotion of listening for ‘pleasure’ – which results from attentive, disinterested contemplation – rather than going for the interested counterpart 2
One should add that in Hegel’s system of thought, music plays a more important and valuable role in his notion of a telelogical, dialectical progressing of humanity. Music, for Hegel, gives us direct access to the inward world of feeling, which he does not see as opposed to the world of ideas, but as a firm part of it; music thus forms an essential step in matters of the spiritual elevation of the human mind (see Bowman 1998, esp. 94-112).
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of ‘gratification’ – read individual (and thus subjective) sensuous experience. The problem with Kant’s transcendental idealism and its legacy in musicology is obvious; as Bowman puts it: “A music emancipated from history, from science, from morality, and from sensation is ultimately a music emancipated from meaning itself” (Bowman 1998, 87). The price to be paid for aesthetic autonomy and universal viability tends to be, quite literally, insignificance. Nevertheless, a highly influential school of ‘formalist’ music philosophers has started from and radicalised Kant’s disinterested principles. The essential proposition of what I choose to call the ‘formalist myth’ is that music bears no reference whatsoever to anything beyond itself, and that musical meaning is found exclusively in the intrinsic formal principles of sound organisation. While idealist positions still emphasise music’s importance for the extra-musical realm – at least with regard to the world of ideas – and thus give it an epistemological relevance, formalist positions take from idealism the idea of autonomy and universality, but deny all extra-musical effect. One of the founding documents of this trend is Eduard Hanslick’s polemical piece On the Musically Beautiful dating to 1854, which is explicitly levelled against so-called “feeling theories” promoted by “music enthusiasts.” As Hanslick argues, their enjoying music as a “fuzzy state of supersensuously sensuous agitation” is utterly banal, as “for all they would know, a fine cigar or the piquant delicacy of a warm bath produces the same effect as a symphony” (Hanslick 1986, 59). Feeling has no relation to musical quality itself, but is arbitrarily attached to it; Hanslick therefore concludes that “the representation of a specific feeling or emotional state is not at all among the characteristic powers of music” (ibid., 9). While he may have a point here, his debateable solution to the problem is that feeling is to be discarded altogether in favour of a disinterested and purely ‘objective’ analysis of music’s “tonally moving forms” (ibid., 29). As music has no content but itself and any metaphysical endeavours to bridge the form–content divide are inevitably misleading, the true meaning of music must exclusively be sought out in music’s formal proportion and progression. Enjoying music, as I was still taught in school, is to painstakingly attend to unfolding tonal patterns and to take intellectual pleasure from anticipating a composer’s intricate tonal design. 3 When Hanslick claims that “contempla3
Formalist approaches to music have since lost much of Hanslick’s polemical edge and taken a more nuanced approach; nevertheless, the works of Edmund Gurney, Leonard Meyer, Stephen Davies or Peter Kivy have neither departed from Hanslick’s core assumptions nor satisfyingly countered the problem of musical ‘insignificance’. As Nicholas Cook memorably notes: “Pure music, it seems, is an aesthetician’s (and music theorist’s) fiction; the real thing unites itself promiscuously with any other media that are available” (Cook 1998, 92).
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tive hearing is the only artistic, true form,” this of course implies that first, the appreciation of music inevitably demands a thorough expertise of its structural and compositional principles, and second, that music of any value and challenge is more or less found in the emerging canon of the art music world only. Obviously, there is a heavy ideological edge in the presumed ‘objectivism’ of formalist approaches to music; but it would be too easy to simply shrug them off as tools of bourgeois distinction, as the philosophical problem they depart from continues to be troubling: if we do not wish to exclusively resort to music as autonomous form, how can we come to terms with the apparent arbitrariness and fuzziness of its possible effects?
A Trialectical Approach to Musical Meaning Let us try and take stock of what can indeed be asserted about musical meaning. The most enlightening source to begin with, in my view, is JeanJacques Nattiez’s Music and Discourse (1990), which is aware of earlier precursors in Western music philosophy and revisits them from a post-structuralist angle. Subtitled Toward a Semiology of Music, it implicitly challenges the formalist tendencies in, for instance, Theodor W. Adorno’s writings which insist that “what is said [by music] cannot be abstracted from the music; it does not form a system of signs” (Adorno 2002, 85). As musical organisations of sound are, after all, perceived as ‘meaningful’ by most listeners disregarding of formal training and social background, Nattiez affords music semiotic status, albeit in a strictly Peircean sense. Defining the musical sign by taking recourse to Charles S. Peirce’s tripartite system comprising the signifier, the signified, and the interpretant implies that it relates to a (virtual) object by always drawing other elements – interpretants – into the relationship, which similarly acquire the status of signs and in turn draw further elements into the equation. There is, consequently, no such thing as a stable, unchangeable relationship between signs and objects (as conceived in structuralist approaches), neither for musical nor for verbal signs. But particularly in view of the more blatant fuzziness and polyvalence of music, Peirce’s system, which allows that “the process of referring effected by the sign is infinite” (Nattiez 1990, 7, emphasis in the original), provides a conceptual groundwork which renders the claims of musical ‘mimesis’ obsolete: there is certainly no such thing as an ‘objective’ referent of music, but only potentially infinite “webs” of interpretants which are, moreover, always “fragment[s] of actual experience” (ibid., 9). The latter observation is particularly relevant regarding idealist or formalist approaches to music, as it insists that the generation and perception of musical meaning is everything but a univer-
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sal affair, but firmly embedded in human practices at specific times and specific places: “The meaning of an object of any kind is the constellation of interpretants drawn from the lived experience of the sign’s user – the ‘producer’ or ‘receiver’ – in a given situation” (ibid., 10). Music thus works on very similar premises as language does, the only difference being that musical discourse is marked by a greater degree of arbitrariness; the webs of interpretants drawn by musical signs tend to be far more unstable than the webs drawn by verbal signs. It is on these grounds that music is much less of a communicational art than verbal art can be. Nattiez addresses this issue by taking recourse to Jean Molino’s ‘tripartition’ of semiotic processes involving the “poietic” (or “encoding,” in Stuart Hall’s terms, see Hall 1993) processes of musical production, the “immanent” or “neutral” level of the organisation of sound itself which bears the traces of the encoding process, and the “esthetic” (or “decoding”) process involved in musical perception. Both encoding and decoding are seen as largely autonomous procedures, and are performed on the grounds of the individuals’ “lived experience” and the discursive universe surrounding them. As such universes are rarely congruent for producers and receivers; since situational contexts and individual dispositions of reception are open to infinite variation; and owing to the general instability and rather arbitrary nature of clusters of interpretants, successful communication is the exception rather than the norm in musical discourse: “In fact, a perfect balance between the poietic and the esthetic, in which poietic and esthetic strategies closely correspond, seems to be the rarest bird in the history of music” (Nattiez 1990, 99). This is not to endorse notions of the purely random and relative, however, or to resort to exclusively social models of explication: interpretive processes remain bound to the ‘neutral’ materiality and “traces” of the sound itself, even though such traces are by no means prescriptive or directive, but have at best a suggestive quality. Musical signs, for Nattiez, “manifest a level of specific organization, that must be described. But this level is not sufficient: the poietic lurks under the surface of the immanent; the immanent is the springboard for the esthetic” (ibid., 29). There is clearly no room in this model for any such thing as musical universals in the Kantian sense; musical meaning is an historically and culturally relative affair. More fundamentally, even within cultural frames, there is hardly a singular, dominant conception of what differentiates music from mere sound, as quite simply, “music is whatever people choose to recognize as such” (ibid., 49, emphasis in the original). If there is any such thing as universals in music – after all, the music of other cultures is by no means unintelligible to us in ways that language often is, but may ‘speak’ to us in multiple ways – they are not to be found in “immanent structures, but in the
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behaviors associated with sound phenomena, particularly in poietic strategies” (ibid., 65, emphasis in the original). While there seems to be something like an anthropologically given, common faculty or drive to create meaning from sound, this meaning nevertheless remains rather elusive. Oddly enough, Nattiez himself seems somewhat uncomfortable with the ‘postmodernist’ results of his lucid and demystifying assessment, and unwilling to accept its radical consequences. His response is that “excessive culturalism should not prevent us from recognizing, from accepting, the existence of facts and truths” (ibid., 196, emphasis in the original), and he consequently claims that behind all relativisms, there lurks something he is fond of calling the “total musical fact.” This ‘fact’, of course, can never be fully grasped, but it may nevertheless be circumvented by adopting and collecting a multiplicity of perspectives and descriptions. The heuristic value of this assumption, to my mind, is rather limited, though, and diverts from the analytical grounds on which the elusiveness and polyvalence of music may be partly contained. In particularly, it diverts from the commonsensical notion that musical meaning is continuous with meaning in general – an idea that is only surprising because we are so used to thinking the opposite without enough surprise. We make sense of music as we make sense of life. And since we make sense of life only amid a dense network of social, cultural and historical forces, musical meaning inevitably bears the traces, and sometimes the blazons, of those forces. (Kramer 2002, 163)
Departing from this statement by Lawrence Kramer, I suggest that what we make of musical sound and experience indeed evolves from the interplay of different yet interdependent aspects of perception: first, the cognitive exposure to given formal properties of sound organisation (favoured by idealists and formalists); second, the embeddedness of musical sound in contextual and generic conventions which frame musical performances, involving, among other things, economic and institutional constraints (something Nattiez is hardly concerned with); and third, the physical and kinaesthetic dimensions of responding to music. Each aspect – cognitive, social, physical – informs the other. While certain generic conventions may put particular emphasis on any one of these aspects (often with vested interests – certainly, the art music world propagates a predominantly cognitive experience, the folk world emphasises social interaction, and musical styles associated with pop often relish in physical hedonism), all three aspects of music evaluation invariably come into play. At the risk of stating the obvious: what music eventually
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‘means’ to us is always a product of the trialectical dynamic interaction of the interdependent spheres of mind, society, and body. 4 Understanding sound to some degree always involves attending to what Nattiez refers to as musical immanence – be it with the professional vocabulary of the expert musicologist or the intuitive descriptive vocabulary of Hanslick’s detested ‘philistine’. The cognitive sphere is crucial in the proposed triad as without cognition, bodily experience cannot be reflected upon, nor can it be verbally communicated and shared with others. Inversely argued, however, cognition is never disinterested, i.e. exclusively affected by manifest musical forms, but invariably constricted by the sounds’ relation to social ritual and convention, as well as by their sensuous, bodily processing. I have dealt rather extensively with the social and performative aspects framing musical meaning in the previous two chapters: clearly, just like the polyvalence of verbal meaning, the musical meaning of songs is equally contained by certain generic conventions of performance and their respective communicative economies. Such conventions charge particular patterns of musical immanence with culturally specific meanings which can be shared with or withheld from others in processes of distinction, and they are firmly embedded in specific institutional, juridical and economical frameworks of production and consumption. In Feminine Endings, Susan McClary, for instance, demonstrates how elements of musical immanence are perceived as ‘gendered’ in both art and pop music discourses – as, say, in the notion of ‘male’ and ‘female’ cadences. However, they are gendered, McClary carefully makes clear, not because of their musical ‘character’, but by social convention and coding. “These codes change over time,” she explains: the ‘meaning’ of femininity was not the same in the eighteenth century as in the late nineteenth, and musical characterizations differ accordingly. To be sure, some aspects of the codes are strikingly resilient and have been transmitted in ways that are quite recognizable up to the present […]. But if some aspects of the codes prove stable, it is not because music is a ‘universal language’, but rather because certain social attitudes concerning gender have remained relatively constant through that stretch of history. (McClary 1991, 8).
4
Neurological and psychological research confirm this view; as Herbert Bruhn notes: “Summing up, it may be concluded that it is inadequate to contemplate music as a singular object of perception in psycho-physiological processing. The effect, which only seemingly originates in the music alone, is in fact generated by an interplay with other areas of perception; with the previous personal experiences of a human being, with the perception of the situational context, and with lasting or ephemeral emotional conditions. Scientific research still does not sufficiently attend to this fact” (Bruhn 1998, 182, my tr.).
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McClary’s point also serves as a transition to the third element in the triad: the body. Attributing notions of gender, sexuality and desire to music, of course, not only relates to questions of social construction, but also to the body as the core sensorial medium of experiencing musical sound. For a very long time, the notion of music as ‘embodied’ experience had little room in Western music philosophy which tended to propagate music as something ‘absolute’ and ‘transcendent’, and only began to resurface in phenomenological theories in the wake of Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. One of the most intriguing phenomenological approaches to (art) music has been proposed by Thomas Clifton in Music as Heard (1983). Music, for Clifton, is “the actualisation of the possibility of any sound whatever to present to some human being meaning which he experiences with his body – that is to say, with his mind, his feelings, his senses, his will, and his metabolism” (Clifton 1983, 1). Clifton thus outright defies the Cartesian mindbody dualism characterising much discourse on art music. Music may exist outside of human perception, yet it becomes meaningful only if a human being attends to it with his or her whole body; it requires the complicity and presence of a person who interacts with the musical source in reciprocal dialogue. Moreover, Clifton proposes that much of the descriptive vocabulary of traditional musicology – such as pitch, interval, harmony, dissonance or tonality – are not foundational to what we hear and perceive. While they may serve as tools of formalist reconstruction, what we actually perceive or hear more fundamentally unfolds on the grounds of interdependent musical strata which he labels ‘time’, ‘space’, ‘play’ and ‘feeling’. The actual human experience of musical time, Clifton argues following Husserl, has little to do with the organised and ordered “transitive succession of discreet nows” (ibid., 56) indicated by musical notation, but presents us with a much more complex phenomenon. The passage of time is hardly experienced as unidirectional or constant: on the contrary, acoustic presence may be obliterated by the affective impact and mnemonic associations of past notes, or their future anticipation; accordingly, musical sound as lived experience may impede the passing of time, as when sounds agitate or displease, or it may speed up its passing when “we and it move in the same direction deliberately, desiringly, and possessingly” (ibid., 54). Time, moreover, always interacts with musical space or “texture” as Clifton conceives it. Necessarily ‘situated’ in spatial contexts as all lived experience, musical space is nevertheless different from ‘objective’ as well as purely ‘acoustic’ space, but emerges as the product of a synesthetic physical exposure in which visual, tactile and auditory functions synergetically interact. Notions of ‘thinness’ or ‘thickness’ of musical lines, of ‘colour’ or ‘extension’, are thus not mere metaphors, but “bodily enaction[s] of meaning” (Lochhead 1995, 36).
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With the notion of ‘play’, Clifton partly refers to what he calls the aleatoric and heuristic dimensions of listening; music as experience, for him, is based on anticipation and surprise in a dialectics of stability and disintegration. Yet more importantly in our context, play also refers to the inevitable ‘ritual’ framing of music in designed contexts and social settings which guarantee the seriousness of the bodily enactment of sound. In such ritualistic enactment, space and time are infused with ‘feeling’. This last stratum refers to the degree of mutual possession of music and embodied self: “[music] has value because I possess it, and it possesses me” (Clifton 1983, 273). Experiencing sound as music thus requires active and deliberate immersion, or, in Clifton’s terms, “bodily complicity” (ibid., 279) – otherwise music slips back into noise. For Clifton, music is not ‘about’ feeling or ‘denoting’ feeling, but in a more encompassing phenomenological sense, it is feeling itself. This (re)inauguration of the body as a formative category in experiencing music is crucial; yet it also bears the danger of both new essentialisms – Clifton thinks of his four strata time, space, play and feeling as essential and universal – as well as of relativisms. It is important, therefore, to align notions of bodily subjectivity with cognitive and social processes in a more fundamental way than Clifton does. As Lawrence Ferrara notes, approaches such as Clifton’s do not appear “to follow a basic shift in phenomenology from subjectivism into ‘intersubjectivism’ in which man exists within an onto-historical situation marked by interaction” (Ferrara 1991, 153). Pierre Bourdieu’s insistence on the social foundation of bodily habits and dispositions is vital here, which he captures with the notion of ‘hexis’. “Bodily hexis,” Bourdieu explains, “is political mythology realised, em-bodied, turned into a permanent disposition, a durable manner of standing, speaking and thereby of feeling and thinking” (Bourdieu 1977, 93, emphases in the original). Even though she does explicitly refer to Bourdieu, the idea of a socially framed bodily disposition or hexis is basically also what Susan McClary drives at when she writes on the importance of the body in musical communication: music is foremost among the “technologies of the body,” that is, a site where we learn how to experience socially mediated patterns of kinetic energy, being in time, emotions, desire, pleasure, and much more. […] These patterns inevitably arrive already marked with histories – histories involving class, gender, ethnicity; music thus provides a terrain where competing notions of the body (and the self, ideals of social interaction, feelings and so on) vie for attention and influence. (McClary 1994, 32-33)
Bodily behaviour and dispositions are a core aspect of competing musical genres and thus interact with all other social aspects (communicative, economic, institutional, juridical) discussed in the previous chapter; and of course, bodily ‘feeling’ is never entirely random, but remains linked to sound
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that is open to rational description and intersubjective sharing with a community of other listeners. Let us return to the core questions asked at the beginning of this chapter then and see whether we can make better sense of them in the light of what has been said: what exactly is the meaning of music, and how, or in how far, does music mean anything in particular? Following Christopher Small, it turns out that these may have been the wrong questions in the first place; for Small at least, “[t]here is no such thing as music. Music is not a thing at all but an activity, something that people do. […] If there is no such thing as music, then to ask ‘What is the meaning of music?’ is to ask a question that has no possible answer” (Small 1998, 2-3). I do not think that we need to go as far as to provocatively renounce ‘music’ as such; but Small’s point is well made – musical meaning is hardly an inherent proponent of abstract musical ‘works’ of art, but a product of multiple cultural practices. It evolves every time anew in the trialectical dynamics between cognitive contemplation, processes of social interaction and distinction, and corresponding conventions of kinaesthetic involvement and bodily complicity. Rather than a product of ‘pure’ sound, musical meaning is a paradigmatically ‘impure’ product of what Small coins as “musicking” – of mentally, socially and bodily partaking in a performance, be it live or recorded. This understanding of what music means (or rather means to us), is fundamental not only with regard to musical sound itself, but also when it comes to the question of how sound and verbal meaning interact in songs. “The ways in which song words are subject to the pressure of their music are subtle and fascinating,” Mark W. Booth writes: “They are reinforced, accented, blurred, belied, inspired to new meaning, in a continual interplay” (Booth 1991, 7-8). Such possible ‘sound effects’ on verbal meaning are too varied to allow for detailed coverage in the framework of this chapter (yet will be covered, to some extent, in the specific case studies in part two). Let me emphasise again, however, that word-music relations cannot be sufficiently accounted for by merely investigating formal relations. 5 Rather, we need to conceive of two complex (trialectic) meaning-creating systems – one verbal, one musical – that are short-circuited in a feedback loop in such a way that they continually and dynamically inflect each other. Both systems, moreover, are instable in themselves, even if verbal meaning is more conventionalised and depends to a lesser degree on pragmatic fixture. Whether meaning is then 5
The assumption that meaning is a product of musicking rather than exclusively inherent in the music itself will have to serve as a justification for the fact that I will largely bypass ‘formalist’ literature dedicated to the relationship between words and (art) music, including formative texts by Cone (1957), Scher (1984 and 1992), Bernhart (1988), or Berley (2000).
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stabilised (“reinforced,” “accented”), further destabilised (“blurred,” “belied”), or whether an unexpected synthesis produces newness (“inspired”) in the enriching encounter of words and music in song really depends on in which way not only the formal, but particularly also the social and bodily conventions of lyrics and music correlate in a specific performance arena in the very act of musicking. The results of word-music interaction in this sense are hardly predicable and shift with shifting social and bodily dispositions from arena to arena. But let us nevertheless try to exemplarily approximate one specific sound effect in word-music relations – an effect that Lawrence Kramer calls “songfulness” – which may help to ultimately also make better sense of the lyrical discrepancies between Martin Carthy and Sérgio Mendes’s versions of “Scarborough Fair.”
Scarborough Fair (III): Songful Transformations Kramer introduces the category of “songfulness” in order to come to terms with the fact that we are often surprisingly unaware of the actual verbal meaning of lyrics – meaning that would be quite obvious to us if presented as a poem on a piece of paper – in the performance and reception of particular songs. 6 Kramer’s own perfect example is that of Schubert’s setting of Goethe’s “Heideröslein” – a poem that is commonly read as a thinly veiled and rather cynical extended metaphor for the act of deflowering and the vanity of resisting masculine domination (read penetration). 7 Through the particular kind of vocal embodiment engendered by Schubert’s setting, this less than charming content is, according to Kramer, curiously suspended in an alternative denotative realm of diffuse comfort and fantasy, in a process that has to do with particular generic conventions of musical communication (in this case of the Volkslied), and a corresponding “bodily complicity,” as Clifton would put it, between singer and listener. Kramer’s description of the vocal effect merits quoting at some length: 6
7
Some empirical evidence of this phenomenon has been provided by two studies of teenage and college students’ responses to popular protest songs in the 1970 US – the majority of students interviewed had no idea what the lyrics of such songs as “Eve of Destruction” were actually about (see Denisoff and Levin 1972; Robinson and Hirsch 1972). Rather than turning exclusively to sociological explanations involving problems of production and consumption to account for this phenomenon (see e.g. Frith 1978), I believe that the ‘songful’ organisation of sound in many protest songs plays a considerable role. The third and final stanza reads (in my tr.): “And the wild lad picked / the little rose on the heath / little rose fought back and pricked / but her ‘woe’ and ‘ah’ did her no good / she just had to let it happen / little rose, little rose, little rose red / little rose on the heath.”
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Reading Song Lyrics As the medium of meaningful utterance, voice brings the music into a space of potential or virtual meaning even when actual meaning is left hanging; as the medium of social relationship, voice involves the listener in a potential or virtual intersubjectivity that in some circumstances may be realized in the course of song; and as a corporeal medium, voice addresses itself in its sensuous and vibratory fullness to the body of the listener, thereby offering both material pleasure and an incitement to fantasy. These effects all depend on the ability of the singing voice to envelope or suffuse both melody and text so that their independent existence is obscured. One way of defining songfulness is as the condensation of this distinctness into a quality, the conversation of the absence of textual and melodic distinctness into a positive presence. (Kramer 2002, 54). 8
While there are many scenarios in which verbal content becomes unintelligible on purely acoustic grounds – through drowning in musical sound, for instance, through vocal polyphony, through excessive vocal embellishment which violates intonation and speech rhythm, through high frequencies (above 312 Hz), or through electrical distortion in variants of rock – the loss of verbal meaning in songfulness cannot be explained acoustically. Verbal meaning is suspended, here, despite the fact that words remain perfectly audible and intelligible; instead, they are suffused with another, larger semantic realm opened up through what Ola Stockfelt calls “genre-normative modes of listening” (Stockfelt 2004, 383) and their mnemonic inscriptions on the body. Songfulness is probably not the only mode in which the exclusion of verbal content in favour of other semantic fields may occur – Kramer describes at least one other mode which he calls ‘overvocalisation’, denoting “the purposeful effacement of text by voice [through] emotional and metaphysical extremes” (Kramer 1986, 132). 9 Yet while “overvocalization is extraordinary, or at least a convention for signifying the extraordinary,” songfulness in contrast presents the unmarked case: “it is, in fact, the ideal ordinariness of song” (Kramer 2002, 64). The conspicuous feeling that making sense of Martin Carthy’s version of “Scarborough Fair” very much depends on the verbal meaning of the lyrics, whereas Sérgio Mendes’s “Scarborough Fair” rather makes sense despite its words, must have something to do then with the fact that the first consciously thwarts songfulness (in the specific histori8
9
Kramer reads the songfulness of Schubert’s “Heideröslein” as playfully and deliberately troubled by the comparatively demanding high G lingering over the final “Röslein rot,” which undercuts the tune’s folk tone and renders its songfulness “self-conscious” (Kramer 2002, 61). In his earlier Music and Poetry (1986), Kramer distinguishes the following modes of “erasing” verbal meaning as summarised by Nicholas Cook: “expressive revision (when the music subverts the poetry through its incongruity); imitation (when music corresponds only superficially to the poem, so creating an arena of semantic indeterminacy), and structural dissonance (when music denies ‘its expressive support in a crucial way or at a crucial moment’)” (Cook 1998, 124).
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cal and cultural context of its performance), whereas the latter deliberately seeks it within particular generic conventions. Let us first reconsider the vocal performance of Carthy: Carthy sings with a full-bodied, expressive, yet conversational voice shifting between roughness and tenderness while carefully avoiding sterile perfection. In Roland Barthes’ terms, the voice would indeed be rather on the “grainy” side and work on a genotextual rather than phenotextual level, i.e. affect on the grounds of an immediate, pre-cognitive bodily complicity between singer and listener (cf. Barthes 1977). 10 The ‘personality’ of that voice and intersubjective encounter, however, does not drive at individual, but at collective intimacy. This is partly effected by Carthy’s use of the microphone: if, as Simon Frith holds, “[o]ne effect of microphone use is to draw attention to the technique of singers as singers […] as volume control takes on conversational nuances and vice versa” (Frith 1998, 188, emphasis in the original), Carthy deliberately shuns the possibilities of the microphone as an instrument to create pseudo-erotic intimacy. Rather, except for the addition of some reverb, the processing attempts to retain the original quality of a voice that is not trained classically, but rather through sufficient practice in having to carry without amplification in pubs and smaller venues. Even before communicating any verbal content, the embodied voice thus signifies notions of gender, class and performing space, demarcating a particular speaking position within the context of the British folk revival. As a distinctly male, and presumably working class voice, Carthy’s “Scarborough Fair” clearly appeals to a very different fantasy-structure than Mendes’s version, which rather clearly caters to global fantasies of Hollywood-enhanced images of the Copacabana. Yet while Mendes rather blatantly caters to the escapist desires of his listeners, Carthy’s performance equally evokes a fantasy, in this case of an ‘ordinariness’ and egalitarian sense of communalism which, in the thoroughly middle class 60s folk scene, was hardly given but needed to be carefully constructed and keyed through a particular register involving generic, vocal and musical qualities. Such keying, then, allowed for a particular communicative economy, triggering the modes of listening which are “adequate” (Stockfelt 2004) within the particular performance arena. The ideal generic conventions of listening to a Carthy-style folk performance work against songfulness: first, the folk music world is grounded in a particular hexis that socially regulates the bodily complicity between per10
In “The Grain of the Voice,” Barthes famously compares the vocality of the singers FischerDieskau, who moves audiences through outward technical bravado and vocal perfection, and Panzera, whose vocal range is not of Fischer-Dieskau’s calibre, yet communicates its passion on a bodily, guttural level.
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former and audience. While listeners are encouraged to enjoy the physicality of the music and ‘graininess’ of the voice, they are meant to do so reflexively and consciously; self-absorbed kinaesthetic response, as in dancing, is discouraged, while casual, yet attentive and devoted listening is encouraged (see MacKinnon 1993). Second, folk ideology quite simply tends to privilege narrative over sound, and folk performers are cherished for their quality as storytellers as much as for their skills as musicians: the music is expected to supplement the narrative and carry or reflect its content rather than vice versa. As a consequence, the performance of musical accomplishment is carefully checked in order not to get in the way of the verbal message. Carthy is commonly considered one of the most refined guitar players within and beyond the world of folk, yet his technical brilliance is seen in the elaborateness with which he hides the artfulness of his arrangements behind deceptive simplicity and ease. Carthy’s own account of his guitar style in a 1975 interview may give an idea of this ‘elaborate simplicity’: it’s basically that, only cutting one of the beats out, so that you use the thumb as well to play a melody note. Instead of going ‘dong, ding, dong, ding, dong’ you go ‘dom...dom...dom... dom,’ and the second beat is used to play a note of the melody. On certain things I rest the heel of my hand on the guitar. If you whack the bottom string with the heel of your hand on it, you get this ‘thunk’ and it carries over onto the fifth string, which then drones. You’re not actually striking the second string, you’re just sounding it as you’re going past[.]
Carthy significantly concludes: “I tend to play either what I’m singing or a very, very basic variation on that, or just the skeleton of what I’m singing” (qtd. in Kidney 2004). The arrangement of “Scarborough Fair” is a perfect example of such a restrained and deceptively simple musical arrangement that is put into the service of verbal content: set in (swayable, but not quite danceable) 6/8 time, the dominant pattern is built of 8th-note arpeggios using as many open strings as possible to allow for the ‘droning’ effects mentioned above (while indeed the thumb tends to strike a melody rather than bass note on the 4th beat). The resulting sound thus has a repetitive, mesmerising, and resounding steadiness producing a quietly pulsing beat; in fact, the guitar arrangement in itself would have potential for songfulness (which was later fully exploited by Simon and Garfunkel). Yet it is Carthy’s vocal performance – setting in after only four bars – which dominates the tune; the musical sound, this is, mainly serves to set the mood for the verbal narrative and the ‘enveloping’ and slightly mesmerising quality of the music merely underlines the mysteriousness of the posed riddles and the curious tale of lost love. How does the vocal performance help to key the (generic) dominance of narrative over sound? The most effective keying here, I believe, is highlighting melodic and vocal anachronisms rather than glossing over them in the
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context of the larger musical conventions of 1960s Britain. Take Carthy’s phrasing of the refrain “Parsley, sage, rosemary and thyme,” for instance: unlike Faithfull, Simon and Garfunkel, Mendes and most others, he uses striking melismata on both the words “Sage” and “and.” On the one hand, the effect may reside in a dramatisation of the uncanny in the vocal line, which Carthy after all sees as the remnant of an invocation against the evil eye owing to the tune’s evolution from the much older, supernatural “Elfin Knight” variations. Similar effects may for instance have been intended in the brief lingering on the last syllable of “rosema-ry” (which sounds the raised 6th on the Dorian scale unfamiliar to contemporary listeners, and perhaps underlining the mysterious tinge), or in the demonstrative aspiration of the plosive in “th-yme.” On the other hand and more importantly, the perceived archaisms of such vocal performance distance the rendition of “Scarborough Fair” from the contemporary norms of songfulness in both art music (by its roughness and imperfection) and popular styles (through the ‘outdated’ vocal ornamentation). While calling for bodily complicity in Clifton’s sense, ‘bodily complacency’ is thus carefully checked to foreground a dominantly lyrical message, not in the sense that verbal performance eclipses or fully appropriates the potential meaning of the musical lines, but rather by preventing that their independent denotative capacities merge within a larger semantic and performative realm. What matters in Carthy’s performance is the complementation of word and sound, as much as a sense of contrast or irony. It is due to the friction between the rough and unpolished singing style and the unvarnished elegance of the melodic and instrumental arrangement, that the listener is continually called to pay attention to the re-enacted narrative; Carthy quite simply takes good care that “the singing voice [does not] envelope or suffuse both melody and text so that their independent existence is obscured” (Kramer 2002, 54). Conversely, Sérgio Mendes’s 1968 re-arrangement of Simon and Garfunkel’s 1966 hit single is a prime example of carefully crafted songfulness. Trained as a classical pianist, Mendes intensely participated in the Rio sessions that gave birth to the distinctly Brazilian style of ‘bossa nova’ in the late 1950s, playing with, among others, Antônio Carlos Jobim und João Gilberto. When bossa was discovered not only by the post-bebop US jazz scene (Mendes for instance recorded with Cannonball Adderly on Cannonball’s Bossa Nova) but also for a larger mainstream audience through the mediation of Stan Getz and Charlie Byrd, Mendes moved to California in 1964 and his fusion of traditional bossa styles with elements of jazz and pop styles quickly became the craze of the day. He soon became the commercially most successful Brazilian musician in the States ever, partly through adaptations of Brazilian compositions (his arrangement of Jorge Ben’s “Mas Que Nada”
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was the first Portuguese song to make the US billboard charts), yet mainly through appropriations of Western hits: his breakthrough with Brazil ’66 was a bossa arrangement of Burt Bacharach and Hal David’s “The Look of Love” which quickly outsold Dusty Springfield’s take; and the same recipe proved successful for the Beatles’s “Fool on the Hill” and “Scarborough Fair” (climbing the billboard charts to no. 16, and thus not far below Simon and Garfunkel’s version, which had held no. 4 two years earlier). Bossa nova underwent at least two critical transformations on its way from small Copacabana clubs in the late 50s to Hollywood and on to a global phenomenon in the 60s: musically, there was a move from minimalist guitarbased accompaniment to increasingly lavish orchestral arrangements while harmonic and rhythmic complexities were often reduced to make for more up-tempo and up-beat ‘easier’ listening; socially, the ‘adequate’ mode of reception shifted from folk-oriented contemplation to dancing (the relevant dance steps were published in many Western newspapers during the bossa craze, cf. e.g. Castro 2000). This variant of bossa catering to the global mass markets quite obviously created a particular fantasy-structure for Western audiences drawing on Hollywoodised associations of the Copacabana; it emphasised an exoticist sensuous pleasure and pseudo-erotic easiness which was then translated into a formalised dancing pattern that was all about loosening lower body stiffness. Sérgio Mendes has been accused of selling out Brazilian folk art to the masses on these grounds, and such argument are not entirely unfounded, even if they tend to be based on a simplifying notion of authenticity which Mendes rejects. Independent of whether one considers Mendes’s “Scarborough Fair” to be pathetic or not, though, what interests me here is the ease with which he appropriates the lyrical content of an age-old folk song to effectively suspend its verbal meaning within a soundscape that sets out for something (seemingly) completely different. The first thing to note, here, is of course that Mendes uses a heavily truncated version of the text, by merely adopting the first stanza which is then repeated three times. On the one hand, this selection is indicative of the value that Mendes attributes to the respective verbal and musical content, where the latter clearly has the upper hand. Mendes obviously had little interest in the larger narrative scope of the song which most of his original audience, however, would have been vaguely familiar with through the recent popularity of Simon and Garfunkel’s version which peaked just a few months earlier. On the other hand, the truncated version fits the aesthetic scope of bossa nova quite well as originally, bossa lyrics hardly extended beyond a few lines which were simply repeated (as, for instance, in the early recordings of João Gilberto). Such lyrics tended to paint rather clichéd images of melancholy and love which provided the impressionist verbal material that was needed to
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communicate a predominantly musical message on the levels of voice and sound. Working largely within this generic model, Mendes’s “Scarborough Fair” is thus not only stripped of the meaning of stanzas two to five to begin with, but also musically eclipses the literal meaning of the first. The appropriation of the tune into entirely new generic conventions first called for obvious formal adjustments such as the transposition into 4/4 time and a heavily syncopated rhythmical fundament performed between Dom Um Romau, Rubens Bassni and Sebastião Neto on percussion, a bassplayer lost to history, and Mendes himself through his jazz-inspired off-beat piano phrasing. This new rhythmical quality, which also crucially affects the vocal phrasing, promotes an entirely different type of bodily complicity than that of Carthy’s version, one that ties in with generic modes of ‘adequate’ listening inviting, above all, relaxation and dancing. All this is embedded in a larger, commercially and institutionally supported social framework propagating feel-good self-indulgence and escapist fantasies engendered by the culturally coded ‘tropicality’ of the rhythmic phrasing in conjunction with the cinematic spaceousness and opulence of the orchestral support (arranged by Dave Grusin – who incidentally also collaborated with Simon and Garfunkel on the soundtrack to The Graduate). Yet it is the quality of the voices floating above the luscious soundscape which particularly engenders the tune’s songfulness. The vocal lines are dominated by Lani Hall and Karen Phillips in crystalclear unisono, with Mendes occasionally adding a lower and mellow octave parallel line. The overall vocal peformance is thus gendered as dominantly female, yet at the same time slightly androgynised. In Barthes’s terms again, the voice is neither too ‘grainy’, i.e. objectively linked with the bodily presence and uniqueness of a singular personality, nor too brilliant: there is no excessive display of technical proficiency or harmonic intricacy, but rather a ‘teasing’ vocal play with the new rhythmic format, involving, for instance, vocal glissandi (on “there” in “the one who lives there”) or punctuated, syncopated stops (in “He once was”). Put differently, the vocal quality is strangely anonymous and distant, yet at the same time full of playful and intimate eroticism and thus bodily ‘felt’. There is, as Lawrence Kramer puts it in another context, “a sense of immediate intimate contact between the listener and the subject behind the voice,” while the subject position is filled by an “embodied fiction,” or what Kramer calls a “specific fantasy-structure that underlies the experience of songfulness” (Kramer 2002, 53). While in the context of the “Heideröslein,” Kramer thinks in terms of the re-enactement of the primal “gift of song” of a mother to her child, what we are dealing with in Mendes’s “Scarborough Fair,” I believe, is something less oedipal, though similarly Homeric: Mendes’s musical and vocal arrangement aims at sublimated and vocally encoded seduction and the voices transport
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‘pure’ sex; sex which, as in the song of Homer’s sirens, is somehow both transcendent and physically immediate, and which appeals, though clearly gendered as female, to the exoticist fantasies of both genders. The verbal content is of little matter in all this – what matters instead is the physical and kinaesthetic indulgence in the “singing-in-itself,” as Kramer puts it: “Songfulness is a fusion of vocal and musical utterance judged to be both pleasurable and suitable independent of verbal content. It is the positive quality of singing-in-itself: just singing” (ibid.). The repetitiveness of the vocal and musical content – unbearable to the art music connoisseur preferring a disinterested mode of listening – turns from aesthetic obstacle into a prerequisite: it is integral to the “genre-normative mode of listening” to bossa-pop, one that avoids Kantian aesthetic pleasures in favour of the self-indulgent bodily gratification of losing oneself in the beats and sounds, of relishing hedonistic immersion in musical fantasies of luscious sexuality and seduction. It would certainly be easy to dismiss Sérgio Mendes’s artistic tour-deforce as an utter violation of the original folk tune on these grounds, and especially so in comparison with Martin Carthy’s folk version. Yet one could also argue that in a curious way – and most probably unwittingly so – Mendes’s musical realisation of “Scarborough Fair” is just as true to the original implications of the tune as Carthy’s much more informed and faithful ‘revival’ of the song. After all, the narrative kernel of the early predecessors of “Scarborough Fair” (the “Elfin Knight” variations) is all about seduction: a young and innocent maid calls forth a devil or demon ‘by mistake’ who threatens to take her virginity and can only be held at bay through an elaborate game of riddles which the maid eventually wins. As already remarked, it does not take a lot of Freud to interpret the ‘demon’ of these early songs as an externalised personification of female erotic fantasy which is culturally sanctioned and checked by (patriarchal) rationality. If it is true that the later versions of “Scarborough Fair” carry on a latent preoccupation with female sexuality which is perceived as uncanny and simply translated into the rhetoric of modernity – as a destructive force in the love affair between two human beings –, it may not be entirely off the mark indeed to produce a version of “Scarborough Fair” which translates siren-like seduction into the musical rhetoric of the 1960s. Surely, the message has shifted from social demonisation to one of sexual liberation and indulgence in Mendes’s musical vision of 1968, and has thus moved beyond the (male) melancholy or, alternatively, sarcasm marking the narrative that Carthy recorded three years earlier. The irony remains, though, that Mendes’s corresponding fetishisation of sexuality works not because, but despite the narrative scope of the original tune – Mendes drains the lyrics of their verbal meaning in songfulness, and instead drives his message home musically rather than verbally.
5. Mediality and Musical Multimedia In the previous chapters, it has been tacitly assumed that making sense of lyrics has a lot to do with (live) performance: the chapter on performance and performativity made much of specific ‘performance arenas’ shaping and ‘keying’ communicative processes; the chapter on musical genres foregrounded performing ideologies and the ritual framing of musical events; the chapter on sound and songfulness highlighted the social embeddedness of musical communication and the importance of varying kinds of ‘bodily complicity’ between performers and audiences. This requires some qualification and complication, of course, as participating in live events has long ceased to be the dominant mode of experiencing lyrics, even if the popular music industry has experienced a paradigmatic shift towards liveness again in the wake of the digital revolution and the demise of the traditional recording industries since around 2000. It is vital, therefore, to turn to questions concerning the changing medial base of lyrics. The mediality of song lyrics may be conceived in a narrow and a wider sense of the term; in the first sense, mediality refers to the particular state of ‘encodedness’ in a particular medium, i.e. to the core ‘materiality’ of verbal utterances: while both poetry and song lyrics are constituted of verbal signs, the primary material base of lyrics is ‘sound’, while in poetry, it is ‘writing’. This first aspect of mediality has already been tackled in the previous chapter to some extent, and will serve as a basis for the following discussion. This chapter will mainly concentrate on the second, more encompassing connotation of medialty as a particular apparatus of communication. In Werner Faulstich’s definition, this approach conceives of a ‘medium’ as an “institutionalised system involving an organised channel of communication with a specific performance value and social relevance” (Faulstich 2004, 12, my tr.). To begin with, it should be noted that even in the sense of medium as a systemic and technical apparatus, live performances of songs can by no means be seen as non- or pre-medial; rather, what we confront, here, is a case of “primary” mediality which is increasingly challenged by competitive technological inventions and the ensuing technologising of word and sound. One of my main arguments in this chapter will be that despite an apparent marginalisation of ‘liveness’ over the course of the 20th century (in the 1990s, live performances apparently accounted for less than 1% of all music use, cf. Rösing 1998a, 110) and the advancing cultural dominance of recorded song in multiple medial formats, genre-normative modes of listening have continued to be informed by performing conventions and rituals of liveness. The realms of live and recorded song have not drifted apart into mutually exclusive
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worlds as is often claimed, but have evolved in close dialogue with one another. I wish to also illustrate, however, how the transposition of lyrics into new multi-medial contexts affects the emergence of meaning in songs, and will again close with another brief exemplary reading of “Scarborough Fair,” this time as part of the soundtrack of Mike Nichols’s film The Graduate.
Modes of Medial Performance In order to provide a first overview of the increasingly complex field of mediatised communication in relation to song lyrics, it is helpful to turn to Werner Faulstich’s basic distinction of four types of media according to their degree of technological saturation (Faulstich 2004, for an English intr. see Voigts-Virchow 2005, 20-22). Faulstich distinguishes “primary” or “human” media, which are grounded in ritualised human face-to-face communication; “secondary media,” which are based on printing technology; “tertiary” media or, alternatively, “analogue” media, which are typically based on electronic recording, storage and transmission devices (such as radio, tape and vinyl recordings, film, video, TV, or telephone); and finally “quaternary” or “digital” media, which are introduced as a separate category, not necessarily because of their distinct encoding system (sequences of the binary digits 0 and 1), but because they brought entirely new potentials of editing, disseminating and communicating data (e.g. digital image and/or sound files via computer software, email, intranet/extranet or the world wide web). 1 The distinction of four basic media types conceives an historical trajectory of technological inventions which have shaped the way that lyrics were produced or staged, distributed and received up until the early 21st century, leaving us with a composite and diffuse mediatised landscape as most new medial developments have not led to the displacement of older technology, but to a situation of cumulative coexistence of multiple medial formats. In order to more fully map out this mediatised landscape, I suggest to supplement Faulstich’s focus on technological saturation (here, regarding the recording of words and sound) with a focus on the visual presence of the per1
It is important not to confuse this categorisation with an altogether different distinction of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ media along the lines of the recipients’ degree of ‘complicity’, where primary media are seen to typically involve active involvement, while secondary media provide the background noise to everyday life – the radio, for instance, is commonly referred to as a paradigmatically secondary medium as, in Jody Barland’s terms, “no one cares whether you listen to the radio so long as you don’t turn it off […]. Radio is humble and friendly, it follows your everywhere” (Barland 2004, 193).
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tertiary secondary primary
MEDIUM OF LYRICS
quaternary
formance. It is possible to again distinguish between four different types of visual presence, here: a ‘primary’ presence where performers and listeners physically co-inhabit a performance arena during live events; ‘zero’ presence where the experience of words and sound is severed from the visual experience of their performance; a ‘secondary’ presence where the performer is not directly present, but represented by two-dimensional (more recently also three-dimensional) images; and finally, an ‘ersatz’-presence combining or substituting the immediate visual context of a performance with another visual universe which may or may not be related to the first. Admittedly, the lines between zero, primary, secondary and contextual/ersatz visual presences are often blurry and sometimes difficult to draw at all; yet they will do in order to more clearly organise a number of different modes of medial performance with regard to song lyrics, as illustrated below. sound recording on CD, DVDaudio, MP3, etc.
live event, digital playback
digital video / film representing performance
digital video / film without performer(s)
sound recording on cylinder, shellac, vinyl, tape, etc.
live event, analogue playback
video / film representing performance
video / film without performer(s)
lyrics/score in songbook, booklet, etc.
(performed sheet music, karaoke)
representation of performer(s) in songbook, booklet etc.
artwork / design in songbook, booklet etc.
live event, invisible performer(s)
live event
live event, virtual performer(s)
artwork / design of stage / setting
primary
secondary
contextual/ersatz
zero
VISUAL PRESENCE OF PERFORMANCE
Fig. 2: Modes of medial performance
The system of primary mediality is of course historically the oldest mode of staging lyrics, and has arguably been culturally dominant until the turn of the 20th century, when the new modes of sound recording developed by Thomas A. Edison and Emil Berliner began to more thoroughly take hold (cf. e.g. Laing 2004). Admittedly, though, it may be argued that it had lost some of its relevance already in the Early Modern period, when both printed notations of sound were for the first time distributed outside of the clerical world, and the first mass distribution of printed secular lyrics in the medial format of the
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broadside challenged the relevance of human beings as the sole preservers of vocal tradition and narrative. Faulstich thus argues that the particular ‘medial’ character of most traditional human media dissolved in stratification processes since the Renaissance when, for instance, the singers of an hitherto largely oral culture were reduced to professional roles – master singers founded professional singing schools, while traditional balladeers, by making mercantile use of the new mass medium of the broadside, became primarily ballad venders (Faulstich 2004, 35). In view of songs and lyrics in particular, however, I hold this view to be problematic, as the symbiosis with other medial formats has, neither then nor today, fully displaced the social relevance of the human medium. Singers have managed to continually carve out a social space for the primary mediality of songs, and the cultural validity of the live concert cannot be simply subsumed under the validity of theatre either, which, according to Faulstich, remains the only human medium today (a medium which, one feels tempted to add, has similarly evolved in dialogic relation with printed texts – and, more recently, analogue and digital technology – and has been similarly affected by increasing professionalisation and commercialisation). What, then, is the particular performance value of live events which distinguishes primary mediality in a thoroughly mediatised culture? It is helpful, here, to turn to Erika Fischer-Lichte’s outline of an “aesthetics of the performative” (2004) which she specifically envisages in view of the reaction of performance art since the 1960s to the rigidity of the theatrical tradition, yet which, I believe, may be profitably extended to explicate the value of primary mediality more generally. One core aspect of Fischer-Lichte’s work is the substitution of the received triad ‘production – work – reception’, which has dominated the history of theorising theatre and emphasises the static status of the artwork in its symbolically encoded (written) state, with the triad ‘miseen-scène – event – aesthetic experience’, which accounts for the flexibility, actuality, and embodied nature of performances. Fischer-Lichte’s distinction of work and event has larger cultural repercussions, especially if work and event are not perceived as a Manichean binarism, but as opposite poles in a continuum. This holds especially true in view of the mise-en-scène of songs, where performing conventions have shifted between approximations to both poles not only historically, but especially generically as has already been illustrated. While some aspects of Fischer-Lichte’s ‘aesthetics of the performative’ may thus be more intense, or more applicable to songs according to generic convention, it is possible to argue that all live ‘events’ involving lyrics bear the potential for an aesthetic experience that is exclusive to primary mediality. The core prerequisite for this experience is the “bodily co-presence of performers and audiences” which inevitably engenders a “self-referential and continually changing feedback loop” that both generates and directs an event,
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and introduces an irrational element which may be actively encouraged or suppressed (Fischer-Lichte 2004, 58, my tr.). An extreme case of suppression (which accounts for the somewhat constructed case of primary mediality / zero visuality in the table above) is to stage performances in complete darkness, as for instance Richard Wagner did during the first Bayreuth Festival in 1876, in an attempt to interrupt the feedback loop by ‘extinguishing’ not only the visual bodies of the performers, but also the distracting visuality of other members in the audience (ibid., 59). All events, however, whether highly scripted as in the art music world, or deliberately unscripted as, for instance, in a jazz session, remain defined by the notion that their full materiality emerges in the performance itself rather than in an untroubled reproduction of a pre-existing ‘work’. According to Fischer-Lichte, the physical co-presence of performers and audiences matters in at least three respects: first, this co-presence offers the possibility of role-changes, in the sense that audience members inevitably participate in performances and thus become actors rather than mere viewers and listeners. Such involvement may range from the involuntary signalling of discomfort to clapping to dancing to singing-along all the way to actively coperforming on stage; but in any case, “where human beings physically meet, they react to each other, even if this is not always perceptible to eyes and ears. It is not possible not to react to one another” (ibid., 67, my tr.). Second, events constitute communities which are temporarily generated by the embodied activities of performances. Such communities are ephemeral as they disappear as soon as the activities end; yet nevertheless, they cannot “be conceived as ‘fictional’, but as the emergence of a social reality” (ibid., 90, my tr.) and thus enhance a specific social dynamics. One of the core community-building properties of performances highlighted by Fischer-Lichte, for instance, is rhythm and its invitation to collective kinaesthetic response (ibid., 97). Third, events are marked by the potential of physical contact between performer and audiences, in the sense of sight as well as touch which can both be read as markers of intimacy breaking down the opposition of public and private spheres. Within the material performance arena of an event, audience–performer relationships thus become to a certain extent ephemeral physical realities rather than mere fictions and fantasies. As an effect of these properties, events are, as opposed to ‘works’, to a certain extent inherently singular, as no technology has so far been able to reproduce the individual dynamics marking the temporality, spatiality, soundscape and physicality of live events. Surely, curious hybrids have emerged trying to combine the experience of liveness with advanced visual reproduction technology, as in the case of the entirely virtual rock band Gorillaz (which accounts for the again somewhat constructed category primary
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mediality / secondary visuality in my table). In 2005, Gorillaz famously gave five shows at the Manchester opera house where the band was put right in front of a live audience in 3D by means of a more advanced version of the Victorian ‘Pepper’s ghost’ stage trick (while the real life artists around Damon Albarn backing the cartoon characters performed behind the scenes). 2 This was topped in 2006, when Gorillaz opened the Grammy Awards co-performing first with a virtual, and then flesh-and-blood Madonna – yet of course, Gorillaz’s performances do not (yet) really live up to an aesthetics of the performative, as the characteristic feedback loop is interrupted by the virtual band’s inability to react to their audiences. The human medium, it seems, will remain the paradigmatic factor in any experience of ‘liveness’ in the nearer future.
Liveness and Recordedness in a Mediatised Culture The question remains what kind of status we wish to attribute to live events on these grounds. This question has been vigorously debated in what has come to be known as the Phelan-Auslander debate, which is representative of a larger controversy in cultural studies over the alleged ‘authenticity’ or ‘simulatedness’ of events. Peggy Phelan’s argument in this context stands for an assumption shared by many performance theorists, purporting that live events are the last resort of integrity and authenticity in an otherwise fully mediatised culture. In a world dominated by what Adorno and Horkheimer (2002) have branded as the “culture industry,” they are hailed as sites of cultural opposition to a ubiquitous commodification in the arts, and as still resonating with what Walter Benjamin referred to as “aura,” albeit no longer in the sense of being ‘artworks’, but precisely because of the ephemerality of their event-status which defies the logic of mass reproduction: Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in the circulation of representations of representations: once it does so, it becomes something other than performance. To the degree that performance attempts to enter the economy of reproduction, it betrays and lessens the promise of its own ontology. (Phelan 1993, 146) 3
2 3
I have dealt with the Gorillaz-phenomenon in detail elsewhere (see Eckstein 2009). In a very similar vein as Phelan, performance artist Eric Bogosian, for instance, holds that live theatre is “medicine for a toxic environment of electronic media mind-pollution. […] Theatre is ritual. It is something we make together every time it happens. Theatre is holy. Instead of being bombarded by a cathode ray tube we are speaking to ourselves. Human language, not electronic noise” (Bogosian 1994, xii).
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This proclamation of a binary opposition between live events and mediatised representations, however, is questionable in a number of ways, all suggesting that the proclaimed difference is of a largely ideological, rather than, as Phelan implies, purely ontological nature. To begin with, the perceived opposition of liveness and recordedness is problematic when thrown into historical relief. There is simply no evidence to suggest that live performances have universally and always been perceived as sites of ‘authenticity’. On the contrary: before 1800, performances of (secular) music which were later retrospectively incorporated into the canon of art music were hardly recognised as unique in any sense of the word by their audiences; instead, reception habits were very reminiscent of those we would today associate with the ‘corruptions’ of mediatised culture. Donald Sassoon notes on aristocratic audiences in the 18th century: Their behaviour reflected the absence of any profound interest in the performance. To have an idea of the degree of attention pre-1800 audiences paid to what they were watching or listening to, we should consider not modern audiences, but the relatively relaxed and distracted way in which people watch television: they speak on the telephone, they go to the toilet whenever they feel like it, they make themselves a drink, they eat, they talk loudly, […] and then abruptly switch the set off when they are tired and bored. (Sassoon 2006, 233).
Within art music culture, the 19th century was then marked by the extension of musical experience into the bourgeois domestic sphere through, first, the mass distribution of musical instruments and the piano in particular, and second, printed sheet music, which after the invention of lithography at the turn of the century could not only be produced at affordable cost, but also embellished with colourful illustrations and thus very effectively marketed to private households. While in 1750, there existed only 12, and in 1794, 30 shops which sold sheet music in London, this number dramatically increased to a total of 124 in 1824 (cf. Weber 1994, 180). The expansion of the live music market, the establishment of a concert scene with specifically designed concert halls, and particularly the advent of performer stardom which shaped the devotional listening conventions of both the art and pop music world are thus intimately related to the wider dissemination of printed music. 4 It follows that from the start, the appreciation of a musical event as ‘auratic’ was hardly a function of a primary ‘ontology’ of liveness, but ironically precisely a function of secondary (and later of tertiary and quaternary) me4
As Walter Weber argues, the “secret behind the legendary popularity of the virtuosi of the early nineteenth century was their shrewd exploitation of the market for sheet music. […] The functioning of the relationships within the concert’s life was now controlled by the larger musical market” (ibid., 181-82).
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diality. The cult of the ‘real’ is inextricably linked to the conservative effects generated by culturally shared blueprints which allow for the unlimited reproduction of sound, or in other words: the larger history of valuating liveness is probably less one of an avant-garde resistance to mass culture in Phelan’s sense (“Performance’s independence from mass reproduction, technologically, economically, and linguistically, is its greatest strength,” Phelan 1993, 149), but one of complicity. This argument is certainly not restricted to the cultural dynamics of art music but in a similar fashion also holds true for the emerging folk music world in the 19th century and its fetishisation of the ‘authentic’. For centuries, Britain’s longstanding tradition of balladry made little fuss about a distinction which only after 1800 gained enormous cultural currency, namely the separation of what Francis Child was fond of calling “true popular ballads” as opposed to supposedly inferior “artificial literature”: Widely different from the true popular ballads, the spontaneous products of nature, are the works of the professional ballad-maker, which make up the bulk of Garlands and Broadsides. These, though sometimes not without grace, more frequently not lacking in humour, belong to artificial literature – of course an humble department. (Child 1861, qtd. in Harker 2004, 45)
The quest for a ‘genuine’ British folk tradition in the wake of romantic ideology thus confronted scholars with a large corpus of mediatised and mostly anonymous ballads – “Garlands and Broadsides” – which now needed to be verified as to their status of “true” popular balladhood. This was either attempted by syntactic and semantic analysis (with often dubious results, cf. Harker 2004), or by an ethnographic impulse to record rural performances which were presumably still unspoiled by the corruptions of urban commerce. In 1855, for instance, the Ancient Melody Committee under the patronage of the Duke of Northumberland set out on a large-scale ‘rescue-mission’ of songs to which one Thomas Hepple of Kirkwhelpington significantly contributed with a number of tunes he recorded in the Northumbrian countryside, among them a version of “Whittingham Fair” (Hepple 2003) which, with some alterations, was later included in the Committee’s printed collection of Northumbrian Minstrelsy (Bruce and Stokoe 1882). This version, then, found its way into Francis Child’s “Additions and Corrections” section of English and Scottish Popular Ballads (Child 1957, 497) to further authenticate the medieval genealogy of “Scarborough Fair.” Quite obviously again, the valuation of folk performance as a site of authenticity is predated by the abstraction of printed lyrics, and, moreover, subsequently marketed in the mediatised form of printed collections to a growing middle class buying public newly fascinated with its own English heritage. Again, performance and mediatisation prove to be complicit rather than mutually exclusive.
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This brief account of 19th-century recording in the realm of secondary mediality ties in with Philip Auslander’s investigations of the relationship between liveness and recordedness after the advent of analogue and digital recording technologies. Auslander’s argument, put in one sentence, goes thus: there cannot be any such thing as an ontology of liveness, since in a culture that is evermore dominated by tertiary and quaternary media, live events have become simulations of recordedness in increasing degrees. He contextualises this claim by investigating “performance in a mediatized culture” in contemporary theatre and performance art, court sessions, and, most significantly in our context, rock music culture. To focus on the world of rock is of course no arbitrary choice here, as rock can be read as the paradigmatic case where the preoccupation with the ‘auratic’ and ‘authentic’ that emerged in the 19th century art and folk music scenes has been translated into the 20th-century mass market. Auslander is mostly interested in the dimension of what I have referred to earlier as “Romantic authenticity” (Keightley 2001) in rock, i.e. in music primarily defined by its ‘recordedness’ – its saturation in the technological possibilities of multi-track recording and analogue or digital sound effects – yet nevertheless aspiring to ‘seriousness’ by propagating a sense of ‘folk’ integrity. Auslander’s point of departure is his claim that the early discourse of rock in the 1960s and 70s was hardly, as some rock fans would claim, built on “a relation of opposition in which the live was seen as the authentic and the recorded as inauthentic. Rather, authenticity was produced through a dialectical or symbiotic relationship between live and mediatized representations of music” (Auslander 1999, 160). To make better sense of this, it is necessary to take a brief detour via the nature of recorded sound and its relation to the visuality of performance. The dissemination of sound recording technology in the 20th century undoubtedly revolutionised the cultural economy of songs and firmly established analogue and later digital media formats as culturally dominant. While written texts and musical notation to some extent allowed the storage of sound and its mass marketing, these ‘recordings’ remained abstract until songs were put into practice, i.e. until they were actively performed by human beings. The medial availability of recorded, actual sound consequently had far-reaching effects: 5 first, with the introduction of the radio and its 5
It is impossible to retrace the technological advance of recorded sound in detail here. For an excellent overview of the evolution of recording technique, see Campbell, Martin and Fabos (2005, 64-103), as well as Théberge 2001. Some of the core steps were the invention of the wax cylinder phonograph (Thomas A. Edison, 1877), the flat disk and the gramophone (Emil Berliner, 1888), later the phonograph (first working with shellac discs, replaced during the 1940, when shellac was needed for ammunitions, by polyvinyl discs), audiotape
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dissemination of ‘free music,’ and with the increasing affordability of reproduction devices songs and music increasingly became ubiquitous in the economy of everyday life, both public and private. Second, by entering into an externalised, archival cultural memory, sounds became emancipated from the confines of human interaction to freely travel across time and space, leading to an hitherto unknown simultaneity and ubiquity of historically and culturally specific acoustic material. Third, music entered the capitalist logic of production and consumption in hitherto unknown degrees, leading to continuing battles over the ‘ownership’ of music between artists, a small oligarchy of record companies, intermediaries and consumers. But most basically and crucially, perhaps, the experience of songs and lyrics initially became a purely auditory experience suddenly severed from the primary visual aspects of their performance (cf. Laing 2004). Nevertheless – even if the dimension of ‘zero’ visibility can be seen as the defining trait of the culturally dominant form of song in the 20th century at least until the advent of music television – this did not really challenge the visual nature of musical performance per se, but rather engendered new dimensions of visuality. These initially manifest themselves, in the absence of primary visuality, in what W.J.T. Mitchell would term mental or perceptual images (Mitchell 1984, 505). Simon Frith notes that the simultaneous emergence around the turn of the century of the telephone, the gramophone, and he radio meant that people became accustomed, for the first time ever, to hearing a voice without a body (previously such an experience would have meant the supernatural, the voice of God or the evil). But, of course, in practice we don’t hear telephone or recorded voices like this at all: we assign them bodies, we imagine their physical production. And this is not just a matter of sex and gender, but involves the other basic social attributes as well: age, race, ethnicity, class – everything that is necessary to put together a person to go with a voice. (Frith 1998, 196) 6
6
(first introduced in the 1940, enabling multi-track mixing and editing) and digital recording in the 1970s. The first marketable format for the distribution of digital recordings, the CD, was launched in 1983, while MP3, a data format that compresses music to file sizes that can be distributed via the world wide web, shook up the music market in 2000 and led to the Napster crisis (cf. Garofalo 2004). In 2003, Apple Computer’s iTunes Music Store became the first major server to sell music on the internet; in April 2006, Apple and EMI decided to distribute their complete digital catalogue via iTunes Store without DRM (digital rights management), i.e. without copying and access restrictions (cf. EMI 2007). Already Jean-Jacques Rousseau insisted that “[w]hen I hear a melody, I am aware of the presence of another, like myself, a sentient being” (Rousseau 1990, 287). In the context of rock, Frith is convinced that “to hear music is to see it performed, on stage, with all the trappings” (Frith 1998, 211). The metaphysical reverberations around disembodied voices after the invention of ‘singing machines’ have been discussed extensively by Friedrich Kittler (1986); for a sobering critique of ethnographic evidence, see Middleton (2006, 50).
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What is crucial for our context, moreover, is that Frith and Auslander hold against the views of, for instance, Theodore Gracyk (1996) and others that this does not change even if, as in the case of rock, music is a product of an elaborate studio recording which could never have existed as an organic performance: I listen to records in the full knowledge that what I hear is something that never existed, that never could exist, as a ‘performance,’ something happening in a single time and space; nevertheless, it is now happening, in a single time and space: it is thus a performance and I hear it as one. (Frith 1998, 211)
The aesthetic experience of recorded music thus remains crucially and paradoxically informed by certain notions of liveness. What are we to make of this? To begin with, it seems reasonable to suggest that the cultural dominance of recorded sound does not mean that notions such as ‘performance arena’, ‘communicative economy’ and conventions of ‘genre-normative listening’ become obsolete. On the contrary: the performance arena of a song continues to crucially inform its lyrical messages in a mediatised culture. However, it needs to be conceived as an ‘imagined’ arena which is increasingly keyed by visual representations, i.e. what W. J.T. Mitchell would term “graphic images” or what I have referred to as ‘secondary visuality’, rather than primary visual contexts of live performances. Such keying is for instance performed by the visual paraphernalia of recordings, as can be easily demonstrated by having a brief look at the cover art of three of the albums featuring versions of “Scarborough Fair” I have discussed in the previous chapters. The covers here are exemplary in that they are clearly keying genre-normative modes of listening in the absence of live visuality. Let us begin again with Martin Carthy (fig. 3): I have argued that Carthy’s version of “Scarborough Fair” is expressive of a distinctly male take on frustrated love in which the singer functions less as confessional artist, but as communal storyteller. In this constellation, the tune evokes, rather than the intimacy of private melancholia, a self-reflexive tale of frustration, perhaps sarcasm, in the face of ‘irrational’ female sexuality presumably shared with an integrative, evenminded community of listeners. I have so far argued thus by illustrating the song’s genealogy dating back to the earlier “Elfin Knight” variations of which Carthy is very well aware (as he signals in the liner notes), by taking recourse to the particular (