Cheeky Fictions
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Internationale Forschungen zur Allgemeinen und Vergleichenden Literaturwissenschaft
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Cheeky Fictions
91
Internationale Forschungen zur Allgemeinen und Vergleichenden Literaturwissenschaft
In Verbindung mit Norbert Bachleitner (Universität Wien), Dietrich Briesemeister (Friedrich Schiller-Universität Jena), Francis Claudon (Université Paris XII), Joachim Knape (Universität Tübingen), Klaus Ley (Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz), John A. McCarthy (Vanderbilt University), Alfred Noe (Universität Wien), Manfred Pfister (Freie Universität Berlin), Sven H. Rossel (Universität Wien)
herausgegeben von
Alberto Martino (Universität Wien)
Redaktion: Ernst Grabovszki Anschrift der Redaktion: Institut für Vergleichende Literaturwissenschaft, Berggasse 11/5, A-1090 Wien
Cheeky Fictions Laughter and the Postcolonial
Edited by
Susanne Reichl and Mark Stein
Amsterdam - New York, NY 2005
Le papier sur lequel le présent ouvrage est imprimé remplit les prescriptions de “ISO 9706:1994, Information et documentation - Papier pour documents - Prescriptions pour la permanence”. The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of “ ISO 9706:1994, Information and documentation - Paper for documents Requirements for permanence”. Die Reihe „Internationale Forschungen zur Allgemeinen und Vergleichenden Literaturwissenschaft“ wird ab dem Jahr 2005 gemeinsam von Editions Rodopi, Amsterdam – New York und dem Weidler Buchverlag, Berlin herausgegeben. Die Veröffentlichungen in deutscher Sprache erscheinen im Weidler Buchverlag, alle anderen bei Editions Rodopi. From 2005 onward, the series „Internationale Forschungen zur Allgemeinen und Vergleichenden Literaturwissenschaft“ will appear as a joint publication by Editions Rodopi, Amsterdam – New York and Weidler Buchverlag, Berlin. The German editions will be published by Weidler Buchverlag, all other publications by Editions Rodopi. ISBN: 90-420-1995-6 ©Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam - New York, NY 2005 Printed in The Netherlands
Acknowledgements Thank you to our contributors for their enthusiasm and dedication to Cheeky Fictions. We would also like to express our gratitude to Manfred Pfister, who welcomed this volume into the IFAVL-series. At Rodopi we would like to thank Marieke Schilling and Fred van der Zee. We are also indebted to Jessica Walter, Nilüfer Caglayan, Jonathan Sharp, and Bryan David Aja for their help with indexing, formatting, and copy-editing and to Stefan Ehricke, who designed the cover. The cover design, based on an idea by Barbara Becker, shows a sculpture by an anonymous Zimbabwean artist.
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Contents
SUSANNE REICHL/MARK STEIN: Introduction
1
I. Laughter’s double vision – Humour and cultural ambiguity ULRIKE ERICHSEN: Smiling in the face of adversity: How to use humour to defuse cultural conflict
27
ANTHONY ILONA: ‘Laughing through the tears’: Mockery and self-representation in V.S. Naipaul’s A House for Mr Biswas and Earl Lovelace’s The Dragon Can’t Dance
43
VIRGINIA RICHTER: Laughter and aggression: Desire and derision in a postcolonial context
61
HELGA RAMSEY-KURZ: Humouring the terrorists or the terrorised? Militant Muslims in Salman Rushdie, Zadie Smith, and Hanif Kureishi
73
II. Traditions and transgressions – Writing back and forth HEINZ ANTOR: Postcolonial laughter in Canada: Mordecai Richler’s The Incomparable Atuk
89
SUSAN LEVER: The colonizer’s gift of cursing: Satire in David Foster’s Moonlite
107
MICHAEL MEYER: Swift and Sterne revisited: Postcolonial parodies in Rushdie and Singh-Toor
117
DETLEF GOHRBANDT: After-laughter, or the comedy of decline: Ronald Searle’s critique of postwar Englishness in The Rake’s Progress 131 III. Ethnic cabaret – A license to laugh? MITA BANERJEE: Queer laughter: Shyam Selvadurai’s Funny Boy and the normative as comic
149
VIII ASTRID FELLNER/KLAUS HEISSENBERGER: ‘I was born in East L.A.’: Humour and the displacement of nationality and ethnicity
161
CHRISTIANE SCHLOTE: ‘The sketch’s the thing wherein we’ll catch the conscience of the audience’: Strategies and pitfalls of ethnic TV comedies in Britain, the United States, and Germany
177
IV. The language of humour – The humour of language MARGIT OZVALDA: Worlds apart: Schools in postcolonial Indian fiction
193
SUSANNE PICHLER: Interculturality and humour in Timothy Mo’s Sour Sweet
207
SUSANNE MÜHLEISEN: What makes an accent funny, and why? Black British Englishes and humour televised
225
V. Laughing it off – Does therapeutic humour work? MAGGIE ANN BOWERS: ‘Ethnic glue’: Humour in Native American literatures
247
ANNIE GAGIANO: Using a comic vision to contend with tragedy: Three unusual African English novels
257
GISELA FEURLE: Madam & Eve – Ten Wonderful Years: A cartoon strip and its role in post-apartheid South Africa
271
WENDY WOODWARD: Laughing back at the kingfisher: Zakes Mda’s The Heart of Redness and postcolonial humour
287
INDEX
301
CONTRIBUTORS
311
SUSANNE REICHL AND MARK STEIN
Introduction
I must warn you, reader, that it is not the purpose of this book to make you laugh. As you know, nothing kills the laugh quicker than to explain a joke. I intend to explain all jokes, and the proper and logical outcome will be, not only that you will not laugh now, but that you will never laugh again. So prepare for the descending gloom. – Eastman (1937) Laughter itself cannot be rationally located; its ridicula, too, resist the grip of those categories which presuppose meaning. – Köhler (1997, our translation)
F
rom V.S. Naipaul to Meera Syal, from Mordecai Richler to Zakes Mda: laughter is a central element, humour a key feature, disrespect a vital textual strategy of postcolonial cultural practice. Samuel Selvon’s subtle comedy, Salman Rushdie’s hilarious verbal exploits, Zadie Smith’s multicultural ‘lip’: by different means and to various ends they all provoke laughter. Although the humorous qualities of many postcolonial texts are not to be doubted, so far no sustained attempt to analyse these features and their significance has been undertaken. Opening up further this wide and promising field of research is the remit of this collection of essays. This book brings together essays commissioned from an international group of specialists in postcolonial studies, whose analyses of anglophone postcolonial cultural production raise questions about the strategic use of what can loosely be termed ‘laughter’ – in all its manifestations. Here, laughter is not considered a cultural attribute of a specific postcolonial space or a marker of an inherent Otherness; laughter is rather considered a device
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which is self-consciously employed and strategically positioned in textual constructions – or an effect elicited by these constructions. Whilst marketing departments acknowledge and exploit laughter in postcolonial cultural production – with dust jackets featuring tags such as ‘lorry load[s] of laughs as East meets West,’1 cultural criticism, in stark opposition to such simplifications, has remained virtually silent on the multifarious connections between laughter and the postcolonial. Literary and cultural postcolonial criticism has been marked by a curious reluctance – a restraint verging on the pious – towards the functions of laughter. Occasionally, individual terms and concepts are mentioned,2 but more sustained critical engagement with laughter and humour is strikingly rare. Why is humour such an uneasy bedfellow, why laughter – apparently – an abomination to postcolonial studies? The problem seems to lie with a basic misconceptualisation of the nature of laughter, which is often seen as either slighting a serious subject matter or simply indicating light-hearted entertainment. By contrast, postcolonial critique is concerned with the frequently grave consequences of colonialism and its aftermath. Are we therefore dealing with opposed and even irreconcilable areas? One of our contributors points out that laughter and literature go back a long way, sharing an ‘age-old conjunction between humorous laughter on the one hand and seriousness of purpose on the other’ (Antor 89, below). Laughter has to be taken seriously indeed, and this is what we are doing in this collection. Quite predictably, what little work on humour exists can be subsumed under an interventionist stance – for postcolonial critique is concerned with theorizing engagement, with analysing agency for the marginalized and, in some quarters, even with creating agency.3 We are joining ranks, then, with some few scholars who have worked on the subversive or satiric side of humour and laughter in postcolonial literature.4 But we are at the same time 1 2
3
4
This quotation is taken from the cover of Meera Syal’s Anita and Me (1996). There are no book-length studies of laughter and the postcolonial that go beyond a narrow, interventionist stance. Benson and Connolly’s Encyclopedia of Post-Colonial Literatures in English (2005) contains entries on ‘hoaxes and jokes’ and ‘humour and satire,’ the latter differentiated into various postcolonial regions. These entries support our view that not enough theoretical work has been done and that there is a great deal of disagreement as to what should be categorised as humour. Other postcolonial scholars deal with irony (such as Castle: 518) or the carnivalesque (Goldberg and Quayson: 360), but in the major panoptic texts and collections of recent years, the issue is absent (as, for instance, in Boehmer; Walder; Hawley; Ashcroft et al. 1998; Thieme; McLeod; and Young 2003). Frequently postcolonial critique is idealistically conceptualised as an enterprise creating agency for marginalised peoples or groups; whilst a desirable aim, this can hardly be considered a defining feature of this (or any other) academic subfield. For a critique of this ‘postcolonial imperative’ see Stein. John Clement Ball’s study on the postcolonial satire of 2003 is an example.
Introduction
3
trying to enlarge the scope of postcolonial studies by including in our analyses what lies beyond the interventionist stance. In this way, this book not only works towards closing some methodological and conceptual gaps; it also adds new facets to postcolonial studies and humour theory.
Theorizing laughter and the postcolonial Theories of laughter abound. They are as mottled and date back almost as far as the object they seek to define; nevertheless, they present an unruly and discordant range, with plenty of contradiction and disagreement. Therefore, writing an introduction such as this one is an exercise fraught with heightened self-consciousness: on the one hand, there are a number of points that we need to state clearly, but on the other, some of them have been propounded again and again in similar introductions so that their reiteration in our context might seem a mere finger-exercise. What is more, in researching humour theory we are faced not only with those who meticulously account for humour and laughter, proceeding with scientific rigour, whilst at the other end of the spectrum we encounter ‘humor agnostics’ – the term is Max Eastman’s – who feel that humour cannot or even must not be analysed theoretically (Eastman 1921: 130-5). But even such fervent disclaimers are now a standard device in the rhetorics of humour studies. Writing on comedy and laughter derives from Greek antiquity; and no matter how far back one travels in the history of laughter criticism, the terminology has always been problematic and remains so in more recent texts in English, French, Italian, and German. In 1900, Henri Bergson, in an essay entitled Le Rire (published in English as Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic), turned his inability to define humour into a virtue by claiming ‘we shall not aim at imprisoning the comic spirit within a definition. We regard it, above all, a living thing’ (Bergson: 2). About ten years later, in 1908, Luigi Pirandello starts his terminological investigation in L’umorismo with the following remark: What is humor? If we should take into account all the answers that have been given to this question, all the definitions attempted by writers and critics, we could fill many pages and probably at that point, confused by so many differing opinions, we could do nothing more than to repeat the question: But what, in short, is humor? (Pirandello: 107)
A more recent investigation into comic literary practice, Richard Keller Simon’s The Labyrinth of the Comic, applies Bergson’s metaphor of ‘le labyrinthe du comique’ to the discordant terminology: Anyone who enters a university library looking for simple answers to basic questions about comedy and laughter finds a labyrinth of contradictory explanation and a morass of terminology from which there is no escape. Like the reader of Tom Jones or The Ordeal of Richard Feverel, he wanders through an almost perfect symmetry of binary
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Susanne Reichl / Mark Stein oppositions, of mirrored and inverted arguments, and of flawed and unreliable guides. (Simon: 239)
The terminology that has been developed is at once mind-bogglingly extensive and still insufficient: One woman’s humour is another’s laughter; one man’s wit is another’s joke. Other truisms about humour and laughter that are being circulated are: there is wide disagreement in the critical literature as to what humour and laughter are; it would be simplistic to reduce humour to the stimulus and laughter to the physiological response; laughter is highly subjective; and humour theorists have all but given up on trying to arrive at a grand récit, instead treating individual texts with micro-theories. It is not only literary critics who are somewhat disheartened at the situation. Psychologist Jon E. Roeckelein, in what is the most recent comprehensive and interdisciplinary overview on the psychology of humour, summarises terminological disagreements from areas as diverse as literature, musicology, developmental psychology, phenomenology, philosophy, linguistics, physiology, cognitive sciences, and behavioural sciences, in a chapter of more than seventy pages (Roeckelein: 9-86). These terminological problems seem to lie in the polysemy especially of the term humour, which can refer to ‘a stimulus, a response or a disposition’ (Chapman and Foot: 3).5 However, ‘laughter’ is different from ‘humour,’ and ‘the comic’ is also a rather vague notion. Just referring the reader to other theorists who have fretted over intractable terminology does not seem a legitimate solution to this dilemma. In this volume, it is mainly the complex stimulus- and the response-functions of humour and laughter, and not so much the disposition (‘a sense of humour’), which are being investigated. Laughter is thus regarded as the response to a stimulus but also as an effect that is deliberately pursued by a text. Laughter can be elicited by many triggers, and research shows that laughter is indeed frequently a response to a humour stimulus – but there are other stimuli: [I]f laughter were indeed an exact yardstick with which to measure humor experiences, we might have solved many of the riddles of humor long ago. Unfortunately, for science anyway, laughter is only a gross indicator which may accompany humor experiences. One can be amused and not laugh, especially if alone. […] And to attempt a listing of what can give rise to laughter [and is non-humorous] is a hazardous undertaking, since man apparently laughs at just about everything. […] At any rate, defining the essence of laughter is not nearly so simple as describing its behavioral components or linking it indiscriminately with humor. (Keith-Spiegel: 17-8)
5
For the full quotation, see Ulrike Erichsen’s essay in this volume.
Introduction
5
By referring to the subjectivity of laughter, Patricia Keith-Spiegel introduces another aspect of humour theory: laughter and humour are essentially subjective and whether we find something humorous, funny, comic, whether we laugh at it heartily or don’t even manage a smile, depends on a variety of factors, among them our cultural background and identity, our politics and aesthetics, and our location and current state of mind. From early enquiries into laughter to more contemporary interdisciplinary approaches, humour theorists have always felt the need to critically redefine their subject, indeed to question the whole notion of the comic. Ordinary situations, such as listening to or telling a joke, may also require such a metaperspective: Tellers of jokes sometimes need to explain why their joke is funny and are occasionally disparaged for having told it in the first place. Thus in everyday situations we are often required to rationalize our own laughter – if not to define our own understanding of humour. If theorizing laughter seems to be an exercise in regurgitating uncomfortable research results, we find ourselves similarly pre-empted when it comes to the postcolonial. Terry Eagleton has mockingly commented upon the trouble of defining postcolonialism: ‘There must surely be in existence somewhere a secret handbook for aspiring postcolonial theorists, whose second rule reads: “Begin your essay by calling into question the whole notion of postcolonialism”’ (24). One of the central conundrums of postcolonial studies is its polysemic prefix: Is it a marker of temporality, signifying after the onset of colonialism, if not, conversely, after the end of colonialism? Or does ‘post’ signal an oppositional stance, against colonialism? Often the term is understood in the latter sense. But usages denoting either a body of cultural production from sites historically linked with and informed by colonialism, or denoting a theoretical and ideological position from which any text, any socio-cultural or political discussion can be approached, have maintained currency. On this and many other levels, as this collection will amply demonstrate, postcolonial theory and humour theory share conceptual and theoretical problems of approach: both terms have a history of redefinition, both terms are polysemic. It would, therefore, not be productive to impose terminological and conceptual agreement on individual analyses within a collection like this. On the contrary, one of the strengths of this volume is its refraining from developing an overarching theory of postcolonial laughter, instead setting into dialogue specific contributions to the field. And yet we hope that the total of this collection is greater than the sum of its parts, for it not only features a variety of approaches but also promotes the eclectic blending and productive transformation of critical methodology.
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Master theories and micro-analyses The work done by humour theorists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was characterised by a struggle to account for diverse phenomena with an overarching theory. Richard Keller Simon, in an attempt to reverse the diversification which marked twentieth-century humour research, names writers as diverse as Fielding, Thackeray, Kierkegaard, Darwin, and Freud as ‘generalists,’ who investigated ‘the fundamental connections between the different aspects of the comic […] in detail’ (2). Simon is an exception, though, in contemporary humour research; today most theorists no longer attempt to arrive at comprehensive models in order to account for the wider phenomenon of humour in all its aspects. No all-embracing theory of humour and/or laughter has yet gained widespread acceptance and possibly no general theory will ever be successfully applied to the human race as a whole when its members exhibit such vast individual differences with respect to their humour responsiveness. The paradox associated with humour is almost certainly a function of its being incorrectly viewed as a unitary process. (Chapman and Foot: 4)
Our own understanding of humour and laughter fully agrees with this latter notion. As Paul Lewis claims in Comic Effects: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Humor in Literature, ‘the last thing humor criticism needs is another reductive and too-broad theory’ (Lewis: x). Such reluctance and / or inability to devise a master narrative accounting for laughter seems to be a more general reflection of current modes of theoretical research in the humanities and the social sciences alike. Today, in many fields of research, we observe a turn to detailed examinations in place of grand narratives, to specific analyses in preference to universalising generalisation. Michael Freeman, in a preface to John Parkin’s Humour Theorists of the Twentieth Century (1997), has defined the situation for humour theorists like this: There are still theories of humour, but it has been said that we are now in a period of mini-theories, where individual contributions are solving individual problems without there being a macro-theory to which they can all in the end be referred. (Michael Freeman, in Parkin: x)
For someone writing on laughter or humour today this leaves two options: either restricting oneself to ‘mini-theories’ and being content with addressing rather specific cases, or attempting the impossible, risking gross overgeneralisation and simplification. In this volume, we are opting for the former of the two possibilities: instead of drawing up either a postcolonial theory of laughter or a theory of postcolonial laughter, this study combines a number of contributions tackling individual instances of laughter and humour in postcolonial cultural
Introduction
7
production. The variety of the collected essays, the range of sources and theories drawn upon, as well as the innovative vistas opened up are what this collection offers – not any undue generalisation of these phenomena. The micro-theories available come from various areas of research, the broadest among them being literary studies and psychology. Literary studies on comedy are nearly as old as comedy itself, and throughout the centuries, critics and creative writers have commented on the art of producing humorous fiction and drama.6 Psychological studies of humour were largely carried out in the twentieth century, almost always with reference to Freud’s foundational text Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious of 1905. So great has been Freud’s influence that Paul Lewis, reviewing research into humour, criticises scholars for largely ignoring the empirical psychological work that has been conducted since Freud: ‘[I]t is no longer necessary for critics to settle for intuition in areas that are increasingly accessible to empirical research’ (Lewis: 7). Postcolonial theory cannot possibly compete with the range of humour theory, as it is a considerably younger sub-discipline. However, even at the danger of overemphasising the parallels, we would argue that a similar move from general to more specific research objectives has taken place in postcolonial studies. Whereas earlier texts, such as Said’s Orientalism (1978) or Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin’s The Empire Writes Back (1989; 2002), attempted to introduce a comprehensive analysis of wider socio-cultural phenomena (which is already conveyed by their titles), recent writing is more concerned with distinguishing between specific postcolonial cultural practices, experiences and histories. The move from the general to the specific can certainly be seen in both areas and testifies to the dynamics (and the diversity) of theoretical work in either.
Connectedness across difference For a long time now, postcolonial theory has been concerned with the association between the (seemingly) homogenising umbrella term it brandishes and the heterogeneity it betokens. We would stress the potential of the combination of recognizing discrete time frames, cultural locations, and cultural products with an awareness of a wider socio-cultural and political condition. This balance is eminently suitable for an investigation into laughter in postcolonial fiction and film, and we find this best expressed as ‘connectedness across difference.’ The key term characterising our approach to laughter and the postcolonial, then, is the concept of difference. As the title indicates, this collection 6
Among them are Luigi Pirandello, Mark Twain, Dorothy Parker, P.G. Wodehouse, George Meredith, W.H. Auden, Mordecai Richler, John Updike.
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deals with laughter and the postcolonial; i.e. ‘postcolonial’ does not function as an adjective to modify laughter. There is no ‘postcolonial laughter’ in the singular in the first place. It has been amply remarked that ‘the postcolonial’ cannot easily be reduced to a uniform concept but that it must be respected in its variety. The following two sections will deal with this question in more detail. For us, the concept of the postcolonial is a term of convenience that marks historical, political, economical, and cultural conditions which obtain or did obtain – in some cases, long ago, and in others even today – but whose impact can, in any case, still be perceived today. The postcolonial therefore is characterised by multiple differentiations, indeed it depends for its very definition on recognition of ethnic, local, and historical difference.7 Likewise, as we point out above, both laughter and humour require multi-dimensional conceptualisation, and accordingly have been treated in theoretical works with respect to their variability. It is thus obvious that a combination of two areas which have long been characterised by a dynamics of connectedness across difference should not be (and indeed cannot be productively) translated into a monolithic whole. Laughter and the postcolonial, at their various points of intersection, produce novel and eminently fruitful areas of investigation. One of the challenges of postcolonial perspectives on laughter is the dynamics between universalism and specificity: Laughter, as comparative humorologists have pointed out,8 is a universal phenomenon; every society brings forth cultural products that express a comic vision.9 The specificities of this vision, though, are what divide individual societies. Hence our focus on specific manifestations. This understanding of the dynamics of laughter coincides with our understanding of the postcolonial: both, laughter and the postcolonial, are umbrella terms, both cover phenomena that derive from a confluence of specific socio-cultural situations and a repertory of widely applicable strategies and techniques.
The empire laughs back Given their heterogeneous nature and blurred boundaries, what happens when laughter and the postcolonial are brought together? Can we distil any common theoretical denominators between laughter and the postcolonial? And are there overlaps in the praxes of laughter and the postcolonial? There are, indeed, a number of arguments that suggest a commensurability of 7 8 9
This view is expressed well in McLeod (257-8) and Robert Young (2001: 57-8). See Galigan (23). The notion of universals in literature is a contested subject, especially in the context of postcolonial studies, as it has often been used as a pretext for Eurocentrism; see Ramraj for a summary of the debate.
Introduction
9
postcolonial approaches with theories of laughter, and this commensurability can be based upon the one psychological explanation of laughter that persistently recurs in the canon of humour theory,10 despite variation in detail and terminology: laughter has always been seen as arising out of some kind of incompatibility or some incongruity. Arthur Koestler’s theory of humour, first sketched as an appendix to Insight and Outlook (1949) and later formulated fully in The Act of Creation (1964), is based upon the idea that an incongruity between matrix A and matrix B is a precondition for humour. Koestler developed further an idea that goes back as far as James Beattie’s ‘On Laughter and Ludicrous Composition’ of 1776, and seems to be the one common denominator of all humour theorists. Manfred Pfister, in our sister volume A History of English Laughter, puts it as follows: [L]aughter is always caught up in the kinds of distinctions between centre and margins every society employs to establish and stabilise its identity: in one society, the predominant form of laughter can be that which aims from the site of the ideological or power centre at what is to be marginalised or excluded altogether; in another, the most significant form of laughter can arise from the margins, challenging and subverting the established orthodoxies, authorities and hierarchies. (Pfister: vi-vii)
Although not explicitly directed at it, this discerning description also holds for a postcolonial context. By no means does any given ‘incongruity’ result by default in laughter or permit resolution through humour; and whilst power differentials were of course a crucial precondition for the imperial project, historically it has entailed dissent and opposition. The relationship between the former coloniser and the former colonised is therefore an example of a fundamentally non-humorous disparity. Here, the matrices of power and powerlessness, centre and margin, ruler and ruled, meet in a relationship that is fundamentally inequitable. Ball, in his study on postcolonial satire, refers to this common characteristic of humour and postcolonial models as ‘nonaccommodating power dynamics’ (4), i.e. as a fundamental power imbalance. While the complex postcolonial relationships between centre and margin (or centres and margins) are far from humorous, the specific settings, however diverse, regularly include conditions in which laughter and humour can release some of the tension and relieve some of the potential aggression. The concrete manifestations of laughter arising from such a constellation range from subversive laughter, carnivalesque exhilarations, wry smiles, selfdeprecation, gallows humour, or black humour, to more conciliatory and healing humour, or to the wild and eerie laughter of the otherwise silenced ‘madwoman in the attic.’ All these reflect a struggle for agency, an imbalance of power, and a need, a desire, for release. 10
See, among others, the work of Bergson, Freud, and Koestler.
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This aspect lends itself to comparison with other, similarly unequal power relations that are sometimes addressed and sometimes resolved by laughter: Most famously, Hélène Cixous in her ‘Le Rire de la Méduse’ (1975) has analysed the space that female laughter can map out in a patriarchal world.11 Histories of groups which have suffered from power imbalance and addressed it (but not structurally resolved it) via laughter come to mind: from Freud’s analysis of Jewish jokes to Obrdlik’s study of Czech humour during Nazi occupation (Martineau: 104) – the first sociological study of jokes – to Jaeger’s criticism of conciliatory GDR-humour (42-3) and Boskin’s work on ethnic humour in the US (38-9).
But seriously: Does laughter promote agency? One uninterrupted debate in the history of humour studies is whether laughter actually makes a difference to the incongruity from which it arises, or whether it in fact ultimately buttresses and thereby upholds the power imbalance. This raises the question whether laughter – in postcolonial cultural production – lends agency or whether it, in fact, prevents opposition and dissent by relieving some of the tension. Does the laughter in or induced by postcolonial fiction gesture towards a new world order? Or does postcolonial laughter uphold the order of the day? The earliest example of humour theory available to us, contained in Plato’s Republic, is largely concerned with the corruptive powers that laughter wields against the state, which indeed suggests that laughter has an effect upon the society within which it is employed (Provine: 13). Freud’s understanding of the joke as a socially acceptable form of attack (cf. Parkin: 166) also implies its significance within stratified communities. The most affirming evaluation of the potential of laughter for political and social transformation comes from the above-mentioned Cixous: For her, the triumphant laugh of the Medusa is liberating, joyful, and redeeming: Our glances, our smiles, are spent; laughs exude from all our mouths; our blood flows and we extend ourselves without ever reaching an end; we never hold back our thoughts, our songs, our writing; and we’re not afraid of lacking. (Cixous: 349)
Women’s laughter, according to Cixous, is meant to ‘to break up the “truth” with laughter’ (357), and this power of a woman writer in some respect corresponds to that of the postcolonial writer.12 Writing on feminist humour, Gail Finney finds that ‘a sense of power is central to the creation of humor, which is in turn empowering’ (3). It has been argued that cultural production 11 12
We will deal with Cixous in more detail in the following section. This link between postcolonial and feminist writing is explored in more detail in Virginia Richter’s contribution in this volume.
Introduction
11
plays a key role in the relations between coloniser and colonised (Bhabha 1994, Ashcroft et al. 2002), and the use of laughter and strategies of unsettling humour contribute to the empowerment of the (post)colonised. From a physiological point of view it has been claimed that laughter ‘achieves nothing in itself other than working off the excess energy which for obscure psychological reasons is catalysed by certain types of incongruity’ (Parkin: 136). More sociologically, it has been affirmed that humour can be used effectively to perform serious work only within reasonably well defined social contexts. However, within such contexts, humour normally comes to be used to conserve the dominant pattern of social relationships. Humour can be used to challenge existing patterns, as we saw in the case of the women’s movement – but only when it is given meaning in a relation to criticism and confrontation that is already under way within the serious realm. (Mulkay: 177)
This raises the question whether, in a transcultural postcolonial situation, which is less clearly defined than Mulkay asks for, or rather, not defined by homogeneity, these functions of humour are plausible. In turn, this gives rise to more general questions about the role of cultural production and agency as such, questions that have been raised in postcolonial studies before and which would by far transcend the scope of our project (e.g. Parry 1987): These questions are directly concerned with the actual power that cultural production, especially literature, has in ‘real life,’ and are linked with problems of education and reading in general. Within the scope of this volume it is sufficient to point out that the power wielded by laughter over its objects depends on contextual circumstance determined by culture(s), language(s), histories, and on the socio-political situation in which laughter is engendered. Especially the contributions in section five address this question in more detail. Once again we are faced with the indeterminacy of humour, but rather than resign ourselves to the impossibility of resolving this, we see it as yet another characteristic that makes humour a challenge to investigate. Joseph Boskin, writing on humour as a form of rebellion against unbearable social conditions, corroborates our opinion: Humor’s peculiarity lies in its elastic polarity: it can operate for and against, deny or affirm, oppress or liberate. On the one hand, it reinforces pejorative images; on the other, it facilitates the inversion of such stereotypes. Just as it has been utilized as a weapon of insult and persecution, so, too, has humor been implemented as a device of subversion and protest. In the absence of cosmological affirmation, humor fills a void. (Boskin: 38)
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Laughing back and beyond The above arguments suggest that while there is no specific brand of postcolonial laughter, laughter seems to thrive in a situation of power imbalance and even oppression. It would be simplistic, however, to reduce the laughter in postcolonial texts to an act of ‘laughing back’ at the coloniser, just as it has been amply suggested that the ‘writing back’-paradigm is limiting if applied indiscriminately to all modes postcolonial of literary production. Often regarded as the first study to attempt a synthesizing account of postcolonial literatures, Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin’s The Empire Writes Back (1989; 2002) postulated the centre-margin dynamics as a key characteristic of postcolonial cultural production. This tenet, however, was the cause of much criticism and debate,13 mainly based on the reproach that the ‘writing back’-idea corroborated the coloniser’s position of centrality or power and thus nolens-volens entailed a reinscription and continuation of an unequal power dynamics. Similarly, a ‘laughing-back’-paradigm in the analysis of postcolonial laughter would mean affirming the former coloniser’s position as central if and when they are laughed about, laughed at, or even laughed with. In practice, of course, laughter occurs in a variety of functions and is not necessarily directed at or even involved with the (former) colonial power. We hold that, despite the indisputable importance of satire and subversion in many postcolonial texts, laughter goes beyond the function of addressing the (erstwhile) colonial power. First, laughter is not always used as weapon; it can perform a conciliatory function, constitute an intellectual stimulus, express linguistic finesse, or imply a slightly nostalgic notion, in Marx’s sense of passing cheerfully from the past (‘heiter von der Vergangenheit scheiden,’ Marx: 382). Secondly, even if subversiveness is detected in laughter, its targets are varied so that it can be directed at colonisers or colonised; it can be self-deprecating or stereotyping; it might be read as an empowering move or a resigned comment on a status quo; it might trigger Medusa’s triumphant laughter or merely elicit a tired smile. But it will always raise the complex question ‘Who laughs at whom?’ And here the subjectivity of laughter disallows limiting it to a onedimensional function. Whether we read laughter or humour in a particular text as subversive or not, in fact, whether we identify it as laughter or humour in the first place, is largely a consequence of the way we read, the way we understand postcolonial literatures, and the way in which we know and view the world. 13
McLeod sums up the criticism, especially by Arun Mukherjee and Mishra and Hodge, that followed the publication of The Empire Writes Back (27-9). See also Schulze-Engler.
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Sharing the joke: Communities of laughter The above argument, coupled with our repeated insistence upon the subjectivity of both laughter and humour, could easily be mistaken to suggest that laughter and humour are primarily highly subjective – and not much else. This would render the analyses in this collection idiosyncratic ponderings by individual minds with little wider significance. What, in our view, keeps them from being just that, is what, borrowing from both Stanley Fish and Benedict Anderson, we call ‘communities of laughter.’ Fish has introduced the notion of an interpretive community as one which shares ‘interpretive strategies’ which in turn ‘determine the shape of what is read’ (14). Laughter, too, presupposes shared worlds, shared codes, and shared values. Therefore it is characterised by both subjectivity and intersubjectivity: Understanding humor – especially its social and psychological functions, its value as an indicator of both cultural and personal identity – requires this sense of its radical subjectivity, a sense easily confirmed in the experience of telling a joke to an unamused audience. The extent to which we can share humour is based on a common world view, and one way of distinguishing individuals is by noting when they are amused and with whom. (Lewis: 12-3)
Laughter relies upon ‘a shared matrix of references’ (Slemon: 165) as a prerequisite, and, as a consequence, fulfils an important function in establishing, maintaining, and adjusting in-group ties and group borders. Nothing is laughable in itself: the laughable borrows its special quality from some persons or group of persons who happen to laugh at it, and, unless you happen also to know a good deal about this person or group of persons you cannot by any means guarantee the laugh beforehand. (Greig: 71; qtd. in Raskin: 17)
The specifics of humour, the laughter that is shared among an in-group, are particularly interesting for postcolonial analyses. The socialising function of laughter has been remarked upon in connection with feminist humour – Cixous claims that the power of the Medusa is one of solidarity, by deriding and thus excluding masculinity. The same argument can be found in discussions of ethnic jokes and in developmental psychology.14 During processes of identification, laughter that is shared by in-group members wields cohesive powers. The laughter at someone outside the community strengthens the ties within. In this context we would like to stress that the distinction between cultural insiders and outsiders for us does not hold entirely. Cultures are not mono14
See for instance, Martineau’s discussion of African-American humour in the 1960s (112), and also Olbrechts-Tyteca qtd. in Gutwirth (39).
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lithic but dynamic; cultural production and its reception cannot be contained in stable categories. Neither place of birth nor geographical location constitute the sole condition for membership in a community of laughter. We conceptualize communities of laughter after Benedict Anderson’s imagined communities; their cohesive laughter does not presuppose co-presence; nor can these communities be certain of the identities of their individual members (Anderson: 5-7). If we do not share the requisite cultural references, a joke or pun might be lost on us. Laughter in a Shakespearean play, for example, is not always conclusive to a contemporary audience, and many ‘original’ puns might be lost. However, postcolonial literatures, just like Shakespeare’s dramas, speak not only to local but also to international readerships, which often find cues in the texts that enable access to their comic potential. Laughter and humour are therefore ‘test cases’ not for cultural belonging, but for transcultural competence.
The scope of Cheeky Fictions The first of five sections of this volume, entitled ‘Laughter’s double vision – Humour and cultural ambiguity,’ deals with the ambiguity created by the question of who is actually being laughed at. Four essays examine the legitimacy of laughter and its cultural location; they concur that it is the cultural location of laughter that is decisive for the function that humour has in each case. Ulrike Erichsen opens our volume by delving deeper into some of the theoretical issues that have been raised in our introduction, such as the confusion around terminology, and provides an overview of the most common humour theories and functions of humour. Her theoretical considerations are supported by readings of texts by Meera Syal, Erna Brodber, and Sam Selvon, novels in which humour derives from the uncertainty of whose cultural values are being ridiculed, and whose position is being laughed at. Erichsen’s readings show that the functions of humour cannot be generalised without difficulty. Humour, she contends, cannot actually solve questions of cultural conflict but it can bridge gaps by diffusing the opposition between self and other. Anthony Ilona, too, is concerned with the impossibility of generalisation. Caribbean interpretations of selfhood are shown to be questioned by ironic textual modes by Trinidadian novelists V.S. Naipaul and Earl Lovelace. Ilona draws both on the Bakhtinian principle of the Carnivalesque and on humour traditions local to the Caribbean, such as calypso and picong, in order to formalise the mockery in A House for Mr Biswas and The Dragon Can’t Dance as a project of enlarging the space for Caribbean self-representation. For Ilona it is unsettling forms of humour, such as derision and mockery, which lend these
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texts their transformative force. Virginia Richter refers to psychoanalytical theories of humour to address the issue of humour’s agency. She reassesses Freud’s and Cixous’s work through a contemporary critical lens, finding both wanting due to their focus on either the element of aggression or that of liberation as inherent in laughter. Bhabha’s theory of the stereotype seems to resolve this opposition as it integrates both empowerment and powerlessness. The subsequent analysis of Joe Penhall’s play Blue / Orange allows Richter to point out that postcolonial humour, like stereotypes, cannot easily be interpreted as either liberating or disempowering, but constitutes a complex and context-bound phenomenon. Focussing on the figure of the terrorist Muslim, Helga Ramsey-Kurz also addresses ambiguity in postcolonial writing. She reads texts predating the events of September 11, 2001 against the knowledge of the socio-political implications that this date has brought along, and comes to the conclusion that humour offers an opportunity for postcolonial writers to side with rebellious characters without being accused of political and / or religious fanaticism themselves. She bases her essay on novels by Salman Rushdie, Zadie Smith, and Hanif Kureishi, and, although the terrorist figures are vastly divergent, she isolates a common representational strategy: whilst terrorist characters are ridiculed, humour is established as anti-dogmatic. In this way, the suppleness of humour is seen to provide space for alternative concepts whilst terrorism is associated with rigidity and closure. The four essays in the second section, ‘Traditions and transgressions – Writing back and forth,’ all look at various traditions of humour as points of orientation in an attempt to subvert the coloniser or former coloniser. While the ‘writing back’-principle is acknowledged in all the contributions, it is also clear that it is transcended, mainly through the use of self-directed humour. Thus, it is not only the coloniser that is sent up, but also the subverters themselves, who are mocked and ridiculed. In Heinz Antor’s contribution on Mordecai Richler’s Atuk it is the Canadian Dream and various forms of colonisation that are being satirised. Antor locates postcolonial satire not so much in the aggressive Juvenal tradition as in the more benevolent satire of Horace and Fielding. He links the national quest for identity in 1960s Canada with the multi-layered satire of Atuk. The essay demonstrates how Richler performs a ‘semiosis of derision’ in portraying a chain of continuing exploitation between Canadian business corporations and Inuit communities, in which each participant is revealed as both villain and fool, each being laughed at equally. Susan Lever’s contribution similarly links the object of her investigation, David Foster’s Moonlite, to the satirical tradition of Fielding, Swift, Pope, and Sterne, and later on Evelyn Waugh, but detects a clear postcolonial critique of British colonial history in it. The colonisation of
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Australia mirrored by that of a tiny island in the Hebrides shows how the colonial project renders the colonised people helpless and failing. Lever also considers language use, investigating the varieties of English that Foster employs and their potential for humour. Similar to Antor’s analysis of Canadian identity, Lever diagnoses the search for a post-independence identity as fraught with nostalgia for the former coloniser. Michael Meyer’s analysis of postcolonial parodies has as its basis two short stories that explicitly refer to their canonised antecedents: Matthew Singh-Toor’s ‘Samhadrarow and the Partial Exchange’ is a parody of Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels, Salman Rushdie’s ‘Yorick’ already in its title makes obvious the intertextual connection to Shakespeare’s Hamlet via Sterne’s Tristram Shandy. In how far are postcolonial and postmodern texts indebted to their British antecedents, in how far do they transcend their humour for ‘postcolonial purposes,’ Meyer asks. Both texts are shown to criticise the coloniser-colonised relationship, but also mock the very basis of this critique, the writing-back strategy and the cultural iconicity of the texts on which these parodies are based. Detlef Gohrbandt turns to visual art for a close analysis: Ronald Searle’s The Rake’s Progress, originally published in Punch in the 1950s, is presented as a satire on the British nation at the end of Empire. Searle’s gallery of representative English types in (hopeless) search of fame and success traces types and manners, and chronicles a period rather than showing interest in individuals, and it is this that leads Gohrbandt to point out connections with Hogarth’s A Rake’s Progress of 1735, but also, again, to Fielding. It is especially colonial heroes that Searle shows as having failed, and their individual failure stands metonymically for the failure of the society of which they are part. Gohrbandt reads the drawings against the background of the socio-political situation at the end of the British Empire and demonstrates how Searle’s humour does not offer an escape from inevitable failure: acceptance as well as rejection or bypassing of established institutions such as the BBC or the literary establishment all lead to failure. The three contributions of the third section, ‘Ethnic cabaret – A license to laugh,’ focus upon the ambiguous relationships between the various participants in the act of laughing: those laughed at and those laughing, within a text or between the text and its audience or readership. The term ‘ethnic cabaret’ is Mark Terkessidis’s via Mita Banerjee, and expresses laughter that is directed at the audience itself, but ambiguously so, leaving the question open as to who it is that is being laughed at. Mita Banerjee’s essay applies the theoretical observations of Mark Terkessidis on Turkish-German ‘Kabarett’ to Sri Lankan novelist Shyam Selvadurai’s Funny Boy. Laughter here results from the ambiguity of the implied reader’s position towards the identity positions of the protagonist, a homosexual Tamil, whose identity is
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being challenged a number of times in the novel. Linking ethnic and queer studies, Banerjee identifies the novel’s concerns with ethnic and sexual identities as a non-normative mission, which still leaves the reader ambivalent as to the identity of the implied reader. Similarly, the contribution by Astrid Fellner and Klaus Heissenberger, which focuses on Richard ‘Cheech’ Marin’s film I Was Born in East L.A., draws upon a variety of identities to perform a critique of preconceived ideas of national and ethnic identities. Questioning the nature of stable boundaries, the film mocks any essentialist notions of Chicano, Mexican, or American identity, and the laughter is on the Chicano as well as the American for expecting a clear-cut notion of nationality, and this includes the film’s audience. Fellner and Heissenberger give an illuminating interpretation of the film through the lens of Chicano/a Studies, but also by analysing the frequent references to the American icon Bruce Springsteen and by illustrating how the film succeeds in its subversion of ‘Americanness.’ Christiane Schlote’s contribution, like the above, points up the necessity of stereotypes in comedy, and investigates parallel developments in American, British, and German ethnic comedy TV programmes: All-American Girl, Goodness Gracious Me, and Was Guckst Du? While on the one hand it can be read as a good sign that TV comedy is catching up with demographic change, none of the programmes were received uncontroversially. Each program resulted in debates on the responsibilities of the artist to present the ethnic group concerned in a favourable light, to avoid stereotyping, and to bear the burden of representation of a heterogeneous community, while at the same time being funny. Schlote identifies the strategy of ‘humour appeasement,’ i.e. an attempt at accommodating the sensitivities of both assumed audience(s) and the communities represented. All three contributions of section four, ‘The Language of Humour – The Humour of Language,’ centre on how language evokes laughter and explore how it can both help or hinder the bridging of cultural gaps between characters in a text or between writer and readership. Margit Ozvalda’s contribution on schools in postcolonial fiction investigates the language used in the representation of teachers and pupils. In a postcolonial context, the nexus of school and the colonial education system have been the object of much criticism; Ozvalda focuses on the role humour plays in this. She establishes intertextual connections between eighteenth-century satire, the nineteenth-century realist novel, and the satirical treatment of schools and teachers in contemporary fiction by Vikram Seth, Rohinton Mistry, Meera Syal, and Zadie Smith. Mainly relying upon Salvatore Attardo’s linguistic theories of humour, Ozvalda approaches these texts from a corpus linguistic perspective and bases her results upon a concordance programme. Susanne
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Pichler takes up the specificity of laughter and its cross-cultural (in)accessibility. Gauging the ‘translatability of laughter’ in Timothy Mo’s Sour Sweet (1982), she considers whether laughter is used as a ‘critical weapon’ and probes the preconditions of Western readers’ ability to identify and appreciate humorous language and its referents. Pichler discusses crosslinguistic misunderstandings within the novels that are resolved with laughter and questions the possibilities for readers to identify the humour in culturespecific situations. Susanne Mühleisen, in her sociolinguistic contribution, investigates the changing ways in which the language varieties of West Indian immigrants – Caribbean Creoles and British Black Englishes – have been employed for humorous effect in a number of TV productions from the 1970s to date. Mühleisen suggests that there has been a discernible move away from a very careful treatment of the language of ethnic minority groups (as, for instance, in Empire Road or Desmond’s) towards a less restrained caricaturing of London Jamaican (as in Ali G), a development which, for her, testifies to the fact that London Jamaican has become another of London’s many varieties that is no longer ethnically specific. The four contributions of the concluding section, ‘Laughing it off – Does therapeutic humour work?’, all probe the therapeutic potential of humour and critically assess its value for various postcolonial settings. While some essays come to the conclusion that humour successfully defuses conflicts in a postcolonial situation, others show clearly how in some cases laughter mainly serves to underscore calamity. Maggie Ann Bowers’s contribution on Native American humour takes a critical look at the claim that humour empowers the colonised and subverts their situation of powerlessness. Bowers especially highlights the difference between the celebratory humour and joyful trickster tales by writers such as Thomas King, Gerald Vizenor, and Sherman Alexie, and the pessimistic stance that W.P. Kinsella takes in his darkly comic tales. Kinsella’s humour seems to offer no alternative to the bleak life in the reservations, and, rather than offering relief through catharsis, acknowledges defeat, not survival. Reading three novels by Nuruddin Farah, Dambudzo Marechera, and Meja Mwangi, Annie Gagiano likewise finds humour an inept tool for protection from or insulation against pain and suffering. Gagiano emphasises the ancient link between the comic and the tragic, and highlights how in these three novels a sense of the tragedy of a community is conveyed by resorting to the strategy of ‘comic understanding.’ The comic vision balances the grief in each novel, and in doing so it only serves to emphasise the grief and the tragedy involved. Gisela Feurle introduces us to the world of Madam & Eve, the post-apartheid South African cartoon strip, which has at its heart relationships dating back to apartheid times. Feurle explains the success of the cartoon strip by reading its
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protagonists as iconic of the changing socio-political climate in South Africa, which allows its readers to identify with each in turn. Thus, the laughter evoked by Madam & Eve is directed at the characters involved, but also at the South African audience, who see themselves represented. While the cartoon strip is often advertised as uniting South Africa in laughter, Feurle warns against misunderstanding it as a unified vision that is shared by all South Africans alike. Wendy Woodward’s essay on Zake Mda’s Heart of Redness suitably rounds off this section, and the collection itself, by discovering a middle ground for the therapeutic potential of humour: Woodward finds in Mda a kind of rehabilitative humour, which speaks out against the oppositional thinking that has had a long history in South African culture. Mda rehabilitates amaXhosa history by reconsidering the cattlekilling movement of the 1850s through a mix of social comedy and the grotesque, achieved through a focus on the materiality of the body. Analysing the feminist and ecological aspects of Mda’s humour, Woodward comes to the conclusion that a novel containing a more reconciliatory humour, such as this one, is no less valid a vehicle for socio-cultural transformation than one that resorts to a harsher and more scathing humour. While it has been claimed again and again that analysing humour is an entirely cheerless exercise, devoid of the laughter it seeks to analyse (see also our epigraph, taken from Max Eastman), we do hope that apart from stimulating the reader’s critical faculties, it might also, every now and then, provoke the odd smile, grin, or chuckle.
Bibliography Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 1983. London: Verso, 1991. Atwood, Margaret. ‘What’s so Funny? Notes on Canadian Humour.’ Second Words: Selected Critical Prose. By Margaret Atwood. Toronto: Anansi, 1982. 175-89. Ashcroft, Bill, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin. The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2002. –––. Key Concepts in Post-Colonial Studies. London: Routledge, 1998. Ashcroft, Bill, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, eds. The Post-Colonial Studies Reader. London: Routledge, 1995. Bakhtin, Mikhail. Rabelais and His World. Trans. Helene Iswolsky. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1968.
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Ball, John Clement. Satire and the Postcolonial Novel. V.S. Naipaul, Chinua Achebe, Salman Rushdie. New York: Routledge, 2003. Beattie, James. Essays. On Poetry and Music, As They Affect the Mind. On Laughter and Ludicrous Composition. On the Utility of Classical Learning. William Creech: Edinburgh, 1776. Benson, Eugene, and L.W. Conolly, eds. Encyclopedia of Post-Colonial Literatures in English. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2005. Bergson, Henri. Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic. 1900. Trans. Cloudesley Brereton and Fred Rothwell. London: Macmillan, 1991. Boehmer, Elleke. Colonial and Postcolonial Literature: Migrant Metaphors. Oxford: OUP, 1995. Boskin, Joseph. Rebellious Laughter: People’s Humor in American Culture. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse UP, 1997. Breton, André. Anthology of Black Humor. 1939. Trans. Mark Polizotti. San Francisco, CA: City Light Books, 1997. Castle, Gregory, ed. Postcolonial Discourses: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001. Chapman, Antony J., and Hugh C. Foot, eds. Humour and Laughter: Theory, Research and Applications. London: John Wiley, 1976. Cixous, Hélène. ‘The Laugh of the Medusa.’ 1975. Trans. Keith and Paul Cohen. Feminisms: An Anthology of Literary Theory and Criticism. Ed. Robyn Warhol and Diane Price Herndl. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 1997. 347-62. Durant, John, and Jonathan Miller, eds. Laughing Matters: A Serious Look at Humour. Harlow: Longman, 1988. Eastman, Max. Enjoyment of Laughter. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1937. Eastman, Max. The Sense of Humor. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1921. Eagleton, Terry. ‘Postcolonialism and “Postcolonialism.”’ Interventions 1.1 (1998): 24-6. Finney, Gail. ‘Unity in Difference? An Introduction.’ Look Who’s Laughing: Gender and Comedy. Ed. Gail Finney. Davis, CA: Gordon and Breach, 1994. Freeman, Michael. Preface. Humour Theorists of the Twentieth Century. By John Parkin. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 1997. ix-xii. Freud, Sigmund. Das Ich und das Es: Metapsychologische Schriften. 1923. Studienausgabe III. Ed. Alexander Mitscherlich et al. Frankfurt/M: Fischer, 2001. –––. Der Humor. 1927. Studienausgabe IV. Ed. Alexander Mitscherlich et al. Frankfurt/M: Fischer, 2001. –––. Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewußten. 1905. Studienausgabe IV. Ed. Alexander Mitscherlich et al. Frankfurt/M: Fischer, 2001.
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Galligan, Edward L. The Comic Vision in Literature. Athens, GA: U of Georgia P, 1984. Goldberg, Theo, and Ato Quayson, eds. Relocating Postcolonialism. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002. Grimm, Reinhold, and Jost Hermand, eds. Laughter Unlimited: Essays on Humor, Satire, and the Comic. Madison, WI: U of Wisconsin P, 1991. Gutwirth, Marcel. Laughing Matter: An Essay on the Comic. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1993. Hawley, John C., ed. Encyclopedia of Postcolonial Studies. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001. Jaeger, Joachim W. Humor und Satire in der DDR: Ein Versuch zur Theorie. Frankfurt/Main: R.G. Fischer, 1984. Jäkel, Siegfried, and Asko Timonen, eds. Laughter Down the Centuries. Vols. 1-3. Turku: Turun Yliopisto, 1994-96. Jones, Dorothy, and Barry Andrews. ‘Australian Humour.’ The Penguin New Literary History of Australia. Ed. Laurie Hergenhan. Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin, 1988. 60-76. Keith-Spiegel, Patricia. ‘Early Conceptions of Humor: Varieties and Issues.’ The Psychology of Humour: Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Issues. Ed. Jeffrey H. Goldstein and Paul E. McGhee. New York: Academic Press, 1972. 4-39. Koestler, Arthur. The Act of Creation. London: Hutchinson, 1964. Köhler, Stefanie. Differentes Lachen: Funktion, Präsentation und Genderspezifik der Ridicula im zeitgenössischen englischen Roman. Tübingen: Stauffenburg, 1997. Lewis, Paul. Comic Effects: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Humor in Literature. Albany, NY: State U of New York P, 1989. Martineau, William H. ‘A Model of the Social Functions of Humor.’ The Psychology of Humour: Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Issues. Ed. Jeffrey H. Goldstein and Paul E. McGhee. New York: Academic Press, 1972. 101-25. Marx, Karl. ‘Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie.’ In Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Werke. Berlin: Dietz, 1976. 378-91. McGhee, Paul E. Humor: Its Origin and Development. San Francisco, CA: Freeman and Co., 1979. McLeod, John. Beginning Postcolonialism. Manchester: Manchester UP, 2000. Meredith, George. An Essay on Comedy and the Uses of the Comic Spirit. 1897. Ed. Lane Cooper. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1972. Mulkay, Michael. On Humour: Its Nature and Its Place in Modern Society. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1988.
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Oring, Elliott, ed. Humor and the Individual. Spec. issue of Western Folklore 43.1 (1984). Parkin, John. Humour Theorists of the Twentieth Century. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 1997. Parry, Benita. ‘Problems in Current Discourse Theory.’ Oxford Literary Review 9 (1987): 27-58. Pfister, Manfred, ed. A History of English Laughter: Laughter from Beowulf to Beckett and Beyond. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002. Pirandello, Luigi. On Humor. 1908. Trans. Antonio Illiano and Daniel P. Testa. Chapel Hill, N.C.: U of North Carolina P, 1960. Provine, Robert R. Laughter: A Scientific Investigation. London: Faber, 2000. Ramraj, Victor J. ‘Universalism.’ In Hawley 2001. 445-7. Raskin, Victor. Semantic Mechanisms of Humor. Boston, MA: D. Reidel, 1985. Richler, Mordecai, ed. The Best of Modern Humour. London: Allen Lane, 1983. Roeckelein, Jon E. The Psychology of Humor: A Reference Guide and Annotated Bibliography. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002. Said, Edward. Orientalism. 1978. New York: Vintage Books, 1994. Schulze-Engler, Frank. ‘Universalism with a Difference: The Politics of Postcolonial Theory.’ Nationalism vs. Internationalism: (Inter)National Dimensions of Literatures in English. Ed. Wolfgang Zach and Ken L. Goodwin. Tübingen: Stauffenburg, 1996. 41-6. Sherwood, Scott Cutler. Laughing Matters: The Paradox of Comedy. Amherst, MA: U of Mass P, 1986. Simon, Richard Keller. The Labyrinth of the Comic: Theory and Practice from Fielding to Freud. Tallahassee, FL: Florida State UP, 1985. Slemon, Stephen. ‘Post-Colonial Allegory and the Transformation of History.’ Journal of Commonwealth Literature 23.1 (1988): 157-68. Spalding, Henry D., ed. Encyclopedia of Black Folklore and Humor. Rev. ed. Middle Village, NY: Jonathan David, 1978. Stein, Mark. ‘Ironic Interventions? Chris Ofili’s and Bernadine Evaristo’s Praxes of Transgression.’ Transgressions: Cultural Interventions in the Global Manifold. Ed. Renate Brosch and Rüdiger Kunow. Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2005. 115-25. Thieme, John. Post-Colonial Studies: The Essential Glossary. London: Arnold, 2003. Updike, John. Humor in Fiction. Northridge, CA: Lord John, 2000. Walder, Dennis. Post-Colonial Literatures in English: History, Language, Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, 1998. Wickberg, Daniel. The Senses of Humor: Self and Laughter in Modern America. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1998.
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Young, Robert J.C. Postcolonialism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: OUP, 2003. –––. Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001.
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I. Laughter’s double vision – Humour and cultural ambiguity
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ULRIKE ERICHSEN
Smiling in the face of adversity How to use humour to defuse cultural conflict
A
nalysing humour is like dissecting a frog: nobody enjoys it. This statement, purporting to be a short definition of what it means to analyse humour, is itself an example and illustration of how a certain kind of (rather weak) humour works. The statement brings together two areas of investigative research, that of humour analysis and that of zoological experiments, and claims a similarity between them. The second half of the sentence pretends to explain the stated similarity by claiming that nobody enjoys doing either. Clearly, this pseudo-definition is not a serious attempt at a definition or explanation (leaving aside the fact that biologists might not agree at all), yet it expresses a rather common prejudice about the desirability of humour analysis in bringing a whiff of the unsavoury, if not indecent, to analysing humour. Most of us enjoy humour in its diverse appearances as witty or comic expressions, jokes, parodies, ironic asides, sarcastic remarks and so on. We enjoy the experience but see little need for further analysis or explanation as such explanation would – this seems the general consensus – be counter-productive to the intended humorous effect. Nevertheless, in this paper I shall argue that an analytical approach to humour, and paying closer attention to its diverse functions, can enhance our enjoyment as well as our understanding of humour. Before I start developing my argument, some general remarks with regard to the terminology used in this paper seem appropriate. Chapman and Foot have pointed to a general problem with regard to definitions of the terms ‘humour’ and ‘laughter.’
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Ulrike Erichsen One obvious problem that bedevils definitions of humour is whether it is to be viewed as a stimulus, a response or a disposition. The Penguin English Dictionary allows all three possibilities: humour may refer to that which causes ‘good-tempered laughter’ (stimulus); or ‘cheerful and good-tempered amusement’ (response); or ‘the capacity for seeing the funny side of things’ (disposition). While no-one would dispute that laughter is generally a response, it is just as much a response to non-humorous stimuli as it is to humour stimuli. [...] No all-embracing theory of humour and /or laughter has yet gained widespread acceptance and possibly no general theory will ever be successfully applied to the human race as a whole when its members exhibit such vast individual differences with respect to their humour responsiveness. The paradox associated with humour is almost certainly a function of its being incorrectly viewed as a unitary process. Humour plays a myriad of roles and serves a number of quite different functions. (Chapman and Foot, Introduction: 3f.)
For the purpose of this paper, I am using the term humour in a rather general sense, ranging from subtle amusement to loud laughter.1 One problem in talking about humour is that what we regard as funny or humorous or how we respond to a humorous situation can differ quite considerably from one person to the next. My focus is not so much on analysing why we laugh or explaining the ways in which laughter is elicited in a given situation; I am interested in the various functions, sometimes contradictory, that humour may serve in selected postcolonial narratives on the textual level as well as in the reader-text communication. I shall restrict my discussion to two aspects important to postcolonial texts: comic relief and the use of humour to indicate cultural differences and uncover cultural stereotypes.
Theories of humour and their relevance to the postcolonial context There are a great number of theories and models which try to analyse humour in its various forms and appearances. The most common approaches are: 1) superiority theories (also referred to as derision or disparagement theories), which focus on the relationship between the producer and the recipient or target of a comic or humorous situation and explain laughter as a result of feeling superior to somebody else;2 2) release / relief theories (also referred to as pain and removal theories), which focus on the recipient of the comic stimulus and his or her social and psychological context and explain laughter as some kind of release helping the person to regain his or her social and
1 2
Similarly, I am using the terms ‘humorous,’ ‘funny’ and ‘comic(al)’ as more or less synonymous disregarding their differences with respect to context or register. References are to Thomas Hobbes and Henri Bergson, who emphasise the difference between eminence and infirmity or superiority and inferiority to account for the significance of laughter. Victor Raskin points out that although Hobbes is generally seen as the origin of superiority-theories, Plato, Aristotle and Cicero also give similar explanations for human laughter (see Raskin: 36ff.).
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emotional equilibrium;3 and 3) incongruity theories, which focus on the structural principle of comic or humorous communication and explain the comic as the result of ‘the perceiving of a situation or event in two selfconsistent but habitually incompatible frames of reference’ (Koestler: 35).4 Whereas the first two approaches investigate the emotional side of the problem, incongruity theories emphasize a cognitive perspective on humour. Susan C. Vogel sums up the central questions: Does humour draw on man’s (positive) ability to create startling mental juxtapositions, or is it a (negative) reflection of man’s joy in triumphing over others? [...] why do we enjoy humour? Do we get a kick out of solving puzzles, or do we get a kick out of kicking others? And, if both, how are the two related to one another? (Vogel: 12f.)
Victor Raskin sees the different theoretical approaches as complementary rather than contradictory; he argues: The three approaches actually characterize the complex phenomenon of humor from very different angles and do not at all contradict each other – rather they seem to supplement each other quite nicely. In our terms, the incongruity-based theories make a statement about the stimulus; the superiority theories characterize the relations or attitudes between the speaker and the hearer; and the release / relief theories comment 5 on the feelings and psychology of the hearer only. (Raskin: 40, emphases in original)
Even this rather brief description of the various attempts to analyse humour and human laughter suggests that theories of humour have much to offer for the understanding of typical concerns and contexts in postcolonial writing.6 It is the deliberate ambiguity which ‘underlies much, if not all, of verbal humour’ (Raskin: 13) that provides the nexus to the analysis of postcolonial writing. A large number of postcolonial texts, explicitly or implicitly, bring
3
4 5
6
References are mainly to Sigmund Freud and his Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewußten (1905, Engl. Jokes and Their Relationship to the Unconscious, Trans. James Strachey, 1960). Raskin sees Freud’s model as ‘the best known theory of this kind’ (Raskin: 38). See also Raskin: 31ff. for further references. Raskin proposes a script-based semantic theory of humour which ‘is designed as neutral with respect to all of [the abovementioned, U.E.] theories and is, in fact, easily compatible with most, if not all of them, which is, of course, another way of saying that its goals, premises and terms are rather dramatically different from theirs’ (Raskin: 40f.). Raskin aims for ‘the application of modern linguistic theory to the study of humor [...]. The goal of the theory is to formulate the necessary and sufficient conditions, in purely semantic terms for a text to be funny’ (Raskin. Preface: xiii). I am using the term ‘postcolonial’ in a very wide sense here including not only writing from previously colonised territories or texts focusing on the tension between former colony and former colonising power but also texts that deal with the migrant experience.
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together two frames of reference.7 Many such texts foreground the problems of differing cultural norms and values, exploiting the emotional as well as social and cognitive aspects of such double-coding, often with a critical rather than humorous or comic intention in the narrow sense. Much of literary research on humour and laughter, especially research based on Mikhail Bakhtin’s work, emphasises the critical and subversive function of humour. In Bakhtin’s definition of the novel, the carnivalesque and laughter are vital features of the novelistic genre and are primarily seen as liberating reactions to official traditions or ossified ideologies.8 In this context then, laughter becomes an ‘antiforce, and thus begins to display antinomian traits. Bakhtin authorizes the novel to play the same role in literature that carnival is alleged to play in the real life of cultures’ (Morson and Emerson: 441f.). It is, I think, obvious why a Bakhtinian approach, with its emphasis on the subversion of an official ideology, can have a certain appeal to postcolonial studies. Rather than focus on the subversive aspect of humour, however, I would like to stress another feature of humour’s transgressive potential, namely the ‘productive’ potential of humour and laughter. As far as the inner-textual level is concerned, I will argue that humour can be used as a means to defuse cultural conflicts by offering a strictly limited context for such conflict. Many cultural conflicts stem from differences in cultural values and norms, or are related to superiority / inferiority problems, real or assumed. In such cases, humour can have a socially regulatory function, providing an outlet for criticism without aggravating the initial conflict. In addition, as far as the reader-text interaction is concerned, humour can be used to highlight a doubly-coded situation. It can function as a means to alert the reader to cultural barriers that need to be overcome in order to fully understand the text, and thus can encourage intercultural communication and understanding.
7
8
Obvious examples are texts that operate within the ‘writing back’-paradigm in a narrow sense. Ashcroft et al. define postcolonial literatures as literatures that ‘emerged in their present form out of the experience of colonization and asserted themselves by foregrounding the tension with the imperial power, and by emphasizing their differences from the assumptions of the imperial centre’ (Ashcroft et al.: 2). Another group of texts that employ two frames of reference are novels of migration that focus on culture contact in the former colonising country. Attempting to arrive at a brief and conclusive definition of what Bakhtin understands by ‘laughter’ or ‘the carnivalesque’ is difficult, as he often uses these terms to define generic features of the novel in contrast to other genres. Moreover, his understanding of ‘laughter’ and ‘the carnivalesque’ seems to undergo some subtle changes as far as the four essays in The Dialogic Imagination are concerned; Rabelais and his World shifts the focus to a much more pronounced emphasis on carnival than the preceding texts. However, these nuances cannot be pursued in this context.
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Functions of humour In general, humour seems to serve a variety of different functions on all levels of verbal utterances, first of all, perhaps, that of expressing a certain emotion. In a postcolonial context, however, humour is often used to camouflage rather than express emotions, for instance to cover up aggression or the pain of being an outsider or of being considered inferior. In his introductory remarks to The Book of Negro Humor, Langston Hughes gives a description of humour that emphasises this particular aspect: Humor is laughing at what you haven’t got when you ought to have it. Of course, you laugh by proxy. You’re really laughing at the other guy’s lack, not your own. That’s what makes it funny – the fact that you don’t know you’re laughing at yourself. Humor is when the joke is on you but hits the other fellow first – before it boomerangs. Humor is what you wish in your secret heart were not funny, but it is, and you must laugh. Humor is your own unconscious therapy. (Hughes: vii)
Hughes’s comments suggest an awareness of a discrepancy, a lack of balance, and that humour is a way of dealing with such a discrepancy. Humour is also used in communicating the value of an established relation (Jakobson’s phatic function) through sharing a certain sense of humour (Kotthoff: 355-7). The phatic function is closely related to the conative function of communicating values within the group and / or establishing, maintaining and testing group boundaries (in intra- and inter-group relations). Sharing a sense of humour implies sharing a culture, as humour is a group- or culture-specific expression.9 According to Kotthoff, social and cultural ambiguities seem far more important in eliciting laughter than semantic ambiguities (Kotthoff: 360). Thus, intersubjective agreement between speaker and listener (or speaker and reader) is more important to evoke a humorous reaction than the semantic creativity of the speaker. Werner Sollors goes even further in arguing that ‘the community of laughter itself is an ethnicizing phenomenon, as we develop a sense of we-ness in laughing with others’ (Sollors, qtd. in Walker: 114). This means that humour is a way of expressing being part of a specific group or community as well as a means of creating, as Sollors puts it, a sense of belonging or ‘we-ness.’ To specify the cognitive or referential function of humour in a general way is difficult as 9
One of the Indian female narrators of Meera Syal’s Life Isn’t All Ha Ha Hee Hee (1999) stresses this point rather forcefully: ‘I’d had one boyfriend before, a brief fling in my first term with a guy from Southampton reading French, but I got bored with having to explain stuff all the time. How come my parents came over here? What did korma actually mean in my language? What was that dot on the forehead? Why was my skin so beautiful? I felt like his social worker, not his girlfriend. I knew then this wasn’t what I wanted or needed. I needed someone I could have cultural shorthand with, someone who would get my jokes’ (Syal: 86).
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it is context-bound. The deliberate ambiguity of humour points to the existence of two frames of reference which are often also indicated through code-switching and / or specific metalingual statements. This double-focus of humorous utterances forces the reader or listener to switch between two perspectives and two frames of reference.
Using humour to defuse cultural conflict A great many postcolonial texts employ humour on various levels to emphasise the double perspective inscribed in cultural encounters. In the following examples I would like to point to what I regard as some of the productive rather than subversive uses of humour.10 I shall begin with a rather straightforward example from Meera Syal’s novel Life Isn’t All Ha Ha Hee Hee (1999). Having described an Indian marriage ceremony in the first chapter, the narrator sums up the reactions of the guests, Indian and English, to the happy day: Deepak [the groom, U.E.] stood in the centre of this circle of grief, the lone male in an ocean of heaving female flesh. The other men had regrouped in awkward clumps, giving the women space to grieve, exchanging rueful glances, scuffing their shoes guiltily in the melting slush. For hadn’t they all done this once, pretend cavemen for a day, dragging their women away by the hair, parping their victory on their car horns. Deepak’s face was a mask of calm, almost ennobled by the task ahead of him, to protect and nurture this weeping woman. [...] Tissue clutching matriarchs reattached themselves to harrumphing husbands, reaffirming their bonds to each other and the watching world. [...] The few English guests stood in a confused huddle, wondering why such a splendid day, replete with aching colours, mountainous piles of delicious food [...], embarrassing hospitality, ear-splitting music, wild and strange folk dancing (a bit like jive this Indian business, once you get the footwork going), inhibitions peeled off with second-best jackets, had to end with such a tragic performance. They all had got through the occasion without making an awful faux pas. Now what were they supposed to say to Chila’s [the bride, U.E.] slumped and tear-stained family? Thank you for a lovely day? [...] For everyone else, it had been, despite the weather, a lovely day. A perfect day because rituals had been observed, old footsteps retraced, threads running unbroken, families joined, futures secured. (Syal: 24-6)
The heterodiegetic narrator11 functions as a cultural mediator in this passage, providing insight into the reactions of the Indian as well as the English guests at the wedding. The rather exaggerated descriptions (‘lone male in an ocean of heaving female flesh,’ ‘cavemen [...] dragging their women away,’ ‘a bit like jive this Indian business, once you get the footwork going’) highlight a situation that can be read in accordance with two different cultural codes: to
10 11
The distinction is one of emphasis rather than kind. A heterodiegetic narrator is a narrator who does not participate in the story, who tells a story not about him-/ herself.
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the English guests at the wedding who watch in a ‘confused huddle,’ the collective female weeping at the end of the day comes across as a ‘tragic performance’ while the Indian guests expect this to happen as part of a wellknown ritual. The narrator’s use of hyperbole indicates the intimate knowledge of the cultural insider as well as a certain ironical distance and an awareness of how things might appear to the cultural outsider.12 The humorous presentation points to a difference, a gap in cultural knowledge with part of the humour resulting from a structural inversion: in spite of the fact that the wedding takes place in England it is the English who feel at a loss in this cultural context. In contrast to the textual level, where characters huddle in confusion in the face of events that cannot be explained within their frame of reference, the narrative mediation provides hermeneutic guidance through pointing to the existence of two frames of reference: it facilitates understanding for the non-Indian reader through explaining a certain ritual and accounts for the confusion of the English guests (cultural outsiders as far as the marriage ceremony is concerned) to the Indian reader. Such a passage alerts readers from different cultural backgrounds to the fact that behaviour is culture-coded and can be interpreted in very different ways according to the cultural frame employed. Moreover, it adds to their cultural knowledge and increases awareness for culture-related misunderstanding. A more complex example is taken from Erna Brodber’s novel Myal (1988). The context is that Mrs Maydene Brassington, the white wife of the English-educated, mixed-parentage parson of a black Jamaican community, comes to see Mrs Amy Holness, the black wife of the black headmaster of the community school, to enquire about a mixed-parentage girl (Ella O’Grady, daughter of Mary Riley), who she would like to help educate. The novel is set at the beginning, the first two decades, of the last century. Amy knew she was right. She was taking the left turn. She was coming to her, not to her husband at school and the cursing began to circle in her head: ‘This blasted white pillow case with a string tied in the middle. These white people just wan tek people pickney fi practice upon. Want Mary good-good pickney fi pasture out to her two red-face son. Is pumpkin belly dem wan send this one back home with too?’ But since Amy Holness was the headmaster’s wife and Maydene Brassington the parson’s wife, there was no way what was in her head could be expressed in that way. It stayed there circling. Instead she said when Maydene began to ascend her steps: ‘Why Mrs Brassington how nice to see you. What a coincidence. Someone just called your name to me. They say you are wanting to take Mary’s child into your house.’ [...] Amy Holness continued
12
It is, of course, problematic if not impossible to define ‘cultural insider’ and ‘cultural outsider’ in absolute terms because cultures as well as relations between cultures change and develop. In a similar way, what is considered ‘funny’ in an intercultural context also changes. I am using the terms as heuristic tools to describe different degrees of understanding cultural practices as a result of belonging to a cultural community.
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Ulrike Erichsen ‘My, your boys will love her. She will fit so well into the family. They are expected home soon, aren’t they. Such lovely gentlemen!’ Maydene Brassington was not fooled by the translation. She knew that Mrs Holness was saying ‘You interfering white slob: Why don’t you go and do your dirty work yourself and leave me to my business?’ ‘And that’s another thing’, she thought, ‘that William [her husband, the parson, U.E.] refuses to deal with. That there are classes everywhere and that those below must hate those above and must devise some way of communicating this without seeming too obviously rude. He refuses to participate in “silly linguistic rituals.”[...]’ Maydene was in no hurry to go. [...] Nothing that God made was going to frighten her. So if Mrs Holness thought that just because she was black, was a couple rungs below her socially, she could roll this into a weapon with which to distance her, she would have to think again. (Brodber: 20-1)
Brodber’s novel depicts a situation that, in terms of its social conventions and expectations, is doubly coded: Not only is Maydene Brassington the wife of the parson, thus within the social hierarchy of the community above the teacher’s wife, she is also white and English and therefore a representative and agent of the colonising power. As such she is recognized as a threat by Amy Holness who suspects that the parson’s wife plans to use Ella O’Grady for the sexual initiation of her sons. (‘These white people just wan tek people pickney fi practice upon.’) The passage makes it quite clear that this has happened before and that the implicit threat is real enough. The comic element in the situation lies not so much in the way the two women communicate with each other but in the discrepancy between appearance and reality, in this case between utterance and thought. This can only be deciphered by the reader who is also party to the thoughts of the two women. The passage illustrates the working of asymmetrical relationships, typical of the colonial situation, through providing a double-focus on the characters’ thoughts as well as utterances. This is particularly obvious with regard to Amy Holness’s behaviour. Her assessment of Maydene Brassington’s plans is very critical, and she fears that Ella O’Grady might be used and sexually exploited. However, convention forbids that she utters her assumptions directly or explicitly; she must find a more circumstantial way of expressing her view. The humorous effect for the reader results from the fact that he or she knows about Mrs Holman’s opinion, yet sees it presented in a much weaker form and a different language, Standard English in contrast to Jamaican Patois, to Mrs Brassington. The contrast between ‘her two red-face son’ and ‘your boys will love her. [...] Such lovely gentlemen’ could not be more obvious, especially as Mrs Holman fears exactly what she says, namely that the boys will love, that is make love to, that is have sex with the girl she wants to protect. The parson’s wife can ‘translate’ these utterances because she can see through what her husband calls ‘silly linguistic rituals,’ and she is aware of the fact that such linguistic rituals are not only an expression of but also perform an important function in asymmetrical relationships. Yet
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Maydene Brassington is not prepared to go along with the role that such linguistic ritual assigns to her. Moreover, her focalizing of the situation points out to the reader that she is aware of the fact that Amy Holness, in terms of the social hierarchy the less influential character, is using politeness as a weapon to stop the parson’s wife from interfering. This is how the situation develops: Maydene settled in and tried to look comfortable on the little bentwood chair handed her, though to tell the truth her fat hips were drooping over the sides like a Friday evening hamper on a donkey’s back. She knew how ridiculous she looked and she knew how uncomfortable she felt but she peeped into the drawing room and admired the ruffles and the tatting on the centre table aloud and said to herself, above her discomfiture, ‘She doesn’t know it yet, but we are going to be friends and she is going to teach me to make all those delicious things they make with coconuts.’ Then she proceeded to smile into space. Her silence was off-putting. [...] And Maydene pushed her advantage even further to dictate the level and the tone of the conversation. The matter on the floor was of course the exploitation of people’s natural god-given gifts – their selves or those of the beings they made. Amy had accused her of stealing her people and exploiting their bodies. The accusation was too oblique to force a direct response. Maydene would side step that, take another tack and throw her slightly. She looked at the floor which was incredibly shine. [...] Mrs Holness – she said – How do you manage to grow up children and keep your floor so shine? – She did know that Mrs Holness had no children. Amy broke. (Brodber: 21-2)
What comes across as an expert’s linguistic manipulation in this particular passage, and thus seems to reinforce all stereotypes about the exploitative relationship between coloniser and colonised, must be seen in the larger context of the novel as a whole. Maydene Brassington uses her linguistic expertise and her insight into the reasons for the ‘silly linguistic rituals’ to show people that communication is possible even between people who seem to be on different sides.13 The obvious but superficial markers of a humorous situation employed here, calling somebody names or referring to aspects of the outward appearance, draw the reader’s attention to the situation and, ideally, make him or her reflect more deeply about it. Humour, thus, can be used to make a point on the cognitive or referential level while at the same time providing relief on the emotional and social level of the communication. 13
The chapter provides another example of ‘linguistic ritual’ and how it is undermined and put to positive use by the two women: ‘One truth deserves some others and Maydene admitted it. – [...] You do know that my husband is not Jamaican. – Amy knew that she meant ‘not full white’ and at another time would have feigned surprise, “But Mrs Brassington, how extraordinary.” Today she was silent and Maydene went on. – There are things about him that I therefore cannot easily understand. When I saw that child I saw him. [...] What I am only now beginning to see is the enormous size of the pain my husband must have lived through as a child. [...] – And she too was silent. There on the little verandah, Adam and Eve looked away from each other for they had eaten the forbidden fruit’ (Brodber: 23).
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The ending of the situation described above functions in a similar way: ‘There on the little verandah, Adam and Eve looked away from each other for they had eaten the forbidden fruit’ (Brodber: 23). The biblical reference that, at first glance, seems incongruous, as we have listened to a conversation between two women, forces the reader to think about an application to the given situation that will make sense. In spite of the fact that Adam and Eve, read Mrs Brassington and Mrs Holness, look away from each other they have learnt something significant about each other: it is in this sense that they have eaten from the tree of knowledge. Here, the humour is employed to uncover the complex social and linguistic negotiations necessary in asymmetrical relationships typical of the colonial context. On the referential level, the passage raises a rather critical issue, the sexual exploitation of colonised people, but it does so in a way that also provides comic relief to the reader in spite of the serious topic. Mrs Holness uses what is called ‘silly linguistic ritual’ in the novel to express her criticism of certain practices under the colonial system. Translating her utterances and exposing the difference between appearance (Mrs Holness’ polite remarks) and reality (her real opinion as expressed in Jamaican Patois) to the reader produces a comic effect while at the same time encouraging the reader to think about the issue. The incongruity expressed functions as a humorous as well as an intellectual stimulant. The narration in the passages given does not aim for essentialising or resolving the conflict but presents different perceptions and strategies of negotiating such differences. The humorous presentation emphasises that there is room for manoeuvre and negotiation even in a very constricted social setting. Sam Selvon’s Moses Ascending (1975) is the last and perhaps the most complex of my examples. Selvon’s novel, a sequel to his novel of migration The Lonely Londoners (1956), confronts the reader with a group of Caribbean immigrants in London, many of whom the reader already knows from The Lonely Londoners. In the later novel, the characters are more or less settled and see themselves less as immigrants than as part of a changing Britain. Moses, the eponymous narrator, dreams of becoming a landlord in order to mark his personal development as well as social rise: After all these years paying rent, I had the ambition to own my own property in London, no matter how ruinous or dilapidated it was. If you are a tenant, you catch your arse forever, but if you are a landlord, it is a horse of a different colour. [...] I would 14 naturally of preferred a mansion in Belgravia or a penthouse in Mayfair, without too 14
As Selvon transcribes the peculiarities of his narrator’s speech into written language, they sometimes may suggest grammatical errors if measured against Standard English. As these peculiarities relate to the intention of conveying the oral / aural quality of Trinidadian English speech I shall abstain from marking them with [sic].
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many black people around, but I had the feeling that if I didn’t make the move now, I would be doomed to the basement brigade for the rest of my life. (Selvon, 1984 [1975]: 2-3)
The comment about ‘too many black people around’ serves a double function in this context. On the one hand, it reflects Moses’s experience as a black immigrant with white landlords; on the other hand, it also signifies his identification with a certain social class as well as his aspiration to be recognised by this class as their equal. From the very beginning, the narrator positions himself between two frames of reference, the Caribbean immigrant set in London, and the white upper middle-class to which he aspires. Thus, to the reader, especially the non-immigrant reader, Moses becomes a mediator between two worlds in a very concrete sense. He acquaints the reader with a great number of prejudices from which Caribbean immigrants had to suffer when they first came to England, for instance the fact that coloured people seem to look alike to Europeans. When asking one of his Pakistani tenants about his experiences in Britain, Moses admits that he does not know any Pakistani immigrants: ‘“I don’t know any Pakis,” I say conversationally, “although there are a lot in the country. Have you been here long?”’ (Selvon 1984 [1975]: 46). During a second interview, it turns out that Moses’ primary motivation in talking to his tenant is the fact that he is collecting information for a book he intends to write: ‘What I really want is your view on current affairs. How does the Pakistani community react to Black Power? What trials and tribulations do they have to overcome? What about that story I read about, how chaps who ride motor-bikes got to take off their turbans and wear crash helmets?’ ‘That’s the Sikhs.’ ‘Well whatever you call them.’ I wave it aside. I wasn’t going to divide up the Asian races, research or no research. Besides, I know that English people so stupid that the whole lot of Orientals and Blacks is the same kettle of fish as far as they are concerned. (Selvon 1984 [1975]: 51)
In a slightly changed context, Moses behaves towards his tenant as the English behaved towards him and his Caribbean friends when he first arrived. Faizull, the Pakistani tenant, plays on this attitude when he invents another Pakistani, Farouk, who supposedly bears responsibility for the illegal immigration operation that Faizull runs and who is said to share his room yet who is always out or at work whenever Moses wants to talk to him. Despite complaining that the immigration operation is illegal, Moses is happy to accept a bribe of twenty Pounds for every immigrant staying in his house (cp. Selvon 1984 [1975]: 67). Moses’ attitude towards the Asian community mirrors the mixture of apprehension and condescension that he himself experienced at the hands of the white English population with whom he now identifies. Selvon’s novel uncovers stereotypes as functional rather than
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essential features through the slippage that invests Moses with the same characteristic behaviour that he used to criticise in the English. The nightmare was now happening for true. It is hard enough to try and fathom one or two [Asians, U.E.] with their dark, scowling faces, piercing resentful eyes, and their general inscrutable miens and bearings. When you are faced with a dozen [...]; when it is not only men but woman too [...]. Can you blame me if I saw this cluster of beings as in a blur unable to distinguish one from the other? (Selvon 1984 [1975]: 72)
Similarly, the inversion of the Crusoe-Friday relationship between Moses and his ‘man Friday, a white immigrant name Bob from somewhere in the Midlands who came to seek his fortunes in London’ (Selvon 1984 [1975]: 4), functions as an ironic reminder that the implied superiority / inferiority in the positions of employer and employee, master and servant, is a function of social role and position rather than a natural characteristic. Moses’ description of Bob illustrates his knowledge of the literary inter-text as well as his awareness of the influence of social position on behaviour and the evaluation of behaviour: He was a willing worker eager to learn the ways of the Black man. [...] The only thing I didn’t like about him was he went out most evenings and come back pissed, drunk like a lord. As we became good friends, or rather Master and Servant, I try to convert him from the evils of alcohol, but it was no use. [...] And whilst I was indoctrinating him, I also learn a lesson my self, which is that Black and White could live in harmony, for he was loyal and true, and never listened to all that shit you hear about black people. Afterwards he tell me he used to believe it, but since coming under my employ he realize that black people is human too. I decided to teach him the Bible when I could make the time. (Selvon 1984 [1975]: 4-5)
Selvon’s reversal of the master-servant relation, with the black character as master and the white as servant, and his exaggerated use of common stereotypes enable him to make a point about notions of superiority in colonial as well as neo-colonial relationships without explicitly referring to a specific context. The humorous effect partly derives from the reader’s knowledge of the novel’s inter-text and its contrast with the new perspective presented in Moses Ascending. The use of Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe as an inter-text and implicit (although often rather explicit) reference continually forces the reader to compare text and inter-text,15 thus undermining the seemingly ‘natural’ relation of (knowledgeable and white) master and (ignorant and black) servant. The structural reversal exposes these roles as stereotypes based on essentialising assumptions. Moreover, through syntactically paral-
15
In his introduction to Moses Ascending, Mervyn Morris gives a number of examples for inter-textual relations between Selvon’s novel and Robinson Crusoe (cp. Selvon 1984 [1975]: xiv f.).
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leling and semantically equating contradictory notions like ‘As we became good friends, or rather Master and Servant’ or different registers like ‘come back pissed, drunk as a lord,’ Selvon’s narrator points to the fact that the evaluation of a situation or relation is very much a matter of interest, power, and the chosen frame of reference. Rather than compare individual cultural frames of reference, thereby emphasising the relative stability and reenforcing the ‘us versus them’-dichotomy, Selvon’s novel illustrates that cultural judgements are not only historically variable but also contextdependent and therefore far from ‘natural’ or ‘given.’
Conclusion Many postcolonial texts address the problem of differing cultural norms and values. The deliberate ambiguity, be it verbal or structural, on which much humour relies offers an opportunity to acknowledge and highlight such differences in a non-conflictual way (example 1). Theories of humour can provide a sharper focus for the understanding and enjoyment of humorous situations by alerting the reader to the fact that humour works on different levels and can fulfil different functions simultaneously. A critical issue can be raised on the referential or cognitive level while a humorous episode can provide (comic) relief on the emotional or social level (example 2). Such an effect can be achieved at the textual level as well as in the reader-textcommunication. Undermining well-known and seemingly ‘natural’ frames of evaluation through structural reversal or parodistic reference (example 3) forces the reader to engage with new or different perspectives. This multifunctionality makes humour a perfect means to, on the one hand, strengthen group cohesion while at the same time transgressing group boundaries and entering new territories.16 Thus, humour can work as a stabilizing as well as de-stabilizing phenomenon. Trying to solve cultural conflicts often involves comparative evaluations. The cultural frames of reference themselves provoke discussion. Thus, initially minor differences can turn into full-blown debates about the relative merits of different norms and values. Humour in postcolonial texts can be employed as a means to defuse such cultural conflict by pointing out cultural differences without the need to ‘solve’ the potential conflict or to decide which frame of reference is more appropriate. Humorous descriptions of 16
Jason Stearns sees this as an important function of humour: ‘So humor can be the locus of subversion and also the place where, in Bhabha’s terms, “newness enters the world.” This occurs where there is a breakdown in the semantic determinacy of a sign, […] where the meaning of text or a sign changes and humour is definitely such a venue.’ Jason Stearns, ‘Postcolonial Cinema’ (11 December 1997) at http://www.mytholyoke.edu/~aamkpa/ Problems.Stearns.html (12.07.02).
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cultural differences, as the examples selected here illustrate, leave the different frames of reference intact, encouraging the reader to switch between two perspectives rather than foregrounding one at the expense of the other. Thus, humour can fulfil a mediating function: indicating differences in cultural practices but also bridging gaps in cultural knowledge.
Bibliography Ashcroft, Bill, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin. The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures. London: Routledge, 1989. Bakhtin, Mikhail M. The Dialogic Imagination. Ed. Michael Holquist. Trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin, TX: U of Texas P, 1981. Brodber, Erna. Myal. London: New Beacon Books, 1988. Chapman, Antony J., and Hugh C. Foot. Introduction. Humour and Laughter: Theory, Research and Applications. Ed. Antony J. Chapman and Hugh C. Foot. London: John Wiley & Sons, 1976. Hughes, Langston. ‘A Note on Humor.’ The Book of Negro Humor. Ed. Langston Hughes. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1966. Jakobson, Roman. ‘Linguistics and Poetics.’ Poetry of Grammar and Grammar of Poetics. Ed. Stephen Rudy. The Hague: Mouton de Gruyter, 1981. 18-51. Koestler, Arthur. The Act of Creation. New York: Macmillan, 1964. Kotthoff, Helga. Spaß verstehen: Zur Pragmatik von konversationellem Humor. Reihe Germanistische Linguistik 196. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1998. Morson, Gary Saul, and Caryl Emerson. Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1990. Raskin, Victor. Semantic Mechanisms of Humour. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985. Selvon, Sam. The Lonely Londoners. 1956. Longman Caribbean Writers Series. Harlow: Longman, 1985. –––. Moses Ascending. 1975. Caribbean Writers Series. Oxford: Heinemann, 1984. Stearns, Jason. ‘Postcolonial Cinema.’ 11 Dec. 1997. 12 July 02 . Syal, Meera. Life Isn’t All Ha Ha Hee Hee. 1999. London: Doubleday, 2000. Vogel, Susan C. Humor: A Semiogenetic Approach. Bochum Publications in Evolutionary Cultural Semiotics, BPX 9. Bochum: Brockmeyer, 1989.
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Walker, Nancy A. A Very Serious Thing: Women’s Humor and American Culture. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1988
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ANTHONY ILONA
‘Laughing through the tears’ Mockery and self-representation in V. S. Naipaul’s A House for Mr Biswas and Earl Lovelace’s The Dragon Can’t Dance
Any image […] suggestive of the notion of a society disguising itself, or of a social masquerade, so to speak, will be laughable. – Henri Bergson (1911) Something of the Carnival lunacy touches all these islands […]. – V. S. Naipaul (1970) Tell Desperadoes when you reach the hill, I decompose, but I composing still. – Derek Walcott (1982)
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owards the end of V. S. Naipaul’s reputed third novel, A House for Mr Biswas (1961), the titular protagonist, on his deathbed, imagines the kind of headline his former employer at the Trinidad Sentinel newspaper might reserve for him in his wake. ‘ROVING REPORTER PASSES ON,’ Mr Biswas speculates. The posthumous headline, however, denies Biswas even the flattery of an adjective; ‘JOURNALIST DIES SUDDENLY,’ it reads (589). In a similar turn, the opening paragraph of Earl Lovelace’s novel, The Dragon Can’t Dance (1979) renders one man’s attempt to symbolize the plight of his community through a live re-enactment of the crucifixion. Bombarded with heavy stones by members of his own clan he, Taffy, resigns with the words ‘who is I to die for people’ (9).
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The ego-deflation rendered in these two episodes signals a key concern within the boundaries of characterisation in Caribbean fiction. It is a concern often expressed in terms of a peculiar tension between the effort to capture individuality in a single representative voice and the contrasting diversity of local perspectives on the matter. This concern highlights a faultline in attempts to render Caribbean identity as a composite and unique self-hood unchallenged by the diverse cultural influences and differentiated points of view that inhabit the region. Such concern sees the problem as evident in the most discrete acts of self-representation. As such, it ruminates on the recurrent sign of representational failure in a region where standard or received forms of discursive signification – whether derived from the conventions of journalistic reportage, religious iconography or elsewhere – remain insufficiently pliant in their articulation of, say, the dual meaning of an historic Caribbean event or the polyphony encased in the utterance of a single Caribbean phrase. As it is manifested in the region’s fiction, such preoccupation with the limits of representation finds ways – perhaps in the creative spirit of Derek Walcott’s already dead poet in the epigraph above, writing via the veil of his ghostly absence – to work through such restraints. Deliberate use of the complicating devices of mimicry and masquerade – both figuratively demonstrated in the actions of the mocked heroes, Mr Biswas and Taffy – provide writers of the Caribbean with ways of unfixing unilateral interpretations of self-hood by re-directing textuality towards more flexible, ironic modes of expression. At the very least, these devices allow writers the double vision of constructing composite, received notions of identity while, in a spirit of creative levity, throwing mocking stones at the narrow premises of their constitution. Such concern with the undoing of singularity and definition in self-representation is understandable when the disparity that informs the Caribbean region is taken into account.
Conflicting gravities In a region that is geographically dispersed and whose composition is often figured in the iconography of the archetypal ‘melting pot,’ a unified invocation of character is not so easily forthcoming or sustained. Encompassing as it does such large-scale demographic ingress from Africa, Asia, and Europe, the Caribbean remains an unequivocal site of cultural and social heterogeneity. As such, it is a site of multiple identities and multiple fractures. The intermingling of African, South Asian and Spanish-derived sounds and words within the anglophone vernacular of Trinidad alone proves this point. All this via the interjection, over centuries, of migration, slavery, colonialism, indenture and, more latterly, nationalism, tourism, and satellite television. Nothing less than a polychromatic kaleidoscope can illustrate the
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distinctive cultural imprint left by recurrent territorial contest in the region’s past. Only then would the composition of a region forged out of what Wilson Harris terms ‘adversarial contexts’ – contexts of conquest, genocide, resistance, exile, alienation and more – come into view (Harris 1985). Suffice it to say that such context informs the modern Caribbean and emerges in the tensions that circulate between the convergent forces of cultural and social intermixture (creolization) and the polarizing forces of ideological difference (tradition-modernity, colonizer-colonized, elite-masses).1 This evolved complexity defines the particularity of the region and by extension its literature. It also renders each attempt at individuation to be, in the words of Roberto Marquez, ‘a dramatic tension between alienation and opportunity, irresolution and resolve, defeat and victory’ (Marquez: 293). With these ‘conflicting gravities’ (Marquez: 294) in mind, this essay seeks to utilize the examples set by two regionally specific texts, V. S. Naipaul’s A House for Mr Biswas and Earl Lovelace’s The Dragon Can’t Dance, to show how Anglo-Trinidadian writing opens up a space for the project of Caribbean self-representation. Both texts respectively emerge from the pre- and post-independent eras in Trinidad, a chronology that invites a critical perception of growing textual alertness among writers to the problems of representation in the Caribbean region. The argument here is that these two novels thematize the issue of self-representation in their design. They identify and re-direct instances of failure in attempts at composed, singular self-assertion in their narratives. In so doing, I argue, Naipaul and Lovelace generate a conception of unilateral notions of subjectivity as a necessary illusion or bad faith; one that is, in their narratives, metonymically associated with the stasis and containment of traditionalist, colonialist and nationalist indoctrination and so inappropriate to the historically changeable and plural character of the Caribbean. The aim here is to show how these two authors use a disruptive form of humour in their texts to erode inimical categories of subject constitution. Exposing mimicry and masquerade in their Trinidadian settings, these texts prise open the concepts of subjective flexibility and multiple point of view. I propose that there is a deliberate deflationary strategy of what is here termed mock-signification in Biswas and Dragon. This is a strategy of representation that is itself rooted in Trinidadian creole culture. In the playful pantomime of the picong – a Spanish derived term for an ironic, ego-bashing verbal encounter between mutual adversaries. It is a strategy that unsettles and 1
I paraphrase Franklin W. Knight and Colin A. Palmer’s view that, ‘[a]t all levels of Caribbean societies tensions operate between the centrifugal tendencies of state policies and ideals and the centripetal forces of beliefs, family and kin’ (Knight & Palmer 1989: 16-7, my emphases).
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diverts the perception of representational failure and, instead, privileges representational possibility. This is ultimately manifested in a conceptual shift away from social stasis and towards an emphasis on change and multiplicity. Much of this will take hold in closer attention to the novels at hand. For now it is enough, perhaps, to keep alive the possibility that Mr Biswas and Taffy are always already the architects of their own self-perception over and above the moment of violent interjection by script and stone.
The mock-sign The key device used in Biswas and Dragon to engage with the problem of self-representation is, I claim, mockery. The verb ‘to mock’ means to engage in ‘a derisive action’ (OED). To deride is to laugh at in such a way as to disparage or ridicule. As such mockery – which encompasses derision – conjures images of corrosion, deliberate degradation, even subversion; thus, ‘to laugh at in contempt, to make sport of’ (OED). Prior to his uncelebrated departure at the hands of the Trinidad Sentinel above, Mr Biswas notes of the loiterers in Port-of-Spain’s central landmark, Woodford Square, that, ‘[e]ven about the beggars there was an air of establishment […] one or two were reputed to be millionaires’ (317). Thus he mocks their much-cherished status on the bottom rung of society. By suggesting that their life-long penury has made them financially viable, Biswas makes sport of their claims to charity and derides the credibility of their status as vagrants. In turn, the narrative mocks Mr Biswas’ own life-long effort at self-improvement, his ambition to ‘paddle his own canoe’ (107), by posing these vagrants in a position of economic advantage in relation to the disillusioned protagonist. At both the level of narrative point of view and character point of view, then, the strategic use of mockery has, here, the capacity to render a subversion of established ideals of self-perception. In his book Rabelais and His World (1965), Mikhail Bakhtin discusses mockery in terms of the folk humour prominent in the work of the earlyModern French writer, Francois Rabelais. In Bakhtin’s oft-quoted introduction to this book, mockery is associated with the oral and literary indulgences of the medieval European folk at festival time. Here mockery emanates from such cultural enclaves as carnival, popular literature and music, and the marketplace. In its capacity to reduce and subvert, mockery is seen by Bakhtin in universalist terms as expressing ‘the point of view of the whole world’ and is directed at ‘all and everyone’ because it sees the ‘entire world in its droll aspect’ (Bakhtin: 11-2). Bakhtin also sees folk humour and its corollary, mockery, as essentially physical. The explosive, emotive force of the laughter that mockery can provoke enables, in Bakhtin’s view, strategies of spontaneous interruption, disruption, and subversion. This is in
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contrast to the satirist who, in opposition to the thing he seeks to deride, ‘places himself above the object of his mockery’ (Bakhtin: 12). The satirist, in Bakhtin’s eyes, can only offer an individual reaction to some isolated ‘comic’ event. In the atmosphere of levity that defines the festival experience for Bakhtin, and for his subject Rabelais, mockery has an ambivalent meaning. Acts of derision and comic debasement are ‘always the other side of praise and celebration.’ Divisions are derided and vaunted in a sort of ‘gay relativity,’ a ‘continual shifting from top to bottom, from front to rear, of numerous parodies and travesties, humiliations, profanations, comic crownings and uncrownings’ (Bakhtin: 11). These Rabelaisian features of ambivalence and recalcitrance are useful to the definition of mockery I wish to adopt here. However, the term must be recovered from the somewhat axiomatic vagaries of Bakhtin’s folk-centred perspective. Though this view foregrounds individual and collective human agency in the act of representational resistance, it tends to fix subversive potential within the generalised and reversible terms of high social status versus low social status. This remains inappropriate to the discursive context in which mockery is to be used here. The claim I want to make for the subversive use of mockery in Biswas and Dragon is specific to the arena of creolization in the Caribbean where what is being attacked is less the selfdeceptive seriousness and formality of some fixed, external, upper-class social stratum and more the self-deception involved in the process of assimilating its identity, mimicking its authority and performing its mannerisms without self-awareness. The latter places more emphasis on mockery as contemplative self-critique and favours the slow-burning subtleties of posture, gesture, and attitude over the immediacy of oral disruption. None of this is to deny the influence in Caribbean culture of the enlightened humanistic concerns Bakhtin privileges in his reading of Rabelais. Indeed, it is well documented that the perennial spectacle and masquerade of the carnival festival popular in Trinidad and other territories of the Caribbean is a genealogical heirloom, so to speak, of Rabelais’ own post-medieval France.2 As such, much of Bakhtin’s theory remains useful to any assessment of Caribbean folk culture. That said, there is another way in which the term mockery might be seen as viable. Alongside the oral form of mockery defined above, is the concept of the mock-sign. The mock-sign is defined not so much as an act but, rather, a gesture, ‘a derisive gesture’ (OED). The power of the mock-sign to deride lies not in oral presentation but in a mimed re-presentation to or of the object of derision. In The Birth of Tragedy (1872), Friedrich Nietzsche renders some 2
Errol Hill discusses the colonial background of carnival in the Caribbean in his The Trinidad Carnival: Mandate for a National Theatre.
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sense of the imagistic force of the mock-sign in his discussion of William Shakespeare’s Hamlet. The famous play-within-a-play segment ‘The Mousetrap’ is aimed at the treacherous King of Denmark and staged, partly without words, by the King’s discontented nephew, Hamlet. The mimed segment is Nietzsche’s point of reference here: The structure of the scenes and the visible images reveal a deeper wisdom than [Hamlet] himself can convey in words and concepts […] so that the lesson of Hamlet […] is to be found not in words themselves but in a profound contemplation and survey of the play as a whole. (Nietzsche: 81)
The mock drama staged by Hamlet, then, defers the immediate and spontaneous shock-value of plain, oral mockery and instead creates a procession of meaningful signs or gestures in its place. The mock-sign is therefore a mediated or concealed kind of derision, one that intensifies its subversive effects through visual gesture. The act of generating such masked, non-verbal signs of derision might be termed mock-signification; this being the deliberate, performed process of making derisive meaning. As with the play staged by Shakespeare’s brooding hero, mock-signification is evaluative in its effect. As Hamlet himself is noted to say, ‘[t]he play’s the thing wherein I’ll catch the conscience of the King’ (Shakespeare: 669). In this sense, mock-signification responds to oppressive forms of authority and to the monolithic ideals of established orthodoxy through this performative semiotics of derision. As such imitation is the prime strategic gesture of mock-signification. It presents an imitation of the well-known or familiar styles of the authority / orthodoxy it seeks to deride. Earl Lovelace’s narrator perhaps makes derisive comment on the pseudo-colonial influence of American culture in Trinidad and its effect on self-representation in his depiction of the procession of postures assumed by the Port-of-Spain street gangs in Dragon: And these walls […] on which they have scrawled their own names and that of their gangs, Marabuntas, Apple-Jackers, Brimstone, Shane – hard names derived from the movies which on some nights they slip off the walls to see, Western movies of the gun talk and the quick draw and the slow crawl, smooth grand gestures which they imitate so exquisitely as if these gestures were their own borrowed to the movie stars for them to later reclaim as proper to their person. (11-2)
The imitative, cowboy Western gestures of the gang members here convey the sense of a pageant or parade in which mimicry and masquerade is the main representational style. In their ennobling yet, from the narrator’s point of view, ridiculous function, these gestures of mimicry and masquerade are the mock signifiers of representative failure as well as representative possibility.
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It may be judicious at this point to reiterate the initial claim that mocksignification is the key device used in the fictional thematic of representation concerning notions of Caribbean selfhood. As a strategy of representation that both uses and derides imitation for its effect, mock-signification cannot be considered a cohesive form in itself. This is because its expression relies so heavily on familiarity with the referent or form it imitates. Unlike Bakhtin’s subversive, Dionysian image of the body, mock-signification does not ‘negate’ its object in the process of renewal. Nor does it resolve itself in a notion of representational unity external to the thing it derides. It is not, as Derek Walcott has phrased it, ‘an exchange of Gods’ (Walcott 1993: 38). Rather, mock-signification simply diverts consciousness of its effects towards a notion of the flexible, changeable, simultaneous, and plural nature of identity formation and meaning. This is what Wilson Harris means when he speaks of the potential for the heterogeneous experience of the creole Caribbean subject to ‘implode’ biased categories and precepts (Harris 1967: 50). This, in a ‘play of values […] through and beyond what is given to us and what we accept […] as objective appearances’ (Harris 1981: 65). Note, for example, how Lovelace’s narrator above shifts the motives of the streetgang poseurs to imply that they themselves are the source of the seductive image of machismo that is, now, a second-hand on-screen imitation by the very American actors they revere. This humorous turn echoes the subversive function of mockery privileged by Bakhtin in its ‘comic crowning and uncrowning.’ It also signals a deliberate narrative refusal of the notion of subjective sovereignty. In its misdirection, Lovelace’s mock-signifyin’3 here refuses and relativizes the concept of a fixed, unified and transcendent (‘movie star’) subject position. Instead, and without resolution, it re-directs the reader’s attention toward the playful masquerade involved in all notions of subject constitution and identity – assumed by film stars and street urchins alike.
Picong There is a long tradition of playful mockery in Trinidadian culture. It informs the reputation Trinidad has for its humour. This is a humour noted for being able to ‘humble’ and ‘brutalize’ as well as ‘heighten enjoyment’ and ‘educate’ (Jones & Liverpool: 259). A cursory glance at some of its features may illuminate the subsequent reading of its use as a representational strategy in Biswas and Dragon.
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The tradition of mock-signification in African American male oral culture must be acknowledged here for its comparable phenomenon of heroic self-identification (see Gates, Jr. 1988).
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Mock-signification resembles the ‘picong’ element of the Trinidad-based musical form of the calypso. The word picong is itself derived from the Spanish adjective picόn (meaning mocking or huffing) and, in Trinidad, is often used in its adverbial sense (Allsopp & Allsopp: 439). To give or take picong is to be embroiled in a sustained taunt, derision, ridicule, or insult. In the festive context of the Trinidadian calypso, picong refers to a spontaneous and highly competitive verbal contest between two or more calypso performers (‘calypsonians’). It describes the silver-tongued alacrity of their lyrical warfare as they playfully ridicule each other in the hope of winning the ‘calypso crown’ on offer each year (Jones & Liverpool: 283). All this occurs within the heightened atmosphere of the carnival season and so gives the picong a certain folk-popularity alongside the calypso’s reputation as ‘the music of the masses of Trinidad’ (Rohlehr 1970: 87). Within the bounds of the calypso’s attractive, syncopated musical rhythms and the additional propensity for the calypsonian to comment – often through double entendre – on the socio-political climate and popular icons of the day, the picong is an established genre within the diverse oral tradition of creole Caribbean culture. This tradition also encompasses (dub-)poetry, chants, hymns, riddles, fables, jokes, word-games and so on. However, there is a strong element of the gestural in the picong. This stems from its more dramatic confrontational resonance, particularly in relation to the performance of calypso warfare and from its perennial use by the calypsonian as a vehicle for social protest. As such, ‘[t]he calypsonian’s pose is normally one of a stylised, melodramatic defiance’ (Rohlehr 1970: 96). A particularly idiosyncratic and, on first sight, humorous manifestation of such performative defiance is the custom of aggrandized epithets, stage names, given to the calypsonian. The names of the legendary calypsonians, ‘Atilla the Hun,’ ‘Lord Executer,’ ‘Roaring Lion,’ ‘Lord Kitchener,’ ‘The Mighty Stalin,’ and ‘The Mighty Duke’ resemble the mock-movie titles of Earl Lovelace’s street-gangs above in their grandeur. The calypsonian’s eponymic reference to figures – mainly from European continental history and heritage – collectively implies an overcompensation for their own acute sense of historical marginality. Only the calypso legends, ‘The Mighty Sparrow,’ ‘The Mighty Chalkdust’ and ‘Lord Shorty’ seem, in their titular ambivalence, to temper this accusation. These grand titles are, in fact, picong battle-names. They derive from the collective desire for the calypsonian to establish the scale of his superiority and / or verbal ferocity through consistent use of the prefix ‘mighty’ and the appropriation of the name of an exalted figure (Hill: 4 & 76). Such mock-signification – enacting and deriding bogus claims to authority – is a key dimension of the performative mien of Trinidadian
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humour. This much is acknowledged by James M. Jones and Hollis V. Liverpool in their key study of 1974, ‘Calypso Humour in Trinidad’: There are numerous theoretical approaches to [calypso] humour. In general, cognitive theories are not readily applicable to calypso humour. […] ‘you can’t tell a straight joke. Trinidadians like slapstick, you gotta act it out.’ (Jones & Liverpool: 282)
With this performative, ‘act it out,’ functionality in mind, I wish now to turn to the evidence of sustained engagement with the theme of self-representation in V. S. Naipaul’s Biswas and Earl Lovelace’s Dragon. There are features of each text which, when looked at closely, reveal a self-conscious mockery of singular and elevated notions of self and identity that reflect the intense irony of the picong performance. These features also form the starting-point in both texts for a reassessment of the value of experiences of historical change and social plurality in Trinidadian society.
‘The Mighty Biswas’ Biswas is a text famous for its broadly imaginative and detailed exposition of the life of its protagonist, Mr Mohun Biswas. The title of this novel and the narrative’s persistent reference to Mohun Biswas as ‘Mr’ signals an attempt to ennoble the status of what is otherwise an impossibly ignoble life history. In its insistence on Biswas’ claim to ‘Mister-hood,’ this book might, in the light of the above, be easily titled ‘The Mighty Biswas.’ Naipaul’s prefix of ‘Mr’ can therefore be seen as a titre de guerre for an embattled protagonist whose dislocated life sees him failing in several different scenarios as he moves from residence to residence, from job to job, from country to city and from the stifling traditionalism of his domineering in-laws, the Tulsis, to the disparate materialism of the colonial capital. The narrative of Biswas is a playful amplification-in-repetition of circumstances in which the protagonist flounders in his efforts at self-improvement. Over the course of his forty-six years – years which straddle the Second World War era in colonial Trinidad – Mohun Biswas relocates to over a dozen different homes. Each location provides a different setting for Naipaul to illuminate the drama of crisis and conflict that persists in Biswas’ life. Variably accompanied by his wife Shama and their growing brood of four – Savi, Myra, Anand, and Kamla – Mr Biswas finds himself lodged in little more than a series of overcrowded barracks and shambolic half-built or decaying mud-huts. Equally frustrating are Biswas’ several changes of occupation. These have rendered him an absent-minded Pundit’s apprentice, a wayward bus-conductor, a neglectful sign-writer, a harassed plantation driver, and a liberal-minded journalist, among other things. From his uncertified, six-fingered birth to his anonymously announced death, the
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recurrence of failure in Biswas’ life seems a deliberate narrative excuse to have its protagonist wear a succession of mocking masques in a procession of contrasting situations. This – to echo Naipaul’s own epigraph to this discussion – in a kind of ‘lunatic’ carnival of narrative derision. This is evident after a particularly bruising period for Mr Biswas under the patronage of his domineering Aunt Tara and a corresponding internship as shopkeeper for a corrupt uncle. In his resolve to ‘get a job of my own. And […] my own house too’ (67), Biswas trawls the job-market the following Monday morning: He passed a tailor and tried to picture himself cutting khaki cloth, tacking, and operating a sewing-machine. He passed a barber and tried to picture himself stropping a razor; his mind wandered off […]. But he didn’t like the tailor he saw, a fat man sulkily sewing in a dingy shop; and as for barbers, he had never liked those who cut his own hair; he thought too how it would disgust Pundit Jairam to learn that his former pupil had taken up barbering, a profession immemorially low. He walked on […] it seemed, the same owners, the same assistants; and it all filled him with the same depression. (67-69)
The picaresque image of Mr Biswas moving through the spectacle of colonial Trinidad chimes in its mockery with his observations of the Woodford Square vagrants seen earlier. However, there are two features in this passage that confirm Naipaul’s strategic adoption of mock-signification to thematize the flawed self-regard of his Trinidadian protagonist. The first is the imaginative masquerade undertaken by Biswas. Note how he insinuates himself in each occupation to fantasise the dignity of a life of concentrated discipline (‘stropping the razor’). Note also how he denounces the value and relevance of these occupations, in relation to his own traditional Hindu background (‘how it would disgust Pundit Jairam’). Like an indecisive calypsonian seeking an apt battle-name, Biswas both assumes and mocks the roles of these dignifying yet constricting and repetitively low-grade (‘the same owners, the same assistants’) job prospects. The second notable feature of this passage signifies at the level of narrative form. This entire episode of Mr Biswas’ futile job-hunt might stand in as an analogy for the causality of the novel’s plot-structure as a whole. When seen in conjunction with the novel’s circular stress on the Biswasian pratfall, it echoes, in its detail, Naipaul’s broader design. There is also the suggestion of an Harrisian ‘play of values’ (see above) between the notion of spiritual improvement associated with the teachings of Biswas’ Hindu mentor, Jairam, and Smilesian character building in the daily discipline of full-time razor-stropping employment. Neither the traditionalism of Jairam, and of the Tulsi-household Biswas later seeks to escape, nor the self-help individualism that fuels the materialist concerns of the shopkeepers of colonial Trinidad, are satisfactory here. Both imply a life of stasis and
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containment that Biswas must ‘move on’ from now that he has decided to be the free agent in his own self-determination (‘And […] my own house too’). My point here is that this rite of passage for Mr Biswas signals a brave new dispensation of unilateral orthodoxy (traditionalism, colonialist materialism) and the beginning of a more creative attitude towards his selfsustenance. Indeed, given his flights of fancy here, Biswas, having left job and home, is free to remake himself in a variety of ways. He thus becomes the producer / author in the re-presentation of himself to the world. It is no accident, then, that Mr Biswas soon takes up the more creative occupation of freelance sign-writer. This is employment that gives him some autonomy, and also, like his journalism later in life, licences playful mimicry and masquerade. Such is evinced in Mr Biswas’ plundering of calligraphic styles from foreign magazines (mimicry) (77-8) and in his indulgence of ‘snowcapped’ lettering in the inapt Christmas-time climate of the ‘blazing’ Trinidadian sun (masquerade) (77). Here, though, the figurative mimicry and masquerade are deliberate; they signal a mocking agency in Biswas’ calligraphic gestures common to all creative bricolage. Compare Biswas’ expropriative ways here with Naipaul’s 1964 description of his own early literary efforts: Books came from afar; they could offer only fantasy. […] The process of adaptation was automatic and continuous. Dickens’s rain and drizzle I turned into tropical downpours; the snow and fog I accepted as conventions of books. […] [A]nything which sought to remove the characters from the make-up world in which I set them, I rejected. I went to books for fantasy; at the same time I required reality. (Naipaul 1964 & 1984: 24-5)
Naipaul’s significant use of the words ‘fantasy,’ ‘adaptation,’ and ‘continuity’ reinforces the view held here that a strategic process of mocksignification, of a perceptual de-constitution and re-constitution of received forms and formulas, is a necessary feature of self-representation for the Trinidadian / Caribbean subject. Naipaul himself has never been seen as wholly enamoured of his own natal connection to the ‘half-made’ society of colonial Trinidad – leaving as soon as he could on a scholarship from Queen’s Royal College to Oxford University, aged eighteen. Yet, as writer, he has an appreciation of the historical significance of Trinidadian expropriation in the face of social stasis and containment: The slave in Trinidad worked by day and lived at night. Then the world of plantations fell away; and in its place was a securer, secret world of fantasy of […] ‘kingdoms,’ ‘regiments,’ bands. The people who were slaves by day saw themselves then as kings, queens, dauphins, princesses […]. The [n]egro kingdoms of the night were broken up. But the fantasies remained. (Naipaul 1970 & 1984: 267-8, my emphasis)
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What Naipaul exposes here is the fact that there has never been anything but pantomime when it comes to questions of identity in Trinidad. The masked world of pretend ‘kingdoms’ and ‘princesses’ exposes a tragic genealogy of violated self-esteem, repressed creativity and mockery circulating in the colony’s past of plantation slavery. Indeed, Naipaul has been accused of overstating the case in his subsequent works. Most notorious in this regard is his suggestion in his non-fictional book The Middle Passage (1962) that a deficit of obvious creative achievement in the scheme of world affairs disqualified Trinidad, and the West Indies in general, from official historical recognition. However, if Naipaul’s succession of his youthful propensity to assimilate Dickensian fog is anything to go by – having, in more recent times, been awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature (2001) – then he contradicts himself. For as much as historical violence blocks and represses direct acts of creative self-expression, it inspires among its mocking victims new forms of creative release.
The play’s the thing This last point about violence as the insignia of creative repression and masked self-assertion can be understood as a thematic concern of Earl Lovelace’s novel Dragon. Such violence precipitates again in Trinidad in an era when the officially recognised prospect of local autonomy is undermined by unanticipated forces of repression emerging from within the nation. It is here, during the early post-independent nation-building era in Trinidad, that Lovelace sets his novel. In the anglophone Caribbean, this era largely spans the 1960s and 1970s. It is an era when the process of decolonisation and the bourgeoning of ‘national consciousness’ (Fanon: 119-65) took firm hold in the region. In this era, there is unwavering focus on issues of self-reliance and reform away from the dictat of a centuries-old colonial governance. Such focus allowed for sustained and widespread engagement with finding alternative models of self-rule and self-image for the region. There were proposals of alternative orthodoxies and discussions about identity from among the masses, politicians, intellectuals, and cultural movements. ‘We of the Caribbean and its contingent territories,’ writes John Hearne in his introduction to Carifesta, the pan-Caribbean critical forum of 1976, ‘had better realise that much is going to be asked of us in the next three generations, and that we had better come up with some original answers’ (Hearne: xi). Hitherto, much of these ‘answers’ failed to satisfy the demands of a broadly heterogeneous environment. Dr. Eric Williams, the celebrated historian and Prime Minister who led Trinidad to independence in August 1962, concedes this much towards the end of his autobiography Inward Hunger (1969): ‘Independence did not bring us a clean slate. Our
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independent society inherited the sectionalism and individualism bred by colonialism’ (Williams: 338-9). This retention of categorical ‘-isms’ from an officially bygone era is what Frantz Fanon terms a ‘pitfall’ of national consciousness. This describes an interruption or slippage in the process of moving on from the past due to the retention of logic inscribed in the customs and practices of institutions (educational, legal, administrative) inherited from the colonial era. ‘Even when we have power,’ Lovelace’s protagonist, Aldrick, confirms, ‘we was looking to somebody else to make the decision. Even when we acting we ain’t the actor’ (188). The collective insecurity from which such moments of indecision and subconscious reliance arise has been termed a ‘nervous condition.’4 A key manifestation of this nervous condition is, for Fanon, a reactionary violence. This describes an attempt to assert authority that overthrows its own selfassertions by repeating the divisiveness, the ‘sectionalism’ as Williams puts it, of colonialist aggression. What was the oppressive structure of colonizer versus colonized now becomes the national ruling elite versus the masses. Authority asserted under these oppositional terms effects a logic of repression and rebellion that conflates the character of the ruling elite with that of the old colonizer. The national elite therefore negates its own assertions of rehabilitation out of the colonial era as repressive violence becomes its main gesture of self-assertion. Fanon describes the ineffectual gestures of this countervailing violence as ‘a sort of auto-da-fé in the destruction of all […] idols: egoism, recrimination that springs from pride, and the childish stupidity of those who always want to have the last word’ (Fanon: 36-7). This theme of violence in the era of bourgeoning national consciousness is figured in Dragon in the trope of the carnival masquerade. The masquerade allows for contrasting styles of signification in the novel in response to the nihilistic effects of violence on self-presentation. Here, in the fictional setting of the ‘Yard’ in Alice Street – located on the former slave-rebel outpost of Calvary Hill, near Port-of-Spain and now inhabited by lower class urbanites – Lovelace’s cast of characters use a succession of metaphorical masques as signifiers of their ‘insistent surviving’ (159) in the face of social alienation and poverty. For some, such as Fisheye, the masquerade degenerates into a Fanonian auto-da-fé; for others, like the calypsonian Philo, the masquerade is a transformative ‘picong.’ For most, though, the masquerade is a nervous entrapment between the two, negation and re-creation, such that ‘laughter is not laughter; it is a groan; it is a groan coming from the bosom of these […] shacks’ (9). Such pathos is evident in Aldrick’s careful suture and mnemonic 4
See Jean-Paul Sartre’s preface to Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth: ‘The status of the ‘native’ is a nervous condition introduced and maintained by the settler among colonized people with their consent’ (Fanon: 17).
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fetishism of his carnival-time dragon costume (35). It is evident in the dishevelled bridal gown Sylvia wears in silent invitation to Aldrick (42). It is also evident in the unappreciated acquisition of a ‘Humber’ bicycle by the marginalized figure of Pariag (93). Individually, these masques signify the social alienation of each performer. Collectively, they represent a latent schism in the community consciousness of the Yard that contradicts its idealistic ‘all o’ we is one’ (59) doctrine. There is a key moment in Dragon where the issue of violence appears as an ambivalent moment of negation in the text. It appears in the novel’s central scene. This scene replicates some of the defamiliarizing effects of Hamlet’s ‘The Mousetrap,’ where gesture is preferred over verbal utterance as the means of representation in a performance that imitates and derides reality. This occurs when Fisheye, deciding he has to ‘rip open the guts of the city’ (124) – note Lovelace’s Bakhtinian imagery of bodily subversion and negation here – enlists his fellow street-gang ‘cowboys’ and a now discontented Aldrick in the siege of a police vehicle. Naming themselves, in grand picong fashion, the ‘People’s Liberation Army,’ they circle Woodford Square advocating Black Power and holding two police officers hostage at gun point. At this moment, Aldrick feels an uncanny, albeit temporary, sense of elation at their newfound agency: He felt the calm power of a man surrounded by miracles […]. As the jeep cruised slowly down the street […] he had the feeling of being imprisoned in a dragon costume on Carnival Tuesday. This feeling pierced him more as he saw their route lined with people […]. (177)
The analogy Aldrick makes here to being ‘imprisoned’ in a carnival costume and the carnival-like spectacle their siege causes cannot be overstated. Within Lovelace’s text itself the siege takes place over the course of the same two days (the days preceding Ash Wednesday) and over the same route (encircling Port-of-Spain’s Woodford Square) as the Trinidadian carnival in which Aldrick usually performs his Dragon dance. Indeed, the temporal and spatial details of the P.L.A. siege loosely resemble the details of Trinidad’s historic ‘February Revolution’ of 1970. This was a series of social disturbances that culminated in a concerted demand among individuals and interest groups for the Trinidadian State to eliminate ‘colonial ties, habits and institutions as well as for the redistribution of national wealth’ (Bennett: 129). The historian Herman L. Bennett gives vivid account of such disturbances: The first portent of the challenge to the existing order occurred on the first day of Carnival, February 9 1970, when Black Power themes and protest bands appeared alongside the traditional costumes. The political overtones were apparent in a depiction
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of the black experience entitled, ‘The Truth about Blacks – Past and Present,’ which portrayed […] ‘massas’ and the ‘stooges of the massas.’ (Bennett: 136)
Even here, in the dramatic, real-time context of political protest, there is deliberate use of masquerade in the act of representing the condition and grievances of the post-independent Trinidadian subject. The 1970 carnival masquerade’s metaphor of degrading relations between ‘massas’ and their ‘stooges’ makes direct comment on the oppression felt by the populace in this supposedly independent nation-state. ‘[M]ake no peace with slavery,’ (179) Aldrick declares from a megaphone during his own carnivalesque protest. Earl Lovelace has himself made comment on the subjective feeling of disempowerment circulating around that time: [T]he individual has been dwarfed by the hugeness of institutions which do not allow his voice to be heard. He has been a spectator at the parade of power, in activities in which he has had no deciding voice. (Lovelace 1984: 4)
No surprise, then, that neither Lovelace’s fictional liberation army nor the serious-minded revellers of 9 February 1970 achieve a full redress of their socio-economic grievances. Both become victims of violent intervention by the State. This suspends any prior dialogue about reform or rehabilitation. In Dragon, police surveillance is increased and the posturing street-gangs of Calvary Hill and elsewhere are expunged (164). By April 1970, as Bennett notes, skirmishes between post-carnival activist groups and the police had increased to such a point that a national State-of-Emergency was declared (Bennett: 134). It is only in the character of Philo that Lovelace finds any respite from the nervous condition of violence circulating in this fictional setting of postindependent Trinidad. It is no accident that Philo is a calypsonian. This is in recognition of the calypsonian’s propensity to, as Gordon Rohlehr puts it, ‘visualise multiple characters in multiple situations and to do so by capturing multiple tones of voice’ (Rohlehr 1970: 94). In this regard, only the ironic art of the calypsonian can generate sufficient polyphony to represent the heterogeneity comprising the Caribbean experience. This, without collapsing into a regressive negation of opposing ideals. Indeed, in an encounter not long before the siege and where, on the street corner, Fisheye violently rejects Philo’s appeal to unity and friendship, the latter is provoked to turn this experience into a popular calypso. Needless to say, the calypso aids the revival of Philo’s hitherto flagging career and lifts him out of the economic depravity and social violence of the Yard. Thus goes Philo’s picong: Bad Johns on the Corner and in night clubs I ain’t ‘fraid you again
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Yesterday you was bad, today I am the ruler Of Trinidad. (233)
The self-assertive realism of Philo’s lyrics here reveals little hint of a nervous condition. Real violence is sublimated into the creative act of making song, of making a style that mocks negativity and violence and extols self-transformation. There is a phrase common in Trinidadian vernacular – and, perhaps, elsewhere in the Antilles – ‘making style.’ ‘Like Cleopatra down her river, making style,’ goes Derek Walcott’s famous poem ‘Mass Man’ (Walcott 1969: 19). Making style means showing-off; showing-off but also making new, idiosyncratic shapes in the process. The two novels discussed above, Biswas and Dragon, have been seen to emphasise this phenomenon of making style through themes of imitation and expropriation, mimicry and masquerade. I have collectively termed these functions mock-signification and outlined the performative resemblance of this mock-signification to the peculiarly creole art of the picong. Through the characters of Mr Biswas and Philo, mock-signification has been seen, often with humorous effect, to divert consciousness away from fixed, unitarian notions of subject constitution and towards changeability and plurality. The idiosyncrasy here lies in the aptness of this emphasis on change and plurality to the heterogeneous condition of the creole Caribbean. In privileging these terms within the bounds of characterisation in their respective texts, Naipaul and Lovelace make – rather than reflect – styles of representation suitable for showing off the complex and dynamic composition of Trinidadian identity.
Bibliography Bakhtin, Mikhail. Introduction. Rabelais and His World. Trans. Helene Iswolsky. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965. 1-58. Bennett, Herman L. ‘The Challenge to the Post-Colonial State: A Case Study of the February Revolution in Trinidad.’ The Modern Caribbean. Ed. Franklin W. Knight and Colin A. Palmer. U of North Carolina P, 1989. 129-46. Bergson, Henri. Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic. 1900. Trans. Cloudesley Brereton and Fred Rothwell. London: Macmillan, 1911. Bhabha, Homi K. ‘Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse.’ October 28 (1984): 125-33. –––. ‘Representation and the Colonial Text: A Critical Exploration of Some Forms of Mimeticism.’ The Theory of Reading. Ed. Frank Gloversmith. Brighton: Harvester, 1985. 93-122.
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Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth. 1961. Trans. Constance Farrington. London: Penguin, 1990. Gates, Jr., Henry Louis. The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of Afro-American Literary Criticism. Oxford: OUP, 1988. Harris, Wilson. ‘Adversarial Contexts and Creativity.’ New Left Review 154 (1985): 124-8. –––. ‘A Talk on the Subjective Imagination.’ 1973. Explorations: A Selection of Talks and Articles 1966-1981. Mundelstrup: Dangaroo, 1981. 57-67. –––. Tradition, the Writer and Society: Critical Essays. London: New Beacon Books, 1967. Hearne, John, ed. Carifesta Forum: An Anthology of 20 Caribbean Voices. Mona: Institute of Jamaica, 1976. Hill, Errol. The Trinidad Carnival: Mandate for a National Theatre. Austin, U of Texas P, 1972. Jones, James M., and Hollis V. Liverpool. ‘Calypso Humour in Trinidad.’ Humour and Laughter: Theory, Research and Applications. Ed. Anthony J. Chapman and Hugh C. Foot. London: John Wiley, 1976. 259-86. Knight, Franklin W., and Colin A. Palmer. ‘The Caribbean: A Regional Overview.’ The Modern Caribbean. Ed. Franklin W. Knight and Colin A. Palmer. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1989. 1-19. Lovelace, Earl. The Dragon Can’t Dance. London: André Deutsch, 1979. –––. ‘Engaging the World.’ Wasafiri 1 (1984): 3-4. Marquez, Roberto. ‘Nationalism, Nation and Ideology: Trends in the Emergence of a Caribbean Literature.’ The Modern Caribbean. Ed. Franklin W. Knight and Colin A. Palmer. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1989. 293-340. Naipaul, V.S. A House for Mr Biswas. 1961. London: Penguin, 1969. –––. ‘Jasmine.’ 1964. The Overcrowded Barracoon. 1972. London: Penguin, 1984. 24-31. –––. ‘Power?’ 1970. The Overcrowded Barracoon. 1972. London: Penguin, 1984. 267-75. Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Birth of Tragedy. 1872. Ed. Michael Tanner. Trans. Shaun Whiteside. London: Penguin, 1993. ‘Picong.’ The Dictionary of Caribbean English Usage. Ed. Richard Allsopp and Jeanette Allsopp. Oxford: OUP, 1996. 439. Rohlehr, Gordon. ‘Sparrow and the Language of Calypso.’ Savacou 2 (1970): 87-99. –––. ‘The Shape of That Hurt: An Introduction to Voiceprint.’ 1989. The Shape of That Hurt and Other Essays. Port-of-Spain: Longman, 1992. 164-90.
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Walcott, Derek. ‘The Figure of Crusoe.’ Critical Perspectives on Derek Walcott. Ed. Robert D. Hamner. Washington D.C.: Three Continents Press, 1993. 33-40. –––. ‘Mass Man.’ The Gulf and Other Poems. London: Jonathan Cape, 1969. 19. –––. ‘The Spoiler’s Return.’ The Fortunate Traveller. London: Faber and Faber, 1982. 53-60. Williams, Eric. Inward Hunger: The Education of a Prime Minister. 1969. London: André Deutsch, 1981.
VIRGINIA RICHTER
Laughter and aggression Desire and derision in a postcolonial context
I
n contemporary theory, laughter tends to be linked with the epithet ‘subversive.’1 According to Hélène Cixous, for instance, laughter is closely connected to transgressive female writing. The ‘laughing Medusa’ breaks through established phallogocentric patterns coupling femininity and death; consequently, the very structures of desire, language, and history are changed (Cixous: 885). This far-reaching claim presupposes that social structures are solely dependent on psychological structures and, consequently, that a re-coding of the ways we desire can transform actual power relations in our society. In Cixous’s proposition, this change can be worked through the (female) body, through the exploration and acceptance of ‘the fantastic tumult of her drives’ (Cixous: 876). From the perspective of more recent feminist theory, Cixous’s link between the liberation of the body and political liberation seems naïve, to put it mildly; in fact, this notion of ‘subversion’ is only conceivable through a metaphorization of the political which erases the real effects of power structures. In Cixous’s outlook, oppression is constituted by semiotic allocations of meaning (e.g. woman as castrated) which can be challenged on the semiotic level (the laughing woman denies her castration). Particularly illuminating in this respect is her use of Freud’s metaphor of the ‘dark continent’ for femininity: You can incarcerate them [women], slow them down, get away with the old Apartheid routine, but for a time only. As soon as they begin to speak, at the same time as they’re
1
Laughter as ‘subversive’ in the sense of ‘politically liberating’ is described in Jenkins; see esp. his chapter on ‘Ridiculing Racism’ (Jenkins: 79ff.).
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In this discursive tradition, femininity is turned into an abject territory, but this forbidden space can be reclaimed: ‘[W]e are black and we are beautiful’ (Cixous: 878).2 Obviously, Cixous quotes Freud’s metaphor with critical intent; nevertheless, her re-iteration is deeply problematic from a postcolonial point of view: although she wants to reverse the traditional valorization of the male / female dichotomy, she does not even consider breaking down the semantic link between ‘Africa’ and the abject (darkness, danger, horror).3 In addition, her use of the ‘dark continent’ as a metaphor of universal gender oppression points to her unreflected affiliation with Western feminism, which privileges gender as the origin of oppression – at the expense of other categories such as race, ethnicity, or religion (cf. Mohanty: 202). Finally, Cixous completely sidelines factors which stabilize an uneven distribution of power, such as economic issues or historical determinants, or rather, she subsumes such factors as metaphors under her critique of phallocentrism (‘Apartheid’). The problems inherent in Cixous’s approach are representative of most psychoanalytical theories of humour: on the one hand, the focus on the individual at the expense of the political; on the other hand, universalization at the expense of cultural difference. What marks Cixous out is her optimism concerning the liberating power of laughter which is posited as analogous to the subversive effect of écriture féminine. Concomitantly, Cixous completely ignores the question whether laughter can itself collude with power, i.e. whether ridicule can be a means of oppression. This question will be at the centre of my analysis. In particular, I aim to discuss the function of laughter for the attribution of ethnically marked identity – in the most extreme case, racial stereotyping – in a situation understood by at least one participant as ‘funny.’ This attribution of a stereotyped identity to others goes hand in hand with the affirmation of one’s own identity as superior, individualized, nonstereotyped; derogatory laughter plays a crucial role in this mechanism of distancing and hierarchy-formation. In a first step, I will re-read Freud’s 2
3
Cixous here alludes to the popular slogan of the African-American civil rights movement, ‘black is beautiful;’ her interest, however, lies in its use as a metaphor for her argumentation from a decidedly white feminist perspective. This conjunction has a long tradition, but in modernity it was most forcefully established in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness. It can be argued that the space penetrated first by Kurtz, then by Marlow is coded as female. The notion that a feminised Africa is not just mute and passive but ‘laughs back’ could indeed disturb a long-standing dichotomy in Western racial thinking; but this train of thought is not pursued by Cixous.
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theory of the joke – one of the few theories which explicitly deal with laughter and aggression – in the light of postcolonial theory, particularly Bhabha’s notion of the stereotype; in a second step, I will analyse the interaction of laughter, aggression and discursive power in Joe Penhall’s drama Blue / Orange.
Freud’s theory of the joke: Laughter as aggression According to Freud, the greatest pleasure is called forth either by obscene or by ‘tendentious’ jokes, i.e. by jokes directed against somebody (e.g. a member of an ethnic group) or something (e.g. religion). They can be said to be ‘subversive’ in the sense of giving voice to a forbidden truth – but by functioning as socially admissible vents they also contain their own subversiveness. Compared to Cixous, Freud’s notion of the subversive is set in a lower key: the release of drives is not expected to result in social changes. Jokes are based on the release of repressed sexual or aggressive impulses; both sexual drives and aggression against others are permitted only under carefully laid down circumstances – the mechanism of the joke, which is analogous to the psycho-linguistic work in dreams (displacement, condensation), allows the circumvention of the restraint. Most importantly for my argument, Freud describes jokes as manifestations of a symbolic victory over an enemy, a victory that is confirmed by the laughter of the third person (the audience). By laughing, the hitherto indifferent listener is transformed into someone who shares the hate and contempt of the narrator for the object of the joke (Freud: 126). In this way, a ‘coalition’ is formed between the first person (who tells the joke) and the third person (who listens and laughs) at the expense of the second person (the butt of the joke). Freud makes it abundantly clear that the primary impulse of the joke is not ‘funny’ but hostile, intended to humiliate and vanquish the ‘enemy’ (Freud: 98). In this constellation, the role of the third person is quite crucial: the listener is the authority who confirms the defeat of the butt, the triumph of the teller, and, consequently, the establishment of a hierarchical power structure. As Sander Gilman has observed, the jokes Freud tells refer to incidents in which an Eastern Jew is the butt of the joke of another Jew: ‘Freud’s scientific narrative frames the telling of these jokes in precise scientific discourse, separating his own scholarly, masculine voice from the marginalized voice of the Jews in the jokes’ (Gilman: 128). A fourth person is thus introduced into the triangular structure of the joke: the scientific observer whose identity is constituted precisely by his double distance from the butt of the joke, as an assimilated Jew and as somebody not involved in the psychological processes at work in the exchange of jokes. His retelling of
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this particular kind of joke from a disinterested scientific position thus amounts to an affirmation of his transcendence of a stereotyped Jewish identity. In the transformation of jokes into the material of scientific discourse, the subjectivity of the scientist is constituted as an unmarked one – i.e. nongendered (or male) and non-racialised (or white). At the core of the joke is the stereotype. In fact, this is the basis for the ‘coalition’ established by the joke: persons A and C distance themselves from B, who fully personifies the stereotype. The notion of the stereotype brings me closer to the question of laughter and aggression in postcolonial discourse. Homi Bhabha points out the importance of ambivalence in the colonial stereotype. The otherness expressed in the colonial stereotype is an object of both desire and derision, thus constituting the productive ambivalence of the object of colonial discourse. The colonial stereotype is always already known, but has to be constantly reiterated; it is structured by a simultaneous recognition and disavowal of racial, cultural, and historical difference – colonial discourse produces the colonised as other and, at the same time, as fully knowable (Bhabha: 70). The point of postcolonial intervention, Bhabha claims, does not consist in replacing a ‘bad’ stereotype with a ‘good truth,’ but in understanding this productive ambivalence. Only when the notion of a binary structure – the antagonism between coloniser and colonised – is replaced by an analysis of the dynamics of rejection and desire is it possible to achieve a more profound understanding of colonial discourse, and, possibly, to break the chain of endless repetition. However, an important change has to be made when Bhabha’s inquiry into colonial discourse is transferred onto the postcolonial condition: if the ‘dirty secret’ of colonial discourse is its unacknowledged desire for the other (cf. Young: 3), in postcolonial discourse it is the persistence of derision, the trace of racial stereotyping in both critical and fictional writing. The valorization of hybridity and liminality in Bhabha’s writing runs the risk of ignoring the fixing of the postcolonial subject by the continuing effect of the stereotype.4 The in-betweenness attributed by Bhabha to the postcolonial subject thus occupies structurally the same position as female laughter in Cixous’s theory: it denotes slippage, elusiveness, indeterminacy – and consequently an undermining of the hierarchies of gender and race, respectively. But again, like Cixous, Bhabha has to downplay the real effects of existing social difference, which may be constituted discursively but are experienced as tangible restrictive categories by those who are unable to embrace joyfully their hybridity. Despite the cultural productivity of the colonial encounter
4
For a critique of Bhabha’s universalism and postmodern textualism, see Loomba: 178.
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claimed by authors such as Paul Gilroy, the pathogenic quality of a black person’s contact with white culture, so eloquently described by Frantz Fanon, should not be ignored.5 What are the implications of Freud and Bhabha’s theoretical work for an analysis of postcolonial laughter? While Freud insists on the separation produced by the joke – the distancing and exclusion of the ‘second person’ – Bhabha in turn makes it abundantly clear that this separation is, in fact, an impossible construct. The aggression inherent in the joke and the stereotype cannot really keep the ‘other’ at bay; the desire for the other always compromises the difference and distance proclaimed by derision. A study of derision in the postcolonial context has to account for this paradox: the continuing construction of categories of exclusion and their simultaneous precariousness. If postmodern celebrations of subversive laughter take it too easy, Freud’s insistence on the neat separation between the three positions involved in joking situations is just too pat. Although laughter is not liberating in a simplistic way, it does contain an element of uncontrollability which renders difficult to maintain the distance between teller and butt, or butt and audience. To sum up the crucial aspects of the three theories presented here: Cixous’s positive evaluation of laughter results in an empowerment of the subaltern (here: women) as a laughing subject. Conversely, Freud’s focus on jokes as mechanisms of exclusion leads to a devaluation of the subaltern (here: Jews) as an object of laughter. Bhabha, without directly referring to either of these approaches, can be said to occupy a meta-position: as the contradictory object of desire and derision, the subaltern (here: the colonised) simultaneously confirms and denies both the possibilities of empowerment through laughter and of devaluation through derision, and thus points not so much to the fact of social hierarchy but to the process of its (endlessly deferred) constitution. While Bhabha’s theory appears as the most sophisticated of the three, the interplay of the issues raised by Cixous and Freud – subversion vs. containment, empowerment vs. exclusion – is equally indispensable for a consideration of laughter and derision from a postcolonial perspective.
The ambivalence of derision in Penhall’s Blue / Orange In Joe Penhall’s comedy Blue / Orange,6 the interaction between postcolonial identities, social encounters informed by power, and the ambivalent function
5
For an analysis of this encounter from the point of view of recent psychoanalytic theory, see Juliet Flower MacCannell’s chapter on ‘The Postcolonial Unconscious; or, The White Man’s Thing’ (MacCannell: 57ff.).
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of laughter is directly addressed.7 The plot revolves around two white psychiatrists, Bruce and Robert, who have to determine whether their black patient Christopher is mentally ill or culturally alienated, suffering from a ‘situational neurosis’ (Fanon: 60) which results compellingly from his situation as postcolonial subject, as a black man in a white world. In fact, Christopher displays most of the symptoms resulting, according to Fanon, from the ‘Negro’s’ encounter with white hegemony: a ‘feeling of insignificance,’ ‘inadequacy in all human communication’ (Fanon: 50), rage, delusions, paranoia. Initially Christopher was hospitalized under ‘Section II’ of the Mental Health Act, a regulation allowing to detain him for a period of twenty-eight days, and diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder. At the beginning of the play – on the eve of his release – Christopher is once more examined by young doctor Bruce, a trainee in psychiatry. Bruce wants to revise the original diagnosis from BPD to the more serious schizophrenia which would allow him to detain Christopher for another six months under ‘Section III’ of the Mental Health. This aggravation of the diagnosis could finally result in a confinement of indeterminate duration; it is opposed by senior consultant Robert on a number of grounds: charity – Christopher would be institutionalized and stigmatized for the rest of his life – but also expediency – the hospital lacks funds and free beds. The debate about Christopher’s clinical diagnosis is pervaded by the initially latent and later open power struggle between Bruce and Robert, who is also the young doctor’s supervisor. In due course it becomes clear that what is at stake is not just a difference in medical opinion, but the career prospects of the two physicians. Jokes and jests play a crucial role in their dispute. A casual remark made by Bruce is understood as a racist joke against Christopher, and used by Robert to remove Bruce from the case and, in the end, from the clinic. The contest hinges on the question who can make which kind of jokes at whose expense. Jokes are thus used to determine the relative power positions of the two scientists; Christopher can initially be seen as the butt at whose expense the struggle takes place, but in the process his identity becomes more and more elusive and finally disavows the efforts at 6
7
Blue / Orange was first performed at the Cottesloe Theatre, London, on 7 April 2000, under the direction of Roger Michell, with Chiwetel Ejiofor in the role of Christopher, Andrew Lincoln as Bruce, and Bill Nighy as Robert. For my analysis of Blue / Orange, I will draw on Freud’s theory of the joke although in Penhall’s play verbal comedy is not created by jokes in the narrow sense of the word – ‘a brief usu. oral narrative designed to provoke laughter and typically having a climactic humorous twist or denouement’ (Webster’s Dictionary) – but by comic utterances of all kinds – quips, word play, sarcastic comments, and irony. The dramatic tension arises out of the indeterminacy of these utterances: it is not always clear whether something was spoken in jest or in earnest.
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categorization pursued by the two psychiatrists. In a way, the situation moves from the Freudian realm, where power relations are marked by derision, to Bhabha’s concept of the interdependence and precariousness of subject and object: the coalitions formed between the three persons become unstable and unpredictable. Christopher, the borderline patient who is represented as someone who does not belong to any social group or community, functions as a ‘court jester,’ not bound by law or decorum to adhere to the communication rules of his environment (cf. Palmer: 25ff.). As a person of African descent and British upbringing, he is a hybrid subject in Bhabha’s sense. But although this figure can be subjected to a celebratory reading as a representative of inbetweenness, and although as a jester he is linked to verbal transgression, on an individual level he is clearly deprived of agency. Christopher’s use of jokes is transgressive in the sense of breaking through the politically correct euphemisms prescribed by contemporary medical ethics. Bruce in particular becomes the target of his wordplay and wit. The young consultant, a stickler for rules and correct procedure, is drawn out to overstep the boundaries of objective medical discourse by ‘quoting’ Christopher’s incorrect language. His aim is to ‘connect’ with Christopher, to talk to him at his own linguistic and social level. However, the bond formed by this banter is precarious: Christopher remains one of the patients, Bruce the ‘white doctor’ who treats him from a superior position – after all, Bruce’s diagnosis will decide Christopher’s fate. In fact, it soon becomes clear that Bruce’s ‘quoting’ expresses his hidden aggressions against his patient. Still the power hierarchy is far from unequivocal: Christopher succeeds in disrupting Bruce’s selfimage as benevolent, caring doctor. He points out the cracks in Bruce’s verbal armour by subjecting his words to a literal, almost childish, but most efficacious analysis: Christopher: It’s a nuthouse, man. Bruce: I grant you – indeed – there are a fair proportion – Christopher: A fair proportion? You’re kidding me. Bruce: Of quite, quite – Christopher: They are NUTS! Bruce: [...] crazy people here [...] yes – Christopher: Crazies man! Radio Rental. Bruce: People with – well – we don’t actually use the term ‘crazy’ [...] Christopher: You just said it. Bruce: I know I just said it but – I shouldn’t have – I was – humouring – I was you know – it’s a no no. Christopher: But you just said it. Bruce: I know but – you see my point? Christopher: You said it first.
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Virginia Richter Bruce: OK look [...] there are things we [...] there are terms we use which people used to use all the time, terms which used to be inoffensive but things are a bit different now. Certain words. (Penhall: 7f.)
Bruce knows that certain words, especially racist epithets, are taboo in the clinic. Against his better judgement, however, he lapses again and again into the use of ‘incorrect’ words such as ‘crazy,’ ‘idiot,’ ‘bastard,’ and, above all, ‘nigger.’ These terms are permissible as long as they are understood by all participants in the communication as ironic, as quotations, in fact, as jokes. Bruce wants to see his use of them interpreted as equalizing gestures, as efforts on his part to enter a non-hierarchical communication with Christopher. But he wants to keep the control over the interpretation of his utterances, a control which is repeatedly disturbed by Christopher’s insistence on their literal, non-ironic meaning, and on the situatedness of their exchanges between white doctor and black patient. By contrast, Robert, the senior consultant, blithely offends against the rules of political correctness. He refers to a French Rugby team as ‘The Frog,’ to Australians and New Zealanders as ‘hairy colonial outposts’ (10), and councils Christopher patronisingly to ‘[g]o home and listen to some reggae music’ (108). He justifies his racist stereotyping in Humpty-Dumptylike fashion with his position of power: ‘And right now doctor, my semantics are better than yours so I win’ (24). His handling of the case is entirely determined by career considerations, as he openly acknowledges: ‘I’ll never make Professor. You’ll never make your Specialist Registrar Training’ (19), if they do not manage the case according to the wishes of the hospital administration. When Bruce refuses to ‘play the game,’ Robert does not hesitate to sacrifice him, using one of Bruce’s ill-advised jokes or ‘ironic quotes.’ In an early exchange between Bruce and Christopher, the doctor lets himself be provoked into calling his patient an ‘uppity nigga’: Bruce: You know that’s not the way you talk to the consultants. Christopher: He’s giving me the fear. Bruce: Calm down. Now you are acting like a – Christopher: A what? A what. Go on say it. An ‘uppity nigga.’ [...] Bruce: Well [...] OK yes frankly you are and that’s not what we do is it? Eh? And when you get out of here, if you start staring at people like that, what are they going to think? [...] They’ll think you’re a, a, an ‘uppity nigga’, that’s what they’ll think. (15)
Bruce has to learn that what he intended as a joke can be read as disrespectful against his superior (85) and offensive against his patient. However, he finds out that he cannot ‘take back’ his utterance, and that his elevated position as a doctor does not automatically grant him the licence to joke about his patients.
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Rules that did not seem relevant at the time – e.g. politeness – can be invoked retrospectively: Bruce: I, I, I, didn’t call you a, a, a, um, a [...] a [...] (Beat.) ‘Nigger.’ Christopher: You said ‘uppity nigga.’ You did. Deny. Bruce: Only because you did. My God! It was a quote! Christopher: Yeah but you shouldn’ta said it. Bruce: Oh so so so only you can say it? Christopher: It’s not polite. (77)
Bruce finds out the hard way that the doctor-patient relationship is not really ‘permissive’ of joking – i.e. that his quips spoken in jest are understood as earnest. According to humour theorist Jerry Palmer, a joke must be permitted as well as intended in order to accede to the status of joke (Palmer: 147). Consequently, a joke can potentially fail if one of the participants rejects it as ‘not funny.’ In general, it is not the butt – in this case, Christopher – who has the authority to accept or dismiss the joke, but Freud’s third person, the addressee. Robert as the true addressee of Bruce’s joke strategically rejects sanctioning it as funny. Instead of forming a coalition with his colleague by stereotyping the patient as ‘nigger,’ he leagues unexpectedly with Christopher, or rather takes advantage of him in order to get rid of Bruce: He manipulates Christopher into lodging an official complaint with the hospital authorities. The conflict turns precisely on the assessment of the communication situation as permissive of joking – hence funny, or not – hence inappropriate and offensive. Robert spells it out for Bruce that he not only failed to be funny, but that he cannot expect to control the interpretation of his utterance: Bruce: OK. OK. Look [...] have you never heard [...] listen, uh, Doctor [...] did you hear Christopher refer to himself, somewhat effacingly, somewhat ironically as a, quote, ‘uppity nigga’? Did you hear him say that? Robert: It was unmistakable. Bruce: And presumably you heard me quoting him, also, I offer, somewhat ironically? 8 Robert: I’d steer clear of irony if I were you. You’re not Lenny Bruce. (82)
The interpersonal structure of Freud’s model is inverted in Blue / Orange. Here, the person who jokes (Bruce) does not succeed in forming a coalition with the addressee (Robert), i.e. Bruce does not gain Robert’s support for his intended treatment of Christopher, nor for the furtherance of his career. Rather, an extremely tenuous coalition is achieved by Christopher and Robert, which results in the patient’s release from hospital and the senior 8
Bruce is unlike Lenny Bruce in not being funny, but in another respect he does resemble him: he misjudges badly the political effect of his words, just as the American comedian did who was repeatedly indicted for obscenity (cf. Schaeffer: 59ff.).
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consultant’s gain of material for his research on culturally induced paranoia. This happens although, in fact, Robert and Bruce share the same contempt for Christopher; it is hard to say which one of the physicians is more condescending. However, the expression of aggression and derision serves only as a basis for the most fleeting kind of social bonding which is easily overridden by personal interest. The ethical positions of both psychiatrists are radically discredited in the course of the drama. Consequently, the truth-value of their utterances – particularly their diagnoses of Christopher’s mental state – is equally suspect. But nor does Christopher profit from this disaffection – he is also denied the authority to exercise control over his positioning in the communication situation. Whatever the outcome of Robert and Bruce’s dispute, Christopher remains at the mercy of their prescriptions. Despite his efforts to give himself a history, his identity remains elusive – a fact not to be celebrated but deplored since it is a part of the aetiology of his paranoia. At one point, Christopher maintains to be the son of Idi Amin – later, of Muhammed Ali. Robert tries to integrate these preposterous claims in his theory of culturally induced neurosis, thereby further demonstrating his scientific shallowness, whereas Bruce rejects outright Christopher’s assertions and Robert’s acceptance of them. Neither position is privileged by the text: although it seems evident that Christopher does suffer from delusions, the question whether he is neurotic or psychotic – or ‘on the border’ – remains open. Concomitantly, neither Bruce nor Robert can escape the Freudian triangle where every participant can become the object of derision. The desired fourth position mentioned by Sander Gilman, the unassailable position of unmarked enunciation, is structurally barred by the necessity to speak from a determinate place.9 One of the achievements of Blue / Orange is to demonstrate the situatedness of all acts of interpretation. The focus is not directed at the exposure of racism as such, but at the analysis of uncontrollable linguistic processes in a politically highly charged situation. Both Bruce’s dissenting interpretation of Christopher’s fictional filiation with Idi Amin – which reads this claim as a sign of Christopher’s illness – and Robert’s affirmative interpretation – which reads it as a sign of his cultural disaffection – result from the psychiatrists’ differing medical preconceptions, professional situations, cultural background etc. The drama does not take sides but opens a meta-level of interpretation; it inquires into the way interpretations are achieved. This structure in turn can be linked to the three theoretical positions presented at the beginning of this essay. The alternatives offered by Cixous – 9
I.e., there are no unmarked positions. In the play, Bruce and Robert’s whiteness does not just signify an unmarked normality (cf. Dyer 1, 13 and passim) but forms an oppositional, historically situated term that is structurally equivalent to Christopher’s blackness.
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laughter as a subversive force – and Freud – laughter as a socially repressive force – taken alone, would not result in satisfactory interpretations of the complex social interaction of the play. The function of laughter cannot be subsumed exclusively either under the heading of transgression nor under the heading of social control: it serves to stabilize the hierarchy between different social groups – black / white, middle-class / poor, doctor / patient, university educated / uneducated, but it is also transgressive since it discloses the aggressive desires habitually glossed over by politically correct language. Bhabha’s deconstructive approach, on the other hand, can help to integrate both aspects, empowerment and devaluation, in a theory of postcolonial laughter as a double-edged phenomenon whose specific cultural meaning is constituted in reference to a particular context. Such a theory would have to position postcolonial laughter at the border between liberating laughter and destructive aggression, taking into account both its transgressive potential and the concrete social structures restricting these transgressive possibilities.
Bibliography Bhabha, Homi K. ‘The Other Question: Stereotype, Discrimination and the Discourse of Colonialism.’ The Location of Culture. London: Routledge, 1994. 66-84. Cixous, Hélène. ‘The Laugh of the Medusa.’ Trans. Keith Cohen and Paula Cohen. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 1.4 (1976): 87593. Dyer, Richard. White. London: Routledge, 1997. Fanon, Frantz. Black Skin, White Masks. 1952. Trans. Charles Lam Markmann. London: Pluto, 1986. Freud, Sigmund. Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewußten. 1905. Psychologische Schriften, Studienausgabe IV. Ed. Alexander Mitscherlich et al. Frankfurt/M: Fischer, 1982. Gilman, Sander L. Freud, Race, and Gender. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1993. Jenkins, Ron. Subversive Laughter: The Liberating Power of Comedy. New York: Free Press, 1994. Loomba, Ania. Colonialism / Postcolonialism. London: Routledge, 1998. MacCannell, Juliet Flower. The Hysteric’s Guide to the Future Female Subject. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2000. Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. ‘Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses.’ Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A
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Reader. Ed. Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman. New York: Columbia UP, 1994. 196-220. Palmer, Jerry. Taking Humour Seriously. London: Routledge, 1994. Parkin, John. Humour Theorists of the Twentieth Century. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 1997. Penhall, Joe. Blue / Orange. London: Methuen, 2001. Schaeffer, Neil. The Art of Laughter. New York: Columbia UP, 1981. Young, Robert. Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race. London: Routledge, 1995.
HELGA RAMSEY-KURZ
Humouring the terrorists or the terrorised? Militant Muslims in Salman Rushdie, Zadie Smith, and Hanif Kureishi
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elf-consciously biased against any form of political, economic, or cultural patronising, postcolonial literature seems a highly likely place in which to find ideologies of subversion and revolt formulated and possibilities of their realisation reflected. Sympathy with a rebel’s traitorous fantasies, even to the point of complete identification with dissidents, insurrectionists, partisans, and anarchists is not an infrequent stance propagated by postcolonial writers.1 In fact, it is a stance widely expected in their works, so much so that an openly counter-hegemonic slant may indeed be identified as a feature of postcoloniality itself. The mutinous nature of postcolonial literature would, of course, not meet with the same broad acceptance without the authors’ observance of their audiences’ understanding of political propriety, or correctness, which, not even among western readers, apparently so committed to freedom of thought and expression, is informed by an unlimited capacity for tolerance. Given the ambivalent position of writers from Europe’s erstwhile colonies as both opponents to, yet at the same time beneficiaries of, still overtly hegemonic (infra)structures, it seems obvious that they should resort to a mode as evasive as humour in their 1
This is documented, for instance, by Margaret Scanlan’s study of representations of terrorism in English fiction, which, apart from positing the indebtedness of nineteenthcentury representations of terrorism to the Romantic idea of rebellion, records a sudden caesura in the production of terrorist novels after the Great War and relates the re-emergence of the theme of terrorism in later twentieth-century fiction, especially by writers from outside Europe, to the reappearance of insurgent terrorism in the 1970s.
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explorations of political insurgence. For in allowing them to strategically downplay and even negate the seriousness of their non-conformist political views, humour provides a most effective means of forestalling the censoring without which, postcolonial writers know, their demonstrative siding with malcontent and rebellious elements of their societies might be considered offensive or even dangerous. Over the last twenty years, the global circulation of anglophone literatures and their resultant accessibility to an unprecedentedly broad spectrum of readerships has, however, dramatically complicated the postcolonial writer’s task of ‘humouring’ his or her audiences. In fact, comic explorations of ideological or political concerns in texts addressing multiple readerships have proven rather perilous ventures in a number of cases. ‘Humour,’ as critical theory has it, ‘thrives only in its native climate.’2 Yet, to know what the native climate of a text actually is becomes virtually impossible when that text positions itself at the interface of different native lands. The pronunciation of a fatwa on Salman Rushdie probably constitutes the most notorious consequence of literary humour, which, while thriving in one ‘native climate,’ missed its goal and caused considerable psychological, political, and cultural havoc in another. Whereas, until recently, the west could afford to attribute the refusal to engage in the playful rapport which Rushdie solicits in The Satanic Verses, quite complacently, to a lack of enlightenment in non-western societies, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 have significantly transformed western perceptions of political dissent and opposition, and effectively corroded the acceptability of the discursive practice of making light of political radicalism and religious fundamentalism. As an ironic consequence, it is right at a time when the Christian and the Islamic worlds are finally witnessing the escalation of their hostilities predicted by Samuel Huntington, that they find themselves united in the experience of a profound unease, if not distaste, when confronted with certain formulations of political opposition and violence. Whether, in this situation, the humorous explorations of political and religious fanaticism which Salman Rushdie, Zadie Smith, and Hanif Kureishi offer in The Satanic Verses, in White Teeth, and in ‘My Son the Fanatic,’ respectively, would have seen publication or prompted the same broad approval with which the west has met their appearance is more than doubtful.3 This in itself seems to warrant a re2
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‘Comedy,’ Encyclopaedia Britannica. The notion of comedy’s ‘native climate’ is of course derived from Bergson’s understanding of society, or ‘life in common’ as the ‘natural environment’ of laughter (cf. Bergson: 65). This is a question also raised by Werbner in Imagined Diasporas Among Manchester Muslims (3).
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examination of the three narratives which tries to assert whether and, if so, how their comic nature can still be operative in a cultural climate informed by a heightened collective sensibility to the threat of ideologically motivated aggression and its immense destructive potential. ‘The novel begins metaphorically as well as literally – with a bang,’ Ranjan Goonetilleke writes about The Satanic Verses and proceeds to observe: Hijackers explode an Air India jumbo jet over the English Channel. It is based on a real occurrence: the blowing up of an Air India Boeing 747 off South-West Ireland in 1985 by Sikh militants. Though it is not examined, Rushdie does present terrorism, another prominent and growing aspect of recent history. (Goonetilleke: 74)
It is true, Salman Rushdie does not exactly examine terrorism in The Satanic Verses. Nor does Zadie Smith in White Teeth as she leads the novel towards a ‘bang’ at its very end. Hanif Kureishi does not submit an examination of terrorism either in ‘My Son the Fanatic,’ even if the short story portrays the son of Punjabi immigrants to London as an Islamic fundamentalist and, in the process, addresses the fears that the boy’s religious zeal evokes in others. A proper examination of terrorism would imply considering the phenomenon also as ‘violence aimed, either directly or indirectly, at governments in an effort to influence policy or topple an existing regime’ (‘terrorism’), or, somewhat more specifically, as ‘the deliberate military targeting of civilians [with the aim to affect] the political behavior of nations and leaders’ (Carr: 17). The Satanic Verses, White Teeth, and ‘My Son the Fanatic’ neither interpret nor explore terrorism as a tactic of collective intimidation; nor do they record historical instances of this particular and, according to Caleb Carr, rather ancient form of warfare against non-combatant citizens. If the narratives explicitly or implicitly touch on the theme of terrorism, they do so in the first place to reflect on its psychological effects, on the fears terrorist action generates and the scenarios of horror it inspires in the minds of the terrorised. The view of terrorism they promote essentially agrees with the interpretation advanced by Mustapha Marrouchi. Rejecting ‘the civilised world’s’ ‘glib definitions of “terrorism,”’ which, he contends, have so far only served the west to criminalise its political opponents and to justify its own aggressions, Marrouchi insists that terrorism requires to be comprehended in the first place as a conceptual problem and, as such, as a still thoroughly intangible phenomenon: Terrorism overrides history, politics, economics, and above all common sense. It has no immediate graspable definition, it does not admit of negotiation or argument, its moral force cannot really be challenged, except by terrorists, it is applicable virtually everywhere and to nearly everything at any time. Terrorists are, or have become, a
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Utter incomprehension, which Marrouchi identifies as the most pervasive attitude to terrorist action today, is ironically reduplicated and hyperbolised in the stories under study here. In the process, the difficulty to assert and discuss terrorism objectively is linked to another epistemological dilemma, namely that of apprehending contemporary Islamic revivalism and resurgence. In strictly abstaining from analysing both the motives of the anarchist actions they portray and the Islamic or Sikh sensibilities their characters represent, the narratives analysed in this paper also anticipate and resonate the atavistic fear of Muslim militancy which has been prevalent in Britain especially since the Gulf War and the then explicit siding of the Muslim conference in Bradford with Saddam Hussein (Ahmed: 163-81). ‘What did they want? Nothing new. An independent homeland, religious freedom, release of political detainees, justice, ransom money, a safe-conduct to a country of their choice’ (Rushdie: 78-9), the narrator of The Satanic Verses typically reels off the demands of the hijackers responsible for the explosion of the jumbo jet Bostan, flight AI420, in a tone suggestive of total indifference to the terrorists’ cause, if not even of utter boredom at the lack of imaginativeness the terrorists’ undertaking betrays. ‘The men do not know,’ Saladin Chamcha, one of the hostages, establishes, unimpressed by the hijackers’ daring. ‘They want to behave the way they have seen hijackers behaving in the movies and on TV; they are reality aping a crude image of itself, they are worms swallowing their tails’ (Rushdie: 78). The young rebel Millat in White Teeth is hardly credited with a better apprehension of the cause to which he has subscribed. His peers may admire him as ‘the first into battle come jihad, cool as fuck in a crisis, a man of action’ (Smith 445), but they do so really only for his perfect impersonations of Brando, Pacino, and Liotta. ‘Millat,’ the narrative allows, ‘was far from possessing one of the best minds, or even a reasonable mind; intellectual proof or disproof was beyond him’ (Smith: 445). His motives for supporting the ‘Keepers of the Eternal and Victorious Islamic Nation’ are correspondingly banal, too. He has joined KEVIN, we learn, ‘because he loved clans (and the outfit and the bow tie), and he loved clans at war’ (Smith: 442). The reasons for Ali’s sudden espousal of Islamist ideas are kept even more oblique in ‘My Son the Fanatic.’ Whatever the reader’s own position, Kureishi’s story requires her or him to share the father’s bewilderment at the boy’s sweeping condemnation of the west as ‘a sink of hypocrites, adulterers, homosexuals, drug takers and prostitutes’ (Kureishi: 126) and his pompous announcement that the Law of Islam will ‘rule the world,’ ‘the skin of the infidel’ will ‘burn off again and again,’ and ‘the Jews
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and Christers [...] be routed’ (Kureishi: 126). Overwhelmed by Ali’s grotesquely platitudinous talk of the west’s moral degeneracy, his father Parvez succumbs to the impression that the person lecturing him from the back seat of his taxi is not really his son or that the boy must have ‘swallowed someone else’s voice’ (Kureishi: 126). The father’s reading of the son’s transformed behaviour seems as valid as Ali’s, who, when asked why he would give his life for jihad, vaguely retorts, for ‘us the reward will be in paradise’ (Kureishi: 126). Ali’s susceptibility to religious claptrap is obvious. So is the futility of Parvez’s attempt to find an acceptable explanation for his son’s discovery of the ‘spiritual dimension’ (Kureishi 123). Nothing allays the sense of obscurity which overcomes Parvez at the beginning of the story when he studies the new order in Ali’s room and registers spaces ‘where before there had been only mess’ (Kureishi: 119) and marks on the walls where Ali’s pictures have been removed. With only a private identity, yet no public mission to define them, the militant subjects’ part seems constricted to that of would-be terrorists, of innocents, idealists, ‘fanatics,’ ‘babies,’ pathetic ‘worms’ merely masking themselves as terrorists. This impression is enforced by the other characters’ categorical refusal to acknowledge the seriousness of the threats with which they are confronted. Not in the least intimidated, Saladin Chamcha, for instance, briefly contemplates arguing with Tavleen, the female head of the hijacking quartet, and advising her that ‘unbendingness can also be monomania, [...] can be tyranny, and also [...] brittle, whereas what is flexible can also be humane’ (Rushdie: 81). Sitting in a restaurant and listening to Ali’s accusations while studying his son’s fastidious face and the look of censure in it, Parvez looses his temper and throws a plate on the floor, suppressing the urge to also rip the cloth from the table only when he becomes aware of the other customers and waiters staring at him. Descriptions of violence and the bold defiance of its perpetrators by their victims are central also to the comic blurring of positions in Smith’s novel. Parvez’s rage compares to the exasperation with which Alsana in White Teeth responds when she recognises her son Millat among a group of enraged Muslims on television, burning copies of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses. ‘Has the day come when babies are burning the books, has it?’ (Smith: 237) the infuriated mother exclaims, before storming into Millat’s room and collecting all his worldly possessions to incinerate them in the back yard. ‘Everyone has to be taught a lesson,’ Alsana announces, lighting the match. ‘And if he starts burning other people’s things, then he loses something sacred also’ (Smith: 237), is her curt appraisal of the imminent family crisis. Apart from such hilarious demonstrations of quixotic bravery, the rebels’ comically unfortunate choice of targets apparently immune to intimidation
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may even result in the victims’ ready identification with and keen support of their aggressors. An instance of such curious confusion of loyalties occurs in The Satanic Verses, when the hostages, seized by a sense of having been forgotten by the rest of the world, join the hijackers screaming furiously into the desert night, ‘Hijras! Chootias! Shits!’ (Rushdie: 80). The resultant merging of roles enforces the carnivalesque nature of the situation in which (would-be) terrorists and terrorised find themselves strangely united. It seems clear that in the ensuing confusion, the protagonists have lost control over both the narrated course of events and their part in it. To use Zadie Smith’s words, they are reduced to enacting ‘an unstoppable narrative, written, produced and directed by somebody else’ (Smith: 526). In the light of the ambiguities emerging from the sudden multiplication of actual and feigned identities, the anticipated catastrophe ceases to present itself as the only possible closure. Other scenarios come to constitute just as likely outcomes to the events set in motion. In The Satanic Verses, this prompts Saladin Chamcha to speculate that Tavleen might really be a well-meaning airline hostess. Even when she suddenly lifts her djellabah and exhibits a stark naked body with explosives taped all over it, he remains unable to accept that the show is no longer part of an extravagant demonstration of safety procedures. The seriousness of her unrelenting call for a ‘sacrifice,’ with which Tavleen will bring Saladin back to reality later, is still absent from the thoroughly comic disclosure of the grenades she carries under her black disguise ‘like extra breasts nestling in her cleavage’ (Rushdie: 81). At least from the confused hero’s point of view, it appears not at all impossible that the paraphernalia attached to the woman will never be put to use in the way she has tacitly suggested with her ‘performance.’ A similar caesura interrupts the dangerous charade enacted by Millat in White Teeth as Smith has the narrative shift from a gradual revelation of the young man’s evil intentions to an analysis of the feelings keeping him from executing his murderous scheme. The reader is drawn into a sort of conspiracy with Millat as the self-appointed assassin recalls how easy it was to organise a gun for himself and how completely ‘unfazed’ (Smith: 526) he felt when he held the weapon in his hand for the first time. ‘It’s all so familiar. It’s all on TV’ (Smith: 526), he reflects, almost certain that shooting someone is merely a matter of convincing himself that he is just a star in the role of an unscrupulous killer. However, doubts overcome Millat as the moment of action draws closer. ‘Of course, now that he’s here, now that he’s stoned and scared, and it doesn’t feel so easy, and the right-hand side of his jacket feels like someone put a fucking cartoon anvil in there,’ the narrative offers, ‘now he sees the great difference between TV and life, and it kicks him right in the groin’ (Smith: 526). As in The Satanic Verses, the disclosure
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of the rebel’s secret fears serves to accommodate the possibility of a development bypassing the explosion towards which the narrative has been accelerating. Humanity, the reader is led to hope, will assert itself and the terrorist be identified as an innocent only masquerading as a villain. Kureishi’s story evokes the same hope, albeit in a slightly different manner, by deconstructing the perspective from which it at first presents its central character’s transformation into a fanatical Muslim. In gradually exposing Parvez’s bias against Islam, his naivety, short temper, patriarchal airs, his unreasonable dismay at Ali’s sudden show of prudence, and his paranoid suspicion that Ali is on drugs, indeed must be a ‘drug addict killer’ (121), Kureishi effectively erodes both the validity of the father’s judgement and his reading of Ali as a fanatic. As a result, one is led to conclude that rather than a pre-emptive characterisation of the son, the story’s title is intended as a first characterisation of the father, beside whose personal conflict allusions to the potential political danger of the son’s conversion to Islamism will remain secondary. What Glen Cavaliero notes about comic fiction and comedy in general, then, can be said to find a perfect illustration in the special treatment that militant activism receives in The Satanic Verses, White Teeth, and ‘My Son the Fanatic’: Comedy is nothing if not self-scrutinising, its turning of the tables being in perpetual revolution. [...] It draws attention to, and thrives upon, the factor of surprise, that element of sheer chance which upsets all sense of the dependability of foreseeable predestination. It does not resist, but welcomes, disruptive incursions [...]. (Cavaliero: 4)
Comedy, in other words, calls itself in question. It surprises by not keeping what it only pretends to promise, thus undermining the authority it also only pretends to assert.4 Rushdie, Smith, and Kureishi take this comedic principle to an extreme in temporarily departing even from the comic vein in which they inscribe political and religious fanaticism. In typically postmodern defiance of the formal virtue of generic purity, they endorse a method of shifting freely and abruptly between diametrically opposed styles and genres, of moving unexpectedly from comedy to melodrama or from comedy to tragedy, thereby assaulting their texts’ logic and alienating or ‘terrifying,’ as it were, their readers whom insistent gestures of comedic appeasement have been luring into dismissing the possibility of a seriously catastrophic ending. Rather than validating the seriousness of the political and religious fanaticism described, these manoeuvres demand to be read as generating yet another quality of seriousness, one altogether different from the deadly earnestness 4
Or, to express it in Kant’s words: ‘Comedy effects a sudden evaporation of expectation to nothing’ (Kant: 198).
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with which the militant characters, Ali, Millat and Tavleen, adhere to their oddly unaccountable or unaccounted for missions. This ‘other’ seriousness crystallises, for example, towards the end of the hijacking episode in The Satanic Verses and instantly revokes the sense of lethal danger that has been effectively suppressed by the grotesquely inappropriate reactions of Saladin Chamcha and Gibreel Farishta to the hijackers and their threats. The narrative suddenly changes back from an oriental fantasy recounted from the limited perspectives of these two antiheroes into a political statement, when after one hundred and ten days (rather than one thousand and one nights) the hostage-taking reaches not the implicitly promised happy ending, but a deeply chilling turning point: The woman, whose unexpected revelation of a heavily armed but otherwise naked body may momentarily have tempted some hostages to believe themselves the rather fortunate beneficiaries of some exquisitely extravagant hospitality, announces that her patience has been exhausted, selects a hostage, pronounces his death sentence and before the eyes of the still incredulous onlookers shoots him in the back of his head. The dead body topples out of the aeroplane onto the tarmac. The woman shuts the door and says, softly, ‘Martyrdom is a privilege [...]. We shall be like stars; like the sun’ (Rushdie: 86). The unequivocal brutality of the incident instantaneously eliminates any remaining expectations of its comic invalidation as yet another delusion on the part of one of the witnesses. Re-alerted to the imminence of a catastrophe, the hostages (and, with them, the reader) are made aware of a change of setting and forced to acknowledge that, after all, the plane is approaching its destination and circling over England’s shore ‘like a gigantic seabird. Gull. [Or, even more tragically, like an] Albatross’ (Rushdie: 87), and that the woman ‘really means business’: [S]he was going through with it, all the way, she was holding in her hand the wire that connected all the pins of all the grenades beneath her gown, all those fatal breasts, and although at that moment Buta and Dara rushed at her she pulled the wire anyway, and the walls came tumbling down. (Rushdie: 87)
Likewise, towards the end of White Teeth, Smith crushes the expectation of a non-violent finale, which she has earlier encouraged by the suggestion of Millat’s fears. She does so by unexpectedly opening a new chapter with a bullet from Millat’s gun hitting Archibald Jones, probably the most sympathetic, peace-loving and likeable protagonist in the novel. Penetrating Archie’s thigh, the bullet sends him spinning round ‘with some melodrama’ (450) before he falls right through a glass case containing, quite absurdly or even anticlimactically, a mouse. ‘Shards of glass all over the gaff. What a performance,’ the narrative comments upon the scene, adding: ‘If it were TV you would hear the saxophone around now; the credits would be rolling’
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(Smith: 450).5 The comic quality of this commentary does not diffuse the horror of the revelation that Millat has indeed overcome his fears, selected a human target, chosen a trajectory for his bullet, and fired. To foreground the gravity of the sudden turn of events, a flashback is inserted just before the narrative shifts to the shooting of Archibald Jones. It takes the reader back to an earlier chapter set in Bulgaria in 1945, and presents the recipient of Millat’s bullet, Archibald Jones, or Archie, as a young British lieutenant about to execute an alleged collaborator of the Nazis. The end of the war has already been proclaimed and Archie knows that, by liquidating his captive, he would commit a criminal act. Only fear of his friend Samad Iqbal, who insists on the murder as a pledge of Archie’s manliness, prevents Archie from letting his prisoner escape. In the ensuing dialogue between the captive and his involuntary executor, Archie is persuaded to throw a coin and let it decide the man’s destiny. As the coin is flying through the air, the captive grabs Archie’s gun and shoots him in the hand. Martyrdom, for Archie, is not a ‘privilege.’ As the surreal recurrence of the same situation and Archie’s decision to react once more as he did decades earlier suggests, it is ultimately a moral choice and so is the killing of others. Despite the fact that the injury Archie receives from Millat is not lethal but harmless enough to warrant an essentially humorous description, Millat does not stand completely redeemed at the end of the novel. The revocation of Archie’s only dramatic experience of war, along with the uncanny reappearance of his former captive Dr Sick, disturb the sense that all is well because all has ended well, even if the damage stays limited to a wounded leg and the release of a genetically manipulated mouse. A similarly ambiguous turn of events is brought about towards the closure of Kureishi’s story, when the narrative suddenly abandons the strategy of presenting Ali as an innocent victim of parental distrust and defamation and shifts to examining, in fact positing, the legitimacy of Parvez’s alarm at his son’s sudden display of radical tendencies. As part of this shift, Kureishi has Ali shed the role of a mere object of the father’s seemingly paranoid projections and finally appear as a figure in his own right; not, however, to challenge his father, but his father’s friend and confidante Bettina. While delaying the final showdown between father and son, the ensuing confrontation between Ali and Bettina restores the sense of alarm which Parvez feels when he first becomes aware of Ali’s conversion, but which is eroded so effectively by Kureishi’s comic accounts of Parvez’s ludicrous reactions to his son’s new behaviour. For a rather sinister side to Ali’s 5
On the fascination of serious novelists with the link between terrorism and the television medium see Margaret Scanlan, Plotting Terror: Novelists and Terrorists in Contemporary Fiction (2001).
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fanaticism surfaces when the boy, judging Bettina unworthy of his respect because she is a prostitute, begins to treat her with increasingly malicious and brutal insolence. The chance of a resumption of the story’s comic tone is finally annulled when the boy’s verbal assaults become so vitriolic that Bettina suddenly opens the door of Parvez’s car and, before Parvez can stop, throws herself out. From this point, the only possible turn for the father-son conflict to take is a seriously violent one. The fact that, at home, Ali goes straight to his room to pray, is as devoid of any comicality as is Kureishi’s description of Parvez beginning to pour himself drinks to drown his frustration. The seriousness of both men’s reactions undermines the impression hitherto sustained of their antagonism being but a harmless discord. What is more, it foreshadows the graveness of the narrative’s closure brought about by the drunken father eventually storming Ali’s sanctuary, pulling the boy from his prayer mat, and beating him up. The suggestion that the beating is an unpremeditated act of drunkenness is characteristically misleading. With it, Kureishi once more casts doubt on the reliability of the father’s judgement and deflects from a highly significant piece of information supplied towards the end of ‘My Son the Fanatic’: Like Archie’s selfsacrificial effort to protect Dr Sick in White Teeth, Parvez’s act of retribution has an important precedent. Three years earlier, the reader learns, he rescued Bettina from a violent customer and it is from this incident that their friendship has developed. This seemingly insignificant detail deserves special attention as it significantly complicates the meaning of Ali’s contempt for his father. While at first sight not an entirely implausible attitude for a devout young Muslim to assume vis-à-vis a parent who consumes alcohol, loves bacon, fails to grow a beard, and believes that ‘life is for the living’ (Kureishi: 129), Ali’s scorn translates into something far more ominous at the suggestion of Parvez’s chivalrous behaviour and the sympathy for ‘the oppressed’ that his father has actually practised, yet Ali himself only been preaching. Miraculously, both Gibreel Farishta and Saladin Chamcha survive the explosion of Bostan, flight AI420. This, indeed, is the main point of the hijacking episode in The Satanic Verses. Fate confirms what Gibreel has always believed, namely that ‘[t]o be born again [...] first you have to die’ (Rushdie: 3). Miraculously, too, or rather, ironically, Millat gets away with attempted murder and is sentenced to no more than four hundred hours of community service to be served together with his brother Magid, for the trivial reason that recorded evidence and eyewitness statements prove too inconclusive to determine who of the twins has actually delivered the shot at Archie. No less ironically, after Parvez has beaten up his son, Ali turns his
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bloodied face at his father to demand curtly and with still unbroken pride: ‘So who’s the fanatic now?’ (Kureishi: 131). In none of these instances, humour is simply resumed after the final catastrophe. For all the authors’ efforts to comically exaggerate terrorist incompetence, the inflicted injuries and destruction make clear that the expected (because implicitly promised) unmasking of the young rebels as harmless fools will never ensue. The reader is forced to accept in the end that the protagonists’ determination is far more than mimicry and that their weapons and explosives are far more than eccentric accessories worn only to enhance the ingenuity of their masquerade. The roles they have adopted prove more seriously theirs than has been suggested all along. Uncertainty prevails in the end as to whether the characters have at all left the carnival that seems to have brought them together or whether they have never joined it in the first place. Kureishi, Rushdie, and Smith’s identification of South Asian Islamism (or a variation of it) as the inspirational source of their characters’ extremist tendencies does not help to resolve this uncertainty.6 Ali’s parents are Punjabis, Millat and Magid’s Muslims from Bengal, and the hijackers in The Satanic Verses are Indian Sikhs. It is clear that with their characters’ cultural background, all three authors revoke the close historical ties between British and Muslim India, which so crucially contributed to the formation of Islamic nation states on the Asian subcontinent. In so doing, they assume an angle spectacularly unsuited to develop the idea of jihad, as proclaimed by their protagonists, on the basis of the received opposition of Christianity and Islam. Even if their protagonists insist that what they are fighting is a holy war against unbelievers in Europe, the authors carefully avoid attributing the antagonisms in their stories to irreconcilable differences between ‘occidental’ and ‘oriental’ civilisations. In fact, they strategically describe affinities and hostilities that run counter to the popular perception of Christian and Muslim mentalities as essentially incompatible traditions of thought. The crosscultural friendships between Archie and Samad in White Teeth and between Bettina and Parvez in ‘My Son the Fanatic’ exemplify such deviations as much as does the fact that the (would-be) terrorists in all three texts ultimately choose to assault not some totally unknown Other, let alone an individual embodying western affluence and hegemonic power, but someone either of their own kind or close to them. Ali attacks his father; Millat fantasises about killing his brother before he shoots his father’s best friend; the hijackers in Rushdie’s novel select and execute a shorn Sirdarji, ‘a Sikh who has given up the turban and cut his hair.’ At the same time, obvious 6
On Kureishi’s novels and their resistance to the confines of ethnicity see also Mark Stein’s paper, ‘Posed Ethnicity and the Postethnic: Hanif Kureishi’s Novels’ (Stein: 2000).
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traitors to their faith, homeland, and primary culture like Saladin Chamcha and Gibreel Farishta or such unpalatable personifications of western technocracy as Marcus Chalfen or Dr Perret escape any disaster unharmed. Cultural divisions are effectively dissolved; loyalties appear purely accidental and so do hostilities, rendering it impossible to predict who, in an apparently incomprehensible chaos of affections and disaffections, will eventually assume the part of the assassin and who will be assigned that of the assassinated. Comedy, by definition, does not deplore such confusion, but celebrates it. In their comic explorations of contemporary British society, Smith, Kureishi, and Rushdie identify chaos as an inevitable but not necessarily deleterious corollary of cultural diversification. For them, the flexibility and freedom that chaos permits is more conducive to cultural regeneration than the continuity secured by order. In The Satanic Verses it is immediately after the explosion of the jumbo jet over the English Channel that the productivity of chaos finds expression in a baroque tableau of aircraft passengers, two actors, ‘more than a few migrants,’ ‘a quantity of wives,’ and ‘a sufficiency of children’ suspended in the air amidst ‘reclining seats, stereophonic headsets, drinks trolleys, motion discomfort receptacles, disembarkation cards, duty-free video games, braided caps, paper cups, blankets, oxygen masks’ (Rushdie: 4). The wild collage epitomises a moment in the reconfiguration of meaning which, for Rushdie, is bound to ensue from disorder. Their open celebration of anarchy and chaos, however, does not warrant comprehending Smith, Kureishi, or Rushdie as fully endorsing the Romantic identification of the writer as rebel and, conversely, of the rebel (or terrorist) as the writer’s Doppelganger (Scanlan: 83). What distinguishes their notion of the subversive function of writing from the Romantics’ is the awareness that, in the contemporary world, rebellion (or terrorism) is no longer propelled by an abhorrence of dogma, of hegemonic structures, and of monolithic concentrations of power, but by a determination to impose new dogmas, install new hegemonies and construct and enforce new monoliths. Accordingly, the critique offered in the texts analysed here is directed against representatives of established power structures and advocates of alternative, yet ultimately equally rigid regimes at once. The rebels whom Rushdie, Smith, and Kureishi portray are neither visionaries nor anarchists; they are just as dependent on order as the systems they attack. Their rather constricted notion of freedom entraps them in a discourse of subversion which allows no room for imagination, let alone for humour. What they turn out to share with their enemies is a fierce belief in the importance of being earnest. ‘[U]nbendingness can be monomania, tyranny [...] and brittle,’ Saladin Chamcha considers telling Tavleen. Yet Rushdie’s foolish anti-hero is wise
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enough to realise that Tavleen will never understand that only ‘what is flexible can also be humane’ and remains silent. It is thus that Rushdie transfers the exploration of what he conceives as subversion to an altogether different level in his novel. My readings of The Satanic Verses, White Teeth, and ‘My Son the Fanatic’ have demonstrated, that the deadly seriousness with which Tavleen, Millat, and Ali pronounce their readiness to die for their causes, if taken entirely seriously by Rushdie, Smith, and Kureishi, would dramatically constrict the narratives’ scope to a single trajectory and thereby yield a rather stereotyped interpretation of the characters’ aggression. The authors escape this limitation by implicitly insisting on the importance of not being earnest, which their characters fail to understand. It is in the process of exposing this failure that these texts posit humour both as a viable political stance and as a powerful, if not even as the only antidote to dogma. They leave no doubt that, by comparison, earnestness is a pathetically unimaginative mode of responding to ideological opposition. As a form of response to terrorist aggression, it may even signify the willing acceptance of the terrorists’ terms. On the other hand it appears that humour is most effective precisely where it is least expected, as has recently been illustrated by the rather unconventional attempt of NATO general secretary George Robertson to locomote the American government away from the murderously serious position into which it had allowed itself to be petrified by its latest experiences of terrorism. The world’s fear of war in Iraq was momentarily suspended by Robertson’s ironic revocation of the notoriously grave spirit of Winston Churchill with the quotation: ‘You can always count on the Americans to do the right thing after exhausting all other alternatives.’ Unfortunately, the few in power were too earnest to take seriously this rare recourse to humour by a leading politician.
Bibliography Ahmed, Akbar S. Islam Today: A Short Introduction to the Muslim World. London: I.B. Tauris, 2001. Bergson, Henri. Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic. Trans. Cloudesley Brereton. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1980. Carr, Caleb. The Lessons of Terror: A History of Warfare Against Civilians: Why It Has Always Failed and Why It Will Fail Again. London: Little, Brown, 2002.
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Cavaliero, Glen. The Alchemy of Laughter: Comedy in English Fiction. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000. ‘Comedy.’ Encyclopaedia Britannica. Reference Suite CD-ROM. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc, 2003. Goonetilleke, D.C.R.A. Salman Rushdie. Macmillan Modern Novelists. London: Macmillan, 1998. Huntington, Samuel P. ‘The Clash of Civilizations.’ Foreign Affairs 72.3 (1993): 22-41. Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Judgement. Trans. J.C. Meredith. Oxford: OUP, 1952. Kureishi, Hanif. ‘My Son the Fanatic.’ 1997. Love in a Blue Time. London: Faber, 1999. Marrouchi, Mustapha. ‘Introduction: Colonialism, Islamism, Terrorism.’ College Literature 30 (2003): 1-55. Rushdie, Salman. The Satanic Verses. 1988. London: Vintage, 1998. Scanlan, Margaret. ‘Literature Can Look Terrorism in the Eye and Measure Its Human Consequences.’ Chronicle of Higher Education 48.17 (2001a): 11. –––. Plotting Terror: Novelists and Terrorists in Contemporary Fiction. Charlottesville: U of Virginia P, 2001b. Smith, Zadie. White Teeth. 2000. London: Penguin, 2001. Stein, Mark. ‘Posed Ethnicity and the Postethnic: Hanif Kureishi’s Novels.’ English Literatures in International Contexts. Ed. Heinz Antor and Klaus Stierstorfer. Anglistische Forschungen 283. Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 2000. 119-39. ‘Terrorism.’ Encyclopaedia Britannica. Reference Suite CD-ROM. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc, 2003. Werbner, Pnina. Imagined Diasporas Among Manchester Muslims: The Performance of Pakistani Transnational Identity Politics. Oxford: James Currey, 2002.
II. Traditions and transgressions – Writing back and forth
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HEINZ ANTOR
Postcolonial laughter in Canada Mordecai Richler’s The Incomparable Atuk
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ostcolonial studies, on the one hand, seem to be an utterly humourless affair, as a brief glance at some of the current anthologies and surveys of the field quickly shows. Consult any of the well-known handbooks giving a survey of colonialism and postcolonialism and you will soon find that their indexes do not list concepts such as ‘laughter’ or ‘humour.’ On the other hand, both a look at concrete examples of postcolonial literature and more detailed reflection on the concepts of the postcolonial and of humour and laughter will make the absence noted above appear to be quite a curious one. For one thing, many literary texts dealing with the phenomenon of postcolonialism are very funny indeed and the naïve reference to the seriousness of the subject of postcolonialism obviously does not only misrepresent the body of literary works that forms an important pillar of its primary material, but it is also based on the erroneous assumption that laughter is something that cannot be taken seriously. However, the presupposition that makes the separation of humour and of postcolonial literature possible is based on a conceptual misunderstanding of the nature of laughter, which must not only be seen as a form of light entertainment, but also as a phenomenon which has a legitimate place in such a conflict-ridden field as that of colonialism and its aftermath and must therefore be taken seriously. The age-old conjunction between humorous laughter on the one hand and seriousness of purpose on the other reaches back to the Ancients, and we find it theorized in many a twentieth-century writer’s critical thought as well. The British writer Kingsley Amis, for example, provides us with just one such
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instance. In his early period as a writer in the 1950s, he was often referred to as one of the so-called Angry Young Men because of the harsh social criticism he expressed in his early novels, in which he fiercely attacked contemporary structures of social injustice and abuse in the class society of postwar Britain, and yet, at the same time, he produced hilarious texts leaving many of his readers in stitches. Amis himself pointed out several times that this constituted no contradiction whatsoever. When asked whether he considered himself to be a comic writer, he answered: ‘Not primarily. Seriocomic’ (Amis 1961: 46). He went on to point out that the comic and the serious are not mutually exclusive alternatives. On the contrary: ‘One ought to be prepared to be funny about anything. It doesn’t preclude having serious feelings about it too. It may even draw attention to them. I think politics comes in here [...]’ (Amis 1961: 48). Amis, in his context, clearly referred to the social and political situation in contemporary Britain, but the point is valid in a postcolonial environment as well. Humour and laughter and their function of drawing attention to serious matters are particularly relevant to a discussion of satire. In 1957, Amis published a programmatic essay entitled ‘Laughter’s to be Taken Seriously’ in the New York Times Book Review, in which he explicitly established a link between laughter and satire and discussed their serious functions: Satire offers a social and moral contribution. A culture without satire is a culture without self-criticism and thus, ultimately, without humanity. A society such as ours, in which the forms of power are changing and multiplying, needs above all the restraining influences of savage laughter. Even if that influence at times seems negligible, the satirist’s laughter is valid as a gesture – a gesture on the side of reason. [...] Satire in its modern forms I take to be fiction that attacks vice and folly as manifested in the individual. (Amis 1957: 1)
Amis places himself here in the tradition of Juvenal and of the latter’s combination of laughter and saeva indignatio, and this is something we can come across not only in the context of British literary social criticism, but in many other texts dealing with human vice and folly, be it in Ancient Rome or in modern postcolonial environments. Satiric laughter as a tool of the rational attack on abuses cannot be restricted to criticism of individual weaknesses and wrongdoings, though, as Amis self-contradictorily seems to imply in the passage last quoted here; it has to be seen as a major weapon in the fight against social and political evil as well. Indeed, personal and collective vice and folly often go together in postcolonial (and other) texts, and their laughter often aims at both the individual and at entire social systems. Postcolonial societies, with their multicultural conditions and their postindependence nationalisms and re-arrangements, are prime examples of the changing and multiplying forms of power referred to above (just as Amis’s
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postwar Britain was) and thus provide ample opportunity for the critical laughter of satirical deconstructions. The laughter of postcolonial satirists, though, does not only fulfil the function of savagely lashing out in a Juvenalian manner at the iniquities of the colonial system and of its postcolonial consequences, but sometimes it also tries to ‘laugh mankind out of their favourite follies’ (Fielding: I, xvii) in a way that is related more to the satires of Henry Fielding and of Horace than to the fiercer and more aggressive Juvenal.1 Whether we find a rather urbane and suave Horatian satire that combines criticism and laughter with benevolence in the vein of Fielding and Shaftesbury or whether we are confronted with an altogether more bitter kind of humour in ‘savage’ satires full of anger and fury depends on the concrete historical and cultural context of the individual texts in hand; this is why a study of laughter, and even more so one of postcolonial laughter, beyond all generalizations, will have to abide by the New Historicist injunction to always historicize.
The 1960s: Canadian identity in focus When in 1963, the anglophone Jewish-Canadian writer Mordecai Richler published a slim volume of fiction entitled The Incomparable Atuk, Canada had officially been a more or less independent dominion for ninety-six years and the centenary of Confederation was approaching rapidly. This was a time when Canadians began to questioningly look at themselves and ask who and what exactly they were. The issues of Canadianness, of specifically Canadian qualities, and of a Canadian identity were to become hotly contested ones in the years that followed, and Richler’s book has to be seen within this postcolonial framework. Canada had ceased to be a British colony in 1867, but it had not really become an economically, politically, culturally, and psychologically independent nation at the same time. The history of Canadian culture is that of a country which well into the twentieth century considered itself to be on the margins of the anglophone world, of which London and New York constituted the centre.2 Mordecai Richler’s The Incomparable Atuk is an early representative of the spate of writing published around the centenary of Confederation dealing 1 2
It is interesting to observe in this context that, in ‘Laughter’s to Be Taken Seriously,’ Amis named Fielding as the writer to whom he felt the closest affinities (Amis 1961: 50). It was as late as 1941 that Hugh MacLennan, a writer from Nova Scotia, decided to put Canada on the literary map and to cut out a genuinely independent role in the world for it in his blatantly nationalistic novel Barometer Rising. In his later novel The Precipice (1947), he cast a very critical and an anxious look at the growing influence of Canada’s big brother in the south on his country’s culture. The question of British colonialism gradually came to be substituted by that of American economic and cultural imperialism and the postcolonial status of Canada had to be discussed increasingly within a different context.
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with the idea of Canadian identity, i.e. it is a typical example of a kind of fiction that has been one of the pillars of the Canadian literary scene since the mid-twentieth century. Like many other books of the period, it is concerned with a Canadian self as well as with that self’s relations with its others. Unlike most other writers on the issue of Canadian identity, however, Richler uses the comic lens of a hilarious kind of humour to cast a very critical and satirical glance at the key questions involved.
Comic alterity, or: An Inuit in Toronto The basic idea of The Incomparable Atuk is one which immediately places the book in a postcolonial context and at the same time provides ample food both for comedy and for the serious discussion of the multicultural issues created in such an environment. Atuk is an Inuit3 from Baffin Bay who is taken to Toronto in 1960 by Rory Peel, a representative of the Twentyman Fur Company who will use Atuk’s poetry for their own purposes, as we are told in the first chapter: The Twentyman Fur Co, a vastly misunderstood enterprise, was, at the time, suffering from a foul run of newspaper publicity and questions in parliament because, it was claimed, the Eskimo was dying of consumption, malnutrition and even frost-bite, all because of what the white man had done to make his accustomed way of life unfeasible. Peel, the brightest young advertising man in Toronto, was flown north to see if he could come up with an idea. And so [...] he gave Atuk two electric blankets, a sack of flour, his cigarette lighter, and twelve bars of chocolate in exchange for a sheaf of his verse. The poems, as everybody knows, later ran in a series of advertisements in magazines all across Canada. (Richler 1989: 2-3)
The company that takes Atuk south to Toronto is in the fur trade, i.e. in that branch of the capitalist economy that historically played such a dominant role in the colonizing of North America (Ray: 76-7). The Twentyman Fur Co thus becomes the representative of colonial practices in the novel, and indeed, it seems to be engaging in the same exploitative strategies as its historical forebears. Atuk is taken to Toronto as part of a huge publicity campaign aiming at restoring the company’s somewhat weathered reputation, and he is thus made into a pawn on Twentyman’s economic chessboard. The company is not really interested in Inuit poetry, but merely in regaining consumer confidence in order to maximize the profits it draws out of Canada’s natural resources. Atuk literally comes from the ‘True North strong and free,’ as Canada is referred to in ‘O Canada,’ the Canadian national anthem and he is displaced to Toronto in order to serve the company’s purposes. Like his forebears centuries earlier, Atuk is unfairly recompensed for his poetry by the 3
Throughout the novel, which was published before the advent of political correctness, Atuk is referred to as an Eskimo, and Richler has been criticized for this more recently.
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modern equivalent of the cheap baubles given to indigenous peoples by first colonizers around the globe in exchange for their riches. The fur company and the Inuit thus represent colonizers and colonized, and Atuk’s move to Toronto confronts the alterities of two Others in a postcolonial setting. All this sounds very problematic, and indeed, Richler could have taken this basic situation as the point of departure for a very serious engagement with questions of (post)colonial exploitation. This certainly is an important element of one level of this text. And yet, the very confrontation between the othernesses of different cultures is one of the sources of this novel’s comic quality. What makes sense within one culture may be felt to be risible from the point of view of a member of another. Richler also makes use of the comic potential of an intercultural situation at the beginning of The Incomparable Atuk, and the eponymous hero at times turns into a Canadian version of Voltaire’s ingénu,4 whose naïve look at life in contemporary Toronto does not primarily serve to make the Northern visitor appear as a simpleton, but to comically and with satiric effect deconstruct life in the Canadian metropolis.5 In Toronto, Atuk is confronted for the first time with the promises the consumer constantly faces in a market economy; he takes them literally, which has absurd consequences, so that the comic effect thus created draws the reader’s attention to the fraudulence of the whole economic system: Toronto was so rich in opportunities that an alert Eskimo could even make a start on his fortune while he slept. Atuk kept his radio tuned to CJFD all night, just in case Night Owl phoned to find out if he was listening and offered him a free television set, washing machine or wrist-watch with automatic calendar and built-in alarm. [...] Because he took the Standard each morning he was entitled to a free accident policy and as he had the Gazette delivered to his door he was automatically covered against harm by hurricane. [...] in Toronto they stopped just short of paving the streets with gold. Any minute a fortune might drop at your feet. Round one corner The Friendly Loan Company beckoned you to just come in and grab what you wanted, and round another, men with guns drawn unloaded bags of money from an armoured car. A fifty pence purchase at Twentyman’s Department Store entitled you to a chit that could get you a free return trip to Rome or the Setting for Ben-Hur, if you won the Lucky Dip. [...] [...] In Toronto, remember, a fortune could drop at your feet every minute. Today, as always, he carried an Ozo soap wrapper with him on the off chance that he might run into the beautiful, prize-giving Miss Body Odour. Although he had no purchases to make, Atuk zigzagged in and out of the magic eye doors of supermarkets, chain 4
5
The comparison also turns up in Woodcock (44) and in Morra (5). Golden chooses another character by Voltaire for a very similar comparison when he calls Atuk ‘a Baffin BayCandide’ (Golden: 78). Cf. Ramraj (67): ‘Atuk functions initially as an artless figure whose primitive innocence serves to undercut the pretensions of civilized society.’
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The absurdity of the literal-mindedness and gullibility Atuk displays when confronted with the marketing hype of the big city has a defamiliarizing effect which, in the sense of Shklovsky, de-automates our perception and makes us look afresh at what we are surrounded by every day and what we normally do not think about any longer but simply accept. We thus recognize ‘something mechanical encrusted on the living’ (Sypher: 84), which, according to Bergson, creates an inward protest reaction in us that we normally refer to as laughter. This protest, however, is not only directed against the human being submitted to the mechanical here, but also against the deceptions and against the organized fraud of a profit-oriented capitalist system that seems to have colonized and abused us all just as it has colonized and abused Atuk and his people. Richler could have concentrated on Atuk’s character as that of a northern ingénu and gone on in a similar vein. Instead, however, he turns his protagonist into a somewhat rounder character capable of developing and of surprising the reader. Moreover, he introduces a number of other Canadian characters whom Atuk meets in Toronto and he thus transforms his satire into a more multi-layered text.
The comedy of derivative Canadian dream(ing)s and myths Atuk is willing to adapt to his new environment and he learns quickly in Toronto. He wants to profit from the supposedly great opportunities offered by capitalism and become rich and well-known. He dreams a Canadian version of the American dream and embarks onto the route from arctic rags to Toronto’s riches.6 This is why the first part of the novel is entitled ‘What you Dare to Dream, Dare to Do’ (Richler 1989: 1) and this motto turns up intermittently as a leitmotif throughout the first third of the book. It soon turns out that virtually everybody in the novel dreams this Canadian dream, and Richler uses this device as a satirical tool which allows him not only to take a critical look at contemporary Canada as a postcolonial nation but also to create a kind of laughter that certainly has to be taken seriously.7 ‘What you Dare to Dream, Dare to Do,’ the motto of the first part, has been coined by Dr. Burt Parks, a trainer and sports teacher touring Canada 6 7
As Davidson points out: ‘The “American Dream” becomes the “Canadian Dream”; the “Canadian Dream” becomes the “Eskimo Dream”’ (Davidson: 106). This is why Golden can insist that ‘[i]n The Incomparable Atuk, comic rendition is more than [...] distracting humorous motif’ (Golden: 80).
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with a show displaying a group of body-builders for supposedly patriotic purposes, as he eloquently explains: ‘We have brought together here some of the finest examples of Canadian manhood in the world. We are building a new race of muscular marvels greater than the Greek Gods. We’re doing it for patriotic reasons’ (Richler 1989: 26). The comparison between the high (Greek Gods) and the low (the body-building show) has a mock-heroic effect here and, through the discrepancy between patriotic claims on the one hand and the banality of what is offered to justify them, humorously debunks the pretentiousness of Parks’s nationalistic gesture. Moreover, the latter’s patriotism is seriously questioned when it turns out that rather than celebrate his country, Parks simply wants to market his body-building programme, such as when he claims: ‘You too [...] can develop a physique like Buddy Lane and overcome constipation, hernia, hardening of the arteries, diarrhœa, impotence, and so forth’ (Richler 1989: 26). In Parks’s show, economic interest poses as Canadian patriotism and thus exposes the latter as a hollow shell covering mere self-interest. The Canadian dream of muscular marvels presented here, then, quite apart from its fascist overtones, is ridiculed as a sham. The reader laughs at Parks’s pompous grandiloquence and at the same time is made to reflect seriously on what would actually justify the idea of a distinct Canadian identity and of a Canadian patriotism. When, a little later, Atuk is introduced to Dr. Parks, the body-builder describes himself in the following words: ‘I’m world-famous [...] all over Canada’ (Richler 1989: 30). Again, this incites laughter in the reader, who recognizes the discrepancy between Parks’s grand aspirations to world fame and the restrictedness of his reputation to Canada, which cuts down to size all those in the novel who, mainly out of sheer self-interest, would like to overcome Canada’s postcolonial marginality by exaggeratedly turning it into a global centre. Rather than stress Canada’s greatness, Parks’s remark emphasizes his own provinciality,8 and it draws the reader’s attention to the fact that Canada is indeed still considered by many to be on the colonial margin. There are many examples in this novel of the satirical deconstruction of contemporary versions of Canadianness as derivative and as still indebted to colonial thinking.9 Seymour Bone’s reputation as a critic of national importance, for example, is humorously founded on the Canadian presupposition that the cultural standards of the erstwhile colonial centre in London are still to be accepted as guidelines that can provide orientation. 8 9
Ramraj also sees The Incomparable Atuk as a satire exposing Canadian ‘insularity’ (Ramraj: 70). This is why Morra refers to Toronto society as described in the novel as ‘a microcosm of colonial-minded English Canada’ (5).
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This becomes obvious when Bone decides to put out a critical journal pompously entitled The Genius and written only by himself and by his wife Ruthy: It did not do well the first year, even as a give-away to actors, writers, and producers. But the second year a miracle happened. Within one week, both Time and the London Spectator decided to do humorous columns about culture in Canada and chose Bone’s journal as a logical take-off point. Very few people in Canada realized that their struggling, no-saying critic was being ridiculed. On the contrary. Most people were impressed. ‘It doesn’t matter what we think,’ a realistic CBC producer said. ‘If the London Spectator feels he’s worth writing about, we ought to give him an opportunity.’ (Richler 1989: 62)
The satire of this passage excludes and ridicules Bone because of the pretentiousness of his apparently quite boring magazine and all those Canadians who are still so indebted to colonial thinking that they mistake London taking notice of a Canadian cultural product as a sign of its greatness. The serious implication here is that Canadians do not have cultural standards of their own and that, rather than look to the old colonial centres, they should develop properly Canadian values. Bone himself is an imitator of English culture and he merely sells as his own opinion what he has read in the British print media. The reader is confronted with a very similar case of Canadian postcolonial cultural imitation of models from the colonial centres in the character of Harry Snipes, who edits a journal imitating the style of American-style popular culture magazines. Canada is here attacked for not being strong enough to withstand being caught up in the powerful wake of American mass culture. This is such an important theme in the book that the author prefaced it with a quotation from an article by Richard H. Rovere published in Maclean’s on 5 November 1960: What would happen in Canada if full sovereignty were invoked and the southern border were sealed tight against American mass culture – if the air-waves were jammed, if all our comic books were embargoed, if only the purest and most uplifting of American cultural commodities were allowed entry? Native industries would take over, obviously. Cut off from American junk, Canada would have to produce her own. (Richler 1989: n.p.)
The last sentence implies that Canada is so America-centred that even in the unlikely case of a cultural embargo directed against the southern neighbour, Canadians would only produce the same kind of junk again, and the kitsch
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offered in Snipes’s magazine is an illustration of just that.10 Snipes is so deeply immersed in the American imagination that he is no longer able to come up with an independent Canadian counter-part. When he meets Atuk for the first time, he immediately asks the Inuit to write a contribution for Metro: ‘We’re fighting for our life here. We stand for a Canadian national identity and the American mags are trying to drive us out of business. Like Fiction?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘Good. Now lemme see.’ Snipes lifted a copy of the Aug 4, 1940 issue of Collier’s off a stack of old magazines and neatly razored out a short story. ‘Here’s a good one. I want you to re-set it in Moose Jaw 1850. We haven’t any Western yarns for the May issue. But please remember to change more than the names. Play around with the physical descriptions and details. Use your imagination, Atuk. That’s what we’re paying you for. (Richler 1989: 5-6)
The satire of The Incomparable Atuk, then, is directed against the derivativeness of Canadian culture which, just like Harry Snipes and the readers of his magazine or like the readers of Seymour Bone’s critical journal, makes itself dependent on the point of view and on the standards of the old colonial power or of the southern neighbour.11 In another scene, Snipes is referred to as ‘the most notorious of Canada’s middle-aged angries’ (Richler 1989: 47), and this only reinforces the point made here because this description quite fittingly looks to contemporary Britain and to its so-called Angry Young Men for an epithet for the epigonal Canadian.
Atuk’s Canadian dream With Atuk, Richler presents us with a character trying to act out the experimental idea mentioned in the epigraph of a taking over of Canada by native industries on the level of cultural production. This experiment, however, will merely show that an independent Canadian culture stands only a very small chance in the face of the corrupting forces of an American-style market economy that has long since taken over even the minds of those trying to define an independent Canadian identity. The vehicle used in the novel to bring across this sobering insight, again, is the Juvenalian laughter of ‘savage’ indignation.
Golden sees the novel as ‘an unabashed comic assault on Canadian kitsch culture’ (Golden: 77). 11 Cf. Ross, who has pointed out that Canadian cultural products ‘are all hand-me-down American style’ (Ross: 111). 10
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Atuk first becomes famous when his poetry is used in the advertising campaign of the Twentyman Fur Co. Since this is a ploy to detract public attention from the company’s exploitation of the Inuit and the Canadian north, indigenous poetry is here made to serve the purposes of others rather than being appreciated for its own sake. Indeed, before Rory Peel finds Atuk at Baffin Bay and brings him south, RCMP sergeant Jock Wilson ‘had discouraged Atuk from writing poetry. He had pointed out to the lad that verses would not get him the bigger, better igloo he craved and, what’s more, his writing was ungrammatical’ (Richler 1989: 2). What to the Canadian policeman, from his white Anglo-Saxon perspective, seems to be a lack of quality, to the Twentyman Fur Co, however, turns into a marketable commodity because it fits a racist stereotype of Inuit ‘primitivism;’ therefore Atuk’s poetry is lauded for ‘a certain arctic simplicity’ (Richler 1989: 47) expressed in such lines as ‘I go hunt bear in white dawn/ good spirit come with me./I go fish in silver twilight,/good spirit come with me./Over the white crust soon comes/ forever night/ good spirit,/O, spirit,/stay with me’ (Richler 1989: 46, italics in original text). Atuk is prized in Toronto for serving stereotypical notions of white Canadians about life in the arctic north, and Twentyman is not the only one to profit from the Inuit’s writings. Professor Norman Gore, who disparagingly looks down upon Atuk as a ‘chunky little primitive’ with a ‘sly side to his nature’ (Richler 1989: 4), rides the wave created by the fur company’s advertising campaign, edits and publishes a volume of Atuk’s poetry and thus gains a lot of publicity together with the book (Richler 1989: 3). In order to fulfil his dream of greater wealth, Atuk at first falls victim to an internal colonialism that does not grant him any freedom, poetic or otherwise, but expects him to play the game of his exploiters in Toronto. Atuk does so to a limited extent only, though, and tries to serve different gods simultaneously. He shocks and surprises Rory Peel as Twentyman’s representative at a public reading where he comes up with the following poem: Twentyman Fur company,/I have seen the best sealhunters of my generation putrefy raving die from tuberculosis,/Massey, you square,/eskimos don’t rub noses any more and the cats around Baffin Bay dig split-level houses./Listen to me, Pearson,/a house is not a home,/an igloo is not a pad./And you, Diefenbaker, can kiss my ass/ where holy most holy pea-soup hockey players have rumbled./Canada, wake up, you’re all immigrants to me:/my people are living like niggers. (Richler 1989: 47)
On the one hand, this text exposes the truth of the allegations of colonialist exploitation of the north levelled against the Twentyman Fur Co and, by implication, it foregrounds the internal colonialism of Canada’s treatment of its indigenous population. On the other hand, though, the rejection of arctic
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stereotypes and the criticism of leading Canadian politicians here does not merely constitute a genuine act of indigenous rebellion against oppression at the hands of white invaders, but yet again is deeply implicated in a more complex game of very different interests. Atuk here levels a calculated attack against the hand that has fed him so far, and in so doing caters for the interests of the critics of Twentyman. Accordingly, when Peel is infuriated by this act of insubordination and calls Atuk a ‘son-of-a-bitch’ who in the future will ‘clear every poem with [him]’ because he ‘took Twentyman’s name in vain’ (Richler 1989: 47-8), Atuk counters by drawing Peel’s attention to the audience’s deafening applause, and he turns to his listeners with the following words: ‘Is much good you all like [...] My heart fills’ (Richler 1989: 48). This passage is a source of laughter for several reasons. First of all, one can feel a certain Schadenfreude and side with Atuk when he breaks out of the stereotypical corset of ‘primitivist’ pseudo-poetry the Twentyman Fur Co expects him to come up with and when, in doing so, he exposes the latter’s exploitative profiteering. Peel, in his infuriated reaction, implicitly likens the name of Twentyman to that of God, which, in its total inadequacy, provokes our irreverent laughter and at the same time exposes the extent to which Twentyman’s capitalist interests are illegitimately raised to the status of religious doctrine. Atuk’s syntactically and grammatically correct and angrily colloquial protest poem is placed side by side in the novel with his linguistically ‘primitivist’ invocation of ‘good spirit’ quoted above. Together with his reaction to the audience’s applause, in which he again reverts to the role of the linguistically incompetent simpleton, this not only creates a humorous effect through the sheer formal discrepancy of the language used. Rather, it also makes us laugh with Atuk because we realize that the Inuit, who so far has been abused by the white Anglo-Saxons in Toronto, now in turn uses these people’s stereotypes – be it that of the ‘primitive’ or that of the ‘postcolonial rebel’ – to further his own purposes.12 Atuk has quickly learned his lesson and has turned from a naïve ingénu into a clever picaro who drifts through the social world of Toronto seeking his own advantage.13 Although this can make the reader laugh with him at those who only consider him as an instrument for the realization of their own dreams of wealth and fame, it does not make us uncritical towards Atuk. The protagonist’s comical devices also make us aware of the Inuit’s own One must allow, though, that different readerships might react differently here. To a German or to a Canadian indigenous readership, for example, laughter might come more easily than to many a white Anglo-Canadian reader. 13 Ramraj also compares Atuk’s stay in the big city to a ‘picaresque journey through Toronto’s social world’ (Ramraj: 68). 12
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corruption in Toronto. Atuk, the indigenous Canadian, seems to have taken over the values of the capitalist colonizers of his country and this makes him copy the exploitative strategies he has observed in others. Having discovered that Inuit sculpture is sold at very high prices in Toronto, Atuk sends for eighteen members of his family and takes them south from Baffin Bay in order to make them work in a presumably illegal basement factory he sets up. There they have to produce those sculptures he sells at a large profit. Atuk dreams the capitalist dream, which is an essentially Anglo-Saxon one, and he exploits his own relatives whom he keeps imprisoned like slaves. Atuk becomes ‘Eskimo Tycoon’ (Richler 1989: 43), as we are told by the title of the second part of the novel, and this goes hand in hand with a process of moral deprivation. The moral indignation one might feel about this, however, is not brought about by means of sermonizing or ranting in the vein of an angry young man such as, say, Jimmy Porter, but by wild and maniacal laughter induced in order to create a postcolonial version of saeva indignatio again. For example, in order to isolate his relatives from the outside world and to make them comply with his wishes and put in more working hours, he constructs a narrative in which he depicts the world beyond the walls of their artificially created work-prison as one full of dangers in which they cannot survive without his help. In addition, he uses television, which hitherto has been unknown to his relatives, as a supposedly magic device he alone can use to reward them if their output is productive enough. In a hilarious scene, he comes home and turns the switching on of the TV set into a pseudo-shamanic performance14 the only purpose of which is to strengthen his authority with his family workforce: The Old One took down the bar, unbolted the door, and opened the locks one by one. ‘Enter in peace,’ the Old One said. ‘Hi,’ Atuk said. ‘How’s everything?’ ‘They are all gathered around the box and waiting. There is much tension among them for you failed them yesterday. The Old One strongly recommends the magic for tonight.’ [...] ‘Have you worked hard and long while Atuk, who cares not a reindeer’s knuckle for his own safety, has rushed hither and thither among the many white, washed, and unfriendly ones, always in your interest?’ ‘Yes,’ they chanted. ‘Yes.’ ‘Tonight, then,’ Atuk said, ‘I shall plead for the magic. [...]’ [...] Atuk went into his trance. Stumbling, swaying, eyes rolling, he wandered round the room. The others watched hopefully, afraid, tears rolling down their cheeks. Except, Atuk noticed, for Ignak. ‘Oh ... oh ... I’m beginning to feel the power.’ Ti-Lucy cried out. Moose groaned. ‘Ai,’ Atuk called. ‘Aiii-aii.’ He backed up against the window and felt behind the 14
Morra also sees Atuk in ‘the guise of a shaman’ in this scene (Morra: 2, cf. 11).
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curtain with his hands. ‘Aii.’ With a sudden sweep of his arms, he said, ‘Oh, Mighty One, let there be sound for my flock.’ There was a sound and Atuk saw that it was good. He counted to five and called out, ‘Let there be pictures, Mighty One, for my hard workers. Let the wavy lines form moving pictures. Bring us – ’ [...] ‘...bring us a Dupont Special with Frank Sinatra...’ [...] ‘...bring us songs, dances, fill us with laughter.’ ‘It is too much, Atuk. We burst.’ ‘Give us this day many girls with long, delicious legs and leaping breasts uncovered.’ The boys began to stamp their feet. Moose stood on his head. ‘Look, it is here!’ ‘Long live Atuk! Maker of miracles!’ ‘Amen!’ (Richler 1989: 69-72)
Atuk here takes up a position similar to that of the western colonizer, using superior technology to intimidate the people he wants to make docile and obedient in order better to exploit them. He also constructs himself into a divine position, as the Biblical references in the text show, in order to earn his family’s respect and justify his claims for longer working hours. This puts him in a similar position as the one taken up by Twentyman, whose name, like that of a divinity, as Peel has told Atuk before, should not be taken in vain. Just as in Twentyman’s case, the religion that is here used as opium for Atuk’s people, is not based upon a transcendent deeper meaning of life but upon sheer economic greed.15 We laugh here both at the gullibility of Atuk’s family and at the comic discrepancy between the bombast of his performance and the banality of what it artificially blows up into a supposedly metaphysical event. Atuk’s relatives here seem to become the butt of a politically incorrect kind of humour16 because they conform to and thus reinforce the stereotype of ‘naïve’ and ‘primitive’ indigenous people who have reached a less advanced state of civilization and thus appear more like children than like mature people. But this is only possible because they are artificially kept in the dark about the TV set by the exploiter Atuk. Moreover, it is only the flat characters in the Inuit family who are deceived by their clever and ruthless relative. Ignak does not walk into the trap and sees through Atuk’s performance. Consequently, he is referred to as ‘an Eskimo fascist’ (Richler 1989: 85) by Atuk, who in turn is accused by Ignak of being an ‘[a]ssimilationist’ (Richler 1989: 87). When Ignak tells his relative: ‘We wish [...] you would remember Baffin Bay and how the white scum rule our land,’ Atuk answers back: ‘How Morra also points out that Atuk ‘sacrifices any tenable attachment to his own community and culture for the sake of self-interested gain’ (Morra: 4). 16 Morra also refers to The Incomparable Atuk as a ‘satirical, politically incorrect text’ (Morra: 1). Richler’s humour can also be quite aggressive, which is why Cohen talks about his ‘pugnacious urban humor’ (Cohen: 24). 15
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long will you hold a grudge? Another thousand years?’ (Richler 1989: 97). The protagonist here denies history because it would make it more difficult for him to imitate Twentyman in an act of postcolonial mimicry.17 Atuk adopts the colonizer’s disparaging attitudes towards the colonized indigenous peoples in his own reactions to his relatives whom he considers to be ‘indolent to the bone’ and ‘in constant need of a whip-hand over them’ (Richler 1989: 53). He refers to them as ‘[p]rimitives’ (Richler 1989: 100) and as ‘savages’ (Richler 1989: 109). He wants them to be ‘primitives’ and to produce ‘primitive’ art because that is what he can sell in the postcolonial market-place. When his relatives begin to produce better quality sculptures, he is paradoxically shocked because he finds ‘[a]ll crudeness and innocence gone’ (Richler 1989: 97). What would normally elicit laughter in us here also serves to foreground the way in which the protagonist caters for a demand created by disparaging colonial stereotypes of native ‘primitivism.’ Atuk is infected with the virus of the spirit of free capitalist enterprise, and with it he catches the infection of inhuman exploitation and denigration. In a way, he becomes a traitor to the Inuit cause, and the laughter created by such scenes as that of the ‘magical’ TV set is to be taken very seriously indeed as a tool of emphasizing the working of a colonial spirit that even transgresses ethnic borders and works within a colonized people itself. In the second part of the novel, then, Atuk has turned from ingénu and victim of Twentyman and his exploitative company to Twentyman’s disciple18 and to a neocolonial little villain himself19 who, invested with the picaro’s moral indifference, now turns colonialist mechanisms against his own people and even dares to challenge Twentyman with his more rebellious poems. When Rory Peel warns him against Twentyman’s shrewdness, he answers: ‘You watch me. I’m shrewder’ (Richler 1989: 112). Thus, the third part of the novel follows the further fortunes of Atuk in the world of Twentyman’s neoliberal capitalism and it demonstrates that Atuk still is merely an instrument that is used by Twentyman to secure the latter’s own profit. Again, this is shown in a humorous vein, this time through the medium of black comedy. In order to be able to go through with a business deal with the Chinese, Twentyman has to get rid of American opposition, and he plans to cash in on Canadian anti-Americanism by artificially turning Atuk into a Canadian Atuk’s mimicry of Twentyman’s capitalist colonialist tricks also unfolds the force of parody for the reader, alongside with parody’s deconstructive effect (cf. Bhabha: 86 and Morra: 3). 18 Davidson also sees Atuk as ‘the creature of Buck Twentyman, the ultimate tycoon and the villain of the novel’ (Davidson: 107). 19 Ramraj draws our attention to the fact that, in the end, ‘the reader enjoys the conflict of villain against villain’ (Ramraj: 70). 17
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martyr and a victim of America. Here Twentyman yet again proves to be a scheming Machiavellian who abuses people to realize his profit, and Richler takes recourse to the macabre and uses black humour to point an accusing satirical finger at all those involved. He enjoys teasing the politically correct by incorporating into the story a tale of an act of cannibalism perpetrated by Atuk who, it turns out, has eaten ‘an American army intelligence colonel’ spying on the Russians (Richler 1989: 54) in the Canadian arctic north. Canadian sovereignty here is violated in the Cold War rivalry of the two superpowers. The reader is never told why Atuk consumed the American intelligence officer, and it remains open whether his cannibalism is to be read as an act of postcolonial self-defence or as a symbolic representation of Canadians such as Snipes feeding on American culture.20 The drastic exaggeration of the metaphoric nurturing of Canada by America turns Atuk’s anthropophagy into black comedy, and it combines humour and horror21 in order to expose Canada’s neocolonial dependence on America. When Atuk is arrested because he has eaten the American colonel, Twentyman tries to turn him into the figurehead of a postcolonial Canadian reaction against America by organizing popular support for the Inuit, and he lures Atuk into becoming the first candidate in Stick Out Your Neck, a TV quiz show organized by Twentyman which offers a huge sum as prize money but guillotines the candidate should he fail to answer a question.22 Twentyman leases the rights to the programme to an American company. Atuk reverts to his early naïve status of gullible ingénu and believes Twentyman, who tells him he will secretly signal all the correct answers to him during the programme. Instead of doing so, Twentyman has Atuk confronted with a ridiculously complicated and difficult hockey question and leaves him in the lurch so that, right at the end of the novel, the Inuit is indeed guillotined, and Twentyman uses the American sponsorship of the programme to stage a wave of anti-Americanism on which he rides to eventually sell his tractors to China. Once again, the indigenous Canadian dies for the sake of the white trader’s profit, but the Canadian masses who violently protest against America are also pawns in Twentyman’s game. Cf. Morra (13). Referring to Terry Heller’s definition of black humour, Randall, in his discussion of St. Urbain’s Horseman, another comic novel by Richler, states that ‘black humour is the result of suspending the two extremes (horror and humour) so that the reader becomes moved “to the verge of schizophrenia” and ultimately tries to reconcile the two to avoid insanity’ (Randall: 25). 22 Golden refers to the programme as ‘a surface emblem of the broader cheapening of Canadian cultural life in the novel’ (Golden: 79). Richler himself wrote about the performative and media aspect of modern life: ‘Put plainly, these days everybody’s in show business, all trades are riddled with impurities’ (Richler 1991: 264). 20 21
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Nevertheless, many a reader will laugh at the end of the book, namely at Atuk and at those gullible Canadians23 who react exactly as planned by Twentyman because they are flat characters without a soul of their own. They react mechanically like robots and are remote-controlled by colonialist capitalist interests.24 Since they are unable to come up with a viable and independent Canadian position of their own, we cannot feel with them, but see their failures as stumbling blocks on the way to a strong and genuine Canadian identity. The title of the novel, The Incomparable Atuk, echoes the title of another famous North American novel, namely The Great Gatsby.25 Atuk’s dream is a Canadian version of the American dream, and, as in Gatsby’s case, he comes to a bad end. Unlike in Fitzgerald’s novel, though, we laugh at Atuk’s follies, but the laughter thus created nevertheless is to be taken seriously because of the criticism of very real faults represented thus. Richler’s humorous deconstructions, however, are not only aimed at Twentyman’s neocolonialist exploitation of Canada and at Atuk’s character, which combines features of the picaro with those of the fool and of the trickster (cf. Morra: 2ff.). Rather, Richler also makes us laugh at the folly of the many characters who accompany Atuk on his picaresque journey from arctic origins to death under the postcolonial guillotine wielded by commercial interests. In particular, the book’s satire is directed against the use of stereotypes and the treatment of minorities in multicultural Canada, ranging from Professor Gore and his wife’s racist stereotypes hidden away behind their gentle façade to Rory Peel’s pseudo-liberalism and covert antiSemitism. In the course of these satirical deconstructions of the benevolent surface of a politically correct Canadian multiculturalism behind which there still lurk the ugly faces of racism and discrimination, the Inuit are not only compared to Jews, but also to black people. Atuk himself, in the protest poem that so enraged Rory Peel, says about his people that they are ‘living like niggers’ (Richler 1989: 47) and thus stresses the history of colonial and postcolonial exploitation Canadian indigenous and black people share.
Atuk here is to be seen as the representative of Canada as a whole. Golden emphasizes this in his interpretation of Atuk’s death when he writes: ‘As his head rolls, so rolls all of Canada’s in Richler’s perception’ (Golden: 80). 24 Cf. Morra (3): ‘Atuk, the poet, is beheaded by Twentyman, the representative of materialism and imperialist tendencies.’ Davidson also indirectly refers to Atuk as a flat character when he describes the protagonist as ‘the stock character in an archetypal capitalist myth’ (Davidson: 112). 25 Davidson also draws this comparison and considers The Incomparable Atuk as ‘a “Canadianized” version of the American novel’ (Davidson: 106). 23
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Conclusion The Incomparable Atuk provides a good example of the possibility and of the range of postcolonial humour. The laughter that is so plentifully incited in the reader of the novel is to be taken seriously because it is the laughter of the detection of abuses in a postcolonial context. Richler’s brilliant and hilarious satire exposes the continuing colonial practices in the dealings of white Canadians with their country’s indigenous population just as much as the latter’s corruptibility when faced with the commercialist culture of the descendants of colonial settlers. Canadian culture of the 1960s becomes the butt of humour because it is shown to be derivative and lacking a value structure of its own, with pompous attempts at constructing a Canadian identity providing the material for mock-heroic deconstructions.26 Canada’s role in a postcolonial world under American sway is laughingly exposed just as much as the unreflected anti-Americanism of many Canadians. Finally, many of the evils to be met in multicultural contexts and particularly frequent in postcolonial environments, such as racism and ethnic prejudice, are exposed to the ‘savage laughter’ of a kind of satire that is sometimes indebted to Juvenal, but can also rise to the standards of Horace in its mellower moments. Paradoxically, in a teasingly mock-heroic gesture with a Shakespearean reference, the final word in the novel is given to Snipes, who addresses a huge crowd of Canadians after Atuk’s violent death and tells them: ‘Friends, Canucks, countrymen, [...] use your noggins’ (Richler 1989: 178). The novel thus ends with an invocation to Canadians to do a bit of their own thinking27 – and the implied author of the novel would certainly agree with that.
Bibliography Amis, Kingsley. ‘Laughter’s to be Taken Seriously.’ New York Times 7 July 1957: 1-13. –––. ‘My Kind of Comedy.’ Twentieth Century 170 (July 1961): 46-50. Bhabha, Homi K. The Location of Culture. London: Routledge, 1994. Cohen, Sarah Blacher. ‘The Comedy of Urban Low Life: From Saul Bellow to Mordecai Richler.’ Thalia: Studies in Literary Humor 4.2 (1981): 21-4. In view of the combination of laughter and satirical criticism, it is more accurate to use the term ‘mock-heroic’ here than to follow Morra, who simply states that ‘both Atuk and Twentyman are given heroic proportions’ (Morra: 15). 27 Atuk’s headlessness brought about by his execution in the guillotine can therefore also be interpreted as the ‘headlessness of both Atuk and Canada’ (Morra: 17). 26
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Davidson, Arnold E. Mordecai Richler. New York: Frederick Ungar, 1983. Fielding, Henry. The History of Tom Jones. 1749. 2 vols. London: Dent, 1974. Golden, Daniel. ‘Mystical Musings and Comic Confrontations: The Fiction of Saul Bellow and Mordecai Richler.’ Essays on Canadian Writing 22 (1981): 62-85. Goldie, Terry. ‘The Minority Men.’ Thalia: Studies in Literary Humor 4.2 (1981): 15-20. Greenstein, Michael. ‘Mordecai Richler and Jewish-Canadian Humor.’ Jewish Wry: Essays on Jewish Humor. Ed. Sarah Blacher Cohen. Detroit: Wayne State UP, 1987. 196-215. Morra, Linda. ‘Playing the Fool: The Satire of Canadian Cultural Nationalism in Mordecai Richler’s The Incomparable Atuk.’ Studies in Canadian Literature 26.1 (2001): 1-26. Ramraj, Victor J. Mordecai Richler. Boston: Twayne, 1983. Randall, Neil. ‘Laughing at the Victim: Humour in St. Urbain’s Horseman.’ Thalia: Studies in Literary Humor 4.2 (1981): 25-30. Ray, Arthur. ‘When Two Worlds Meet.’ The Illustrated History of Canada. 1987. Ed. Craig Brown. Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1997. 17-104. Richler, Mordecai. The Incomparable Atuk. 1963. New Canadian Library. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1989. –––. ‘Why I Write.’ The Canadian Essay. Ed. Gerald Lynch and David Rampton. Toronto: Copp Clark Pittman, 1991. 259-67. Ross, Malcolm. ‘The Incomparable Atuk’: The Impossible Sum of Our Traditions. Reflections on Canadian Literature. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986. Shklovsky, Victor. ‘Art as Technique.’ 1917. Modern Criticism and Theory. Ed. David Lodge. London: Longman, 1988. Sypher, Wylie, ed. Comedy. George Meredith: ‘An Essay on Comedy.’ Henri Bergson: ‘Laughter.’ 1956. Baltimore: Hopkins, 1980. Woodcock, George. Mordecai Richler. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971.
SUSAN LEVER
The colonizer’s gift of cursing Satire in David Foster’s Moonlite
I
n the central section of David Foster’s novel Moonlite (1981), a poor Scottish undergraduate at one of England’s old universities is led by his wealthier fellows into a life of drinking and gambling. Finbar MacDuffie, known as Moonlite, is an albino with night sight, a complete oddity who gains his only social value as an exotic curiosity. Lady Virginia Creeper invites him to a country house party where several other peculiar people compete for attention – including an effete poet and a German scientist. Readers of eighteenth and nineteenth-century English novels may find this scene strangely familiar; it could be from one of the country house satires of Thomas Love Peacock, with shades of earlier satirical writers such as Fielding. Yet this novel has already hinted at a slightly different viewpoint: Without wishing to scant the contributions made towards science and the arts by gentlemen, who alone have the means of pursuing them, it must be said that Colonial gentlemen take a very different view. The contrast is nowhere better exemplified than in the New West Highlands, where seventy years after colonisation it is rare to find a man who can name a single indigenous plant or bird. The English gentleman in new surroundings will always replace them as quickly as he can with a facsimile of his own ancestral seat, complete to the very vermin, and far from deriving any benefit from his love of nature, foreign species are forced to contend with a ruthless policy of depredatory rape, that must be seen to be believed. Then, not every man will leave a toilet seat as he would wish to find it, and the ideal society would contain no English gentlemen. (Foster: 139)
The mention of the toilet seat shifts the formal voice of the passage into a more contemporary and colloquial realm. While the novel’s literary models
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are English, readers will have grasped that it offers an Australian perspective in its account of British colonial history. Moonlite is set in the British Isles for three quarters of its length; it begins in the outer Hebrides island of Hiphoray where Finbar is born, and follows his picaresque adventures in Scotland, England and the New West Highlands. From its beginning the novel hints that its story of the colonization of a tiny island is, at the same time, a metaphorical history of the colonization of Australia. While the novel builds on research into the lives of the people on islands such as Saint Kilda at the time of the highland clearances, it also offers Australian references in passing. Like the Australian Aborigines, ‘the people claim they have always lived here, yet remarkably, they have no seafaring tradition’ (Foster: 18); when the first Christian missionary arrives on the island he brings (ominously for Australian readers) ‘a hutch with a pair of rabbits and a faggot of blackberry brambles’ (Foster: 56). In a reversal of the famous obeisance to Queen Elizabeth II by the long-serving Australian Prime Minister, R.G. Menzies, Hamish Menzies tells of his uncle’s sighting of the German prince at the Battle of Culloden: ‘Ah did but see him ridin by but Ah shall Hate him till Ah die!’ (Foster: 77). Australian readers will understand that the story of the dispossession of the primitive people on the island of Hiphoray prefigures the pattern of dispossession of the Australian Aborigines. It also, of course, follows an archetypal pattern of Western colonization with Christian missionaries joining capitalist opportunists, and scientists following in their wake. The Australian comparison offers a further irony – the Scottish highlanders were cleared from their homes for the same reason that the Aborigines of SouthEastern Australia were dispossessed – for sheep whose wool was destined for British mills. Don Watson’s account of the highland settlers in the Gippsland district of Victoria, Caledonia Australis, attests to the novel’s accuracy in this respect. Watson reports that some highlanders even recognized the similarities between their own displacement by the English and the pattern they were now enacting on the indigenous people of Australia. What Leela Gandhi calls the ‘Caliban paradigm’ (Gandhi: 148) has created much discussion in post-colonial theory, where Caliban’s response to Miranda in Shakespeare’s The Tempest becomes an emblem of the ambivalence of colonized peoples to English language and literature: ‘You taught me language, and my profit on’t is, I know how to curse’ (I, ii, 366-7). Edward Said and others have argued that English literature is deeply implicated in the British colonial enterprise, and that it forms part of the psychological armoury of colonialism. Yet, alongside the canon of nineteenth-century English literature taught in universities and schools throughout the Empire, lies a relatively neglected, subversive tradition of
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satirical writing. This is the tradition of Swift, Pope, and Sterne that, despite a decline in the nineteenth century, persisted in the novels of writers such as Peacock to re-emerge in the twentieth century with practitioners such as Evelyn Waugh. If cursing is the ancient origin of satire, as Robert C. Elliott has argued in his The Power of Satire: Magic, Ritual, Art, Caliban’s cursing may also offer a model for one of the most significant forms of post-colonial response to the language of the colonizers. Satire may well be the archetypal postcolonial genre: it is the colonizer’s gift of cursing. Many of the landmark postcolonial novels, particularly those of Indian writers, have been satires. The ambivalent love and hate of the colonizer’s traditions dominates Shashi Tharoor’s The Great Indian Novel and Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children. Both these novels make their reference to literary models clear – Tharoor by explicit parody of English and Indian classics, Rushdie by reference to Sterne, The Arabian Nights and the Mahabharata. In Australia, Foster’s use of satire to ridicule white colonialism has been followed by Kim Scott’s satirical account of the colonizing of Aborigines in his prize-winning novel Benang. Of course, this kind of contemporary satire has sometimes been read as postmodernist play, unreliable as an account of political experience and evading commitment through irony. Once we recognize it as satire, then its relationship to its context becomes clear: satire operates through comic exaggeration and relies for its political force on readers’ recognition of its reference to mutual experience. Satire is not bound to report history as a set of chronological facts, nor to offer sympathy with individual characters, but can observe, quite coldly and even inconsistently, a multitude of aspects of the world. Moonlite makes the English satirical tradition part of its analysis and attack on the process of colonization, and its comic variations on one of the strands of English literature prove peculiarly suited to the dilemmas of the white colonial settler, particularly the Celt. The novel mimics the Other tradition – the English satiric and comic tradition that has mocked the pitiless rationality and greed at the heart of British colonial power. At the same time, Moonlite’s portrayal of nineteenth-century colonialism reminds us of the presence of the Other within the Greater British nation – the Celts who so often fought British imperial wars and pioneered British colonies. The Celts, particularly the Scots, have performed the roles of both victim and complicit perpetrators of the British colonial project. They are Britain’s own colonized indigenes who have taken on the colonizing task. On the island of Hiphoray, access to the wider world soon leaves the islanders starving through the loss of their grain crop and their failure to hunt the fulmar fledglings at the appropriate season. They become used to performing for the enjoyment of tourists in the summer and adapt themselves
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to the strange gifts brought to them: a saucepan makes a good helmet for climbing, a single surgical boot balances the steepness of the mountains. They continue to dispose of rubbish in the traditional way – allowing it to blow away in the wind – but their new possessions don’t decompose, and they are soon regarded as greedy, dirty, drunken, and shiftless people. The tourists lose interest. The scientists, however, want to protect the island from change – at least until anthropological study can be completed – and forbid the tourists from feeding the hungry people. Within a few years the population of adult men has diminished while the number of women and children has grown, with the old women now remaining (rather than being left to die on a nearby island) and all the children surviving birth (rather than dying at the hands of the midwife). The capitalists return with more productive sheep so that the islanders can spin and weave tweed for export, but ‘the cost of shipping the world’s worst tweed far exceeds the demand’ (Foster: 98). Those islanders who haven’t succumbed to disease and alcoholism are shipped as settlers to the New West Highlands. The story of the island’s exploitation and abandonment could be a tragedy. Instead, it is a comic satire on the destructive nature of History, where History is understood as the ideal of chronological progress that emerged from Western Enlightenment thinking. Satire traditionally takes a conservative position in the face of such Enlightenment and is often dismissed as an inherently conservative genre, despite its anarchic stylistic qualities. Satire, whether in the hands of a Roman satirist like Juvenal or an eighteenthcentury writer like Swift, tends to see History as decline rather than progress; it regards the claims of history-as-progress with great cynicism. Stephen Harris has argued that, if the civilizing process of the colonial enterprise is seen as the fulfilment of History, Moonlite uses satire as an appropriate ‘counter-discursive’ mode to attack British exploitation in its guise of colonizing success (Harris: 72). Foster’s version of history looks to generalized and repeated patterns of change, rather than specific historical achievements, and it seeks out the ironies in a process that, as he shows, colonizes a people so that they can colonize in turn. The MacEsaus of Hiphoray live in touch with a spirit-world where mythology rather than history sustains them: Malcolm Mor’s exploits are recounted as if they were recent events. The islanders have no sense of themselves as individuals, so that individual death is accepted as part of the cycle of life. The twenty male MacEsaus go by the first name of Gillie or Murdo, depending on which side of the village stream they live, and they speak with only two voices. Each year at the winter solstice, the island men climb to the top of the highest cliff and throw themselves over as a
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propitiatory offering to the spirit-world