Practical Guilt: Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms

PRACTICAL GUILT

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PRACTICAL GUILT Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms P. S . GREENSPA N

New Yor k Oxfor d OXFORD UNIVERSIT Y PRES S 1995

Oxford Universit y Press Oxford Ne w York Athens Aucklan d Bangko k Bomba y Calcutta Cap e Town Da r e s Salaam Delh i Florence Hon g Kong Istanbu l Karach i Kuala Lumpur Madra s Madri d Melbourn e Mexico City Nairob i Pari s Singapor e Taipei Toky o Toront o and associate d companie s in Berlin Ibada n

Copyright © 1995 by P. S. Greenspan Published by Oxford Universit y Press, Inc. , 200 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 Oxford i s a registered trademar k o f Oxford Universit y Press All rights reserved. No par t o f this publication ma y b e reproduced, stored i n a retrieval system, o r transmitted , i n any for m o r b y any means , electronic, mechanical , photocopying, recording , o r otherwise , without the prior permission o f Oxford Universit y Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Greenspan, Patricia S., 1944Practical guilt : mora l dilemmas, emotions, an d social norms / P. S. Greenspan. p. cm . Includes bibliographica l references and index . ISBN 0-19-508762-3; ISBNO-19-509090-X (pbk.) 1. Guilt . 2 . Emotion s (Philosophy ) 3 . Socia l norms. 4 . Ethics . I. Titl e BJ1471.5.G74 199 4 128'.3—dc20 93-4006 7

135798642 Printed i n the Unite d States of America on acid-fre e pape r

In memor y o f ALAN DONAGA N

The fox condemns the trap, not himself. William Blak e The Marriage of Heaven and Hell

Acknowledgments

The sources of my thinking on the several subjects of this essay go back many years, but its first full draft was written durin g 1990-91 at the National Human ities Center i n Research Triangle Park , Nort h Carolina . I am indebted to th e other fellows in residence at the center for historical and literar y discussion of guilt, and to the center staff for sustaining the more upbeat emotions that allowed for m y unusual productivity ove r th e year . Le t me als o than k th e Nationa l Endowment fo r the Humanities for providin g my funding an d th e University of Maryland, which provided supplementary support. Two terms off at Mary land during the preceding two years enabled me to write drafts o f some initial sections an d to work ou t a detailed plan of argument. I owe special thanks t o colleague James Lesher, then actin g dean of the Colleg e o f Arts and Humani ties, for arranging my leave during autumn 1988; I was awarded another leav e by the Graduate Research Board at Maryland durin g autumn 1989 . I am also grateful t o a number of people who supporte d m y work o n thi s project or provoked m y thinking with correspondence o r conversation o n the subjects it brings together. Alan Donagan, t o whom the book is dedicated, wa s my colleague at the University of Chicago an d the mainstay of my grant refer ees for many years thereafter, switching over to this project despite his sharply opposing vie w on moral dilemmas . Hi s letter s o n the subjec t determined th e basic shape of my argument and its ultimate focus on metaethics—to use a term still out o f favor for a set of issues in the foundations of ethics that concerne d me most as a student of philosophy bu t became unfashionable at about the time I left school. Much of this essay emerged in an attempt to answer Alan's insistent an d impassioned question s abou t ho w ethics could accommodat e dilem mas while amounting to somethin g mor e tha n a simple codification o f emo tions. Alan's prodding serve d to dra w me back t o a number of earlier interests , with dilemma s providing a helpfully narro w angle of approach to topic s to o large to deal with effectively head-on . At one point during the planning of this essay, upon reviewing some of my old student papers and other course materials while packing up to move, I even found som e anticipation s of my specific theses. There was a long-forgotten defense of guilt for the unavoidable written up for a seminar at Harvard i n 1970 an d a critique of W. D. Ross for a 196 7 ethics course whose main line of argument I decided to incorporate into chap-

viii Acknowledgments

ter 4 , sectio n 3 , of this essay. Some of these topics, which at tha t poin t wer e rather off-center, have since come into their own i n contemporary mora l philosophy. However, they have mainly been linked with the Aristotelian approach to ethics that stresses notions of virtue and character over obligation and action. My argumen t her e is in part a n attemp t t o sho w wha t sor t o f role emotion s also play on the modern approac h we associate wit h Kant , once we detach i t from som e o f the mor e extrem e elements of a Kantia n approach, a s brough t out b y my treatment of dilemmas. Some features of this project are due to conversation s with Marylan d colleague and department chair Michael Slote that encouraged me to bring my work on dilemma s and emotion s t o bea r o n mor e mainstrea m issues in ethics. To highlight th e connection , I decided to presen t m y argument a s it emerged, in discussion of the views of a number of central contemporary authors, to whom I also owe a debt of thanks for providing me with materials I sometimes use in ways quit e othe r tha n wha t the y intended . Amon g author s o n dilemmas , a particular influence was Ruth Marcus, whose paper I responded to at the 198 0 Chapel Hill Colloquium in Philosophy. Three conversations with Bernard Williams in October 198 9 als o helped me clarify his views on dilemmas and related subjects. Besides Donagan an d Slote , a number of people wrote letters in support of my numerou s gran t application s fo r thi s project : Annett e Baier , Simo n Blackburn, Richard Brandt, John Cooper, Jonathan Glover , Mary Mothersill , Thomas Nagel, and Philip Quinn. What emerged from my year at the National Humanities Center was a social view of the base s of ethics that I came to see as the centra l result of my work o n this subject. Colleagues who provide d comments o n draft s o f par t o r al l o f th e essa y includ e Kent Bach , David Copp , Jonathan Dancy , Stephen Leighton, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord , Walte r Sinnott Armstrong, the late Michael Woods, several anonymous reviewers, and students in some of my classes, especially Lawrence Dobbs, Richard Fyfe, Scott Gelfand, David Hull, and Stephen Tighe. I also received comments on drafts of particular sections at a number of oral presentations (a t Philosophy Department Colloquia , unles s otherwise noted) : Chapter 5 , sectio n 1 , "Subjective Guilt and Responsibility, " wa s rea d at th e University o f Rocheste r i n 1988 , the n a t Indian a University in 1989 ; par t of chapter 4, section 1 , at North Carolin a State University in 1991 unde r the title "Guilt an d Virtue" ; chapte r 4 , sectio n 2 , "Guil t a s an Identificatory Mechanism," at the University of North Carolin a a t Chapel Hill and at the National Humanities Cente r Seminar on the Concept o f a Person i n 1991; par t of chapter 5 , section s 2-3 , a t a symposiu m i n honor o f Ruth Marcu s a t th e Pacific Division meetings of the American Philosophical Association in 1992 unde r the title "Perspectival Guilt"; and a selection from chapter 3, section 3 , at Georgetown University and Queen's University (Kingston, Ontario) i n 1993 unde r the title "Protagorea n Realism. " Chapte r 3 , section 1 , was discussed at a meeting of the Georgetown / Maryland Moral Psycholog y Reading Group in 1991 . Later drafts of some of these pieces, along with some related selections, have appeared in print: "Subjective Guil t and Responsibility, " in Mind 10 1 (1992):

Acknowledgments i

x

287-303; "Guil t a s an Indentificator y Mechanism," i n Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 7 4 (1993): 46-59; "Guilt an d Virtue," in Journal o f Philosophy 9 1 (1994): 57-70 ; and a longe r versio n o f "Perspectiva l Guilt, " i n Modality, Morality an d Belief: Essays in Honor o f Ruth Barcan Marcus, ed. W. SinnottArmstrong (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 [copyright © Cambridge University Press; reprinted by permission]). For secretarial support at various stages, let me also thank Marsha Brown , Richard Fyfe , an d Kati e Kight. I owe particular thank s a t Oxfor d University Press to Angela Blackburn for painstaking editorial help and advice. Washington, D.C . P.S.G August 1993

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Contents

Introduction, 3 I. BETWEEN THE HORNS 1. Defusin g Dilemmas , 9 1. Mora l Dilemma s and Motivational Force , 1 1 2. Motivatin g Moral "Ought, " 23 2. Practica l Oughts and Prohibitions, 29 1. Practica l Oughts in Conflict, 30 2. Deonti c Strength and Value, 41 3. Problem s for Practical Ought-Systems, 5 2 3. Motivationa l Foundations of Conflict, 6 6 1. Mora l Realis m and Practical Phenomenology, 67 2. Internalis t Dilemmas, 77 3. Betwee n the Horns, 90 II. SENSIBILITY AND STANDPOINTS 4. Mora l Residues, 109 1. Th e Moral Significanc e of Guilt, 111 2. Guil t as an Identificatory Mechanism, 126 3. Contrary-to-Dut y "Ought-to-Feel," 13 6 5. Unavoidabl e Guilt , 15 1 1. Subjectiv e Guilt and Responsibility , 152 2. Perspectiva l Appropriateness, 166 3. Objectiv e Guilt and Wrong, 17 6

xii Contents

6. Basin g Ethics on Emotion, 187 1. Th e Motivational Model, 188 2. Sensibilit y and Standpoints, 19 8

Notes, 211 Bibliography, 23 5 Index, 24 3

PRACTICAL GUILT

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Introduction

In what follow s I deal with a numbe r o f diverse issues of interest to philoso phers (an d others) in several areas and o f different intellectua l bent. I explain the connections among these topics in chapter 1, but since my discussion quickl y enters the thick of metaethical debate, it might be helpful at this point to present an overal l ma p o f my argument s o that reader s ma y char t alternativ e paths through it. My argument begins with issue s in the foundations of ethics, with a n eye to determinin g th e plac e o f mora l emotion . However , man y reader s migh t prefer to begi n with my treatment o f a specific emotion, guilt, in part II , possibly doubling back later a s needed t o mak e full sens e of the general point s I extract fro m that discussio n for moral dilemmas , toward th e end of chapte r 5, or the role o f emotion i n ethics, i n chapter 6 . I have provided index references to cases discussed, along with other background informatio n that should help t o clea r up an y initiall y obscure passages , bu t I think tha t th e bul k of chapters 4 and 5 can be read independentl y by readers wit h a special interes t in emotion . For readers of part I, I shall give more specifi c advice as my discussion there proceeds about how they might bypass the more technical treatment of deontic logic in chapter 2 . It should als o b e possible t o proceed directl y to chapte r 3 , and thenc e t o chapte r 6 , for a n accoun t o f my proposals o n metaethic s that bypasses details of the literature on moral dilemma s along with the treatmen t of guilt. The index will supply references to some terminology explained in chapter 1; and the second sectio n of chapter 1 might be read on its own, for a fulle r account o f my overall argument i n relation t o metaethics. A t this point I want just to give an outline that indicates th e main topics to be covered in each chapter but leaves explanations unti l later . I begin in chapter 1 with a review of philosophers' treatmen t o f dilemmas, attempting to show why they are thought t o pose a problem fo r the coherency of ethics. On my account they call into question the motivational force of "ought" and similar deontic terms, taken as essentially practical or action-guiding. They pose a metaethical dilemma of sorts, between "subject-independent" views of moral motivation , whic h apparentl y mak e mora l dilemma s impossible, an d "subject-dependent" views, which seem to be unable to capture the motivational difficulty o f dilemmas. 3

4 Practical

Guilt

In chapter 21 deal with some of the standard question s raised for dilemmas in connection with deontic logic , though I come at them from a direction tha t I hope will bring out their metaethical relevance. First I address questions raised by Bernard Williams's dismissal of dilemmas involving practical oughts as conclusions of deliberation. I argue that an investigation of some presupposition s about the weighing of moral reasons favors a redefinition of dilemmas in terms of prohibitions rather than positive oughts. I then apply this negative formulation t o th e choice dilemma s apparently force between standard deonti c principles, mos t notabl y "ought"-implies-"can " an d agglomeration , wit h som e comments abou t th e implication s o f th e choic e fo r th e unifiabilit y o f actionguiding ethics, understood a s based on practical "ought." Chapter 3 begins with a shift t o contemporary version s of the questio n of motivational forc e introduce d i n chapter 1 . On th e basi s of some of Philippa Foot's comments abou t mora l teaching , I suggest a way o f underminin g the standard dichotom y betwee n internalis m and externalis m i n contemporar y metaethics by connecting motivational forc e to th e general moral functio n of "ought," as presupposed i n teaching the term, rather tha n t o it s meaning in a given judgment. The resulting view, which I call "general internalism," amounts to a modification of externalism to provide a nonaccidental link between moral judgment an d motivation . I attemp t t o sho w tha t i t yield s a mor e plausible account of various problematic metaethical issues than standard internalis m or externalism. In particular, I argue that the view is needed to make sense of moral dilemmas. Standar d version s o f internalism , a s represente d b y th e view s o f Joh n McDowell an d J. L. Mackie, see m to b e unable to accoun t fo r dilemma s adequately. B y switching t o genera l internalism, however , I sho w ho w w e ca n extract fro m elements o f bot h views an explanatio n o f dilemmas i n term s of the conception o f ethics as a social artifact with a link to individual motivation provided by emotion. Par t I ends with some of the implications of my proposed metaethical alternative, which I defend as a version of moral realism . Part II turns to guilt and related reactions to moral wrong, initially considered without distinction , a s emotional residue s of moral conflict or more generally of "mora l failure " i n the sens e of ought-violation. I n chapter 4 I sho w the significance of guilt feelings as a link between virtue and duty ethics. I then attempt a mor e specifi c accoun t o f th e natur e an d functio n o f guil t a s a n identificatory mechanism , eventuall y distinguishing it fro m sham e an d othe r similar moral feelings that do not necessarily involve identification with others, though m y view allows fo r their overla p with guilt in some cases . Next I turn t o question s abou t th e sens e in which guilt or an y emotiona l reaction can be morally required—as guilt seems to be in typical cases of moral failure—in ligh t of the principle that "ought"-implies-"can. " I n application t o dilemmas, these are questions abou t a judgment of "ought-to-feel" tha t might be thought o f a s offering a way out—a n indirect way o f satisfying the ough t that i s not acted on—for agents with enoug h control to generate the requisite emotion. I argue, however, that this suggestion needs to be qualified in important ways. Among other things, there are second-order dilemmas in some cases,

Introduction 5

in which guilt feelings would interfere with effective actio n on the ought that is supposed t o be satisfied directly , by taking action . In chapter 5 I address objections to classifying th e agent's reaction a s guilt in situations of dilemma on the grounds that guilt implies a judgment of culpability. In application initially to nondilemmatic cases of guilt for the unavoidable, I defend a view of the prepositional conten t o f guilt according t o which the emotion involve s an "a s if " version o f the corresponding evaluativ e judgment, not necessarily an evaluation that the agent believes. On the question of appropriateness, my approach yields an asymmetry between guilt and emotional blame that I take to explain any reluctance we may have to impose guilt on the agent in a dilemma. The differen t positio n o f the subjec t in relation to guil t as opposed t o blame licenses a different sor t of assessment o f emotional warrant , so that les s is required to warrant guilt. I go on to defen d a corresponding ob jective notio n o f guilt in application t o mora l dilemmas , thought o f a s cases where all the agent's options for action ar e wrong . In chapte r 6 I focus agai n o n th e metaethica l position emergin g from m y argument, as introduced in chapter 1 and developed in chapter 3. After drawing out som e o f the implication s of my motivational interpretatio n o f the rol e of moral emotion , I attempt t o sho w ho w th e "socia l artifact" versio n of mora l realism can allo w for a n elemen t of expressivism and othe r view s commonly thought of in contrast to realism—most notably relativism—without entailing acceptance of those views . On it s most genera l characterization, th e resul t of my argument is thus a defense of commonsense ethics against the problems raised by dilemmas, by way o f an extended treatmen t o f the base s of ethics in moral emotion.

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I BETWEEN THE HORN S

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1 Defusing Dilemma s

In the past twenty-five year s or s o a number of philosophers hav e argued fo r the possibility of full-blown mora l dilemmas : cases in which al l of the agent' s alternatives, through no fault of his own, turn out to be morally wrong. Other authors have attempted to dismiss such cases as undermining the rational coherency of ethics, on th e moder n conceptio n o f ethics as essentially a system of rules meant to guide action. A good specimen of the sort of case at issue in the literature is provided by one of Michael Walzer's examples in his contribution to a 1973 symposiu m on the rules of war with Thomas Nagel, Richard Brandt, and R . M. Hare. 1 The case assumes that torture i s necessary to get a terroris t to giv e away the whereabouts o f bomb s set to g o off throughout th e city but that tortur e stil l remain s wrong unde r thes e circumstances—alon g wit h th e agent's onl y other alternative, which involves letting the bombs destroy many innocent civilians. The case is one in which our ordinary moral code fails to yield coherent mora l advice—in Nagel' s word s i t set s th e agen t i n a "mora l blin d alley"—since it apparently rule s out al l alternatives.2 Brand t and Hare argue in opposition t o this account tha t suc h acts as torturing th e terrorist, eve n i f normally wrong , do not reall y count a s wrong under the circumstances. 3 Instea d o f relying on general rules such as the one prohibiting torture, we should appeal in a case of conflict t o straightforwar d utilitaria n assessments of the acts in question. Bu t note tha t someon e on either side of this dispute could agre e with Brand t an d Hare tha t utilitaria n considerations outweig h principled objections to tortur e in Walzer's cas e when i t comes t o a practical decision . Th e disput e concern s not what to do in such cases but whether the action one must do, morally speaking, can stil l be wrong. For a case that poses the issue more sharply, we might set up alternatives of roughly the same sort and attemp t t o brin g them into balance. Walzer's cas e involves doing active harm i n order to sav e lives, but consider a possible case from sp y fiction i n which someon e ha s stumble d across plans fo r a politica l assassination an d is threatened with the murder of a family member unless she remains silent. Here the agent may be made out as choosing between two fail ures to save a life—on th e assumption that she is all set to inform o n the assassins when they reveal that the family member is under threat and will be killed unless she holds back. Each of her alternatives—failing to save the family mem9

10 Between

the Horns

ber and failing to save the assassin's intended victim—would seem to be forbidden b y th e mora l rules . B y adjusting amounts o f har m tha t woul d ensu e and similar morally significant features of the case, we could presumably make both alternatives come out as about equall y wrong on the view that allows for dilemmas—or not wrong after all , apparently, on the view favored by Brandt and Hare. At issue in this "balanced" assassinatio n case , on m y understanding of dilemmas, is whether the term "wrong" makes sense apart from a comparison of options i n which at leas t one act comes ou t a s right. Proponents o f dilemmas interpret "wrong " as applying to som e property o f acts that i s not essentially comparative, and the phenomenology of moral experience seems to bear them out. Though in some cases the availability of a better alternative may be all that makes us count an act as wrong, that is not our initial reason for holding in the assassination case that it would be wrong to allow a murder. It also seems that, whatever the agen t decide s to d o here , i t will be reasonable fo r he r t o fee l a sense of guilt for allowing a murder. On the other hand, the logic of moral discourse ma y seem to requir e taking the comparativ e poin t abou t "wrong " a s understood an d dismissing guilt feelings as inappropriate where an agent makes the best choice possible under the circumstances . I shall eventually argue, in the chapters that follow, that guilt can indeed be made out a s appropriate i n such cases—not jus t an understandabl e spillover from mor e normal cases but rather a warranted reactio n t o whichever act the agent decides to do. This account will yield a way of making sense of the pos sibility of dilemmas, for n o compariso n o f alternatives seems to b e built into the clai m that a virtuous agent would vie w some ac t a s a stai n o n her mora l record. Just a s every one of a set of exhaustive alternatives can b e ugly or up setting or in some other way repugnant, so there is no strictly logical problem in supposing that al l of an agent's alternatives warrant guilt. There might seem to be a logical problem with conflicting ought-judgments themselves, but i n the contemporary debat e ove r dilemma s to b e outlined i n the present chapter this at any rate has been shown to be false: It begs the question at issue in dilemmas to suppose that the prohibition of an act implies that some alternativ e to i t is not prohibited—a s we would nee d to sa y in order t o derive a straightforward logical contradiction fro m the prohibition o f all alternatives. However, even if dilemmas involve no contradiction, the y seem to make impossible demand s of an agent . I n warranting guil t for unavoidabl e wrong, they subjec t a n agent t o "mora l luck, " meanin g moral responsibilit y for fac tors beyon d hi s control.4 More fundamentally , they seem to pos e a threat t o the very intelligibility of ethics as a system of rules meant to guide action. It is unclear how moral judgments can be thought o f as telling an agent what to d o in a case of practical deadlock, where everythin g he can do i s forbidden. In this chapter, I hope to brin g out som e more particular question s raise d by dilemmas for the view of ethics as essentially action-guiding. I take these t o be variants of a historical problem about the motivational force of obligation . In fact, I shall suggest that dilemmas also reveal the main lines of an answer t o these more general metaethical questions in the role they assign to guilt. Let me

Defusing Dilemmas 1

1

first fil l i n some of the philosophical background on dilemmas and attempt t o show how the issue bears on metaethics (section 1). I shall then be in a position to giv e an ide a of my own intende d argument and it s implications for ethics and mora l psychology (section 2). In general terms, I think we can use dilemmas to exhibi t the motivational structure of an ethic s that i n some sense rests on psycholog y yet escapes between the horns of some standard way s of making out th e relation between the two. It does so on my account by reference to the social role and origin s of moral motivation .

1. Mora l Dilemmas an d Motivationa l Forc e Dilemmas first surfac e a s problems for the coherency o f action-guiding ethics in the modern literature, with its emphasis since Kant on notions of obligation. Aquinas had earlier restricted conflic t to cases of prior wrongdoing on the part of th e agent , apparently in answer t o question s o f moral luc k raised b y Gregory the Great' s view of dilemmas as traps set by the devil. 5 If the devi l could trap a n innocen t agent int o doin g wrong , then presumabl y not al l evildoers would deserve eternal punishment. But the claim that all alternatives are wrong is not thus problematic as applied to an author o f prior evil, already consigned to hell by a just god . Instead, th e clai m seem s t o rais e problem s fo r th e vie w of a n agen t a s "bound" to act by obligation independentl y of some sanction like the threat of divine punishment. Thus, Kant denied the possibility of moral dilemmas, seen as conflictin g obligations, o n a notio n o f obligatio n a s "mora l necessity." 6 Though it might make sense to say of Aquinas's evil agent in a dilemma that he has to do two incompatible acts in order to get to heaven—at least as a way of saying that heave n i s by now beyon d hi s reach—the clai m tha t h e "ha s to " simpliciter would just seem incoherent. Such metaphors of necessity refer to obedience t o la w as a kin d o f compulsion, an d fo r Kan t they also have a literal application t o the holy or perfectly rational will, which is moral by nature. The moral la w simply describes the natural behavior o f a holy will, so any obligations derived from it on Kantian assumptions must be capable of joint fulfillment. Moral philosopher s afte r Kan t allow fo r an d ofte n emphasiz e conflict of obligations, bu t not of a sort that clearly involves dilemmas. In most cases dilemmas are ruled out: Ross, for instance, limits conflict to prima faci e duties, only one of which in any conflicting set can amount t o a n actual duty in the sense that implies really being in force.7 The suggestion tha t there might be genuine dilemmas seems to have emerged only in recent years as a product of the attempt to formalize Kantian assumptions abou t moral necessit y in deontic logic . Deontic logic , th e logi c of obligation, wa s se t up o n th e mode l o f alethi c modal logic, the logic of necessity and possibility, with moral requirement taken as analogous to necessary truth except for its failure to imply truth; but a number of paradoxical consequences immediately raised questions about the analogy.8 Undermining it opened the door to the possibility of dilemmas, not as a further problem for deontic logic—except insofar as the standard system lacked

12 Between

the Horns

the resources t o capture dilemmas—but rather as an insight into the nature of the ethic s o f duty , th e moder n approac h t o ethic s exemplifie d by Kant. Th e suggestion was picked up by moral philosophers and interpreted a s in some way problematic for ethics, but with disagreement about the extent to which it undermined ethical rationality. Let us take a look a t the highlights of that debate , in enough detail for a reconception o f the problem .

Dilemmas in Contemporary Duty Ethics Dilemmas were introduced into the nontechnical literature by a logician, E. J. Lemmon, in an article published in The Philosophical Review in 1962.9 Lemmon understood dilemma s as cases in which an agent both ought an d ought no t t o do the same thing. In typical cases he took the m to be explained by the derivation o f oughts fro m thre e differen t sources : dutie s (base d on th e agent's posi tion or status), obligations (base d instead on acts of commitment), and general moral principles. Thus , in Plato's well-known case of weapons borrowe d fro m someone wh o then goes mad and demands their return, the agent has to choos e between fulfillin g a n obligatio n based o n his promise an d satisfyin g th e mor e general obligation t o prevent harm. 10 Lemmon treats Plato's case as resolvable by appeal t o a higher-order utilitarian principle, but he also brings up Sartre's case of a young man in occupied France who ha s to choose betwee n joining the resistance an d stayin g home t o support his dependent mother. 11 This case apparently involves a choice between two ought s o f the same sort: duties based o n the agent's differen t role s as son and citizen. Lemmon treats the evidence bearing on the choice as inconclusive, but th e cas e provide s a t leas t the framewor k for a full-blown dilemma to th e extent that it is not clearly decidable by appeal to the agent's preexisting moral attitudes. I n a full-blow n dilemm a o n Lemmon' s account , th e agen t ha s t o develop a new moral outlook i n deciding what to do—which i n this case would seem to mea n identifyin g himsel f with one of his conflicting roles . Lemmon's accoun t leave s a number of questions unanswered : It is unclear, in particular, whether the choice of a new moral outloo k i s supposed to resolve a dilemma or to leav e it in force. At any rate, Lemmo n make s out the proble m raised b y dilemma s a s a proble m fo r th e adequac y o f genera l philosophica l approaches t o ethics : approaches h e sees as tailored t o "th e easy , rule-guided moral situation."12 In strictly logical terms, he takes dilemmas to be unproblematic, a s h e think s ca n b e show n b y contrasting "ought " wit h "must. " Tha t "must" and "mus t not " ar e incompatible he takes to follo w fro m th e fact (or presumed fact; I shall question it in chapter 2) that "must" implies "will." "H e will" and "he will not" canno t bot h be true, so neither can "He must" an d "H e must not." Bu t the argument does not apply to "ought": The possibility of violating an ought amount s to the basic point of disanalogy betwee n deonti c and alethic modal logic . The next major discussion of dilemmas occurs in Bernard Williams's defense of th e consistenc y of conflicting oughts , initially published in the Proceedings of th e Aristotelian Society in 1965.13 Williams argues that dilemmas violate stan-

Defusing Dilemmas 1

3

dard deonti c assumption s t o th e exten t tha t the y force a choice betwee n th e principle that "ought" implies "can" an d a principle of deontic distribution that he refers to as "agglomeration" an d decides to drop—in contrast to Lemmon , who instead rejects "ought"-implies-"can."14 With O as an operator for "ought" and A and B as variables describing possible acts, we may symboliz e agglom eration as : OA and O B imply O(A & B) . In dilemmatic cases, wher e A and B are assumed to be incompatible, it will not be possible to satisfy their conjunction, so O(A & B ) will violate "ought"-implies-"can. " Williams's articl e ha s bee n widely disputed i n the ethic s literatur e fo r hi s apparent argumen t to th e existence of dilemmas from mora l emotio n an d fo r the metaethical conclusions he uses dilemmas to support. H e sets up dilemmas a bit differently fro m Lemmon , focusing on cases of contingent conflict, where the several things one ought to do are not logically incompatible but are jointly unrealizable in the worl d a s it happens to be . The case Williams presents a s a full-blown dilemma is one in which there may be no uncertainty about what t o do, assuming that one ought to do what is "for the best": the case of Aeschylus' Agamemnon, who as military commander has to sacrifice his daughter Iphigenia to secure the success of the Gree k fleet. 15 Despite its false religious assumptions, Agamemnon's case is well chosen t o illustrate the basis of dilemmas in moral emotion. Having killed his daughter , Agamemnon i s expected t o fee l ba d abou t hi s actio n eve n i n th e absenc e o f reasons fo r doub t abou t whethe r i t was fo r th e best . Hi s conflic t canno t b e resolved "without remainder " insofar as it leaves a kind of affective residue that Williams identifie s as regre t an d defend s as a rationall y appropriat e mora l reaction. Wha t William s wants t o sa y on thi s basi s is that th e "ought " tha t Agamemnon has to violate is still in force rather than bein g canceled or qualified in the way that ethical theories often assume . Agamemnon's conflict therefore resemble s a conflic t o f desires , i n which th e rejecte d elemen t doe s no t simply vanish but ma y reappea r i n affective form—o r sometimes wit h a different object , as in cases involving obligations to make u p fo r a violation of obligation. In mor e genera l terms , th e cas e o f Agamemnon i s supposed t o exhibi t a disanalogy between ought-judgments and belief s that Williams takes in a later article as undermining moral realism, understood a s involving commitment t o an independent reality that makes moral judgments true or false.16 On Williams's account, in contrast to a conflict of desires, a conflict of belief s is decided by eliminating one of the conflicting elements. The conflict between beliefs means that one of them must be wrong, unlike ought-judgments, which may both remain in force despite a conflict. This point against moral realism has received critical attention from Philippa Foot an d othe r authors 17 a s the upsho t o f Williams's treatment o f dilemmas . But dilemma s surface often i n Williams's writings, alon g wit h othe r case s of conflict—in discussions of utilitarianism, "dirty hands" i n political life, and incommensurable values—apparently as basic ethical data with divers e implications.18 I n the firs t instance , they are used just to provide an extreme contras t to cases of conflict i n which one o f the conflicting ought s is canceled.

14 Between

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On Williams's view, dilemmatic oughts are neither canceled nor overridden . He later distinguishe s an intermediat e sort o f case that als o involves a moral remainder, albeit one characterize d somewha t differentl y i n terms of feeling . In contrast to dilemmas—which are now set up negatively, as "tragic" cases in which all alternatives are wrong—there ar e fairly common cases of utilitarian trade-offs in political life in which right action still incurs a "moral cost." Though the agent does not do wrong simpliciter, h e has to wrong someone—there is a victim o f hi s action , wh o ha s a justifie d complaint—an d hi s ac t retain s a n "uncancelled moral disagreeableness," reflecte d in an appropriate reactio n o f disquiet or distaste. 19 A deeper form of regret is apparently reserved for dilemmatic cases, thoug h William s stops shor t o f ascribin g guilt to th e agen t i n a dilemma. Guilt may be thought to b e irrational in a case where, through no faul t of his own, the agent cannot avoid doing wrong, on the assumption that the reaction can b e justified onl y if one i s guilty. However, som e later essays by logicians do defend guilt, in different ways , as the appropriate reaction to dilemmas. Bas van Fraasse n take s appropriat e feeling s o f guil t t o depen d o n actua l o r objective guilt, but he holds that guilt for the unavoidable is shown to be coherent in objective terms by the doctrine of original sin; Ruth Marcus expresses doubts about this but notes that th e objec t of guilt in a dilemma, the particular alternative tha t i s rejected, is not unavoidabl e in itself . Van Fraasse n i s one o f a number o f authors who follo w Lemmon in attributing dilemmas to multipl e sources or grounds of obligation, extendin g Lemmon's account with a notio n of incommensurable values or reasons, whereas Marcus defends the possibility of single-principle conflicts at leas t for deontological conception s of the right. Van Fraassen takes dilemmas to call into question presuppositions of standard deontic logic, seen as including an assumptio n linking "ought" to what i s for the best. 20 A more detailed account in terms of incommensurability is provided by Nagel in a discussion identifying fiv e fundamental types of value—and ultimately the clash betwee n agent- an d outcome-centere d standpoint s o f evaluation—as sources o f dilemma. 21 On NageP s view, dilemmas undermine the unifiabilit y of ethics conceived as the search for general principles, as opposed t o a "fragmentary" approac h t o th e subjec t relyin g on the exercise of judgment in particular cases. However, dilemma s attributable t o multipl e standpoints, o r ground s of obligation or social roles, could be handled by keying oughts to these differen t sources, as in Hector-Neri Castaneda' s alternativ e system of deontic logic with its subscripted version of O. 22 S o it is important tha t Nage l briefl y allow s fo r conflicts within his several categories23 and henc e between unqualified (o r a t any rate, similarly qualified) ought-judgments. The common reaction that dilemmas as thus understood woul d mak e ethics in some way incoherent o r incon sistent gets its first sustained argument in an article by Terrance McConnell. 24 McConnell cites John Rawl s along with Castaneda an d David Lyons to illus trate the widespread assumption that a n adequate moral theory must exclude dilemmas; Marcus adds Donald Davidson to the list of well-known contempo-

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rary philosophers wh o treat conflictin g oughts a s evidence of a contradictio n in the existing moral code.25 But against these authors Marcus defends the code that yields dilemmas as indeed consistent . For our purposes, wha t McConnell picks out as his second sens e of ethical inconsistency is what is relevant: On th e standard assumptio n that a n obliga tion to do B entails an obligation to do whatever B requires, dilemmas involve commitment to bot h O A and O~A . This i s to sa y that Williams' s contingen t notion of dilemmas yields dilemmas in Lemmon's sense, in which the same act is both required and forbidden—a strange consequence that violates some highly intuitive principles of standard deontic logic , thoug h i t may no t b e logically questionable in itself. On the other hand, Marcus essentially argues that the general rules that give rise to contingent dilemmas need not b e inconsistent even in practical terms, so that ethics conceived as a system of rules is not undermine d by the derivation of incompatible directives. She does so by putting forth a definition of consistency for rules that count s as consistent an y set of rules that can be obeyed in all circumstances in some possible world, eve n if not in the actual world.26 Ou r moral code will not be deficient as a guide to action in the actual world as long as it meets this weaker requirement of consistency, since Marcus takes the code to include a second-order regulativ e principle enjoining th e avoidance of conflict. This is the action required of us in dilemmatic cases, and feeling s of guilt are justified b y the role they play in motivating it—a t any rate in future cases , or before a given dilemma becomes unavoidable. Assuming that violating any obligation incurs at least a small burden of guilt—a need to make explanations and excuses—Marcu s extend s th e accoun t o f dilemmas in terms of unerase d obligations beyond those cases Williams acknowledges, t o include even trivial ought-conflicts. The result would see m to b e a view of dilemmas and guil t as pervading the moral life . In defense o f a Kantian approach t o ethics, however, Alan Donagan refor mulates McConnell's charg e of practical inconsistenc y agains t proponents o f dilemma who rejec t the principle of agglomeration—including all authors afte r Lemmon in this overview—by comparing th e ultimate moral authority on any such accoun t t o Captai n Quee g i n Th e Caine Mutiny. 27 Captai n Quee g wa s found mentall y incompetent, partl y on the grounds tha t he issued conflicting orders. By the same token, moralit y would b e "absurd," even if not inconsis tent, i f it subjected us to conflicting commands. O n Donagan's rationalis t as sumptions, then , we may reject a moral syste m as "il l constructed" i f its pre cepts canno t b e agglomerated. Donaga n see s Marcu s a s instea d modifyin g "ought"-implies-"can," sinc e she restricts the principle to first-order rules, but as thus interpreted her appeal to the second-order regulativ e principle that tells us to avoid conflict involves treating morality as an unreachable ideal.28 Essen tially, then, our choice between the two principles, "ought"-implies-"can " and agglomeration, amount s to a choice betwee n th e action-guidin g function of ethics and it s rationality or coherency as a product o f human thought. The bulk of Donagan's argumen t against dilemmas amounts to an attemp t to account for the facts of moral conflict within his rationalist preconceptions .

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Like McConnell (followin g Aquinas) , he exempts the evildoer' s self-impose d conflicts a s no threat t o ethical consistency, bu t h e handles other case s either by challenging the validity of one of the conflicting considerations or b y denying that th e choice betwee n them can b e moral. Othe r author s hav e added a positive accoun t o f th e emotiona l fact s o f conflict; the bes t know n i s Hare's two-level utilitarian explanation in terms of general habits of emotional response instilled i n u s as th e mos t efficien t wa y o f motivatin g mora l behavio r under normal circumstances. 29 But the main charge against dilemmas seems to be some version of incoherency of the sort illustrated by Donagan's Captai n Queeg case. There are other, more specialized treatments of dilemma.30 I have presented only highlights of the debate in order t o exhibit the central problem dilemma s seem to raise for moral theory. In the first instance, it is a problem about whether "ought" can play the strong action-guiding role, as a vehicle for expressing moral commands, tha t appear s to be assigned to it by the modern ethics of duty. For the assumptio n behin d the charg e of practical incoherenc y is that conflicting moral judgments cannot mak e sense if taken at fac e valu e as telling the agen t what to do, in contrast t o their interpretation i n the cases Aquinas accepted, as essentially serving to punish an agent for prior wrong . That the derivation of conflicting commands amounts to a perfectly intelligible foul-up of an ethical system or its fit to th e world—one tha t ma y not b e fully attributabl e to problem s in assessing value —seems t o b e an overlooke d alternative. Indeed, as I shall go on to indicate, even Williams fails to leave room for thi s possibility . Marcus's view makes room fo r somethin g lik e it, bu t de clines to acknowledge it as a foul-up. I take it to be based on a view of ethics as a necessaril y imperfect human product, bu t no more incoheren t than a hypothetical pinbal l machine tha t registers "tilt " unde r circumstance s othe r tha n player error. This results in a nasty surprise, as on the view of dilemmas as traps of th e devil . On m y own account , though , dilemma s ar e explained b y limitations of the mechanism rather tha n b y fiendish intention . My overvie w here als o omit s some o f the meatie r case s o f dilemma: newsworthy cases of "moral blackmail" on the model o f the choice between lettin g hostages b e killed and encouraging further terroris m b y negotiating for their release, and variou s other real-lif e an d literary cases such as (in one example) the woman's choice between family duty and duty to self in Ibsen's A Doll's House. 31 I focus instead throughout this essay on variants of a few cases dealt with at length in the philosophical literature, plus some rather streamlined additions like the case of Captai n Queeg , t o illustrat e the problem dilemma s seem to pose for action guiding duty ethics. I shall later argue that it is a soluble problem, i f we make a number of important distinction s on the understanding of action-guiding status. At thi s point, however, I want t o identif y i t a s a problem an d t o sho w ho w i t bears on more general concerns i n the history of moral philosophy.

The Problem for Practical "Ought" Donagan uses the Captain Queeg case against a command-based view of ethics like van Fraassen's . Bu t it is worth notin g that a mora l legislato r responsible

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for dilemmas need not come out with straightforwardly conflicting commands— to swab an d no t t o swa b the deck, say—bu t only with ought-judgment s that imply such commands, give n further fact s about th e world and a strong inter pretation o f "ought." We would be less likely to question Queeg' s sanity or legal competence—more likel y to attribute the conflict to change of mind, forgetful ness, an d simila r norma l menta l imperfections—if he had issue d two contin gently conflicting commands, as on Williams's account o f dilemmas. The conflict migh t even be rather obvious : Imagine a harried mother' s commands t o her children to clean up and (i n the same breath) to kee p still. Donagan's analogy seems to mix together differen t sort s of criticism, then. I want t o disentangl e on e o f them, th e on e correspondin g t o th e charg e of incoherency, for discussion in what follows. His statement of the Captain Queeg analogy in terms o f commands mask s a distinction between irrationalit y and unreasonableness: If Queeg had simply come out with conflicting requirements— requirements for adequate performance in a certain rank, say (perhaps as criteria for promotion)—the fact that it would be impossible to act on both of them might be seen as canceling the natural interpretation o f his statements as commands. Issuing them would still undermine his authority t o some extent, since it would show him to be an impossible person to satisfy. But it is another question whethe r hi s statements mak e no sense , as one migh t want t o sa y of th e conflicting command s issue d by the mother i n my example . Of course, morality or the moral code might be said to be in a special position, since it is not subject to the mental limitations—of knowledge and memory, of change in perspective over time—that characterize human legislators and judges. Morality presumabl y means what i t says, along wit h al l the consequence s of what i t says, at an y given time. Similarly for God. Bu t Donagan need s the sor t of distinction just illustrated in order to make an exception of Aquinas's dilemmas fo r th e evildoer . Ho w woul d Go d b e cleared o f incoherency i n his com mands at a given time—where that implie s a failure t o mak e sense, or irrationality—by the fact that the conflict between them is attributable to the agent's prior moral error ? The agent i s punished in such cases wit h unreasonabl e requirements—or with requirements that would be unreasonable if he were innocent. Imposin g the m o n a n innocen t perso n i n full-fledge d case s o f dilemma would presumably support an objection from unfairness , or moral luck, which Donagan an d other s might see as involving an incoherency i n our moral con cepts or in the nature and purposes attributed to God as a moral judge. So this more general incoherency rather than incoherency in the conflicting commands themselves seems to b e what i s in question. However, what if one thinks of ethics or morality—I shall use the two terms interchangeably—as primarily an instrument of social rationality, eithe r manmade o r designe d wit h huma n limitation s in mind? Dilemmas migh t the n be explained a s side effect s o f the pursui t of perfectly coherent genera l purpose s with a moral code tailored to reflec t thes e limitations, and we might deny any possibility of appeal beyond them to som e more ultimat e level of moral trut h that woul d resolv e the conflict. 32 With moral luc k thus accepte d a s a fac t o f ethical life, dilemmas may still be said to undermine the authority of the moral

18 Between

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code t o som e exten t b y revealing its fallibility a s a guide to choice . Bu t it is a further ste p t o th e charg e tha t i t is incompetent t o legislate , on th e mode l of Captain Queeg . Williams is one author who seems to be eager to make room fo r moral luck, and in recent writings he attempts to undermine the notion of moral blame ; yet even he denies all-things-considered or "conclusive" practica l status to the ought that i s not acted o n in a dilemma.33 This ma y surprise some readers; h e is usually and naturally interpreted a s holding that dilemmas involve action-guiding oughts.34 I attempt t o she d ligh t on thi s issu e in chapter 2 . Fo r th e moment , however, le t us just note tha t othe r putativ e sense s of "ought, " distinguished for other purposes, migh t be called into service to capture dilemmas but do not seem to b e adequate t o captur e their problemati c aspect . A merely classifica tory ough t tha t migh t b e thought o f as "critical " o r "judgmental"—labelin g alternatives to a certain action as wrong but not actually telling the agent what to do—would no t seem to capture the sense in which an agent i n the grips of a dilemma is motivationally "torn. " Moreover, variou s weake r bu t stil l actionguiding senses of "ought" might be distinguished from the strong or imperatival sense that yields commands; thes e include commendatory or ideal "ought" and a prim a faci e o r other "ought " tha t record s a commitment o r othe r practica l reason but without fina l judgment as to whether it requires action. Just because they are in themselves relatively inert in motivational terms, though, these substitutes for conclusive practical "ought" seem to yield too easy a picture of dilemmatic choice . This problem i s brought ou t in its sharpest for m by what I call "balanced " dilemmas, wher e th e alternative s in questio n ar e abou t equall y wrong—an d seriously so, enough to justif y takin g both o f the conflicting oughts a s conclusive i n a moral sense . O f cours e the y cannot bot h determin e action , nor ca n they coherently be meant to d o so in conjunction. This i s essentially why Williams denies them conclusiv e practical status . Bu t his view here seem s t o cu t against the characterization o f dilemmas on Nagel's account , say , a s cases in which there is "decisive support" for incompatible alternatives: If an ought tha t seems to express "decisive and sufficient" reason s for action35 has practical or motivational force at all, how can the rational agent who accepts i t forgo actio n on i t in favor of its competitor? Williams cannot mean to say merely that its competitor i n fact wins the day. We shall have to as k what h e does (or should) mean by inquiring into some of the notions of deontic compariso n tha t come up in an attempt a t explanation . More generally , though, we need to ask whether it is possible to accommodat e dilemmas within a coheren t motivationa l pictur e of the mora l "ought. " Th e question that seems to emerge from the debate over the rationality of two com peting (an d in some sens e conclusive) practica l ought s ca n b e made ou t a s a new version of an old question in moral philosophy about the motivational forc e of obligation: How can the reason that "binds " a n agent to the performance of an obligatory act b e seen as compelling action? The question for dilemmas is how "compulsive " moral motivation can pull in opposing directions. We might think of motivational force in terms of vectors,

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which i n dilemmatic cases apparentl y ar e no t cancele d o r eve n weakened b y opposition. In mathematical terms, they do not combine to yield a single product. To retain their problematic aspect—t o defuse dilemmas as a threat to ethics rather than merely debunk or deflate them—we need to retain this difficult moti vational property. It is unclear how we can do this, however, o n standard ac counts of the relation of ethics to psychology. In motivational terms, standar d account s divide into those tha t mak e ou t the motivational force of moral judgments as dependent on some extracognitiv e psychological state of the agent, typically desire, and those that insist that belie f is sufficien t t o generat e the necessar y motivation for action . Account s o f th e latter sor t migh t b e said t o mak e mora l motivatio n "subject-independent, " meaning that its source is independent of the particular mind that holds a moral judgment (rather than minds generally). Subject-independent accounts are given by authors who would be classified in contemporary terminology as "internalis t realists" (sometime s "cognitivists"). Thes e authors hold, that is, both that the motivation t o ac t o n a mora l judgmen t is implied b y its meaning, so tha t a rational agent who holds it necessarily acts on it (internalism), and that mora l judgments describe some subject-independent facts about the world (realism).36 Accounts of motivational force that mak e it subject-dependent, on th e othe r hand, are given by authors who deny either one of these positions—holding either that moral motivation is provided b y something besides the content o f a mora l judgment (externalism) or that moral judgments either have no subject-independent content o r are false (antirealism). These terms are not without problems , bu t on the assumption tha t Hum e falls int o th e externalist-or-antirealis t categor y insofa r as h e gives a subjectdependent accoun t o f moral motivation , th e mai n positions o n motivationa l force can be illustrated by the contrast betwee n his view and Kant's. 37 Because of its link to obligation , which for Hume is secondary to virtue, the notion o f motivational forc e comes u p mor e explicitl y in Kant, thoug h Hume' s tal k of practical forc e an d o f the dependenc e of morality on sentimen t (including desire) can be understood a s contrasting wit h Kant's position. Roughl y speaking, then, I want t o say that th e choice betwee n Humean an d Kantian, or subjectdependent and subject-independent, approaches t o moral motivation amount s to a choice between making dilemmas implausibly easy on the agent in motivational terms and making them hard t o the point o f impossibility. Let us begin with Kant, whose positio n i s more clear-cut . I t is summed u p in general terms by his claim, shortly before he rules out conflicting obligations, that "i n discussing practical law s of reason we do not take [moral] feeling into account, since it does not concern th e ground of these laws but only the subjective effect whic h they have on ou r mind." 38 H e goes on t o give a version o f a common objectio n to emotion-base d theorie s of ethics—what I shall cal l th e charge of "subject-relativity"—i n view of the fac t that emotiona l motivatio n varies from on e mind to the next. However , fo r Kant—and in the general historical tradition of discussion of motivational force, which goes back to natu ral la w theorists—tal k of motivation is not limite d to subjectiv e causatio n o f the sort the objection questions, but rather refers in the first instance to the deter-

20 Between

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mination t o ac t b y considerations o f reason. 39 The poin t fo r ou r purpose s i s that motivational forc e in this sense, if built into the meaning of a moral judgment, would indeed seem to rule out belief in conflicting judgments on the part of an agent who is fully rational. To hold bot h of two ought-judgments known to be in conflict would be to attempt t o act on both of them and hence to attemp t to do what on e knew to b e impossible. At any rate, this holds for "conclusive" ought-judgments , on an all-or-nothing interpretation o f their motivational force. But on Kantia n cognitivist assumptions, th e connection betwee n belief in and actio n o n a given ought-judgment would not seem to allow for any independent variation in degree. So a less than firm tendenc y t o act , o n th e par t o f a rationa l agen t (rationa l in a sens e tha t rules out weaknes s of will), would have to b e explained in terms of some similarly qualified belief—no t the sort of conclusive or "all-things-considered" judgment we have in a full-blown dilemma. Do dilemma s se t u p i n term s o f practica l "ought " far e an y bette r o n a Humean o r other subject-dependen t approach? Her e we have a wider range of possibilities to consider , bu t i f we limit ourselves for th e moment to standar d forms o f subject-dependence, it is hard t o se e how the y can yield an adequat e motivational pictur e o f dilemmas . What i s in question , le t u s assume , i s th e strength o f an agent's desire s to ac t on eac h o f the ought s i n conflict. Subjectdependent views divide, though, over the question whether this connection t o desire is in some sense given in the content o f an ought-judgment. At this point, let us assume that it is, in line with the standard readin g of Hume as an internalist antirealist. Now , i f an agent were full y attune d i n these terms to bot h side s of a conflict, the problem just outlined for subject-independent views would see m to apply here too. S o instead we need to assume that the agent's motivation t o act on one of the oughts in conflict is weak enough to permit action on the other. In that case, on our current understanding of the content o f an ought-judgment, at least one of the judgments in question woul d itsel f be weakened accordingly to a prima faci e ought-judgment , and w e would los e the sense of "all-things considered" conflic t that accounts fo r the motivational difficult y o f dilemmas. This is to say that dilemmas become to o unproblemati c o n a standard sor t of Humean approach . The y apparently ar e assimilate d to case s of prima facie ought-conflict. But the resultant picture of choice in a dilemma seems in a certain sense to b e too easy : It is as if Agamemnon o r the agen t i n my balanced assas sination cas e i n section 1 had simpl y to weig h u p pros and con s an d decide , flipping a coin o r th e lik e to brea k an y ties , wit h variou s compensatory act s and feeling s see n as calle d fo r b y the ac t thu s chose n bu t wit h an y opposin g motives under th e circumstances canceled out . Th e agent ough t t o fee l some thing like horror a t the choice, perhaps; bu t this and similar moral reactions on the standar d pictur e seem to b e felt mor e o r les s on the side , not a s part o f his current motivation to take action but rather as contemplative responses to action on the model o f an aesthetic reaction . In fact , I shall go o n t o sugges t ways o f modifyin g this picture in defens e of a roughly Humean approach, thoug h one whose conten t I shall understand as subject-independent , in a sens e sufficien t t o answe r th e charg e of subject -

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relativity. At this point, however, I want to blur over some distinctions I make later, to set up the problem my argument is meant to address. In short, the standard approache s availabl e in the literature to handl e moral dilemma s fac e u s with a metaethica l dilemma: They make dilemmas either too problematic , i n the sens e o f bein g practicall y difficult t o th e poin t o f impossibility , o r to o unproblematic: too easy on the agent in motivational terms to capture th e difficulty o f dilemmatic choice. The second horn of this metaethical dilemma covers several distinguishable sorts of inadequacies in accounts of dilemma. As a further instance of it, suppose we now try the other Humean view I allowed for and think of subject-dependent motivational forc e a s extrinsi c to th e meanin g o f a n ought-judgment . Thi s amounts in contemporary terms to a shift fro m internalis m to externalism. But it would see m to attribut e to the agent i n a dilemma the kind of motivational detachment fro m a moral judgment that i n extreme form amounts to motivational "amoralism " (sometime s called accidie)—the lac k of any inclination to do what one believe s to b e required—here explained jus t b y the impossibility of satisfying all requirements. On the resulting account, dilemmati c oughts could both b e recognized as all-things-considered, bu t w e would hav e to den y that they could bot h b e practical—meant to guide action, that is to say, as used by the agen t wh o ex hypothesi hold s both o f them. The agent might still feel morally torn between alternatives, but the point is that this motivational effect woul d no longer b e attributable to the judgments he applies to the case. It seems to be an accidental effect, dependen t on what a particular agen t happen s t o feel , an d henc e to b e vulnerable to th e charg e of subject-relativity. Even if we grant that a normal agent will feel pulled in bot h directions i n the situation of dilemmatic choice—or i n Humean terms that i t is part of human nature to feel tha t way—we cannot conclud e that such feeling s are appropriate t o the situation or in some way called for by it.40 This versio n of the Humean account , then, seems not to have the resources t o represent the authoritative status of moral claims, as imposing requirements upon minds rather than merel y allowing for whatever desire s mind s happen t o have. 41 So again (but in another sense ) dilemmas seem to b e made too easy . What if we respond to these difficulties i n the obvious way, by rejecting the possibility of dilemmas? In fact, I think that problems similar to those just noted can be seen to arise in another for m for an attempt to capture the psychologi cal phenomena of ought-conflict without recognizing dilemmas. Consider Hare's attempt t o explai n the agent's reaction s i n cases o f conflict as appropriate t o more norma l sort s o f cases, cases covered by the simpl e rules we learn a s children an d generally find adequat e to the moral life , though w e also can appea l beyond them to utilitarian considerations wher e the y conflict. In the rare situation of conflict on Hare's account, guilt, remorse, and similar moral reaction s to wron g would actuall y be inappropriate i n representational terms—on e of the agent's options woul d no t really be wrong—but th e feelings would stil l be valuable as signs of a good mora l upbringing. 42 Indeed, some for m o f moral distress a t what he has to d o seems to b e required of the agent in a dilemma if we are to think well of him.

22 Between

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That las t clai m ma y see m t o b e born e ou t b y Aeschylus ' treatmen t o f Agamemnon, for instance. 43 I n general, Hare's account of the feelings expected of a moral agent in many ways resembles my own intended account i n this essay, but hi s metaethical presuppositions yiel d a different vie w of conflict—a view I take to be inadequate in the end to capture even the subjective aspect of dilemmas across th e board . T o se e this, le t us first as k how th e emotiona l require ments Hare would impos e on the agent in a case of conflict are supposed to fit into his utilitarianism. Hare's discussion of moral education suggest s a justifi cation o f emotion a s a precondition o f personal virtue, but hi s overall view is put fort h as a two-level version of act-utilitarianism. Emotions woul d seem to come out, i n that case, as required only in light of the generally good effect s of inculcating virtue. But it does not seem obvious that this approach woul d yield a requiremen t o f emotio n i n al l cases o f putativ e dilemma—or specificall y a requirement to fee l guilt or som e similar negative self-directed emotion o f the sort that th e relevant cases assume . We would no t b e satisfied, that is , by an Agamemnon wh o reacte d simply with horror or some other form of anxiety at his action viewed externally, without evaluativ e focus on hi s own rol e i n it a s agent . W e see m to deman d th e negative self-focu s of guilt and relate d emotions—a t a minimum , Williams's "agent-regret"—in respons e to a seriously wrong act.44 But it is unclear whether we can always justify this in utilitarian terms, in part just because the situatio n of dilemm a i s so rare . A reasonable se t o f utilitaria n rules prescribin g moral feelings woul d presumabl y make exceptions fo r cases tha t ca n b e seen not t o support th e usual role of feeling as a goad t o moral behavior . Bu t there might have been no reason to think that Agamemnon or anyone affected b y his actions would be likely to suffer specificall y as a result of his failure to feel guilt—enough so, at any rate, to justif y th e unpleasantness of that emotio n as something required above and beyon d an y public atonement he might offer . The mos t Hare's account ca n provide , i t seems, i n the wa y o f a requirement t o fee l guilt y in suc h cases i s another simpl e rule o n th e leve l o f thos e that ar e supersede d b y act-utilitarian calculations i n cases o f dilemma. Th e requirement to feel would itsel f be superseded, then, in the even t of conflict— as might well occur in a case lik e Agamemnon's, wher e guil t feelings woul d be likely to undermin e the performance o f act-utilitarian obligations . Moreover, thes e remark s appl y no t jus t to agent s lik e Agamemno n wh o happe n not t o fee l what is generally required of agents who hav e acte d similarl y but also t o som e agent s wh o d o mee t th e norma l expectations . I t i s sometime s possible, tha t is, to tal k onesel f ou t o f feeling guilty in cases wher e the emo tion is understood t o b e just an unfortunate side effect o f oversimplified rules learned i n childhood bu t late r refine d so as not to apply . I n such cases, par t of wha t on e doe s to ge t rid o f the feelin g i s to poin t t o th e evidenc e for it s inappropriateness—where tha t mean s it s failure t o represen t accuratel y th e particular situatio n a t hand . O n the sort of view Hare recommends, w e apparently lose the sense that guilt or the like is a correct respons e to the agent' s situation i n th e sens e that implie s accurate representation o f it—what I call rational (a s distinc t fro m mora l o r social ) appropriateness.45 S o where th e

Defusing Dilemmas 2

3

moral requiremen t to fee l i s superseded by act-utilitarian considerations, a n agent ough t simpl y to forg o guil t if he can manag e it. In my own argumen t I assume that th e rational appropriatenes s o f guilt is in question unles s otherwise noted . I shall later have much more t o sa y about the emotional requirements of cases like Agamemnon's, which might be thought of a s yieldin g a subjectiv e notion o f dilemmas . Subjectivel y speaking , dilem mas involve the appropriateness o f guilt for all alternatives, taking guilt broadly at thi s point t o includ e remorse an d simila r reactions t o a n ac t thought o f as wrong, thoug h I later mak e some more detailed distinctions. Apar t fro m thi s subjective sense, however, I do not intend to argue here for the existence of dilemmas. Instead, my central question is whether dilemmas as cases of unavoidable wrong threate n the coherency o f ethics. To address that question, I shall often assume in what follows that dilemmas in this objective sense exist, but the reader is free t o conditionaliz e my argument, taking i t as an indicatio n o f the prob lems to which acceptance o f dilemmas would give rise. In the first instance, then, my aim here is to escape the metaethical dilemm a set up in this section by showing how a reasonably authoritative conception o f ethics can coherently allow for dilemmas, without making them motivationally flaccid o r in some other wa y implausibly undemanding. I shall not attemp t t o convert th e reader t o a particular vie w on th e questio n o f dilemma s bu t just to provide a sensible rationale for such a view. This is also my aim with respec t to the broader questions, such as that of emotional appropriateness, tha t come up in connection with my treatment of dilemmas. Since these broader question s are important to my argument—they eventually will displace dilemmas, in fact, as its central focus—they require separate discussion .

2. Motivatin g Moral "Ought" The general problem of motivational force was posed i n contemporary term s by Elizabeth Anscombe in an argument for the abandonment of the specifically moral sense of "ought" in modern dut y ethics.46 Anscomb e favored an interpretatio n derived from th e Aristotelian ethics of virtue, and a contemporary mov e back to Aristotle's approach, with evaluations of persons and personal traits replacing actrequirements as the primary ethical judgments, now seems t o b e in full swing. 47 The problem just posed fo r dilemmas as practical conflict s fits int o this trend in the literatur e to the exten t tha t it cuts agains t a strong action-guidin g sens e of "ought." Anscombe's argument calls into question the moral sense of "ought" on the grounds that i t is at this point merely "emphatic": It rests on a mere appear ance of force left over from the earlier use of the word on natural law accounts in connection wit h divine judgment.48 Withou t th e view of ethics as based on laws promulgated by God, s o that motivational force could be understood concretel y in terms of a threat of God' s displeasure or o f punishment, there i s nothing t o support th e heavy stress laid on "ought" a s a distinctively moral notion . Moral dilemma s can now b e seen as providing a logically vivid illustration of th e impossibl e demands o n th e mora l "ought " accordin g t o thi s vie w of

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modern ethics . Th e problem the y raise fo r the practical coherenc y o f ethics — taken a s somethin g ove r an d abov e problem s o f moral luck—result s from a secular Kantian conception o f obligation as moral necessity. A strong interpre tation of "ought" in terms of divine punishment, though it would of course raise questions abou t God' s justice, might i n principle be handled b y hesitating t o attribute to God our notion of individual responsibility. O n the other hand, a weaker secular interpretatio n a s merely judgmental or at any rate not conclu sively practical—as referring simply to a commitment, say, or to liability to social condemnation—would mak e dilemma s in a sens e to o easy , i f my precedin g argument is correct. I t is emphatic "ought " that i s in question here, too, bu t in its action-guiding role, as providing the motivational force that Anscombe dismisses a s "purel y psychological " (p . 41), no w tha t th e ter m itsel f ha s bee n drained of content . The extended argument that follows amounts to a defense of "ought" against the motivationa l proble m raise d b y dilemmas along with som e othe r case s i n metaethical dispute. But rather than attempting to answer Anscombe's challeng e by supplying the missing content o f "ought," I shall suggest a two-componen t view of moral meanin g that separate s th e questio n o f the meanin g of a given judgment from the question o f its motivational force. My argument on motivational forc e will allow fo r differen t interpretation s o f the conten t o f "ought " rather than pinning it down precisely , though I shall also give an indicatio n of my ow n favore d vie w if only t o exhibi t it s departure fro m Anscomb e o n th e connection o f "ought" to natura l law . Anscombe's claim that the motivational forc e of "ought" is undermined by the abandonment of belief in natural law, the belief supporting its original interpretation, assume s tha t motivationa l forc e i s determined b y meaning . Thi s amounts to a version of internalism. Internalism seems to have emerged, in fact, during the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century transformations o f the natural law approach withi n British moral philosophy . Motivational force was initially understood a s something like a causally effective version of what Philippa Foot calls "reason-giving " force. 49 A moral judgmen t has reason-giving force for a certain agen t i f it supplie s her wit h a reaso n fo r doin g wha t i t prescribes— a reason tha t ha s to make sense in light of her interests and desires , though sh e need not therefore be motivated b y them to act on it. On natural law accounts , for instance , perhaps we could say that th e threat of divine punishment would count as a reason for obeying the law, even though some basically rational agents with insufficien t fea r o f divine punishment might no t b e motivated t o d o so , instead choosing t o incur the punishment . This allow s tha t a rational agent' s desires and othe r motivatin g states suc h as emotions ma y fail t o reflect he r interests—in other words, tha t ther e ma y be a gap between accepting an ought judgment and bein g motivated t o act on it. However, the gap is closed by a different wa y of understanding motivational force tha t seem s to hav e become standar d i n Anglo-American moral philoso phy b y the tim e we ge t t o th e contemporar y debat e ove r internalis m versus externalism. The shift i s presupposed b y eighteenth-century moral philosophy, especially "moral sense" theories, which began to focus on emotion as the critical

Defusing Dilemmas 25 factor in moral motivation, though this was soon overshadowed b y an emphasis on its role in moral knowledge. 50 In effect, reason-givin g force was made t o depend on motivational force rather than the other way around: It was benevolence or conscience or some other internal motive that supplied the agent with a reason for action o n a moral judgment. But the reversal made it seem plausible to take holding a moral judgment as implying motivation t o act on it. Hence Anscombe finds "ought " empty o f content i f it lacks motivational force; on the other hand, she assumes that its force must be more than psycho logical i n order t o captur e th e authorit y w e ascribe t o mora l judgment . She quickly disposes of Butler, for instance, o n the grounds that he does not mak e room fo r an immoral conscience.51 Her argument is essentially a version of the Kantian objectio n fro m subject-relativity , but a central purpos e o f m y ow n argument in what follows is to assign emotion a role in modern duty ethics that escapes reasonable forms of this objection. I shall approach the problem of motivational forc e through dilemmas, taking dilemmas as a way of posing the problem i n sharp form. My ultimate aim, as I have noted, is not to convert the reader to my own view of dilemmas; rather, I hope to use dilemmas as a way of exhibiting the connections among a number of central issues in metaethics—taking the term broadly to refer to the study of the foundations of ethics.52 I think we can establish a new angle of view on this subject, awa y fro m it s previous focus on metaphysical , epistemological, an d semantical issues, by assigning a central position to issues in moral psychology, as raised by the question of dilemmas. I shall begin, then, in chapter 2 by considering some fairly narrowly defined questions about dilemmas and moral reasoning in connection with deontic logic, but my concerns wil l soon branc h ou t from tha t starting point . In effect, this essay will have three main topics: dilemmas, guilt, and metaethics —or, more specifically, the role of emotion i n the foundations of ethics, which I take to be that of supplying motivational force. My initial focus will be relatively narrow, with dilemmas serving as a way in and guil t as a bridge to my ultimate topic, the role of emotion i n ethics. Similarly for authors considered: I shall begin with Williams as my central exampl e since his work cover s th e various topics I want to bring together, thoug h he often fails to connect them clearly or to go as far as I would like on key issues. On two issues concerning dilemmas—whether they are conflicts between conclusive practical oughts and whether guil t as opposed t o som e weake r for m o f regret i s appropriate fo r the ought not acte d on—m y own position comes closer t o some of the other authors discusse d in my initial overview, especiall y Nagel an d Marcus . Once my argument turns to general metaethical issues, as it will fairly quickly on the basi s of the opposition William s sets u p between dilemma s and mora l realism, I shall discuss some other author s whos e overal l approaches stan d i n sharp contrast to Williams's: Philippa Foot and John McDowell. J. L. Mackie's view, which is one of the main contemporary examples of antirealism, provides both a contrast t o McDowel l (i n a contemporary versio n of the Hume/Kan t contrast in the preceding section) and some materials for constructing the sort of two-component realist view that I want to defend here as able to handle dilem-

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mas. I refer to this view as "social artifac t realism." I t is realist at any rate in a somewhat extende d sens e that seem s to fit current definitions. The view essentially puts social rationality in the role Anscombe assigns to a divine lawgiver. A moral code or other normative system (for simplicity's sake, I shall mainly speak i n terms of a code o f rules ) i s something man-mad e bu t subject t o constraint s dictate d b y social end s and th e natur e and function s of society—as i f the standard Aristotelian arguments abou t virtu e were modified to appl y to groups. It s content i s therefore not fixe d b y the rules a group happens to have—the norm-based alternative that Anscombe at one point considers and rejects—bu t it is real in the way that artifact s are real, though thei r original existenc e is of course dependent on minds. It is also imperfect—a s a product of human imperfection in general terms, bu t more specificall y becaus e it is subject t o limitation s in the ordinar y huma n capacit y t o maste r rules . Fo r a fundamental socia l constraint o n the cod e i s the requiremen t of teachability. The mora l cod e o n this accoun t i s not unlik e what Har e describe s as the simpler set of rules that we ordinarily go by, but i t is not supersede d i n moral terms whe n i t yields a conflict . Rather, case s o f conflict involve real motiva tional deadlock , indicatin g a breakdown o f the moral code that m y own view will tr y t o explai n a s a sid e effec t o f the mechanis m that allow s th e cod e t o function properl y in normal cases. For what make s the rules action-guiding in general is the sort of internal goad to action tha t i s provided by teaching them in conjunction with guilt and similar moral emotions. Thi s motivational role of emotion favor s what I call a "perspectival " notio n o f appropriateness tha t i s weaker tha n the one Hare take s for granted, sinc e it assesses emotions as warranted relativ e to a partial subset of the total bod y of evidence in light of which we would asses s a corresponding belief . Thus, guilt ma y be appropriate a s a feeling even where the agent is not objectivel y at fault all things considered, a s we assume i n a case of dilemma. I shall not give a detailed account of the nature and justification of the moral code i n what follows , since I want m y argument t o appl y to variou s differen t approaches to ethics . Those contemporary approache s I am familia r wit h all seem to allo w fo r dilemmas at least on something like Hare's "intuitive" leve l of simple rules—though sometimes with a higher level deus ex machina (whether act-utilitarianism o r God himself) brough t i n to sav e the day. O n a rule-utilitarian view, for instance, the rules that would have the best consequences overall if generally adhered t o presumabl y must b e consistent, bu t the y might still come into contingent conflict as a result of some unusual event or in cases where the assumption o f general adherence is not satisfied. On a divine command view, we could get similar results by thinking of God as a kind of moral watchmaker whose command s amoun t to a code o f rules meant t o serve for all time rather than specific directives, without a n option o f direct appea l where they conflict. And eve n on a Kantian view, applyin g the categorica l imperativ e t o a se t of maxims simple enough to yield teachable rule s might also be held to generate conflicts. Such theories need not treat dilemmas as an embarrassment. Rather, dilemmas amount t o th e sorts o f exceptions that ca n be said to "prove " the moral

Defusing Dilemmas 27 rules. They exhibit the general mechanism of action-guidance b y blocking its usual direct effects, displayin g a residue of guilt or some similar negative moral emotion that usuall y functions i n anticipatory form, before action, t o ensure compliance with the rules. This emotion is what yields the appearance of binding force in cases where compliance is reluctant. The discussion of guilt, then, will connect my initial topic, moral dilemmas, with th e genera l issue I expect i t to illuminate : the rol e o f emotio n i n mora l motivation. Through most of this argument, I understand "guilt" rather broadly, using the term at the outset to cover various distinguishable emotions suc h as shame and remorse, an d even later for the most part ignoring it s religious and psychoanalytic associations. N o doubt in reaction to one or both of the latter, the ver y idea of guilt is an objec t of amusement or aversio n i n some quarters , and ver y few mainstream moral philosophers make mention o f it. But I think there is something to b e said in defense o f the emotion—or , rather , th e emo tional mechanism. For guil t o n th e vie w I shall defend here, eve n guilt in th e narrow sense , i s not reall y a single emotion bu t a tendency to tak e on various different identificator y emotions involving a negative self-evaluation. Within philosophy, this view gets support from Jonathan Edwards' s explanation of conscience in his 1755 treatis e on ethics, and i t is also borne out b y recent psychological studies of guilt.53 In fact, the term "guilt " seem s not to have been used as an emotion term at all until the late sixteenth century—an d then only in error, as a substitute for "sens e o f guilt," with "guilt " on it s accepted use taken as referring to an objective state of affairs.54 Th e religious notion, a t least in the firs t instance , involves an extraemotional stat e o f the self— a vari ant of primitive ideas of "tainting," analogous to a disease that will spread unless one takes steps t o preven t it, as spelled out fo r guil t by rules of ritual atone ment.55 Atonement as originally conceived might or might not involve a notion of some feeling one ought to have—fear of God's wrath, say, or contrition. But the gradual internalization of religious focus associate d particularl y with th e period of the Reformation seems to have led to the idea of a general feeling o r sense of guilt as the appropriate response to wrongdoing. 56 Late r I attempt t o show how the emotiona l mechanism I equate with (subjective ) guilt preserves some of these historical associations . I shall also have to say something about the pitfalls of the emotion, an d a t least by implication those of emotional response generally, since guilt in some of its manifestations seems to represent an extreme case of emotional uncontrol . The widespread view of guilt as a personally destructive psychological force— a mechanism of social control that essentially inflicts damage on the individual— is due to Freud' s influenc e and . among philosopher s ma y b e traced bac k t o Nietzsche.57 Eve n within the psychoanalytic literature, however , on e can fin d the defense of a psychologically beneficial form of guilt in the work of Melanie Klein.58 My own defens e o f the emotion i n common sens e terms will focus on the social bases that give it value as a moral motivator . My interpretation of guilt as an identificatory mechanis m will allow for its attribution beyond Judeo-Christian religious culture and it s historical heirs to cultures that lack our emphasis on guilt, sometimes thought of by anthropolo-

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gists followin g Ruth Benedic t as "shame-cultures." 59 I shal l eventually argue that guilt has some advantages over shame and other related emotions as a source of moral motivation. To some extent, however, the central role I assign to guilt is an accidenta l function o f my focus o n th e proble m of moral dilemmas . My detailed accoun t o f it s role i n moral motivatio n i s intended as exemplary— a way into the general question of the role of emotion in ethics. It is a moral (or specifically deontic) emotion par excellence, but it shares with other emotion s on m y account a motivational functio n tha t stand s i n contrast to th e percep tual analog y applied t o emotion s o n othe r emotion-base d bu t nondismissive accounts o f ethics. That is, Hume and other moral "sentimentalists " see m to see moral emotions as recording evaluative information (or possibly misinformation) about the world. The standard contrasting account—besides emotivism and similar dismissive accounts—is Mill's utilitarian treatment of "internal sanctions," which assigns emotions a motivational rol e without effect o n the content of moral judgment.60 I hope in what follows to exhibit a further metaethica l option, one that gets in between the horns of the standard alternative s with its focus on the social standpoint o f evaluation. I shall do so by digging deeply into the motivational question s raised by dilemmas.

2 Practical Oughts and Prohibitions

Let us first tur n to th e problems raised by dilemmas for the logical principles governing ought-judgment. Williams's early article focused attention on the clash between the principle that "ought" implies "can" an d the principle of agglomeration—that OA and OB imply O(A & B)—bot h of which seem intuitively to characterize a strong action-guiding sense of "ought." The same can be said of two other principles of standard deontic logic that later authors have brought into conflict on the assumption that dilemmas exist: the principle that "ought" implies "permissible" and the principle of deontic closure . The latter principle essentially tells us that anythin g necessary to fulfil l a n obligation is itself obligatory; with ~M as the alethic modal operator fo r possibility, we may symbolize this as: OA and ~M( A 8c ~B) imply OB.1 Some such principle along with agglomeration would see m to b e needed to suppor t th e derivation of one ought-statement from another and hence the systematic project of deontic logic . On the other hand, the two principles governing the implications of the term "ought" seem to be needed to support a notion of prescriptive "ought," taken as an ought that is both practical and positive, or meant to tell an agent what to do. We seem to be forced to choose, then, between the systematic aims of deontic logic and its relevance to action-guiding ethics. In fact, I think that somethin g like this will turn ou t to b e true. However , we need not deal here in full detai l with the problems raised by the two pairs of principles withi n deontic logic . Instead , le t us loo k a t som e centra l deonti c notions an d principle s in application t o mora l reasoning , wit h deonti c logi c understood as a failed attempt at systematization whose grounds for failure may be illuminating. I shall occasionally use the resources o f deontic logic to symbolize the principles and other assumptions unde r scrutiny; but the main thing I expec t m y argument on thi s subjec t t o revea l i s that a n attemp t t o handl e dilemmas b y working ou t som e alternativ e deonti c syste m would a t bes t b e impossibly complicated. I shall begin by focusing on the problem posed in chapter 1 for conflicts between practical oughts (sectio n 1). The principle that "ought " implie s "can " would seem to be defensible by appeal to the notion of a practical ought as one that is intended to guide action: What would be the point, in short, of trying to 29

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guide an agent i n a direction he cannot go ? Yet Williams's explanation o f conclusive practical "ought " apparentl y make s the notion inapplicabl e to dilemmas. It has to apply in some form, however, in order to make sense of our rea soning about th e fulfillmen t o f conflicting oughts at times before they actually come into conflict. My argument involves a closer look at the interpretation of practical "ought" and relate d notions , includin g notions o f deontic weigh t suc h a s "all-things considered." I n section 21 raise some more general questions about the picture of the logical structure of ought-conflict that is presupposed b y deontic logic in common with much of contemporary mora l philosophy, as derived from Ross's account o f the balancin g of prima faci e duties . Amon g other things, I hope t o bring out a way o f assessing th e comparative strength o f oughts tha t favor s a negative characterization o f dilemmas in terms of prohibitions, or action-guiding judgments of moral wrong , rather tha n positiv e ought-judgments. In short, I argue that acceptin g th e principle tha t "ought " implie s "permissible" mean s taking positive ought-conflicts as merely prima facie—and to that extent granting Williams's point—wherea s cases of exhaustive prohibition ma y stil l come out a s dilemmatic in the fulles t sense . The defens e of negative action-guiding dilemmas is the mai n resul t of my argument in this chapter. In response t o the literatur e on dilemmas, however , the secon d hal f o f the chapte r turn s t o somewha t mor e technica l discussion . For those who prefer to shortcut detail s this is summed up in a final subsectio n beginning o n p . 62 . M y ful l argumen t i n section 3 focuses on th e change s i n deontic logi c an d ultimatel y in our pictur e of moral reasonin g tha t woul d b e needed to accommodate dilemmas on my account. To let the operator O cover our ordinary ought-judgments, with "ought " taken in a strong action-guiding sense, I retain the two ought-implication principles "ought"-implies-"can" an d "ought"-implies-"permissible." I n light of my treatment of dilemmas, the latte r principle is limited to positive ought-judgments, so closure can also be retained with appropriat e limitations . O n th e othe r hand , I attempt t o sho w ho w we might indee d fin d ground s fo r dropping th e othe r ought-derivation principle , agglomeration, an d wha t result s the change would hav e for the logica l structure of ethics. Broadly speaking, on the view that will emerge here, ethics comes out a s fragmented—as Nagel put s it in his treatment o f dilemmas i n terms of incommensurable values . My ow n accoun t wil l involve a specificall y deonti c form o f fragmentation, a splintering into practica l subsystems; but on e line of attack on the coherency of ethics as thus construed will be met by showing th e rationale behind th e denia l of agglomeration .

1. Practica l Ought s i n Conflic t In this section I want to defend the practical status of dilemmatic oughts agains t some implications of Williams's view.2 I take it that denyin g the practica l status of dilemmas would leave us without the aspect of motivational conflict tha t we need in order to capture what is troubling about them as problems of moral

Practical Oughts and Prohibitions 3

1

choice. Firs t I focus on a particular argument that seems to show tha t practica l force has to be attributed to dilemmatic oughts in order to account fo r the force of som e ought s derive d fro m them: ought s prescribin g actions neede d t o pre pare t o satisf y th e firs t set , o r wha t I shall call "preparatory " oughts . At any rate, this conclusion follows from a natural understanding of practical forc e in terms of meaning. I go on to defend that interpretation a s an alternative to taking practica l forc e a s a functio n of th e speaker' s intentions . I then begi n t o respond t o the various reasons m y discussion bring s to ligh t for denying "all things-considered" statu s to conflicting practical oughts . Throughout thi s argument , I assume tha t ther e ar e o r a t an y rat e ca n b e genuine dilemmas—meaning (for purposes of the present discussion) dilemmas of th e "balanced " variet y i n which th e tw o ought s i n conflict ar e o f roughly equal weight. I also assume that the cases under consideration involv e "time bound" oughts , i n contras t t o th e timeles s obligation s sometime s take n fo r granted i n discussions of deontic logic. 3 This means essentially that whether a given ought i s in force depends o n when it is evaluated—a time that need no t be the sam e as the dat e (implici t o r explicit ) on it s object, or wha t i t tells the agent he ought to do. If yesterday I promised, fo r instance, to do act A tomorrow, it is already true today that I ought to do A tomorrow. In my central argument in this section I hope to show that these assumptions favor an interpreta tion o f dilemmatic "ought" as practical, in order to make sense of the advance deliberation that fulfillin g i t may entail.

Deliberation in Dilemmas Consider th e cas e o f dilemm a se t u p b y Sartre: Th e ma n wh o mus t choos e between joining the French resistance and staying home to support hi s dependent mother might very well represent both of his options a s things he ought t o do. That is, we can imagine him prescribing each of them, as he weighs the relevant considerations. O f course he would not com e out with a conjoint ought statement prescribin g both, but we can follow Williams and othe r author s on dilemmas in allowing for a distinction here by rejecting the principle of agglom eration. However , on e might b e moved to as k how th e agent i n Sartre's case could coherently prescribe even each of his options without a change of mind— in the same breath, as it were—given that his combined prescriptions would be unfulfillable. Should we avoid this problem b y representing the oughts i n conflict as not really meant to elicit action an d i n that sense not practical oughts? Perhaps we might characteriz e dilemma s instea d i n term s o f ought s tha t simpl y classif y various possibl e act s wit h respec t t o mora l reasons , tellin g us that ther e ar e decisive moral reasons fo r eac h o f two exclusiv e alternatives rather tha n pre suming to tel l the agen t wha t t o d o unde r th e circumstances . However , thi s would leave out the kind of active motivational conflict that moral reasons seem to generate in typical cases of dilemma. It would make dilemmas too easy : We would los e the sens e of the rationa l agent as practically "torn," o r subjec t t o contrary motivationa l vectors, t o th e exten t tha t sh e appreciates the reason s

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bearing on her choice of action. Instead , th e case would b e assimilated to one in which an agent could not decide what to do, at any rate on moral grounds — a case in which she was intellectually torn, though not becaus e of any defect in her practical reasoning . We would als o seem to lack the resources to capture a n agent's earlie r reasoning i n cases o f dilemma . That is , we sometime s hav e t o deriv e practica l directives from dilemmatic ought-statements befor e they come into conflict— for instance, where their fulfillment require s advance preparation. I f the oughts in a dilemmatic pair were not practical, however , i t is unclear how they could support th e derivation o f practical preparatory oughts . A n attempt t o take the dilemmatic oughts as practical only at an earlier time when they yielded such preparatory ought s withou t conflict would seem to undermin e the very poin t of practical forc e by letting it lapse unaccountably before the time the ought statement i n question assign s to action . This is my argument for dilemmatic practical "ought" in a nutshell; now let me illustrate it with a version of Sartre's case . For the agent t o be able to sup port hi s mother financially , say, in 1942—taking a simple-minded view of the sort of support tha t is in question here just for purposes o f easy illustration—it might be necessary for hi m to star t savin g in 1932 . S o in 193 2 w e apparentl y could deriv e a claim that h e ought t o sav e some money. 4 Bu t then on e o f the ought-statements tha t conflict in 1942 woul d seem to involve a practical ought at least from the standpoint of 1932. Moreover , i f we say that its practical force somehow lapse s b y 1942, tha t woul d see m to undermin e any practical forc e ascribed to i t earlier. Presumably, the reason fo r the earlier advic e was just to enable the agen t to suppor t hi s mother later , bu t supportin g he r i n 194 2 re quires further action a t that time . What woul d b e the point i n practical term s of giving advice that will just be withdrawn before the time to act on it arrives? Someone raisin g objections to thi s argumen t might defen d the notio n o f earlier practical force that simply lapses as familiar enough in other cases: What about obligation s tha t becom e unfulfillabl e befor e th e tim e o f action , say — assuming a tensed version of the principle that "ought" implies "can" a s applying to practica l "ought" ? However , sinc e "can " i n the principle implie s tha t fulfillment i s possible through th e agent' s ow n efforts , I would repl y that th e obligations i n question her e are those tha t th e agen t essentiall y makes unful fillable by doing or failing to do something earlier, as opposed t o any that lapse because of events he cannot prevent, including actions of other agents. For instance, we might suppose that our agent's obligatio n to support hi s mother in 1942 would lapse in practical force before then if he did not save money in 1932 , since on our hypothesi s the later obligation is fulfillable onl y with ten years of savings behind him. Here a practical ough t lapses b y the tim e assigned to ac tion becaus e the agen t fail s t o ac t i n light of it a t earlie r times. In the cas e of dilemma, by contrast, o n the assumption of lapsed practical force, it would seem that the agent could follow our advice to the letter until the time for action arrives and stil l have it withdrawn at th e last minute. My argument can also be extended to meet various more sophisticated objections. I do not wan t to pause for a full treatment , but i t is worth noting that

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the oughts the argument turns on are not supposed to be relative to the agent's state of knowledge, in particular whether the dilemma can be foreseen. For instance, someone might suggest that we could explain the practical force of the 1932 ought s in terms of some sort of epistemic claim about the 194 2 oughts — about thei r probable practica l force, say, relative to what i s known i n 1932— without taking the 1942 ought s to be practical a s well. However, i t is not clear why the agen t actually (an d not jus t probably) ought to prepar e t o satisf y a n ought tha t is merely probable. The claim that an ought is practical, though, whic h I interpreted abov e as a claim that it is meant to elicit action, naturally suggests that it is offered a s advice to a given agent (possibly by the agen t himself) , s o that it s force would vary with contextual factors including what i s known a t the time. However, unless we are concerned with the agent's blameworthiness for failing to act (with subjective rather than objective "ought," in the usual terminology), a practical ought is assumed to hold whether or not the agent knows or has reason to think that it does. Whether an ought is practical or "action-guiding" i n this sense depends only o n ho w i t i s intended, not o n whethe r circumstance s ar e suc h tha t th e intention is fulfillable, includin g whether it gets through to the agent, as required for actuall y guiding his action. In order to cover oughts in the third person w e might think of this as an ought that is "suited to " action-guidance . The problem with dilemmatic oughts, it seems, is with the speaker's state of knowledge: The fac t that h e knows that two o f his intentions ar e no t jointly fulfillable woul d seem to make a rational speaker retract one of them. My present argument is not designed to answer this problem but to show that denying practical forc e to dilemmati c oughts doe s no t yiel d a satisfyin g answer , give n the other thing s we want to sa y in such cases. M y answe r t o the problem i n later chapters wil l involv e assessing th e rationalit y o f ethics—o f a mora l cod e o r system of norms (what actually gives rise to thes e oughts , even if in the deliberative voice of some individual speaker)—in social terms. What on e is assessing, in short, is something general: a set of general social rules or guidelines designed to b e teachable o n the basi s of general emotional respons e tendencies. This is the source of various specific practical directives that may not always be rational considered in themselves, as utterances of some individual agent or other speaker. The practica l force o f the dilemmati c oughts i n m y exampl e ca n thu s b e understood a s derivative from th e moral syste m tha t yield s them. T o sa y that they are meant to elici t action, then, i s ultimately to sa y something abou t th e intent of the system—about the role such a system assigns to moral judgments —rather than about the intentions of a particular speaker . I now want a t least to allow for some of the larger points I have in mind by defending my interpretation of practical force as something that is not simply supplied by the speaker .

Practical Force and Meaning My argument above from preparator y "ought" seems to depen d on thinking of practical "force" i n a linguistic sense, as a function o f meaning. This is what

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makes it puzzling to think o f a practical ought as derived from anothe r ough t that is not practical: Where could it get its practical force except from the ought it i s derived from? Bu t if practical o r action-guidin g force i s a function o f th e speaker's intention , on e migh t wan t t o thin k o f i t a s contextual: a matte r of what the speaker in a given case uses an ought-statement to do, which is a function of what he thinks it can do and varies with the circumstances—with whether the ought is fulfillable i n itself and whether it has competition a s in dilemmas. On thi s accoun t a speake r supplie s practical forc e t o a n ough t tha t i s itsel f motivationally inert—so that h e might just supply it to a derivative ought like those in my example. It is his "speech act" rathe r than the meaning of the term that makes "ought" practical . This account makes sense in light of all the cases in common languag e that fail to obey the principle that "ought " implies "can." There are other senses of "ought" i n play beside s the practical—mos t notabl y idea l "ought," which is meant t o commen d some actio n o r stat e o f affairs . I n another versio n o f the case from Sartre, for instance, w e might want to say that the agent ought to be less attached t o hi s mother, without supposin g that h e has very much control over his degree of attachment an d hence without meaning to get him to change it. However, we need not assum e that these different use s of "ought" are distinct enough to count as different senses . We have something more general than a particular speech act on a particular occasio n (a n utterance) to appeal to— a recognized use (meaning a mode of use rather than an instance) obeying logical principles o f it s own—as a n alternativ e t o descriptiv e meaning. We may still think o f thi s a s a for m o f "meaning " i n the wide r sens e of general linguistic intent suggested a t the end of the preceding subsection.5 That is, a term may be linked nonaccidentall y t o the pursuit of certain purposes b y a general role or function (eve n i f one amon g several ) in th e language , in a wa y tha t control s what a given speaker uses it to do rather than simply emerging from hi s speech act. If we think of the language as already fixed b y past usage, we can say that the term is "meant," in the sens e of "designed," to fulfil l a certain function . This notion of a general recognized us e of a term, which itself has a kind of functional meaning, will accommodate third-perso n practical oughts as instances of practical "ought" that are not actuall y intended t o fulfil l it s defining func tion. What makes them practical, we want to say, is the fact that they are suited to action-guidance—capable of eliciting action b y virtue of their general role in the language—a s would no t b e the case, for instance , i f they were no t really about action bu t rather were meant to commend some personal trait or state of affairs. O f course , i t may sometime s b e indeterminate whethe r a given thirdperson ought is an instance of practical "ought" in this sense. The only test would seem to be a more general sort of appeal to the intentions of a given speaker— what h e would tr y to d o with i t in the presenc e o f the agent , say, at an y rat e under ideal conditions (where interference would not be resented and so forth)— and speakers ' intention s ma y b e indeterminate. Bu t although the notio n of a general use of the term is something we extract from such particular instances— much as we extract the notion of a language from a history of individual utter-

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ances—it may b e set up i n normative terms as something independent, a system dictating correct us e on a given occasion . This suggestion leaves it open that an ought may count a s practical even if it is not i n fact use d to fulfil l th e definin g function o f practical "ought " o n a given occasion , an d eve n if for extrinsi c reasons i t could no t b e so used . I t is enough that i t be part o f a systematic use of the term that has that function i n general. Whatever the limitations on our ability to tell when this is so, the point gives u s a roug h argumen t fo r countin g dilemmati c oughts a s practical , just insofar as they are logically linked to clear-cut cases of practical "ought" in the way that makes them part o f the same general use of the term . We also want to sa y more than this, for the practical force of the prepara tory ought in my example seemed to be something imposed on the agent or other speaker, not somethin g he supplied, even by choosing a certain form of words. To withhol d i t in light of the late r dilemma would hav e been an error , tantamount to plumping for one side of the dilemma in advance. In effect, I argue in chapter 4 that there is a way of taking dilemmatic oughts in most cases as practical in a fulle r sense—albei t an indirec t sense, i n which emotion ma y b e elicited a s a substitute fo r action—eve n on th e leve l o f individual utterance. Fo r the moment, however, let me reinforce my general suggestions on the meaning of practical "ought" with some speculations on the origins of the notion . One possible source is our talk of the practical "force" o f moral terms, used more or less interchangeably with "motivational" force , though it refers to the speaker as opposed to the agent. This usage traces back most notably to Hume' s discussion in the Treatise of morality as practical, i n the sense of being meant to influence action; the notion o f "force" tha t later authors hav e supplied here seems essentially to combin e Hume's talk o f influence or impulsio n with th e linguistic concerns o f our ow n times. 6 The lin k was effecte d b y noncognitivist accounts of moral meaning in terms of practical function but i s by now a feature of the term s in which the metaethica l debate i s set up, eve n if one reject s noncognitivism. What Hum e ha d i n mind, however, was a branch o f philosophy tie d to a certain facult y o f the mind : practical a s opposed t o speculativ e or theoretica l reason. Bu t practical "ought " als o ha s a plausible interpretation i n terms of practical reasons that might be thought to reflect this earlier notion rathe r than the idea of "force" a s something a term might have by virtue of its function in the language. Whether a given use of "ought" counts as a practical reason may indeed seem to b e something that i s settled case by case, depending in the firs t instance on the intentions of the speaker. Thus, Williams, taking the first-person use as primary, understands a practical "ought" as one that plays a certain role in deliberation; i t answers th e deliberative question, "Wha t ough t I to do?" 7 What i s in question here in denying this function to the oughts i n a dilemma is whether the agent can reasonably use them to conclude deliberation unde r certain circumstances—where he cannot ac t on both—an d no t whethe r they are oughts of a sort tha t play that role in general. This understanding of practical "ought" makes sense in connection with the

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attempts o f some contemporary author s t o define "ought" in terms of reasons.8 However, th e intuitiv e appeal o f the denia l of practical "ought " i n dilemma s may als o depen d o n th e commo n vie w o f a (conclusive ) practical reaso n a s motivationally sufficient—a s providing sufficien t reaso n fo r actio n i n causa l terms—assuming rationality.9 A practical reason o n this interpretation require s nothing furthe r to produc e action . Th e interpretatio n come s ultimatel y fro m Aristotle o n deliberation, especiall y his claim that the conclusion o f the practi cal syllogism is an action.10 We might want to say that a n ought tha t is practical i n this sens e i s one tha t woul d produc e actio n i n a rationa l agen t i f only certain externa l condition s wer e met . I n tha t case , i f conflicting oughts wer e both practical , the y would produc e incompatibl e actions . Sinc e that resul t is impossible, i t follows that conflictin g oughts cannot bot h b e practical . This argumen t rests o n taking "practical" a s meaning something lik e "sufficient t o determin e the will to action, " wit h the phrase understoo d t o impl y motivational effectivenes s i n the absenc e of external barriers. The phrase echoes Kant; and the reading of "practical" seems to be borne out by Kant's iden tification o f practical reason wit h the will. 11 But I think we can see that it would not surviv e the shift fro m Kantian—and originally Aristotelian—talk of a general facult y of practical reaso n t o th e contemporar y discussio n o f a practica l reason an d o f ought-statement s a s practical . O f practica l reaso n i t migh t o f course b e said tha t i t would no t b e the facult y i t i s unless it i n fac t produce s action. Bu t it is a further step to mak e the same claim of a given practical rea son. To say that a n ought-statement i s practical or action-guiding need not be to say that it actually motivates actio n i n a given case bu t just that i t is meant to—in a sense distinct from what it s speaker ha s i n mind, a s well as from th e descriptive meaning of the statement .

"All Things Considered" The notion o f motivational sufficienc y suggest s an idea of a practical ought a s representing the output o f deliberation, or an "all-out" judgment , on the model of the unconditiona l judgment in Davidson's treatmen t o f weakness o f will. 12 It may be natural to equate this with the all-things-considered or "all-in" ought judgment on Williams's account, 13 bu t Davidson interprets the latter a s conditional. I t essentially sums up the evidence, or the inpu t of deliberation, on th e assumption tha t al l th e fact s ar e in . Bu t i n betwee n inpu t an d outpu t fall s the shado w o f redeliberation: deliberatio n from contrary reasons . I n cases of dilemma, moreover, redeliberation need not be irrational. Assuming that dilemmas exist, then, a process of deliberation that is rationally sufficient—sufficien t to justify action and in that sense complete—need not be motivationally so, even in a rational agent , i n the sense that implie s causal efficacy . This conceptio n o f practica l reasonin g ca n b e reconciled wit h Aristotle' s view—even his view of the practical syllogism as entailing action, the source of Davidson's unconditional reading of the "all-out" judgment . John Cooper , for instance, treats the conclusion of practical reasoning as a decision to perform a specific type o f action, with th e practica l syllogism a s a reconstruction of th e

Practical Oughts and Prohibitions 37 further perceptua l processe s neede d to produce a particular action. 14 It woul d thus be possible to reach a conclusion of practical reasonin g or deliberation an d yet fail to act, as happens in cases of weakness of will but also at least arguably in som e case s of moral conflict. 15 The conclusio n of deliberation nee d not be taken a s a here-and-no w judgmen t prescribing "this " actio n bu t rathe r a s one that narrows thing s down t o a n act of a certain kind , with som e tim e lef t before actio n fo r the agent to appl y or fai l t o apply the judgment to what lie s before him. In that case, it seems, there will be room for contrary reasons to get a grip. On m y account , i t i s Kantia n necessitarianism—wha t migh t b e calle d "rational" necessitarianism, though in application t o moral judgments it yields the notio n o f mora l necessity—tha t stand s i n th e wa y o f makin g sens e of dilemmas. In the present connection, Kantia n talk o f the will or practical rea son as "determining" actio n is often used without questio n eve n by opponent s of Kantian ethics. I shall have more t o sa y later o n this general issue, but her e I want to focus on the notion o f an "all-things-considered " practica l ought. In response t o the argument just outlined, one might want t o sa y that th e claim that deliberatio n yields an all-things-considere d conclusio n implie s a kin d of rational completeness that rules out conflicting conclusions; it amounts to a claim that there are no further reason s to take into account. So deliberation in a case of dilemma may fail to yield an all-things-considered conclusion, bu t it canno t yield two suc h conclusions. What happens, then, in a case like Sartre's? One might be tempted to handle the case by taking even an arbitrary resolution o f the conflict to turn on some thing like a choice of "projects" 16—an implicitl y general act of self-legislation with implications for the agent's future choices—that could be represented as a further step in practical reasoning. If the agent chooses t o stay with his mother , say, he will effectively b e committing himself to a future mode o f life contain ing further choices in harmony with that one. He will be ruling out options such as quitting his job the following year to pursue his goals as an artist. It is important, however, that this sort of deliberative conclusion would b e limited to the first person , wit h the implication that other s could not prescrib e fo r the agen t the choice h e is entitled to mak e for himsel f in the situation of dilemma. 17 Still, there seem to be cases unlike Sartre's cas e whose resolutio n doe s no t or should not involv e a decision of principle, even an arbitrary decisio n wit h implications for the future. Conside r the case of dilemma in the novel Sophie's Choice, where Sophie is forced by a concentration cam p guard t o choose on e of her children, lest both be taken to the gas chamber.18 Eve n if, morally speaking, Sophie mus t choos e on e child to save , bu t supposin g tha t th e choic e of her son ove r he r daughte r canno t reall y be justified b y appeal t o som e rele vant distinguishing feature of the sort she in fact relies on, the choice she makes should not b e taken as constraining future choices. She is not henceforth com mitted t o actio n consisten t wit h i t such a s some sor t o f specia l attentio n t o male children—or for that matter , to action with the opposite tendency , as if to compensate . The poin t i s that no t ever y decision to act , an d henc e not ever y practical

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resolution of a dilemma, involves appeal to an ought-judgment. Thus, Williams allows for an alternative version of the deliberative question, a s "What am I to do?",19 which would seem to apply to decisions bearing on only one case. With the deliberative question frame d i n terms of "ought," though, so that the conclusion of deliberation is supposed to b e an ought-judgment—wha t we might think o f as a "principled " rathe r than a n arbitrar y answe r to th e deliberative question—why shoul d w e no t sa y that Sophie' s deliberatio n terminates i n a dilemma? The denial that dilemmatic ought-statements can both hold all-things-considered is a standard response from opponents o f dilemma to cases like Sophie's . What the y woul d sa y is that th e conflictin g ought-judgments a t issu e in th e case—one prescribin g that sh e save her daughter an d th e othe r tha t sh e save her son—ar e no t fina l judgment s but merel y prima facie ; s o the cas e may b e assimilated to Ross's cases of prima facie duties. The only duty that Sophie has "all thing s considered" i s the disjunctiv e duty t o sav e either he r daughte r o r her son, fo r it is of overriding importance tha t sh e save one of them, and under the circumstances she cannot sav e both . It is odd to fin d Williams in agreement on this point wit h the opponents of dilemma, even if only with reference to practical oughts . In application to cases of the sort I call "weighted," o n the model of Agamemnon's case, Williams wants to say that neither ought in conflict is overridden: Though all things considered it may be better to fulfil l on e of them, its fulfillment "doe s not adequately meet the claim s involved in the conflict," 20 s o the othe r ough t remain s in force. In balanced cases like Sophie's, then , where neither alternative is better, we would seem to have all the more reason to say that th e two oughts in conflict are neither overriding nor overridden. 21 Williams briefly suggests a reason for denying that they are in force all things considered whe n he notes tha t "th e proces s o f deliberation . . . involves narrowing down , b y rejection, the answers t o 'Wha t ough t I to do?'" 22 O n thi s account, a n all-things-considered answer would evidentl y be an answer base d on ruling out all other answers—all other alternative s to action, tha t is—s o of course ther e can b e only one . I n a case o f balanced dilemma , the onl y candidate fo r this status is the disjunctiv e ought that prescribe s fulfilling on e or th e other of the two ought s i n conflict. However, I think we should look again at this apparently trivial point. There is another way of making out an all-things-considered answer—namely, as one based on ruling out all other answer s that ca n be ruled out. I f the evidence in a given case does not support a unique answer, the n two answers to the deliberative question ma y be said to hol d al l things considered. In light of all the evidence, tha t is—th e set o f "principled " appeal s availabl e to justif y a n ought judgment—we seem to have sufficient reaso n fo r concluding both tha t Sophi e ought t o save her daughter and that sh e ought t o sav e her son . Both pieces of action-guidance are independently warranted, in short—a fac t that would not be captured if we stopped a t the judgment that Sophie ought to save one child or the other . Williams's explanation of why neither of the con flicting oughts in weighted cases counts as overriding also reveals the inadequacy

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of this stronger disjunctiv e ought. Presumably , each child has an independent claim on it s mother to b e saved—not just a claim for fai r consideratio n in the choice of one to save—that the disjunctive ought fails to answer. Of course the disjunctive ought may still be said to b e in force "all things considered," bu t it would b e question-begging to assum e that i t i s in competition wit h the con flicting oughts for that status. So we have no real justification fo r letting it displace them as deliberative conclusions. Thi s also holds fo r a n ought resulting from a n arbitrary decision procedure that might be used to satisf y th e disjunc tive ought: the outcom e of a coin-flip, say. What I think we ultimately need is another look at notions of deontic weight. I shall attempt thi s in the next section, bu t a t this point we can already see at least i n roug h outlin e how all-things-considere d status ma y appl y to eac h of two conflicting practical ought-judgments. First, we need to recognize that even reasons already acknowledged as bearing on a given case may be reconsidered from anothe r evaluativ e standpoint. Ther e can b e different way s of assessing reasons, tha t is , both o f which take i n all the reasons , a t leas t as background considerations, if we allow for "gestalt shifts" determining which reasons stand out agains t th e overal l background . Th e all-things-considere d evaluation of action need not b e governed by a single standard o f what i s "for th e best, " on the model that Williams applies to Agamemnon's case, 23 but can also appeal to various independent standards, as Williams and othe r proponents o f dilemma recognize. Second, w e shoul d not e tha t th e "core " meanin g o f a n ought-judgment involves a negative evaluation— a judgment that al l alternatives to actio n ar e ruled out—so that deliberation involves narrowing down one's options in a more fundamental sens e than William s indicates. It does not jus t involve rejecting answers to the question "What ought I to do?"; rather, an answer to this question itself rest s o n rejecting the agent's other options . I f there can b e two such answers, then , tha t togethe r would rul e out al l the agent's options, we would have a case in which the same total body of reasons, assesse d accordin g to tw o different standards , yield s conflicting negative all-things-considere d ought judgments. Let us return to Sartre's case for a simple example that allows for the plausibility of an appeal t o reasons . O n a n account tha t denie s practical status t o the oughts in a dilemma, what the agen t in such a case is doing is considering only a limited subset of the reasons bearin g on his action a s he frames his two conclusions: "I'v e got to join the resistance," say , and " I can't leav e Mother." However, on e coul d jus t as easil y represent th e sam e chai n o f reasonin g a s involving an evaluative "gestalt shift" in his view of the full set of reasons bearing on the case. That is, instead of reaching different conclusion s on the basis of a limited set of reasons about whether i t would be better to join the resistance or to support hi s mother, the agent might be seen as concluding that a failure t o do either would b e bad enough. It would b e ba d enough to coun t a s morally unthinkable, let us say, for a negative version of the "satisficing" account of moral deliberation that has been suggested b y recent authors on utilitarianis m and relate d subjects. 24 The case

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of cours e is one i n which the agen t has to decid e in practical terms to d o th e unthinkable; but this decision need not rest on the sorts of reasons whose conclusion can b e translated int o a third-person ought-judgment . A general principle of action o f the sor t that in some extramoral sense resolves the dilemma would b e limited to th e firs t perso n i n the wa y note d earlie r and ma y some times involve a step beyond deliberation in terms of "ought." This negative model of deliberation in dilemmas will let us see the agent as motivationally torn rather than simply left u p in the air, as we might expect if deliberation failed to terminate. However, it is important that "ought" in standard deontic logic also has positive implications insofar as it is assumed to imply "permissible."25 I n fact , this seem s to m e to reflec t th e most common us e of "ought" i n everyday speech an d t o b e tied t o th e prescriptiv e function ofte n assigned to the term. Examples like those just given for Sartre's case—"I've got to join the resistance" and " I can't leave Mother"—suggest that the point does not hold for "must," though "must" is sometimes thought of as a stronger form of the same concept.26 At any rate, with "ought" understood as prescriptive in this sense , i t woul d indee d seem to b e impossibl e for practica l reasonin g t o generate conflicting ought-judgments as conclusions. This is one of those point s that ar e obvious once seen, and i t may explain the plausibility of the rejection of practical "ought" in dilemmas. It is the combination embodied in the meanin g of prescriptive "ought" of a positive claim that its object is permissible with the negative "core" claim that everything else is impermissible that disallow s conflict . I n intuitive terms: To sa y that a n allthings-considered review of the reasons rules out everythin g is just to sa y that nothing is permissible. But in that case, the requirements of prescriptive "ought" will not b e met. So it is for prescriptiv e "ought," no t jus t practical "ought"—fo r "ought " that is assumed to b e positive in its practical role, to th e extent tha t it points the agent toward som e action—that Williams's denial of practical "ought " in dilemmas seems to be defensible. In that case, however, in order to capture the motivational conflict involved in dilemmas—to make them out as involving more than a conflict between prima facie ought-judgments—we can move to a negative characterization of them in terms of prohibitions, or action-guiding judgments of moral wrong. Williams himself seems in later writings to prefe r a negative characterization.27 Taking the distinction to have the implications for practical "ought" that my argument here suggests means violating some othe r assumption s o f standard deonti c logic, i n the first instanc e that "forbidden " implie s the permissibility of some alternative to action. Bu t those assumptions essentially just beg the question-o f dilemmas, presumabl y on ground s o f systematic simplicity. I examine these deontic assumptions in more detail later in this chapter, but we can see the significance of my positive/negative distinction in nontechnical terms at this point i n relation t o Williams's deliberative question "Wha t ought I to do?" In one sense, indeed, this question would not b e answered adequately by a prohibition—it would b e raised again, jus t a s i t would be if answered wit h two conflicting positive oughts—unless it is understood in relation to a particular

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act, s o that th e context supplies a positive ought-judgment. In that cas e "Yo u ought no t to do A" will amount t o advice to do B, where A and B exhaust th e field o f alternatives. Bu t this implicatio n o f positive practica l forc e trades o n our ordinar y assumptio n tha t some act of those ope n t o th e agen t i s permis sible, which of course i s just what dilemma s call into question .

2. Deonti c Strengt h an d Value The attemp t t o confin e moral conflic t to conflic t between prim a faci e ought judgments harks bac k t o Ross' s theory. Despit e man y authors' objection s t o the term "prim a facie " and Ross' s own qualms about his use of it as an adjective modifying "duty," th e Lati n ter m seem s irreplaceabl y handy fo r makin g an easy switch to adverbial status i n application to "ought" and related expres sions. We can speak of an ought or an ought-judgment as merely prima facie— or within one, of what its agent ough t prima facie to do. The term is also famil iar from its use in law with reference to partial evidence. Ross at one point gives "parti-resultant" a s a more informativ e substitute for it. 28 We apply i t on th e assumption tha t the reasons o r evidence bearing on an ought-judgment can be broken dow n int o distinguishabl e grounds , pr o an d con , s o that a judgment based o n onl y some o f them ca n b e said t o resul t from a partial subse t o f th e total bod y o f evidence. Although Ross himself contrasted prim a facie with actual or absolute duties, in the contemporary literatur e the term seems to have two contraries, use d more or less interchangeably in application t o ought s that result from a weighing of all relevant evidence: "overriding" an d "all-things-considered. " Thes e term s of deontic weight or strength are equivalent, however, only on the assumption tha t there are no full-fledge d action-guidin g dilemmas. In this section I show ho w the underlying notions come apart and examine the consequences of prising them apart fo r the resolution of dilemmas. Contemporary account s o f the meanin g of "ought " sugges t tha t man y of the nondilemmatic cases for which "ought" has more or less become canonical in moral philosophy are really more appropriately described by "must." 29 But my discussion here of deontic dominance , as we might call the propert y o f an ought that wins the weighing process, wil l also yield a more complicated pic ture o f this stronge r for m o f "ought. " I n applicatio n t o a n ough t o f norma l strength, my discussion of dominance will bring out reasons for the differentia l treatment o f positive and negativ e dilemmas that bega n to emerg e i n the las t section. I then conside r som e question s about th e resolvabilit y of dilemmas conceived i n positive or negativ e terms. B y singling out negativ e dilemmas as irresolvable in a stronger sense , I shall be defending a conception o f dilemmas that fit s thei r use in logic and mathematic s in addition to the everyday picture of them a s practical choice-conflicts. Dilemmatic reasoning involves showing that all alternatives have contradictory or otherwise unacceptable consequences. Similarly, as a moral concept the notion has its clearest application to case s in which all alternatives count as wrong.

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Forms of Dominance The difference betwee n all-things-considered an d overridin g ought-judgments can be brought out most sharpl y by way of a look at their application to judgments o f permission. Th e operato r P (for "it i s permissible that") i s taken a s primitive in one approach t o standard deonti c logic, with O defined in terms of it as denying the permissibilit y of the negatio n o f the objec t of obligation. An axiom o f the standar d syste m yield s the principl e that "ought " implie s "per missible," s o that "ought " is doubly linked to permissibility: negatively, since Op = ~Pp, and positively , since Op implie s Pp. However, a positive judgment of permissio n ca n b e thought o f a s holdin g al l thing s considere d bu t no t a s overriding: It just makes no sense to say that something is overridingly permissible. The reason fo r this seems to b e that two differen t kind s of deontic weight or dominance are assessed by the two notions. For "all-things-considered" th e relevant sort o f weight i s at leas t partly evidential: the weigh t o f the evidence or reasons for holding the deontic judgment in question considere d agains t th e background o f the tota l bod y o f evidence. 30 This applie s readily enough t o a positive judgment of permissibility, if only b y negating it s application t o th e negative judgmen t of impermissibility. The positiv e judgmen t may b e said t o hold "al l thing s considered" a s long as the negative judgment does not . By contrast, for a judgment of overridingness the relevan t sort of weight is specifically practical, since it measures something like the importance o f acting on the deonti c judgmen t in question. Thi s ma y b e thought o f as the practica l "strength" o f a requirement or prohibition . However , i t does no t appl y t o a permission, as a judgment that simpl y allows som e action . A n action an d th e alternatives to it may both be permitted, an d there is no inference from a denial that a n action i s prohibited with such-and-suc h a strength t o a claim that th e action is permitted with the same strength. Permissions have no particular practical strengt h bu t woul d see m just t o hol d i n the absenc e o f any prohibition , however weak, that meets the requisite level of strength to count as "all-thingsconsidered." This distinction between evidential backing and practical strength seem s to hold up, moreover, if we understand ought-judgments in terms of practical reasons. A permission woul d then amount t o a denial that there are such reason s in sufficient strengt h to yield an ought. Reason s for i t could not b e practical in the relevant sense, since there is nothing in particular that amounts to action in fulfillment o f a permission. Besides reasons fo r belie f i n a permission, o r a s a way o f analyzin g such reasons, ther e migh t be said t o b e reasons fo r issuing a permissio n tha t ar e practica l i n a mor e genera l or indirec t sense; they may appeal, say , to th e valu e of morally unconstrained choic e wit h respec t t o th e action in question. But these are not reason s fo r action i n the sense that applie s to a requirement or prohibition, where what i s in question is action on the part of th e agent to whom th e judgment applies, as opposed t o the speaker's act in issuing the judgment. The distinctio n between the two sort s o f assessment in application to per -

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3

missions introduce s complexities that are increased i n application t o the compound judgments taken as corresponding t o positive oughts. Presumably , both elements of the judgment Op, ~Pp and Pp, would hav e to b e weighed in an allthings-considered assessment , wherea s if permissions cannot b e overriding, only the negative "core" element of the meaning of the judgment can be taken int o account b y a claim of overridingness. But the point for my purposes her e is that on the assumption of dilemmas the all-things-considered assessment of the tw o elements wil l itsel f com e apart. Supposin g that all alternatives in a given cas e are prohibited strongly enough to count as impermissible all-things-considered— and that the case can be described (granting closure) as one in which bot h O p and Op hold—the negative but not the positive element of the meaning of each of th e ought-judgments bearing on the case would see m to b e satisfied. That all alternatives are ruled out all things considered amounts , of course, to th e sor t o f assumptio n whos e coherenc y is in questio n i n the debat e over dilemmas. But I think we can now see a way of interpreting "all things considered" tha t allow s fo r it s coherency. Le t u s thin k o f a n all-things-considered prohibition i n the firs t instanc e as one that i s important enough—o r th e rea sons fo r whic h ar e importan t enough—t o stan d i n ligh t o f the tota l bod y of evidence. This amounts to a kind of perceptual o r figure-ground dominance— of th e reason s fo r prohibitin g somethin g agains t th e genera l backgroun d of reasons bearin g on action—and hence allows fo r gestal t shifts i n a way that is not possibl e for practical motives. The reasons fo r prohibiting somethin g and the reasons for prohibiting its contrary may both be important enoug h to stand out agains t th e field , tha t is , assuming that neithe r overrides th e other , a s in cases of dilemma. In the case drawn fro m Sartre , fo r instance, i t seems to mak e perfect sense for th e agen t t o sa y that th e reason s agains t abandonin g hi s mother an d th e reasons agains t lettin g down th e resistance are importan t enoug h t o b e unaffected b y each other. Both prohibitions hold, that is, in light of all the evidence bearing o n action—assumin g (as the cas e demands ) that th e resistanc e need s this particular agent no less than his mother does. Neither prohibition i s overriding, on our assumptio n tha t the case is a balanced dilemma , so each prohibition is sufficiently seriou s to remain in force despite th e conflict. The "weighted " cases that Williams discusses may not see m at first glance to allow fo r a shift i n evidential perspective; bu t the y turn out t o b e amenable to the same general treatment. Williams wants to say that neither obligation is really overriding in a case like Agamemnon's, even though one of his options is clearly better , on the grounds tha t the reasons fo r preferring one to th e other fail to answer adequately the reasons on the other side—or in Williams's terms "the claim s involved i n the conflict." 31 Tha t is , as utilitaria n considerations , they fail to answer the nonutilitarian reasons for the ought that is not acted on; and presumabl y the same could be said o f any resolution o f the dilemm a that appealed to reasons different i n kind from those the agent chooses to act against. If Agamemnon decided that his duties as military commander were more important unde r the circumstances than his role as a father—whethe r on utilitarian grounds o r something else—that would still leave his paternal obligations with

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enough importance , of a sort incommensurabl e with that o f his military role, to remai n in force despite the conflict. The basi c notion that lies behind the all-things-considered weighing of evidence seems to b e that of a sufficiently serious reason—to prohibi t something, in the first instance , with permission define d i n terms of the absenc e of a suffi ciently serious reason to prohibit something and obligation defined a s indicated above. This notion mus t have comparative content o f the sort that comes into the notio n o f overridingness , i f we assum e that som e reason s ca n b e seriou s enough to cancel out others , at leas t below a certain threshhold leve l of absolute seriousness. It cannot b e purely comparative, though, o n the assumptio n that i t yields dilemmas for prohibition s tha t ar e supporte d b y reasons abov e the threshhold level—reasons that are serious enough. If we understand dilemmas in terms of the notion, we can rule out the sorts of conflicts among trivial obligations that are plausibly dismissed as prima facie.32 I appealed to the notion at the end of my preceding section as providing a way aroun d Williams' s ban on conclusive dilemmatic oughts—supposing that oughts include "ought-nots, " or prohibitions. Our intuitiv e talk of practical necessit y corresponding t o the modal auxiliary "must"—for whic h "ought" often function s a s a weaker substitute in the discourse o f moral philosophy—seem s to fi t the notio n rathe r nicely . Talk of what one "cannot" do on moral grounds—in simplistic terms, the idea of something "taboo" (withou t the overtones the word sometime s ha s of absolute or groundless prohibition)—may be taken a s indicating the absolut e seriousness of a prohibition. The prohibition i n question is serious enough, that is, to per sist i n the fac e o f extrem e barriers to actio n i n accordance wit h it , including moral barrier s of the sort one encounters in dilemmas. It does sound natural, as I noted a t the end of the last section, fo r the agen t in Sartre's case to use variants of "must" to express the two ought s bearing on his decision: "I've got to join the resistance" an d " I can't leave Mother." Each statement evince s a kind of moral urgency ; and neither , not eve n the positiv e statement, seem s to imply "permissible." On e can easily imagine the agent , in response t o a revie w of the reason s agains t joinin g the resistance , protestin g that h e has to. "Must " i s stronger tha n "ought " i n the suggestio n i t gives of moral catastroph e i f unsatisfied—as opposed t o doin g les s than one' s best in moral terms—and i n cases of dilemma there is catastrophe eithe r way. However, som e author s hold tha t "must " has strong enoug h implications to provid e a way ou t o f dilemmas. The vie w is suggested b y Lemmon's argument for their logical coherency, which depends on contrasting "ought " with "must," an d b y Williams's accoun t o f practical necessity , i n which he argues for a version of Lemmon's assumptio n tha t "must " implie s "will," o r actual ity.33 Bu t Williams's account is importantly limited—t o intentiona l action, as he notes, bu t also to what he calls "incapacities of character."34 Th e latter represent onl y on e sor t o f applicatio n o f "must, " th e sor t exemplifie d by th e Sophoclean tragi c hero that h e picks out a t th e beginnin g of hi s treatment a s one o f the tw o mai n examples of its moral use—with the othe r example provided b y the Kantian moral agent. Faced with a dilemma the Sophoclea n hero

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cannot do otherwise, given his character, than act on a certain one of the oughts in conflict. The claim that he cannot do otherwise, then, is a claim that his character i s such that h e cannot—which would b e falsified , o f course, b y his doin g otherwise after all. It should be obvious that there cannot be two incompatible actions of which this claim is true, for reason s resemblin g the argument from motivationa l sufficiency that I considered an d rejecte d toward th e end of my preceding section as an interpretation o f Williams's notion o f conclusive practical "ought." Does the interpretatio n instea d fi t the notio n o f "must, " whic h William s takes as stronger? It could fit the notion in general terms, I think, only if all decisions in cases of dilemma could be made out as determined by the agent's preestablishe d character. But in Sartre's case the causal relation between character an d choice is supposed t o run in reverse. At any rate, reference to character in a sense that allows for development over the time in question—as at least partly constituted by the agent's current projects and the like, assumed to preexist hi s choice but also to be subject to change in the situation tha t requires choice—cannot play a causal role here. Does the truth of the agent's claim that h e "had to " choos e a certain option simpl y depend, then , on what he goes on to do, in something like the way that a claim of knowledge depends on truth: not becaus e his character make s him ac t a s h e does, bu t rathe r becaus e our notio n o f i t refers in part t o future action ? It seems wrong, firs t o f all, to rejec t a s false a n agent' s clai m that h e "ha s to" d o something he later fails to do. Consider " I have to go now," a s said by a guest who is persuaded t o linger on. Though w e might respond i n conversation with a denial of his statement, our counterclaim can also be read as a way of pointing out that practica l necessit y does not impl y necessity. We need no t be denying, that is , that th e guest' s reason s fo r leavin g are stron g enoug h t o support the statement; we might just be telling him to ignore them or acknowledging after the fact that he did ignore them. Similarly, the reason why the agent in Sartre's cas e cannot sa y at a later tim e that h e had t o take th e option h e in fact rejected i s not that on e of his original statements has turned out to be false but rather tha t the moral importanc e of action on it has become a thing of the past. Mora l catastroph e ha s alread y occurred an d bee n assimilate d into th e background of action . In an y case, ther e ar e "must"-claim s tha t d o no t fi t the characte r mode l at all. "I have to pa y my rent o n the firs t o f the month" nee d not b e taken as attributing to it s speaker a high degree o f conscientiousness in financial mat ters. Instead, it is naturally read as elliptical for a claim that something bad will happen i f the ren t i s not pai d b y the tim e indicated . Thi s ma y b e somethin g specific—the agen t wil l be subject t o a fine, say—bu t it need not be . Perhap s the only penalty for tardy payment is failure to meet a certain standard o f performance in financial matter s or failure to conform to the rules, something that is perfectly possible, o n the model of "moral catastrophe. " A simplification of deontic logic sometimes called "escapism" applie s this reading to oughts generally, with the role of the threatened bad state of affair s assigned to "the sanction, " symbolized by a constant S referring to whatever is

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entailed by the nonfulfillment o f obligation and presumably is escaped by fulfill ment.35 O n thi s account a statemen t lik e the one just above might b e read a s "If I don't pa y m y rent b y the fift h o f th e month , I incur the sanction. " Th e further "escapist " assumptio n that the sanction is avoidable makes this approach unsuitable for our purposes, sinc e it begs the question of dilemmas. However , it provides a reasonable model for interpreting individual "must"-claims of the sort just illustrated: as ought-statements that threaten the agent with a morally catastrophic sanction . Will the sanctions model le t us assimilate "must"-claims t o the perceptua l picture of figure-ground dominance I have sketched in application to all-thingsconsidered prohibition? Not withou t some differences, i t seems; for besides its failure to impl y "permissible" bu t for similar reasons "must " also fail s t o imply "can " i n intuitive terms. The agent may protest tha t h e has to suppor t hi s mother, fo r instance , i n response t o reason s fo r thinking it impossible at thi s point—without ten years of savings behind him, say—as well as in response t o reasons for some conflicting obligation. I would explain this by taking "must" as resting on a partial view of the evidence rather than on an all-things-considered view. That is, it rests on reasons that are thought to be important enough to stand o n their own, blottin g out contrary reasons rather than simply dominating the field . Th e agent' s protes t amount s to a denial of any contrary rea sons—for th e moment , anyway—a s he asserts th e strengt h o f the reason s h e chooses t o focu s on. I t isolates th e latte r from the evidentia l background, instead o f pickin g them ou t fro m a backgroun d tha t remain s withi n view , a s indicated by the fact that he could not have said, in light of the reasons for joining the resistance, "Even so , I can't leave Mother." On this account "must" is not just a strengthened form of "ought" but rather presupposes a different wa y of dealing with the reasons for an ought-judgment, where these are assumed to b e particularly strong. If we also assum e that the same bod y o f evidence admits o f gestalt shifts , o n th e othe r hand , th e "eve n so" statement jus t above would be acceptable as rephrased in terms of "ought": "Even so , I shouldn' t leav e Mother." No r doe s it s naturalness depen d o n a weaker readin g o f "ought " a s merel y recommending rathe r tha n requirin g action; it would soun d most natura l as "Eve n so , it would b e wrong t o leave Mother." This grants the contrary reasons rather than denies them, but assert s in the fac e o f them tha t th e prohibitio n i n questio n hold s "al l thing s consid ered." Can the prohibition b e practical if the contrary prohibition is, too? I see no barrier t o takin g contrary prohibition s a s meant t o guid e action, whe n the y follow fro m rules designed for tha t purpos e i n general terms, though th e spe cific directives derived from the rules on a given occasion are not jointly fulfillable and henc e would b e unreasonable a s commands. Wit h agglomeratio n ou t o f the picture, they are not therefore logically incoherent in combination. For that matter, they may in fact guide action at least indirectly, on the sanctions model , by making out nonfulfillment a s morally unacceptable or as incurring some sor t of specific sanctio n rather than b y directly bringing about fulfillment . O n this interpretation, "Don't do X" i s elliptical for "Don't do X or you will incur S."

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In cases of dilemma, of course, th e agen t wil l have no wa y o f avoiding S altogether; i n opting fo r a particular horn of the dilemma, however, h e chooses t o accept a particular instance of S. Putting up with a sanction, then, or acceptin g it—or something more active, such as subjecting oneself to it—might be thought of as an indirect way of satisfying th e ought tha t loses out . However, thi s possibility—t o be considered i n mor e concret e for m later , when I turn t o guil t as an exampl e o f what philosopher s cal l "interna l sanc tions"—can hol d onl y fo r negativ e oughts o r prohibitions , i f my precedin g argument is correct. Insofar as a positive ough t als o implies that fulfillmen t i s permissible—in other words, insofar as it does not simply reduce to a negative ought—it rules out the competing all-things-considere d ought as interpreted o n the sanctions model , with a statement o f permission take n a s denying that it s object will incur a sanction.36 Further, on the account just given, the correspond ing "must," positive or negative, turns a blind eye to contrary reason s i n a way that undermines the suppor t fo r it s competitor. B y contrast, a negative ough t exhibits a kind of perceptual dominance that admits contrary reason s int o th e field o f view and henc e allows it s competitor a basis in it as well. In maintaining a prohibition "all-things-considered " eve n in light of equally strong prohibition s of alternatives, we are exhibiting what migh t be called the intractability of moral wrong: the relative imperviousness of judgments of wrong to th e sort s o f furthe r practica l calculations that affec t positiv e o r nonmora l action-guidance. The claim that there are important enough reasons for requiring some act, b y contrast—or o n the other hand, for ruling it out in prudential terms as irrational o r the like—will not make sense as an all-things-considere d judgment in combination wit h an admission that there are equally strong rea sons on the other side . The evidential assessment of negative ought-judgments thus seems to allo w them uniquely the sort of noncomparative conten t tha t is needed fo r full-fledged mora l dilemmas.

Resoluability and Wrong Williams and othe r proponent s o f moral dilemma s make the m ou t a s resolvable only nonmorally, by appeal to a practical ough t reflecting the agent's personal projects and the like. Morally speaking, they are irresolvable, in the sense that moralit y fail s t o provid e a basi s for resolving them. Onc e w e distinguish between positive and negative dilemmas, however, I think we can see that full fledged dilemmas—thos e that fi t the negativ e conception i n terms o f exhaus tive prohibitions—will be irresolvable in a stronger sense : The y wil l admi t o f no morally acceptable resolution , whether o r not morally based. The agent has to violat e mora l norms , no t jus t t o reac h beyon d them , i n order t o resolv e a negative dilemma in practical terms , a s he must i n one way o r another , sinc e the prohibitions bearin g on his decision ar e assumed to exhaust the field . For dilemmas characterized positively, on the other hand, we seem to have to yiel d t o th e insistenc e of opponents o f dilemmas that wha t w e really have are prima facie ought s in conflict; otherwise, the same acts would come out a s both permissibl e and impermissible . This follow s fro m th e assumptio n tha t

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separates positiv e from negativ e oughts: tha t "ought " implie s "permissible." Whether or not one of the conflicting oughts can be taken as overriding, it seems that neither can count as all-things-considered on this positive formulation. This was th e kerne l of truth I found in Williams's argumen t fo r denyin g that bot h can be conclusive. Rather than excluding dilemmas from the practical sphere , however, my account allows for a separate treatment o f dilemmas set up negatively. As noted i n my initial overview of the literatur e o n dilemmas , moral philosophers hav e sometimes stressed the negative characterization, bu t as far as I know th e distinctio n was no t give n any attentio n unti l my own treatmen t i n 1983 o f the case from Sophie's Choice. 37 The positive characterization i s emphasized i n th e literatur e on deonti c logic ; with th e exceptio n o f Von Wrigh t i n 1968 non e o f the classic papers on the subjec t discusses dilemmas in negative terms, an d th e distinctio n is first note d i n a piece published i n 1987. 38 Here I want essentially to revise my earlier argument for the distinction i n light of later developments, especially my current suggestions on deontic strength and value, by taking a fresh loo k at the notion of a disjunctive ought brought in to resolve a dilemma. Readers who wish to bypass technical discussion should at this point skip to p . 6 2 fo r the summar y and transitiona l comment s a t th e end o f this chapter. In attemptin g t o resolv e Sophie's dilemma , then , on e migh t appea l t o a n ought that prescribes saving at least one child, which under the circumstances requires choosing a particular one. I think of this as a disjunctive ought—on a use of th e ter m tha t cover s inclusiv e "or"—since it amount s t o a n indefinit e prescription t o save one child or other. On the assumption tha t the dilemmatic oughts that prescribe saving each child are in balance, the disjunctive ought might naturally be taken as outweighing either of them. It is most important that Sophie not let both children be killed, so on this account what she ought to do all things considered i s to make a choice between them an d sav e one of them—choosing one by some fair method . What the disjunctive ought prescribes , in effect, i s a practical resolutio n o f the dilemma : action i n accordanc e wit h a tiebreaking ought, presumably arbitrary, of the sort that migh t result from flippin g a coin in circumstances that allow for it. In order to satisfy the minimal moral demands of th e case , Sophie i s advised to appea l beyon d strictl y moral considerations . However, Williams's view on overridingness seemed to rule out that account of Sophie' s choice . Supposin g tha t a mothe r ha s seriou s an d separat e mora l obligations t o preserv e each o f her children, no t jus t her progen y considere d collectively, Sophie's satisfactio n of the disjunctive obligation woul d no t ade quately meet the claims involved in the conflict. Unlike Agamemnon's choice between his daughter and the expedition unde r his command, Sophie' s choic e might be said to involve commensurable (equal) claims, but on the assumptio n that they do not permit trade-offs, a fair decisio n between them will still leave one of them unsatisfied. It is not enough that both be taken into account on the model of political representation. On the other hand, we can now see grounds for accepting the conclusion of opponents o f dilemmas—an d Williams's conclusion for conflictin g practical

Practical Oughts and Prohibitions 49 oughts—that neither of the conflicting positive oughts in Sophie's case is in force all things considered. Thoug h neithe r is overridden, each implies a claim of permissibility that is contradicted b y the other. Can we then say that it is all-thingsconsidered statu s rather tha n overridingnes s that distinguishes the disjunctiv e ought? There ma y be no ought in force all things considered t o contradict th e implied clai m that i t is permissible for Sophi e to sav e one chil d or th e other . To say this, we would have to reject at least some strong form s of the principle of deontic closure, assuming that the negative oughts or prohibitions bearing on th e cas e are in force all things considered. A s the cas e i s set up, saving one child requires letting one be taken to th e gas chamber—whichever one is not picked out b y the tiebreaker Sophie uses. If the necessary means to satisfy ing an ought are themselves obligatory—as closure over causal relations would have it—and "ought" implies "permissible," th e disjunctive ought presumably combines with th e tiebreake r (a t any rate afte r th e latte r i s decided upon) t o imply the permissibility of failing t o sav e a particular child . So it cannot hol d all things considered alon g with a prohibition o f that failure. In any case, what the disjunctive ought gives us is not quit e a resolution of the dilemma. On the positive account o f the case, we do not have a dilemma in the first place but instead just a prima facie ought-conflict. And on the negative account, th e disjunctiv e ought doe s not yiel d a morally acceptable resolution , despite it s moral basis , sinc e we also hav e all-things-considered prohibitions ruling out eac h o f the action s tha t would satisf y it. Closure ove r causal rela tions would yield explicit prohibitions of saving either child, and even without closure we have to conclude that any particular acts that would satisfy th e disjunctive obligation are morally prohibited under some other description. 39 They may not be prohibited with equal force—we can say that the disjunctive ought is weightier than the dilemmatic prohibitions and hence in one sense "outweighs " them—but th e prohibition s ar e seriou s enough i n absolute terms t o coun t a s all-things-considered. In short , though i t i s perfectly clear what Sophi e mus t do , an d o n mora l grounds, i n respons e t o th e dilemma , ther e seem s to b e n o wa y ou t o f th e dilemma that can count as morally permissible. I have framed this conclusion in terms of "must" rather than "ought," since the use of "ought" migh t be taken to entail that some act is permissible after all , on our assumption that "ought " implies "permissible. " Whethe r i t doe s hav e tha t consequenc e depend s o n whether w e accep t closur e over causa l relations . Fo r reason s lik e those just indicated, i f we d o accep t closure , there wil l be nothin g tha t Sophi e morally ought to do, at any rate all things considered, in response to the dilemma—not even the disjunctiv e act of saving one child o r the other, despite it s overriding moral importance, as one might say. At any rate, even without closure we would have to deny that any particular act done to satisfy the disjunction can possibly pass muster in moral terms . There will be other balanced cases, like the assassination case in chapter 1 , that do not allo w for a disjunctive ought in the first place, since all the alternatives in them, including inaction, are prohibited with equal force. Sophie's choice might be made into such a case if we assume that she has to do something morally

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worse to either child in order to save the other than simply failing to save it. At a certain level—if Sophie had to torture one child, say—the wrongness of these acts might be thought o f a s balancing the wrongnes s of violating the disjunctive obligation an d failin g t o sav e either one. However , eve n without a n exhaustively balanced case of exhaustive prohibition, dilemmas on th e negative characterization will still have problematic consequences of the sor t just indicated. We can already begin to see some of the complications for deontic logic that dilemmas introduce. I shall postpone t o m y next section further comment s on closure and the other standard principles that dilemmas call into question. The important thing to note at this point is that much depends on how we decide to describe a given case—both the choices and the reasons for them that are thought to b e at issue in the dilemma . In the firs t instance , our decisio n will affec t th e plausibility of the case as set up in negative terms: the plausibility of the claim that there is reason enoug h fo r prohibiting all options i n it. Consider Sartre' s case, once again: A serious question might be raised about counting as wrong or impermissibl e in it s own righ t th e agent' s failur e t o joi n the resistance . It sounds plausibl e in positive term s to sa y that h e ought t o joi n the resistance ; and o n standar d deonti c assumption s thi s implies that i t would b e impermissible for him not to . Bu t in this case the reasons for th e act i n question would normally be taken a s primary, it seems, with reasons against omittin g the ac t seen as derived from them. To get around this problem and continue to use the case for purposes of illustration, I specified that the resistance needs this agent in particular. To suppor t the claim that he would b e doing something wrong by staying home—in a sense that does not reduce to a failure to satisf y a positive duty—we might suppos e tha t h e is the on e person wh o possesse s certai n skills with explosives, s o that th e resistanc e depends o n hi m n o les s than hi s mother does . Our ordinar y assumptio n abou t th e case, by contrast, woul d b e just that the agent ought to volunteer for a task that is required of some indefinite set of members of a group he belongs to—in a commendatory sense of "ought" that does no t reall y have the imperativa l force o f a n ough t base d o n prohibition . We sometimes blur the distinction betwee n these different level s or strengths of action-guiding force to ge t practical results. But it is important tha t with an y weaker assumptions than those just indicated Sartre's case would no longer count as a full-fledge d dilemm a i n m y terms, howeve r neatl y balanced th e alterna tives it presents, o r howeve r balance d they seem to b e if we conside r deonti c strength independently of positive or negative value. The crucial thing for the question o f resolvability is that th e agent' s alternative s each b e prohibited b y strong enough reasons for the prohibitions t o stand i n light of each other . On the other hand, the cases I have referred to as weighted dilemmas, such as Agamemnon's case, will fit my account of dilemmas irresolvable by permissible means, assuming that the prohibitions they involve are in force all things considered. Even in ligh t of al l the evidence—i n light o f wha t w e migh t suppose to be the overriding importance of the success of the Greek military expe-

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1

dition—Agamemnon's sacrifice of Iphigenia remains prohibited; it still counts as morally wrong, and indeed in the strongest terms, in a sense meant to guide action. Here it is even clear which alternative the agent must choose for a practical resolution of the dilemma like that given by the disjunctive ought in Sophie's case, whereas in Sophie's cas e th e disjunctiv e ough t neede d supplementation by a tiebreaker selecting a specific option. S o the case does not involv e a moral quandary, but it still seems to amoun t to a moral dilemma. Since balanced dilemmas pose furthe r problem s of choice, they might seem to b e dilemmatic in a fuller sense . But the term "fatal" dilemm a seems apt fo r any cases that exhibi t the property o f allowing no morall y acceptable resolu tion. Fatal dilemmas are those tha t exhibi t Nagel's "mora l blin d alley": They offer th e agent no way out of a forced choice among moral wrongs. To describe even Sophie's case in these terms, however, requires some care. Her prohibited alternatives have to be thought of as acts of failing to save either child—standing idl y b y while a child is taken—rather than a s the act s of saving one child that they also amount to in fact, for the acts of saving also come out as permissible under that description. Moreover , if it does not seem plausible that there are strong enough reason s agains t eac h ac t o f omissio n fo r th e tw o prohibi tions to hold in light of each other—and even in light of the weightier disjunctive requirement to save at least one of her children—the case could always be strengthened. We might suppose that Sophie actually has to harm one child to save the other, as in the exhaustively balanced variant case I described. My suggestion i s just that on some version the case will exhibit the sort of fatal dilemmatic structure that poses problems fo r the practical coherency of ethics. For an example that doe s no t requir e compounding the wrongs th e agen t has to choose between, we might turn back to my assassination case. Here the agent faces a choice between allowing the assassination of an important political figure by her silence and lettin g the assassins murder one of her relatives, if she fails to cooperate an d informs on them. To balance the agent's responsibility to her family, we might suppose tha t the political figure represents a major force fo r good under urgent circumstances. However, eve n if the case is not a balanced dilemma , it wil l come ou t a s a fata l dilemm a along wit h Walzer' s torture case , accordin g t o th e treatmen t jus t give n o f weighte d case s lik e Agamemnon's. In common with Agamemnon's case and at least some variants of Sophie's, it admits of no morally acceptable resolution; unlike all but exhaustively balanced variants of Sophie's case, it does not eve n allow for the sort of morally mandated, thoug h stil l impermissible, way ou t tha t i s provided b y a weightier disjunctive requirement. In short, no. matter what the agent does here, she does wrong, and neithe r of her options seems to be any better or morally more important than the other. What can it mean, then, to offer he r all-things-considered moral advice—or for that matter, to decline to do so, stopping at the claim that each of her alternatives is prima facie prohibited? The case seems to undermine not just the agent' s choice of action but ou r ow n accoun t of it in action-guiding terms. It therefore poses in particularly stark form the problem of practical "ought" in dilemmas.

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I want no w t o consider som e o f the general consequences for deontic logi c of my own attempt t o make room for such cases within action-guiding ethics .

3. Problem s for Practica l Ought-System s On th e vie w I se t out t o defen d here , th e statement s tha t see m t o appl y t o dilemmas are odd and in many ways unsettling but not incoherent. They make sense as results of applying teachable practical rules to situations of intractable wrong, even if they may be said to mak e no sens e as concrete piece s of practical advice in those situations. I now want to pinpoint some of the ways in which dilemmas on the accoun t jus t given are unsettling, particularly for systemati c approaches t o moral reasoning that purport t o capture our ordinary notion of practical "ought. " I shall focus o n a few central problems raised b y dilemmas for deontic logic, without much technical detail on alternative systems. My aim is just to indicate in broad outline the degree of complication tha t would resul t from a n attempt t o stretch the materials provided by the standard syste m to fit our ordinary moral thought. I shall assume on the basis of my understanding of the action-guiding function assigne d t o "ought"—o r t o th e particula r sense or us e of "ought " tha t deontic logi c as here interpreted is meant to capture—tha t bot h o f the ought implication principles picked out earlier do apply. For practical "ought, " that is, it is essentially a matter o f definition that "ought " implie s "can " an d tha t positive (and hence prescriptive) "ought" implies "permissible"; bu t thi s is of course compatible with the claim that other uses of "ought" have different func tions and henc e do no t obe y the two principles. 40 M y central tas k i n this section will be to suggest ways of handling the two further principles that seemed to conflict with these in application to dilemmas: the ought-derivation principles, agglomeration an d closure. Closure will naturally come u p firs t becaus e of its relation a s indicated i n my last section t o som e of the odder result s of the distinction I have defended between positiv e an d negativ e dilemmas . In fact , befor e w e ge t t o th e clas h between principles , we need to rais e som e question s abou t th e results of that distinction fo r deonti c logic . S o far, I have blurred over problem s abou t per mission an d negatio n i n the standard syste m that no w nee d to b e considered. Once the y are deal t with, I shall claim, dilemmas themselves will no t giv e us reason t o restric t th e principl e of closure . However , ther e ar e othe r reason s having to do with the interpretation of the deontic operator tha t will be worth discussing here at least briefly . On th e othe r hand , agglomeratio n wil l stil l b e calle d int o questio n b y dilemmas, an d I shall go on to sugges t a rationale for droppin g i t that make s sense on our assumption of a strong action-guiding interpretation o f "ought," now though t o f i n negativ e terms. Withou t agglomeratio n w e see m t o en d up wit h a collectio n of subsystems of practical "ought" designe d to rul e ou t dilemmas within any single system. Along with dilemmas, though, this picture also seems to rule out the sort of interplay between ought-judgments that deontic

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3

logic has to capture if it is to represent any of the more interestin g cases of moral reasoning. Prescriptive "Ought" Standard deonti c logic derives the principle that "ought" implies "permissible " from a n axiom tha t essentiall y begs the question agains t dilemmas : P p v Pp. 41 Even without this assumption, however, a version of "ought"-implies-"permis sible" migh t seem to rule out the distinction underlying our negative definition of dilemma s because th e principl e applies t o negativ e ought s a s well as posi tive. That is, if "ought-not" also implies "permissible-not," w e would seem to have incompatible judgments of permissibility in negative cases as well as positive. In the assassination case , for instance, if the agent ough t neither to infor m on the assassins nor to remain silent, we seem to have it that she is permitted to do either, given that no t doing one amounts t o doin g th e other. But our negative ought-judgments presumably tell us that she is not permitted t o do either. Since "ought" involves both a positive and a negative permission, i n short, the case yields a contradiction, assuming closure. Even without closur e it yields an implausible set of permissions . Perhaps the simplest way of avoiding this problem would be to take "ought not," o r F (for "it is forbidden that"), a s primitive in deontic logi c rather tha n O o r P and t o buil d "ought"-implies-"permissible" int o the definition of Op. With Pp defined a s ~Fp, Op would then come ou t as Fp & ~Fp; and "ought" implies-"permissible" woul d not apply to Fp to yield Pp. The principle would still apply to Op, but the point is that on this approach O p would no longer be equivalent to Fp . It would no longer amoun t t o a negative ought, o r "ought not," a prohibition, bu t instead, one might say, to "ough t not-"—with "not " understood a s negatin g the objec t o f "ought, " s o tha t th e resultin g ought statement require s some alternative action, rather tha n a s yielding a negative version o f the operator, s o that th e statement forbid s action . This negative approach therefor e involves complicating on e of the underlying grammatical assumptions of deontic logic , whic h treat s "ought-not " an d "ought not- " a s interchangeable . However, i t doe s see m to fi t the pictur e of all-things-considered practical oughts and reasons that emerged from my treatment of dilemmas in this chapter. Th e notion o f sufficient reaso n fo r prohibit ing some action came out as fundamental in the sense of not reducing to reason s in favor of some alternative action, since it is not undercu t by decisive reasons against alternatives . This pictur e captures somethin g intuitivel y basic, more over, t o the extent that the notion o f a "taboo"—ruling ou t certain actions on the basis of authoritative command—might be thought o f as a primitive "ought" in historical o r developmental terms as well as logically. On the other hand, the picture might seem to violate the standard interpretation o f negation, derived from Frege , as modifying th e content o f a proposi tion rather than amounting to a further operator on propositions—denial, say— on a par wit h assertion. For instance, Frege insists that no distinction between positive and negative propositions (in his terms, "thoughts" ) i s needed to make

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sense of any logical principle he knows of. 42 Would thi s rule out principle s of deontic logic that distinguish between positive and negative deontic operators ? In fact, Michael Dummett suggests that we add to Frege's stated remark s some corresponding points about prohibition: To avoid overcomplication in the way Frege ha s i n min d whe n h e takes th e denia l of a propositio n a s asserting it s negation, we also nee d to tak e prohibition as commanding a negation. 43 Bu t this is apparently to grant that Fp amounts to Op . This applicatio n o f Frege' s vie w is less straightforwar d tha n i t appears , however. First, we should not e that th e deontic operators are not themselves "force operators" on the model of assertion. They can be understood a s prepositional operators , forming compound proposition s fro m prepositiona l vari ables—"it ough t t o b e the case tha t p " fro m "i t i s the case tha t p"—s o tha t negative force can stil l modify th e conten t of a proposition: I t would be built into th e conten t o f th e compoun d propositio n forme d b y a negativ e deontic operator. We now need to drop the assumption that this is expressible in terms of th e negatio n o f the simple r component proposition , however . Instead, we have to recognize a distinction for a statement with imperativa l force between negating the description o f the state of affairs i t commands the agent to bring about and issuing a negative version of the command—in other words, substituting "prevent" for "bring about." We should grant, of course, tha t packin g negation int o th e operator a s on this account will indeed complicate matters in a way that is contrary to the spirit of Frege' s approach . Bu t agains t th e simpl e application o f Frege' s view s on affirmation an d negation to the deontic modalities, we should note that the latter are alread y complicated b y th e presenc e o f permissio n a s a n intermediate possibility betwee n command an d prohibition . Ther e ar e tw o differen t way s of negatin g the imperativa l content o f a command, on e migh t say: issuing a countercommand an d simply retracting the command. 44 In fact, "entertaining" a proposition migh t be suggested in place of assertion as providing a mentalistic parallel to command tha t more accuratel y represents the real complications to b e found in our us e of the notion , includin g the logica l space i t leaves for permission. Here there seem to b e several possibilities: (1) One can hold a proposition i n mind, or actively entertain it, by analogy to a command. (2) One can block it out or exclude it from consciousness— the analogue of prohibition—possibly but not necessarily by entertaining some other proposition tha t excludes it. But (3) one can also simply fail t o entertain it, not necessarily by blocking it out but perhaps just because one is unreceptive to i t in some more passive way. The sort o f assumption marking off the third possibility from th e second is that being unprepared to think about something, being uninterested in it, or the lik e is not alway s explainable in terms of some competing mental activity. For similar reasons, (4 ) one can als o in some cases do nothing to prevent a certain proposition fro m coming to mind and yet just fail to entertai n it. So failing to bloc k out a prepositional though t count s as a distinguishable possibility—amountin g t o th e analogu e of permissio n in m y treatment of the logi c of practical "ought." The complications introduced by my approach, then, are not without par-

Practical Oughts and Prohibitions 55 allel i n moral psychology , an d m y approach i s founded on mora l psycholog y insofar a s i t rest s o n th e perceptua l o r figure/groun d assessment o f deonti c weights that was outlined in the preceding section. We can see further reason s for complicatin g this account i f we now take a look a t th e problems with closure, the principle called int o question b y dilemmas in standard deonti c logic on the assumption that "ought" implies "permissible." Sinc e my account effec tively limit s the latte r principl e to positiv e oughts—thos e expresse d b y th e operator O , including oughts wit h negated proposition s a s their objects—and at the sam e time limit s dilemmas to negativ e oughts, i t keeps dilemmas fro m posing any special problem with respect to closure. We no longer have to worry, that is , about applyin g closure t o a statemen t grantin g the permissibilit y of satisfying a conflicting ought—about whethe r we could deriv e from i t a contradiction of the statemen t o f impermissibility that follow s by definition from the ought with which i t conflicts. For all-things-considered conflicting oughts will now be limited to prohibitions, which do not imply "permissible. " Closure may be questioned, however, on independent grounds that bring to light important general problems with the interpretation of the deontic opera tor—or operators, we now shoul d say, since the ambiguities in our readin g of O will be exhibited somewhat differentl y b y F, which does not provide a parallel to the distinction betwee n "ought" and "obligation. " A s previously stated in positive form, closure allows us to derive obligations to do anything necessary to fulfil l ou r obligations . To th e extent tha t th e unrestricte d principl e is plausible, however, it really seems to apply to oughts rather than to obligations strictly construed—at any rate, obligations whose objects amount to acts—for reasons we may illustrate with the assassination case. In intuitive terms, with "obligation " take n broadly to include requirements imposed b y moral principles as well as specific commitments, the agen t in the assassination cas e may be said to have an obligation to protect he r country or even to save a certain political figure from assassinatio n in addition to the obligation to protect he r family. To fulfill thi s obligation under the circumstances, she is required to infor m on th e assassins . Fulfillin g th e latte r requiremen t in turn imposes on her any number of further requirements in context, most nota bly that sh e fail t o prevent the murder of the family membe r under threat bu t also, for instance, tha t sh e move her lip s and othe r trivia l presuppositions of action on her original obligation that have nothing to d o with the conflict. Whether O applies to any of these putatively derived obligations, however— whether we can speak o f them plausibly as "obligations"—depends very much on the terms in which we decide to interpre t the operator. The word "ought " applies fairly readily to the results of closure—we may grant that the agent ought to move her lips, say—but "obligation" appears to be sensitive to instrumental remoteness and change s i n wording of a sort tha t woul d mak e it hard t o formulate a qualified versio n of the principle. We might grant, fo r instance , that the agent has an obligation that requires her to move her lips—or even that it is obligatory that she move her lips—but surely not that she has an obligation to move her lips. On the other hand, I think we would allow that she has an obligation to say something, for instance, even though this already involves going

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somewhat beyon d the stated content s o f her original obligation and certainly of the general moral principle from which it was derived by closure.45 Th e bes t we can say , I think, is that closur e doe s no t hol d generall y for obligation , a t any rat e as applied directly to acts. Standard deonti c logi c reads O i n a way that mixe s "ought" and "obliga tion," but as applied to prepositional variable s on assumptions that do seem to allow for closure—though they also seem to keep deontic logic from capturing practical "ought." The readings usually given for the operator ar e "it is obligatory that " or "i t ough t t o b e (the case) that," take n as interchangeable. Both phrases, bu t especially the latter, ar e naturally read i n light of the sort o f ideal interpretation of ought-judgments that corresponds to the "ideal world" semantics of standard deonti c logic. 46 Wha t ough t t o b e the case, accordin g to thi s approach, i s what i s the case in all deontically perfect or idea l worlds, world s in perfect conformity to th e mora l rules . In recognizing dilemmas, of course , we recognize that the real world i s not i n this sense ideal: Any world compat ible with wha t i s now irrevocabl y the cas e will have to b e seriously flawed in moral terms. Even apart fro m dilemmas, moreover, our real-world obligations will sometimes rest on the assumption of a less than perfect moral world t o the extent tha t the y include "contrary-to-duty" obligations , obligations to mak e up for moral wrongs. 47 Wha t i s in question here is what a given agent ought t o do, not what ought to be, but although "ought-to-do" seems to cover more of our ordinar y practica l ought-judgments , deontic logi c seem s t o fi t "ought to-be." Even read in terms of "obligation," then, but applied to propositional vari ables, O ca n b e expected t o suppor t closure , as it seemed t o i n the example s drawn from the assassination case just above. That anythin g logically or causally require d b y what i s true o f al l idea l worlds wil l b e true o f the m a s wel l presumably would follow from the definitio n o f a morally ideal world a s satisfying logica l and causal laws. As applied to acts, on the other hand, example s like those just cited suggest that closure holds for "ought" but not for "obligation," s o i t seem s w e hav e t o choos e betwee n "ought " an d "obligation " i n interpreting th e deonti c operator . Where the y introduc e a n infinitiv e phras e rather than "that," terms based on "obligation" appea r to be more tightly tied to the wording of the principles, commitments, or the like from which particular requirements are derived. To avoid these complications, I have mainly stuck to "ought " i n this chapter, supplyin g its missing noun for m wit h th e ver b even in some case s wher e "obligation" migh t sound mor e natural . For we seem to nee d both th e principle of closure and statement s of "ought-to-do" i n order t o capture the prac tical reasoning involve d in dilemmas—including most notabl y the derivation of preparatory oughts that came into my initial argument against Williams. In a case lik e Sartre's, tha t is , even if there are n o positiv e dilemmatic oughts i n force all things considered, we still want to be able to derive obligations requiring th e agen t t o tak e an y necessar y and permissible mean s to satisfyin g th e corresponding prohibitions. If it is forbidden fo r the agent to fail to support hi s mother in 1942, say , and financia l a s well as personal support is intended, then

Practical Oughts and Prohibitions 57 he ought t o star t savin g as early as 193 2 o n the assumption tha t savin g in no way interferes with the ability to satisfy his other obligations. That we now need to spell out the latter assumption, of permissibility, is a complication introduce d by my negative formulation of deontic principles. With permissibility granted, however, closure does seem to apply to the case in negative form and to yield a positive preparatory ought-judgment . In negative "ought-to-do" terms, closure says that it is forbidden to do anything that entail s doing something forbidden: FA and ~M( B & ~A ) imply FB. The principle seems at least not to clash with intuition, whose deliverances are less firm for the less familiar negative operator. "Forbidden" ma y sound odd in application to acts whose logical or causal tie to a violation of obligation is relatively remote, bu t it is not clearly ruled out, an d we seem to have no less awkward phrase except "ought not," whic h does apply. It also is worth noting that "forbidden" clearl y means something stronger than "nonideal, " even where it is used in a phrase that suggests "ought-to-be." Similarly for "prohibited," which I shall continue to us e here. The distinction betwee n "ought-to-do " an d "ought-to-be, " considered a s extending to "forbidden" an d related negative ought-terms, might now help us to deal with some of the odd results noted (an d some others that were blurred over) i n the precedin g section. O n th e presen t accoun t w e would see m to b e limited t o a negativ e version of the disjunctiv e ough t tha t was brough t i n t o resolve Sophie's dilemma at least in practical terms: a conjunctive prohibition — on letting both childre n be killed, say—that would no t b e subject to "ought" implies-"permissible." Otherwise , th e principl e o f closure , o r closur e plu s agglomeration, woul d apparentl y classif y th e sam e ac t a s bot h permissible and forbidden : A positive disjunctive ough t woul d impl y the permissibilit y of saving a particular child in accordance wit h some sort of tiebreaker, while the original dilemmatic prohibitions would imply that this is forbidden. Without th e disjunctiv e ought , though , ther e wil l be nothing tha t Sophie ought t o do. We now hav e to deny , that is , that sh e ought (al l things consid ered) to save at least on e child—just becaus e there is no permissible means t o doing so—even assuming that the prohibition on letting both be killed is clearly stronger tha n either of the dilemmatic prohibitions. The point is that Sophie is given no moral permission to act in this case. Any particular act she might perform—meaning an y act-token (whethe r or not we should tak e thi s to include disjunctive an d othe r compoun d acts)—i s prohibited wit h sufficien t indepen dent strength t o remai n i n force even in ligh t of the conjunctiv e prohibition. Although this result may sound odd, w e can mute its oddness b y granting that i t still ought to b e the case that Sophi e save at leas t one child, since there ought to be some permissible way of doing so—even in the less-than-ideal world in which she has to act to save a child at all. There is still a distinguishable type of act that is required of her (and hence permitted) under the circumstances; it is merely a contingent matter that this coincides with a prohibited act-type , as her choice-situatio n is in fac t se t up . However , prohibitio n might b e sai d t o "dominate" permissio n for "ought-to-do": If an act-token is prohibited under some description, then it is prohibited tout court, whether or not i t is also per-

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mitted unde r some other description . What thi s means is that al l of Sophie' s particular options come out a s prohibited. At the same time, there still will be some to which "ought-to-be" applies , to yield not just a version of the disjunctive ought (an d its particular conclusion by way o f the tiebreaker ) but als o of the original dilemmatic oughts whose positive "ought-to-do" versions we had to drop. We can also say that it ought to be the case that Sophie save each child, that is, given that "ought-to-be " ca n be limited fairly naturall y to act s under different descriptions . With differen t backgroun d condition s presuppose d b y differen t ought statements as on dyadic systems of deontic logic, "ought-to-be" should accommodate al l of the variou s statements we want t o mak e abou t case s o f moral dilemma.48 Relative to the fact that Sophie has to act to save one child, that is, it ough t t o b e the cas e that sh e does—compatibly with th e fac t tha t i t reall y ought no t t o b e the case (and would not b e the case in a world tha t was ideal without qualification ) tha t sh e have to ac t to sav e one child. Different condi tions would yiel d different an d sometimes conflicting obligations, but o n this account the statements expressing them would essentially be insulated from each other b y their different presuppositions in a way that would make it impossible for the m to capture the motivational conflict characteristic of dilemmas. This sort of fragmentation o f deontic logic into separate subsystem s is the main threa t pose d b y dropping the principl e of agglomeration, a s I go o n t o argue. I n any case, i t is "ought-to-do" rathe r than "ought-to-be " tha t woul d seem t o hav e even a chance o f capturing action-guidin g dilemmas. It i s also "ought-to-do" that coincides with the sort of everyday practical use of "ought" that deontic logicians generally seem to b e after, despite their usual reading of the operator. The basis of standard deontic logic in ideal conceptions of "ought " seems to undermin e any claims it might make to capture th e elements of ordinary moral reasoning. Nonstandard approaches i n the field see m to b e able to capture the m onl y by disconnecting them, cuttin g of f possibilities of mutual influence, as we shall see. Deontic Fragmentation Williams defends his decision to drop the principle of agglomeration by noting that many of the act-evaluations that migh t b e thought t o entai l ought-statements—"desirable," "advisable," "sensible, " an d "prudent" are his examples— do not obe y the principle. 49 Tw o acts can eac h b e good i n one of these ways, we might say, and ye t not b e good i n combination, since their goodness rest s on reason s tha t cance l each othe r out . Bu t this argumen t has force onl y for a use of "ought" whose link to "good" makes it weaker than the imperatival sense that is in question here for cases of action-guiding dilemma. It suggests just the sort of quick departure from dut y ethics in the fac e o f moral conflic t that my overall argumen t here is meant to resist. Fo r th e sor t o f ought tha t rules out alternatives, agglomeration does seem plausible: If anything but a certain act is unacceptable, an d the same is true of another act, how ca n it not b e true of the two i n combination?

Practical Oughts and Prohibitions 59 Since conflicting positive all-things-considered oughts hav e been eliminated from ou r picture of dilemmas, our problem is now with agglomeration i n negative form. The reformulate d principle tells us that F A and F B imply F(A v B), but i n a cas e o f exhaustiv e prohibition th e latte r formul a cannot b e action guiding sinc e its disjunctive object hold s necessarily . It disobey s the negative correlate of the principle that "ought " implies "can": that "ought-not" implies "can avoid." However , we should now raise a more general question about what the apparent reference to agency here can amount to on an "ought-to-be" inter pretation o f the principle—an d how muc h action-guidanc e i t really involves. Interpreted i n terms o f ideal worlds th e principle that "ought " implie s "can " essentially guarantees that a deontically perfect world i s also a possible world, but i t does not ensur e that actio n i s needed to brin g such a world about . S o it allows fo r ought-judgments without an y action-guiding point, suc h as a judgment that one ought t o obey the laws of logic. Odd consequence s of this trivial sort ar e ofte n tolerated i n the interest s of systematization.50 "Ought"-implies-"ca n avoid " (a s opposed to "can"), thoug h presupposed b y the Kantia n approach fro m whic h w e ge t "ought"-implies "can," i s not assume d i n standar d deonti c logic . Requirin g the inevitabl e is thought to be harmless enough, since conformity to it is automatic. Bu t of course this sort of failure with respect to action-guidingness may not be so harmless to whatever claims deontic logic makes to represent ordinary moral discourse. An ought that gives reasons fo r action, rathe r tha n just for preferring some independent outcome , woul d appl y onl y to state s o f affair s tha t depen d o n wha t one does . However, the main variant of deontic logic for "ought-to-do," Castaneda' s system, with O applied to "practitions" (intentions or prescriptions), allows for logically harmless but practically pointless use s of "ought" to th e extent tha t it still makes out obligation as a kind of moral necessity.51 Castaneda also accept s the principle of agglomeration, which he at one point defends in "ought-to-do" terms b y appeal t o a vie w of ought-statement s a s restrictin g a n agent' s free dom, since the extent of the restriction on freedom and the reasons for it would have to be the same for O(A & B) as for OA 8t OB. 52 My remarks here suggest, though, that one should consider the point of such a restriction—its importance , or what it achieves—as part of what i s meant by the reasons for it and hence as determining whether it constitutes a real or a tenable restriction. Ther e migh t be a separate point in each of the restrictions on action whose combination turns out to b e pointless in cases of dilemma—to move now beyon d logically harmless cases on the assumption that there is also no point in requiring the impossible. By analogy, there might be two restrictive dietary regimens, each offerin g certain health benefits in return for forgoing certain foods but jointl y ruling out so much that th e combined regimen would b e unhealthy. We can think of Castaneda's restriction s on freedom as based o n a practical interpretation o f "ought" i n terms of reasons fo r action-guidanc e that im proves o n Williams' s reference t o desire s and relate d notion s o f th e good . Castaneda seems to b e on the right track, moreover, in switching deontic logic to "ought-to-do. " However , I think he still retains too muc h of what i s wrong

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with standar d deonti c logi c b y retaining its Kantian basis in moral necessity . One reason h e may need to d o so, apart from his emphasis on systematic sim plicity, is that h e does mak e referenc e to desire s insofar a s he makes ou t th e truth of an ought-statement in terms of its relation to the agent's optiona l ends. 53 The strengt h o f a requiremen t i n contras t t o a desire—th e binding force of "ought," in other words—ha s t o come fro m something other tha n it s source , on this sort o f end-based account ; th e usua l alternative is some sor t o f structural feature analogous t o logica l necessity as on Kant's view. The intermediate "escapist" account I have suggested in this chapter essentially replaces the mode l o f necessit y with tha t o f needs, strengthenin g desire by reference to som e sor t o f harm o r ba d stat e o f affairs a s contingent upo n nonfulfillment. 54 Th e change allows us to continue to speak o f oughts a s imposing restrictions on an agent's freedom—a moral ought may be said to leave one wit h n o rea l alternativ e i n moral term s t o it s fulfillment—bu t w e no w lack the unifyin g assumptio n tha t the agent must be left wit h somethin g he is free t o do. Needs can quite conceivably be unsatisfiable i n combination, tha t is, as things work ou t in some particula r situation, though they still press just as urgently for satisfaction when they conflict. They do not see m to undercut each other in felt practical force , one might say, even where they cannot bot h result i n action . Considered individually , needs of the sort i n question here would see m to imply "can " a t leas t in the sens e of holding out hop e of avoiding the harm in question if they are satisfied. Since a set of needs does not impl y a correspond ing ability to satisfy al l of its members in conjunction, however, this version of escapism provide s u s with a reasonabl e paralle l to "ought " tha t ma y indeed violate the principl e o f agglomeration . Needin g each o f two thing s doe s no t imply needing both of them, i f only because the har m eac h averts migh t con ceivably be allowed o r eve n brough t on b y the pair. Consider , fo r instance, a patient with two disorders wh o needs two medications that interact badly , so that the result of taking both medications to avoid ill health would be ill health. When we switch to the negative version of agglomeration, w e can see essentially the same thing in terms of the model of perceptual dominance of reasons against various alternative acts—the negative basis of the sanctions-model , in effect—that I appealed t o earlier. There may be strong enough reasons agains t each of two exhaustive alternatives to rule out each of them—from moral consideration, le t us say—even if we den y that i t make s sense to spea k o f ruling out th e pair of them, or al l possibilities, in a single breath. This suppose s tha t the notion of strong enough reasons for ruling something out rests on a figureground relation : selection fro m a backgroun d o f further possibilities , s o that any given act of selection ha s to leav e something over. That tw o figure s each ma y b e capable o f standin g ou t agains t th e back ground, i n short, does no t impl y that the y can do s o in combination, jus t because there may be no further backgroun d to contrast wit h them; each may serve as backgroun d for the other , as one's vie w undergoes gestalt shifts. Th e "fig ures" her e amount t o act s rule d ou t b y strong enoug h reasons, o r forbidde n with sufficient strength—o n the assumption required by agglomeration as inter-

Practical Oughts and Prohibitions 6

1

preted i n "ought-to-do" terms, tha t act s related b y disjunction or the like can be thought o f as forming compound acts . In "ought-to-be" terms, agglomeration ma y be dealt with differently. Stron g enough reasons agains t doing some act need not b e seen as implied by the rea sons wh y it (or the state o f affairs tha t consist s i n doing it ) ought no t t o be , if the strength o f reasons for a prohibition depends on its practical point, as I have suggested. An act that is inevitably going to be done, say, might on this account be one that ought no t to be—eve n though ther e cannot b e strong enough rea sons fo r prohibitin g it , sinc e no possibl e reason s coul d satisf y th e poin t o f a prohibition b y keeping it from bein g done. I n application t o dilemmas , then , where the overal l choice-situation ough t not t o be , the disjunction of exhaus tive alternatives the situation allows for may be thought o f as forbidden in ideal terms. I n practical terms , th e sam e prohibitio n would violat e agglomeration : There will be strong enough reasons to prohibit each of the alternatives but not their disjunction. To allo w fo r agglomeratio n o f nondilemmati c oughts, w e would nee d t o complicate deonti c logic further b y qualifying th e principle—adding a clause , say, tha t restrict s i t i n positive for m t o ought s wit h compatibl e objects . Fo r dilemmatic cases , o n the othe r hand , w e have to dea l wit h a kind o f deonti c fragmentation that i s evidently not limite d to cases of incommensurable value, if there are balanced cases like Sophie's in which only one morally relevant value is at stake. However, a s we saw earlier, a more pervasive sort of fragmentation into subsystems already results from the attempt t o represent conflicting oughts within a n "ought-to-be " versio n of standard deonti c logic as provided b y the dyadic system. The sam e ma y now b e said o f Castaneda's "ought-to-do " syste m wit h it s assignment o f conflictin g oughts t o differen t subscripte d contexts o f ends . Castaneda's approac h make s at least initial sense for many of the standard case s of dilemma, which involve a clash between different sort s of values, principles, or th e like . However, i f a basi s i n differen t end s is enough to insulat e ought s from eac h other, we would see m to have a distinct subsystem for every distinguishable source of obligation.55 Thus , i n Sophie's case obligations t o differen t children might be assigned different subscript s to avoid intrasystematic conflict, even though the y are grounded i n the sam e moral concerns . Bu t just becaus e they both are grounded in moral concerns, it is unclear that this move excludes dilemmas from morality. In any case, by disallowing logical interaction betwee n conflicting oughts, Castaneda's approac h would apparently keep deontic logi c from capturin g the problematic aspec t o f dilemmas. This i s not t o sa y that a logical syste m or se t of subsystems purporting t o represent ethic s can b e expected t o captur e everythin g interesting about real life ethical cases. As a proposal for structuring deontic logic, Castaneda's treat ment of dilemmas seems to m e to b e on the mark a s long as it is not take n a s ruling them out except fro m a certain version of deontic logic. His own view in fact seem s to b e that moralit y essentially is an attemp t t o resolv e conflicts, in the first instanc e between oughts arising from differen t agents ' ends.56 At least in rough terms, his approach resembles the account of morality as a social arti-

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fact that I shall go on to defend in chapter 3 . However, i n setting up moral subsystems i n terms o f contexts o f end s that ca n b e "harmonized " int o a singl e system, as he assumes, Castaneda essentially begins with a general ban on moral conflict. What I have tried to do in this chapter i s not to give a detailed defense of a new approach t o deontic logic but simply to show how an adequate approach woul d seem to spli t into subsystems in the attemp t t o captur e th e notion o f practical "ought." This notion allow s for dilemmas on the view I have outlined by virtue of it s relation t o th e reason s fo r an d agains t action . I have use d a perceptua l analogy t o understan d th e compariso n o f reason s tha t all-things-considere d practical "ought " presupposes. I n the firs t instance , the notio n require s suffi cient reason fo r ruling out alternativ e actions; an d I have maintained that thi s core elemen t of its meaning may b e separately applicabl e to al l alternatives in a given situation. This is enough to provide a rationale for dilemmas in negative form, as cases of exhaustive prohibition. I n positive form, as cases o f exclusive requirement , they seem to be ruled out by the stipulation that positive or prescriptive "ought" also implies "permissible," understoo d a s the absenc e of sufficient reaso n fo r ruling out its object. To allow for the distinction, I have suggested that deonti c logic be founded instead on prescriptive "ought. " The real complications thi s change would introduce see m to me to be not much worse tha n those require d in any case in order to shift fro m the ideal notion o f "ought" that the standar d system cover s t o th e ordinar y practica l notio n tha t underlie s action-guidin g ethics. We can now understan d why agglomeration fail s for practical "ought " by noting that the perceptual account of reasons allows for a kind of "split image " in certai n cases : Set s of reasons ma y eac h b e important o r seriou s enoug h t o stand i n light of each other, eve n where they cannot stan d togethe r i n the way that might seem to b e required by a picture o f ethics as harmonizing differen t ends. O n th e perceptua l picture , reason s sometime s compet e fo r dominance , prompting gestal t shift s i n our vie w of the evidence, as captured b y the sort of division into subsystems that Castaneda use s to avoid dilemmas. I take this alternative picture instead to indicate in evidential terms what i t means to say that dilemmas ar e possible . Deonti c fragmentation , i n short , doe s no t undermin e the coherency of ethics bu t jus t its uniflability a t the level of particular action guiding oughts. To the extent tha t th e moral code ca n be seen as a product o f potentially conflicting (socia l and individual ) needs, i t provides a n intelligible basis for dilemmas . The mai n poin t o f m y treatment o f dilemma s i n connection wit h deonti c logic i n thi s chapte r wa s t o allo w fo r th e coherenc y o f practica l "ought " i n dilemmas—the sort o f ought tha t i s intended t o motivat e an d tha t therefor e would seem to fal l subject to the problem of motivational forc e outlined in my preceding chapter. I did s o by defending the negativ e conception o f dilemmas. On this conception, which I introduced in section 1 as a way around Williams's

Practical Oughts an d Prohibitions 6

3

denial of practical "ought," dilemmas are thought of as prohibitions of all alternatives open to the agent under the circumstances rather than as conflicting requirements or positive ought-judgments. I defended the positive/negative distinction in the first half of section 2 with reference to the perceptual picture of the weighting of practical reasons as evidence for a n all-things-considere d ought, o r on e tha t holds i n light of all the evidence, as distinct from on e that is "overriding" i n the sense of being strong enough in practical weight to cancel out competitors. Thi s amounts to a figureground notion of reasons that pass a certain threshhold o f seriousness as standing out agains t the general background in a way that allows for gestalt shifts . It allows u s to thin k of negative dilemmas as involving exhaustive all-thingsconsidered prohibitions, because the reason against any given alternative open to th e agen t ma y be strong enoug h in absolute term s t o pas s th e threshhold , even though i t cannot b e said to cance l the forc e of opposing reasons , which also pas s th e threshhold . The notion applie s to weighte d a s well as balanced dilemmas—to cases like Agamemnon's as well as Sophie's—on th e assumption that even reasons of lesser weight in comparison with competing reasons ma y still be strong enoug h not to b e canceled. Another centra l idea of this chapter emerge d fro m the compariso n o f allthings-considered "ought" with the stronger term "must," which apparently is not subjec t to dilemmas even in negative form. As an alternative to Williams's interpretation o f "must " a s implyin g "will " i n accordanc e wit h a mode l of necessitation by character, I suggested a strengthened version of the "escapist" or sanction s mode l that som e deonti c logician s have applie d to "ought. " To say that one ought to do something is on this account to say that it is necessary to avoid some sanction or ba d state of affairs—perhaps just something on the order o f moral wrong , a s the genera l sort o f sanctio n associate d wit h mora l "ought." Accordingly , to sa y that on e "must " d o somethin g i s to refe r t o a sanction s o bad as to blo t out opposin g reason s fo r action. Thi s i s not to say that ther e ar e n o suc h opposin g reasons—an d statement s frame d in terms of "must" and related notions d o seem to apply naturally to cases of dilemma— but just that they do not persist i n view in the way that the perceptual picture of reasons allow s with respect to ordinary ought-judgments. What the stronger term rules out i n such cases is the inclusion of all of the agent's reasons fo r action within a single background o f evidence bearing on an ought-judgment. It therefore might be said to capture the illusion that the moral sanction i s avoidable—the assumptio n buil t into standar d version s o f "escapism " whic h my account reject s for cases of dilemma. My ensuing defense of the logical coherency of my account and its implications for deontic logic applied the sanctions model to an interpretation o f oughtjudgments in terms oineeds, as an alternative to Kantian "moral necessity" for understanding the imperatival force of moral "ought." A need involves the threat of a sanction that i s avoidable by satisfying it , thoug h perhap s no t avoidabl e simpliciter sinc e there is no guarantee that a set of needs will be jointly satisfi able. One might think of "must"-statements accordingly as statements express-

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ing the dominance of some particular need or consistent set of needs—perhaps only a limited subset of the overall set of practical requirements imposed by the situation. On th e way to thi s application o f the sanctions mode l t o needs , my argument deal t i n somewha t mor e detai l wit h bot h th e assumption s o f case s o f dilemma and som e centra l assumptions an d principle s of deontic logic , in defense o f my negative conception o f dilemmas as cases in which nothing is permissible. In the second hal f of section 2,1 maintained that dilemma s on my account come out as irresolvable in the sense of not being settled b y appeal to any morally acceptabl e considerations , eve n if one accept s a stronge r disjunctiv e ought prescribing the satisfaction of at least one of the ought s i n conflict—or, in negative terms, forbidding the violation of both prohibitions. In Sophie's case, for instance , this amount s t o a weightier prohibition o n lettin g both childre n be taken t o the gas chamber. Wit h a certain allocation o f harms, moreover — for instance , if saving one child could b e accomplished only by inflicting something worse than death on the other—the disjunctive ought might come out with the same weight as those in conflict, for a case of exhaustively balanced prohi bition. I then turned, in section 3, to the logical underpinnings of the positive/negative distinction, beginning with problems about the application of the principle that "ought" implies "permissible" t o negative oughts or prohibitions. In nontechnical terms: On e migh t object that m y defense of the principl e in application to prescriptive "ought " would see m to apply to prescriptive "ought " just as well, as a practical ought enjoining the failure to perform a certain action. I essentially removed the parallelism by distinguishing between a negative ought and a n ough t tha t enjoin s some negativel y specified action. The former doe s not point the agent toward some indefinite alternative to action bu t rather just away from action, with no implication that there is a real alternative. My argument dealt with th e distinctio n b y way o f a proposal fo r a versio n of deonti c logic that takes the operator F (for "forbidden") as primitive in place of O or P, building "ought"-implies-"permissible" int o the definition o f O so that it covers only positive ought-judgments. In response t o Fregean objections to buildin g negation int o the operator, I argued that th e very real complications th e move would introduc e make sense in ligh t of the complicatin g rol e o f permissio n a s a thir d possibilit y between obligation and prohibition in deontic logic. The appropriate analog y to obligation versus prohibition is not really assertion versus negation but rather the more complex arra y o f possibilitie s that emerg e i f we conside r th e alternative s to actively entertaining a proposition—or "thought, " in Frege's own mentalistic terms—besides actively blocking it out . An important resul t of my suggestions for deonti c logi c i s the retentio n of the principle of closure: that O A and ~M ( A & ~B ) imply OB. My view avoids any conflict between closure and "ought"-implies-"permissible," o f the sort that has been held to resul t from dilemmas , since i t restricts the latte r principle to positive "ought" and reject s positive dilemmas. However, I noted independent problems with closur e as applied to ordinar y ought-judgments. The principle

Practical Oughts and Prohibitions 65 seems to hold reliably only for statements phrase d i n terms o f "ought," since "obligation" i s more sensitive to the wording of particular commitments, principles, and the like , at an y rate a s applied vi a an infinitiv e phras e t o som e required action. On th e othe r hand , standar d deonti c logi c is not reall y set up t o captur e ought-judgments about action , wit h its reading of the operator O as "it ough t to be the case that" (used interchangeably with "it is obligatory that"). I argued that its claims to represent practica l "ought " depend on capturing "ought-to do" (i n Castaneda's terms ) as opposed t o the statements of "ought-to-be" corresponding to ideal-worl d semantics . In the secon d half o f section 3 I considered th e extrem e complicatio n o f deonti c logi c tha t woul d resul t fro m th e modifications neede d t o exten d i t to dilemmati c "ought-to-do." I provided a rationale for rejecting the principle of agglomeration—that O A and O B imply O(A & B)—which dilemmas bring into conflict with "ought"-implies-"can" a s a principle governing practical "ought. " My claim was that ought-statement s do not count as practical unless they actually have some point as pieces of actionguidance, and that two statement s with suc h a point considere d individually may lose it when agglomerated. Bu t without agglomeration—or with the principle limited to different practica l contexts i n the manner of Castaneda's "ought to-do" version of deontic logic—oughts seem to fragment into logically isolated subsystems. So, again, deontic logi c fails to capture practical "ought." The model of needs for interpreting practical "ought" comes up in illustrating the failur e o f agglomeration. It—o r the sanctions model generally—yields a way of understanding oughts in terms of negative reasons, with motivational force provided by a threat, the prospect o f some sort of sanction on nonperformance. So my argument here extends beyond the issue of the logical structure of dilemmas , t o sugges t a conceptio n o f mora l "ought " tha t migh t begi n t o answer the more general problems raised in chapter 1 . The model of needs has an obvious subjective interpretation correspondin g t o m y perceptual analogy in this chapter, with felt need s taken as involving emotional awarenes s o f the cost o f doing without som e object . In the case of action-guiding moral needs , this would seem to amount t o anticipatory awareness of a sanction on nonperformance. Now I want to as k whether the sort of view suggested b y the model can accor d dilemma s and ethic s generally any "real " basis in the sens e of one that i s not merel y subjective.

3 Motivational Foundation s o f Conflic t

With dilemma s now formulate d negativel y in terms o f practical "ought"—i n terms, tha t is , of prohibitions that ar e mean t to guid e actio n i n some appro priately stron g sense— I wan t t o tak e a close r loo k a t thei r implication s fo r the question of moral realism . Williams's treatment of dilemmas as analogou s to conflicting desires rather than belief s was supposed t o indicate, in effect, that ought-statements canno t describ e moral facts: facts about th e world, indepen dent of our moral judgments and accounting for their truth as on standard defi nitions of realism.1 Bu t Williams does not take account of evaluative facts : facts about the goodness o r badness of some object. To exclude these from the realm of facts is to be g the questio n agains t realism before the issue of conflict even comes up . Evaluative beliefs can certainly attribute the sorts of properties tha t Williams cites as nonagglomerative—properties describe d by variants of "good" like "desirable" an d "prudent"—to contingently incompatible objects without more than pragmatic conflict about which object to choose. I t would b e another story, o f course, t o appl y the corresponding overal l assessments t o incompat ible objects—to pronounce eac h of them best or most desirable, say, or the only prudent objec t of choice unde r the circumstances. 2 Bu t unless we assume non cognitivism, evaluative beliefs still seem to provide at least a small foothol d fo r conflicting ought-judgment s within the category of belief . This is essentially a version of Philippa Foot's counterargument to Williams. 3 But Williams's problem fo r belie f migh t see m to re-arise in application t o th e motivational aspects o f dilemma. Capturing the difficulty o f dilemmatic choic e as something impose d o n th e agent b y the ought-statement s i n conflict seem s to require an internalist view of moral motivation, according to which it is impossible for a rational agen t t o hold a moral belie f without bein g motivated t o act o n it . I n the cas e o f dilemmas , though, th e attemp t t o ac t o n al l of one's moral beliefs would be self-defeating. So conflicting all-things-considered ought judgments would seem to be irrational in combination; with motivational "vec tors" thought o f as part of the world suc h judgments describe, they would als o rule out the sort of independent reality presupposed b y moral realism . Foot's comments on dilemma s seem to b e limited to a fairly wea k sens e of action-guidance that escape s this problem a t th e cost o f failing t o suppor t a n account o f th e motivationa l force of mora l "ought." 4 However , I think tha t Foot's remarks elsewhere on moral teaching contain materials for an interme66

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diate position on internalism that combine s with realis m to yield a defensible answer t o th e problem o f dilemmas and motivation . I n this chapter I extrac t that view from Foot along with some other recent authors on metaethics—none of whom, i t seems to me, can account adequatel y for dilemmas as things stand. I begin by usi'ng Foot's comments on moral teaching to identify a version of externalism that ties motivational force in general terms to the moral import o r function o f an ought-statement, thoug h not to its specific meaning (section 1). This vie w might be thought o f a s "genera l internalism, " thoug h i t would b e classified as a form of externalism as these terms are usually defined. Like standard externalist views, it allows for the coherency of motivational "amoralism," a hypothetical moral stance that involves holding a moral belief without being motivated to ac t on it. On the other hand, lik e internalist views, it provides a nonaccidental connection between the meaning of moral terms and their motivational force. I shall go on to illustrate this nonaccidental connection by offering a speculative account of the teaching of "ought" by reference to emotion. In phenomenological terms my suggestion wil l be that th e "deman d quality " associate d with action-guiding moral "ought" rests in part on a tendency to generate anticipatory guilt feelings—broadly construed as self-directed emotional discomfor t at th e though t o f responsibility for a wrong. Thi s sor t of reference to feelin g might seem to violate realist assumptions; bu t my view is meant to allow fo r a subject-independent accoun t o f the conten t o f any given moral judgmen t and hence for a variant of moral realis m in conjunction with a subject-dependent account o f motivational force. It thereby solves a problem for current concep tions of realism, which seem to forc e a choice between dismissing amoralism and slighting the motivational purposes o f moral judgment.5 I attempt t o make a space for this intermediate view by examining the versions of internalism that we find i n the writings of two contemporary authors , John McDowel l an d J . L. Mackie, whos e position s roughl y reflec t th e Kant / Hume contrast o n motivationa l force set up i n chapter 1 . I exhibit problem s with bot h view s but als o extrac t fro m the m som e element s of an alternativ e position i n section 2. I then fil l i n my own proposed vie w and defen d i t against some objections , wit h specia l attentio n t o variant s of th e charg e o f subjectrelativity in section 3. What I hope eventuall y to put together , beginning here and continuing in my final chapter, i s a view of the basi s of morality in a set of socially instituted norms enforced on the individual level by a link to emotion . Despite a conventionalist element—and a partial basis in emotion, somethin g usually associated wit h subjectivis t approaches—I think there i s an argumen t for takin g this view as a version of moral realism.

1. Mora l Realism an d Practica l Phenomenolog y At leas t three kinds of forc e come u p i n th e literatur e on mora l motivation : motivational, practical or action-guiding, and reason-givin g force (sometimes referred to as "normativity"). A (first-person) moral judgment with motivational

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force is one that actually moves the agent who accept s i t to act, providing that she is rational. O n the other hand, a judgment with practical forc e is meant to get her to act , an d one with reason-giving force offer s he r a reason fo r action. Anscombe called into question the motivational force of moral "ought " on the grounds that, as currently understood, withou t referenc e to a divine lawgiver, it i s merely psychological. Foot, on th e othe r hand, take s ai m i n some o f he r arguments against the reason-giving force of moral judgments, particularly in response to the Kantian insistence on "binding" obligation. 6 However, in a treatment of Hume on moral judgmen t Foot has some related comments about th e notion o f practical force, 7 and I think that her arguments i n both place s have implications for motivational force. In the present discussion, then, I shall blur over the distinctions between these notions, except where they seem to make a difference, i n the hopes of using some of Foot's remarks to brin g out the point I have in mind. Anscombe took mora l "ought " to b e marked of f at thi s point onl y b y its emphatic quality. I shall try to dea l with this in psychological terms by way of a relate d phenomenologica l propert y sometime s calle d "deman d quality, " a property I actually take to b e shared b y nonmoral ought s tha t exhibi t a com pulsive hold on us, perhaps by reference to a deviation from some aesthetic or other notion of "fitness." 8 (Consider , for instance, the feeling that one ought to straighten a slanted picture on the wall.) The contrast i s to oughts that merely recommend some action—as the best way of promoting ou r aims , say. What is special abou t th e moral "ought " i s presumably something abou t th e psycho logical sanctions such as blame that a violation o f it would incur . For presen t purposes, however , I shall be content t o capture somethin g broader : what we might call the stron g imperativa l sense of "ought, " thought o f as picking out an ought wit h demand quality. Foot's central aim in her work on reason-giving force is to debunk the spe cial bindingness that Kant attributed to moral "ought " as an illusion—an illusion foiste d on us by the way we are taught to us e moral language. In particu lar, as a result of what we are taught to say about morality , amoralis m come s out soundin g impossible: I t seems to make n o sense for someone t o acknowl edge the truth o f a moral judgmen t and ye t fail t o acknowledg e it s force as a reason bearing on his action. However, I want to emphasize the positive results of this an d relate d illusions , including some partiall y self-fulfilling result s fo r the special force of moral judgments .

Moral Teaching and Illusion My point about self-fulfillin g illusio n can b e seen by considering Foot' s treat ment o f the overridingness of moral judgments. 9 As with reason-givin g force , overridingness may b e thought o f a s an instanc e o f the kin d o f binding forc e that Kant had in mind—in this case, involving enough force to win any conflict with nonmoral considerations, however important the latter are thought to be. In both cases Foot wants to say that the property i n question is not a necessary

Motivational Foundations of Conflict 69 property o f moral judgments in the sense of applying to an y given occasion o f their use; to thi s extent the bindin g force of morality is an illusion. However, despit e the negative conclusion she wants to draw from it , Foot's explanation o f th e illusio n of necessar y overridingnes s seem s t o involv e the inculcation of habits of practical reasoning that d o accord mora l judgment s a special place or priority. Moral considerations seem to be necessarily overriding, on Foot's account, simpl y because we are taught t o handl e moral judgments differently i n the fac e o f conflict, modifying th e rule s to accommodat e excep tions rather than treating them as "rigid rules that it is sometimes right to ignore " on the model of etiquette.10 Thus , i f our verdic t in a certain case is that an ac t that would otherwise b e morally forbidden is required on nonmoral grounds , we are taught to withdraw the judgment that it is morally forbidden rather than treating the judgment as overridden. The result, o f course, i s that no judgment called moral is ever overridden. It is important to see that the illusion in question here is not simply the view of moral judgments as overriding—they are effectivel y made overriding , afte r all, by the way we are taught to handle them—but rather of overridingness as some kind of intrinsic or necessary property o f moral judgments . Foot points out that there are deviant cases, as where a code of personal hono r such as one that prescribes duelling is given greater weight than moral proscriptions. 11 Th e special priorit y o f moral judgment s is something w e accord t o the m i n ordi nary cases rather than something we discover them to have; so it is something we can also take back . Foot does not say that the illusion of necessary overridingness is in any way useful. However, the attribution of a product o f moral teaching to morality itself makes sense as a way of strengthening the habits that moral teaching inculcates. The point als o yields a defens e o f practical illusion on Foot's main "binding ness" issue , the issu e of reason-giving force: I t might well be useful i n getting people to obey moral rules without attention to their desires or interests to represent morality as necessarily reason-giving. Foot in fact suggests something of the sort—along with a basis in moral teaching similar to the one she ascribes to overridingness—when she appeals to the social purposes o f moral language to explain why "people are taught to take moral considerations as reasons for acting, without an y reference to wha t the y want, or wha t thei r interest s are." 12 Again, the upshot of such teaching would seem to be that moral consideration s generally do exhibit the property w e ascribe to them necessarily , and th e illusion of necessity may help make that so. To extend the point to motivational force, let us take a look at some of Foot's earlier comments on Humean practical force. In arguing against what amounts to an antirealist account of moral judgments as needed to explain ho w moral ity is necessarily practical Foo t acknowledges a kernel of truth i n the claim of necessary practicality: It is not that this is false, bu t that one may easily insist on too close a connexion between moral judgment and the will. . . . [W]e take it as part of the meaning

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of what we call 'moral terms' that they are in general used for teaching particular kinds of conduct; though nothing follows abou t what any particula r individual who use s the terms must feel o r do. 13

These comments sugges t a view that migh t be thought o f as a general variant of internalism, though o n the usual definition of this contemporary terminology, it would com e ou t a s externalist. Something about thei r practical force is presupposed by the meaning of moral terms and may even be said to apply to them necessarily, but onl y in a collective sense. It concerns a didactic functio n tha t they have on the whole , tha t is, rather tha n their effec t o n any given use. Pre sumably, it is a condition o f meaningful mora l discourse that th e terms actu ally fulfill thei r didactic functio n wit h some regularity—enough to ensure that moral judgments have practical forc e in general, meaning "b y an d large. " Bu t "general internalism" (a s I shall call this view) still leaves room fo r Foot's version of the amoralist: an agent who without irrationality claims not to be moved by moral considerations sinc e they fail to connect with her desires or interests. 14 I want i n what follows to supplemen t this suggestion b y showing ho w we might usefull y teac h mora l judgment s in a way tha t assign s the m a n illusor y kind o f compulsiv e forc e i n individua l motivation. Foot' s argumen t agains t reason-giving forc e a t on e poin t briefl y suggest s wha t I hav e i n mind , albei t dismissively, with a mention of some illusory feelings. Her point is just that our sense that "w e 'must do' o r 'have to do' something whatever ou r interests and desires" lack s any basi s in belief: [J]ust as one ma y fee l a s if one i s falling withou t believing that one i s moving downward, so one ma y fee l a s if one ha s to do wha t is morally required without believing oneself to be under physical or psychological compulsion, or about to incu r a penalty if one does not comply.15

However, "a s if " feeling s o f compulsion o f the sor t tha t Foo t bring s in here would see m t o b e partially self-fulfillin g i n psychological term s to th e exten t that the y impos e a penalt y o f emotional discomfor t o n noncomplianc e tha t makes it difficult no t to comply. 16 Onc e again, Foot's legitimate objection is to a clai m abou t necessity—i n this case, a litera l reading o f ou r feelin g tha t w e "must" comply, or one that makes out compliance as strictly necessary to escape some external sanctio n o r penalty . I shall go on to sketc h an account of the teaching of practical "ought" that makes out suc h "a s if " feeling s of compulsion i n terms of an internal sanctio n of anticipatory guilt , taken not merel y as an anticipation o f (later) guilt at violating some prohibition bu t als o as current guilt at the thought o f a future violation "a s if " alread y committed . Eve n without supposin g tha t suc h feelings necessitate action, I think they have an important role to play in filling out Foot's mainly Wittgensteinian linguisti c account o f mora l teachin g wit h a kin d o f Humean psychological glue. It will not be impossible on my suggested accoun t to resist the force of a moral judgment, but it will be psychologically difficult i n most cases . M y accoun t ca n stil l leav e room , however , fo r Foot' s rationa l amoralist as someone who has managed to talk herself ou t of the feelings asso ciated wit h mora l teachin g or someon e o n whom mora l teachin g never quite

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took emotiona l effect i n the first place: There i s also no necessary connectio n on any given occasion o r for any particular agent between moral teaching and the feelings it sets up as part of a general mechanism for eliciting action. All my account require s is that ther e b e some suc h mechanis m i n operation mos t of the time—and that most of the time it operate effectively—a s a presuppositio n of action-guiding moral "ought. " One might be tempted t o question, though, whether this requirement really allows for "the" amoralis t as someone completely immune to the force of moral considerations, i n contrast t o the many normal agents who see m to exhibi t a kind of local amoralism for certain circumscribed areas of moral judgment. That someone migh t believe that, say, eating factory farm animals is wrong, without an y desire or interes t that pull s against it , seems plausible enough, bu t i t does not follow that a particular agent could keep morality on ice, motivationally speaking, with respect to everything it asked of him. A certain degree of moral motivation migh t b e thought t o b e required b y sufficient participatio n i n th e institution o f mora l discours e t o b e said to hol d mora l belief s a s opposed t o merely parroting moral statements. I shall not take a position o n this issue, but I consider i t an advantag e of the genera l version of internalism that it can ac commodate suc h limitation s o n th e possibilit y of amoralis m withou t rulin g amoralism out entirely. Essentially, though, what w e hav e on m y account o f compulsive motiva tion in terms of emotional discomfort are short-term psychological needs in place of Kantian moral o r rational necessit y to supply the "binding " forc e of moral obligation for individual agents. To say that this glue is merely psychological is not to say that it is only accidentally linked to the meaning of moral judgments; general internalism gets between the alternatives offered u s in the standard di chotomy between internalism and externalism by rejecting the assumption tha t the "force " o f a given moral term is either part of its meaning or a mere concomitant of it. Instead, the view holds that motivational force in a general sense is presupposed b y a term's moral meaning , or it s role i n a certain norm-gov erned linguistic institution, as a condition of any specific meaning it may have. We may think of this as analogous, say , to th e way the practical implication s underlying th e lega l meaning of certain term s ma y depen d o n thei r role i n a legal system. (Consider, for instance, a phrase used to affi x lega l penalties like "in contempt o f court.") Le t us now take a speculative look a t the way such a link between moral meaning and motivational force may be set up on the basis of illusion. Teaching Practical "Ought" In teaching a child moral language we begin with the strongest instances, leaving qualifications an d refinement s until later. Thi s mean s that "ought " doe s no t itself figur e i n the earlies t cases I shall consider, whic h fo r th e mos t par t use "must" ("Mustn' t d o that!" ) an d straightforward imperatives or imperatival variants ("Don't!" or simply "No!"). "Ought" is reserved for ages at which a child is able to exercise some judgment. Use of the weaker term leaves room fo r

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reasons on the other side: "You shouldn't d o that" advises against a given action, perhaps emphatically, but even where i t may be said to have imperatival force , it does not mean the same as "Don't!" On my proposed motivational account, then, "ought " i s introduced onl y afte r w e use stronger term s t o establis h th e initial link to moral motivation. I f deontic terms are in question, what w e need to see in the first instance is how we teach "must"—or rather , "must not," sinc e the negative formulation also is teachable at a less advanced stage, when a child has begun to exhibi t action o n it s own bu t cannot ye t reliably follow instruc tions. On its earliest uses, though, "mus t not" applie s after th e performance o f a forbidden action . In advance of or coincidin g with punishment—o r as itself a form of punishment insofar as it expresses disapproval—we tell a child that he "must not " perfor m the act in question. Befor e action we might more naturally use the imperative. Both expressions fi t cases where the child seems already t o be planning to do some forbidden action an d we mean to warn him of impending punishment. Imagine a child who seems to be about to touch som e delicat e or dangerou s object . "Mustn't touc h tha t [vase], " say , migh t b e uttered i n a singsong, threatening tone a t this point. But a warning to the same effect som e time in advance of action woul d see m to b e unintelligible at the earliest stage, before th e child can even understand positiv e act-descriptions . I conclude that practical "ought" (which I shall take as a generic term cover ing stronger an d negative formulations along with statements framed in term s of "should" ) ha s its origins i n a situatio n i n which tempora l distinction s ar e blurred i n the interest s of early moral teaching . This fits i n with my proposed account o f the teaching of "ought" in terms of anticipatory guilt, for the accoun t will depen d o n blurrin g the barrie r betwee n pas t an d futur e i n psychologica l terms an d extending guil t in a backward directio n t o a time preceding action . Another fac t that seems to fit is that i n the time right befor e or after actio n when "must not" get s its primary use we would naturally turn to an evaluation of the agent: "Ba d boy!" o r the like. Later, in chapter 4, I shall examine in some detail the role of emotional guil t as a link betwee n dut y and virtue ethics. Fo r present purposes , le t us just note tha t guil t is normally for an act , bu t a n ac t seen a s in some wa y "tainting " the perso n wh o perform s it; it amounts, on e might say, to a feeling ofpersonal unfitness . We encourage guilt in the teachin g situation just described, then , essentially just by telling the child that violating a practical ough t ha s earned hi m condemnation . The personal evaluatio n may be linked to punishment, but punishmen t of the usual sort might just be seen as accentuating a more general emotional threa t conveyed by our succession of verbal utterances. Their tone is one of mounting anger turning to all-ou t ange r with th e performance o f the forbidden act . But anger is an emotion tha t itself ca n serv e as a kind of punishment fo r others to the extent that it involves focusing negative attention o n them. The underlying threat here seems to be rejection—exclusion in emotional term s from the family or othe r socia l group—as somethin g that prompt s act s of expiation o f th e sort associated with adult guilt: apologies and various compensatory acts in an attempt at reparation. In this case our anger is likely to abate after punishment ,

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or after our expression o f anger if there is no other punishment. On the assumption tha t early emotional learnin g results fro m imitation, however , one fairl y immediate result would seem to be self-directed identificatory anger as a pro totype of guilt. We may think of guilt rather broadly at this point, picking it out just as some sort of unpleasant reaction to one's own putative offenses. Even when it is refined (both i n childhood developmen t an d i n the fulle r versio n o f my argument o n this subject in chapter 4), its phenomenological aspec t will be various. But the variants all involve self-blame. The scenari o jus t sketched fo r learnin g "must not" involve s a kind of verbal ritual acting out anger, and my suggestion is that it is meant not jus t to modif y th e child's over t behavior , linguistic and moral, but more fundamentally, t o modify hi s emotion tendencie s as motives toward future behavior. It elicits guilt as a reflection of the reactions o f authority figures or objects of childhood dependency, though th e emotion will later take differ ent forms via emotional identification. A case involving the infliction o f harm on another chil d may help illustrate this last point—and th e possible origins of a distinction between "must " an d "ought." Consider our likely response when the child hurts his younger brother. If our aim were just to prevent the misdeed in the future b y getting the child to exert behavioral control, the "must not " scenari o would seem to be sufficient . However, ou r mor e likel y tac k i n all bu t th e mos t extrem e case s i s to tr y t o instill empathy , or a tendency to identif y wit h th e victi m of the misdee d tha t will serve as a barrier to harmful acts in the future. 17 So instead we make a fus s over the child who ha s been hurt, thereby showing how we identify wit h him. Sometimes this amounts to punishing the aggressor wit h a two-person for m of social exclusion, as we play up the fact that ou r loyalties lie with his victim; in any case, it reinforces the sorts of direct expressions o f anger jus t described— to instil l a variant of guilt involving empathy with the victim's distress. 18 If our emphasis in the new situation were on blame (after action ) or simple prevention (before) , we might still use an ought-statemen t frame d i n terms of "must": "You mustn't be so rough with him!" Thi s sounds too sharp, though, for the usual sort of case, where our primary aim is to encourage a form of practical reasoning that rests on the ability to se e things from anothe r imaginative standpoint. To acknowledge the validity of two standpoints, or the presence of reasons o n bot h sides , a weake r statemen t frame d i n term s o f synonym s of "ought" sounds more apt: "Yo u shouldn' t b e so rough." What one seeks from a child by way of overt expiation in these cases is likely to be an apology, and here it can be directed at an injured party, a victim of his offense rathe r than a n authorit y he has offended . W e rehearse him i n certain linguistic rituals after th e forbidden action—"Tell hi m you'r e sorry"—an d i n both sort s of cases we thereby encourage a furthe r kin d of mentalistic ritual, involving expiation accomplished by undergoing an unpleasant emotion plus a reading back of later emotional reactions int o the standpoint of deliberation. The point for present purposes is that, along with simple empathy with the victim in the more complex case, we also prompt a child to fee l guil t in advance of action i n future situation s where he contemplates doing the same thing.

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This experience of anticipatory guilt provides a basis for our illusion of practical compulsion o n my account. A s an unpleasant feeling , guilt can b e said t o motivate action t o ward of f a kind of emotional self-punishmen t to th e exten t that it constitutes a motive for its own relief. The account i s not meant to imply that guil t is the only emotion appeale d t o in teaching practical "ought " or tha t practical "ought " in the strong or "binding" sense yields the only or the best or highest form of moral motivation. However , i t is worth noting that the accoun t makes out guil t as not s o clearly distinct from lov e and othe r emotions some times ranked higher.19 With its link to empathy or emotional identification, guilt might b e seen as involving a kind of reflection of lov e in self-directed negative affect. M y clai m i s just that w e nee d som e suc h elemen t of negative affec t t o supply the demand qualit y of "ought." In defense of my suggestion o f temporal illusion , note that we have seen two ways in which the emotional overtones of practical "ought " may serve to extend it beyon d th e earlies t cases pairin g i t with guilt—i n th e for m o f "mus t not " applied to an act the child may already have performed—to ought-statement s preceding action, perhaps at some temporal remove. First, the anticipation with an ought-statemen t o f an act the child seems about t o perform—th e singson g warning followe d b y ange r i f he act s anyway—woul d naturall y result i n th e association o f remembered guilt to the temptation t o perform future acts of that sort. Second, another way in which "ought" is extended vi a guilt to acts at some distance in the future extends it also to positive ought-statements bu t with differ ent objects. I have in mind the sorts of "contrary-to-duty" obligation s impose d on the child as expiation fo r a forbidden action—obligations , tha t is , to make amends for acting contrary t o duty—on the basis of whose fulfillment hi s punishment may be lifted. These get their motivational force from guilt insofar as they rest on a threat o f continued emotional discomfort—anxiet y about social rejec tion o r th e like—unles s and unti l he fulfill s them . O n m y proposed account , this experienc e of guilt as a forc e for futur e actio n ma y b e read int o th e very content o f th e emotion—guil t become s anxiet y about no t havin g ye t mad e amends o r th e like—an d the n ma y b e rea d bac k int o th e initia l situation o f forbidden action . S o the two source s of motivational force—anticipator y emo tional punishmen t and contrary-to-duty obligation—combin e t o yield a single mechanism capable o f operating in advance . The resul t in adult life is recognizable as an element of anxiety accompany ing the thought o f unfulfilled obligation . T o th e extent tha t thi s common feel ing amounts t o anticipator y guilt , it involves a kind of illusion, I want t o say , with failure to perform the required act so far conflated in emotional terms with failure to perform it. That is not to say that the agent believes he has failed irrevocably, bu t jus t that th e though t tha t h e has come s t o min d a s an objec t of discomfort i n moment s precedin g reflection . O n th e vie w I apply t o guil t i n chapter 5 , an emotion wit h generall y beneficial consequences ma y even count as appropriate wit h this illusory sort o f object . The illusion here resembles an optical illusion that the perceiver understands as such but stil l is visually misled by—in the way tha t on e might be said t o be kinaesthetically misled by the sense of falling in the passage I quoted from Foo t

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debunking moral compulsion. My suggestion is that guilt in anticipatory form amounts to an "as if" feelin g with a beneficial role as a reason for action t o the extent that it makes it psychologically harder for the agent to violate an obligation.20 Thus, for instance, in a case where action is needed to keep a promise, a sense of having t o act can b e seen as painfully absorbin g attention—th e agen t is constantly lookin g over his shoulder, one might say—in a way that is due to childhood experienc e of guilt and relate d emotions. The result is a situation in which failure t o ac t incur s a cost i n discomfort—and therefore becomes a less tolerable option , eve n if still possible—so that th e illusor y feeling o f compulsion fulfill s itsel f t o som e exten t b y constituting a penalty for noncompliance . I should stress that my suggested account of childhood experience purposely lumps togethe r element s of practica l though t tha t ar e late r distinguished . In particular, there seem s t o b e no clea r contrast betwee n practica l an d specifically moral uses of "ought" in the early teaching of the term in connection with guilt. My initia l "mus t not " scenari o woul d wor k jus t as well fo r touching a light plu g a s a vase , s o my accoun t her e applies more generall y to practica l "ought," even though it s foundation in identification with authorit y gives it a primitive kind of moral basis . Since guilt is thought o f as a distinctively moral emotion, on e might be tempted t o ask how it gets extended t o nonmoral cases . However, I think we really should sa y that th e feelin g i s not extende d bu t th e reverse: Its moral us e is picked ou t wit h time from an undifferentiate d cluster of cases in which it plays a role in teaching behavioral norms. We initially lump together cases of morality and etiquette, for instance, using the threat of group exclusion to teac h both—an d usin g shame as well as guilt for both , ignoring later emotional distinctions . Apart from refinements, however, the general upshot of this account i s the way it connects th e force of "ought" to its meaning—nonaccidentally, I want to say, but not by simply building motivational force into the meaning of individual moral terms or judgments as on standard internalist accounts. Reference to guilt and similar emotions i s an essential part of the teaching of moral terms , something that underlie s their meanin g as a precondition o f their moral use , taken as their us e in eliciting behavior. The resul t is a picture o f the "magne tism" o f mora l languag e as actio n a t a tempora l distance. 21 It s influenc e o n behavior depends on emotional demands we make in early moral teaching: what we might distinguish fro m the meaning of a given moral ter m as its "didacti c import."22 In ligh t o f th e wa y suc h term s ar e taught , tha t is , they retai n emotiona l overtones fro m th e initia l teaching situation . Bu t although thi s penumbr a of associated discomfort is essential to the motivational purpose of moral language, it can be canceled—both i n cases of defective emotional learning and a s a result of critical reflection. In an emotional sense we can easily see how amoralis m is possible: A rational agent may grant that she ought no t to do a certain act and yet contemplate doing it without guilt or any similar motivating emotion. Indeed , emotion will drop ou t eve n in normal cases where one acts morally just out of habit. My suggestio n i s not tha t w e experience guilt or som e similar emotion on typical moral uses of the word "ought" ; rather, because of their role in moral

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teaching, suc h feeling s are normall y availabl e as back-u p response s i n case s where mora l actio n i s not automatic . A s states o f emotional discomfor t the y can functio n motivationally i n potential form , simply by providin g a threat . What genera l internalism tells us, in short, is that this threat i s not par t of the meaning of a moral term , though it plays a role in setting up moral meanin g in the firs t plac e and i s in most case s carried alon g with it . My argument fo r genera l internalism is meant to leav e room fo r a version of mora l realis m that assign s a fundamental motivational rol e to mora l emo tion. I would also like to use it to suggest something more general: the reconception of metaethics as a branch o f moral psychology. Some recent author s have attempted t o locat e withi n th e usual boundaries of the subject i n metaphysics and epistemolog y a n essentiall y perceptual account o f moral judgmen t that is realist despit e subjectivis t elements.23 Their vie w makes ou t mora l response s on the mode l o f color perceptio n an d thu s represents the conten t o f ethics as subject-independent in the sense of being independent of any particular subject , while granting its dependence on th e existenc e of minds generally. Even if we accept something of this sort for basic value concepts, however , the analogy to color perception seem s not to fit those responses that underlie specifically deonti c concepts lik e moral "ought. " Feelings of guilt, that is, and related feelings associated wit h the thought of wrong d o no t appea r t o exis t i n unrefined for m with a certai n se t of natural objects on th e mode l o f untutored sense-perceptio n i n an infant' s initial reac tive apparatus. I f the accoun t I have offered her e is even roughl y right , suc h feelings are based on a tendency to identify emotionall y with others, including objects o f childhood dependency , who therefor e have the powe r t o shap e the resulting emotions. Mora l emotion s lik e guilt thus seem to be subject to socia l manipulation o f a sort that make s cross-cultural convergence on a perceptual model uncertain . However , I hope to hav e exhibited another wa y o f allowing for a subjectivist element in moral realism by understanding moral emotions as supplying the motivational forc e o f moral "ought. " The view makes out motivational force as indeed something psychological , something distinct fro m reason-giving force, which I shall say more about later. This mean s tha t ethic s nee d no t b e rationally undermined , thoug h i t lose s a certain psychologica l prop , if one sees through the illusions that originally got it going, assumin g on e ha s developed sufficient insigh t by that stag e t o mak e out independen t reasons fo r it. On my proposed account , emotions an d othe r motives in the sens e o f interna l causes o f behavio r often reinforce moral rea sons i n adult life ; an d sinc e mora l behavio r must b e taught a t a stag e befor e one can adequately discern the reasons for it, this form of motivation ha s to be taught first , in conjunction wit h simple rules. At the later stage , however , on e can kick away the motivational ladde r and still have access to reasons capabl e of influencin g action : the aestheti c reason s fo r no t riskin g damage t o a vase, say, and the social or interpersonal reasons for not causing harm to others. Wha t is illusory according to m y argument here is not th e force o f moral reasons fo r an agent assumed to be rational but just the impression that it amounts to "bind ing" force , understood a s a kind of extrapsychological compulsion.

Motivational Foundations of Conflict 77 My psychologica l account o f motivational forc e also explain s i t as some thing essentially social. It is something with which morality is invested by a social group—not particularly society at large but rather the various overlapping faceto-face groups that teach and thereby shape moral emotions. In what follow s I use that basic scenario of moral teaching to construct a general metaethical view that i s capable of making sense of moral dilemmas.

2. Internalis t Dilemmas Standard approache s t o mora l motivatio n see m to be unable as they stand t o accommodate moral dilemmas, for reasons that also yield an unsatisfying treat ment of amoralism. Externalist views of the usual sort and antirealis t views— the approaches I grouped togethe r i n chapter 1 as "subject-dependent"—ca n be said to make dilemmas too easy. Whether the agent in a dilemma is motivationally "torn" by the choice he has to make depends on whether h e happens to b e moved b y both of the ought s in conflict. If someone i s not, th e fac t that others ar e or even that their motivational propensities are generally of greater moral valu e tha n hi s own (a s on Hare' s view ) say s nothin g t o challeng e his response to that particular situation. The fact that we might justify the response, if it did occur, b y appeal to its ordinary function doe s not impl y some deficiency where one manages to avoi d it. Similarly , on a n externalis t account , nothin g essential to moral belief seems to be lacking to the amoralist: I t comes out no t just as possible but even as unproblematic how someone ca n accept an ought judgment and yet feel n o inclinatio n to ac t on it. Internalism is linked in the first instance to noncognitivist versions of antirealism, which interpret the content of a moral judgment in terms of its intended practical functio n an d henc e i n subject-dependen t terms. S o o n standar d antirealist accounts, assuming that genuine ambivalence is possible with respect to moral motivation, dilemmas in a subjective sense will come out a s possible too. Thei r motivational opposition, though, will amount to nothing beyond the agent's ambivalence . Since the conten t an d th e motivationa l forc e of a mora l judgment will both presumably be supplied by the same mental state, whethe r a situation is a genuine dilemma will depend on the agent's reaction to it. Thi s leads us by a different rout e to the problem just noted fo r externalism. O n th e question o f amoralism, however, we get the opposite result: Just becaus e th e content o f a moral judgmen t supplies its motivational force, it will be impossible to accept on e without the other. There is another sort of antirealist view in the contemporary literature, J. L. Mackie's "erro r theory," o n which dilemmas also come out as impossible—and at the same time, one might still say, as too easy on the agent—just because all moral judgments are taken to be false. On this approach, whic h assumes internalism, moral judgments do mean something subject-independent and actionguiding, but the combination is impossible: All there really is to bac k them u p motivationally is the agent's menta l states. The view is therefore subjectivist ; I argue that it might be reconstructed as a form o f realism, however, by correct-

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ing standard internalis m to avoid what Mackie's theor y take s to b e our usual moral error. I eventually present this move as a way out o f the problem set up in chapter 1. First, though, I want t o loo k a t som e feature s of the internalis t version of realism that now seems to hold the field. This is John McDowell's cognitivism , defended i n opposition to the desire/belief model of intentional action insofar as it takes moral belief—rathe r tha n belie f supplemente d b y a furthe r menta l state, typically desire—as sufficient t o generate action. 24 Her e to o I think that refining the view to make it accommodate dilemma s and amoralis m will yield something close r t o m y own position . I n bot h cases , fo r tha t matter , I think that the necessar y refinements can be constructed largel y out o f materials the author provides. McDowell's remarks at one point suggest that it might be belief as an object of current attentio n rathe r tha n belie f alone , a t leas t i n the ordi nary sense, that constitutes the motivating cognitive state he has in mind. This is something that m y own vie w interprets i n terms of emotion, vi a an evaluative analysis that als o seems to accommodat e McDowell' s characterizatio n of moral insigh t as a specia l kind o f sensitivity. However , m y understandin g of emotion will depart fro m McDowell's perceptual model with an account of the tie between emotions and actio n tha t allow s for moral dilemmas .

Cognitivism and Motivational Sufficiency Though McDowell' s vie w is developed i n a numbe r of article s o n differen t subjects, it s main point s relevant to motivationa l issue s can b e foun d i n a n early critical piece on Foot alon g with a footnote allusio n to dilemma s in an account of virtue.25 As in my treatment of Foot, I shall not attemp t a detailed exposition o f McDowell's overal l metaethical view but instea d shall bring in particular points an d position s a s they affect th e issue s under discussion. In brief: McDowell defend s an Aristotelian notion of virtue as based o n a kind of perceptio n o f reasons fo r actio n i n opposition t o Foot' s view of morality as simply not giving reasons to someone wh o has no independent motivation to act morally, of the sort provided by desire on the standard model . Reason giving forc e o n McDowell' s accoun t doe s no t depen d o n desir e as a n inde pendent factor ; rather, i t is something tha t the virtuou s person perceive s as applying to the particular situation, with desire taken as following from tha t perception. McDowell agrees with Foot, then, that a n agent who is unmoved by moral considerations i s not necessaril y irrational bu t instea d make s her out a s mor ally blind: She fails to se e the reason tha t morality indeed provides. What she lacks i s an accurat e vie w of th e practica l requirement s o f th e situatio n tha t McDowell identifies with virtue on the assumption that it depends on a similar appreciation of all potentially competing requirements and hence amounts to a general perceptual capacity. It is in reference to his discussion of this version of the doctrin e of the unit y of the virtues that McDowell includes a footnote relevant to dilemmas. In defense of a claim that the virtues of kindness and justice presuppose each

Motivational Foundations of Conflict 79 other, since the agen t wit h eithe r virtu e ha s to b e able to pic k ou t situation s calling for its exercise fro m thos e that cal l for the other, McDowell notes : I do not mea n to suggest that there is always a way of acting satisfactorily (a s opposed t o makin g th e bes t of a ba d job) ; nor tha t there is always on e right answer to the question what one should do. But when there is a right answer, a virtuous person should be able to tel l what it is. 26

McDowell's firs t clause here is as close as he comes to taking a position o n the possibility of dilemmas. But it might be read as substituting an explanation short of dilemma—tha t sometimes al l alternatives are morall y objectionable in th e sense o f nonideal—fo r the sort s o f cases o f impermissibl e alternatives that a proponent o f dilemmas would cite. I take the rest of the passage to imply a rejection of genuine dilemmas. In such cases there might be said not to b e one right answer (a s in McDowell's secon d clause ) to th e questio n what to do , bu t this may be understood i n a way that does not allow for the substitution (in his next sentence) of no right answer, meanin g no requirement of the sort that a virtuous person apprehends . McDowell's substitutio n rests on the assumption tha t a right answer to the question what one should do amounts to one that specifies a right act. This works well enough for the positive conception o f dilemmas on the assumption tha t a right answe r is an ought-judgment prescribing a permissible act. W e can no w see that the sor t of problem abou t th e motivationa l sufficienc y o f conflicting ought-judgments that might seem to undermine McDowell's cognitivism—th e problem I used Kant' s vie w to illustrat e in chapter 1—doe s no t aris e for th e positive conception . W e do not hav e to dea l with case s i n which each o f tw o conflicting all-things-considere d ought s yields sufficient motivatio n to act, o n McDowell's accoun t o r Kant's , sinc e such cases ar e rule d out b y the assump tion that "ought " implies "permissible." Bu t the problem can easily be formulated fo r exhaustive prohibitions . On McDowell's account , the virtuous agent must be sensitive to any and all act-requirements imposed by his situation, including of course negative requirements or prohibitions; accordin g to standard internalism , his sensitivity would seem to be sufficient b y itself to generate action. Bu t then, if there were cases of genuine dilemma, McDowell's notion s of sensitivity and motivational sufficienc y would apparentl y impl y that th e virtuous agen t perform s tw o incompatibl e actions. I t follows that McDowell's accoun t cannot accommodat e dilemma s set up a s case s o f exhaustiv e prohibitio n unles s it someho w modifie s standard internalism. His footnot e evade s this problem , i n effect , b y putting the ques tion in positive terms and equating the existence of a right answer with that of a right o r satisfactor y thing to do . With th e question se t up negatively, how ever, there will be two righ t answers—two prohibitions—whic h togethe r yield the result that ther e is no right thing to do . It migh t b e though t tha t McDowel l doe s mea n t o modif y standar d internalism, though in a way quit e different fro m wha t I have in mind, insofar as he relies on a notio n o f motivationa l force that connect s i t t o th e forc e of reasons. Tha t is , there would see m to b e no distinctio n betwee n motivational

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and reason-giving force on his view—or on Nagel's Kantian version of internalist realism, though Nagel does accept dilemmas. Perhaps an internalist in this sense can simply deny that motivational force has to involve a push toward action — has to determine the will, in Kantian terms. Instead, in some cases i t might just involve appreciating th e practical relevance of a reason—or, in the case of dilemmas, it s decisiveness. On thi s account, whethe r on e actuall y i s moved t o ac t would depend o n the absence of all-things-considered competing reasons . Both Nagel an d McDowel l clearl y want motivationa l forc e to impl y more than an intellectual recognition of the reasons bearing on action, however. The notion i s supposed t o replac e desir e in explaining the generatio n o f action b y reasons.27 T o withdra w an y pus h towar d action , then , i n the fac e o f seriou s moral conflict, would mak e dilemmas too easy on the agent. That is, the agent' s conflicting reasons would apparently just be rendered inert by conflict, reduced to a mere list of negative features of action tha t leav e him with nothin g to do . Rather tha n bein g motivationally "torn, " or impelle d in opposing directions , he would seem to be in a condition o f practical stalemate and henc e simply frustrated at his inability to settl e on a course of action. I shall eventually propose a way of modifying McDowell's Aristotelia n view in connection with the issue of amoralism that will yield a preferable approach to mora l dilemmas . But let us note firs t tha t certain moves that migh t b e suggested fo r applying his view to dilemma s by requiring a lesser degree of motivational force are not reall y open t o him, given the kinds of demands hi s view makes on the notion o f a virtuous agent. One might want to object, for instance, that the motivational vacillatio n or even deadlock that would see m to be mandated b y cases o f exhaustive prohibitio n coul d b e explained b y attributing t o the agent motives o f less than full strength . We should see the virtuous agent in such cases as moved t o some exten t b y each of two competin g prima facie rea sons. To say that, however, woul d jus t be to say that th e case doe s not consti tute a dilemma; we should remind ourselve s of the assumption tha t dilemma s involve conclusiv e o r all-things-considere d ought s i n conflict . Presumably, moreover, th e virtuou s agen t woul d hav e to b e sensitive to eac h o f them i n a degree that reflects their moral importance in absolute as well as in relative terms. Agamemnon, for instance, falls short of virtue because he does not sufficientl y register the mora l horro r of the sacrific e of his daughter an d henc e is insensitive to one side of his dilemma. On the other hand, we cannot say that th e virtuous person trie s but fails to act on two conflicting reasons that she is sensitive to, for she is assumed t o b e rational, an d rationalit y rules out actio n a t cross purposes. I shall suggest a way o f handling this problem; bu t les t it be thought eas y enough for McDowell t o handl e it just by rejecting dilemmas , we should als o take note of a related proble m with respect to amoralism. McDowell' s answe r to Foot's treatment o f the amoralist in effect interpret s th e amoralist a s some thing else—something othe r tha n th e motivational amoralis t unde r consideration—by making him out as morally blind, or unable to appreciate moral rea sons o n a cognitiv e level . McDowell' s alternativ e to th e desire/belie f mode l

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essentially rests o n expandin g the notio n o f what i s involved at th e cognitive level so that it would not be possible to share the same view of the circumstances as someone who i s morally sensitive and ye t not b e similarly motivated.28 T o the extent that the "view" i n question here involves seeing a certain action in a favorable light , it implies seeing a reason t o perform the action and hence has reason-giving force. McDowell doe s not distinguis h motivational from reason-givin g force, as I have noted . Presumably he would coun t i t as eithe r impossibl e o r irrational , and hence as impossible for a virtuous agent, t o recognize a reason fo r actio n and ye t not b e motivated. Bu t the amoralist n o les s than th e virtuou s agent is supposed to be rational. McDowell's answer to Foot, then, essentially involves denying that the amoralist really recognizes the same moral reason s fo r action as the rest o f us—or i n the firs t instanc e a s the virtuou s agent, whose reason s we share when morally motivated. This response may be difficult t o fault intuitively just because the problem of amoralism a s set up in global terms rests on acceptance of a counterintuitive kind of moral personality. To the extent tha t we can mak e sense of it (b y appeal to literar y examples, say) , it is sufficientl y foreign t o pu t th e amoralist' s cognitiv e stat e somewha t beyon d imaginative reach. In response t o example s of our ow n "local " amoralism, however—my earlier exampl e wa s eatin g factor y far m animals—McDowel l woul d hav e to say that we could no t reall y share the virtuou s person's view of eve n th e iso lated sor t o f situatio n tha t i s in question. A s a moral "blin d spot, " thi s als o involves failure to see . An argumen t over thi s sort o f case woul d typicall y focus on th e questio n whether th e agen t professin g motivational amoralis m coul d possibl y be acquainted i n a ful l enoug h sense with al l relevant information, especially firsthand or imaginative information such as that giving insight into the misery of animals on factor y farms. However, i t is important tha t thi s lin e of respons e would move beyond the specific focus on belie f a s the beare r of moral knowledge in the desire/belief model from which McDowell pulls away. It is indeed a kind of "perceptual " acquaintanc e with th e facts—but in a more litera l sense than McDowell has in mind in his use of perceptual imagery for moral insight— rather than simpl e intellectual comprehension tha t is likely to make a motivational differenc e i n the case cited. McDowell himself might just say that th e supposed amoralis t abou t eating factory far m animals—th e agent who claim s to recognize that it is wrong an d yet not to be motivated to abstain—could not really understand what it was to "recognize" a practical reason. The notion entail s acknowledging the bearing of some consideration o n one's choice of action, which effectivel y undercut s a distinction between intellectual and motivational acknowledgment. However , it is not clear that the only way to recognize the practical relevance of a reason is to be inclined to act on it. One might simply use it to fudge action—acknowl edging that eatin g factory farm animal s is morally substandard, say, without feeling impelle d t o liv e up to a moral standard so rigorous a s to deman d that one abstain . To captur e the decisivenes s of a serious moral reason , w e could

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understand th e relevan t sort o f motivational amoralist as measuring his own and other agents' virtue in light of the standard, deferring to vegetarians as moral exemplars but still without motivatio n t o joi n them. Besides dropping desire , then, I think McDowell's exclusio n of amoralism must turn on an expansion o f the sorts of cognitive possibilities allowed for by the desire/belief model. "Cognitive " come s out, i n short, as a broader categor y than "intellectual " on an approach tha t would support hi s talk of moral sensitivity and the like. The move is masked by McDowell's us e of the standard ter minology: He evidently wants to include some conative elements within belief rather than questionin g whether belie f i n the usua l sense is sufficient. T o dis cuss the mov e in terms tha t relate i t to m y own treatmen t o f emotion, I shall use "belief" in what follows more narrowly than McDowell, though one might also substitut e som e mor e qualifie d notion suc h a s "belie f i n it s judgmental aspect" fo r th e sak e o f faithfulnes s t o McDowell' s preferre d blurring of th e standard distinctions . McDowell's inclusio n of extraintellectual elements within cognition is in fact suggested b y some brie f comments o n incontinenc e at th e en d o f his reply to Foot.29 Since he no longe r ha s a purely conative category like desire available to explain continence, McDowell ha s to make use of the cognitive, and here he appeals beyond belief to attention, which he interprets as part of the continent person's "conception " of the situation—the most intellectual of the terms replacing "belief " i n his substitute fo r th e desire/belie f model. (H e sometimes use s "perception," apparentl y withou t distinction, 30 bu t hi s most commo n term , encompassing both, is "view.") O f incontinent or weak-willed agents he writes: Their inclinations are aroused, as the virtuous person's ar e not, b y their awareness of competing attractions : a lively desire clouds or blur s the focu s of their attention o n "th e noble." 31

The comment hark s back to McDowell's precedin g account of Aristotle's virtuous person as exhibiting temperance or single-minded moral motivation—as distinct fro m mere continence, or strong-willed triumph over contrary motivation—by "silencing " immora l inclinations. 32 I n McDowell's exampl e i n tha t discussion the virtuous person simpl y lacks any desire for illicit sex rather than manages to overcome one. In a case of weakness, then, desire can be made out as an interfering factor, though McDowell' s cognitivis t view deprives it of any independent role in virtuous motivation . What doe s i t interfere with i n cases o f weakness, an d how ? If we remind ourselves of the distinctio n betwee n a belie f an d a thought tha t on e actually entertains o r hold s i n mind , w e ca n replac e McDowell' s Aristotelia n tal k of attention t o the noble with a reference to whatever mental mechanism serves to fi x moral judgment s in mind . Thi s ma y o r ma y no t b e purely cognitive; I take i t typically to involv e the sor t o f cognitive/affective mi x tha t w e fin d i n moral emotion . A t any rate, it need not b e seen as involving the sort of separable or independent noncognitive element that McDowell means to exclude in dropping desire. On the other hand, in most cases it involves something beyond belief. Belie f i s just what th e weak-wille d agent is assumed to shar e with on e

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who is virtuous: what the person overcome b y adulterous passion lose s sight of but stil l retains. H e know s wha t i s right bu t fail s t o ac t on his knowledge jus t because he does no t hav e it fixed firml y i n mind. This nee d no t mea n tha t th e weak-wille d agen t i s not thinkin g abou t th e moral truth in question, even in relation to the noble; he may very well be acutely aware tha t h e is acting against hi s beliefs . I t is a fulle r kin d of practical atten tion tha t is presumably lacking. Somethin g simila r might no w b e said o f th e amoralist, however. His moral sensitivity has been "silenced," t o use McDowell's term, not b y desire but in this case simply by a failure to generate the appropri ate moral emotio n a s needed t o supply motivation . This i s not t o sa y that a moral emotio n i s always needed to motivate. M y speculative accoun t o f the teachin g o f "ought " i n section 1 allowed tha t th e moral behavior we inculcate via emotion normally becomes habitual. In typical cases habitual moral behavior is not quite automatic but can be said to involve an emotional residue of the teaching situation, in the sense of arousal sufficien t to fix a belief in mind, securing attention. However, i t need not involve a specific moral emotion; McDowell' s "sensitivity " will do. I would also grant that belief alone can motivate, meaning "can i n some cases," even without attention—a s when th e habi t o f acting on som e mora l belie f become s s o ingrained as to b e discharged in rote fashion. Habit in such a case would no t amount t o a further mental determinant of action needed to supplement belief but just a pattern o f action on belief. It need not be taken strictly as "determining" action ; the com mon inferenc e fro m a claim that som e menta l state or facult y ca n motivate t o the view of it as sufficient i n something lik e a causal sense is an instance of th e Kantian "necessitarian " approac h t o moralit y and motivatio n tha t m y argu ment here is meant to question. It is not obvious that anythin g with the power to motivat e mus t d o s o unles s checked, o r tha t ingraine d habit s ar e alway s compulsive. In any case, the amoralist is assumed to lack normal habits of moral behavior; so at least in short-range terms, motivating him requires an emotion . Whether th e amoralis t o n thi s accoun t ma y b e said t o shar e th e virtuou s person's "view " o r "conception " o f the situation—"perception " i n a broa d sense, roughly equivalent to "apprehension," withou t any sensory overtones — depends on whether we interpret such notions as covering the full range of cognitive and auxiliary responses t o the moral facts, including attention an d emo tion, or as limited to belief. At any rate, the notion of emotional appropriatenes s that I explain in chapter 5 will allow fo r the failure to fee l an appropriate emo tion compatibly with rationality. Appropriateness doe s not mandate feeling , in short. Bu t this point wil l effectively driv e a wedge betwee n reason-givin g an d motivational force . Although McDowell doe s not explicitly question the standard categories for explaining action that he has inherited from the philosophers h e criticizes, many of his comments i n his reply to Foo t and elsewher e suggest my broader inter pretation of the cognitive. Here, for instance, he at one point brings in our understanding of th e "meaning " o f som e morall y significan t circumstanc e as illus trated b y a statemen t w e migh t mak e i n trying to ge t someon e t o shar e th e requisite view of things: "You don' t kno w what i t means that someon e i s shy

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and sensitive." 33 Someon e wh o made this statement woul d typicall y be claiming not jus t that th e hearer lacke d some factua l information abou t th e behavioral or other implication s of shyness but rather tha t he had no idea what shy ness was like. This is what shyness means to the one who is shy, and the reaso n why i t inhibits him behaviorally. Without experiencin g shynes s "fro m th e inside," on e is at leas t arguabl y unable to understan d it s outer meanin g in the sense of its behavioral significance. Real knowledge of this sort, however, seems to requir e imaginatio n an d emotiona l empath y a s part o f the recommende d "cognitive" vie w of things . More generally, meanings in the sense indicated include saliences of the sor t that emotions register : the notion o f what i s important o r significan t about a situation, o r in cognitive terms, what i s worth attention. 34 McDowel l hasten s to point ou t that the appeal the statement abou t shynes s makes is not to "pas sion a s opposed t o reason, " or to feelin g take n a s something "quit e ove r and above one's view of the facts," 35 th e sort o f independent element of desire that he wants to eliminate. My suggestion here, however, is just that emotional evaluations ar e part o f one's view of the facts. On th e account o f emotions I defend later in application to guilt, emotions includ e evaluative thoughts a s objects of comfort o r discomfort . I n McDowell' s perceptua l imager y o f silence d an d unsilenced reasons, they may be thought of as an important menta l mechanism for amplifying reasons , o r for amplifying an d recordin g them for futur e refer ence—registering them a s objects of practical attentio n b y loading the m wit h positive o r negative affect . We can no w se e how m y account migh t le t McDowell handl e cases o f dilemma. Here, on any adequate picture, we have two emotionally amplified rea sons as a norm for the appropriately sensitive moral agent, not just as a description o f how some agent s happen to react . O f course, i t is impossible t o act on two conflicting moral beliefs, but the possibility of emotional ambivalence allows for a form of practical attention t o both o f them.36 Wit h the agent's conflicting reasons fo r action seen as given in the evaluative content o f the two emotions , we can make him out as motivated by both o f two conflicting ought-judgments. Action on one of them will be blocked, of course; but a "residue" emotio n suc h as guilt will remain as a sign of its motivational forc e deflected onto emotion . I shall later argue that this function of guilt depends on its component o f negative affect . Making McDowell' s view accommodate dilemma s requires modifying hi s commitment t o th e motivationa l sufficienc y o f cognitiv e commitmen t t o a n ought-judgment, if that means its causal sufficiency fo r action. M y account accomplishes this by abandoning strict internalism in favor of the general version defended i n section 1 , according to which an agen t can understan d a n ought judgment and fai l t o registe r i t motivationally. M y accoun t take s emotio n a s the primar y beare r o f motivationa l force an d henc e introduces a furthe r ele ment besides belief to explain moral motivation—something added onto belief in typica l cases and potentiall y detachable from it , even i f not quit e independent of it on the model of desire. Belief may fai l to motivate either because this further elemen t is missing or because its motivational influence i s blocked—the

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latter pertainin g to cases of dilemma, where not al l oughts ca n be satisfied, so that emotion serves as a second-best substitut e for action. A version of McDowell's persona l mora l standar d migh t b e said to pla y a role in my own view to the extent that the weaker normativ e link my view sets up betwee n mora l judgments and emotio n stil l depend s fo r its application t o dilemmas on th e possibility of conflicting emotions i n a rational agent . How ever, my account of the role of guilt in chapter 4 will depart from the Aristotelian standard o f perfect virtue on which McDowell relies . I n any case, rather tha n presupposing a form of virtue ethics of the sort McDowell has in mind—I shall later mak e some alternative suggestions—my defense of dilemmas admits of a coherent interpretatio n i n terms of general principles of duty : the conceptio n of ethics that McDowell's perceptua l imagery is meant to replace with a "par ticularist" moral theory. Let me now turn to Mackie's view for a notion o f the rule-based structure of morality, with morality reconstructed t o answer Mackie' s arguments against realism.

Protagorean "Social Artifact Realism" The ordinar y conceptio n o f rea l perceptua l propertie s associate d wit h McDowell's versio n of realism actually makes it see m eas y to accommodat e dilemmas. In cases of exhaustive prohibition, al l we need are noncomparative negative properties tha t apply to all alternatives, and th e list of possible parallels i s a lon g one . Conside r th e propertie s o f being horrible o r hideou s o r re volting—or eve n (on certain assumptions) the sort of thing that would disgust an ideal observer. A moral term with simila r visceral overtones tha t woul d fit my perceptual treatment of sufficient reason s against action in chapter 2 is "intolerable." Th e possibilit y of dilemmas as expressed i n such terms jus t means that every option in some cases can fail to meet some minimal standard of moral acceptability. What threaten s th e intelligibilit y o f thi s vie w i s th e presume d action guidingness of moral judgments, as attributed to the moral facts to which they refer on an internalist version of realism. This is essentially the basis of Mackie' s "argument fro m queerness " t o th e denial of the objectivit y o f moral values. 37 Mackie use s the term "objectiv e prescript!vity" fo r the "queer " combination of claims tha t h e takes to b e implied both b y moral discours e o f the ordinary sort and b y the writings of most mora l philosophers . Prescriptivit y or action guidingness is a property of moral language , but insofa r a s we use moral lan guage to describe something objective, Mackie's accoun t make s us out as attributing prescriptivity to something in the world. The account therefore amounts to a n "erro r theory": In contrast t o noncognitivist account s tha t den y moral statements descriptive meaning it interprets them as meaning something false. 38 However, Mackie' s comment s at some points suggest that the error migh t be removable: Ordinary moral discourse could be revised to stic k to th e facts (as Mackie conceives them) essentially by canceling its prescriptive force. Rather than droppin g internalism , as thi s entails, Mackie evidentl y means t o revis e ordinary moral discourse in the direction of noncognitivism. But an alternative

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move of the sort I have in mind is suggested i n his discussion of naturalist defi nitions of moral terms with referenc e to a n assumed se t of purposes, which is essentially a reworking o f Foot's treatment o f "good." 39 Mackie himsel f bypasses the suggestion fo r all but a few cases involving fixed standards o f evaluation; values would apparently be less than fully objectiv e in the sense he has in mind to the extent that the determination of standards rests on potentially variable purposes. Hi s ow n eventua l definition o f "good" makes indefinit e refer ence to the satisfaction of requirements, and he insists that statements o f moral value must be taken as ascribing "intrinsic requirements" to the world: "require ments which simply are there, in the nature of things, without bein g the requirements of any person o r body of persons, eve n God."40 This is the assumption I want t o challenge , for "ought " rathe r tha n for "good," alon g wit h Mackie' s general assumption o f internalism. Mackie ofte n refer s metaphoricall y t o th e questio n o f objectivit y as th e question whether moral values are part of the "fabric" o f the world; his description of behavior as part of its "furniture" suggest s that h e has in mind a spatial network o f relations amon g soli d objects. 41 Instead , w e might thin k of moral values as analogous to the weave in a woven fabric—something inseparable from its threads, afte r all—an d a t the sam e time a s relating behavio r to person s o r minds to the extent tha t moralit y rests on a relation to their purposes, or their harm and benefit. I take it that this latter sort of dependence on minds does no t undercut realism—doe s no t constitut e "subject-dependence " i n th e relevan t sense—if i t leaves intact the role o f minds as knowers o f moral truths. Macki e uses the term "objectivity " fo r the view he means to attack , an d h e attributes the view to philosophers who base moral value on subjective states like pleasure/ pain, as well as to Plato an d Kant. 42 What mora l realis m rules out, however , is subject-relativity, meanin g relativity to the putative subject of knowledge of a moral judgment as opposed to the various subjects of experience the judgment might be thought t o be about. A realist view can even make moral valu e depend on the existence of minds as knowers of some judgment s of the sort that i s in question, a s long as it does not make a given judgment depend for its truth on someone's current commit ment to it . Since Foot's naturalist definition of "good" appeals t o a standar d set of purposes, not necessaril y those of a given subject, it would see m to come out as realist on this account. Moreover, McDowell's treatmen t o f moral valueproperties on the model of perceptual properties i s interpreted as realist, thoug h it makes moral judgment s depend i n a general sense on ou r possessio n o f the capacity fo r moral sensitivity. 43 I want i n what follows to suggest a further leve l of general subject-dependence for specifically deontic properties as compatibl e with mora l realism . I f we take fo r grante d eithe r o f thes e othe r account s i n application t o evaluative properties—making the m out as "subjective" onl y in a metaethically harmless sense—the n I think we can also understand mora l requirements as requirements of persons rathe r than intrinsi c requirements without departin g fro m realism. On th e sort of interpretation I shall suggest, they depend on prior social requirements within certain constraints imposed b y con-

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siderations of social value, including both rationa l and moral value as applied to the comparison o f alternative moral institutions . What I have in mind are the various social choices and attitudes that underlie the adoption an d maintenanc e of a moral code. I shall go on to extract my proposed versio n of realism, which I refer to as "social artifact" realism, from the picture of morality given in Mackie's own transition to his account of normative ethics. But my extension o f Mackie's view should also apply in general terms to rather different conception s o f the basis of morality, such as a version of divine command theory tha t takes God a s the sourc e o f moral ought-judgments (perhap s with huma n welfare in mind) but no t o f judgments of good. The view also might be taken to yiel d a contractarian basi s for morality that avoids Kantian presuppositions.44 I t combines elements of virtue and duty ethics, as we shall see. I put i t forth as a way of reconfiguring the structure of ethics, with a different metaethica l basis insofar as it departs fro m standar d posi tions on the question of internalism. After denying moral judgments objectivity, Mackie proceeds to a treatment of normative ethics in terms of the function of morality as a system of constraint s on conduct designed to protect others' interests. 45 Moralit y on this account is needed to counteract limited sympathies, or a tendency toward self-interest, and its content depends on what will best promote tha t cooperative social end. But this suggests that evaluativ e judgments of a sort that Mackie apparently find s unproblematic, about the effectiveness of means in promoting ends, might help provide an objective basis for some moral judgments even if not thos e in ordinary moral discourse. 46 I f so, morality could presumabl y be reconstructed t o avoid the error o f attributing action-guidingness to something external. Perhaps Mackie did not thin k of this position a s "objectivist" jus t because it assigns an important rol e to moral emotion. The mythical account of the historical basis of morality that he takes from Plato' s Protagoras splits it into tw o elements: aidos (shame or respect; a word with broader implications that Mackie decides to translate as "moral sense" ) and dike (law or justice).47 Mackie interprets dike t o cove r formal rules and politico-lega l "devices " se t up t o secure the aims of morality, bu t the term would also see m to appl y to various infor mal social practice s with th e sam e end, such as promising, that his preceding argument includes under the umbrell a term "institutions. " These com e u p as central devices of morality when Mackie fills in the Protagorean vie w with critical discussions of Hobbes's contract and Hume's artificial virtue of justice, concluding with a rejection of the suggestion that ethics abandon rules in favor of virtues. We might think of dike, then, on Mackie's interpretation, a s the basi s of morality in rules. Mackie seems'to restrict aidos, on the other hand, to the sources of motivation to conform to rules, dispositions t o act as well as emotions. Bu t it would be natural—and consistent with Plato's use of the Protagorean view—t o extend this term to the looser sorts of emotional and behavioral habituation that underlie moral virtue. I shall chop things up somewhat differently fro m eithe r Plato or Mackie, however, by also allowing for an extension of dike to looser norms

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or standards o f behavior of the sort that virtu e ethics stresses. On this reading , dike an d aidos amount to external and internal aspects of morality—sanctions, standards, o r what have you—corresponding in my own account to the subjectindependent and -dependen t components o f moral meaning. On a les s mythological historica l account tha n w e fin d i n the Protagoras, perhaps th e tw o notion s shoul d initiall y b e taken a s combined in some mor e primitive idea such as that of a "taboo," understoo d a s a particular emotion laden rule. For m y purposes here , what i s important i s just that bot h pla y a n essential role in morality as it has developed; dike i s conceptually distinguishable at an advanced stage as a moral code (broadl y construed) and aidos as the source of motivation to act on the code, which cannot b e objective in Mackie's terms since motivating states are subjective. Mackie's internalism—his assumption that motivation must be built into the content of moral judgments—keeps him from accommodatin g th e Protagorean accoun t within a version of morality that would escap e his charge of error. However , withou t that assumption , Mackie might be seen a s allowing for a for m o f moral realis m in his own re marks on the aspect of morality that h e takes to b e worth pursuin g further. The Protagorea n accoun t woul d fi t in with Mackie' s earlie r attempts t o understand the basi c moral term s i n a way that cut s acros s position s o n th e issue o f objectivity . We ca n se e how i t migh t b e defende d a s a n externalis t form o f realism in connection wit h hi s comments on "ought. " His first us e of the notio n o f a n institutio n come s fro m Joh n Searle' s attemp t t o clos e th e Humean "is/ought " gap with a n argument, 48 vi a "institutional facts " abou t promising, fro m th e fac t tha t someon e ha s mad e a promis e t o a n ought statement requirin g its fulfillment. I n answer t o Searle, Mackie distinguishes between th e mer e reporting o f facts about a n institutio n suc h a s promising , or describing it from the outside, an d on the other hand, speaking from within it, thus in effect endorsin g it, as in Searle's conclusion. The distinction is presented a s independent of any belie f i n objective prescriptivity, so it amount s to a way of understanding the prescriptive force of "ought" without attribut ing any queer combinations of properties t o objects. Instead, the motivatio n to act on an ought-statement apparentl y comes fro m involvemen t in an institution—something it is logically possible t o opt ou t of , thereby blocking the inference fro m "is " t o "ought. " On Mackie's later extensio n o f the notio n o f an institutio n to an y kind of group practice, these remarks apply beyond promising to morality in general— and we might also say, to the use of terms like "ought" in moral teaching. Mackie himself presumably thinks of an amoralist a s someone who reject s the institu tion of morality altogether, though h e is sufficiently awar e of it in reference to other people' s behavio r to b e able to describ e i t from th e outside . But on my general version of internalism, there is room for a motivational amoralist con ceived as someone wit h one foot in and one foot out of the moral institution t o the extent that he uses moral language with a meaning set up by childhood mora l teaching. The latte r o n my account amount s to th e practice of loading mora l terms with emotional sanctions. The sanctions themselves can be dismissed as "kid stuff" i n adult life without abandoning some or all of the other habits they

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were used to teach—at a minimum the linguistic habits that support th e meaningful us e of moral terms in the case of the amoralist . In his account of "ought" in terms of reasons, Mackie applies the notion of an institutio n t o th e practice of taking other people' s interests a s reasons for action, which he represents as "an establishe d wa y of thinking, a moral tradition" that makes certain demands of an agent. 49 Institution s create moral rea sons, then , an d thoug h Mackie' s discussio n make s i t clear tha t the y ar e no t therefore "artificial " creations in all cases, hi s later accoun t o f Hume i n connection with the Protagorean myt h indicates that they sometimes come under Hume's "artificial virtue" of justice. They are to some extent products o f social convention, that is . But the flourishing o f a social group that he mentions here briefly a s a kind of overarching group interest—h e apparently equates it with survival—would seem to count as a further sourc e of reasons promoted by the link between dike and aidos, between rules favoring cooperation an d the moral sentiments that motivate action on them. To rejec t the link is essentially to opt out o f human society by refusing t o shar e its aims. Or so one might add on Mackie's behalf; he unfortunately fails to connect his treatment o f "ought" and institution s with his later Protagorean accoun t o f the function o f morality. I shall have more to say in the next section abou t ho w th e notion of group flourishing might be made to yield a realist account of the sort of binding force he attributes to "ought." For the moment, the thing to note is that the resulting view does not involve ascribing any special motivational properties to situations in the world around us. Both dike an d aidos can be described from without simpl y by describing natural and artificia l (sociall y created) facts abou t the world, in a sense that covers human behavior and responses—including the kinds of nonmoral evaluative facts that Mackie would accept as objectively based, such as facts about the "best" means to one's ends. "The facts " on a Protagorea n version of realism, then, will be the same as those i n Mackie's subjectivis m but with a connection to moral emotion explaining their prescriptive force as something that pertains to statements made within the social institution thus described. The resultin g view, social artifac t realism , allows for a n understandin g of morality as real even though invented—that is, for Mackie's ow n understand ing of it as essentially man-made to fulfill a certain purpose. For artifacts surely deserve a place in the fabri c o f the world—o r eve n as part o f its "furniture, " like the tables and chairs we point to i n classroom discussion s of the reality of physical objects . Morality o r th e mora l cod e i s real on thi s account i n some thing like the way that an artifact is: It is dependent on minds for its existence and purpose and therefore at least to some extent for its form; on the other hand, it is subject-independent in the sense of not bein g malleable at will. It can even be viewed as imposing 'requirements on minds in a way analogous to the pos tural demands made on the body by a certain kind of chair. But we need to ask whether this is enough to answer the charge of subject-relativity with a notion of the authority of ethics of the sort that Mackie faults naturalis t accounts for not being able to provide. 50 Let us now take a step back from th e view that ha s emerged from discussio n of Foot, McDowell, and Mackie to see how the result can b e reshaped to giv e us what we want fro m mora l realism.

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3. Betwee n the Horn s With it s assumption o f general internalism , socia l artifac t realism promises a solution t o the problem of action-guiding dilemmas becaus e i t affords a sense in whic h th e norma l agent' s emotiona l reactions ar e impose d o n hi m b y the situation o f conflict rather than simply being accidental features of his response. Its two components i n the Protagorean stor y were already in play in the account of th e teachin g of moral language via emotion tha t I used at the beginnin g of this chapter to establish a motivational link between ought-judgments and guilt. My notion of "didactic import" should now enable us to make out guilt or some similar moral emotio n a s justified i n cases of dilemma in a sense that is strong enough t o mee t reasonable versions of the charge of subject-relativity, as well as being weak enoug h to allo w fo r cases o f abnormal mora l respons e o n th e order of amoralism . One way i n which my proposed accoun t i s not subject-relative , we should now note, amounts to a departure from Foot's version of externalism: An agent's reasons for action do not depend solely on his own desires and interests. At any rate, the social artifact view allows us to say that they do not, sinc e it allows us to appeal to the notion of a group standpoint, with group flourishing as a further end an d a source o f further interest s beyond those o f individual members bu t requiring action of them in at least some cases. Morality o n this more thorough going version of externalism may "give" m e reasons that I do not accept—tha t I choose t o loo k awa y fro m o r simpl y miss, in the wa y tha t one might fai l t o take a hint. It may give me reasons to act on others' behalf for the sake of social harmony, say—muc h as an appeal to group interests might b e thought t o give me reason to enlarge the gene pool by having children, even if that would in no way promote my own interests, real or perceived. We can still say that reason s are motivationally sufficient o n this account in the sense of being able without supplementation to give rise to the requisite behavior, whil e denying that they must do so, even on the part o f a rational agent who i s aware o f them and has no countervailing reasons.51 Instead, they are available to motivate behavior if the agent attends to them in emotional or other practical terms—if he sees things from th e standpoint o f the whole. This yields a version of McDowell's vie w of moral insigh t but withou t th e interpretation o f motivational sufficiency tha t keeps hi s view from accommo dating dilemmas. On my account, dilemmas arise because the code of rules best fitted i n general terms to th e socia l an d individua l aims o f moralit y i s simply not adequate to all possible cases; but it is not therefore superseded, at any rate within the mora l poin t o f view, when it yields a conflict. Though man-made , the rules of morality are not lik e rules of a game that can b e tinkered with t o correct any defects, or abandoned alon g with th e game i f they turn out not t o be perfectible. They sometimes resul t in deadlock, wit h emotiona l response a substitute for action on them, as provided by their general motivational underpinnings. The view drawn from Macki e makes ethics subject-dependent to the extent that i t does interpre t motivational force in terms o f a lin k t o emotion . We now nee d to as k bot h how th e vie w can b e seen as a for m o f realism and

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whether it can stand u p to the complaint tha t a subject-dependent view is too easy on the agent in a dilemma.

Constraints on Moral Codes What w e mainl y wan t fro m realism , I tak e it , i s a reasonabl e basi s fo r th e authority o f ethics . Th e poin t o f distinguishing the tw o component s o f th e Protagorean accoun t i s to separate out such a metaethical basis from th e subject-dependent elements of morality. I take them to correspond roughly to the stages of developing moral consciousness produced b y Aristotelian habituation in early moral life, as a child is made to follow rules in rote fashion, on the basis of which, in conjunction with reward an d punishment , he learns moral emo tion tendencies—the latter in turn yielding moral motivation at a more advanced stage.52 More fundamentally, though, dike an d aidos represen t no t tempora l stages but components o f my proposed explanation of moral meaning in terms of the institution of a moral code: the social creation o f the code itsel f and th e provision of psychological backing for it by connecting it to emotions. Though they are distinguishable for explanatory purposes , however, i t is important t o see how the two component s interact . The content o f the mora l code will be influenced b y a requiremen t of teachability, mos t notably , tha t bring s in th e general facts of individual psychology. So the order of developmental stages in individual psychology may be reversed on the social level or in relation to questions of explanatory priority . On th e othe r hand , th e content o f the moral cod e shoul d no t depen d o n individual psychological variations; an agent cannot jus t opt ou t o f the moral rules by appeal to a deviant or deficient conscience or mora l sensibility . This gives i n a nutshel l the sens e i n whic h ethics ma y stil l b e sai d t o b e subjectindependent on the Protagorean account , as I shall continue to think of it despite differences fro m historical Protagoreanism, difference s exploited an d expanded in my ensuing discussion. We still need to ask whether the view is undermined by the social variability it presumably allows for. What is to keep it from applying to just any socially accepted code of rules that might be used in moral teaching? Since the result of moral teaching via emotion would seem to be a sense in which socially induced emotion gives us access to moral truths—having been taught to us in conjunction with them and indeed in conjunction with the use of moral language—this amounts to a social version of the charge of subject-relativity. Is the Protagorean view viciously subject-dependent, after all ? Interestingly, the same sorts of social facts may be used to support another objection pulling in the opposite direction. The extent to which individual conscience depends on social indoctrination might seem to undermine the autonomy we expect of a moral agent. This amounts to the independence of the mind from external forces, including social forces. The objection may be compounded by a commo n philosophica l vie w of emotions themselve s as alie n psychological forces—as standin g outside the min d or self , adventitiou s additions to i t implanted by external objects of desire or b y social training or suggestion .

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Both of these objections, from subject-relativit y and fro m autonomy, rais e questions about the content an d interaction of the two components—question s about th e role playe d b y moral emotions , alon g with mor e genera l question s about the presuppositions o f the moral code. At the outset, though, we should note that it is not so obvious that emotions are in any worse position than belief s as bases of conscience. Mackie' s interpretatio n o f aidos i n terms of emotion s presumably has to d o with thei r genera l usefulness a s a motivational mecha nism; on m y own account , emotions lik e shame and guil t effectively punis h a failure t o act with discomfort . Bu t this is part o f what seem s to pu t the m out side the agent's control: They are typically less malleable than beliefs in response to either individual deliberation or the particular feature s of the agent's situation. For much the same reason, however, emotions may in some way s be better insulated than beliefs against the kind of social manipulation that is now in question. The y may als o hav e a biologica l basis i n innat e responses tha t set s more limits on early childhood training. On the other hand, even my realist version of the Protagorean view is meant to allow fo r some degre e of relativity to social convention as the source of the basic social arrangements presupposed b y justice. I do not want to insist that it restricts u s to a unique outcome in the choic e o f a moral code ; t o coun t a s a version of realism, however , i t has to constrai n th e choice sufficiently t o pre serve a sense of the authority of ethics.53 Le t us ask, then, whether we can fin d something in the two components o f the view that might serve to keep the choice of codes within reasonable bounds—that might impose limits, for instance, on the fairness of an acceptable mora l code. I shall consider the questio n i n illustrative form by asking what might prevent a society from allowin g or encour aging indifference t o the welfare of a certain subclass of its members. Why no t have an "outcaste" group, in short? A full treatment of issues of justice is of course beyond the scope of my argument here . What I want t o argu e i s that a realist version o f the Protagorea n view allows for the usual sorts of moves on the subject—plus one that is somewhat different—withi n a broadly "communitarian " framework . Thes e move s have well-known limitations, bu t my aim here is just to indicate how a socially based view can avoid any special problems associated with communitarianism . Though derive d from Mackie, m y own suggested version of the view rests on a use of the notion of group flourishing as a kind of social parallel to Aristotelian happiness, providin g a standard fo r the correction o f moral codes. Followin g Aristotle on individual flourishing, I interpret the notion in a way that allows it some moral or other evaluative content—so that it is not a strict welfare notion but also a notion of group excellence or virtue. This may require departing some what fro m Mackie' s metaphysicall y auster e presuppositions , bu t I think th e deviation will turn out to be minimal—and largely defensible in terms of moves that Mackie seems ready enough t o allow . Mackie himself , despite hi s ow n us e o f relativit y as a n argumen t agains t objective values, attempts to handl e fairness issue s by modifying th e principle of universalizability. 54 The firs t thin g we ought to not e is that there is nothing about a realist version of the Protagorean vie w to keep us from simpl y accept-

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ing some suc h principle as a basic constraint o n moral codes. I t is specifically moral properties—the requirements of particular situations as in McDowell' s version o f realism ; what Macki e think s o f a s "intrinsi c requirements"—tha t apparently would violate a Mackiean ban on "objective prescriptivity." But what about rational constraints , suc h as those se t by facts about th e bes t mean s t o group flourishing on Mackie's ow n view ? Even if universalizability or some other principle of fairness cannot be completely justified i n instrumental terms, we might take it as a kind of constitutive constraint on groups we would think of as flourishing. Our preference for groups that satisf y th e constraint migh t be compared t o ou r preferenc e for simplicity in the comparison o f rival scientific theories.55 We might think of universalizability, i n fact, as a moral versio n o f simplicity to th e exten t tha t i t involves treating simila r cases similarly. To tak e this line i s to thin k o f fairness in th e first instanc e as a featur e w e valu e in groups, whateve r it s consequences fo r "prescriptivity," a s a source of principles of action. O r better , perhaps: I t is a feature w e value in moral codes , allowin g for their nonarbitrary extension t o new cases. With fairness taken as a property of codes, universalizability also comes ou t as promoting some independently defined purposes of morality. Besides accommodating unforeseen circumstances, a moral code governed by some such principle will provide a way of resolving interpersonal conflicts that is defensible to all parties.56 Even with fairness applied directly to groups, universalizability can be seen as promoting socia l harmony and stabilit y to th e extent that i t makes the group standpoint attractiv e to it s members and hence more likely to serve as a source of individual motivation. However, eve n if it served no furthe r purpose , mora l simplicity of the sor t that rules out arbitrar y distinctions shoul d not b e dismissed as something we just happen t o value . One migh t ask at thi s point whethe r the appeal t o simplicity in the choice among scientific theories would b e seriously undermined if we came up with peopl e or cultures with a taste for complexity and epicycles. I take it we would say that people with deviant preferences of the sort suggested just do not participat e i n the scientific enterprise; a mode o f explanation that stresses elegant complexity would be put into some category other than "scientific." To say something similar of "moral" codes would not be to rule out mora l diversity. For that matter, it would not rule out caste systems, since moral codes may be conjoined with religious and other nonmoral requirements. My suggestion is rather tha t fairnes s may be taken a s a norm o f social rationality an d t o that extent—possibly along with competing norms—as governing the construction of moral codes . Morality on this account involves assessment i n light of certain basic rational value s governing th e ai m o f promotin g grou p flourishin g such a s social harmony and stability . If one thinks of the notio n o f flourishing as applied t o plant life, it seems plausible to suppose that it builds in certain basic evaluative constraints such as symmetry or balance, other things being equal: A plant whose lower leave s all fall off , say, might be thought of as a health y specimen if it is the standard specimen of its kind, but presumably not i f others commonly flour-

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ish i n a mor e robus t sense . O r conside r preference s in th e huma n form : The bizarre things that other cultures and our own have done in the interests of physical attractiveness or to mark differences in status need not make us hesitate about the ver y basic value assumptions implici t in the idea l of a healthy body. Similarly, our notio n o f a "viable " mora l code, meanin g one that adequately promotes grou p flourishing , may rely on certain basic constraints a s presuppose d by social rationality without thereby imprinting our ful l se t of moral values on the world o r imposing them on other cultures . Constraints o f ordinar y instrumenta l rationality o f th e sor t wit h whic h I began—our preferenc e for the most effectiv e wa y of promoting a n end (rather than th e subtlest , say)—shoul d themselves be viewed as evaluative. Taking a straight lin e as the "best " way of connecting points require s deciding agains t various alternative values that favor indirectness. But we can also move beyond the instrumenta l model i n the way I indicated, by including moral constraint s on flourishing: not further constituents of the social end, to be promoted a s part of it, but minimal standards i t has to meet i n order t o be worth promoting . Despite its general teleological structure, then, the social artifact view should be able to accommodate nonconsequentialis t theories of normative ethics. It is not necessaril y utilitarian—any more tha n Aristotle' s vie w is egoist. A s with Aristotelian happiness, the relevant constraints on the moral end may be thought of as built into the notion of flourishing rather than as imposed o n it from without. Thus, a condition o n group flourishing as the defining purpose o f a moral code migh t be held to b e due regard for social subgroups—s o that a caste system could be rejected on moral grounds as "unbalanced," lik e otherwise healthy physical growth tha t i s stunted i n one area . The particular lines of argument I have brought in so far to handle fairness, from universalizabilit y and from social symmetry or balance, still might allow for a moral justification of caste systems as ways of assigning different sort s of people differen t function s in a well-arranged social order. Bu t the justification will be made no easier by the social basis I have assigned to ethics . As I intend the notio n o f group flourishing , it does not refe r simpl y to the flourishing of a group in the sense of a collective entity distinguishable from its individual members; i t also and primaril y entails the flourishing of group members , o f individuals in a group. O n an y account I would fin d acceptable , thi s i s what socia l groups ar e for , thoug h onc e se t up the y may tak e o n purpose s o f their own , sometimes i n conflict wit h individua l interests. M y vie w count s a s "social " because i t takes socia l norm s a s basi c elements of morality; i t does not tak e notions o f social valu e as prior t o individual interests . Division accordin g t o functio n would thu s requir e a defense addressed t o group members in an attemp t t o satisf y reasonabl e demand s o f a scheme designed t o promot e thei r good . An argument o n these normativ e issue s might assume ignoranc e o f an individual's place i n the social order, of the sort asso ciated with Rawlsian contractarianism; o r it might consider features of the social order as "collective goods" of value to group members on the whole, for a teleological defens e of basi c social values. 57 The usua l strategies o f bot h dut y an d virtue ethic s wil l b e availabl e as resources, sinc e m y vie w essentially supple-

Motivational Foundations of Conflict 95 ments agent-base d virtu e ethics with a socia l notio n o f virtue, as a sourc e of rules of duty . I have more to say in defense of social artifact realism in chapter 6. Though I want i t to accommodat e differen t approache s t o normativ e issues , th e view has genera l implication s for bot h th e structure an d th e conten t o f normativ e ethics, some o f which will come ou t i n what follows . Indeed , in chapter 6 we shall begin to have a glimpse of some ways in which the view might even affec t practical issues. Its main implication for metaethics (narrowl y construed) is that an argument in terms of group flourishing relocates th e area of potential moral disagreement to the level of basic values. It is here that one might have to appea l to one's own moral perception as in McDowell's versio n of realism. But we can at an y rat e limi t such appea l t o abstrac t discussio n o f th e element s o f mora l code construction an d othe r higher level social norms—both norm s o f instrumental rationality and constitutive constraints on the moral enterprise—as distinct fro m specifi c requirement s of action. This has th e advantag e o f making the fac t o f moral disagreemen t more intelligibl e and o f avoiding the applica tion o f special motivationa l properties t o situations i n the world aroun d us— the sort of thing that Macki e find s "queer. " Instead , ou r fundamenta l moral disagreements concer n personal an d socia l ends: envisioned states o f self an d society, whose properties ar e quite reasonably seen as motivational . This is not t o say that their motivational force is irresistible, even assuming rationality. In fact, there is a further kind of instrumental argument besides those commonly noted tha t ough t to be brought in at this point a s a way of limiting the appeal to moral perception. The project of constructing a viable moral code , that is, will be subject to material limitations, as well as to forma l constraint s like simplicity, to the extent that viability depends on a connection to individual motivation. T o strengthe n th e cas e fo r basi c mora l value s such a s fairness , I suggest tha t w e supplement the perceptual mode l o f realism wit h som e reference to the emotional mechanism that underlie s moral teaching .

The Role of Moral Emotion The main point t o not e i s that mora l emotion s see m to b e formed from othe r responses o n th e basi s of natural identificatory processes tha t are not directly sensitive t o socia l o r sociall y marked distinction s amon g people—o r eve n t o differences i n natural endowment of the sort that might be used to support socia l stratification accordin g t o function . Instead, on th e sor t o f picture I relied on earlier in my speculative account of the teaching of moral "ought " in conjunction wit h guilt , our inculcatio n of moral emotion s presuppose s sensitivit y to personal and behaviora l similarities and relationships such as contact an d personal dependency . Early on , infant s exhibi t a crying response t o th e soun d o f another infan t crying.58 On e ca n se e how som e genera l tendency o f th e sort , t o imitat e the emotional behavior of other species members, might be useful i n an animal herd as a way of communicating a quick response to a threat t o the group perceived by one o f its members. In humans the empathetic response serves as the foun -

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dation fo r a way o f communicating different sort s o f emotion—ne w feeling s built on a n infant' s original stoc k o f emotional responses, a s associated wit h the behavio r it imitates. A kind of "imprinting " o f emotiona l behavior—and with i t emotions themselves—from the mother o r other objec t of dependency reinforces the infant's natural responses and regroups them into new ones. The infant's natura l sympath y in this initiall y behavioral sense i s shaped int o th e adult tendency to tak e on others ' emotion s partl y by seeing others imitate its own feelings, with imitation cultivated as a kind of imaginative play. The result is a quick way of communicating more complex feelings, including specifically moral feeling s (fo r instance, guilt), b y initiatin g the gam e i n situation s tha t prompt th e child to entertain certain thoughts . On this rough accoun t o f emotional learnin g as founded on imitation and imagination, identification is not itself an emotional response among others fro m a certain putative range of sensibility but a mode of communicating responses from preexistin g ranges and constructing new responses o n the basi s of them. The important questio n in connection with moral teaching, then, is not on e of natural convergence of emotional response on the model of perception—or even of "corrected " respons e o n th e mode l o f perceptual judgment—but rather of its feasible allocatio n to object s in support o f a moral code. Behavioral similarity would seem to be enough to set off the mechanism, so the attemp t t o limi t it to member s of a social subgroup—o r t o chec k i t with some opposing tendency, even one that i s arguably natural such as fear o f the stranger—might b e taken as yielding an unstabl e combination. I t i s not a t all an impossible combination, but its two elements are apparently in tension, and the more inclusive element would seem to be the one that determines the scope of emotional interaction.59 A rigid stress on the exclusive element thus may be challenged a s impeding the construction of a viable moral code. My claim about caste systems is not that they are ruled out b y human emotional nature but jus t that a basis in social exclusion pulls against our natural response tendencies in a way that tends to undermine moral code construction. Agents would risk acting at cross-purposes in not taking adequate moral account of the sufferings o f people they understood to be human. At the very least, then, human emotional nature affects th e social and psychological costs imposed by alternative moral codes. This approach t o mora l psychology might be thought o f as "bottom-up " since it assigns emotion a role in determining the shape of a viable moral code rather than simply tacking it on to a predetermined code a s a source of moral motivation. My account therefore differs fro m other motivational accounts, most notably Mill' s utilitaria n appeal to "interna l sanctions, " a s well a s from th e perceptual o r aestheti c mode l that w e find , most notably , in Hume. 60 Mora l emotion as I conceive it does not just register in affect a n independently grounded (or an ungrounded) moral code but is part of the system of penalties and payoff s that makes a code operative in the first place. It plays a special role even among features of individual psychology insofar as occurrent emotion provides the sort of controllabl e episodic basis that allow s for th e teachin g of moral language. On m y account, negative moral emotions such as guilt may b e thought of

Motivational Foundations of Conflict 97 as felt needs registering in affect ou r morally "binding" reason s for action. Bu t they are in many cases artificial or manufactured needs set up to reflect the group standpoint in individual response tendencies . Their purpose, in short, is to har ness egoisti c energie s t o mora l ends . S o their nature a s the availabl e suppor t mechanism for a moral code also imposes limits on the nature of a viable code: The code must be such as to allow for support fro m a manageable extension o f our natura l stoc k o f emotions . Is it odd to think of this view as realist? The term may seem to presuppos e a perceptual model, but a moral code is of course not something "ou t there " t o be seen. Besides being instituted by minds, it now appears t o b e constrained by their response tendencies. In any case, on reasonable versions of the view I have offered, th e standard appealed t o may not be the actual code in force but rathe r one that is corrected i n certain ways as needed to promote grou p flourishing. 61 So it is an idealized artifact of human choice and emotion. Bu t I take it that the hypothetical fact that the actual code would promote grou p flourishing if corrected in certain ways is "real" enough for our purposes an d is connected clearly enough to human harms and benefits to count as a "moral" fact.62 I shall allow the term "realism, " then , for views that answer the charge of subject-relativity by appeal t o suc h facts, see n a s governed b y constraints o f the sor t just indicated. The term has a number of misleading connotations, bu t i t seems t o b e the term in use as a single expression summing up the alternative to both metaethical noncognitivism or nondescriptivism and Mackie's "erro r theory," two ways of denying that moral judgments state facts: the former by denying that the y purport to b e factual; the latter b y denying their truth. M y two-component vie w essentially serves to separate th e factual content o f morality from the question of its force over behavior. It is not put forth as realism in the metaphysical sense that would make out moral judgments as ascribing special properties to objects. 63 Rather, it s conception o f moral fact s a s hypothetical about unrealize d states of affairs on the order of group flourishin g suggests a way of reinterpreting the notion of "moral observation " tha t is often assumed, by analogy to perceptual judgment, to amoun t t o acquaintanc e wit h particula r moral fact s of the sor t given by "This is wrong."64 Moral error and disagreement will be easier to understand—and for that matter, a certain degree of skepticism will be reasonable— if we relocate the observation leve l in ethics (i n contrast t o science ) to tha t of abstract imagination. Though morality on this two-component versio n of realism may depend o n the actual moral code as something set up and held in place by minds, its content will no t b e determined b y the desire s o r decision s o f any particula r agen t o r even those ope n to the group as a whole at a particular historical moment. The notion o f a constitution a s a written cod e of rules that constrains furthe r legal decision bu t i s itself subject to correction i n light of its general social purpose s provides a helpful legal analogy for understanding the authority of a moral code , as a product o f human will and inventio n that nonetheles s constrains human choice. To gran t it authority in that sense , however, i s not t o suppos e tha t it somehow has the power t o compel obedience, even among agents assumed t o

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be rational; it constrains choice only within the relevant framework. For morality (as opposed t o a constitution), the relevant framework is not simpl y the par ticular code or system of norms in force but also something more general backing it up: the standpoint of group flourishing. It also involves something more particular that can be harnessed to the social code in psychological terms: guilt or som e similar motivational mechanism involving moral emotion. A n individual ma y have to pa y a price for abandoning the grou p standpoint , i n the manner of an athlet e who risk s her health in pursuit of more specialized selfdevelopment. I shoul d not e tha t th e socia l artifac t view is not pu t fort h a s a thorough going analysi s of moral term s o r judgments . I t i s meant t o captur e onl y th e descriptive content o f ethics, at this point considered as a whole: the social prac tices, behaviora l and emotional , b y virtue of which a moral code may be said to be "in force " a s a way of promoting th e characteristic end of life i n groups, along with corrections and extension s o f the code in light of that general end. This amount s to th e backing for our mora l judgments , but i t leaves out thei r prescriptive force as something that depends on adopting the normative standpoint tha t i t tries onl y to understan d from outside . An interpretation of wha t we say from the inside would of course have to do more, and the view is meant to be compatible with different way s of attempting t o do more. It provides only a roug h accoun t o f morality as a socia l institution , plus an indicatio n of th e role of emotion a s its link to individua l motivation. Norms of emotional response are fundamental to morality, then, insofar as they regulat e the interna l sanctions and som e o f the chie f externa l sanction s that actually keep the moral cod e i n force. I tried to illustrat e with my earlier remarks on fairness ho w they play a role in determining the nature of a viable code. They are essential to it in general terms because they build the group stand point into individual psychology, providing the individual with a way of accessing it from hi s own immediat e psychological reactions . Thi s yields a sense in which moral emotions let us "perceive" mora l facts, but it is an indirect sense, parasitic on their primary role as motivators . As the basis of moral teaching, norms of emotional response set up a particularly exacting standard o f individual moral sensitivity. However, the standar d in question need not b e seen as an ideal of individual virtue on the Aristotelian model. It would make amotivational use s of moral terms count as in some way deficient thoug h no t therefor e deviant i n meaning, and no t i n all cases a ba d thing. There are times calling for action—even moral action—when the demands of perfect moral sensitivity would ge t in the way; political "dirty hands" case s provide important examples. 65 Bu t there is another point to be made here: Perfect virtue in fact might be said to require the ability to free oneself in moments of adult reflection from th e emotional baggag e o f childhood mora l instructio n in order t o take a critical look a t the accepted mora l code. This point rests on some assumptions worth noting. It places a value on the capacity for moral growth, o n the assumptio n that a perfect mora l education of the sort Aristotle describes, say, may or may not yield perfect moral sensitivity, dependin g o n th e surroundin g society' s code—a s witness , o f course ,

Motivational Foundations of Conflict 99 Aristotle's view s on women and his acceptance of slavery. A "blind spot" may be held in place by emotional distractions, including those set up by the moral code. In fact, as I argue in the next chapter, Aristotle' s treatmen t o f shame in connection wit h th e virtue s suggests that hi s view makes insufficien t accom modation fo r personal moral imperfection as something an otherwise virtuous person might be called upon to change. When the moral code itself is in need of improvement, though, its underlying system of emotional response may constitute an inertia l force agains t reasonable change. A side effect o f allowing for detachmen t from mora l emotio n i s the possi bility of amoralism: the rationally intelligible use of moral language without its usual motivationa l props . Anothe r sid e effec t i s the possibilit y o f a kin d of emotional self-criticism that can be used to reconcile emotion-based ethic s with the valu e placed o n autonomy . On e ca n ris e above one's personal syste m of emotional response , a s well as the system set up b y the moral code, even supposing tha t it constitutes an integral part of oneself. Indeed, the point i s to ask whether it constitutes the self one wants to be. Thus, we might discourage certain emotions in ourselves, perhaps on moral grounds—and perhaps including the very emotions that allowe d us as children to perceiv e moral grounds : fea r of social disapproval, say, or an eagerness to be accepted. Emotiona l self-criticism may itself be seen as emotion-based—as motivated, for instance, by admiration o r disdain for one's current self, as something partly constituted b y certain emotions.66 However, my suggested account of the emotional basis of ethics is not mean t to yield a monolithic view of its foundations but to accor d emo tions a serious place amon g them, despite th e notoriou s pitfall s of emotiona l motivation. At least in some cases, emotional self-criticism conceivably involves rising abov e emotion. I do want t o deny , though, tha t thi s mean s risin g to a level where the usua l emotional support fo r ethic s is annulled.

The Intractability of Wrong One might think that a corrected versio n of the actua l moral cod e o f the sort that is now in question could not contain conflicts. In defense of universalizability or some simila r principle, I appealed to simplicity considerations a s favoring a code that can be extended readily to new cases. But surely, it might be said, the need for "i n principle" decision s uniting different case s counts agains t a cod e that allows for irresolvable conflicts of the sort at issue in dilemmas. In the face of conflict, what we ought to do is to detach ourselves from the emotional reac tions that support our ordinary set of moral rules and bring in some alternative principle that yields an acceptable resolution . This way.of ruling out dilemmas is associated with Hare's account of moral thinking as taking place o n two levels : the "intuitive " level , consisting i n our everyday stock of emotion-based rules , and th e "critical " level, a higher court of appeal fo r deciding what rules to put o n the lower level and how to resolve cases in which the rules turn out to b e inadequate.67 On Hare's view what we appeal to is a single principle that he takes to be derivable from universalizability : the principle of utility. But Hare's approach t o normative ethics need not con-

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cern u s here; we may grant for purposes of argument tha t th e practical resolution to a moral dilemma should involve "acting for the best"—as Williams puts it in considering th e case of Agamemnon 68—and that thi s mean s maximizing utility. Th e questio n raise d b y dilemma s is whether th e mora l rul e tha t w e thereby ac t agains t mus t b e seen as superseded. What I need t o argu e her e is just that we may still take it to be in force compatibl y wit h a coherent vie w of ethics, on assumption s lik e those jus t defende d as yielding a version of moral realism. The question of realism initially came up in negative form in connection with dilemmas: Williams's accoun t of them was presented in part a s a way of undermining realism. Bu t if I am right , the view turns out t o pla y a positive rol e in defense of dilemmas. Realist assumptions allow us to put a limit on the respon siveness of our intuitiv e principles to considerations o f simplicity: to distinguish the sorts o f corrections t o the actual code that ar e needed t o promote its general practical purpose s fro m other s that might be introduced solel y for the sake of various theoretical end s such as systematic neatness. In contrast t o Hare's prescriptivism, social artifac t realis m does no t make out mora l principle s as simply chosen by us within certain logica l constraints . Our correction s t o th e mora l cod e tha t i s socially in force are mean t t o le t it capture somethin g subject-independent , even i f not unique : a versio n o f th e actual code that would do an adequate job in promoting th e end or complex of ends summed u p as "group flourishing." On this account, a viable moral cod e is constrained b y the nature of its defining social end as well as by the means to it, including most notabl y its motivational basis in emotional learning. By contrast, Hare claims that reasoning at the critical level permits n o appeal t o substantial moral intuition s but only to logical intuitions such as universalizability. With regard t o dilemmas, I think there is reason t o insist against Hare that the emotiona l underpinning s of a viable moral cod e would i n fac t b e undermined by canceling the application of its principles to cases of conflict. In a word, it is important t o the general purposes of the code that a morally sensitive agent both registe r emotionall y the principle he has to act against an d be seen as responding thereby to a practical requirement imposed by the situation. This point rests o n a n accoun t o f moral educatio n outline d previousl y that i s not unlike Hare's, except tha t Hare apparentl y relies solely on considerations o f personal virtue to mak e roo m fo r our intuitiv e emotional responses , a s needed fo r his account t o cove r response s tha t ma y not b e justified i n utilitarian terms. I n a case of conflict, Hare's account allow s us to say that a person wh o experiences no guil t o r remors e fo r violatin g the overridde n intuitiv e ough t woul d b e a morally worse person—or a morally worse educated person, as he also puts it 69— whom w e reasonably think less well of for the lack. But Hare's account appar ently does not le t us say that one morally ought to feel guilt or remorse i n such a case a s a substitute fo r action, o r to satisf y a "contrary-to-duty" obligation , perhaps eve n in contexts wher e the emotion would d o more har m than good . Nor doe s it let us think of the emotion a s rationally appropriate. Of course, consideration s of virtue and the Aristotelian picture of virtue as based o n genera l habits of emotional response also underlie the notio n o f the

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ideally sensitive agent that my own discussion took from McDowell . I attempt to sho w ho w guil t fits int o thi s picture a t the beginnin g of chapter 4 , an d my own account wil l diverge further fro m both Aristotle's and McDowell's. It has already begun to pul l away fro m the m by setting up a special standard, mor e exacting tha n normal , for mora l teaching . A n importan t poin t o f agreemen t with them, however, is the view of an ideall y sensitive agent a s responding t o something real—t o morall y significan t feature s of th e situatio n rathe r tha n merely to feature s tha t ar e i n general morall y significant. It i s Hare's willingness to drop this point, I want to claim, that keeps him from making adequate sense of dilemmas. Consider on e of Hare's illustrations of the role he assigns to guil t in moral thinking: On a visit to Czechoslovakia at the height of the cold war, he says, he would have lied to avoid being expelled if he had bee n asked by officials abou t the purpos e of his visit; despite the belie f tha t he ought t o lie , he would have felt guilty. Hare handles the case by allowing for conflict on what he elsewhere distinguishes as the intuitiv e level of moral thinking; he here refers to " a sens e of 'thinkin g that I ought' in which . . . [f]eeling guilty is inseparable fro m . . . thinking that I ought not. " Bu t on the critica l level, there i s no mora l dut y t o back up this conflicting thought; i t is justified simpl y as something expecte d of a morally good agent: " I should be a morally worse man i f I were not affecte d in this way."70 Note that this justification is not utilitarian: Though ther e might be generally beneficial consequence s of emotional sensitivit y on mora l issues, those agent s who woul d b e able to forg o it in this case without effec t o n their general tendencies would be well advised to d o so. Now contras t th e cas e wit h tha t o f Agamemnon . Agamemno n i s indeed considered morally deficient fo r failing to b e affected wit h guilt or som e similar emotion b y the sacrific e of his daughter. Bu t to say only this i s to trea t th e case as fundamentally indistinguishable from one that involves an act that would be wrong under other circumstance s but is not wrong under those tha t obtain , as with Hare's imagine d lie to a n officia l o f a n unjus t government . Th e ideal response o n Hare's account i s treated a s appropriate no t t o th e situatio n bu t rather for a person—as i n this case failing t o fi t the situation i n a way that is characteristic of someone with a good moral upbringing, given the fact that emotions rest on general habits of response . Hare is willing to apply his position to some morally serious cases, but they all involv e slighting some members of a group in order t o fulfil l a more basic responsibility to the group as a whole.71 These are what Williams calls cases of "moral cost, " withou t th e sor t o f unanswere d clai m tha t i s a t issu e i n Agamemnon's sacrifice o f his daughter. In all the cases Hare deals with, then, the ought that i s not acte d o n is on his account clearl y overridden. His reason for expecting a morally good person to react to it has to do with the limitations of human psychology—the need to construct our everyday moral sensibility from the limite d materials provided by general emotion tendencies—considere d as distinct from th e morall y significant feature s of the situation. My ow n approac h t o morall y serious cases appeal s to a n idea l of moral sensitivity no t jus t a s the produc t of the righ t sort o f upbringing but als o as a

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standard o f correct response : the more exactin g didacti c standard tha t underlies moral teaching . Thi s ma y b e thought o f essentiall y as a standar d o f du e attention t o what on e is talking about, a s registered i n emotion. I do not hol d that an agent has to conform t o it insofar as he holds moral judgments but that otherwise his responses ar e i n a certain sense deficient. They d o no t coun t a s full response s sinc e they fail t o expres s th e motivation to act—thoug h i n normal cases it is enough that the agent does act, as he may do automatically. In a case like Agamemnon's, however, th e emotional components o f a full respons e will be morally required as a substitute for action o n one of the ought s i n conflict. This was my suggested modificatio n of McDowell's cognitivis m i n order to allow for dilemmas. The point of the further departures from McDowell's vie w that I took from Mackie but defended as compatible with the aims of realism is just that we can still insist along with McDowell tha t Agamemnon's requisite emotional response is one that is merited by features of his choice-situation, a s opposed to simply being meritorious on his part.72 Guilt or remorse i s justified o r appropriate i n Agamemnon's circumstances, no t just understandable or even admirable as the result o f a goo d mora l upbringing . However, I d o no t wan t t o sa y tha t th e emotion amount s t o a perceptio n o f som e specia l motivationa l property o f the situation; i t is enough that i t be backed up b y subject-independent facts in the relevant sense. This sense allows for facts about a code of rules set up an d sustained by minds for subject-dependent purposes. What it excludes is relativity to minds as knowers—or a s the source o f the prescriptions that substitut e for knowledg e on Hare's noncognitivist account . In short, the moral code is not simpl y stitched together case-by-case , and it cannot b e tailored t o fi t th e requirement s o f a particula r cas e a s o n Hare' s account o f dilemmas. Where conflicts occur, we may indeed have to appeal t o considerations of utility. I count thi s as a moral appeal , bu t it does no t yiel d a moral resolution of the conflict on the view I have defended: It leaves intact the intuitive judgments that Hare would dismiss as lower level. Given the interaction of the two component s o f morality that m y own vie w takes as elements in its explanation, we can rest this refusal to rise above emotion on the general moral importance o f registering the standpoin t o f the ought that lose s out . Indeed, we may even appeal t o utilitarian considerations i n support o f this departure from Hare's utilitarianism. In part I I I shall use the example of guilt to defen d a notion o f appropriate emotio n tha t build s in appeal t o consider ations o f general adaptiveness. I t is not limite d to a utilitarian reading, a s we shall see. At this point, however, let me confin e myself in arguing against Har e to an example of the general utilitarian benefits of emotion i n cases of dilemma. In a case like Agamemnon's, guil t or remorse as an identificatory response ca n be said to exhibit the agent's mora l convictions in feelings an d act s of expres sion that are superior to statements o f belief to the extent that they are beyond full voluntary control an d hence harder to simulate. They therefore are able to reassure us about the agent's general response tendencies more than any claims he might make about his preference for avoiding the conflict and the act he would have chosen i n its absence.

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The agent can also be said to subjec t himself to discomfor t b y undergoing guilt or remorse, to the extent that his emotions are under some voluntary control. I shall later supplement the picture of emotions a s useful fo r purposes o f communication with an appreciation o f the motivational and symbolic significance of self-subjection to discomfort. For our present purposes, w e can already see that expressions o f belief of the sort just indicated would also be oddly remote under Agamemnon's circumstances—"hollow" o r "wooden" in a way that contrasts wit h the immediacy of emotion. The agent brings the situation home to himself and gives others a reason for taking his response seriously insofar as he manifests some emotion on the order of guilt. The emotion serves to dramatize his commitment to ends that hi s action i n this case cannot serve . The fact that it is unpleasant both fits the negative content of the moral belief it expresses and counts a s a reason agains t undergoing the emotion i n its absence. The conclusion I want t o dra w fro m these points i s that a moral code that yields a dilemma on the level of intuitive moral thinking should not be corrected in the way Hare suggests, by anulling the application of the rules to that case in favor o f critical thinking. It is not enoug h to bas e the same emotional requirements on considerations of virtue, as Hare has in mind. To see this, let us take another loo k a t what an agent migh t reasonably think or fee l about his emotional responses i n a situation of conflict of the sort that Hare imagine s on his trip to cold-war Czechoslovakia . It would b e compatible with the good mora l education evidenced by the guilt he feels about a lie that is in fact justified simply to "laug h off" the feeling, dismissing it as a representation of the real moral requirements of the situation, perhaps eve n with a degree of pride for hi s ad vanced moral sensibility. This is not what we want from Agamemnon, needless to say. Nor coul d he delude himself about th e situatio n an d stil l b e capable of critica l thinking. I conclude, then, that th e appeal to simplicit y as a reason for limiting the num ber of rules relevant to the case would be undercut by the need to explain what the agen t i n i t ough t t o feel . I n any case , the sor t o f simplicity I appealed t o earlier had a practical justification as allowing for a comprehensible method of extrapolating fro m th e preexisting rules to new cases. What is in question here is just a n attemp t t o swee p away mora l clutte r in th e interest s of metamora l neatness. The problem with its application t o dilemmas is that it also seems to discard our sense of the intractability of moral wrong. I brought up this notion earlie r in connection with m y claim that a mora l prohibition is not erased by considerations on the other side, in favor of action. At that point I had in mind nonmoral or positive considerations; but what is in question here is something like higher level considerations: th e view of things from a n impersonal standpoint of judgment, to be distinguished from bot h the all-things-considered and the group standpoints tha t have come into my argument. The notion o f intractability will have further, more particula r applica tions later, but i n the present context, it can b e used as a general way o f summing u p m y answe r t o th e proble m I bega n wit h abou t dilemma s an d motivational force. It is what makes our mora l intuitions resist the kind of systematization that many philosophers would impose on them, by ensuring that

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a sufficiently seriou s moral reason against some act is not blotted out by a stronger reason i n favor of it. At bottom, then, it involves a kind of intractability to argument that keeps an appeal to critical thought from doin g what Hare wants. The notion of intractability connects my account o f dilemmas to specifically moral o r deonti c notions , a s distinct fro m Hare' s accoun t o f their emotiona l basis in terms of virtue and other authors' attempt s t o explain them a s clashes of incommensurable values. The claim that an agent must do something wron g in a case of moral dilemma adds something to the claim that he must forgo some good. It eve n adds somethin g to th e clai m that eithe r choice h e makes is bad insofar as the link to emotion ensures that "wrong " is not just a motivationally inert label—o r perhaps even one with positive force o n the mode l o f the Afri can-American slang use of "bad" i n American English or of the tongue-in-cheek extension to adult behavior of "naughty" an d similar terms for reproving children. This i s to sa y that a us e of "wrong " withou t motivationa l forc e is a substandard use , not jus t that the speaker falls short of a standard o f perfect virtue, though dependin g on the reasons for it the use may be morally substandard an d the speake r mor e tha n linguisticall y deviant . In application t o dilemmas , this means that it is not lef t t o an agent's psychological makeu p to tell him how t o react—whether to feel "torn" or simply to grant that both alternatives are wrong while responding t o on e o f them with indifference . T o b e unmoved b y either alternative is to violate a norm of full response ; sinc e being moved require s at least undergoing an unpleasant feeling, we have a sense on this account in which a dilemma is hard on the agent but still possible. The agent in a dilemma is torn between tw o alternative s that ar e both i n emotional term s ba d fo r him . This yields a solution t o the problem posed i n chapter 1 . Or rather , i t yields the outline of a solution. The summary of my results in this chapte r raise s in roug h for m a se t o f furthe r question s mor e specificall y about guilt and other moral emotions: about the response mechanism I want to use t o explai n mora l motivation , it s assessmen t fo r appropriateness , an d it s relation to judgments of responsibility and wrong. These include questions about the moral worth and the practical usefulness of guilt as a source of moral motivation bu t als o mor e genera l questions about norm s governin g emotional response an d their relation to moral action . I want to treat guilt in dilemmatic cases essentially as a substitute for action rather than as a way of registering the perception of moral wrong, o r a mark of moral virtu e or a good mora l upbringing , at leas t i n the firs t instance . But it may see m to b e a rather poor substitute for an y number of reasons. On e tha t might come up here, in light of my criticisms of Hare's account, i s its degree of self-focus: An agent who i s motivated by guilt might be said to be acting out of concern for his own moral worth—or eve n for his own state of emotional comfort or discomfort—and hence to be no less morally deficient than one who dismisses hi s guilt feelings i n a case of conflict. Moreover, a n accoun t o f such feelings a s appropriate in cases of dilemma might seem to compromise the notion of intractability just defended. It would apparently make out guil t as justified o n general utilitarian or othe r practical

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grounds in at least some cases where the corresponding evaluative belief—that the agent is responsible for wrong—would not b e warranted. But if this is true, it would also seem to detach guilt from a judgment of wrong. Instead, the emotion migh t be see n a s requiring only prima faci e evidenc e of wrongdoing . I n that case, the claim that guilt is appropriate no matter what th e agent does in a case of dilemma stops short of giving us what it seemed to jus t above: a view of the agent as responding to something real in the situation. Le t us now attemp t to deal with this question by way of an extended look a t guilt.

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II SENSIBILITY AN D STANDPOINT S

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4 Moral Residue s

Guilt came int o m y argumen t i n part I in two connecte d roles : i n its primary form, following action, in response to a contrary-to-duty obligation to feel some appropriate emotion, an d i n anticipatory form , i n advanc e o f action, a s th e emotional strut of the motivational force of moral "ought. " I have maintained that the two role s allow the emotion t o serve as a kind of substitute for action in cases o f dilemma. I t i s by no mean s a n adequat e substitute i n mora l term s but i s enough to answe r metaethica l worries abou t th e sense in which both of the ought s i n conflict can b e practical. Th e motivationa l rol e o f th e emotio n also serves to justif y i t as a sometimes problematic after-the-fac t reaction—-an affective residu e of moral failur e that persists even when failure is unavoidable. My treatment o f dilemmas as cases in which guilt is warranted fo r al l alternatives is essentially a modification of Williams's claim that thei r practical reso lution leaves a moral "remainder," no t itsel f a feeling but marked by moral feel ings of regret, alon g wit h othe r way s of acknowledging that th e ac t the agen t has to perform is still wrong. However, alon g with most philosophers, Williams has little to say about guilt. Williams's "agent-regret" migh t be thought o f as a general category meant to include guilt along wit h othe r emotions , thoug h i t suggests a more passiv e variant o f sadness. 1 Bu t Agamemnon's case counts a s a genuin e dilemma for Williams just because the sacrifice of Iphigenia is still morally wrong unde r the circumstances, eve n though i t is required by Agamemnon's dutie s a s military commander. I t does not just involve a regrettable wrong don e t o his daughter that i s analogous t o th e "mora l cost " of the thing s a politician ma y b e overridingly required to do. Rather, its wrongness i s serious enough not to be erased by th e balancin g of obligation s tha t make s i t com e ou t a t th e sam e tim e a s required, perhaps eve n with stronger practica l weight. My vie w is that guil t is needed to capture the force of "wrong" in this account as something more tha n a motivationally inert label. At the outset, however, I want to continue to work with a broad interpreta tion o f guilt as an "interna l sanction" o f the moral cod e involvin g some form of discomfort a t the thought that one is responsible for a wrong—a feelin g tha t may b e covered by other emotion concepts, mos t notably shame, in other cultures. A distinction between guilt and sham e with some reasons fo r preferrin g guilt, plu s a n explanatio n of th e pitfall s o f th e emotion , wil l emerge as this 109

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chapter proceeds. In chapter 5 I argue that th e standard way of distinguishing guilt from variou s other self-directed contrary-to-duty feelings in our ow n culture—by limiting its object to voluntary action—does no t really fit the facts of emotional lif e o r eve n the norm s of emotional rationality . Williams bypasses guilt in favor of regret a t least partly because he relies on this distinction i n his treatment o f dilemmas. In fact, though, on Williams's account the substitution of obligation for practical "ought" in dilemmas would apparently allow blame, the third-perso n counterpar t o f guil t in emotional terms , fo r th e violatio n of moral obligation i n such cases. 2 But appropriate blam e no less than guilt seems to b e limited to voluntar y action. My ow n view will allow instead fo r weaker grounds for guilt than for blame on the basis of the special motivational role of the first-person emotion . In this chapter, befor e attacking the question of voluntariness, I want to fil l out th e accoun t o f guil t that bega n t o emerg e i n m y discussio n o f it s role i n childhood moral teaching. My treatment of the moral significance o f the emotion i n adult life (sectio n 1 ) will initially focus on the lin k i t provides betwee n the ethics of virtue and of duty. Insofar as it captures the intractability of moral wrong—its resistance to the balancin g of obligations—in a case lik e Agamemnon's, i t expresses th e sens e tha t som e act s ar e intolerable . In Agamemnon' s case it essentially serves to direct feelings of "taboo" onto the self, as tainted or stained b y wrong action . I t thereb y provides a n elemen t of mora l self-threa t that is not present in more passive reactions lik e regret or shame or in less selforiented feeling s lik e remorse. I t also provides an alternative to a strictly Aristotelian approach t o virtue by making room fo r serious lapses from it within a notion o f flawed or imperfec t virtue. I eventuall y bring my remark s o n guil t and virtu e to bea r o n tw o genera l contrasts tha t see m to underli e the motivational significance of guilt: between positive and negative and between self - and other-directed emotions an d othe r attitudes. My argument for an asymmetrical treatment of emotions in each pair will lay the basis for my later defense of weaker grounds for guilt than for blame. Here I shall use it to help answer questions raised by a problematic case for the connection betwee n guil t and perfec t or idea l virtue, of the sort that seem s to be possible in genuine moral dilemmas , understood a s cases in which the agent is not responsibl e for th e situatio n o f conflic t and assumin g that h e doe s th e best he can to ac t in light of it. The discussio n will lead to my account, i n section 2 , o f guilt in the narro w sense a s an identificator y mechanism: a general reaction pattern sometimes encompassing the other feelings typically contrasted with guilt but distinguishe d by a different sor t o f connection t o th e self. I expect m y remarks t o suppor t a distinctio n between guil t and shame , in particular, that favors guilt as a moral motivator. Bu t I shall mainly be considering guilt in reasonable dose s and wit h reasonabl e objects, in sharp distinc tion to a common vie w of the emotion a s an overwhelming and uncontrollable inhibiting factor. The pitfall s o f the emotio n will come u p i n my argument as side effect s o f it s valuable features an d a s reason s for denyin g that a requirement to feel guilty provides a way of resolving a dilemma. In a defense of "ought to-feel" (sectio n 3), I address the general problems raised by requiring any feel -

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ing, o n the usua l assumptions abou t emotional control . I also consider a sec ond-order dilemm a raised by the possibility that guilt in a case like Agamemnon's might interfer e wit h effectiv e actio n o n th e stronge r ough t i n the conflict . A t best, if I am right, a requirement to feel guilty resolves the metaethical proble m of dilemmas and practical "ought. " It cannot b e taken as offering a way out t o the agen t i n a dilemm a or a s preserving th e ethic s o f virtue from mora l luck .

1. Th e Mora l Significance o f Guil t Guilt i s usually thought of—b y thos e philosopher s wh o mentio n i t at all—i n connection wit h th e ethics of duty, which takes acts as the primary objects of moral evaluation. 3 It is meant to attac h t o an act viewed as wrong, or a violation o f moral obligation . However , within duty ethics it is treated a s a second ary matter, a question to be postponed unti l after the determination of the right act. I want to argue that the moral significance of guilt begins to come out whe n we consider i t as an element of virtue ethics, or the earlier (and recently revived) approach tha t instead emphasizes the evaluation of persons and personal traits in connection wit h notions o f character an d personal mora l perfection . Guilt can be seen as linking the ethic s of virtue to tha t o f duty more firml y than i s accomplished, fo r instance, jus t by listing conscientiousness amon g th e virtues or by laying special stress on the virtue of justice. If conscientiousness i s just on e virtu e among others , it s requirements ma y sometime s b e slighted i n favor o f others compatibl y with overall virtue. If justice, on the othe r hand , i s the essential virtue, a single lapse from it presumably takes an agent out o f the running fo r overal l virtue. Even if virtue is subject to degrees , it s degrees ar e not calculated act by act, so a serious lapse may make it unclear what motiv e is left to the agent for future virtuous action. By contrast, taking justice to involve a requirement o f guilt for wrong actio n a s a precondition o f overall virtue has the effec t o f imposing a repeatable emotiona l cost on lapse s from virtue. It is important t o thi s suggestion tha t guilt both ascribe s somethin g nega tive to th e sel f an d i s itself a negative state o f feeling. It is not itsel f a virtue— nor i s feeling i t o r havin g a tendenc y t o fee l it—bu t rathe r a requiremen t o f imperfect virtu e and a goad t o futur e virtuous action. I shall be thinking of it here as an emotion, no t a state of affairs o r a personal trait. To that extent, my treatment o f guilt will be roughly in line with Aristotle's remark s on sham e in the Nicomachean Ethics; sinc e the Greek s did not hav e a shame/guilt distinc tion, I shall tak e Aristotle' s remark s a s applying to bot h emotions. 4 Aristotl e apparently consider s sham e importan t enoug h i n connection wit h th e virtue s to b e included in his account o f them, bu t a t th e sam e tim e h e acknowledge s that i t doe s no t reall y belon g o n th e list . A s a correlat e o f imperfec t virtue , shame—meaning th e sens e o f shame, o r sham e a s a dispositiona l emotion , a tendency t o fee l certai n occurren t emotion s (includin g both sham e itsel f an d fear of disgrace) under the right circumstances—may be seen as a virtue in children. For adults, it is neither a virtue nor a part of virtue on Aristotle's account, which a t tha t stag e o f developmen t rule s ou t seriou s lapse s fro m perfection .

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My own use of "guilt" i s meant rathe r broadl y at this point, in a way that does no t distinguis h it from mora l shame , o r sham e fel t fo r a n ac t viewe d a s wrong. Even that limitation might seem to introduce a difference fro m Aristotle' s notion insofa r as it connects guilt to duty ethics. Though Aristotle' s shame does extend t o lapse s from duty—indeed, he ties it explicitly to voluntar y actions 5 —it more directly concerns the personal disgrace to which they subject the agent. One's sel f i s viewed as diminishe d by th e shamefu l wrong i t does , i n short , whereas fo r guilt , we ma y sa y b y contrast, th e sel f ma y merel y be threatened with diminution: Wrong acts "taint" the agent, but, in normal cases he can erase the taint through reparativ e action. In what follows I argue for the importance o f guilt even within virtue ethics as a negative response t o wron g action ; I thereby resist bot h Aristotle' s insis tence on perfection and a certain use of Aristotle i n contemporary mora l phi losophy a s a model for isolating virtue ethics fro m th e modern ethic s of duty . Williams, mos t notably , favor s dropping strictl y moral notion s i n favor o f a broader categor y of the ethical, which is not base d on blame. 6 While I welcome the mov e awa y fro m a narro w concentratio n o n duty , m y ai m her e i s essentially to hel p keep the ethics of virtue moored to that of duty—to kee p it, as I would say , from drifting ou t t o sea . I also turn t o a case of moral dilemm a t o illustrate an important distinction within virtue ethics introduced b y the extension o f emotional guil t to putative instances of moral perfection.

Guilt and Imperfect Virtue Let us first not e that we are not simpl y returning to dut y ethics when we refer to guil t as required b y imperfect virtue (in the ordinar y sens e of flawed as op posed to ideal virtue, with no reference to the Kantian distinction betwee n perfect and imperfect duties). Our claim at this point need not be that guilt is obligatory i n the usual sense—a possibility I shall in fact defen d later i n this chapte r —but rathe r just that undergoin g the emotion i s a precondition o f such virtue as is still achievable under the circumstances. From the standpoint o f duty ethics, this claim would seem to amount to a hypothetical imperative—"Feel guilty if you want to be virtuous" or the like—and guilt would no t b e commanded by such a principle , except a s supplemented b y a dut y to exhibi t virtue . Within virtue ethics, by contrast, th e claim just serves to recommend guil t as one of the necessary ingredients of virtue in the cas e in question, with virtu e assumed t o be a state w e want t o exhibit . It is a question, o f course, wha t forc e the clai m would have against someon e wh o doe s not muc h car e whether h e qualifies as virtuous; an answer might overlap with duty ethics—by appealing, for instance, to th e claim on others' respec t that virtu e entails. But let us limit attention a t this poin t t o agent s who d o hav e a n idea l o f overall virtue, though the y ma y not ac t in accordance with it on all occasions o r even bother figurin g out what it requires . The questio n of overall virtue, as I interpret it, asks whether someon e i s an admirable person, o r admirabl e on the whole, a s opposed t o bein g admirable only with some qualification—in certain respects or in a certain role; as an art -

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ist, say . Moreover, an answer to the question involves more than simpl y summing the more limited sorts of virtue that an agent may display—even with due weight assigned to their importance, the degree to which they involve a display of virtue, and so forth. Thus, for instance, we might deny that Richard Wagner was an admirable person in view of his anti-Semitism or his betrayal of his friend Von Billow , eve n granting that h e was a ver y admirable composer, and even with some inclinatio n to say that his achievements as a composer wer e important enough to outweigh moral failings. His moral failings may be outweighed in some general scheme of things, that is to say, but not i n the determination of overall worth as a person o n this account. Indeed, a similar point might be made for cases in which only moral virtue is under consideration a t ever y stage. If a moral laps e is sufficiently serious , it will not be enough to make up for the lapse with good deeds; rather, the agent must appreciate it s seriousness, in a sense not unlik e aesthetic appreciatio n t o the extent tha t it rules out bein g left cold. A Raskolnikov, say, who goes on to become a major philanthropist without a moment o f remorse for his murder of the old lady would not thereb y have met the demands of overall virtue, even if he also managed to convince himself intellectually that the murder was wrong. Indeed, eve n a religiou s conversion would no t b e morally satisfyin g unless it involved an appropriate elemen t of discomfort abou t hi s crimes. We might be willing to infer this from th e strength of his later motivation to do good, take n as an instance of the reparative tendency associated wit h guilt. But at least some postulated negativ e feeling seem s t o b e needed t o assur e u s that th e agent' s negative evaluation of his act affect s hi m personally . Some such argument is familiar from discussions of legal punishment, rehabilitation, and surrounding issues. The hypothetical rehabilitated mass murderer who goes on to lead an exemplary life but never feels remorse gives pause, quite apart from deterrenc e considerations, even to those of us who would like to do without revenge . No doub t w e insist on feeling , in real-lif e case s o f the sort , partly jus t to hel p us determine whether an y observed change s in personality and mode of life are genuine and reliable, on the assumption tha t feeling is one of the les s malleable signs of belie f an d behavio r tendencies. Bu t we insis t on guilt feelings i n particular (taking guilt broadly to includ e remorse an d mora l shame) becaus e it is also importan t to u s that such changes rest on emotiona l self-reflection. For practica l purposes , i t would presumabl y be enoug h i f we could ge t a mass murdere r t o fee l horro r a t he r past acts , pity fo r th e victims , and othe r alternatives to self-directed discomfort—supposing, fo r instance, tha t w e had some method o f rehabilitation that resulted in her ceasing to identif y wit h her past self. Psychosurgery—or, for that matter, religious conversion—might have that result, but I take it that in moral terms we would not b e satisfied. The discontinuity between the agent's pas t and present selves would seem to undercut any judgment of overall virtue—by substituting two selve s for one, as it were— rather than justifying a judgment of imperfect virtue. To the extent that we care about the moral worth o f persons, we prefer a method of rehabilitating someone that does not essentially involve giving up on her. Other things being equal

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(as of course the y may not be) , we want th e agent to redee m her old lif e rathe r than simpl y to launc h a new one . It may be that wrongs as serious as those now in question have to be said to rule out anythin g worthy o f the name "virtue, " eve n qualified. Guilt may no t be sufficient, tha t is , even in combination wit h good behavior i n the future, fo r a judgment of imperfect virtue that applies to the agent's life as a whole in such cases. However, guilt still seems to be necessary to something we think morally valuable—and something that falls within the scope of virtue ethics to the extent that it involves a judgment of persons and their characters an d lives rather than being adequately handled by claims about what acts ought to be done. The result may be said to be a "graded" notion of virtue, taken as covering diverse notions of personal moral worth, not all of them covered in ordinary language (or standard philosophi c usage ) by the ter m "virtue. " Eve n in a case in which real redemption i s impossible, that is, we still seem to place a value just on facing u p to th e past . We admire someone wh o insist s o n doin g s o at som e cos t t o his own peace of mind—and perhaps eve n to hi s effectiveness a s a moral agent in certain cases. The notion o f a noble character seems to include a kind of heightened sensitivit y to one' s own moral wrongs . W e sometimes thin k o f this as a nobler ideal than mora l purity, for that matter, s o that imperfect comes out as better in a way than perfect virtue. Other terms might be substituted for "virtue " —"moral decency, " fo r instance—where "virtue" o n its ordinary us e does not quite apply. Our idea l o f mora l self-sensitivit y can giv e ris e t o duty/virtu e conflicts— potentially dilemmatic choices between doing the right thing and displaying the requisite emotional reaction—becaus e o f the cripplin g effect s o f guilt in some cases. Ther e ma y eve n be cases in which overall virtue is not achievable , even with qualifications , because o f a conflic t within virtue ethics , whic h o n thi s account wil l be influenced by the contingencies of the agent's record o f moral action to date. Also, of course, our ideal leaves open many questions about the type an d degre e o f wrong fo r whic h guil t is required—whether jus t fo r "in character" violations , say , or rather fo r any major lapses fro m virtuous character o n the part o f the agent . Even with some very rough edges, though, the ideal manages to fill two gap s in standard virtue ethics. First, it yields a "time-bound" vie w of virtue that allows us to ask what is still achievable in a life that may already include some serious and irrevocable deviations from perfect virtue. By contrast, Aristotle's dismissal of shame in virtuous adults underlines the uncompromising quality of his conception o f virtue . The lis t of virtues derived fro m Aristotl e i s not reall y well designed, one might say , to advis e an agen t in medias res —an agen t decidin g what to d o at some particula r poin t i n his life—as oppose d to a n educator o r someone else who is in a position to plan lives from the outset o r to judge them as a whole. By supplying a notion o f imperfect virtue that includes some negative feeling s abou t oneself , we modif y Aristotle' s essentially prideful idea l by building in serious gradations, instead of simply balancing it with an indiscriminate ideal of humility as on some standard religious extensions of the Aristotelian model.

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Second, a s a corollary o f the time-bound view, our idea l of moral self-sen sitivity provides a way o f representing withi n virtue ethics th e stricte r action guiding status of certain ought-statements though t of as commands rathe r tha n simply recommendations . Tha t i s to say , i t let s u s preserve som e normativ e notion o f binding "ought," conceived a s a requirement that th e agent canno t get out of—b y developin g himself in other dimension s of virtue, say, or by compensating withi n the mora l sphere . The idea l accomplishe s thi s withi n virtu e ethics b y insisting on a kin d o f emotiona l reparatio n fo r mor e seriou s viola tions a s a condition of such virtue as is still achievable. From amon g th e many things that a virtuous person woul d no t do , tha t is , it singles out som e a s incompatible even with imperfec t virtue unless the agent pays a certain affectiv e price. By thus allowing for a wrong act's conditional compatibility with a lesser degree o f virtue, it keep s virtu e ethics fro m pushin g the agen t i n suc h a cas e beyond the ethical pale, declaring him incapabl e of any morall y estimable lif e by din t o f hi s futur e behavior . I t ensure s tha t eve n the morall y flawe d agen t will b e subject t o som e persona l norms , i f only norms o f imperfec t virtue, in what he goes on to do . Someone migh t sugges t tha t th e Aristotelia n model ca n secur e thi s result just a s well by appealing act b y act t o th e standar d provide d b y the perfectly virtuous person. That is, what a n imperfectl y virtuous person ough t t o d o on any give n occasion wil l be jus t what th e perfectl y virtuous person would do , even though i t is no longer possibl e to attai n perfect virtue by so acting. How ever, I think we can see that differen t norm s sometimes apply to the imperfectly virtuous. For one thing, consider th e Aristotelean ideal of proper prid e that was just mentioned: If nothing else, Aristotle's own picture of what this requires will have to admit o f gradations h e fails to recognize: some alternatives to the sort of loft y self-regar d he expect s o f th e virtuou s person . Beside s this, there ar e specific "contrary-to-duty " obligations—obligation s t o apologiz e o r to mak e amends, most notably; bu t also other obligations based on changes i n the situation resulting from the agent's deviation s from ideal behavior—that would no t apply to the perfectly virtuous agent. Perhaps Aristotle could accommodate thes e under "rectificator y justice," 7 i f the category were stretched t o cove r state s of mind. M y poin t her e i s just tha t guil t a s a requiremen t o f imperfec t virtu e amounts t o a compensatory stat e o f feelin g tha t doe s no t fi t the Aristotelia n model without some stretching .

Guilt and Perfect Virtue I now want to switch t o a different sor t of case, i n which guilt seems to b e required by perfect virtue. This is a case of moral dilemma, where the agent's recor d of mora l actio n i s necessarily imperfect, since the circumstances leav e him n o choice but to do something wrong , eve n though he is not to blam e for the circumstances an d doe s th e bes t h e can t o resolv e the dilemma . Le t u s fo r th e moment ignore the various questions raised by insisting particularly on guilt in such cases and not e tha t ou r intuitiv e treatment of them doe s seem to requir e some mora l emotio n o f th e sort . A nice cas e fo r discussio n i s provided b y a

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passage fro m Bertran d Russell' s autobiograph y cite d b y Marcia Baro n i n a n argument for the inadequacy of Williams's "agent-regret." 8 Russell limits himself i n the passage to an expression o f sorrow—no guil t or other emotio n con cerning the moral quality of his act—for a time when his activities as a pacifist during World War I required him to jil t an American woman h e had promise d to live with i f she persuaded he r father to brin g her to England . The case a s it stands ma y seem t o b e what Williams calls a case o f "moral cost"—of wrongin g someon e bu t withou t doin g somethin g wron g unde r th e circumstances—though Russell' s description o f it provides enough ra w mate rial fo r a full-scal e dilemma . Even , without modificatio n i t allow s u s t o rais e some importan t question s abou t jus t ho w muc h our idea l of moral sensitivity might require. Russell writes: When sh e arrived I could think of nothing but the war, and as I had determined to come ou t publicl y against it , I did no t wis h to complicate m y position wit h a privat e scandal , whic h woul d hav e mad e anythin g that I migh t sa y o f n o account. I felt i t therefor e impossible to carr y ou t wha t w e ha d planned . She stayed in England and I had relation s with her from tim e to time, but the shock of th e wa r kille d my passio n fo r her , an d I broke he r heart . Ultimately she fel l victim t o a rar e disease, whic h firs t paralyze d her, an d the n mad e her insane . . . . Before insanity attacked her , sh e had a rar e an d remarkabl e mind an d a disposition a s lovable as it was unusual. If the war had not intervened , the plan which we formed in Chicago migh t have brought great happiness to us both. I feel stil l the sorrow o f this tragedy. 9

The case is conceived as one of clear moral choice: Russell's obligation to work effectively agains t the war is presumably strong enough to make it right to brea k a privat e promise. Bu t even assuming that the promis e itsel f wa s blameless — along with Russell's later behavior toward th e promisee—the promisee stil l has a righ t to fee l aggrieved . The cas e a t leas t resembles a dilemm a to th e exten t that it involves an unmet claim: The wrong done to the woman i s from her standpoint not reall y canceled out b y the importance of Russell's antiwar activities . We may grant that the latter ar e important enoug h to mak e the promise relatively trivial and Russell' s act permissible, however. As Baron points out , Russell' s reaction stil l seems disturbingly impersonal. It is not quit e a cold reaction; rather, I would say (modifying Baron), it is warm in a suspiciously sentimentalized way. Wha t sound s lik e some sor t o f hereditary mental illness is inserted into the tal e as if it resulted from a broken heart . Such regre t a s Russel l attributes to himsel f doe s no t see m to b e agent-regret, since it is not directed toward his action. He says he feels the sorrow of the tragedy that befel l th e woman, but presumabl y he has i n mind the tragedy of her overall lif e rathe r tha n particularl y hi s own contributio n t o it , which di d no t itself result in tragedy. Williams would surely accept Baron's claim that our ideal of overall personal virtu e requires more than this . Does it require guilt, at least in a broad sense—of discomfort at responsibil ity (leaving it open what sort of responsibility) for a wrong? As the case stands , we might want to say that Russell really ought to feel a twinge of guilt or remorse, perhaps just as a stage on his way to overall sorrow, while thinking of the woman

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and hi s behavior toward he r as vividly as he is now doin g i n writing his autobiography. But he is under no obligation on other occasions t o dredge up those thoughts i n the first place—or to consider the situation from the woman's stand point. Love may require this, but that is another story, irrelevant to the present question, unles s we suppose tha t i t obligates th e agen t t o remai n i n a state of love. Fro m a n all-things-considere d moral standpoint , i t seems, the woman's claim on Russell was relatively unimportant, an d his behavior toward her was justified. A t an y rate , le t u s grant thi s poin t fo r purpose s o f argumen t alon g with others that might be questioned in Russell's own understanding of the case, since our questio n i s what emotio n i s called for b y the cas e a s Russell understood it. The case could amount to a full-blown dilemma , as I understand the term, only i f by jilting th e woma n Russel l had don e somethin g harmfu l enoug h t o count as wrong even all-things-considered. A different sor t of case in which she had alread y disrupted her life seriously in light of the promise (ruined her reputation b y living with him , say) might yield a pacifist paralle l to Sartre' s case . Another, more fanciful possibilit y is suggested by the link Russell may be imagining between his act and the woman's late r illness. If heartbreak or something similar ha d reall y helped caus e th e degre e o f har m tha t late r befel l her — particularly supposing that the link could have been foreseen—we might indeed hold tha t an adequately sensitive moral reaction on the part of the agent in the case would hav e to includ e some element of guilt. This is not to say, of course, that the reaction has to last forever. Let us get away from the question of what Russell should be feeling many years later while writing his autobiography an d just note that we do now seem to have a case in which eve n perfect virtue requires feelings o f guilt , as agains t wha t Aristotl e suggests about shame when he limits it to children. Either that or our notion of virtue has to be modified—made "extensional, " a s it were—to take in the moral quality of an agent's life , the record o f what h e does in life, along with his personal qualities of character. I f Russell in this hypothetical case had been able to pursue his antiwar activities only by doing serious wrong—but on the assumption tha t thi s was the best choic e available to hi m under th e circumstances— such wrong a s he had t o do would not hav e been chargeable to flaw s o f character. Indeed, one might say, it sometimes takes strengt h o f character i n such cases not to be inhibited from action by moral squeamishness. At the same time, it seems that a truly noble character would lead the agent to reflect on his past act at som e time or othe r an d underg o some variant of guilt. Thus modified, Russell's case (as I shall still call its modified version) brings out a number of important points and questions about ou r idea l of moral sen sitivity. As we just saw, i t suggests that w e need an extensiona l reading of the notion of virtue—as the agent's recor d o f moral merit , let us say—in order t o accommodate ou r expectation s o f an agent i n a dilemma. Or better , perhaps : There are two possibilities to be distinguished here, one of them in conflict with the clai m that perfec t virtu e in such dilemmatic cases requires guilt—though both o f the m i n differen t way s migh t see m t o constitut e departure s fro m Aristotle's assumptions. On the one hand, we might think of merit as a distinct

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notion from virtue proper—the alternative I have proposed. A judgment of merit might be said to involv e an assessment of the agent's lif e story, or his life story insofar a s it is active, in contrast t o both hi s character and th e record o f things that happen to him. For we seem to need two notions of personal excellence to capture what w e want t o sa y about Russell's case—namely, that virtu e in its standard sense , or noble character, requires guilt on Russell's part in response to a blot on hi s record o f action a s measured by our nonstandar d alternative notion o f virtue as moral merit. On the other hand, if we think of merit as replacing the standard notion of virtue, we apparently have to drop the claim that perfect virtue requires guilt— welcome news, perhaps, to those who find the claim odd in its mixture of notions of virtue and duty . Merit, it might be said, is simply virtue conceived as subject to mora l luck , including a furthe r sor t o f luck besides that recognize d on th e standard conceptio n o f virtue , which does no t allo w fo r dilemmas. 10 Perfec t merit simply is not ope n to a n agent in the unluck y circumstances of Russell's case, where through no fault of his own he has to do something wrong. I f merit amounts to virtue, this just means that, in describing such dilemmatic cases, we need to retreat to the claims made earlier about gradations of imperfect virtue. In the end, though, I think that an appreciation o f the emotional requirements of Russell' s case wil l tel l i n favo r o f retainin g a conceptio n o f virtu e as itsel f untouched b y dilemmatic luck and i n more general terms will shed some light on the appropriate connectio n between virtue ethics and th e modern ethics of duty. Up to this point m y argument on guilt and virtue has essentially bypassed duty ethics by treating the requirement to fee l guilty as ideal rather than prac tical. The contraste d term s correspon d t o tw o alternativ e readings of ought statements: o n the one hand, ranking something highest, or commending it to choice, an d o n the other hand , commanding an agen t t o choos e i t or brin g it about. A n idea l ough t evaluate s but doe s no t prescrib e it s object , i n othe r words—except o n conditio n tha t th e agen t want s t o fulfil l th e ideal . S o in application t o Russell' s case it tells us only what h e would fee l i f he were perfectly virtuous , not wha t feeling s (i f any) are required of him simpliciter. On e might want t o sa y that fro m a general moral standpoint—a s oppose d t o on e required by love, say, or some similar ideal that calls for imaginative participation i n the standpoin t o f the woman wit h who m h e was involved—guil t feelings on Russell's part would be supererogatory. Self-subjectio n t o them constitutes a condition of special merit or virtue, beyond what duty commands. M y own view, to b e defended in section 3, is that in typical cases of dilemma guilt feelings are indeed obligatory and that a reading of "ought" that prescribes them is part of what keep s dilemmas from underminin g action-guiding ethics. My ful l argumen t for this last point wil l depend o n th e general account of guilt I go on to give in this chapter and the next. In response t o those (perhaps Russell himself) who would argue that guilt is irrational or unnecessary for an act of perfect virtue , it is possible to appeal beyond intuitions on specific cases to a general view of the functio n o f the emotion. Morally speaking , emotions like guilt have a special role to play in an approach t o ethic s that gives serious

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attention t o persona l standpoint s i n th e wa y recommende d b y many of th e current proponents o f virtue ethics.11 In Russell's case, guilt serves essentially to register the standpoint o f the woman h e had to jilt—her justified resentment of his action—alongside the overarching moral standpoint tha t determined his decision. In the end, then, what counts in favor of guilt in a case like Russell's will be its fit with an intelligible overall account of morality and emotion. Fo r purposes of my more limited argument in this section, however, let me end with an attempt to defend my treatment of Russell's case by detaching the claim I mean to make about i t from various more questionable claims that migh t b e thought to follow. The claim that Russell ought to fee l guilt y for having jilted the woman in the case does not mean , firs t o f all, that a reasonable person woul d encourage Russell to fee l guilty. Even from a moral standpoin t (an d there are others), we may recogniz e overriding reasons t o forg o that ofte n debilitatin g emotion; a s mentioned earlier with reference to other cases, feeling guilty might undermine an effective decisio n to avoid the other horn of the dilemma by keeping Russell from concentratin g on his antiwar activities . Feeling guilty later migh t not b e an option , moreover . Fo r one thing, guilt might conceivably just be crowde d out b y other appropriat e feeling s onc e th e woman' s horribl e fat e ha s over shadowed an y immediate harm done b y jilting her. 12 Secondly, a deepe r poin t t o not e i s that Russell' s cas e seem s t o involv e a basic asymmetry between guilt and other-directed emotional blame as responses to a less than perfect moral record. When we say that Russell ought to feel guilty (or ought at some earlier point to have felt guilty) about jiltin g the woman, we do not mean to recommend blame or personal anger toward someon e who acted as he did, however understandable it may be on the part of the woman. Under the circumstances (on our assumptions abou t th e case), his action towar d th e woman was morally required, and h e was not a t fault fo r the fact that i t was . In requiring that he also feel guilt y about hi s action w e would not b e assessing him negativel y for i t in emotional term s bu t rathe r insistin g that h e so assess himself. Nor would his self-assessment commit him to a similar emotional assessment o f others i n his position. H e woul d b e committed onl y t o holdin g that they too ough t to fee l guilt y for act s o f the sort—no t t o a view of them as in fact guilty and henc e appropriate objects of third-person blame . To the extent that a feeling o f guilt on Russell's part involves a past practical ought , then— directed toward the act that he holds himself responsible for omitting—we might seem to b e recommending that i t be limited to his own cas e i n a way that th e logic of duty ethics is thought to rule out. Even from the standpoin t o f virtue ethics considered i n isolation, th e case serves to highligh t the self-directednes s or reflexivity of the conten t o f a firstperson ideal ought requiring guilt. The expression "hold s himself responsible " just applied to Russell is significant because it brings out the fact that what we are demanding of him is the impositio n of some sort of moral burde n on himself. This does not imply that we (or he) would have a right to impose that same burden o n others—t o hold them responsible directly, that is , as distinct from expecting them to take that stance toward themselves. It is important, too, tha t

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we do not thin k of those who satisf y th e ideal of perfect virtu e just as persons of whom w e expec t something . Ou r notio n o f perfec t virtu e is specificall y a notion of emotional or other burden s self-imposed. We need to retain a distinct notion of virtue, then, as unaffected b y dilemma in order t o capture within virtue ethics our sens e that the agen t i n a dilemma acts blamelessly. Aristotle's notio n o f virtue is picked out b y its connection t o praise and blame . What m y discussion here indicates is that du e attentio n t o the special features of guilt as the first-person counterpart of blame introduces a further notion of virtue—an extensional notion subject to moral luck and hence more tightly tied to happiness than virtue in Aristotle's sense seems to be. More fundamentally, the guilt/blame contrast in Russell's case seems to rest on two asymmetries with important bearin g on questions of moral motivation. It depends not onl y on the fac t tha t one of the two emotion s contrasted i s selfdirected but also on the fact that both emotions are negative—bad states of feeling, that is, directed toward states of affairs evaluated as bad. The contrast would apparently b e reversed if the tw o coul d b e seen a s emotiona l reward s rathe r than essentiall y punishments, give n th e sam e sort o f differenc e i n reflexivity . Consider how we would react to a positive self-directed feeling in Russell's case: pride, say, at having been able to resis t romantic temptation in the interest s of the antiwar cause. Even if a parallel feeling of admiration for Russell would be justified o n our part, we would n o doubt thin k less of him for reflectin g posi tively on the same facts. An emotional reactio n t o th e case, i n short, involves taking a kind of position o n the agent's moral record whose own moral assessment depend s no t jus t on accurac y bu t als o o n wha t i t doe s fo r th e agent— whether it inflates o r diminishe s him—and on whether the agen t o r someon e else undergoes it. In the end, then, the importance of guilt to virtue depends on the fac t tha t i t is itself somethin g bad .

Two Asymmetries Let us at this point paus e to conside r i n their own righ t the two asymmetrie s that see m to cu t of f guilt fro m eithe r prid e or blam e in Russell' s case. Thei r general importance , I want t o say , lie s in their lin k t o th e tw o side s o f emo tional justification: the "backward-looking " assessmen t of emotions as appropriate or inappropriate to the surrounding situation and their "forward-looking " instrumental assessment i n relation to action. 13 Wha t I shall call the "qualita tive" asymmetr y (positive versus negative, as illustrated by pride versus guilt) bears on our treatment of guilt as a reason for action and hence on its forwardlooking justification, as I shall indicate. On the other hand, what I shall call the "directional" asymmetry (self- versus other-directed, as illustrated by guilt versus blame) bear s more immediately on the noninstrumental reasons we expect t o find fo r guilt, or it s backward-looking justification. I shall begin with th e qualitativ e asymmetry, since its explanation i n general terms seems to focu s o n norms o f individual rationality in contrast t o th e social norms that underli e the directional asymmetry. However, applying it to the rational assessment of emotions wil l b e a complex matter that als o brings

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in socia l norms ; an d th e mor e tellin g contrast fo r presen t purpose s wil l tur n out to b e not rationa l bu t moral. Th e effec t o f the two asymmetrie s i n combination—to make a long story short—will b e a tendency to justify guilt on rathe r slim grounds in contrast to either pride or blame. But its explanation will make reference to the moral role of emotions insofa r as it involves assessing them a s rewards or punishments. Consider firs t th e motivational significanc e of the qualitative asymmetry— in the present case, the greater forc e for action of a negative emotion lik e guilt than a corresponding positiv e emotio n suc h as pride. Intuitivel y it seems tha t pursuing and attaining some positive goal is optional i n a way that the drive to escape something negative is not: Th e latte r serves not jus t as a goal o f actio n but also as a goad to it. However, w e should note that this way of putting thing s blurs over a certain ambiguity in the classification of emotional state s a s posi tive or negative . I t assumes that th e relevan t classification is affective—dividing good fro m ba d feelings—so i t may no t fi t certain emotions whose qualit y as feelings seem s to clash wit h the evaluativ e points the y make. Love is commonly thought o f as positive, for instance, becaus e it says something positive about it s object, not becaus e it necessarily feels good. However , my assumption i s that a n emotio n lik e love can be analyzed into several pair s of affective an d evaluative components i n a way that yields a qualitative match for eac h pair. 14 A n apparently positive emotion ma y thus turn out to b e negative because it depends on desire, with desire taken a s involving discomfort a t a negative evaluation of the current situation—of distance fro m th e object, i n the case of love—but as yielding comfort whe n satisfied , so that th e emotio n may sometimes still be pleasurable overall . The two levels of qualitative assessment, affectiv e and evaluative, will match up readily enough for guilt and pride. However, distinguishin g them brings out another possible source of confusion in understanding what I want to say about the qualitative asymmetry. That is , insofar as its motivational significance rests on the contrast betwee n positiv e and negativ e affect, th e qualitative asymmetry might seem to presuppose th e directional asymmetry rather than operatin g independently: The greater force for action of a bad feeling depends on its being bad for the agent. However , fo r "self-directedness, " in the sense at issue in the directional asymmetry, the emotion i n question also has to be about the agent— to evaluate him positively or negatively in the way exhibited by guilt and pride . The qualitativ e assessment o f emotions i s necessarily self-involved, one migh t say, but whether a feeling is self-directed is a distinct question that depends o n its evaluative content, no t jus t its element of affect, o r "feeling " in the narro w sense. Considered i n isolation , then , th e qualitativ e asymmetry amount s t o a n imbalance i n motivationa l forc e betwee n positive an d negativ e feelin g state s whose quality is assumed to coincide with their value for the agent. Th e asymmetry concerns rational motivatio n to the extent that it is attributable to a difference i n the forc e o f positiv e an d negativ e affective reason s for action . I t i s often take n for granted , as I noted i n chapter 3 , tha t a reaso n (o r a goo d o r sufficient "all-things-considered " reason) for action amounts to a consideration

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in ligh t o f which i t would b e irrational no t t o act . Bu t the assumptio n seem s really to hol d only for negative affective (instrumental ) reasons i n my sense— the sens e tha t implie s affective badness—a t leas t from th e standpoin t o f basic or minimal (as opposed to perfect or ideal) rationality. It seems to be quite compatible with basi c rationality to ignore th e corresponding sor t of positive rea son for action: a positive feeling state seen as requiring action fo r its perpetuation o r attainment . Thus, fo r instance, to say that prid e offer s m e a reason fo r moral behavio r might just be meant as a claim that I can attain or sustain a certain particularly good stat e o f emotiona l self-assessmen t only (o r mos t effectively ) b y mora l behavior. We need not suppose , tha t is , that i n the absence of moral behavio r I would fee l particularly bad. If not, though , m y reason fo r action nee d not b e viewed a s one I would b e irrational to ignore—o r no t unles s we supplemen t our intuitiv e conception o f basic rationality wit h something more demanding , most notably one that insist s on maximizing the good. If rational intelligibilit y is in question, that is , turning down somethin g good require s no instrumental justification—it i s enough to say "I don't need this"—whereas puttin g up with something bad makes sense only on the assumption tha t th e costs of changing it would b e too hig h or that it is likely to improv e things overall. Again, these points ar e meant to b e limited to things perceived as good o r bad for the agent, in particular the agent's affectiv e states . However , the qualitative asymmetr y will extend t o nonaffectiv e reasons tha t refe r t o a n agent' s interests b y way o f futur e feelin g states . A n agent' s recognitio n tha t mora l behavior i s a presuppositio n o f his futur e moral good , or virtue , may indeed provide hi m wit h a rationa l goa d towar d action , dependin g on ho w h e feel s about a lapse fro m virtue and o n ho w h e thinks he would fee l i f he exhibited one, assumin g a rational requirement to take into account futur e feelings. Alternatively, an agent may simply choose t o act to achieve a positive goal of mora l virtue ; but h e will not b e rationally compelled t o d o so , even on the assumption that he has such a goal and that i t does demand action o n his part. At most, rationality will require that h e either act on the goal or abandon it. 15 By contrast, a goad towar d actio n o f the sor t tha t negativ e affect provides — perhaps jus t as part o f the desire to achiev e some goa l or o f the state i n which one envisions it or of some later state one envisions if one does not achiev e it— is not subjec t to the agent's will in quite the same way. One cannot simpl y get rid of a goad, as opposed t o a purely positive end or goal, by focusing on something else; so rationality requires attention t o i t in practical terms as well—if only t o indirec t means o f getting rid o f it—eve n when i t stand s a t som e dis tance i n the future . B y contrast, th e natura l urg e to sustai n a present stat e of positive feeling—assumin g n o negativ e element suc h as that introduce d b y a threat o f loss or withdrawal—seems to be optional fro m the standpoint o f basic rationality. In short : Goal s ar e optional ; goads compel . W e ma y stil l sa y that a goa l provides "sufficient" reaso n for action in the sense explained earlier—meaning that no further reason would be needed to justify actio n on it, but not that action must occur in light of it, even assuming all-things-considered status and practi-

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cal rationality. Th e qualitative asymmetry emphasizes th e bad ove r the good, then, as providing the kind of "compulsive" motivatio n tha t undermine s free dom b y making it difficult t o d o otherwise. 16 W e recognize it , in effect, whe n we focus on internal sanctions a s motivational props of the moral code . The significance of the qualitative asymmetry in relation to dilemmas begins to emerg e when we consider ho w th e instrumental role o f guilt as a source of moral motivation might also affect ou r assessment o f the warrant fo r the emotion. We seem to adjust the standards of backward-looking justification to reflect forward-looking considerations: An emotional response ma y be encouraged for its general social (o r other practical ) adaptiveness, essentiall y b y relaxing the evidential demands we would make on a corresponding judgment. 17 In the case drawn fro m Russell' s autobiography, i f guilt as opposed t o prid e i s generally useful as a moral motive, that might explain why we expect Russel l to feel guilty about a wrong essentially forced on him by the moral demands of the case rather than proud o f himself for satisfying thos e demands . However, th e pride/guilt contrast doe s not work out quit e so neatly. First, it seems to be only in moral terms that we rule out pride on Russell's part. If we distinguish rationa l from moral o r socia l appropriateness , prid e seem s a per fectly appropriate reactio n to the case, providing it has the right sort of object. Pride at having jilted the woman would not be appropriate, jus t because its object is not itsel f praiseworthy, bu t pride at havin g resisted romanti c temptatio n i n favor o f duty (o r something similar) might be sufficiently justifie d b y the evidence. We do not tighten th e standards o f evidence, at any rate beyon d a certain point, fo r an emotion tha t i s not to b e encouraged o n grounds of general adaptiveness. Accordin g to the rather generous "perspectival" account o f appropriateness tha t I defend wit h referenc e to guil t in chapter 5 , sufficient evidence for a judgment of guilt according to the usua l standards o f warrant fo r belief will always be enough to warrant the corresponding emotion . S o assuming tha t Russell' s antiwar activitie s were importan t enoug h t o mak e hi s act praiseworthy—as i t might b e even on a dilemmatic construction o f the case , where i t also counts a s all-things-considered wrong—pride wil l be rationally even if not morall y appropriate . Second, however, questions about any simple denial of motivational forc e to pride seem to me to shift attentio n to the directional asymmetry as the main source of our weake r evidential standard fo r guilt. We may begi n by granting that pride does no t motivate action in quite the same "compulsive " sens e as a negative emotion lik e guilt. But this assumes that the form of pride in question contains no element of psychological need of the sort that can sometimes make positive emotions har d t o suppress . Fo r instance, such pride a s Russell might feel for his resistance to romantic temptatio n i n favor of duty must be thought of as a "quiet" variant of the emotion tha t would no t make him at all likely to boast about his deed or about his impersonal cast of mind or the like. But spelling ou t thi s assumptio n suggests tha t th e reaso n prid e i s not encourage d in Russell's case i s not necessaril y because it lacks motivational force bu t rathe r at leas t partly becaus e whatever force it ha s woul d ten d t o mak e i t socially maladaptive.

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On the other hand, "quiet" pride may seem to be adaptive to the extent that it lends a kind of passive reinforcement to an urge toward action—in this case, an urge toward mora l action. The contrast with guilt turns out to be undercut, that is, by a different wa y in which pride can have practical consequences—not precisely by "motivating" action , i f that means providing a reason tha t makes the agen t act , bu t rathe r b y putting the agen t into a stat e o f mind tha t facili tates action. I t i s useful fo r it s mood-lifting and othe r energizin g effects a s a n enabling factor in the backgroun d of action even if not a cause of action in any stronger sense. Even without the admixture of negative feelings, then, pride will have a rol e to pla y in moral (an d other rational ) motivation distinc t fro m its role as an end of action or positive goal. So the qualitative asymmetry need not make pride less practically useful tha n guilt, despite its less compelling force as a practical reason. In any case, we also relax the standards of evidence for guilt on the basis of certain noninstrumental considerations—of how one has a right to trea t one self versus others—that my later perspectival account will allow for, along with considerations of general adaptiveness. Let us therefore now brin g in the directional asymmetry , initially by comparing prid e on Russell' s part wit h a posi tive reaction to hi m on the part of someone else. Even in moral term s it would presumably be open to u s as readers of Russell's autobiography t o admire him for doin g what h e had to d o in the service of the antiwar cause . On e wants t o say that w e have a right, in a way that Russel l himself does not, t o ignor e the harm his act involves for others and react positively to hi m as its agent just on the basis of other features of it that in this case are assumed to b e more impor tant. I n making this comparative judgment , we rely on th e directiona l asymmetry, essentially by demanding that a self-directed emotion be more responsive to significan t subsets o f th e availabl e evidence than i s expected o f it s other directed counterpart . By contrast, w e d o no t hav e the righ t to reac t negativel y to anothe r per son—to condem n someone , emotionall y speaking—on the basi s o f a limited subset of the evidenc e bearing on his act, however significant evidence of that sort may b e i n general terms. S o blame for Russell—th e other-directed coun terpart of the guilt we expect of him—apparently is ruled out. Indeed , it seems to b e rule d ou t rationall y a s wel l a s morall y in backward-lookin g terms — unlike pride, which , as noted jus t above , seems to b e ruled out onl y morally. Rather than being insufficiently warrante d by the overall facts of the case, pride apparently rests on shiftin g attention awa y from a partial subset of them—the facts abou t th e har m Russell' s act does—to whic h a virtuous agent woul d be sensitive, even where something else is morally more important. The proble m with blame , understood a s other-directed persona l anger , is not that it plays a lesser role than guilt in moral motivation. At least insofar as it is negative, it plays a roughl y commensurate rol e a s a motiv e fo r actin g t o change one's interpersonal environment. To the extent that i t involves a negative evaluatio n of someon e else, though, there are als o noninstrumenta l reasons that count agains t relaxing the standard s of backward-looking justification as with guilt. From the standpoint of minimal charity it would be too much

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to expec t other s t o liv e u p t o th e highe r standard s o f behavio r that on e may justifiably impos e o n oneself—an d that th e virtuou s person o n th e vie w suggested her e must impose o n himself. In short, the view holds that the demands of perfect virtue include a kind of moral fastidiousness: painstaking attention t o morall y significant detail. Subjecting oneself to negativ e emotion a s a way o f focusing attention o n a corre sponding evaluative proposition serve s to meet these demands in circumstances that do not allow for action. I n defense of dilemmatic guilt, then, reacting with discomfort eve n to partial evidence of responsibility for a wrong may be taken as showing special concern fo r its victim at the cost o f some emotional harm to oneself. But moral fastidiousness as a requirement of perfect virtue would seem to yield just the opposite resul t for blame insofar as it is other-directed and henc e involves subjecting someone els e to a negative evaluation. Indeed, I take it that emotional blame is ruled out b y our normal expectation of charity toward oth ers, no t just by the more exactin g demands o f virtue, at any rate for those no t in the position o f victim. On th e socia l vie w of ethic s an d emotio n defende d here, th e qualit y an d direction of these and simila r emotions give s them a significance a s rewards o r punishments for action tha t ca n b e used t o provid e motivationa l backin g fo r the moral code. Guil t and blam e bot h com e ou t a s "punishing " t o th e exten t that the y direc t negativ e attentio n towar d thei r objects , wherea s prid e an d admiration coun t a s emotiona l rewards . I t i s th e fac t tha t prid e i s a self administered reward, then, that would see m to make us morally wary of it in a case like Russell's, even granting i t sufficient backin g to coun t a s rational. A t the ver y least, a self-administered reward i s unseemly under circumstances in which one' s goo d dee d depend s o n doin g serious wrong, eve n apart from th e instrumental danger of encouraging future indifference t o the harms one's actions cause. So we have a kind of reverse parallel of my treatment o f guilt as a morally encouraged self-subjection to punishment for harm caused, bu t with com plications introduced by our differentia l treatmen t o f evidence for and agains t rational appropriateness . I have more to say in chapter 5 about the guilt/blame asymmetry in strictly rational terms, but at this point w e can already see how the notion o f guilt as a self-imposed emotional burden gives it a special moral role to play in cases like the one drawn from Russell' s autobiography. I t captures our ideal of the noble character a s requiring more o f itself , i n short. But it combines this element of moral self-sufficienc y wit h a sens e o f connectio n t o others , o f sharin g i n th e harms one does to them, t o the extent tha t it involves emotional identification with the victim of wrong. It is this that seem s to be missing from Russell's sor row a t the unfortunate demise of the woman h e jilted. I now want t o go on t o argue, however, that something more like guilt in the narrow sens e is best suited to supply this lack. I shall leave off further discussio n of Russell's case until I have set forth my account o f guilt . I n advanc e of th e account , I would expec t som e reader s t o recoil at th e suggestion that guil t best fits the case . I indicate a number of reasons for this in my next section, but on e rather obvious reason I want to dispel

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at th e outse t ha s to d o wit h th e sexua l overtone s o f guilt in popular culture . This may suggest to some readers that guilt is to be imposed on Russell for sexual misconduct, bu t nothin g of the sort is intended. At any rate, shame, the main competitor to guilt among after-the-fact mora l emotions, would seem to be in even a worse position in that respect—and also to be ruled out by our assumption that Russell acted honorably in the case. He would also have acted nobly , my claim is, if he had allowe d himself a twinge of guilt. Remorse might seem initially to b e less objectionable than eithe r shame or guilt, but one of my central aims in what follows is to undermin e the view of these emotions as necessarily distinct.

2. Guil t as an Identificator y Mechanism On a standard philosopher' s picture , emotiona l guilt i s contrasted wit h alter native reactions such as shame and remors e on the basis of the way its evaluative content brings in the self and connects the self to its acts and to other agents. On Rawls' s account, guil t is said to b e directed in the first instanc e toward a n act viewed as wrong rather than some bad trait of the sel f a s with shame. 18 It s content i s seen as essentially moral i n a way tha t i s not tru e of shame, which may sometimes rest on nonmoral traits, including one's relation to the traits or acts of other agents. However, for purposes of setting up a neat contrast i n this discussion, I shall restrict myself t o a subtype of shame with the same sorts of grounds a s guilt—what might be called "moral shame. " Thu s limited , shame seems to focus more closely on the self than does guilt insofar a s the self rathe r than a n ac t i s its primary object of negative evaluation. Like moral shame but apparently unlike remorse, though, guilt does represent th e sel f a s somehow affecte d (tainted , stained, tarnished, or th e like ) b y the wrong act attributed to it. As a practical motive—via the desire for reparation that seems to separate guilt and remorse from shame—guilt may therefore seem to be self-regarding in a way that remorse is not.19 Perhaps partly because of this contrast, guilt-motivation is sometimes taken to fal l on the egoistic side of the current debat e about egoisti c versus altruistic sources of moral motiva tion.20 The usual emotional alternative considered in the debate is love, whose object is another person viewed positively; but eve n among negative contraryto-duty emotions there may seem to b e more altruistic possibilities. Indeed, the point may be applied even to guilt versus shame, though in one sense (as just noted) shame seems to involve a closer focus on the self than either remorse o r guilt . A common contras t betwee n guil t and sham e links guilt t o approaches t o ethics based o n a notion of individual responsibility for action, or autonomy. Sham e is tied more closely to th e ethic s of virtue—not particularly to the good opinion of others, as was maintained in earlier versions of the contrast but rather to something more like status in a moral community. 21 Bot h emotions res t o n th e internalizatio n of others' reactions , but sham e seems t o involve a thought of being viewed by others with scorn, whereas guilt involves accusatory anger.22 However, the two emotions are necessarily mixed together

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as a result of overlaps in childhood teaching: Guilt is often inculcated b y a form of group rejection , for instance, to the extent tha t disapproval involve s at leas t a qualifie d withdrawa l o f love. For tha t matter , an y neat egoism/altruis m contras t i s further undermine d by some othe r importan t way s in which guilt may seem to be tied more closel y to regard fo r others than shame is. Its characteristic desir e for reparation ma y be said to move the agent toward other s insofa r as it prompts hi m to make up for an y har m don e them , i n contrast t o th e desir e to hid e from other s tha t i s linked with shame. In fact, the connection t o egoism/altruism just described may seem to b e reversed by Rawls's accoun t o f guilt versus shame i n terms o f th e agent's concern fo r the welfare of others as opposed to his own stat e of mora l perfection.23 Thoug h Rawl s sees shame as a higher mora l motive than guil t to the extent that it prompts act s of supererogation, guil t comes out on his account as a more directl y altruistic motive: an emotion buil t on concern fo r others . Rawls's vie w seems to accor d wit h recen t researc h i n developmental psy chology linkin g guilt with empathetic distress.24 I n what follow s I want essen tially to sugges t a reconception o f the natur e o f guilt that incorporate s a version o f this approach, but broadene d t o cove r recalcitran t cases i n light of an older traditio n o f understanding guilt in terms o f anger. A version o f the latte r that bring s in a form of empathy can be found in Jonathan Edwards' s accoun t of "natural conscience." 25 Th e view I derive from Edwards's accoun t essentially interprets guil t not as a distinct emotion o n a par with shame, remorse, an d the like but a s a particular emotiona l mechanism , o r a pattern o f emotional reac tion, making use of these more basic reactions among others. I take this to allow for overlap s betwee n guil t and sham e o f a sor t tha t wil l bea r o n th e disput e among anthropologist s an d others abou t th e differenc e betwee n culture s that rely on guilt versus shame as instruments of moral control. 26 My more general aim in this section, though , is to tie guilt to the self in a way that explains bot h its special force and its peculiar pitfalls as a motive for action on behalf of others .

Guilt and Empathy The current tren d among psychologists attemptin g t o understand guil t in individual development bases the emotion o n empathy, usuall y conceived a s identification with others' sufferings, o r empathetic sorrow or distress.27 W e might be tempted t o se e this work a s providing empirical confirmation fo r the con nection Rawl s sets up between guilt and concer n fo r others, bu t i n fact i t rest s on similar definitional assumptions that deserve some scrutiny. Since "guilt" is essentially a made-up emotion ter m in the firs t place , arising in English originally by mistake, it would seem to be fair game for artificial line-drawing , even more tha n the othe r element s in our disorderl y stoc k o f emotion terms. 28 Bu t we d o a t thi s poin t hav e some fir m intuition s about it s use that ough t t o b e respected. I n particular, a wider notion of empathy seems to be needed to cover the cases of guilt for simple rule infraction withou t envisione d harm to other s that w e ofte n tak e as prime examples of the emotion . One migh t feel a t leas t somewhat guilty, for instance , about various viola-

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tions of the duty of fidelity—from flatterin g someone to revealing a confidence to misrepresenting one's political opinions for the sake of social harmony—that do no damage to anyone affected b y them and in some cases even are performed just in order to benefi t those affected . The sort o f reference to general harm— to the usual effects o f such behavior—that we might be tempted t o make her e would apparently limit the emotion to agents who accept a utilitarian justification fo r th e rule s they feel guilt y about violating . But surely it i s at leas t con ceivable that someone might undergo the emotion without theoretica l commit ment on the subject, and also for acts that seem to do no harm to others even in general terms suc h as violations o f certain rules of religiou s obedience. O n a definition that builds in reference to harm, guilt about victimless sexual behavior, say , would requir e either attributing to the agent a mistake about th e consequences o f his act or extendin g "harm" to cover cases of offense, conceive d as involving distress about the rule violation per se. In any case, there is still a question whether empathetic distres s is sufficien t to captur e th e evaluativ e content o f guilt—what the emotio n say s abou t it s object—where the act in question is reasonably seen as harming others. Some thing else seems to be needed, that is, to distinguish feeling guilty from just feeling sorry fo r th e perso n on e ha s harmed , o r eve n sorrowful o r distresse d o n hi s behalf, perhaps t o a degree that i s heightened by the recognitio n o f one's own causal role but without any element of emotional self-reproach. Consider wha t one might feel, say, about the other side's casualties in a war. Adding in a mere belief tha t on e i s responsible or eve n blameworthy migh t o r migh t no t affec t the conten t o f one's emotion, turning sorrow int o guilt . Even with a shif t o f emotional focu s t o th e agent' s actio n (a s with Williams' s notio n o f "agent regret") we might just have a kind of self-directed sorrow or some othe r emo tion such as anguish that intuitivel y seems to fal l shor t of full-fledge d guilt . If we add i n a further emotion , though—self-ange r or som e othe r negative self-directed emotion—i t might seem unclear why we shoul d no t tak e thi s a s the cor e elemen t of guilt, detachable from empath y an d sufficien t fo r guil t in its own right in the cases of simple or victimless rule violation just cited. Empathy could still be seen as playing a critical role in the development of guilt because it serves to exten d the emotio n beyon d suc h cases, even if we d o no t mak e it out as part of the very concept o f guilt, let alone the essential part, or as necessarily present i n the earliest cases in childhood emotiona l experience . However, I think that the notion o f guilt as based on self-anger may in fact allow fo r a broade r accoun t o f th e emotio n i n term s o f empathy . Conside r Jonathan Edwards's use of the elements of empathetic anger along with a notion of emotional consistenc y to mak e sense of conscience: [W]hen a man' s conscienc e disapprove s of hi s treatmen t o f hi s neighbour , i n the firs t place he is conscious, that if he were in his neighbour's stead, he should resent such treatment from a sense of justice, or fro m a sense of uniformity an d equality between such treatment and resentment, and punishment. . . . And then in the nex t place, he perceives that therefor e h e is not consisten t with himself , in doing what h e himself shoul d resent in that case; an d henc e disapproves it, as bein g naturally avers e to oppositio n to himself. 29

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At the initia l stage o f Edwards's two-stag e account, th e agen t identifie s with the resentment of the perso n h e harms o r otherwis e treat s unjustly . I t is clear from a preceding passage tha t Edwards means to say here that the agent actu ally puts himself imaginatively in the other person's shoe s in understanding his resentment.30 We can think of an agent at this first stage, then—resolving some ambiguities in Edwards's account—a s reproaching himself from the standpoint of the victim of a moral wrong he has committed. Th e second stag e essentially combines this element of empathy wit h the agent's sens e of his ow n contrar y motives as the basis for a second-order emotiona l reaction of "aversion t o self inconsistence and opposition " tha t Edward s equate s with uneas y conscience and takes to b e at odds with self-love. 31 We may simplify thi s fo r our presen t purposes to the agent's uncomfortable awareness that his first-order empathetic emotion is self-directed and negative. Emotional guilt of the sort in question here seems to belong at the first stag e of Edwards's account, as the basic empathetic ingredient of an uneasy conscience, involving self-opposition bu t not yet the second stag e of emotional reactio n t o the awareness of self-opposition. A s Edwards describes it, this stage seem s t o involve a form of anger (as I take resentment to be) based on the agent's imaginative participation i n the standpoint of those affected b y his action. The account can be stretched to cover psychologists' account s of guilt as based o n empathy in the narrower sense—the sense suggested by Rawls's talk of concern for other s —if w e grant tha t ange r ma y b e projected ont o the person s affecte d b y one's act. Tha t is , empathy i n the narrowe r sens e ma y sometime s com e t o includ e anger b y considering wha t on e migh t fee l i f one were i n someone else' s posi tion, even if the other person i s not perceived as angry on his own behalf . This rests on understanding empathy as emotional identification—which I interpret to cover any emotions base d on sharing the evaluativ e standpoint o f anothe r person, a s distinct from th e tendency to take a particular person a s an overall model for one's own experienc e that psychologists sometimes hav e in mind by the term . We ma y spea k accordingl y of guilt as an identificator y mechanism with a different particula r basi s in empathy in different cases , some involving self-anger added onto a more sorrowful (or other negative but passive) view of things from another' s standpoin t an d some involvin g other self-directe d negative emotions . This view also seems capable of covering cases of guilt for victimless wrongs, if we allow for an independent source of self-anger or some othe r self-directed negative emotion that is empathetic in a broader sense, since it is based on identification wit h authorit y figure s or wit h object s of dependenc y i n earl y life . Empathy o n m y speculative account o f guilt and "ought " i n chapte r 3 is encouraged in children essentially by linking emotional imitation wit h the conditions of social acceptance or acceptance in the family group. Disapproval o f a forbidden ac t ma y b e communicated a t a stage befor e th e resentmen t of an y victims of harm is in question, with the rol e of the victi m as a source o f anger assumed instea d by something on the orde r of a judge. My propose d accoun t of guilt is not mean t to settl e the ultimat e origin of the emotion, however ; nor would I want to exclud e any possibilities by conceptual line-drawing. Rather,

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my suggestion that we understand guil t as an identificatory mechanism is supposed t o allo w for emotional variation s as long as they all exhibit an elemen t of Edwards' s "self-inconsistenc e an d opposition"—wha t w e ma y thin k of a s "self-alienation," borrowin g a term from Gabriele Taylor.32 That is, the guilty agent is assumed to b e emotionally at odds with himself as a result of the kind of identification with others that we find in the first stage of Edwards's account . This i s the basi s for th e aversiv e reaction t o th e awarenes s o f self-oppositio n that yield s conscience in Edwards's secon d stage . In the typical sort of adult moral case, guilt rests on identificatory self-anger. I interpret this broadly to involve discomfort at the thought of oneself as responsible for a wrong (wit h the latte r ter m take n to includ e both unjustifie d har m and simple or victimless rule-violation), typically as a basis for a reparative urge that provides a parallel to the desire for revenge characteristic of other-directed anger. Thi s urg e may b e absen t i n some case s tha t w e stil l coun t a s case s o f guilt—what I call "deficient" (a s opposed t o "full-blown" ) cases. 33 It s presence in typical cases, however, yields a further, forward-looking sense in which guilt is action-oriented i n contrast t o shame , beside s being based on the evaluation of a past action and of the self only in relation to that action rathe r than as the bearer of a certain trait . In other cases, though—including many of the sorts of cases psychoanalyst s handle—guilt may involve some other self-alienate d emotion, something mor e passive though still negative and self-directed , of the sort that would result from identification wit h a victim seen a s reacting with a passive sense of grievance rather than active blame. Other forms of emotional self-reproach include selfhatred (i n the sense of self-aversion) or eve n self-horror (at one's role i n causing the other's suffering, say) . What i s important i s that th e reaction involves the kin d o f emotiona l self-punishmen t o n behal f o f other s tha t Edwards' s account captures in terms of the sense of justice. This is to be distinguished from internalized fear o f punishment by others, a s on Freud's account of the origin s of the superego , thoug h i n fac t m y account seem s to fi t Freud's comment s o n remorse.34 It s central featur e fo r ou r purpose s i s that i t make s guil t ou t a s including remorse, alon g with othe r negativ e emotions, wher e they are used as ways o f inflictin g punishmen t o n onesel f a s par t o f th e genera l sor t o f identificatory mechanism that we find i n Edwards. This accoun t seem s to m e to b e the one that bes t explains the overlaps we find i n our intuition s about cases . I t is not jus t that emotion s lik e shame, guilt, and remors e have indefinite boundarie s o r that our idea s of them are obscur e or ill-defined . In my own experienc e of testing out th e standard distinction s in application to imagine d cases, i t ofte n seem s clear tha t bot h guil t and sham e are in play: I find myself more or less wincing and hanging my head at the same time, say . Nor doe s it seem to b e enough t o sa y that guil t and sham e or guilt and remors e coincid e i n application t o cases , a s they would i f they both independently applied; rather, ther e ar e a t leas t some case s i n which the y d o no t really see m to b e distinct. All three may b e part o f the sam e emotiona l reac tion—or, mor e precisely, shame an d remors e ma y b e part o f guilt—in a cas e where an appropriately sensitive person with certain moral expectations of him-

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self find s tha t h e has accused someone unjustly , fo r instance . O n th e accoun t suggested here shame and remorse , or self-alienated versions of them, ma y be part o f the ver y punishmen t that guil t inflicts , i n contrast t o th e usua l treatment of these alternative emotions as either interchangeable or quite distinct. My account als o applies to forms of guilt that psychoanalyst s have distinguished as "survivor('s) guilt" or "separation guilt" and that our culture seems to have in common with others that mainly impose shame for moral breaches. 35 Guilt at some form of benefit ove r or separatio n fro m th e othe r members of a group with which one identifies may serve as a mechanism of group control in a way that includes moral control, bu t that also seems to represent at least one strand o f development of the notio n that i s not base d o n ideas of sin or pollution.36 The biblical sources of our own culture's emphasis on guilt actually deal explicitly only with sin; to locate emotional guilt in the Bible 37 we seem to need to apply the general sort of identificatory mechanism that we find in Edwards's account to the relationship between man and his divine judge. What these different case s have in common seem s to b e an inner conflict that ma y be multiplied b y the multiplicity of objects of identification—from othe r people to th e group a s a whole t o God—a s reason s fo r self-alienatio n that ar e themselves capable of conflict and henc e can generate dilemmas. 38 I shall deal in my next chapter with the questions raised by dilemmas as cases of unavoidable wrong. For the moment, I should note that the account of guilt I have outlined here is not put forth as a definition in the sense of an analysis of the content o f the emotion. W e may retain the standard definitio n in terms of self-attributed responsibility for a wrong. By explaining guilt as an identificator y mechanism, I am in effect addin g to this a certain view of how discomfort comes to be directed toward tha t thought, thus constituting guilt as an emotion. What I have picked ou t a s essentia l to th e developmen t o f th e feelin g i s the sor t o f self-opposition tha t Edward s interprets in terms of identificatory resentment . Typically this arises from som e form of anger, though i t also may be based on a range of other emotions serving to distance the self from its act in response to grounds for anger. In any case, it is phenomenologically distinct from standar d self-anger t o the extent tha t i t is identificatory and henc e self-alienated.39 Even allowing for the phenomenological rang e of guilt feelings, I think we can see that mere acceptance of others' anger without some identificatory emotion would no t b e sufficient. Conside r th e stoc k exampl e of a wayward hus band who accept s his wife's anger a s valid from he r standpoint, whic h i s one he has to put up with (even meekly, perhaps) for his own ends, though it is not a standpoin t h e share s i n emotiona l terms . I think w e hav e to sa y tha t hi s acquiescence in her anger as a punishment imposed from without—even if registered in some sort of counterpart emotion—fall s short o f felt guilt, though he may of course hav e a reason t o obscur e th e distinction . Fel t guilt seems to be more likely, in fact, in cases where it is clear that others will not impose punishment from without b y feeling anger . More generally, the account of guilt as an identificatory mechanism will help us distinguish what intuitivel y seem to b e genuine cases o f the emotio n fro m other possible "fixes" o n the thought of responsibility for wrong: satisfaction,

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say, at being the focus of others' angry attention. B y itself, a definition of guilt would limit the relevant cases to uncomfortable emotions but still would allow for emotions other than those we intuitively classify a s guilt: simple resentment on one's own behalf, most notably; or self-pity at social rejection (perhaps with a content that acknowledges its justification—something on the order of "I can't do anythin g right.") I shall also go on t o sho w ho w th e accoun t draw n fro m Edwards lets us explain guilt-motivation—both its advantages and its pitfalls— in a way that depends o n its basis in self-alienation . A Puritan divine may seem an unpromising choice to appea l to , eve n with modifications a s indicated , i n attemptin g t o convinc e contemporar y mora l philosophers o f the valu e of guilt-motivation. One reaso n fo r th e aversio n t o talk o f guilt , alon g wit h objection s to th e Freudia n account , i s of cours e it s religious overtones: I n its more overwhelmin g forms the emotion i s associated with a particularl y self-punitiv e extreme o f Purita n religious consciousness . However, it should be clear from the passage quoted earlier that Edwards's treatment o f guilt is philosophical rathe r tha n religious . In fact, Edwards reverses the usual link to religion by considering conscience as a "natural" motive , meaning pre-religious: a motive that is present i n us before our soul s ar e saved. As such, of course, it is not the highest motive on his account; the motive required for Edwards' s notion o f "true virtue" i s benevolence or love—jus t wha t som e of the current opponents o f guilt-motivation have in mind. Moreover, Edwards' s (and th e common ) characterizatio n o f ba d conscienc e a s "uneasy " stand s i n contrast to th e familia r picture o f overwhelming guilt that w e fin d i n certain depictions o f Puritan religious consciousness—or, fo r tha t matter , i n psycho analytic case histories or the modern novel . Guilt on the picture Edwards offer s us is or ca n b e a moderate emotiona l reaction an d seem s perfectly sensibl e in affective term s a s a wa y o f registerin g self-attribute d wrong. Le t us no w se e what els e might b e said i n its favor.

In Praise of Guilt On the identificatory account jus t presented, guilt is sometimes a passive feel ing, as I think we have to sa y in light of the ful l rang e o f cases. Bu t in the central moral cases, it s tie to anger makes it active—if not affectively , i n the sense of being aroused i n feeling tone, then at any rate evaluatively, to the extent that its evaluative component typicall y supports a n urge toward reparativ e action : discomfort a t the thought tha t one ought to make up for a wrong. Thi s means that guil t exhibit s motivationa l forc e t o a degre e tha t i s not tru e o f shame . Shame—meaning occurren t emotiona l shame , no t jus t th e genera l sens e of shame, or a disposition t o exhibit the emotion—is an inhibited or "downcast" feeling i n phenomenological terms. S o cases of motivation b y shame turn ou t for th e mos t par t to b e cases o f motivation t o avoid shame , base d o n (i f any emotion) fear or even pride. By contrast, though guilt may be incapacitating in excessive doses, th e agen t i n a state of feelin g guilt y i s typically motivated b y that stat e to escape it—in a way that makes guilt provide a potentially powerful mora l motiv e even afte r a moral lapse. It has a special role to play , then—

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which is not t o say that it leaves no room for shame—in a morality buil t on a view of human nature a s imperfect but improvable . For a nonmoral example , on e might consider wha t on e would b e likely to do ou t o f guilt versus shame i n response t o a ba d piec e o f wor k on e ha d t o publish: On the standard picture, someone motivated by guilt would get to work on something else to make up for wasting his talents or his colleagues' tim e on the las t effort ; someon e motivate d b y sham e woul d typicall y try t o hid e o r obscure th e object of his emotion. H e might also tr y to mak e u p fo r it , bu t it would no t see m t o matte r t o th e effectivenes s o f suc h compensator y actio n whether it is connected to the object of shame in a way that would mak e it count as "reparative"—as repairing what was broken by the violation of professiona l standards. Tha t is , the agen t wh o i s ashamed o f his past performanc e migh t make up for it, not by improved performance in the same area, but just by stressing other area s in which h e already shines. Guilt in contrast t o shame , w e might say, i s intractable to summing . On e might indee d attemp t t o wor k i t off by performance in other areas , bu t guilt for a serious moral wrong wil l be expiated—if at all—only by action (including mental action) that addresse s th e wrong done . In sublimated form, then, with the thought o f wrong hidden from consciousness, i t yields a particularly pow erful motiv e because it is unappeasable. For much the same reason, it may sometimes be overwhelming. There ar e cases of wrong s o serious that guilt is inexpiable: Agamemnon's sacrifice of his daughter and many of the other standar d cases of moral dilemmas would seem to qualify. On the other side, though, psychological studies indicate that shame is particularly incapacitating i n extreme form, at least as induced in children.40 Someone overwhelmed by either shame or guilt , of course, wil l not b e motivated to d o muc h at all—a t an y rate , will not b e effectively motivated—excep t t o th e exten t tha t undergoin g th e emo tion itsel f count s as a kind of partial or substitute action. Sham e involves lowering oneself , or takin g th e submissiv e posture, w e ma y say—hangin g one' s head—whereas guilt involves a kind of emotional self-punishment. The structure of guilt-motivation is worth explorin g further in these terms , since the emotio n itsel f count s a s a for m of the punishmen t it demands. On e way o f making up fo r a seriou s wrong, tha t is , involves anticipating others ' reactions b y inflicting punishmen t on oneself . So at leas t t o som e extent , th e desire for reparation characteristic of guilt may be satisfied just by undergoing that unpleasant self-directed emotion. This gives the emotion a special motivational role as a kind of ritual act of emotional self-punishment. Psychoanalysts see self-punishment of various sorts (self-destructiv e behavior , most notably ) as a defense against guilt in certain cases.41 But the account suggested here builds this function into guilt itself b y way o f its self-referential quality . The point ha s complex motivationa l possibilities that seem to pul l in bot h directions—reinforcing guil t as a motive but als o explainin g some o f the pit falls o f guilt-motivation. Though guil t i s unpleasant, it seem s t o b e on e o f a number of unpleasant emotions that we characteristically "wallow" in, with a need to dwell on their negative thought content. In anticipatory form, then, as an attemp t to hea d off further o r wors e guilt b y self-punishment, i t may ver y

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likely fail . I t often has the opposit e result, i n fact—"feeds" o n itsel f in a wa y that can compound it s motivational force but also constitutes a powerful motive for avoidin g the emotion jus t by shifting attention. Whereas sham e incapaci tates by inhibition, the arousal ofte n linked to guilt may involve hounding oneself t o a degree tha t also interferes with action . Ther e ar e cases i n which on e avoids even entertaining the thought o f action—of writin g a letter already to o long postponed, say—out of an inability to face the emotion. O n my account, we may say that a tendency toward compulsive repetition of ritual self-punishment sometime s undermines its motivational effectiveness. This complex accoun t o f guilt-motivation with its basis in talk of emotiona l self-punishment gives rise to questions o f voluntariness that I shall postpone to my next section . Fo r the remainder of this section, I want t o exhibit som e fur ther pitfalls of guilt as a motive, along with some of its advantages in compari son to shame , remorse , an d th e various othe r reaction s t o mora l wron g tha t might b e substitute d fo r it . Th e centra l poin t tha t distinguishe s guil t fro m shame—to focus first on its main competitor—seems t o be self-alienation. Shame does no t see m to divide the sel f agains t itsel f in the way that guil t does o n th e account draw n fro m Edwards . Thoug h i t may be seen as based on the expecta tion of contempt o r the like from others—perhaps onl y hypothetical others (o r even jus t one' s hypothetica l idea l self ) i n th e cas e o f a n actio n hidde n fro m view—it does not amoun t t o self-contempt. Th e agen t doe s no t identif y with his judges, that is , in feeling what he feels; he is solidly in the inferior position of th e perso n judged—no t at al l a comfortabl e positio n bu t on e that at leas t assigns him a definite place . If he did identif y wit h hi s judges, to th e exten t o f feeling things (at least ambivalently) from their standpoint, hi s emotion woul d also com e ou t a s part of the guil t response, o n th e accoun t suggeste d her e of guilt a s a n identificator y mechanism tha t sometime s use s othe r emotion s a s materials. With attention confined to cases in which the two emotions are distinct, then , there seems to b e one way in which guil t may be worse than sham e in motiva tional terms: Both emotions obviously interfere with self-esteem, but guilt may be said to do so in a "conflicted" wa y that is arguably more incapacitating tha n simple inhibition . However, w e hav e begu n to se e how thi s element o f inne r conflict a s the basis for the self-referential qualit y of the emotion als o makes it potentially more powerfu l as a motive. Guil t may play an irreplaceable mora l role, in short, to the extent that it yields a self-perpetuating motivational mecha nism. On mos t o f the other comparison s I can think o f between guilt and shame , we seem to fac e a choice between differen t sort s o f advantages an d disadvan tages. Sometime s i t is a value-laden choice: Fo r instance , it might be said tha t guilt at least accords th e sel f a kind of dignity insofar as it is identified wit h it s judges rather tha n simpl y being confined to the position o f the person judged . The functio n o f th e sens e o f sham e seem s t o includ e keeping people i n thei r place—it amount s t o th e knowledg e o f one's place—i n a wa y tha t link s the emotion to social stratification and group conformity. Similarly, moral sham e may sometime s b e incapacitating to th e exten t tha t i t favor s acknowledgin g

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imperfections as characterizing oneself i n global term s rather tha n just in connection wit h a past action . Moral guilt is also commonly said to be tied to individualism because of its reference to specific acts as falling within the agent's sphere of responsibility. 42 I raise questions in chapter 5 that undercut thi s point somewhat—it introduce s further issue s of voluntariness of the sor t that the presen t discussio n i s meant to bypass—but my account stil l yields at least a rough contrast with shame on the question of individual responsibility. Still , to the extent tha t the guilty self identifies wit h th e victim s of the wron g i t does, as well as with it s judges, its responsibility ties it to others; and th e connection i s reinforced, o f course, fo r nonmoral variants of guilt such as survivor's guil t that are imposed fo r benefits distinguishing an individua l from other members of a group. A s a reaction t o someone else' s plight o r disadvantages , guil t is owed t o other s i n a way tha t shame i s not. In differen t ways , though , bot h guil t an d sham e involv e negative evaluations focuse d more o r les s explicitly on th e self . I take i t that thi s is what set s them apar t fro m alternativ e reactions t o moral wrong . Variants o f regret, fo r instance, eve n i f directed towar d one' s ow n pas t acts , o n explicitl y mora l grounds, d o no t involv e any kin d o f threa t t o th e self—t o the estimatio n o f character o r merit—on the basi s of past acts , but on the contrary see m to use negative feeling simply to distance the self from its past act s without an y intervening stage o f self-punishment. In affectiv e terms , regre t ma y b e unpleasant, but i t lacks the elemen t of negative self-evaluation that support s m y motivational accoun t of guilt. The same might also be said of remorse, however , even though this involves a wish to undo the wrong on e has done (a s guilt may not) alon g with the need to make up for it by future action. In cases where it is distinct from guilt, remorse is more tightly tied to a specific past action: Its associated reparativ e desire does not amoun t to th e sort of general need t o clea r th e self—t o expiate a wrong, thereby erasing a "taint"—that account s fo r the motivational power o f moral guilt i n anticipator y form . Th e possibilit y o f "free-floating " guilt , thoug h a source o f some devastating psychological problems , a t the same time gives the emotion a practical scope tha t doe s not characteriz e it s alternatives. Thus, in my earlier example of publishing a bad piece of work, neither regret nor remors e woul d see m to motivat e late r wor k i n the wa y that we typically see guilt as doing. The same seems to hol d fo r the various other after-the-fac t "taboo-feelings" (a s I think of them) that might be suggested as alternative emotional residues of moral ought-violation: horror, say; or a kind of moral anguish that amounts to a variant of grief. On th e other hand , a feeling o f "compunc tion," which is sometimes mentioned a s a less problematic alternativ e to guilt in case s o f moral dilemma , would no t reall y seem t o b e after-the-fact—o r at any rate, it would not admit of the same after-the-fact temporal distance—an d thus i s naturally interpreted by Hare a s a variant of fear. 43 I conclude, then, that guilt is the best candidate among these negative emotional reactions for supplying the motivational force of moral "ought." It can also cause motivational problems insofar as it sometimes involves an obsessive

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inability to "let go"—of act s one cannot make up for, relationships one cannot improve, or tendencies one cannot brin g under control—but i t seems to share at least some of these problems with moral obligation. I t therefore seems well suited to help explain the sense of compulsion we associate with "ought." What guilt ha s ove r othe r emotiona l candidate s o n th e accoun t I hav e give n is a potential future-orientation mediated by its identificatory focu s on th e self . For the same reason, of course, we might question its application to Russell's case and other moral dilemmas. There seems to be no need for the agent in such a cas e to mak e u p fo r th e wrong h e has don e b y hi s future behavio r in other areas of life beyond doing what he can to mitigate the effect s o f that particular action, as he would if he felt only remorse. Presumably the wrong in question is something he should have done overall. Why not say , then, that Russell ought to hav e felt remors e a t jiltin g th e woma n bu t no t th e sor t o f negativ e self evaluation involve d in emotional guilt ? M y answe r t o thi s questio n will ultimately depend on a fuller accoun t o f the standard s o f emotional appropriateness. Befor e w e get to tha t issue , however, w e nee d t o as k wha t i s meant b y saying that a n agent in a dilemma ought to react with one emotion o r another. My view , in brief , i s that th e agent ought to fee l somethin g like guilt an d tha t guilt in the narrow sense just distinguished is appropriate; bu t it remains a question whether th e agent ought specificall y to fee l guil t in that sense . Let us now look a t some of the more general problems raised by "ought-to-feel. " 3. Contrary-to-Dut y "Ought-to-Feel " Both my account of guilt and th e role I assign to i t in cases of dilemma rest on a view of emotions a s able to serve as substitutes for action. I speak of them in some cases as self-imposed and as indirect ways of satisfying obligations to take action—and for that matter as objects of obligation in their own right. Because of both their motivational force and their independent symbolic significance as rewards and punishments for action, they may sometimes be required to express evaluative standpoint s o r commitment s tha t a n agen t canno t expres s mor e directly, through action , unde r th e circumstances . B y contrast, th e recen t resurgence of interest in emotions i n the ethics literature seems for the most par t to limit their role to virtue ethics. They serv e alongside action o n an Aristotelian accoun t a s objects of long-term trainin g in virtue, commendable both in their own right and in support o f dispositions to virtuous action but not in any stronger sense required. 44 The exclusion of emotions from dut y ethics is typically traced back to Kant; Ross, fo r instance , i n extending on e o f Prichard' s arguments , appeal s t o th e Kantian principle that "ought" implies "can" a s a reason for denying that action from a particular motive (in a sense that includes virtuous feelings) can be obligatory.45 Hi s argument , alon g with Prichard's , apparentl y drive s a hard wedg e between dut y and virtu e ethics . In fact , though , elsewher e in the sam e wor k Ross provides the reade r with sufficien t material s for a respons e to th e argu ment. I shall begin my treatment of "ought-to-feel" by constructing a response

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from Ross' s comments a s supplemented b y my own vie w of emotion. What I hope to show is that emotions have an important role to play, albeit a comple x role, as objects of obligation alongside action in the general approach t o ethics derived from Kant, despite any excesses of Kant's own versio n of it. My response t o Ross's argument will turn on the way we rely on voluntary action to generate emotion i n standard cases. It will eventually be put to wor k in defense of an interpretation of dilemmatic ought-judgments as guiding action indirectly insofar as they imply various contrary-to-duty obligations, including those prescribing guilt and simila r moral emotions. This view involves assigning to action-guiding "ought" a kind of conditional imperatival force in application to feeling, in addition to its literal or direct force as commanding action. However, some care is needed in interpreting this view. For one thing, a major pitfall o f guilt-motivation not previousl y discussed seems to b e a tendency t o substitute the emotion fo r right action. "I' m such a miserable sinner" as a way of fendin g of f reasonable change can b e sincerely fel t a s a more o r les s auto matic response to well-rehearsed cues, but this is obviously not what one has in mind in requiring guilt. The requirement to fee l guilt y if one cannot manage to act must not b e taken a s implying a permission to omi t actio n an d fee l guilty instead. Nor shoul d "ought-to-feel " b e taken as resolving dilemmas. It is important in any case to distinguish the practical an d normativ e ethical problems raise d by dilemma s from th e metaethica l difficulties t o whic h m y argumen t her e is addressed. A wrong plus guilt will not mak e a right on an y view I would fin d plausible in answer t o thos e difficulties . Bu t further, "ought-to-feel" wil l no t always yield a way out of them. In some cases, like the one drawn from Russell's autobiography, possible conflicts between required feeling and action might give rise to second-order dilemmas . If the normative point o f the required feeling is to protect virtue from the effects o f moral luck, my discussion will indicate that this role is also subjec t to important limitations . Requiring Guilt Feelings In th e passage s tha t bea r o n "ought-to-feel, " Prichar d an d Ros s ar e mainl y concerned to deny the possibility of being obligated to act from a certain desire or motive—as opposed t o simply possessing it, or exhibiting it in some way or other, which i s what concern s u s here. The y d o so , moreover , partl y o n th e grounds that requirin g act-motive compounds rathe r tha n simpl y acts woul d involve a regres s i f applied t o th e sens e of obligation, th e desir e to d o some thing because it is required, or Kantian conscientiousness.46 However, Ross also brings in an argument from "ought"-implies-"can " tha t woul d see m to coun t against requiring a motive in itself, and Prichard's argument apparently come s up in defense o f a general limitation of "ought" to "ought-to-do, " taking it as applicable to "action s an d actions alone." 47 I want to loo k closel y at Ross's us e of the Kantian principle. He writes: It is not th e case that I can b y choice produce a certain motive (whether this be an ordinar y desir e o r th e sens e o f obligation ) i n mysel f a t a moment' s notice,

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still less that I can a t a moment's notic e mak e it effective i n stimulating m e t o act. I can ac t fro m a certain motiv e only if I have the motive; if not th e mos t I can d o i s to cultivat e it by suitably directing my attention o r b y acting i n certain appropriate ways so that o n some future occasio n it will be present i n me, and I shall be able to act fro m it . My present duty, therefore, cannot b e to ac t here and now from it. 48

Our questio n (t o modify Ross' s last line here) is whether it can b e someone' s present duty to have or display a certain motive—and even to display it "her e and now" i n some wide enough sense of that expression to accommodate act s of the norma l sort, a s the norma l objects of duty. I shall argu e that i t can be . Though I shall not take the point further here , moreover, I think we could easily extend i t to yield the claim Ross explicitly wants to deny: that one can have a duty to act from th e motive in question. We just cannot tak e this to rule out a duty to perfor m the ac t i n itself, or regardless of motive. The object of the duty to act from a certain motive, that is, should be understood as being moved b y that desire , emotion, or whatever it may be, with the duty t o perfor m th e ac t i n questio n see n a s independently fulfillable, no t a s replaced b y the dut y t o displa y a certai n act/motiv e compound, a s o n th e Prichard/ Ross interpretation o f Kantian conscientiousness. If acts alone could not b e required, we might jus t avoi d th e worrie s thes e author s rais e b y substituting motivational prohibitions fo r requirements. A prohibition o f all lessthan-virtuous motives woul d o n this account b e taken a s ruling out an y act s the agent would do out o f those motives, even if that means ruling out al l pos sibilities for performing those acts. O n the supposition that a t least som e act s are required simpliciter, however—i f only acts of omission like refraining from murder—we need a more plausible response, i n positive terms, to Ross's arguments agains t obligatory motives. The relevant sort of motive for our purposes is not a long-term character trai t on the model of the sense of duty but a short-term emotional state, including certain motivating states o f fel t desire . These ar e clearl y covered b y Ross's argument , despite its focus on th e sorts o f motives Kant favored. However, th e argumen t apparently limits our control ove r such states to the long-term strategies fo r cultivating them in ourselves that come up in relation to the Aristotelian picture of training in virtue. By means of acts of attention or overt acts that we can control, we can manag e to produc e a certain feeling o r othe r motiv e in ourselves—but perhaps not "a t a moment's notice, " o r with the kind of immediate contro l tha t Ross in the quoted passage takes "ought"-implies-"can" t o imply. Ross's denial that w e can produc e a motive "b y choice" suggests tha t h e may als o b e interpreting th e principl e a s insisting on direc t contro l o f a sor t that is unlikely: On the Aristotelian picture, one becomes conscientious o r courageous, say , no t simpl y b y aiming toward bein g so but instea d b y directing attention towar d somethin g else , such as the actions thes e motives requir e on particular occasions. However , w e might begin by raising some questions abou t this interpretation of "ought"-implies-"can" tha t will also bear on the issu e of temporal immediac y and o n probable further backgroun d assumptions of the Kantian principle.

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Are acts required only if they can b e accomplished directl y by choice? Presumably they must depend only on choices one can manage, bu t must these be choices to perform the acts in question unde r the descriptions under which they are required ? I do not se e why w e should say so, particularly if we remembe r some o f th e difference s betwee n "ought " an d "obligation " tha t emerge d i n chapter 2 and concentrate o n "ought," the term for which closure over causal relations holds . There seem to b e cases in which our require d ends have to b e promoted indirectly , that is , by means tha t entai l shiftin g attentio n t o some thing else. For instance, perhaps I ought t o hel p a frien d wh o wil l b e able t o benefit from what I do for him (s o that I will indeed be helping him) only if I do not se e myself a s helping him bu t rathe r a s participating in a joint project fo r its own sake . We might suppose tha t h e needs help because of a loss in confidence that would just be made worse by too much overt concern from others— and tha t if I thought of myself as helping him, my concern woul d be evident in what I did. It ma y b e important t o thi s sor t o f case tha t ther e i s something I can d o directly—namely, whatever overt acts are required to help my friend. But even supposing that this exhausts my strict obligations in the case—if indeed the term "obligation" applie s to it strictly—the claim that I ought to help him seems acceptable. Simila r cases might be constructed fo r various activitie s that require intellectual absorption, sometime s to th e point o f blotting ou t ful l conscious ness of one's motives. Indeed, a similar point is often made about the pursuit of happiness, a s a backgroun d requirement of either morality or prudence . An d there are examples of specific behavior required by morality or prudence—often described by reference to motives or other states of mind—that would ten d t o be undermined by direct aim. Consider th e command t o sho w respec t say , o r the advice to be assertive, and imagine how likely one would be to satisfy eithe r of them adequately by just trying to. So intuitive cases do not bear out an interpretation o f the Kantian principle as limiting oughts to acts one can perform at will, if that means by willing those acts as such—one way of taking "by choice" i n Ross's argument . What about "at a moment's notice" ? There ar e certainly examples of overt acts that are fit subjects of obligation and yet require preparation—or tim e for completion. Some of thes e involv e long-ter m cultivatio n o f an abilit y t o act , o f th e sor t tha t i s suggested by the Aristotelian picture of training in virtue: Consider, fo r instance , my "time-bound " extensio n o f Sartre' s cas e i n chapter 2 , wher e th e agent' s ability to discharge his obligation to support hi s mother depend s on ten years of savings . Bu t there ar e othe r example s shorte r ter m tha n this , particularl y where the act itsel f takes time. Ross provides at leas t one good example , i n fact, when he turns to a n extended discussion of the nature of right acts, or the question how much is to be included i n th e descriptio n o f a n objec t o f obligation. 49 O f a cas e i n whic h returning a borrowed book can only be accomplished by mailing it, he concludes that fulfillmen t o f the obligation to retur n it requires actually getting it to th e other party, not jus t dropping it in the mail. 50 At the very least, if the mail s go astray, one owes the other party an explanation of one's failur e to get the book

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to him . O f course, i n that case , the objec t o f obligation i s not somethin g tha t can b e don e "a t a moment' s notice." On e ca n initiat e action a t a moment' s notice, perhaps, bu t only in a sense that include s such preparatory menta l acts as planning to bu y some wrappin g pape r an d th e like . In normal cases , how ever, the sam e can b e said o f the processe s tha t giv e rise to a certai n kin d of motivation—to an emotional reaction like guilt, say—if one allows for the point about indirectnes s that came out just above . Let u s take a loo k a t the questio n o f ho w w e generate emotional motiva tion. Fo r instance , consider ho w I might get myself to fee l guilt y about some thing I took to requir e the emotion . Suppos e I find mysel f indifferen t t o som e harm I have done to X—or perhaps to some harm that has befallen X as a result of my actions or in comparison t o some benefi t that comes to me. What might I do to generate guilt? Note that w e do not hav e in mind here the general tendency to fee l guilty , or proneness to guilt, even just with respect to X; perhaps I hav e no deficienc y i n tha t regard , o r perhap s ther e ar e reason s agains t th e general tendency. In any case , what w e want i s just a feeling o f guilt on som e particular occasion wit h an object that is limited accordingly. One thing I might do and might well be advised or advise myself to do is to think abou t certain aspect s o f the situation—to attend t o o r eve n to dwel l on the harm done to X from X's standpoint, it s connection to my own action, and the various things that connect me to X, suc h as benefits I have received from him i n the past . Emotional discomfor t essentiall y serves as a way o f directing or sustainin g attention towar d som e negativ e evaluation and arise s naturally (albeit not inevitably ) in the act of fixing attentio n o n the thought i n question. An attempt t o generate it more directly—just by telling oneself to fee l guilty — would b e inefficaciou s o r eve n counterproductive, i n part becaus e i t direct s attention to something else. We should be careful t o cancel out an y suggestion tha t generating emotion or emotion itself amounts to an act that is within the agent's control—any more than i t is fully withi n the control o f the agen t i n Ross's case to ge t a boo k t o someone throug h the mail. The indirec t methods fo r generating emotion ma y be no more reliable than the mail. If the mail does go astray, of course, we might withdraw the claim that th e agent really ought to hav e returned the book, o n the grounds that "ought" implies "can"; but that does not mean that the claim should b e withdrawn for all similar cases in which th e mail does not go astray but might have. "Ought" holds on the assumption that "can" does ; but "can " is adequately fulfilled by doing the act (or exhibiting the emotion or other motive) in question. I t does no t impl y "by som e generall y reliable method"—in othe r words, that the agent possesses a general capacity to bring about th e object of obligation—any more than it implies "at a moment's notice. " Our uncertai n control ove r our emotion s an d othe r motive s and state s of mind may be indirect in a further way besides that indicated, because the exercise of it typically runs in reverse temporal orde r from means-end s calculations, as well as depending on th e substitutio n in attention o f another end . That is, one ma y sometime s generate a required emotion b y aiming at performin g an act—including an act of attention, as in the example just given—which in fact ,

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if performed, would be motivated b y the emotion i n question. Though th e temporal reversal pertains only to occurrent motivation—by emotions and similar episodic states rather than long-term dispositional motives—i t is illustrated by one of Prichard's comments abou t courage . Prichar d allow s that on e ma y be required to do something that involve s action fro m courage, a particular dangerous act that one can perform only by working up some courage, compatibly with hi s exclusio n o f a n obligatio n t o ac t fro m tha t motive. 51 However , Prichard's poin t depend s o n interpretin g courag e a s th e suppressio n o f a n occurrent emotion , namely fear. It i s worth takin g note i n general terms o f the sor t o f negative control o f emotions to which this example appeals: our ability to block emotions , so that we can also be said to allow the m to occur whe n we do no t bloc k them. But it might be thought that guilt admits of this less than other emotions; in any case, it should b e clear from m y previous discussion of the pitfall s o f guilt that I do not mea n to den y that on e can b e overwhelmed b y guilt feelings. Indeed , i t is possible (an d compatible with anythin g I want t o sa y about emotion s gener ally) tha t a degre e of "uncontrol " i s built into th e ver y concept o f emotions : that what unites the states we think of as emotional is in part their resistance to full control . More o r less by definition, that is , they are state s tha t w e canno t just put ourselve s into either directly or b y entertaining certain thoughts . M y claim here is that they are not therefor e disqualified as objects of obligation— of practical as opposed to ideal "ought"—given the range of acts that have that status. Emotions might be said to be midway between belief and action in the degree of practical control they allow for. Belief is typically harder to control, an d our claims abou t wha t belief s on e ough t t o hav e are presumabl y commendatory for th e most part. But "ought-to-think" als o applies to occurrent acts of attention—of fixin g a certain thought i n mind—and through the m (i n the wa y just indicated) to emotions. Acts of sustained attention ar e of course not full y con trollable either: One cannot simpl y command oneself to concentrate on something undistracted . More precisely , such a comman d ma y no t b e possible t o satisfy—or ma y in the next moment go unheeded. We do not therefore hesitate to issue such commands, though—to require someone to pay attention—in cases that allo w fo r th e ordinar y sor t o f qualifie d control . Directin g and sustain ing attentio n seem s to coun t a s a long-ter m ac t o n th e mode l o f getting tha t book bac k through the mail to its rightful owner . I t is similarly recalcitrant to full control , despite the fact that i n this case the interferin g factors may al l be internal. Our eve n more qualifie d contro l ove r the emotional state s that aris e from such acts of attention is sufficient reaso n no t t o coun t th e generatio n o f emotion as an act: Though the concept o f action extends beyond intentional action to behavio r that occurs more o r les s automatically (an example might be tapping one's fingers while thinking), presumably this has to be behavior of a sort that on e could produc e at will. My claim here is simply that, even i f emotions are not lik e this, they are stil l controllable enough by way o f acts of attention to b e suitable objects of practical "ought" in at leas t some cases.

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This does not mean we would issue such a practical ought i n conversation, even mental conversation. Orderin g oneself or someone else to fee l guilty might defeat it s point b y it s very directness, accordin g to th e argumen t I have out lined here; more than that, i t would seem to undermine the moral significance of th e emotion. Guil t in the case s where it is required is supposed t o b e automatic; only as an automatic response , unmediated by practical reasoning, can it giv e u s th e kin d o f evidenc e of moral motivatio n that w e wan t i n cases of dilemma, most notably . Russell, for instance, in the case previously discussed, would not b e fully admirabl e in the terms we require if he had simpl y managed to make himself feel guilty in response to the knowledge that guilt was required by perfect virtue. So virtue imposes a kind of paradoxical limitatio n on practi cal "ought-to-feel. " Th e sam e sor t o f parado x i s abundantly illustrated by "ought-to-think," though , in the sense that involves attention: Consider the selfdefeating result s in many cases of explicitly urging intellectual absorption o n oneself a s a necessary means to satisfyin g th e requirements of one's studies or one's job . I conclude tha t th e parallel problems for emotion d o no t limi t it t o virtue ethics in the way that the arguments in Prichard and Ross seem to show. Indirect Action-Guidance It is important t o bea r i n mind that "ought-to-feel " i n a case lik e Russell's or even Agamemnon's i s not quit e on the sam e level as the all-things-considered practical oughts in conflict in a dilemma, despite my argument fo r taking it as analogous to "ought-to-do. " I shall illustrate in a moment how, beside s being conditional on the failure to satisf y on e of the dilemmatic oughts, the requirement to feel guilty may conflict with the other ought in certain cases. This means that m y suggestion tha t emotion s serv e as act-substitutes in such cases i s not put fort h a s a wa y o f resolvin g dilemmas. Emotion s d o no t provid e a full y adequate alternative for satisfying th e ought the agent fails to ac t on but serve instead t o exhibi t it s motivational force, along with othe r sign s of its importance to the agent, b y exhibiting the internal sanctions on moral failure . My crucia l claim is that thi s i s enough t o mak e th e dilemmati c ough t i n question adequately action-guiding for our purposes: It is meant to guide action directly, though o f course it cannot d o so in combination with the other ough t in conflict ; it may stil l guide action indirectly , however, t o th e exten t tha t i t tells us as a second-best alternativ e to fee l som e appropriate emotio n suc h as guilt. According to my preceding treatment of "ought-to-feel," thi s amounts t o telling us to allow ourselves to fee l the emotion—if necessary, to get ourselves to—by performing a mental act: directin g attention in such a way as to generate the feeling. In short, practical "ought-to-feel" amounts to a kind of indirect "ought-to-do" with anothe r object . On thi s account, emotions ca n b e seen as "residues " of moral choic e i n a fairly litera l sense: They embody what is left o f action on a moral ought whe n direct actio n i s blocked. 52 However , the y ar e themselve s subject t o ought conflicts. Indeed, I want now to consider what to say about cases in which they

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seem to allow for higher order dilemmas . Up to this point, for instance, I have been workin g wit h a n understandin g o f th e cas e draw n fro m Aeschylus ' Agamemnon that take s fo r grante d som e assumption s inherited fro m th e lit erature on dilemmas. In particular, I have assumed that Agamemnon unprob lematically ought to fee l guilt or some similar moral emotion and that, insofar as the cas e amount s to a dilemma , this would hav e been true eve n i f he ha d chosen differently. However, I think there are problems lurking in any easy resort to "ought-to-feel. " For instance, now that we have distinguished some of the emotions that might be urged on Agamemnon, a question might be raised as to whether the dilemma Aeschylus depicts is genuinely moral. I take it that Agamemnon indeed ough t to fee l guilt , at leas t prima facie , a s a self-directed variant of remorse for th e murder o f his daughter. The crim e is serious enough to b e personally "taint ing," i n short, even if in a larger sense he had to commit it. But it is not so obvious that Aeschylus represents the necessity in question here as moral or that he takes some moral variant of agent-regret to be appropriate fo r Agamemnon's othe r alternative, which involves failing in his duties as military commander (an d more fundamentally as his brother's avenger).53 The conflict might also be interpreted as a clash between moral and nonmora l requirements, with the latter taken as imposed b y something like social or religiou s roles and expectations—o r bet ter, perhaps, by an older ethical system now uneasily superseded by specifically moral norms , i n a sense that entail s regard for the welfare of other agents . The murder on this account o f things is the morally wrong act in question, but Agamemnon' s alternativ e migh t still be thought o f as more importan t t o avoid—for instance, on a view like Williams's that questions the finality of moral norms.54 If this i s true, w e might want t o sa y that sham e or som e othe r con trary-to-duty emotio n rathe r tha n guilt in the narrow sens e would hav e been appropriate had Agamemnon refused t o sacrifice his daughter. The case might still be a "tragic" case to th e extent that it pits morality against another pow erful syste m of norms—pre-moral religiou s norms, say—wit h no satisfactor y resolution possible. But it would n o longer seem to be a moral dilemma in our terms. I shall therefore ignore these problems of interpretation i n what follows and continue to work with what we might call "the philosopher's Agamemnon" : the received picture of Agamemnon as an agent in the grips of a moral dilemma , with bot h o f the choices h e faces assumed to b e morally wrong. The received picture also apparently has it that Agamemno n ough t t o fee l something appropriat e for the wrong he has to do. One might think of the case, however, as involving another dilemm a on the level of "ought-to-feel"—in th e first instance a conflict between feelin g and action, the result of mixing "ought to-feel" wit h "ought-to-do." There are cases, tha t is , as I noted earlie r in discussing the pitfalls of guilt, where the emotion would be so overwhelming as to undermine any possibility of effective action. Surely this is likely in Agamemnon' s case: I f he allowed himsel f an appropriat e reactio n t o th e murde r o f his ow n daughter, on e migh t suppose , h e would b e unable to functio n i n hi s rol e a s military commander and henc e would be failing t o ac t consistently in light of

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the very reasons for the sacrifice. But then the ought requiring him to feel guilty, no less than th e ought he has chosen to violate, would conflict with the ough t he means to ac t on in performing the sacrifice. If th e result amounts to a further mora l dilemma , I take that to sho w tha t "ought-to-feel" leave s intact the problem s o f choic e raise d b y dilemmas an d makes clear their unhappy upshot for both duty and virtue ethics. Feeling guilty might itself com e out a s wrong—or a s emotionally self-indulgent, insofar as it interferes wit h require d action—so substitutin g emotion fo r actio n i n such a case will not provide an effective wa y o f erasing the moral stai n on the agent' s character. Guil t will still count as appropriate t o the case on the view of appropriateness I shall go o n t o defend , which build s in referenc e only t o genera l adaptiveness in the sense that involves fulfillment o f some moral or other func tion in standard cases ; but i n this case its usual function will be undermined. If we als o sa y that th e agen t morall y ought t o fee l th e emotion , th e cas e migh t seem to yield a higher order dilemma that rule s out perfect virtue no less than perfect performance of obligation . There ar e ways around this conclusion that involv e denying, after all , that Agamemnon i n our varian t case reall y ough t t o fee l guilty . However, o n m y account o f the mora l significanc e of guilt in connection wit h virtue, the mos t obvious move would stil l leave virtue ethics with th e problem s o f moral luc k raised by dilemmas. We might take "ought-to-feel " i n the cas e as prima faci e only—at least supposin g that w e also take it as practical, a s we need to do t o establish th e lin k between virtue an d duty . Apart fro m consideration s o f virtue, that is, Agamemnon might not seem to have a moral reason against failin g to fee l guilt y that is strong enoug h to stan d in light of the reasons agains t fail ing in his duties as military commander i n the wa y explaine d i n chapter 2 in defense of dilemmas. So on this account "ought-to-feel " woul d not yiel d a further dilemma within duty ethics, though b y the same token i t would not affor d a wa y o f preserving virtue against the problem s raise d o n th e lowe r leve l b y "ought-to-do." Agamemnon presumably ought to forgo virtue in favor of right action, if he has to choose. Moral sensitivity as a requirement of virtue will make virtue unachievable , in short , eve n wit h th e "time-bound " imperfection s I allowed for i n section 1 . A possible way around this conclusion might involve a return to the broa d sense of guilt, with the suggestion that the agent substitute some less incapacitating emotion suc h as remorse to avoi d a further conflict . Guilt in the narro w sense would stil l be made out a s appropriate (i n the sense of rationally acceptable), no matter what the agent does, but it would not therefore be required by perfect virtue . Remorse coul d stil l serv e to clea r th e agent' s characte r t o th e extent that it is a negative feeling even if not self-directed in quite the same way as guilt, and th e requiremen t to fee l i t might be said to b e in force "all thing s considered." However , remors e migh t als o b e maladaptive i n som e cases — enough so to give rise to a second-order conflic t of the sort just outlined. Though it does not have the self-focus of either guilt or shame and hence might be thought to interfer e les s with activities requiring self-assurance, the mere fact tha t i t is normally a downcast feelin g might inhibit effective action . For that matter, its

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focus on a particular act in the past and on acts of reparation specificall y relate d to it might distract attention from the agent's other obligations in an unhelpfu l way. All that such second-order dilemma s would d o to undercu t virtue ethics is to limit achievable virtue to something even further from moral perfection than we saw i n section 1—eve n on the leve l of sensibility, our substitut e for actio n in light of first-order dilemmas. They do not exhibi t any sort of incoherency in virtue ethics but simpl y subject i t to problem s o f moral luc k similar to thos e that appl y to th e ethic s of duty. Th e poin t i s simply that virtu e ethics woul d seem to b e in no bette r positio n tha n dut y ethics with regard t o mora l dilemmas, a t an y rate if we ris e up a level and conside r possibl e conflicts involving "ought-to-feel." This point rests on a suggestion for avoiding second-order dilemma s within duty ethics , however , b y taking th e requiremen t to fee l guilt y as prima faci e only, which now deserves scrutiny. The suggestion presumably would be meant to save the claim that the statements of "ought-to-do" in dilemmatic cases guide action indirectly via "ought-to-feel." Otherwise , that is, we could not make out indirect action-guidance, or the substitution o f emotion fo r action, a s yielding a conflict-free manifestatio n of motivational force for the oughts in conflict on the lower level. So duty ethics would still seem to be threatened with incoherency. In fact, though, I think this misconstrues th e relevanc e of "ought-to-feel " i n a way that woul d leav e us with problem s o f explanatory coherency . We can see this by considering the connection o f all-things-considered sta tus to the strength of reasons, an d henc e to reasons fo r attention, a s the foundation o f "ought-to-feel." On the perceptual mode l of reasons fo r prohibitio n defended i n reference t o dilemma s in chapter 2 , ou r assignmen t of all-thingsconsidered status to a statement such as "Sacrificing one's daughter is prohibited" woul d amount to a claim that the moral reasons agains t sacrificing one's daughter ar e stron g enoug h to stan d i n ligh t of opposin g reasons . Bu t this is essentially a claim about "salience, " o r the appropriate allocatio n o f attention . The strength or seriousness of a reason i n comparison t o others amount s to its moral o r other practical importance. It is important enoug h to bea r in mind as a reaso n fo r action, i n short—and henc e there is reason t o loa d i t with affect , thus giving rise to emotio n on my account a s the norma l wa y o f fixing atten tion o n some appropriate objec t of thought . Now, thi s latter reason—the reason fo r emotion—might sometimes be balanced by stronger opposing considerations. There are many quite ordinary cases in which emotion is not the best way of directing attention, despite the fact that this standard function i s what sets it off as a distinct mental category. Emotio n can sometime s undermine action o r eve n distract attentio n fro m th e nee d t o act. I f we consider case s o f the sor t tha t cam e int o th e precedin g subsection, where moral action is best promoted by looking away fro m th e moral reason s for it , it seems that a prohibition might be outweighed in some case s even as a reason for attention, since there may be stronger reasons for attending to something else. I have been following Williams , however, in interpreting overriding status

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as implying more than this : that all claims on the other side will be met by acting o n th e reaso n i n question. 55 Bu t surel y Iphigenia , a s th e victi m o f Agamemnon's sacrifice , has a claim on his attention that would not b e met by single-minded devotio n t o hi s dut y a s Gree k commander . I n somethin g lik e McDowell's terms, he r claim is important enoug h not t o b e "silenced" b y any allegedly more pressin g obligation s to others . I prefer the visua l metaphor o f figure/ground: From a certain standpoint o f moral evaluation, her claim stands out agains t th e backgroun d o f countervailing considerations . S o it counts a s all-things-considered, even when w e grant tha t ther e ar e stronge r reason s fo r directing attention elsewhere . According t o much the sam e argument a s we applied t o first-order dilemmas, then , w e d o see m to fac e furthe r dilemma s o f "ought-to-feel. " Despit e appearances, thi s will no t reall y compromise m y propose d resolutio n o f th e metaethical proble m o f dilemmas. Th e keyston e o f the latte r wa s the general version of internalism, according to which moral language by virtue of its meaning has motivational forc e in general terms bu t no t necessaril y in any particular case . Emotio n cam e i n a t thi s metaethica l leve l as th e initia l vehicl e of motivational force , relied on i n early moral teachin g t o connec t "ought " an d similar terms to tendencies to required action. My current argument shows how "ought" may extend t o emotion tendencies too, an d in particular to guilt, as a way of exhibiting the motivational forc e of the first-order ought that the agent has to violate in a dilemma. We should not expect i n this case either, however, that the usual role of emotion woul d b e fulfillable i n every instance. There may be cases lik e Agamemnon's i n which th e agen t als o ha s to violat e "ought-to feel." What thi s possibility undermines is not th e overall coherency of ethics in the terms explaine d above bu t th e agent' s persona l recor d o f action—and hi s virtue, which a t thi s leve l i s not s o clearly distinguishable from it , a s we ca n now se e in application t o som e o f the normativ e problems raise d b y cases of dilemma.

Making Up for Moral Luck Even if dilemmas do not pos e a threat t o the coherency of ethics, they still are troubling as cases of moral luck, or responsibility for factors beyond the agent' s control. In chapter 5 I extend the guilt/blame asymmetry to show that they do not thereby undermine the coherency of the notion o f responsibility, which can be made out i n terms that do not impl y blameworthiness. M y emphasis in my overall argument here is on the metaethica l problems raised by dilemmas. But within normative ethics, dilemmas are problematic insofa r as they indeed saddle an agent with a form of responsibility that undermines her efforts to make something morally worth y of her life . Even without blame, that is, the agent in a dilemma will have to live with a blot on her moral record. My defense of "ought-to-feel" effectivel y extend s her moral record t o includ e her record of emotional reaction an d thus has normative implications. It casts guilt in a positive role as a way of making up for moral luck: Because the emotion serves as a way for the agent to distance herself fro m

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the wrong she has to do via mental self-punishment, it effectively insulate s her character, or virtue proper, from he r record of moral action , o r wha t I distinguished as "merit" in section 1 . In the firs t instance , then , what dilemma s of "ought-to-feel " tel l us is just that even this second-best substitute for action may sometimes be morally ruled out. So it will not work a s a practical response to moral luck in all cases. More generally, however, th e explanatio n o f why i t fail s seem s to m e to brin g ou t what i s fundamentally a t issu e in the problem of moral luck : the fac t tha t th e self t o whic h w e attribut e responsibility , conceived as what cause s action, i s really a construct fro m our actions (along with the other things we take as basic expressions o f moral character ) and henc e in a certain sens e is a fiction . It is fictional as the sort of separable entity on which we can pin responsibility—in a sense that require s a determinate moral character . Kant of course assumed the existence of a separable noumenal self when he made out a good will as compatible with thoroughgoing moral failure. 56 Even without Kantian metaphysics, though, the ordinary notion of responsibility that is threatened by moral luck seems to trade on an artificia l notio n o f the self a s something one could i n principle characterize independently of what i t does. However, this is particularly questionable when we get to th e leve l of feeling , understood accordin g to m y present argumen t in term s o f act s o f attention . Consider Russell's case once again. According to my argument in section 1, the act that he had to do in response to his first-order dilemma, jilting the woman, could b e taken a s affectin g hi s record o f moral actio n bu t no t hi s character . However, i f he als o face d a second-order dilemma , we woul d hav e to giv e a similar treatment to something that intuitivel y seems more central to his character: his emotional response s in morally momentous circumstances. One might attempt to cordon off the circumstances of dilemma, at any rate for agent s who d o not exhibi t a similar general pattern of response. However , if we really suppose that the circumstances in Russell's case are morally serious enough to yield a dilemma—that jilting the woman would cause her serious harm (or we might turn back to Agamemnon's case for a deed that wears its seriousness on its face)—it begins to be unclear how we can form a notion o f the agent' s moral character that does not include his emotional act in the particular instance. The act in question involve s a kind of refusal t o feel—shiftin g attentio n away from any objects of thought that would tend to generate the required emotion— rather tha n simpl e affectiv e numbness , in response t o a morall y momentou s occasion. And it is a long-range act, extendin g beyond the occasio n i n temporal terms . Withholding the response fo r a short period , that is , would no t b e enough to allow the agent to satisfy his primary obligation in the case. Nor could he detach himself from his refusal t o feel, on our understandin g of the case, by rising to yet a further leve l and punishing himself with guilt for it—or not until so much time has passed tha t th e resul t would seem t o coun t a s a chang e in character. S o at this level, apparently, one is more or les s what one does . That i s why i t ca n als o b e appropriat e t o blam e someone wh o i s simply prevented b y his own emotiona l incapacity from satisfyin g "ought-to-feel" — not necessarily an agent confronted with a dilemma but a sociopath, say, who

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does not hav e it in her to fee l remors e fo r a vicious murder; or fo r that matter , the real-life Russell. My asymmetrical treatment of guilt and blame along with various other "reactiv e attitudes"—to us e Strawson's ter m in bringing them t o bear o n fre e wil l issues—will therefor e no t yiel d any sor t o f uncomplicate d overall asymmetry as applied to moral responsibility. 57 On the level of "oughtto-feel" th e guilt/blame asymmetry may i n fact b e reversed: It may b e socially adaptive on the whole to blam e others for certain morally crucial feelings they cannot help , just because it expresses our own standpoint and commitments a s moral agents. By contrast, guil t for one's ow n unavoidabl e feelings o r refusal s to fee l might seem to have lost its usual moral point: By shifting attention awa y from th e objec t of the require d feeling s t o one' s own failur e t o hav e them, i t would simpl y set up anothe r for m of distraction. The result of some personal deficiencies, in short, i s a deficient person, eve n if h e had n o chance to b e other tha n h e is. What w e fee l i n response i s rightly thought o f as blame, moreover, i n the sense of personal anger—not just hatre d or some other emotion tha t focuses on the person as distinct from what h e does. On the account defended here, the agent does something morally condemnabl e in such a case: He violates a statement o f "ought-to-feel." Eve n in cases of second-order dilemma , where w e can presumably assign the cause of the agent' s emotional deficiency to the moral demand s of the situation rather tha n to per sonal mora l coldness, w e would typicall y feel a n aversion to the cold-bloode d agent o f harm that migh t b e seen as an emotional correlate o f "tainting." If I am right, then, an understanding of moral luck and related free will issues ultimately require s coming t o term s wit h wha t amount s t o somethin g lik e a Humean versio n of the moral self : a fictionally independen t entity, invented to serve as a stable object of praise and blame. 58 If this notion raise s problems fo r the coherency of ethics—if its fictional status means that we have to retrac t i n moments o f reflection what we need to sa y as functioning moral agents—the y are at an y rate no t problem s specia l to dilemmas. For present purposes i t will be enough to make clear with reference to con crete cases like Russell's that claims about reactiv e attitudes like guilt and blam e will not yield any simple way out of the problems raised by moral luck . We can find som e further importan t complication s in variants of Russell's case that do not amoun t t o dilemma s i n my terms bu t instea d raise issue s of whether an d how action and its consequences "stic k to " th e moral self. Suppose we alter the case as I have interpreted it and assum e that Russell was guilty of some element of negligence—perhaps he inappropriately led the woman on, to get her to com e to England—tha t make s th e cas e fal l shor t o f perfec t virtue. I t woul d the n amount to a dilemma of the sort that Aquinas recognized, a result of the agent' s own wrongdoing , eve n if wrongdoing o f a relatively minor sor t tha t doe s no t typically have such devastating consequences . I take it that in such a case we would hold Russell at least partly responsibl e for th e consequence s of his action, eve n if our blam e is mitigated somewha t i n degree b y the fac t tha t the y were completely unforeseeable. W e woul d blam e him fo r causing the woman's demise , that is—no t just for leading her on , an d not jus t t o th e limite d extent tha t w e would blam e him i f he ha d le d he r o n

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without suc h extreme consequences. Th e cas e woul d resembl e one i n whic h driving home from a party slightly intoxicated results in a car accident—a variant of the case of an unavoidable car accident that I deal with in chapter 5, bu t one that i s avoidable in long-range terms in the sense that the agent could an d should hav e prevented the acciden t b y refrainin g fro m drivin g whil e intoxi cated.59 The point for present purposes i s that the agent's faul t a s we conceive it in such cases does sprea d to th e consequence s of her action , s o we think it reasonable to blame her in light of the harm she actually causes. We do not jus t expect he r t o fee l guilt y about i t hersel f i n order t o distanc e herself from he r record o f action an d thus preserve virtue—even whatever imperfect virtue she can stil l clai m compatibly with wha t sh e did—as in my treatmen t o f cases in section 1 . She is damned by the harmfu l consequence s o f her deed . Th e poin t also holds for Russell's case, supposing that harmful consequences would result from a morally mandated response to the first-order conflict . One might be tempted to correct fo r the oddity of these ordinary judgments of responsibility by subtracting out moral luck factors, but any such attempt t o tidy them u p for theoretical purposes woul d thro w the m ou t o f line with ou r intuitive assessmen t o f th e correspondin g reactiv e attitudes. Consider , fo r instance, the suggestion that an agent guilty of minor negligence without harmfu l consequences ought properly t o fee l jus t a s guilty as i f she had cause d majo r harm, since her character would be no different fro m tha t of the agent who did . This amounts to another way of separating virtue from merit. It seems unreasonable, though, where the harm in question is not even foreseeable in general terms a s the sor t o f thin g that migh t wel l happen i f one commit s th e mino r misdeed in question. This is how Russell' s case differ s fro m the cas e of mino r negligence that might have caused a car accident but did not. I n the latter case , guilt is warranted no t jus t by the possible consequences of such negligence but also b y their likelihood—the risk the agen t actuall y (and knowingly) took b y drinking while intoxicated, say. The standard way of generating guilt for something of the sort is in fact to imagin e the possible consequences as if they were actual, and we can reasonably demand that the agent do so—vividly enough to induce greater care in the future. Bu t that i s nothing to what w e would expec t of her i f the consequence s actually occurred, an d sh e did i n fact kill someon e through negligence. So the real-lif e Russel l who treate d th e woma n h e jilted somewha t badly , but with no very bad results, ought presumably to feel some guilt in light of the normal sort s of wounds that can b e inflicted b y such behavior—not just for a violation o f gentlemanly honor o r th e like . Some guilt may b e in order o n th e same grounds, in fact, even in a case where the woman turn s out to suffer noth ing at all—because she immediately takes up with someone else , say—though here I think the demand for self-punitive emotion would agai n be mitigated in degree, this time by events as they actually ensued. However, i t would be unreasonable to expect Russel l in either of these cases to fee l what w e would expec t him t o fee l i n the case of catastrophic moral luck. That there are such cases is something I take to b e a fact o f moral life, to b e understood bu t no t mad e any easier, even in a theoretical sense, by appeal t o

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our reactiv e attitudes on the sort o f account propose d here . For emotions als o reflect moral luck. My account of guilt for the unavoidable in chapter 5 will be relevant to the question, then, insofar as it lets us extend the emotion an d even appropriate instance s of it beyond an agent's morally culpable acts. But it will thereby offe r a way of accommodating th e phenomenon rathe r tha n attempt ing to dispel it or to reinvent ethics in light of it; for the Humean self that picks up its character from its consequences is not simply a philosopher's notio n that might b e rejected while maintaining the social practices that constitute moral ity. I take i t to b e our ordinar y notion , underlyin g our ordinar y treatment of the moral sentiments .

5 Unavoidable Guil t Several recen t author s o n guil t and relate d notion s apparentl y allo w fo r th e rationality of guilt feelings in at least some cases o f unavoidable wrong. Their views yield differen t decision s o n som e troublin g real-life case s rangin g from the case of an unavoidable ca r accident that, without any fault o n the part of the driver, results in the death of a child to cases of survivor's guil t and vicarious or collective guilt. I now wan t t o tak e a new look a t thes e cases and oth ers—and a critical look a t some o f the views of guilt proposed—in a n attemp t to wor k ou t a n understandin g of the content of guilt and th e ground s fo r its appropriateness tha t wil l better suppor t th e general conclusion tha t detache s grounds for guilt from grounds for blame . This project rests on a rejection of the standard vie w of guilt as involving a corresponding evaluativ e judgment that w e find, most notably , i n Rawls. 1 O n this "judgmentalist " account , emotiona l guilt—wha t w e ma y distinguis h a s "subjective" guilt—requires a judgment (in the sense of a belief) that on e actu ally i s guilty, a judgmen t o f "objective " guil t o f the sor t tha t implie s mora l responsibility. Views differ o n whether this requirement is to b e imposed onl y on appropriat e instance s or o n all genuine instances o f the emotion, a s Rawls apparently has in mind. At any rate, there is a way of accommodating guil t for the unavoidable that remain s within th e judgmentalist framework bu t weak ens the content o f the requisit e judgment to an attribution o f causal responsi bility that extend s t o case s lik e the acciden t cas e while apparently rulin g out survivor's guilt and othe r dispute d cases as impossible . What I want t o defen d her e i n oppositio n t o thi s accoun t i s a nonjudgmentalist view of guilt that see s the subjectively guilty agent as "feelin g as if " he were morally responsibl e (sectio n 1) . On m y own view , guilt amount s t o discomfort with a certain evaluative prepositional objec t and hence may be said to correspond t o a judgment, though one can undergo the feeling without holding the judgment. Indeed, one can even undergo it appropriately, a s I argue in section 2 . My view will allow u s to interpre t survivor' s guil t and othe r dispute d cases as having the same sort of content a s moral instance s of guilt; it will also give us a framework for fine r grained consideration o f questions o f emotiona l appropriateness in application to the ful l rang e of cases. My view takes guilt as adequately warranted b y a partial subset of the total body of evidence bearing on its corresponding judgment—a perceptual "slice " of the evidence, one might say, that on practical grounds is seen as sufficient t o 151

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warrant holding in mind the evaluative content o f the judgment. We may think of this as a "perspectival " accoun t o f emotional appropriateness . Th e general idea behind the view is that emotional discomfor t serves as a way of holding an evaluative thought i n mind—as distinc t fro m puttin g i t into storage , a s wit h belief—so tha t warran t fo r a n emotio n i s properly affecte d b y nonevidentia l reasons for attention to its evaluative component. Thes e include various instrumental functions that such attention serves , including social or moral functions, along with any noninstrumental moral or other norms that affect its value under similar circumstances. I argue that the view therefore supports a n asymmetri cal treatmen t o f guil t an d blame , a s form s of emotiona l punishmen t whos e practical effect s diffe r becaus e guilt imposes th e punishmen t on th e on e wh o undergoes the emotion whereas blam e imposes it on someone else. In a word, guilt is sometimes appropriate, i n contrast t o blame, when we do not hav e adequate warrant fo r th e correspondin g judgment . After defending this point i n general terms, I attempt to teas e ou t som e o f its implications for our dispute d cases of guilt fo r th e unavoidable . I then turn t o problem s tha t arise in applying the view to cases of moral dilemma, as cases in which guilt is unavoidable because the agen t mus t d o wrong, thoug h an y particular wron g he does will be avoidable. The guilt/blame asymmetry explains our reluctanc e to blame the agent in a dilemma, but i t also seems to exhibit the inadequacy of a subjectiv e definitio n of dilemmas , a s cases i n which eithe r alternative warrants guilt. The argument allowin g for guilt without mora l responsibility also apparently supports at least some cases of guilt without wrong as perspectivally appropriate. A subjective definition of dilemmas would therefore seem to imply only th e prim a faci e wrongnes s o f eithe r alternative . However, I shal l try t o show ho w we can extract an objective notion fro m m y treatment of appropri ate guilt (section 3) by way o f the referenc e to "tainting " tha t come s int o ou r explanation of the desire for reparation characteristi c of the emotion . My account of guilt will have to b e complex enough to yield plausible distinctions betwee n dilemma s an d othe r cases , includin g our initia l cases o f perspectivally appropriate guilt, where we want to deny that the agent really is guilty. However , I shall begin b y narrowin g attentio n t o th e questio n o f th e content o f guilt in cases of the latte r sort , especially the familia r cas e o f guilt for causing the death o f a child in an unavoidable car accident . In effect, I shall be arguing that th e simplest ways o f responding to suc h cases are too simple : Either they rule out guilt as something other than the emotion it appears to be or the y accep t i t a s unproblematicall y rationa l i n a wa y tha t seem s equally counterintuitive. I shall eventually argue that it is rational—but on the basis of the mor e comple x "nonjudgmentalist " accoun t I shal l defend here , firs t i n application to guilt itself and then t o the grounds for its appropriateness . 1. Subjectiv e Guil t and Responsibilit y How shoul d we analyze emotional guilt? The feelin g would seem to rest on self blame, but we should note first that it does not always have the active or aroused

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quality of anger. Following the rough lines of Aristotle's definition I take anger— meaning persona l anger , th e varian t o f th e emotio n tha t amount s t o other directed emotional blam e as opposed to mer e frustration—to involve a desire to inflic t som e sor t of punishment on it s object for a wrong. 2 I would analyze the emotio n furthe r into affective an d evaluativ e aspects b y taking the desir e for punitive action as involving discomfort at an unfulfilled actio n requirement— at th e though t tha t the agent , o r th e subjec t o f emotion, ough t t o punis h it s object, meanin g tha t actio n o n he r par t i s still neede d t o effec t punishment . Anger thus is seen as an aroused feelin g at least partly becaus e of its essential orientation towar d action—its threat o f continuing discomfort unles s and until the agent does punish the object—even though it may sometimes be satisfied without action , o r without action o n the part of the agent, perhaps b y an apology from the object. An apology might be seen as a kind of self-punishment t o the exten t tha t i t involve s self-abasement, s o i t seem s t o coun t a s a n activ e expression o f guilt . Fo r tha t matter , emotiona l guil t involve s a kin d o f self punishment in cases in which the agent has some control over whether he experiences that unpleasant feeling. But it is important that, if anger is thought o f as originally grounded i n an animal urge to attack , guil t comes ou t no t a s a self directed versio n o f the urge—a n urge to attac k oneself—bu t as a les s aggres sive counterpart o f it, requiring in the first instanc e reparation, o r some way of making amends. Guil t may thus involve self-punishment as a form of repara tion alon g with the readiness to submit to attack o r to other punishmen t from others; in developed form, though, i t is not simpl y inwardly directed anger . One might still say that the different desire s for action essentia l to guilt and (personal) anger both hav e the same general end: a state of affairs i n which the perpetrator someho w "pay s for" a prior wrong. They differ i n where they place the burden of active responsibility for accomplishin g that end, each assigning to a differen t agen t a requiremen t o f action enforce d b y .discomfort unti l th e job is done. This difference o f course amounts to a limited structural similarity: The agents in question here are different i n relation to the prior wrong, but they are both subject s of the relevant emotion. O n the other hand, anger has a per sonal object, viewed as the perpetrator o f the wrong, whereas guilt also assign s this prior sort o f responsibility t o th e subject . Insofar as they both hol d som e such guilt y party t o account , though , bot h emotion s ultimatel y rest o n th e attribution of responsibility for a wrong. S o on the assumption tha t emotiona l evaluations amount t o judgments—th e assumption I call "judgmentalism" — one might look fo r the basic content of both emotion s i n a judgment of respon sibility. The judgment yields emotional guil t and blam e as different specifica tions of the urge to right a wrong depending on the agent's practical standpoint . I now want t o consider problem s with this view and ways of defending it in application t o som e familia r cases of guilt in which we do no t see m to hav e a judgment of moral responsibility: cases of guilt without fault. I shall work wit h the cas e of guilt for a n unavoidabl e car acciden t an d construc t a variant of it that seems to involv e guilt without agency t o sho w th e inadequacy of a recent attempt t o defen d judgmentalis m by framing th e accoun t o f guilt i n terms of causal responsibility . I think we ca n se e that thi s move commits the agen t i n

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such cases to a counterintuitive degree of irrationality. I shall attempt t o sho w that a nonjudgmentalist account tha t preserves the reference t o moral respon sibility would square better with intuition, particularly as extended to more standard case s o f guilt without agenc y that anothe r recen t autho r make s ou t a s rational but nonmoral. I shall end this section by extracting from the cases some features o f the practical role of the emotion tha t see m to yield a rational basis for case s o f guilt without blame.

Guilt without Fault On th e vie w of the conten t o f guilt just described, the emotio n i s sui generis, though it s evaluative structure links it closely to anger, with differences in desire content bu t th e same evaluative basis for desire in a judgment of responsibility for a wrong. It seems natural to thin k of the latte r a s a judgment of moral re sponsibility, for a version of this view that I shall call "naive judgmentalism." A naive judgmentalist analysis of guilt makes feeling guilt y rest o n a straight forward belie f that one is guilty, a judgment simply asserting the evaluative content of the emotion. But this analysis seems immediately to be called into question by cases of guilt without fault—clear-cu t cases , in which the agent may be assumed t o kno w tha t h e i s not a t faul t (a n assumption I shall often take fo r granted i n what follows)—suc h as guilt at causin g the deat h o f a chil d i n a n unavoidable ca r accident . Eve n supposing tha t th e feeling s i n suc h case s ar e irrational, it seems undeniable that they occur, and almost undeniable that they amount t o guil t feelings. The denia l that they amount to guilt is suggested b y the responses o f naive judgmentalists to another sor t of case, in which the agent does not believ e that some ac t o f his was wrong , thoug h he does accept ful l responsibilit y for it . A standard example , found in Rawls, involves the violatio n of a religious taboo in a religion the agent was taught a s a child but no w rejects. 3 What th e agen t now feel s whe n h e violates the Sabbath , fo r instance , ma y b e a feelin g o f discomfort persisting from childhood experience s of guilt, but on this view it cannot b e a genuine case o f guilt. It may see m that w e nee d some vie w of this sort t o distinguis h guilt fro m various other emotions that migh t be confused with it, such as fear o f punishment or other forms of anxiety that might be thought of as its childhood predecessors. Eve n as supplemented by a desire to hea d of f or appeas e th e punishment—by performin g some ac t of the sor t tha t amount s t o reparatio n wher e we do have guilt—this feeling needs to be conjoined with a view of the punishment as somehow justified , to amount to (subjective ) guilt. Built into the notio n of guilt, that is—as distinct from, say, fear of persecution—is a kind of acknowledgment of grounds for punishment as given in the corresponding judgmen t of fault. In general, it seems that emotions have an evaluative content that determines their classification—distinguishin g guil t from fea r an d variou s other unpleasant reaction s that ma y no t alway s be so distinct from i t in affectiv e quality . I take this to b e the main point i n support of a judgmentalist analysis, though I

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think it can also be used to construct a n evaluative view that does no t require the content o f an emotio n to b e an objec t of strict belief . But before we abandon judgmentalism , we might tr y makin g room withi n i t fo r case s o f "emo tional inertia, " o r th e la g of feelings behin d their corresponding beliefs , as in taboo cases of the sor t jus t illustrated. In a n attemp t t o accommodat e tabo o cases withi n a versio n of judgmentalism, one recent author, Gabriel e Taylor, seem s briefly to bring together tw o such strategies.4 First , the naive judgmentalist analysis of guilt might be retained by simply weakening the notio n o f judgment o r belief , takin g it to cove r an y thoughts that com e to mind, even if they are immediately rejected by "consid ered judgment." Thus, Taylo r say s that the act forbidden by a taboo retaine d from childhoo d stil l "presents itself " as wrong in the circumstances of action , though no t when the agent considers it "from a more rational point o f view. " Her introductor y remark s o n emotion s an d belief 5 indicat e tha t sh e woul d interpret th e notio n o f belie f t o includ e the sor t o f mental stat e suggeste d b y "presents itself " i n this passage: wha t i s sometimes calle d a n "a s if " feeling . An agent's residual feelings from childhood religious belief would still count as involving belief s o n thi s accoun t a s lon g a s the y hav e th e though t conten t required for feeling s o f guilt. Second, one might also allow for taboo cases by weakening that evaluative content, the content o f the judgment in question, allowing for something like a conventional interpretatio n o f "justified " punishment. Punishmen t migh t b e thought to be justified i n some sense, that is, as long as it is imposed fo r violating an authoritative rule , meaning one whose authorit y is generally accepted, even if the agent questions the reasons fo r it himself. What on e feels guilty for, on thi s view, is just the violatio n of a taboo—not necessaril y a moral wron g and hence not enough to satisfy the naive judgmentalist analysis. Though Tay lor apparently combines a move of this sort ( I have restated he r version of it to apply more clearl y to rules ) wit h the weakene d notion o f belie f tha t wa s just noted, it would seem to be sufficient o n its own to allow for guilt in taboo cases. Both o f these two genera l judgmentalist strategies—weakening the notio n of belie f o r th e evaluativ e content o f the belie f require d fo r a guil t feelings — may b e extended t o th e cases with whic h we are concerned. Her e th e agent' s responsibility i s in questio n rathe r tha n th e mora l evaluatio n o f hi s act , o r whether i t amounts t o a wrong i n the sens e of something forbidde n as in th e taboo cases . A different versio n of the second strategy , yieldin g what migh t be called a "weak " judgmentalis t analysis of guilt, stand s behin d Taylor' s ow n treatment of such cases. I want t o consider it here at some length , since it represents a possibility intermediat e betwee n naive judgmentalism and m y ow n view. Taylor interpret s emotiona l guil t in terms o f a weaker sor t of judgment of responsibility tha n tha t involve d in ordinary judgments of fault: causal rathe r than mora l responsibility. 6 As applied to the accident case, thi s notion appar ently would make guilt feelings unproblematic, though it would also leave one puzzled a s to ho w thei r rationality could be called into question. If subjective guilt implies only the self-attributio n o f causal responsibility, feelings o f guilt

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at causing the death of a child, however unavoidably , would see m to b e clearly appropriate a s well as authentic . Of course it is not unthinkabl e that the analysi s of such complex emotion s as guilt might yield a few conceptual surprises . Bu t the onl y advantag e o f the weak judgmentalis t analysis seems to b e its straightforward treatmen t o f this and othe r putativel y rational case s of emotion a s cases o f rational belief . Fo r an idea of the problems it faces in application t o irrational cases we might compare th e usual version of the acciden t case with on e not eve n involving causal responsibility. Consider wha t the weak judgmentalis t account woul d hav e us say about the distinction betwee n th e usual version of the case, in which harm results from something the agent does (albeit unavoidably), and a case in which the chain of causation lead s back without interruption to some prior cause. For instance, what i f the agent's car had simpl y been propelled int o a nearby child by anothe r vehicl e that hi t it—an d that would hav e hit th e child, ha d hi s car not been there—so that the accident i n no way resulted from his agency? Here Taylor woul d apparently hav e to dismiss guilt as unintelligible—at any rate, in an agent assumed to b e otherwise basicall y rational—since the emotion coul d not have even the weaker belie f content require d by her suggested modification of its standard judgmentalis t analysis. Intuitively speaking , however , I think w e hav e t o sa y that suc h case s ar e possible. We can imagine someone goin g over in memory the sequence of events leading up to the crash, pulling out a subset of them to focus on that is compatible with the usual scenario, th e one that does involve responsibility, and feel ing guilty. His reason need not be uncertainty about what happened bu t rather , say, some irrational tendency to fix on the worst possible interpretation o f events from th e standpoin t o f self-esteem . Perhaps h e wa s taugh t t o blam e himself excessively as a child. I take this sort of tendency to be compatible with overall cognitive rationality : Th e agen t on e ha s i n mind her e i s not cognitivel y confused i n th e usua l sense—hi s syste m o f settle d belief s i s not disrupted—bu t instead is subject to a relatively localized disruption of the normal response tendencies. However, in order to accommodate suc h cases within judgmentalism— to preserve a foothold fo r real but irrational guilt feelings—we apparently need to brin g in a version of Taylor's first strategy for handling emotional inerti a in taboo cases, with a notion o f belief wea k enoug h t o allo w fo r cognitive delusion. Further weakening the content o f belief woul d mak e the case com e ou t a s rational, that is; so to explain it as a case of irrational emotion o n this account , we apparently have to ascrib e to its agent a n irrationa l causal belief. We have to grant that the agent i n the case believe s himself causally responsible fo r the accident. The agen t clearly feels as if he were responsible—at an y rate, off and on, o r at those time s when h e focuses on the subse t of his memories tha t suggests that interpretatio n o f events—eve n thoug h h e knows h e i s not an d dis misses the feelin g as deluded. But the judgmentalist account o f the case insists that th e feelin g implie s a deluded belief. If we have to allow this much cognitive delusion, however, why not attribut e to th e agen t a deluded belief i n moral responsibility ? The strateg y o f weaken-

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ing th e naiv e judgmentalis t analysis o f guilt—th e strateg y tha t yield s wea k judgmentalism—might seem to be unnecessary, in other words, when one con siders the weak sense of "belief" th e analysis still presupposes. W e might extract a simila r point fro m th e taboo cases: An agent migh t sometimes fee l lingerin g guilt about th e violation of a religious rule that is not actuall y accorded muc h authority i n hi s adult lif e eve n i n conventiona l terms , thoug h i t wa s i n forc e during childhood. Particularl y clear-cut example s migh t b e drawn fro m rule s of conduct meant to be limited to children, such as prohibitions of naughty words and the like, to show tha t th e weakening o f belief content t o handle irrationa l cases does no t reall y represent a distinct alternativ e t o the reliance on a wea k notion o f belief . At most, the weak judgmentalist strategy serves to contain the extent of the cognitive delusion that the naive judgmentalist strategy attribute s to the agen t in such cases. I t makes out th e firs t version o f the acciden t case as undeluded , that is, and hence as clearly rational; o n the other hand, it seems to yield a treat ment of the second versio n of the cas e a s involving a deeper kind of delusion : delusion as to the facts. Rather than merely being confused about the standard s for mora l responsibilit y or somethin g similar , the agen t mus t on thi s accoun t mistakenly believe that h e somehow cause d th e accident after all. More precisely , he must both believ e this and believ e it to be false, either at the sam e tim e o r wit h n o goo d reaso n fo r a chang e o f mind , sinc e o n ou r hypothesis he knows he is not responsible for the accident, though he feels com pelled to dwel l on th e subse t o f events tha t suggest s tha t h e is. The cas e thu s requires logical conflict; so the exten t of delusion require d by weak judgmentalism still seems excessive. It is minor onl y if one considers how littl e may b e built int o th e notio n o f belie f on eithe r versio n o f judgmentalism : Any stra y thought would seem to have to qualify, if all of the cases in question here are t o count a s cases o f guilt. On th e assumptio n tha t belie f interpreted i n any reasonabl y strict sens e is governed b y a principle of logical charity , I would tur n instea d to a nonjudgmentalist analysis of emotion.7 Whereas the weak judgmentalist analysis of guilt allows for a weaker judgment than the judgment of moral responsibility required by the naive analysis, my approach would allo w fo r something weaker tha n a judgment bu t stil l framed in terms o f moral responsibility . In general, instea d of claiming that emotion s entai l evaluative beliefs, I take them sometimes just to involve evaluative thoughts held i n mind by intentional states of comfort o r discomfort. Thus , whe n an agent feel s guilty about th e death caused b y an accident he was involved in, he need not actuall y assent t o the evaluative basis of his emotion—the though t o f himself as responsible for a wrong—but h e doe s have to be discomfited by it in a sense that involve s entertaining the thought as an objec t of discomfort . This is not to say that the agent merely "entertains" such a thought; it s status as an objec t of discomfort (with discomfort taken as a general state o f feelin g of a sor t on e would naturally want t o escape ) is essential to th e motivationa l cast of my account. Nor d o I want t o say, on the other hand, that the agent ha s to entertain such a thought explicitly. Let me very briefly try to cancel out som e

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misleading suggestions of my account and t o indicat e the general rationale for it before considering its application to cases. First, the agent's discomfort about a certain evaluativ e thought is understood t o b e directed toward th e prepositional conten t o f the thought , th e stat e o f affair s i t concerns, no t towar d th e fact tha t i t occurs t o hi m or som e logica l or othe r featur e o f it as an object of contemplation. Second , my analysis is meant to allow for unconscious emotions, as involving conscious states of affect (comfor t or discomfort) but with evaluative objects that th e agent cannot identif y correctly. 8 Further, though the analysis is understood t o be limited to occurrent emotions, s o that guil t amount s t o occurren t discomfor t a t a certai n evaluative thought, the thought content of an emotion need not itself be taken as occurrent. There need be no episode of mental utterance corresponding to an unconscious thought; and even on the conscious level , talk of thoughts might be replaced by statements describin g relations amon g hypothetica l objects o f attention. Th e claim that an agent' s discomfor t in a case of guilt, say, is occurrently directed toward a thought o f himself as responsibl e might be understood a s meaning that attention to his discomfort would lea d to awareness of that thought in the absence o f various barrier s t o attention—includin g barriers of th e sor t tha t presumably make guilt unconscious. It is tempting to equate a dispositional mental state of attention t o a proposition, of the sort here in question, with a belief . However, I take the relevant disposition t o be tied in a special way to prereflective features of "mental set, " as part o f a preparatory for m o f practical reasonin g that sometime s turns on remaining subliminal, immune from the intellectua l criticism that belie f i s expected t o withstand. 9 Emotiona l evaluations, in short, amount to pattern s of attention, without the stability we expect o f beliefs. That belief implies a degree of logica l coherency is suggested by some recen t treatments of more straightforwardly cognitiv e influences o n behavior . Stephen Stich, for instance, interprets the less logically structured behavioral dispositions of nonhuman animals as "subdoxasti c states, " an d i n a treatmen t o f developed practical reasoning Michael Bratman uses the term "acceptance" fo r a state of taking some proposition for granted without belie f relativ e to a given practical context. 10 What Bratman has in mind is the sort of assumption—about the likelihood of an earthquake, in one example—that it is rational to make in some context s and not others (depending, for instance, on the practical costs of error) in deliberating about what to do. It would not be rational on Bratman's account to let belief var y with the context—a n instanc e of th e principl e of logical charity, I take it, based on the primary tie of belief to theoretical contexts. I want to suggest, further, that what I have called "as if " feelings in my argument above may be picked out on the model of Bratman's states of "acceptance" b y their role in practical reasoning. Their role is of course somewhat different; but like Bratman, I shall be content to characterize them in terms of it—in terms of a kind of idealized or normative functional role , in effect—without attemptin g to say anything about thei r nature in themselve s excep t that the y otherwis e resemble beliefs. Generally speaking , on th e accoun t I have applied to guilt , emotio n add s motivational force to our explicit reasoning from judgment s insofar as it directs

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attention t o certain thoughts by loading them with discomfort. The usual practical point o f guilt, after all , is to motivat e actio n o n a moral ought-judgment by inflicting emotiona l punishment for the failure to act . A s we have seen, the mechanism can operat e i n advance of action a s applied to th e mer e anticipa tion of moral failure : the thought of oneself as already responsible for a wrong, even when thi s does not amoun t t o a belief . What it amounts t o i s a momen tary objec t of (dispositional) attention, held in mind an d allowed t o influenc e thought an d behavio r as i f it were believed , though unlik e belief it woul d b e discarded upo n a moment's reflection. The point is to generate a readiness to act that resists reflection, along with the ability to ignor e or explain away the practical urging s of judgment. Emotional motivatio n on this account reinforces the usua l model of practical rea soning with the need to discharge discomfort as a reason for action beyond what is provided b y the evaluative content of emotion, whic h may or may not b e an object of belief. Like Bratman's "acceptance," a n emotional evaluation is treated temporarily o r fo r certain purpose s a s if it were believed . This means that, in discussing cases of the sort at issue here, we cannot take at face value the various thoughts that might occur to an agent: Some mental contents that could be seen as self-ascriptions of responsibility—the agent's reflection tha t he should never have gone out that night , for instance—would b e most charitabl y interpreted on that account as nonjudgmental. They may sometimes just amount t o questions the agent puts to himself or thoughts h e considers and rejects; or they may be held in mind on something other than a literal reading as responsibility ascriptions. On some such assumptions, at any rate, we may say that guilt does involve a thought of oneself as morally responsible but that i t need not alway s involve the corresponding belief . The nonjudgmental analysis will therefore allow for guilt without cognitive delusion even in the second version of the accident case, in which the agent feels guilt y just as a result of passive causal involvement in a child's death , though h e knows he lacks even causal responsibility for it . In effect, th e analysi s limits his disturbance to th e leve l o f emotion b y detaching emotion fro m belief . It also has the advantage, as I shall argue, of allowing fo r guilt i n some case s where on e might b e tempted t o detac h th e emotio n eve n from a thought of moral o r causal responsibility.

Guilt without Agency A crucial test of my nonjudgmentalist analysis will be its ability in the next section t o provid e a foundatio n fo r som e defensibl e distinction s o n th e issu e of emotional appropriateness. Fo r present purposes, however , let us just attempt to use the analysis to accommodate some apparent cases of guilt. First, in what follows, I show how the analysis allows for clearly irrational cases like the one just discussed (but without yet defending their classification a s irrational). Then I appl y i t t o som e arguabl y rational cases tha t eve n the wea k judgmentalis t analysis in terms of causal responsibility would seem to rule out. In effect, then, in th e remainde r of thi s sectio n I shal l b e extendin g my defens e o f th e non -

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judgmentalist analysi s to a widening circle of cases—and t o anothe r possibl e way of weakening the notion of responsibility—with implications for the justifi catory questio n o f guilt versus blame. My analysi s differs fro m th e judgmentalis t analyses considere d s o fa r i n allowing guilt to take on objects other than the agent's acts—or thing s he does, if that should be taken more broadly; or even, perhaps, event s involving him— for a less clear-cut dividing line than is usually drawn betwee n object s of guilt and shame. O n the usual view, only shame applies to persona l traits , though t of a s distinc t fro m conformit y to rules . Bu t i f there ar e norm s impose d o n children's personal developmen t that a child might be expected t o come to live up to without necessaril y doing anything, then one might very well grow u p to feel guilt y about violatin g them. A n example might b e guilt about no t bein g very bright o r ambitious—not havin g what i t takes t o succeed i n the way that one's parents may have had in mind. The object of guilt here amounts to some thing ove r an d abov e an y definit e omission s on e migh t b e sai d t o hav e per formed—omissions sufficientl y localize d in time to count a s objects of guilt on the usual account. It need not be seen as reducible, say, to a failure to go through some particular stage in development that was supposed t o involve doing something: perfecting one's talents, working hard, or the like. Intuitively speaking, it seems possible, whether or not it is rational, to feel guilt, not just shame, abou t all sorts of uncontrollable inadequacies, inabilities, and trait s o f character o r temperament discourage d b y parents an d other s bu t extendin g a s far bac k i n one's history as the claim to a distinct personality or self. This means that th e objects of guilt in certain cases will violate the assump tions o f Taylor's analysi s by failing to allo w for reasonable causal attributio n to the agent in terms of either event-causation of the usual (Humean) sort or an indeterministic notion o f "agent-causation." 11 I shall come bac k to these tw o alternatives for making out causa l responsibility in a moment, but firs t le t me introduce another sor t of case that might tempt us just to abandon referenc e to responsibility or a t an y rate to weaken th e sense of the ter m further—th e approach take n b y Herbert Morri s i n his defense o f "nonmoral" guilt. 12 Morris mark s off as nonmoral a subtype of guilt that does not involv e culpability; he explains it instead, in effect, a s a form of "separation guilt, " base d on the severing of personal tie s to member s of a group wit h whic h one identifies. Although Morris's argument focuses directly on the notion o f appropriat e guilt rather tha n startin g from a n analysi s of the conten t o f the emotion , i t is relevant to m y discussion her e because it yields a kin d o f opposit e pol e fro m Taylor's accoun t in application to cases of guilt without agency . Unlike my own view, it does not requir e even the thought o f oneself as somehow i n the posi tion o f an agent . The cases just cited of guilt for personal shortcomings might indeed seem to involve another sor t of responsibility besides the sort at issu e in moral blame . Children growing up are more or less held accountable by their parents for living up to parental expectations. I would treat this as sometimes giving rise to a tendency (short of belief) for an agent to think of himself as if he had don e something to make his personality what it is; but Morris would say that moral respon-

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sibility is not necessar y even in thought fo r a genuine (or even an appropriate ) case of guilt. By failing t o confor m t o th e norm s o f the famil y group , a child may in a certain sense be breaking away from the group independently of anything it does, jus t in virtue of basic temperament o r personality; and thi s is all that a judgment of nonmoral guil t asserts o n Morris's account . Morris doe s not appl y hi s view to cases of guilt for traits. However , thes e may not be the strongest cases in favor of either Morris's view or my own. On e might object that their intuitive plausibility as cases of guilt rather than sham e seems to depend on whether they involve behavioral shortcomings—as oppose d to the failure to meet norms of attractiveness and the like—and hence on a kind of general reference to agency. But there is another set of examples among thos e discussed b y Morris, o f guilt for a n undeserve d benefit 13 —ranging from survivor's guil t t o guil t at bein g favored economically over others—t o undercu t the suggestio n that a n objec t of guilt must a t leas t be manifested in behavior . An agen t might know tha t ther e was nothing sh e could hav e done, fo r instance, to keep from being favored over a sibling in her childhood—and noth ing she omitted then or since in attempting t o make up for the inequality . But the inequality itself seems to b e a possible object of guilt. At most, the object of guilt in such cases would seem to involve a passive event—being benefited over others, say . But this i s something tha t happen s t o th e agent , a s in the secon d version of the accident case.14 Responsibility for the unequal state of affairs tha t results from i t would seem to shift bac k to its own causes, then, with n o causal role fo r the agent . It may not b e easy, though, eve n to fin d a n event involving the agen t tha t can serve as part of a causal chain leading to the object of guilt in such cases, if we follow Hume's insistenc e on logicall y distinct caus e an d effect. 15 In som e cases, i t may not b e possible to pic k out an y very definite event. Consider, fo r instance, guilt for one' s beliefs : Commo n tal k o f guilt feelings fo r a failur e of religious belief would seem to apply to a case in which the agent discovers that she never did have the kin d of faith tha t is required of her. Bu t then he r guilt will no t b e attributable t o a n even t of ceasing to believe—o r even, give n the sort o f belief tha t i s in question here , t o a failur e o f belie f formatio n a t som e particular tim e when belie f wa s calle d for . Perhap s sh e migh t se e herself a s involved in some sort of ongoing ac t o f omission o f belief formatio n through out he r life . Bu t although some mov e of this sort might serve to locat e withi n the agent's history a Humean event-cause of her lack of faith, it could not give us the two events we need for a Humean clai m of causal connection. Tha t is, a second applicatio n o f the move would no t see m to pick out a distinct even t to serve as the objec t of guilt in this case. What th e agen t feel s guilt y about, if it does amount to an act, seems to amount to the same act: that lifelong omission of belief . Bu t then sh e would no t com e ou t a s causall y responsible fo r i t i n Humean terms, so the case would still pose a problem for the weak judgmentalist account. Similar case s ar e brough t u p b y Morri s unde r th e headin g o f guil t fo r thoughts, as reasons against requiring culpability.16 By "thoughts" Morri s ha s in min d mainly wishes, bu t i t is worth notin g that th e strengt h o f suc h cases

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depends on assigning them somethin g lik e the dispositional structure of belief in the cases just considered. Actively entertaining a wish, that is—a n occurrent thought o f the sort tha t typically involves an ac t of attention—may be voluntary and hence avoidable. At any rate, it is subject often enoug h to some voluntary control tha t m y nonjudgmentalist interpretation o f guilt as involvin g an "as if" attributio n of responsibility seems to fit. On the other hand, the sort of evil wish about someon e that an agen t migh t discover i n himself—perhaps as something h e ha s carrie d aroun d fo r years—ma y also b e a n objec t o f guilt , whether o r no t har m actuall y befall s the other . Sinc e the proble m jus t note d about distinguishin g cause fro m effec t woul d see m t o appl y to it , though , i t would see m to count agains t wea k judgmentalis m in the way explained wit h reference to beliefs . An alternative strategy for handling the various cases of guilt without agency that hav e surfaced so far migh t involv e appeal t o a notion o f substantial selfcausation that i s broader than agent-causation. Agent-causation is supposed t o be limited to free acts, but perhaps some other things about me are importantl y attributable to me in a sense that appeals neithe r to some distinct event involving me nor to my agency. To say this would not be to deny that there are eventcauses to b e found for character traits, beliefs, and dispositiona l wishes—any more tha n fo r ou r statu s i n relatio n t o othe r member s o f the variou s group s that defin e us . But just because of the wa y suc h notions a s character ar e con structed, thi s consequence of determinism might be held to be compatible with the view that certain traits an d patterns o f action, includin g especially mental action, ar e attributable in a special sens e to th e self . They help define it s individual nature, one might say, along with the sorts of morally self-defining act s that surface d in chapter 4, bu t i n contrast to passive processes lik e the work ings of the digestive tract tha t do not express some basic property of the agent , though they may admit of indirect causal control . This move beyond agent-causation would not solve all problems for the weak judgmentalist view , however . O n Taylor' s causa l versio n o f th e view , fo r instance, only shame, not guilt, is thought t o make sense as a "vicarious" emo tion, in response t o acts ascribed to others—for the behavior of one's children, say, or one's fellow citizens. 17 An d it is important t o note that the view entails not jus t that vicarious guilt is irrational bu t tha t i t is conceptually impossibl e without at least a deluded judgment of indirect causal responsibility: the belief that one' s failing s a s a parent, for instance , mus t hav e been responsible fo r a child's later misdeeds. Intuitively speaking, however, suc h cases seem to b e even more common, if anything , tha n thos e resemblin g th e acciden t cas e wit h whic h I began . Whether rationall y or not , w e sometime s fee l a s i f we wer e responsible fo r the acts of others whose doings would b e said to reflect on us just by virtue of common grou p membershi p without reall y acknowledging an y causal con nection. A case in point migh t be white American guilt about slaver y or guilt felt for various other national misdeeds that occurred before the birth of those who fee l guilty.

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At least sometimes, moreover, suc h feelings see m to b e accepted a s appropriate or reasonable. Morris devotes considerable attention to cases of guilt felt in respons e t o th e act s o f one's natio n a s cases i n favor o f hi s ow n account , which migh t be set up a s an alternativ e version o f weak judgmentalism. 18 In place of a judgment of responsibility in the sense that involves culpability, Morris appeals to our identificatory ties to other group members. Even without a judgment abou t th e latter , though , i f we allo w fo r emotiona l reaction s base d o n imaginative identification with others , w e can mak e out vicariou s guilt as n o more problematic than a host o f vicarious emotions, including the empatheti c reactions to harm don e to others that underli e ordinary guilt on the account I gave in chapter 3 . Taylor's shar p contrast betwee n guilt and sham e on this question actually seems to rest on a misunderstanding of the notion of vicarious emotion. Sham e is commonly felt for acts of others in a way that is not true of guilt. But strictly "vicarious" sham e would amoun t t o sham e fro m th e other's imagine d standpoint; it is "for" anothe r agen t in the sense of being felt o n hi s behalf . If I feel shame in response to the misdeeds of my brother, say, normally my feeling will not b e vicarious; what I am ashame d o f i s something connecte d t o mysel f in real-life terms. My own status is assumed to be diminished by what my brothe r does even without the assumption that I am responsible for it but just by virtue of the fac t tha t statu s is partly a product o f interpersonal ties. Identification o f cours e play s a rol e i n determinin g interpersona l ties . Whether I fee l shame , fo r instance , a t th e misdeed s of a colleagu e i n ethic s depends in part on the importance others assig n to our common categor y bu t also o n m y own tendenc y to grou p mysel f with colleagues in my field. How ever, a simila r point applie s to guil t in case s i n which on e feel s guilt y abou t activities attributable to a group to which one belongs: family, profession, nation, race, o r world . I n fact, there i s a furthe r way o f generating vicarious guilt in such cases that is worth distinguishin g from the usual mechanism of identification wit h othe r individuals . On th e assumptio n tha t responsibilit y can some times be assigned to a group considered a s a whole, not just to its other mem bers, what on e feels ma y depend o n a general kin d of group identification , or imagining oneself as participating in the group's collective actions. "Collective " guilt i n this sense amounts t o th e feelin g o f guilt for involvemen t in a case of collective responsibility.19 It is a prime case, though not the only case, of vicarious guilt, but it seems to rest on the same general identificatory mechanism that can also operate i n extending the bases for shame . What is the function o f guilt in such cases? It can sometimes just amount t o an unavoidabl e cost o f basin g individual identit y on grou p membership , a s Morris wants to say. 20 However, one can often manag e to drop out of a group in imagination. Particularly when the group act s in ways one is fundamentally opposed to , it might seem unclear what the point is of feeling guilty on its behalf. Why should I punish myself for something I would never do—for wars and witch trials I know I would have resisted? Doe s the prid e or othe r pleasure I take in group involvemen t at othe r time s somehow commi t m e to feelin g guilt y i n a

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case where the group goes astray—as a matter o f emotional "logic " or perhap s as a kind o f recompense fo r the benefit s o f group membership? Morris's comments elsewhere suggest grounds of general moral solidarity, 21 but i t is important t o not e tha t th e acceptance o f guilt as appropriate i n such cases falls short of a strict requirement to feel guilty. I may be required on moral grounds t o fee l something fo r th e America n internment o f Japanese civilians during World Wa r II , say; and perhap s m y feeling shoul d in some way reflect my membership in the group tha t committed th e crime. However, i t is unclear why its very content mus t reflect that fact. Assuming that I am myself unlikely to participate i n such collective acts or even to allow them, it might be enough just to feel sympathy and outrage, perhaps to a degree augmented by my ties to the event. The point i s to detac h myself , after all . However, I think we can make out vicarious guilt as having a point, even if not as specifically required, in just such terms. In cases where the identificatory bases of the emotio n admi t o f control, i t can b e seen as a way of clearing oneself of involvement and at the same time expiating the deed on behalf of others by a kind of ritual self-punishment. One identifies with the perpetrator, whethe r a group on e belong s t o or som e other individua l member of it, simply to dis tance oneself and the group as a whole symbolically from th e deed by submitting in emotional term s to the punishment the deed merits . Identification with the victims, that is, does represent an alternative way of exhibiting moral solidarity in response to the case. What distinguishes the func tion of guilt is its self-punitive aspect as a negative self-directed emotion. Thoug h sympathy and outrage may involve an initial layer of negative feeling, they need not feel bad overall in the way that guilt does. I take it, then, that my nonjudgmentalist account serve s to supplement Morris's appeal to identificatory ties in explaining th e distinctiv e role of guilt in suc h cases . Th e "a s if " feelin g tha t one is morally responsible for a wrong and therefore deserves punishment—at any rate, the emotional self-punishment of guilt feelings—seems to make more sense here in intuitive terms, moreover , than Morris's denial that guilt in such cases counts as moral. Morris's distinction between moral and nonmoral guilt allows for a univocal account of the emotion insofar as moral guilt on his account is understood t o rest on separation fro m the moral community.22 But by a kind of transitivity of identification, this would seem to make vicarious cases of moral guilt come out as moral too . My suggested moral-but-nonjudgmental account of the various cases Morris considers seems to me to be compatible with the substance of his view; it rejects only his classification of separation guil t as necessarily nonmoral. I do recog nize cases o f nonmoral guilt—guil t about goin g of f one's health regimen an d similar examples—in which the rule s the agen t violate s are in fact nonmoral , though h e treats the m i n emotional term s a s if they had mora l force . Bu t the distinction does not turn on the issue of culpability. The hardest cases to interpret plausibl y as moral might seem to b e cases o f survivor's guilt. These ma y involve a n undeserve d benefit tha t th e agen t clearly did nothin g to gai n an d can do nothing to mak e up for; so on the assumption o f basic rationality, one might want to question how he could see himself even in "as if" term s as mor-

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ally responsible. Morri s in fact suggests something of the sort himself, though, when he includes these and similar cases in his discussion o f guilt about "unjus t enrichment."23 My own proposal for handling such cases can be strengthened b y appeal t o the self-referential character of guilt. To the extent that guilt functions as a kind of emotional self-punishment , that is, it goes some way toward fulfilling it s own characteristic desir e fo r reparation. Bu t in that case , th e failur e to fee l guilt y counts as a possible object of guilt itself. This effectively redouble s the motivational force of anticipatory guilt—guilt about one's failure (s o far) to make up for a wrong , a s th e basi s fo r a forward-lookin g varian t o f th e emotio n tha t Morris also want s t o recognize. 24 O n m y account o f it in terms o f an "a s if " feeling, the emotion i s sometimes self-generating in anticipatory form : One feel s as if one already has done something wrong simpl y by failing to fee l guilty (or guilty enough) yet. This way o f compounding guil t may seem a fiendish trick. In fact, I think it helps explain som e of the pitfalls of the emotion, i n particular it s obsessive or unappeasabl e qualit y in many cases. Bu t can i t serv e a s a foundatio n fo r guilt, or mus t on e assum e a more basi c negative self-evaluation as a reaso n for th e emotion? I n cases of guilt for an undeserved benefit, I think we might well begi n with anticipator y self-referentia l guilt, i f we appea l t o a deman d for "leveling" : a requirement that th e agen t brin g himself down to th e leve l of others i n a group wit h which he identifies, if only by subjecting himself t o emotional self-punishmen t for exceedin g th e norm. What he should punis h himself with , accordin g t o this suggestion , i s discomfort a t th e thought tha t he has done something to deserve punishment—though all he really may have done i s to fai l to inflic t i t so far. Indeed, som e demand o f the sort—requirin g in th e firs t instanc e unconsciou s self-referentia l guilt, whic h the n ma y b e masked b y guilt with som e othe r (perhap s indefinite ) object—ma y see m o n occasion t o be imposed b y others as a condition o f participation i n the group s to whic h w e ar e boun d b y mutual identification . Breakin g awa y fro m th e family, for instance—whether b y one's own efforts or by the death of parent s or other misfortunes of family members that do not befal l oneself—is a prime source of separation guil t and ca n sometimes b e encouraged b y family mem bers. Morris's discussio n bring s u p resentmen t an d indignatio n a s appropriat e reactions on the part of others (alon g with self-reproach on the part of the agent as involved in feelings of guilt) only in connection with moral guilt. 25 But others' reactions in nonmoral case s may also include other-directed form s of blame of the sort that demand guilt of the agent, sometimes in no less fiendish forms than the one suggested. Part of showing that one identifies with others in a way that makes inequalities unwelcome involves the willingness to make up for inequalities with self-inflicted emotiona l distress. But this is an unachievable aim in many cases, an d accordin g t o th e accoun t I have offered, i t i s based o n a n illusory feeling of responsibility. I now want to argue, however, that there are some cases in which guilt may b e rationally appropriate eve n without adequat e ground s for other-directe d blame.

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2. Perspectiva l Appropriateness Understanding the grounds on which we take some cases of guilt to be acceptable in rational terms while dismissing others as unreasonable or unwarrante d "emotional reactions " mean s taking at least a brief look a t the general notion of emotiona l appropriateness . Th e ter m "appropriate " i s semitechnical: a n artificially regimente d refinement of our loose r an d mor e varied talk i n common speech of particular emotions as reasonable or unreasonable in "backward looking" terms—as fitting the agent's situation, accurately representing its salient or significant features t o th e exten t that h e is aware o f them. I t is a notion of justification relativ e to reason s rathe r than a truth-value of emotions, bu t i t is meant t o serve as their primary representationa l value in a sense that implies adequate performance of representational function. Emotions are taken to have a representational function on the sort of account I favor insofar a s they are mad e out i n terms of evaluations—meaning evaluative thoughts, possibl y unasserted. I take these a s belieflike state s o r preposi tional attitudes with a content give n by an evaluative judgment that might be thought o f a s corresponding t o th e emotio n i n question , thoug h i t nee d no t always accompany the emotion. The evaluative thoughts may not be connected logically to our other settled attitudes, that is, in the way that serves to pick out judgments as thoughts expressing belief , or attitudes of assertion; they are held in mind in a more temporary way , but one that allows them a significant influ ence on behavior . Normally they are objects of attention, thoug h th e accoun t also allows for unconscious emotions as cases in which the agent misidentifie s the content o f the evaluation . What hold s the content i n mind i n the relevant sense is emotional comfort o r discomfort—something that can also be seen as having a representational functio n to th e extent tha t i t reflects the positive o r negative aspect o f an associate d evaluation . It is essential to this account tha t comfort an d discomfort are taken a s general intentiona l states—states o f positiv e o r negativ e affect directe d towar d evaluative propositions—rather tha n amounting merely to affective symptom s of emotional evaluation, a s in the usua l list of sensory states characteristi c o f emotions. Thus, guilt amounts to discomfort at or about the thought of oneself as responsible for a wrong—not jus t to the thought plus an accompanying pang of discomfort. On the other hand, it is also important that in justifying guilt all we have to justify , a t leas t in the firs t instance , i s something on th e orde r o f a "pang" of guilt: a momentary stat e of discomfort tending to convey attention to its evaluative object in more o r less immediate terms rather than the sort of settled behavioral tendency linked with belief . Further, justificatio n of th e emotio n make s referenc e to it s motivationa l function, with discomfort seen as a state from which an agent would naturally want to escape.26 In justifying guilt, what we are justifying is essentially an escape tendency: to change one's affective stat e b y acting to falsif y it s evaluative content, o r th e self-attributio n of responsibilit y for a wrong, see n a s imposin g a requirement of reparative action. That is, the point of the emotional reaction is to set up a need to act in certain ways that make up for and in some sense miti-

Unavoidable Guilt 167 gate responsibility. But I take this to mean that the representational rationality of guilt (along with other emotions) will be properly influenced b y instrumental considerations: The standards of emotional appropriateness will be adjusted to reflect fact s about the general practical adaptiveness of a given emotion ten dency, or its value as a motivator. Fo r guilt, my account will have the effec t o f extending the emotion beyond the corresponding judgment of fault—and beyon d other-directed emotional blame, as we shall see, for an asymmetrical treatment in rational terms of guilt and persona l anger .

Emotions and Cognitive "Fit" The account just outlined might be said to mak e out emotion s a s "evaluative affects." Comfor t o r discomfor t an d th e though t towar d whic h it i s directed are not reall y separable parts of emotion, bu t I still speak of them as affectiv e and evaluativ e "components," wort h distinguishin g conceptually in order t o concentrate on the latter in considering justificatory questions. My strategy for considering emotional appropriateness involve s packing the qualitative content of an emotion into its evaluative component—including its positive or negative aspect, eve n though this might seem to repea t informatio n given b y the affec tive component—to permit a n analog y to belie f warrant, o r evidential justification fo r th e correspondin g judgment. 27 The centra l ai m o f thi s approach , though, i s to brin g into sharper relie f som e o f the limitation s on the analogy . Let me try to capture thes e now a t leas t roughl y by appeal to a distinction in current philosophy of mind between "direction s of fit." The distinction arises in Searle's account of intentionality as a point of comparison betwee n belief s an d desire s (alon g with analogou s speec h acts ) tha t applies onl y in a derivativ e sense t o emotions. 28 A belie f exhibit s "mind-to world" fit insofar as it is supposed t o correspond t o the world. By contrast, the point of a desire is to get the world to conform to it; its direction of fit is "worldto-mind." Thus , in the event of a disparity, a belief counts as deficient in fulfill ing its function, o r in the usual terms false, whereas the onus normally falls o n the world (includin g the agent) for failin g t o satisf y a desire. Emotions do not see m to fal l neatl y int o either category. They ar e assess able in rational terms as appropriate o r inappropriate—what I take to provide the analogy to belie f warrant—but thes e term s normally build i n reference to the adequacy of the reasons for an emotion, not just the sort of fit to the worl d that may be accidental. We may think of such reasons as facts about th e agent and henc e as include d in "th e world, " a t leas t i f we tak e the m a s limite d t o noninstrumental o r backward-lookin g reason s tha t ar e assumed t o charac terize things as they are independently of the mental state in question to allow for ou r initia l contrast between states o f belief and desire . A desire is also supposed to fit instrumental or forward-looking reasons, that is, insofar as these count a s reasons for thinking its satisfaction good. This i s not fitnes s to th e world, though , i n the sens e that applie s to beliefs . I n an y case , emotiona l appropriateness still resists characterization in these terms. Even assuming that it is rational appropriateness that i s in question—as distinct from th e various

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moral an d quasi-mora l o r socia l version s o f th e notio n t o whic h on e migh t appeal—it may not b e clear that an emotion tha t fail s to fit the world i s rationally deficient . Our assessmen t o f states o f sadness, fo r instance , t o star t wit h a simpler example than guilt, will not be based solely on whether they correspond to the facts o f the case as measured by a single evaluative standard. The furthe r fac t that sadnes s tends to inhibit corrective actio n make s it a sometimes unhelpfu l response to misfortune. For practical purposes, then , we may be justified in withholding the emotional response in circumstances that warrant it. But this point also affect s ou r vie w of things fro m a representationa l standpoint : Forgoin g sadness is taken as rationally appropriate i n a case in which sadness would also be appropriate, so that we have an important contrast to the assessment of belief warrant. On certai n assumptions , th e sam e ma y b e said o f substituting a contrar y emotion suc h as joy. Just to be happy about the same misfortunes described in the same way would of course be unreasonable; a certain caricature of an Eastern mystic might be able to manage it, but she would presumably be sacrificing reasonableness t o somethin g else . What i s not s o unreasonable , or unusual , though it also requires some mental self-trickery, is to focu s attention instea d on a different perceptua l "slice " or cross-section o f the information available in order to generate a positive emotion with preferable motivational effects. T o the extent that the feeling thus generated involves attention to a thought that is reasonably picked out from the background of evidence for evaluation, the emotion wil l count a s appropriate. Th e point i s that this justification rests o n th e assessment o f a mental act—an ac t o f attention—an d henc e is quite properly influenced b y practical considerations . What emotions are supposed to represent on this account is the importance of certai n piece s of information—reasons o f a certain sort, including reasons for attention, rather than directly "the facts " i n some distinct sense. But attention is another elemen t of cognition beside s belief an d is also subject to a kind of evidential assessment. Fitnes s to th e salient facts i s enough to warrant even a maladaptive emotion. Accordingly , we may say that a n appropriate evalua tive objec t of affect—wha t my accoun t represent s a s the conten t o f a n emo tion—amounts t o on e that o n a reasonable vie w of things stands out agains t the background of evidence. Gestalt shifts are possible—there may be more than one reasonable view of things—so the notion is a tolerant one. It also has to be left somewha t fuzz y t o correspond a t least roughly to our intuitive judgments: What constitutes a reasonable subset of the evidence to pick out for attention— a reasonable perceptual "slice, " as I put it—wil l often b e a matter of debate. It is subject to mora l an d socia l norm s i n a way tha t allow s fo r som e degre e of relativity to time and loca l convention. Consider , fo r instance, how we would classify sadness in the middle of a happy event at the thought of man's ultimate death and decay. The thought makes sense in a certain kind of religious culture but unde r other circumstance s might be a matter fo r psychiatry. The variability of the cases I have cited should indicate that we cannot expect an account of emotional appropriateness to provide firm answer s to the many

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questions such cases raise. What I hope to provide is just an explanation of some of th e relevan t questions . Ou r reaso n fo r picking out "slices " of the evidence for purposes o f emotional reactio n (and hence for its assessment) has to do with the function of emotions in directing attention: They serve to hold in mind reasons of potentially immediate or isolated significance—by contrast with evaluative belief , which essentially involves putting the sam e sort s of proposition s into storage, connecting them with our other beliefs as settled response tenden cies. A s I noted earlier , this means that w e nee d onl y justify somethin g shor t term i n justifyin g a n emotion—a t an y rate , i f we limi t ourselve s to it s basi c qualitative justification, ignoring many important question s o f degree. The sam e point als o seem s to hel p explain wh y warran t fo r emotio n an d belief will be affected differentl y b y the practical adaptiveness or instrumental value of a given evaluative thought. On e should expec t emotio n with it s basis in attentio n t o b e sensitive , most notably , t o fact s abou t th e usefulnes s o f a thought i n motivating action. A s a quick response i n many cases, however , i t cannot res t o n any sort of calculation of consequences in the case at han d bu t at most ca n come t o registe r the general value of the kin d of thought i n question. A belief, on the other hand, need not b e borne in mind, and the results of including a certain evaluatio n among the objects of belief will be more unpre dictable insofar as beliefs are both less present to consciousness in standard case s and longe r term . At any rate, as a normative matter, tie d to our acceptance of representation a s its defining function, we exclude considerations of adaptiveness from ou r weighin g of the evidence for belief. This amounts t o assignin g belief its straightforward mind-to-worl d directio n o f fit . My alternativ e suggestio n for emotion s migh t b e summed u p a s a clai m tha t emotion s exhibi t variable mind-to-world fi t to the extent that their representational function incorporate s reference to forward-looking practical reasons along with the sorts of backwardlooking reasons tha t constitute evidence. The standards o f evidence are raised or lowered , tightened o r relaxed , i n ligh t o f facts about th e genera l practica l adaptiveness of a given response tendency . The resulting picture of emotional justification ties emotions to somethin g more like perceptual standpoints than a unified conception o f "the world." The range of allowable standpoints will be limited by facts of the sort that properly govern objects of attention—facts about the general significance of certain pieces of information—but since these are evaluative, they presumably do not fit into "the world" in the sense intended. Even if one attempted t o include them, how ever—as a kind of "atmosphere" to the world, say—the point for our purpose s is that one would hav e to allow for multiple worlds (or a world with multiple overlapping atmospheres) to capture emotional appropriateness . The notion of appropriateness tha t this account yields may be thought of as "perspectival" becaus e it allows for the assessmen t o f emotions i n relation t o particular subsets or perceptual slices of the total body o f evidence, as well as in relation to the evidence overall. It rests on the general point that what we are justifying in justifying an emotion is essentially an affectivel y mediate d tendency to direc t attention rathe r than the sor t o f settled respons e tendency that i s at issue in assessments of belief. The notion allows for appropriate emotion in cases

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of what I call "snap " evaluation, where we jump to a n emotiona l conclusio n before all the facts are in, as well as in other "parti-resultant " cases , with emotional deviatio n fro m warrante d belie f assume d t o reflec t the genera l significance of some part o r aspect o f the evidence. For guilt, I now wan t t o say, the relevant aspect may amount to something like one's own involvement in a violation of the moral norms , eve n if the involvement falls short of moral respon sibility—and even if the violation is not quit e a wrong act—i n contrast to th e judgment that one is guilty. My thought is that in general terms the subset of the evidence for the corresponding judgment to whic h one reacts i n these cases is important enoug h t o justify a t least an initial outlay of attention. This is what i t means to b e "sensitive to" th e mor e ramifie d set of considerations that woul d groun d th e judgment. There ar e furthe r reasons i n the cas e of guilt for thinkin g that uncom fortable attention , i n particular , migh t b e warranted a s a wa y o f controllin g future behavior , or o f making up fo r past behavior, if only by subjecting oneself to guilt. Guilt seems to be morally useful to us as a motivator, in fact, largely in anticipatory or symbolic forms that depend on perspectival appropriateness . In cases where the emotio n i s warranted b y serious past wrongdoing o f one's own, adequat e reparation is often jus t not possible. For that matter , it is questionable how often the emotion is felt in such cases—apart fro m cases in which the agen t unwittingl y failed t o se e things i n the requisit e light a t th e tim e of action, to appreciate the wrong done or his own involvement, and hence might seem to lack the fulles t sor t of moral responsibility . The point applies to case s of collective responsibility, in which the main moral failing on the part of many agents is likely to be just the sort of failure to pay attention that emotional sensitivity on the account I have outlined is supposed t o prevent. It does so, if I am right, primarily by focusing attention on something short of adequate evidence for the corresponding belief .

Detaching Guilt from Blame I now wan t t o us e the notio n o f perspectival appropriateness t o explai n wh y guilt should be appropriate i n cases in which blame—personal anger, its thirdperson counterpar t i n emotional terms—is not.29 Guilt functions as a general way of keeping oneself alert to significan t subset s of the available evidence, in the first instance for their potential bearing on future moral action. We can therefore justify the emotion a s a reaction to subsets of the evidence that do not similarly warrant persona l anger. It would b e unjust, for instance, to blam e someone personally in a case of collective guilt in which the agent himself did nothing wrong. The perceptual slice that he might reasonably focus on—the thought of the dee d a s chargeable to a group i n which he claims membership—does no t count as adequate reaso n fo r someone else to inflic t emotional punishment on him. The ai m of keeping him on hi s toes, morally speaking, would no t justif y the kind of treatment that one might reasonably accord oneself in a similar case— or demand of him. The reason is partly just that on e is oneself, with more extensive sway over

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what on e may do to onesel f in emotional (o r other) terms. Guilt also serves a positive function for onesel f t o th e extent tha t self-subjectio n to th e emotio n counts a s a kind o f self-cleansing ritual: a way o f clearing oneself o f involvement in wrong by emotional self-punishment. One would not similarly be benefiting anothe r person , helpin g to clea r hi m o f involvement , by blamin g him for the wrongs done by others in a group to which he belongs. To do so would be to indulg e in a menta l variant of scapegoating tha t subject s him t o unde served punishment on others' behalf. This brie f argumen t rests o n understandin g emotion a s essentially evaluative, with negative personal evaluations seen as unpleasant for their objects, even if their objects do not undergo the associated elemen t of unpleasant affect . Th e argument does not rest, however, o n equating emotional blam e with blaming others overtly : There ar e o f cours e al l sort s o f mora l o r socia l reason s fo r restraining oneself from over t act s o f blame, but eve n if we limi t ourselves t o mental acts, blam e requires a stronger justification tha n guilt. Besides the sort of mora l reaso n jus t given , th e asymmetr y turn s o n th e wide r se t o f moti vationally adequate emotional alternative s to blame . In addition t o th e availability o f a collective object o f blame , w e ough t t o tak e not e o f a structura l difference betwee n blame and guilt that explains why I specify "personal " anger as the third-person counterpart o f guilt corresponding to blame. For anger also has a n impersonal variant, frustration , whereas guilt is by definition directed toward th e self. 30 In combination wit h m y perspectival accoun t o f appropri ateness, the availability of a less personally punishing alternative for anger means that th e standards for justifyin g it s personal varian t will be higher. Frustration count s as a deficient instance of anger, as I put it—i n contrast to th e full-fledge d case s tha t represen t th e most full y elaborate d instance s of the emotio n i n adult life . S o there i s something els e to tur n t o whe n th e evidence is not adequate for blame. There may also be deficient instances of guilt— passive cases, say, without the characteristic desire for reparation—but my point here is that these will not b e deficient in quite the same way as impersonal an ger. They will not be directed toward something mor e diffuse tha n their defin ing personal object, the self; otherwise, they would amount to something othe r than guilt, perhaps frustration or perhaps a form of sadness with an indefinit e object (a s on som e account s o f depression). By contrast, anger i n the sens e of generalized frustration, directed toward n o one in particular, provides us with an emotiona l option t o perspectiva l personal ange r or blame , ange r tha t tar gets its object on an inadequate evidential basis for the corresponding judgment of fault. So the standards for imposing blame will not b e relaxed a s they are for guilt (along with other emotions), assuming that the general practical function of anger would b e served well enough by frustration. There are , o f course , case s i n which emotiona l blam e withou t adequat e evidence for a judgment of fault is of psychological or other benefit to the agent in the sense of the person undergoing the emotion; cases of scapegoating might be thought to be chief among them. However, this does not affec t th e justifica tion o f personal anger in it s representational function; w e stil l spea k o f anger as unwarrante d in suc h cases. The sort s o f fact s tha t affec t ou r weightin g of

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backward-looking reason s fo r th e emotio n hav e t o d o wit h it s general adaptiveness—in th e firs t instance , it s energizing function i n motivating cor rective action. Frustration involves a generalized urge to lash out, correspond ing to it s diffus e object , that shoul d serv e this en d a s well as personal ange r when the evidence does not pick out a specific object. In any case, it is not just benefit t o the agent that i s in question i n considering the general adaptiveness of an emotion. To the extent tha t persona l anger has a role to play as a moral corrective, by inflicting emotiona l punishmen t for injustice , an y instrumental benefits o f scapegoating would b e undermined by the fac t tha t i t punishes an innocent party. Guilt seem s t o b e different , assumin g that w e hav e a righ t to scapegoa t ourselves—to sacrifice ourselve s to some ai m of our own—a t any rate, up to a point. The emotion has a positive function in defense of moral self-esteem that would not b e adequately served by other-directed emotions like frustration, at least in general terms: One might indeed recommend some other-directed substitute on many or even most occasions i n the manner of various self-help manuals, but it is general adaptiveness that on my account lets us loosen our evidential demands on an emotion. This is meant to b e broadly construed, to exten d to emotion s tha t offe r som e uniqu e benefits to th e agen t o r jus t to peopl e i n general, even if they also inflict harms, perhaps even greater harms. Remember that perspectival appropriateness i s taken a s compatible with the reasonableness of suppressing a given emotion. Let u s now attemp t t o se e what happen s t o som e cases of guilt when w e apply the notio n o f perspectival appropriateness. First , conside r th e case s of collective guil t that hav e surfaced at point s i n m y argument . My accoun t o f appropriate emotion allows us to grant that no one should be blamed solely for the crimes of others: It would b e unreasonable to hold someone responsible in a backward-looking sense (as opposed t o insisting that she take responsibility) for what her nation or other group may have done in her name.31 O n the other hand, we may also sa y that sh e ought t o hol d hersel f responsible in the wa y that is evidenced by emotion. Sh e may b e blamed if she fails to manage this— at any rate, in some form; there are emotional alternatives to guilt, albeit more limited than thos e that appl y to blame . The fac t tha t guil t i s appropriate, i n the sens e of "rationall y acceptable, " will no t b e sufficient t o mandat e tha t reaction , as I have noted. I t does com e out a s appropriate, though , i f we suppose tha t the agent' s involvemen t in the group that counts as the collective agent in the case naturally sets up enough of a lin k betwee n he r ow n agenc y an d th e ac t i n questio n t o justif y directin g momentary discomfort toward a thought o f herself as responsible fo r it . Th e thought may just be brought to mind with a question mark and rejected as soon as she has a chance to reflect on it , but i t is appropriate a s an object of uneasy attention a s long as there is reason fo r he r to rais e the questio n o f her mora l responsibility. A crime committed by a group in the remote past, say, and clearly excluded from its future behavior by changes in group character over time would not naturally raise the question of responsibility in this sense, though of course a lin k could be manufactured.

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The considerations relevan t t o decidin g such issue s are complex, an d th e relevant concept s ar e properl y fuzzy . I shall b e conten t jus t to sketc h thei r application to the range of cases at issue. Conside r no w the case in which one feels guilt y for havin g caused the deat h o f a child in an unavoidabl e car acci dent. A central cause of guilt feelings in such cases, o r those we are inclined to accept a s appropriate, i s just the agent's nee d to reassure himself that he is not guilty. That is, after the accident the driver of the car that killed the child would naturally feel impelle d to run throug h what happened, considering vividly his own participation i n it, if only to b e sure that he did not d o anything to cause it. He would do this by confronting himself with various particular subsets of the total bod y of relevant evidence that considered i n themselves would tend t o suggest that he is guilty—and to call up feelings o f guilt as they come to mind, given the responsiveness of emotions t o partial evidence. In each case he would be able to answer any self-accusation by bringing to mind further evidence. This would presumably allay guilt, though i t would no t prevent the reaction, an d it would no t prevent the reaction fro m recurring, at any rate for some time afte r the accident : A morally sensitiv e person i n a case o f such moral consequenc e could b e expected t o review the facts repeatedly an d i n rather exactin g detail , focusing first on the memory of this or that ac t of his that might be picked ou t as a cause of the accident, the n searching again for the reasons fo r thinking its results could not hav e been foreseen . The need to clear oneself of real or objectiv e guilt can in this way generate guilt feelings . Where the nee d is real, though, i n the sens e of being supporte d by more tha n th e fact s o f the agent' s individua l psychology, th e feeling s may well come out a s appropriate. I t is not irrelevan t to th e case under discussio n that the victim is a child, someone an agent is supposed t o take special pains to look after , so that i t is reasonable t o assume more tha n the normal amoun t of responsibility even after-the-fact, and blame cannot easily be shifted to anothe r agent. The agent reviewing his contribution t o the case may focus, say, on the fact that he turned the car sharply in a certain direction—the n remind himself that it was too dark to see the child—or he may focus on things he could have done differentl y whos e connection to the case is more remote. Goin g out at all that night or going out with a trivial purpose migh t well come up as reasons fo r self-reproach (no t just regret), at leas t unti l the fact s of the cas e mor e o r les s settle in mind. My suggestion here is not that they should settle into a judgment of guilt but that emotional guil t properly precede s adequate evidence for such a judgment. Even when al l the evidence is at hand, guilt will be appropriate i n reaction t o partial subset s o f it whose rol e i n producing th e reactio n serve s a general practical purpose—in this case, as a way of assuming special responsi bility for those unabl e to fen d fo r themselves . The appropriateness o f the emotion depends , then , o n the reasonablenes s in instrumental as well as representational term s o f focusing attention o n certain thoughts, including the sorts of perceptual memories one might well retain from a car acciden t and othe r bit s of reflective informatio n of a sort that ca n come t o mind, be banished, an d the n come bac k again. This picture stands in contrast t o the usual idea of even emotional guilt as imposed on the basis of an

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inner set of courtroom proceedings, deliberatin g to a fina l judgment . I would fill it out, moreover , wit h a parallel in mentalistic terms to the primitive notion of "tainting " i n which th e agen t struggles to clea r himself of a connection t o some morall y disturbin g event b y holding i n mind th e variou s thoughts tha t seem to lin k him t o i t an d severin g any putativ e link b y means o f emotiona l self-punishment. What will be in question in disputed cases o n th e issu e of appropriatenes s will normally be the general adaptiveness of guilt feelings in response t o a subset of the overall evidence that constitutes prima facie evidence for a judgment of guilt. However, in cases of irrational guilt where the emotion i s not base d o n a natural or reasonable perceptual slice of the available information, we do not have even prima faci e evidenc e for th e judgment. This i s how I would handl e the variant of the accident case i n which a memory o f merely passive involvement—driving a car tha t wa s propelle d into th e child by another ca r tha t hi t it—is trumped u p into a recurring thought of oneself as somehow a t fault, just on the basi s of a neurotic habit of self-accusation. Such cases are not so odd, nor are they limited to cognitively irrational agents, if one includes as genuine feelings of guilt the pangs and othe r momentary sensations that might b e felt just in raising the question o f warrant fo r the corre sponding judgmen t in cases where responsibility has unclea r boundaries. Th e heightened responsibility that adults assume on behalf of children yields a fun d of familiar examples, but one might also consider, for instance, the feelings that arise as one ask s whether damag e to a borrowed boo k o r a sublet apartmen t was something on e ought to have foreseen and avoided. In some circumstances or state s o f mind—where on e expect s to b e blame d unreasonabl y b y others , say—it woul d no t b e unnatural to pa y at leas t momentar y attentio n eve n t o perverse subset s o f th e evidence , i f only t o rehears e th e argument s agains t according them prima faci e weight. In general, it is important t o not e that no t just any emotional respons e that might be made out as normal will come out as appropriate o n the perspectival account, despite its appeal in standard circumstances to th e notio n o f a natural object of attention. 32 Some explanation o f irrational guilt along these lines may thus be applied to mor e ordinar y case s o f guilt without faul t fro m th e literature . Le t u s see how i t fit s tw o particularl y problematic sort s o f cases. Consider firs t taboo cases suc h a s thos e discusse d b y Rawls: case s o f residua l guil t for violatin g prohibitions fro m childhoo d o r th e surroundin g societ y tha t th e agen t cur rently rejects. These resemble the original accident case i n not involvin g self attributed faul t (meaning responsibility for a wrong), though unlik e the variant cas e they do involv e agency. Here, however , th e stres s i s on the denial of "wrong" rathe r tha n "responsibility. " Taylor' s inclusio n o f taboo case s a s cases o f genuin e guilt (contr a Rawls ) by appeal t o conventionall y accepte d authority for the rule in question would see m to make them appropriate cases, assuming no mistake about th e conventions. One might indeed provoke a pang of guil t just by remembering or anticipatin g blame on th e par t o f others, s o the response i s in that sens e natural. However, o n my own accoun t the emo tion would stil l come out a s inappropriate in a case in which the convention -

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ally accepte d rul e i n questio n jus t sets u p a n artificia l wa y o f sortin g moral experience. Proscribing somethin g purel y as a matte r o f convention, tha t is , withou t reference t o huma n harm s an d benefit s or othe r reasonabl e object s o f mora l attention (i f there are any), does not support th e appeal to general adaptivenes s that result s i n our mor e relaxed standar d o f evidence for guilt than fo r blame . The genera l mora l significanc e o f emotio n i n a broade r sense—a s a wa y o f enforcing conformit y t o whateve r rul e is in place—would seem t o b e relevan t only where moral considerations favo r adherence to the particular rul e in question. S o "mere" taboos in the sense of purely conventional prohibition s whos e validity on e reject s will no t yiel d eve n prim a faci e suppor t fo r guil t feelings. We have to say more, though, to handle taboos that may not be purely conventional bu t arguabl y have som e basis—inadequat e from th e standpoin t of moral justification—in a natural human response. Examples include fea r of the stranger a s a possible source o f racial taboos an d th e feeling s of hostility used to punish deviation fro m standar d se x roles and preferences . O n th e assump tion that a certain behaviora l norm ought t o be modified, the feelings that serv e to enforce it need no t com e ou t a s appropriate jus t becaus e it is in fact widely accepted. However , rathe r tha n denyin g that guil t in such case s i s based o n a natural way of sorting information , we can follow the model of blame and den y the adaptiveness in general social terms of allowing ourselves to react to a certain portion o f the evidenc e in isolation . On the other hand , there ar e rules on the order o f the ban on incest that are commonly calle d taboos but ar e thought o f as essential t o th e foundation s o f human society, albei t with details subject to convention. Here we may be willing to accept guil t as appropriate eve n in a case like that o f Oedipus, wher e th e violation is involuntary and hence does not merit blame. This sort of extensio n of appropriate guil t beyond blam e has to be limited to the aspect of emotional justification tha t appeals t o the practical reason s fo r attention t o a certain subset of the evidence for the relevant evaluation. The subset itself has to be accepted independently, that is, as a natural or reasonable object of attention—on ground s I shall not attemp t t o pi n dow n here—i n orde r t o avoi d th e kin d o f practica l gerrymandering that woul d simpl y manufacture objects of guilt. If we now turn to survivor's guilt and similar cases of guilt without agency — cases that migh t seem to be distinct in kind, involving the thought o f separatio n from a group rather than of moral responsibility for a wrong—we ca n ask whether there is a way of counting them as appropriate withou t multiplying senses of guilt as in Morris's account. In fact, many of the moral case s just discussed typically involve a component o f survivor's guilt: The justification of collective guilt commonly appeals to benefits received as a result of the harms done to others by one's group; eve n in the secon d versio n o f the acciden t case, guilt might b e defended simply fo r survivin g the chil d that dies . I interpret suc h feeling s as involving a thought of moral responsibility that is not warranted b y the evidence as a whole. Rather, on the perspectival account the justification for holding it in mind depends on the practical value of guilt as an identificatory mechanism: its role in promot ing the sense of moral solidarity that Morris describes.

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This is to say that guilt in the relevant cases functions as a way for the agent to clear himself via emotional self-punishmen t of any suggestion o f benefit from being favored above the other members of a group with which he identifies. It expresses the fact that he does identify with the group by bringing him down to its level in emotional terms. On the perspectival account, hi s self-attribution of responsibility also has to res t o n a natura l way o f sorting the availabl e information. I think we can sa y that i t does i n serious cases o f survivor's guilt—a s opposed to just any case of guilt for the ills of the world—insofar as the though t arises naturally as a question i n others' minds where people ar e genuinely "in the same boat" in some respect or other.33 These are cases in which it is natural to resent inequality. However, th e account doe s no t accep t others ' persona l resentmen t o f the agent a s warranted i n such cases . It matter s t o th e justificatio n of survivor' s guilt that it is self-inflicted a s a way of expressing identificatory commitments. Others ar e in no position t o decide for the agent what these are to be; the mos t they can reasonably do i s demand tha t h e decide a certain way a s a conditio n of grou p acceptance . Bu t even this doe s no t pic k ou t guil t i n particular: Th e emotion come s out a s optional, morally speaking as well as rationally, to th e extent tha t other feeling s suc h as those involve d in humility represent alterna tives for accomplishin g the sor t of leveling in question . The cases I have brought u p s o far give us the beginning s of a continuum of cases on the question of grounds fo r guilt short o f belief—and th e beginning s of an argument from appropriat e guil t feelings to a kind of objective guilt suitable for dilemmas . What varies in the cases is the strengt h o f the reason w e have for attention t o the prepositional objec t of discomfort involved in guilt feelings: the thought tha t the agent is responsible for a wrong. I n the original version of the accident case, but not in the variant case or the typical taboo cases, we consider it reasonable as well as understandable fo r someone i n the agent' s positio n t o raise the question of guilt. Appropriate case s of collective guilt and survivor's guilt seem to involve something stronger, however: Unlike either of the accident cases, they are cases in which the question of responsibility also naturally arises in other people's minds. There is a social as well as a nonidiosyncratic psychological basis for th e emotion, tha t is— a basis for claiming that the agent really is tainted by what his society has done in his name, say; or that there is a real need to make up for inequalit y of the sort that undermines group solidarity. The other case s that Morris emphasizes, such as guilt for thoughts, see m to me to vary with the par ticular circumstances in respect t o where they fall o n the continuum. But I now want t o extend the continuum in the direction of greater strength of reasons fo r attention—to case s in which there i s reason no t jus t for raising the questio n o f responsibility but also for reaching a positive conclusion .

3. Objectiv e Guil t an d Wrong Moral dilemma s seem to b e cases of appropriate moral guilt without ful l mora l responsibility. They are cases in which the agent cannot avoi d doing something wrong, even if he can avoid the particular wrong he chooses to commit, since his

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choice situatio n offer s hi m onl y wron g alternatives . S o the case s d o involve agency—they even require specifically moral agency—but they seem to count as cases of guilt without fault , versions of the original accident case distinguished by the agent's appeal to moral reasons for what he does. I take them to be cases in which each alternative is prohibited on serious enough grounds to make it come out as wrong all things considered despit e the lack of permissible alternatives to it. With th e notio n o f perspectiva l appropriatenes s o n han d an d defende d in intuitive terms fo r nondilemmati c guil t without fault , w e can se e dilemmas as cases in which emotional or subjective guilt is appropriate for either alternative. The thought is that the reasons for prohibiting a given alternative form a morally significant subse t of the informatio n bearin g on a dilemma: a natural object of attention tha t is important enoug h i n general moral terms t o warran t an emotional reaction eve n without bein g balanced against countervailing reasons. Indeed, we might be tempted to define dilemmas in subjective terms as cases in whic h either alternative warrant s guilt . However, despit e m y dismissa l of rational guilt in taboo cases, my notion o f perspectival appropriatenes s coul d conceivably allow for cases of guilt without wrong. Perhaps guilt is sometimes adequately warranted i n light of its general practical function i n a case of merely prima facie evidence for counting some act as wrong, as well as for holding the agent responsible for it. If so, what the agent does in a dilemma might not really count a s wrong al l things considered unde r the circumstances. Thus, o n this account, w e might sa y that th e ban on parricide violate d by Agamemnon's sacrific e of Iphigenia has enormous general moral importanc e that is registered in emotion bu t is not really in force as a guide to actio n in the particular situation—assumin g tha t i t i s even more importan t t o ensur e th e success of the Gree k expedition. O r i n a "balanced " cas e lik e the on e draw n from Sartre , where the agent faces a choice between abandoning his dependent mother and failin g i n his duty to joi n the French resistance, w e might say the same for a prohibition of either action: Neither is more important, s o both have merely prima facie status, and all the agent morally must do is choose—though guilt will be warranted whateve r choice he makes. However, i f we accept thes e cases as genuine dilemmas, at an y rate as philosophers understan d the term, we have to say more than this. My own view is that the violation of prohibition in such cases is serious enough to count as wrong all things considered; it is not in the usual terms justified, then , at any rate fully, even if it is excused by the facts of the agent's choice-situation, so that he is not subject to blame. 34 We can now see that the appropriateness of emotional guilt does not imply this view of the wrongs of the case. I shall go on to argue , however, that i t does impl y something stronger tha n merel y prima faci e wrong — something we can understand a t least in rough terms by reference to the primitive notion of "tainting." With some further backing, moreover, it can be made to yiel d a notion o f objective guilt suitable for dilemmas.

Real Taints My appeal to the notion of tainting in explaining the psychological function of guilt in the last section suggested a way o f distinguishing among cases of guilt

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for the unavoidable. What we wanted there was a way of distinguishing between appropriate an d inappropriate subjective guilt—on a notion of appropriatenes s that di d no t reduc e to warran t fo r th e correspondin g judgment , of objective guilt or fault . O f those case s that com e ou t a s appropriate o n the perspectiva l account it seems that some do and some do not involv e what might be thought of as a real taint—a real need to dispe l the appearance o f fault, let us say—as a result of involvement in the act in question. I now want to suggest that this notion is sufficiently objectiv e to allow for a reasonable interpretation of the comments of agent s i n survivor's guilt and relate d cases . I t also wil l hel p us understan d what i s at issue in cases of dilemma. I should firs t poin t ou t tha t th e agen t in the acciden t case is not tainte d b y involvement i n a morall y offensiv e ac t i n th e wa y tha t Agamemno n is , fo r instance. The cas e involve s a nee d t o clea r oneself, in response to a questio n that naturall y arises about one' s ow n responsibility for what happened; but as I understand it, the case assumes that the question does not arise in minds other than one' s own . I t is taken a s obvious, that is, that th e agent in the case is not responsible for a wrong; indeed, as the case is set up, no wrong was done. What justifies attentio n t o th e questio n o f responsibilit y and henc e make s guilt an appropriate reactio n is the adaptiveness on other occasions of the general emotional mechanis m guilt brings into play . This i s to sa y that there i s no rea l or objective correlate o f guilt in the particula r case at hand , though th e case ha s important motivationa l implications for other cases . What I want t o argue, though, is that more tha n thi s is involved in cases of dilemma—and even in the sorts of cases that Morris cite s as examples of objective nonmora l guilt . As a firs t ste p i n the argument , w e migh t sa y that thes e cases involv e an appearanc e o f fault—something to whic h others beside s the agent migh t be expected t o react, so that guilt functions essentiall y as a way of heading off others' blame. The agent's nee d to clear himself i s based on some thing intersubjectively real, that is. I refer to it as a "taint" to mark what I take to b e its nonaccidental resemblanc e to th e primitiv e notion, whic h involve d various punitive or cleansing rituals acted ou t eve n on inanimate objects used as instrument s of wrongdoing. 35 Bu t my point i s not jus t abou t wha t w e ar e inclined t o sa y in cases of dilemma . For on e thing , the verba l point doe s no t really apply so readily to al l such cases, as we can se e by considering what w e would say about the agent in the case drawn from Sartre. Failure in one's duties as a son or a citizen may not dra w th e kind of harsh reactio n fro m others that leads us to speak of a taint as opposed to a serious moral shortcoming or other flaw. M y point her e is just that there is something, whateve r it amounts to o r should be called, that gives guilt more than individual psychological backing in such cases . A taint in this sense amounts at least to an intersubjective tendency—to raise the question of responsibility—somewhat on the order of a "suspicion" of objective guilt in the semiobjective sense in which that term is sometimes used. To be tainted i s to b e "unde r a cloud" o f suspicion , or reasonabl y subject t o suspicion on the part of others, as opposed t o just having reason oneself to raise the question of responsibility, which is all we need for appropriat e subjective guilt

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as in the acciden t case. What we are doing here, one might say, is reinterpreting the primitiv e notion i n psychological terms. A n agen t i s really tainted o n this account wher e he has a real need to clear himself in the eyes of others—no t just wher e other s woul d i n fac t b e suspicious bu t onl y where, i n ligh t of th e facts or the evidence available (assumed to constitute a natural perceptual slice of the overall evidence), they would have real reason t o be. At a minimum they have reason to deman d an explanation. Emotiona l guil t is essentially a way of heading the m of f b y raisin g the questio n oneself—an d reactin g t o it , a s a n instance o f a genera l response tendenc y learned for it s motivationa l useful ness o n othe r occasion s tha t als o serve s on thi s occasio n a s a for m o f self punishment, symbolically distancing the agent from even nonculpable involvement in moral wrong. To se e how th e notion o f a real taint in the sense of intersubjectively war ranted emotional guilt applies to cases—fillin g ou t th e rational portion o f the continuum o f case s mentione d i n th e precedin g section—we migh t first con sider variants of the accident case in which the agent does have "something to answer for " i n others' eyes, even if he would in the en d b e declared blameless. One might suppose that the agent did something a bit irregular in his car upkeep that required explanation i n light of what happened. Perhaps it was not really a factor in the accident; or perhaps its explanation would amount to an excuse. In any case, the very need to suppl y such a reason i s enough t o yield a limited objective basis for guil t on the account I have offered . By contrast , o n th e usua l interpretation o f the acciden t case , th e nee d t o supply a reason—to defend oneself against charges of objective guilt—is a matter of individual psychology, albeit by no means idiosyncratic. In general terms: A perceptual slic e of the relevant information that counts a s a natural objec t of attention fro m the standpoint o f individual psychology may not have the same status fro m a socia l standpoint. I n the origina l accident case , other s typically would dismiss the agent's guilt feelings as making no sense to them, simply on the basis of what is immediately evident. In other cases, further question s may be in order—even i f we sometimes suppres s them to preserv e social harmon y or the agent's peac e of mind. Despite its social reference, that is , the notion o f a tain t i s not merel y conventional: An agent may hav e something to explai n independently of whether others in fact demand an explanation; his real appearance of guilt in this sense will not depend on whether he actually appears guilty in others' eyes . What shoul d w e say, then, abou t survivor' s guilt and th e other cases that Morris wants to treat as involving real or objective guilt? The word "taint " does not apply naturally to such cases, nor do such cases seem to raise a serious question o f moral responsibility . Where the y do involve some sor t of wrong, a s in cases of being favored financially over others, i t is something that is clearly not the agent's fault ; what i s objectionable to other s abou t hi m is supposed t o be just that h e benefits fro m th e situation , if only passively. However, I think we can still say that the agent in such a case has a need to prove something to others —to expres s hi s solidarity with them, bringing himself dow n t o thei r leve l by way of the sort of symbolic leveling behavior described earlier. Guilt here may

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be seen a s a way o f keepin g social frustratio n fro m focusing—a s i t naturally might—on him . What it serves to eras e is a real appearance o f indeed benefiting ("enjoying" benefits) , or grounds fo r envy. The notion o f a taint does apply naturally to cases of collective guilt, and it provides a way o f understandin g the rea l basis for collectiv e guil t in applica tion to individuals. In popular discussion s o f the question o f German guil t for the Holocaust, for instance, there sometimes seems to be a tendency to dismis s guilt feelings a s unreasonable to expect fro m peopl e born afte r the war o n the grounds that it would indee d be unreasonable to hold them personally respon sible in a backward-looking sense for what happened . But assuming that ther e is a real basis for a judgment of collective guilt—in a sense, remember, that need not appl y to individual s (as with corporations whos e environmenta l sins cannot b e charged t o ever y employee, or i n some cases , t o an y employee in par ticular)—it makes sense to speak of innocent individuals as tainted b y the acts of others. This does no t mean that they are themselves morally flawed in some way but that th e question o f moral responsibility naturally arises on the basi s of thei r grou p affiliation—wit h emotiona l guil t supplying a kin d o f answe r (though not th e only possible answer) in practical terms . The upshot o f this discussion of cases—gradually narrowing dow n my initial cases o f guilt without faul t b y appeal to the perspectival notion o f appro priateness—is that ther e i s sometimes a rea l basi s for guil t feelings that fall s short o f the judgmen t tha t on e i s guilty. I have referred to thi s a s a "taint, " offering a n intersubjective reading of what I take to be a successor to the primitive notion o f tainting. But we might just think of it instead as perspectival guilt. It amounts t o somethin g midwa y between guilt feelings and objectiv e guilt in the usual sense, as implied by a judgment of fault, and it seems to b e enough t o explain thos e nondilemmati c case s o f guilt without faul t i n which w e woul d not b e inclined to dismis s the agent's clai m that h e really is guilty. Instead of reconceiving the cases as involving guilt in some other, nonmoral sense , we may reinterpret thei r claim to objective status in terms of intersubjective backing for guilt feelings. Real taints in this intersubjective sense would see m to represen t th e strongest consequenc e fo r dilemmati c options tha t i s derivable from a n argumen t from mora l feeling , an argumen t base d solel y on th e appropriatenes s o f guilt or some simila r emotion i n response to whatever the agent does . However , b y adding i n referenc e to th e elemen t o f voluntar y control a t thi s poin t i n th e argument, I think we can se e that dilemma s als o involv e something stronger , something closer to full-blown objective guilt, though still perspectival in a way that accord s with my treatment o f the grounds for the emotion. The y involve a real basi s fo r full-blow n objective guilt—not jus t fo r raisin g th e questio n o f responsibility but als o for a positive answer in the form of a judgment of fault, though th e evidenc e for tha t conclusio n i s overturned b y countervailing rea sons. In itself, that is , the evidenc e is sufficient fo r the attributio n o f responsi bility just insofar a s the agent intentionally did something he knew to be wrong under th e circumstances ; but sinc e they were circumstances where h e ha d to , morally speaking, a broader vie w would show that h e is not reall y at fault .

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Thus, even long after Agamemnon's sacrifice of his daughter, the act requires explanation i n moral terms. Objectivel y speaking rathe r than subjectivel y (if he feels nothing) , there is a need for Agamemnon to satisfy himsel f and other s that the act was morally required under the circumstances. But we also want t o say more tha n this: that th e act lef t mora l traces o f a sort tha t are summed u p in the imagery of staining. It is a mark against him, a blot on his record of moral action, and a threat to his character or virtue—unless the wrongness of the deed (from a limited but morally central standpoint) can somehow b e "put int o perspective" by rehearsing the explanation fo r it yet again. The way dilemmas apparently differ fro m th e cases of intersubjectively real taints just considered lies in something like the fact that Marcus notes in defense of dilemmati c guilt:36 They d o involv e responsibilit y for a particular wrong , insofar as the agent in them chooses a wrong option i n the knowledge that it is wrong an d carrie s through o n th e choic e b y voluntary action. O f cours e th e choice is in some sense involuntary or forced on him; he has no control ove r his range of options, in particular the fac t that all of them are wrong. So he is not responsible for doing something wrong, or for wrong o r wrongdoing a s such.37 But he is responsible for th e particular wrong h e does i n a sense that exceeds mere involvement in moral wrong. We might say that hi s act is culpable as far as it goes—perspectivally, in other words, or considered from a certain stand point, a standpoint that is important enoug h to count as morally significant in itself. This is more than a claim of general moral significance, of the sort that yields feelings o f compunction i n respons e t o prim a faci e wrong . M y suggestio n i n Agamemnon's case is that there are strong enough reasons against the sacrifice of his daughter to make it count as wrong all things considered in the circumstances in which it occurs, eve n on the assumption that there are stronger rea sons o n the other side. That thes e reasons for counting the act as wrong als o tend t o undermin e the agent' s mora l worth—o r metaphorically , that th e act stains the self—count s a s a n objectiv e basis for fel t guil t that stil l makes psychological reference bu t i s not therefor e merely intersubjective. Marcus's ow n treatment of dilemmatic guilt does not seem to be limited to a first-person standpoint in the way I have in mind. She appeals, a s I have just done, to the agent's voluntary control over what he does in support of the attribution of responsibility, but she does not distinguish between grounds for guilt on the part of the agent and grounds for blame, the corresponding other-directed emotion. Our intuitive view, I take it, is that blame in the sense of personal anger is not reall y warranted i n such cases—at any rate, for what th e agent does , a s opposed to a failure t o fee l wha t h e ought to fee l abou t his action. It may be reasonable to shun an agent tainted b y a seriously wrong act—an act on the order o f parricide, say, as in Agamemnon's case—or to fee l various related emotion s (possibl y taken as variants of blame), such as personal aversion or horror. But if we really agree that he made the morally best choice open to him at ever y stage, it would not b e appropriate, though it might be natural, to blam e him i n the sens e that entail s feelin g th e desir e to punis h him tha t is characteristic o f anger . From a third-perso n standpoint, o n th e perspectiva l

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account, hi s act comes ou t a s wrong bu t excused , eve n thoug h i n emotiona l terms h e should no t excus e himsel f an d i s therefore subjec t to blam e fo r no t feeling guilty . According t o th e argumen t I hav e outlined , thi s asymmetrica l treatment o f blame and guilt rests on the differentia l practica l effect s o f react ing to a partial basis for assigning fault—assessed in light of the different emo tional alternatives to that reaction—in one' s own case versus that o f another. On Marcus ' unamende d account , b y contrast, a n agen t i n a dilemm a woul d come out as morally blameworthy for his action—for doing what morally speaking he had to do . To complet e the tas k o f characterizing dilemmati c guilt perspectivally, let me now attempt t o show ho w we might replace the metaphor o f staining with appeal t o reasons, of the sort that would tel l us when a taint counts a s real. As noted earlier , talk of taints i s not quit e applicabl e t o case s lik e the one draw n from Sartre . On the other hand , it does apply to nondilemmatic cases of moral conflict: We speak of money from a bad sourc e as tainted, fo r instance, even on the assumption that i t would not be wrong t o make use of it for a good end. To meet the challenge to my account pose d at the end of part I, we need to sho w that perspectival guilt can capture the intractability of wrong. Bu t that require s a notion strong enough to distinguish dilemmas from the various weaker cases of moral conflict that migh t be confused with them. W e are now in a positio n to approac h th e tas k i n light o f my discussio n o f the functio n o f guilt in thi s chapter and the last . Dirty Hands If w e thin k o f emotional guil t as a self-cleansin g ritual, w e ma y sa y that th e agent i n a dilemma has real grounds fo r it to the extent tha t th e ritual is really required to cleanse him of responsibility for a wrong. Thi s means that th e reasons supporting a negative self-evaluation, even if evidentially limited, are mor ally important enough in themselves to affect th e assessment of the agent's mora l worth unles s checked—as they are when th e agent subjects himself to guilt. To remove the metaphor o f tainting, then, le t us stipulate, first , that th e reason s are significant enough for the evaluation to register in attention i n the way that unpleasant affect allow s it to do—thus warding off a more settled negative selfjudgment. Fo r dilemmas , however , w e nee d a secon d stipulation , on e tha t explains why the need for the self-cleansing ritual recurs: From the limited perspective of the act under consideration w e do have enough reaso n fo r reaching a judgment of fault; the judgment is undercut onl y in light of the total body of evidence. So attention t o th e act (whic h is morally warranted) warrant s emo tional guilt . What w e hav e in the rol e o f objectiv e guilt in dilemmas, then, i s essentially an unsatisfiable need—a need to dispel the appearance of fault, base d on a limited subset o f the evidenc e that i s important enoug h b y itself t o yield moral wrong . Guilt functions o n thi s account a s a way o f preserving virtue by providing some furthe r reason s o n the othe r side—balancin g those tha t threate n t o un dermine virtue with evidence that the agent takes them seriously enough to suffe r

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over them . T o th e exten t tha t th e sufferin g i s in some sens e self-inflicted—a s we may say in light of our indirect control ove r emotions via acts of attention— it amount s t o a way o f bringin g oneself dow n t o th e leve l o f a victim of th e wrong in question. On m y understanding of guilt as an identificator y mechanism, it essentially serves to register the standpoint o f the victim. But there are other case s resemblin g dilemmas, sometime s marke d of f a s case s o f "dirt y hands," wher e the agen t i s not require d to tak e tha t standpoint—perhap s h e even ought not to take it—not just in order to avoid a second-order dilemm a of the sort discussed in chapter 4 but rather becaus e of an obligation to see things from th e standpoint o f the whole. Or so I want to maintain as a way of distinguishing such cases from dilemmas. The term "dirty hands," which is based on the metaphor o f staining or tainting, sometimes is used as a more general term covering dilemmas, though Williams an d othe r author s us e it to mar k of f cases fallin g shor t o f dilemm a a s exemplified b y the unsavory compromises politician s sometimes have to make to gai n an d retai n office. 38 Th e ter m als o extend s t o mor e seriou s cases that arise in the conduct of office; one example is Winston Churchill' s reputed decision durin g World Wa r I I to allo w the cit y of Coventr y to b e bombed rathe r than reveal to the Germans that the Allies had cracked their code. Like the word "taint" and its derivatives in application to the cases in my last section, the term "dirty hands" doe s no t appl y naturally to al l the relevan t cases at issue here. But I shall take it as a semitechnical term covering all such political and relate d cases alon g with genuine cases of dilemma. Williams's discussion of the range of relevant cases in fact suggests another term to distinguish nondilemmatic cases. The term, which has surfaced at several points in my argument, is "moral cost." Williams uses it in application t o cases where , thoug h ther e i s a right thin g to do , i t still involves "wronging" someone. Ther e i s a victi m of th e action , tha t is , who ha s a legitimat e com plaint—unlike the person whos e interest s los e ou t i n a case where on e ough t simply overrides another—though on the other hand, this is not enough to make the actio n wron g a s i n cases o f dilemma . The notio n introduce s a tripartit e division of cases of conflict—into cases of overriding, moral cost, and dilemma— that apparently rests on a view of certain agents (politicians and others exercising authority on behal f of a group) as licensed t o mak e utilitarian trade-offs. Their duties require sacrificing individual interests to the interests of the group as a whole an d henc e involve special permissio n t o violat e the right s o f individuals. But the rights of individuals are not therefore simply canceled; they leave emotional trace s o n th e orde r o f "disquiet " o n th e par t o f a n appropriatel y sensitive agen t a s evidenc e of th e "mora l cos t attache d t o lettin g a righ t b e overridden by consequences." 39 In short , then , th e notio n o f mora l cos t amount s t o a mora l remainde r resulting from a clash between utilitarian and rights-based obligations in which rights lose out fo r certain special reasons bu t ar e no t therefor e overridden on the account Williams wants to maintain. For our purposes, questions about the details of the account can be shelved in favor of the general point that Williams's notion o f an uncancele d moral remainder in cases of conflict i s not limite d to

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dilemmas. He makes it out in nondilemmatic cases a s the remainder of a right, as distinct fro m a n all-things-considere d moral reason— a "claim " o f the sort that figures i n his explanation o f the uncancele d element in a dilemma. 40 The notion als o seems to be linked to a distinction between the appropriat e emotional residue s in such cases, with "regre t a t the deepest level" reserved for dilemmas, whil e mora l cos t case s ar e characterize d b y referenc e to variou s weaker emotional reactions—a s "distasteful, " fo r instance. 41 However , I think it would b e a mistake to suppose that the different sort s of cases of conflict may be understood adequatel y by appeal t o differen t variant s of agent-regret—or , on the othe r hand , i n terms of quantitative differences i n emotional intensity. I think we can improv e on Williams's appeal to the leve l of emotional involvement with a finer specification of the possibilities in play here, if we think abou t the way in which guilt and simila r emotional reactions ar e focused not just on action bu t als o o n the self . Consider Churchill' s case as described jus t above, o n th e assumptio n tha t he did the right thing in sacrificing Coventr y to the Allies' war aims . If we als o assume tha t th e conduc t o f hi s duties allows fo r emotiona l sensitivit y on th e question—in contras t t o th e second-orde r dilemma s discussed i n chapter 4 — the requisite reaction wil l involve discomfort at what h e had to do, but not the sort o f devaluation of self that i s involved in the variants of guilt. Nor nee d we suppose tha t the problem with guilt has to do with the crippling effects o f selfalienation. Rather, a negative self-evaluation i s just not warrante d here , as it is in a case of dilemma. We might su m this up by noting that distast e an d disquie t and other emo tions of the sort Williams uses to characterize moral cost cases do not impute a stain to the agent's self but at most something more peripheral, a s suggested by "dirty hands. " The y als o see m t o diffe r fro m guil t i n no t requirin g quite th e same focus o f attention o n the wrong i n question: I t would b e correct a s a dispositional attributio n o f emotion to say that someone feel s uneasy about some thing she did in the way these terms suggest even if she managed to avoid thinking about i t and henc e never felt the relevant emotions. Similarly, a certain kin d of avoidance i n thought woul d suffic e t o discharge an obligation to respond wit h distaste or disquiet to an unsavory act. One need not dwell on the act and inflic t some negativ e emotion o n onesel f i n occurrent terms . Bu t this i s the poin t o f guilt feelings, in virtue of which they are sometimes required, on the account I have offered . We do sometimes us e the very malleable term "guilt " to refer to the agent' s feelings i n moral cos t cases, bu t I would sugges t that what distinguishe s genuinely dilemmatic case s i s a requiremen t to fee l guilt y simpliciter—not jus t o n condition tha t one take a certain limited standpoint bu t in a sense that implie s a requiremen t t o take the relevan t standpoint . W e can su m this u p b y saying that the standpoin t i n question, a subse t o f the evidenc e bearing o n th e case, has a claim on the agent' s ful l attention . B y contrast, the politician who mus t wrong someone is obligated to include that person's standpoint within her overall view o f things—an d hence to qualif y an y satisfactio n sh e feel s o n th e whol e with an element of discomfort. But she is not reall y obligated—indeed it might

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seem to be inappropriately "personal" of her, though it is sometimes treate d as a mark of noble character—to drop out of the group perspective and dwel l on the harm done to individuals. One expects politicians to give consideration i n their overall judgments to the harm they have to do to individuals, but not necessarily to give it the sort of isolated emotional attention that Sophi e owes, for instance, to the child she cannot save . In short , then, mora l cos t case s ma y b e distinguished from dilemma s i n emotional term s a s requiring only peripheral attention t o th e wrong i n question—something secured well enough by dispositional affect o r b y mixing discomfort into what one feels toward a more inclusive object. By contrast, dilemmas call for occurrent discomfor t as a way of focusing attentio n o n the threa t of a negative self-evaluation o f the sort involved in guilt. We can illustrat e this point b y comparing the origina l version of Russell's case with th e dilemmatic case that I constructed fro m i t i n chapter 4 . The differenc e betwee n th e tw o cases turned o n degre e of harm done: In the origina l version the woma n wa s disappointed an d he r lif e was disrupted by Russell's failure to keep his promise, but th e connection betwee n his act and he r later mental illness and deat h was merely incidental. However, I take it that with the same degree of political reference (enough , let us grant, t o justif y Russel l in assessing hi s action fro m the standpoint o f the whole, even though his political role i s unofficial)—an d without referenc e to requirement s imposed b y love—this difference i n degree of harm would make the difference betwee n moral cost and dilemma. It would yield a general moral obligation to think about his act from the woman's standpoint and to experience something on the order of emotional guilt . This is to say that, with the case set up as a dilemma, Russell is required t o assume the emotiona l standpoint o f a victim, the on e whose rights h e has t o sacrifice i n favor o f consequences, a s a way of making up for the sacrifice . On a mora l cost version of the case, though, if we consider thing s from a general moral standpoint, h e is required at most to fee l guilty if he sees things from the victim's standpoint. He is also required not to feel various unqualified positiv e emotions suc h as unalloyed pride at his act as viewed from the mor e removed standpoint. H e can get by without guilt in the narrow sense , even on a view of things fro m he r standpoint , i f he substitutes a perspectival emotion wit h less self-focus o n the order of remorse, however . To justif y a n unconditional obligation to fee l guilt y in the moral cost case, we would hav e to brin g in the particular requirements imposed o n Russell by love as an interpersonal ideal, and I think we would also have to switch to "separation guilt." That is , love for the woman presumably does commit Russell, at least as a requirement of virtue, to seeing things from her standpoint—to identifying wit h he r i n a sense that shoul d indee d yield self-alienation if he has t o sever th e relationship . I n contrast t o th e dilemmati c case, though , wher e h e actually does the woman serious harm, I would not take the real-life Russell as morally tainted by the ac t required of him. I conclude, then, that the worries introduced at the end of the last subsection can be met by a subtle enough treatment of the different emotiona l requirements of different case s of conflict. A "real taint" in the fulles t sense involves real self-

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threat i n moral terms fro m a n all-things-considere d moral standpoint . Bu t in Williams's cases from political life, the wrongs done to individuals for the sake of more importan t political aims ar e assumed to b e insignificant fro m the allthings-considered standpoin t an d t o tain t th e person wh o doe s the m onl y t o the extent of making her morally impure. Though sh e is not a fit subject of perfect pride, sh e i s also no t a n appropriat e targe t o f self-blam e lik e the agen t i n a dilemma. The basic point of difference betwee n my own and more standard emotion based approaches to dilemmas can be illustrated with reference to Russell's case by pausing now to reflect on the epigraph I gave this book: "The fo x condemns the trap, not himself. " If Russell's case is interpreted a s a moral dilemma , on e might naturally ask why he should blame himself. After all , our assumptio n i s that he made the best decision he could under circumstances that arose through no faul t o f his own. I f anything was to blame , it was th e world fo r settin g u p those circumstances , or perhap s th e mora l cod e tha t reject s all responses t o them—the trap, not himself. On th e vie w I have taken, though , wha t th e ideall y sensitive moral agen t would fee l may not quit e fit what the fox would believe. Feelings are belieflik e but properly part from belief s insofar as their primary function include s some of the purposes o f action. In cases of dilemma, guilt serves as an act-substitute to the exten t that i t goes som e wa y toward satisfyin g its associated desir e fo r reparation. Her e it would essentiall y bring Russell down t o the position of the person h e has to harm , makin g u p t o som e degre e for the deficiencie s of the world an d the moral code as applied to action. In general, then, moral emotio n plays a role within the moral lif e an d doe s no t merel y record it .

6 Basing Ethic s on Emotio n My argument in chapters 4 and 5 was needed to dispel certain initial objections to understandin g dilemma s in terms o f emotional guilt . A more fundamenta l question no w remain s t o b e considered, i f we widen ou r focu s beyon d guilt , which wa s picked ou t for central treatmen t here because of its disputed status in cases of dilemma and it s special motivational significance. This is the questio n of how the acceptance o f dilemmas ties ethics to emotions i n general terms. An argument to dilemma s from th e reactions expecte d o f agents like Agamemno n as suggested b y Wiliiams's treatmen t migh t seem to tak e mora l judgment s as simply serving to record mora l emotions . I proposed a metaethical alternative in chapter 3 that counts emotion s amon g the grounds of ethics in virtue of their role in moral motivation. The y constrai n the shape of the moral code, that is—the corrected version of the social institution of morality that counts as a real albeit man-made basis of ethics—in virtue of the fact that any viable moral code has to be teachable in conjunction with emotions. Bu t emotions o r othe r attitude s o r mental states migh t see m to exhaust the bases of ethics on this account, which I put forth as a two-component varian t of moral realism , though granting the oddity of the term. On e migh t sa y that what it means for a moral code t o b e "in force " in a given society i s just for it to b e held i n force by shared emotion s of moral assessment : A n action count s as a violation of the rules, or as wrong, t o the extent tha t i t is seen as justifyin g moral blame or some simila r emotion.1 M y guilt/blame asymmetry qualifies an account in these terms but leaves intact its view of ethics as a projection of human feelings onto the worl d o f objects. This sor t o f "projectivist " vie w is often attribute d t o Hume. 2 O n it s usual interpretation, however , i t depends on a roughly perceptual model of moral sentiment that seems to forc e a choice betwee n realism an d emotion-base d ethics . This is what I now want to call into question. My aim in this discussion generally has bee n to trac e a path betwee n the horn s o f various opposed alternative s in metaethics, and o n this issue I want to say that a motivational mode l of the role of emotio n offer s a wa y betwee n standar d position s o n th e questio n o f mora l realism. I shall argue this by considering the view put fort h b y Simon Blackburn as a "quasi-realist" version of projectivism.3 Blackburn's account comes close to the one I have offered i n its resistance to opting for either of the standard alternatives on the question in sharply opposed form . It provides a logical structure for emotion-based ethical discourse that essentially mimics the structure of discourse 187

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about real objects. What I propose is a similar sort of intermediate account that does not fi t Blackburn's characterization of his own vie w as a form of antirealism, but tha t seem s to m e to yiel d a better resolutio n t o the proble m se t up in chapter 1 for "subject-dependent" approache s to moral dilemmas. I attempt t o fil l ou t m y explanation o f the motivationa l mode l i n this fina l chapter b y showing how i t differs fro m standard projectivis m and b y exhibiting its implications for the view of moral emotio n a s essentially a kind of perception o f moral saliences (section 1). My aim is to pul l together an d t o place into perspectiv e som e o f th e divers e points an d insight s that emerge d a s my argument her e proceeded throug h th e rang e o f issues brought u p initiall y by moral dilemmas. The problem of dilemmas, as I have understood it , centers on a question abou t the rational coherency of a moral cod e that generates set s of practical o r action-guiding oughts incapabl e of joint satisfaction. M y answe r has interpreted moral action-guidance as based on the interplay between individual and group standpoints. Emotio n function s primarily on my account a s the source o f individual motivation t o conform t o a moral code set up i n the first instance as an instrument of group flourishing. It is justified b y its general motivational role in a way that allow s for unsatisfiability o r some othe r moti vational foul-up on a given occasion. On the other hand, its own social sources block any simple foundationalist view of emotion i n relation to the content of the moral code . The metaethical role of emotion i s multileveled and complex i n ways that I attempt t o bring out i n this chapter. Among the morally significant aspects of emotion i s its capacity to take in other evaluative standpoints vi a identification. I have made much of this capacity in my account o f guilt, as a prime exampl e of a socially constructed emotion . Bu t we may als o see identification in more general terms as the source of a kind of emotion-based knowledge, both of other individuals and o f the interpersona l standpoint tha t inform s the mora l code . This latter is important a s providing another way between two horns in recent debate: the personal an d the impersona l standpoint s a t issue in discussions of the value of ethical impartiality.4 It also lets us characterize dilemmas as a product of the basi s of ethics in combining different standpoints . O n th e accoun t I have defended, these come ou t no t jus t as conflicting personal standpoint s o f the sort that ca n result from different role s or othe r source s o f obligation bu t more fundamentall y a s complementary metaethical standpoints—o f th e individual agent faced with a moral decisio n and o f the social end that governs his behavior a s a moral agent—whose interactio n can go wrong i n the particula r case. I end wit h a discussio n o f some problem s fo r th e genera l view of ethic s (section 2) that has emerged from this attempt t o understand dilemmas as conflicts of action-guiding moral oughts .

1. Th e Motivationa l Model On m y accoun t o f dilemmas , emotions functio n primaril y a s substitute s for action, motivationa l traces of th e ough t tha t i s not acte d on . Thi s stand s in

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contrast t o th e perceptua l mode l o f emotion s a s putativ e bearer s o f ethica l knowledge that w e find i n a number of contemporary authors. 5 On the moti vational model, moral emotions ma y still be seen as yielding a kind of indirect knowledge of ethical properties a s an inference from our fel t tendency to act in certain ways. But the difference can be brought out by contrasting different pos sible accounts of an example that comes up in the dispute between intuitionis t realists and projectivists : perceiving the sadness i n a face. 6 Realists relying on the perceptual model want to say quite simply that we are aware of sadness in such a case as an irreducible property o f what we see, though one that depends on ou r perceptua l makeu p in the wa y tha t colo r propertie s do . A standar d projectivist account , b y contrast, woul d tak e u s as "projectin g onto " a fac e perceived a s contorted i n a certai n wa y a n associate d feelin g fro m ou r ow n experience. Thus explained, our naive view of sadness as something we perceive in the face comes out a s a kind of perceptual illusion. Mackie sees an analogous illusion, o f "intrinsic requirement" o r "objectiv e prescriptivity," as undermining ethical discourse, but on other version s of projectivism the illusion comes ou t as benign. The poin t fo r my purposes i s that i t still apparently counts as per ceptual in a broad sense: Projectivism on its standard construal takes for granted the model of emotion as primarily a mode of apprehension that i s assumed by the realist view from which it departs. O n th e sor t o f view I want t o suggest , though, on e might say that what goes on when we see a face a s sad is that we respond t o it s contortions wit h a trace o f empathetic sadness—not a percep tion, real or apparent, o f its feeling bu t a feeling fel t o n its behalf. The mora l analogu e to sadnes s o n th e view I shall defend, however, need not be something we can attribute to external objects considered in themselves. We might think of it as a relational property linking an act that is judged wrong to emotional sanction s accepte d a s part of the institutio n of a moral code . I n any case, it is the tendency to impos e th e sanctions—a menta l act tendency— that we are aware of when we seem to "perceive" mora l properties on this view. But we now need to ask how the account differ s fro m more sophisticated ver sions of projectivism than Mackie's. Blackburn, for instance, at one point characterizes his own account as "conative" i n contrast to th e realist's perceptua l account.7 The main point of difference i n general terms is Blackburn's classification of his account as antirealist, whereas in departing altogether from a perceptual account, I hope to locat e an alternative to perceptual realism within a form o f realism that assigns emotions a fundamental moral role .

Forms of Subject-Dependence Blackburn's quasi-realism is essentially a way of reconciling projectivism with the "ordinar y language " evidence for realism . We speak o f ethical statements as true or false, most notably—as objects of doubt and o f knowledge—and we use them in unasserted contexts such as conditional clauses without reference to the speaker's current emotion or other attitude. Blackburn attempts to explain such features o f ethical discourse in terms of a complex set of semantical con-

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straints meant to "fulfil l th e practical purposes fo r which we evaluate things."8 These ma y be said to give ethical discourse th e appearanc e o f describing some independent reality, whereas in fact on Blackburn's account i t rests on the pro jection o f our ow n attitude s onto a world o f natural o r nonmoral facts . Blackburn's antirealist approach, inherite d from Aye r and Har e and ulti mately attribute d to Hume , start s wit h a pictur e of moral judgmen t as base d on an individual's emotional or other practical stance toward the world, though recently Blackburn has attempted to allo w for a social version of the picture. 9 Like my own view, Blackburn's projectivist quasi-realism claims a kind of subject-independence compatibly with a basis in emotions or other attitudes—wha t Blackburn sometimes speaks of as personal "commitments." This is backed u p by a refusal t o endorse statements expressing subject-dependence, 10 as opposed to m y own restrictio n in chapter 3 of forms of subject-dependence relevant to the issu e o f realism to thos e in which th e min d i n question i s seen as the on e currently making a given moral judgment. Does Blackburn' s theory provide an alternative way out of the problem outlined here for dilemmas and motivationa l force i n chapter 1 ? Let us first as k how Blackburn' s theory differ s fro m th e one I have offered . On a general level, several important difference s see m to emerge from the fac t that Blackburn's account i s set up explicitly as a version of expressivism.11 That is, although accordin g to quasi-realis m moral judgment s exhibit belieflik e be havior, their primary function on Blackburn's projectivist view is really that of attitudes. O f the sentences expressin g them h e writes: They expres s something more to d o wit h attitudes, practices, emotions, feel ings arisin g in contemplating some kinds of conduct, with goal seeking , with insistence upon normative constraints on conduct, and nothing to do with representing the world. In the familia r metaphor , their "direction of fit" with the world is active—to have the world conform t o them, rather than descriptive or representational.12

In othe r words , the worl d i n itsel f contain s n o mora l fact s against whic h w e might measure our moral statements; a discrepancy does no t impl y inaccurate description but rather some sort of failure to act properly. Yet it is perfectly apt to spea k of such statements a s true or fals e o n Blackburn' s view insofar as we construct truth an d simila r notions t o furthe r th e practical aims of moral dis course. One might want to say that an extended notio n of "the world " results from our creation of values on this account. This is essentially the view I have taken, with the moral code see n as a creation o f the human min d but once created as taking o n a lif e o f it s own i n constraining furthe r moral choices . Th e rule s it comprises exhibi t the world-to-mind directio n o f fit that Blackbur n attributes to our moral statements in the passage just quoted. But moral statements them selves may on this accoun t b e understood a s having a descriptiv e function to the exten t tha t the y describ e the working s o f th e code . Mor e precisely , they describe human action i n terms of its fit to the code—a s satisfying o r failing t o satisfy th e mora l rules . The cod e itsel f ma y b e see n as a kind of projection of

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our deonti c attitudes , bu t ont o an intervenin g screen, a s it were, rathe r tha n directly onto objects. The resul t is an artifact o f thought, allowin g for a new , relational way o f describing natural objects. It is in some respects like the fictional object s that Blackburn discusses along with lega l codes a s examples of how texts ma y constrain what we say—except that it does not purport t o represent anything. For a legal analogy, as noted i n chapter 3 , one might consider the way the U.S. Constitution constrain s legislation, sometimes in a way tha t conflicts wit h the values of current legislators. Blackburn at one point in discussing subject-dependence speaks of the values we create a s taking on a lif e o f their own.13 However, a s I intend this point, it involves a break with the antirealist tradition that Blackburn's view is meant to defend—the tradition from whic h he derives its classification as "expressivist. " On the account I have suggested, the point of moral discourse is to describe acts in relation to th e code—to an idealize d version of the actual code, correcte d i n light o f the en d i t is meant to achieve : group flourishing , which essentially replaces Blackburn' s appeal t o th e pragmatic aims of moral discourse . Sinc e the code on this account is not the invention of any one mind—or even of the dominant socia l sensibilit y of any on e era—it is perfectly possible to get its contents wrong. The overarching end that constrains it is itself made out as something other than a product o f human sensibility, though it depends on human ends. By contrast, Blackburn presumably wants to say that his own appeal to pragmatic aims is simply an expression of some more fundamental set of attitudes . This las t point reveals a basic difference betwee n Blackburn' s account an d the one I described in chapter 3 . On the face of them, many of his comments on moral sensibility and the like resemble my characterization of the corrected moral code. In connection with the notion o f a "viable " code , fo r instance, consider what Blackburn says in response to popular associations wit h "relativism" an d "subjective" views of ethics: Just as the senses constrain what w e can believ e about th e empirical world, so our nature s and desires , needs and pleasures , constrain muc h of what w e can admire an d commend , tolerat e an d work for . There are no t s o many livable, unfragmented, developed , consistent, an d coheren t system s of attitude. 14

However, remark s like these about the "best possible set of attitudes" see m to require interpretation themselves in terms of the speaker's attitudes—a s endorsing a certain sensibility—o n Blackburn's account o f value. 15 Blackbur n often brings in higher order emotion s an d other attitude s toward one's moral emotions i n his detailed account of quasi-realism. They figure, for instance, i n his explanation of the use of moral terms in unasserted contexts , with the speake r understood a s endorsing logical and other connections amon g endorsements. 16 And they also underlie his explanation of moral truth to the extent that seeing our moral judgments as false depends on the notion o f an improved standpoint of evaluation from whic h we may admire or disavow our first-order emotional propensities.17 Fundamental reference to a judgment of emotional appropriateness take n a s descriptiv e could no t d o thi s jo b withou t compromisin g the expressivist cast of Blackburn's theory.

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The same must be said, then, of appeals to group flourishing or even to particular moral ends such as fairness as constraints o n the moral code. I suggested several alternativ e ways of making sense of such constraints i n chapter 3—i n terms of judgments of group value, for instance, on a version of the perceptual model; but also in motivational terms, as supporting the teachability of moral rules. An expressivist account , though, woul d seem to hav e to rel y on a basic expression of preference at some point in the explanation. If it is expressivist at the leve l of moral judgments , moreover—and I shall later sugges t that i t need not be—it would hav e to do without the separation into two components tha t allows for a version of externalism.18 That is, from within morality on my own account on e has to endors e the sort o f cooperative sensibility that is constitutive of the moral enterprise—or at any rate, one has to endorse it by and large— but the content o f morality is given independently. So one can withhold the endorsement and still acknowledge moral truths. For an individual property analogous to group flourishing on my proposed view consider health as an end that might be said to b e constitutive of medical practice. The doctor's warnings about alcohol may be understood an d acknowledged, with healt h seen as the standard of adequate functioning proper t o the sort of entity that is in question, a body, even by someone whose current commitments lie elsewhere. Similarly, group flourishing may b e seen a s a norma tive constraint governin g groups, spelling out the elements of group perfection, but assesse d fro m a standpoint th e speaker may reject. It is worth notin g tha t neithe r of these standpoints, medica l or moral , has to b e taken a s settin g u p a n invarian t ideal: There ma y b e interna l conflicts among th e elements i n question, so that a n individua l might hav e to choose , say, betwee n hig h energ y and placi d endurance , on th e mode l o f th e choic e between societie s stressing cultural achievement and thos e conten t t o mak e a relatively unperturbe d contributio n t o th e strea m o f life . Thi s ma y b e some what weake r tha n Blackburn' s view, with it s assumption tha t mora l trut h is constructed t o serv e the pragmati c ends of moral discourse , favoring a single answer to questions set up in moral terms.19 Blackburn's view apparently builds in the philosopher's concer n with dialogue and debate—or perhaps particularly the linguistic emphases of his semantical approach t o metaethics . At any rate , on my own accoun t eve n the overarching end of morality need no t b e shared by someone wh o grasp s the content o f a moral judgment. Subject-independence o n m y accoun t rest s on mor e tha n a highe r orde r positive attitude toward subject-independence as in Blackburn's quasi-realism. It also seems to provid e a basis for a descriptivist interpretation o f moral language. A moral judgment may be understood, not necessarily as expressing the speaker's attitudes , bu t a s purporting t o describ e the world i n terms of some standard o f morality tha t count s a s "real" enough fo r the purpose, whateve r its origins as a projection o f attitudes. It is a real invention or artifact , somewhat on the model of a computer program, which once designed constrains what the programme r ca n do—includin g his attempts to modif y it . Bu t the sor t of reality in question here should not be confused with that claimed by metaphysical realism: the vie w that abstrac t propertie s exist apar t fro m th e thing s whose

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properties they are. Existence apart from the mind of a putative subject of knowledge is all that is in question, as with the color properties discusse d in the debate over the perceptual model o f realism. I hav e suggeste d "socia l artifac t realism " a s a nam e fo r thi s alternativ e approach t o metaethics. However, i f the word "realism " pose s problems, w e might just get rid of it and speak instead of social artifact "descriptivism" a s an alternative to the expressivist version of projectivism that Blackburn draws from twentieth-century metaethics in the tradition stemmin g from Hume. Th e view still shares with Hume the insistence that moral properties ar e not simply "ou t there" a s objects of perception, eve n though our moral language often suggests as much. But neither are many of the acts we describe by reference to such prop erties. Instead of filling ou t th e Humea n accoun t o f moral language , the view essentially expands Hume's accoun t o f the moral imagination b y taking some thing like the standard to which he appeals in making sense of justice as underlying more basic moral attitudes, to the extent that morality entails a principled extension to new cases. It is appeal to som e suc h standard tha t provide s the hardness o f the mora l "must" and that thereby helps make dilemmatic cases hard enough on the agent to avoi d th e proble m I se t u p fo r subject-dependen t view s i n chapte r 1 . Blackburn's quasi-realist projectivism and m y own vie w both se e ethics as in some sense subject-independent even though emotion-based . However , it was subject-dependent motivatio n tha t wa s i n questio n i n chapte r 1 . The two component view allows for a split between content an d motivation, s o that the motivational force of an ought with all-things-considered rational statu s nee d not actuall y be strong enoug h to win the day. At the same time, th e self-punishing aspect of guilt as a substitute for action and its anticipatory role as a motivator i n advance of actio n ma y b e said t o kee p th e agen t o n th e hook . If we allow fo r "perspectival " guilt , with a real bu t limite d foundation i n a mora l "taint" o n th e agent , th e emotio n wil l be warranted b y the ough t th e agen t violates in a dilemma. By contrast, thoug h Blackburn could of course allow for guilt or some othe r unpleasant residue of moral conflict, he could no t provid e any firmer foundation fo r it than ho w we ultimately happen t o feel. 20 That is, a requirement to feel guilt y would seem to have to rest o n our higher orde r attitud e toward the emotion—toward a certain sort of sensibility in reaction t o a dilemma. To avoid my objections to Hare's treatment of moral residue s in virtue-ethical terms, th e account migh t endorse ange r o r som e simila r emotion towar d a n agen t wh o fails t o exhibi t the requisit e sensibility. But this would itsel f express a certain sensibility. At no poin t coul d w e simply appeal t o th e moral demand s o f the case, th e conten t o f the practica l ought s i n conflict, as dictating what to feel . My own account departs from expressivism in the first instanc e b y analyzing emotions in terms of ought-judgments and other evaluations. This may seem to make moral judgment prior to emotion—with odd results for the attribution of emotions to animals and humans that lack the capacity for moral judgment— but i t is important t o not e tha t the dependenc e is not one-way. 21 My detailed account o f guilt migh t in fac t b e viewed as providing a particular example of

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how an emotion wit h a moral content might result by processes o f refinemen t and social shaping from a childhood reactio n that is itself not specifically moral . The child in my developmental account in chapter 3 reacts initially on the basis of a pre-moral evaluation of its immediate environment as a source of pleasure or pain—but extended to include social pleasures and pains via the mechanism of emotiona l identification . The eventua l result of the socia l sources o f emo tional learning in general terms is comfort or discomfort directe d toward fairl y sophisticated sorts of prepositional objects , including moral act-requirements, so that emotions serv e to register the importance o f moral reasons for action , as i n th e pictur e that emerge d fro m m y discussio n o f deonti c dominance i n chapter 2.1 now want to approach th e results of that discussio n from anothe r angle, in relation to the question of the sense in which emotions may be said to amount to perceptions of moral truths . Emotional Perception A perceptual interpretation of moral emotio n ma y see m to b e implied by the role we accord emotional reactions as evidence of the truth of moral judgments. Despite the original use of "intuition" i n ethics to stand for an intellectual faculty, the term now ofte n seem s to b e applied t o any gut feelin g i n response t o particular cases. In attempting to systematize our emotional reactions into general principles, it might be said, wha t w e are doing is weeding out illusio n by applying a test of coherency. What passes the test counts as a perception o f the moral facts. This accoun t o f things also ma y see m to fi t ou r preanalyti c treatment o f emotions as a guide to moral decision-making. A feeling of discomfort at some act I have managed to justify to myself or that others are trying to persuade me to do is something we count as a reason fo r moral mistrust. The act just "feels wrong." However, I would suggest that such appeals to emotion as a bearer of moral knowledge may be understood withou t the analogy to sense-perception , in terms of the motivationa l role I have assigne d to mora l feeling . Th e us e of emotion to motivate moral behavior lets us take emotional reaction s as data— in th e firs t instance , as clues to wha t we really think, to th e exten t tha t they involve urges to act . O n m y account, tha t is , they have an evaluativ e content that i n ordinary cases is keyed to ou r mora l beliefs rather tha n directl y to th e facts themselves, as on perceptual versions of realism. But they may b e said to "track" the relevant facts, at any rate roughly, and to provide the bases for an inference to them, insofar as they are taught to us as motivational props of the moral code. They register the values instilled in us as part of the process o f setting up the code b y linking it to individua l psychology. Emotions may also be said to provide a kind of moral knowledge that short cuts belie f i n som e cases . Thei r motivationa l functio n depends o n directin g positive or negative attention toward thei r evaluative objects, which might not always be accepted as objects of belief. We might think of empathy, for instance, as providing a kind of nonmoral knowledge, of others' menta l states, b y way of evaluativ e standpoint s understood no t t o appl y to ourselves . But to gran t

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this is not to say that we "perceive" others ' mental states via emotion i n a sense that implie s direct awareness ; rather , ou r awarenes s i s mediated b y imagination. In any case, emotiona l knowledg e of moral truth s come s ou t a s a much more complex matter on the sort of account I mean to suggest here than it does on a perceptual model . I shall have more to sa y in my next sectio n abou t th e sense in which empathy ma y affor d individual s a source o f specifically mora l knowledge vi a identificatio n with th e group . Fo r th e moment , le t me take a simpler example of emotion without belief. Suppose I feel uneasy about some action that in fact seems justified—grad ing a paper I take to b e irredeemably bad, say, on the basis of just the first few pages. Emotional discomfor t here serves to hold i n mind a general rule enjoining punctilious performance of all job-related duties that prescribes completing the paper. The result in this case is a variant of guilt; but the mechanism in play here extends beyond self-punitive or even negative emotions in a way that may indeed make it seem to resemble perception. Perceptua l language came into my discussion o f the evidential assessment of oughts in chapter 2, where I used the image of figure/ground dominance to make intelligible the persistence of negative oughts i n th e fac e o f conflict—the source o f dilemma s on m y account i n terms o f sufficiently stron g reasons. On e might suggest, then, that moral emo tions amount to perceptions o f the force of moral reasons . There i s a kernel of truth i n this view to the extent that emotional comfor t and discomfor t o n m y own accoun t o f emotion s migh t b e said t o registe r i n affective terms their positive or negative evaluative content. However, we have to b e careful no t to take "perception " too seriously—eve n after cancelin g out any sensory connotations, a s I have done. For our emotional access to the facts is typically mediate d b y beliefs—possibl y false beliefs , a s m y example here is meant t o indicate . My "perception " o f the importanc e o f completing an irre deemably bad paper i s explainable as the residue of an emotion securing attention t o a general rule that i s thought t o b e important enoug h b y and larg e t o justify a few spillovers to othe r cases. Eve n in veridical cases, moreover, wha t emotional attentio n hook s ont o in the firs t instanc e may b e something to b e added to the surrounding situation, not something found in it: the act to be done, not som e property of the world by virtue of which it demands action. And the emotion ma y be at som e remov e from th e situation—lik e an allergi c reaction to a food enjoye d a t the time but producing hives a few hours later . One migh t object that sense-perceptio n als o depend s on ou r expectation s and othe r belief s abou t th e situation. However, to pic k ou t mora l emotion s I take it that we need to assign them a belieflike content, even if it is one that ha s to be left indefinit e in some cases. Consider a case involving more in the way of affective qualit y than the one just cited: moral horro r at the thought o f a seriously wrong act such as Agamemnon's parricide. The sensory "feel" of this and similar reactions may be part of what motivate s the analogy to perception, bu t it seems to have sources in imagination that are distinguishable from th e simple awareness of moral wrong. I would interpret it as an identificatory response t o the victim's pain and feeling s of betrayal or t o society' s feelings o f aversion to the perpetrator . T o assig n the feelin g a specificall y mora l content , though ,

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so that i t might seem to coun t a s the perception o f a moral property , w e need to se e it as directed toward a n abstract thought : that the act in question is forbidden, say. It is in this sense, conceptual rather tha n causal , that mora l emo tions see m to b e mediated by beliefs. On m y account, emotion s ar e reasons fo r action—eve n instrumenta l rea sons, since comfort an d discomfort, besides registering the force of evaluations, themselves amoun t t o reason s fo r sustainin g or changin g one' s presen t state . To see more concretely how emotions can be understood i n motivational terms, we might turn away from the moral cases under consideration t o other cases of emotional perceptio n tha t we would no t b e so ready t o explai n by appeal t o special properties o f objects. An analog y I find usefu l fro m detectiv e fiction i s the detective' s uneas y sense that somethin g "doesn't fit" : There i s somethin g funny abou t th e fact s o f the cas e a s she knows them—o r perhap s ther e wa s something out o f place in a room sh e has just visited—but it is unclear where to locate the problem . W e need not explai n her perception o f "unfittingness " as keyed to a corresponding property of the situation that she somehow i s in contact with directly. I would sugges t instead that sh e is more immediatel y aware of something like the interrupted scanning of her own perceptions or thoughts — her review of the facts of the case or the objects in the room, in contrast t o nor mal cases in her experience or to the room a s she saw it before. In short, she is reacting to somethin g irregula r about he r own mental tendencies, though her attention i s focused outward o n its causes. I lik e this analog y partl y becaus e th e sense o f "fittingness " i s sometime s brought i n to characteriz e th e positiv e inpu t of our mora l faculties . M y ow n view is that the negative reaction, a "taboo feeling," is more basic—an d that it need not have much specific affective content, beyond something like the detective's sense of uneasiness, in order t o count a s an emotion. It amounts to a socially inculcated or reinforced aversion to certain acts, with an intellectual content whose analysi s may require as much special insight and skill as is required of the detective to get at the causes of her uneasiness. In the moral case, of course, in order to be effective th e basic reaction ha s to be widespread. Bu t its analysis involves attention t o things too remote to count as plausible objects of perception: the mora l code , the ends i t is meant t o serve , an d th e way s it has to b e corrected i n order t o serve them. One need not understand these things in detail to use moral languag e intelligibly: Our ordinar y description s of acts a s satisfying o r failin g to satisf y th e moral code will be left indefinite . I shall have something t o say in my next section abou t problem s th e socia l artifac t view face s t o th e exten t tha t i t ha s a relativist basis—with "the " mora l code picked out in some way that implicitly refers to the speaker. At this point, however , I want t o raise a related questio n about th e basi c value constraints tha t the view presupposes. Thes e emerged in the discussio n o f fairness in chapter 3 as possibly importin g referenc e to rea l value properties i n something like McDowell's sense . Bu t the properties wer e limited to such things as the rational way of assessing means to an end and the proper compositio n o f the socia l end t o b e used i n assessin g the mora l code . Should we now accep t at least these basic value constraints as indeed objects of

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emotional perception i n the broad sense just indicated? Can one simply see, for instance, that harmony and stability are traits of a flourishing group in the way that the detective recognizes the solution when it occurs to her? The analogy is too simple, I think, for what we have to deal with in the moral case are constraints on what is to count as a solution—as if the detective had t o choose betwee n two partial solutions, both wit h some loose explanator y end s but on e yieldin g a bette r accoun t o f how th e dee d wa s don e an d th e othe r a fuller accoun t of the perpetrator' s motive . Suppose she opted fo r th e firs t ex planation o n the grounds tha t a murderer's mental states ma y no t alway s be open to understanding or scrutiny. If we share her basic explanatory expecta tions, must we b e given pause by the though t tha t someon e els e migh t have different explanator y expectations—might insist, for instance, that understanding an act requires understanding its reasons? By admitting that the acceptance of a certain solution rest s on a basic decision on explanatory issues—rather than on some sort of perception o f explanatory adequacy—w e would no t b e taking a statement of the solutio n simpl y as expressing th e speaker' s explanator y expectations, an y mor e tha n a jur y i n announcing its verdict is simply expressing the presumption of innocence. Similarly, i n th e mora l case , ou r relianc e on a choice of basi c values at a certai n level need not be taken as undermining descriptivism; our moral judgments may be understood as describing acts in accordance with the values we have chosen rather than simply as expressing the choice of values—even if the choice introduces a relativistic element. This account still gives us what we want from realism as long as our value-choice is implicit in the moral code, as a social/historical artifact that is not modifiabl e at will. Whether it is thus implicit is a matter for argument on occasions when we encounter a real disagreement about basic values, about which I say more in the next section . The motivationa l mode l defende d her e a s a wa y o f understandin g th e metaethical relevance of emotion seems to me also t o yield a bette r notio n of its normative ethical relevance. It allows for the importance o f the "forward looking" assessmen t of different emotion s in accordance with their motivational effects b y letting it influenc e th e standard s o f emotional appropriateness . B y contrast, the analogy of perceptual correction t o remove the distortions of perception fro m differen t standpoint s tends to produce a "disinterested " idea l of moral judgmen t as somethin g essentiall y impersonal. On e lin e o f argumen t sparking the current revival of virtue ethics rests on the importance o f particular personal standpoint s o f evaluation.22 But the motivational mode l seem s to provide a clearer picture o f the reasons fo r the moral assessmen t o f emotion s that virtue ethics brings to center stage. On a n accoun t o f moral training like the one drawn fro m Aristotle, emo tions ar e take n a s subject s of praise an d blam e not jus t because o f their ten dency to lead to overt action but for their own sake.23 They are typically understood in terms of character traits, but the motivational model sees them as based on acts of a sort—acts o f attention—even where they do no t lea d to over t action. In admiring someone's courage, say, or his sympathy and concern , what I value in the firs t instanc e is his tendency to hol d in mind certain thoughts in

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situations o f danger or harm t o others, often at some affective cos t to himself. Emotional affec t i s explained as a way of holding thoughts i n mind by registering their evaluative features in positive or negative feeling tone. This may seem at firs t sigh t to fi t the perceptual analogy , but i t involves actively entertaining one propositio n rathe r tha n another , no t simpl y receivin g information fro m external reality. There ar e furthe r possibilitie s within duty ethics, i f we accep t m y defense of "ought-to-feel, " fo r basin g ethics on emotion i n normative terms: Motive s can b e see n a s the prim e bearer s o f mora l valu e with over t act s judge d only derivatively.24 O n th e metaethica l questio n o f th e emotiona l basi s o f ethics , though, there seem to be three possibilities to be distinguished, besides of course the denial of an emotional basis as in Kant.25 Besides the different way s of understanding emotion s a s registerin g mora l judgments , tha t is—perceptuall y o r motivationally—there are familiar way s of understanding moral judgments as essentially registering emotions. View s on the metaethica l question can b e divided accordin g t o whethe r the y assign emotions o r other motive s a place in the semantical analysis of ethical judgments. Blackburn's semantical approac h is a new entry in the dominant twentieth-centur y tradition o f inquiry into th e meanings of moral terms stemming from G . E. Moore's cognitivist account of "good" as unanalyzable on the model of color terms.261 hope to have contrib uted i n this essa y the beginning s of both a fine r graine d understandin g o f th e nature of moral emotion and a way of remaining neutral on the semantical questions tha t have dominated metaethica l discussion unti l now.

2. Sensibilit y an d Standpoint s One way of basing ethics on a kind of emotional perception has indeed emerged from m y argument here to the extent that it underscores the role of empathy in moral judgment. The motivational significance of empathy as a way of binding oneself to others was important t o my defense of emotional guilt , which I interpreted a s an identificator y mechanism, in response t o mora l dilemmas . Emo tional identification also can b e seen as yielding a form of knowledge—knowledge o f others' mental states, o f the sort that came up i n the las t section, an d also, we should now note, a form of specifically moral knowledge to the extent that it enables us to take a perspective essential to morality, that o f the grou p as a whole . The picture of morality to which I have appealed rest s on this overarching view o f things i n its reliance o n a notio n o f group flourishin g as guiding th e correction o f the moral code. This ideal is meant to b e understood b y analogy to the Aristotelian notion of individual flourishing or happiness. Though I have allowed a standard wa y of referring to our estimate s of flourishing in terms of the ascriptio n o f value-properties, it i s important tha t the propertie s i n ques tion are often unrealized . The sam e is true of many of the other properties that we understan d vi a empathy: They involv e state s o f feeling , fo r instance , tha t would resul t from som e futur e actio n w e are contemplating bu t ma y no t do .

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Perception of external objects is not the right model for such cases. In my argument up to this point I mainly took for granted ou r views about group flourishing and saw moral emotions o n my motivational account a s imposed o n individuals in order to enforce obedience to a pre-existing moral code. But we now might probe deeper , to questions abou t th e bases of the code. Morality woul d of course b e undermined by a certain kind of basis in emotion, whereas the epistemic role of emotions o n the perceptual realist model pose s no threat. However, the tendency of this essay has been to uncover various ways in which the motivational role of emotions affect s the content o f the moral code and to reinterpret their epistemic role in terms of it. I want to complete my argument, in this section, by beginning to respond t o some problems that might be raised for the view that has emerged here, indicating how I think they might be handled b y extensions of it . In particular, I attempt t o sho w a t leas t roughly how objection s concerning the view' s relianc e on a standpoin t tha t seem s t o oppose individua l autonomy can be countered b y a notion o f self-identity that brings out it s sources in group identification. A variant of group identification—self-projection int o the standpoint o f the whole (not to be confused with the impersonal standpoint)—ultimately figures as one of the sources of our insight into group flourishing. We understand what makes a group flourish b y analogy to the way we understand individual happiness in the case of another agent, puttin g ourselves into the imagined position of the group in question. This positive appeal to imagination stands in contrast to th e eliminatio n of personal biase s that produce s disintereste d moral emo tions on the usual perceptual model, bu t i t can still be seen as involving a correction o f individua l perspective . O n th e othe r hand , i t ma y seem to involv e personifying th e group i n a way tha t calls to min d the collectivis t excesses of nineteenth-century idealism. I want to suggest , instead, tha t grou p identification underlies a certain kind of individual self-regard.

The Interpersonal "Ought" My treatment of "ought" in chapters 2 and 3 essentially explained the sense of obligation a s based on th e impositio n o f group need s o n th e individual , with moral emotions originating as felt individual needs manufactured by the grou p to enforc e compliance . But part I ended wit h a differen t sor t of appeal t o th e emotional basis of ethics in response t o initia l worries abou t subject-relativit y and relate d issues. Despite the socia l source s o f our adul t stoc k o f emotions , ethics on the account I offered ha s to rely on the shape given to behavior by our natural emotion tendencies. I appealed particularly to our tendency to identif y emotionally with others, as a barrier to views that put some subgroups beyond the moral pale—not an insuperable barrier, but one that impose s a social cos t on exclusive caste systems . I now wan t t o ad d to thi s some mor e genera l reflections on ho w m y view brings together self-regard an d concern for others in support of moral motivation. Even apart from th e sources of particular emotions like guilt in identification with others, emotional motivation may be seen as linking the self to other s

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to the extent that it focuses an agent's attentio n o n something external to himself whil e appealin g t o hi s concern fo r hi s own stat e o f comfort a s a furthe r reason fo r action. 27 By using object-directed comfort o r discomfort as a way of holding significant thoughts in mind, emotions can be said to incorporate som e other-regarding reason s fo r action within self-interest. The stres s o n socia l factor s in this account fit s i n with view s of the sel f a s essentially a social product.28 Our firs t stirrings of self-awareness are plausibly held to depend on identification with the reactions of others—to behavio r that from others ' externa l perspectiv e seems to requir e explanatio n i n terms o f a localized set of perceptions and interests or a distinct personality. Given the facts of childhood dependency, our sens e of ourselves as having interests—or a self interest; or a self—requires no t just a review of our menta l contents considered in isolation but also some awareness of the changes in them consequent on action on ou r behal f by others. We must come to see such action a s originating outside ourselves and in general to distinguish ourselves from th e group or groups that provid e our initia l sources of identity. Further, even in adult lif e our sens e of who w e are is in many ways constituted by our relations to others—by a potentially conflicting set of statuses and roles, from our initial place in the birth order of a certain family to the position we eventually achieve in society at large. But these fairly commonplace observations about th e social sources of the self can b e made to yield an alternative to the relianc e of traditional account s of the role of emotion i n ethics on notion s of individual flourishing, even those that buil d in some moral o r social valueconstraints on flourishing. We might think of the self as originally extended—enlarged t o include various others (in the first instance, the mother)—but with shifting boundaries leading us to distinguish an individual self, over time, as a kind of intersection of its multiple group extensions. O n this picture, the other end-poin t o f social composition i s also a kin d of explanatory construct: Th e overarchin g group, th e group tha t yield s "the standpoin t o f the whole, " migh t be thought o f as th e conflict-free idealizatio n of th e variou s small-grou p socia l source s o f self identity. But we have to resist any temptation to see the standpoint of the whole as one among other personal standpoints—a standpoint someon e or something might b e said t o have rather tha n on e we ought t o striv e to take . It need no t count a s a possible experientia l standpoint, a "perspective " i n the sens e tha t implies a subjective point o f view, but rathe r jus t a s a limit o n our attemp t t o reconcile the various group standpoints that potentiall y constitute a self. Reconciling group standpoints, that is , means reconciling the aims of various competin g groups , whic h presumabl y means reconcilin g the desire s and interests of the various extended selves that would result from allyin g ourselves to them . By taking this project to th e limit, we remove a kind of limit to individual self-definition b y keeping open multipl e possibilities of group membership. To th e extent that a subjective viewpoint emerges, it is that of imaginary self-projection—in thi s case into a n enlarge d view o f thing s rather than int o someone else's particular perceptual position. It is a viewpoint that centers on the agent rather than tends toward neutrality . We d o hav e to adjus t ou r indi -

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vidual slant on things to attain it, as on the usual account of perceptual correction. But it is important t o the moral cast of mind the account yields that ou r corrections are not meant to achieve an impersonal standpoint; rather, they aim at a certain overarchin g pattern o f personal standpoints . The resultin g imaginary standpoint, o f enlarged self-interest , is a psycho logically rewarding one to take. Any barriers to i t involve forgoing something personally valuable, if only because they put limit s on th e pleasure s of imagination. I think we can use these reflections to get at some specifically social reasons for adherence to morality—thus in effect expandin g the standard notio n of autonomy a s self-rule t o includ e identification with the mora l community . Such an ideal can be made to yield a modern version of traditional Aristotelian approaches t o virtue ethics, with their reliance on individual flourishing a s an aim that depends on relations to other s bu t can be all too easil y limited to an elite subgroup. The aim serves as something that might induce an agent to behave morally withou t necessaril y advancing his welfare. What I think my socially based approach migh t be able to add to fill this role—particularly in cases where individual flourishing has to b e sacrificed, even in a moral sense, as in secondorder dilemmas—i s a vie w of grou p flourishin g a s affectin g individua l selfidentity and henc e the worth o r meaning of an individual life in a sense distinct from individua l flourishing. I shall attempt to fil l ou t this suggestion in a moment, bu t its initial point is to avoid a view of morality as simply imposed on the individual by processes of social engineering—eve n small-scale engineering, of th e sor t involve d in m y account of moral teaching via guilt in chapter 3. The basis of guilt in identificatory processes tha t I went o n to describe in chapter 4 begins to move us away from tha t model t o the extent that i t makes out eve n a socially manufactured emotion lik e guilt as expressing a natura l emotional mechanism that i s itself essentially social. My current suggestion involves extending that account to the bases o f moral motivation . O n th e accoun t I have offered, guil t involve s the absence of something positive—a sense of community with others, let us say— that i n emotiona l term s ma y b e though t o f a s a for m o f pride . Prid e in thi s communitarian form may be seen as a socially based element in our conception of the meaningfulness of an individual life—its worth in a sense that sometimes detaches fro m individua l happiness or even virtue. To put the matter simply: We derive self-worth in a fundamental wa y from our identification with various overlapping groups and group projects. Actio n on reasons give n by a particular group standpoint , whateve r its instrumental costs o r benefits , has a self-fulfillin g expressiv e function fo r th e individual : It enhances the self by identifying i t with something larger. Group identification may be psychologically rewarding with respect to all sorts of group affiliations, of course, includin g bad ones, but a s a source of value it presupposes a valueladen notion o f group flourishing. It is a further mov e to the group standpoint— the standpoin t o f the whole , wha t I think of as the mora l standpoint , a s op posed to that of some elite group, or even of the various overlapping subgroups an individua l in fac t belong s to—but I think it can b e mad e easier by understanding what i s achieved by social pride.

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That is , the valu e o f grou p identificatio n for th e individua l self i n more mundane cases, such as ethnic pride, lies partly in the protection i t offers agains t contingency, or the vagarie s of individual fortune. My il l fate will be less of a loss t o m e i f I can se e my effort s a s serving some large r effor t tha n m y own , something whose success in pursuit of what I value is compatible with my own failure. This sort o f self-transcendence, in one form o r another , i s the poin t of group membership insofar as it affects self-regard . Groups als o have fortunes , however, and their aims may be frustrated or misdirected; for that matter, they can mistreat or exclude some of the individuals who identif y wit h them. So an individual's group commitments can also be failures. Insurance against il l fortune i s provided b y spreadin g ou t one' s commitment s t o variou s differen t groups—and i s reinforced by commitment to an ideal community, the community of the whole . Taking th e mora l standpoint i n this sense i s the bes t available bulwark against ba d mora l luck. There are ways in which the moral projec t also can fail— I shal l bring up a possible metaethical failure i n the next section—but it is at an y rate cushioned against the usual forms of bad luck, including moral luck, to the extent tha t it looks beyond individual flourishing, or even the flourishing of a particular subgroup. For instance, in the face of a moral dilemma or other situation in which my ow n virtu e turns ou t t o b e irredeemabl y compromised—a second-orde r dilemma, say, in which moral sensitivity is no help either—it would stil l be possible, if I really did ac t a s well as one could unde r the circumstances , t o tak e pride at least in that achievement. At the very least, pride gives me a reason for not doin g worse. What I do stil l matters or has a point—the intende d sense of "meaning" here . In more norma l case s wher e w e raise the questio n "Wh y b e moral?" th e answer may be given by appeal to a form of pride—not specifically to the affec tive rewards of the occurrent emotion but to a presupposition o f its evaluative content: the claim moral behavior gives us on other agents' regard. This is supposed t o b e independent o f our actua l affiliations wit h others , an d o f others' accurate perception o f us, as also subject to ill fortune. What one loses by aiming at others ' actua l regar d a s oppose d t o wha t the y would thin k (o r feel ) if they knew one's motives , say , is membership in an idea l community as a basis for self-respect. 29 An overarching group idea l as an extension of individual self-worth might suggest some sort of Nietzschean versio n of self-perfectionism. Bu t the notio n of imaginary self-enlargement I have in mind is not a n inflatio n of self-regard; rather, it amounts to the set of potential identifications with others that results from removin g barriers to enlargement of one's own perspective. With th e self seen as the intersectio n of an individual's multiple overlapping possibilities of group membership, any two-person grou p including oneself count s a s a com ponent standpoin t i n the set that is potentially one's own, th e set of communities on e migh t ente r into . T o sligh t any on e o f these standpoint s i s thus, on e might say, to limi t oneself by obstructing a possible mental route t o imagined self-enlargement. We ca n thin k o f th e interpersona l standpoint i n this sense a s a particula r

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kind of group standpoint : a standpoint o f the whole that is constructed ou t of all its parts, since it takes in all the overlapping socia l perspectives that poten tially constitut e the self . M y suggestio n i s that this o r som e simila r practica l ideal afford s a motive toward mora l behavio r i n people whos e motivationa l structure is roughly normal but who might still seek reassurance that they are not losing out by acting morally—as opposed t o an amoralist, defined as someone who lack s moral motives. 30 M y discussion her e is just meant t o exhibi t a self-regarding motive for seeing things from the moral standpoint, not to present that standpoint a s a precondition o f rationality, as on Kantian accounts of the moral "ought. " The "ought " that emerges from m y account o f morality as a social artifac t will be normatively "binding" onl y from the group standpoint; from the standpoint of particular individuals it is binding only in the psychological sense given by my treatment of motivational force in chapter 3. Societies have reasons, tha t is, why their individual members must do what morality prescribes; their members have those moral reasons only in a weaker sense that allows fo r a failur e to act on them compatibly with rationality. Accompanying psychological sanctions, a s instilled by the group t o generat e conformity to mora l reasons , giv e the illusion of rational bindingness on the individual level and serve as goads t o action in the individual case. It is only when an individual takes the overarchin g group standpoin t tha t he is "bound" by moral reasons. What I have suggested is that we do have a natural motive for taking that overarching view of things, namely pride; but i t is not th e sort of motive that compels action. Final Perspectives I now wan t t o conside r som e furthe r objection s t o th e socia l vie w of ethics I have proposed, o n the grounds tha t it s reference to th e surrounding commu nity gives it a conventionalist aspect . There ar e variou s way s o f defusin g th e threat o f relativism. 31 Here I want t o sho w ho w w e might ward i t off, at an y rate for terms o f serious moral condemnatio n suc h a s "wrong," by appealin g to assumption s the socia l artifact view makes about hypothetica l correction s to th e moral cod e i n force i n a given community. Various way s of avoiding a relativist upshot ca n b e teased ou t o f the reference to a "viable " mora l code , particularly as understood i n light of possibilities of group overlap . William s has recently defended relativism for groups tha t d o not com e into contact.32 I shall eventually be using the possibility of group contact as one barrier t o rela tivism on the view I think of as roughly Protagorean: a s making man th e measure of morality, at leas t i n a collective sense, whethe r o r no t i t comes ou t a s relativist on all definitions o r makes man the measure of "al l things." The relativist element of the view seems to emerge when we call into question the many references I have allowed to "the " mora l code. On my proposed interpretation, moral judgments are to be taken as describing contemplated act s in accordance with a corrected versio n of the code. The y therefore essentially extend an d appl y a man-made standard whose creatio n amount s t o th e con ventional acceptance within society of certain practices of moral response, in -

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eluding but not limited to moral emotions. But we need to face a familiar problem about th e multiplicit y of conventionally accepte d standard s o n man y issues, even within the same overall group. The question turns on the possibility of conflicting group practices that can result in basic disagreements over issues such as abortion o n which there may be moral subcommunities in opposition. But an adequate answer for metaethical purposes does not require picking out one such community as the source of "the " moral code for a given speaker. The actual code may be thought of as indeterminate i n some case s withou t threa t t o wha t i s at stak e her e i n metaethical terms—the existence of a right answer t o mora l questions—wit h its basis in a corrected versio n o f the code. There migh t very well be two righ t answers in the sens e of conflicting ways o f correctin g th e code , bot h makin g it viable insofar as they both would adequately promote group flourishing. Since viability i s a "satisficing " rathe r tha n a "maximizing " notion , th e criterio n i t pro vides might be met in several equally acceptable ways . On the other hand , this sort of conflict need not entai l metaethical relativism—depending on where we locate the initial indeterminacy that gives rise to it and wha t w e take a moral judgmen t to say . A n indeterminacy in the cod e itself—in ou r attempt to sum up the moral practices of the overall community— need not imply variation in the higher order standard appeale d to in correcting it: what counts as group flourishing or as adequate promotion o f group flour ishing. On thes e questions of basic value, as opposed to specificall y mora l o r deontic questions, m y view allows fo r a limited "perceptual " versio n of real ism. Bu t it is one that turns on a complicated feat of imagination (of hypothetical social practices and their effects o n the group a s a whole) rather than simply on "seeing" mora l properties i n the world around us. Much error is possible, along with disagreement about how to tell what is an error, on such questions as whether a group that restricts reverence for human life to postnatal forms of it would be likely to flourish. But divergent views could be explained either by different hypothetica l factua l conjectures o r b y problem s i n performin g the imaginative acts required for moral perception . However, a n explanation o f the latter problems might be thought to introduce a highe r level sourc e o f indeterminacy . There ma y b e no singl e answer, that is , to th e questio n how on e is to conside r thing s from the overall grou p standpoint. Fo r instance, even assuming that a fetus is conscious at a given stage of development , ther e will b e different way s o f weighing its interests agains t the mother's. Nor i s it clear that only a conscious standpoint ca n matter to the determination of group flourishing. The assignment of independent value to lif e might be thought to b e part of group flourishin g in the way that, say, cultural achievement arguably is—not just because of its effects o n huma n conscious ness but also for its own sake . Perceptual realism on the model of G. E. Moore's theory 33 i s the standar d way of settling such questions of multiple goods, and my view is meant to allow for i t as one possibility. We can still minimize the need to accept special moral properties by limiting ourselves to perceptio n of the element s of group flour ishing. Valu e properties o n this accoun t woul d b e attributed t o hypothetica l

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social practice s and situations a s seen from a general group standpoint rathe r than to particular situations in the world around us. They would not be seen as intrinsically motivating in the way that Mackie find s objectionable, for it is left open that a rational agent may not care to promote what she understands to be a requirement of group flourishing. So my suggested versio n of realism can a t least do without any distinctively moral faculties of perception and rely on ordinary interpersonal insight as mediated by emotion an d expande d b y imagination. At a certain point, however, thi s version of the view may indeed require insistence on what one "sees." Still, we ca n avoi d adoptin g Moore' s intuitionis t mora l epistemolog y t o explain such claims. We may suppose that there is a "truth of the matter" about the constraints on group flourishing—on the model of Aristotelian happiness— without holding that we have access to basic truths of a sort that warrants the term "knowledge. " Instead , perhaps, a particular visio n of the moral aim can be tested i n imagination, either by simple apprehension o r b y the mor e com plex sorts of operations embodie d in Rawls's method of reflective equilibrium, but without any guarantee that imagination is vivid enough or free enough from personal biases to arrive at the right conclusion. With perceptual realism pushed to the level of basic constraints on moral codes, we could thus make better sense of disagreement among moral agents assumed to b e rational, educated, attentive, an d th e like , and a t th e sam e time necessaril y committed t o particula r personal standpoints . As an alternative to perceptual realism, however, I think we could also allow an element of indeterminacy at this level. Different societie s and differen t sub groups within the same society may disagree on basi c questions of value without any of them being in error, perhaps because there is no definite answer. We might be tempted to sum this up with a claim that such issues must be decided by convention. But although important socia l aims will be impeded if we cannot ge t everyone to agre e on a convention, the metaethica l result need not be relativism. Basic judgments of value within the rang e o f indeterminacy might be subject to a relativist account, but there may be ways of avoiding that result for particular deontic judgments. I want to end this discussion by sketching one line of argument that attempt s to "drai n off " a n initia l element of value-relativism b y the wa y i t understand s judgments of mora l wrong . I t i s a comple x argument that may or may not convince; but I do not put it forth as essential to the defens e o f social artifac t realism. Rather, i t suggest s a purer for m o f th e view, one that avoid s any appeal to mora l perception , but that still does no t come ou t a s relativist, if the argument is correct. The argument turns on interpreting moral judgments as general claims about the viabilit y of alternative moral codes, not jus t the particular code t o whic h the speaker happens to adhere. The result in a case of conflicting codes would apparently favo r the mor e permissiv e judgment. That is , if we were t o gran t that there could be a viable society whose code permits an act forbidden b y our own, I take i t tha t w e woul d b e granting thereby that th e ac t i n question— polygamy, say—is not really wrong but just contrary to our own way of life, or "locally forbidden." Similarly, in the abortio n cas e we might be said to have

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two alternative ways of assigning values, either of which would lead to a viable version of the code, assuming for the moment that we agree on the criteria fo r viability. But the judgment that abortion is wrong amount s on the present suggestion to a judgment that abortion i s ruled out by the corrected mora l code — meaning an y versio n o f th e mora l cod e tha t woul d b e viable in the sens e of adequately promotin g group flourishing . This would seem to be false, though , if w e suppose tha t there is at leas t one viable version of the cod e that permit s abortion. The statement tha t abortion is morally permissible, which makes this weaker claim , woul d com e ou t a s tru e whateve r th e persona l value s of it s speaker. In that case, however , mora l dispute s like the one ove r abortio n will turn out to rest on disagreement over basic issues of social rationality: on what count s as group flourishin g or as adequate promotion o f it. But then we need to com plicate the abov e argumen t b y considering the possibilit y of higher level con flict over the assessment o f viability. For instance, perhaps an abortion foe would insist that the developmen t o f fetal lif e itsel f ough t t o coun t i n the determination o f group flourishing , whereas other s woul d den y this. Unless the disput e could be attributed t o a factual disagreement, the two groups would seem to be talking at cross-purposes i n the way that i s characteristic of moral relativism. Whether i t really amounts to relativism, however, depend s on whether we allow judgments of the viability of a moral code to be settled by personal decision. Ther e may b e a trut h o f the matte r o n tha t level—o r an indeterminacy that we leave unresolved—compatibly with the interpretation of particular moral judgments as referring to the speaker's moral code. For the social artifact view does not have to take moral judgments as in some sense about the different evaluative standpoint s fro m whic h the y are made . Thoug h i t give s a descriptivis t account o f them by reference to a corrected version of the speaker's moral code , it need not interpre t the m a s describing the content o f such a code. Rather , a moral judgment may be understood as referring indefinitely to the form or forms the actual code would tak e if corrected an d describin g a certain act in relation to it. A judgment of wrong, say, would describe an act as ruled out b y any corrected version of the code. So the meaning of its reference to a "corrected" moral code (as understood i n terms of viability) would no t var y with th e speake r i n cases of conflicting moral subcultures . However, what i f we were to gran t tha t it s truth-value does var y with th e speaker: that th e criteri a fo r determining its truth-value are open t o persona l decision o n basi c question s o f value ? Thi s sor t o f subject-relativit y (whether individual or social ) may b e taken a s the definin g featur e of moral relativism, at any rate a s applied t o cognitivist views of ethics of the sort under consider ation. Bu t ther e i s an analog y I brough t i n earlie r t o undercu t metaethica l expressivism that might also be useful i n connection with relativism—showing how my view could conceivably incorporate a n element of both relativism and expressivism without amountin g to a version of either of them. Suppose we take a basic judgment of social rationality as expressing a certain decision-making stance, on the model of a jury's presumption of innocence in Anglo-Saxo n law . This i s what determine s which corrected versio n o f th e

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code a given speaker ha s i n mind i n making a particular mora l judgment . So his moral judgmen t might als o b e said to expres s tha t stance , bu t onl y in the extended sens e i n whic h a jury' s verdict might b e though t o f a s a particula r expression o f the presumption of innocence. Its linguistic function may still be seen a s descriptive: I t is meant to describ e a certain ac t i n terms o f th e appli cable syste m o f rules, jus t as a verdic t of "no t guilty " i s meant t o describ e a certain agent in terms of the applicable system. However, o n our present hypo thesis of basic indeterminacy, it is as if we were tempted to equate "no t guilty " verdicts reached unde r tw o differen t lega l systems. The verdict s can b e taken as meaning the same thing—that the agent did not commit the act she is charged with—but their referenc e to differen t way s o f weighing evidence undermines the equation. So moral judgment s on thi s accoun t hav e to b e understoo d relativ e to a particular system of basic presumptions and other norms; and it seems that there may be several such systems corresponding to differences i n the constraints on e recognizes as governing the promotio n o f group flourishing. But let us ask a t this point wha t th e socia l artifac t view could say about tw o distinc t societie s with different codes . One test of the viability of a moral code would seem to be its ability to surviv e contact wit h othe r way s o f life . I f maintaining a certai n code in force in a community that has access to alternatives requires changing some o f its rules, that change would count a s a correction introduce d fo r th e sake of social stability. A version of this point als o would seem to appl y crosstemporally, to codes that develop in ways that can be made out as historically necessary. We might accept a superseded code as a standard fo r assessing judgments within its limited temporal sphere—and similarly for geographically isolated societies—in the way that Williams suggests; this is essentially the model of alternativ e frame s of referenc e provided b y my jur y analogy . Bu t w e als o have a way of getting beyon d this to a more overarching social frame of refer ence. In effect, on this account, moral codes will be tested by their tenability from a large r grou p standpoin t i n light of the natura l conditions o f socia l life . Bu t note tha t this is a negative test only—there might be a code that could survive knowledge of alternatives yet for some other reason fails to promote group flour ishing—so it is compatible with competing accounts of the constraints o n group flourishing. The way the test is formulated lets us avoid the conclusion tha t any culture that i n fact win s out ove r others ha s the more viabl e morality. Fo r instance, it would not necessarily rule out cultures or subcultures such as the Amish in American society whose existenc e depends on protective barrier s limiting the contact thei r members have with the outside world. What it rules out i s a society that coul d no t surviv e contact with other s eve n with th e ai d of protectiv e barriers compatible with group flourishing on the account suggested in chapter 3. This would disallo w unfai r barrier s such as those singlin g out a particular social subgroup (for instance, women) for behavioral restriction. It may still see m odd t o coun t a code or a group adherin g to i t as morall y superior just because it wins a competitive test of viability. But note, first, that a society that does win out over others need not have a morality that itself would

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pass the test, since the test also implies viability in absolute terms. Some feature of the winning society's code, that is, including the very means by which it won (unfair economi c practices with respect t o other cultures , say), may be incompatible with group flourishing, at any rate on the larger scale of the group tha t would be formed by incorporating othe r cultures as subcultures. Second, thoug h ther e ma y b e a sens e of "morall y superior " i n which th e term applie s to cultures that may not be viable in competitive terms, I think we should consider this as analogous to the case of an individual who exceed s the standards fo r personal virtue in ways that undermine his personal effectivenes s and henc e make his conduct come ou t a s wrong. Imagin e a teacher, say , wh o adheres t o a n idea l code o f conduc t i n relation t o student s tha t assume s a n unrealistic degree of honesty and reliabilit y on their part—with the result tha t he is always being taken advantage of and hi s aid to deservin g students i s not really helpful . W e d o sometime s spea k o f suc h individual s as "morall y supe rior," though their behavior in fact comes out a s morally defective in any bu t the ideal world it presupposes. I t is easier to think of societies than of individuals as operating in isolation, bu t th e point i s that this view of things no longe r fit s the facts of the case and henc e never did fit the long-term facts. What i s at issue in determinin g viability i s the suitabilit y of a moral code t o guidin g a societ y through time. If a code cannot comman d the allegiance of its members—or if it could not comman d suc h allegianc e in the fac e o f competition—then whethe r or not one admires the features of human nature that lead its members to favor alternatives, it is simply defective in real-world terms, on the model of the pedagogical code that make s unrealistic assumptions abou t studen t behavior . Like it or not , th e function of codes i n controlling behavior means that th e fact s of human behavio r impose limits on what they can prescribe. One might object that moral codes are embedded i n a host of other institutions that might influence individuals to opt in or out of a given social group. A particular code ma y gain adherents, say, not becaus e of its moral content bu t because i t is conjoined with a n appealin g set of cultural values. However, w e should not e tha t th e tes t o f competitiv e viability , despite it s basis in real-lif e patterns o f choice, als o ha s a hypothetica l element. I t i s meant t o tur n o n a culture's survivability under conditions of clear-headed choice—ruling out military conquest , say , along wit h subtle r kinds of encroachment, a s evidence of moral superiority . On the other hand , i f a society's mora l cod e i s in some way responsible for it s cultural appeal rathe r tha n simpl y being incidentall y con joined with it , then a widespread preferenc e for the cultural values in question would indeed seem to count a s a reason i n favor of the code. The preference for them would coun t amon g th e facts of human nature, that is , so that my argument on the issue of the real-life presuppositions o f the code would apply, even if the cultural values themselves (ranking Disneyland alongside the Louvre, say) might be faulted on aesthetic o r other nonmora l grounds . In short, the test of competitive viability involves a mix of real-life and hypo thetical element s that a fulle r treatmen t would o f course have to spen d som e time sorting out. I think we have them sufficiently i n hand, however, fo r pur -

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poses o f my present argument . Let us apply the test to th e extreme case of cultural contact, wher e we have conflicting subcultures within the same society . If a social consensus would naturally tend t o develop i n favor of one of th e views in conflict, on the one hand, that would seem to mean that the other side' s version of the corrected cod e is not really viable, at any rate under present his torical conditions . O n th e other hand , i f both side s could manag e to coexist , that would apparently undermine the claims of the abortion foe s in our example . We again would have to deny, that is, that their version of the corrected cod e is really viable. It would not yield group flourishing in its own terms, on our hypo thesis, where the opposing subgroup is able to follow its own code, so that there are regular violations of the presumption i n favor of fetal life . This assumes that the opposing subgroup is sizable, or would naturally become so under the imagined circumstances, which allow for contact wit h social alternatives. So even if abortion require d going elsewhere, the violations would be substantial enough to undermin e the abortion foes ' standar d o f "adequate " flourishing—unlike, say, the occasional murders that a society banning murder can be said to toler ate. What if we conclude that neither version of the corrected cod e is viable? O r what if neither consensus nor coexistence i s possible and th e conflict so undermines social stabilit y that th e actual code ha s to b e viewed as incorrigible? In that case, a moral prohibition could not hold true, assuming that it amounts t o a claim about corrected version s of the code. Abortion woul d again come ou t as permissible, but s o would everythin g else. This i s a disturbin g outcome i n metaethical a s well as ethical terms. Th e poin t fo r m y purposes, however , i s just that it is not relativism. The truth of a moral judgment would not vary with the speaker . Rather , judgments of wrong woul d al l be false—as on Mackie' s view but fo r differen t reasons : becaus e moralit y ha s turned ou t t o b e a faile d project, not becaus e its basic materials were misconceived. Note, too, tha t thi s scenario rules out eve n replacing the actua l code wit h one that enforces a decision without consensus, as an extreme form of "correction." The abortion example illustrates nicely the possibility that any such ruling would be too regularly violated to promote stability. The alternative in practical terms would seem to be the adoption o f a more permissive standard o f viability, as setting a threshhold of adequate (rathe r than requiring maximal) promotion o f group flourishing . "Our" mora l code , then, can b e understood a s the code universally in force—potentially, that is; with current indeterminacies where we now disagree, but on the more optimistic assumption that somethin g can be worked out . For the moral ai m would indee d seem to b e unachievable and the project of morality misconceived if our allusion s to the corrected cod e turned out not to refe r to even one possible social construct . At any rate, the view I have outlined as a version of realism, though se t u p partly i n relativistic terms, o n thi s accoun t manage s t o avoi d thoroughgoin g relativism without any element of perceptual realism. Nor doe s it quite fit into the other standard metaethical categories, though it combines elements of several of them. In particular, it involves a partial basis in emotion that offer s a n

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alternative to "emotivism, " a form o f expressivism brought u p i n the firs t in stance a s part o f the logical positivist program.34 Emotivism was originally an attempt t o push morality outsid e the pale of cognition b y making it an instrument of emotional expression an d influence. Other metaethica l views set up in opposition to emotivis m have made roo m fo r moral emotion , i f at all , on th e model of "moral sense" theories , a s itself an instrument of cognition. I hope in this discussion to have extracted a subtler alternative for understanding the emotional basi s o f ethics fro m th e attemp t t o mak e sens e o f dilemmas and othe r puzzles of the mora l life .

Notes

Chapter 1 1. Se e the followin g selections i n Wa r and Moral Responsibility, ed . M . Cohen , T. Nagel, and T. Scanlon (Princeton , N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974): Michae l Walzer, "Politica l Action : Th e Proble m o f Dirty Hands," pp. 62-82; Thomas Nagel , "War an d Massacre," pp. 3-24; R . B. Brandt, "Utilitarianis m and the Rules of War," pp. 25-45; an d R. M. Hare, "Rule s o f War and Moral Reasoning, " pp . 46-61. 2. Nagel , "Wa r and Massacre," p. 23. 3. Se e esp. Brandt, "Utilitarianism, " pp . 30-31; cf . Hare , "Rule s o f War," pp. 59-60. 4. Fo r a general discussion o f the notion, see Bernard Williams, Moral Luck: Philosopfe»ca/Papers 1973-19SO (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 20-39; and Thomas Nagel , Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 24-38 . 5. Se e the discussion in Alan Donagan, Th e Theory o f Morality (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1977) , p. 144 ; cf. G. H. Von Wright, An Essay in Deontic Logic and the General Theory of Action (Amsterdam: North Holland , 1968) , p. 81, n. 1. The reconstruction o f Aquinas's reasoning i n terms of issues of moral luck is my insertion ; one might suggest grace as the applicabl e concept withi n his own framework . 6. Se e Immanuel Kant, Th e Doctrine of Virtue: Part II o f th e Metaphysic o f Morals, trans. M . J. Gregor (Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964) , p. 23 . Kant allows for conflict between th e grounds o f obligation—which, according to com ments he makes elsewhere, apparently are such as to become obligations if certain conditions (presumably including the absence of conflicting grounds) are satisfied; cf. idem, Lectures o n Ethics, trans. L . Infield (Ne w York : Harpe r & Row , 1963), p . 19. Kant's views on th e holy will, which I use subsequently to give some internal support fo r his position o n moral conflict, are not explicitl y brought t o bea r o n the issue, as far a s I know, thoug h th e connectio n seem s obviou s enough. Se e esp. idem, Foundations o f th e Metaphysics o f Morals, trans . L. W. Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), pp . 30-31. But note that th e form o f necessitation i n question woul d amoun t to obligatio n onl y for imperfect being s on Kant' s account; cf . the distinctio n betwee n forms o f necessitation i n point o f freedom in Lectures o n Ethics, pp. 27-30 . 7. Se e W. David Ross , Th e Right an d th e Good (Oxford : Clarendon , 1930) , pp. 19-20 , 28, 41. 8. SeeG . H. Von Wright, "Deonti c Logic, " Mind 6 0 (1951): 1-15; cf. A. N. Prior, "The Paradoxe s o f Derive d Obligation, " Mind 6 3 (1954) : 64-65. Cf. als o Roderic k M. Chisholm, "Contrary-to-Duty Imperatives and Deontic Logic," Analysis 2 4 (1963): 211

212 Notes

t o pages 12-15

33-36, an d G. H. Von Wright, Norm and Action (London: Routledge 8 t Kegan Paul, 1963). A general account is provided i n Dagfinn F011esdal and Risto Hilpinen, "Deontic Logic: An Introduction," i n Deontic Logic: Introductory an d Systematic Readings, ed . R. Hilpinen (Dordrecht , Holland: D . Reidel, 1971) , pp. 1-35; se e esp. pp. 8-9,13, and 23-26. 9. Reprinte d as E. J. Lemmon, "Mora l Dilemmas," i n Moral Dilemmas, ed. C. W. Gowans (Ne w York: Oxford Universit y Press, 1987) , pp . 101-14 ; cf . idem, "Deontic Logic and th e Logic of Imperatives," Logique et Analyse 8 (1965): 45-51, fo r a fulle r account o f the implication s of dilemmas for deonti c logic . 10. Se e Plato, Republic, I , 331c5-9. 11. Se e Jean-Paul Sartre , "Existentialis m I s a Humanism, " trans . P . Mairet , i n Existentialism from Dostoevsky t o Sartre, ed . W. Kaufman n (Ne w York: Meridian , 1957), pp. 295-96. 12. Lemmon , "Mora l Dilemmas," p . 113; cf. pp. 111-12. 13. Reprinte d a s Bernard Williams, "Ethica l Consistency, " i n Moral Dilemmas, ed. C. W. Gowan s (Ne w York: Oxford Universit y Press, 1987) , pp. 115-37 . 14. Lemmon , "Mora l Dilemmas," p. 107, n. 2. 15. Se e Aeschylus, "Agamemnon," 204-52 . 16. Se e Bernard Williams, Problems o f th e Self: Philosophical Papers 1956-1972 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973) , pp . 204-5. 17. Se e Philippa Foot, "Mora l Realism and Moral Dilemma, " i n Moral Dilemmas, ed. C . W. Gowan s (Ne w York : Oxfor d Universit y Press , 1987) , pp . 250-70; also, Samuel Guttenplan, "Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma, " Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 8 0 (1979-80): 61-80, and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong , Moral Dilemmas (Oxford: Basi l Blackwell, 1988), pp . 189-214 . 18. Se e Bernard Williams, Morality: An Introduction t o Ethics (Ne w York: Harper & Row, 1972), pp . 92-93, and idem, Moral Luck, pp. 60-61, 74, and 78-79. 19. Se e ibid., pp . 60-63; cf. p. 74 , n . 2 (cf . also n. 3 for Williams's identification of "tragic " cases with dilemmas). 20. Se e Bas C. van Fraassen, "Values and the Heart's Command, " i n Moral Dilemmas, ed. C. W. Gowans (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1987), pp . 138-53; and Ruth Barcan Marcus, "Mora l Dilemmas and Consistency, " i n ibid., pp . 188-204. 21. Se e Thomas Nagel, "Th e Fragmentation o f Value," i n Moral Dilemmas, ed. C. W. Gowans (Oxford : Oxford Universit y Press, 1987), pp. 174-87 . For another view of ethics as based on conflicting standpoints, close r i n some ways to m y own view , see Stuart Hampshire, Morality and Conflict (Cambridge , Mass.: Harvard Universit y Press, 1983), pp. 140-69 . Cf. also th e discussion o f incommensurability in connection wit h dilemmas in Joseph Raz , Th e Morality o f Freedom (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1986), pp . 357-66. 22. Se e Hector-Neri Castaneda , Thinking an d Doing: Th e Philosophical Foundations o f Institutions (Dordrecht , Holland: D . Reidel, 1975), pp. 191 , 195-201. 23. Nagel , "Fragmentatio n of Value," p. 175. 24. Se e Terrance C . McConnell, "Mora l Dilemma s and Consistenc y in Ethics," i n Moral Dilemmas, ed . C . W. Gowan s (Oxford : Oxfor d Universit y Press, 1987) , pp. 154-73 ; cf . also idem , "Mora l Dilemma s an d Requirin g the Impossible, " Philosophical Studies 2 9 (1976) : 410-11 . 25. Se e McConnell, "Mora l Dilemma s and Consistency," p. 171, n. 2, and Marcus , "Moral Dilemmas and Consistency," p. 190. Cf. John Rawls,A Theory o f Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvar d Universit y Press , 1971) , pp . 133-34; David Lyons, Forms and Limits o f Utilitarianism (Oxford : Oxfor d Universit y Press , 1965) , p . 21; an d Donal d

Notes t o pages 15-18 21

3

Davidson, Essays on Actions an d Events (Oxford : Clarendon, 1980) , p . 34. Fo r mor e on Davidson's views , cf. Frank Jackson, "Davidso n o n Moral Conflict, " in Actions and Events, ed . E. Lapore and B. Mclaughlin (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), pp. 104-15 . 26. Marcus , "Mora l Dilemmas and Consistency," pp . 194-95 . 27. Se e Alan Donagan, "Consistenc y i n Rationalis t Mora l Systems, " i n Moral Dilemmas, ed. C. W. Gowans (Oxford : Oxford Universit y Press, 1987) , pp. 278-81; cf. Herman Wouk , Th e Caine Mutiny (Garde n City, N.Y.: Doubleday , 1952) . 28. Donagan , "Consistency, " pp . 280-81. 29. Se e R. M. Hare , "Mora l Conflicts, " i n Moral Dilemmas, ed. C. W. Gowan s (Oxford: Oxfor d Universit y Press, 1987) , pp. 208-10; cf. also Ear l Conee , "Agains t Moral Dilemmas, " i n Moral Dilemmas, ed. C. W. Gowan s (Oxford : Oxford Univer sity Press , 1987) , pp . 241-43. 30. Furthe r proponents o f dilemma include Philip L. Quinn, who extends the notion to conflicts between moral and religious requirements in "Moral Obligation, Religious Demand, an d Practical Conflict," in Rationality, Religious Belief, an d Moral Commitment, ed. R. Audi and W. J. Wainwright (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986) , pp. 195-212 , an d Michael Slote , wh o extends it to utilitaria n case s in Beyond Optimizing (Cambridge , Mass.: Harvar d Universit y Press, 1989) , pp. 99-123; cf . idem , "Utilitarianism, Mora l Dilemmas , an d Mora l Cost, " American Philosophical Quarterly 3 2 (1985): 161-68 . Foot, "Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma," doe s not seem to take a definite posi tion o n dilemmas, at leas t as here interpreted (se e esp. pp. 265-66), although her ar gument does allow for something weaker along the same lines (cf. pp. 254-55,267-68). I omit a number of other intermediate or hard-to-classify views from this brief overview of central contributions. For a detailed summary of the relevant arguments in the literature along with bibliographical information, see Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Dilemmas. 31. Se e Henrik Ibsen , The Works ofHenrik Ibsen (Ne w York: Blue Ribbon Books, 1928), 4: 165-215. Among philosophers' treatments , see esp. Terrance C . McConnell , "Moral Blackmail, " Ethics 9 1 (1981): 544-67, and Martha Nussbaum , Th e Fragility of Goodness: Luck an d Ethics i n Greek Tragedy an d Philosophy (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1986) , pp . 25-82. 32. Christophe r Chernia k and Roy Sorensen (personal communications) have each independently called my attention to the theory of heuristics as offering a similar account of decision-making within cognitive limitations—in that case meant to explain apparent irrationalities in probability assessment; see, e.g., Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "Judgment unde r Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,"Science 185 (1984): 1124 31. Sorense n ha s suggeste d two nice analogies to m y proposed vie w of dilemmas as a tolerable side effect o f man-made (or "man-tailored") morality . First is the practice of overbooking flights , somethin g that airline s do systematicall y in the expectation tha t not every passenger will show up—a reasonable expectation, albeit sometimes violated. Second i s an optica l illusion , which might be considered a n inevitabl e result of what , on th e whole , i s the idea l visual system. In th e mora l case , however , I mean to deny that we have the kind of independent standard needed to dismiss such consequences as "illusions"; a n appeal to God , say, even if it yielded a religious solution t o a dilemma, would stil l leave it unresolve d in strictl y mora l terms . Th e sam e hold s fo r practica l solutions o n utilitaria n or simila r grounds. 33. Se e Williams, Moral Luck, pp . 118-19 , 124-25 ; cf. idem , "Ethica l Consis tency," pp . 134-36. For hi s views on mora l luck and blame , cf. idem, Moral Luck, pp. 20-39, and idem, Ethics and the Limits o f Philosophy (Cambridge , Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985) , pp . 176-77.

214 Note

s to pages 18-20

34. See , e.g., Foot, "Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma," pp. 251-57, and Michael Stocker, Plural an d Conflicting Values (Oxford : Clarendon , 1990) , p . 124 ; cf . als o Christopher W. Gowans, "Mora l Dilemmas and Prescriptivism," American Philosophical Quarterly 2 6 (1989) : 187-97, for th e defens e o f a position simila r t o Williams's , apparently without awarenes s of the overlap. 35. Nagel , "Fragmentatio n o f Value," p . 175 . 36. Fo r the terms "internalism" an d "externalism, " se e W. D. Falk, "'Ought' and Motivation," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 48 (1947-48): 492-510; cf. W. K. Frankena, "Obligation an d Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy," in Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. A. I. Melden (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958), pp. 40-81. A more precise version of the roug h characterization of moral realism I rely on her e is provided in David O. Brink, Moral Realism an d the foundations o f Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) , p . 17 . Also roughly speaking, internalist realism can be identified wit h an Oxford schoo l of contemporar y metaethic s develope d mos t systematicall y by follower s o f Joh n McDowell—see, e.g. , Davi d McNaughton , Moral Vision (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 46-50 (cf . p. 15 for the clai m t o represen t McDowell' s views, although McDowell avoids this terminology himself) . On th e other hand , standar d externalis t realism seems to correspond t o a Cornell school of realism; cf., e.g., Brink, Moral Realism and Foundations of Ethics, pp. 37-80. As Brink points out (p . 78), internalism is linked in the first instance with noncognitivist versions of antirealism, for which the practical function o f morality or th e connectio n with emotio n tha t support s i t actuall y supplie s the meanin g o f a mora l judgment . However, the view has come to b e linked with versions of realism that attemp t t o incorporate a Kantian treatment of practical reason. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel , Th e Possibility o f Altruism (Oxford : Clarendon , 1970) , pp . 7-14 , an d idem , Th e View from Nowhere (Ne w York : Oxfor d Universit y Press, 1986) , pp . 139ff ; cf . Christin e M . Korsgaard, "Skepticis m abou t Practica l Reason," Journal o f Philosophy 8 3 (1986) : 5-25. Fo r the alternativ e approach, an d anothe r versio n of the internalism/externalism distinction tha t Korsgaar d and other s rel y on—applie d to reason s rather tha n t o moral judgments—cf. Williams, Moral Luck, pp. 101-13.1 shall rely on Falk's specifically moral version of the distinction in what follows; though it is sometimes explained in terms of Williams's version, the two pul l apart for views that allow moral judgments to be true in application to an amoralist or other agent to whom the y do not give reasons in Williams's sense. Philippa Foot's view, for instance, which I deal with centrally in chapter 3, section 1, seems to be naturally classified as externalist on moral meaning but internalis t on reason-givin g force; cf. Brink, Moral Realism an d th e Foundations of Ethics, pp. 39 , 43 , 61 . 37. Se e David Hume, A Treatise o f Human Nature (Oxford : Clarendon, 1964) , pp. 470-76; cf., e.g., p . 457. Cf . Nagel, Possibility o f Altruism, pp. 10-11. The classification tha t follow s is designed t o avoi d problem s abou t th e prope r interpretatio n of Hume's view. 38. Kant , Lectures o n Ethics, p. 20. 39. Se e ibid., p. 28, fo r a distinction betwee n two sorts of practical necessitation , per stimulos and per motivos, with emotiona l motivation in the former category, and the latter construed a s broader, includin g also the sort o f objective practical necessitation that applies to actio n on obligation. Cf. Kant's comments on moral motive s and binding grounds of obligation on pp. 18-19 . This broader notion of motivation clearly extends beyond the psychologist's sens e relied o n fo r emotiona l motivatio n in P . S . Greenspan, Emotions an d Reasons: A n

Notes to pages 21-25 21

5

Inquiry into Emotional justification (Ne w York: Routledge, Chapma n and Hall, 1988) , e.g. p. 153; cf. R. S. Peters, The Concept o f Motivation (Ne w York: Humanities, 1980) , esp. pp . 37-51.1 think that th e psychologist's sens e is at this point th e common one, so I shall use Philippa Foot's alternative terminology ("reason-giving force" ) fo r th e Kantian notion; but note that some current authors, e.g., Korsgaard, "Skepticism, " d o not mak e this distinction in discussing motivational force. 40. Cf . Ronald De Sousa's apparent equatio n of normal and appropriate emotiona l response i n Th e Rationality o f Emotion (Cambridge , Mass.: Bradford Books, 1987) , p. 202. Hume himsel f allow s onl y for a limite d belief-base d distinction betwee n reasonable an d unreasonabl e emotional respons e tha t woul d no t suppl y what w e wan t here; cf. Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, pp. 415-16. My argument in what follow s will work fro m m y own accoun t of appropriate emotio n i n Greenspan, Emotions and Reasons, pp. 83-107. I reexplain this notion her e in simpler terms, however; se e chapter 5, section 2 . 41. Cf . McNaughton, Moral Vision, p , 48 . 42. Se e Hare, "Mora l Conflicts, " pp. 209-10. 43. Fo r discussion o f the textual evidence tha t the chorus faults Agamemnon fo r not reactin g appropriately , se e Nussbaum, Fragility o f Goodness, pp . 36-37ff . 44. Se e Williams, Moral Luck, p. 27 . 45. Se e Greenspan, Emotions and Reasons, e.g. , p. 96; cf. Williams, Moral Luck, p. 63. 46. Se e G.E.M. Anscombe, "Modern Mora l Philosophy," i n Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3 , Ethics, Religion an d Politics (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota , 1981), pp. 26-42. 47. Se e e.g. Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978) ; John McDowell, "Virtu e and Reason," Monist 6 2 (1979): 331-50; Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue (Notr e Dame, Ind.: University o f Notre Dam e Press , 1984) ; Williams, Ethics an d th e Limits, of Philosophy; Stocker, Plural and Conflicting Values; and Michae l Slote , From Morality t o Virtue (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) . A n early influence on some of these writ ers was Iri s Murdoch; cf . Murdoch, Th e Sovereignty o f Good (London : Ark, 1970) . 48. Anscombe , "Moder n Mora l Philosophy, " pp . 29-33. 49. Se e Foot, Virtues and Vices, pp. 150-51, 162-63; cf. pp. 178-79. The latte r term seems to capture current talk of "normativity," a s sometimes equate d with moti vational force, following Kant; cf. note 3 9 this chapter. In historical term s I take reasongiving force to amoun t to th e rationally "binding" forc e of obligation, essentiall y the justificatory force of the moral "ought." For an early contemporary statemen t i n terms of normativity, see Stephen L. Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca , N.Y.: Cornel l Uni versity Press, 1983), pp. 19ff . The notions of reason-giving and motivational forc e now need to b e pried apar t in classifying view s as internalist; cf . Brink, Moral Realism an d Foundations o f Ethics, pp. 38-40. 50. For an interesting historical overview, see Louis I. Bredvold, The Natural History o f Sensibility (Detroit : Wayne State University Press, 1962). For the philosophica l account I rely on here , see Stephen L . Darwall, "Motiv e an d Obligatio n i n the British Moralists," Social Philosophy an d Policy 7 (1989) : 139-40 . A helpful discussio n o f the relevan t conceptua l framewor k i s provided i n Charlott e Brown , "Mora l Sens e Theorists," i n Encyclopedia o f Ethics, ed. L. C. and C. B. Becker (New York: Garland, 1992), 2: 862-68. For a historical view that bears a certain structural resemblance to the on e I go o n t o defend , cf . als o Jerom e B . Schneewind, "Pufendorf' s Place i n th e History o f Ethics," Synthese 7 2 (1987) : 144-46.

216 Notes

t o pages 25-29

51. Se e Anscombe, "Moder n Moral Philosophy," p . 27; cf. Joseph Butler , A Dissertation o f th e Nature o f Virtue (London : SPCK, 1970), par. [2], p. 148. 52. Fo r a fairly standard definition of "metaethics" tha t would cover relevant issues in psychology and other empirical subjects, see William K. Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), pp. 4-5. 53. Se e Jonathan Edwards , Th e Nature o f True Virtue (An n Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960), p . 63; cf. the revie w of recent work i n developmental psychology in Martin L. Hoffman, "Development of Prosocial Motivation: Empathy and Guilt, " in Development o f Prosocial Behavior, ed. N. Eisenberg-Ber g (New York: Academic Press, 1982) , pp. 281-313. 54. Se e 5d under "guilt " in Th e Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford : Clarendon, 1970), 4: 496; cf . 6a-b under "guilty " o n p . 497 fo r use s of the adjectiv e i n application t o conscience , mind, feelings , and th e like , going bac k t o Shakespear e a century earlier. 55. Fo r a historical account of "tainting" in relation to legal culpability, see George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston : Little, Brown, 1978), pp. 343-50. Cf. the account of religious ideas of pollution i n Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger (London : Routledge 8c Kegan Paul, 1966). 56. A colleague at the National Humanities Center, Michael MacDonald (personal communication), brought to my attention an English account from 162 1 of the pitfall s of emotional guilt, or the guilty conscience, described in terms of the "sense o f . .. God's anger justl y deserved" ; se e Robert Burton , Th e Anatomy o f Melancholy (Ne w York : Tudor, 1927) , pp. 400-404. Note tha t Burton declines to attribute emotional guil t to Catholics; despite the gradual internalization of religious feeling throughout the Middle Ages an d th e influenc e o f th e Reformatio n on bot h religiou s traditions, som e differ ence in sensibility might be thought to result from the clearer steps laid out in the Catholic tradition fo r penance and forgivenes s of sin. At any rate, on the accoun t offere d here , the mere lack of a word fo r emotional guilt (in Latin, for instance) will not b e decisive. Thus, Augustine , writing abou t hi s adolescent thef t o f pears, ha s t o wor k withi n the confines of a sham e vocabulary; cf. St. Augustine's Confessions, trans . W . Watt s (New York: Putnam, 1922) , 1 : 77-79. Give n that h e describes himself a s undergoing some emotion associated with the internalized sense of God's anger, my account in what follows wil l allow Augustine emotional guilt . I have some furthe r comment s i n later notes on these often fascinating historical and cultural issues, although I cannot attemp t a full-scal e treatmen t here. 57. Se e esp. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, trans. J. Strachey (New York: Norton, 1961), pp. 83-96 ; cf. Friedrich Nietszche, O n th e Genealogy o f Morals, trans. W. Kaufmann an d R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1969), pp. 57-96. 58. Se e esp. Melanie Klein and Joan Riviere, Love, Hate and Reparation (New York: Norton, 1964), pp . 65-66. 59. Se e Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum an d th e Sword: Patterns o f Japanese Culture (Boston : Houghton Mifflin , 1946) , pp . 222-23ff . 60. Se e John Stuar t Mill , Utilitarianism (Ne w York: Bobbs-Merrill , 1957) , pp. 36-43 .

Chapter 2 1. Se e Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Dilemmas, pp. 108-68 , for a discussion of tw o patterns of argument against dilemmas from th e tw o pair s of principles. For ou r pur -

Notes t o pages 30-34 21

7

poses, on e fairl y compac t argumen t wil l b e sufficient t o exhibi t both conflicts . I f w e allow M fo r physical possibility, the assumption tha t there are dilemmas as interprete d in term s of conflicting positive ought-judgments comes ou t a s the claim that ther e ar e acts A and B such that O A and O B and ~M( A & B) . But on this assumption, th e principle of closure would yiel d O~B and O~A . Closur e essentially tells us that a n obliga tion als o applie s t o anythin g required t o fulfil l it , an d dilemma s amoun t t o case s i n which each obligatory act requires the negation o f the other. So now we have two pair s of ought-statement s wit h contradictory objects : OA & : O~A an d O B & O~B . Eve n if they are practically inconsistent, however, neithe r pair of statements amount s to a truthfunctional contradiction . The same holds for the pair that conjoins their objects t o yield obligations with contradictory object s according to the principle of agglomeration: O( A & ~A ) and O(B & ~B) . But the standard syste m of deontic logic takes impossibl e state s of affair s a s impermissible ; with P as it s operato r fo r permissibility , that is , it let s u s conclude fo r an y A that ~P( A & ~A) . (Cf. (C4') i n F011esda l and Hilpinen , "Deonti c Logic," p. 13. ) Th e assumptio n tha t "ought " implie s "permissible " wil l therefore let us deriv e a contradictio n withi n th e standar d system , sinc e in applicatio n t o eac h o f the conjoint ought-statements jus t derived it yields a statement of the form P(A & ~A). Alternatively, a contraposative versio n o f "ought"-implies-"can " yield s ~O(A & -A ) for an y A and henc e a direct contradictio n o f our derive d ought-statements . 2. Williams' s positio n essentiall y rests o n applying to practical "ought, " taken a s a conclusion of deliberation, a principle of "exclusivity" tha t combines th e two deonti c principles he thinks dilemmas force us to choose between: "ought"-implies-"can " an d agglomeration (see Moral Luck, pp. 118-19) . A version of this point occurs in his earlier treatment o f what h e calls deliberative "ought"; see idem, "Ethica l Consistency," pp. 134-36 . However, I shall not deal here with Williams's argument on this subject in full detail , partly because its terms shift in a way that makes it resist perspicuous treatment. Besides equating practical "ought" with "ought" as a conclusion of deliberation (a point I shall deal wit h late r i n thi s chapter), William s apparently make s differen t assumption s i n different place s a s t o whethe r a practica l ough t i s by definitio n "conclusive, " o r all things-considered (cf . Moral Luck, pp. 118-19 , 124 , n . 3). For the defens e o f a position simila r to Williams' s on practical ought i n dilemmas , see Gowans, "Mora l Dilemma s and Prescriptivism, " an d idem , Innocence Lost: A n Examination of Inescapable Moral Wrongdoing (Ne w York: Oxford Universit y Press, 1994). 3. Se e P. S. Greenspan, "Conditiona l Ought s an d Hypothetica l Imperatives,"Journal of Philosophy 7 2 (1975): 259-79; cf. idem, "Derive d Obligation : Som e Paradoxe s Escaped," Ph.D . dissertatio n (Cambridge , Mass.: Harvar d University , 1972). 4. Thi s depend s on a version o f th e principl e of deonti c closure , whic h i n roug h form tell s us that anythin g necessary t o satisf y a n ought i s itself obligatory. I shall later suggest some limitations on the principle, but even in modified form it should still allo w for the inference in question here. In general terms , my present argument brings to mind Nagel's argumen t o n reason s i n Possibility o f Altruism, p. 36 . Bu t not e tha t Nage l considers only th e direc t derivatio n of earlie r instrumenta l reason s fro m a statemen t dated a t the time assigned to action, whereas m y suggested accoun t date s ought-state ments at the time of utterance and allows fo r distinct dates o n their objects , or the act s they require. 5. I n Grice's terms, what I ascribe to a general use of "ought" might be thought of as part o f it s "conventiona l meaning" a s distinc t fro m "conversationa l implicature, " or the shiftin g commitment s of individual speakers; see Paul Grice, Studies i n the Wa y

218 Note

s to pages 3 5-3 7

of Words (Cambridge , Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 41. An analogy might be the way the word "but " implicates contrast betwee n tw o conjuncts, except tha t ou r example migh t be said t o involv e two differen t conventiona l uses . Among example s no t relate d t o "ought " itself , the bes t I can thin k o f hav e to d o with litera l versus recognized nonlitera l uses of the same form of words. For instance , the expression "Go d damn!" as used today no longer prescribe s divine condemnatio n but instea d function s mainl y to expres s anger. I t therefore "implicates " ange r on th e part o f the speaker, a s a function o f conventional meaning. Bu t it can also be used with almost th e opposite intent , in a hoot o f victory (when one's team scores a touchdown , say). It might even be thought tha t this latter use is common enoug h t o count a s a further conventiona l meaning . I n either case , th e expressio n serve s a t leas t on e genera l emotive functio n i n the language that is distinct from it s literal meaning—and possibly from a given speaker's persona l intent. Assuming that practical force involves a similar kind of functional o r conventiona l meaning, w e might want t o sa y that i t "implicates " rathe r tha n implies "can " in any strict logica l sense . Remembe r tha t Gric e invente d th e forme r ter m t o contras t wit h logical implicatio n (see pp. 24-25; cf. pp. 121 , 341). The important poin t for our purposes, however, i s that thi s does not make "can" follow simply as a matter o f conversational implicature , as Sinnott-Armstrong maintains (Moral Dilemmas, pp. 121-26). Rather, th e principle would see m to b e definitive o f practical "ought, " a s designed t o serve a particular (action-guiding ) function i n the language . 6. Se e Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, p. 457; cf., e.g., Foot, Virtues and Vices, pp. 78-80 . 7. See , e.g., Williams, Moral Luck, p. 119. 8. See , e.g., Hector-Neri Castaneda , Th e Structure o f Morality (Springfield , I11.: Charles C. Thomas, 1974) , p. 64; Gilbert Harman, The Nature o f Morality (Ne w York: Oxford Universit y Press, 1977) , pp. 117-19 ; an d Josep h Raz , Practical Reason an d Norms (Princeton , N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990) , pp. 29-32. 9. A version of this view seems to surface, e.g., in Williams, Moral Luck, pp. 10 9 -11; cf. als o Nagel , Possibility o f Altruism, pp. 8-9, an d Foot , Virtues an d Vices, p . 15 2 (though I gather that Foot would now reject this argument [personal communication]). 10. Se e Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1147a27-31; cf. idem, Movement o f Animals, 701all e t circa, and idem, De Anima, 433al7 et circa. 11. Se e Lewis White Beck , A Commentary o n Kant's Critique o f Practical Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press , 1960) , p . 39 , fo r a reconciliation o f Kant's references t o practica l reaso n a s determinant of and a s identical to the will. 12. Se e Davidson, Essays o n Actions and Events, p. 39 . 13. Williams , Moral Luck, p. 119. 14. Se e John M . Cooper , Reason an d Human Good i n Aristotle (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1986) , pp. 23-46. 15. Se e Stocker, Plural and Conflicting Values, pp . 51-84, fo r a n argumen t tha t Aristotle himsel f makes room fo r conflict. However, m y use of Aristotle's view of practical reasonin g her e is not mean t to commit hi m to dilemmas. 16. Cf . Williams, Moral Luck, e.g. p. 12. 17. Cf . Alasdair Maclntyre, "Wha t Moralit y I s Not," in The Definition o f Morality, ed . G . Wallac e an d A.D.M . Walke r (London : Methuen , 1970) , pp . 27-31. See Greenspan, "Conditiona l Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives," p. 275, n. 13 , for an argument against one natural way o f interpreting the result s of a first-person ought as binding fro m a third-perso n standpoint. 18. Se e William Styron , Sophie's Choice (Ne w York: Bantam, 1980), p . 589; cf.

Notes t o pages 38-48 21

9

P. S. Greenspan, "Mora l Dilemmas and Guilt," Philosophical Studies 4 3 (1983): 117 25. 19. Williams , "Ethica l Consistency, " p . 136. 20. Williams , Moral Luck, pp. 78-79; cf. p. 74. 21. Cf . Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Dilemmas, for th e us e of this compound over ridingness notion i n defense o f dilemmas. 22. Williams , Moral Luck, p. 119. 23. Williams , "Ethical Consistency," p . 123, and idem, Moral Luck, p. 79; cf. Moral Luck, p. 125. 24. Se e Slote, Beyond Optimizing; cf . Stocker , Plural an d Conflicting Values, pp. 314-15. 25. Th e two principle s of standard deontic logic that togethe r hav e this resul t are given as (Cl) and (C2 ) in F011esdal and Hilpinen , "Deonti c Logic, " pp. 8-9; but not e that (C2) , which denies the possibility of exhaustive prohibition, beg s the question fo r our purposes . 26. Se e esp. Roger Wertheimer, The Significance o f Sense: Meaning, Modality, an d Morality (Ithaca , N.Y. : Cornel l Universit y Press , 1972), pp. 82-83, 110-11. 27. See , e.g., Williams, Moral Luck, p. 60. 28. Se e Ross, Right and the Good, p. 28. 29. Se e Wertheimer, Significance o f Sense, pp. 117-18 ; cf. pp. 104 , 109 . 30. Not e tha t th e "total " bod y o f evidence on a standar d readin g mean s al l relevant reasons—not jus t all available reasons o r all reasons actuall y held b y the agent , as on Davidson' s interpretatio n of "all-things-considered " i n Essays o n Actions and Events, p. 40. Taking the latter notio n as evidential thus should not rule out an objective notion o f dilemmas. To sa y that tw o competing prohibition s hol d al l things considered o n thi s account will not simpl y tell u s about th e agent' s epistemi c position — that he is not i n possession o f adequate reasons for choice or the like (which in weighted cases, o f course , ma y wel l be false)—but rather abou t th e requirement s o f hi s situation. M y perceptual imagery is meant to capture something abou t th e objective determination of rational weight, not t o sugges t that i t depends o n a n observer . 31. Cf . Williams, Moral Luck, pp. 74 , 79. 32. Cf . Marcus, "Mora l Dilemma s and Consistency, " p . 193 ; my own vie w here comes closer to Williams's. Note that the initial examples of conflicting oughts in Foot's critique o f Williams seem to b e cases o f overriding that ar e bette r suite d t o Marcus' s view; see Foot, "Moral Realis m and Mora l Dilemma, " p. 251. 33. Lemmon , "Mora l Dilemmas, " p. 106; Williams , Moral Luck, pp. 124-30 . 34. Williams , "Ethical Consistency, " p . 129. 35. Se e Alan Ross Anderson, "The Formal Analysis of Normative Systems, " in The Logic of Decision and Action, ed. N. Rescher (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967), pp. 147-213 . Cf. A. N. Prior, "Escapism: The Logical Basis of Ethics," mEssays in Moral Philosophy, ed . A. I. Melden (Seattle : University of Washington Press , 1958) , pp. 135-46 . 36. Tha t is, it denies that th e object of permission wil l incur any deontic sanction . Even if OA and O B are interpreted as referring to two differen t sanctions, S A and S B, as needed t o allo w for a n escapist account o f dilemmas, fulfillment o f either one of these oughts i n a dilemm a would see m t o incu r some sanction—e.g., sinc e A entails ~B , it would incu r SB—which would see m to b e enough to mak e it impermissible. 37. Se e Greenspan, "Moral Dilemma s and Guilt," p. 118 ; cf. pp. 121-22 . I pushed the argumen t a bi t furthe r i n connectio n with som e assumption s o f deonti c logi c in "Sophie's Choices : More o n Exclusiv e Requirement" (unpublished) .

220 Notes

t o pages 48-58

38. Se e Von Wright, Essay in Deontic Logic, pp. 78-81; cf. Peter Vallentyne, "Prohibition Dilemmas and Deontic Logic," Logique et Analyse 117-1 8 (1987) : 120, n. 5. The distinction is made more explicitly and defende d at length in idem, "Tw o Type s of Moral Dilemmas, " Erkenntnis 3 0 (1989): 301-18. 39. Thi s assumes that the tiebreaker does not cancel out any of the original dilemmatic prohibitions and tha t prohibitio n applies to all particular act s satisfyin g a given description, or tokens of a certain act-type. This i s another difference fro m permission , which tell s us only tha t ther e is nothing objectionabl e about a n ac t insofa r as it satisfies a given description, or amount s to a token o f a certain type , so that th e particular act i n question may stil l b e prohibited. 40. Cf . Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Dilemmas, pp. 121-26, 160-61, for th e limitation o f th e ought-implicatio n principles to conversationa l implicatur e as extende d beyond practica l uses of "ought. " 41. Cf . (C2 ) in F011esdal and Hilpinen , "Deonti c Logic, " p . 9 . 42. Gottlo b Frege , "Negation, " i n Translations from th e Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, ed. Pete r Geac h an d Ma x Blac k (New York: Philosophica l Library, 1952), p . 125. 43. Se e Michael Dummett , Frege: Philosophy o f Language, 2n d ed . (London : Duckworth, 1981) , p . 317. 44. Cf . ibid., p . 335. 45. Cf . Ruth Barca n Marcus , "Mor e abou t Mora l Dilemmas " (unpublished ; de livered a t th e Chapel Hill Coloquiu m in Philosophy, 1980) , pp . 14-15 . 46. Se e Fellesdal and Hilpinen, "Deontic Logic, " p . 17 . Note that Marcus' s second order regulative principle to avoi d conflicts seems to make best sense in these terms— since at the time assigned to action in a dilemma it may well be too lat e for the agent t o avoid it , though hi s doing s o would stil l count a s the idea l state o f affairs . 47. Cf . esp. Chisholm, "Contrary-to-Duty Imperatives. " Cf . Greenspan, "Derive d Obligation," for m y discussio n o f many of these issues. 48. Cf . F011esdal and Hilpinen , "Deonti c Logic, " pp . 26-31. I shoul d not e tha t this seems not to be true of a more recent attempt t o handle dilemmatic oughts as cases of defeasibl e reasoning , b y abandoning modal logi c altogether (i n favor of "nonmon otonic" logic) as the appropriate foundation for deontic logic. See John F . Horty, "Mora l Dilemmas and Nonmonotonic Logic," Journal o f Philosophical Logic 23 (1994): 35-65; cf. idem , "Deontic Logi c a s Founded on Nonmonotonic Logic, " Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 9 (1993): 69-91. The analogie s illustrating Horty's proposal (propositions roughly true but conflicting as stated, such as "Birds fly" and "Pen guins don't fly," on th e assumption that penguin s are birds) suggest tha t it would no t really captur e dilemmas, i n th e sens e o f specifi c conflicting directives fo r action , bu t rather just general ought-statements whose conflic t in application t o a particular cas e presumably would be handled by withdrawing one of them. (W e would no t conclude , for instance , that Tweet y th e Pengui n does fl y qu a bir d a s wel l a s failin g t o fl y qu a penguin, but rather that "Bird s fly" is not reall y applicable to Tweety's case.) Horty's point, as I understand it, is that we cannot appea l t o the content o f such statements— to built-i n exceptio n clauses and th e like—to tell us which on e t o withdraw . Hi s pro posed syste m of deonti c logi c would cove r conflictin g rules an d henc e woul d yiel d a logic applicable to our ordinar y deontic judgments—perhaps one that more accurately reflects ou r ordinar y use of them in moral reasoning. But it would no t see m to yiel d a logical systematization of our deontic judgments, or a "deontic logic " i n the usual sense, except a s limited t o th e genera l level. 49. Williams , "Ethica l Consistency," p. 132.

Notes t o pages 59-69 22

1

50. O n dilemmas and simplicity, see Bernard Williams's comments on Isaiah Berlin's value pluralism in his introduction t o Concepts an d Categories: Philosophical Essays, by I. Berlin (London : Hogarth, 1978) , pp . xvi-xvii . 51. Se e esp. Hector-Neri Castaneda , "O n th e Semantic s of th e Ought-to-Do, " Synthese 2 1 (1970): 451; cf. idem, Thinking an d Doing, pp. 207-8, 248-53. 52. Se e Castaneda, Thinking an d Doing, p. 224. 53. Fo r Castaneda' s overal l account (whos e ful l complexit y I cannot attemp t t o capture here) , see esp. ibid., pp . 154-79 . Castaneda' s notio n o f th e "Legitimacy " o f practitions as the value analogous to the truth of propositions, and o f deontic trut h as necessary Legitimacy , is summed u p i n a very helpful overvie w of Castaneda' s views ; see Michael E. Bratman, "Castaneda' s Theor y o f Though t an d Action, " i n Agent, Language, and the Structure o f th e World, ed . J. E . Tomberlin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), pp. 152-55; fo r mor e o n th e connectio n t o a n agent' s ends , includin g some problems with cause-effect relations , se e pp. 155-59 . 54. Cf . the account of needs in contrast t o desires given in David Wiggins, Needs, Values, Truth (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1987), pp . 5-16 . 55. Cf . Bratman, "Castaneda' s Theor y o f Thought an d Action, " p . 156 , where oughts on Castaneda' s accoun t ar e taken as indexed to a specific promise . 56. Se e esp. Castaneda's accoun t of the thre e "dimensions " o f morality in Structure of Morality, pp . 175-226 ; cf. his account of the consistency of normative systems by analog y to legal systems in Thinking an d Doing, pp. 225-28.

Chapter 3 1. Williams , Problems o f th e Self, pp . 204-5; cf. Wiggins, Needs, Values, Truth, pp. 87-137 . 2. Cf . also P. S. Greenspan, " A Case of Mixed Feelings : Ambivalence and the Logic of Emotion, " i n Explaining Emotions, ed. A . O. Rort y (Berkeley : University of Cali fornia Press , 1980) , pp . 223-50. I there deal with cases that exhibit a logical structure Williams bypasse s (see Williams, "Ethica l Consistency, " p . 117) , along wit h th e sor t of logical behavior that he takes to mark off desires. That is , the unqualified evaluative beliefs that reflec t emotiona l ambivalenc e may b e said to b e retained i n residual form by being qualified rathe r than simpl y eliminated in the fac e o f conflict. 3. Se e Foot, "Mora l Realism and Moral Dilemma, " esp. pp. 254-57, 265-67 . 4. Ibid. , p. 262; cf. pp. 267-68 . 5. Se e McNaughton, Moral Vision, pp . 139—40 , 48-50; and Brink , Moral Realism and Foundations o f Ethics, pp. 43-50 . 6. Se e Foot, Virtues and Vices, pp. 157-73 ; cf. p. 17 9 for the distinction from motivational force. For a study of Foot tha t overlaps on important points with the account that follows but without the implications for general internalism, see Simon Blackburn, "The Fligh t to Reality," in Virtues an d Reasons, ed. R. Hursthouse and G . Lawrence (Oxford: Oxfor d Universit y Press, 1995) . 7. Foot , Virtues and Vices, pp. 74-80 . 8. Cf . the account in terms of "fittingness" i n Maurice Mandelbaum, The Phenomenology o f Moral Experience (Baltimore : Johns Hopkin s Universit y Press, 1969) , pp. 59-71 . 9. Foot , Virtues and Vices, pp. 181-88 . 10. Ibid. , p. 186. 11. Ibid. , pp. 183-85 .

222 Notes

t o pages 69-78

12. Ibid. , p. 153. 13. Ibid. , pp. 79-80. 14. Ibid. , see, e.g. p. 152. 15. Ibid. , p. 163. 16. Cf . P. S. Greenspan, "Behavio r Control an d Freedo m o f Action," Philosophical Review 8 7 (1978): 25-40. 17. Cf . Ben Spiecker, "Education and th e Moral Emotions," i n Philosophical Issues in Moral Education and Development, ed . B. Spiecker and R. Straughan (Milton Keynes, U.K.: Open Universit y Press, 1988) , pp . 43-63. 18. Fo r a review of the psychological literature suggesting a developmental account of guilt as based on empathy (but omitting the earlier stage I include here), see Hoffman, "Development of Prosocial Motivation, " pp. 297-305.1 discus s this evidence further in chapter 4. 19. Se e Laurence Thomas, Living Morally: A Psychology of Moral Character (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989) , pp . 76-80 , for a negativ e view of guilt as a self-interested an d henc e a n essentiall y antimora l motive. It i s compatible wit h any thing I have in mind, I should say, that we would prefe r to have children (an d friend s and others ) act out o f some motiv e other tha n guilt ; but I take i t that the sam e hold s for mora l ought-statements . 20. Fo r m y general account of emotions a s reasons operating b y way o f the nee d to escap e discomfort , se e Greenspan, Emotions an d Reasons, pp . 153ff . For a n em pirical account of emotions that pays less attention to conceptual issues but otherwise overlaps with mine , see Paul L. Harris, Children an d Emotion: The Development o f Psychological Understanding (Oxford : Blackwell, 1989); with reference to the suggestions I develop here , se e pp. 44-45, 93-94, 98. 21. Cf . C . L. Stevenson, Pacts and Values (Ne w Haven, Conn. : Yal e University Press, 1963) , p. 13. 22. Thi s might be thought of as a variant of Grice's "conversationa l implicature " but with the ordinary purposes o f moral discours e replacing the communicative aims of an ordinary speaker. See Grice, Studies i n the Wa y of Words, pp . 26-28.The notio n of "didacti c import " i s not mean t to cove r jus t any emotiona l overtones o f a wor d resulting from the way it is commonly taught, such as shame in connection with word s for th e genitals, bu t just those essential t o settin g up it s role in the language. I characterized the latter as its "functional" meanin g in chapter 2, section 1 ; in Grice's terms it seems to amoun t t o "conventional " meanin g (se e my note 5 , chapter 2) . There i s no institution of genital discourse designed specifically to control behavior . To claim that moral discours e is another matte r is not t o rul e out th e possibility of a society—or in a nice exampl e that wa s suggeste d t o me , som e ultralibera l parents i n California (presumably speaking their own language)—that did without terms set up for their actionguiding function. The point i s just that the y would thereby be doing without "moral" language i n our (conventional ) sense. This i s not t o sa y that mora l discours e ha s n o further functions that they might retain, as part of an institution that could still be called "moral," albeit in a somewhat differen t (mor e "laid-back") sense . 23. Se e esp. Wiggins, Needs, Values, Truth, pp. 185-211; see also John McDowell , "Values an d Secondar y Qualities, " i n Morality an d Objectivity: A Tribute t o J. L . Mackie, ed. T. Honderich (London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), pp. 110-29. Note that Wiggin s considers "realism " somethin g of a misnomer for hi s view, although he would accep t McDowell' s "cognitivism " (se e p. 209). 24. Cf . McNaughton, Moral Vision, pp . 21-23, 46-47, 106-13. 25. Se e John McDowell , "Ar e Moral Requirement s Hypothetical Imperatives?,"

Notes t o pages 79-89 22

3

Proceedings o f th e Aristotelian Society Suppl . 52 (1978) : 13-29 , an d idem , "Virtu e and Reason," 331-50. For help in understanding McDowell's view , I am indebted bot h to McNaughton, Moral Vision, and to Jonathan Danc y (personal communication), who provided comment s on th e ensuin g discussion. Se e Dancy's Moral Reasons (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1993), which advances a version of McDowell's view but which reached me too lat e for consideration here . 26. McDowell , "Virtu e and Reason," p. 348, n. 5. 27. Cf . Nagel, Possibility o f Altruism, pp. 29-32. 28. McDowell , "Mora l Requirements, " p. 16. 29. Ibid. , p. 28. 30. McDowell , "Virtu e and Reason," p . 333. 31. Ibid . 32. McDowell , "Mora l Requirements, " pp. 26-27. 33. Ibid. , p. 21. 34. Cf . McDowell, "Virtu e and Reason," p . 344. Annette Baier, in her comments on m y Emotions and Reasons (America n Philosophical Associatio n Pacifi c Divisio n meetings, March 1990) , noted that the point about emotions can be traced to Descartes' s treatment i n "The Passions o f the Soul" ; se e Th e Philosophical Works o f Descartes, trans. E. S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970) , Vol. 1 , Pt. Second, Art. 74 , p. 364. 35. McDowell , "Mora l Requirements," p. 22. 36. Cf . my defense o f ambivalence as rationally appropriate i n Greenspan, "Cas e of Mixe d Feelings" ; cf . idem, Emotions an d Reasons, pp. 109-36. 37. Se e J. L . Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (London: Penguin, 1987) , pp. 38-42. 38. Ibid. , pp. 23-24, 40, 35; cf. pp. 23, 40. 39. Se e Foot, Virtues and Vices, pp. 132-47 ; cf. pp. 100-5 . 40. Mackie , Ethics, pp. 51-52, 59. 41. Ibid. , pp. 15 , 16. 42. Ibid. , esp. p. 31. 43. Se e McDowell, "Value s and Secondar y Qualities, " pp . 120-22 . McDowel l acknowledges th e limitations of the secondary qualities analogy o n p. 120; the poin t of the analogy seems to be the distinction between general and particular subject-independence (independenc e of minds generally vs. the speaker) , with th e latte r take n as sufficient fo r a claim to b e part o f "reality." Cf . also McDowell's discussio n of related issues in "Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the World," in Pleasure, Preference and Value, ed. E. Schaper (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) , pp . 1-16. 44. Cf . John Rawls , "Kantia n Constructivism in Moral Theory, " J ournal o f Philosophy 7 7 (1980) : 515-72. Since Rawls's late r politica l version of constructivism is set up to accommodate intuitionist realism, it should also be compatible with the alternative I propose; cf . John Rawls , Political Liberalism (Ne w York: Columbi a University Press, 1993) , p . 95 . 45. Mackie , Ethics, see esp. pp. 106-15 . 46. Ibid. , cf. pp. 27-29, 35, 48-49, 65-66, 75. 47. Se e Plato, Protagoras, 320c8-323a4 , and Mackie , Ethics, pp. 108 , 113-15. 48. Cf . John Searle, "How t o Derive 'Ought' fro m 'Is'," Philosophical Review 7 3 (1964): 43-58; cf. Mackie, Ethics, pp . 66-72, esp. p . 67. 49. Mackie , Ethics, p. 79; cf. pp. 73-79, 81, 111-13 . 50. Ibid. , p. 33.

224 Note

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51. Se e my discussion o f "having " a reason i n P. S. Greenspan, "Unfreedo m an d Responsibility," i n Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions, ed. F. Schoeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) , p. 75, for a way of retaining the claim that the agen t i n suc h a cas e "has " a reason t o d o wha t moralit y requires . Cf . Williams , Moral Luck, pp. 106-7 , fo r the basi s of the denia l of such "external " reasons i n the insistence that a reason necessaril y motivates a rational agent . Extendin g externalis m to th e version tha t applie s to reason-givin g a s well as motivational forc e allows fo r a fuller answe r t o Mackie' s "argumen t fro m queerness" ; cf . Richard Garner , "O n th e Genuine Queerness o f Moral Propertie s an d Facts, " Australasian Journal o f Philosophy 6 8 (1990) : 137-46 . 52. Cf . Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, esp. Bk. II, Sees. 1 and 3. Note that ordi nary moral consciousnes s i s in question here . For philosophers an d other s inclined t o reflect o n and analyz e morality, we might of course include a further stage—th e evaluation o f mora l code s accordin g t o metaethica l norms , whic h include s standard s o f viability of the sor t I go on t o describe. 53. Fo r a recent antirealist attempt t o provide a limited kind o f objective basis for ethics, with particula r referenc e t o th e issu e o f authority, see Allan Gibbard , Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory o f Normative Judgment (Cambridge , Mass.: Harvard University Press , 1990) , pp . 153-250 . O n Gibbard' s view , however , th e authority in question comes out as that of a speaker—or of particular moral utterances—rather tha n of certain sorts of claims or considerations independentl y of their source , which I take to b e the issue relevant to ethics . 54. Mackie , Ethics, pp. 36-39, 83-92. 55. Cf . the discussion of "explanatory values" in Geoffrey Sayre-McCord , "Mora l Theory and Explanatory Impotence," i n Essays on Moral Realism, ed. G. Sayre-McCord (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornel l University Press, 1988) , p. 279. 56. Suc h appeal provides the basis for contractarian arguments ; cf. Rawls, Theory of Justice, pp . 15 , 13 . 57. Cf . Raz, Morality o f Freedom, pp . 198-203 , 250-55. Alternatively , to th e extent tha t social groups ar e susceptible to treatment a s moral agents , on e might take them as having duties to their members, including duties o f fair treatment , perhaps as an element of the sor t o f social atmosphere of tolerance and simila r libera l values that Raz commends. On a contractarian approach , a group's clai m on its members' adher ence might be based on performance of such duties. An argument along these lines was suggested t o m e b y th e treatmen t o f societ y a s the primar y beare r o f th e dut y t o ai d needy individuals in David Copp, "Th e Right to an Adequate Standard o f Living: Justice, Autonomy, and the Basic Needs," Social Philosophy an d Policy 9 (1992): 231-61. Just as the duty to aid on this account gets parceled out to individual members via taxation, moreover, othe r social duties to individuals might be held to transfer to them too, for a socially based accoun t of "duties t o oneself " an d simila r issues. My central argumen t here is meant t o b e independent o f these suggestions. However, for a systematic defense of some of the social notions I rely on, se e Copp, "What Collectives Are: Agency, Individualism and Legal Theory," Dialogue 23 (1984): 249-69, and idem , "Th e Concept o f a Society, " Dialogue 3 1 (1992) , 183-212. I n Morality, Normativity, an d Society (Ne w York: Oxford University Press, 1995) , Cop p defends a social artifact vie w that overlap s in many ways with my own. One poin t o f difference , though, is Copp's focus on the overall society as the source of moral norms, as oppose d to th e variou s smaller group interaction s that suppor t th e teachin g of moralit y via emotion o n m y account. 58. Se e Hoffman, "Developmen t of Prosocial Motivation," p. 282. My own attempt

Notes t o pages 95-97 22

5

to make philosophic sense of empathetic emotion in Greenspan, Emotions an d Reasons, pp. 62-79, resembles th e accoun t o f "fello w feeling " in Adam Smith, The Theory o f the Moral Sentiments, i n British Moralists: 1650-1800, ed. D. D. Raphael (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991) , 2: 201-6. Recent discussion s i n cognitive science also dea l wit h th e topic unde r the headin g of "simulation" ; see , e.g., Robert Gordon , Th e Structure o f Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridg e Universit y Press, 1987) , pp. 149-55. 59. Not e that the reference to emotional interaction—meanin g mutual influence , of the sort that supports emotional learning , as described in section 1—may be used to limit the moral implications of our more extended sympathy with animals. Indeed, emotional identification sometimes extends even to inanimate objects: I cry out in pain when my car hits a pothole, say ; see also the findings reported i n Alvin Goldman's APA Pacific Divisio n Presidentia l Address , "Empathy , Mind , an d Morals, " Proceedings an d Addresses o f th e American Philosophical Association 6 6 (1992) : 27-28. On th e other hand , an argument of the sort I offer fo r not excluding members of a subclass o f one' s ow n societ y fro m th e scop e o f ou r mora l obligation s als o ma y b e extended to members of other societies—fo r instance, by noting that the habits of mind encouraged by subjecting them to hostile treatment would b e likely to turn inward when it lacked a target, thus threatening the stability of the moral code. However, these issues (and others I omit) deserve a fulle r treatmen t than I can provide here. 60. Se e Mill, Utilitarianism, pp . 36-43, an d Hume , Treatise o f Human Nature, p. 456; cf. p. 470. Mill holds that human emotional sensibilit y in no way restricts th e content o f a moral code. Hume' s account, o n the other hand , restrict s sympath y to a later stag e i n the establishment o f justice as a moral virtue; see, e.g., p. 498. Cf. also Rawls , Theory o f Justice, pp . 453-512, for an account of moral emotion s relevant t o contractarianis m tha t I take t o b e essentially "top-down. " Th e accoun t presented her e overlaps at important point s with Rawls's defens e of the "stability " o f the principles of justice, but Rawls's treatmen t of moral psychology in connection wit h stability seems to b e intended onl y a s confirmation o f the principles , not a s an inde pendent basi s for them. Thus, o n Rawls's view , any feasible principles of justice must be capable o f support fro m a natural set of moral sentiment s amounting to ou r sens e of justice; so they would have to satisf y th e requirement of teachability and other general presuppositions tha t ma y brin g i n fact s abou t huma n emotional nature . Bu t th e choice o f principle s i n Rawls' s "origina l position " i s justified withou t mor e specifi c reference t o huma n motivation—in contrast t o m y own picture of moral emotion s a s providing a particular episodic basis for the teaching of moral language and behavio r that generates moral norms . 61. Cf . David Wong, Moral Relativity (Berkeley : Universit y of Californi a Press, 1984); cf. also Castaneda' s appea l t o correctio n o f actua l moral code s i n ligh t o f a n ideal of morality in Structure o f Morality, pp . 185-89 . See also Richard Brandt, "Toward a Credibl e Form of Utilitarianism," i n Morality an d th e Language o f Conduct, ed. H-N. Castaneda and G. Nakhnikian (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1965) , pp. 107-43 , for a similar use of the notion o f an ideal moral code, thoug h without th e historical referenc e that thes e othe r view s presuppose. M y own suggestion s migh t b e thought of, for that matter, as yielding something like a social version of Brandt's relativist "idea l observer " vie w in metaethics ; see, e.g., Richard Brandt , Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs , N.J. : Prentice-Hall, 1959) , pp . 173-74 . 62. A similar basis for a version of realism in facts abou t social rationality is provided by Peter Railton, "Moral Realism, " Philosophical Review 9 5 (1986): 163-207; however, Railton's approach is tied to utilitarianis m in a way I want to avoid. I leave it as an exercise to the reader, incidentally, to decide whether my own view also counts

226 Notes

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as a versio n o f "naturalism. " Th e issu e i s complicated b y m y willingness to gran t that th e notio n o f flourishin g i s partly evaluative , possibly eve n in a sens e w e ca n think of as "moral." McDowell has recently questioned th e interpretation of "natu ral" i n relation to Aristotle; see "Reason an d Nature" (unpublished ; delivered at the meetings o f th e America n Philosophical Association , Easter n Division , Decembe r 1992). M y ow n hunc h (whic h I hop e t o explor e i n some furthe r work) i s that th e categories of the natural and the normative are not so distinct at the social level, even with "natural " take n in its more modern sense. In any case, the issue will be affecte d by the option s I leave open fo r the metaethica l underpinnings of social artifact realism i n chapter 6. 63. I n partial explanation of the tendency of moral philosophers t o interpret realism i n thi s way (cf. , e.g., Gibbard, Wise Choices, Ap t Feelings, pp . 33-34) , I offe r Keynes's observation on G . E. Moore's literal-mindedness: "Moore had a nightmare once in which he could not distinguish propositions fro m tables. But even when awake, he could not distinguish love and beaut y and trut h from th e furniture" (J. M. Keynes, Two Memoirs [London , Ruper t Hart-Davis, 1949] , p. 94). Keynes's comment seems to b e meant admiringly , bu t one result of Moore's influence is that his hypostatizin g tendency sometime s sets th e standar d fo r wha t philosopher s hav e in min d by "real ism" an d simila r terms in ethics—as witness, e.g. , the characterizatio n o f objectivist ethics as attributing moral values to "th e furniture o f the world" i n Mackie , Ethics, p. 16 . My own mov e away from a perceptual model also means giving up a common analogy to scientifi c realism , but I take i t that th e convergence of the two side s in the current realism/antirealism debate—e.g., the overlap between my view and Gibbard's— actually serves to undermin e antirealism's challenge to ou r naiv e phenomenology (cf. Brink, Moral Realism and Foundations o f Ethics, pp. 23-24). 64. Se e esp. Harman, Nature o f Morality, pp . 3-10, fo r a n antirealis t argument resting on this assumption; cf. Nicholas L. Sturgeon, "Moral Explanations," i n Morality, Reason and Truth, ed. D. Copp and D. Zimmerman (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1985) , pp . 49-78, for a realist reply . 65. Cf . esp. Walzer, "Political Action"; Williams, Moral Luck; and Nagel, Mortal Questions. 66. Cf . Simon Blackburn, "Rule-Following an d Moral Realism, " i n Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, ed. S. H. Holzma n an d C . M. Leac h (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981) , p. 175. 67. Se e esp. Hare, "Mora l Conflicts, " pp . 206-19; cf. idem, "Utilitarianis m and the Vicarious Affects," i n The Philosophy o f Nicholas Rescher, ed. E. Sosa (Dordrecht, Holland: D . Reidel, 1979) , pp . 141-52 . 68. Williams , "Ethical Consistency," p . 123. 69. Hare , "Mora l Conflicts, " pp . 209-10. 70. Al l quotes this paragraph from ibid., p . 210. 71. Ibid. , p. 209. 72. Cf . McDowell, "Value s and Secondar y Qualities," pp . 118ff .

Chapter 4 1. Thoug h Williams contrasts agent-regret with a number of other contrary-to-duty reactions (se e Moral Luck, pp. 30-32), as far a s I know his published discussions do not connect it to guilt. My remarks here are based in part on some conversations with Williams i n 1989 , particularly in discussio n of preliminar y draft s o f chapter s 2-3 o f

Notes t o pages 110-123 22

7

Shame and Necessity (Berkeley : University of Californi a Press, 1993) ; th e boo k itself came out to o lat e for consideration i n this argument, however . 2. Cf . Williams, Moral Luck, p. 121 . 3. See , e.g., Marci a Baron , "Remors e an d Agent-Regret, " i n Midwest Studies i n Philosophy, ed . P. A. French, T. E. Uehling, Jr., and H. K. Wettstein (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dam e Press , 1988) , 13 : 259-60; cf. Herbert Fingarette , "Feelin g Guilty," American Philosophical Quarterly 1 6 (1979): 159-64 , and Herber t Morris , "Reflections o n Feeling Guilty," Philosophical Studies 4 0 (1981) : 187-93 . 4. Se e Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1128blO-35. 5. Ibid. , 1128b29 . 6. Se e esp. Williams, Ethics and the Limits o f Philosophy; cf. also Slote, From Morality to Virtue. 7. Aristotle , Nicomachean Ethics, 1131b25-1132b20 . 8. Se e Baron, "Remors e an d Agent-Regret, " p . 270. Baron' s favore d alternativ e to agent-regret is remorse, although she also acknowledges tha t guilt applie s to many of her cases, at least in a broad sense; cf., e.g., p. 260. Her argument is apparently meant to cut against virtue ethics, however, rathe r tha n t o support modifications i n the standard versio n of the theory, a s suggested here. Note that he r definitio n o f virtue ethics is an odd one, sinc e it apparently insists on incompatibility with duty ethics and rules out takin g conscientiousness as a virtue; cf. p. 259 . 9. Bertran d Russell, The Autobiography o f Bertrand Russell: 1872-1914 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967) , pp . 329-30. 10. Bu t cf. Stocker, Plural and Conflicting Values, p. 65 , fo r a n interpretatio n of Aristotle o n whic h bas e acts , includin g even act s performe d unde r duress , rul e ou t eudaimonia, an d with it presumably virtue. Stocker takes the point as applying to cases of "dirt y hands"—like my "weighted" dilemmas , except tha t th e alternatives are no t said t o be wrong al l things considered; see , e.g., ibid. , p . 10 . 11. Fo r examples of this approach, alon g with the works by Williams cited earlier , see esp. Lawrence A. Blum, Friendship, Altruism and Morality (London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), and Michael Stocker, "The Schizophreni a of Modern Ethical Theories," Journal o f Philosophy 7 3 (1976): 453-66. 12. Withou t our independent information about Russell's somewhat limite d emotional range, I should add, this might be a more charitable explanation of his reaction in the passage cited. Perhaps I ought to remind the reader, for that matter, that the case in which I have made out guil t as obligatory i s substantially modified from Russell' s real-life case. As another alternativ e in the real-life case, o n a view that allows for unconscious guil t as a n emotio n th e agen t misidentifie s (cf. Greenspan, Emotions and Reasons, pp. 25-30), one might instead argue that Russell really did feel guilty on some level, despite the fact that the passage acknowledges onl y sorrow. The element of irrationality commonly introduced b y unconscious emotion migh t help make sense of the confusion I have noted i n Russell's account o f the reason s fo r hi s feeling . 13. Se e Greenspan, Emotions and Reasons, p. 4; cf. pp. 83-136, for the development and defens e of the general account o f emotional appropriatenes s tha t I begin to apply to guilt in this section, which is preliminary to my argument in chapter 5, section 2, in this volume. 14. Se e Greenspan, Emotions and Reasons, pp . 31-32; cf. pp. 55ff . 15. Cf . Greenspan, "Conditional Ought s and Hypothetical Imperatives, " pp. 272 73. 16. Cf . Greenspan, "Behavior Contro l an d Freedo m o f Action," an d idem , Emotions and Reasons, pp . 153 , 165-66 , 173 .

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s to pages 123-131

17. Cf . ibid., pp. 83-136. 18. Th e basi c account outline d here i s culled from a numbe r o f sources; se e esp. Rawls, Theory o f Justice, pp . 440-46, 479-85; Herbert Morris , O n Guilt an d Innocence: Essays in Legal Philosophy an d Moral Psychology (Berkeley : University of California Press , 1976) , pp . 59-63; Gabriel e Taylor, Pride, Shame, an d Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment (Oxford : Clarendon, 1985); and Fingarette, "Feeling Guilty." I shall postpone unti l chapter 5 a discussion o f standard assumption s abou t th e connectio n of emotional guil t to th e self-attributio n of responsibility. 19. Cf . Taylor, Pride, Shame, an d Guilt, p. 101; cf. pp. 99-100. 20. Cf. , e.g., Thomas, Living Morally, pp . 76-80. 21. Cf. , e.g., Taylor, Pride, Shame, an d Guilt, pp. 54-57ff . 22. Cf . Gibbard, Wise Choices, Ap t Feelings, pp. 136-40 . 23. Se e Rawls, Theory o f Justice, pp . 484-85; cf. pp. 445-46. 24. Se e esp. Hoffman, "Developmen t o f Prosocia l Motivation, " fo r a revie w of the recent literature . 25. Se e Edwards, Nature o f True Virtue, pp . 61-74 . 26. Se e esp. Benedict, Chrysanthemum an d the Sword; cf., e.g., Millie R. Creighton , "Revisiting Sham e and Guil t Cultures : A Forty-Year Pilgrimage," Ethos 1 8 (1990) : 279-307. 27. Se e esp. Hoffman, "Developmen t o f Prosocia l Motivation, " pp . 296-97. Hoffman doe s no t mak e a clea r shame/guil t distinction; but cf . June Pric e Tangney , "Moral Affect : Th e Good , th e Bad, an d th e Ugly, " Journal o f Personality an d Social Psychology 6 1 (1991) : 598-607 , for results supporting hi s central claim s in applica tion specificall y t o guilt . 28. Se e The Oxford English Dictionary. Othe r languages apparently have no noun for emotiona l guil t per s e but instea d mus t refe r t o th e sens e of guilt or t o feeling s of guilt—which presumably can include feelings of moral shame—to distinguish the emotion fro m th e stat e o f being guilty or a t fault . Alternatively , they can us e an adjectiv e for "guilty " wit h "feels," t o mea n "feel s a s if' a t fault . 29. Edwards , Nature o f True Virtue, pp . 66-67. Edwards's notio n o f consistency is apparently a "sentimentalist" modificatio n of the then-current "intellectualist" views of Samue l Clarke ; se e Norman Fiering , Jonathan Edwards's Moral Thought an d It s British Context (Chape l Hill: Universit y of North Carolina , 1981) , pp. 87-93. 30. Edwards , Nature o f True Virtue, p . 64 . 31. Ibid. , cf. pp. 61ff. 32. Se e Taylor, Pride, Shame, an d Guilt, p. 92; cf. pp. 90, 106. 33. Cf . Greenspan, Emotions and Reasons, pp . 48-55. 34. See Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, pp. 85, 94ff. Freud apparently uses "remorse" fo r guilt fel t fo r a n actua l deed. I n any case, hi s developed accoun t of th e sense of guilt that he takes to precede action seems to me to allow for the identificatory interpretation I give here. In fact, Freud suggests something of the sort in his characterization of the supereg o i n terms of aggression directe d toward th e ego it develops as a part of; cf., e.g., p. 84 . See also p. 95 for the characterization of the sources o f guilt in terms of love/hate ambivalence; cf. Klein and Riviere , Love, Hate an d Reparation. 35. Se e esp. Arnold H. Modell , "O n Havin g the Right to a Life: An Aspect of the Superego's Development, " International Journal of Psychoanalysis 46 (1965): 323-31; cf. Takeo Doi , The Anatomy of Dependence (Tokyo : Kodansha International, 1973) , pp. 48-57, fo r a Japanese psychiatrist's account o f a simila r notion o f guilt i n Japan (at th e deat h o f parents and th e like ) a s a reactio n t o th e sens e that on e i s betraying one's group ties. I shall attempt a fulle r discussio n of such cases in chapter 5 .

Notes t o pages 131-139 22

9

36. Cf. , e.g., Douglas, Purity an d Danger. Wha t is commonly referred to as "Jewish guilt" seems to me to b e in large part a variant of separation guil t with th e features I focus on here rather tha n anything specifically religiou s as one might suppose . (Not e that th e notion of original sin is distinctively Christian, indeed Western Christian , du e to Sain t Augustine) Another elemen t ma y b e something like Nietzschean "debt" ; cf. Nietszche, Genealogy o f Morals, pp . 62-63ff . Th e one element I can locat e tha t doe s seem to hav e biblical sources i s the tendency to explai n ba d event s a s results o f one' s own (or in the biblical case, the group's) misdeeds . According to my argument i n chapter 5 , eve n raising th e questio n o f (objective ) guilt—"Wha t hav e I done t o deserv e this?"—can b e enough t o generat e guilt feelings . 37. Cf. , e.g., Ezekiel 6:9 and 36:31 for expressions of self-loathing that see m to be plausibly classifie d a s guilt; I owe thes e references to biblica l scholar Davi d Halperi n (personal communication). 38. Cf . Sharon Bishop , "Connection s an d Guilt, " Hypatia 2 (1987) : 7-23 . 39. Cf . Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, pp. 139-40 . Gibbard's ow n accoun t of guilt as a counterpart to ange r i s naturally read i n the rather wea k term s I go on t o discuss, bu t it also allows for fillin g out i n the way I propose here. 40. See , e.g., June Price Tangney, Patricia Wagner, and Richard Gramzow, "Prone ness to Shame , Proneness t o Guilt , and Psychopathology, " Journal o f Abnormal Psychology 10 1 (1992): 469-78 . 41. Se e Michael Friedman, "Toward a Reconceptualization of Guilt," Contemporary Psychoanalysis 2 1 (1985) : 540; cf. pp. 535, 539. 42. Cf. , e.g., the account of the Ancient Greek shift from "shame-culture " t o "guilt culture" i n E. R. Dodds , Th e Greeks an d th e Irrational (Berkeley : University of California Press , 1951) , pp. 17f., 28-63. 43. Hare , "Mora l Conflicts, " p . 208. 44. See , e.g., L. A . Kosman , "Bein g Properly Affected : Virtue s an d Feeling s i n Aristotle's Ethics," i n Essays o n Aristotle's Ethics, ed. A. O . Rorty (Berkeley : University of California, 1980), pp . 103-16 . For other treatments of the issu e of responsibility for emotion (bu t mainly in a backward-looking sense of "responsibility"), se e Robert Merrihew Adams , "Involuntar y Sins," Philosophical Review 94 (1985): 3-31 , an d Edward Sankowski , "Responsibility of Persons fo r Their Emotions, " Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (1977): 829-40 . 45. Se e Ross, Right an d the Good, pp . 4-6, and H. A. Prichard, "Doe s Moral Phi losophy Res t o n a Mistake?, " Mind 2 1 (1912) : 33 . Fo r a mor e recen t exampl e o f th e standard vie w of Kant on emotions , se e esp. Blum , Friendships, Altruism and Morality; cf. Nancy Sherman, "The Place of Emotions in Kantian Morality," i n Identity, Character, and Morality, ed. O. Flanagan and A. O. Rorty (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990) , pp. 149-70 , for anothe r sid e o f this story. However, I take i t that Kant's exclusio n of emotions from the grounds of moral judgment as required by my own argumen t remains intact, even if he makes room fo r the m in other ways as components o f the moral life . 46. Cf . Prichard, "Moral Philosophy," p. 27, and Ross, Right and the Good, p. 5. 47. Prichard , "Mora l Philosophy, " p . 24. 48. Ross , Right an d th e Good, p. 5. 49. Ibid. , pp. 42-43. 50. Not e tha t Ros s late r changed hi s mind on this point, holdin g instead tha t th e duty to fulfil l a promise was a duty not to effec t a certain result but to try to d o so; see W. David Ross, Foundations o f Ethics (Oxford : Clarendon, 1939), p . 108 . The change would reinforce my argument in what follows for treating "ought-to-feel" on the model of "ought-to-do. "

230 Notes

t o pages 141-160

51. Prichard , "Mora l Philosophy," p . 33. 52. Cf . Marcus, "Mora l Dilemmas and Consistency, " p . 198. 53. Cf . Aeschylus, "Agamemnon," 217-18 ; cf. Nussbaum, Fragility o f Goodness, pp. 35-37 . 54. Williams , "Ethical Consistency, " p . 135. 55. Williams , Moral Luck, p. 179. 56. Se e esp. Kant, Foundations o f th e Metaphysics o f Morals, p . 10 ; cf . Nagel , Mortal Questions, p. 24. Wha t I suggest her e is not unlik e Nagel's ow n diagnosi s o f the problem of moral luck, which he explains by appeal to his distinction between internal and externa l points of view; cf. pp. 36ff . 57. Se e Peter Strawson, "Freedom an d Resentment, " i n Free Will, ed. G. Watso n (Oxford: Oxfor d Universit y Press , 1982) , pp . 59-80; cf. Susan Wolf, "Asymmetrica l Freedom, "Journal o f Philosophy 7 7 (1980) : 151-66. The issu e is also complicated by features of the rational and moral assessment of these emotions noted elsewhere in this chapter—for instance , in my discussion o f asymmetries involving pride. 58. Se e Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, pp. 251-55; cf. pp. 409-10. The fiction I have in min d as bearin g on responsibilit y issues is a bi t differen t fro m th e on e Hume discusses in his treatment of personal identity (cf . esp. p. 255). I t essentially involves making out the self as distinct from an d prior to its actions, in order to cast i t in the rol e of responsible cause. Although a ful l discussio n o f these issues i s beyond th e scope o f this discussion, I shall hav e a bi t mor e t o sa y about the m i n chapter 5 . Fo r related comments on the notion of causation b y character, see Greenspan, "Unfreedom and Responsibility" ; cf. Adams, "Involuntary Sins. " 59. Cf . Greenspan, "Unfreedom and Responsibility," pp . 69-70. Nagel discusse s a similar case, of an accident resulting from failur e to have one's brakes checked, wit h reference t o moral luck in Mortal Questions, p. 29 .

Chapter 5 1. Se e Rawls, Theory o f Justice, p . 482. For general objection s to judgmentalism, see Greenspan, Emotions and Reasons, pp. 15-80. 2. Se e Aristotle, Rhetorica, Boo k II, Sec. 2,1378a31-1378b5; cf. Greenspan, Emotions an d Reasons, pp . 48-55. 3. Rawls , Theory o f Justice, p . 482. 4. Se e Taylor, Pride, Shame, an d Guilt, p. 86. 5. Ibid. , p. 1. 6. Ibid. , p. 91. 7. Se e Greenspan, Emotions an d Reasons, pp. 18-20; cf. idem, "Emotions a s Evaluations," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 6 2 (1981) : 158-69. 8. Se e Greenspan, Emotions and Reasons, pp. 25-30. But note, i n relation to my present argument, the reasons offered agains t any easy inference to unconscious evaluations o n pp. 19 , 24. 9. Cf . ibid., pp . 153-62. 10. Se e Stephen P. Stich, "Beliefs and Subdoxasti c States, " Philosophy o f Science 45 (1978) : 499-518, and Michae l E. Bratman, "Practical Reasonin g an d Acceptanc e in a Context," Mind 10 1 (1992): 1-15 . 11. Fo r the latter notion, see, e.g., Donagan, Theory o f Morality, p . 45 . 12. Se e Herbert Morris, "Nonmora l Guilt, " i n Responsibility, Character, and th e Emotions, ed. F. Schoeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 220-41.

Notes t o pages 161-172 23

1

13. Ibid. , pp. 232-37. 14. Taylo r ha s a puzzling comment abou t th e parallel sort of economic case : "I f I feel guilty about m y privileged position i n society due to circumstances of birth then I see myself as an agen t causall y involved: it i s my birt h whic h ha s brough t abou t th e state o f affairs whic h is my privileged position" (Pride, Shame, an d Guilt, p. 91). But the agent's birth is no less passive than bein g benefited economically or the like; it just is less easily distinguished from th e perso n t o who m i t happens . S o it is questionable how this could yield the requisite sort of causal responsibility on Taylor's account without a n implausibl e attribution o f delusion t o th e agent . Presumably , what i s in question i s causation b y the agent in some sense—i f no t throug h he r act or agenc y then a t least through some other form of activity on her part. But surely birth does not qualify . 15. Se e Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, p. 139. 16. Morris , "Nonmora l Guilt, " pp . 226-32. 17. Taylor , Pride, Shame, an d Guilt, pp. 91-92 . 18. Morris , "Nonmora l Guilt, " pp . 237-40. 19. Cf . Joel Feinberg , Doing an d Deserving: Essays in the Theory o f Responsibility (Princeton , N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970) , p. 233. Taylor apparentl y misses this distinction when sh e cites Feinberg's poin t tha t vicarious objective guilt is impos sible, in support of her own view that "feeling s of guilt . . . cannot aris e from th e deeds or omissions o f others" (Pride, Shame, an d Guilt, p. 91; cf. n. 5 and Feinberg , Doing and Deserving, pp . 231, 237). 20. Morris , "Nonmora l Guilt, " pp . 239-40. 21. Ibid. , pp. 232, 237. 22. Ibid. , p . 226. 23. Ibid. , p. 232. 24. See , e.g., Herbert Morris, "Th e Decline of Guilt," Ethics 9 9 (1988) : 66. 25. Morris , "Nonmora l Guilt, " 226. 26. Se e Greenspan, Emotions and Reasons, p. 31; cf. pp. 153-62 . 27. Cf . ibid., esp. pp. 83-107, for my extended inquir y into appropriateness , re sulting in a nonquantitative criterion i n terms o f belie f warrant . 28. Se e John Searle , Intentionality (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1983) , pp. 31-35; cf., e.g., p. 8 for his statement of the point a s a claim that emotions have no direction o f fit—meaning, I take it , emotion s themselve s a s distinct fro m desire s an d beliefs. Searle sees emotions as combining elements of desire and belief, with an emphasis on desir e (but as only partially characterized b y his analysis; cf. p. 36), while making out appropriatenes s i n term s o f belie f satisfaction (pp . 8-9) . Note, however , tha t h e uses the category of desire to capture evaluative content. 29. Cf . Gibbard, Wise Choices, Ap t Feelings, p. 139. In th e ensuin g argument I hope t o sho w ho w the standards for guilt and ange r might diverge—compatibly with the valu e placed accordin g t o Gibbar d o n meshin g guilt an d ange r (cf . p. 299). See Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Dilemmas, p. 107, for the application to dilemmas of a similar claim of asymmetry between remorse and blame , though without the explanation I provide here; cf. also Greenspan , "Mora l Dilemmas and Guilt. " 30. Cf . Greenspan, Emotions and Reasons, pp. 48-55, 188 , n. 3. 31. Cf . my distinction between backward- and forward-lookin g notions o f responsibility i n Greenspan , "Unfreedo m an d Responsibility, " pp . 64 , 71 . On e migh t be tempted to take personal blam e as appropriate jus t in virtue of its usefulness i n getting individual member s to exer t forward-lookin g responsibility and refor m the relevant group. However, general adaptiveness would seem to b e well enough served by blame imposed for failing to take responsibility—i n that way and als o in the emotional terms

232 Notes

t o pages 174-189

that I go on t o justify . Somethin g simila r applies, moreover, t o any independent symbolic function that might be assigned to blame, in expressing a strong stand against the group behavio r in question . 32. O n th e othe r hand , th e standard s o f appropriatenes s ma y incorporat e fact s about norma l emotional developmen t to the extent tha t thes e affect bot h th e naturalness of an object of attention an d th e general adaptiveness of an emotional response t o it. This point ma y afford a deeper explanation of the notio n o f "paradigm scenarios " in D e Sousa, Rationality o f Emotion, pp. 181-84 , as early stages i n emotional learning that ar e give n specia l stres s i n determinin g the rationalit y of a n emotio n i n adul t life. In view of facts about emotional "inertia, " o r the tendency of emotional responses to outliv e changes in their corresponding judgments , we would expec t som e stages in childhood developmen t t o affec t adul t respons e patterns . Fo r instance , it migh t be thought that anger in response t o injurie s t o oneself , a s the natural childhood stru t of the sense of justice, is important enoug h i n developmental terms to warran t blam e on the par t o f the victi m in a case like Russell's, even in the absenc e of adequate grounds for third-perso n moral blame—a possibility I tried to allo w for in chapter 4. But there is als o roo m fo r a goo d dea l o f empirica l disagreemen t o n thes e issues; i t shoul d b e evident tha t m y treatment of cases here rests o n a heavy element of conjecture. 33. Cf . Morris's somewhat les s discriminate acceptance o f "share d guilt " i n O n Guilt and Innocence, pp. 111-138. 34. Cf . Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Dilemmas, p. 42; unlik e Sinnott-Armstrong , I take it that " I had no choice," eve n if meant as an appeal to moral necessity , counts as an excuse . 35. Cf . Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, pp . 343-44. 36. Marcus , "Mora l Dilemmas and Consistency," pp . 193-94, 198-99. 37. Thi s point distinguishe s dilemmas from th e case s o f responsibilit y for inevitable states of affairs cite d i n John Marti n Fischer and Mar k Ravizza , "Responsibility and Inevitability," Ethics 10 1 (1991): 258-64. Note that the agent in a dilemma would have done otherwis e (avoide d doing wrong) if he had bee n able to; cf. the contrastin g cases cited on pp. 264-65. 38. See Williams, Moral Luck, p. 54; cf. p. 41. Cf. also Stocker , Plural and Conflicting Values, pp . 9-19 . 39. Williams , Moral Luck, pp. 63, 61. 40. Ibid. , p. 79. 41. Ibid. , p. 63.

Chapter 6 1. See , e.g. , Richar d Brandt , "Th e Scienc e of Ma n an d Wid e Reflectiv e Equilibrium," Ethics 10 0 (1990) : 263 . Th e genera l pattern o f definitio n derive s fro m Mill , Utilitarianism, p. 60—cf. also Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, p. 41—though Mil l does no t singl e out emotiona l blam e but ha s in mind also overt act s o f social censur e and punishment. 2. Se e esp. Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, p. 469 . 3. Se e esp. Simon Blackburn , Spreading th e Word (Oxford : Clarendon , 1984) , pp. 167-71 , 181-223 . 4. Se e esp. Nagel, View from Nowhere, pp. 171-75 . 5. Se e esp. De Sousa, Rationality o f Emotion; cf. also, e.g., Morto n White , What Is an d What Ought t o B e Done (Ne w York : Oxford Universit y Press , 1981) , which

Notes t o pages 189-197 23

3

assigns emotions a role in moral knowledg e analogou s t o tha t o f sense-perception i n scientific knowledge. McDowell's wor k als o seems to assign emotions a role I think of as perceptual—in the broad sense I have in mind here (meaning, roughly, "representa tional"), not on a specifically sensor y interpretation, a s might seem to fit the "second ary qualities" view—despite a very differen t accoun t o f moral knowledge ; cf. esp. m y discussion of McDowell's Virtue an d Reason in chapter 3, section 2, in this volume . 6. Se e Simon Blackburn, "How to Be an Ethical Anti-Realist," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, ed . P. A. French, T. E. Uehling, Jr., and H . K . Wettstein (Notre Dame , Ind.: University of Notre Dam e Press, 1988) , 12: 365; cf. p. 374, n. 5, for furthe r ref erences. 7. Ibid. , p. 365; cf. Simon Blackburn, "Errors an d the Phenomenology of Value, " in Morality an d Objectivity: A Tribute t o J. L. Mackie, ed . T. Honderic h (London : Routledge & Kega n Paul, 1985), pp. 1-22 , fo r a careful accoun t of the ways in which moral judgment fails t o fi t a perceptual analogy in detail (as on McDowell' s "second ary qualities" view). 8. Blackburn , Spreading th e Word, p . 195 ; cf. pp. 186 , 207. 9. Cf . Blackbur n "Flight t o Reality. " Fo r a n explicitl y socia l versio n o f anti realism, cf. Gibbard, Wise Choices, Ap t Feelings. Fo r simplicity' s sake, I shall limit my remark s her e t o Blackburn , bu t I tak e the m t o appl y a t leas t roughl y t o an y expressivist view. 10. Se e Blackburn, Spreading the Word, pp . 217-19. 11. Ibid. , pp. 167-71 . 12. Simo n Blackburn, "Attitudes and Contents, " Ethics 9 8 (1988): 504. 13. Se e Blackburn, Spreading the Word, p . 219, n. 21 . 14. Ibid. , p. 197. 15. Ibid. , p. 21. 16. Ibid. , pp. 193-95 . 17. Se e Simon Blackburn , "Truth , Realism, an d th e Regulatio n o f Theory," i n Midwest Studies in Philosophy, ed . P. A. French, T. E. Uehling, Jr., and H. K . Wettstein (Notre Dame , Ind. : Universit y o f Notre Dame , 1980) , 5: 357-58, and idem , "Rule Following and Moral Realism, " p . 175. 18. Blackbur n at som e point s seem s t o b e ope n t o a genera l interpretatio n o f internalism, however; see his Spreading the Word, p. 189. But cf., e.g., idem, "How to Be an Ethical Anti-Realist," p. 363, for the mor e standard view . 19. Blackburn , Spreading th e Word, pp . 198-201 . 20. I n a recent pape r o n dilemmas , Blackbur n indeed rest s th e specia l nature of moral dilemmas—but set up as positive ought-conflicts and interpreted in terms of quandaries about what to do—on nothing beyon d a quantitative difference i n residues; see his "What I s Puzzling about Dilemmas?" in Understanding Moral Dilemmas, ed. H. E . Mason (Ne w York: Oxfor d Universit y Press, 1995) . I saw a n earlie r version o f th e paper, as delivered at a conference on dilemmas at the University of Minnesota in April 1991. 21. Cf . Blackburn, "Flight to Reality. " O n the social base s of emotion in connection with my own suggestions on this issue, cf. the "socia l constructionist " view s current in anthropology and related subjects , as represented, e.g. , in Rom Harre ed., The Social Construction o f Emotions (Oxford: Basi l Blackwell, 1986). However, o n som e versions the approach apparentl y rules out an y innate emotions, a s I do no t mea n t o do; m y assumption is rather that innat e responses ar e shape d int o ne w emotions via social learning. 22. Se e esp. Stocker, "Schizophreni a o f Modern Ethica l Theories, " pp . 453-66.

234 Note

s to pages 198-210

23. Cf . Kosman, "Being Properly Affected. " 24. Se e esp. Robert M . Adams , "Motiv e Utilitarianism, " Journal o f Philosophy 73 (1976) : 467-81 . 25. Cf . Michael Moore , "Th e Moral Wort h o f Retribution, " i n Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions, ed. F. Schoeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 199-202ff . 26. Se e G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge : Cambridge Universit y Press, 1903), pp. 6-15 . 27. Cf . Greenspan, Emotions an d Reasons, pp. 155ff. , and idem, "Fooling th e Motivational Meter : A Reply t o Roberts " (unpublished) . I t migh t b e usefu l t o thin k o f emotional affec t as also providing a second-order reason for action, in the sense of Raz, Practical Reason, pp. 39-40—albei t a positive or reinforcing reason o f a sort Raz bypasses—to th e exten t tha t i t provide s a reason fo r attentio n to a n evaluativ e reason (the evaluative content o f emotion). I read thi s boo k to o lat e to influenc e m y discussion here; however, it might also provide some helpful terminolog y for the ideas abou t oughts an d reasons expressed i n chapters 2-3 . 28. See , e.g., Josiah Royce, The Philosophy o f Josiah Royce (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1982), pp. 189-96 ; cf. George Herber t Mead , O n Social Psychology: Selected Papers (Chicago: Universit y of Chicago Press , 1956) , pp. 39-42, 199-246 . The brie f reflections tha t follo w are my own. 29. Cf . Royce's idea l communitarianism (e.g., Philosophy o f Royce, pp. 367-87). For that matter, there are elements of a communitarian view in the Kantian ideal of the realm of ends; cf. Kant, Foundations o f th e Metaphysics o f Morals, pp . 51ff. 30. Cf . Rawls's discussio n o f "congruence " i n Theory o f Justice, pp . 567-77 . A more ordinar y argument fro m pride than the one I suggest here, bu t limited to agent s with a certain kind of motivational structure, might point out that whatever one cared to achieve in life on a n individual level would be cheapened or compromised b y being achieved at the cost of violating moral requirements. Its achievement would b e comparable to winning a fight that was "fixed"—a s th e agent would be aware, eve n if no one else was. Note that m y argument is not mean t to show tha t moralit y is the overriding end, but jus t that i t i s among th e ends , o f a rational agen t wit h th e usua l sor t o f motiva tional structure . It may have to compete with individual achievement and other forms of value (some arguably moral) whose focu s i s more directl y on th e individual. 31. Cf . esp. Wong, Moral Relativity, an d Geoffre y Sayre-McCord , "Bein g a Realist about Relativis m (in Ethics)," Philosophical Studies 6 1 (1991) : 155-76 , for recen t defenses o f the possibility o f combining relativism and realism . 32. Se e Williams, Ethics an d th e Limits o f Philosophy, pp . 160-66 . 33. Se e Moore, Principia Ethica, Ch. 6. 34. Cf . A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth an d Logic, London: V . Gollancz, 194 6 (rev . ed., Dover , n.d.) , pp. 102-13.

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Index

Accident case, 151-54, 157 , 173, 174, 176, 178-7 9 second version , 156-57, 159, 176, 179 Agamemnon, case of, 13, 21-22, 43-44, 50-51, 80 , 101-3, 146 , 177, 181 Agent-regret, 14 , 109-10, 116 , 135, 184 Agglomeration (principl e of deontic), 12-13, 15 , 29-31, 57-62, 60-62, 216 n.l Amoralism, 21, 67-68, 70-71, 75, 80-83, 88-90, 99 Anscombe, G.E.M. , 23-25, 26, 68 Antirealism. See Realism; see also Blackburn; Macki e Aquinas, Thomas, 11, 17, 148 Aristotle, 36 , 92, 98-99, 110-12, 114-15, 153, 226 n.62 Augustine, Saint, 21 6 n.56 Assassination case, 9-10, 51 , 53, 55 Benedict, Ruth, 28 Blackburn, Simon, 187-93, 198, 223 n.18, 223 n.20 Blame, 119-20, 124-32 , 147-48, 152-53, 170-78 , 181-8 2 Brandt, Richard , 9-10 , 225 n.61 Bratman, Michael , 158-5 9 Captain Quee g case, 15-1 8 Castaneda, Hector-Neri , 14, 59-60, 61-62, 65 Closure (principl e of deontic), 29-30, 49, 55-57, 64, 217 n.l Cognitivism, 19-20, 78, 80-84 Compunction, 135 , 181

Conscience. Se e Edwards; Se e also Social artifact view : Protagorean version Cooper, John, 36-37 Copp, David, 224 n.57 Davidson, Donald , 36 , 219 n.30 Deontic logic. See Dilemmas; se e also "Ought" Descriptivism. See Expressivism De Sousa, Ronald , 21 5 n.40, 232 n.32 "Didactic import, " 75, 222 n.22 Dilemmas (moral), 9. See also specific cases balanced (vs . weighted), 10 , 18, 31, 38,43,51 exhaustively balanced, 49-50 , 64 explained b y social artifac t view. See Social artifact view in deonti c logic , 11-15 , 29, 52-62, 62-65, 216-17 n.l, 220 n.48. See also specific deontic concepts and principles negative conception, 41 , 47-48, 62-64, 79 problem for ethics, 9-11 , 15-23 . See also Motivational force ; "Ought " second-order, 143-48 , 201-2 subjective sense , 23, 77, 152, 177 "Dirty hands, " 98, 183-84, 227 n.10 Donagan, Alan , 15-1 7 Dummett, Michael, 5 4 Edwards, Jonathan , 27 , 127-3 2 Emotion(s). See also Social artifact view; specific emotions act-substitutes, 35, 84-85, 133, 136-37, 141-48, 186 243

244

Index

Emotion(s) (continued) appropriate/inappropriate, 26 , 83 , 120-25, 166-72, 215 n.40, 232 n.32. See also Blame ; Guilt (emotional) and attention , 78, 82-84, 138-42 , 152, 166 , 169 empathetic, 73-74 , 84, 95-96, 127 29, 194-98 , 225 n.58. See also Guilt (emotional) : as identificatory evaluative content, 84, 128, 154-55, 157-59, 166-67 , 194 judgmentalist/nonjudgmentalist views , 151-60, 162-6 4 perceptual (vs . motivational) model , 28, 76 , 78, 187-89, 194-95 , 23233 n.5. See also Realis m rational role, 84 , 121-22, 145, 158-59, 196 , 234 n.27 social sources , 76-77, 91-92, 126-27 , 193-94, 199-203, 233 n.21. See also "Ought" : account o f teaching ; Social artifac t vie w Emotional identification . Se e Emotion(s): empathetic, socia l source s Empathy. Se e Emotion(s) Error theory . Se e Macki e "Escapism." See "Ought": sanctions model Externalism. Se e Internalism Expressivism (vs . descriptivism), 190-93, 197, 206-7, 209-10. See also Blackbur n Foot, Philippa, 13 , 24, 66-70, 78, 80-81, 86, 90, 213 n.30, 214 n.36, 219 n.32 Frege, Gottlob, 53-54, 64 Freud, Sigmund , 27, 130, 228 n.34 Gibbard, Allan , 224 n.53 Grice, Paul , 217-18 n.5, 222 n.22 Group flourishing. See Social artifact view Guilt (emotional) . See also specific cases anticipatory, 27 , 70, 72-75, 133-35 , 165 appropriate/inappropriate, 10 , 14-15, 177-80. See also Blame; Emotion(s): appropriate/inappropriate; Hare ; specific cases

biblical sources , 131-32, 22 9 n.36, 229 n.37 collective, 162-64 , 170, 172, 175-76, 180 as identificatory , 27, 125, 129-32, 134, 136 , 163-65, 17 5 j udgmentalist/nonjudgmentalist accounts, 151-60 , 162-6 4 link betwee n virtu e and duty, 110 19 in moral teaching . Se e "Ought" moral function , 118-19 , 163-64, 171, 176 , 179 motivational force , 132-34 "nonmoral." See Morris and othe r reaction s t o moral wrong . See specific emotions and responsibility , 119-20 , 126, 148-50, 151-57 , 160-65 , 172-81, 231 n.14 "separation." Se e survivor's survivor's, 131 , 135, 160-61, 164-65, 175-76, 179-80 , 228 n.35 and tainting . Se e Taintin g vicarious. Se e collective Guilt, objective , 151, 176-82 perspectival, 180-8 2 and tainting . Se e Tainting Hare, R. M., 9-10, 16 , 21-22, 26, 99 104, 135 , 190 Horty, John F. , 220 n.48 Hume, David, 19 , 28, 35, 87, 96, 187, 193, 21 5 n.40, 230 n.8, 225 n.60, 230 n.58 Internalism (moral) , 19-21, 24 , 66, 77, 79-80, 85-88, 214 n.36 general, 67 , 70-71, 84 , 88, 146 vs. Williams's version , 21 4 n.36, 224 n.51 Kant, Immanuel , 11 , 19-20, 36, 68, 147, 198 , 211 n.6, 214 n.39, 229 n.45. See also Mora l necessity ; Subject-relativity Klein, Melanie, 2 7 Lemmon, E . J., 12-13, 14, 15, 44

Index Mackie, J . L., 77, 85-90, 92, 189, 205 Marcus, Rut h Barcan , 14-15, 16, 181-82, 220 n.46 McConnell, Terrance , 14-15, 16 McDowell, John , 78-86, 223 n.43. Se e also Realism : perceptua l Metaethics, 25 , 87 , 95, 187, 224 n.52. See also Motivational force ; specific theories as based o n mora l psychology , 76, 198 and normativ e issues, 95, 137, 146 Mill, John Stuart , 28 , 96, 225 n.60, 232 n.l Moore, G . E., 198, 204-5 Moral cost , 14 , 101, 109, 116, 183-85 Moral luck , 10 , 17-18, 146-50 , 202 Moral merit , 117-1 8 Moral necessity , 11 , 37, 59-60, 63, 71. See also Reason(s): sufficient Morris, Herbert, 160-61, 163-6 5 Motivational forc e (of moral language). See also Internalism; "Ought"; Practical force ; Reason-giving force metaethical problem , 18-20 , 23-25. See also Amoralism; Dilemmas supplied b y emotions, 74-77 , 83-84. See also "Ought" : account o f teaching; Social artifact view; specific emotions "Must," 12, 40, 44-47, 49, 63-64, 71-73 Nagel, Thomas , 9 , 14, 18, 30, 79-80, 214n.36, 217 n.4, 230 n.56 Naturalism, 85-86 , 89, 225-26 n.62 Needs, 60 , 63-65, 71, 96-97. See also "Ought": sanctions mode l Nietszche, Friedrich , 27, 202 Noncognitivism, 35 , 77, 85, 214 n.36 Normativity. See Reason-giving force Obligation. Se e "Ought" Ought, disjunctive , in dilemmas, 38-39, 48-49 "Ought" account o f teaching, 69-75 action-guiding. See practical all-things-considered, 18 , 36-39, 41-44, 47-49, 145-46, 219 n.30. See also Dilemmas; Reason(s)

245

commendatory. Se e ideal conclusive. Se e all-things-considere d ideal (vs. practical) , 18 , 34, 50 , 11 8 moral, 23 , 60, 68-69, 75-76, 86 , 135-36 negative. Se e prescriptiv e vs. obligation, 55-5 6 overriding, 41-44 , 48-49, 63, 68-69, 145-46, 183 positive. Se e prescriptive practical, 16-25 , 29-65, 74-75 , 217 n.2 prescriptive, 40 , 52 , 62, 64, 88 . See also "Ought"-implies-"permis sible"; Practical forc e prima facie (vs. all-things-considered), 18,41,47, 144-45, 177 prescriptive, 53 , 62, 64 . See also Prohibition(s) and reasons , 31 , 35-36, 42-44, 71-72, 76 . See also Reason-givin g force; Reason(s) sanctions model , 45-47, 63, 65, 203, 219 n.36. See also Need s "Ought-to-do" (vs. "ought-to-be") , 56-59, 61, 65, 137, 142-45, 229 n.50 "Ought-to-feel." Se e Emotions: actsubstitutes "Ought"-implies-"can," 12-13 , 15, 34, 52, 65, 217 n.l, 218 n.5. See also "Ought": practica l applied t o emotion, 136-40 "Ought"-implies-"can avoid," 59 "Ought"-implies-"permissible," 40, 42, 47-49, 62, 217 n.l. See also "Ought": prescriptiv e and prescriptiv e "ought, " 52-53 , 55-57, 64 Permission(s), 42-44, 47, 54, 64, 220 n.39. See also "Ought" : prescriptive; "Ought"-implies "permissible" Perspectival appropriateness. Se e Emotions: appropriate / inappropriate; Guil t (emotional): appropriate/inappropriate; se e also Guilt, objective Plato, 12 , 87

246

Index

Practical force , 19 , 31-35, 67-68, 69-70. See also "Ought " Practical necessity. Se e "Must" Practical reason(ing). See Reason(s) Prichard, H. A., 136-38, 141, 142 Pride, 120-25, 201-3 Prohibition(s), 44, 46-47, 53-57. See also Dilemmas: negative conception; "Ought" : prescriptiv e Projectivism, 187-89 . See also Blackburn Quasi-realism. Se e Blackburn Rawls, John, 126-27, 151, 154, 223 n.44, 22 5 n.60 Raz, Joseph, 22 4 n.57, 234 n.27 Realism (moral), 13, 19, 66-67, 214 n.36. See also Cognitivism ; Social artifact view; Subjectdependence; Subject-relativity perceptual (model) , 76, 81-82, 95, 204-5, 226 n.63. See also Emotion(s); McDowell; Reason(s) Reason-giving force, 24-25, 67-70, 78-81, 83, 90, 214-15 n.39 , 215 n.49 Reason(s) perceptual model, 39 , 43-44, 46-47, 60, 63, 94, 144^6, 204-5. See also "Ought" practical, 35 , 40, 80-81. See also Emotion(s), and reasons; Mora l necessity; "Ought" sufficient, 36 , 39, 84, 90, 121-22, 203. Se e also Internalism; Mora l necessity; Reason-giving force Regret. See Agent-regret Relativism (moral) , 91-92, 203-9 Remorse, 27, 113, 110, 130-31, 135 36, 14 4 Ross, W. D., 11, 38, 40, 41, 136-40, 142, 22 9 n.30 Russell's case, 116-20, 123-26 , 136-37 , 142, 147-49 , 185-86, 227 n.12, 232 n.37 Sartre's case, 12 , 31-34, 37, 39-40, 43-45, 50, 56-57, 139, 177, 178 Searle, John, 88 , 167, 231 n.28

Self-alienation. See Guilt (emotional) : as identificatory Shame, 27, 109-14, 126-27 , 130-35, 160-63 Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter , 21 8 n.5, 232 n.34 Social artifact view (o f ethics). See also "Ought": account o f teaching; Relativism compatible with differen t normativ e views, 26, 87 , 94-95, 225 n.62 emotional basis , 26 , 76, 92, 95-100, 187-89 as explaining dilemmas, 17, 90, 100-104 Protagorean version , 87-89 , 203. Se e also Macki e social version o f virtue ethics, 26 , 92-95, 98-104 as version o f realism, 26 , 86-87, 89, 91-95, 97-98 , 190-93, 197 and valu e constraints, 92-96 , 192, 196-97, 204-209. See also Realism: perceptua l Sophie, cas e of, 37-38, 48-49, 50-51, 57-58, 61, 64, 185 Stich, Stephen, 15 8 Stocker, Michael, 22 7 n.10 Strawson, Peter , 14 8 Subject-dependence, 19-21, 67 , 86, 88, 100, 191-9 3 Subject-relativity, 19 , 86, 90, 97, 102, 206 Taboo cases , 154-57 , 174-7 7 Tainting, 27 , 174, 177-82 Taylor, Gabriele, 155-56 , 160, 162-63, 174 Van Fraassen , Ba s C., 14 , 16 Von Wright, G . H., 48 Walzer, Michael, 9 , 51 Williams, Bernard, 12-18 , 29-30, 35-40, 43-45, 58, 66, 109-110 , 145-46, 183-84, 214 n.36, 217 n.2, 226 n.l. See also Agentregret; International; Moral cost

"Wrong," 10 , 104, 109, 174, 205-6 Wrong, intractabilit y of, 47, 103-4 , 182