Models of Local Governance: Public Opinion and Political Theory in Britain

Contents List of Figures

vii

Acknowledgements

ix

Introduction and Overview

1

1 From Local Government to Local Governance Two decades of institutional change Governance: a strange new world? What price local democracy? New Labour: reform beyond reform Normative models of local governance Conclusion

11 11 18 21 24 28 32

2 A Multi-Level Survey The test of public opinion Levels of opinion: the general public and rival local governance elites The survey

33 33 34 36

3 The Limits of Local Identity Objective links to locality Subjective links to locality Pride, responsibility and exclusion Conclusion: multiple identities and inclusive citizenship

45 46 51 64 68

4 The Role of Local Governance Minimalism National or local standards? The Tiebout thesis Local interests A mission to mobilize? What influenced ideas about the proper objectives of local governance?

71 72 73 74 75 76

5 The Image of Traditional Local Government Representation and responsiveness Interests Effectiveness Satisfaction and trust

85 86 87 90 95

v

79

vi Contents

Influences on images Conclusion: low on efficiency but high on honesty and trustworthiness

97 103

6 Institutional Preferences Localism Democracy Paying for services Rival institutions of local governance Influences Conclusion: a general preference for democratically elected governance

105 105 111 114 115 119

7 Governing Perspectives The local connection Party and ideology The role of local governance The image of local government Institutional preferences Conclusion: a governing consensus between rival elites but divisions within

130 131 140 141 148 168

8 Testing Models against Public Opinion Assumptions about local identity and citizenship Aims and objectives Images Institutional preferences Conclusion: winners and losers among the four models tested

188 190 202 213 220

9 Public Support for Local Democracy A democratic form of local governance Autonomous local governance Conclusion: defending local democracy on two fronts

242 243 251 259

Notes

262

Index

268

122

181

237

List of Figures 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.1 4.2 5.1 6.1 6.2 6.3 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 8.1 9.1 9.2

Objective links to locality Strength of local identities Regional patterns of identities Focus on those who need council jobs Provide as few services as possible Trust in councillors, board members and government Impact of local identification on institutional ratings Impact of ideology on institutional ratings Autonomous local governance Identifications Councils compared to private businesses Perceptions of each other’s efficiency Quango accountability Institutional ratings Testing models of local governance The impact of a good image of local councils The impact of ideology and pragmatic localism

vii

49 58 64 83 83 102 125 126 128 136 159 160 174 178 239 247 258

Acknowledgements We must thank the ESRC (Economic and Social Research Council) which funded this research under the Local Governance Programme grant L311253054 to William L. Miller and Malcolm Dickson. Iain Murray acted as our principal research assistant and the interviews were carried out by a team of Glasgow University students trained and supervised by him. Malcolm Dickson programmed the CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing) system which they used. We must also thank the 2203 members of the public, 788 elected local councillors and 903 appointed members of local TEC/LECs or DHA/HBs (local enterprise and health boards) who gave up their time to participate in our long and searching interviews.

ix

Introduction and Overview

This is a book about attitudes towards local governance – the attitudes of political theorists, of practitioners and of the general public. The book focuses on Britain but it is widely recognized that the contemporary debate about local governance in Britain is only a part, though a very important part, of a worldwide debate about local governance. The issues that concern us are not limited to contemporary Britain.

Local governance And it is a book about local governance rather than local government traditionally understood. The system of elected local councils running a wide range of services that lasted, in Britain, from the 1930s to the 1980s is only one method of local governance. By local governance we mean the commissioning, organization and control of services such as health, education, policing, infrastructure and economic development within localities. There were alternatives to the so-called ‘all-purpose’ elected councils before the 1930s and there are alternatives now. Under the Conservative governments of 1979–97 Britain became the world’s ‘brand leader of local government’, ‘introducing a whole raft of new bodies at local level, mainly special purpose bodies, all appointed, whilst removing functions from elected local governments at the same time’.1 We pay particular attention to the alternatives to traditional local government that burgeoned during the Thatcherite years. We look at the attitudes of academic theorists and the general public towards local governance by appointed bodies, by consumer or producer self-management, and by private companies operating within a market, as well as their attitudes towards local governance by elected all-purpose councils. More than that, we investigate the view from the 1

2 Models of Local Governance

inside: the attitudes of elected local councillors from the traditional system of elected local democracy, and the attitudes of board members in the new rival quangocracy of appointed boards. Chapter 1 reviews the extraordinary period of change during the years of Conservative national government and provides a context for the analysis presented in the remainder of the book. The shift from local government to local governance is first examined in terms of institutional changes and developments. Elected local authorities were joined by a range of quangos, appointed bodies and partnership organizations in the work of providing local services, decisions and strategic visions. The new emphasis on ‘governance’ also brought into focus a range of new actors from the business world, from the voluntary sector and more broadly from among active citizens. These actors took prominent roles alongside the elected politicians and the permanent officials from traditional elected local authorities. The new emphasis on ‘governance’ sparked much debate and indeed controversy in the local government world. There were questions raised about the accountability and probity of the new institutions of local governance. In a broad sense it appeared that the system was fragmented and lacked overall coherence. It also lacked a fundamental legitimacy. Yet at the same time the standing and status of elected local authorities was at a low ebb. Low turnout in elections, near invisible political leadership and public disenchantment made claims for the democratic credentials of elected local authorities more difficult to sustain during the 1980s and 1990s than before. In short from the perspective of many academics, specialist journalists and informed commentators the Conservatives had presided over a period of change in local governance which saw the creation or extension of a local quango world that lacked legitimacy and a decline in the status and standing of the established institutions of elected local government. Prescriptions of how to address this crisis in local democracy have not been slow in coming forward. Indeed some ideas for radical change in the way that local politics works and operates have been taken up by the New Labour government elected in May 1997, notably the idea of introducing directly elected mayors.

Measuring attitudes towards local governance But the main thrust of this book is not to prescribe, nor to provide a detailed account of the trials and tribulations of local governance under the Conservatives or for that matter under New Labour. Rather

Introduction and Overview 3

our aim is to test the reactions of the public and practitioners inside the system to the new world of local governance that has been created over the last two decades. More than that we relate their views on local governance to the major themes in the debate on local governance stimulated by political theorists and informed observers. There is not one model of local governance but rather a variety of models. Throughout the book we refer to a broad distinction between localist, individualist, mobilization and centralist models of local governance. (Indeed in Chapter 8 each of these models is comprehensively tested against public opinion.) Our aim then is to test the reactions of public and practitioners to the world of local governance that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s and provide an understanding of how these two bodies of opinion would like to see a system of local governance constructed. What, from their point of view, is the ideal model of local governance? Chapter 2 gives a brief description of our methodology. We used a multi-level survey to investigate public and elite attitudes towards local governance. It comprised 2203 interviews with the general public, 788 with elected councillors and 903 with appointed members of boards charged with local business development and local health care – TEC/LECs (Training and Enterprise Councils in England and Wales, Local Enterprise Companies in Scotland) and DHA/HBs (District Health Authorities in England and Wales, Health Boards in Scotland). Rather than spreading our interviews with appointed elites across too wide and disparate a range, we chose to look only at members of TEC/LECs and DHA/HBs. These organizations constituted particularly wellorganized and powerful representatives of the local quango state. And restricting our attention to these two provided enough interviews within each to allow us to analyse opinion within specific kinds of quango, and contrast opinion between them. The contrast proves unexpectedly illuminating. It is difficult to deny that understanding the views of the public and those that work inside the local governance system should be one factor informing public policy discussion and decision. Yet investigating people’s views about issues such as local governance is problematic. For most members of the public – and indeed for many members of the local governance elite (board members and elected councillors) – general questions about the performance of the system or thoughts about how it could be reconstructed are not to the forefront of their daily lives. The interviewing system we used helped to address the difficulties raised by the relatively low salience of the issues that

4 Models of Local Governance

concerned our respondents. CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing) allows the researcher to vary wordings, putting variants of the same questions or testing out different scenarios using split and randomized samples. The flexibility and variety thereby introduced enables us, for example, to gain greater depth and understanding of the respondents’ replies, check when a particular wording changes the responses unduly, and gauge whether opinion is strongly or weakly held.

Local identity The main body of our findings starts with a look at the general public’s attitudes. Chapter 3 investigates the extent, depth and nature of the public’s perceived and felt community of place.2 We found a strong and widespread psychological ‘sense of belonging’ to localities of different kinds. But this sense of belonging peaked with respect to ‘Britain’. It was lower for regions (Scotland excepted), lower still for the local district or home neighbourhood, lower still for the workplace, and very low indeed for ‘Europe’. Nonetheless, among the public as a whole, local identification with region and district was far stronger than identification with any class, religion or political party. People felt a particularly acute sense of pride in the achievements of local people and shame at their misdemeanours. But this psychological identification with locality lacked one essential character of citizenship: it was simply not exclusive. Only a small minority felt that access to local services or participation in local elections should be restricted to those who had lived or paid taxes locally for at least two years – itself a ridiculously low threshold for entry into a genuinely meaningful ‘local citizenship’. Despite their own strong sense of local identification, the vast majority felt that local government should be the property of currently local residents, no matter how recently arrived nor how shallow their local roots. Citizenship is nothing if not a privilege. It is a meaningless concept if it includes everybody and excludes nobody. And a local citizenship that applies to anyone who happens to be in the locality on the day is not in any real sense a citizenship. Nor is a local community that automatically includes everyone who happens to be in the locality on the day, in any real sense a community. The vast majority of the public therefore base their attitude towards access to local elections and services on some wider and non-local conception of citizenship and community, probably focused on Britain, and perhaps wider still.

Introduction and Overview 5

The role of local governance Chapter 4 deals with the general public’s attitudes towards the role of local governance, its aims and objectives. Should it provide only a minimal range of services? Should it provide local or national standards of service? Should it let the market provide? Should it attempt to mobilize local people or particular ‘disadvantaged’ groups, or leave them to get on with their own lives? Should the conflict between local and individual autonomy be reconciled by individuals moving to a different locality more in keeping with their ideal of local governance (a test of the so-called ‘Tiebout hypothesis’, see p. 74)? We found a wide diversity of views on these issues. There was evidence that they reflected, in part, the general political ideology of left versus right, big government versus small government. Such left–right ideology had a strong influence on attitudes towards the extent of public services but less upon attitudes towards issues that involved local autonomy. Attitudes towards local autonomy were themselves strikingly paradoxical. There was overwhelming public support both for ‘national standards’ and for local councils’ freedom to provide ‘whatever standard of services their local community wants and is willing to pay for’. Two-thirds of the public simultaneously supported both. Relatively few – only a quarter – supported local discretion without national standards, and even less supported national standards without local discretion.

The image of traditional local government Critics of traditional local governance by elected councils had claimed that councils were in fact neither representative, nor efficient, nor even honest. Chapter 5 investigates the general public’s image of locally elected councils – both in absolute and comparative terms. The public was ambivalent about how well councils represented local people’s views, but overwhelmingly positive about the good intentions of local councillors. However, more than four in ten felt their local council did not care about their views. Councils were seen as too much influenced by central government and local bureaucrats. Conversely they were seen as insufficiently influenced by local voters, by those who paid the most local taxes, by racial or ethnic minorities or by women’s groups. On balance, despite all the tabloid scandals that have afflicted local authorities, the public thought their own local council was less corrupt

6 Models of Local Governance

than private business, and less wasteful than central government, though less efficient than private business. Although they rated elected councillors just as good at organizing things as appointed DHA/HB members, they rated councillors lower than appointed TEC/LEC board members in terms of organizing ability. And they were less satisfied with the services provided by local councils than with those provided by local doctors, electricity suppliers or tradesmen. But they trusted elected councillors slightly more than appointed board members, and far more than they trusted Parliament or central government. Moreover the public saw local government as capable of achieving locally defined goals at least to the same degree as central government was capable of achieving nationally defined goals.

The structure and institutions of local governance In Chapter 6 we investigate the general public’s attitudes towards the structure and institutions of local governance, and recent or proposed reforms to that structure. How local should it be? How autonomous with respect to central government? And how directly under the control of local voters? We found enormous (and perhaps unrealistic) public support for local autonomy against central government. But we also found enormous public support for direct public control of local government itself by means of referenda and directly elected mayors. Similarly there was overwhelming public rejection of the notion that appointed boards should be left to run their own affairs without some mechanism for democratic control, preferably local democratic control. Two-thirds of the public thought appointed boards should be responsible to locally elected councils rather than to central government, though a majority said the powers of locally elected councils should be limited to investigating the activities of appointed boards rather than controlling them on a day-to-day basis. A large majority said it did not matter who ran local services provided they were well run. But when asked about specific structures the public rated locally elected councils as by far the best way to run local services – far better than appointed boards, self-management by service users or providers, or control by market forces. Even more striking was the uniformity with which locally elected councils were given the top rating by all sections of the public. Across the ideological spectrum support varied sharply both for appointed boards and for private companies operating in the market. But it never came anywhere near the level of support for elected local councils at any point

Introduction and Overview 7

on the ideological (or party) spectrum. Similarly the strength or weakness of local identification had only a very slight influence on support for elected local councils. Local governance by means of local democracy was by far the top choice even among extreme right wingers, even among the strongest of Conservative Party supporters, even among those who admitted they had not voted in the most recent local election, and even among those with the weakest sense of local identification.

The perspectives of rival elites Chapter 7 focuses on the attitudes of rival local governance elites, elected councillors and appointed board members, contrasting them with each other and with the views of the general public. Elected councillors identified particularly strongly with their locality, and they were particularly confident that services could be best run locally rather than nationally. Naturally enough, they took a particularly favourable view of elected local councils. Conversely they were more sceptical than the public about referenda and overwhelmingly opposed to the direct election of mayors. As the best way to provide local governance, councillors rated locally elected councils even higher than did the public, and they rated appointed boards or private companies even lower than did the public. But they were about as ambivalent as the public itself towards self-management by service users or providers. None of this should come as a great surprise. The views of appointed members of the quangocracy were less expected, however. To a remarkable extent, the views of appointed board members were similar to those of elected councillors. In particular, when asked to rate different institutions as the best way to provide local governance, appointed board members gave by far the top ratings to elected local councils. They were even more favourable than the public towards elected local councils (though not as favourable as councillors themselves). Appointed board members, unlike councillors, rated appointed boards higher than self-management by service users or providers, but they still placed appointed boards far behind elected councils. Moreover, there was little community of interest between those members appointed to different boards. TEC/LEC board members took a particularly negative view of DHA/HBs, and vice versa. And when they took a particularly positive view of appointed board members, as they did on the question of trustworthiness, they limited their positive

8 Models of Local Governance

view to their own particular kind of board. Far more members of TEC/LEC and DHA/HB boards alleged that members of the other board ‘did not care about the views of people like me’ than made the same criticism of elected councils. And at the same time, appointed board members joined elected councillors in a highly critical attitude towards central government. So although we might characterize appointed board members and elected councillors as ‘rival local governance elites’ they had a surprising amount in common. Appointed board members were simply not antagonistic to the concept, institutions or personnel of local democracy even though they constituted a rival alternative to it.

Testing theoretical models against public opinion In Chapter 8 we test four comprehensive theoretical models of local governance against our survey findings: • the traditional local democracy or localist model centred on allpurpose elected local councils; and three alternative models: • the ‘new right’ or individualist model centred on markets serving individuals as customers; • the ‘new left’ or mobilization model focused on human development and the mobilization of disadvantaged people or disadvantaged neighbourhoods; • the centralist model (the inverse of a local autonomy model) which stresses national identification, national standards and national democracy. Each of these four models bases prescriptions for forms and structures of local governance on assumptions about the public’s identities, aims and objectives, images of local government and institutional preferences. None of these models proves entirely consistent with our survey findings but, on a crude count of consistencies and inconsistencies, the local democracy and mobilization models fare best. The ‘new right’ individualist model proves highly inconsistent with the reality of the public’s identifications, aims and objectives, images and preferences. And the often overlooked centralist model comes somewhere in the middle.

Introduction and Overview 9

The foundations of support for local democracy Finally, in Chapter 9 we address the question of why people support local democracy. That they prefer it to all alternative structures of local governance is not in doubt. But why? We use a series of multiple regression analyses to weigh the relative importance of four factors that might influence support for local democracy and its alternatives: 1. 2. 3. 4.

a psychological sense of local identity; pragmatic localism – a belief in small-scale government; left–right ideology; a good or bad image of existing local councils.

The strongest defence of a democratic form of local governance against all alternative (non-democratic or non-elective) local structures is the general, pervasive assumption that elective democracy is the right way to run any system of governance, be it central or local. But beyond that, other factors also have some influence upon support for local democracy or its alternatives. But local democracy also has to defend itself against the claims of a democratic central government. It has to defend a local form of governance against a national form. We investigate whether support for local autonomy is primarily spatial and geographic, or primarily ideological and partisan. Do people support local autonomy because they believe that small-scale government is best, or simply because they oppose the party and ideology that (for the moment) happens to control central government? Ideology clearly plays two roles simultaneously. In itself it does indicate a policy choice between public and private provision. But because central government in Britain always represents a clear position on this left–right spectrum, ideology also indicates whether people are ideologically sympathetic or unsympathetic to central government. Very few of us can fully separate our attitudes towards central government as a central authority from our attitudes towards the party and ideology that happen to control the centre at the moment. A left-wing ideology (as an ideology in itself) as well as a good image of local councils as representative, efficient and honest, both provide a defence for local democracy against alternative local structures of local governance. By contrast, pragmatic localism (belief in small-scale government), local identification and opposition sentiment (or an ideology opposite to that in control at the centre) all

10 Models of Local Governance

provide a defence for local democracy against the rival claims of central government. Thus, at the time of our study, a left-wing ideology provided a strong defence for local democracy against the rival claims of a right-wing central government. But we suspect that a left-wing ideology would not provide a strong defence for local democracy against the rival claims of a left-wing central government. Full empirical confirmation of that must wait until New Labour has been in power at the centre for long enough to be identified with the centre, and to be faced with a range of Conservative-dominated local councils. But there is already some preliminary evidence that indicates a move in that direction: by 1998 Labour supporters no longer backed local autonomy to a greater extent than Conservatives, with the result that overall support for local autonomy had declined.3 In the longer term, it may be Conservatives and right-wingers that boost support for local autonomy once again if Labour continues to hold power at the centre. More immediately, our evidence shows that neither local identification nor pragmatic localism provided a defence for local democracy against the rival claims of other specifically local alternatives such as locally appointed boards, self-management by local service users and local producers, or even the provision of services through the market by local private companies. Conceptually, local democracy has to defend itself on two very different fronts with two very different weapons. Since it is both local and democratic, it is vulnerable to very different attacks from central government on the one hand and from the private sector on the other. It survives, and may yet prosper, because there is a general presumption in favour of local governance (whether democratic or not) albeit within a framework of national minimum standards, and also a general presumption in favour of democratic governance (whether local or not). In the public esteem this combination of general prejudices protects the concept of local democracy remarkably well against all its own shortcomings. Any other system of local governance is viewed as second best, a necessary evil perhaps to solve a short-term problem, but fundamentally incompatible with a culture that is both democratic and pragmatically localist. If local governance through appointed boards, market provision or self-management is to acquire legitimacy, it desperately needs some means of sheltering under the democratic umbrella of local democracy.

1 From Local Government to Local Governance

To refer to a shift over the last two decades from local government to local governance in Britain implies a recognition of two factors. First there has been a shift in the institutional structure of governing with a range of appointed bodies or ‘quangos’ gaining greater responsibility and prominence. Second there has been a change in the character of governing, a blurring of responsibilities, with appointed bodies and partnership organizations working alongside elected local authorities. Elected politicians and full-time local government bureaucrats have found themselves joined by a range of other actors. And major roles have developed for users, for interested citizens and for the private sector in this complex interplay of local actors To understand the world of local governance it is necessary to begin with a review of institutional change over the last two decades. The second part of this chapter then explores some of the key features of the new system that resulted from these changes and the tensions associated with it as a style of governing. The third section examines the debate about the need to revive local democracy, a debate which was stimulated by this shift from local government to governance. The fourth section looks at New Labour’s approach to ‘reform beyond reform’ in British local governance. And a final section summarizes a number of normative models of how local governance might be organized.

Two decades of institutional change The institutional structure of local governance changed substantially during the long period of national Conservative government between 1979 and 1997.1 The basic structure of local government shifted from a 11

12 Models of Local Governance

largely two-tier to a unitary structure. Central control over local finance became far tighter and more detailed. The functions and responsibilities of elected local authorities were squeezed and restructured. Alongside elected councils there emerged new or reshaped appointed bodies or quangos that came to play a prominent role in the governance of localities. Finally reforms aimed at changing the way services were delivered encouraged a more indirect arm’s length style of management and introduced extensive internal differentiation. The two-tier system of local authorities which had been established during the local government reorganizations of the 1960s and 1970s did not stand the test of time. In the 1980s and 1990s there was a general shift towards a ‘unitary’ or single-tier system of local government. It was argued that a single-tier system would minimize wasteful bureaucracy and be easier for the public to understand. The process of reform began in 1986 with the abolition of the Greater London Council and the six English metropolitan county councils. This created a unitary system of local government throughout the main urban conurbations of England (though not of Scotland). However, not all functions previously performed by these upper-tier authorities could be undertaken by the lower-tier London boroughs and metropolitan districts. So a number of joint boards and committees which grouped authorities together in an ad hoc way had to be established for particular purposes. The abolition of the metropolitan counties led to the creation of a series of joint boards covering police, fire services, public transport and waste disposal. These boards consisted of councillors appointed by the constituent authorities but they had their own identity and legal status. The abolition of the Greater London Council led to the creation of a joint board for fire services. London Transport had already been removed from the control of the Greater London Council prior to abolition, and the (London) Metropolitan Police had always been directly accountable to central government through the Home Secretary. In other fields of London governance, including land-use planning and roads, central government took significantly greater powers than elsewhere. Under New Labour, the governance of London changed again in May 2000 with not only an elected assembly but also a directly elected mayor. Institutional restructuring was extended further, to Scotland, Wales and the non-metropolitan areas of England, in the early 1990s. In Scotland and Wales central government took direct responsibility for drawing up reform plans, ignoring public protests and creating ex-

From Local Government to Local Governance 13

clusively single-tier systems of local authorities. In England the reform was put in the hands of a semi-independent Local Government Commission. The government’s original purpose was widely believed to be the establishment of a single tier of unitary authorities throughout non-metropolitan England but a successful campaign against change was fought by many county councils. The first round of the Commission’s investigations eventually produced the abolition of four upper-tier county councils and the establishment of 14 new unitary shire councils. A second round led to the creation of more new unitary authorities. In the end, the reforms of the early to mid-1990s produced unitary local government in most of the major towns, cities and urban areas in England, along with the whole of Scotland and Wales. At the end of the Conservatives’ period in government the basic structure of elected local authorities in Britain was therefore as outlined in Table 1.1. The unitary authorities remained responsible for a wide range of services including education, social welfare, housing, environmental protection, planning and economic development. In the two-tier structure the upper-tier county councils retained their position as the dominant spenders taking responsibility for major services, while the lower-tier districts retained housing and leisure services as their main functions. However, the areas and populations covered by many upper-tier county councils had been reduced since, in many counties, the major county town or city gained unitary status. During their period in office the Conservatives also introduced a tighter and tighter financial system. The debacle of the Poll Tax added to the problems of local finance. 2 It undermined the public’s willingness to pay local taxes and, as part of a post-Poll Tax settlement,

Table 1.1

The structure of elected local government in Britain 1997/1998

Single-tier (unitary) 46 36 32 22 32 Two-tier (functions split between levels) 33 238

English unitary councils English metropolitan districts London boroughs (plus City of London Corporation) Welsh councils Scottish councils

English county councils English non-metropolitan authorities

14 Models of Local Governance

national VAT was hiked 2.5 per cent to fund a further proportion of local services from central resources. Excluding user charges, local taxation (the Council Tax) accounted for at best only a quarter of total local authority income by 1997. The remainder of local authority income came from central government transfers and other nationally distributed sources. Apart from the post-Poll Tax settlement, the crucial shift occurred in 1990–91 when the government removed the control of local ‘non-domestic’ or business rates from local authorities. In the mid-1980s a combination of local domestic and business rates had meant that local government raised over half its own income. The heavy reliance on non-local revenue established in the early 1990s created a substantial opportunity for central government to dictate the level of local spending in aggregate terms. In addition it was able to influence the spending decisions of individual authorities by using annual Standard Spending Assessments (SSAs) to define what ‘needed’ to be spent and by using ‘capping’ powers over local authority budgets to ensure that they did not rise above government approved levels. These draconian measures led to an increasing degree of central control over local spending. Some local authorities had to make drastic cuts. Others protected programmes through a variety of strategems including what was called ‘creative accounting’. They became expert in juggling the books so that the figures for spending matched government targets but resources still continued to flow into local services. Over time, however, the scope for creative accountancy was reduced both by the introduction of new central controls and by the build-up of postponed costs. Although local government was still responsible for about a quarter of all public spending in 1997 it now operated under very controlled conditions. Elected local authorities were not only reorganized and restructured, they were bypassed. There was a growth in the number of appointed bodies or quangos at the local level. Training and Enterprise Councils took over local authorities’ responsibilities in further education and training towards the end of the 1980s. Institutions of further education along with sixth form colleges were constituted as corporate bodies in their own right, following the previous removal of what were then local authority controlled polytechnics and are now centrally controlled universities. In specific areas, urban development corporations, housing action trusts, housing associations and more broadly various partnership organizations assumed, with the support of central government funds, responsibilities for renewal and development. In Scotland, Local Enterprise Companies had a broad role in training and regeneration. For other functions local

From Local Government to Local Governance 15

authorities were required to set up companies to take over responsibilities in public transport, airports and waste disposal, sometimes as a step towards privatization. In England and Wales water and sewage was handed over to the control of private companies; in Scotland it was put under the control of appointed boards. Provisions for opting out of local council or local health authority control led to the creation of grant-maintained schools and hospital trusts as free-standing institutions. Free-standing police authorities were established in 1995. The government’s original intention was to change the composition of police authorities so that there would no longer be a majority of councillors on them. As a result of intervention by the House of Lords appointed councillors could get a bare majority on most police authorities but the intended weakening of local authority control nonetheless occurred. At the end of these reforms, local quangos covered vital functional areas. Some were appointed directly by central government. Others were ostensibly ‘self-governing’ in that they were not directly appointed by central government, but they were mainly funded by central government and very strongly influenced by central government policy. These appointed bodies operating at the local level were responsible for a substantial amount of public spending. By the mid1990s the key bodies appointed and funded directly by central government, together with self-governing bodies supervised and funded by the central government, were responsible for over £40 billion of public funds. That was a figure not far from the spending responsibilities of elected local authorities. Table 1.2 presents some basic information on the key agencies that were most prominent as part of this reformed institutional framework for local governance. A variety of factors explain why local quangos and non-elected bodies gained an increased role under the Conservatives. Each quango has its own history and particular reasons why it was established but it is possible to see a number of shared elements in the story of the growth of quangos. One significant factor was undoubtedly the desire to bypass traditional local government. Distrust of local authorities was evident from the early years of the Conservative government but it became more pronounced as the Conservatives lost political control at the local level. By the mid-1980s the Conservatives controlled fewer local councils than Labour. By the 1990s the Conservatives had been reduced to running just under two dozen local authorities (about 5 per cent of the total). Parties that control national government expect to lose seats at

16 Models of Local Governance Table 1.2 in £bn)

Key agencies in the Conservatives’ ‘local quango state’ (expenditure

Functional area

Government appointed bodies

Self-governing bodies

Education

City Technology Colleges Higher Education Corporations (7.56) Further Education Corporations (3.2) Housing Action Trusts (0.09) Urban Development Corporations (0.5)

Grant Maintained Schools

Housing Urban Development and Training

Health

Housing Associations (1.5) Training and Enterprise Council (1.4) Local Enterprise Companies (0.5)

District Health Authorities (12.9)b Family Health Services Authorities (6.8) Health Trusts (6.0)1

Source: Adapted from G. Stoker, ‘Quangos and local democracy’, in M. Flinders and M. Smith (eds), Quangos, Accountability and Reform (London: Macmillan, 1999). Some of these agencies were abolished by the incoming New Labour government after 1997.

the local level. But for the Conservatives, local government, especially in urban areas, become virtually a ‘no-go’ area. In such circumstances bypassing elected local authorities might well have appeared particularly attractive. A second factor behind the growth of local quangos was the desire to bring new participants into the process of local governance. It was argued that the electoral system and its demands discouraged many people with relevant skills and experience from being involved in local governance. Bringing business skills, knowledge and interest to local governance was a key theme for the Conservatives. But there was also a recognition of the value of enabling others from outside the traditional system such as service users, volunteers and active citizens to become involved in local decision-making. Finally there was a view that quangos would help to develop more business-like management of public services in tune with the ideas and arguments of the ‘New Public Management’. By developing more slimline and focused management teams to run organizations and by encouraging competition between these organizations to attract users

From Local Government to Local Governance 17

and/or public funds it would be possible to stimulate efficiencies and greater effectiveness through quasi-market incentives. Moreover because it controlled the purse strings more directly the centre would be able to dictate not only aggregate spending levels but also more detailed priorities in these organizations. To complete the picture of organizational change and continue the theme of greater fragmentation and complexity in the system of local governance it can be noted that alongside external differentiation came internal division. In both local authorities and the major local quangos a shift in the pattern of internal management was encouraged by ‘New Public Management’ ideas and by Conservative legislation.3 ‘New Public Management’ presented a complex set of ideas which have evolved and developed around different themes. The version most clearly embraced by the Conservatives provided a critique of existing forms of service provision and a prescription for improvement based on introducing market-like disciplines. Public service organizations, so the argument had it, were dominated by producer interests (the bureaucrats and the various ranks of other employees). And the power of the producer was not held in check by market incentives and demands as it was in private sector organizations. As a result public service organizations were alleged to be neither efficient in terms of saving public money nor responsive to consumer needs. The solution was to fragment ‘monopolistic’ public service structures and develop quasi-market forces to control them. Key reforms included the introduction of a purchaser–provider divide within organizations and the development of performance targets and incentives. The aim was to create an organizational ‘home’ for the client/consumer voice within the system in order to challenge the power of producers. Consumers – or more directly their surrogates – would have the power to purchase the services they required and to measure performance. A key reform was the introduction of compulsory competitive tendering which started with a focus on the main ‘blue-collar’ services of building, cleaning and refuse collection, though towards the end of the Conservatives’ tenure the focus shifted towards ‘white-collar’ services also. Tendering led to some services being undertaken by private sector providers under time-limited contracts. And even though most work remained ‘in-house’ it now had to operate on new terms. The purchaser part of the organization developed a client role both to specify the form of service required and to monitor the performance of the contractor. The contractor that took direct responsibility for service delivery, even when it was an ‘in-house’ direct service

18 Models of Local Governance

organization (DSO), had to operate within its own finance and accounting provisions. Such DSOs also tended to demand a degree of flexibility in the management of their personnel and in the development of their own business plans. Moreover, rather than pay fixed or long-established overheads for central services such as salary management, financial information and computer support, many DSOs negotiated service level agreements with the central departments responsible for providing them. Competitive tendering requirements applied both to local authorities and to some appointed bodies. In education the introduction of devolved management responsibilities for schools created a similar pressure for more contract-oriented management. In social services a separation was introduced between the assessment of needs and the provision of services, which created a similar client–contractor dimension in their operations. What resulted from the introduction of ‘New Public Management’ reforms was a more differentiated system of internal management. Local authorities and to some extent other institutions in the world of local governance found themselves divided into a series of separate units with relationships conducted through contractual or semicontractual arrangements. The idea of the shift from local government to governance is in part captured by a recognition that institutions governing localities have been reshaped during the long tenure of the Conservative national government. Elected local authorities remain in place although since 1979 there has been a move towards single-tier rather two-tier local government. Various appointed boards, partnership organizations and local quangos have increased in prominence and they are responsible for a level of spending that nearly matches that of elected local authorities. And within local service delivery organizations, more contractstyle management structures have encouraged a process of internal differentiation.

Governance: a strange new world? The switch to the new concept of ‘governance’ implied more than a new set of institutional arrangements. It also implied a new set of practices which challenged traditional understandings of government and public management and brought in their wake new tensions and new difficulties. The Conservative reforms ushered in a strange new world of local governance which raised a number of issues in the minds of

From Local Government to Local Governance 19

the public and policy-makers. The complexity and blurred responsibilities of the system raised some doubts about its legitimacy. Questions were raised about standards of probity in public affairs. There was some concern that the system had lost a capacity for overall coherence and steering. Finally there were issues of accountability. The complexity of this new governance confirmed the divorce between our formal constitutional understanding of governing arrangements and the way they worked in practice.4 Throughout all of the postwar period local authorities have never been the sole governmental actors within localities. Health authorities, public utilities and other agencies always had a substantial impact on service provision and the physical shaping of localities. However, the increased intensity and prominence given to non-elected agencies under the Conservative governments of 1979–97 and the associated downgrading of the role of elected local authorities created a system that lacked strong legitimacy. The divorce between the normative codes used to explain and justify government and the reality of the decision-making in the system created tensions. As Guy Peters commented: ‘We must be concerned with the extent to which complex structures linking the public and private sectors … actually mask responsibility and add to the problems of citizens in understanding and influencing the actions of their governments.’5 The issue was more than there being a ‘cultural lag’ while public attitudes caught up with the new reality of public services. The public and more specifically the media lacked a legitimation framework in which to place the emerging system of local governance. The exercise of power needs to be legitimate. This argument is more than a normative assertion. It rests also on the pragmatic grounds that to be effective in the long run power-holders must be seen to be legitimate. A legitimation deficit undermines public support and commitment to programmes of change and ultimately undermines the ability of powerholders to mobilize resources and promote cooperation and partnership. Through their concern with performance, ‘governance-oriented’ reformers may have improved managerial efficiency but in the minds of many members of the public and indeed some policy-makers there was a blurring of overarching responsibility and clarity about who was responsible for what. ‘Governance’ lacked the simple legitimizing ‘myths’ of the traditional system. It no longer seemed so self-evident that it was ‘the council’ (town hall or county hall) that was responsible. The reforms may have created a system that was more difficult to understand and as a result appeared more difficult to influence (or perhaps more out of control).

20 Models of Local Governance

Second there was a raft of concerns about the standards applied by appointed agencies in the conduct of their business.6 It was claimed that people were appointed to the boards of quangos not on the basis of merit nor as a reflection of their expertise but because of their political sympathies. In some instances, those who had failed to win public office by election were appointed to public positions through the ‘back door’. It was argued that the management and decision-making of many quangos was shrouded in secrecy, that they lacked openness in the conduct of their affairs when compared to elected local authorities. A further criticism was that appropriate standards in declaring interests or ensuring probity in the management of public finances had not always been put into effect, or had not been properly observed. Certainly, the traditional elected local authorities had not been immune from criticism about the way they conducted their affairs. But the issue of probity in public affairs become more prominent in the new era of ‘local governance’.7 And contemporary developments in central government reinforced the growing significance of probity in governance at all levels. Third there was a view that although quangos might be effective in their narrow area of operation, the existence of a diverse and complex range of such agencies exacerbated the problem of corporate governance – the bringing of the parts together. Increasing differentiation, along with the weakening of the relative position of local authorities, constituted fragmentation within the overall system. Differentiation has the strength of specialization and focus. Organizations have a clear if bounded task and bring relevant expertise to that task. But a system of governance has to have a capacity for integration as well as differentiation. The relative weakening of the position of local authorities in the system may have reduced the capacity for integration provided by traditional multipurpose authorities even if they had never been the ‘all-purpose’ authorities that they were so often called. Many of the new agencies of local governance were subject to direct influence from central government through the appointment of their controlling boards or by way of funding which came directly or indirectly from the centre. Central government, however, could not readily provide integrative mechanisms at the local level. The integrative mechanisms of central government, which have themselves often been criticized, focus on central government departments, on the Cabinet and its committees, and on processes of consultation. And these do not provide the necessary integrative mechanisms at the local level. The fourth batch of criticisms focused on accountability. Quangos were subject to strict financial and managerial accountability in many

From Local Government to Local Governance 21

instances but, it was argued, they lacked political accountability. The key point is that these other forms of accountability cannot replace the need for collective accountability for the policy and resource allocations of these bodies. The requirements of that further and more general accountability are not met by the framework of democratic control through Parliament. The effective control that can be exercised over so complex a machinery of bodies through this central route is inherently limited. Moreover the issue is whether in any event public accountability at national level is appropriate for appointed bodies at local level. If there are local choices to be made by appointed bodies about priorities or the setting of policy, even though these choices may take place within a framework of national policy, the argument is that where there is local choice there should be an opportunity for a local voice.

What price local democracy? The emergence of this new concept of ‘governance’ led to increasing concern about the quality of democracy at the local level. The accountability dilemma noted in the previous section was heightened by a recognition that during the Conservative period of rule the political legitimacy and relevance of elected local authorities seemed in decline. Initial recognition that politics was changing at the local level was reflected in the establishment of the Widdicombe Committee by the Conservative government in the mid-1980s. 8 The evidence and research presented to the Committee captured key elements of the changing world even if the Committee’s report was rather narrow in its focus and conservative in its recommendations. Even so the government ignored much of its analysis and went ahead with some minor tinkering reforms of local political practice in the Local Government and Housing Act 1989. The independent Commission for Local Democracy (CLD) published a series of research reports which laid bare the problems of existing local democracy and in its final report in 1995 it made radical proposals for change. 9 The sense that something was fundamentally wrong with local democracy in practice was confirmed by the report of the House of Lords Select Committee chaired by Lord Hunt. 10 The Commission for Local Democracy and the Hunt Committee shared some of the same analysis and a general vision of the way forward, although their detailed prescriptions varied. The problems of local democracy were not newly created by the Conservatives during their period of national government, as both

22 Models of Local Governance

the CLD and Hunt reports recognized, but a number of weaknesses were exacerbated. The most obvious weakness was low turnout in local elections. Turnout figures varied considerably between and even within local authorities but a turnout of around 40 per cent on average put Britain at the bottom of the league in terms of European Union local government systems. Turnout had never been particularly high and there were signs of a slightly upward trend from the early 1970s for all authorities except counties. But since a peak in the early 1990s the trend has been downward again. Turnout at the 1998 local elections was under 30 per cent and turnout in the 1999 elections no better. Another set of concerns focused on who was attracted to stand as a councillor. According to a 1993 survey nearly half of all councillors were over 55 years old, about a third were retired and only a quarter were women.11 There were reports of increasing difficulty in getting people to stand for elections. The reasons for not standing provided by the overwhelming majority of the public were related to the perceived low status of councillors and the negative impact of the role on career and family. The role of party politics in local government raises a complex set of advantages and disadvantages. In any electoral system party politics makes a valuable contribution in structuring choices for the public. It also helps organize government by ensuring discipline and cohesion among elected representatives. However, there are problems. The influence of party too often takes place out of the public gaze and in closed party group meetings. In more public settings it can encourage an adversarial style in public debates. Party points are scored but the public are turned off. Above all there is a danger that accountability to the party can become a substitute for a wider accountability to the public. Networks of party activists are relatively thin and cut only a little way into their communities. Research suggests that for most local parties their ‘world’ was relatively small and closed.12 Local party networks are dominated by a relatively small number of activists. Typically in areas where one party dominates local politics the key exchanges take place between 40 and 50 individuals, of whom perhaps around 20 might be considered ‘key influentials’. A further difficulty is the existence of ‘one-party local states’ where one party is able to rule virtually unchallenged. In 1997 a third of all councils in Britain could be described as one-party monopolistic (70 per cent or more seats held by one party) and nearly a quarter of councils could be designated as one-party dominant (55–69 per cent of seats held by one

From Local Government to Local Governance 23

party). About 15 per cent of councils have some element of independent influence. That leaves just less that a third of all councils with a competitive two-party or multi-party system for the public.13 The relative absence of competitive party politics in so many localities helps to create the perception on the part of the public and media that local politics is an insular, petty, personalized, faction-ridden affair peppered with too regular instances of small-scale corruption. At the very least a healthy democracy demands a healthy opposition and the current voting system does not guarantee opposition parties a share of seats in proportion to their vote in many local authorities. So the prospect of an effective opposition is undermined. The influence of national factors and considerations on voting habits – which even the most ardent localists admit is the dominant element in determining local votes – makes the claim for legitimacy stemming from election on the part of councillors appear even thinner.14 Further, the way of making decisions in councils – the committee system – too often obscures where decisions are made and consumes a vast amount of councillor and officer time for only limited benefits. It also undermines the scope for visible and accountable local political leadership. In most authorities private party groups provide the key focus for decision-making. To some extent, council committees are therefore a charade. Yet councillors – according to survey evidence – spend about two-thirds of their time in these committees or preparing for them. The officer structure also devotes a huge amount of time and resources in this process. Time and capacity is taken away from the potential role of councillors as community representatives or scrutineers of the policy and performance of the authority or other bodies. For almost all authorities a political executive or leadership structure can be detected by insiders. What is lacking is visibility and accountability to the public for that leadership role. Finally the Conservatives found themselves criticized for creating a system of governance that limited local discretion to an excessive degree and put too much reliance on the role of the centre. Both the Commission for Local Democracy and the Hunt Committee emphasized the need to restore greater discretion to local authorities. Key proposals included: • local authorities should have a general power of local competence; • local authorities should be given a community leadership role, holding other institutions in the world of governance to account and helping to provide an overview of a community’s needs and priorities;

24 Models of Local Governance

• there should be greater local control over spending decisions through the end of capping and the enhancement of the local revenue base. In short, the Conservatives presided over a decline in the quality of local democracy which led to a reform debate which emphasized two goals: (a) reorganization of the institutions and dynamics of local democracy itself, and (b) a shift in the balance of central–local relations to restore a greater degree of local autonomy.

New Labour: reform beyond reform Labour’s landslide election victory in 1997 brought a new agenda into play for local government. Local government in 1997 was largely Labour. Labour had outright control of about half of all authorities and was involved in the control of nearly another quarter. Labour’s stranglehold has been eroded at the local level since 1997 but only to a minor extent. It is likely to remain the dominant party at the local as well as the national level for a number of years to come, both in terms of its number of councillors and in terms of the number of authorities under its control. The strong presence of Labour at both national and local level has given central–local relations a different tone. There is much talk of partnership between central and local government. The local authority associations in England, Scotland and Wales undoubtedly enjoy increased access to ministers and some real influence over policy. Yet tensions remain. In part that reflects the dominance of New Labour at the centre and the substantial presence though not dominance of Old Labour in some local authorities. More broadly the tensions revolve around the demands made by the Blair government with respect to local authorities. As a pamphlet published by the Prime Minister in 1998 put it: ‘The people’s needs require you to change … so that you can play your part in helping to modernise Britain and, in partnership with others, deliver the policies on which this government was elected.’15 Local government is seen by New Labour as crucial to delivering its key election promises in education, social services, housing and many other areas. The modernization of local government is also seen as part of a broader programme of renewal for the political institutions and constitutional arrangements of Britain. Thus the politics of local government are important to New Labour. Local government as much as

From Local Government to Local Governance 25

national government provides a basis for the public to judge it. Failure at either level is judged to be unacceptable. New Labour’s agenda tackles head-on two issues that were ducked by the Conservatives: (a) the political organization of local government; and (b) its core role and purpose. The Prime Minister’s pamphlet indicates that the two issues are linked: ‘At the heart of local government’s new role is leadership – leadership that gives vision, partnership and quality of life to cities, towns and villages all over Britain.’16 However, there is seen to be a need for a considerable improvement in the quality of elected local government if that leadership role is going to be viable. Local government’s credentials to be community leaders are weakened by its poor base of popular support … Councils need to avoid getting trapped in the secret world of the caucus and the party group. They should let people have their say … But the heart of the problem is that local government needs recognised leaders if it is to fulfil the community leadership role.17 At the centre of Labour’s agenda is a concern to restore public trust and legitimacy to the political life of councils in order for them to take on a community leadership role. In broad terms Labour has taken on board many of the arguments of the Commission for Local Democracy and to a lesser extent those of the Hunt Report. The White Paper, Modernising Local Government: In Touch with the People, provides the most comprehensive statement of New Labour’s agenda for England and Wales.18 The heart of the reform package comes in four elements. First councils are expected to adopt new political structures. Contrary to the fears of some, the approach is not too prescriptive. A number of options are laid out – a directly elected mayor with a cabinet, a cabinet with a leader and what in effect is a city manager system. The White Paper makes it clear that ‘councils will choose which of these models they prefer and the detail of how they wish to operate within the broad definition of the model’. Equally, refusing to take forward change is not an option. The White Paper suggests that central government will take a reserve power to tackle councils that fail to develop any reform plans or neglect to implement their reform proposals. In addition local people are to be given the right to trigger a referendum on the directly elected mayor option. Legislation to implement these reforms forms part of the legislative programme for 1999/2000. The second major element in the reform package is a set of measures to improve local democracy. Again the emphasis is on enhancing the

26 Models of Local Governance

accessibility and legitimacy of local government through ‘higher participation in elections and close and regular contact between a council and local people between elections’. Legislation is being introduced to enable councils to experiment with electronic voting, polling stations, postal voting and the timing of elections. Local authorities are going to be placed under a new statutory duty to consult on best value performance reviews and plans and the broader community plan. Legislation will also be introduced to confirm the power of councils to hold referendums. The third element in the reform package is the introduction of a range of new disciplines to be imposed on local authorities. The White Paper confirms that the surcharging (fining) of councillors will be abolished. But a new ethical framework will be imposed, overseen by an internal standards committee but backed up by an independent body to investigate allegations that a council’s Code of Conduct has been breached. Legislation establishing these procedures also forms part of a package of measures for the 1999/2000 parliamentary session. The most developed proposals in the White Paper relate to the disciplines associated with ‘Best Value’. Compulsory competitive tendering is to be abolished. But in its place there are proposals for a framework designed to encourage clarity about service standards, targets for continuous improvement, greater involvement for service users, and independent audit and inspection procedures. Central government is also to give itself powers to intervene in a ‘flexible and constructive’ way if service and performance failure is persistent or serious. Legislation containing these measures has already been passed and local authorities will have to operate these ‘Best Value’ procedures by April 2000. The final element in the reform package is a set of new powers and responsibilities for local authorities. The White Paper proposes to ‘enshrine in law the role of the council as the elected leader of their local community with a responsibility for the well-being and sustainable development of its area’. Along with this responsibility will come a duty on the council to provide a community strategy for its area. Councils are to be given a discretionary power to take steps to promote the well-being of the area (a sort of general competence facility) and a clear power to engage in partnership arrangements of various sorts, including participation in companies. On the financial side the government proposes a single capital pot, better asset management, the possibility of a supplementary business rate, the abolition of crude and universal capping and more stability in grant provision to councils.

From Local Government to Local Governance 27

New Labour has sustained a commitment to financial constraint although there are signs of some relaxation. The announcements on public spending made in July 1998 indicated substantially more money for local government’s education and social services responsibilities but limited growth in other areas. Capital spending is also likely to be increased above levels achieved under the Conservatives. Yet there is a strong element of caution in New Labour’s management of local finances. Major levers remain in the hands of the centre although there is considerable scope for local authorities to develop some modest additional revenue streams and some imaginative partnership-based capital projects and schemes to release resources through effective asset management. Labour has not abandoned the Conservatives’ belief in managerialism and consumerism in a general sense, although its emphasis is rather different. The ‘Best Value’ regime carries the potential of being a flexible and effective tool for improvements in local service delivery. There is also a strong theme in government circles on the virtue of developing ‘joined up’ or ‘holistic’ approaches to tackling social and economic problems.19 Local government with its range of responsibilities and leadership role has a particular contribution to make in this area. New Labour has shown a strong interest in continuing the process of change and reform for local government. It has, however, committed itself to developing a different reform style, one that is more experimental, involves more consultation and is less top-down. Yet in the education, employment and welfare policy arenas legislation and ministerial interventions seem designed to ensure that local government delivers the national objectives of the new government. In the words of the rising cabinet star, Stephen Byers, local authorities ‘have to prove they are part of the solution rather than part of the problem’. There is a more general ministerial concern with achieving action and an impatience with those that appear to be obstructing change. The substantial shocks to the system of local government in Britain under the Conservatives have led under New Labour to a reformulated and challenging redefinition of local self-government. The value of local government is not to be judged by the services it delivers (the dominant paradigm of the 1970s) but by its capacity to lead a process of social, economic and political development in local communities. Local government is above all a political vehicle for communicating, organizing and expressing the concerns, visions and problem-solving capacity of local people.

28 Models of Local Governance

What is far from clear is whether central government – under the New Labour leadership – is prepared to will the means for local authorities to take on that community governance role. Local authorities may be given a general power of local competence to engage in activities that meet the needs of their community but they are not, for example, going to be given much in the way of specific powers to call local quangos to account. The emphasis is very much on building new partnerships. And local authorities are going to be subject to continued strict financial discipline. The New Labour government might, in turn, suggest that it is not clear to them that most local authorities have the will, the capacity or the imagination to open themselves up in the way that their community governance role demands. So the debate on local self-government in Britain runs the risk of becoming stuck in a Catch22 situation: to perform local authorities need to be trusted, but to be trusted they need to perform.

Normative models of local governance The sense of change started by the Conservatives and continued under New Labour implies an end to the traditional model of local government. This has helped to create an understanding that there is not a single model for local governance but rather a competition between a range of models. Without claiming comprehensive coverage it is possible to identify four models (see Table 1.3). The localist model is the one most associated with the traditional defence of local government and is commonly expressed in the formal outpourings of local government representative bodies and institutions. In broad terms it draws on a ‘liberal pluralist’ perspective in terms of political theory. For the localist the essential thing about local governance is that it should be seen as the expression of local choice.20 The institutions of local government must be accountable to the locality in order to ensure that they are responsive to local needs. They must have sufficient autonomy to make decisions that reflect the wishes of their local citizens rather than those of, for example, any higher tier or level of government. Localists give primacy to the ‘traditional’ representative institutions of local government which in the British case are multi-purpose (often incorrectly called ‘all-purpose’) elected local authorities. Local authorities are there to lead on service delivery. Direct in-house provision is not necessary for all services, all of the time, but most localists would argue that without some ‘hands-on’ direct provision local authorities would

Expression and meeting of local communities’ needs Ensuring individual choice and responsiveness in respect of services Developing a politics of change to ensure more effective influence of disadvantaged and excluded To maintain national standards and the primacy of national democracy

Individualist

Mobilization

Centralist

Key goals

Strongly in favour

Favours consumer consultation but not large-scale citizen participation

Supportive but gives primacy to elected representatives

Attitude to public participation

Dimensions

Strongly opposed Limited value

Strongly in favour as part of process of change

Inclined to favour but recognizes need for upper-level intervention to protect individuals

Strongly in favour

Attitude to local autonomy

Normative models of local governance

Localist

Model

Table 1.3

Agencies subject to substantial central control

Neighbourhoodbased and decentralized structures

Competitive range of servicespecific providers

Multi-functional elected local authorities

Key servicedelivery mechanism

National government: legislation, guidance and controls

Developmental participatory politics

Individual rights as consumer

Representative politics through local elections

Key political mechanism

29

30 Models of Local Governance

lack the capacity, sensitivity and understanding to perform their role of meeting local needs. Some wider participation by the public is considered laudable and worthwhile but from a localist perspective priority is given to the judgement of elected representatives. Councillors should have the right to make the final decision because their electoral status renders them accountable and because they have a perspective that is broader than that offered by a single community association or lobby group. They can balance and weigh competing demands from the community and come to an appropriate judgement about the way forward. The individualist model is most clearly associated with ‘New Right’ political thought.21 Here the emphasis is not on facilitating collective choice by the local community but rather on ensuring that the system of local governance is designed in a way that ensures that individual consumers obtain the right bundle of services to meet their personal needs. The aim of the system should be to ensure that individuals get the choice of service they want, related to a willingness to pay taxes or charges. To meet the design challenge of creating government that is responsive in that manner makes the advocates of this individualist perspective inclined to favour very local institutions. Smaller-scale government where voter-consumers have an option of moving between jurisdictions is more likely to create a variety of service–tax mixes and facilitate choice. Smaller-scale government is also likely to be made more subject to the demands and wishes of individual consumers. This preference for small-scale government, however, is conditional on individual choices being met and individual rights being respected. The ‘individualist’ model favours competition between service providers. By setting up a market-like model, it is argued, the forces of consumer choice will ensure that producers are responsive and concerned to provide services tailored to individual needs. Collective political decision-making and large-scale participation is distrusted because it favours organized and vocal minorities who bargain additional resources and benefits for themselves out of the state at the expense of taxpayers and the unorganized ‘silent’ majority. Political processes should be kept to a minimum. The key challenge is to enable individual consumers to protect their rights and interests. Sophisticated systems of complaint and redress, citizens’ charters which lay out expectations and rights in relation to service delivery, the ‘right to buy’ council property, appeals to an ombudsman and, more broadly, a capacity to use the law to claim your rights are among the mechanisms to promote individual rights favoured by the New Right.

From Local Government to Local Governance 31

The mobilization model draws on a left-wing perspective. There have always been a variety of views on the left about local governance. Many have favoured national government intervention and dominance in order to overcome local inequalities and the limitations of action at the local level.22 But a counter-argument and one associated with the mobilization model is that any worthwhile left-wing politics involves doing things with people rather than for them. The local level provides an opportunity to organize the disadvantaged and mobilize them so that an active political alliance is formed to challenge inequality and exclusion. Local governance provides the base for an effective oppositional politics.23 As a form of political practice the mobilization model came to prominence in Britain in the early 1980s as a range of left-wing Labour councils – led by high-profile figures such as Ken Livingstone and David Blunkett – developed a campaigning style of local politics both as a challenge to the Thatcher government and as an attempt to reinvigorate and renew left-wing political alliances at the local level.24 A key element of the political process for the mobilization model is that there is sufficient scope for local autonomy to allow a dynamic local politics to develop which is involving and creates multiple opportunities for participation by the public. The key overarching challenge is seen as using the local political arena to encourage a developmental participatory politics in which the disadvantaged and excluded learn and put into practice the arts of organization, campaigning and mobilization. In terms of service delivery there is a preference for a structure decentralized right down to the neighbourhood level. First, breaking down bureaucracies makes them more susceptible to the influence of the traditionally excluded. Neighbourhood offices provide accessible service delivery outlets that are more likely to be responsive to the demands of disadvantaged local communities. Moreover decentralized structures may provide a focus and resource for the various disadvantaged communities within any local authority area. The final model of local governance is not one that favours a strong local politics. The centralist model only rarely finds explicit expression in the world of political theory but in the world of political practice, especially in Britain, it has a sustained presence.25 The model rests on a fundamental preference for the primacy of national democracy. The key challenge is to ensure that all citizens receive a similar access to quality services and that national standards are raised and maintained. As such, local autonomy is opposed and local participation is not highly valued.

32 Models of Local Governance

The key issue in service delivery is that local agencies of service provision are subject to central control and direction in order to ensure that national objectives are achieved and nationally set performance targets are met. The overarching democratic priority rests with the superior national parliament and government. It has a responsibility to use legislation, guidance and controls to ensure that the national will of the population is successfully imposed. Local agencies have a role and can provide a valuable service. However, their key task is to support the achievement of national objectives and standards.

Conclusion The shift from ‘local government’ to ‘local governance’ has brought into play new institutions, a range of local appointed governors operating alongside elected colleagues, and a variety of new practices and ways of working. Since 1979 a range of reforms have been introduced that most observers argue have led to profound changes. But what do the public and those who are in charge of the new system of local governance make of it? What are their views about how our local governance system could be reconstructed for the better? These are the issues that dominate the remainder of the book.

2 A Multi-Level Survey

Arguments for and against the traditional model of local governance, for and against the innovations of the 1979–97 Conservative governments or for and against New Labour’s reforms all raise questions about identification with locality, the proper purposes and objectives of a system of local governance, perceptions of the performance of different institutions and preferred prescriptions for institutional structures.

The test of public opinion These questions can be investigated in many ways – for example, by looking for internal contradictions in the logic of theories of local governance1 or by empirical studies of how the old and the new systems worked in practice.2 But they should also be tested against public opinion. Of course the test of public opinion is only one element of any well-rounded assessment of alternative models. Margaret Thatcher often took the view that she should act first and win the support of public opinion afterwards. Public support for traditional systems may reflect nothing more than a conservative (with a small ‘c’) reluctance to contemplate change. The public may come to like a radical new system only after its virtues have been demonstrated in practice. But, as the public reaction to the Poll Tax showed, public opposition may also reflect a ‘settled will’ of the people, a genuine position on the substance of the issue in question. In a democracy we should at least take note of public opinion about the structure of government. Public acceptability lies at the moral heart of democratic legitimacy. And in purely practical terms, public acceptability makes a system much easier to run. Moreover, the public’s collective judgement may be better than that of a handful of enthusiastic ideologues in a ‘think tank’.3 33

34 Models of Local Governance

Public opinion is relevant in two ways to the arguments about local governance that we presented in the previous chapter. First, and most obviously, the public has its own preferences about the aims, structure and institutions of local governance, and these may conflict with the prescriptions of rival theoretical models. Does the public feel, with John Stuart Mill, that elected local government should contribute to national democracy by training people in democratic methods or by dispersing power throughout the land? Does it accord legitimacy to the decisions of locally elected authorities? And, if so, is that primarily because these authorities are local, or because they are elected? What rights should be granted to the minority within a locally elected authority? What is the public’s attitude to market provision of local services? Or to user charges? Or to user or provider control of local services? How does the public weight the competing claims of local autonomy and national standards? But there is a second way in which public opinion is important. Prescriptive models of local governance are usually based in part on assumptions about the public’s perceptions and perspectives as much as on their institutional preferences. Thus, for example, it matters whether people really are willing to move house just in order to live under a preferred local service/tax regime as some public choice theorists suggest. And it matters whether they really do feel a strong sense of local identity as some of the defenders of traditional local government suggest. It matters whether the public really does regard the traditional locally elected authorities as representative. Or as corrupt. And it matters whether the public really does regard the new appointed boards as more or less representative, more or less corrupt than the elected councils. Or more efficient than elected councils. There is no point in designing a system to fit assumed local identities that do not really exist, nor to meet an assumed public discontent that does not really exist. In so far as prescriptive models are designed to fit the contours of public perspectives on local governance, it is important to know what those perspectives are.

Levels of opinion: the general public and rival local governance elites But in addition to outlining the views of the general public, we will contrast their views with the views of those who participate in the process of local governance at a higher level, the local governance elite. More than that, we will contrast the views of rival local governance

A Multi-Level Survey 35

elites, the old and the new, the elected and the appointed, local authority councillors and quango board members. Both elected councillors and appointed board members are part of the local governance elite. As such they could be expected to differ from the general public. They have far more experience of the problems and processes of local governance than the ordinary citizen. They should have far more interest in local governance, and far more information about it, than the ordinary citizen. We anticipate some evidence of a ‘governing perspective’ among the elites, whether elected or appointed. But we also anticipate differences between these elites. They are, at least potentially, rival elites within the overall structure of local governance. They owe their place to different processes of selection. And Jones, Stewart and Regan argue that election and appointment affect behaviour at the level of the authority itself. Election creates an active relationship between the councillor and his locality: appointment on the other hand creates no such relationship … The elected member may or may not differ from the appointed member in ability, in experience or in background. The critical difference lies in the [mere] fact of election.4 In their view, appointed local governance elites should differ significantly from elected elites simply because their role and their office is different, irrespective of their personal background or original opinions. So how do rival local governance elites differ from each other? How do appointed board members differ from elected councillors on their commitment to the locality, on their views about the proper objectives for local governance, and on the best institutional structures and mechanisms available to achieve those objectives? It would be surprising if appointed board members did not have an unusually positive insider’s view of appointed boards. But whether they have an unusually negative attitude towards elected councils is a more open question. Appointed board members may see their boards as a superior replacement for elected councils, the way of the future. That was certainly how the Thatcherites viewed them. But, on the other hand, board members may see their boards more as a useful adjunct to elected councils, useful only in limited areas where there is more need for specialist technocratic expertise than for democratic representation. And members of different types of appointed board may also differ significantly from each other on some issues at least. In particular,

36 Models of Local Governance

board members may see their own particular kind of board as ‘exceptional’, and take a positive view of it, without feeling any wider commitment to the general principle of appointed boards. Indeed they may be quite critical of other types of appointed boards.

The survey In 1994–95, towards the end the Conservatives’ radical restructuring of local governance, we conducted a wide ranging survey of public attitudes. The timing is important. By that time the issues in the move from local government to local governance were becoming more familiar to the general public. Many aspects of public attitudes towards questions of local governance were well informed by the mid-1990s and our survey is likely to provide insight into informed and stable public attitudes to fundamental questions. But in one respect, any survey of public attitudes towards local governance is likely to reflect attitudes that are changeable, though changeable in very predictable ways. In the mid-1990s, after almost two decades of Conservative central government, the public found it difficult to distinguish clearly between ‘central government’ and the ‘Conservative Party’. As we shall show, this had some important implications for attitudes towards local autonomy. If New Labour succeeds in its ambition to win a second (or even a third) term, then ‘central government’ will once again come to be identified with a particular party, though with a different one. In that case we hypothesize that some of the partisan patterns of opinion that emerge so clearly in this survey will remain the same in character and intensity, but will reverse in sign. We looked at four different elements of public opinion: the general public plus three different kinds of local governance elite. We interviewed 2203 members of the public, 788 elected local councillors and 903 appointed members of local quango boards. The target populations of the general public and elected councillors presented no conceptual problems though there were, of course, some practical problems involved in drawing a sample and persuading selected individuals to give us an interview. In the case of local quangos, however, we faced a dilemma caused by the number and variety of such organizations. 5 We felt it was important to avoid a heterogeneous, fragmented and ill-defined sample of too many non-elected quangos. So we focused on only two: Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) and District Health Authorities (DHAs), both of which operated in England and Wales, together with the

A Multi-Level Survey 37

Scottish Local Enterprise Companies (LECs) and Scottish Health Boards (HBs), which were their near-equivalents in Scotland. TEC/LECs and DHA/HBs represented the two most extensive, well-defined, visible and accessible alternatives to local governance by locally elected councils. Following the 1989/90 reforms TEC/LECs were charged with fostering local economic development and with assessing and meeting skills and training requirements within their local areas. DHA/HBs became purchasers of health care services, responsible for assessing health care needs within their area and meeting these needs by purchasing services from competing providers such as Hospital Trusts. These were very important local public services and even before the 1989/90 reforms, the existence of appointed quangos in training and health was highly controversial. Jones and Stewart, for example, argued that ‘in the NHS the rationale for the existing appointed health authorities [DHAs] is feeble. They contribute little to management, have no legitimate basis for representation and confuse accountability.’6 So elected local authorities ‘should be given responsibility for the local government of health, taking over the responsibilities of DHAs’. At the same time they also argued that ‘the training functions of the Manpower Services Commission [later exercised by TEC/LECs] should be transferred to local authorities’ and that even the remaining functions of the MSC should ‘be considered for transfer to local authorities’. 7 Our focus on only two types of quango was intended to provide enough interviews with members of each type for us to say something about opinion within each specific type and thus to contrast boardroom opinion between the two types of quango. We excluded executive members of quango boards from our survey, since they were essentially employees, equivalent to civil servants or council officials rather than elected councillors. Our target population of appointed quango board members was therefore the non-executive members appointed to TEC/LEC or DHA/HB boards. There were few prescriptions regarding the selection of TEC/LEC board members, though two-thirds of seats had to go to the private sector. Members had to be chosen, and subsequently had to act, as individuals, not as representatives of their respective organizations or companies. TEC/LECs were private companies, so responsibility for board formation was left in the hands of the private sector and remained largely unstructured. Typically a core private sector group was drawn from local private sector networks. This dominant core group then selected individuals from organizations such as local authorities, voluntary groups and trade unions to fill the remaining third of seats on the

38 Models of Local Governance

board. Boards were not required to reflect the composition of local communities. They were proudly and unashamedly business-centred and business-oriented. Non-executive members of DHA/HB boards were expected to bring an independent view to the work of the board and a broader perspective than might be available from the executive members but they were also seen as crucial in the development of a more business-like approach to running the boards. Each District Health Authority comprised a chairman appointed by the Secretary of State, up to five executive members and five non-executive members appointed by the Regional Health Authority. The District Health Authority was accountable to the Regional Health Authority, which in turn was accountable to the Secretary of State. Non-executive members were required to: (a) live, work in or have connections with the area encompassed by their authority; (b) include individuals linked to community groups; (c) have backgrounds in the business sector, voluntary sector, community organizations, local authorities or the NHS (but excluding current employees of the authority). Scottish Health Boards differed somewhat in composition and structure from DHAs. They had a maximum of 12 members including the chairman. The Secretary of State for Scotland appointed the chairman, and also aimed to appoint six non-executives, on the advice of the chairman though after consultation with elected local authorities, universities and professional organizations. These appointments were strongly criticized, especially in Scotland, where the the Secretary of State for Scotland and his party had a very weak democratic mandate based upon only 11 out of 72 Scottish MPs and 22 per cent of the Scottish vote at the 1992 General Election. The system of appointment in Scotland has since been modified to meet that criticism, and the Secretary of State for Scotland now has a less direct role in these appointments than at the time of our survey. But our survey reflects the opinions of board members appointed in the first ‘white heat’ of the Conservatives’ commitment to appointed rather than elected local governance. In the event, our strategy of selecting all our appointed board members from just two kinds of quango did provide large enough samples – 569 members of TEC/LEC boards and 334 members of DHA/HB boards – to provide reliable evidence about the views of these two types of board members. That meant we could compare and contrast the views of members appointed to different boards. Moreover, we worded our questionnaire to ask questions specifically about these two kinds of quango. So we can reliably contrast the views

A Multi-Level Survey 39

of quango board members not just towards elected councils and appointed boards in general, but also distinguish their views about their own type of quango (TEC/LEC or DHA/HB) from their views about the other kind of quango. As we shall see in later chapters, how board members on these two different types of quango viewed each other proves almost as interesting and enlightening as the way both groups of appointed board members viewed elected councils. Sampling All interviews were conducted by telephone from Glasgow University. Over 90 per cent of adults in Britain were accessible by phone at the time.8 For our sample of the general public we drew a random sample of listed telephone numbers from BT directories throughout Britain, and then made a random selection of those present at the selected number. While that strategy did not give access to the increasing number of ex-directory numbers, it allowed us to mail advance letters of introduction to each selected household a few days before phoning for an interview. People are naturally reluctant to submit to a long and searching interview without advance warning. 9 We estimate these letters of introduction reduced the refusal rate by almost a third. The sample was weighted to bring it into line with the 1991 Census and 1995 Labour Force Survey on age, gender, housing tenure, education, economic activity and region. For our sample of councillors we drew a random sample of names from the 1995 Municipal Yearbook. There were 82 Training and Enterprise Councils in England and Wales and 22 Local Enterprise Companies in Scotland. Only one TEC, Sheffield, failed to provide a list of board members and contact details when we approached them directly. Since there was evidence of a high turnover of board members we interviewed some recent past members as well as those who currently held seats. The 1994 Health Services Yearbook provided a list of the non-executive board members for all DHA/HBs and we supplemented this by approaching each board to confirm membership and get contact details. During the survey, DHAs were undergoing a reorganization which encouraged the merger of DHAs and Family Health Service Authorities (FHSAs). In addition, there were mergers between DHAs. This complicated the sampling process. But in the end, 90 authorities provided us with the details we requested while only 11 refused, though several failed to reply by the end of the interviewing period, mostly because of the upheaval caused by reorganization. In order to minimize the transient effects of particular events on public opinion, interviews with the general public were conducted

40 Models of Local Governance

over an eight-month period from November 1994 to June 1995, and interviews with TEC/LEC and DHA/HB board members over the six months from February to July 1995. However, it was impracticable to attempt contact with councillors prior to the May 1995 local elections, as most were unavailable due to campaigning. As a result, interviews with councillors were conducted over a much shorter period than the other samples: in June and July 1995. The sequence of interviews with members of each sample was randomized. Thus, whatever the cut-off point at which we stopped interviewing, those interviewed were an approximately random subset of our full sampling frame. The unusual political significance of ‘don’t knows’ and refusals Patterns of ‘don’t knows’ and refusals in surveys are usually only of methodological interest. But on this occasion they have some political significance. Although our questionnaire routinely included a ‘don’t know’ answer category, respondents were never prompted for this during the interview. Our intention was to counteract the tendency for survey respondents to opt out of thinking about challenging questions by retreating into the ‘don’t know’ category. This is a considerable problem in postal or other self-completion surveys which inevitably have to make the ‘don’t know’ option visible. Our design allowed us to accept genuine ‘don’t knows’ while avoiding this opt-out tendency. ‘Don’t know’ responses were neither discouraged nor encouraged. As might be expected, this approach produced relatively low levels of ‘don’t know’ responses. The incidence of ‘don’t knows’ was greater amongst the general public than in the elite samples but, even so, there were only ten questions where the level of ‘don’t know’ responses exceeded 15 per cent among the general public. Seven of these ten were questions about TEC/LECs, as were five of the six questions that exceeded the 15 per cent ‘don’t know’ threshold in the councillors’ sample and all four that exceeded the threshold in the DHA/HB members’ sample. Conversely, the only question which exceeded this threshold in the TEC/LEC sample was a question about DHA/HBs. Quango boards therefore had a relatively low profile. They were relatively invisible, not just to the public at large but also to local governance elites. And this relatively private governance of public institutions itself raises questions of democratic accountability. The overall response rate was 52 per cent in our sample of the general public. Naturally, it was much higher among elites of all kinds. But it varied significantly between elites. It ran at 88 per cent in our

A Multi-Level Survey 41

sample of councillors, and 91 per cent in our sample of DHA/HB members, but only 73 per cent among TEC/LEC members – which seems to confirm the allegation that the business-oriented TEC/LECs were particularly secretive. Since we had the business address of each TEC/LEC board member we could identify with a fair degree of accuracy the sector in which each member was employed. The response rate varied according to the sector. Among TEC/LEC board members employed in the public sector it ran at 88 per cent, and among those TEC/LEC board members who were themselves elected councillors it reached a truly remarkable 99 per cent. But conversely, among TEC/LEC board members employed in the private sector it dropped to 69 per cent. So it was specifically the dominant element of businessmen on TEC/LEC boards that was so unusually secretive. Since two-thirds of TEC/LEC board members came from the private sector this variation in response rates among TEC/LEC members hardly biased the TEC/LEC sample as a whole, and it is not of any great methodological importance. But it is of some political significance. It seems to indicate something about the distinctive culture of the businessmen (as compared to academics and politicians) who predominated on the TEC/LECs. And it suggests that the relative invisibility of TEC/LECs to the public was not entirely the fault of the public. How to interpret findings based on randomized question wordings We should say something about our system of interviewing by CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing). Each interviewer worked with a desktop computer. The questionnaire appeared, question by question, on the computer screen. But many of our questions came with two or more variants of question wording. And during an interview, the computer would randomly select one form of words to put up on the screen, silently recording which form of question wording was used on that occasion, along with the respondent’s answer. Provided we interpret the answers properly, this can be a revealing way to ask questions. We can get much nearer to a conversational dialogue than in conventional surveys. First we can investigate whether opinions were lightly held, whether they are easily influenced by question wording (especially simple inversions of question wording) or prone to amendment when challenged by argument. We also used varied computer-controlled ‘scenarios’ (hypothetical situations in which the respondent was asked to say what should be done in particular circumstances) to determine what people really meant by local citizenship, how exclusive it was, and how it related to national citizen-

42 Models of Local Governance

ship. Randomly varying question wordings across subsamples in this way allowed us to pack more questions into a thirty-minute questionnaire than would otherwise be possible if everyone was asked every question. It also allowed us to investigate closely related topics while avoiding contamination effects (where answers given to one question affect those given to a similar but subtly different question). Useful though it is, our use of the CATI method produces results that can be confusing if they are wrongly interpreted. Let us take a concrete example. One question read: Local councils like the council in [council district] generally take decisions that [represent / do not represent] the views of local people. Do you agree or disagree? In this example, the actual district name was automatically inserted instead of council district. In addition, a randomly selected half sample was asked to agree that the local council did represent local views, while the other half were asked to agree that it did not represent local views. This is indicated in the text by putting both forms of words in square brackets, separated by a slash. If there had been three forms of words in the square brackets, divided by slashes, it would indicate that each version was put to a randomly selected one-third of respondents. But no respondent was ever asked to choose between the alternatives laid out within the brackets. Each respondent was only asked one version of the question. If people had no strong views but just tended to be generally agreeable, we might find that two-thirds would agree to the [represent / do not represent] proposition no matter which way round it was put. In fact that did happen when this particular question was put to our sample of the general public, though not when it was put to our samples of local governance elites. That indicates that the general public did not have clear and firm views on this question, but that local governance elites had more well-defined views on it. Wherever the percentages agreeing to such directly contradictory propositions together exceed 100 per cent, it indicates a lack of clearly formed opinions among the public, not an error in our tabulated percentages. Where our findings are based upon agreement with alternative propositions put to random subsamples rather than on a choice between alternatives offered to all respondents, we indicate it by means of an asterisk in our tables as a warning against misinterpretation. And where this method produces results that indicate only weakly held views we draw attention to that fact in the text.

A Multi-Level Survey 43

Out CATI method of randomly varying question wordings is not equivalent to the more traditional method of using split-half samples. In the traditional method there are only two half-samples, A and B, each with its own questionnaire (though both questionnaires may share a common core of questions). In consequence when a question Q occurs in two versions, one is assigned to questionnaire A, the other to questionnaire B. However, version A of question Q occurs in the context of questionnaire A, which differs in many respects from the context of questionnaire B, and the context may affect the answers. In our CATI method, however, versions A and B of question Q are assigned randomly to interviews, irrespective of how different versions of other questions are assigned. Thus versions A and B of question Q occur in the context of interviews which, on average, do not differ at all from each other. The wording of other questions certainly varies a great deal among all the interviews that include version A of question Q, but it varies in the same way among all the interviews that include version B of question Q. The significance of this somewhat complex point is that we can attribute the difference between answers to versions A and B of question Q entirely to the difference in the wording of versions A and B of question Q itself. In the more traditional method of split-half samples, the difference in answers to versions A and B of question Q may not be caused by the difference in wording of this question itself so much as by the different context in which it was asked. Thus the validity of comparisons between answers to versions A and B of question Q is much greater in our CATI method than in traditional split sample surveys. Finally, although this text makes frequent use of the terms ‘district’ and ‘region’ even in descriptions of question wording, these terms seldom occurred in that form in the CATI interviews. At the start of each interview we asked ‘which part of Britain do you live in?’ and offered ten options: ‘Scotland, Wales, London, the South East (of England excluding London), South West (of England), the Midlands, East Anglia, the North East (of England), the North West (of England), and Yorkshire/Humberside.’ Thereafter the computer automatically replaced the word ‘region’ where appropriate with the actual region indicated by the respondent at the start. Next we asked: ‘What is the name of your local council, that is your district or borough council?’ And thereafter the computer automatically replaced the word ‘district’ where appropriate with the actual district name that the respondent had given at the start. Only those very few respondents who did not know the region or district where they lived were asked about ‘your

44 Models of Local Governance

region’ or ‘your district’ rather than these specific named regions or districts. Apart from anything else, this approach avoided the problem of irritating Scottish and Welsh respondents by repeatedly describing Scotland and Wales as ‘regions’. For them, our questions about regions simply asked about ‘Scotland’ or about ‘Wales’. But perhaps more significantly it meant that our questions focused each respondent’s mind onto their own specific district or region, not onto some vague notion of districts and regions. The distinction is important. Americans reputedly trust their senator but distrust the Senate. Newspaper readers, in the many countries where we have posed the question, tell us that they trust the daily newspaper that they buy much more than they trust ‘the press’ in general. So it is important to bear in mind that when we asked in this survey whether respondents thought local councils ‘represent the views of local people’, or ‘are generally more or less corrupt than private businesses’, our CATI system focused their minds onto ‘Harrogate’, ‘Milton Keynes’, ‘Newbury’, ‘Oxford’, ‘St Albans’ or wherever they lived rather than onto some unspecified district council. And when we asked how strongly respondents ‘felt a sense of belonging’ to their district or region, our CATI system posed the question in terms of ‘Harrogate’ or ‘Yorkshire/Humberside’ rather than some unspecified district or region. Images and identifications in particular were keyed to actual councils and actual places. These are, we believe, the images and identifications that matter most for a study of the principles of local governance. An image of the ‘London loony left’ (whether well-founded or not) might once have had an impact on party choice in elections far beyond London, and in national elections as well as in local elections. But this is not a study of electoral behaviour and it is the public’s current image of their own local council that is more relevant to theories of local governance.

3 The Limits of Local Identity

Alternative models of local governance make different assumptions about whether the relationship between citizens and their locality is affective, instrumental or irrelevant. Were people emotionally committed to their locality and willing to contribute to it, or did they expect benefits from it, or did they think in purely individualistic and/or national terms and therefore not in terms of locality at all? In this chapter we examine the evidence on public commitment to localities, especially to the localities defined by the structure of elected local governance, though we also look at the degree of public commitment to wider regions. Conflicting assumptions about the significance of locality underpin alternative theories of local governance. Even if people are not strongly rooted in their localities they may still need local services, but their attitude to those services will either be that of individual consumers or of citizens of the (national) state. Their attitude will not be that of members of a local community and the concept of local citizenship will be empty or irrelevant. Clarke and Stewart argue, however, that ‘the primary role’ of local authorities is ‘local government and not local administration [and] that role must have its basis in citizenship’.1 And in their view, ‘the structure of local government should be based, not on the alleged efficiencies of administration, but on the perceived and felt community of place [our emphasis].’2 There are some reasons why psychological commitment to localities should be strong compared to other commitments. Locality structures personal experience and face-to-face contacts. To those who live in the Jesmond ward of Newcastle upon Tyne, Jesmond – and perhaps Newcastle – is a daily reality while Europe is an abstraction.

45

46 Models of Local Governance

But there are also very good reasons why psychological commitments to localities should be weak compared to other commitments. The smaller the locality the more likely people are to leave it, either temporarily or permanently. Most residents of Jesmond probably leave that neighbourhood every week to work, to go shopping, to visit friends or to go to the cinema. They are likely to leave Newcastle somewhat less frequently, though the huge Metro Centre shopping and entertainment complex lies outside Newcastle, just across the Tyne, in Gateshead. Conversely, many residents of Newcastle would have lived outside Newcastle at some time in their lives. By contrast, relatively few would have lived for long outside Britain, and few would have moved from one religious faith to another. So a local community – as defined by local government boundaries – is likely to be less stable, as well as being less bounded, than the national community or a religious community. Moreover, British local authority boundaries have been revised quite frequently in recent decades, with major reforms in London during the 1960s, throughout the rest of the country in the 1970s, in metropolitan England in the 1980s and throughout the rest of the country again in the 1990s.3 So even if people stayed rooted to one place, local government boundaries would frequently have shifted past them.

Objective links to locality For analytic purposes, we divided Britain into ten regions: Scotland, Wales, London, the South East, South West, North East and North West of England, the Midlands, East Anglia and Yorkshire/Humberside. In our survey, 92 per cent of the public said they had been born in Britain, but only 67 per cent had been born in the region where they now lived and only 36 per cent in the local council district where they now lived. On the other hand, 80 per cent had lived for more than 20 years in their region and 60 per cent had lived that long in their district; 47 per cent said all their relatives lived in the region though only 19 per cent said all their relatives lived in their district; and 59 per cent said all their friends lived in the region though only 34 per cent said all their friends lived in their district. Thus objective links to the region were 31 per cent stronger than links to the district when measured in terms of birthplace, 28 per cent stronger when measured in terms of relatives, and 25 per cent stronger when measured in terms of friends. For a large majority of the public, the local council

The Limits of Local Identity 47 Table 3.1

Objective links to locality %

%

Born in Britain

92

Born in region

67

Born in district?

36

Lived in region for 20 years or more

80

Lived in district for 20 years or more

60

Relatives in region none under half over half all Friends in region: none under half over half all All shopping and leisure within region

11 23 19 47 2 12 27 59 82

Relatives in district none under half over half all Friends in district: none under half over half all All shopping and leisure within district

50

Workplace located: within district outside district both no job

38 27 3 31

27 36 17 19 5 29 32 34

Note : For simplicity, throughout this book we have routinely excluded ‘don’t know’ answers before calculating percentages. Thus, for example,the figure of 82 per cent (of those who answered the question) saying that they restrict all their shopping and leisure to within the region implies that 18 per cent (of those who answered the question) said they did not restrict such activities to within the region. Very occasionally the number of ‘don’t know / can’t say’ is sufficiently large to merit comment as a significant finding in itself.

district was simply too small to mark the boundary of their connections to family and friends. Work, leisure and shopping were somewhat more local than family and friends: half the people in our survey did not make regular use of shopping or leisure facilities outside the district. And, among those who had a job, almost three-fifths worked within their local council district. Many had no job of course. So at most, less than a third of the public had jobs outside their local district.

48 Models of Local Governance Table 3.2

Objective links to locality strengthen over time Number of years lived in the local council district

All friends in region All friends in district Work in district (% of those in work) All shopping/leisure within district Born in region Born in district All relatives in region All relatives in district

0–4 %

5–9 %

10–19 %

20–29 %

30–39 40–49 % %

50+ %

42 11 47

47 18 42

50 24 59

65 40 56

65 41 63

66 43 69

68 51 80

39

46

53

45

49

51

62

45 10 30 4

50 8 34 6

57 14 41 7

64 30 49 21

80 49 57 30

83 62 54 31

85 71 58 33

The longer people had lived in the locality the more roots they had put down there. Or perhaps it was the extent of their local connections that tied them to the locality. Either way, length of residence in the locality proved to be a key variable. If we divide people into seven categories according to their length of residence in the local council district, the per centage with all their friends living in the district rose steadily from 11 per cent to 51 per cent as length of residence increased (and the percentage with all their friends living in the region rose from 42 per cent to 68 per cent). People seemed to acquire local friends as time passed. In addition, the percentage whose job lay within their local district rose from 47 per cent to 80 per cent as their length of residence increased. Similarly, the percentages having all their relatives in the region or district also rose steadily with the number of years spent living in the locality. The percentage with all their relatives in the district rose steadily from 4 per cent to 33 per cent and the percentage with all their relatives in the region from 30 per cent to 58 per cent. Only the use of shopping and leisure facilities failed to conform so clearly to this pattern of increasingly local orientations as time spent in the locality increased. What kinds of people were the most locally oriented? A good indicator is the percentage who had lived for over 20 years in the district. As we have seen, the longer people had lived in an area, the more roots they had there. So what affected long-term residence?

The Limits of Local Identity 49 Figure 3.1

Objective links to locality.

70 60

All shopping/leisure in district

Per cent

50 40 30 20 All friends in district

All relatives in district

10 0

0–4 yrs

5–9 yrs 10–19 yrs 20–29 yrs 30–39 yrs 40–49 yrs

50+ yrs

Years lived in district

Table 3.3

Social bias in objective links to locality Lived in district for 20 years %

Under 35 yrs old 35–54 yrs old 55 and over Middle-class self-image Working-class self-image Self-employed Management Professional Non-manual worker Manual worker Renting privately House owner Renting from the council No school certificates School certificates but no degree University degree

42 58 76 50 67 56 52 57 60 76 43 59 79 74 56 39

Lived in region for 20 years % 67 82 88 73 84 79 77 77 82 89 58 81 88 89 79 63

Obviously age itself made a difference. The old (over 55 years) were 34 per cent more likely than the young (18–35 years) to have lived in

50 Models of Local Governance

the local district for over 20 years. Other social patterns were less obvious. The self-described ‘working class’ were 17 per cent more likely than the self-described ‘middle class’ to be long-term residents. Compared to people with managerial jobs, manual workers were 24 per cent more likely to be long-term residents. Council tenants were the most likely to be long-term residents and those in the private rented sector the least. More striking still, compared to those with university degrees, people without educational qualifications were 35 per cent more likely to be long-term residents of the district, and 26 per cent more likely to be long-term residents of the region. So there was a strong class and educational bias, as well as the obvious age bias, in patterns of long-term local residence. In addition, there were regional biases. Judged by long-term residence in the region, those in Scotland were the most likely to be longterm residents, closely followed by people in the north of England. Conversely people in London and the South West (but not the South East) of England were the least likely to be long-term residents. But judged by a still more local criterion, long-term residence in the local council district, people in all the northern regions of England and in Wales were more likely to be long-term residents than those in Scotland though, once again, the people of London and the South West of England were the least. Scottish residents tended to move around within Scotland and, indeed, beyond it, but relatively few came into Scotland from outside.

Table 3.4

Regional bias in objective links to locality Lived in district for 20 years %

NE England NW England Yorkshire/Humberside Wales Scotland Midlands East Anglia SE England SW England London

73 69 69 68 61 59 57 55 52 40

Note: Sorted by percentage of long-term residents in local district.

Lived in region for 20 years % 88 85 84 83 90 78 79 80 64 66

The Limits of Local Identity 51

Subjective links to locality Local interest and awareness We asked respondents to rate their interest in various issues by giving a ‘mark out of ten’ for their degree of interest, drawing attention to a mark of ‘five out of ten’ as the dividing point between being ‘very interested’ and ‘not very interested’. For analytical purposes we subtract five from the score, so that the dividing point becomes zero, and the scale runs from minus five (extremely uninterested) up to plus five (extremely interested). Using this scale we can compare public interest in: • ‘national issues and what parliament and government does about them’; • ‘local issues and what your local council does about them’; • ‘European issues and what the European Community does about them’. On average the public rated their interest in local and national issues about the same – at close to +2 on the ±5 point scale. But they rated their interest in European issues at close to the mid-point, zero. By that standard, people were as interested in local as in national affairs, and far more interested in local than European affairs. Three-fifths also claimed that, in local elections, they voted more on local issues than on national issues. On the other hand, twice as many admitted they had not voted in the last local elections as in the last parliamentary General Election.4

Table 3.5

Interest in local issues Mean score on ± 5 point scale

National issues and what parliament and govt do Local issues and what local council does European issues and what European Community does

2.0 1.9 0.4 %

In local elections, vote on: national issues local issues Claimed they voted in the last parliamentary election Claimed they voted in the last local elections

34 57 87 74

52 Models of Local Governance

Almost half read a local evening paper regularly and four-fifths claimed to follow local news on radio or television regularly. Only a minority, but in absolute terms a very substantial minority of 24 per cent, claimed to have attended a public meeting on a local issue ‘within the last few years’ and 33 per cent said they had attended a parents’ meeting at a local school. The extent of their knowledge about local governance was limited, however. Fully 92 per cent knew the name of their local district council, but only 26 per cent knew even approximately how much of its revenue came from the local council tax. We offered a choice of ‘around a quarter or less, around a half, or around three-quarters or more’. (The correct answer at the time was ‘a quarter or less’.) We used our CATI system to permute the order of the options in this question but it had little effect on the answers. Most of the public thought their local council tax was more significant than in fact it was. As a further check on the extent of public information we asked people to tell us whether various local services were ‘controlled mainly by your local council; mainly by private companies; or mainly by committees appointed by government?’ Correctly, very few thought local

Table 3.6

Local information %

Regularly follow local news on radio or TV Regularly read local weekly paper Regularly read local evening paper

78 70 44

Attended parents’ meeting at school in last few years Attended public meeting on local issue in last few years

33 24

Know district name Know council tax funds only quarter of LG spending

92 26

Attribute control of the following services mainly to local council: schools policing refuse collection help for local businesses water and sewage hospitals unemployment benefits electricity

78 68 63 48 37 31 29 9

Note: Entries for perceived control of services sorted in descending order.

The Limits of Local Identity 53

councils controlled electricity. And a majority thought that local councils controlled schools, refuse collection and the police – for which there was some, though not complete, justification. But between a quarter and a third incorrectly held their local councils responsible for hospitals, water and sewage, and unemployment benefits. And of those who expressed a view, almost half held their local councils responsible for help to local businesses – though on this point an unusually high percentage (30 per cent) of the public spontaneously declared that they simply did not know who was responsible. Although local authorities have had some economic development powers since the late 1980s, a ‘general competence’ for local affairs has never been part of the British system of local governance. Our evidence suggests a specific and conscious lack of knowledge about responsibilities for local economic development. But more broadly it suggests a consistent tendency for the public to attribute greater responsibilities to elected councils than they actually possessed – a tendency, far from complete but visible nonetheless, towards holding elected councils ‘generally accountable’ for services within the locality. Once again, long-term residence in the district proved a key explanatory variable. Dividing people into seven categories by length of residence in the district showed that reading a local evening paper rose steadily from 37 per cent to 49 per cent as length of residence increased. Following local news on radio and television rose from 71 per cent to 84 per cent. Knowledge of the district council name rose from 80 per cent to 96 per cent. And reported (albeit over-reported) voting in local elections rose from 56 per cent to 84 per cent. Most striking of all, the ratio of claimed voting on local rather than national issues in local elections rose from approximately 1 : 1 up to 3 : 1 as length of residence increased, from an equal stress on local and national issues to three times as much stress on local as on national issues. Multiple identities In his discussion of Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, Hobsbawm argued that ‘the modern nation, either as a state or as a body of people aspiring to form such a state, differs in size, scale and nature from the actual communities with which human beings have identified over most of history.’5 For a comparative measure of the degree of identification with different scales of community we asked people about identifications with a dozen different reference groups or areas. Hobsbawm himself contrasted spatial identifications with ‘supra-local forms of popular identification’ such as Catholicism. We did the same.

54 Models of Local Governance Table 3.7

Local knowledge strengthens over time Number of years lived in the local council district 0–4 %

5–9 %

10–19 %

20–29 %

30–39 %

40–49 %

50+ %

Regularly follow local news on radio or TV Regularly read local weekly paper Regularly read local evening paper

71

77

71

75

81

86

84

58

68

70

75

69

75

71

37

39

41

45

49

43

49

Know district council name Claimed they voted in the last local elections

80

90

92

92

94

96

96

56

68

69

76

79

80

84

46

43

33

39

31

29

23

44

49

59

52

62

63

68

Local voting choice influenced mainly by national issues Local voting choice influenced mainly by local issues

But we asked in particular about identification with a range of seven spatial entities: • • • • • •

Europe; Britain; the region where the respondent lived; their local (council) district; the neighbourhood where they lived; the neighbourhood where they worked (which we shall call the ‘workplace’ to distinguish it from the ‘neighbourhood’ of residence); • the place where they were born. We asked respondents to rate ‘how strongly you feel a sense of belonging’ to these areas using a ‘mark out of ten’ in each case. We focused attention on ‘five out of ten’ as the dividing point between a ‘weak’ and a ‘strong’ sense of belonging, and for analytic purposes we have subtracted five from these ‘marks out of ten’ scores. Zero then becomes the dividing point. Negative scores indicate weak

The Limits of Local Identity 55

identifications and positive scores strong identifications. The scale ranges from plus five to minus five. Following Hobsbawm we also asked respondents to rate, ‘on the same scale’, their sense of belonging to: • • • • •

‘a class such as the working class or the middle class’; ‘your circle of friends’; ‘your family’; ‘a religion of any kind’; ‘a political party of any kind’.

Identification with family came top with an average score of almost 4 (against a maximum of 5). The respondent’s ‘circle of friends’ scored close to 3. Class scored a dismal 1.0, and both party and religion got slightly negative scores. That merely calibrates our scale. Our principal concern was: where did the various spatial referents fit on this scale? Identification with Britain came top. It was followed, in order, by identification with the region, the home neighbourhood, the district, the birthplace and, finally, the workplace of the respondent. At 3.0, identification with Britain scored slightly higher than identification with friends, though substantially lower than with family. Region came close behind at 2.7. The district, at 2.0, was some way behind

Table 3.8

Identification: a sense of belonging Mean score on ± 5 point scale

Strength of feeling of belonging to: family Britain circle of friends region home neighbourhood district birthplace a social class work neighbourhood Europe a religion a political party Note: All scores measured on a scale from minus 5 to plus 5.

3.9 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.0 0.5 –0.1 –0.2 –0.4

56 Models of Local Governance

Britain but slightly ahead of birthplace at 1.8. Workplace was far behind that, at 0.4. And Europe came close to zero. So, contrary to Hobsbawm’s speculation, our findings suggest that identification with smaller areas was not consistently stronger than with larger areas. Indeed, identification increased as the area widened within the British state, though it collapsed as the area was extended beyond Britain to include Europe. Yet we should not swing too far to the opposite extreme. Although the strength of local identification did not exceed the level and intensity of national identification, regional identification rivalled national identification very closely. And identification with neighbourhood and district was also moderately strong – less strong than national identification, but certainly stronger than class, religious or party-political identification. Moreover, identifications with wider or narrower geographic areas were not mutually exclusive. Indeed the correlations between identifications with all of the seven geographic areas mentioned in our questions were positive without exception, though some were strong and others very weak. There was a particularly strong set of positive correlations between the various subnational identifications – between regional, district and neighbourhood identifications. There were particularly weak, almost negligible, correlations between subnational identifications and a supra-national identification with Europe. But there was a moderately positive correlation of 0.21 between identifications with Britain and Europe, and a stronger positive correlation of around 0.30 between identification with Britain and the localities – region, district and neighbourhood – within Britain. We did not force people to make unwelcome and unnatural choices between these

Table 3.9

Correlations between identifications (¥100)

Identification with: Europe Britain Region District Neighbourhood Workplace Birthplace Family Friends

Europe Britain Region District Neighbourhood Work- Birthplace place 100 21 7 7 4 5 4 5 10

100 31 26 30 19 15 22 14

100 64 52 33 28 26 27

100 64 36 28 20 21

100 45 26 18 24

100 23 16 17

100 23 17

The Limits of Local Identity 57

different breadths of space, and many clearly did not choose to do so voluntarily. A factor analysis of all 12 identifications produced three factors. The first, which was centred on identification with the district, grouped together identifications with the district, the neighbourhood, the region and the workplace, and could be described as a localism factor. The second, which centred on identification with the family, grouped together identifications with family, friends and, much more loosely, class. It might be interpreted as a personal relationships factor. The third, which centred on identification with Europe, grouped together identifications with Europe, political parties and religion, and could be viewed as a supra-local factor. Only two of the original 12 identifications could not be classified unambiguously under one or other of these factor groupings. Identification with birthplace was almost as strongly (or as weakly!) linked to the localism as to the personal relationships factor. And identification with Britain was weakly linked to the localism factor though more strongly to the supra-local factor. Table 3.10

Local connections and local identities

Lived in region (district) for: 50 years or more 40–49 years 30–39 years 20–29 years 10–19 years 5–9 years 0–4 years Lived for 20 years or more: in district in region but not in district neither under 35 yrs old 35–54 yrs old 55 and over

Identification with region mean score

Identification with district mean score

3.7 3.3 2.8 2.4 1.7 1.2 –0.1

2.9 2.6 2.1 1.5 1.1 0.4 –0.3

(3.7) (3.5) (3.1) (2.6) (2.3) (2.0) (1.5)

(3.4) (3.1) (2.6) (1.7) (1.5) (1.0) (0.1)

Identification with Britain mean score

3.5 (3.5) 3.0 (3.3) 2.5 (3.0) 2.7 (2.9) 3.0 (2.8) 2.7 (2.8) 2.6 (2.5)

3.1 2.9

2.6 1.4

3.1 2.6

1.2 2.2 2.7 3.2

0.6 1.2 2.0 2.6

2.8 2.2 2.9 3.6

58 Models of Local Governance Figure 3.2

Strength of local identities.

Mean scores on ± 5 point scale

4 3.5 3

With Britain

2.5 2

With region

1.5 1 0.5 0

With district

0–4 yrs

5–9 yrs

10–19 yrs 20–29yrs 30–39 yrs 40–49 yrs 50+ yrs Years lived in district

Who identified most with the locality? It was useful to contrast the patterns of identification with state, region and district. The old identified more strongly than the young with all three. Partly as a result of that, those who had lived longer in the region or district also identified more with Britain as well as with the region or district itself, though only a little more. Suppose we contrast those who had lived in the district for under five years (‘recent arrivals’) with those who had lived in it for over 50 years (‘very long-term residents’). ‘Very long-term residents’ differed from the ‘recent arrivals’ by 3.3 points (on the ±5 point scale) in terms of identification with their district, but by only 2.2 points in terms of identification with their region, and by only 1.0 points in terms of identification with Britain. The effect was not limited to the newest arrivals nor to the longest residents. Figure 3.2 shows that the length of residence in a particular locality generally had its most powerful influence upon identification with that very particular locality, with the district rather than with the region or with Britain. Analysis of the data from two Local Government Commissions in the early 1990s found a similar pattern of attachments. The researchers found that length of residence in a particular local area was the predominant factor in driving attachment not only at that level, but at

The Limits of Local Identity 59

higher levels also. They speculated that what they might be measuring was a sense of ‘being settled’.6 Multiple regression analysis confirmed that age itself had no influence upon identification with region or district once the length of local residence had been taken into account. We used stepwise multiple regression to predict the strength of identification with five areas – Britain, the region, the district, the neighbourhood and the workplace. As predictors we took age in years, plus 13 measures of objective local connections: whether people were born in Britain, in the region or in the district; the number of years lived in the region and district; the proportions of relatives and friends who lived in the region and district (on four-point scales); whether the respondent’s workplace was outside the district; and whether they paid regular attention to local evening papers, local weekly papers or local evening news on radio and television. Six of these had no impact, once other influences were taken into account: attention to local news media, the proportion of relatives in the locality and whether people had been born in the district. Only age and being born in Britain – and age more than British birth – affected the strength of identification with Britain. Indeed, since so many had been born in Britain (92 per cent), birthplace could hardly explain much of the variation between people in the strength of their identification with Britain or anything else. But identification with Britain increased sharply with age. Being born in the region, having a high proportion of friends in the region and being a long-term resident in the region all increased the strength of identification with the region. But by far the strongest of these influences was simply long-term residence in the region. Having a high proportion of friends in the district and being a longterm resident in the district (or even in the region) increased the strength of identification with the district. But the strongest of these influences was long-term residence in the district itself, even when long-term residence in the region was taken into account. Age, having a high proportion of friends in the district and being a long-term resident in the district all contributed towards the strength of identification with the neighbourhood. Although age itself had no effect upon identification with either the region or the district, it had as much effect as long-term residence on identification with the neighbourhood. Older people had a noticeably stronger identification with the very limited space of their very local neighbourhood. Finally, our multiple regression analysis suggested that identification with the workplace was highly dependent upon the location of the

60 Models of Local Governance

workplace and, in fact, derivative from identification with the place of residence. Identification with the workplace was influenced both by long-term residence in the region and by its precise location. But by far the strongest influence on identification with the workplace was its location within the district of residence: people identified with their workplace if it was close to where they lived and therefore if they already identified with that same place for other reasons. It was significant that the location of the workplace, inside or outside the district of residence, had a very strong influence upon identification with the workplace, but no influence upon identification with the place of residence – clear evidence that it was residence, not workplace, that determined local identification. The self-described working class were more likely to identify strongly with the region and the district while the self-described middle class were slightly more likely to identify strongly with Britain. Those who rented their house from a private landlord were much less likely than council tenants to identify strongly with the region (by a 1.3 point margin) and very much less likely to identify strongly with the district (by a 2.0 point margin) – although they were only slightly less likely to identify strongly with Britain (by a 0.6 point margin). And compared to university graduates, the educationally unqualified identified much more strongly with the region (by a 1.5 point margin) and with the district (by a 1.6 point margin) but only a little more strongly with Britain (by a 0.6 point margin). Both education, and the mobility implied by renting from the private housing sector, encouraged a more cosmopolitan and less parochial perspective but more in terms of eroding localism than in terms of eroding state nationalism. Adherents of the Church of England identified especially strongly with Britain (mean score 3.5), while adherents of the Church of Scotland identified especially strongly with their region, Scotland (mean score 3.7 – though that was lower than for the Scottish sample as a whole: within Scotland, Church of Scotland adherents actually identified a little less than others with Scotland, and a little more with Britain). The irreligious identified relatively weakly with the district (mean score 1.3), region (mean score 2.2) or Britain (mean score 2.3). But perhaps just as significant as the social and political factors that influenced local identifications were the social factors that did not. Gender had no detectable influence: women were scarcely any more parochially oriented than men. Those who lived in rural areas were scarcely any more parochially oriented than those who lived in big

The Limits of Local Identity 61 Table 3.11

Social patterns of local identity Identification with region mean score

Identification with district mean score

Identification with Britain mean score

Middle-class ID Working-class ID

2.4 3.0

1.7 2.3

3.1 2.9

Self-employed Management Professional Non-manual Manual

2.7 2.5 2.5 2.8 3.2

1.7 1.9 1.8 2.1 2.5

3.0 3.2 3.0 2.9 3.0

Own house Private rent Council rent

2.7 1.9 3.2

2.0 0.7 2.7

3.0 2.3 2.9

No school certificates No degree University degree

3.3 2.6 1.8

2.6 1.9 1.0

3.2 2.9 2.6

towns and cities. Those who worked for local government (except for school teachers), or had family or friends employed by local government, did not identify with the district any more strongly than others. The strength of local identification hardly differed between those who felt they ‘knew enough’ to use their local election votes wisely or to assess whether the local council was taking the right decisions and those who did not. Nor between those who made much use of local government services and those who did not. Nor between those who felt their region or district was relatively well or badly off. Nor between those who lived in politically competitive and politically ‘safe’ districts. Nor between those who placed themselves at different points on the left/right ideological spectrum (except for those on the extreme left). Nor between those with Conservative, Labour or Liberal voting preferences – though, unsurprisingly, Scottish and Welsh nationalists were more locally oriented. Those who lived in districts that were nearly always controlled by Labour councils tended to identify more with the locality and less with Britain than those who lived in normally Conservative districts, however. Within both parties’ citadels, individual Conservative voters identified with Britain much more strongly than individual Labour

62 Models of Local Governance

voters. But individual Conservative voters were only more likely than individual Labour voters to identify strongly with their district if they lived in a local Conservative stronghold. And conversely, individual Labour voters were especially likely to identify much less than Conservative voters with their district if they lived in a local Conservative stronghold. Those who had considered moving to another district with better local services or lower local taxes but had not actually done so – and who therefore still lived in a district they had considered leaving – had a particularly weak identification with that district. The pattern of spatial identifications varied dramatically across the different regions of Britain. Identification with the district ranged only between 2.1 and 2.4 across all the northern regions of England, the Midlands, Wales and Scotland. But it sank lower in southern England and dropped to a mere 1.2 in London. Similarly, identification with Britain ranged only between 3.1 and 3.5 across the whole of England except for London where it dropped to 2.6. But it dropped to 2.0 in Wales and to a dismal 1.4 in Scotland. Conversely identification with the region peaked at 3.9 in Scotland (where, of course, the word ‘region’ in our question was replaced by ‘Scotland’). But it was also high throughout northern England and Wales where it ranged only between 3.1 and 3.4. By contrast, it was low throughout the Midlands and the south, including London, where it ranged between 1.9 and 2.3.

Table 3.12

Local identity and political incompatibility Identification with region mean score

Identification with district mean score

Identification with Britain mean score

District always Cons: and Cons pref. and Lab pref.

2.3 2.7 2.1

1.7 2.3 1.4

3.2 3.8 3.0

District always Lab: and Cons pref. and Lab pref.

3.2 3.4 3.1

2.3 2.7 2.5

2.8 3.6 2.7

Geographic exit done considered not even considered

3.1 2.5 2.7

2.2 1.0 2.1

2.9 2.6 3.0

The Limits of Local Identity 63

Thus an overall tendency for identification to be strongest with Britain and weakest with the district applied throughout the Midlands and south of England including London. But this simple pattern did not extend to the north of England, Wales or Scotland. Across the whole of the north of England, including Yorkshire/Humberside, identification with the region rivalled that with Britain, though identification with the district remained weaker. In Wales, and more strikingly in Scotland, there was a third pattern: identification with the ‘region’ (‘Wales’ or ‘Scotland’ in this case) was strongest, identification with Britain was weakest and identification with the district was intermediate. Several recent surveys have shown that a majority in Scotland choose to identify with Scotland rather than Britain when asked to choose between them.7 That could be the result of either an unusually strong identification with the ‘region’ (‘Scotland’), or an unusually weak identification with Britain. Our survey suggests that it was the result of both. But in Wales, by contrast, identification with the ‘region’ (‘Wales’) was no stronger than in the north of England, though identification with Britain was weaker. Despite the SNP’s attempt to link Scottish and European identifications together by articulating the slogan ‘Scotland in Europe’ – implying that Scotland should cut free from Britain but draw closer to the rest of Europe rather than adopt a policy of national isolation –

Table 3.13

Regional patterns of local identity Identification with region mean score

Scotland NW England Yorkshire/ Humberside Wales NE England Midlands SW England SE England East Anglia London

Identification with district mean score

Identification with Britain mean score

Identification with Europe mean score

3.9 3.4

2.3 2.4

1.4 3.3

–0.2 –0.3

3.3 3.2 3.1 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.9

2.2 2.3 2.3 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.2

3.5 2.0 3.1 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.3 2.6

–0.1 –0.3 –0.3 0.1 0.1 –0.2 –0.2 0.5

Note: Sorted by strength of identification with the region.

64 Models of Local Governance Figure 3.3

Regional patterns of identities.

4.5 With region

3 With Britain 2.5 2

With district

1.5 1 0.5 0

nd la ot

gl

es Sc

W al

W

En

En N

E N

Yo r

ks

/H

la

um

gl

b

s nd

gl id M

En

En

SW

E

SE

nd Lo

ia

gl

An

gl

–0.5 With Europe –1 on

Mean scores on ± 5 point scale

4 3.5

identification with Europe was no higher in Scotland than elsewhere. In our survey, it was those who lived in London that had the most European identities – driven as much we suspect by cosmopolitanism as by anti-British nationalism, though we also found identification with Britain to be weaker in London than in any area apart from Scotland and Wales. Within every region, identification with Britain correlated positively with regional identification. The correlation was much weaker in Scotland than anywhere else. Nonetheless, even within Scotland, the strength of identification with Scotland correlated weakly but still positively with both British and European identification. So our evidence does not support the romantic notion that strong Scottish identifiers might be either peculiarly pro-European or anti-British.8 However, less dramatically, it does reveal the lack of a strong correlation between ‘regional’ and British identities within Scotland.

Pride, responsibility and exclusion Using randomly selected split-half samples, we asked whether people felt proud or ashamed when they heard of something good or bad that had

The Limits of Local Identity 65 Table 3.14

Local pride and responsibility % Pride/shame

*Feel [pride / shame] when something [good / bad] was done by people: from district from region from rest of Britain

% *Pride

% *Shame

70 67 59

50 43 38

60 55 49 % More responsibility

*District people have more responsibility for welfare of others in district (than for those who live in the rest of the region) *Region people have more responsibility for welfare of others in region (than for those who live in the rest of Britain)

61

47

Note:* These two versions of the questions were put to randomly selected split-half samples. Figures are the percentages who answered with an unqualified ‘yes’.

been done by someone from their district, from their region or from the rest of Britain. Half were asked about pride when hearing about ‘something good’, half about shame when hearing about ‘something bad’ – which avoided any pressure to take equal responsibility for the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’. The public was always about 10 per cent more willing to feel pride in others’ achievements than to feel shame for their misdeeds. But what was most significant in this context was that the public was most inclined to feel either pride or shame when hearing about someone from the district, and least inclined to feel these emotions when hearing about people from outside the region. Emotional involvement seemed to increase as the scale of the locality decreased. People felt a special responsibility for their local areas and that sense of responsibility clearly strengthened as the area diminished. Only 47 per cent agreed that people who lived in their region had more responsibility for the welfare of others in that region than for the welfare of others in Britain as a whole. But 61 per cent agreed that people who lived in their district had more responsibility for the welfare of others in that district than for the welfare of others in their region as a whole.

66 Models of Local Governance

Thus, although identification with Britain was generally stronger than identification with the region or district, responsibility for welfare, like pride and shame, seemed to increase as the scale of the locality decreased. Despite that, pride and responsibility correlated with local identification quite markedly. Feelings of pride (or shame) about people from their own district correlated at 0.24 with district identification. And pride (or shame) about people from their own region correlated at 0.27 with regional identification though pride (or shame) about other British people correlated at only 0.13 with the strength of British identification. Similarly regional identification correlated at 0.18 with feelings of special responsibility for people in the region (contrasted with those in the rest of Britain), though local district identification correlated much less well with feelings of special responsibility for people in the district (contrasted with those in the region). All five of these measures of emotional or rational responsibility correlated better with the strength of local identity than with the mere length of local residence, however. Yet the dominance of a British perspective was revealed when it came to erecting barriers against people from outside their region or district. We asked whether people from the rest of Britain should be excluded from voting in local elections if they had not [lived/paid taxes] for two years within the relevant [district/region]. We put each variant of the question to randomly selected subsamples, but it made little difference whether we asked about mere residence or about taxpaying, nor whether we asked about the region or the district. Only 23 per cent of the public were willing to take an exclusive approach to the local

Table 3.15

Correlations with pride and responsibility Pride/shame about people from: Britain region district

correlation Identification: with Britain with region with district

13 11 10

correlation

correlation

7 27 20

10 22 24

Responsible for welfare of: region district versus versus Britain region correlation correlation

–2 18 12

0 3 8

The Limits of Local Identity 67

franchise. If we had set the term at over two years – at say five or ten years – we presume the public would have taken an even less exclusive and even more inclusive stance with regard to the local franchise. Secondly, we asked about barring access to local schools and hospitals until incomers had lived or paid taxes locally for at least two years. (Again we varied the question wording between region or district and between residence and taxpaying, putting each variant of the question to randomly selected subsamples.) This second approach to the issue of local exclusion won even less public support: a mere 18 per cent. Overwhelmingly the public took the view that local services should be accessible to the national citizenry. And in so far as they differed at all on this issue, their attitudes towards local exclusiveness correlated better with mere length of local residence than with the strength of local identity. The weakness of the correlation between local exclusiveness and local identification merits some emphasis. Even among those who fell into the top quintile in terms of the strength of their identification with the local district, the numbers who took an exclusive attitude on the right to vote in local elections only reached 27 per cent. And in that top quintile the numbers who took an exclusive attitude on rights of free access to local schools and hospitals only reached 19 per cent. There was a detectable correlation with local identification but it was so weak as to be barely detectable – statistically significant (in our large sample) but certainly not politically significant.

Table 3.16

Exclusion

Only if they have [lived/paid taxes] for at least 2 years in [region/district] should people from other parts of Britain who come to live in [region/district] … be able to vote at local elections % If identification with district falls into the… lowest quintile (score < 0) second (score 0) mid quintile (score 1, 2) fourth (score 3, 4) highest quintile (score 5)

get free access to local schools and hospitals %

23

18

19 18 26 22 27

12 18 19 19 19

Note: Figures are the percentages who positively agree.

68 Models of Local Governance

Conclusion: multiple identities and inclusive citizenship The concept of local democracy would imply that the locality, or more broadly the ‘territory’, has some significant meaning for people. The phenomenon of globalization and the development of a more geographically mobile society have led some to question whether a basis for local democracy remains. Was there enough sense of attachment to sustain local politics? Our findings suggest the need to recognize a complex response to that apparently simple question. Identification with the family was considerably stronger than the other identifications we investigated, but it was far from an exclusive identification. It did not prohibit strong identifications with wider communities. Indeed, identification with family on the one hand correlated quite strongly with identification with Britain, region, district and birthplace on the other. People identified as strongly with their home neighbourhood as with the district, but much more strongly with the district than, for example, with a social class. Identification with Britain was clearly stronger than with local districts but not much stronger than with regions except in the south of England. In the north of England identification with Britain was about the same as with the region. And in Scotland and Wales, identification with Britain was much weaker than with the region, and even somewhat weaker than with the district. So local identification at various levels was certainly strong enough to suggest that people should not be regarded merely as individualistic consumers of local services. They did have a psychological basis for a concept of local citizenship but, very significantly, it was an inclusive rather than an exclusive concept. Only a small minority of the public would deny recent incomers access to local public services or the right to participate in local decision-making. And yet it may be difficult to give real content to the notion of citizenship without distinguishing between citizens and non-citizens. A federal system like the United States permits the possibility of a sharply defined local citizenship, at least at the level of the different states within the Union. State universities in the USA, for example, have different scales of fees for ‘in-state’ and ‘out-of-state’ students. Conversely they often make no distinction between a student arriving from another state of the USA and a student arriving from Europe or Asia. That is very definitely not the way the British public views access to local authority funded services. Yet, even in Britain, it may be unreasonable to expect the residents of a locality to pay additional

The Limits of Local Identity 69

taxes for a significantly higher level of investment in local services if those services are then going to be accessible to those who have not made the tax investment. Conceivably this problem might not arise if the additional local taxes were for immediate operating costs rather than investment since the extra taxes, in that case, would correspond to immediate and transient extra benefits. But otherwise, mobility would destroy the connection between extra local taxes and extra local services. Since mobility between regions was so much less than between districts, truly local policies might be sustainable without explicitly exclusionary provisions if the locality were a region rather than a district. But a non-exclusive perspective inevitably pushes the boundaries of real local autonomy outwards, well beyond district boundaries and at least as far as regional boundaries. Our findings about objective links to locality are important. Fully 90 per cent had lived for over ten years in their region and almost 80 per cent in their district. But only two-thirds were still living in the region where they had been born and only one-third in the district where they were born. Two-thirds had friends outside the district, fourfifths had relatives outside and almost half regularly travelled outside the district for leisure or shopping. People’s lives were not, in general, constrained within local council districts. What happened in one district, what facilities were provided in one district, affected many people beyond its boundaries to a degree that was much less true for regions and is, of course, still less true for states. Mobility mattered. Recent arrivals in a region identified far more strongly with Britain than with the region. But by the time they had spent over 20 years in the region they identified with region and state about equally. And by the time they had spent over 30 years in the region they identified more strongly with the region than with Britain. Identification with the local council district was generally weaker than with the region or with Britain, but by the time people had spent 30 years in a district, their identification with the district was almost as strong as with Britain. Rather less than half the public (41 per cent) had spent 30 years living in their district, though rather more than half (62 per cent) had spent 30 years living in their region. Conversely about half the public had spent less than this length of time living in their localities and were, in consequence, relatively weakly committed to them. If the fracturing of personal relationships and increasing job mobility leads to increasing geographic mobility we can expect the strength of local

70 Models of Local Governance

identifications to decline as people cross boundaries. But only in so far as they cross boundaries: if they move across district boundaries more frequently but remain within regional boundaries we can expect a further strengthening of regional identifications relative to district or neighbourhood identifications. Those theories of local governance which stress the importance of very local communities were based upon the visions of an age that has passed, if it ever existed, and which is unlikely to return. The impact of mobility suggests that the future of local identification might be increasingly regional.

4 The Role of Local Governance

Different aims and objectives have been proposed for local governance, objectives that range all the way from developing the personality of the individual and mobilizing the apathetic through to the cheap or efficient provision of services to those that want to buy them. ‘New Right’ theorists see local governance primarily as a provider of those few services that cannot be provided, or at least that cannot be provided more efficiently, by private companies operating in the market. Theorists on the left take a more positive and expansive view of public services. To them, public services are not a necessary evil, to be only grudgingly accepted, but an opportunity to provide a wide range of high quality services that will enhance the lives of citizens. But even those who look favourably upon public services may disagree about whether they should be national or local. And they may disagree on whether public services should apply national standards even if delivered by local agencies, or whether they should vary from place to place according to the wishes of local people and the willingness of local people to pay for them. Ultimately these three viewpoints encapsulate different notions of citizenship – local citizenship, national citizenship or very little citizenship of any kind at all. Different theorists therefore emphasize different objectives for local governance. Some of these differences are no more than a difference of emphasis. But others are differences between incompatible objectives. What do the public think about such abstract matters? Are there clear majorities in favour of some objectives and against others? And, if there are clear majorities, are they logically coherent or self-contradictory? Are there public majorities for incompatible objectives? In this chapter we ask what the public think the role of local government should be. What level of services should be provided? What is their 71

72 Models of Local Governance

attitude to national standards? Does the public think that local government has a role beyond service delivery? And do these questions matter enough for people make a tax–service calculation when choosing where to live?

Minimalism We asked four questions to gauge the extent of local public services supported by the public. There was 90 per cent support for the proposition that ‘local services which are only used by those in special need, like the sick or the poor, should be provided by local councils, and at least partly paid for by taxes’. And 82 per cent of the public agreed that ‘local services that everyone needs, such as refuse collection and basic police services, should be provided without charge by local councils, and paid for by taxes’. But only 71 per cent agreed that ‘local councils should provide special services for those who are willing to pay extra for them – like special security patrols for shops and businesses’. And only 67 per cent agreed that ‘local councils should provide special grants and subsidies for things that councillors feel make the area a better place even if only a few people actually use them – things like theatres, concert halls or sports centres’. Although these are fairly general, abstract propositions we attempted to make them more concrete and intelligible by giving examples of the kinds of services involved. And on the question of subsidies for facilities that would only be used by a minority we took care to specify examples that might appeal to both young and old, to intellectuals and non-intellectuals. Our figures show that people took a generally expansive view of the proper objectives of local government, since support ranged upwards from a minimum of 67 per cent. Nonetheless people drew some distinction between services for the needy minority, those for everyone and those for non-needy minorities.

Table 4.1

Minimalism %

Provide services for special needs Provide universal services Provide extra services for cash Grants and subsidies for theatres, concert halls, sports centres

90 82 71 67

The Role of Local Governance 73

National or local standards? The public clearly supported national standards as a minimum but not as a maximum, as a floor but not as a ceiling. An overwhelming majority (92 per cent) of the public agreed that ‘local councils should be free to provide whatever standard of services their local community wants and is willing to pay for’. And when faced with a straight choice between alternatives, a similar majority (91 per cent) of the public took the view that local government should provide ‘as few or as many services as the local community decide’, rejecting the alternative that it should provide ‘only those services that central government decides’. These responses indicate overwhelming rejection of the idea that central government should place limits on local services. The phrasing of both these questions seems to imply local autonomy irrespective of whether that autonomy led to a broad or a narrow range of local services. But we also found a large majority (74 per cent) for the proposition that ‘Parliament should decide national standards for public services and require local councils to meet those standards everywhere.’ Moreover, 78 per cent agreed that local councils should ‘stay out of national politics’ which, in combination with the support for Parliament to set mandatory standards for local government, implies a clear hierarchy of authority. Attitudes towards local autonomy and national standards were thus either incoherent or complex. A look at the combinations of answers to questions about national standards and local autonomy may help resolve the mystery. A large majority (66 per cent) of the public seemed to support centrally imposed minimum national standards combined with local autonomy

Table 4.2

National standards? %

Local govt should provide ‘as few or as many services as the local community decide’ (not ‘only those services that central government decides’) *Local councils should be free to provide whatever standard of services their local community wants and is willing to pay for *Parliament should decide national standards for public services and require local councils to meet those standards everywhere Local councils should stay out of national politics Note: * These two questions were put to randomly selected split-half samples.

91 92

74 78

74 Models of Local Governance Table 4.3

Combining attitudes to local autonomy and national standards Should Parliament set national standards? No Yes Total % % %

Local govt should provide: ‘as few or as many services as the local community decide’ ‘only those services that central government decides’ Total

25

66

91

1 26

8 74

9 100

to push standards up beyond the minimum – a floor without a ceiling. Only a minority (25 per cent) supported complete local autonomy without a floor level of national standards. Only 8 per cent wanted central government to set both minimum and maximum standards for local services, supporting both floor level ‘national standards’ and a ceiling limiting local services to ‘only those that central government decides’. And a negligible number of respondents opted for a centrally imposed ceiling without a centrally imposed floor on local services.

The Tiebout thesis In a celebrated article, Charles Tiebout suggested that personal and collective autonomy could be reconciled by making local districts so small that people who disliked the mix of services and taxes provided in one locality could easily migrate to another which offered a different mix.1 Some researchers have reported that ‘households in London claim to take into account tax–service factors when deciding to relocate’. 2 In our survey we asked not just about whether the tax–services mix might affect the choice of location when people were in the process of moving, but whether it might itself prompt their decision to relocate. And we asked the question throughout Britain, not just in the rather special housing environment of London. We asked: ‘Have you ever considered moving house to another local council because local [services were better / council tax was lower] there? And have you actually moved for that reason?’ Overall we found that most had not even considered relocating for these reasons, though rather more had considered relocating to get

The Role of Local Governance 75 Table 4.4

The Tiebout relocation thesis Considered relocation to council with better services or lower taxes? Not even considered Considered but not Actually relocated actually relocated

All respondents * ‘for better service’ * ‘for lower taxes’ London only * ‘for better service’ * ‘for lower taxes’

93 97

6 3

1 1

83 95

14 3

3 2

Note: * Questions about ‘better services’ and ‘lower taxes’ were put to randomly selected split-half samples.

better services (7 per cent) than to get lower taxes (3 per cent). Only one per cent had actually relocated for these reasons. However, our survey did confirm, as Dowding and others have suggested, that such behaviour was more frequent in London. In our survey, 17 per cent in London said they had considered relocating to get better services and 5 per cent to get lower taxes, though less than 3 per cent said they had actually relocated for either reason.

Local interests At the time of our survey, twenty years had passed since the British had last elected a government that extolled the virtues of economic intervention. On the other hand, the Conservative government had tried to foster positive attitudes towards the role of business in local politics. We asked whether ‘local government should actively encourage local business in order to create jobs and improve the local economy’ or ‘leave economic development to [central government/ market forces]?’ It made no difference at all whether we balanced local government economic initiatives against central government or against the market: 88 per cent said local government should take economic initiatives. The public remained instinctively interventionist in local terms. At the same time this high level of support for local economic initiatives implied a majority neither for a ‘zero-sum’ competition with other areas for economic development, nor for ‘feather-bedding’ local business. We asked whether ‘when a local council buys in services from

76 Models of Local Governance Table 4.5

Local interests and development %

Local government should encourage economic development, not leave it to [central govt/market] *not leave to central govt *not leave to market Exercise local preference in purchasing

88 88 88 52

Note: * Questions about whether to leave local economic development to ‘central govt’ or ‘the market’ were put to randomly selected split-half samples.

a private company, should it give a preference to local businesses even if they charge a little more than others because that will boost local employment; or should it always choose the company that offers best value for money because that will keep local taxes down’? That question split public opinion down the middle: 52 per cent backed discriminatory local preference, 48 per cent opposed it. Certainly, it is true that our question reminded people of the inevitable costs of exercising discriminatory local preferences. Nonetheless it is striking that support for discriminatory local preference was so much less than for the general principle of encouraging local business. The public was evenly divided about disregarding the market when focused on purchasing, despite its overwhelming refusal to leave local economic development to market forces.

A mission to mobilize? Both liberals and left-wing radicals have argued that local government should develop more than the local economy, certainly more than local businesses. Following J. S. Mill, philosophical liberals have argued that an important function of local government is to develop individual capabilities and personalities through active participation in government ‘on a human scale’. So we asked whether ‘local government should help people to develop their capabilities and personalities by encouraging them to participate [in elections and political campaigns/ directly in the management of the services they themselves use]; or leave individuals to develop their own capabilities and personalities?’ Despite this hint at a ‘big brother’ state interfering with people’s ‘own’ development there was substantial, even though minority,

The Role of Local Governance 77 Table 4.6

Develop personality? %

Local government should help develop people’s capabilities and personalities by participation *in elections and political campaigns *in the self-management of services

42 52

Note: * Questions about whether to develop capabilities through participation in elections or in self-management were put to randomly selected split-half samples.

support for local government acting to help develop individuals’ capabilities and personalities. Significantly, however, there was more support for personal development through direct participation in selfmanagement schemes than through elections and political campaigns: 52 per cent compared to 42 per cent. In similar vein, we asked whether ‘local government should set up special committees to provide moral [but not/and] financial support to [women’s groups/racial and ethnic groups/gays and lesbians]’? About half the public, on average, said local government should set up such committees. It made no difference at all whether we specifically included or excluded ‘financial’ as well as moral support. However, the target group did make a difference. There was 62 per cent support for ethnic committees, and 55 per cent for women’s committees, but only 35 per cent for gay and lesbian committees. Overall, however, the level

Table 4.7

Set up support committees for ‘minorities’? %

Local government should set up support committees… *to give moral but not financial support *to give moral and financial support *for racial and ethnic groups *for women’s groups *for gays and lesbians

51 51 62 55 35

Note: * Questions about whether or not to offer financial support were put to randomly selected split-half samples, and questions about committees for ethnic groups, women or gays were put to randomly selected split-third samples. The two random selections were independent: so, for example, approximately half the interviews about committees for ethnic minorities specifically included financial support and half specifically excluded it.

78 Models of Local Governance Table 4.8

Encourage demands for services? %

Local government should… * ‘provide as few services as possible, allowing people to provide for themselves’ * ‘encourage those in need to demand more services’

16 78

Note: * These two questions were put to randomly selected split-half samples.

of public support for these committees designed to encourage ‘minorities’ of various kinds ran at much the same level as support for developing individual capabilities and personalities. By contrast there was much greater support for empowering those who specifically required local government services – indeed, a surprisingly high level of support. When asked whether local government should ‘provide as few services as possible, allowing people to provide for themselves’ 84 per cent of the public rejected the proposition. More radically, 78 per cent agreed with the proposition that ‘local government should encourage those in need to demand more services’. Elsewhere we asked whether, ‘when making their decisions, local councils should pay most attention to the views and interests of those who [pay most council tax / have expert knowledge / need council jobs / rely most on council services]’? Only 22 per cent agreed that councils should pay most attention to those who ‘pay most council tax’. But 52 per cent agreed they should pay most attention to those who ‘need council jobs’, 84 per cent to ‘experts’ and 90 per cent to those who ‘rely most on council services’. (Since each respondent was asked only one variant of this question, it really measures the numbers who thought it important – rather than literally ‘most’ important – to pay

Table 4.9

Pay most attention to whom? %

Councils should pay most attention to those who… *rely most on council services *have expert knowledge *need council jobs *pay most council tax Note: * These four questions were put to randomly selected split-quarter samples.

90 84 52 22

The Role of Local Governance 79

attention to each of these groups.) The relative enthusiasm for paying attention to the needy rather than to taxpayers is consistent with our finding that a large majority of the public wanted councils to ‘encourage those in need to demand more services’. So while people were divided on the paternalistic mission of local government to develop individual personalities or encourage so-called social ‘minorities’, a very large majority felt that local government had a mission to pay attention to those who relied most on council services and to encourage them to demand even more services.

What influenced ideas about the proper objectives of local governance? Social background Attitudes towards minimalism were hardly affected by social background. Working-class identifiers, for example, were very slightly more favourable than middle-class identifiers towards universal services and services for the needy but, at the same time, very slightly less favourable than middle-class identifiers towards ‘quality of life’ subsidies for theatres, concert halls or sports centres. The surprise is not that we found such plausible patterns but that they were so weak. Education made somewhat more of a difference. Compared to those with only school-level qualifications, university graduates hardly differed in their support for universal services or services for the needy. But graduates were relatively antagonistic towards the provision of special chargeable services for shops and businesses and relatively favourable towards ‘quality of life’ subsidies for sports and the arts. Working-class identification correlated most strongly with support for paying attention to those who needed local government jobs (r = 0.21) or services (r = 0.12), and with encouraging those in need to demand more services (r = 0.18). Older respondents were somewhat more inclined to agree that councils should pay most attention to local taxpayers, provide as few services as possible and stay out of national politics. Women hardly differed from men. The highly educated were less inclined than others to agree that councils should pay most attention to any particular reference group though their reluctance was most evident with respect to those who needed council jobs and least evident with respect to ‘experts’. Across the regions, the most striking pattern was a tendency for people in Scotland, Wales and all the northern regions of England to

80 Models of Local Governance

be a few per cent less inclined than those in the south of England to say that their local councils should stay out of national politics. But this question of council involvement in national politics apart, social patterns of opinion do not seem very distinctively ‘local’. In character, they are the kinds of pattern we might expect with any questions about public services and taxation, national or local, though they are perhaps rather weaker than we might expect if asked in the context of national politics. Local identity and ideology This conclusion that attitudes towards the objectives of local governance were not greatly influenced by purely ‘local’ considerations is confirmed by a comparison between the influence of local identity and left–right ideology. Attitudes towards the objectives of local governance hardly correlated at all with the length of time people had lived in a district, or with the strength of their identification with the local district. They correlated more strongly and more extensively with measures of left–right ideology or political partisanship. Dividing our sample of the public roughly into quintiles on the basis of their strength of identification with their local district shows very little systematic variation in attitudes towards the objectives of local government between those who identified strongly and weakly with the locality – with two partial exceptions. Strong local identifiers stressed the need for local councils to pay attention both to local council-tax payers and to those who needed council jobs – which is a truly local, non-ideological tendency. But the strongest local identifiers were only 6 per cent more favourable to local autonomy and 5 per cent less favourable to national standards than the weakest local identifiers. That does not mean that support for local autonomy was weak: quite the contrary. The correlation with local identity was weak because even those who had recently arrived in the district, or only weakly identified with it, expressed very strong support for local autonomy in setting local council services. It was not the case that local identity failed to generate support for local autonomy and local council services. Rather, a strong local identity was not a necessary precondition for such support – a fact that is obscured by correlation analysis but emerges clearly when we look at the absolute levels of support for local autonomy and local services. By contrast ideology or partisanship affected attitudes to many objectives of local governance, often quite strongly. Comparing Tables 4.10 and 4.11 shows that the extremes of local identification only produced a

The Role of Local Governance 81 Table 4.10

Objectives of local governance by identification with district Strength of identification with district: <0 0 1,2 3,4 5 % % % % %

Provide services for needy Provide universal services Provide extra services for cash Subsidies for theatres, sports centres, etc.

89 81 64 66

91 79 73 69

87 82 68 69

91 85 73 65

90 84 73 69

Provide whatever services local people want Whatever standards locality will pay for Parliament to set national standards

91 88 77

92 89 82

91 94 69

93 94 76

90 94 72

84

86

87

90

89

50

52

54

49

55

14

24

24

20

28

82

78

87

82

87

Encourage local economic development Exercise local preference in purchasing (versus best value) Pay most attention to those who pay most most council tax Pay most attention to those who have expert knowledge Pay most attention to those who need council jobs Pay most attention to those who rely most on council services

39

45

52

56

59

85

87

87

96

92

Provide as few services as possible Encourage demand Set up support committees

15 74 49

16 76 51

18 79 53

15 79 49

18 81 53

Develop individuals through participation Stay out of national politics

50 75

48 78

48 80

47 77

43 78

Note: The cut points on the local identity scale divide the public into five roughly equally sized groups.

greater than 10 per cent effect upon attitudes in two rows, while the extremes of ideology did so in eight rows. Compared to those who placed themselves on the left, self-described right-wingers were 14 per cent more favourable to councils providing extra payable services for business although slightly less favourable towards the provision of other kinds of local services. They were 22 per cent less favourable to discriminatory local preference (versus ‘value for money’). Conversely, right-wingers were 22 per cent more inclined to say councils should provide as few

82 Models of Local Governance Table 4.11

Objectives of local governance by ideological self-image

Provide services for needy Provide universal services Provide extra services for cash Subsidies for theatres, sports centres, etc. Provide whatever services local people want Whatever standards locality will pay for Parliament to set national standards Encourage local economic development Exercise local preference in purchasing (versus best value)

Left %

C-L %

Centre %

C-R %

Right %

92 82 61

91 87 69

90 81 78

88 81 75

87 79 75

70

66

72

61

65

94

93

91

89

88

90 73

95 74

97 79

90 77

93 74

88

90

88

87

84

64

55

50

47

42

18

16

30

26

22

78

73

86

86

93

Pay most attention to those who pay most council tax Pay most attention to those who have expert knowledge Pay most attention to those who need council jobs Pay most attention to those who rely most on council services

51

54

50

49

50

91

90

90

93

79

Provide as few services as possible Encourage demand Set up support committees

10 81 53

8 83 56

17 81 54

19 74 46

32 69 39

Develop individuals through participation Stay out of national politics

53 66

49 78

44 81

45 81

46 82

Note: Left includes ‘strongly’ left; right includes ‘strongly’ right. The cut points on the ideological self-image scale divide the public into five roughly equally sized groups.

services as possible. They were 14 per cent less favourable to setting up support committees for ‘minorities’ and 12 per cent less favourable to encouraging the needy to demand more services. They were 15 per cent more favourable to paying most attention to ‘experts’ and 12 per cent less favourable to paying most attention to those who relied on council

The Role of Local Governance 83

% who say ‘pay most attention to those who need council jobs’

Figure 4.1

Focus on those who need council jobs.

65

By identification with district

60 55 50 By right-wing ideology

45 40 35 30

Lowest quintile

Middle

Highest quintile

Ideology and local identification both arrayed along the horizontal axis

Figure 4.2

Provide as few services as possible.

35 30

By right-wing ideology

25

Per cent

20 15

By identification with district

10 5 0 Middle Highest quintile Lowest quintile Ideology and local identification both arrayed along the horizontal axis

services. And right-wingers were 16 per cent more inclined to say local councils should stay out of national politics.

84 Models of Local Governance

Significantly, however, while a right-wing ideology reduced support for extensive free-at-the-point-of-use services, it did not have any effect upon support for local autonomy or national standards. And conversely, although a left-wing ideology increased support for paying attention to those who relied on local services, it did not increase support for paying attention to those who needed council jobs. In summary, therefore, ideology affected support for extensive free public services and the encouragement of demand for them but it did not affect attitudes to local autonomy. Local identification had little or no effect upon attitudes towards the extent of public services. But local identification did slightly increase the already very high level of support for local autonomy, and slightly reduce support for national standards. And local identification had rather more effect upon increasing support for more attention to be paid to local council-tax payers, local council employees and the users of local services.

5 The Image of Traditional Local Government

Support for different institutional arrangements may not be entirely based upon different conceptions of local citizenship. It may also depend upon images of the rival institutions that deliver local governance. It matters whether particular institutions are more or less responsive than others, more or less efficient and more or less corrupt. Other things being equal, pragmatic citizens should prefer a system that is responsive, efficient and honest to one that is unresponsive, inefficient and dishonest – though they might differ on how much weight they would give to honesty as against efficiency, for example. If it were generally agreed that the traditional system of all-purpose elected councils was responsive, efficient and honest, then the case for change would be weakened: ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’ as Americans say. Conversely, if it were generally agreed that the traditional system was unresponsive, inefficient and dishonest, then the case for change would be that much more persuasive. In practice, the question is not whether a system is or is not responsive, efficient and honest in the absolute, but whether it is more responsive, more efficient and more honest than other available alternatives. When the major local governance reforms of the 1980s and 1990s were introduced the answer to these comparative questions could only be speculative. Political theorists, like the public, had experience only of the all-purpose elected councils. Now, however, comparative questions are less speculative, since we have some, albeit limited, experience of alternatives. In this chapter we look at public images and perceptions of alternative systems of local governance. Although we focus more upon perceptions of the traditional elected local councils than the newer,

85

86 Models of Local Governance

appointed rivals, and although the public may still have relatively little experience of those rivals, we also pose some comparative questions.

Representation and responsiveness Democracy requires representative and responsive governance. That is not to say that these are always desirable in terms of efficiency or ‘good government’, however defined. But it is to say that they are always desirable in terms of democratic government.1 Overall, the public’s perception of the responsiveness of any form of local governance was no more than lukewarm. We asked whether people felt that their local council ‘generally took decisions that represented the views of local people’. Among the public, opinion was neither clear-cut nor firmly held: 60 per cent agreed with the proposition that their local council’s decisions were representative, but 66 per cent were willing to agree to the opposite proposition, that their decisions were not representative. (As usual we put these alternative propositions to randomly selected half-samples.) The public was 20 per cent more willing to agree that their council relied more on the views of ‘experts rather than their voters’ than to agree with the opposite proposition. But only a minority, though a substantial one (41 per cent), agreed that their local council ‘doesn’t care about the views of people like me’. Significantly less, about 25 per cent, felt that the people they met in everyday life generally disregarded or failed to take account of their views and opinions. So this was to some extent a statement about the unresponsiveness of their local council rather than a mere admission that their own views generally carried no weight. But judged by a similarly worded question, slightly more of the public (47 per cent) thought that the appointed boards of enterprise companies and health authorities did not care about their views. So on a comparative basis, elected councils scored slightly better than these appointed boards in terms of perceived responsiveness. Yet it is surprising perhaps that an elected authority scored so little better than these appointed boards. And indeed, the ‘local police force’ scored better than all three on responsiveness, despite being controlled more by appointed representatives of various kinds. Moreover, as we shall see in the next chapter, nearly three-quarters of the public viewed local community groups as better than elected councillors at representing them.

The Image of Traditional Local Government 87 Table 5.1

Representation and responsiveness %

Local councils like the council in [council]… *generally take decisions that represent the views of local people *do not represent the views of local people Local councils like the council in [council]… *rely on the views of experts rather than their voters *do what is popular with the voters rather than rely on the views of experts People I meet in everyday life generally… *take account of my views and opinions *disregard my views and opinions The local council doesn’t care about the views of people like me The local health authority doesn’t care about the views of people like me The local enterprise company doesn’t care about the views of people like me The local police force doesn’t care about the views of people like me

60 66 74 54 68 17 41 46 48 26

Note: * These two versions of the question were put to randomly selected split-half samples

Interests Special interests So, if the public were no more than lukewarm about the extent to which elected councils reflected and responded to their own views, did they think councils were over-responsive to special interests of any kind? We asked whether local councils were dominated by business interests or, alternatively, whether they failed to take them sufficiently into account, whether the council weighted its service provision towards poorer or richer areas, and whether the council was too willing to accept or reject the dictates of central government. Among the public, opinion seemed fairly evenly divided on all these questions – though that may have reflected indecision and vagueness rather than a sharp division of opinion within the public. When we framed the question in a different way we got a much clearer result. We asked whether nine groups had ‘too much or too little influence over decisions about local services’. In each case about a quarter of the public, without any prompting, said the degree of influence was about right, but most people took a view, and their views varied sharply across the nine groups.

88 Models of Local Governance Table 5.2

Council bias %

Local councils like the council in [council]… *are dominated by business interests *do not take enough account of business interests Local councils like the council in [council] provide better services… *in poor areas where people need them most *in rich areas where people need them least Local councils like the council in [council] are too willing…. *to reject instructions from central government *to accept instructions from central government

62 51 44 46 48 59

Note: * These two versions of the question were put to randomly selected split-half samples.

On balance, the public did not think that either their elected local councillors or local businessmen had much too much or too little influence. But by a margin of over 30 per cent they thought local taxpayers, and racial or ethnic groups, had too little. And by margins of up to twice that much the public claimed that local voters, ordinary council workers and women’s groups had too little influence. Conversely, by a margin of 35 per cent they felt that senior local government officials (local government bureaucrats rather than politicians) had too much influence. And by a margin of 54 per cent they felt that central government had too much. Indeed there was a striking contrast between the public’s assertion by a margin of 54 per cent that central government had too much influence over decisions about local services, and their assertion by a similar margin of 60 per cent that local voters had too little. It seems that the fairly even balance of public opinion on whether their local council was too willing to accept or reject instructions from central government reflected wearied resignation, or the desire to avoid interinstitutional conflict, rather than agreement that the balance of power between local and central government was about right. Self-interest Tabloid journalists and political opponents of local government politicians (sometimes within the same party) frequently accuse them of ‘junketing’ – using their office for personal gain, usually very small personal gains but offensive to local taxpayers nonetheless. And even

The Image of Traditional Local Government 89

when local councillors are not accused of financial corruption they may be accused of excessive self-importance. We asked questions designed to elicit such feelings among the public. First we asked randomly selected half-samples of the public whether the phrases ‘they have the good of the community at heart’ and ‘they are in it for personal gain’ matched their image of elected local councillors and appointed board members. Almost twice as many had an image of councillors acting ‘for the good of the community’ (79 per cent) as for ‘personal gain’ (42 per cent). Similarly, almost twice as many had an image of councillors driven by ‘a sense of duty to their fellow citizens’ (80 per cent) as by a desire for personal prestige (44 per cent). Public attitudes towards appointed board members of TEC/LECs or DHA/HBs were similar: again twice as many took the favourable as the unfavourable view – on the pursuit of both personal gain and personal prestige. Certainly we could get a substantial minority to agree to critical comments about the self-seeking of elected councillors and appointed board members, but it was far easier to get them to agree to positive statements. And, significantly, the balance of these positive and negative

Table 5.3

Too much or too little influence? % ‘too much’ minus % ‘too little’

Groups which have too much or too little influence over what local services are provided by public bodies: central government senior local government officials elected councillors local businessmen racial and ethnic groups those who pay most in local taxes women’s groups those who vote in local elections ordinary council workers

54 35 3 –10 –30 –32 –49 –60 –63

Note: Although the question only asked whether each group had ‘too much or too little influence’, large numbers of respondents spontaneously replied ‘neither too much nor too little – about right’, or words to that effect. Excluding the question about central government on which opinion was more one-sided, the numbers replying ‘neither’ ranged from 21 per cent to 32 per cent. Consequently, in this table, we have not treated this response as a ‘don’t know’ to be excluded from our calculation of percentages. Instead we report the difference between the ‘too much’ and ‘too little’ percentages, calculated as a percentage of all three responses – ‘too much’, ‘too little’ and ‘neither’.

90 Models of Local Governance Table 5.4

Self-interest %

Local councillors… *have the good of the community at heart *are in it for personal gain *have a sense of duty towards their fellow citizens *just want people to look up to them People appointed to DHA/HBs… *have the good of the community at heart *are in it for personal gain *have a sense of duty towards their fellow citizens *just want people to look up to them People appointed to TEC/LECs… *have the good of the community at heart *are in it for personal gain *have a sense of duty towards their fellow citizens *just want people to look up to them

79 42 80 44 66 31 73 31 73 41 70 37

Note: * The two versions of each question were put to randomly selected split-half samples.

statements about self-seeking provided almost no basis in public opinion for discriminating between different systems of local governance. Corruption The word ‘corruption’ implies rather more than junketing or selfseeking. We asked people whether they thought local councils were more or less corrupt than private businesses. We could get 35 per cent to agree that local councils were ‘more corrupt’, but 51 per cent to agree that they were ‘less corrupt’. On balance therefore, public opinion seemed to favour local councils over private business and councillors over private businessmen, though not by a very large margin.

Effectiveness Efficiency and waste Some right-wing theorists and politicians allege that public authorities in general, and local councils in particular, are prone to waste taxpayers’

The Image of Traditional Local Government 91 Table 5.5

Corruption %

Local councils like the council in [council] are generally… * more corrupt than private businesses * less corrupt than private businesses

35 51

Note:* The two versions of this question were put to randomly selected-split half samples.

money by over-providing unwanted or unnecessary services or by operating inefficiently, using old-fashioned methods and weak labour discipline. We found 61 per cent of the public agreed that their local council ‘wasted a good deal of taxpayers’ money’. However, when we asked exactly the same question about Parliament and central government, a massive 91 per cent agreed. Compared to central government, therefore, the local council had a relatively frugal image. We investigated attitudes towards the allegation of over-provision directly by putting the proposition that local councils ‘raise high local taxes to provide unnecessary services’ to half the sample. At the same time we investigated perceptions of under-provision by putting the opposite proposition that local councils ‘fail to provide services up to proper national standards because they are unwilling to raise local taxes’ to the other half of the sample. Although 47 per cent agreed there was over-provision, 41 per cent agreed there was under-provision. So on balance, there was no clear public view that councils either overprovided or under-provided services. That leaves the allegation of inefficient organization. Only 22 per cent were willing to agree that local councils were ‘more efficient than private businesses’ while 66 per cent were willing to agree that councils were ‘less efficient’. So the margin by which the public concluded that councils were less efficient than private business was almost three times as large as the margin by which the public concluded that councils were less corrupt than private business. The public’s image of council inefficiency was much stronger than their image of council probity. However, the public’s very sharp image of ‘private businesses’ being more efficient than councils did not extend to appointed boards, even though these were meant to introduce the methods and personnel of private business into local governance. By a margin

92 Models of Local Governance Table 5.6

Efficiency %

Parliament and the government waste a good deal of taxpayers’ money The council in [council] waste a good deal of taxpayers’ money

92 61

Local councils like the council in [council]… *raise high local taxes to provide unnecessary services *fail to provide services up to proper national standards because they are unwilling to raise local taxes

41

Local councils like the council in [council]… *are generally more efficient than private businesses *are generally less efficient than private businesses

22 66

Local councillors… *are good at organizing things *are not very good at organizing things

57 45

People appointed to DHA/HBs… *are good at organizing things *are not very good at organizing things

55 50

People appointed to TEC/LECs… *are good at organizing things *are not very good at organizing things

69 38

47

Note: * The two versions of each question were put to randomly selected split-half samples.

of 31 per cent the public thought appointed board members of TEC/LECs were ‘good at organizing things’ rather than ‘not very good’. But with the same question wording, a margin of 12 per cent of the public agreed that local councillors were also ‘good at organizing things’ rather than ‘not very good’. And that was a better margin than in the public’s assessment of the organizing ability of DHA/HB boards (only a 5 per cent margin). Thus, while the public were very clear that councils were less efficient than private businesses, they did not feel that the appointed board members who ran public services through quangos were necessarily better organizers than elected councillors. Capability But however well organized central and local government may be, many desirable goals may still be beyond their capabilities. So we asked whether central and local government could do ‘very little’ or ‘quite a

The Image of Traditional Local Government 93

bit’ towards achieving each of nine goals, taking the percentage who answered ‘quite a bit’ as an indicator of perceived capability. Local councils scored surprisingly well in comparison with central government. The top scores were 83 per cent for central government’s ability to ‘improve health and social services’ and 87 per cent for local councils’ ability to ‘improve their area as a place to live in’. The lowest scores were 64 per cent for central government’s ability to ‘keep prices down’ and 53 per cent for local councils’ ability to ‘improve employment prospects in their area’. The generally high scores for local government suggest that the community governance role for local authorities is one that the public may find convincing. Comparing public perceptions of central and local government capabilities on similar goals, central government scored 18 per cent higher on its ability to ‘improve health and social services’ and 13 per cent higher on its ability to ‘improve employment prospects’. But central government scored only 6 per cent higher on its ability to ‘cut crime’. And local councils’ ability to ‘improve their area as a place to live’ was rated 12 per cent higher than central government’s ability to ‘improve the general standard of living’ – not an identical goal but one that should be considered the ‘corresponding goal’ appropriate to a different level of government. Overall therefore, people did not see local councils as much less capable of achieving locally defined goals than central government was of achieving nationally defined goals.

Table 5.7

Capability %

British governments can do ‘quite a bit’ to… improve health and social services improve the general standard of living cut crime reduce unemployment keep prices down Average for British governments Local councils can do ‘quite a bit’ to… improve their area as a place to live improve heath and social services in their area cut crime in their area improve employment prospects in their area Average for local councils

83 75 69 66 64 71 87 65 63 53 67

94 Models of Local Governance

Effective channels of protest Related to perceptions of capability in terms of goals are public perceptions of local and central government – and other institutions – as effective channels for public discontent. We asked people to ‘suppose that [the government/your local council/your local enterprise company/your district health authority/your local police authority] proposed to do something you thought was really unjust or harmful [and would/but would not] directly affect you’. Then we asked respondents to give us ‘a mark out of ten’ to indicate ‘how effective’ they thought’ it would be ‘to [protest/complain]… • to your MP? • to your local councillor? • to [the offices of the appropriate government department/the district council/your local enterprise company/your district health authority/the police themselves]? (depending on the institution proposing the unjust or harmful action) • to newspapers, radio or television?’ Subtracting five from these marks provides a scale of perceived effectiveness that runs from minus five to plus five, with zero as a neutral point which we can regard as ‘neither very effective nor ineffective’. This was a complex question. As usual, alternatives within square brackets were applied to randomly selected subsamples. The question involved three different and simultaneous randomizations. To simplify the analysis, let us ignore the distinctions between ‘protest’ and ‘complain’ and between whether the action ‘would’ or ‘would not’ directly affect the respondent. Effectively we are then averaging out the answers across those variants of the question. And, for the moment, let

Table 5.8

Generally effective as channels of protest Mean score on ± 5 scale

How effective would it be to [protest/complain] to… newspapers, radio or television your local councillor your MP relevant institution proposing the unjust or harmful action

1.1 0.3 0.1 0.0

The Image of Traditional Local Government 95

us also ignore the distinctions between which of the five institutions was proposing the ‘unjust or harmful’ action. On the ±5-point scale, the public rated the effectiveness of complaints or protests to the mass media as most effective, complaints or protests to councillors as much less effective and to MPs or the institution proposing the unjust or harmful action as even less effective. Irrespective of the institution proposing the action, complaints to the mass media were rated most effective, and its rating hardly varied. MPs came second, but a poor second, for effective protests or complaints about central government actions. But local councillors came second to the media in all other situations, and they came a very respectable second for effective protests or complaints about local council actions – more effective than MPs were for complaints about central government. Protests and complaints directly addressed to the specific institution which was proposing the ‘unjust or harmful’ action – ‘the offices of the appropriate government department’, ‘the district council’, ‘your local enterprise company’, ‘your district health authority’, or ‘the police themselves’ – were rated most effective when they involved the local council, least effective when they involved a department of central government, and intermediate when they involved quangos such as TEC/LECs or DHA/HBs. But they were never rated as highly as protests or complaints to elected councillors, even when the council itself was not directly involved. But although protests or complaints through the mass media were considered the most effective they were difficult to achieve and the public used them relatively infrequently.2 People were most likely to have complained to their local councillor, their district council or their MP.3 They were less likely to have complained to the offices of a central government department or to the police. They were even less likely to have complained to the mass media or their district health authority. And they were very unlikely indeed to have complained to the relatively new and relatively obscure TEC/LECs. When they voted with their feet, therefore, they opted for elected councillors and MPs as their main channels of protest and least of all for appointed boards.

Satisfaction and trust Using similar ±5-point scales we measured the public’s satisfaction with the overall service and value for money provided by local

96 Models of Local Governance Table 5.9

Specifically effective as channels of protest Mean score on ± 5 scale

*How effective would it be to [protest/complain] about actions of the government to… newspapers, radio or television your MP your local councillor offices of the appropriate government department

1.1 0.0 –0.2 –0.6

*How effective would it be to [protest/complain] about actions of your local council to… newspapers, radio or television your local councillor the district council your MP

1.2 0.7 0.4 0.4

*How effective would it be to [protest/complain] about actions of your local TEC/LEC to… newspapers, radio or television your local councillor your MP your local enterprise company

1.2 0.3 0.0 –0.3

*How effective would it be to [protest/complain] about actions of your local DHA/HB to… newspapers, radio or television your local councillor your MP your district health authority

1.0 0.2 0.1 0.0

*How effective would it be to [protest/complain] about actions of your local police authority to… newspapers, radio or television your local councillor the police themselves your MP

1.2 0.3 0.1 0.1

Note: * These five versions of the questions were put to randomly selected sub-samples.

councils, and compared it with the public’s satisfaction with other providers of local services. The public rated satisfaction with local councils rather lower than their satisfaction with local tradesmen they had employed to do household repairs (if any) or their local (now privatized) electricity supplier,

The Image of Traditional Local Government 97 Table 5.10

Actually used as channels of protest %

Ever [protested/complained] in person, or by phone or letter to… your local councillor *the district council your MP *offices of the appropriate government department *the police themselves newspapers, radio or television *your district health authority *your local enterprise company

36 32 31 24 22 17 15 4

Note: * These five versions of the question were put to randomly selected sub-samples.

and much lower than their satisfaction with their (DHA/HB-provided) local doctor – though that probably reflects the public’s notorious, almost superstitious, faith in their doctors. We also asked people to provide, on the same scale, a measure of their trust in elected councils and appointed boards ‘to do what is right for their areas’, and their trust in ‘parliament and the government to do what is right for Britain’. Compared to these other public service providers, it was local councils that scored highest on trust, somewhat higher than the appointed boards and far higher than central government.

Influences on images Images of local governance did not vary greatly across different social groups. Class, for example, had very little effect upon images except for a slight tendency for middle-class identifiers to defend both local and national government against crude charges that they wasted taxpayers’ money. Women were somewhat more likely than men to allege that the council wasted taxpayers’ money. And unsurprisingly, women were somewhat more likely than men to say that ‘women’s groups’ had too little influence upon decisions about local public services. But apart from that their image of local governance hardly differed from that of men. The highly educated were distinguished most by their actual complaints to MPs and the mass media, but not by any special expectation that they would be effective.

98 Models of Local Governance Table 5.11

Satisfaction and trust Mean score on ± 5 scale

Satisfaction with the overall service and value for money you receive from… local doctor electricity supplier tradesmen who have done household repairs for you (if any) local council

1.8 1.3

How much can you trust, to do what is right for their areas… people elected to local councils people appointed to DHA/HBs businessmen appointed to TEC/LECs

0.8 0.6 0.4

How much can you trust Parliament and government to do what is right for Britain

–0.7

3.0 2.0

Age had more effect on images of local governance than any other social variable. Older people were especially critical of the supposed excess influence of ethnic groups, women’s groups, council employees and even local voters. They were particularly satisfied with the services provided by their local council – but also with every other provider of services about whom we asked. They were particularly convinced that the local council and local health authority cared about their views. They were particularly likely to have contacted a local councillor, though not an MP or the press. And they were particularly likely to trust elected councillors – though also more likely than younger people to trust health board members, Parliament and the government. People with a relatively right-wing self-image, or Conservative rather than Labour preferences, tended to defend the motivations and responsiveness of appointed boards, defend the influence of local businessmen over public services, and criticize the undue influence of ethnic groups or women’s groups. Right-wingers were also unusually ready to defend the quality of service given by any provider other than the local council. People with a strong sense of identification with their district were particularly willing to defend the quality of council services, though they also tended to defend the quality of local services provided by others, if to a lesser extent.

The Image of Traditional Local Government 99

The influence of social background, ideological self-image and local identification can be summarized quite well by focusing on the correlation between these factors and the level of trust expressed by the public in elected councillors, appointed board members and central government. Age correlated positively, though to varying degrees, with all of these: older people were just generally trusting, though particularly with respect to local councils. Middle-class identification only correlated noticeably with trust in central government. Most interesting are the correlations between trust on the one hand and local identification or right-wing self-images on the other. Trust in local councillors correlated fairly strongly with local identification but hardly at all with left–right ideology. Conversely, trust in central government correlated strongly with right-wing self-images but fairly weakly with local identification. Trust in health boards correlated equally well with both local and ideological identities. And trust in TEC/LECs correlated more with ideology than with local identification. Thus the balance of influence shifts steadily from local identification to right-wing ideology as we move from councillors, through DHA/HBs and TEC/LECs to central government. Table 5.12

Correlations with social background, local identity or ideology Middle-class Age identity corr ¥ 100 corr ¥ 100

Trust to do what is right for their areas… people elected to local councils people appointed to DHA/HBs businessmen appointed to TEC/LECs Trust to do what is right for Britain… Parliament and government

Identification with district corr ¥ 100

Right-wingself image corr ¥ 100

–

19

22

–

–

11

18

17

–

–

14

22

15

11

13

35

Notes: 1. Identification with district coded on 11-point scale from –5 to +5. 2. Right-wing self image coded on a 7-point scale: strongly left, left, centre-left, centre, centre-right, right, strongly right. 3. Correlations less than 0.10 replaced by a dash.

100 Models of Local Governance Table 5.13

Levels of trust by social background, local identity or ideology Trust elected Trust appointed Trust appointed Trust Parliament councillors DHA/HB board TEC/LEC board and government members members Mean score on Mean score on Mean score on Mean score on ± 5 scale ± 5 scale ± 5 scale ± 5 scale

Class self-image: middle class working class Age: young (18–34) middle-aged (35–54) old (55 and over) Identification with district: lowest quintile (score <0) second (score 0) mid-quintile (score 1,2) fourth (score 3,4) highest quintile (score 5) Ideological self-image: left centre-left centre centre-right right

0.9 0.7

0.8 0.6

0.6 0.3

–0.2 –0.9

0.3

0.5

0.4

–0.9

0.7 1.2

0.4 1.0

0.4 0.5

–0.8 –0.4

0.1 0.5

–0.1 0.5

–0.2 0.4

–1.4 –0.8

0.7 1.0

0.5 0.8

0.4 0.7

–0.6 –0.4

1.2

0.9

0.6

–0.6

0.7 1.0 0.7 0.8 0.8

0.1 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.0

–0.3 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.8

–1.7 –0.9 –0.7 –0.1 0.5

The same conclusions can be drawn from an inspection of the mean scores for trust within different social and political categories (Table 5.13). And if we divide the public at the median on both ideology and local identification, we can see how levels of trust varied with combinations of local and ideological identity (Table 5.14). By that test, trust in councillors was influenced exclusively by local identity rather than by ideology while trust in central government was influenced mainly by ideology. But trust in appointed boards was influenced by both local identity and ideology.

The Image of Traditional Local Government 101 Table 5.14 Trust by combinations of left–right ideology and local identification Low district identification (up to 2) Mean score on ± 5 scale Trust elected local councillors: left or centre-left right, centre-right or centre

High district identification (3 or more) Mean score on ± 5 scale

0.4

1.2

0.5

1.1

Trust DHA/HB or TEC/LEC board members: left or centre-left right, centre-right or centre

–0.1

0.5

0.7

1.1

Trust Parliament and government: left or centre-left right, centre-right or centre

–1.6

–1.1

0

0.3

Note: These divisions on ideology and local district identification divide the sample into four approximately equal subsamples.

These patterns are illustrated in Figure 5.1. Those who identified strongly with their district had a high level of trust in councillors. So the rising bars for trust in councillors are higher at the back than at the front. By contrast, right-wingers had a high level of trust in a central government that was, at the time, a right-wing government. So the rising bars for trust in the government and Parliament are very much higher on the right than on the left, and only slightly higher at the back. But both strong local identifiers and right-wingers had a relatively high level of trust in local appointed boards, TEC/LECs and DHA/HBs. So the rising bars for trust in appointed board members are higher both at the back-left and at the front-right than they are at the front-left, and by roughly the same amount – indicating roughly an equal impact on trust in appointed boards from either localism or right-wing ideology. And the bar at the back-right is considerably higher still, showing the impact of the combination of localism and right-wing ideology.

102 Models of Local Governance Figure 5.1

Trust in councillors, board members and government.

Mean scores for trust on ± 5 pont scale

1.5

1

0.5 0 –0.5 Trust govt

–1 Trust appointed board members

Trust councillors –1.5

High district identification Low High district identification Low

–2

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High district identification

Even though general levels of trust in local councillors did not seem to be much influenced by ideology, it might be thought the interaction between the public’s own ideology and their perception of their local council’s ideology would have an impact. Left-wingers who lived in areas controlled by a right-wing council, or right-wingers who lived in areas controlled by a left-wing council, might be more inclined to distrust councillors.(5.15) In fact, left-wingers who lived in places which they said had nearly always been controlled by a Conservative district council expressed almost as much trust in councillors as other left-wingers who had lived under near-permanent Labour councils. Right-wingers were somewhat more sensitive to the partisanship of their council, however. Rightwingers who lived under near-permanent Labour councils differed from other right-wingers who had lived under near-permanent Conservative councils by 0.4 on our scale of trust in councillors. So, for

The Image of Traditional Local Government 103 Table 5.15 scores)

Trust in councillors by personal ideology and party control (mean

Party control of the local district council… nearly always nearly always changed changed Conservative Labour occasionally often Personal self-image: left or centre-left right, centre-right or centre

0.7

0.8

1.1

1.1

0.9

0.5

1.2

1.0

right-wingers, the long-term partisanship of the local council did make some difference to their trust in local councillors. But significantly, the highest levels of trust in local councillors expressed by both left- and right-wingers occurred not under near-permanent Labour or Conservative councils, but in places where the party control of the local district council had changed ‘occasionally’ or ‘often’ in the past.

Conclusion: low on efficiency but high on honesty and trustworthiness The public were no more than lukewarm about the responsiveness, as they saw it, of local councils, but they thought appointed boards no better in this respect. They criticized elected local councils for being too subservient to central government and non-elected local bureaucrats. But they felt most other local groups – including local businessmen, ethnic and gender groups, local taxpayers, local voters and local council employees – had too little rather than too much influence over decisions about local services. On balance, the public saw local councillors as motivated by a desire to serve their community rather than by a desire for personal gain or prestige – as much as those appointed to DHA/HB boards and more so than those appointed to TEC/LEC boards. Councils appeared rather less corrupt than private businesses, though much less efficient. The public thought appointed TEC/LEC board members particularly good at organization though appointed DHA/HB board members seemed no better at organizing things than councillors. These images of council probity but business efficiency were consistent with public levels of satisfaction and trust. The public was less

104 Models of Local Governance

satisfied with the services provided by local councils than those provided by local doctors, electricity suppliers or tradesmen. But it trusted elected councillors more than appointed board members and far more than central government. These levels of trust were influenced, in different ways, by ideological and local identifications. Local identification dominated trust in elected councillors while ideological identification dominated trust in central government. What is particularly interesting is that both these identifications – local and ideological – influenced trust in appointed local governance boards. Right-wingers liked appointed boards, no doubt in part because these boards were the creatures of a right-wing Conservative government. But those with the strongest commitment to their localities were also more willing to trust these appointed boards, presumably because they saw them as more than mere creatures of a right-wing central government – genuinely local even if also ideologically driven. As we shall see in later chapters the attitudes and opinions of the people appointed to these boards were in fact locally oriented as well as ideologically driven. So there was some truth in this aspect of public perceptions.

6 Institutional Preferences

In this chapter we look at public views about the best institutions and mechanisms for delivering local services. Institutional preferences are linked to views about the aims and objectives of local governance. But institutional preferences are not dictated by views about objectives: the connection is a matter of choice rather than strict logical necessity. Support for no more than a minimal range of local public services does not, in fact, determine views about whether these services should be delivered by elected councils or by appointed boards. It is possible to oppose local socialism or local social democracy without opposing local political democracy. The connection between attitudes to purposes and to institutions is detectable but remarkably weak. So before we investigate that connection we shall focus our attention on the public’s institutional preferences for local governance as an important aspect of public opinion in its own right.

Localism How local? The arguments for larger or smaller local authority areas are fairly well known.1 Some services may benefit from economies of scale that require a relatively large organization spanning a wide geographic area. And questions of equity or national standards may also be easier to address if the geographic scope of the organization is larger rather than smaller. On the other hand, the essence of local governance is that it should be local. Any argument for local governance at all inevitably implies that it should be as local as is practically possible – arguments, for example, that focus on the need for responsiveness, variety, representation or local knowledge. 105

106 Models of Local Governance

In principle the concept of subsidiarity solves the problem by asserting that all government should operate on as local a scale as is possible but cover as wide an area as is necessary. But this principle provides little guidance in practice if a single institution is to be responsible for providing a comprehensive range of different services, since the balance between economies of scale and the need to accommodate local circumstances may vary considerably from one service to another. However, the principle of subsidiarity can be invoked to justify a more complex system of governance involving various multi-purpose and single-purpose authorities operating on different geographic scales – neighbourhoods, council districts, the regions of Britain, Britain itself or the European Union – appropriate to the services that they deliver. We asked people whether they thought each of eight different services was best provided by an authority operating on the scale of their local council district, their region (one of the ten into which we divided Britain) or Britain as a whole. Overall, averaging across these eight services, the district was chosen by 44 per cent, Britain by 32 per cent and the region by 24 per cent. But public awareness of the need for different services to be organized in different ways was more striking than the fact that local districts came top on the average. The average was a purely arithmetical construct, not a general choice for all public services.

Table 6.1

Best size for different services? Service would be best provided by a body responsible for an area about the size of… the district council %

Refuse collection Leisure services Schools/education Roads Police Environment/pollution Hospitals/ health Economic development Average

84 82 42 33 32 30 26 20 44

the region %

Britain as a whole %

10 13 29 29 28 21 33 29 24

6 5 29 38 41 49 41 51 32

Note: Rows sorted by percentage naming district as the best scale for providing the service.

Institutional Preferences 107

Overwhelmingly the public said that refuse collection and leisure services should operate on the scale of their district council. But it was divided three ways on education, roads and the police, though tilting towards the district on education and towards Britain on roads and police. The public was also divided on services concerning the environment and pollution, hospitals and health, and economic development, but more clearly inclined towards having these services organized and controlled at a national rather than a local level. The public never placed the region in top place for any of these services, though the region came second to the district on refuse collection, leisure and education, and second to Britain-wide organization on hospitals, health and economic development. Indeed, although the local district was the single most popular choice (with an average of 44 per cent support) to run the eight services specified in our questions, a majority chose a higher level of government of some kind. So on balance, averaging across these eight services, people seemed to think their district was too small to run the service. That conclusion was confirmed when we asked explicitly whether the ‘[district] council area is too [big/small] for the provision of local services like health, education and policing?’ In reply, 18 per cent agreed that their district was ‘too big’ but 38 per cent agreed that it was ‘too small’. At the time of our survey local district councils existed. Some higher tier local authorities also remained in England though the Greater London Council and the English metropolitan councils had been abolished a few years earlier and the Scottish regional councils were in the process of abolition. However, with the single exception of the GLC, abolished in 1985, elected authorities on the scale of our ten specified regions had never existed in Britain. Scottish ‘regional’ authorities had covered regions within Scotland, not Scotland as a whole. And English counties, even the metropolitan counties prior to 1985, had been

Table 6.2

District council area is too big or too small? %

*Too big *Too small

18 38

Note: * These two versions of the question were put to randomly selected split-half samples.

108 Models of Local Governance

much smaller than the ten regions into which we divided Britain – and which we specified by name in our question about organizing services at the level of the respondent’s region. Consequently our question included references to the district and to Britain which already had elected governments, and to the respondent’s region which, London excepted, had never had an elected regional government. 2 Given the hypothetical nature of regional government at the time, it is perhaps significant that as many as 24 per cent on average opted for regional control of local services. Elsewhere in the interview we asked directly: ‘Would you support or oppose giving greater powers of self-government to [region], by means of an elected council or assembly for the whole of [region]?’ For each respondent, our CATI system automatically inserted the actual name of their particular region into the question. A clear majority supported the idea of an elected council for their region as a whole. Support for regional government varied. In our survey, as might be expected, support was highest in Scotland (where ‘Scotland’ itself was substituted for [region] in the question) by a margin of at least 11 per cent compared to any other region. But support for elected regional government ran as high in London and the north of England as in Wales. Indeed, on our figures, it was higher in London than in Wales.

Table 6.3

Support elected regional governments? %

Support (unconditionally) Support, if locals want it Oppose

56 4 40

Unconditionally support elected regional government within… Scotland London NW England Wales Yorkshire/Humberside NE England East Anglia Midlands SW England SE England

76 65 64 61 59 55 52 49 48 46

Note: Within region entries sorted by levels of support.

Institutional Preferences 109

That reflects the pattern of local and regional identities that we found in Chapter 3. Support for elected regional government was highest in those regions where the strength of regional identity most exceeded the strength of local district identity – in the north, and especially in Scotland, because regional identity was so strong, and within London because local (borough) identity was so weak. The recent reorganization of local government raised questions about who should fix local government boundaries. In England and Wales, new boundaries were fixed by independent commissions after public hearings (although Parliament had the final decision). But in Scotland, new boundaries were drawn up in private by civil servants from the Scottish Office working directly under the control of the Secretary of State, and then imposed despite widespread allegations of gerrymandering. We asked who should decide ‘the boundaries and sizes of local councils like [district]?’ We offered respondents a choice of ‘central government, a joint committee of neighbouring local councils, independent experts, or the local people in a referendum’. The public’s top choice was a referendum (46 per cent) followed by a joint committee of local councils (31 per cent). Central government, such as the Secretary of State for Scotland, won very little public support (9 per cent) and even ‘independent experts’ only got 15 per cent support. Central versus local control Paralleling the high levels of support for local autonomy that we found in Chapter 4, there was widespread public support for local councils to have the final say in disputes with central government if they had obtained a clear electoral mandate locally. If a local council ‘got the support of local people by winning a local [election/referendum] on an issue, but the government is opposed to it’ an overwhelming majority (86 per cent) of the public said that the local council ‘should have the final say’. It made very little difference whether our question was phrased in terms of a mandate obtained at a local election or by means of a local referendum.

Table 6.4

Who should fix local government boundaries? %

Local people in a referendum Joint committee of local councils Independent experts Central government

46 31 15 9

110 Models of Local Governance

But public ambivalence towards local autonomy versus national standards was reflected in answers to another question. We asked respondents to ‘suppose that a local council wants to do something which it is legally entitled to do and for which it has the support of a majority of voters in its area, but a minority in the area are bitterly opposed to it’. And in those circumstances we asked whether it would be ‘right and proper for the minority to campaign against the decision at the next local elections’ or to ‘appeal to central government to step in and overrule the local council’. In reply, 54 per cent said it would be quite ‘right and proper’ for the local minority to ‘appeal to central government to step in and overrule the local council’ which implies support for political limitations on local autonomy – over and above any legal limitations. Certainly, that was far less than the 83 per cent who thought it ‘right and proper’ for the local minority simply to ‘campaign against the council decision at the next local elections’. And accepting the minority’s right to appeal over the head of their local council is not quite the same as asserting that central government should actually overrule the local council, though it would be a pointless exercise if central government were always to reject such appeals. Nonetheless, even 54 per cent indicates a substantial degree of acceptance for practical limitations on the autonomy of local councils. Moreover, the public saw central government as a useful mechanism for ensuring ‘proper standards in local services such as health, education or policing’. When asked to choose the best way of ensuring such ‘proper standards’, 39 per cent opted for (central) ‘government inspectors’ and 29 per cent for using the ‘courts to claim compensation for poor services’. Only 32 per cent opted to rely on voter power in local elections.

Table 6.5

The final say: local or central government? %

Local rather than central govt should have the final say… *after a local election on the issue *after a local referendum on the issue Note: * These two versions of the question were put to randomly selected split-half samples.

88 83

Institutional Preferences 111 Table 6.6

Proper rights for local minorities %

If a local council wants to do something which it is legally entitled to do and for which it has the support of a majority of voters in its area, but a minority in the area are bitterly opposed to it, then it would be right and proper for the minority to... campaign against the council decision at the next local election appeal to central government to overrule the local council

83 54

Democracy Direct democracy When asked, the public usually tend to support mechanisms of direct democracy. We have already seen that a local referendum was the most popular public choice of mechanism for fixing local government boundaries. Similarly, when faced with the more general proposition that ‘[national/local] political issues are too complex to be decided by everyone voting in a referendum and should be left to [Parliament/the local council] to decide’, 65 per cent disagreed. That indicates rather firm public support for referenda despite our intentionally discouraging question wording. But it was support for direct democracy at any level rather than for specifically local referenda. In fact support for referenda in national politics ran at 69 per cent while support for referenda in local politics ran at only 61 per cent. Another traditional mechanism of direct democracy, now part of New Labour’s local government reform programme, is a directly elected executive mayor. We found public support for that was even higher. Although we avoided the somewhat ambiguous and Anglocentric term ‘mayor’ in our interviews, 78 per cent of the public agreed that ‘the leader of the council should be directly elected by

Table 6.7

Best way to ensure proper standards in local services? %

National government inspectors Voter power in local elections Individuals going to court and claiming compensation

39 32 29

112 Models of Local Governance Table 6.8

Populist attitudes / Support for direct democracy %

Support referenda (by disagreeing with anti-referendum question)… *in national politics *in local politics

69 61

Council leader should be directly rather than indirectly elected

78

Council decisions would be improved by having… *more councillors *fewer councillors

26 58

Note: * The two versions of each question were put to randomly selected split-half samples.

voters to [represent/carry out the will of] the people as a whole, and not be elected by councillors as at present’. Our wording posed a clear choice between a directly or indirectly elected chief executive. Support for directly elected council leaders was very high everywhere. It only varied by a few per cent across the regions of Britain. Significantly, it was lowest in London at 72 per cent. That was still a very high figure. But what distinguished Londoners from others in our survey was their unusually high level of support for a Londonwide tier of regional government rather than unusually high support for an elected mayor. Along with public support for a greater role for themselves as voters, there was public support for a reduction in the number of their elected representatives. We suggested that ‘council decisions would be improved by having [more/less] councillors on each council than at present’. Only 26 per cent agreed that more councillors would improve decisions, while 58 per cent agreed that fewer councillors would do so. Monitoring quangos Elected local councils won more support when contrasted with nonelected bodies than when contrasted with the people themselves. We reminded our respondents that ‘many local services are no longer provided by elected local councils but by specialist bodies like health authorities (boards in Scotland), NHS trusts, Training and Enterprise Councils (Local Enterprise Companies in Scotland), and school boards’. Then we asked how these non-elected bodies should relate to central and local government. We divided our respondents randomly into two half-samples.

Institutional Preferences 113

In one half-sample, we focused attention on the locus of accountability for these non-elected bodies and asked whether ‘these non-elected bodies should normally: • be responsible to central government? • be responsible to local councils? • act like private companies and decide their own affairs?’ To prevent the sequencing of these three alternatives affecting the results we used the facilities of our CATI program to permute the sequence randomly. A very large majority of the public, 68 per cent, said these non-elected bodies should be responsible to elected local councils. A further 20 per cent said they should be responsible to central government. And a mere 12 per cent that they should be left to run their own affairs. In the other half-sample, we focused attention on the degree of accountability for these non-elected bodies and asked whether councils should: • ‘have powers to control these non-elected bodies? • have powers to investigate these non-elected bodies, but not to control them directly? • leave these non-elected bodies to get on with managing their own affairs?’ Once again, we used the facilities of our CATI program to permute the sequencing of these alternatives randomly to avoid any tendency for people to opt for the first or the last of a set of three somewhat wordy alternatives. A clear majority (57 per cent) said local councils should have powers of investigation but not of control. Another 26 per cent went further and said councils should have powers of control. And only 18 per cent said councils should have no powers of oversight, leaving these non-elected bodies to manage their own affairs. Taken together, these two questions show, very clearly, the degree and nature of public support for local council monitoring of appointed quangos. Overwhelmingly the public felt that these quangos should be monitored, and monitored by local rather than central government. However, they did appear to feel that powers of investigation rather than control would be sufficient to keep quangos in order. If glasnost could destroy the Soviet Union it might be sufficient to control local NHS trusts.

114 Models of Local Governance Table 6.9

Monitoring quango boards %

Non-elected bodies like health authorities, NHS trusts, TEC/LECs and school boards should… be responsible to central government be responsible to local councils decide their own affairs, like private companies Elected local councils should… have powers to control these non-elected bodies have power to investigate, but not control them leave them to get on with managing their own affairs

20 68 12 26 57 18

Paying for services In principle, a huge majority of the public backed the concept of taxbased local services. Only 34 per cent would agree that ‘people should only have to pay for local services they use personally’ while 83 per cent agreed that ‘everyone should contribute through taxation to the cost of local services whether they use them or not’. (We put each question to a randomly selected half of the sample, and no one was asked both questions.) Elsewhere in the interview we asked: ‘which do you feel should be the main way of paying for most local services – charging those who use the service, local council taxes, or national subsidies paid from national taxes like income tax and VAT?’ Only 24 per cent opted for charging users. The most popular choice (43 per cent) was local taxation even though local taxation has traditionally contributed relatively little towards the provision of most local services, and very little indeed if we count hospitals and health care as ‘local services’.

Table 6.10

Pay for services? %

*People should only have to pay for local services they use personally *Everyone should contribute through taxation to the cost of local services whether they use them or not Note: * These two questions were put to randomly selected split-half samples.

34 83

Institutional Preferences 115

We went on to ask in detail about the funding of six specific services. Averaging across all six services, the public placed much more weight on national taxation but even less on service charges than when asked generally about ‘most local services’. A very clear majority of the public opted for local taxation as the main basis for funding swimming pools and public libraries. More surprisingly perhaps, a majority, even if a smaller one, opted for local taxation as the main basis for funding ‘local public transport’. Conversely, very large majorities opted for national taxation as the main basis for funding schools, hospitals and the police. As for user charges, very few opted for user charges as the main basis for funding schools, hospitals and the police, though 14 per cent would make libraries a chargeable service, and about 25 per cent would make swimming pools and local transport mainly chargeable services.

Rival institutions of local governance A large majority of the public (70 per cent) agreed that ‘it really does not matter whether local services are run by elected councils, appointed boards, or private business as long as they keep the quality up while keeping charges and taxes down.’ Among the public, purely ideological commitment to particular forms of local service provision seemed weak. In particular, this was reflected in a remarkably weak

Table 6.11

Best way to pay for different services? User-charges

Local taxes

%

%

National subsidies from national taxes %

For ‘most local services’

24

43

33

For specified services: swimming pools public libraries local public transport schools police hospitals

26 14 23 3 2 3

65 67 55 24 22 12

8 19 22 73 77 85

Average for specified services

12

41

47

Note: Rows sorted by per cent naming national subsidy as best for funding the service.

116 Models of Local Governance

commitment to all-purpose authorities. Only 30 per cent felt it was better to have ‘one body responsible for all local services in its area, from refuse collection to health care’ rather than ‘specialist bodies responsible for each separate service’. Elected local councils were often described, after the 1929 reforms, as ‘all-purpose local authorities’ though the term was never quite accurate, and it became significantly less so after the creation of a National Health Service in 1948. Public rejection of truly ‘all-purpose’ local authorities certainly did not imply opposition to elected councils, however. We asked people to rate various ways of ‘organizing and controlling local services’ by giving each a ‘mark out of ten’. Elected local councils scored far better than any alternative. If we subtract five from each score, so that they range from minus 5 to plus 5 with zero as the neutral point, elected councils scored an average of plus 2.6. ‘Letting those who provide the service run it themselves – for example, teachers running schools’ came next with an average score of plus 0.7 but that was a long way behind the public’s rating for elected councils. ‘Letting those who use the service run it themselves – for example, parents running schools’, or putting services in the hands of ‘committees of [businessmen/experts] appointed by central government’ both scored close to zero, though quangos run by ‘businessmen’ scored noticeably worse than those run by ‘experts’. And ‘leaving the provision of local services to private companies who charge for the use of the service’ received the worst score of all, a significantly negative score of minus 0.8. Table 6.12

Best for organizing and controlling local services %

Does not matter who runs local services if quality is right All-purpose local authorities are better than specialist bodies

70 30 Mean score on ± 5 scale

Best way to organise and control local services: elected council service-providers, e.g. teachers running schools service-users, e.g. parents running schools experts appointed by central govt businessmen appointed by central govt private companies charging for use of service

2.6 0.7 0.1 –0.1 –0.5 –0.8

Note: Entries sorted by ratings for ‘best way to organize and control local services’.

Institutional Preferences 117 Table 6.13

Voluntary and community groups %

Local community groups represent ordinary people’s opinions better than local councillors Easier to get things done by joining local community groups than by approaching local councillors directly Best way to make sure people get the services they want is to let them organize them through voluntary groups and associations

72 63

39

A substantial majority of the public agreed that ‘local community groups represent ordinary people’s opinions better than local councillors’, and that it was ‘easier to get things done by joining local community groups than by approaching local councillors directly’. But when we went on to suggest that ‘the best way to make sure people get the services they want is to let them organize them through voluntary groups and associations’ only a minority, 39 per cent, agreed. Community and voluntary groups therefore won high marks for representation, pressure and lobbying but not as a general means of organizing and controlling local services, despite the success of housing associations. Correlations between scores given to rival institutions were particularly high between ratings for appointed boards and private companies, and between control by users and providers. This seems to suggest three dimensions of support: for elected councils, for boards and Table 6.14

Correlations between ratings for rival institutions Elected councils

Elected council Appointed boards Private companies Users Providers

100

Appointed boards

Private companies

–22 100

–18 46 100

Service users 0 22 21 100

Service providers –8 29 18 37 100

Note: Random half-samples were asked about ‘appointed committees of [businessmen/experts]’. The pattern of correlations with these two kinds of boards did not differ greatly though, as might be expected, public ratings of appointed boards of ‘businessmen’ correlated somewhat more strongly than ratings of appointed boards of ‘experts’ with public ratings for ‘private companies’.

118 Models of Local Governance

private companies, and for participant control by users (e.g. parents) or providers (e.g. teachers). People who gave relatively high ratings to elected councils tended to give relatively low ratings to appointed boards and private companies, yet neither relatively high nor low ratings to control by users or providers. Thus there was a degree of conflict or contradiction between support for elected councils and appointed boards or private companies which was not so evident between support for elected councils and participant control by users or providers. We tested the public’s ability to discriminate between different services by asking who ‘should mainly control’ and who ‘does mainly control’ each of eight different services – offering as alternatives: Table 6.15

Control of different services? Local council %

Private company %

Appointed boards %

Who should control? refuse collection schools help for local business policing water and sewage hospitals unemployment benefits electricity Average

77 55 52 46 45 30 23 18 43

19 3 9 1 21 4 1 36 12

4 42 39 53 34 66 76 46 45

Who actually does control? refuse collection schools help for local business policing water and sewage hospitals unemployment benefits electricity Average

63 78 48 68 37 31 29 9 45

35 3 12 1 56 10 1 81 25

1 19 40 31 7 59 70 10 30

Notes: 1. Rows sorted by per cent saying control of the service should rest mainly with the local council. 2. There were very few ‘don’t knows’ on every one of the ‘should control’ but larger numbers of DKs on the ‘actually does control’ questions. These reached 10 per cent on hospitals, 11 per cent on unemployment benefits and 30 per cent on ‘help for local business’.

Institutional Preferences 119

‘your local council, private companies, or committees appointed by government’. Overwhelmingly people said their local council should control refuse collection, and a narrow majority also chose their local council for schools and ‘help for local business’. Conversely, a large majority opted for government-appointed committees to control hospitals and the distribution of unemployment benefits. On other services public opinion was more divided. On policing, it divided between the local council and government-appointed committees, though slightly more of the public favoured the latter. And on public utilities – water, sewage and electricity – the public split three ways between control by local government, by central government or by private companies, though it put local councils top for water and sewage, and central government top for electricity. Across the eight services the public divided almost equally between local and central government control while only 12 per cent opted for private companies. To some extent these choices simply reflected the actually existing pattern of control, or public misperceptions about the actual pattern of control. That much is obvious. What is more interesting is the extent to which choices did not reflect either realities or misperceptions. Thus 81 per cent were aware that electricity was mainly controlled by private companies but only 36 per cent approved. And 56 per cent were aware that water was mainly controlled by private companies but only 21 per cent approved. On the other hand, 78 per cent thought schools were mainly controlled by local councils but only 55 per cent approved. On average the rate of approval of local council control roughly equalled the rate of perceptions of local council control. But compared to their perceptions, people were on average 15 per cent more willing to accept control by appointed committees and boards and 13 per cent less willing to accept control by private companies – reflecting greater public support for control by ‘experts’ than by ‘markets’.

Influences Most attitudes towards the best scale of operation and control of local services were relatively unaffected by social background, strength of local identity, or political ideology. However, there was one exception: the question of whether there should be an elected assembly for the respondent’s region. Regional government was relatively unpopular among older people, middle-class identifiers, those who placed themselves ‘on the right’ rather than ‘on the left’, and Conservative party

120 Models of Local Governance

supporters. It was relatively popular among those who identified strongly with their region. Both localism and left/right ideology therefore influenced opinion on elected regional assemblies, though party had more influence than either. Right-wingers and Conservative supporters were also the most likely to say that central government should have the final say in any dispute with a local council, even if the council had won an popular mandate in a local election or local referendum. Similarly, right-wingers and Conservative supporters were more likely than others to defend appointed quango boards from interference by local councils. And if quangos were to be responsible to elected government, right-wingers preferred that it should be to central government.

Table 6.16

Correlations with opposition to elected local institutions Middle-class identity

Age

Identification Right-wing with locality self-image

corr ¥ 100 corr ¥ 100 corr ¥ 100 Oppose regional assembly Central government to have the final say Appointed bodies should be left to run their own affairs Appointed bodies should be responsible to central government

corr ¥ 100

Con v. Lab party preference corr ¥ 100

16

14

–13

15

20

11

–

–

14

13

–

–

–

15

18

–

–

–

14

–

Notes: 1. Identification with locality (district or region) was coded on an 11-point scale from –5 to +5. We have used identification with the district, except for the question about regional assemblies, where the correlation was, reasonably enough, slightly higher with regional identification 2. ‘Right-wing self-image’ was coded on a 7-point scale: strongly left, left, centre-left, centre, centre-right, right, strongly right. 3. Correlations less than 0.10 replaced by a dash.

Institutional Preferences 121

Support for referenda varied very little with social or political background, but opposition to the proposal for elected mayors was stronger among the middle class and the highly educated, though it was largely unaffected by local identification or left/right ideology. Opposition to complete dependence upon usercharges for local services came mainly from the old rather than, as might have been expected, from self-proclaimed left-wingers. Age apart, the lack of correlation reflected a very general view that local government services should be funded mainly by local or national taxes. Leaving private companies to provide local services was most popular among right-wingers and Conservatives but it was unaffected by other aspects of social and political background, including local identity. Even the correlation between support for private companies and ideology or party was only evident on half of the local services we discussed in our interviews. Right-wingers were clearly more favourable to private companies providing refuse disposal services, water and electricity, but only slightly more inclined than others to see a role for private firms in hospitals, and still less so in schools, the police, unemployment benefits or encouraging local businesses. Right-wingers and Conservatives were particularly likely to agree that the institutional form of local governance ‘did not matter’ as long as the quality and cost of local services was right. The highly educated were particularly likely to disagree. But perhaps it is worth noting that local identification had little effect upon answers to this question and, in so far as it had any at all, those who identified most strongly with the locality were inclined to agree that institutional forms did not matter.

Table 6.17

Correlations with support for private firms running specific services Right-wing self-image corr ¥ 100

Should be run by private companies: water electricity refuse collection hospitals

20 19 16 10

Cons v. Lab party preference corr ¥ 100

18 19 17 –

Notes: 1. Right-wing self image coded on a 7-point scale: strongly left, left, centre-left, centre, centre-right, right, strongly right . 2. Correlations less than 0.10 replaced by a dash.

122 Models of Local Governance

When asked to rate particular institutions as mechanisms for organizing and controlling local services, right-wingers and/or Conservatives were more favourable than others towards private companies and quango boards, especially if the quango boards were filled with ‘businessmen’ rather than ‘experts’. The highly educated were relatively unfavourable towards private companies or quango boards, whether filled by ‘businessmen’ or ‘experts’, and, at the same time, relatively sceptical about the contribution of voluntary groups. But perhaps our most intriguing finding is that those who had the strongest sense of local identification were more favourable than others to each and every institution of local governance – to appointed boards, especially if filled with ‘experts’ rather than ‘businessmen’, to service users and providers, and to private companies as well as to elected councils. Indeed local identification had relatively little effect upon support for elected local councils. It was age, not local identity, that correlated most strongly with favourable ratings for elected local councils. It seems that a strong sense of local identity made people favourable towards local services and local governance of whatever kind, while it was ideology that made them favour one kind of governance over another. Perhaps a strong personal sense of local identity made it particularly easy for the public to believe in the local commitment of those involved in local governance, irrespective of whether they were elected councillors, appointed quango board members, volunteers or employees.

Conclusion: a general preference for democratically elected governance Certainly, the public endorsed the view that it did not matter who provided local services so long as the quality and cost was right. But as a general mechanism for organizing and controlling local services, the public rated elected local councils very highly, certainly far higher than any alternative we offered. Nothing else came close in the public’s estimation. They had a mildly positive attitude towards self-management by service users or providers. And a mildly but increasingly negative attitude towards, respectively, appointed boards of ‘experts’, appointed boards of ‘businessmen’ and private companies operating in the market. A table of mean scores for each alternative institution for local governance emphasizes the fact that elected local councils were universally seen as the best way to organize local services. Every section of the

– –16 –19 – – –10

–17 –20

corr ¥ 100

20 – – – – –

– –

corr ¥ 100

Age

9 14 20 11 11 10

– –

corr ¥ 100

Identification with district

– 25 14 – – 25

22 –

corr ¥ 100

Right-wing self-image

– 21 – – –12 19

16 –

Con v. Lab party preference corr ¥ 100

Notes: 1. Identification with district coded on 11-point scale from –5 to +5. 2. Right-wing self image coded on a 7-point scale: strongly left, left, centre-left, centre, centre-right, right, strongly right. 3. Correlations less than 0.10 replaced by a dash, except the correlation between local identification and council rating, which falls just short of the threshold but is important theoretically.

– – – –11 –10 –

Correlation with public ratings of following, as best way to organize and control local services… elected council appointed businessmen appointed experts service users service providers private companies/the market

corr ¥ 100

Middle-class High identity education

– –12

Correlations with institutional ratings

Correlation with ‘organization does not matter’ Voluntary groups best

Table 6.18

123

124 Models of Local Governance Table 6.19 General presumptions in favour of democratic and locally autonomous governance Democratic local governance Rating for an elected council as the best way to run local services Mean score on ± 5 scale Ideological self-image: left centre-left centre centre-right right Identification with district: lowest quintile (score <0) second (score 0) mid quintile (score 1,2) fourth (score 3,4) highest quintile (score 5)

Autonomous local governance Say that the local council, not central government, should have the ‘final say’ %

2.7 2.7 2.3 2.7 2.5

89 90 91 85 73

2.5 2.4

82 85

2.4 2.5

84 88

3.0

87

2.5 2.5

86 86

Years lived in district: lowest quintile (<9yrs) second (9–19) mid quintile (20–29) fourth (30–44) highest quintile (45 or more)

2.6 2.4

83 87

2.9

86

Participation in local elections: voted in last local election did not vote

2.7 2.3

86 85

public, whether on the left or on the right, whether they identified strongly or weakly with the locality, whether they were recent incomers or long-term residents, nonetheless rated elected local councils far above any other institution of local governance. Support for elected

Institutional Preferences 125

local councils failed to correlate with local identity or ideology because even those with a weak sense of local identity or a right-wing ideology still gave elected councils very high marks as a way of organizing and controlling local services. Even those who did not participate in local elections gave almost as high marks to elected councils as those who did participate in them. Support for a democratic system of local governance, based on elections, was founded upon a pervasive public commitment to democratic procedures and was unaffected by the strength of local identification or ideology. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 display the level of support for alternative structures of local governance at different strengths of local identification, or different positions on the left–right scale. As Figure 6.1 shows, local identification increased confidence in the good sense of local service users, local service providers, local experts and even local businessmen. Long-term residence had a similar effect. And as Figure 6.2 shows, right-wing ideology increased the ratings given to private companies and quangos run by ‘businessmen’. But these figures also show that at every point on the local identity or ideological spectrum, elected councils were rated far above any alternative. The lines indicating support for elected councils at different strengths of local identification, or different positions on the left–right scale, are almost horizontal and always much higher than for any other means of local governance.

Mean scores for best way to run local services

Figure 6.1

Impact of local identification on institutional ratings.

3.5 3

Elected council

2.5 2 1.5 1

Providers Users

0.5

Experts

0 Businessmen

–0.5 –1

The market

–1.5 –2 Lowest quintile

Middle Strenght of identification with the district

Highest quintile

126 Models of Local Governance

Mean scores for best way to run local services

Figure 6.2

Impact of ideology on institutional ratings.

3 2.5

Elected council

2 1.5 1

Providers

0.5 Users

0 –0.5

Experts

–1

Businessmen

–1.5

The market

–2 Left

Centre

Right

Left–right ideology

Similarly, there was overwhelming support for an autonomous system, as indicated by the numbers who said the local council, with the backing of its electorate, should have the final say in a dispute with central government. And that too did not depend much upon local identification. Indeed, support for the principle of local autonomy was hardly affected by the strength of psychological identification with the local district in which the respondent lived, nor by whether people were recent incomers or long-term residents, nor by whether they participated in local elections. In Figure 6.3 the line indicating support for local autonomy rises very little as local identification intensifies. But it falls sharply at the right-wing end of the ideological spectrum, though only from around 90 per cent on the left to 73 per cent on the right. Support for autonomous local governance, like support for a democratic form of local governance, was based on a general presumption, a presumption in favour of local autonomy, that varied little and which did not depend upon psychological commitment to the particular local district in which people currently lived. On average, the public thought their local district was a better size than any other for the delivery of local services, but far from perfect and inherently non- perfectable. They recognized that different

–1.4 –0.6 –0.7 –0.2 0.4 –1.1 –0.7 –0.5 –0.2 –0.3 –0.9 –0.3 –0.8 –0.4 –0.1 –0.5 –0.4

Identification with district: lowest quintile (score < 0) second (score 0) mid quintile (score 1,2) fourth (score 3,4) highest quintile (score 5)

Years lived in district: lowest quintile (< 9yrs) second (9–19) mid quintile (20–29) fourth (30–44) highest quintile (45 or more)

Participation in local elections: voted in last local election did not vote –0.1 0.1

–0.4 –0.3 –0.2 0 0.6

–1.0 –0.3 –0.2 0.3 0.3

–0.6 0 0.2 0.2 0.2

Appointed boards Appointed Appointed ‘businessmen’ ‘experts’ Mean score on Mean score on ± 5 scale ± 5 scale

0.2 0.1

0 0.1 0 0.3 0.3

–0.4 0.1 0 0.3 0.5

0 0.1 0 0.5 0.2

0.7 0.8

0.6 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.8

0.2 0.6 0.8 0.8 1.0

0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.5

Self-management By service By service users providers Mean score on Mean score on ± 5 scale ± 5 scale

Variable ratings for alternative structures of local governance

Ideological self-image: left centre-left centre centre-right right

Table 6.20

–0.9 –0.7

–1.1 –0.8 –0.9 –0.7 –0.6

–1.4 –0.8 –0.8 –0.6 –0.8

–1.6 –1.1 –0.8 –0.5 0

The Market Private companies Mean score on ± 5 scale

127

128 Models of Local Governance

% who say local council should have the ‘final say’

Figure 6.3

Autonomous local governance.

95 By identification with district

90 85 80

By right-wing ideology

75 70 65 Lowest quintile

Middle

Highest quintile

Ideology and local identification both arrayed along the horizontal axis

services might best be run on different scales, and by a mix of singlepurpose and multi-purpose authorities, including elected regional assemblies. But they remained strongly committed to the elective principle. As well as giving general support to local governance by elected councils, they supported extensions of direct electoral participation by means of referenda or direct election of local council leaders. They wanted non-elected bodies such as appointed boards to be made responsible to elected government at some level, and preferably to elected local government. And they strongly supported the principle of funding local services mainly through taxation rather than user charges, though whether that should be national or local taxation depended very much on the particular service in question. Perhaps the public put too much faith in democratic control and local autonomy. In a lecture to the Public Finance Foundation, William Waldegrave tried to dismiss the significance of elections: The key point in this argument is not whether those who run our public services are elected, but whether they are producer-responsive or consumer-responsive. Services are not necessarily made to respond to the public simply by giving citizens a democratic voice, and a distant and diffuse one at that, in their make up.3

Institutional Preferences 129

There may be some truth in that argument. In particular circumstances the public may not support a democratic form of local governance. And their support for local autonomy is inconsistent with their support for national standards. Nonetheless their first instinct is to opt for the democratic and autonomous alternative.

7 Governing Perspectives

Elected councillors constitute the governing elite in the traditional local governance system. How might their perspectives differ from those of the public? It would be surprising if they did not have an unusually positive insider’s view of elected local councils and their role in local governance. But councillors are also party animals. Compared to the public, councillors’ views might be influenced as much by their greater loyalty to ideology and party as by their insider role within the traditional system of local governance. Appointed quango board members constitute an increasing part of the governing elite within the new, mixed local governance system. How might their perspectives differ not only from those of the public but more especially from those of the traditional elite? Appointed board members might be expected to differ from the public simply because they, like elected councillors, are a local governance elite. They might have a ‘governing perspective’ in some respects similar to that of elected councillors. But since elected councillors and appointed board members owe their place to very different processes of selection they may be viewed as (and possibly feel and behave as) rival elites within the overall structure of local governance. Do these rival elites have strongly negative attitudes towards each other, or at least towards each other’s institutions? Or does a commitment to the locality transcend the tension between old and new systems of local governance? And if there is some degree of mutual antagonism, is it symmetric or asymmetric? Does one side feel more aggressive or resentful than the other? Again, it would be surprising if appointed board members did not have an unusually positive insider’s view of appointed boards, just as elected councillors might have an unusually positive insider’s view of 130

Governing Perspectives 131

traditional local government councils. But whether quango board members have a negative attitude towards elected councils is a more open question. They might see their boards as a superior replacement for elected councils, the way of the future. But, on the other hand, they might see their boards more as a useful adjunct to elected councils, useful only in limited areas where there was more need for specialist or technocratic expertise than for democratic representation. And in particular, board members might see their own particular board as exceptional. In that case they might take a positive view of their own particular kind of board without any wider commitment to the general principle of local governance by appointed boards. In this chapter we compare rival local governance elites with the public and with each other. Within the elite we contrast elected councillors with appointed board members. And among board members we contrast those appointed to training and enterprise boards (TEC/LECs) with those appointed to health boards (DHA/HBs).

The local connection Links to locality Councillors were no more likely to have been born in the region or district where they lived than the public generally. Yet, paradoxically, they were far more likely than the public to be long-term residents of the locality. The paradox is explained in part by the fact that councillors were, on average, much older than the public generally. But whatever the cause, the consequence was that councillors were 17 per cent more likely than the public to have lived 20 years in the district. Despite that, councillors were slightly less likely than the public to have all of their friends or relatives located in the region or the district where they lived. They were only slightly less likely than the public to work outside the district and hardly differed from the public in terms of confining their use of shopping and leisure facilities within the region or district. So, across the full range of our objective measures of links to the locality, we cannot describe councillors as unambiguously more (or less) local than the public. By contrast, appointed board members were significantly less likely than either councillors or the public to have been born in the region or the district where they now lived. And while councillors were 17 per cent more likely than the public to have lived in the district for 20 years, DHA/HB board members were slightly less likely than the public to have done so, and TEC/LEC board members 11 per cent less.

80 60 47 19 59 34 38 27 82 50

Lived in region for 20 years or more

Lived in district for 20 years or more

All relatives… in region in district

All friends… in region in district

Workplace located… within district outside district

Use shopping or leisure facilities entirely… within region within district

%

Public

92 67 36

Objective links to locality

Born… in Britain? in region? in district?

Table 7.1

79 54

40 22

55 27

42 17

77

88

91 61 31

Elected councillors %

65 27

57 37

32 14

30 11

49

67

92 49 20

TEC/LEC boards %

71 36

48 30

36 16

34 12

58

79

92 52 19

DHA/HB boards %

132

Interest in local issues

1.9 2.0 0.4

Mean score

Public

4.6 3.9 2.3

Elected councillors Mean score

Note: All scores measured on a scale from minus 5 to plus 5. Entries sorted by councillors’ levels of interest.

Local issues and what local council does National issues and what Parliament and govt do European issues and what European Community does

Table 7.2

2.9 3.6 2.1

TEC/LEC boards Mean score

2.9 3.6 1.8

DHA/HB boards Mean score

133

74 87 57 34 92 26

62 72 64 33 35 28 26 9

Claimed they voted in last local elections Claimed they voted in last parliamentary election

In local elections, vote on… local issues national issues

Know district name Know council tax funds only quarter of LG spending

Attribute control of the following services mainly to local council: refuse collection schools policing help for local businesses water and sewage hospitals unemployment benefits electricity

82 82 50 35 13 5 5 1

100 62

71 14

99 99

90 62

45 78 79

Elected councillors %

Note: Entries for perceived control of services sorted in descending order of councillors’ perceptions.

24 33

Attended public meeting on local issue Attended parents’ meeting at school

%

Public

44 78 70

Local information

Read local evening paper, regularly Follow local news on radio or TV, regularly Read local weekly paper regularly

Table 7.3

80 82 65 15 21 10 6 1

100 63

64 27

83 95

78 49

42 80 72

TEC/LEC boards %

70 82 82 23 22 3 6 1

100 59

64 24

83 98

80 40

32 73 76

DHA/HB boards %

134

Governing Perspectives 135

Appointed board members were about 10 per cent less likely than councillors to have all their relatives living in the region. They were 21 per cent less likely than councillors to have all their friends living in the region. Conversely, only 36 per cent of DHA/HB board members, and 27 per cent of TEC/LEC board members, compared to 50 per cent of the public and 54 per cent of councillors, relied on their district for shopping and leisure facilities. On everything except their workplace – though that is a very significant exception – board members had significantly fewer objective links to their locality than the public, and TEC/LEC board members especially so. All elites, elected or appointed, expressed more interest than the public in political issues of any kind including local, national and European issues. But as we might expect, councillors were uniquely interested in local issues and local council activities, far more even than members of appointed boards. Councillors and board members hardly differed from the public in their attention to local newspapers and local news programmes on radio or television. But both were far more likely than the public to have attended a parents’ meeting at a school or a public meeting on a local issue, councillors about 15 per cent more even than board members. And both councillors and board members were better informed than the public about the control of local services and the funding of local government. Overall therefore in terms of interest and information, board members were closer to elected councillors than to the public, somewhat less obsessed with local affairs than councillors, but much more informed and participant in local affairs than the public. Identifications Local governance elites differed little from the public in terms of their identification with friends or family or even with their birthplace, their region or with Britain as a whole. Even differences in the extent (though not necessarily the direction, however) of identification with a class or religion were small, though board members’ identification with class was relatively weak. But the elites, whether elected or appointed, identified much more strongly than the public with their workplace. And for very different reasons no doubt, elites identified much more strongly than the public with Europe. Figure 7.1 shows that councillors had a unique attachment to the very narrow locality in which they lived. They identified much more strongly with their local district or their home neighbourhood (by

136 Models of Local Governance Figure 7.1

Identifications

Mean scores on  5 point scale

4 3.5 3 2.5 Public Councillors TEC/LECs DHA/HBs

2 1.5 1 0.5 0

–0.5 –1

with Europe

with Britain

with Region

with District

with a Party

around 1.5 points on our ±5 point scale of identification) than either appointed board members or the public. And Figure 7.1 also shows that elected councillors were even more uniquely political animals. They differed by a margin of 3.7 points from the public, and even more from appointed board members, on their identification with a political party. Pride, responsibility and exclusion Elites, whether appointed or elected, distinguished more sharply between pride and shame than the public. They were more inclined than the public to feel proud of good actions by people from their district but, at the same time, they were even less inclined than the public to feel any shame over the bad actions by people from their district. The difference between feeling pride and shame ran at 20 per cent among the public but at 32 per cent among councillors and about 35 per cent among appointed board members. At the same time it is clear, however, that, if we take pride and shame together, councillors were 23 per cent more sensitive to the behaviour of people from the district than they were to the behaviour of people from the rest of Britain, that appointed board members were around 16 per cent more sensitive to the behaviour of local people, and the public only 11 per cent more. That pattern is consistent with

Governing Perspectives 137 Table 7.4

Identifications Public

Strength of feeling of belonging to: family home neighbourhood district Britain a political party region circle of friends work neighbourhood birthplace Europe a social class a religion

Mean score

Elected councillors Mean score

TEC/LEC boards Mean score

DHA/HB boards Mean score

3.9 2.3 2.0 3.0 –0.4 2.7 2.8 0.5 1.8 –0.1 1.0 –0.2

4.3 3.9 3.7 3.6 3.3 3.3 2.9 2.1 1.9 1.2 1.1 0.4

4.1 2.5 2.3 3.4 –0.9 2.5 2.2 1.8 1.1 1.3 –0.1 –0.6

4.1 2.5 2.3 3.5 –0.4 2.6 2.7 1.5 0.9 1.0 0.4 0.4

Notes: All scores measured on a scale from minus 5 to plus 5. Entries sorted by councillors’ identifications.

our finding that councillors had a stronger sense of identification with the local district than board members or the public Councillors hardly differed from the public in terms of their feelings of special responsibility for the welfare of local people. Neither did board members, taken together, though there was a clear difference between TEC/LEC board members and DHA/HB members – board members in the health service were noticeably less willing to discriminate between local and non-local people. But when the issue was put in terms of local exclusion rather than inclusion, a clear difference between elites and the public emerged. Only 9 per cent of councillors and 7 per cent of board members compared to 23 per cent of the public would exclude recent incomers from local elections. And only 7 per cent of councillors along with still fewer board members (especially DHA/HB board members) compared to 18 per cent of the public would exclude recent incomers from free access to local schools and hospitals. On exclusion as on inclusion (i.e. ‘responsibility for welfare’) DHA/HB board members were particularly unwilling to discriminate between locals and incomers. And while some of the differences between them and TEC/LEC members were very small and not by

+11

60 55 49

+20

+23

65 48 42

+32

49 32 30

81 65 55

Elected councillors %

+17

64 52 47

+31

48 37 35

79 66 59

TEC/LEC boards %

+15

55 47 40

+39

35 30 25

74 64 56

DHA/HB boards %

Note: * These two versions of the question were put to randomly selected split-half samples. Figures are the percentages who answer with an unqualified ‘yes’.

difference: district – Britain

Feel [pride/shame] when something [good/bad] is done by people from… district region rest of Britain

difference: pride for district – shame for district

50 43 38

*Feel shame when something bad is done by people from… district region rest of Britain

%

Public

70 67 59

Local pride

*Feel pride when something good is done by people from… district region rest of Britain

Table 7.5

138

Local exclusiveness

18 23

61 47

%

Public

7 9

64 49

Elected councillors %

6 7

71 52

TEC/LEC boards %

3 7

52 46

DHA/HB boards %

Note: * These two versions of the question were put to randomly selected split-half samples. Figures are the percentages who positively agree.

People from rest of Britain should… only get free access to local schools and hospitals only be able to vote in local elections if they have [lived/paid taxes] locally for 2 years

More responsibility for welfare of… *others in district than for those who live in the rest of the region *others in region than for those who live in the rest of Britain

Table 7.6

139

140 Models of Local Governance

themselves statistically compelling evidence, they were at least consistent with DHA/HB board members’ participation in a service that deliberately styled itself the ‘NHS’ – a ‘National’ rather than a local Health Service.

Party and ideology In Chapter 4 we found that ideology or partisanship affected attitudes to most objectives of local governance, often quite strongly. So before we contrast the views of different elites about the proper role of local government with the views of the public we need to take note of broad differences of ideology and partisanship. In terms of national voting preferences, councillors were somewhat more Liberal and Conservative, and considerably less Labour than the public, whose mood at the time of our surveys had swung very heavily towards Labour. Yet in terms of ideological self-images, the public remained to the right of councillors. In addition, councillors tended to put themselves at both extremes of left and right to a noticeably greater degree than the public who tended more towards the centre. In ideological terms, councillors were not only more left-wing than the public but more ideologically polarized than the public. We might expect therefore that ideology, whether left or right, would have a greater influence upon councillors than on the public. Appointed board members were somewhat more Conservative, less Labour and less Liberal than elected councillors in terms of national voting preferences – and, of course, far less Labour than the mood of the public at the time of our surveys. In terms of their ideological selfimages, appointed board members were also far more right-wing than either the public or elected councillors. While the public placed themselves somewhere between councillors and board members in terms of ideology, appointed board members were twice as far away to the right of the public as councillors were to the left of the public. Our findings do not suggest that appointed board members were such Thatcherite placemen as some journalists and politicians on the left had originally claimed, but they were undoubtedly more Conservative and right-wing than either councillors or the public. Other things being equal we might expect the right-wing and Conservative tendencies of appointed board members to prejudice them against public services of any kind, whether national or local, and to prejudice them in favour of letting private firms supply citizens’ needs by operating in the market and providing chargeable services.

Governing Perspectives 141

But other things were very unlikely to be equal in this case. The people appointed to local governance boards were likely to have an unusual interest in locally provided public services. Right-wingers these appointees might be, but very atypical right-wingers.

The role of local governance Minimalism Elites and public differed little on support for universal services or on special services for the needy. But elites, especially councillors, were relatively unenthusiastic about providing extra payable services for business, and relatively favourable towards ‘quality of life’ subsidies for theatres, concert halls and sports centres. Councillors were 23 per cent less favourable than the public to the provision of extra payable services yet, at the same time, 18 per cent more favourable than the public towards ‘quality of life’ subsidies. Averaging support across all four categories of local government services, DHA/HB boards were as favourable as councillors, and TEC/LEC boards slightly more so. Despite their relatively right-wing ideology, therefore, board members certainly did not take a minimalist view on local council services. Their entrepreneurial spirit was too strong for that. The public differed from the elite, and rival elites differed from each other, not so much in their commitment to minimalist or extensive public services as in the mix of categories of public services that they supported. Ideological polarization was greater among councillors than among the public. Amongst both councillors and the public at large, rightwingers were more favourable than left-wingers to providing extra payable services, and less favourable than left-wingers towards providing ‘quality of life’ subsidies. But the extent of ideological polarization was much greater among councillors. Left and right differed on the question of extra payable services by 14 per cent among the public but by 22 per cent among councillors. And on ‘quality of life’ subsidies by only 5 per cent among the public but by 17 per cent among councillors. Board members were less ideologically polarized than councillors, but more so than the public. National or local standards? There was broad support for local autonomy. About 87 per cent of the elite and 92 per cent of the public agreed that ‘local councils should be free to provide whatever standard of services their local community

Note: Votes as percentages of those who opted for one of the three main parties.

26 22 14 21 17 +10

Ideological self-image: left centre-left centre centre right right Left (incl. centre-left) minus right (incl. centre-right)

%

Public

25 17 59 +34

Party and ideology

Voting choice in an immediate parliamentary election: Conservative Liberal Democrat Labour Labour lead over Conservative:

Table 7.7

33 24 9 16 20 +21

33 23 44 +11

Elected councillors %

19 18 17 23 24 –10

44 15 41 –3

TEC/LEC boards %

19 21 14 23 24 –7

44 18 39 –5

DHA/HB boards %

142

Governing Perspectives 143 Table 7.8

Minimalism Public

Provide services for special needs Grants and subsidies for theatres, concert halls, sports centres Provide universal services Provide extra services for cash Average:

%

Elected councillors %

TEC/LEC boards %

DHA/HB boards %

90

89

90

84

67 82 71

85 79 48

81 77 65

73 84 57

78

75

78

75

Note: Entries sorted by councillors’ views.

wants and is willing to pay for’. And appointed board members were only about 10 per cent less likely than councillors or the public to say local government should provide ‘as few or as many services as the local community decide’. There was very much more support for national standards when the concept was put more positively, by asking whether ‘Parliament should decide national standards for public services and require local councils to meet those standards everywhere’. But once again appointed board members were only about 10 per cent more favourable than councillors or the public towards national standards. Table 7.9

National standards? Public Elected TEC/LEC councillors boards % % %

DHA/HB boards %

*Parliament should require local councils to meet national standards 74 *Local councils should be free to provide whatever standard of services their local community wants and is willing to pay for 92

72

85

79

88

87

86

Local government should provide whatever services local people want (versus only what central government decides)

91

81

82

91

Note: * These two versions of the question were put to randomly selected split-half samples.

144 Models of Local Governance

The Tiebout thesis Local governance elites were not in general more likely than the public to contemplate moving house just to live under a more acceptable taxservice regime and they were influenced by the same factors as influenced the public – namely a right-wing ideology, or living in London. TEC/LEC board members who lived in London or in the South East were specially likely to report that they had considered such a move. And board members who had considered moving were more likely than the public (or councillors) actually to have gone ahead and relocated. Thus, among those appointed to TECs who lived in London, half of the 16 per cent who had contemplated moving for Tieboutian reasons had actually done so. And among the larger number of TEC board members who lived in the South East, 7 out of the 8 per cent who had contemplated such a move had actually relocated. But surprisingly perhaps, appointed board members, like the public, were marginally more likely to contemplate such a move in order to get better services than to get lower taxes. A mission to mobilize? Appointed board members hardly differed from the public on questions of local development, and councillors were only slightly more inclined to say that local government should ‘actively encourage local business’ rather than ‘leave economic development to the market’, or still less ‘to central government’. Councillors were also only very slightly more inclined than the public or appointed board members to support discriminatory local preference in purchasing goods and services. Perhaps the surprise is that business-dominated TEC/LEC boards were as willing as the public (and almost as willing as councillors) to agree that ‘local government should actively encourage local business’ and yet no more willing than the public to back a purchasing preference for local businesses. Adam Smith famously alleged that any meeting of businessmen was a conspiracy against the public interest and in favour of their own very particular interests. But despite their right-wing ideology and their business background, TEC/LEC boards were as ‘socialist’ oriented as the public in terms of public intervention to encourage development. And despite their particularly local business connections, they were no more inclined than the public to advocate special favours for local businessmen. In these respects, their ‘public spirit’ seemed to triumph over both their political ideology and their narrow business interests.

The Tiebout relocation thesis

1 3

11

7 3

5 6 4 7

%

Public

1 0

6

3 3

3 4 2 3

Elected councillors %

Note: * These two versions of the question were put to randomly selected split-half samples.

Actually moved to council with better services or lower taxes in London only

in London only

*for better services *for lower taxes

Considered move to council with better services or lower taxes among those on the left among those in the centre among those on the right

Table 7.10

2 8

16

5 4

5 1 4 9

TEC/LEC boards %

2 3

6

6 3

5 5 3 8

DHA/HB boards %

145

Local interests and development

Local government should: actively encourage local business in order to create jobs and improve the local economy, not leave economic development to [central government/market forces] exercise local preference in purchasing

Table 7.11

93

55

52

Elected councillors %

88

%

Public

50

89

TEC/LEC boards %

51

86

DHA/HB boards %

146

Governing Perspectives 147

Councillors were around 20 per cent more enthusiastic than board members or the public about the potential for developing human capabilities and personalities through participation. Board members were slightly more enthusiastic than the public but not a lot more. Councillors were equally enthusiastic about local government ‘helping people develop their capabilities and personalities by encouraging them to participate directly in the management of services they themselves used’ or ‘in elections and political campaigns’. Board members and the public were not only less enthusiastic about both kinds of participation, they were also significantly less enthusiastic about participation in elections and politics than about participation in self-management. As a result, the public was 19 per cent less enthusiastic than councillors about participation in self management, and 30 per cent less enthusiastic about participation in elections and political campaigns. Elected councillors displayed a unique faith in the value of the electoral process. But councillors’ enthusiasm for mobilization faded when they were asked about setting up special committees to encourage and support ethnic groups, women’s groups or gays and lesbians, or ‘encouraging those in need to demand more services’ from local government. When framed in these ways, support was highest among the public, less among councillors and still less among appointed board members. Compared to the public councillors were 5 per cent less favourable to special committees and board members 17 per cent less. And again compared to the public, councillors were 17 per cent less inclined to encourage demands on local government while board members were 23 per cent less. Thus, elites were specially inclined to think that participation would be good for the public, but also specially inclined to fear that it would not be good for local governance. And within the elite, appointed board members were less inclined than councillors to see the benefits of mass participation and more inclined than councillors to see the dangers. On average elites were about 22 per cent less willing than the public to agree that ‘local councils should pay most attention to the views and interests of those who [pay most council tax/have expert knowledge/need council jobs/rely most on council services]’. Indeed, elites were less willing than the public to agree that the council should pay attention to any of these four. But there was some variation across the four. Elites differed most from the public on whether councils should pay attention to those who needed council jobs. That was not wonder-

148 Models of Local Governance Table 7.12

A mission to mobilize? Public Elected TEC/LEC councillors boards % % %

Develop people’s capabilities and personalities by participation: 47 *in elections and political campaigns 42 *in self-management of services 52 Set up support committees: *to give moral but not financial support *to give moral and financial support *for women’s groups *for racial and ethnic groups *for gays and lesbians Encourage the needy to demand more

DHA/HB boards %

72 72 71

53 48 59

56 51 61

51

46

34

35

51 51

43 50

30 38

32 36

55 62 35

48 59 31

33 52 15

33 50 20

78

61

56

55

Note: * These versions of the questions were put to randomly selected subsamples.

fully popular among the public but it was overwhelmingly opposed by elites of all kinds. Among the local governance elite, councillors were more inclined than board members to advocate paying attention to those who needed council jobs or services, and less inclined than board members to advocate paying attention to experts (a particular concern of DHA/HB members) or taxpayers (a particular concern of TEC/LEC members). A bare majority of councillors, 53 per cent, agreed that ‘local councils should stay out of national politics except where it directly affected local services’, but that was 25 per cent less than among the public generally and 21 per cent less than among board members. Councillors were thus uniquely inclined to feel that local councils could contribute to national pluralism.

The image of local government Compared to the public, elected councillors had a much more favourable image of local councils – though not always of other forms of local governance. Of course, the obvious response is: ‘they would, wouldn’t they?’ But it is still worth investigating the size of the difference. The size of the difference is not at all obvious.

Governing Perspectives 149 Table 7.13

Pay most attention to whom? Public

Councils should pay most attention to those who: *rely most on council services *have expert knowledge *need council jobs *pay most council tax Average

%

Elected councillors %

TEC/LEC boards %

DHA/HB boards %

90 84 52 22

72 67 21 4

67 70 7 15

60 81 11 7

62

41

40

40

Note: * These four versions of the question were put to randomly selected quarter-samples. Entries sorted by councillors’ views.

Table 7.14

Contribute to national pluralism? Public

Local councils should stay out of national politics

%

Elected councillors %

TEC/LEC boards %

DHA/HB boards %

78

53

77

71

Appointed members of quango boards had a somewhat less favourable image of local councils than did councillors themselves. That also might be expected. But much less obviously, members of quango boards still had a remarkably favourable image of local councils. In general, appointed board members held a positive and sympathetic view of the traditional, elected local councils. Conversely, appointed members of quango boards also held relatively favourable images of their own boards. And yet again that might be expected. But there was a very significant and much less obvious qualification: appointed board members held considerably less favourable images of quango boards other than their own. Representation and responsiveness By a margin of more than four to one, councillors felt their decisions did represent the views of local people. And by margins of two or three to one, board members agreed with councillors. That was less than the

150 Models of Local Governance

margin among councillors themselves but far different from the public. The public were fairly evenly divided as to whether or not local councils took decisions that represented local views and, on balance, they were slightly more inclined to claim that council decisions were unrepresentative than representative. Less dramatically, by a margin of 20 per cent the public were inclined to allege that councils relied too much on experts. Councillors and DHA/HB members were ambivalent about this. But TEC/LEC members were more inclined (by a margin of 16 per cent the other way) to suggest that councils relied too little on expert opinion and too much on the wishes of their voters. Personally, councillors and board members felt more efficacious than the public. They were about 20 per cent more likely to claim that the people they met in everyday life generally took account of their views and opinions. So it would not be surprising if councillors and board members were also more inclined than the public to feel that local government institutions cared about their views. What is interesting is the way these feelings differed across institutions and between councillors and board members. Councillors differed most from the public in their feelings about the responsiveness of councils (by 33 per cent). They differed less in their feelings about local enterprise companies (by 24 per cent) and the police (by only 12 per cent). And they did not differ at all from the public in their feelings about the responsiveness of local health authorities. Board members were almost identical to councillors in terms of personal efficacy, that is in their feeling that the people they met in everyday life generally took account of their views and opinions. And their views about the extent to which the local council or the local police took account of their views closely mirrored the views of councillors themselves. On these matters, the views of appointed board members and elected councillors were very similar to each other, and very different from those of the public. But councillors and board members parted company when asked whether quango boards, such as the local health authority or the local enterprise company, cared about their views. Moreover, they distinguished very sharply between TEC/LEC and DHA/HB boards. Roughly a quarter of councillors and of DHA/HB board members, but very few of the TEC/LEC board members, alleged that the local enterprise company did not care about their views. Conversely, a quarter of TEC/LEC board members as well as half the councillors, but very few of

Representation

74 54

60 66

%

Public

Note: * These two versions of the questions were put to randomly selected split-half samples.

Local councils like the council in [district] … *rely on the views of experts rather than their voters *do what is popular with the voters rather than rely on the views of experts

Local councils like the council in [district] generally take decisions … *that represent the views of local people *that do not represent the views of local people

Table 7.15

44 38

85 19

Elected councillors %

45 61

71 26

TEC/LEC boards %

56 57

61 35

DHA/HB boards %

151

152 Models of Local Governance

the DHA/HB board members, alleged that the local health authority did not care about their views. It is particularly illuminating to compare the views of board members towards other boards with their views about their local council. Let us take TEC/LEC board members first: 22 per cent of them alleged that the local health authority did not care, but only 8 per cent that the local council did not care. Conversely, 28 per cent of the DHA/HB board members alleged that the local enterprise company did not care, but only 16 per cent that the local council did not care. So members of each appointed board were far more critical of the other appointed board than they were of the elected council. There was no community of interest or ideology between members of different appointed boards in this respect. With the exception of their own board, they each held a significantly more favourable image of elected than appointed local governance – at least in terms of responsiveness. Interests: special interests, self-interest and corruption Among the public, councillors and board members, opinion was fairly evenly divided about whether local councils were too willing to accept central government’s instructions, or too willing to reject them. But on balance, they all concurred that councils were too willing to bow to central government instructions. On balance, the public also thought councils deferred too much to business interests. By contrast, a large margin among board members’ (especially on TEC/LEC boards) felt that local councils paid too little attention to business interests. Councillors agreed with board members rather than the public on this – though not by the same margin. The public was evenly divided on whether council services were biased towards richer or poorer areas. But by a margin of more than three to one, councillors and board members were sure that local council services were biased towards the areas of greatest need. When asked directly whether each of nine groups had too much or to little influence over council decisions, the pattern of board members’ opinions proved remarkably close to those of elected councillors, with only two rather obvious and unimportant exceptions. Board members, unlike councillors, did not think councillors had too little influence. And conversely, board members, particularly on the business-oriented TEC/LEC boards, complained more than councillors about local businessmen’s lack of influence. Indeed there was a broad measure of

46 24 14 8

89 9

Elected councillors %

22 7 12 8

91 6

TEC/LEC boards %

Note: * These four versions of the question were put to randomly selected quarter-samples. Entries sorted by councillors’ views.

46 48 26 41

The local [council/health authority/enterprise company/police force] does not care about the views of people like me … *local health authority *local enterprise company *local police force *local council

%

Public

68 17

Responsiveness

People I meet in everyday life generally … *take account of my views and opinions *disregard my views and opinions

Table 7.16

4 28 7 16

85 7

DHA/HB boards %

153

48 59

Local councils like the council in [district] are too willing … *to reject instructions from central government *to accept instructions from central government

Note: * These two versions of the question were put to randomly selected split-half samples.

44 46

Local councils like the council in [district] provide better services *in poor areas where people need them most *in rich areas where people need them least

%

Public

62 51

Council bias

Local councils like the council in [district] … *are dominated by business interests *do not take enough account of business interests

Table 7.17

18 26

63 18

7 22

Elected councillors %

24 26

54 12

5 49

TEC/LEC boards %

25 27

44 18

11 42

DHA/HB boards %

154

Too much or too little influence?

54 35 –10 –32 –49 –30 3 –63 –60

%

Public

74 31 –17 –20 –28 –31 –36 –37 –43

Elected councillors %

65 24 –49 –32 –24 –29 –1 –27 –46

TEC/LEC boards %

% ‘too much’ minus % ‘too little’

64 39 –35 –30 –22 –32 5 –32 –48

DHA/HB boards %

Notes: Entries sorted by attitudes of councillors. Although the question only asked whether each group had ‘too much or too little influence’, large numbers of respondents replied ‘neither too much nor too little – about right’, or words to that effect. Excluding the question about central government on which opinions were more one-sided, the numbers replying ‘neither’ ranged from 21 per cent to 32 per cent among the public; from 45 per cent to 68 per cent among councillors; and from 38 per cent to 68 per cent among appointed board members. Consequently, we have not excluded such answers from our calculation of percentages in this table, and instead report the difference between the ‘too much’ and ‘too little’ percentages, calculated as percentages of all three responses – ‘too much’, ‘too little’ and ‘neither’.

Groups which have too much or too little influence over decisions about local services. … central government senior local government officials local businessmen those who pay most in local taxes women’s groups racial and ethnic groups elected councillors ordinary council workers those who vote in local elections

Table 7.18

155

156 Models of Local Governance

agreement between councillors, board members and the public on which groups had too much or too little influence over local services. All identified central government and senior local government officials as having far too much influence. And all identified local voters as having far too little influence. We might expect that each local councillor would claim to be personally motivated by public interest rather than by private gain. But it is not at all obvious that they should think the same of their colleagues. Councillors are often very critical of the behaviour of other councillors, and not only of councillors in rival parties. However, by a margin of 91 per cent we found that councillors said their fellow councillors were motivated in general by the good of the community rather than by hopes of personal gain. That set them apart from the public, among whom the margin was only 37 per cent. But among appointed board members a margin of around 72 per cent also said councillors were motivated by the public good. Perceptions of whether councillors were motivated by a sense of duty rather than pompous pride were somewhat less favourable, but still very positive. By a margins of 83 per cent councillors themselves said that councillors as a whole were motivated by duty. That margin was only 36 per cent among the public, but 63 per cent among appointed board members. The main contrast in these perceptions of councillors’ self-interest was therefore between the public and the local governance elite. The views of appointed board members were closer to those of councillors themselves than they were to the views of the public. Compared to councillors, board members were more critical of selfinterested councillors and less critical of self-interested board members. By itself that is hardly surprising. What is far more surprising is the extent to which councillors and board members had positive attitudes about each other and focused their resentment on central government. Despite the widespread suspicion that appointed board members were a weapon of central government against traditional local government, they seemed to be on the side of traditional local government against central government in this respect at least. This mutual sympathy was not perfectly symmetrical, but it was impressive nonetheless. By a margin of 72 per cent, board members said councillors were motivated by the public good. On balance, councillors took the view that TEC/LEC members were motivated by the public good rather than private gain – but only by a margin of 48 per cent. And councillors took the view that DHA/HB members

Governing Perspectives 157

were motivated by the public good – but only by a margin of 37 per cent. Similarly, by a margin of 63 per cent, appointed board members said councillors were motivated by a sense of duty rather than selfglorification. But while councillors on balance took the same favourable view that board members were motivated by a sense of duty, they did so by a margin of only 42 per cent when assessing DHA/HB board members, and by only 33 per cent when assessing TEC/LEC board members. And again it was clear that DHA/HB and TEC/LEC board members were less positive about members of the other kind of board than about members of their own. Even here there were clear asymmetries, however. DHA/HB board members’ assessments of TEC/LEC boards were less positive than vice versa. By a margin of 75 per cent councillors claimed that councils were less corrupt than private businesses. The public took the same view but only by a margin of 16 per cent, and board members concurred but only by a margin of around 21 per cent. Among the business-oriented TEC/LEC boards the margin was actually higher, at 28 per cent. Certainly that margin was far less among appointed board members than among councillors themselves but from the perspective of business-oriented boards it was remarkable since it implied a degree of selfcriticism rather than self-justification. Nonetheless, differences on perceptions of council corruption set councillors apart from both the public and board members. Effectiveness The public was highly suspicious of waste in public services, but far more suspicious of central government than local government. Elites were less suspicious than the public. But while councillors were 44 per cent less likely than the public to allege waste by the local council, TEC/LEC members were only 32 per cent less and DHA/HB members only 15 per cent less likely to do so. Local governance elites were more united in alleging waste by central government, however. Opinion among councillors, board members and the public was fairly evenly balanced on the question of over- or under-provision of local services. The striking difference was that so many of the public would agree with either proposition – indicating a lack of firm opinion on the issue – while local governance elites were much more willing to defend the existing level of council provision by rejecting both propositions.

73 41 70 37 35 51

People appointed to TEC/LECs … *have the good of the community at heart *are in it for personal gain *have a sense of duty towards their fellow citizens *just want people to look up to them

Local councils like the council in [district] … *are generally more corrupt than private businesses *are generally less corrupt than private businesses

5 80

70 22 66 23

69 32 67 25

98 7 96 13

Elected councillors %

Note: * These two versions of the questions were put to randomly selected split-half samples.

66 31 73 31

People appointed to DHA/HBs … *have the good of the community at heart *are in it for personal gain *have a sense of duty towards their fellow citizens *just want people to look up to them

%

Public

79 42 80 44

Self-interest and corruption

Local councillors … *have the good of the community at heart *are in it for personal gain *have a sense of duty towards their fellow citizens *just want people to look up to them

Table 7.19

10 38

93 3 94 9

87 11 83 18

90 15 93 33

TEC/LEC boards %

19 34

81 17 78 16

97 3 98 5

90 21 92 27

DHA/HB boards %

158

Governing Perspectives 159

By a relatively small margin of 14 per cent, councillors claimed that councils were more efficient than private businesses. But the public took the opposite view, and by the much larger margin of 44 per cent. Board members, like the public, were critical of council efficiency, and by even greater margins of around 58 per cent. Figure 7.2 shows perceptions of how councils compared with private businesses on corruption and efficiency. Appointed board members took similar views to the public. By small margins they rated councils as less corrupt than private business, and by large margins they rated councils as less efficient than private businesses. But on both issues, councillors took a uniquely favourable view of councils, very different from the views of appointed board members or the public. Using a battery of non-comparative questions we also asked whether councils, TEC/LEC members and DHA/HB members were ‘good at organizing things’ or not. Figure 7.3 reveals several features of the answers to these questions: • In general, TEC/LEC members had the best reputation for efficiency (they were businessmen of course) and councillors the worst. • Councillors had the worst opinion of appointed board members, and board members had the worst opinion of councillors. In each

Compared to private businesses, the local council

Figure 7.2

Councils compared to private businesses

70 50 30 Public Councillors TEC/LECs DHA/HBs

10 –10 –30 –50 –70

less corrupt more efficient Compared to private businesses, local councils are ...

160 Models of Local Governance Figure 7.3

Perceptions of each other’s efficiency

% ‘good organizers’ minus % ‘not very good’

90 70 Ratings by: Public Councillors TEC/LECs DHA/HBs

50 30 10 –10 –30

councillors TEC/LESs DHA/HBs efficient efficient efficient Are councillors or appointed board members efficient?

case, the public took a view that was intermediate between board members and councillors. • Each elite had a uniquely favourable perception of its own capabilities. Councillors were uniquely favourable to councillors, DHA/HB members to DHA/HB members, and TEC/LEC members to TEC/LEC members. The scale of this tendency towards self-admiration was large. • But each appointed elite was only a little more favourable than the public towards the other appointed elite. DHA/HB members’ perceptions of TEC/LEC members were only slightly more favourable than the public’s perceptions of TEC/LEC members. Conversely, TEC/LEC members’ perceptions of DHA/HB members were only slightly more favourable than the public’s perceptions of DHA/HB members. Among the least obvious and least self-confident aspects of councillors’ opinions were their views about the relative capabilities of central and local government. Across five relevant questions about central government’s capabilities, councillors rated the capability of central government 13 per cent higher than did the public. But by contrast, across the four relevant questions about local councils’

Efficiency

57 45 55 50 69 38

Local councillors … *are good at organizing things *are not very good at organizing things

People appointed to DHA/HBs … *are good at organizing things *are not very good at organizing things

People appointed to TEC/LECs … *are good at organizing things *are not very good at organizing things

Note: * These two versions of the questions were put to randomly selected split-half samples.

22 66

47 41

92 61

%

Public

Local councils like the council in [district] … *are generally more efficient than private businesses *are generally less efficient than private businesses

Local councils like the council in [district] … *raise high local taxes to provide unnecessary services *fail to provide services up to proper national standards because they are unwilling to raise local taxes

Wasting taxpayers money: *parliament and the govt waste a good deal of taxpayers’ money *the council in [district] wastes a good deal of taxpayers’ money

Table 7.20

56 37

52 50

82 16

43 29

11 18

77 17

Elected councillors %

89 8

56 35

34 55

10 65

19 20

76 29

TEC/LEC boards %

75 35

84 13

40 47

9 69

26 20

67 46

DHA/HB boards %

161

162 Models of Local Governance

capabilities, councillors rated the capability of councils 5 per cent lower than did the public. Indeed on the capability of local councils, the pessimism of local councillors set them apart from both the public and appointed board members. The differences are small but they hint at a general tendency to project perceptions of capability onto others – in sharp contrast to claims about honesty and efficiency. Contrary to the naive assertion that democratic politicians claim more capability than they possess, our data hints at attempts to lower expectations rather than inflate them. They would prefer to be judged by input quality rather than by output performance targets. Councillors were three times as likely as the public to have complained or protested through the eight channels of protest that we investigated. Like the public, however, they were most likely to have complained to councillors, councils or MPs and least likely to have complained to appointed boards, especially TEC/LECs. On average, appointed board members were only twice as likely as the public to have protested or complained. Generally board members complained significantly less than councillors, but there were three exceptions to that generalization. DHA/HB members were just as likely as councillors to have complained to their district health authority, though no more so. TEC/LEC board members were also as likely as councillors to have complained to an appropriate department of central government. And TEC/LEC board members were twice as likely as councillors to have complained to their local enterprise company. All three exceptions were obvious ‘insider’ effects, however, and where insider effects were not operating, councillors complained and protested much more frequently than board members. Elites and public took similar views about the effectiveness of protests to MPs or the mass media. But councillors themselves rated the effectiveness of complaints to councillors much higher than did the public or appointed board members. Almost irrespective of the target of complaints – central government, local councils or quangos – the effectiveness of complaints to councillors was rated much greater by councillors themselves than by the public or board members. But councillors rated complaints to councillors as specially effective if the target of complaints was the local council. On our ±5-point scale councillors rated complaints to councillors at 2.4 if the target of complaints was the local council, while both the public and board members rated their effectiveness at only 0.7.

Capability

Note: Entries sorted by councillors’ views.

Average

Local councils can do ‘quite a bit’ to … improve their area as a place to live improve health and social services in their area improve employment prospects in their area cut crime in their area

Average

British governments can do ‘quite a bit’ to … improve health and social services improve the general standard of living cut crime reduce unemployment keep prices down

Table 7.21

67

87 65 53 63

71

83 75 69 66 64

%

Public

62

90 53 53 52

84

94 88 83 81 75

Elected councillors %

66

93 56 53 60

78

92 78 75 72 71

TEC/LEC boards %

71

93 67 57 65

78

93 81 74 70 72

DHA/HB boards %

163

164 Models of Local Governance Table 7.22

Actually used as channels of protest Public Elected TEC/LEC DHA/HB councillors boards boards % % % %

Ever [protested/complained] in person, or by phone or letter to: * the district council your MP your local councillor * offices of the appropriate government department newspapers, radio or television * the police themselves * your district health authority * your local enterprise company Average

32 31 36 24

87 85 83 71

68 69 58 72

66 67 65 57

17 22 15 4

68 63 50 16

38 39 16 33

41 22 50 13

23

65

49

48

Note: * These five versions of the question were put to randomly selected subsamples. Entries sorted by councillors’ actions.

In a similar way TEC/LEC board members rated the effectiveness of complaints to TEC/LECs about TEC/LECs at 1.8 while the public, councillors and even DHA/HB members never rated them above 0.6. And DHA/HB board members rated the effectiveness of complaints to DHA/HBs about DHA/HBs at 2.3 while the public, councillors and even TEC/LEC members never rated them above 0.4. Again this is evidence of insider effects which is not in principle surprising. However, the insider effects were remarkably strong and remarkably specific. And in particular, appointed board members only displayed a strongly insider perspective in relation to their own board. In relation to other boards, appointed board members were only slightly more positive than councillors.

Satisfaction and trust Elites and public expressed similar levels of satisfaction with the service provided by local tradesmen, their local doctor and the local electricity company. When asked about their local council, however, councillors expressed significantly more satisfaction than the public or board members.

Generally effective as channels of protest

Note: Entries sorted by councillors’ views.

How effective would it be to [protest/complain] to … your local councillor newspapers, radio or television your MP

Table 7.23

0.3 1.1 0.1

Mean score on ±5 scale

Public

1.4 0.8 0.5

Elected councillors Mean score on ±5 scale –0.3 0.6 0.4

TEC/LEC boards Mean score on ±5 scale

–0.1 0.8 0.4

DHA/HB boards Mean score on ±5 scale

165

Specifically effective as channels of protest

How effective would it be to [protest/complain] about actions of your local enterprise company to … your local enterprise company your MP newspapers, radio or television your local councillor

How effective would it be to [protest/complain] about actions of your local council to … your local councillor the district council newspapers, radio or television your MP

How effective would it be to [protest/complain] about actions of the government to … your local councillor newspapers, radio or television your MP offices of the appropriate government department

Table 7.24

–0.3 0.0 1.2 0.3

0.7 0.4 1.2 0.4

–0.2 1.1 0.0 –0.6

Mean score on ±5 scale

Public

0.4 0.4 0.8 1.7

2.4 1.8 0.8 0.4

1.4 0.8 0.4 –0.4

Elected councillors Mean score on ±5 scale

1.8 0.5 0.4 –0.6

0.6 0.6 0.6 0.3

–0.8 0.4 0.3 –0.8

TEC/LEC boards Mean score on ±5 scale

0.6 0.5 1.0 0.2

0.7 0.2 0.8 0.3

–1.4 0.7 –0.4 –1.4

DHA/HB boards Mean score on ±5 scale

166

1.0 0.9 0.6 0.5

0.0 0.7 0.5 0.9

Elected councillors Mean score on ±5 scale

0.0 0.7 0.7 0.3

0.4 0.8 0.4 –0.3

TEC/LEC boards Mean score on ±5 scale

–0.1 0.5 0.7 0.3

2.3 1.1 0.8 –0.4

DHA/HB boards Mean score on ±5 scale

Note: Entries sorted by councillors’ views, except for entries related to TEC/LECs or DHA/HBs which have been sorted by their board members’ views.

0.3 1.2 0.1 0.1

How effective would it be to [protest/complain] about actions of your local police authority to … your local councillor newspapers, radio or television your MP the police themselves

Mean score on ±5 scale

Public

(continued)

0.0 1.0 0.1 0.2

Specifically effective as channels of protest

How effective would it be to [protest/complain] about actions of your district health authority to … your district health authority newspapers, radio or television your MP your local councillor

Table 7.24

167

168 Models of Local Governance

Though they were always trusted more than central government, there were clear but complex insider effects on patterns of trust in local governance elites: • Councillors expressed uniquely high trust in councillors, TEC/LEC boards in TEC/LEC members, and DHA/HB boards in DHA/HB members. • There was an asymmetry between the extent to which board members trusted councillors and the extent to which councillors trusted board members. Board members trusted councillors significantly more than vice versa. • Appointed board members displayed almost as much trust in elected councillors as in members of other boards, though not as much as in members of their own board. So, as usual, insider effects were remarkably specific and the hierachy of trust expressed by board members in particular was clear: the board member’s own board came top; other institutions of local governance, irrespective of whether they were elected or appointed came next; and central government came bottom.

Institutional preferences Local autonomy Averaging across eight specific local services, councillors were 19 per cent less inclined than the public to say they should be organized on a national scale. On individual services, the difference between councillors and the public reached 30 per cent or more on whether services concerned with the environment, pollution or economic development should be organized on a local or national scale. But averaging across these eight local services board members were rather more inclined than councillors to say they should be organized nationally, though not so much as the public. Of all the local governance elites, DHA/HB members were the most nationally orientated. In addition, although board members were less favourable than councillors towards organizing these services at district level, they were more favourable even than councillors towards organizing them on a regional scale. The national orientation of DHA/HB members was evident in other ways. They were the most inclined to complain that the area represented by their district council was too small for effective provision of

Satisfaction and trust

Note: Entries sorted by councillors’ views.

How much can you trust, to do what is right for their areas … people elected to local councils businessmen appointed to TEC/LECs people appointed to DHA/HBs

How much can you trust parliament and government, to do what is right for Britain

Satisfaction with the overall service and value for money you receive from … local doctor local council tradesmen who have done household repairs for you (if any) electricity supplier

Table 7.25

0.8 0.4 0.6

–0.7

3.0 1.3 1.8 2.0

Mean score on ±5 scale

Public

2.8 0.8 0.6

0.2

3.3 2.8 2.4 2.3

Elected councillors Mean score on ±5 scale

1.3 2.6 1.6

0.6

3.0 1.8 1.9 2.2

TEC/LEC boards Mean score on ±5 scale

1.2 1.4 3.0

0.9

3.4 1.7 2.2 2.4

DHA/HB boards Mean score on ±5 scale

169

44

Average

24

29 33 21 28 29 29 10 13 32

51 41 49 41 38 29 6 5 56

38 25 57 37 39 58 95 95 31

41 54 25 46 47 30 4 5

Britain District Region % % %

13

21 21 18 17 15 12 1 0 49

33 32 32 32 27 53 94 92 33

44 45 36 44 49 31 5 7 18

23 22 32 24 24 16 1 1

47

17 32 34 30 26 51 98 88

32

50 38 31 48 48 30 1 11

21

33 30 35 23 25 19 1 1

Britain %

DHA/HB boards

Britain District Region % % %

TEC/LEC boards

Britain District Region % % %

Elected councillors

Note: Entries sorted by councillors’ views on organizing services nationally.

20 26 30 32 33 42 84 82

District Region % %

Public

Best size for different services?

Economic development Hospitals/health Environment Police Roads Schools/education Refuse collection Leisure services

Table 7.26

170

Governing Perspectives 171

public services, and yet they were by far the least inclined to support the idea of elected regional assemblies. Conversely, the public expressed as much support for an elected regional tier of government as councillors, and more than board members, but the public was far less inclined than elites to complain that their district area was too small.

Table 7.27

Regions and districts Public %

Elected councillors %

TEC/LEC boards %

DHA/HB boards %

18 38

4 53

7 57

3 63

20

49

50

60

60

60

53

38

%

Elected councillors %

TEC/LEC boards %

DHA/HB boards %

86 88

84 85

66 70

70 69

83

83

62

70

Proper rights for local minorities: to campaign against the decision at the next local election to appeal to central govt to overrule the local council

83

95

95

95

54

64

64

68

Best way to ensure proper standards in local services: national government inspectors voter power in local elections go to court and claim compensation

39 32

59 30

64 22

66 23

29

11

14

11

District council area? *too big *too small difference: too small – too big Support elected regional assemblies?

Table 7.28

The final say: local or central government? Public

Local rather than central govt should have the final say: *after a local election on the issue *after a local referendum on the issue

172 Models of Local Governance

In a confrontation with central government, where the local council had obtained an electoral mandate but was opposed by central government, councillors hardly differed from the public in overwhelmingly taking the side of the council, but board members were about 18 per cent less willing to back local against central government. But, counter-intuitively, councillors were 10 per cent more willing than the public to accept that it was ‘right and proper’ for a local minority to appeal to central government over the head of a local council. Board members took a similar view to councillors. As the best means of ‘ensuring proper standards in local services such as health, education or policing’, councillors were 20 per cent more inclined than the public to opt for ‘national government inspectors’ – though at the expense of less support for legal action in the court rather than less reliance on voter power. Board members were a little more inclined even than councillors to opt for ‘national government inspectors’ as the best way to ensure proper standards in local services and somewhat less inclined to rely on voter power. Democracy Naturally enough, local governance elites were far less populist than the public – irrespective of whether these elites were elected or appointed. So, while 46 per cent of the public opted for local referenda to fix local government boundaries, only 23 per cent of councillors and 21 per cent of board members agreed. Less obviously, councillors did not differ from the public on whether boundary revision should be controlled by local councils or central government. Instead, councillors were much more inclined than the public to place the issue in the hands of ‘independent experts’. And appointed board members were even more favourable than councillors to relying on ‘independent

Table 7.29

Who should fix local government boundaries? Public

Independent experts Joint committee of local councils Local people in a referendum Central government Note: Entries sorted by councillors’ views.

%

Elected councillors %

TEC/LEC boards %

DHA/HB boards %

15 31 46 9

33 31 23 13

39 22 22 18

44 22 19 16

Governing Perspectives 173

experts’ though they were also slightly more favourable to central government. Local governance elites were only around 16 per cent less favourable to the principle of national and local referenda than the public. But councillors drew a sharper distinction than others between local and national referenda. So a majority of councillors favoured national referenda but opposed local referenda. And there were huge differences on the question of directly electing a council leader – now usually described as a directly elected executive mayor. That won the support of 78 per cent of the public. But it was opposed by 62 per cent of appointed board members and by 82 per cent of councillors. Four-fifths of the public supported it while four-fifths of councillors rejected it. Clearly that issue brought out the populism of the public and the councillors’ contrasting commitment to representative democracy. At the same time there were sharp differences on whether the number of elected councillors should be reduced. By varying margins, both elite and public thought there should be a reduction rather than an increase. But while the margin was only a modest 10 per cent among councillors, it reached 32 per cent among the public and 47 per cent among board members. If the issues of directly elected mayors and a reduction in the numbers of councillors came too close to home for the comfort of councillors, the issue of monitoring quangos did the same for

Table 7.30

Direct democracy Public Elected TEC/LEC DHA/HB councillors boards boards % % % %

Support referenda: *in national politics *in local politics difference: in local – in national

65 69 61 –8

51 58 45 –13

43 45 40 –5

50 51 48 –3

Council leader should be directly elected

78

18

38

37

Better to have: *more councillors *fewer councillors difference: fewer – more

26 58 32

11 21 10

8 57 49

8 52 44

174 Models of Local Governance Figure 7.4

Quango accountability

80 70

Per cent

60 50

Public Councillors TEC/LECs DHA/HBs

40 30 20 10 0

to local to central to no-one council government Non-elected bodies should be responsible to ...

appointed board members. And on this issue it was the councillors who led the attack. The locus of accountability Relatively few, even among appointed board members, thought that quangos should act like private businesses without a line of accountability to either local or central government. But while 76 per cent of councillors and 68 per cent of the public thought non-elected local quangos such as DHA/HBs and TEC/LECs should be responsible to elected local councils, fully 63 per cent of board members disagreed with them. Conversely while 42 per cent of TEC/LEC members and 55 per cent of DHA/HB members thought these quangos should be responsible directly to central government, over 80 per cent of councillors and the public disagreed with them (see Figure 7.4). The degree of accountability In a different question we focused exclusively on the relationship between local councils and local quangos, omitting any reference to central government. Instead we asked whether local councils should have powers of control over local quangos, powers of investigation or neither. Councillors were 12 per cent more inclined than the public,

Governing Perspectives 175 Table 7.31

Monitoring quango boards Public

Non-elected bodies like health authorities, NHS trusts, TEC/LECs and school boards should … be responsible to local councils be responsible to central government decide their own affairs, like private companies Local councils should … have powers to control these non-elected bodies have power to investigate, but not control them leave them to get on with managing their own affairs

%

Elected councillors %

TEC/LEC boards %

DHA/HB boards %

68

76

39

34

20

18

42

55

12

6

19

11

26

38

14

12

57

51

44

42

18

10

42

46

and 25 per cent more than board members, to support powers to control. And while many board members would accept local council powers of investigation and oversight, 44 per cent of board members opposed even that. By contrast only 10 per cent of councillors and 18 per cent of the public were willing to let local quangos manage themselves without even local council oversight. The market: paying for services In the abstract, all local governance elites were almost totally opposed to the idea of user charges and totally in favour of tax contributions to support local public services. The public responded in a very different way, with over a third supporting the general principle of user-funded services. But perhaps the public failed to understand the significance of the question. Using our CATI system we put the alternative options to randomly selected split-half samples. The public’s tendency to agree with both alternatives casts doubt on their understanding. Nonetheless the public were less willing than elites to back tax funding as well as more willing to back user charges. The difference between elite and public was less when we framed the question in terms of practice rather than principle. When asked

176 Models of Local Governance Table 7.32

User-charges for services? Public %

* Only service users should pay * Everyone should contribute through taxes

Elected councillors %

TEC/LEC boards %

DHA/HB boards %

34

7

9

6

83

93

96

95

Note: * These two versions of the question were put to randomly selected split-half samples.

whether ‘most local services’ should be funded mainly by user charges, by local taxation or by national taxation, councillors were only 14 per cent less likely than the public to opt for user charges. Board members were slightly more favourable to user charges but only slightly. They remained closer to councillors than to the public. And when we asked about six specific services even these modest differences between elite and public shrank. Both elite and public were almost totally opposed to funding state schools, hospitals or the police by user charges. They differed little on local public transport (where user charges were more generally acceptable) and only by around 10 per cent on the funding of swimming pools or public libraries. On average, across these six specific services, the public, councillors and board members never differed by more than 5 per cent on the allocation of costs between national subsidies, user charges and local taxation. Rival institutions of local governance The public were 23 per cent less inclined than councillors to say that traditional multi-purpose local authorities were better than a set of specialist bodies running individual services, and 42 per cent more inclined than councillors to agree that it did not matter who ran local services if the quality was right. Appointed board members took an intermediate view on whether it mattered who ran local services but they were as critical of traditional multi-purpose authorities as the public. Indeed DHA/HB members were even more critical than the public of multi-purpose authorities and more favourable to specialist bodies. But board members’ preponderant preference for single-purpose authorities (usually appointed) over multi-purpose authorities (usually

12

14 26 23 3 2 3

24

Userchg %

41

67 65 55 24 22 12

43

Local taxes %

48

14 6 24 74 78 95

31

Natl subs %

7

4 15 19 1 1 1

10

Userchg %

45

82 79 57 25 21 4

59

Local taxes %

Elected councillors

Note: Entries sorted by councillors’ views on funding by local taxation.

47

19 8 22 73 77 85

Specified services: public libraries swimming pools local public transport schools police hospitals

Average

33

Natl subs %

Public

Best way to pay for different services?

‘Most local services’

Table 7.33

46

12 4 14 75 79 92

26

Natl subs %

11

10 25 25 2 1 4

15

Userchg %

43

78 71 60 22 20 4

59

Local taxes %

TEC/LEC boards

49

12 3 18 79 84 97

30

Natl subs %

10

10 25 20 4 1 2

14

Userchg %

41

78 72 62 17 15 1

56

Local taxes %

DHA/HB boards

177

178 Models of Local Governance Figure 7.5

Institutional ratings

Mean scores on  5 point scale

5 4 3 Public Councillors TEC/LECs DHA/HBs

2 1 0 –1 –2 –3

elected council

service users

service providers

appointed boards

private companies

elected) was perhaps instrumental rather than ideological, justified only contingently by better performance. When asked to rate six ways of organizing local services in general, the public and appointed board members as well as elected councillors all rated elected councils as the best way to run local services. Not surprisingly, as Figure 7.5 shows, councillors were uniquely favourable to elected councils. But both the public and appointed board members also gave very high ratings to elected councils, far higher than they gave to any other system of local governance. Figure 7.5 also shows that councillors gave uniquely low ratings to appointed boards and private companies, though both the public and even appointed board members also gave them negative ratings on our ±5-point scale. There was very little difference between the public, elected councillors or appointed board members on their ratings for control and management by service users (we instanced parents and schools as an example). Opinion among all three elites echoed the ambivalence of the public. But there were greater differences on control and management by service providers (we instanced schoolteachers as an example). Here the public took a moderately favourable view while elites took a moderately unfavourable view. On the ±5-point scale there was a

Governing Perspectives 179

2-point difference between the public and elites and not much difference among the elites themselves. Elected councillors and appointed board members held similar views on service providers just as they had on service users, but this time their views were strongly negative and at variance with the views of the public. There was a divergence between public and elite on the value of voluntary and community groups. The public was very enthusiastic about them at least for representation and exerting pressure (68 per cent in favour), and moderately enthusiastic about them for actually running services (39 per cent in favour). But councillors were overwhelmingly sceptical about the value of such groups either for representation or for management (83 per cent unfavourable). Board members were considerably more sympathetic than councillors to such groups as mechanisms of representation and pressure, though less sympathetic than the public. But board members were just as hostile as councillors to the suggestion that services were best organized through ‘voluntary groups’. When asked whether local councils, private companies or central government should control eight specific local services, councillors’ choices were very similar on average to those of the public, though slightly more favourable than the public towards local councils and less favourable than the public towards central government. Compared to councillors, appointed board members were 12 per cent less inclined to say these services should be run by local councils and 9 per cent more inclined to opt for private companies. The difference varied across the eight services. Board members differed most from councillors on refuse collection and electricity. On refuse collection, 30 per cent of board members but only 12 per cent of councillors opted for private companies, entirely at the expense of local council control. And on electricity, 58 per cent of board members but only 37 per cent of councillors opted for private companies, mainly at the expense of central government control. But board members agreed with councillors that private companies should not have a major role in education, health, distributing unemployment benefits or policing. Although the private security industry is now larger than the police itself, it seems that no one in our survey thought of ‘policing’ in such terms. To a large extent preferences reflected perceptions of the actual situation. But in so far as preferences differed from perceptions the public wanted more central government control and less private involvement, and councillors wanted more local government control and less private

Note: Entries sorted by councillors’ views.

Best way to organize and control local services: elected council users, e.g. parents running schools providers, e.g. teachers running schools private companies charging for use of service *businessmen appointed by central govt *experts appointed by central govt

All-purpose local authorities are better than specialist bodies

2.6 0.1 0.7 –0.8 –0.5 –0.1

30 Mean score on ±5 scale

70

%

Public

Rating alternative institutions of local governance

Does not matter who runs local services if quality is right

Table 7.34

4.1 –0.1 –1.1 –2.0 –2.3 –2.3

53 Mean score on ±5 scale

28

Elected councillors %

2.9 –0.1 –1.5 –0.6 –0.7 –1.0

34 Mean score on ±5 scale

51

TEC/LEC boards %

2.9 –0.3 –1.2 –0.9 –1.2 –0.3

21 Mean score on ±5 scale

43

DHA/HB boards %

180

Governing Perspectives 181 Table 7.35

Voluntary and community groups Public %

Elected councillors %

TEC/LEC boards %

DHA/HB boards %

Local community groups: best way to get things done represent people better than councillors do

63

16

35

38

72

16

41

40

Best to organize services through voluntary groups

39

18

17

18

involvement. The preferences of appointed board members closely reflected their perceptions, however.

Conclusion: a governing consensus between rival elites but divisions within Councillors and public In many respects councillors were similar to the public, truly representative figures. But how did they differ from the public? What made councillors special? Compared to the public, elected local councillors were more likely to be long-term residents. They were better informed and much more interested in local issues, though they were also more interested in political issues generally. Councillors were far more politically active than the public – not just in the council itself, but in lobbying MPs, central government offices, radio, television and the press, and the non-elected arm of local governance such as district health authorities or local enterprise companies. Councillors had a much stronger sense of psychological identification with their neighbourhood and district, as well as with a political party. Yet despite this stronger sense of local identification, councillors had noticeably less exclusive attitudes towards incomers’ access to local schools and hospitals or voting in local elections. Councillors were much less favourable than the public towards councils providing extra services for cash, but more favourable than the public towards ‘quality of life’ subsidies. They were far more inclined to see a role for local governance in developing citizens’

+15

45

4 42 53 39 34 66 46 76

30

Central govt %

Note: Entries sorted by councillors’ views on local council control.

–13

12

–2

43

Difference: should – does

Average

19 3 1 9 21 4 36 1

77 55 46 52 45 30 18 23

25

45

Who should control different services? refuse collection schools policing help for local business water and sewage hospitals electricity unemployment benefits

Local Private council co. % %

Public

Preferred control of different services

Who does control different services? Average

Table 7.36

+11

47

87 76 65 56 38 32 13 9

36

Local council %

TEC/LEC boards

DHA/HB boards

–14

11

12 3 1 5 27 3 37 1

25

+3

42

1 21 34 39 35 65 50 90

39

–2

34

67 59 54 37 26 21 5 7

36

–3

21

32 6 1 17 42 9 59 2

24

+5

45

1 34 45 46 32 70 36 92

40

+1

36

71 64 52 40 35 9 7 6

35

–7

18

28 5 2 14 34 4 56 2

25

+6

46

1 31 46 46 31 87 37 92

40

Private Central Local Private Central Local Private Central co. govt council co. govt council co. govt % % % % % % % %

Elected councillors

182

Governing Perspectives 183

individual capabilities and personalities through participation in local election campaigns or in the self-management of local services. And they were far more inclined than the public to see a role for local councils in national politics. Naturally enough, some of the greatest differences between councillors and the public concerned their images of local councils and other institutions of local governance. Councillors differed very sharply from the public in their image of councils as truly representative and responsive and in their feeling that councillors had too little influence over services in their locality – and in their feeling that central government had too much influence. Councillors also differed very sharply from the public in their image of their fellow councillors. To a greater extent than the public, councillors saw their colleagues as motivated by the good of the community rather than personal gain, as trustworthy, honest and efficient, and as the best channel for public protests or complaints – even on matters which were the responsibility of central government or non-elected local boards as well as on those where the local council had direct control. Compared to the public, councillors were substantially less inclined to say that services should be run on a national basis though they were substantially more inclined to support ‘government inspectors’ to ensure proper standards in local services. They were much less favourable than the public to populist devices such as referenda and especially antagonistic towards the principle of directly elected executive mayors. Despite very considerable public backing, councillors were even more inclined than their supportive publics to demand that appointed local quangos be held responsible to, or even be controlled by, elected local councils. Finally, councillors’ ratings of alternative institutions of local governance followed the same pattern as among the public though it was much more clearly defined. Councillors gave far higher positive ratings to elected councils than the already very high positive ratings given by the public. And councillors gave far more negative ratings to private companies and appointed quangos than the already negative ratings given by the public. In their direction, few of these findings come as a surprise. What is interesting is not that councillors differ from the public but the scale of the differences, some of which were large by any standard and some of which might qualify for the term ‘extreme’. At the same time there was close agreement between councillors and the public on many aspects of local governance. Both showed strong local identifications yet both

184 Models of Local Governance

were overwhelmingly opposed to local exclusiveness. Both were overwhelmingly favourable to councils providing universal services and services for the needy. Both were strongly in favour of local autonomy, at least to decide on services beyond a national minimum. Both backed a role for local councils in economic development. Both agreed that central government and (non-elected) local officials had too much influence while voters and council workers had too little. Both agreed that councillors were motivated by a desire to serve their community rather than by self-interest. Both agreed that elected local councils should oversee the work of appointed quango boards. And both designated elected local councils as by far the best institution for running local services, and private companies or appointed quangos as the worst. Occasionally, differences between councillors and the public were differences of direction. Usually they were differences of degree, due more to the sharper perceptions and opinions of councillors than to adversarial tensions between them. Elected councillors and appointed board members To a remarkable and surprising extent, the views of the appointed members of local quango boards were similar to those of elected councillors. But not in everything. Moreover, the views of those appointed to one kind of quango differed from the views of those appointed to another. What made appointed elites different from elected councillors? Appointed board members had far weaker objective connections to their locality. They were far less likely to be long-term local residents than elected councillors and far less likely to have all their relatives or friends living locally. Psychologically, too, they were far less local. In particular the appointed elite identified much less than councillors with their region, their district or their home neighbourhood, though almost as much with their work neighbourhood. Appointed board members had far less faith in public participation. They were much less inclined than councillors to see participation in local government as a means of developing citizens’ capabilities and personalities. And in so far as they recognized this possibility at all, they emphasized participation in self-management rather than in elections and political campaigns, while councillors gave equal weight to both. The appointed elite was rather less inclined even than councillors to agree that councils should stimulate demand for their services. It was

Governing Perspectives 185

less inclined than councillors to pay attention to those who needed council jobs, and more inclined to suggest that councils should pay attention to local taxpayers, though these differences between councillors and the appointed board members were fairly small. But appointed board members were far more likely to say that local councils should stay out of national politics. They were also much more likely than councillors to claim that councils did not take enough account of business interests or that local businessmen had too little influence over local services, though councillors on balance agreed with these criticisms, if to a lesser extent. Conversely, councillors were far more likely than appointed board members to say that councillors themselves had too little influence over local services. Councillors were twice as likely as board members to claim that councils were less corrupt than private business, though board members on balance agreed. Conversely, appointed board members were twice as likely as councillors to allege that councils were inefficient, although councillors on balance agreed with that. The appointed elite was far less willing than councillors to back local councils in any confrontation with central government. It was far more willing to cut the number of elected councillors, and far more willing to impose a directly elected executive mayor on the council, though no more willing to accept a role for local referenda. Appointed board members were largely willing to accept that boards should be monitored in some way, but much less willing than councillors to accept oversight and investigation by the local council, still less actual control by the local council. There was also an important asymmetry between the opinions of councillors about appointed boards and the opinions of board members about councillors. Councillors were more likely to claim that board members ignored their views than vice versa. And they were also more likely to criticize board members for being out for personal gain than vice versa. Councillors were less likely to trust members of appointed boards than vice versa. Most significant of all, the appointed elite joined councillors in rating elected local councils as by far the best way to organize and control local services, while councillors rated private companies and appointed boards as by far the worst. Divisions within the appointed elite We have evidence that insider effects were highly specific. People defended the very particular institution in which they served. Thus, for example, councillors were the most likely to claim that their fellow

186 Models of Local Governance

councillors were good organizers, TEC/LEC board members were the most likely to make that claim about TEC/LEC boards, and DHA/HB board members about DHA/HB boards. Councillors gave top marks to fellow councillors for trustworthiness, TEC/LEC board members to their colleagues on TEC/LEC boards, and DHA/HB board members to their colleagues on DHA/HB boards. But there was surprisingly little community of interest and respect between the members of different boards. TEC/LEC board members thought that the best way to influence a TEC/LEC was to complain to it directly but DHA/HB members thought complaints to the press would be more effective. Conversely DHA/HB board members thought that the best way to influence a DHA/HB was to complain to it directly but TEC/LEC members thought complaints to the press would be more effective. And councillors thought complaints to councillors would be most effective in both cases. Far more members of TEC/LEC and DHA/HB boards alleged that members of the other board did not care about their views than made the same criticism of elected councils. TEC/LEC board members gave only very lukewarm support to the idea that DHA/HB board members were good organizers (though DHA/HB board members were more generous towards TEC/LEC boards). And although TEC/LEC and DHA/HB board members rated the trustworthiness of people on their own kind of board much higher than that of councillors, they rated the trustworthiness of people on the other kind of board about the same as that of councillors. When they came to rate alternative institutions as the best way to organize and control local services it was noticeable not only that both TEC/LEC and DHA/HB boards put elected councils far above all other institutions but also that TEC/LEC board members rated boards of ‘experts’ even lower than boards of ‘businessmen’, while DHA/HB members rated boards of ‘businessmen’ even lower than boards of ‘experts’. It is difficult to avoid seeing that as a reflection of their own composition and self-images, equating TEC/LEC boards with businessmen and DHA/HB boards with experts. We can now answer the broad questions we raised at the start of this chapter. While elected local councillors had strongly negative attitudes towards appointed boards as an institution for running local services, the appointed local elite of quango board members did not reciprocate. They defended their own boards, but expressed remarkable sympathy and respect for elected local governance. Indeed they tended to see

Governing Perspectives 187

their own particular board as ‘exceptional’, and took a positive view of it, yet without a wider commitment to the general principle of appointed boards. Whatever their partisanship, their left/right ideology, their commitment to efficiency or their service in an institution of appointed local governance, they remained committed to the principle of elective democracy in local as well as national politics. Perhaps like the sinner who prayed for the strength to reform ‘but not just yet’, the appointed elite were more committed to elective democracy in principle than in practice. Perhaps they thought that elective democracy was the best method of local governance but sometime in the future when pressing problems had been solved, or somewhere else than in the institution in which they themselves served and which, in their view, seemed to work quite well. We do not know. We did not ask. But we were surprised by the strength of commitment to the ideal of elected local governance that was expressed by those who were so deeply involved, as members of appointed boards, in alternatives to it.

8 Testing Models against Public Opinion

This chapter tests the four models of local governance outlined in Chapter 1 against public opinion: the ‘traditional’ or ‘localist model’, the ‘New Right’ or ‘individualist model’, the ‘New Left’ or ‘mobilization model’, and the ‘agency’ or ‘centralist model’. Each model bases recommendations about forms and structures of local governance on assumptions about people’s identities, aims and objectives, images of local government and institutional preferences. We find that all four models fit some aspects of public opinion, and that none fits all aspects of public opinion, but that some fit so much better than others that there are clear winners and losers in this test against public opinion. The ‘traditional model’ of British local governance was based on allpurpose, elected local authorities. That model was always a theoretical model even though it was sometimes presented as an empirical description of a recently destroyed ‘golden age’ of local governance. So it might be better to emphasize its theoretical rather than historical status by naming it the ‘localist’ rather than the ‘traditional’ model. We can test this ‘localist’ model against the findings of our public opinion survey. But it is not enough to test that one model in isolation. We should also test alternative models of local governance in the same way. In the rhetoric of the 1970s and 1980s, the case against the localist or traditional model was expressed in terms of ‘New Right’ or ‘New Left’ ideas. The ‘New Right’ viewed local governance in terms of individuals exercising a choice of local services. The services would be provided through competitive market mechanisms. Variants of this model were sometimes called ‘New Right’ or ‘public choice theory’ models of local governance. For clarity, we shall term it the ‘individualist model’ of local governance.

188

Testing Models against Public Opinion 189

The ‘New Left’ also paid attention to individuals but sought to mobilize them into collective action, or into action within non-market structures. It would encourage the poor or disadvantaged to demand more and better local public services. It aimed to improve not only the services but also the poor and disadvantaged themselves as human beings by getting them to participate in the management of those public services. Variants of this model were sometimes called ‘New Left’ or even ‘Marxist’ models of local governance. We shall term it the ‘mobilization model’ of local governance. Finally, although the 1979–97 Conservative governments’ rhetoric approximated the individualistic ideas of the ‘New Right’ on local governance, it was clear that many of their actions conformed more to an ‘agency model’ of central domination in which local authorities were regarded as mere agents of central government. Desmond King noted that the ‘New Right’ had a ‘rigorous theory of local government’ which included ‘maximisation of local choice’ but that under their governments ‘national policy failed dramatically, through its centralising tendency, to realise these principles’. 1 Paradoxically perhaps, the model implicit in the Conservative governments’ actions is worth at least as much attention as the model explicit in their rhetoric. Since the ‘agency model’ is a very extreme example of central government control, let us simply call our fourth model the ‘centralist model’ of local governance. Often neglected, or treated only by default, it emphasizes membership of a national community, the need for national standards and the prerogatives of national government. It fits well with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Altogether, we now have four broadly defined models of local governance to test against public opinion: • the traditional localist model of all-purpose, elected local authorities; • the individualist model of markets serving individuals; • the mobilization model focused on the mobilization and human development of relatively disadvantaged people and neighbourhoods; • the centralist model which stresses national democracy and national standards for public services. Each of these models should be viewed as an ideal-type model of local governance and not as an empirical description of reality in any specific time or place. Each includes a prescription based upon a diagnosis. Each bases recommendations about forms and structures for

190 Models of Local Governance

local governance on assumptions about people’s identities, perceptions and preferences. We shall set out as clearly as possible the assumptions of each model and compare them with public opinion. And we shall force ourselves to attach ‘plus’ and ‘minus’ signs to these comparisons, indicating where public opinion is consistent or inconsistent with each theoretical model. It is a crude but necessary procedure if we are to match these theories against public opinion. No doubt the advocates of each model will be tempted to applaud the perceptiveness of the judgement with which we award each ‘plus’ and attack the brutality, lack of subtlety and perverse misrepresentation with which we award each ‘minus’. But there is no alternative. At some point we have to put aside the subtleties and endless qualifications in order to decide whether a theory is or is not consistent with some particular aspect of public opinion. We have to reach a judgement, and this procedure is the most transparent way to do so. Our purpose is not to find out whether each model accurately describes contemporary (or even past) local governance nor to reach a judgement about whether its prescriptions are desirable or not. A test of public opinion would be inappropriate for that purpose. Instead, our aim is simply to see whether, or to what extent, each model is consistent with public attitudes, with public perceptions and, more important, with public aspirations.

Assumptions about local identity and citizenship Tip O’Neill, the legendary Speaker of the US House of Representatives, is reputed to have claimed that ‘all politics is local’. That claim has some surface plausibility when applied to the United States though it is much less obviously applicable to Britain. Nonetheless, the traditional or ‘localist model’ of local governance is based on the assumption that locality has a sociological and psychological meaning as well as a geographic meaning. It assumes that people in some real sense ‘live’ in a locality, that ‘local community’ is not an empty phrase, and that people recognize, value and identify with their locality. If so, then there is both a sociological and a psychological reality for local authorities to ‘represent’. By contrast, the ‘individualist model’ assumes the validity of Margaret Thatcher’s notorious claim that: ‘There is no such thing as Society. There are [just] individual men and women, and their families.’2 It assumes that though people may live in a locality they do

Testing Models against Public Opinion 191

not identify with it to any significant degree. The ‘mobilization model’ assumes that people do live in localities and identify with them, but that the localities of greatest significance to them are much smaller than local authority areas, much closer to the idea of a ‘neighbourhood’. Each local authority, in this view, represents not one local community but a variety of different local communities with different and often conflicting interests. Partly for that reason, it is necessary to mobilize the people who live in the less socially and politically dominant neighbourhoods to assert their very specific interests. In the view of this ‘mobilization model’, local authority areas are too large to be the focus of identity. They are not constructed ‘on a human scale’. The ‘centralist model’ makes the opposite assumption: that people live in something much wider than a typical local authority area, and that the focus of their identity is the nation as a whole rather than a relatively small, often rather arbitrarily defined, and frequently redefined, local authority area. Services may be provided locally, but life itself, both socially and psychologically, exists and has its meaning within Britain as a whole, not within small localities. Society and community do exist, but fundamentally as British society and as a national community. These assumptions conflict sharply. Surely they cannot all be right? Do people live their lives materially and psychologically in local authority areas, or in something larger, or in smaller neighbourhoods, or just in the family itself? Let us distinguish the social and material side of life from the psychological. However unlikely it may seem, it is possible with the help of television and the local library to feel psychologically ‘a citizen of the world’ without ever physically going beyond a council district. Sociological assumptions We found that over the course of a person’s life only a small minority live within a local authority area. At the time when we interviewed them 92 per cent claimed to have been born in Britain, but only 67 per cent in the region where they now lived, and a mere 36 per cent in the local authority district where they now lived. And before their lives ended, many of those who were still in the region or district of their birth at the time of the interview would, in all probability, have moved away. A less long-term, whole-life view suggests higher levels of stability: 60 per cent had lived at least 20 years in their current local authority district and 80 per cent had lived that long in their region.

192 Models of Local Governance

On the other hand, mere residence is not all. We found that only half the residents restricted their shopping and leisure activities to the local district and that almost as many (27 per cent) worked outside the district as inside it (38 per cent). Only a third said that all their friends lived in the same district and less than a fifth that all their relatives did so. Half regularly went outside the district for leisure or shopping purposes. For the majority of people, life was not lived exclusively within the narrow confines of a single local authority district. On the other hand, we could make the case that a majority lived their lives within the wider confines of the region: 67 per cent were born in their region (as we have defined ‘region’, one of the ten into which we divided Britain), 80 per cent were long-term residents of the region, 59 per cent said all their friends lived there and almost half that all their relatives lived there. Only 18 per cent went outside the region for leisure or shopping purposes. So the sociological assumptions of the ‘localist model’ are clearly false for local authority districts though more valid in terms of regions. More clearly still, the sociological assumptions of the mobilization model are false, at least for the population as a whole. If only a small minority live their lives in a single council district, an even smaller number must live their lives within the confines of a single neighbourhood. But of course, the mobilization model focuses on those particular sections of society that lack income, education and physical well-being. It is not really intended as a prescription for the population as a whole. More of those who need mobilizing do indeed live spatially restricted lives. Judged by whether they had lived in the same district for 20 years or more, we found that those who had no school certificates were 18 per cent more locally rooted than those who had school certificates and 35 per cent more than university graduates. Manual workers were 24 per cent more locally rooted than those in management. Judged by whether their shopping and leisure activities were confined within their region the poor (those who said their family income was ‘not enough to survive on’) were 19 per cent more locally oriented than the rich (those whose family income was ‘enough for a good standard of living’). The relatively uneducated, the manual working class, the old, the poor and the tenants on council estates were indeed tied more than others to life within the narrow confines of a district and perhaps even within a neighbourhood. The ‘centralist model’ assumes that people live in Britain as a whole rather than being restricted to a specific locality. We found

Testing Models against Public Opinion 193

that people do move around Britain in large numbers, but not round the whole of Britain. They frequently venture beyond a local authority district for shopping, leisure, housing or work. But only a minority move outside their region. So while only a minority live within the confines of a district, an even smaller minority live in Britain as a whole. Socially and materially, life is more typically regional than either local or national. The ‘individualist model’ assumes that life is in essence private: that it is lived within the family, the circle of close friends, or even on a purely individual basis. The individual only interacts with the world beyond the circle of family and friends in order to buy in goods and services. The individual may appear to be living within the district, within the region or even more widely. But in fact the individual is really living in a private world that is probably very small indeed in terms of the number of its inhabitants, though not necessarily in terms of locality. The ‘individualist model’ makes no assumptions about the physical space within which life is lived but it does make strong assumptions about psychological identifications. We can summarize our test of the sociological assumptions underlying these various models by drawing up a scorecard (see Table 8.1). Psychological assumptions The psychological space in which people live, and with which they identify, is equally important for the ‘localist’, ‘mobilization’ and ‘centralist’ models. And it is particularly important for the ‘individualist’ model. The ‘localist’ and ‘mobilization’ models assume that people are interested and informed about their locality, the ‘centralist’ and ‘individualist’ that they are not. We found that people admitted to being less likely to vote in local than in national elections. But they nonetheless claimed to be as interested in local issues and what their local council did as they were in national issues and what Parliament did. And they claimed to be far more interested in both local and national affairs than in European issues and what the EU did. Almost half read a local evening paper, and three-quarters followed local news on television or in local weekly papers. At a minimum level of information, a majority clearly knew that local authorities provided services such as refuse collection, schools and police, but that they did not provide hospitals, unemployment benefits or help for local businesses. Only 9 per cent thought they supplied electricity and more remarkably a large majority were already aware that they no longer supplied water and sewage services.

Assumption

People live their lives in local districts

No assumption about the physical (as distinct from psychological) space in which people live

People live their lives in neighbourhoods

People live their lives in a wide spatial area such as Britain as a whole

Localist

Individualist

Mobilization

Centralist

Sociological assumptions

Model

Table 8.1

Not true for Britain as a whole; more true for regions

Not true for the public as a whole; more true for target groups – the uneducated, the working class, the old, the poor

Physical test not relevant

Not true for local authority districts; more true for regions

Test verdict

– for Britain + for regions

– for whole public + for sections

not relevant

– for district + for region

Rating

194

Testing Models against Public Opinion 195

The low educated and the working class were relatively uninterested in political affairs on a British or European scale but, significantly for the mobilization model, they were about as interested in local affairs as anyone else. And they were more likely than others to read a local evening paper or a local weekly, or to follow local affairs on television. The ‘localist model’ assumes that people identify strongly with their local authority area, and the ‘centralist model’ that they identify strongly with Britain as a whole. The ‘mobilization model’ assumes that they identify, or can be mobilized into identifying, more with ‘people like themselves’ – that is, people who live in their immediate neighbourhood and who have similar social characteristics to themselves. And the ‘individualist model’ assumes that, if they identify with other people at all, it is primarily with their family and friends. Our measure of the strength of identification ran from a possible minimum of minus five to a possible maximum of plus five. On that scale, identification with the local authority district averaged plus 2.0. So people do identify quite strongly with their local district as the ‘localist model’ assumes. But they identified more strongly with their region (at 2.7) and still more with Britain (at 3.0). So the assumptions of the ‘centralist model’ clearly get more support than those of a pure ‘localist model’ based on districts, though not much more than a ‘localist model’ based on regions. An ‘internationalist model’ focused on Europe would score very badly indeed since identification with Europe averaged zero. The level of identification with districts might provide a justification for a limited degree of local autonomy within the framework of nationally defined policy. But by the same token, the level of identification with regions would justify a more equal relationship between regional and national government. Since the level of regional identification varied across the regions of England, and both regional and (British) national identification varied once we crossed beyond the English borders, the varying levels of identification actually would justify: • predominantly British national government in the South and Midlands of England; • equality between regional and national government in the three northern regions of England; • predominantly regional government in Wales, and even more so in Scotland.

Assumption

People are interested and informed about local affairs

People are not interested and informed about local affairs

People are interested and informed about local affairs

People are not interested and informed about local affairs

Localist

Individualist

Mobilization

Centralist

Psychological assumptions – local interest and information

Model

Table 8.2

No

Yes, and target groups more locally oriented

No

Yes

Test verdict

–

+

–

+

Rating

196

Testing Models against Public Opinion 197

Of course, psychological identification alone is not the only basis for government structures. But these are the structures that would be consistent with the pattern of identification with districts and regions, with Britain and with Europe. The ‘mobilization model’ emphazises the actual or potential level of identification with more specific neighbourhoods or social groups. Overall, people identified more strongly with their neighbourhood of residence (at 2.3) than with their local district as a whole (at 2.0), reversing the trend towards lower levels of identification with smaller areas. The assumptions of the mobilization model score well in this respect. But it is important to notice that identification was only strong with the neighbourhood of residence. Identification with the neighbourhood where people worked was weak (at 0.5), with class it was only slightly stronger (at 1.0) and with religion it was even weaker (at zero). In one sense, the pattern of identifications gave powerful support to the ‘individualist model’. Identification with the family (at 3.9) far exceeded identification with anything else. And identification with the respondent’s circle of friends (at 2.8) exceeded everything except identification with Britain. Individual identification and individual loyalties were very strong. Where the ‘individualist model’ fails, and fails lamentably, is in assuming that what is indeed the strongest focus of identification is the only focus, that identification with family and friends excludes other identifications. Not only are other identifications also strong, but there is a positive correlation between family identification and other identifications. In fact our single most important finding about identifications was that they were not exclusive, and that they were in general positively correlated. Another, less direct way of measuring psychological commitment to localities is to see whether people feel a sense of pride or shame about what goes on in them. The ‘localist model’ would assume that pride and shame tied them to the district, the ‘centralist model’ to Britain, the ‘mobilization model’ to the neighbourhood and the ‘individualist model’ only to the family. We found that a majority were willing to take pride in good things done by other people but only a minority felt shame for bad things done by other people. More to the point, we also found that both pride and shame tied people more to the inhabitants of their district than their region, and more to their region than to the rest of Britain. By these measures therefore, ties to the district were stronger than to the region or to Britain.

Assumption

People identify strongly with local districts

People identify with family and friends only

People identify most with specific neighbourhoods or social groups

People identify most with Britain

Localist

Individualist

Mobilization

Centralist

Psychological assumptions – identifications

Model

Table 8.3

Overall, they identify more strongly with Britain than with localities – but this is only clearly true for the South and Midlands of England

Yes, but only for neighbourhoods of residence. Target groups identify more than others with localities and social groups

They identify more strongly with family than with anything else – but not exclusively

Yes, but even more with regions and Britain

Test verdict

+

+

+ for strength – for exclusiveness

+

Rating

198

Testing Models against Public Opinion 199

We did not ask about pride in the neighbourhood. But the target groups of the mobilization model were much more willing than others to admit to vicarious pride or shame. Not only that, but they were even more sensitive than others to actions that were linked to their locality. Compared to graduates, the low educated were 22 per cent more likely to feel such pride or shame about things done by someone ‘from elsewhere in Britain’ but about 32 per cent more likely to feel such pride or shame about things done by someone from their region or district. Similarly the poor were 8 per cent more likely than the rich to feel pride/shame about things done by someone ‘from elsewhere in Britain’ but were about 16 per cent more likely to feel such pride/shame about things done by someone from their region or district. Local authority tenants were by far the most likely to feel such vicarious pride/shame and private renters the least – but once again the difference between them was greatest when it concerned actions by local people. The four models differ sharply on social responsibility and exclusion. The ‘localist model’ assumes a sense of ‘local citizenship’ involving both a special right to local authority services and a special duty towards others who live in the locality. A clear majority (61 per cent) said they felt more responsible for the welfare of the inhabitants of their district than for the welfare of the inhabitants of their region, though only 47 per cent felt they had more responsibility for the welfare of others in their region than for others throughout Britain. Nonetheless even that 47 per cent is inconsistent with a pure ‘centralist model’, which would admit no citizenship more local than national citizenship. And it is also inconsistent with the ‘individualist model’ which views people as customers for services rather than as citizens of any kind. Customers have no rights to anything other than what they purchase for themselves. Like the ‘localist’ and ‘centralist’ models, the ‘mobilization model’ also accepts that those who do not have rights as paying customers may still have a right to services, but the justification for such rights under the ‘mobilization model’ is based more on ‘human rights’ – applicable to people simply by virtue of their common humanity and above all their need for services, rather than their ‘citizenship’. Citizenship implies a right to services and benefits merely by virtue of citizenship, even though the recipient has not paid for them and therefore has no rights as a paying customer. But the status of ‘citizen’ is restrictive, just like that of ‘customer’. Citizenship implies that some people are citizens while others are not, just as some are paying customers and others are not. Citizenship, like customer status, has to be

Assumption

Emotionally involved with district

Emotionally involved only with family

Emotionally involved mainly with neighbourhood

Emotionally involved only with Britain

Localist

Individualist

Mobilization

Centralist

Psychological assumptions – pride and shame

Model

Table 8.4

No

Not tested explicitly. Target groups more sensitive than others, and especially to actions by locals

No

Yes: pride strongest for district

Test verdict

–

Not tested

–

+

Rating

200

Testing Models against Public Opinion 201

‘earned’ in some way. Citizenship is both inclusive and exclusive: it is about setting boundaries and differentiating between people. Thus, ‘local’ citizenship implies differentiating local and national citizenship, including those who qualify for specifically ‘local’ citizenship but excluding those who do not. Under the Maastricht Treaty, citizens of any EU country who have lived in Britain for five years automatically become ‘local citizens’ though not ‘British national citizens’. They can vote in local authority elections (and in the Scottish and Welsh devolution referenda of 1997 and in the subsequent Scottish and Welsh elections) but not in elections to the British Parliament.3 Conversely, local citizenship is not as transportable as national citizenship. British national citizens who live outside Britain can, in certain circumstances, continue to vote in parliamentary elections but not in local authority elections (nor in the Scottish and Welsh devolution referenda of 1997 nor in Scottish and Welsh elections). Under this ‘local government franchise’ Spanish citizens living in Scotland were entitled to vote in the referendum on Scottish devolution, but Scots living in England (let alone Spain) were not. Similarly, local schools, primary heath care (except in emergencies), many social services and even the use of public libraries are usually restricted to local residents. Mere residence is the least restrictive criterion for local citizenship. A common criterion is residence for some minimum period, which implies payment of taxes for some minimum period, though this latter criterion can also be made explicit. The case for such minimum periods is strengthened if local services are not provided entirely out of current public expenditure, but reflect continuous public investment over a period of time. We found that just over one-fifth of the public would restrict local voting rights to those who had lived locally, or paid taxes locally, for at least two years. And just under one-fifth would restrict access to local schools and hospitals in a similar way. They made little distinction between local residence and local taxpaying though they put slightly more emphasis on taxes when asked about schools and hospitals, and slightly more emphasis on residence when asked about voting. And it made no difference whether the questions were framed in terms of the district or the region. These figures for local exclusivity are very low, much lower for example than the numbers who felt a special responsibility for the welfare of people who lived in their locality. No doubt the people in our survey had not thought through all the possible costs as carefully as a ‘New Right’ theorist, or perhaps they were just too warm-hearted,

202 Models of Local Governance

but four out of five seemed very reluctant to place any significant limits on access to local citizenship. Mere residence (without a minimum time period) was clearly enough for them and, although we did not test views on it explicitly, perhaps even mere presence was enough. Indeed, the public displayed a curious mixture of ‘localist’ and ‘centralist’ views about citizenship. Locality seemed to impose a duty of care (which made the majority ‘localist’), yet without conferring privileged access (which made the majority ‘centralist’). Paradoxically, this combination of attitudes is consistent with the ‘mobilization model’ in so far as it focuses on need rather than citizenship though that model focuses especially on relatively small areas of deprivation. Though not concerned with equal rights to local services in the nation as a whole, it would not differentiate between needy individuals within the small areas of its immediate concern.

Aims and objectives The four models take very different views about the proper ideological objectives of local government. The ‘localist model’ suggests local government should be autonomous with respect to central government though accountable to its own electorate. The ‘centralist model’ suggests that it should be an agent for central government and accountable to it. The ‘mobilization model’ emphasizes the need to change society and change the disadvantaged themselves by encouraging the weak to demand more services and more power, rather than focusing on accountability in any form. And the ‘individualist model’ suggests that government of any kind, local or national, is at best a necessary evil and one that should be minimized. Local autonomy In broad ideological terms we found overwhelming support for at least ‘standard raising autonomy’. Although 75 per cent also wanted central government to ‘set national standards’, most of them (67 out of the 75 per cent) also said councils should be free to provide whatever services local people wanted and were willing to pay for. Thus 67 per cent supported ‘standard raising autonomy’ though not ‘standard lowering autonomy’. In addition, another 24 per cent supported unqualified autonomy for local government. Because even ‘standard raising autonomy’ involves a degree of local autonomy it fits the ‘localist model’ and not the ‘centralist’. Conversely, public insistence on at least main-

Assumption

Implicit sense of local citizenship: more responsible for district welfare exclusive definition of local citizenship

No sense of citizenship: responsible only for family

Rights based on need, not exclusive citizenship, but very local perspective

Implicit sense of equal national citizenship: equally responsible for people anywhere in Britain equal rights to local services, even for new arrivals

Localist

Individualist

Mobilization

Centralist

Psychological assumptions – local or national citizenship

Model

Table 8.5

No Yes

Yes

No

Yes: responsibility strongest for district No

Test verdict

– +

+

–

+ –

Rating

203

204 Models of Local Governance

taining minimum national standards fits the ‘centralist model’ but not the ‘localist’. But both ‘standard raising autonomy’ and national minimum standards fit the expansionist aims of the ‘mobilization model’. And in practice, the minimalist aims of the ‘individualist model’ mean that its advocates support local autonomy against national standards (‘standard lowering autonomy’) but cry ‘local tyranny’ when local autonomy is used to reach a collective decision to increase local taxes and services. They do not, in fact, support ‘standard raising autonomy’. Minimalism We found very little support for the ‘individualist’ model’s minimalist view: 82 per cent said local government should provide universal services, that is services that everyone needs such as refuse collection and basic police services. Rather less, but not much less (71 per cent), agreed that local government should provide extra services for payment: ‘special services for those who are willing to pay extra for them, like special security patrols for shops and businesses.’ And almost as many (67 per cent) agreed that it should even provide ‘grants and subsidies for things that councillors feel make the area a better place, even if only a few people actually use them – things like theatres, concert halls or sports centres’. And fully 90 per cent said councils should provide ‘services which are only used by those in special need, like the sick or the poor’. A developmental role The idea that local government should take a positively developmental role, evidenced already in support for ‘quality of life’ subsidies, is consistent especially with the ethos of the ‘mobilization model’, though it is not in conflict with the ‘localist model’. The same could be said of attitudes towards local authority encouragement of local businesses and local employment. We found overwhelming support for the view that local government should be active in local economic development, and that it should not leave it either to central government or to the mysterious workings of the market. Half, though only half, were willing to go so far against free-market principles as to agree that local councils should buy from local suppliers in order to boost local employment even if they charged ‘a little more’. That would be anathema to either the ‘individualist’ or ‘centralist’ models. But the clearest test of the mobilization model was provided by questions that specifically asked about mobilization. Four out of five agreed

Ideological objective

Autonomous with respect to central government

Minimal government (local or national)

A mobilizing force for change

An agent of central government

Localist

Individualist

Mobilization

Centralist

Objectives – local autonomy and national standards

Model

Table 8.6

Yes to minimum national standards No to maximum national standards

Yes to ‘standard raising autonomy’ No to ‘standard lowering autonomy’

Yes to ‘standard raising autonomy’ No to ‘standard lowering autonomy’

Yes to ‘standard raising autonomy’ No to ‘standard lowering autonomy’

Test verdict

+ –

+ +

– –

+ –

Rating

205

Ideological objective Local government should be free to provide ‘extra’ services if it wishes Minimal services only Local government should definitely provide ‘extra’ services Only services specified by central government

Localist

Individualist

Mobilization

Centralist

Objectives – minimalism

Model

Table 8.7

No

Yes: public support ‘extra’ local services

No

Yes: public support ‘extra’ local services

Test verdict

–

+

–

+

Rating

206

Testing Models against Public Opinion 207

that local government should ‘encourage those in need to demand more services’. And just as many disagreed with the opposite view that it ‘should provide as few services as possible, allowing people to provide for themselves.’ About half agreed that local government should set up special committees to provide moral or financial support (it made no difference to the answers whether the question focused on ‘moral’ or ‘financial’ as well as moral support) to groups of women, racial minorities, or gays and lesbians. True, such support dropped to only 35 per cent for gay and lesbian groups, but it rose to 55 per cent for women’s groups and to 62 per cent for racial and ethnic groups. The ‘individualist model’ would certainly not encourage demands on the public purse and both the ‘localist’ and ‘centralist’ models would offer it no more than lukewarm support. But the ‘localist model’ had always claimed that participation in local government and local elections would develop individual personalities. To that extent the ‘localist model’ had an element of mobilization in it. We found that 42 per cent thought local government ‘should help people to develop their capabilities and personalities by encouraging them to participate in elections and political campaigns’. But we found even more support (52 per cent) for the view that local government should assist personal development by encouraging direct involvement in self-management schemes, and that more focused and less electoral strategy was associated far more with the new ‘mobilization model’ than with the old traditional ‘localist model’. Among the mobilization model’s target groups, support for special committees was even higher. It was 16 per cent greater among the poor than among the rich, 11 per cent greater among council tenants than among owner occupiers, and 12 per cent greater among the low educated than among graduates. But the pattern of support for ‘helping people to develop their capabilities and personalities by encouraging them to participate’ was more complex. That proposition had patronizing overtones. Thus support for it was 11 per cent greater among the poor than the rich but, at the same time, 9 per cent less among the low educated than among graduates – a pattern that is only possible because income and education are only loosely correlated in Britain. Graduates, but not the rich, wished to encourage human development through participation in politics and self-management. Accountability Under the ‘localist model’ local government should be accountable to its own electorate and under the ‘centralist model’ to central govern-

Ideological objective

Do not encourage more demands on public funds Encourage personal development through participation in politics and elections

Do not encourage more demands on public funds Leave people to develop in their own way

Encourage the needy to make demands Encourage personal development through participation in self-management of services

Do not encourage more demands on public funds Leave people to develop in their own way

Localist

Individualist

Mobilization

Centralist

Objectives – a developmental role

Model

Table 8.8

No Public divided

Yes More support for development through participation in self-management than in politics – but public still divided

No Public divided

No A majority do not agree

Test verdict

– Mixed

+ Mixed

– Mixed

– –

Rating

208

Testing Models against Public Opinion 209

ment. Under the ‘individualist model’, such local government as could not be abolished and replaced by the market should be accountable to its ‘customers’, the local taxpayers. The ‘mobilization model’ would make local government most accountable to those in most need of its jobs or services. We used four non-comparative questions, asking different subsamples whether local government should pay ‘most attention to the views and interests’ of four different groups: experts, local taxpayers and those who most needed council jobs or council services. The public was four times as willing to agree that local government should pay most attention to those who relied most on council services as to those who paid the most council tax. And it was well over twice as willing to agree that local government should pay most attention to those who needed council jobs as to those who paid the most council tax. Only ‘experts’ rivalled the needy as worthy of most attention. These questions discriminate best between the ‘individualist model’, which is firmly rejected, and the ‘mobilization model’, which is firmly supported. They tell us relatively little about public support for the ‘centralist’ or ‘localist’ models. Pluralism Only the traditional ‘localist model’ emphasizes the contribution of local government to political pluralism. That could happen at two levels, either within the local authority or within the nation as a whole. We found that a majority claimed to vote in local elections on local issues. In so far as they do not, local election voting has been interpreted as a referendum on central government’s performance. Either way that might seem to indicate that local elections contribute to the democratic process at some level. But we also found that 67 per cent thought (perhaps wrongly) that the same party nearly always controlled their local council and only 9 per cent thought that party control changed ‘quite often’ – though 17 per cent thought it changed ‘very occasionally’. Other responses indicated independent or hung councils were the norm. So whatever the self-conscious motivation for their votes in local elections, people did not see local elections as a significant mechanism for choice and change within their own localities. Advocates of the ‘localist model’ have long recognized the tendency for one-party dominance within particular local authorities and have instead stressed the contribution of local government to pluralism in national politics. Some local authorities would be controlled by the

Accountable to the local electorate as a whole Accountable to local taxpayers Act primarily in the interests of the needy Accountable to central government

Localist

Individualist

Mobilization

Centralist

Ideological objective

Objectives – accountability

Model

Table 8.9

Test not relevant

Yes

No

Test not relevant

Test verdict

Not relevant

+

–

Not relevant

Rating

210

Testing Models against Public Opinion 211

party that was in opposition at Westminster. Thus central government would always have to face local authorities which were opposed to it and, moreover, had a democratic mandate of their own. At any time, no party would control all elected bodies in Britain, and each of the major parties would control some, thereby providing pluralism in the country as a whole more effectively even than by proportional representation, hung parliaments and coalition governments at national level. But the diversity of local authorities could only contribute to national pluralism if local authorities had some role and status within national politics. Both the ‘individualist’ and ‘centralist’ models deny such a national role for local authorities. They assert that local government should concern itself exclusively with the efficient provision of minimal or centrally decreed services and stay out of national politics. At the other extreme, the radicals who supported the ‘mobilization model’ were eager for local authorities not just to take a minor role within a generally co-operative national pluralism but for them to challenge existing power structures nationally as well as locally – at least when their opponents, the Conservatives, held office nationally. We found that the public opted for a quiet life. They did not support the concept of using local authorities as a base to challenge central government unless local services were the issue. Fully 78 per cent thought local government ‘should stay out of national politics except where it directly affects local services’. That seems inconsistent with the mobilization model, and consistent with the individualist or centralist models. However, the fact that our question included the qualifying phrase ‘except where it directly affects local services’ means that it is not entirely inconsistent with the localist model, especially when we take account of public attitudes towards local autonomy. Symbolism Both the ‘localist’ and the ‘mobilization’ models favour symbolic acts designed to raise collective consciousness within the locality. The ‘localist model’ would aim to bind the whole local authority area together, while the ‘mobilization model’ is more concerned to raise the collective consciousness of smaller areas of deprivation within the local authority. Conversely, both the ‘centralist’ and ‘individualist’ models, with their emphasis on efficient service delivery, would reject any kind of local symbolism as a distraction, a waste of resources and perhaps a cover for inefficiency and corruption.

Ideological objective Contribute to pluralism in national politics by defending local autonomy Stay out of national politics Contribute to pluralism in national politics by challenging established power structures Stay out of national politics

Localist

Individualist

Mobilization

Centralist

Objectives – pluralism

Model

Table 8.10

Yes

No

Yes

Mixed

Test verdict

+

–

+

Mixed

Rating

212

Testing Models against Public Opinion 213

Such symbols can take many forms: officially sponsored fetes and galas, unnecessary and extravagant public buildings (for concert halls or council chambers perhaps), ‘mayoral elections’ and referenda in the case of the ‘localist model’, or street demonstrations and protests by the deprived in the case of the ‘mobilization model’. Symbolism is an elusive topic and one that our survey did not cover well. An inherent problem is that few symbolic acts are purely symbolic. Most have a practical justification as well. Extravagant public buildings may serve a useful, functional purpose and local referenda may contribute towards democratic decision-making as well as acting as a focus for local consciousness. So although we did ask questions about mayoral elections and local referenda, some may see these as questions about deepening and improving democracy rather than indulging in symbolic politics. Still, even those who advocated the direct election of mayors for big cities such as London generally recognized that the role would be as much symbolic as executive. As we found in Chapter 3, identification with London boroughs was weaker than with local authority districts in any other part of Britain, and identification with London itself was weaker than with any other region of Britain. The importance of an elected London Mayor would be as much to give London a focus and an identity as to plan for London-wide services. We found 78 per cent of the public supported directly elected executive mayors and 61 per cent supported local referenda. In so far as that represents support for local symbolism, it is consistent with the ‘localist model’ but not with the ‘individualist’ or ‘centralist’ models.

Images Images or perceptions of the actual performance of existing local government may be more consistent with one model of local governance than with another. Generally positive impressions of traditional elected local authorities would support the ‘localist model’. More positive impressions of central rather than local government would support the ‘centralist model’. Generally negative impressions of any kind of government would support the ‘individualist model’. And more negative impressions among relatively deprived sections of the public would fit the ‘mobilization model’. Representative In particular, the ‘localist model’ suggests that local authorities can and should be representative of their electors and responsive to them. We

Ideological objective Symbolic acts to raise consciousness of locality No symbolism Symbolic acts to raise consciousness of deprived groups or areas within locality No symbolism

Localist

Individualist

Mobilization

Centralist

Objectives – symbolism

Model

Table 8.11

No

Not tested

No

Yes

Test verdict

–

not tested

–

+

Rating

214

Testing Models against Public Opinion 215

found that public opinion was ambivalent about the extent to which the local council represented the views of local people. Indeed perceptions were weak and malleable. Roughly two-thirds of the public would agree that their own local council did or did not represent the views of local people, depending entirely on the way we put the question. But the public was more inclined to agree that local councils paid attention to the views of experts rather than to their voters. When asked whether various groups had too much or too little influence over the provision of local services, the public complained that local voters and ordinary council workers had far too little influence. As a perception of actually existing local authorities our findings do not support the ‘localist model’ as an accurate description. People did not feel that local authorities actually were as responsive as the ‘localist model’ suggests they should be. But as an aspiration, these findings do tend to support the ‘localist model’. The public wanted local government to be more responsive to its electorate. The ‘centralist model’ suggests local government is or should be the ‘agent’ or representative of central government within the locality. When asked whether various groups had too much or too little influence over the provision of local services, people were highly critical of the excessive influence of central government. And they were inclined to agree that local councils were too willing to accept instructions from central government. Again we need to distinguish aspirations from perceptions: people wanted less central control, but they perceived an excessive degree of it. What they wanted was not consistent with the ‘centralist model’, but what they saw in actually existing local government was something all too consistent with the ‘centralist model’. The ‘mobilization model’ suggests local government should pay most attention to representing the interests of the relatively deprived sections of the public. We found people were a little more inclined to agree that councils were dominated by business interests than that they did not take enough account of business interests. Paradoxically, when asked whether various groups had too much or too little influence over the provision of local services they were, by a small margin, inclined to say that local businessmen had too little. But they were much more inclined to say that ordinary council workers, women’s groups and racial and ethnic groups also had too little influence. A breakdown of opinion by income and education showed that the poor (those who complained their family income was ‘not enough to live on’) were 21 per cent more likely than the rich (those

216 Models of Local Governance

who said their family income was ‘enough for a good standard of living’) to allege that councils ‘did not represent the views of local people’. And they were 19 per cent more likely than the rich to claim that councils provided ‘better services in rich areas where people need them least’. All the elite groups we interviewed, whether elected councillors or appointed members of quango boards, said that council services were biased towards the areas of greatest need within the locality, but the public did not agree. Rightly or wrongly, and probably wrongly, the public did not perceive any clear bias of services between rich and poor areas within their local authority. Certainly there is no evidence here that the general public perceived a ‘mobilization model’ operating within their local authority, though they seemed to regret that. The ‘individualist model’ questions whether government can ever be representative. It suggests that government develops interests and ambitions of its own which are not truly representative, though the ‘individualist model’ would still favour individual choice over any collective decision, however representative. We found that the public decisively rejected any suggestion that elected councillors were in local politics for reasons of self-interest. By a majority of two to one, people said councillors were motivated by ‘the good of the community’ or ‘a sense of duty towards their fellow citizens’ rather than by personal gain or a desire for self-aggrandisement. The ‘individualist model’ also suggests that government tends to grow unnecessarily, to ‘build empires’ and to ‘over-supply’ services. Possibly that could occur even if politicians were not personally motivated by the desire to build personal empires. We did find that 47 per cent agreed that councils ‘raise high local taxes to provide unnecessary services’ against only 41 per cent who agreed that councils ‘fail to provide services up to proper national standards because they are unwilling to raise local taxes’. But that difference is marginal and, given people’s natural antipathy towards tax, it is perhaps surprising that it was so marginal. It is not enough to outweigh the public’s decisive rejection of the notion that councillors were motivated by self-interest. Honest, efficient, responsible and sympathetic The traditional ‘localist model’ sees elected councillors as not only representative but honest, sympathetic and responsible. Other models do not. They suggest that councillors are perverse in various ways. The ‘individualist’ model’s view of elected councillors frequently shades from allegations that they are unrepresentative, to the suggestion that

Perceptions of councils

Representative of local electorate and responsive to them

Likely to pursue the council’s own interest

Responsive to the deprived

Representative of central government

Localist

Individualist

Mobilization

Centralist

Images of elected councils – how representative

Model

Table 8.12

Too much – in contradiction to model

Insufficiently – as the model alleges

No – in contradiction to model

Insufficiently – in contradiction to model

Test verdict

–

+

–

–

Rating

217

218 Models of Local Governance

they are self-interested, and thence to the suggestion that they are simply corrupt. However, we found that by a margin of 16 per cent the public was inclined to view councils as less rather than more corrupt when compared to private businesses – which is inconsistent with the ‘individualist model’. The ‘mobilization model’ suggests that councillors are distant, elitist and insufficiently sympathetic towards the plight of the poor. Only a minority, though a large minority (41 per cent), felt their local council did not care about the views of people like themselves, which was inconsistent with the mobilization model. The poor were 14 per cent more likely than the rich to allege that their local council did not care about their views. But they differed just as much from the rich on whether appointed local governance boards and the police, or even the ‘people they met in everyday life’, disregarded their views. They felt a bit more neglected by everyone, not just by local councils. The public tended to suggest that the media – press, radio or television – would be a slightly more effective channel of protest than their local councillor, even on local government matters. But they seemed to vote with their feet in favour of using councillors as their main channel of protest. By their own account, 36 per cent had complained to their local councillor at some time compared to only 31 per cent who had ever complained to their MP, 17 per cent to the media and even less to a health authority or local enterprise company. Councillors were clearly more approachable than most other channels of complaint and protest. The ‘centralist model’ claims that councillors are irresponsible and, in particular, that they are profligate spenders. We found that 61 per cent of the public were willing to accuse local government of wasting ‘a good deal of taxpayers’ money’. But that gave no real support to the ‘centralist model’ because a massive 92 per cent levelled the same allegation against central government. By that standard, local government seemed comparatively frugal in the eyes of the public. It looked less frugal when compared with private business, however. A large majority accepted that councils were not as efficient as private businesses but, paradoxically, a clear majority felt that councillors were ‘good at organizing things’ (though not as good as the business-oriented TEC/LEC boards). Instinctively the public seemed to recognize that mere efficiency was not the only criterion of good organization and responsible management in the realm of public affairs.

Perceptions of councils Honest, sympathetic and responsible Corrupt Elitist and unsympathetic Irresponsible

Localist

Individualist

Mobilization

Centralist

No – in contradiction to the model

No – in contradiction to the model

No – in contradiction to the model

Yes – as the model assumes

Test verdict

Images of elected councils – how honest, efficient, responsible and sympathetic

Model

Table 8.13

–

–

–

+

Rating

219

220 Models of Local Governance

Trustworthy A similar pattern emerged when we asked about satisfaction and trust. People rated their local doctor, their electricity supplier and local tradesmen higher than their local council in terms of ‘overall service and value for money’, though they probably forgot how much they were paying their doctor through national taxation. But they rated their trust in elected councillors above their trust in the people appointed to DHA/HB and TEC/LEC boards, and far above their trust in ‘Parliament and government’. That is what the ‘localist model’ would expect. It is obviously inconsistent with the ‘centralist model’, though that may partly reflect a less partisan public perspective on local government than on central government. The public clearly did not trust elected councillors anywhere near as much as they trusted each other. But while not very high in absolute terms, the level of public trust in councillors was sufficiently positive to be inconsistent with the ‘mobilization’ model’s inherent suspicion of local authorities and with the ‘individualist’ model’s inherent suspicion of all elected bodies. Moreover, the fact that the public trusted elected councillors more than ‘businessmen appointed to TEC/LEC’ boards is clearly inconsistent with the free-market and private businessoriented ‘individualist model’.

Institutional preferences The link between rival models of local governance and local authority size is controversial. When Clarke and Stewart argued that ‘the structure of local government should be based not on the alleged efficiencies of administration, but on the perceived and felt community of place’4 they seemed to link the ‘centralist model’ with large-scale local authorities since that model gave priority to efficient service delivery. And they linked the ‘localist model’ with small-scale local authorities because it gave priority to local identification. Yet while we found identification with neighbourhoods was stronger than with council districts, we found identification with regions was stronger than both. And when central government broke up large-scale local authorities into smaller units, just after Clarke and Stewart had published their views on scale, it was accused of doing so to reduce the political clout of local authorities and make them easier to control centrally. Abolishing Strathclyde Region was interpreted as centralization. (Conversely, and equally paradoxically, creating a Scottish Parliament was interpreted as decentralization.)

Perceptions of councils

Relatively high public trust in elected councillors

Distrust all politicians and all elected officials

Distrust remote councillors

Trust central government more than local

Localist

Individualist

Mobilization

Centralist

Images of elected councils – how trustworthy

Model

Table 8.14

No – in contradiction to the model

No – in contradiction to the model

No Trust elected councillors more than appointed quango board members – in contradiction to the model

Yes

Test verdict

–

–

–

+

Rating

221

222 Models of Local Governance

Size and subsidiarity The appropriate scale of local government under the ‘individualist model’ is unambiguous: the Tiebout thesis argues for very small local government units to facilitate choice through ‘exit’ and short-distance migration. Coming from the opposite end of the ideological spectrum, the ‘mobilization model’ also focuses on neighbourhoods rather than districts or regions in order to focus specifically on the disadvantaged and to provide a context for mobilization that will not overawe them – a more ‘human scale’. We are inclined to accept that a truly ‘centralist model’ in the Bulpitt tradition of ‘high’ versus ‘low’ politics 5 would also be most consistent with a multiplicity of small, weak and dependent local authorities. But the principle of subsidiarity, involving multiple levels of government operating on different scales simultaneously, perhaps comes closest to the spirit of the ‘localist model’. It was certainly the principle behind the 1974–5 local government reorganization that inaugurated the final phase of the ‘traditional’ system of local governance in Britain. Moreover, it can be argued that the possibilities for genuine local autonomy are positively correlated with size. This is not so much for reasons of technical efficiency in the provision of services which Clarke and Stewart claim have in fact been superseded by advances in technology, but rather to deal with the problems of ‘free-riding’ and ‘exit’, and also to take advantage of the stronger sense of identification and legitimacy associated with a regional level. We found people were 20 per cent more likely to say their local district was ‘too small’ than ‘too big’, though the majority seemed to think it was neither. At the same time, a majority approved the idea of elected regional governments. We have not always found so much support for elected regional authorities in other surveys but other surveys seldom asked people to think so intensively about local governance. We also asked whether different services should be provided by ‘a body responsible for an area about the size of [your district], or the size of [your region], or Britain as a whole’. There was overwhelming support for the districts taking responsibility for refuse collection and for leisure services, but for nothing else. Views on all other services such as education, roads, police, health, economic development and environmental protection were characterized by division rather than consensus. A plurality but not a majority of the public allocated education to districts and almost everything else to Britain. Among local governance elites of all kinds, appointed DHA/HB and TEC/LEC board members as well as elected councillors, the plurality nearly always allo-

Testing Models against Public Opinion 223

cated these other services (i.e. except for education) to the region rather than to Britain. The term ‘subsidiarity’ is almost unknown to the general public, but if it was brought to the public’s attention they would probably react like M. Jourdain in Molière’s Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme when he discovers the meaning of ‘prose’: ‘I’ve been talking prose for the last forty years and have never known it!’6 Subsidiarity applies at all levels, however, and so may be consistent with the ‘mobilization model’ if not with the ‘individualist model’. Both of these models focus on very small areas, but they differ about the autonomy of those areas. The ‘individualist model’ incorporates the Tiebout thesis, which was designed to reconcile autonomy for the local community with freedom for the individual. Under this model, the very small local authorities would be as independent as possible. Individual citizens would act like consumers, ‘shopping around’ for a place to live which had their preferred mix of local services and taxes. While the ‘mobilization model’ emphasizes the ‘voice’ and interests of neighbourhoods, it does not see neighbourhoods as fully independent of a wider local authority, nor in free competition with each other to attract and keep residents. It is more about collective decision-making in the context of sublocal authority subsidiarity. We found only 5 per cent of the public had ever considered moving to a local authority with better services or lower council tax, though that rose to 11 per cent in London. Only 1 per cent throughout Britain had actually moved for these Tieboutian reasons, rising only to 3 per cent in London. Among the few throughout Britain who had contemplated such a move, twice as many were motivated by a desire for better services as for lower taxes. In London, between four and five times as many were motivated by a desire for better services as for lower taxes. So very few people thought or acted in Tieboutian terms. No doubt the advocates of the ‘individualist model’ would argue that people would think and behave differently if they were presented with the new opportunities afforded by a large number of very small, highly autonomous local authorities competing for ‘customer-citizens’. However, the density of population and the density of rapid transport systems across London meant that London boroughs came close to the Tieboutian prescription in terms of geographic size, if not in terms of political autonomy. Moreover we found that the psychological sense of local identity was uniquely weak in London. But despite that, the numbers who had even contemplated Tieboutian moves were small, and the numbers who had actually made them very small indeed even in London.

Institutional preference

Subsidiarity, devolving power to local authorities

Very small local authorities, competing for ‘customer-citizens’

Subsidiarity, devolving power downwards from local authorities

District sized local authorities, large enough to provide services efficiently, but not large enough to mount a political challenge to central government

Localist

Individualist

Mobilization

Centralist

Institutional preferences – size and subsidiarity

Model

Table 8.15

No

Not directly tested.

No

Yes – including districts and regions

Test verdict

–

Not tested

–

+

Rating

224

Testing Models against Public Opinion 225

Funding – by user charges, local taxes or national subsidies The traditional ‘localist model’ stressed the importance of local taxation as at least a major contribution towards the cost of local public services. Taxation was the basis for public services, and only specifically local taxation could provide a basis for local responsibility and local autonomy. Under the ‘individualist model’, however, public services should not be free at the point of use. To avoid over-provision of unnecessary services and to encourage individual responsibility, users – and only users – should pay directly through service charges. Under the ‘mobilization’ and ‘centralist’ models, public services would be subsidized by taxation, but by national rather than local taxation: the rich must subsidize the poor, and that principle should apply to localities as much as to individuals. We found overwhelming support (83 per cent) for the proposition that ‘everyone should contribute through taxation to the cost of local services whether they use them or not’. There was only relatively weak support (34 per cent) for the opposite view that ‘people should only have to pay for local services they use personally’. We approached the issue in another way by asking whether ‘most local services’ should be funded mainly by user charges or by local taxes or by national taxes. Less than a quarter opted for user charges, 33 per cent for ‘national subsidies, paid from national taxes like income tax and VAT’, and 43 per cent for ‘local council taxes’. When asked about six specific local services, the public opted overwhelmingly for national taxation as the preferred means of funding schools, hospitals and (more surprisingly) the police. Less overwhelmingly, but nonetheless by a large majority, they opted for local taxation as the preferred means of funding local swimming pools, libraries and (more surprisingly) public transport. There was almost no public support for user charges for school, hospital and police services. But up to a quarter, though only up to a quarter, opted for user charges as the main basis for funding local sports, library and transport services. Public attitudes towards the proper basis for funding local services were thus almost totally inconsistent with the ‘individualist model’, though they varied between consistency with the ‘localist model’ and other models depending upon the service in question. Enforcement – by voters, courts or government inspectors We have already discussed the principle of national standards and its rather subtle relationship to the principle of local autonomy. Now we

Institutional preference Mainly local taxation Mainly user charges Mainly national subsidies Mainly national subsidies

Localist

Individualist

Mobilization

Centralist

Institutional preferences – funding

Model

Table 8.16

Yes – especially for education, health and police services

Yes – especially for education, health and police services

No

Yes – especially for sports, arts and transport services

Test verdict

+

+

–

+

Rating

226

Testing Models against Public Opinion 227

turn to the more institutional question of enforcement. The various models of local governance naturally differ at least as much on the enforcement of proper standards as on their setting. The ‘localist model’ would leave enforcement to the local electorate, the ‘individualist model’ to individuals and the ‘mobilization model’ to public protests – all ‘bottom-up’ control mechanisms. By contrast, the ‘centralist model’ would rely on various techniques of ‘top-down’ monitoring and inspection. We asked people to choose between three of these methods of enforcement, omitting the option of public protests. Which ‘would be the best way to ensure proper standards in local services such as health, education or policing… • using national government inspectors to monitor standards; • giving voters in local elections the power to dismiss those who control local services; • encouraging individuals to go to court and claim compensation for poor services?’ Public opinion was fairly evenly divided between ‘government inspectors’, ‘local elections’ and ‘encouraging individuals to go to court’. So there was roughly equal support for each model on this question, though a little more for the ‘centralist model’ than for the others. The Tsar–Liberator In a confrontation between local and central government, in which the local authority had won the backing of its electorate by means of a local election or a local referendum, the public came down overwhelmingly on the side of local autonomy. That was clearly inconsistent with the ‘centralist model’ and consistent with the ‘localist model’. Since our respondents seemed no more impressed (indeed slightly less impressed) by a local referendum than by a local election, it somewhat undermines the argument for the more populist ‘mobilization model’, but remains broadly consistent with it. The ‘individualist model’ is based on fear of the ‘tyranny of majorities’ – especially the ‘tyranny of local and temporary majorities’ – over individuals and minorities. For that model, the issue is not so much whether the local authority should be able to impose its will against central government as whether it should be able to impose its will on the minority of its own residents who disagree with the collective decision of the local majority. Under the ‘individualist model’, central

Institutional preference Local elections Courts and compensation Public protests Government inspectors

Localist

Individualist

Mobilization

Centralist

Institutional preferences – enforcement

Model

Table 8.17

Chosen by 39 per cent

Not offered as an option

Chosen by 29 per cent

Chosen by 32 per cent

Test verdict

+

Not tested

+

+

Rating

228

Testing Models against Public Opinion 229

government can therefore appear in the role of a Liberator rather than a Tsar. We found a remarkable degree of public sympathy for the ‘individualist’ model in this respect. As could only be expected, over four out of five thought it was quite proper for the local minority to continue campaigning locally against the majority decision, at the next local election in particular. That was surely their basic democratic right. But much less obviously, a small majority (54 per cent) also said it would be ‘right and proper for the minority to appeal to central government to step in and overrule the local council’. Thus public opinion was overwhelmingly on the side of the local council against central government, but also (by a small majority) on the side of a local minority attempting to use the power of the state against the local council. It appears inconsistent to say the local authority should both have the final say, and not have the final say. But the concepts of an ‘appeal’ (in law) or a ‘review’ (in public administration) or a ‘repeat experiment’ (in science) involve that same principle of inconsistency: that having taken a firm decision, we should not be afraid to consider it again or defend it before a wider audience. Our respondents did not say that central government should respond to the minority’s appeal by actually overruling the local authority. They merely agreed that it was right and proper for the minority to make that appeal. And a system of appeals can be a very valuable incentive to make justifiable decisions in the first place, even if it seldom leads to policy reversals. The ‘mobilization model’ stresses the special rights of neighbourhoods within local authorities. The ‘individualist model’ warns against the tyranny of the majority in the local authority leading to over-taxation and the over-provision of services which individuals may not want. But the ‘mobilization model’ warns that this same tyranny of the majority might lead to under-taxation and the under-provision of services which the under-class in deprived neighbourhoods may desperately need. And it also warns against the simple managerial neglect of poor people and poor neighbourhoods, too inarticulate to adequately defend their interests against insensitive or incompetent management. As 18 years of Conservative central government wore on, New Left mobilizers had little faith that central government would be any more sympathetic than local governments to the problems of deprived areas. They came increasingly to see solutions more in terms of populism, self-management and neighbourhood autonomy than in terms of the centralist ideas of postwar Attlee socialism. But in principle the ‘mobilization model’ would also support the right to appeal over the head of

230 Models of Local Governance

an unsympathetic local authority, even if such a right might be usefully exercised (from the perspective of the New Left) only when appealing over the head of a right-wing local authority to a left-wing central government. Representative democracy versus executive management The traditional ‘localist model’ was firmly based on the idea of representative democracy, on local decisions being taken by committees of elected councillors who were numerous enough to maintain close contact with their electors. It was indeed a ‘councillor-friendly’ model, unlike all the others. The ‘individualist’ and ‘centralist’ models envisage small, businesslike, management committees, concerned primarily with efficiency rather than representation. Among the public, we found 58 per cent wanted a reduced number of councillors and only 26 per cent an increase. Significantly, the vast majority of councillors themselves wanted no change in their numbers. And while 55 per cent of appointed members of quango boards wanted fewer elected councillors, only a mere 8 per cent wanted more. So the public tended towards rejecting the traditional ‘localist model’ on this point, and quango board members did so more decisively. Representative versus direct democracy The ‘mobilization model’ envisages direct management and decisionmaking by the public themselves. We found a great deal of public support for the mechanisms of direct democracy: 61 per cent in favour of local referenda and 78 per cent for direct election of the council leader or executive mayor. Both were rejected by elected councillors and appointed board members. Such mechanisms are inconsistent with the ethos of representative democracy on which the traditional ‘localist model’ was founded. For rather different reasons, the populist mechanisms of direct democracy in local governance are also inconsistent with the ‘centralist model’ because they might confer too much independent political authority on local government. They are inconsistent with the status of an ‘agent’. To a degree, they are consistent with the ‘mobilization model’ because they have the flavour of ‘people power’ and direct involvement, which might energize the masses, though neighbourhood referenda would be even more consistent with the ‘mobilization model’ than local authority referenda. Populist mechanisms won stronger support from the mobilization model’s target groups. The poor were

Institutional preference

Local government to have final say

Minority right to appeal to central government against (probably over-taxing) local government

Minority right to appeal to central government against (probably under-providing) local government

Central government to have final say

Localist

Individualist

Mobilization

Centralist

Institutional preferences – the Tsar–Liberator

Model

Table 8.18

No

Evenly divided, though small majority in favour

Evenly divided, though small majority in favour

Yes

Test verdict

–

Mixed

Mixed

+

Rating

231

Institutional preference

Large numbers of locally elected councillors

Fewer elected councillors

No clear view on number of elected councillors. More stress on neighbourhood representation or direct participation in self-management

Fewer elected councillors

Localist

Individualist

Mobilization

Centralist

Institutional preferences – representation by number

Model

Table 8.19

Yes

Not relevant

Yes

No

Test verdict

+

Not relevant

+

–

Rating

232

Testing Models against Public Opinion 233

13 per cent more favourable than the rich towards local referenda, and 12 per cent more favourable than the rich towards directly elected mayors. Graduates were slightly less favourable than average towards local referenda and 21 per cent less favourable than the low educated towards directly elected mayors. Paradoxically, popular referenda are also acceptable to the ‘individualist model’ as a ‘blocking mechanism’. In practice, low and socially biased turnouts in referenda would probably favour the better-off high taxpayers and work more to the advantage of the ‘New Right’ than the ‘New Left’. But whatever might eventually happen in practice, the ‘New Right’ and ‘New Left’ are joined by a common antagonism towards elected local authorities and by common, though mutually contradictory, hopes that populist mechanisms might work to their advantage. Providing – by all-purpose or specialist bodies The traditional ‘localist model’ focused on elected all-purpose councils, which themselves delivered as well as commissioned services. In the jargon of local governance, they were ‘providers’ as well as ‘enablers’. The ‘individualist model’ suggests that elected local authorities should ‘enable’ as little as possible, and themselves ‘provide’ almost nothing at all. Private companies should provide local services whether these are paid for by individual users (the first preference of the ‘individualist’ model) or commissioned by elected councils and paid for out of taxation (the fall-back position of the ‘individualist’ model). The ‘centralist model’ on the other hand is more favourable to direct public provision of services, but often by centrally appointed boards rather than by elected councils. And the ‘mobilization model’ also tends to support direct provision of services by public bodies other than the elected local authority, perhaps operating on a neighbourhood scale. This ‘enabling versus providing’ debate has proved intensely interesting to local governance theorists, and still more to local governance practitioners whose jobs were at stake. But we found the public does not care one way or the other: 70 per cent were agreed that ‘it really does not matter whether local services are run by elected councils, appointed boards, or private businesses as long as they keep the quality up while keeping charges and taxes down’. When asked to chose between all-purpose and single-purpose specialist bodies 70 per cent also came down in favour of specialist bodies. But when asked whether eight specific services should be ‘provided mainly by local councils, mainly by the government, or mainly by private companies’ there was

Representative democracy Populist democracy – if any at all Populist democracy Representative democracy

Localist

Individualist

Mobilization

Centralist

Institutional preference

Institutional preferences – direct or representative democracy

Model

Table 8.20

No

Yes

Yes

No

Test verdict

–

+

+

–

Rating

234

Testing Models against Public Opinion 235

almost no support for private companies except on electricity, water and refuse collection and then only minority support ranging from 19 to 36 per cent. Taken together, these findings are inconsistent with the ‘localist model’ on the grounds of specialization, and inconsistent with the ‘individualist model’ on grounds of the public’s preference for public providers. Enabling – monitoring and control Commissioning, control and monitoring is another matter, however. It is possible to update the traditional ‘localist model’ by transforming elected local authorities from ‘providers’ into ‘enablers’ without destroying the model completely. Monitoring and control is even closer to the essence of that model than direct provision, however. The ‘localist model’ could not concede monitoring and control to bodies other than locally elected bodies. The ‘individualist model’ believes in control of services through the ‘hidden hand’ of the free market. The ‘mobilization model’ stresses non-market control and collective selfmanagement by users or by providers of local services. And the ‘centralist model’ stresses the value of control through appointed boards that are ultimately appointed by central government and responsible to central government rather than to their local communities. The public had mixed and flexible views on the issue of service providers but they had very clear views on the best ‘ways of organizing and controlling local services’. They rated control by elected local councils far above self-management by providers (such as teachers) or users (such as parents of school children), and far above ‘committees of experts or businessmen appointed by central government’ or ‘private companies charging for the use of the service’. We found that a majority reacted favourably towards the idea of ‘local community groups’ as more representative of ordinary people’s opinions than local councillors, and as an ‘easier way to get things done than by approaching local councillors directly’, which was consistent with the ethos of the ‘mobilization model’. On the other hand 61 per cent rejected the proposition that ‘the best way to make sure people get the services they want is to let them organize them through voluntary groups and associations’. Perhaps that reflected concern about the availability of resources as well as suspicion about the poor organizing ability and inadequate accountability of voluntary groups. Nonetheless, along with very strong support for elected local authorities as the best way to monitor and control local services there is evidence of public support for at least an input from ‘local community groups’ – though probably

Institutional preference

All-purpose public bodies

Specialist private companies

A variety of public bodies, including specialist

Centrally appointed specialist boards

Localist

Individualist

Mobilization

Centralist

Institutional preferences – providing

Model

Table 8.21

Does not matter, but prefer specialist bodies

Does not matter, but prefer specialist bodies

Does not matter, but prefer public bodies

Does not matter, but prefer specialist bodies

Test verdict

+

+

–

–

Rating

236

Testing Models against Public Opinion 237

acting in concert with the elected local authority rather than as an alternative to it. In a similar way we found very little support for the autonomy of non-elected, specialist bodies ‘like health authorities, NHS trusts, or Training and Enterprise Councils’: 68 per cent of the public said these bodies should ‘be responsible to local councils’ (and another 20 per cent that they should be responsible to central government). The only public concession towards quango autonomy was that twice as many said local councils should have only ‘powers to investigate these nonelected bodies’ as said councils should have ‘powers to control them directly’.

Conclusion: winners and losers among the four models tested To reach an overall conclusion on the extent to which these rival models fit public opinion we can usefully total up the number of ‘pluses’ and ‘minuses’ that we have awarded to each model. Much of the debate about local governance in Britain has been prompted by the alleged inadequacy of the traditional ‘localist model’. We have found that there were many points of agreement between public opinion and this model, but also many points of disagreement. Overall we have awarded it just 6 more pluses than minuses. But no other model scored very much better and some scored much worse. The ‘mobilization model’ won 8 more pluses than minuses. It is a relatively populist model. Surveys of public opinion consistently, but unsurprisingly, reveal populist tendencies among the general public which are not shared by experts or politicians and which are strongest among the least educated sections of the public. That may partly explain the high public rating for the ‘mobilization model’ but it does not, of course, invalidate the finding. As Figure 8.1 makes clear, however, the main difference between our test of the ‘localist’ and ‘mobilizing’ models lies in the totals of plus and minus scores awarded, rather than in the balance between plus and minus scores. Our test of the ‘mobilizing model’ produced fewer plus and fewer minus scores than our test of the ‘localist model’. That reflects the fact that the ‘mobilizing model’ focuses so strongly on target groups rather than on the public as a whole. Our survey shows that there was an even closer fit between the ‘mobilizing model’ and public opinion within these target groups than between the model and overall public opinion.

Institutional preference

Elected local body, even if not all-purpose. Appointed boards to be subject to monitoring by locally elected bodies

The free operation of the market

Collective self-management by users or providers of public services in a very restricted locality – a neighbourhood, or even a school

Centrally appointed boards responsible to central government

Localist

Individualist

Mobilization

Centralist

Institutional preferences – enabling, monitoring and control

Model

Table 8.22

No

Some limited support, but in concert with the elected council, and not preferred as an alternative

No

Yes

Test verdict

–

–

–

+

Rating

238

Testing Models against Public Opinion 239

The ‘centralist model’ got a marginally negative rating overall: just 5 more minuses than pluses. And the ‘individualist model’ got an extremely negative rating: 12 more minuses than pluses. Overall therefore, the ‘localist’ and ‘mobilization’ models scored moderately well, the ‘centralist model’ won significantly less public support and the ‘individualist model’ simply failed to match public opinion. What should that mean for the future of local governance in Britain? • First, that the ‘individualist’ model is so far out of touch with public opinion that it is not a helpful or useful model in theoretical terms. Some of its more limited and practical prescriptions are useful in themselves – the public does want efficiency and ‘value for money’ – but the ethos of the model as a whole does not provide a useful guide or framework for thinking about the general development of local governance. • Second, that the ‘centralist model’, much neglected in theory and maligned in practice, should be taken more seriously. It has far more public support than the individualist model that has attracted far more theoretical discussion. • Third, that some combination of the traditional ‘localist’ model and the ‘mobilization’ model comes closest to public opinion and should be the basis for thinking about the future of local governance.

Figure 8.1

Testing models of local governance.

Individualist model

Centralist model

Localist model

Mobilizing model –20

–15

–10

–5

0

5

10

15

20

The number of plus and minus scores in tests against public opinion

5 3 2 5 15

plus

+6

2 3 1 3 9

Localist minus 1 1 0 3 5 –12

4 6 3 4 17

Individualist plus minus 4 5 1 3 13

plus

+8

1 1 2 1 5

Mobilizing minus

Model of local governance

Testing four models of local governance – winners and losers

Assumptions Aims and objectives Images Institutional preferences Totals Net positive

Table 8.23

3 2 0 4 9

plus

–5

4 4 3 3 14

Centralist minus

240

Testing Models against Public Opinion 241

But, though closest to public opinion, neither the traditional ‘localist’ model nor the ‘mobilization’ model is very close. The public has reservations about some aspects of both these models. In a total of 22 tests that could have awarded scores ranging from plus 22 down to minus 22, the traditional model of local governance got a net score of plus 6. On a scale that runs from ‘disaster’ to ‘perfection’, that model therefore comes closer to perfection than to disaster, but it is closer to the middle of this scale than to either end. The test of public opinion suggests that the traditional theory of local governance, and the corresponding practice, need development, reform and improvement rather than total reconstruction or complacent reassertion. Of course it is always difficult to be passionate about moderation at the time and always easy to recognize the evils of enthusiasm in retrospect.

9 Public Support for Local Democracy

In this final chapter we focus on the key concepts of democracy and autonomy in local governance and bring together some of our earlier findings in a slightly more systematic way. Local democracy is not itself a single concept but a combination of these two: democracy and autonomy. Governance can be local without being democratic, or democratic without being local. Local democracy implies a form of governance that is at once both local and democratic. But more than that, it implies a form of governance in which the democratic element is itself local. Local boards appointed by a democratically elected central government do not fall within any reasonable definition of local democracy, even though they can claim to be both local in one sense and democratically accountable in another. And the democratic element in local governance cannot itself be local without some degree of local autonomy. Unless the local electorate is free to make some choices that express local preferences different from those of central government then the democratic element in local governance is a sham – no more than the right of local people to chose their own administrators without influencing policy. Since local democracy is both local and democratic, its space is vulnerable to encroachment by central government (which is democratic but not local) on the one hand and by local appointed boards or businesses (which are local but not democratic) on the other. So the concept of local democracy has to defend itself on two very different fronts. Our findings in earlier chapters suggest that there was a general public presumption in favour of a democratic form for governance and, at the same time, a general public presumption in favour of locally autonomous governance albeit within a framework of national 242

Public Support for Local Democracy 243

minimum standards. Despite all the acknowledged shortcomings of local democracy, this combination of prejudices protects the concept in public esteem. The public prejudice in favour of a democratic form protects local democracy from the rival claims of other means of efficient local administration. And the public prejudice in favour of local autonomy protects it from the rival claims of democratic central government. Any other system of local governance is judged, both by the public and by local elites of all kinds, to be a second best, a necessary evil perhaps to solve a short-term or abnormal problem, but fundamentally incompatible with a culture that is both democratic and localist.

A democratic form of local governance Public support for elective local governance When we asked the public, local councillors and appointed board members to rate alternative systems of local governance we found overwhelming support for local democracy as the best system of local governance. The public gave high scores to a system of locally elected councils as the best way of ‘organizing and controlling local services’ – far higher scores than they gave to any alternative structure of local governance such as appointed boards, self-management by service users or providers, or relying on private companies operating in the market to provide local services. Elected councils scored far higher than all these alternatives not just amongst the public as a whole, but in every age group, at all levels of education, at all strengths of identification with the locality, at all lengths of local residence, at all points on the left–right ideological spectrum and among supporters of every major party. And not just among the public but among both elected and appointed elites. Not only elected councillors but, more surprisingly, appointed members of local enterprise and health boards gave even higher ratings than the public to a system of local governance based on elected local councils and lower ratings than the public to local governance by appointed boards. Indeed appointed board members even gave lower ratings than the public to their own boards – though they gave still lower ratings to other appointed boards. This preference for locally elected councils as the norm for local governance did not depend upon a deep psychological or emotional attachment to the locality, nor on participation in local elections, nor on a favourable view of actually existing local councils, nor on a partic-

244 Models of Local Governance

ular ideological position. Support for a democratic form of local governance was simply a universal presumption, as universal as the presumption in favour of democracy itself. Even though classic arguments about efficiency and representation as justifications for a democratic form of local governance may be wrong, they are redundant. In this age of liberal democracy, popular support for a democratic form is not to be derived from basic principles. It is itself a basic principle of governance, an article of faith, a universal presumption. It is not to be subordinated to arguments about efficiency, honesty or community, which are themselves less fundamental than the public’s universal and unquestioning though perhaps irrational and misguided commitment to democracy. In the contemporary world, governance requires a democratic form for reasons of legitimacy rather than efficiency. Influences upon support for elective local governance But over and above the public’s generalized commitment to a democratic form of governance, other factors may exert a measurable influence. They do not make the difference between a positive and a negative view, but they can still make the difference between grudging acceptance and enthusiastic support. To what extent therefore was support for a democratic form, as expressed in the ratings given to a system of locally elected councils, affected by a psychological sense of identification with a local community? Or by a more pragmatic belief that government operates best on a small scale? Or by admiration for the character and performance of existing local councils? Or by ideological opposition to the incumbent central government? We can address these questions by calculating multiple regressions relating the level of support for a system of locally elected councils to the strength of local identification, to pragmatic localism, to images and perceptions of local council performance, and to left–right ideology. For these regression analyses we have measured these potential influences as follows: • Psychological identification with the locality: measured by the ‘marks out of ten’ which people used to express the strength of their ‘feeling of belonging’ to their local district. • Pragmatic localism: measured by the tendency to opt for a district or at least a regional scale, rather than a Britain-wide scale, for the organization and control of schools and education, hospitals and health services, road building and maintenance, the police, environmental protection and pollution control.1

Public Support for Local Democracy 245

• Ideology: measured by left-right self-image on a 7-point scale from ‘strongly on the left’, through ‘left’, ‘centre-left’, ‘centre’, ‘centreright’ and ‘right’ to ‘strongly on the right’ • A good image of local councils: measured by whether the respondent viewed local councils such as their own as representative, efficient and honest.2 We measured the dependent variable, support for a democratic form of local governance, by the ‘marks out of ten’ which people assigned to a system of locally elected councils as the best way of ‘organizing and controlling local services’. Among the public, our regression analysis shows that none of the four potential influences had a very large impact upon support for a democratic form. All except pragmatic localism had a statistically significant impact but all the coefficients were small. Public support for a democratic form was very strong and it was not much affected by psychological identification with the locality, by pragmatic localism, by ideology or by a good or bad image of local councils’ performance. Nonetheless a strong sense of psychological identification with the locality, a good image of council performance and, to a lesser extent, a left-wing ideology provided a small additional boost. Among local elites, however, these factors exerted a greater influence, especially among appointed board members. Neither psychological identification with the locality nor pragmatic localism had a statistically significant influence upon support for a democratic form of local governance, either among elected councillors or among appointed board members. But a left-wing ideology had a clear impact among both, with coefficients of around 0.14. And a good image of local councils had a similar impact among councillors, and twice as much impact among appointed board members where the coefficient reached 0.28. While the correlation with left-wing ideology is indisputable, its interpretation is not. We suspect that left-wing support for elected local councils at the end of a long period of right-wing central government was the reaction of a political opposition excluded from central government power rather than a purely left-wing reaction in a simple sense. Influences upon support for local alternatives to local democracy A general presumption in favour of democracy and top scores for a democratic form of local governance need not preclude relatively high

13

23

* * 13 14

Elected councillors beta  100

Note: ‘Betas’ are ‘standardized regression coefficients’ or ‘path coefficients’. * = statistically insignificant coefficients.

Multiple correlation coefficient

8 * 4 8

beta  100

Public

Regressions predicting ratings for local democracy

Psychological identification with the locality Pragmatic localism Left-wing ideology Good image of local councils

Table 9.1

37

* * 14 28

Appointed board members beta  100

246

Public Support for Local Democracy 247

support for alternative structures of local governance, at least within some sections of the public. Local governance by appointed boards Public support for appointed boards ran at a much lower level than support for elected local authorities, but it varied more sharply. Ideology had the greatest impact – by a very narrow margin among the public, but by a huge margin among local elites. Right-wingers were relatively sympathetic to local governance by appointed boards while left-wingers were not. But since appointed boards were associated in the public mind with right-wing central governments, this apparently ideological influence probably reflected opposition sentiment as well as anti-business sentiment. Board members themselves were a little less driven than councillors by ideology and, unlike councillors, they were influenced by their image of elected councils. A negative image of elected councils encouraged board members to favour appointed boards as a general panacea in local governance (the coefficient reached 0.15). Figure 9.1 shows how a good or bad image of local council performance had a relatively strong impact on appointed board members’ attitudes towards alternative forms of local governance, but little or no impact on the attitudes

The impact of a good image of local councils.

4 3 2 1 0 –1 –2 –3

Rating of councils

5 By councillors

By public By board members

By public

Rating of boards

Mean scores for best way to run local services

Figure 9.1

By councillors

–4 Lowest quintile

Middle

Highest quintile

See councils as representative, honest and efficient?

248 Models of Local Governance

of the public or elected councillors. Indeed board members whose image of local council performance fell into the most negative quintile rated governance by elected councils only a little higher than by appointed boards – though it is significant that even in that group, there was a small preference for a democratic form. But most surprisingly for the communitarian advocates of traditional local democracy, the strength of psychological identification with the locality proved no defence at all for local democracy against the claims of a system of appointed boards. Quite the opposite in fact. Those who identified the most with their locality were the very ones who were most sympathetic to local governance by appointed boards. Among the public the regression coefficient reached 0.16. It was less, but it was still significant, among councillors and board members. We should remember that appointed boards such as TEC/LECs or DHA/HBs were local even if they were not a product of local democracy. We asked random half samples for their ratings of appointed boards of ‘businessmen’ and of ‘experts’. Comparison shows that left-wing ideology had a somewhat greater negative impact on attitudes towards boards of ‘businessmen’. Conversely, identification with the locality had a somewhat greater positive impact on attitudes towards boards of ‘experts’. Provision of local services by the private market By far the most predictable of all were attitudes towards private companies delivering and charging for local services. Attitudes were dominated by ideology and, in this case, probably reflected genuinely ideological reactions more than opposition sentiment. The coefficient of ideology reached 0.23 amongst the public and a huge 0.51 among local elites. Right-wingers favoured market provision, left-wingers did not. In addition to ideology, however, a negative image of local councils significantly increased support for local governance by private companies not only among appointed board members but among councillors as well. Local governance by self-management By contrast, support for local governance through self-management by service users or providers – we instanced parents and teachers as examples of users and providers – was the least predictable. Among the public, those who identified most strongly with the locality were the most sympathetic towards self-management, but the effect was fairly small.

24

39

7 * –37 *

Elected councillors beta  100

Note: ‘Betas’ are ‘standardized regression coefficients’ or ‘path coefficients’. * = statistically insignificant coefficients.

Multiple correlation coefficient

16 * –17 *

beta  100

Public

Regressions predicting ratings for appointed boards

Psychological identification with the locality Pragmatic localism Left-wing ideology Good image of local councils

Table 9.2

38

10 * –28 –15

Appointed board members beta  100

249

25

59

* * –51 –16

Elected councillors beta  100

Note: ‘Betas’ are ‘standardized regression coefficients’ or ‘path coefficients’. * = statistically insignificant coefficients.

Multiple correlation coefficient

9 * –23 *

beta  100

Public

Regressions predicting ratings for local services to run by private companies

Psychological identification with the locality Pragmatic localism Left-wing ideology Good image of local councils

Table 9.3

56

* * –50 –13

Appointed board members beta  100

250

Public Support for Local Democracy 251

Nothing significantly affected the low ratings councillors gave to self-management by service providers, but ideology and image had a modest impact on their attitudes towards self-management by service users (a right-wing ideology and a negative image of local councils increased councillors’ support for user control). Conversely nothing significantly affected the low ratings that board members gave to selfmanagement by service users. A democratic form of local governance versus local alternatives Our review of these influences on attitudes towards local governance by democratically elected councils and various non-elected alternatives suggests some general tendencies: • Ideology had a strong influence on sympathy for governance by appointed boards and private companies, but not on anything else. • Images of local councils affected board members, attitudes across the whole range of alternative structures, but images had less influence on councillors’ attitudes, and none at all on the public’s attitudes towards any of the alternatives to elected local authorities. • Pragmatic localism had very little influence on attitudes towards elected councils or on attitudes towards alternative local structures. • Psychological identification with the locality had more influence upon attitudes among the general public than on elite attitudes, but while it increased support for a democratic form of local governance it increased support, even more, for each of the local alternatives. So, on balance it eroded the relative advantage in public support that a democratic form enjoyed over other forms of local governance.

Autonomous local governance A democratic form constitutes the first element of local democracy. Local autonomy constitutes the second. The Widdicome Committee argued that ‘there is no validity in the assertion that local authorities have a local mandate’ which could place them beyond the reach of Parliament.3 But even Parliament and central government themselves pay lip-service to the principle of local autonomy, usually expressed in the ambiguous formula of declarations such as that in the 1970 White Paper: ‘The Government believe unequivocally in greater freedom for local authorities within the framework of national policies.’4 This reflects neither hypocrisy nor muddled thinking, however. There has always been, and probably always will be, a ‘chronic tension

252 Models of Local Governance

between powerful traditions of local rule and central rule – between the idea of local government and the idea of parliamentary sovereignty’.5 Both traditions, both goals, are highly valued by the public, local elites and, with a few notable exceptions, by central government politicians also. Public support for local autonomy Just as we found a general public presumption that local governance should have a democratic form, we also found a general public presumption that local governance should enjoy a degree of autonomy. One question provided a measure of support for the basic principle of local autonomy: ‘Suppose a local council wants to do something and gets the support of local people by winning a local [election/referendum] on the issue, but the government is opposed to it. Who should have the final say, the local council or the government?’ Of those with a view on this, about 85 per cent of the public and a similar number of councillors backed the council rather than central government. More remarkably, 68 per cent of appointed board members agreed with them. That was not the considered view of the Widdicombe Committee and it went far beyond any central government’s commitment to ‘greater freedom for local authorities within the framework of national policies’. It might be dismissed as populist and unrealistic. But it does indicate a general presumption in favour of local autonomy in the absence of good reasons for overriding it. Influences upon support for the principle of local autonomy But over and above the public’s generalized commitment to local autonomy, other factors may exert a measurable influence. As with support for a democratic form of local governance, they do not make the difference between a positive and a negative attitude towards local autonomy, but they can still make the difference between moderate and enthusiastic support for it. One good reason for rejecting local autonomy may be pragmatic centralism, the sense that services should be provided on a regional or national scale, the exact inverse of our notion of pragmatic localism. But those who are strongly committed to universalist ideologies, whether of the left or of the right, also find it exceptionally difficult to tolerate any degree of local autonomy. No doubt some centralists value national uniformity as an end in itself, but many more value it as a means to the end of spreading their particular idea of good government as widely as possible or as a means of resisting bad government wherever it may be found.

Public Support for Local Democracy 253

Opposition to local autonomy may therefore be driven by commitments that are as much ideological as centralist. We can use our standard regression model to predict support for the principle of local autonomy. Judged by these regressions it seems that pragmatic localism and the strength of psychological identification with the locality both had some influence on the attitudes of the public and appointed board members (though not on the opinions of councillors). But the largest single impact came from ideology with coefficients of 0.13 among the public and 0.22 among local elites, whether elected or appointed. Towards the end of a long period of right-wing central government, left-wingers were relatively favourable to local autonomy while right-wingers were not. It is likely that this reflects opposition sentiment rather than left-wing ideology as such. Support for autonomy should not be dismissed simply because it is strongly influenced by opposition sentiment, however. Opposition is the very foundation of liberty and democracy at any level – and quite naturally it is an important foundation for local democracy in particular. It is natural and healthy for the opposition to discover the need to disperse power. If they do not, then who will? Influences upon support for the practice of local autonomy In practice, aside from the principle of whether local or central government should have ‘the final say’ in matters of dispute, the scope and powers of local authorities affect the degree or extent of local autonomy. An important practical aspect of local autonomy was whether the elected council should be ‘master within its own house’ with respect to quangos. Quangos would not be able to evade responsibility to a fully autonomous local government system either by pleading their own autonomy or by claiming direct responsibility to central government. We reminded people that ‘many local services are no longer provided by elected local councils but by special bodies like Health Authorities (Boards in Scotland), NHS Trusts, Training and Enterprise Councils (Local Enterprise Companies in Scotland) and School Boards’. We then asked a randomly selected half-sample whether elected local councils ‘should: • have powers to control these non-elected bodies; • have powers to investigate these non-elected bodies, but not control them directly; • leave these non-elected bodies to get on with managing their own affairs?’

18

Multiple correlation coefficient

27

* * 21 8

Elected councillors beta  100

Note: ‘Betas’ are ‘standardized regression coefficients’ or ‘path coefficients’. * = statistically insignificant coefficients.

7 9 13 *

beta  100

Public

Regressions predicting support for local autonomy

Psychological identification with the locality Pragmatic localism Left-wing ideology Good image of local councils

Table 9.4

29

11 12 22 *

Appointed board members beta  100

254

Public Support for Local Democracy 255

This version of the question stresses the degree of control or oversight to be exercised by the democratic form of local governance over the appointed form. And consequently, the attitudes of the public and of elected councillors to this question were almost totally dominated by left–right ideology. The views of appointed board members were also dominated by ideology though influenced, to a lesser but considerable extent, by their image of councils as being representative, efficient and honest. We asked the other half-sample whether these non-elected bodies ‘should normally: • be responsible to central government; • be responsible to local councils; • act like private companies and decide their own affairs?’ This version of the question concerns the locus of quango responsibility rather than the degree of responsibility. It stresses the local versus national dimension to oversight. Consequently, attitudes were influenced by localism, though more by pragmatic localism than by psychological identification with the locality. The public’s preference for local rather than national oversight was clearly influenced more by pragmatic localism than by ideology or its image of council performance. And pragmatic localism also had a significant impact on the attitudes of local elites. But the attitudes of appointed board members were influenced most of all by their image of council performance, and the attitudes of elected councillors most of all by their left–right ideology. Councillors were uniquely motivated by ideology, board members by instrumental considerations. Figure 9.2 illustrates the independent influences of ideology and pragmatic localism on attitudes to the locus of quango accountability. Both clearly made an impact. Among the public the rising bar at the back-left is the highest and at the front-right the lowest. But the two other bars are at roughly the same height, indicating roughly equal impacts from ideology and localism. And the same pattern emerges among appointed board members, though all four rising bars are much lower among board members than among the public since they were generally much less enthusiastic about quangos being held accountable to local councils. But among councillors a left-wing ideology had much more influence than localism. So the two rising bars on the left are roughly equal. Even those left-wing councillors whose localism was weak nonetheless wanted to make quangos accountable to their local council.

17

Multiple correlation coefficient

40

* * 39 *

Elected councillors Beta  100

Note: ‘Betas’ are ‘standardized regression coefficients’ or ‘path coefficients’. * = statistically insignificant coefficients.

–7 * 14 *

beta  100

Public

Regressions predicting attitudes towards the degree of accountability

Psychological identification with the locality Pragmatic localism Left-wing ideology Good image of local councils

Table 9.5

36

* * 27 16

Appointed board members beta  100

256

* 15 12 11 24

Should be responsible to local council: Psychological identification with the locality Pragmatic localism Left-wing ideology Good image of local councils

Multiple correlation coefficient

36

* 14 28 *

25

* –13 –17 *

26

* * –24 *

Elected councillors beta  100

Note: ‘Betas’ are ‘standardized regression coefficients’ or ‘path coefficients’. * = statistically insignificant coefficients.

25

Multiple correlation coefficient

–9 –18 –10 –9

12

Multiple correlation coefficient

Should be responsible to (central) government: Psychological identification with the locality Pragmatic localism Left-wing ideology Good image of local councils

10 * * *

beta  100

Public

Regressions predicting attitudes towards the locus of accountability

Should behave like private companies: Psychological identification with the locality Pragmatic localism Left-wing ideology Good image of local councils

Table 9.6

39

* 16 18 23

23

* * –11 –13

21

* –11 –8 –13

Appointed board members beta  100

257

258 Models of Local Governance Figure 9.2

The impact of ideology and pragmatic localism.

% who say quangos should report to the local council

90

80 70 60 50 40 Councillors 30 Public

Board members

20

High localism Low

10

High localism Low

0

t

ef /C ht ig R

Le

ft/

C

R

ig

en

en

tre

tre

-L

en /C ht

C ft/ Le

t

tre

ef -L en

ht R

ig

C ft/ Le

tre

/C

en

en

tre

-L

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High localism Low

Another key question in our survey also posed a three-way choice between national or local democracy or the market. We asked whether each of eight services should be provided ‘mainly by local councils, mainly by the government, or mainly by private companies?’ We can use our standard regression model to predict the frequency with which people opted for central government, local councils or private companies. Judged by these analyses, left–right ideology dominated the frequency with which people opted for private companies. And pragmatic localism (or its inverse, pragmatic centralism) dominated the frequency with which people opted for central government. So in the context of this three-way choice, both ideology and localism affected the frequency with which people opted for local council provision. These patterns of support for local councils in a three-way contest with central

Public Support for Local Democracy 259

government and the private sector illustrate very well the two fronts on which local democracy was open to attack. Among the public, support for service provision by local councils was influenced most by pragmatic localism. Among elites, it was influenced about equally by pragmatic localism and left-wing ideology.

Conclusion: defending local democracy on two fronts Local democracy versus non-democratic alternatives The strongest defence of a democratic form for local governance is the general and pervasive assumption that elective democracy is the right way to run any system of governance, be it central or local. Among elites, and especially among appointed board members, a good image of local councils as representative, efficient and honest provided a further defence for local democracy against other specifically local alternatives for local governance. For elites, local democracy was to some extent justified instrumentally by performance. Among both the public and local elites, but most especially among elected councillors, a left-wing ideology boosted support for a democratic form of local governance and decreased support for such nonelected alternatives as appointed boards or market provision of local services. Its seems likely that the impact of ideology should be taken at face-value here. It is natural for the left to support public services and oppose the provision of local services by private firms or appointed boards, especially appointed boards staffed by local businessmen. But a strong sense of local identification actually encouraged support for non-elected local alternatives to local democracy and provided an alternative legitimacy for them. They might not be democratic, but at least they were local. Local versus central government On the other hand, psychological identification with the locality, and more especially belief in small-scale government (pragmatic localism), provided a defence for the idea of local democracy against central government. Among both public and elites, pragmatic localism increased support for local councils in disputes with central government, it increased support for local services to be run by local councils rather than by branches of central ministries, and it increased support for appointed boards to be held accountable to local councils rather than to central government. It seems as natural that localism should provide a defence for local democracy against the encroachments of central

5 30 9 7 33

By local councils: Psychological identification with the locality Pragmatic localism Left-wing ideology Good image of local councils

Multiple correlation coefficient

43

9 25 29 *

28

* –27 * *

55

* * –49 –10

Elected councillors beta  100

Note: ‘Betas’ are ‘standardized regression coefficients’ or ‘path coefficients’. * = statistically insignificant coefficients.

34

–6 –32 * –5

22

* * –20 –6

Multiple correlation coefficient

By (central) government: Psychological identification with the locality Pragmatic localism Left-wing ideology Good image of local councils

Multiple correlation coefficient

By private companies: Psychological identification with the locality Pragmatic localism Left-wing ideology Good image of local councils

beta  100

Public

46

8 24 25 18

32

* –29 10 –10

45

* * –41 –10

Appointed board members beta  100

Table 9.7 Regressions predicting how frequently people opted for services to be provided by local councils, central government or private companies

260

Public Support for Local Democracy 261

government as that left-wing ideology should provide a defence of local democracy against the provision of public services by the private sector. A second role for ideology: opposition sentiment Much less obviously, our analyses have shown that ideology also played an important role in defending local democracy against central government, and particularly so among elites. Left-wing councillors and board members were considerably more inclined to back local autonomy against central government. But we interpret this as evidence of the impact of opposition sentiment rather than left-wing sentiment in itself. It is natural for the party or ideology that is in opposition at the centre to discover, or to rediscover, the virtues of local autonomy. By the time of our survey, the right had held power at the centre for almost two decades, but it had lost control of most local councils. So ideology and partisanship provided the left with a reason to support local autonomy and the right with a reason to reject it. After a similar period of left-wing power at the centre, it is likely that ideology would again reinforce support for local autonomy, but more among rightwingers than left-wingers. National politics and public attitudes to local governance It seems that public attitudes – and more especially elite attitudes – towards local governance cannot be separated from attitudes towards national politics even when we focus on the question of local autonomy. Local governance is part of a complex web of governance at many levels. It cannot be treated as if it exists in a separate compartment, insulated from national governance and national politics. Nor is it connected to central government purely by localism versus centralism. The strains within national politics provide a strong motivation for supporting local autonomy. Conversely, the use of democratic forms in local governance and the achievement of at least some degree of local autonomy contribute not just to the health of local democracy but to the dispersion of power and the institutionalization of democracy-in-depth on which the health of national democracy depends. The democratic culture is indivisible.

Notes

Introduction and Overview 1. Caroline Andrew and Michael Goldsmith, ‘From local government to local governance – and beyond?’,International Political Science Review: Special Issue on New Trends in Municipal Government, vol. 19, no. 2 (1998) pp. 101–7 at p. 105. 2. Clarke and Stewart have argued that ‘the primary role of local authorities is local government and not local administration’, that this role ‘must have its basis in citizenship’ and that, in consequence, its structure should be based ‘not on the alleged efficiencies of administration but on the perceived and felt community of place’. See Michael Clarke and John Stewart, The Choices for Local Government – for the 1990s and Beyond (London: Longman, 1991) at p. 76 and p. 74 respectively. 3. The large inter-party differences between Conservative and Labour supporters on the issue of local autonomy which were so clearly visible in five BSAS surveys between 1986 and 1994 had ‘all but disappeared’ by 1998. See Nirmala Rao and Ken Young, ‘Revitalising local democracy’, in British Social Attitudes: the 16th Report – Who Shares New Labour Values? (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999) pp. 45–63 at p. 52.

Chapter 1

From Local Government to Local Governance

1. For overviews of local government during the period of change in the 1980s and 1990s see John Stewart and Gerry Stoker (eds), Local Government in the 1990s (London: Macmillan, 1995), and David Wilson and Chris Game, Local Government in the United Kingdom, 2nd edn (London: Macmillan, 1998). 2. For an account of that debacle see David Butler, Andrew Adonis and Tony Travers, Failure in British Government: The Politics of the Poll Tax (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 3. See Gerry Stoker (ed.), The New Management of British Local Governance (London: Macmillan, 1999). 4. See Gerry Stoker, ‘Governance as theory: five propositions’, International Social Science Journal, vol. 50, no.155 (1988) pp. 17–28, and Roderick A. W. Rhodes, Understanding Governance (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1999). 5. Guy Peters, ‘Managing the Hollow State’, in Kjell A. Eliasson and Jan Kooiman (eds), Managing Public Organizations, 2nd edn (London: Sage, 1993) p. 44. 6. See Gerry Stoker, ‘Quangos and local democracy’, in Matthew V. Flinders and Martin J. Smith (eds), Quangos, Accountability and Reform (London: Macmillan, 1999) pp. 40–54. 262

Notes 263 7. See Lord Nolan (Chairman), Committee on Standards in Public Life: Report on Local Government (London: HMSO, 1997). 8. See David Widdicombe (Chairman), The Conduct of Local Authority Business: Report Cmnd 9797 (London: HMSO, 1986). A review and development of the research conducted by Widdicombe is provided in John Gyford, Steve Leach and Chris Game, The Changing Politics of Local Government (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989). 9. See Commission for Local Democracy, Taking Charge: The Rebirth of Local Democracy (London: CLD/Municipal Journal Books, 1995). Much of the research undertaken by the CLD and a critical commentary on its report is provided in Lawrence Pratchett and David Wilson (eds), Local Democracy and Local Government (London: Macmillan, 1996). 10. See Lord Hunt (Chairman), House of Lords, Select Committee on Relations Between Central and Local Government, Volume 1 (London: HMSO, 1996). 11. See Nirmala Rao, Managing Change: Councillors and the New Local Government (York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1993). 12. See Chris Game and Steve Leach, ‘Political Parties and Local Democracy’, in Pratchett and Wilson, Local Democracy and Local Government. 13. Figures taken from Wilson and Game, Local Government in the United Kingdom, Exhibit 14.1, p. 260. 14. See William L. Miller, Irrelevant Elections? The Quality of Local Democracy in Britain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). 15. See Tony Blair, Leading the Way: A New Vision for Local Government (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 1998) p. 22. 16. Blair, Leading the Way, p. 13. 17. Blair, Leading the Way, pp. 14, 15, 16. 18. See DETR (Department for Environment, Transport and Regions), Modernising Local Government: In Touch with the People (London: HMSO, July 1998). 19. Leach suggests the logic of the 1998 White Paper is not as ‘joined up’ as New Labour claims and that within it there are unresolved tensions – first between support for more local leadership and autonomy combined with more central direction and oversight, and second between some measures designed to strengthen representative democracy and others designed to encourage a move towards a more populist concept of democracy. He concludes that New Labour is genuinely enthusiastic about local community leadership but haunted by memories of how some of its own Labour-controlled local authorities abused their powers in the past. Hence the tensions and ambiguities. See Steve Leach, ‘Modernisation and devolution: implications for local government’, Representation, vol. 36, no. 1 (1999), pp. 29–38. 20. Strong advocates of the localist case are George Jones and John Stewart, The Case for Local Government (London: Allen & Unwin, 1995). 21. For a review of New Right thought on local government see Gerry Stoker, The Politics of Local Government, 2nd edn (London: Macmillan, 1991), and Desmond King, ‘From the urban Left to the New Right: normative theory and local government’, in Stewart and Stoker, Local Government in the 1990s. 22. See Andrew Sancton, ‘British Socialist theories in the division of power by area’, Political Studies, vol. 24 (1976) pp. 158–70.

264 Notes 23. The mobilization model finds support in general terms and some conceptual elaboration in a number of chapters in Desmond King and Gerry Stoker (eds), Rethinking Local Democracy (London: Macmillan, 1998). See in particular the chapters by Anne Philips and Hugh Ward. See also Desmond King, ‘From the urban Left to the New Right’, in Stewart and Stoker, Local Government in the 1990s. 24. On the practice of left-wing Labour councils in the 1980s see Martin Boddy and Colin Fudge (eds), Local Socialism? (London: Macmillan, 1984), and John Gyford, The Politics of Local Socialism (London: Unwin Hyman, 1995). 25. The emergence of the centralist line of thought is described in Martin Loughlin, Legality and Locality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).

Chapter 2

A Multi-Level Survey

1. In the mould of Desmond King and Gerry Stoker (eds), Rethinking Local Democracy (London: Macmillan, 1996) for example. 2. See, for example, Gerry Stoker (ed.), The New Management of British Local Governance (London: Macmillan, 1999). 3. David Butler, Andrew Adonis and Tony Travers, Failure in British Government: The Politics of the Poll Tax (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 4. George Jones, John Stewart and David Regan, ‘Chapter 14: the case for local authority control in the government of health’, in George Jones and John Stewart (eds), The Case for Local Government (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983) pp. 114–41 at pp. 124–5. 5. Indeed, there is no generally agreed definition of just what constitutes a quango. See Stuart Weir and Wendy Hall (eds), EGO-trip: Extra-Governmental Organizations in the United Kingdom and their Accountability (London: Charter 88, 1994) and Chris Skelcher, The Appointed State: Quasi-governmental Organizations and Democracy (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1998). However, there was much more agreement about which quangos had an important role within the new structure of local governance set up by the 1979–97 Conservative governments. Desmond King, for example, claimed in 1996 that ‘according to some writers [himself included] Britain now deserves the sobriquet “quango state”, such is the prevalence of non-elected authorities with administrative responsibilities. Commonly cited examples include Training and Enterprise councils [TECs], hospital trusts, grant maintained schools, housing associations, housing action trusts, urban development corporations, and district health authorities [DHAs].’ See Desmond King, ‘Conclusion’, in King and Stoker, Rethinking Local Democracy, pp. 214–23 at p. 216. See also John Stewart, Alan Greer and Paul Hoggett, The Quango State: An Alternative Approach. Research Report No. 10 (London: Commission for Local Democracy, 1995), and Gerry Stoker, The Role and Purpose of Local Government (London: Commission for Local Democracy, 1994). 6. Jones and Stewart, The Case for Local Government, p. 140. 7. Jones and Stewart, The Case for Local Government, pp. 145–6. 8. OPCS, General Household Survey (London: Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, 1993). 9. Interviews averaged 29 minutes. Councillors took around three minutes less than average, appointed board members about two or three minutes more.

Notes 265 Within the general public there was a correlation between the time taken to complete the interview and the age of the respondent: those over 55 years old took seven minutes longer than those aged under 25. But there was no correlation between the length of interviews and other social or political characteristics such as gender, education, region or voting preference.

Chapter 3

The Limits of Local Identity

1. Michael Clarke and John Stewart, The Choices for Local Government – for the 1990s and Beyond (London: Longman, 1991) p. 76. 2. Clarke and Stewart, The Choices for Local Government, p. 74. 3. For an analysis of the reorganization of London government in the 1960s see Gerald Rhodes, The Government of London: the Struggle for Reform (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970). On the 1970s reorganization see Bruce Wood, The Process of Local Government Reform 1966–74 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1976). On the 1980s reorganization of metropolitan government see Steve Leach et al., After Abolition: The Operation of the Post-1996 Metropolitan Government System in England (Birmingham: INLOGOV, 1992). And for an account of the 1990s reorganization see the special issue of Public Administration, Spring 1997. 4. Our figures overestimated actual turnout in both local and national elections, partly because official figures underestimate turnout (the register is inaccurate) and partly perhaps because those who agreed to give an interview were more likely to be participators – in elections as in surveys – but also because errors of memory make people overestimate their turnout especially in local elections. Most people vote in some elections even if they do not vote in every election. And in Britain abstention is usually accidental rather than principled, caused by the pressures of daily life rather than political antagonism. In consequence, when we probe their memories of turnout people tend to confuse voting preferences with actual voting, and voting in one election with voting in another, thereby inflating their memories of voting on any one occasion. The effect seems stronger in relation to local than national elections. 5. Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p. 46. 6. Ken Young, Brian Gosschalk and Warren Hatter, In Search of Community Identity (York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1996). 7. See, for example, Lynn Bennie, Jack Brand and James Mitchell, How Scotland Votes (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997) p. 133. 8. Although our Scottish subsample was inevitably quite small (only 207 respondents) it is interesting that, among respondents in Scotland, the correlations between identifications with all of the seven geographic areas mentioned in our questions were also positive, without exception. In particular there was a positive correlation between identification with Scotland and Britain, though it was weaker than the correlation between identification with an English region and with Britain. And in the light of nationalist slogans such as ‘Scotland in Europe’ it is interesting that there was a particularly high correlation in Scotland between identification with Britain and with Europe (0.44 in Scotland compared with 0.21 in Britain as a whole).

266 Notes This suggests that Europe was not viewed in Scotland as some alternative to Britain but rather as just another area larger than (or even beyond) Scotland. Scottish identification with Europe is thus perhaps best seen simply in terms of a cosmopolitian/parochial or outward/inward dimension to public attitudes rather than in terms of the nationalist concept of Europe as an escape route for Scotland from the confines of the United Kingdom.

Chapter 4

The Role of Local Governance

1. Charles M. Tiebout, ‘A pure theory of local expenditures’, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 64 (1956) pp. 416–24. 2. Keith Dowding, ‘Public choice and local governance’, in Desmond King and Gerry Stoker (eds), Rethinking Local Democracy (London: Macmillan, 1996) pp. 50–66 at p. 61.

Chapter 5

The Image of Traditional Local Government

1. See David Beetham, ‘Theorising democracy and local government’, in Desmond King and Gerry Stoker (eds), Rethinking Local Democracy (London: Macmillan, 1996) pp. 28–49. 2. At this point we did not ask about local community groups. Other evidence presented in the next chapter suggests that the public regarded these even more local organizations as both accessible and effective. 3. Although the percentage difference is small, it is interesting that slightly higher numbers said they had complained to their ‘local councillor’ than to the less human and more institutional ‘district council’.

Chapter 6

Institutional Preferences

1. For a review see Michael Keating, ‘Size, efficiency and democracy: consolidation, fragmentation and public choice’, in David Judge, Gerry Stoker and Harold Wolman (eds), Theories of Urban Politics (London: Sage, 1995) pp. 117–34. 2. Scotland had a parliament until 1707 of course and, whatever the historic reality, the myth probably affected contemporary Scottish attitudes towards Scotland- wide control of services. 3. William Waldegrave, The Reality of Reform and Accountability in Today’s Public Service (London: Lecture to the Public Finance Foundation, 5 July 1993) p. 13.

Chapter 8

Testing Models against Public Opinion

1 Desmond S. King, ‘The New Right, the New Left and local government’, in John Stewart and Gerry Stoker (eds), The Future of Local Government (London: Macmillan, 1989) pp. 185–211 at p. 186.

Notes 267 2. Tony Augarde (ed.), The Oxford Dictionary of Modern Quotations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) p. 213, citing Women’s Own, 31 October 1987, though Thatcher made similar claims when she addressed the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, whose very existence denied her claim. 3. Ann Dummett, ‘Citizenship and identity’, in Robert Hazell (ed.), Constitutional Futures (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) pp. 213–29 at p. 221. 4. Michael Clarke and John Stewart, The Choices for Local Government – for the 1990s and Beyond (London: Longman, 1991) p. 74. 5. See James Bulpitt, Territory and Power in the United Kingdom: An Interpretation (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983). 6. See J. B. Poquelin (known as ‘Molière’), Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme, Act 2, Scene 4.

Chapter 9

Public Support for Local Democracy

1. Our measure of a localist-versus-centralist attitude towards local governance was based on a battery of eight questions about the proper scale of governance. We asked: ‘For each of the following services, do you think it would be best provided by a body responsible for an area about the size of [the local district], or the size of [the local region], or Britain as a whole?’ The question then specified: (i) schools and education services; (ii) hospitals and health services; (iii) refuse collection; (iv) road building and maintenance; (v) the police; (vi) leisure services; (vii) environmental protection and pollution control; (viii) economic development. We excluded three of these questions because over 80 per cent opted for a district-size body for refuse collection and for leisure, and less than 20 per cent for a district-size body to deal with economic development. For these three services there seemed a broad consensus favouring either a small or large scale. But for each of the other five services, opinion was broadly spread across the three possible scales of governance and thus provides an indication of the differences between individual perspectives. Answers to each of these were initially coded as follows: district-sized (coded +1), region-sized (coded zero) and Britain-wide (coded –1). We then averaged each person’s coded answers over these five services. 2. The questions asked whether ‘local councils like the council in [own district]’ did or did not ‘represent’ local opinion, and whether they were more or less ‘efficient’ and ‘corrupt’ than private business. Answers to each were rated on a 5-point scale, from most positive to most negative, and the three answers averaged. 3. David Widdicombe (Chairman), The Conduct of Local Authority Business: Report, Cmnd 9797 (London: HMSO, 1986) para. 3.6. 4. The Reform of Local Government, Cmnd 4276 (London: HMSO, 1970) para. 60. Compare Michael Heseltine’s declaration that ‘democratic accountability lies in Parliament, from which all the authority exercised at local level is derived…but that does not argue for tightly centralised control. Conservatives distrust the concentration of power.’ Michael Heseltine, Where There’s a Will (London: Hutchinson, 1987) p. 132. 5. David Butler, Andrew Adonis and Tony Travers, Failure in British Government: The Politics of the Poll Tax (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) p. 267.

Index Adonis, Andrew, 13, 33, 252, 262, 264, 267 aims and objectives, 5, 71–84, 141–48, 202–14 aims and objectives, influences on, 79–84 ‘all-purpose’ institutions, 115–16, 176–82, 233–6 Andrew, Caroline, 1, 262 Augarde, Tony, 190, 267 autonomous governance, influences on support for, 9–10, 252–61 autonomous governance, support for, 9–10, 251–2, 259–61 autonomy, local, 73, 108–11, 141–3, 171–2, 202–5, 222–4

corruption, 90–1, 157–9, 218–19 councillors, opinions of, 130–87 democratic governance, influences on support for, 9–10, 244–51, 259–61 democratic governance, support for, 9–10, 243–4, 259–61 DETR (Dept. for Environment, Transport and Regions), 25, 263 DHA/HBs, 7, 38 DHA/HBs, opinions of board members, 130–87 direct democracy, 111–12, 172–3, 230–4 don’t knows, unusual significance of, 40 Dowding, Keith, 74, 266 Dummett, Ann, 201, 267

Beetham, David, 86, 266 Bennie, Lynn, 63, 265 Blair, Tony, 24–5, 263 board members, opinions of, 130–87 Boddy, Martin, 31, 264 Brand, Jack, 63, 265 Bulpitt, James, 222, 267 Butler, David, 13, 33, 252, 262, 264, 267 capability, 92–3, 160–3 CATI, 3, 41–4 central government, local minority appeals to, 110–11, 171–2, 227–31 centralist model, 8, 31 centralist model, testing, 188–241 Clarke, Michael, 4, 45, 220, 262, 265, 267 CLD (Commission for Local Democracy), 21–4 Commission for Local Democracy, 21, 263 compulsory competitive tendering, 17–18 Conservative Governments’ reforms 1979–97, 1, 11–32

economic development, 75–6, 144–6, 204–8 effective channels of protest, 94–7, 162–7, 218–19 efficiency, 90–2, 157–60, 218–19 Eliasson, Kjell A., 19, 262 elite consensus, 184–5 elites, divided, 185–7 ‘enabling’ institutions, 112–14, 174–5, 235–8 exclusion, 66–7, 137–40, 199–202 executive management, 111–12, 172–3, 230–2 Flinders, Matthew V., 20, 262 Fudge, Colin, 31, 264 Game, Chris, 11, 21, 22, 23, 262, 263 GLC (Greater London Council), 12 Goldsmith, Michael, 1, 262 Gosschalk, Brian, 59, 265 ‘governance’, contrasted with government, 1, 18–21

268

Index 269 governing perspectives, 130–87 Greer, Alan, 36, 264 Gyford, John, 21, 31, 263, 264 Hall, Wendy, 36, 264 Hatter, Warren, 59, 265 Hazell, Robert, 201, 267 Heseltine, Michael, 267 Hobsbawm, Eric J., 53, 265 Hoggett, Paul, 36, 264 Hunt, Lord, 21, 263 identifications, 45–70, 135–6, 190–203 identifications, multiple, 53–7 identifications, regional patterns of, 63–4 identifications, social patterns of, 58–62 ideology, 9–10, 140–2 ideology, influence of, 244–61, see also under: ‘influences on’ various attitudes image of local government, influence of, 244–61 images of local government, 5, 85–104, 148–69, 213–21 images of local government, influences on, 97–103 individualist model, 8, 30 individualist model, testing, 188–241 institutions for local government, 6, 11–28 institutions for local government, influences on preferences, 119–29 institutions for local government, preferences, 6, 105–29, 168–82, 220–38 institutions for local government, ratings of, 116–19, 176–80, 233–8, 242–51 Jones, George, 28, 35, 37, 263, 264 Judge, David, 105, 266 Keating, Michael, 105, 266 King, Desmond, 30, 31, 33, 36, 189, 263, 264, 266 Kooiman, Jan, 19, 262

Leach, Steve, 21, 22, 27, 46, 263, 265 local autonomy, 73, 108–11, 141–3, 171–2, 202–5, 222–4 local governance, 1, 11–32 local governance, support for, 253–9 local identity, 4, 9, 45–70, 135–7, 190–203 local minorities, protection of, 110–11, 171–2, 227–31 localism, 9, 190–203 localism, influence of, 244–61; see also under: ‘influences on’ various attitudes localism, pragmatic, 9, 105–7, 168–71, 222–4 localist model, 8, 28 localist model, testing, 188–241 locality, exclusive attitudes towards, 66–7, 137–40, 199–202 locality, objective links to, 46–50, 131–5, 191–4 locality, pride in, 65, 136–8, 197–9 locality, resonsibilty for, 65, 136–8, 199–201 locality, subjective links to, 51–64, 133–5, 193–203 Loughlin, Martin, 31, 264 metropolitan counties, 12 Miller, William L., 23, 263 minimalism, 72, 141–3, 204–6 Mitchell, James, 63, 265 mobilization model, 8, 31 mobilization model, testing, 188–241 mobilize, mission to, 76–79, 147–8, 204–8 models of local governance, 3, 8, 28–32, 188–90 models of local governance, test results, 237–41 models of local governance, testing, 188–241 ‘monitoring’ institutions, 112–14, 174–5, 235–8 monitoring quangos, 112–14, 174–5, 235–8

270 Index national standards, 73, 141–3, 202–5 national standards, enforcement of, 111–12, 171–2, 226–8 ‘New Labour’ reforms, 24–8 New Public Management, 17–18 Nolan, Lord, 20, 263 OPCS (Office of Population Censuses and surveys), 39, 264 party, 9–10, 140–2 party, influence of, see under: ‘influences on’ various attitudes paying for services, 114–15, 175–7, 225–6 Peters, Guy, 19, 262 Philips, Anne, 31, 264 pluralism, local government’s contribution to, 73, 148–9, 209–12 ‘Poll Tax’, 13–14, 33, 252, 262, 264, 267 Pratchett, Lawrence, 21, 22, 263 ‘providing’ institutions, 115–16, 176–82, 233–6 quangocracy, 7 quangos, 14–16, 36–9 randomized question wordings, 41–3 Rao, Nirmala, 10, 22, 262, 263 ‘refusals’, unusual significance of, 41 Regan, David, 35, 264 respresentation and responsiveness, 86–7, 149–53, 213–17 Rhodes, Gerald, 46, 265 Rhodes, Roderick A.W., 19, 262 rival elites, 7, 34–9 rival elites, opinions of, 7, 130–87 role of local governance, see: aims and objectives sampling, 39 Sancton, Andrew, 31, 263 satisfaction, 95–97, 164–9

self-interest, 88–89, 156–9, 216–17 Skelcher, Chris, 36, 264 Smith, Martin J., 20, 262 ‘special interests’, 87–9, 152–5, 218–19 ‘special purpose’ institutions, 115–16, 176–82, 233–6 Stewart, John, 4, 11, 28, 30, 31, 35, 36, 37, 45, 189, 220, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267 Stoker, Gerry, 11, 17, 19, 20, 30, 31, 33, 36, 105, 189, 262, 263, 264, 266 structure of local government, see: institutions for local government subsidiarity, 222–4 survey design, 3, 36–40 symbolism, 211–14 TEC/LEC board members, 7, 37 TEC/LEC board members, opinions of, 130–87 Thatcher reforms, 1–2 Tiebout thesis, 74–5, 144–5, 222–4 Tiebout, Charles M., 74, 266 Travers, Tony, 13, 33, 252, 262, 264, 267 trust, 95–7, 164–9, 220–1 ‘two-tier’ system of local government, 12 Waldegrave, William, 128, 266 Ward, Hugh, 31, 264 waste, 90–2, 161, 218–19 Weir, Stuart, 36, 264 welfare mission, 78–9, 148–9, 204–8 Widdicombe, David, 21, 251, 263, 267 Wilson, David, 11, 21, 22, 23, 262, 263 Wolman, Harold, 105, 266 Wood, Bruce, 46, 265 Young, Ken, 10, 59, 262, 265