The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge Studies in Public Opinion and Political Psychology)

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a public that has no fixed attitude t o w a r d w h a t it wants d o n e , but simply a r a n g e of only partially consistent c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , s o m e o n e has got to play the role of crystallizing issues in a way that can lead to a c t i o n . Consider, in this c o n n e c t i o n , D o u g l a s A r n o l d ' s recent b o o k , The Logic of Congressional Action (1990). A r n o l d shows that C o n g r e s s often takes blatantly contradictory actions. It favors a balanced budget w h e n this is the issue, and favors increased spending w h e n asked to vote on p a r t i c u l a r s p e n d i n g provisions. L i k e w i s e , it favors " t a x i n c e n t i v e s " w h e n asked to vote on t h e m one item at a t i m e , and also tax simplification w h e n asked to vote on tax reform. T h e key to these and n u m e r o u s other inconsistencies in C o n g r e s s ' s r e c o r d , according to Arn o l d , is h o w issue entrepreneurs frame t h e given issue, thereby linking it to o n e rather than a n o t h e r potential distribution of public o p i n i o n . S u c c e s s in c o n g r e s sional politics turns on the ability to get o n e ' s colleagues and o t h e r elites, e s pecially in t h e p r e s s , to think about o n e ' s issue in a way that will p r o d u c e majority s u p p o r t for it rather t h a n , as might be the c a s e u n d e r a different issue frame, majority o p p o s i t i o n . A similar a r g u m e n t might be m a d e for leadership in g e n e r a l . Political leaders are s e l d o m t h e passive i n s t r u m e n t s of majority o p i n i o n . Nor, as it s e e m s to m e , do they often a t t e m p t openly to c h a l l e n g e public o p i n i o n . But they do regularly attempt to play on the contradictory ideas that are always present in p e o p l e ' s m i n d s , e l e v a t i n g the salience of s o m e and h a r n e s s i n g t h e m to new initiatives while d o w n p l a y i n g or ignoring other ideas - all of w h i c h is just a n o t h e r way of talking about issue framing. I s u g g e s t , t h e n , that my a c c o u n t of an ambivalent public is not only m o r e faithful to the wealth of m i c r o e v i d e n c e e x a m i n e d e a r l i e r in this chapter, but also m o r e faithful to the c o m p l e x role of public opinion in d e m o c r a t i c politics. All of the analysis in this and the last c h a p t e r involves the form and nature of attitudes r a t h e r than the content of p e o p l e ' s opinion s t a t e m e n t s and the process by which they are formed. T h e next five chapters are c o n c e r n e d with d r a w i n g out the implications of the m o d e l in these latter areas.

The mainstream and polarization effects

W i t h the national inflation rate a p p r o a c h i n g the then-startling level of 7 percent, President N i x o n went on television in late s u m m e r 1971 to a n n o u n c e a surprise decision to i m p o s e w a g e and p r i c e controls on the e c o n o m y . A l t h o u g h such controls w e r e a major d e p a r t u r e from administration policy, t h e decision w a s imm e d i a t e l y hailed by c o m m e n t a t o r s across the political s p e c t r u m as a n e c e s s a r y step in t h e battle against inflation. By g o o d luck, there exist excellent d a t a on the effect of N i x o n ' s s p e e c h on public attitudes. A C o l u m b i a University survey of political activists h a p p e n e d to be in t h e field at t h e t i m e of N i x o n ' s a n n o u n c e m e n t , and G a l l u p surveys on price controls b r a c k e t e d the s p e e c h . T h e C o l u m b i a study found, first of all, that the s p e e c h had little effect on D e m o c r a t i c activists, w h o tended to favor w a g e and price controls even before N i x o n s p o k e . But t h e effect of t h e speech on R e p u b lican activists w a s d r a m a t i c . Virtually o v e r n i g h t , s u p p o r t for controls a m o n g R e p u b l i c a n activists shot up from 37 percent to 82 percent, a rise of s o m e 45 p e r c e n t a g e points ( B a r t o n , 1 9 7 4 - 5 ) . T h e G a l l u p s u r v e y s , m e a n w h i l e , showed that t h e public as a w h o l e b e c a m e about 10 p e r c e n t a g e points m o r e favorable toward price controls in the w e e k s following the N i x o n s p e e c h . T h i s c a s e suggests that a p o p u l a r president b a c k e d by a unified W a s h i n g t o n c o m m u n i t y can have a powerful effect on public o p i n i o n , especially that part of the public that is most attentive to politics. T h i s is the first of a series of c h a p t e r s that a i m s at a c c o u n t i n g for the effects of such elite c o m m u n i c a t i o n s on m a s s attitudes. In this c h a p t e r we e x a m i n e two simple ideal typical s i t u a t i o n s , o n e type in which elites achieve a c o n s e n s u s or near c o n s e n s u s on a value or policy, so that virtually all c o m m u n i c a t i o n s take t h e s a m e side of t h e given issue, and a n o t h e r type in which elites disagree along p a r t i s a n or ideological lines, so that there is a roughly even flow of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s on b o t h sides of t h e issue. T h e c a s e of w a g e and price controls is an e x a m p l e of the first type of situation, and the nearly unified s u p p o r t of A m e r i c a n elites for the w a r in V i e t n a m in 1964 is another. T h e sharply ideological division of elites o v e r V i e t n a m in t h e late 1960s is an e x a m p l e of t h e s e c o n d . T h e R A S m o d e l , as we shall see, leads us to expect that these t w o types of situations will have regular and predictable effects on public attitudes.

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L a t e r c h a p t e r s will e x a m i n e m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d c a s e s , ones in which the pattern of elite m e s s a g e s switches from mainly consensual to mainly conflictual, and others in which elites are d i v i d e d , but in w h i c h the relative intensity of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s c h a n g e s o v e r t i m e . Such c h a n g e s in the flow of elite c o m m u n i c a tions p r o d u c e quite interesting and nonintuitive patterns of c h a n g e in m a s s attitude r e p o r t s , as will b e c o m e apparent.

MAINSTREAM

EFFECT

W h a t , we m a y now a s k , would be t h e theoretically expected effect on public opinion if elites across the political s p e c t r u m were to achieve a c o n s e n s u s in s u p port of a p a r t i c u l a r " m a i n s t r e a m " policy? Or, to ask the same question in the l a n g u a g e of the m o d e l : W h a t w o u l d be t h e e x p e c t e d effect on public opinion if virtually all the persuasive m e s s a g e s c a r r i e d in political media on a p a r t i c u l a r policy were favorable to that policy, and if there were no cueing m e s s a g e s to alert p e o p l e that the policy w a s inconsistent with their values?

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eign policies (see also S i g e l m a n and Conover, 1981). T h e i r explanation for this paralleled K e y ' s a r g u m e n t . Information m e a s u r e d " o n e ' s a t t a c h m e n t t o the m a i n s t r e a m and the resultant exposure t o influences such a s the m a s s m e d i a " (1966: p. 189). M c C l o s k y and Brill's (1983) a r g u m e n t that e d u c a t i o n p r o m o t e s the " s o c i a l l e a r n i n g " of libertarian ideals, and M u e l l e r ' s (1973) claim that better e d u c a t e d p e r s o n s were m o r e likely to s u p p o r t the V i e t n a m W a r because they were better " f o l l o w e r s " of official policy likewise appeal to the notion that exposure to " m a i n s t r e a m " values tends to e n h a n c e s u p p o r t for t h e m . M o r e recently, the t e n d e n c y of better e d u c a t e d p e r s o n s to be m o r e o p p o s e d to the quarantining of A I D S v i c t i m s ( S n i d e r m a n et a l . , 1991) appears to reflect the internalization of a m e d i c a l c o n s e n s u s that such action is u n n e c e s s a r y to prevent the spread of the disease (Colby and C o o k , 1 9 9 1 ) . '

Noting that e d u c a t i o n w a s associated with greater support for racial equality, private health i n s u r a n c e , and tolerance of n o n c o n f o r m i s t s , Key explained that " f o r m a l e d u c a t i o n may serve to indoctrinate p e o p l e into the more-or-less official political values of the c u l t u r e " (p. 3 4 0 ) .

In a c o m p a r a t i v e study of the United S t a t e s and Britain, C a i n , Ferejohn, and Fiorina (1987) turned up a finding that nicely illustrates the " i n d o c t r i n a t i n g eff e c t " that e x p o s u r e to a p a r t i c u l a r elite culture often p r o d u c e s . Citizens in both c o u n t r i e s w e r e asked w h e t h e r elected representatives should " s u p p o r t the position their p a r t i e s take w h e n s o m e t h i n g c o m e s up for a v o t e , or should they m a k e up their o w n m i n d s r e g a r d l e s s of h o w their p a r t i e s want t h e m to v o t e . " In B r i t a i n , w h e r e P a r l i a m e n t d e p e n d s on a high degree of p a r t y discipline, collegee d u c a t e d p e r s o n s were m o r e likely than those with only high school e d u c a t i o n to say that representatives should h e w the p a r t y line. But in the United S t a t e s , with its a n t i p a r t y and individualist political tradition, c o l l e g e - e d u c a t e d persons were m o r e likely to say that representatives should vote their o w n opinions. T h u s , the better e d u c a t e d in each c o u n t r y are the m o r e faithful adherents of their c o u n t r y ' s r e s p e c t i v e national traditions. If the m a i n s t r e a m a r g u m e n t is c o r r e c t , c o r r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n a w a r e n e s s and s u p p o r t for a policy should be strongest w h e n elite c o n s e n s u s is strongest and less strong w h e n elite c o n s e n s u s is less strong or nonexistent (D25). M u c h p u b lished e v i d e n c e (to be s u p p l e m e n t e d later in this chapter) s u p p o r t s this e x p e c tation. For e x a m p l e , M u e l l e r notes that the correlation b e t w e e n e d u c a t i o n and s u p p o r t for the V i e t n a m W a r w a s strong early in the war, w h e n most elites supp o r t e d it, and weak in the late p h a s e s of the war, w h e n p a r t y and ideological elites b e c a m e deeply divided. In a s y s t e m a t i c test of this hypothesis in the d o m a i n of civil l i b e r t i e s , M c C l o s k y and Brill ( 1 9 8 3 : p. 4 2 1 ) classified m o r e than 100 civil liberties items according to the d e g r e e of support for the libertarian option in relevant S u p r e m e C o u r t decisions and in the attitudes of s o m e 2 , 0 0 0 elites they had s u r v e y e d . T h e y found that for items on which the C o u r t and other elites had strongly e n d o r s e d the civil liberties position, m e m b e r s of the general public w h o had attended college w e r e , on a v e r a g e , 24 p e r c e n t a g e points more libertarian than w e r e those with less than a high school e d u c a t i o n . Yet e d u c a t i o n had a progressively w e a k e r effect in inducing support for libertarian policies as elite s u p p o r t for t h e m d e c l i n e d , until finally, e d u c a t i o n had a slightly n e g a t i v e

W r i t i n g a few years later, G a m s o n and Modigliani (1966) noted a substantial correlation b e t w e e n political information and support for the g o v e r n m e n t ' s for-

1 This is my interpretation of the education effect reported by Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991, chap. 4). For a further discussion of this point, see Chapter 12.

A x i o m Al s u g g e s t s , first of all, that t h e greater a c i t i z e n ' s level of political a w a r e n e s s , the greater the likelihood of reception of persuasive m e s s a g e s on this hypothetical m a i n s t r e a m issue. If all of the cueing m e s s a g e s on this policy were favorable, no o n e w o u l d have any basis via A2 for resisting it. F r o m this we can d e d u c e that the greater a p e r s o n ' s level of political a w a r e n e s s , the greater the n u m b e r of m a i n s t r e a m m e s s a g e s t h e person would internalize in the form of considerations and h e n c e , all else e q u a l , the greater the p e r s o n ' s level of expressed support for the m a i n s t r e a m policy (D25). R e s e a r c h e r s w o r k i n g on a variety of substantive p r o b l e m s have r e p o r t e d s u p p o r t for this implication of the m o d e l . In fact, t h o u g h using different v o c a b u l a r i e s , several have m a d e roughly the s a m e a r g u m e n t as h e r e . For exa m p l e , in Public Opinion and American Democracy (1961), V. O. Key, Jr., w r o t e that a p e r s o n ' s level of formal e d u c a t i o n may be an indicator of the extent to which the person has been influenced by s o c i e t y ' s traditional or " o f f i c i a l " values. Key w r o t e : Probably a major consequence of education for opinion consists in the bearing of education on the kinds of influences to which a person is subjected throughout his life. The more extended the educational experience, the more probable it is that a person will be exposed to the discussions of issues as they arise. When, as so often occurs, the current discussion is heavily loaded on one side, it might be expected that this educationally conditioned exposure would have some bearing on the direction of opinion. (1961: p. 341)

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association with s u p p o r t for civil liberties on those (few) items on w h i c h the pre-Rehnquist C o u r t and most elites took an antilibertarian position (for exa m p l e , civil d i s o b e d i e n c e ) . It is w i d e l y supposed that political awareness - w h e t h e r m e a s u r e d by k n o w l e d g e , p a r t i c i p a t i o n , or e d u c a t i o n - e n g e n d e r s resistance to elite influence rather than, as a s s u m e d in the m a i n s t r e a m m o d e l , susceptibility to it. As will b e c o m e clear in C h a p t e r s 7 - 1 1 , this supposition has s o m e validity. Political a w a r e n e s s does a p p e a r to e n g e n d e r resistance to the political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s of g o v e r n i n g authorities. But awareness does so less by e n g e n d e r i n g resistance per se than by increasing t h e p e r s o n ' s sensitivity to the c o m m u n i c a t i o n s of countervailing elites, especially the ideological o p p o n e n t s of the r e g i m e . T h u s , for e x a m p l e , it will turn out in C h a p t e r 9 that a major source of opposition to t h e V i e t n a m W a r was the e x p o s u r e of politically a w a r e citizens to a n t i w a r c o m m u n i c a t i o n s that were t o o faint to be picked up by the less a w a r e . T h e notion that politically aware persons resist all forms of political persuasion is highly dubious. O n e other c o m m e n t . T h e r e are in every society ideas on w h i c h virtually eve r y o n e agrees. In such c a s e s , the idea is unlikely to b e c o m e the object of studies of public o p i n i o n , except perhaps in studies of c u l t u r e . S u c h " m o t h e r h o o d iss u e s " in t h e United States m i g h t include m a i n t e n a n c e of free e l e c t i o n s , taxs u p p o r t e d public s c h o o l s , and state-organized a t t e m p t s to repulse an invading e n e m y . T h e m a i n s t r e a m model is less useful for policies of this type than for policies on which there is p o p u l a r reluctance to go along with an elite c o n s e n s u s , such as tolerance of disliked g r o u p s , or support for w a r w h e n the nation is not immediately threatened. 2

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to see the ideological implications of the m e s s a g e s they r e c e i v e , they will be likely to reject c o n s e r v a t i v e a r g u m e n t s on this issue; these c u e i n g m e s s a g e s will not, however, i m p e d e their internalization of liberal m e s s a g e s . Less politically aware liberals, by contrast, will be exposed to few persuasive m e s s a g e s , a n d , owing to their low reception of cueing m e s s a g e s and the lower accessibility of these cues in m e m o r y , will be less selective about the persuasive m e s s a g e s they internalize. In c o n s e q u e n c e of this d y n a m i c , the most a w a r e liberals will fill their h e a d s , so to speak, with a large n u m b e r of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that a r e , on b a l a n c e , favorable to the liberal side of the issue. Less aware liberals, for their p a r t , will fill their h e a d s with a smaller n u m b e r of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , and these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s will not consistently favor the liberal side of the issue. T h e s a m e a r g u m e n t , mutatis mutandis, applies to c o n s e r v a t i v e s . Highly a w a r e c o n s e r v a t i v e s should fill their heads with mostly c o n s e r v a t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , while less a w a r e c o n s e r v a t i v e s should fill their heads with a smaller n u m b e r of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that are less consistently c o n s e r v a t i v e . O u r e x p e c t a t i o n , t h e n , is that for cases in which there is a roughly even flow of o p p o s i n g p a r t i s a n m e s s a g e s , the ratio of ideologically consistent c o n siderations to ideologically inconsistent o n e s should increase as political awareness increases. Figure 4 . 1 h a s already c o n f i r m e d this e x p e c t a t i o n . As s h o w n there, the r a t i o of consistent c o n s i d e r a t i o n s to total c o n s i d e r a t i o n s increases from about .5 a m o n g the least informed persons to about .80 a m o n g the m o s t informed. Two of the slopes in Figure 4 . 1 are statistically significant at the .01 level and the third is significant at the .10 l e v e l . O n e m a y expect that an increasing r a t i o of ideologically consistent to inconsistent c o n s i d e r a t i o n s should translate into differences in p e o p l e ' s attitude statem e n t s : M o r e a w a r e liberals will be m o r e likely to call to mind c o n s i d e r a t i o n s favorable to the liberal position and h e n c e will be m o r e likely to s u p p o r t it. Less aware liberals will be less likely to be able to recall c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of any k i n d , which will lead to higher no-opinion r a t e s , and less likely to endorse the liberal position w h e n they do offer an o p i n i o n . 3

THE POLARIZATION EFFECT T h e r e a r e , of c o u r s e , many cases in which political elites heatedly d i s a g r e e , so that no " m a i n s t r e a m " exists. In cases of this t y p e , the R A S m o d e l leads us to expect quite different patterns of m a s s attitudes. To see why, let us a s s u m e a situation in which elites are roughly evenly divided on a p a r t i s a n issue, with o n e p a r t i s a n c a m p s p o n s o r i n g persuasive m e s sages favoring t h e liberal position and the other s p o n s o r i n g m e s s a g e s in support of the c o n s e r v a t i v e position. We further a s s u m e that each c a m p sponsors cueing m e s s a g e s indicating why the given policy is or is not consistent with liberal (or c o n s e r v a t i v e ) values. Finally, let us a s s u m e that all of these m e s s a g e s are equally intense in that a person at a given level of political a w a r e n e s s w o u l d be equally likely to e n c o u n t e r and take in any one of t h e m . Within the general p u b l i c , increases in awareness will lead to increased reception of persuasive m e s s a g e s favoring both the liberal position and the c o n servative position (from A l ) and also increased reception of c u e i n g m e s s a g e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e issue. Let us focus first on how this affects liberals. Since p o litically a w a r e liberals will be likely to possess cueing m e s s a g e s that e n a b l e t h e m 2 See also Chong, McClosky, and Zaller, 1984.

4

T h e logic of this a r g u m e n t again applies equally to c o n s e r v a t i v e s . T h a t is, increases in awareness m a k e m a s s c o n s e r v a t i v e s increasingly likely to m a k e conservative attitude s t a t e m e n t s w h e n asked about the issue. T h u s , in the c a s e of an evenly divided p a r t i s a n elite and a balanced flow of partisan c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , the effect of political a w a r e n e s s is to p r o m o t e the 3 The relationships depicted in Figure 4.1, however, apply to the sample as a whole; closer inspection of the data reveals that the expected relationships hold only for liberals, where they hold very strongly. For conservatives, there appears to be little change in the ratio of consistentto-inconsistent considerations as awareness increases. The reason for this complication appears to be that the assumed conditions for the test have not been met, namely, a roughly even division of elite support for the opposing policy alternatives. For none of the three options is the division of mass opinion close to 50-50, as it ought to be in the case of an equal elite division. See Chapter 8 for further tests of the effect of awareness and ideology on the internalization of considerations. 4 See Krosnick and Milburn, 1990, for a review of the evidence on the effects of political awareness on no-opinion rates.

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polarization of attitude r e p o r t s as m o r e aware liberals gravitate m o r e reliably to the liberal position and m o r e aware c o n s e r v a t i v e s gravitate m o r e reliably to the c o n s e r v a t i v e position (D26).

Mainstream

support for

the

polarization

effect

M u c h empirical e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t s the e x p e c t a t i o n of an awareness-induced p o larization of liberals and c o n s e r v a t i v e s on p a r t i s a n issues. T h e polarizing effect of political a w a r e n e s s on p a r t i s a n (as against m a i n s t r e a m ) issues w a s first noted by G e o r g e B e l k n a p and A n g u s C a m p b e l l ( 1 9 5 1 - 2 ) and w a s incorporated into the M i c h i g a n s c h o o l ' s classic, The American Voter (Campbell et a l . , 1960: p p . 186, 2 0 7 ) . U s i n g different theoretical v o c a b u l a r i e s , G a m s o n and Modigliani (1966) and C h o n g , M c C l o s k y , and Zaller (1984) have noted the same effect. T h e y exa m i n e public attitudes toward n u m e r o u s issues on which elites d i s a g r e e , issues r a n g i n g from foreign policy to civil liberties to welfare to race to e c o n o m i c policy. In each c a s e , increases in political a w a r e n e s s were associated with a s h a r p e r p o l a r i z a t i o n of attitudes b e t w e e n liberals (or D e m o c r a t s ) , on o n e s i d e , and conservatives (or R e p u b l i c a n s ) , on the o t h e r . 5

T h e d a t a in Figure 6.1 illustrate both the m a i n s t r e a m and p o l a r i z a t i o n effects of political a w a r e n e s s . W h e n , in 1964, A m e r i c a n elites nearly all s u p p o r t e d the V i e t n a m War, increases in a w a r e n e s s led nonelite liberals and c o n s e r v a t i v e s to b e c o m e m o r e s u p p o r t i v e of the " m a i n s t r e a m " war policy. Yet w h e n , in 1970, A m e r i c a n elites had b e c o m e d e e p l y divided about the war, increases in awareness are a s s o c i a t e d with greater p o l a r i z a t i o n of the attitudes of m a s s liberals and c o n s e r v a t i v e s . T h e Persian G u l f W a r affords a n o t h e r o p p o r t u n i t y to o b s e r v e both the mainstream and the p o l a r i z a t i o n effect. F r o m the Iraqi invasion of K u w a i t in A u g u s t 1990 through t h e fall 1990 congressional e l e c t i o n , there w a s only light criticism of President B u s h ' s h a n d l i n g of the crisis a n d , in particular, virtually no a r t i c ulate opposition to the policy of sending U . S . forces to the region. T h u s , as J. W. A p p l e w r o t e on the eve of the e l e c t i o n , 6

[A] midterm election campaign has taken place with war threatening in the Persian Gulf, and . . . the major foreign policy issue confronting the nation has generated almost no debate among the candidates about what the U.S. should do. Instead, President Bush has traded insults with Saddam Hussein of Iraq, and the Democrats have barely mentioned the subject. (New York Times, 6 November 1991, p. A l ) 5 In Gamson and Modigliani, these findings are the basis for a "cognitive consistency" model of opinion formation; in McClosky et al., they are the basis for a "contested norms" model of opinionation. Yet in both cases, the empirical regularity being explained, as well as the operational constructs in the models, are the same as in the Belknap and Campbell polarization model. 6 To validate these claims concerning elite consensus and division, I asked a research assistant to classify cover stories on Vietnam in Newsweek and Time. In 1964 prowar cover stories outnumbered antiwar ones by a margin of approximately 3 to 1; in 1970, the ratio was close 1 to 1. (See also Hallin, 1986.)

polarization

103

effects

1970

1964 100

100

Conservatives

Conservatives

80 Empirical

and

Percent 60 supporting war 40

Liberals Liberals

20 0 Political awareness Cons. N

42 25

53 32

71 65

102 33

86 51

40 12

53 19

120 30

114 41

153 73

Figure 6 . 1 . An illustration of the mainstream and polarization models. Liberals are defined as persons who rated liberals fifteen or more points higher than conservatives on separate 100-point feeling thermometers; conservatives are persons who exhibited the reverse pattern. Persons supporting the war are those who said either that the United States should "keep troops in Vietnam but try to end the fighting," which was the position of both the Johnson and Nixon administrations, or that the U.S. should take a stronger stand on the war. The awareness measure is described in the Measures Appendix. Source: 1964 and 1970 CPS surveys. Two days after the e l e c t i o n , however, Bush a n n o u n c e d a d e c i s i o n to send several h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d additional troops to the gulf. T h i s decision s p a r k e d strong congressional c r i t i c i s m , leading to congressional h e a r i n g s in which administration policy w a s harshly criticized and later to a congressional vote on a w a r policy resolution. As in the V i e t n a m c a s e , D e m o c r a t s w e r e the most salient critics of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s h a w k i s h policies and R e p u b l i c a n s were t h e most salient defenders. In v i e w of t h i s , we should expect, in the period before C o n g r e s s reacted critically to B u s h ' s troop a n n o u n c e m e n t , to find e v i d e n c e of the m a i n s t r e a m effect; after criticism b e g a n , we should expect to o b s e r v e the p o l a r i z a t i o n p a t t e r n . By g o o d luck, the 1990 National E l e c t i o n Study went into t h e field on the day after the election and w a s able to c o m p l e t e m o r e than 2 5 0 i n t e r v i e w s before congressional c r i t i c i s m of B u s h ' s military buildup b e g a n . It also c a r r i e d a question a s k i n g w h e t h e r " w e did the right thing in sending U . S . military forces to the Persian Gulf, or should we have stayed o u t ? ' ' R e s u l t s , which are d e r i v e d from a m a x i m u m likelihood logistic regression that controls for political a w a r e n e s s , p a r t y a t t a c h m e n t , gender, r a c e , and Jewish ethnicity are s h o w n in Figure 6 . 2 . ( T h e coefficients on which the figure is b a s e d are in Table 6 . 3 of the a p p e n d i x to this chapter.) As e x p e c t e d , the d a t a 7

7 Democrats and Republicans in the figure are constructed as persons with a score of ± 1.3 on the party variable, where party ranges from -2 (strong Republican) to +2 (strong Democrat). Awareness scores in the figure run from —1.8 SD to +2.57 SD.

104

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

Before congressional criticism 100 T 75

Percent who say it was "right thing" 50 to send troops to Gulf 25

Mainstream

and

polarization

effects

105

After congressional criticism 100y

Republicans

Republicans Democrats

Political awareness

i Figure 6.2. Partisans become more polarized over time on "right to send troops." Estimates are derived from coefficients in Table 6.3. Source: 1990 NES survey.

betray little e v i d e n c e of p a r t i s a n p o l a r i z a t i o n in the period prior to t h e c o n g r e s sional c r i t i c i s m of B u s h ' s policies, but clear p o l a r i z a t i o n afterward. Public division d o e s not a p p e a r to be as s h a r p as in the V i e t n a m c a s e , but this is probably b e c a u s e elite polarization on Persian Gulf policy did not a p p r o a c h that of the V i e t n a m p e r i o d in t e r m s of either d u r a t i o n or intensity. Before c o n t i n u i n g the analysis of opinion on Persian G u l f policy, I must discuss a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l issue. In c r e a t i n g Figure 6 . 2 from the coefficients in a logistic regression m o d e l , I had to m a k e certain c o d i n g decisions. For e x a m p l e , to show the effects of political a w a r e n e s s , I m a n i p u l a t e d scores from roughly the 1st percentile on political a w a r e n e s s to the 98th percentile. Since I need to m a k e many similar decisions about how to c r e a t e g r a p h s from coefficients in the next several c h a p t e r s , I want to s t a n d a r d i z e my p r o c e d u r e s in an intelligible set of c o n v e n t i o n s . A s u m m a r y of these c o n v e n t i o n s , w h i c h will be used for the rest of the b o o k , is given in the a c c o m p a n y i n g b o x . T h e 1990 N E S survey c a r r i e d o n e other q u e s t i o n w h i c h is useful for g a u g i n g public opinion on the gulf crisis. It reads: Which of the following do you think we should do now in the Persian Gulf:

Conventions of graphical analysis For graphs showing the relationship between political awareness, political predispositions, and a political attitude or attitude change, the following conventions will apply in the remainder of the book: Basic design. In all cases, political awareness will be treated as the principal independent variable and plotted against the jr-axis. The dependent variable, usually the probability of a political attitude or attitude change, the will be plotted against the y-axis, as in Figure 6.2. The effect of differences in political dispositions (such as, being a Democrat rather than a Republican) will be shown by separate lines within the graphs, as in Figure 6.2. Range of political awareness. Except as noted, graphs depict the simulated effect of moving from about the 1st percentile to about the 98th percentile on political awareness. This range leaves about 1 percent of the cases outside each endpoint, though, of course, lumpiness in the data makes it impossible to achieve this range in every case. Because different awareness scales have different skews, the range of political awareness scores will not always correspond to a particular z-score range, such as ±2 SD. The particular z-score ranges used in the simulations will be provided in footnotes. Range of simulated attitude scores. With one clearly noted exception, graphs showing probabilities or proportions will use a scale of 0 to 1.0. When means are used, graphs will reflect the range of mean values in the data. Thus, in the case of means, the ranges can vary from figure to figure. However, unless explicitly noted, identical scales will be used in figures that are being compared to one another. Range of predispositional variables. Throughout the analysis, party attachment is coded from -2 (strong Republican) to -1 (weak or independent Republican) to +1 (weak or independent Democrat) to +2 strong Democrat, with all others assigned to the score of zero. In graphs that depict the effect of being a Republican or Democrat, partisans are simulated by scores of either —1.3 or + 1.3, as appropriate. The effects of other predispositional measures (such as equalitarianism, hawkishness) are simulated differently in different cases, depending on how many measures are available for use in a given model. For example, if only one measure is used in a model, the range may be ±2 SD for that variable; if three measures are used, their joint effect - that is, the effect of identical movements on all three variables - will be depicted over a smaller range. The exact values are provided in each case. The aim will be to approximate the raw data, insofar as the raw data can be directly observed.

Pull out U.S. forces entirely. Try harder to find a diplomatic solution. Tighten the economic embargo. Take tougher military action. All but the first of these o p t i o n s imply support for the basic United States policy of military involvement in the Persian Gulf. S i n c e , with the possible exception of the congressional Black C a u c u s , virtually all of B u s h ' s elite critics accepted this policy, we should expect to find that, a m o n g the p u b l i c , political

a w a r e n e s s is associated with g r e a t e r s u p p o r t for keeping U . S . forces in the G u l f - w h i c h is to say, greater levels of rejection of the " p u l l o u t " option in favor of o n e of t h e o t h e r three r e s p o n s e a l t e r n a t i v e s . T h i s e x p e c t a t i o n is c o n firmed in Figure 6 . 3 (see Table 6 . 3 , the c h a p t e r a p p e n d i x , for coefficients). E v e n within the g r o u p most resistant to using military action against Iraq black D e m o c r a t i c w o m e n - rejection of the pullout option rises from about 54 percent in the lowest a w a r e n e s s c a t e g o r y to about 92 percent in the highest

106

Mainstream

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

100 T

50

polarization

When Bush more conciliatory

Modal Republicans

75 Percent who favor option other than pulling out U.S. troops

and

effects

107

When Bush more threatening

100

Black Democratic women

Percent who ^ favor tougher military action 50 against Iraq

Modal Democrats

25

25 0 Political awareness Political awareness Figure 6.3. Support for keeping U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf. Estimates are derived from coefficients in Table 6.3. Source: 1990 NES survey. 8

c a t e g o r y . T h e trends in Figure 6 . 3 were about the s a m e throughout the period of the s u r v e y . It is difficult to be certain w h a t to expect from the three response o p t i o n s m o r e d i p l o m a c y , a tighter e m b a r g o , and t o u g h e r military action - that I have c o u n t e d as i m p l y i n g s u p p o r t for military involvement in t h e Gulf. Certainly, D e m o c r a t s en m a s s e wouid be e x p e c t e d to reject the c h o i c e of " t o u g h e r military a c t i o n , " since t h e D e m o c r a t i c p a r t y in C o n g r e s s w a s clearly identified with o p position to this idea. T h e p r o b l e m is that it is not c l e a r that R e p u b l i c a n s should be e x p e c t e d to e m b r a c e it. For B u s h ' s public position, especially in the early m o n t h s of the c r i s i s , w a s that an e m b a r g o , in c o m b i n a t i o n with skilled diplomacy, w o u l d m a k e it possible to avoid the use of force. In m i d - D e c e m b e r , however, the Bush administration rejected a proposed J a n u a r y 12th m e e t i n g in B a g h d a d on the g r o u n d s that it w a s t o o near the United N a t i o n s deadline for Iraqi w i t h d r a w a l from K u w a i t to be useful for averting military action. By that point, therefore, it w a s clear at least that willingness to use force w a s a key feature of Bush policy. O n e m i g h t therefore expect that at about that t i m e o p p o s i n g partisan g r o u p s in t h e public b e c a m e increasingly polarized over the q u e s t i o n of military force. 9

Figure 6 . 4 a p p e a r s to s u p p o r t this e x p e c t a t i o n . H i g h l y aware D e m o c r a t s and R e p u b l i c a n s were apparently m o r e polarized over the use of force after D e c e m b e r 15 than they had been before. D e s p i t e this, however, the increase in p o 8 In separate regressions for blacks and whites, political awareness is associated with rejection of the pull-out option at least as strongly among blacks as among whites. (In a simple linear regression of this question [scored 0-1] on political awareness, the intercept and slope for blacks are .55 and .047, respectively; for whites, the intercept and slope are .78 and .022, with all terms highly statistically significant; the range of political awareness is 0 through 13.) See Chapter 9 for additional discussion of the effects of elite opinion leadership on Afro-Americans. 9 Insofar as there was a time trend, it was toward less party polarization, but the trend did not approach either statistical or substantive significance.

Figure 6.4. Partisans become more polarized over time on use of military force. Estimates are derived from coefficients in Table 6.3. Source: 1990 NES survey. larization does not achieve statistical significance and must therefore be taken as equivocal s u p p o r t for my e x p e c t a t i o n (coefficients s h o w n in Table 6 . 3 ) . T h e key point here is that exposure to public affairs, as m e a s u r e d by tests of political a w a r e n e s s , has i m p o r t a n t effects on m a s s a t t i t u d e s , but that these effects differ across policies and across t i m e , d e p e n d i n g on the positions taken by political elites and reflected in the m a s s m e d i a . A w a r e n e s s is associated with s u p p o r t for those a s p e c t s of g o v e r n m e n t policy that have the consensual s u p p o r t of political and m e d i a e l i t e s , but is a s s o c i a t e d with higher levels of polarization over policies on which elites are d i v i d e d . 1 0

To d e m o n s t r a t e this point m o r e rigorously, I selected items from the 1972— 7 4 - 7 6 N E S survey that s e e m e d o n their face t o exemplify m a i n s t r e a m policies and p a r t i s a n policies of the early 1 9 7 0 s . " Table 6.1 c o n t a i n s a list of these items. S e l e c t i o n of t h e items w a s b a s e d on my j u d g m e n t of the positions of liberal and c o n s e r v a t i v e elites, political p a r t y elites, and the m a s s m e d i a at the t i m e of t h e N E S study. To confirm these j u d g m e n t s , I a s k e d a research assistant to read t h e platforms of the D e m o c r a t i c and Republican p a r t i e s in 1972, and to rate each p a r t y on each issue. T h e research assistant w a s u n a w a r e of my e x p e c tations and d i d the r a t i n g s on the basis of instructions that were conveyed in w r i t i n g . I expected that both p a r t i e s w o u l d explicitly e n d o r s e the policies I had identified as m a i n s t r e a m policies, and w o u l d take sharply o p p o s i n g positions on policies I had identified as p a r t i s a n policies. T h e s e e x p e c t a t i o n s were largely 1 2

10 In showing that the public became more polarized in its attitudes toward Vietnam and Persian Gulf policy, I have been, in effect, examining mass opinion change. The actual patterns of change occurring in these cases are, however, considerably more complicated than I have been able to demonstrate in this initial treatment. For further examination of opinion change on Vietnam, see Chapter 9; for a treatment of opinion change on Gulf war policy along the lines sketched in Chapter 7, see Zaller (1992). 11 I used the panel data because this test was part of a study to test the comparative ability of political knowledge, education, political interest, media exposure, and political participation to specify relationships that a good measure of political awareness should specify. It turned out that political knowledge outperformed all of the alternative measures (see Zaller, 1990). 12 The written instructions are available from the author upon request.

108

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

Mainstream

and

polarization

effects

109

T h e m o d e l used to e s t i m a t e the effect of a w a r e n e s s on each of these policy Table issues

6.1.

Question

stems for

opinions

on

mainstream

and partisan

items w a s as follows: Prob(Lib. Response) = Prob(Opinionation) x Prob(Lib. I Opinionation)

Mainstream issues This country would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world. Do you think that mainland China should be a member of the United Nations, or do you think it should not? Should farmers and businessmen be allowed to do business with Communist countries or should they be forbidden to do business with Communist countries? Should the government support the right of black people to go to any hotel or restaurant they can afford, or should it stay out of this matter? Recently there has been a lot of talk about women's rights. Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry, and government. Others feel that women's place is in the home. Partisan issues There is much discussion of the best way to deal with racial problems. Some people think achieving racial integration of schools is so important that it justifies busing children to schools out of their neighborhoods. Others think letting children go to their neighborhood schools is so important that they oppose busing. Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on their own. Do you think we did the right thing in getting into the fighting in Vietnam or should we have stayed out? Source: 1972 NES survey.

c o n f i r m e d . T h e o n e exception involved an item about w h e t h e r the federal gove r n m e n t should g u a r a n t e e blacks t h e right to equal treatment in hotels and restaurants. A provision on equal a c c o m m o d a t i o n s w a s a key p a r t of 1964 Civil Rights Act, w h i c h , S e n a t o r B a r r y G o l d w a t e r n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , passed the C o n gress with majority s u p p o r t from both the D e m o c r a t i c and Republican p a r t i e s . T h e D e m o c r a t i c platform, as I had e x p e c t e d , explicitly e n d o r s e d this policy, but the R e p u b l i c a n Party, although professing general s u p p o r t for equal r i g h t s , m a d e no direct reference to it. I c o n t i n u e , in light of the b i p a r t i s a n history of the Civil Rights Act and the fact that even S o u t h e r n opposition to it had collapsed by 1972, to c o n s i d e r equal a c c o m m o d a t i o n s in hotels and restaurants a m a i n s t r e a m government policy. 13

13 In addition to the items in Table 6.1,1 asked my research assistant to rate an item on whether the government should act against inflation. There was strong endorsement of this principle by both parties, but a ceiling effect on mass support for the policy prevented a test on the effect of political awareness on support for this idea.

T h a t i s , t h e probability of a liberal r e s p o n s e is the probability of offering any opinion at all, t i m e s t h e probability of m a k i n g a liberal r e s p o n s e , given that an opinion has b e e n offered. T h e t w o p a r t s of the m o d e l have been estim a t e d separately. T h e probability of a liberal o p i n i o n , given that an opinion s t a t e m e n t has been m a d e , h a s b e e n m o d e l e d as a logit function of a w a r e n e s s , ideological selfd e s i g n a t i o n , p a r t y identification, and standard d e m o g r a p h i c variables ( r a c e , a g e , i n c o m e , and r e s i d e n c e in a S o u t h e r n state). In addition to these v a r i a b l e s , the initial specification of each e q u a t i o n contained an interaction t e r m for A w a r e n e s s x Ideology and A w a r e n e s s X Party. T h i s e q u a t i o n w a s e s t i m a t e d separately for each of the five m a i n s t r e a m and three p a r t i s a n issues. To m a x i m i z e c o m p a r a b i l i t y of results across different item f o r m a t s , each item w a s coded to a three-point scale r u n n i n g from 0 to 0 . 5 to 1 . 0 . 14

15

T h e e x p e c t a t i o n from the m o d e l is that for p a r t i s a n policies, the t w o A w a r e ness x Values interaction t e r m s will be s t r o n g , but that for m a i n s t r e a m policies these interactions will be a n e m i c . T h e s e c o n d e x p e c t a t i o n is that awareness will have an i m p o r t a n t positive impact on s u p p o r t for m a i n s t r e a m policies. T h e first of these e x p e c t a t i o n s is largely c o n f i r m e d . T h e Ideology x A w a r e ness t e r m gets coefficients that are large for t h e three p a r t i s a n issues and trivial for t h e five m a i n s t r e a m issues, exactly as e x p e c t e d . T h e P a r t y x A w a r e n e s s t e r m b e h a v e s erratically, but its coefficients are either statistically insignificant or t o o small to have m u c h i m p a c t , thus leaving the ideology interaction t e r m to d o m i n a t e the results. Let us l o o k first at results for t h e three p a r t i s a n issues. T h e coefficients for the three p a r t i s a n issues are s h o w n in the left-hand side of Table 6 . 2 , and a graphical analysis of these coefficients is s h o w n in the top half 14 The question asked respondents to place themselves on a seven-point scale that ran from "extremely liberal" to "liberal" to "slightly liberal" to "moderate, middle of the road" to "extremely conservative." The question was asked in all three waves of the survey, and in the test reported below, responses over all three waves were averaged. People who gave no opinion in one year were assigned their average for the other two years; people who gave a response in only one year were assigned their response from that year. People who gave a no-opinion response all three times were assigned to the sample average. This way of including respondents with missing data would be expected to produce differences in item reliabilities across different respondents, but since this difference is constant across all dependent variables, and since the key hypothesis involves differences in the effect of ideology across different items, it would not be expected to produce biased results. Omitting respondents with any missing data would, on the other hand, undermine ability to detect the effect of awareness on support for mainstream policies, since the people omitted would be mainly less-informed persons. 15 When the original item was an agree/disagree item, "in between" responses were coded to .5 and other responses were coded zero or one. The jobs and women's rights items were originally seven-point scales; 4 was coded to .5 and the other points were coded to zero or one. Busing was also originally a seven-point scale, but it was so skewed in the antibusing direction that it was necessary to transform it; the far conservative position, which contained 68 percent of all respondents, was coded to zero, the next most conservative position was coded to .5, and the remaining five scale points were coded to one.

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TABLE

6.2.

Coefficient

estimates for

Partisan issues Job Vietnam School guarantee war busing

partisan

Equal accom.

and

mainstream

issues

Mainstream issues W o m e n ' s China Comm. rights in UN trade

Direction of response function? -1.99 Intercept Awareness (standardized)-0.84* Ideology (7-point scale) 0.37*

-0.57 -0.71* 0.27*

-3.52 -0.71* 0.60*

Awareness X ideology Party (range +2 to - 2 ) )

0.18* 0.01

0.19* -.07

0.30* 0.07

b -0.09**

Awareness X party

0.06

0.01

-0.13**

0.13*

0.02

Opinionation Intercept Awareness

1.98 0.89*

2.70 0.62*

2.48 0.80*

2.64 0.99*

2.83 0.51*

0.62 0.26* 0.18*

-0.74 0.50* 0.33*

_ oj** 0.31*

Antiisolation

1.33 0.65* 0.13

0.40 0.73* 0.14

2.28 1.12* -0.11

b 0.01

b 0.01

-0.07 0.01

b

b

-0.06

2.68 1.32*

1.35 0.73*

5.01 1.58*

function

a

Coefficients are from logistic equation described in text. Estimation was by nonlinear least squares. Equations also included controls for race, age, South, and income; these coefficients are the same as those used, but not reported for reasons of space, in Zaller (1990). * Term omitted after F-test showed that coefficient had no statistical effect on equation; nonsignificant terms were omitted only when they caused severe multicollinearity; see text for further discussion. * Significant at .01 level. ** Significant at .05 level. Source: 1 9 7 2 - 7 4 - 7 6 NES panel survey.

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However, multicollinearity can greatly reduce the precision of e s t i m a t e s even w h e n the true effect of one of the collinear variables is z e r o . To test w h e t h e r the A w a r e n e s s x Value interaction t e r m s had any real effect on the mainstream policies, I r e e s t i m a t e d each e q u a t i o n without the interaction t e r m s and did an F-test to see if the omissions had a significant effect on the residual s u m of squares. For a n t i i s o l a t i o n i s m , w o m e n ' s r i g h t s , trade with c o m m u n i s t n a t i o n s , and a d m i s s i o n of C h i n a to the United N a t i o n s , the /-"-test indicated that the interaction t e r m s did not c o n t r i b u t e significantly to the fit of the m o d e l . Moreover, with the interactions o m i t t e d , a w a r e n e s s t o o k on a statistically significant p o s itive coefficient in all four c a s e s , as e x p e c t e d . In the fifth c a s e , equal a c c o m m o d a t i o n s , the Party x A w a r e n e s s coefficient r e m a i n e d significant, but with the nonsignificant Ideology x A w a r e n e s s t e r m o m i t t e d , a w a r e n e s s had the e x p e c t e d positive effect on support for this m a i n s t r e a m race p o l i c y . 1 6

17

T h e r i g h t - h a n d side of Table 6 . 2 and t h e bottom half of Figure 6 . 5 present the results for t h e m a i n s t r e a m issues. Two mainstream issues - antiisolationism and trade with c o m m u n i s t nations - are not s h o w n in Figure 6.5 but closely r e s e m ble the p a t t e r n for the item on admission of C h i n a to the United N a t i o n s , which is s h o w n in the figure. Of the five m a i n s t r e a m issues, only the w o m e n ' s role item raises any doubts about the p e r f o r m a n c e of the m o d e l . T h o u g h a w a r e n e s s d o e s , as e x p e c t e d , have a positive effect on s u p p o r t for g e n d e r equality, the effect on liberals in this interactive model is m o d e s t . Moreover, the effect of ideology is quite large, especially if, as I m a i n t a i n , elite m e s s a g e s consensually favored an equal role for w o m e n . O n e e x p l a n a t i o n for these results is that, despite the e n d o r s e m e n t of the t w o p a r t i e s in 1972, w o m e n ' s rights w a s not really a m a i n s t r e a m issue at that t i m e ; if s o , it is no p r o b l e m for t h e m o d e l , w h i c h takes elite c o n s e n s u s as an initial c o n d i t i o n . O t h e r e x p l a n a t i o n s , however, a p p e a r m o r e p l a u s i b l e . T h e m o d e s t slope for liberals, first of all, is the result of a ceiling effect a m o n g liberals. It w o u l d be h a r d to get very m u c h positive slope in view of the fact that s u p p o r t a m o n g l o w - a w a r e n e s s liberals starts out at 71 percent. W i t h respect to the large effect of ideology, recall that 1972 w a s near the h i g h w a t e r m a r k for radical femi n i s m , a v i e w p o i n t that had little m a s s s u p p o r t and may have had d e l e t e r i o u s spillover effects on s u p p o r t for equal rights for w o m e n ( M a n s b r i d g e , 1986). Recall also that the Republican Party, a l t h o u g h endorsing equal rights for w o m e n in 1972, w a s shortly to w i t h d r a w its s u p p o r t for the Equal Rights A m m e n d m e n t . All this m a k e s the w o m e n ' s role issue a p a r t i c u l a r l y tough test of the m a i n s t r e a m hypothesis. A n d yet the hypothesis is, in the e n d , upheld in the sense that there is an i m p o r t a n t positive effect for a w a r e n e s s . Altogether, t h e n , the m a i n s t r e a m results, along with those for the three partisan issues, s u p p o r t the t w o basic d e d u c t i o n s of the m o d e l : In cases of elite 16 See Hanushek and Jackson, 1977: pp. 231-3; Rao and Miller, 1971: ch. 3. 17 It is not permissible to do a parallel test omitting the direct awareness term, since awareness must be in the equation if awareness X ideology is included.

Mainstream

and

polarization

113

effects

c o n s e n s u s , political awareness leads to increased s u p p o r t for the m a i n s t r e a m policy, and in cases of elite division, political awareness leads to increased p o larization a m o n g g r o u p s having o p p o s e d value o r i e n t a t i o n s . 18

A T T I T U D E C O N S T R A I N T AND MASS B E L I E F SYSTEMS An extensive research literature h a s d o c u m e n t e d that people w h o are liberal (or c o n s e r v a t i v e ) on o n e issue tend to be relatively liberal (or c o n s e r v a t i v e ) on a r a n g e of o t h e r issues. T h i s t e n d e n c y is most c o m m o n l y explained by m e a n s of the concept of " a t t i t u d e c o n s t r a i n t , " w h i c h implies that o n e sort of attitude (ideological o r i e n t a t i o n ) constrains other attitudes (policy preferences), thereby linking a r a n g e of attitudes into a c o h e s i v e " b e l i e f s y s t e m . " T h e classic statement of this a r g u m e n t is Philip C o n v e r s e ' s famous paper, " T h e nature of belief systems in mass publics" ( 1 9 6 4 ) . As it h a p p e n s , the logic of the p o l a r i z a t i o n a r g u m e n t is i s o m o r p h i c with the logic of C o n v e r s e ' s account of attitude constraint in his 1964 paper. T h u s in explaining m a s s attitude p o l a r i z a t i o n o n p a r t i s a n issues, the R A S model h a s also explained attitude constraint. This point is easily d e m o n s t r a t e d . A c c o r d i n g to C o n v e r s e , ideologies originate a m o n g a " m i n u s c u l e " n u m b e r of " c r e a t i v e e l i t e s " and subsequently diffuse t h r o u g h t h e public. Elites, t h u s , are the source of m a s s ideologies. C o n verse a r g u e s , however, that the diffusion of elite-created belief s y s t e m s is highly imperfect. O n l y the politically a w a r e pay e n o u g h attention to elite discourse to find out the ideological implications of different policies - in C o n v e r s e ' s t e r m s , to learn " w h a t g o e s with w h a t . " As a result, attitude constraint of the c o n v e n tional l i b e r a l - c o n s e r v a t i v e t y p e develops mainly a m o n g the m o r e politically a w a r e strata. C o m p a r e this a r g u m e n t to the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e p o l a r i z a t i o n m o d e l in the upper half of Figure 6 . 5 : Highly a w a r e liberals and c o n s e r v a t i v e s (or D e m o crats and Republicans) look to a p p r o p r i a t e p a r t i s a n elites to find out " w h a t goes with w h a t . " H a v i n g acquired this i n f o r m a t i o n , they are able to b e c o m e consistently liberal or consistently c o n s e r v a t i v e across a r a n g e of issues. T h e less a w a r e , as s h o w n in Figure 6 . 5 , are less likely to acquire the attitude that is conventionally a p p r o p r i a t e to their p a r t i s a n o r i e n t a t i o n , and h e n c e less likely to d e velop " a t t i t u d e c o n s t r a i n t " across issues. T h e well-established finding of belief s y s t e m s studies - that average interitem c o r r e l a t i o n s a m o n g issues are higher 1 9

18 Mainstream norms are determined not by what all elites actually believe, but by what the elites who have regular access to the public say in their public utterances. If, for example, there were many Southern elected officials who continued to oppose equal accommodations for blacks in 1972 but who had no access to the media to express this view, and if, on the other hand, supporters of equal accommodations had good access to the mass media to publicize their side of the issue, then equal accommodations would be classified as a mainstream norm. The elites who count as shapers of public opinion in this model are those who have or control access to the mass media. 19 For the most recent work and bibliographies of the vast literature in this area, see Wyckoff (1987) and Jacoby (1991).

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N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

Mainstream

a m o n g m o r e a w a r e citizens - is j u s t a generalization of this pattern to a cluster of ideologically c h a r g e d issues ( s e e , for e x a m p l e , S t i m s o n , 1975; Jacoby, 1 9 9 1 ) . T h u s the existence of attitude consistency across issues, and the welld o c u m e n t e d t e n d e n c y for consistency to b e c o m e stronger with increases in a w a r e n e s s , can both be explained by the R A S m o d e l (D27, D28). This account of attitude consistency does not, so far as I can tell, differ in any i m p o r t a n t way from C o n v e r s e ' s . It is simply a s o m e w h a t m o r e fully specified statement of his general a r g u m e n t . I shall have m o r e to say about attitude constraint in C h a p t e r 9, w h e r e I show h o w it d e v e l o p s and c h a n g e s in situations in which t h e flow of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s is not, as I have a s s u m e d it to be in this chapter, either stable over t i m e or evenly balanced b e t w e e n liberal and c o n s e r v a t i v e m e s s a g e s . 20

21

ALTERNATIVE

EXPLANATIONS

T h e r e are a l t e r n a t i v e explanations for the empirical regularities noted in this chapter, and it is instructive to r e v i e w t h e m , for they illustrate the fragmented state of the public opinion field of which I c o m p l a i n e d in t h e opening c h a p t e r For e x a m p l e , Cantril (1944) found that persons scoring high on a m e a s u r e of political k n o w l e d g e were m o r e likely to s u p p o r t A m e r i c a n involvement in W o r l d W a r I I , including n u m e r o u s p a r t i c u l a r policies of the Roosevelt a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , such as the foundation of a United N a t i o n s o r g a n i z a t i o n upon the defeat of the A x i s powers. Canti il s e x p l a n a t i o n for this p a t t e r n is that better informed A m e r i c a n s are likely to have a c o r r e c t u n d e r s t a n d i n g of their true interests. Stouffer (1954) argues that better e d u c a t e d persons are m o r e s u p p o r t i v e of civil liberties b e c a u s e they are more likely to give a " s o b e r s e c o n d t h o u g h t " to freed o m issues; A l l p o r t (1954: p. 405) cites the greater personal security of better e d u c a t e d persons as a possible explanation for their g r e a t e r racial liberalism; B o b o and Licari (1989) c o n t e n d that e d u c a t i o n p r o m o t e s political tolerance b e c a u s e it is associated with " m o r e sophisticated m o d e s of r e a s o n i n g " ; and 2 2

20 Lane (1973) and Marcus, Tabb, and Sullivan (1974), among many others, criticize Converse's belief-systems argument on the grounds that it overlooks idiosyncratic ways in which individuals may structure their attitudes, and that it arbitrarily equates ideological consistency with sophistication. My account accepts the first point, claiming, in effect, that political awareness drives a socialization process that overrides idiosyncratic attitude structures. My account does not, however, equate consistency with sophistication except in the possibly perverse sense that an ideologically "consistent" individual has managed to absorb a particular set of conventions. 21 Even critics of Converse's position find evidence that constraint varies by political awareness (see Wyckoff, 1987). Wyckoff concludes with an excellent analysis of the conditions under which attitude constraint is most likely to appear. 22 In their study of Political Tolerance and American Democracy, Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus (1981) maintain that better educated persons are not more tolerant, once dislike for the target group is controlled for. Two comments are in order here. The first is that the mainstream model would expect better educated people to be more tolerant only when a traditionally protected civil liberty is at stake - as in the case of freedom of political speech, which has been well protected by the Supreme Court in recent years. But the mainstream model would not predict education to be associated with support for civil liberties that have not achieved mainstream status, such as the right of members of a self-proclaimed terrorist group, like the Symbionese Liberation

and

polarization

effects

115

H a m i l t o n ( 1 9 6 8 ) and H a h n (1970) suggest that higher levels of s u p p o r t for the V i e t n a m W a r a m o n g e d u c a t e d persons may be d u e , as H a m i l t o n puts it, to " u p p e r - m i d d l e class a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m " (p. 4 4 6 ) . E a c h of these a r g u m e n t s is perhaps plausible on its face, but n o n e generalizes easily to other issues. T h e m o r e p a r s i m o n i o u s explanation o f the R A S m o d e l w o u l d b e that better e d u c a t e d and o t h e r w i s e m o r e politically aware p e r s o n s have been in each c a s e m o r e heavily e x p o s e d to m a i n s t r e a m elite values. ( A l t h o u g h the w o r k n e c e s s a r y to e s tablish the existence of m a i n s t r e a m n o r m s in s o m e of these c a s e s has not been d o n e , I believe it could b e . ) In a careful p i e c e of w o r k , J a c k m a n (1978) notes that e d u c a t i o n is associated with liberalism on s o m e race items (such as " s t r i c t s e g r e g a t i o n " of t h e races) but not on others (such as b u s i n g ) . She c o n c l u d e s from this that, c o n t r a r y to m u c h past r e s e a r c h , e d u c a t i o n p r o m o t e s only " s u p e r f i c i a l " l e a r n i n g o f d e m o cratic values r a t h e r than g e n u i n e c o m m i t m e n t t o t h e m . T h e a l t e r n a t i v e a r g u m e n t of the R A S m o d e l , of c o u r s e , w o u l d be that the first type of item taps a mainstream policy and the s e c o n d a p a r t i s a n p o l i c y . T h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f the R A S m o d e l , w h i c h follows from K e y ' s o b s e r v a t i o n o n the " i n d o c t r i n a t i n g e f f e c t " of e x p o s u r e to elite d i s c o u r s e , is preferable in each of these cases b e c a u s e it is e m b e d d e d in a theory having a w i d e r r a n g e of a p plications. In particular, it can explain why awareness h a s a polarizing effect in s o m e c a s e s and a m a i n s t r e a m effect in o t h e r s , even w h e n the substantive issue domain is the s a m e . T h e r e also exist a l t e r n a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s for attitude constraint. M o s t stress the internal sources of constraint - that is, s c h e m a t i c a s s o c i a t i o n s that d e v e l o p within the m i n d as a result of t h o u g h t about the p a r t i c u l a r issues. T h e s e explan a t i o n s also stress that m o r e politically aware persons (often described as p o litical " e x p e r t s " ) are m o r e ideologically consistent than are less aware persons 23

2 4

Army, to teach in the public schools. In looking for a global effect of education, Sullivan et al. fail to distinguish between cases in which the mainstream model would expect to find educationally induced tolerance and cases in which it would not. (From table 5.2 of Sullivan et al., it appears that the effect of education on tolerance is large in the case of free speech for one's most disliked group, but that the effect of education is nonexistent when it comes to being "pleased" at having one's child date a member of one's least liked group; it may be that citizens in a democracy ought, in some sense, to be tolerant of having their children date members of their least liked political group, but nothing in the mainstream model would predict that better educated people would be more likely to be so pleased than less well-educated ones.) Second, even if the better educated people are more tolerant in part because they are less frightened of certain groups, which appears to be the case, the support they give to mainstream civil liberties remains politically significant. It is, moreover, quite possible that learning to discount one's fears of radical groups is simply another element of mainstream civil liberties norms that is better learned by better educated persons. For example, learning to discount one's irrational fears of domestic communism seems to have been a principal "mainstream" lesson of the so-called McCarthyism period. 23 For a critique of Jackman that uses different conceptual machinery to reach essentially the same conclusion, see chapter 4 of Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock, 1991. 24 The fact that, as Duch and Gibson (n.d.) point out, the effect of education on tolerance varies substantially from one nation to another is further reason to believe that it measures differences in socialization rather than differences in cognitive capacity or psychological adjustment.

116

Mainstream

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

(novices) b e c a u s e they think m o r e about politics (Fiske and Kinder, 1981; J u d d and K r o s n i c k , 1989). T h o u g h a p p r o a c h i n g the p r o b l e m quite differently, L u s k i n ' s (1987) treatment of the relationship between attitude constraint and p o litical sophistication likewise stresses c o n n e c t i o n s b e t w e e n i d e a - e l e m e n t s within a person's mind. T h o u g h not denying the i m p o r t a n c e of intrapsychic c o n n e c t i o n s and t h e ind i v i d u a l ' s o w n thought in developing t h e m , the R A S m o d e l m a n a g e s to explain attitude consistency without referring to such mental o r g a n i z a t i o n . It instead stresses the extrapsychic or external sources of constraint, n a m e l y the p a t t e r n of elite division or nondivision on the given issue. In m a i n t a i n i n g this external foc u s , the R A S m o d e l is able to explain the quite different effects that awareness has in different c o n t e x t s , as in Figures 6.1 and 6 . 5 . A l s o , the R A S m o d e l can better explain p h e n o m e n a , including r a n d o m response variation and r e s p o n s e effects, that affect novices and e x p e r t s alike. Finally, the present m o d e l , as s h o w n in the next four c h a p t e r s , adds a d y n a m i c e l e m e n t to o u r understanding of h o w a w a r e n e s s (or expertise) affects attitude s t a t e m e n t s , n a m e l y an account of attitude c h a n g e . APPENDIX Table

6.3.

Coefficients for

Intercept Awareness (standardized) Party (range -2 to +2) Party x awareness Time

0

Gender (female = 1, else 0) Race (black = l . e l s e O ) Ethnicity (Jewish = 1, else 0)

Gulf War

Right to send troops -0.02 -0.24 (.17) 0.09 (.14)

Reject pullout of troops -2.19 -0.73 (.09)

-0.03 (.14) -0.18 (.19) -.60 (.13) 1.04 (.20) 0.19 (49)

0.12 (.07)

0.28 (.07)

_ -0.35 (•16) 0.69 (.17) -0.15 (.63)

opinion Tougher military action 1.33 0.13 (.07) 0.19 (-06) 0.06 (.06) -0.42 (.19) -0.81 (.14) 0.84 (.25) -0.27 (.49)

Time x party X awareness

0.15* (.15)

Time X party

0.23* (.15)

—

-0.05 (.15)

Time x awareness

-0.18* (.19) 1976

-

-0.12 (.21) 1987

N

-0.12 (.17)

1987

and

polarization

effects

Notes to Table 6.3 Note: Cell entries are coefficients from ML estimation of logistic regression model, with standard errors shown in parentheses. First dependent variable is whether the U.S. did the right thing in sending troops to the Persian Gulf (0-1); the second is whether U.S. should pursue some policy other than a pullout of troops from the gulf region; the third is whether the United States should take tougher military action against Iraq. For the "right thing" question, time is coded 0 in the period through November 9, when congressional criticism of American involvement began, and 1 afterward. For the "tougher military action" question, time is coded 0 in the period through December 15, at which time President Bush rejected an Iraqi meeting proposal, thereby signaling clear intent to enforce a January 15 pullout deadline, and 1 afterward. Block of three coefficients is statistically significant on F-test at p < . 0 1 . a

b

Source: 1990 NES survey.

Basic

7

Basic processes of "attitude change"

Within the R A S m o d e l , " a t t i t u d e s , " in t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l sense of t h e t e r m , do not exist. Rather, p e o p l e m a k e " a t t i t u d e r e p o r t s " o r " s u r v e y r e s p o n s e s " o n the basis of m o m e n t a r i l y salient c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . A t t i t u d e c h a n g e , t h e n , cannot be und e r s t o o d within the R A S model as a conversion e x p e r i e n c e , the replacement of one crystallized opinion structure by another. It must instead be u n d e r s t o o d as a c h a n g e in t h e b a l a n c e of positive a n d n e g a t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s relating to a given issue. To m o d e l it, one must represent the process by which new c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are a d d e d to t h e pool of existing c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in the p e r s o n ' s m i n d , thereby p e r m a n e n t l y altering l o n g - t e r m r e s p o n s e probabilities on the issue. Permanent alterations in long-term response probabilities are the R A S m o d e l ' s equivalent of attitude c h a n g e . Since this p h r a s e is a c u m b e r s o m e o n e , my discussion of t h e p h e n o m e n o n will retain the m o r e s t a n d a r d locution, attitude c h a n g e . However, the r e a d e r s h o u l d k e e p in m i n d that I am using it as a p h r a s e of c o n v e n i e n c e , and am actually referring to an alteration in l o n g - t e r m response probabilities that has been brought about by the acquisition of n e w c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Attitude c h a n g e , u n d e r s t o o d in this way, m a k e s an e n o r m o u s l y m o r e interesting subject of study than cross-sectional opinion. W h e n a d e q u a t e opinion d a t a are available, as they are in a handful of c a s e s , the analyst is no longer forced to infer a d y n a m i c process from a static distribution of o p i n i o n , as w a s d o n e in C h a p t e r 6, but can directly o b s e r v e the processes that are shaping opinion. T h i s p e r m i t s a m o r e c h a l l e n g i n g and s t i m u l a t i n g test of t h e R A S m o d e l t h a n has been possible so far. It will, in particular, enable us to see in detail w h e t h e r the effects of e x p o s u r e to streams of o p p o s i n g information f l o w s , a r e , as c l a i m e d , major forces in shaping m a s s attitudes. T h i s c h a p t e r deals with the basics of attitude c h a n g e , including s o m e initial tests of t h e a r g u m e n t . M o r e d e m a n d i n g and revealing tests of t h e m o d e l a p p e a r in later chapters. A l t h o u g h I will c o n t i n u e to use the R A S m o d e l in this c h a p t e r to d e d u c e e x p e c t e d p a t t e r n s in the d a t a , the d e d u c t i o n s will be fewer and easier to keep track of. H e n c e , I will c e a s e n u m b e r i n g t h e m as in e a r l i e r c h a p t e r s . MODELING ATTITUDE CHANGE T h e defining a x i o m s o f t h e R A S m o d e l have strong implications for h o w attitude c h a n g e , as just defined, may be expected to occur. To d e v e l o p these implications, we return to the fundamentals of the m o d e l .

processes

of

"attitude

change'

119

S u p p o s e t h a t , after s o m e interval of t i m e , public opinion on a certain issue has c h a n g e d . F r o m the p e r s p e c t i v e o f the R A S m o d e l , such c h a n g e can only h a v e o c c u r r e d b e c a u s e the relative salience of liberal and c o n s e r v a t i v e c o n s i d erations in p e o p l e ' s m i n d s is different from w h a t it w a s previously; t h i s , in t u r n , m a y have c o m e about by o n e of only t w o routes. T h e first is that recent events or i n f o r m a t i o n m a y have increased t h e salience of preexisting liberal or c o n s e r v a t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , thereby bringing about c h a n g e s in p e o p l e ' s attitude r e p o r t s , as discussed u n d e r the r u b r i c of salience effects in C h a p t e r 5. A l t h o u g h salience effects m a y persist for any period of t i m e , d e p e n d i n g on how long the events or information c a u s i n g t h e m remain c u r r e n t , t h e y involve no c h a n g e s in p e o p l e ' s feelings t o w a r d the issue itself and h e n c e do not fit the definition of attitude c h a n g e . Salience effects that persist m a y b e m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e l y described a s " m o o d c h a n g e s . " M o o d c h a n g e s m a y b e difficult t o distinguish e m p i r i c a l l y from attitude c h a n g e , except in a laboratory e x p e r i m e n t that alters a p e r s o n ' s general state of mind without e x p o s i n g h e r to any new ideas. N o n e t h e l e s s , I conjecture that the w e l l - k n o w n presidential " r a l l y - r o u n d - t h e - f l a g e f f e c t s , " w h e r e b y the j o b perform a n c e r a t i n g s of U . S . presidents shoot up in t i m e s of international crisis ( M u e l ler, 1973; B r o d y , 1991), m a y be p a r t i a l l y d u e to m o o d shifts in t h e p u b l i c . T h a t is, the public m a y lay greater stress on the p r e s i d e n t ' s leadership function in t i m e s of threat, and evaluate h i m differently even t h o u g h the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s und e r l y i n g t h e e v a l u a t i o n s a r e u n c h a n g e d . However, I stress that shifts in the national m o o d can b e , at m o s t , only a partial explanation for rally effects, since, as B r o d y (1991) h a s s h o w n , t h e t i m i n g and m a g n i t u d e of rallies is d e p e n d e n t on the extent to which other political elites support the president in t i m e of crisis. O w i n g to t h e lack of d a t a , I shall have nothing further to say about m o o d effects in this study. T h e other way in which the R A S m o d e l allows c h a n g e s in the p u b l i c ' s res p o n s e to an issue is as follows: S o m e m e m b e r s of t h e public have been e x p o s e d to p e r s u a s i v e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n d a c c e p t e d t h e m as c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , thereby altering the b a l a n c e of liberal and c o n s e r v a t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in their minds and h e n c e their l o n g - t e r m r e s p o n s e probabilities. T h i s t y p e of c h a n g e fits the definition of attitude c h a n g e , as given a m o m e n t a g o . Attitude c h a n g e , t h u s , d e p e n d s on a t w o - s t e p process involving reception of new ideas and acceptance of s o m e as n e w c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , thereby altering t h e b a l a n c e of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in people's minds. Note that p e o p l e may form both n e w liberal and new c o n s e r v a t i v e considera t i o n s d u r i n g a p e r i o d of attitude c h a n g e . All that is logically required for attitude c h a n g e to o c c u r is that, if overall opinion h a s m o v e d , say, in a c o n s e r v a t i v e d i r e c t i o n , t h e relative prevalence of c o n s e r v a t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in p e o p l e ' s m i n d s h a s increased. If, as o u g h t n o r m a l l y to be the c a s e , the initially existing balance of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s reflects the balance of c o m p e t i n g c o n s e r v a t i v e and liberal m e s s a g e s in t h e p r e c e d i n g p e r i o d , t h e relative p r e v a l e n c e of c o n s e r v a t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s will increase if the relative intensity of the c o n s e r v a t i v e m e s s a g e has increased.

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Basic

To take an e x a m p l e : S u p p o s e t h a t , e v e r y w e e k , t h e n e w s m e d i a broadcast n i n e liberal stories on a given issue and o n e c o n s e r v a t i v e story, e a c h having equal p r o m i n e n c e and credibility. T h e n s u p p o s e the m e d i a begin broadcasting eight liberal and two c o n s e r v a t i v e m e s s a g e s every w e e k . T h i s w o u l d count as a gain in the relative intensity of the c o n s e r v a t i v e m e s s a g e and w o u l d create a m o v e ment of opinion in the c o n s e r v a t i v e direction. It is helpful at this point to d r o p references to liberal and c o n s e r v a t i v e m e s sages a n d to recast the a r g u m e n t in t e r m s of d o m i n a n t and countervailing m e s sages. T h u s , t h e m e s s a g e that is m o r e intense d u r i n g the period of attitude c h a n g e is defined as t h e dominant m e s s a g e , and t h e less intense m e s s a g e is t h e countervailing m e s s a g e . O p i n i o n c h a n g e m a y s o m e t i m e s o c c u r in t h e direction of t h e c o u n t e r v a i l i n g , or less i n t e n s e , m e s s a g e if t h e less intense m e s s a g e , t h o u g h r e m a i n i n g less intense, has n o n e t h e l e s s gained in relative intensity ( a s in the e x a m p l e in the p r e c e d i n g p a r a g r a p h ) . Most often, however, opinion c h a n g e probably r u n s in the direction of the m o r e intense or d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e . Let us say that the probability a given individual will express s u p p o r t for the d o m i n a n t position at t i m e 1 i s ' D, Ci

+

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F r o m E q u a t i o n 7 . 1 , we can see that t h e incidence of attitude c h a n g e in r e s p o n s e t o d o m i n a n t and countervailing m e s s a g e s d e p e n d s o n four q u a n t i t i e s : C , , D , , C , and D . 2

2

In b e g i n n i n g to think about the incidence of attitude c h a n g e , it is useful to focus on resistance to c h a n g e in t h e direction of a d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e , given e x p o s u r e t o d o m i n a n t and c o u n t e r v a l e n t m e s s a g e s . S u c h resistance can take three f o r m s , w h i c h I will d e s c r i b e as p a r t i s a n r e s i s t a n c e , inertial r e s i s t a n c e , and c o u n t e r v a l e n t resistance. E a c h d e p e n d s on o n e or m o r e of t h e t e r m s in Equation 7 . 1 , a s follows: Partisan resistance. Individuals may refuse to internalize n e w d o m i n a n t m e s sages that they r e c o g n i z e as inconsistent with their u n d e r l y i n g p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s , w h e r e such recognition d e p e n d s (via a x i o m s A 1 - A 3 ) o n t h e possession and a c cessibility of contextual information from a relevant c u e i n g m e s s a g e . By rejecting d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e s , p e r s o n s e n s u r e that D is a small n u m b e r or p e r h a p s z e r o , w h i c h r e d u c e s c h a n g e in the direction of t h e d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e . B e c a u s e such outright rejection of t h e d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e is r o o t e d in a p e r s o n ' s predisp o s i t i o n s , I refer to it as predispositional or p a r t i s a n r e s i s t a n c e . 2

D,

w h e r e C , a n d D , are t h e n u m b e r o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n t h e p e r s o n ' s m i n d initially favoring t h e countervailing a n d d o m i n a n t p o s i t i o n s , respectively. So if s o m e individual has three d o m i n a n t and t w o c o u n t e r v a l e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , and if she responds to survey q u e s t i o n s on the basis of the first c o n s i d e r a t i o n that c o m e s to m i n d , the probability of stating a d o m i n a n t opinion is 3 / (3 + 2) = . 6 .

Inertial

O v e r the next t i m e p e r i o d , persons may, in response to the political c o m m u nications they encounter, form n e w c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . N e w c o n s i d e r a t i o n s favoring the d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e will b e d e s i g n a t e d D , and n e w c o n s i d e r a t i o n s favoring t h e c o u n t e r v a i l i n g position will b e C . G i v e n t h i s , c h a n g e i n l o n g - t e r m r e s p o n s e probability - that i s , " a t t i t u d e c h a n g e " - can be specified as t h e difference b e t w e e n t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n s favoring t h e d o m i n a n t position a t t i m e 2 , and t h e p r o p o r t i o n favoring this position at t i m e 1, as follows.-

to p e r s u a s i o n .

2

2

(D\

+ D) 2

C h a n g e in response probability = D C, + D ,

(7.1)

This e q u a t i o n , w h i c h simply c l a i m s that c h a n g e s in l o n g - t e r m r e s p o n s e p r o b abilities d e p e n d on c h a n g e s in the mix of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s relating to an issue, is the foundation for all of this s t u d y ' s subsequent investigation of attitude c h a n g e . 1 Again, I assume that individuals respond on the basis of the first consideration that comes to mind, and also that some consideration always comes to mind - that is, people do not respond "no opinion."

resistance.

Individuals,

especially

well-informed

ones,

may

possess

large stores of preexisting c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , C, and D , , so that even if s o m e n e w c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , D , are internalized, their effects will b e s w a m p e d b y t h e effects 2

of previously f o r m e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . B e c a u s e this form of resistance d e p e n d s on t h e inertial m a s s of preexisting c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , I refer to it as inertial resistance

Countervalent

resistance.

Individuals

may

internalize

countervalent consider-

a t i o n s , C , d u r i n g the p e r i o d of attitude c h a n g e . T h e effect of these consider2

ations in c o u n t e r a c t i n g newly f o r m e d d o m i n a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s is w h a t I call countervalent resistance. It follows from the logic of the R A S m o d e l that t h e incidence of each type of resistance is likely to increase with increasing levels of political a w a r e n e s s . To see why this is s o , we can c o n s i d e r the e x a m p l e of how liberals w o u l d be affected by a d o m i n a n t c o n s e r v a t i v e m e s s a g e and a c o u n t e r v a i l i n g liberal m e s s a g e . O b v i o u s l y , liberals will be m o r e likely than c o n s e r v a t i v e s to reject the d o m inant c o n s e r v a t i v e m e s s a g e - if they p o s s e s s the contextual information that enables t h e m to r e c o g n i z e it as inconsistent with their predispositions. B e c a u s e m o r e a w a r e liberals will, b y t h e R e c e p t i o n A x i o m , b e m o r e likely t o possess the contextual information n e c e s s a r y to achieve such r e c o g n i t i o n , they will be more likely to reject t h e d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e s w h i c h they r e c e i v e , thereby exhibiting g r e a t e r partisan resistance than less a w a r e liberals. T h e m o s t politically a w a r e liberals will also tend to have the largest stores of existing liberal c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , thereby m a k i n g t h e m most likely to exhibit

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inertial resistance. T h e reason is that, as highly a w a r e p e r s o n s , they will h a v e been m o r e heavily e x p o s e d to liberal m e s s a g e s previously, a n d , as liberals, they will likely have internalized many of t h e m as c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Finally, highly aware liberals will be most heavily e x p o s e d to the countervailing liberal m e s s a g e d u r i n g the period of attitude c h a n g e a n d , as liberals, they will be likely to accept it. H e n c e they will be most likely to internalize new liberal c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , thereby exhibiting countervalent resistance to c h a n g e . Note t h a t , in this e x a m p l e a n d t h r o u g h o u t my discussion of attitude c h a n g e , resistance to c h a n g e m e a n s resistance to c h a n g e in l o n g - t e r m r e s p o n s e p r o b a bilities. T h u s , the highly aware m a y internalize s o m e c o n s e r v a t i v e m e s s a g e s but yet, b e c a u s e they also form s o m e n e w c o u n t e r v a l e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s or exhibit inertial r e s i s t a n c e , remain u n c h a n g e d in their l o n g - t e r m probability of giving a conservative response. M o r e generally, resistance to a d o m i n a n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n flow can take quite different forms. People m a y resist either by rejecting u n c o n g e n i a l m e s s a g e s at the point of e n c o u n t e r i n g t h e m , or, if s o m e a r e a c c e p t e d , by counteracting the effects of the d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e s by m e a n s of c o u n t e r v a l e n t and inertial considerations. Since each of t h e three forms of resistance to persuasion p r o d u c e s distinctive effects, it will be possible to d e m o n s t r a t e that each m a k e s an independent contribution to resistance to attitude c h a n g e . C h a p t e r s 8 through 10 d e v e l o p the evidence of t h e s e i n d e p e n d e n resistance effects. T h i s chapter, however, takes a different tack. It will d e v e l o p a m o d e l of attitude c h a n g e that m a k e s no direct reference to any of t h e three resistance m e c h a n i s m s , and no direct reference to c o u n t e r v a l e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . It will b e , therefore, a " o n e - m e s s a g e " m o d e l of attitude c h a n g e , w h e r e the one m e s s a g e is the one that is gaining in relative intensity and thereby bringing about attitude c h a n g e . T h e o n e - m e s s a g e m o d e l will serve to introduce the reader to the c o m p l e x patterns of attitude c h a n g e that can be e x p e c t e d within the R A S m o d e l ; it will also be capable of functioning as a sort of " r e d u c e d f o r m " m o d e l of attitude c h a n g e in the majority of situations in w h i c h t h e d a t a n e c e s s a r y to o b s e r v e t h e independent effects of inertial, c o u n t e r v a l e n t , and p a r t i s a n resistance are unavailable. A R E C E P T I O N - A C C E P T A N C E MODEL OF A T T I T U D E C H A N G E F r o m t h e p r e c e d i n g discussion, attitude c h a n g e r e q u i r e s , at a m i n i m u m , r e c e p tion and a c c e p t a n c e of o n e or m o r e n e w c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Accordingly, I will represent attitude c h a n g e as the o u t c o m e of the following probabilistic r e c e p t i o n acceptance process: Prob(Change) = Prob(Reception) x Prob(Acceptance I Reception)

(7.2)

where Prob(Change) = probability of change in long-term response probability Prob(Reception) = probability of reception of a change-inducing message; by reception is meant that the person has been exposed to and comprehended the message

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Prob(Acceptance I Reception) = probability of accepting (or internalizing) the message, given reception T h u s if, for e x a m p l e , an individual h a s a .5 probability of receiving a m e s s a g e and a .5 probability of a c c e p t i n g it (having received it), his probability of attitude c h a n g e , a c c o r d i n g to this m o d e l , is simply the product of these reception and a c c e p t a n c e p r o b a b i l i t i e s , that is, .5 x .5 = . 2 5 . As is o b v i o u s , this formulation of the attitude c h a n g e process omits any reference to " c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , " which cannot be easily m e a s u r e d in most attitude c h a n g e s i t u a t i o n s , and refers instead to the probability of c h a n g e in a p e r s o n ' s s u m m a r y attitude r e p o r t . It also o m i t s any reference to c o u n t e r v a l e n t m e s s a g e s , even t h o u g h they will often be present in attitude c h a n g e situations. T h e s e are significant simplifications. Yet, E q u a t i o n 7 . 2 does depict a r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e p r o c e s s , as required by the R A S m o d e l , and the e q u a t i o n c a n , as we shall see, be filled out in a way that implicitly a c c o m m o d a t e s the effects of both c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a n d c o u n t e r v a l e n t m e s s a g e s o n the incidence o f attitude c h a n g e . Let us begin filling out E q u a t i o n 7.2 by m o r e fully specifying the reception and a c c e p t a n c e functions that jointly constitute it. F r o m previous c h a p t e r s , we k n o w that the probability of reception of c h a n g e - i n d u c i n g m e s s a g e s is positively a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a p e r s o n ' s level of general political a w a r e n e s s . T h u s we can stipulate that P r o b ( R e c e p t i o n ) in E q u a t i o n 7.2 is an increasing (positive) function of political awareness. W i t h respect to the a c c e p t a n c e function in E q u a t i o n 7 . 2 , we k n o w from the previous s e c t i o n that - o w i n g to their g r e a t e r attention to c u e i n g m e s s a g e s , their larger stores of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and their greater exposure to countervalent m e s sages - m o r e a w a r e persons are relatively m o r e resistant to the effects of d o m inant m e s s a g e s that are inconsistent with their predispositions. We can therefore use a w a r e n e s s , a m e a s u r e d v a r i a b l e , to capture t h e effects of t h e s e three difficult-to-observe resistance m e c h a n i s m s . M o r e specifically, we can specify an a c c e p t a n c e function for E q u a t i o n 7 . 2 in which a c c e p t a n c e rates decline as a w a r e n e s s and ideological distance from the m e s s a g e jointly increase. Before c o m p l e t i n g specification of the reception and a c c e p t a n c e functions, it will be useful to p r o v i d e illustrations of t h e ideas d e v e l o p e d so far and to sketch their principal implications. C o n s i d e r the following hypothetical d a t a , which give probabilities of r e c e p t i o n , a c c e p t a n c e , and attitude c h a n g e for persons having different levels of political a w a r e n e s s : Attitude change in response to a hypothetical message Level of awareness Low Prob(Reception) Prob(Accept I Reception) Change (Reception x Acceptance)

.10 .90 .09

Middle .50 .50 . 25

High .90 .10 .09

In the first row, reception probabilities increase from .10 to .50 to .90 as political a w a r e n e s s increases from low to m i d d l e to h i g h . T h e s e n u m b e r s c a p t u r e t h e n o t i o n , central t o t h e R A S m o d e l , that reception increases w i t h awareness. I n

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the s e c o n d row, a c c e p t a n c e probabilities d e c r e a s e from . 9 0 to . 10 as awareness increases from low to h i g h . T h e s e hypothetical n u m b e r s capture the n o t i o n , d e veloped in t h e p r e c e d i n g s e c t i o n , that a c c e p t a n c e levels tend to decline with inc r e a s e s in a w a r e n e s s . T h e resulting c h a n g e probabilities, which are formed by m u l t i p l y i n g reception rates by a c c e p t a n c e rates within each c o l u m n , are shown in the third row. As can be s e e n , persons in the m i d d l e levels of awareness are most likely to e x p e r i e n c e attitude c h a n g e in this hypothetical c a s e . T h u s , the m o d e l implies that the relationship b e t w e e n awareness and attitude c h a n g e m a y be n o n m o n o t o n i c , that is, that p e r s o n s at m i d d l e levels of a w a r e n e s s may be most likely to c h a n g e . As w a s indicated in t h e brief discussion of c o n gressional e l e c t i o n s in C h a p t e r 2, and as m u c h m o r e e v i d e n c e will attest, nonm o n o t o n i c p a t t e r n s of attitude c h a n g e turn up with c o n s i d e r a b l e regularity in o p i n i o n d a t a . H e n c e , E q u a t i o n 7 . 2 , w i t h further e l a b o r a t i o n o f t h e r e c e p t i o n and a c c e p t a n c e functions, will be central to t h e explanation of attitude c h a n g e over t h e next four c h a p t e r s . It must i m m e d i a t e l y be a d d e d , however, that attitude c h a n g e does not always c o n f o r m to a n o n m o n o t o n i c p a t t e r n . M a r k e d l y different p a t t e r n s of c h a n g e are e x p e c t e d , d e p e n d i n g on how various message-level and individual-level factors interact. T h u s , a nonmonotonic pattern of attitude change is simply one special case among many possibilities. T h e s e different possibilities do not occur at rand o m but a d h e r e to a definite theoretical m o d e l . T h i s point is best m a d e by rev i e w i n g the w o r k of William M c G u i r e ( 1 9 6 8 , 1969), t h e social psychologist w h o first p r o p o s e d a r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l of attitude c h a n g e h a v i n g t h e form of E q u a t i o n 7 . 2 .

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tance of the c o m m u n i c a t i o n s which one has received, one could a r g u e that p e o ple possessing little self-esteem tend to yield uncritically to w h a t e v e r c o m m u nications they h a p p e n to encounter. H a v i n g thus posited that self-esteem h a s a positive relationship with reception and a n e g a t i v e relationship with a c c e p t a n c e , M c G u i r e proposed t h e logic of t h e r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e p r o c e s s , as e m b o d i e d in E q u a t i o n 7 . 2 and illustrated in t h e hypothetical d a t a just e x a m i n e d , to explain why the e x p e c t e d relation b e t w e e n self-esteem and attitude c h a n g e is, u n d e r certain c o n d i t i o n s , n o n m o n o t o n i c . M c G u i r e goes o n , however, to show that E q u a t i o n 7 . 2 can account for a variety of other patterns of opinion c h a n g e . In fact, the great value of t h e r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e model proposed by M c G u i r e is that it e n a b l e s the analyst to explain results that s e e m at first to be contradictory. C o n s i d e r a typical " h a r d l e a r n i n g " s i t u a t i o n , which is defined as a situation in which the persuasive m e s sage is, for s o m e r e a s o n , difficult to receive. T h e factors m a k i n g for difficulty of reception might include b a c k g r o u n d n o i s e , the presence of d i s t r a c t i o n s , or t h e inherent difficulty of the m e s s a g e . A prototypical h a r d l e a r n i n g situation is a college lecture in physics. All physics students may be p r e s u m e d to have a h i g h disposition toward a c c e p t a n c e of the c o n t e n t s of the lecture, but only the most intelligent may be able to understand it. O n e can capture this situation by saying that e v e r y o n e h a s a 1.0 probability of a c c e p t i n g the contents of the physics lecture, given reception of it. But effective reception of the physics lecture will be positively c o r r e l a t e d with intelligence. W h e n we represent these ideas in a r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e t a b l e , like the one following, we find (in the b o t t o m row of t h e table) that the most intelligent students are most likely to u n d e r g o " a t t i t u d e c h a n g e " in response to the instructor's "persuasive argument."

PATTERNS OF ATTITUDE CHANGE M c G u i r e began with a p r o b l e m that had long vexed social p s y c h o l o g i s t s , namely the relation b e t w e e n personality and persuasibility. M c G u i r e noted that several personality traits - self-esteem, intelligence, and freedom from anxiety - had been shown to be associated with n o n m o n o t o n i c p a t t e r n s of attitude c h a n g e in e x p e r i m e n t a l studies of persuasion in laboratory settings. To explain this occurr e n c e , he suggested that these personality traits m i g h t be positively associated with reception of persuasive c o m m u n i c a t i o n s but negatively a s s o c i a t e d with disposition t o w a r d a c c e p t a n c e , given r e c e p t i o n . In t h e c a s e of t h e e x p e c t e d p o s itive r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n self-esteem and r e c e p t i o n , for e x a m p l e , o n e m i g h t a r g u e that high self-esteem is a s s o c i a t e d w i t h low need for e g o defense, greater capacity for focusing o n e ' s a t t e n t i o n , a n d lower levels of anxiety - all of w h i c h c o n d u c e t o w a r d a h i g h e r probability of reception of persuasive c o m m u n i c a t i o n . As r e g a r d s the e x p e c t e d n e g a t i v e relationship between self-esteem and a c c e p 2

3

2 McGuire's term for what I am calling acceptance was yielding. 3 For evidence that self-esteem is associated with exposure to political values in a nonlaboratory setting, see Sniderman, 1975.

Attitude change in a "hard learning" situation Levels of intelligence High Middle Low Prob(Reception) Prob(Accept 1 Reception) Change (Reception x Acceptance)

.10 1.0 .10

.20 1.0 .20

.30 1.0 .30

As will be seen below, there are also political situations in which m e s s a g e s h a v e so little intensity, or are so difficult to c o m p r e h e n d , t h a t , like s o m e physics lectures, they reach only the most a w a r e persons. In such c a s e s , w h i c h m i g h t also b e called " h a r d l e a r n i n g " s i t u a t i o n s , the most a w a r e persons are most likely to c h a n g e . A l t h o u g h generally resistant to p e r s u a s i o n , they are the only people w h o will have been effectively e x p o s e d to any n e w i n f o r m a t i o n . Now c o n s i d e r an entirely different kind of persuasion situation, an " e a s y l e a r n i n g " situation in which s o m e o n e stands in front of a large a u d i e n c e and repeats suggestively, " Y o u r head is m o v i n g back and forth, back and f o r t h . " W h a t m a k e s this an e a s y l e a r n i n g situation is that the persuasive m e s s a g e is so extremely s i m p l e and c l e a r that w e m a y a s s u m e that essentially e v e r y o n e , except

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Basic

perhaps the h a r d of h e a r i n g , receives it. To capture the d y n a m i c s of such an easy learning situation, we set e v e r y o n e ' s reception probability to 1.0. If, as s h o w n below, we a s s u m e that a c c e p t a n c e probabilities in this situation would be negatively c o r r e l a t e d with intelligence, and then c a r r y out the multiplication of rows in a c c o r d with the m o d e l , we find that p e o p l e with the least intelligence should be m o s t likely to begin swaying their heads back and forth. Attitude change in an "easy learning" situation Levels of intelligence Low Middle High Prob(Reception) Prob(Accept 1 Reception) Change (Reception x Acceptance)

1.0 .90

1.0 .50

1.0 .10

.90

.50

.10

M c G u i r e cites n u m e r o u s studies w h o s e results, t h o u g h o n c e apparently contradictory, m a k e sense w h e n interpreted in light of this m o d e l . For any individual trait v a r i a b l e that is positively c o r r e l a t e d w i t h reception of persuasive c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and negatively c o r r e l a t e d with likelihood of uncritically accepting t h e m , t h e relation between the trait and attitude c h a n g e can be positive, n e g a t i v e , or n o n m o n o t o n i c , d e p e n d i n g on w h e t h e r the persuasion situation stresses t h e capacity of subjects to receive the m e s s a g e (as in the educational or " h a r d l e a r n i n g " situations), their willingness to accept the m e s s a g e (as in the case of the easy but repetitious m e s s a g e ) , or both (which m a y s o m e t i m e s produce a n o n m o n o t o n i c pattern of c h a n g e ) . Political a w a r e n e s s , like the personality traits that M c G u i r e e x a m i n e d , would be e x p e c t e d to be positively c o r r e l a t e d with reception of persuasive c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n d negatively correlated with likelihood of uncritical a c c e p t a n c e . H e n c e , the relation between a w a r e n e s s and attitude c h a n g e m a y be p o s i t i v e , n e g a t i v e , or n o n m o n o t o n i c . In fact, w h o l e families of c u r v e s can be g e n e r a t e d in theory and m a t c h e d to actual d a t a , d e p e n d i n g on how an individual's p r e d i s p o sitions and a w a r e n e s s interact with p a r t i c u l a r m e s s a g e s . W h a t gives rise to families of c u r v e s , r a t h e r than a single c u r v e p a t t e r n , is that persuasive c o m m u n i c a t i o n s vary c o n t i n u o u s l y from very hard (or " l o w intens i t y " ) to very e a s y ( " h i g h i n t e n s i t y " ) , and as m e s s a g e intensity c h a n g e s , the shapes of the attitude c h a n g e curves g e n e r a t e d by the m e s s a g e s c h a n g e incrementally. Similarly, resistance to a m e s s a g e may differ incrementally in different g r o u p s , d e p e n d i n g on the fit b e t w e e n their p a r t i s a n s h i p and the p a r t i s a n coloration of the m e s s a g e source. T h i s w a s a type of factor that M c G u i r e did not c o n sider, but it can greatly affect the shape of the attitude c h a n g e c u r v e s that o n e observes. Let me offer s o m e illustrations. T h e following set of tables illustrates h o w p a t t e r n s of r e c e p t i o n and a c c e p t a n c e of a liberal message a m o n g three ideological g r o u p s - liberals, c e n t r i s t s , a n d c o n s e r v a t i v e s - m i g h t c o m e together to form a family of attitude c h a n g e c u r v e s :

processes

of

' 'attitude

127

change'

Attitude change in response to a liberal message within three ideological groups Level of awareness Among liberals

Among centrists

Among conservs.

Low Middle High Low Middle High Low Middle High Prob(Reception)

.10

.50

.90

.10

.50

.90

.10

.50

.90

Prob(Accept I Reception)

_90_

.85

.80

.90

.55

.20

.90

.46

.02

Change(Reception x Acceptance)

.09

.425

.72

.09

.275

.18

.09

.23

.018

W i t h i n all three g r o u p s , r e c e p t i o n of t h e liberal m e s s a g e increases from . 10 to .50 to .90 as political a w a r e n e s s i n c r e a s e s ; this is shown in the top row of each p a r t of t h e t a b l e and indicates that the intensity of the persuasive m e s s a g e is the s a m e for all three g r o u p s . A l s o within all g r o u p s , a c c e p t a n c e rates decline with a w a r e n e s s . Yet t h e decline in a c c e p t a n c e rates is m u c h steeper for c o n s e r v a t i v e s ( w h e r e it falls from .90 to .02) than a m o n g liberals ( w h e r e it declines only from .90 to . 8 0 ) , with centrists falling in b e t w e e n . T h e result is that attitude c h a n g e is expected to follow different p a t t e r n s in the two g r o u p s : C h a n g e rises with awareness a m o n g liberals (from .09 to .425 to .72) but is n o n m o n o t o n i c with respect to a w a r e n e s s a m o n g centrists and c o n s e r v a t i v e s . B e c a u s e these p a t t e r n s r e a p p e a r in v a r i o u s guises t h r o u g h o u t t h e rest of t h e b o o k , generally r e s e m b l i n g actual e s t i m a t e s of reception and a c c e p t a n c e r a t e s , as s h o w n in F i g u r e s 7 . 4 and 1 0 . 1 , it is essential for t h e r e a d e r to be entirely c l e a r about h o w t h e n o n m o n o t o n i c i t y c o m e s about: C o n s e r v a t i v e s and centrists h a v i n g low levels of awareness do not c h a n g e m u c h b e c a u s e only 10 percent of t h e m a r e ever e x p o s e d t o any c h a n g e - i n d u c i n g m e s s a g e s . H i g h l y a w a r e c o n s e r v a t i v e s a n d centrists a r e very likely to be e x p o s e d to t h e liberal m e s s a g e (their r e c e p t i o n r a t e is 90 p e r c e n t ) , but their a c c e p t a n c e r a t e s are so low (2 and 20 p e r c e n t , respectively) that few e n d u p c h a n g i n g their attitudes. T h i s leaves m o d e r a t e l y a w a r e c o n s e r v a t i v e s and centrists m o s t s u s c e p t i b l e t o c h a n g e : T h e y pay e n o u g h attention to be likely to receive t h e liberal m e s s a g e but are not sufficiently a w a r e to be able to reject it as inconsistent with their values. T h e shapes of the n o n m o n o tonic c h a n g e c u r v e s a m o n g c o n s e r v a t i v e s a r e , a s can b e seen, s o m e w h a t different than a m o n g centrists, b e c a u s e the n e g a t i v e effect of a w a r e n e s s on a c c e p t a n c e is stronger in the former c a s e than in the latter. A q u e s t i o n that arises in this e x a m p l e is why, a m o n g liberals, there is any t e n d e n c y for a w a r e n e s s to c r e a t e resistance to persuasion by a liberal m e s s a g e . I n d e e d , m i g h t not a c c e p t a n c e rates rise with political a w a r e n e s s w h e n the m e s sage is a congenial o n e ? My a n s w e r to this q u e s t i o n is e m p i r i c a l : W h e n a m o d e l is d e s i g n e d to allow for this sort of i n t e r a c t i o n , there turns out always to be a negative relation b e t w e e n a w a r e n e s s and probability of a c c e p t a n c e , even w h e n the m e s s a g e is ideologically c o n g e n i a l . T h e effect of a w a r e n e s s on a c c e p t a n c e m a y be slight, as in this e x a m p l e of liberals r e s p o n d i n g to a liberal m e s s a g e , but it s e e m s a l w a y s

128

N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N 4

to be n e g a t i v e . W h a t this indicates is that, p e r h a p s for r e a s o n s of inertial resistance, m o r e a w a r e p e r s o n s a r e a l w a y s s o m e w h a t m o r e resistant t o c h a n g e , given r e c e p t i o n of a c h a n g e - i n d u c i n g m e s s a g e , t h a n a r e less a w a r e persons.

I N I T I A L TESTS O F T H E MODEL Even t h o u g h d e v e l o p m e n t of the abbreviated r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l is not yet c o m p l e t e , it is useful to d e m o n s t r a t e that the s i m u l a t i o n s just outlined res e m b l e cases of attitude c h a n g e that actually occur in the political w o r l d . I will take t w o such c a s e s , o n e involving opinion c h a n g e in a liberal direction and the other c h a n g e in a c o n s e r v a t i v e d i r e c t i o n . T h e first c a s e involves public attitudes t o w a r d defense s p e n d i n g . In the 1980 and 1982 e l e c t i o n studies, t h e N E S a s k e d the following q u e s t i o n : Some people believe we should spend much less money for defense. Others feel that defense spending should be greatly increased. Where do you stand on this issue, or haven't you thought much about it? R e s p o n d e n t s w e r e then a s k e d to place t h e m s e l v e s on a seven-point s c a l e , from greatly r e d u c e d s p e n d i n g at point 1 to greatly increased s p e n d i n g at point 7. D u r i n g t h e t w o - y e a r interval b e t w e e n s u r v e y s , c o v e r a g e of t h e defense issue in the press w a s heavily unfavorable t o w a r d defense s p e n d i n g . As discussed in C h a p t e r 2, a c o n t e n t analysis of stories in Newsweek found that stories favoring cuts in s p e n d i n g o u t n u m b e r e d p r o - s p e n d i n g stories by a r a t i o of about 2 to 1. Thus, although countervalent communications were present, there was a dominant, a n t i - d e f e n s e - s p e n d i n g m e s s a g e in this p e r i o d . P r e s u m a b l y as a result of this d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e , the p e r c e n t a g e of persons favoring cuts in defense (persons w h o t o o k point 1, 2, or 3 on the defense scale) in the t w o N E S surveys rose from 10 percent to 28 p e r c e n t . 5

T h e s e c o n d e x a m p l e involves U . S . policy in Central A m e r i c a . T h e q u e s t i o n , w h i c h w a s a s k e d in the fall of 1986 a n d again to a s u b s a m p l e of the s a m e res p o n d e n t s in J u n e 1987, w a s as follows: Some people feel that the United States should become much more involved in the internal affairs of Central America. Others feel we should become much less involved. Where do you stand on this issue, or haven't you thought much about it? T h e I r a n - C o n t r a controversy e m e r g e d in November, as the N a t i o n a l E l e c t i o n Study w e n t into t h e field, and hit full stride over the next few m o n t h s . At the h e a r t of t h e controversy w e r e a l l e g a t i o n s that t h e R e a g a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n had illegally used funds from t h e sale of w e a p o n s to Iran to s u p p o r t t h e C o n t r a g u e r r i l l a s , 4 In particular, there is no tendency for awareness to interact with ideology in the acceptance process so as to produce a positive awareness slope for one ideological group and a negative one for the other. Except in Tables 7.3 and 9.1,1 have not reported the results of such tests, because I have regarded them as exploratory. 5 In the period from 1978 to 1980, coverage of the defense issue in the same magazine favored increases in defense spending by about the same ratio it favored decreases in spending over the period 1980 to 1982. However, the NES surveys did not begin to carry parallel measures of attitudes toward defense spending until the 1980-2 period.

Basic

processes

of

' 'attitude

129

change'

w h o w e r e fighting t o o v e r t h r o w t h e c o m m u n i s t g o v e r n m e n t o f N i c a r a g u a . T h e S e n a t e ' s I r a n - C o n t r a h e a r i n g s w e r e u n d e r way at the t i m e of the reinterview in J u n e . As we will see in the next chapter, this controversy brought a steep decline in President R e a g a n ' s popularity. But it also brought increased publicity to the Presi d e n t ' s Central A m e r i c a policy, as exemplified in the defiant testimony of Lieutenant C o l o n e l Oliver N o r t h at the S e n a t e C o n t r a h e a r i n g s . T h e result was increased public s u p p o r t for A m e r i c a n i n v o l v e m e n t in Central A m e r i c a . In the 1 9 8 6 - 7 N E S s u r v e y s , the increase w a s from 2 8 percent s u p p o r t t o 3 8 percent s u p p o r t . G i v e n that m a s s attitude c h a n g e h a s o c c u r r e d , t h e r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l gives u s definite e x p e c t a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e p a t t e r n s o f t h e c h a n g e . W h e n opinion c h a n g e s in r e s p o n s e to a p r e d o m i n a n t l y liberal m e s s a g e , as in t h e c a s e of defense s p e n d i n g , we expect t h a t , for liberals, t h e r e will be a positive relation b e t w e e n political a w a r e n e s s and likelihood of c h a n g e , as in the preceding e x a m p l e . For c o n s e r v a t i v e s r e s p o n d i n g to a liberal m e s s a g e , we expect a n o n m o n o t o n i c p a t t e r n in w h i c h m o d e r a t e l y a w a r e c o n s e r v a t i v e s are most likely to c h a n g e , as also indicated in the p r e c e d i n g . But w h e n , as in the Central A m e r ica issue, m a s s attitude c h a n g e occurs in r e s p o n s e to a conservative m e s s a g e , our e x p e c t a t i o n s for liberals and c o n s e r v a t i v e s reverse: We anticipate a positive relation b e t w e e n a w a r e n e s s and c h a n g e a m o n g c o n s e r v a t i v e s , and a n o n m o n o tonic relation with a w a r e n e s s a m o n g liberals. To test t h e s e e x p e c t a t i o n s , we n e e d , for e a c h survey, a m e a s u r e of political a w a r e n e s s and a m e a s u r e of i n d i v i d u a l s ' values or p a r t i s a n s h i p . A w a r e n e s s can be readily m e a s u r e d in b o t h s u r v e y s w i t h tests of neutral political k n o w l e d g e . For t h e s u r v e y s c a p t u r i n g attitude c h a n g e on Central A m e r i c a , an excellent m e a sure of political values is available, namely, t h e H u r w i t z - P e f f l e y items on ant i c o m m u n i s m and military vigilance ( H u r w i t z and Peffley, 1 9 8 8 ) . For the 1 9 8 0 - 2 s u r v e y s , the most a p p r o p r i a t e m e a s u r e of values c a r r i e d on both surveys is the traditional m e a s u r e of p a r t y a t t a c h m e n t . Since differences between D e m o c r a t s and R e p u b l i c a n s on defense spending were one of the major e l e m e n t s of i n t e r p a r t y conflict in the early 1980s, p a r t y a t t a c h m e n t is a r e a s o n a b l e m e a sure of individual predispositions on this i s s u e . 6

7

8

T h e results o f t h e tests a r e s h o w n i n Tables 7 . 1 . a n d 7 . 2 . Let u s l o o k first a t Table 7 . 1 , w h i c h deals w i t h t h e defense s p e n d i n g issue. T h e table s h o w s r a t e s o f 6 See Sobel (1989) and Bowen (1989) for evidence on commercial polls of similar increases in support for U.S. involvement in Central America. 7 The 1986 NES postelection study carried a question on U.S. involvement in Central America. This question was repeated in the June wave of the 1987 NES pilot study, which reinterviewed 457 people from the fall survey. Hurwitz-Peffley (1988) militarism items were carried in the second wave of the pilot survey, which began in August and was able to reinterview only 360 of the original 457 pilot respondents. Since the militarism scale is necessary to the analysis, the analysis will be based on the fall 1986 and June 1987 interviews of respondents who agreed to be interviewed in the second wave of the pilot study in August. 8 Both the defense spending and Central America items were originally asked in the form of sevenpoint scales. For purposes of this analysis, positions 1, 2, and 3 on the defense scale have been collapsed into support for greater cuts; positions 5, 6, and 7 on the Central America scale have been collapsed into support for greater U.S. involvement.

130

Basic processes of "attitude change'

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

T a b l e 7 . 1 . Support for cuts in defense spending, 1980 and 1982

T a b l e 7 . 2 . Support for greater U.S. involvement in Central America, 1986 and 1987

Level of political awareness Low Hieh Democrats 1980 N

12" (318)

1982

Change rate 1980 to 1982*

12 (129)

20 (123)

16 (304)

11 (131) 36 (185)

41 (128)

57 (153)

4%

28

33

46

Republicans 1980

8 (134)

12 (78)

1982

10 (113)

23 (103)

29 (100)

4 (161) 14 (128)

2%

13

27

10

fl

Change rate 1980 to 1982* a

3 (125) .

Source: 1980 and 1982 NES surveys.

2

Centrists 1986 1987 Change rate 1986 to 1987

30 48

43 50

60 80

14% (18)

26 (40)

12 (44)

50 (15)

a

23

08 30

18 38

21 21

7% (30)

24 (37)

24 (40)

00 (14)

20 20

10 10

08 18

08 19

0% (15)

0 (3D

11 (50)

12 (26)

l7

3

Cell entries give percent who favor greater U. S. involvement in Central America.

O u r interest h e r e is in the probabilities of attitude c h a n g e , that is, the p r o b ability that a person not already c o m m i t t e d to cuts in defense s p e n d i n g would switch to favor such cuts in the second survey. T h u s if 20 percent of highly a w a r e D e m o c r a t s favored cuts in 1980 and 57 percent did so in 1982, then the perc e n t a g e of p e r s o n s not initially favoring cuts w h o switched w a s

s

Change rate 1986 to 1987 N

22° 33

a

support for cuts in defense s p e n d i n g , separately in 1980 and 1982, for D e m o crats and R e p u b l i c a n s by level of political awareness. T h u s , it can be seen that in 1980, 12 percent of D e m o c r a t s in the lowest awareness c a t e g o r y favored cuts in defense s p e n d i n g ; but in 1982, 16 percent of D e m o c r a t s in the l o w - a w a r e n e s s c a t e g o r y favored such cuts. T h i s a m o u n t s to a difference of 4 p e r c e n t a g e points. M e a n w h i l e , the m o s t highly aware D e m o c r a t s went from 20 percent in favor of defense cuts to 57 percent in favor, a difference of 37 p e r c e n t a g e points.

D

Hawks 1986 1987

Change rate 1986 to 1987

* Change rate is calculated as (Opinion82 - Opinionso)/ (100 Opinion80)-

[Time - Time,] Percent c h a n g e = -—— - = [100% - T i m e , ]

Level of political awareness Low Hieh

Doves 1986 1987

Cell entries give percent who favor defense cuts.

131

[57% - 20%] '- = 4 6 % [100% - 2 0 % ] ° 4 b /

C h a n g e r a t e s , calculated in this way for D e m o c r a t s at each level of a w a r e n e s s , are displayed in the third row of Table 7 . 1 . As can be seen, they generally fit

Source: 1986 NES survey and 1987 NES pilot survey.

e x p e c t a t i o n s : M o r e a w a r e D e m o c r a t s are m o r e likely to have switched to a p o sition of favoring defense cuts. T h e lower panel of the table provides parallel d a t a for R e p u b l i c a n s . Note the c h a n g e figures for R e p u b l i c a n s in t h e b o t t o m row of the table; as can be seen, c h a n g e levels r u n from 2 percent in the lowest a w a r e n e s s c a t e g o r y to 13 percent in t h e next c a t e g o r y to 27 percent in the third c a t e g o r y and then d o w n to 10 percent in the highest c a t e g o r y , a r e l a t i o n s h i p that is, as e x p e c t e d , n o n m o n o tonic. Altogether, t h e n , the results from the defense s p e n d i n g issue c o n f o r m well to theory. Table 7 . 2 presents c o m p a r a b l e d a t a for the Central A m e r i c a n issue. T h e fit to e x p e c t a t i o n s here is fairly g o o d but, at least at first g l a n c e , not perfect. A m o n g " h a w k s " there is a positive relationship b e t w e e n political a w a r e n e s s and c h a n g e in the direction of greater s u p p o r t for A m e r i c a n i n v o l v e m e n t in Central A m e r ica. A m o n g " c e n t r i s t s " this relationship is sharply n o n m o n o t o n i c , a result that is quite in the spirit of t h e m o d e l .

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T h e r e is, however, a p r o b l e m with the " d o v e s . " As would be e x p e c t e d , doves were m u c h less responsive to the p r o - C o n t r a m e s s a g e than were either h a w k s or centrists. But c o n t r a r y to e x p e c t a t i o n , the tiny handful of d o v e s w h o did m o v e in a c o n s e r v a t i v e direction were not m o d e r a t e l y aware d o v e s , but very highly aware doves. This d e p a r t u r e from e x p e c t a t i o n is m o r e apparent t h a n real. For o n e t h i n g , the n u m b e r of c a s e s in the critical cells is such that small d e p a r t u r e s from expectations should not be taken too s e r i o u s l y . (Different r e s p o n s e s by just two individuals in the cell for highly a w a r e doves w o u l d have brought the c h a n g e rate in this g r o u p d o w n to .04.) Table 7 . 2 also shows t h e effect of only o n e predispositional v a r i a b l e ; there m a y be other predispositions that need to be controlled before we can get a clear picture of h o w attitudes were c h a n g i n g . T h e need for controls and statistical tests highlights the limitations of tabular analysis for t e s t i n g the R A S m o d e l . To address these n e e d s , it is n e c e s s a r y to d e v e l o p a statistical model of the attitude c h a n g e process. Since variants of this m o d e l will be at t h e c e n t e r of my analysis in the r e m a i n d e r of the b o o k , I will fully d e s c r i b e each step of the m o d e l d e v e l o p m e n t . T h i s will involve detail that statistically a c c o m p l i s h e d readers m a y find t e d i o u s , but that o t h e r s will, I h o p e , find useful. 9

A STATISTICAL MODEL OF A T T I T U D E C H A N G E T h e basis of the statistical m o d e l will be E q u a t i o n 7 . 2 , r e p e a t e d below: Prob(Change) = Prob(Reception) x Prob(Acceptance I Reception) c. Logistic form Attitude c h a n g e , t h u s , is a m u l t i p l i c a t i v e function of s e p a r a t e reception and a c c e p t a n c e functions. To m a k e this e q u a t i o n a statistical m o d e l of attitude c h a n g e , we need to specify the nature of these reception and a c c e p t a n c e functions. F r o m e a r l i e r d i s c u s s i o n s , we have a fair a m o u n t of information about w h a t these specifications must b e . We k n o w , first of all, that political a w a r e n e s s is positively a s s o c i a t e d with reception of persuasive c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , and we k n o w that a w a r e n e s s and political values (and perhaps other variables) are negatively a s s o c i a t e d with the likelihood of uncritical a c c e p t a n c e . But to m a k e full use of this i n f o r m a t i o n , we must k n o w the functional form of the relationships b e t w e e n these i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e s , on o n e side, and the d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e s , reception and a c c e p t a n c e , on the other. We need to know, in o t h e r w o r d s , w h e t h e r the form of these r e l a t i o n s h i p s is strictly linear, e x p o n e n t i a l , or s o m e thing else. If this s e e m s an a r c a n e issue, c o n s i d e r the following p r o b l e m . S u p p o s e that we have tested several million schoolchildren from k i n d e r g a r t e n through g r a d e twelve o n t h e q u e s t i o n , " W h a t i s the square root o f 4 ? " A n d s u p p o s e that w e now want to m o d e l the relationship b e t w e e n years of schooling and the proba9 In evaluating this table, it is useful to keep in mind that, for a difference of means test with p = .20 and « = 25, the standard error of the mean difference is 0.11.

1.0 Probability of correct answer

.50

6 Years of school

12

Figure 7 . 1 . Three functional forms for relations between two variables.

bility of getting t h e c o r r e c t a n s w e r to this q u e s t i o n . O b v i o u s l y , we w o u l d expect to find a positive r e l a t i o n s h i p . T h a t is, m o r e years of schooling w o u l d be associated with a h i g h e r c h a n c e of getting the a n s w e r right. But as Figure 7.1 s h o w s , there are several forms this relationship could t a k e . T h e top panel depicts a strictly linear relationship: E a c h additional year of school increases the probability of a c o r r e c t r e s p o n s e by a constant a m o u n t . T h e m i d d l e panel depicts an

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exponential relationship: S c h o o l i n g affects k n o w l e d g e of s q u a r e roots slowly at first, but has an increasingly powerful effect as one goes further in school. T h u s going from the first to the s e c o n d g r a d e has scarcely any effect, but going from eleventh to twelfth g r a d e has a very large effect. T h e b o t t o m panel of Figure 7.1 claims that the relationship b e t w e e n schooling and m a t h k n o w l e d g e follows the form of a logistic function: T h e earliest and latest years of school have little effect, but the m i d d l e years of school have a substantial effect. T h e point h e r e is that in o r d e r to m o d e l the relationship b e t w e e n two varia b l e s , o n e m u s t k n o w m o r e than just the fact that they are positively c o r r e l a t e d . O n e must k n o w - or at least be able to m a k e a plausible g u e s s about - the form of their r e l a t i o n s h i p . To resolve this p r o b l e m in the present e x a m p l e , we w o u l d use o u r b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l e d g e of h o w e d u c a t i o n is organized in the United States. K n o w i n g , that is, that square roots are n o r m a l l y taught b e t w e e n the third and eighth g r a d e s , we w o u l d a s s u m e that little learning about square roots o c curs in t h e very e a r l y or very late years of s c h o o l , and h e n c e that the logistic functional form best describes the relationship b e t w e e n years of school and correct a n s w e r s on this p a r t i c u l a r test q u e s t i o n .

E q u a t i o n 7 . 3 can be equivalently written as

T h e choice of functional form in the c a s e of awareness and reception is also fairly clear. S i n c e we are dealing with probabilities of r e c e p t i o n , we w o u l d like to have a function that v a r i e s naturally b e t w e e n 0 and 1. T h e logistic form m e e t s that r e q u i r e m e n t . T h e lowest value it can take is 0 and t h e largest value is 1. Empirical studies of the dl 'fusion of ideas also often find that logistic functions (or close equivalents) provide a g o o d fit to the actual d a t a ( P r i c e , 1961; N e u m a n , 1990).

Political a w a r e n e s s in Figure 7 . 2 has been scored in s t a n d a r d units. T h e m e a sures of political a w a r e n e s s that I will use in m o d e l i n g attitude c h a n g e have also been expressed in s t a n d a r d units. Since the awareness m e a s u r e s usually have a roughly n o r m a l d i s t r i b u t i o n , this m e a n s about 96 percent of individuals will usually have a w a r e n e s s scores that fall within an interval of ±2 units on Figure 7 . 2 . K n o w i n g t h i s , t h e reader can interpret the m a g n i t u d e of t h e coefficients r e p o r t e d in later sections of this b o o k by referring back to Figure 7 . 2 . For e x a m p l e , for a c a s e in which the a w a r e n e s s coefficient is 1.0 and a is near z e r o , Figure 7.2 implies that reception levels rise from about 10 percent at low levels of awareness to 90 percent at high levels of a w a r e n e s s . Relationships of this strength or greater will be c o m m o n in the empirical analyses reported below.

10

For all these r e a s o n s , I will a s s u m e that the relationship b e t w e e n a w a r e n e s s and reception can be represented by the following logistic function: Prob(Reception), = 1 —

1 + / + e(flu

+ «i Awareness,)

(7.3)

P r o b ( R e c e p t i o n ) , = 1 - [1 +/ + E x p ( a

0

+ ^Awareness,)]

- 1

(7.3')

Since m a n y readers will not be greatly familiar with this type of logistic function, and since it will be heavily and s o m e w h a t unconventionally used in my e x a m i n a t i o n of attitude c h a n g e , it is w o r t h digressing to gain s o m e familiarity with t h e function and its a s s o c i a t e d p a r a m e t e r s . T h e " a , " p a r a m e t e r is, first of all, a m e a s u r e of t h e strength of the relationship b e t w e e n political a w a r e n e s s and r e c e p t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r m e s s a g e . T h u s , it is the a n a l o g u e of the slope in a s t a n d a r d linear regression. T h e top panel of Figure 7.2 shows h o w the relationship b e t w e e n awareness and reception varies for a typical r a n g e of values of a , : ( a , = . 5 , a, = 1.0, a, = 2 . 0 ) . " T h e higher the value of a , the stronger the relationship b e t w e e n a w a r e n e s s and r e c e p t i o n . For the c a s e in w h i c h a = 2 . 0 , reception levels are near zero at low a w a r e n e s s , begin a s h a r p rise at about - 2 , and a p p r o a c h a ceiling of 100 percent by the t i m e awareness reaches a level of +2 units. x

x

0

T h e a p a r a m e t e r captures the difficulty or the " l o u d n e s s " of the p a r t i c u l a r m e s s a g e , and is the a n a l o g u e of the intercept in s t a n d a r d regression. T h e m i d d l e section of Figure 7.2 shows how reception varies with information at three different values of a (and a fixed value of a, = 2 . 0 ) . H i g h values of a indicate high levels of reception at given levels of a w a r e n e s s , w h i c h in turn indicate " h i g h - i n t e n s i t y " m e s s a g e s . If a p p r o p r i a t e care is taken in the c o n s t r u c t i o n of v a r i a b l e s , the a coefficients can be c o m p a r e d across m o d e l s to see which involve the most intense m e s s a g e . This brings us to t h e / p a r a m e t e r . All of the projections in the top and m i d d l e panels of Figure 7.2 set the floor p a r a m e t e r , / , to z e r o . W h e n / t a k e s on positive v a l u e s , it sets m i n i m u m or " f l o o r " levels of r e c e p t i o n , r e g a r d l e s s of an indiv i d u a l ' s level of awareness. T h e b o t t o m panel of Figure 7.2 shows three r e c e p tion c u r v e s that are identical to those in the m i d d l e p a n e l , except that the floor p a r a m e t e r is set to . 3 0 . T h u s , instead of rising from a floor of z e r o , reception rises from a floor d e t e r m i n e d by / . 0

where ProbfReception), = the probability that individual (i) will receive a persuasive message a = coefficient designating the intensity of message a, = coefficient designating strength of relationship between awareness and reception / = floor parameter 0

e = the natural logarithmetic base, 2.7214 10 In tests of individual differences in ability, such as IQ tests, researchers regard each question as a "test" that some people will "pass" and others will "fail," depending on their general levels of ability. They next argue, from elementary statistical considerations, that the relationship between any particular test item and a general measure of ability should be described by the normal ogive function, which is a close approximation of the logistic function (Torgerson, 1958; Lord and Novick, 1968). In a similar fashion, one can regard reception of a particular persuasive message as a "test" that some will pass and others will fail, depending on their general levels of political awareness. By analogy to test theory, it would then follow that the relationship between reception of a particular persuasive message and general levels of political awareness should be described by a logistic function.

0

0

0

1

11 These examples assume that Political Awareness runs from -3 to + 3 . 12 On the use of floor parameters in such situations, see Lord and Novick (1968: ch. 17).

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a. Logistic curves for three values of the a j coefficient 1.0

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137

no way of a c c o m m o d a t i n g the fact that such persons give a n s w e r s to survey questions. T h e / parameter, t h u s , is a n u i s a n c e t e r m that i m p r o v e s the fit of t h e m o d e l to t h e d a t a without c o n v e y i n g substantive significance. As Figure 7 . 2 s h o w s , it has an effect only at lower levels of a w a r e n e s s , w h e r e g u e s s i n g is likely t o b e most c o m m o n . 1 3

Probability of reception

T h e probability that an individual will accept a persuasive m e s s a g e (having received it) d e c r e a s e s with awareness and ideological distance from the m e s s a g e . Again a s s u m i n g that the logistic function d e s c r i b e s the form of this relat i o n s h i p , w e m a y write

.50

-3

-2 -1 0 +1 +2 Level of political awareness (scored in standard units)

+3

P r o b ( A c c e p t I Reception), = [1 + E x p ( — b — fo]Awareness, 0

— ^Predispositions, . . . ) ] " '

(7.4)

where b. Logistic curves for three values of the a coefficient 0

Prob(AcceptancelReception), = the probability that individual (/) will accept the persuasive message, having received it

I.OT

b = coefficient designating the difficulty or credibility of message 0

Probability of reception

b = coefficient designating the effect of awareness on resistance to persuasion x

.50

b = coefficient designating the effect of predispositions on resistance to persuasion 2

-3

-2

-1 0 +1 +2 Political awareness

+3

E q u a t i o n 7 . 4 differs from E q u a t i o n 7 . 3 in t w o i m p o r t a n t w a y s . First, its form has been altered so as to m a k e its coefficients m o r e intelligible. In particular, E q u a t i o n 7 . 4 h a s been set up so that if, as e x p e c t e d , higher levels of a w a r e n e s s are associated with lower a c c e p t a n c e r a t e s , the coefficient on awareness will take a n e g a t i v e s i g n . T h e second difference is that the a c c e p t a n c e function contains a t e r m for differences in political p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s , that is, ideology, party, religiosity, or whatever. 1 4

c. Logistic curves when the floor parameter is 0.30 1.0V

Probability of reception

-50

-2

-1 0 +1 +2 Political awareness

Figure 7.2. Variations of the logistic function. Floor p a r a m e t e r s are n e c e s s a r y in situations in which p e o p l e m a y respond to survey q u e s t i o n s w i t h o u t having received any information about the q u e s t i o n w h i c h , in m a n y c a s e s , probably m e a n s g u e s s i n g . W i t h o u t a floor p a r a m e t e r to assign " r e c e p t i o n " scores to g u e s s e r s , t h e model I am developing w o u l d have

An i m p o r t a n t feature of logistic functions is that w h e n e v e r two or more variables are u s e d , the variables automatically interact with one another - which is to say, the effect of o n e variable d e p e n d s on the values taken by the others. T h u s , in E q u a t i o n 7 . 4 , the effect of a w a r e n e s s will always d e p e n d on the effect of the predispositions v a r i a b l e ( s ) . It is n e c e s s a r y to allow for such A w a r e n e s s x Predispositions interactions b e c a u s e the R A S m o d e l h o l d s that predispositions have no effect unless the individual is sufficiently politically a w a r e to possess the contextual information that e n a b l e s resistance to uncongenial m e s s a g e s . T h u s , 13 T h e / parameter may also be thought of as creating a more flexible, three-parameter reception function. Or again, it might be thought of as specifying floor levels of reception that are independent of political awareness. 14 In earlier work with this model (Zaller, 1989, 1991; Geddes and Zaller, 1989), the acceptance function was specified in such a way that obtaining a positive coefficient on awareness in this function indicated a negative relationship between awareness and probability of acceptance. In this book, I have changed the specification of the acceptance function to avoid this possibly confusing outcome.

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Republicans

1.0

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I w o u l d , incidentally, e n c o u r a g e readers w h o have access to a spreadsheet p r o g r a m to replicate the results in Figures 7.2 and 7 . 3 , to e x p e r i m e n t with o t h e r p a r a m e t e r v a l u e s , and to plot the results of t h e more c o m p l e x functions I shall r e p o r t h e r e . D o i n g this will greatly e n h a n c e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the claims I m a k e

Probability of .50 acceptance

on behalf of the R A S m o d e l . We are now ready to b r i n g t h e reception and a c c e p t a n c e functions together. Substituting E q u a t i o n s 7 . 3 and 7 . 4 into E q u a t i o n 7 . 2 , w e get P r o b ( C h a n g e ) = (1 - (1 + / + E x p [ + a

1

0

+ a , A w a r e n e s s ] ) " ) x (1 + re

E x p [ — b — frjAwareness — b P d i s p o s i t i o n s . . . ] ) " ' 0

Level of political awareness (scored in standard units)

2

(7.5)

T h e first t e r m in E q u a t i o n 7.5 is a monotonically increasing function of awaren e s s , while the s e c o n d is a similarly d e c r e a s i n g function of a w a r e n e s s and value

Figure 7.3. The automatically interactive nature of the logistic function Values of the logistic function are b = 2, b, = - 1 , b = - 1 , with scores of -2 and +2 on the predispositions variable for Republicans and Democrats, respectively. The model is Equation 7.4. 0

distance from t h e m e s s a g e .

2

as we saw in Table 7 . 1 , u n a w a r e D e m o c r a t s and R e p u b l i c a n s did not differ m u c h in their resistance to a n t i - d e f e n s e - s p e n d i n g c o m m u n i c a t i o n s : T h e former b e c a m e 4 percent less favorable t o w a r d defense s p e n d i n g , w h i l e the latter b e c a m e 2 percent less favorable. Yet p a r t y a t t a c h m e n t h a d a large impact on resistance t o antidefense m e s s a g e s a m o n g highly aware p a r t i s a n s : D e m o c r a t s b e c a m e 4 6 percent less favorable and R e p u b l i c a n s 10 percent less favorable. T h e s a m e sort of Predisposition x A w a r e n e s s interaction a r o s e , mutatis mutandis, for h a w k s and d o v e s in r e s p o n s e to a c o n s e r v a t i v e m e s s a g e , as s h o w n in Table 7 . 2 . Figure 7 . 3 s h o w s h o w E q u a t i o n 7 . 4 h a n d l e s A w a r e n e s s x Predisposition interactions. In this figure, b is set to + 2 , b is set to — 1, and b is set to — 1; party is scored —2 for R e p u b l i c a n s a n d + 2 for D e m o c r a t s . T h e s e v a l u e s , as will be seen below, fall within t h e r a n g e of t h e values o b t a i n e d e m p i r i c a l l y from t h e application of E q u a t i o n 7 . 4 to actual d a t a . T h e figure shows that increases in awareness lead to lower a c c e p t a n c e r a t e s a m o n g both D e m o c r a t s and Republic a n s , but to a m u c h steeper d e c l i n e a m o n g D e m o c r a t s . T h u s , the effect of a w a r e ness on a c c e p t a n c e d e p e n d s on w h e t h e r t h e person is a D e m o c r a t or R e p u b l i c a n . (This interaction would occur only w h e n the c h a n g e - i n d u c i n g m e s s a g e w a s a conservative m e s s a g e ; for a liberal m e s s a g e , the sign on b w o u l d reverse, thereby causing a w a r e n e s s to have a greater effect on the a c c e p t a n c e rates of Republicans.) 0

{

2

2

T h e r e a d e r m a y w o n d e r why, since t h e R A S m o d e l e x p e c t s this t y p e o f interaction, I do not simply include a specific t e r m for A w a r e n e s s x Predispositions in E q u a t i o n 7 . 4 . T h e reason is practical: Most of the t i m e such interaction t e r m s c o n t r i b u t e little or n o t h i n g to the fit of t h e m o d e l but n o n e t h e l e s s introduce large a m o u n t s of t r o u b l e s o m e multicollinearity. Or, to put it differently, E q u a t i o n 7 . 4 n o r m a l l y picks up interaction effects without the need for specific interaction t e r m s (see Table 7 . 3 ) . However, in o n e c a s e , reported in C h a p t e r 9, I found interaction t e r m s helpful and so did include t h e m in an a c c e p t a n c e function.

T h e r e is an i m p o r t a n t and n o n o b v i o u s feature of this formulation of the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l . It is the implicit a s s u m p t i o n that a p e r s o n ' s pred i s p o s i t i o n s , a l t h o u g h affecting a c c e p t a n c e of persuasive m e s s a g e s , do not affect r e c e p t i o n . This a s s u m p t i o n is signaled by the fact that predispositional variables are included only in the a c c e p t a n c e function. This specification of the m o d e l w o u l d be i n a p p r o p r i a t e if, as e a r l y o p i n i o n research indicated, individuals e n g a g e d in " s e l e c t i v e r e c e p t i o n " of political information - if, that is, they e x p o s e d t h e m s e l v e s mainly to ideas they thought they were likely to find acc e p t a b l e and avoided e x p o s u r e to u n c o n g e n i a l ideas. However, m o r e recent research has been u n k i n d to the notion of selective reception (Sears and Freedm a n , 1967; M c G u i r e , 1969; W i c k l u n d and B r e h m , 1976; C o t t o n , 1985; Patterson a n d M c C l u r e , 1974; Patterson 1980). M o s t p e o p l e , this research m a i n t a i n s , are simply not so rigid in their information-seeking b e h a v i o r that they will expose t h e m s e l v e s only to ideas that they find c o n g e n i a l . To the extent selective e x p o s u r e o c c u r s at all, it a p p e a r s to do so u n d e r special c o n d i t i o n s that do not typically arise in situations of m a s s p e r s u a s i o n . T h e likely r e a s o n s for the relative u n i m p o r t a n c e of selective reception are several. First, m o s t p e o p l e inform t h e m s e l v e s by m e a n s of e x p o s u r e to a fairly w i d e variety of o u t l e t s , m o s t of which are " c o m m o n c a r r i e r s " of a national c o m m u n i c a t i o n s flow (Key, 1961). S e c o n d , selective reception requires a level o f c o n c e r n e d vigilance m u c h greater than most c i t i z e n s , w h o are relatively a p athetic about politics, are likely to m a k e (Graber, 1984: p. 128). A n d third, m o s t n e w s events i m p o r t a n t e n o u g h to e n g a g e t h e attention of survey researchers 15

15 For example, the one case in which, according to Cotton (1985), selective exposure has been rigorously documented in a nonlaboratory setting involved new car purchasers. The new car purchasers were more likely than ones who had bought their cars a year earlier to look at advertisements for the car they had just purchased than ads for a car they had examined but decided not to buy. Recently, Price and Zaller (1990) have turned up some evidence of selective exposure effects in reception of new stories. The effects were typically small to nonexistent, but were large in two cases, both involving minor news stories. (For laboratory evidence of selective exposure, see Markus and Zajonc, 1985.)

140

N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N

are major, c o n t i n u i n g stories such as the V i e t n a m W a r or the I r a n - C o n t r a scand a l , so that p e o p l e w h o pay any significant degree of attention to politics are unlikely to r e m a i n u n a w a r e of t h e m even if they are not avidly interested in each new detail. T h e s e l e c t i v e reception hypothesis cannot be entirely false. After all, it w o u l d be extremely s u r p r i s i n g if, say, liberal i d e o l o g u e s were as likely to subscribe to National Review as to Nation. But, by the available e v i d e n c e , selective reception apparently d o e s not o c c u r on a sufficiently broad scale to affect the diffusion of major political i d e a s , and hence poses little d a n g e r to my formulation of the reception-acceptance m o d e l . A l t h o u g h E q u a t i o n 7.5 is a m o d e l of attitude c h a n g e , it requires a d a p t a t i o n before it can be applied to the t w o cases u n d e r e x a m i n a t i o n h e r e . T h e r e are three reasons for this. T h e first is that, in the defense s p e n d i n g c a s e , we have no individual-level d a t a on attitude c h a n g e ; rather, we have s e p a r a t e cross-section surveys in w h i c h similar i n d i v i d u a l s , rather than the same individuals, are c o m pared across t i m e . ( T h u s , for e x a m p l e , the low-awareness D e m o c r a t s in the 1980 survey in Table 7.1 w e r e not reinterviewed in 1982 to find out w h e t h e r their attitudes had c h a n g e d ; rather, a s e p a r a t e s a m p l e w a s d r a w n in 1982 to m e a s u r e t h e attitudes of l o w - a w a r e n e s s D e m o c r a t s . ) F r o m this sort of d a t a one can calculate aggregate-level c h a n g e rates across different types of p e r s o n s , as in Table 7 . 1 , but not individual-level c h a n g e rates of the type required by Equation 7.5. T h e s e c o n d limitation of e q u a t i o n 7 . 5 is that it a c c o m m o d a t e s c h a n g e in o n e direction only - the direction of t h e d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e . T h i s creates a p r o b l e m even w h e n individual-level c h a n g e d a t a are available, as it is in the Central A m e r i c a c a s e . If, as h e r e , s u p p o r t for a hawkish policy rises from 28 percent to 38 p e r c e n t , E q u a t i o n 7.5 implicitly a s s u m e s that 10 percent of the s a m p l e has c h a n g e d its attitude in the direction of the d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e and the other 90 percent has r e m a i n e d stable. O w i n g , however, to r a n d o m response variability (see Table 2 . 1 ) , the actual p a t t e r n of c h a n g e is m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d . T h u s , in the Central A m e r i c a c a s e , 22 percent c h a n g e d in the direction of the d o m i n a n t h a w k i s h m e s s a g e while 12 percent c h a n g e d in a dovish d i r e c t i o n , for a net c h a n g e of 10 percent. E q u a t i o n 7.5 cannot a c c o m m o d a t e such two-way patterns of c h a n g e .

Basic

16 The reader may wonder why I do not subject these arguments about selective reception to an empirical test by entering measures of political predispositions in the reception function. If they attract significant coefficients, it would indicate that selective reception occurs; if not, it would show that there is no problem. The reason is that Equation 7.5 would not be identified if all predispositions variables were entered in both the reception and acceptance functions. There would then be complete collinearity between the two functions, and hence no ability for the model to distinguish the separate effects of variables on the reception and acceptance steps.

of

"attitude

141

change'

For these r e a s o n s , t h e n , we need a m o d e l of the attitude c h a n g e process that is c a p a b l e of c a p t u r i n g c h a n g e b e t w e e n a baseline distribution of opinion and a subsequent opinion d i s t r i b u t i o n , and that does so without implicitly a s s u m i n g that all individual-level c h a n g e r u n s in t h e direction of the d o m i n a n t persuasive message. O n e can d e v e l o p such a m o d e l by m a k i n g separate e s t i m a t e s of baseline attitudes at t i m e , and the probability of attitude c h a n g e , so that t i m e attitudes are a function of baseline attitudes and c h a n g e probabilities, as follows: 2

Prob(Opinion ) = Prob(Baseline Opinion) + Prob(Change) * (1 — B a s e l i n e O p i n i o n ) 2

1 6

A final difficulty is that if, as in E q u a t i o n 7 . 5 , o n e m o d e l s only individuallevel c h a n g e r a t e s , o n e is inefficiently discarding information about the baseline and final distributions of opinion. T h i s information is often essential for gaining leverage on t h e overall r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e process.

processes

(7.6)

T h a t is, the probability of h o l d i n g a p a r t i c u l a r opinion at t i m e is the probability of h o l d i n g it at the baseline p e r i o d , plus the probability of c o n v e r t i n g to the opinion if not already h o l d i n g it at t i m e , . 2

T h e baseline and c h a n g e functions can be specified straightforwardly as s e p a r a t e r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l s , each having the form of E q u a t i o n 7 . 5 . T h a t is, baseline opinion is the o u t c o m e of a r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e process that is c a p tured by E q u a t i o n 7 . 5 , and attitude c h a n g e is also t h e o u t c o m e of a receptiona c c e p t a n c e p r o c e s s that is captured by E q u a t i o n 7 . 5 . This m o d e l m u s t be e s t i m a t e d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y on d a t a from both the t i m e , and t i m e p e r i o d s , a s follows: 2

Prob(Opinion), = Prob(Baseline) + Dum, * Prob(Change) * (1 - Baseline)

(7.7)

w h e r e D u m , takes the value of 0 at t i m e , and the value of 1 at t i m e . T h u s , opinion at t i m e , d e p e n d s on the baseline r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e process only, while opinion at t i m e d e p e n d s on both the baseline and the c h a n g e models. Since the / p a r a m e t e r in the r e c e p t i o n function is intended to pick up the effects of g u e s s i n g , and since these effects are absorbed in the baseline m o d e l , it is u n n e c e s s a r y to include an / p a r a m e t e r in the reception function of the change model. 2

2

Coefficients from the application of E q u a t i o n 7.7 to the d a t a on defense spending are s h o w n in the left c o l u m n of Table 7 . 3 . T h e d e p e n d e n t variable is a 0 - 1 variable that distinguishes those w h o s u p p o r t cuts in defense spending from all o t h e r s , including those w h o m a k e no-opinion r e s p o n s e s . To facilitate 17

17 This scoring of the dependent variable has advantages and disadvantages. The obvious disadvantage is that it throws away information from the original seven-point scales by making everyone either a zero or a one. This poses an efficiency problem. But on the other hand, to keep information from the seven-point scale, I would have to discard no-opinion respondents as missing data. No-opinion respondents, whose typically low political awareness scores indicate they have failed to receive any information that would enable them to have an opinion, help to define the effect of awareness on reception. Hence to discard them would introduce bias. A second advantage of 0-1 scoring is that it enables me to retain the natural metric of "percent supporting" a given position, which adds to the intelligibility of the results (note the relationship of Figure 7.4 to Figure 8.2). I return to this issue in Chapter 11.

212

Basic

N A T U R E A N D ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

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Political awareness Figure 7.4. Estimated effects of reception and acceptance on changing support for defense spending. Estimates are derived from the change function in Equation 7.7 and the coefficients for the unconstrained model in Table 7.3. Source: 1980 and 1982 NES surveys. replication of these results, I include in the appendix to this chapter the S A S p r o g r a m c o d e used t o p r o d u c e t h e m . T h e coefficients in Table 7 . 3 all have g o o d m a g n i t u d e s , as can be seen by c o m p a r i n g t h e m to the coefficients used to p r o d u c e Figure 7 . 2 , and signs that run in t h e theoretically expected directions. However, there is a great deal of statistical i m p r e c i s i o n in the coefficients in the a c c e p t a n c e function of the b a s e line m o d e l . T h e reason for the imprecision in this subfunction a p p e a r s to be that there is little v a r i a n c e in s u p p o r t for cuts in defense spending in 1980, as can be seen in Table 7 . 1 . To r e d u c e this i m p r e c i s i o n , I constrained t h e value of the most unstable coefficient, that of party, to be equal in both the baseline and c h a n g e m o d e l s . T h i s resulted in a m o r e stable set of e s t i m a t e s , as s h o w n in the center c o l u m n of Table 7 . 3 . T h e constraint did b r i n g about a statistically significant reduction in t h e statistical fit of the m o d e l to the d a t a (F ( 1 , 2 , 9 9 3 ) , 4 . 1 2 , p < . 0 5 ) , but did not affect t h e visual or qualitative fit of the m o d e l to the r a w d a t a , as s h o w n earlier in Table 7 . 1 . T h e right-hand c o l u m n of Table 7.3 shows the coefficients that are obtained w h e n A w a r e n e s s X Party t e r m s are put into the m o d e l . T h e inclusion of these t e r m s did not significantly i m p r o v e t h e statistical fit of the m o d e l , and I present t h e m only to satisfy the interest of readers w h o might w o n d e r about the effect of interaction t e r m s on the p e r f o r m a n c e of the m o d e l . T h e r e is little m o r e to be learned about the d y n a m i c s of attitude c h a n g e from simple visual i n s p e c t i o n of t h e coefficients from the m o d e l . I h a v e , therefore, used the coefficients, in conjunction with E q u a t i o n 7 . 7 , to construct graphical r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of the implied effects of these coefficients. T h e s e g r a p h s , based on coefficients from the unconstrained m o d e l and using t h e graphing c o n v e n tions set forth in C h a p t e r 6, are s h o w n in Figure 7 . 4 .

144

Figure 7 . 4 d e c o m p o s e s the attitude c h a n g e process into its c o m p o n e n t s : rec e p t i o n , a c c e p t a n c e , and attitude c h a n g e . In t h e left-hand p a n e l , the figure shows e s t i m a t e d rates of reception of a n t i - d e f e n s e - s p e n d i n g m e s s a g e s b e t w e e n 1980 and 1982. T h e s e e s t i m a t e s have been obtained by p l u g g i n g the reception coefficients from t h e c h a n g e m o d e l in Table 7.3 into the reception function, E q u a t i o n 7 . 3 , and calculating r e c e p t i o n rates at different levels of political awareness. As e x p e c t e d , r e c e p t i o n of a n t i - d e f e n s e - s p e n d i n g information increases as political awareness i n c r e a s e s . A c c e p t a n c e r a t e s , given r e c e p t i o n , are s h o w n in the c e n t e r panels of the figu r e . T h e y have been obtained by p l u g g i n g the a c c e p t a n c e coefficients from Table 7.3 into t h e a c c e p t a n c e function, as given in E q u a t i o n 7 . 4 . As can be seen, these r a t e s differ m a r k e d l y for R e p u b l i c a n s and D e m o c r a t s . A m o n g Republic a n s , political a w a r e n e s s g e n e r a t e s m u c h lower rates of a c c e p t a n c e of a n t i d e fense i n f o r m a t i o n - or alternatively, m u c h higher levels of resistance; a m o n g D e m o c r a t s , a w a r e n e s s also p r o d u c e s higher resistance r a t e s , but only barely so. T h u s , as e x p e c t e d , a w a r e n e s s interacts with political predispositions to g e n e r a t e selective resistance to p e r s u a s i o n .

145

Basic processes of ' 'attitude change'

N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N

Table 7.4. Coefficients for opinion change on U.S. involvement in Central America No constraints Baseline reception function Intercept

-1.15

Two constraints -1.27

18

M u l t i p l i c a t i o n of the reception rates on the left of Figure 7 . 4 by the a c c e p tance rates in t h e c e n t e r yields e s t i m a t e d rates of attitude c h a n g e on cuts in d e fense s p e n d i n g , w h i c h are s h o w n on t h e right. To illustrate how this w o r k s , the figure focuses on a hypothetical R e p u b l i c a n and D e m o c r a t w h o are s o m e w h a t above t h e m e d i a n level of political a w a r e n e s s . E a c h h a s a 52 percent c h a n c e of e x p o s u r e to antidefense i n f o r m a t i o n , but their a c c e p t a n c e r a t e s are quite different: 30 percent for t h e Republican and 94 percent for t h e D e m o c r a t . Multiplication of these r e c e p t i o n and a c c e p t a n c e rates yields attitude c h a n g e r a t e s , as s h o w n on the right. For the R e p u b l i c a n , the c h a n g e rate is .52 x .30 = . 1 5 . T h e s e e s t i m a t e d rates "of attitude c h a n g e agree well with the r a w d a t a on attitude c h a n g e , a s s h o w n i n Table 7 . 1 .

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a

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2.13 (1.20) 0.35 (.16)

-0.33

-0.19 -0.80" (.37) -1.42 (.46) -0.33 (.20)

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Awareness Hawk-dove (standardized) Reagan fall disapproval (range -2 to +2) Change reception function Intercept Awareness Change acceptance function Intercept Awareness Hawk-dove Reagan disapproval

-0.76 (.42) -1.38 (.43) -0.30 (.19)

-1.40 1.17 (1.16)

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2.13 (1.20)

1.50

-0.10

-1.39 (1.56) -0.66 (.93) -0.29 (.47)

-0.80* (.37) -0.52 (.47) -0.14 (.28)

155.99

156.18

Let us turn n o w to the issue of U . S . involvement in Central A m e r i c a . Coefficient e s t i m a t e s for the application of E q u a t i o n 7.7 to the d a t a from this issue are s h o w n in Table 7 . 4 . O w i n g to the m u c h smaller s a m p l e involved, these e s t i m a t e s are even less precise than those for the defense s p e n d i n g issue, and here the instability extends to both the baseline and c h a n g e m o d e l s . Of t h e six substantive coefficients, only two reach statistical significance. In order to i m p r o v e the statistical precision of the fit, I constrained the coefficients on political awareness to be t h e s a m e in both the baseline and c h a n g e m o d e l s . T h a t is, awareness w a s constrained to have the s a m e effect on reception in both p e r i o d s and t h e s a m e effect on a c c e p t a n c e in b o t h periods. T h e s e constraints b r o u g h t the theoretically i m p o r t a n t coefficients of a w a r e n e s s to statistical significance at the .05 level, as can be seen in Table 7 . 4 , and did so without p r o d u c i n g a significant reduction in t h e fit of the model to the d a t a (F [2, 7 0 7 ] , . 4 3 , n . s . ) . A l s o , t h e qualitative fit of the constrained m o d e l to the d a t a is as g o o d as the fit of t h e unconstrained model.

It is interesting that h a w k - d o v e attitudes a p p e a r about four t i m e s m o r e important as a d e t e r m i n a n t of Central A m e r i c a attitudes than approval of presidential j o b p e r f o r m a n c e . (Since the h a w k - d o v e scale has been s t a n d a r d i z e d and t h e approval m e a s u r e r u n s from - 2 t o + 2 , the t w o variables have a p p r o x i m a t e l y the

18 The z-scores on the awareness variable in this graph run from -1.86 to +1.96; these scores correspond to about the 1st and 98th percentiles on political awareness.

19 Hawk-dove attitudes remain dominant if party attachment is substituted for Reagan approval.

Residual sum of squares

Note: Model is Equation 7.7, estimated by maximum likelihood. The dependent variable is a 0-1 variable indicating support for greater involvement in Central America. Other political variables are scored in liberal direction. Standard errors are in parentheses. The Timei N and Time2 N are 360. Coefficient constrained to equal another coefficient Source: 1986 and 1987 NES surveys. a

19

146

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

Basic

processes

1.0

of

' 'attitude

Political awareness Figure 7.5. Attitude change on U.S. involvement in Central America. Estimates are derived from the change function in Equation 7.7 and the coefficients for unconstrained model in Table 7.4. Source: 1986 and 1987 NES surveys. same r a n g e . ) T h u s , it w a s not R e a g a n s u p p o r t e r s per se w h o mainly rallied b e hind U . S . i n v o l v e m e n t in Central A m e r i c a d u r i n g the I r a n - C o n t r a controversy; it w a s p e o p l e h a v i n g h a w k i s h values. (For additional discussion of this issue, see the a p p e n d i x to C h a p t e r 8.) T h e e s t i m a t e d patterns of attitude c h a n g e in the Central A m e r i c a c a s e are shown in Figure 7 . 5 . T h e s e p a t t e r n s , which are derived from the c h a n g e m o d e l in Table 7 . 4 , are highly similar to those for the defense-spending issue. T h e only i m p o r t a n t difference is that, for the Central A m e r i c a issue, it is the left-wing g r o u p that is resistant to c h a n g e , w h e r e a s in the defense c a s e , the r i g h t - w i n g g r o u p is m o r e resistant. T h u s , together, the defense and Central A m e r i c a cases show that t h e m o d e l w o r k s as well w h e n opinion s w i n g s to the right as w h e n it s w i n g s to t h e left. In o r d e r to be certain the reader u n d e r s t a n d s w h a t is and is not being s h o w n in Figure 7 . 5 , I present Figure 7 . 6 , which displays the Central A m e r i c a d a t a from a different v i e w p o i n t . R a t h e r than show rates of change b e t w e e n t w o points in t i m e , as in F i g u r e 7 . 5 , it shows absolute levels of support in each p e r i o d . T h u s , 7 9 percent o f the most a w a r e h a w k s s u p p o r t e d greater U . S . involvement in the fall, w h i l e 89 percent did so in the summer. T h i s absolute difference of 10 points (89 - 79 = 10) a m o u n t s to a conversion rate of about 50 percent for highly a w a r e h a w k s not already s u p p o r t i n g greater U . S . involvement in the fall (10/[100 - 79] = 10/21 = 48 p e r c e n t ) . M e a n w h i l e , there is an 11-point shift a m o n g h a w k s scoring just below the m e d i a n on political awareness (46 - 35 = 11). This 11-point shift represents the conversion of only 17 percent 2 0

20 The z-score values for awareness in this graph are - 1.87 and + 1.92 SD. The higher awareness score leaves about 2 percent of cases, rather than the usual 1 percent, in the upper tail; this cutoff has been used because it more accurately represents the actual data. Hawks and doves are defined as scores of ±2 on the hawk-dove scale and ± 1.5 on Reagan disapproval, which has been scored from -2 to +2.

147

Hawks, after Iran-Contra

T

Proportion supporting .75 greater U.S. involvement in Central America before and after IranContra

Proportion changing to favor greater U.S. involvement in Central America, fall 1986 to summer 1987

change'

Hawks, before 79 Iran-Contra

Political awareness

Doves, after Iran-Contra Doves, before Iran-Contra

Figure 7.6. Estimated support for greater U.S. involvement in Central America before and after Iran-Contra. Estimates are derived from Equation 7.7 and the coefficients for unconstrained model in Table 7.4. Source: 1986 and 1987 NES surveys.

(11/[100 - 35] = 17 percent) of h a w k s at this level of political awareness. T h e s e c o n v e r s i o n rates are what I have plotted in Figure 7 . 5 . T h e receptiona c c e p t a n c e m o d e l , t h u s , d o e s not deal in the absolute magnitudes of opinion c h a n g e within s u b g r o u p s ; it deals in conversion rates a m o n g the u n c o n v e r t e d m e m b e r s of p a r t i c u l a r g r o u p s . T h e difference is great. Figure 7 . 6 m a k e s a n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t point. It m i g h t s e e m odd that the I r a n C o n t r a controversy p r o d u c e d attitude c h a n g e in a p r o i n v o l v e m e n t d i r e c t i o n . Yet if it w e r e instead a s s e r t e d that I r a n - C o n t r a further polarized public attitudes about U . S . i n v o l v e m e n t in Central A m e r i c a , the assertion w o u l d not s e e m o d d at all. W h a t Figure 7 . 6 also shows is that a critical effect of the controversy w a s , in fact, to further p o l a r i z e h a w k s and doves. If p o l a r i z a t i o n p r o d u c e d greater overall s u p p o r t for the p r o i n v o l v e m e n t p o s i t i o n , it w a s b e c a u s e the public w a s , at the b e g i n n i n g of the I r a n - C o n t r a affair, so one-sidedly o p p o s e d to U . S . inv o l v e m e n t in Central A m e r i c a that p o l a r i z a t i o n entailed gains in s u p p o r t for the p r o - i n v o l v e m e n t position. Before closing the chapter, I should n o t e that the w i d e c o n f i d e n c e intervals for coefficients of t h e u n c o n s t r a i n e d m o d e l are w o r r i s o m e , and that I discuss this p r o b l e m in my c o n c l u d i n g evaluation of the m o d e l in C h a p t e r 11. In the m e a n t i m e , let me say briefly that there a p p e a r to be t w o r e a s o n s for the p r o b l e m . T h e y are multicollinearity arising from the fact that awareness must be entered in the m o d e l four t i m e s (in the reception and a c c e p t a n c e subfunctions of both the baseline and c h a n g e m o d e l s ) , and t h e d e p e n d e n c e of s o m e coefficients on a small s u b g r o u p of r e s p o n d e n t s , n a m e l y p e o p l e w h o both rank high on political awareness and a p p e a r predisposed to resist a given m e s s a g e . A l t h o u g h neither of these p r o b l e m s is a p r o b l e m with the m o d e l itself, they m a k e testing the m o d e l difficult. S o m e steps to m a x i m i z e t h e efficiency of future tests are also discussed in C h a p t e r 11.

148

Basic

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

C O N C L U D I N G REMARKS This c h a p t e r has d e v e l o p e d s o m e basic principles of attitude c h a n g e , p r o p o s e d a simplified m o d e l that is broadly consistent with these p r i n c i p l e s , and u n d e r t a k e n simple tests of the m o d e l s . T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t of the points m a d e in this chapter is that attitude c h a n g e may be u n d e r s t o o d as a t w o - s t e p process involving, first, reception of persuasive c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n d , s e c o n d , a c c e p t a n c e or n o n a c c e p tance of their contents. T h e reception step in this process d e p e n d s on the i n d i v i d u a l ' s level of political awareness: T h e greater the p e r s o n ' s a w a r e n e s s , t h e greater his or her c h a n c e s of receiving - that is, being exposed to and c o m p r e h e n d i n g - a given c h a n g e inducing m e s s a g e . T h e a c c e p t a n c e step is m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d , but the central idea is that politically a w a r e persons are better able to resist persuasive c o m m u n i c a t i o n s that are inconsistent with their basic values than a r e less aware persons. T h e m a g n i t u d e of the a w a r e n e s s - i n d u c e d resistance effect d e p e n d s on the value distance of the individual from the persuasive c o m m u n i c a t i o n . W h e n the distance is m i n i m a l , awareness m a y have little or no effect in inducing resistance to c h a n g e , as in the case of D e m o c r a t s r e s p o n d i n g to t h e a n t i - d e f e n s e spending m e s s a g e in Figure 7 . 4 . But w h e n the distance is great, a w a r e n e s s is strongly associated with resistance to c h a n g e , as in the case of R e p u b l i c a n s r e s p o n d i n g to t h e s a m e liberal m e s s a g e in Figure 7 . 4 . L a t e r chapters will fill out this a r g u m e n t in several ways. O n e i m p o r t a n t step that r e m a i n s to be taken is an e x a m i n a t i o n of the effects of m e s s a g e s of different intensities. As M c G u i r e ' s analysis of e a s y - l e a r n i n g and h a r d - l e a r n i n g situations indicates, t h e expected pattern of m a s s attitude c h a n g e is m a r k e d l y different w h e n the p e r s u a s i v e m e s s a g e s a t u r a t e s , - o r nearly s a t u r a t e s , a p o p u l a t i o n , than w h e n the m e s s a g e has so little intensity that it can reach only the most politically aware m e m b e r s of the g r o u p . A n o t h e r c o m p l e x i t y c o n c e r n s t h e novelty or freshness of the issue that the persuasive m e s s a g e addresses. If the issue is an extremely familiar o n e , most citizens will have relatively large stores of existing c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , and this will produce high overall levels of inertial resistance to the m e s s a g e . Such resistance will not only lessen the a g g r e g a t e amount of attitude c h a n g e that occurs in response to a m e s s a g e of given intensity, but also alter the pattern of c h a n g e . Yet a n o t h e r task that r e m a i n s is to d e v e l o p e v i d e n c e that the d y n a m i c s of the attitude c h a n g e m o d e l hold at the level of the most basic e l e m e n t of the R A S m o d e l , the f o r m a t i o n of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in response to persuasive c o m m u n i c a tions. I have m a d e specific claims c o n c e r n i n g the role of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in the c h a n g e p r o c e s s but have yet to p r o d u c e direct e v i d e n c e that the claims a r e valid. Finally, t h e m o d e l proposed in this c h a p t e r a s s u m e s that attitude c h a n g e results from the e x p o s u r e of the public to a single, d o m i n a n t flow of c o m m u n i cations. T h i s , as I have m a d e clear, is a major simplification. I n d e e d , in t h e case of U . S . involvement in Central A m e r i c a , w h e r e p r o i n v o l v e m e n t c h a n g e took place a m i d t h e I r a n - C o n t r a s c a n d a l , t h e simplification is so e x t r e m e as to be

processes

of

"attitude

149

change'

entirely i m p l a u s i b l e . T h e a s s u m p t i o n of a one-sided information flow is less ext r e m e in the c a s e of defense s p e n d i n g , w h e r e , as I w a s able to report, the flow of i n f o r m a t i o n in t h e m e d i a p r e d o m i n a n t l y favored cuts in defense spending. But even h e r e , the public w a s exposed to s o m e c o u n t e r v a l e n t information from the R e a g a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , w h i c h sought to justify its policy of increased s p e n d i n g . Taking full account of t h e existence of such two-sided information flows is perhaps t h e m o s t interesting c o m p l i c a t i o n to be added to this intitial discussion of attitude c h a n g e . APPENDIX T h i s appendix explains h o w to obtain m a x i m u m likelihood (M L) e s t i m a t e s of Equation 7.7. E q u a t i o n 7.7 takes t h e general form Prob(-y = 1) =fiX, B). w h e r e y is a 0 - 1 d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e , X is a vector of independent v a r i a b l e s , and P is a coefficient vector. T h e first step is to w r i t e out t h e likelihood function, as follows: L = n D\ *fiX, B) X n D2 * (1

-f(X, 3))

w h e r e Dl takes t h e value of 1 if y = 1 and zero o t h e r w i s e , and D2 takes t h e value of 1 w h e n y = 0 and 0 o t h e r w i s e . T h e log of t h e likelihood function is then Log(L) =

2

m

io

x

* M > 0)1

+

2

D 1

*

l o

8

[ 1

3 ) 1

T h e aim is to m a x i m i z e the value of L o g ( L ) . B e c a u s e t h e log of a n u m b e r b e t w e e n 0 and 1 is n e g a t i v e , and b e c a u s e 0 < f(X, 3) < 1 since it gives p r o b abilities, this expression can be rewritten as 02

-Log(L) =

* l ° g W * . P)] ~

10

1

X*^

-M> P)J )

2

B e c a u s e n o n l i n e a r regression will find t h e coefficient values of a right-hand expression that m i n i m i z e t h e s u m of squared residuals from a left-hand varia b l e , o n e can find t h e values of B that m i n i m i z e the nonsquared value of - L o g (L) - w h i c h is t h e s a m e as m a x i m i z i n g t h e n o n s q u a r e d value of Log(L) - if one uses nonlinear regression to e s t i m a t e 0 = y/-D\ * \og\flX, 3)] - D2 * log[l

-f(X, 3)]

(7.8)

This a l g o r i t h m for p r o d u c i n g m a x i m u m likelihood e s t i m a t e s , w h i c h h a s w i d e utility but h a s not b e e n previously p u b l i s h e d , w a s suggested by D o u g Rivers of Stanford University. In o r d e r to apply E q u a t i o n 7 . 8 to d a t a on attitude c h a n g e b e t w e e n t w o t i m e p e riods for a case in w h i c h / ( X , 3) equals E q u a t i o n 7 . 7 , it is n e c e s s a r y to c o m b i n e the d a t a from t h e t w o p e r i o d s into a single stacked data file, with a 0 - 1 d u m m y variable t o indicate w h i c h data are from t i m e , and w h i c h are from t i m e . T h e 2

150

N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N

following S A S p r o g r a m l a n g u a g e can then b e used t o p r o d u c e M L e s t i m a t e s from such a d a t a file. This e x a m p l e involves the c a s e of c h a n g e s in attitudes toward defense s p e n d i n g b e t w e e n 1980 and 1982, w h e r e t h e value of 1 on D E F S P N indicates s u p p o r t for cuts in s p e n d i n g , and the value of 1 on Y E A R indicates attitudes in 1982:

8

Tests of the one-message model

DATA; INFILE MYDATA; INPUT AWARE 1-11 DEFSPN 12-19 IF DEFSPN EQ 1 THEN Dl = l; IF DEFSPN EQ 0 THEN Dl = 0 ; IF DEFSPN EQ 0 THEN D 2 = 1; IF DEFSPN EQ 1 THEN D 2 = 0 ; VAR1=0; PROC NLIN M E T H O D = D U D ;

PID 20-27

YEAR 28-35;

PARMS B 9 9 = . 1 0 B 0 = - 3 . 9 B1 = 1.2 B 2 = 4 B3 = - . 6 B10= — 1.1 Bl 1 = 1 B 2 1 = 2 . 4 B31 = —1.4 B 4 4 = 1 . 2 ; Tl = (1-(1/(1+B99+EXP(B0+B1*AWARE))))* (1/(1+EXP(-B2-B3*AWARE-B4*PID))); T2 = (1-(1/(1+EXP(B10+B11*AWARE))))* (1/(1+ EXP( - B21 - B31 * A W A R E - B44*PID)))* PI = T1+YEAR*T2*(1-Tl); MODEL VAR1

=

B4=4

( - D 1 *LOG10(P1) - D 2 * L O G 1 0 ( 1 - P l ) ) * * . 5 ;

It is also possible to use nonlinear regression to e s t i m a t e the simpler expression:

M O D E L D E F S P N = PI

T h i s will g i v e e s t i m a t e s that are u n b i a s e d and consistent but inefficient; also, the s t a n d a r d e r r o r s will be incorrect, o w i n g to heteroskedasticity arising from a 0 - 1 dependent variable. 21

T h e p u r p o s e of C h a p t e r 7 w a s to familiarize the reader with the basic logic of the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e process and to d e v e l o p a m o d e l c a p a b l e of c a p t u r i n g the essentials of t h e process as it manifests itself in t h e limited attitude c h a n g e d a t a that are available in typical surveys. T h e present chapter develops and tests the m o d e l ' s d e d u c t i v e i m p l i c a t i o n s , including s o m e nonintuitive o n e s . T h e a i m i s t o c o n v i n c e the r e a d e r that t h e success of the m o d e l in its initial tests w a s not m e r e l y fortuitous but a r i s e s from a significant c o n g r u e n c e b e t w e e n its structure and the actual d y n a m i c s of m a s s o p i n i o n . T h e c h a p t e r h a s three p a r t s . T h e first analyzes t w o message-level d e t e r m i nants of attitude c h a n g e : the intensity of the c h a n g e - inducing m e s s a g e s , and w h e t h e r the m e s s a g e s deal with a familiar or unfamiliar issue. T h e s e factors create predictably different p a t t e r n s of opinion c h a n g e . T h e s e c o n d p a r t e x a m i n e s the d y n a m i c s of resistance to persuasion at the level of the R A S m o d e l ' s p r i m itive t e r m , c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Finally, t h e c h a p t e r uses the m o d e l to shed light on a classic p r o b l e m of opinion r e s e a r c h , g e n e r a t i o n a l differences in receptivity to n e w ideas. I should w a r n that, in the course of developing these diverse tests of the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l , t h e c h a p t e r skips from o n e e m p i r i c a l e x a m p l e t o

21 The only difficulty in implementing this estimation technique is the selection of good starting values for parameters in the model. In small datasets, this can be a serious problem, since nonsensical estimates will be generated unless the starting values for most parameters are reasonably close to actual values. My approach to finding starting values is as follows: First, confirm by visual inspection of the raw data, as organized in the manner of Table 7.1, that there is reason to believe that the reception-acceptance model will apply. That is, confirm the existence of clear nonmonotonicities in the data; if the appropriate patterns are not apparent, further modeling is unlikely to be helpful. Second, eliminate all but the essential variables from the model; in most cases, this will mean using only awareness in the reception function, and only awareness and one predispositions variable in the acceptance function. Third, fix the parameter values for these three variables to plausible values; if all three have been standardized and if the predispositions variable has been scored so that high values indicate resistance to change, plausible values are + 1 , - 1 , and - . 4 , respectively. Then, using starting values of 0 for the intercepts in the reception and acceptance functions, estimate the baseline function for data from the initial time period alone. Once intercept estimates for the baseline model have been obtained, they can be used as starting values. As constraints are serially loosened, remaining pieces of the model are put back and additional variables are added. An alternative approach is to use a spreadsheet to manually fit the model to the data by choosing appropriate parameter values, where the data have been organized in the form of Table 7.1. I suspect that many researchers wanting to use the reception-acceptance model will need to learn to manipulate it on a spreadsheet before they are able to use a statistics package to fit it to data.

a n o t h e r - from public s u p p o r t for foreign wars to presidential approval ratings to racial attitudes - without d e v e l o p i n g a c o m p r e h e n s i v e picture of opinion in any single d o m a i n . T h i s m a k e s the c h a p t e r a bit of a h o d g e p o d g e to read, but I see no a l t e r n a t i v e if I am to exploit fully the limited d a t a that are available to test the m o d e l . CHARACTERISTIC PATTERNS OF ATTITUDE CHANGE T h e analysis o f attitude c h a n g e h a s s o far c o n c e n t r a t e d o n h o w t w o types o f individual-level factors, differences in habitual political a w a r e n e s s and in political p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s , interactively affect attitude c h a n g e . T h i s section will b r i n g into play t w o message-level factors that also systematically affect p a t t e r n s of attitude c h a n g e . T h e first of the message-level differences is the p e n e t r a t i n g p o w e r or intensity of c h a n g e - i n d u c i n g m e s s a g e s . T h e idea here is that s o m e m e s s a g e s have greater

152

Tests of the one-message model

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

153

capacity than o t h e r s to transfuse a public that is differentially attentive to politics. A few m e s s a g e s have such great p e n e t r a t i n g p o w e r that they reach virtually e v e r y o n e , r e g a r d l e s s of their level of attention to politics. C o m m u n i c a t i o n s conc e r n i n g the U . S . policy of o p p o s i n g G e r m a n y and Japan in W o r l d W a r II are an e x a m p l e of such very high-intensity m e s s a g e s (Cantril, 1944). But m a n y m e s sages reach only p e r s o n s w h o are relatively attentive to politics. M o s t c o n g r e s sional a c t i o n s , S u p r e m e C o u r t d e c i s i o n s , and presidential d i r e c t i v e s , even those that m a k e the front p a g e s of n e w s p a p e r s and arouse s o m e controversy, fall into this c a t e g o r y , as we shall s e e . O n e m i g h t suspect that the capacity of a m e s s a g e to p e n e t r a t e the c o n s c i o u s ness of m e m b e r s of the p u b l i c , w h i c h is w h a t I m e a n by intensity, is wholly a function of t h e a m o u n t of broadcast t i m e or front-page space that the n e w s m e dia devote to it. T h e r e i s , however, a factor that is at least as i m p o r t a n t : h o w m u c h p e o p l e already k n o w and care about the issue that the m e s s a g e addresses. T h e greater their c o n c e r n and initial k n o w l e d g e , the m o r e likely they are to n o tice and c o m p r e h e n d additional information that c o m e s their way. This can be seen from the 1989 N E S pilot study, w h i c h m e a s u r e d the diffusion of p a r t i c u l a r n e w s stories through t h e p u b l i c . T h e following three n e w s stories b r o k e j u s t before or d u r i n g t h e pilot survey: Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North was given a suspended sentence, a fine, and 1,200 hours of community service for his conviction of crimes in connection with the IranContra controversy. North's sentencing was a highly discrete event that was the lead story on the national television news and in most newspapers for one day. Speaker Jim Wright resigned his speakership and left the House of Representatives amid allegations of scandal. Wright's resignation was the final act in a long drawn-out political controversy that was at or near the top of the news for several months. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that juveniles and mentally retarded persons could be executed for the crime of murder. Like North's sentencing, this was a discrete event that was at the top of the national news for a short time and then disappeared from view. In the survey, r e s p o n d e n t s were q u e s t i o n e d to find out w h a t , if a n y t h i n g , they had l e a r n e d about these n e w s m e s s a g e s . For e x a m p l e , on the W r i g h t story, p e o ple w e r e a s k e d : Have you heard or read any stories on the resignation of Congressman Jim Wright from the House of Representatives? ( I F Y E S ) D O you happen t o recall why h e resigned? Persons w h o c o u l d give a minimally correct a n s w e r to the follow-up q u e s tion - for e x a m p l e , any m e n t i o n , however v a g u e , of scandal or a c c u s a t i o n s of w r o n g d o i n g - w e r e c o u n t e d as having " r e c e i v e d " the story of the W r i g h t resignation. F r o m such d a t a , it can be e s t i m a t e d that a p p r o x i m a t e l y 75 percent of the public l e a r n e d of N o r t h ' s s e n t e n c e , about 45 percent b e c a m e aware of t h e W r i g h t affair, and 25 percent h e a r d of the S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s d e a t h penalty d e c i sion (Price and Zaller, 1990).

Political awareness Figure 8.1. Diffusion of political news. Estimates are derived from Equation 7.3 and the coefficients in Table 8.6. Source: 1989 NES pilot survey.

T h e only way to explain these d a t a is to a s s u m e that the p e n e t r a t i n g p o w e r of a m e s s a g e m a y be as m u c h a p r o p e r t y of t h e a u d i e n c e that d o e s or d o e s not find it interesting as it is of the a m o u n t of m e d i a c o v e r a g e devoted to it. T h u s , t h e story of Oliver N o r t h ' s sentencing achieved w i d e r recognition in o n e day than the W r i g h t scandal achieved in several m o n t h s . Similarly, w h e n former President R o n a l d R e a g a n fell off his horse w h i l e v a c a t i o n i n g in M e x i c o , m o r e people l e a r n e d about it t h a n l e a r n e d the reason for the W r i g h t r e s i g n a t i o n , even t h o u g h t h e horse incident o c c u r r e d on a Saturday and received m i n i m a l coverage in lightly w a t c h e d w e e k e n d n e w s s h o w s . T h u s , w h e n I refer to t h e intensity of a m e s s a g e , t h e r e a d e r should k e e p in m i n d that I am m a k i n g a statement about both the m e s s a g e itself and the a u d i e n c e that d o e s or d o e s not b e c o m e interested in i t . 1

2

T h e diffusion p a t t e r n s of these differently intense n e w s stories are w o r t h exa m i n i n g m o r e carefully b e c a u s e , unlike the cases of attitude c h a n g e we have e x a m i n e d , they e n a b l e us to m e a s u r e r e c e p t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r m e s s a g e s independently of w h e t h e r the m e s s a g e s brought about attitude c h a n g e . T h u s , we can see very clearly j u s t h o w different p i e c e s of information diffuse t h r o u g h the p u b l i c . D a t a on the diffusion of the N o r t h , W r i g h t , and d e a t h penalty stories are s h o w n in F i g u r e 8 . 1 . T h e r e i s , as e x p e c t e d , a strong relationship b e t w e e n p e o p l e ' s habitual levels of political a w a r e n e s s and their reception of p a r t i c u l a r n e w s stories. S o m e m e m b e r s of the public (those w h o score high on habitual political awareness) l e a r n about virtually all i m p o r t a n t political n e w s , w h i l e o t h e r s learn about almost n o n e of i t . (The c u r v e s in Figure 8.1 are d e r i v e d from logistic 3

1 More complex stories may also have less penetrating power than simple stories. However, it seems to me that the stories mentioned here are all fairly simple, and that differences in people's interest in them are therefore the key to the observed differences in penetrating power. 2 In principle, one could obtain separate measures of intensity of coverage of an issue and the public's familiarity with it, but such data are not available for the present study. 3 Compare these results with those of Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien (1970).

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Tests

regressions o f t h e form o f E q u a t i o n 7 . 3 ; t h e associated coefficient e s t i m a t e s a r e s h o w n in Table 8.6 in the a p p e n d i x to this chapter.) T h e r i g h t h a n d panel of Figure 8.1 c o n t a i n s c o m p a r i s o n d a t a on the diffusion of a nonpolitical story, t h e c r a s h of a D C - 1 0 airliner w h i l e trying to m a k e an e m e r g e n c y landing. T h e disaster, w h i c h killed m o r e than 100 p e r s o n s , w a s c a p tured on v i d e o t a p e and s h o w n repeatedly on television for several days. It w a s p r o m i n e n t l y featured in all t h e n a t i o n ' s political m e d i a - local and national TV n e w s , the n e w s w e e k l i e s , r a d i o , and press. In view of the a m o u n t of this covera g e , the intrinsic interest of the story, the vividness of the a c c o m p a n y i n g television and still p i c t u r e s , and the simplicity of the plotline, it is striking that a large n u m b e r of people n o n e t h e l e s s remained u n a w a r e of its existence. T h e s e m u s t be persons either w h o were entirely cut off from the n e w s media or w h o m a n a g e to r e m e m b e r almost n o t h i n g of w h a t they e n c o u n t e r in the m e d i a . T h e diffusion p a t t e r n s for the four differently intense n e w s stories in Figure 8.1 h a v e t h e u t m o s t i m p o r t a n c e for the study of attitude c h a n g e . T h e attitude c h a n g e c u r v e s we saw in the last c h a p t e r take m a r k e d l y different s h a p e s , d e pending on w h e t h e r they involve a story that has the p e n e t r a t i n g p o w e r of the D C - 1 0 c r a s h , t h e N o r t h s e n t e n c i n g , o r the S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s d e a t h penalty decision. If m e s s a g e s can vary in their intensity, they can also vary in the extent to w h i c h they a d d r e s s issues on w h i c h t h e public h a s a large store of existing considerations. T h i s is the second m e s s a g e - l e v e l variable that systematically affects patterns of attitude c h a n g e . A c c o r d i n g to our e a r l i e r discussion of inertial res i s t a n c e , large stores of preexisting c o n s i d e r a t i o n s act to dilute t h e effects of any new m e s s a g e . For this r e a s o n , m e s s a g e s addressing issues that a r e , in this particular s e n s e , familiar to the public are likely to p r o d u c e less attitude c h a n g e , all else e q u a l , than m e s s a g e s that a d d r e s s novel or unfamiliar t o p i c s . T h e y also affect the e x p e c t e d patterns of c h a n g e , as depicted in attitude c h a n g e c u r v e s of the type e x a m i n e d in C h a p t e r 7. 4

T h e attitude c h a n g e m o d e l e m b o d i e d i n E q u a t i o n 7 . 5 , r e p e a t e d b e l o w , h a s been designed to capture these two message-level variables: Prob(Change)

=

-1

(1 - (1 +/ + E x p [ + a + o.\Awareness]) ) x (1 + E x p [ — b — b | A w a r e n e s s — ^Predispositions]) 0

0

- 1

(7.5)

Differences in m e s s a g e intensity are captured by the a p a r a m e t e r in the reception function; higher values of a indicate that people at the same level of political a w a r e n e s s will have h i g h e r levels of r e c e p t i o n of t h e given m e s s a g e , all else e q u a l . ( C o m p a r e the m i d d l e panel of Figure 7.2 with Figure 8.1.) Differe n c e s in m e s s a g e familiarity, w h i c h affect a c c e p t a n c e r a t e s , are captured by the b coefficient in t h e a c c e p t a n c e function; lower levels of b indicate lower levels of a c c e p t a n c e , at given levels of reception of persuasive m e s s a g e s . 0

0

0

0

4 Note that message intensity, as discussed here, and message familiarity are not entirely independent, since both depend on the public's prior level of information about the topic of the message.

of

the

one-message

155

model

B e c a u s e the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l is highly interactive - b e c a u s e that is, the effect of o n e variable d e p e n d s on the values of all other variables - the effects of shifts in a and b ramify t h r o u g h o u t the m o d e l . In o r d e r to illustrate their effects, I have c o n s t r u c t e d a typology, s h o w n as Figure 8 . 2 , to illustrate c h a r a c t e r i s t i c patterns o f attitude c h a n g e . T h e typology h a s b e e n c o n s t r u c t e d from E q u a t i o n 7 . 5 by using typical values for t h e p a r a m e t e r s on individual-level variables ( a w a r e n e s s and predispositions) while v a r y i n g the m e s s a g e level par a m e t e r s , a and b , to capture typical differences in intensity and familiarity. To facilitate exposition of the typology, I a s s u m e the diffusion of a liberal m e s sage through s u b p o p u l a t i o n s that are liberal, centrist, and c o n s e r v a t i v e in their p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s , but o t h e r m e t r i c s o f d i s t a n c e b e t w e e n m e s s a g e s o u r c e s a n d m e s sage receivers, such as those associated with religion or ethnicity, would prod u c e the s a m e theoretically expected p a t t e r n s . 0

0

5

0

0

L o o k first at the t o p panel of Figure 8 . 2 . It s h o w s e x p e c t e d p a t t e r n s of attitude c h a n g e on " l e s s f a m i l i a r " topics for m e s s a g e s of low, m e d i u m , and high intensity, w h e r e levels of m e s s a g e intensity roughly c o r r e s p o n d to the intensity of stories o n t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s d e a t h p e n a l t y d e c i s i o n , t h e W r i g h t r e s i g n a t i o n , and the D C - 1 0 c r a s h , as depicted in F i g u r e 8 . 1 . W h e n the c h a n g e - i n d u c i n g m e s s a g e has low intensity, as in panel A, attitude c h a n g e is c o n c e n t r a t e d a m o n g t h e m o s t highly a w a r e persons. T h i s is b e c a u s e highly a w a r e p e r s o n s are the only o n e s w h o meet the first requirement for attitude c h a n g e : r e c e p t i o n of a relevant m e s s a g e . But as t h e c h a n g e - i n d u c i n g m e s s a g e b e c o m e s m o r e i n t e n s e , as in panel B and especially C, attitude c h a n g e b e c o m e s c o m m o n a m o n g m o d e r a t e l y aware and finally modestly aware persons. O n e can see from these g r a p h s t h a t , in g e n e r a l , the lower the intensity of the message, the smaller the proportion of attitude change that occurs among lessaware persons. Conversely, the higher the intensity of the m e s s a g e , the higher t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f attitude c h a n g e that o c c u r s a m o n g less-aware persons. Note that t h e p a t t e r n s of attitude c h a n g e on the issue of U . S . involvement in Central A m e r i c a , as depicted in Figure 7.5 of the last chapter, roughly c o r r e s p o n d to t h e p a t t e r n in panel B of this figure. T h i s c o r r e s p o n d e n c e will be a critical e l e m e n t in tests of the validity of the typology later in this section. T h e lower panel of Figure 8.2 uses the s a m e p a r a m e t e r values as in the t o p p a n e l , except that t h e b coefficient h a s b e e n set higher to indicate attitude c h a n g e on a " m o r e f a m i l i a r " topic. T h e increase in issue familiarity has t w o effects on attitude c h a n g e . T h e first is t h a t , as would be e x p e c t e d , m e s s a g e s on m o r e familiar subjects p r o d u c e less overall attitude c h a n g e . S e c o n d and m o r e subtly, a higher proportion of the attitude change on more familiar issues (compared to less familiar issues) is concentrated among less-aware persons. This 0

5 The values used in constructing the typology are a| = 1.25 and b, = - 1.25; a for low-, middle, and high-intensity messages are - 2 . 5 , 0, 2.5, respectively; b for low-familiarity and highfamiliarity messages are +3 and 0, respectively; liberal, centrist, and conservative persons had additional resistance effects of +1.5, 0, and - 1 . 5 , respectively. The / parameter is 0. In constructing the simulated change scores, awareness runs from -2 to +2. These values, when substituted into Equation 7.5, will precisely reproduce the curves shown in Figure 8.2. 0

0

Tests

of the

one-message

model

157

Figure 8.3. Simulated effects of message intensity and familiarity on opinion change (three dimensional). can be seen by noting the peak level of c h a n g e on each c u r v e and c o m p a r i n g it with its vertical c o u n t e r p a r t ; the peaks are m o r e toward the low-awareness end of the s p e c t r u m in the b o t t o m p a n e l s . 6

O b v i o u s l y , the c u r v e s depicted in Figure 8.2 do not exhaust the patterns of attitude c h a n g e that might be g e n e r a t e d by E q u a t i o n 7.5 and o b s e r v e d in actual data. In particular, one might e n c o u n t e r m e s s a g e s that are even m o r e intense than those d e p i c t e d h e r e , in which c a s e the c h a n g e rates a m o n g the least a w a r e persons in panels C and F of Figure 8.2 w o u l d be even higher. Alternatively, o n e might e n c o u n t e r issues that are even less familiar than those e x a m i n e d in the figure, in which c a s e there would be even larger a m o u n t s of attitude c h a n g e , especially a m o n g highly aware persons. T h e important point about Figure 8 . 2 , t h e n , is not that it tells us exactly w h a t to expect in every possible situation, but that it gives us a basis for projecting how, in a general way, c h a n g e s in m e s s a g e intensity and issue familiarity interact with each other and with individual-level factors in the a t t i t u d e - c h a n g e process. S i n c e , as this discussion indicates, the p a r t i c u l a r attitude-change curves d e rived from the model d e p e n d on the p a r t i c u l a r p a r a m e t e r values used to construct t h e m , I wanted to m a k e sure that the typology is not overly d e p e n d e n t on the p a r t i c u l a r p a r a m e t e r values I c h o s e . Accordingly, I c o n s t r u c t e d Figure 8 . 3 , which generalizes Figure 8.2 to three d i m e n s i o n s a n d , in the process of d o i n g s o , shows the joint effects of m e s s a g e intensity and issue familiarity across a m u c h 6 Given that awareness has both reception and acceptance effects.

158

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Tests of the one-message model

w i d e r r a n g e of p a r a m e t e r values. (As a visual aid to i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the regions of Figure 8.3 that c o r r e s p o n d to the different cells of Figure 8.2 are labeled a c cordingly.) I found that three-dimensional representations of the m o d e l , of the type shown in F i g u r e 8 . 3 , retain the s a m e general shape over all plausible values of a and b , provided that a w a r e n e s s r e m a i n s positively a s s o c i a t e d with reception of c h a n g e - i n d u c i n g m e s s a g e s and negatively a s s o c i a t e d with a c c e p t a n c e to roughly the s a m e d e g r e e . Figure 8 . 3 , t h u s , depicts the general p a t t e r n s of attitude c h a n g e that can be e x p e c t e d if E q u a t i o n 7.5 has accurately captured the d y n a m i c s of the attitude-change process.

t w o years. Yet it is implausible to claim that this w a s an issue that really gripped t h e public m i n d . O n e indication of this is that the p u b l i c ' s level of factual inf o r m a t i o n on this issue, as g a u g e d by direct tests of i n f o r m a t i o n , w a s notoriously low. For e x a m p l e , only 38 percent of A m e r i c a n s k n e w in 1986 that the U n i t e d States w a s s u p p o r t i n g the C o n t r a guerillas and not the N i c a r a g u a n gove r n m e n t (Shipler, 1986). As we saw earlier, attitude c h a n g e on the Central A m e r i c a issue c o n f o r m e d to the p a t t e r n indicating a m e s s a g e of m i d d l e intensity and a lower level of issue familiarity (Figure 8 . 2 b ) . Let us therefore stipulate the Central A m e r i c a c a s e to have defined t h e s t a n d a r d for middle-intensity persuasive m e s s a g e s and low issue familiarity. To t h e extent that o t h e r cases differ from t h e s e s t a n d a r d s , they will be classified as having m o r e or less intensity, and m o r e or less average familiarity within t h e public.

7

0

0

T h e t y p o l o g i e s of expected p a t t e r n s of attitude c h a n g e in Figures 8.2 and 8.3 create the potential for tests of the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l that a r e , by the standards of social s c i e n c e , rather d e m a n d i n g , as the next section will show.

The

case

of presidential

popularity

C o n f i r m a t i o n of the empirical value of the typology in Figure 8.2 requires independent m e a s u r e m e n t of the t w o message-level v a r i a b l e s , intensity and familiarity. T h i s is no e a s y task. W i t h respect to intensity, the p r o b l e m is that, as indicated, intensity involves m o r e than the a m o u n t of m e d i a attention to an issue, which could by itself be fairly easily m e a s u r e d . Intensity, as used h e r e , also involves the degree to which the public finds the subject an inherently interesting and e n g a g i n g o n e A l t h o u g h o n e might be able to capture this less tangible factor by m e a s u r i n g h o w m u c h the public k n o w s or cares about different issues, the d a t a n e c e s s a r y for m a k i n g such c o m p a r a t i v e m e a s u r e m e n t s are currently unavailable. W i t h respect to issue familiarity, the m e a s u r e m e n t p r o b l e m is essentially t h e s a m e . It w o u l d be fairly e a s y to use surveys to g a t h e r d a t a on w h a t the public k n o w s about different issues, and to use this as a m e a s u r e of a g g r e g a t e levels of issue familiarity. But, at the m o m e n t , such d a t a are unavailable. C o m p a r a t i v e rates of no o p i n i o n , as utilized in B a r t e l s ' s 1988 analysis of voter k n o w l e d g e of different c a n d i d a t e s , might be a plausible indicator of a g g r e g a t e levels of issue familiarity, except that different q u e s t i o n formats raise different hurdles to the expression of no opinion on different issues. A l t h o u g h r i g o r o u s m e a s u r e m e n t s of intensity and familiarity a r e , for these r e a s o n s , i m p o s s i b l e in the present study, informal but plausible c o m p a r a t i v e m e a s u r e m e n t s can be m a d e for at least s o m e issues. My m e t h o d will be to take the issue of U . S . involvement in Central A m e r i c a as a baseline c a s e , and to j u d g e other c a s e s in relation to it. So let us begin with a close e x a m i n a t i o n of this c a s e . U . S . i n v o l v e m e n t in the guerrilla wars of Central A m e r i c a w a s frequently e n o u g h in the n e w s through 1986 and 1987 to indicate serious m e d i a attention. For e x a m p l e , both Time and Newsweek devoted cover stories to it d u r i n g these 7 That is, a and b values between ± 10. 0

0

T h e first c a s e to be e x a m i n e d in light of these standards is the d e c l i n e in President R e a g a n ' s j o b p e r f o r m a n c e r a t i n g over the course of the I r a n - C o n t r a controversy. In the p e r i o d b e t w e e n late N o v e m b e r 1986 and J u n e 1987, R e a g a n ' s disapproval r a t i n g rose from 32 percent to 48 percent in r e s p o n s e to c h a r g e s that the president had k n o w n about the illegal diversion of g o v e r n m e n t funds to the C o n t r a guerrillas in N i c a r a g u a . W h a t can be said about m e s s a g e intensity and issue familiarity in this c a s e ? In c o m p a r i s o n to the intensity of m e s s a g e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e Central A m e r i c a issue, m e s s a g e s on R e a g a n ' s j o b p e r f o r m a n c e must be classified as m o r e int e n s e . First, with respect to t h e sheer a m o u n t of m e d i a a t t e n t i o n , the I r a n - C o n tra scandal w a s the major c o n t i n u i n g n e w s story in the United States for several m o n t h s , w h i c h is a status that t h e Central A m e r i c a issue, by itself, never a c h i e v e d . S e c o n d , with respect to public interest, President R e a g a n w a s in this period the c o u n t r y ' s leading political figure and the focal point of a large fraction of the n e w s broadcast in the U n i t e d States on a day-to-day basis ( G r o s s m a n and K u m a r , 1981; I y e n g a r and Kinder, 1987). It is therefore likely that his conduct of t h e p r e s i d e n c y w a s a m o r e interesting issue than a guerrilla w a r w h o s e principal a d v e r s a r i e s w e r e not even w i d e l y k n o w n . A m e r i c a n s w o u l d also be e x p e c t e d to have larger a m o u n t s of stored information about R e a g a n , w h o w a s then in his sixth year as president, than about affairs in Central A m e r i c a . If s o , t h e issue of R e a g a n ' s j o b p e r f o r m a n c e w o u l d have been a m o r e familiar issue. G i v e n that t h e c a s e of R e a g a n ' s j o b p e r f o r m a n c e involved m e s s a g e s of higher intensity and h i g h e r familiarity, in t h e p a r t i c u l a r senses i n d i c a t e d , than m e s s a g e s on Central A m e r i c a , it follows that t h e p a t t e r n of attitude c h a n g e on R e a g a n ' s j o b evaluation should differ from t h e Central A m e r i c a pattern in roughly the way that Figure 8.2b differs from Figure 8.2f. T h e attitude c h a n g e d a t a n e c e s s a r y to evaluate this e x p e c t a t i o n are presented in Figure 8.4. T h e s e d a t a show t h e probability of a c h a n g e t o w a r d disapproval of President R e a g a n ' s j o b p e r f o r m a n c e b e t w e e n N o v e m b e r 1986 and J u n e 1987, a s captured in the regular N E S p o s t e l e c t i o n survey and the 1987 N E S pilot study.

160

Tests of the one-message model

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

From raw data

Proportion of November Reagan approvers who switch to disapproval in June

Estimated from model

Liberal Democrats Centrist Democrats

161

1.0

.75 Probability of opinion change among .50 centrists

Democrats .25

Central America

Republicans

Presidential disapproval

Political awareness Centrist Republicans Nov. N = 140 June N = 44

126 49

182 39

141 45

142 39

Reps. Nov. N = 85 June N = 25

62 36

130 36

114 31

149 37

Centrist Independents

Figure 8.4. Opinion change on Reagan approval following Iran-Contra controversy. Estimated change rates are derived from Equation 7.7 and the coefficients in Table 8.5. Source: 1986 and 1987 NES surveys.

T h e c h a n g e c u r v e s on the left have been calculated from r a w d a t a in the m a n n e r of Tables 7.1 and 7 . 2 . As; can be s e e n , the match b e t w e e n Figure 8.2f and the r a w d a t a is r e a s o n a b l e . T h e c h a n g e c u r v e s on the right have been e s t i m a t e d from t h e receptiona c c e p t a n c e m o d e l , as expressed in E q u a t i o n 7 . 7 . T h e model controls for p a r t y identification, e g a l i t a r i a n i s m , and attitudes toward U . S . involvement in Central A m e r i c a , as m e a s u r e d in the baseline survey. (The coefficients from which Figure 8.4 is d e r i v e d , along with a discussion of their e s t i m a t i o n , are c o n t a i n e d in the a p p e n d i x to this chapter.) W h e n the effects of the two value m e a s u r e s are controlled - as in the three c u r v e s in Figure 8.4 for centrist R e p u b l i c a n s , centrist I n d e p e n d e n t s , and centrist D e m o c r a t s - t h e p a t t e r n s of attitude c h a n g e closely r e s e m b l e b o t h the r a w d a t a and the theoretically derived p a t t e r n s in cell F of t h e typology. (Centrist D e m o c r a t s are defined as persons w h o have a m e a n p a r t y identification of 1.3 and w h o score at the p o p u l a t i o n m e a n on egalitarianism and the h a w k - d o v e scale.) Yet w h e n we e x a m i n e the fourth c u r v e in Figure 8 . 4 , that of liberal D e m o c r a t s , the typology appears to fail. For in this c a s e there is no e v i d e n c e of nonmonotonicity. Moreover, there a p p e a r s to be a conflict with the r a w d a t a on the left-hand side of Figure 8.4, which shows a strongly n o n m o n o t o n i c pattern a m o n g D e m o c r a t s . W h a t i s going o n ? 8

8 Liberal Democrats are defined as persons having a mean party identification of 1.3 and who score 1 SD above average on egalitarianism and dovishness. Political awareness in Figure 8.4 ranges from -1.87 SD to +2 SD.

Political awareness Figure 8.5. Patterns of opinion change among centrists on two issues. Estimates are transposed from Figures 7.5 and 8.4.

W i t h respect to t h e apparent conflict with the raw d a t a , there is a c o m p o s i tional p r o b l e m . T h e r a w d a t a show p a t t e r n s of attitude c h a n g e among Democrats who were capable of exhibiting attitude change in an anti-Reagan direction, that i s , a m o n g D e m o c r a t s w h o did not already disapprove of R e a g a n ' s j o b p e r f o r m a n c e in fall 1986. T h i s g r o u p did not contain m a n y liberal D e m o c r a t s , since m o s t liberal D e m o c r a t s , especially those high on political awaren e s s , already disapproved of R e a g a n ' s p e r f o r m a n c e at that t i m e . T h u s , the simulated attitude c h a n g e c u r v e for liberal D e m o c r a t s d o e s not attempt to explain w h a t w a s g o i n g on a m o n g the majority of D e m o c r a t s in the fall w h o were available for c o n v e r s i o n to an a n t i - R e a g a n position. T h e o n e for centrist D e m ocrats d o e s , and this c u r v e generally agrees w i t h the r a w d a t a . But if the p a t t e r n s of attitude c h a n g e that o c c u r at any point d e p e n d on the ideological c o m p o s i t i o n of the g r o u p available for attitude c h a n g e , can we still m a k e a fair test of t h e t y p o l o g y ? Yes, p r o v i d e d we control for p a r t i s a n c o m p o s i t i o n . Figure 8.5 i m p o s e s such a control by c o m p a r i n g t h e attitude-change c u r v e s of centrists on the issues of presidential popularity and of Central A m e r i c a i n v o l v e m e n t , the defining instance of a m e d i u m - i n t e n s i t y and low-familiarity issue. W i t h p a r t i s a n c o m p o s i tion controlled, we can see that - even t h o u g h t h e total a m o u n t of attitude c h a n g e is about the s a m e on b o t h issues - t h e a n t i - R e a g a n m e s s a g e w a s louder, since it w a s m o r e successful in p e n e t r a t i n g t h e lower a w a r e n e s s strata. We can also see that the a n t i - R e a g a n m e s s a g e w a s m o r e familiar, since it e n c o u n t e r e d greater resistance a m o n g highly aware p e r s o n s , as is expected for m o r e familiar issues. It is striking that, a m o n g the most politically a w a r e c e n t r i s t s , the I r a n - C o n t r a controversy had virtually no effect on R e a g a n ' s approval r a t i n g . It is t e m p t i n g to attribute this s t o u t h e a r t e d resistance to t h e effects of ideology, but since we are dealing with c e n t r i s t s , this is h a r d to d o . An a l t e r n a t i v e explanation is that we are seeing the effects of t h e inertial resistance that develops on familiar issues.

162

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

Six years into the R e a g a n presidency, these politically attentive centrists had already acquired so m u c h information that the revelations of the I r a n - C o n t r a hearings m a d e little additional impact. Rather, the scandal had its greatest impact on those w h o s e initial information about R e a g a n , as j u d g e d by their overall levels of political a w a r e n e s s , w a s relatively m o d e s t .

Opinion formation

on

new

issues

Tests

of

the

one-message

model

163

In 1956 t h e C e n t e r for Political Studies at the University of M i c h i g a n posed the following a g r e e - d i s a g r e e q u e s t i o n in a national survey: The government in Washington should stay out of the question of whether white and colored children go to the same schools. G i v e n the novelty of this issue, one m a y r e a s o n a b l y c o n c l u d e that m o s t of the p e r s o n s (except for blacks) w h o favored federally m a n d a t e d school desegregation in this poll were fairly new adherents to this v i e w . 1 0

A parallel a r g u m e n t can be m a d e for the o t h e r two issues to be e x a m i n e d here: This section applies the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e model to three additional cases; the f o r m a t i o n of attitudes toward federal involvement in school d e s e g r e g a t i o n in the m i d - 1 9 5 0 s , the f o r m a t i o n of p o p u l a r j u d g m e n t s on the p e r f o r m a n c e of the national e c o n o m y at t h e t i m e the c o u n t r y a p p e a r e d to be c o m i n g out of the recession of 1 9 8 1 - 2 , and the f o r m a t i o n of attitudes toward a p r o p o s e d freeze on nuclear w e a p o n p r o d u c t i o n in the e a r l y 1980s. E a c h of these cases has considerable intrinsic interest, but the m a i n p u r p o s e in examining t h e m is to provide further tests of the typology of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c patterns of attitude c h a n g e as d e picted in Figure 8 . 2 . N o t e , however, that the previous p a r a g r a p h refers to cases of attitude formation r a t h e r t h a n , as earlier, to attitude change. T h e reason is that here I am dealing with attitudes that were formed and m e a s u r e d early in the life of the given issue, at t h e point w h e n the issue w a s j u s t e m e r g i n g on the national a g e n d a and beginning to attract the attention of pollsters. In such s i t u a t i o n s , attitude c h a n g e cannot be m e a s u r e d against a baseline of p r i o r opinion b e c a u s e , at least in these c a s e s , t h e issues w e r e so n e w that there w e r e no p r i o r m e a s u r e m e n t s and quite possibly no p r i o r opinions. I will therefore a s s u m e that most of the opinion in favor of the n e w issue h a s been formed in r e s p o n s e to recent c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , a n d , m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , that opinion h a s formed in a c c o r d a n c e with the usual r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e process. I will a s s u m e , in other w o r d s , that attitude formation is a type of attitude c h a n g e that d e p e n d s on a t w o - s t e p process in which political a w a r e n e s s is positively associated with reception of m e s s a g e s on the n e w issue, and in which a c c e p t a n c e of these m e s s a g e s d e p e n d s on awareness and on political values. C o n s i d e r school d e s e g r e g a t i o n in the 1950s. Until the S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s ruling on Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, the idea that the federal g o v e r n m e n t should take the leading role in d e s e g r e g a t i n g the public schools of the S o u t h w a s simply not a subject of salient public controversy. Neither of the t w o major parties had a d v o c a t e d it in its p l a t f o r m s , no major legislation on t h e subject had c o m e close to p a s s a g e in C o n g r e s s , and no major politician w a s identified with it. School d e s e g r e g a t i o n w a s still largely a " n o n i s s u e , " in the sense of B a c h r a c h and B a r a t z (1962). H e n c e , no polling a g e n c y a t t e m p t e d to m e a s u r e public attitudes on the issue until the S u p r e m e C o u r t suddenly thrust school d e s e g r e g a t i o n o n t o the national a g e n d a . 9

9 Page and Shapiro, in press: ch. 3.

Nuclear freeze. T h e notion of a freeze on t h e production of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s enjoyed a brief but intense v o g u e in the early 1980s. Television talk shows d e b a t e d it, a spate of n e w b o o k s w a s devoted to it, and both h o u s e s of C o n g r e s s passed resolutions favoring it. A l t h o u g h no national polling o r g a n i z a t i o n c a r r i e d a q u e s t i o n on this issue until its e m e r g e n c e as an issue in 1 9 8 1 , p o p u l a r support for it w a s strong in all of t h e early polls on t h e subject. In the fall of 1982, the N E S asked t h e following question: Do you think the United States should freeze the production of nuclear weapons on its own, do so only if the Soviet Union agrees to a freeze as well, or do you think that the United States should not freeze production of nuclear weapons at all? S u p p o r t for a n u c l e a r freeze, as captured by the first t w o o p t i o n s , could only have b e e n n e w s u p p o r t , since the idea for a " f r e e z e " on n u c l e a r w e a p o n s production had been self-consciously invented by a n t i w a r activists only a few m o n t h s before t h e issue e m e r g e d in t h e national limelight ( P r i n g l e , 1982).

The economy. T h r o u g h t h e first six m o n t h s of 1982, the c o u n t r y w a s mired in the deepest recession since the G r e a t D e p r e s s i o n of the 1930s. By the fall, however, there b e g a n to be r e p o r t s in the m a s s m e d i a that the e c o n o m y w a s turning a r o u n d and h e a d i n g t o w a r d a period of e x p a n s i o n . T h e s e mainly t o o k the form of n e w s r e p o r t s about v a r i o u s e c o n o m i c indicators and of p r o g n o s t i c a t i o n s by e c o n o m i c forecasters. In N o v e m b e r and D e c e m b e r of that year, the N E S asked the following q u e s t i o n : Over the past year, has the economy gotten worse, stayed about the same, or improved? G i v e n t h e b l e a k n e s s of t h e e c o n o m y in t h e earlier m o n t h s of 1982, such support as existed for t h e p r o p o s i t i o n that the e c o n o m y w a s i m p r o v i n g at the t i m e of the fall survey m a y be c o n s i d e r e d new s u p p o r t for this view. 10 It is true, as Page and Shapiro (in press) point out, that American public opinion had been moving steadily leftward on race since at least the mid-1940s, presumably at least partly in response to other Supreme Court decisions on race, President Truman's efforts to achieve fair employment for blacks, and agitation by Hubert Humphrey and others within the Democratic Party. One might therefore take the sum of media reports of these activities as "the message" which, filtering through the reception-acceptance process, produced the degree of support for school desegregation that existed in 1956.

164

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

In order to test p a t t e r n s of attitude formation on these topics against the typology in Figure 8 . 2 , it is n e c e s s a r y to m a k e rough j u d g m e n t s about the intensity and issue familiarity of each of these three issues. To begin with issue intensity: T h e segregation and freeze issues s e e m , from my casual e x a m i n a t i o n of the periodical literature of the 1950s and 1980s, to be typical instances of controversial issues. T h a t is, they received significant press c o v e r a g e , s o m e t i m e s as the lead story of the day, but did not d o m i n a t e the W a s h i n g t o n c o m m u n i t y and political n e w s for m o n t h s at a t i m e . T h e y s e e m e d , t h u s , to involve political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s of roughly m i d d l e intensity, m u c h as in the case of U . S . policy in Central A m e r i c a . T h e n e w s on the e c o n o m y s e e m s , by c o m p a r i s o n , significantly less intense than c o v e r a g e of the Central A m e r i c a issue. M o s t of it w a s c a r r i e d as second-level n e w s , worthy of a 3 0 - s e c o n d spot well back in the national evening n e w s or a headline in the business p a g e s , but never of major story status. W i t h respect to general familiarity, I w o u l d j u d g e race to b e , by far, the most familiar. This issue is, as many o b s e r v e r s have noted (for e x a m p l e , C o n v e r s e , 1964; C a r m i n e s and S t i m s o n , 1982, 1989), o n e of the few political subjects on which A m e r i c a n s are likely to have well-crystallized opinions. T h e n u c l e a r freeze issue, however, seems at the other p o l e of issue familiarity, a c o m p l e t e l y novel twist on a subject that is, however i m p o r t a n t , still a foreign policy issue that is relatively r e m o t e from most p e o p l e ' s lives. T h e familiarity of n e w s on the e c o n o m y is, by my lights, t h e most difficult to evaluate. On the o n e h a n d , the p e r f o r m a n c e of the e c o n o m y is s o m e t h i n g that touches e v e r y o n e ' s lives and is, in this s e n s e , highly familiar; but on the other h a n d , few p e o p l e keep close tabs on technical indicators of e c o n o m i c perform a n c e , w h i c h m e a n s that any new information of this type w o u l d not e n c o u n t e r a large store of preexisting c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . " In view of the difficulty of classifying e c o n o m i c n e w s on issue familiarity, I will leave this classification o p e n . F r o m the foregoing, we expect p a t t e r n s of attitude formation on the freeze to r e s e m b l e cell B of the typology ( m i d d l e intensity and low familiarity) and the segregation issue to r e s e m b l e cell E ( m i d d l e intensity and high familiarity). Patterns of e c o n o m i c j u d g m e n t should r e s e m b l e one of the low-message-intensity cells (a or d ) . T h e attitude c u r v e s n e c e s s a r y for e v a l u a t i n g these e x p e c t a t i o n s are reported in Figure 8.6. T h e s e curves have been derived from a straightforward application of E q u a t i o n 7.5 to d a t a on each of the three issues (coefficients for these applications m a y be found in Table 8.7 in the appendix to this c h a p t e r ) . As can be seen, the fit with theoretical e x p e c t a t i o n s is r e a s o n a b l e .

Tests

Percent believing that economy is improving, fall 1982

of the

one-message

model

Percent favoring nuclear weapons freeze, fall 1982

165 Percent favoring federally mandated school desegregation, 1956

Political awareness Figure 8.6. Estimated patterns of opinion change on three new issues. Estimates are derived from Equation 7.5 and coefficients in Table 8.7. Source: 1982 NES survey and 1956-58-60 CPS survey. for the n e w idea a m o n g liberals, and that this s a m e relationship is n o n m o n o t o n i c a m o n g c o n s e r v a t i v e s . W i t h respect to the e c o n o m y , w h e r e the n e w s of the improving e c o n o m y had a c o n s e r v a t i v e v a l e n c e ( " R e a g a n o m i c s is w o r k i n g " ) , these p a t t e r n s reverse: T h e r e is a positive a w a r e n e s s relationship for c o n s e r v a tives and a n o n m o n o t o n i c o n e for liberals. Evaluating

the

attitude-change

typology

A l o n g with the results of the previous chapter, these d a t a lend significant s u p p o r t to t h e r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l and to e x p e c t a t i o n s of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c patt e r n s of attitude c h a n g e d e r i v e d from it. In particular, they lend s u p p o r t to these d e d u c t i o n s from t h e m o d e l : The diffusion of a liberal message through a very liberal group, or a conservative message through a very conservative group, will produce a monotonic pattern of attitude change in which the most aware persons are most likely to change, at least in cases in which the issue is a relatively unfamiliar one. The diffusion of a moderately intense liberal message through a conservative group, or a moderately intense conservative message through a liberal group, will produce a nonmonotonic pattern of attitude change in which moderately aware persons are most likely to change.

Note that for the two liberal issues, t h e freeze and school d e s e g r e g a t i o n , there is, as we w o u l d e x p e c t , a positive relationship between a w a r e n e s s and support

Low-intensity messages, as compared to high-intensity ones, will produce a higher proportion of change among highly aware persons, as in Figure 8.2. Attitude change on less familiar issues, as compared to more familiar issues, will more often occur among highly aware persons, as in Figure 8.2.

11 For example, only about 15 percent of respondents to the 1985 NES pilot study were able to identify Paul Volker as chairman of the Federal Reserve. 12 Awareness runs from -2.54 to + 1.35 for the school issue and -1.86 to + 1.96 for the other two. To achieve equivalence across cases, scores on the two scales in the school case have been set at - . 8 5 and +.85; for the other two issues, scores on the solo scales range ±1.5. Ranges for the party and approval variables are ±1.3. Age is set at 45.

T h e e v i d e n c e in s u p p o r t of the first t w o of these d e d u c t i o n s s e e m s quite s t r o n g , and m o r e s u p p o r t i n g e v i d e n c e will be r e p o r t e d below. T h a t is, there is presently a significant n u m b e r of c a s e s in which there exist m o n o t o n i c i t i e s and n o n m o n o t o n i c i t i e s in t h e e x p e c t e d p l a c e s , and it s e e m s likely that m o r e such cases will a c c u m u l a t e in the future.

12

166

N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N

Tests

T h e c o m p l e x series of d e d u c t i o n s e m b o d i e d in the typology of attitude c h a n g e is less strongly s u p p o r t e d , for two r e a s o n s : weak m e a s u r e m e n t of the key independent v a r i a b l e s , intensity and familiarity; and a scarcity of cases that c a n , even by the weak m e a s u r e m e n t used h e r e , be plausibly assigned to p a r t i c u l a r cells. Still, t h e available e v i d e n c e is s u p p o r t i v e : As e x p e c t e d , a low-intensity m e s s a g e (on the e c o n o m y ) produced a higher p r o p o r t i o n of its c h a n g e a m o n g highly aware persons than the m o r e intense m e s s a g e (on Central A m e r i c a ) . A l s o as e x p e c t e d , a larger p r o p o r t i o n of c h a n g e on the two m o r e familiar issues (segregation and R e a g a n approval) o c c u r r e d a m o n g m o d e r a t e l y aware persons than o c c u r r e d a m o n g these persons on less familiar issues. But confident confirmation that t h e typology h o l d s , especially in c o n n e c t i o n with the p u t a t i v e effects of m e s s a g e familiarity, awaits stronger e v i d e n c e . 1 3

Before leaving this topic, it is n e c e s s a r y to repeat an i m p o r t a n t caveat: T h r o u g h o u t this and the last chapter, I have sought to model the diffusion of a single m e s s a g e , that is, a m e s s a g e in which all c o m m u n i c a t i o n favors o n e side of the issue. W h e n , as often o c c u r s , m a s s opinion c h a n g e s in r e s p o n s e to inform a t i o n flows that c a r r y o p p o s i n g m e s s a g e s - and especially w h e n t h e o p p o s i n g m e s s a g e s differ in intensity from each o t h e r and across t i m e - the expected patterns of attitude c h a n g e can be quite different. As in the previous chapter, none of the cases e x a m i n e d m e e t s the requirement of a strictly o n e - s i d e d information flow. Satisfactory resolution of this p r o b l e m awaits d e v e l o p m e n t of a " t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l " of attitude c h a n g e to replace the simple " o n e - m e s s a g e ' m o d e l that I have been using so far. T h a t will c o m e in C h a p t e r 9. In the m e a n t i m e , it is apparent that the o n e - m e s s a g e m o d e l is robust to fairly substantial d e p a r t u r e s from its a s s u m p t i o n of a strictly one-sided information flow, which m e a n s that it can be a useful theoretical tool in cases in w h i c h the d a t a n e c e s s a r y for testing a m o r e e l a b o r a t e t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l are unavailable.

M I C R O F O U N D A T I O N S OF RESISTANCE TO PERSUASION

of the

one-message

model

167

More aware persons are more likely to possess and have available in memory the cueing messages that enable them to recognize messages that are inconsistent with their values. More aware persons are likely to have larger stores of preexisting considerations on most issues. This "informational ballast" counteracts the effects of any new messages that might be accepted. More aware persons are more likely to be exposed to relatively esoteric communications which run counter to the dominant message in the political environment. The acceptance of such countervalent communications counteracts the effects of any dominant messages that might also be internalized. T h e s e three forms of resistance, each rooted in the R A S m o d e l , were d e scribed as p a r t i s a n resistance, inertial r e s i s t a n c e , and c o u n t e r v a l e n t resistance, respectively. T h e aim of this section is to search for e v i d e n c e of the empirical validity of the first t w o types of resistance. I will c o n t i n u e this effort in C h a p t e r s 9 and 10, w h e r e I will also provide e v i d e n c e of c o u n t e r v a l e n t resistance.

Preexisting

considerations

and

inertial

resistance

It w o u l d obviously be highly valuable to m a k e direct o b s e r v a t i o n s of the stored c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w h i c h , as the R A S m o d e l c l a i m s , are the basis of inertial resistance to p e r s u a s i o n . T h e r e is only o n e c a s e of attitude c h a n g e for which such o b s e r v a t i o n s are available: the decline in President R e a g a n ' s approval ratings over the course of the I r a n - C o n t r a controversy of 1 9 8 6 - 7 . As we saw earlier, Reagan suffered his greatest losses a m o n g persons of m o d e r a t e political a w a r e ness. Highly a w a r e p e r s o n s , t h o u g h m o r e heavily exposed to the d a m a g i n g n e w s of I r a n - C o n t r a , were relatively resistant to c h a n g e . So the q u e s t i o n to be asked is: Is there e v i d e n c e that the inertial effects of previously formed c o n s i d e r a t i o n s contributed to the resistance of highly a w a r e p e r s o n s ? A m e a s u r e of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s affecting R e a g a n ' s j o b e v a l u a t i o n s can be found in the J u n e wave of the 1987 N E S pilot study. R e s p o n d e n t s were asked to rate R e a g a n ' s p e r f o r m a n c e and then i m m e d i a t e l y afterward were asked the following open-ended question: 14

A central feature of the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l is that greater political awareness is associated with greater resistance to ideas that are inconsistent with o n e ' s political v a l u e s , and that the a m o u n t of added resistance d u e to awareness increases as value distance from the m e s s a g e increases. A l t h o u g h there can be little d o u b t , in light of the e v i d e n c e already presented, that a w a r e n e s s has such resistance effects u n d e r at least s o m e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , the r e a s o n s for the resistance are yet to be m a d e clear. E a r l y in C h a p t e r 7, three explanatory m e c h a nisms were proposed: 13 The middle-intensity message on race also produced a higher proportion of its change among highly aware persons than the more intense message on presidential performance. However, a confounding factor here is that race is probably a more familiar issue than presidential performance; the effect of this difference is to reinforce rather than cross cut the effect of the intensity difference, which makes it difficult to be certain whether the apparent difference is due to intensity or familiarity or both.

Still thinking about the question you just answered, I'd like you to tell me what ideas came to mind as you were answering that question. Exactly what things went through your mind? (Up to three follow-up probes of "Any others?") 14 The Reagan approval item used here was included near the end of the survey as part of a priming experiment. That is, several items ahead of the approval item were a series of questions that made salient either favorable or unfavorable aspects of Reagan's job performance. The openended probes were included in order to directly assess the effects of the primes. The priming experiment failed in the sense that it failed to produce a shift in marginal approval rates for Reagan. However, half of the sample was primed with information concerning the IranContra controversy, and these persons were slightly more likely to mention Iran-Contra in their open-ended remarks. Hence all persons from this half-sample have been eliminated from the analysis that follows. Note that the approval item used to measure attitude change on presidential approval is a separate item that was carried early in the survey and hence was unaffected by the failed priming experiment.

168

N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N

Tests

T h e majority of r e m a r k s elicited by these p r o b e s c o u l d be c o m f o r t a b l y a c c o m m o d a t e d within t h e standard N E S c a n d i d a t e m a s t e r c o d e s (these a r e t h e c o d e s used for classifying r e s p o n s e s to q u e s t i o n s a s k i n g for the r e s p o n d e n t s ' likes and dislikes about the c a n d i d a t e s in the regular N E S s u r v e y s ) . However, s o m e r e m a r k s c o n c e r n i n g R e a g a n ' s j o b p e r f o r m a n c e had never c o m e u p i n connection w i t h o t h e r c a n d i d a t e s and h e n c e required new c o d e s . T h r e e of these n e w c o d e s s e e m to involve direct or indirect reference to the I r a n - C o n t r a scandal: Uninformed; doesn't (seem to) know anything about the issues/what is going on in the country/government. Doesn't work (hard) at job; not involved (enough) in the work of his office; delegates too much authority to others; has chosen poor/incompetent aides; his aides have not performed well. (Involvement in) Diversion of money to the Contras (in violation of the l a w ) .

Table on

8.1. Reagan

of

Relationship job

the

one-message

between

political

169

model

awareness

and

remarks

performance Level of Dolitical awareness Hi^h

Middle

Low 1.21

1.30

1.55

1.63

0.09°

0.23

0.41

0.42

0.28

0.08*

0.15

0.23

0.21

0.13

44

52

54

38

46

Mean number of remarks not related to Iran-Contra affair

0.68

Mean number of remarks related to Iran-Contra affair Ratio of Contra remarks to all remarks N

a

15 a

R e m a r k s falling into any of these n e w c a t e g o r i e s , plus direct references to att e m p t s to free h o s t a g e s (which w e r e a c c o m m o d a t e d within an existing c o d e ) , have been c o m b i n e d into a simple index that m a y be considered a rough indic a t o r of t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s relating to I r a n - C o n t r a that e n t e r e d into p e o p l e ' s calc u l a t i o n s o f R e a g a n ' s approval r a t i n g . T h i s index, it m u s t be e m p h a s i z e d , is a v e r y r o u g h indicator. First, there a r e m a n y t h i n g s that p e o p l e m i g h t h a v e said about R e a g a n that w e r e 'inspired b y I r a n - C o n t r a (such a s " H e i s d i s h o n e s t " ) but that w o u l d not h a v e been captured b y these specie! c o d e s . S e c o n d , s o m e p e o p l e , n o t a b l y highly a w a r e D e m o c r a t s , m a y have had s o m a n y m o r e i m p o r t a n t (to t h e m ) r e a s o n s for d i s a p proving of R e a g a n that they failed to m e n t i o n I r a n - C o n t r a even t h o u g h it w e i g h e d in their minds as a n e g a t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n . T h i r d , it is possible that people are u n a b l e to recall on a m o m e n t ' s notice all of the ideas that have influenced their e v a l u a t i o n s , as m a i n t a i n e d by L o d g e , M c G r a w , and Stroh (1989). For these r e a s o n s , the index almost c e r t a i n l y understates the influence of the scandal o n R e a g a n ' s ratings. N o n e t h e l e s s , these d a t a do e n a b l e us to test notions about how information about I r a n - C o n t r a interacted with o t h e r information about R e a g a n ' s j o b perform a n c e t o affect his overall j o b r a t i n g . W h a t exactly, t h e n , d o w e w a n t t o test? If stored i n f o r m a t i o n e n g e n d e r s resistance to persuasion a m o n g highly a w a r e p e r s o n s , we should find, first, that highly a w a r e p e r s o n s h a v e large stores of n o n - C o n t r a c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , and s e c o n d , that t h e s e n o n - C o n t r a c o n s i d e r a t i o n s serve to offset the impact of scandal-related c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . As can be seen in Table 8 . 1 , the first e x p e c t a t i o n is strongly s u p p o r t e d . T h e m o r e attention p e o p l e paid to politics, t h e better able they were to recall n o n - C o n t r a c o n s i d e r a t i o n s on which to j u d g e R e a g a n . T h e s e c o n d e x p e c t a t i o n is also s u p p o r t e d ; as can be seen in the b o t t o m row of Table 8 . 1 , the r a t i o of C o n t r a to n o n - C o n t r a c o n s i d e r a t i o n s 15 By inadvertence, codes for the open-ended Reagan remarks were not included in the codebook for the 1987 pilot. However, the new codes have been permanently incorporated into the existing NES master codes, and so can be found in the party/candidate master codes in the earlyrelease codebook for the 1988 election study. They are distinguished from preexisting codes by an asterisk.

Cell entries in this row represent mean number of remarks of type indicated. Cells include all respondents, including those who had no opinion on Reagan job approval. Cell entry in this row is the average of an individual-level measure. Source: 1987 NES pilot survey. is highest a m o n g persons in t h e m i d d l i n g levels of political a w a r e n e s s . T h i s n o n monotonicity, w h i c h easily achieves statistical s i g n i f i c a n c e ,

16

h a s c o m e about i n

p a r t b e c a u s e t h e large n u m b e r of n o n - C o n t r a c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in the m i n d s of highly a w a r e p e r s o n s has been able to dilute t h e effects of C o n t r a - r e l a t e d ones. T h u s , Table 8.1 is consistent with the notion that stored information c o n c e r n i n g R e a g a n ' s overall p e r f o r m a n c e as president helped to offset t h e effects of negative n e w s c o n c e r n i n g I r a n - C o n t r a . T h e r e a r e t w o additional points t o n o t i c e i n Table 8 . 1 . O n e i s t h e v e r y low level of s p o n t a n e o u s m e n t i o n of the controversy in the least a w a r e strata of the public; even allowing for s o m e u n d e r m e a s u r e m e n t , 9 percent is a low level of p e n e t r a t i o n for a controversy of the m a g n i t u d e of I r a n - C o n t r a . T h i s , p r e s u m ably, is why there w a s relatively little c h a n g e in popularity ratings a m o n g t h e least a w a r e , as s h o w n earlier. T h e o t h e r point to n o t i c e is t h e p a t t e r n of n o n m o n o t o n i c i t y i n s p o n t a n e o u s references t o t h e s c a n d a l . T h i s n o n m o n o t o n i c i t y c o n t r i b u t e d to the n o n m o n o t o n i c r a t i o in the b o t t o m row of Table 8 . 1 ; its explanation is c o n s i d e r e d in t h e next s e c t i o n .

Partisan

resistance

at

the

level

of considerations

Inertial resistance i s , as we have s e e n , a m e c h a n i s m for diluting t h e effects of n e w l y a c q u i r e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . A m o r e efficient form of resistance to persuas i o n , however, is outright rejection of n e w c o n s i d e r a t i o n s at t h e point of first e n c o u n t e r i n g t h e m , if they are inconsistent with o n e ' s predispositions. 16 This can be confirmed by regression analysis. If ratio is the dependent variable, and information and information-squared are the independent variables, the coefficients on both independent variables are significant at the .05 level, one-tailed.

170

N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N

Tests

of

the

one-message

W i t h i n the R A S m o d e l , p e o p l e can reject ideas only w h e n they possess cueing i n f o r m a t i o n to let t h e m k n o w that a p a r t i c u l a r idea is inconsistent with their v a l u e s , and they are m o r e likely to possess this information and have it available for use if they are politically a w a r e (see Table 4 . 4 ) . H e n c e we should expect g r e a t e r p a r t i s a n resistance t o u n c o n g e n i a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a m o n g wellinformed p e r s o n s . F r o m this r e a s o n i n g , we should find that, for typical p a r t i s a n issues, the inc i d e n c e of inconsistent c o n s i d e r a t i o n s - c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that are inconsistent with t h e p e r s o n ' s ideology - tends to be n o n m o n o t o n i c with respect to political awareness. T h e reason s t e m s from n o w familiar logic: Highly aware persons will, in the n o r m a l course of e v e n t s , be heavily e x p o s e d to inconsistent m e s s a g e s but, being highly a w a r e , they will p o s s e s s the contextual information n e c e s s a r y to r e c o g n i z e and reject these m e s s a g e s . Very u n a w a r e persons will be exposed to few m e s s a g e s of any kind and h e n c e also form few inconsistent c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . This w o u l d leave m o d e r a t e l y a w a r e p e r s o n s as most likely to form inconsistent c o n s i d e r a t i o n s : T h e y pay e n o u g h a t t e n t i o n to politics to be fairly heavily exp o s e d to inconsistent m e s s a g e s , but often lack the m e s s a g e cues n e c e s s a r y to r e c o g n i z e inconsistency. In a d d i t i o n , we w o u l d expect a positive r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n a w a r e n e s s and acquisition of consistent c o n s i d e r a t i o n s - that is, c o n s i d e r a t i o n s consistent with a p e r s o n ' s ideology. The reason is that there is, as a l w a y s , a strong exposure effect from a w a r e n e s s a n d , in this c a s e , no a w a r e n e s s - i n d u c e d resistance effect. T h u s we have a dual e x p e c t a t i o n : All else e q u a l , political a w a r e n e s s should have a positive r e l a t i o n s h i p with t h e acquisition of consistent c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and a n o n m o n o t o n i c association with inconsistent c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Or, m o r e generally, the t y p o l o g y in F i g u r e 8.2 should apply to the f o r m a t i o n of n e w considerations as well as to attitude c h a n g e . To test the e x p e c t a t i o n , I return to d a t a from the 1987 Pilot study. This survey, it will be r e c a l l e d , contains m e a s u r e s of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s for three issues: j o b guara n t e e s , g o v e r n m e n t s e r v i c e s , and aid to blacks. E a c h c o n s i d e r a t i o n has been classified as either consistent or inconsistent with t h e p e r s o n ' s liberal-conservative o r i e n t a t i o n (see M e a s u r e s A p p e n d i x for description of m e a s u r e ) ; t h u s , for a liberal p e r s o n , any c o n s i d e r a t i o n that m i g h t induce the person to give a liberal response h a s b e e n classified as a consistent c o n s i d e r a t i o n and any that w o u l d tend to induce a c o n s e r v a t i v e r e s p o n s e h a s been classified as an inconsistent conside r a t i o n . S e p a r a t e indices have been c r e a t e d to tally the n u m b e r of consistent and inconsistent c o n s i d e r a t i o n s each p e r s o n m e n t i o n e d . To m a x i m i z e c h a n c e s that these indices w o u l d c a p t u r e the full r a n g e of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in p e o p l e ' s h e a d s , they were built to include all relevant r e m a r k s over both w a v e s of the study. T h e d a t a are from t h e stop-and-think p r o b e s since, as will be r e c a l l e d , these p r o b e s were i n t e n d e d , inter alia, to elicit as m a n y as possible of t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s present in p e o p l e ' s m i n d s . T h e d a t a on consistent and inconsistent c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are a r r a y e d in Figure 8 . 7 . To c o m p e n s a t e for the small n u m b e r of cases and t h e high level of e r r o r in

171

model

Consistent considerations

Average number of considerations

0H

1

1

1

1

1

Political awareness Figure 8.7. Effect of political awareness on formation of consistent and inconsistent considerations. See Table 8.2 for data on which figure is based. Source: 1987 NES pilot survey. these d a t a (see discussion in C h a p t e r 4 ) , this figure presents results that have been a g g r e g a t e d over all three items. As can be s e e n , these d a t a are consistent with e x p e c t a t i o n s . W h e n t h e s a m e d a t a are e x a m i n e d at t h e level of individual i t e m s , as s h o w n in Table 8 . 2 , t h e results are rather r a g g e d but still essentially consistent with e x p e c t a t i o n s . T h e n o n m o n o t o n i c p a t t e r n of references to t h e I r a n - C o n t r a controversy in Table 8.1 also suggests the existence of p a r t i s a n resistance. T h e most informed persons w e r e o b v i o u s l y heavily e x p o s e d to n e w s of I r a n - C o n t r a , but they were apparently less likely to internalize it t h a n w e r e m o d e r a t e l y a w a r e persons. W e should e x p e c t , however, that highly a w a r e R e p u b l i c a n s w o u l d b e m u c h m o r e resistant to I r a n - C o n t r a n e w s than highly aware D e m o c r a t s . T h u s if we look separately at R e p u b l i c a n s and D e m o c r a t s , we should find a n o n m o n o t o n i c relationship b e t w e e n a w a r e n e s s and I r a n - C o n t r a m e n t i o n s a m o n g R e p u b l i c a n s , and a positive r e l a t i o n s h i p a m o n g D e m o c r a t s . As can be seen in Table 8 . 3 , this e x p e c t a t i o n is s u p p o r t e d by t h e d a t a . Altogether, t h e n , the e x p e c t e d p a t t e r n s of monotonicity and n o n m o n o t o n i c i t y have been o b t a i n e d separately for a g r o u p of three social welfare items and for presidential p o p u l a r i t y r a t i n g s , and w e r e especially c l e a r in the latter c a s e . T h i s pattern of results could have been o b t a i n e d by c h a n c e alone only about six t i m e s 17

17 Table 8.2 has folded the ideology scale at the midpoint, so that considerations for liberals and conservatives can be examined at the same time, thereby boosting the number of cases for analysis. The expected relationships, however, are much stronger for liberals alone than they are for liberals and conservatives together, as in Table 8.2. My attempts at simulation suggest that something like this pattern could be produced if the conservative messages on these social welfare issues were more intense (reflecting the nation's tradition of economic individualism) and more credible (i.e., lower values on the b coefficient in the acceptance function) than the liberal messages. (For an argument that this is so, see Feldman and Zaller, 1992.) 0

172

Table 8.3. Relationship among party, awareness, and remarks on Iran-Contra

Table 8.2. Ideology, awareness, and consistency of considerations

Low

Level of political awareness Middle High

Job guarantees Consistent considerations Inconsistent considerations N

1.50 2.08 (12)

2.82 2.94 (17)

3.14 2.79 (34)

3.68 2.54 (37)

3.37 2.57 (30)

4.23 1.31 (13)

Government services Consistent considerations Inconsistent considerations N

2.62 1.46 (13)

3.57 1.95 (21)

2.95 3.16 (37)

3.25 2.64 (36)

4.73 3.03 (30)

5.29 1.86 (14)

Aid to blacks Consistent considerations Inconsistent considerations N

2.92 3.58 (12)

3.70 3.70 (20)

4.26 4.09 (34)

5.42 3.58 (38)

6.06 3.23 (31)

5.36 3.07 (14)

Unweighted mean Consistent considerations Inconsistent considerations

2.34 2.37

3.36 2.86

3.33 3.35

3.74 2.92

4.72 2.94

4.96 2.08

Note: Cell entries are mean number of remarks of the type indicated. Source: 1987 NES pilot survey. in a h u n d r e d . ' - T h u s t h e results presented in this section offer helpful but not clinching e v i d e n c e for p a r t i s a n resistance at the level of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s as a type of resistance m e c h a n i s m . F u r t h e r e v i d e n c e on this point will be d e v e l o p e d in C h a p t e r 10.

AGE AND RESISTANCE TO C H A N G E My analysis so far h a s e x a m i n e d the effects on attitude c h a n g e of several kinds of political predispositions: party a t t a c h m e n t , d o v i s h n e s s , e g a l i t a r i a n i s m , and so forth. However, the predispositions that regulate attitude c h a n g e need not be manifestly political. O n e i m p o r t a n t but not manifestly political predisposition is chronological a g e . Research has p r o d u c e d a b u n d a n t e v i d e n c e of g e n e r a t i o n a l differences in s u s c e p tibility to new ideas ( A b r a m s o n , 1983; G l e n n , 1977). 18 Taking the summary data from Table 8.2 and the results from Table 8.3, there are four opportunities to observe the expected patterns of monotonicity and nonmonotonicity, and expectations are upheld in all four cases. The probability of observing this outcome by chance alone is , 5 ~ .06. Note that the numbers of cases on which the individual tests are based are quite small. 4

173

Tests of the one-message model

N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N

Republicans N

Level of political awareness High Low Middle 0.30 0.23 0.25 0.33 (20) (18) (20) (26)

Democrats N

0.07 (27)

0.28 (32)

0.41 (32)

0.46 (26)

Note: Cell entries are mean number of negative references to Iran-Contra affair. Source: 1987 NES pilot survey. If the R A S m o d e l is a truly general m o d e l of attitude f o r m a t i o n and c h a n g e , it o u g h t to specify the effects of g e n e r a t i o n a l differences in susceptibility to persuasion as well as it specifies the effects of o t h e r predispositional factors. We o u g h t , t h e n , to be able to o b s e r v e the s a m e k i n d s of interactions b e t w e e n p o litical a w a r e n e s s and age that we found b e t w e e n a w a r e n e s s and other predispositional variables. It is, however, by no m e a n s o b v i o u s than this will be the c a s e . C o n s i d e r the issue of racial equality. T h e r e are well-established g e n e r a t i o n a l differences in support for racial equality, w i t h y o u n g e r c o h o r t s exhibiting greater racial liberalism. Insofar as chronological age represents t h e distillation of a p e r s o n ' s life e x p e r i e n c e with an issue - in this c a s e , the fact that most o l d e r A m e r i c a n s g r e w up in a period in w h i c h both political n o r m s and e v e r y d a y practice p e r m i t t e d or even required racial d i s c r i m i n a t i o n - age m i g h t retard a trend toward racial liberalism, r e g a r d l e s s of political a w a r e n e s s or any other factor in t h e R A S m o d e l . But s u p p o s e , as I s u g g e s t e d in C h a p t e r 2, that racial equality is not s o m e sort of a m o r p h o u s trend, but a n e w n o r m c r e a t e d by v a r i o u s elites and transmitted to the public via t h e political m e d i a . If s o , the m o r e politically a w a r e m e m b e r s of each c o h o r t should be m o r e heavily e x p o s e d to t h e n e w i d e a , thereby creating at least the potential for g r e a t e r attitude c h a n g e a m o n g the most a w a r e . S u p p o s e also that the ability to defend o n e ' s predispositions against novel influences d e p e n d s on t h e possession of relevant contextual i n f o r m a t i o n . If s o , older highly a w a r e persons w h o were e x p o s e d t o pro-equality c o m m u n i c a t i o n s might be better able to reject t h e m t h a n their less a w a r e c o u n t e r p a r t s . If this reasoning is c o r r e c t , age o u g h t to interact with political a w a r e n e s s in the R A S m o d e l to explain susceptibility to new ideas about r a c e . Let m e , t h e n , e x a m i n e t h e effect of age in c o n d i t i o n i n g r e s p o n s e s to three historic c h a n g e s in A m e r i c a n public opinion: t h e c o n v e r s i o n of t h e public from the isolationist attitudes that p r e d o m i n a t e d p r i o r to W o r l d W a r II to " l i b e r a l intern a t i o n a l i s m " in the late 1940s and 1950s, t h e retreat of m u c h of t h e public during the V i e t n a m W a r from the original d o c t r i n e s of liberal i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m , and

174

N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N

the a c c e p t a n c e by m u c h of the public of the n e w n o r m of racial equality in the 1950s. In e a c h c a s e , I will pay p a r t i c u l a r attention to why political awareness m i g h t interact w i t h age to e n h a n c e resistance to p e r s u a s i o n .

Resistance

to

liberal

internationalism

T h r o u g h o u t the 1930s and early 1940s, the D e m o c r a t i c Party, especially its liberal w i n g , w a s t h e p a r t y of " i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m . " It favored an activist foreign policy in w h i c h U . S . military p o w e r w a s seen as n e c e s s a r y to defend A m e r i c a n interests and to k e e p t h e c o u n t r y ' s e n e m i e s in c h e c k . F o r e m o s t a m o n g these ene m i e s , of c o u r s e , were N a z i G e r m a n y and Stalinist Russia. M e a n w h i l e , the Republican Party, especially its c o n s e r v a t i v e w i n g , w a s the p a r t y of isolationism. T h e United States had no need for an internationalist foreign policy, it c l a i m e d ; we c o u l d r e m a i n peacefully secure behind o u r o c e a n buffers, leaving other nations to l o o k after their own interests. D u r i n g and after W o r l d W a r I I , t h e R e p u b l i c a n Party largely a b a n d o n e d its isolationist p o s t u r e . W a r t i m e e x p e r i e n c e h a d , as it s e e m e d to t h e leaders of the w a r effort, p r o v e n that A m e r i c a could no longer remain aloof from w o r l d affairs without suffering disastrous c o n s e q u e n c e s . S o , u n d e r the leadership df Senator A r t h u r V a n d e n b e r g , the Republican Party s u p p o r t e d D e m o c r a t i c President Trum a n ' s initiatives on the e c o n o m i c rebuilding of E u r o p e , a s y s t e m of military alliances in w h i c h the United States w a s always the key m e m b e r , A m e r i c a n m e m b e r s h i p in t h e United N a t i o n s , a n d , finally, A m e r i c a n intervention in the Korean War. W i t h t h e R e p u b l i c a n Party largely in a s u p p o r t i n g r o l e , liberal internationalism w a s by the 1950s a " m a i n s t r e a m " policy n o r m in the U n i t e d States. In the t e r m i n o l o g y of t h e R A S m o d e l , there w a s a steady stream of m e s s a g e s favoring this policy and few c u e i n g m e s s a g e s indicating inconsistency b e t w e e n internationalism and c o n s e r v a t i s m . W i t h i n most s e g m e n t s o f the p o p u l a t i o n , t h e n , w e expect the s t a n d a r d m a i n s t r e a m p a t t e r n , namely, a strong positive association b e t w e e n political a w a r e n e s s and s u p p o r t for the m a i n s t r e a m n o r m . But w h a t of highly a w a r e older R e p u b l i c a n s ? M i g h t not they h a v e resisted the m a i n s t r e a m t i d e ? T h r o u g h o u t t h e 1920s and 1930s and even p a r t of the 1940s, they had been e x p o s e d to a steady stream of party c o m m u n i c a t i o n s o p posing liberal i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m in the m o s t strenuous t e r m s . P r e s u m a b l y they had internalized m a n y of these a r g u m e n t s in the form of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , and p r e s u m a b l y s o m e of these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s were still alive in their m i n d s in the early 1950s, thereby providing the basis for resistance to the n e w policy of mainstream i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m . 19

If s o , o u r e x p e c t a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g p a t t e r n s of support for internationalism a m o n g R e p u b l i c a n s circa 1950 should be as follows. A m o n g y o u n g e r Republi19 It is true that some Republicans, led by Senator Bricker, continued to oppose liberal internationalism. Cohen (1963), however, maintains that most of the press in this period regarded isolationism as a "provincial" view and hence tended to ignore it.

Tests

of

the

one-message

175

model

c a n s , w h o h a d little direct familiarity with R e p u b l i c a n isolationism in its heyday in t h e 1930s, there should be a positive relationship b e t w e e n awareness and support for m a i n s t r e a m i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m . A m o n g older R e p u b l i c a n s , however, we m a y expect a n o n m o n o t o n i c relationship w i t h awareness: T h e least a w a r e pay t o o little attention to be e x p o s e d to m e s s a g e s favoring the n e w m a i n s t r e a m n o r m and h e n c e mainly fail to s u p p o r t it. T h e most a w a r e also resist, not b e c a u s e they d o n ' t k n o w about it, but b e c a u s e they possess (from the 1930s) the contextual information n e c e s s a r y to reject the n e w i d e a , and perhaps also b e c a u s e they p o s sess larger inertial stores of isolationist c o n s i d e r a t i o n s from previous d e c a d e s . S u p p o r t for i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m , t h e n , should be greatest a m o n g m o d e r a t e l y aware older R e p u b l i c a n s : T h e y pay e n o u g h attention to receive m e s s a g e s favoring the m a i n s t r e a m n o r m but do not possess sufficient contextual information and informational ballast to e n a b l e t h e m to resist. A 1951 survey by t h e C e n t e r for Political Studies at the University of M i c h igan p e r m i t s a test of these e x p e c t a t i o n s . A rarity a m o n g surveys of this p e r i o d , it contained a m e a s u r e of political i n f o r m a t i o n , as well as several items on A m e r i c a n foreign policy. T h e toughest test of liberal i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m in this period w a s T r u m a n ' s K o r e a n W a r policy, w h i c h required major A m e r i c a n " s a c r i f i c e s " in the interest of w h a t w a s , from the isolationist p e r s p e c t i v e , u n i m p o r tant Asian real e s t a t e . S i n c e the 1951 survey w a s a one-shot survey, we do not have d a t a on attitude c h a n g e over t i m e . But since any s u p p o r t for A m e r i c a n i n v o l v e m e n t in Korea must have b e e n relatively n e w s u p p o r t , e x p e c t a t i o n s d e r i v e d from the receptiona c c e p t a n c e m o d e l o u g h t to apply. T h e m e a s u r e of s u p p o r t for T r u m a n ' s w a r policy w a s d i s a g r e e m e n t with the assertion that t h e United States " s h o u l d get out of Korea now and stay o u t . " T h e m o d e l used to e s t i m a t e support for t h e T r u m a n policy is a straightforward application of E q u a t i o n 7 . 5 , except that an age variable h a s b e e n a d d e d . T h e results, a l t h o u g h b a s e d on a small n u m b e r of cases in t h e critical cells, sustain e x p e c t a t i o n s (see Figure 8.8). A m o n g all D e m o c r a t s (data not shown) and a m o n g y o u n g e r R e p u b l i c a n s , there is a strong positive relation b e t w e e n awareness and s u p p o r t for A m e r i c a n intervention in K o r e a . A m o n g older R e p u b l i c a n s , but no o t h e r s e g m e n t of t h e p o p u l a t i o n , this relationship is strongly n o n m o n o t o n i c , the result p r e s u m a b l y of resistance to a new policy on the part of highly aware R e p u b l i c a n s w h o had not yet forgotten their p a r t y ' s old isolationist line. A l t h o u g h s o m e coefficients in the m o d e l do not achieve c o n v e n t i o n a l levels of statistical significance, the critical coefficient on the age v a r i a b l e is significant at t h e .07 level (see Table 8.7 in t h e a p p e n d i x to this c h a p t e r for coefficient estimates).

Resistance

to

the

liberal

anti-Vietnam

War

movement

T h e V i e t n a m W a r p r o v i d e s a parallel c a s e for further tests of t h e effects of a g e . T h e only i m p o r t a n t difference is that in V i e t n a m the shoe is on the o t h e r foot: It

176

N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N

Estimated from

18-44 yrs.

75 Proportion of Republicans supporting .50 intervention in Korea

of the

one-message

model

177

to t h e new policy, t h u s leaving m o d e r a t e l y a w a r e o l d e r liberals most susceptible

From raw data 1.0

Tests

model 18-24 yrs.

Over 44 yrs.

to c h a n g e . T h e d a t a for testing this e x p e c t a t i o n are m u c h stronger than in the Korean c a s e in that they e n a b l e us to e x a m i n e patterns of actual c h a n g e over t i m e (rather t h a n , as earlier, s u p p o r t for a n e w p a r t i s a n policy in a single cross-sectional s u r v e y ) . In e a c h of its four e l e c t i o n surveys b e t w e e n 1964 and 1970, t h e C e n t e r for Political Studies a s k e d its respondents a q u e s t i o n on s u p p o r t for the V i e t n a m War, thereby p e r m i t t i n g the direct a s s e s s m e n t of attitude c h a n g e . T h e q u e s t i o n w a s Which of the following do you think we should do now in Vietnam? Pull out of Vietnam entirely.

Political awareness N = 12 27

61 58

23 43

Keep our soldiers in Vietnam but try to end the fighting. Take a stronger stand even if it means invading North Vietnam. 7

A = 587

Figure 8.8. Cohort differences among Republicans in support for Korean War. Estimates are derived from Equation 7.5 and coefficients in Table 8.7. Source: 1951 CPS survey. is highly a w a r e o l d e r liberals w h o w e r e forced to a c c o m m o d a t e t h e m s e l v e s to a shift in p a r t i s a n n o r m s . T h e basic outline of the c h a n g e in liberal ideology d u r i n g t h e V i e t n a m W a r is well k n o w n . For at least a g e n e r a t i o n p r i o r to the war, liberal ideology w a s , as just indicated, closely identified with an activist foreign policy. T h u s , o l d e r liberals w o u l d have e x p e r i e n c e d the " l e s s o n s of M u n i c h , " the m o s t i m p o r t a n t of which w a s that " a p p e a s e m e n t " of aggressor n a t i o n s only e n c o u r a g e s further aggression; they w o u l d have witnessed t h e c o m m u n i s t " t a k e o v e r s " of e a s t e r n Eur o p e and C h i n a in t h e period before the resolve of t h e United States stiffened; and they w o u l d h a v e " s e e n " in K o r e a , G r e e c e , Turkey, and West Berlin that a display of strength can deter aggression. If these older liberals (and, increasingly, o l d e r c o n s e r v a t i v e s too) w e r e following p a r t i s a n interpretations of these e v e n t s , they w o u l d therefore have e n c o u n t e r e d n u m e r o u s a r g u m e n t s on the need to " s t a n d up to c o m m u n i s m " in places like V i e t n a m . Younger, politically a w a r e liberals m i g h t also have e n c o u n t e r e d s o m e of these " l e s s o n s , " but w o u l d have had fewer o p p o r t u n i t i e s to learn t h e m than older liberals. O v e r the c o u r s e of the V i e t n a m War, liberal s u p p o r t for i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m at first w e a k e n e d and then reversed. L i b e r a l i s m c a m e to be associated with the view that A m e r i c a n intervention in V i e t n a m w a s a tragic and u n w a r r a n t e d intrusion into t h e internal affairs of a sovereign n a t i o n . So here we expect the d y n a m i c s of g e n e r a t i o n a l difference to be played out within the liberal c a m p . T h a t is, w e expect that a m o n g y o u n g e r liberals, there will be a positive relation b e t w e e n political awareness and attitude c h a n g e in t h e direction of t h e n e w liberal n o r m . A m o n g o l d e r liberals, we instead expect a n o n m o n o t o n i c relation in w h i c h highly a w a r e liberals exhibit inertial resistance 2 0

20 I refer to changes in "liberalism" rather than changes in the Democratic Party because liberal ideology appeared to shift more rapidly than did the Democratic Party, which included a large conservative wing.

T h e s e c o n d o p t i o n , b e c a u s e it represents the official policy of both the J o h n s o n and N i x o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s ( G e l b with B e t t s , 1979), will be c o u n t e d as " w a r s u p p o r t " in t h e analysis that follows, as will the third r e s p o n s e o p t i o n . T h e " p u l l o u t " o p t i o n will b e c o u n t e d a s o p p o s i t i o n t o the war. T h e d a t a on c h a n g i n g s u p p o r t for t h e w a r b e t w e e n 1966 (which w a s high tide for s u p p o r t of t h e war) and 1970 a m o n g three c o h o r t s of liberals are s h o w n in Table 8 . 4 . T h r o u g h t h e noise c r e a t e d b y small c e l l s , t h e table clearly s u p p o r t s the e x p e c t a t i o n of inertial resistance a m o n g highly a w a r e o l d e r liberals. A m o n g y o u n g e r liberals, there is a positive r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n political a w a r e n e s s and reduced s u p p o r t for t h e war, but a m o n g m i d d l e - a g e d and especially o l d e r liberals, this relationship is n o n m o n o t o n i c . ( T h e m e a s u r e of ideology used in this table is discussed in detail in C h a p t e r 9 in c o n n e c t i o n with a m o r e extended exa m i n a t i o n of attitudes on t h e V i e t n a m War.) T h e reader s h o u l d n o t e that there is a significant a n o m a l y in these d a t a , namely t h e - 6 percent c h a n g e i n s u p p o r t for t h e w a r a m o n g t h e least aware older liberals. T h i s n u m b e r indicates that u n a w a r e older liberals actually b e c a m e more s u p p o r t i v e of the w a r b e t w e e n 1966 and 1970. In the next c h a p t e r we shall see e v i d e n c e that this c o n t r a r i a n c h a n g e - that i s , c h a n g e that r u n s c o n t r a r y to the direction of c h a n g e in most of the rest of society - is probably quite real. To explain it, a m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d m o d e l is n e e d e d than h a s b e e n d e v e l o p e d so far. In t h e m e a n t i m e , however, t h e d a t a in Table 8 . 4 , in conjunction with t h e K o r e a n data j u s t e x a m i n e d , indicate that t h e R A S m o d e l helps to specify t h e effect of age on susceptibility to attitude c h a n g e . 21

Generation

and

race

I have already d e v e l o p e d the r a t i o n a l e for e x p e c t i n g a g e to interact with political awareness in d e t e r m i n i n g resistance to t h e n e w n o r m of racial equality. B e c a u s e , as we have s e e n , ideology is also an i m p o r t a n t resistance factor with respect to 21 For a difference of means test between two cells which have N = 25 and a true mean of .40, the standard error is .14; and 95 percent confidence interval is then ± 2 8 .

178

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

Tests of the one-message model

Table 8.4. Generational differences in support for Vietnam War among liberals, 1966 to 1970

IDEOLOGY

Liberals 100r

Level of political awareness Low High Youngest cohort W a r support in 1966 N War support in 1970 Change rate 1966 to 1970

60% (30)

89 (47)

86 (22)

92 (50)

50 (38)

67 (33)

54 (35)

43 (49)

17

25

37

53

179

Conservatives T

Percent favoring mandated school desegregation

Political awareness Middle cohort War support in 1966

44 (59)

71 (52)

92 (36)

83 (59)

43 (51)

61 (38)

54 (41)

57 (51)

2

14

41

31

32 (54)

75 (36)

73 (15)

79 (24)

W a r support in 1970

34 (47)

56 (39)

21 (19)

67 (21)

Change rate 1966 to 1970

-6

25

71

15

W a r support in 1970 Change rate 1966 to 1970 Oldest cohort War support in 1966

Note: Youngest cohort is age 21 to 35 in 1966; middle cohort is age 36 to 55; oldest cohort is age 56 and above. Liberals are persons who score in upper 40 percent of dove measure described in Chapter 9. Change rate is calculated as 100 x (Support66-Support70)/Support66Source: 1966 and 1970 CPS surveys.

racial equality, we should expect a triple interaction, as follows: A m o n g p e o p l e w h o are both liberal and y o u n g , there should be little or no resistance to racial equality; h e n c e within this g r o u p - and only within this g r o u p - there should be a positive linear relationship b e t w e e n a w a r e n e s s and racial liberalism. As age and c o n s e r v a t i v i s m increase, the relationship b e t w e e n a w a r e n e s s and s u p p o r t for racial equality should b e c o m e increasingly n o n m o n o t o n i c . Figure 8.9 tests this e x p e c t a t i o n by s h o w i n g levels of s u p p o r t for school d e s e g r e g a t i o n by a g e c o h o r t , ideology, and political a w a r e n e s s . T h e e s t i m a t e s are derived from the 22

22 The 1956-58-60 NES panel carried a question on desegregation in all three waves, and some pro-integration change occurred between 1956 and 1958, perhaps in response to President Eisenhower's use of federal troops to enforce a desegregation order in Little Rock. There was, however, too little change to show a distinct pattern.

Figure 8.9. Cohort differences in support for school desegregation in 1956. Estimates are derived from Equation 7.5 and coefficients in Table 8.7. Source: 1956-58-60 CPS survey.

s a m e m o d e l r e p o r t e d in Figure 8 . 6 , except that here age differences are shown rather than s u p p r e s s e d . As can be s e e n , the d a t a conform to e x p e c t a t i o n . But w h a t exactly, o n e m a y still wonder, w o u l d m a k e highly a w a r e o l d e r liberals relatively resistant to c o u r t - m a n d a t e d school d e s e g r e g a t i o n in the S o u t h ? W h y w o u l d not their prior e x p e r i e n c e as liberal ideologues rather than as older citizens have p r e d i s p o s e d t h e m to be especially s u p p o r t i v e of federal involvement in this issue? T h e a n s w e r to these q u e s t i o n s , t h o u g h perhaps o b s c u r e to persons living in the late twentieth century, w o u l d , I believe, have been quite o b v i o u s to m i d c e n t u r y liberals. F r o m the late nineteenth c e n t u r y until Franklin R o o s e v e l t ' s attack on the S u p r e m e C o u r t in the late 1930s, judicial activism in the United States almost invariably served c o n s e r v a t i v e interests; in these s a m e y e a r s , the principles of s t a t e s ' rights and judicial self-restraint most often served to protect liberal policies from federal judicial interference. T h i s w a s b e c a u s e liberal-minded state legislatures in t h e N o r t h e a s t and M i d w e s t w e r e passing e c o n o m i c regulations that the S u p r e m e C o u r t , acting in the n a m e of constitutional p r i n c i p l e , regularly invalidated. Upset by t h i s , liberals stressed the " d e m o c r a t i c " principle that the j u d i c i a r y should defer to the p o p u l a r b r a n c h e s of g o v e r n m e n t - especially state and local g o v e r n m e n t s . T h u s , j u s t as highly aware o l d e r liberals in the 1960s had learned the " l e s s o n s of M u n i c h " t o o well to o p p o s e the V i e t n a m War, so highly a w a r e older liberals in the 1950s had learned the " d a n g e r s of j u d i cial a c t i v i s m " t o o well to be entirely c o m f o r t a b l e with Brown v. Board of Education. (There m a y be a parallel to this p h e n o m e n o n in the attitudes of s o m e 23

23 See White, 1976, for an account of the discomfit that race and civil liberties issues in the 1950s caused one older liberal, Feli". Frankfurter. As a Supreme Court justice. Frankfurter appears to have been torn between his attachment to the doctrine of judicial self-restraint, formed in his young adulthood, and his equally strong commitment to racial and civil liberty.

180

NATURE

AND

ORIGINS

OF

MASS

OPINION

c o n t e m p o r a r y liberals w h o personally fought to end racial d i s c r i m i n a t i o n but now o p p o s e affirmative action on the g r o u n d s that racial selectivity is never justifiable.)

General

effects

of age

I have e x a m i n e d these three cases in s o m e detail in order to s h o w why exactly the effects of age on susceptibility to new ideas can be specified by the R A S m o d e l . However, if, as I have s u g g e s t e d , age is a predispositional factor like any other, no special c a s e - b y - c a s e justification is necessary. If older p e o p l e are m o r e or less predisposed toward s o m e idea - w h e t h e r for reason of past l e a r n i n g , p h y s iological c o n d i t i o n , self-interest, life c i r c u m s t a n c e s , general c o n s e r v a t i v i s m , or anything else - the logic of the R A S m o d e l should apply. T h a t is, m o r e a w a r e older persons should be m o r e heavily e x p o s e d to c h a n g e - i n d u c i n g political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , and they should also be better able to resist ideas that are c o n t r a r y to their predispositions. T h e r e is, I should a d d , no reason to believe that age will be generally a s s o ciated with greater resistance to c h a n g e . If a proposal to increase M e d i c a r e benefits b e c a m e a highly salient political issue, the elderly w o u l d not be expected to be unusually prone to resist. S u p p o r t for the idea a m o n g the elderly might increase w i t h level s of political a w a r e n e s s without any sign of resistance a m o n g the most a w a r e . Resistance, if there were any, w o u l d be expected a m o n g the politically a w a r e y o u n g . My a r g u m e n t in this s e c t i o n , t h e n , is not that age is associated with resistance to n e w ideas; it is that the predispositional effects of a g e , w h a t e v e r their direction, can be specified by the R A S m o d e l .

SUMMARY

This c h a p t e r has s h o w n that the o n e - m e s s a g e model of attitude c h a n g e , a l t h o u g h a significant simplification of w h a t must occur in reality, h a s sufficient internal complexity to g e n e r a t e interestingly different e x p e c t a t i o n s in different c i r c u m stances, and sufficient validity that these e x p e c t a t i o n s can r e m a i n plausible even after e m p i r i c a l t e s t i n g . M o r e specifically, the c h a p t e r has s h o w n that different patterns of attitude c h a n g e arise for different types of issues and c o m m u n i c a tions, that the f o r m a t i o n of the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that u n d e r l i e p e o p l e ' s closede n d e d survey r e s p o n s e s also a p p e a r to follow the logic of the o n e - m e s s a g e m o d e l , and that t h e o n e - m e s s a g e m o d e l specifies the effect of one i m p o r t a n t type of nonpolitical predisposition, namely, a g e . A variety of different kinds of e v i d e n c e , no o n e piece of w h i c h is c o n c l u s i v e , is a c c u m u l a t i n g in support of the R A S m o d e l . T h e next t w o c h a p t e r s add to this c u m u l a t i o n in t h e context of c h a p t e r length e x a m i n a t i o n s of t w o substantive p r o b l e m s , attitudes toward the war in V i e t n a m and e v a l u a t i o n s of c a n d i d a t e s in partisan elections.

Tests

APPENDIX:

of the

one-message

ESTIMATING POPULARITY

THE

181

model

PRESIDENTIAL

MODEL

A l t h o u g h R e a g a n ' s approval r a t i n g s fell s h a r p l y in early N o v e m b e r in response to revelations c o n c e r n i n g the I r a n - C o n t r a m a t t e r (Brody, 1991), they r e m a i n e d steady t h r o u g h most of N o v e m b e r in the s a m p l e of the N E S p o s t e l e c t i o n survey, which b e g a n on N o v e m b e r 6 and c o n t i n u e d t h r o u g h January. T h e r e a p p e a r s to have been a s h a r p break in the d a t a series on N o v e m b e r 2 8 , which is the day after T h a n k s g i v i n g and three days after A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l E d w i n M e e s e ann o u n c e d that the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w a s b e g i n n i n g a self-investigation of I r a n C o n t r a allegations. P r i o r t o N o v e m b e r 2 8 , R e a g a n ' s disapproval rating stood a t 32 percent in the N E S s a m p l e , with no indication of a t i m e trend; from N o v e m ber 28 until the e n d of the N E S i n t e r v i e w i n g p e r i o d , disapproval averaged 39 p e r c e n t , a c h a n g e that is highly statistically significant. In the 1987 pilot survey, w h i c h r e i n t e r v i e w e d 4 5 7 of the fall N E S r e s p o n d e n t s , R e a g a n ' s disapproval rating w a s 48 percent. In light of these d a t a , I used t h e p r e - N o v e m b e r 28 period as m y baseline period and the J u n e 1987 a s m y p o s t c h a n g e p e r i o d . 2 4

T h e e s t i m a t i o n of E q u a t i o n 7.7 on t h e s e d a t a is s h o w n in the left c o l u m n of Table 8 . 5 . As can be s e e n , all theoretically i m p o r t a n t coefficients have g o o d m a g n i t u d e s , but their s t a n d a r d e r r o r s are l a r g e , as in earlier a p p l i c a t i o n s of t h e m o d e l . H e n c e I a d d e d t w o constraints to t h e basic m o d e l . First, I r e m o v e d the floor p a r a m e t e r , w h i c h clearly w a s going b e y o n d its intended effect of picking up t h e effects of g u e s s i n g and which had a h u g e standard error. I also constrained a w a r e n e s s to have t h e s a m e effect on reception in both the baseline and c h a n g e subfunctions. T h e s e t w o constraints did not significantly diminish the overall fit of t h e m o d e l to the d a t a (F, [ 2 , 1905], 1.6, n.s.) and also did not n o ticeably affect t h e q u a l i t a t i v e fit of t h e m o d e l , as analyzed graphically. T h e constraints d i d , however, b r i n g stability to the results; in particular, they brought coefficient e s t i m a t e s for t h e t w o m o s t theoretically i m p o r t a n t coefficients those d e p i c t i n g the effect of a w a r e n e s s on reception and a c c e p t a n c e in the c h a n g e m o d e l - into the r a n g e of c o n v e n t i o n a l statistical significance. An interesting feature of these results is that t h e effects of the predispositions variables - party, e g a l i t a r i a n i s m , and attitudes t o w a r d U . S . involvement in C e n tral A m e r i c a - on R e a g a n ' s evaluations a p p e a r to have increased over the p e riod. Of these a p p a r e n t i n c r e a s e s , only that associated with Central A m e r i c a attitudes s u r v i v e s an F-test of statistical significance. This c a s e is an i m p o r t a n t o n e , however, b e c a u s e it c o n f i r m s t h e analysis of Krosnick and K i n d e r (1990), 24 I also examined attitude change within the 457-person NES pilot sample, using the sample's own fall interviews as the baseline. Using the small pilot sample, it was impossible to discard that portion of the panel that had been interviewed after November 27. Thus, this dataset was not only smaller than the one just described; it also contained less real attitude change. Despite this, the patterns of change in the raw pilot data were essentially similar to those found in the larger comparison. However, I was unable to get the model to reliably fit the smaller dataset, and chose instead to use as my baseline the pre-November 27 portion of the whole NES postelection study, as described.

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N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N

Table 8.5. Coefficients for model of change in presidential job approval No constraints Baseline reception function Intercept Awareness (standardized) Floor parameter Baseline acceptance function Intercept Awareness Party attachment (range -2 to +2) Equalitarianism (standardized) Central America attitudes* (standardized) Change reception function Intercept Awareness Change acceptance function Intercept Awareness Party attachment Equalitarianism Central America attitudes Residual sum of squares

Two constraints

of the

one-message

183

model

w h o found that t h e I r a n - C o n t r a controversy had " p r i m e d " p e o p l e ' s attitudes o n Central A m e r i c a n policy, thereby leading these attitudes to b e c o m e m o r e strongly e n g a g e d as d e t e r m i n a n t s of presidential approval ratings. Tables 8.6 and 8.7 contain the coefficients for t h e r e m a i n i n g figures in the chapter.

0.62 3.35 (4.39) 2.84 (4.18)

2.12 0.79° (.43)

-0.88 0.03 (.14) 0.94 (.11) 0.35 (.09) 0.28 (.09)

0.92 0.07 (.15) 0.91 (.10) 0.36 (.08) 0.23 (.09)

-0.25 0.68 (.39)

-0.22 0.79 (.43)

1.24 -2.68 (2.16) 2.02 (1.59) 1.81 (1.71) 3.67 (3.00) 421.21

0.68 -2.17 (1.22) 1.76 (.94) 1.64 (1.14) 3.10 (1.74) 421.91

Table 8.6. Coefficients for diffusion of news

Intercept (an)

a

Note: Model is Equation 7.7, estimated by maximum likelihood. Dependent variable is disapproval of job performance (0-1). The Timei N is 1463; Time2 A is 457. Standard errors are in parentheses. , Coefficients constrained to be equal. * The items were Contra spending and United States involvement in Central America, as measured in 1986. Source: 1986 and 1987 NES surveys. 7

a

Tests

Awareness (ai)

North sentence 0.88 (.11)

Wright resign -0.42 (.10)

Death penalty -1.96 (.17)

DC-10 crash 3.48 (.65)

1.12 (.12)

1.92 (.18)

1.03 (.15)

2.43 (.51)

Note: Model is equation 7.3, estimated by nonlinear least squares. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Source: 1989 NES pilot survey.

184

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

Table 8.7. Coefficients for opinion formation on school desegregation, economic news, nuclear freeze, and Korea

9

Two-sided information flows School desegregation function

• Reception Intercept Awareness

Acceptance Intercept Awareness Age

Nuclear Economic freeze news ~

Korean War

0.35

2.14

-1.02

1.52

0.72 (.32)

1.15 (.31)

1.21 (.28)

1.58 (.41)

function

0

Domestic policy attiudes (standardized) Foreign policy attitudes (standardized) Reagan j o b approval (range -2 to +2) Party attachment (range -2 to +2) Fxonomic attitudes (standardized) Vote in 1948* (1 = Dewey, 0 = Truman) N

2.17

2.05

1.35

3.59

-.71 (.40) -0.038 (.017)

-0.33 (-22) -0.008 (.008)

-0.61 (.34)

0.55 (•23)

_

-0.35 (.46) -1.60 (1.09)

0.38 (.22)

0.91 (.20)

—

0.08 (.08)

-.033 (.01)

-0.66 (.16)

_

-0.13 (-13)

_ 848

1400

.

1413

-0.77 (.60) 596

Note: Model for all issues is Equation 7.5, estimated by maximum likelihood. Dependent variables are 0 - 1 , as follows: disagreement that the federal government should stay out of school desegregation (V74); support for joint or unilateral freeze (V305); statement that economy has improved in last year (V327); disagreement that the United States "should get out of Korea now and stay out." Other political variables are coded in liberal direction, except vote for Deweyf see Measures Appendix for additional information. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. " Age was entered in years, except for Korea, where a five-point cohort variable on 0 - 1 range was used because age in years was unavailable. * Nonvoters from 1948 are excluded from the analysis because their political predispositions are unknown. Sources: For school desegregation, 1956-58-60 CPS study; for freeze and economic news, 1982 NES survey; for Korean War, 1951 CPS survey.

Until this chapter, I have m o d e l e d attitude c h a n g e as a response to a one-sided stream of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s - for e x a m p l e , the n e g a t i v e effects of I r a n - C o n t r a on presidential popularity, or the a r g u m e n t for liberal internationalism in the p o s t W o r l d W a r II era. M u c h has been l e a r n e d about the d y n a m i c s of attitude c h a n g e from this a p p r o a c h b e c a u s e , in many c a s e s , the flow of political c o m m u n i c a tions really is, at least for a t i m e , heavily o n e - s i d e d . Yet it is rarely completely one-sided over any a p p r e c i a b l e length of t i m e . Even a m i d the I r a n - C o n t r a scand a l , for e x a m p l e , s o m e Republican senators defended the president, and their r e m a r k s m a y have had s o m e effect in p r e v e n t i n g even greater d a m a g e to President R e a g a n ' s approval ratings. T h e b u r d e n of this c h a p t e r is to d e v e l o p a m o d e l that is c a p a b l e of c a p t u r i n g the effects of t w o - s i d e d information flows w h i c h c h a n g e public opinion - that is, information flows that consist of both a d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e p u s h i n g m u c h of public opinion in o n e d i r e c t i o n , and a less i n t e n s e , c o u n t e r v a l e n t m e s s a g e that partly c o u n t e r a c t s the effects of the d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e . Such a model is possible b e c a u s e , as will be s h o w n , d o m i n a n t and c o u n t e r v a l e n t m e s s a g e s can have different effects in different s e g m e n t s of the p o p u l a t i o n , d e p e n d i n g on c i t i z e n s ' p o litical a w a r e n e s s and ideological o r i e n t a t i o n s and on the relative intensities of the t w o m e s s a g e s . But the larger p u r p o s e of this c h a p t e r is to integrate the w o r k of e a r l i e r c h a p ters into a general s t a t e m e n t of the effect on m a s s opinion of two-sided information flows. We saw in C h a p t e r 6 that w h e n elite discourse one-sidedly favors a given policy, it p r o d u c e s a " m a i n s t r e a m p a t t e r n " in which the most a w a r e m e m bers of the public s u b s c r i b e to the elite c o n s e n s u s most strongly, and further, that w h e n elite discourse d i v i d e s along p a r t i s a n lines, the effect is to g e n e r a t e a " p o l a r i z a t i o n " of m a s s o p i n i o n . T h e present c h a p t e r extends this analysis by showing how the m a i n s t r e a m and polarization p a t t e r n s form and c h a n g e over t i m e in response to c h a n g e s in t h e intensities of c o m p e t i n g m e s s a g e s in a two-sided information flow. T h e c h a p t e r further s h o w s h o w c h a n g e s in t h e relative intensities of o p p o s i n g m e s s a g e s can p r o d u c e not only the p a t t e r n s of attitude c h a n g e o b s e r v e d in C h a p t e r s 7 and 8, but m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d o n e s as well. M o r e generally, t h e n , this c h a p t e r seeks to show that public opinion can be u n d e r s t o o d as a r e s p o n s e to the relative intensity and stability of o p p o s i n g flows

186

Two-sided

N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N

information

187

flows

of liberal and c o n s e r v a t i v e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . (Again, I stress that use of these ideological labels is meant to convey only the directional thrust of the m e s s a g e . ) W h e t h e r public opinion is m o m e n t a r i l y stable in the m a i n s t r e a m or p o l a r i z a t i o n p a t t e r n , o r u n d e r g o i n g attitude c h a n g e , d e p e n d s o n w h e t h e r the o p p o s i n g c o m m u n i c a t i o n flows are one-sided or evenly b a l a n c e d , and w h e t h e r they a r e stable or c h a n g i n g over t i m e . Unfortunately, there are few issues for which the relative intensity of o p p o s ing m e s s a g e s c h a n g e s clearly and crisply over a short period of t i m e , and only one c a s e of w h i c h I am aware in which the resulting c h a n g e s in m a s s attitudes have been a d e q u a t e l y captured by a series of high-quality surveys. T h i s c a s e , however, is an i m p o r t a n t and intrinsically interesting o n e : p o p u l a r s u p p o r t for and opposition to A m e r i c a n involvement in the V i e t n a m War. T h i s c a s e will provide most of t h e illustrative material for the a r g u m e n t of this chapter. To a c c o m p l i s h the goals of this chapter, it will be n e c e s s a r y to e n g a g e in s o m e statistical m o d e l i n g and a fairly extensive discussion of the d a t a e m p l o y e d . To m a k e it easier to see w h e r e the technical w o r k is g o i n g , I have included a simple illustration of the effects of two-sided information flows at t h e b e g i n n i n g of the chapter. T h e n , in t h e m i d d l e section of the chapter, I d e v e l o p a statistical model that is c a p a b l e of c a p t u r i n g attitude c h a n g e in r e s p o n s e to c h a n g e s in a two-sided information flow. T h e final section d e s c r i b e s the m e a s u r e s used in testing the model and t h e results of the m o d e l i n g effort.

b. Pages of listings from New York Times index

Total pages listing stories on Vietnam War in N.Y. Times index

20"

0-1 64

EBB AND FLOW OF SUPPORT FOR T H E V I E T N A M WAR T h e c a s e of the V i e t n a m W a r presents an unusually fertile p p p o r t u n i t y for exa m i n i n g the d y n a m i c s of public o p i n i o n . A m o n g its attractive features are the following: Rapid change in elite positions on the issue. Liberal opinion leaders overwhelmingly supported the war in 1964, but mainly opposed it in 1970. Conservative elites, by contrast, continued to support the war throughout the period of American involvement. Chan ges in the intensity of the dominant message. President Johnson made far more strenuous efforts to promote public support for the war after the increased commitment of U.S. ground troops in 1965 than he had a year earlier, when he was in the midst of an election campaign. Changes in the intensity of the countervalent message. The antiwar message was virtually nonexistent in 1964 and was still hardly more than a whisper in 1966. By 1970, however, it was probably as intense, and perhaps more intense, than the prewar message. Transformation of Vietnam from a mainstream issue in 1964 to a polarization issue in 1970. T h e election studies c o n d u c t e d by the C e n t e r for Political Studies ( C P S ) at the University of M i c h i g a n d u r i n g the V i e t n a m W a r provide excellent d a t a on the p u b l i c ' s r e s p o n s e to this issue. An almost identical q u e s t i o n , quoted in C h a p t e r 8, w a s a s k e d in four different s u r v e y s , and each of these surveys c a r r i e d

i

1

"

66

68

70

Figure 9 . 1 . Two estimates of trends in media content on Vietnam. The story count measure gives the count of pro- and antiwar stories associated with cover stories on the Vietnam War in the period 1963 to 1970 in Life, Time, and Newsweek magazines. a g o o d selection of explanatory v a r i a b l e s , especially political a w a r e n e s s and p o litical values. Before t u r n i n g to t h e opinion d a t a , however, it is useful to e x a m i n e the sources of m a s s opinion on t h e war, n a m e l y t h e flow of political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s on V i e t n a m . I have d e v e l o p e d several indicators of these c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . First and most i m p o r t a n t , I a s k e d a research assistant to u n d e r t a k e a content analysis of w a r r e p o r t i n g in Time, Newsweek, and Life m a g a z i n e s for t h e period 1963 to 1970. T h e research assistant w a s u n a w a r e of my e x p e c t a t i o n s as to w h a t the analysis m i g h t reveal. Following i n s t r u c t i o n s , he identified all m a g a z i n e issues in which the V i e t n a m W a r or related events (such as a n t i w a r protests) w e r e featured on the cover and read all stories in these m a g a z i n e s relating to the war. T h e stories selected in this way m a y be c o n s i d e r e d a r e a s o n a b l e s a m p l e of the w a r r e p o r t a g e that w a s m o s t salient to t h e p u b l i c . T h e research assistant rated e a c h as p r e d o m i n a n t l y p r o w a r in its slant, predominantly antiwar, or fairly evenly b a l a n c e d . T h e resulting e s t i m a t e of trends in war c o v e r a g e are depicted in Figure 9 . 1 a . B y these d a t a , t h e p r o w a r m e s s a g e w a s only m o d e r a t e l y p r o m i n e n t i n 1 9 6 3 - 4 , averaging about four stories per year per m a g a z i n e in association with a cover on V i e t n a m . (There w e r e , of c o u r s e , m a n y n o n - c o v e r - r e l a t e d stories on V i e t n a m . )

188

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

But the p r o w a r story w a s n o n e t h e l e s s far m o r e intense than w a s the a n t i w a r story, which averaged about 1.5 cover-related items per m a g a z i n e p e r year. A close e x a m i n a t i o n of these early a n t i w a r stories s h o w s , in a d d i t i o n , that they did not p o r t r a y p a r t i s a n opposition to the war, as did m u c h of the later c o v e r a g e ; rather, they r e p o r t e d difficulties in the conduct of the w a r that might have been interpreted as r e a s o n s for strengthening the U . S . c o m m i t m e n t . As can also be seen in Figure 9 . 1 a , the p r o w a r m e s s a g e gained considerably in intensity b e t w e e n 1964 and 1966, m a i n t a i n i n g this higher level of intensity through about 1968. After 1968 the p r o w a r m e s s a g e declined rapidly, falling almost to 1964 levels of intensity. M e a n w h i l e , the a n t i w a r m e s s a g e gained in intensity each year and a p p e a r s to have caught and even o v e r t a k e n the p r o w a r m e s s a g e in intensity by 1970. A peculiarity of these d a t a is the overall fall-off in n e w s c o v e r a g e of t h e w a r in 1970. Did the v o l u m e of w a r c o v e r a g e really decline in 1970, even t h o u g h levels of U . S . t r o o p c o m m i t m e n t r e m a i n e d near peak levels, or did w a r n e w s simply c e a s e to be featured in periodical p u b l i c a t i o n s ? 1

To c h e c k the latter possibility, I did a s i m p l e count of p a g e s in the New York Times Index devoted to stories about V i e t n a m . T h e results, displayed in Figure 9 . 1 b , suggest that the total v o l u m e of w a r c o v e r a g e remained high in the later years of the war. W h a t s e e m s to have h a p p e n e d , t h u s , is that w a r coverage lost its novelty in later years of the conflict, and so tended to d r o p out of the trendier periodical literature. In a n o t h e r m e d i u m , however, the overall v o l u m e of coverage r e m a i n e d h i g h . As a further c h e c k on information flow d u r i n g the war, I e x a m i n e d H a l l i n ' s (1984) published analysis of p r o w a r and a n t i w a r statements in the television n e w s . A central finding of his study w a s that " s p o k e s m e n for administration policy were heavily p r e d o m i n a n t d u r i n g the early period [prior to s p r i n g , 1968], while after Tet there w a s relative parity b e t w e e n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and its criti c s " (1984: 9 ) . Hallin also reports (personal c o m m u n i c a t i o n ) that the overall v o l u m e of w a r c o v e r a g e on television increased through about 1966 and rem a i n e d roughly steady until after 1970. O n e can also take the actions of leading political figures as an indicator of trends in political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s on the war. For e x a m p l e , w h e n in 1964 President J o h n s o n sought congressional a u t h o r i z a t i o n for his V i e t n a m policy in the Gulf of Tonkin r e s o l u t i o n , it passed 4 1 4 to 0 in the H o u s e of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and by a m a r g i n of 88 to 2 in the S e n a t e . T h e s e congressional actions s u g g e s t , as did the m e d i a analysis for this p e r i o d , that political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s in the e a r l y p h a s e of the V i e t n a m W a r p r e d o m i n a n t l y favored A m e r i c a n involvement. As U . S . i n v o l v e m e n t in the w a r increased in 1965 and 1966, President J o h n s o n devoted m o r e of his public utterances to p r o m o t i n g his w a r policy. However, real congressional d e b a t e over the V i e t n a m War, including t h e first hints of opposition to it, also e m e r g e d in this p e r i o d , most p r o m i n e n t l y in hear1 A separate count of Vietnam articles in the Readers Guide to Periodical Literature shows a similar decline across a wider range of media outlets.

Two-sided

information

189

flows

ings c o n d u c t e d by S e n a t o r William Fulbright in 1966. B e g i n n i n g in 1967, there were also s o m e a t t e m p t s in C o n g r e s s to cut off funding for t h e war. Yet these initial efforts w e r e soundly defeated, indicating c o n t i n u e d strong s u p p o r t for the w a r by congressional e l i t e s . So again, the actions of leading political figures are broadly consistent w i t h the trends in m e d i a c o v e r a g e , as depicted in Figure 9. l a . T h e years 1969 and 1970 m a r k e d the height of heavily covered a n t i w a r protests, but they were also a t i m e in which the Nixon a d m i n i s t r a t i o n sought by its well-publicized " V i e t n a m i z a t i o n ' p r o g r a m t o show that U . S . policy w a s succ e e d i n g , and a t i m e in which attempts in C o n g r e s s to cut off w a r funding continued to be defeated, t h o u g h by closer m a r g i n s than p r e v i o u s l y . H e r e , t h e n , we find a discrepancy b e t w e e n the two indicators of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s flow. Alt h o u g h the n e w s m a g a z i n e d a t a suggest that the flow of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s favored the a n t i w a r position by 1970, the actions of political officeholders show that there r e m a i n e d a stream of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s that w a s , on b a l a n c e , s u p p o r t i v e of A m e r i c a n involvement. 2

3

Taking all of these indicators together, it a p p e a r s that both the p r o w a r and the a n t i w a r m e s s a g e s b e c a m e m o r e intense b e t w e e n 1964 and 1966, with the p r o w a r m e s s a g e initially far m o r e intense but losing this a d v a n t a g e by 1970. T h e flow of pro- and a n t i w a r c o m m u n i c a t i o n s may have b e e n roughly even by 1970, and probably still quite high in overall v o l u m e . T h i s is a m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d pattern of c h a n g e in the flow of political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s than has b e e n examined so far, and o n e which cannot be fully acc o m m o d a t e d in the s i m p l e model developed in C h a p t e r 7. To capture its effects, a " t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l " of opinion c h a n g e is necessary. T h e central idea in a t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l is that citizens are e x p o s e d to t w o c o m m u n i c a t i o n f l o w s , o n e on each side of the issue. T h e s e o p p o s i n g c o m m u nications m a y have different effects in different s e g m e n t s of t h e p o p u l a t i o n , d e p e n d i n g on t h e relative intensity of t h e m e s s a g e s . For e x a m p l e , in t h e period b e t w e e n 1964 and 1966, o n e might expect the a n t i w a r m e s s a g e , w h i c h w a s still very low in intensity even in 1966, to have had its greatest impact on the most politically a w a r e liberals: Their high levels of awareness w o u l d ensure reception of the m e s s a g e , and their liberalism w o u l d m a k e t h e m s y m p a t h e t i c to it. By contrast, the increase in the p r o w a r m e s s a g e from 1964 to 1966 m i g h t be expected to have a relatively larger impact on persons of m o d e r a t e or low political a w a r e ness: T h e p r o w a r m e s s a g e w a s , as just s h o w n , already fairly intense in 1964, and so w o u l d p r o b a b l y have reached most highly a w a r e persons at that t i m e . H e n c e the increase in its intensity would m a i n l y affect persons w h o had not yet gotten the m e s s a g e in 1964, that is, m o d e r a t e l y a w a r e or less-aware persons. 2 A 1966 proposal to repeal the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was defeated in a Senate vote by a margin of 92 to 5; a 1967 House amendment barring funds for military operations over North Vietnam was defeated 372 to 18. See Jack McWethy, The Power of the Pentagon (1972: p. 112). 3 In 1970 the Cooper-Church amendment, barring funds for U.S. military operations in Cambodia, passed the Senate 58 to 37, but was defeated in the House 237 to 153. Later in 1970 the McGovern-Hatfield amendment, setting a deadline for U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, was defeated in the Senate by a vote of 55 to 39; the measure did not come to a vote in the House (ibid.).

190

N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N

From raw data

Two-sided

From logit regressions

information

191

flows

sities to form liberal and c o n s e r v a t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , w h i c h in turn d e t e r m i n e their survey r e s p o n s e s .

100 1964

Percent 75 supporting Vietnam 50-| War

1966

25-f 0 1964 N= 17 14

Political awarenes 37 27

73 65

31 22

26 18

Same N

Figure 9.2. Patterns of support for the Vietnam War among liberals in 1964 and 1966. Logit estimates for the figure on right are constructed from a model in which awareness and awareness squared were the only independent variables. The awareness scores used in constructing this figure are given in footnote 15. The measure of support for the war is described in Chapter 8. For reasons discussed in connection with Figure 9.6, this analysis is limited to whites. Source: 1964 and 1966 CPS surveys. T h e s e s u p p o s i t i o n s , as can be seen in Figure 9 . 2 , nicely fit t h e c h a n g i n g patterns of s u p p o r t for the V i e t n a m W a r a m o n g liberals b e t w e e n 1964 and 1966. ( T h e m e a s u r e of liberal or dovish values u s e d in this figure will be d e s c r i b e d later in the chapter.) S u p p o r t for the w a r a m o n g less aware d o v e s rose between 1964 and 1966, p r e s u m a b l y b e c a u s e t h e y had finally b e g u n to be heavily e x p o s e d to p r o w a r a r g u m e n t s ; n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h i s , the most a w a r e doves began to turn against the war b e t w e e n 1964 and 1966, presumably b e c a u s e they enc o u n t e r e d and a c c e p t e d an a n t i w a r m e s s a g e that w a s still inaudible to less attentive doves. T h i s account of attitude c h a n g e b e t w e e n 1964 and 1966, t h o u g h rough and informal, is the clearest illustration I have for the main point of this chapter: Public attitudes on major issues c h a n g e in r e s p o n s e to c h a n g e s in t h e relative intensities of c o m p e t i n g streams of political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , as filtered t h r o u g h t h e r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e process. As I have indicated, however, this account is preliminary. To m a k e it fully c r e d i b l e , it will be n e c e s s a r y to explain not only attitude c h a n g e a m o n g d o v e s b e t w e e n 1964 and 1966, but attitude c h a n g e in the w h o l e p o p u l a t i o n b e t w e e n 1964 and 1970. (The C P S item on V i e t n a m w a s c h a n g e d after 1970, w h i c h is why my analysis e n d s at that point.)

In o r d e r to test this basic c l a i m , it is n e c e s s a r y to introduce s o m e simplifying a s s u m p t i o n s in the R A S m o d e l . First, it is not possible to m e a s u r e reception and a c c e p t a n c e of each of the discrete c o m m u n i c a t i o n s - official s p e e c h e s , press r e l e a s e s , n e w s stories, and so on - that constituted the real-world p r o w a r and a n t i w a r m e s s a g e s of t h e V i e t n a m era. H e n c e , I will a s s u m e that, within each t w o - y e a r p e r i o d , all c o m m u n i c a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g the war fell into a fixed but reasonably small n u m b e r of c a t e g o r i e s , w h i c h I will take to be " m e s s a g e s . " I further a s s u m e that all of the m e s s a g e s of a given direction and t i m e interval are equally intense. T h u s , within each t w o - y e a r t i m e p e r i o d , there will be N p r o w a r m e s s a g e s of uniform intensity, and N a n t i w a r m e s s a g e s of different but uniform intensity. Since real-world c o m m u n i c a t i o n s are t o o n u m e r o u s and varied to be actually m e a s u r a b l e or, if o r g a n i z e d into a m a n a g e a b l e n u m b e r of t o p i c s , merely abstract entities anyway, n o t h i n g of i m p o r t a n c e seems lost by this simplification. T h e s e c o n d simplifying a s s u m p t i o n is that no c o n s i d e r a t i o n r e m a i n s active in a p e r s o n ' s mind for m o r e than two years unless it is reinforced by reception and a c c e p t a n c e of an identical a r g u m e n t , in w h i c h c a s e it is the s a m e as a new cons i d e r a t i o n . T h e value of this a s s u m p t i o n is t h a t , o n c e it has been m a d e , public opinion in each of the four V i e t n a m surveys can be m o d e l e d as a response to c o m m u n i c a t i o n s i n t h e p r e c e d i n g t w o y e a r s , w h i c h e l i m i n a t e s t h e n e e d t o take account of the lagged effects of c o m m u n i c a t i o n from earlier t i m e p e r i o d s . Alt h o u g h t h e r e is no d o u b t that c o m m u n i c a t i o n s have effects that c a n last longer than t w o y e a r s , the four surveys of the V i e t n a m dataset do not provide sufficient leverage to d e t e r m i n e w h a t t h e lagged effects a r e . H e n c e , a g a i n , it d o e s not s e e m that anything h a s been lost by t h e simplifying a s s u m p t i o n . T h e final simplifying a s s u m p t i o n is t h a t individuals r e s p o n d to s u r v e y q u e s tions on the basis of the first c o n s i d e r a t i o n that c o m e s to m i n d rather than on the basis o f w h a t e v e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are a c c e s s i b l e , a s allowed i n a x i o m A 4 . T h i s a s s u m p t i o n greatly simplifies the formal structure of the m o d e l w i t h o u t , a g a i n , giving u p a n y t h i n g about w h i c h w e h a v e i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e p r e s e n t d a t a . We can now begin d e v e l o p m e n t of a m o d e l for the diffusion of c o m p e t i n g liberal and c o n s e r v a t i v e m e s s a g e s about t h e V i e t n a m War. T h e m o d e l is based on a t w o - s t e p process in which individuals a r e e x p o s e d to political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s t h a t , if received and a c c e p t e d , b e c o m e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s for t h e m . I begin with a m o d e l of the r e c e p t i o n p r o c e s s , as follows: 4

Prob(Reception) , = 1 = RE rt

A T W O - M E S S A G E MODEL OF A T T I T U D E C H A N G E T h e basic c l a i m of the R A S model is that p e o p l e respond to survey q u e s t i o n s on the basis of w h a t e v e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are present in their m i n d s and i m m e d i a t e l y accessible in m e m o r y . T h e f o r m a t i o n of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , for its p a r t , d e p e n d s on the flow of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s in the political e n v i r o n m e n t . H e n c e , c h a n g e s in the relative intensities o f t h e o p p o s i n g m e s s a g e s d e t e r m i n e p e o p l e ' s relative p r o p e n -

ikl

-

[1

+ /+

Exp(a k, + fl|*Awareness,)]

_l

0

(9. l a )

E q u a t i o n 9. la is a s t a n d a r d logistic function, that is, one that varies b e t w e e n a floor of zero and a ceiling of 1.0. T h e subscript / indicates individual-level differences. T h e subscript k refers to the ideological c o l o r a t i o n of t h e m e s s a g e 4 See Appendix B to Chapter 10 for a model that permits lagged effects of previous communications.

192

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

Two-sided

(prowar and a n t i w a r ) while the / subscript refers to the t i m e of the survey ( 6 4 , 6 6 , 6 8 , 70). Since the a p a r a m e t e r c a r r i e s these kt s u b s c r i p t s , shifts in the intercept of the logistic function vary by m e s s a g e and by t i m e , thereby allowing shifts in the intensity of each m e s s a g e across t i m e . If the reader reviews my discussion of the basic reception function in C h a p t e r 7, this will be seen as an app r o p r i a t e way of specifying shifts in m e s s a g e i n t e n s i t y . Since there are four t i m e periods and two m e s s a g e s , these kt subscripts indicate that we will be e s t i m a t i n g eight different a p a r a m e t e r s , o n e for the intensity of the p r o - and a n t i w a r m e s s a g e s in e a c h t i m e period. T h u s I h a v e , in effect, m a d e the intercept of the logistic function into a variable for c a p t u r i n g t i m e related differences in m e s s a g e intensity. I turn now to a m o d e l of the a c c e p t a n c e process. T h e Resistance A x i o m holds that p e o p l e reject political m e s s a g e s that a r e inconsistent with their predisposit i o n s , but only if they possess contextual information c o n c e r n i n g the relationship b e t w e e n their predispositions and the m e s s a g e . F r o m a x i o m s A l and A 3 , respectively, both the reception and the accessibility of cueing information (given reception of it) will be associated with higher levels of habitual political awareness. H e n c e , rates of a c c e p t a n c e of i n c o m i n g m e s s a g e s , given reception of t h e m , ought to decline as a joint function of political a w a r e n e s s and ideological distance (a p h r a s e I will use instead of " p r e d i s p o s i t i o n a l d i s t a n c e " ) from the m e s s a g e . T h e following logistic function meets these r e q u i r e m e n t s : 0

5

0

Prob(Accept I

Recept),*, = -

[1

+

Exp(-b

0k

~

193

flows

c h a n g e d as liberal elites b e g a n to o p p o s e the w a r starting in about 1966, this specification will e n a b l e us to test w h e t h e r ideological distance and a w a r e n e s s b e c a m e , as e x p e c t e d , m o r e strongly associated with resistance to persuasion after that t i m e . W i t h t h e r e c e p t i o n function in E q u a t i o n 9 . 1 a and the a c c e p t a n c e function in E q u a t i o n 9 . 2 , we h a v e precise s t a t e m e n t s about h o w individuals r e s p o n d to the political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s they encounter, selectively internalizing s o m e of these c o m m u n i c a t i o n s as n e w c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . W h a t r e m a i n s is to state how they transform c o n s i d e r a t i o n s into survey responses. T h e R A S m o d e l , a s indicated, a s s u m e s that individuals s a m p l e w h a t e v e r consideration is ' 'at t h e top of t h e h e a d ' ' at the m o m e n t of r e s p o n s e . Let /?, be defined as a function g i v i n g the likelihood that a typical c o n s i d e r a t i o n , having been f o r m e d , will be accessible for a n s w e r i n g survey q u e s t i o n s , and let it be a s s u m e d that Ri v a r i e s directly w i t h political a w a r e n e s s and nothing e l s e , as follows : Prob(Recall), = 1 - [1 + E x p ( c + c ^ A w a r e n e s s , ) ] " = R,

1

0

(9-3)

N o t e that b e c a u s e this function c a r r i e s no kt s u b s c r i p t s , it applies to each consideration in a p e r s o n ' s m i n d , so that r e g a r d l e s s of w h e n a c o n s i d e r a t i o n h a s b e e n formed or w h i c h side of the issue it favors, it is equally likely to be s a m p l e d . O n e can readily i m a g i n e m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d or ideologically biased sampling functions, but t h e available d a t a p r o v i d e neither m e a n s for testing m o r e

b *Awareness, u

c o m p l i c a t e d formulations n o r reason to try t h e m , since the present specification

^2f*Distance,]~'

= Accept,*,

information

(9.2)

As in E q u a t i o n 9 . 1 a , the subscripts in this e q u a t i o n e m b o d y definite claims about t h e opinion formation process. First, the k subscript on the intercept p a r a m e t e r b indicates that s o m e m e s s a g e s m a y e n c o u n t e r m o r e resistance than others. For e x a m p l e , o n e might suspect that the liberal a n t i w a r m e s s a g e w o u l d e n c o u n t e r m o r e resistance, at given levels of a w a r e n e s s and ideological dist a n c e , than w o u l d the c o n s e r v a t i v e p r o w a r m e s s a g e , b e c a u s e it runs c o n t r a r y to an established policy. Or, the liberal m e s s a g e m i g h t b e , for reasons of patrio t i s m or rhetoric or political a s s o c i a t i o n , an inherently less attractive or persuasive m e s s a g e . T h e subscript k e n a b l e s the m o d e l to capture such m e s s a g e level variation in overall a c c e p t a n c e notes. S e c o n d , there are / subscripts for t i m e on the coefficients for a w a r e n e s s and ideological distance from the m e s s a g e . S i n c e , as I have a r g u e d , the effects of these variables d e p e n d on cueing m e s s a g e s from elites, and since these c u e s 0

5 An argument might be made that the a, coefficient, which captures the strength of relationship between reception and awareness independently of message intensity, should also be subscripted by time or by message. If, for example, a message was carried exclusively through political media in its early phases, but was carried through entertainment and political media in a later phase, it would be appropriate to allow for a stronger relationship between exposure and awareness in the earlier period. Since, however, the Vietnam data are not strong enough to make credible tests of the null hypothesis, I have specified a time-invariant a, parameter.

t u r n s out to w o r k quite well. W i t h the n e w /?, t e r m , we can w r i t e an expression for the probability that a m e s s a g e to w h i c h an individual has b e e n exposed will be i m m e d i a t e l y accessible in m e m o r y as a c o n s i d e r a t i o n . This is simply the probability that an individual h a s received t h e m e s s a g e , t i m e s the probability that he has a c c e p t e d it, t i m e s the probability that he h a s it accessible in m e m o r y at the m o m e n t of r e s p o n d i n g to an attitude q u e s t i o n , as follows: Prob(Accessible),*, = / ^ ( A c c e p t , * , ) / ? , = AC , ik

(9.4)

Since we h a v e already a s s u m e d that there are N prowar a r g u m e n t s (k=P) and N a n t i w a r a r g u m e n t s (k=A), the relative accessibility of p r o w a r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s is equal to

Y^E^Accept,/.,)/?,

— ^/^(Accept,,.,)/?, +

^

(95)

2/^XAcceptM,);?,

6 In principle, of course, any variable that affects attention to an issue would also affect recall ability; however, nothing of value except general awareness is available in the Vietnam data series. Also, it would follow from axiom A3 that recall ability varies inversely with the time since a consideration has been formed. However, I omit this idea from Equation 9.3 because it has no observable implications in the context of the present problem.

194

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

Two-sided

T h i s expression can be simplified in t w o ways. First, the fl, t e r m s a p p e a r in both the n u m e r a t o r and denominator, so they cancel and can be o m i t t e d . S e c o n d , b e c a u s e there a r e , by a s s u m p t i o n , equal n u m b e r s of p r o w a r and a n t i w a r m e s sages, and b e c a u s e all m e s s a g e s of each type are a s s u m e d to be equally i n t e n s e , the s u m m a t i o n signs also b e c o m e superfluous. This leaves

M

lV4/

)

as o u r m e a s u r e of the relative accessibility of p r o w a r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s P over antiwar c o n s i d e r a t i o n s A in the mind of i n d i v i d u a l a t t i m e t, w h e r e t h e reception and a c c e p t a n c e functions are given by E q u a t i o n s 9 . 1 a and 9 . 2 . E q u a t i o n 9 . 6 is intuitively q u i t e s i m p l e : Relative accessibilities d e p e n d on the r e c e p t i o n a c c e p t a n c e ratios of the two m e s s a g e s , w h e r e these ratios v a r y by t i m e and by differences a m o n g individuals in a w a r e n e s s and ideological d i s t a n c e . O n e p r o b l e m r e m a i n s : namely, w h a t t o d o about " N o o p i n i o n " r e s p o n s e s . I n the V i e t n a m c a s e as in o t h e r s , large n u m b e r s of t h e public r e p o r t e d that they had no opinion. P r e s u m a b l y , people m a k e such r e s p o n s e s w h e n they are u n a b l e to call to m i n d any c o n s i d e r a t i o n that w o u l d give t h e m a reason for s u p p o r t i n g one rather than the o t h e r side of the issue. If the c h a n c e that any p a r t i c u l a r conside r a t i o n is accessible in the m e m o r y of the i individual is AC , (from E q u a t i o n 9 . 4 ) , then t h e c h a n c e that s o m e o n e w o u l d have n o n e of the 2N possible considerations readily accessible in m e m o r y is th

ik N

P r o b ( N o opinion),,

=

(1

- AC ,)(\

- AC ,)(\

ik

- AC )

ik

(1

-IT(1

-AC ,W(\ iP

-

flows

195

AC ,)) iA

/?£,/>,Accept,/., *

(y°) RE ,Accept , + RE iP

iP

i A

, Accepts,

T h i s e q u a t i o n , in conjunction with a p p r o p r i a t e l y modified expressions for antiw a r and " N o o p i n i o n " r e s p o n s e s , is my m o d e l for fitting the opinion d a t a on Vietnam.

/?£,-/>,( Accept,-/.,) /v£,/>,(Accept,/>,) + / ? £ , ( A c c e p t

=

information

ikl

...

(1

T h i s t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l is obviously quite different in form from the o n e m e s s a g e m o d e l d e v e l o p e d in C h a p t e r 7, which w a s intended as a simplification of the basic a t t i t u d e - c h a n g e process. However, both m o d e l s are c a p a b l e of c a p t u r i n g , in essentially similar fashion, m a n y types of attitude c h a n g e , as will be s h o w n below. T h e t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l i s , however, by far the m o r e versatile and powerful, as will also be apparent. T h e m o d e l d e v e l o p e d in this section is not, I might a d d , the only form that a t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l c o u l d t a k e . In A p p e n d i x A to this chapter, I d e r i v e an alt e r n a t i v e form w h i c h , b e c a u s e it o m i t s any reference to c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , is m a t h e m a t i c a l l y simpler. Before e s t i m a t i n g t h e t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l on the C P S d a t a series on t h e Vietn a m War, I m u s t d e s c r i b e certain features of the d a t a . D e s p i t e their generally high quality, there are s o m e p r o b l e m s in a d a p t i n g t h e m for use by t h e t w o message model.

- AC J ikt

DATA AND RESULTS A s s u m i n g , as I h a v e , an equal n u m b e r of liberal and c o n s e r v a t i v e m e s s a g e s , this b e c o m e s P r o b ( N o opinion),,

= =

N

N

Il (\

-

AC ) l\ {\

n*(l

-

REinAceeptip,

iPl

-

AC ) iAl

Ri)

-

RE

,Acce t ,

iA

P iA

/?,)

T h e probability of having s o m e o p i n i o n , t h e n , is Prob(Opinion),, =

1

N

- n"(l

- AC ,)n (\ iP

- AC ) iAt

(9.7)

Putting this expression for o p i n i o n a t i o n together with the expression for the relative accessibility of p r o w a r a r g u m e n t s , we obtain the basic statistical m o d e l for e s t i m a t i n g s u p p o r t for the V i e t n a m War: Probability of p r o w a r response//., = (Probability of recalling any c o n s i d e r a t i o n at all) X

/ [

Accessibility of p r o w a r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s Accessibility of

\ prowar considerations

+

Accessibility of antiwar considerations

N o n e of the major C P S surveys c o n d u c t e d from 1964 to 1970 w e r e reinterviews with t h e s a m e r e s p o n d e n t s . T h e analysis of m a s s attitudes across t i m e therefore requires c o m p a r i s o n s of p a r t i c u l a r types of persons across t i m e - c o m p a r i s o n , for e x a m p l e , of w a r s u p p o r t a m o n g " h i g h l y informed d o v e s " in 1964 with w a r s u p p o r t a m o n g " h i g h l y informed d o v e s " i n 1966, 1968, and 1970. T h i s , in t u r n , requires the c o n s t r u c t i o n of highly similar m e a s u r e s of awareness and values in all four s u r v e y s , so that similar s u b g r o u p s of p e o p l e can be located in e a c h survey. W i t h respect to a w a r e n e s s , this is e a s y to d o . As discussed in t h e M e a s u r e s A p p e n d i x , each survey contains a set of information items sufficient to build an awareness scale with an a l p h a reliability of .80 or better. A l t h o u g h m o s t of the information i t e m s vary from year to year, there is no reason to believe that they vary in c o n s e q u e n t i a l w a y s . Just as o n e c o u l d rank o r d e r individuals in t e r m s of spelling ability with o n e r a n d o m l y selected set of twenty w o r d s about as well as with a n o t h e r r a n d o m l y selected set of twenty w o r d s , so the different information tests used in the different C P S surveys should all serve roughly equally well. Building c o m p a r a b l e m e a s u r e s of political values is m o r e difficult. O n e p o s sible m e a s u r e of values is a p e r s o n ' s " i d e o l o g i c a l " position on the l e f t - r i g h t c o n t i n u u m , w h i c h can be m e a s u r e d in the C P S surveys as t h e difference in

196

N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N

" f e e l i n g t h e r m o m e t e r " scores for liberals and c o n s e r v a t i v e s . T h i s m e a s u r e , however, h a s a major difficulty. A l t h o u g h ideology must function as an e x o g e nous c a u s e of o p i n i o n toward the war in V i e t n a m , it is possible that influence r u n s partly in t h e o t h e r d i r e c t i o n . It is p o s s i b l e , that is, that p e o p l e form evalu a t i o n s of liberals and c o n s e r v a t i v e s partly on the basis of their opinion on the V i e t n a m issue r a t h e r than vice v e r s a . 7

A n o t h e r possibility is to use p e o p l e ' s general feelings of h a w k i s h n e s s or d o v ishness as the m e a s u r e of predispositions to support or o p p o s e the war. T h e advantage of h a w k - d o v e opinion is that it is the d i m e n s i o n of l e f t - r i g h t o r i e n t a t i o n m o s t likely to affect opinions toward the V i e t n a m War. T h e p r o b l e m is that t h e 1 9 6 4 - 7 0 C P S surveys contain no direct m e a s u r e of it. T h e p r o b l e m is not, however, as intractable as it might s e e m . O n e can use F r a n k l i n ' s (1989) t w o - s a m p l e instrumental variables t e c h n i q u e to c o n s t r u c t a proxy m e a s u r e of h a w k - d o v e attitudes. T h i s t e c h n i q u e , which uses information from one dataset to build an instrumental variable in a n o t h e r d a t a s e t , p r o d u c e s m e a s u r e s that are a s y m p t o t i c a l l y u n b i a s e d and efficient. T h e t e c h n i q u e w o r k s as follows. First, we locate a dataset that h a s a g o o d m e a s u r e of h a w k - d o v e values. T h e one I use here is the 1988 N a t i o n a l E l e c t i o n Study, which asked several q u e s t i o n s of the following type: Which do you think is the better way for us to keep the peace - by having a very strong military so that other countries won't attack us, or by working out our disagreements at the bargaining table? 8

A b a t t e r y of these i t e m s can be used to predict a p e r s o n ' s general predisposition to s u p p o r t foreign wars. T h e next step is to locate a set of " a u x i l i a r y " d e m o g r a p h i c and issue variables - gender, religion, racial attitudes - which are related to the m e a s u r e of h a w k - d o v e values in the 1988 dataset and w h i c h are c a r r i e d in identical form in the V i e t n a m d a t a s e t s . Having d o n e t h i s , o n e d o e s a regression in the 1988 dataset to d e t e r m i n e the relationship b e t w e e n h a w k - d o v e v a l u e s , on o n e s i d e , and the auxiliary v a r i a b l e s , on the other. T h e a s s u m p t i o n behind the regression is that the coefficients it g e n e r a t e s , even t h o u g h b a s e d on 1988 d a t a , capture a time-invariant relationship b e t w e e n h a w k - d o v e values and the auxiliary variables. We then go back to t h e V i e t n a m d a t a s e t s , w h e r e we use the auxiliary variables (the s a m e o n e s that were c a r r i e d in the 1988 dataset) to m a k e predictions about which p e o p l e w e r e likely to be h a w k s and doves in t h e 1960s. T h u s , if w o m e n , Q u a k e r s , a n d racial liberals were d o v e s in 1988, we will predict that w o m e n , Q u a k e r s , and racial liberals were likely to have been doves in the 1960s as well. But how do we c o m b i n e scores on n u m e r o u s auxiliary variables to predict a p e r s o n ' s overall likelihood of having been a h a w k or dove in t h e 1960s? This is w h e r e the coefficients from t h e 1988 regression c o m e in. If t h e coefficients 7 Party attachment could substitute for ideology; however, party is a weaker predictor of war attitudes, while suffering the same endogeneity problem. 8 A series of hawk-dove items of this type were developed and validated by Hurwitz and Peffley (1988).

Two-sided

information

flows

197

h a v e , as a s s u m e d , c a p t u r e d a time-invariant relationship between the auxiliary variables and h a w k - d o v e v a l u e s , they should predict h o w exactly the auxiliary variables w e r e related to h a w k - d o v e values in the V i e t n a m era. So we use these coefficients as w e i g h t s on the auxiliary v a r i a b l e s to c o m b i n e t h e m into a n e w " i n s t r u m e n t a l v a r i a b l e . " T h e new v a r i a b l e , a weighted c o m b i n a t i o n of the inf o r m a t i o n on n u m e r o u s auxiliary v a r i a b l e s , should predict w h o w a s likely to have been a h a w k or a d o v e in the 1960s. A limitation of this a p p r o a c h , as with any use of instrumental v a r i a b l e s , is that the instrument is only as g o o d as the auxiliary variables that have been used to construct it, w h i c h , in the present c a s e , is not very g o o d , since the /--square on the first stage regression is only 0 . 1 4 . D e s p i t e t h i s , the m e a s u r e turns out to perform extremely w e l l , as will be shown below. (See A p p e n d i x B of this c h a p ter for further details and discussion of the m e a s u r e ; see also footnote 14.) O n e final m e a s u r e m e n t issue needs to be a d d r e s s e d . A l t h o u g h , as I indicated, the M i c h i g a n s u r v e y s asked essentially the s a m e V i e t n a m q u e s t i o n over four surv e y s , there is o n e n o t e w o r t h y discontinuity. In 1964 and 1966 all respondents were asked w h e t h e r they had been " p a y i n g attention to w h a t is going on in Vietn a m , " and only those w h o responded affirmatively were subsequently asked w h e t h e r they s u p p o r t e d or o p p o s e d A m e r i c a n involvement. In 1964 s o m e 20 percent of the r e s p o n d e n t s failed this m i n i m a l test of interest and were not asked w h e t h e r they s u p p o r t e d or o p p o s e d the w a r ; in 1966 persons failing to pass the initial interest screen fell to 7 percent. T h e n , in 1968 and 1970, the interest screen w a s d r o p p e d , so that only those v o l u n t e e r i n g a " N o o p i n i o n " response are c o u n t e d in that c a t e g o r y . T h i s discontinuity m a k e s it difficult to offer confident e s t i m a t e s of the c h a n g e s in " N o - o p i n i o n " rates b e t w e e n 1966 and 1968. Yet the trajectory of decline from 1964 to 1966 in no-attention responses (from 20 percent to 7 percent) suggests that the n u m b e r of such r e s p o n d e n t s still having no interest in 1968 w a s probably s m a l l . A n d , of c o u r s e , r e s p o n d e n t s could still volunteer a " N o - o p i n i o n " r e s p o n s e to the V i e t n a m item itself. S o m e 7 percent did in 1968, which w a s d o w n from 9 percent in 1966 and 13 percent in 1964. T h e fact that volunteered rates of " N o o p i n i o n " c o n t i n u e d to fall from 1966 to 1968 despite removal of t h e interest filter, as well as o t h e r published d a t a ( P i e r c e , Beatty, and Hagner, 1982: p. 142), m a k e it c l e a r that " N o o p i n i o n " rates did actually continue to decline b e t w e e n 1966 and 1968. But the C P S d a t a probably o v e r e s t i m a t e the a m o u n t by which they did so. T h i s p r o b l e m can be a c c o m m o d a t e d by adding a t i m e subscript to the " f l o o r p a r a m e t e r " in the reception function, as follows: ProbC/?/:),*, = 1 - [1 + /, + Exp(a fa + a i * A w a r e n e s s , ) ] ~ ' 0

= RE

ikl

(9.1ft)

w h e r e / , can take different values i n 1 9 6 4 - 6 and 1 9 6 8 - 7 0 . T h e s u b s c r i p t e d / p a r a m e t e r p e r m i t s different floor levels of o p i n i o n a t i o n , d e p e n d i n g on the prese n c e or absence of a " N o - o p i n i o n " filter.

198

Two-sided information flows

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

Estimation

of the

model

T h e m o d e l m a k e s m u l t i n o m i a l e s t i m a t e s of r e s p o n s e probabilities for three cate g o r i e s : s u p p o r t for the war, opposition to it, and no o p i n i o n . T h e s e e s t i m a t e s are m a d e across four datasets having 5 , 0 0 2 respondents. Initial e s t i m a t i o n of the m o d e l indicated that p a t t e r n s of opinion c h a n g e were different a m o n g A n g l o whites than o t h e r g r o u p s . A s e p a r a t e analysis w a s therefore u n d e r t a k e n for blacks and is r e p o r t e d below; however, Hispanic and A s i a n - A m e r i c a n respondents have been o m i t t e d b e c a u s e there are t o o few cases for s e p a r a t e analysis.

199

Table 9.1. Coefficients for diffusion of prowar and antiwar messages on Vietnam War

9

My first e s t i m a t e s of the m o d e l p r o d u c e d plausible values for all coefficients, but a graphical analysis showed that t h e e s t i m a t e d coefficients " u n d e r f i t " the r a w d a t a , in t h e sense that trends w h i c h w e r e clearly a p p a r e n t in t h e r a w d a t a , as in Figure 9 . 2 , w e r e not a d e q u a t e l y r e p r e s e n t e d . T h e underfitting w a s not dram a t i c , but it w a s quite n o t i c e a b l e . To r e m e d y the p r o b l e m , I a d d e d a t e r m for a w a r e n e s s t i m e s values in t h e a c c e p t a n c e function, and this e n a b l e d the m o d e l to do a better j o b of fitting the r a w d a t a , t h o u g h underfitting r e m a i n s a p r o b l e m . M a x i m u m likelihood coefficient e s t i m a t e s of E q u a t i o n 9.8 for whites are s h o w n in the first c o l u m n of Table 9 . 1 . T h e coefficients in the table are d e scribed both in t e r m s of the substantive variable to which they refer and the subfunction in w h i c h they occur. T h e s t a n d a r d e r r o r s for all coefficients, w h i c h are also s h o w n , should be r e g a r d e d as a p p r o x i m a t e . T h e most n o t a b l e aspect of these coefficient e s t i m a t e s is their lack of statistical precision, w h i c h is to say, the very high s t a n d a r d errors that are associated with t h e m . T h e r e are t w o fairly o b v i o u s r e a s o n s for this p r o b l e m . T h e first is that the d a t a have given the m o d e l no indication of the actual intensities of the c o m m u n i c a t i o n flows that are supposedly shaping opinion - except that they differ by year and by m e s s a g e - or t h e n u m b e r of discrete m e s s a g e s citizens were e x p o s e d to. T h i s c r e a t e s severe multicollinearity: T h e r e m i g h t Have been few m e s s a g e s of high intensity, or m a n y m e s s a g e s of low intensity, and the m o d e l h a s no w a y of telling. S e c o n d , political awareness has three s e p a r a t e roles to play - namely, m e d i a t i n g m e m o r y s e a r c h , r e c e p t i o n , and resistance. On top of t h i s , a w a r e n e s s a p p e a r s in several interaction t e r m s in the a c c e p t a n c e function. T h e effect, o n c e a g a i n , is severe multicollinearity.

1 0

In an effort to reduce the multicollinearity, I introduced s o m e plausible constraints in the m o d e l . Before p r e s e n t i n g results from the constrained m o d e l , however, it is instructive to e x a m i n e the u n c o n s t r a i n e d coefficients. 9 As explained in the last chapter, the war support option combines two separate response options - keeping U.S. troops in Vietnam while trying to end the fighting, and taking a stronger stand even if it means invading North Vietnam. The first represents the consistent position of the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations; the latter was the preferred strategy of some right-wing critics of the administration. Hawks and doves differed in expected ways in their choices between the two prowar options, and it would be desirable to build a "three-message model" capable of capturing this variation. 10 I should add that none of the substantive conclusions of this chapter would have to be changed if the Awareness x Values terms were omitted; their inclusion serves only to enhance the visual clarity of the simulations, as in Figure 9.4.

Unconstrained model Reception function (Equation Eight dummy intercepts (a ^ ) 0

Constrained model

9db)

t

See Figure 9.3

-

-5.68 (1.29)

Message slope

—

1.71 (0.64)

Awareness (standardized)

0.51 (0.32)

0.50 (0.17)

Floor 6 4 - 6 6 (f )

0.008 (0.11)

0.01 (0.02)

Floor 6 8 - 7 0 (f )

0.04 (0.53)

0.06 (0.03)

1.43 (2.36)

2.31 (1.48)

Liberal message intercept

-1.06 (3.83)

-1.23 (0.43)

Awareness

-0.08 (1.09)

0.06 (0.50)

Awareness X time (Time = 0 in 1964, 1 afterward)

-0.27 (0.78)

-0.43 (0.51)

Hawk-dove* (standardized)

0.11 (0.26)

0.19 (0.30)

H a w k - d o v e X awareness*

0.01 (0.27)

-0.07 (0.32)

Time

0.29 (2.55)

0.47 (0.41)

H a w k - d o v e X time*

0.19 (.33)

0.14 (0.30)

H a w k - d o v e X awareness X time*

0.09 (0.27)

0.22 (0.35)

-0.18 (0.21)

-0.05 (0.16)

3.19 (2.48)

3.47 (2.36)

1.66 (.94)

1.75 (.94)

Message intercept

3

t

t

Acceptance function (Equation 9.2) Conservative message intercept (bok)

Male (1 = male)* Recall function Intercept (co) Awareness

(cj)

(Equation 9.3)

200

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

Number of messages

(AO

Degrees of freedom Residual sum of squares

35.2 (560) 9980 1643.67

Two-sided information flows

24 (fixed) 9987 1650.77

Note: Dependent variable is a multinomial item on Vietnam policy: support for the war, opposition to it, and no opinion. The model is Equation 9.8, with subfunctions specified by Equations 9.1b, 9.2, and 9.3. Estimation is by maximum likelihood. N of cases is 5002. In the unconstrained model, changes in message intensity over time are captured by eight dummy intercepts in the reception function, one for the liberal and conservative message in each of the four years, as plotted in Figure 9.3. In the constrained model, the message intercept and slope operate on the eight logged story counts shown in Figure 9.1 to produce eight estimates of message intensity. * Coefficient is negative in acceptance function for conservative message (indicating lower acceptance among liberals) and positive in acceptance function for liberal message. Sources: 1964, 1966, 1978, and 1970 CPS surveys.

Antiwar message -3.0

T h e s e results s u p p o r t a key point in my a r g u m e n t , n a m e l y that the effects of values and a w a r e n e s s on political attitudes are not a u t o m a t i c but d e p e n d on elite cues for a c t i v a t i o n . As explained in the previous s e c t i o n , the model uses c h a n g e s in the intercept of t h e reception function, in the form of the a , coefficients, to e s t i m a t e the intensities of pro- and a n t i w a r c o m m u n i c a t i o n s that would have been n e c e s s a r y to p r o d u c e the o b s e r v e d patterns of opinion on the war. T h e values of these c o efficients are s h o w n in Figure 9 . 3 (rather than in Table 9 . 1 ) . T h e i r absolute values have little m e a n i n g , but c h a n g e s over t i m e indicate c h a n g e s in the relative intensities of the t w o m e s s a g e s and therefore do have m e a n i n g . T h u s , the model e s t i m a t e s that the p r o w a r m e s s a g e increased in intensity from 1964 to 1966, fell back m o d e r a t e l y in 1968, and declined o n c e again in 1970. M e a n w h i l e , the m o d e l e s t i m a t e s that the a n t i w a r m e s s a g e , t h o u g h initially very w e a k , steadily gained in intensity until 1970, when it finally b e c a m e more intense than the prowar message. to

11 In my earlier analysis of opinion on the Vietnam War (Zaller. 1991), awareness had positively signed effects in the acceptance function. This difference is due to a change in the form of the acceptance function, as explained in footnote 14 of Chapter 7.

Prowar message

Magnitude of a(Okt)

coefficients from reception ^ „ function (Equation 9.1b)

a

Note first t h a t , in the a c c e p t a n c e function, the effects of b o t h ideology and a w a r e n e s s a p p e a r to increase m a r k e d l y from the period in which there w a s a m a i n s t r e a m elite c o n s e n s u s (1964) to the period in which the w a r p r o v o k e d elite d i s a g r e e m e n t (1966 through 1970). T h e direct effect of values increased by a factor of 1.7, t h e direct effect of a w a r e n e s s increased by a factor of 3 . 4 , and the awareness x values interaction increased by a factor of 9 . "

201

-5.0 1963-4

1965-6

1967-8

1969-70

Figure 9.3. Estimated intensities of prowar and antiwar messages, 1963-1970.

T h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n these e s t i m a t e d m e s s a g e intensities - w h i c h , I stress, have been inferred by the model from trends in opinion d a t a alone - with the actual c o u n t of pro- and a n t i w a r stories in national n e w s m a g a z i n e s in Figure 9 . 1 a is r e m a r k a b l y g o o d . Indeed, it may be a little t o o g o o d . As discussed earlier, different indicators of m e d i a coverage yield s o m e w h a t different results than those s h o w n in F i g u r e 9 . 1 a , and a different version of the t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l , as d e s c r i b e d in A p p e n d i x A to this c h a p t e r and applied to the V i e t n a m d a t a (Zaller, 1991), p r o d u c e d s o m e w h a t different e s t i m a t e s of the pro- and a n t i w a r information f l o w s . E v e n s o , the basic result, very high a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n two c o m p l e t e l y different types of e s t i m a t e s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n flow, a m o u n t s to an i m p o r t a n t a c h i e v e m e n t for the t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l . 1 2

In r e e s t i m a t i n g the m o d e l , I i m p o s e d t w o constraints. T h e first is that I required the a coefficients to be a linear function of the logged story counts s h o w n in Figure 9. l a . T h u s , the intensities of the pro- and a n t i w a r m e s s a g e s are no longer c o m p l e t e l y free to take any value in a given year, but are constrained to reflect an actual c o u n t of pro- and a n t i w a r stories a p p e a r i n g in the m e d i a . S e c o n d , b e c a u s e t h e n u m b e r of m e s s a g e s in a two-year period is a purely theoretical entity, I arbitrarily constrained it to the n u m b e r of m o n t h s b e t w e e n surv e y s , 2 4 . This constraint increased the residual v a r i a n c e in the m o d e l (but only slightly, since any n u m b e r of m e s s a g e s b e t w e e n about eight and sixty s e e m s to p r o d u c e an almost equally g o o d fit) while greatly d e c r e a s i n g e s t i m a t e s of standard e r r o r s . 0kt

13

12 The correlation between the eight a , coefficients reported in Zaller (1991) and the log of the story counts in Figure 9.1 is 0.79; for the version of the two-message model used in this book, the correlation is 0.89. 13 Another advantage of the constrained model is that it converges much more quickly to final parameter estimates. The unconstrained model took several hundred (expensive!) iterations to converge on what seemed to me like firm estimates, even though the initial starting values were fairly good. The greater computational efficiency of the constrained model makes it feasible to do F-tests on particular coefficients, which must still be done in some cases. llk

202

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

Two-sided

information

203

flows

elite divisions over the war activated the p u b l i c ' s predispositions toward s u p p o r t or o p p o s i t i o n .

Percent supporting war 100

DOVES

Of the substantively interesting v a r i a b l e s , only m a l e g e n d e r is insignificant in the constrained m o d e l . T h i s is s u r p r i s i n g , since a g e n d e r effect is visibly present in the r a w d a t a (see Zaller, 1991). I guessed that t h e p r o b l e m might be that gend e r is an i m p o r t a n t contributor to the h a w k - d o v e instrument and so is, in a s e n s e , being entered into the a c c e p t a n c e function twice. I therefore substituted a m o r e direct m e a s u r e of ideology - the difference in each r e s p o n d e n t ' s r a t i n g s of liberals and c o n s e r v a t i v e s on 100-point feeling t h e r m o m e t e r s , as d e s c r i b e d above - into the a c c e p t a n c e function and r e e s t i m a t e d the m o d e l . In this m o d e l , gender w a s statistically significant on an individual coefficient F-test (F,[2,9987], 13.68, p < . 0 1 ) . 1 4

Political awareness HAWKS

1966

1968 1970

1964

Patterns

of support for and opposition

to

the

war

M o r e i m p o r t a n t than the fit of the model to t h e d a t a is the substantive story implied by the d a t a and the m o d e l . T h e story e m e r g e s readily from a graphical a n a l y s i s , as shown in Figure 9 . 4 . (This and subsequent figures are b a s e d on results from the c o n s t r a i n e d m o d e l . ) Let us e x a m i n e first the attitudes of doves. Figure 9 . 4 s h o w s that in 1964 p o litical awareness had a roughly linear relation with s u p p o r t for the war. T h i s result exemplifies the m a i n s t r e a m or " f o l l o w e r " model of opinion f o r m a t i o n , as discussed in C h a p t e r 6. 1 5

Political awareness Figure 9.4. Patterns 1970. Estimates are See footnote 15 for Source: 1964, 1966,

of support for the Vietnam War among hawks and doves, 1964derived from media-constrained coefficient estimates in Table 9 . 1 . additional information on the coding of variables in this figure. 1968, and 1970 CPS surveys.

By 1966, however, the J o h n s o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w a s a t t e m p t i n g to c o u n t e r an incipient a n t i w a r m o v e m e n t through " p e a c e o f f e n s i v e s , " c o n d e m n a t i o n s o f " c o m m u n i s t a g g r e s s i o n , " and other publicity ploys. T h e effects of t h e louder

E s t i m a t e s from the constrained m o d e l are s h o w n in the r i g h t - h a n d c o l u m n of Table 9.1 As can be seen, the precision of the coefficient e s t i m a t e s is greatly improved. All but o n e of the coefficients in the reception and recall functions is now statistically significant, and the e x c e p t i o n , the floor p a r a m e t e r / in 1 9 6 4 - 6 , w a s not e x p e c t e d to diverge from z e r o .

14 Multicollinearity among the other variables in the acceptance function affected the precision of the intercept, which in turn affected the precision of the gender coefficient. Interestingly, the decrease in residual variance from using the feeling thermometers, despite the problem of endogeneity, as the measure of values over using the hawk-dove instrument is modest. This indicates both a slight level of endogeneity in the feeling thermometers and an impressively good performance by the hawk-dove instrument. 15 Hawks and doves are persons having a score of ± 1.85 on the hawk-dove variable; for comparison, the mean score of the doves depicted in Figure 9.2 was just over +2. The following table gives the z-score ranges for the awareness scores that were used in constructing Figure 9.4. Also included are the extreme values of each awareness measure in each year.

T h e coefficients in the a c c e p t a n c e function, however, remain quite i m p r e c i s e . Yet on a series of F - t e s t s , the i m p o r t a n t coefficients all e m e r g e d as statistically significant. T h u s , a w a r e n e s s , v a l u e s , and A w a r e n e s s x Values had no overall effect (these apply only to 1964), but t h e block of coefficients c a p t u r i n g the increased effect of these variables in the period 1966 through 1970 - A w a r e n e s s x T i m e , Values x T i m e , A w a r e n e s s x Values x T i m e , and T i m e - w e r e all statistically significant (F[4, 9 9 8 7 ] , 2 . 3 9 p < . 0 5 ) . T h e interaction t e r m s for a w a r e n e s s and values - A w a r e n e s s X Values and A w a r e n e s s X Values x T i m e - w e r e also statistically significant on an F-test. W h a t all this m e a n s in plain English is that awareness and values had significant effects on resistance to pro- and a n t i w a r c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , but only after

z-score values of awareness scales 1964 1966 1968 Minimum value 5th percentile 98th percentile Maximum value

-2.51 -2.03 1.61 1.84

-1.57 -1.57 2.24 2.66

-2.58 -2.00 1.61 1.96

1970 -2.14 -1.70 2.13 2.57

Note that the lower range awareness scores represent the 5th percentile in this figure rather than the 1st as in most other figures. The reason is that the lowest z-score on the 1966 awareness scale is -1.57, a score attained by 7.7 percent of the sample. To maintain rough comparability between this lower end value and those of other years, I used a 5th percentile cutoff in the other years.

204

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

Two-sided

prowar m e s s a g e register mainly a m o n g respondents in the m i d d l e to lower ranges of the information s p e c t r u m ; these are people w h o previously had been only lightly e x p o s e d to the prowar m e s s a g e and were now readily c o n v e r t e d to s u p p o r t i n g it. M e a n w h i l e , the a n t i w a r m e s s a g e , t h o u g h barely a u d i b l e to most of the p u b l i c , had b e g u n to reach and c o n v e r t the most politically informed d o v e s , w h o were the o n e segment of the public to b e c o m e less s u p p o r t i v e of the war b e t w e e n 1964 and 1966. T h e top m i d d l e panel of Figure 9 . 4 shows that, as late as 1968, a small prowar trend is still evident a m o n g the least informed doves (though this effect is statistically u n c e r t a i n ) w h o were still j u s t getting the p r o w a r m e s s a g e , but that the small p r o w a r trend at the low end of the awareness scale is offset by a m u c h larger a n t i w a r m o v e m e n t in the m i d d l e and upper ranges of the a w a r e n e s s scale. T h u s the b a l a n c e of p r o - and a n t i w a r m e s s a g e s that had mainly favored the war in 1966 w a s w o r k i n g against it in 1968. Finally, as the top right panel of Figure 9 . 4 s h o w s , all s e g m e n t s of the dove s u b g r o u p were turning against the w a r by 1970. Note that the biggest a n t i w a r shift in liberal opinion o c c u r r e d after Richard Nixon took over the presidency in 1969. W i t h the w a r effort being led by a R e publican rather than a D e m o c r a t , many d o v e s found it easier to o p p o s e the war, an o b s e r v a t i o n first m a d e in M u e l l e r ' s (1973) account of c h a n g i n g p a t t e r n s of support for the war. Yet it is also n o t a b l e that the t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l quite nicely picks up the a c c e ' e r a t i o n in liberal a n t i w a r opinion after 1969 without including a special t e r m for c h a n g e in presidential leadership; the only source of opinion c h a n g e on V i e t n a m in this period is c h a n g e in the p a t t e r n of pro- and a n t i w a r information in the m e d i a , as s h o w n in Figure 9.1a. C h a n g i n g p a t t e r n s of w a r support a m o n g h a w k s generally parallel those a m o n g d o v e s , w i t h the c o n s p i c u o u s exception that w a r support a m p n g the most aware h a w k s never really declines. B e t w e e n 1964 and 1966, s u p p o r t for the w a r grows in all a w a r e n e s s g r o u p s , including those scoring at the very top of the awareness scale. In 1968 gains in s u p p o r t for the war a m o n g t h e less informed roughly balance small losses a m o n g the most informed. A n d in 1970, despite the growing intensity of the a n t i w a r m e s s a g e , s u p p o r t for the w a r a m o n g h a w k s d e clines only slightly - mainly a m o n g m o d e r a t e l y a w a r e h a w k s . T h u s , t h r o u g h o u t the war, political a w a r e n e s s r e m a i n s positively associated with what is, a m o n g h a w k s , a strong p a r t i s a n n o r m . It is interesting to c o m p a r e the effects of political a w a r e n e s s on h a w k s and doves. First of all, t h e least informed within each c a m p behave similarly. O w i n g to their habitual inattentiveness to politics, they are late to s u p p o r t the w a r and also late to respond to a n t i w a r i n f o r m a t i o n . M o d e r a t e l y aware h a w k s and doves also b e h a v e fairly similarly: T h e y fail to s u p p o r t the w a r in its initial stage b e c a u s e they have not been sufficiently p r o p a g a n d i z e d ; as the p r o w a r m e s s a g e heats u p , they b e c o m e m o r e s u p p o r t i v e of the war, but then just as quickly begin to a b a n d o n the war w h e n the a n t i w a r m e s s a g e b e c o m e s loud

information

flows

205

100

Rates of nonopinionation

Political awareness Figure 9.5. Estimated "No-opinion" rates among doves, 1964-1970. Estimates are derived from media-constrained coefficient estimates in Table 9 . 1 . Source: 1964, 1966, 1968, and 1970 CPS surveys.

e n o u g h to reach t h e m . T h e most politically aware i d e o l o g u e s , m e a n w h i l e , b e have very differently. H i g h l y aware doves begin turning against the w a r as early as 1966; highly a w a r e h a w k s , by contrast, largely hold their g r o u n d , so that they are almost as likely to s u p p o r t the w a r in 1970 as they were at the start of the conflict. T h e e x p l a n a t i o n , of c o u r s e , is that h a w k s were sustained by a steady flow of ideologically congenial prowar m e s s a g e s and w e r e , at t h e s a m e t i m e , highly resistant to the ideologically inconsistent a n t i w a r m e s s a g e . A l t h o u g h my analysis has focused on differing rates of s u p p o r t for t h e Vietn a m War, the m o d e l also accounts for trends in opposition to the w a r and in " N o o p i n i o n " rates. T h e latter are rather interesting, as depicted in Figure 9 . 5 . T h e r e i s , a s w o u l d b e e x p e c t e d , a strong relationship b e t w e e n " N o o p i n i o n " rates and political awareness. But the relationship is m u c h steeper e a r l y in the war, w h e n most politically u n a w a r e persons had no opinion on the war, than it w a s in later y e a r s , w h e n most citizens had opinions. T h e model is able to a c c o m m o d a t e these c h a n g i n g " N o o p i n i o n " rates b e c a u s e the opinionation function c a r r i e s information (via E q u a t i o n 9 . 4 ) about the intensity of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s on the w a r , and m o r e intense m e s s a g e s a r e , of c o u r s e , associated with lower rates of the " N o o p i n i o n " r e s p o n s e . 1 6

A l t h o u g h it is not shown in Figure 9 . 5 , the model predicts an increase in " N o o p i n i o n " rates b e t w e e n 1968 and 1970. T h i s projected increase is s m a l l , about 2 p e r c e n t a g e points in the lowest awareness g r o u p and even s m a l l e r in o t h e r g r o u p s , and so does not show up in the raw d a t a . However, P i e r c e , Beatty, and H a g n e r (1982: p . 142) report that, across several s u r v e y s , " N o o p i n i o n " rates did begin to c r e e p u p w a r d in 1971, a reflection perhaps of a d e c l i n e in the intensity of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s on the war. 16 More specifically, the RE , terms in Equation (9.4) carry the a„ coefficients. lk

kl

206

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

Two-sided

information

flows

207

of w h i t e liberals after that t i m e . T h e r e s e e m s , n o n e t h e l e s s , to be an o b v i o u s explanation: T h e V i e t n a m W a r w a s led by President L y n d o n J o h n s o n , w h o in 1964 and 1965 w o n congressional approval for t w o historic civil rights bills and w h o launched the a m b i t i o u s W a r on Poverty p r o g r a m . In light of t h i s , m e m b e r s of the black public were likely to attach greater credibility to J o h n s o n ' s s t a t e m e n t s on the w a r than w e r e o t h e r types of persons. By 1968, however, J o h n s o n ' s civil rights a c h i e v e m e n t s w e r e well behind h i m and many m e m b e r s of the black civil rights leadership g r o u p , including the recently assassinated M a r t i n L u t h e r K i n g , Jr., had c o m e out against the w a r . In this situation, blacks b e c a m e m o r e susceptible to the increasingly intense a n t i w a r m e s s a g e . 1 8

Political awareness Figure 9.6. Trends in black support for the Vietnam War, 1964-1970. Trend lines have been derived from logistic regressions. The awareness measure in the figure runs ± 1.75 SD. Source: 1964, 1966, 1968, and 1970 CPS surveys.

T h u s , blacks a p p e a r to have been as r e s p o n s i v e as whites to the flow of proand a n t i w a r information on V i e t n a m , but blacks evaluated this information in light of s o m e w h a t different leadership cues.

A F R O - A M E R I C A N S ' SUPPORT FOR T H E WAR

IMPLICATIONS

T h e small n u m b e r of A f r o - A m e r i c a n s available for analysis in the C P S datasets (despite black o v e r s a m p l e s in s o m e years) m a k e s it difficult to m a k e a confident a s s e s s m e n t of black trends in support for the war. N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e available d a t a reveal s o m e highly s u g g e s t i v e p a t t e r n s , as s h o w n in Figure 9 . 6 . (The d a t a in this figure have b e e n c o n s t r u c t e d from s i m p l e p o l y n o m i a l regression in order to s m o o t h out l u m p i n e s s arising from s a m p l i n g error.)

T h e results of this c h a p t e r have a d v a n c e d o u r understanding of the d y n a m i c s of opinion c h a n g e in several respects. First, they p r o v i d e the first c l e a r e v i d e n c e of c o u n t e r v a l e n t r e s i s t a n c e , m o s t strikingly in the period 1964 to 1966. T h e y show, that is, that highly aware d o v e s w e r e able to resist t h e d o m i n a n t p r o w a r m e s s a g e of this period in p a r t b e c a u s e they w e r e e x p o s e d to the c o u n t e r v a l e n t a n t i w a r m e s s a g e . T h i s m e s s a g e , t h o u g h less intense than the p r o w a r m e s s a g e in the early stage of the war, not only neutralized the p r o w a r m e s s a g e , but actually induced s o m e of the m o s t a w a r e doves to b u c k t h e national trend by b e c o m i n g less s u p p o r t i v e of the war. T h e reason that the effects of c o u n t e r v a l e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n s are so clear in the c a s e of V i e t n a m is that the c o u n t e r v a l e n t m e s s a g e w a s b e c o m i n g m o r e intense at a t i m e w h e n the d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e w a s also b e c o m i n g m o r e i n t e n s e , so that each m e s s a g e c o u l d p r o d u c e c o n v e r t s in a different part of the public. This pattern of i n f o r m a t i o n flows is probably unusual (though see Figure 10.5). But it is likely that there are m a n y other cases in w h i c h c o u n t e r v a l e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , t h o u g h not quite strong e n o u g h to p r o d u c e m o v e m e n t s against a p r e d o m inant national trend, are n o n e t h e l e s s i m p o r t a n t in inducing resistance to such a trend. We shall see further clear e v i d e n c e of the effects of c o u n t e r v a l e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n s in the next chapter.

T h e d a t a in the left panel of Figure 9 . 6 show p a t t e r n s of w a r s u p p o r t a m o n g blacks in 1964 and 1966. T h e s e patterns generally r e s e m b l e those of w h i t e cons e r v a t i v e s , r a t h e r than w h i t e liberals, in Figure 9 . 4 ; there is, in other w o r d s , a generally positive r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n a w a r e n e s s and support for the war, with an increase in s u p p o r t b e t w e e n 1964 and 1966 that registers mainly a m o n g lessa w a r e and m o d e r a t e l y aware persons. T h e j u m p i n w a r support p r e s u m a b l y reflects the increase in the intensity of p r o w a r c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . C o n t r a r y to s o m e a n a l y s e s , these d a t a offer no indication that blacks were initially reluctant to s u p p o r t the V i e t n a m W a r . After 1966, however, black attitudes toward the war begin to r e s e m b l e those of w h i t e liberals, as can be seen from a c o m p a r i s o n of the right-hand side of Figure 9 . 6 with trends a m o n g liberals in Figure 9 . 4 . That is, s u p p o r t for the war declined significantly, especially a m o n g highly and m o d e r a t e l y informed b l a c k s , as a result of the g r a d u a l diffusion of the a n t i w a r m e s s a g e . Nothing in t h e s e opinion d a t a c a n , by itself, explain why black attitudes tow a r d the w a r should r e s e m b l e those of w h i t e c o n s e r v a t i v e s until 1966 and those 1 7

17 There is a significant tendency for blacks to be less supportive of the war in both years, but it disappears once a control for political awareness has been imposed. A close inspection of the data further suggests that highly aware blacks were more supportive of the war than highly aware white conservatives (or any other group) in both 1964 and 1966; at the same time, however, less informed blacks were less supportive of the war than less informed white conservatives (or any other group) in each year. These apparent racial differences, however, are unreliable because of very small numbers of cases at the extremes of high and low information.

S e c o n d , t h e s e results e n a b l e us to see that attitude c h a n g e in r e s p o n s e to a two-sided m e s s a g e can take different forms at different points in t i m e , d e p e n d ing on the relative intensities of the o p p o s i n g m e s s a g e s and the prior distribution of o p i n i o n . We see also that s o m e of t h e s e p a t t e r n s do not m a t c h those develo p e d in the typology p r o p o s e d in C h a p t e r 8, a typology that w a s c o n s t r u c t e d 18 Johnson's approval ratings fell more rapidly among blacks than among whites in the period from 1966 to mid-1968, but then rebounded at the time of the election. (See Dawson, Brown, and Cohen, n.d.)

208

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

100 Percent decline in support for Vietnam War, 1968 to 1970

75

^ 25

0 Political awareness Figure 9.7. Changes in support for the Vietnam War, 1968-1970. Figure shows percentage of persons supporting the war in 1968 who no longer supported it in 1970. These estimates are derived from the support scores shown in Figure 9.4. Source: 1968 and 1970 CPS surveys.

u n d e r the a s s u m p t i o n that opinion c h a n g e is a response to a o n e - s i d e d information flow. W h a t , t h e n , do we m a k e of the typology in C h a p t e r 8? A l t h o u g h I cannot say precisely, my s i m u l a t i o n s of attitude c h a n g e with E q u a t i o n 9 . 8 , along with the empirical results r e p o r t e d in C h a p t e r 8, suggest that the typology is, despite its focus on one-sided information f l o w s , a g o o d a p p r o x i m a t i o n to a w i d e r variety of c a s e s . T h e typology a p p e a r s to be an especially g o o d a p p r o x i m a t i o n to the patterns of c h a n g e that m a y be expected w h e n one of the o p p o s i n g m e s s a g e s r e m a i n s equally intense or loses intensity over t i m e , while the other m e s s a g e gains in intensity. T h i s pattern of c h a n g e s in a two-sided information flow is perhaps the most c o m m o n form of s t i m u l u s to m a s s attitude c h a n g e ; in fact, all cases of m a s s attitude c h a n g e of which I am a w a r e , except the 1964 to 1966 period of the V i e t n a m War, a p p e a r to have been produced by this type of stimulus. For e x a m p l e , late in the V i e t n a m War, w h e n the p r o w a r m e s s a g e w a s roughly stable or losing intensity and the a n t i w a r m e s s a g e w a s gaining in intensity (see Figure 9 . 3 ) , the typology provides an a p p r o x i m a t i o n of the patterns of attitude c h a n g e that actually o c c u r r e d , as can be seen in Figure 9.7. N o n e t h e l e s s , it r e m a i n s t h e c a s e that the p a t t e r n s depicted in the t y p o l o g y in C h a p t e r 8 strictly hold only under c o n d i t i o n s of a one-sided c o m m u n i c a t i o n flow. T h e s e c o n d i t i o n s w o u l d s e e m most likely to hold w h e n the period b e t w e e n attitude m e a s u r e m e n t s is s h o r t , and w h e n the gain in the relative intensity of o n e of the m e s s a g e s is large. T h i r d , the results presented in this chapter, along with the discussion of age effects on the V i e t n a m issue, constitute an unusually detailed account of h o w m a s s belief s y s t e m s form and c h a n g e o v e r t i m e in response to a c o m p l e x

Two-sided information flows

209

stimulus. T h e leading theoretical account of this general p h e n o m e n o n has long been C o n v e r s e ' s " T h e nature o f belief s y s t e m s i n m a s s p u b l i c s " ( 1 9 6 4 ) . His a r g u m e n t , it will be recalled, w a s that c e r t a i n " c r e a t i v e e l i t e s " manufacture w i d e - r a n g i n g belief s y s t e m s - which is to say, clusters of attitudes that are w i d e l y perceived as " g o i n g t o g e t h e r . " T h e s e belief s y s t e m s then diffuse imperfectly through the p u b l i c , such that only the m o s t a w a r e m e m b e r s of the public m a n a g e to fully absorb t h e m . T h e a r g u m e n t of this c h a p t e r has filled in i m p o r t a n t details of this general a r g u m e n t a n d , in so d o i n g , has s o m e w h a t altered it. It has d o c u m e n t e d , first of all, how a new e l e m e n t - an a n t i w a r posture on V i e t n a m - b e c a m e gradually i n c o r p o r a t e d into t h e liberal belief p a c k a g e , w h e r e liberalism itself is o p e r a t i o n ally m e a s u r e d as general tendencies toward h a w k i s h n e s s or dovishness. (The s a m e patterns of attitude c h a n g e arise m o r e s h a r p l y if a direct m e a s u r e of ideology - scores for liberals and c o n s e r v a t i v e s on 100-point feeling t h e r m o m e ters - are substituted for the h a w k - d o v e i n s t r u m e n t that I u s e d . ) T h e story of this i n c o r p o r a t i o n is largely in the spirit of C o n v e r s e ' s analysis: T h e m o s t p o litically attuned liberals w e r e the first to adopt the new belief e l e m e n t , while highly aware c o n s e r v a t i v e s t e n d e d , in g e n e r a l , to resist it. T h e r e a r e , however, s o m e u n e x p e c t e d turns. I n C o n v e r s e ' s theory, ideology o p e r a t e s as a " c o n s t r a i n t " on the o r g a n i z a t i o n of o n e ' s attitudes. T h u s , if o n e is a liberal, one is e x p e c t e d to e m b r a c e all of the e l e m e n t s of the liberal belief p a c k a g e . T h a t a r g u m e n t d o e s not, however, readily apply to the highly a w a r e , older liberals w h o c o n t i n u e d to resist t h e a n t i w a r e l e m e n t of the liberal belief p a c k a g e as late as 1970. As they p r e s u m a b l y saw it, the constraints of liberal ideology cut the o t h e r way - toward support of t h e V i e t n a m W a r as a n o t h e r c a s e of p o s t - W o r l d W a r II liberal i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m . S u c h lags in a d o p t i n g policies to which individuals are p r e s u m a b l y predisposed by their general philosophy represent an interesting and heretofore u n g l i m p s e d aspect of the notion of ideological constraint in a d y n a m i c setting. A n o t h e r u n e x p e c t e d turn is the back-and-forth m o v e m e n t of m o d e r a t e l y aware and less a w a r e liberals. T h e liberals w h o m o v e d in a p r o w a r direction between 1964 and 1966 m a y have t h o u g h t , if they stopped to reflect on it, that they were m o v i n g in a liberal direction. After all, internationalism had been a c o r e e l e m e n t of t h e liberal belief p a c k a g e for s o m e thirty y e a r s , and the principal advocate of t h e p r o w a r policy w a s t h e liberal D e m o c r a t i c president, L y n d o n J o h n s o n . Yet, if, as s e e m s most r e a s o n a b l e , ideology is defined by t h e prefere n c e s of its avant g a r d e elites, this is a n o t h e r c a s e in w h i c h persons w e r e " c o n s t r a i n e d " by w h a t they t o o k to be liberalism to adopt a policy attitude that w a s , for its t i m e , rapidly b e c o m i n g a litmus test of c o n s e r v a t i v e values. T h e analysis of c h a n g i n g attitudes on t h e V i e t n a m W a r t h u s affords a rare o p p o r t u n i t y - rare b e c a u s e the direction of elite cues on m o s t issues is stable from year to year - to o b s e r v e the evolution of m a s s ideologies. A l t h o u g h this 19 For other treatments of the evolution of mass belief systems, see Miller and Levitan, 1976; Carmines and Stimson, 1989; and Hurwitz and Peffley, in press.

210

Two-sided

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

1964

0

1

1966

,

1

1970

,

J

,

Political awareness Figure 9.8. Partisan polarization on the Vietnam War. Estimates are a rearrangement of the data appearing in Figure 9.4. Source: 1964, 1966, 1968, and 1970 CPS surveys.

c a s e has involved foreign policy a t t i t u d e s , it is likely that ideological cues on other issues s o m e t i m e s u n d e r g o similar c h a n g e s i n " w h a t g o e s with w h a t , " and that w h e n they d o , they p r o d u c e similar c h a n g e s in the pattern of m a s s attitudes. T h e r e a r e , it should be a d d e d , no c o n t r a d i c t i o n s between my analysis of the V i e t n a m c a s e and the general theory outlined by C o n v e r s e . V i e t n a m has simply provided e x a m p l e s of how, in a d y n a m i c situation, various types of lags may lead to u n e x p e c t e d forms of ideological constraint. Finally, and most importantly, the results of this chapter provide credible evidence for a very strong claim: that public attitudes toward major issues are a r e s p o n s e to the relative intensity of c o m p e t i n g political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s on those issues. W h e n elites unite on a m a i n s t r e a m issue, the p u b l i c ' s r e s p o n s e is relatively n o n i d e o l o g i c a l , with the most a w a r e m e m b e r s of the public reflecting the elite c o n s e n s u s m o s t strongly. W h e n elites c o m e to disagree along p a r t i s a n or ideological lines, the p u b l i c ' s response will b e c o m e ideological as w e l l , with the most politically aware m e m b e r s of the public responding most ideologically. T h e degree of m a s s ideological p o l a r i z a t i o n on an issue reflects the relative intensity of the o p p o s i n g information flows. T h u s , w h e n , in the c a s e of the Vietn a m W a r in 1966, the c o n s e r v a t i v e m e s s a g e w a s m u c h m o r e intense than the liberal, the d e g r e e of p o l a r i z a t i o n w a s b o t h m o d e s t and skewed in the direction of the c o n s e r v a t i v e position; as the o p p o s i n g information flows b e c a m e more nearly b a l a n c e d , overall s u p p o r t for t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e position fell and ideological p o l a r i z a t i o n b e c a m e m o r e intense. T h e s e points are highlighted in Figure 9 . 8 , which is a reorganization of d a t a presented earlier in Figure 9 . 4 . (Polarization is s h a r p e r if the ideology t h e r m o m e t e r s rather than an instrument are used to m e a s u r e p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s ; see Zaller, 1 9 9 1 , figure 8. 2 0

20 It is interesting that even though the model estimates the antiwar message to have been more intense than the prowar message in 1970, it also indicates that public support for the war was greater in that year than opposition. This is possible because the model also maintains that there was more resistance to the antiwar message, at comparable levels of reception, than to the prowar message; this difference is captured in the intercept difference in the acceptance functions of the two messages, as shown in Table 9.1.

information

flows

211

A l t h o u g h the t w o - m e s s a g e model used in this chapter has m a d e " c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , " defined as discrete reasons for favoring or o p p o s i n g an idea, its p r i m itive unit of analysis, no m e a s u r e m e n t s of public opinion on V i e t n a m were m a d e at the level of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . As a result, I have been unable to provide direct evidence that the d y n a m i c s of the model hold at the intrapsychic level at which people either internalize or fail to internalize p a r t i c u l a r m e s s a g e s they e n c o u n ter. T h e next c h a p t e r fills out this part of the a r g u m e n t by s h o w i n g how the relative intensity of o p p o s i n g c o m m u n i c a t i o n flows d e t e r m i n e s the formation of new c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , which in turn d e t e r m i n e s the s u m m a r y preference statements people m a k e .

APPENDIX A: AN A L T E R N A T I V E FORM OF T W O - M E S S A G E MODEL In this a p p e n d i x , I d e r i v e an alternative form of t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l . T h e alternative omits any reference to c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , but is o t h e r w i s e similar to the model d e v e l o p e d in the text. Let us a s s u m e a political w o r l d in w h i c h , within every t i m e period t and with respect to every political issue, citizens are presented with t w o information f l o w s , or " m e s s a g e s , " o n e tending to push m a s s opinion in a liberal direction and the other in a c o n s e r v a t i v e direction. T h e t w o m e s s a g e s represent t h e s u m of all directionally valenced c o m m u n i c a t i o n s relating to a given issue in the period. T h e following t h r e e - a x i o m model shows how, in such a w o r l d , t e m p o r a l variations in the intensities of the liberal and c o n s e r v a t i v e m e s s a g e s can explain both the cross-sectional distribution of m a s s opinion at any o n e t i m e and c h a n g e s in opinion over t i m e . 1. RECEPTION AXIOM. An individual's probabilities of receiving the liberal and conservative messages within any given time period t are independent, increasing functions of general level of political awareness. T h e m a t h e m a t i c a l form of this a x i o m is E q u a t i o n 9.\b. 2. ACCEPTANCE AXIOM. The probability that an individual will resist - that is, refuse to accept - a message, given reception of it, increases with (I) distance between the values of the individual and the value coloration of the message, and (2) the likelihood that individuals will be aware of the elite-supplied "contextual information" that gives messages their colorations. T h e form of this a x i o m is given by E q u a t i o n 9 . 2 . Before stating the third a x i o m , I define " s u p p o r t i n g m e s s a g e s " as those consistent with an existing opinion and " o p p o s i n g m e s s a g e s " as those that are inconsistent. T h e final a x i o m can now be stated: 3. CHANGE AXIOM. Two types of opinion change, conversion and decay, may occur: A. When a person accepts an opposing message (having received it) and does not accept a supporting message (whether receiving it or not), the person converts to the opposing view.

212

NATURE

AND

ORIGINS

OF

MASS

OPINION

Two-sided information flows

B. If a person accepts no messages in a given period, or accepts both a supporting message and an opposing one, the person's initial opinion decays toward "no opinion" with a fixed probability of d. We can use these a x i o m s to write an expression for the probability that, following s o m e t i m e p e r i o d , an individual w h o initially holds a liberal opinion or no opinion will c h a n g e to a c o n s e r v a t i v e o p i n i o n . F r o m a x i o m s 1 t h r o u g h 3 A , that probability m u s t be =

Pt->c

Probability that an individual will switch

n[

to a c o n s e r v a t i v e opinion following t i m e p e r i o d / =

[RE {\

-

ia

*E ,)]Acceptjc,

+

/t

RE RE iCl

iLl

[Accept, ,(l - Accept^,)]

(9.9)

c

T h e first t e r m on the right-hand side is the probability that the individual will receive only a c o n s e r v a t i v e m e s s a g e - RE (\ - RE ) - t i m e s the probability that the person will accept it, having been e x p o s e d , A c c e p t , , . T h e s e c o n d t e r m is t h e probability that the individual will receive both m e s s a g e s - RE RE but accept only the c o n s e r v a t i v e o n e - A c c e p t , , ( l - A c c e p t , , ) . T h e t e r m P ^ can be similarly defined. iCt

iLl

c

iCl

c

iU

x

u

+

I

O n e can also w r i t e out the probability that the response of an individual initially holding an o p i n i o n will decay to no o p i n i o n . T h a t probability is d t i m e s the probability of either a c c e p t i n g no m e s s a g e s or accepting both a s u p p o r t i n g and o p p o s i n g m e s s a g e , as follows: ^Non,

+ l

=

d[(l (1

-

-

+

RE t)(\ iC

Accept ,) (C

-

RE )

+

+

RE (\

iU

-

RE )

RE ){\

-

Accept,^)

iCt

-

iU

RE (\ ia

iLl

/v^c/ff^Accept/oAccepti.,]

= 41 "

- P^ J

(9.10)

U

At s o m e initial m o m e n t , e v e r y o n e h a s a fixed probability of h o l d i n g a liberal or c o n s e r v a t i v e opinion or no opinion. Let us call these probabilities L i b , Con,,) and N o n . T h e probability that s o m e o n e initially h o l d i n g a liberal opinion will still hold a liberal opinion at t i m e t + 1 is then (()

( ; )

Lib

( r +

|)

= Lib

( / )

- [P^ Lib c

+ [^(Con

w

( / )

] - [P^

N o n

+ Non )]

Lib ,)] (

(9.11)

( ; )

A parallel expression c a n , of c o u r s e , be written for c o n s e r v a t i v e opinion at t+1. W i t h s o m e algebraic m a n i p u l a t i o n , E q u a t i o n 9.11 can be rewritten as a difference e q u a t i o n that gives the probability of a liberal opinion after N t i m e per i o d s , as follows: N

1 Ub

(t+N)

where X

=

1

-

P^

c

-

=

L i b ^ + P^

P_

L{

L

-

d

+

d(P^

c

_ +

- X

(9.12)

x

P^ ) L

O n e m a y c o n c e p t u a l i z e t i m e as consisting of an infinitude of arbitrarily tiny t i m e units. If s o , N is infinity, in which c a s e the t e r m X in E q u a t i o n 9 . 1 2 , which N

213

is a p r o p o r t i o n raised to an infinite power, g o e s to z e r o . T h i s leaves N

1 - X Lib(,+/v) - P^L j _ %

+

P^

L

+

d

-

d(P^

c

+

P-

(9.13)

T h u s , opinion at any point in t i m e represents an equilibrium o u t c o m e that is independent of s t a r t i n g values. This equilibrium d e p e n d s , at the a g g r e g a t e level, on the intensities of t h e c o m p e t i n g information f l o w s , a n d , at the individual level, on p e o p l e ' s attention to politics and their values. O p i n i o n c h a n g e in response to persuasive i n f o r m a t i o n , a central topic of my a n a l y s i s , can be captured as a difference over t i m e b e t w e e n equilibrium p o i n t s , w h e r e c h a n g i n g equilibria d e p e n d on c h a n g e in t h e c o m p e t i n g information flows. T h i s m o d e l h a s been used (Zaller, 1991) to e s t i m a t e the effect of ideology and awareness on s u p p o r t for the V i e t n a m War, p r o d u c i n g results that are highly similar to those r e p o r t e d in this chapter. T h e m a i n difference is that this model does less well in e s t i m a t i n g t h e intensities of the a n t i w a r and p r o w a r m e s s a g e s to w h i c h the public w a s e x p o s e d , in the sense that its e s t i m a t e s c o r r e s p o n d less well with the story c o u n t s s h o w n in Figure 9 . 1 . See footnote 12.

APPENDIX

B:

MEASUREMENT

OF

HAWK-DOVE

ATTITUDES

F r a n k l i n ' s instrumental variables t e c h n i q u e p r o v i d e s " a m e t h o d o f e s t i m a t i n g relationships b e t w e e n v a r i a b l e s not m e a s u r e d in the s a m e d a t a s e t " (1989: p. 2 3 ) . T h e m e t h o d is as follows: O n e h a s a m e a s u r e of variable X in dataset A but not dataset B; h o w e v e r the d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e of interest, v a r i a b l e Y, is in dataset B. O n e then locates a set of auxiliary variables c a r r i e d in both datasets. T h e X variable is regressed on these auxiliary variables in dataset A, an instrument for X is built from t h e resulting coefficient e s t i m a t e s , and this instrument is used in dataset B as an independent predictor of variable Y. In t h e present c a s e , the X variable is a m e a s u r e of h a w k - d o v e attitudes, as m e a s u r e d in the 1988 National E l e c t i o n S t u d y ; the Y v a r i a b l e is opinion toward the V i e t n a m War, as m e a s u r e d in the C P S surveys of 1964 to 1970. Provided a p p r o p r i a t e ass u m p t i o n s are m e t , F r a n k l i n ' s t e c h n i q u e m a k e s it possible to build an instrumental m e a s u r e of h a w k - d o v e attitudes in t h e C P S datasets from information contained in the 1988 N E S . T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t of these a s s u m p t i o n s are that both datasets be s a m p l e s of the s a m e p o p u l a t i o n , and that relationships b e t w e e n the auxiliary v a r i a b l e s and the X variable be t h e s a m e in both datasets. T h e latter a s s u m p t i o n is obviously the m o r e w o r r i s o m e , since the datasets w e r e created eighteen to twenty-four years a p a r t . N o n e t h e l e s s , it is not implausible to believe that t h e types of persons m o s t likely to be d o v e s in 1988, such as f e m a l e s , atheists, and civil rights libe r a l s , were likely to be d o v e s in t h e 1960s as w e l l , provided they w e r e given a p p r o p r i a t e l e a d e r s h i p cues. A n d , in fact, all of these variables are c o r r e l a t e d

214

Two-sided information flows

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

Table 9.2. First stage regression estimates for hawk-dove instrument Coefficient 0.40

T-ratio 4.04

0.15 -0.18

2.51 2.54

0.98

1.05

0.55 0.43 0.08 0.50

2.99 1.53 3.57 6.01

Too fast on civil rights

-0.38

6.75

Border state

-0.01

.16

Southern state

-0.13

1.91

Union member N Adjusted r

-0.11 1441 .14

1.68

Agnostic or atheist Catholic Fundamentalist

12

215

sociated with less h a w k i s h n e s s in 1988 but greater support for t h e V i e t n a m War, especially in the e a r l y p h a s e of the war. T h i s reversal is best explained by M u e l l e r ' s (1973) o b s e r v a t i o n that better e d u c a t e d p e r s o n s , t h o u g h not dispositionally h a w k i s h , are m o r e susceptible to elite opinion leadership, since they are m o r e heavily e x p o s e d to w h a t elites are saying. A n d a g a i n , this d o e s not s e e m to represent a c h a n g e in t h e last twenty y e a r s , since e d u c a t i o n w a s positively associated with s u p p o r t for m a i n s t r e a m policy in the n a t i o n ' s m o s t recent w a r even t h o u g h it w a s negatively a s s o c i a t e d with h a w k i s h n e s s , as m e a s u r e d by the N E S in 1 9 8 8 . But even t h o u g h no sign c h a n g e s a p p e a r to have o c c u r r e d over t i m e , the " w r o n g - w a y " c o r r e l a t i o n s of age and e d u c a t i o n with h a w k i s h n e s s indicate that they should not be used in building an instrumental m e a s u r e that is intended to m e a s u r e predispositions to s u p p o r t t h e V i e t n a m War. 2 2

Jehovah's Witness Jew Pacifistic religion* Church attendance Too slow on civil rights (V845) c

2

rf

Note: Dependent variable consists of five items, combined by principal components analysis into a scale: Strong military or bargain for peace (V966); importance of strong military (V967); United States stay most powerful (V972); Communist takeovers always threat (V973); United States must stop communism (V974). High scores indicate dovish responses. "Codes 130 to 149, and 152 on V527. *Codes 153, 155, and 156 on V527.
with opinions toward the V i e t n a m W a r in the expected directions. H e n c e , despite s o m e c o n c e r n , it is r e a s o n a b l e to a s s u m e that the c o n d i t i o n s n e c e s s a r y to apply the Franklin t e c h n i q u e have been m e t . Two variables require c o m m e n t , however. First, age is associated with greater h a w k i s h n e s s in 1988, as m e a s u r e d by general h a w k - d o v e items of the type shown in the text, but less support for the V i e t n a m W a r in the 1960s. T h i s does not, however, a p p e a r to represent c h a n g e over t i m e , since older p e r s o n s , t h o u g h p r e s u m a b l y still t e n d i n g to be hawkish in 1991, were also less likely to support U . S . military involvement in the Persian G u l f c r i s i s . S e c o n d , e d u c a t i o n i s ' a s 21

21 New York Times, December 14, 1990, p. A8.

T h e O L S coefficients used i n building t h e h a w k - d o v e i n s t r u m e n t , along with information c o n c e r n i n g the auxiliary v a r i a b l e s , are shown in Table 9 . 2 . 22 Ibid.

Information flow and electoral choice 10

217

s u r v e y s in w h i c h to o b s e r v e the effects of c o m p e t i n g m e s s a g e s of differing in1

Information flow and electoral choice

E l e c t i o n c a m p a i g n s are a t t e m p t s by c o m p e t i n g p a r t i s a n elites to reach citizens with political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and p e r s u a d e t h e m to a point of view. In this e s sential respect, election c a m p a i g n s r e s e m b l e the o n g o i n g c a m p a i g n s to shape public opinion that we have examined in previous chapters. O n e may therefore suspect that the d y n a m i c s of contested e l e c t i o n s are m u c h like those we have already seen. O n e m a y s u s p e c t , that is, that citizens vary in their susceptibility to influence a c c o r d i n g to their general levels of political awareness and their predispositions to accept the c a m p a i g n m e s s a g e s they r e c e i v e . T h e aim of this c h a p t e r is to test this suspicion. I will e x a m i n e four types of contested e l e c t i o n s : e l e c t i o n s for the H o u s e of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and U . S . S e n a t e , general presidential e l e c t i o n s , and presidential p r i m a r y e l e c t i o n s . In so d o i n g , I will try to shed light afresh on the q u e s t i o n of how citizens c h o o s e their elected representatives. No a t t e m p t will be m a d e , however, to develop a c o m p r e h e n s i v e account of electoral b e h a v i o r in these four types of elections. Rather, my prim a r y effort will be to use s y s t e m a t i c differences that exist a m o n g t h e m to increase u n d e r s t a n d i n g of how, in g e n e r a l , m a s s attitudes form and c h a n g e in r e s p o n s e to c o m p e t i n g flows of political i n f o r m a t i o n . Capitalizing on t h e fact that most congressional c a m p a i g n s are d o m i n a t e d by incumbent officeholders, I shall be especially interested in the p r o c e s s by which citizens resist d o m i n a n t campaign messages. T h e great a d v a n t a g e of electoral a t t i t u d e s , for the p u r p o s e s of this b o o k , is that m o r e resources have been devoted to studying t h e m than to any o t h e r kind of political attitude. In c o n s e q u e n c e , there exist datasets with strong m e a s u r e s of all of t h e key v a r i a b l e s in the R A S m o d e l - i n c l u d i n g , most importantly, the " c o n s i d e r a t i o n s " that underlie p e o p l e ' s opinion s t a t e m e n t s , w h i c h in this case are r e p o r t s of vote decisions. T h e r e is also w i d e and readily m e a s u r a b l e variability in the relative intensity of the c o m p e t i n g m e s s a g e s (the political c a m paigns) to which p e o p l e are exposed. O n e of the richest of the election d a t a s e t s , from the p e r s p e c t i v e of d a t a needs of the R A S m o d e l , is the 1978 N E S congressional election study. T h e study carries identical individual-level m e a s u r e s of a w a r e n e s s , ideology, and attitudes tow a r d c a n d i d a t e s across seventy-seven w i d e l y different contested e l e c t i o n s . T h u s , w h e r e a s in the c a s e of attitudes toward the V i e t n a m W a r we had j u s t four

tensity, here we h a v e , in effect, s e v e n t y - s e v e n . T h e availability of such strong d a t a will e n a b l e us to u n d e r t a k e a relatively full e x a m i n a t i o n of h o w t h e basic resistance m e c h a n i s m s of t h e R A S m o d e l , e s p e cially inertial and c o u n t e r v a l e n t r e s i s t a n c e , o p e r a t e in a d y n a m i c setting. In add i t i o n , we will e n c o u n t e r further instances of differential information flow, that i s , cases in w h i c h c o m p e t i n g m e s s a g e s g e n e r a t e cross-cutting opinion formation in different s e g m e n t s of the p u b l i c , d e p e n d i n g on levels of attentiveness and the relative intensities of the t w o m e s s a g e s . T h e o u t c o m e of these analyses will be a m u c h clearer picture of how c o m p l e x information flows affect the f o r m a t i o n of citizen preferences. B e c a u s e t h e largest single p a r t of this c h a p t e r is devoted to exploiting the H o u s e e l e c t i o n d a t a , I begin with a brief review of c u r r e n t research on House elections.

I N E R T I A L RESISTANCE T O I N C U M B E N T - D O M I N A T E D HOUSE CAMPAIGNS A central research p r o b l e m in congressional e l e c t i o n s in recent years h a s been the d y n a m i c s of i n c u m b e n t a d v a n t a g e . S i n c e D a v i d M a y h e w raised the puzzle of the " v a n i s h i n g m a r g i n a l s " in a famous 1974 paper, scholars have t u r n e d out a torrent of papers a t t e m p t i n g to explain w h y politically marginal districts - that is, districts c a r r i e d by t h e winning p a r t y by a m a r g i n of five points or less have tended to d i s a p p e a r over the past t w o d e c a d e s . M u c h of this research has focused on the i n c u m b e n t ' s skill in c o n s t i t u e n c y service and i m a g e b u i l d i n g , by w h i c h t h e m e m b e r c r e a t e s a " p e r s o n a l v o t e " that is significantly independent of n o r m a l p a r t y a t t a c h m e n t s in the district ( E r i k s o n , 1971; F e n n o , 1978; F i o r i n a , 1977;. M a n n , 1978; C a i n , Ferejohn, and F i o r i n a , 1987). I n a s m u c h as H o u s e m e m b e r s m u s t reach and persuade m e m b e r s of an e l e c torate that vary in both attention to politics and p a r t i s a n p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s , the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l w o u l d s e e m ideally suited to studying t h e process by w h i c h i n c u m b e n t s d e v e l o p their m a s s followings. Let us begin with t h e reception of p r o i n c u m b e n t i n f o r m a t i o n . S o m e of the self-promotional efforts of H o u s e m e m b e r s take the form of c a s e w o r k (for exa m p l e , c h a s i n g after lost social security c h e c k s ) that will c o m e to the attention of voters independently of their general political a w a r e n e s s . But m o s t of w h a t H o u s e m e m b e r s do to publicize t h e m s e l v e s is likely to reach mainly p e o p l e w h o are chronically attentive to politics. T h i s includes sending out newsletters (which are m o r e likely to be read by the politically a w a r e ) , efforts to b r i n g particularistic benefits to t h e district ( w h i c h d e p e n d on n e w s p a p e r s and civic g r o u p s to get the word o u t ) , c o l l e c t i n g political e n d o r s e m e n t s , and giving s p e e c h e s and att e n d i n g rallies. W h e n , on t h e other h a n d , politically apathetic persons h a p p e n to 1 The NES study covered 108 districts, but my analysis focuses on the 77 in which an incumbent House member sought reelection against an opponent from the other party.

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e n c o u n t e r information about their H o u s e m e m b e r , they may forget, ignore, or o t h e r w i s e fail to react to w h a t they see; this, after all, is w h a t it m e a n s to be politically a p a t h e t i c . S o , meaningful e x p o s u r e to the activities of H o u s e m e m b e r s is likely to be positively associated with habitual political a w a r e n e s s . A n d given that most H o u s e e l e c t i o n s are low-key contests in which only the i n c u m b e n t m a n a g e s to m o u n t a serious c a m p a i g n , most of w h a t politically a w a r e p e o p l e e n c o u n ter d u r i n g and b e t w e e n c a m p a i g n s will have a strong p r o i n c u m b e n t bias ( J a c o b s o n , 1991). But this is only half the story. People w h o are politically aware m a y also be better able to resist the appeals of a d o m i n a n t c a m p a i g n m e s s a g e , if they are predisposed by p a r t y or ideology to do s o . T h i s is b e c a u s e , as we have seen, such persons are likely to possess prior information that acts to dilute the effects of n e w ideas. T h e y a r e m o r e likely to receive c o u n t e r v a l e n t m e s s a g e s (in this c a s e , the c a m p a i g n information of the congressional challenger) and m o r e likely to possess the contextual information n e c e s s a r y to recognize and reject outright c o m m u n i c a t i o n s that are inconsistent with their predispositions. In o t h e r w o r d s , m o r e aware persons are m o r e likely to exhibit inertial, c o u n t e r v a l e n t , and partisan resistance to t h e b l a n d i s h m e n t s of t h e i n c u m b e n t H o u s e member. If m o r e a w a r e p e r s o n s are m o r e heavily exposed to the d o m i n a n t c a m p a i g n of t h e i n c u m b e n t , a n d also m o r e c a p a b l e of resisting its m e s s a g e s (given r e c e p t i o n ) , we might expect from the logic of the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e process to find a n o n m o n o t o n i c relationship b e t w e e n a w a r e n e s s and vote defection, such that p e r s o n s w h o are moderately politically aware will be most likely to defect to t h e i n c u m b e n t , thereby creating a " p e r s o n a l v o t e " for him or her. As m a n y readers will recall, Philip C o n v e r s e found e v i d e n c e of such nonmonotonicity in his classic study of the 1952 presidential e l e c t i o n , " I n f o r m a t i o n flow a n d the stability of p a r t i s a n a t t i t u d e s " ( 1 9 6 2 ) . He explained it in t h e s e nowfamiliar t e r m s : Highly aware persons are heavily exposed to the p e r s u a s i v e appeals of the c a m p a i g n , but, o w i n g to the strength of their preexisting attitudes, they are difficult to influence. At t h e s a m e t i m e , p e r s o n s w h o pay little attention to politics are also relatively stable - not b e c a u s e they have strong p a r t i s a n c o m m i t m e n t s , but b e c a u s e they pay so little attention to politics that they rarely enc o u n t e r c o m m u n i c a t i o n s that can c h a n g e their preferences. Finally, m o d e r a t e l y aware people pay e n o u g h attention to politics to be exposed to p a r t i s a n c o m m u n i c a t i o n s but are not sufficiently c o m m i t t e d to their initial preferences to be i m m u n e to c o n v e r s i o n . H e n c e this g r o u p t e n d s to be the most volatile of the three. C o n v e r s e ' s e x p l a n a t i o n for why politically aware persons might be m o r e difficult to p e r s u a d e , despite their high levels of exposure to the c a m p a i g n , is also familiar: the highly informed voter operates with a large storage of political lore, and the uninformed voter is characterized by poor retention of past political information. Our repeated observations of the staggering differences in information level in the electorate,

Information

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and

electoral

choice

219

then, are observations of the great differences in this " m a s s " from voter to voter. And the probability that any given voter will be sufficiently deflected in his partisan momentum to cross party lines in a specified election . . . varies inversely as a function of the mass of stored information about politics, (pp. 140-1, emphasis in the original) If, as s e e m s r e a s o n a b l e , o n e substitutes the p h r a s e " p r e e x i s t i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s " for " m a s s of stored i n f o r m a t i o n , " C o n v e r s e ' s e x p l a n a t i o n for a w a r e n e s s induced resistance to persuasion c o r r e s p o n d s almost exactly to my notion of inertial resistance. C o n v e r s e m a k e s no reference, however, to c o n c e p t s r e s e m b l i n g my notions of countervalent or partisan resistance. In his " I n f o r m a t i o n f l o w " a r t i c l e , C o n v e r s e looked briefly at data from the 1958 H o u s e e l e c t i o n s , but he turned up no e v i d e n c e of a n o n m o n o t o n i c pattern of p a r t i s a n instability. C o n v e r s e ' s quite plausible explanation w a s that n e w s about congressional e l e c t i o n s w a s so " e x t r e m e l y w e a k " that it went " u n h e e d e d by all but t h e most avid readers of political n e w s " (p. 143). H e n c e defection rates in H o u s e e l e c t i o n s were very low, and such defection as did o c c u r was c o n c e n t r a t e d a m o n g the m o r e politically a w a r e voters. But C o n v e r s e ' s analysis w a s based on c o n g r e s s i o n a l e l e c t i o n s as they existed three d e c a d e s a g o . H o u s e c a m p a i g n s have gained intensity in recent d e c a d e s , e n o u g h intensity p e r h a p s that they now reach voters w h o are only m o d e r a t e l y attentive to politics. C e r t a i n l y t h e recent explosion of television a d v e r t i s i n g and the a p p e a r a n c e of the new nonstop reelection c a m p a i g n s w o u l d justify t h e ass u m p t i o n that H o u s e c a m p a i g n s now reach a larger fraction of t h e e l e c t o r a t e than they did in the 1 9 5 0 s . A n d if this is t r u e , it might turn out that p e o p l e of m o d e r a t e political a w a r e n e s s are now m o r e susceptible to the appeals of congressional c a m p a i g n s than a r e t h e most attentive voters. A look back to C h a p t e r 8 will reveal that the difference b e t w e e n C o n v e r s e ' s account of the 1958 H o u s e e l e c t i o n s and my expectations for the 1978 e l e c t i o n s is perfectly captured by t h e difference b e t w e e n cell A and cell B in t h e typology of attitude c h a n g e in Figure 8.2; cell A refers to the effects of low-intensity m e s s a g e s , w h e r e a s cell B refers to medium-intensity m e s s a g e s . 2

Let us dynamic whether, ical role

t u r n , t h e n , to t h e d a t a to see w h e t h e r the basic r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e holds in H o u s e e l e c t i o n s as in o t h e r political c o n t e x t s , a n d , if s o , as C o n v e r s e t h o u g h t , " s t o r e d information about p o l i t i c s " plays a critin the g e n e r a t i o n of resistance to persuasion.

Defection

patterns

in

House

elections

In H o u s e e l e c t i o n s in which an i n c u m b e n t seeks r e e l e c t i o n , the i n c u m b e n t normally d o m i n a t e s the flow of political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , with the result that alm o s t all defections a r e defections to the p a r t y of the i n c u m b e n t ( A b r a m o w i t z , 2 Despite this, the ability of constituents to freely recall the name of their congressional representative has not changed since the 1950s (Nelson, 1978-9). Evidence of more intense campaign activity is nonetheless abundant (Fiorina, 1977; Mann, 1978). It is possible, as Mann and Wolfinger (1980) suggest, that name recognition has increased even though recall has not.

220

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and

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1980; J a c o b s o n , 1 9 9 1 ; especially at p. 115). T h e present a n a l y s i s , t h e n , will limit itself to defections to the incumbent from m e m b e r s of the o p p o s i n g party.

T h e m e a n of r e s p o n s e s to this q u e s t i o n h a s been calculated for respondents in

T h e s e defecting " o u t p a r t i s a n s " hold c o n s i d e r a b l e political interest: T h e y are precisely t h e voters w h o , by a b a n d o n i n g their n o r m a l party in o r d e r to s u p p o r t the i n c u m b e n t , are most responsible for t h e " v a n i s h i n g m a r g i n a l s " and t h e rise of the " p e r s o n a l v o t e . " T h e defectors also hold theoretical interest: T h e y have succ u m b e d to the m e s s a g e of a d o m i n a n t c a m p a i g n despite its inconsistency with their political predispositions. O u r task is to find out w h y exactly they h a v e d o n e so.

in political a w a r e n e s s . T h e s e purged m e a n s , which ranged from a low of 0 . 6

My approach will be to model defection as the o u t c o m e of a s t a n d a r d r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e p r o c e s s , where the source of persuasive c o m m u n i c a t i o n is t h e d o m i n a n t c a m p a i g n of t h e i n c u m b e n t . T h e m o d e l , t h u s , will take t h e following form: Prob(Defection) = 1 — (1 + E x p [ a x(l + Exp[-ft

0

0

+ ^Awareness + . . . others])

~ ft|Awareness. . . o t h e r s ] )

- 1

- 1

(10.1)

[adapted from E q u a t i o n (7.5)] An attractive feature of H o u s e e l e c t i o n s , from the point of v i e w of exercising t h e r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l , is that t h e intensity of t h e d o m i n a n t i n c u m b e n t c a m p a i g n varies m a r k e d l y from one district to another, and d o e s so in w a y s that are readily m e a s u r e d by such variables as c a m p a i g n s p e n d i n g . T h e intensity of t h e c h a l l e n g e r ' s c a m p a i g n - w h i c h is to say, t h e intensity of t h e c o u n t e r v a l e n t information flow - also varies in readily m e a s u r a b l e ways. To capture the effects of fhis variation in information flow, I have included the following variables in t h e t w o subfunctions of the model: Reception function

Acceptance

Political awareness

Political awareness

function

Intensity of media coverage

Strength of party attachment

Incumbent's spending

Inertia (preexisting considerations)

Challenger's spending

Challenger's spending

Years in office (seniority) Seniority x Challenger's spending Each set of v a r i a b l e s requires c o m m e n t , b e g i n n i n g with t h e r e c e p t i o n variables. N o t e , first of all, that there is only o n e individual-level r e c e p t i o n v a r i a b l e , political awareness. T h e rest - m e d i a c o v e r a g e , i n c u m b e n t ' s s p e n d i n g , chall e n g e r ' s s p e n d i n g , a n d seniority - are aggregate-level variables i n t e n d e d to c a p ture the flow of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s in the political e n v i r o n m e n t . U s e of a logistic function to model the reception process m e a n s that the a g g r e g a t e variables will interact with individual differences in political awareness to d e t e r m i n e h o w m u c h information different p e o p l e r e c e i v e . To m e a s u r e the general intensity of m e d i a c o v e r a g e of a given r a c e , I begin with responses to the following question: How many newspaper articles did you read about the campaign for the U.S. House of Representatives in your district - would you say you read a good many, several or just one or two?

each congressional district and purged of the effects of district-level variation 3

to a high of 1.9, c a n be u s e d as an aggregate-level m e a s u r e of the intensity of media coverage. Years in office has been included a m o n g the reception variables on the theory that m o r e senior i n c u m b e n t s have had m o r e t i m e to get their m e s s a g e out to the public via n e w s l e t t e r s , a p p e a r a n c e s , c a s e w o r k , and n e w s e v e n t s , a n d h e n c e will be m o r e effective in a t t r a c t i n g defectors from the opposition party. Seniority, t h u s , is intended as a proxy for the interelection c o m m u n i c a t i o n s by which inc u m b e n t s gradually build a personal following in their districts. Seniority, it will t u r n o u t , h a s the effect e x p e c t e d , but only in lightly contested races. In the most heavily contested r a c e s , long service in office s e e m s to hurt rather than help t h e i n c u m b e n t . I sought to capture this cross-cutting effect by including a t e r m for seniority t i m e s c h a l l e n g e r ' s s p e n d i n g . I turn n o w to t h e a c c e p t a n c e function. T h e m o s t interesting variable here is inertia, by which I m e a n the m a s s of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that c a u s e voters to lean toward their c h o s e n party, and that the i n c u m b e n t c a m p a i g n must o v e r c o m e if it is to win t h e votes of p a r t i s a n s of t h e o p p o s i n g party. T h r o u g h o u t my discussion of the o n e - m e s s a g e m o d e l , I have m a i n t a i n e d that political a w a r e n e s s is a s s o c i a t e d with resistance to persuasion in p a r t b e c a u s e it is a proxy for inertial resistance. In adding the inertia variable to the a c c e p t a n c e function, I am a b l e , for t h e first t i m e , to m a k e a direct test for inertial resistance. To m e a s u r e i n e r t i a , I u s e the standard N E S " l i k e s / d i s l i k e s " q u e s t i o n s about the political p a r t i e s . T h e s e are o p e n - e n d e d p r o b e s in which voters are asked w h a t they like and dislike about each party, as follows: 4

I'd like to ask you what you think are the good and bad points about the two national parties. Is there anything in particular that you like about the Democratic [Republican] party? What is that? Anything else? [Up to five responses were coded.] Is there anything in particular that you don't like about the Democratic [Republican] party? What is that? Anything else? [Up to five responses were coded.] Inertia can then be m e a s u r e d as follows: Inertia =

+ ^ ( O u t p a r t y likes) + ^ ( I n c u m b e n t p a r t y dislikes) - ^ ( O u t p a r t y dislikes)

- ^ ( I n c u m b e n t p a r t y likes)

3 If individuals in one district are, say, very well educated, the mean number of articles about the House race that are reported for that district may be high even if there was only a light campaign. These are the sorts of individual-level effects I have purged from the district-level means. 4 This term represents an ad hoc adaptation to the presence of a substantial antiincumbent information flow in high-intensity races. Such adaptations are needed because Equation 10.1 is essentially a one-message model. As the challenger campaign becomes more intense, Equation 10.1 becomes less capable of capturing what is going on in a theoretically coherent way. A twomessage model, along the lines of that proposed in Chapter 9, is needed here.

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Information flow and electoral choice

Table 10.1. Coefficients predicting vote for House incumbent among outpartisans Reception function Intercept Awareness (standardized) Incumbent spending (in $10 thousands) Challenger spending (in $10 thousands) Media coverage (range .59 - 1.9) Seniority (logged)

0.28 (.18) 3.51 (2.72) 2.84 (2.13)

Partisan inertia"

Seniority X challenger spending

-0.41 (.26)

N

-1.71 2.24 (1.20) -0.11 (.09)

Acceptance Intercept Awareness

function 3.39 -1.01 (.41) -1.32 (.48)

Party strength

Challenger spending

/

-0.22 (.12) -0.05 (.02)

277

223

B e c a u s e there are only 2 7 7 cases available for a n a l y s i s , n a m e l y t h e o u t p a r t i sans w h o voted in a race in which an i n c u m b e n t w a s o p p o s e d for r e e l e c t i o n , m a n y of the coefficients in Table 10.1 lack statistical precision. N o n e t h e l e s s , all of the individual-level variables achieve statistically significant coefficients, thereby c o n f i r m i n g the basic applicability of t h e R A S m o d e l to this c a s e . T h e significant n e g a t i v e coefficient on a w a r e n e s s in the a c c e p t a n c e function is especially n o t e w o r t h y . In the R A S m o d e l and especially in C o n v e r s e ' s " I n f o r m a t i o n f l o w " m o d e l , political a w a r e n e s s is i m p o r t a n t as a resistance factor in part b e c a u s e it is a proxy for the stored m a s s of p r e c a m p a i g n c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . W i t h preexisting c o n s i d e r a t i o n s c o n t r o l l e d , a s i n E q u a t i o n 1 0 . 1 , o n e m i g h t therefore have e x p e c t e d a w a r e n e s s to have little or no direct effect on resistance. T h e fact that a w a r e n e s s c o n t i n u e s to do so indicates that there is s o m e t h i n g about a w a r e n e s s , b e y o n d its effect as a proxy for preexisting or inertial c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , that e n g e n d e r s resistance t o i n c u m b e n t - d o m i n a t e d c a m p a i g n s . T h e " s o m e t h i n g " will turn o u t , as my analysis unfolds, to be p a r t i s a n resistance and especially c o u n t e r v a l e n t r e s i s t a n c e . 5

M e a n w h i l e , the effect of inertia, a l t h o u g h statistically significant, is only Note: Model is Equation 10.1, estimated by maximum likelihood. Standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variable is vote for incumbent among outpartisans. a

High scores run in direction of challenger party. Source: 1978 NES sun ey.

m o d e r a t e l y large. T h i s can be seen by c o m p a r i n g its effect to that of party. Given i n e r t i a ' s coefficient of — . 2 2 , it takes a net score of 6 on inertia, which is a very high score on this v a r i a b l e , to equal the effect of strength of party a t t a c h m e n t , w h i c h h a s a r a n g e of o n e unit and is applied against a coefficient of — 1 . 3 2 . O m i t t i n g inertia from the m o d e l leads to a 2 percent increase in residual v a r i a t i o n , but omitting strength of party a t t a c h m e n t leads to a 4 per-

T h e higher an o u t p a r t i s a n ' s score on the inertia v a r i a b l e , t h e m o r e difficult it should b e , at a given level of exposure to an incumbent d o m i n a t e d c a m p a i g n , to deflect h e r or his vote to t h e p a r t y of t h e H o u s e i n c u m b e n t .

cent increase.

T h e final v a r i a b l e in the a c c e p t a n c e function that requires c o m m e n t is chall e n g e r ' s s p e n d i n g . T h e idea h e r e is that o u t p a r t i s a n s will be less likely to accept the i n c u m b e n t ' s m e s s a g e if they are being c o n c u r r e n t l y e x p o s e d to a strong c a m p a i g n by a challenger. T h u s , the c h a l l e n g e r ' s spending v a r i a b l e in the a c c e p t a n c e function is an attempt to capture the effects of c o u n t e r v a l e n t information.

all six of the a g g r e g a t e m e a s u r e s indicates that their overall effect is statistically

Altogether, t h e n , E q u a t i o n 10.1 specifies a c o m p l e x interaction b e t w e e n individual-level differences in propensities for reception and a c c e p t a n c e of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , a n d aggregate-level differences in t h e intensities of a d o m i n a n t and countervalent c o m m u n i c a t i o n flow. As should be a p p a r e n t , however, E q u a t i o n 10.1 is not fully a t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l - it does not contain s e p a r a t e reception and a c c e p t a n c e functions for each m e s s a g e , as did the m o d e l used for e s t i m a t i n g V i e t n a m attitudes in C h a p t e r 9. But, like the o n e - m e s s a g e m o d e l p r o p o s e d in C h a p t e r s 7 and 8, it does a t t e m p t , in the w a y s I have i n d i c a t e d , to c a p t u r e the effects of a t w o - s i d e d information flow (see footnote 4 ) . T h e coefficients o b t a i n e d from e s t i m a t i n g t h e m o d e l are s h o w n in Table 1 0 . 1 . A l t h o u g h the interpretation of these coefficients requires, as u s u a l , a graphical a n a l y s i s , s o m e information can be g l e a n e d from visual i n s p e c t i o n .

It is n o t a b l e that only o n e of the aggregate-level m e a s u r e s of c a m p a i g n intensity achieves a statistically significant coefficient. However, a block F-test on 6

significant ( F [ 6 , 2 6 5 ] , 2 . 6 2 , p < . 0 5 ) . T h e most substantively interesting of t h e a g g r e g a t e variables is seniority, which has a positive m a i n effect but a n e g a t i v e interaction with c h a l l e n g e r s p e n d i n g . T h i s i n d i c a t e s , as suggested earlier, that seniority is helpful to i n c u m bents in low-intensity races but tends to be harmful in high-intensity ones. B e c a u s e t h e apparently cross-cutting effects of seniority a r e b o t h statistically marginal and not fully a n t i c i p a t e d , t h e c a u t i o u s reader m a y be inclined to disc o u n t t h e m . However, a n F - t e s t o n the t w o seniority t e r m s indicates that their joint effect is close to statistical significance (F[2, 2 6 5 ) , 2 . 9 6 , P < . 0 6 ) . T h e r e 5 In my earlier analysis of House elections (Zaller, 1989), awareness had a positive coefficient in the acceptance function. This difference is due to a change in the form of the acceptance function, as explained in footnote 14 of Chapter 7. In another matter, I have discovered a typographical error in the statement of the reception function in the earlier paper (Zaller, 1989); the A coefficients in Equations 2 and 4 should have negative signs. 6 Owing to the probable endogeneity bias of the spending variables, there is no point in trying to make a verbal interpretation of the individual coefficients. Rather, I will use graphical displays to depict their effects as part of a block of variables capturing overall campaign intensity.

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is also c o r r o b o r a t i n g e v i d e n c e for both the direct and interactive effects of seniority, as will be r e p o r t e d . I p r o p o s e , therefore, to accept the cross-cutting effects of seniority as p r o b a b l y real and to a t t e m p t over the course of the c h a p t e r to explain h o w they have c o m e about. I turn now to a graphical analysis of the implied effects of t h e coefficients in Table 1 0 . 1 . T h i s analysis appears i n Figure 1 0 . 1 , which d e c o m p o s e s the process of electoral persuasion into its three c o m p o n e n t parts. T h a t i s , it s h o w s est i m a t e d rates of reception of defection-inducing c a m p a i g n m e s s a g e s (left p a n e l ) , rates of a c c e p t a n c e of these m e s s a g e s a m o n g o u t p a r t i s a n s (center p a n e l ) , and defection r a t e s to the i n c u m b e n t a m o n g o u t p a r t i s a n s (right p a n e l ) . T h e figure shows these e s t i m a t e d r a t e s for three types of " c o n s t r u c t e d o u t p a r t i s a n s , " d e fined as follows: A strong p a r t i s a n identifies strongly with her p a r t y and has a score of +3 on t h e inertia v a r i a b l e ; a disaffected partisan is a " n o t so s t r o n g " or i n d e p e n d e n t - l e a n i n g p a r t y m e m b e r and has a score of —3 on inertia ( m o r e dislikes of her p a r t y than likes); and finally, a m o d a l o u t p a r t i s a n h a s a score of + 0 . 7 on the inertia v a r i a b l e and a score of 1.30 on the party strength variable ( " s t r o n g " p a r t i s a n s w e r e scored a s 2 and " w e a k " and " l e a n i n g " p a r t i s a n s a s 1, so that 1.30 represents s o m e o n e falling b e t w e e n these p o s i t i o n s ) . T h e simulations in the top panel of Figure 10.1 involve a race in w h i c h the H o u s e inc u m b e n t has j u s t t w o years of seniority; in the lower panel is a s i m u l a t i o n for a race in which the i n c u m b e n t has c o m p l e t e d ten years in office. B o t h top and b o t t o m panels involve a low-intensity r a c e , namely, o n e in w h i c h the i n c u m b e n t s p e n d s $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 (in 1978 d o l l a r s ) , t h e c h a l l e n g e r m a k e s no s p e n d i n g r e p o r t , and m e d i a c o v e r a g e is . 7 5 , w h i c h is near t h e b o t t o m of its r a n g e . A b o u t 10 percent of all contested H o u s e e l e c t i o n s involve c a m p a i g n s of this t y p e . 7

For t h e sake of illustration, let us focus on a " s t r o n g p a r t i s a n " voter w h o scores at the 50th percentile of habitual a w a r e n e s s . T h e top panel of t h e figure s h o w s that, for a race with a o n e - t e r m i n c u m b e n t , this type of voter h a s a 72 percent c h a n c e of reception of a defection-inducing m e s s a g e , a 56 percent c h a n c e of a c c e p t i n g it (given r e c e p t i o n ) , and therefore a .72 x . 5 6 = .40 c h a n c e of defecting to t h e i n c u m b e n t H o u s e m e m b e r . For a race with a five-term i n c u m b e n t , the c h a n c e of reception of a defection-inducing m e s s a g e by the s a m e type of voter rises to . 9 7 , w h i c h , all else e q u a l , drives e s t i m a t e d defection rates up to 54 percent (.97 x .56 = .54). W i t h the o r g a n i z a t i o n of Figure 10.1 n o w clear, we can turn to substantive questions. Let us begin by looking m o r e closely at how seniority affects defections t o the i n c u m b e n t . A s noted earlier, H o u s e m e m b e r s c o n d u c t virtually nonstop c a m p a i g n s for r e e l e c t i o n . This e n a b l e s t h e m , over t i m e , to reach even voters w h o are relatively inattentive to politics. T h u s , as the t w o left-hand panels in Figure 10.1 show, low to m o d e r a t e l y a w a r e voters are m u c h m o r e likely to receive p r o i n c u m b e n t m e s s a g e s w h e n t h e i n c u m b e n t has been in office five t e r m s rather than o n e t e r m . A typical voter of m o d e r a t e l y low a w a r e n e s s has a 7 In Figures 10.1, 10.2, and 10.6, political awareness has been manipulated over the range from -1.88 to +1.8.

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roughly 25 percent c h a n c e of reception of a p r o i n c u m b e n t m e s s a g e if he h a p p e n s to reside in the district of a o n e - t e r m H o u s e m e m b e r ; but this same voter, if residing in the district of a five-term i n c u m b e n t , has a roughly 65 percent c h a n c e of receiving such a m e s s a g e . T h e s e seniority-induced differences in reception of p r o i n c u m b e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n s lead to h i g h e r levels of defection by less aware voters to ten-year inc u m b e n t s , as seen in the right-hand panels. N o t e , however, seniority p r o d u c e s no c o m p a r a b l e increase in defection rates a m o n g the most aware voters, w h o , as the figure s h o w s , reach a saturation point for effective exposure after the i n c u m b e n t ' s first t e r m . In a n o t h e r v e i n , n o t e that, in the center panels of Figure 1 0 . 1 , e s t i m a t e d acc e p t a n c e rates d e c l i n e with both a w a r e n e s s and partisan o r i e n t a t i o n , which is here m e a s u r e d by both strength of party a t t a c h m e n t and scores on the inertia v a r i a b l e . This is a visual r e s t a t e m e n t of the earlier point that habitual a w a r e n e s s contributes substantially to resistance even after controlling for p a r t i s a n "orientation. W i t h o u t this independent a c c e p t a n c e effect of a w a r e n e s s , there w o u l d be no n o n m o n o t o n i c i t y in the defection c u r v e s of the right-hand panels after controlling for p a r t i s a n s h i p and inertia. O n e can also see from the center panels of Figure 10.1 that the effects of p o litical awareness and p a r t i s a n s h i p are highly interactive. T h a t i s , the variables m e a s u r i n g p a r t i s a n s h i p h a \ e little effect on resistance, except at m i d d l e and high levels of political a w a r e n e s s , w h e r e the effect is large. This further u n d e r s c o r e s the i m p o r t a n c e of political awareness as a resistance factor.

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Pure campaign intensity effect

Percent who defect to incumbent House member

Political awareness Figure 10.2. The effect of information flow on defections in 1978 House elections. Estimates are derived from coefficients in Table 10.1. Baseline is a race in which the incumbent has two years of seniority and is involved in a very low-intensity reelection campaign. Figures give estimates for modal outparty voters. Source: 1978 NES survey.

intensity races is u n c e r t a i n , its direction is not: H i g h seniority, in c o m b i n a t i o n with high c a m p a i g n intensity, reduces t h e n u m b e r of defections that an i n c u m bent can expect from m e m b e r s of the o p p o s i t i o n party, as the Seniority x C h a l lenger spending interaction coefficient in Table 10.1 indicates.

Finally, n o t e that the p a t t e r n s of defection roughly c o r r e s p o n d to the p a t t e r n s of attitude c h a n g e that w o u l d be expected in r e s p o n s e to persuasive m e s s a g e s on an " u n f a m i l i a r t o p i c , " as s h o w n in the top half of Figure 8.2. T h e efforts of a t w o - y e a r i n c u m b e n t have the effect of a m o d e r a t e l y intense m e s s a g e , as in cell B of the typology, w h i l e the efforts of a t e n - y e a r i n c u m b e n t s e e m to constitute a high intensity m e s s a g e , as in cell C.

T h e basic point in Figure 10.1 w a s that seniority brings with it increased penetration of defection-inducing m e s s a g e s , thereby winning the i n c u m b e n t greater support a m o n g voters w h o score m o d e r a t e to low on political awareness. Seniority - or rather, the c u m u l a t e d effects of cultivating a personal vote in o n e ' s district - is n o t , of c o u r s e , the only source of defection-inducing m e s s a g e s . A high-intensity r e e l e c t i o n c a m p a i g n can a c c o m p l i s h roughly t h e s a m e e n d , a s s h o w n in Figure 10.2. Let me explain h o w t h e figure w o r k s .

It is m i s l e a d i n g , however, to suppose that m a n y H o u s e e l e c t i o n s constitute anything like a high-intensity m e s s a g e . Recall that Figure 10.1 depicts persuasion effects for p e r s o n s w h o report having voted in a congressional e l e c t i o n . If t h e w h o l e p o p u l a t i o n were included in the d e n o m i n a t o r from which defection rates were c a l c u l a t e d , both the low-seniority and high-seniority cases would roughly r e s e m b l e cell B of t h e typology. T h u s , it is m o r e r e a s o n a b l e to maintain that a typical i n c u m b e n t - d o m i n a t e d c a m p a i g n constitutes a " m o d e r a t e l y intense m e s s a g e on an unfamiliar t o p i c . "

B a s e l i n e defection r a t e s , shown in identical form in both the left and right panels of Figure 10.2, refer to defections by m o d a l o u t p a r t i s a n s to a two-year i n c u m b e n t in a low-intensity c a m p a i g n , as these t e r m s were defined earlier. I refer to these as baseline rates b e c a u s e they a r e what o c c u r w h e n the flow of defection-inducing m e s s a g e s is at its m i n i m u m . (This minimal information flow is not, however, an especially low m i n i m u m , since first-term legislators w o r k extraordinarily h a r d to build up a personal following a m o n g their constituents; F e n n o , 1978; H i b b i n g , 1991.)

Before leaving the analysis of seniority effects in Figure 1 0 . 1 , I e m p h a s i z e that the analysis h a s involved only low-intensity races. B e c a u s e of the interaction b e t w e e n seniority and c a m p a i g n intensity, as s h o w n in Table 1 0 . 1 , the effect of seniority is quite different in high-intensity races. I have not presented a graphical analysis of this effect b e c a u s e there are t o o few races involving both high seniority and high c a m p a i g n intensity to be confident what t h e visual pattern of the effect is. But a l t h o u g h the visual form of the seniority effect in high-

In t h e left-hand p o r t i o n of Figure 10.2, we s e e , in relation to baseline r a t e s , the effect of ten years of seniority on defection rates. If the d a t a in this panel s e e m familiar, it is b e c a u s e they are a r e a r r a n g e m e n t of a p o r t i o n of t h e d a t a in Figure 1 0 . 1 ; I include t h e m to facilitate certain c o m p a r i s o n s , as will b e come apparent. T h e new information in Figure 10.2 involves t h e effects of a high-intensity c a m p a i g n , s h o w n on t h e right. A high-intensity c a m p a i g n is defined as o n e in

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which the i n c u m b e n t s p e n d s $ 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 , the c h a l l e n g e r spends $ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 , and the m e d i a c o v e r a g e variable is set to 1.25. T h e s e values constitute a race that falls at about the 90th percentile of overall c a m p a i g n intensity. B e c a u s e my idealized high-intensity race involves an i n c u m b e n t with exactly t w o years of seniority, differences in defection rates from baseline levels are purely the effects of the high-intensity c a m p a i g n . As can be s e e n , the highintensity c a m p a i g n p r o d u c e s cross-cutting effects: higher-than-baseline levels of defection to the i n c u m b e n t a m o n g less a w a r e voters, and lower-than-baseline levels of defection a m o n g the most aware voters. T h e existence of these cross-cutting effects defies the logic of a o n e - m e s s a g e m o d e l , which expects all c h a n g e to run in the direction of the d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e . W h a t has p r o d u c e d the pattern of cross-cutting effects s h o w n in Figure 10.2 is an interaction b e t w e e n a d o m i n a n t i n c u m b e n t c a m p a i g n and a less int e n s e , or c o u n t e r v a i l i n g , challenger c a m p a i g n . T h a t interaction, as later analysis will show, is as follows: T h e i n c u m b e n t ' s high-intensity c a m p a i g n m a n a g e s to reach less aware v o t e r s , w h e r e a s the c h a l l e n g e r ' s less intense c a m p a i g n does not. Therefore the i n c u m b e n t reaps big gains a m o n g the less a w a r e - gains w h i c h , it a p p e a r s , are roughly equivalent to those w o n from ten years of seniority, as shown on t h e left. But the c h a l l e n g e r ' s c a m p a i g n , a l t h o u g h t o o weak to reach u n a w a r e o u t p a r t i s a n s , can reach the politically attentive. Highly attentive o u t p a r t i s a n s a r e , of c o u r s e , also heavily e x p o s e d to the i n c u m b e n t ' s c a m p a i g n , but, as o u t p a r t i s a n s , they are more likely to accept the c h a l l e n g e r ' s m e s s a g e , thereby reducing their s u p p o r t for the i n c u m b e n t to below baseline levels. T h e difference b e t w e e n the left and right panels of Figure 10.2 is illuminating on this point. A high level of seniority g e n e r a t e s no reduction in votes for t h e i n c u m b e n t in any g r o u p b e c a u s e , in contrast to a high level of c a m p a i g n intensity, it involves a m a i n l y one-sided m e s s a g e , n a m e l y the i n c u m b e n t ' s efforts to build up a personal v o t e . This type of m e s s a g e p r o d u c e s only o n e directional c h a n g e , at least in low-intensity c a m p a i g n s . But a high-intensity c a m p a i g n , b e c a u s e it c a r r i e s two-sided m e s s a g e s , can p r o d u c e cross-cutting patt e r n s of c h a n g e . T h e cross-cutting effects of c a m p a i g n intensity constitute a n o t h e r c a s e of differential information flow. As in the early years of the V i e t n a m War, t w o m e s sages p r o d u c e different effects in different s e g m e n t s of the p u b l i c , d e p e n d i n g on an interaction b e t w e e n the relative intensities of the m e s s a g e s and p e o p l e ' s levels of political a w a r e n e s s .

C O U N T E R V A L E N T AND PARTISAN RESISTANCE TO I N C U M B E N T - D O M I N A T E D H O U S E CAMPAIGNS T h e analysis so far has relied on a single blunt indicator of c a m p a i g n influence: w h e t h e r o u t p a r t i s a n s voted for the p a r t y of the i n c u m b e n t . T h e present section e x p a n d s this analysis in t w o directions. First, it e x a m i n e s t h e effects of c a m paigns on p e o p l e ' s evaluations of H o u s e c a n d i d a t e s , both i n c u m b e n t and chal-

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229

lenger, and it d o e s so at the level of positive and n e g a t i v e " c o n s i d e r a t i o n s " formed with respect to e a c h c a n d i d a t e . T h e greater information contained in such c o m p a r a t i v e c a n d i d a t e evaluations allows us to gain a m u c h clearer idea of how c a m p a i g n influence o c c u r s . A n d s e c o n d , b e c a u s e there is m e a s u r a b l e variation in evaluations of the c a n d i d a t e s a m o n g voters and n o n v o t e r s , and a m o n g inpartisans and o u t p a r t i s a n s , the analysis in this section includes all respondents living in a given district. T h i s greater inclusiveness greatly increases the n u m b e r of c a s e s available for study and hence the p o w e r of the tests that can be undertaken. T h i s s e c t i o n , like the previous o n e , c o n t i n u e s to e x a m i n e only districts in which there w a s a d o m i n a n t and c o u n t e r v a l e n t c a m p a i g n , that is, districts in which an i n c u m b e n t sought reelection in a contested r a c e . T h e 1978 N E S study c o n t a i n s excellent m e a s u r e s of c i t i z e n s ' e v a l u a t i o n s of the H o u s e c a n d i d a t e s . All respondents w e r e a s k e d , with respect to e a c h candid a t e , the following o p e n - e n d e d likes/dislikes probes: Next I would like to ask you some questions about the candidates who ran in this district for the U.S. House of Representatives. Was there anything in particular that you liked about [name of candidate], the Democratic/Republican candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives? What was that? Anything else? [Up to four responses were coded.] Was there anything in particular that you didn't like about [ . . . ] . Anything else? R e s p o n s e s to these q u e s t i o n s may be taken as indicators of the positive and n e g a t i v e c a m p a i g n m e s s a g e s that voters receive and accept as c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . W i t h respect to c h a l l e n g e r s , most of w h o m are n e o p h y t e s , almost all of these m e s s a g e s will have reached voters d u r i n g the H o u s e c a m p a i g n itself. W i t h respect to i n c u m b e n t s , s o m e information will represent the effects of i n c u m b e n t s ' interelection activities and s o m e will represent c a m p a i g n i n f o r m a t i o n . In both c a s e s , however, differences between w h a t voters k n o w about c a n d i d a t e s in verylow-intensity c a m p a i g n s and w h a t they k n o w in higher-intensity c a m p a i g n s can be taken as e v i d e n c e of the effects of the c a m p a i g n s . T h e r e is, of c o u r s e , s o m e reason to be w a r y of using the likes/dislikes d a t a as m e a s u r e s of the c a n d i d a t e information in p e o p l e ' s heads. O b v i o u s l y these d a t a do not constitute a one-to-one and exhaustive m a p p i n g of every c a n d i d a t e centered c o n s i d e r a t i o n in p e o p l e ' s heads. S o m e individuals may, for e x a m p l e , fail to r e m e m b e r s o m e p i e c e s of c a n d i d a t e information that have i m p o r t a n t l y affected their votes ( L o d g e , M c G r a w , and S t r o h , 1989); others m a y offer a large n u m b e r of c o m m e n t s simply b e c a u s e they find it easy to talk about politics. T h e limitations of t h e d a t a should not be o v e r d r a w n , however. First, as will be s h o w n , it is possible to control for individual differences in loquacity. M o r e imp o r t a n t , the v o l u m e of c a n d i d a t e r e m a r k s , as also d e m o n s t r a t e d below, varies strongly across different c a m p a i g n c o n t e x t s , r a n g i n g from a simulated average of about 2.5 discrete r e m a r k s per respondent in heavily contested races to less than 0 . 5 r e m a r k s per r e s p o n d e n t in low-intensity races. As long as o n e is willing to a s s u m e that this cross-district variation reflects m o r e than individual-level differences in propensity to talk, as it obviously m u s t , then it is possible to use the

230

Information flow and electoral choice

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

Table 10.2. Awareness and acquisition of electoral considerations

231

Table 10.3. The effect of party and candiate information on vote for 1978 House incumbent among outpartisans

Level of political awareness Sum of all likes and dislikes about two 1978 House candidates

Low 0.50 (311)

0.86 (316)

Middle 1.13 (305)

1.50 (334)

Hieh 2.06 (302)

Sum of all likes and dislikes about two parties in 197

0.67 (311)

1.01 (316)

1.61 (305)

2.41 (334)

4.06 (302)

Sum of all likes and dislikes 2.35 about 1984 presidential candidates (518)

4.11 (466)

6.26 (398)

6.62 (426)

7.81 (434)

8

Note: Cell entries are mean number of summed likes and dislikes. Data from 1978 are derived from cases in which there was both an incumbent and a challenger. Number of cases is shown in parentheses. Sources: 1978 and 1984 NES surveys. likes/dislikes d a t a to m e a s u r e the diffusion of c a m p a i g n information to different types of voters in different electoral contexts. Finally, the likes/dislikes d a t a appear, on face i n s p e c t i o n , to m e a s u r e exactly w h a t , according to the R A S m o d e l , we o u g h t to be m e a s u r i n g , namely the discrete bits of positive and n e g a t i v e cand i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that have reached voters. Despite s o m e r e a s o n for c o n c e r n , t h e n , I r e g a r d these d a t a as extremely well suited to the p r o b l e m at h a n d ; indeed, they constitute the best d a t a of w h i c h I am aware for investigating t h e microfoundations of attitude formation and c h a n g e in a d y n a m i c political e n v i r o n m e n t . Table 10.2 gives us an initial look at these d a t a . In the top panel is the s u m of H o u s e c a n d i d a t e likes and dislikes, b r o k e n d o w n by r e s p o n d e n t s ' level of habitual political a w a r e n e s s . As w o u l d be e x p e c t e d , the p e o p l e w h o are m o r e politically a w a r e are m o r e likely to acquire information about p a r t i c u l a r H o u s e c a n d i d a t e s . Politically a w a r e people are also m o r e likely to a m a s s large stores of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s about t h e t w o p a r t i e s , as s h o w n in the m i d d l e panel of the t a b l e . For p u r p o s e of c o m p a r i s o n , Table 10.2 also contains d a t a on the total n u m b e r of likes and dislikes about t h e i n c u m b e n t and c h a l l e n g e r in the 1984 presidential e l e c t i o n . A salient feature of Table 10.2 is that voters have many m o r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s about the t w o p a r t i e s than about their t w o H o u s e c a n d i d a t e s . A n i m m e d i a t e q u e s t i o n , therefore, is h o w m u c h impact each t y p e of c o n s i d e r a t i o n has on p e o p l e ' s votes. If the impact of p a r t y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s - the basis of the inertia variable e x a m i n e d in the previous section - is sufficiently great relative to that of c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , there m i g h t be no point in pursuing an investigation of t h e origins of c a n d i d a t e information. T h e simplest w a y to address this p r o b l e m is to perform a logistic regression analysis in w h i c h vote c h o i c e is the d e p e n d e n t variable and the t w o likes/dislikes

Intercept Net candidate likes and dislikes (candidate information) Net party likes and dislikes (party information) "Strongly" identified with party (0-1) Political issues scale (standardized) N

-.36 -1.14 (.19) -0.29 (.11) 1.11 (.41) 0.06 (.06) 277

Note: Coefficients from maximum likelihood logistic regression in which incumbent vote among outpartisans in contested races was the dependent variable. Source: 1978 NES survey.

m e a s u r e s , u n d e r s t o o d as indicators of party c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and c a n d i d a t e cons i d e r a t i o n s , are used as independent variables. S u c h an analysis is r e p o r t e d in Table 10.3. Since my focus is still on resistance to i n c u m b e n t - d o m i n a t e d c a m p a i g n s , the regression includes only p a r t i s a n s of the outparty. Party considerations are entered in the regression as the net of likes and dislikes, while c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are also entered as a net s c o r e , calculated as follows: Net c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n =

+ ^ ( I n c u m b e n t c a n d i d a t e likes) - ( - ^ ( C h a l l e n g e r dislikes) — ^ ( I n c u m b e n t c a n d i d a t e dislikes) - ^ ( C h a l l e n g e r likes)

1 0

2

( - )

T h e regression in Table 10.3 controls for strength of party a t t a c h m e n t ( " s t r o n g " versus other) and position on a general m e a s u r e of l e f t - r i g h t issue o r i e n t a t i o n (with high scores indicating greater ideological distance from the i n c u m b e n t , w h o is a s s u m e d to be liberal if a D e m o c r a t and c o n s e r v a t i v e if a R e p u b l i c a n ; this m e a s u r e is described m o r e fully in the next s e c t i o n ) . T h e logistic regression results indicate that c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are the most i m p o r t a n t single d e t e r m i n a n t of H o u s e v o t i n g . O n e additional like or dislike of one of the c a n d i d a t e s has the s a m e effect as identification as a strong m e m b e r of the outparty, and about four t i m e s the effect of each party like or dislike. Ideological issue distance from the i n c u m b e n t - t h o u g h , as we shall see, indirectly i m p o r t a n t as a d e t e r m i n a n t of the acquisition of c a n d i d a t e considerations - seems to have virtually no direct effect on the v o t e .

232

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Low-intensity races

Information

Higher-intensity races

flow

and

electoral

choice

233

Partisans of outparty

Partisans of inparty Incumbent likes

Incumbent likes Mean number of considerations of each type Incumbent dislikes Challenger dislikes Challenger likes

0 92 49

100 45

108 66

Challenger dislikes

Political awareness

Political awareness N= 88 29

Incumbent dislikes ; Challenger likes

93 76

N= 43 45

43 47

56 48

67 61

69 49

f

Figure 10.3. Formation o considerations in 1978 House elections. Source: 1978 NES survey. T h e s e results p r o v i d e further e v i d e n c e that inertial c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , w h i c h exist in v o t e r s ' m i n d s independently of any p a r t i c u l a r H o u s e c a m p a i g n , play a role in preventing defections to i n c u m b e n t s , especially, as Figure 10.1 and Table 10.2 s h o w e d , a m o n g highly a w a r e p e r s o n s , w h o possess the largest stores of inertial c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . But the results also show that the m a i n action in H o u s e e l e c t i o n s is in c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , which d o m i n a t e the other m e a s u r e s . Let us therefore proceed with o u r analysis of how voters acquire c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s from political c a m p a i g n s . We can learn a fair a m o u n t about how this occurs from s i m p l e graphical displays of the r a w d a t a , as s h o w n in Figure 1 0 . 3 . T h e figure presents s e p a r a t e s u m m a r i e s of net c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s for lower-intensity and higher-intensity H o u s e r a c e s , with the cutpoint b e t w e e n the t w o set at $ 4 0 , 0 0 0 . F o c u s i n g first on m e m b e r s of the i n c u m b e n t ' s party, d e scribed in the figure as " p a r t i s a n s of i n p a r t y , " we find, within both types of r a c e s , a strong positive relationship b e t w e e n political a w a r e n e s s and net considerations. S i n c e the net c o n s i d e r a t i o n s m e a s u r e is scored in the direction of the i n c u m b e n t , this indicates that, for i n p a r t i s a n s , greater exposure to t h e H o u s e c a m p a i g n , as indexed by political a w a r e n e s s , is associated with steadily higher levels of p r o i n c u m b e n t attitudes. Moreover, the positive trend lines contain no hint of the n o n m o n o t o n i c i t y that arises from t h e resistance of t h e highly a w a r e . T h e r e is little s u r p r i s e h e r e . Highly a w a r e i n p a r t i s a n s have no reason to resist the p r o i n c u m b e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n s to w h i c h they have been e x p o s e d in the c a m paign a n d , as is a p p a r e n t , they do not.

N = 133

137

157

177

164

W= 78

99

98

128

125

Figure 10.4. Types of candidate considerations formed in 1978 House campaigns. Source: 1978 NES survey. For p a r t i s a n s w h o a r e not m e m b e r s of t h e i n c u m b e n t ' s party, however, there exists a strong n o n m o n o t o n i c relationship b e t w e e n political a w a r e n e s s and net c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . N o t e also that the c u r v e for highly a w a r e " o u t p a r t i s a n s " is offset d o w n w a r d in higher-intensity races (on r i g h t ) , an o c c u r r e n c e which correctly indicates that their defections to the i n c u m b e n t are lower in higher-intensity races. C l e a r l y , highly a w a r e o u t p a r t i s a n s , t h o u g h heavily exposed to the c a m p a i g n , are m o r e resistant to t h e p r e d o m i n a n t l y p r o i n c u m b e n t m e s s a g e than are m o d e r a t e l y aware o u t p a r t i s a n s , and they are especially resistant to the i n c u m b e n t ' s efforts in higher-intensity races. W h y is this? To find out, let us d i s a g g r e g a t e the net c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n c u r v e s of outp a r t i s a n s into their c o m p o n e n t p a r t s , namely, the likes and dislikes of each cand i d a t e . W h e n we do t h i s , in Figure 10.4, we e n c o u n t e r a striking result: T h e r e is only slight e v i d e n c e of t h e n o n m o n o t o n i c i t y that arises from the heightened p a r t i s a n resistance of the highly a w a r e . O n e sees a hint of it in o n e of the c u r v e s (specifically, the i n c u m b e n t likes c u r v e of o u t p a r t i s a n s ) , but the m a i n m e s s a g e in Figure 10.4 is that the h i g h e r a p e r s o n ' s level of political a w a r e n e s s , the m o r e likely the person is to m e n t i o n things she or he likes and dislikes about both c a n d i d a t e s - and to do so even when it goes against the partisan grain. T h i s is a n o t a b l e but also s o m e w h a t puzzling finding. If increases in political awareness are a s s o c i a t e d with increases in susceptibility to all types of influe n c e , which is w h a t Figure 10.4 s e e m s to show, how does it o c c u r that, as shown earlier, the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n a w a r e n e s s and vote defection is strongly nonmonotonic?

234

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

T h e a n s w e r is close at h a n d . T h e first point to notice in Figure 10.4 is the extent to which i n c u m b e n t likes o v e r w h e l m all o t h e r types of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . A m o n g the less a w a r e m e m b e r s of the inparty, incumbent likes are almost the only type of r e s p o n s e given. A n d even a m o n g o u t p a r t i s a n s , reasons for liking the incumbent are four t i m e s as n u m e r o u s as reasons for liking the challenger. M a n y H o u s e c h a l l e n g e r s , it a p p e a r s , are all but invisible. But c h a l l e n g e r s , t h o u g h invisible to m o s t , are visible to the highly a w a r e . T h i s , it turns out, is the key to explaining how highly aware o u t p a r t i s a n s resist the d o m i n a n t p r o i n c u m b e n t m e s s a g e . R e c e p t i o n of countervailing considerations from the c h a l l e n g e r ' s c a m p a i g n , which only the most aware voters are able to a c h i e v e , gives highly aware o u t p a r t i s a n s an informational basis for o p posing the i n c u m b e n t . Highly aware o u t p a r t i s a n s , it thus a p p e a r s , do not simply resist the incumbent; they acquire countervailing information that enables t h e m to positively s u p p o r t the challenger. In the s a m e vein, Figure 10.4 shows that the incidence of i n c u m b e n t dislikes rises sharply with political a w a r e n e s s , especially a m o n g o u t p a r t i s a n s . T h i s gives highly aware o u t p a r t i s a n s - but almost no o n e else - a further informational basis for o p p o s i n g the i n c u m b e n t . Highly aware o u t p a r t i s a n s , t h u s , are the only g r o u p in t h e e l e c t o r a t e for w h o m p r o i n c u m b e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s do not o v e r w h e l m all others - t h e only g r o u p , that is, that pays 2nough attention to notice the relatively low-key c a m paigns of c h a l l e n g e r s and is also p r e d i s p o s e d , on p a r t i s a n g r o u n d s , to accept the information that c h a l l e n g e r s purvey. T h u s , the capacity of highly aware outpartisans to resist the i n c u m b e n t arises from their sensitivity to information flows that are t o o weak to reach the m a s s of less a w a r e o u t p a r t i s a n s . All of t h i s , of c o u r s e , a m o u n t s to a c l e a r and direct d e m o n s t r a t i o n of countervalent resistance. It is the same m e c h a n i s m that w a s invoked to explain the i m p e r v i o u s n e s s of sophisticated liberals to t h e d o m i n a n t p r o w a r m e s s a g e of the early V i e t n a m W a r period; the only difference is that here, o w i n g to the superior data available for H o u s e e l e c t i o n s , we are able to o b s e r v e directly t h e effects of the countervalent m e s s a g e at the level of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .

Focusing

on

partisan

resistance

T h e analysis has so far focused on inertial and c o u n t e r v a l e n t resistance to the d o m i n a n t i n c u m b e n t c a m p a i g n , and has found e v i d e n c e that b o t h types of resistance are m o r e c o m m o n a m o n g those w h o are m o r e politically a w a r e . But what about p a r t i s a n resistance - that is, the tendency of p e o p l e to refuse to accept c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that are inconsistent with their political p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s ? A l t h o u g h I did not e m p h a s i z e it, we have already e n c o u n t e r e d e v i d e n c e of p a r t i s a n resistance. It a p p e a r e d most clearly in Figure 1 0 . 3 , w h e r e we saw that p a r t i s a n s of the i n c u m b e n t ' s party w e r e far m o r e likely than o u t p a r t i s a n s to achieve p r o i n c u m b e n t scores on the m e a s u r e of net c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .

Information

flow

and

electoral

choice

235

T h i s o c c u r r e d b e c a u s e p a r t i s a n s selectively a c c e p t e d the congenial c a n d i d a t e inf o r m a t i o n to which they w e r e exposed while rejecting w h a t w a s u n c o n g e n i a l . W h a t is not yet clear, however, is w h e t h e r political awareness e n h a n c e s partisan resistance. W h e n we e x a m i n e d the relationship between a w a r e n e s s and c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in Figure 10.4, we found only slight visual e v i d e n c e of the n o n m o n o t o n i c i t y that arises from t h e greater p a r t i s a n resistance of the m o r e politically a w a r e . T h i s initial e v i d e n c e needs to be m o r e rigorously tested. I propose to do this by m a k i n g the likes and dislikes of each c a n d i d a t e the d e p e n d e n t variable of its o w n r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l . T h a t is, I will estim a t e four m o d e l s having the general form of E q u a t i o n , 1 0 . 1 , each specifying v a r i a t i o n s in o n e of t h e four c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s m e a s u r e s as a function of individual- and aggregate-level influences. If the c o n c l u s i o n s reached thus far are c o r r e c t , we should find that a g g r e g a t e v a r i a t i o n in c a m p a i g n intensity, along with individual-level differences in political a t t e n t i v e n e s s , have a major impact on t h e reception of c a n d i d a t e information, but that habitual a w a r e n e s s h a s little or no effect on a c c e p t a n c e rates. We should find, in o t h e r w o r d s , that awareness affects the formation of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s mainly through its effect on the reception p r o c e s s , as suggested by Figure 10.4. T h e model to be e s t i m a t e d is as follows:

4

Net c a n d i d a t e considerations;; = ^ ( L i k e / D i s l i k e ) „ =

4

2 ((Recepty)(Acceptjj I Recepty))„

(10.3)

w h e r e the / subscript refers to individual-level differences, the j subscript refers to district-level v a r i a b l e s , and n to t h e four s u m m a r y m e a s u r e s of considerations. In e s t i m a t i n g this m o d e l , I will a s s u m e that t h e reception and a c c e p t a n c e functions take t h e logistic f o r m , as in E q u a t i o n 1 0 . 1 . M e a s u r e m e n t of the variables in this m o d e l is m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d than usual and so requires s o m e extra attention. Measuring reception of campaign information. The individual-level variables affecting reception of c a m p a i g n information in E q u a t i o n 10.1 will be political a w a r e n e s s , m e a s u r e d in the usual way, plus expressed levels of interest in p o litical c a m p a i g n s and w h e t h e r the person voted in the 1978 congressional e l e c tion. T h e reason for adding the latter t w o m e a s u r e s is that the 1978 N E S survey c a r r i e d fewer and s o m e w h a t w e a k e r political k n o w l e d g e items than m o s t N E S s u r v e y s , which m a k e s the use of s u p p l e m e n t s a d v i s a b l e . T h e use of c a m p a i g n interest and vote t u r n o u t as reception m e a s u r e s raises a subtle point. T h r o u g h o u t this b o o k , I a t t e m p t to m e a s u r e i n d i v i d u a l s ' habitual levels of political a w a r e n e s s , by which I m e a n l o n g - t e r m a w a r e n e s s that is ind e p e n d e n t of the level of a w a r e n e s s of any p a r t i c u l a r c a m p a i g n or issue. T h e reason for insisting on c h r o n i c , as against e p i s o d i c , a w a r e n e s s is that a person stimulated to high levels of political a t t e n t i v e n e s s by a c a m p a i g n m a y exhibit

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less p a r t i s a n or inertial resistance to persuasion than s o m e o n e w h o is habitually attentive to politics, even if both are paying equal a m o u n t s of attention to the c a m p a i g n at a given m o m e n t . T h i s point is i m p o r t a n t b e c a u s e both expressed levels of political interest and vote t u r n o u t are slightly higher in districts in which an intense H o u s e race has o c c u r r e d . T h i s indicates that the c a m p a i g n has s t i m u l a t e d p e o p l e in these districts to score higher on these m e a s u r e s than they normally w o u l d . T h i s difficulty, however, is easily r e m e d i e d by p u r g i n g both variables of their correlation with district-level m e a s u r e s of c a m p a i g n intensity, as m e a s u r e d by m e d i a cove r a g e . W i t h this adjustment m a d e , each can be taken as a m e a s u r e of habitual awareness that is independent of any p a r t i c u l a r c a m p a i g n . T h e district-level variables affecting reception of c a m p a i g n information are c a m p a i g n s p e n d i n g by the i n c u m b e n t and by the challenger, intensity of m e d i a c o v e r a g e , and n u m b e r of years the i n c u m b e n t has served in the H o u s e . T h e s p e n d i n g variables require a brief c o m m e n t . As other research h a s s h o w n , s p e n d i n g by the incumbent is d e t e r m i n e d , in p a r t , by the level of t h e c h a l l e n g e r ' s s p e n d i n g and by how well the i n c u m b e n t did in his or her previous r a c e . S p e n d i n g by c h a l l e n g e r s , for its p a r t , is determined in p a r t by t h e quality of the c h a l l e n g e r (as g a u g e d by political skills or past e x p e r i e n c e , for e x a m p l e ) , in p a r t by how well the i n c u m b e n t did in the last race (weak i n c u m b e n t s t e n d to attract s t r o n g , h e a v y - s p e n d i n g c h a l l e n g e r s ) , and in p a r t by the i n c u m b e n t ' s record in office ( J a c o b s o n , 1980; J o h a n n e s and M c A d a m s , 1987). B e y o n d t h i s , n e w s p a p e r c o v e r a g e of congressional races varies as a function of the c h a l l e n g e r ' s s p e n d i n g , i n c u m b e n t ' s s p e n d i n g , and quality of the c a n d i d a t e s (Westlye, 1991). No o n e has yet been able to disentangle h o w exactly these several variables affect one another, and I cannot do so either. H e n c e in the analysis that follows, I will include all of the m e a s u r e s in t h e m o d e l in o r d e r to capture their reducedform effects, but I will not attempt to d r a w c o n c l u s i o n s from the relative m a g nitude of p a r t i c u l a r coefficients. Instead, I will use the entire set of coefficients to simulate the overall effects of certain types of races: higher-intensity races (high spending by b o t h c a n d i d a t e s , with heavy n e w s p a p e r c o v e r a g e ) , and lowerintensity races ( m o d e r a t e spending by the i n c u m b e n t , low s p e n d i n g by the challenger, with light n e w s c o v e r a g e ) . Measuring acceptance of campaign information. I will use four individual-level a c c e p t a n c e v a r i a b l e s , each m e a s u r i n g a theoretically distinct c o n c e p t . It is imp o r t a n t to m a k e c l e a r exactly w h a t these c o n c e p t s a r e . T h e first a c c e p t a n c e variable is party identification, as m e a s u r e d by t h e traditional party identification m e a s u r e . A strong coefficient on this variable w o u l d indicate a partisan bias in information processing — that is, a t e n d e n c y for p a r t i s a n s , all else e q u a l , to accept favorable information about their p a r t y ' s c a n d i d a t e and to resist favorable information about the o p p o s i t i o n ' s c a n d i d a t e . As usual, this v a r i a b l e h a s been c o d e d to a five-point r a n g e , in w h i c h strong

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identifiers ( ± 2 ) are distinguished from weak identifiers and independent leaners ( ± 1 ) and pure i n d e p e n d e n t s (0). S c o r i n g is in the direction of t h e c h a l l e n g e r ' s party. T h e second a c c e p t a n c e variable is policy distance from i n c u m b e n t and challenger. T h e i n c u m b e n t policy distance variable captures the l e f t - r i g h t distance b e t w e e n the i n d i v i d u a l ' s policy preferences (as m e a s u r e d by N E S issue q u e s tions) and the i n c u m b e n t ' s voting record (as m e a s u r e d by the roll call r a t i n g s of A m e r i c a n s for D e m o c r a t i c Action and t h e A m e r i c a n C o n s e r v a t i v e U n i o n ) . A large coefficient on this v a r i a b l e w o u l d c o n s t i t u t e a further indication of p a r t i san bias in the internalization of i n c o m i n g m e s s a g e s . 8

B e c a u s e d a t a on the policy o r i e n t a t i o n of challengers are unavailable, I w a s u n a b l e to build as g o o d a m e a s u r e of policy d i s t a n c e from t h e m . S i n c e , however, D e m o c r a t i c politicians t e n d to be to the left of Republican politicians, liberal m e m b e r s of the public should tend to be closer to D e m o c r a t i c than Republican c h a l l e n g e r s , while m a s s c o n s e r v a t i v e s should exhibit t h e o p p o s i t e tendency. O n this r a t i o n a l e , I use a m e a s u r e of l e f t - r i g h t issue o r i e n t a t i o n , scored to reflect w h e t h e r the c h a l l e n g e r is a D e m o c r a t or R e p u b l i c a n , to capture policy distance from the challenger. T h e third a c c e p t a n c e v a r i a b l e is inertia. T h i s v a r i a b l e , the net of p a r t y likes and dislikes, m e a s u r e s an i n d i v i d u a l ' s m a s s of stored p a r t i s a n c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , as described earlier. A large coefficient on this variable would indicate that stored p a r t i s a n information functions to fend off c a n d i d a t e information that is inconsistent with o n e ' s p a r t i s a n o r i e n t a t i o n . N o t e t h a t , within the R A S m o d e l framew o r k , there is no e x p e c t a t i o n that preexisting c o n s i d e r a t i o n s will affect acquisition of n e w c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ; they are supposed to create only inertial resistance, that i s , to dilute t h e effects of n e w c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . T h e final a c c e p t a n c e variable is political awareness. In addition to being a proxy for stored c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and r e c e p t i o n of c o u n t e r v a l e n t i n f o r m a t i o n , political a w a r e n e s s m a y e n h a n c e p a r t i s a n resistance t o d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e s b e cause it is associated with the possession of c u e i n g m e s s a g e s that e n a b l e individuals to see t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n persuasive m e s s a g e s and their values. B e c a u s e inertial c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and r e c e p t i o n of c o u n t e r v a l e n t information are directly m e a s u r e d by other variables in the a c c e p t a n c e function, any r e m a i n ing effect of political a w a r e n e s s can be attributed to its effect in e n h a n c i n g partisan resistance. T h e r e is one other issue to be discussed. It is, as earlier indicated, unrealistic to a s s u m e that an i n d i v i d u a l ' s volunteered likes and dislikes provide a c o m p l e t e r e p o r t of the c a m p a i g n m e s s a g e s he or she has internalized. O n e w o r r i s o m e possibility is t h a t , all else e q u a l , s o m e individuals are m o r e talkative than o t h e r s , perhaps b e c a u s e they are better able to search their m e m o r i e s for 8 This distance measure was created in the following steps: Build a measure of the left-right orientation of each survey respondent; average the ADA and ACA ratings of the incumbent over the previous two years; standardize both measures; subtract the two z-score scales; and take the absolute value of the difference. See the Measures Appendix for further information.

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relevant information or perhaps b e c a u s e they are simply loquacious. To control for these individual differences, I t o o k each p e r s o n ' s total n u m b e r of volunteered likes and dislikes (independent of directional thrust) about the political p a r t i e s as a m e a s u r e of m e m o r y and/or loquacity and used it as a n u i s a n c e v a r i a b l e in the a c c e p t a n c e function. P e o p l e w h o have a great deal to say about the p a r t i e s are e x p e c t e d , all else e q u a l , to have m o r e to say about the c a n d i d a t e s . ( L o q u a c ity, as m e a s u r e d h e r e , is confounded with an individual's level of political a w a r e n e s s , but since awareness is directly m e a s u r e d by other v a r i a b l e s , this is not a p r o b l e m . ) W i t h these v a r i a b l e s , we can m o d e l t h e diffusion of positive and n e g a t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s about each c a n d i d a t e as a function of several aggregate-level information flows - the c h a l l e n g e r ' s c a m p a i g n , the i n c u m b e n t ' s c a m p a i g n , m e d i a c o v e r a g e , and t h e a c c u m u l a t e d n e w s of the i n c u m b e n t ' s r e c o r d in office (seniority). At the individual level, r e s p o n d e n t s m a y be m o r e or less heavily exposed to these c o m m u n i c a t i o n f l o w s , d e p e n d i n g on their levels of political a t t e n t i v e n e s s , and m o r e or less resistant to t h e m e s s a g e s they r e c e i v e , as determ i n e d by their p a r t y identification, policy o r i e n t a t i o n , preexisting considera t i o n s , and awareness. T h e results of t h e e s t i m a t i o n are s h o w n in Table 1 0 . 4 . As with o t h e r m o d e l s of the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e p r o c e s s , a graphical analysis is n e c e s s a r y to convey the full significance of t h e coefficient e s t i m a t e s . S o m e i n f o r m a t i o n , however, can be gleaned from an e x a m i n a t i o n of the r a w coefficients, b e g i n n i n g with those from the r e c e p t i o n f u n c t i o n . 9

1

9 The dependent variables of this analysis are the sum of all remarks of a given type, recoded to a 0-1 scale. On the theory that the intervals between a person's first, second, third, or fourth remarks might be unequal, I experimented with various transformations of the dependent variable, but this made no important difference in the results. 10 I would like to make a few comments on two variables from the reception function, incumbents' margin of victory in their last race and the number of days that elapsed between the election and the NES interview of a given respondent. Although tangential to the main analysis, both variables have intrinsic interest. Victory margin was included to pick up the reception effects of earlier, incumbent-dominated campaigns. The signs of this variable's coefficients indicate that it performed as expected: Incumbents who won their previous race by large margins are more often liked and less often disliked, all else equal, than incumbents who had a close race in their last outing. This effect, however, is statistically insignificant and substantively small. The implication of this essentially null result is that if a hard race in the previous election has any effect on the current election, it is because of its indirect effect on challenger quality and spending rather than because of a direct lingering effect on candidate evaluations. This conclusion is similar to the Jacobson and Kernell (1981) argument that the effect of the economy on congressional outcomes is largely mediated by its intervening effect on strategic politicians. The other variable, days since election, was included to control for the possibility that the passing of time might lessen people's ability or motivation to explain what they liked and disliked about the candidates. The negative sign for this variable indicates that the variable performed as it would be expected to perform in three of the four cases; its effects, however, are neither large nor statistically significant. I also note that loquacity - the count of party likes and dislikes - performs as expected: The more a person has to say about the two political parties, the more he or she is likely to say about the two House candidates. This effect is moderately large and statistically significant, but theoretically uninteresting. The ability to control for loquacity, however, improves the fit of the model and hence the ability to estimate other effects.

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Table 10.4. Coefficients for diffusion of likes and dislikes in contested 1978 House races Incumbent likes Reception function Intercept Awareness (standardized) General i n t e r e s t ^ (range 1-3) Voted in 1978 (range 0 - 1 ) Incumbent spending (in logged $ 10,000s) Challenger spending (in logged $10,000s) News coverage (range 0 . 6 - 1 . 9 ) Seniority (log of years in office) Last victory margin (log point difference) Days since election (range 1-75) Acceptance function Intercept Awareness (standardized) Loquacity (Count of party remarks) Party attachment (range -2 to +2) Partisan inertia (Net party likes and dislikes) Issue distance from incumbent Issue scale (standardized)

Incumbent dislikes

Challenger likes

Challenger dislikes -8.21 0.71 (.34) 0.43 (.14) 1.05 (.24) 1.54 (.45) 1.61 (.24) 1.48 (.31)

-4.43 0.58 (.08) 0.20 (.07) 0.85 (.11) 0.86 (.21) -0.11 (.11) 1.34 (.19) 0.42 (.16) 0.13 (.12) -0.0024 (.0027)

-8.92 1.11 (.29) 0.06 (.15) 0.74 (.24) 2.36 (.58) 0.25 (.24) 2.59 (.69) 2.02 (.51) -.13 (.27) 0.004 (.006)

-7.90 0.71 (.18) 0.88 (.14) 0.28 (.18) 1.10 (.46) 1.61 (.25) 0.86 (.26)

-0.006 (.005)

-0.008 (.005)

1.60 -1.43 (.32) 0.32 (.08) -0.45 (.13) -0.00 (.07) -0.47 (.16)

-2.26 -0.25 (.30) 0.11 (.03) 0.20 (.06) 0.07

0.07 -0.89 (.39) 0.15 (.07) 0.19 (.12) 0.27 (.11)

-0.54 -0.04 (.55) 0.21 (.09) -0.14 (.12) 0.20 (.10)

—

(.04)

0.52 (.07)

-

'

-

-

-

-

0.13 (.12)

-0.47 (.19)

Note: Dependent variables are sum of all remarks of given type, recoded to 0 - 1 range. Up to four remarks were counted in connection with each probe, except the challenger-dislike probe, for which only two remarks were counted, since no one made four remarks of this type and less than .5 percent made three. The model is Equation 10.1, estimated by nonlinear least squares. Approximate standard errors appear in parentheses. Number of cases, which include all cases in which an incumbent sought reelection in a contested race, is 1545. Source: 1978 NES survey.

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N o t e , first of all, that seniority has significant coefficients in both the incumbent-likes and the incumbent-dislikes m o d e l s , thereby indicating quite unequivocally that seniority d o e s , as s u g g e s t e d earlier, g e n e r a t e cross-cutting effects. O n e ' s first suspicion is that these cross-cutting effects might be mutually canceling. But this is not generally t h e c a s e . B e c a u s e the intercept in the reception function of the incumbent-dislikes model is low, seniority has sizable effects only at high values of the o t h e r reception variables. T h u s , the n e g a t i v e effects of seniority c o m e into play only in high-intensity c a m p a i g n s . M e a n w h i l e , the intercept in the i n c u m b e n t - l i k e s m o d e l is higher - the highest, in fact, of the four c a s e s ; this m e a n s that the positive effects of seniority can c o m e into play even at low values of the o t h e r reception v a r i a b l e s , which is to say, even in low-intensity c a m p a i g n s . (See C h a p t e r 7 at Figure 7.3 for an explanation of why the variables in a logistic function automatically interact with o n e another.) T h u s , a careful reading of Table 10.4 indicates that seniority h a s cross-cutting effects that tend to be net positive for the i n c u m b e n t in low-intensity races and net n e g a t i v e in h i g h e r s p e n d i n g races. T h i s c o n c l u s i o n , w h i c h is readily confirmed by graphical analysis (not s h o w n ) , c o n f i r m s my earlier analysis of voter defection r a t e s , w h i c h also found seniority to be helpful in low-intensity races and harmful in high-intensity ones (see Table 10.1). S e n a t o r E d w a r d K e n n e d y of M a s s a c h u s e t t s m a y exemplify the kind of politician for w h o m seniority h a s cross-cutting effects. In a low-intensity r a c e , his g l a m o u r and family b a c k g r o u n d are i m m e d i a t e selling points, helping h i m to roll up large vote m a r g i n s . But in a high-intensity r a c e , a skilled c h a l l e n g e r m i g h t , even without raising issues from K e n n e d y ' s personal life, find m u c h useful a m m u n i t i o n in the s e n a t o r ' s long record as an u n a b a s h e d liberal. T h u s , the potentially n e g a t i v e effects of K e n n e d y ' s long record might b e c o m e i m p o r t a n t only in the presence of a p o t e n t c h a l l e n g e . T h e present analysis of t h e cross-cutting effects of seniority is m o r e solidly founded than the e a r l i e r o n e in these respects: It derives from coefficients that are highly statistically significant and it is based on a s a m p l e that includes all respondents r a t h e r than only o u t p a r t i s a n v o t e r s . T h e present analysis is also m o r e theoretically i n f o r m a t i v e , since, by d e c o m p o s i n g the political c a m p a i g n into its p a r t s and n o t i n g their differential i n t e n s i t i e s , it has been able to show why seniority has the cross-cutting effects that it does. 11

T h e other point to notice about the variables in the reception function is that, a l t h o u g h there are three individual-level m e a s u r e s of political attentiveness in each m o d e l of c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , they obtain correctly signed coefficients in all cases and achieve statistically significant effects in 10 of 12 trials. T h i s , in c o m b i n a t i o n with the usually large m a g n i t u d e s of the coefficients, in11 It is possible that there is an endogenous interaction here, such that senior incumbents do not normally encounter serious challenges unless there is a serious weakness in their record. An analysis along the lines of Westlye (1991; ch. 8) would be needed to deal with this possibility.

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d i c a t e s that individual-level differences in a t t e n t i v e n e s s are a major d e t e r m i n a n t of t h e acquisition of c a n d i d a t e information. I turn now to coefficients from the a c c e p t a n c e function. T h e inertia v a r i a b l e , first of all, performs weakly. Its four coefficients r a n g e from m o d e r a t e l y large in the e x p e c t e d direction to m o d e r a t e l y large in the unexpected d i r e c t i o n , with the r e m a i n i n g t w o c a s e s close to z e r o . T h e s e results are a further indication of the limits of preexisting c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , w h i c h is w h a t the inertia v a r i a b l e is intended to c a p t u r e , as a source of resistance to i n c o m i n g information from d o m inant political c a m p a i g n s . Inertia, as we saw in Tables 10.1 and 1 0 . 3 , is i m p o r t a n t as a c o u n t e r w e i g h t to fresh c a m p a i g n information at the point of m a k ing vote d e c i s i o n s ; however, it s e e m s to have no consistent impact on the acc e p t a n c e of n e w c a n d i d a t e information as positive or n e g a t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . 1 2

T h e party a t t a c h m e n t and the issue distance v a r i a b l e s , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , perform well, obtaining correctly signed coefficients in all e q u a t i o n s in which they a p p e a r and achieving statistical significance in five of eight c a s e s . T h i s pattern indicates the existence of a p a r t i s a n bias in c i t i z e n s ' processing of the c a n d i d a t e information to w h i c h they are exposed: G i v e n reception of a r a n g e of c a m p a i g n m e s s a g e s , p e o p l e t e n d to accept what is congenial to their p a r t i s a n values and to reject w h a t is not. A l t h o u g h it is not a p p a r e n t from simple inspection of these coefficients, their net impact on the f o r m a t i o n of c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , as will be revealed shortly in graphical a n a l y s i s , is large. T h i s brings us to the final i m p o r t a n t a c c e p t a n c e v a r i a b l e , political awareness. H e r e the e v i d e n c e is m i x e d . A w a r e n e s s a p p e a r s to play a role in p r o m o t i n g partisan resistance to positive c a n d i d a t e i n f o r m a t i o n - i n c u m b e n t and c h a l l e n g e r likes - at the point of e n c o u n t e r i n g it, but d o e s not induce resistance to n e g a t i v e information about the c a n d i d a t e s . U n s u r e w h a t to m a k e of this mixed o u t c o m e , I c o n d u c t e d parallel invest i g a t i o n s of t h e effect of a w a r e n e s s in inducing resistance to c a n d i d a t e considerations in S e n a t e e l e c t i o n s a n d . i n t h e 1984 presidential e l e c t i o n . W h a t I found is that a w a r e n e s s is not i m p o r t a n t l y a s s o c i a t e d with resistance to likes/ dislikes information for either i n c u m b e n t s or challengers in either of these types of e l e c t i o n . 13

Taking the three types of elections together, t h e n , the e v i d e n c e suggests that awareness has relatively little effect in e n h a n c i n g p a r t i s a n resistance to persuasion at the level of i n c o m i n g c a n d i d a t e information - even t h o u g h , as we have seen in Figure 1 0 . 1 , political awareness is strongly associated with resistance to 12 The one correctly signed and statistically significant coefficient involves the challenger-likes model, where, as suggested a moment ago, my ability to measure ideological distance from the challenger is marginal. It is a good bet, therefore, that inertia is functioning here more as a proxy for ideological distance than as a measure of inertial resistance. 13 In particular, I have not found any cases in which awareness picks up a statistically significant coefficient in the acceptance function of a reception-acceptance model of candidate likes or dislikes, except the two cases in Table 10.4.

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i n c u m b e n t c a m p a i g n s at the level of s u m m a r y vote decisions in H o u s e elections. (For c o m p a r a b l e e v i d e n c e on S e n a t e and presidential e l e c t i o n s , see Figure 10.6.) T h e s e seemingly contradictory findings are possible b e c a u s e a w a r e n e s s e n h a n c e d p a r t i s a n resistance to c o m m u n i c a t i o n at the point of e n c o u n t e r i n g it is only o n e of three w a y s in which awareness can induce resistance to a d o m i n a n t c a m p a i g n m e s s a g e . T h e o t h e r t w o a w a r e n e s s - m e d i a t e d resistance m e c h a n i s m s , inertial and especially c o u n t e r v a l e n t r e s i s t a n c e , have large effects even t h o u g h the first does not. Still, however, it is natural to ask why, in contrast to what occurs in other d o m a i n s , there is little or no resistance effect from awareness in the f o r m a t i o n of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s about c a n d i d a t e s in p a r t i s a n e l e c t i o n s . Recall, in particular, that political a w a r e n e s s w a s associated with resistance to ideologically inconsistent c o n s i d e r a t i o n s involving controversial issues (job g u a r a n t e e s , g o v e r n m e n t serv i c e s , aid to b l a c k s , and presidential p e r f o r m a n c e ; see Tables 8.2 and 8.3 and Figure 8.7). A l t h o u g h the a n s w e r to this question cannot be d e m o n s t r a t e d from the available d a t a , it is e a s y to infer w h a t is going o n . N o t e , first of all, that there is no a b s e n c e of p a r t i s a n resistance in the f o r m a t i o n of c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . D e m o c r a t s and liberals differ sharply from R e p u b l i c a n s and c o n s e r v a t i v e s in the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s they form (Table 10.4). W h a t is different for c a n d i d a t e conside r a t i o n s , in c o m p a r i s o n with issue-relevant c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , is that the least p o litically a w a r e p e o p l e exhibit nearly as m u c h p a r t i s a n d i s c r i m i n a t i o n as the most a w a r e . If the R A S m o d e l ;s c o r r e c t , this can only be b e c a u s e the c u e i n g inform a t i o n n e c e s s a r y to achieve p a r t i s a n resistance is m u c h more w i d e l y available in election c a m p a i g n s , especially in S e n a t e and presidential c a m p a i g n s , than in o t h e r political contexts - so widely available that even the least politically aware p e o p l e m a n a g e to acquire it. It is quite plausible that this is the c a s e . C o n t e s t e d e l e c t i o n s are organized as c o m p e t i t i o n s b e t w e e n o p p o s i n g p a r t i s a n g r o u p s . Reflecting t h i s , n e w s r e p o r t s routinely identify the p a r t i s a n affiliations of t h e c o n t e n d i n g c a n d i d a t e s , as do political a d v e r t i s e m e n t s , the other principal source of c a n d i d a t e i n f o r m a t i o n . As a result, anyone e n c o u n t e r i n g c a n d i d a t e information can very easily r e c o g n i z e its p a r t i s a n implications. T h e s a m e cannot be said for nonelectoral political c o m m u n i c a t i o n . A l t h o u g h I am aware of no study of the subject, my o b s e r v a tion is that n e w s r e p o r t s on political issues only rarely c a r r y c l e a r p a r t i s a n c u e ing i n f o r m a t i o n . If this impression is c o r r e c t , and if, as the R A S model c o n t e n d s , political a w a r e n e s s induces p a r t i s a n resistance precisely by virtue of its association with c u e i n g information that is o b s c u r e or e s o t e r i c , then it would follow that its a s sociation with p a r t i s a n resistance w o u l d be m a r k e d l y w e a k e r in p a r t i s a n e l e c tion c a m p a i g n s t h a n in o t h e r contexts. Altogether, t h e n , political a t t e n t i v e n e s s , as m e a s u r e d by a w a r e n e s s , interest, and vote turnout, h a s consistently large and usually significant effects on r e c e p tion of c a m p a i g n i n f o r m a t i o n , but a w a r e n e s s h a s only inconsistent effects on t h e

Information

flow

and

electoral

choice

243

a c c e p t a n c e process. Insofar as attentiveness affects the acquisition of c a m p a i g n i n f o r m a t i o n , it appears therefore to be mainly via its effect on r e c e p t i o n .

Simulating

the

effects

of campaign

intensity

T h e coefficients in Table 10.4, in conjunction w i t h the e q u a t i o n s that g e n e r a t e d t h e m , imply a c o m p r e h e n s i v e account of attitude f o r m a t i o n in H o u s e c a m p a i g n s . By using the coefficients in graphical s i m u l a t i o n s , we can gain further insight into the d y n a m i c s of resistance to p e r s u a s i o n . Let me first use s i m u l a t i o n s to m a k e a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l point. In introducing the likes/dislikes q u e s t i o n s as m e a s u r e s of the c a n d i d a t e information that has reached voters, I noted a suspicion that m a y still linger in s o m e r e a d e r s ' m i n d s : that these questions mainly m e a s u r e individual differences in m o t i v a t i o n to disc u s s politics. T h e coefficients in Table 10.4 e n a b l e us to test this possibility. Let us c o n s i d e r low-intensity and high-intensity r a c e s , as defined earlier. Let us also a s s u m e that the first h a s a two-year i n c u m b e n t r u n n i n g for reelection and the s e c o n d a ten-year i n c u m b e n t . C a m p a i g n intensity, operationalized in this way, has a large impact on w h a t citizens are able to learn about their H o u s e m e m b e r s . T h e average n u m b e r of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s e x p e c t e d from a m o d a l o u t p a r t i s a n in low-intensity races is 0 . 2 7 ; in high-intensity r a c e s , it is 2 . 5 1 . T h i s average difference is entirely attributable to differences in c a m p a i g n intensity. Moreover, the simulated n u m b e r of r e m a r k s in a hypothetical race in which there is no c a m p a i g n - no s p e n d i n g by either c a n d i d a t e , the lowest level of press c o v e r a g e , and no i n c u m b e n t seniority as a source of information - is 0 . 2 0 . A l m o s t all of these r e m a r k s c o m e from m o d e r a t e l y a w a r e and especially highly a w a r e persons w h o give reasons for liking the i n c u m b e n t , a result that is, if a n y t h i n g , a bit low in light of H o u s e m e m b e r s ' c o n t i n u o u s efforts to build c o n s t i t u e n c y s u p p o r t d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d s between elections. T h e s e findings should resolve any doubts that the v o l u m e of likes/dislikes rem a r k s reflects to any i m p o r t a n t degree simple individual differences in willingness to talk. T h e r e a r e , as there o u g h t to b e , large individual differences in sensitivity to political c a m p a i g n s , but p e o p l e ' s ability to m a k e r e m a r k s about c a n d i d a t e s d e p e n d s very heavily on the intensity of the c a m p a i g n s . I turn now to m o r e substantive c o n c e r n s . We saw in Figure 10.2 that increases in seniority and in c a m p a i g n intensity p r o d u c e distinctive c h a n g e s in the pattern of defections to i n c u m b e n t H o u s e m e m b e r s , as m e a s u r e d against a baseline involving a t w o - y e a r i n c u m b e n t in a low-intensity r a c e . Figure 10.5 depicts the s a m e seniority and c a m p a i g n effects that w e r e s h o w n earlier, except at the level of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . T h u s , on the left of Figure 10.5, we see that an increase in i n c u m b e n t seniority from t w o years to ten years produces a slight increase in net p r o i n c u m b e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , w h e r e the increase is m e a s u r e d against the s a m e type of baseline race as in the e a r l i e r analysis. T h e effect is c o n c e n t r a t e d

244

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

Pure seniority effect

Pure campaign intensity effect

+.75

+.751

+.50 Tenth-year incumbent +

2 5

Net proincumbent considerations 0

Information flow and electoral choice

"•"""""""""'S^eline

^"""^

+.50 +.25 0

-.25

Highintensity campaign

-.25

-.50

1

-.50

partisans i n 197S^H , ™ " ° " «he formation o f considerations among outpart, ans in 1978 House elect.ons. Estimates are derived from coefficients in Table 10 4 Baseline is a race ,n wh.ch the incumbent has two years of seniority and s invoWed ^n a

Z^S^ST

t M >

c a m p a i 8 n

-

f , o w

p , o t s

voters to recall the i n c u m b e n t ' s n a m e . But, they m a i n t a i n , i n c u m b e n c y advantage d o e s not require recall ability; it requires only that the voter be able to reco g n i z e the i n c u m b e n t ' s n a m e w h e n e n c o u n t e r i n g it in the voting b o o t h . H e n c e the rise of the personal vote m a y rest on little m o r e than an increase in t h e ability of voters to r e c o g n i z e i n c u m b e n t s ' n a m e s . T h e n u b of this a r g u m e n t is that i n c u m b e n c y a d v a n t a g e , which is large at the level of the ballot b o x , d e p e n d s on cognitive u n d e r p i n n i n g s that are exceedingly slight. A n d this is exactly the pattern I have found: T h e effect of seniority w h i c h , I reiterate, is m e r e l y a proxy for t h e things that i n c u m b e n t s do to build a personal vote - is large at the level of vote defections in Figure 10.2 but small at the level of c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in Figure 1 0 . 5 . 1 5

Political awareness , n f

245

8ive

estimates

for

mainly a m o n g o u t p a r t i s a n s scoring m i d d l e to low on political a w a r e n e s s , which is roughly the s a m e g r o u p that w a s most affected by seniority in t h e e a r l i e r analysis of v o t e defections. On t h e right of Figure 10.5, we see that an increase in c a m p a i g n intensity from low to high p r o d u c e s higher than b a s e l i n e s u p p o r t for the i n c u m b e n t a m o n g l e s ; a w a r e o u t p a r t i s a n s , and lower than baseline s u p p o r t a m o n g t h e highly a w a r e o u t p a r t i s a n s . T h e s e results also m a t c h the effects of c a m p a i g n intensity on o u t p a r t i s a n defections, as s h o w n in F i g u r e 1 0 . 2 . 1 4

G i v e n the differences in t h e m e t h o d s used to p r o d u c e Figures 10.2 a n d 10.5 t h e former involving the votes of 2 7 7 o u t p a r t i s a n s , the latter the net likes and dislikes of the t w o c a n d i d a t e s by s o m e 1,500 respondents - t h e s u b s t a n t i v e corr e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n t h e t w o sets of e s t i m a t e s s e e m s quite impressive. A n d yet, as can be seen, the m a g n i t u d e of the effect of seniority on c o n s i d e r a t i o n s s e e m s q u i t e small in relation to the m a g n i t u d e of t h e effect of defections, as s h o w n earlier. W h a t is g o i n g o n ? An explanation is s u g g e s t e d by an important analysis by M a n n and Wolfinger (1980). T h e y n o t e that t h e rise of a personal v o t e for i n c u m b e n t H o u s e m e m b e r s h a s not been a s s o c i a t e d with any d e t e c t a b l e increase over t i m e in the ability of 14 In these and subsequent simulations of candidate considerations, the effect of political awareness is simulated by simultaneously manipulating scores on the three awareness measures: knowledge, interest, and voting. Knowledge runs from - 1 . 8 SD to 1.5 SD, with the asymmetry reflecting the skew in the measure. In Figure 10.2, interest was included in the Awareness scale; in the present analysis, it is entered as a separate variable in the reception function and, for purposes of simulation, is manipulated over the range of 1.0 to 2.6 on the original three-point scale, with an adjustment for purging. Vote turnout is manipulated over a range of 0 to 1, with an adjustment for purging. The loquacity variable, the sum of party likes and dislikes, was set to 2.0 in all cases, thereby eliminating its correlation with political awareness.

My c o n c l u s i o n , therefore, is that the m o d e s t m a g n i t u d e of the seniority effect in Figure 10.5 is p r o b a b l y an accurate indication that the effect really is small, but not so small that it c a n n o t m a k e a big difference in the voting b o o t h w h e n the i n c u m b e n t is c o m p e t i n g against a c h a l l e n g e r w h o is all but invisible. Before leaving Figure 1 0 . 5 , I want to return to the q u e s t i o n of w h y exactly high c a m p a i g n intensity has the cross-cutting effects that it does. S i n c e Figure 10.5 has been p r o d u c e d by c o m p u t e r s i m u l a t i o n , it is possible to say exactly what h a s g e n e r a t e d t h e cross-cutting effects. T h e c a u s e of these cross-cutting effects, as I suggested earlier, is differential information flow. S c o r e s on net c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in t h e baseline race have been produced by a d o m i n a n t but not very intense p r o i n c u m b e n t c o m m u nication flow, and a c o u n t e r v a l e n t p r o c h a l l e n g e r m e s s a g e that is extremely faint. As c a m p a i g n intensity i n c r e a s e s , the d o m i n a n t p r o i n c u m b e n t m e s s a g e gains sufficient p o w e r to reach low-awareness voters w h o could not pick it up in a b a s e line r a c e . H e n c e s u p p o r t for the i n c u m b e n t a m o n g t h e least a w a r e o u t p a r t i s a n s increases a s c a m p a i g n intensity increases. T h e c o u n t e r v a l e n t c h a l l e n g e r m e s s a g e also gains in intensity, but only e n o u g h to reach the most politically aware p e o p l e , w h o , if they are o u t p a r t i s a n s , then b e c o m e less favorable toward the incumbent. T h e s e points are m a d e c l e a r in Table 1 0 . 5 , w h i c h shows the simulated n u m b e r of d o m i n a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ( i n c u m b e n t likes plus c h a l l e n g e r dislikes) and c o u n tervalent c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ( i n c u m b e n t dislikes plus c h a l l e n g e r likes) in both a lowintensity and a high-intensity r a c e . T h e effects are shown separately for a highawareness o u t p a r t i s a n voter and a l o w - a w a r e n e s s o n e . In the first row of the t a b l e , which depicts a low-intensity r a c e , neither highawareness nor l o w - a w a r e n e s s o u t p a r t i s a n s volunteer many c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , and most of w h a t they do express involves information from the d o m i n a n t c a m p a i g n . T h e c h a l l e n g e r ' s c a m p a i g n , t h u s , is almost invisible even to highly aware outpartisans. 15 The effects are small in the sense that the net of positive and negative considerations that seniority can explain is small; the coefficients responsible for the separate positive and negative effects, as shown in Table 10.4, are not small.

246 Table among

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

10.5. Effect outpartisans

of campaign

intensity

High awareness outpartisan Proincumbent Prochallenger considerations considerations

on formation

Information flow and electoral choice

of considerations

Low awareness outpartisan Proincumbent considerations

Prochallenger considerations

Low-intensity campaign

0.24

0.07

0.16

0.01

High-intensity campaign

1.09

1.43

0.92

0.26

+1.36

+0.76

Gain from campaign

+0.85

Net gain/loss to incumbent

-0.41

+0.25 +0.51

Note: Cell entries are simulated mean number of considerations in each category for modal outpartisan voters, where simulations are based on coefficients in Table 10.4. Source: 1978 NES survey.

In a high-intensity r a c e , as s h o w n in the s e c o n d row of the t a b l e , highly a w a r e voters acquire additional c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , but m o r e c o u n t e r v a l e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s than d o m i n a n t ones. ( T h e s e respondents were heavily exposed to b o t h c a m p a i g n s , but, as o u t p a r t i s a n s , they accept m a i n l y countervalent c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . ) As a result, their net evaluation of the i n c u m b e n t falls below the b a s e l i n e . M e a n w h i l e , the effect of an intense c a m p a i g n on less a w a r e o u t p a r t i s a n s is quite different. T h e y a r e , as we have seen in Table 10.4, predisposed to accept c o u n t e r v a l e n t i n f o r m a t i o n , but most of w h a t reaches t h e m is i n f o r m a t i o n from t h e d o m i n a n t c a m p a i g n . H e n c e , in contrast to h i g h - a w a r e n e s s o u t p a r t i s a n s , they acquire m o r e d o m i n a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s than c o u n t e r v a l e n t o n e s , w h i c h leads t h e m to raise their net evaluations of the i n c u m b e n t above baseline levels. T h e s e d a t a on t h e effects of differential information flow offer a striking parallel to the n o t a b l e c a s e of c h a n g e s in public attitudes toward the V i e t n a m W a r b e t w e e n 1964 and 1966, w h e n less aware liberals b e c a m e m o r e s u p p o r t i v e of the w a r while m o r e a w a r e liberals b e c a m e less so. T h e only difference is t h a t , in the c a s e of H o u s e e l e c t i o n s , we have been able to capture the effects of a two-sided information flow b o t h at the level of s u m m a r y s t a t e m e n t s of preference (that is, vote c h o i c e s , as in Figure 10.2) and at the m o r e basic level of the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s u n d e r l y i n g s u m m a r y decisions.

Summary

on

House

elections

T h e analysis of H o u s e e l e c t i o n s h a s given us o u r best o p p o r t u n i t y to pick a p a r t the d y n a m i c s of resistance to persuasion by a d o m i n a n t political m e s s a g e , and especially the role of political a w a r e n e s s in such resistance. W h a t have we learned?

247

C o n v e r s e , in his study of information flow in p a r t i s a n e l e c t i o n s , proposed o n e m e c h a n i s m by w h i c h a w a r e n e s s induces resistance to p e r s u a s i o n . M o r e aware p e o p l e , he a r g u e d , d e v e l o p larger stores of l o n g - t e r m p a r t i s a n i n f o r m a t i o n , and this internalized ballast e n a b l e s t h e m to withstand the c a m p a i g n m e s s a g e s they encounter. T h e H o u s e d a t a produced s u p p o r t for this view. P e o p l e w h o are generally attentive to politics do have larger stores of preexisting p a r t i s a n conside r a t i o n s (Table 10.2), and preexisting c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are a s s o c i a t e d with resistance to i n c u m b e n t - d o m i n a t e d c a m p a i g n s (Tables 10.1 and 1 0 . 3 , and Figure 10.1). This type of resistance is w h a t I have t e r m e d inertial resistance. But political a w a r e n e s s r e m a i n s associated with resistance even after controlling for its intervening effect as a proxy for inertial c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . O n e reason for this is that a w a r e n e s s also e n h a n c e s partisan resistance to political c o m m u nications at the point of e n c o u n t e r i n g and d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r to accept t h e m , as s h o w n in Table 10.4. Yet t h e effects of a w a r e n e s s - i n d u c e d resistance to persuasion w e r e neither large nor consistent. T h e y played a role in resistance to i n c u m b e n t - d o m i n a t e d c a m p a i g n s , but not a large o n e . T h i s b r i n g s us to the third form of resistance to d o m i n a n t political c a m p a i g n s , countervalent resistance. C o u n t e r v a l e n t resistance involves sensitivity to sources of information o t h e r than the d o m i n a n t c a m p a i g n , w h i c h , in the present c a s e , m e a n s sensitivity to the prochallenger and a n t i i n c u m b e n t information from the c h a l l e n g e r c a m p a i g n . T h e major finding in this area h a s been t h a t , as s h o w n most clearly in Figure 10.4, highly a w a r e p e r s o n s , but not most o t h e r p e o p l e , receive significant a m o u n t s of information from the countervailing challenger c a m p a i g n . As a result, highly aware o u t p a r t i s a n s , but not m o s t o t h e r s , develop r e a s o n s for o p p o s ing the i n c u m b e n t and s u p p o r t i n g the challenger. T h i s , in t u r n , e n a b l e s highly aware o u t p a r t i s a n s to resist the d o m i n a n t i n c u m b e n t c a m p a i g n in the e l e m e n t a r y sense that, a l t h o u g h they m a y internalize s o m e p r o i n c u m b e n t m e s s a g e s , they d o not e n d up s u p p o r t i n g the i n c u m b e n t . It is w o r t h e m p h a s i z i n g that w h a t d r i v e s the c o u n t e r v a l e n t resistance of t h e politically aware is not resistance per s e , but t h e ability to pick up low-intensity c o m m u n i c a t i o n s from the political e n v i r o n m e n t . C o u n t e r v a l e n t resistance a p pears to be the m o s t i m p o r t a n t source of resistance to d o m i n a n t political campaigns. It might be objected that w h a t I am calling c o u n t e r v a l e n t resistance to a d o m inant m e s s a g e is not really resistance at all, but merely susceptibility to alternative sources of p e r s u a s i o n . This objection m a y perhaps be r e a s o n a b l e in cases in w h i c h the c o u n t e r v a l e n t m e s s a g e is nearly as intense as the d o m i n a n t o n e . But it should not be forgotten that c o u n t e r v a l e n t resistance involves, most fundamentally, being e x p o s e d to t w o streams of influence and picking out the o n e that is m o r e congenial w i t h o n e ' s values r a t h e r than simply the o n e that is louder. As long as this sort of a u t o n o m o u s choice is being m a d e , it m a k e s sense to say that o n e m e s s a g e has been c h o s e n and the o t h e r resisted.

248

Information

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N HOUSE E L E C T I O N S IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

M o s t analysis of electoral c h o i c e , as I indicated in C h a p t e r 1, focuses on a single type of e l e c t i o n . B e c a u s e t h e present analysis of H o u s e elections has been cast in t e r m s of the general R A S m o d e l , however, there is every reason to try to extend it to m o r e c a s e s . T h i s is what I u n d e r t a k e to do in this section. O n e w o u l d not, of c o u r s e , expect identical patterns of electoral c h o i c e in w i d e l y dissimilar c a s e s . O n e w o u l d , however, expect the basic processes of inf o r m a t i o n diffusion and influence to be t h e s a m e . If s o , voting b e h a v i o r across types of e l e c t i o n s should a p p e a r fundamentally similar, o n c e s y s t e m a t i c differe n c e s in t h e flow of information are taken account of. Since H o u s e e l e c t i o n s provide less information to voters than any other type of national e l e c t i o n , and in this sense m a r k a sort of limiting c a s e , the o b v i o u s question b e c o m e s : W h a t h a p p e n s to electoral c h o i c e as c a m p a i g n intensity increases, thereby providing voters with larger a m o u n t s of c a n d i d a t e i n f o r m a t i o n ? To a n s w e r this q u e s t i o n , I brought together d a t a on voter defection to the inc u m b e n t from three other types of races: low- and high-intensity S e n a t e c a m p a i g n s , and the 1984 presidential r a c e . T h e s e d a t a are shown in Figure 10.6. Let me briefly d e s c r i b e the p r o c e d u r e s used to g e n e r a t e these d a t a . House elections. Defection patterns in low- and high-intensity H o u s e races are the s a m e as in t h e r i g h t - h a n d panel of Figure 10.2. T h e s e p a t t e r n s , as m a y be r e c a l l e d , depict the effects of c a m p a i g n intensity, net of the effect of seniority, which is held at its m i n i m u m value.

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Outpartisan defections to incumbent in contested 1990 Senate elections

Outpartisan defections to incumbent in contested 1978 House elections

Lowintensity

choice

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Democratic defections to Reagan in 1984 presidential election

Low-intensity races

Political awareness Figure 10.6. Defections to incumbent party in U.S. national elections. House estimates are based on coefficients in Table 10.1; Senate estimates are based on coefficients in Table 10.6; presidential data are based on a polynomial regression. Source: National Election Study surveys. Presidential elections.

E s t i m a t i o n of defection rates to the i n c u m b e n t ' s p a r t y in

1984 w a s sufficiently straightforward that it could be a c c o m p l i s h e d by a simple p o l y n o m i a l regression.

Senate elections. Defection patterns in S e n a t e e l e c t i o n s have been e s t i m a t e d from t h e 1990 w a v e of the N E S Senate election study. T h e s e d a t a involve the twenty-five races in w h i c h an i n c u m b e n t sought reelection under c h a l l e n g e from the opposition party. T h e m o d e l and p r o c e d u r e s used in e s t i m a t i n g defection p a t t e r n s are exactly the s a m e as in the c a s e of H o u s e elections. T h e defection p a t t e r n s shown in the figure are e s t i m a t e s for m o d a l p a r t i s a n s , as d e s c r i b e d in A p p e n d i x A to this chapter. As in the c a s e of the H o u s e d a t a , low-intensity races have been defined by scores on the three c a m p a i g n - i n t e n s i t y v a r i a b l e s and corr e s p o n d to roughly the 10th percentile of overall c a m p a i g n intensity; highintensity races have been defined by scores at about the 90th p e r c e n t i l e . A l s o as in the case of H o u s e e l e c t i o n s , the i n c u m b e n t is a s s u m e d to have j u s t c o m pleted a first t e r m . Details of variable c o n s t r u c t i o n are found in A p p e n d i x A. 16

16 To control for differences in state population, I divided campaign spending by the number of congressional districts in the state. Low-intensity races were ones in which the total of the incumbent's spending, including party and other sources, was $1.5 million per district, the total of the challenger's spending was $500,000 per district, and the aggregate media intensity score was near the bottom of its range at 0.05. High-intensity races were ones in which incumbent and challenger spending were $10 million, and media intensity was .75.'

In e x a m i n i n g Figure 10.6, it is i m m e d i a t e l y a p p a r e n t that the n o n m o n o t o n i c i t y often associated with t h e r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e model shows up strongly in H o u s e elections but is essentially absent from the other c a s e s . As explained in C h a p t e r 8, this is neither a p r o b l e m nor even a surprise for the R A S m o d e l , since n o n m o n o t o n i c i t y is only o n e of the possible o u t c o m e s of the r e c e p t i o n a c c e p t a n c e process. If t h e c h a n g e - i n d u c i n g m e s s a g e is sufficiently intense to reach the least politically aware stratum of the e l e c t o r a t e , politically u n a w a r e persons can be e x p e c t e d to be more susceptible to influence than a n y o n e else. T h u s , D r y e r (1971) found that the n o n m o n o t o n i c i t y that C o n v e r s e discovered in t h e 1952 presidential e l e c t i o n did not show up in any s u b s e q u e n t presidential contest. Instead, there has been a m o n o t o n i c a l l y n e g a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n awareness and probability of vote defection. " T h e flow of s h o r t - t e r m s t i m u l i , " as D r y e r explained, " h a s effectively p e n e t r a t e d all s e g m e n t s of the e l e c t o r a t e , " thereby ironing out t h e n o n m o n o t o n i c i t y and p r o d u c i n g attitude c h a n g e even in the least politically active stratum of the e l e c t o r a t e (Dryer, 1971: p. 5 3 3 ) . W h a t Figure 10.6 adds to D r y e r ' s account is that even S e n a t e c a m p a i g n s now achieve sufficient intensity to penetrate to t h e least aware stratum of the e l e c t o r a t e , but that most H o u s e elections do not. T h e r e is, however, a p r o m i n e n t feature of Figure 10.6 that cannot be readily a c c o m m o d a t e d within a o n e - m e s s a g e f r a m e w o r k . It is the fact that peak levels

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Information

of defection o c c u r in H o u s e elections and in low-intensity S e n a t e e l e c t i o n s , which have relatively low levels of c a m p a i g n intensity, while the lowest defection rates occur in a presidential e l e c t i o n , which h a s the highest i n t e n s i t y . Nothing in my typology of attitude c h a n g e , as presented in Figure 8 . 2 , or any o t h e r m a n i p u l a t i o n of the logic of the o n e - m e s s a g e m o d e l , can explain this o c c u r r e n c e . T h e cross-cutting effects of c a m p a i g n intensity in the c a s e of H o u s e e l e c t i o n s likewise defy the logic of a o n e - m e s s a g e m o d e l . In order to explain the patterns of vote defection in Figure 10.6, w h i c h should be u n d e r s t o o d most generally as patterns of attitude c h a n g e , it is n e c e s s a r y to take account of both sides of the c o m m u n i c a t i o n flow to which citizens have been e x p o s e d . 17

W i t h respect to H o u s e e l e c t i o n s , this task has already been a c c o m p l i s h e d by my discussion of the effect of differential information flow on the f o r m a t i o n of c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Figure 10.7 gives us the e v i d e n c e n e c e s s a r y to extend this discussion to S e n a t e and presidential e l e c t i o n s . Figure 10.7 displays s u m m a r y m e a s u r e s of c a n d i d a t e evaluations for all three types of e l e c t i o n s , b a s e d on administration of the s a m e likes/dislikes q u e s t i o n s in each c a s e . T h e d a t a on H o u s e e l e c t i o n s in the figure are derived from the coefficients presented in Table 10.4; the d a t a for S e n a t e e l e c t i o n s have been simulated by the s a m e p r o c e d u r e s as used for H o u s e elections (see A p p e n d i x A to this c h a p t e r ) ; and the d a t a for the 1984 presidential election are simply plots of the raw m e a n s for E^emocrats and R e p u b l i c a n s by levels of political awareness. T h e i m m e d i a t e l y evident pattern in these d a t a is that m o r e intense c a m p a i g n s , both across types of e l e c t i o n s and within t h e m , lead inpartisans and o u t p a r t i s a n s to d e v e l o p overall c a n d i d a t e evaluations - m e a s u r e d as the net of the four cand i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n m e a s u r e s — that are m o r e polarized along p a r t i s a n lines. G i v e n that, as we saw in Table 10.3, c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s powerfully affect vote d e c i s i o n s , the effect of this polarization of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s along p a r t y lines is to g e n e r a t e m o r e party-line voting in the more intense races and h e n c e lower defection rates. Since it has been p r o d u c e d by s i m u l a t i o n , the greater polarization of net cand i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in high-intensity races is fully e x p l a i n a b l e . Two m a i n factors are at w o r k : M o r e intense races entail, in the construction of these figures as well as in actual p r a c t i c e , both more evenly balanced c o m m u n i c a t i o n flows and a larger overall v o l u m e of c o m m u n i c a t i o n . It is no m y s t e r y that a balanced c o m m u n i c a t i o n flow c o n t r i b u t e s to p a r t y p o l a r i z a t i o n , since it gives e a c h side the informational basis of a partisan evaluation of the c a n d i d a t e s , but sheer volu m e of c o m m u n i c a t i o n is also extremely i m p o r t a n t . Let us see why. We have already seen that D e m o c r a t s tend to accept m o r e of the proD e m o c r a t i c m e s s a g e s they e n c o u n t e r than they do of the p r o - R e p u b l i c a n o n e s , 17 The 1984 presidential election, of course, produced higher levels of defection to the inparty than in most presidential elections, but is otherwise typical of other cases. Even among House elections, higher-intensity races produce lower overall levels of defection than low-intensity races (mean 41 percent vs. 59 percent, t = 2.87, p < .01).

Net like/dislike scores in contested 1978 House elections

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Net like/dislike scores in contested 1970 Senate elections

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choice

Net likeldislike scores in contested 1984 Presidential elections

Pro( incumbent

Republicans

ProChallenger Political awareness KEY 1. Members of inparty, high intensity race 2. Members of inparty, low intensity race 3. Members of outparty, low intensity race 4. Members of outparty, high intensity race Figure 10.7. Candidate evaluations in U.S. national elections. House estimates are based on Equation 10.1 and the coefficients in Table 10.4; Senate estimates are based on coefficients in Table 10.7; presidential data depict raw data. Sources: National Election Study surveys. and that R e p u b l i c a n s exhibit the reverse tendency. Let us a s s u m e , for the sake of a r g u m e n t , that t h e a c c e p t a n c e rate is 67 percent for congenial m e s s a g e s , but 33 percent for uncongenial ones. T h i s a m o u n t s to p a r t i s a n bias in information processing that is roughly in line with the rates implied for median respondents by the coefficients in Table 10.4. If, t h e n , a D e m o c r a t is e x p o s e d to three proD e m o c r a t i c m e s s a g e s and three pro-Republican o n e s , his expected net score will be +1 in the D e m o c r a t i c direction (he will accept t w o of the first type and one of the s e c o n d , for a net score of + 1 ) . But if he is exposed to six m e s s a g e s of each t y p e , his expected net score will increase to +2 (he will accept four congenial m e s s a g e s and two u n c o n g e n i a l o n e s ) . In g e n e r a l , the larger the n u m b e r of m e s sages on which this or any consistent D e m o c r a t i c bias o p e r a t e s , the larger the expected net score in the D e m o c r a t i c d i r e c t i o n . T h e same p r o c e s s , of c o u r s e , drives R e p u b l i c a n s to a higher net score in t h e Republican d i r e c t i o n .

252

Information flow and electoral choice

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

T h i s a r g u m e n t explains why, all else e q u a l , there is more p a r t y p o l a r i z a t i o n in high-intensity (high-information) races. Since highly aware p a r t i s a n s ingest m o r e c a m p a i g n information than less aware p a r t i s a n s , it also explains why highly aware D e m o c r a t s and R e p u b l i c a n s are m o r e polarized in their net cons i d e r a t i o n s scores than are less a w a r e p a r t i s a n s of each stripe. It is w o r t h e m p h a s i z i n g , t h e n , that the m a i n reason for the greater p a r t i s a n p o l a r i z a t i o n of m o r e a w a r e voters - especially in presidential e l e c t i o n s , w h e r e the flow of c a n d i d a t e information is essentially evenly balanced - is not that the m o r e aware voters are m o r e selective in d e c i d i n g which c o m m u n i c a t i o n s to accept (though there m a y be s o m e t e n d e n c y for t h e m to be). It is, rather, that m o r e a w a r e p a r t i s a n s , o w i n g to the effect of a w a r e n e s s on r e c e p t i o n , ingest m u c h m o r e information than less aware p a r t i s a n s , and processing this greater volume of information with (almost) the same partisan bias as e v e r y o n e else leads t h e m to form net e v a l u a t i o n s that are m o r e highly p o l a r i z e d . T h i s a r g u m e n t explains why there is m o r e party-line voting in e l e c t i o n s in w h i c h information flow is m o r e intense, and why, within both presidential and S e n a t e e l e c t i o n s , there tends to be m o r e p a r t y loyalty a m o n g m o r e a w a r e voters. In H o u s e e l e c t i o n s there is a n o n m o n o t o n i c relationship between a w a r e n e s s and defection, but the reason for the exceptional p a t t e r n is clear. T h e a m o u n t of inf o r m a t i o n about the c a n d i d a t e s reaching less a w a r e voters in H o u s e e l e c t i o n s is lower than in any o t h e r t y p e of r a c e , an a m o u n t that is fairly close to n i l . Voters w h o are undisturbed by any new information do not defect to t h e o p p o s i t i o n . A modified form of C o n v e r s e ' s original information flow a r g u m e n t w o u l d , in light of all t h i s , explain t h e cross-election p a t t e r n of defections in Figure 10.6 as follows: Voters at the lowest awareness levels and in the lowest intensity e l e c tions r e m a i n loyal to their p a r t y b e c a u s e , as C o n v e r s e originally a r g u e d , they get almost no new i n f o r m a t i o n . As the information reaching voters rises from nearly nil to s o m e , p a r t i s a n instability shoots to its highest levels; these are the cases of m i d d l e - a w a r e n e s s voters in low-intensity H o u s e r a c e s , and l o w - a w a r e n e s s voters in low-intensity S e n a t e races. T h e reason for the m a r k e d instability of these voters is that most of the information they get is p r o i n c u m b e n t i n f o r m a t i o n , w h i c h they have little inertial capacity to resist. As c a m p a i g n information reaching outp a r t i s a n voters c o n t i n u e s to r i s e , instability falls from its peak levels, reaching a limit of almost no p a r t i s a n defection a m o n g highly aware voters in presidential e l e c t i o n s . Inertial resistance is only a small p a r t of the explanation for the d e cline in instability from peak levels. T h e m a i n reason is that more attentive voters are receiving higher volumes of more balanced c a n d i d a t e i n f o r m a t i o n , all of w h i c h c o n d u c e toward greater party p o l a r i z a t i o n of c a n d i d a t e e v a l u a t i o n s and h e n c e higher levels of p a r t i s a n loyalty. 1 8

T h i s analysis leads to an o b s e r v a t i o n of s o m e theoretical significance: Alt h o u g h resistance to d o m i n a n t political c a m p a i g n s d e p e n d s heavily on factors that are internal to individuals - notably stored c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , political values and a t t a c h m e n t s , and political awareness - intraindividual predispositions to18 The simulated mean number of remarks across both candidates for voters in the lowest awareness category in a low-intensity, low-seniority House race is 0.13.

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w a r d resistance c a n n o t , by t h e m s e l v e s , explain very m u c h . In o r d e r to have real effect, they must be n o u r i s h e d by exposure to a countervalent information flow. W h e n people are e x p o s e d to two c o m p e t i n g sets of electoral i n f o r m a t i o n , they are generally able to c h o o s e a m o n g t h e m on the basis of their p a r t i s a n s h i p and values even w h e n they do not score especially well on tests of political awareness. But w h e n individuals are exposed to a o n e - s i d e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n flow, as in low-key H o u s e and S e n a t e e l e c t i o n s , their capacity for critical resistance appears quite limited. T h e conclusion I d r a w from this is that the most i m p o r t a n t source of resistance to d o m i n a n t c a m p a i g n s - certainly in e l e c t i o n s a n d , as e v i d e n c e from t h e mainstream model i n d i c a t e s , perhaps in other contexts as well - is c o u n t e r v a l e n t information c a r r i e d within the overall stream of political i n f o r m a t i o n . Before I c o n c l u d e this a r g u m e n t , let us e x a m i n e one final c a s e of attitude form a t i o n and c h a n g e .

T H E DYNAMICS OF P R E S I D E N T I A L PRIMARIES O n e difficulty in studying attitude c h a n g e in t h e context of p a r t i s a n e l e c t i o n s is that m o s t vote decisions are so strongly m o o r e d to stable p a r t y identifications that there is little o p p o r t u n i t y to o b s e r v e c h a n g e . In e x a m i n i n g rates of defection of voters in H o u s e e l e c t i o n s , for e x a m p l e , it w a s n e c e s s a r y to set aside most voters on the g r o u n d s that, as p a r t i s a n s of the inparty, they p r o d u c e d almost no cases of defection from p a r t y v o t i n g . T h i s difficulty obviously d o e s not arise in presidential p r i m a r y e l e c t i o n s . Indeed, the p r o b l e m is more nearly the opposite: Preferences s o m e t i m e s shift so rapidly that it is impossible to get a g o o d fix on t h e m . It is therefore interesting to see w h e t h e r the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of electoral d y n a m i c s that w o r k s so well in the relatively stable context of p a r t i s a n e l e c t i o n s applies to a m o r e free-wheeling e l e c t i o n as w e l l .

Background In t h e first w e e k s of the 1984 D e m o c r a t i c n o m i n a t i o n contest, it a p p e a r e d that a serious race m i g h t never d e v e l o p . J o h n G l e n n w a s m o u n t i n g an inept and faltering c a m p a i g n , and this left Walter M o n d a l e almost u n o p p o s e d in a D e m o cratic pack c o n s i s t i n g , except for h i m , of u n k n o w n s . Shortly before the N e w H a m p s h i r e p r i m a r y , t h e New York Times released a national poll s h o w i n g that M o n d a l e w a s further a h e a d than any c a n d i d a t e had ever been at that point in the n o m i n a t i o n contest. But big things w e r e stirring in Iowa. In t h e w e e k prior to that s t a t e ' s c a u c u s e s , G a r y H a r t w a s m o v i n g up fast, and this b e g a n to be reflected in national n e w s weeklies. If Time or Newsweek included a picture of any c a n d i d a t e other than M o n d a l e or G l e n n , it w a s likely to be H a r t . H a r t went on to place well in Iowa, finishing s e c o n d t o M o n d a l e . T h e n , m o r e unexpectedly, H a r t t r o u n c e d M o n d a l e in N e w H a m p s h i r e a n d , on the m a s s i v e t i d e of publicity that followed, s e e m e d on t h e verge of k n o c k i n g M o n d a l e out of the r a c e . H a r t ' s p i c t u r e , of c o u r s e ,

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graced the covers of the n e w s w e e k l i e s a n d , o v e r n i g h t , his n a m e b e c a m e a h o u s e hold w o r d . But a l t h o u g h performing very strongly in the S u p e r Tuesday p r i m a ries that followed t w o w e e k s after N e w H a m p s h i r e , H a r t c o u l d n ' t quite force M o n d a l e from the r a c e . Instead, he suddenly found himself the butt of j o k e s about his n a m e and his a g e , and trying to a n s w e r the question " W h e r e ' s the b e e f ? " T h r o u g h late M a r c h , April, and May, H a r t and M o n d a l e e n g a g e d in trench warfare, with M o n d a l e finally prevailing. T h e s e e v e n t s , as c o m p l e x a stimulus to m a s s opinion as any e n c o u n t e r e d in this b o o k , provide a final opportunity to o b s e r v e the effects of information flow on the evolution of the p u b l i c ' s political preferences.

Data

and

model

D u r i n g the p r i m a r y p e r i o d , the N E S c o n d u c t e d a c o n t i n u o u s survey of attitudes toward the c o n t e n d i n g c a n d i d a t e s . A l t h o u g h these surveys contacted only about forty-five D e m o c r a t s a w e e k , they provide an extremely v a l u a b l e , if slightly fuzzy, series of snapshots of the r a c e . In analyzing these d a t a , I have broken t h e p r i m a r y season into p e r i o d s that c o i n c i d e with the major s w i n g s in public attitudes. T h e first, c o v e r i n g J a n u a r y and early February, is the t ime w h e n M o n d a l e s e e m e d to have the race locked up and w h e n H a r t w a s a mefe blip in the national polls. T h e s e c o n d , covering, the last t w o w e e k s of F e b r u a r y w a s the period w h e n M o n d a l e w a s widely c o n s i d e r e d unstoppable but H a r t w a s beginning to build m o m e n t u m in the Iowa and N e w H a m p s h i r e c a m p a i g n s . T h e third is the t h r e e - w e e k period from i m m e d i a t e l y after N e w H a m p s h i r e to just before the Illinois p r i m a r y , the race in w h i c h H a r t suffered his first serious defeat; this w a s the period in which H a r t enjoyed his a m a z ing surge in the polls, but also the period in which he began to e n c o u n t e r the first questions about his c h a r a c t e r and his supposedly " n e w i s s u e s . " T h e fourth period r u n s from late M a r c h through the end of the p r i m a r y s e a s o n , a period of many m i n o r ups and d o w n s from which M o n d a l e eventually e m e r g e d the victor. Figure 10.8 provides a b r e a k d o w n of m e a n s u p p o r t for each c a n d i d a t e a m o n g D e m o c r a t s in each t i m e p e r i o d . Even from visual inspection, these d a t a tell an o b v i o u s story of differential information flow - that is, a story of the differential p e n e t r a t i o n of c a n d i d a t e m e s s a g e s of differing intensities. In the p e r i o d before the Iowa p r i m a r i e s , higher levels of political awareness are associated with steadily greater s u p p o r t for M o n d a l e , the c a n d i d a t e w h o , at that point, had no debilitating w a r t s and w a s , according to the m e d i a , the D e m o c r a t with the best c h a n c e of winning t h e n o m i n a t i o n (Brady and J o h n s t o n , 1987; Tables 7 and 8). G a r y H a r t had minimal s u p p o r t , but w h a t little he had w a s c o n c e n t r a t e d a m o n g the most politically aware m e m b e r s of the D e m o c r a t i c party, w h o were the only people sufficiently attentive to politics to have b e c o m e aware of such a " s e c o n d tier" candidate. 1 9

19 Thus, as Sam Popkin has noted, the politically aware are often "leading indicators" of future change (oral remarks. Southern California Running Dog Seminar,,San Diego, February 1988).

256

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

T h e finding that the most aware D e m o c r a t s w e r e most susceptible to influe n c e by the d o m i n a n t M o n d a l e c a m p a i g n of this period m a y s e e m s u r p r i s i n g . But it s h o u l d n ' t . If, as has been a r g u e d , a w a r e n e s s is associated with resistance to persuasion b e c a u s e it proxies for r e c e p t i o n of a l t e r n a t i v e information sources - notably, the stored m a s s of previously formed c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , cueing m e s s a g e s , and c o u n t e r v a l e n t information flows - there is no reason to expect a w a r e n e s s - i n d u c e d resistance effects in this p e r i o d . D e m o c r a t s had no m e m o r y of bad e x p e r i e n c e s with M o n d a l e ; national elites largely s u p p o r t e d his candidacy, or at any rate p r o v i d e d no opinion leadership against h i m ; and the H a r t c a m p a i g n w a s t o o w e a k to be an effective source of c o u n t e r v a l e n t i n f o r m a t i o n . In such c i r c u m s t a n c e s , there w o u l d be no informational basis for resistance to persuasion and no c u e i n g m e s s a g e s that w o u l d i m p e d e the internalization of proM o n d a l e m e s s a g e s , so that influence should d e p e n d wholly on levels of r e c e p tion of the d o m i n a n t c a m p a i g n m e s s a g e . I n the t w o - w e e k period preceding the N e w H a m p s h i r e p r i m a r y , H a r t b e g a n his r i s e . But at this e a r l y point, the esoteric H a r t m e s s a g e w a s still able to reach only t h e most a w a r e q u a r t i l e of the D e m o c r a t i c rank-and-file. T h e r e w a s no resistance to this m e s s a g e , b e c a u s e H a r t , like M o n d a l e , w a s getting one-sidedly positive c o v e r a g e in the press and b e c a u s e D e m o c r a t s had no prior information about H a r t that w o u l d give t h e m a basis for resistance. M e a n w h i l e , the M o n d a l e m e s s a g e , which w a s still more intense than that of H a r t before the N e w H a m p shire p r i m a r y , w a s m a k i n g c o n v e r t s a m o n g t h e r a n k s of the m o d e r a t e l y a w a r e , w h o had not been paying sufficient attention to receive the M o n d a l e m e s s a g e in the p r e c a m p a i g n p e r i o d and were now j u s t tuning in. But the M o n d a l e m e s s a g e could m a k e n o m o r e c o n v e r t s a m o n g the m o s t a w a r e D e m o c r a t s b e c a u s e , within this s e g m e n t of t h e D e m o c r a t i c c o m m u n i t y , it w a s in direct c o m p e t i t i o n with the Hart campaign. So in this p e r i o d , there w a s still no e v i d e n c e of resistance to p e r s u a s i o n . T h e most a w a r e were clearly the most i n f l u e n c e a b l e , and by a very w i d e m a r g i n . ( T h e s h a r p n o n m o n o t o n i c i t y in net s u p p o r t for M o n d a l e in the s e c o n d period w a s not e v i d e n c e of resistance to c h a n g e ; it w a s e v i d e n c e that the m o s t a w a r e D e m o c r a t s were d e s e r t i n g M o n d a l e in o r d e r to follow H a r t , and that less a w a r e o n e s had not yet gotten the n e w s about H a r t ' s rising star.) Trends were m a r k e d l y different in the third t i m e p e r i o d . A l t h o u g h H a r t w a s enjoying his p o s t - N e w H a m p s h i r e publicity s u r g e , he was unable to gain any m o r e s u p p o r t a m o n g highly aware D e m o c r a t s . N o r did M o n d a l e lose any support in this g r o u p . T h u s , highly a w a r e persons had b e g u n to exhibit resistance to the d o m i n a n t c a m p a i g n m e s s a g e . T h e r e a s o n , presumably, w a s that they had now acquired e n o u g h information about the t w o c a n d i d a t e s that they could no longer be blown about by every n e w turn in the c a m p a i g n . M e a n w h i l e , H a r t ' s p o s t - N e w H a m p s h i r e publicity binge w a s strong e n o u g h finally t o reach m o d erately aware D e m o c r a t s , w h o rapidly d e s e r t e d M o n d a l e and s w u n g to H a r t in large n u m b e r s . T h e largest attitude s w i n g s in this period were clearly c o n c e n trated a m o n g p e r s o n s of m o d e r a t e political a w a r e n e s s . T h e m a g n i t u d e of this

257

Information flow and electoral choice Proportion switching to Hart after Iowa

Proportion switching to Hart after New Hampshire

Proportion switching to Mondale in late campaign period

Political awareness Figure 10.9. Estimated rates of preference change in Mondale vs. Hart contest. Note: Estimates are derived from coefficients in Table 10.8 and model in Appendix B to Chapter 10. Estimates involve Democrats only. p o p u l a r surge - to w h i c h t h e most aware and least aware D e m o c r a t s c o n t r i b u t e d little - w a s what n e a r l y d r o v e M o n d a l e from the r a c e . In the final p e r i o d , m o d e r a t e l y a w a r e D e m o c r a t s , following t h e n e w s of M o n d a y ' s increasing success i n t h e later p r i m a r i e s , s w u n g back t o M o n d a l e w h i l e the most politically a w a r e D e m o c r a t s c o n t i n u e d largely to hold their g r o u n d . A g a i n , t h e n , political a w a r e n e s s w a s associated with resistance to c h a n g e , pres u m a b l y b e c a u s e highly a w a r e persons h a d , by this t i m e , been able to firmly anchor their evaluations in an inertial m a s s of stored information about the t w o c a n d i d a t e s . T h e least a w a r e D e m o c r a t s were also fairly s t a b l e , with most of t h e m u n a b l e even to form a preference in the p r i m a r y contest. T h i s left m o d e r ately a w a r e persons m o s t susceptible to t h e c u r r e n t s of the t i m e . 2 0

Unfortunately, there are no data at the level of c a n d i d a t e likes and dislikes with which to c h e c k this account of the m i c r o d y n a m i c s of attitude c h a n g e . It is, however, possible to fit the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l to the d a t a s h o w n in Figure 10.8 in order to see w h e t h e r the story I h a v e j u s t told c a n , in a statistical s e n s e , hold together. T h i s m o d e l i n g exercise is relegated to A p p e n d i x B of this chapter. T h e only point that needs to be m a d e h e r e is that the m o d e l fits the d a t a extremely well and c o n f i r m s my basic a c c o u n t in every i m p o r t a n t respect. For e x a m p l e , Figure 10.9 gives the r a t e s of attitude c h a n g e toward H a r t and then toward M o n d a l e in the final p h a s e s of t h e c a m p a i g n , as e s t i m a t e d from coefficients in the m o d e l . Summary

on

primary

elections

T h e s e findings, especially those from the e a r l y p h a s e s of the c a m p a i g n , underscore a critical theoretical point: A w a r e n e s s - i n d u c e d resistance to d o m i n a n t political c a m p a i g n s is not a u t o m a t i c . It d e p e n d s on access to a l t e r n a t i v e c o m 20 From different perspectives, Bartels (1988) and Brady and Johnston (1987) also stress that voter learning takes place over the course of the primary campaign.

256

T h e finding that the m o s t a w a r e D e m o c r a t s were most s u s c e p t i b l e to influe n c e by the d o m i n a n t M o n d a l e c a m p a i g n of this period may s e e m s u r p r i s i n g . But it s h o u l d n ' t . If, as has been a r g u e d , a w a r e n e s s is associated with resistance to persuasion b e c a u s e it proxies for r e c e p t i o n of a l t e r n a t i v e information sources - notably, the stored m a s s of previously formed c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , c u e i n g m e s s a g e s , and c o u n t e r v a l e n t information flows - there is no reason to expect a w a r e n e s s - i n d u c e d resistance effects in this p e r i o d . D e m o c r a t s had no m e m o r y of bad e x p e r i e n c e s with M o n d a l e ; national elites largely s u p p o r t e d his candidacy, or at any rate p r o v i d e d no opinion l e a d e r s h i p against h i m ; and the H a r t c a m p a i g n w a s too w e a k to be an effective source of c o u n t e r v a l e n t i n f o r m a t i o n . In such c i r c u m s t a n c e s , there w o u l d be no informational basis for resistance to persuasion and no c u e i n g m e s s a g e s that w o u l d i m p e d e the internalization of proM o n d a l e m e s s a g e s , so that influence should d e p e n d wholly on levels of r e c e p tion of the d o m i n a n t c a m p a i g n m e s s a g e . I n the t w o - w e e k period preceding the N e w H a m p s h i r e p r i m a r y , H a r t began his r i s e . But at this e a r l y point, the esoteric H a r t m e s s a g e was still able to reach only t h e most a w a r e q u a r t i l e of the D e m o c r a t i c rank-and-file. T h e r e w a s no resistance to this m e s s a g e , b e c a u s e H a r t , like M o n d a l e , w a s getting one-sidedly positive c o v e r a g e in the press and b e c a u s e D e m o c r a t s had no prior information about H a r t that w o u l d give t h e m a basis for resistance. M e a n w h i l e , the M o n d a l e m e s s a g e , which w a s still r i o r e intense than that of H a r t before the N e w H a m p shire p r i m a r y , w a s m a k i n g c o n v e r t s a m o n g the r a n k s o f the m o d e r a t e l y a w a r e , w h o had not been p a y i n g sufficient attention to receive the M o n d a l e m e s s a g e in the p r e c a m p a i g n p e r i o d and were now j u s t tuning in. But the M o n d a l e m e s s a g e could m a k e n o m o r e c o n v e r t s a m o n g the m o s t a w a r e D e m o c r a t s b e c a u s e , within this s e g m e n t of the D e m o c r a t i c c o m m u n i t y , it w a s in direct c o m p e t i t i o n with the Hart campaign. So in this p e r i o d , there w a s still no e v i d e n c e of resistance to p e r s u a s i o n . T h e most a w a r e were clearly the most i n f l u e n c e a b l e , and by a very w i d e m a r g i n . ( T h e s h a r p n o n m o n o t o n i c i t y in net s u p p o r t for M o n d a l e in the s e c o n d p e r i o d w a s not e v i d e n c e of resistance to c h a n g e ; it w a s e v i d e n c e that the m o s t a w a r e D e m o c r a t s were d e s e r t i n g M o n d a l e in o r d e r to follow H a r t , and that less a w a r e o n e s had not yet gotten the n e w s about H a r t ' s rising star.) Trends were m a r k e d l y different in the third t i m e p e r i o d . A l t h o u g h H a r t w a s enjoying his p o s t - N e w H a m p s h i r e publicity s u r g e , he w a s u n a b l e to gain any m o r e support a m o n g highly aware D e m o c r a t s . Nor did M o n d a l e lose any s u p p o r t in this g r o u p . T h u s , highly a w a r e p e r s o n s had b e g u n to exhibit resistance to the d o m i n a n t c a m p a i g n m e s s a g e . T h e r e a s o n , presumably, w a s that they had now acquired e n o u g h information about the t w o c a n d i d a t e s that they could no longer be blown about by every new turn in the c a m p a i g n . M e a n w h i l e , H a r t ' s p o s t - N e w H a m p s h i r e publicity b i n g e w a s strong e n o u g h finally t o reach m o d erately a w a r e D e m o c r a t s , w h o rapidly d e s e r t e d M o n d a l e and s w u n g t o H a r t i n large n u m b e r s . T h e largest attitude s w i n g s in this period were c l e a r l y c o n c e n trated a m o n g p e r s o n s of m o d e r a t e political a w a r e n e s s . T h e m a g n i t u d e of this

257

Information flow and electoral choice

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

Proportion switching to Hart after Iowa

Proportion switching to Hart after New Hampshire

Proportion switching to Mondale in late campaign period

1.0 .8 .6 .4 .2 0

]

/

' Political awareness

Figure 10.9. Estimated rates of preference change in Mondale vs. Hart contest. Note: Estimates are derived from coefficients in Table 10.8 and model in Appendix B to Chapter 10. Estimates involve Democrats only. p o p u l a r surge - to w h i c h t h e most aware and least aware D e m o c r a t s c o n t r i b u t e d little - w a s what n e a r l y d r o v e M o n d a l e from the r a c e . In the final p e r i o d , m o d e r a t e l y a w a r e D e m o c r a t s , following t h e n e w s of M o n d a y ' s increasing success i n t h e later p r i m a r i e s , s w u n g back t o M o n d a l e w h i l e t h e m o s t politically a w a r e D e m o c r a t s c o n t i n u e d largely to h o l d their g r o u n d . A g a i n , t h e n , political a w a r e n e s s w a s associated with resistance t o c h a n g e , pres u m a b l y b e c a u s e highly a w a r e persons h a d , by this t i m e , been able to firmly a n c h o r their evaluations in an inertial m a s s of stored information about the t w o c a n d i d a t e s . T h e least a w a r e D e m o c r a t s w e r e also fairly s t a b l e , with most of t h e m u n a b l e even to form a preference in the p r i m a r y contest. T h i s left m o d e r ately aware p e r s o n s m o s t susceptible t o t h e c u r r e n t s o f the t i m e . Unfortunately, there are no d a t a at t h e level of c a n d i d a t e likes and dislikes with which to c h e c k this account of t h e m i c r o d y n a m i c s of attitude c h a n g e . It is, however, possible to fit t h e r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l to the d a t a s h o w n in Figure 10.8 in order to see w h e t h e r the story I have j u s t told c a n , in a statistical s e n s e , h o l d together. T h i s m o d e l i n g exercise is relegated to A p p e n d i x B of this chapter. T h e only point that needs to be m a d e here is that t h e m o d e l fits t h e d a t a extremely well and c o n f i r m s my basic account in every i m p o r t a n t respect. For e x a m p l e , Figure 10.9 gives the rates of attitude c h a n g e t o w a r d H a r t and then toward M o n d a l e in the final p h a s e s of the c a m p a i g n , as e s t i m a t e d from coefficients in t h e m o d e l . 2 0

Summary

on

primary

elections

T h e s e findings, especially those from the e a r l y p h a s e s of the c a m p a i g n , underscore a critical theoretical point: A w a r e n e s s - i n d u c e d resistance to d o m i n a n t political c a m p a i g n s is not a u t o m a t i c . It d e p e n d s on access to a l t e r n a t i v e c o m 20 From different perspectives, Bartels (1988) and Brady and Johnston (1987) also stress that voter learning takes place over the course of the primary campaign.

258

N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N

Information

m u n i c a t i o n s - either in the form of stored c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and information from past c a m p a i g n s or in t h e form of c u r r e n t reception of c o u n t e r v a l e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n s or cues. H e n c e w h e n , as in the early stages of the 1984 p r i m a r i e s , the m o s t a w a r e persons have no informational basis for r e s i s t a n c e , they exhibit no hint of resistance. To the c o n t r a r y , they are m o r e reactive to c a m p a i g n s of the m o m e n t than any o t h e r s e g m e n t of the p u b l i c . O n l y in the later stages of the c a m p a i g n , by w h i c h t i m e there w a s a two-sided information flow and s o m e d e v e l o p m e n t of inertial c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , do we find that the most a w a r e D e m o c r a t s are most resistant to c h a n g e .

CONCLUDING

REMARKS

T h i s c h a p t e r has been only incidentally c o n c e r n e d with e l e c t i o n s . Its real aim has been t o s h o w h o w p e o p l e ' s s u m m a r y political d e c i s i o n s , w h e t h e r vote choices or r e s p o n s e s to c l o s e d - e n d e d survey i t e m s , are b a s e d on c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that form from the c o m p e t i n g influences to which they have been e x p o s e d . T h e a d v a n t a g e of this c h a p t e r over p r e c e d i n g ones is that it has h a d , for the first t i m e , a b u n d a n t , m e a s u r a b l e variability in t h e intensities of t h e o p p o s i n g m e s s a g e s to w h i c h individuals have been e x p o s e d , along with m e a s u r e s of the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that u n d e r l i e s u m m a r y e x p r e s s i o n s of political preferences. This has m a d e it possible to directly o b s e r v e the effects of inertial resistance (in the form of party likes and dislikes) a n d , m o r e i m p o r t a n t in the context of e l e c t i o n s , the effects of c o u n t e r v a l e n t resistance (in the form of prochallenger and antiinc u m b e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n f l o w s ) . But the theoretical m a c h i n e r y u n d e r l y i n g these o b s e r v a t i o n s has b e e n exactly the s a m e as in e a r l i e r analyses of attitude formation and c h a n g e .

APPENDIX A: D E F E C T I O N S IN S E N A T E E L E C T I O N S T h e m o d e l used in e s t i m a t i n g defection to the i n c u m b e n t in S e n a t e e l e c t i o n s w a s the s a m e as for H o u s e defections. T h e variables used in the m o d e l are as follows: Political awareness. A l t h o u g h the S e n a t e election study contained an unusually weak selection of a w a r e n e s s i t e m s , I built the best m e a s u r e I c o u l d , as d e s c r i b e d in the M e a s u r e s A p p e n d i x . Campaign intensity.

T h e 1990 S e n a t e study a s k e d all respondents:

How many stories did you read, see or hear regarding the campaign in this state for the U.S. Senate? Would you say that you read, saw, or heard a good many, just one or two, or none? As described in the c a s e of the H o u s e d a t a , I c o n v e r t e d responses to this question to a state-level m e a s u r e of the intensity of m e d i a c o v e r a g e . T h e variable r u n s from 0 to 0 . 7 4 scale units, as d e n o m i n a t e d by the original two-unit scale. 21

21 There may be some heteroskedasticity in measurement of the aggregate media variable, but it is likely to be small since N's of the state-level means are approximately the same.

flow

and

electoral

choice

259

Table 10.6. Coefficients predicting vote for Senate incumbent among outpartisans Reception function Intercept Awareness (standardized) Incumbent spending (in $10 thousands per cong. district) Challenger spending (in $10 thousands per cong. district) Media coverage (range 0 - .74) Seniority (logged) Seniority X Challenger spending Acceptance function Intercept Awareness (standardized) Partisan strength (range 1-2) Policy distance (see text) Challenger spending N

0.19 0.40 (.39) 0.015 (.008) -.012 (.008) -2.65 (1.42) 1.14 (1.41) -0.0035 (.0031) 4.05 -1.31 (.50) -1.18 (.57) -0.70 (.31) 0.001 (.001) 450

Note: Model is Equation 10.1, estimated by maximum likelihood. Standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variable is whether outpartisan voted for the incumbent. Source: 1990 NES Senate survey.

Political values. T h e S e n a t e study c a r r i e d the traditional party identification m e a s u r e , scored in t h e usual way. It w a s also possible to m e a s u r e ideological or policy distance from the i n c u m b e n t . T h e d i s t a n c e m e a s u r e w a s c o n s t r u c t e d by s u m m i n g i n c u m b e n t s ' scores on the A m e r i c a n s for D e m o c r a t i c A c t i o n and A m e r i c a n C o n s e r v a t i v e U n i o n r a t i n g scales from the year prior to the e l e c t i o n , standardizing the s c o r e s , and subtracting from a standardized m e a s u r e of res p o n d e n t s ' ideological self-description. T h e v a r i a b l e has been c o d e d so that, if the D e m o c r a t i c c a n d i d a t e is to the left of the Republican c a n d i d a t e , higher scores indicate greater policy affinity to the challenger. T h e coefficients for the S e n a t e defection m o d e l are s h o w n in Table 10.6. O n e point of interest in t h e s e coefficients is t h a t , a l t h o u g h the seniority effects in S e n a t e e l e c t i o n s a r e s m a l l e r than in H o u s e e l e c t i o n s (as s h o w n in Table 10.1)

260

Information flow and electoral choice

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

T a b l e 1 0 . 7 . Coefficients for diffusion of likes and dislikes in contested 1990 Senate races Incumbent likes Reception function Intercept -1.60 Awareness 1.00 (standardized) (.18) Voted in 1978 1.20 (range 0-1) (.24) Incumbent spending 5.11 (log $10,000s per cong. dist.) (2.23) Challenger spending -3.80 (2.02) News coverage -0.89 (range 0 - .75) (.53) Seniority 1.02 (log of years in office) (.36) Prior elective office (0 or 1) Acceptance function Intercept Party attachment (range -2 to +2) Issue distance from Incumbent Ideological identification (standardized) Domestic spending attitudes (standardized)

Incumbent dislikes

Challenger likes

Challenge dislikes

-2.96 0.82 (.14) 0.35 (.15) 5.37 (1.57)

-3.10 0.62 (.12) 0.71 (.18) 2.91 (1.51) -2.73 (1.37) 2.51 (.52)

-2.20 0.94 (.16) 0.94 (.23) -1.77 (2.20) 1.18 (1.99) 5.45 (.89)

-4.99 (1-45) 1.70 (.42) 0.03 (.20)

—

—

-0.50 -0.21 (.03) -0.12 (.05)

-1.32 0.30 (.06) 0.38 (.09)

-

-

-0.06 (.04)

0.06 (.06)

—

—

0.12 (.07)

0.27 (.09)

-0.79 0.43 (.09)

-1.32 -0.12 (.04)

_ 0.03 (.07) 0.21 (.08)

_ -0.29 (.05) -0.13 (.05)

Note: Dependent variables are sums of all remarks of given type, recoded to 0 - 1 range. Up to five remarks were counted in conection with each probe. The model is Equation 10.1. Approximate standard errors are in parentheses. A' of cases, which involve all states in which an incumbent sought reelection in a contested race in 1990, is 1866. Source: 1990 NES Senate survey.

261

I might add that the effects of the predispositions v a r i a b l e s , w h i c h are not displayed in Figure 10.6 b e c a u s e it shows trends only for modal o u t p a r t i s a n s , are substantial. A m o n g voters ideologically closest to the i n c u m b e n t , defection patterns actually increase with political a w a r e n e s s ; a m o n g those most ideologically distant, the decline in defection associated with a w a r e n e s s is steeper than shown in Figure 10.6. T h u s , t h e pattern of defection for different types of p a r t i s a n s s o m e w h a t r e s e m b l e s the voter defection c u r v e s in Figure 1 0 . 1 , except for a m o r e intense m e s s a g e . My e s t i m a t e s of net c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n scores for S e n a t e e l e c t i o n s in Figure 10.7 were p r o d u c e d by the same general m e t h o d used in c r e a t i n g the H o u s e e s t i m a t e s , as r e p o r t e d in Table 10.4. In the reception function, I used political a w a r e n e s s , voter t u r n o u t (purged of the effects of c a m p a i g n intensity), logged s p e n d i n g by the i n c u m b e n t , logged s p e n d i n g by the challenger, logged seniority, and m e d i a c o v e r a g e ; in t h e m o d e l s for c h a l l e n g e r likes and dislikes, I also used a v a r i a b l e m e a s u r i n g the previous electoral e x p e r i e n c e of the challenger. In the a c c e p t a n c e function, I used party a t t a c h m e n t and policy d i s t a n c e . I specified the distance v a r i a b l e in t h e a c c e p t a n c e e q u a t i o n as the absolute value of policy distance (note, I a s s u m e that l e f t - r i g h t policy distance affects vote c h o i c e , as d e scribed a m o m e n t a g o , but that absolute policy difference affects liking and disliking, so that, for e x a m p l e , a c o n s e r v a t i v e voter to the right of a c o n s e r v a t i v e S e n a t o r will not be led to vote against the i n c u m b e n t but may be led to dislike h i m or h e r ) . T h e survey also c a r r i e d a series of q u e s t i o n s on budget priorities. I c o m b i n e d these items into a scale, s t a n d a r d i z e d the scale, and adjusted the scoring so that low scores indicate affinity with t h e i n c u m b e n t . To m e a s u r e issue distance from the challenger, I used r e s p o n d e n t s ' ideological self-identification, s t a n d a r d i z i n g and c o d i n g it to fit the p a r t y affiliation of the challenger. N o t e that I did not use political a w a r e n e s s in the a c c e p t a n c e function of the e s t i m a t e s of likes and dislikes for the S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e s . This is b e c a u s e , w h e n it w a s included, it b e h a v e d oddly, picking up large positive coefficients (indic a t i n g less resistance a m o n g the highly a w a r e ) , while causing the a w a r e n e s s variable in the r e c e p t i o n function also to pick up n e g a t i v e coefficients (indicating less reception a m o n g the m o r e a w a r e ) . I do not understand why E q u a t i o n 10.1 b e h a v e d nonsensically in this c a s e after it had w o r k e d well in so m a n y othe r s , but elimination of a w a r e n e s s from t h e a c c e p t a n c e function restored sense to the e s t i m a t e s , as s h o w n in Table 1 0 . 7 . 2 2

and do not a p p r o a c h statistical significance, they follow the s a m e p a t t e r n as in the H o u s e case: a positive m a i n effect for seniority and a n e g a t i v e interaction with c h a l l e n g e r s p e n d i n g .

T h e values used to c r e a t e the idealized o u t p a r t i s a n s in Figure 10.7 w e r e the s a m e as those used in the H o u s e analysis of likes/dislikes: p a r t y d i s t a n c e scores of 1.3 and — 1 . 3 , absolute policy distance scores of 2 and 0, budget attitude

T h e x-axis for S e n a t e e l e c t i o n s in Figure 10.6 m a n i p u l a t e s political awareness over a r a n g e of — 1.9 SD to + 1 . 8 6 , w h i c h , as u s u a l , represents 98 percent of the total r a n g e of t h e s c a l e . T h e idealized o u t p a r t i s a n s used in the analysis in Figure 10.6 are p e o p l e having a p a r t y identification score of 1.3 and a policy distance score o f + 2 .

22 There was a similar tendency in estimates of the House likes/dislikes data when the loquacity measure (a count of all party likes and dislikes, regardless of direction) was left out of the House model. The loquacity measure, which is, of course, positively correlated with awareness, was not available in the Senate data. A possible explanation for this difficulty is that the model, which contains some of the same variables in both a reception and an acceptance function, is not identified if the true value of the awareness coefficient in the acceptance function is zero.

262

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

Information

scores of 1 and — 1, and ideological distances from the challenger of 1 and — 1 for o u t p a r t i s a n s and i n p a r t i s a n s , respectively.

Table 10.8. model

To m o d e l trends in c a n d i d a t e support in the 1984 D e m o c r a t i c p r i m a r i e s , we specify an initial s u p p o r t e q u a t i o n for H a r t and M o n d a l e , as follows: //, = P ,

(10.4o)

Mi = P

(10.4ft)

H e r e H and M, are levels of support for H a r t and M o n d a l e at t i m e 1, and P , and P are functions that specify this s u p p o r t , " H a r t c h a n g e " and " M o n d a l e c h a n g e , " in relation to levels of political a w a r e n e s s . Each s u b s e q u e n t t i m e period is then conceived as a " c a m p a i g n " that either adds to M o n d a l e ' s s u p p o r t by subtracting from H a r t ' s or vice versa. x

electoral

Reception function

PRIMARY C O N T E S T

MCl

and

263

choice

Coefficients for presidential primaries

A P P E N D I X B : MODELING T H E M O N D A L E - H A R T

HC

flow

Acceptance function

Haiti intercept

-4.92 (2.12)

a

Mondale i intercepts

1.17 (.64)

-0.02 (.27)

Hart2 intercept

-2.59 (.50)

a

Hart3 intercepts

0.32 (.40)

2.44 (1.46)

Mondale4 intercepts

-0.44 (.41)

2.41 (1.62)

Awareness (standardized)

1.17 (0.80)

-2.87* (1.43)

HC

MC]

D u r i n g the s e c o n d t i m e p e r i o d , a certain p r o p o r t i o n of D e m o c r a t s c o n v e r t to H a r t , as given by P , which is also a function of political a w a r e n e s s . T h e n , following E q u a t i o n 7 . 7 , w e may w r i t e HC

H = Hi + P c * (1 - Hi) 2

H

(10.4c)

2

Mi = Mi - P

* Mi

HCi

(10Ad)

T h a t is, H a r t s u p p o r t at t i m e 2 is equal to initial H a r t s u p p o r t plus the proportion of initial n o n s u p p o r t e r s w h o c o n v e r t to H a r t . M o n d a l e s u p p o r t at t i m e 2 is equal to initial M o n d a l e s u p p o r t m i n u s the p r o p o r t i o n of initial s u p p o r t lost to H a r t . T h e r e m a i n i n g e q u a t i o n s are then Hy = H

+ P

2

M H M

3

= M

4

= /Y

4

= M

* (1 - H )

HCy

(\0Ae)

2

a

H

=

4

[[P

HCL

+

2

- P *M

(10.4/)

+

3

- P *H

(10.4g)

~

PMC,

(10Ah)

+

PHC,

HCi

2

MCi

3

+ P

3

* (1

MC)

- M) 3

w h e r e P and P are the p r o p o r t i o n s c o n v e r t i n g to H a r t in period 3 and to M o n d a l e in period 4. T h e s e P t e r m s m o d e l the effect of the d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e of each p e r i o d , and each is a form of the usual r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e p r o c e s s , as in E q u a t i o n 7.5 in the text. E q u a t i o n s \0Aa-h represent a series of nested e q u a t i o n s , such that t e r m s from each earlier e q u a t i o n appear in later ones as well. After a p p r o p r i a t e substitutions, for e x a m p l e , the four H a r t e q u a t i o n s b e c o m e HC}

Note: The data for this model are the 40 aggregate means in Figure 10.8. Standard errors appear in parentheses. Acceptance function eliminated to conserve degrees of freedom; see text. * Coefficient applies to acceptance function only in third and fourth time periods. Source: 1984 NES primary election survey.

MC

PHC,

PHC,

*

*

(1

*

[[PHC,

* (1

"

—

(1

-

[PHC, + [PHC,

P ,)] HC

+

PHC,

PHC, *

(1

*

(1

-

-

PHC,)])]

PHC,)]

+ PHC, * (1

~~

PHC, I ) ] ) ]

w h e r e each of the P t e r m s represents a r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e process having the form of E q u a t i o n 7 . 5 . T h e four M o n d a l e e q u a t i o n s have a c o m p a r a b l e form. HC

c

Hi H

2

H3

= = =

PHC, [P

+

HCL

[[P , HC

+

PHC, +

PHC,

*

*

(1

-

PHC,)]

PHC,

*

(1

-

(1

"

[PHC,

PHC,)] +

PHC

E a c h of t h e five P t e r m s in these e q u a t i o n s has four p a r a m e t e r s - an intercept for the r e c e p t i o n and a c c e p t a n c e functions, and a coefficient on attentiveness in both functions - w h i c h add up to a total of twenty p a r a m e t e r s to be simultaneously estimated. C

In e s t i m a t i n g this c u m b e r s o m e m o d e l , I used the a g g r e g a t e d a t a s h o w n in Figure 10.8 - s o m e 40 d a t a points (4 p e r i o d s x 2 c a n d i d a t e s x 5 awareness g r o u p s ) . To p r e s e r v e d e g r e e s of freedom, I simplified the m o d e l by constraining or e l i m i n a t i n g as m a n y p a r a m e t e r s as p o s s i b l e . First, I constrained a w a r e n e s s to have the s a m e effect in t h e reception functions of all P t e r m s , leaving the intercept t e r m s , a , to pick up differences in t h e intensities of t h e various c

*

(1

-

P ,)])] HC

0

264

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

m e s s a g e s . This is a strong but not u n r e a s o n a b l e constraint: After controlling for m e s s a g e intensity via intercept shifts, a w a r e n e s s ought to have the s a m e strength of relationship with r e c e p t i o n in each c a m p a i g n in each t i m e p e r i o d . S e c o n d , since visual e x a m i n a t i o n of the d a t a and initial e s t i m a t e s indicated that the acc e p t a n c e function m a d e no contribution to the e s t i m a t i o n of E q u a t i o n s 1 0 . 4 a - d , it w a s e l i m i n a t e d , w h i c h saved several p a r a m e t e r s . T h e a w a r e n e s s variable w a s eliminated as an a c c e p t a n c e factor in E q u a t i o n 10.46 on the s a m e g r o u n d s . Finally, I constrained a w a r e n e s s to have the s a m e effect in the a c c e p t a n c e functions of E q u a t i o n s \0.4e-h; separate a w a r e n e s s coefficients w o u l d have been preferable h e r e , but n o n e of the coefficients could have a p p r o a c h e d statistical significance if e s t i m a t e d separately. T h e imposition of these constraints left ten coefficients for t h e forty d a t a points. E q u a t i o n s 10.4a-/* were s i m u l t a n e o u s l y e s t i m a t e d with a n o n l i n e a r regression p r o g r a m .

11

Evaluating the model and looking toward future research

23

T h e coefficient e s t i m a t e s are s h o w n in Table 10.8. B e c a u s e most of the t e r m s represent intercept shifts in the reception or a c c e p t a n c e functions and h e n c e involve only five or ten d a t a points, it is not w o r r i s o m e that s o m e fall short of statistical significance in this highly interactive m o d e l . W h a t is i m p o r t a n t is that coefficients d e n o t i n g t h e effects of a w a r e n e s s on reception and on a c c e p t a n c e both achieve s o m e d e g r e e of statistical s i g n i f i c a n c e . As a further indication of g o o d n e s s of fit, it m a y be noted that the c o r r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n the y - e s t i m a t e s from t h e model and the r a w d a t a is .92 ( r = . 8 4 ) . Given the s a m p l i n g e r r o r in the r a w d a t a and t h e constraints on the m o d e l , this would s e e m to be as m u c h a c c u r a c y as could be h o p e d for. 24

2

23 Coefficient estimates for b tended toward indicating no resistance. 24 Because the model has been estimated from data aggregates derived from different cell sizes, significance tests should be regarded as being only roughly suggestive. 0

" I f t h e public had an opinion and there w a s no pollster a r o u n d to m e a s u r e it, w o u l d public opinion e x i s t ? " Like the old c o n u n d r u m about the tree falling in the forest with no o n e to h e a r it, this q u e s t i o n is not c o m p l e t e l y v a c u o u s . T h e a n s w e r d e p e n d s on w h a t o n e m e a n s by public o p i n i o n . If by public opinion one m e a n s the h o p e s , fears, feelings, and reactions to events of o r d i n a r y citizens as they go about their p r i v a t e lives, then certainly there is public opinion w h e t h e r or not there is a pollster to m e a s u r e it. But if by public opinion o n e m e a n s ord i n a r y citizens w a l k i n g a r o u n d saying t o t h e m s e l v e s things like " I strongly a p prove o f the way G e o r g e Bush i s doing his j o b a s p r e s i d e n t " o r " I think w e should take a stronger s t a n d , even if it m e a n s invading N o r t h V i e t n a m , " then most of w h a t gets m e a s u r e d as public opinion d o e s not exist except in the presence of a pollster. T h e R A S model has been about both k i n d s o f public o p i n i o n , the " c o n s i d e r a t i o n s " that p e o p l e form in r e s p o n s e to t h e flow of political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , and t h e process by w h i c h they translate typically disorganized c o n s i d e r a t i o n s into the survey r e s p o n s e s that virtually e v e r y o n e now takes as constituting p u b lic o p i n i o n . To t h e extent o n e evaluates t h e R A S m o d e l on the conventional criteria of empirical breadth and theoretical parsimony, it l o o k s quite g o o d . Its four a x i o m s can be used to explain a w i d e variety of p h e n o m e n a , including s o m e c o n c e r n i n g attitude c h a n g e , that w o u l d be difficult to explain except by essentially similar ideas. 1

T h e most i m p o r t a n t feature of t h e m o d e l is its m a r r i a g e of a t h e o r y of inform a t i o n diffusion t h r o u g h a p o p u l a t i o n that is differentially attentive to politics (axioms Al and A 2 ) , with a t h e o r y of h o w p e o p l e transform this information into survey responses ( A 3 and A 4 ) . It is the union of these t w o p r o c e s s e s that gives the m o d e l its breadth of c o v e r a g e , and that c r e a t e s the potential for further extensions and a p p l i c a t i o n s of the m o d e l . However, the model h a s t h e vice of its virtues: Breadth and p a r s i m o n y have been achieved at the e x p e n s e of significant simplification and o m i s s i o n . H e n c e , 1 An exception is Ginsberg, 1986. For an analysis of differing conceptions of public opinion, see Price, 1992.

268

N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

W H O LEADS W H O M ?

The

model

and future

research

269

c r e a t e s p r o b l e m s for my a s s u m p t i o n that the c o u r t w a s p r e d o m i n a n t l y leading r a t h e r than following m a s s opinion in the B r o w n c a s e .

A c c o r d i n g to an oft told t a l e , a n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y revolutionary w a s sipping w i n e in a cafe o n e afternoon w h e n a m o b suddenly rushed past in t h e street. " M o n D i e u ! " he c r i e d , " t h e p e o p l e are on the m o v e , I am their leader, I must follow t h e m . " He then raced out into the street and to the head of t h e c r o w d . A l t h o u g h the story is perhaps a p o c r y p h a l , the p r o b l e m it raises is real. O n e regularly o b s e r v e s " l e a d e r s " at the head of m a s s m o v e m e n t s , but o n e cannot, on this e v i d e n c e a l o n e , be certain that elites are actually leading. T h e y m i g h t , of c o u r s e , be l e a d i n g , but they might also be following. W i t h o n e e x c e p t i o n , this is not a p r o b l e m I have been able to deal with syst e m a t i c a l l y in this study. I have taken the intensities of o p p o s i n g political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s to be e x o g e n o u s variables and have limited my analysis to the s u p p o s e d effects of these c o m m u n i c a t i o n s on public o p i n i o n . My w o r k i n g a s s u m p t i o n , t h u s , h a s been that elite c o m m u n i c a t i o n s shape m a s s opinion r a t h e r than vice versa. 2

I justify this w o r k i n g a s s u m p t i o n on two g r o u n d s . First, in several of the cases e x a m i n e d , it is c l e a r from the nature of the p a r t i c u l a r cases that the elite stimulus to m a s s attitude c h a n g e really w a s either mainly or wholly e x o g e n o u s . It is p e r h a p s most c l e a r in the c a s e of the I r a n - C o n t r a scandal, w h i c h p r o d u c e d c h a n g e in public attitudes toward presidential p e r f o r m a n c e and Central A m e r i c a policy, as discussed in C h a p t e r s 7 and 8. At t h e t i m e the scandal b r o k e , President R e a g a n ' s popularity was high and he had no serious p r o b l e m s on the h o r i z o n . T h e congressional attacks on R e a g a n ' s role in the I r a n - C o n t r a e v e n t s , t h u s , must have o c c u r r e d in spite of his initial standing with t h e public rather than b e c a u s e his p o p u l a r i t y w a s already low. Similar a r g u m e n t s can be m a d e for four o t h e r c a s e s :

2. T h e n u c l e a r freeze m o v e m e n t of the early 1980s involved a great deal of g r a s s r o o t s public activity. A l m o s t certainly, m a n y politicians got on t h e freeze b a n d w a g o n only b e c a u s e they perceived it to be an extremely p o p u l a r issue. T h e i m p e t u s for the freeze m o v e m e n t , however, can be clearly traced to p e o p l e w h o w o u l d have to be c o n s i d e r e d elites, n a m e l y m e m b e r s of the professional a r m s control c o m m u n i t y w h o had been losing internal d e b a t e s and calculated that politicians w o u l d not pay any attention to t h e m until they mobilized public s u p p o r t for their cause ( P r i n g l e , 1982). T h e impetus to the m a s s m o v e m e n t that led many politicians to c l i m b on t h e freeze b a n d w a g o n w a s t h u s itself the product of other elites w h o were quite self-consciously a t t e m p t i n g to lead o p i n i o n . 3. T h e bullish n e w s r e p o r t s that led to o p t i m i s t i c a s s e s s m e n t s of the U . S . e c o n o m y in late 1982 a m o n g s o m e m e m b e r s of the public w e r e no d o u b t s o m e c o m bination of hopeful p r o g n o s t i c a t i o n s by President R e a g a n and the b u s i n e s s c o m m u n i t y , and technical e c o n o m i c r e p o r t s . In neither c a s e , and especially the latter, could o n e say that these r e p o r t s were a r e s p o n s e to what t h e public already believed.

1. It is h a r d to a r g u e that the S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s decision in Brown v. Board of Education w a s a r e s p o n s e to p o p u l a r pressure for an end to S o u t h e r n s c h o o l segr e g a t i o n . Inside a c c o u n t s indicate that, on the contrary, the C o u r t perceived the public as largely hostile to federal intervention on this issue. T h e C o u r t d i d indeed have a p r o b l e m with public o p i n i o n , but the p r o b l e m w a s not h o w far it w o u l d be forced to go in o p p o s i n g d i s c r i m i n a t i o n but how far it could go without p r o v o k i n g a political b a c k l a s h (Kluger, 1975). To be sure, the N a t i o n a l Association for the A d v a n c e m e n t of Colored People w a s pressuring for a d e s e g r e g a t i o n r u l i n g , but it h a d , at that point, minimal political clout. T h u s , the B r o w n d e c i sion appears to have b e e n m o t i v a t e d p r i m a r i l y by the m o r a l c o n v i c t i o n s of the j u s t i c e s . H o w these c o n v i c t i o n s f o r m e d , and why they took the form they did in the m i d - 1 9 5 0 s , is o b v i o u s l y a d e e p and i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n , but it is not o n e that

4. T h e Bush a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s mobilization of public support for t h e Persian Gulf W a r is o n e of the m o s t striking cases of elite opinion leadership e x a m i n e d in this b o o k . W h e n Iraq invaded Kuwait in A u g u s t , 1990, only a small fraction of A m e r i c a n s w a s aware that K u w a i t existed ( L a n g , L a n g , and L a r s o n , 1991). Yet within two w e e k s , public s u p p o r t for the use of A m e r i c a n troops to prevent further Iraqi aggression w a s t o p p i n g 80 percent in t h e polls, and this s u p p o r t eventually c a r r i e d over into solid backing for a w a r to liberate K u w a i t (Mueller, 1992). W h a t m a k e s this mobilization of m a s s opinion impressive is that it w a s a c c o m p l i s h e d in the a b s e n c e of any c o m m u n i s t threat, which for 40 years had been the standard justification for the use of A m e r i c a n troops a b r o a d , and d e spite the fact t h a t , before t h e w a r b e g a n , m o s t p e o p l e e x p e c t e d it to be costly in A m e r i c a n lives. Since no polls were apparently taken in the period b e t w e e n the initial Iraqi invasion and President B u s h ' s d e c l a r a t i o n that the aggression would not be allowed to s t a n d , t h e r e is no e m p i r i c a l basis for ruling out the possibility that Bush w a s simply r e s p o n d i n g to a g r o u n d s w e l l of public d e m a n d for a firm A m e r i c a n r e s p o n s e . However, few informed o b s e r v e r s of these events are likely to take this possibility seriously. T h e Persian G u l f W a r w a s , by all a p p e a r a n c e s , a c a s e in w h i c h a politically skilled p r e s i d e n t , with t h e s u p p o r t of the press and m o s t other e l i t e s , handily s h a p e d m a s s o p i n i o n .

2 In the analysis of campaign effects in House elections, I controlled for incumbents' prior victory margins in order to find out whether the most intense campaigns were directed against incumbents who were already weak. The evidence indicated essentially no reason for concern in this particular case. See footnote 10 in Chapter 10.

T h e general point here is t h a t , however difficult it m a y be to resolve the direction of e l i t e - m a s s influence in the abstract, it is often possible to m a k e plausible j u d g m e n t s in p a r t i c u l a r c a s e s .

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The model and future research

S e c o n d , even w h e n politicians pursue a certain policy b e c a u s e of perceived public pressure to do s o , it is often the anticipation of that p r e s s u r e , rather than actual p r e s s u r e , that is critical. T h i s is a point that V. O. Key (1961) has e m p h a s i z e d . T h e public opinion to which elites try to be responsive is not the public opinion that is reflected in polls at the point of m a k i n g d e c i s i o n s , but t h e public opinion that an o p p o n e n t might be able to call into existence at the next e l e c t i o n . Politicians w h o slavishly follow existing opinion a r e , as K e y a r g u e s , likely to fare p o o r l y in the long r u n .

h o m e in A r k a n s a s . In fact, the e v i d e n c e indicates that he t o o k his a n t i w a r p o sition in spite of the best advice of his political staff (but b e c a u s e of advice he w a s getting from his foreign policy a d v i s o r y s t a f f ) . A n o t h e r early m a i n s t r e a m o p p o n e n t of t h e war, R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Tip O ' N e i l l of M a s s a c h u s e t t s , likewise relates that his e a r l y o p p o s i t i o n w a s a r e s p o n s e to w h a t military a u t h o r i t i e s privately told h i m about t h e futility of the war, and in spite of his belief that opposition to t h e w a r w a s political suicide ( O ' N e i l l , 1987: p. 195). T h e m e d i a w e r e , o f c o u r s e , another i m p o r t a n t source o f a n t i w a r c o m m u n i c a tions. To a very c o n s i d e r a b l e extent, however, m e d i a r e p o r t i n g reflected, as it always d o e s , w h a t the m e d i a ' s sources w e r e saying. For e x a m p l e , C h a r l e s Mohr, a c o r r e s p o n d e n t for Time and later for the New York Times, h a s written of t h e a n t i w a r r e p o r t i n g that o r i g i n a t e d a m o n g r e p o r t e r s in South V i e t n a m :

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Let me take a s i m p l e c a s e of such a n t i c i p a t o r y influence, followed by a m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d o n e . President N i x o n ' s surprise a n n o u n c e m e n t o f w a g e and price controls in s u m m e r 1 9 7 1 , as described at the b e g i n n i n g of C h a p t e r 6, w a s surely an act calculated to o b v i a t e criticism of his record on handling the e c o n o m y in the u p c o m i n g presidential e l e c t i o n . In this sense N i x o n was r e s p o n d i n g to public o p i n i o n . Yet he w a s also leading it, since, as we saw, his s p e e c h had a definite impact in m o v i n g public opinion further in the direction of s u p p o r t for controls. N o w consider the infinitely more c o m p l i c a t e d c a s e of the V i e t n a m War. F r o m G e l b ' s account ( G e l b w i t h B e t t s , 1979), we k n o w that President J o h n s o n w a s well advised on the difficulties of trying to use A m e r i c a n military force to stabilize a n o n c o m m u n i s t g o v e r n m e n t in South V i e t n a m . J o h n s o n w a s also well a w a r e that there w a s no groundswell of p o p u l a r s u p p o r t for sending troops to V i e t n a m . Yet J o h n s o n f e i r e d that if he p e r m i t t e d South V i e t n a m to fall to the N o r t h V i e t n a m e s e , he w o u l d open himself to the c h a r g e of being " s o f t on c o m m u n i s m " and having " l o s t V i e t n a m " i n the s a m e way that President T r u m a n had supposedly " l o s t C h i n a . " Q u i t e likely, J o h n s o n feared, this w o u l d d o o m his G r e a t Society d o m e s t i c a g e n d a and set off a n e w round of M c C a r t h y i s t r e c r i m inations in which he w o u l d be the loser. In this situation, J o h n s o n led as well as followed the public into a w a r that neither he nor it w a s e a g e r to p r o s e c u t e . He w a s following public opinion in the sense that he a n t i c i p a t e d a harsh retrospective j u d g m e n t if he allowed a c o m munist takeover, but leading public opinion in the sense that, in o r d e r to avoid this j u d g m e n t , he had to mobilize public s u p p o r t for policies that w e r e by no m e a n s i m m e d i a t e l y popular. If, t h e n , J o h n s o n w a s , in a s e n s e , genuinely leading public opinion on the war, perhaps a case can be m a d e that a n t i w a r politicians were the o n e s w h o were following public opinion m o r e than leading it. T h o u g h m o r e p l a u s i b l e , t h i s , t o o , is a hard case to m a k e . For it w a s at the high tide of p o p u l a r support for the w a r in 1966 that m a i n s t r e a m politicians began to o p p o s e the war. Further, the earliest m a i n s t r e a m o p p o n e n t s of t h e war were from c o n s t i t u e n c i e s that could not be d e scribed as hotbeds of a n t i w a r feeling. Take the c a s e of S e n a t o r J. W i l l i a m Fulbright of A r k a n s a s , the earliest i m p o r t a n t political figure to turn against the war. Fulbright must have m a d e a calculation that an a n t i w a r position w o u l d not lead to i n s u r m o u n t a b l e p r o b l e m s with his constituents. Yet it is i m p l a u s i b l e to think that Fulbright w a s in any m o r e direct way responding to a n t i w a r pressures back

3

The debate was not essentially, as some seem to believe, a quarrel between the press and the U.S. officials in Vietnam. It was, rather, a quarrel between factions within the U.S. Mission. For the most part, field advisers closest to the action and to the Vietnamese took the pessimistic view. Some of the more senior officials in Saigon, who were reporting to Washington on the progress of the programs they themselves were administering, were publicly and persistently optimistic. The reporters quickly became aware of this dispute, because brilliant young field officers, as exemplified by the late John Paul Vann, increasingly turned to the journalists. The reporters did not invent the somber information that sometimes appeared in their stories. (1983: p. 56) Since these sources w e r e mostly in the military, the C I A , and t h e State D e p a r t m e n t (Hallin, 1986; M o h r 1983; H a l b e r s t a m , 1979), it seems unlikely that their leaks of a n t i w a r i n f o r m a t i o n w e r e in any simple sense a response to c h a n g e s in 4

public o p i n i o n . Perhaps the m o s t i m p o r t a n t exception to the claim that press r e p o r t i n g tends to reflect press sources o c c u r r e d d u r i n g t h e Tet offensive in early 1968, w h e n the press depicted w h a t w a s apparently a decisive A m e r i c a n military victory a s , instead, a serious defeat ( B r a e s t r u p , 1979). T h i s apparent m i s r e p o r t i n g of the n e w s in an a n t i w a r d i r e c t i o n d o e s not, however, a p p e a r to have been a r e s p o n s e to public opinion in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , which still largely s u p p o r t e d the war at the t i m e of Tet. Rather, r e p o r t i n g a p p e a r s to have reflected the press c o r p s ' surprise that t h e Viet C o n g were able to m o u n t an apparently credible n a t i o n w i d e military offensive after A m e r i c a n officials had been saying that the Viet C o n g were all but defeated. (It is c o n v e n t i o n a l w i s d o m in A m e r i c a n electoral politics that any c o m p e t i t o r w h o d o e s " b e t t e r than e x p e c t e d " by the press finds h i m - or herself t h e beneficiary of an excited o v e r r e a c t i o n by the press; see Polsby, 1983.) N o n e of this is to deny a significant d e g r e e of elite responsiveness to m a s s o p i n i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y in the later p h a s e s of t h e V i e t n a m War. Most likely, t h o u g h it is difficult to i m a g i n e h o w anyone could rsally be sure, m a r g i n a l r e d u c t i o n s in public s u p p o r t for the w a r m a d e it i n c r e m e n t a l l y safer for those politicians 3 Halberstam, 1972: p. 420. 4 For an account of the disdain with which the foreign policy elite regard public opinion, see Cohen, 1973.

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predisposed against t h e w a r to go public with their a n t i w a r sentiments. P r e s u m ably a similar interaction o c c u r r e d b e t w e e n press and public, t h o u g h it is again i m p o r t a n t to note that the p r e s s , especially the elite p r e s s , w a s c a r r y i n g significant a m o u n t s of a n t i w a r information in 1965 and 1966, well before there w a s any indication that d e c l i n i n g public s u p p o r t for t h e war was m a k i n g it safe to do so. E a c h increment of additional elite opposition m a d e safe by c h a n g e s in public opinion may then have p r o d u c e d an additional increment of c h a n g e in m a s s o p i n i o n , which m a y have further e m b o l d e n e d t h e potential elite o p p o s i t i o n , and so forth. T h e late entry of R o b e r t K e n n e d y as an a n t i w a r c a n d i d a t e in t h e 1968 D e m o c r a t i c presidential p r i m a r i e s m a y be an e x a m p l e of a politician w h o acted only after p r e l i m i n a r y s o u n d i n g s of public opinion - in the form of E u g e n e M c C a r t h y ' s success in t h e N e w H a m p s h i r e p r i m a r y - signaled that an a n t i w a r p o sition w a s politically p r o m i s i n g .

model

and future

research

p r o c e e d s via an e l i t e - d o m i n a t e d m e d i a or by h u m b l e w o r d - o f - m o u t h ,

273 the

r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l can capture the joint effects of both m o d e s of 5

S u c h e l i t e - m a s s d y n a m i c s are by no m e a n s inconsistent with an a s s u m p t i o n of elite opinion l e a d e r s h i p . O n e a r g u m e n t m i g h t be that w e a k e n i n g public s u p port for the V i e t n a m W a r c r e a t e d discretion for elites to m o v e in a similar direction. T h e elites w h o t o o k a d v a n t a g e of this discretion w o u l d have been those predisposed by ideology or analysis to do so. T h u s , elites act a u t o n o m o u s l y to shape o p i n i o n , but only after they calculate that it is safe to do s o . An a l t e r n a t i v e a r g u m e n t for elite leadership would posit a differentially a u t o n o m o u s elite, s o m e p a r t s o f w h i c h , p r i m a r i l y ncluding u p w a r d l y m o b i l e politicians, are s o m e w h a t responsive to m a s s o p i n i o n , and other p a r t s of w h i c h , including m o s t foreign policy e x p e r t s , military officers, and g o v e r n m e n t officials critical of the war, are largely independent of public opinion. T h e m o r e a u t o n o m o u s s e g m e n t s of the elite, by this a r g u m e n t , use the media to g e n e r a t e public pressure to w h i c h other, m o r e responsive e l i t e s , the politicians, then a c c e d e . A weak form of t h e argum e n t for elite opinion leadership - and o n e that s e e m s to me m u c h t o o weak w o u l d be that a n t i w a r elites were simply r e s p o n d i n g to m a s s o p i n i o n , but that their responses t o o k t h e form of a n t i w a r m e s s a g e s , which diffused t h r o u g h t h e m e d i a in a m a n n e r specified by the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e p r o c e s s , thereby prod u c i n g further m a s s c h a n g e , which in turn further pressured elites t o w a r d c h a n g e . By this w e a k a r g u m e n t , it would be a n o n a u t o n o m o u s elite that w a s influencing m a s s o p i n i o n .

diffusion. T h e allusion to g e r m s , incidentally, is not fanciful. T h e r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l , as formalized in this b o o k , is a g e n e r i c diffusion m o d e l . G i v e n a p p r o priate m e a s u r e s of e x p o s u r e and resistance, it m i g h t be used to d e s c r i b e the diffusion of new fashions, religious beliefs, or even diseases. W i t h i n an adult p o p u l a t i o n , for e x a m p l e , susceptibility to a socially transmitted d i s e a s e might be n o n m o n o t o n i c with respect to age: Young adults m i g h t be high on the social interactions associated with exposure to the d i s e a s e but also healthy e n o u g h to resist it; the old might be v u l n e r a b l e but socially reclusive; and so the m i d d l e - a g e d might be hardest hit. T h e incidence of A I D S m a y present an e x a m p l e of this sort of interaction, since r a w d a t a published by t h e U . S . C e n t e r s for Disease Control suggests that the incidence of A I D S w a s , at least for a t i m e , n o n m o n o t o n i c with respect to age ( " F e d e r a l P l a n n i n g , " 1987). W h a t all this indicates is that a close fit b e t w e e n the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l and d a t a on m a s s attitude c h a n g e d o e s not, by itself, indicate anything about the extent of elite influence. T h e model is simply a m e a n s for specifying the process of diffusion of elite influence, w h e r e the r e a s o n s for believing that it is elite influence, r a t h e r than s o m e t h i n g e l s e , that is diffusing must be s u p plied independently of the m o d e l . (See the discussion on p p . 4 3 - 4 . ) T h e r e is, as I have b e e n arguing (and argued e a r l i e r in C h a p t e r 2 ) , an a m p l e supply of such reasons. A n d yet, a fully a d e q u a t e account of elite opinion leadership is not o n e that sees a public that responds to elite initiatives in a c o m pletely m e c h a n i c a l fashion, t h o u g h a positive r e s p o n s e by the public to wellcrafted initiatives can usually be c o u n t e d u p o n . Rather, it is an account in w h i c h elites - always h a v i n g s o m e ideas that are a u t o n o m o u s l y their o w n , always p o tentially split a m o n g t h e m s e l v e s along p a r t i s a n lines and m a n e u v e r i n g for partisan a d v a n t a g e , and a l w a y s looking over their shoulders to see w h a t the public is thinking and might think in the future - a t t e m p t to lead and to follow at the s a m e t i m e . Or, to put the point s o m e w h a t differently, the q u e s t i o n is not w h e t h e r elites lead or follow, but how much and which elites lead r a t h e r than follow m a s s o p i n i o n , and under what circumstances they do so. A full analysis

It is i m p o r t a n t to r e c o g n i z e that, strictly s p e a k i n g , o n e cannot use the results of my m o d e l i n g to s u p p o r t even a weak a r g u m e n t for elite influence. T h e reason is that the R A S m o d e l , as f o r m u l a t e d , is entirely agnostic about the sources of the political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s that m o v e public o p i n i o n . T h u s , it is consistent with the model that e l i t e s , including even t h e m e d i a , have no influence w h a t soever on public o p i n i o n , and that all political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s diffuse t h r o u g h the p o p u l a t i o n by personal c o n t a c t , like g e r m s . So long as political a w a r e n e s s is positively associated w i t h reception of political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and negatively associated with a c c e p t a n c e - as it would be in either a g e r m or elite-driven scen a r i o - the model applies. T h i s m a y be part of the reason the m o d e l p e r f o r m s so well: B e c a u s e the diffusion process has t h e s a m e formal p r o p e r t i e s w h e t h e r it

5 It should be noted, however, that the classic studies of personal influence provide no mechanism for explaining how interpersonal communications could bring about systematic changes in the distribution of mass opinion independently of elite influence. Rather, these studies have emphasized the role of personal discussion either as a conservatizing force that buttresses the individual against external influence, as in the Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954) study titled Voting, or as a mediating force, as in the Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) study titled Personal Influence, which shows how local opinion leaders pick up ideas in the media and pass them on to friends. In the first case, no attitude change occurs, while in the second, opinion leaders may be said merely to aid in the diffusion of elite-generated information. With respect to the second point, MacKuen and Brown (1987) conclude that political discussion is basically another "information channel" (p. 485): "[T]he social circle is not an active independent force in politics but instead shapes the information that comes from outside. Thus it is proper to think of the social environment not as a source of influence but as an intervening mechanism in a larger communication system" (p. 483).

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of these p r o b l e m s is well beyond the scope of this b o o k . My only aim in this brief discussion h a s b e e n , first, to m a k e c l e a r w h a t exactly my formal m o d e l s of attitude diffusion do and do not prove about elite opinion l e a d e r s h i p , and seco n d , to m a k e it a p p e a r plausible that, in a broad r a n g e of c i r c u m s t a n c e s , the a m o u n t of a u t o n o m o u s leadership exercised by elites is substantial. (I return to this p r o b l e m in C h a p t e r 12.)

CRITICAL REVIEW OF BASIC AXIOMS Critical evaluation of the R A S model m a y be o r g a n i z e d a r o u n d its defining axi o m s , beginning with A l , the R e c e p t i o n A x i o m . T h e a s s e r t i o n i n A l i s that greater attention to an issue is associated with greater reception of m e s s a g e s c o n c e r n i n g that issue. T h i s claim would s e e m initially u n e x c e p t i o n a b l e . Yet w h a t exactly is it that people receive? A l m o s t certainly, different people can be exposed to t h e s a m e m e s s a g e and yet receive quite different m e s s a g e s , or even no intelligible m e s s a g e , d e p e n d i n g on their prior k n o w l e d g e about the iss u e . T h e r e are at least t w o ways in which this can h a p p e n . First, as noted in C h a p t e r 8, p e o p l e m a y better c o m p r e h e n d stories on subjects about which they have m o r e initial familiarity. T h u s , for e x a m p l e , m o r e p e o p l e l e a r n e d about the s e n t e n c i n g of the colorful M a r i n e , Oliver N o r t h , for his c o n v i c t i o n in t h e I r a n C o n t r a controversy than learned the reason for the resignation of the c o m p a r a tively bland H o u s e S p e a k e r Jim W r i g h t , even t h o u g h the latter story played out o v e r a period of several m o n t h s and received far more extensive c o v e r a g e . (In fact, o n e poll s u g g e s t e d that almost as m a n y p e o p l e k n e w the n a m e of Oliver N o r t h ' s striking secretary, F a w n H a l l , as k n e w why W r i g h t resigned the speake r s h i p . ) S e c o n d , and m o r e speculatively, individuals w h o are e x p o s e d to the s a m e m e s s a g e may, if they take notice of it, perceive it differently. For e x a m p l e , the air force m a y stage an e l a b o r a t e spectacle for the maiden flight of the B 2 , its n e w flying w i n g b o m b e r , to show that the plane really w o r k s . S o m e m e m b e r s of the public m a y receive this as a p r o - B 2 m e s s a g e , but others may " s e e " in the flight " a n o b v i o u s l y useless b a t m o b i l e . " In b o t h of these c a s e s , differences in reception (given equal attentiveness to the s a m e m e s s a g e ) will d e p e n d on p e o p l e ' s previously existing ideas (or s c h e m a t a ) w h i c h m a y differ both in content and degree of d e v e l o p m e n t across individuals (Fiske and Kinder, 1981). T h e R A S m o d e l , as presently constituted, m a k e s no allowance for these w a y s in w h i c h prior opinion m a y affect reception or p a r t i s a n perception of the c o m m u nications one e n c o u n t e r s . C o n s i d e r next the Resistance A x i o m , A 2 , w h i c h claims that p e o p l e can resist persuasion only to the extent that they have acquired an a p p r o p r i a t e c u e i n g m e s s a g e , w h e r e c u e i n g m e s s a g e s are a s s u m e d to have an origin that is, at least in p r i n c i p l e , s e p a r a t e from the persuasive m e s s a g e itself. T h i s specification of the Resistance A x i o m is intended to follow C o n v e r s e ' s (1964) notion that p e o p l e need to acquire contextual k n o w l e d g e of " w h a t g o e s with w h a t " in order to d e v e l o p conventionally l e f t - r i g h t belief s y s t e m s . W i t h

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the inference (from A 1 ) that m o r e aware persons are m o r e likely to possess c u e ing i n f o r m a t i o n , this a x i o m played a crucial role in explaining attitude c h a n g e . All else e q u a l , m o r e a w a r e persons are m o r e likely to resist m e s s a g e s , given rec e p t i o n of t h e m , that are inconsistent with their basic values - that is, to exhibit p a r t i s a n resistance. But how can we be certain that it is possession of relevant contextual inform a t i o n , rather than s o m e t h i n g e l s e , that explains the greater critical resistance of m o r e aware p e r s o n s ? As the reader may have n o t i c e d , I have been u n a b l e to p r o d u c e any direct e v i d e n c e on this point, that is, any d a t a that credibly m e a s u r e possession or n o n p o s s e s s i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r cueing m e s s a g e and link it to t h e a c c e p t a n c e or n o n a c c e p t a n c e of a new c o n s i d e r a t i o n . I h a v e , however, pointed to abundant e v i d e n c e of the i m p o r t a n c e of contextual information about m e s s a g e sources in m a s s c o m m u n i c a t i o n s - e v i d e n c e that inf o r m a t i o n or cues about t h e person providing a m e s s a g e greatly affects h o w p e o ple respond to it. So my e m p h a s i s on c u e i n g m e s s a g e s rests on a solid foundation of past r e s e a r c h . I h a v e , moreover, been able to p r o d u c e a fair a m o u n t of indirect e v i d e n c e of the i m p o r t a n c e of c u e i n g i n f o r m a t i o n . An i m p o r t a n t piece of this e v i d e n c e c o m e s from the V i e t n a m War. W h e n a m a i n s t r e a m elite c o n s e n s u s existed, exposure to the elite c o n s e n s u s , as m e a s u r e d by i n d i v i d u a l s ' levels of political a w a r e n e s s , w a s associated with greater s u p p o r t for the war, with no resistance a m o n g the m o s t politically a w a r e . W i t h the app e a r a n c e of elite ideological d i s a g r e e m e n t s in 1966, however, politically sophisticated liberals b e g a n to resist prowar m e s s a g e s and to accept a n t i w a r ones. T h u s , elite cues functioned to activate ideological predispositions a m o n g the p o litically a w a r e . T h e e x a m i n a t i o n of the m a i n s t r e a m and p o l a r i z a t i o n m o d e l s in C h a p t e r 6 provided several other cases in which political a w a r e n e s s either w a s or w a s not a s sociated with political p o l a r i z a t i o n , d e p e n d i n g on the configuration of elite c u e s . Perhaps the most striking of these c a s e s involved attitudes on r e c o g n i t i o n of C o m m u n i s t C h i n a in 1972. Political a w a r e n e s s w a s not a s s o c i a t e d with resistance to this policy, even t h o u g h it is e a s y to imagine that s o m e politically sophisticated c o n s e r v a t i v e s w o u l d have eagerly resisted it if a p p r o p r i a t e ideological cues had been g i v e n . 6

T h u s , most of my e v i d e n c e for the i m p o r t a n c e of cueing m e s s a g e s derives from e x a m i n a t i o n of the attitudes of the politically a w a r e , w h o are extremely responsive to w h a t ideologically congenial elites urge t h e m to b e l i e v e . In one type of c a s e , however, the entire m a s s public - and not j u s t t h e most politically attentive s e g m e n t - relies heavily on p a r t i s a n cues. This is the c a s e of contested e l e c t i o n s , w h e r e all citizens are about equally p a r t i s a n in their t e n d e n c y to accept t h e information supplied by their o w n p a r t y ' s c a n d i d a t e and to reject that of the opposition p a r t y ' s c a n d i d a t e . 6 Congressional Quarterly reports "a rising chorus of praise" for establishing relations with China, but also some criticism. Among the critics were John Ashbrook, an aspirant for the Republican presidential nomination, and columnist William F. Buckley (March 4, 1972: 472-3).

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It is t h u s clear that a w a r e n e s s is associated with resistance to persuasion in s o m e cases but not others. If o n e rejects my explanation - that cueing m e s s a g e s are subtle in s o m e cases (typical p a r t i s a n issues, such as j o b g u a r a n t e e s ) , c o m pletely o b v i o u s in others (partisan e l e c t i o n s ) , and nonexistent in still others ( m a i n s t r e a m issues), so as to m a k e highly a w a r e persons m o r e c a p a b l e of partisan resistance in the first type of situation but not in the second or third - then it b e c o m e s n e c e s s a r y to p r o p o s e s o m e other explanation for why a w a r e n e s s has this pattern of resistance effects. S i n c e , for the m o m e n t , no a l t e r n a t i v e explanation is a p p a r e n t , it is r e a s o n a b l e to accept the idea that, in m a n y but not all situations, awareness brings with it esoteric k n o w l e d g e of " w h a t g o e s with w h a t , " and that this contextual k n o w l e d g e is an i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t of resistance to p e r s u a s i o n . A m o r e serious c r i t i c i s m of the Resistance A x i o m can be m a d e on conceptual g r o u n d s . Let us a s s u m e , as I suggested earlier, that s o m e people see in the m a i d e n flight of t h e B2 a comical b a t m o b i l e - and see t h i s , I should a d d , precisely because they have e a r l i e r received a n d , as d o v e s , accepted stories about p o o r p e r f o r m a n c e by h i g h - t e c h n o l o g y w e a p o n s - while others see in t h e flight a magnificent flying m a c h i n e . People w h o s e p r e c o n c e p t i o n s so influence w h a t they perceive do not then need to e n g a g e in a s e p a r a t e evaluation to see w h e t h e r the m e s s a g e should be accepted as a p r o - B 2 c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Perception and evalu a t i o n constitute for t h e m a single, s c h e m a - d r i v e n s t e p . H e n c e , it m a y reasonably be objected that t h e R A S m o d e l , in s h a r p l y distinguishing the reception step from the a c c e p t a n c e s t e p , is creating a purely theoretical d i s t i n c t i o n . T h e a l t e r n a t i v e w o u l d be to design a theory in which the internalization of prior, ideologically cued c o m m u n i c a t i o n s affects both the likelihood of receiving a m e s s a g e and the form in which the m e s s a g e will be perceived. T h u s , if s o m e o n e hears from a trusted source that the B2 is a costly and useless c o l o s s u s , the person may be m o r e likely to notice future n e w s about the B2 and to interpret that n e w s in w a y s consistent with this initial information bias. T h e r e is m u c h research on mental o r g a n i z a t i o n in social p s y c h o l o g y indicating that perception is t h e o r y - l a d e n in this way. It w o u l d therefore be valuable to graft a theory of perception o n t o the R A S m o d e l . T h e lack of such a t h e o r y is, in my opinion, one of the greatest deficiencies of the present m o d e l . T h e Accessibility A x i o m , A 3 , is perhaps the most defensible of the four axioms. T h e notion that ideas that have been used recently or frequently are m o r e readily recalled from m e m o r y is extremely well s u p p o r t e d both by e x p e r i m e n t a l p s y c h o l o g y (as in W y e r and Srull, 1989) and by research on political attitudes (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Iyengar, 1991), and the R A S m o d e l simply capitalizes on this e v i d e n c e . T h e r e must, however, be more to accessibility than recency of a c t i v a t i o n . For e x a m p l e , the studies of Wilson et al. (for reviews see W i l s o n , Kraft, and D u n n , 1989; Wilson et a l . , 1989) and Millar and Tesser (1986) clearly indicate that p e o ple call to mind different c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w h e n a s k e d to a r t i c u l a t e the r e a s o n s for their attitudes than w h e n asked to think about their feelings on a subject. T h i s

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w o u l d s e e m to indicate, unsurprisingly, that m e m o r y search d e p e n d s on subtle features of the task in w h o s e service it is being p e r f o r m e d . It s e e m s likely that m e m o r y search is also affected by such m a t t e r s as m o o d , social c o n t e x t , and other recent activities, even if unrelated to the task at h a n d . I have finessed these potential c o m p l i c a t i o n s by a s s u m i n g a large d e g r e e of simple r a n d o m n e s s in t h e m e m o r y search process - or, as I have expressed it, r a n d o m n e s s in " t h e ideas that happen to be at the top of o n e ' s head at a given m o m e n t . " A l t h o u g h this s e e m s to me a c c e p t a b l e as an initial strategy, future m o d e l builders might profitably pay more attention to how m e m o r y search o c curs. T h e expected payoff w o u l d be the ability to explain more of the instability over t i m e that is associated with p e o p l e ' s survey responses. A n o t h e r s h o r t c o m i n g of the Accessibility A x i o m is that, since it p e r m i t s the activation of o n e idea to increase the accessibility of related or similar i d e a s , it is natural to w o n d e r w h a t exactly it is that d e t e r m i n e s w h e n ideas are related or similar. T h i s is s o m e t h i n g that the R A S m o d e l d o e s not currently a d d r e s s but m i g h t , with greater attention to the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of ideas in the m i n d , eventually be able to address. It might well turn out t h a t , for e x a m p l e , w h i c h ideas are related to one a n o t h e r is less a function of logic or linguistic similarity than of elite cues and other features of the external e n v i r o n m e n t . But since, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g these l i m i t a t i o n s , A3 s e e m s to a c c o m p l i s h its role in t h e m o d e l quite adequately, there w o u l d s e e m less need to t a m p e r with it than with s o m e of the o t h e r a x i o m s . T h e R e s p o n s e A x i o m , w h i c h claims that individuals a n s w e r survey q u e s t i o n s by averaging across the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that are most i m m e d i a t e l y accessible in m e m o r y , is the most c o n t e s t a b l e of the four a x i o m s . O n e i m p o r t a n t s h o r t c o m i n g is that it provides no m e a n s of taking into account either the " s t r e n g t h " or the " e x t r e m i t y " of the attitude statements p e o p l e are willing to m a k e . T h a t i s , it allows people to favor o n e or the other side of an issue, but not to take positions that are m o r e or less s t r o n g , or m o r e or less e x t r e m e . T h e r e is nothing inherently w r o n g with this b i n a r y a p p r o a c h . M u c h of the t i m e w h e n public opinion enters into elite p o l i t i c s , it enters as a single number, the p e r c e n t a g e w h o a p p r o v e of the p r e s i d e n t ' s h a n d l i n g of his j o b , or w h o s u p port b u s i n g to achieve racial i n t e g r a t i o n , or w h o want an i m m e d i a t e pullout from V i e t n a m . E l e c t i o n s , as c o n d u c t e d in the United S t a t e s , are likewise agg r e g a t i o n s o f 0 - 1 choices. N o n e t h e l e s s , it w o u l d be valuable to take account of attitude strength and extremity within the R A S m o d e l . O n e a p p r o a c h w o u l d b e t o a s s u m e that the extremity or strength of an individual's attitude r e p o r t v a r i e s with t h e net directional thrust of h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and t h e total n u m b e r of salient conside r a t i o n s . " A p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f mutually consistent c o n s i d e r a t i o n s " w o u l d thus be t h e c a u s e of e x t r e m e or strong attitude r e p o r t s . I am aware of no d a t a for testing this idea in c o n n e c t i o n with political issues, but it is readily tested in c o n n e c t i o n with e v a l u a t i o n s of politicians. In the 1984 N E S election study, for e x a m p l e , r e s p o n d e n t s w e r e asked their likes and dislikes

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Table and

11.1. underlying

The relationship considerations

0=25. Average Net of likes and dislikes Average Sum of likes and dislikes N

between

evaluational

The

extremity

Rating of Reagan on 100-point scale 26-35 3fr43 46-55 56-65 66-75 75-100

-2.75

-2.09

-1.78

-0.91

-0.52

0.39

1.90

3.02

2.97

2.68

1.76

2.69

2.98

3.14

287

123

146

234

245

419

757

Source: 1984 NES survey.

about Ronald R e a g a n and then i m m e d i a t e l y afterward were asked to evaluate h i m on a 100-point feeling t h e r m o m e t e r . R e s p o n s e s to the former q u e s t i o n can be taken as a m e a s u r e of the n u m b e r and thrust of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s relating to R e a g a n that were i m m e d i a t e l y salient in the r e s p o n d e n t ' s m i n d , while r e s p o n s e s to the latter can be used to m e a s u r e attitude extremity. Table 11.1 presents the relevant data. As can be seen in the top p a n e l , there is a strong positive r e l a t i o n s h i p between net R e a g a n likes/dislikes and the overall w a r m t h of feelings toward h i m . As the b o t t o m panel further s h o w s , the relationship b e t w e e n total n u m b e r of Reagan c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and feelings scores is strongly n o n m o n o t o n i c . T h u s , p e o p l e with the largest average n u m b e r of R e a g a n likes and dislikes evaluated h i m most extremely. This little analysis raises the possibility that attitude extremity m i g h t be a relatively simple function of the n u m b e r and direction of accessible c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . A n o t h e r difficulty with my simple top-of-the-head response rule is that it is o p e n l y at odds with a c o n s i d e r a b l e research literature which argues that, instead of m a k i n g " m e m o r y - b a s e d " j u d g m e n t s from accessible i d e a s , as in A 4 , p e o p l e ' s j u d g m e n t s are n o r m a l l y m a d e " o n - l i n e " at the point of initial p r o c e s s i n g of i n c o m i n g information ( H a s t i e and P a r k , 1986; Lichtenstein and S r u l l , 1987; L o d g e , M c G r a w , and S t r o h , 1989; M c G r a w and Pinney, 1990). W h e n a s k e d to express an attitude, p e o p l e simply retrieve their current evaluation and r e p o r t it, rather t h a n , as I have c l a i m e d , construct their attitude reports on the basis of the ideas most i m m e d i a t e l y salient to t h e m . T h e on-line m o d e l is obviously a plausible o n e , but not necessarily equally plausible for every type of p r o b l e m . It is n o t a b l e , first of all, that m o s t of the e v i d e n c e H a s t i e and P a r k cite involves nonpolitical subjects, especially personality e v a l u a t i o n . As they point out, it is extremely difficult to prevent p e o p l e from forming integrated evaluations of other personalities as information c o m e s in. A p p a r e n t l y this is s o m e t h i n g that people do naturally and effortlessly. It is by no m e a n s o b v i o u s , however, that the s a m e is true of political c o n t r o versies. In fact, t h e o p p o s i t e may be nearer t h e truth. Indirect e v i d e n c e from a variety of sources indicates that it is difficult u n d e r the best of c i r c u m s t a n c e s to

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induce citizens to form c o h e r e n t impressions about political subjects ( s e e , for e x a m p l e , L a n e , 1962; C o n v e r s e , 1964; H o c h s c h i l d , 1981: ch. 9 ) . P a r k and H a s t i e do specify special c o n d i t i o n s in which p e o p l e m a k e evaluations on the basis of ideas i m m e d i a t e l y available in m e m o r y , namely, w h e n p e o ple e n c o u n t e r information that is so u n i m p o r t a n t to t h e m that they d o n ' t b o t h e r to k e e p u p d a t e d e v a l u a t i o n s but are then u n e x p e c t e d l y asked to state an o p i n i o n . W h e n this h a p p e n s , p e o p l e are forced to rely on ideas recalled from m e m o r y as the basis of attitude r e p o r t s . I suggest that these c o n d i t i o n s are t h e n o r m in p o litical information p r o c e s s i n g . In fact, the issues on which survey r e s p o n d e n t s are invited to offer o p i n i o n s are simply t o o n u m e r o u s , t o o m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l , a n d , taken as a g r o u p , t o o o b s c u r e for it to be feasible for t h e m to e n g a g e in on-line processing of relevant information (see M c G r a w and Pinney, 1990). T h e strongest e v i d e n c e that the on-line m o d e l is inappropriate in the d o m a i n of political attitudes is that p e o p l e ' s attitude r e p o r t s exhibit so m u c h purely chance variation over t i m e and are systematically affected by t h i n g s , such as q u e s t i o n order, that o u g h t , by the logic of the on-line m o d e l , to be irrelevant. E v e n attitude r e p o r t s c o n c e r n i n g w e l l - k n o w n politicians, as an e x p e r i m e n t by W i l s o n , Kraft, and D u n n (1989) h a s s h o w n , a p p e a r to d e p e n d on the ideas at t h e top of the head at t h e m o m e n t of r e s p o n s e rather than any d e e p e r true attitude. It t h u s a p p e a r s that t h e on-line m o d e l suffers from t h e s a m e w e a k n e s s e s as the c o n v e n t i o n a l " t r u e a t t i t u d e " m o d e l s discussed earlier. In fact, the on-line m o d e l is essentially j u s t a variant of the old notion that survey r e s p o n s e s represent revelations of preexisting states of o p i n i o n , a notion that, as I have argued at l e n g t h , fails to w o r k very well. H a v i n g now, I b e l i e v e , strongly defended t h e R e s p o n s e A x i o m from criticism m o t i v a t e d by the on-line m o d e l , I w o u l d like to b a c k off a bit. For a l t h o u g h the m e m o r y - b a s e d j u d g m e n t p r o c e s s e m b o d i e d in A4 is defensible, it should be reg a r d e d only as a r o u g h first a p p r o x i m a t i o n of w h a t must actually occur. It seems to me likely that p e o p l e do e n g a g e in w h a t might be called bounded on-line processing of political i n f o r m a t i o n . T h a t is, they m a y m a k e on-line e v a l u a t i o n s of p a r t i c u l a r subjects but then fail to integrate e a c h newly u p d a t e d evaluation into a fresh global e v a l u a t i o n . So if, for e x a m p l e , p e o p l e e n c o u n t e r information about t h i r d - g e n e r a t i o n welfare families, they m a k e an on-line u p d a t e of their j u d g m e n t of the value of social spending for the alleviation of poverty. If, s o m e t i m e later, they e n c o u n t e r information about the n e e d s of h o m e l e s s p e r s o n s , they u p d a t e their j u d g m e n t on t h e u n m e t welfare n e e d s of the n a t i o n . But w h a t they do not d o , unless called to do so by an unusual event such as a public opinion survey, is to m a k e an u p d a t e of their global attitude toward the welfare s y s t e m . T h u s , if asked on a survey to m a k e a global statement on the p r o p e r level of welfare s p e n d i n g , they will have no u p - t o - d a t e global evaluation to retrieve but will instead have to m a k e an on-the-spot j u d g m e n t from w h a t e v e r ( u p d a t e d ) cons i d e r a t i o n s , w h e t h e r involving h o m e l e s s p e r s o n s o r s o m e t h i n g e l s e , c o m e most readily to m i n d . By this a c c o u n t , A4 is not so m u c h w r o n g as underspecified: M e m o r y - b a s e d d e c i s i o n m a k i n g o c c u r s , but s o , at a n o t h e r level, d o e s on-line processing.

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T h i s limitation points to a more general w e a k n e s s of the entire R A S framew o r k , namely its failure to p r o v i d e any m e c h a n i s m for integration of information that h a s been acquired. By its a x i o m s , p e o p l e screen information at the point of first e n c o u n t e r i n g it, but o n c e internalized, each bit of information b e c o m e s just a n o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n in a mental " b i n " full of such atomized c o g n i t i o n s . T h i s is obviously a d r a s t i c simplification. A l t h o u g h total d i s c o n n e c t e d n e s s may, as Luskin (1987) skillfully a r g u e s , occur within certain s e g m e n t s of t h e p u b l i c , it cannot be the w h o l e story. S o m e p e o p l e , and probably m o s t , surely do build up c o m p l e x l y differentiated c o g n i t i o n s that cannot be a d e q u a t e l y captured by my simple notion of a c o n s i d e r a t i o n . C o n t r a r y to the R A S m o d e l , these m e n tal structures u n d o u b t e d l y g r o w in size and subtlety as new information is enc o u n t e r e d and integrated, t h u s perhaps increasing their chronic accessibility and h e n c e relative " i m p o r t a n c e " as d e t e r m i n a n t s of attitude r e p o r t s . I n t e g r a t e d inf o r m a t i o n structures might also play a major role in both the perception and critical scrutiny of i n c o m i n g c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . A n o t h e r s h o r t c o m i n g in this s a m e vein is that the m o d e l m a k e s no provision for m u l t i p l e reception of the s a m e m e s s a g e . D o e s a m e s s a g e that has b e e n accepted t w o or m o r e t i m e s then b e c o m e t w o or m o r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ? Or, m o r e in the spirit of the R A S m o d e l , might re-reception of an idea increase its salience and h e n c e its likelihood of use? Or finally, d o e s re-reception m a k e it m o r e likely that an idea will be integrated within s o m e larger, m o r e c o m p l e x mental structure? Probably the answer to all of these q u e s t i o n s , each of which c h a l l e n g e s the basic structure of the R A S m o d e l , is yes. T h e reason that I have left so m u c h that I believe to be true out of the R A S m o d e l is, quite simply, that there has been no pressing need to include it. T h e m a c h i n e r y of the current m o d e l has been able to explain a large part of the varia n c e in the existing survey e v i d e n c e that s e e m s presently a m e n a b l e to s y s t e m a t i c e x p l a n a t i o n , and I have been loathe to m a k e the R A S model any m o r e e l a b o r a t e than n e c e s s a r y to do this, v In the longer r u n , however, greater e l a b o r a t i o n of the model will b e c o m e app r o p r i a t e . Perhaps a fifth a x i o m could specify that the effect of t h o u g h t about a subject - perhaps even t h o u g h t that is independent of any elite influence (see Tesser, 1978) - is to build up integrated c o g n i t i v e structures, p r e s u m a b l y schem a t a . As these structures grow, they might c o l o n i z e or neutralize o p p o s i n g , less developed c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , thereby reducing r e s p o n s e instability. T h e y m i g h t also influence the interpretation and processing of new c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , thereby preventing the future f o r m a t i o n of o p p o s i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . It w o u l d be easy, however, to take the notion of integrated c o g n i t i v e structures t o o far. O n e s h o u l d , in particular, never take this idea so far as to o v e r l o o k the substantial extent to w h i c h most p e o p l e ' s political ideas are not integrated into coherent mental s t r u c t u r e s , the extent to which o p p o s i n g ideas and feelings regularly coexist c o m f o r t a b l y within the s a m e b r a i n , and the large e l e m e n t of c h a n c e in the process by which one rather than a n o t h e r idea c o m e s to the top of the head and exerts m o m e n t a r y control over a b e h a v i o r or attitude s t a t e m e n t .

The

model

and future

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281

W h a t would be most d e s i r a b l e , t h e n , is not the R A S model I have p r o p o s e d , but a R e c e i v e - A c c e p t - / « / e ^ r a r e - S a m p l e M o d e l , in which the o u t c o m e of initial information processing affects r e c e p t i o n , a c c e p t a n c e , and integration of subseq u e n t information. I d o u b t , however, that theoretical e l a b o r a t i o n of the R A S model along these lines will b e c o m e fruitful to analysts of public opinion until we learn how to m e a s u r e more than the simple " l i k e s " and " d i s l i k e s " that have been featured in my analysis. T h i s , in t u r n , will require s o m e way of m e a s u r i n g , a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s , the v o l u m e and c o m p l e x i t y of discrete c o g n i t i o n s , and w h e r e , in a stream of verbal statements from a survey r e s p o n d e n t , t h o u g h t s o r g a n i z e d by o n e c o g nitive structure leave off and those associated with a n o t h e r begin. T h e s e sorts of i m p r o v e m e n t s in m e a s u r e m e n t capacity in m a s s surveys are not, so far as I am a w a r e , i m m e d i a t e l y in p r o s p e c t . S o , a l t h o u g h I readily a c k n o w l e d g e p h e n o m e n a that the a x i o m s of t h e R A S f r a m e w o r k cannot presently a c c o m m o d a t e , and can m a k e fairly specific suggestions about how the f r a m e w o r k might be p a r s i m o n i o u s l y e l a b o r a t e d in o r d e r to better a c c o m m o d a t e t h e m , I do not see any reason for opinion researchers to m a k e these e l a b o r a t i o n s until the d a t a n e c e s s a r y for their testing b e c o m e available.

MODELS OF T H E R E C E P T I O N - A C C E P T A N C E PROCESS If t h e most general a c h i e v e m e n t of the R A S model is its integration of a w i d e r a n g e of empirical regularities within a c o m p a c t m o d e l , its most p a r t i c u l a r success centers on its treatment of attitude c h a n g e . T h e core idea here has been that reception of persuasive c o m m u n i c a t i o n s increases with attentiveness to politics, and that capacity for resistance to uncongenial c o m m u n i c a t i o n s also increases with attentiveness. T h i s dual c l a i m , which o r i g i n a t e d in w o r k by Philip C o n verse and William M c G u i r e in the 1960s, h a s both m o t i v a t e d the discovery of s o m e interesting patterns of attitude c h a n g e and provided a basis for organizing t h e m , as in the typology proposed in C h a p t e r 8. E v e n if, as will d o u b t l e s s occur, future research turns up cases of attitude c h a n g e that are not i m m e d i a t e l y explicable within this typology, researchers should be reluctant to discard either the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e d y n a m i c or the role of political attentiveness in m e d i a t i n g it. As I have a t t e m p t e d to show, individual differences in propensity to receive political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s are so great and so c o n s e q u e n t i a l u n d e r a w i d e r a n g e of conditions that it is virtually never safe to ignore t h e m . T h e effects of attentiveness on a c c e p t a n c e or n o n a c c e p t a n c e of persuasive m e s s a g e s , given r e c e p t i o n , are less universal - in particular, they s e e m to w a s h out in high-intensity p a r t i s a n e l e c t i o n s - but they a r e n o n e t h e l e s s extremely i m p o r t a n t in many types of s i t u a t i o n s , and therefore also d a n g e r o u s to ignore. But despite the general i m p o r t a n c e of the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e d y n a m i c , there are a n u m b e r of q u e s t i o n s that may be raised about my d e v e l o p m e n t of

t

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p a r t i c u l a r r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e models. I g r o u p these questions u n d e r t w o rub r i c s : general theoretical issues and m e t h o d o l o g i c a l issues.

Theoretical

The model and future research Table 11.2. Two measures of opinion change on U.S. policy in Central America

issues

In my o p e n i n g discussion of attitude c h a n g e in C h a p t e r 7, I said that attitude c h a n g e cannot be u n d e r s t o o d within the R A S m o d e l as a conversion experie n c e - the r e p l a c e m e n t of o n e crystallized belief by another. It must instead be u n d e r s t o o d as a c h a n g e in the balance of positive and n e g a t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s relating to a given issue. O w i n g to the lack of a p p r o p r i a t e d a t a , I have been u n a b l e to do full j u s t i c e to this theoretical p o s i t i o n . T h a t is, I have b e e n unable to show how c h a n g e s over t i m e in the b a l a n c e of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in p e o p l e ' s h e a d s lead to g r a d u a t e d c h a n g e s in c l o s e d - e n d e d attitude r e p o r t s , such as a m o v e m e n t from " s t r o n g a g r e e m e n t " with a p a r t i c u l a r policy to " n o t so s t r o n g " a g r e e m e n t . Rather, all of my analyses have dealt with the d i c h o t o m o u s c a s e : Either people c h a n g e their initial position to the o p p o s i t e position or they r e m a i n unchanged. D i c h o t o m o u s scoring of attitude c h a n g e m e a s u r e s d o e s have technical advantages: T h e 0 - 1 scoring m e t r i c , which distinguishes those w h o s u p p o r t a given position from all o t h e r s , including those w h o say " D o n ' t k n o w , " is the only o n e - d i m e n s i o n a l metric hat avoids treating " D o n ' t k n o w " responses a s missing d a t a . Since people w h o respond " D o n ' t k n o w " are less politically a w a r e than c o u n t e r p a r t s w h o d o a n s w e r survey q u e s t i o n s , their loss a s missing d a t a w o u l d introduce significant distortion into e s t i m a t e s of t h e effect of a w a r e n e s s on opinion f o r m a t i o n and c h a n g e . For e x a m p l e , most of the attitude c h a n g e in the early stages of the V i e t n a m W a r consisted of the conversion of respondents without -opinions into s u p p o r t e r s of the war. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g all t h i s , attitude scales that m e a s u r e strength or extremity of attitude reports are c o n v e y i n g real information about p e o p l e ' s opinions. C h a n g e s in the d e g r e e of strength or extremity of an attitude, even if they do not involve crossing t h e threshold to s u p p o r t a policy that w a s previously o p p o s e d , likewise convey i n f o r m a t i o n . T h e p r o b l e m is h o w to use it. T w 6 possibilities are s u g g e s t e d in Table 11.2. T h e issue is U . S . involvement in Central A m e r i c a , on w h i c h attitudes were m e a s u r e d on a seven-point scale at t w o t i m e points. In the top half of Table 1 1 . 2 , 1 simply t o o k the m e a n difference o v e r t i m e i n scores o n the seven-point scale, o m i t t i n g " D o n ' t k n o w " respondents. As can be seen, these patterns of c h a n g e are radically different from those found in the e a r l i e r analysis. However, there is an o b v i o u s difficulty with this m e t h o d of m e a s u r i n g attitude c h a n g e : M a n y highly aware h a w k s were at points 5 or 6 on the seven-point scale at the first interview, so that little p r o i n v o l v e m e n t c h a n g e w a s possible for t h e m ; s o m e were even at point 7, w h e r e no m o v e m e n t to the right w a s p o s s i b l e . In g e n e r a l , the greater a r e s p o n d e n t ' s propensity to c h a n g e in the direction of a particular m e s s a g e , the m o r e limited the r o o m for c h a n g e w a s likely to b e . M e a n -

283

Level of political awareness Low High Method one: Attitude change as difference of means Hawks 1986 mean 1987 mean

3.65 4.15

4.23 4.59

5.26 5.60

0.61

0.50

0.36

(18)

(40)

(44)

0.34 (15)

3.47 4.07

2.76 3.95

3.53 4.05

3.71 3.71

0.60 (30)

1.19 (37)

0.52 (40)

0.00 (14)

Doves 1986 mean 1987 mean

3.87 4.07

2.97 3.16

2.60 3.00

2.27 3.19

Mean difference

0.20

0.19

0.40

0.92

(15)

(3D

(50)

(26)

3.67 4.28

Mean difference N Centrists 1986 mean 1987 mean Mean difference v

a

Method two: Attitude change as proportionate

change

Hawks 0.18* (17)

0.03 (37)

0.09 (41)

0.18 (13)

-0.01

0.23 (37)

0.14 (37)

-0.19 (14)

0.03 (30)

0.05

0.16

(49)

(26)

Centrists (29)

Doves -0.09 (14)

a

Cell entry is mean score on 7-point scale. * Cell entry is proportionate change between surveys, as described in text. Source: 1986 and 1987 NES surveys.

w h i l e , highly aware d o v e s were c o n c e n t r a t e d at points 1 and 2, w h e r e there w a s m u c h r o o m for r i g h t w a r d m o v e m e n t , including m o v e m e n t that did not require t h e m to cross the threshold into actual s u p p o r t for greater involvement in Central America. As a way of taking into account these floor and ceiling factors, I calculated c h a n g e scores for each r e s p o n d e n t , as follows,

284

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N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

model

and future

285

research

A n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n about t h e r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e p r o c e s s i s w h y ex-

Time2 — T i m e i Change = — — 7 — Time]

actly critical resistance to persuasion often increases with levels of political

T h i s m e a s u r e , calculated from panel d a t a , scores each r e s p o n d e n t ' s c h a n g e as a p r o p o r t i o n of his o p p o r t u n i t y for c h a n g e . S i n c e division by z e r o is i m p o s s i b l e , this a p p r o a c h requires the e l i m i n a t i o n of r e s p o n d e n t s w h o were at point 7 at the first i n t e r v i e w , a plausible r e q u i r e m e n t in v i e w of t h e impossibility of further r i g h t w a r d m o v e m e n t by such persons. T h e results of this maneuver, as s h o w n in t h e lower half of Table 11.2, are s o m e w h a t closer to the results of my earlier a n a l y s i s , which also implicitly controls for floors a n d c e i l i n g s . However, except for taking into account ceiling effects, this set of results has no m o r e theoretical w a r r a n t than the first. For like the s i m p l e subtraction a p p r o a c h , it fails to link probability of switching sides on an issue with g r a d u a t e d c h a n g e in the m i x of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in p e o p l e ' s h e a d s . 7

To see w h a t linkage m i g h t look like, c o n s i d e r an issue in which c o m m u n i c a t i o n s so strongly favor o n e side - say, t h e liberal side - that even c o n s e r v a t i v e s take the liberal side of a d i c h o t o m o u s i t e m . But such c o n s e r v a t i v e s u p p o r t w o u l d p r e s u m a b l y b e a m b i v a l e n t . H e n c e any intensification o f c o n s e r v a t i v e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s w o u l d tip the b a l a n c e of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s for many c o n s e r v a t i v e s , p r o d u c i n g heavy switching to the c o n s e r v a t i v e side of the d i c h o t o m y . L i b e r a l s , b e c a u s e initially less a m b i v a l e n t , would be less likely to cross the t h r e s h o l d . T h u s , even if both g r o u p s formed exactly t h e s a m e n e w c o n s i d e r a t i o n s - and in this sense exhibited equal c h a n g e - c o n s e r v a t i v e s w o u l d be m o r e apt to switch s i d e s , with the most a w a r e most likely to do so o w i n g to heavier e x p o s u r e to n e w ideas and ( m o s t likely) g r e a t e r initial a m b i v a l e n c e resulting from p r i o r r e c e p t i o n of c o u n t e r v a l e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n . This sort of a r g u m e n t c o u l d , I believe, m a k e a useful s t a r t i n g point for future research in this a r e a . 8

a w a r e n e s s . I h a v e offered a t h r e e - p a r t e x p l a n a t i o n for this r e s i s t a n c e , c e n t e r i n g on the m e c h a n i s m s of inertial r e s i s t a n c e , c o u n t e r v a l e n t resistance, and p a r t i s a n resistance. Of t h e t h r e e , c o u n t e r v a l e n t resistance - t h e c l a i m that better informed p e o p l e are m o r e resistant to d o m i n a n t persuasive m e s s a g e s b e c a u s e they are m o r e likely to b e c o m e a w a r e of low-intensity c o u n t e r v a l e n t information flows - s e e m s to h a v e t h e strongest e m p i r i c a l support. It is h a r d to imagine how o n e m i g h t explain the p e c u l i a r p a t t e r n s of c h a n g e that arose d u r i n g the V i e t n a m W a r and in voting in c o n g r e s s i o n a l e l e c t i o n s w i t h o u t reference to the effects of c o u n t e r v a l e n t communications. P a r t i s a n r e s i s t a n c e , t h e c l a i m that p e o p l e reject i d e a s that they a r e a b l e t o r e c o g n i z e as being inconsistent with their v a l u e s , likewise s e e m s to be on a firm f o u n d a t i o n , as j u s t i n d i c a t e d . T h i s b r i n g s us to inertial r e s i s t a n c e , w h i c h is the idea that p e o p l e h a v i n g a large store of initial c o n s i d e r a t i o n s on an issue a r e m o r e resistant to s u b s e q u e n t c h a n g e . T h i s resistance m e c h a n i s m , a l t h o u g h d a t i n g t o C o n v e r s e ' s (1962) introduction of the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e d y n a m i c , is o p e n to q u e s t i o n . T h e probl e m s are both theoretical and e m p i r i c a l . On t h e theoretical s i d e , s u p p o s e that C and Z), are c o u n t e r v a l e n t and d o m i n a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in a p e r s o n ' s m i n d at an initial point in t i m e , and that C and D are c o u n t e r v a l e n t and d o m i n a n t cons i d e r a t i o n s acquired o v e r a s u b s e q u e n t t i m e p e r i o d . T h e e x p e c t e d r e s p o n s e c h a n g e o v e r t i m e is t h e n given by: {

2

2

• , , , C h a n g e in r e s p o n s e probability = nu

(Ci + C )

h

2

C, 7 The pattern in Table 11.2 would be perfect, except for high-awareness doves, who show much larger than expected change. I was naturally curious about this problem and so investigated it. Virtually all of the difficulty is with two individuals (in a cell of 26) who shifted from 1 on the seven-point Central America scale in 1986 to 7 in 1987, a maximal change in the wrong direction. Immediately following this question in the 1987 survey was a question about whether aid to the Contra guerrillas should be increased, decreased, or kept the same. Both of the problematic doves responded by volunteering that aid to the Contras should be entirely cut off! Apparently, then, their stated support for "much greater U.S. involvement in Central America" is misleading. One possibility is that they wanted the United States to be more involved in development projects or humanitarian relief. More likely, however, is that they simply made an error in using the sevenpoint scale. This would have been easy since the 1987 survey was conducted by telephone. In this mode, interviewers describe a seven-point scale to respondents rather than, as in a regular NES survey, give respondents a show-card with a labeled seven-point scale. I monitored many of the 1987 telephone interviewers and heard one case in which I was certain that a respondent picked the wrong number to describe her self-described position on Central America and another in which I felt it was likely that an error had been made. The SRC interviewing staff is generally reluctant to use seven-point scales over the telephone, and this case may illustrate why. 8 Because it is difficult to anticipate issues on which attitudes will change in the real world, it might be necessary to pursue the relationship between considerations and susceptibility to change in a laboratory setting. A type of opinion that is particularly suitable for use in examining attitude change in a natural setting is presidential approval, which can be counted upon to exhibit relatively large amounts of variation over time. s

,

(11.1)

C, + D ,

T h e claim of inertial resistance is that the larger C , , the greater the p e r s o n ' s resistance to the effects of the d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e . If s o , the derivative of E q u a tion 7 . 1 w i t h respect t o C , o u g h t t o b e p o s i t i v e , w h i c h w o u l d indicate that h i g h e r initial n u m b e r s of c o u n t e r v a l e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a r e , all else e q u a l , associated with higher levels of c o n t i n u e d s u p p o r t for the c o u n t e r v a l e n t position. However, this d e r i v a t i v e turns out not to be p o s i t i v e ; it is a c o m p l i c a t e d function that indicates no c l e a r r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n C

{

and resistance to a d o m i n a n t

9

message. Despite t h i s , the notion of inertial resistance r e m a i n s an intuitively plausible o n e . T h e r e w a s , moreover, s o m e c l e a r e m p i r i c a l s u p p o r t for it in the analysis of v o t i n g in H o u s e e l e c t i o n s . O n e m i g h t , in a d d i t i o n , c o u n t t h e steadfast loyalty of 9 Numerical analysis of the derivative with plausible values for the key terms indicates that C, is, as expected, often associated with resistance to a dominant message, but never very strongly. Derivatives of Equation 7.1 testing for the effects of C and D , which are associated with countervalent and partisan resistance, do have the expected signs. 2

2

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sophisticated older p a r t i s a n s to established ideas c o n c e r n i n g K o r e a and Vietn a m , as discussed in C h a p t e r 8, as e v i d e n c e for inertial resistance. T h e idea here w o u l d be that old p a r t i s a n s have longer e x p e r i e n c e with these ideas and h e n c e a greater store of inertial c o n s i d e r a t i o n s m a k i n g t h e m resistant to c h a n g e . But there are also s o m e e m p i r i c a l p r o b l e m s . A p a r t i c u l a r l y troubling o n e involved t h e p u b l i c ' s r e s p o n s e t o President N i x o n ' s initiatives toward the c o m m u n i s t g o v e r n m e n t of m a i n l a n d C h i n a , as discussed in C h a p t e r 6. T h i s w a s an issue that had exercised c o n s e r v a t i v e s for t w o d e c a d e s , and so I e x p e c t e d that sophisticated c o n s e r v a t i v e s , especially older o n e s , would exhibit s o m e inertial resistance to a d m i s s i o n of " R e d C h i n a , " as the c o u n t r y w a s then called, to the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . But I s e a r c h e d diligently for e v i d e n c e of such inertial resist a n c e - w h i c h should have taken the form of a n o n m o n o t o n i c r e l a t i o n s h i p b e tween awareness and s u p p o r t for recognition of C h i n a - and could find n o n e . T h e relationship to t h e n e w m a i n s t r e a m n o r m w a s , as reported in C h a p t e r 6, as monotonically positive a m o n g c o n s e r v a t i v e s a s a m o n g other types o f p e o p l e .

insufficient to implant a n e w idea in a n y o n e ' s h e a d , but a d e q u a t e to a w a k e n and

286

A n o t h e r d i s a p p o i n t m e n t , from the point of view of inertial resistance, w a s the b r e a t h t a k i n g l y swift m o v e m e n t of Republican activists, individuals w h o w o u l d u n d o u b t e d l y score at the top of m e a s u r e s of b o t h p a r t i s a n s h i p and political a w a r e n e s s , toward w a g e and price controls o n c e N i x o n a n n o u n c e d his s u p p o r t of t h e m in 1 9 7 1 , as also discussed in C h a p t e r 6. T h i s policy w a s as antithetical to traditional Republican c o n s e r v a t i s m as any that o n e can i m a g i n e , but it p r o v o k e d scarcely any resistance. T h e s e t w o c a s e s , in c o m b i n a t i o n with the m o d e r a t e m a g n i t u d e s of t h e effect of inertial resistance in congressional e l e c t i o n s , feed the impression that inertial resistance is less i m p o r t a n t than either p a r t i s a n or c o u n t e r v a l e n t resistance as a source of resistance to d o m i n a n t political m e s s a g e s . T h e notion of inertial resistance should certainly be kept alive, but it should also be treated with r e s e r v e until a reformulated t h e o r y or better d a t a can p r o v i d e it with a stronger w a r r a n t . O n e possibility is that .inertial r e s i s t a n c e , like the other t w o forms of resist a n c e , d e p e n d s on n o u r i s h m e n t from c u r r e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . I suggest this bec a u s e in the two c a s e s in w h i c h there w a s s o m e t h i n g like inertial resistance to a n e w idea - the c o n t r a s t i n g cases of sophisticated o l d e r c o n s e r v a t i v e s resisting t h e K o r e a n W a r and of sophisticated older liberals resisting a n t i - V i e t n a m W a r ideas - there w a s a m p l e reinforcement for preexisting attitudes in elite disc o u r s e . In the c a s e in w h i c h , as it s e e m e d to m e , inertial resistance should have been present but apparently w a s not - N i x o n ' s reversal of U . S . policy toward c o m m u n i s t C h i n a - there w a s virtually no elite opposition to N i x o n ' s n e w policy and also no resistance a m o n g sophisticated c o n s e r v a t i v e s . H e n c e w h a t I am calling inertial resistance m a y w o r k s o m e t h i n g like this: P e o p l e with large stores of preexisting c o n s i d e r a t i o n s with respect to an issue m a y exhibit unusual resistance to new ideas but only so long as elite discourse gives s o m e indication of the c o n t i n u e d relevance of their old feelings. A b s e n t m i n i m a l elite v a l i d a t i o n , old feelings m a y be s w a m p e d by ideas of the m o m e n t , as in N i x o n ' s policy reversal on C h i n a . Elite v a l i d a t i o n , on this view, m i g h t be

287

invigorate preexisting ideas. It is useful to recall at this point that t w o of my three resistance m e c h a n i s m s , p a r t i s a n and c o u n t e r v a l e n t resistance, d e p e n d on n o u r i s h m e n t from elite disc o u r s e (cueing m e s s a g e s in the first c a s e , c o u n t e r v a l e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n s in the s e c o n d ) . N o w it turns out that even inertial r e s i s t a n c e , already the least important of t h e three m e c h a n i s m s , m a y also d e p e n d on elite c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h e implication of all this is painfully clear: T h e capacity of citizens for a u t o n o m o u s resistance to d o m i n a n t elite c o m m u n i c a t i o n s is very distinctly limited. I t u r n , finally, to a large but almost invisible simplification in the receptiona c c e p t a n c e m o d e l , n a m e l y the implicit a s s u m p t i o n that individuals never think for t h e m s e l v e s , but instead rely exclusively on the reception of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s reaching t h e m from t h e external e n v i r o n m e n t . Technically, this presupposition m a y be stated as follows: Prob(Attitude change) = Prob(Reception) x Prob(Acceptance I Reception) + P r o b ( A c c e p t a n c e I No reception) w h e r e P r o b ( A c c e p t a n c e I No reception) is c o n s t r a i n e d always to be z e r o . It is difficult to say h o w large a simplification is involved h e r e . But before discussing that q u e s t i o n , I want to put t h e m o d e l ' s constraint c o n c e r n i n g indep e n d e n t thought in p e r s p e c t i v e by noting w h a t t h e m o d e l does allow. It d o e s allow p e o p l e to v a r y in their political p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s , so that citizens m a y be m o r e or less strongly predisposed toward equality, hawkish military policies, tolerance of dissent, and so forth. W h e t h e r these predispositions are p r o d u c t s of socialization, adult e x p e r i e n c e , self-interest, inborn personality, or r e a s o n e d c h o i c e , they represent c r i t i c a l , internally m o t i v a t e d influences on opinion a n d , as s u c h , afford citizens an important d e g r e e of a u t o n o m y from elite inform a t i o n flows. To put the m a t t e r m o r e strongly: T h e m o d e l d o e s not c l a i m , as a reader of an early draft of this b o o k c o m p l a i n e d , that individuals are the passive receptacles of w h a t e v e r elites want t h e m to believe; the c l a i m , rather, is that citizens pick and c h o o s e , on the basis of their predispositions, from the m e n u of elitesponsored a l t e r n a t i v e s to which they have b e e n e x p o s e d . T h i s is still a strong c l a i m , but a less o u t r a g e o u s o n e . T h e a r g u m e n t is that most c i t i z e n s , to the extent they are attentive to politics, align t h e m s e l v e s with leaders or g r o u p s that share their predispositions and have m o r e information t h a n they d o . In this way, they avoid the necessity - and perhaps t h e practical impossibility - of really thinking about issues. (The n o r m a t i v e and research implications of this claim are c o n s i d e r e d in C h a p t e r 12.) Let me play out this logic as it applies to a c o n c r e t e c a s e that h a s been extensively e x a m i n e d in this b o o k , the V i e t n a m War. T h i s is an issue that is often said to have b e e n agonizingly difficult for m a n y p e r s o n s , especially e d u c a t e d liberals. T h e s e were p e o p l e w h o t e n d e d to be strong supporters of the w a r in its

288

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initial phase but found the w a r increasingly difficult to s u p p o r t and eventually t u r n e d , a m i d m u c h d i s c o m f o r t , o v e r w h e l m i n g l y against it. T h e m o d e l , of c o u r s e , explains both the initial s u p p o r t and s u b s e q u e n t o p p o sition of e d u c a t e d liberals as a response to the c u e s of liberal elites. If, as w a s the c a s e , it proved difficult for many e d u c a t e d liberals to turn against t h e w a r as liberal elite opinion leaders b e c a m e increasingly antiwar, this might simply be a c a s e of a m b i v a l e n c e b e t w e e n o p p o s i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , w h e r e the a m b i v a l e n c e has been brought about by " i n e r t i a l r e s i s t a n c e " to the new a n t i w a r m e s s a g e . S u c h inertial resistance w a s , as the model w o u l d expect, m u c h stronger a m o n g o l d e r liberals, w h o , in contrast to y o u n g e r o n e s , had built up large stores of antic o m m u n i s m and o t h e r C o l d W a r - t y p e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . A l t h o u g h few e d u c a t e d liberals may have consciously experienced t h e m s e l v e s as suffering t h e effects of inertial resistance to a new elite n o r m , it does not s e e m to me that t h e m o d e l d o e s an o b v i o u s injustice in claiming that this is w h a t q c c u r r e d .

However, the d y n a m i c s of a " p u b l i c opinion b a s e d on intergroup f e e l i n g s " need not fundamentally differ from the d y n a m i c s of a public opinion b a s e d on elite d i s c o u r s e , as p r o p o s e d in this b o o k . P e o p l e w h o pay little attention to elite d i s c o u r s e would still need to acquire information about the w o r l d and to evaluate it in light of s o m e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of w h a t the information m e a n s ; they w o u l d also still formulate attitude r e p o r t s on the basis of top-of-the-head information (or feelings), with all that follows from this. O n l y t h e sources of the leadership c u e s and information flows n e e d be different: T h e y m i g h t originate in informal or n e i g h b o r h o o d subcultures r a t h e r than in a m a i n s t r e a m elite, and might diffuse by w o r d of m o u t h rather t h a n via t h e m e d i a . S u c h c o m m u n i c a t i o n flows m a y be as likely to contradict as to c o r r o b o r a t e information from the elite c o m m u n i c a t i o n c h a n n e l s , as an e x a m p l e from the former Soviet U n i o n will shortly illustrate, but they n e e d not contradict any principles of the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l . As I o b s e r v e d earlier, c o m m u n i c a t i o n s transmitted by face-to-face interaction in the m a n n e r of g e r m s m a y obey the principles of t h e m o d e l to the same extent as elite c o m m u n i c a t i o n s that diffuse through the m a s s m e d i a .

I am less confident that the a r g u m e n t of this b o o k can capture the processes by which the attitude r e p o r t s of less attentive p e o p l e are formed. T h e reason is that, being less politically a t t e n t i v e , they are less influenced by the flow of p o litical c o m m u n i c a t i o n s that is at the h e a r t of the b o o k ' s a r g u m e n t . H o w less attentive p e r s o n s respond to political issues in the absence of attention to or information about many of t h e m is a difficult q u e s t i o n . P a r t of the answer, as we have s e e n , is that their attitude r e p o r t s tend to be u n r e l i a b l e , in that they lack t e m p o r a l stability and are p o o r l y correlated with their political predispositions. A n o t h e r p a r t of the a n s w e r is that politically inattentive p e o p l e m a y often give " m i s t a k e n " attitude r e p o r t s , in t h e sense that they r e s p o n d on the basis of an incorrect g u e s s about the m e a n i n g of the q u e s t i o n s they have been a s k e d . I w a s able to report o n e clear c a s e of this in C h a p t e r 5, w h e r e it w a s s h o w n that inattentive persons r e s p o n d e d to a sparely w o r d e d q u e s t i o n about U . S . s p e n d i n g on aid to the C o n t r a rebels as if they were being asked about g o v e r n m e n t spending in g e n e r a l . T h e result w a s that social welfare liberals were most s u p p o r t i v e of aid to" the C o n t r a s and social welfare c o n s e r v a t i v e s m o s t o p p o s e d . This w r o n g - w a y c o r r e l a t i o n with ideology d i s a p p e a r e d , however, w h e n a m o r e e l a b o r a t e q u e s t i o n c o n v e y e d the information that the C o n t r a s w e r e o p p o nents of c o m m u n i s m . T h e s e o b s e r v a t i o n s a c c e n t u a t e the n e g a t i v e , in that they stress w h a t is missing from the attitude r e p o r t s of the politically inattentive. T h i s is not i n a p p r o p r i a t e , but there must be a positive s i d e , as well, to indicate what does occur. It s e e m s likely that the s a m e predispositions that a n i m a t e the attitude r e p o r t s of the politically a w a r e are present and influential a m o n g the less a w a r e . It is j u s t that they m a y o p e r a t e m o r e directly on opinion - or at least o p e r a t e indep e n d e n t l y of any m e d i a t i o n via the information and leadership c u e s c a r r i e d in elite political discourse. T h u s , for e x a m p l e , S n i d e r m a n , Brody, and Tetlock (1991) report t h a t , a m o n g p o o r l y e d u c a t e d p e r s o n s , feelings or affect toward v a r i o u s political and social g r o u p s are a potent influence on attitude r e p o r t s , w h e r e a s , a m o n g better e d u c a t e d p e r s o n s , indicators of ideology are t h e d o m i nant influence.

But might not the ideas that o r i g i n a t e a m o n g the public and diffuse by word of m o u t h be different from those that o r i g i n a t e a m o n g elites? I n d e e d , they m i g h t . Taxpayer revolts and b a c k l a s h e s of v a r i o u s t y p e s , including w h i t e backlashes against federal efforts to p r o m o t e racial equality, are probably o n e type of attitude that tends to o r i g i n a t e m o r e often a m o n g the public than a m o n g elites t h o u g h , even h e r e , there a r e cases in w h i c h politicians stir up b a c k l a s h e s and voter revolts b e c a u s e they expect to profit politically by t h e m . All this brings us b a c k to the q u e s t i o n discussed earlier: H o w often do elites a u t o n o m o u s l y lead opinion and how often do they simply go along with a public that o p e r a t e s on its o w n internal d y n a m i c ? A n d as in my e a r l i e r d i s c u s s i o n , I have no general a n s w e r to this q u e s t i o n . I can only o b s e r v e that in the p a r t i c u l a r cases e x a m i n e d in this b o o k , there is reason to believe that elites p r e d o m i n a t e l y led rather than followed.

Methodological

issues

T h e central effort of the latter half of this b o o k h a s been to show h o w public opinion is formed from an interaction b e t w e e n aggregate-level variation in the intensity of political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and individual-level differences in political a w a r e n e s s and political values. Additional issues a r i s e in the statistical m o d eling of this interaction. I have taken two general a p p r o a c h e s , o n e that a s s u m e s the diffusion of a single m e s s a g e through the p u b l i c , and a n o t h e r that a s s u m e s t w o c o m p e t i n g m e s sages. T h e first a p p r o a c h , t h o u g h b a s e d on a simplification, yields surprisingly a c c u r a t e predictions about w h a t should be e x p e c t e d u n d e r a r a n g e of p a r t i c u l a r c o n d i t i o n s . But, as C h a p t e r s 9 and 10 have m a d e clear, there are i m p o r t a n t features of m a s s opinion that cannot be explained by a o n e - m e s s a g e m o d e l . In particular, the cross-cutting m o v e m e n t s of liberal opinion early in t h e V i e t n a m War, and t h e inverse association b e t w e e n c a m p a i g n intensity and aggregate-level

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defection to the o p p o s i t i o n party in e l e c t i o n s , require the explicit m o d e l i n g of a t w o - m e s s a g e information flow. I suspect that s o m e readers will e x p e r i e n c e t h e progression of my a r g u m e n t from o n e - m e s s a g e to t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l s with a degree of frustration. T w o m e s s a g e m o d e l s are statistically c u m b e r s o m e , i m p o s e d a t a r e q u i r e m e n t s that can rarely be m e t , and fail to yield c l e a r predictions about w h a t will h a p p e n in a given situation. A n d if the predictions of the o n e - m e s s a g e m o d e l - which are not only c l e a r but aesthetically attractive - have only limited applicability, these readers will w o n d e r w h a t , after all, a r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l is really w o r t h . I think, however, that any d i s p a r a g e m e n t of t w o - m e s s a g e variants of the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l is u n w a r r a n t e d . For although t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l s c a n n o t readily be used deductively, they can certainly be used, as in t h e V i e t n a m c a s e and the presidential p r i m a r i e s c a s e , as t h e basis for r i g o r o u s statistical m o d e l i n g . Moreover, t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l s p e r f o r m t h e i m p o r t a n t service of explaining why the s i m p l e r o n e - m e s s a g e m o d e l breaks d o w n in the cases in w h i c h it d o e s break d o w n , and of d o i n g so in a way that vindicates the essential principles of the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e process. If criticism is d u e the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l s I have d e v e l o p e d , it is that there is t o o little c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n the o n e - m e s s a g e and t w o - m e s s a g e versions of t h e m . It w o u l d be preferable to have a single statistical m o d e l that w o u l d , by m e a n s of explicit simplifying a s s u m p t i o n s , reduce to various s i m p l e r forms. But I h a v e been unable to formulate such a m a s t e r r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l . A n o t h e r c o n c e r n is statistical robustness. S o m e of my results, as has b e e n a p p a r e n t , are quite fragile. T h e fragility manifests itself in large s t a n d a r d e r r o r s for coefficients and the need to constrain p a r a m e t e r s in m o d e l s in o r d e r to obtain conventionally significant e s t i m a t e s . T h i s statistical imprecision h a s s o m e t i m e s involved the two m o s t theoretically i m p o r t a n t effects in the R A S m o d e l , the effects of a w a r e n e s s on r e c e p t i o n and on resistance to p e r s u a s i o n , given r e c e p t i o n . T w o r e m a r k s are in o r d e r h e r e . First, c o n t e m p o r a r y statistical theory, t h o u g h not m o s t public opinion r e s e a r c h , tends to d o w n p l a y the i m p o r t a n c e of statistical significance as e s t i m a t e d from a single test of a m o d e l on a single d a t a s e t . It instead e m p h a s i z e s the stability of results o b t a i n e d across related p r o b l e m s and d a t a s e t s , and e m p h a s i z e s , as w e l l , the substantive m a g n i t u d e of p a r t i c u l a r effects and the theoretical p a t t e r n into which they fit ( A c h e n , 1983). E v a l u a t e d in light of these criteria, the results reported in C h a p t e r s 7 through 10 of this b o o k are strong. Political a w a r e n e s s , in particular, h a s proven itself extremely important, p r o d u c i n g l a r g e , theoretically intelligible and occasionally nonintuitive effects. W h e n the m a g n i t u d e s of these a w a r e n e s s effects have v a r i e d , the variation h a s often been in conformity with theory (as in t h e lack of an awareness effect on resistance in certain situations). T h e c o l l e c t i v e weight of this e v i d e n c e , including the b a c k g r o u n d t h e o r y and research on w h i c h the R A S m o d e l is founded, m a k e s it s e e m bootless to w o r r y about t h e s t a n d a r d errors of p a r t i c u l a r coefficients.

The

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research

A n d yet, the information conveyed by the frequently large standard e r r o r s and loose statistical fits is real. E v e n with the constraints I have i m p o s e d on the R A S m o d e l , it has often been u n a b l e to obtain statistically precise fits. T h e r e appear to be three sources of the p r o b l e m . O n e is t h e highly interactive nature of my o n e - m e s s a g e and t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l s . T h e o r y requires political a w a r e n e s s to be entered into these m o d e l s several different times. T h u s , in the o n e - m e s s a g e m o d e l in E q u a t i o n 7 . 7 , a w a r e n e s s must be entered in the reception functions of both the baseline and c h a n g e m o d e l s , and in the a c c e p t a n c e functions of both m o d e l s . In the t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l proposed in C h a p t e r 9, awareness a p p e a r s in the r e c e p t i o n function for both the liberal and c o n s e r v a t i v e m e s s a g e s , in the a c c e p t a n c e function for both m e s s a g e s , and in the recall function. T h e predispositional variables are entered t w i c e . T h e net effect of all t h i s , even after s o m e constraints have been i m p o s e d , is to create a large a m o u n t of multicollinearity, and thereby a loose statistical fit to the data. A n o t h e r source of statistical imprecision is that m u c h of what the m o d e l is trying to capture involves the b e h a v i o r of small subgroups of the overall s a m p l e . In particular, the m o d e l ' s e s t i m a t e of the effect of a w a r e n e s s on resistance d e p e n d s heavily on the handful of persons w h o are both heavily exposed to a m e s sage and predisposed to resist it. S u c h p e o p l e m a y constitute about half of the upper 10 percent of the s a m p l e on political a w a r e n e s s , which is to say, about five percent of the s a m p l e - a s a m p l e that, in several of my cases of attitude c h a n g e , w a s quite small to begin w i t h . Multicollinearity in the p r e s e n c e of small c a s e n u m b e r s in critical s u b g r o u p s can k n o c k the statistical precision out of any m o d e l , no m a t t e r how well crafted it might b e . In c o n s e q u e n c e of all t h i s , the difference b e t w e e n a fit in w h i c h political awareness affects resistance to persuasion and o n e in which it has no such effect m a y be small. This is a p p a r e n t in Figure 1 1 . 1 , which shows w h a t small differe n c e is m a d e in e s t i m a t e d patterns of opinion c h a n g e on U . S . involvement in Central A m e r i c a if a w a r e n e s s is deleted from the a c c e p t a n c e f u n c t i o n . (Note that I have altered the scale of the y-axis in Figure 11.1 from the usual 0 - 1 r a n g e in o r d e r to m a k e it easier to see what is h a p p e n i n g . ) Little wonder, in light of this figure, that the effect of a w a r e n e s s on resistance is difficult to reliably detect. 10

E v e n the effect of a w a r e n e s s on r e c e p t i o n , which appears by my e s t i m a t e s to be a highly reliable effect, m a y be difficult to detect in p a r t i c u l a r c a s e s . L o o k b a c k , for e x a m p l e , at the patterns of voter defections to the R e p u b l i c a n presidential c a n d i d a t e , as s h o w n in Figure 10.6. G r e a t e r a w a r e n e s s is associated with greater resistance to the presidential c a m p a i g n , with no hint that political awareness m a y have any positive effect on r e c e p t i o n . T h e r e is similarly little e v i d e n c e , either visual or statistical, of strong reception effects from political a w a r e n e s s apparent in the d a t a on vote defection in S e n a t e e l e c t i o n s , as also s h o w n in Figure 10.6. Yet t h e m a s s of d a t a presented in the s e c o n d half of this b o o k , as well 10 In estimating the model on which Figure 11.1 is based, I fixed the coefficients in the baseline function to be the same as in Table 7.4, thereby allowing only the coefficients in the change function to freely vary.

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The

OPINION

.50-,

Political awareness

Figure 11.1. When awareness-induced resistance is set to zero. Solid black lines show estimated probabilities of opinion change from standard model; gray lines show estimated change when political awareness is omitted from the acceptance function. Source: 1986 and 1987 NES surveys. as p a r t i c u l a r d a t a involving these e l e c t i o n s (as in Figure 10.7), m a k e it c l e a r that a w a r e n e s s is associated with large individual-level differences in r e c e p t i o n in these cases as in t h e o t h e r s we have e x a m i n e d . In t h e face of these difficulties - multicollinearity, the d e p e n d e n c e of results on relatively small s u b g r o u p s of the overall s a m p l e , and effects that m a y be either subtle or invisible in p a r t i c u l a r contexts - w h a t can be d o n e ? It is i m p o r t a n t , first of all, to be clear that n o n e of these difficulties is a difficulty of the R A S m o d e l itself. It is not, that is, a difficulty of the m o d e l that political a w a r e n e s s h a s b o t h reception and a c c e p t a n c e effects, and that these effects may, u n d e r certain c o n d i t i o n s , interact in w a y s that p r o d u c e gentle nonm o n o t o n i c curves that are h a r d to distinguish from negatively sloped straight lines or almost flat lines. T h e difficulty, rather, is in finding w a y s to test the m o d e l that give its e x p e c t e d effects a fair c h a n c e to show up in typically noisy survey data. 1

T h e p r e c a u t i o n s n e c e s s a r y to conduct reliable tests of statistical m o d e l s are generally w e l l - k n o w n , but let me add a few r e m a r k s relating to p e c u l i a r i t i e s of the R A S m o d e l . Reliable measures. I n a s m u c h as results often d e p e n d on the b e h a v i o r of relatively small s u b g r o u p s at the extremes of high and low a w a r e n e s s , it is essential to have m e a s u r e s of political awareness that can reliably distinguish those subgroups. As explained in C h a p t e r 2 and in the M e a s u r e s A p p e n d i x , simple tests of political k n o w l e d g e s e e m to discharge this m e a s u r e m e n t function better than alt e r n a t i v e m e a s u r e s . In e v e r y c a s e in w h i c h I had an o p p o r t u n i t y to m a k e c o m p a r i s o n s , other types of m e a s u r e s did w o r s e in the sense that they showed w e a k e r effects than m e a s u r e s of political k n o w l e d g e were able to detect. T h u s ,

model

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if I had used variables o t h e r than political k n o w l e d g e in my tests of the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l , I would have obtained significantly w e a k e r results than I did - and in s o m e c a s e s , nothing of interest at all. It is an interesting oddity that different disciplines prefer different types of items to m e a s u r e w h a t I have been calling political awareness. Political scientists are partial to interest in politics, especially self-report m e a s u r e s of interest in election c a m p a i g n s . " C o m m u n i c a t i o n specialists prefer self-reports of m e d i a exposure (though see P r i c e and Zaller, 1990). Sociologists like to use e d u c a t i o n , which they see as a m e a s u r e of social stratification. O n l y p s y c h o l o g i s t s , for reasons no less r o o t e d in disciplinary prejudice, m a k e w i d e s p r e a d use of political k n o w l e d g e , w h i c h they take as a m e a s u r e of " e x p e r t i s e , " on which they have a large literature. It is, as a l w a y s , also i m p o r t a n t to use statistically reliable m e a s u r e s . T h r e e - or four-item k n o w l e d g e s c a l e s , in which all of the items have roughly m i d d l i n g levels of difficulty, will n o r m a l l y fail to provide g o o d d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in the critical extremes of high and low political awareness. If a researcher can use only three or four i t e m s , they should at least be k n o w l e d g e tests that v a r y in difficulty from easy to h a r d . 1 2

T h e R A S m o d e l is no less sensitive to reliable m e a s u r e m e n t of political predispositions. For e x a m p l e , my findings on attitude c h a n g e on U . S . involvement in Central A m e r i c a are entirely d e p e n d e n t on the availability of an eight-item militarism scale, w h i c h , by pure luck, h a p p e n e d to be u n d e r g o i n g testing in a study that spanned the I r a n - C o n t r a controversy. Survey size. It s e e m s likely that the t w o - w a v e survey of 3 6 0 p e r s o n s , as used in the e s t i m a t i o n of attitude c h a n g e on Central A m e r i c a , is near the m i n i m u m n u m b e r of cases n e c e s s a r y to adequately test the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l . I say this b e c a u s e the a m o u n t and p a t t e r n of attitude c h a n g e , as apparent in the raw d a t a , c o n f o r m well to theoretical e x p e c t a t i o n s , and the m e a s u r e s n e c e s s a r y to capture this c h a n g e w e r e about as g o o d as they could reasonably have b e e n , including, as they d i d , b o t h a 22-item a w a r e n e s s scale with an alpha reliability of .87 and the P e f f l e y - H u r w i t z militarism i t e m s to which I just referred. D e s p i t e all t h i s , the R A S m o d e l p r o d u c e d coefficient e s t i m a t e s that, a l t h o u g h having g o o d m a g n i t u d e s , w e r e barely able to achieve c o n v e n t i o n a l levels of statistical significance, even after constraining the m o d e l . It will, of c o u r s e , be quite difficult to achieve large s a m p l e sizes in surveys designed to capture attitude c h a n g e , since it is rarely possible to anticipate in a d v a n c e w h e n attitude c h a n g e will occur and w h a t q u e s t i o n s will be n e c e s s a r y to c a p t u r e it. U See pp. 235-6 in Chapter 10 for a discussion of the particular pitfalls of this measure. 12 Knowledge items that pose easy or hard tests tend, because of their limited variance, to produce misleadingly low item-to-total correlations (see Zaller, 1985, for examples). Thus, researchers wanting to build powerful measures of awareness need either to ignore the item-to-total correlations of their easy and hard items, or use suitable nonlinear and nonstandardized measures of statistical association (for example, item-to-total logit or probit coefficients).

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Variance in information flow. L a r g e datasets and reliable m e a s u r e s , despite their i m p o r t a n c e , m a y bring only m i n o r gains in testing of the R A S m o d e l . W h a t is most essential is g o o d v a r i a n c e on the principal independent variable in the m o d e l , namely, the aggregate-level flow of c h a n g e - i n d u c i n g persuasive c o m m u nications. To get this v a r i a n c e , it is n e c e s s a r y to m o v e away from s i m p l e cases like those e x a m i n e d in C h a p t e r s 7 and 8, w h e r e t h e w h o l e public h a s b e e n exp o s e d to t h e s a m e flow of persuasive c o m m u n i c a t i o n s between a single pair of survey o b s e r v a t i o n s , and to try instead to locate cases in which there is usable aggregate-level v a r i a t i o n in information flow. C h a p t e r 9, which analyzed attit u d e c h a n g e on the V i e t n a m W a r over a six-year p e r i o d , and C h a p t e r 10, which e x a m i n e d the effect of 77 different H o u s e c a m p a i g n s on voter a t t i t u d e s , showed w h a t can be l e a r n e d from such c a s e s . T h e fine analyses of E r b r i n g , G o l d e n b e r g , and Miller (1980), M a c K u e n (1984), and B a r t e l s (1988) p r o v i d e further e x a m ples of the testing of sophisticated individual-level m o d e l s of attitude f o r m a t i o n and c h a n g e by capitalizing on v a r i a n c e in the flow of political i n f o r m a t i o n . Modeling technology. N o t h i n g in the four a x i o m s of the R A S m o d e l requires that it be o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d and tested by m e a n s of t h e c o m p l i c a t e d nonlinear m o d els I have used in this b o o k . But given the inevitable limitations of the d a t a available for testing t h e m o d e l , it is essential to squeeze as m u c h m e a n i n g as possible from t h e available e v i d e n c e . At least in the c a s e of the R A S m o d e l , this will m e a n frequent resort to c o m p l i c a t e d n o n l i n e a r m o d e l s . My analysis of attitude c h a n g e would have been m u c h less successful if it had relied on s t a n d a r d linear regression m o d e l s , including interactive variants of these m o d e l s , instead of taking t h e path it h a s . I certainly do not c l a i m that the o p e r a t i o n a l forms into which I have cast the R A S m o d e l are ideal. But they do have t h e virtue of taking central a c c o u n t of the c o m p l e x interaction that exists a m o n g political a w a r e n e s s , political predisposit i o n s , and t h e flow of political i n f o r m a t i o n , and s o m e type of nonlinear m o d e l that can efficiently do this is essential for testing the R A S m o d e l . M o d e l i n g t e c h n o l o g y is t h e o n e factor in testing the R A S m o d e l that is fully u n d e r the control of opinion researchers. T h e y should not fail to m a k e t h e most of it. A final m e t h o d o l o g i c a l issue is my m e a s u r e m e n t of aggregate-level information flow. A l t h o u g h t h e flow of elite c o m m u n i c a t i o n s in the m e d i a is a p r i m e indep e n d e n t variable in my a n a l y s i s , I have m a d e no attempt to m e a s u r e it precisely. T h i s is true even in my analysis of attitudes t o w a r d V i e t n a m , w h e r e I c o m m i s sioned counts of stories for and against the w a r in several n e w s m a g a z i n e s . T h e difficulty is t h a t , as explained a few p a g e s a g o , m e s s a g e intensity involves m o r e than just the n u m b e r and salience of stories that are c a r r i e d in the m e d i a . It also involves characteristics of a m a s s a u d i e n c e that d o e s or d o e s not find a story interesting. Ia the long r u n , it will be desirable to distinguish sharply the s e p a r a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s of m e d i a attention and m a s s receptivity to the

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p e n e t r a t i n g power of a given m e s s a g e , which is h o w I defined m e s s a g e intensity. P r o g r e s s on this p r o b l e m will involve m o r e than better s t o r y - c o u n t i n g techniques. It will likely involve t h e union of a m o r e refined t h e o r y of the " m e s s a g e r e c e i v e r ' ' with a closely allied t h e o r y of m e d i a c o n t e n t analysis. In t h e m e a n t i m e , r e s e a r c h e r s c o m p a r i n g p a r t i c u l a r cases of m a s s attitude c h a n g e will have to d e p e n d on their judgments of the intensities of the c o m m u nication flows that have b r o u g h t about c h a n g e , even w h e n they have m a d e precise c o u n t s of m e d i a r e p o r t a g e . A n d to this extent, their tests of the m o d e l will be s o m e w h a t ad h o c . H a v i n g now d o n e my best to evaluate my f o r m u l a t i o n and testing of the R A S m o d e l , I wish to c o n s i d e r possible extensions.

PARSIMONY AS A V A L U E T h e centrifugal urge in a c a d e m i c r e s e a r c h , by w h i c h I m e a n the t e n d e n c y to d e velop n e w c o n c e p t s and n e w theoretical m a c h i n e r y for each n e w substantive p r o b l e m , is very strong in t h e political b e h a v i o r field. It a p p e a r s , moreover, that the m o s t gifted r e s e a r c h e r s e x p e r i e n c e t h e urge most strongly. T h e result, as I l a m e n t e d in the o p e n i n g of this b o o k , is that opinion research has b e c o m e deeply and needlessly f r a g m e n t e d , almost c o m p l e t e l y lacking in theoretical c o h e r e n c e as each n e w survey q u e s t i o n e m e r g e s as the object of its o w n specialized research literature. T h i s b o o k has been w r i t t e n in self-conscious opposition to this centrifugal u r g e . T h e a i m h a s been to identify a c o m p a c t set of c o r e ideas and to tie as m a n y p h e n o m e n a as possible to this c o r e . A l t h o u g h this effort might be unflatteringly c h a r a c t e r i z e d as i m p e r i a l i s t i c , the a n i m a t i n g spirit has been that of p a r s i m o n i o u s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . For, all else e q u a l , the m o r e c o n c e p t s and d i s t i n c t i o n s used to account for a given set of p h e n o m e n a , t h e less well those p h e n o m e n a are understood. In the spirit of p a r s i m o n y rather than i m p e r i a l i s m , t h e n , I w o u l d like to suggest s o m e additional p h e n o m e n a that currently exist as s e p a r a t e research topics but t h a t , I b e l i e v e , can be fruitfully analyzed within the f r a m e w o r k of the R A S m o d e l . T h e issues are evaluation of presidential character, trust in g o v e r n m e n t , and p o p u l a r s u p p o r t for a u t h o r i t a r i a n r e g i m e s .

Evaluation

of presidential

character

In a classic of the voting literature, S t o k e s (1966) argued that fluctuations in the p u b l i c ' s a s s e s s m e n t s of the personal qualities of presidential c a n d i d a t e s are the m o s t i m p o r t a n t factor in explaining interelection s w i n g s in the v o t e . R e c e n t research has tried to specify m o r e precisely the nature of these c h a r a c t e r assessm e n t s . Two streams of analysis have e m e r g e d . O n e is c o n c e r n e d with e m o t i o n a l reactions to the c a n d i d a t e s - feelings of fear, h o p e , p r i d e , and so forth. T h e o t h e r focuses on the p u b l i c ' s e v a l u a t i o n s of presidential character, especially the

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extent to which t h e c a n d i d a t e s s e e m to possess the traits of personal integrity and competence. Both streams of research have tended to focus on the factor structure of p o p ular reactions to presidential c h a r a c t e r - that is, the d i m e n s i o n s of j u d g m e n t that u n d e r l i e p e o p l e ' s a s s e s s m e n t s ( s e e , for e x a m p l e , Kinder, 1986). It has not d e voted m u c h attention to how, and whether, p e o p l e form their a s s e s s m e n t s of presidential character. T h e implicit a s s u m p t i o n in this area of opinion r e s e a r c h , as in most of the public opinion field, has been that all citizens pay e n o u g h attention to politics to d e v e l o p structured reactions to the n a t i o n ' s leading political figures. T h e a p p r o a c h t a k e n h e r e , in contrast, is to c o n s i d e r " i n f o r m a t i o n " about a p r e s i d e n t ' s c h a r a c t e r a " c a m p a i g n m e s s a g e " like other persuasive m e s s a g e s , and to use the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e model to c a p t u r e the diffusion p a t t e r n s of this m e s s a g e . T h e idea is that people w h o pay m o r e attention to politics receive m o r e information relating to presidential c h a r a c t e r and that they r e s p o n d to this information on t h e basis of their general levels of political a w a r e n e s s , their i d e o logical v a l u e s , a n d their p a r t i s a n s h i p . Less attentive citizens e n c o u n t e r less evidence of presidential c h a r a c t e r and are less able to m a k e p a r t i s a n and ideological evaluations of the e v i d e n c e they do c o m e across. S u c h an a p p r o a c h s e e m s at least initially p l a u s i b l e . Presidential c a n d i d a t e s always try in a general w a y to project sterling personal qualities and to k e e p their w a r t s h i d d e n from view. Occasionally, their efforts m a y b e c o m e c o n s p i c u o u s , as in J i m m y C a r t e r ' s a t t e m p t to d e m o n s t r a t e t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s in the 1976 c a m p a i g n or R o n a l d R e a g a n ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n to d e m o n s t r a t e levelheadedness in t h e 1980 contest. But h o w e v e r subtle or o b v i o u s these c a m p a i g n m e s s a g e s , citizens m a y still vary in both their attentiveness to and their disposition to accept t h e m . Let u s , t h e n , turn to analysis of e v a l u a t i o n s of Reagan in the 1984 election c a m p a i g n . R e a g a n w a s by this point as well k n o w n as most presidential candidates are likely to get,. W i t h a strong e c o n o m y and a record u n b l e m i s h e d by personal s c a n d a l , o n e w o u l d expect h i m to have at least m o d e r a t e l y high r a t i n g s on c o m p e t e n c e and, given his ability to project sincerity, perhaps even h i g h e r ratings on personal integrity. To m e a s u r e a s s e s s m e n t s of R e a g a n on t h e s e t w o dim e n s i o n s , which fall on the two major d i m e n s i o n s on w h i c h A m e r i c a n s are said to assess presidential c h a r a c t e r (Kinder, 1986), I rely on the following items from the N E S battery: Now I'd like to know your impressions of Ronald Reagan. I am going to read a list of words and phrases people use to describe political figures. After each one I would like you to tell me how much the word or phrase fits your impression of Ronald Reagan. Moral Knowledgeable A c c o r d i n g to p o p u l a r lore, o n e of R e a g a n ' s principal a c h i e v e m e n t s as president w a s to m a k e A m e r i c a feel g o o d about itself again. T h e idea that u n d e r Reagan the United S t a t e s w a s " s t a n d i n g t a l l " in w o r l d affairs w a s a c o n t i n u i n g

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refrain of his years in office. At the s a m e t i m e , m a n y liberals confessed to a p prehension; there w a s s o m e t h i n g about R e a g a n that s e e m e d t o scare t h e m . T h e N E S study of the 1984 e l e c t i o n included q u e s t i o n s m e a s u r i n g v o t e r s ' e m o t i o n a l reactions to R e a g a n on b o t h these d i m e n s i o n s : Now we would like to know something about the feelings you have toward the candidates for President. I am going to name a candidate, and I want you to tell me whether something about the person, or something he has done, has made you have certain feelings like anger or pride. Think about Ronald Reagan. Now, has Reagan - because of the kind of person he is, or because of something he has done - ever made your feel: Angry Proud To g a u g e public r e s p o n s e s to these items I used the basic r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e model as e m b o d i e d in E q u a t i o n 7 . 5 . T h e resulting e s t i m a t e s , s h o w n in Table 1 1 . 3 , are depicted graphically in Figure 1 1 . 2 . ( T h e r a w d a t a closely r e s e m b l e the e s t i m a t e s in Figure 11.2 and so are not s h o w n . ) T h e s e results are n o t a b l e in several respects. T h e first is that A m e r i c a n s are highly p a r t i s a n in their a s s e s s m e n t s of presidential character. T h i s , of c o u r s e , is no longer n e w s at this point ( C a m p b e l l et a l . , 1960; C o n v e r s e and D e P e u x , 1962). W h a t is n e w s , at least to the scholarly literature of this subject, is how strongly individual differences in political a w a r e n e s s interact with p a r t i s a n s h i p and ideology in the a s s e s s m e n t of presidential character. A m o n g less a w a r e citizens, p a r t i s a n s h i p has less effect; a m o n g the highly informed, t h e effect of partisanship is m o r e p r o n o u n c e d . T h e third salient feature of these results is how differently t h e public reacted to R e a g a n ' s knowledgeability than to his other c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . By these d a t a , R e a g a n w a s less successful in projecting c o m p e t e n c e t h a n in proj e c t i n g morality, instilling p r i d e , and, in certain g r o u p s , p r o v o k i n g fear. Highly aware Republican c o n s e r v a t i v e s , the g r o u p that most strongly s u p p o r t s R e a g a n on other m a t t e r s , failed to rally behind h i m on this aspect of presidential perf o r m a n c e . Rather, it is m o d e r a t e l y a w a r e R e p u b l i c a n c o n s e r v a t i v e s w h o were most likely to assert that R e a g a n w a s extremely k n o w l e d g e a b l e about politics. T h u s we h a v e , in this c a s e but no o t h e r s , a strong n o n m o n o t o n i c relationship a m o n g R e p u b l i c a n s b e t w e e n political a w a r e n e s s and belief in R e a g a n ' s good qualities. 1 3

T h i s pattern i s , I b e l i e v e , best explained in t e r m s of the differential intensities of a d o m i n a n t and c o u n t e r v a i l i n g m e s s a g e . T h e d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e is the c a r e fully crafted i m a g e of presidential m e d i a advisors w h o , by skilled scripting of R e a g a n ' s public a p p e a r a n c e s , effectively project t h e idea that R e a g a n is the c o m m a n d i n g leader of t h e national g o v e r n m e n t . T h i s is the m e s s a g e that most p e o p l e e n c o u n t e r e d m o s t of the t i m e they received information about R e a g a n in 13 Although Figure 11.2 is based on Reagan evaluations in the postelection NES survey, highly similar patterns appear in data in the preelection survey. In particular, awareness has a resistance effect for knowledge but not for the other three ratings.

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Table

11.3.

Coefficients for presidential Traits Knowledgeable

Reception function Intercept Awareness

Moral

2.94 1.52 (.36)

0.90 0.96 (.35)

0.48 -1.25 (.24)

0.32 -0.17 (.17)

1.27 -0.21 (.13)

-0.72 0.20 (.21)

Party (range -2 to +2)

-0.56 (.11)

-0.52 (.08)

-0.88 (.11)

0.66 (.12)

Ideology self-id (range - 3 t o +3)

-0.37 (.10)

-0.20 (.07)

-0.34 (.07)

0.30 (.09)

Race (1 if black, else 0)

0.11 (.35) 1921

-1.09 (.28) 1923

-1.47 (.26) 1932

0.05 (.28) 1987

Acceptance Intercept Awareness

N

299

research

Percent who see Reagan as "extremely knowledgeable"

Conservative strong Republicans

Emotional reaction. Pride Fear

2.95 1.59 (.75)

and future

Percent who see Reagan as "extremely moral"

evaluation

1.18 0.74 (.28)

model

Conservative strong Republicans

function

Note: Model is equation 7.5, estimated by maximum likelihood. Trait items coded 1 for "extremely," 0 otherwise; emotional reaction items coded 1 ibi "yes," 0 otherwise. Other political variables coded liberal high. Dependent variables are from postelection survey. " N o o p i n i o n " respondents on ideology (V369 and V370) were coded to middle position. Standard errors appear in parentheses. Source: 1984 NES survey.

the m e d i a . But there w a s also a countervailing m e s s a g e which a p p e a r e d , t h o u g h m u c h less prominently, i n " o p - e d " and " n e w s a n a l y s i s " p i e c e s , and w h i c h d e picted R e a g a n as u n i n f o r m e d and uninterested in the details of g o v e r n a n c e . T h i s m e s s a g e , b e c a u s e less i n t e n s e , reached only t h e most politically a w a r e s e g m e n t s of the p u b l i c . But within this g r o u p of p e o p l e , it c o u n t e r a c t e d the effects of the d o m i n a n t p r o - R e a g a n m e s s a g e , thereby p r o d u c i n g the n o n m o n o t o n i c i t y that is a p p a r e n t in Figure 11.2. Note that political a w a r e n e s s has an i m p o r t a n t effect in the a c c e p t a n c e function of t h e knowledgeability m o d e l in Table 1 1 . 3 , but in n o n e of the o t h e r m o d els. T h i s is consistent with my a r g u m e n t , d e v e l o p e d in C h a p t e r 7, that one reason that awareness is often associated with resistance to a d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e is that it is a proxy for exposure to c o u n t e r v a l e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n s that are insufficiently intense to reach the w h o l e public. Unfortunately, there is no easy way to m a k e direct m e a s u r e m e n t s of t h e intensity of the actual p r o - R e a g a n and a n t i - R e a g a n m e s s a g e s on each of t h e characteristics e x a m i n e d in Figure 11.2, and h e n c e no way to c h e c k the validity of this a r g u m e n t b e y o n d an appeal to the r e a d e r ' s intuition. My a r g u m e n t does

Democrats Political awareness Percent who say Reagan has made them feel "proud" IOOT

Percent who say Reagan has made them feel "afraid"

Conservative strong Republicans

Liberal strong Democrats.

Republicans

Political awareness Figure 11.2. Partisan and ideological reactions to candidate Reagan in 1984. Estimates are derived from coefficients in Table 11.3. Awareness runs from —1.97 SD to + 2 . 0 2 SD. Modal partisans have scores of ± 1 . 3 on the party measure and ± 1 on a 7-point measure of ideological self-location. Strong partisans have scores of ±2 on each of these measures. Source: 1984 NES survey. nonetheless provide a new and, I h o p e , interesting slant on the p u b l i c ' s j u d g ment of presidential character. T h i s a r g u m e n t , quite simply, is that the d y n a m i c s of public opinion on this m a t t e r are m u c h the s a m e as on o t h e r s : Political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s e m a n a t e from the elite centers of society, in this c a s e political c a m p a i g n s , m e d i a a d v i s o r s , a n d the p r e s i d e n t ' s record in office; the m a s s r e s p o n s e to these m e s s a g e s d e p e n d s on individual differences in value o r i e n t a t i o n s and attention to politics, and on the relative intensities of the v a r i o u s m e s s a g e s .

TRUST IN G O V E R N M E N T In t h e m i d - 1 9 6 0 s , as the United States w a s about to enter the w a r in V i e t n a m , p o p u l a r trust in g o v e r n m e n t appeared impressively high ( L a n e , 1965). But t h e n ,

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The

be g i n n i n g about 1965, c o n f i d e n c e b e g a n to e r o d e , a trend that soon affected attitudes not only toward g o v e r n m e n t but t o w a r d virtually the full r a n g e of A m e r ican institutions, including even the clergy (Miller, 1974; Citrin, 1974; U p s e t and Schneider, 1982). T h e reason for the d e c l i n e has never been entirely clear, but it has been widely a r g u e d that the t u m u l t u o u s events of the 1960s, especially the u n p o p u l a r war in V i e t n a m , the protest against it, and t h e black urban r i o t s , were at the root of the phenomenon. S h o u l d the w a v e of c y n i c i s m that swept over the c o u n t r y in this p e r i o d conform to the d y n a m i c s of the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l ? If one c o n c e i v e s of t h e decline in trust as a sort of m o o d c h a n g e , a h u m o r reflecting the generally bad t i m e s on w h i c h the c o u n t r y had fallen, the a n s w e r w o u l d probably be n o . T h e r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l is d e s i g n e d to capture the diffusion of p a r t i c u l a r ideas and m e s s a g e s , not the spread of a m o r p h o u s m o o d s and h u m o r s . But if, on the o t h e r h a n d , o n e c o n c e i v e s of t h e decline in trust as the p u b l i c ' s r e s p o n s e to attacks on national integrity by alienated protesters and leftist intellectuals, then the a n s w e r w o u l d b e yes. T h e m e s s a g e o f " l i b e r a l a l i e n a t i o n " should follow the s a m e diffusion path as any o t h e r type of m e s s a g e . S i n c e I could never d e c i d e w h i c h of these c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s w a s m o r e valid, and since I feel o b l i g a t e d to report both the successes of the m o d e l and its failu r e s , I w a s reluctant to subject the m o d e l to a test in this d o m a i n . Recently, h o w ever, Jack C i t r i n , w h o specializes in analysis of trust in g o v e r n m e n t , c o n c l u d e d that t h e r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l might plausibly be applied to the p r o b l e m , and asked for my a d v i c e in building political a w a r e n e s s scales. I sent h i m copies of these scales for all N E S surveys and waited for the results of his analysis. S o m e of his results are s h o w n in Figure 1 1 . 3 . As can be s e e n , t h e increase in g o v e r n m e n t a l distrust o v e r t h e p e r i o d of the V i e t n a m W a r appears to have followed the p a t t e r n a s s o c i a t e d with the diffusion of liberal m e s s a g e s . A m o n g libe r a l s , there is a r o u g h l y linear and positive r e l a t i o n s h i p between a w a r e n e s s and c h a n g e in the direction of a liberal m e s s a g e ; a m o n g c o n s e r v a t i v e s , this relationship is s h a r p l y n o n m o n o t o n i c . (Centrists, not s h o w n , follow an indistinct m i d d l e p a t t e r n . ) Citrin, in e x a m i n i n g patterns of c h a n g e in trust in g o v e r n m e n t over several o t h e r t i m e p e r i o d s , found little additional s u p p o r t for t h e receptiona c c e p t a n c e m o d e l . O n e reason for t h i s , no d o u b t , is that fairly large a m o u n t s of attitude c h a n g e are n e c e s s a r y before t h e patterns of c h a n g e begin to stand out against b a c k g r o u n d levels of m e a s u r e m e n t error, and most c h a n g e s in trust levels since 1972 have b e e n of m o d e s t m a g n i t u d e . Another, m o r e substantive reason m a y be that n o n e of the c h a n g e - i n d u c i n g information flows had a c l e a r ideological v a l e n c e . It h a s n o t , in other w o r d s , a l w a y s been clear w h e t h e r liberals or c o n s e r v a t i v e s or p e r h a p s even centrists should be most susceptible to t h e presumed change-inducing message. 1 4

14 Citrin's results are part of a book manuscript in progress: "Governing the Disenchanted," Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley.

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1.00Liberals 0.75-

Proportionate reduction in trust in government,

u

-

: > u

"

o 25-

Conservatives

1964-72

0.00 ^ -0.25-

Political awareness Figure 11.3. Decline in trust in government. Data are from 1964 and 1972 CPS surveys, as provided by Jack Citrin, University of California, Berkeley. Trust is measured by a two-item index, whether government can be counted to do what is right, and whether government is run by a few big interests. C i t r i n ' s investigation of t h e p e r f o r m a n c e of the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l in t h e d o m a i n of g o v e r n m e n t trust u n d e r s c o r e s a key theoretical point: T h e model applies only to cases in which o n e can d e m o n s t r a t e or plausibly a s s u m e the existence of p a r t i c u l a r c h a n g e - i n d u c i n g m e s s a g e s having distinct ideological c o l o r a t i o n s . W h e n o n e cannot d o t h i s , the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l d o e s not perform, and should not be expected to p e r f o r m , in the m a n n e r suggested by my analysis.

POPULAR SUPPORT FOR A U T H O R I T A R I A N REGIMES T h e R A S model o r i g i n a t e d in studies of A m e r i c a n public opinion and A m e r i c a n political psychology. T h e r e is, however, no reason to believe that it applies only in the United States. It is an entirely general m o d e l a n d , as such, o u g h t to apply in any situation in which public opinion forms and c h a n g e s in r e s p o n s e to the diffusion of political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . In an effort to show t h i s , I c o l l a b o r a t e d with B a r b a r a G e d d e s , a specialist in c o m p a r a t i v e politics, in an application of the m o d e l to a less developed n a t i o n . 1 5

T h e p r o b l e m that G e d d e s and I e x a m i n e d w a s p o p u l a r support for authoritarian r e g i m e s . E v e r y a u t h o r i t a r i a n g o v e r n m e n t a t t e m p t s to control the flow of n e w s and information to t h e public - but with w h a t effect? T h e R A S m o d e l , with its e m p h a s i s on the diffusion of elite c o m m u n i c a t i o n , is ideally suited to a n s w e r i n g this q u e s t i o n . P r e s u m a b l y the most politically aware m e m b e r s of the public receive the largest a m o u n t s of g o v e r n m e n t p r o p a g a n d a , and are also most 15 The joint paper was proposed by Geddes, who, upon becoming familiar with the receptionacceptance model, asserted that if it was as general as I claimed, it ought to be capable of explaining patterns of popular support for, and resistance to, the authoritarian regime then in power in Brazil. This was the beginning of an extremely fruitful collaboration.

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c a p a b l e of resisting it. H e n c e we should expect that p e o p l e in the broad m i d d l e r a n g e s of political a w a r e n e s s are most likely to exhibit support for the policies of authoritarian regimes. W i t h o u t going into technical detail that is readily available e l s e w h e r e ( G e d d e s and Zaller, 1989), this is exactly what we found. U s i n g opinion d a t a c o l l e c t e d in Brazil at the height of its a u t h o r i t a r i a n period in the early 1970s, G e d d e s and I show that s u p p o r t for the g o v e r n m e n t ' s a u t h o r i t a r i a n policies w a s greatest a m o n g citizens exhibiting m o d e r a t e levels of political awareness. S u p p o r t for a u t h o r i t a r i a n policies rises steadily with increases in political awareness (which is m e a s u r e d , as in this b o o k , by simple tests of factual k n o w l e d g e about politics) until about the 9 0 t h percentile on awareness. At that point, the trend flattens and then reverses as s u p p o r t for g o v e r n m e n t policies begins to d e c l i n e . T h i s n o n m o n o t o n i c p a t t e r n w a s not obtained for all policy i t e m s , however. For policies in w h i c h the a u t h o r i t a r i a n g o v e r n m e n t simply c a r r i e d forward t h e mains t r e a m policies of t h e previous d e m o c r a t i c r e g i m e , there w a s no n o n m o n o t o n i c ity: T h e most a w a r e p e r s o n s w e r e most likely to support the g o v e r n m e n t ' s m a i n s t r e a m line. H e n c e in Brazil as in the United S t a t e s , m a i n s t r e a m c o m m u n i c a t i o n s e n c o u n t e r e d n o resistance. N o n m o n o t o n i c patterns were o b t a i n e d only in policy a r e a s , such as c e n s o r s h i p of the p r e s s , in w h i c h the military g o v e r n m e n t d e p a r t e d from policies of the previous r e g i m e . T h e Brazilian d a t a were not strong e n o u g h to show why exactly m o r e aware p e r s o n s w e r e less willing to accept a u t h o r i t a r i a n policies a n d , in particular, w h e t h e r their unwillingness w a s r o o t e d in inertial, c o u n t e r v a l e n t , or p a r t i s a n resistance. T h e Brazilian survey d i d , however, c o n t a i n an abbreviated version of the classic F - s c a l e , and this e n a b l e d us to extend t h e m o d e l in a n o t h e r d i r e c t i o n . T h e F - s c a l e , as readers m a y recall, w a s p r o p o s e d by the authors of The Authoritarian Personality ( A d o r n o et a l . , 1950) as a m e a s u r e of predispositions tow a r d fascist ideologies. T h e items in the scale involve such matters as o b e d i e n c e to p a r e n t s , respect for e l d e r s , and c o n t e m p t for w e a k n e s s . A l t h o u g h n o n e of the i t e m s contains manifestly political c o n t e n t , they are nonetheless intended to m e a s u r e deeply r o o t e d personality predispositions toward a u t h o r i t a r i a n political policies and ideologies. Unfortunately, the effectiveness of this scale has never been fully tested in a setting in which the m a s s e s of o r d i n a r y citizens w e r e being heavily e x p o s e d to a d o m i n a n t a u t h o r i t a r i a n m e s s a g e . T h e Brazilian dataset therefore afforded a v a l u a b l e o p p o r t u n i t y to see w h e t h e r the scale p e r f o r m s as e x p e c t e d . As can be seen in F i g u r e 11.4, both the F - s c a l e and political a w a r e n e s s are associated with s u p p o r t for a u t h o r i t a r i a n p o l i c i e s , but not in a straightforward w a y . Persons w h o pay little attention to politics do not reliably s u p p o r t the policies of the military g o v e r n m e n t even w h e n their personality d i s p o s i t i o n s , as 1 6

16 Both relationships are highly statistically significant in a fully specified model (p < .01) (see Geddes and Zaller, 1989: table 3).

The

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303

High on F-scale

.60

40 Net score on index of support for authoritarian policies . 20

Low on F-scale

Political awareness Figure 11.4. The F-scale and support for the authoritarian regime in Brazil. Dependent variable is an 8-item scale indicating support for authoritarian policies, such as press censorship and suppression of unions. The F-scale consists of five items, purged of the effects of education, sex, race, and residential location. General procedures used in constructing the figure are the same as reported in figure 3 of Geddes and Zaller (1989). Authoritarians and nonauthoritarians in the figure have been constructed from scores of approximately ± 1 . 2 5 SDs on the F-scale; other background variables have been set to their modal values. Source: 1972-73 survey by researchers at the Instituto Universitario de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro and the University of Michigan.

m e a s u r e d by the F - s c a l e , indicate they ought to do s o . This is p r e s u m a b l y b e c a u s e they pay t o o little attention to politics to k n o w w h a t policies the authoritarian g o v e r n m e n t stands for. (Note that persons scoring low on a w a r e n e s s in Brazil w e r e , by U . S . s t a n d a r d s , extremely uninformed about politics; m a n y were illiterates w h o did not even k n o w the n a m e of the c o u n t r y ' s president.) M o d e r ately a w a r e persons exhibit m o r e support for a u t h o r i t a r i a n policies, but not m u c h m o r e e v i d e n c e of ideological a c u m e n . Like the p a r t i s a n defectors in H o u s e e l e c t i o n s , they are simply responding uncritically to the d o m i n a n t political m e s s a g e in the e n v i r o n m e n t . O n l y a m o n g highly aware persons is there an important relationship b e t w e e n a u t h o r i t a r i a n predispositions and s u p p o r t for authoritarian policies. This is b e c a u s e , in Brazil as in the United S t a t e s , highly aware persons are the only o n e s c a p a b l e of r e s p o n d i n g in a consistently i d e o logical fashion to the political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s they encounter. T h e s e results represent an i m p o r t a n t qualification of the t h e o r y of the authoritarian personality. T h e y s u g g e s t , first of all, that exposure to a u t h o r i t a r i a n prop a g a n d a may be at least as i m p o r t a n t in a c c o u n t i n g for s u p p o r t for a u t h o r i t a r i a n r e g i m e s as are a u t h o r i t a r i a n personality o r i e n t a t i o n s . T h e y further suggest that personality predispositions are just that: predispositions. W h e t h e r , or to w h a t extent, a u t h o r i t a r i a n predispositions manifest t h e m s e l v e s in the form of s u p p o r t for a u t h o r i t a r i a n policies d e p e n d s , as a l w a y s , on a critical interaction with political awareness.

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Dispositions toward a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m are not, of c o u r s e , the only factor influencing s u p p o r t for a u t h o r i t a r i a n policies. E d u c a t i o n is also i m p o r t a n t . Better e d u c a t e d Brazilians, p e r h a p s b e c a u s e greater literacy increased their reception of c o u n t e r v a l e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n s that w e r e largely u n c e n s o r e d by t h e military, were significantly m o r e resistant to a u t h o r i t a r i a n policies, given r e c e p t i o n of t h e m , than were p o o r l y e d u c a t e d ones. T h e result w a s a pattern m u c h like that s h o w n in Figure 11.4, except with e d u c a t i o n substituted for scores on the F-scale. O n e surprise in o u r analysis involved chronological a g e . We e x p e c t e d older, politically a w a r e B r a z i l i a n s , b e c a u s e of their e x p e r i e n c e with the d e m o c r a t i c n o r m s of the previous r e g i m e , to be m o r e resistant than their y o u n g c o u n t e r p a r t s to the policies of the a u t h o r i t a r i a n g o v e r n m e n t . A g e , however, turned out to have no d i s c e r n i b l e effect, p e r h a p s b e c a u s e it w a s a s s o c i a t e d with t w o mutually canceling effects, c o m m i t m e n t to the d e m o c r a t i c n o r m s of the previous r e g i m e and a preference for the o r d e r and stability of a u t h o r i t a r i a n g o v e r n m e n t . O n e should not place t o o m u c h e m p h a s i s o n the p a r t i c u l a r patterns o f r e g i m e s u p p o r t found in Brazil. T h e r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e model would lead o n e to expect significant v a r i a t i o n in these p a t t e r n s from o n e country to another. T h e s e e x p e c t a t i o n s are set out in Figure 1 1 . 5 , a typology c l a i m i n g that variations in r e g i m e s u p p o r t d e p e n d on how vigorously g o v e r n m e n t s seek to indoctrinate their citizens, and h o w m u c h access citizens have to c o u n t e r v a l e n t communication. In c o u n t r i e s in which the g o v e r n m e n t m a k e s energetic efforts to indoctrinate its citizens - t h e g o v e r n m e n t s of Nazi G e r m a n y and the now defunct Soviet U n i o n are e x a m p l e s - even the least politically informed m e m b e r s of society m a y (in c o m p a r i s o n w i t h t h e least informed Brazilians) exhibit m o d e r a t e l y high levels of s u p p o r t for r e g i m e n o r m s ( c o m p a r e the cases in the left-hand c o l u m n of Figure 11.5 to those in t h e right-hand c o l u m n ) . A s e c o n d source of variation in p o p u l a r s u p p o r t for a u t h o r i t a r i a n r e g i m e s is the access of citizens in different c o u n t r i e s to c o u n t e r v a l e n t sources of values. M a n y citizens in a u t h o r i t a r i a n Brazil retained access to b o o k s and other small circulation publications that c a r r i e d a l t e r n a t i v e values; s o m e also r e m e m b e r e d the d e m o c r a t i c n o r m s of the previous r e g i m e . In other a u t h o r i t a r i a n c o u n t r i e s , h o w e v e r - N o r t h K o r e a c o m e s to m i n d - scarcely any s e g m e n t of the p o p u l a t i o n h a s either personal m e m o r y of, or access t o , sources of a n t i r e g i m e values. In c o n s e q u e n c e , the d e c l i n e in supp o r t for r e g i m e policies that we found a m o n g the most aware Brazilians should show up m o r e weakly, or p e r h a p s not at all, a m o n g the most aware citizens of c o u n t r i e s such as N o r t h K o r e a ( c o m p a r e cases in the top row of Figure 11.5 to those in the b o t t o m r o w ) .

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High effort Nazi Germany ?

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17 In developing this typology, we assume that authoritarian regimes espouse authoritarian policies. The Gorbachev government in the Soviet Union, however, was a partial exception. Its glasnost and pereslroika policies must be viewed, in the context of Soviet history, as nonauthoritarian. One would therefore expect patterns of support for these policies to differ from those forecast for other cases.

Figure 11.5. A typology of support for government policies.

It is difficult to think of m o d e r n a u t h o r i t a r i a n c o u n t r i e s that fall clearly into the lower right cell of Figure 11.5. However, o n e might reasonably c o n s i d e r the United States an e x a m p l e of a n o n m o b i l i z i n g r e g i m e w h o s e elites have achieved high levels of v o l u n t a r y a g r e e m e n t on certain n o r m s relating to c a p i t a l i s m , d e m o c r a c y , a n d , at t i m e s , foreign policy. T h e analysis of C h a p t e r 6 indicates that w h e n such elite c o n s e n s u s exists, A m e r i c a n public opinion indeed c o n f o r m s to the p a t t e r n in the lower right cell. (See Figure 6 . 5 . ) In p r o p o s i n g this typology, G e d d e s and I had in m i n d cases in which t h e gove r n m e n t m a i n t a i n s at least t h e a p p e a r a n c e of c o m p e t e n c e and effectiveness. Certainly this w a s true of the Brazilian r e g i m e at the t i m e of o u r survey. For cases in w h i c h g o v e r n m e n t s are m a r k e d l y less effective (or less lucky with the e c o n o m y ) , o n e w o u l d expect m o r e resistance t o g o v e r n m e n t policies. T h e m o d e l readily a c c o m m o d a t e s the effects of such h e i g h t e n e d resistance. R e t u r n i n g to Figures 8.2 and 8 . 3 , we see that as resistance i n c r e a s e s , p a t t e r n s of policy s u p port b e c o m e n o n m o n o t o n i c and perhaps n e g a t i v e . H e n c e for the c a s e of an ineffective g o v e r n m e n t , we w o u l d expect, ceteris p a r i b u s , a gently n o n m o n o t o n i c

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p a t t e r n of support a m o n g the m o d e r a t e to poorly e d u c a t e d , and a n e a r l y flat or n e g a t i v e relationship with awareness a m o n g the better e d u c a t e d . (It is straightforward to r e d r a w Figure 11.5 to illustrate such c a s e s . ) T h e r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l thus specifies the w a y s in which a variety of factors - a n a t i o n ' s p r i o r e x p e r i e n c e with a l t e r n a t i v e i d e o l o g i e s , the intensity of the r e g i m e ' s efforts at public m o b i l i z a t i o n , the access of citizens to a l t e r n a t i v e sources of i d e a s , and the r e g i m e ' s p e r f o r m a n c e - interact to affect overall patt e r n s of r e g i m e s u p p o r t .

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result, according to a R a d i o Free E u r o p e survey of Soviet citizens traveling in the w e s t , w a s that b e t w e e n 1984 and 1986

1 8

A s m a t t e r i n g of e v i d e n c e from w h a t used to be k n o w n as E a s t e r n bloc c o m munist c o u n t r i e s in the p r e - G o r b a c h e v e r a provides additional s u p p o r t for the R A S m o d e l . A 1984 study by Polish researchers at the University of W a r s a w found that s u p p o r t for m a r t i a l law and o p p o s i t i o n to the union Solidarity were greatest a m o n g p e o p l e at low-to-middle levels of e d u c a t i o n . In 1985, w h e n the g o v e r n m e n t had b e g u n to p r o m o t e a return to n o r m a l c y , many p o o r l y e d u c a t e d r e s p o n d e n t s had lapsed into no opinion, so that s u p p o r t for martial law w a s then greatest a m o n g p e o p l e a t m i d d l e levels o f e d u c a t i o n ( R y s z k a , 1987: p . 2 5 3 ) . T h e s e findings are readily intelligible if, as s e e m s r e a s o n a b l e , o n e is willing to a s s u m e that e d u c a t i o n is positively associated with reception of p r o r e g i m e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and negatively associated with a disposition toward uncritical acc e p t a n c e of these c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . Similar, t h o u g h s o m e w h a t sketchier e v i d e n c e is available from the f o r m e r S o viet U n i o n . Philip R o e d e r ( 1 9 8 5 , 1989) reviews studies s h o w i n g that, a l t h o u g h o p p o s i t i o n to the Soviet r e g i m e was greatest within the best e d u c a t e d s e g m e n t s of society, e d u c a t i o n w a s positively a s s o c i a t e d with individual susceptibility to indoctrination p r o g r a m s in factory settings. In o t h e r w o r d s , s u p p o r t for the reg i m e s e e m e d to increase with e d u c a t i o n - except at the very highest levels of e d u c a t i o n , w h e r e s u p p o r t declined s o m e w h a t . On the basis of this and o t h e r evi d e n c e , R o e d e r suggests that " t h e relationship b e t w e e n dissent and social m o bilization is curvilinear, declining with early social mobilization u n d e r Party t u t e l a g e , but rising as-education and urbanization b e c o m e still m o r e a d v a n c e d . " T h e inverse of R o e d e r ' s dissent c u r v e is, of c o u r s e , a pattern in w h i c h support for t h e r e g i m e increases as e d u c a t i o n i n c r e a s e s , but then declines at t h e highest levels of e d u c a t i o n . 1 9

By far the most p r o v o c a t i v e e v i d e n c e from a former E a s t e r n block nation involves c h a n g i n g p a t t e r n s of s u p p o r t for the Afghan W a r a m o n g the Soviet p u b l i c . It seems that after an initial p e r i o d in the e a r l y 1980s in which the Soviet m e d i a gave relatively little publicity to the war, the g o v e r n m e n t b e c a m e conc e r n e d about signs of public d i s q u i e t u d e . C o n s e q u e n t l y , it m a d e a " d e c i s i o n to d e v e l o p ' i n f o r m a t i o n ' - p a r t i c u l a r l y on television - about the w a r . " T h e 2 0

18 It is interesting to note that when the Brazilian economy faltered, support for the regime collapsed first in just those quarters in which our analysis would lead one to expect it: among the most highly educated and politically involved segments of the population (Alves, 1984; Lamounier, 1980). 19 I thank Stanislaw Gebethner for bringing these data to my attention. 20 Foreign Opinions (June 1987), Centre d'Analyse et de Prevision, Ministere des Affairs Etrangers. Number 4, Paris. I thank Chris Achen for bringing these data to my attention.

approval increased among those who had so far proved hesitant, in particular young people, uneducated, [and] central Asian citizens. On the other hand, opposition has developed in key sectors such as Moscow, Leningrad, among graduates and party members. (Roeder, 1985) In a d d i t i o n , no-opinion r a t e s , which had been high in 1984, fell d u r i n g this p e r i o d of intensified p r o g o v e r n m e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , and fell most of all in provincial areas. In S i b e r i a , t h e most peripheral region of the Soviet U n i o n , " D o n ' t k n o w " r a t e s declined from 5 9 % t o 3 1 % b e t w e e n 1984 and 1986, while s u p p o r t for the w a r rose from 2 4 % t o 5 1 % and o p p o s i t i o n rates r e m a i n e d u n c h a n g e d . But in M o s c o w and L e n i n g r a d , the least peripheral r e g i o n s , the biggest c h a n g e w a s an increase in o p p o s i t i o n from 2 0 % to 3 5 % . T h e s e Soviet results present a striking parallel to c h a n g i n g patterns of s u p p o r t for t h e V i e t n a m W a r in the United States b e t w e e n 1964 and 1966. It will be recalled t h a t , in this p e r i o d , s u p p o r t for the w a r rose in the least aware s t r a t u m in r e s p o n s e to an intensified p r o w a r c a m p a i g n by t h e g o v e r n m e n t , but that, at t h e s a m e t i m e , it fell a m o n g the mostly highly a w a r e d o v e s , w h o were the only o n e s likely b o t h to receive and to accept the a n t i w a r m e s s a g e . O n e w o n d e r s about t h e source of the a n t i - A f g h a n W a r m e s s a g e in t h e Soviet U n i o n . O u r only e v i d e n c e about it is that a n t i w a r Soviets were most likely to m e n t i o n " w o r d of m o u t h " as their m a i n source of information about the war. T h i s no doubt represents a g e n u i n e and i m p o r t a n t difference from the United States. W h e r e the m e d i a are controlled by the g o v e r n m e n t , c o u n t e r v a l e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n s must diffuse through informal c h a n n e l s . But aside from t h i s , the effects of d o m i n a n t and c o u n t e r v a l e n t m e s s a g e s a r e , as far as one can tell from the available d a t a , surprisingly similar in these two cases of u n p o p u l a r foreign w a r s . T h e r e is, however, an i m p o r t a n t caveat to all this. M u c h e v i d e n c e suggests that p o p u l a r support that is built up by m e a n s of one-sided c o m m u n i c a t i o n s can collapse virtually overnight w h e n t w o - s i d e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s are allowed. A d e m o n s t r a t i o n of this o c c u r r e d in a u t h o r i t a r i a n Brazil shortly after o u r d a t a were c o l l e c t e d . In a highly controlled " e l e c t i o n c a m p a i g n " in which only g o v e r n m e n t approved c a n d i d a t e s w e r e allowed access t o t h e m a s s m e d i a , the g o v e r n ment c a n d i d a t e s were so far ahead of the opposition in the public opinion polls that the g o v e r n m e n t felt it safe to permit the o p p o s i t i o n c a n d i d a t e s limited access to the m e d i a a few w e e k s before t h e 1974 e l e c t i o n . W h e n it did s o , s u p p o r t for t h e official c a n d i d a t e s p l u m m e t e d . M a n y found t h e m s e l v e s in suddenly close r a c e s , and a n u m b e r were actually defeated ( L a m o u n i e r , 1980). T h a t m a s s opinion m a y prove highly c h a n g e a b l e is by no m e a n s e v i d e n c e of its insignificance. W e a k l y held or superficial o p i n i o n s that c o n d u c e toward a c q u i e s c e n c e in a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m or are the basis for choices b e t w e e n radically different c a n d i d a t e s in e l e c t i o n s can be i m m e n s e l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l in spite of their superficiality. M a s s opinion m a y b e , in m a n y c a s e s , an inherently superficial

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force, but it is directly attached to the levers of g o v e r n m e n t , and this can m a k e it extremely powerful. It should also be noted t h a t , in s o m e a u t h o r i t a r i a n c o u n t r i e s , o p p o s i t i o n a c tivists d e v e l o p unofficial n e t w o r k s to challenge r e g i m e d o m i n a t i o n of political ideas. T h i s h a p p e n e d in t h e Philippines d u r i n g the M a r c o s r e g i m e and recently in S o u t h K o r e a . M o r e strikingly, as events in R o m a n i a showed in 1989, it is possible for a citizenry to stage a s p o n t a n e o u s rebellion even in the a b s e n c e of such c o m m u n i c a t i o n s n e t w o r k s . It is obviously important to understand how such events occur. T h e d y n a m i c s of the R A S m o d e l , however, offer no c l e a r insight to such p r o b l e m s . 2 1

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T h e c o m m o n f r a m e w o r k developed in this b o o k involves the interactive effects of four types of variables: at the a g g r e g a t e level, variation in the intensity of political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ; at the individual-level, variation in c i t i z e n s ' attention to politics and in their political predispositions (especially values); a n d , again at t h e a g g r e g a t e level, in t h e accidental factors that make considerations momentarily salient to p e o p l e , such as n e w s reports or q u e s t i o n n a i r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . T h e s e variables interact in a four-axiom m o d e l that specifies how individuals acquire political c o n s i d e r a t i o n s from the political e n v i r o n m e n t and use t h e m to formulate a n s w e r s to q u e s t i o n s about their political preferences. T h e general m o d e l s e e m s to w o r k a p p r o x i m a t e l y equally well in a w i d e range of political c o n t e x t s , from e l e c t i o n s to s u p p o r t for foreign wars to evaluation of presidential character. T h e four-axiom R A S m o d e l actually reduces to t w o main ideas. T h e first is that individuals do not possess " t r u e a t t i t u d e s , " in the usual technical sense of the t e r m , on most political issues, but a series of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that a r e typically rather p o o r l y integrated. T h e c r u d e m o d e l I have proposed d o e s not begin to do j u s t i c e to the process by which c o m p e t i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are f o r m e d , interact with one another, and stochastically d e t e r m i n e p e o p l e ' s responses to particular survey questions. But the core claim of the R A S model that people do not typically have " j u s t o n e a t t i t u d e " on issues is, as I have sought to show, essentially c o r r e c t and d e s e r v e s , in o n e form or another, a central place in o u r und e r s t a n d i n g of the nature of m a s s o p i n i o n . T h e o t h e r m a i n idea in the R A S model is that an interaction between political a w a r e n e s s and political predispositions is fundamental to the process by which citizens use information from the political e n v i r o n m e n t to form opinions. T h i s interaction w a s almost c o m p l e t e l y neglected in studies of political b e h a v i o r in the 1960s and 1970s but s e e m s to be getting m o r e attention from attitude re21 In the latter case, the government, although authoritarian, allowed the mass media a fair amount of latitude for criticizing its policies. 22 A report on National Public Radio, however, contended that the Romanian revolution began in peripheral areas of the country because that was where access to alternative communications, in the form of news reports from neighboring countries, was greatest.

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searchers - t h o u g h not yet from many voting b e h a v i o r specialists - in recent years (see E r b r i n g , G o l d e n b e r g , and Miller, 1980; M a c K u e n , 1984; Franklin and K o s a k i , 1989; K r o s n i c k and Kinder, 1990; Stoker, 1990; Jacoby, 1991; Pollock, L i s l e , and Vittes, 1991; S n i d e r m a n , Brody, and Tetlock, 1991; F r a n k l i n , 1992; and H u r w i t z and Peffley, in p r e s s ) . But even s o , s t a n d a r d p r o c e d u r e in the m a jority of political b e h a v i o r studies is still to a s s u m e that citizens react to the stimuli they e n c o u n t e r - w h e t h e r political c a m p a i g n s , presidential p e r f o r m a n c e , the state of the e c o n o m y , issues of war, p e a c e , or d o m e s t i c policy - solely on the basis of their values and interests. T h e idea that, o w i n g to differences in p o litical a w a r e n e s s , citizens m a y vary substantially in their ability to act on their values and interests is typically not r e c o g n i z e d . T h e m o d e l I have p r o p o s e d is certainly not w i t h o u t w e a k n e s s e s . In view of t h e m , especially the inability of the m o d e l in its present form to a c c o m m o d a t e either the integration of discrete information into larger mental s t r u c t u r e s , or the p r o c e s s by which political perception is influenced by past e x p e r i e n c e , the m o d e l must be c o n s i d e r e d a p p r o x i m a t e and p r o v i s i o n a l . It i s , I should also n o t e , very m u c h an o p e n q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r the p a r t i c u l a r o p e r a t i o n a l m o d e l s by w h i c h I have sought to a c c o m m o d a t e the interactive effects of political a w a r e n e s s and political p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s , especially as e m b o d i e d in E q u a t i o n s 7.7 and 9 . 8 , a r e ideal. I certainly do not c l a i m that they a r e . My c l a i m is only that r e s e a r c h e r s need to find s o m e way of taking these interactions into central account in their o w n m o d e l b u i l d i n g , b e c a u s e these interactions are both very c o m m o n and substantively i m p o r t a n t . D e s p i t e its v a r i o u s l i m i t a t i o n s , the general R A S m o d e l h a s t h e virtue of pulling t o g e t h e r within o n e theoretical s y s t e m a w i d e variety of empirical p h e n o m e n a , m a n y of w h i c h a r e analyzed by specialists w h o rarely or never c o m m u n i c a t e with o n e another. T h e specialized division of labor is a strength of scientific activity, but w h e n the vast majority of w o r k c o n c e n t r a t e s on issues of topical i m p o r t a n c e - even great topical i m p o r t a n c e , such as racial a t t i t u d e s , or s u p p o r t for U . S . intervention in foreign w a r s , or e l e c t i o n s - with little regard for anything besides t h e inherent i m p o r t a n c e of the topic, specialization has great costs. My feeling, as I have indicated, is that these costs have b e c o m e t o o great, and that it is t i m e to start i n c u r r i n g a few costs on the o t h e r side of the ledger. T h e R A S m o d e l , in a c c e p t i n g the costs of n o n s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , h a s been able to m a k e c l e a r t h e g r e a t , presently largely u n t a p p e d potential for synthesis within the public opinion field. T h e R A S model also s w i m s d e t e r m i n e d l y against the current o f m u c h political b e h a v i o r r e s e a r c h , w h i c h cheerfully e m p h a s i z e s the diversity of i n d i v i d u a l s ' r e s p o n s e s to politics. In so d o i n g , the m o d e l reflects my conviction that the a p p r o p r i a t e scientific r e s p o n s e to the diversity of nature is not to rejoice, but to r e d o u b l e t h e effort to find strong m o d e l s and broad generalizations that will fruitfully simplify t h e realities that we e x p e r i e n c e in daily life.

Elite

12

Epilogue: The question of elite domination of public opinion

The voice of the people is but an echo. The output of an echo chamber bears an inevitable and invariable relation to the input. As candidates and parties clamor for attention and vie for popular support, the people's verdict can be no more than a selective reflection from the alternatives and outlooks presented to them (p. 2). -V. O. Key, Jr., The Responsible Electorate In t h e 1930s and 1940s, m a n y o b s e r v e r s feared that the rise of the m o d e r n m a s s m e d i a w o u l d b r i n g a n e w e r a of totalitarian d o m i n a t i o n . M a s s circulation n e w s p a p e r s , t h e newly invented r a d i o , and m o t i o n pictures s e e m e d ideal tools for playing upon the fears of the n e w m a s s s o c i e t i e s , and the great t h o u g h t e m p o r a r y success of Hitler in G e r m a n y , Mussolini in Italy, and Stalin in the Soviet U n i o n s e e m e d to confirm e v e r y o n e ' s worst fears. G e o r g e O r w e l l ' s famous novel 1984 is p e r h a p s the best-known expression of this foreboding over the d a r k potential of the m a s s m e d i a , but many social scientists shared O r w e l l ' s a p p r e h e n s i o n . As a result, a t t e m p t s to m e a s u r e t h e effects of the m a s s m e d i a on public opinion were a staple of early opinion r e s e a r c h . T h i s early research t u r n e d out to be r e a s s u r i n g , however. C o m p a r e d to w h a t m a n y feared the m e d i a m i g h t be able to a c c o m p l i s h , surveys found m e d i a effects to be relatively small (Klapper, 1960). T h e m e d i a most often served to reinforce and activate existing opinion rather than to c r e a t e it, and m u c h of the impact the m e d i a did have w a s m e d i a t e d by c o m m u n i t y leaders in a kind of " t w o - s t e p f l o w " (Lazarsfeld, B e r e l s o n , and G a u d e t , 1944; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and M c P h e e , 1954). If m e d i a effects w e r e , as almost all research i n d i c a t e d , " m i n i m a l , " then the d a n g e r from political elites w h o might exploit the m e d i a to m a n i p u l a t e m a s s opinion must be m i n i m a l as well - or so it s e e m e d to the majority of m a i n s t r e a m c o m m u n i c a t i o n researchers w h o , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the i m p o r t u n i n g s of a handful of identifiably leftist a c a d e m i c s (for e x a m p l e , M i l i b a n d , 1969), were content to ignore the possibility of elite d o m i n a t i o n of m a s s opinion by m e a n s of the mass media. Recently, however, t h e s t a n d a r d belief in " m i n i m a l " effects has c o m e u n d e r severe attack. U s i n g w i d e l y different m e t h o d o l o g i e s but converging on the s a m e c o n c l u s i o n , several research g r o u p s have found e v i d e n c e of substantial m e d i a

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effects (Patterson and M c C l u r e , 1974; Patterson, 1980; Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder, 1982; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; B a r t e l s , 1988; F a n , 1988; Brody, 1991; P a g e , S h a p i r o , and D e m p s e y , 1987; Page and S h a p i r o , in p r e s s ) . No single n e w s story or broadcast may have great effect, but the c u m u l a t i v e effect of many stories over a period of m o n t h s or years may n o n e t h e l e s s be large (Iyengar, 1991). T h u s , although the old m o d e l of the m e d i a as a " h y p o d e r m i c n e e d l e " that could inject ideas into the b o d y politic on c o m m a n d h a s not been revived, m a i n s t r e a m c o m m u n i c a t i o n research has now developed a healthy respect for w h a t the m e dia, and t h e politicians w h o use it, can a c c o m p l i s h . If t h e theory of m i n i m a l m e d i a effects h a s lost its a c a d e m i c w a r r a n t , then so has c o m p l a i s a n c e over the potential for elite m a n i p u l a t i o n of m a s s opinion through use of the m e d i a . In this concluding s e c t i o n , I therefore turn to this issue. My discussion will be heavily structured by the c a t e g o r i e s of my earlier, empirical analyses.

DEFINING

ELITE

DOMINATION

T h e a r g u m e n t of this b o o k is, on first i n s p e c t i o n , scarcely e n c o u r a g i n g with respect to d o m i n a t i o n of m a s s opinion by elites. M a n y c i t i z e n s , as w a s a r g u e d , pay too little attention to public affairs to be able to respond critically to t h e political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s they e n c o u n t e r ; rather, they are blown about by w h a t e v e r current of information m a n a g e s to develop the greatest intensity. T h e m i n o r i t y of citizens w h o are highly attentive to public affairs are scarcely m o r e critical: They respond to new issues mainly on the basis of t h e p a r t i s a n s h i p and ideology of the elite sources of t h e m e s s a g e s . If m a n y citizens are largely uncritical in their response to political c o m m u nications as c a r r i e d in the m a s s m e d i a , and if most of the rest respond m e c h a n ically on the basis of p a r t i s a n c u e s , how can o n e deny t h e existence of a substantial degree of elite d o m i n a t i o n of public o p i n i o n ? It all d e p e n d s on how o n e defines elite d o m i n a t i o n . If one takes it to m e a n any situation in which the public c h a n g e s its opinion in t h e direction of the " i n f o r m a t i o n " and leadership c u e s supplied to it by elites, indeed, there is not m u c h to a r g u e about. Not only t h e present study, but several others provide a b u n d a n t e v i d e n c e of this sort of elite d o m i n a t i o n (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; P a g e , Shap i r o , and D e m p s e y , 1987; F a n , 1988). Yet the matter cannot be d e c i d e d so easily. Of course the public r e s p o n d s to elite-supplied information and leadership cues. H o w could it be o t h e r w i s e in a w o r l d in which events are a m b i g u o u s and in w h i c h the public m u s t regularly have opinions about m a t t e r s that a r e , to use Llippmann's p h r a s e a g a i n , " o u t of reach, out of sight, out of m i n d " ( 1 9 2 2 , 1946: p. 21)? P a g e and Shapiro (in p r e s s ) , recognizing an u n a v o i d a b l e d e p e n d e n c y of public opinion on elite d i s c o u r s e , frame the p r o b l e m in t e r m s of the "quality of information and interpretation [that] is conveyed to the p u b l i c . " T h e y c o n t i n u e ,

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To the extent that the public receives useful interpretations and correct and helpful information - information and interpretations that help it arrive at the policy choices it would make if fully informed - the policy preferences it expresses can be considered "authentic." . . . Individuals or institutions that influence public opinion by providing correct, helpful political information can be said to educate the public. On the other hand, to the extent that the public is given erroneous interpretations or false, misleading, or biased information, people may make mistaken evaluations of policy alternatives and may express support for policies harmful to their own interests and to values they cherish. An extreme result of such mistaken evaluations could be the systematic "false consciousness" or "hegemony" of which some Marxists and other theorists speak. . . . Those who influence public opinion by providing incorrect, biased, or selective information may be said to mislead the public. If they do so consciously, and deliberately, by means of lies, falsehoods, deception, or concealment, they manipulate public opinion, (ch. 9; emphasis in original) T h e difficulty in this way of framing the p r o b l e m , as Page and Shapiro a c k n o w l e d g e , is that it requires independent k n o w l e d g e of (or a s s u m p t i o n s about) which interpretations and information are c o r r e c t , and such independent k n o w l e d g e is largely unavailable. Despite this, however, Page and S h a p i r o att e m p t to identify cases of elite m a n i p u l a t i o n . For e x a m p l e , they w r i t e that President Reagan misled or manipulated the public on a variety of foreign policy matters. Calling the Soviet Union an "evil empire," with leaders willing to " l i e , cheat, and steal" for their ends, he made exaggerated charges that the Soviets had broken the SALT arms control treaties, and he portrayed the U.S. as advocating arms control while he in fact resisted reaching agreement, (ch. 9)

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W i t h this in m i n d , I define elite d o m i n a t i o n as a situation in which elites induce citizens to hold opinions that they would not hold if aware of the best available information and analysis. T h i s c o n c e p t i o n is still p r o b l e m a t i c in that it d e p e n d s on an a s s e s s m e n t of what the public w o u l d believe if it w e r e fully informed. But this difficulty is not, I believe, an i n s u r m o u n t a b l e o n e , as the following p a r a b l e will suggest.

T H E PARABLE OF P U R P L E L A N D O n c e there w a s a c o u n t r y that w a s inhabited by t w o kinds of p e o p l e , blues and reds. Blues and reds shared m a n y v a l u e s , but they evaluated public policies differently. Blue people preferred s h o r t , round policies expressed in strong c o l o r s , w h e r e a s the reds preferred tall, rectangular policies a r t i c u l a t e d in pastel colors. In c o n s e q u e n c e of their ideological differences, w h i c h might or m i g h t not have been rooted in differences of material interest, reds and blues w e r e in constant political d i s a g r e e m e n t . But both sides valued reason and e v i d e n c e , and so each c o m m i s s i o n e d e x p e r t s to advise t h e m . Of c o u r s e , blues hired blue persons as experts and reds hired red persons as e x p e r t s , but they c h a r g e d their expert advisors to a r g u e , d i s c u s s , and d e b a t e with o n e a n o t h e r in an effort to a c h i e v e , if at all p o s s i b l e , the best resolutions to policy p r o b l e m s . To e n c o u r a g e experts to get the best a n s w e r s to policy d i l e m m a s , they offered very large prizes - consisting of s t a t u s , research s u p p o r t , a n d , in a handful of c a s e s , public recognition - to those e x p e r t s w h o were able to m a k e c o n v i n c i n g a r g u m e n t s to other experts.

T h o u g h not wishing to defend either the R e a g a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s policies or its use of rhetoric in these instances, I would also be reluctant to cite t h e m as cases of m a n i p u l a t i o n of public opinion. W h o , after all, can say that the Soviet U n i o n w a s not, in s o m e s e n s e , an evil e m p i r e , or that it w a s truly the United S t a t e s r a t h e r than the Soviet g o v e r n m e n t that w a s d r a g g i n g its feet on a r m s control? J u d g m e n t s on such m a t t e r s are inherently political - which often m e a n s ideological - and it is a m i s t a k e , in my view, to u n d e r t a k e an evaluation of e l i t e - m a s s relations on the a s s u m p t i o n that o n e ' s own j u d g m e n t s c a n , in gene r a l , rise above p a r t i s a n s h i p .

Like all free c o u n t r i e s , P u r p l e Land had professional politicians and political activists to take the lead in public affairs. But the politicians and activists of P u r p l e Land were p r a g m a t i c and p e o p l e - o r i e n t e d sorts w h o rarely c a m e u p with ideas on their o w n . Rather, they looked to e x p e r t s of their o w n c o l o r a t i o n for i d e a s , and w h e n a congenial expert g r o u p p r o p o s e d s o m e t h i n g new, t h e politicians and activists d i d n ' t ask many h a r d q u e s t i o n s . T h e i r m a i n c o n c e r n s were the readiness of t h e public to receive the idea, a d v a n t a g e o u s framing of t h e idea in partisan d e b a t e , and other matters of effective m a r k e t i n g , l l e n c e , the politicians rarely ventured beyond t h e p a r a m e t e r s of expert d i s c o u r s e .

Yet Page and S h a p i r o ' s notion of " i n f o r m a t i o n and interpretations that help [the public] a r r i v e at the policy choices it w o u l d m a k e if fully i n f o r m e d " is, I b e l i e v e , a conceptually useful o n e . For o n e t h i n g , " f u l l y i n f o r m e d " j u d g m e n t s , if they refer to all available information r a t h e r than to all possible i n f o r m a t i o n , need not always b e correct j u d g m e n t s . O n e can m a k e o n e ' s best decision o n the basis of available information and still be dead w r o n g . Further, p e o p l e w h o are " f u l l y i n f o r m e d " may n o n e t h e l e s s d i s a g r e e , a s e x p e r i e n c e regularly s h o w s . O n these t w o c o u n t s , t h e n , there is latitude for o p p o s i n g groups to disagree radically w i t h o u t each of t h e m risking a c h a r g e from the other that it is seeking to m a nipulate - or in my t e r m s , to d o m i n a t e - public o p i n i o n .

N e i t h e r red nor blue citizens were especially interested in politics. T h e y preferred to devote their t i m e to their j o b s , their families, and to b a s e b a l l , the national p a s t i m e . So they d i d n ' t take t h e trouble to follow political d e b a t e very carefully; rather, they c o m m i s s i o n e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n specialists to k e e p t h e m inf o r m e d , in general and easily c o m p r e h e n s i b l e t e r m s , of what each political group thought. Citizens were so apolitical that few paid attention to which e x p e r t s or politicians e n d o r s e d which p a r t i c u l a r policies, but those w h o did notice w o u l d m e chanically adopt the o p i n i o n s of their o w n type of elite, as r e p o r t e d by c o m m u n i c a t i o n specialists in the press. T h e r e m a i n d e r simply spouted w h a t e v e r

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idea w a s at the top of their h e a d s , without attaching much significance to w h a t they said. T h e one thing no citizen ever did w a s to think for himself or herself. All simply selected from the m e n u of elite-supplied options. If elite d o m i n a t i o n consists of elites inducing the public to hold attitudes that it would not hold if fully informed, it may be said that the citizens of P u r p l e L a n d entirely avoided elite d o m i n a t i o n . W h e n , despite differences in o u t l o o k , blue and red experts agreed with one a n o t h e r and got most politicians and citizens to go along with t h e m , citizens could feel assured that, even if they d e voted their w h o l e lives to investigating the given policy p r o b l e m , they w o u l d not reach conclusions m u c h different from the o n e s a d v o c a t e d by the e x p e r t s . For the expert c o m m u n i t y included persons having the s a m e values as the c o m m u nity at large, and reached its conclusions after extensive analysis of the best available information. E v e n in cases of elite d i s a g r e e m e n t , in which each type of citizen m e c h a n i cally followed the advice of his or her o w n type of politician or e x p e r t , there w a s no elite d o m i n a t i o n . For citizens could still be confident that, the m o r e closely they looked into a subject, the m o r e likely they would be to reach the s a m e conclusion reached by the expert s u b c o m m u n i t y sharing their o w n values. This p a r a b l e shows that it is possible at least to imagine c o n d i t i o n s in w h i c h the d e p e n d e n c e of m a s s op-nion on the information and analyses c a r r i e d in elite disc o u r s e is great, and y e : in which elite d o m i n a t i o n of public o p i n i o n , by a plausible construction of the t e r m , is unlikely to occur. T h e s e conditions are 1. predispositional differences among the experts paralleling those within the general public, such that experts are motivated to examine issues from all viewpoints; 2. institutional incentives for experts to develop effective solutions to pressing problems; 3. a press that, whatever else it also does, provides ample coverage of all expert viewpoints, where the term " e x p e r t " is broadly construed to include anyone having specialized knowledge of a problematic subject; 4. politicians and activists that keep within the parameters of expert opinion; 5. a citizenry that is capable, in cases of elite disagreement, of aligning itself with the elite faction that shares its own predispositions. A l t h o u g h one may be able to imagine better or stronger safeguards against elite d o m i n a t i o n , the o n e s proposed here w o u l d be r e a s o n a b l y effective, and they have the virtue of being researchable by s t a n d a r d empirical t e c h n i q u e s . T h e researcher need have no special or suprapolitical insight into the " c o r r e c t n e s s " of the leadership p r o v i d e d by elites. It is only n e c e s s a r y to e x a m i n e the processes by which leadership cues are g e n e r a t e d and diffused. T h e r e m a i n d e r of t h e c h a p t e r will use these c o n d i t i o n s as the basis for e x a m ining the degree of elite d o m i n a t i o n that exists in the United States. T h e a i m will not be to settle the q u e s t i o n , which is obviously impossible in the few p a g e s that r e m a i n in this study, but to show the kinds of issues that need to be discussed and the kinds of additional e v i d e n c e n e c e s s a r y to reach a c o n v i n c i n g c o n c l u s i o n .

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T H E P O L I T I C A L C O M M U N I C A T I O N S SYSTEM O F T H E U N I T E D STATES The

press

Scholars interested in the quality of information and analyses available to the public have tended to focus on the press as the m o s t p r o x i m a t e source of that i n f o r m a t i o n . H e n c e , a great deal of information about it is available. O n e of the clearest findings to e m e r g e from the scholarly literature on the press is that reporters will regard as n e w s w o r t h y that which their " l e g i t i m a t e " sources say is n e w s w o r t h y ( C o h e n , 1963). As L e o n Sigal (1973) w r i t e s , Even when the journalist is in a position to observe an event directly, he remains reluctant to offer interpretations of his own, preferring instead to rely on his news sources. For the reporter, in short, most news is not what has happened, but what someone says has happened, (p. 69) As o n e journalist put it: " W e d o n ' t deal in facts, but in attributed o p i n i o n s " (cited in G a n s , 1980: p. 130). O n e reason for the well-established reliance of reporters on their sources is that j o u r n a l i s t s have a tendency to " g o n a t i v e , " identifying with the sources and w a n t i n g to p r o m o t e the s o u r c e ' s w o r l d view. As Russell B a k e r has w r i t t e n , The State Department reporter quickly learns to talk like a fuddy-duddy and to look grave, important, and inscrutable. The Pentagon man always looks like he has just come in from maneuvers. The Capital Hill reporter . . . affects the hooded expression of a man privy to many deals. Like the politicians he covers, he tends to garrulity, coarse jokes, and bourbon and to hate reform, (cited in Sigal, 1973: p. 49) A m o r e fundamental reason that r e p o r t e r s rely so heavily on sources is that they have no real c h o i c e . R e p o r t e r s have neither the t i m e nor the training nor, in most c a s e s , the inclination t o d o p r i m a r y investigations. A s David H a l b e r s t a m has written in The Powers That Be (1979) of the j o u r n a l i s t s w h o cover foreign affairs, they had come to journalism through the traditional routes, they had written the requisite police stories and chased fire engines and they had done all that a bit better than their peers, moving ahead in their profession, and they had finally come to Washington. If after their arrival in Washington they wrote stories about foreign policy, they did not dare inject their own viewpoints, of which they had none, or their own expertise, of which they also had none. Rather they relied almost exclusively on what some American or possibly British official told them at a briefing or at lunch. The closer journalists came to great issues, the more vulnerable they felt. (pp. 517-18) Journalists have r e p u t a t i o n s as s w a s h b u c k l i n g c h a r a c t e r s w h o are never afraid to say w h a t they think is t r u e . It would be m o r e accurate to say that j o u r n a l i s t s are never afraid to say w h a t other people think is t r u e . Yet in a w o r l d in which there are e n o r m o u s pressures - s o m e political, s o m e e c o n o m i c , and s o m e a r i s ing from t h e prejudices of the populace - to suppress w h a t is t r u e , an intense c o m m i t m e n t to publicizing the v i e w s of a w i d e r a n g e of sources can be an extremely valuable service.

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secular understanding of this subject, r e g a r d e d homosexuality as a d i s e a s e , press c o v e r a g e of the issue w a s d o m i n a t e d by a n t i h o m o s e x u a l stereotypes. T h u s , if o n e l o o k s up h o m o s e x u a l i t y in the New York Times Index of 1950, o n e finds a request to see the perversion and scandal listings. But w h e n the A P A d e c l a r e d , by a poll of its m e m b e r s h i p in 1974, that h o m o s e x u a l i t y w a s no longer to be c o n s i d e r e d a d i s e a s e , the press began to e m p l o y a " c i v i l r i g h t s ' frame of refere n c e alongside the old " v i c e " frame, thus offering the public an a l t e r n a t i v e way of c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g the issue of homosexuality.

40

Count of 30 news stories using civil rights frame on ABC, 20 CBS, and NBC news programs 10

69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 Year Figure 12.1. Number of stories using civil rights frame on network television news. Source: Vanderbilt Television News Archives. It i s , however, a m i s t a k e to think of the relationship between the press and its sources in m e c h a n i s t i c t e r m s . T h e sources responsible for a given story m a y not be q u o t e d in it, c o n s u l t e d for it, or even personally familiar to the reporter. T h i s is b e c a u s e , most generally, w h a t the press a t t e m p t s to do is to cover the n e w s from " a l l l e g i t i m a t e points of v i e w , " w h e r e legitimacy is conferred not only by g o v e r n m e n t a u t h o r i t i e s and interest g r o u p leaders, but also by subject m a t t e r specialists w h o have b e e n , in effect, accredited by m a i n s t r e a m institutions such as the g o v e r n m e n t , universities, r e s e a r c h institutes, or major b o o k publishers. H e n c e , if there is a significant fraction of m a i n s t r e a m expert opinion that h o l d s a p a r t i c u l a r v i e w , t h e press will l o o k for w a y s to use that v i e w as the basis of n e w s r e p o r t s . W h e n , for e x a m p l e , C B S television n e w s c o r r e s p o n d e n t M o r e l y Safer filed his famous story of a U . S . m a r i n e using his cigarette lighter to b u r n a V i e t n a m e s e p e a s a n t ' s t h a t c h e d roof hut ( H a l b e r s t a m , 1979), a story that w a s obviously a n t i w a r in its i m p l i c a t i o n s , it is doubtful that Safer c h e c k e d with any p a r t i c u l a r source on how to frame t h e story. However, he w a s n o n e theless reflecting a view of t h e w a r that w a s held by a significant fraction of foreign policy e x p e r t s . In a s s e r t i n g such a broad d e p e n d e n c e of m e d i a r e p o r t i n g on expert o p i n i o n , I am going beyond the existing literature on the p r e s s , w h i c h h a s formulated press d e p e n d e n c y in t e r m s of d e p e n d e n c e on p a r t i c u l a r s o u r c e s , most often g o v e r n m e n t officials dealing with a foreign policy issue. However, there is no reason to believe that a press w h i c h is congenitally d e p e n d e n t on g o v e r n m e n t sources for a type of story that is d o m i n a t e d by the g o v e r n m e n t will shed that d e p e n d e n c e in other types of situations. T h e b r o a d e r d e p e n d e n c e m a y be more difficult to d o c u m e n t , but it is likely to be present nonetheless. C o n s i d e r the treatment of homosexuality in the m e d i a . In the period in which the A m e r i c a n Psychiatric Association ( A P A ) , as the most authoritative source of

T h e c h a n g e in n e t w o r k television n e w s c o v e r a g e of homosexuality, in p a r t i c ular, o c c u r r e d quite suddenly at the t i m e of the A P A v o t e . In the five years prior to the A P A vote in 1974, TV n e t w o r k n e w s devoted 14 m i n u t e s to stories that, implicitly or explicitly, referred to h o m o s e x u a l s as a minority g r o u p seeking its rights. In the next five y e a r s , the n e t w o r k s devoted 135 m i n u t e s to stories of this k i n d , a nearly tenfold i n c r e a s e . T h e s a m e d a t a , a r r a y e d in t e r m s of story c o u n t s , are shown in Figure 1 2 . 1 . 1

My e x a m i n a t i o n of this n e w civil rights c o v e r a g e , which w a s generally but not always s y m p a t h e t i c to g a y s , indicates that most fell into one of three c a t e g o r i e s : 2

1. Coverage of a lawsuit by Air Force Lieutenant Leonard Matlovich, who was attempting to reverse the decision of the military to dismiss him for being homosexual. Over several days, all three networks devoted significant attention to this story. 2. Coverage of state and local referenda on gay rights. Following the APA vote, the media regarded these referenda, beginning with one in Dade Country, Florida, as having national political significance. 3. Human interest stories on gay and lesbian organizations, especially those forming on college campuses. These stories examined the loneliness of homosexual students, and their efforts to form support organizations, hold social events such as gay dances, and oppose discriminatory rules. It m i g h t be objected that n o n e of these stories had any direct c o n n e c t i o n with the A P A v o t e , and that w h a t really c h a n g e d w a s t h e behavior of h o m o s e x u a l s , w h o were b e c o m i n g increasingly militant and increasingly effective in d e m a n d ing their rights. C e r t a i n l y the increased militancy and visibility of h o m o s e x u a l s c o n t r i b u t e d to the c h a n g e in press c o v e r a g e . But it w a s hardly the w h o l e e x p l a n a t i o n . For exa m p l e , nothing in t h e gay rights m o v e m e n t c o m p e l l e d the spate of largely s y m pathetic stories about c a m p u s gay rights o r g a n i z a t i o n s . In one of these stories, N B C r e p o r t e r Betty Rollins noted: The question is, do homosexual organizations encourage homosexuality? Psychiatrists we spoke to think not. They point out that in this society, no one wants to be a homosexual who isn't one and that if a kid goes as far as joining a homosexual club, he is a homosexual. All the club does is to make him feel less alone and less terrible about the sexual feelings he has and can't help having. 3

1 Calculated from the Television News Archive of Vanderbilt University. 2 Some of news under the civil rights rubric included persons arguing against civil rights for gays, as in the case of the well-publicized opposition of singer Anita Bryant to a Dade County, Florida ordinance that outlawed discrimination on the basis of sexual preference. 3 NBC Evening News, April 13, 1973.

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Elite domination of public opinion

T h e explicit reference to expert opinion in this story is not, however, typical of the new coverage of homosexuality. To the extent that expert opinion w a s important in most stories, it w a s as deep b a c k g r o u n d . For w h a t c h a n g e d in the 1970s w a s that the press w a s no longer seeing h o m o s e x u a l s as social d e v i a n t s , but as o r d i n a r y citizens suffering the effects of h o m o p h o b i c prejudice. Given this c h a n g e of view, w h i c h as I show later o n , clearly originated a m o n g psychiatric e x p e r t s , m u c h else followed more or less automatically. C o n s i d e r the contrast b e t w e e n the last story dealing with gay rights on C B S n e w s p r i o r to the A P A v o t e , and the first such story following t h e v o t e . In the earlier story, gays had w o n a c o u r t victory p e r m i t t i n g t h e m to d e m o n s t r a t e at the D e m o c r a t i c national c o n v e n t i o n in M i a m i in 1972. Walter C r o n k i t e , in a slot often used for light n e w s at the end of his p r o g r a m , reported the victory this way:

c a m e out in opposition to the m e a s u r e : California g o v e r n o r J e r r y B r o w n , former g o v e r n o r and presidential aspirant R o n a l d R e a g a n , and President J i m m y Carter. It is h a r d to imagine such b e h a v i o r on the p a r t of a m b i t i o u s politicians in an e r a w h e n e x p e r t s were in u n a n i m o u s a g r e e m e n t that h o m o s e x u a l i t y w a s a form of m e n t a l illness and in w h i c h the press routinely c a t e g o r i z e d n e w s about h o m o sexuality u n d e r the r u b r i c of p e r v e r s i o n .

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Miami Beach had laws against female impersonation. Today a federal judge in Miami struck them down, saying they were too vague, and besides, discriminated against men. The suit was brought by the Civil Liberties Union on complaint of gay activists who plan to demonstrate at the Democratic convention next month. They'll apparently give the fashion reporters something to contemplate. And that's the way it i s . 4

T h u s , gays were still fair target for mild ridicule on the national n e w s in 1972. T h e next gay rights stor> on C B S o c c u r r e d shortly after the A P A vote and involved the a t t e m p t s of gay activists in N e w York City to win passage of an antid i s c r i m i n a t i o n law, an effort that had been u n d e r way for several years. C r o n k i t e introduced the story as follows: Part of the new morality of the 1960s and 70s is a new attitude toward homosexuals. The homosexual men and women have organized to fight for acceptance and respectability. They have succeeded in winning equal rights under the law in many communities, but in the nation's biggest city, the fight goes o n . s

C o v e r a g e of the M a t l o v i c h c a s e represents an equally significant c h a n g e in press behavior. M a t l o v i c h w a s far from being the first h o m o s e x u a l to protest being d i s m i s s e d from a g o v e r n m e n t j o b b e c a u s e of his sexual o r i e n t a t i o n . He w a s , however, the first to get e x t e n s i v e , respectful c o v e r a g e on the evening TV n e w s for doing s o . T h a t this coverage c a m e very soon after the A P A ' s d e c l a r a t i o n on h o m o s e x u a l i t y s e e m s m o r e than c o i n c i d e n c e . T h e point, t h e n , is that h o m o s e x u a l s had been seeking equal rights for s o m e years w h e n , in the a f t e r m a t h of the A P A v o t e , t h e m a i n s t r e a m press began to take a different view of their efforts. T h e c h a n g e in media r e p o r t i n g c a n n o t be linked in a m e c h a n i c a l way to the A P A vote but is nonetheless best u n d e r s t o o d as reflecting the p r e s s ' s general sensitivity to expert authority. It w a s not, incidentally, only the p r e s s , but also m a n y m a i n s t r e a m politicians w h o s e b e h a v i o r c h a n g e d in the aftermath of the A P A vote. T h u s , w h e n voters in California w e r e asked in 1978 to d e c i d e on a.ballot initiative that w o u l d m a k e it easier to fire h o m o s e x u a l s c h o o l t e a c h e r s , three nationally prominent politicians 4 June 22, 1972.

5 May 6, 1974.

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T h e r e is, in s u m , reason to believe that the press is to a c o n s i d e r a b l e d e g r e e d e p e n d e n t on subject m a t t e r specialists, including g o v e r n m e n t officials a m o n g m a n y o t h e r s , in framing and r e p o r t i n g the n e w s . I have a t t e m p t e d to s u m m a r i z e the nature of this d e p e n d e n c e by a s s e r t i n g that t h e press u n d e r t a k e s , in g e n e r a l , to cover t h e n e w s from all legitimate points of view, w h e r e legitimacy is determ i n e d by w h a t m a i n s t r e a m e x p e r t s take s e r i o u s l y . 6

Experts T h e a r g u m e n t of the p r e c e d i n g s e c t i o n , if c o r r e c t , places the real responsibility for selecting the ideas that reach the public with the p r e s s ' s sources. As V. O. Key, Jr. (1961), c o n c l u d e d in this r e g a r d , " T h e picture of the press collectively as the w i e l d e r of great p o w e r on its own initiative d o e s not fit the f a c t s " ( p . 394). The managers of the mass media, he continues, should no more be held accountable for the materials that flow through their channels than should the managers of transportation concerns be blamed for the quality of the printed matter they transport from place to place. The tone and quality of the content of the media tend to be mightily influenced, if not fixed, by those who manufacture news, (p. 395) T h i s in turn suggests that if we are interested in t h e quality of the information reaching the public, we must understand how it is manufactured, w h i c h is to say, we must understand t h e politics of expert c o m m u n i t i e s as they relate to the g e n e r a t i o n and diffusion of k n o w l e d g e c l a i m s , policy r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s , and general frames of reference. We especially need to k n o w the extent to which these c o m m u n i t i e s are ideologically d i v e r s e , o p e n to c h a l l e n g e , and institutionally s u p p o r t i v e of s e r i o u s - m i n d e d a t t e m p t s to discover feasible solutions to pressing p r o b l e m s . T h e r e has b e e n , as far as I can tell, little scholarly attention to these q u e s tions. T h e r e a r e , to be s u r e , n u m e r o u s accounts of h o w p a r t i c u l a r g r o u p s of individuals have a t t e m p t e d to resolve p a r t i c u l a r policy d i l e m m a s . But a t t e m p t s to generalize from these a c c o u n t s , or to a n s w e r s y s t e m a t i c a l l y questions of the type just p o s e d , a p p e a r to be a l m o s t entirely lacking in the literature of political science and c o m m u n i c a t i o n studies. Let m e , t h e n , offer an anecdotal glimpse of the w o r k i n g s of the s u b c o m m u nity of persons specializing in questions of n u c l e a r strategy. It involves types of personal interactions t h a t , as far as I have been able to tell, are o u t s i d e existing 6 This argument is similar to Bennett's (1990) indexing hypothesis, except that it refers to a broader range of sources than Bennett considers to be influential.

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studies of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , but that a r e , I b e l i e v e , of the utmost i m p o r t a n c e for u n d e r s t a n d i n g the forces that u l t i m a t e l y shape public o p i n i o n . A few years a g o , it w a s p r o p o s e d by a g r o u p of scientists that any significant use of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s by either the United States or the former Soviet Union w o u l d result in an e n v i r o n m e n t a l disaster of m o n u m e n t a l p r o p o r t i o n s . T h e idea w a s that the explosion of large n u m b e r s of n u c l e a r b o m b s , possibly only a few d o z e n , w o u l d throw up e n o r m o u s a m o u n t s of dust, d e b r i s , and s m o k e into the a t m o s p h e r e , b l o c k i n g out t h e sun and c r e a t i n g a d e c a d e s long " n u c l e a r w i n t e r " of near-total d a r k n e s s and freezing t e m p e r a t u r e s . As a result, the use of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s , even in self-defense, w o u l d be suicidal not only for o n e ' s n a t i o n , but for o n e ' s race and for all of t h e e a r t h ' s creatures (Schell, 1982). T h e idea of n u c l e a r w i n t e r w a s , as would be e x p e c t e d , most p o p u l a r a m o n g libe r a l s , w h o used it as an a r g u m e n t for restricting p r o d u c t i o n of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s . At the t i m e w h e n these ideas were being d e b a t e d in the m e d i a , I w a s put in c h a r g e of organizing a speaker p r o g r a m at my university on t h e subject of the morality of n u c l e a r war. O n e of the people I invited w a s a well-known conservative e x p e r t w h o had w r i t t e n extensively on n u c l e a r war, including strategies for fighting n u c l e a r w a r s on a limited but, a c c o r d i n g to the theory of n u c l e a r winter, potentially c a t a s t r o p h i c scale. W h e n I a s k e d a liberal nuclear w a r policy expert to introduce this p e r s o n and to serve as m o d e r a t o r for the e n s u i n g disc u s s i o n , he flatly and firmly refused. T h e ideas of the c o n s e r v a t i v e war e x p e r t w e r e d e e p l y i m m o r a l , th? liberal expert said, and it w o u l d hardly be possible for h i m to attend the talk, let alone serve as m o d e r a t o r for it. However, after m u c h c o a x i n g - including my insistence that, as moderator, he would be in a better position to o p p o s e the baleful influence of t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e expert - he agreed to s e r v e as moderator. On t h e day of t h e talk, I w a s chatting with the c o n s e r v a t i v e expert w h e n the liberal d r o p p e d in. After s t a n d a r d introductions were m a d e , the liberal c a l m l y a s k e d his fellow e x p e r t , " W e l l , w h a t are you w o r k i n g o n these d a y s ? " 7

" N u c l e a r w i n t e r , " replied the c o n s e r v a t i v e . " T h a t ' s i n t e r e s t i n g , " said the liberal. " W h a t are you f i n d i n g ? " " T h a t it's basically a n o n s t a r t e r , " replied the c o n s e r v a t i v e . - • I stepped back and looked a r o u n d for shelter, fearing a nuclear explosion w a s about to occur. But t h e w o r r y w a s unfounded. " Y e a h , t h a t ' s pretty m u c h the way I see it, t o o , " said the liberal, w h o w a s a physicist by training. " I ' v e d o n e an awful lot of calculations and I c a n ' t c o m e up with any that m a k e n u c l e a r w i n t e r s e e m like a real possibility." W i t h that, t h e t w o m e n launched into a discussion of exactly w h a t t h e incine r a t i o n rates of various substances w e r e , h o w m u c h of what kinds of c o m b u s tible m a t e r i a l s are found in typical c i t i e s , and other technical p a r a m e t e r s of the process by w h i c h n u c l e a r w i n t e r m i g h t or might not be created. T h e y a p p e a r e d to agree on almost e v e r y t h i n g . 7 Quotations are approximate.

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S h o r t l y after these e v e n t s , discussion of n u c l e a r winter d i s a p p e a r e d from the p o p u l a r m e d i a and the issue w a s seemingly forgotten. T h i s a n e c d o t e , w h i c h is straight out of P u r p l e L a n d , suggests several important points. First, despite a g r e e m e n t on n u c l e a r winter, there is clear e v i d e n c e of ideological diversity of a sort that doubtless manifests itself in other situations. S e c o n d , strong ideological differences are not an insuperable b a r r i e r to rational discussion and to the a c h i e v e m e n t of a g r e e m e n t on p a r t i c u l a r issues. T h e key to b r i d g i n g ideological differences appears to be the existence of a b o d y of conventional scientific k n o w l e d g e , in this c a s e the laws of physics and chemistry, w h i c h both experts a c c e p t e d . T h i s k n o w l e d g e is apparently sufficiently well d e veloped and routinized that it can lead its users to accept conclusions they are p r e d i s p o s e d against. T h i r d , the press apparently lost interest in the issue after relevant experts on both sides concluded that it w a s a nonstarter, and did so d e spite a c o n s u m e r m a r k e t for stories on n u c l e a r w i n t e r that w a s p r e s u m a b l y as strong as it had ever b e e n . H o w often these things are true of other issues and expert c o m m u n i t i e s is impossible to say. C e r t a i n l y o n e can readily i m a g i n e expert c o m m u n i t i e s that enforce ideological h o m o g e n e i t y on their m e m b e r s , or t h a t , if they do permit diversity, are so d e e p l y polarized that no rational discussion can occur, or that have no c o n v e n t i o n a l k n o w l e d g e that is sufficiently strong to c o m p e l a c c e p t a n c e a m o n g differently p r e d i s p o s e d users. T h e s e issues, I m a i n t a i n , are i m p o r t a n t ones. T h e y go to the h e a r t of t h e functioning of the political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s s y s t e m in the United S t a t e s , affecting not only public opinion but g o v e r n m e n t a c t i o n . Yet, as I e m p h a s i z e , they s e e m to be outside the s c o p e of current investigation. By way of m a k i n g a p r e l i m i n a r y b u t , I h o p e , suggestive e x a m i n a t i o n of these issues, let me return to t h e issue of homosexuality. I have already sketched an a r g u m e n t about the effect of expert opinion on m e d i a treatment of this issue. I will n o w l o o k briefly at h o w expert opinion on this issue d e v e l o p e d . At m i d - t w e n t i e t h century, there had been a lengthy history of h o m o s e x u a l rights g r o u p s seeking a c c e p t a n c e by society. But the g r o u p s had been small, short-lived, and ineffective. A l t h o u g h s o m e of t h e early rights g r o u p s had believed that " t h e p e r i o d of passing over the m a t t e r [of h o m o s e x u a l i t y ] and disr e g a r d i n g it is past, for g o o d , " Lauritsen and T h o r s t a d (1974) o b s e r v e d that 8

The early homosexual rights movement was cut short, in the 1930s, after 70 years of existence, having achieved virtually no lasting breakthroughs. The small, isolated groups that came into existence here and there during the next two decades could not even be called holding actions, since there was little left to hold onto. (p. 71) It s e e m s that h o m o s e x u a l s faced t w o p r o b l e m s . As a minority g r o u p almost universally considered d e v i a n t , they were not able to m a k e h e a d w a y without having at least a few allies inside the s y s t e m , and they had n o n e . A l s o , far from w a n t i n g to challenge m a i n s t r e a m s o c i e t y ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of their plight, many 8 Cited in Lauritsen and Thorstad, 1974: p. 22.

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h o m o s e x u a l s accepted and internalized it. As a h o m o s e x u a l rights activist w r o t e in t h e 1960s: The homosexual, whether born or bred (and the psychiatric argument is still raging) has been conditioned to think of himself as . . . something to be despised. The minute he discovers he's "different" he avidly reads anything he can on the subject. And what does he find? More ammunition for his self-contempt. He's told by psychiatric "authorities" that he's " s i c k . " So he begins to tell himself not that " T h e psychiatrists say I'm sick," but " I ' m sick." He programs himself into perpetual feelings of unworthiness." (emphasis in the original) 9

In the late 1940s, however, a handful of professional psychiatrists and psychologists u n d e r t o o k research that placed h o m o s e x u a l i t y in a new light. T h e r e h a d , to be s u r e , been p r i o r research and t h e o r i z i n g on the subject, but t h e n e w research w a s , in a small but i m p o r t a n t way, m o r e r i g o r o u s than e a r l i e r efforts: R a t h e r than study h o m o s e x u a l s w h o were either i m p r i s o n e d for s o m e c r i m e , often a sex c r i m e , or actively seeking psychiatric h e l p , the new studies found w a y s of e x a m i n i n g h o m o s e x u a l s w h o were leading o r d i n a r y lives (Bayer, 1981). T h e results were a surprise to almost e v e r y o n e . Alfred Kinsey, in his i n t e r v i e w - b a s e d studies of m a l e sexuality, t u r n e d up evidence that, he said, indicated that a large fraction of m a l e s w o u l d have a h o m o s e x u a l e x p e r i e n c e ending in o r g a s m at s o m e point in their lives. As he further argued: The opinion that homosexual activity in itself provides evidence of a psychopathic personality is materially challenged by these incidence and frequency data. Of the 40 or 50 percent of the male population which has had a homosexual experience, certainly a high proportion would not be considered psychopathic personalities on the basis of anything else in their histories. (1948: 659) A n o t h e r researcher, E v e l y n H o o k e r o f U C L A , administered personality a s s e s s m e n t tests to m a t c h e d s a m p l e s of h o m o s e x u a l and n o n h o m o s e x u a l m e n in the early 1950s and found no differences in their overall levels of personal adj u s t m e n t . O t h e r researchers followed suit, and soon there w a s a c o n s i d e r a b l e b o d y of psychiatric e v i d e n c e that raised serious q u e s t i o n about w h e t h e r h o m o sexuality w a s a form of mental illness. It is n o t a b l e that Hooker, w h o s e research proved the most influential, used s t a n d a r d social scientific research techniques. T h a t i s , she administered s t a n d a r d tests of personal adjustment and interpreted their results in c o n v e n t i o n a l l y e s tablished ways. T h e s e tests, R o r s c h a c h inkblot tests interpreted by j u d g e s blind to which had been provided by h o m o s e x u a l s , m a y not inspire great c o n f i d e n c e a m o n g n o n p s y c h i a t r i s t s , but, with respect to the issue of homosexuality, they constituted an application of neutral scientific k n o w l e d g e . No d o u b t b e c a u s e of t h i s , the initial response of a significant fraction of the psychiatric c o m m u n i t y w a s i m m e d i a t e l y favorable. H e r w o r k w a s q u i c k l y accepted for publication in an i m p o r t a n t j o u r n a l , and H o o k e r herself went on to a distinguished career. S h e w a s even asked by t h e N i x o n administration to head a 1969 federal task force on homosexuality, and by the International Encyclopedia 9 Leo Martello, cited in Marotta, 1981: p. 103.

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of the Social Sciences to w r i t e its section on homosexuality. T h u s , far from p e nalizing H o o k e r for her i d e a s , the psychiatric and political c o m m u n i t i e s rew a r d e d her. H o o k e r ' s research and follow-up studies gave homosexuality, for p e r h a p s the first t i m e in A m e r i c a n history, a solid foundation of s y m p a t h e t i c opinion in a m a i n s t r e a m institution. T h e n e w view w a s by no m e a n s universally held within p s y c h i a t r y : Traditional p s y c h o t h e r a p i s t s c o n t i n u e d to a r g u e that h o m o s e x u a l i t y w a s a d i s e a s e and to treat it as s u c h . But p s y c h i a t r y w a s no longer m o n o l i t h i c in its view of homosexuality, and if my general view of efforts by the m e d i a to r e p o r t t h e n e w s from " a l l legitimate points of v i e w " is c o r r e c t , this w a s e n o u g h to b r i n g about an i m p o r t a n t degree of c h a n g e in public discussion of t h e issue. T h e earliest and most attentive a u d i e n c e for this n e w research consisted of h o m o s e x u a l s . T h e i r r e s p o n s e w a s not only interesting - for it suggests that the authority of e x p e r t i s e is accepted by g r o u p s o t h e r than t h e m e d i a - but part of the story of h o w further c h a n g e o c c u r r e d within t h e psychiatric c o m m u nity. T h e initial r e s p o n s e , a c c o r d i n g to Bayer ( 1 9 8 1 ) , w a s o n e of keen but cautious interest. H o m o s e x u a l s w a n t e d to k n o w m o r e about the n e w research but d i d n ' t leap to any c o n c l u s i o n s about it. T h e i r m e e t i n g s and p u b l i c a t i o n s gave roughly equal play to the n e w research and to representatives of the traditional s c h o o l . " W h e r e medical m e n , p s y c h o a n a l y s t s , and social scientists fail to a g r e e , " o n e contributor to a h o m o s e x u a l publication w r o t e , " l a y m e n can only c o w e r in s i l e n c e . " Yet it w a s probably inevitable that h o m o s e x u a l s , having b e e n offered a choice b e t w e e n seeing t h e m s e l v e s as mentally ill and seeing t h e m s e l v e s as n o r m a l and healthy, would eventually g r a v i t a t e toward the latter view. As this o c c u r r e d , the n e w e r psychiatric view of h o m o s e x u a l i t y t o o k on great i m p o r t a n c e in efforts by h o m o s e x u a l s both to o r g a n i z e t h e m s e l v e s and to instigate social c h a n g e . F r a n k K a m e n y , t h e l e a d e r of a g r o u p of W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . , g a y s , w a s a key figure i n both respects. " T h e entire h o m o p h i l e m o v e m e n t , " h e said, " i s going to rise or fall upon the q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r h o m o s e x u a l i t y is a s i c k n e s s . " " K a m e n y personally rejected the authority of p s y c h i a t r y over the status of h o m o sexuality but n o n e t h e l e s s invoked scientific values and t h e new p s y c h i a t r i c e v i d e n c e to p e r s u a d e m e m b e r s of his o r g a n i z a t i o n to proclaim publicly that their sexual preferences w e r e n o r m a l and healthy. However, it w a s not until 1965 that K a m e n y w a s able to win approval for such a s t a t e m e n t , and even t h e n , it w a s carefully hedged: " i n t h e a b s e n c e of valid e v i d e n c e to the c o n t r a r y , " read the resolution of the W a s h i n g t o n D . C . M a t t a c h i n e Society, " h o m o s e x u a l i t y is not a sickness . . . but is merely a p r e f e r e n c e . " In a still later p h a s e of its r e s p o n s e to the new psychiatric e v i d e n c e , h o m o sexuals b e g a n to publicly reject psychiatric authority. E v e n as this o c c u r r e d , however, friendly psychiatric experts r e m a i n e d w e l c o m e allies. T h e s e e x p e r t s , Bayer (1981) c o m m e n t s , 1 0

12

10 Cited in Bayer, 1981: p. 74. 11 Cited ibid.: p. 82. 12 Cited in D'Emillio, 1983: p. 164.

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provided homosexuals with evidence and with a vocabulary of criticism that were invaluable in the effort to tear the mantle of authority from those who claimed that science itself had discovered the psychopathology inherent in homosexuality. The role of the expert at homophile meetings shifted from that of providing homosexuals with insight into the etiology of their sexual preferences to that of providing insight into the illegitimate power of psychiatry, (p. 86) It is interesting to note that the behavior of h o m o s e x u a l s in this period conforms to the basic n o t i o n s of the m a i n s t r e a m and p o l a r i z a t i o n m o d e l s . W h e n h o m o s e x u a l i t y w a s c o n s i d e r e d by virtually all specialists and the press to be a d i s e a s e , h o m o s e x u a l s largely accepted this m a i n s t r e a m n o r m by staying, as the p h r a s e g o e s , " i n the c l o s e t . " This orientation w a s obviously sustained in p a r t by realistic fears of w h a t w o u l d h a p p e n if they were discovered; but it is c l e a r that in m a n y c a s e s , the m a i n s t r e a m n o r m against h o m o s e x u a l i t y w a s to a significant d e g r e e internalized. But t h e n , offered by s o m e psychiatric authorities a c h o i c e of c o n s i d e r i n g t h e m s e l v e s sick or merely to have an a l t e r n a t i v e sexual preference, h o m o s e x u a l s naturally allied t h e m s e l v e s with the friendlier view. P a r t of t h e effort to o v e r c o m e s o c i e t y ' s prejudice against h o m o s e x u a l i t y w a s a y e a r s ' long series of confrontations b e t w e e n militant gays and the A m e r i c a n Psychiatric A s s o c i a t i o n , w h i c h c o n t i n u e d in its official publications to classify h o m o s e x u a l i t y as d i s e a s e . T h u s w h e n the A P A met in W a s h i n g t o n in 1970, F r a n k K a m e n y helped to lead the protest: The planned disruption occurred on May 3, when gay and anti-war activists stormed the prestigious Convocation oi Fellows. During the ensuing uproar, Kameny grabbed a microphone and denounced the right of psychiatrists to discuss the question of homosexuality. Borrowing from the anti-war movement, he declared, "Psychiatry is the enemy incarnate. Psychiatry has waged a relentless war of extermination against us. You may take this as a declaration of war against you." Fist-shaking psychiatrists, infuriated by the invaders, compared their tactics to that of Nazi storm troopers. (Bayer, 1981: p. 105) S u c h d i s r u p t i o n s no d o u b t impelled the leaders of the A P A to think m o r e c a r e fully about the issue of h o m o s e x u a l i t y than they w o u l d o t h e r w i s e have d o n e . As a result, w h e n the trustees of the A P A , and later a majority of the A P A m e m b e r s h i p in a referendum, voted to delete h o m o s e x u a l i t y from its official list of m e n t a l d i s o r d e r s , both those w h o w o n the vote and those w h o lost felt.that the action had involved a large political c o m p o n e n t - as obviously it h a d . But equally obviously, there w a s m o r e to the politics of this expert c o m m u n i t y than 1960s-style pressure tactics. As B a y e r o b s e r v e d , s o m e of the trustees voting for the c h a n g e w e r e genuinely c o n v i n c e d that homosexuality w a s not n e c essarily a d i s e a s e , while others " f e l t privately that homosexuality w a s indeed a d i s o r d e r . . . [but] n e v e r t h e l e s s a c k n o w l e d g e d that the evidence required to s u b stantiate their position w a s l a c k i n g " (p. 136). In short, s t a n d a r d ' p s y c h i a t r i c evi d e n c e , w h a t e v e r its intrinsic m e r i t , appeared to c o u n t . If this s e e m s a naive v i e w , consider the significance of the psychiatric evid e n c e in coldly political t e r m s . O n c e the findings of H o o k e r and others b e g a n to a c c u m u l a t e , the psychiatric profession faced a g e n u i n e d i l e m m a , o n e that had eventually to be faced w h e t h e r gay militants d e m a n d e d it or not. E i t h e r psychiatrists could r e m o v e h o m o s e x u a l i t y from the list of mental disorders on the

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g r o u n d s that the s t a n d a r d a s s e s s m e n t t e c h n i q u e s had failed to uncover e v i d e n c e of p s y c h i c p r o b l e m s a m o n g h o m o s e x u a l s , or they could devalue the s t a n d a r d a s sessment t e c h n i q u e s - the basis for p s y c h i a t r y ' s authority in o t h e r d o m a i n s - on the g r o u n d s that they had failed to uncover the p a t h o l o g y inherent in h o m o s e x uality. T h i s m u s t , in the e n d , have been an easy c h o i c e . T h e reader should n o t i c e that n o w h e r e in this account have I evaluated the c o r r e c t n e s s of the view of h o m o s e x u a l i t y taken by psychiatrists. T h i s is b e c a u s e the c o r r e c t n e s s of elite v i e w s is, from the p e r s p e c t i v e I am p r o p o s i n g , irrelevant. W h a t matters is, in effect, procedural c o r r e c t n e s s : w h e t h e r the relevant expert c o m m u n i t i e s are ideologically diverse and w h e t h e r they have institutionalized incentive structures that impel m e m b e r s to m a k e their best efforts to resolve pressing p r o b l e m s . W i t h respect to these q u e s t i o n s , the psychiatric profession appears to d e s e r v e a favorable e v a l u a t i o n . A researcher of no initial standing in her field, an untenured research a s s o c i a t e at what w a s then a m i n o r state university, w a s able to o p e n the first i m p o r t a n t crack in a previously i m p r e g n a b l e p o w e r s t r u c t u r e , and to do so in the m i d - 1 9 5 0 s , a t i m e not obviously propitious for such an undertaking. T h i s is an impressive a c h i e v e m e n t not only for the individual, but for the institutional a r r a n g e m e n t s that m a d e it possible. T h e most i m p o r t a n t of these institutional a r r a n g e m e n t s , I have s u g g e s t e d , w a s the existence within t h e psychiatric c o m m u n i t y of s t a n d a r d personality a s s e s s m e n t t e c h n i q u e s , w h i c h I have referred to as c o n v e n t i o n a l scientific k n o w l e d g e . T h e last few p a g e s have used a case study in o r d e r to e x a m i n e the politics of an expert c o m m u n i t y . I do not b e l i e v e , however, that the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the d y n a m i c s of expert c o m m u n i t i e s should be too heavily d e p e n d e n t on c a s e studies. Rather, an a t t e m p t should be m a d e to d e v e l o p a general account of h o w expert c o m m u n i t i e s g e n e r a t e ideas and h o w these ideas diffuse. T h e key issues in such a general a c c o u n t , I b e l i e v e , should be possible bias in recruitment to the expert c o m m u n i t i e s , professional incentive structures within the c o m m u n i t i e s , and the d e v e l o p m e n t of a b o d y of c o n v e n t i o n a l k n o w l e d g e strong e n o u g h to c o m p e l a g r e e m e n t a m o n g differently predisposed users. T h e r e exists s o m e solid literature on the first q u e s t i o n . It indicates that persons of different ideological o r i e n t a t i o n s are attracted to different a c a d e m i c disciplines (Lipset and L a d d , 1970) a n d , o n e a s s u m e s , to different o c c u p a t i o n a l g r o u p i n g s as well. W h e t h e r this results in ideological h o m o g e n e i t y within g r o u p s , or pressures that m a k e it difficult for the minority to do its w o r k , is an i m p o r t a n t but presently u n a n s w e r e d q u e s t i o n . To the extent that r e c r u i t m e n t to expert c o m m u n i t i e s , w h e t h e r by m e a n s of v o l u n t a r y self-selection or p u r p o s i v e enforcement of ideological s t a n d a r d s , limits t h e types of persons w h o can bec o m e e x p e r t s , the r a n g e of elite discourse is restricted and the specter of elite d o m i n a t i o n is raised. W i t h respect to the s e c o n d q u e s t i o n , the existing literature is, if a n y t h i n g , even m o r e lacking. F r o m my previous d i s c u s s i o n s , it nonetheless s e e m s plausib l e to maintain that at least s o m e e x p e r t s , professionals, and o t h e r types of

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subject m a t t e r specialists do often have incentive structures that strongly e m p h a s i z e the a d v a n c e m e n t of k n o w l e d g e for the solution of pressing societal problems. A c o n s p i c u o u s e x a m p l e of t h e m may be found in the medical research c o m m u n i t y , within which s t a t u s , research s u p p o r t , and salary all d e p e n d on the practical or theoretical value of the research o n e has d o n e , as j u d g e d by peers in the field. Similar incentive structures are in place in most a c a d e m i c disciplines or at least the individuals w h o serve on r e c r u i t m e n t and p r o m o t i o n c o m m i t t e e s within universities devote a great deal of energy to trying to m a k e sure that they a r e . T h u s , one need not posit experts and professionals w h o are altruistic in ord e r to believe that many of t h e m are genuinely interested in the discovery of k n o w l e d g e of g o o d public policy. O n e need only posit incentive structures that e n c o u r a g e t h e m to have such interests. Such incentive structures obviously cannot e l i m i n a t e bias or g u a r a n t e e correct c o n c l u s i o n s . But they may n o n e t h e l e s s serve as effective i n d u c e m e n t s to try to reach these goals. T h e incentive structures prevalent in expert c o m m u n i t i e s , especially if internalized, may provide a strong influence on a p e r s o n ' s behavior. I o n c e s p o k e to a sociologist doing research in association with medical scientists w h o , in the early stages of the A I D S e p i d e m i c , were trying to isolate the A I D S virus and d e t e r m i n e its m o d e of t r a n s m i s s i o n . M a n y of these r e s e a r c h e r s , the sociologist told m e , w e r e either gay or s y m p a t h e t i c to g a y s , and so had a strong desire to find that A I D S w a s not as readily transmissible as many viruses. For a short initial p e r i o d , he said, trfss p r e c o n c e p t i o n s e e m e d to affect research p l a n s . But very quickly, he said, all r e s e a r c h e r s , gay and n o n g a y alike, began to focus on w i n n i n g " t h e big p r i z e " - that is, being the first to discover the true nature of A I D S , r e g a r d l e s s of their personal interests or w i s h e s c o n c e r n i n g its n a t u r e . It is, I reiterate, an open e m p i r i c a l question h o w strongly such incentives are felt across w h a t r a n g e of expert and professional o c c u p a t i o n g r o u p s to which r e p o r t e r s and politicians go for information - but an empirical q u e s t i o n well worth investigating. My notion of professional and expert c o m m u n i t i e s obviously d r a w s heavily on t h e idealized c o n c e p t i o n of a scientific c o m m u n i t y (see M e r t o n , 1982; H a g s t r o m , 1965). T h i s should n o t , however, o b s c u r e the critically i m p o r t a n t fact that, for m u c h of the subject m a t t e r that is relevant to politics, the personal and political predispositions of experts and professionals can and regularly do influe n c e t h e conclusions they reach (or at least try to r e a c h ) . I am aware of no research on this point, but I d o u b t that many will d i s p u t e it. Certainly within any subfield of social s c i e n c e , all of us k n o w studies w h i c h reflect the ideological t e n d e n c i e s of researchers w h o c a n , on other g r o u n d s , be identified as m o r e or less liberal or c o n s e r v a t i v e . It seems quite likely that this is true of o t h e r professional and expert c o m m u n i t i e s as well. T h u s , to return to the A I D S e x a m p l e , it s e e m s likely that, if there were s o m e medical researchers w h o w a n t e d , for reason of their predispositions or perceived interests, to be able to show that A I D S could not be casually t r a n s m i t t e d , there were o t h e r researchers w h o s e p r e d i s p o sitions or perceived interests m o t i v a t e d the o p p o s i t e c o n c l u s i o n .

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opinion

I see no conflict in c o m p a r i n g professional and expert c o m m u n i t i e s to scientific c o m m u n i t i e s , while also giving very w i d e scope to the o p e r a t i o n of ideologically m o t i v a t e d p r e c o n c e p t i o n s . A s m y U C L A colleague Richard S k l a r has o b s e r v e d , social science t h e o r i e s are often c o n c e i v e d in ideological sin rather than scientific virtue. But, a l t h o u g h people may be m o t i v a t e d by various prec o n c e p t i o n s , they m u s t , in order to maintain high standing in their specialized c o m m u n i t i e s , justify their eventual conclusions in t e r m s of a r g u m e n t s that eve r y o n e can accept, including persons w h o do not share their predispositions or p r e c o n c e p t i o n s . Moreover, a c a s e can be m a d e that ideological b i a s , so long as it is o p e r a t i n g within pluralistic professional and expert c o m m u n i t i e s , has salutary effects. It w o u l d tend to assure that every potentially controversial issue is scrutinized by persons having a r a n g e of m o t i v a t e d p r e c o n c e p t i o n s . To the extent that such differently m o t i v a t e d persons can agree on a c o m m o n answer, as very often they d o , t h e rest of society w h o are not specialists can have s o m e confidence that the a n s w e r p r o p o s e d by the e x p e r t s is sound - or if not s o u n d , the best that anyone can do for the m o m e n t . A n d to the extent that differently m o t i v a t e d p e r s o n s cannot a g r e e , they w o u l d , as sources for reporters and staff advisors to politicians, air their d i s a g r e e m e n t s in p u b l i c , thereby a l e r t i n g o r d i n a r y citizens to t h e existence of uncertainty. T h i s brings u s back t o o u r m a i n c o n c e r n about elite d o m i n a t i o n . W h e n , d e spite their divergent p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s , all relevant specialists agree on a policy, any source w h o m j o u r n a l i s t s consult will say roughly the s a m e t h i n g , with the result that society will have " e l i t e c o n s e n s u s " and a " m a i n s t r e a m n o r m " that will be m o s t strongly s u p p o r t e d by the most politically attentive m e m b e r s of society. But w h e n predispositions induce relevant specialists to d i s a g r e e , j o u r n a l ists will publicize the d i s a g r e e m e n t , often in starkly ideological t e r m s that invoke i m a g e s of g o o d and evil. Politicians and publicists, w h o maintain lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s to like-minded specialists, will also d i s a g r e e . T h e result will be a polarization of the general public along lines that m i r r o r the elite ideological conflict, with the most attentive m e m b e r s of the public most ideologically p o l a r i z e d . 13

Ideology, in this view, is a mechanism by which ordinary citizens make contact with specialists who are knowledgeable on controversial issues and who share the citizens' predispositions. As such, ideology can m a k e a valuable contribution to d e m o c r a t i c politics in a society in w h i c h people are expected not only to have opinions about a range of impossibly difficult issues, but to use those opinions as the basis for c h o o s i n g leaders and h o l d i n g t h e m a c c o u n t a b l e . Note that ideology, as t h e t e r m is being used h e r e , is not, as it is often taken by opinion researchers to b e , the unified product of an individual creative gen i u s , such as Karl M a r x or E d m u n d B u r k e or John L o c k e . Rather, it is an 13 Congressional committee and personal staffs, policy institutes and think tanks, and overlapping parts of the federal bureaucracy often have distinct political colorations, thereby tying politicians to members of specialist communities who share their values.

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a g g l o m e r a t i o n of v i e w s of different specialists sharing a c o m m o n predispositional b e n t . T h u s , for e x a m p l e , w h a t passes for c o n s e r v a t i v e e c o n o m i c s o r c o n s e r v a t i v e foreign policy will be w h a t most c o n s e r v a t i v e e c o n o m i s t s and conservative foreign policy e x p e r t s agree needs to be d o n e . W h e n the e x p e r t s c h a n g e their v i e w s , as liberal experts c h a n g e d their opinion about V i e t n a m , m a s s belief s y s t e m s will, with the sorts of lags I have d o c u m e n t e d in earlier c h a p t e r s , tend to follow the elite view. T h e r e is no p a r t i c u l a r need for m e m b e r s of t h e general public to k n o w technical details of the expert d e b a t e on these iss u e s , or to k n o w why a given set of policies is c o n s e r v a t i v e or liberal, in order to take positions on t h e m that are consistent with their ideological predispositions; they need only be able to r e c o g n i z e which elites share their predispositions and take cues from t h e m . 1 4

I have now sketched an idealized s y s t e m of public information in which political ideas and perspectives d e v e l o p a m o n g various kinds of policy specialists and diffuse d o w n w a r d to the public via politicians and the m a s s m e d i a . T h i s idealized s y s t e m is obviously not t h e w h o l e p i c t u r e , for it neglects the extremely imp o r t a n t role of political institutions, p a r t i s a n c o m p e t i t i o n , and political c e n s o r s h i p in regulating t h e flow of information through society. But even s o , my account of this s y s t e m m a k e s two useful points. It sets o u t , first of all, a set of idealized c o n d i t i o n s t h a t , if m e t , w o u l d greatly mitigate the n o r m a t i v e l y o b j e c t i o n a b l e effects of a heavy d e p e n d e n c e of m a s s opinion on elite d i s c o u r s e . It further shows that, as an empirical matter, s o m e of these conditions - expert c o m m u n i t i e s o p e r a t i n g at least s o m e of the t i m e within salutary incentive structures, and a press that is attentive to these c o m m u n i t i e s - are at least partially met in the current information system of the United States. I turn now to s o m e brief r e m a r k s about the effect of political factors on the o p e r a t i o n of my idealized information s y s t e m .

POLITICS AND I N F O R M A T I O N In leaving until now any discussion of the effects of " p o l i t i c s " on t h e flow of i n f o r m a t i o n , I imply that the g e n e r a t i o n of information is p r i m a r y and that political factors that regulate its d i s s e m i n a t i o n , including the activities of g o v e r n m e n t officials, o t h e r politicians, and interest g r o u p s , a m o n g o t h e r s , are secondary. T h e reason for this e m p h a s i s is, quite simply, that political information prec e d e s political action. All political actors, including the g o v e r n m e n t , must form s o m e view of w h a t is h a p p e n i n g in the w o r l d before u n d e r t a k i n g any a c t i o n , including action to c e n s o r or m a n i p u l a t e the flow of information to the p u b l i c , and this view is invariably a product of various kinds of policy and information 14 This common bent presumably involves non-issue specific predispositions toward order, stability, and social control, among other things (for some empirically grounded conjectures, see McClosky and Zaller, 1985, ch. 7; Costantini and Craik, 1980).

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specialists. Moreover, since m u c h of the information s y s t e m exists o u t s i d e of the g o v e r n m e n t , the ability of politicians to suppress or control information is, t h o u g h i m p o r t a n t , limited. For any given issue, there are expert c o m m u n i t i e s in p l a c e , each at least potentially divided along ideological lines, and each with established lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n to g o v e r n m e n t decision m a k e r s , political o p positions a n d , via the p r e s s , to the public. T h i s p e r s p e c t i v e on the flow of information in the United States is u n o r t h o d o x . M o s t a c c o u n t s , w h i c h are based on studies of the " s o u r c e s " that give inf o r m a t i o n to t h e p r e s s , e m p h a s i z e the role of g o v e r n m e n t in the g e n e r a t i o n of information and its role in m a n i p u l a t i n g or c e n s o r i n g that information ( C o h e n , 1963; Sigal, 1973, Hallin, 1986; B e n n e t t , 1990). T h e s e a c c o u n t s , to the extent that they aspire to a n s w e r general q u e s t i o n s about the sources of the information that reaches the p u b l i c , focus t o o n a r r o w l y on w h a t is c o m p a r a t i v e l y easy to o b s e r v e and study. G o v e r n m e n t officials m a y be the p r o x i m a t e source of m u c h of the information that reaches the p u b l i c , but they are not necessarily the creators of the i n f o r m a t i o n , nor can they always control h o w information is framed by the press or w h a t the press is interested in, nor are they equally i m p o r t a n t on all types of issues. An illuminating c a s e of h o w m e m b e r s of the n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l information s y s t e m can exert influence independently of g o v e r n m e n t w a s described by Washington Post r e p o r t e r D a v i d B r o d e r s o m e twenty years after it o c c u r r e d . E a r l y in the V i e t n a m War, w h e n U . S . i n v o l v e m e n t still had the s u p p o r t of almost all m a i n s t r e a m politicians and w h e n the g o v e r n m e n t w a s providing little a n t i w a r i n f o r m a t i o n , S e n a t o r F r a n k C h u r c h , a y o u n g S e n a t o r from I d a h o with a strong interest in foreign policy, a r r a n g e d a " d i n n e r s e m i n a r " for s o m e r e p o r t e r s on the subject of V i e t n a m . As B r o d e r relates: Church's guest at the dinner was Hans J. Morgenthau of the University of Chicago, an authority on foreign policy. The two men tried their best to make a largely skeptical group of reporters reexamine the prevailing assumptions about Vietnam. The struggle taking place there, they asserted, was not aggression by proxy from China or Moscow but an indigenous revolution, led by a man Ho Chi Minn - who appeared to be the only authentic Vietnamese leader on the scene. . . . If Americans . . . went down the path the French had followed, Church and Morgenthau said, then we would pay a terrible price. I went home thoroughly unconvinced that night, but had many occasions in the next dozen years to recollect the warning. (Broder, 1984) T h e details of the discussion, even t h o u g h anticipating the line a n t i w a r liberals w o u l d eventually t a k e , are u n i m p o r t a n t . W h a t is i m p o r t a n t is C h u r c h ' s or p e r h a p s M o r g a n t h a u ' s - apparently self-conscious effort to influence t h e rep o r t i n g of leading j o u r n a l i s t s by exposing t h e m to a c a d e m i c v i e w p o i n t s . Informal discussions like t h e s e , w h i c h are by no m e a n s rare in j o u r n a l i s m , are o n e route by w h i c h t h e ideas of leading policy specialists reach and inform the w o r k of practicing j o u r n a l i s t s . B o o k s are probably at least as i m p o r t a n t . Bright y o u n g r e p o r t e r s a r r i v i n g on a beat about which they k n o w little routinely seek out the leading b o o k s on their n e w subjects and use t h e m for intellectual

330

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o r i e n t a t i o n . In the c a s e of V i e t n a m , these b o o k s were the b o o k s of B e r n a r d Fall, a historian w h o w a s apparently read by most of the journalists in V i e t n a m ( H a l b e r s t a m , 1979) and w h o s e t h e m e w a s that the V i e t n a m W a r should be und e r s t o o d in light of a n t i i m p e r i a l i s m and V i e t n a m e s e nationalism rather t h a n , as m o s t U . S . g o v e r n m e n t p o l i c y m a k e r s t h o u g h t , as a struggle b e t w e e n d e m o c r a c y and c o m m u n i s m . If, after absorbing such i d e a s , reporters found it difficult to be as staunchly a n t i c o m m u n i s t as many of their official sources, if they actively sought out dissenting voices within the g o v e r n m e n t , if by the q u e s t i o n s they asked at press conferences they constantly and impatiently pressured high officials to give e v i d e n c e of " r e s u l t s , " and if they often took the o p p o r t u n i t y to play up e m b a r r a s s m e n t s to U . S . policy (such as c o r r u p t i o n within the S o u t h Vietn a m e s e g o v e r n m e n t or mistreatment of V i e t n a m e s e peasants by the m i l i t a r y ) , at least part of the e x p l a n a t i o n should be laid to the influence of t h e extrag o v e r n m e n t a l experts w h o created the intellectual framework that helped m o t i vate such actions. 1 5

In stressing the n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l origins of m u c h official information, I by no m e a n s deny that g o v e r n m e n t regularly uses w h a t influence it can m u s t e r to color or to c e n s o r w h a t reaches the p u b l i c . It is also certainly true that " p o l i t i c s " the t e n d e n c y of p a r t i s a n elites to disagree with one another no m a t t e r what exp e r t s m i g h t say, t h e t e n d e n c y of politicians to p a n d e r to w h a t e v e r interests can help t h e m stay in office, and the t e n d e n c y of g o v e r n m e n t officials to suppress and m a n i p u l a t e the flow of information - can easily o v e r r i d e the influence of policy specialists and a c a d e m i c experts in the short r u n , w h e r e the short r u n m a y be sufficiently long to c o m m i t the nation to an ill-advised course of a c t i o n . But t h e c o r r u p t i n g influence of p a r t i s a n politics should not be e x a g g e r a t e d . For e x a m p l e , fear of the A I D S virus and of the h o m o s e x u a l s and d r u g users w h o were initially its principal c a r r i e r s w a s surely one of the most potentially explosive backlash issues of the 1980s. Yet a backlash political issue never e m e r g e d . A national strategy of public e d u c a t i o n and intensive scientific research c a m e to be accepted by both political p a r t i e s and virtually the entire p o litical elite as the best way of dealing with the p r o b l e m . Such d i s a g r e e m e n t as o c c u r r e d centered almost exclusively on speed of the research r e s p o n s a and levels of public funding rather than on the strategy itself. T h u s A I D S has r e m a i n e d a m e d i c a l and public health issue - that is, an e x p e r t - d o m i n a t e d one - despite having great potential as a p a r t i s a n political controversy (Colby and C o o k , 1991). Yet can anyone d o u b t that, if medical e x p e r t s had disagreed on this fund a m e n t a l strategy - if, for e x a m p l e , a significant n u m b e r had favored a quara n t i n e policy - the issue w o u l d have b e c o m e instantly and bitterly p a r t i s a n and ideological? A similar a r g u m e n t can be m a d e with respect to r a c e . No issue in A m e r i c a n society is m o r e deeply political than r a c e , and yet, a variety of e x p e r t s , most 15 It is not, I imagine, uncommon for politicians to look to expert opinion for orientation when they take on a new subject. Thus, Fall's books were reputed also to have been a major influence on Senator William Fulbright, an early critic of the Vietnam War.

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notably psychologists c o n c e r n e d with h u m a n intelligence and with the harmful effects of racial s e g r e g a t i o n , have been active and seemingly influential on this issue t h r o u g h o u t the twentieth century. Early in the century, the thrust of expert opinion w a s p r e d o m i n a n t l y racist, as discussed in C h a p t e r 2. However, d u r i n g the 1920s, a period that w a s , incidentally, widely r e g a r d e d as a t i m e of cultural c o n s e r v a t i s m in the c o u n t r y as a w h o l e , expert opinion on g r o u p differences in intelligence u n d e r w e n t a virtual revolution. By 1930 a new scholarly c o n s e n s u s , m i n i m i z i n g the existence and especially the significance of any possible g r o u p differences in intelligence, had b e c o m e d o m i n a n t . It is at least a r g u a b l e that this n e w expert c o n s e n s u s , w h i c h soon c a m e to be reflected in the opinions of edu c a t e d w h i t e p e r s o n s , is the reason that the w h i t e power structure of the country, after c e n t u r i e s of suppressing the efforts of blacks to gain equality, b e g a n at last to see their point ( M y r d a l , 1944). T h e r e a r e , without q u e s t i o n , m y r i a d ways in which political a u t h o r i t i e s and o t h e r interests can short-circuit the idealized s y s t e m I have sketched and distort the flow of information to the public. E x p e r t c o m m u n i t i e s are t h e m s e l v e s prey to m y r i a d internally caused dysfunctions. T h e existing literature on the press and m a s s c o m m u n i c a t i o n s h a s , to s o m e extent, focused on the b r e a k d o w n s . An unintended c o n s e q u e n c e of this e m p h a s i s is that we s o m e t i m e s get a better idea of how t h e s y s t e m fails to w o r k than of how it w o r k s at all. In view of t h i s , my aim in this c h a p t e r h a s been to direct attention toward a b r o a d e r range of factors than is n o r m a l l y e x a m i n e d , especially the existence of policy specialists w h o are relatively independent of political authority and other interests, w h o play a major role in raising and framing issues, and w h o are linked to public o p i n i o n , via the press and politicians, by shared ideological predispositions.

CONCLUDING

REMARKS

In any c o m p l e x society, as in P u r p l e L a n d , there must be a division of labor in the c o n d u c t of politically relevant d e b a t e . This necessity suggests an objection to my general a r g u m e n t . If, as I have i m p l i e d , only specialists are c o m p e t e n t to c o n d u c t political d e b a t e , why bring the public into it at all? W h y not let gove r n m e n t policy reflect the p r e p o n d e r a n t weight of expert o p i n i o n ? T h e r e are several a n s w e r s . O n e is that, quite simply, it is the p e o p l e ' s right to settle any d e b a t e they feel m o v e d to settle. A n o t h e r is t h a t , as J. S. Mill and others have a r g u e d , political p a r t i c i p a t i o n is a value in itself, ennobling and selffulfilling to all w h o p a r t a k e of it. I, however, w o u l d not find either of these arg u m e n t s very attractive if I believed that the p u b l i c , in exercising its u n d o u b t e d rights and seeking its self-fulfillment, regularly m a d e decisions that I r e g a r d e d as morally abhorrent or technically stupid. I therefore offer a third reason for involving the public in political d e b a t e : T h a t g o v e r n m e n t , in the a b s e n c e of c h e c k s , invariably g o e s astray and b e c o m e s o v e r b e a r i n g o r w o r s e . A few specialists do not constitute a viable c h e c k on political authority. It is too e a s y to i g n o r e , j a i l , kill, or o t h e r w i s e silence t h e m . T h e i r only h o p e of being

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effective is to publicize and politicize w h a t e v e r d i s a g r e e m e n t s a r i s e , so that the m a s s e s of o r d i n a r y citizens can weigh into the d e b a t e . I do not see any o b v i o u s reason to believe that the w h o l e citizenry will b e , in g e n e r a l , wiser t h a n specialists, so long as the specialists are broadly recruited and given freedom to o p e r a t e within a salutary s y s t e m of incentives. It is t h e collective ability of citizens in a d e m o c r a c y to pressure leaders in useful d i r e c t i o n s and, w h e n n e c e s sary, to r e m o v e the l e a d e r s , m o r e than the collective w i s d o m of the p e o p l e , that seems to me critical. All of this a s s u m e s , of c o u r s e , that an independent public opinion can actually c h e c k political authorities. G i v e n the c o n t i n u e d existence of c o m p e t i t i o n a m o n g partisan elites for public s u p p o r t in the current A m e r i c a n political s y s t e m , I do not see this a s s u m p t i o n as p a r t i c u l a r l y p r o b l e m a t i c . T h e real p r o b l e m is g u a r a n t e e i n g the existence of an equally vigorous c o m p e t i t i o n a m o n g o p p o s ing ideas.

Measures appendix

POLITICAL

KNOWLEDGE

S i n c e political a w a r e n e s s is the key independent variable in this study, I have extensively investigated how it may be most effectively m e a s u r e d (Zaller, 1985, 1986, 1990; P r i c e and Zaller, 1990). A l t h o u g h s o m e of this w o r k has involved c o n c e p t u a l clarification, m o s t of it has been m u n d a n e l y e m p i r i c a l , as I have painstakingly tested a l t e r n a t i v e m e a s u r e s across a variety of datasets and issues. T h e routine empirical w o r k , however, has paid a useful dividend: It h a s s h o w n that t h e effects o n e attributes to political a w a r e n e s s can d e p e n d greatly on how one g o e s about m e a s u r i n g it.

How

to

measure

political

awareness

T h e surveys of the National E l e c t i o n Studies ( N E S ) , w h i c h provide the d a t a for almost all of the n e w analyses r e p o r t e d in this b o o k , contain n u m e r o u s m e a s u r e s that w o u l d seem suitable as m e a s u r e s of political a w a r e n e s s . T h e s e include level of political p a r t i c i p a t i o n (such as e n g a g i n g in political discussions with friends, giving m o n e y to c a n d i d a t e s ) , level of political interest, level of m e d i a u s e , educational a t t a i n m e n t , and neutral factual k n o w l e d g e about politics. T h e r e is no a g r e e m e n t in t h e existing scholarly literature about which of these m e a s u r e s is b e s t . E v e n C o n v e r s e has given m i x e d signals on this q u e s t i o n . In 1

1 Some scholars use a single-item control, most commonly education or information, or, less commonly, interest (e.g., Dean and Moran, 1977; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock, 1991; Judd and Milburn, 1980); sometimes they use up to five or six controls either simultaneously (Achen, 1975) or combined into an index (Erikson, 1979); and sometimes they introduce a series of single-item controls in bivariate form (Fiorina, 1981). In general, researchers seem simply to use whatever measure of awareness is handy and permits them to get on with their main analysis. These measures, all compounds of the same family of variables, are given a variety of names: political interest and involvement (Converse, 1964, 1980); cognitive ability (Stimson, 1975); political sophistication (Chong, McClosky, and Zaller, 1984; Erikson, 1979; Neuman, 1986; Sidanius, 1988; Luskin, 1990); political expertise (Fiske and Kinder, 1981; Fiske, Lau, and Smith, 1990); ideological sophistication (Knight, 1985); and indicators of rational civic man (Fiorina, 1981; Key with Cummings, 1966). Judd, Krosnick, and Milburn (1981), having been criticized by Converse (1980) for relying on education as their measure of awareness, show that their results hold whether they use education, interest, or political activity; Luskin (1987) and Fiorina (1981) also test several different measures across a limited range of criterion variables.

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Measures

appendix

his classic 1964 study of m a s s belief s y s t e m s , he m a d e clear that there is a cluster of variables - i n f o r m a t i o n , activity, s o p h i s t i c a t i o n , e d u c a t i o n , status as a m e m b e r of the political elite, and political interest - that are associated with constrained belief s y s t e m s ; of t h e s e , the latter t w o , and especially the last, seem most central to his a r g u m e n t . Yet in a paper written a r o u n d the same t i m e , C o n verse (1962) e m p l o y s m e d i a u s a g e , a variable given little play in his belief syst e m s paper, as the m e a s u r e of the extent to which individuals are both exposed to p a r t i s a n election c a m p a i g n s and e n d o w e d with the capacity to resist their appeals. In his 1975 a r t i c l e in the Handbook of Political Science, C o n v e r s e further r e p o r t s that " a f t e r a long and rather u n r e w a r d i n g s e a r c h " he found that a m e a sure of " p a r t i s a n political i n v o l v e m e n t " functions as the most i m p o r t a n t determ i n a n t of attitude stability, t h o u g h not necessarily of other p r o p e r t i e s of welld e v e l o p e d belief s y s t e m s (p. 104). He reiterates this position in 1980 in c o m m e n t i n g on a paper that had used e d u c a t i o n as its control v a r i a b l e , here referring to t h e key variable m o r e simply as " p o l i t i c a l i n v o l v e m e n t . " E v e n in the absence of empirical evidence on c o m p a r a t i v e p e r f o r m a n c e of the v a r i o u s possible m e a s u r e s of a w a r e n e s s , o n e w o u l d find s o m e operational m e a sures m o r e attractive than others. For e x a m p l e , p e o p l e w h o d e v e l o p the abstract learning skills that are supposedly i m p a r t e d by formal schooling w o u l d s e e m likely, by that account, to be m o r e adept at the c o m p r e h e n s i o n of political ideas. Yet e d u c a t i o n is only m o d e r a t e l y correlated with political interest and m e d i a exp o s u r e . This suggests that m a n y e d u c a t e d p e o p l e , although having the cognitive skill n e c e s s a r y to d e v e l o p political a w a r e n e s s , n o n e t h e l e s s lack the interest or m o t i v a t i o n to k e e p abreast of political events ( L u s k i n , 1990). S t a n d a r d m e a s u r e s of m e d i a exposure w o u l d appear, at first g l a n c e , excellent c a n d i d a t e s for m e a s u r i n g a w a r e n e s s of political ideas. T h e y h a v e , however, important w e a k n e s s e s . O n e is that, as Price and I have argued (1990), it is p r o b ably n e c e s s a r y to distinguish between exposure to " l o w - b r o w " political m e d i a A c t i o n N e w s on TV, People m a g a z i n e , talk show r a d i o , local w e e k l y n e w s p a pers - and exposure to " h i g h - b r o w " m e d i a , such as the TV network n e w s , N a tional Public R a d i o , and the Wall Street Journal. O n l y the latter c a r r y the rich diet of national and international n e w s n e c e s s a r y to create political a w a r e n e s s . Yet the m e a s u r e s of m e d i a exposure on most existing surveys do not p e r m i t o n e to distinguish b e t w e e n low-brow and high-brow m e d i a . S e c o n d , even if s e p a r a t e m e a s u r e s were available, it would be difficult to k n o w how to calibrate t h e m ; intermittent attention to N a t i o n a l Public R a d i o m i g h t , for e x a m p l e , c o n t r i b u t e m o r e to political awareness than avid attention to local TV news. T h i r d , m e a sures of self-reported m e d i a exposure suffer from subjective differences in selfrating s t a n d a r d s , and also s o c i a l - d e s i r a b i l i t y - i n d u c e d e x a g g e r a t i o n . For e x a m p l e , P r i c e and I (1990) found that, according to survey self-reports, 40 percent of the A m e r i c a n public listens to N a t i o n a l Public R a d i o several t i m e s a w e e k , a level that is both implausibly high and a b o v e N P R ' s own internal estim a t e s by a factor of about 10. In a n o t h e r e x a m p l e , s o m e r e s p o n d e n t s , h a v i n g claimed to read the Wall Street Journal, responded to a follow-up that they nor-

Measures

appendix

335

mally read the p a p e r seven d a y s a w e e k . This sort of m i s r e p o r t i n g , even if it occurs fairly infrequently, can wreak havoc with m o d e l s that d e p e n d on t h e ability to d i s c r i m i n a t e accurately at the top levels of political awareness. A n d finally, m e d i a e x p o s u r e , even if well m e a s u r e d , is still only a m e a s u r e of e x p o s u r e to politics rather t h a n , as required by the m o d e l , propensity for actual reception of i n f o r m a t i o n . Political p a r t i c i p a t i o n also h a s serious w e a k n e s s e s as a m e a s u r e of a w a r e n e s s . For e x a m p l e , a city m a i n t e n a n c e w o r k e r w h o must c o n t r i b u t e w o r k or m o n e y to the p a r t y m a c h i n e in o r d e r to k e e p his j o b w o u l d be indistinguishable on most political p a r t i c i p a t i o n m e a s u r e s from an activist in an issue-oriented political c l u b , even t h o u g h their differences in political a w a r e n e s s (as defined here) could be very great. It i s , moreover, easily possible for a person to achieve very high levels of political a w a r e n e s s without ever giving m o n e y to c a n d i d a t e s , w o r k i n g for p a r t i e s , or o t h e r w i s e p a r t i c i p a t i n g in politics. T h i s b r i n g s us to neutral factual k n o w l e d g e about politics, a type of m e a s u r e that, to a greater extent than any of the o t h e r s , captures political l e a r n i n g that h a s actually o c c u r r e d - political ideas that the individual h a s e n c o u n t e r e d , u n d e r s t o o d , and stored in his h e a d . T h i s is exactly w h a t we want to be m e a s u r i n g . Factual k n o w l e d g e is preferable on other theoretical g r o u n d s . A l o n e a m o n g the possible m e a s u r e s of a w a r e n e s s , tests of political k n o w l e d g e are relatively i m m u n e to a social desirability r e s p o n s e set; that is, individuals cannot overstate their levels of information h o l d i n g b e c a u s e they perceive that it is socially d e sirable to a p p e a r politically a w a r e . Tests of factual k n o w l e d g e are also relatively i m m u n e to r e s p o n s e effects, such as B i s h o p et al.'s (1984) d e m o n s t r a t i o n that expressed levels of political interest are readily affected by the context in which interest q u e s t i o n s are a s k e d . Finally, unlike m e d i a exposure and political interest, tests of k n o w l e d g e do not require r e s p o n d e n t s to e s t i m a t e subjective behaviors or inner states; they either pass or fail p a r t i c u l a r tests. In an a t t e m p t to settle the m e a s u r e m e n t p r o b l e m empirically, I tested t h e performance of several a l t e r n a t i v e m e a s u r e s of political awareness in predicting a variety of relevant criterion v a r i a b l e s (Zaller, 1986, 1990). T h e a w a r e n e s s m e a sures were e d u c a t i o n , m e d i a e x p o s u r e , p a r t i c i p a t i o n in politics ( d o n a t i n g money, attending s p e e c h e s , e t c . ) , interest in politics, and political k n o w l e d g e . T h e criterion variables included levels of o b s e r v e d attitude stability, attitude consistency, and degree of c o r r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n vote choice and party attachm e n t . P r i c e and I (1990) also e x a m i n e d the c o m p a r a t i v e ability of political k n o w l e d g e , e d u c a t i o n , and m e d i a exposure to specify individual-level reception probabilities for p r o m i n e n t n e w s stories; we also tested the c o m p a r a t i v e perform a n c e of k n o w l e d g e and m e d i a use in a r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l of attitude c h a n g e . T h e results of these tests were u n a m b i g u o u s : In each individual test, neutral factual information w a s always a r e s p e c t a b l e c o m p e t i t o r and almost 2

2 Individuals can attempt to guess correct answers, but a guessing penalty can be introduced to correct for this. I have experimented with guessing penalties and found that they do not improve the performance of information scales.

336

Measures

appendix

Measures

always the leading performer. No other m e a s u r e gave an overall p e r f o r m a n c e that w a s nearly as g o o d . T h e s e results also agree with the s o m e w h a t n a r r o w e r r a n g e of tests c o n d u c t e d by Luskin (1987). Accordingly, neutral factual information is, on both theoretical and empirical g r o u n d s , the preferred m e a s u r e of political a w a r e n e s s and is used as such t h r o u g h o u t this b o o k . In t h e cases in which an insufficient n u m b e r of k n o w l e d g e i t e m s is available, they are s u p p l e m e n t e d by m e a s u r e s of interest and e d u c a t i o n , as d e s c r i b e d below.

A s u b s e q u e n t inquiry c o a u t h o r e d with Vincent P r i c e ( P r i c e and Zaller, 1990) reached a similar c o n c l u s i o n . F r o m necessity, this b o o k relies almost exclusively on g e n e r a l - p u r p o s e rather than domain-specific m e a s u r e s of political awareness. A l t h o u g h domain-specific m e a s u r e s w o u l d be preferable, the loss from not having t h e m is apparently slight.

Types Issues

in

the

measurement

of political

information

G r a n t i n g that political k n o w l e d g e is the best available m e a s u r e of political a w a r e n e s s , there remain several questions about how k n o w l e d g e itself should best be m e a s u r e d . O n e that has attracted interest is w h e t h e r information is best m e a s u r e d globally by m e a n s of general tests of political k n o w l e d g e , or w h e t h e r m e a s u r e s must be specific to the p a r t i c u l a r d o m a i n in which information effects are e x p e c t e d (Iyengar, 1990). F r o m a theoretical p e r s p e c t i v e , awareness clearly s h o u l d , to the extent p o s sible, be m e a s u r e d separately within each d o m a i n for w h i c h effects are exp e c t e d . This follows from a x i o m A l , which claims that reception d e p e n d s not on global a w a r e n e s s , but on attention to p a r t i c u l a r issues. Therefore, we should expect to find stronger a w a r e n e s s effects for domain-specific m e a s u r e s of inform a t i o n than for global m e a s u r e s . T h e e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t s this expectation (Iyengar, 1990; Zaller, 1986; M c G r a w and Pinney, 1990). T h e r e i s , however, a serious difficulty in p r o d u c i n g d o m a i n specific effects. T h e difficulty is that, as a practical matter, p e o p l e w h o pay attention to o n e facet of politics tend to pay attention to other facets as well. As a result, it is difficult to build domain-specific scales that exhibit a satisfactory d e g r e e of discriminant validity. Iyengar (1990) m a n a g e s to obtain such validity, but only at the cost of e l i m i n a t i n g many face valid items that were t o o highly c o r r e l a t e d with one a n o t h e r across d o m a i n s ; these exclusions significantly red u c e the reliability of his scales. U s i n g the s a m e d a t a s e t , I built d o m a i n - s p e c i f i c scales that included all face-valid items that were available (Zaller, 1986); w h e n I did s o , I found that domain-specific k n o w l e d g e scales c o n c e r n i n g e c o n o m i c s , foreign policy, and minority relations were intercorrelated in the r a n g e of .70 (without c o r r e c t i n g for scale unreliabilities). T h e s e domain-specific k n o w l e d g e scales outperformed a general k n o w l e d g e scale in predicting relevant criterion v a r i a b l e s (such as attitude stability), but never by m a r g i n s that a p p r o a c h e d statistical or substantive significance. I therefore c o n c l u d e d It is clear that the effects of political information on public opinion are, to some extent, domain specific. . . . At the same time, the superiority of domain specific measures of information is both modest and uneven. . . . Together, these results suggest that political information is a relatively general trait that can be effectively measured with a generalpurpose information scale. (Zaller, 1986)

337

appendix

of information

tests

T h e items available as m e a s u r e s of political information vary greatly in number, quality, and format over the twenty-four I C P S R d a t a s e t s that have been used in this b o o k . In a handful of c a s e s , notably the N E S studies of 1986 and 1988 and the Brazilian public opinion survey, there is a g o o d selection of items which had been consciously d e s i g n e d as tests of factual k n o w l e d g e . In a few other c a s e s , most seriously the 1978 N E S congressional study and the 1984 " r o l l i n g t h u n d e r " survey of presidential p r i m a r i e s and the 1990 N E S S e n a t e study, there were few or no such i t e m s . A n d in the majority of c a s e s , there w a s a handful of g o o d information t e s t s , but t o o few to p r o d u c e highly reliable a w a r e n e s s scales, by w h i c h I m e a n scales with alpha reliabilities of 0 . 8 5 or h i g h e r . H e n c e it w a s n e c e s s a r y to locate i t e m s that, t h o u g h not direct m e a s u r e s of political a w a r e n e s s , could be c o n v e r t e d to this u s e . In the course of this b o o k , I have m a d e extensive use of t h e following three types of information tests: 3

4

1. T h e ability to m a k e " c o r r e c t " c o m p a r a t i v e p l a c e m e n t s of g r o u p s and candidates on issue d i m e n s i o n s , which I call " l o c a t i o n t e s t s . " S i n c e 1968, C P S / N E S surveys have regularly asked respondents to place t h e m s e l v e s on an issue d i m e n s i o n and also to place certain political objects - such as t h e presidential n o m i n e e s , the p a r t i e s , and liberals and c o n s e r v a t i v e s - on these s a m e scales. T h u s , for e x a m p l e , a respondent might have been asked to place herself on a seven-point defense-spending scale ( w h e r e 1 is the most a n t i s p e n d i n g position and 7 is the most p r o - s p e n d i n g p o s i t i o n ) , and then asked to place 1988 presidential c a n d i d a t e s G e o r g e B u s h and Michael D u k a k i s on the s a m e scale. It is very difficult to say exactly w h e r e B u s h ' s " t r u e " position on this scale m i g h t b e , but it can be confidently asserted that Bush should be located to the pro3 The 1984 survey contains measures of citizen awareness of various presidential contenders, but these are not well suited to my purposes. The difficulty is that such measures, as Bartels (1988) has shown, register higher levels of awareness over the course of the primary campaign as people learned more about the candidates. This is a difficulty because my theory holds that people who are high on habitual awareness will react differently to the fresh information they encounter than will people who are low on habitual awareness. Hence it is necessary to measure people's habitual awareness, and measures that are reactive to the current campaign cannot do this. 4 A three- or four-item scale of the type used in many opinion studies will normally have a reliability in the range of .65. Such a scale can easily fail to detect mild nonmonotonicity of the type shown in Figure 8.2 or subtle features of attitude change curves, as depicted in Figure 8.5. For the purposes of this book, much lengthier scales are needed.

338

Measures

appendix

s p e n d i n g side of D u k a k i s . H e n c e a respondent w h o locates Bush to the right of D u k a k i s on this scale can be c o u n t e d as having " c o r r e c t l y " a n s w e r e d a test of political k n o w l e d g e . T h e analyst must use j u d g m e n t in c o n v e r t i n g location items into k n o w l e d g e tests since, for s o m e i t e m s , it is impossible to say that one c a n d i d a t e or party differs from the other. For e x a m p l e , it is not at all o b v i o u s w h e t h e r J i m m y C a r t e r or Gerald Ford w a s farther to the left on w o m e n ' s r i g h t s , which m a k e s this issue unsuitable for use in m e a s u r i n g political k n o w l e d g e . But in m a n y c a s e s , c o r r e c t relative p l a c e m e n t s are o b v i o u s to any informed o b s e r v e r of American politics. 5

2. Willingness to rate c e r t a i n political figures on " f e e l i n g t h e r m o m e t e r s , " which may b e referred t o a s " r e c o g n i t i o n i t e m s . " N E S surveys regularly ask r e s p o n d e n t s to rate v a r i o u s political figures - including p r e s i d e n t s , s e n a t o r s , and political n o t a b l e s (such as Ralph Nader) - on 100-point " f e e l i n g t h e r m o m e t e r s . " R e s p o n d e n t s a r e , however, offered the o p t i o n of saying they are unfamiliar with the given political figure, and t h o s e taking this option may be c o u n t e d as having failed a k n o w l e d g e test. It is c o m m o n for researchers to use these items as k n o w l e d g e tests ( B a r t e l s , 1988; M a n n and Wolfinger, 1980). N o n e t h e l e s s , b e c a u s e this type of k n o w l e d g e test is highly susceptible to a social desirability r e s p o n s e set, I use it only sparingly and only w h e n better a l t e r n a t i v e s are unavailable. 3 . M a n y C P S / N E S surveys require i n t e r v i e w e r s , upon c o m p l e t i n g e a c h interv i e w , to rate each r e s p o n d e n t ' s apparent level of political information on a fivepoint scale. I have extensively analyzed the p e r f o r m a n c e of these rating scales and c o n c l u d e d that, at least in surveys involving face-to-face i n t e r v i e w s and c o n s i d e r a b l e political c o n t e n t , they perform extremely well (Zaller, 1985). In particular, a single five-point interviewer rating scale performs about as well as a scale c o n s t r u c t e d from 10 to 15 direct k n o w l e d g e tests, w h e r e the m e a s u r e of p e r f o r m a n c e is the ability to predict relevant c r i t e r i a . 6

A fear in relying upon such interviewer ratings is that they might be s y s t e m atically biased in favor of higher-status p e r s o n s , notably whites and m a l e s . H o w ever, I c h e c k e d carefully for e v i d e n c e of such bias and w a s able to find n o n e (Zaller, 1985). 5 Prior to 1970, CPS surveys sometimes directly asked respondents which party was more likely to favor a certain policy (e.g., Medicare for the elderly). 1 found that, in all years in which this type of item was asked, it performed poorly as a knowledge test in the sense that item reliabilities were relatively low. I suspect this is because these items are one-shot items, whereas the comparative location items depend on three responses (self-rating, and ratings of each of two objects). The multiple-step measures provide more opportunities to screen out guessers. In general, I discarded items with low reliability, no matter their face validity, unless the low reliability was due to a strong skew. 6 This qualification is important. One would not expect interviewer ratings of respondent awareness to work unless the interviewer had ample opportunity to observe the respondent deal with political matters.

Measures

appendix

339

M o s t of the a w a r e n e s s scales used in this b o o k have been c o n s t r u c t e d from these three types of items - especially the c o m p a r a t i v e location tests - and from m o r e s t a n d a r d , direct tests of k n o w l e d g e (such a s , W h i c h party controls t h e H o u s e of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ? W h a t is the t e r m of office of a U . S . senator?). It is natural to w o n d e r w h e t h e r " c a t c h - a l l " scales of the type I use perform as well as scales c o n s t r u c t e d from m o r e c o n v e n t i o n a l k n o w l e d g e tests. T h e 1985 N E S pilot study affords an o p p o r t u n i t y to investigate this question. It c a r r i e s s o m e twenty-seven direct k n o w l e d g e tests, that is, questions w h i c h directly asked r e s p o n d e n t s to supply the a n s w e r to a factual question about politics. W h e n a scale c o n s t r u c t e d from these twenty-seven items w a s pitted against one of my catch-all scales, there w a s essentially no difference in their ability to predict three criteria: attitude stability, attitude consistency, and issue salience (Zaller, 1 9 8 6 ) . 7

Coding

conventions

In c o n v e r t i n g a variety of i t e m s to tests of political i n f o r m a t i o n , I h a v e , with exceptions explicitly noted below, adhered to t h e following coding c o n v e n t i o n s : 1. Each discrete test of information has been given equal weight. In cases in which a single item could capture multiple bits of information, each bit was counted separately. In 1966, for example, respondents were asked to name as many Supreme Court justices as they could; I awarded one point for each justice they could name (up to four names). For another example, the interviewer rating scale has five points; I awarded respondents one point for each level above the lowest level. 2. In keeping with the previous point, I created simple additive scales, except in a few cases as noted. 3. Persons who failed to give a correct answer because they responded "Don't know" were counted as having given an incorrect response. This includes cases in which respondents were not asked the comparative location of candidates on an issue scale because they had no opinion on the issue itself. 4. Persons with missing data were not eliminated unless more than two-thirds of their responses were missing. Instead, these persons were assigned the average score for the items for which data were available. 8

9

All of the awareness scales I u s e , except the 1951 s c a l e , the 1978 H o u s e e l e c tions s c a l e , and the 1990 S e n a t e e l e c t i o n s s c a l e , have alpha reliabilities in the 7 The catch-all scale in this case was based on items culled from the 1984 NES study. It had twentytwo items and an alpha reliability of .87. The twenty-seven-item scale had a reliability of .89. 8 I experimented with use of principal components analysis to extract the most important common factor from a set of items. Although this made little difference for the results I obtained, I was reluctant to use the technique because it gave small weights to items which, although strongly skewed, had high discriminating power. Technically, the problem is that principal components assume a linear relationship between items and the underlying awareness factor, and this assumption is egregiously false for skewed items, as shown in Zaller, 1985. I regarded skewed items as strong items, because they isolated respondents at the extremes of the awareness continuum; but principal components regarded them as weak items, because they appeared to explain little variance in the underlying construct. 9 In the 1968 survey, respondents were asked to rate candidates even on issues on which they had no opinion. It turned out that scarcely any people who had no opinion on an issue were willing to estimate the positions of others on that issue.

340

Measures

appendix

r a n g e from about .80 to . 9 0 , with most having a l p h a reliabilities a r o u n d . 8 5 . T h e three exceptions have reliabilities in the r a n g e of . 6 0 to . 7 0 . S i n c e , however, the a s s u m p t i o n s u n d e r l y i n g the use of the alpha s t a t i s t i c , especially the a s s u m p t i o n of equal item difficulty, a r e not met in the d a t a I u s e , and since other m e a s u r e s of reliability are not readily available, there s e e m s no point in providing reliabilities for each scale. O t h e r detailed information about the m e a s u r e s of a w a r e ness I have used is given below.

Scale

appendix

341

(V109); which party is c o n s e r v a t i v e ( V 3 6 1 ) ; congressional c a n d i d a t e s ' n a m e s and i n c u m b e n c y status (three i t e m s , V 3 8 6 , V 3 8 7 ) ; majority in C o n g r e s s ( V 3 0 5 , V 3 0 6 ) ; up to two points for expression of interest in foreign affairs ( V 1 0 2 ) . A l s o t w o interviewer rating s c a l e s , V 2 6 9 on preelection and V531 on p o s t e l e c t i o n , w h i c h were averaged to yield a m a x i m u m of four points; and two tests of ability to m a k e proper c o m p a r a t i v e p l a c e m e n t s of politicians on issue s c a l e s , as follows: J o h n s o n and Wallace o n V i e t n a m ( V 4 6 6 and V 4 6 9 ) ; H u m p h r e y and W a l lace on urban unrest (V461 and V 4 6 3 ) . T h e u n s t a n d a r d i z e d m e a s u r e h a s a m e a n of 11.39 and a s t a n d a r d deviation of 4 . 4 1 .

construction

Variable n u m b e r s refer to the relevant I C P S R c o d e b o o k . (The S P S S x c o d e for building these scales is available via bitnet to any scholar wishing to use it.) 1951 CPS terviewer (col. 6 5 ) , mentioned

Measures

"minor election study." A w a r e n e s s is m e a s u r e d by a three-point inrating of the r e s p o n d e n t ' s apparent understanding of w o r l d affairs plus a one-point m e a s u r e indicating w h e t h e r the person specifically D e a n Acheson in the course of the i n t e r v i e w (col. 6 7 ) .

1956 CPS election study. T h e r e were an insufficient n u m b e r of items to build an information scale from the 1956 study alone. H e n c e I used twelve tests scattered across all three waves of the 1 9 5 6 - 5 8 - 6 0 p a n e l , as follows: V 1 4 2 , V 1 4 5 , V 3 1 7 , V 3 1 8 , V 3 9 4 (two i t e m s ) , V 3 9 5 , V 6 0 8 , V 6 0 9 , V 6 1 1 , V 6 1 2 , V 6 1 3 , V 6 1 5 , V798.' T h e u n s t a n d a r d i z e d m e a s u r e h a s a m e a n of 7 . 8 and a standard deviation of 3 . 0 8 .

1970 CPS Awareness scale. An eighteen-point s c a l e , as follows: Attention to V i e t n a m ( V 4 0 ) ; which p a r t y is m o r e c o n s e r v a t i v e ( V 1 7 7 ) ; congressional candidate ( V 2 0 3 ) ; p e r c e n t a g e of tax dollar to defense ( V 2 5 6 ) ; w h o can c h a n g e law ( V 2 5 8 ) ; n u m b e r of allowable t e r m s as president ( V 2 5 9 ) ; t e r m of U . S . senator ( V 2 6 0 ) ; t e r m of congressional representative ( V 2 6 1 ) ; interviewer rating of res p o n d e n t ' s information (up to four p o i n t s , V 3 9 6 ) . T h e r e were four c o m p a r a t i v e location tests, as follows: D e m o c r a t s and R e p u b l i c a n s on V i e t n a m ( V 9 3 and V 9 4 ) ; M u s k i e and W a l l a c e o n aid t o m i n o r i t i e s ( V I 1 0 and V I 1 1 ) ; D e m o c r a t s and Nixon on inflation ( V I 1 4 and V I 1 6 ) ; and M u s k i e and W a l l a c e on criminal rights ( V 1 2 4 and V 1 2 5 ) ; also t w o 1-item location tests, Wallace on urban unrest and V i e t n a m ( V 9 0 , V 9 7 ) . T h e u n s t a n d a r d i z e d m e a s u r e has a m e a n of 9 . 5 4 and a s t a n d a r d deviation of 4 . 4 4 . 1972-74-76 NES panel awareness scale.

1964 CPS election study. A sixteen-point s c a l e , as follows: L . B . J . ' s and G o l d w a t e r ' s h o m e state and religion ( V 2 9 4 to V 2 9 7 ) ; which party is m o r e c o n s e r vative ( V 3 0 2 ) ; majority in C o n g r e s s ( V 3 0 5 , V 3 0 6 ) ; congressional c a n d i d a t e s ' n a m e s , i n c u m b e n c y status (three i t e m s , V 3 0 9 , V 3 1 2 ) ; which party favors g o v e r n m e n t utilities ( V 3 4 6 ) ; C h i n a ' s form of g o v e r n m e n t and U . N . status (two i t e m s , V 3 5 2 ) ; form of C u b a ' s g o v e r n m e n t ( V 3 5 4 ) ; k n o w l e d g e of 1964 Civil Rights Act ( V 4 0 6 , V 4 0 7 ) . T h e unstandardized m e a s u r e has a m e a n of 10.4 and a s t a n d a r d deviation of 4 . 1 3 . - .

T h i s scale is described in Zaller,

1990.

1966 CPS election study. A fifteen-point scale, as follows: congressional cand i d a t e s ' n a m e s and i n c u m b e n c y status (three i t e m s , V 9 0 , V 9 2 ) ; majority in C o n g r e s s ( V 1 0 0 , V 1 0 1 ) ; n a m e s of U . S . S u p r e m e C o u r t j u s t i c e s (up to four p o i n t s , V 1 6 7 ) ; interviewer rating of r e s p o n d e n t ' s information level (up to four p o i n t s , V 2 4 2 ) . Since this scale w a s used to m e a s u r e exposure to n e w s about V i e t n a m , I a w a r d e d up to t w o points for expression of interest in foreign affairs ( V 6 5 ) . T h e unstandardized m e a s u r e has a m e a n of 7 . 4 8 and a s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n of 4 . 7 .

1978 NES election awareness scale. An unusually diverse scale, as follows: M e a n i n g of liberalism ( V 4 1 0 ) , m e a n i n g of c o n s e r v a t i v i s m ( V 4 1 3 ) , party control of H o u s e of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s before and after e l e c t i o n ( V 5 0 0 , V 5 0 1 ) . T h r e e recognition i t e m s , R o n a l d R e a g a n ( V 1 3 9 ) , J e r r y B r o w n ( V 1 4 1 ) , and Ralph N a d e r ( V 1 4 4 ) . Four c o m p a r a t i v e location items: D e m o c r a t s and R e p u b l i c a n s o n j o b g u a r a n t e e s ( V 3 5 9 , V 3 6 0 ) , o n rights o f the accused ( V 3 7 5 , V 3 7 6 ) , o n g o v e r n ment medical insurance ( V 3 8 3 , V 3 8 4 ) , and o n liberalism and c o n s e r v a t i v i s m ( V 4 0 1 , V 4 0 2 ) . Political interest, V 4 3 ; and interviewer rated i n f o r m a t i o n , V 6 3 6 . B e c a u s e I w a s unsure w h e t h e r these i t e m s d e s e r v e d equal w e i g h t i n g , I c o m b i n e d t h e m into a scale by m e a n s of weights o b t a i n e d from a principal c o m p o n e n t s analysis. B e c a u s e the political interest variable is correlated with the intensity of p a r t i c u l a r H o u s e r a c e s , as m e a s u r e d by the media-intensity variable (see text of C h a p t e r 10), I p u r g e d it of this influence before a d d i n g it to the a w a r e n e s s scale. T h e u n s t a n d a r d i z e d m e a s u r e has a m e a n of 7 . 4 and a s t a n d a r d deviation of 3 . 3 . (In the analysis of likes/dislikes in C h a p t e r 10, the interest item is used as a s e p arate variable.)

1968 CPS election study. A seventeen-point s c a l e , as follows: C h i n a ' s form of g o v e r n m e n t and U . N . status (two i t e m s , V 1 0 7 ) ; form o f C u b a ' s g o v e r n m e n t

1980 NES election awareness scale. A twenty-five-point s c a l e , as follows: ten c o m p a r a t i v e location items: C a r t e r and R e a g a n o n ideology ( V 2 6 8 and V 2 6 9 ) ;

342

Measures

appendix

K e n n e d y and Connally on ideology ( V 2 7 0 and V 2 7 1 ) ; two p a r t i e s on ideology ( V 2 7 8 and V 2 7 9 ) ; C a r t e r and Reagan on defense spending ( V 2 8 2 and V 2 8 3 ) ; p a r t i e s on g o v e r n m e n t services ( V 2 9 6 and V 2 9 7 ) ; p a r t i e s on j o b s and inflation trade-off ( V 3 0 6 and V 3 0 7 ) ; C a r t e r and Reagan on a b o r t i o n (V312 and V 3 1 3 ) ; C a r t e r and Reagan on c o o p e r a t i o n with Russia ( V 1 0 7 9 and V 1 0 8 0 ) ; p a r t i e s on j o b g u a r a n t e e s ( V I 1 2 1 and V I 1 2 2 ) ; Reagan and K e n n e d y on aid to m i n o r i t i e s ( V 1 0 6 4 and V 1 0 6 6 ) . T h e s e additional items: h e a r d poll results ( V 2 1 9 ) , expresses opinion on tax cut proposal ( V 3 2 2 ) , n a m e and p a r t y of congressional c a n d i d a t e s (four i t e m s , V 8 2 6 , V 8 2 9 ) , n a m e s of S e n a t e candidates (four i t e m s , w h e r e relevant, V 8 3 7 and V 8 4 0 ; respondents were not penalized for living in a state without a Senate r a c e ) , p a r t y that s u p p o r t s stronger federal g o v e r n m e n t ( V I 1 3 1 ) . T h e r e were t w o interviewer rating s c a l e s , V 7 2 6 o n p r e e l e c t i o n and V I 1 8 6 on p o s t e l e c t i o n , which were averaged to yield a m a x i m u m of four points. T h e u n s t a n d a r d i z e d m e a s u r e has a m e a n of 9 . 6 and a standard deviation of 5 . 7 . 1982 NES election awareness scale. A twenty-five-point scale, as follows: T h r e e r e c o g n i t i o n items: J o h n A n d e r s o n , B u s h , and M o n d a l e ( V 1 2 5 , V 1 3 4 , V 1 3 5 ) . Five c o m p a r a t i v e location items: D e m o c r a t s and R e p u b l i c a n s on ideolo g y scale ( V 4 0 4 , V 4 0 5 ) , o n defense spending scale ( V 4 0 9 , V 4 1 0 ) , o n j o b guarantees ( V 4 2 7 , V 4 2 8 ) , and o n g o v e r n m e n t services ( V 4 4 5 , V 4 4 6 ) ; liberals and c o n s e r v a t i v e s on aid to rr.inorities ( V 4 2 2 and V 4 2 3 ) . A l s o t w o single objectlocation tests: Ronald R e i g a n located right of c e n t e r on ideology ( V 3 9 4 ) and defense spending ( V 4 0 8 ) . N a m e and p a r t y of congressional c a n d i d a t e s (four i t e m s , V 1 0 2 , V 1 0 6 ) , n a m e and party of Senate c a n d i d a t e s (four i t e m s , w h e r e relevant, V I 1 5 , V I 1 8 ) . Party control o f H o u s e and S e n a t e , party that elected most n e w m e m b e r s to H o u s e ( V 5 2 3 to V 5 2 5 ) . I n t e r v i e w e r rating of r e s p o n d e n t information (up to four p o i n t s , V 7 6 8 ) . T h e u n s t a n d a r d i z e d m e a s u r e has a m e a n of 11.7 and a standard deviation of 6 . 3 . 1984 NES Continuous Monitoring Study awareness scale. A twenty-four-point s c a l e , a s follows: V 1 3 6 (three i t e m s ) , V 4 0 7 (four i t e m s ) , V 6 1 4 , V 6 2 2 , V 6 2 6 , 805 ( t w o i t e m s ) , V 8 7 6 . Eleven recognition i t e m s , V 2 2 0 , V 2 2 2 t o V 2 3 1 . B e c a u s e I w a s unsure w h e t h e r these items d e s e r v e d equal w e i g h t i n g , I c o m bined t h e m into a scale by m e a n s of weights o b t a i n e d from a principal c o m p o nents analysis. 1984 NES election awareness scale. A twenty-four-point scale, as follows: T h e r e were eleven c o m p a r a t i v e location i t e m s , several of which required respondents to place objects t w o or three points apart: R e a g a n and M o n d a l e on ideolo g y ( V 3 7 1 and V 3 7 2 , at least two points a p a r t ) , g o v e r n m e n t services ( V 3 7 6 and V 3 7 7 , at least two points a p a r t ) , aid to m i n o r i t i e s ( V 3 8 3 and V 3 8 4 ) , U . S . inv o l v e m e n t in Central A m e r i c a ( V 3 8 9 and V 3 9 0 ) , defense spending ( V 3 9 6 and V 3 9 7 ) , c o o p e r a t i o n with Russia ( V 4 0 9 and V 4 1 0 ) , j o b g u a r a n t e e s ( V 4 1 5 and V 4 1 6 ) , R e a g a n and M o n d a l e on ideology (distance of three points required for correct answer, V1017 and V1018); liberals and c o n s e r v a t i v e s on g o v e r n m e n t

Measures

appendix

343

services ( V 1 0 3 4 and V 1 0 3 5 , three points a p a r t ) , involvement in Central A m e r ica ( V 1 0 4 5 and V 1 0 4 6 , three points a p a r t ) , j o b g u a r a n t e e s ( V 1 0 5 4 and V 1 0 5 5 , three points a p a r t ) . In addition: n a m e and p a r t y of congressional c a n d i d a t e s (four i t e m s , V 7 4 1 , V 7 4 5 ) , which party i s more c o n s e r v a t i v e ( V 8 7 5 ) , which p a r t y h a s m o r e m e m b e r s in H o u s e and S e n a t e before and after election ( V 1 0 0 6 to V 1 0 0 9 ) , r e c o g n i t i o n of Bush and F e r r a r o ( V 2 9 2 and V 3 0 4 ) . T h e r e w e r e t w o interviewer rating scales, V 7 1 3 on preelection and V I 1 1 2 on p o s t e l e c t i o n , which w e r e averaged to yield a m a x i m u m of four points. T h e u n s t a n d a r d i z e d m e a s u r e has a m e a n of 9.8 and a standard deviation of 5 . 9 . 1986 NES election and 1987 pilot awareness scale. A nineteen-point s c a l e , as follows: ability to n a m e political offices held by B u s h , Weinberger, R e h n q u i s t , Volker, O ' N e i l l , D o l e ( V 6 3 5 t o V 6 4 2 ) , n a m e s o f H o u s e c a n d i d a t e s ( V 2 0 2 , V 2 0 6 ) , two r e c o g n i t i o n t e s t s , H a r t and J a c k s o n ( V 2 4 2 , V 2 4 4 ) . Four location items: D e m o c r a t s and R e p u b l i c a n s on ideology ( V 7 3 0 and V 7 3 1 ) , on defense spending ( V 7 4 9 and V 7 5 0 ) , on involvement in Central A m e r i c a (V811 and V 8 1 2 ) , and on g o v e r n m e n t services (V831 and V 8 3 2 ) ; c o m p a r a t i v e r a n k i n g s on ideology, defense, and services had to be at least t w o points apart to get credit for a c o r r e c t answer. An additional point w a s a w a r d e d for placing Reagan on the c o n s e r v a t i v e side of the ideology scale, which is a n o n c o m p a r a t i v e location test ( V 7 2 3 ) . T h e u n s t a n d a r d i z e d m e a s u r e , as used in the analysis of attitude c h a n g e on Central A m e r i c a , h a s a m e a n of 7 . 9 and a standard deviation of 4 . 2 . 1989 NES pilot awareness scale. A twenty-two-point s c a l e , as follows: budget k n o w l e d g e ( V 8 3 5 ) , w h i c h p a r t y is m o r e c o n s e r v a t i v e ( V 5 6 5 6 ) , the political offices held by K e n n e d y , S c h u l t z , R e h n q u i s t , G o r b a c h e v , Thatcher, and Arafat ( V 5 8 2 7 to V 5 8 3 3 ) , p a r t y control of C o n g r e s s ( V 8 3 4 , V 8 3 5 ) , and n a m e s of congressional c a n d i d a t e s ( V 5 1 0 6 ) . Seven location items: c o m p a r a t i v e p l a c e m e n t s of the D e m o c r a t s and R e p u b l i c a n s on ideology ( V 4 2 1 and V 4 2 2 ) , g o v e r n m e n t services ( V 6 0 6 and V 6 0 7 ) , defense spending ( V 6 1 0 and V 6 1 1 ) , medical insurance ( V 6 2 0 and V 6 2 1 ) , j o b g u a r a n t e e s ( V 6 2 7 and V 6 2 8 ) , and c o o p e r a t i o n with R u s sia ( V 7 1 2 and V 7 1 3 ) ; in a d d i t i o n , a point w a s given for r a n k i n g D u k a k i s t w o or m o r e points to the left of Bush on ideology (V417 and V 4 1 8 ) . R e s p o n d e n t s could also get up to four points from the interviewer rating of respondent information ( V 1 2 4 1 ) . T h e u n s t a n d a r d i z e d m e a s u r e has a m e a n of 10.5 and a standard deviation of 5 . 7 . 1990 NES awareness scale. A fourteen-point scale consisting of tests of t h e ability to give the political office held by Q u a y l e , M i t c h e l l , R e h n q u i s t , Gorbachev, Thatcher, M a n d e l l a , and Foley ( V 8 3 5 to V 8 4 1 ) ; plus p a r t y control of C o n g r e s s ( V 8 4 2 , V 8 4 3 ) and interviewer rating of respondent k n o w l e d g e ( V 1 2 3 1 ) . T h e uns t a n d a r d i z e d m e a s u r e has a m e a n of 4 . 9 5 and a standard deviation of 2 . 7 4 . 1990 NES Senate study awareness scale. T h e 1990 S e n a t e study contained only five political k n o w l e d g e i t e m s - tests of r e s p o n d e n t ' s ability to locate G e o r g e

344

Measures

appendix

B u s h , the D e m o c r a t i c Party, and the Republican Party on a seven-point l i b e r a l c o n s e r v a t i v e scale ( V 5 1 7 , V 5 3 3 , V 5 3 4 ) , and the n a m e s of the c a n d i d a t e s in H o u s e e l e c t i o n s ( V 4 1 , V 4 5 ) . I c o m b i n e d these with tests of willingness to evaluate B u s h ' s j o b p e r f o r m a n c e (V36) and to state an opinion on aid to m i n o r ities ( V 5 3 7 ) . This scale had a mean of 3 . 0 4 and a standard deviation of 1.53. T h e purged interest item (see 1978 a w a r e n e s s scale) and the scale were s t a n d a r d i z e d , c o m b i n e d , and restandardized, thereby giving equal weight to each c o m p o n e n t in the final awareness scale.

Measures

345

appendix

separately scaled by m e a n s of principal c o m p o n e n t s analysis. T h e items in t h e d o m e s t i c policy cluster w e r e V 3 2 , V 3 8 , V 5 3 , V 5 9 ; the items i n t h e foreign policy cluster were V 3 5 , V 5 0 , V 6 8 , V 7 1 . 1964,

1966,

1968,

1970 CPS election studies.

See a p p e n d i x to C h a p t e r 9.

1978 NES election study. T h e items used to m e a s u r e respondent attitudes are V 3 5 7 , V 3 6 5 , V 3 7 3 , V 3 9 9 , V 4 4 3 . See footnote 8 in C h a p t e r 10 for further information.

POLITICAL

PREDISPOSITIONS 1982 NES election study.

W i t h the exception of t h e 1951 and 1956 s t u d i e s , my m e a s u r e s of political a w a r e n e s s are quite strong and essentially c o m p a r a b l e in all years. M e a s u r e m e n t of political predispositions is m u c h m o r e uneven a n d , on the w h o l e , m u c h less a d e q u a t e . Except in t w o studies - notably the 1987 N E S pilot study, which contains t h e H u r w i t z - P e f f l e y (1988) m e a s u r e of foreign policy p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s , and the 1989 pilot study, which contains an excellent selection of C o n o v e r - F e l d m a n equality items - I w a s always dealing with m e a s u r e s that I felt were m o r e or less i n a d e q u a t e to the tasks to which I put t h e m . A l t h o u g h m a n y of the surveys contained reasonably g o o d value m e a s u r e s , they did not contain value m e a s u r e s of the particular dimensior on which public opinion w a s u n d e r g o i n g c h a n g e . C h a p t e r 2 provides the theoretical justification for opportunistically using w h a t ever m e a s u r e s are available. T h e least a d e q u a t e studies were the 1951 and 1956 studies. T h e only m e a s u r e of general p a r t i s a n o r i e n t a t i o n in the 1951 study w a s recalled vote in the 1948 e l e c t i o n . A l t h o u g h this m e a s u r e served as the basis for the original s t a t e m e n t of the M i c h i g a n t h e o r y of p a r t y identification ( B e l k n a p and C a m p b e l l , 1 9 5 1 - 2 ) , the m e a s u r e leaves m u c h to be desired. T h e 1956 study c o n t a i n s a n u m b e r of g o o d preference q u e s t i o n s , but n o n e that s e e m well suited for capturing the predispositions that underlie racial attitudes. Since 1984, N E S surveys have c a r r i e d a generally excellent selection of value m e a s u r e s .

Coding

conventions

In building value scales, I m a d e full use of w h a t e v e r information w a s c o n t a i n e d in an item (that is, I did not recode to a smaller n u m b e r of c a t e g o r i e s ) . T h e items were c o m b i n e d into scales by m e a n s of weights obtained from principal c o m ponents a n a l y s i s , unless all items had the same r a n g e , in which c a s e simple additive indices were c r e a t e d .

Scale

construction

1956 CPS election study. T h e r e were t w o m a i n sets of i t e m s , o n e c o n c e r n i n g d o m e s t i c politics and the o t h e r foreign politics. T h e items in each cluster were

For use in diffusion of e c o n o m i c n e w s , three e c o n o m i c

policy items: j o b g u a r a n t e e s ( V 4 2 5 ) , g o v e r n m e n t services ( V 4 4 3 ) , regulation of business ( V 4 5 9 ) . For use with n u c l e a r freeze issue, t w o defense spending items (V317 and V 4 0 7 ) . 1984 NES

election

study.

Four items:

liberal-conservative

self-identification

( V 3 6 9 ) , g o v e r n m e n t services ( V 3 7 5 ) , minority aid ( V 3 8 2 ) , and j o b g u a r a n t e e s (V414). 1987 NES pilot study.

I t e m s from H u r w i t z - P e f f l e y foreign affairs battery c o m -

bined into h a w k - d o v e s c a l e , a s follows: V 2 2 4 5 , V 5 2 3 3 , V 5 2 4 9 , V 5 2 5 1 , V 5 2 5 2 , V 5 2 5 3 , plus t w o additional items (Russia and Defense s p e n d i n g ) , V 7 4 2 and V 9 0 7 . T h e social welfare ideology scale consists of fourteen C o n o v e r - F e l d m a n items plus t w o m e a s u r e s of ideological self-designation, as follows: V 6 2 0 to V 6 2 2 , V 6 2 4 , V 6 2 6 , V 7 0 1 t o V 7 0 6 , V 2 1 7 6 , V 2 1 7 8 , V 2 1 7 9 , plus V 7 2 2 and V1010. T h e g o v e r n m e n t s p e n d i n g scale consisted o f V 7 1 6 - V 7 2 5 .