Middle Powers in International Politics

MIDDLE POWERS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS The book traces the history of the idea of middle-ranking powers through several centuries of European political writings, examines the position of such powers in the League of Nations and the United Nations, and defines the concept of middle powers in the con­ temporary context. The major part of the book, however, is devoted to an exam­ ination of the conduct and an analysis of the role of middle powers in several typical situations of the four principal forms of the states system: namely, the unifocal, the dualistic, the triangular and the multiple system. On the basis of historical material drawn mainly from the inter-American system of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the German and the European systems of the nineteenth century and the European and global systems of the twentieth century, various patterns are established and certain tendencies noted in the international conduct and role of such powers. The main conclusions reached are that the systemic roles of middle powers have not always been quite so important or beneficial as claimed on their behalf in both the older and the more recent literature on the subject; that their parts generally have been conditioned by the form and state of the international system; that their scope usually has been greatest when relations between the great powers in the system have been ambiguous, i.e. neither too hostile nor too co-operative; and that their most significant parts in most situations have been in regional and local affairs rather than at the central or global levels of international politics. The last chapter of the book is rounded off with some speculations about the likely roles of middle powers in the global states system of the future.

Carsten

Holbraad

is

Deputy Director

of

the

Centre

for

International Relations, Queen's University, Canada. He has previously been Senior Fellow in the School oflnternational Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa, and Research Fellow and Senior Research Fellow in the Department of International Relations, Institute of Advanced Studies, Australian National University. He took his B.Sc. (Econ.) at the London School of Economics and his

D. Phil. at the University of Sussex.

By the same author

THE CONCERT OF EUROPE: A Study in German and British International Theory 1815-1914 SUPER POWERS AND WORLD ORDER

(editor)

SUPERPOWERS AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

Middle Powers in International Politics

Carsten Holbraad

M

MACMILLAN PRESS LONDON

© Carsten Holbraad 1984 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without permission. First published 1984 by THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD London and Basingstoke Companies and representatives throughout the world ISBN 0 333 �5443 5 Printed in Hong Kong

For Sonya and Martin

Contents Preface

lX

Introduction

1 The History of the Idea 1.1 Before 1814 1.2 European Restoration 1.3 German Confederation 1.4 From the Crimean War to the First World War

10

2 The League of Nations and the United Nations 2.1 The League of Nations 2.2 The United Nations

45

3 The Hierarchy of Powers 3.1 Characterisation of Middle Powers 3.2 Ranking of Powers

67

' j ·

The Unifocal System.

4.1 Dominance 4.2 Primacy 4.3 Hegemony

5 The Dualistic System.

10 19 27 33

46 56

68 75

92 100 104 107 117

5.1 Cold War

119

5.2 Diplomatic Concert

134

5.3 Rivalry and Co-operation

140

6 The Triangular System.

159

6.1 Equilateral Triangles

163

6.2 Non-Equilateral Triangles

168

7 The Multiple System.

177

7.1 Diplomatic Concert

179

Contents

Vlll

7.2 7.3

Intense Rivalry Moderate Rivalry

188 196

Conclusion

205

Notes

214

Index

229

Preface The fitful relaxation of tension between the super powers after the Cuban missile crisis, the widening rift between China and the Soviet Union in the early 1960s and the greater independence of French diplomacy under de Gaulle loosened the Cold War pattern of East­ West relations enough to enlarge the diplomatic scope of many of the lesser powers in the global states system. One result was a revival of interest in the international role of the growing number of middle-ranking powers. In the 1960s and 1970s books and articles about the place of middle powers in international politics appeared in various parts of the world. Most of them discussed these powers strictly in the context of the immediate situation, usually relating their policies and conduct to a narrow range of current issues. This !',book presents middle-ranking powers in a wider perspective. Setting out the concept of the middle power against the background ';of the earlier history of ideas about such powers, it examines the conduct of past and present middle powers in a variety of systemic contexts . Drawing on historical as well as contemporary material, it analyses the roles of these powers in several typical situations of the most familiar forms of the states system. This approach makes it possible to attempt a general assessment of the contribution of middle powers to the international political process. Most of the material for the book was collected when I was a member of the Department of International Relations in the Research School of Pacific Studies at the Australian National University. Some of the first ideas on the subject were developed in conversations with my friend and colleague there, the late Sisir Gupta. Several other former colleagues in Australia read various draft chapters and made useful suggestions. I am particularly grateful to Professor J . L. Richardson at the ANU , who commented critically on an early draft of a substantial part of the book. Chapter 5 incorporates sections of my contribution to a volume of essays published in memory of Sisir Gupta ('The Role of Non-Aligned Middle Powers', in M. S. Rajan and Shivaji Ganguly (eds), Great lX

X

Preface

Power Relations, World Order and the Third World, New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1981), and I am obliged to the editors for allowing me to use this material here. Chapter 6, with the kind permission of the editor and the publishers of the Year Book of World Affairs, is based on 'Middle-Power Roles in Great-Power Triangles', my contribution to the 1976 volume (London, Stevens & Son). Copenhagen

C. H.

Introduction In the 1 960s and 1 970s, a number of departures from the traditional concern with the policies and interaction of the great powers marked the academic study of international politics. One was a revival of interest in the nature and role of small states. This development, the .first signs of which appeared already in the late 1 950s, was due to JeVeral sets of circumstances. The most obvious was the proliferation of new states in Asia and Africa after the Second World War, which greatly changed the numerical proportion in the world between great powers and lesser states. A more profound cause was the detente in East-West relations in the 1 960s, which presented new diplomatic opportunities as well as new difficulties for many small states. On a less general level, the international drama surrounding �me small states, especially in the Middle East and South East Asia, apd the spectacular performance of a few ofthem, notably Israel and North Vietnam, demanded the attention of students of international �litics. Finally, the opening or expansion of departments of international relations at universities in a number of small countries in various parts of the world made it possible for political scientists of diverse national backgrounds to respond to the new challenges. Their efforts resulted in a fairly substantial number of books and articles, most of them published in the late 1 960s and early 1970s. While this literature often throws a good deal of light on the behaviour of certain kinds of small states in particular types of international situations, as a general treatment of the nature and role of small states it has several shortcomings. In the first place, it more often than not fails to take account not only of earlier writings on the topic, especially those of the inter-war period, but also of relevant work carried out by contemporary scholars in other fields. 1 Second, though it explores the concept of the small state from many angles, it does not provide an entirely adequate and broadly agreed definition of the subject-matter. Third, few of the studies reach generalisations about the international conduct of small states that apply to the category as a whole and seem of a certain importance.

2

Middle Powers in International Politics

Yet, despite the rather limited achievements of the first spate of writings, the new interest in the behaviour of these states helped to broaden the perspective on the society of states and to redress the balance in the study of international politics, which during the period of the Cold War had been tilted too heavily in favour of the great powers. The revival of interest in small states was not accompanied by an equally serious study of middle-sized powers. Most of the small number of symposia and articles about the role of such powers that in the 1960s and 1970s appeared in various countries, including Canada, West Germany and India, were quite limited in scope, often focusing on a narrow range of current issues and sometimes propounding particular ideas of foreign policy. This had been true also of some of the earlier literature on the subject, for example of certain German writings of the early nineteenth century equally limited in relevance and linked with a political programme. 2 Though much has been written about the problems and policies of individual middle-sized powers, little work of substance has been done on the nature and role of these states as a group or a class of the international system . Some of the reasons for this are obvious. First, there is the difficulty of defining the subject-matter of such a study. 'Middle powers', as they have been called, have no special standing in international law that could serve as a guide to their identity. 3 Though various middle-ranking powers enjoyed certain privileges in the great post-war conferences of modern history, their attempts to secure institutional status within the League of Nations and the United Nations were not particularly successful and left no lasting result of real significance. 4 While some political scientists have suggested criteria for distinguishing three or more classes of states and a few have drawn up lists of middle-ranking powers, nobody has quite overcome the serious difficulties of providing an entirely satisfactory definition of the type of power that is neither great nor small. Second, there is the problem of reaching valid and significant generalisations about the international conduct of such powers. Whichever criteria are used for distinguishing middle-ranking powers from those above and below them, the category is likely to include a range of highly heterogeneous powers. Idiosyncracies of political character and differences in international position are bound to affect their behaviour and are likely to make it difficult to detect more than broad tendencies in their responses to various international situations.

Introduction

3

Yet there are good reasons why attempts should be made to come grips with this subject. Given that the existing states system, in ·common with many earlier systems of modern history, contains a substantial number of units which obviously are neither great powers nor small states, a study of the role of middle-sized powers seems a natural complement of the traditional concern with great powers and the more recent work on small states. What is more, the intermediate category of states usually comprises a particularly interesting and rather important group of powers. It is the meeting place of once great but declining powers, tired from generations of power politics at the highest level but rich in experience, and oflesser :but ascending powers, conscious of their potential and stirred by :� bition. Together with states long established at intermediate )evels, they form a range not unlike that of the middle classes of some �mestic societies. Indeed, their recurrent preoccupation with the �gers of great-power oligarchy and their tendency occasionally to claim superior wisdom and virtue bring to mind the traditional case �for the middle class as put by political philosophers, from Aristotle to James Mill. 5 f; Focusing on the political relations of the middle-sized powers, )With the great powers and the small states as well as among themselves, is in some respects a particularly suitable approach to the study of the states system and its processes. It allows one to look at �e system from within. Those who concentrate exclusively on the .interrelations of the great powers enjoy the obvious advantages of dealing with the chief actors but are in danger of taking a too Olympian view of international politics. Some of the charges of distortion that have been levelled at historians of earlier times, who were disposed to concern themselves almost entirely with popes and emperors, kings and generals and the ruling classes, and to ignore the lower orders of society, could be laid also against some modern writers on international relations. On the other hand, those who approach the subject from the angle of small states can be at a serious disadvantage. Moving among states which, even when they are neither mere pawns in great-power relations nor outright depen­ dents of a major power, tend to be objects rather than subjects, in the sense that their international behaviour is highly conditioned by the policies and relations of stronger powers, they sometimes find it hard to come to grips with a process which, so to speak, is decided at .higher levels. Thus, an analysis of the conduct of middle-ranking powers may not only illuminate the international system from an to

4

Middle Powers in International Politics

unfamiliar angle but may also present some of its processes in a perspective truer than those frequently associated with either traditional or more novel approaches. A final, and more pertinent, reason for taking up the study of these powers is that their role in international politics appears to have become more important in recent decades. For most secondary powers, aligned as well as unaligned, the East-West detente meant a widening of diplomatic scope. While the improvement in super­ power relations allowed some middle-sized powers to take initiatives of their own in regard to the central relationship of international politics, it permitted other such powers to assume roles in regional politics which in the years of the Cold War had been less possible. As a result, the general state of international relations in many parts of the world came to depend rather more than before on the conduct of these powers. With their scope enlarged and their influence enhanced, some of them became increasingly conscious ofboth their identity and their potential as intermediate powers. Soon the term 'middle powers' and its various synonyms, which had enjoyed little currency since the onset of the Cold War, were brought into use again, while speculation about a special role for such powers, which had languished since the early years of the United Nations, was revived. 6 The aim of the present study is to examine the actual conduct and determine the typical roles of middle powers in international politics. If for the moment we leave aside the difficulties of measuring the strength ofstates and drawing dividing lines in a list of powers arranged according to force at their disposal, we may define the subject-matter provisionally as states that are weaker than the great powers in the system but significantly stronger than the minor powers and small states with which they normally interact. By surveying and analysing the behaviour of such powers in character­ istic situations of various forms of the states system, it may be possible to detect certain tendencies in their international conduct which, when related to the processes of the systems to which they belong, may point to their typical roles in international relations. In very large systems, particularly the global system of the second half of the twentieth century, middle powers often play their most conspicuous parts within their own regions, where their immediate interests usually lie. In such cases, the more typical of their regional, or sub­ systemic, parts will be outlined and discussed. But the study will focus on the systemic roles of middle powers, especially on their

Introduction

5

condu ct in regard to the central relationship of each system. Though

of varying, and sometimes perhaps minimal, importance to the

processes of the system as a whole, such roles must be central to an enquiry that is aimed at providing a general picture of the performance of middle powers in diverse systemic conditions. The basic theme of this work is the connection between the form and state of the international system and the conduct of the middle powers in it. The number of great powers in the system and the political relations that exist between these chiefactors determine the international environment of the lesser states and influence their behaviour, towards the great powers as well as among themselves. The middle powers, closer to the top level of international politics, tend to be particularly sensitive to the conditions that prevail there. For them, each systemic situation presents its own set of difficulties and opportunities. Just how each of them perceives the elements of the situation is bound to depend on a variety of subj ective factors, NCb as the political ideas and passions of its leaders; and how it J/jiiSponds to the situation must to some extent reflect also other such factors, for example its diplomatic tradition and its domestic �titutions. Yet, despite all subjective influences, the reactions of !niddl e powers in comparable international situations may be CX:pected to show some similarities. All of them exposed to the :competitive conditions of international society and determined to JUrvive and prosper, they can neither afford persistently to ignore .dle threats and encouragements presented by the structure of the �tem and the interaction of its principal actors, nor repeatedly fail ,,_, exercise a degree of rationality in their response to them. Variously threatening their interests and offering possibilities of �uring some of their goals, these pressures can sometimes be strong and general enough to produce observable tendencies in the systemic conduct of the middle powers. What is more, they may affe ct their sub-systemic behaviour as well. By setting the broad parameters of-their activities at this level and shaping the general circumstances under which they must defend their interests and pursue their aims in regional affairs, the systemic factors may help to create various patterns of sub-systemic conduct. But the inter­ national conduct of the middle powers, at both the systemic and the sub-systemic level, in turn has effects of its own on the politi­ cal processes of the system. It is the nature and magnitude of these effects that determine the role of middle powers in international politics. 7

6

Middle Powers in International Politics

In both its aim and its theme, the present study obviously reflects a 'state-centric' view of the affairs of the world. Until fairly recently, this would require no special justification. But in the 1960s and 1970s, approaches to the study of international relations that followed the tradition of focusing on the states and their political interaction became the subject of sustained criticism. Drawing attention to the presence and influence of various non-state actors on the world scene, a group of writers argued that states were becoming relatively less important and, therefore, less worthy of attention. The actors to watch, according to this school of thought, were the several sorts of transnational organisations, most of which tended to ignore international boundaries in their operations and some of which, particularly the multinational corporations, occa­ sionally secured a dominating influence on the affairs of individual states. Like some of the other departures from tradition that took place in those decades, this approach reflected, though with some distortions, the particular international circumstances of the period in which it emerged and developed. The detente in relations between the superpowers made it possible for a while to shift attention from matters of national security to broader economic issues. The prosperity of large parts of the world allowed some transnational forces and most multinational organisations con­ siderably freer play than they had enjoyed in the period of the Cold War. And the growing number of recently emerged states in the Third World included some that were willing, or obliged, to let themselves be influenced or dominated by multinational corpor­ ations. This situation led some political scientists to concern themselves largely with the economic factors of international politics, especially with those that transcended the boundaries of states and enjoyed a global range, and to take little account of the political-strategic context in which such factors operated. Though they threw light on interesting aspects of the contemporary scene, particularly on relations between the rich and the poorer parts of the world, these writers did not succeed in showing that the revival in the influence of transnational actors had seriously undermined the states system. The activities of the multinational corporations, on which so much of their case rested, at no time eclipsed the role of states. Though a few of the less viable states, for periods, submitted to domination by foreign organisations, others deliberately used them for the development of their economies or for other purposes of their own. And most of the stronger states either regulated their

Introduction

7

operations or, like the communist states, kept them out altogether. States are still the major actors, and principal powers still the chief actors on the world stage. Hence, the case for viewing the role of middle powers in the context of the states system, and for regarding their conduct as conditioned by the form and state of this system, is a strong one. That the present study is intended to deal with certain more lasting tendencies in international politics, rather than with various novel, and possibly transient, features of the contemporary, or recent, situation, reinforces the case for a state-centric approach. The analytical part of this study rests on material drawn from a number of historical systems, namely the European system from the Congress of Vienna to the First World War, the German states system from 1816 to 1866, the inter-American system of the late nineteenth and the twentieth century, the global and the European system of the inter-war years, and the global system since 1945 . Between them, these systems present structures of one, two, three and more than three great powers. What is more, each of them, �rough a series of marked changes in the political relations of the great powers, offers a variety of typical situations for the other powers in the system. Finally, each of the systems contains a number of states, ranging from a few to many, which may be defined as middle powers. Yet, though in some ways rich and varied, the material presented by these historical systems is inadequate for a strictly inductive analysis of the conduct and role of middle powers. In several of the situations to be distinguished, there simply were not enough such powers in the system to permit generalisations about their be­ haviour. In some cases, one or more of a small number of middle powers behaved, generally for domestic reasons, so erratically as to exclude them from the analysis. In other cases, two or more middle powers, while moved by the same systemic forces, were situated, geographically or otherwise, so differently as to make comparisons problematic. A further difficulty is that where the analysis rests on two or three structurally similar systems, these may be in other respects so dissimilar that comparisons can be made only with reservations. For such reasons, most generalisations about middle powers based merely on facts drawn from the historical material available must be highly tentative. To give a clearer picture of the ways middle powers are inclined to behave, the inductive process has to be combined with a good deal of deduction . If the international conduct of middle powers

8

Middle Powers in International Politics

tends to be conditioned by the prevailing forces in the system to which they belong, the starting-point for a process of deduction must be the interaction of the great powers. Each type of situation created by the dynamics of this interaction, determined as it is by the number of great powers and the state of their relations, presents a range of theoretically possible roles for the middle powers in the system. It also produces a set of constraints and incentives likely in some way to influence their response to the situation. By listing the various conceivable roles and assessing the probable effect of the particular systemic influences at work, it is possible to formulate hypotheses about the types of role most likely to be attempted . These hypotheses then may be tested against the actual behaviour of middle powers in relevant historical situations. The inductive and the deductive method can go hand in hand. While abstract analysis of the system and its processes may be brought in to clarify generalisations made from historical material, recorded facts can be used to try out hypotheses based on deduction from implicit models. The extent to which it is possible to marry the generalisations and the hypotheses without doing violence to the facts or infringing the rules of logic depends on the degree of systemic conditioning of the behaviour of middle powers, and is thus a test of the basic assumption of the present study. As we shall see, the issue of this marriage of the inductive and the deductive approach is a series of propositions about the typical conduct and likely role of middle powers in certain kinds of international situations. A combination of vague generalisations from limited material and abstract analysis of implicit models is useful also when it comes to assessing the effect that the efforts of middle powers are likely to have on the processes of international politics. By estimating the actual achievements of such powers in a number of concrete situations as well as exploring the limitations on their influence inherent in the system, it is possible to gain an indication of the importance of their various roles. Here again, as we shall see, the outcome of the two-pronged investigation is a set of observations about tendencies in diverse situations of the several systems. The first three chapters of this book trace the development of the concept of middle powers. Starting with the initial emergence and occasional reappearances of the idea in European political writings of earlier centuries, the story continues with the attempts after the First and the Second World Wars to secure a special status for such powers in the League of Nations and the United Nations. The last

Introduction

9

stage takes in various scholarly efforts of more recent decades to define middle powers and classifY states, which lead up to a discussion of the definition and classification used in this work. The last four chapters, which constitute the main part of the study, outline certain patterns of conduct and point to some characteristic roles of middle powers in various typical situations of each of the four basic forms of the states system, namely the unifocal, the dualistic, the triangular, and the multiple. The discussion of the latter form of system is rounded off with some brief speculations about the various imaginable roles of middle powers in a global multiple system, one of the most frequently canvassed possibilities for the future of the international political system. The analysis of the four sorts of system allows us to identify the kind of systemic conditions that have proved most favourable to middle powers set on taking an active part in international politics, whether at the systemic or at the sub-systemic level. The book concludes with an attempt to estimate the quality of the contribution of middle powers to the international political process. Bearing in mind the claims that have been made on behalf of such powers, in the earlier as well as in some of the more recent literature on the subject, we shall try to decide, on the basis of their record, whether, how, and to what extent middle powers tend to take a constructive part in the pursuit of the basic goals ofinternational society - order and security, peace and j ustice.

1 The History of the Idea Since the focus in both the older and the newer literature of international politics generally has been on the principal powers, the basic distinction in writings about the modem states system has always been between great powers and others. More often than not the latter have been grouped together under the label of minor powers or small states and given only little attention. But many writers of the past have divided the non-great states according to size and importance into two, and sometimes three or more, classes. Some of them have gone out of their way to comment on the nature and speculate about the role of the powers in the category immediately below the great powers. And a few have actually made this intermediate level in the hierarchy ofpowers their chief concern. Far from amounting to a continuous tradition of thought on the subject, the observations on the character and discussions of the function of secondary or middle powers to be found in earlier political writings can be described as scattered and isolated . Yet, the fact that the part played by these powers in the international system has been for centuries an occasionally recurring subject of the literature makes it worth tracing the history of the idea. For the earlier period it may suffice simply to note some of the ideas that have been advanced and trace any development of thought that may be observed. But for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, from the states systems of which most of the material for the analysis of the conduct and role of middle powers to be set out in later chapters is drawn, there is more point in presenting the ideas in the systemic and political contexts in which they arose. 1.1

BEFORE 1814

A sketch of the earliest history of the notion of middle powers in European political thought may be found in a fragment of a draft chapter on the grading of powers left by the late Martin Wight. 1 lO

The History of the Idea

11

Here Wight showed how the grading of powers started with the simple recognition that states are of different kinds and magnitudes and developed into the doctrine that they accordingly have different roles in international society. Some of the early writers he found it particularly worth looking at were Aquinas, Bartolus and Botero. When Thomas Aquinas, writing more than seven hundred years ago, tried to formulate the concept of the state, he came up against the difficulty that states are heterogeneous. His response was to distinguish three classes of political units: city, province and kingdom. He did not define his intermediate category, and it is not clear from his usage what exactly he meant by the term 'provincia'. 2 Yet by introducing three classes of states he prepared the way for future speculation about the nature and role of the members of the middle class. In the following century Bartolus ofSassoferrato, the Italian post­ glossator, took the division into three classes one step further. By fitting the Aristotelian triad of constitutions into a grading of states, he arrived at the following order. First, magna in primo gradu magnitudinis, came city-states, which, in his view, ought to be ruled by the whole people. Next, major, et sic in secundo gradu magnitudinis, were states too large in territory for direct democracy and best governed by aristocracies. His examples were Venice and Florence. Last, maxima, et sic in tertio gradu magnitudinis, came a people or nation so wide in dominion that only monarchy could provide it with unity and good government. Here the Roman Empire would be a good example, he suggested. 3 Bartolus's criterion for classifying states, we may note, was territorial size, and his concern constitutional form rather than international role. But by associating a particular type of government with each class of state he helped to bring out the point that differences of size between the three classes go with differences of kind. Surveying the following centuries, Martin Wight did not find anyone before Botero who developed the grading of powers and gave substance to the class of middle powers. Giovanni Botero was a Jesuit-trained Piedmontese teacher of philosophy and rhetoric who became archbishop of Milan. His Ragion di Stato appeared in 1589. At the outset of the book, he divided states into three classes: some dominions are small, others large, others medium; and these are not absolute but comparative, and with respect to their

12

Middle Powers in International Politics neighbours. So a little state is one that is not able to maintain itself alone but has need of protection and of the support of another, as the Republic of Ragusa, and of Lucca. A medium one is that which has force and authority sufficient to maintain itself without the need of the help of another, as the Dominion of the Signory of Venice, the Kingdom of Bohemia, the Duchy of Milan, and the County of Flanders. Then we call those states great which have notable advantage over their neighbours, as the Turkish Empire, and that of the Catholic King. 4

A few pages later Botero asked which states, large, small or middle­ sized, are most lasting. After discussing the effects of the weakness of small states and the dangers of being large, he turned to the advantages of the middle-sized states: Middle-sized states are the most lasting, since they are exposed neither to violence by their weakness nor to envy by their greatness, and their wealth and power being moderate, passions are less violent, ambition finds less support and licence less provocation than in large States. Fear of their neighbours restrains them, and even if feelings are roused to anger they are more easily quieted and tranquillity restored. . . Thus some middle-sized powers have lasted far longer than the greatest, as we see in the case of Sparta, Carthage and above all Venice, for there has never been an empire in which mediocrity of power went with such stability and strength. Yet although this medio­ crity is more conducive to the preservation of an empire tha'n excessive power, middle-sized States do not last long if their leaders are not content but wish to expand and become great, and, exceeding the bounds of mediocrity, leave behind also those of security . . . So long as the ruler recognises the limits of mediocrity and is content to remain within them his rule will be lasting. 5 Obviously preferring states of middle size, for which he used the terms me<;ano and mediocro, Botero was among those writers who devoted more attention to the intermediate class than to other classes of powers. By defining this type of state in terms of 'strength and authority to stand on its own without the need of help from others' , he linked size with international power and security. This took the thinking about middle powers a good deal further than the

The History of the Idea

13

position of Bartol us and other earlier writers, who had connected size with constitutional form and domestic politics. The line of thought that Botero had started, Martin Wight observed, was apparently not taken up again until the middle of the eighteenth century. Here he was referring to the writings of the Abbe de Mably, which however he did not discuss in this draft. 6 The relevant ideas of this writer are contained in a work first published in 1 7 57, under the title Principes des negociations, pour servir d'introduction au droit publique de l' Europe, jonde sur les traites. Mably not only distinguished powers of the first, the second and the third order but also prescribed how each type of power ought to conduct its affairs in various situations. In doing so, he came close to generalising about the roles of secondary powers. He was interested mainly in the dualistic system of international politics. Having presented the principles that guided, or, rather, ought to guide, the international conduct of the two dominant powers in such a system, he turned to the powers of the second order. Their conduct and role, he realised, depended very much on the type of relationship existing between the dominant powers. When Austria and France, in their time as dominant powers, unwisely had found themselves in severe conflict with each other, they had needed the help of their neighbours and had tended to involve them in their disputes. While the dominant powers had regarded these allies as instruments to be used for their own purposes, their allies had perceived an opportunity to aggrandise themselves at the expense of the dominant powers. But not all of them had succeeded . 'Si quelques­ uns ont en effe t augmenti leur fortune en vendant leurs secours, d'autres, en suivant La meme politique, n'ont eli que joiblement didommages par leurs conquetes des maux que La guerre leur avo it causes.' 7 Within the category of secondary powers, Mably distinguished two classes. Some secondary powers were almost able to play the role of dominant powers. The more important they were, the more such powers ought to conduct themselves in accordance with the principles that he had recommended for the dominant powers. To do so was in their own interest:

Leur moderation leur Jera des allies; leur amour pour La justice les rendra meme souvent arbitres entre les puissances du premier ordre. Pendant que celles-ci se jont Ia guerre et s'ajjoiblissent, il est de /'interet des autres de conserver La paix, parce qu'elles s'enrichiront; et des-tors l'intervalle qui les separe des premieres -sera moins grand. 8

14

Middle Powers in International Politics

A decline in the influence of the dominant powers presented a special opportunity for such secondary powers. If, perhaps through the incompetence of their ministers and princes, the governments of the principal powers became paralysed, a prince of the second order ought to take advantage of the situation by assuming the lead in European affairs, which position might give him the opportunity to enhance his reputation by giving proof of his wisdom. But he should be careful to distinguish between a temporary set-back, and the more lasting decline in the fortunes of dominant powers which alone would give the secondary power a chance to satisfy its ambition for leadership. The members ofMably's other class of secondary powers were less close to the dominant powers in the hierarchy of states. They needed to strengthen their position before they might be able to take a leading role. Yet, in some respects, Mably observed sadly, the lesser secondary powers enjoyed considerable advantages:

Elles peuvent profiter des querelles qu'ont les puissances supirieures, et s'accroftre a leurs dipens. Il est facheux, pour le bonheur de l'humaniti, qu'on ne puisse opposer a ['ambition de ces itats que des raisonnemens de morale et non de politique. En travail/ant a s'agrandir, ils ne courent aucun des dangers auxquels la meme ambition expose des princes plus puissans. Comme ils ne font dans les aifaires qu'un role subalterne, la principale attention ne sejixe point sur eux: ils ne sont point !'objet de Ia jalousie; et la haine publique qui les ipargne se tourne toute entiere contre les puissances qui lesfont agir et qui achetent leurs secours. Souvent, et l'experience le prouve, ils ne se sont point rendus odieux en ne se servant pas pour ilever leurfortune de moyens autorises par la justice et la bonnefoi. Leurfoiblesse leur sert en quelque sorte d'excuse; tanto! ils semblent ne cider qu'a la nicessiti; tantot un hasardfavorablefournit quelque pritexte spicieux a leur politique. Etant soutenus par la puissance enfaveur de qui ils ont commis une irifidiliti, ils n'en craignent point de reproches; et les plaintes que fait la puissance qu'ils ont trahie sont prises quelquefois pour un eloge ( tant on est deprave!) ou ne passent que pour l'if.fet de son ressenti ment. 9 Mably went on to explain how such secondary powers should conduct themselves in order to benefit fully from their natural advantages:

L'interet de ses itats, pour se rendre recommandables pendant la paix, c'est d'entretenir la division entre les grandes puissances, de.flatter leurs passions;

The History of the Idea

15

et par de doubles negociations, conduites avec finesse et d'une maniere equivoque, de paro£tre entrer dans leurs vues, et de donner des esperances a tous les partis, sans prendre cependant aucun engagement decide. Par cette conduite, un prince ne se concilie pas, il est vrai, l'amitie des puissances superieures; mais cette amitie lui seroit inutile, et il les accoutume a ne se point passer de lui, il les tient dans La disposition de le servir, et leur donne meme a eel egard une sorte d'emulation dont il prqfitera suivant les circonstances. La guerre, qui "est unfieau pour tous les autres etats, est un bonheur pour lui. II doit y prendre part, a mains que quelque raison particuliere ne sy oppose; car, en general, Ia guerre ne se fait point a ses depens. Elle lui vaut meme des subsides; et Ia paix qui Ia termine lui sera toujours avantageuse, pourvu que, toujoursfidelle a ses principes, il a it l'art peu difficile de se trouver a Iafin de Ia guerre l'allie de Ia puissance qui l'aura faite avec le plus de bonheur.10 lie would be embarrassed, Mably said, to expound maxims so Machiavellian as these if it were not that from them one could draw �nclusions useful to mankind: II est done vrai que les puissances superieures. sont encore moins ennemies les

unes des autres, que de ces etats d'un ordre inferieur qui ne peuvent s'agrandir qu'a leurs depens. L'union des unes obligeroit les autres a se con/enter de leur fortune; et it semble qu'il ne soil permis aux puissances subalternes d'avoir une ambition utile, que pour mettre un frein a celle des puissances superieures, dont les querelles causent une desolation generate. 11 He concluded his analysis of the relationship between dominant

and secondary powers with a few observa tions on the faithlessness of

'ambitious secondary powers, and with some further advice for the princes of such powers. Then he proceeded to discuss the third-rank powers, again presenting interests and conduct in terms of the relationship with the principal powers. Essentially, the function of middle powers, as Mably saw it, was to enhance and secure the quality of political life at the highest level of European affairs. The upper secondary powers - which have their counterparts in the contemporary states system 1 2 - should conduct themselves according to much the same principles as those applying to the powers above them, and might be expected to exert a moderating and pacifying influence on relations between the dominant powers. They must also be ready to take the lead in European politics if the principal powers failed in this role. The

16

Middle Powers in International Politics

lower secondary powers, whose interests did not allow them to conduct their foreign affairs in accordance with principles nearly so high as those applying to their superiors, could still help to limit tension and conflict at the top level of international politics, but only through their own greed and ambition. The last idea is the most interesting. It seems that Mably approved of the tendency for lesser secondary powers to pursue their selfish ambitions by almost any means because of its effect on the principal powers. Pressure from inferior powers bent on expansion and self-advancement, he thought, made the superior ones more aware of a shared interest in subordinating their own quarrels to their joint conflict with those below them, more conscious of the need to maintain a degree of solidarity to keep down potential challengers. Concerted opposition by the dominant powers to the selfish drives of the middle powers, in turn, could check the ambitions of the latter and confine their endeavours to a level where they would be only useful. The principal benefit of this relationship of mutual restraint, in Mably's view, was that tension between the two levels of the hierarchy would prevent rivalry at the top level from reaching the point where it might cause widespread desolation. Though his main concern obviously was with the principal powers, Mably, by generalising about the interests of the secondary powers and relating their conduct to the politics of the dominam powers, brought thinking about the function of middle powers in the European states system to a more advanced stage than any other writer before the nineteenth century seems to have done. Rousseau, whose Contrat social and Emile were published five years after Mably's Principes des negociations, also distinguished three classes of states -large, small and middle-sized - but did not have much to say about the latter. Like Bartolus four centuries before him, he matched ideal types of government with the three sizes of states:

On a de tout temps beaucoup dispute sur La meilleure forme de Gouvernement, sans considirer que chacune est la meilleure en certains cas, et la pire en d'autres. Pour nous, si dans les diffirents Etats le nombre des magistrats doit etre inverse de celui des citoyens, nous conclurons qu'en general le Gouvernement democratique convient aux petits Etats, l'aristocratique aux mediocres, et le monarchique aux grands. 13 Disliking large states and distrusting monarchical government, he believed in the advantages of small states and the virtues of the democratic form .

The History of the Idea

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For the middle-sized state and the aristocratic form of govern­ ment, Rousseau had no particular enthusiasm. When considering extremes of size, he recognised, on the one hand, that states can become too large for good government and, on the other, that they can be too small to survive as independent units. But, unlike Botero, who made similar observations about the disadvantages of being very large or very small, he saw no special virtue in the middle-sized state, as distinct from the viable small state: ' Toute grande nation est incapable de discipline; un Etat trap petit n'a point de consistance; la midiocrite meme ne fait quelquefois qu'unir les deux difauts.' 14 This was

hardly a view that could encourage him to speculate about the international roles of middle powers. \:' Nor did the international lawyers and the military writers of the •l;tte eighteenth century show much interest in the subject of middle ,w�rs. The int�rnational la�ers, though given to c!assifying and �kmg states, did not recogmse this_ class. To determme rank, they �erally used formal criteria, such as degree of sovereignty, form of p. ernment, titles, age, e�c: To these the great positi�ist _j urist, _ 1777, added the cntenon of Joh ann Jacob Moser, wntmg m .,wer. 15 But in his discussion of the distribution of power as a source iJf :inequality among sovereign states, he distinguished only stronger �d weaker states -just as in an earlier work he had recognised p.ly big and small states when he had classified according to i�e:

:�·; .

.L .

/: ·Die Europiiische souveraine Staaten seynd theils gross, theils klein:

Und

Proportion ;), seynd; so kommen doch auch die griisste dieser kleinen souverainen Staaten : nicht einmahl dem schwiichesten grossen souverainen Staat bey sehr ob gleich jene unter einander wieder von gar verschiedener

:'r. · ..

'·:

·

weitem bey.16

When, on the eve of the French Revolution, G. F. von Martens enumerated and classified the states of Europe, he took issue with Moser about his use of the criterion of power. In a discussion of the division of states into great and little, he mentioned that it was not enough to distinguish those states that enjoyed absolute sovereignty from those that were not fully sovereign. It was necessary to distinguish also those that were entitled to royal honours, and that generally were called great states, from those that were not entitled to such honours, and that by way of opposition to the former were called little states. Here he added a footnote:

18

Middle Powers in International Politics

In any other sense, this division of states into great and little which Mr J. J. Moser appears to have introduced, is altogether arbitrary and vague. If we would divide them according to their power, we must make more than two classes; and then, the Province of Holland, the Republic of Berne, and the Duchy of Silesia, could not be ranked in the lowest class. 1 7 But having so firmly rejected the criterion of power, Martens was in no position to pursue his idea of one or more intermediate classes of powers. The military writers at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, who were trying to digest the experience of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, generally saw only great and small powers, and naturally enough concentrated their attention on the former. Occasionally, however, there was a departure from this simple division. The Prussian strategist A. H. D. von Bulow, Clausewitz's predecessor, provides an example. Though in most places in his works he applied the customary two-tier distinction, in the passages where he discussed Frederick the Great's efforts to improve the European position of Prussia through war he intro­ duced an intermediate category. This king, he pointed out, had not intended to lead his country into the rank ofthe principal powers but had aimed only at establishing a middle-sized state. The outcome of his efforts had been a kingdom which not only had threatened nobody but actually had helped to protect each of its neighbours. 1 8 But, in Bulow's view, this result of Frederick's expansionist pursuits had not at all been desirable. The King had done either too much or too little: ,Zu vie/, indem er durch die Eroberung Schlesiens den Hass grosser Miichte sich zuzog und aus einer gliicklichen Dunkelheit hervorgieng, in welcher des Wohl seiner Unterthanen sein einziger Ruhm hiitte seyn sollen; zu wenig, indem er nicht his zur abschreckenden Grosse einen gewaltsam gebildeten Staat erhob. 19

The situation of the middle-sized state, it may be concluded from Bulow's criticism of Frederick the Great, was neither happy nor safe. Foreshadowing the ambitions of later generations of Prussian writers, he considered only great-powerhood worth having - an attitude that did not allow him to give much thought to the international role of middle powers.

The History of the Idea

19

I t was not till after the reorganisation of the European and German states systems at Vienna, it seems, that writers again emerged who were able not only to recognise middle-ranking powers but also to think constructively about their role in the states sytem. 1.2

EUROPEAN RESTORATION

In the nineteenth century the ranking of states as powers became a subject of diplomatic discussion. It was a topic of the Congress of Vienna; and the negotiations of I 8 14-1 5 together with the diplo­ matic practice of the initial restoration period introduced divisions in the hierarchy of states more marked than those that had existed before. Later meetings of European statesmen brought about or ·confirmed a number of changes and modifications in the post• Napoleonic ranking. While some powers moved to a higher class, others gained a new position within the same class. Those European congresses and conferences that had some bearing on the structure of the international hierarchy were sometimes preceded but more often followed by some public discussion of the new order and the changes in the grading of individual states. Hence they form a convenient framework for a presentation and analysis of the ideas with which we are here concerned. It was not only in the European but also in the German states system that the Congress of Vienna drew class divisions. In each &ystem the states that were ranked immediately below the great powers attracted the attention of a number of writers and became the subject of some speculation about the nature and role of middle powers. Since the two discussions were carried on in different con­ texts and by different people, they may be treated separately here. The problem of ranking the members of the European states system engaged the attention of the Congress in February 1 8 1 5, when a plan for three classes of states came before it. Spain and Portugal, then in a marginal position in relation to the great powers, wished for two only. When adoption of the plan was prevented by disputes as to the ranking of the 'great republics', it was superseded by a classification of ministers. Diplomatic officials were divided in to three classes, with a fourth class being added three years later through a refinement introduced by the Congress of Aix-la­ Chapelle. .

20

Middle Powers in International Politics

More important in its effect on the international hierarchy of Europe than those formal classifications, however, was the actual procedure adopted at Vienna. In practice, the Congress of Vienna eventually drew a firm line between the great powers and the rest of the members of the states system. But this it did only after some initial uncertainty as to where the line should go and not without some delay in imposing it. The result was that some states for a time were left in an intermediate position, between the five principal powers above and the more numerous minor powers below them. Already, in the middle of September 1 8 14, at the first informal meetings of the sovereigns and ministers of the four victorious allies of the Napoleonic Wars, Austria, France, Russia and Britain, it was decided unanimously that the conduct of the business to be transacted at Vienna 'must practically rest with the leading Powers'. On 24 September Castlereagh reported to his prime minister that the representatives of the four powers were agreed 'that the effective Cabinet should not be carried beyond the six Powers of the first order' . 2 0 The power then included with the principal allies and the defeated power was Spain. At this stage the idea was to have a formal directing committee of the six, with an inner committee of the four allies to conduct the real business of the Congress. But later it was agreed to accept Talleyrand's proposal for a formal committee · of eight with an inner committee of five, the fifth being France. The additions to the wider committee were Portugal and Sweden, which, together with Spain and the four allies, had signed the Treaties of Paris, which had called the Congress of Vienna into existence. The effect of these moves was to demote Spain and to promote Portugal and Sweden. These were the powers that in the councils of Vienna came to occupy the level immediately below that of the five principal powers. The three lesser members of the Committee of Eight were not allowed to play an important part in the deliberations and decisions of the Congress. The statesmen of the great powers not only took charge of the conduct of business but also excluded the represen­ tatives of all other states from the most important negotiations. The division between the principal and the secondary members of the Committee became so marked that when the Final Act was ready for signature, the Spanish representative refused altogether to sign. He pointed out that only a small proportion of the subjects dealt with in the Act had been reported in the sittings of the Committee and argued that a fraction of the members of the Committee ought not to

The History of the Idea

21

be permitted to settle the affairs of all of Europe. But the supremacy great powers was upheld, and indeed was confirmed by the European congresses of the post-war period. At the Congress of Aix­ la-Chapelle, only three years later, neither Spain, Sweden nor Portugal was admitted. Nor did any of these powers later in the century succeed in recovering the position in Europe which they as signatories of the Treaties of Paris and members of the Committee of Eight originally had enjoyed. Yet, the situation of these states - especially Spain, which in the immediate post-war context had enjoyed the status of marginal principal power - as well as that of a few other significant lesser powers - not least the Netherlands, which at the Congress of Vienna had taken the lead in protesting against impositions by the great powers - did inspire a few writers of the restoration period to think about the rank and role in European politics of middle, or �condary, powers. The idea that the states of Europe divided into more than two ;(;lasses, which at one stage had engaged the attention of the Congress :9f Vienna, reappeared in some post-war writings. But generally it (was in the context of discussions about the role of the great powers 'lhat it turned up. Here, the man who, as a long-standing student of ,'the states system and latterly as the secretary to the European :Congresses, knew the structure of post-war Europe better than :perhaps any other writer provides the best example. In a report on ; �e congress system prepared in March 1 8 1 8, Friedrich Gentz 1described Europe as a great political family united under · the ,,Areopagus of the great powers: 'Les Etats de second, de troisieme, de of the

·

;guatrieme ordre se soumettent tacitement, et sans que rien n'ait jamais eti

stipuli a cet egard, aux decisions prises en commun par les Puissances priponderantes', he observed. 2 1 In paying minimal attention to the

secondary powers and ascribing to them and those below them only .the most passive of roles, Gentz was fairly typical of those writers of his generation who were favourably impressed with, or anxious to defend, the operation of the new congress system. But there were a few contemporary observers who were able to look beyond the great powers and their doings, and to help clarify the notion of secondary powers. One writer who gave some body to the classification of states was Karl Heinrich Ludwig Politz, a political scientist at Leipzig University. The first volume of Die Staatswissenschoften im Lichte unsrer ,(eit, his major work, had a section that dealt with the subject of

22

Middle Powers in International Politics

dividing the powers on the basis of their political importance (Gewichte) . The theory of constitutional law, which built on the abstract idea of the equality of all independent states, knew no such division, he said. In practical international law, on the other hand, which rested on history and politics, especially those of the European states system, states were classified variously according to political rank ( Wurde) , political importance, sovereignty, or degree of independence. But statecraft, he continued, which stood between constitutional law and international law in the sense that it acknowledged the rule of law while also drawing on the facts and lessons ofhistory, recognised that formal political rank and degree of sovereignty could not be adequate criteria for classifying states: 'allein die Entwickelung der Begrijfe vom politischen Gewichte, und dem davon abhiingenden politischen Range der Staaten ist ein Gegenstand der Staatskunst ' . 2 2

Though geographical size was not to be ignored, population figures, because they indicated the level of physical, intellectual and moral force, were in Politz's view the best criterion for deciding relative political importance. On this basis he divided states into four ranks. The first rank comprised states with a population in excess of 10 million; the second, states with a population of between 4 and 10 million; the third, states with a population of between 1 and 4 million; and the fourth, states with less than one million inhabitants. He allowed for exceptions to this broad classification. Internal or external misfortunes in the affairs of a state might reduce it to a class below that indicated by its population figures; and outstanding leadership might raise a state, temporarily or per­ manently, to a level above the one accorded it in his scheme. For these reasons, any general classification of states could rarely last long. 2 3 Politz's main contribution was to suggest a plan for the classifi­ cation of powers. Apart from some very general observations on the importance that states of even third and fourth rank, through their weight and position, might have in the operation of the balance of power, he did not go into the subject of the international roles of lesser powers. Like Gentz, he was not even particularly interested in secondary states, and did not use the term 'middle power' . Some years later another German writer, now rather better known than Politz, used this term and displayed some interest in the role of a particular type of middle power. In an article of 1 83 1 , Karl von Clausewitz discussed the latest developments in Europe with

The History of the Idea

23

reference to the international situation of Germany. Commenting the effect of the Belgian secession from the Netherlands, he started with the observation that since the disappearance of the Kingdom of Burgundy as a separating middle power (trennende Mittelmacht) between Germany and France, the former had been always exposed to the ambitions and aggressive policies of the latter power. 2 4 Clausewitz used the term again when he turned to the subject of Poland. The idea of an independent Poland which would form 'a beneficial (heilsame) middle power against Russia' he rejected on the grounds of the inherent characteristics and the historical record of the Polish nation. As an implacable enemy of Germany, especially of Prussia, a new Poland would be more likely to ally itself with France, which was Germany's real enemy, than to provide protection against Russia, which was not hostile to Germany. 2 5 In Clausewitz's usage, it seems, a middle power was not simply a state that belonged in an intermediate category in a classification according to power. It also needed certain geographical, political and strategic qualities. Geographically, it had to be in a separating ,eosition between great powers, to be a .?,wischenmacht - though Clausewitz may not have used this term. Politically, it had to be :teliable and of a friendly disposition towards its neighbours, at least towards Prussia and Germany. And strategically, it had to be able to afford some protection to its great-power neighbours, which meant that it had to be strong enough to defend itself- a subject that he had already touched on in his earlier and now more famous writings. 2 6 Altogether, his notion was a rather self-interested one, reflecting the concerns of the great-power neighbour of the would­ be middle power. Clausewitz's contribution to thinking about middle powers borders on, though it is not part of, the theory of buffer states. This was a feature also of the rather different set of ideas advanced by a prominent spokesman for certain lesser powers. Hans Christoph von Gagern had represented the Netherlands and Luxemburg at the Congress of Vienna, where he had taken an initiative on behalf of the minor German states and had protested loudly against great­ power domination of the negotiations. Later, in the Bundestag, he had become an outspoken champion of constitutionalism, so much that Metternich eventually had prevailed on the King of the Netherlands to have him removed from office. In retirement Gagern took it upon himself to champion what he considered to be on

24

Middle Powers in International Politics

the rights of Spain and the Netherlands in European politics. In an essay on the Great Alliance of the post-war years, published when the congress system was already breaking down, he discussed the position of those two states. The attitude that the dominant powers in the Committee of Eight had adopted to Spain had been disgraceful, he thought. This state had been treated with the greatest indifference and had been allowed practically no part in the negotiations; and, even so, the protests voiced by its representa­ tive at Vienna had been found not worthy of an answer. Yet, on historical, geographical, numerical and political as well as on moral grounds, that country, or rather its king, Ferdinand VII, had deserved a principal position in the Great Alliance. Much the same was true of the Netherlands and the House of Orange, he thought. The greatness of its history, its long maritime tradition and its contributions to international law and European politics entitled it to a place among the leading powers. 2 7 Gagern's argument was not only that Spain and the Netherlands had a right to be treated as members of the first class of powers, but also that they possessed certain qualities that enabled them to play a particularly useful role within the Great Alliance. By exercising a beneficial influence on the five dominant powers, they could help to maintain peace and order in Europe: Es ist nicht zu vergessen, jene fiinf Miichte sind allesamt essentiell­ kriegerisch, - stark, - also voll Selbstvertrauen und voll <:,uversicht. Der politische Scepticism einer sechsten oder siebenten Macht, die ihnen allen bifreundet ist, wird zur Erhaltung eben des Friedens, eben der Ordnung wesentlich beitragen. 2 8

More than twenty years later, in the fifth volume of an account of his life in politics, Gagern looked back on the history of the Great Alliance, and took up again the subject of secondary powers and their role in the states system. Now his concern was the division of the Netherlands after the Belgian revolt. This event, he argued, had certainly not been good for the general state of Europe. The Netherlands, as established by the Congress of Vienna, had been intended as a barrier against French expansion. It had been the best possible protection for Prussia, which already had been weakened through the mutilation ofPoland and Saxony. Now the dismember­ ment of the Netherlands as well had shaken the Great Alliance, so violently that the bonds holding it together had loosened, with the

The History of the Idea

25

result that jealousy and suspicion had come to dominate relations within it: Das bessere System des Gleichgewichts, das nur Thoren und Unwissende leugnen oder gering zu schiitzen scheinen, iichte Staatsmiinner aber immer im Auge behalten, hat also dadurch keineswegs gewonnen. Der alte Begrif.f der Barrieren ist damit gleichsam verschwunden. Der Niederlande Missstimmung,finanzielle Unordnung und Beschriinkung, die schiidliche Riickwirkung auf das Numerische des Heeres sind davon unmittelbare, unzweideutige Folgen. 2 9

In the system of the balance of power, the function of secondary states such as the Netherlands, in his view, was to provide barriers against territorial encroachments by stronger powers. To do that effectively, these states had to be of a certain size and strength. As had been the case with Clausewitz, the type of separating state with which Gagern was concerned was not a small, passive buffer state but a middle-sized power able to play an active part in the balance of power. In his earlier writings, it may be observed, Gagern argued the case for a widening of the circle of principal powers rather than for the recognition of an intermediate class of states. If he had had his way, the notion of great power, which he had challenged already at the Congress ofVienna, 3 0 where it had received formal expression, would presumably either have been abandoned altogether or have been given a content less associated with military force than with those other qualities which would have allowed Spain and the Netherlands to participate in the councils of Europe. Conversely, the notion of middle or secondary powers - terms that he was not in the habit of using - did not particularly interest him. But, though his immediate aim was to break down the distinction between the five great powers and those immediately below them, he did seem to recognise that Spain and the Netherlands would have fallen into a category of their own if they had been allowed to join the principal powers. They would have been different from the five others both in nature and in role, he implied. By basing his case on historical and moral grounds rather than on the military and political power of the two countries, as well as by suggesting that their political attitudes would have been different from that of the five more martial powers, he acknowledged by implication the obvious military inferiority of his candidates. And by stressing the potential influence of these

26

Middle Powers in International Politics

states in relation to the task of safeguarding peace and order, he indicated a special role for them in European politics. Thus, through his advocacy of great powers manquies, as well as through his later defence ofbarrier states, Gagem did contribute to the small stock of nineteenth-century ideas about middle powers. Gagern's thoughts on the great and the not-so-great powers of the restoration period may be compared with the ideas of Johann Gustav Droysen, the founder of the Prussian school of historians. Like Gagern, Droysen disliked the oligarchic system of I B 1 5 and showed a certain amount of interest in the fortunes of some secondary states. In the course of a passionate attack on the Pentarchy, written in 1 849, he observed that the European system introduced by the Congress of Vienna was rapidly breaking down. Among the reasons for this he detected changes in the power relationships of the great powers, particularly in the ratios between Prussia and its neighbours, and a rise in the influence of certain secondary powers:

Denn sclwn . . . ist die Stellung der minderen Staaten eine ungemein andere, als sie es nach der pentarchistischen Theorie sein sollte; schon beginnt Spanien die schwer ertrot;:;ten eigenen Bahnen mit Entschiedenheit ;:;u veifolgen, Schwedens Politik beginnt sich wie nach langem Schlafe wieder ;:;u regen; der gesundeste Staat des Continents, Belgien, beginnt den positiven Ausdruck fiir das ;:;u suchen, was ihm einst in der Form einer ewigen Neutralitiit Seitens der London Conferen;:; ;:;ugewiesen ist. Oberall das Bediiifniss, aus der oligarchischen Gebundenheit, die die lebensvolle Entwickelung der ein;:;elnen Staaten hemmte, hinaus;:;utreten und ein System der Freiheit und Gerechtigheit statt dessen der Willkiihr und Gewalt ;:;u gewinnen. Nur durch die Neugestaltung Deutschlands ist es ;:;u gewinnen. 3 1 However, noting a rise in the influence of these powers - for which he occasionally used the term 'second-rank' or 'middle' ( mitt/ere) states 3 2 - did not lead Droysen to speculate about their present or future role in the states system. To have done so would have run counter to the whole trend of his thinking about European politics. It would have implied acceptance of a hierarchy of powers in which the five great powers of I B 1 5 retained their dominant position, when his concern was to do away not only with the entire oligarchic system but also with the very idea of the great power. 3 3 Being at least as strongly opposed to this idea as Gagern was and far less

The History of the Idea

27

committed to the interests of particular secondary states, Droysen had even less to say about middle powers. 1 .3

GERMAN CONFEDERATION

we have seen, in European political wntmgs the age of restoration was not rich in ideas about middle powers. Generally speaking, neither those writers who supported the great-power system introduced at Vienna nor those who opposed it had much to JaY about the secondary powers in Europe. In German political writings, however, the same age produced a fair amount of speculation about middle states and their role, and gave rise to at least one substantial contribution to the history of ideas about �ddle powers. The most obvious explanation of this difference is (hat in Europe there were no established and recognised middle powers in this period, whereas in Germany there were. •.. Contrary to the Committee of Eight, the German Committee of Five, which the Congress of Vienna had set up to arrange the affairs �Germany, ddiberately recognised a class of middle states. It did not create such a class. In the constitutional history of Germany there was a long tradition of grading states. Since the end of the fifteenth century the Reichstag of the Holy Roman Empire had met ·� three estates, namely the electors, the princes and prelates, and �e free cities. This arrangement, which had expressed the power -'tructure within the Empire, had been for centuries a subject of German constitutional writings, as a result of which the idea of 'grades of power can be traced in works of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 3 4 The originally medieval structure of Germany had lingered on until the Empire finally collapsed in the French Revolutionary and �apoleonic Wars. The failure of the counter-revolutionary inter­ vention launched by the Emperor and the King of Prussia in 1 792 eventually led to a reorganisation ofGermany by Napoleon, the first stage of which was completed by 1 803. While the number of states was reduced from three hundred to thirty, the large ones were aggrandised and their princes turned into agents ofNapoleon. After another war with the Emperor, Napoleon took one step further in the subordination ofGermany by decreeing the end of the Empire in 1 806 and proceeding to establish the Confederation of the Rhine under his own presidency. Promoting the leading German princes As

28

Middle Powers in International Politics

to kings and giving each state a formal constitution, he imposed a common political and social order on all of Germany outside Prussia and Austria. The result of these arrangements was a separation of Austria and Prussia from the rest of Germany and, within the latter, a fairly clear division between the larger states, which came to be known as 'middle states', and all the others. The middle states survived the defeat of Napoleon, and the three most important - Bavaria, Wiirttemberg and Hanover -joined the German Committee at Vienna together with Austria and Prussia. Baden was excluded, at which it was deeply offended . The three middle states took a rather more active part in the activities of the German Committee than the three lesser members of the Committee of Eight did in the arrangement of European affairs. Generally they opposed Prussia, whose representatives wanted a constitution for all of Germany, and supported Austria, who� influential chancellor was against projects that might encourage a national or liberal movement in Germany. Especially Bavaria and Wiirttemberg in the south, supported by Baden, were against any tendencies that might endanger their territory or royal power. But Hanover in the north, exposed to the danger of Prussian domi­ nation, leaned towards Austria too, at least in more important issues. Yet, the middle states often took a rather more independent line in the negotiations than Metternich would have liked . The influence of the middle states may be seen in the shape of the Confederation, the final result of the work of the German Committee. This association consisted of thirty-five monarchical states and four city republics. Its chief organ was the Federal Diet at Frankfurt, the Select Council of which carried out the regular business of the Confederation. On this Council the eleven larger states had one vote each. The twenty-eight smaller states were divided into seven 'curias', each of which had one vote. The eleven were: Austria and Prussia, which as great powers of both the German and the European system enjoyed a special position within the Confederation; Hanover, Holstein and Luxemburg, whose sovereigns were the kings of England, Denmark and the Netherlands; and Bavaria, Saxony, Wiirttemberg, Baden, Electoral Hesse and Grand-Ducal Hesse. Broadly, it was the last group that came to be known as the middle states. But the term was applied more particularly to those of them that became most prominent in German politics, namely Bavaria, Wiirttemberg and Baden, the three south-German states. a 5

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The Federal Diet started its work in 1 8 1 6. For fifty years, until the linal winding-up of the Confederation in 1 866, the middle states retained their status and played parts in German politics. In the ararious issues of the day they sometimes leaned towards one of the two great powers, while at other times they took independent positions. In the latter situations, they generally stood separately from each other, but occasionally they tried to co-operate. 3 6 Yet, though they survived and took identifiable positions in the affairs of rhe day, they never had a great deal of influence on the course of events. In the system dominated by Austria and Prussia, the middle .tates were always too weak to play a major part. It is significant that those politicians and writers who speculated about the role that � German middle power might assume in the states system rarely �m to have focused on the potentials of particular middle states. ore often they were inspired by the idea of an association of all the er German states, a confederation within the Confederation, ... hich they thought might become a third German power - perhaps �en a new European power. y The champions of this idea sometimes used the term 'middle Pow-er' to describe their projection . But this was not a new term in German political writings. Others had used it before them, but in a i'ather different sense. Thus, some of those writers who, inspired by ,..e ideas that were emerging in Germany after the French Jtevolution and the Napoleonic invasions, had held up the ideal of Ge rman unity had used 'middle power' to mean central power. As early as 1 802 the poet Johann Gottfried Herder, a forerunner of !German nationalism, had employed the term in this sense:

,.. �

[One] would wish the Prussian crown all the more happiness and glory, since . . . the state of affairs has changed so much . Russia has risen to a might which one did not . . . anticipate; Sweden is impoverished; Poland has disappeared . The western and southern parts of Europe, how they, too, have changed ! Should we then not thank Providence that . . . [Prussia] . . . now united with Austria . . . should become a part of that great Central Power [Mittelmacht] which must help protect the continent of all German peoples as well as the northern kingdoms, from subj ug­ ation by foreign nations? 3 7 Here Mittelmacht referred to a power that was stituated in the middle, geographically, not to a state that occupied an intermediate

30

Middle Powers in International Politics

posi tion in the power hierarchy of the states system . I ndeed , what the men who entertained this type of notion had in mind was a German power so strong that it would be able to hold its own between Russia in the east and France in the west. Freiherr vom Stein, Friedrich List, Freiherr von Bruck, Konstantin Frantz and the other statesmen and writers who supported the grossdeutsch movement, as it came to be called, wanted to unite all the German lands in order to make the geographical centre of Europe also its political centre. Since the idea of a secondary power was very far from their minds when they thought about the future of Mitteleuropa, their particular use of the term 'middle power' will not be further considered here. The type of idea with which we are concerned seems to have been particularly prevalent in Wiirttemberg, whose king apparently hoped to secure a top position within the proj ected third German power. His representative in the Federal Diet from 1 8 1 7 till 1 823, Karl August von Wangenheim, became a prominent spokesman for what came to be known as Triaspolitik. The central idea of this programme was to bring together in a new confederation all those states which were only German and not also European, the 'true Germany' , and to rearrange the German Confederation so as to give the projected confederation a position in German affairs more or less eq ual to that enjoyed by the two established powers, Austria and Prussia. This plan clearly involved a strengthening of the role of the lesser states and a weakening of the influence of Austria and Prussia within Germany. But it is not certain that Wangenheim believed that the third German power could become a great power, or even that he wanted this . A point which he made in a note to Metternich in 1 8 1 8 suggests that he may have understood and accepted that his new power would be inferior in strength to the two existing ones. Assuring the Chancellor that there would be no danger of the lesser powers uniting against both of the great powers, he pointed out that the combined forces of all the lesser states would never eq ual the force of even one of the great powers. 3 8 No doubt this assurance was given for diplomatic reasons; but there was enough truth in his observation to allow us to see his ideas as part of thinking abou t middle powers. However, this was not a term Wangenheim was in the habit of using; 3 9 and his writings do not amount to a significant contribution to the theory of middle powers . Abou t the various possible roles the new power might play in German or European politics he did not

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say a great deal . Though he occasionally suggested that i t might mediate between Austria and Prussia or hold the balance in Germany, he seems to have conceived of the planned confederation .mainly as a defensive arrangement against political domination by the two German great powers. A rather clearer picture of the character and role of the projected third German power emerged from the writings of another, but a less official, advocate of the ideas behind the policies of the .government of Wiirttemberg in the early years of the Confederation. Friedrich Ludwig Lindner was an editor and writer of liberal political views who in Stuttgart had established a close friendship with the King of Wiirttemberg. His Manuscript aus Sud­ Deutschland, which caused a stir in Germany when it appeared under a pseudonym in London in 1 820, is the foremost exposition of �e reindeutsche idea. It is a passionate attack on the German settlement of 1 8 1 5 . The joint hegemony of Austria and Prussia amounted to a tutelage of the rest of Germany, Lindner complained, and created a most un­ satisfactory situation for the middle and small states of the 'Confederation. They had little influence on German affairs, and had nobody to take care of their interests in European politics. Since the negotiations at Vienna, a practice had developed of discussing and settling matters directly related to the interests of Germany, by which he meant the 'true' Germany, without hearing German views other than those of Austria and Prussia. The negotiations of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1 8 1 8 afforded a glaring, but in his view not isolated, example of this. The two German great powers, with their separate interests and special goals, were not well suited to represent the rest of Germany. The true Germany needed strength and independence to protect its interests, against Austria and Prussia as well as against the rest of Europe. Consequently, he urged the middle and small states to join forces and set up a third German power. 4 0 This they should do not only for their own sake. Europe, too, needed a new German power, Lindner argued. The European balance of power, which had been overturned by Napoleon, had not yet been restored. Until this could be done, not even the peaceable disposition of the present rulers would ensure lasting peace. Europe, composed of states, was like a body made up of organs. As a body might perish if one of the organs were removed, so the states system could collapse if it lacked the right sort of members.

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Middle Powers in International Politics

To survive and prosper, Europe needed a certain number of states of particular sizes. The fewer the number, he generalised , the greater the danger threatening the system and the less the security of the individual states. On the other hand , too large a number of small states was liable to cause confusion and constant friction . Also, small states were too weak to solve the problems of civilisation . Great goals, this contemporary of Hegel pointed out, demanded great strength . The most useful states were the middle powers. They were the guardians of the balance of power, who guaranteed the peace of Europe and the security of other powers :

Liegen sie zwischen den grossen Staaten, so sind sie urn so aujmerksamere und niitz;lichere Wachter. Darum aher diirfen sie auch nicht zu klein seyn; sie kiinnten sonst vom Feinde iiherschwemmt, und von ihm gez;wungen werden, ihre Kriifte mit den seinen z;u verbinden. Die ,Zwischenmiichte miissen im Notlifall durch eigene Starke einen feindlichen Angrijj zuriick treihen kiinnen. Poland had been such a barrier but existed no more. The gap left by its elimination could be filled only by Germany. 4 1 Each of the great powers stood to gain from the creation of a German middle power:

Die Riesenmiichte kiinnen hey jedem ungerechten Angrijj, der sie bedroht, zuverliissig aufHiilje von Seiten der mittleren Miichte rechnen, indem diese ihr Schicksal voraussehen miissen,jalls der grossere Staat zu Grunde geht. Dann kiinnte sich Ieicht eine Macht z;ur alleinherrschenden erheben. Austria would be protected both against a Russian attempt at expansion and against an attack from France. Prussia would enjoy the same benefits. While Russia would be guarded against a French invasion , France would be guaranteed against Russia. And England surely would wish to have a middle power in Europe which would be able to command the respect of Russia, France, Austria and Prussia and be strong enough to prevent a partition of the Polish type . By taking the place that Poland once had occupied in the states system, such a German power would keep the great powers away from each other and th us guarantee the peace of Europe. 4 2 In arguing for the establishment of a third German power, Lindner outlined a theory of middle powers . Whatever his ultimate hopes for the true Germany may have been , the power he proj ected

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in this tract was secondary i n strength to the great powers, though

strong enough to defend itself if attacked by one of them . The role he assi gned to it in the system of the balance of power was different from that of the great powers as well as from that of mos t small states. Middle powers, he generalised, had a special interest in maintaining the balance of power. More than other powers, they could be relied on to act as balancers, to support any great power that was exposed to attack from another. If they happened to be not middle powers but also 'in-between powers ' , they performed an additional function in the system . Not easily overrun by their neighbours, they separated great-power rivals both geographically and strategically . Like most other wri ters, before as well as after him, with something of substance to say on the subj ect, Lindner drew a rather flattering picture of the international conduct of middle powers. ; Neither those writers who campaigned for the promotion of Spain, the Netherlands and other minor European powers nor those writers who championed the idea of a new German power were successful. The position and influence of the minor powers in Europe and the middle states in the Confederation did not improve in the course of the century . The European secondary powers of 1 8 15 were small states by 1 9 1 4. The German middle states, as long as they lasted, never agreed to unite among themselves and rarely managed even to concert their policies . As the hopes of moving to a higher level and playing more prominent parts dimmed for the lesse r powers and the middle states, they gradually ceased to be focus for speculation about the nature and role of middle powers.

only

1 .4.

F R O M T H E CRIMEAN WAR T O THE F I RST WORLD WAR

I n the second half of the nineteenth century there were two states that in some respects occupied an intermediate position in the European hierarchy of powers. One was the Ottoman Empire, which the great powers at the Paris Congress after the Crimean War formally admi tted to the Concert of Europe but which they afterwards rarely treated as an equal . The other was united I taly, which at the London Conference of 1 867 on the Luxemburg question gained admission for the first time to the meetings of the principal powers but which for long remained a great power by

34

Middle Powers in International Politics

name only . The factual situation of these states in relation to both the great powers and the small states was such that it might conceivably have given rise to some ideas about middle powers and their role in the European system. The Ottoman Empire was in a uniq ue position in European politics . In the firs t place, it was not really part of the international society of Europe . Geographically marginal, culturally alien and historically hostile, it was still a frontier country . Second , though i t was a member o ft h e states system in t h e sense that it in teracted wi th European powers and filled some role in the balance of power, its status in the system was uncertain . On the one hand , its large population of various races, nationalities and religions, its vast territories in Europe as well as Asia, and its strategic importance to several great powers, clearly marked it ofT from the minor powers and small states of the system . On the other hand, its mili tary weakness, inefficient administration and long record of economic decline had long since taken it out of the rank of great powers . This combination of qualities placed the Empire in a particularly exposed position in relation to Europe . Like Poland in the eighteenth century, the O ttoman Empire was a candidate for partitioning. I t commanded a territory large and attractive enough to arouse the greed and inspire the rivalry of the great powers, and did not have the strength to defend itself effectively against encroachments by them . But the attitude of the great powers to the Ottoman Empire was differen t from that of the powers to Poland in the earlier period . While the three eastern great powers had agreed to take shares of Poland , the great powers with an interest in the Ottoman Empire were unable to reach agreement on such a course. I n order to avoid isolated intervention by one great power, which might upset the balance of power in the region , they tentatively agreed instead t o maintain the territorial integrity of the Empire. By curbing separate action and encouraging joint measures the great powers largely succeeded in restraining each other in the rivalry for influence in Constantinople. But the mixture of rivalry and co-operation which characterised their handling of the Eastern Question gave relations with the Ottoman Empire a very ambiguous quality. As ' the sick man of Europe' who had to be kept alive, the Empire was subjected to continual interference . To reform its administra­ tion and improve the conditions of its subj ects, the great powers , or some of them, repeatedly employed diplomatic pressure , sometimes

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bac king it with threats of intervention and coercion. I n one way, this treatment, by curtailing the independence of the Empire, reduced it to a level below that of many lesser powers, which the great powers most of the time left in peace . On the other hand , the continuous preoccupation of the powers with the Eastern Question gave the Empire a degree of diplomatic prominence and political importance not enjoyed by other non-great powers. The re­ sourcefulness it displayed in its dealings with the Concert of Europe and, especially, its abili ty to take advantage of the disagreements and rivalries of the great powers, enhanced its international significance, sometimes to the point where it could meet the great powers almost on terms of equality. It was this dual role of ward and equal of the great powers, of object and subject in European politics, that found expression in the Treaty of Paris of 1 856, which admitted the Sublime Porte 'aux tZVantages du droit public et du concert europlen' . Thus, in form, co-opted .into the Concert of Europe, the Empire was in fact placed under the joint supervision of the great powers . That the practice of excluding ,the Sultan or his representatives from international conferences, ·even from those that were arranged specifically to deal with the Eastern Question, continued after 1 856 shows that the Ottoman Empire was not really accepted as a great power. If, in fact, the place of the Ottoman Empire in the European system was a little below that of the great powers but well above that of the small states, this position does not seem to have led anyone to describe the Empire as a middle power. Nor, apparently, did it inspire much thinking about the international role of such powers . Writers who were interested in the status of the Ottoman Empire, most of them international lawyers, stressed the fact of its depen­ dence on the Concert of Europe against the form of its membership of this body . Thomas Erskine Holland, a leading British authority on the legal aspects of the Eastern Question, took a particularly low view of the status of the Ottoman Empire . Pointing to the paramount position which the European Concert had made for itself in Turkey, he described the Empire as 'something like a semi­ sovereign State under the tutelage of Europe' . 4 3 John Westlake, writing some 'years before the First World War, called Turkey's position in Europe 'ambiguous' . If, in an issue with that country, the six great powers were agreed among themselves, they treated it not as a great power but as a state upon which their will was to be enforced . But when Turkey was able to negotiate an agreement

36

Middle Powers in International Politics

with the six and participate in its execution , it ranked as a seventh great power. 4 4 Westlake did not see the Ottoman Empire as occupying an intermediate posi tion but rather as oscillating between one extreme and the other. Nor did the case of I taly give rise to much speculation about middle powers . After unification, this country, with i ts sizable territory and large population, rose rapidly above the rank of small states , to which its constituent members for long had belonged . Recognising its poten tialities, the great powers soon drew it into European politics at the highest level. Those who expected to benefit from its support-first Britain and later Germany-patronised the new state and facilitated its participation in European con­ ferences . The London Conference of 1 86 7 may be seen as marking I taly's en try into the Concert of Europe. Over the next half century it took part in various important meetings of the powers, including the Congress of Berlin. Even more important, from 1 882, when it joined Austria and Germany in the Triple Alliance, till l 9 1 5 , when it went to war on the side of the Entente powers, it played a not insignificant role in the system of alliances that took shape in Bismarck's times and collapsed in the First World War. Mainly for the convenience of the great powers, united I taly, it might be said, was deemed a principal power. But I taly, very much the marginal member of the Concert of Europe, was never convincing in the role of great power. I ts economic backwardness, financial confusion, in ternal conflicts of various sorts and mili tary and naval weakness severely limited the influence it could bring to bear in international politics . According to relative power at its disposal , I taly was not j ust inferior to the established great powers but rather in a different category altogether. Like the Ottoman Empire, it could be regarded as an intermediate-class power in fact. But while that power played i ts role mainly outside, and often in opposi tion to , the Concert of Europe , I taly was an insider. This circumstance made I taly an unlikely obj ect of speculation about middle powers . Both international lawyers and political writers of the late nineteenth century tended to include it in the first category of powers . Johann Caspar Bluntschli, a Swiss who identified with the German national movement and became one of the foremost international lawyers of Bismarck's Germany, is an example. Writing in 1 8 78, he listed the sovereign states of Europe. There were first the six great powers : the German Empire , France,

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Great Britain, I taly, Austria-Hungary and Russia. The remaining states he divided into seven west European and four east European (including Turkey ) , adding to the last group the semi-sovereign state, Bulgaria. The very small and powerless states he excluded . 4 5 Though he recognised the possibility of states moving from one class to the other, Bluntschli had no intermediate category of powers but distinguished only between the great powers and the rest. 4 6 Heinrich von Treitschke, too, was inclined to count I taly a great power. I n a series oflectures on politics which he delivered regularly at the University of Berlin in his later years, he discussed the European states system and noted its increasingly aristocratic character. The Pentarchy, which I taly was about to join as a sixth great power, was consolidating its preponderance in European affairs . States of the second and third ranks were finding themselves, as a rule, excluded from all important business. 4 7 Though Treitschke distinguished three classes of states, he obviously thought the division between the great powers and the second-rank states the only one of political importance. The impotence of all lesser states left no special role for those of second rank. Paradoxically, it may be concluded, two dubious or marginal great powers which became the only plausible middle powers of the late nineteenth century inspired less thought abou t the nature and role of such powers than did certain states earlier in the century which never had any possibility of establishing themselves in intermediate positions. By elevating the two powers, the Congress of Paris and the Conference of London provoked less speculation about middle powers than the Congress of Vienna did by reducing the secondary powers in Europe and curtailing the lesser states in Germany . Nor did certain subseq uent writings on matters of international law and European poli tics of some relevance to our topic produce a great many observations and generalisations of the sort that would interest us here. One major debate, which went on during much of the century of the European Concert and reached a high point with the Hague Conferences of 1 899 and 1 90 7 , was between those who upheld the old principle of the legal equality of all sovereign states and those who, in recognition of the fact of political inequality among powers, qualified or set aside this principle. Especially in the works of the latter writers one might hope to come across ideas about middle powers . But there is only little to be found here, it seems . Thinking about the lesser powers rarely went beyond classification.

38

Middle Powers in International Politics

Establishing criteria for classifying states, however, sometimes brought such wri ters up against problems very similar to those encountered in much more recent writings about middle powers . James Lorimer, professor of the Law of Nature and of Nations at Edinburgh, provides a good example. The Institutes of the Law of.Nations, which he published in 1 883 and 1 884, has a chapter on the means of ascertaining the relative value of states. With the aim of preparing the way for a formal organisation of in ternational society, which would involve a ranking of all states, Lorimer set out criteria for estimating their international value. Four factors, he thought, should be taken into account: first, the extent or size of the state, or the quantity of materials of which it is composed ; second , the content or quality of the state, or of its materials; third , the form of the state, or the manner in which its materials are combined ; and fourth, the government of the state, or the manner in which its forces are brought into action . Discussing the first two criteria, he pointed to a now familiar difficulty, that of combining quantity and quality in the estimation of the magnitude of states. To combine the elements of area and population in an index of mere physical size was relatively easy. To find a way of measuring material wealth and intellectual and moral resources for the purpose of estimating quality might not be impossible either. But as sources of power the two were inseparable. Using a number of examples to illustrate this point, he explored the difficulty, but did not find a way of overcoming it. His discussion of the last two criteria shows him attaching rather more importance to the composition of states and the form of government than has been customary in more recent efforts to rank powers. 4 8 Lorimer did not himself attempt to apply his criteria and rank the states of the world . Recognising the great practical difficulties of making stateS accept voluntarily any relative positions assigned to them , and the even greater difficulties of imposing such positions on them, he left the actual ranking, as well as subsequent revisions of the order, to the chief organ of his proj ected international organisation, in effect to the six great powers . 4 9 Nor did he try to anticipate the work of the future international organisation by assigning special roles to particular ranks of powers . His contribution to thinking about secondary powers consisted entirely in presenting criteria for ranking states according to power. But these criteria he developed

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more carefully and examined tnore closely than earlier writers had done. The concept of middle power did not attract his attention . I n his own work, h e distinguished only between great powers and small, or minor, states. In a system in which there are no recognised middle powers but only great powers and small states, such as that of Europe in the mid­ nineteenth century, two developments might give rise to the establishment of an intermediate category of powers . One is what sociologists would call upward mobility, of which the admission of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of united I taly are the closest relevant examples . The other is downward mobility from the class of : great powers . Of this the second half of the nineteenth century has no obvious example; but the experience of the German Empire in the · last decades before the First World War led some observers to detect such a tendency in the states system . The Congress of Berlin, which had made Bismarck boast that he now drove Europe four-in-hand from the box, had marked Germany's zenith within the Europ ean Concert. Twenty or thirty years later, in the age of imperialism, Germany was still in a strong position in Continental politics but was finding itself at a disadvantage in the increasingly important world politics. While some of the great powers were establishing them­ selves as world powers, Germany was left behind in the race for colonies . Many German writers, worried about signs of a hierarchy developing among the great powers, began to fear that Germany migh t end up as a secondary power. One of them was Treitschke. The following passage, which followed some comments on the declining influence of lesser powers in the age of the European Pen tarchy, expressed his premonitions about Germany 's future among the great powers :

Die ganze Entwicklung umerer Staatengesellschajt geht also unverkennbar darauf aus die Staaten zweiten Ranges zuriickzudriingen. Und da eriiffnen sich, wenn wir die nichteuropiiische Welt mit in Betracht ziehen, unendlich ermte Aussichten auchfiir um. Bei der Vertheilung dieser nichteuropiiischen Welt unter die europiiischen Miichte ist Deutschland bisher immer zu kurz gekommen, und es handelt sich doch urn umer Dasein als Grossstaat bei der Frage, ob wir auch jemeits der Meere eine Macht werden kiinnen. Sonst erifffnet sich die griissliche Aussicht, dass England und Russ/and sich in die Welt theilen; und da weiss man wirklich nicht, was umittlicher und entsetz/icher wiire, die russische Knute oder der englische Geldbeutel. s o

40

Middle Powers in International Politics

After 1 900 not only the historians at Berlin but also more popular writers became preoccupied with the class divisions that seemed to them to be developing within the group of great powers . A prominent case was that of Paul Rohrbach , who in the dozen years preceding 1 9 1 4 published a stream of passionately imperialistic writings. In Deutschland unter den Weltviilkern, of which the first edi tion appeared in 1 903 and an expanded version in 1 908, he observed that the old system in which six great powers had maintained a balance of power in Europe and which had reached its highest point with the Congress of Berlin, was changing character radically. Two of the states, Britain and Russia, were developing into world powers; and an outside power, the United States of America, was in the process of j oining them . I taly and Austria-Hungary had been left behind as purely European powers; and Germany and France were in positions in between . The question that exercised him was whether Germany could find a place alongside Britain, America and Russia, the powers that would make the world history of the twentieth century - 'oder ob wir uns damit bescheiden miissen, im Konzert der

Weltpolitik auf einen Platz zweiter Klasse zuriickzutreten' . 5 1 The mixture of patriotic fear and national ambition which motivated imperialists such as Rohrbach did not lead them to take up l !nes of thought of the type with which we are here concerned . The powers of Rohrbach's 'zweiter Klasse' were not middle powers but secondary great powers; and the possible role of such secondary powers in the future international system was not a subj ect that could stir his interest. As· was the case with most of that generation of German political writers, his concern was to make sure that his own country would not be left behind in the rivalry of the principal powers, not at all to promote a new class of powers - whether of Germany and France between the three world powers and the two purely European powers , or of Germany, France, Austria and I taly between the world powers and the small powers. Although the perceived tendencies towards downward mobility in the decades before the First World War, like the actual cases of upward mobility in the decades after the Crimean War, may be seen as signs of a development away from the sharp division between great powers and small states which had prevailed in the earlier part of the century, they too led neither to the establishment of an intermediate class of powers nor to the formulation of significant ideas about middle powers and their role in international politics . On the whole, it must be concluded , there was not much thinking

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41

about middle powers i n nineteenth-century Europe. The simple reason for this was that such powers either did not exist or were not recognised as existing in that period of European history. If the three lesser members of the Committee of Eight had secured intermediate status in the post- 1 8 1 5 system , if the Netherlands or another minor power had risen above its station, if the ' third Germany' had become a political reality, if the Ottoman Empire had entered European society in a less ambiguous way, or if I taly had stayed outside the Concert of Europe, the states system might have presented real cases of middle powers round which ideas on the subj ect could have developed . As it was, there were only small states, of various sizes, and great powers, some of them greater than others. The large majority of the writers who were interested in the states system and international politics naturally focused on the latter, some of them presenting the great powers as the pillars of order and peace in Europe and others holding them up as sources of inj ustice and suffering for small states and suppressed nations. But in the earlier part of the century a few ideas on the subj ect of middle powers did appear. Those of them that went beyond mere classification of states, or the establishment of criteria for such classification, were generally directed against the system of great­ power domination, whether in Europe or in Germany. They were ess e ntially projections of ambitions held on behalf of particular lesser states, ei ther European secondary powers or German middle states, and often took the form of arguments for the establishment of one or more middle powers. Since they were motivated by a desire to see these lesser states assume a more influential role in international politics, it is not surprising that they presented the prospective middle powers as capable of performing particularly useful services in the states system . Middle powers were recommended as defenders of the balance of power and providers of peace and order. They would be friendly and peaceable, modest and responsible members of international society, it was suggested . As in both earlier and later writings on the subj ect, there was a marked tendency to invest such powers with a degree of moral superiority. If ambition to see particular states play more important roles led to the formulation of a number of ideas abou t middle powers, excessive ambition of this type also provided an obstacle to more serious thought about the nature and role of such powers . Some of the promoters of secondary powers were not too determined to stop upward mobility at the intermediate level, sometimes failing to

42

Middle Powers in International Politics

make it clear whether they were thinking about a middle power or about a new great power. Gagem, for example, aimed at having the two states whose interests he had at heart accepted as members of the European Concert; and some of the sponsors of the ' true Germany' wanted the third partner in the proj ected tripartite arrangement of Germany to assume a position equal to that of the two existing great powers. This tendency to blur the distinction between great powers and those immediately below them made it more difficult to note behavioural qualities peculiar to middle powers and to discern international roles which might be special to them . This could be one reason why most of the thinking on the subj ect that did take place in the nineteenth century was neither rigorous nor very profound .

Looking back at European political writings of the past centuries, one sees a few relatively substantial sets of ideas - those of Botero, Mably and Lindner - and a larger number of isolated observations, implied notions and tentative generalisations on the subj ect of middle powers. Continuity of thought, with development of ideas from generation to generation , is not a marked feature. Few writers referred to earlier work on this class of powers or even showed that they were aware of the existence of such work . Nor is there a great deal of logical coherence among the various contributions. While the few fairly developed sets of ideas were the products of quite different periods of European history, the more numerous scattered thoughts reflected a considerable variety of political concerns and national interests. In both origin and content, the individual contributions are too different to be pieced together and developed into a general theory of the nature and role of middle powers. But the writings presented here do offer a number of interesting distinctions and suggestive insights which may serve as starting­ points for a modem enq uiry into middle powers and their role. Throughout the literature reviewed , middle power, or i ts synonyms, has been a relational concept, in the sense that it has been defined or described with reference to other classes of the states system, especially that of the principal powers . While some writers have applied political tests for distinguishing middle powers, others have suggested statistical criteria for the ranking of states. The former include those who have recognised middle powers on the basis of

The History rif the Idea

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'aeneral ability to perform at a certain level in European politics as well as those who have linked them to a particular role in the states

�tern . While Botero characterised a middle power as one that had

$uBicient force and authority to maintain i tself without help from pthers, Mably distinguished between upper secondary powers Wh ich were almost able to play the role of dominant powers and secondary ones which had less in common with those powers . ·Clausewitz, o n the other hand , thought that a state would q ualify as a middle power only if it was able to fill the part of a barrier state. While both Botero and Mably defined their category in terms so brpad as almost to slur the difference between great powers and dle powers, Clausewitz pinned his middle powers down to a cific function in the mechanics of the political system of Europe. statistical approach is exemplified by Politz, in whose ranking of opean states two intermediate classes are delimited on the basis : . population figures . Though this particular criterion would be inadequate as sole indicator of the relative power of nations in ,)be contemporary world, his use of measurable material for an ective classification points in the right direction . For our rposes, too, it will be necessary to classify states according to the e they actually command rather than with reference to the U1ternational performance or the political role they seem to carry

.Jower

Mid

. :�e ;� �

!�uite

�j pu pow r put.

The mostly rather flattering observations on the conduct and the

¥ene·rally favourable conclusions about the role of middle powers in

Ulternational politics, which form so striking a feature of the whole literature on the subj ect, raise questions that seem worth pursuing in a modem con text. Have secondary powers on the whole exercised a moderating and pacifying influence on relations between principal powers, as Mably explained was the case, or have they rather helped to intensify and maintain rivalry at this level of international politics? Have they been reliable guardians of the balance of power, as German and other Con tinental writers of the restoration period maintained , or have they often pursued their own interests regard­ less of the rules of the balance of power? Have they shown themselves more concerned about international order, security and peace than most members of the society of states, as the champions of both existing and projected middle powers were in the habit of insisting, or have they in many si tuations presented a challenge to the great powers of the system and a threat to the small states in their vicinity?

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Middle Powers in International Politics

With such questions in mind, we may set out to examine the actual conduct and role of middle powers in various typical situations of different sorts of states systems . But first the history of the idea must be brought up to date, and the concept of middle power be defined in contemporary terms.

2 The League of Nations and the United Nations After the First World War the ranking o f states again became a subject of diplomatic discussion, but this time on a much wider geographical scale than after the Napoleonic Wars. While the Congress of Vienna had attempted to classify the states of Europe and the German Committee had succeeded in ranking the states of Germany, the representatives of the victorious great powers who met in Paris early in 1 9 1 9 set out to grade most of the states of the world . At the preparatory meetings injanuary, Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Wilson had to decide on the representation of belligerent, neutral and new states at the Peace Conference. After a good deal of discussion, a list of thirty-two countries to which invitations to the first meeting were to be sent was drawn up with the number ofdelegates assigned to each. The five great powers, namely the United States, the British Empire, France, I taly and Japan, were allowed five delegates each . A small group comprising Belgium, Brazil and Serbia were allocated three each . A group of twelve countries, including among others China, I ndia and the three most important British Dominions, and, in Europe, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Poland, Portugal and Roumania, were given two each . The remainder, most of them small Latin American states which had played at most a marginal role in the war, were allowed one delegate each . Russia, which was in a state of political chaos, and the enemy powers Germany, Austria-H ungary, Bulgaria and Turkey were excluded . 1 The main criterion applied in this allocation was war effort. Hence Belgium and Serbia, both of which had fought hard and suffered much , were included in the second class ; and Canada, Australia, South Africa and India, the armi es of which had fough t in many theatres of war and had sustained great losses, were put in the third class, even though that seemed to give the British Empire a disproportionately high total representation . But considerations

45

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Middle Powers in International Politics

other than war record were taken into account too, especially size and power. It was on the latter grounds that President Wilson put up a hard fight for Brazil, the largest of the South American countries, and succeeded in having it placed in the second category of states to be represented at plenary meetings, even though it had taken only a small part in the war. Conversely, New Zealand , with an impressive fighting record , was given only half the representation of the larger dominions. Yet, though some account was taken of size and power, the allocation of delegates for the Peace Conference was far from corresponding to a division into great, middle and small powers. According to such a division, Serbia would hardly have gone into the upper, and Greece, Roumania and Hedj as into the lower intermediate category. The classification ofjanuary 1 9 1 9 was carried out by the principal victorious allies for the purpose of negotiating a peace with the defeated powers. It was not till the Peace Conference addressed itself to the task of setting up an international organisation that the notion of middle powers re­ ceived serious consideration .

2. 1

THE LEAGU E OF NAT IONS

As had happened at the Congress of Vienna, the victorious great powers - the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, as they styled themselves - took charge of negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference. A convenient distinction between powers with 'general interests ' , namely themselves, and those with 'special interests', the rest of the states, was introduced, on the basis of which a steering committee consisting of two representatives of each of the five great powers was set up. This committee , which became known as the Council of Ten, prepared the plenary sessions and initiated and controlled the work of the Conference. I ts most influential members were the representatives of France, Britain and the United States. The authority of the Council of Ten was challenged at the second plenary session of the Conference. When a number of commissions were being set up through resolutions already drafted by the Council, obj ections were raised by various delegates representing lesser powers. Hymans, the Belgian Foreign Minister, started the argument by questioning the proposal that the five great powers should have two representatives each on all commissions, and the many lesser powers only five to be chosen from among them .

The League of Nations and the United Nations

47

Belgium, he claimed, ought to have at least one and in some cases two representatives on the commissions . A Brazilian delegate took the same line, and went on to q uestion the right of the self­ constituted Council of Ten to lay down rules . The Canadian delegate, Sir Robert Borden, added his support. Complaining that the matter had not been placed before the Conference in the most a ppropriate way, he said , 'We are told that certain decisions have been reached. The result of that is that everyone of us asks : "By whom have these decisions been reached, and by what auth­ ority?" ' 2 Representatives of other nations followed, expressing similar criticisms and demanding representation on the proposed commissions. It was then that Clemenceau, the permanent President of the Peace Conference, gave his memorable answer to the spokesmen of the minor powers. First he reminded the delegates that it was the great powers that had decided that there was going to be a conference at Paris and that the representatives of interested countries should be summoned to attend it. He admitted that the representatives of the great powers were meeting, but insisted that they were in a position to j ustify their action : 'The British Prime Minister j ust now reminded me that, on the day when the war ceased, the Allies had 1 2 000 000 men fighting on various fronts. This entitles them to consideration . ' Pointing to the great goal of the League of Nations, he went on to make much the same poin ts as Metternich and Castlereagh had made a hundred years before, about the practical need for relatively small committees and commissions and about the various ways and means open to all delegates of making their views known both to particular com­ miss ions and to the Conference as a whole . 3 Clemenceau 's forceful reply silenced the delegates of the lesser powers for a while. The commissions were set up as proposed, with only five members on each to represent the powers with 'special interests' . On the most important commission, however, that on the League of Nations, the representation of the smaller powers was subsequently increased from five to nine. But the great powers, with a total of ten representatives, which included President Wilson and Colonel House for the United States and Lord Robert Cecil and General Smuts for Britain, retained control of this commission too. The commission on the League ofNations had its first meeting on 3 February 1 9 1 9. In regard to middle powers, the most important part of its work was the composition of the proposed Council of the

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Middle Powers in International Politics

League. That the five great powers would have permanent seats on this executive committee was clear from the beginning. The question was whether other powers too should be admitted and , if so, how many and on what terms . In the view of the British Foreign Office, the idea of the League of Nations had grown out of the tradition of the Concert of Europe, which always had been one of great-power management of international relations . A British memorandum which limited membership of the Council to the great powers of the world was before the commission . Another document available at this stage was General Smuts's pamphlet, The League of Nations - A Practical Suggestion, which modified the British proposal by suggesting the inclusion of a number of other states drawn from two panels . Since it explicitly distinguished an intermediate rank of powers, this was the more interesting proposal from our point of view. After listing the great powers entitled to permanent seats, among which he included a future Germany under stable democratic government, Smuts wrote : To these permanent members I would suggest that four ad­ ditional members be added in rotation from two panels, one panel comprising the important intermediate Powers below the rank of Great Powers, such as Spain, Hungary, Turkey, Central Russia, Poland , Greater Serbia, etc . , and the other panel comprising all the minor states who are members of the league . Each panel will provide two members, who will be selected from it in rotation according to rules to be laid down in the first instance by the permanent members, who will also fix the two original panels . The council will therefore have nine or ten members according as Germany is or is not a stable democratic great Power in future. The advantage of this constitution is that the Great Powers obtain a majority - although only a bare maj ority - represen­ tation on the council and could not therefore complain that their interests run the risk of being swamped by the multiplicity of small states . On the other hand the intermediate and minor states receive a very substantial representation on the league, and could not complain that they are at the mercy of the Great Powers. As an alternative, he went on to suggest the idea of permanent representation for a number of large groups of smaller states . 4

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In the course of summing up his recommendations as to the constitution and functions of the League, Smuts introduced the term 'middle power' into the negotiations of the Peace Conference : The council will be the execu tive committee of the league, and will consist of the Prime Ministers or Foreign Secretaries or other authoritative representatives of the Great Powers, together with the represen tatives drawn in rotation from two panels of the middle Powers and minor states respectively, in such a way that the Great Powers have a bare majority. A minority of three or more can veto any action or resolu tion of the council. 5 President Wilson, who was very impressed with Smuts's pam­ phlet, incorporated some of its central ideas in his own revised draft of the League Covenan t. Like Smuts, he acknowledged the existence of an intermediate rank of powers . Using the terms 'Body of Delegates' and 'Execu tive Council' for the two principal organs of the League, he wrote: all actions of the Body of Delegates taken in the exercise of their functions and powers granted to them under this Covenant shall be first formulated and agreed upon by an Executive Council, which shall act either by reference or upon its own initiative and which shall consist of the representatives of the Great Powers together with representatives drawn in annual rotation from two panels, one of which shall be made up of the representatives of the States ranking next after the Great Powers and the other of the representatives of the minor States (a classification which the Body of Delegates shall i tself establish and may from time to time alter) , such a number being drawn from these panels as will be but one less than the representatives of the Great Powers; and three or more negative votes in the Council shall operate as a veto upon any action or resolution proposed. 6 Subsequently, however, the position of the United S tates moved closer to the original British, and the next American draft provided for a Council that consisted normally only of the great powers . This proposal was strongly criticised by the representatives of the lesser powers, and it was at this stage that a motion was put forward and carried that the number of such powers represented on the commission should be increased from five to nine. When the other

50

Middle Powers in International Politics

great powers failed to support Britain and the United States, with France and I taly actually speaking up for the lesser powers, the British modified their proposal by suggesting the inclusion of two representatives of the other members of the League. Smuts and others expressed their dissatisfaction with this allocation, and the Belgian representative wanted to raise the figure to five. Lord Robert Cecil opposed an increase; but at a later meeting, with the four new members now present, another debate led to a final fixing of the nu�nber at four. 7 This solution, though it gave the great powers a majority of one at the outset, allowed a few middle powers to voice their claims and views at the highest level of League politics - which they did with increasing determination over the next half dozen years . According to the terms of the Covenant, the Assembly was to elect the non-permanent members of the Council 'from time to time in its discretion ' . The First Assembly, meeting in 1 920, elected three of the four states that already had been appointed on a temporary basis, namely Spain, Brazil and Belgium, and substituted China for Greece. Since the Covenant made no definite provision for the length of term and the re-eligibility of non-permanent members, it was left to the Assembly to work out some rules and seek their adoption by the Council. This led to a great debate, which went on for several Assemblies and which turned largely on the claims for special consideration advanced by certain middle powers. The First Assembly produced numerous proposals for the regulation of the selection of non-permanent members, the prin­ cipal ideas advocated being representation by rotation and rep­ resentation by regional or geographical association . 8 Both prin­ ciples were incorporated in recommendations passed by later Assemblies; and in October 1 92 1 the Second Assembly voted an amendment to the Covenant which declared that the Assembly 'shall fix by a two-thirds majority the rules dealing with the election of the non-permanent Members of the Council, and particularly such regulations as relate to their term of office and the conditions of re-eligibility ' . However, adoption of this amendment, which would have allowed the Assembly to put its principles into practice, was held up for years by powers that had an interest in preventing the introduction of a system of representation by rotation . The leading opponent of any such system was Spain . I n September 1 92 1 this country, which regarded itself a s more akin to the great powers than to the small states, had secretly put in a claim

The League of Nations and the United Nations

51

for a permanent seat on the Council . For reasons of their own , both France and Britain had given their assent. But the proposal had not gone through, because Brazil, motivated by ambitions similar to Spain's, had refused to give its support unless it, too, received a permanent seat, which the other members of the Council were not prepared to give it. Tacitly maintaining its claim, Spain now omitted to ratify the amendment passed by the Second Assembly, and France took the same line. In the circumstances, the only way in which some of the various groups clamouring for representation on the Council could be given seats was to increase the number of non-permanent members. This happened in 1 922, when the Third Asse mbly added Sweden, a representative of the ex-neutrals, and Uruguay, a second representative of the numerous Latin American member states, to the list of non-permanent members. The only other change that took place in the constitution of the Council before 1 926 was the substitution of Czechoslovakia for China, whose government no longer seemed representative of the country. Thus, by that year, Spain and Brazil together with Belgium, which enjoyed the patronage of France, had sat on the Council for seven years . Uruguay and Sweden had been re-elected by each Assembly since 1 92 2 , and Czechoslovakia since 1 923. Only Greece and China had lost their seats, in both cases as a result of domestic upheavals . The record was one that encouraged the belief that at least some of the so-called non-permanent members of the Council had in effect secured semi-permanent status. The events of 1 926 produced an explosion of claims by secondary powers for membership of the Council. The Locarno Agreements of October 1 925, the principal aim of which was to safeguard relations between Germany and France, provided the background . They had been concluded on the understanding that Germany would apply for membership of the League of Nations and that the other signatories would support her for a permanent seat on the Council. I n February, Germany submitted its formal demand for admission. But before the machinery of the League could complete the procedure of admitting a great power as a new member, a number of other powers took the opportunity of putting in claims of their own for permanent seats. One was Poland, which enjoyed the support of France - whose government apparently thought that Poland might make a useful ally against Germany on the Council ­ and received some encouragement from Britain and , later, also from I taly. Spain and Brazil, too, grasped the chance and , with some

52

Middle Powers in International Politics

backing from one or two of the great powers, revived their earlier claims for permanent seats. China and Belgium announced that if any new permanent seats were created other than that intended for Germany, they, too, would be candidates; and Persia helped to swell the list. Germany, fearing that its recognition as a great power would be qualified and its influence in the Council reduced if lesser powers were admitted on equal terms, opposed these claims and made it clear that it would not join the League if other powers were granted permanent seats at the same time. To save the situation, the signatories of the Locarno Treaties went into secret session and negotiated a proposal for settlement of the issue. The essence of their plan was that Germany would receive a permanent seat at once, that Sweden and Czechoslovakia would resign their temporary seats, and that the Assembly would be asked to elect Poland and Holland to take their places. Poland was satisfied with this solution, but Spain and Brazil were not. Spain declared that it would resign from the League if it did not obtain a permanent seat, and Brazil insisted that it would veto Germany's seat if it did not itself re­ ceive one at the same time. On these reactions the proposal foundered. Then the whole subject of Germany's admission was turned over to the Assembly, where several representatives of small states and some middle powers, particularly Brazil, found an opportunity to criticise strongly the practice whereby the Locarno powers, mainly Britain and France, had tried secretly and unsuccessfully to arrange among themselves matters that were of general concern to all members of the League. A committee of the Council, on which all the parties directly interested as well as a few others were represented, was set up to consider the problem and find a solution. The plan it produced, and which the Assembly subsequently adopted, represented a compromise. Membership of the Council was to be raised from ten to fourteen, with Germany alone becoming a new permanent member. The elected members, increased from six to nine, were to sit for three years and were not to be re-elected immediately. However, the last rule was qualified by a clause that stated that up to three states might be re-elected if two­ thirds of the Assembly voted for it. No limit was placed on the number of times a state could be declared re-eligible. The effect of this qualification was to create an intermediate category of semi­ permanent members. Since it was introduced with Poland, Spain

The League of Nations and the United Nations

53

and Brazil in mind, the clause amounted t o a n implicit recognition of the existence of middle powers . Poland was satisfied with this solution, but once again Spain and Brazil were not . Presented with an opportunity of securing an intermediate position in the hierarchy of the League, they refused to accept being relegated to the second rank of powers. Both gave notice of their intention to wi thdraw from the League; Spain, at the same time, however, announcing its intention finally to ratify the amendment passed by the Second Assembly . In the end, only Brazil took the decisive step out of the League. When the Assembly elected the new Council , it gave Poland a three-year seat and, by an overwhelming majori ty , declared it re-eligible . When Spain re­ turned in 1 928, it was awarded the same privilege . Thus, Poland and Spain became the first middle powers to receive formal recognition. 9 Some of the arguments advanced on behalf of the various powers that in the early and mid- 1 920s aspired to permanent seats on the Council are worth noting. On the part of the Poles it was argued that theirs was a nation of thirty million people, which placed it closer in size to great powers such as Britain, France and I taly than to its small neighbours, the Baltic states; that it was situated in the heart of Europe, which gave it a direct interest in most European questions; and that it had so many unsettled issues with Germany that i t was best if it could be on a footing of legal eq uality with this power. 1 0 Spain rested its claim in the first place on i ts former position as a great power. I ts representative at the League on one occasion characteristically declared that it was his duty ' to watch over the prestige of this ancient, glorious, and well-beloved Spain which has been relegated to a position inferior to that which it merits ' . 1 1 O ther points advanced in its favour were that Spain was the biggest state neutral in the World War, that it occupied a detached position in Europe, and that it enjoyed cultural and moral leadership of the Latin American nations. 1 2 Brazil emphasised that it was a country of thirty million people with an area larger than the United States. Despite obj ections from other South American states, it put itselfforward as the leader of the Latin American countries. Poin ting to the absence of the United States from the League and to the fact that Brazil was the next greatest American power, it claimed a representative role on behalf of not only South America but also the entire hemisphere. 1 3

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Middle Powers in International Politics

China rested its case mainly on its population , area and economic potentialities , but also on its ancient civilisation. I ts delegate said in the formal application put in in March 1 926: My Government takes its stand on the international status quo and the importance of China in comparison with other Powers. My Government further considers that such a representation of China, a Power which occupies the greatest area on the Asiatic Continent, which possesses a quarter of the total population of the globe, which disposes of unlimited resources and a considerable economic power, and which has distinguished itself by its ancient civilization and its traditional culture, could but enhance the efficacy of the League of Nations . 1 4 And Persia put itself forward as the chief Mohammedan power in the League. 1 5 Whether these powers based their claims mainly on size and economic potential, on location and international profile, on representative role, or on past glory, they generally displayed a tendency to overstate their case and to belittle the difference between themselves and the great powers . Like some of the official and unofficial champions of the rights ofSpain, the Netherlands and the third Germany in post-Napoleonic Europe, the representatives of these secondary states were inclined to present them as would-be great powers. Since they ultimately wanted their countries to be treated on more or less equal terms with the principal powers, they had only little to say about the characters and roles that might be peculiar to members of a distinct middle class of powers. The spokesmen of many of the smaller members of the League went in the opposite direction and refused to accept the distinction between middle powers and small states . The three Scandinavian governments, for example, advocated the principle of equality of all states that were not truly great powers and opposed every tendency to introduce a three-tier classification of members of the League. Having failed in the negotiations of 1 926 to prevent special consideration from being given to the claims of Poland and equally prominent secondary powers, they insisted on interpreting the provision for re-election as not creating an intermediate class of states. 1 6 South American governments revealed similar concerns when many of them repeatedly obj ected to the pretensions Brazil displayed in putting itself forward as the leader of Latin America.

The League of Nations and the United Nations

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Like many small states in other parts of the world, they preferred a strict rule of representation by rotation on the Council to one giving permanency or semi-permanency to particularly prominent sec­ ondary powers . Speeches and declarations expressing the views of small states which did not recognise any essential difference between themselves and those secondary powers which claimed to be more than small states must be particularly barren of ideas about the nature and role of middle powers . Such ideas seem more likely to be present in the works of international lawyers, diplomatic historians, poli tical scientists and other writers of the period with an interest in the international system. In fact, the recognition of middle powers expressed in the amended rules governing the composition of the League Council was soon reflected in scholarly writings. Thus, the Anglo-Saxon literature of the late 1 920s and the 1 930s on the League of Nations took account of such powers . C . Howard-Ellis, in a book published in 1 928, pointed out that the idea that certain states which could not qualify for the rank of great powers were yet of sufficient importance to constitute a special category went back to the first beginning of the League, when Smuts and Wilson had suggested that the temporary members of the Council should be elected by two panels of states, one of which would be composed of the middle-sized powers . Both Poland and Spain, he agreed , had strong claims to an intermediate position . 1 7 C. K. Webster and S. Herbert, in a work published five years later, offered the opinion that the creation of semi-permanent seats for certain larger secondary powers corre­ sponded to the reality of things, for there was an obvious difference between states such as Spain, Poland and Brazil and the smaller ones, which were inferior in both population and prestige . 1 8 And Waldo E. Stephens, in a book that appeared in 1 939, observed that at the close of the World War there was a number of states, such as Brazil, Poland, Spain and China, that appeared to belong to an intermediary class of powers. They were not great powers like Britain and France. Nor could they be grouped with states such as Belgium, Holland and Switzerland. 'The intermediary powers considered their superiority over the small powers as being firmly established , as the great powers had viewed their posi tion distinct from the lesser S tates taken collectively. ' He agreed that the demands of these powers for seats on the Council had required special consideration. 1 9 But, though they acknowledged the existence of middle powers,

56

Middle Powers in International Politics

these and other writers, mostly concerned as they were with the League of Nations, rarely ventured into generalisations and speculations about the typical conduct and natural functions ofsuch powers in international politics. It was not till after the collapse of the League of Nations, the outbreak of another world war and the establishment of a new international organisation that writers again began seriously to think about the role of middle powers. 2.2

THE UNITED NATIONS

In the Second World War the governments of the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain agreed to set up a new international organisation as soon as they had defeated their enemies; and in the last years of the war Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill exchanged opinions about the principles and structure of the proposed institution. They were determined that the special position their countries had gained in the prosecution of the war should be recognised in the peace-time organisation. On the grounds that the burden of maintaining the peace would fall mainly on the great powers, the three statesmen agreed to reserve decisive influence for these powers in the organisation to be set up. In August 1 944 representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and China met at Dumbarton Oaks on the outskirts of Washington to continue their discussions about post-war inter­ national organisation and to reach some provisional conclusions. They drew up a set of proposals for the consideration of other potential members of the future United Nations. The essence of these proposals was that threats to international peace and security would be the responsibility of an organ then to be called the Executive Council, later the Security Council, which would have the power to take decisions binding upon all members of the United Nations. Most other matters would be the concern of an organ to be named the General Assembly, the legal powers of which, however, would be limited to discussion and recommendation. The Security Council would consist of five permanent members, namely the four powers that had drawn up the proposals and France, and six non­ permanent members, which would be elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms, three of them to retire each year. The Big Five, as they came to be known, would have a dominating role. That China was included in this group was not simply because of its

The League of .Nations and the United .Nations

57

huge population - which had not given it great-power status in the inter-war years - but more in recognition of its long record of war with Japan and, of particular concern to the United States, its potential strategic importance in Eastern Asia. In April l 945, representatives of the nations that had accepted the invitation of the sponsoring powers to draw up and sign the Charter of the United Nations met at San Francisco. One of the key issues of the Conference was the composition and powers of the Security Council. Though most of the smaller states sought to reduce the overwhelming power allocated to the Big Five - whether by chang­ ing the voting formula proposed, by raising the number of non­ permanent seats in the Security Council, by increasing the powers of the General Assembly, or by some other means - they generally accepted the traditional diplomatic distinction between great powers and others as well as the principle that the former should enjoy some pre-eminence within the new institution. But not all agreed that the distinction between great powers and others was the Only one worth making. Some were of the opinion that a number of states were so close to the Big Five in the international hierarchy of power that they were entitled to a special position among the lesser $lates. Such powers, they argued, ought to be given priority in the elections to the non-permanent seats in the Security Council. Those IOilletimes pointed out as middle powers were Canada, Australia, Brazil, Mexico, Poland, Holland and Belgium, the last two then still colonial powers of some importance. 2 0 The principal champions of the rights of middle powers were Canada and Australia. It is worth looking at their arguments in some detail. Already at the earliest planning stages Prime Minister Mackenzie King had expressed concern about Canada's representation in whatever institution might be set up. In a speech to the Canadian parliament in july 1 943 he had argued that effective representation should be neither restricted to the largest states nor extended to all states. It should be determined 'on a functional basis which will admit to full membership those countries large or small which have the greatest contribution to make to the particular object in question'. 2 1 That principle of representation, he had suggested, would make it possible to find a compromise between the theoretical equality of all states and the practical necessity of limiting representation on international bodies to a workable number. It was a principle that Canadian spokesmen were to advance on many occasions over the next few years.

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Middle Powers in International Politics

A year later, a few weeks before the Big Four's conversations at Dumbarton Oaks, King had evoked the functional idea with the specific purpose of strengthening the case for representation of middle powers in the proposed Security Council: The simple division of the world between great powers and the rest is unreal and even dangerous. The great powers are called by that name simply because they posssess great power. The other states of the world possess power and, therefore, the capacity to use it for the maintenance of peace - in varying degrees ranging from almost zero in the case of the smallest and weakest states up to a military potential not far below that of the great powers. In determining what states should be represented on the council with the great powers, it is, I believe, necessary to apply the functional idea. Those countries which have most to contribute to the maintenance of the peace of the world should be most frequently selected. The military contribution actually made during this war by the members of the United Nations provides one good working basis for a selective principle of choice. 2 2 Subsequently the Canadian government had dispatched to the governments of the Big Five a memorandum on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, which pointed to the willingness and capacity displayed by Canada in two world wars to participate both militarily and industrially in concerted action against aggression, and pressed for changes in the draft charter to ensure that states with so much to contribute to the maintenance ofpeace and security were elected to seats on the Council more frequently, or for longer periods, than states with less to give. 2 3 This was the essence of the case that Canada took to the San Francisco Conference. It pointed towards graded representation, and rested in the first place on the war efforts of countries such as Canada and Australia. But behind the arguments was the assump­ tion, not always tacit, that middle powers could be trusted to exercise their diplomatic influence and military power in the interest of international society, that they were capable of being less selfish than great powers and more responsible than small states. In later years this tendency to assume a degree of moral superiority was to become an even more noticeable feature of some Canadian thinking about the nature and role of middle powers. The Canadian case for middle powers found several practical

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expressions at San Francisco. One had to do with representation on the Security Council and took the form of an amendment proposal which read, 'The General Assembly shall adopt rules governing the ' choice of non-permanent members, in order to ensure that due weight be given to the contribution of members to the maintenance of international peace and security and the performance of their obligations to the United Nations.' 2 4 The proposal was voted down; but the idea was incorporated in an amendment put forward by the sponsoring powers and accepted by the Conference. Thus it found its way into the first paragraph of Article 23 of the Charter. Another initiative by the Canadian delegation was aimed more directly at reducing domination by the permanent members of the Security Council. It concerned participation by states that were not members of the Security Council in decisions of that body involving the use of their armed forces for punitive measures. The Canadians, thinking that such states might well be secondary powers, acted on the principle of 'no taxation without representation' when they stated that they wanted to.be 'consulted rather than ordered to take action'. 2 6 The Conference agreed that any state asked to participate in the use of force should have the right to take part in the Security Council's decisions to call for its forces. The result was Article 44 of the Charter. In the negotiations about the composition of the Economic and Social Council, which was to be entirely elective, Canada again introduced the functional idea. Well aware that in the economic field Canada and other middle powers were closer to the level of the great powers than they were in the military sphere, its represen­ tatives proposed that the General Assembly, in choosing members for that body, should give 'due regard to the necessity of arranging for the adequate representation of states of major economic importance'. 2 6 Representatives of small states, however, were able to argue that the Council was to deal not only with economic but also with social, cultural and other matters. When some of them demanded an equal chance in the elections, Canada withdrew its amendment proposal. But it was agreed that members of this Council should be eligible for re-election, which would allow the economic great powers to be continuously represented. In the pursuit of these and other aims - such as a reduction in the scope of the veto rights of the great powers - Canada occasionally co­ operated with other secondary powers, for example Australia and Brazil, and sometimes also with small states, particularly

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Middle Powers in International Politics

New Zealand. But such co-operation was generally on an ad hoc basis. The problems and opportunities of the lesser powers in 1 945 were not so similar that it was possible for them to co-ordinate their policies towards the great powers on a broad front and for a long time. Even Australia, which in so many ways had much in common with Canada, took a line in defence of the rights of secondary powers which at some stages of the negotiations differed significantly from Canada's. The Australian government, even more than the Canadian, had been dissatisfied with the great powers' leadership of the war efforts. In the later years of the war the Australians had felt particularly resentful about the practice of largely excluding them from consultation on most matters relating to the armistice and peace settlements. Even questions of special relevance to their own region, the Pacific, had been settled without, in their view, adequate consultation having taken place at either the Commonwealth or the Allied level. As a result, the government had become increasingly concerned about the status and influence of Australia. Its reaction to the outline proposals for a new international organisation had been to stress the potential importance of smaller powers for the post-war and peace-time world while accepting the need for great-power leadership. At the time of the Dumbarton Oaks negotiations Dr H. V. Evatt, the Minister for External Affairs, had publicly argued the Australian case for representation of smaller powers on what later came to be known as the Security Council: One important point is that the representatives of the smaller powers on the executive authority should be adequate to ensure a balanced outlook on world affairs and so increase confidence in all executive decisions. Further the executive should be so constituted that no distinct region of the globe and no important group of nations should be left unrepresented on it. 2 7 The principle of regional representation was one that was bound to appeal more to Australia, the principal allied power in the Pacific region, than to Canada, with the United States as its closest neighbour. But, later, Dr Evatt had added a criterion for represen­ tation more in line with Canadian thinking. In a speech delivered in America he had introduced the test of war efforts. Arguing the case for the smaller powers in general and for Australia in particular, he had said, 'Regard should, of course, be paid to the claims of these allied nations who have, both in this war and in the last, largely

The League of Nations and the United Nations

61

contributed to the overthrow of the aggressors . ' 2 8 The emphasis, however, had still been on regional representation. In the months before the San Francisco Conference, Dr Evatt and his colleagues had become increasingly preoccupied with ideas that pointed towards enlarged roles for middle and small powers . 2 9 Here they had received some encouragement from the French,

whose spokesmen had expressed strong agreement with the Australian government on the status and rights of what both parties

called 'middle powers' . 3 0 By the time the Conference met, the Australian delegation was ready to take a leading role in opposing tendencies towards domination by great powers and championing

'the rights of smaller states .

At San Francisco, where Australia was elected a member of the Executive Committee of the Conference, Australian policy was directed mainly at reducing the veto rights reserved by the great .powers at the Yalta Conference and at enlarging the roles of lesser

pow

ers within the new organisation. 3 1 The latter pursui t, here the more relevant, led in the first place to an attempt to secure representation on the Security Council for countries such as the Netherlands, Canada and Brazil, in addition to Australia itself. In a speech to the Conference, Francis Forde, deputy prime minister and a member of the delegation, restated the Australian case for

representation : It will have to be recognized that outside the great powers there are certain powers who, by reason of their resources and their geographical location, will have to be relied upon especially for the main tenance of peace and security in various q uarters of the world . Like France, Canada, and other countries, Australia has consistently maintained this principle. But there is another principle of even greater importance . Certain powers, not classified as great, have proved by their record in two world wars that they not only have the capacity but also the will to fight in resistance of aggressors threatening the world with tyranny . These powers are in a sense proved veterans in the struggle against Fascist dictatorship threatening the securi ty of the world . They are in truth security powers . They have a claim to special recognition in any security organization . 3 2 One of the aims of a series of amendments subsequently proposed by Australia was:

62

Middle Powers in International Politics To see that the Security Council is in fact composed of 'security' Powers, i . e . , Powers which by their past military contribution to the cause of world security, have proved able and willing to as­ sume substantial security responsibilities, or which are willing, and by virtue of their geographical position in relation to regions of pri­ mary strategical importance are able, to make a substantial contri­ bution to the maintenance of international peace and security. 3 3

In both the speech and the amendment the order o f importance of the two principal qualifications proposed as criteria for election to the Security Council was the opposite of that of earlier statements. By placing proved capacity and will to fight aggression first, and playing down geographical location and regional role, Australia moved closer to the Canadian position. However, while the two Anglo-Saxon middle powers might now agree that past record, in two world wars, would make the best single test of suitability for the Security Council, this was hardly a view that could be shared by all secondary powers. For the principal Latin American powers, for example, whose contribution to the war efforts had been of quite another order, this criterion could not have great appeal . The case for Brazil, for instance, rested better on economic resources and geographical location. Neither at San Francisco nor at later sessions of the United Nations did the secondary powers of the world find common grounds for their claims for a special status and role within the new organisation. I n the circumstances, it is not surprising that the middle powers on the whole failed to achieve their aims. None of the gains they secured in these early negotiations was substantial enough to give them a special position within the United Nations; and some of their gains eventually turned out to be of even less significance than initially expected . A case in point is that paragraph of Article 23 of the Charter which laid down the rules that were to guide the General Assembly in the election of non-permanent members of the Security Council. As amended , it read , 'due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution ' . Though the functional prin­ ciple clearly was given priority here, in practice it was soon subordinated to that of equitable geographical representation . The first election, which brought Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, Poland , the

The League of Nations and the United Nations

63

Netherlands and Australia into the Security Council, may be seen as reflecting a compromise between the two principles . 3 4 But, shortly, Eas t European, Latin American and Commonwealth countries laid claims to continuous representation of their groups of states, and a practice developed of always having representatives of these as well as of a few other groups. By the early 1 950s the General Assembly

was repeatedly deadlocked over elections to the Security Council. With the large increase in membership of the U nited Nations that took place after the mid- 1 950s the situation worsened . Eventually, in 1 963, the Security Council was enlarged and the bloc system of representation was formally introduced . As the blocs were arranged on a regional basis, the functional principle favouring the middle powers was then finally eclipsed . The middle powers themselves never formed a bloc. Having accepted the new geographical rules of representation, they were reduced to arguing their cases for election within the blocs to which they belonged . Thus the tendency to give formal recognition to the intermediate class of powers which had developed in the early years of the League of Nations was reversed

in the first decades of the U nited Nations .

Nor did the elections for the Economic and Social Council help much to bolster the position of middle powers within the United Nations. Formally, the rules guiding the General Assembly in the allocation of seats on this council took little account of power. But,

by

permitting re-election of members, they allowed the chief industrial powers to enjoy an advantage over other states. The result was that the great powers, the permanent members of the Security Council, soon became for practical purposes also permanent members of the Economic and Social Council. As regards election of the remaining members, a practice developed of applying the functional principle side by side with the geographical, as a result of which a number of secondary powers were re-elected repeatedly. But when, in 1 963, the bloc system of representation was adopted for elections to this council too, the functional idea was relegated to the regional level . However, neither the initial practice of re-election nor the subsequent eclipse ofthe functional principle had more than a marginal effect on the general standing of middle powers, because by the time these developments were taking place the Economic and Social Council had already become a rather less important body than some of those who in 1 945 had pressed for special recognition for middle powers in its membership had hoped would be the case .

64

Middle Powers in International Politics

Furthermore , when disagreement and conflict among the per­ manent members curtailed the effectiveness and influence of the Security Council, the various limitations on its powers imposed at San Francisco as safeguards for the secondary powers in particular, such as Article 44, turned out to be rather less necessary than expected, and therefore not so much of a gain. On the other hand, the broadening of the scope and increase in the powers of the General Assembly negotiated in 1 945, and subseq uently enhanced through the decline of the Security Council as a decision-making body, hardly proved of special advantage to the middle powers . Rather, it was the new, small states, which discovered in the General Assembly a suitable vehicle for their ambitions, that in the long run benefited from these developments. It is not difficult to point to a number of reasons why the middle powers failed to gain real recognition in 1 945 and to secure a status of their own within the new organisation . In the first place, as already noted, these powers were unable to take a joint stand in the negotiations and to engage in continuous co-operation. Their difficulty in developing a degree of solidarity was not only that they lacked a common programme but also that they barely recognised each other. There was no generally accepted definition, or even an agreed list, of middle powers. Second, the efforts of the champions of middle powers met opposition from two sides . With the exception of France - then only a marginal great power - which in the early discussions about post-war international organisation occasionally supported some secondary powers, the great powers largely resisted middle-power claims, which they tended to see as challenges to their own position ofdominance. The small states, on their side , generally saw no special advantage in recognising an intermediate class of powers, since it implied a relegation of themselves to a level of status and influence even lower than the one they occupied together with the secondary powers in a simple division between great powers and others . So, although Australia found some supporters among the small states when at San Francisco it put itself forward as leader of middle and smaller powers, most of the small states were inclined to support the great powers in their opposition to middle-power claims. 3 6 The result was a situation in which a motley, disunited and not always too-determined group of would-be middle powers faced a good deal of resistance to their policies of self-enhancement, most of it from above but some also from below their own level, while receiving little effective support from either side.

The League of Nations and the United Nations

65

A more fundamental and compelling reason why the middle powers failed to establish themselves was the solidarity of the great powers in the immediate post-war situation . As long as the principal

victorious powers, the authors of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and the sponsors of the San Francisco Conference, were able to maintain a relatively solid front, their power and influence were so overwhelming that the only significant distinction in the hierarchy was between them and others. When the concert of the great powers took all important decisions and no other power was in a position to bring much influence to bear, any proposal to classify ·the lesser powers and award special status to an intermediate class

'of states

was in conflict with the realities of the existing power structure of the

'world.

�

t seems to be a paradox of the history ofideas of middle powers that claims for diplomatic and legal recognition of an intermediate class � � powers tend to be put forward in situations where there is only little chance of having them accepted . The history of the last two )lundred years shows that it is normally at the end of, or soon after,

)Jeriods

of general war that prominent secondary powers feel encouraged to press cases for having themselves and their peers 'separated from the masses of minor states and installed at a level close to that of the great powers . For the less-than-great powers, post-war situations often present a combination of real dangers and apparent opportunities. On the one hand , most such powers not only have the recent experience of being excluded from top-level decision-making, both in the last stages of the war efforts and in the armistice negotiations, but also face the likely prospect of being dominated by a close concert of the principal victors, throughout the preparations of a peace settlement as well as in the first post-war period . On the other hand , they have seen the old , pre-war order of international society break down and have become involved in the setting-up of a new structure and the creation of a novel set of institutions. All the elements of such situations are apt to spur some of the secondary powers to attempt to improve or secure their positions. But, whether their aim is to be accepted as near-great powers, to be formally recognised as intermediate powers, or simply to avoid being always ranked with the small states, to succeed in such conditions is very difficult. The experiences of 1 8 1 5 , 1 9 1 9 and 1 945 show that the forces of collective repression exercised from the

66

Middle Powers in International Politics

top level of a post-war hierarchy of powers tend to prevail over moves for increased status emanating from the level immediately below. The best that middle powers seem able to achieve in post­ war situations is a number of rather insubstantial and ultimately impermanent advantages . The marginal and temporary role of the three lesser members of the Committee of Eight at Vienna, the conflict and uncertainty surrounding the posi tion of the few semi-permanent members of the Council of the League, and the feeble expression and declining importance of the so-called functional idea in the Charter of the United Nations, all bear out the generalisation that post-war conditions do not give much scope for middle-sized powers anxious to secure formal recognition and a lasting standing of their own. But it is normally only at the end of general wars that great powers set about reorganising international society and introducing changes in the states system of the kind that conceivably could include the establishment of a new class of powers. The conclusion suggesting itself is that, as long as two or more great powers dominate the states system, middle powers are unlikely to receive legal recognition and gain institutional status - whatever the nature of the roles they may perform and whatever the degree of influence they may command, in non-post-war situations of international politics. 3 6

3 The Hierarchy of Powers The small number of books and articles about the role of middle powers that in recent decades appeared in various parts of the world were not the last fruits of a long tradition of scholarly interest in the subject. The work on this class of powers done by European writers in earlier times had never amounted to a continuous tradition and, in any case, had petered out in the first half of the nineteenth century, with the result that the insights it had presented had been

all but forgotten. Nor did the recent writings stem from the

controversies in the early years of the League of Nations and the United Nations, when certain secondary powers had pressed for intermediate status in the various organs of the new institutions . The fate of these efforts, which had been no more than partially successful in the case of the League and largely unsuccessful in that of the U nited Nations, had become a matter of mainly historical interest. Contemporary concern with middle powers goes back only to the early 1 960s, when signs of a detente in East-West relations and hints of a transformation of the dualistic system seemed to open possibilities for a growing number of secondary powers to pursue new and more independent policies, whether in global or in regional affairs. In the course of the 1 960s, developments of this nature in the international political system encouraged writers in Canada, Western Europe, I ndia and elsewhere to take up again the subject of the nature and role of middle powers, which in the years of the Cold War had been largely neglected . In some respects, the modern literature resembled older European writings on the subj ect. Discussions of the role of middle powers again showed a tendency to generalise from a few cases of powers reacting in a particular way to a certain set of international circumstances, and an inclination not only to overlook or ignore other possible reactions but also to pay too little attention to the transient nature of the current international situation . Also, descriptions of the conduct of middle powers once more revealed a proneness to paint a rather flattering picture. In one respect,

67

68

Middle Powers in International Politics

however, the recent writings differed from the older literature. Attempts to characterise middle powers generally evinced greater care about precision in defining concepts . This concern, even more marked in modern literature on the nature and role of small states and part of the general movement towards a more scientific approach to the study of politics, led to a search for absolute criteria for ranking powers and reliable indices for distinguishing middle powers. The quest, however, did not produce an entirely satisfac­ tory way of classifying powers or a widely accepted definition of middle powers, such as might have served as basis for more rigorous enquiry into the nature, behaviour and role of these powers.

3. 1

CHARACTERI SATION OF M I DDLE POWERS

The virtual failure of the attempt to secure special status and lasting advantages for middle powers within the organisation of the United Nations did not put an end to thinking and writing about the character and role of such powers . Especially in Canada, whose representatives at the first meetings of the United Nations together with the Australians had been the foremost advocates of the rights of secondary powers, did the discussion continue into the initial post­ war period . As long as the concert of the great powers survived, it was possible to maintain some of the arguments that had been put

forward in 1 945. The role of middle powers could still be seen as governed by the solidarity of the great powers and linked to the security system of the U nited Nations. Thus, as late as 1 94 7, the Canadian professor George DeT. Glazebrook was able to charac­ terise middle powers by ' their opposition to undue great power control, their growing tendency to act together, and the influence they have individually come to exert' . 1 His list of such powers, which he thought generally acceptable, included Belgium and the Netherlands and excluded the three principal ex-enemies. The following year an official of the Canadian Department of External Affairs, R. G. Riddell, took the characterisation of the nature and discussion of the part of middle powers a little further. I n an address o n the role o f middle powers in t h e United Nations, h e admitted that nobody had offered a n adequate definition o f such a power but suggested that certain well-marked attributes, taken singly or in various combinations, might produce an identifiable result. 'The middle powers are those which, by reason of their size,

The Hierarchy of Powers

69

thei r material resources, their willingness and ability to accept responsibility, their influence and their stability are close to being great powers. ' 2 Echoing Canadian arguments at San Francisco, he offered the opinion that performance in the recent war and the current reconstruction had indicated some criteria that might be applied. Turning to the role of middle powers in relation to the new system of collective security, Riddell set out the reasons why these powers could be expected to contribute a great deal. ' I n a predatory world, the middle powers are more vulnerable than their smaller neighbours, and Jess able to protect themselves than their larger ones.' 3 Their relatively large size, coveted resources and strategic importance, he explained , endangered their security without giving the means to defend themselves single-handed . The best arrangement for their protection was a successful international

them

organisation . Since they had more to gain from such an organisation

than the great powers, who in the last resort could do without it, and

the small powers, whose independence always was more precarious, t ey could be relied on, he concluded, to play a particularly large

h

part in its work. Their principal contributions to the existing security organisation of the United Nations could take three forms,

he

suggested, namely support backed by considerable resources,

participation with a strong sense of responsibility and supply of political leadership of a high standard . The post-war notions of middle-power roles entertained by such writers and officials implied a degree of concert among the great powers and a measure of success in the operation of the new security system barely reached even in the first years after the war. When, subsequently, bloc politics and cold war unmistakably eclipsed these conditions, such ideas soon became so irrelevant to the real state of the world and the actual situation of most middle powers that they lost much of the currency that they had enjoyed in the first years of the United Nations . The following period was not rich in ideas about middle powers. The polarisation of the states system that took place in the first years of the Cold War drew most of the nations that in 1 945 had been mentioned as middle powers into military alliances with the United States and tied Poland even more closely to the Soviet Union . Though the conduct of these and other powers within the two camps provided good material for a study of certain types of roles open to middle powers in a dualistic system with a high level of tension, their general state of dependence on one great power or the

70

Middle Powers in International Politics

other did not inspire many contemporary writers to theorise about their part in international politics. Some of the newer middle powers, notably I ndia, were able to stay clear of both of the blocs and to establish themselves as leading members of the group of non­ aligned nations. Compared with those that had tied themselves to one or the other of the superpowers, they enjoyed considerable diplomatic scope. Being in a position to initiate a variety of moves not only in regional but also in global politics, they could sometimes don the moral mantle, which in the post-war years usually had been worn by some of the older middle powers. But, whatever part they played in international politics, they were acting as members of the non-aligned group rather than as middle powers, with the result that the various writings to which their situation and conduct gave rise became part of the literature of non-alignment rather than on middle powers. What is more, the differences between the inter­ national problems and diplomatic possibilities of aligned and of unaligned powers made the period of the Cold War a rather more difficult time to generalise about the conduct and roles of middle powers than the immediate post-war years had been . In the early 1 960s the international situation began to change in ways that affected most middle powers. The greater independence of French diplomacy under de Gaulle and the growing rift between China and the Soviet Union showed that the dualistic system of global politics was moving from a simpler towards a more complex form . The fitful relaxation of tension between the superpowers initiated by Kennedy and Khrushchev after the Cuban missile crisis indicated that East-West relations were entering a new phase. Both developments tended to enlarge the diplomatic scope of middle powers, particularly of those in the Western alliance system which could conclude that considerations of security no longer required them to steer quite so close to the alliance leader, but also of those in the other camp, as well as of most of the unaligned ones . At the same time, the number of middle powers in the world seemed to be growing. Several new and populous countries, Pakistan and Indonesia for example, as well as some neutral or non­ aligned states of diplomatic significance, such as Sweden and Yugoslavia, were finding their way into unofficial lists of middle powers. The three former great powers that had been defeated in the Second World War had recovered economically and had joined the Western alliance system at the level of middle powers. Two declining great powers , Britain and France, had been outdistanced

The Hierarchy if Powers

71

by the rise of the superpowers and, despite their residual extra­ regional interests and influence, could be seen hovering at a level not very far above that of the foremost middle powers. And China, long since out of the circle of great powers and not yet the third party of a global diplomatic triangle, could be counted a middle power as well. The widening of the scope and the increase in the number of middle powers encouraged writers to take up again the subject of their role in international politics. While in the writings of the first post-war years the role of middle powers generally had been related to the operation of the system of collective security, in the publications of the detente period it was �often linked with the conduct of the East-West relationship. Rather as had happened in the earlier situation, most writers, now reoccupied with the danger of an outbreak of major war, cast &elected middle powers in auxiliary roles in the management of the ·.central complex of great-power relations, while a few, more 'c oncerned about recent signs of co-operation between the super­ powers, insisted that the principal task of such powers ought to be to work together to oppose attempts at joint great-power domination. 4 As with the earlier ideas, it was in Canadian writings that the notion of middle powers playing useful parts in connection with the East­ West conflict found its best expressions . There, two roles often mentioned were mediation between the rivals or their allies and peace-keeping under United Nations auspices. Indeed, in the 1 960s there was a tendency among some of those who contributed most to Canadian thinking on the subj ect to characterise middle powers in terms of mediatory activities rather than with reference to relative power. Thus, when john Holmes, director general of the Canadian Institute of I nternational Affairs, held up India under Nehru as a great example of a middle power, it was less because of its mili tary forces and economic resources than because of its active diplomacy in the conflict between the two blocs. Even the practice of including, in certain contexts, countries such as Norway, I reland and Tunisia in the list of middle powers might be acceptab ie, he thought, on the grounds that actual performance in international politics could be more important than mere existence with intermediate-class stat­ istics. 5 Examples of middle powers being cast collectively in the role of opposing the great powers seem much rarer. But a few may be found in Chinese writings of the late 1 960s and early 1 9 70s, when Mao reacted to what he described as Russo-American 'collusion' by advancing the doctrine of the 'second intermediate zone' , which

p

72

Middle Powers in International Politics

permitted China to co-operate temporarily with certain secondary capitalist states, such as Britain and France. In some of the countries less deeply involved in the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States and more directly concerned with the tension between the advanced and the develop­ ing parts of the world, there was a tendency to link the notion of middle powers with the North-South issue rather than with the East-West conflict. One example was Australia. Speaking in 1 964, the Australian minister for external affairs , Sir Garfield Barwick, explained that his country was a middle power in more senses than one : It is clearly one in the general sense in which the expression is used. But also it has common interests with both the advanced and the underdeveloped countries; it stands in point of realized wealth between the haves and the have-nots . It is at the one time a granary and a highly industrialized country. It has a European background and is set in intimate geographical propinquity to Asia. 6 The last sentence became the theme of an address that Sir Alan Watt, director of the Australian I nstitute of International Affairs, delivered some years later. Though avoiding the use of the term 'middle power' , he q uoted Barwick's description of Australia and called it a wanderer between two worlds, Europe and Asia. 7 This characterisation might be seen as implying a conception of middle powers that relates to a third type ofworld discord, namely between civilisations. Some scholars, perhaps less committed to a particular ideology of middle powers or less identified with the policies of any one power than some of the writers and officials already referred to, followed the practice of characterising middle powers in terms of inter­ national role withou t, however, casting them for special parts in some global issue. Members of the Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Policy took this line when they, in the late 1 960s, prepared a survey of middle powers . Having first tried to draw up precise definitions to distinguish various classes of powers but having found it impossible to establish obj ective criteria, they decided instead to classify powers in terms of influence exercised . A middle power, they ruled , was 'a state which plays a role in its region' . 8 In a study of regional international politics, two American political

The Hierarchy of Powers scientists,

of states

73

L. J . Can tori and S. L. Spiegel, distinguished seven types

on the basis of their range of influence. The first four categories, which included all the 'active' nations, were primary, secondary, middle and minor powers. The secondary powers were

the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Japan and China, and the middle powers ' those states whose level of power permits to play only decidedly limited and selected roles in sub­ ordinate systems other than their own'. 9 In a later work on

them

international systems, Michael Haas distinguished more simply between major, middle and minor powers, applying the traditional criteria of global and regional interests . Middle and minor powers,

be laid down, had primary interests only within a localised regional

system. The former were 'locally prominent actors, who may be

'sought as allies by major powers but who are never leaders of a subsystem ' . The only comfort of such powers, he thought, was that they could put minor powers in their place. 1 0 Though many writers thus continued the practice of character­

ising middle powers in terms of role, others showed a new interest in

definitions based directly on relative power. Indeed, a feature of the writings of the late 1 960s was a search for reliable indices of the power of states. For the purposes of some scholars, it was often enough to adapt one of the simple criteria used in older writings on the subject, such as territorial size or population . Thus, when David Vital had to exclude middle powers from his study of small states he roughly defined the upper limits of the class with which he was concerned as a population of lO to 1 5 million in the case of

very

economically advanced countries, and 20 to 30 million in the case of developing countries . These then became his lower limits for middle powers. 1 1 Those who needed greater precision often turned to economic criteria. The Canadian economist Eric Hanson ranked and divided nations with reference to their levels of total and per capita income and productivity. Like many other observers, he found total gross national product (GNP) the best single objective indicator of the power of a state, because the various factors that make up such power - population, area, strategic location, institutional organ­ isation, leadership, participation in international organisations, alliances, associations and trading areas, etc. - all tend to be in some way or other reflected in this quantity. But, considering per capita in come very important for any assessment of national power, he related GNP to size of population . The result was that his list of

74

Middle Powers in International Politics

middle powers ranged from the large to the small developed nations of Europe, with Canada as the middle power par excellence. l 2 J . D . Sethi, director o f study in t h e I ndian Council of World Affairs, too, used economic criteria for defining middle powers, but produced a briefer list, including only seven, and introduced the category of potential middle powers. 1 3 Other scholars , concentrating more exclusively on strategic power, defined middle powers with reference to capacity for producing nuclear weapons. John Burton, writing in 1 965, said simply that they were those non-great powers that had a d eveloped industry and an actual or possible nuclear capability. 1 4 William Schneider of the Hudson Institute suggested some years later that the 'medium powers' of the 1 9 70s and 1 980s would be ' those industrialized or semi-industrialized nations capable of making the S l 0-20 billion allocation over a five-to-fifteen year period to develop a significant nuclear force' . 1 5 Since they based their estimates of the level of nuclear capability on economic and technological data, these writers, too, relied largely on measurable quantities for assessing the relative power of nations. Of the two alternative approaches to the characterisation of middle powers distinguished in this survey of some of the literature generated by the revival in speculation abou t such powers that took place in the first decade after detente, namely in terms of perceived role and on the basis of assessed power, the former is the less useful for the purposes of the present study. Characterisations connoting a certain type of role in a given international context seem particu­ larly unsuitable. While at worst probably amounting to little more than ideologically motivated statements about how middle powers ought to conduct themselves, at best they may be generalisations from the reactions of a few powers to a particular set of circum­ stances presented by a transient international situation . Character­ isations in the more general terms of regional role raise the problems of deciding what playing a role means and of delimiting regions. This approach also limits the enquiry to states systems that, like that of the twentieth century, are complex and extensive enough to allow distinctions between general and limited interests and global and regional roles to be applied . 16 But a much more serious difficulty about any definition in terms of role is that it prejudges the issue of an enquiry into the international role of middle powers. This is so even when the refe rence is not to a particular system-wide role but to an unspecified regional role . Relegating the middle powers to

The Hierarchy of Powers

75

regional roles means excluding the possibility that such states in certain situations may play roles at other levels of international politics, that circumstances may arise in which they can take on systemic parts or in which they can find themselves with a diplomatic scope as narrow as that characteristic of minor powers or small states. At this stage of our study, characterisations of middle powers in terms of role could be useful only as hypotheses for further enquiry. To avoid circular reasoning, the concept of middle power will have to be defined in other terms. Characterisations based on assessments of power point in the right direction, though to be really useful they would need a little more statistical precision and political detachment than was .COmmonly applied in the writings of the 1 960s and early 1 970s. Despite its advantages, a simple classification based on population atatistics, even when related to levels of economic development, 'would scarcely be adequate for identifying the middle powers of the ,modern world. Definitions derived from relevant economic data but l,lrawn up with an eye to the current policies of particular powers could have only limited applicability. And definitions in terms of military power measured as actual or potential possession of a 'certain type afforce would be too closely linked with the immediate atrategic situation and current armament policies to be of more lasting value. But each of these ways of identifying middle powers draws attention to an element of national power which must not be ignored in an attempt to evolve a more suitable system of classifying the powers of the world. 3.2

RANKING OF POWERS

Not all of the terms in which great powers may be defined can be adapted for use in the definition of the concept of middle powers. A state is a great power not only because it commands military strength and economic resources of the highest order but also because it enjoys a certain status and belongs to a special class in international society. Its status is acknowledged in international law and respected in diplomatic practice. Despite their efforts in the early years of both the League of Nations and the United Nations to secure some recognition of their own, the middle powers have no such formal standing in international society. Though political scientists have developed various methods for measuring the

76

Middle Powers in International Politics

relative status carried by states in political and social intercourse and have used their data to rank and classify nations, 1 7 their divisions are recognised in neither law nor diplomacy. That the great powers belong to a class of their own and, despite their rivalries, share certain interests in international politics is clear to most members of the society of states. In the habit of claiming superior rights and accepting special responsibilities, these powers often cast themselves as the managers of international relations. At the end of major wars, fo.r example, they, or some of them, generally take the lead in arranging the peace settlement and restoring the international system, usually reserving a controlling influence for themselves in post-war politics. In such situations, any attempt on the part of secondary powers to gain admittance to the top council generally serves only to emphasise the exclusiveness of the great­ power class. Despite their name, which suggests a class structure on the pattern of the most familiar national societies, middle powers do not constitute a class to nearly the same extent as the great powers do. For one thing, the division between them and those below in the international hierarchy is far less marked than the distinction between the great powers and themselves, which makes it less easy to group them together conceptually. For another, their shared interests are not so substantial and lasting as those of the great powers, which makes it more difficult to develop a clal's conscious­ ness. For the great powers, the need to defend their collective authority against challenges from below and the concern to maintain their superior position against would-be great powers can be strong incentives to restrain their rivalry and, sometimes, even to concert their policies. Middle powers have no such obvious shared interests to defend against challenges from smaller powers. In extreme situations of joint oppression by the great powers, as we shall see in later chapters, they may move closer to each other in defence of the rights of the lesser powers; and on particular issues of great and general importance to middle-ranking powers they, or some of them, may take a joint stand. But, generally, middle powers are not able to achieve and to maintain even that minimum degree of solidarity which has allowed the great powers of modern history to appear as a distinct class of international society. Middle powers, it seems, can be distinguished best in terms of the strength they possess and the power they command. If the power of a nation is defined as its ability to impose its will on other states and to resist attempts by other states to impose on itself, the force, or

The Hierarchy cif Powers

77

strength, of a nation may be defined as the means by which it exercises this power. An attempt to estimate the power of a nation usually starts with an effort to evaluate the force at its disposal. But total force is made up of several elements, including military, economic and moral, each of which comprises many components and some of which are more difficult to measure than others. What is more, the relative importance and mutual dependence of these elements are uncertain and varying. And the distinctions between potential and actual force and between defensive and offensive power point to additional difficulties of estimating accurately the ,power of nations. 1 8 '' It is not surprising that most of the earlier writers who attempted ,lib analyse the concept of international power refrained from ,quantifying the factors they listed as the elements of force, and that those who actually tried to calculate power applied only the crudest 1indicators, such as area, population, size of army, etc. In more recent !decades, however, there has been a marked tendency to look for 'greater precision in the measuring of power. Refined statistical ,methods have been applied to a considerable variety of data in the !�arch for reliable indicators. Generally the focus has been on eeonomic factors. In 1 954 Kingsley Davis proposed total national �ncome, the grand result of all the productive forces at a nation's command, as the best index of national power. 1 9 But it was in the '.1960s that the attempt to quantify power got under way seriously. , O ne of the earlier and more elaborate efforts was Clifford German's. Under the four headings of economy, land, population, and military power, he took account of many factors. Accepting the impossibility of achieving absolute scientific detachment, he deliberately applied selective and subjective criteria in combining and comparing the different qualities. Having in this manner developed an overall index for 'a tentative evaluation of world power', he used it for ranking and classifying nineteen powers of the late 1 950s. 2 0 A. F. K. Organski, also searching for such an index, started with a long list of elements of national power but reduced it to what he regarded as the three most important determinants, namely popu­ lation, political development and economic development. Through further simplification he ended up with gross national product as his sole index. 2 1 Later writers developed yet other methods of assessing the relative power of nations. 2 2 A survey of this literature of the 1 960s and early 1 970s suggests a number of conclusions. First, in the search for precision in the

78

Middle Powers in International Politics

estimation of national power, there was a tendency to concentrate on factors that could be measured, especially economic ones, at the expense of those that were less measurable, such as the moral ones. Second, in choosing among several factors and weighting their relative importance, there was an unavoidable element of subjec­ tivity and arbitrariness. Third, the quest, as was to be expected, produced no entirely satisfactory index, whether simple or com­ bined. If measurements of force cannot be exact, we may conclude that �stimates of power can be only approximate. But the attempts of the 1 960s and 1 970s to reach as close an approximation as possible show also that some indicators of national power are more reliable and useful than others. The case for GNP seems particularly strong. This quantity reflects most of the material and moral factors that make up power, including population, area, location, resources, organisation and leadership. Since it is essen­ tially a measure of economic strength, it indicates potential as much as actual military power, and therefore neither overrates countries that for reasons of choice or necessity have assumed a military posture much higher than they may maintain in the long run, nor underrates countries that have not had occasion to convert a sizable proportion of their economic force into military strength. It correlates highly with a number of much more complex and elaborate indices of power, such as German's. 2 3 What is more, it corresponds fairly closely to most people's impressions of the relative power of nations. 2 4 Finally, carefully calculated figures for GNP are readily available. However, when used as the sole indicator of power, GNP has a number oflimitations and presents certain difficulties. One difficulty relates to the phenomenon sometimes described as 'rank incon­ sistency'. 2 6 Though there is a tendency for rankings of states to be concordant, in the sense that a state that ranks high, or low, according to one indicator, tends to rank high, or low, according to other indicators as well, more or less striking exceptions occur not infrequently. Thus, a country that on the basis of GNP alone would assume a certain rank, might find itself in a much higher, or much lower, position when ranked with reference to a more specific indicator of power, for example population, area or armed forces. In other words, although GNP directly or indirectly expresses a great many factors of power, it may not in all cases adequately reflect particular strengths or particular weaknesses. There are also statistical problems that limit the comparability of GNP figures of

The Hierarchy of Powers

79

different countries. One is that of relating different currencies, another that of allowing for the tendency of less commercialised countries, such as the socialist states of Eastern Europe, to restrict their data to material output and to exclude the service component, which is normally included in the figures of other countries. 2 6 Finally, when applying this indicator to historical material, one is limited to the last half century, as the concept of GNP was first introduced in the 1 930s. But, given that the aim here is not so much to rank the nations of the world in exact order of power as simply to distinguish an intermediate category of powers, such shortcomings may not present insuperable obstacles to using the criterion of GNP. Though only a crude measure of relative power, this figure seems adequate at least as a primary indicator. In marginal cases, however, it may be necessary to take account of other relevant data as well. For the long term in particular, size of population can be a useful supplementary indicator, since it normally is more permanent than GNP. For the short term, size ofarmed forces, amount of military expenditure and quantity of particular armaments may be more useful as secondary indicators, because they express actual military strength. In the future, possession of nuclear weapons in more than symbolic numbers might become a more relevant criterion than it is now, when most middle powers do not have these arms. But no matter how many auxiliary indicators of power are brought into play, deciding the category of a marginal power may be in the last resort also a matter of personal judgement. If the first step in distinguishing the middle powers of the contemporary international system is to rank the states of the world according to their GNP, the next step is to draw the dividing lines in the hierarchy of power. For our purposes, it is enough to make two divisions, one that separates the middle powers from those above them, the great powers, and one that divides them from those below, the minor powers and the various categories of small states. The upper dividing line is the easier to draw. As is generally the case, the great powers are few in number and are recognised by nearly all other members of the system as being in a class of their own. The only marginal case here is China. Its huge population and large area together with its considerable strategic-military capability, ideo­ logical appeal and political leadership allowed it in the decades after the break with the Soviet Union to assume an autonomous role at the top level of international politics. For the purposes of its

80

Middle Powers in International Politics

interaction with the superpowers in the diplomatic triangle of the 1 970s, it was deemed a great power. Yet, its GNP, below Japan's and the richest West European countries', and its nuclear capa­ bility, perhaps not superior to France's for example, indicate that it is still only one of the leading middle powers of the world. The other great powers of the early years of the United Nations, the United Kingdom and France, now fit naturally into this group of middle powers as well. Since the mid- 1 950s, their occasional appearances in the part of great powers have been less than convincing. The defeated great powers of the Second World War, Germany, Japan and Italy, also find their places among the middle powers of today. Though both japan and West Germany score very high on GNP, it is only in economic terms that they could be called great powers. Indicators of armed force, particularly of strategic weapons, place them clearly among the middle powers. Thus, with only the two superpowers in the great-power category, all secondary powers will here be classed as middle powers. Since middle powers enjoy no legal or conventional status to separate them from lesser states, the lower dividing line is bound to be more arbitrary. Deciding where to draw it is complicated by the fact that no single minimum qualification for inclusion in the category, whether expressed in GNP or in terms of any other indicator, can produce a reasonably satisfactory result throughout the system. Since it is mainly in relation to the other states of its region that a middle power stands out as something more than a minor power or small state, and since the level of power of the more prominent of these lesser states is far from uniform, or even comparable, throughout the various regions of the world, any precise limit is bound to produce an anomalous division when applied universally. If, instead of a single, sharply drawn line, a fairly broad and accommoda�ing range of separation were used, so many marginal cases would arise that the outcome would be equally unsatisfactory. The system of division must be one that allows us to include in our category, for example, Mexico, which geographically is between the United States and a large number of small states and therefore clearly in an intermediate position in the regional hierarchy of powers, without having to include also Belgium and the Netherlands, countries that, though one has a GNP not very much lower and the other one considerably higher than Mexico's, do not now, without their colonies, fit naturally into the category of middle powers. The system must also enable us to include, for example,

The Hierarchy if Powers

81

South Africa, the strongest power in Africa, without compelling us to take in Denmark as well; and Indonesia, with a population of about 1 50 million, without requiring us to include Austria and Switzerland too. The most suitable approach, it seems, is first to consider each region by itself and draw the line of separation at whichever level a division between middle and lesser powers seems most natural, and then to compare the results from region to region and see to what extent it is possible to achieve some uniformity of standards throughout the system, or part of it. This method involves dividing the world into regions. For our purposes, a simple geographical .division seems preferable to one based on established patterns of interaction among states. Though some regional patterns of intercourse stand out from the general background of international politics, there is so much overlapping of relationships from area to area that it does not seem possible to divide the global states system into clearly segregated regional sub-systems. In the tables on the following pages, the states of the world have been arranged into the six geographical groups that have become conventional for the purpose of presenting international statistics, namely those of Africa, Asia, Europe, North and Central America, South America, and Oceania and Indonesia. Within each group the states have been ranked in order of GNP on the basis of 1 975 data, and population figures for the same year have been added. 2 7 More recent data are not necessarily preferable, because most of the observations and generalisations about the conduct and role of modern middle powers to be presented in the following chapters are based more on historical material from the last few decades than on the record of the late 1 970s and early 1 980s. It follows, however, that there is some need to take account of trends in the statistics of individual countries over the period with which we are most concerned. Not all states that in the mid- 1 970s scored high enough on GNP to be included in the category of middle powers might have done so fifteen or twenty years earlier, while a few that did not qualify in 1 975 might well have done so at an earlier stage. What is more, certain countries here still in the category of minor powers and small states are likely in the not-too-distant future to pass what then will be deemed the minimum requirement for qualifying as middle powers. Yet, in most cases the relative positions of states in the international hierarchy of power do not alter radically within a few decades.

82

Middle Powers in International Politics TABLE 3.1

I South Africa 2 Nigeria 3 Algeria 4 Libya 5 Egypt, Arab Republic of 6 Morocco 7 Ghana 8 Sudan 9 Tunisia I 0 Ivory Coast I I Rhodesia 1 2 Zaire 1 3 Kenya 14 Ethiopia 1 5 Uganda 1 6 Tanzania 1 7 Zambia 18 Cameroon 19 Angola 20 Senegal 2 1 Madagascar 22 Mozambique 23 Gabon 24 Reunion 25 Namibia 26 Guinea 27 Congo, People's Republic of the 28 Malawi 29 Upper Volta 30 Liberia 3 1 Sierra Leone 32 Niger 33 Togo 34 Mauritius 35 Mali 36 Chad 37 Rwanda 38 Mauritania 39 Burundi 40 Benin 4 1 Central African Empire 42 Somalia 43 Botswana

Africa

GNP at market prices ( 1975) ( US$ millions)

Population ( mid-1975)

32 270 25 600 1 3 680 1 3 510 9 540 7 860 5 860 4 1 40 4 090 3 630 3 460 3 450 2 970 2 730 2 680 2 440 2 090 2 050 2 030 1 800 I 720 1 640 1 360 960 860 750 670 660 640 640 610 590 560 540 530 460 430 420 410 390 390 340 230

25 470 75 023 1 5 747 2 442 37 230 16 680 9 870 1 5 550 5 594 6 700 6 3 10 24 72 1 1 3 350 27 950 1 1 556 1 4 738 4 920 7 435 5 470 5 000 8 833 9 240 536 500 880 5 540 1 329 5 044 6 032 1 549 2 982 4 592 2 220 883 5 69 7 4 035 4 1 37 1 322 3 732 3 1 10 I 787 3 1 80 666

((}()0)

83

The Hierarchy of Powers TABLE 3. 1

44 Swaziland

45 Djibouti .46 Lesotho 47 Equatorial Guinea 48 Gambia, The :49 Cape Verde 50 Guinea-Bissau 51 Comoros 52 Sao Tome and Principe 53 Seychelles M Spanish Sahara (former)

(continued)

GNP at market prices ( 1975) ( USS millions)

Population ( mid-1975) (000)

220 200 1 90 1 00 90 80 70 70 4{) 30 not available

494 1 05 1 21 7 320 519 290 530 333 80 57 1 17

.The figures for the African states (Table 3 . 1 ) present an obvious break between South Mrica and Nigeria at the top of the list and Algeria, Libya and the Arab Republic of Egypt in the following positions. It seems reasonable to include both South Africa, the strongest power on the continent, and Nigeria, the richest and most populous nation in black Africa, among the middle powers and to exclude Algeria and Libya, with only about half the GNP of Nigeria and much smaller populations . This means leaving out also Egypt, which despite its high military posture throughout most of the years of the struggle with Israel has a GNP less than a third of South Africa's and a population about half of Nigeria's. In the Asian figures (Table 3 . 2 ) , there is a fairly suitable break between Iran, with a GNP of 55 5 1 0 million dollars and a population of more than 33 million, and Saudi Arabia, with a considerably smaller GNP and a population of less than one-fourth . To draw the line there means counting among the minor powers Iraq , with its ambitious armaments programme and willingness to challenge Iran, Israel, with its extremely high military posture (which may include possession of the nuclear bomb ) but small area and population, and Pakistan , with its large population and record of military conflict with India, as well as a number of other countries with GNP figures higher than those of these three powers. It also means grouping Iran together with Japan and I ndia, which have either GNP or population figures many times greater than Iran's, though lower defence expenditures . But when the Asian table is

84

Middle Powers in International Politics TABLE 3.2

Asia

G.NP at market prices ( 1975) ( USS millions)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14 15 16 I7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

Japan China, People's Republic of India Iran Saudi Arabia Korea, Republic of Philippines Kuwait China, Republic of Thailand Iraq Israel Pakistan Malaysia United Arab Emirates Hong Kong Bangladesh Korea, Democratic People's Republic of Singapore Syrian Arab Republic Sri Lanka Burma Lebanon Qatar Afghanistan Oman Nepal Mongolia Jordan Yemen Arab Republic Brunei Bahrain Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of Lao People's Democratic Republic Macao Bhutan Maldives Viet Nam Cambodia

Population (mid-1975) (000)

496 260 3 1 5 250 85 960 55 5 1 0 33 240 1 9 850 1 5 930 1 5 270 1 4 890 1 4 600 1 3 880 1 3 1 60 1 1 270 9 340 8 880 7 700 7 280

I l l 570 822 800 608 072 33 390 8 296 35 280 42 23 1 I 005 1 6 000 4 1 870 I I 1 20 3 469 69 229 1 2 308 653 4 367 78 600

7 1 00 5 510 5 330 3 540 3 320 3 290 2 200 2 060 I 790 1 340 1 250 1 240 I 210 950 580

1 5 848 2 250 7 410 1 3 603 30 1 70 3 1 64 200 1 3 700 773 1 2 587 1 446 2 700 5 936 1 55 260

410 300 220 80 10 not available not available

1 677 3 200 277 I 1 76 1 18 47 600 not available

The Hierarchy of Powers

85

related to the African, this does not seem too unreasonable a division, since Iran has a GNP more than twice as big as Nigeria's and a population a third larger than South Africa's. In Europe (Table 3.3) , not only the former great powers should be classed as middle powers but also Spain and Poland, whose TABLE 3.3

1 USSR 2 Germany, Federal Republic of 3 France 4 United Kingdom 5 Italy 6 Spain 7 Poland 8 Netherlands 9 Sweden 1 0 German Democratic Republic I I Belgium 1 2 Switzerland 1 3 Czechoslovakia 14 Austria 15 Turkey 1 6 Denmark 1 7 Yugoslavia 18 Norway 1 9 Roumania 20 Finland 2 1 Hungary 22 Greece 2 3 Bulgaria 24 Portugal 2 5 Ireland 26 Luxembourg 27 Iceland 28 Albania 29 Cyprus 30 Malta 3 1 Channel Islands 32 Gre�:: nland 33 Faroe Islands 34 Isle of Man 35 Gibraltar

Europe

GNP at market prices

Population

( 1975) ( USS millions)

( mid-1975)

649 470 4 1 2 480 3 1 4 080 2 1 1 700 1 56 590 97 1 40 88 320 78 550 66 830 65 830 6 1 470 53 840 53 450 36 650 36 030 34 450 33 080 27 1 1 0 26 450 25 520 22 690 2 1 320 1 8 420 1 5 060 7 470 2 1 50 I 320 1 220 780 460 380 220 200 1 20 90

254 393 6 1 830 52 790 55 960 55 8 1 0 35 348 34 022 1 3 650 8 200 1 6 850 9 799 6 400 1 4 820 7 520 40 1 98 5 060 2 1 350 4010 2 1 245 4 7 10 1 0 541 9 10 1 8 722 9 57 7 3 1 30 358 223 2 405 630 328 1 27 48 40 60 29

(000)

86

Middle Powers in International Politics

existence as powers of intermediate rank may be traced back far beyond the early years of the League of Nations, Spain's to the nineteenth and Poland's to the eighteenth century. The line should be drawn above the Netherlands, which since the loss of its colonies is, like Belgium, no more than a very rich small country. This means excluding Sweden as well as Yugoslavia, both of which sometimes have found their way into lists of middle powers, though usually on account of their policies of armed neutrality and stubborn non­ alignment rather than because of their actual strength and resources. It also means leaving out East Germany and Czechoslovakia, whose GNPs are smaller than the Netherlands' and whose populations are less than half of Spain's and Poland's, and Turkey, which has a large population but a GNP little bigger than Denmark's. In North and Central America (Table 3.4) it is easier to draw the dividing line. Canada, which has a GNP bigger than several European middle powers' and a record as principal champion of TABLE 3.4

North aad Ceatral Am.eric:a

GNP at market prices (1975) ( US$ millions) I United States

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

Canada Mexico Cuba Puerto Rico Guatemala Dominican Republic Jamaica Trinidad and Tobago Panama Costa Rica El Salvador Nicaragua Honduras Haiti Martinique Bahamas Guadeloupe Virgin Islands (US) Netherlands Antilles Bermuda

I 5 1 9 890

1 58 1 00 63 200 7 460 7 1 20 3 590 3 390 2 2 70 2 1 70 2 1 50 1 890 1 830 1 580 I 050 850 770 630 490 480 410 360

Population (mid-1975)

({}{)()) 2 1 3 540 22 830 59 928 9 332 3 090 6 2 75 4 695 2 042 I 082 1 668 1 965 4 006 2 26 1 2 890 4 584 325 204 325 95 242 53

The Hierarchy of Powers TABLE 3.4

(continued) GNP at market prices ( 1975) ( USS millions)

22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

30

350 230 90 60 60 40 40 40 30

Barbados Canal Zone Belize St Lucia Antigua Grenada St Vincent Dominica St Kitts-Nevis

TABLE 3.5

Population ( mid- 1975)

(000)

246 44 1 40 107 71 1 10 90 75 49

South America

GNP at market prices ( 1975) ( USS millions) I Brazil 2 Argentina 3 Venezuela 4 Colombia 5 Peru 6 Chile 7 Ecuador 8 Uruguay 9 Bolivia 10 Paraguay I I Surinam 12 Guyana 13 French Guyana

87

1 1 0 1 30 39 330 27 320 1 3 630 I I 670 1 0 1 30 4 1 80 3 600 2 040 I 470 500 400 1 00

Population ( mid- 1975)

(000)

1 06 996 25 383 I I 993 23 576 15 387 1 0 253 7 069 2 764 5 634 2 553 368 770 56

such powers in the United Nations, and Mexico, whose closest competitors in terms of GNP are Cuba and Puerto Rico, are not only obvious but the only possible candidates for inclusion in our category. South America (Table 3.5) , too, presents no problem. Only Brazil and Argentina, which since their independence in the nineteenth century together with Mexico have been the principal powers of Latin America, can be included. None of the powers below them, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru and Chile, is in the same class. 2 8

88

Middle Powers in International Politics

Finally, from Oceania and Indonesia (Table 3.6) we can admit only Australia and Indonesia, since the next states on the list are New Zealand and Papua New Guinea. Australia has a GNP figure between Mexico's and India's, and huge resources, but a popu­ lation smaller than that of any other member ofour class. Indonesia, on the other hand, has a population considerably larger than both Brazil's and Japan's but a GNP not much more than twice New Zealand's. Yet all the other countries within this geographical group are far inferior to both Australia and Indonesia in GNP as well as in population and area. TABLE 3.6

Oceania and Indonesia

GNP at market prices ( 1975) ( US$ millions) I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14 15

Australia Indonesia New Zealand Papua New Guinea Fiji Guam New Caledonia French Polynesia American Samoa Pacific Islands, Trust Territory of the Gilbert Islands Solomon Islands Western Samoa New Hebrides Tonga

Population ( mid-1975) ( 000)

77 0 1 0 29 1 20 1 3 1 30 1 290 620 610 600 380 1 60

1 3 500 1 32 1 1 2 3 0 70 2 756 569 1 08 1 35 1 38 29

1 20 60 50 50 50 40

1 16 53 1 90 1 52 97 99

A comparison of the levels of division between middle powers and lesser states in the six groups shows a fairly close correspondence, except in the case of Europe. Excluding for the moment this area, we find that the three middle powers with the lowest GNP figures are Nigeria with 25 600, Indonesia with 29 1 20 and South Africa with 32 270 million dollars, and that the only overlap with the category of minor powers and small states is of Saudi Arabia at 33 240 and Venezuela at 27 320 million dollars. Thus, if we want a degree of uniformity of standards throughout the five areas, we may lay down as the 1 975 minimum requirement for being a middle power a GNP of 25 000 million dollars, and then exclude Saudi

The Hierarchy of Powers

89

�rabia and Venezuela. The relatively small populations of these

(bun tri es together with their very high dependence on one �modity would make it difficult to include them. Alternatively, We may fix the minimum at 35 000 million dollars and, relaxing the liiq uirem ent of uniformity of standards a little, upgrade South 'tffii ca, Nigeria and Indonesia by weighting the figures for their two �ons. The intermediate figure of 28 000 million marks the more precise point of division, because it requires us to exclude only one �te, Saudi Arabia, and to upgrade only one power, Nigeria. \ · In Europe, the part of the world with the highest number of small f'ates at an advanced level of development, the minimum qualifi­ �pon for being counted a middle power must be much higher. The $NP figure that would allow us to include Poland and Spain and to ' clude the Netherlands and countries further down the list would it � about 85 000 million dollars, which is roughly three times the �re suggested for the rest of the world. One difficulty about ti*ving different standards for different areas is that comparable �tries that lie close to each other and maintain some interaction JjJUt belong to separate areas may be treated unequally. Under the ')'s tem of divisions used here, Turkey and Iran may present such a pile. IfTurkey, with a GNP worth more than 36 000 million dollars and a population of more than 40 million, could have been classed pnder Asia, it would have qualified as a middle power under the limits proposed. Yet in Europe, according to our criterion, it is only of the smaller powers. However, even this fairly ,� eighth-strongest •treme case does not seem so anomalous when it is considered that :Turkey regards itself as part of Europe and is a long-standing member of a military alliance which has its centre in the North Atlantic, while Iran is clearly an Asian power. On the whole, given the elusiveness of the concept of national power and the hetero­ geneity of international society, the system of classifying the powers of the 1 970s proposed here may be as equitable and convenient as is possible. 2 9 Thus we end up with a list of eighteen middle powers, six from Europe, four from Asia and two from each of the other four geographical areas (see Table 3.7) . The most striking feature of this list is the huge disparity of wealth and size, ranging from a GNP of little more than 25 000 million to one of nearly 500 000 million and from a population of under 1 4 million to one of over 800 million. The middle powers with a GNP worth more than 200 000 million dollars may be seen as forming a subordinate class of their own. They are all former, or successors of ·.

90

Middle Powers in International Politics Table 3.7

Japan Germany, Federal Republic of China, People's Republic of France United Kingdom Canada I taly ·Brazil Spain Poland India Australia Mexico Iran Argentina South Africa Indonesia Nigeria

GNP at market prices ( 1975) ( USS millions)

Population ( mid-1975) (000)

496 260 4 1 2 480 3 1 5 250 3 1 4 080 2 1 1 700 1 58 1 00 1 56 590 1 1 0 1 30 97 1 40 88 320 85 960 77 0 1 0 63 200 55 5 1 0 39 330 32 270 29 1 20 25 600

I l l 5 70 6 1 830 822 800 52 790 55 960 22 830 55 8 1 0 1 06 996 35 348 34 022 608 072 1 3 500 59 928 33 390 25 383 25 470 1 32 1 1 2 75 023

former, great powers. Three of them, the United Kingdom, France and China, were accepted as great powers at the end of the Second World War and were given permanent seats on the Security Council of the United Nations. Hence they still enjoy a formal status in international society not shared by any other middle power. More important, they possess substantial quantities of nuclear weapons, which make them strategically superior to all other middle powers and second only to the superpowers. The other two, West Germany and Japan, started the post-war period with the handicap of being the principal defeated powers of the Second World War. But their recovery was so rapid and sweeping that their economic strength for long has exceeded that of any other middle power. Sometimes the five are referred to as 'secondary powers' or, when considered in relation to the superpowers, as 'other major powers'. While the former term suggests that they constitute a separate class of states rather than a section within a wider class, the latter implies that they belong, albeit in an inferior capacity, to the top set of the society of states. Given that the aim of the present enquiry is to find out what middle powers may have in common and

The Hierarchy of Powers

91

what may distinguish them from other classes of states, a more suitable name here for the five is 'upper middle powers'. The remaining middle powers are a mixed group. There are old­ states, such as Spain, Poland and Brazil, which long tablished es have enjoyed a middle position in the hierarchy of the international system as well as fairly newly independent states, such as India, Indonesia and Nigeria, which much more recently have found a place at this level. There are some that are wealthy and industrially advanced and others that are relatively poor but rapidly develop­ ing, some that are stable and largely satisfied and others that are restless and potentially ambitious. Finally, when all the eighteen middle powers are viewed together in the perspective of recent history, one more difference is worth noting. While some of them, pre-eminently Canada, often have appeared highly conscious of being middle powers, others most of the time clearly have not seen themselves as such. The latter group includes two extreme types. One is the upper middle power which occasionally has insisted on, or at least never objected to, being counted with the great powers, France under de Gaulle reviving the post-war idea of the Big Four being one of the best examples. The other type is the middle power which, temporarily at least, has assumed an international posture so low and inconspicuous as to suggest that it would prefer to be ranked with the minor powers and small states, Franco's Spain ostracised by Western Europe being one possible example and post-war Japan stigmatised by its former enemies another. While all belonging to this very wide intermediate range in the power structure of the states system, the middle powers of the contemporary world apparently form a highly heterogeneous group in almost every significant respect. This suggests that any similarity that may be observed in their international conduct and any generalisation that may be formulated about their systemic role are likely to flow not so much from a set of inherent characteristics and inclinations shared by such powers as from various external pressures and incentives to which they are exposed. The nature and force of such outside influences are determined essentially by the number of great powers in the system and by the relationships that exist between or among them. The way some middle powers tend to react to the more typical situations of the several basic forms of the international political system, and the various roles they may play in such situations, form the subject of the remaining chapters.

4 The U nifocal System The traditional term for an international system that is made up of one great power and a number of lesser states is 'empire'. For the purpose of an enquiry into the international relations of a particular class of lesser powers, it has the disadvantage of implying the existence of a certain type of political relationship between the principal power and the other members of the system. The terminology introduced by writers of the 'dependence' school, which turns on distinctions such as between 'centre' and 'periphery' or 'metropolis' and 'satellites', is equally unsatisfactory, because it focuses too exclusively on the economic inequality of the relation­ ship. One of the more neutral, ifless attractive, labels used by some American writers, namely 'unicentral', 'unipolar' or 'unifocal system', seems preferable. The latter is the term that will be used here. The best way of ascertaining the nature of the roles that middle powers tend to assume in unifocal situations would be to examine their actual conduct in a variety of international systems presided over by one great power. However, the modern history of Europe and the world does not present a large number of such cases. While, from one point ofview, the record of the states system may appear as a long series of attempts by one great power after the other to establish just this type of international order, the bids for hegemony have usually failed. As a result of the operation of the balance of power, the basic structure of international society has generally been dualistic or multiple rather than unifocal. The older history of European civilisation, especially the mediaeval and the Roman, and the records of some non-European systems of the past, for example the Chinese, undoubtedly contain material of some interest. But the different nature of those systems is likely to make most such material, even when it is accessible, ·of only limited relevance to a modern enquiry into the role of middle powers. The most promising field appears to be the inter-American system, which since the last decades of the nineteenth century has had only 92

The Unifocal System

93

one great power and which has gone through several distinct phases of development. For long periods of its earlier history it was largely self-contained, while at other times it was linked more or less closely to the European system. More recently it has become a sub-system of the global structure of international politics. Another unifocal system that might be worth looking at is that of contemporary Eastern Europe. But as a subject for a general study of the role of middle powers, it seems inferior to the inter-American in at least four respects. First, having been always a sub-system, it has no record of separate existence and autonomous functioning comparable to that of the inter-American. Second, with only 'Poland in our category of middle powers and with the German :Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia not far below in the scale 'Ofpower, it does not offer a class of middle powers so substantial and so clearly marked off from the rest of the states in the system as does the inter-American. Third, with a much shorter history, it cannot present a set of inter-state relationships so long and varied and patterns of interaction so well defined as those of the inter­ American. Fourth, since it is of so recent origin and has been always under the sway of the Soviet Union, the material it offers about its international relations is far less accessible than that of the inter­ American system. Yet, it should not be ignored. The conduct of Poland within Eastern Europe obviously helps to throw light on the role of middle powers in a particular type of unifocal situation. Though apparently more suitable for case study than any other, the inter-American system is far from perfect for our purposes. Few of the patterns of political interaction it displayed were products solely of forces within the system. Since the world beyond the hemisphere never was a political vacuum and since attempts to seal off the system rarely were successful, inter-American relations were periodically quite strongly affected by links with other international systems. These links took two broad forms, namely involvement of the great power in the affairs of the central or the global system and political interaction between individual lesser powers and various members of other systems. Despite its occasional excursions into European politics, the traditional policy of the United States was to stay out of the conflicts of the old great powers. While the First World War represented a break in the continuity of this posture, the Second World War, followed by the post-war engagement in global politics, meant the end of the old isolationism. Both the temporary and the more

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permanent departures from the traditional position affected re­ lations within the hemisphere. Particularly the acceptance of extra­ hemispheric responsibilities after 1 945 put a strain on US relations with Latin America. In the first post-war years, when the United States devoted a great deal of effort to the economic recovery of Europe, the Latin Americans were dissatisfied to find their own part of the world so low in Washington's scale of priorities. In the earlier years of the Cold War, when the United States concluded alliances with states in various parts of the world and undertook commit­ ments far beyond the hemisphere, Latin American governments became concerned about the danger of being drawn into extra­ continental conflict. The growing tension between a world power pre-eminently concerned with the build-up and support of its extra­ continental allies and a group of states almost exclusively absorbed in their own economic development became an important factor in the shaping of the pattern of interaction within the system. If it was in the years of the First World War and in the period since the beginning of the Second World War that the inter-American system was most disturbed by US relations with extra-hemispheric powers, it must be in the pre- 1 9 1 4 age and in the inter-war period that, as far as this difficulty is concerned, the best material for our study is likely to be found. Political interaction between Latin American states and extra­ continental powers, the source of the other set of extraneous influences in the system, may be looked at both from the point of view of the outsiders that interfered in the region and from that of the regional states that established links with outside powers. In the earlier part of the nineteenth century, when the Monroe Doctrine and the power of the United States gave only limited protection, European powers quite often intervened in Latin America, some­ times also with military means. In the 1 830s and 1 840s, when the United States was busy asserting itself in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, both France and Britain took a hand in Latin American affairs. In the 1 840s and 1 850s the United States and Britain clashed in Central America, until they reached a detente and came to an understanding. During the Civil War both France and Spain took advantage of America's weakness, particularly France in Mexico. Not till after the Civil War did the strength of the United States become a real discouragement for European powers with ambitions in the region. Subsequently these powers became increasingly preoccupied with the balance of power in Europe and

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their rivalries in Africa and Asia. In the later part of the century, when the ability and determination of the United States to protect the Americas grew, and tension in Europe rose, the incidence of European intervention in the hemisphere declined markedly. Apart from various attempts by enemies of the United States in the two world wars to establish links with some of its less reliable allies and certain other states in Latin America, not till the Russo-American Cold War did the challenge of foreign intervention in the region reappear in a serious form. First the Soviet Union gained a foothold in Cuba. Later China showed an interest in some of the middle­ ranking South American powers, particularly Peru, Chile and Colombia. More recently the Soviet Union, fronted by Cuba, threatened to engage itself in the civil conflict in El Salvador. And in 1982 Britain went to war with Argentina over possession of the island group known to the British as the Falklands. It seems that, as regards the difficulty presented by the incidence of diplomatic and military intervention by overseas powers, the best period for a study of the inter-American system starts some time after the Civil War and ends after the beginning of the Cold War, but excludes the two world wars. Sometimes the initiative for developing links with outside powers came from Latin American states themselves. While the Monroe Doctrine helped to safeguard Latin America against encroachments from Europe, it offered no real protection against the overwhelming power of the United States. Indeed, the more effectively the United States excluded other great powers from the hemisphere, the more open the region was to the penetration of US influence. To deal with this threat, individual Latin American states occasionally resorted to exploiting the rivalries of the great powers, sometimes going as far as seeking the support of an overseas power against the United States. At one time or another each of the three secondary powers in the system was drawn towards such a policy of calling in the old world to redress the balance of the new. During the First World War Mexico, then burdened by very strained relations with the United States, took advantage of the latter's involvement in Europe by fraternising with Germany. In the Second World War Argentina, whose bonds with Europe had always been stronger than any other Latin American state's, left no doubt about its sympathy with the Axis powers. Having refused, at the Inter-American Conference in Rio de janeiro in january 1 942, to join in a declaration ofwar and to break relations with the Axis powers, President Castille found

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many opportunities to support the Germans diplomatically . In the Cold War there was a tendency in some capitals to balance between the blocs instead of supporting the United States. The outstanding example of Latin American non-alignment in the initial period of Russo-American tension was Argentina's ' third position' under Peron . In the early 1 960s Brazil, under the presidencies of Quadros and Goulart, nearly gave up i ts traditional pro-US policy and, in search of a more independent position in the world , set out to improve relations with a number of communist countries, at the same time seeking to identify common interests with the developing nations of Africa and Asia . Lesser Latin American states too, from Colombia in the nineteenth century to Cuba in the Cold War, occasionally pursued the policy of exploiting the rivalries of the great powers. Even the broad regional support for various inter­ national institutions, such as the League of Nations and , in particular, the United Nations, could be seen as attempts to bolster the position of the Latin American countries within the hemisphere by strengthening their bonds with the world beyond . From an early stage, it was in the General Assembly and not in the Security Council, where the United States was the most powerful member, that Latin American countries concentrated their efforts to bring influence to bear. In the case of both the major and the minor Latin American states concerned , it was the involvement of the United States in conflicts beyond the hemisphere which gave them the opportunity to seek greater independence and more influence through this type of policy. If the great power in a unifocal system engages itself in a parallel or a higher system, some of the other members, it seems, are likely to do the same, though they are apt to take positions rather different from that of the great power. If they assume a non-aligned stand or move closer to the opposite side in an extra-systemic conflict, an exacerbation of tension within the unifocal system tends to result. Yet, despite the willingness ofsome states to take advantage of the engagement of the United States in rivalries and wars beyond the region, the Latin American countries only rarely involved them­ selves deeply in extra-continental politics . The reason for this lay not only in the resistance of the United States to attempts by Latin American governments to develop undesirable relations with unfriendly powers outside the hemisphere but also in the attitude of these governments themselves . In general, they were inclined to

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protect the rights and pursue the interests o f their countries by diplomatic activity confined to their own states system. Even in more recent periods, when the Cold War and the East-West detente have presented rather good opportunities for extra-continental dip­ lomacy, this has been their attitude. With the exception of Cuba, the Latin American governments have been wary of using the commun­ ist powers for increasing their diplomatic leverage in the region. Despite periodical attempts by certain powers to find a ' third ' , or non-aligned, position in the global conflict and a widespread tendency to identify with the Third World , they have basically accepted their place in the American hemispheric order, with its mixture of international securi ty and diplomatic imposition , econ­ omic advantage and political dependence. The psychological basis for this acceptance is a certain pan­ American self-awareness, expressed in the notion that ' the peoples of this hemisphere stand in a special relationship to one another which , sets them apart from the rest of the world ' . 1 Rooted in geography and history, this 'Western Hemisphere Idea' is sustained by a set of beliefs, most of them, such as that postulating common domestic institutions and shared political aspirations, mixtures of myth and fact. The foremost political expression of the idea is the inter­ American states system itself. That its members not only have maintained over a very long period a habit of political interaction which stands out from the rest of the international relations of the world but also have developed a network of international insti­ tutions which regulate their various relations with each other makes it clearly recognisable as a system. Despite its several, and serious, shortcomings, the history of this states system provides the best available material for a study of the conduct and role of middle powers in a unifocal system. I n the contemporary context, the middle powers of Latin America have already been identified as Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. 2 These powers, fortunately for our enq uiries, have stood out from the lesser Latin American states and formed a class of their own not only in the most recent times but throughout the period of the inter-American system with which we are here concerned , namely the last hundred years or so. In modern times, the division between them and the others has even found institutional ex­ pression . When the Latin American Free Trade Area ( LAFTA) was created in 1 962, its members were ranked as big, medium and small according to the economic capacity of each . Argentina, Brazil and

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Mexico went into the top group, while Chile, Peru, Colombia, Uruguay and Venezuela went into the middle and the rest into the bottom group . What is more, the economic and political tensions that later developed within the LAFTA group followed broadly the same lines of demarcation, with the clearest conflict of interest being between the three industrial giants and the intermediate group of states . About the identity of the great power there is even less doubt. Throughout the period in q uestion, the only such power in the inter­ American system has been the United S tates. If in a system with two or more great powers it is the nature of the political relationships between these powers that more than any­ thing else determines the international environment of the middle powers, in a system with only one great power the way in which this power uses its preponderance must be a maj or influence in the shaping of the situation of the middle powers. The manner in which it maintains its position and the means by which it pursues its goals, though partly no doubt determined by conditions already prevail­ ing in the region, are bound to affect the conduct and influence the role of the middle powers in the system. For other purposes, Hedley Bull has distinguished three ways in which a great power may exercise preponderance of power over the lesser states in a system : through dominance, through hegemony or through primacy . The distinctions turn on the degree of force employed by the great power and on the measure of willing acceptance offered by the lesser states . While dominance stands for a high degree of coercion and a low degree of acceptance and primacy for the opposite combination, hegemony represents an intermediate pro­ portion . 3 These distinctions seem eq ually useful here . The history of US preponderance in the inter-American system presents periods of both dominance, primacy and hegemony. The part of the story relevant to this enquiry starts in the 1 880s, when the United States, with the Civil War behind it and the danger of challenges from Europe receding, began to promote the pan­ American movement and to form a 'special relationship' with the states of Latin America. In the following years the system acquired the unifoca1 character which has marked it ever since. From late in the century till the end of the 1 920s, when both domestically and internationally the Latin American countries often were in a state of turmoil, the relationship between the great power and the others was broadly one of dominance, with the United States persistently interfering in the affairs of Central America and frequently using

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force in pursuit of its ends. From the early 1 9 30s till some time after the Second World War, when the Latin American countries on the whole were absorbed in domestic affairs, the situation was rather one of primacy, with the Uni ted States subscribing to the principle of non-intervention in Latin American politics and in return receiving a good deal of loyal support from its neighbours in the sou th . From early in the Cold War till well into the East-West detente , when many Latin American countries were economically and politically dependent on the United States, the situation could best be described as one ofhegemony, with the United States usually relying on its economic power and ideological appeal in the region but occasionally interfering with force in defence of i ts interests. While Roosevelt's affirmation of the 'Good Neighbour' policy in 1 933 could be regarded as having marked the starting-point of a new era, the initiation of Kissinger's ' New Dialogue' with Latin America in 1 974 seems to have ushered in only a brief revival of primacy. Each of the three major periods shows some correspondence between the quality of the international environment of the region and the way in which the great power exercised its preponderance. It was in the years of greatest confusion and conflict that the United States used most force, and in the ages of self-absorption and dependence that i t relied more o n the co-operation o f Latin American governments . In each period the United States generally had a Latin American policy, rather than either a Central American, a Caribbean and a South American policy or a special policy towards each of the major countries in the region . It was inclined to pursue its strategic, commercial and ideological interests within a general set of ideas about relations wi th Latin America, a tendency which was encour­ aged by the need to conduct much of the business through inter­ American institutions rather than along bilateral channels . This makes it easier to recognise changes of policy and to distinguish periods of interaction between the great power and the other members of the system . Thus it allows us to relate the international conduct of the middle powers to the way in which the great power brought i ts weigh t to bear. On the other hand , the United States rarely pursued its Latin American policy with the same intensity throughout the region. In the periods of dominance and hegemony, it used force only in Mexico, the Caribbean and Central America, where its concerns were most pressing and its capability for such action greatest. I n South America it showed less determination and relied o n other

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Middle Powers in International Politics

means . Indeed , this difference in the execution of policy was sometimes so marked as to suggest that the Latin American policy of the United States was to be taken seriously only within its 'imperial preserve' . 4 The inclination of the great power to concentrate on the nearer parts of the region means that the conduct of the middle powers must be related not only to the way in which preponderance was exercised but also to the geographical positions in which they were placed . Both tendencies, to evolve a general policy for the region and to pursue it more resolu tely in the nearer parts, may apply to the great power in most unifocal systems that are very large as well as relatively isolated . Whether motivated largely by self-interest or guided also by some sense of responsibility, the power in the focal role seems likely as a rule to require a broad framework of policy to be able to co-ordinate its actions in the system . Except where the region borders on territory controlled by a rival outside the system, which could make the rim countries a particularly sensitive area, the great power also seems likely most of the time to be more concerned with the inner than with the ou ter reaches . If both assumptions are correct, the analytical approach already outlined may be equally well sui ted for unifocal systems other than the one to be examined here.

4. 1

DOM I NANCE

I n the age of dominance, which lasted from the final decade of the nineteenth to the third decade of the twentieth century, the hemispheric policy of the United States provoked very different reactions from the three middle powers in the system. Mexico, immediate neighbour of the United States and potential victim of its imperialism, started by reluctantly submitting to the encroachments on the region from the north . When the United States deprived Spain of its last American colonies and went on to set up its own protectorates in the Caribbean, supported the independence of Panama against Colombia and began to build up its strategic interests in Central America, introduced the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine and made itself the policeman of the hemisphere, there was little that the Mexican dictator Porfirio Diaz could do to protect the rights of his country and citizens . Though he let his representatives at the pan-American and the Hague con-

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ferences espouse certain principles of public and private inter­ national law designed to curb foreign interests , he basically accepted the situation . In the turbulent first years of the Mexican Revolution, when the American ambassador and the State Department, and later also President Wilson, almost constantly meddled in the affairs of the neighbour, backing their interference with economic sanctions and an arms embargo as well as occasional acts of armed intervention, there was again little that Mexican leaders effectively could do. Faced with Wilson's ' moral imperialism', President Huerta tried without much success to lean on Europe for money and arms. His successor Carranza took his stand instead on international law. His insistence on the principle of the territorial integrity of states, it has been noted, put him among the first to develop the doctrine of domestic jurisdiction. 5 After the First World War, which for Mexico had been an opportunity to take advantage of US involvement in Europe, the paramount preoccupation of Mexican foreign policy was still relations with the United States. Tension between the two countries remained high . At the centre of the conflict in the 1 920s were various financial and economic issues, chief among them those relating to Mexican oil . Mexico again rested its case largely on international law, particularly on what became known as the Latin American doctrine of non-intervention , in the formulation and refinement of which Mexicans played a large part. The aim was to make the United States agree that no nation had the right to intervene in the domestic, or even the foreign, affairs of any other nation in the hemisphere . When the Uni ted States refused to accept this prin­ ciple, the matter came to a head at the pan-American conference at Havana in 1 928. By then, however, relations between the two countries had already begun to improve. Presiden t Coolidge sending Dwight Morrow to Mexico as ambassador in 1 92 7 can be seen as marking the beginning of the retreat from imperialism in the regwn. During this first period of US preponderance, Brazil cast itself in a role very different from Mexico's. Far from being a potential victim of the great power, it sought the part of ally and partner of the United States . Earlier in the nineteenth century its closest relations had been with Britain . But these had become strained already in the days of the Brazilian Empire, when the British had tried to stop its slave trade. Instead Dom Pedro I I had begun to develop a

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Middle Powers in International Politics

friendship with the Uni ted States, which implici tly had been directed against the Spanish-American republics. This phase of Brazilian external relations had come to an end with the fall of the Empire in 1 889, which had led to a decade of domestic turmoil. Not till the first decade of the twentieth century did Brazil again develop a firm line in foreign affairs . I ts new policy became identified with Baron Rio Branco, foreign minister from 1 902 till 1 9 1 2 and the foremost Brazilian statesman of the time . For the guidance of his country, he formulated four principles of policy, namely, to increase national prestige abroad , to exercise leadership in Latin America and especially in South America, to give greater emphasis to pan­ Americanism, and to enter into close alliance with the United States . 6 Rather than standing with the Spanish-American states against the Uni ted States, Portuguese Brazil should see its task as bringing the three Americas together under a Brazil-United States axis. To this end, Rio Branco led Brazil into co-operation with Argentina and Chile, which gave rise to the notion of the ABC bloc . In an effort to consolidate the relationship with Washington, he exchanged ambassadors in 1 905, and the following year welcomed the American Secretary of State in Rio de janeiro. That the United States was by then the biggest buyer of Brazilian exports gave the emerging entente a strong commercial base. For decades after these developments, Brazilian foreign policy was guided by Rio Branco's ideas. In 1 9 1 7 Brazil entered the war, the only large Latin American country to join the United States against the Central Powers. After the war, when the United States refused to j oin the League of Nations, Brazil gladly took on the part of the leading power of the western hemisphere in the new organisation . It held a seat on the Council until 1 926, when it withdrew from the League after Germany had been given a permanent seat and Brazil had been denied one . 7 During most of this long period of inter-American relations Argentina took a line almost the opposite of Brazil's. Instead of seeking to become the ally and partner of the United States, it chose the role of opponent and potential rival . This was a part for which both geography and history had made it well suited . Located farthest from the United States, it was less exposed to its domination and better placed to oppose it d iplomatically than any of the other Latin American middle powers. With strong traditional links with Europe, mainly through immigration and trade, it was in a good position to play extra-continental powers against the United States .

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Its closest bonds were with Britain, whose trade and investments and other relations with Argentina in the course of the nineteenth century had grown to proportions so huge that Englishmen eventually could quip that this country was the most loyal dominion of the British Empire. As a result of the relationship with Britain, Argentina was able to use each of the two Anglo-Saxon great powers against the other in order to develop its own independence. This was the policy it pursued in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century . Within Latin America, Argentina sought leadership b y rivalling Brazil and Chile in the military and naval spheres and by challenging the United States in the pan-American movement. The ambitions of the Argentine oligarchy were revealed already at the first pan-American conference in 1 889 . But the clearest manifes­ tation came in 1 902, when its foreign minister issued a statement condemning the use of force by foreign powers for the collection of debts, later known after him as the Drago Doctrine. This declar­ ation, by which Argentina made a bid for diplomatic leadership in the most sensitive of all issues , could be regarded as a challenge to the United States, whose statesmen had been in the habit of regarding the Monroe Doctrine as a unilateral declaration . Two years later Theodore Roosevelt countered by issuing his Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which intimated that the United States intended to keep Latin American countries from getting themselves into such a state as to provoke European intervention. From then on the Argentine attitude to the United States was clearly hostile, the animosity being sustained also by economic competition. Shortly, Argentina, in a clear attempt to capitalise on Spanish-American suspicions of the 'colossus in the north' , made a renewed bid for leadership of Latin America against the United States and its ally Brazil . In the First World War Argentina marked its position against the United States by maintaining diplomatic relations with Germany. In the 1 920s, when Argentina, now under middle-class regimes, went through a strongly nationalist phase, it was as keen as in the days of the pre-war oligarchy to lead Latin America against the United States . Thus, at the Havana conference in 1 928 the Argentine delegate launched a strong attack on the United States under the cover of a general denunciation of the practice of intervention . In the following years, too, Argentina maintained a resolutely unco-operative atti tude towards the United States, for

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example doing its best to obstruct Washington's efforts to end the Chaco War. Again the policy ofopposing the giant was supported by economic considerations , this time to do with the American tariffs , which barred Argentine grain and wool. As in t h e case o f the other middle powers in the system, the stance assumed by Argentina during the period of dominance was not only a reaction to the strategic and political impact of the great power but also an expression of the economic, and even cultural, preoccupations of the nation .

4.2

PRI MACY

In the course of the first half of the 1 930s the political environment of the hemisphere changed profoundly. A situation developed which was characterised by considerably less international turmoil and rather more domestic absorption in the region than in earlier periods. Partly in response to the new conditions, the United States introduced changes in its Latin American policy which went beyond rhetoric and affected the substance of inter-American relations . American policy-makers , having come round to the view that their goals might be achieved more easily through co-operation than through coercion, repudiated the Roosevelt Corollary, reaffirmed the Good Neighbour policy and accepted the doctrine of non­ intervention . Eventually the US government, partly in reaction to the deterioration in the global political situation, went one step further in recognising the rights of the Latin American nations when it accepted the principle of consultation in matters relating to the possibility of an outbreak of a war that might affect the hemisphere. To implement the new policy and give substance to the changed relationships, various conferences were arranged and new inter­ national agencies set up. The three secondary powers in the system reacted variously to the new si tuation . Mexico, which in the age of dominance had moved from the part of reluctant victim to that of outspoken critic, finished the period of primacy as a j unior partner of the United States. I t started b y taking the lead i n demanding ' non-intervention' for Latin America. Thus, at the I nter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, held at Buenos Aires in 1 936, it was the Mexican delegation that initiated the Additional Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention . Imbued with a new self-confidence and a

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greater sense of dignity, which sprang also from favourable domestic developments, Mexican representatives took up a variety of other international causes as well, both in the League of Nations, which it bad joined in 1 93 1 , and elsewhere. The oil expropriation in 1 938, which became the symbol of economic independence, and the successful resistance to the resulting pressures from Britain and the l.Jnited States further increased Mexican self-confidence . By 1 940 Mexico seemed to be drifting towards the Axis powers . But shortly before Pearl Harbour, relations with the United States reached a more harmonious phase, and later on relations with Britain too . After a spell as partner in the ' belligerent neutrality' of the United States, Mexico declared war on the Axis in 1 942 . rough a significant contribution to the war, the Mexican vernment gained some national prestige and strengthened the t-war position of the country. In 1 945 its foreign minister chaired an inter-American meeting at Mexico City arranged to prepare for the United Nations and to discuss other matters affecting post­ war relations between the United States and Latin America . Subseq uently Mexico gained one of the original non-permanent seats in the Security Council. Relations with the United States probably reached their highest point in 1 94 7 , when an exchange of ceremonial visits was arranged . Noting that Mexico was no longer a vassal or an enemy of its neighbour, President Aleman, in an address to a j oint session of the United States Congress, used this occasion to stress that it was only as a partner that his country could join the United States in the pursuit of the hemispheric ideals of peace and progress . 8 I n the same period, Brazil displayed some uncertainty about its regional role. While never q uite abandoning the traditional policy of acting as the main bulwark of the United States in South America, it showed signs in the 1 930s of a growing ambition to go beyond this position in search of a new part in international politics. On the one hand, President Vargas, in office from 1 930 till 1 945, knew that Brazil needed the United States and was careful to keep on good terms with Roosevelt. On the other hand, as leader of a country that was going through a new nationalist phase, he did not hide that he was attracted ideologically by the Axis powers. However, once the war in Europe had broken out, Brazil step by step engaged itself on the side of its traditional ally, finally declaring war in August 1 942. By allowing the United States to maintain bases on its territory, supplying natural resources and even despatching expeditionary

Th � )x>s

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Middle Powers in International Politics

forces, it made a substantial contribution to allied efforts, in return for arms and funds. Thus strategic considerations triumphed over ideological inclinations. While Brazil was moving closer to the United States, Argentina went in the opposite direction . The first reaction of the Argentine government to the change in the regional policy of the U nited States in the early 1 930s was to become a little more co-operative, or at least to reduce its opposition to the great power slightly . But this was only a temporary development. In the middle and late 1 930s, Argentina reverted to the traditional policy of asserting its indepen­ dence of the United States and seeking leadership of the region. Conscious as always of its ties with several European nations, it generally opposed the efforts of Washington to bring about a continental concert of peace and security to deal with the growing danger of war. In particular, it obstructed the establishment of an effective machinery for consultation. After the outbreak of the war in Europe Argentina ·stuck to the policy of neutrality, refusing until a very late stage to break diplomatic relations with the Axis powers and even then failing to deal effectively with their activities within its territory. Under a military government, Argentina at the same time entered into tense rivalry with Brazil, thus once again revealing an ambition to dominate South America. These policies put a strain on the diplomatic relations of Argentina .. The other Latin American states, most of them on the side of the United States in the war and some of them insecure about the ambitions of Argentina, preferred the leadership of the great power to that of the middle power. By the end of the war Argentina was isolated . Excluded from the Chapultepec conference in 1 945, it was subjected to diplomatic pressure in the post-war years as well, especially from the United States. Thus the would-be leader of Spanish America ended up ostracised by all of the Americas. While Mexico and Brazil eventually joined the United States as allies, Argentina took the part of near-enemy. But these develop­ ments, primarily responses to the dangers and temptations presented by the war, were results of events taking place outside the hemisphere rather than effects of conditions prevailing within the system. As indications of the typical conduct and likely roles of middle powers under conditions of primacy, the initial reactions of the three powers to the change in regional policy of the United States may be more reliable than their ultimate diplomatic choices .

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Mexico gaining self-confidence and moving towards a more inde­ pendent position, Brazil becoming ambivalent in its policy and revealing new ambitions in the region, and Argentina moderating its opposition and striking a slightly more responsive attitude, could all be seen as largely results of a loosening in the control and a red uction in the pressure exercised by the great power in the system , :3s conseq uences of the change from dominance to primacy . In each case, the reactions of the middle power pointed towards a more flexible line in foreign policy and a less clear-cut role within the system . In the new situation, the part of Mexico, though still fundamentally defensive, could be played in a spirit of greater independence; that of Brazil, while still largely supportive, could be performed wi th a keener awareness of alternatives; and that of :Argentina, though still on balance adversary, could be pursued with 'b fixedness of purpose . It is significant that the change in attitude .� policy was most marked in the case of Mexico. More exposed to �e preponderance of the United States than the other middle powers, it was more affected by changes in the way in which this was exercised .

4.3

HEGEMONY

The last period distinguished here is the age of the Organization of American States ( OAS) . Though it started with the establishment of a number of inter-American institutions, it presented a marked deterioration in relations between 'the one and the twenty' . The incompatibility of the global engagement of the Uni ted S tates in the struggle against communism and the nationalistic preoccupations of the Latin American states with the development of their own economies pushed the relationship in the direction of hegemony . Though the contact between the great power and the other members of the system went through several phases in the course of the period, on the whole it showed a higher degree of coercion and a smaller measure of willing co-operation than it had done before the war. While most of the time the United States was able to rely on its ideological influence and economic power, occasionally it found it necessary or expedient to intervene with force or by stealth to defend or further its interests, as in Guatemala in 1 954, Cuba in 1 96 1 , the Dominican Republic in 1 965 and Chile in the early 1 970s . After the last exercise in meddling this period seemed to be coming to an end .

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Middle Powers in International Politics

On the one hand, the detente in East-West relations and the proliferation of military, authoritarian governments in Latin America now made it less necessary for the United States to intervene for reasons of security. On the other hand , a growing concern with economic issues in the region , an increased awareness of the dependence of most of the national economies of Latin America, and a widespread hostility to mili tary intervention from outside, made it less expedient for the United States to resort to the more heavy-handed means in dealing with individual countries in the hemisphere. However, the ' New Dialogue' of the mid- 1 9 70s may not have initiated a lasting return to primacy . Rather, it seems from the record of the first years of the Reagan administration , the improvement in the relationship between the great power and the others amounted to no more than a lull in the exercise of hegemony, perhaps brought about by temporary circumstances in global and regional politics and prolonged by the diminished capabilities of the first post-Vietnam administrations. Of the three broad periods in inter-American relations dis­ tinguished here, that of hegemony must be the least suitable for the purposes of the present enq uiry . The deep involvement of the Uni ted States in global politics during the decades of the Cold War and its aftermath exposed the hemispheric system to the pulls and pressures of the central system, with the result that the pattern of interaction in the former became more seriously disturbed than it had been in the decades before the First World War and in most of the inter-war years . Not least the conduct and role of the middle powers in the system were affected by influences from outside the hemisphere . Yet, this period of American history does provide some clues for an enquiry into the typical reactions of such powers under conditions of hegemony. The conduct of the immediate neighbour of the United S tates was probably least affected by global politics, though even here the effect of extra-hemispheric influences may be detected . When the wartime partnership came to an end and relations between the United States and Latin America began to deteriorate, Mexico reacted by once again taking up the cause of non-intervention. It opposed not only unilateral intervention by the United States but also collective intervention under the auspices of the OAS . Thus, in the case of Cuba, which became the key issue of this period , Mexico was among the most steadfast of Latin American opponents of the idea of intervening, maintaining the righ t of the Cuban government to

The Unifocal System

1 09

adopt any domestic programme it chose. In this stand some observers saw signs of a potential Mexican leadership of Latin America against the United S tates . But if the Mexicans ever harboured such aspirations, the influence of the United States prevented their realisation. It may not be unreasonable to interpret the Cuban policy of the Mexican government as the result of a tacit deal with the United S tates, which allowed the middle power to demonstrate its independence on the condition that it refrained from attempting to organise a bloc against the hegemonic power. As in earlier periods, Mexican policy was essentially defensive. Carried out with caution and restraint, it did not exclude a degree of tacit co­ operation with the powerful neighbour. To the extent that Mexico succeeded in going beyond the inter­ American system and taking part in world politics, it did so mainly through its voting in the United Nations, which was more independent than that of any other Latin American state except Guatemala. Most other steps in the same direction , such as President Echeverria's visits to various parts of the world, his presence at the UNCTAD meetings in Chile, and a good deal of talk abou t the Third World , may have been gestures of independence aimed primarily at domestic nationalist opinion rather than real depar­ tures from traditional policy . In this period, too, the international conduct of Mexico reflected its political dependence on the United States, but with a difference. If its role before the First World War had been not very unlike that of Poland in the East European system ofSoviet dominance in the first decade after the Second World War, the part it played in the period of the Cold War and detente seemed at least as independent as that of Finland in more recent years . In the course of the same period, Brazil involved itself rather more deeply in experiments with world politics . This did not happen immediately, however. In the 1 950s, its government still con­ cen trated on developing the national economy and securing diplomatic leadership of Latin America. A significant step in that direction was 'Operation Panamerica', which could be described as a Marshall Plan for Latin America. Put forward as a proposal by President Kubitschek in 1 958, it did not draw much response from the United States, until President Kennedy, concerned about the dangers of subversion in the region, eventually took over the idea and turned it into the Alliance for Progress . It was between 1 96 1 and 1 964 that the great departure from traditional policy took place. Under the leadership ofQuadros and Goulart, Brazil entered global

1 10

Middle Powers in International Politics

politics by assuming a non-aligned position in the East-West issue, developing relations with certain communist countries and display­ ing an interest in various Third World nations in Africa and Asia. I n inter-American politics, it adopted a much more unco-operative attitude towards the United States than before . When Quadros reached an agreement with Frondizi of Argentina he seemed to be engaged not only in an attempt to overcome the old rivalry between the two principal powers of South America but also to be taking a first step towards forming a Latin American bloc to counterbalance the preponderance of the United States in the region . And early in 1 962 Goulart led the unsuccessful opposition to the efforts of the United States to expel Cuba from the OAS . After the mili tarist revolution in 1 964 the foreign policy of Brazil, though still the resul t of global as well as hemispheric considerations, reverted to more tradi tional lines. While Quadros apparently had calculated that the most advantageous course for his country would be to balance between East and West and seek economic aid from both sides, Castello Branco clearly had no doubt that the safest policy in the global struggle between communism and democracy would be a close alliance with the United States . Rej ecting the neutralist position ofhis predecessors, he hailed the United States as the leader of the free world. Returning to the principles laid down by Rio Branco more than half a century earlier, he entered into close collaboration with the government in Washington . In hemispheric matters, Brazil reversed the policy towards Cuba and participated in the intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1 965 . Thus Brazil once again cast itself in the part of regional agen t of the United States. But the signs of an ambition to go beyond the role of ally and agent, which had been visible already in the 1 930s, were becoming increasingly apparent. To secure a more independent and powerful position for Brazil in the hemisphere seemed to be the principal concern of Castello Branco's successors. Domestically, they con­ centrated their efforts on economic development, and managed to bring about the remarkable boom of the late 1 960s and early 1 9 70s. Their plans significantly included an ambitious programme for the development of nuclear energy . In the foreign field , they made the weigh t of Brazil felt most strongly in the buffer states, Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia, which traditionally had looked towards Argentina but now increasingly fell under the sway of Brazil . By the end of the period under consideration, the tendency of Brazilian

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foreign policy seemed to be towards a Latin American hegemony . Whether such a role might be combined wi th that of ally and agent of the hegemonic power in the system at large must depend on the existence of a substantial degree of harmony between the interests and policies of the two powers concerned . That it was only towards the end of the period , when the presence of the United States in the region was becoming less keenly felt, that Brazil seemed to be moving towards hegemony suggests that this role might be more app­ ropriate to situations where the great power takes a lower profile than that which normally would be characteristic of a hegemonic power. Argentina, too, went through a stage where it tried to balance between East and West. President Peron, till his fall in 1 955, pursued the old policy of exploiting a rivalry between the United States and a great power outside the system . Grandiosely assuming a ' third position' in the ideological conflict between communism and capitalism, he set out to make his country militarily strong and socially united in the hope that his system of 'j usticialism ' one day would triumph over both of the other political systems . In regional politics, he strove for a Latin American bloc under Argentine leadership against 'Yankee imperialism' . This policy, however, did not survive Peron. Exposed to the pressures of the Cold War, his successors found it safer to side with the West and seek accommod­ ation with the United States. Once they had abandoned the ' third position' , they turned their attention to domestic development and exports. The governments of the 1 960s, though they sided with the democratic countries in the Cold War, stopped short of co-operating with the United States in regional politics. President Frondizi, while maintaining correct relations wi th Washington , entered into the diplomatic agreement with Brazil partly, apparently, with the aim of establishing a counterweight to the influence of the United States in South America. Late in 1 96 1 Argentina j oined Mexico, Brazil and three other Latin American countries in opposing the efforts of the United States to organise measures against Cuba through the OAS . The later governments of the 1 960s moved further to the right, maintaining a strongly anti-communist line in foreign as well as domestic affairs. While stepping up the rivalry with Brazil, they were careful not to strain relations with the United States too much . For Argentina, anxiety about the potential hegemony of the neighbour­ ing middle power increasingly came to overshadow concern about the actual hegemony of the much more distant great power.

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Middle Powers in International Politics

organise an anti-hegemonial alliance were three . In the first place, rivalry among themselves, which affected also relations with and among the smaller states in the vicinity, presented a serious obstacle . The strongest tension was generally between Brazil and Argentina. But if Mexico had not been quite so dependent on the United States and had been freer to play an active role in the region to the south, the natural competition between it and Brazil might well have developed into a fairly tense rivalry too. Second , despite the pressure from the United States and the tensions among the lesser powers, the middle powers shared with the great power, as well as with nearly all other states in the region, certain fundamental values and concerns which stood in the way of a grouping into opposite camps . I n addition t o the common ideological bonds o f pan-American unity referred to already and the shared strategic interests arising from the existence of hostile extra-hemispheric powers, there was the steadily growing web of economic interdependence. This relationship, at first between uneq ual trading partners and later between a highly advanced and immensely powerful economy and a number of developing countries with uneven but generally inferior resources, made Latin America too dependent economically on the United States to allow its leading powers to organise a collective political opposition . Last but not least, the power of the United States was simply so overwhelming as to make all attempts at establishing a counterforce within the system seem futile. The historical conduct of Canada, the fourth middle power in the hemisphere though not a part of the inter-American system , is a further indication that a unifocal system marked by great ineq uality between the principal and the secondary powers tends to breed 'special relationships' rather than to generate a common front. Far from seeking a diplomatic concert with the two South American middle powers, Canada never even managed to set up diplomatic machinery for co-ordinating the efforts of the two North American middle powers to deal with the giant between them . The record of Poland in the system of communist states also supports the conclusion that middle powers in a unifocal system tend to seek accommodation with the central power rather than to form anti­ hegemonial alliances . For China, the outsider in that system , it was j ust as impossible to draw Poland away from the Soviet Union as it was for Argentina, the only would-be opponent in the inter­ American system , to coax Mexico away from the United States. While the inter-American system had no balance of power, it did

The Unifocal System

1 15

present certain rudimentary patterns of power. One was geographi­ If buffer states and other small states are ignored , signs may be detected of the old geopolitical structure of odd and even numbers, where one's neighbour is an enemy and the neighbour's neighbour on the opposite side a friend . 1 0 Thus, the alignment of Brazil with the United States was a fairly permanent feature of the picture . But the pattern was not completed by a corresponding relationship between Argentina and Mexico, largely, presumably, because of the disability of Mexico mentioned already . The other pattern of power was in the hierarchical dimension, where the tendency of some small states to lean towards the great power in order to gain protection against a local middle power sometimes gave the system a structure resembling a sandwich . Thus, at times Paraguay and Bolivia, often more afraid of Argentina than of the fai rly remote great power, sought refuge in a closer relationship wi th the United States . At other times it was the ambitions of Brazil that drove the small neighbours towards the great power. I n Central America, where the presence of the United States weighed much more heavily than in the south , this tendency could not be so pronounced . Though Guatemalans might refer to Mexico, more than half-seriously, as ' the colossus of the north ' , they were in no position to ignore the pressure from the real colossus. The nature of their dilemma was demonstrated in 1 954, when Mexico and the United States interfered competitively in their affairs, each backing its own side in the domestic political conflict. Where the great power was regarded as no less of a threat than the middle power, the sandwich pattern of alignment could not take shape . As the preponderance of the great power prevented the formation of a balance of power, so it stood in the way of the completion of both the geographical and the hierarchical pattern of power. It was this preponderance of the focal power together with the geographical position of each of the middle powers that more than anything else determined the systemic roles of the latter. The overwhelming power of the Uni ted States , occasionally brought to bear by military means but most of the time manifested only in poli tical, economic and ideological terms, not only helped to shape the characteristic parts of the three powers but also conduced to limit their possibilities of performing these parts. Indeed, it restricted the ways and means open to them almost to the point where their roles in the system became nominal more than real . Thus , when Mexico took up the defence of its region against impositions by the

cal.

1 16

Middle Powers in International Politics

United States, it was reduced to relying mainly on the weapons provided by international law. When Brazil gave its support to the U nited States, the medium at its disposal was rarely a conventional alliance but more often simply a diplomatic concert, an arrange­ ment marked by a habit of co-operating in inter-American insti­ tutions and elsewhere. And when Argentina took the path of the adversary of the great power, it found it very hard to go beyond the position of the would-be organiser of Latin American blocs and anti­ hegemonial alliances, generally having to restrict its opposition to a refusal to co-operate in regional organisations and to diplomatic obstruction in general. Even in their own relationship Brazil and Argentina, like most smaller Latin American states involved in local rivalries, found it prudent to exercise a good deal of self-restraint . While the force and authority of the great power stifled conflict and protected order in the unifocal system of states , its domination and penetration of large parts of the system reduced the political independence and circumscribed the diplomatic freedom of the middle powers.

5 The Dualistic System Ancient, medieval and modern history all present cases of states systems in which two powers enjoyed preponderance over all others. While the foremost classical example is that of Athens and Sparta, 'SOme of the most prominent medieval ones are those of the Byzantine Empire and its successive enemies. Each of the great powers of t.rnodern history has at one time or another been involved in a tdualistic system. Such situations present great variety as regards both the structure of the system and the nature of the relationships among its units. In the first place, the ratio of strength between the preponderant powers can vary considerably, with marked in­ equality perhaps being more common than rough eq uality. In the longest-lasting dualism of the nineteenth century, that of Prussia and Austria within the German Confederation, Prussia started as much the inferior party but gained relative strength until in the end, under Bismarck, it could defeat Austria in war. In the most recent case, of the Soviet Union and the United States since the Second World War, the Soviet Union was for long both strategically and economically inferior but eventually achieved parity in strategic terms. Second, the quality of the relationship between the two preponderant powers may vary from extreme hostility to a high degree of co-operation, with conflict, however, being the most usual state of affairs . Such conflict is sometimes largely political, while at other times it may have also a substantial doctrinal element. The Austro-Prussian rivalry was overridingly political, being essentially about the mastery of Germany . The ideological differences between the two powers in regard to constitutional and national issues were overshadowed by their doctrinal alliance against the revolutionary movements in Germany and Europe. In the Russo-American conflict, ideology played a much larger role, though its influence seemed to decline after the Cold War. Third, as in the unifocal system, each of the principal powers may use its preponderance in several ways and may enter into various sorts of relationships with other members of the system. The situation that has been called

117

1 18

Middle Powers in International Politics

' tight bipolarity', where all the states in the system are divided into opposed blocs , is a rare phenomenon in history. ' Loose bipolarity' , where some or most of the states are divided into two opposite alliances or coalitions but where at least some states remain unaligned , seems much the more normal state of affairs. This chapter will explore the connection between the quality of the relationship between the two principal powers and the type of conduct characteristic of the middle powers in the system . If we exclude from consideration the extremely rare case where the principal powers lose interest in each other and stop interacting politically, we may think of the various types of relationship possible between them as forming a spectrum, with war at one end and condominium at the other. Between the extremes are, next to war, the intense, sub-military conflict that has come to be known as cold war; next to condominium, the relationship of co-operation short of joint government ihat is traditionally described as diplomatic concert; and , in the middle, a broad range made up of various mixtures of rivalry and co-operation , of which the East-West detente of the 1 960s is one example. The spectrum is arranged according to level of tension between the two powers and degree of control of such tension, with war marking a high level of tension and a low degree of control, condominium the opposite combination, and cold war, diplomatic concert, and restrained rivalry and limited co-operation intermediate proportions. Here neither the extreme situation of war, where the middle powers normally become allies or neutrals, nor that of condominium, where they may end up as subjects or agents of the two partners in joint government, will be considered . Nor will mixtures of two or more of the five typical situations distinguished here, or transitions from one situation to another, be brought into the analysis . The focus will be on the three types of relationship most relevant to the Russo-American dualism of the third quarter of the twentieth century, namely cold war, diplomatic concert, and rivalry mixed with co-operation . The cen tral relationship is the dominant one in the states system . I t is in the light of the interaction between the two preponderant powers that all other states have to conduct their own relationships, with them as well as with each other. The middle powers in the system , especially those closest to the top level of international politics, are particularly affected by what passes between the great powers . For them, each type of relationship is likely to present dangers as well as opportunities, the precise nature of the challenge

The Dualistic System

1 19

to each depending mainly on its geographical position and political resources . Just how each middle power perceives the various d angers and opportunities is conditioned by a number of subj ective factors, such as the ideas, emotions and goals of its leadership . And how it reacts to them depends to a certain extent on its domestic institutions and political style. Nevertheless, the challenge issued by the central relationship, the threats and inducements presented to lesser powers, are often strong and general enough to produce certain tendencies in the reactions of the middle powers. Examining these tendencies in different dualistic situations, we may distinguish certain types ofinternational conduct characteristic of these powers. And relating such types of conduct to the dynamics of the system in general , we may reach some tentative generalisations about the international roles of middle powers in conditions of duality . The material for such an enquiry may be drawn from the two principal dualistic systems of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, that ofAustria and Prussia in the German Confederation and that of the United States and the Soviet Union in the East-West period of global politics .

5. 1

COLD WAR

Intense conflict between the two great powers, even when short of open war, creates a particularly dangerous situation for the lesser members of the system. They are in peril of becoming victims of the central rivalry by being encroached upon, perhaps even swallowed up, by one of the parties. In the Cold War from the late 1 940s to the early 1 960s, which was marked by recurrent crises between the Soviet Union and the United States and local wars between their allies or agents, the lesser states faced the additional danger of the situation developing into a major war of the sort that might subject the world to nuclear warfare. But, as we shall see, cold war between the great powers may also present the middle powers, or some of them, with the opportunity of enhancing their diplomatic position and securi ng some political gains. For the middle powers, having to protect their interests in such a situation, the basic choice is between joining one of the sides or remaining uncommitted in the central conflict. Which course they take will depend to a large extent on their geographical position and the nature of their relations with the protagonists. A middle power

1 20

Middle Powers in International Politics

located close to a centre of tension between the great powers and exposed to pressure from one or both of them is more likely to join one of the camps than a middle power in a more remote position and not subj ect to q uite the same pressures. While the middle powers of Western and Eastern Europe, dependent in various respects on one superpower or the other, were divided already at the outset of the Russo-American Cold War and soon became firmly integrated in opposite military camps, India and Indonesia, both much more removed from the central conflict, were able to retain their independence and remain uncommitted in the rivalry. Domestic considerations may be important as well. In the case of India, for example, a policy of non-commitment in the political and ideo­ logical issue between East and West was essential for the internal stability of the country. For those middle powers that take sides, the choice between the protagonists may depend on a variety of considerations . Those based on power calculations have received most attention from students of international politics, especially in the older literature on the subject. They are of two kinds and may lead to opposite decisions. Some middle powers may seek security by joining the weaker or more threatened side in an anti-hegemonial alliance. Others may think it in their interest to ally themselves with the stronger or more aggressive party on the calculation that, if war does break out, they will avoid the ravages of defeat and perhaps even share the spoils of victory . Good examples of either course may be found in the history of ancient states systems . Corinth, which could be regarded as a middle power in the system dominated by Sparta and Athens, showed considerable elasticity in its alliance policy. Because its leaders recognised that the city's interests would be seriously threatened if any one state secured domination of the Hellenic society of states, it regularly supported the weaker of the rivals and sometimes alliances.

took

the

initiative

in

organising anti-hegemonial

An opposite example is that of Cheng in ancient China. In the periods 1 1 1-XI, in the seventh and sixth centuries BC , Cheng, led by a long line of able statesmen supported by a patriotic and well­ organised people, was a very considerable power. Occupying an extensive territory, which geographically was placed between the poles of power in the north and the south, it played a very different balancing game in a period of almost constant insecurity and expectation of violence. In principle always ready to switch sides, it

The Dualistic System

121

generally supported the stronger of the two camps, one of which was led first by Ch'i and then by Chin, and the other by Ch' u: During the course of its fluctuations between the camps of Ch 'ior Chin and Ch' u the statesmen of Cheng seized every possible opportunity to improve the position of their own country. Occasionally Cheng transferred its allegiance quite voluntarily when it sensed that the other power was on the rise so that it would not have to suffer the ravages of an attack directed against it. This was the case in 642 Be , when there was internal strife in Ch'i following the death of Duke Huan. Cheng immediately trans­ ferred its loyalty to the Ch'u camp. 1 Whether a middle power caught in a dualistic conflict seeks security in an anti-hegemonial alliance or whether i t pursues its interests together with the potentially dominating power will depend on a number of factors, such as its geographical position, its political tradition, the nature of the issue, and the norms of the states system . 2 However, the choice of sides is not governed by power calcu­ lations alone . Sometimes the ideas and emotions of the actors may be as importan t as the relation of forces in the dualism. This will be the case where the central conflict is ideological as much as power­ political. At the outset of the Cold War, the secondary and middle powers of Western Europe immediately sided with the stronger, conservative power against the weaker, revolutionary power. They did so not merely out of concern for the military balance on the European continent but also because their ideological orientation and political sympathies favoured the West rather than the East. They considered that culturally, economically and politically they had more in common with the United States and more to fear from Soviet Russia. On the other side, it was for reasons of the same nature that the governments of Poland and Communist China accepted the leadership of the Soviet U nion in the Cold War with the West. Among the secondary members of the opposed blocs or alliances in a dualistic system with a high degree of tension, a distinction may be made between satellites and allies . The relationship between the alliance leader and a satellite is one of control and compliance. The great power may exercise its control mainly by force, for example by stationing troops on the territory of the satellite or by threatening to invade it, but may use other sanctions as well, both political and economic . The satellite may pursue its policy of compliance out of a

1 22

Middle Powers in International Politics

sense of extreme dependence on the great power, whether in military, political or economic affairs. The tightness of control and the degree of dependence will determine the diplomatic scope of the middle-power satellites. If Poland before 1 956 was an example of the firmly controlled and highly dependent satellite, after that year it appeared in the role of a rather freer satellite. In the earlier period of the Cold War, this middle power, guided by its traditional preoccupation with Germany and a recurring fear of an accord between Moscow and Bonn, led by a government that depended for its control of the people on the support of the Soviet Union, and constrained by the integration of its post-war economy with that of the great-power neighbour, was strategically , politically and econ­ omically so dependent on the Soviet Union that it saw no alternative to a policy of servile compliance. In the later 1 950s and early 1 960s, however, the same country, benefiting from a slight loosening of the bonds of Soviet control in Eastern Europe and a corresponding increase in its political self-confidence, was in a position to take some initiatives of its own, in East-West as well as in intra-bloc affairs . Thus, in 1 957 the Polish government presented to the United Nations the so-called Rapacki Plan, which called for the establish­ ment of a denuclearised zone in central Europe. In the early 1 960s, the Polish leader Gomulka, though obviously loyal to the Russians, tried to conciliate between the Soviet U nion and China. 3 Through subsequent measures, too, Poland laboured to build up an identity of its own in international politics. The relationship between the alliance leader and a middle-power ally, though of course also highly unequal, is one based more on reward and less on threats of the more extreme kind . Although the needs of the ally may be great, there is an element of choice in i ts alliance policy. Here a distinction may be made between the faithful ally, which in most matters of importance is prepared to pursue, more or less unquestioningly, a policy that is in conformity with the goals of the alliance leader, and the critical ally, which mixes conditional support with a fair amount of advice and criticism. If Australia, on the whole, seems a good example of the former type, especially France but also Britain fall in the latter category . Australia, distant from the part of the world to which historically and culturally it belongs, and close to Asia, e ,hanced i ts sense of security by strengthening i ts bonds with the United States and identifying demonstratively with its policies in Asia, despatching troops first to Korea and then to Vietnam . France and Britain, both

The Dualistic System

1 23

European powers with a long tradition of independent conduct at the top level of international politics, presented a more measured response to American conduct of global politics in the Cold War. While the French, preoccupied with their own problems in North Mrica and elsewhere, urged the Americans to support the policies that suited French interests best, the British, conscious of having a 'special relationship' with the alliance leader, combined public support for American policies with private advice and words of caution . Canada, with the advantages and disadvantages of being a neighbour of the alliance leader, found a middle course between unquestioning support and outspoken criticism . If the parts assumed by aligned middle powers range from obedient agent to friendly critic of the great power, it is primarily in relation to the central conflict of the dualistic system t.hat their diplomatic influence must be estimated and their international role assessed . On behalf of such powers it has often been claimed that they have a particularly important part to play in reducing tension and easing relations between the great-power opponents . Aligned middle powers are particularly well placed, it has been argued , for performing such ameliorating functions as restraining the alliance leader, mediating between the contestants, and helping to observe a truce and keep the peace in a local conflict. Some good reasons may be advanced in support of this view . Close contact with the alliance leader, together with a certain amount of weight within the alliance, allow some middle powers to express their views regularly and, if they see a need , to urge caution and moderation in the right quarters. This was Lester Pearson's point when he said about Canada's relations wi th the United States, 'We know them so well. We can really talk to them like nobody else can . ' 4 If the policy­ makers of the great power happen to be uncertain or divided , the influence of its middle-power advisers can be q uite considerable, especially if they concur in their urgings. In attempting mediation, contact and influence with one of the opponents may again be an advantage. In some situations such assets may be of greater benefit than impartiality in the central issue, not only because they allow the middle power to encourage its great-power ally to enter into negotiation and seek agreement, but also because they can help it to gain the ear of the opposite party. I talians, for example, thought that when their country in some critical phases of the Vietnam conflict of the 1 960s was able to play a role in the search for a solution, it was precisely because I taly enj oyed friendly relations with the United

1 24

Middle Powers in International Politics

States which allowed its representatives to speak in terms that sounded credible to Hanoi . 5 Finally, the record shows that in peace­ keeping, whether in the form of truce observation or in that which involves a military presence, some aligned middle powers, notably Canada, have been particularly active, both in the initiation of operations and through actual participation. However, there are eq ually solid reasons for not relying on aligned middle powers always to be playing the parts of controlling or reducing tension in cold-war situations. I n the first place, such powers cannot be expected at all times and in all circumstances to prefer moderation in the conduct of the rivalry and to show determination in the search for solutions. Indeed , in a situation where their own stake in the conflict is at least as great as that of the alliance leader, they may push for a strong line in relations with the opposite side. In the issue over the offshore islands in the Far East in the 1 950s, Communist China, with what it regarded as an unfinished civil war on its hands, seemed at least as keen as the Soviet Union to initiate probing operations against their enemies . And it is doubtful that the voice of Australia, a country much closer to Asia and no less conscious of the communist threat than the United States, was always one of caution and restraint when debate in Washington was about the interventions in Korea and Indochina. Second , the nature of international society is such that even when one or more middle powers are inclined to play an ameliorating role, they are not always able to influence the conduct of the central relationship in any significant way. A great power involved in keen rivalry with another great power and determined on a particular line of action will only rarely allow itself to be curbed or guided by the urgings oflesser powers, even when they are its principal allies . I f both great powers are s e t o n pursuing the cold war with t h e means a t their disposal, t h e middle-power allies can neither restrain them, mediate in the issue, nor intervene effectively to dampen the conflict. Leaders of allied powers who believe that they can exert decisive influence behind the scenes when tension is running high are apt to be deceiving themselves . The so-called special relationship between Britain and the United States, often more salient to the British than to the Americans, provides an instructive example. When Harold Wilson avoided public criticism of Lyndon Johnson 's policy in the Vietnam War on the grounds that he was playing a crucial role in private diplomacy, he found that the President was taking practi­ cally no notice of him. 6

The Dualistic System

1 25

In intense conflict, the two great powers deal with each other directly . 7 Only if one or both of them want to achieve some form of accommodation with the adversary may it be possible for a few of the lesse r powers to enter the conflict in a mediatory capacity. For this role, being aligned can in some circumstances be an advantage, though in others it will be a handicap. But the success of the middle powers as mediators will depend less on their international standing and diplomatic efforts than on the .attitudes and responses of the great powers themselves. This is likely to be so also in situations where the middle powers intervene physically in a dispute, for example by taking part in a peace-keeping operation . The interven­ tion of the United Nations Emergency Force, which Canada initiated in the later stage of the Suez crisis in 1 956, succeeded largely because the superpowers, unable to intervene themselves without great risk, gave active or passive support, the United States facilitating the enterprise diplomatically and the Soviet Union acquiescing, or at least refraining from sabotaging it. Not always willing and only in certain conditions able to help reduce tension and promote agreement between the camps, middle powers in a cold-war alliance are no more than occasionally to be found in the role of mediators . Their real part in relation to the central conflict is as supporters or lieutenants of the alliance leader. In a global system, they normally play this part on a regional level, either as major allies in a collective security arrangement dominated or led by the great power, like Poland in the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, Canada and the West European middle powers in NATO and Australia in ANZUS and SEA TO, or as parties to a bilateral pact with the great power, like China and Spain in the 1 950s. Here their influence can be q uite considerable. While Britain and France had major roles in the issue over Berlin in the earlier period of the Cold War, China took the leading part in the clash over the offshore islands in the later 1 950s . These upper middle powers, which for historical and geographical reasons were at least as deeply involved in the respective conflicts as their alliance leaders, had policies of their own which in neither case could be ignored by the superpower ally. In their occasional role of promoters of detente between the great­ power rivals, aligned middle powers may be not very much more important than some smaller allies attempting the same part . Though their weight in the alliance may give them a rather better chance of influencing the alliance leader when they try to exert

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Middle Powers in International Politics

diplomatic restraint or of attracting the interest of both parties when they advance mediatory proposals, the fact that the success of such initiatives depends largely on the attitudes of the great powers may leave them in a situation only marginally more advantageous than that of smaller would-be mediators. And when it comes to peace­ keeping functions, the role of middle powers is even less clearly demarcated than that of small states. Though such functions, in their various forms, certainly have attracted a number of middle powers, some of them aligned , they have never become typical middle-power activities. While some such powers have been unwilling or unable to involve themselves or have been found unsuitable for the task, many small states have taken a particularly active part in the operations . 8 But as lieutenants of the alliance leader, most middle powers stand out from the lesser members of a cold-war alliance . Though sometimes a small state, for example because of its strategic location, may enjoy an importance as ally quite out of proportion to its military might and economic resources, a middle power, especially an upper middle power, generally carries greater weight in an alliance. To the extent that middle powers form a rank of their own in the international system they are likely to do so within an alliance as well, since here, too, their standing and influence rest in the last resort on the force they command and the resources they possess . The unaligned middle powers, less affected by the polarising forces of the dualistic system, have a wider range of possible roles in the cold war. I n relation to the central conflict, the number of possibilities theoretically open to them is four. If they take the level of tension between the two camps for given and unalterable, they may keep aloof from the conflict and mind their own domestic or local business, or they may play one side off against the other in an attempt to draw benefits from the situation . If they regard the level of tension as open to manipulation or influence, they may try to heighten it by sharpening some of the issues between the camps , or they may try to lower it by offering their good offices or their services as mediators between the parties . The dynamics of cold war in a dualistic system will make some of these logical possibilities more likely than others; and the actual conduct of the unaligned middle powers will in each case depend also on a number ofspecial obj ective and subjective factors, such as the geographical location of the state, the nature of its regime, the ideological convictions of its government and the political fears and ambitions of its leaders .

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Sta nding aloof from the conflict of the great powers and their allies and concentrating on nearby issues and domestic matters is basically an attractive policy. It is likely to appeal to many of the smaller unaligned states . Middle powers that calculate that they .llave nothing much to gain from occupying themselves with the central conflict as well as middle powers that see no alternative to .keeping a very low profile in international politics might take the same course. An example of the former type might be a power that was fairly confident of i ts ability to survive as a neutral in any major war and of its chance at least to maintain its position in any post-war system and that was preoccupied with matters more pressing than those dividing the great powers. In a world of nuclear weapons, such an attitude must be rarer than in earlier times . The declaratory policy of China in the 1 960s, when the leaders who had accused Khrushchev of 'capitulationism' in the Cuban missile crisis went on 'to suggest that there was so little need to fear nuclear war that armed struggle in the Third World should be encouraged regardless, was sometimes seen as tending in that direction . But, advanced in a situation of strategic stalemate and in a climate of growing detente between the superpowers, this policy probably turned on a low assessment of the likelihood of nuclear war erupting, and in any case, as we shall see, did not stop China from assuming other, more active parts in response to the changing central relationship. An example of the type of power that stood aloof out of necessity rather than from choice might be one relatively isolated from the central conflict and deeply absorbed in domestic and local or regional affairs . In the years after the Congo crisis, when Africa was not an important scene of East-West rivalry, newly independent Nigeria had little energy left for global issues and could pursue only a passive course in the Cold War. However, for most unaligned middle powers in the system, the dangers and, not least, the opportunities presented by a very high level of tension in the central relationship will be too great for them to take no initiative whatever and to play no role at all in regard to the great-power conflict. One of the more active ways for such powers of seeking to protect and further their interests is to play one great power off against the other. By threatening to lean towards one side, an unaligned middle power may be able to gain support or force concessions from the opposite side, particularly if the two camps maintain at least a rough balance of power and the middle power has something of real interest to offer one or both of the rivals. But in a situation of high

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Middle Powers in International Politics

tension, when the polarising forces in the system are at their strongest and the risk of the cold war becoming real war is ever present, this is a difficult and dangerous game to play for a power that is in principle already an object of competition between the great powers. The middle power attempting it may find itself unable to maintain its unaligned position, and may even end up a victim instead of a beneficiary of the central conflict. As a preferred policy, it seems more suitable for a situation with a lower l�vel of tension between the great powers. If in the 1 950s India befriended the communist bloc, it was hardly because Nehru at that stage aspired to the role of a ' trimmer' seeking benefits from either or both sides, but probably, rather, because he, in the age of Dulles, thought the United States a greater danger to the independence of the countries of the Third World than the Soviet U nion . An even more dangerous policy in a cold-war situation is deliberately to exacerbate tension in the central relationship . Though, as we shall see, there may be some diplomatic advantage for uncommitted powers in having tension between the camps run at a high level, there are good reasons why they should avoid acting as trouble-makers . Above all, the risk of a major war, in which they could be drawn into the hostili ties and after which they might have to face an all-dominant victor, would tend to hold them back. In any case, it is a role which often is easier to play for a member of one of the camps, even a small-power ally, than for an unaligned power. While an ally directly involved in a local conflict in which the great powers have a stake sometimes may be able to draw the alliance leader close to war with the opponents, an uncommitted power will rarely have the means to do so. Taiwan, in a clash over the offshore islands, and Egypt, in a crisis in the Middle East, could exert considerable pressure on their great-power allies , who in each case had to exercise restraining influence to avoid a dangerous escalation of the local conflict. But China in the 1 960s, after the rift with the Soviet Union in effect an unaligned middle power, which had no desire for a reduction of tension between the superpowers and which professed not to be afraid of major war, was unable to prevent first Soviet 'capitulation ' and then East-West detente. 9 For most unaligned middle powers, as for many other states in the system , the overriding concern in relation to the cold war must be to avoid the outbreak of a major war. Hence they are often drawn towards the role of ameliorators of the relations between the great powers or between the allies and friends of these powers. At

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opportune moments, they may offer their good offices in a local war or even propose to mediate between the parties . In the 1 950s, after the outbreak of the Korean War, India made itself available as a channel of communication between the principal countries in­ volved ; and at one stage of the war in Vietnam , Indonesia offered to mediate provided all the parties concerned wanted it. 1 0 I n situ­ ations where a cease-fire has been brought about, middle powers not committed to either side and with significant armed forces at their disposal may play a part in peace-keeping together with various other powers . India took part in the United Nations Emergency Force, which moved in after the Suez action, and played com­ parable roles in the Congo and , as a member of the International Control Commission , in Vietnam . By providing troops and officials for activities of this kind , the middle powers may perform a useful role in helping to damp down or extinguish local conflicts . Their offers of good offices and mediation , however, can be, as a rule, of only marginal value in practical terms . If great powers that are involved in conflict with each other, whether directly or through proxies, want to enter into negotiation, they can generally find a way. If they do not wish to negotiate, no third party can make them do so; and if they do not in tend to reach agreement, not even a concert of middle powers is able to bring enough pressure to bear to make them come to terms . 1 1 Yet the existence of a number of significant uncommitted powers eager to bring about a reduction in tension is bound to have some effect on the climate in which the antagonists pursue their cold war. In some situations , particularly where the decision-makers of one or both of the alliance leaders are divided , pressure from the would-be ameliorators among such powers migh t well have a sobering influence on the conduct of the great-power rivalry . While their efforts to facilitate negotiation are unlikely to be a major influence on the course of the conflict, the middle powers making the attempts may draw considerable diplomatic advan tages for themselves as a result of their initiatives . By appearing in the role of helpfu l third parties in situations where fear of major war is widespread, they can sometimes enhance their diplomatic status and strengthen their international position in the world at large, which migh t prove to their benefit particularly when they deal with more immediate concerns at regional and local levels . The most substantial result of Nehru's diplomatic efforts in the Cold War of the 1 950s, it may be argued, was to establish I ndia as leader of the

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Middle Powers in International Politics

non-aligned nations and spokesman of the Third World . If the great powers and their allies happen to be locked in a tight balance of forces with little apparent room for diplomatic manoeuvres from either side, the opportuni ties for third parties to secure advantages of this nature are particularly good. In such a situation , even uncommitted small states may attempt the part of mediators . However, since they generally carry less weight and appear less convincing than the more prominent middle powers, they are likely to derive fewer advantages from this role. I n relation to the central conflict, the typical role of uncommitted middle powers is that of would-be ameliorators. But there are other ways in which such powers may assert themselves in cold-war situations and play a part in the dualistic system . By raising or drawing attention to political issues other than those that divide the blocs, they may help to increase the complexity of the pattern of conflict and to diversify tension in the system . In the 1 950s, I ndia did not only oppose the Cold War and power politics of the two blocs but also spoke up against colonialism and racism in various parts of the world . By the 1 960s, when most of the former colonies in Asia and Africa had become independent, the keynote of the non-aligned nations was no longer the struggle of oppressed peoples but the economic inequality between the advanced and the under­ developed parts of the world. Thus again new topics were added to the agenda of world politics . Sometimes unaligned middle powers may push their alternative concerns so hard as to suggest that they supersede the matters at issue between the camps of the cold war. An outstanding example is Indonesia under Sukarno. Describing a world divided along lines very different from those that had obtained in the earlier period of the Cold War, its spokesmen insisted that the real issue of the present and the future was the confrontation between the new, poor countries and the old, established forces of oppression and exploi­ tation . Putting itself ahead of ' the new emerging forces ' , the Indonesian government pursued what it described as an in­ dependent active foreign policy. President Sukarno said in a speech to the Non-Bloc Summit Conference in Belgrade in 1 96 1 : Prevailing world opinion today would have us believe that the real source of international tension and strife is ideological conflict between the great powers . I think that is not true . There is a conflict which cuts deeper into the flesh of man, and that is the

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conflict between the new emergent forces for freedom and j ustice and the old forces of domination , the one pushing its head relentlessly through the crust of the earth which has given it its lifeblood , the other striving desperately to retain all it can trying to hold back the course of history. 1 2 In presenting a heightened North-South confrontation as eclipsing a recedin g East-West conflict and in advocating a decidedly radical policy for the non-aligned coun tries, Sukarno's I ndonesia of the early 1 960s dissociated itself from the more moderate views and policies that had been expounded by Nehru 's I ndia in the 1 950s. However, whether their programme is to reform international society or whether it is revolutionary, such middle powers are likely to find it very hard to deflect the attention of the world from the issues that divide the great powers and their allies. In a situation of cold war, the general preoccupation of governments with peace and national security tends to override concerns with j ustice and economic eq uality . Yet, by adding matters of such nature to the international agenda, uncommitted middle powers may play a useful role in helping to widen the horizons of the political world and to prepare the international system for a more complex pattern of issues. In attempting to alter the pattern of conflict, uncommitted middle powers may resort to even more radical measures. They may try to change, or at leaS t modify, the power structure of the international system itself. To defend themselves and others against the dangers of too high a level of tension in the central relationship and to promote interests other than those at issue between the great powers, they may take steps to form themselves into a third bloc and transform the simple dualism into a more complex system . In doing so, they may initially want merely to increase their diplomatic leverage in the central conflict, but may ultimately aim at setting themselves up as the balancers of the system. I n the middle of the nineteenth century, the German 'middle states' became linked with such a policy. 1 3 In the earlier part of the history of the Confederation, when rivalry between the two German great powers had been only moderate, the line of Bavaria, Wiirttemberg and Baden in the south and Hanover in the north had generally been to lean on Austria, the stronger of the two powers . From Metternich's Austria they had sought protection against various Prussian schemes for national unification and hegemony as

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Middle Powers in International Politics

well as against the growing popular national and radical move­ ments. By 1 848 the conditions that had facilitated this policy were disappearing. With the anti-revolutionary partnership of Austria and Prussia breaking up and the competition between them intensifying, the position of the states located in between was becoming much more difficult. Caught between two rivals for influence over Germany, they feared a victory of either. At the Frankfurt Assembly, the representatives of some of the states in the south and the middle turned to the old idea of a tripartite organisation for Germany, of a federal structure in which the lesser states together would form a third power comparable to, and independent of, Austria and Prussia. After 1 849, too, these governments, facing the danger of having their states crushed between the Habsburg 'grossdeutsch' and the Prussian 'kleindeutsch' programme, joined each other in putting forward various proposals along such lines. 1 4 Thus some of the middle states, along with a number of minor states, finally became involved in the scheme that thirty years earlier had been championed in vain by the representa­ tive of W i.irttemberg. 1 5 Aimed at transforming the dualism into a triangular system, the scheme involved taking the middle states out of their traditional role of supporters of one of the great powers and placing them at the head of a third party in German politics. It did not work. The ' third Germany' never became a third power; and German politics remained dualistic, until Bismarck defeated Austria and went on to unite Germany under Prussian leadership. The middle states, which in the war of 1 866 supported Austria, were annexed or subdued, while Austria was excluded from the new Reich. As victims of the rivalry of the great powers , the German middle states are a reminder of the ultimate fate that may befall middle powers in a dualistic system. Despite the great and obvious differences between the German states system of the mid-nineteenth century and the global international system of the mid-twentieth, the two cases show certain similarities in the reactions of significant third parties to situations of intense conflict between the great powers. In the global system, too, there was a tendency for some lesser powers to move closer to each other with the idea of possibly forming some sort of composite third party to the central relationship. To be sure, prominent leaders of non-aligned countries repeatedly denied that they intended to create a third force or bloc in global politics,

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insisting that such an aim would be both contradictory and harmful to the spirit and policy of non-alignment. Given the differences of i nstitutions, ideologies and preoccupations displayed by their co untries, they almost certainly would also have found it impossible to achieve the degree of solidarity required to maintain such a bloc. Instead they pursued a less demanding form of co-operation . At a series of conferences, of which Bandung in 1 955 and Belgrade in 1 96 1 mark the highest points , the representatives of non-aligned countries attempted to co-ordinate their diplomatic efforts. Finding some consensus in their views of the world , they called for joint action in pursuit of certain broad goals, such as peace, indepen­ dence and equality. The principal forum for their collective efforts became the United Nations. H ere, with the spokesmen of the small and new nations being rather more vociferous than those of the longer-established middle powers, the Afro-Asian countries did reach a degree of collaboration which at times brought them close to constituting a third bloc in the General Assembly. In the 1 950s, their platform was largely that of anti-colonialism, while later, especially after the establishment of UNCTAD, the same countries became essentially a pressure group of have-not states clamouring for a redistribution of the material goods of the world . But it was on such issues, rather than on those more germane to the political­ ideological conflict between East and West, that countries of the Third World achieved a measure of co-operation. When they succeeded in turning the debate in the United Nations into a three­ cornered struggle, it was largely because this organisation was no longer the principal arena of the central conflict. Outside the United Nations, global politics remained essentially dualistic throughout the period of the Cold War. As in the German Confederation, Triaspolitik had no real prospect in the global system . Even if the uncommitted countries of the Third World had been willing and able to overcome their differences and act collectively, they could not have turned the duel into a triangular conflict. The superpowers were too preponderant and the polarising tendencies too strong for any group of lesser powers to set itself up as an effective third party. Yet, the efforts of the non-aligned leaders to find a position of their own had some effect on the pattern of international conflict. By achieving a degree of concert on a range of issues, they managed somewhat to complicate the simple structure of the East-West confrontation . If in a dualistic system with a high level of tension committed

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Middle Powers in International Politics

middle powers may be said to accentuate the central conflict by siding with one great power against the other, the uncommitted middle powers may be seen as helping to limit this conflict. By steering clear of the alliances and opposing bloc politics, they prevent the division from becoming universal and secure a degree of looseness in the system . By putting themselves forward as would-be mediators in inter-bloc conflicts and bringing up issues from different political spheres, they demand consideration for the world beyond the camps and point to alternative dimensions of inter­ national conflict. Finally, by seeking ways of organising co­ operation among third parties to the central conflict, they hint at the possibility of a more complex system of international politics. By their mere existence as well as by their actual policies, unaligned middle powers help to create the condi tions in which cold war in a dualistic system may be overcome .

5.2

DI PLOMAT I C CONCERT

Opposite cold war, in the spectrum of relationships theoretically possible between the parties to a dualistic system, we have diplomatic concert. It is a state of affairs characterised by a degree of co-ordination of foreign policies and diplomatic measures high enough to allow the two great powers to share managerial functions in the society of states, but not enough to permit them to exercise joint government through a condominium. The process of co­ ordination involves a great deal of negotiation between the two powers. Though most of this usually goes through normal diplo­ matic channels, some of it may take place at 'summit meetings ' . Such meetings, especially if they are regular o r frequent, tend to give the concert a more formal character. Though secondary and lesser powers may be consulted on particular matters and may be represented at some meetings, negotiations between the great powers are often exclusive and meetings of their leaders frequently arranged above the heads of all or most other states . For the middle powers in the system, a great-power concert generally presents obvious dangers, though , as we shall see, in some cases also real opportunities . Essentially, the danger is that of being reduced to obj ects in the international political process . Between them, the great powers may manage affairs so efficiently that the scope of all or most lesser powers is severely restricted . They may

The

Dualistic System

1 35

remain in concert for so long that their management comes to resemble joint government of the society of states. Indeed , as cold­ war situations carry the ever-present risk of all-out war, so the existence of concert conj ures up the prospect of condominium. What is more, though the establishment of a great-power concert brings order to the international relations of the system, the actual dispositions of the managers are likely to reflect the in terests of the great powers themselves at least as much as the needs of inter­ national society at large . Hence, to many lesser powers, a great­ power concert may come to appear as a conspiracy against other members of the states system, especially against those most likely to challenge the authority of the great powers. One natural response of middle powers in such a situation would be to explore the possibility of protecting their interests by co­ operating with each other, and perhaps with small states as well. The purpose of such co-operation would be to create a diplomatic counterweight to the concert strong enough to resist the encroach­ ments of the great powers . This was the policy pursued by Wiirttemberg in the early years of the German Confederation , when politics in central Europe were dominated by the conservative partnerShip of Austria and Prussia. Then acting under the motto of 'peaceful dualism' , Metternich, representing the senior partner, as a rule took great care to consult the Prussian statesmen and secure their agreement on all matters of mutual concern . To some of the lesser states, this arrangement appeared, in the words of Gagern, who represented Dutch interests, rather as a 'masked duum­ virate'; 1 6 and Wiirttemberg took the lead in opposing it. U nder the guidance of Wangenheim, its representative in the Federal Diet, this middle state became the spokesman of the ' third Germany' and the champion of Triaspolitik, according to which the middle and the smaller states would come together in a 'confederation within the Confederation' and Germany assume a tripartite structure . 1 7 From a less official position , Lindner, eq ually concerned about the rights of the lesser states, advocated a similar policy. 1 8 But, contrary to Wangenheim, he countenanced foreign patronage for the ' pure German confederation' . 1 9 I n doing so, he implicitly acknowledged the central difficulty about realising the scheme of Triaspolitik, namely the weakness of the rest of Germany in relation to Austria and Prussia. Even if all the other states had combined under the leadership of one or more middle states, they could not have transformed the dualism into a triangular balance of power.

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Middle Powers in International Politics

As it was, the attempt never got off the ground . Absence of solidarity among the middle states themselves and lack of support from the smaller states doomed Triaspolitik from the start. In the early years of the Confederation, Bavaria and Hanover, the strongest of the middle states, professed to see themselves as near­ eq uals of the two great powers, which made it difficult for them to identify with the other middle states . Many of the smaller states were more afraid of the pretensions and ambitions of various middle states, with whom some of them shared borders, than of the overwhelming power of Austria and Prussia. Hence they often found it safer to lean towards the great powers, especially towards Prussia, which had particularly tense relations with the middle states, than to back these states . Like the unifocal system, 2 0 the dualistic one presen ts signs of a 'sandwich' pattern, with the top and the bottom layers of the society of states tending to combine against the middle. I n the 1 960s, certain faint tendencies of the two superpowers to concert their policies in various important fields provoked reactions from apprehensive middle powers not unlike those of the middle states in the early years of the German Confederation . The nuclear­ test-ban treaty negotiated by the Russian and American govern­ ments in the Kennedy years was seen by the Chinese and French as essentially a scheme to maintain the overwhelming strategic superiority of the superpowers . The tentative Soviet rapprochement with the U nited S tates after Russia's disengagement from China in the later Khrushchev years raised apprehensions in Warsaw, where Russian overtures to West Germany seemed a possible parallel with frightening prospects. The attempt to impose the nuclear non­ proliferation treaty on the world , spearheaded by the superpowers and Britain in the later 1 960s, drew initially a rather negative response from such countries as Brazil, I ndia and West Germany, which were anxious not to close for ever the option of developing nuclear explosives, whether for economic or for diplomatic or for strategic purposes. And the superpowers' tacit recognition of each other's spheres of influence, particularly in Central America and Eastern Europe, which allowed the United States to interfere in the Dominican Republic in 1 965 and the Soviet U nion to invade Czechoslovakia in 1 968 with impunity , further enhanced the sense of insecurity that some middle powers had about Russo-American detente. Their earlier fear of the Cold War leading to a real war had in some cases been replaced by anxiety abou t an emerging concert

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which might conceivably develop into something that could be called a 'condominium' . As in post- 1 8 1 5 Germany, such middle-power fears gave rise to a num ber of sporadic, and largely futile, moves to co-operate against the would-be 'duopolists ' . Most of these efforts, such as West German and Japanese consultations about a joint response to the pressure to have the non-proliferation treaty accepted , were limited or half-hearted . The best thought-out and most determined attempt to build up opposition to a superpower concert came from Mao's China. As part of its reaction to Russo-American 'collusion ' , it advanced what became known as the doctrine of the 'second intermediate zone ' , according to which China was permitted to exploit the contradictions between the United States and its principal allies by co-operating temporarily with some secondary capitalist states . Under Chou-en-lai's direction, the Chinese govern­ ment began to make overtures to various West European powers . If Mao's China may be said to have assumed Wiirttemberg's old role, that of the would-be prompter of an association of lesser states to counter a great-power concert, France and Britain in the 1 960s often took courses that resembled more those of Bavaria and Hanover. Both of them reluctant to relinquish the great-power status they had enjoyed in the post-war years, France under de Gaulle occasionally revived the concept of the Big Four while Britain steadfastly clung to the notion of a special relationship with the United States. The German states system of the earlier years of the Confed­ eration as well as the global system of the first decade of East-West detente showed tendencies towards the formation of a class struc­ ture. 2 1 In both cases, a degree of co-ordination between the great powers provoked some attempts at co-operation among the secon­ dary states . But the record also shows j ust how scattered and irresolute, and unsuccessful, these efforts on the whole were. Neither the German middle states nor the modern middle powers were able to sink their differences and concert their policies enough to provide joint opposition to a great-power concert and collective protection against the risks of condominium. While a few called for co­ operation, most followed their own separate lines . The notorious difficulty of establishing and maintaining an effective concert of two great powers is apparently matched by an even greater difficulty of co-ordinating the reactions of a group of middle powers . The reasons for this may be twofold . First, the dangers presented

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Middle Powers in International Politics

by a great-power concert seem to be not quite overwhelming enough to frighten the middle powers into solidarity. Though substantial, they can rarely be of the most extreme kind . For these powers, as well as for most other members of the system, even a high degree of co­ operation between the two great powers must be preferable both to the domination that might result if one great power secured hegemony and to the anarchy that might prevail if no great powers were able or willing to assume international responsibilities. Second, the great-power concert may present some of the more prominent middle powers with opportunities attractive enough to tempt them to dissociate themselves from the rest of their group . Bavaria and Hanover posing as would-be great powers in the early years of the German Confederation, and France and Britain clinging to their special status as former great powers in the first period of East-West detente, are indications that the chance of being accepted at a level dose to that of the great powers may sometimes loom larger than the risk of being reduced to a position not far above that of the ranks of small powers. Middle powers faced with such an opportunity may be more likely to seek an association with the great powers than to make a bid for leadership of the lesser ones. Whether such middle powers succeed in forming a special relationship with the great powers, perhaps even j oining them in an enlarged concert, will depend partly on how much they have to contribute to the management of international politics and partly on how willing the great powers are to share responsibility with them . Neither Bavaria nor Hanover had its claims accepted by the two German great powers . And when France and Britain in the initial phase of the conflict in the Middle East in 1 967 separately took certain diplomatic steps to help manage the crisis, they were frustrated in their attempts and forced to leave all further efforts to control the situation to the superpowers. Only one of these powers, the United States, responded positively to the French proposal for a revival of the Big Four concert of the post-war years and the British plan for a multilateral force . 2 2 In more favourable situations, however, there may well be subordinate parts for a few middle powers . In a global dualistic system, they are likely to be of a specialised or regional character. One example is the nuclear concert of the late 1 960s, in which two former great powers played secondary roles. Britain, acting together with the United States and the Soviet Union, was one of the original sponsors of the non­ proliferation treaty . Though France refused to sign the treaty, this

The Dualistic System

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power, too, in effect joined the concert by declaring that it would act as if it had signed . Occasionally the same two middle powers secured

roles of some importance in informal concerts set up to deal with the affairs of a particular region, especially the Middle East. However, the superpower concert of the 1 960s was rarely substantial enough to provide solid material for a study of the roles of secondary powers in relation to this type of central relationship. While a dualistic concert may inspire some middle powers with fear and others with hope, their reactions in either case are likely to differ markedly from those of most smaller states in the system . The fear of being reduced to the level of the near-powerless must be felt more strongly by middle-ranking powers endangered by the great­ power concert than by the maj ority of small states . The latter, too, may well have their diplomatic scope curtailed as a result of great­ power co-operation but, being weak already, will generally have less to lose, and therefore less reason to be concerned about the central relationship. If some of them believed that certain middle powers presented a greater threat to them than any or both of the great powers did, they might even welcome and support such j oint measures of the latter as seemed likely to restrain the middle powers. In the German Confederation, as we have seen, many of the small states were inclined to support one or both of the great powers against the middle states, their traditional enemies . The reactions to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty may be seen as further evidence of tendencies towards the formation of a 'sandwich' pattern of support. The small states, most of them without either the possibility or the intention of ever developing nuclear arms, were generally in favour of the treaty sponsored by the superpowers and Britain, while its more determined opponents were those middle powers that were reluctant to give up the option of acquiring such weapons. Often having more to lose and sometimes also less to gain from great-power control than other states, many middle powers are likely to be more opposed to a dualistic concert than most of the lesser powers in the system - even though they may act separately rather than jointly and protest rather than resist. For the middle powers with the opportunity of becoming either j unior partners or agents of the great powers, the situation created by a dualistic concert must be even more different from that facing the small states. None of the latter can normally hope to gain a share in the management of international politics. What is more, some of them may actually find themselves at a disadvantage as a result of

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Middle Powers in International Politics

the strengthening in the diplomatic position of the middle-power collaborators . For an African nation under pressure from France or Britain, for example, it must be a matter of serious concern to know that the middle power in question is backed, passively or actively, by one or both of the superpowers. Here it is the small state that stands to lose more and gain less than the middle power. Thus, for middle powers with the possibility of associating themselves with the great powers, a dualistic concert must be a good deal easier to accept than it can be for at least some small states . Though a few middle powers may see opportunities in a great­ power concert, most are likely to greet it with apprehension . Though some small states may find the concert a drawback, many are likely to consider it an advantage . Even where a number of middle powers and small states find themselves on the same side in their reactions to th e concert, their motivations for either opposing or supporting it will probably be rather different. While most middle p(>wers will oppose it out offear of the great powers, some small states may dislike it mainly because of their tense relations with one or more middle­ power collaborators . While some middle powers may support the concert with a view to j oining it, many small states may welcome it as a means of securing protection against certain middle powers. But, whatever their rank and motivation, states that take the same side may ultimately rest their case on the same sort of arguments. Those that see themselves as potential victims of a d ualistic concert can base their opposition on the sovereign rights of states, while those that consider themselves among the likely beneficiaries of such an arrangement can rest their support on the need for international order.

5.3

R IVALRY AND CO-OPERATION

The third situation of the dualistic system to be considered here is characterised by a mixture of conflict and harmony in the cen tral relationship. Both of the elements that mark the situations already discussed are present, but in weaker forms . Rivalry is generally less intense, being conducted perhaps on the political and economic as much as on the strategic and military levels, and crises normally less frequent or less dangerous than in cold war. Co-operation is on the whole not so advanced as in diplomatic concert, being limited in either degree or extent, and may take the less demanding form of

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tacit co-ordination. The various possible mixtures of the two elements form a wide range, with a situation approaching cold war at one extreme and a state of affairs close to diplomatic concert at the other. But any particular relationship is more likely to present a fluctuating combination than a stable balance between conflict and harmony. I n a situation in which rivalry between the great powers is tempered with a measure of co-operation, the polarising tendencies in the system will be weaker than in cold war. It will not be quite so important for each of the two powers to put pressure on other states to fall in line, and not quite so necessary for such states to seek protection in a tight alliance system, or to guard their independence by remaining strictly unaligned . The likely results are alliances with a degree of looseness rather than firm blocs, and a large number of floating states rather than a group of determined neutrals. In such a structure, the distinction between aligned and unaligned states will be more blurred than in a highly polarised system . On the one hand , the aligned states will enjoy greater autonomy in relations with the alliance leader. They will be freer to challenge the great power, especially on matters not of decisive importance for the issue with the opposite side, and may sometimes also take initiatives of their own in relations with the other great power and its allies . On the other hand , the unaligned states will be in a better position to play the balance between the great powers and their allies . Being more than principal objects and potential victims of a rivalry between hostile camps, they will be freer to lean one way or the other in order to take advantage of a favourable bargaining position . Conversely, where co-operation between the great powers is modified by considerable rivalry, the oppressing tendencies in the system will be weaker than under diplomatic concert. The two quasi-partners in the management of international politics will find it harder to co-ordinate their policies and more difficult to carry out parallel measures. With less to fear and less to gain from the efforts of the great powers, the other members of the system will not have so strong an incentive to either oppose or support would-be collabor­ ation at the top level. Hence, in the system at large at any rate, the tendencies towards the formation of a class structure of inter­ national society and a sandwich pattern of alignment are likely to be weaker than under diplomatic concert. Compared with both cold war and diplomatic concert, a mixed situation tends to offer the middle powers in the system greater

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diplomatic scope. The dangers generally attending those more extreme situations, particularly of the outbreak of general war on the one hand and of the establishment ofcondominium on the other, being rather more remote, these powers are not subject to quite the same restraints and can contemplate policies and actions that otherwise might be too dangerous or simply impossible. The actual conduct of middle powers in dualistic systems of mixed relations may be studied in certain periods of German politics in the nineteenth century as well as in at least one stage of global politics in more recent years. Relations between Austria and Prussia in the decades before 1 848, after ' peaceful dualism' had given way to moderate rivalry and before the rivalry developed into a more intense conflict, as well as in the later 1 850s displayed a mixture of rivalry and co­ operation . So, on a grander scale, did Russo-American relations in the middle and late 1 960s, after the post- 1 962 detente had failed to lead to a broad diplomatic concert and before the rise of China created a diplomatic triangle which pointed towards the transform­ ation of the dualism into a more complex structure . Though something can be learned from an examination of the reactions of the German middle states within the relatively simple organisation of the Confederation, it is the much larger and more intricate global political system of the 1 960s that best illustrates the wide range of roles open to middle powers in a situation of ambiguous relations between the great powers . In a survey of these roles, a broad distinction, obviously more applicable to a global than to a geographically confined system of states, may be made between those that belong to the central relationship or the states system at large and those that are essentially regional or local , between systemic and sub-systemic roles. Considering first the former category, we may introduce a secondary distinction, which is related to the nature of the international situations in which the middle powers perform these roles. Given that the relations between the great powers are ambiguous and changing, the proportion between the elements of rivalry and co-operation may vary in both time and space, with rivalry predominating some time or somewhere and co-operation prevailing at other times or elsewhere . Hence we may try to separate the type of situation where middle powers face two great powers that are engaged in what is essentially restrained rivalry rather than limited co-operation, from the type of situation where the opposite is the case. Dealing first with the former type, we may

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introduce a third distinction, namely the familiar one between middle powers that tend to take sides and those that prefer to remain unaligned . That the various categories are not always mutually exclusive but present a certain amount of overlapping will in some cases allow us to view the same type of role in different perspectives . In discussing the systemic roles typical of aligned middle powers in conditions of restrained rivalry, we may start by noting the reasons why such states take sides and support one great power against the other. They are much the same as in dualistic situations of more intense conflict. Like other states, the middle powers are guided by power calculations or ideological considerations or by both, either or both of which could lead them into a defensive or an aggressive alliance . When the middle states in the rivalry of the German Confederation sided with anti-national and anti-liberal Austria in opposition to the constitutional schemes and hegemonial ambitions of Prussia, they were not only supporting conservatism against revisionism but also backing what appeared to be the stronger of the two powers and the one more likely to respect their rights. However, they were dependants rather than supporters of Austria. Though they liked to see themselves as holding the balance in German politics, it was in fact the balance of power between Austria and Prussia that was maintaining them. When this balance eventually collapsed and gave way to Prussian hegemony, the middle states soon disappeared altogether. In the periods of limited rivalry that preceded these developments, before 1 848 and in the later 1 850s, the roles performed by the four principal middle states in relation to the issue between the two great powers were minimal. Too weak and disunited to exert much influence, they could do little of real consequence to the central relationship. We must look elsewhere for material to throw light on the roles open to middle powers in such situations . East-West politics of the detente period of the 1 960s had something in common with the limited rivalry within the German Confederation as far as the alignment of secondary states was concerned . Again, most middle powers found themselves on the side of the more conservative and , as yet, stronger of the great powers . Of the European states here defined as middle powers, only Poland was with the Soviet Union . In Asia, China escaped the restraints of the alliance with its superpower neighbour and moved towards an unaligned position . On the Western side, de Gaulle took advantage of the detente by challenging Washington within NATO and

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seeking support for his obstruction of American policies from other powers in Europe, which set up cross-pressures in a few capitals, especially Bonn, and led to some loosening of the bonds of alliance. But the division that had come about in the Cold War largely survived, with the result that most of the middle powers of the world remained on the Western side. In this situation, it was the conduct of the European middle powers, Eastern as well as Western, that most clearly indicated the nature of the parts that such powers may assume in conditions of limited rivalry. Some of the parts seem to be much the same as in cold war, though the reduced risk of general war is apt to affect both the salience of the roles and the ability of the middle powers to perform them. This applies not least to the whole field of amelioration of the central relationship. In a rivalry already of only moderate intensity, restraint of the alliance leader may well seem less necessary. If the exercise of such restraint depends on a degree of intimacy between the middle power and the great power, the looser quality of the alliance could in some cases make it also more difficult to carry out. On the other hand, to the extent that a successful exercise of restraint presupposes a measure of independence on behalf of the ally, the same quality of the alliance could make it instead easier to achieve . I t may be a matter of the relative effectiveness of the private warnings and urgings of a Lester Pearson and the public disagree­ ment and criticism of a Charles de Gaulle. Providing good offices and mediating between the great powers, too, are services likely to be in less demand than in situations of cold war, because of the lower level of tension and easier contact between the rivals. Yet, Poland 's role in relation to the parties involved in the Vietnam war in the 1 960s shows that such acts are still possible. For peace-keeping, the third way in which middle powers may play an ameliorating role, the need may be greater than in cold war, since truces and accommodations of the type requiring such action are more likely to be arranged when the level of tension is lower. I t is significant that interest in peace-keeping functions reached its highest point in the 1 960s . However, the situation of restrained conflict may also present aligned middle powers with the possibility of assuming roles other than those characteristic of cold war. I n relation to the central division, perhaps the most constructive part that they might attempt is that of 'bridge-building' . While, under conditions of cold war, discipline within each alliance often is such that political

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relations between the camps tend to be conducted directly and exclusively by the great powers, in the more relaxed situation of limited rivalry the middle-power allies often enjoy diplomatic autonomy enough to allow them to initiate contacts of their own with the other side. Sometimes a middle power may actually find itself better placed than the alliance leader to launch such initiatives. Though some significant moves may be in the direction of the great-power opponent, the general tendency seems to be to aim at its middle- and small-power allies. While de Gaulle's France directed its efforts at both Russia and the lesser East European countries, other Western middle powers concentrated their diplo­ matic offensive of the 1 960s on the allies of the Soviet U nion . West Germany in particular, through Ostpolitik, exploited its special position in relation to the countries of Eastern Europe. On the other side of the division too, Poland , though anxious to improve its relations with the United States, pursued its detente policy mainly in Europe. Rapprochement with West Germany, realisation of the Gomulka Plan for a freeze on nuclear weapons in central Europe, and convening of a European security conference were among the main points of the policy initiated by Gomulka and continued by the Gierek government. 2 3 After the Warsaw visit of Nixon and Kissinger in 1 9 72 a Polish writer could conclude that the role of middle powers 'increases proportionately to the progress of detente in East-West relations ' . 2 4 While, on balance, there may be more scope for aligned middle powers under conditions of limited rivalry than in cold war, it cannot be assumed that they will always use their enhanced influence so as to ease relations between the two sides . As in cold war, they may have so large a stake in the conflict, or in particular issues, that they are driven to pursue policies that tend to exacerbate tension . In such cases, too, a lower risk of war and a greater measure of independence of the alliance leader are likely to be of advantage to the middle powers concerned . In the Suez crisis of 1 956, Britain and France, unable to disregard the dangers of intensifying the Cold War and very aware of their dependence on the United States, had to abandon their action in response to American pressure and demand for a withdrawal . But twelve years later, in conditions of detente, a middle power on the other side of the East-West division successfully sponsored action of a type that tended to aggravate tension in the central relationship. In the crisis over Czechoslovakia, Poland, together with East Germany, apparently encouraged , and

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perhaps even pressed, the Soviet Union to organise an invasion of the territory of their ally. Only a tacit and tentative agreement between the superpowers to respect each other's spheres of in­ fluence, backed by a shared concern to keep East-West tension below a certain level, allowed the Warsaw Pact countries to carry out their invasion and occupation with impunity. Without such an agreement, what started as an intramural crisis in Eastern Europe could conceivably have developed into a major East-West crisis . Thus, while a lower level of tension between the two sides may leave latitude enough for middle powers and others to promote policies that involve a significant risk of intensifying the central conflict, the desire or need of the great powers to restrain their rivalry may be strong enough to prevent too serious an exacerbation of tension between the alliances. If in conditions of intense conflict the risk of major war limits the scope of middle powers bent on potentially aggravating conduct, in situations of restrained conflict the element of co-operation in the central relationship may limit the effect of such conduct. The list of systemic roles characteristic of unaligned middle powers in situations of restrained rivalry, too, shows a marked change of emphasis when compared with that of cold war. For such powers as well, a lower level of tension in the central relationship presents a rather different set of problems and opportunities which is bound to have some effect on their international conduct. The results may be detected not only in their roles in relation to the central conflict but also in certain other systemic parts occasionally attempted by unaligned middle powers. As in situations of cold war, powers that tend to take the level of tension between the two sides for given might either stay aloof from the central conflict and mind their own business or play the balance and try to benefit from the rivalry of the great powers. From choice, or more likely from necessity, a few middle powers may take the former course. In the first years of the East-West detente, Nigeria remained almost entirely uninvolved in anything but narrow local affairs. And South Africa, ostracised by international society, was compelled to confine its role to its immediate neighbourhood . But such a degree of willing or enforced passivity is likely to be rare. Though the pressures on middle powers to involve themselves in systemic politics may be weaker than in cold war, the opportunities to secure substantial advantages by doing so are such that most unaligned middle powers may be expected to take a more active line.

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For some, the most attractive policy will be balancing between the two sides of the central conflict and playing one off against the other. While the lower degree of tension generally limits the risk of being caught up in major war and the danger of ending up as victim of the rivalry, the keenness of the competition that still goes on between the great powers may allow middle powers that choose this part to exploit a favourable bargaining position, perhaps to the point of drawing benefits from both sides . In the restrained rivalry of the 1 960s, some unaligned middle powers were able to make the superpowers compete for the supply of aid and arms. The I ndian government of the time, having changed the priorities of its foreign policy, in effect did 'this . When, after its earlier preoccupation with limiting the Cold War and reforming world politics, it found that it had to concentrate on securing foreign aid , this government made the realisation of its second five-year plan virtually dependent on both American and Russian aid, some of which it received directly and some indirectly . After the war with China, I ndia became more concerned with defence and securi ty. While clinging to the doctrine of non-alignment, it gradually abandoned the principle of equi­ distance and moved closer to the Soviet Union, until the relation­ ship seemed to be one of almost open dependence on the superpower that was nearer and had more to offer. For the unaligned middle powers that regard the central rivalry as open to manipulation , the number of possibilities is again, as in cold war, two: namely, attempting to exacerbate tension between the parties, and intervening to ease relations between them . The former course, though less dangerous than in situations of more intense conflict, is still a difficult one. Even in conditions of restrained rivalry, an uncommitted secondary power may rarely be able seriously to aggravate conflict between two great-power opponents which want to keep tension between themselves and their allies below a certain level. China, which in the 1 960s pursued a policy of dividing the superpowers and enjoyed a measure of support from other have-not states, was unable to prevent the establishment of a detente. There is no reason to suppose that any lesser middle power could have been more successful in the role of troublemaker. As in the case of the aligned ones, the need for unaligned middle powers to act as catalysts of detente is on the whole less pressing than in cold war. Only in peace-keeping, for which such powers often are well suited , might there be, as already explained, more of a role in conditions of restrained conflict . For good offices and mediation by

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third parties there is likely to be less of a demand because of the lower level of tension and the greater amount of direct contact between the principal parties . This may have been one reason why soon after the Belgrade Conference of 1 96 1 the traditional concerns with East-West politics became partially eclipsed by other issues in the eollective thinking of the leaders of non -aligned states. While the I ndian government, as we have seen, allowed its earlier preoccup­ ations with the Russo-American dualism to be superseded by its concern first with development and aid and then security and defence, the I ndonesian government, under Sukarno's leadership, tried to shift the attention of the world from the East-West issue to the North-South confrontation . 2 5 These departures from the spirit of Bandung and Belgrade, which for India at least involved a marked diminution in diplomatic standing in the world, pointed towards a variety of international roles not directly related to the central rivalry . On the systemic level, one such role was that of bringing to the fore global issues other than those that had been prominent in the East-West conflict. The period of detente, when the superpowers seemed to be moving towards a relationship of peaceful co­ existence , seemed a good time for certain unaligned middle powers to demand more attention for matters of special concern to themselves . Beset by intractable economic difficulties and preoc­ cupied with the striking contrast between the rich and the poor parts of the world, some of the foremost members of the non-aligned movement, backed by most other countries of the Third World , reinforced their efforts to bring the economic ineq uality among nations to the notice of the world and to effect some real changes in the global distribution of wealth. While I ndia, under Nehru and his successors, continued to follow the more moderate, reformist line, I ndonesia with increasing vigour pressed for confrontation . 'I think we can have full confidence in the ability of Moscow and Washington to find additional accommodation and increased rapprochement', Sukarno said in a speech at the conference of non­ aligned states in Cairo in 1 964, developing the view of the world that he had ou dined already at Belgrade: 2 6 I am convinced that they will continue to co-exist peacefully, and with increasing ease. I think we should compliment them on their achievement. Long live peaceful co-existence between Moscow and Washington ! I do not think they are in need of us at this

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present j uncture ! However, we will do well to transfer our attention and to exert our energies upon a more complicated and more urgent matter. And that is the serious problem of peaceful co-existence between the old forces of domination and the new developing nations. 2 7 As part of its policy, I ndonesia made a bid for joint leadership with China of all the have-not states. That middle power, too, was determined to belittle the ideological and political issues between the

Soviet Union and the United States and to intensify the conflict between the advanced and the disadvantaged parts of the world . Whether they favoured reform or whether they pursued revolution , by stressing the North-South issue so strongly the unaligned middle powers played an important part in varying the focus of global politics and increasing the complexi ty of international relations. The last systemic role of unaligned powers distinguished in the discussion of cold-war situations, that of uniting to transform the dualistic structure of the system, may be even less typical under conditions of restrained conflict. The reasons for this are twofold . First, if the two principal motivations for exploring the possibility of forming a third bloc and turning the dualism into a diplomatic triangle are fear of the possible results of a very high level of tension between the great powers and desire to acq uire greater leverage in inter-bloc politics, the incentives will tend to be weaker when tension is lower and polarity looser. Second, if one of the main obstacles to forming a third bloc is disagreement among the unaligned powers themselves, the task seems likely to be even more difficult to accomplish in conditions of restrained rivalry, which may offer at least some of these powers such tempting opportunities to pursue separate goals, particularly at sub-systemic levels, that they will find schemes of diplomatic concert and unity even less attractive . It is significant that the non-aligned powers as a whole found it much more difficult to agree on a common set of principles in the 1 960s than in the 1 950s. To the extent that I ndonesia and China had any success at all in uniting the poorer countries behind their leadership, it was on the North-South issue only. When, eventually, the global political system did begin to take on the character of a triangle, it was not as a result of the formation of a bloc of unaligned countries, but through the diplomatic rise of China. Mixed situations characterised by limited co-operation between

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the great powers rather than restrained rivalry do not present quite so wide a range of systemic roles for the middle powers, and can be dealt with more briefly here. As under conditions of full diplomatic concert, middle powers may either oppose or support the central relationship, though their systemic incentive to do either may not be q uite so strong. Those that take the former line are more likely to oppose separately than jointly. The known difficulties that at the best of times stand in the way of a j oint effort, namely weakness in relation to the great powers, disagreement among themselves and lack of support from small powers , will be particularly difficult for the middle powers to overcome in a situation where co-operation at the top level is only limited and oppression oflesser powers therefore less pronounced than under concert. On the other hand , since co­ operation between the great powers is already tempered with a substantial measure of rivalry, individual middle powers de­ termined to oppose the quasi-partnership of the great may find it a little easier than under conditions of concert to keep the would-be partners apart, and in favourable circumstances perhaps even to divide them further. The case of China in the 1 960s is instructive. Before its cultural revolu tion, this power, as we have seen , explored the possibility of organising joint opposition with certain other middle powers to a Russo-American relationship that showed some signs of developing into diplomatic concert but never really went beyond rather limited co-operation in special fields and occasional tacit co-ordination of diplomatic measures . Later, having failed to prevent a Russo_:-American detente in this manner, China managed to maintain a pressure of its own on the superpowers, the aim of which was to disrupt, or at least curb, a relationship which, seen from Peking, then appeared as a mixture of collusion and struggle, with the former element directed at itself in particular. However, since a great-power relationship of no more than quite limited collaboration in many cases can present only little real danger to secondary powers in the system and in some cases may even offer interesting diplomatic opportunities for them, most middle powers may well be inclined to support the arrangement. Some of them may actually seek to play an active part in it. To the extent that they sucr.eed , their roles are likely to be either as junior partners or, if the system covers a very large area, as regional agents of the great-power collaborators. In the former case, they may join a quasi-concert presided over by the two great powers, perhaps on a temporary basis to help deal with a crisis in the relations between

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certain other states, or more permanently to assist in the manage­ ment of a particular set of international issues . Thus Bri tain and France, the latter after some delay and with a number of reservations, joined the nuclear concert of the late 1 960s, of which the foremost expression was the non-proliferation treaty . Middle powers may find themselves in the other role, of regional agents of the principal powers, if they take a hand in the management of the international politics of a particular part of the world and have the support or at least the approval of the great powers . Again Britain and France in the 1 960s provide an example, this time in relation to African affairs. In a situation where the superpowers seemed to be groping for ways of engaging each other in limited collaboration and at a stage when Africa was not an important arena ofEast-West rivalry, these powers, each of them then still with considerable influence and a number of responsibilities in the region, occasion­ ally assumed managerial functions in local conflicts, sometimes with the backing of one superpower and the acquiescence of the other. For the role of junior partner as well as for that of regional agent, upper middle powers, with their greater political experience and diplomatic weight, often seem better suited than others . But, as in the case of full diplomatic concert, the possibility of any middle power assuming a supporting part, of whichever type distinguished here, must depend not only on its ability and inclination to perform the role but also on the willingness of the two great powers to share or delegate some of their international responsibilities. One of the most striking features of a global, or at least very extensive, dualistic system characterised by a mixture of rivalry and co-operation in the central relationship is that it gives most middle powers considerably larger scope for autonomous roles than they normally enjoy in conditions of either cold war or diplomatic concert. Neither exposed to those intense pressures to relate their international conduct to the central rivalry, which are character­ istic of cold war, nor subj ect to that high degree of managerial control that is inherent in diplomatic concert, the middle powers in such a system are often much freer to pursue regional interests and local concerns of their own . In doing so, they are likely to develop complex patterns of international relations, which may involve other middle powers in the vicinity, one or both of the great powers in the system, and some smaller states in the region , and to take on various sub-systemic roles which in spite of the geographical limitations may be quite important . The character of their

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relationships and the nature of their roles present a broad range of possibilities . In some regions and under some conditions, a middle power may enj oy preponderance and influence enough to establish itself as the local great power, with or without great-power backing. I n other regions or in other circumstances, two or more middle powers may engage each other i n rivalry, with or without great­ power involvement . Elsewhere or under different conditions, a number of middle powers may establish a regional concert, with or without support from the great powers and with or without participation by local small states . The role of the regional great power that is backed , tacitly or explicitly, by the two great powers in the system is, when viewed in the context of the central relationship, essentially that of an agent. I t depends o n a degree of co-operation between the great powers . The nearest examples in the 1 960s migh t be the parts played by France and Britain in Africa, already mentioned . However, given the tension between the great powers, it is more likely that such a middle power will have the support of only one of them, or that it will maintain itself more or less independently of both of them . When Brazil , in the second half of the 1 960s, began to cast itself for the role of the great power of South America, the background was its long history in the part of ally and agent of the United States . Japan had the benefit of military and strategic protection from the same great power when it went all out to develop its industrial potential and secure economic dominance in South East Asia. And I ndia was on friendly terms with the Soviet Union when it consolidated its position in the subcontinent by defeating Pakistan and assisting in the creation of Bangia Desh . Support from above may also take the form of an upper middle power encouraging a lower middle power to pursue or develop certain regional am­ bitions . I ndonesia derived more than moral support from China when, in the first half of the 1 960s , it cast itself as the guardian of the hemisphere; and Nigeria received much encouragement from Britain before it ventured on to the path of regional primacy, first in West Africa and then in most of black Africa . The best example of a middle power asserting itself independently of both principal and secondary powers may be South Africa, which enj oyed little real support from above when it reacted to international ostracisation by securing its position among the immediate neighbours and de­ pendencies of the Republic . For the purpose of examining the relations between a middle

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power in the position of local great power and the smaller states under its influence, some of the distinctions introduced in the analysis of the unifocal system may be useful. 2 8 Here, too the various ways of exercising preponderance can be arranged accord­ ing to degree of force employed and measure of willing acceptance offered . If the term 'dominance' stands for a combination of habitual use, or threat, of force and a minimum of willing acceptance, South Africa's struggle for racial survival and I ndonesia's pursuit of over-ambitious goals may have produced the best examples of dominant middle powers . If hegemony means occasional coercion and a moderate degree of acceptance , Brazil, allowing for the relatively low incidence of international violence in the region to which it belongs, and I ndia may be seen as cases of hegemonic middle powers . And if primacy is the term we use for situations where force is not brought into play and acceptance is granted in substantial measure, Japan, having exercised its pre­ ponderance in South East Asia almost exclusively in the economic sphere, and Nigeria, having been careful to maintain an extremely low profile in foreign affairs, seem among the most obvious examples . Where there are two or more middle powers in a region, a rivalry may develop . Such a rivalry, especially if it became both keen and prolonged , could not easily take its course without at least some involvement or intervention by the great powers . The influence exercised by these powers would be likely to reflect the ambiguity of their own relationship . While most of the time they might support, perhaps even encourage, a rival each, in situations of crisis they might try to impose restraint as well. That it is from the politics of the Middle East in the 1 960s that this mixture of encouragement and restraint has become most familiar shows that regional or local rivalry with a degree of great-power involvement is by no means limited to the states that here have been classed as middle powers . The best examples of regional conflict between such powers in the same period were those of I ndia, Pakistan and China, all of which then could be regarded as middle powers . Like the intensification of the struggle between Israel and the Arab states, the enmities in the subcontinent might be seen as part of the broad shift from direct conflict and crises between the great powers to local rivalries and wars between lesser powers that followed the detente in Russo­ American relations. But the pattern of great-power involvement in the subcontinent was rather more complex than in the Middle East.

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I n the I ndo-Pakistani conflict, the U nited States, the stronger but more distant of the great powers, traditionally supported Pakistan, the weaker and newer of the rivals, while the Soviet Union generally backed India, the stronger and more established party. In the Sino­ Indian conflict, the Soviet Union, after its rift with China, involved itself ever more deeply with I ndia, while the United States gradually disengaged itself from the region - a move that could be seen as a reaction to early signs of a diplomatic triangle emerging in the global system . The result for the three middle powers was somewhat unequal degrees of dependence on the great powers . While China, relying on its own resources, enjoyed considerable autonomy in regional politics, I ndia and Pakistan, each in varying measures dependent on military, diplomatic and economic support from outside, had to accept certain limitations on their roles in the local rivalries. Where two middle powers engage each other in regional rivalry, a dualistic sub-system, with some of the features of the central system examined in this chapter, may establish itself. Here, too, the intensity of the rivalry will condition the international conduct of the smaller states in the vicinity . Both the I ndo-Pakistani and the Sino-Indian conflict went through various levels of tension, ranging from restrained rivalry and cold war to crisis and war, each of which influenced the policies and actions of most of the small states in the area . A similar conflict in a region with a larger number of states, for example between Brazil and Argentina in South America or between Nigeria and South Africa in Africa, might conceivably produce patterns of small-state behaviour almost as varied as those distinguished in the discussion above of the conduct of middle powers in conditions of dualistic conflict at the systemic level . If the rivalry is intense and lasting enough to give rise to a degree of polarisation in the sub-system, a few of the more prominent small powers, some of them aligned and others perhaps unaligned , might attempt roles in regard to the middle-power duel comparable to some of those occasionally assumed by middle powers in relation to great-power rivalry. However, the possibility of such initiatives, whether of the ameliorating or of the exacerbating kind , having any effect at all on the conflict must be subj ect to the influence exerted on the middle-power rivals by the great powers. The third of the regional middle-power roles distinguished here, that of concert leader, also seems often to depend on a degree of support from one of the great powers . The EEC, in which France,

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West Germany and I taly, later joined by Britain, took the principal parts, owed a good deal to American sponsorship . While the United States encouraged the creation and aided the early development of the Community, NATO provided the military and strategic protection under which the members could pursue their goal of a degree of economic and political integration . Similarly, LAFT A, in which Argentina, Brazil and Mexico accepted the parts of big members, took shape within the protective framework of OAS . 211 ASEAN , on the other hand , in which Suharto's I ndonesia from the outset played the leading role, was essentially an autonomous enterprise with little backing from outside the region . I ndeed , while the declared aim of this association of South East Asian states with non-communist governments was to facilitate economic co­ operation, one of the principal concerns of its members was to protect the region against interference by outside great and maj or powers . But ASEAN was an exception . I n a dualistic system with a substantial amount of rivalry and some tendencies towards polaris­ ation, regional associations of states may only rarely be able to establish themselves and survive without some form of support from one great power or the other . As in the case of central concerts, the obj ectives as well as the form and style of regional concerts can vary greatly. A sub-systemic association of states may be set up for economic, for political or for strategic reasons , or for a combination of motives . ASEAN , formally an organisation for economic ends, implicitly expressed, in addi tion to the strategic _concern to prevent foreign intervention, a political preoccupation with the danger of communist insurrection . The association may comprise any number of middle powers in the region , as shown by the examples mentioned . ASEAN counted only one such power among its members, but came into being in a political climate marked by improved relations among the middle powers in the wider region . Though I ndonesia, Australia, Japan and I ndia never developed a diplomatic concert, in the later 1 960s their relations had reached a state that allowed Indonesia to take the lead in organising formal international co-operation in the limited area of South East Asia. The concert may be of middle powers only or, as in all of the three examples, may include also a number of smaller states . I t may be a closed club or, like the EEC, may be continually expanding its membership. I t may present various degrees of formality in structure, ranging from an ad lwc diplomatic arrangement to an established international organisation.

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Finally, the concert may pursue its objectives with more or with less regard for the interests and sensibilities of other states within its reach . The more such states feel oppressed or ignored by it, the more likely they will be to look beyond the region for support and protection. Apparently, it is at the sub-systemic level that a global duali.sm with mixed relations offers middle powers their most substantial roles . While their parts in regard to the central relationship can be only secondary, as preponderant powers , rivals or concert leaders in their own regions they act as principals . However, even at this level the difference between their parts and those of some smaller states is sometimes unclear . Certainly , middle powers that enjoy regional preponderance, particularly if this takes the form of dominance or hegemony, as well as middle powers that control a regional concert, especially if it is of the more formal and oppressive type, are in positions quite different from those of smaller states under their sway . If some of these smaller states attempted to protect themselves against the middle powers by seeking an understanding with one or both of the great powers in the system , the difference would be further accentuated . But between the middle-power partners and other members of a broader regional concert and between middle-power rivals and other parties to regional conflict the distinction may be less clear . Thus, a comparison between the records of Holland and I taly in the EEC suggests that some concert­ minded smaller states may perform functions not essentially different from those of a middle-power member of the same association . And events in the Middle East and South East Asia in the 1 960s demonstrated that some smaller states involved in a local conflict may take on parts no less consequential than those of middle-power rivals . Even in regional poli tics the distinction between middle powers and small s tates is more blurred than that between great powers and middle powers in the system at large .

On the whole, middle powers have a greater role in the dualistic system when the central relationship is ambiguous than when it takes the more clear-cu t forms of cold war or diplomatic concert . When the great powers are engaged in intense conflict, the middle powers tend to be either dependent allies or obj ects of the rivalry . When the great powers are involved in advanced co-operation , middle powers are among the most obvious victims of their concert, though a few may become ju nior partners or agents of the two

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collaborators . But when the great powers are engaged i n both rivalry and co-operation with each other, whether their relationship is in the nature of restrained rivalry or whether, rather, it has the character of limited co-operation, most of the middle powers are likely to enj oy considerable scope. In regard to the more negative manifestations of such a mixed relationship, some of the middle powers may be in a position to exert significant influence, which they often , though not always, use to help reduce tension between the two sides . As regards the more positive expressions of the relationship , some of them may -attempt to oppose exercises in great­ power co-operation while others may lend their support by actively associating themselves with such efforts . And in regional politics, assuming that the system comprises many states and covers a large area, a number of middle powers may set themselves up as preponderant powers , engage each other in rivalry or take the lead in forming an association of states . Despite the tendency of great powers to involve themselves in regional affairs and the inclination of regional powers to lean on stronger outside powers , middle powers in such roles are often independent enough to exercise decisive influence within their areas . I t follows that, in this type of dualistic situation , the state of international relations in large parts of the area covered by such a system must depend to a considerable degree on the conduct of the middle powers . I ndeed , in some regions the level of international order will be determined largely by the nature of the roles these powers assume and the way they play them . When the East-West detente brought the first clear signs of a rise in the importance of middle powers in certain parts of the world , some observers greeted the development with confidence while others were apprehensive . On the one hand , there was the possibility of particular powers securing greater influence on the management of the central relationship and the even more attractive prospect of some powers being able to devote more attention to the issues and obj ectives of their own regions . On the other hand , there was uncertainty about the qualifications of various middle powers for taking on new responsibilities , especially about the ability and will of those in the Third World , where overwhelming domestic difficulties and dis­ turbing foreign ambitions apparently left few candidates for the role of regional guardians of international order . 30 I n retrospect, however, some of these doubts and fears seem to have been exaggerated . A contemporary observer looking back at the actual

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performance of middle powers in the last few decades might take a more favourable view of the capabilities of such powers to contribute to the orderly management of the international political process . Though mixed , the record of the middle powers in their various regions does not on the whole seem inferior to that of the great powers in the system at large .

6 The Triangular System International systems o f three great powers seem t o b e relatively rare and , when they do appear, tend to be also rather short-lived . More often than not they are resolved by war. Through conquest, whether by one great power of two, by two ofone, or by one ofone , a triangular system may be reduced to a simpler system, either unifocal or dualistic. 1 Sometimes, however, they are dissolved by peaceful transformation. Through the appearance, or reappear­ ance, of one or more additional great powers, a triangular system may be turned into a multiple one. Both too few and too transient, the historical examples available seem scarcely adequate for an inductive study of the triangular system . Occasionally, however, international systems that are not triadic in composition present patterns of diplomatic interaction that are clearly triangular. In a multiple system, four or more great powers may divide for diplomatic purposes into three corners. In a dualistic system, a leading secondary power may form a diplomatic triangle with the two principal powers. And in a unifocal system, two important secondary powers may engage the preponderant power in triangular interaction. To regard such cases as instances of the triangular system would be to confuse the structure of a system with the processes that go on within it. 2 Yet, diplomatic triangles of these types are not necessarily irrelevant to our purposes . If they are the dominant relationship of the system, stand out clearly from the rest of its international relations and last for some considerable time, they can provide useful additional material for an analysis of the dynamics of international triangles . If, at the same time, the system to which they belong contains a number of middle powers, other than any that may be part of the triangle itself, such patterns of interaction may cause some of these powers to react in ways that can help to indicate the type of conduct that would be characteristic of middle powers in various situations of the triangular system. Thus, certain historical cases of diplomatic triangles may furnish valuable 1 59

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supplementary material for a study of the role of middle powers in great-power triangles . Even so, modern history provides only a fairly limited number of triangular situations relevant to such a study. Neither of the two supposed triangles of the nineteenth century, Europe at the height of the Napoleonic Empire and Germany in the age of the Confederation, is a very satisfactory case from our point of view . The triangle of France, Russia and Bri tain between the battle of J ena in 1 806 and the retreat from Moscow in 1 8 1 3 was brief and precarious . It arose when Austria and Prussia temporarily left the ranks of the great powers, and disappeared when they returned . To call it a triangular system is to ignore the existence of the United States, which already then had proved itself able to bring influence to bear in European politics . What is more , since the triangle rested on the treaty of Tilsit, by which Napoleon and Alexander had partitioned Continental Europe in preparation for the struggle with Bri tain, it afforded little scope for middle powers . Most non-great powers not eliminated or crippled had been reduced to subservient allies of Napoleon . The Tilsit situation illustrates mainly the extreme difficulties of middle powers subjected to a local great­ power condominium . By the time the geographically more mar­ ginal middle powers , Spain and Portugal in the south and Sweden in the north, were able again to assert themselves in the system, it was no longer triangular. When they were ready to join the fourth coalition, in the summer of 1 8 1 3 , the situation was once again characterised by dualistic struggle within a multiple system, with Napoleonic France on one side and the maj ority of the European great powers on the other. The triangle of Austria, Prussia and the ' third Germany' in the half century after the Congress of Vienna was always more an idea than part of political reality. As we have seen, the scheme of bringing the lesser German states together in a confederation within the Confederation and turning the great-power dualism into a triangular system had a number of champions among the spokes­ men of middle states . 3 And in certain situations, some of these states actually took steps to realise the plan . They did so, on the one hand , when the two German great powers were close enough to each other to make some of the lesser states in the system fear their joint ascendancy, especially in the years of ' peaceful dualism' at the beginning of the restoration period but also at the time of the Austro-Prussian alliance of 20 April 1 854; and , on the other hand ,

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they did so when the same great powers were involved in a rivalry intense enough to pose the danger for lesser states of becoming victims of the conflict, particularly in the period starting with the Frankfurt Assembly of 1 848. 4 But none of these efforts came to fruition. The middle and the smaller states, with their diversity of goals and fears, remained as lacking in unity and direction as the Third World was in the East-West dualism of the post-war decades . Even if they had been able to achieve a high degree of political unity, they would have been too weak to assume the part of a third great power. In any case, a united and independent ' third Germany' joining Austria and Prussia in a Central European triangle would have left no middle powers in the German states system . The history of the German Confederation, despite occa­ sional tendencies towards triangularity, is of little use in a study of middle powers in triangular systems. A third triangular situation worth considering is that of Europe in the late 1 930s. Made up of the League powers , the Axis powers and the Soviet Union, this triangle underwent remarkable changes of shape . In the original configuration, which was established with the Hitler-Mussolini treaty of October 1 936, the three rivalling parties were all q uite far from each other. But through the Anglo-French policy of appeasement of M ussolini's I taly and Hitler's Germany and the Munich agreements of September 1 938, the Western powers and the Axis powers drew closer to each other. Subsequently, through the Nazi-Soviet pact of August 1 939, the Soviet U nion and the Axis powers moved near each other. Eventually, after the German invasion of Russia in june 1 94 1 , the Soviet U nion joined the Western powers to fight and defeat Germany and its allies. At all stages, it was a composite triangle, consisting of five great powers . To regard it as a triangular system would be to ignore not only its multiple composi tion but also the existence of the non-European great powers, especially the United States, which, despite its temporary withdrawal into isolation, repeatedly had vindicated its part in the states system. The international relations of Europe in the 1 930s , it may be said , presented a triangular constellation of a multiple system, in which some great powers stayed close enough to each other jointly to make up a comer of the triangle and others remained far enough from the centre of interaction to allow the triangle to take shape . Only on the ideological level was there a true triangular system , in which eventually also Japan and the United States became involved . Here

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the three-cornered struggle between the liberal democrats , the fascists and the communists has been compared to the Wars of Religion from the mid-sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth century , between catholics, Iutherans and calvinists. Despite its shortcom­ ings, however, the political triangle that existed in Europe before the Second World War is not irrelevant to our enquiry. The trials of Spain, which suffered the intervention of the Axis powers and the Soviet U nion and the non-intervention of the League powers in its civil war, and the fate of Poland , which after much manoeuvring within the triangle became the victim first of Russo-German agreement and then of Russo-German war, point to some of the dangers to which middle powers in great-power triangles may be exposed . But a rather more illuminating case is the diplomatic triangle of the Soviet U nion, the United States and China that emerged in the 1 9 70s. Though far from perfect for our purposes, it is the relationship best suited for case s tudy here . Withou t eclipsing the Russo-American dualism , which rested on the huge strategic superiority of the superpowers and their long tradition of exclusive relations, the interaction of the three powers formed a pattern in global politics which stood out fairly clearly from the rest of international relations and lasted long enough to allow it to become the subject of analytic enquiry. Before the first appearance of this triangle there was much speculation about a five-power system of international politics, which would involve also J apan and Western Europe as full participants. Neither of these , however, was able to fill its part in such a structure . ] apan, without nuclear weapons, and Western Europe, lacking in political cohesion, were hardly in the same class as China for diplomatic purposes . Strategically de­ pendent on the U nited States and economically insecure, they were not capable of sustained autonomous action at the top level of international politics. But China, relying on its political strength and ideological appeal and commanding an already considerable strategic capability, was both willing and able to assume an independent role close to the centre of the world stage . Once each of the superpowers had engaged it in separate interaction , the Soviet U nion through the conflict and rivalry that developed in Asia in the 1 960s and the U nited States through the rapprochement arranged by the Nixon administration in the early 1 970s, the triangle took shape rapidly. Made up of two superpowers and one upper middle power which for the purposes of this interaction had been deemed a

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great power, it soon established i tself at the centre of the global system. The longer it lasted the more conscious the three powers became of belonging to a triangular system of interaction , and the more aware other states became of having to conduct their affairs in conditions of triangular dynamics. 6 However, as a case of triangular interaction , the Sino-Russo­ American relationship has two shortcomings, namely the great inequality of the parties and the brief duration of its existence. Though even rough equality of power may be fairly unusual in any type of international constellation, the inferiority ·or China was so marked that the diplomatic relationships presen ted and the inter­ national conditions created by this constellation of powers may not be typical of international triangles . Hence, for the purpose of setting out some of the various situations that may arise in a proper triangular system, it will be necessary to rely rather more on abstract analysis of the dynamics of the ideal triangle, in which the capabilities and goals of the three parties are comparable, than on an examination of the properties and potential of this historical triangle, which developed in what was still basically a dualistic system. Second , the incipient nature of the triangle of the 1 970s , together with the paucity of other historical examples , inevitably limits the amount and the variety of material available to indicate the characteristic reactions of middle powers in the several types of triangular situations. For this reason , observations about the international conduct of such powers have to be more tentative and statements abou t their typical roles more speculative than in the discussions of the other systems explored in this study.

6. 1 .

EQU I LATERAL TRIANGLES

In classifying the various types of relationships possible between three great powers, a distinction may be made between those that describe an equidistant, or equilateral, triangle and those that produce a lopsided shape, a figure in which the three sides are not all similar. Of the former class, three different sets of trilateral relations will be considered here, namely unmitigated rivalry, diplomatic concert and restrained rivalry. As in the discussion of the dualistic system, the two extremes, condominium and war, will be excluded . U nmitigated rivalry is a state in which each great power rivals the other two at a high level of intensity, without, however, entering

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into an all-out war, which would be likely to lead first to a break­ down of the equilateral form of the triangle and then perhaps to a knock-ou t defeat of one or two of the three powers. Such a state of relations never developed in the diplomatic triangle of the 1 970s , but can easily be imagined . In the conditions that would prevail, the middle powers in the system would face much the same dangers as in a cold-war situation of the dualistic system . In common with most other states, they would be exposed, on the one hand , to the risk of being encroached upon, or even swallowed up, by one of the rivals and , on the other hand , to the danger of suffering great damage, or in conditions of modern warfare perhaps obliteration , if one or more of the three cold wars broke out into open and major hostilities. As in the Cold War of the late 1 940s and the 1 950s many middle powers, caught as they were between the Sovi et U nion and the United States and exposed to pressure from each side, entered into military alliance with the superpower on which they were most dependent or against the one from which they had most to fear, so most of the middle powers in a triangular cold war would be likely to take sides and draw close to one or other of the three corners . Some, particularly those adj acent to and dependent on one of the great powers, could be expected to side with that power, in some cases probably almost regardless of the balance of forces and the nature of the issues between the two sides. Thus , in a rivalry between the three principal powers of the 1 9 70s , Poland and Canada could be relied on each to take the side of its overwhelming neighbour and ideological ally. Others, those whom geography and history had left in a position of choice, would be freer to apply calculations of power. While some could follow traditional balance­ of-power principles and support whichever side seemed weaker or more threatened , others might take the course Poland took in January 1 934, when it signed a 1 0-years' non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany, and backed what appeared to be the side more likely to prevail . Within each alliance, the middle powers would enjoy the advantages and , no doubt, seize some of the opportunities that go with being the major allies of a great power involved in serious conflict. In certain situations, some of them might use such influence as they had to try to restrain the alliance leader or otherwise moderate the conflicts with the other blocs, as several middle-power allies of the United States occasionally did in the Cold War. In different circumstances , a few other such powers might find it more

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in their interest to encourage the alliance leader to take a strong line, even at the risk of exacerbating tension with the rivals, as middle powers on both sides seem to have done at certain junctures of the East-West conflict. 6 Whatever the direction of the influence actually exercised by the middle-power allies, it could hardly be decisive for the course of the conflict, which normally would be in the hands of the great powers. As in dualistic cold war, the real role of aligned middle powers · in intense triangular conflict would usually be that of principal supporters and first lieu tenants of the great-power rivals. Compared with the corresponding situation of the dualistic system, a triangular cold war would present fewer opportunities for middle powers to remain unaligned . Few middle powers would be so removed from all the centres of tension as to be able, and so unimportant to all the great powers as to be allowed , to maintain positions of neutrality or non-alignment. Hence, the various roles that may go with such policies, particularly that of would-be mediator between great powers, which Nehru's India and others occasionally took on in the Cold War, could only rarely find takers in trilateral conflict. At the opposite side of the spectrum of relationships possible in a triangular system of the equidistant shape is diplomatic concert. Marked by a high degree of consultation and co-operation among the partners, though not so high as that characteristic of con­ dominium, concert is not easily established or maintained . Normally appearing only at the end of a maj or war and then usually dissolving already in the early post-war period, it did not materialise in the triangle of the 1 9 70s. Had it done so, the result might have been a mixed blessing for the middle powers of the world . Like other members of the states system , they would have benefited from the fairly high degree of international erder which would have been the probable result of great-power co-operation. Some might have aspired to the part of associates of the great powers. If they had succeeded, their roles in the concert would probably have been subordinate, of the types distinguished in the discussion of the corresponding situation of the dualistic system . 7 But most middle powers would have been more likely to find their scope severely narrowed . Since with the great powers close enough to each other to form a concert it hardly would have mattered greatly to others if there were less than or more than three of them, instances of dualistic and multiple concerts in nineteenth-century Europe might

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be a guide to the likely effects of a triangular concert as well as to the possible reactions of the middle powers in the system . 8 Although there are obvious difficulties about applying lessons drawn from a German duopoly and a European quadruple or quintuple congress system to a global triangular concert, the general effect would probably have been much the same . As long as the solidarity of the three las ted , most middle powers would have been likely to enjoy less freedom and find fewer opportunities in the international sphere . More than any of the other triangular situations to be considered here , concert would tend to reduce middle powers to the role characteristic of small states. While our study of the dualistic system indicates that middle powers exposed to great-power collaboration are inclined to explore possibilities of co-operating to resist the impositions of the concert, it also shows that such efforts are likely to be, on the whole, not very successful. Compared with either of the more extreme possi bilities discussed above, an intermediate set of relations , in the form of rivalry with restraint, seems a rather more likely solution for an equilateral triangle. In a world of nuclear powers, the element of mutual restraint in each of the relationships making up such a triangle would stem mainly from the need to avoid major war, as it did in the detente between the superpowers. Given time , this shared habit of restraint might generate a set of loosely defined guidelines and tacitly agreed rules for regulating the competitive interaction of the three powers, as it may have done already in the Russo-American relationship. The pattern of rivalry that might result could perhaps follow that which developed between the United States, the Soviet Union and China in recent decades . After the height of the Cold War, conflict among these powers began to take the form less and less of direct confrontation and more and more of indirect clash . I n Soviet-American relations the change was from confrontation i n central Europe, especially over Berlin, t o crisis and something resembling 'war by proxy' in the Middle East. In Sino-Soviet relations the shift was from direct clash along the common border in central Asia, to rivalry and war between allies or friends first in the subcontinent and then in South East Asia. And in the relationship between the U nited States and China the same development may be detected if the Korean War and the open confrontations of the Taiwan Strait crises are compared with the war in Indochina, where China never committed troops and the U nited States eventually withdrew them. The overall pattern in such a set of

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relationship could be one i n which the three parties tried to avoid direct clashes by respecting each other's minimum spheres of influence and relegating their rivalries to parts of the world where their influence was less clearly demarcated . When considering the various possible roles of middle powers in such a state of a triangular system, a distinction would have to be made between powers located within a great-power sphere of influence and powers beyond such spheres. For the former category, one of the main features of the international situation in which they found themselves would be their dependence on the great power. Not only their diplomatic scope within the sphere but also their ability to take initiatives beyond would depend to a large extent on the way in which the great power exercised its preponderance, on the degree of domination it established . Their conduct and role in relation to the great power might be much the same as in a unifocal system . 9 The middle powers outside the three spheres of the great powers would presumably enj oy more latitude, with a variety of roles open to them. Some might enter into the limited conflicts of the great powers and , as in the case of unmitigated rivalry, take sides and play the familiar parts characteristic of major partners of an alliance leader. O thers might prefer to try to steer clear of all great-power rivalries and concentrate on their own domestic, local or regional concerns . But, as in the situation of unmitigated rivalry, the polarising tendencies on each side of the triangle would presumably offer less scope for unalignment than the corresponding dualistic situation . Some of the regional roles that may be open to middle powers under conditions of dualistic limited conflict might well be possible for several such powers also in situations of triangular restrained rivalry. 1 0 One of the most significant would probably be that of regional rivals. As in the corresponding situation of the dualistic system, middle powers that entered into a keen rivalry with each other might find it difficult to stay out of great-power conflict. Particularly a prolonged regional struggle between two midd le powers would be likely sooner or later to become mixed up with the rivalry between the great powers most interested in the region. While each of the middle powers might need the support of one of the great powers, each of the great powers might want to use the middle power for ends of its own. While in some situations the middle powers might be in a position to manipulate their great-

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power principals, in other circumstances the principals would be able to influence their middle-power clients, sometimes giving encouragement and sometimes imposing restraint in the regional conflict. To the extent that the great powers channelled their own rivalry through the regional struggle of the middle powers, the latter might play a useful role in helping to reduce direct conflict between the former and limit tension in the equilateral triangle .

6.2.

NON-EQU I LATERAL TRIANGLES

The two typical lopsided configurations of a triangular system are that in which two powers engage in keen rivalry while the third keeps i ts distance and that in which two powers collaborate against the third . If the most advantageous state of affairs for one party in a competitive triangle is where the other two are embroiled with each other in a rivalry short of war, the most unfavourable state for it is where they are engaged with each other in close co-operation against itself. I ndeed , whatever the concrete issues dividing the three parties, the desire of each to be tertius gaudens and the fear of each of becoming victim of a hostile coalition of the others may be seen as the basic concerns activating the dynamics of the triangular system . These concerns will affect not only the interaction of the great powers themselves but, indirectly, also the conduct of the lesser powers in the system. First, let us consider the case of two rivals and an outsider. One of the findings of triad theory is that a triangle with one competitive, or negative, and two co-operative, or positive, relationships is un­ stable, and that the pressure towards stability will be directed mainly at the party involved in both of the positive relationships. 1 1 Each of the rivals wants the third party to join a coalition against the other. The weaker the third party , the harder it may find it to resist the pressure to choose between the others. Pressure will be directed also at any uncommi tted secondary power that in any way may be able to influence the course and outcome of the rivalry. Each such power will have its own triangular relationship with the two rivals and, unless its position is strengthened through the presence in the system of the uncommitted third great power, will be in much the same situation as when exposed to great-power rivalry in a dualistic system . Middle powers situated close to the centre of tension will fee l the polarising forces a t work between the opponents, a n d will find it

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difficult to avoid taking sides and entering into some form of alliance with one or the other of the rivals. I ndia, which had been able to remain unaligned in the conflict between East and West, found i t much harder t o balance between the two principal communist powers when the centre of friction moved to Asia and I ndia found itself on the Sino-Soviet side of an emerging triangle. Middle powers that are more removed from the area of tension between the great powers and are determined to stay out of the conflict may succeed in balancing between the two opponents . Some of them may be content merely to enjoy the role of secondary tertius gaudens, either simply standing by while concentrating on their own affairs, or actually attempting to draw benefits from the competition of the great powers. In relation to the Sino-Soviet issue in the triangle of the 1 970s , I ndonesia may be the best example. Others may attempt to mediate, in the manner of some nonaligned middle powers in the dualistic Cold War of the 1 950s and 1 960s. 1 2 Such attempts are as unlikely to be successful as i n similar situations of the dualistic system. A middle power usually cannot mediate between great-power opponents , though trying to do so may enhance its diplomatic status for a while. The third course, sometimes open to the great-power outsider, namely to s tir up strife between the two opponents in order to prolong their rivalry and thus maintain its own position of advantage, would normally be beyond the reach of a middle power, especially one well removed from the scene of action. So far, the role of middle powers in this type of triangle has been considered only in regard to the relationship between the two rivals. Those powers whose international conduct would be conditioned more by the relationship of one or both of the two relatively co­ operative pairs of great powers wou ld have more freedom of movement than those which, so to speak, were on the third side of the triangle. Exposed neither to the polarising tendencies which would go with a high degree of rivalry nor to the suppressing tendencies which would be a likely result of an advanced stage of exclusive co-operation between the great, they would be rather freer to follow their local pursuits and take regional initiatives. I n such a situation a number o f courses o f action can b e imagined . I n some circumstances, an ambitious middle power might secure leadership of its region . I n a future global triangle, an economically and militarily stronger Indonesia, if left in peace by all of the great powers, could conceivably pursue such a policy. I n other circum-

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stances , two or more middle powers might find themselves engaged in a regional rivalry in which the great powers , otherwise preoc­ cupied in such a triangle, might take only a moderate interest. In appropriate circumstances, Nigeria and South Africa could con­ ceivably develop such a relationship. Yet another possibility for the middle powers on the relatively co­ operative sides of the triangle would be regional co-operation. The interest that European powers, both' Western and Eastern, took in the European Security Conference could be related to the shift of tension from the Soviet-American to the Sino-Soviet side of the emerging triangle. Similarly, the idea of a regional association championed by some West Pacific powers, particularly Australia, in the early and mid- 1 970s could be seen as reflecting the correspond­ ing shift of tension from the Sino-American to the Sino-Soviet relationship . Co-operation in the fields of security and economics, especially if it involved also the smaller states in the region, would afford the middle powers some protection against the dangers bound up with the instability of this type of triangle. In the event of the great-power third party abandoning its position of balance and joining the great-power rival closer to the middle powers concerned , their practice of co-operation would enhance their ability to oppose encroachments by the great-power alliance, which now would dominate the international relations of the region. If the third party in the central relationship jumped the other way and joined the opposite rival, regional arrangements might give some protection against the intensification of great-power rivalry, to which these middle powers now would be exposed. Whether the centre of tension in the triangle of the 1 970s really was between the Soviet U nion and China or whether it still was between the Soviet U nion and the United S tates, whether it was the United States or whether it was China that occupied the position of tertius gaudens, the Australian project for some form of regional co-operation could be seen as aimed at meeting the alternative dangers for the region of too much collaboration and too much competition between the great powers . If the third party in an unstable non-equilateral triangle of this type did join one of the rivals , perhaps after engaging the o ther in separate rivalry and thus temporarily bringing about another unstable isosceles triangle, the final situation to be considered here would arise . If the most significant property of any triad is its propensity to divide into a combination of two against one, this

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situation must in the long run be the most likely of the various triangular possibilities. As regards the role of the middle powers in the system, it seems also the most interesting. Those that find themselves caught between the two great powers involved in relatively close collaboration with each other are sometimes inclined , it appears , to move nearer to the third great power, the one in the opposite corner. With that power they often have problems in common . While the great power is faced with a hostile coalition , the middle powers on the opposite side of the triangle may be exposed to the dangers of a local great-power concert, or even a condominium. They and it may share an interest in dividing the two collaborators or, if they cannot do that, in establishing some sort of counterweight to them. The pattern that may result can be seen fairly clearly in some of the earlier triangles of European history . At the time of the signing of the treaty of Tilsit, Sweden leaned towards Britain. I n 1 92 1 , when the coolness of the Western powers towards both the ex­ enemy and the new Soviet government tended to throw Germany and Russia together, Poland, afraid of a German national revival and suspicious of Russian designs on her frontiers, signed a treaty of alliance with France. The Nazi-Soviet pact of August 1 939 was followed immediately by an Anglo-Polish treaty. The subsequent fate of Sweden and Poland in the two triangles shows not only that their concerns were only too well founded but also that their diplomatic moves were in the right direction. Sweden, after being defeated first by France and then by Russia and being forced to declare war on Britain, ended up as a member of the fourth coalition against Napoleon, gaining Norway as compensation for the loss of Finland. Poland was invaded, occupied and partitioned by Germany and the Soviet U nion but, through the victory of the Allies, eventually restored , though under Russian patronage . Even the global triangle of the United States , the Soviet Union and China showed signs of the tendency towards the formation of an axis in this kind of situation . Already the first hints of Russo­ American co-operation after the detente in the dualistic structure of the 1 960s provoked middle-power moves in the direction of the third power in a potential triangle. Late in 1 963 de Gaulle, in an attempt to further his plans for a European Europe against what he regarded as tendencies towards a Soviet-American condominium, 'played the Chinese card ' by switching recogni tion from Taipeh to Peking. 'The two hegemonic conspirators of Yalta', he apparently calculated , 'could be unbalanced and budged by throwing China's

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weight into the equation . ' 1 3 With the rise of China and the emergence of a diplomatic triangle, further signs of the pattern appeared . While the Chinese went out of their way to express approval of the European Economic Community and offer en­ couragement to its members, the governments of several middle powers in Western Europe set out to improve their relations with China. If, in the event, the Soviet Union and the United States had moved close enough to each other to j ustify French suspicions and Chinese accusations , perhaps a rather more substantial Sino­ European axis would have developed in the triangle of the 1 9 70s. Thus, if the superpowers had entered into a much wider and deeper understanding than the SALT agreements , several European middle powers, perhaps not only Western ones, might have responded even more favourably to Chinese overtures and might have taken important steps of their own to develop relations with China . I f, on the other hand, Russian fears had proved j ustified and the U nited States and China had entered into an entente directed against the Soviet U nion, Japan might have had second thoughts about its choice between the two principal communist powers . If its leaders had thought such a development of the Sino-American rapprochement a threat to their own relations with the Americans, they might well have followed traditional balance-of-power prin­ ciples and moved closer to the Soviet U nion . In such a situation, perhaps even I ndonesia would have given up balancing between all of the three powers and would have followed India's example and inclined towards the Soviet U nion . If, instead, the Soviet U nion and China had found a way of patching up their political and ideological quarrels and formed a new anti-capitalist alliance on the third side of the triangle, Japan could have been expected to turn its back on both of the communist powers and again look only towards the U nited States . Even I ndia and the United States might conceivably have fou nd it easier to improve their relations in such circumstances . If these are the reactions of some middle powers caught between two great-power collaborators, they are likely to differ from those of many small states in the region . The latter, generally having less to lose than the middle powers in terms of international standing, might not be quite so opposed to great-power co-operation . If they thought a concert of the two great powers likely to prove a useful check on the ambitions of their middle-power neighbours, they

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might even welcome i t . For example, situations of a Sino--Russo-­ American triangle could be imagined in which some of I ndia's smaller neighbours would be more concerned about I ndian intentions than about Sino--Soviet co-operation, or situations in which some of l ndonesia's weaker neighbours would be more afraid of l ndonesian expansionism than of a Sino-American entente. And in Europe, it was generally the middle powers, not the small states, that in the 1 960s protested most vigorously against the so-called tendencies towards a Soviet-American condominium . The small states, it seems, could not be expected to take the same line towards the third great power as some of their middle-power neighbours . On the whole more willing than most middle powers to trade part of their diplomatic independence for a measure of international order in the region, they would have less incentive to try to set up an axis with the power in the opposite corner of the triangle . I ndeed , their role in relation to the general equilibrium of the system might well be quite different from that of those middle powers which followed the principle of the balance. of power. If the small states went as far as supporting the great-power collaborators against the middle powers, a sandwich pattern of alignment , similar to that character­ istic of some concert situations in the dualistic system, might come about on the co-operative side of the triangle. So far, only the conduct of the middle powers in immediate danger of becoming victims of local great-power collaboration has been considered , not that of those less directly threatened by a degree of co-operation between the two . But the other middle powers too, usually those on the other sides of the triangle, so to speak, must be affected by the lopsidedness of the great-power constellation . If the two collaborators entered into a close and hostile alliance against the third great power, the system would take on some of the character of a dualism . The result might be a cold war, in which the polarising forces between the two sides would be so strong that m ost of those other middle powers would be likely to end up on one side or the other, where they would assume the parts of major allies of the great powers . Even in a situation of limited co­ operation between the two great powers and restrained rivalry between them and the third , several of the middle powers would probably take sides . Some of those which were not tied to ei ther of the two collaborators might follow conventional balance-of-power principles and lean towards the isolated great power . One way they could do this would be to engage in regional co-operation sponsored

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by that power . Thus, the Soviet idea of an Asian collective security arrangement gained some attraction in the region through the Sino-American rapprochement of the Nixon and Kissinger years . Conversely, China's bid for leadership of medium and small nations in the early 1 9 70s might have met with more local success if the Chinese accusations of Russo-American collusion had been more credible to the world at large . If the coalition of two pursued revisionist goals and the third great power defended the inter­ national status quo, the supporters of the latter power might have a strong incentive to form a more solid anti-hegemonial alliance . Thus, if the two communist powers in the triangle of the 1 9 70s had moved in the direction of a new revolutionary alliance , the governments of some principal West European nations might well have decided to restrain their post-detente inclination to stress independence of the alliance leader, while Australian political leaders might have favoured a return to the theme of 'our great and powerful friend ' in foreign policy . But, whatever the nature of the great-power relations , it is unlikely that all middle powers on the two ' negative ' sides of the triangle would follow those on the 'positive' side which moved towards the great-power outsider. Some might protect their interests, or seek their fortune, by leaning towards one or both of the great-power collaborators . Thus, if the U nited States and China in the 1 9 70s had entered into a form of co-operation that did not present an obvious threat to Japan, the latter power might well have adhered to its earlier policy of leaning on the U nited States and opposing the Soviet U nion . Similarly, if the bond had been between the Soviet Union and the United States, it is doubtful that I ndia would have broken off its good relations with the former in order to support China against a possible attempt by the superpowers to establish a dual hegemony . A few other middle powers might try to remain unaligned . Thus, if the collaborators in the triangle of the late 1 9 70s had been the two communist powers, a revolutionary and self-absorbed anti-American and anti-communist I ran would have been likely to prefer this course to throwing its weight in with the U nited States . In this probably no more than in other si tuations of the triangular system can the middle powers be relied on to adhere to the traditional rules of the balance of power. Their alliance policy, in so far as it affects the general equilibrium, may sometimes be a destabilising influence in the system .

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As in the dualistic system, it may be concluded tentatively from this largely deductive analysis, middle powers in a triangular system generally enjoy wider scope when the great powers are involved in mixed relationships than when they are united in concert or engaged in keen rivalry with each other . I n situations of only moderate rivalry in an equilateral triangle as well as in the two types of non-equilateral situations considered here, in which all or some of the three great-power relationships tend to be ambiguous, a number of middle powers may be in a position to take a variety of initiatives at the systemic level . Occasionally, no doubt, the effect of such initiatives can be considerable . Yet, whether the middle powers are aligned with one or two of the great powers , as may be often the case, or whether they are unaligned , their influence may be on the whole of less-than-decisive importance in the conduct of the central relationships of the triangle . In any case, it cannot be assumed that their actions will be always motivated by a desire to play a positive role in the management of systemic conflict and the pursuit of international order . Assuming that the triangular system i s o f global o r a t least very large dimensions, the middle powers, most of which are motivated primarily by regional goals and guided mainly by local consider­ ations, seem likely to find their more autonomous and influential parts at sub-systemic levels . Here, in situations of mixed relations at the top level of the system, they may be able to set themselves up as preponderant powers, to engage in rivalry with each other or to take the lead in forming an association of states . In each of such roles, they may exercise decisive influence within their regions . A middle power that enjoys a position of preponderance, whether it imposes dominance , establishes hegemony or accepts primacy, is likely to be the principal regulating agent in the international relations of i ts sphere . Two or more middle powers that engage in rivalry , with whatever degree of intensity they pursue it, tend to divide the lesser states in the vicinity and shape the pattern of conflict in the area . And one or more middle powers that organises an association of states, whatever its aims and practices, helps to reduce or control certain types of tension and friction among its members . If used to secure order, maintain stability or organise co-operation among the states of the regions, such influence may be highly beneficial in terms of some of the basic goals ofinternational society . Compared with their systemic roles, which may be often relatively unimport-

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ant and not always conducive to stability and order, the sub­ systemic roles of middle powers in various types of triangular situations seem much more likely to be of real substance and positive value .

7 The Multiple System The last type of in ternational system to b e considered here contains more than three great powers. Though, historically, the number of great powers in multiple systems has ranged from four to more than half a dozen, 1 five seems to be typical. The I talian states system of the century before the Reformation had five principal powers, after Florence had joined Naples, Rome, Venice and Milan. In large parts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, European politics were dominated by five great powers, namely Britain, France, Austria, Russia and Prussia. I n 1 9 1 9 there were five great powers, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers of the Paris Peace Conference. The European states system of the 1 930s counted five great powers, namely Britain, France, Russia, Germany and I taly. And in 1 945 the victorious powers again decided that there were five great powers in the world, those that became the permanent members of the Security Council . The five-power structure, it appears, is not only the typical form of the multiple system but also a fairly common phenomenon in the history of international politics. The actual number of great powers in the system must be of some significance for its dynamics , the difference between four and five probably being the most important. Yet, the effect on the character of the whole system of having one great power less than five, or one or two more than five, is likely to be much smaller than the result of a difference between one and two, or between two and three or even three and four, great powers in a system . The reduced significance of the extra great power that seems to go with an increase in the number of such powers, together with the observed tendency of the multiple system to comprise five great powers, make it possible to consider systems of more than three great powers under one heading, and unnecessary to make an analytical distinction be­ tween the quadruple, the quintuple , the sextuple and other multiplex systems. But variety in the composition of the multiple system goes beyond the number of great powers. Like dualistic and triangular systems , 1 77

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multiple ones more often than not display considerable ineq uality of power among their principal members. For several decades after 1 8 1 5 , Prussia was considered much·weaker than the other powers in the European Pentarchy. I taly was inferior to nearly all the other great powers in the League of Nations in the 1 920s, and to the other European great powers in the 1 930s. And j ust as France, Britain and the United States had been able to dominate international politics at the end of the First World War, so the U nited States , the Soviet U nion and Britain could take the lead after the Second World War, both France and China then being weak and exhausted . Yet, differences of power, whether temporary or lasting, within the rank of great powers are often smaller t h an the difference between the weakest among them and those below in the hierarchy of power, the middle powers . Also, the larger number of great powers tends to make inequalities among them rather less important for the dynamics of the system than similar inequalities would be in the dualistic or the triangular system. For these reasons, it is possible here largely to ignore the effects of such inequalities and to treat all the great powers in the system as at least comparable . As in the dualistic and triangular systems, the principal determi­ nant of the role of middle powers in the multiple system is the q uality of the political relationships existing among the great powers. In conformity with the analysis of the other systems, the extremes of joint government and war will be excluded here . The former situation, which sometimes arises at the end of a major war but usually lasts only till the wartime solidarity of the victorious allies is sapped by inevitable post-war rivalries, will tend to reduce the middle powers to subj ects of the great-power collaborators. War among the great powers, which is most likely to occur when their rivalries lead to a breakdown of the multiple balance of power and a division into two hostile camps, presents the middle powers with a choice between the roles of allies and of neutrals and exposes them to the danger ofbecoming victims of the hostilities. The situations to be considered here are the three most typical intermediate possibilities, namely diplomatic concert short of joint government, intense rivalry short of maj or war, and a moderate rivalry which may have elements ofboth co-operation and conflict. Material for the analysis of such situations will be drawn from the historical cases of Europe in the nineteenth century, of the world and Europe in the inter-war period , and of the world in the first years after the end of the Second World War, before the global international system became truly

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dualistic . The discussion of each type of situation will be rounded off with some brief speculations about the various imaginable roles of middle powers in a possible future multiple system of global international politics.

7. 1

D I PLOMAT I C CONCERT

Multiple concerts, like dualistic and triadic concerts , are marked by a degree of diplomatic co-ordination high enough to allow the parties to assume managerial functions in international society. The more formal type, often distinguished by regular or frequent meetings of representatives of the great powers and the establish­ ment of special diplomatic machinery, rests on a considerable measure of consensus among the parties, and is normally the result of a major war . At times it may be so efficient as almost to assume the character ofjoint government. The more informal type, generally operating through ad hoc meetings and normal diplomatic channels, expresses certain shared concerns of the parties and comes into play more intermittently. It rarely excludes a fair amount of rivalry among the great powers . A good example of the formal multiple concert is the so-called congress system, which dominated European politics for a decade after the end of the Napoleonic Wars . After the Congress of Vienna the powers of the Quadruple Alliance, preoccupied with the dangers of revolution and French expansion­ ism , and France, j oining them at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1 8 1 8, proceeded to manage the affairs of Europe through periodic congresses of sovereigns and ministers. The best example of the informal type of concert may be found in the subsequent history of the European Concert. Sharing a number of concerns , some of them relating to the Eastern Question , the European great powers developed a practice of regularly consulting each other about critical issues and occasionally meeting in conference to co-ordinate their measures. Though their attempts to co-operate often collapsed in rivalry, the great powers, or a majority of them, repeatedly achieved a degree of concert in their dealings with other states . The j ustification for a great-power concert rests on the need for a measure of international order, which is often expressed in terms of peace and security. Usually seeking the protection of such values on the basis of the existing territorial division and the established legal structure, the powers of the concert as a rule discourage revisionist

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initiatives which have not been arranged or approved by them­ selves. Guided by conservative ideas, they generally try to stop the advancement of separate designs of the type that might upset the international status q uo, and to frustrate all popular demands for change which might disturb the harmony of international society . Thus they easily come to appear as suppressors of lesser powers and thwarters of peoples. If, as is apt to happen, they at the same time seek to defend the interest they share in maintaining their joint supremacy, their concert also takes on some of the character of a conspiracy against other states, particularly against those im­ mediately below them in the hierarchy. In such a situation, many of the middle powers are likely to find the concert of doubtful advantage . Though, like most other states, they may benefit from the absence of various forms of international disorder, they are in danger of ending up as the principal victims of the solidarity of the great. They may find their exercise of power and independence curtailed almost to the point where they have , in effect, been reduced to the ranks of small powers. Other middle powers, however, may see an opportunity for themselves . Believing that they have something to contribute to international· order, they may try to join the great powers as j unior partners in the concert or to become its agents in particular spheres or regions . The great concert situations of the past provide examples of both reactions. For most middle powers, the Concert of Europe was a repressive institution . The three states that as members of the Committee of Eight at the Congress of Vienna had enjoyed some sort of intermediate position in the first post-war system , namely Spain , Portugal and Sweden , soon found themselves excluded from all important negotiations, at Vienna as well as at the later European congresses. 2 Apart from occasional protests at high-handed treat­ ment by the powers above them, their voices were not heard again in the post-war period . 3 Through the solidarity of the great, they were in effect reduced to the ranks in international society. The Ottoman Empire, which on account of its ambiguous posi tion in the European system might be regarded as a middle power, 4 was sometimes treated worse than most small powers . As the 'sick man of Europe ' , it was subj ected to continual interference . To reform its administration and protect certain sections of its subjects , the great powers repeatedly resorted to concerted diplomatic pressure, often backing it with threats of intervention and coercion . Though from 1 856 formally a member of the Concert of Europe, the Ottoman

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Empire was not normally allowed representation a t European conferences, even when they had been called together to deal with the Eastern Question. Only when the great powers failed to agree and the concert broke down was it possible for the Ottoman Empire temporarily to escape from its role as the ward of Europe. The multiple concerts of 1 9 1 9 and 1 945, too, placed middle powers at a disadvantage and provoked some of them to protest. When the representatives of the five great powers, through the Council of Ten , took control of the Paris Peace Conference, spokesmen of several prominent lesser powers, notably Brazil and Canada, challenged their authority - though with little success. 5 At the Yalta Conference in 1 945 , the three principal allied powers, acting as a directorate, settled the fate of Poland without Polish representation. At the San Francisco Conference the same year, as well as in United Nations meetings of the first post-war years, the great powers successfully resisted the pressure from certain lesser powers, whose representatives, at one stage under the leadership of the Australians, opposed tendencies towards domination by great powers and championed the rights of smaller states. 6 In neither of these situations of formal concert did the protests of middle powers and other states have much effect. These examples from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries show not only that great-power solidarity in a multiple system, as in dualistic and triangular ones, is a threat to middle powers, but also that there is little such powers can do to defend themselves effectively against the dangers facing them. The overwhelming preponderance of several great powers in concert dwarfs all lesser powers in the system . Even if the middle powers co-ordinated their diplomatic efforts and sought the support of small states in their opposition to the concert, the distribution of power in the system is such that they would have little chance ofbringing real influence to bear . Besides , achieving such a common front is itself very difficult. As in the three other types of international systems examined above, there is a tendency in the multiple system for some small states to lean towards the great powers rather than to support the middle powers. When here, too, the outlines of the familiar 'sandwich pattern' emerge, it is again because a number of small s tates feel more threatened by their middle-power neighbours than by the great-power concert. 7 Even to bring the middle powers themselves into line may prove impossible. Some, like Poland in 1 945, may be in no position to j oin a common diplomatic front. Some, benefiting

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from the peace and order that usually characterise a situation of concert, may turn their attention to domestic affairs. Some , while sharing the concern about great-power domination, may make their stand against it on grounds all of their own . And others, more impressed with the opportunities than with the dangers presen ted by multiple concert, may take quite a different course : rather than accept the part of protesting victims, they may assume the role of would-be collaborators. In relation to the Concert of Europe, Spain was the first power to attempt the role of partner. Having been counted among the ' powers of the first order' at the initial meetings at Vienna in September 1 8 1 4, it subsequently insisted on retaining this status but, as we have seen, ended up a victim and outspoken critic of great-power solidari ty. 8 A generation later, Sweden played a minor role at the London conferences of 1 850, 1 852 and 1 864, which followed the wars over the Danish duchies . In order to strengthen its own position in the negotiations with the other great powers, Britain arranged for the participation of Denmark's Scandinavian neigh­ bour. The Ottoman Empire, though formally admitted to the European Concert after the Crimean War, remained an object rather than a subject in European politics . To the extent that it had a role among the principal powers of Europe , it was essentially a self­ defensive one , aimed at resisting their concerted pressure and warding off separate encroachments. The role played by united I taly was rather more impressive than those of the other middle powers . Though deemed a principal power and drawn into European politics at the highest level, I taly never became more than a near great power. On account of its late arrival and marked inferiority in the circle of principal powers, it could well be regarded as in fact no more than a middle power. 9 Patronised by, in turn , Britain and united Germany, the two powers that expected to benefit from its support, it was allowed to participate in a succession of important meetings of the great powers in the later part of the century, starting with the London Conference of 1 86 7 and including the Congress of Berlin in 1 8 78. In contrast to the Ottoman Empire, it was an insider in the European Concert, where it had a role considerably more substantial and varied than that of Sweden in the middle of the century . In 1 9 1 9, none o f the secondary powers was admitted a s j unior partner in the formal concert of Versailles and Paris , even though some of them , notably Spain and Brazil , saw reasons to regard

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themselves as more akin to the great powers than to the small states. By the time a few middle powers managed to secure semi­ permanent status in the Council of the League of Nations, the post­ war concert no longer existed . 1 0 Nor did the Big Five of 1 945 allow any of the middle powers of the time to join their counsels . The spirited advocacy of the functional idea by Canada together with the arguments of a few other secondary powers secured a small number of rather insubstantial safeguards against great-power domination, but failed to establish a special position for middle powers in the organisation of the United Nations . 1 1 To be associates in a multiple concert is apparently a rarer role for middle powers than to become victims of great-power solidarity. Judging by the circumstances in which a few secondary powers did secure some sort of associate position, the case of united I taly being the best example, it is easier to do in an informal type of concert than in the less flexible situation of formal concert. The possibility of a middle power being drawn into the counsels of the great will depend partly on how useful it is likely to be and partly on how willing the principal powers are to share their responsibilities and privi leges . Thus, both Sweden and I taly joined European conferences because one or more of the great powers thought their presence useful and the others accepted it. The influence of such co-opted mem bers on the management of international politics, though probably greater than that of most outsiders, whether suppressed middle powers or impotent small states, is likely to be in most cases only marginal . On the whole, middle powers in a multiple system tend to have less of a role in international politics when the great powers are in concert than when they are engaged in conflict and rivalry. Whether these generalisations , based as they are on a small number of diverse historical cases, would apply also to a fu ture world concert of several great powers must be a matter for speculation. The first question that ought to be considered here is whether the idea of such a concert is at all likely to be realised in the not-too-distant future . Both of the assumptions on which it rests, one relating to the number of great powers in the proj ected global system and the other to the nature of their relationships, can be questioned . Already in the 1 960s , certain developments in inter­ national politics, especially the detente in East-West relations and the rise of China and a few other secondary powers, inspired speculation abou t an emerging multiple system of powers . And in the 1 970s, as we have seen, the dualistic system took on a triangular

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character when China engaged in diplomatic interaction with both of the superpowers. But so far, there are still at most only three powers in the world that could be called great, only two of which are superpowers in the accepted usage of the term . Neither Japan nor 'Western Europe' , the two powers that were cast for parts in a multiple system, has up to now emerged as an autonomous actor at the. top level of international politics. While the former is, as yet, without nuclear weapons, the latter still lacks adequate poli tical cohesion; and both are strategically dependent on the Uni ted States and economically not too secure. On present indications, it is unlikely that a truly multiple system will take shape for at least another decade. If and when it does, it seems equally unlikely that the relationships among the four, five or more great powers will be such as to constitute a diplomatic concert. Apart from the shared danger that arises from the risk of major war with nuclear weapons , few or none of the political and cultural conditions on which the great multiple concerts of the past depended appear to be present today, or seem likely to come about over the next decade or two. 1 2 If a multiple system did emerge , either of the two typical situations to be discussed below, namely intense conflict between two camps and limited rivalry within a complex balance-of-power structure, would seem a more likely outcome than concert. If, nevertheless , for the purposes of our speculations abou t the future, we imagine the development of a concert of more than three great powers , we might expect it to be informal rather than formal . Barring the catastrophe of a major war among the great powers , it seems very unlikely that they would be able to develop the sort of close concert that normally follows only a general war. However, an informal concert of the world could be of various kinds. It could be a concert for the management of international politics in general , perhaps with a concentration o n dangerous crises. Or it could b e a concert for dealing with a particular set of problems , such as those of controlling the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons. For the middle powers in the system, the two kinds of concert would present dissimilar conditions and might open different possibilities . Hence their potential roles are best considered separately. An informal concert for the general management of international politics might be of at least two types, depending on the way the great powers went about the task. If they engaged in collective management, we would have something like the European Concert of the ad hoc conferences, but on a global scale . If, instead, they

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divided their labour along geographical lines and managed the world by separate, though co-ordinated , efforts, we might end up with a system of spheres of influence, based no doubt on the various regional interests of the several great powers. Each type of concert would create its own conditions for the middle powers. Collective management on a global scale might lead to the development of a number of regional, and perhaps overlapping, informal concerts , in each of which the gr.eat powers, or those of them most interested in the region , would take the principal parts and one or two of the foremost local rniddle powers might acquire subsidiary roles . Thus, I ndia might be co-opted into a regional concert that handled subcontinental affairs, rather as Sweden was allowed to participate in the conferences that dealt with the issue over the Danish duchies. The possibility of select middle powers assuming such a role would depend again on what they had to offer and on the willingness of the great powers to draw them in. Many middle powers, especially the less prominent ones, would be left out, and might become victims of the solidarity of those above them. As in most situations of concert, the policies imposed by the partners would be likely to reflect their own interests rather than those of the lesser powers in the region. A system of spheres of influence, for example of the type that Churchill at one stage envisaged for the post-war world , would require a degree of co-ordination of the rights and responsibilities of the great powers but might well leave them with a free hand within their respective spheres . As long as each respected the au thority of the others, they would all be at liberty to pursue their own policies within the spheres allocated to them. For the middle powers which within each sphere would be left to deal with the local great power the situation would be much the same as in a unifocal system . 1 3 Their conduct and role would depend on the way the great power exercised its preponderance as well as on their own individual inclinations . Though conceivably the great power might be satisfied with hegemony or even with no more than primacy, the need to hold i ts own among the other great powers and to avoid interference from outside in the affairs of the region might well impel it to secure a degree of dominance within the sphere. 1 4 The inclinations of the middle powers would depend on a number of objective and subjective factors, such as geographical position and political traditions, and might lead them in different directions. I n respond­ ing to the preponderant power, some might support its policy, while

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others would see it as a threat. Though a few might be attracted by the idea of actively opposing the great power, such a course would rarely be open to a middle power. Their typical roles would be either as agents or would-be agents of the local great power, perhaps not unlike the traditional part of Brazil in the inter-American system, 1 5 or as victims or potential victims of great-power control, possibly rather like the recurrent part of Poland in the East European sub-system . If, under a system of collective management, a few middle powers might become j unior partners in regional concerts and, under a system of separate spheres, some middle powers could become regional agents of a great power, a future global concert for the general management of international politics would offer more scope for such powers than they had in the informal concert of nineteenth-century Europe, where the geographical limitations of the states system left few possibilities of similar roles. However, probably only a minority of the middle powers of the future would qualify for such parts . Most of them would be more likely to remain disadvantaged outsiders or oppressed victims. If a future multiple concert of this type managed to secure a degree of international order, it might be largely at the expense of the influence and independence of these powers. This might be true also of a multiple concert that concentrated on the control of nuclear weapons. Just how such a concert could be established is very difficult to see in present circumstances. Perhaps only the shock and devastation of one or more local or regional wars in which nuclear weapons were actually used could bring the great powers of the future together to check the proliferation of and control the use of these weapons. If a concert of this type were reached , it might include not only all of the great powers but also some or all of the lesser powers that in the meantime had acq uired nuclear weapons. Thus a small number of middle powers, perhaps together with several minor powers, might become associates of the great powers. As members of the nuclear club and j unior partners in the concert, they would enjoy a certain status. But their possibilities of taking diplomatic advantage of the possession of nuclear weapons in d ealings with other powers would be almost certainly reduced . Without a firm control of the use of such weapons, especially of those belonging to the new and more marginal members of the club, it is difficult to see how an attempt to prevent further proliferation could be any more successful than the nuclear non-proliferation treaty

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introduced i n the late 1 960s. I f, for example, India had j oined both the club and the concert and Pakistan were still only a potential nuclear-weapons power, there would be little chance of stopping the latter power from 'going nuclear' unless the former had accepted a very substantial curb of its ability to threaten or resort to the use of nuclear weapons in relations with neighbours and rivals . Thus, membership of a nuclear concert would for middle powers be likely to involve acceptance of ou tside control of their ultimate weapons. Such control, no doubt, would be vested in the great powers, the senior members of the concert. If it were to be effective, the control would have to extend also to any nuclear-weapons powers that had remained outside the concert . However, the principal victims of the solidarity o f the great powers and their associates would be those powers that were considering or planning to start the development of nuclear­ weapons capability, or that had started but not completed the process . If their option of joining the circle of nuclear-weapons powers were closed , their diplomatic status might suffer con­ siderably and their relative power fall behind . No longer would they be able to pursue regional ambitions or defend local interests as potential nuclear powers ; and no longer could they look forward to one day being able to threaten their enemies with nuclear weapons. This set-back would be likely not only to weaken their position in relation to neighbours and rivals but also to reduce their leverage with the great powers. If they happened to belong to the Third World , it would, furthermore, help to maintain the inferiority of the developing countries in the power struggle known as the North­ South conflict. Among the potential nuclear-weapons powers there would probably be some middle powers that would be ready to accept all of these handicaps as the price to be paid for a necessary degree of general control of nuclear weapons , a price that most of the countries that did not have to pay it undoubtedly would find a very reasonable one . But other middle powers in the same category would be bound to see the nuclear concert as a conspiracy of haves against have-nots . Together with lesser potential nuclear-weapons powers, they would find themselves confronted on one side by those that already possessed the bomb and on the other by those that had no possibility or intention of ever acq uiring i t . Perhaps more than anything else , a concert for the control of nuclear weapons would bring out the sandwich pattern of alignment inherent in the hierarchy of the states system. For most of the middle powers, those

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with as well as those without nuclear weapons , a concert for controlling the use and preventing the spread of such weapons would be in effect an instrument for keeping secondary powers in their place. Any imaginable multiple concert of the future, it may be concluded , would be as likely as those of the past to consolidate the superiority of the great powers at the expense mainly of the middle powers.

7.2

INTENSE R IVALRY

The opposite of diplomatic concert is international conflict short of major war. When rivalry within a multiple system reaches a certain level of intensity, the great powers begin to form alliances against each other. They may not all take sides immediately; and if they are more than five, several groups may form at the earlier stages . But eventually, if tension keeps rising, all of the great powers are likely to d ivide into two hostile sides, normally with at least two of them in each group . I f there is a balance of power in the system, it is now a dualistic one. Two alliances face each other in conflict rather as the two powers in the corresponding situation of the dualistic system do. As in the latter situation , the issue is likely to be abou t vital political interests but may have an ideological dimension as well. Though the conflict is apt to lead to general war, the only situation with which we are here concerned is that of cold war between two groups of great powers. Such a pattern of conflict established itself in the European system during the last decades before the First World War. In 1 89 1 Germany, Austria-Hungary and I taly renewed their Triple Alliance, and the following year Russia and France signed a military agreement. Britain, conscious of its long tradi tion of holding the balance in Europe and preoccupied elsewhere, re­ mained undecided and isolated till the following decade, when it formed an entente and started military conversations with France. Eventually, Germany and Austria-Hungary stood against France, Russia and Britain. A similar pattern began to work i tself out among the European powers in the late 1 930s but did not reach completion till the second year after the outbreak of war. Starting with the Hitler-Mussolini treaty of 1 936, it first took the shape of a composite triangle, made up of the League powers, the Axis powers and the Soviet Union . 1 6 Not till Germany invaded Russia in 1 94 1 and the

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Soviet Union joined the Western powers in the war against the Axis powers did the system finally break down into two sides. The schism that rent the world in the late 1 940s might be seen as a third example of this pattern . However, by the time this division was taking place, the structure of the global system itself was already in fact, though not in form, d ualistic rather than multiple·. With China absorbed in civil war and Britain and France in effect reduced to secondary positions in the hierarchy of powers, international politics were no longer dominated by the Big Five or the Big Four, but by the Big Two. Hence the two pre-war situations seem the more appropriate illustrations . For the middle powers in the system , an intense rivalry between groups of great powers creates a situation that can be both difficult and dangerous. Some of them will experience a degree of pressure from one or both of the groups to take sides in the central conflict. Though a few may find it necessary or desirable to seek security or advantage in an alliance, most of them seem likely to resist the pressure and steer clear of the groupings . While the former lose some of their diplomatic independence and expose themselves to the influence of their great-power allies, the latter maintain their freedom to manoeuvre but risk becoming obj ects of the rivalry between the camps. And in common with the rest of the members of the states system, all of the middle powers, whether aligned or not, are in peril of suffering the ravages of war, if the conflict between the camps breaks out into open and general hostilities. In the earliest of the historical cases considered here, both of the two secondary powers which we have deemed to be middle powers managed to remain uncommitted in the central rivalry till the latest possible stage . The Ottoman Empire signed a treaty of alliance with Germany on 2 August 1 9 1 4, the day after the latter had declared war on Russia. I taly joined the Entente powers in April 1 9 1 5 and declared war on Austria-Hungary the following month. In the other pre-war situation , too, the middle powers found their final place only on the eve of war. Spain, barely out of the civil war in which the Axis powers had intervened on one side and the Soviet U nion on the other, formed an alliance with Germany and I taly in March 1 939, but remained formally neutral when war broke out. Poland, which had had a non-aggression pact with Germany in the earlier stages of triangular conflict, sought protection in a treaty with Britain when Ribbentrop and Molotov signed the Nazi-Soviet pact in August 1 939. This apparent tendency for middle powers in

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multiple systems to make their final choice of sides only at a very advanced stage of conflict may be contrasted with the reactions of middle powers on the outbreak of the Russo-American Cold War. No sooner had the multiple concert of the post-war world given way to the dualistic conflict of the later 1 940s than most of the powers that in 1 945 had been listed as middle powers entered into military alliances with the United States, while Poland tied itself even more closely to the Soviet U nion . The polarising forces, it seems, are rather weaker in a multiple system divided by intense rivalry than in the corresponding situation of the dualistic system . This difference, the explanation of which must be sought in the plurality of great powers on either side of the conflict, is bound to affect the situation , and perhaps also the role, of any middle power that does take sides in the central rivalry. In relation to its great­ power allies , such a power is likely to enjoy rather more freedom than its counterpart in the dualistic system, where the dependence of the ally and the control of the alliance leader often create a very tight relationship . While the middle power may be in a position occasionally to adopt nonconformist attitudes and policies, the great powers in the alliance, often in disagreement among them­ selves about the various matters at issue, will generally find it very difficult to dominate and discipline the middle power. In relation to the conflict with the opposite side, the aligned middle power may have little scope for ameliorative initiatives, probably even less than under the dualistic system. The presence of two or more great powers on each side will make it particularly difficult for any lesser power to exercise a restraining or a mediating influence . Nor is the complex structure of the system, which makes negotiation between the camps cumbersome and agreements precarious, likely to give rise to a need for executive functions such as peace-keeping. Even more than in the dualistic system, it may be expected , the typical role of an aligned middle power will be simply that of supporter. However, it is the conduct and role of the uncommitted middle powers that are the more pertinent here. In the European system that finally collapsed in the First World War, both the Ottoman Empire and I taly, as we have seen , remained unaligned throughou t the crucial period . While Turkey always had been an ou tsider in the alliance system that began to take shape in Bismarck's times, I taly had defected from the Triple Alliance at the conference at Algeciras in 1 906. In the last years before the war, when tension between the great powers was reaching its highest point, both of them tried to

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turn the si tuation to advantage by balancing between the two camps . While the Ottoman Empire was anxious to defend itself against intervention from outside, I taly was eager to pursue certain ambitions abroad . To compare the performances and contrast the fates of the two powers is instructive . For I taly, it was a successful policy. After a war with Turkey in 1 9 1 1 - 1 2 , it gained Tripoli and Cyrenaica, and subsequently held out for good terms before committing itself in the European war. Eventually joining the Entente powers, it ended up on the victorious side and became one of the five great powers at Versailles . The fate of the Ottoman Empire was very different. In the 1 890s, when international tension had been more moderate and diffuse, the Sultan's government had been able to resist most outside pressure by playing one great power off against another. But as tension in Europe increased , the situation became more com­ plicated . By the time the two groups of powers were locked in hostile rivalry with each other, the most serious challenge to the territorial integrity of the Empire came no longer from the side of the great powers . In 1 9 1 2 the small Balkan states, each with claims of its own, saw an opportunity to act jointly against the power that so often in the past had enjoyed the protection of the European concert. After forming a league, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia went to war and defeated the Turks. Thus the Ottoman Empire , which for so long had been both the ward of the Concert of Europe and a principal obj ect of the rivalry of the great powers, became a victim of the aggression of small states. That Russia, guided by strategic considerations rather than by pro-Slav sentiment, had involved itself in the negotiations surrounding the formation of the Balkan league was a hint of the ultimate predicament of a middle power, where its great-power adversary joins its small-state enemies to seek its elimination . 1 7 However, it was not till after the First World War that the fall and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire was finally brought about. I f the case of the Ottoman Empire points to the risk of a 'sandwich' alignment of the upper and the lower enemies of a middle power, the history of Spain and Poland on the eve of the Second World War illustrates the dangers of intense rivalry among the great powers themselves . While the final pattern of conflict was still working itself out in the multiple system of the late 1 930s , Spain became the battleground for competitive intervention by three of the great powers and Poland the prey of occupation and partition

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by two of them. In their different ways, the three cases show middle powers in the passive role of victims . Where secondary powers are caught between hostile groups of great powers , this may be a not untypical role for them to fill. Of the various more active parts that conceivably might be open to unaligned middle powers in such situations, balancing between the groups while seeking advantages from either side seems the most likely possibility. I n the two historical cases considered here, only I taly, as we have seen, succeeded in this role. But none of the other theoretically possible roles had any real takers . 1 8 In a system so geographically constrained as the European of the two pre-war periods, there was little or no possibility of standing aloof from the conflict between the great powers. With tension at so high a level and with so many powers involved , mediation between the parties was not open to any secondary, if indeed to any, power. And with the magnitude of the risks involved in an outbreak of general war, deliberate exacerbation of the conflict could hardly be considered a rational course, at least not by powers that might have more to lose than to gain from such war. 1 9 No other role than that of trimmer seemed both possible and reasonable . This part, which in the highly polarised conditions of cold war in a dualistic system is usually both too difficult and too dangerous to attempt, may well be the typical choice of unaligned middle powers wanting to play an active role in the more diffuse dynamics of a multiple system. That some middle powers are able to draw substantial diplomatic benefits from balancing between the camps while others end up as victims of the rivalry, shows that intense conflict within a multiple system may present greater opportunities as well as greater risks for such powers than a multiple concert normally does. Though a great-power concert may offer some middle powers the chance to become junior partners or agents, it might not give them more independence and scope than favourably placed unaligned middle powers enj oy in a great-power conflict. Though such a concert may check or even suppress some of the middle powers, it is probably less likely to endanger their very survival as independent states than keen great-power rivalry is. On basis of the necessarily limited material presented here, it is not possible to decide whether middle powers on the whole benefit more from the measure of international order that goes with concert than from the scope for diplomatic manoeuvre that may result from conflict among the great powers. While a degree of security, even if acquired at the expense of some

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diplomatic freedom, may meet the needs of some middle powers, the opportunity to play the balance, though often associated with considerable risks, may be important for others . But, though each situation may have its advantages and disadvantages, neither concert nor conflict among the great powers really seems to favour the middle powers as a group . The diplomatic successes of the Ottoman Empire in the 1 890s, as well as in earlier periods when there was neither diplomatic concert nor intense rivalry among the great powers, suggest that a mixture of co-operation and conflict, the third type of situation to be considered here, offers rather better conditions for the middle powers than either of the more extreme situations . If we conclude that middle powers in a multiple system divided by intense rivalry tend to remain unaligned rather than to take sides, and to play the balancing game rather than to attempt any other active part, we may ask whether such conclusions would be likely to apply to a future global situation of this type . Assuming that the world in some later decade will be dominated by four, five or even half a dozen great powers, a divided system seems a more probable outcome than mu ltiple concert. Given that great powers are natural rivals , the principal powers of such a world would be more likely to carry their competition to a high level of tension than to bring their policies into harmony with each other. If they did engage in such a rivalry, they would tend to divide up into two hostile groups, though the final pattern might well take some time to establish itself. The division might leave two or more great powers on each side, as in the pre- 1 9 1 4 system , or it might be between one and the rest of them, as could be the result if the power and policies of one of the superpowers came to present an obvious threat to the entire system. In either case, the middle powers of the future would have to respond to the problems and opportunities characteristic of a system divided into hostile camps. Since both sides would be armed with nuclear weapons, some of the special considerations that have affected the alignment of secondary powers in the Russo-American conflict of recent decades might be relevant here too. The record of that rivalry, in the view of some observers, shows that it has become in some ways less necessary as well as less desirable for the great powers to acquire allies and supporters among the lesser powers than it was in pre-nuclear times. With the nature of the balance of deterrence being such that competition for strategic advantage is conducted mainly through

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research, development of armaments programmes and deployment of forces by the great powers themselves, there is now relatively little that most lesser powers can contribute in the way of armaments, especially of the strategic kind . Second , the notorious difficulty of managing the lesser members of an alliance and the recurrent danger of being manipulated by them for their own ends sometimes make it too risky, in an age of nuclear weapons, for the great powers to commit themselves to the protection of such powers. From the point of view of the secondary powers, too, alliances with great powers have sometimes come to seem of more doubtful advantage than they were before. Ever unable to ignore the danger of major, nuclear war, the great powers cannot in all situations be relied on to come to the aid of lesser allies whose security is threatened . All of these considerations, assuming that they would apply also to a multiple system of nuclear powers, must have a weakening effect on any tendency for the middle powers to take sides in a future rivalry between groups of great powers. If such a tendency is likely in any case to be weaker in a multiple than in a dualistic system, most of the middle powers might well be inclined to remain unaligned. However, there are also reasons to believe that some of the middle powers would be caught up in the conflict and be drawn towards one side or the other. Even though they would have less to contribute to an alliance in the way offorces and armaments than in the age of conventional warfare, the great powers might need them for bases and various other facilities that they could provide or for the resources which they would command . Thus, if the United States and japan were on the same side, both would probably want Australia as an ally. In certain cases, one set of great powers might draw a potentially useful middle power towards their own side primarily in order to stop it from joining the opposite camp . In this way , even a middle power which showed as many signs of becoming an inconvenient and unreliable ally as post-revolutionary I ran does today might conceivably end up within one of the camps. From the point of view of the middle powers themselves, there might be weighty considerations encouraging them to take sides . Some might be so exposed to the dangers inherent in the great-power conflict, whether because of their geographical position or for some other reason, that they wou ld want to seek protection within one of the camps. Thus , if the Soviet U nion and the United States were on opposite sides and there were still middle powers left in Eastern and Western Europe, at least some of them would be likely to seek, or to

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want to retain, an alliance relationship with one side or the other. So even though the polarising forces in the system at large might be no stronger, and perhaps rather weaker, than in past situations of multiple conflict, some middle powers would probably end up in the part of supporters of one set of great powers or the other in such a future global rivalry. For the unaligned middle powers, the most characteristic active role would probably still be balancing between the camps , as Italy did in the pre- 1 9 1 4 system . While taking care not to become victims of the global rivalry, such powers might try to exploit their intermediate position by seeking diplomatic advantage from either or both sides . But there would be other possibilities as well. I n a global system, unaligned middle powers would have more scope for keeping aloof from the central conflict than they had in the geographically confined systems of Europe before each of the two world wars. Whether from choice or from necessity, some of those well removed from the centres of tension between the great powers and their allies might assume an essentially passive part in global politics and devote most or all of their attention to domestic, local and regional affairs. If, for example, tension between the two sides in the multiple system found its centres in Europe and Asia, both the Latin American and the African middle powers might be free to limit their diplomatic efforts to their own continents . In most cases, however, middle powers that chose this course would still be likely to find their opportuni ties to pursue local ambitions and assume regional roles limited by considerations arising from the divided state of the global system and the high level of tension elsewhere in the world . In the last resort, they, too, would be in danger of being drawn into the central conflict and perhaps falling prey to the rivalry of the great powers. In a multiple system of global extent, yet another role might be open to unaligned middle powers. As in the dualistic rivalry of the Russo-American Cold War, some of these powers might take it upon themselves to raise issues other than those that divided the two sides in the central conflict. 2 0 Third World middle powers, for example, might advance the claims of the have-not countries against the privileges of the rich and developed nations, the principal representatives of which would be the rivalling great powers. In pursuing policies of redistribution of the wealth of the world, such middle powers might urge reform, as India did in the corresponding situation of the dualistic system, or call for more

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revolu tionary measures , as Indonesia did under Sukarno. In either case, their pressure would tend to complicate the pattern of international conflict and to diversify tension in the global system . Future middle powers that set out to shift the attention of the world to new issues of one sort or another might act separately or jointly, and with or without the support of smaller unaligned states. If a comparative weakness of the polarising forces in a divided multiple system might make i t a little easier to play the balancing game than it is in conditions of dualistic cold war, the same weakness could conceivably make it j ust possible to overcome the familiar obstacles to the formation of some kind of third grouping in global politics. Though most middle powers still might take the parts of either supporters or trimmers, the roles open to them in a future multiple system divided by intense rivalry might well be rather more varied , and perhaps also more important, than they were in the two situations of European history that have formed the basis of the present analysis.

7.3

MODERATE R I VALRY

If the several types of great-power relationships possible within a multiple system are seen as forming a spectrum, with diplomatic concert on one side and intense rivalry on the other, the middle area will be taken up by various mixtures of co-operation and conflict, which may be described collectively as moderate rivalry. Here, co-operation, if it involves all of the great powers , is generally minimal and intermittent and conflict usually restrained or local. Characteristically, both elements are distributed unevenly through­ out the system, with some great powers co-operating against others, and are subject to fairly frequent changes of location . A complex balance of power, operating through shifting combinations of powers, maintains the system and protects the independence of its units. With reversals of alliances being a normal feature and minor adj ustments continually taking place, this type of situation has greater mobility and flexibility than both diplomatic concert, where all the great powers tend to stand together, and intense rivalry, in which they usually end up sharply divided against each other. If diplomatic concert is a phenomenon of post-war periods in particular, �nd intense rivalry often the mark of pre-war situations, moderate rivalry may be regarded as the normal state of affairs in a multiple system.

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In fact, such a rivalry characterised the European states system for long periods of its history, particularly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries . Thus, the middle part of the nineteenth century, from the breakdown of the post-Napoleonic congress system to the division into armed camps of the pre- 1 9 1 4 period , was largely an age of great-power rivalry regulated by a multiple balance of power. Though the latent Concert of Europe occasion­ ally was brought into play , most of the time the great powers were at odds with each other. Though wars now and then broke out, some of them involving one, two or even three great powers, they never for long divided Europe into two hostile camps. A moderate rivalry, with elements ofboth co-operation and conflict, again distinguished international politics in the 1 920s and earlier 1 930s. Co-operation among the European great powers, particularly Germany, France and Britain , reached its highest point in the later 1 920s, after which the great powers engaged in a rivalry which became increasingly tense. Both historical situations present useful material for an analysis of the role of middle powers in a multiple system with moderate rivalry among the great powers. This type of situation generally provides the best conditions for the middle powers in the system . Exposed neither to the oppressing tendencies of a great-power concert nor to the dividing influences of a keen rivalry, they often have considerable scope for manoeuvre . Some of them may play a part in the operation of the balance of power, letting themselves be drawn into one or more of the shifting combinations organised and led by the great powers. In 1 834 Spain and Portugal, which as members of the Committee of Eight at Vienna had secured some sort of intermediate position in the post­ Napoleonic states system but which since 1 8 1 5 had been particu­ larly passive in European politics, joined France and Britain in a Quadruple Alliance. From one point of view, this alliance, which Palmerston hoped 'would serve as a powerful counterpoise to the Holy Alliance of the East' , was a response to the convention signed by Russia and Austria the previous year, when the Tsar and the Emperor had met at Miinchengratz . For the British, however, its more immediate aim was to prevent the French from acting on their own in support of the liberal forces in Spain and Portugal, then both at civil war. Soon disrupted as a result of rivalry between Britain and France in the Mediterranean region , the Quadruple Alliance was an early example of secondary powers being co-opted to play minor parts in the brief constellations of forces characteristic of the complex balance of power.

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Later in the century the Ottoman Empire and united I taly played rather more substantial roles in the European balance of power, the former in the Crimean War and the latter in the Bismarckian alliance system . As the principal obj ect of the rivalry of the great powers , the Ottoman Empire provided the occasion for the hostilities that led to the Crimean War. Once the Russians had presented an ultimatum in Constantinople and invaded the Danubian principalities and the Turks had gone to war and suffered a spectacular defeat, it became increasingly difficult for Britain and France , the principal rivals of Russia in the East, to stay out of the hostilities. After signing a treaty with Turkey, they declared war on Russia and subsequently entered into a formal alliance with each other. The two other great powers stayed out of the war, Austria playing off one side against the other and Prussia remaining neutral . The worsting of Russia in the war vindicated the principle of collective control of the affairs of the Ottoman Empire instead of separate intervention by one great power. At the peace congress at Paris, the Ottoman Empire was in effect made the ward of all the great powers of Europe. Thus a middle power that, as enemy of one great power and ally of two, briefly had been an independent actor in the balance of power became again an obj ect in European poli tics. I taly, diplomatically rather closer to the great powers of Europe, had a much more lasting part in the balance of power. I n 1 882 it put an end to its isolation by joining Germany and Austria-Hungary in the Triple Alliance . While anger with the French over the annexation of Tunis the previous year was part of its motivation for making a treaty with the Germans , the hope of securing some support in its difficulties with the Pope encouraged it to form an alliance with the Austrians. Germany saw I taly as a possible ally against the French, and Austria-Hungary appreciated the promise of I talian neutrality in the event of a war with Russia. The Alliance, essentially defensive, was renewed five years later, when new treaties going considerably further than the original arrangements were added . The same year I taly signed a treaty first with Britain and then with Austria-Hungary, the purpose of which was to maintain the status q uo in the Mediterranean . Later that year the same three powers made a further agreement, which provided for some support of the Ottoman Empire against Ru�sia. The Triple Alliance was subsequently renewed again . When I taly eventually, at the conference of Algeciras in 1 906, defected from this combi-

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nation of powers and started playing the balance between the two camps, the European situation was rio longer one of moderate rivalry. If this later role of l taly, sustained till after the outbreak of general war, shows how a middle power may benefit from in tense rivalry in a multiple system, its participation in the operation of the complex balance of the 1 880s and early 1 890s demonstrates how such a power may exploit a situation of moderate rivalry to the point where it gains a systemic importance out of proportion to its intrinsic merit. In the inter-war period , the example of a middle power entering into balance-of-power alliances is Poland . In 1 92 1 this country, caught between Russia and Germany and afraid of both, signed a treaty of alliance with France, which was seeking protection against a revival of German power. It was the first in a series of such treaties between France and east European countries. Four years later Poland , together with Czechoslovakia, signed arbitration treaties with Germany, which complemented the Locarno treaties guaran­ teeing Germany's western frontiers, and strengthened the arrange­ ment with France for mutual defence in the case of German aggression . The year of Hitler's accession to power, 1 933, became a turning-point in Polish diplomacy towards the West. When the French government in that year rej ected a Polish proposal for preventive war against Germany, the Polish government began to lose confidence in the alliance with France . Its reaction was to seek protection in a better relationship with the neighbour. The following year it signed a ten-year non-aggression pact with Germany, on which Hitler based his foreign policy until the conflict over Danzig on the eve of the Second World War. This reversal of alliances shows that middle powers do not always follow traditional balance-of-power principles in their alliance policies. When ex­ posed to the overwhelming power of a potentially hostile great­ power neighbour, they, like smaller states in similar situations, may resort to seeking accommodation with the preponderant power rather than stick to the policy of looking for security in an anti­ hegemonial alliance. These four examples suggest a number of points about the role of middle powers in balance-of-power alliances. First, their parts seem to vary greatly in both importance and duration. If the case of Spain and Portugal in the brief Quadruple Alliance represents one extreme, that of I taly in the long-lasting Triple Alliance stands for the other. Second , though they may not be the only lesser powers to

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participate in such alliances, their parts tend to be more substantial than those of smaller allies. Piedmont, too , joined the alliance of the Crimean War; but the influence it gained was negligible compared with that of the Ottoman Empire. Other east European states signed treaties of alliance with France in the 1 920s; but that with Poland came first and formed the basis of the French security system . Third , membership of an alliance may do as much for the middle powers themselves, in terms not only of security but also of prestige and influence, as it does for the strength and effe ctiveness of the alliance . While being deemed a great power facilitated I taly's entry into Bismarck's alliance system, membership of the Triple Alliance greatly helped this country to pass itself off as a great power. Fourth, the motivations of middle powers for entering into alliance with a great power tend to stem from interests of a geographically limited kind . In all of the cases considered here , the overriding concerns of the middle powers were with local , sometimes even domestic, affairs rather than with the states system in general. And fifth, a corollary of the previous point, the middle powers' choice of allies does not always conform with the established rules of the balance of power. The action of Poland in 1 934, though understandable in terms of the geographical position of the country and the policies of the great powers, had a destabilising influence in the system. The typical conduct of those secondary powers that did not become involved in the shifting alliances of the complex balance of power was to stay aloof from the moderate rivalry of the great powers and concentrate on local and domestic affairs. Spain and Portugal followed this line before as well as after the Quadruple Alliance of 1 834 to the point where their international role in no significant way differed from that characteristic of the small powers in the European system . So, most of the time , did Sweden, which in the Crimean War refused various attempts by the allied powers to draw it out of a cautious neutrality. In the multiple system of the 1 920s and early 1 930s, Spain played a particularly self-absorbed role . Going through a series of political upheavals, which cul­ minated in the civil war of the later 1 930s, it was quite unable to play an active role at the systemic level. The only unaligned middle power to do so habitually was the Ottoman Empire . Exposed to continual diplomatic pressure from the principal European powers and unable to strengthen i tself through effective domestic reform , it took every opportunity to

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defend its pos1t10n and prolong its survival by playing on the rivalries of the great powers. The skill it displayed and the successes it achieved in exploiting their different approaches to the Eastern Question and conflicting designs on Turkish territory, indicate clearly that the moderate rivalry of these powers provided better conditions for defensive diplomacy of the Turkish type than either diplomatic concert or intense rivalry among the great powers could do. Neither reduced to the J>lace of ward of the European Concert nor left unprotected against the competition of great powers and the ambitions of small nations, it had greater scope and more leverage than in the more extreme situations of the multiple system . However, in struggling for survival by playing o n e great power off against another, the Ottoman Empire sometimes deliberately encouraged rivalry among the parties, thereby nourishing tension in the area. Thus, while tactical skill frequently allowed this middle power to engage in diplomatic interaction on terms of near equality with the great powers , a determination to defend its interests, even at the risk of causing a European crisis, forced it to share with several small states the role of exacerbator of conflict in the system . Participating in the shifting alignments of the balance of power and concentrating on regional and local affairs might well be the two most typical roles of middle powers also in a future multiple situation of this sort . Assuming the emergence of a global multiple system in the last decades of this century, a moderate rivalry regulated by a complex balance of power seems the most realistic hope for the world , more likely than a solid diplomatic concert of all the great powers and less dangerous than an intense rivalry between two hostile camps. I f such a situation were to come about, a number of middle powers would undoubtedly take some part in the operation of the global balance . But there is no reason to believe that they would be always guided by anti-hegemonial principles . As in both similar and other situations of the past, the alliance policies of most middle powers would be likely to reflect separate, regional concerns at least as much as general, systemic considerations. For many of them, not only geography but also ideology would present major obstacles to flexibility in alignment. Whether from necessity or from choice, some middle powers would be likely to steer close to a great power on which they were militarily or economically dependent or with which they had political ideas in common , rather than to apply the classical balance-of-power calculations. Thus, whatever the constellation of forces in a future complex balance of

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power, both Poland and Canada would probably remain allies, or at least supporters, of their great-power neighbours. Even I ndia and Australia might be reluctant to break out of the Soviet and the American orbit in search of allies in other qu arters, probably preferring to rely on their traditional friends instead of playing a creative part in the formation of anti-hegemonial alliances . Other middle powers, some perhaps yet to emerge as such, would be freer to respond to the dynamics of the global balance of power and to take a hand in the stabilisation of the multiple system. Whatever their motives for entering into an alliance and whatever their choice of partners, all of the middle powers that involved themselves actively in the central balance of power would be able to play the familiar roles of maj or allies, perhaps sometimes encouraging and sometimes restraining the alliance leaders in the rivalry with other great powers . But the most significant roles would probably be played by those middle powers that remained unaligned in relation to the rivalry of the great powers . Some of them might be close enough to a centre of tension, or for some other reason be important enough to the great powers, to be able to seek advantages by playing one rival off against another - a policy that, as in the case of the Ottoman Empire, might result in an exacerbation of tension at the systemic level . An unaligned I ran could conceivably play such a role by exploiting a future competition for its allegiance among the great powers most interested in its region. Others, unable or unwilling to take more than a very minimal part in global politics, would concentrate on domestic, local or regional affairs . Here the global dimensions of the system could offer rich opportunities . As long as tensions in the system at large remained well below the critical point, unaligned middle powers would be relatively free to pursue their ambitions at sub-systemic levels and seek autonomous roles in their various regions. As in similar conditions of the dualistic system, such powers might establish a variety of regional relationships, not only among themselves but also with some of the smaller states and perhaps with one or more of the great powers as well . 2 1 In some cases, a middle power might set itself up as the local great power, with or without the backing of great powers and with or without the willing support of small states within its sway. I n other situations, two or more middle powers, possibly encouraged and sometimes perhaps re­ strained by great powers with an in terest in the region, might engage in a local rivalry, which could divide the smaller states in the

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VICimty. In different circumstances, one or more middle powers might take the lead in organising a regional concert of nations, whether for military, political or economic ends. Such patterns might conceivably work themselves out among the future middle powers of South America, Africa and South East Asia. Whichever form they took, the middle powers involved would have a decisive part in determining the quali ty of international relations in their regions. Peace and security in large parts of the world , perhaps in most of the Third World, would depend in the first place upon the policies pursued and the relationships developed by these middle powers .

The conduct and role of middle powers in a multiple system seem to be as affected by the nature of the political relations among the great powers as they are in dualistic and triangular systems. I ndeed , the characteristic responses of such powers to the dangers and oppor­ tunities presented by each of the three broad types of great-power interaction distinguished here have much in common with their reactions in the corresponding situations of the other systems . When the great powers form a diplomatic concert, the middle powers generally face the danger of becoming victims of the solidarity of the great, though some may see an opportunity of gaining influence by joining them . As under a dualistic or a triangular concert, some middle powers will protest against the tendencies towards j oint management of international politics , while others may seek to establish themselves as j u nior partners in the concert. In conditions of intense rivalry between hostile groups of great powers, however, the situation of the middle powers seems to be a little different from the corresponding case of, at any rate, the dualistic system. Since the polarising forces tend to be weaker than in a cold war between only two great powers, the middle powers may sometimes find it a little safer to play the balancing game, and in some systems perhaps rather easier to keep aloof from the interaction ofthe great powers and concentrate on other affairs. The result seems to be that, although some middle powers end up �aking sides in the central conflict, most tend to stay unaligned . While in dualistic situations of this type middle powers generally find themselves in the roles of either dependent allies or obj ects of the rivalry of the great powers, here they more often can take the parts of either supporters or trimmers, unless the system is large enough to

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Middle Powers in International Politics

allow some of them to turn their backs on the great powers and mind their own business . The mixed type of situation characterised by moderate rivalry and limited co-operation among the great powers again presents striking similarities, particularly with the dualistic system . While some middle powers participate in the central system by joining balance-of-power alliances, others devote their attention more exclusively to various sub-systemic concerns. As in dualistic situ­ ations of the same type, the opportunities for the latter form of activity tend to be particularly good , especially in a multiple system of large dimensions . In the multiple, the triangular and the dualistic system the ambiguous situation created by mixed relations among the great powers provides the best conditions for the middle powers . At the systemic level, where they can perform secondary roles of varying degrees of importance, as well as at sub-systemic levels, where in favourable circumstances they may assume more or less auton­ omous roles as local principals, they have on the whole greater scope than in the more clear-cut situations of diplomatic concert or intense rivalry among the great powers . In the future, too, it is ambiguous great-power relations, whether characterised by mod­ erate rivalry or by limited co-operation , that seem likely to give middle powers the best opportunity to play parts of real con­ sequence in international politics.

Conclusion T o make a general assessment o f the role o f middle powers, it is necessary to relate their typical contributions to the international political process to the basic goals of the society of nations . Foremost among these have generally been international order, on which security and peace depend , and international j ustice . 1 Most of the claims that in the past were advanced on behalf of the middle powers were based on their conduct in relation to international order. Such powers were presented as guardians of the balance of power, protecting the security of other states and the peace of the whole system; 2 as moderating and pacifying influences in the society of states, reducing tension and limiting conflict among the great powers; 3 or as principal supporters of international organisations, evincing a particularly high sense of responsibility. 4 In recent times, however, some middle powers have concerned themselves rather more with matters of international j ustice than with order. Most middle powers of the Third World have put themselves forward as champions of anti-colonial, racial and economic justice. The contributions actually made by middle powers to the maintenance of order and the pursuit of j ustice may be considered first at the systemic level . The bearing of the conduct of middle powers upon the order of the states system can be discussed most conveniently under the headings of balance of power, diplomacy and international law, three main pillars of international order. Have middle powers on the whole conducted their relations with the great powers in accordance with the traditional rules of balance of power, or have they pursued their interests in disregard , and perhaps deliberate violation, of such rules? U ndeniably, they have often done the latter. When the great powers have been united , whether through the singular structure of a unifocal system or in concert situations of a dualistic, a triangular or a multiple system, the middle powers generally have shown only limited inclination to join each other, and the smaller states, in an attempt to create a counterweight . 205

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Middle Powers in International Politics

Though an individual middle power in a unifocal system sometimes has taken the part of potential organiser of anti-hegemonial alliances, the typical reaction to the imbalance of power that is characteristic of such a system seems to have been for each to seek a special relationship with the great power. Though some have voiced protests and a few have sought ways of co-operating against a concert of two or more great powers , the ou tcome seems only very rarely to have been collective opposi tion to great-power preponder­ ance . What is more , in both the unifocal system and the various concert situations one or more prominent middle powers have arranged to co-operate with the great, either as regional agents or as j unior partners. When, instead , the great powers have been divided , the middle powers have far from always let their policies of alignment be guided by consideration for the equilibrium of the system . Some have remained unaligned , either staying aloof from the central relationship and minding their own domestic and local affairs or, more often, attempting to play the balance between the two sides to their own advantage. O thers have aligned themselves but have been too dependent on one side or the other to choose freely between them. Those that have been in a position of choice have sometimes let themselves be guided by immediate or narrow concerns rather than by long-term and systemic considerations . And even when their decision has been based on calculations of a broader and more lasting kind , the result has occasionally been alignment with the stronger and potentially more aggressive side. Though many middle powers have taken their place in anti­ hegemonial alliances , on the whole such powers have not proved reliable guardians of the balance of power. I ndeed , to the extent that they have carried sufficient weight to affect the balance significantly, their influence in the system has sometimes been destabilising. Have middle powers through their diplomacy generally exer­ cised a restraining and mitigating influence on the rivalry and conflict of the great powers and their allies, or have they, rather, managed to steer clear of the issues dividing the parties to the central relationship, tried to draw advantages from the division , or even acted so as to exacerbate tension in the system? Here again their record , though probably rather better than in relation to the balance of power, is fairly mixed . Their efforts to play a role have been particularly manifest in situations of dualistic rivalry, where both aligned and unaligned middle powers have intervened in a

Conclusion

207

variety of ways . Aligned powe�, relying on their position and contacts within the alliance, have at times tried to restrain the alliance leader, particularly in situations of high tension between the opponents . Given the difficulty of curbing or even guiding a great power involved in keen rivalry with another great power, such attempts, though occasionally probably not without some effect, are unlikely by themselves to have been decisive for the course of any conflict. Other initiatives by aligned middle powers have taken the form of offers to provide good offices or to mediate in critical situations, whether local wars or central confrontations . Since diplomatic intervention of this kind , though often useful when the great powers already are seeking accommodation , cannot by itself bring the rivals to negotiate, such moves too are unlikely to have been of major importance in the settlement of crises. On the whole, aligned middle powers seem to have had their best opportunities to exercise an ameliorating influence when the central rivalry has been more restrained . In such situations, some of them have taken on the valuable role of ' bridge-building' , for which they often may be better suited than the alliance leader. On a more practical level, some middle powers have made a contribution by supporting or participating in peace-keeping operations, though this has never been a function characteristic of such powers in particular. However, the efforts of aligned middle powers in relation to the central rivalry have not always been designed to mitigate conflict. Sometimes their stake in one or more of the issues dividing the parties has been so great that they have preferred simply to back the alliance leader or, when tension seemed below the critical level, even been willing to encourage action of a kind that might be expected to exacerbate relations with the opposite side. The diplomatic efforts of unaligned middle powers in similar situations of dualistic conflict may on the whole have had greater effect than those of aligned ones. Though in their case , too, offers to provide good offices or to arrange mediation seem to have been of less practical use than participation in peace-keeping and truce observation , the very existence of a number of significant powers that refused to commit themselves in the central conflict and occasionally offered their services in a mediatory capacity must have had a somewhat sobering effect on the antagonists. Of greater importance may have been various attempts to accentuate issues other than those dividing the blocs, and certain efforts to change the structure of the system by organising a third group of powers . I n

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Middle Powers in International Politics

such ways unaligned middle powers of the Cold War and detente periods of East-West politics have played a significant part in varying the focus of global politics and complicating the pattern of the in ternational system, thereby helping to overcome the sharp division between two opposed blocs. But unaligned middle powers have had other roles as well. Some have simply stood apart from great-power conflict and concentrated on domestic and local affairs . Others, as already noted, have played the balancing game and tried to secure benefits from the rivalry . And some have deliberately run the risk of exacerbating the conflict for purposes of their own. Thus, while the diplomacy of middle powers, particularly of unaligned ones , sometimes has helped to restrict or surmount conflict between the great powers, it has not at all times been a constructive influence in the central relationship . Have middle powers tradi tionally been among the main props of international law, or have they been more conspicuous as violators of its rules and conventions? The presen t study throws too little light on the connection between the behaviour of middle powers and the law of nations to allow us to decide j ust where the balance in their conduct has lain . But even a glance at our list of contemporary middle powers makes it clear that certain past claims extolling the virtues of this class of powers must be q ualified by reference to the character and style of some existing powers. The argument advanced by Botero nearly four hundred years ago, that the moderate wealth and power of such states make them less violent, ambitious and licentious than large states , 5 has been echoed in those more recent writings where middle powers have been presented as the most reliable guardians of the interests of international society, on the grounds that they tend to be less selfish than great powers and more responsible than small states . 6 But, while the category of middle powers today includes many satisfied and conservative nations which have gained a reputation for law-abiding conduct, it also comprises a number of ambitious and restless states of which some occasionally have resorted to acts of aggression and a few have pursued programmes of international revolution. Though there are more ofthe former kind than of the latter, and a few that partake of both sets of q ualities and are difficult to classify, there are rather too many of the latter type to allow us to accept the proposition that modern middle powers by and large can be relied on to use their resources in support of law and order.

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209

Yet, despite the apparent character of some contemporary powers, the claims traditionally advanced on behalf of middle powers may be not without some foundation . The position of such states in the hierarchy of powers does suggest that their incentives to respect and uphold international law may be in some respects stronger than those of others . Being weaker and more exposed than great powers, they are less able to override the law in their dealings with other states and more dependent on a system of rules and conventions protective of the sovereign rights of states. Being richer and less dependent on others than most small states, they have more to lose from a state of international lawlessness and perhaps also more to gain from a degree of international organisation . This was the reasoning that led some spokesmen for middle powers to argue in 1 945 that such powers had a special stake in international organisations that were designed to protect the security of their members. 7 The historical record of middle powers in the principal international organisations of the twentieth century, however, only partly bears out this argument. Though many such powers certainly have had prominent positions in the various institutions and have played constructive parts in their work, not all of them have done so, a few even having resigned from the League or the United Nations. 8 While abstract analysis proceeding from the place of middle powers in the rank ordering of states may point to a tendency for such powers to appear in the role of supporters of international law and organisations, a detailed study of their actual performance within the various institutions may well give a more mixed picture. Though many middle powers, particularly through their dip­ lomacy in situations of great-power rivalry, have made useful and sometimes important contributions to the pursuit of international order, the general conduct of such powers in the several kinds of systems does not appear to have been highly conducive to the promotion of order among states. Do middle powers have a better record in relation to the pursuit of international j ustice? Here it is even more difficult to generalise . Having not had j ustice among states as one of its chief concerns , this study casts only limited light on the conduct of middle powers in this respect . Yet it is apparent that such powers have tended to be divided both in their attitudes to the general goal and in their policies on particular issues . The division in their general attitudes to the promotion of inter-state j ustice can perhaps be inferred from their reactions to situations

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where international relations have been managed by one great power enjoying preponderance or by two or more great powers acting in concert . As already recapitulated , most middle powers exposed to the oppressive tendencies and conservative inclinations inherent in such an arrangement have protested against it, having occasionally also looked for ways of organising a joint defence of the political independence and diplomatic freedom of the lesser states affected. While generally based on the sovereign rights of states laid down by international law, such a reaction does not necessarily preclude support for revisionist claims advanced in the name of inter-state j ustice . But some middle powers , usually either former great powers or regionally preponderant powers, have instead associated themselves with the system ofgreat-power management by seeking the role of j unior partner or regional agent. This reaction , usually j ustified by reference to the need for a degree of international order, hardly seems reconcilable with support of demands for change in the international status quo advanced in furtherance of j ustice between states. The pursuit of certain particular kinds of international j ustice has divided the middle powers much more explicitly. The struggles for anti-colonial, racial and economic j ustice that have occupied such large parts of the world since the end of the Second World War have in one way or another involved most of the contemporary middle powers and have turned some of them into opponents of each other. Old imperial powers have confronted former de­ pendencies in the anti-colonial struggle; states tainted by racist ideologies have stood against nations championing the cause of racial equality; and rich and industrially advanced countries have faced states struggling with the plight of poverty and the difficulties of economic development. This difference in ideas and concerns , which reflects the heterogeneity of the whole group of middle­ ranking powers, characterises also their positions on issues of individual j ustice. While some middle powers have made their mark in codifying and defending human rights, others have gained a reputation as notorious violators of the same rights. Even if the five upper middle powers were considered separately from the rest of the intermediate class of powers, it would still be very difficult to generalise abou t the roles of modern middle powers in relation to the pursuit of the several kinds of j ustice. While the upper group would have China in a position of its own on many issues, the lower group would present wide disagreement on most matters. Though

Conclusion

21 1

many middle powers clearly have played important parts in the various struggles for j ustice, in general the systemic conduct of such powers does not appear to have been of any greater help in the pursuit of this goal than in that of order in international society. At regional and local levels of the global system of the late twentieth century, however, the situation may be rather different. I t i s here that middle powers usually have their most pressing concerns and make their greatest efforts . Provided they are not exposed to the suppressing tendencies of a concert ofgreat powers or to the dividing influences of a keen rivalry of these powers, this is also the sphere in which they normally have their widest diplomatic scope . While their roles in the system at large nearly always have to be of a secondary kind , at the sub-systemic level they can sometimes take the parts of principals. The three most typical such parts are that of a single middle power that enjoys a regional preponderance of power, that of two or more middle powers that are engaged in regional rivalry with each other, and that of one or more middle powers that are at the centre of a regional association of states. In each of such roles, the middle powers concerned are in a position to exercise decisive influence on the s tate of the international relations of their region. If they found it possible to conduct their relations and pursue their interests with an eye to order and j ustice among the states of the region, they could make a valuable contribution to the pursuit of the basic goals of international society. The goal of a degree of international order they could help pursue by seeking to maintain stability, control conflict and uphold international law in their regions. A middle power enjoying pre­ ponderance might set about securing the sort of s tability that sometimes goes with imbalance of power. Middle powers engaged in rivalry, on the other hand , might seek stability through a balance of power. And middle powers at the head of an association of states might pursue the same goal by maintaining diplomatic concert . A preponderant middle power might attempt to control international conflict by skilful management of relations with and among other states, probably using much the same means as a great power in a unifocal system would do. Rivalling middle powers might en­ deavour to do the same by limiting tension and managing crises between themselves as well as between their allies. And middle powers in an association might take a similar course in their relations with states not part of the regional concert. A preponder­ ant middle power might help to uphold international law by

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striving to comply with its rules and conventions and by encourag­ ing other states to do the same. Middle powers in conflict might play a similar part by accepting legal restraints on the pursuit of their rivalry and by insisting that their allies and friends do so too. And middle powers in concert might exert influence in the same direction by observing the various sets of rights and duties that govern their relations with lesser members of the association and their dealings with states outside it. Also the cause of international j ustice could be advanced by middle powers acting in their various regional roles. A preponderant middle power might occasionally facilitate changes in the international status quo in order to accommodate a particularly disadvantaged state . Rivalling middle powers might conceivably restrict their competitive pursuit of self­ interests out of regard for each other's just needs . And middle powers in concert might show more than minimal consideration in their dealings with states not only inside but also outside the association . Since the international conduct of middle powers at sub-systemic levels has been only the secondary concern of the present study, the findings do not allow us to determine to what extent such powers have managed to allow for the goals of international society in their regional and local policies . But, though obviously their conduct here too has been of mixed quality, a broad review of international politics in recent decades leaves the impression that their record at these levels may be no worse than that of the great powers in the system at large and perhaps rather better than their own in the same sphere. Given the current trend towards greater regional autonomy in the global international system, 9 there would be some grounds for optimism about the future if it could be established that middle powers tend to perform more responsibly in the spheres where they have most scope and influence. Middle powers, it may be concluded , are not innately wiser or more virtuous than other states . If they seem disposed to behave differently from great powers and small states, it is essentially because they are placed in a different position in the hierarchy of powers and exposed to other pressures . Having neither the superior strength nor the general interests and wide responsibilities of great powers , they are rarely faced with temptations quite so big as those that great powers sometimes come up against. Commanding greater resources than lesser powers and carrying more weight in international relations, they are often led to attempt parts that

Conclusion

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would be beyond the capabilities of most small states . But their scope for diplomatic initiatives , the nature of their international roles and the extent of their influence depend to a large extent on the form and state of the international system to which they belong. In systems wi th two or more great powers, a mixture of co-operation and conflict in the central relationship usually provides the best conditions for the middle powers . While even in favourable circumstances the systemic roles within the reach of such powers are in most cases quite limited , the sub-systemic parts open to them in very large systems are often of decisive importance. Thus, while the principal responsibility for maintaining a degree of order in the system at large rests with the great powers, one of the ways of discharging it in a global context is to bring abou t conditions favourable for middle powers willing and able to help pursue the fundamental goals of international society within their own spheres .

Notes INTRODUCTION

l . Niels Amstrup, i n a useful critical survey o f the literature o n the subject, notes

2. 3.

4. 5.

6.

7.

'an astonishing lack of cumulation' in the contributions to the theory of small states ( 'The Perennial Problem of Small States: A Survey of Research Efforts', Cooperation and Co r!fiict, no. 3, 1 976, p. 1 78) . See pp. 30-3 . Strupp's Wiirterbuch des Vo·tkerrechts has no entry entitled ' Mittelmiichte' or ' Mittelstaaten'; and a contribution on the ranking of states distinguishes only between great powers and small states (v. Frisch, 'Rang der Staaten im Volkerrechtsverkehr', in H.-J . Schlochauer (ed . ) , Wo·rterbuch des Viilkerrechts (Berlin: de Gruyter & Co. , 1 960-2 ) , vol. I I , pp. 33 1 -2 ) . See Chapter 2 . While some o f the arguments advanced by champions o f middle powers in earlier centuries, as we shall see in the following chapter, carry distinct Aristotelian echoes, bringing to mind the pass age of Politics that extols the qualities of the middle class , the views expressed by some more recent spokesmen of such powers seem to s p ring from a faith resembling that ofjames Mill, who in 1 820 confidently described the middle rank as ' both the most wise and the most virtuous part of the community' (An Essay on Government, Cambridge University Press, 1 93 7, p. 7 1 ) . Some of the more common syrtonyms of 'middle power' in the English language are 'medium power' , 'secondary power' and 'semi power'. Despite the various ideological connotations with which it has been loaded in recent times, 'middle power' is the term preferred in this study. Not only has it been the most commonly used expression in English since the end of the Second World War, when Canadians and Australians took the lead in arguing the case for 'middle powers' (see pp. 57--62 ) ; it also has a background in German political writings of the nineteenth century, where both 'Mittelmacht' and 'Mittelstaat' appeared at an early stage (see pp. 22-3, 26, 3 1 -3) . 'Secondary power', though frequently used in earlier writings in most European languages, is more suitable for the strongest of the middle-ranking powers, those that here will be called 'upper middle powers' , than for the whole broad range of intermediate powers. 'Semi power' is misleading, because it seems to refer to a state that is less than a power, not just less than a great power (for a fuller discussion oflerminology and definitions, see Chapter 3.) 'Role', here conceived in terms of the reciprocal relationship between typical behaviour and systemic processes, is used in a looser sense than is normal in the social sciences. A conventional definition, in terms of expectations entertained by other units of the system, would be less suitable to international society than it is to more developed and more static forms of society.

214

Notes

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T H E H I ST O R Y O F T H E I D EA

1. M. Wight, Power Polities, eel. H . Bull and C. Holbraad ( Penguin and Leicester Univenity Press , 1 978) pp. 295-30 1 . 2 . Ibid, pp. 295-6. Wight saw two ideas linked in Aquinas's proviw, namely the

3.

4.

5. 6.

7. 8.

9. 10. 1 1. 1 2.

13. 14. 15.

16. 1 7. 18. 1 9. 20. 21.

declining idea of the Roman imperial political unit and the rising idea of the over-grown city state or the pays. His reference is to a passage in the fint chapter of De Regimilli Prin&ipam. Wight, Power Politics, pp. 296-7. The relevant passages are printed in R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, Mediuval Political Tluory i11 tlu West, vol. VI (London: Blackwood, 1 936) p. 78, n. 2. G. Botero, Tlu Reason ofState, trans. P. J. and D. P. Waley (London: Routledge &: Kegan Paul, 1 956) , book I, 2, pp. 3-4. Wight points out that Botero's examples of middle powen were out of date and suggests that it was really the Duchy of Savoy, of which Botero was a subject, that he had in mind (Power Politics, p. 299) . See also M. Wight, Systems of States, eel. H. Bull (Leicester Univenity Press , 1 977) p. 1 38) . Tlu Reason of State, trans. Waley, book I, 6, pp. 8-9. Wight merely mentions Mably's classification of powen, before closing the fragment with a brief reference to the class of middle powen in the Napoleonic reorganisation of Germany between 1 797 and 1803 and the su 61eq uent reorganisation of Europe in 1 8 1 4- 1 5 (Power Politics, p. 30 1 ) . G . Bonnot de Mably, Collection complete des OIUDTU til I'Abhlde Mobly (Paris: Ch. Desbriere, 1 794-5) vol. V, pp. 74-5. I bid, p. 75. Ibid, pp. 8 1 -2. Ibid, pp. 82-3. Ibid, p. 84. Mably lilted the powen he had in mind as the court of Vienna, Russia, Spain, Denmark, etc. (ibid, p. 75) . The distinction is parallel to that applied in Chapter 3 below, where China, japan, France, United Kingdom and West Germany are described as upper middle powen. C. E. Vaughan ( eel . ) , Tlu Political Writings oj]etJII ]tiCqws &uss1� ( Cambridge Univenity Press , 1 9 1 5) vol. I I , 'Emile' , p. 1 57. I bid, vol. I, 'Premiere venion du Contrat social', p. 489. J . J. Moser, Versuch des MUSlin EuropiJisclun Vol/cer-Rechts i11 Fritdells- und Kritgs­ Zeiten (Frankfurt am Mayn: Varrentrapp Sohn &: Wenner, 1 777) part I , pp. 35 and 44--6; see also J . J. Moser, GrrauJ-S�, rks jekt iihlitlun Europlisclun Vol/cer-Rechts in Frittiens-Zeiten (Frankfurt am Mayn: Johann August Rupe, 1 763) p. 23. Moser, Grund-Siitz:.e, p. 1 9. G. F. von Martens, The lAw of .Nations, 4th edn, trans. W. Cobbett (London: William Cobbett, 1 829) p. 29. A. H . D. Freiherr von Bulow, Blitke alif z:.ulcflriftige B•gebmheiten, 'aber keW Propluz:.eihrmgm ( 1 806) pp. 6-7. I bid, pp. 67-8. C . Webster, T/u Congress of Vitrma, 1814-1815 (London: G. Bell &: Sons, 1 950) p. 6 1 . F . Gentz, Dlplclus inldites du Chevalier de Gmtz:. tJWC Hospot/Drs til ValtiChu, ptw.r

216

Notes servir a l'histoire de La politique europeenne ( 1813 ti 1828) , ed . A. Prokesch-Osten ( Paris: Pion, 1876-7) vol. I, pp. 354-5. Gentz's Areopagus comprised the

22.

members of the Quadruple Alliance and France, soon to emerge from the state of tutelage in which it had temporarily found itself. He did not list the secondary powers. An alternative view of the hierarchy of powers found expression in the works of the French writer, and former archbishop, Dufour de Pradt, whom Gentz engaged in a polemic about the new system of European politics. De Pradt saw post-Napoleonic Europe in dualistic terms. Britain and Russia shared a protectorate of the rest of Europe, and all other states had to defend themselves against the dangers of exploitation and domination by these powers. Among the states of the second order he distinguished at least two class es , putting the Netherlands, but not Sweden and Spain, in the upper one. But he did not use the term 'middle powers' about this or any lower class of powers. (See especially de Pradt, L'Europe apres le Congres d'Aix-la-Ciulpelle, faisant suite au Congres de Vienne (Brussels: de Mot, 1 8 1 9) and Paralltle de Ia puissance anglaise et russe relativement tl l'Europe (Paris: Bl:chet Aim':, 1 823) ) . K. H. L. Politz, Die Slalltswissensclulften im Lichte unsrer ,(tit, 2nd edn (Leipzig: Hinrichsche, 1 827-8) vol. I, p. 585.

23. I bid, pp. 585-7. 24. C. von Clausewitz, Politische Schriften und Briife, ed. H. Rothfels ( Munich: Drei Masken, 1 922) 'Zuriickfuhrung der vielen politischen Fragen, welche Deutschland beschiftigen, auf die unserer Gesamtexistenz ( 1 83 1 ) ', pp. 22930. 25. Ibid, pp. 233-4, 26. Hinterlassene Werke des Generals Carl von Clausewit;: uber Krieg und Kriegfuhrung. Vom Kriege (Berlin: Diimmler, 1 832-4) book VI, chs 1 and 6. 2 7 . H. C. von Gagern, Der Einsiedkr odtr Fragmente uber Sittenlehre, Staatsrecht und Politik (Stuttgart and Tiibingen: Cotta, 1 822-3) vol. I I , 'Die grosse Allianz', pp. 58-9. 28. Ibid, p. 62. 29. H. C. Freiherr von Gagern, Mein Antheil an dtr Politik, vol. V, Der ,(weite Pariser Frieden (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1 845) part I, p. 426. 30. The Cambridge Modern History, ed. A. W. Ward, G. W. Prothero and S. Leathes (Cambridge University Press , 1 902-1 1 ) vol. IX, p. 652. 3 1 . J. G. Droysen, Politische Schriften, ed. F. Gilbert ( Munich and Berlin: Oldenbourg, 1 933) 'Preussen und das System der Grossm achte', p. 228. In a 32. 33. 34. 35.

footnote, the editor suggests which events Droysen might have had in mind when he noted the rising influence of these secondary states. See, for example, ibid, 'Die politische Stellung Preussens' ( 1 845) , p. 48, and 'Zur Charakteristik der europaischen Krises' ( 1 854) , p. 330. For an exposition of Droysen's ideas about European politics and the future role of Prussi a, see C. Holbraad, The Concert of Europe: A Study in German and British International Theory 1815-1914 (London: Longman, 1970) pp. 55-8. Wight, Power Politics, p. 297. For details of the composition and structure of the German Confederation, see, for example, H. Holborn, A History of Modern Germany, 1648-184() (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1 965) pp. 44-4-6; and F. Schnabel, Deutsche Geschichte im Neun;:,ehnten ]ahrhundtrt, vol. II (Freiburg: Herder, 1 949) p. 552.

Notes

217

36. See Chapter 5, in which the pattern of conduct of the German middle states is analysed. 37. Quoted in H. Cord Meyer, Mittelellropa in Germtlll Tlwught and Action 181�1945 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1 955) p. 9. 38. Die Wahl des Frtiherm von Wangenheim . . . .tum Abgeordneten in die Wiirtembergische Stiindtversammlung (Tiibingen: Laupp, 1 832) appendix 1 , p. 2 1 6. 39. In a constitutional tract published in Weimar in 1 849 - even the title ofwhich, Osterreich, Preussen und das reine Deutschland arif der Grundlage des deutschen Staatenbundes organisch .tum deutschen Bundesstaatl vereinigt, shows that the author had not changed his views much over the years - Wangenheim described the projected confederation as the Mittelglied of the German federation he had in mind (see, for example, p. 54) . But from the context it is clear that this term referred to geographical position and political role rather than to relative power. For a study ofWangenheim's ideas for the reorganisation of Germany, see C. Albrecht, Die Triaspolitik des Frhr. K. Aug. v. Wangenhtim, vol. XIV of Darstlllungen aus der Wiirttlmbergischen Geschithtl (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1 9 1 4) .

40 . G . Erichson (pseud. ) , Manuscript aus Siid-Deutschland (London: Griphi, 1 820) pp. 1 5(}-9 and 168. 4 1 . Ibid, pp. 22 1 -4. 42. Ibid, pp. 223-9. 43. T. E. Holland, Studies in International Low (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 898) 'Pacific Blockade' ( 1 89 7 ) , p. 1 48. 44. J. Westlake, lntemational lAw, 2nd edn (Cambridge University Press, l 9 1 Q­ l 3) , part I, p. 325 n. 45. J . C. Bluntschli, Gesammelte kleine Schriften (Nordlingen: Beck, 1 879-8 1 ) vol. II, 'Die Organisation des europaischen Statenvereines', p. 300 . 46. In his own project for the international organisation of Europe, Bluntschli gave two votes to each of the great powers and one vote to each remaining state (ibid, p. 303) . 47. H. von Treitschke, Politik, ed. M. Cornicelius (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1 897-8) vol. I , p . 42. 48. J. Lorimer, The Institutes of the Low ofNations. A Treatise of the Jural Relations of Separate Political Communities (London: Blackwood, 1 883-4) vol. I , pp. 1 822 1 2. 49. Ibid, vol. I, pp. 2 1 2- 1 5 and vol. II, pp. 28o- l . 50. Treitschke, Politik, vol. I, pp. 42-3. 5 1 . P. Rohrbach, Deutschland untlr den WeltvOikern, 2nd edn (Berlin: Schoneberg, 1 908) pp. 3 1 9 and 3 1 .

2

T H E LEAG U E OF N A T I O N S A N D T H E U N I T ED N A T I ONS l. Lord Hankey, The Supreme Control at the Peace Conference 1919 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1 963) p. 37.

2. Ibid, p. 45. 3. Ibid, p. 46. 4. D. H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1 928) vol. II, pp. 4 1 -2 .

218

Notes

5. Ibid, p. 45. 6. C. Howard-Ellis, The Origi11, Stntcture, and Working of the uague of NatitJns (London: Allen &: Unwin, 1 928) p. 82. 7. A. Zimmcrn, The uague of Nalions and the lbJI of Law, 1918-35 (London: Macmillan, 1 939) pp. 255--8; F. Morley, The Socie9 of Nalions (Washington, ' DC: Brookings Inatitution, 1 932) pp. 82--4. 8. W. E. Stcphcna, Rn1isions of the Trt� of Versailles ( New York: Columbia Univenity Press, 1 939) p. 1 28. 9. For an account of the evenb of 1 926, see F. P. Walten, A History of the uague of Nalitms (Oxford Univenity Press, 1 952) ch. 2 7 . 10. Howard-Ellis, Till Origi11, Stru&ture, and Working of the uague of.NatitJns, p. 1 43. 1 1 . Stephena, RevisitJns, p. 1 32 n. The passage occurred in a speech of September 1 926 in reply to a apecial request that Spain's seat on the Council should not be left vacant. 1 2. Howard-Ellis, Till Origill, Stntctwr�, and Working of the League of NatitJns, p. 1 43. 1 3. See, for example, a speech by the Brazilian presiden t after the negotiations at Geneva in March 1 926 ( Till Timu, 24 March 1 926, p. 1 6 ) . 1 4. The Timts, 5 March 1 926, p . 1 4. 1 5. Howard-Ellis, Till Oripl, Slntdure, and Working of the uague ofNatitJns, p. 143. 16. S. S. Jones, The &andiNwiall States and the uague of .NatitJIIS (Princeton Univenity Press, 1 939) pp. 1 23-5. 1 7. Howard-Ellis, The Origi11, Stru&ture, and Working of the uague of NatitJns, pp. 1 52-3. 1 8. C. K. Webeter and S. Herbert, The uague of NatitJns in Theory and Pr4Ctice (London: Allen &: Unwin, 1 933) p. 86. 1 9. Stephens, RevisitJns, p. 1 3 1 . 20 . Wight, Por«r Poiitiu, p . 64 ; see also A . Vandenbosch and W . Hogan, The Ullilld NatitJns - Ba&lcgrtnm4, Org411isatitJII , Flltl&titJIIS and Activities (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1 952) p. 86, where Canada, Brazil, the Netherlands and Auatralia are mentioned as states regarding themselves as middle powen. 2 1 . F. H. Soward and E. Mcinnis, C4114da and the Unilld .NatitJns (New York: Manhattan Publishing Co., 1956) p. 1 0. 22. R. A. MacKay, ' The Canadian Doctrine of the Middle Powen', in H. L. Dyck and H. P. Kr01by (eds) , Empire and .NatitJns. Essays in Ho11011.r of Frederic H. Soword {Toronto: Univenity of Toronto Press , 1 969) p. 1 34. 23. Ibid, pp. 1 34-5. 24. C. Eagleton, 'The Share of Canada in the Making of the United Nations', The U11il!lf'si9 of Tor011 to Law Joumal, vo1. VII. no. 2 ( 1 948) p. 334. 25. Ibid, p. 338. 26. Ibid, p. 343. 27. J. D. E. Plant, 'The Origins and Development of Australia's Policy and Posture at the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco - 1945' ( unpubl . Ph. D. thesis, Australian National Univenity) p. 1 1 5 . 2 8 . Ibid, p. 250. 29. Ibid, p. 286. 30. I bid , p. 290. 3 1 . Dr Evatt bas given his own account of Australian policies and activities at San Francisco in ch. IV of his The Task of .NatitJns (New York: Duell, Sloan &:

Notes

2 19

Pearce, 1 949) ; but see also, for example, A. Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1938-1965 ( Cambridge University Press, 1 967) pp. 78-93.

32. Plant, 'The Origins and Development of Australia's Policy and Posture', p. 3 1 8. 33. Ibid, p. 328. 34. Canada withdrew on the third ballot in favour of Australia, who argued

35.

36.

3

strongly that it was the only power to represent the Pacific area. For a survey of the early history of elections to the Security Council, see MacKay, 'The Canadian Doctrine of the Middle Powers' , pp. 1 35--6. I t was as a result of a certain harmony of views between some small states and the great powers, especially between a number of Latin American states and the United States, that the Canadian proposal for specific rules to give effect to the functional idea was replaced by the watered-down amendment that became part ofArticle 23 (Soward and Mcinnis, Canada and the United Nations, pp. 26-7 ) . The outcome of the Napoleonic reorganisation o f Germany o f 1 803, to which the middle states of the later German Confederation owed their origin, suggests that middle powers may stand a better chance of establishing themselves when the post-war restructuring of the states system is carried out by one great power only.

T H E H I E R A R C H Y OF POW E R S I . G. DeT. Glazebrook, 'The Middle Powers i n the United Nations System', Internationo.l Organization, vol. I , no. 2 (June 1 947) p. 308. For some critical remarks on the Canadian post-war doctrines of the role of middle powers, see MacKay, 'The Canadian Doctrine of the Middle Powers', p. 1 39. 2. R. G. Riddell, 'The Role ofthe Middle Powers in the United Nations. Extracts from an address . . . June 22, 1 948' (unpublished) p. I . 3 . Ibid, p . 2 . This observation should be compared with Botero's of 1 589, that middle powers 'are exposed neither to violence by their weakness nor to envy by their greatness' (see p. 1 2) . Riddell's statement is the obverse of Botero's. 4. In the earlier period, this difference in the conception of the role of middle powers may be seen not only in the debates of 1 945 but also in the first post-war writings. Note, for example, the difference of emphasis between Glazebrook , characterising middle powers in terms of their opposition to great-power control, and Riddell, reflecting the views of the Canadian government of the time, presenting the same powers as being both willing and able to support and participate in the most important work of the permanent members of the Security Council (see pp. 68-9) . 5. J. W. Holmes, 'Is There a Future for Middlepowermanship?' , in J. King Gordon (ed . ) , Canada's Role as a Middle Power, Contemporary Affairs No. 35 (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1 966) pp.

1 5-18. 6. Current Notes on Internationo.l Affairs, March 1 964 (Department o f External Affairs, Canberra) vol. 35, no. 3, p. 24 ( House of Representatives, 1 1 March) . 7 . A . Watt, 'Ost und West - Australien und die Probleme Siidostasiens', Oesterreichische <:,eitschrift fiir Aussenpolitik, vol. 9, no. 1 ( 1 969) pp. 1 5-3 1 .

220

Notes

8. The Role of Middle Powers in World Politics (Bonn: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft ftir Auswartige Politik, 1 968) p. 4. 9. L.J. Cantori and S. L. Spiegel, The lnttmational Politics ofRegions ( Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1 970) p. 1 4. In a subsequent work, Spiegel used the same basic distinctions but made a few changes in the list of middle powers (S. L. Spiegel, Dominance and Diversi�. The Inttmationtll Hierarchy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1 972) ch. 3) . In both studies, the classification of nations according to range ofinftuence was backed up by attempts to assess their relative power, the elements of power being divided into material, military, and motivational. 10. M. Haas, lnttmatioTIIll Conflict (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1 974) pp. 324 and 33 1 . For a division along similar lines, between great powers and minor (including middle) powers, see Wight, Power Politics, pp. 43 and 65. Wight used the distinction applied at the Versailles Peace Congress , between general and limited interests. 1 1 . D. Vital, The lnequali� ofStates. A Study ofthe Small Power in InttmatiOTUll Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967) p. 8. 1 2. E. Hanson, 'The Economic Policies of a Middle Power', in Gordon, Cantlda's Role as a Middk Power, pp. 1 02-4 and 1 08- 1 0. 1 3 . J. D. Sethi, 'India as Middle Power', /Nlia Q]larter!J, vol. XXV, no. 2 (April­ June 1 969) pp. 107-8. 14. J. W. Burton, lnttmationtll Relations. A General Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1 965) p. 1 05. 1 5. W. Schneider, 'The French Nuclear Force and the Economic and Strategic Prospects for Medium Powers Independent Nuclear Deterrent', Arms Control and National Securi�, vol. I ( 1 969) p. 73 n. 16. For an expansion ofthis point, see C. Holbraad, 'The Role of Middle Powers', Cooperation and Conflict. Nordic Journal ofInttmationtll Politics, no. 2 ( 1 97 1 ) pp. 812. 1 7. Singer and Small found diplomatic representation of other states a good index of the status of a state and ranked the members of the international system on this basis (J. D. Singer and M. Small, 'The Composition and Status Ordering of the International System: 1 8 1 5- 1 940', World Politics, vol. XVI II, no. 2 (January 1 966 ) pp. 236-82) . Both Wallace and East used the same data when they measured the 'ascribed status', or 'prestige', of states for the purpose of examining the relationship between 'status inconsistency' and violence in the international system (M. D. Wallace, 'Power, Status, and International War', ]ourntll of Peace Research, vol. 8 ( 1 97 1 ) pp. 23-35; M . A. East, 'Status Discrepancy and Violence in the International System: An Empirical Analysis', in J . N. Rosenau, V. Davis and M. A. East (eds) , The Analysis of Inttmational Politics (New York: The Free Press , 1 972) p. 305) . Johan Galtung and his disciples have used a variety of other indicators of international status. 18. For a discussion of the distinctions mentioned here and a critique of attempts at precise measuring of the strength and power of countries, see R. Aron, Peace aNi War. A Theory of Inttmationtll Relations, trans. R. Howard and A. B. Fox (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1 962) ch. I I . 1 9. K. Davis, 'The Democratic Foundations of National Power', i n M. Berger, T. Abel and C. H. Page (eds) , Freedom and Control in Modern Socie� (New York: Van Nostrand, 1 954) p. 1 0. Katherine and A. F. K. Organski, writing in 1 96 1 , listed the deficiencies of national income as an indicator o f national power but

Notes

20. 21.

22.

23. 24.

25. 26. 27.

28. 29.

22 1

agreed that it was still thought the best general index (K. and A. F. K. Organski, Population and World Power (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1 96 1 ) . p. 28) . F. C. German, 'A Tentative Evaluation of World Power', Journal of Co'!flict &solution, vol. IV, no. 1 ( March 1960) pp. 1 38-44 . A. F. K. Organski, World Politics, 2 nd edn (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1 968) pp. 1 89-220. For a critique of the studies of German and Organski, see S. Rosen, 'War Power and the Willingness to Suffer', in B. M. Russett ( ed. ) , Peace, War, and Numbers (London: Sage Publications, 1 972) pp. 1 7Q- l . Rosen accepted the case for GNP as the most useful simple measure of 'war power', but for his own purposes used instead the revenue of the central govern­ ment. See, for example, some of the contributions to the literature on classification of powers referred to above. Cantori and Spiegel, in examining the material characteristics of power, concentrated on three factors, namely size of population, size of GNP and amount of energy consumed. While their criterion of military power was size of armed forces, their indication of motivation was percentage of GNP devoted to military expenditures. When they found these five factors insufficient, t h ey introduced supplementary data ( The lntmultional Politics of &gions, p. 54) . Spiegel refined this method in his later work (Dominance and Diversiry, ch. 2) . Wallace used five indices of 'achieved status', or 'national power capability', namely total population, urban population, iron and steel production, armed forces personnel and military expenditures ('Power, Status, and International War', pp. 25-6) . Rosen, 'War Power and the Willingness to Suffer', p. 1 7 1 . See, for example, a study by Alcock and Newcombe, in which thirty-eight Canadians were asked to rank nations according to perceived power (N. Z. Alcock and A. G. Newcombe, 'The Perception of National Power', Journal of Co'!flict &solution, vol. 14 ( 1 970) pp. 335--43 ) . A similar study of Latin American countries had previously been carried out in Chile (S. Schwartzman and M. Mora y Araujo, 'Images of International Stratification in Latin America', Journal of Peace &search, no. 3 ( 1 966 ) ) . This term and its synonym 'rank disequilibrium' have been used by Johan Galtung and other sociologists and political scientists who have investigated the domestic and international consequences of the phenomenon. Spiegel, Dominance and Diversiry, p. 52. The source is World Bank Atlas, 1 977 (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) , where relevant statistical explanations and notes qualify­ ing individual figures may be found. For a comparison of the 1 975 figures with earlier and later ones, see note 29. The ranking of Latin American states is discussed on pp. 97-8. To see just how reliable the system of classifying powers used here is, over relatively short periods, we may compare the GNP figures for 1 975, on which the classification rests, with those for 1 970 and 1 980. In general, the 1 970 figures (see World Bank Atlas, 1 972) do not show a great difference in the positions of the states here defined as middle powers in relation to the lesser powers immediately below them in the area lists of 1 9.75. The most notable discrepancies are in Africa, where Egypt in 1 970 was a little ahead ofNigeria, then only just recovering from the Biafran war; and in Asia, where Pakistan,

222

Notes before the independence of Bangladesh, was ahead of Iran. In 1 970, thus, it would have been reasonable to exclude Nigeria from the list of middle powers and to include Pakistan. In Europe, East Germany was ahead of Spain, though behind Poland. But the case for East Germany being included might already then have appeared weaker than that for Spain, with its much larger size and population and, not least, its long history as a middle power. Nor do the 1 970 figures show startling differences in the ranking of the states here defined as middle powers, none of them being more than a few places higher or lower in the list than five years later. The difference in the price of oil seems to have had a rather greater effect on the relative economic strength of oil-producing countries not on our list than on that of those on it. Thus, Iran ­ though then, as later, a marginal case - could well be counted a middle power already in 1 970, when its place was after Argentina and South Africa but before Indonesia. For 1 980, preliminary GNP figures (see World Bank Atlas, 1 98 1 ) available for the states here defined as middle powers are as follows:

( US S millions) Japan Germany, Federal Republic of France United Kingdom Italy China Brazil Canada Spain India Mexico Australia Poland Nigeria South Mrica Argentina Indonesia Iran

1 1 52 9 1 0 827 790 627 700 442 820 368 860 283 250 243 240 242 530 1 99 780 1 59 430 1 44 000 1 42 240 1 39 780 85 5 1 0 66 960 66 430 6 1 770 not available

The most marked divisions between middle powers and those immediately below them in the area lists were again in North and Central America, where Mexico was followed by Puerto Rico at 1 1 070 million dollars; in Oceania and Indonesia, where Indonesia was followed by New Zealand at 23 1 60 million dollars; and in Africa, where South Mrica was followed by Algeria at 36 4 1 0 million dollars. In South America, Argentina w as again succeeded by Venezuela, at 54 220 million dollars. In Asia, where Saudi Arabia headed the list of non-middle powers at 100 930 million dollars, no comparison is possi ble, as figures for Iran were not available. In Europe, the Netherlands at 1 6 1 440 million dollars was well ahead of Poland, with East Germany at 1 20 940 million dollars and Belgium at 1 1 9 770 million dollars not very far behind. But the population, area and history of Poland still make it reasonable to keep this

Notes

223

power in the Jist, while excluding the three others. On the basis of the 1 980 figures, we may say that the minimum qualification for being counted a middle power is a GNP of about 60 000 million. dollars in the geographical areas of Africa, South America and Oceania and Indonesia, and a GNP of about 1 40 000 million dollars in the areas of Asia, Europe and North and Central America. Comparing the relative order of middle powers in the 1 980 list with that of 1 975, we note that one of the upper middle powers, China, has slipped so much as to be overtaken by I taly. Further down the list two oil-producing countries, Mexico and Nigeria, have improved their positions, the latter by £Our places, while Poland has moved down three places. Otherwise there are no great changes in the order. As measured in terms of GNP, the comparative strength of middle powers, whether in relation to minor powers or to each other, apparently does not tend to vary a great deal over relatively short periods.

4

T H E UN I F O C A L S Y S T E M

I . A. P. Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline ( I thaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1 954) p. l ; quoted in R. N. Burr, Our Troubled

2. 3. 4.

5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

5

Hemisphere. Perspectives on United States-Latin A merican Relations (Washington, DC: Brookings I nstitution, 1 96 7 ) p. 1 2 . See pp. 86-7 . H . Bull, The Anarchical Sociery: A Study of Order in World Politics ( London : Macmillan, 1 97 7 ) pp. 2 1 3- 1 9. For the tendency in the United States to divide the hemisphere into areas, see D. Bronheim, 'Latin American Diversity and United States Foreign Policy', in D. A. Chalmers (ed . ) , Changing Latin A merica, APS Proceedings, vol. 30, no. 4 (New York: Academy of Political Science, 1 972) pp. 1 67-8. See J. Castaneda, ' Revolution and Foreign Policy: Mexico's Experience', in C. A. Astiz (ed . ) , Latin A merican International Politics: A mbitions, Capabilities, and the National Interest of Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1 969) pp. 1 43--4. See E. Bradford Burns, 'Tradition and Variation in Brazilian Foreign Policy' , i n Astiz, Latin A merican International Politics, pp. 1 78-9. See pp. 5 1 -3 . H. F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1 953) p. 3 1 4. See pp. 2 7-8 . This is the system that Lewis Namier described as 'the "sandwich system" of international politics' (L. B. Namier, Conflicts. Studies in Contemporary History (London : Macmillan, 1 942) p. 1 4; see also L. B. Namier, Personalities and Powers (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1 955) pp. 1 1 1 - 1 2 ) .

T H E D U A L I ST I C SYSTEM

I . R. L. Walker, The Multi-State System of Ancient China ( Hamden, Connecticut: The Shoe String Press, 1 95 3 ) p. 5 1 . A table on p. 50 presents the general slant

224

2.

3.

4. 5.

6.

7.

8. 9.

Notes

of Cheng's allegiance between 678 BC and 546 Be Walker describes the role of Cheng in the states system as that of a 'passive balancer' , and points out that this balancing process involved the states in almost constant warfare (p. 52) . Martin Wight, discussing the balance of power as policy in the context of the European states system - though without special reference to the conduct of middle powers in dualistic situations - stressed particularly the moral factor. Listing the wartime cases of Prussia's relations with Napoleon before the battle ofJena, Roumania's relations with Russia in the Russo -Turkish War of 1 877-8 and Mussolini's policy in 1 94{), he used Gibbon's term 'jackal powers' for those that simply chose what they thought was the winning side. It tended to be a futile policy because it ignored the needs of the balance of power. The law of the balance of power, Wight noticed, 'is true of states in proportion to their strength, confidence and internal cohesion. Weak and corrupt states, and especially those ruled by an unrepresentative despot or clique, tend to gravitate towards the dominant power' (Power Politics, p. 1 8 1 ) . After the Moscow Conference o f November 1 960, Gomulka stayed on for several weeks in an attempt to conciliate in the strained relations between the two principal communist powers (R. Hiscocks, Poland: Bridge for the Abyss? (Oxford University Press , 1 963) p . 259) . Late in 1 963, too, Poland's leadership was reported to be trying to mediate in the ideological quarrel between the Soviet Union and China (New York Times, 2 November 1 963, p. 1 ) . Address delivered a t Banff, Alberta, o n 2 7 August 1 965 (Gordon, Canada's Role as a Middle Power, pp. 2QO-l ) . A . Farace, 'The Role of Middle Powers i n a Changing World' (unpublished paper delivered at Carleton University, Ottawa, on 1 3 February 1 969 by the I talian ambassador to Canada) p. 29. For a general discussion of partiality in mediation, see S. Touval, 'Biased Intermediaries' , Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, vol. I, no. I ( 1 975) . H. Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-1970 (London : Weidenfeld & Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1 9 7 1 ) , for example pp. 79-80. Wilson's own conception of the Anglo-American relationship is set out on p. 50. In an interesting study of East-West interaction patterns, Johan Galtung shows that in conditions of conflict within a dualistic system there is a tendency for the 'topdogs' (in which categcry he includes not only the Soviet Union and the United States but also the United Kingdom, France and China) to dominate interaction. The 'topdogs' discourage the 'underdogs' (a category which takes in all lesser bloc members, including powers that in a study which operated with more than two classes of states might be called 'middledogs') from establishing contact with their counterparts and with the 'topdogs' on the other side ( J . Galtung, 'East-West Interaction Patterns' , Journal of Peace Research, vol. 3 ( 1 966) pp. 1 48-9) . The analysis suggests that the conclusions would be broadly similar if the division were between the two alliance leaders only and all lesser members of the blocs. For a discussion of participation in peace-keeping operations, see MacKay, 'The Canadian Doctrine of the Middle Powers', pp. 1 40- 1 . The diplomatic influence of Taiwan and Egypt in the role of troublemaker may be compared with that of China in chs I I, I I I and IV of C. Holbraad, Superpowers and International Conflict (London: Macmillan, and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1 979) .

Notes

225

1 0 . Some of the mediatory moves of the Suharto government are listed in 0 . G. Roeder, 'Fetching Filipino', Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. LIX, no. 4 ( 25 January 1 968) p. 1 33. I I . The literature on uncommitted states in the role of intermediaries in dualistic conflict is reviewed in 0 . R. Young, The Intermediaries. Third Parties in International Crises ( Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 1 967) pp. 941 02. After surveying the arguments for and against expecting useful results from diplomatic intervention from such quarters, Young concludes that, although there appears to be some potential in uncommitted states for successful intervention, 'the role must ultimately be described as rather limited and circumscribed for any practical purpose' (p. 1 02) . 1 2 . Towards Friendship, Peace and Justice, Speech by President Sukarno before the Non-Bloc Summit Conference in Beograd, on I September 1 96 1 (Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia) . 1 3. See pp. 2 7-33. 1 4. H . C . Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action 1815-1945 ( The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1 955) pp. 20 and 23. 15. See pp. 30- 1 . 1 6. H. von Treitschke, History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century (Lndon: Jarrold, 1 9 1 5- 1 9 ) vol. I I , p. 1 08. 1 7 . For a discussion of Wangenheim's ideas, see pp. 30- 1 . 1 8. For a discussion of Lindner's views, see pp. 3 1 -3 . 1 9 . For a discussion o f the difference between Wangenheim and Lindner o n this point, see Albrecht, Die Triaspolitik des Frhr. K. Aug. v. Wangenheim, p. 5 . 2 0 . See p. 1 1 5 . 2 1 . For a n analysis o f th e class structure o f the international system, see Galtung, 'East-West Interaction Patterns', pp. 1 4 7-8. 22. Holbraad, Superpowers and International Corifiict, pp. 7 7-8. 23. For details of Polish relations with various European middle powers in this period, see J. F. Morrison, The Polish People's Republic: Integration and Communiry Building in Eastern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1 968) pp. 1 1 213. 24. Quoted i n A . Bromke, 'Poland under Gierek: A New Political Style' , Problems of Communism, vol. XXI, no. 5 ( Sept-Get 1 972) p. 1 7 . The writer was Janucz Stefanowicz. 25. In the later 1 960s, however, the Indonesian government, now under the leadership ofSuharto, revealed some lingering concern with the issues dividing the great powers, at one juncture actually offering to mediate between the parties to the war in Indochina. Yet, there was no real return to the spirit of Bandung and Belgrade. 26. See pp. 1 30- 1 . 27. Quoted in B. Prasad, 'The General Experience of Nonalignment and its Prospects for the Future', in L. Acimovic (ed . ) , Nonalignment in the World of Today (Beograd: Institute of International Politics and Economics, 1 969) p. 1 06. 28. See p. 98. 29. See pp. 97-8. 30. See, for example, Sisir Gupta's subtle analysis of the implications for the Third World of the relations between the great powers in the late 1 960s and early 1 9 70s. Distinguishing between an 'inner' and an 'outer' world, he noted a

Notes

226

tendency for the superpowers to become increasingly absorbed in their relationship of limited co-operation and restrained rivalry, and expressed the fear that they and their major allies would be tempted to confine their attention to the problems and crises of the developed parts of the world and to leave the regions beyond to their own devices (S. Gupta, 'Great Power Relations and the Third World' , in C. Holbraad (ed. ) , Super Powers and World Order (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1 9 7 1 ) pp. 1 29-33) . Gupta's concern that it might no longer be possible for the 'outer world' to look to the great powers for minimum protection against the worst effects of international anarchy implied considerable scepticism about the ability of Third World powers on their own to maintain an acceptable level of order in their regions, which in the circumstances of the late 1 960s seemed well justified .

6

THE T R I A N G U L A R SYST E M

1 . The various processes of conquest whereby a great-power triangle may be resolved have been explored by Martin Wight in 'Triangles and Duels', in M. Wight, Systems ofStates, ed. H. Bull ( Leicester University Press, 1 9 7 7 ) . The evidence of history, Wight suggested, shows that 'triangles, like duels, are relationships of conflict, and are resolved by war' (p. 1 79) . P. A. Reynolds took a similar view when he set out to show by a process of reasoning that the three­ state system has 'an inherent probability of self-destruction' (P. A. Reynolds, An Introduction to International Relations ( London: Longman, 1 97 1 ) pp. 204--6) . However, R. J . Yalem, concerned about the stability of the triangle of the United States, the Soviet Union and China, provided a critique of this position and set out some rules to be followed by the three actors if the stability of the system was to be maintained ( 'Tripolarity and World Politics' , The Year Book of World Affairs 1974, London, val. 28, pp. 23-42) . 2. The confusion of structure and process has been clarified by Kenneth Waltz in Theory of International Politics ( Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1 979) ; see, for example, pp. 1 30- 1 . 3. See pp. 30-3 . 4. See pp. 1 3 1 -2. 5. Elsewhere ·I have discussed the character and analysed the dynamics of the incipient triangle of the United States, the Soviet Union and China ( Holbraad, Superpowers and International Conflict, ch . V I ) . Some of the distinc­ tions introduced there form the basis of the present enquiry into the roles of middle powers in a triangular system. 6. For a discussion of the roles of aligned middle powers in dualistic cold war, see pp. 1 23--6. 7. See pp. 1 38-9. 8. For dualistic concerts, see pp. 1 34-40; for multiple concerts, see pp. 1 79-83. 9. See Chapter 4. 1 0. The typical regional roles of middle powers in dualistic limited conflict are ou tlined on pp. 1 5 1 --6. I I . See, for example, T. Caplow, Two Against One: Coalitions in Triads ( Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1 968) p. 79. 1 2 . See pp. 1 28-30.

Notes

227

1 3 . For details o fde Gaulle's move in this game, see W . A. C. Adie, ' "One World" Restored? Sino-American Relations on a New Footing', Asian Survry, vol. X I I , no. 5 ( May 1 9 72) pp. 3 73-4. The quotation i s from Adie's interpretation of de Gaulle's reasoning.

7

T H E M U LT I PLE SYSTEM

I . If the two powers that for some purposes had · been treated as great powers,

2. 3.

4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

9. 1 0. I I.

1 2.

1 3. 1 4. 15.

1 6.

1 7.

namely the Ottoman Empire and I taly, and the two non-European great powers, the United States and japan, are included, the international system of the decades before the First World War counted nine great powers. For the emergence of Spain, Portugal and Sweden in intermediate positions, see pp. 1 9-2 1 . The strongest protest came from the representative of Spain at Vienna, who refused to sign the Final Act (see p. 20) . Three years later, on the occasion of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, where the powers of the Quadruple Alliance had put some pressure on Sweden in connection with the transfer of Norway, the Swedish king wrote a letter to Metternich's master in which he complained bitterly about the joint domination of the great powers over all other members of the European system (see H. von Treitschke, Deutsche Geschichte im .Neunz.ehnten ]ahrhundert, vol. II ( Leipzig: H irzel, 1 883) p. 4 77, where extracts of the letter are given) . The argument for regarding the Ottoman Empire as a middle power is set out on pp. 33-5. For details of the reactions of lesser powers to the Council ofTen, see pp. 46-7. For details of the reactions of lesser powers to tendencies towards great-power domination in 1 945 , see pp. 57--62. For examples ofthe reactions ofsmall states to a concert ofgreat powers, see pp. 1 36, 1 39-40. For the story of Spain's demotion, see p. 20; details of its reactions may be found in Comte d'Angeberg (ed. ) , Le Congres de Vienne et les Traitis de 1815 ( Paris: Amyot, 1 864) vol. I I , pp. 1 34 1 -2 and 1 45 7 . Some reasons for treating united I taly as a power of intermediate class are set out on p. 36. For the story ofthe recognition of an intermediate category of semi-permanent members of the League Council, see pp. 47-54. For an account of the attempt by middle powers to secure a special position in 1 945, see pp. 57--6 5. For an analysis of the historical circumstances that conditioned the rise of the Concert of Europe and an assessment of the possibility of a multiple concert of the world emerging in the future, see Holbraad, Superpowers and International Corifiict, pp. 1 42-5 1 . See Chapter 4. For the distinction between dominance, hegemony and primacy, see p. 98. See pp. 1 0 1 -2, 1 05--6, 1 09- 1 6. For the changing configurations of the composite triangle of the League powers, the Axis powers and the Soviet Union, see p. 1 6 1 . Parallels to Russia's involvement with Turkey's Balkan enemies may be seen in

228

18. 1 9.

20. 21.

Notes

the great powers' support of the Belgians against the Netherlands and of the Norwegians against Sweden . Indeed, there is some truth in the generalisation that the European great powers suppressed national rebellions when they were directed against a great power, as in the case of the Poles, the Hungarians and the I rish, but actually helped such uprisings when they were against a lesser power (see V. V. Sveics, Small Nation Survival (Jericho, NY: The Exposition Press, 1 970) p. 88) . For a discussion of the logically possible roles of unaligned middle powers in relation to cold war in a dualistic system, see pp. 1 26-30. The conduct of the small Balkan states on the eve of the First World War suggests that, in some circumstances, the part of troublemaker is more likely to be taken by small states than by middle powers. For a discussion of the corresponding role in a dualistic system divided by keen rivalry, see pp. 1 30--4. For a discussion of regional relationships and sub-systemic roles of middle powers in dualistic systems characterised by a mixture of rivalry and co­ operation between the great powers, see pp. 1 5 1 -8.

CONCLU S I ON

I . Hedley Bull has clarified the relationship between the various goals of

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

9.

international society and discussed the question of priorities (Bull, The Anarchical Sociery, pp. xii-xiv and 77-98) . See, for example, the writings of F. L. Lindner discussed on pp. 3 1 -3. See, for example, the ideas of the Abbe de Mably discussed on pp. 1 3- 1 6 . See, for example, t h e arguments o ft h e Canadian official R . G. Riddell outlined on pp. 68-9. See p. 1 2. Such ideas may be found in, for example, Canadian writings of the first years of the United Nations, some of which have been discussed on pp. 68-9. See pp. 58--62. Brazil withdrew from the League of Nations after the controversy in the mid1 920s about membership of the Council (see pp. 5 1 -3) ; Indonesia resigned from the United Nations in january 1 965 but returned in Sep tember 1 966. The current tendency towards more regional autonomy in global politics has been demonstrated by the decline in the ability of the superpowers to influence middle powers and small states, especially those that are not members of the principal military alliances. It is not only a result of the detente in East-West relations, which has weakened the polarising forces in the states system, and the diplomatic rise of China, which has made the dualistic structure of the system more complex, but has to do also with the nature of the weaponry of the superpowers and the determination of many countries in the Third World to base their foreign policies on their own regional interests.

I ndex Africa 82-3, 95, 1 5 1 , 1 52 Aix-la-Chapelle, Congress of 1 9, 2 1 , 3 1 , 1 79 Albania 85 Aleman, President 1 05 Algeciras conference 1 90, 1 98 Algeria 82, 83 alignment and non-alignment 70, 86, 96, 1 27 , 1 32-3, 1 40-58, 1 68, 206, 207 : see also alliances Alliance, Great 24 alliances 1 2 1 -8, 1 34, 1 4 1 , 1 44-7 , 1 52, 1 56, 1 67 , 1 74, 1 89, 1 94-204 Aquinas 1 1 Argentina 86, 87, 90-8, 1 02--4, 106, 1 07 , 1 1 0- 1 6, 1 54, 1 55 Association of South East Asian States (ASEAN) 1 55 Australia 45, 57-64, 68, 72, 88, 90, 1 22, 1 24, 1 25, 1 55, 1 70, 1 74, 1 8 1 , 1 94 Austria 1 3, 20, 28-32, 36, 37, 4{), 8 1 , 85, 1 1 7, 1 3 1 , 1 32 , 1 35, 1 36, 1 42, 1 43 , 1 60, 1 97 , 1 98 Austria-Hungary 4{), 45, 1 88, 1 89, 1 98 Axis powers 95, 1 05, 1 6 1 , 1 62, 1 88-9 Baden 28, 1 3 1 balance of power 25, 32, 33, 4{), 43, 92, 94, 1 1 0- 1 4, 1 20- 1 , 1 27 , 1 3 1 , 1 35, 1 43, 1 46, 147, 1 73, 1 74, 1 88, 1 92-206, 208, 2 1 1 Baltic states 53, 1 9 1 Bandung conference 1 33, 1 48 Bangia Desh 1 52 Bartol us of Sasso ferrato I I , 1 3 Barwick, Sir Garfield 72 Bavaria 28, 1 3 1 , 1 36-8

Belgium 23, 24, 26, 45-7, 50-2, 55, 57, 68, 80, 85, 86 Belgrade conference 1 30, 1 33, 1 48 Berlin, Congress of 36, 39, 4{), 1 82 Bismarck 36, 39, I I 7, 1 32 bloc politics 63, 69, 70, 96, 1 1 3, 1 30-4, 1 49 Bluntschli, J. C. 36, 3 7 Bolivia 87, 1 1 0, 1 1 5 Botero, Giovanni I I , 1 2, 1 7 , 42, 43 , 208 Branco, Castello I I 0 Branco, Rio 1 02, 1 1 0 Brazil 45-7 , 50-7 , 59, 6 1 , 62, 87, 88, 90, 9 1 , 96, 97, 1 0 1 - 1 6, 1 24, 1 25, 1 36, 1 52-5, 1 8 1 , 1 82 Bri tain: in Europe 20, 36, 37, 1 55, 1 60, 1 7 1 , 1 88, 1 97 ; Crimean War 1 98; League of Nations 46-53, 55; United Nations 56-8; Latin America 94, 95, 101, 1 03; Africa 1 5 1 , 1 52; non-prolif­ eration treaty 1 36, 1 39; Suez cns1s 145; status 4{), 70, 72, 73, 80, 85, 90, 1 22, 1 3 7, 1 38, 1 89 British Empire 45, 1 03 Bruck, Freiherr von 30 buffer states 23, 25, 26, 32, 33, 43, 1 1 5 Bulgaria 37, 45, 85, 1 9 1 Bull, Hedley 98 Bulow, A. H. D. von 1 8 Burgundy 2 3 Burton, John 74 Cairo conference 1 48-9 Canada 45, 57-62, 68, 69, 7 1 , 74, 86, 90, 9 1 , 1 1 4, 1 23-5, 1 8 1 , 1 83 Cantori, L. J . 73 Caribbean 99, 1 00

229

230

Index

Carranza, President 1 0 1 Castille, President 95 Castlereagh 20, 47 Cecil, Lord Robert 4 7, 50 Chaco war I 04 Chapultepec conference I 06 Cheng 1 20- 1 Chi!� 87, 95, 98, 1 02, 1 03, 1 07 China: in League of Nations 50-2, 54, 55; in South America 95; in United Nations 56, 57; relations with Russia 70, 1 1 4, 1 2 1 , 1 22, 1 27, 1 28, 1 36, 1 37, 1 54, 1 66, 1 70, I 7 1 , 1 72 ; status 7 1 -3, 79, 80, 84, 90, 1 42, 1 43, 1 47, 1 49, 1 50, 1 52, 1 53, 1 62-3, 1 74, 1 78, 1 83, 1 84 Chou-en-lai 1 3 7 Churchill, W . S . 56 classification of states 37-9, 4 1 , 4555, 89, 97-8 Clausewitz, Karl von 1 8, 22-3, 25, 43 Clemenceau 45, 47 cold war 67, 69, 70, 95-7 , 99, 1 08, I l l , 1 1 7-35, 1 40, 1 4 1 , 1 44-7, ] 64--{i , 1 88, 1 90, 1 95 collective security 69, 7 1 , 1 25 Colombia 87, 95, 96, 98, 1 00 colonies 39 colonialism 1 30, 2 1 0 communism 97, 1 1 0, I l l , 1 55 Congo crisis 1 27, 1 29 congress system l 79 Coolidge, President 1 0 1 Corinth 1 20 Crimean War 1 98, 200 Cuba 86, 87, 95-7 , 1 07-1 1 , 1 1 3 Cuban missile crisis 70, 1 27 Cyprus 85 Czechoslovakia 45, 5 1 , 52, 85, 86, 93, 1 36, 1 45, 1 99

Danzig 1 99 Davis, Kingsley 77 Denmark 28, 8 1 , 85, 86, 1 82 detente 67, 7 1 , 97, 99, 1 08, 1 2 7, 1 28, 1 36, 1 43, 1 45, 1 47, 1 48, 1 50, 1 57 , 1 66 Diaz, Porfirio l 00

diplomacy 1 1 6, 1 1 9, 1 29, 1 30, 1 45 , 205, 207-9 diplomatic concert 1 1 8, 1 34--4 1 , 1 4956, 1 63 , 1 65, 1 66, 1 79-88, 1 92-3, 21 1-13 diplomatic status 58, 65, 70, 7 1 , 75, 76, 1 48 , 1 69 dominance 1 3- 1 5 , 98, 1 ()0-4, 1 53 Dominican Republic 86, 1 07, 1 1 0, 1 36 Drago Doctrine l 03 Droysen, Johann Gustav 26, 27 Dulles, J. F. 1 28 Dumbarton Oaks 56, 58, 60, 65 East Germany 85, 86, 93, 1 45 Eastern Question see Ottoman Empire Echeverrias, President 1 09 economic factors in international status 36, 59, 62, 73, 74, 77, 92 ; see also gross national product, poverty Egypt 62, 82, 83, 1 28 Eight, Committee of 20, 2 1 , 24, 27, 28, 4 1 , 66, 1 80, 197 EI Salvador 86, 95 England 28, 32: see also Britain Europe: ranking . of powers in 85--6, 89; US relations with 94--5 ; see also Monroe Doctrine Europe, Concert of 33, 35-7 , 4 1 , 42, 48, 1 79-82, 1 9 1 , 1 97 European Economic Community 1 54--6, 1 72 Evatt, Dr H. V. 60, 61 Falkland Islands 95 Federal Diet of Germany 28-30, 1 35 Ferdinand V I I of Spain 24 Finland 85, I 7 1 Five, Committee of 27 Forde, Francis 61 F ranee: in European balance of power 1 3, 20, 23, 24, 30, 32, 36, 40, 1 60, 1 6 1 , 1 7 1 , 1 88, 1 97-200; League of Nations, 45, 46, 50-3 , 55; United Nations 56, 61 ; in Latin America 94; in Africa 1 23,

Index

23 1

151, 1 52; in EEC 1 54-5 ; status 40, 64, 70, 72, 73, 80, 85, 90, 9 1 , 1 22, 1 25, 1 36, 1 37 , 1 38, 1 45, 1 78, 1 89 Franco, General 9 1 Frankfurt Assembly 1 32, 1 6 1 Frantz, Konstantin 30 Frederick the Great 1 8 Frondizi, President 1 1 0, I l l functional idea 57-9, 62-3, 66, 1 83

Hesse 28 Hitler 1 6 1 , 1 88, 1 99 Holland see Netherlands Holland, Thomas Erskine Holmes, John 7 1 Holstein 28 How ard Ellis C. 55 House, Colonel 4 7 Huerta, President 1 0 1 Hungary 3 7 , 48, 85

Gagern, Hans Christoph von 23-6, 42, 1 35 Gaulle, Charles de 70, 9 1 , 1 3 7, 1 43-5, 171 Gentz, Friedrich 2 1 German, Clifford 7 7 , 78 German Committee 28, 45 German Confederation 2 7-33, 1 1 7 , 1 32, 1 35-9, 1 43, 1 60, 1 6 1 Germany: alliances 36, 1 88, 1 89, 1 98; relations with Argentina 95-6; with France 5 1 ; with Mexico 95; with Poland 25, 53, 1 22 , I 7 1 , 189, 199; status 36-- 7 , 39--42, 45, 48, 52, 80; thi rd Germany' 36, 4 1 , 1 32, 1 35, 1 60, 1 6 1 ; see also East Germany, German Confederation, Hitler, Nazi-Soviet Pact, West Germany Gierek 1 45 Glazebrook, George DeT. 68 Gomulka 1 22, 1 45 Good Neighbour policy 99, 1 04 good offices 1 26, 1 29, 1 44, 1 47, 207 Goulart, President 96, 1 09, 1 1 0, 1 1 2 Greece 45, 46, 50, 5 1 , 85, 1 9 1 gross national product 7 3 , 7 7-90 Guatemala 86, 1 07, 1 09, 1 1 5

ideology 1 1 7 , 1 2 1 , 1 6 1 Iceland 85 I ndia 45, 70, 7 1 , 83, 84, 88, 90, 9 1 , 1 20, 1 28-3 1 , 1 36, 1 47, 1 48, 1 52-5, 1 65, 1 69, 1 72, 1 7 3, 1 95 Indonesia 70, 8 1 , 88-9 1 , 1 20, 1 29-3 1 , 1 48, 1 49, 1 52, 1 53, 1 55, 1 69, 1 72, 1 73, 1 96 International Control Commission 1 29 international organisations 97, 1 55, 205, 209 Iran 83-5 , 89, 90, 1 74 Iraq 83, 84 I reland 7 1 , 85 Israel 83, 84, 1 53 I taly 33, 36, 37, 39--4 1 , 50, 5 1 , 53, 80, 85, 90, 1 23, 1 55, 1 56, 1 6 1 , 1 77, 1 78, 1 82, 1 83, 1 88-91 , 1 98-200

'

Haas, Michael 73 Hague conferences 37, 1 00 Hanover 28, 1 3 1 , 1 36, 1 37, 1 38 Hanson, Eric 73 Havana conference 1 03 Hedjas 46 hegemony 98, 99, 1 07-1 4, 1 53 Herbert, S. 1 55 Herder, J. G. 29

-

35

,

Japan 45, 57, 73, 80, 83, 84, 88, 90, 9 1 , 1 37, 1 52, 1 53, 1 55, 1 62, 1 72, 1 74, 1 84 Johnson, President 1 24 j ustice, international 205, 209- 1 2 Kennedy, President 70, 1 09 Khruschev 70, 1 27 King, Mackenzie 57, 58 Kissinger, Henry 99, 1 45, 1 75 Korea 1 22, 1 24, 1 29, 1 66 Kubitschek, President 1 09 Latin America 94-1 1 1 Latin American Free Trade Area 98, 1 1 3, 1 55 law, constitutional 22

97,

232

Index

law, international 22, 36, 37, 55, 65, 75, 76, 1 0 1 , 1 1 2, 1 1 3, 1 1 6, 205, 208- 1 0 League of Nations 46-56, 63, 66, 67, 75, 96, 1 02, 1 05, 1 6 1 , 1 62, 1 78, 1 83, 209 Libya 82, 83 Lindner, F. L. 3 1 -3, 42 List, Friedrich 30 Lloyd, George 45 Locarno treaties 5 1 , 52, 1 99 London conferences 26, 33, 36, 37, 1 82 Lorimer, James 38-9 Luxemburg 23, 28, 33, 85 Mably, Abbe de 1 3- 1 6, 42, 43 Malta 85 Mao 7 1 , 1 37 Martens, G. F. von 1 7 , 1 8 mediation 7 1 , 1 23, 1 25, 1 26, 1 29, 1 30, 1 34, 1 47, 1 65, 1 69, 207 Metternich 23, 28, 30, 47, 1 3 1 , 1 35 Mexico 57, 62, 80, 86-8, 90, 94 , 95 , 97-1 0 1 , 1 04- 1 5, 1 55 middle powers, definitions of 2, 4, 9, 1 8, 1 9, 23, 27, 29, 49, 55, 57, 6875, 90-1 military power 25, 36, 58, 59, 7 7 -9, 1 29: see also nuclear weapons Monroe Doctrine 94-5, 100, 1 03 Montenegro 1 9 1 Morrow, Dwight 1 0 I Moser, J. J . 1 7, 1 8 Miinchengriitz 1 97 Munich agreements 1 6 1 Mussolini 1 6 1 , 1 88 Napoleon 27, 28, 1 60, 1 7 1 Nazi-Soviet pact 1 6 1 , 1 7 1 , 1 89 Nehru 7 1 , 1 28, 1 29, 1 3 1 , 1 48, 1 65 Netherlands 2 1 , 23-5, 28, 33, 41 , 52, 55, 57, 6 1 , 63, 68, 80, 85, 86, 89, 1 56 neutrality 5 1 , 53, 1 27, 1 89, 200: see also alignment New Zealand 46, 60, 88 Nigeria 82, 83, 85, 88-9 1 , 1 27, 1 46, 1 52-4, 1 70

Nixon, Richard 1 45, 1 62, 1 74 non-intervention 1 04, 1 08, 1 1 2, 1 1 3 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 1 25, 1 43, 1 55 Norway 7 1 , 85, 1 7 1 nuclear weapons 74, 79, 80, 83, 90, I 10, 1 22, 1 2 7, 1 36, 1 38, 1 39, 1 45 , 1 5 1 , 1 84-7, 1 94 Oceania 88 offshore islands 1 24, 1 25, 1 28 Organization of American States 1 07, 1 08, 1 1 0, 1 1 1 , 1 55 Organski, A. F. K. 77 Ottoman Empire 33-6, 39, 41, 1 7982, 1 89-93, 1 98, 200, 20 1 Pak�tan 70, 83, 84, 1 52-4 Panama 86, I 00 Paraguay 87, I 1 0, 1 1 5 Paris Congress 33, 37 Paris Peace Conference 45-9, 1 77 , 1 8 1 , 1 98 Paris, Treaties of 20, 2 1 , 35 peace-keeping 58, 59, 6 1 , 62, 7 1 , 1 235, 1 26, 1 29, 1 44, 207 Pearson, Lester 1 23, 1 44 Pentarchy 26, 37, 39, 1 78 Peron 96, I l l Persia 52, 54 Peru 87, 95, 98 Piedmont 200 Poland: in balance of power 23, 24, 29, 32, 69, 1 1 4, 1 2 1 , 1 22, 1 25 , 1 43, 1 45, 1 62, 1 64, 1 7 1 , 1 89-9 1 , 1 99, 200; in League of Nations 45, 48, 5 1 , 52, 54; in United Nations 57, 62; as mediator 1 44; status 53, 55, 85, 86, 89-9 1 ' 93, 1 8 1 Politz, K . H. L . 2 1 , 22, 43 population 22, 43, 53, 54, 57, 73, 7589 Portugal 1 9, 20, 2 1 , 45, 85, 1 60, 1 80, 1 97 , 200 poverty 89, 1 30, 1 48, 1 49, 2 1 0 primacy 98, 99, 1 04-7 Principal Allied and Associated Powers 46, I 77 Prussia 1 8, 24, 26-32, 1 1 7, 1 3 1 , 1 32,

Index

1 35, 1 36, 1 42, 1 43, 1 60, 1 6 1 , 1 98 Puerto Rico 86, 87 Quadros, President 96, 1 09, 1 1 0, 1 1 2 Quadruple Alliance 1 79, 1 97 , 1 99, 200 racism 1 30, 2 1 0 ranking of powers 68, 75-9 1 Rapacki Plan 1 22 Rhine, Confederation of 27 Riddell, R. G. 68, 69 Rio de Janeiro conference 95 rivalry 43, 76, 96, 1 1 4, 1 1 8, 1 32, 1 4058, 1 63-9, 1 73, 1 75, 1 78, 1 88-204 Rohrbach, Paul 40 Roosevelt, F. D. 56, 99 Roosevelt Corollary 1 00, 1 03, 1 04 Roumania 45, 46 , 85 Rousseau 1 6, I 7 Russia 20, 23, 29, 30, 32, 37, 40, 45, 48, 1 60, 1 7 1 , 1 88, 1 97 , 1 98: see also Soviet Union sandwich structure m alignments 1 1 5, 1 36, 1 73, 1 8 1 , 1 9 1 San Francisco conference 57-9, 6 1 , 62, 64, 65, 69, 1 8 1 satellites 1 2 1 , 1 22 Saudi Arabia 83, 84, 88, 89 Saxony 24, 28 Schneider, William 74 Serbia 45, 46, 48, 1 9 1 Sethi , J . D. 74 Smuts, General 47-9, 50, 55 South Africa 45, 82, 83, 85, 88, 89, 1 47 , 1 52, 1 53, 1 54, 1 70 South America 54, 55, 8 1 , 94, 95: see also Latin America South East Asia Treaty Organisation 1 25 sovereignty 1 7, 22, 37, 2 1 0 Soviet Union 56, 69-72, 85, 93, 95, 1 1 4, 1 1 7 , 1 36-8, 1 42, 1 43, 1 6 1 -3, 1 70-4, 1 99: see also cold war Spain 1 9-2 1 , 24-6, 33, 48, 5Q--5, 85, 86, 89-9 1 , 94, 1 00 , 1 60, 1 80, 1 82, 1 89, 1 9 1 , 1 97, 200 Spiegel, S. L. 73

233

Stalin 56 Stein, Freiherr von 30 Stephens, Waldo E. 55 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties 1 72 strategic power 74, 75, 79, 90 Suez crisis 1 25, 1 29, 1 45 Sukarno 1 30, 1 3 1 , 1 48 Sweden 20, 2 1 , 26, 29, 5 1 , 52, 70, 85, 86, 1 60, 1 7 1 , 1 80, 1 82, 1 83, 200 Switzerland 55, 8 1 , 85 Taiwan 1 28, 1 66 Talleyrand 20 Ten, Council of 46, 47, 1 8 1 tension, as factor i n international be­ haviour 69, 1 1 8, 1 2Q--33, 1 44-9, 1 52, 1 57 , 1 68-70, 1 75 Tilsit, treaty of 1 60, 1 7 1 Treitschke, H . von 37, 39 Triaspolitik 30, 1 33, 1 35, 1 36 Triple Alliance 36, 1 60, 1 88, 1 90, 1 98-200 truce observation 1 23, 1 24, 1 44, 207 Tunis, annexation of 1 98 Tunisia 7 1 Turkey 37, 45, 48, 85, 86, 89: see also Ottoman Empire United Kingdom see Britain United Nations 56-69, 7 1 , 75, 96, 1 05, 1 09, 1 29, 1 33, 1 77 , 1 8 1 , 1 83 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNGTAD) 1 33 United Nations Emergency Force 1 25, 1 29, 209 United States of America 40, 45, 49, 50, 53, 56, 69, 7 1 , 72, 86, 93- 1 1 7, 1 36-8, 1 42 , 1 43, 1 6o-3, 1 7Q--3 : see also cold war Uruguay 5 1 , 87, 98, 1 1 0 Vargas, President 1 05 Venezuela 87-9, 98 Vienna, Congress of 1 9-2 1 , 23-7, 3 1 , 37, 45, 46 , 1 60, 1 79, 1 80, 1 82, 197 Vietnam 1 22-4, 1 29, 1 44, 1 66 Vital, David 73

234

Index

Wangenheim, K. A. von 30, 1 35 war effort as criterion of rank 45, 46, 57, 58, 6 1 , 69 Warsaw Treaty Organisation 1 25, 1 46 Watt, Sir Alan 72 wealth see poverty Webster, C. K. 55 West Germany 73, 85, 90, 1 36, 1 37, 1 45, 1 55

Westlake, John 35, 36 Wight, Martin 1 0, I I , 1 3 Wilson, Harold 1 24 Wilson, Woodrow 45-7 Wiirttemberg 28, 30, 3 1 , 1 3 1 , 1 32, 1 35 , 1 37 Yalta Conference 56, 6 1 , 1 7 1 , 1 8 1 Yugoslavia 70, 85, 86