INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
R. K. Pruthi
SARUP & SONS NEW DELHI - 110002
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lnternalionaf Politics
to Reserved 1st Edition - 2005 ISBN 8 I -7625-545-9
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Preface
International Politics has entered a period of pr9foll,nd unsettling change. It is riven by discord, cultural diversity, economic inequality and political fragmentation. Revolution in information technology, regiooalizalian of world economy, transformation in Eastern Europe, new axes of conflict and alignment suggest that the world is on the edge of a new historical epoch. Our lives are increasingly influenced by activities and events happening away from the soc ial context in which we carry on our day~to·day activities and emerging trends and patterns of interaction in global politics reveal the complexity of the contemporary international political order. In thi s complexity and di versity, intense patterns of interact ion, the permeability of the nation state, rapid and cascading change, and the fragility of order and governance, the five characteristics features of the international political system can be understood in proper history perspective is the aim of this book. Effort is made to provide to our readers, the important and innovati ve material on the subject, oriented specially for students and teachers. We take this opportunit y to reco rd our g rateful acknowledgements to the authorities on the subject. Librarians and their staffmcmbers have rendered aU poss ible help, we thank them all.
vi
Co-operation, kindness and hard work of my publisher Shri Prabhat Kumar and his staffmembers have been immense. We sh311 all feel adequately rewarded if our humble labour promotes further thining on the subject and also if our readers find the book
useful for them.
Contents
Prefa ce
,
I.
Towards A New Geopolitics
2.
The Place of Political Science
15
J.
Principles of Government
28
4.
The State
49
5.
Thomas Paine 's Political Writings
74
6.
The Evo lution of the Slate
III
7.
The Rights of Man
129
8.
The Politics of Southem Africa
168
9.
West Asia and the World Order
191
10.
Non-Alignment
208
11.
Changing Contours of World Politics
225
12. The Coming International Order
242
13.
268
International Relations : Concept and Application
14. The United Nations and International Politics Index
295 310
1 Towards A New Geopolitics
'A new era is emerging in the life history of the international system' wrote Saul Cohen after the momentous events of 1989 and 1990. He went on to express his optimism that, following the end orlhe Cold War, the whole system would be able to move to a higher stage of development in 1991 . I
Optimism of this kind is inherent in the hope, frequentlyexpressed since 1989, of the dawning of a 'new order' in which that
confrontation which was the keynote of the Cold War would he replaced by an era in which peace and harmony would prevai l. However, in a paper published at about the same time as that of Cohen, Pierre de Senarclens struck a more sombre note when he observed that 'the international scene is still the place where all the crises. conflicts and relations of domination and violence ... appear in their starkest guise' .l
He observed that what Raymond Aron referred to as 'the state of nature' has periodically prevailed over 'the rule of law' thus upsctting the delicately balanced international system. In the aftermath of the Cold War, a new order with its own particular ' rule of law' is in the course of coming into being, but in many parts of the world the convulsions which have accompanied the collapse of the old order appear also to have produced a reversion to something like a 'state of nature'. In the past, the collapse of one order and its replacement by a new one has normally taken place after a regional or global war, a massive rnal of strength among the powers resulting in profound changes in Ihe geographical distribution of power. As a result of th is, the hierarchy ofi ntemational power relationships
2
buernj:uional Polirics
has been transformed. Some great powers have been toppled from their
dominant positions, others have moved up to replace them, while yet others, once great, have fallen completely out of the power rankings. Whatever may have been the individual motivations for their behaviour, the function of the great powers in relation to the
international system as a whole has been to establish and maintain a degree of order. This they have done both individually within their
particular territorial spheres and collectively through the establishment of a 'concert' of powers, a balance of coercive forces which, for a period at least, has brought stability, or at least the appearance of it. The successful maintenance of a concert of this sort has been dependent upon the continuing good will of all the major participating powers. Should one of the powers seek unilaterally to bring about substantial change, and so challenge the system, the concert will be unable to survive. Challenges of this sort are motivated initially by attempts to achieve positions of primus illter pares within the existing system and, shoul.d such a development prove intolerable to the other powers, to replace the system by a new one centring entirely on the power itself. Such moves constitute bids to attain positions of dominance and they have nonnally been undertaken in certain clearly identifiable geopolitical circumstances.} The effect of this on the international system has been to link together ' the state of nature', that assertion of unrestricted physical power, with 'the rule of law', the curbing of such power. In the European theatre, the response to a bid by one or other of the great powers to attain a position of dominance has usually been the assembling of countervailing force by a coalition of the other powers. This has had the effect of setting limits to the success oftne aspirations of the would-be dominator. The ' newness' of new international orders has thus largely consisted of changes in the geographkal distribution of the centres of power rather than in the nature and disposition of the power itself. The princ ipal objective of the wielding of such power has been the achievement and consolidation of greater territorial control. Paradoxically this situation has had two opposite effects. It has underpinned a kind of ' rule of law' and at the same time it has pennitted resort to a 'state of nature'.
Towards A New Geopolitics
3
The fonner is a consequence of the exercise of authority; the latter of the persistent ri val ries among those who have aspired to exercise it and conflicts with those who have been its objects. It is the tensions which thi s situation has produced which ha ve been responsible for the eventual breakdown of each new order. Each has, in tum, been replaced by one having a different political geography but with the same basic objectives and relying on the same methods for attaining them. Real innovation within the international system entails far more than changes in its spatial patterns. It necessitates a complete shift away from domination to non-domination as the governing principle within it. There have been times and places when non-dominating forms of international organisation have existed. The Hanseatic League, the United Provinces and the Helvetic Confederacy are examples. However, there has not been an overall regional system in which domination, in one form or another, has not been inherent. The relationship of the dominator to the dominated may at times have softened and even come to be virtually imperceptible. Yet, every system has remained fundamentally coercive and the threat of the use of overwhelming physical force to sustain it has been held in reserve. In the periodic transfonnations of the system, those peoples which have been dominated at one period may themselves become dominators in the next. Thus, relief from one domination has signalled not an end of the process but the beginning of a new one. Actual situations of oppression may have been brought to end, but the domination mode has been subsequently resumed. In assessing, from a geopolitical perspective , whether the establishment of an international system based entirel y on nondomination is a realistic possibility, it is necessary to identify that characteristic particular to geopolitical phenomena which has given the political map one essential difference from those maps depicting the other principal anthropo-geographical phenomena. Whil e the spatial distributions of the phenomena of populati on, industry, and commerce have tended to change fairly gradually over periods, oftime, the spatial arrangements of the phenomena depicted by the political map have tended to change fa r more unevenly. Over considerable periods of time the political map has remained relatively static, and thi s fact may give rise to the impression that fairly unchanging and
4
Internarional Politics
even stable situations pertain. However, this illusion of stability has
proved temporary and periods of relative quiescence have been terminated suddenly and explosively. When the dust has settled, the political landscape is seen to have considerably altered, sometimes beyond all recognition, and this fact is reflected in a very different
political map . Thus. while the behaviour of the other anthropogeographicaJ phenomena has usually been gradualist, that of
political phenomena has been catastrophic. It has been less like a river gradually transforming the landscape through which it flows than a quiescent volcano suddenly erupting with the most devastating effects on other terrestrial phenomena in its vicinity. In order to understand the causes of this behaviour, it is necessary to consider further the nature of the geopolitical s urface and the forces which have produced it. The overall effect of the existence of the geopolitical s urface is to segment the phenomena of the other anthropogeographical surfaces so separating them into territorial compartments. The boundaries of these compartments may be impenneable enough to produce distortions in the behaviour of the phenomena located within them. These compartments are the states, and their basic function is.to provide order and protection. The most fundamental concern of the state is to ensure its own self-preservation, and above all this entails safeguarding its territory and the physical bases of its power. A consequence of this is that states possess a built-in propensity to view change with some suspicion . This particularly applies to change which produces alterations, and especially dimunitions, in its size. While extensions of territory are likely to be welcomed, contractions, which have the effect of diminishing available resources and so overall power, are resisted fiercely. The state is thus basically a conservative phenomenon, most particularly in respect of its territorial integrity, and it seeks to consolidate is position through the attainment of a high Icvel of internal hom ogeneity. The most signi fi cant aspect of this is cultu ral homogeneity which is the essence of the concept ofthe 'nation state' . This has been defined as being an attempt to weld 'national community and territorial state imo coextensive e nt ities'.~ It has been frequently expressed anthropomorphi call y by the use of images and icons depicting the state as a person, for instance, John Bull, Marianne. and
Towards A New Geopolitics
5
Uncle Sam. Yet complete 'congruity' of this kind is, in practice, extremely rare and incongrui ty has been far more usual. The state may even have the effect of exacerbating the dissatisfactions of those section s of the population whic h have been margi nali sed by thf' dominant group. Older and more mature states, for instance France, have come to proximate most closely to a situation of congruity in territory and population. The concept of the French ' Hexagon' has come to possess a natural, even sacred, character. Geometry has been invoked to reinforce geography in imparting a sense of morphological rightness, and attempts by foreigners to detach a portion of the sacred territory have been treated as causes for national grief and chagrin. However, in less consolidated states, such as Yugoslavia. the ' national ' character failed to develop and the older nationalities of which the country was composed, such as the Croats and the Slovenes, remained powerful human realities and evoked greater loyalty than the artificially constructed state. With the collapse of communism-that ideological cement which held together many ramshackle political edifices-the underlying internal tensions surfaced and brought about the complete dismembennent of the Yugoslav state. The ' nation-state' nonnally
seeks identification wifh the dominant cultural group as the ' nation ' and in its own defence it appeals to it for support. This it does by invoking the defence of the state, masquerading as 'nation ', from either external or internal perils. It is the c reation of this cultural identity, which has been the most important single factor in state consolidation. In this the state ceases to be merely the local government of one particular segment of territory and enters the realms of the sacred and the mystical. In the defence of its claims to territorial inviolability and invoking divine sanction for its destiny, the sacred soil of the state may need to be enriched with the pure blood of its martyrs. Indeed, blood appears to be the particular ingredient, above all others, which has imparted to the geopolitical surface its singular rigidity. States, said Leopold Kohr, are the products, ' not of nature but This is essentially because they are products of the assertion of the dominance of one section of the population over the others, the geographical expression of this being the control exercised by the core region of the state over its peripheries. The core is both the centre from which political power is exercised and also the centre of the dominant nation. From this combination may arise an ideology tailored to justify offorce '.~
6
International Politics
the destiny of the nation-state on the world scene and the defence of
the values which it claims to espouse. Such defence can easily tum into aggression if further territorial acquisition is deemed to be necessary in the interests afthe state. Above all, an ideology can justify the assertion of dominance over other states and the necessity of reforming the international system to promote this.
'Any system ', writes AJ.R Groom, 'must have the wherewithal to accommodate change and conflict; only by change can a changing environment be accommodated without conflict or catastrophe' ,6 Since the most individual characteristic of the geopolitical surface is its rigidity, together with the instability and violence associated with this, the creation of a genuinely new international order necessitates the 'nonnalisation' of this surface in tenns of the others. The essential prerequisite for this nonnalisation is the introduction ofa capacity for gradual and non·violent change. Kohr maintained that the 'nation states ' being 'artificial structures masquerading as nations' require 'consuming efforts to maintain themselves' and these efforts are directed principally towards the achievement and maintenance of control over the 'real ' nations. Addressing the problems of Europe in particular, he proposed a new political map made up of these 'real' nations. The ' real ' Europe, concealed for so long beneath the strident and chauvinistic colours of the political map, would then at long last show through. A continent would emerge, Kohr asserted, which was made ' up not of artificial imperialist constructs such as France, Spain and Britain but out of the 'real' nations: Brittany, Catalonia, Scotland and so on. This, said Kohr, is 'Europe's natural and original landscape'.' Thi s would be all the more acceptable as an alternative because, by virtue of their smallness if nothing else, these nations would be more likely to advocate associative rather then dissociative means in the solution of international problems. This idea is founded both on the idealistic belief in what Andre Gide described as 'the virtue of small nations' and on the empirical observation that, because of their weakness, small nations are more likely to see themselves as being gainers rather than losers from a successfully functioning internationalism. How does this proposed transfonnational solution address the panicular problem of the singular rigidity of the geopolitical surface?
Towards A New Geopolitics
7
If, as Kohr argued, the new political map would reflect the ' natural and original landscape' then the new surface could prove to be more rather than less rigid. It presents a possible scenario in which an 'eternal' France would be replaced by an 'eternal ' Brittany, Alsace and Languedoc. Likewise, an 'eternal' India could be replace by an ' eternal ' Bengal. Punjab and Kashmir and many 'eternal ' nations might also replace the former Soviet Union. If it is a sustainable argwnent that change must be accommodated, then it·is hardly logical to exclude certain phenomena as being too sacrosanct to be included in this. Indeed, the evidence casts doubt on the automatic virtue of small nations. Small states are by no means immune from aggressive behaviour and consequently from contributing directly to the violence characteristic of the geopolitical surface. After all, the great powers were themselves once small states and their territorial expansion was associated with the presence within them of a particular set of geopolitical characteristics. This spatial equivalent of the aggressive gene nurtured the propensity for territorial expansion.' The central question, then, is not simply about the merits of one particular political map as compared to others. Nor is it a question of one fragile pretence to eternity as opposed to another one. It is how a fundamental change may be made from a rigid geopolitical surface which can be altered only by violent mcans to a dynamic one which incorporates the capacity for non· violent change. Saul Cohen made . the link between the two concepts of small states 'and geopolitical change. As a result of the present tendency towards 'deconcentration of political power' he foresaw a continued 'proliferation' of new states. Important among these were 'gateway states', similar to Rosecrance's ' mediative states ', which were the agents for converting 'zones of conflict' into 'zones of accommodation '.9 [n contrast to Kohr's vision which, although incorporating such profound changes, is ultimately a static one, Cohen's is dynamic . Words like 'change', 'cvolution ' and 'emergence' recur. However, the main stumbling block in converting this potential dynamism into reality lies in making it acceptable to'the principal international actors. Such a development, Cohen maintained, need not be regarded as necessari Iy weakening existing powers. On the contrary, there can be positive advantages to them in allowing the new states to emerge.
8
Intern.ational Politics
Building a capacity for change into the world 's geopolitical surface was advocated by the French political geographer, VanMorvran Goblet, before World War II. In The Twilight of Treoll·es. Goblet proposed that the stalic political geography of Europe, sanctified as it had been by periodic treaties, should give place to a political geography which was 'living and evolving' . He condemned 'Ies lin/ires lIuturelles' (natural frontiers) and ' the emptiness of mystical nationalisms' . 10 Indeed, Goblet regarded the concept of the 'nation' as being essentially something developed by states to further their own interests. Such nations were produced by a method akin to alchemy. the selected ingredients being mixed together-adding fog as well, as did the Celts, he observed wryly. II II was imperative that, given the capacity for self-
Towards A New Geopolitics
9
World War I that the geographical di stribution of physical resources was very uneven and, viewed from a national perspective, there was a direct relationship between this and the strength of the European powers. While viewed from a state-centred perspective this pointed to a geopolitics of confrontation, viewed from a continental or macroregional pers pect ive the s ituation looked rathe r differe nt. A transnational industrial centre was seen to be emerging which extended over parts of the territories oftive states. Within this ' heavy Industrial Triangle' the overwhelming proportion of the coal, iron and steel of the original six member states of the European Community was being produced . This Triangle was identified as being the embryonic economic core region of a transnational unit encompassing the greater part of continental Western Europe. 11 It was the perception of this geopolitical fact which gave Jean Monnet the realisation that lasting cooperation was not a fun ction of idealism alone but wou ld be most effective when fmnly grounded in the realities of geography. I •• The subsequent development ofthe transnational core concept led to the coining in the 1960s of the term ' Lotharingian axis ' for a broad zone linking the North Sea to the Mediterranean . Within this zone the greater part of the commercial and industrial power of the European Community was concentrated, and from it the greater part of the physical strength of the grouping has derived. Lotharingia, of course, was the name given to the transient ' Middle Kingdom ' of the declining Caro lingian Empire which predated the emergence of the Westphalian states system. It represents a spat ial li nk between the concepts of Kohr and Monnet: on the onc hand, a return to a past political geography in which many of the geopolitical elements of unity were already present; on the other the creation of the structures to help bring about future integration. Thus, past and future have been revealed by the weakening of the polychromatic geopolitical surface and the diminishing role of the stales. The geopolitical concept of th e ' Lotharingian axis' , like those of the ' Heavy Industrial Triangle' and 'Golden Triangle'- the latter linking together southern Britain with the adjacent continentconceptualises the spatial dimension of the transnational alternatives which now exist to the Westphalian map of Europe. However, there is evidence that some of the transnational spatial structures which are
10
International Politics
in the course of emerging are replicating on a continental scale spatial structures found in the states themselves. A notable example of this is the centre-periphery dichotomy, which has now developed a European dimension. This could signal the emergence of a 'natural and original landscape' on a continental scale having the same potential for rigidity as Kohr's small states scenario. The dangers to dynamism inherent in the idea of 'real' nations must certainly also be present in that of a ' real' Europe having its own geopolitical structures and, pot~ntially, its own 'limiles naturelles'. 'New Presbyter is but old Priest writ large' commented John Milton on the religious changes taking place in his day. Likewise, the new Europe may justify itself by developing a new geometry to replace the old and in so doing make use of new versions of old hexagons. A ' new' Europe constructed along these lines could well prove to be but a larger version of the old one.
Similar considerations to these also apply in Southern and Eastern Asia, the other two most important macro-regions of the old world. The central geopolitical question there is whether the large political units which characterise them are, either actually or potentially, states of a Westphalian type 'writ large' having the basic behavioural patterns associated with such states in Europe. Or are they political units of an entirely different order, with their own spatial structures and, as a consequence, possessing a different range of possibilities for developing lasting cooperation? On the answer to this question depends the effectiveness of regionalism as a component part of any new world order. Does it represent something radically 'new' in tenns of the transfonnation of the world's geopolitical surface or is it just the old order transferred to a new international dimension? The contention of this paper has been that a genuinely 'new' order can only be founded on the principle of non-domination. This in tum necessitates the introduction of dynamism into the existing rigid geopolitical surface. To effect this requires a paradigm shift in attitudes to geopolitics. It entails the shedding of those trappings of eternity which have enveloped states and an acceptance of the transitory nature of a ll geopolitical phenomena. Together with thi s there has to be recognition that states have a speci fic raison d'etre at a panicular time and place. Thus, they have a beginning and an end, a birth and a
Towards A New Geopolitics
11
death; there can be no ' eternal' geopolitical space. In this respect, at least, they can be regarded as having some of the characteristics associated with natural phenomena. Such a paradigm shift would be akin to converting states into something like those ' limited life corporations' which have been proposed by some economists in the interests of economic rejuvenation. The gerontocracy of ex.isting states, led by the great powers, has invariably resisted even the smallest of geopolitical changes. They have behaved as though they were, in Murphy's phrase, ' untransmutable spatial givens' ." The notion of territorial change or dismembennent has been as taboo a subject as death. Indeed, it has been the death of states which has been most fiercely resisted. Against all the evidence to the contrary, a belief in the eternal life of the state has persisted and the idea of resurrection to guarantee this has been a built-in feature of national mythologies. King Arthur, Prince VacJav ('Good King Wenceslas' ) and Holger Danske, amongst others, have waited in readiness to defend their nations when in mortal peril. When states have died, their death agonies have been protracted and the associated disruption to the system a whole has been considerable.
as.
In the closing months of 1991 the world witnessed the singular occurrence of the end of one oftbe great powers, the Soviet Union. It was singular both because it was swift- the Ottoman Empire had taken over a hundred years to die-and also because it took place in peacetime and was replaced by a Commonwealth of lndependent States based on the acknowledgement of the sovereignty of its component parts. This singular occurrence does not, on its own, invalidate the perceived nonns of great power behaviour. Russia, the avatar of the Soviet Union, remains one of the great powers of the world. It has, in most respects, become the inheritor of the fallen state. Yet, despite this, what happened in 1991 also resembled in some respects the first attempt at the establishment of a non-
Il
International Politics
systems which replace the principle of dominance with that of 000-
dominance. The geopolitical structures associated with non-domination. and the change which facilitates it, need to be bener understood so that they may be of use in developing models of non-dominating systems having the potential for more general applicability.
Groom pointed 10 the futility of those 'hopeless idealists waiting for the light to shine on the road to Damascus' and Halford Mackinder urged that ' democrati c ideals' should always be tempered with 'reality'.17 Reality, to Mackinder. consisted of those facts of geography which underlie all international situations. II Geopolitical realism has much in common with Groom's ' problem solving' approach, but there is one essential difference. This is that the end product is not the management of the existing system but putting an entirely new one in its place. There are two linked methods by which this may be broUght about. First, there is the possibility ofhamessing the powerful emotions engendered by nationalism for the purpose of bringing about change rather than of shoring up existing power structures. The prerequisite for this is the removal from the states of that culture identification, that statism masquerading as nationalism, which has been used as the most effective justification for their continuation. Such inculcated nationalism aims to make phenomena which are actually transitory and therefore dynamic, appear to be fixed and permanent. The most effective counterweight to this ideological nationalism of the slates has been the nationalism associated with Kohr's 'real' nations themselves. This has already been instrumental in bringing about important changes in the geopolitical surface. As catalysts for change, sub·state nations have a proven track record. As a method of introducing fluidity into an otherwise static surface this is to be seen as being a means rather than an end and its success in this depends on the existence of certain particular characteristics in small state behaviour. The second, and related, approach to converting ideal into reality is to encourage the existing states, and the great powers in particular, to see that their own best interests may be served by facilitating rather than preventing change. Both Cohen and Groom stressed the need for this. Groom questioned whether the ' drive to domination ' is actually inherent or whether it is, in fact , a response to ' perceived environmental situations'. The problem-solving approach led him to the conclusion
Towards A New Geopoli/ics
\3
that in the circumstances of today's strong mutual dependency, the dominating-dominated relationship is not only irrelevant but counterproductive. What is required, said Groom, is the inculcation of 'a noncoercive attitude to change' .19 Barbara Tuchman, in The March of FoJ/y , identified the attempt to hang on desperately to old or fallen structures as being on facet of the non-rational behaviour of states which so often runs counter to their own best interests. This behaviour she considered to be one of the most bizarre and fascinating paradoxes in history.21) She called it ' HumptyDumpty folly' since it was, she maintained, as futile an endeavour as anempting to reconstruct a broken egg, yolk and all. The greatest violence on the world's geopolitical surface has owed much to HwnptyDumpty folly. The perpetuation of domination has ultimately proved ~o be unsuccessfu l and to be counter-productive for those who have made the anempt. It has invariably ended up like that ofOzymandias, ' King of Kings ' in Shelley's poem of that name. His colossal statue stood in the desert, but Nothing beside remains. Round the decay Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare The lone and level sands stretch far away. She lley's image of the desert is particularly evocative in the nuclear age which began in the Arizona desert and could end by converting the rest of the world into something similar. ' In a higher world it is otherwise' , said Cardinal Newman, 'but here below to live is to change and to be perfect is to change often'. The establi shment of a dynamic international order which will have the in-built capacity to change and, if necessary, to change often, requires a paradigm shift not only within the existing states but within humanity itself. Such a shift could well now be a necessity ifhumanity is to have any future at all. NOTES l.
Saul B. Cohen. 'The Emerging World Map of Peace', in N. Kliot and S. Waterman, cds., The Political Geography of Conflier alld Peace ( London: Belhaven Press, 1991), p. 35.
2.
Pierre de Senarclens, 'The Real ist Parndigm and International Conflicts" International Social Science Journal 127 (1991 ), p. 17.
International Politics
14 3.
Geoffrey Parker, The Geopolitics of Domination (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 64-75.
4.
c.H. Williams, 'National Congruence', in PJ. Taylor and R. Johnson. eds., A World in Crisis (London: Longman, 1989), p. 229.
5.
Leopold Kohr, Th e Breakdown of Nations (London: Roulledge and Kegan Paul, 1957).
6.
AJ .R. Groom, 'No Compromise: Probl em-Solving in a Theoretical Perspective', International Social Science Journal 127 (1991), p. 85.
7.
Kohr, The Breakdown of Nations, p. 57.
8.
Parker, The Geopolitics of Domination, pp. 64-75.
9.
Cohen, 'The Emerging World Map of Peace'.
to. Y.M. Goblet,
The 'TWilight o/Treaties (London: Bell. 1936), pp. 1-21.
II . Y.M. Goblet, Political Geography and the World Map (London: George Philip, 1956), p. 106. 12. Goblet, The 'TWilight o/Treaties. p. 256.
13. Geoffrey Parker, The Logic of Uni ty ( London : Longman, 1981) , pp. 75-90. 14. Geoffrey Parker, The Political Geography of Community Europe (London : Butterwonh's, 1983), p. 140. 15. A.B. Murphy, 'Territorial Ideology and International Connict: The Legacy of Prior Fonnalions', in Khot and Watennan, eds. , The Political Geography o/Conflict and Peace, p. 126. 16. Parker, The Geopolitics 0/ Domination, pp. 147·59. 17. Groom, 'No Compromise', p. 78, and Halford mackinder. Democratic Ideals and Reality (London: Constable, 1919). 18. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality. 19. Groom. 'No Compromise'. 20. Barbara Tuchman, The March of Folly (London: Michael Joseph, 1984).
2 The Place of Political Science
The specialisation of knowledge has been one of the most remarkable mental phenomena of the Age, and more and more, as accurate knowledge afthe facts of the world around us increases in amount, it has been found necessary to divide large areas of study into smaller ones, and to classify the smaller according to common resemblances, assigning to each class a name of its OWO. Thus Biology. the Science of Living things, has been divided into
Zoology and Botany; and Zoology into Invenebrates and Vertebrates. and these again we study nOI only in smaller classes, but from another
view·point. in their inner compOsition and their mental equipment, under Anatomy. Physiology and Psychology, our field becoming less in extent and but more intensively cultivated.
Similarly Political Science is a subdivision of History, and also of Psychology, founded on a certain class of facts contained in the first, and on observation of the workings and evolution of the human mind. These facts relate to the organisation of men into groups, their interrelations and external relations, their methods of government, their laws, their evolution as a group, the aggregation of groups into a larger group for a common purpose, and the like. The Science, itself results from this innate tendency in men to live together. Man is called by Aristotle "a political animal", from his point of view "a city animal"; in Biology he is called "a social animal". The temperament of the beast of prey leads him to live apart, or with his mate, though smaller beasts of prey, being weak, combine into hunting packs; the "social animal " not living on fles h- though man has departed from this wholesome rule-prefers company, feeding
16
International Politics
together, to solitude. The beast of prey growls and snarls over his food,
if another comes near him; the social animal grazes in friendly contact with his fellows .
Man's need for society is shown in tbe fact that human nature does not grow, expand, become beautiful , in isolation. Language itself
is the result of the social instinct, the desire to communicate with others. Emotion cannot give any happiness except where it flows outward to another or to others. Without this, it causes only pain of the most acute kind, and is a continual source of misery. Love, friendship, the joy of comradeship, offcllow-feeling- all that renders fertile the desert of life, making it blossom into beauty~all these depend on contact with another. The family, originally beginning in pass ion, is sublimated by mind into lasting emotion, and this one universal and stable institution, springing from the deepest wells in human nature, is the foundation of society. Moreover the capacity and the need for love is most developed in the finest types of human nature and is least in the lowest; it is the former who pour it out most richly, and they who suffer most from its absence. Solitary confinement maddens, and is the heaviest punishment known to human law. At all times and in all places man seeks companionship; he cannot live, nor develop to his highest, alone. Says Aristotle: As we see Ihat every city is a society, and every society is established fo r some good purpose-for an apparent good is lhe spring of all human actions-it is evident thai this is the principle upon which they are everyone founded. and this is more especially true of that which has for its object the best possible, and is itself the most excellent, and comprehends all the rest. Now lhis is called a City, and lhe society thereof a political society. I (A Treatise 01/ Government. Trans., from the Greek of Aristotle by William Ellis in 1776. Edition of 1888. Book I, Chap. i. p. 9. G. Routledge. The book is more often named Politics. )
Inductive and Deducth'e Sciences Political Science in the West is a very modem product, so modern that Sir J.R. Seeley complains that no satis factory textbook existed on the subject. For a modem science, we now it, begins with tbe observation and collection of facts; the n foll ows the classification of the facts, their arrangement into groups; to these the mind applies itself studying their juxtapositions and arri ves at certain underlying general
The Place of Political Science
17
connections, sequences, similarities amid diversities; finall y, disregarding the irrelevant and accidental and clinging to the relevant and suggesti ve, by a process of induction a hypothesis or theory is reached, which illumines the hidden interrelations and shows them as coherent and intelligible. Working wit h that theory as guide, experiments to test it are devised, which gradually eliminate the irrelevant and link together the relevant, and a great generalisation emerges, or some hitherto unknown law, thereafter recognised as a truth. Through these processes the modem man builds up his science. In ancient times another process was foll owed: certain l"'1lths were recognised by the intellect as congruous with its own nature---"whose nature is truth" says an Upani shat- and therefore as self-evident, needing no external proof. The imellect recognises these as true when they are presented to it, by a direct intellectual vision, far more reliable than the vision of the physical eye. Sciences, such as mathematics, were developed by deductions from such truths, by sheer intellectual effort, long sustained. Modern nomenclature has classified as Science the concrete study which leads up to general , or abstract, truthsj the abstract truth is reached by stripping away from the concrete truths all the differences by which we distinguish them, and uniting that which they have in common . Where thi s is the method, we call it scientific. Where an abstract truth is first seen by the intellect, and its results are thought out speculatively, we speak of Philosophy, a nd th e meth od as philosophical. The end sought alike by Science and Philosophy is onc- Truth. The methods vary. One ascends, the other descends, but they meet and coalesce on a common ground, the synthetic Truth. Both methods are useful , even necessary; the use of the first evolves mental faculties-observation, analysis, judgment, and the like; the use of the second develops the Intellect. They are not really enemies, as they used to be in Gennany; they are complements. Plato, in his Republic, Aristotle, in his Treatise on Government, crea1e by their intellecrual imagination an ideal State, perfect, beautiful. They then lay down its laws, its methods, its customs, such as would train the citizens to the ideal as conceived, and carry out its purpose. (Professor Seeley, we shall find , objects to the view that we are to seek for a purpose in Soc iety; he would examine only the facts, and
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International Politics
not trouble about any purpose, any object aimed at.} Similarly wrought
Sir Thomas More in his Utopia. Then we have another class of thinkers, using imagination to construct that which they think must have existed. Hooker, in his Ecclesiastical P.olity, Locke. in his Civil Government; Hobbes, in hi s Leviathan ; Jean Jacques Rousseau, in his Contrat Socia l- The se all imagine unobserved primitive conditions, out of which the State emerges by conb"act-a theory which is in the air, not fonned out of facts by induction, nor deduced from truths self-e'/ident to tbe intellect. and thus without a scientific basis, however sc ientifically it may be worked out from the supposed contract. Political Science and History
If we are to built up a Political Science, whence can we collect our facts save from History? History gives the material for the Science; the Science illuminates History, and readers it intelligible. Professor Seeley puts this very well: This Science is not a thing distinct from History, but inseparable from it. To call it a part of History might do some violence to the usage of language, but I may venture to say that History without Political Science is a study incomplete, truncated, as on the other hand Political Science without History is hollow and baseless---or in one word: History without Political Science has no fruit: Political Science without History has no root. (Lecture i, pp. 3, 4.)
Professor Sidgwick says in his Preface to this book: As regards the general view that these lectures enforce and ilIustrate- · the two-aided doctrine (1) that the right method of studying Political Science is an essentially historical method, and (2) that the right method of studying Political History is to study it as material for Political Science-I think it may be said that this was one of his deepest and most permanent convictions (pp. x, xi).
That Professor Sidgwick is right in this view is shown not only in the passage above quoted, but also in another passage in which Professor Seeley pleads that the first modem attempts at a Political Science arc based on a wrong method, and "that States can be treated in the same way as plants or as animals". He proceeds:
The Place of Political Science
19
Let us now enquire what aspect our science wOL!ld wear ifit pursued this method. Inductively pursued, Political Science would live and move among historical facts. It would begin by collecting these facts with great industry, and verifying them with most scrupulous care, for it would be keenly alive to the danger of confounding mere rumour, or legend, or pany-statement with such facts as science can recognise. Next it would not attempt to bolster up with the facts so obtained some preconceived theory; all such theories it would put on one side, and honestly wait to see what theories arose naturally out of the facts. For this purpose it would begin by grouping and classifying the facts, placing together, for example, such facts as bear on the internal growth of States, and in another group such as relate to their external action, or the interaction of States on each other.... Everything here depends upon a large supply of- what shall I say? I was going to say historical facts-factS carefully observed and exactly registered. (Lecture i, pp. 21, 22 .) Further, it must be remembered that Political Science is meant to be applied in practice, as well as studied in theory, that it is an An as well as a Science. Professor Sidgwick truly says in his Preface that «in order to know what England ought to be and do now, they must study what she has been and done in the past". Similarly President Wilson Writes: Each people, each Nation , must live upon the lines of its own experience. Nations are no more capable of borrowing experience than individuals are. The histories of other peoples may furnish us with light. but they cannot furnish us \!I'ith conditions of action. Every Nation must constantly keep in touch with its past. (The State. Woodrow Wilson, Ph.D., LL.D. Revised Edition. (Chap. xvi, § 1535. Heath & Co., London.) A Nation is a growth, with its roots deeply buried in its Past, and that Past is to be found in its history. National self-respect, pride of country, patriotism, all grow out of the knowledge of ancestral virtue, ancestral achievement, ancestral greatness. Noblesse oblige"Nobility compels"-is as true of Nations as of men. The intense patriotism of the Scotch grows out of and is nourished by their intimate knowledge of their history, interwoven with the places, town s, mountains, rivers, fields of heir native land. Here a battle was fought; there some martyrs died for freedom; yonder a Highland charge swept all before it; in that glen a massacre took place; in this spot Bruce
20
International Po/ilics
was hidden; in that fort Mary was imprisoned; so will a Scot talk to you, if you travel with him through his country. If countries have nol
a long past of their ~wn, their people look for it in the Past of the land whence they came. The British Colonies look back to their Mother Country for historical inspiration. The United States with pride nurse the memories of the land whence the "Mayflower" brought their fathers. This is why every boy and girl should grow up in the atmosphere of their own country's history, and be fed with the stories of the heroes and heroines, of the sages and saints of their race. The history of foreign Nations should be read for instruction, but the history of one's own country should be the daily food, until it is assimilated into the life of the boy and girl, grows with their growth and strengthens with their strength. Thus can Patriotism become an overpowering emotion. Only when they grow up thus, can Indians know what India "ought to be and do now," what institutions will best suit her, what lines of progress can best be chosen by her, what are the directions in which she can best advance. The fundamental reason why a foreign Government can never be either successful or stable is that it has no common Past with the Nation over which it rules. It is, therefore, continually blundering, however well-intentioned it may be. It has no "feel" for the suitable, the acceptable, and wonders at its own failures, regarding the Nation it rules as being to blame, and ungrateful. If it invades and conquers, it must settle down, it must become National, part of the Nation, assimilated to the Nation, one with the Nation, or it must pass away, and leave the Nation to come to its own. Individuals of Graded Complexity One other principle of Evolution we must grasp, still as a generalisation, before we enter on the details of our special subject. It is the well recognised scientific idea of graded Bodies, or organisms, becoming more and more complex as they ascend the ladder of evolution, but retaining their own individuality, even when entering into a higher organism as forming part of it. Every organism is a Life embodied in a Fonn. The conception is a familiar one in the East, each Life being recognised as a fragment of the Life Universal, that shapes
The Place of Political Science
21
for itself, through innumerable stages, the forms suited to its unfolding powers. Each such life is technically called by the Hindu a Jiva, or a Jivatma, a Living Being, or a Living Self, and is seen as the cause of evolution, by slow and gradual changes creating from the surrounding matter the organs necessary for the more and more complete working of his latent powers, or functions. In the familiar presentation by the Chhandogyopanishat (VlH, xii, 4) it was the will of the self to see, to smell, to hear, to think, that brought about the appropriate organs of enjoyment. That luminous generalisation was reached by Modem Science towards the latter part of the nineteenth century, when we find it laid down that in the simplest organism, the plastid, the functions of the Life- taking in food, digestion, respiration, circuiation- are all performed by any part oflhe plastid; there are no organs. As the Lifefunctions go on, the part of the body which is most conveniem for the carrying on of a particular function becomes appropriated by that function , and is shaped inlo its organ by the exercise of the function through it. Thus, the taking in of food fabricates in the course of ages a mouth and aesophagus; the function of digestion slowly builds a stomach and intestines; the function of respiration gradually forms lungs; and the function of circulation a heart. It may be noted that while the·plastid is floating freely in all directions, no mouth forms, since food particles may touch il anywhere. When it becomes fixed, the part of the body opposite the fixed point in that which touches food constantly, and there gradually the mouth is fonned, and there senseorgans develop. Very curious and interesting are the many transformations through which these organs pass, were they reach their, at present, highest forms- a most fascinating study. Out of it ali , Science definitely says that the exercise of the Life-function creates the organ; the exact opposite of he position taken by Science in the middle of the nineteenth century, that the organ produced the function. It is the Life, with its will to live, that creates a form for its own use and more efficient exercise. Even before Biological Science had recognised life as being, as Sir William Crookes said, the shaper and organiser of Form, it had seen graded organisms on an ascending ladder, and had regarded each as an individual, that is, as a life embodied in a Form, the Fonn being composed of less developed lives also embodied in forms , thai is of
22
International Politics
less evolved Individuals, the place of the individual being higher or lower according to the greater or less complexity of the Form, and
the more or less numerousness of the aspects of the life. (Organs are not biological individuals. because they are differentiations within a body, and neither have, nor have had. any separated existence.) The life which inhabits the Form is the controlling, directing. hannonising,
and co-ordinating power, holding the organism together, whether it be simple or complex, and using the fonn to express its Will. its intelligence and its Activity. Th~ we have as Biologicallndividuals: A simple Cell. A group of Cells forming an Organism.
A simple or complex Organism up to a Human Being. A group of Human Beings, forming a Family. A group of Families, fonning a Tribe. A group of Tribes., fonning a Nation. A group orNalions, forming an Empire or Conunonwealth. A group of Commonwealths or Empires. fonning Organised Humanity.
The first six of these are patent and can be studied. The seventh in its imperfect fonn as Empire has existed, and in its higher form of Commonwealth is in the process of making at the present time. The eighth is, as yet, in the future, in the scientific imagination as in the religious vision. The point for us to realise in our study is that there is a Life, a Jiva, a Jivatma, a fragment of the Divine Life, with more and more of its latent powers unfolded in each successive fonn, each such form being a true Individual. In this individualised life, or Jivatma, inhere the characteristics, or unfolded powers, brought out by the special evolution of the successive forms in which it dwells, family characteristics, tribal characteristics, national characteristics. This family, tribal, national, Life or Jivatma, is not a mere word, a metaphor; it is a fact in Nature. It is the controlling, directing, hannonising and c(H)rdinating power as much in the family, the tribe, and the Nation, as in the single human being, for they are all -alike Individuals, a life embodied in a form. This idea is very familiar in the west from the use made of it by S. Paul, who speaks of it as a " mystery" to the Ephesians, and who points out to' the Corinthian Church: As the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of
The Place of Political Science
23
that one body, being many, are one body, so also Christ. .. .That there should be no schism in the body, but that the members should have the same care one for another. And whether one member suffer all the members suffer with it; or one member be honoured, all the mem!>ers rejoice with it. Now ye are the body of Chrisl, and members in particular (/ Cor., xii, 12-27.). The Gennan writer, Professor J.K. Bluntschli, has put this idea very strongly and well. ''The State," he says, "has a moral nature" (Book I, Chap. iii, p. 2). He writes : The Slate is in no way a lifeless insuurnent, a dead machine; it is a living and therefore organised being. This organic nature of the Slate has not always been understood ... Jt is the especial merit of the German school of historical jurists 10 have recognised the organic nature of the Nation and the State. This conception refutes both the mathematical and mechanical view of the stale, and the atomistic way of treating it, which forgets the whole in the individuals... .ln the state spirit and body, will and active organs. are necessarily bound together in one life. The one National Spirit, which is something different from the average sum of the contemporary spirit of all citizens, is the spirit of the state; the one national will. which is di fferent from the average will of the multitude, is the will of the state. The eonstitution .. .is the body of the state. it is the fonn in which the nation manifests its common life. Individual states differ like individual men in spirit, character and fonn . The progress of mankind depends essentially on the emulation of its component Peoples and States .... While history explains the organic nature of the State, we learn from it at the same time that the state does not stand on the same grade with the lower organisms of plants and animals but is of a higher kind: we learn that it is a moral and spiritual organism, a great body which is capable of taking up into itself the feelings and thoughts or the Nation, or a uttering them in laws, and realising them in acts; we are infonned of moral qualities and of the character of each State. History ascribes 10 the state a personality which. having spirit and body, possesses and manifests a will orits own. The glory and honour of the state have always elevated the heart of its sons, and animated them to sacrifices . For freedom and independence, for the Rights of the State. the noblesl and best have in all times and in all Nations, expended their goods and their lives. To extend the reputation and the power of the State. 10 further its welfare and its happiness, has universally been regarded as one of the
24
International Politics most honourable duties of gifted men. The joys and sorrows of the state have always been shared by all its citizens. The whole great idea of Fatherland and love of country would be inconceivable, if the State did nOI possess this high moral and personal character.... The State is, par excellence a Person, ill the sense of public Jaw. The purpose of the whole constitution is 10 enable the Person of the S iale to express and reali::;e its will, which is different from the individual wills of all Individuals, and different from the sum of them. (Book I, Chap. i, pp. 18. 19. 20.22.)
This conception of the State, fundamentally true, has been wrought into the mind ofthe German people, and has given them the
marvellous coherence, endurance under suffering and power to sacrifice aUlhat makes life dear, which they are manifesting in the present War. So powerfully do idea work out in the conduct of a Nation .. so important are literature teachings to the state. The German error lies, as we shall see, it making the state supreme, and in sacrificing everything to it. a Machiavelli taught. even morality, truth, justice, righteousness. We need to add to this the Indian idea, that above the state is the Supreme Law, Dharma, the expression of the Divine Nature. The most absolute Indian monarch was regarded as the administrator, not as the creator, of Law, and ifhe disregarded it, so the Shastras taught, the law he disregarded wou ld sweep him away, he and his house with him. But for the moment, we are concerned only with the state as an organism- natuml, because inherent, as said, in universal human nature, but also, in a sense, artificial, because shaped and modified by human intelligence. Some writers. in recognising the immense work of the latter have overlooked the former, as though a race-horse ceased altogether to be a natural product, because carefully bred by human in te lligence selecting certa in parents, so as to develop certai n characteristics. Professor seeley presses this same idea, asking: "Are not States living organisms?" He points out that "it is a characteristic of life, which has been made very prominent in recent science, that substances infonned by it (I would substitute 'infonned by life at a certain stage of its unfoldment') receive what is call ed organi sation, that is, the different parts acquire different capacities and adapt themsel ves to perform different functions. Each park becomes more or less a living
The Place of Political Science
2S
tool or organ." Then he proceeds: But Ihis is precisely what characterises a state. A State is a number of human beings not merely c rowd ed or massed together, Ihal organised. This is so strikingly true that all the technical terms applied to physical and political organisation are interchangeable, and the word organi sation itself is applied in both departments alike without metaphor. We say a man is a member of a State. Whal does the word member mean? It means " limb". We say the eye or the ear performs a function. What does function mean? It is a political term, meaning the discharge of a public office. These e:
When we speak of a man being public spirited. we mean that he feel s a wrong inflicted on another as keenly as though it had been inflicted on himself; that he resents a general injustice as though it were done to himself personally; that he protects the weak, though the person protected be neither a friend nor a relative; that he regards a public duty as more imperative than a private one. In such a man the State-consciousness is active; he has realised himself 8S one with the State, hi s life as identical with the life embodic:d in the state. It is the parallcl of the Reali sation of the Self, thc "I am Brahman" of the Yogi. The love of country, the pride in country, the composite emotion that we call Patriotism. already spoken of, it. then, not an emotion directed to a Nothingness, but to a Reality- to that fragment of the Life Universal. the Divine Life, which is the self, the Jivatma. of the State to which we belong. Professor Seeley, in his favourite Socratic way, has put this very well : When I say, " I am an Englishman," what do I mean? Does it refer to my parentage or family? Well, I cannot absolutely say that it does not.
26
International Politics I regard myself as being of some sort of kin to other Englishmen, as though we were all alike descended from some primitive Anglus. I feel this very strongly in the presence of foreigners, for I find that they speak a different language and seem both mentally and bodily of a somewhat different type. But whether it reaUy is so, is after all of no practical importance. I am an Englishman, and should be so just as much if my ancestors were Frenchmen . And yet that J am an Englishman and not a Frenchman is all.important to me. (Lecture it p. 15.)
I have been using the word "State" as though we all knew exactly what is its content; yet probably the ideas of most of us are very hazy on the subject. We shall have to discover a definition for the word State, which will apply to it in the Family. the Tribe, the Nation, the Empire or Commonwealth, and finally in organised Humanity, or the World-State. We shall try to find such a definition in the next lecture. We shall also, probably next week. trace the origin of the state and try to understand its essential nature. Conclusion In concluding this Introductory Lecture, I would earnestly ask you to make an effort to understand clearly any principle or generalisation which may be new or unfamiliar to you, because these will govern all I say, and if they be not thoroughly comprehended the whole subject is likely to remain dim and vague, Jacking in clearness and accuracy of thougbt. You need to grasp the long and laborious method of establishing a scientific truth-the 'sublime patience of the investigator," as W.K. Clifford rightly called it. You need also to remember the weakness of the method-the likelihood that all relevant fact s may not have been collected. You need to think over very carefully the meaning of the Biological Individual , to realise its two factors, Life and Form, and to understand the building up of higher Individuals out oflower ones, and the functions of the Life in the higher Individual, controlling, directing, hannonising and co-ordinating .the lower individuals who form his body. You will then come to our Science well prepared to study it. One di ffercnce between East and West should be noted, though it does not affect our actual study of the facts. In the East the-State is
27
The Place of Political Science
regarded not only as inherent in human nature, but a1so, as the creation ofmeo who were superhuman in their knowledge, and the existence of its life, with its controlling, directing, hannonising and organising powers rests on their authority, and this on their knowledge of Ishvara, of God. In Greece, Nature is the authority, and that which is nearest to the Order of Nature is best. In modem days, these powers are sometimes regarded as the inherent life-forces, belonging to what Professor Seeley called the "political vital principle", and there can hardly be said to be any authoritative basis for the views taken, since they are still in the region of an imperfect theory, not having yet been based on sufficient research into facts, nor subjected to experiment for final verification. Still, as I said. the origin of the organising force in the state need not affect our study of the facts which result from it. NOTE I.
Po/is. a cil}', hence political society - the society of a city. To the Greek
that was "the best possible," and to him it was the State.
3 Principles of Government
There is no subject more interesting 10 every man than the subject of government. His security, be he rich or poor, and in a great measure his prosperity are connected therewith; it is therefore his interest as well as his duty to make himself acquainted with its principles' and what the pl1lctice ought to be.
Every art and science, however imperfectly known at first, has been studied. improved, and brought to what we call perfection by the progressive labours of succeeding generations; but the science of government has stood still. No improvement has been made in the
principle and scarcely any in the practice till the American Revolution began.
In all the countries of Europe (except in France) the same fonus and systems that were erected in the remote ages of ignorance still continue, and their antiquity is put in the place of principle; it is forbidden to investigate their origin or by what right they exist. If it be asked tiow has this happened, the answer is easy: they are established on a principle that is false, and they employ their power to prevent detection. Notwithstanding the mystery with wh ich the science of government has been enveloped, for the purpose of enslaving, plundering, and imposing upon mankind, it is of all things the least mysterious and the most easy to be understood. The meanest capacity cannot be at a loss if it begins its inquiries at the right point. Every art and science has some point or alphabet at which the study of that art or science begins and by the assistance of which the progress is facilitated. The same method ought to be observed with respect to the science of government.
Principles of Government
29
Instead, then, of embarrassing the subject in the outset with the numerous subdivisions under which different forms of government have been classed, such as aristocracy, democracy, oligarchy, monarchy, etc., the better method will be to begin with what may be called primary divisions, or those under which all the several subdivisions will be
compl
First, government by election and representation. Secondly, government by hereditary succession. All the several forms and systems of government, however numerous or diversified, class themselves under one or other of those primary divisions; for either they are on the system of representation or on that of hereditary succession. As to that equivocal thing called "mixed government, "I such as the late government of Holland and the present government of England, it does not make an exception to the general rule because the parts separately considered are either representative or hereditary. Beginning then our inquiries at this point, we have first to examine into the nature of those two primal)' divisions. If they are equally right in principle, it is mere matter of opinion which we prefer. If the one be demonstratively better than the other, that difference directs our choice; but if one of them should be so absolutely false as not to.have a right of existence, the matter settles itself at once, because a negative proved on one thing, where two only are offered and one must be accepted, amounts to an affinnative on the other. The revolutions that are now spreading themselves in the world have their origin in this state of the case, and the present war is a conflict between the representative system founded on the rights of the people and the hereditary system founded in usurpation. As to what are called monarchy, royalty, and aristocracy, they do not, either as things or as terms, sufficiently describe the hereditary system; they are but secondary things or signs of the hereditary system and which fall of themselves if that system has not a right to exist. Were there no such terms as "monarchy," "royalty," and "aristocracy," or were other terms substituted in their place, the hereditary system, if it continued, would not be altered thereby.·
30
International Politics
It would be the same system under any other titulary name as it is now. The character therefore of the revolutions of the present day distinguishes itself most definitely by grounding itself on the system of representative government, in opposition to the hereditary. No other distinction reaches the whole of the principle. Having thus opened the case generally, I proceed, in the first place, to examine the hereditary system because it has the priority in point of time. The representative system is the invention oftbe modem world; and that no doubt may arise as to my own opinion, Jdeclare it beforehand, which is that there ;s not a problem in Euclid more mathematically true than that hereditary govemmelll has not a right 10 exist. Wh en there/ore we lake from any man the exercise of hereditary power, we take away that which he never had the right to possess and which no law or custom could or ever can give him a title to.
The arguments that have hitherto been employed against the hereditary system have been chiefly founded upon the absurdity of it and its incompetence to the purpose of good government. Nothing can present to our judgement or to. our imagination a figure of greater absurdity than that of seeing the government of a nation fall, as it frequently does, into the hands of a lad necessarily destitute of experience and often little better than a fool. It is an insult to every man of years, of character, and of talents in a country. The moment we begin to reason upon the hereditary system, it fall s into derision; let but a single idea begin, and a thousand will soon follow. Insignificance, imbecility, childhood, dotage, want of moral character-in fine, every defect, serious or laughable-unite to hold up the hereditary system as a figure of ridicule. Leaving, however, the ridiculousness of the thing to the reflections of the reader, I proceed to the more important part of the question, namely, whether such a system has a right to exist. To be satisfied of the right of a thing to exist, we must be satisfied that it had a right to begin. If it had not a right to begin, it has not the right to continue. By what right, then, did the hereditary system begin? Let a man but ask himself this question, and he will find that he cannot satisfy himself with an answer.
Principles of Government
31
The right which any man or any family had to set itself up at first to govern a nation and to establish itself hereditarily was no other than the right which Robespierrel had to do the same thing in France. Ifhe had none, they had none. If they had any, he had as much; for it is impossible to discover superiority of right in any family, by virtue of which hereditary government could begin. The Capets, the Gulephs, the Robespierres, the MaraIs,' are all on the same standing as to the question of right. It belongs exclusively to none. It is one step toward liberty to perceive that hereditary government could not begin as an exclusive right in any family. The next point will be whether, having once begun, it could grow into a right by the influence of time. This would be supposing an absurdity; for either it is puning time in the place of principle or making it superior to principle, whereas time has no more connection with or influence upon principle than principle has upon time. The wrong which began a thousand years ago is as much a wrong as ifil began today, and the right which originates today is as much a right as if it had the sanction of a thousand years. Time with respect to principles is an eternal now; it has no operation upon them, it changes nothing of their nature and qualities. But what have we to do with a thousand years? Our Iife~ime is but a short portion of that period; and if we find the wrong in existence as soon as we begin to live, that is the point of time at which is begins to us, and our right to resist it is the same as if it never existed before.
As hereditary government could not begin as a natural right in any family, not derive after its commencement any right from time, we have only to examine whether there exist in a nation a right to set it up and establish it by what is called law, as has been done in England. I answer "No," and that any law or any constitution made for that purpose is an act of treason against the right of every minor in the nation at the time it is made and against the rights of all succeeding generations. I shall speak upon each of those cases. First, of the minor at the time such law is made. Secondly, of the generations that are to follow. A nation, in a collective sense, comprehends all the individuals of whatever age, from just born to just dying. Of these, one pan will
32
International Politics
be minors and the other aged. The average of life is no exactly the same in eve!)' climate and country. but in general the minority in years are the majority in numbers; that is, the number of per<'...ons under twenty-one year is greater than the number of persons above that age.
This difference in number is nol necessary to the establishment of the principle I mean 10 lay down, but it serves to show the justice of it more strongly. The principle would be equally as good if the
majority in years were also the majority in numbers. The rights OfmiDOrs are as sacred as the rights of the aged. The difference is altogether in the difference age of the two parties, and nothing in the nature of the rights; the rights are the same rights and are to be preserved inviolate for the inheritance of the minors when they shall come of age. Ouring the minority of minors, their rights are
under the sacred guardianship of the aged. The minor cannot surrender them. the guardian cannot dispossess him; consequently the aged part of a nation, who are the lawmakers for the time being and who, in the march of life, are but a few years ahead of those who are yet minors and to whom they must shortly given place, have not and cannot have the right to make a law to set up and establi sh hereditary government , or, to speak more distinctly, a hereditary succession of governors, because it is an attempt to deprive every minor in the nation, at the time such a law is made, of his inheritance of rights when he shall come of age and to subjugate him to a system of government to which, during his minority, he could neither consent nor object. If a person who is a minor at the time such a law is proposed had happened to have been born a few years sooner, so as to be of the age of twenty-one years at the time of proposing it, his right to have objected against it, to have exposed the injustice and tyrannical principles of it and to have voted against it, will be admitted on all sides. If, therefore, the law operates to prevent his exercising the same rights after he comes of age as he would have had a right to exercise had he been of age at the time, it is undeniably a law to take away and annul the rights of every person in the nation who shall be a minor at the time of making such a law, and consequently the right to make it cannot exist.
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I come now to speak of government by hereditary succession, as it applies to succeeding generations and to show that in this case, as in the case of minors, there does not exist in a nation a right to set it up. A nation, though continually existing. is continually in a state of renewal and succession. It is never stationary. Everyday produces new binhs, carries minors forward to maturity and old persons from the stage. In this ever-running flood of generations there is no part superior in authority to another. Could we concei"e an idea of superiority in any, at what point of time, or in what century of the world, are we to fix it? To what cause are we to ascribe it? By what evidence are we to prove it? By what criterion are we to know it? A single reflection will teach us that our ancestors, like ourselves, were but tenants for life in 'the great freehold of rights. The fee absolute was not in them, it is not in us; it belongs to the whole family of man through all ages. If we think otherwise than this, we think either as slaves or as tyrants. As slaves, if we think that any former generation had 8 right to bind us; as tyrants, if we think that we have authority to bind the generations that are to follow.
It may not be inapplicable to the subject to endeavor to define what is to be understood by a "generation" in the sense the word is
here used. As a natural tenn, its meaning is sufficiently clear. The father, the son, the grandson are so many distinct generations. But when we speak of a generation as describing the persons in whom l~gal authority resides, as distinct from another generation of the same description who are to succeed them, it comprehends all those who are above the age of twenty-one years at the time that we count from; and a generation of this kind will continue in authority between fourteen and twenty-one year, that is, until the number of minors, who shall have arrived at age, shall be greater than the number of persons remaining of the fonner stock. For example, if France at this or any other moment contains twenty-four millions of souls, twelve millions will be males and twelve females. Of the twelve millions of males, six millions will be of the age of twenty-one years and six will be under, and the authority to govern will reside in the first six.
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International Politics But everyday will make some alteration, and in twenty-one years
everyone of those minors who survives will have arrived at age. and the greater part of the former stock will be gone; the majority of persons then living, in whom the legal authority resides. will be composed of those who, twenty-one years before, had no legal existence. Those will be fathers and grandfathers in their tum; and, in the next twenty-one years (or less), another race of minors arrived at age will succeed them. and so on.
As this is ever the case, and as every generation is equal in rights to another, it consequently follows that there cannot be a right in any to establish government by hereditary succession. because it would be supposing itself possessed of a right superior to the rest, namely, that of commanding by its own authority how the world shall be hereafter governed and who shall governed and who shall govern it. Every age and generation is and must be (as a matter of right) as free to act for itself in all cases as the age and generation that preceded it. The vanity and preswnption of governing beyond the grave is the most ridiculous and insolent of all tyrannies. Man has no property in man ; neither has one generation a property in the generations that are to follow. tn the first part of the · Rights of Man I have spoken of government by hereditary succession, and I will here close the subject with an extract from that work. which states it Wlder the two following
heads.The history of the English Parliament furnishes an example of this kind, and which merits to be recorded as being the greatest instance of legislative ignorance and want of principle that is to be found in any country. The case is as follows: The English Parliamenl of 1688 imported a man and his wife from Holland, William and Mary, and made them King and Queen of England. Having done this, the said Parliament made a law to convey the government of the country to the heirs of William and Mary, in
B.
[Th e quotation from Rights of Man omitted rrom this text of the "Dissertation" appears on pages 102-104 or the present work. The passage begins. "Firsl, the right or a particular ramily..... and doses (with some necessary differences in phrasing), "good Lord, deliver the world."]
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the following words: "We, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal. and Commons, do, in the name of Ihe people of England, most humbly and faithfully submit ourselves, our heir.t and posterities, to William and Mary, their heirs and posterities, forever." And in a subsequent law, as quoted by Edmund Burke, the said Parliament. in the name of the people of England then living, binds the said people, their heirs and posterities, to Williams and Mary, their heirs and posterities, 10 the end of time.
It is not sufficient that we laugh at the ignorance of such lawmakers; it is necessary that we reprobate their want of principle. The Constituent Assembly of France, 1789, fell into the same vice as the Parliament of England had done, and assumed to establish a hereditary succession in the family of the Capets as an act of the constitution of that year. That every nation,for the time being. has a right to govern itself as it pleases must always be admitted; but government by hereditary succession is government for another race of people, and not for itself; and as those on whom it is to operate are not yet in existence, or are minors, so neither is the right in existence to set it up for them, and to assume such a right is treason against the right of posterity. I here close the arguments on the first head, that of government by hereditary succession, and proceed to the second, that of government by election and representation, or, as it may be concisely expressed, represenrQlive government, in contradistinction to hereditary governmenl. Reasoning by exclusion, if hereditary government has not a right to exist, and that it has not is provable, represenlative government is admitted to course. In contemplating government by election and representation, we amuse not ourselves in inquiring when or how, or by what right, it began. Its origin is ever in view. ~an is himself the origin and the .evidence of the right. It appertains to him in right of his existence, and his person in the title deed. The true and only true basis of representative government is equality of rights. Every man has a right to one. vote and no more in the choice of representatives. The rich have no more right to exclude the poor from the right of voting or of electing and being elected than
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the poor have to exclude the rich, and wherever it is attempted or proposed on either side it is a question of force and not of right. Who is he that would exclude another? That other has a right to
exclude him. Thai which is now called aristocracy implies an inequality of rights, but who are the persons that have a right to establish this inequality? Will the rich exclude themselves? No. Will the poor exclude themselves? No. By what right then can any be excluded? It would be a question if any man or class of men have a right to exclude themselves, but be this as it may. they cannot have the right to exclude another. The poor will not delegate such a right to the rich nor the rich to the poor, and to assume it is not only to assume arbitnuy power but to assume a right to commit robbery. Personal rights, of which the right of voting for representatives is one, are a species of property of the most sacred kind; and he that would employ his pecuniary property or presume upon the influence it gives him to dispossess or rob another of his property or rights uses that pecuniary property as he would use fireanns and merits to have it taken from him. Inequality of rights is created by a combination in one pan of the community to exclude another part from its rights. Whenever it be made an article of a constitution or a law that the right of voting or of electing and being elected shall appertain exclusively to persons possessing a certain quantity of property, be it little or much, it is a combination of the persons possessing that quantity to exclude those who do not possess the same quantity. It is investing themselves with powers as a self-created part of society, to the exclusion of the rest. It is always to be taken for granted that those who oppose an equality of rights never mean the exclusion should take place on themselves; and in this view of the case, pardoning the vanity of the thing, aristocracy is a subject to laughter. This self-soothing vanity is encouraged by another idea not less selfish, which is that the opposc;rs conceive they are playing a safe game, in which there is a chance to gain and none to lose; that, at any rate, the doctrine of equality includes them and that, if they cannot get more rights than those whom they oppose and would exclude, they shall not have less.
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This opinion has already been fatal to thousands who, not contented with equal rights, have sought more till they lost all , and experienced in themselves the degrading inequality they endeavored to fix upon others. In any view of the case, it is dangerous and impolitic, sometimes ridiculous and always unjust, to make property the criterion of the right of voting. Ifthe sum or value of the property upon which the right is to take place be considerable, it will exclude a majority of the people and unite them in a common interest against the government and against those who support it; and as the power is always with the majority, they can overturn such a government and its supporters whenever they please. . If, in order to avoid this danger. a small quantity of property be fixed as the criterion of the right. it exhibits liberty in disgrace by putting it in competition with accident and insignificance. When a broodmare shall fortunately produce a foal or a mule that, by being worth the sum in question, shaH convey to its owner the right of voting or by its death take it from him. in whom does the origin of such a right exist? Is it in the man or in the mule? When we consider how many ways property may be acquired without merit and lost without crime. we ought to spurn the idea of making it a criterion of rights. But the offensive part of the case is that this exclusion from the right of voting implies a stigma on the moral character of the persons excluded, and this is what no part of the community has a right to pronounce upon another part. No external circumstance can justifY. it; wealth is no proof of moral character, nor poverty of the want of it. On the contrary; wealth is often the preswnptive evidence of dishonesty and poverty the negative evidence of innocence. If therefore property,' whether linle or much, be made a criterion, the means by which that property has been acquired ought to be made a criterion also. The only ground upon which exclusion from the right of voting is consistent with justice would be to inflict it as a punishment for a certain time upon those who should propose to take away that right from others. The right of voting for representatives is the primary right by which other rights are protected.
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International Politics
To take away this right is to reduce a man to slavery, for slavery consists in being subject to the will of another, and he that has not a vote in the election of representatives is in this case. The proposal,
therefore, to disfranchise any class of men is as criminal as the proposal to take away property.
When we speak of right, we oUght always to unite with it the idea of duties: rights become duties by reciprocity. The right which I
enjoy becomes my duty to guarantee it to another, and he to me; and those who violate the duty justly incur a forfeiture of the right.
and
In a political view of the case, the strength pennanent security of government is in proportion to the number of people interested in supporting it. The true policy, therefore. is to interest the whole by an equality of rights. for d1e danger arises from exclusions. It is possible to exclude men from the right of voting, but it is impossible to exclude them from the right of rebelling against that exclusion; and when all other rights are taken away. the right of rebellion is made perfect. While men could be persuaded they had no rights, or that rights appertained only to a certain class of men, or that government as a thing existing in right of itself. it was not difficult to govern them authoritatively. The ignorance in which they were held and the superstition in which they were instructed furnished the means of doing it. But when the ignorance is gone and the superstition with i~~-···· they perceive the imposition that has been acted upon them. when they reflect that the cultivator and the manufacturer are the primary means of all the wealth that exists in the world beyond what nature spontaneously produces, when they begin to feel their consequences by their usefulness and their right as members of society, it is then no longer possible to govern them as before. The fraud once detected cannot be reacted. To attempt it is to provoke derision or invite destruction. That property will ever be unequal is certain. Industry, supe.;oiiiY · of talents,. dexterity of management, extreme frugality, fortunate opportunities or the opposite, or the means of those things, will ever produce that effect, without having recourse to the harsh, ill-sounding names of avarice and oppression; and besides this there are some men
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who, though they do not despise wealth. will not stop to the drudgery or the means of acquiring it nor will be troubled with it beyond their wants or their independence, while in others there is an avidity to obtain it by every means not punishable-it makes the sole business of their lives, and they follow it as a religion. All that is required with respect to property is to obtain it honestly and not employ it criminally, but it is always criminally employed when it is made a criterion for exclusive rights. In institutions that are purely pecuniary, such as that of a bank or a commercial company, the rights of the members composing that company are wholly created by the property they invest therein, and no other rights are represented in the government of that company than what arise out of that property; neither has that government cognizance of anyihing but property. But the case is totally different with respect to the institution of civil government, organized on the system of representation . Such a government has cognizance of everything and of every man as a member of the national society, whether he has property or not; and therefore the principle requires that every man and every kind of righ, be represented, of which the right to acquire and to hold property is but one, and that not of the most essential kind. The protection of a man 's person is more sacred than the protection of property, and besides this the faculty of performing any kind of work or services by which he acquires a livelihood or maintaining his family is of the nature of property. It is property to him; he has acquired it, and it is as much the object of his protection as exterior property, possessed without that faculty, can be the object of protection in another person. I have always believed that the best security for property, be it much or little, is to remove from every part of the community, as far as can possibly be done, every cause of complaint and every motive to violence, and this can only be done by an equality of rights. When rights are secure, property is secure in consequence. But when property is made a pretense for unequal or exclusive rights, it weakens the right to hold the property, and provokes indignation and tumult; for it is unnatural to· believe that property can be secure under the guarantee of a society injured in its rights by the influence of that property.
40
Inlernalional Politics Next to the injustice and ill-policy of making property a pretence
for exclusive right is the unaccountable absurdity of giving to mere sound the idea of property and annexing to it certain rights, for what else is a title but sound? Nature is often giving to the world some
extraordinary men who arrive at fame by merit and universal consent, such as Aristotle, Socrates, Plato, etc. They were truly great or noble. But when government sets up a manufactory of nobles. it is as absurd as if she undertook to manufacture wise men. Her nobles are all
counterfeits. This wax-work order has assumed the name of aristocracy, and the disgrace of it would be lessened if it could be considered only as childish imbecility. We pardon foppery because of its insignificance, and on the same ground we might pardon the foppery of titles. But the origin of aristocracy was worse than foppery. It was robbery. The first aristocrats in all countries were brigands. Those oflater times, sycophants.
11 is very wellknown thai in England (and the same will be found in other countries), the great landed estates now held in descent were plundered from the quiet inhabitants at the Conquest. The possibility did not exist of acquiring such estates honestly. If it be asked how they could have been acquired, no answer but that of robbery can be given. That they were not acquired by trade, by commerce, by manufactures, by agriculture, or by any reputable employment is certain. How then were they aC'quired? Blush, aristocracy, to hear your origin, for your progenitors were thieves. They were the Robespienes and the lacobins of that day. When they had committed the robbery, they endeavored to lose the disgrace of its 'by sinking their real names under fictitious ones, which they called titles. It is ever the practice of felons 10 act in this manner. They' never pass by their real names. As property, honestly obtained, is best secured "by an equality of rights, so ill-gotten property depends for protection on a monopoly of rights. He who has robbed another of his property will next endeavor to .disann him of his rights to secure that property; for when the robber becomes the legislator, he believes himself secure. Thai part of tbe government ofEngJand that is called the House of Lords was originally composed of persons who had committed the robberies of which I have
Prillciples of Govemmem
41
been speaking. II was an association for the protection ofthe property they had stolen. But besides the criminality of the origin of aristocracy, it has an injurious effect on the moral and physical character of man . Like slavery, it debilitates the human faculties; for as the mind bowed down by slavery loss in silence its elastic powers, so, in the contrary extreme, when it is buoyed up by folly it becomes incapable of exerting them and dwindles into imbecility. It is impossible that a mind employed upon ribands and titles can ever be great. The childishness of the objects consumes the man.
It is at all times necessary, and more particularly so during the progress of a revolution and until right ideas confinn themselves by habit, that we frequently refresh our patriotism by reference to first principles. It is by tracing things to their origin that we learn to understand them, and it is by keeping that line and that origin always in view that we never forget them. An inquiry into the origin of rights will demonstrate to us that righls are not gifts from one man to another, nor from one class of men to another; for who is he who could be the first giver, or by what principle or on what authority could he possess the right of giving? A declaration of rights is not a creation of them nor a donation of them. It is a manifest of the principle by which they exist, followed by a detail of what the rights are; for every civil righ t has a natural right for its foundation, and it includes the princ iple of a reciprocal guarantee of those rights from man to man. As, therefore, it is impossible to discover any origin of rights otherwise than in the origin of man, it consequently follows that rights appertain to man in right .-. of his existence only, and must therefore be equal 10 every man. The principle of an equality of rights is clear and simple. Every man can understand it, and it is by understanding his rights that he leams his duties; for where the rights of men are equal, every man must finally see the necessity of protecting the rights of others as the most effectual security for his own. But if, in the fonnation of a constitution, we depart from the principle of equal rights or attempt any modification of it, we plunge into a labyrinth of difficulties from which there is no way out but by
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retreating. Where are we to SlOp? Or by what principle are we to find out tbe point to stop at that shall discriminate between men afthe same country, part of whom shall be free and the rest not?
If property is to ,be made the criterion, it is a total departure from every moral principle of liberty, because it is attaching rights to mere maner and making man the agent of that matter. It is, moreover, holding
up property as an apple of discord, and not only exciting but justifying war against it; for I maintain the principle that when property is used
as an instrument to take away the rights of those who may happen not to possess property, it is used to an unlawful purpose, as firearms would be in a similar case. In a state of nature all men are equal in rights, but they are not equal in power; the weak cannot protect themselves against the strong. This being the case, the institution of civil society is for the purpose of making an equalization of powers that shall be parallel to and a guarantee of the equality of rights. The laws of a country, wben properly constructed, apply to tbis purpose. Every man takes the ann of the law for his protection as more effectual than his own, and therefore every man has an equal right in thc formation of the government and of the laws by which he is to be governed and judged. In extensive countries and societies, such as America and France, this right in the individual can only be exercised . by delegation, that is, by election and representation; and hence it is that the institution of representative government arises. Hitherto I have confined myself to matters of principle only. First, that hereditary government has not a right to exist, that it cannot be established on any principle of right, and that it is a violation of all principle. Secondly, that goverrunent by election and representation has its origin in the natural and eternal rights of man; for whether a man be his own lawgiver, as he would be in a state of nature, or whether he exercises his portion of legi slative sovereignty in his own person, as might be the case in small democracies where all could assemble for the formation of the laws by which they were to be governed, or whether he exercises it in the choice of persons to represent him in a national assembly of representatives, the origin of the right is the same in all cases. The first , as is before observed, is defective in power;
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the second is practicable only in democracies of small extent; the third is the greatest scale upon which human government can be instituted. Next to matters of principle are matters of opinion, and it is necessary to distinguish between the two. Whether the tights of men shall be equal is not a matter of opinion but of right, and consequently of principle; for men do not hold their rights as grants from each other, but each one in right of himself. Society is the guardian but nOI the giver. And as in extensive societies, such as America and France, the right of the individual in matters of government cannot be exercised but by election and representation, it consequently follows that the only system of government consistent with principle, where simple democracy is impracticable, is tbe representative system. But as to the organical part, or the manner in which the several parts of govemment shall be arranged and composed, it is altogether mailer of opinion. It is necessary that all the parts be confonnable with the principle of equal rights; and so long as this principle be religiously adhered to no very material error can take place, neither can any error continue long in that part which falls within the province of opinion. In all matters of opinion, the social compact, or the principle by which society is held together, requires that the majority of opinions becomes the rule for the whole and that the minority yields practical obedience thereto. This is perfectly conformable to the principle of equal rights; for, in the first place, every man has a right 10 give an opinion, but no man has a right Ihal his opinion should govern the rest. In the second place, it is not supposed to be known beforehand on which side of any question, whether for or against, any man 's opinion will fall. He may happen to be in a majority upon some questions and in a minority upon others, and by the same rule that he expects obedience in the one case he must yield it in the other. All the disorders that have arisen in France during the progress of the Revolution have had their origi.n, not in the principle ofequal rights, but in the violation of that principle. The principle of equal rights has been repeatedly violated. and that not by the majority but by the minority, and that minority has been composed of men possessing property, as well as of mell without property; property,
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therefore. even IIpon the experience already had, is no more a criterion of character lhall it is o/rights. It will sometimes happen that the minority are ri ght and the majo rity are wrong, but as soon as experience proves this to be the
case, the minority will increase to a majority. and the error will reform itsclfby the tranquil operation o f freedom of opinion and equality of rights. Nothing, therefore, can justify an insurrection; neither can it ever be necessary where rights are equal and opinions free.
Taking then the principle of equal rights as the foundati on of the Revolution, and consequently of the constitution. the organical part, or the manner in which the several parts of the government shall be arranged In the constitution, wi ll, as is already said, fall within the province of opinion. Various methods will present themselves upon a question of this kind; and though experience is yet wanting to determine which is the best, it has, I think, sufficie ntly decided which is the worst that is the worst which, in its del iberations and decisions, is subject to the precipitance and passion of an individual; and when the whole legislature is crowded into one body, it is an individual in mass. In all cases of deliberation, it is necessary to have a corps of reserve; and it would be better to divide the representation by lot into two parts, and let them revise and correct each other, than that the who le should sit together and debate at once. Representative government is not necessari ly confined to anyone particular form. The principl e is the same in all the forms under which it can be arranged. The equal rights of the people is the root from which the whole springs, and the branches may be arranged as present opinion or future experience shall best direct. As to that hospital of incurables (as Chesterfields calls it), the British House of Peers, it is an excrescence growing out of corruption; and there is no more affinity or resemblance between any of the branches of a legislative body originating from the right of the people and the aforesaid House of Peers than between a regular member of the human body and an ulcerated wen. As to that part of government that is called Ihe "executive," it is necessary in the first place to fi x a precise meaning to the word.
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There are but two divisions into which power can be arranged. first , that of willing or decreeing the laws; secondly, that of executing or putting them in practice. The former corresponds to the intellectual faculties of the human mind, which reasons and determines what shall be done; the second, to the mechanical powers of the human body that puts that determination into practice. If the former decides and the latter does not penorm, it is a state of imbecility; and if the laner acts without the predetermination of the fonner, it is a state of lunacy. The executive department therefore is official and is subordinate to the legislative, as the body is to the mind in a state of health; for it is impossible to conceive the idea of two sovereignties, a sovereignty to will and a sovereignty to act. The executive is not invested with the power of deliberating whether it shall act or not; it has not discretionary authority in the case, for it can act flO other thillg than what the laws decree and it is obliged to act conformably thereto; and in this view of the case the executive is made up of all the official departments that execute the laws, of which that which is called the "judiciary" is the chief. But mankind have conceived an idea that some kind of authority is necessary to superintend the execution of the laws and to see that they are faithfully performed ; and it is by confoundi ng thi s superintending authority with the official execution that we get embarrassed about the term "exec utive power." All the parts in the governments of the united States of America that aT!: called the "executive" are no other than authorities to superintend the execution of the laws, and they are so far independent of the legislative that they know the legislative only through the laws and cannot be controlled or directed by it through any other medium. In what manner this superintending authority shall be appointed or composed is a matter that falls within the province of opinion. Some may prefer one method and some another, and in all cases where opinion only and not principle is concerned the majority of opinions forms the rule for all . There are however somethi ngs deducible from reason and evidenced by experience that serve to gu ide our decision upon the case. The one is never to invest any indi vidual with extraordinary power;
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for besides hi s being tempted to misuse it, it will excite contention and commotion in the nation for the office. Secondly, never to invest
power long in the hands of any number of individuals. Th e inconveniences that may be supposed to accompany frequent changes arc less to be feared than the danger that arises from long continuance.
I shall conclude this discourse with offering some observations on the means of preserving liberty; for it is not only necessary that we establish it, but that we preserve it It is, in the first place, necessary that we distinguish between the means made use of to overthrow despotism, in order to prepare the way fo~ the establishment ofliberty, and the means to be used after the despotism is overthrown. The means made use of in the first case are j ustified by na:essity. Those means are, in general , insurrections; for while the established government of despotism continues in any country, it is scarcely possible that any other means can be used. It is also certain that, in the commencement of a revolution. the revolutionary party permit to themse lves a discretionary exercise of power regu lated more by circumstances than by principle, which, were the practice to continue, liberty would never be establis hed, or if establi shed would soon be ovel1hrown. II is never to be expected in a revolution that every man is to change his opinion at the same moment. There never yet was any truth or any principl e so irresistibly obvious that all men believed it at once. Time and reason must cooperate with each other to the final establishment of any principle. and therefore those who may happen to be first convinced have not a ri ght to persecute others on whom conviction operates more slowly. The moral principle of revolutions is to instruct, not to destroy. Had a constitution been established two years ago (as ought to have been done), the violences that have since desolated France and injured the character of the Revolution would, in my opinion, have been prevented. The nation would then have had a bond of union, and every individual would have known the line of conduct he was to follow. But instead of this, a revolutionary government, a thing without either principle or authority, was substituted in its place; v irtue and crime depended upon accident. and that which was patriotism one day became treason the next.
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All these things have followed from the want of a constitution: for it is the nature and intention of a constitution to prevem governing by party by establishing a common principle thai shall limit and control the power and impulse of party, and that says to all parties, thus far shalt thou go alld 110 further. But in the absence of a constitution. men look entirely to party; and instead of principle governing party. party governs principle. An avidity to punish is always dangerous to liberty. It leads men to stretch, to misinterpret, and to misapply even the best of laws. He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for ifhe violates tbis duty, he establishes a precedent that will reach to himsel f.
NOTES L
Charles I, who became King of England in 1625. was condemned as a traitor and enemy of the nation and was beheaded in 1649.
2.
The words of Jesus as reponed in Matthew 22: 21. Tory politicians and pamphleteers of the period frequently used this injunction as Biblical authority for the submission of the individual to the state.
3.
Gideon delivered the Israelites from the Midianites. as described in Judges 6: 1-27; 8: 1-23.
4.
Samuel's yielding to the people's clamor for a king is related in I Samuel: 8.
5.
William I, King of England, was the illegitimate son of Robert "Le Diable." Duke of Normandy. He invaded England in 1066, and acquired the throne as a result of his victory in the battle of Hastings.
6.
York and Lancaster were the two noble families whose rivalry for the throne of England brought on the Wars of the Roses, so called because the emblem of the House of York was a white rose and that of Lancaster a red rose. The contesting monarchs mentioned in this paragraph are Henry VI (reigned 1422-61 ) and Edward IV (reigned 1461-81).
7.
Henry VII reigned from 1485 to '509.
8.
Sir William Meredith, who died in 1790, was a lord of the admiralty under Rockingham's first ministry (1 765). He was also the author of several political works.
9.
This reference is too vague for positive identification. Paine probably has in mind one of two brothers, Henry Pelham (1695:'-1754) or Thomas
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international Politics Pelham-Holies ( 1693- 1768), both of whom. at various times, held mi nisterial positions in the English government. See Dictionary of National Biography.
10. On April 19. 1775, the battles of Lexington and Concord were fought. These batt les marked the opening hostilities of the American Revolution.
4 The State
What is a Stale? That is the question to which we must try to find an answer today. Let us begin with suggested and accepted definitions, and test them, so as to eliminate anything which we consider to be either superfluous or erroneous. The shorter a definition the better, provided its terseness does nol mar its clarity and sufficiency. It should contain the essentials oflhe term defined, and also its differential or specialties so as to separate it from cognate and allied tenus. Where the thing defined is complex, as is the case with the thing we call the
State, the difficulty of reconciling adequacy and terseness is obvious. THE EAST
India We tum first to India, as indicated in the last lecture, in our search for the definition of a state. We have to face here the difficu lty, that, as Bernouf- I think it was- said of Egypt, there are no "beginnings" in the modem sense; the state "springs forth on the stage of his lOry complete, as Minerva from the head of Jove". Nor is there anything surprising or unlikel y in this , if the traditions of Egypt and India are true, for in each case tradition tells of Divine Dynasties, of a superhuman Legislator, and in India the latter, named Manu. was literally the Father of his people. Thus. the race began in hi s Family, multiplied and spread for unknown periods of time in Central Asia. ultimately in vading India, conquering it and settling down therein, whi le other branches from the same Patriarchal Family went westwards in successive waves, reaching. and spreading
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over and settling in Europe, and carrying with them the early simple. Aryan polity of scII:govcming village communities, their ineradicable love of liberty, and the genius for democratic institution s so characteristic of the Aryan race. A fief explaining the Teutonic Mark (Village Communities . Lecture i. p. 10), or Township as an organised, sel f-acting group of TeUlOnic famili es, exercising a co mmon proprietorship over a defi nite tract of land, its Mark, cultivating its domain on a common system and sustaining itself by the produce,
Maine poi nts out that similar groups were "the political unit of the
earli est English soc iety," existed in Scandinavia, were observed in the Orkney and Shetland Islands by Walter SCOIt, and in England were later absorbed in larger aggregat ions. The " larger groups, in which Famil ies are found to have been primitively combined for the purposes of ownership o f land" (p. II), make the Village, living on its land, which can be fu ll y studied in India. He speaks of the individual property in land as disengaging itself from collective holdings, as shown in Teutonic and Scand inavian villages, and even in England, and notes that "these primiti ve European tenures and thi s primiti ve European tillage const itute the actual working system of the Indi an village commu nities, and that they detennine the whole course of Anglo-Indian administration" (p. 62). These vill ages li ved under customary law; the Council of village elders does not command anything; it merely deelares what has always been ... Their antiquity is by itself assumed to be a suffi cient reason fo r obeying them ... a person aggrie ved complains not of an individual wrong, but of the disturbance of the order of the entire little society. More than all, customary law is not enforced by a sanction. In th e almost inconcei va ble case o f disobedience to the award of the Village Council, the sole punishment, or the so le certai n punrshment, woul d appear to be universal disapprobation. (Leeture iii. p. 68.)
The importance of this to us is that we find in the West the view that the function of the government of a state is to give "command under penalty," but in this early village state there is no command, and no penalty save disapprobation. Maine once morc, compelled by his study of law, remarks on
The State
51
the ignorance of Eastern phenomena shown by the Western writers on this subject, and says: The Village Community of India exhibits resemblances to the Teutonic Township which are much 100 strong and numerous to be accidental; where it differs from the Township, the difference may be at least plausibly explained. It has the same double aspect of a group of famili es united by the assumption of common kinship, and of a company of persons exercising joint ownership over land. The domain which it occupies is distributed, if not in the same manner, upon the same principles, and the ideas which prevail within the group of the relations and duties of its members to one another appear to be substantially the same. But the Indian Village Community is a living and not a dead institution. The causes which transformed the Mark into the Manor, though they may be tlaced in India, have operated very feebly; and over the greatest part of the country the Village-Community has 'lol been absorbed in any larger collection of men, or lost in a territorial area of wider extent. For fi scal and legal purposes it is the proprietary unit of large and populous Provinces. It is under constant and careful observation, and the doubtful poiuls which it exhibits are the subject of the most earnest discussion and of the most vt'hemenl controversy. No better example could therefore be given of the new material which the East, and especially India, furni shes to the juridical enquirer.... {India) is the great repository of verifiable phenomena of ancient usage and ancient juridi cal thought. (Lecture i, pp. 12, 13, 22.) Sir Henry Maine refers to two books, one by Sir John Lubbock and the other by Mr. McLennan, who "conceive themselves to have shown that the first steps of mankind towards civilisation were taken from a condition in which assemblages of men followed practices which are not found to occur universally eVl!n in ani mal nature" (p. 16). These, he observes, may be found in India in some aboriginal tribes, driven into inaccessible recesses in mountainous districts, but some of these usages, referred to immemorial antiquity, " have been described to me as having been for the first time resoned to in our own days through the mere pressure of external circumstances or novel temptations" (p. 17). This view agrees, we shall see presently, with that of Dr. Wilson. We are on safer ground when, following the most ancient Indian literature, we see society origi nating in the Patriarchal Family, which is a "group of men and women, children and slaves, of animate and
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inanimate property, all connected together by common subjection to the Paternal Power of the chief of the household" (p. 18). Such families , growing up in Central Asia, forming villages and cities and spreading thence, would, when once sen led in Indi a, while keeping
the origina l type of the villages, readi ly develop into cities and kingdoms in the course of many generations, multiplying "for untold centuries," as Vincent Smith says, band becoming the highly civilised
communities we read of three thousand years before the Christian era. There are thousands of years for their growth before the books
on polity, now in our possession, were written, during which the history of the then existing States is at present lacking. Dr. Sayee, in his Hibbert lectures of 1887, mentions Indian trade with Babylon nearly five thousand years ago, in 3000 s.c., India being then a congeries of wealthy, highly civilised, and trading States. Vincent Smith speaks of sixteen States between the HimaJayas and the Nerbudda river, some monarchical , some aristocratic-republican, separated by forests, jungles, and unsenled lands. Forms of government were very various. Ajatashatru hereditary King of Magadha, was contemporary with Darius, King of Persia in the sixth century B.C. On the other hand, Dr. Radhakumud Mukerji, writing on the "Republics of Ancient India" (The Commonweal, June 20th, 1918) quotes Megastbenes as speaking of five Nations by name, as peoples "which are free, have no Kings, and occupy mountain heights where they have built many cities" . Curtius gives the name of "a powerful Indian people whose form of government was democratic and not real , who had no Kings, but were led by three Generals". Arrian mentions others who preserved their autonomy intact for a long time before Alexander's invasion. He also mentions Nysa, a City-State, such as we shall find described in Aristotle. ruled by three hundred wise men, fonning a Council with a President. When Alexander asked that one hundred men should be sent to him from the governing body, the president answered : "How, 0 King, can a single city, if deprived of a hundred of it best men, continue to be well governed?" Not only do we find in In dian the se manifold types of government, but we find also the state organism of a higher order, the Empire over many kingdoms. Chandragupta Maurya, 321-297 B.c., ruled from the Hindu Khush to the Nerbudda. from the Arabian Sea
The Stale
S3
to the Bay of Bengal. Bindusara extended his fathers empire to the south of Madras. Ashoka extended it sti ll further, and had four Viceroys under him for administrati ve purposes. The Empire lasted from-321 R C . to 232 S.c. Other and empire arose, earlier and latter; I select this one, ;becausc it was the first reckoned in the West as hi storical. The Chakravarti, or Ovcrlord, was a well-recognised monial , as a ll re aders of Indi an literature kno w. Th e la st "horse-sacrifice," the recognition o f the over:ordship, of the Lord Paramount, of India, was offered in the seventh century A.D., by Adityasena. The literature we have belongs naturally to the more advanced and complex conditions, the "full-grown 'State ' from the head of Jovc". The polity is laid down by authority, if we accept the literature concerned, and this, so far as known, dea ls with kingdoms, castes, classes, kings, councilors, officials, etc. , among the movables, vi llages, towns, di stricts, forts, etc .. among the immovables, all in full working order, or with directions how to create the villages, etc., where they did not exist, as when population was too dense, or additional terrilory was acquired, new villages had to be fonned. Fragments of his lOry in the early days are available, fro m travellers mostly, which show us many forms of government over areas of varying size. from a city 10 a large district and on to great kingdoms and empires. In these we have descriptions of stales, not definitions of "the State," and the word state as used in modem days in applicable to each of these areas. Thus, we .arrive at eliminating any special kind of government, and see onl y a government, not a fonn of government, as essenti al to the idea of a stale; moreover, it is a government over an organi sed people, settled in a definite rerritory. The Arthashastra of Kautilya (translated by R. Shamasastry, Mysore Government Orienta l Library Series, Government Press, Bangalore, 191 5), known also as VishnuguPla and Chanaicya, the great Minister of Chandragupta Maurya, w ho began to reign six. years before Alexander invaded Afghanistan, d eals with a compl icated and huge Empire, highly organi sed. I am not concerned with any details of these governments any more than of the villages- that will come later- and mention the ex istence of them in our search for definitions, merely to show that,
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as said, while a stale implies a government of some sort, the fonn of the government is non-essential. In the time of Kautilya the Science
ofGoverrunent had been much discussed, and in Book J, chap. ii, after mentioning that there were four sciences, of which Danda Niti, the science of government, was one, Kautilya mentions the schools of
Manu, Brahaspati, Ushanas, as all dealing with the Science of Government, on which. says Kautilya, the other three sciences depend (Book I, chap. iv, I, p. 10).
~
We do not find either in Manu or in Kautilya any discussions as to the nature of a State. But we are told that a kingdom has seven limbs, or constituent parts: "The King, his minister, his capital, hi s realm, his treasury, hi s anny and his ally" (Manu's Institutes. Chap. ix, v. 294, p. 395). Kautilya gives them as "The King, the minister, the country, the fort, the treasury, the army and the friend" as "the e lements of sovereignty". (Book VI, C hapter i, p. 318.) But this does not help us to a definition of the State. Manu 's laws are concerned with the inhabitants of a kingdom, their relationships, their offices, their functions, their duties, etc. The famil y is the unit; ''To be mothers were women created and to be fathers men" ; "Let mutual fidelity continue until death; this may be considered as the summary of the highest law for husband and wife" (Chap. ix, shl. 96, 101). " He only is a perfect man who consists of his wife, himself and his offspring .... The husband is declared to be one with the wife" (Ibid. , shl. 45}-a far nobler conception, as we shall find, than that of Aristotle, the Greek.
It is the duty of the King to unite families into Villages. " Villages," says Kautilya, consisting each of not less than a hundred families, and of not more than five hundred families of agricultural people ofShu.dra caste, with boundaries extending as far as a krosha or two and capable of protecting each other shall be formed . Boundaries shall be denoted by a river, a mountain, forests. bulbous plants. caves, artificial buildings. or by trees. (Book 11 , chap. i, para 46.)
Every aggregation of ten villages is to be protected by a sangrahana; in the centres of 200,400 and 800 villages, fortresses of different kinds are to the erected, and strong forts with boundary guards
The Slale
55
on the frontiers of the kingdom, which is also to have a fortified capital in its centre (chap, iii , 51). Manu directs that soldiers, commanded by a trusty officer, should
be placed in the midst of groups of vi llages to protect the people, and each village is to have its ruler, and there are rulers also for groups of villages, 10, 20, 100, 1,000 (chap. vii, 114, 15). The details of organisation, once more, will be studied later. Here, as I said, we are seeking for definition of the state. The Shukralli/i (tmnslated by Professor Seney Thamar Sarkar, Panini Office, Allahabad), contains minute detai ls for the d ischarge of the respective duties of the various classes of the people, and is purely practical. The state is the Kingdom "an organism of seven limbs" (chap. i, 121), the same as already mentioned; it is composed of "gramona. p urana, deshan" (ibid., 751) , villages, cit ies and districts; the villages may be arranged in groups of 10, toO, 1,000, 10,000 for the purposes of government. The word indicating the State is Rashtmn, equally used for kingdom, district, or region; it includes all immovable and movable objects within its ares, and "belongs to him under whose submission it comes"- its mler. The ten requisites in the administration of justice are the king, officers, counci llors, Smrti Shastras, accountant, clerk, gold, fire, water and one's own men (chap. iv, § v, 72). A court of justice is that place where the study of the social, and political interests of man takes place according to the dictates of Dhanna Shaslras (Ibid., 82). For definition these books yield: ~conomi e
"The state is an organism of seven limbs, under a Ruler and Counc il; it consists of villages, cities and districts, and has a body of laws and customs." No form of government except this, apparently, is contemplated. It is obvious from the langl,lage used that we are in the presence of highly organised kingdoms, and Ihis idea, arisi ng from the most superficial glance, will become absolutely established in our later study. Summing up the general results from the facts availabl e in ancient India we see a ladder of ascent. We have the rungs of Family, Vi llage, Groups ofYillages, becoming larger and larger integrations,
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living in definite areas wi th their rulers, reaching the Kingdom, or the
Republic. Eliminating differences, we find in all these four common fac tors: they are aggregations of human beings, of varied occupations, living on a fixed territory, with a government over each; that is, each
is an organised community-a community with organs for th e discharge of definite functions- and from a study of these we must fOrol
our Indian definition: A State is an organised community of human beings settled in a
defmite area, and directed by a government.
We find in India a Family-State, a Village-State, a MultipleVillage-State, a City-State, a Republic-State, a Kingdom-State, an Empire-State, the last three, a1t forms of the Country-State. But we do not find a Nation-State; there was a fundamental Unity, which made temporary aggregations under an Overlord easy, due to a common descent, "sons of Manu," a common religion, common basic laws, but not the sense of Nationality as now ~gnised. To Manu we owe the luminous idea that all human societies, like a family, consist of elders, equals, and youngers, to each of whom special duties should be rendered : reverence to the elders, friendship to the equals, protection to the youngers, and on the due discharge of these, the happiness of all States depends. The state should be founded on the fami ly, and State obligations are enlarged family obligations. The profound principle which emerges from this fundamental idea that man only becomes man in the family, that Man, the truly human being, is not a separate masculine being, but a husband-wi fe-child. raises Duty above Rights, obligations above claims; it substitutes mutual helpfulness for compdit ion, the law of sacrifice for the law of the struggle for existence. It is the recognition that man is a social, not an isolated being, and that the state should be moulded in accordance with this natural law. You will see the imponance of his conceptiC'n when you come to study the State. as conceived in modem Europe, until modem science reinforced ancient teaching, and thus gave binh to Socialism. The Hebrews In the Hebrew Nation we see the sequential development of the Slale from a Patriarch, Abraham, the head of a fam ily; fro m his twelve
57
The Slale
great-grandsons the multiplication into twelve Tribes, recognising a descent from a common ancestor; the welding of these Tribes into a Nation, and the establishment ofthe Nation on a Territory. The story is probably true in the main outline, and if so offers a case of the gradual building up of the successive types of the State. In addition to this, the Hebrews become a Theocracy, after the multiplication of the Families into Tribes, and the theocratic element is dominant through the monarchies that succeed. It also gives an interesting illustration, I think unique, of the perishing of the Nalion·State, by the destruction of its government and the loss of its territory, and the survival of the nation without country or ruler, preserving its national characteristics through its adherence to its national religion. It is a fact in favour of the view of a nation, as being an individual , a Spiritual Entity, a fragment of the divine, able to live and preserve its individuality, without some of the organs which nonnally constilute parts of its form, and are generally regarded as essentials of national life. THE WEST Greece Let us now tum away from the East to the West, and again seek for a definition of the State as conceived in Greece and Rome. In the western world Plato with his Republic, Aristotle with his Politics, are the commanding figures as regards the idea of the State. Bluntschli says of the last: His Politics, although written in that youthful "eriod of the world 's history which preceded the more advanced development of the state, has yet remained for two thousand years one of the purest sources of political wisdom. (Chap. ii, p. 7.)
Plato 's essential idea of the State was that it was an organi sm, not merely an artificial compound. It should follow the Law of Nature, and be, as it were, the Ideal Man: The best state is that which approaches most nearly to the condition of the individual. If a part of the body suffers. the whole body feels the hurt and sympathises altogether with the part affected. (Republic. quoted by Bluntschli, Book I, chap. iii. p. 36.)
Thc idea of the unit of the State as a solitary individual merely,
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nOI as in the Indian view, a family, lies at the root of many error in practice, for it is man as isolated, not man as a family, and leads to combat rather than to co-operation. The value of the Greek idea lies in recognising the state as an organism. Bluntschli well sums up his
teaching: The state, according to Plato, is the highest revelation of human vinue,
the harmonious manifestation of the powers of the human soul, humanity perfected. As the soul of man consists of a rarional, a spirited. and a desiring element, and as reason and spirit ought to rule the desires, so in the Platonic ideal, the wise ought to rule. the brave warriors should protect the community, and the classes which are occupied with material acquis ition and bodily work should obey the two higher orders. In the Body Politic, justice requires that each pan should do its own work. (Book I, chap. iii, p. 36.)
Aristotle does not in so many words give a definition of the State, but he identifies it with the city; he says that the best possible Society is a city, "and the society thereof a political society" (Book I, chap. i, p. 9). As a definition this is hardly satisfactory, since it comes to the statement that "the society ofa city is a city society," ''political'' being a deri vative of polis, a City; but the meaning is cltat, that only men who live in a city fonn a society worthy of the name, a city-man society. Such a "Political," or City-State, has a government adapted to the nature of free men, and "is the government of free men and equals" (Book I, chap. vii, p. 20). Aristotle does not ignore the fact that the family exists apart from the City, and that "Hesiod is right when he says, ' first a house, then a wife, then an ox: for the plough,'" but this society "which Nature has established for daily support is the domestic"; also he remarks that "the society of many families, which was first instituted for their listing mutual advantage, is called a village, and a village is most naturally composed of the descendants of one family," whence village government is the government of elders. But these, he does not regard as States, since States are governed by men who are free and equal. A City only arises as follows: When many villages so entirely join themselves together as in every respect to form but one society, that Society is a City, and contains in itself, if I may so speak. the end and perfection of government. fi rst
The Slale
S9
founded that we might live. but continued that we may live happily. (Book I. chap. ii. pp. 10-12.)
Also he has said: "A City is a community of free men" (Book III, chap. vii, p. 92). "A City, in one word. is a collective body of
such persons, sufficient in themselves to all the purposes of life," "such persons" being "citizens" or those who have a right to "share in the judicial and executive part of government" (Book II, chap. i, p. 81}--that being his very useful, ifnot complete, definition ofa citizen. Again he says: A City is a Society of people joining together with their families and their children to live agreeably, for the sake of having their li ves as happy and independent as possible; and for this purpose it is necessary that they should live in one place and intermarry with each other, hence in all cilies there are family meetings, clubs, sacrifices, and public entertainments to promote friendship, for, a love of sociability is friendship itself; so that the cnd then for which a City is established is that the inhabitants of it may live happy, and these things are conducive to that end; for it is a community of families and villages, for the sake of a perfect independent life. that is, as we have already said, for the sake ofliving well and bappily. 1t is nOI therefore founded for the purpose of men merely living together, but for their living as men ought. (Book III. chap. ix. p. 98.)
The last words recall those lately spoken by President Wilson: "To make the world fit for free men to live in." Aristotle 's purpose is ethical; the ideal city is a place in which the free man can develop to his highest possibility; the motive is to live "as men ought," for "with us," he says, "reason and intelligence are the end of nature." (Book vn, chap. xvi, p. 262.) To him, outside the city, the state, therefore, did not exist, and nearly all his treatise deals with government, its type and its duties- a matter, once more. that you will have to study in detail presently. We find , tben, in Aristotle, no clear definition of the State as a concept, and we can only make a definition out of the conditions he postulates. I suggest faT his idea: "A State is a Society of men inhabiting a City, with a government composed of men who are free and equal, and are capable of filling an office in the Government." It will be noticed that thi s definition does not include within the State women, children, or slaves. all of whom lived in the City. Women
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were under Domestic Government, as being by nature inferior to men, but were to be treated as citizens of a free State-though not coming within the definition of a citizen, that he must be able to fill an office in the state; children were under Domestic Government as being young and imperfect (Book I, chap. xii, p. 31); slaves as being " 8 particular
species of property" (Book I, chap. viii, 2 1). The confining of the State to men was the natural and logical outgrowth of aristotle's view of the family, as consisting of three aspects united in one man, who filled the "three parts of Domestic Government," as master---Qf the slaves; as father-ofthe children; as husband---Qf the wife. This view orthe
State colours European thought, the subjection of women being characteristic of European systems. and. as we shall see, it comes out strongly in Bluntschli's view of the state as a masculine entity. Shakespeare said truly that The evil which men do lives after them. Even in India it has degraded the higher view of the family as the unit of the state, with all the network of ideas of which the family is the centre. It has made the man everything, and in the household
all gives way to his convenience and comfort. thus making selfishness instead of sacrifice the pivot of family life. Only in the woman is the old ideal preserved, and her uner sacrifice to husband and son is apt to fncrease masculine selfishness. None the less, in her self-sacrifice lies the salvation of India. The future welfare of the Indian state depends on the re-establishment of the old idea of the family, with its mutual sacrifice and mutual service and mutual helpfulness. conditioned in their fonn, not in their essence, by the "elder, equal, and younger". Rome The Roman idea of the State was based on the Greek, but laid more stress on law; the Greek saw as the purpose of the state that men might have Happiness ; the Roman made pre-dominant the protective power of the State, and saw as its purpose that men might have justice. Bluntschli says of the Greeks: They base the State upon human nature, and hold that only in the State can man atjain his perfection and find true satisfaction. The State is for them the moral order of the world. in which human nature fulfil s
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61
its end. The Romans first distinguished law from morality, and gave it a definite form, and thus they brought out more distinctly the legal nature of the State. Thereby they limited the State, and gave it greater firmness and power. II no longer summed up for them the ethical ordering of the world, but was primarily a common legal organisation. (Book I, chap. iii, pp. 35, 38, 39.)
Moreover, in the Roman State, the masses were given a more distinctly recognised place than among the Greeks though I am not forgetting the meetings of the Athenian people in the Agora, or the laws of Draco, or the refonns of Solon. The Patricians, like the Greek Aristocrats, stood high in the State, the descendants of the Gens, or Family. The Gentes included no plebeian. The history of the city of Rome shows us that the nucleus of it was composed of a number of primitive clans living each in its separate settlement, but side by side. for the oldest districts of the city have the names of the ancient patric ian gentes. In short, a number of indications concur to show that Rome-though in the time of Cicero the fact had been quite forgotten-first took shape as a League of cognate but distinct clans, each clan being a conventional family, into which admission could only be procured through the action of adoption. (Seeley, Lecture iii, p. 38.)
But Cicero points out that when the people were organised they were part of the State; this does no include all men, but only those who are organised into a society; Lhen, but only then, the Popular Organism became the source of law; "Vox populi, vox Dei"- "The voice of the people is the voice of God". The proud Roman would have had supreme contempt for the idea that any shouting mob was the voice of God, though the phrase is so used occasionally in modem days. For the ignorant mob, " Bread and Games" was his prescription. For the Organised People, respect- for organisation is only possible with individual self-control. "Salus populi suprema lex," "The welfare of the people is the supreme lex," The struggle of the people to assert and organise themselves is full of interest, and they gradually became a recognised Order in the State. A further addition to the idea of the state, as existing in the West, was made by the Romans- its extension over many nations, thus carrying it into a higher order of individual. The Roman Eagles fl ew
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International PO/ilics
over the Western World, and invaded the Eastern, and Roman citizenship was extended to the borders of the Empire, and was obtainable both by birth and by purchase. The Roman view oflhe state may be summarised: The Slate is the People Organised, governed by its own assemblies and its elected officers; with its citizenship extended to
persons and families belonging to other nations, over whom the authority of the central City was exercised. The Social Contract
For our purpose we need not delay over medieval Europe, and need only pause very shortly on the new idea which emerges in the seventeenth century, and is discussed through the eighteenth. Hooker, Hobbes and Locke in the seventeenth century, and Rousseau in the eighteenth, are its typical exponents. Briefly outlined, the theory is: that the naturnllandholder and the landless, the capitalist and the wage~ earner, the millionaire and the pauper, appear over against each other, and the extremes of luxury and of poverty, divided by an unbridgeable gu lf, are the typical productions of modem civilisation. Had it not crashed down in a World War, it would have been tom into pieces in class convulsions. A return to the ideal of the Family as the unit of the State has reappeared in modem thought, and Political Science is re-establi shing on a scientific basis the higher Ideal. That Ideal. enlarged from the Family to the Nation, is what is called Socialism, and is the analogue, in the State, of Ethic or Morality in Society. As Ethic resides in making universal and nonnal the love-emotion, as revealed in the hannonious Family, so is Sociali sm the extension to the Stale of the principles of mutual helpfulness and sacrifice found in th happy and prosperous family. It has, as its axiom: "From every one according to his capacities; to everyone according to his needs" (Proudhon).
MODERN VIEWS In the nineteenth century began an effort to construct a true Political Science out of the fact s recorded in History, and in the first quarter of the twentieth century we find Professor Seeley complaining of the want of a text-book. He pointed out that
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63
As a mailer of course human beings like other animals are united together in families , and we might be prepared to find the family tie stronger and the family organisation somewhat more developed than in inferior animals. But we observe something more ... vel)' surprising and unexpected. We find that men have another bond of union beyond that of the family, and another higher organi sation ... Almost in any place, in any circumstances where a human being might be found, if you questioned him you would find that he considered himself to belong to some large corporation which imposed duties and conferred rights upon him ... .The English state may be held together in some degree by a common interest, still it is not a mere company composed ofvolunlal)' shareholders, but a union which has its root in the family and which has grown, and not merely been arranged, 10 be what it is. Now. it is surdy impossible not 10 admit that this phenomenon. vast and highly developed as it now appears, is in its large features similar to the most primitive and barbarous tribe. That, too, is a great association, to which its members are attached for life and death. For that. too. its members fight; about its interests they debate. In the tribe, tool. we can often discover that individuals may have no attachment by kindred to the whole; they may have come in as slaves and received emancipation, or as foreigners by adoption. In short. compare the most advanced State with the most primitive tribe, and you will see the Slime features. though the proportions are different. In the State there is more of mind; in the tribe more of nature. Free-w ill and intelligent contrivance nave more play in the fonner; blood and kinship rule in the laUer. Still the State has nOl ceased to be a tribe; kinship still counts for much in it, as the Nationality-movement of the present cenNI)' has strikingly proved. (Lecture i, p. 14. LecNre ii, p. 35, 36.) The Professor regards the principle of Government as essential to the State, and he regards the fact of Government as that on which "depends almost everything important in human history" (p. 37). This Government is to him the main characteristic of the State, and it is universal. "Everywhere the human being belongs to something which may be called a polity, and is subject to something which may be called a Government" (p. 3S). It is the making "use of the arrangement or contrivance called Government" (Lecture i, p. 17), which distinguishes the State, and so to him Political Science is co ncerned with Goverrunent, "as political econcmy deals with wealth, as biology deals with life, as algebra deals with numbers, as geometry deals with space and magnitude" (p, IS). Government he defines as "command enforced
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by penalty" (Lecture iii, p. 75}-a curiously narrow conception, for surely if the State be an organised community, and the Government the executive of its will, then every purpose that the organised community desires to carry out collectively becomes a duty of the State
to be carried out by its Executive. The organism specialises organs, for the discharge of its functions, its condition of men was one of war; to obtain order and security, men surrendered some of their personal inherent rights, and formed by contract a State in which they vested them, this State being an absolute Power, monarchical or other, responsible to none. This supposed contract is the origin of the State.
Grotius: The complete union of free men, who join themselves together for the purpose of enjoying law, and for the sake of public welfare. Hobbes: The State, therefore, is a single person, for whose acts a great multitude by mutual covenants, one with another, have made themselves everyone the author, to the end he may use the means and strength of them all as he shall think expedient for their peace and common defence. Rousseau: To find a form of association which defends and
protects the person and property of every associate with the common power of all and by which each, uniting himself with all, only obeys himself and remains as free as before; such in the fundamental problem resolved in the Contrat Social. In all these the State is not the Nation organised, but the Government. So also in the Encyclopedia Britannica, which has some iRieresting definitions: As currenlly employed in Ihat departmenl or Political Science which concerns itselr, not with relations or separate political entities. but with the political composition or society as a whole, the word State expresses the abstract idea or Government in general, or the governing authority as opposed to the governed, and is thus used by Herbert Spencer in all his discussions or Government and society. Louis XIV's 'Tetat, c'eSI moi," Rousseau's theory or the "contrat social," Bastiat's "donne it l'etatle strict necessaire et garde Ie resle pour 10i," all imply this opposition.
Yet thi s is the very idea we need to oppose. Again:
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" In constinnionallaw, the Stale," says a leading English authority, " is the power by which rights are created and maintained, by which the acts and forbearances necessary for their maintenance are habitually enforced" (Anson, Law wid Custom of the Constitution, pI. i, p. 2). In France, where Ihe Stale embraces a hierarchy of bodies and authorities culminating in the President of the Republic, whose acts are the final fonn of a series of incomplete acts of the members of the hierarchy, it comes nearer to the theoretical meaning of the word... .
Hence a general definition: The State is a human corporation resting on >:ontract, which defends its members against aggression and preserves order by law. In this the idea of the State as an evolving organism has wholly disappeared, and it becomes an apparatus, manufactured by man in Society for his security and order, exercising the rights vested in it by him, and restricted within as narrow limits as are consistent with the purpose of its manufacture. Under these conditions, the State and the People are separate entities and are in a condition of vigilant and anned truce, the individual guarding against any invasion of the rights he has retained, and the government, as the embodied Power of the State, tending to become a tyranny. It is a veiled condition of War between the Government and the Individual, the Government resenting resistance, and the Individual fearing encroachment.
We thus continually ·find the State and the Liberty of the Individual regarded as in conflict, for the more the State does, the less it leaves to the lndividual. Hence the value of the State as a collective organisation largely disappears, and ownership by the State is looked on as an interference with individual cmerprise and initiative; collective help is regarded as a destruction of independence, and as a pauperisation of the Indi vidua l. The idea of the Family as the fundamental unit of the Statc is renounced, and the isolated man becomes the unit; combat, competition, struggle, form the recognised conditions of the people, and soc iety becomes an anarchy within a circle of laws; the exploiter of human labour and the proletarian, the life-acti vities. For the better exercise of its function of Justice, it specialises an organ composed of judges an lawyers; for its function of healing, it specialises an organ composed of doctors and nurses; for its function of commerce, it speciali ses an organ of merchants, and
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accountants, and sailors; and so on, as it becomes more and more specialised and complex. OUf illustration of the body and its organs is more than a metaphor- it is a reality. The "contrivance called
Govemment," or as I should prefer to call it, the Organ ofGovemment, is perhaps the first organ specialised in the organism named the State.
The State should not be thought of as over against the Nation, but as the Nation organised to perform all that is done more efficiently by it collectively than individually. If the State takes over, as in many countries, the management of railways, it is the Government that will manage them and collect their revenue, but its proceedings hardly come within "commands enforced by penalty". Moreover we have seen the Village State in the East, untroubled by commands and free from penalties. But then professor Seeley knew nothing of the East. We saw last week that the Professor considers the State as an organism not a machine, as a growth not a manufacture. We may then embody his view of the State in such a definition as the following: The State is an Organism, consisting of human beings, evolved from the Family through the Tribe, and controlled hy a Government. Characteristically, the Professor will not say that the State exists for any object. "We do not speak of the object of a tree or an animal" (Lecture ii, p. 40). He wishes to study facts and leave purposes aloneagain an unwise narrowing of view. Dr. Woodrow Wilson begins by remarking that it would be desirable to include all tribes, Hottentot or Iroquois, Finn or Turk, in a general survey, but that it is enough to study the "Aryan and Semitic races which have played the chief parts in the history of the European world" (Chap. i, § 2). It is not clear what he means by Aryan; it does not apparently, include Indians, for he goes on to say: In order to !race th e line age of the Europe an and American Governments, which have constituted the order of social life for those stronger and nobler races which have made the most notable progress in civilisation, it is essential to now the political history of the Greeks. the Latins, the Teutons and the Celts principally, if not only, and the original and political habits and ideas of the Aryan and Semitic races alone. The existing Governments of Europe and America furnish the dominating types of today. To know other systems which are defeated
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67
or dead would aid only indirecdy towards an understanding of those which are alive and triumphant. (Chapter i, § 2.)
India is apparently swept away with the Hottenlots and their similars.
Dr. Wilson sees in Kinship the origin of social organisation, and in the Paternal Authority the origin of Government. He contrasts the Patriarchal Family, as the original type institution in humanity, with the view that it emerged from an earlier condition of polyandry and polygyny, which were preceded by promiscuity. But he excludes these, because such conditions were not found in the European field. The Romans and the Greeks descended from the Patriarchal Family. Sir William Maine, as we have seen, gives a better reason. Says Dr. Wilson: No belief is more deeply fi xed in the traditions of the great peoples who have made modem history, than the belief in direct common descent, through males, from a common male ancestor, human or divine; and nothing could well be more numerous or distinct than the traces inhering in the very heart of their polity of an original Patriarchal organisation of the family as the archetype of their political order. (Chapter i, §§ 5, 6.)
It is c urious that Dr. Wil son states the Indian view, while ignoring India. Promiscuity belongs, he thinks, to "times of decadence, rather than 10 the origins of the race," polyandry where women were fewer than the men, polygyny among the wealthy (§ 7). Hence the Family ruled by the Father is the earliest unit, showing ''that clear authority and close organisation which was to serve in fullness of time as the prototype and model of the State" (Ibid) . In the Patriarchal Family sons and grandsons swelled the number, but "there was no majority for them while the father lived"; this group broadened into the Gens, and the Gentes into the Tribe, and "Tribes at length united to fonn a Stale" (§ 8). The State might be nomadic, "a travelling political organisation, a State without territorial boundaries onhe need of them" (§ 10). In this view of the State, Dr. Wilson remarks, that modem definitions do not concur with him; he says: .. , A State,' runs the modern definition, ' is a People organised by law within a definite territory "'. Dr. Wilson will nOl have this. He says: "The first builders of Govemment" saw no reason "why they might nol move their whole
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people, 'bag and baggage' to other lands" (§ (2). Dr. Wilson supports this novel view by the fact that the Franks were not confined to any
Frank-land, and their Kings were "Kings of he Franks," not of a territory. So there were "Kings of the English" for centuries. and John was the first who took the title of "King of England", Indian Kings preserved this idea as to towns and villages, we may note. We find
new towns, some miles from ruined or semiruined ones, whence the inhabitants had been bodily removed, not "hag and baggage," hut bundles and pots. Dr. Wilson urges: The original Governments were knit together by bonds closer than those of geography, more real than the bonds of mere contiguity. They were bound together by real 01 assumed kinship. They had a corporate existence which they recognised as inhering in their blood, and as expressed in all their daily relations with each other. They lived together because of these relations; they were not related because they lived together. (§§ II , 12.)
Not by Contract, Dr. Wilson decides, after glancing at that theory, but from the Family, arises the State. "The Family was the primal unit of political society, and the seed-bed of all larger growths of Government" (§ 22). Dr. Wilson quotes and agrees with John Morley' ~ standpoint in his criticism of Rousseau. In view of the observed and recorded experience of mankind, the ground and origin of society is not a compact; that never existed in any known case, and never was a condition of obligation either in primitive or developed societies, either between subjects and sovereign, or between the equal members of a sovereign body. The true ground is the acceptance of conditions which came into existence by the sociability inherent in man, and werc developed by man's sponlaneous search after convenience. (Rousseall. John Morley, Vol. ii. p. 183.)
Man dislikes loneliness., seeks his mate and his fellows. "Kinship and Religion operated as the two chjef fonnative influences" thinks Dr. Wilson (§ 25). Adoption into the Family admitted into the Family religious mysteries: And so too, Houses could grow by the adoption of families, through the cngrafting of the alien branches jOlo this same sacred stock of the esoteric religion of the kindred. Whether naturally. therefore, or artificially. Houses widened inlo tribes, and tribes into commonwealths, without loss of that kinship in the absence of which, to the thinking
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69
of primitive men, there could be no communion, and therefore no community at all. (§ 24.)
The Ancestors were worshipped as the Gods of the Family, and were accepted by the adopted member. In India this adoption survives, and the Family Pitrs are the Pitrs of the adopted son. As Tribes grew, lines of descent became obscured, and family government and race government became differentiated. The State continued to be conceived as a Family; but the headship of this huge and complex Family ceased to be natural and became political (§ 41). Dr. Wilson's definition of the State would seem to be: . The State is a body of persons descended from a common ancestor, and with a common Government. Sir Henry Maine, in his Anciellt Law, remarks that "the Unit of an ancient society was the Family, of a modem society the Individual" (Seventeenth impression, Chap. v, p. 126. John Murray, London). The elementary group is the Family. connected by common subjection to the highest male ascendant. The 'aggregation of Families forms the Gens, or House. The aggregation of Houses makes the Tribe, The aggregation of Tribes constitutes the Commonwealth. Are we at liberty to follow these indications, and to lay down that the Commonwealth is a collection of persons united by common descent from the progenitor of an original family? (Chap. v, p. 128.)
That was the view of Antiquity. and Maine accepts it, at least as it Legal Fiction, which permitted the useful practice of adoption. In later times, came in the principle of local contiguity, which has driven out the earlier, Bluntschli develops the idea of a descent from the common masculine ancestor into the unusual proposition that the State is masculine. And in this he is thorough and logical. To this the view of Aristotle distinctly leads; the citizen of the State is the man. Bluntschli says distinctly that a fa!11ily, a clan, may become the nucleus round which a State may in time form; but neither a family nor a horde is a State: "Without a Tribe, or, at a higher stage of civilisation, without a Nation, there is no State" (Book I, chap. i, p. 16). He is no way denies the line of evolution, Family, Tribe, etc. ; but he refuses the use of the word "State" to anything less than a Nation, and thus somewhat
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departs from his principle of reaching from historical facts to the
conception of a State, since he bids us survey the many actual States in the world 's history and discover "their common characteristics"
(p. 15). But when those are found and isolated. their presence in any aggregation of people should assign to that aggregation the name of
state. His speciality lies in the restriction of the State to masculinity_ You will remember his fin e description of the State, quoted last week on p. J 9 of my lecture. I recall only the points which I now need to emphasise: The State is in no way a life less instrument, a dead machine; it is a
living and therefore organised being... .!n the Slate spirit and body. wi ll and acti ve organs, are necessarily bound together in one life. The one National Spirit, which is something different from the average sum of the contemporary spirit of all citizens. is the Spirit of the State; the one National Will. which is different from the average will of the multitude. is the Will of the Slate .. ... 1t is a moral and spiritual organism, a great body which is capable of taking up into itself the feelings and thoughts of the Nation. of uuering Ihem in laws. and realising Ihem in acts; we are informed of moral qualilies and of the character of each State. History ascribes to the Stale a personality which, having spirit and body, possesses and manifests a will of its own... .. The State is par excellence, a Person. in the sense of public law. The purpose of the whole constitution is 10 enable the Person of the State to express and realise its will, which is different from the individual wills of all individuals, and different from the sum of them. (Book I, chap. i, pp. 18. 19,20. 22.)
He then proceeds to point out that the personality of the State is, however, only recognised by free people, and only in the civil ised Na tion-State has it attai ned to full efficacy.... .The same is true with regard 10 the masculine character of the modem State. This becomes first apparent in contrast with the feminine character of the Church." (Book I, chap. i, pp. 22. 23.)
Hence he defin es the State. after deSCribing its factors: To put together the result of this historical consideration. the general conception of the State may be determined as follows: "The State is a combination or association of men, in the fqnn of govemmem and governed. on a definite territory, united together into a moral. organised,
The State
71
masculine personali ly; or, more shortly-the Stale is the politically organised Natioml Person of a definite country." (Book I, Chap. i, p. 23.)
Now, the danger of this conception of the State, we have seen in the Germany of today. The State becomes the highest entity recognised by the People nnd Power becomes its chief characteristic. Whether the Power be embodied in a Person, as in the German "Allhighest," the representative of God on earth, or whether it be embodied in the Government of a Republic, or of a Parliament, it matters very little. For safety, we must resort to the Indian view, that above the scepter of Government authority, there is Dharma, the Law, establishing Righteousness, Justice, and Liberty, the fundamental principles on which the stability of the State itself it based. They must be recogni sed as essential to the unfolding of the Divine Nature in man, of the human Spirit. Brahman is free, righteous and just. and these qualities inh.ere in the Self, the Spirit. in man. Bluntschli looks forward to the Universal State, and points out that time is "bringing the Nations nearer to one another, and awakening the universal consciousness Of the community of mankind" (Book I, chap. ii, p. 31). Each State, he says, feels any disturbance in another State as an evil affecting itself. The European Nations, who "know their superiority over other Nations well enough," but "have not yet come to a clear understanding among themselves" as to how they shall "manage the world," must gain knowledge. Unit this has been done, the Universal Empire will be an idea after which many strive, which none can fulfil. But as an idea of the future, the general theory of the State cannot overlook it. Only in the Universal Empire wili the true human Stale be revealed. and in it intemationallaw will attain a higher fonn and an assured existence. To the Universal Empire the particular States ate related. as the Nations to Humanity.... The highest conception of the State-which, however, has not yet been realised- is thus: the State is Humanity organised, but Humanity as masculine, not feminine: the State is the Man. (Ibid. , p. 32.)
A rather curious and simple definition is that of Bodin: A righl Govemmeni. with sovereign power-~fseveral households and their common possessions.
This wou ld take us from a group of Families up to the Universal State.
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International Politics The Encyclopaedia Britannica remarks: In England, we may say, the notion of Slate, from the constitutional point of view, is sli\l inchoate, bUI the play ofintemational intercourse seems to be gradually leading to a clearer conception of the fact that
an increasing national responsibility requires a corresponding increase in the power of C
Much has been wrinen on the "science" of the Stale, or, as we prefer. in Anglo~Saxon Lands, to call it. "Political Science", In Germany the subject is dealt with as an independent branch of university education. Several of her universities have a slaatswisasa-schaflliche Facuillil. granting a special degree in the subject. In consequence of the great
auention paid to the subject in Gennany, her State polity has been largely the work of her political writers. The result has not unnaturally tended to a system bearing some resemblance to that of the American Union, with this very important difference, however, that whereas in the United States the federal power is derived from the democratic forces of the individual States, in Gennany it is derived from their aristocratic and absolutist force. GeJ/Il8n political thinkers. in fact, have worked out Staatsrecht as a comparative study, in which arguments in favour of absolute government have received as much careful consideration as those in favour of democratic institutions. and the Gennan State has developed upon lines based on the best theoretical arguments of these thinkers. There is • therefore. no anomaly in its practically absolutist government working out the most democratic refonns as yet put into legislative form. It follows, however. that Gennan theories are of lillie use in the consideration of the Stale problems with which British and American politicallhinkers have to deal. Anglo-Saxon institutions are following their independent development, and if the influence of foreign institutions is felt at all, it is probably that of the clear logical detail and cohesion of French institutions.
It is for you to study, to think over, to decide what "the State" should mean to you, how you mean to work out the State in India. Make some definitions for yourselves. I suggest the following as a fairly inclusive definition: A State is a multi-human organism, emOOdying a Life, inhabiting a definite Territory, with a Government as its executive, specialising o rgans fo r its activities, and shaping its evolution to achieve a common end.
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Th e Stare
73
Ifwe lesllhis by each larger Slate successivc\y we find it true. In the Family we have severa l persons, elders, contemporaries, youngers, living together as an organised unit; it li ves in a house; it has a Family Life, with the parents as ruler, and the various members specialise their work, to achieve the common end of Family happiness. This is equally true of the Village·State, the Tribe-State, the City-State, the Nation-State, the Commonwealth-State, the World-State, and each point is true in each. But why not try to better it?
5 Thomas Paine's Political Writings
OF THE LI MITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Among thc incivilities by which nations or indi viduals provoke and
irritate each other, Mr. Burke's pamphlet on the French Revolution is an c>;:traordinary instance. Neither the people of France nor the National Assembly were troubling themselves about the affairs of
England or the Engli sh Parliament; and thai Mr. Burke should commence an unprovoked attack upon them. both in Parliament and in public, is a conduct that cannot be pardoned on the score of manners nor justified on thai of policy. There is scarcely an epit het of abuse to be found in the English
language with which Mr. Burke has not loaded the French nation and the National Assembly. Everyth ing which rancor, prejudice, ignorance, or knowledge could suggest are poured forth in the copious fury of ncar four hundred pages. In the strain and on the plan Mr. Burke was writing. he might have written on to as many thousands. When the tongue or the pen is let loose ina frenzy of passio n, it is the man and not the subject that becomes exhausted . Hitherto Mr. Burke has not been mistaken and disappointed in the opinions he had formed of the 3ffairs of France; but such is the ingenuity of his hope, or the malignancy of his despair. that it furni shes him with ncw pretenses to go on. There was a time when it was impossible to make Mr. Burke believe there would be any revolution in France. His op inion then was that the French had neither spirit to undcl1ake it nor fortitude 10 support it. and now that there is ("Inc he seeks an escape by condemning it. Not sufficiently content with abusing the National Assembly, a great ,ial1 of his work is taken up with abus ing Dr. Priee (one of the
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75
best-hearted men that lives) and the two societies in England known by the name of the Revolution Society and the Society for Constitutional Information. Dr. Price had preached a sermon on the fourth of November, 1789, being the anniversary of what is called in England the revolution, which took place in 1688. Mr. Burke, speaking of this sermon, says, The. political divine proceeds dogmatically to asset that, by the principles of the Revolution, the people of England have acquired three fundamental rights: I. To choose our own governors. 2. To cashier them for misconduct. 3. To frame a government for ourselves. Dr. Price does not say that the right to do these things exists in this or in that person, or in this or in that description of persons, but that it exists in the whole, that is it a right resident in the nation. Mr. Burke, on the contrary, denies that such a right exists in the nation, either in whole or in part, or that it exists anywhere; and, what is still more strange and marvelous, he says, "that the people of England utterly disclaim such a right. and that they wi ll resist the practical assertion of it with their lives and fortunes." That men should take up arms and spend their lives and fortunes 1I0t to maintain their rights. but to maintain they have 1I0t ri ghts. is an entirely new species of discovery and suited to the paradoxical genius of Mr. Burke. The method which Mr. Burke takes to prove that the people of England had no such rights and that such rights do not now exist in the nation, ei ther in whole or in part. or anywhere at al1, is of the same marvelous and monstrous kind with what he has already said; for his arguments are that the persons or the generation of persons in whom they did exist are dead. and with them the right is dead also. To prove this. he quotes a declaration made by Parliament about a hundred years ago to William and Mary, in these words: "The Lords Spiritual and Temporal , and Commons, do, in the name of the people aforesaid" (meaning the people of England then living), "most humbly and faithfully submit themselves, their heirs and posterities,forever."
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He also quotes a clause of another act of Parliament made in the same reign, the terms of which, he says, "bind us" (meaning the people of that day) , "our heirs and our posterity, 10 Ihem, th eir heirs ar..d posterity, to the end of time."
Mr. Burke conceives hi s point sufficientl y established by produci ng these clauses, which he enforces by saying that they exclude the ri ght of the nation/orever. And not yet content with making such declarations, repeated over and over again, he further says "that if the
people of England possessed such a right before the Revolution" (which he acknowledges to have been the case, not o nly in England
but throughout Europe, at an early period), "yet that the English na/ioll did, at the lime of the Revolution, most solemnly renounce and abdicate it, for themselves, and for all their posterity, forever." As Mr. Burke occasionally applies the poison drawn from his horrid principles, not only to the English nation, but to thc French Revolution and the National Assembly, and charges that august. illuminated, and illuminating body of men with the epithet of "usurpers," I shan, sans cel"emollie, place another system of principles in opposition to his. The English Parliament of 1688 did a certain thing which, for themselves and their constituents, they had a right to do and which it appeared right should be done. But in addition to thi s right, which they possessed by delegation, they sellip another right by assumptioll, that of binding and controlling posterity to the end of time. The case, therefore, divides itself into two parts: the right which they possessed by del egation, and the right which they set up by assumption. The first is admitted, but with respect to the second, I reply: There never did, there never will , and there never can exist a parliament, or any description of men, or any generation of men, in any count ry, possessed of the right or the power of binding and controlling posterity to the "end of time," or of commanding forever how the world shall be governed o r who shal1 govern it; and therefore al1 such clauses, acts, or declarations, by which the makers of them attempt to do what they have neither the right nor the power to do, nor the power to execute, are in themselves null and void.
Thomas Paine s Political Writings
17
Every age and generation must be as free to a..:t for itself, in all cases, as the ages and generation which preceded il. The vanity and presumption of governing beyond the grave is the most ridiculous and insolent of all tyrannies. Man has no property in man; neither has any generation a property in the generations which are to follow. The Parliament or the people of 1688, or of any other period, had no more right to dispose oflhe people oflbe present day, or to bind or to control them in any shape whatever, than the Parliament or the people of the present day have to di spose of, bind, or control those who are to live a hundred or a thousand years hence. Every generation is and must be competent to all the purposes which its occasions require. It is the living, and not the dead, that are to be accommodated. When man ceases to be, his power and his wants cease with him; and having no longer any participation in the concerns of this world, he has no longer any authority in directing who shall be its governors, or how its government shall be organized or how administered. I am not contending for nor against any fonn of government, nor for nor against any part here or elsewhere. That which a whole nation chooses to do it has a right to do. Mr. Burke says, No. Where then does the right e~ist? I am comending for the rights oflhe living, and against their being willed away and controlled and contracted for by the manuscript assumed authority of the dead ; and Mr. Burke is contending for the authority of the dead over the rights and freedom of the living. There was a time when kings disposed of their crowns by will upon their deathbeds and consigned the people, like beasts of the field , to whatever successor they appointed. This is now so exploded as scarcely to be remembered and so monstrous as hardly to be believed. But the parliamentary clauses upon which Mr. Burke builds his political church are of the same nature. The laws of every country must be analogous to some common principle. In England, no parent or master, nor all the authority of Parliament, omnipotent as it has called itself, can bind or control the personal freedom even of an indi vidual beyond the age of twenty-one
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years. On what ground afrighl, then, could the Parliament of 1688, or any other parliament, bind all posterity forever? Those who have quieted the world and those who are not yet arrived in it are as remote from each other as the utmost stretch of moral imagination can conceive. What possible obligation, then, can exist between them; what rule or principle can be laid down that two
nonentities, the one out of existence and the other not in, and who never can meet in this world, that the one should control the other to the end of time?
In England, it is said that money cannot be taken out of the pockets of the people without their consent. But who authorized, or who could authorize, the Parliament of 1688 to control and take away the freedom of posterity, and limit and confine their right of acting in certain cases forever, wbo were not in existence to give or to withhold their consent? A greater absurdity cannot present itself to the understanding of man than what Mr. Burkl! offers to his readers. He tell s them, and he tells the world to come, that a certain body of men, who existed a hundred years ago, made a law; and that there docs not now exist in the nation , nor ever will, nor ever can, a power to alter it . Under how many subtleties or absurdities has the divine right to govern been imposed on the credulity of mankind! Mr. Burke has discovered a new one, and he has shortened his journey to Rome by appealing to the power of this infallible Parliament of former days; and he produces what it has done as of divine authority, for that power must certainly be more than human which no human power to the end of time can alter. But Mr. Burke has done some service. not to his cause, but to his country, by bringing those clauses into public view. They serve to demonstrate how necessary it is at all times to watch against the attempted encroachment of power and to prevent its running to excess. It is somewhat extraordinary that the offense for which James II was expelled, that of setting up power by assumpliofl. should be re-acted, under another shape and form, by the Parliament that expelled him. It shows that the rights of man were but imperfectly understood at the Revolution ; for certain it is that the right which that Parliament set up by assumptioll (for by delegation if had it not, and could not
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have it because none could give it) over the persons and freedom of posterity forever was the same tyrannical, unfounded kind which James attempted to set up over the Parl iament and the nation. and for which he was expelled. The only difference is (for in principle they differ not) that the one was a usurper over the living and the other over the unborn ; and as the one has no better authority to stand upon than the other, both of them must be equally null and void, and of no effect. From what, or from whence, does Mr. Burke prove the right of any human power to bind posterity forever? He has produced his clauses, but he must produce also hi s proofs that such a right existed and show how it existed. It is ever existed, it must now exist; for whatever appertains to the nature of man cannot be annihilated by man. It is the natUre of man to die, and he will continue to die as long as he continues to be born. But Mr. Burke has set up a sort of political Adam, in whom all posterity arc bound forever; he must therefore prove that his Adam possessed such a power or such a right.
The weaker any cord is, the less it will bear to be stretched and the worse is the policy to stretch it, unless it is intended to break it. Had a person contemplated the overthrow of Mr. Burke's positions, he would have proceeded as Mr. Burke has done. He would have magnified the authorities on purpose to have called the right of them into question and the instant the question of right was started the authorities must have been given up. It requires but a very sma ll glance of thought to perceive that, although laws made in one generation often continue in force through succeeding generations, yct they continue to derive their force from the consent of the li vi ng. A law not repealed continues in force , not because it cannot be repealed, but because it is not repealed; and the nonrepealing passes for consent.
But Mr. Burke's clauses have not even this qualification in their favour. They become null by attempling to become immortal. The nature of In em precludes consent. Th ey destroy the right which they might ha ve by grounding it on a right which they callflot have. Immortal power is nOI a human righI, and therefore cannol be a right of Parliament.
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The Parliament of 1688 might as well have passed an act to have authorized themselves to live forever as to make their authority 10 live
forever. All therefore that can be said of them is that they are a fonnality of words. ef as much import as if those who used them had addressed a congratulation to themselves and, in the oriental style of antiquity, had said, 0 Parliament, live forever! The c ircumstances of the world are continually changing, and the opinions of men change also ; and as government is for the living, and not for the dead, it is the living only that has any right in it. That
which may be thought right and found convenient in one age may be thought wrong and found inconvenient in another. In such cases, who is to decide, the living or the dead? As almost one hundred pages ofM. Burke's book are employed upon these clauses, it will consequently follow that if the clauses themselves, so far as they set up an assumed, usurped dominion over posterity forever, are unauthoritativc and in their nature null and void, that all his voluminous inferences and declamation drawn therefrom or founded thereon are null and void also, and on thi s ground I rest the maUer.
OF THE NATURAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS OF MAN I have now to follow Mr. Burke through a pathless wilderness of rhapsodies and a sort of descant upon governments. in which he asserts whatever he pleases, on the presumption of its being believed, without offeri ng either evidence or reasons for so doing. Before anything can be reasoned upon to a conclusio n, cen ain facts, principles, or data to reason from must be established, admitted, or deni ed. Mr. Burke, with hi s usual outrage, abuses the Declaration of the Rights o f Man: published by the National Assembly to France, as the basis on which the Constitution of France is built. This he calls "paltry and blurred sheets of paper about the rights of man." Does Mr. Burke mean to deny that mall has any rights? Ifhe does, then he must mean that there are no such things as rights anywhere and that he has none himself, for who is there is the world but man? But if Mr. Burke mea ns to admit that man has rights, the a.
(See pp. 96 ff.)
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question then will be, what are those rights, and how came man by them originally? The error of those who reason by precedents drawn from antiquity, respecting the rights of man, is that they do not go far enough into antiquity. They do not go the whole way. They stop in some of the intermediate stages of a hundred or a thousand years and produce what was then done as a rule for the present day. Thi s is no authority at all. If we travel still further into antiquity, we shall find a directly contrary opinion and practice prevailing; and if antiq:Jity is to he authority, a thousand such authorities may be produced, successively contradicting each other; but if we proceed on, we shall at last come out right: we sha ll come to the time when man came from the hand of his Maker. What was he then? Man. Man was hi s high and only title, and a higher cannot be given him. But of titles I shall speak hereafter. We have now arrived a Ine origin of man and at the origin of his rights. As to the manner in which the world has been governed from that day to this, it is no further any concern of ours than to make a proper use of the errors or the improvements which the history of it presents. These who lived a hundred or a thousand years ago were then moderns as we are now. They had their ancients, and those ancients had olhers, and we also shall be ancients in our turn . If the mere name of antiquity is to govern in the affairs of life, the people who are to li ve a hundred or a thousand years hence may as well take us for a prcceden!, as we make a precedent of those who lived hundred or a thousand years ago. The fact is that portions of antiquity, by proving everything. establish nothing. It is authority against authority all the way, till we come to the di vine origin of the rights of man at the creation. Here our inquiries find a resting place and our reason finds a home. If a dispute about the rights of man had arisen at a distance of a hundred years from the creation, it is to this source of authority they must have referred; and it is to the same source of authority that we must now refer. Though I mean not to touch upon any sectarian principle of religion. yet it may be worth observing that the genealogy of Christ is
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traced to Adam. Why then not trace the rights of man to the creation of man? I will answer the question . Because there have been upstart governments thrusting themselves between the presumptuously working
to unmake man. If any generation of men e ver possessed the right of dictating
the mode by which the world should be governed forever, it was the first generation that existed; and if that generation did it not, no succeeding generation can show any authority for doing it, nor can
set any up. The illuminating and divine principle of the equal rights of man (for it has its origin from the maker of man) relates not only to the living individuals, but 10 generations of men succeeding each other. Every generation is equal in rights to the generations which preceded it, by the same rule that every indi vidual is born equal in rights with his contemporary. Every history of the creatio n and every traditionary aCCOUnl, whether from the lettered or unlenercd world. however they may vary in their opinion or belief of cenain particulars, all agree in establishing one point. the unity of man ; by which I mean that men are all of olle degree, and consequently that all men are born equal and with equal natural rights, in the same manner as if posterity had been continued by creatioll instead of generation. the latter being only the mode by which the former is carried forward ; and consequently every child born into the world must be considered as deriving its existence from God. The world is as new to him as it was to the first man that existed, and his natural right in it is of the same kind. The Mosaic account of the creation, whether taken as divine authority or merely historical, is fully up to this point, the unily or equality o/mall. The expressions admit of no controversy. "And God said, let us make man in our own image. In the image of God created he him; male and female created he them." The distinction of sexes is poinled out, but no other distinction is even implied. If this be not divine authority, it is at least his torical authority and shows that the equality of man, so far from being a modem doctrine. is the oldest upon record. II is also to be observed that all the religions known in the world are founded, so far as they relate to man, on the unity ofmati, as being
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all of one degree. Whether In heaven or in hell , or in whatever state man may be supposed to exist hereafter, the good and the' bad are the only distinctions. Nay, even the laws of governments are obliged to slide into this princi ple, by making degrees to consist in crimes and not in persons.
It is one of the greatest of all truths, and of the highest advantage to cultivate. By considering man in this light, and by instructing him to consider himself in this light, it places him in a close connection with all his duties, whether to his Creator or to the creation, of which he is a part; and it is only when he forgets hi s origin, or, to use a more fashionable phrase, hi s birth and/ami/y, that he becomes dissolute. It is not among the least of the evils of the present existing governmenls in all parts of Europe, that man, considered as man, is thrown back to a vast distance from his Maker, and the artificial chasm filled up by a succession of barriers, or a sort of turnpike gates, through which he has to pass. I will quote Mr. Burke's catalogue ofbaniers that he has set up between man and his Maker. Putting himself in the character of a herald, he says: "We fear God: we look with awe to kings, with affection to parliaments, with duty to magistrates, with reverence to priests, and with respect to nobil ity." Mr. Burke has forgotten to put in "chivalry." He has also forgotten to put in Peter. The duty of man is not a wilderness of turnpike gates, through which he is to pass by tickets from onc to the other. It is plain and simple and consists but of two points: his duty to God, which every man must feel ; and with respect to his neighbour, to do as he would be done by. If those to whom power is delegated do well they will be respected, if not they will be despised; and with regard to those to whom no power is delegated, but who assume it, the rational world can know nothing of them. Hitherto we ~a ve spoken only (and that but in part) of the natural rightS of man. We have now to consider the civil rights of man and to show how the one originates from the other. Man did not enter into society to become worse than he was before, nor to have fewer rights than he had before, but to have those rights better secured. Hi s natural rights are the foundation of all hi s civil rights. But in order to pursue
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this distinction with more precision, it is necessary to make the different qualities of natural and civil rights. A few words will explain th is. Natural rights are those which appertain to man in right of hi s existence. Of this kind are all the intellectual rights, or rights of the mind, and also all those fights of acting as an individual for his own comfort and happiness which are not injurious to the natural rights of others. Civi l rights are those which appertain to man in right of his being a member of society. Every civil right has for its foundation some natural right pre-
existing in the individual, but 10 the enjoyment of which his individual power is not in all cases sufficiently competent. Of this kind are all those which relate to security and protection. From this short review it will be easy to distinguish between that class of natural rights which man retains after entering into society and those which he throws into the common stock as a member of society. The natural rights w hich he retains are all those in which the power to execute is as perfect in the individual as the right itself. Among this class, as is before mentioned. are all the intellectual rights, or rights of the mind; consequently religion is one of those rights. The natural rights which are not retained are all those in which, though the right is perfect in the individual, the power to execute them is defective. They answer not his purpose. A man, by natural righ t, has a right to judge in his own cause, and so far as the right of the mind is concerned he never surrenders it; but what avails it him to judge ifhe has not power to redress? He therefore deposits hi s right in the common stock of society and takes the ann of soc iety, of which he is a part, in preference and in addition to his own. Society grams him nothing. Every man is proprietor in society and draws on the capital as a matter of right. From these premises, two or three certain conclusions w ill follow:
First, that every civi l ri ght grows out of a natural right ; or, in other words, is a nalural right exchanged. Secondly, that civil power, properly considered as such. is made up of the aggregate of that class of the natural rights of man wh ich
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becomes defe(;tive in the individual in point of power and answers not his purpose, but when collected to a focus becomes competent to the purpose of everyone. Thirdly , that the power produced from the aggregate of natural rights, imperfe(;t in power in the individual, cannot be applied to invade the natural rights which arc retained in the individual and in which the power to executi ve is as perfect as the right itself. We have now, in a few words, traced man from a natural individual to a member of society and shown, or endeavored to show, the quality of the natural rights retained and those which are exchanged for civil rights. Let us now apply those principle to governments. OF THE NATURE OF GOVERNMENT In casting our eyes over the world, it is extremely easy to di stinguish the governments which have arisen out of society, or out of the social compact, from those which have not; but to place this in a clearer light than what a single glance may afford, it will be proper to take a review of the several sources from which the governments have arisen and Oil which they have been founded. They may be all compreheuded under three heads. Firs/, superstition, Secolldly, power. Thirdly, the common interests of society . and the common rights of man. The first was a government of prieslcraft, the second, of conquerors, and the third, of reason. When a set of artful men pretended, through the medium Q{A oracles, to hold intercourse with the Deity, a5 familiarly as they now march up the backstairs in European courts, the world was completely under the government of superstition. The oracles were consulted, and whatever they were made to say became the law ; and this sort of government lasted as long as this sort of superstition lasted. After these a race of conquerors arose whose government, like that of William the Conqueror, was founded in power, and the sword assumed the name of a scepter. Governments thus established last as long as the power to support them lasts; but that they might avail themselves of eVl!ry engine in their favour, they united fraud to force
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and set up and idol which they called "Divine Right." and which, in imitation of the Pope, who affects to be spiritual and temporal, and in contradiction to the founder of the Christian religion, twisted itself afterward into an idol of another shape, called "Church and State." The key of Saint Peter and the key of the treasury became quartered on one another, and the wondering. cheated multitude worshiped the invention. When I contemplate the natural dignity of man, when I feel (for
nature has not been kind enough to me to blunt my feelings) for the honour and happiness of its character, J become irritated at the attempt to govern mankind by force and fraud, as if they were all knaves and fools, and can scarcely avoid disgust at those who are thus imposed upon. We have now to review the governments which arise out of society, in contradistinction to those which arose out of superstition and conquest. It has been thought a considerable advance toward establiShing the principles of freedom to say that government is a compact between those who govern and those who are governed, but this cannot be true, because it is puning the effect before the cause; for as a man must have existed before governments existed, there necessarily was a time when governments did not exisl, and consequentl y there could origina lly exist no governors to form such a compact with.
The fact therefore must be that the individuals themselves, each in his own personal and sovereign right, entered into a compacr w;r" each other to produce a government; and this is the only mode in which governments have a right to arise and the only principle on which they have a right to exist. To possess ourselves of a clear idea of what government is, or ought to be, we must race it to its origin. In doing this, we shall easily discover that governments must have arisen either out of the people or over the people. Mr. Burke has made no di stinction. He investigates nothing to its source, and therefore he confounds everything; but he has signified hi s intention of undertaking at some future opportunity a comparison between the constitutions of England and France.
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As he thus renders it a subject of controversy by throwing the gauntlet, I take him upon his own ground. It is in high challenges that high truths have the right of appearing; and I accept it ~ith the more readiness because it affords me. at the same time, an opportunity of pursuing the subject with respect to governments arising out of society. But it will be first necessary to define what is meant by a "constitution." It is not sufficient that we adopt the word; we must fix also a standard signification to it. A constitution is not a thing in name only. but in fact. It has not an ideal. but a real existence; and wherever it cannot be produced in a visible form. there is none. A constitution is a thing anlecedefll to a government, and a government is only the creature of a constitution. The constitution of a country is not the act of its government. but of the people constituting a government.
It is the body of elements to which you can refer and quote article by article, and which contains the principles on which the government shall be establi shed, the manner in which it shall be organised, the powers it shall have, the mode of elections the duration of parliaments or by what other name such bodies may be called, the powers which the executive part of the government shall have, and, in fine, everything that relates to the complete organisation of a civil government and the principl es on which it shall act and by which it shall be bound. A constitution, therefore, is to a government what the laws made afterward by that government are to a court of judicature. The court of judicature does not make the laws, neither can it alter them; it only acts in conformity to the laws made. and the government is in like manner governed by the constitution.
OF ARISTOCRACY The French constitution says. " there shall be no titles," and of consequence all that class of equivocal generation which in some countries is called "aristocracy" and in others ''nobility'' is done away, and the "peer" is exalted into "man." Titles are but nicknames. and evcry nickname is a title. The thing is perfectly harmless in itself, but it marks a sort of foppery in the human character which degrades it. It renders man diminutive in things
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which are great, and the counterfeit of woman in things which are little. It talks about its fin e blue "riband" like a girt, and shows its new "garter" like a child. A certain writer, of some antiquity, says, "When I was a chi ld, I thought as a c hild; but when I became a man, I put
away childish things." It is, properly. from he elevated mind of France that thc foll y of titles has been abolished. It has outgrown the baby clothes ar"caunt"
and "duke," and breached itselfin manhood . France has not leveled, it has exalted. It has put down the dwarf to set up thc man . The insignificance of a senseless word like "duke," "count," or "earl " has ceased to please. Even those w ho possessed them have disowned the g ibberish and as they outgrew the rickets have despised thc rattlc. The genuine mind of man, thirsting for its native home, society, contemns the gewgaws that separate him from it. Titles are like c ircles drawn by the magician 's wand to contract the sphere of man 's felicit y. He livt:s immured with in the Bastill e of a word and surveys at a distance the envied life of man. Is it then any wonder that titles should fa ll in France? Is it not a greater wonder they should be kept up anywhere? What are they? What is their wort h and "what is their amount?" When we think or speak of a "judge" or a "genera l," we associate with it the ideas of office and c haracter, we think of gravity in the one and bravery in the othcr; but when we use a word merely as a title, no ideas associate with it. Through all the vocabulary of Adam, there is no such an animal as a duke or a count; neither can we connect any idea to the words. Whether they mean strength or weakness, wisdom or fo ll y, a child or a man, or a rider or a horse, is all equi vocal. W hat respect then can be pa id to that which describes nothing and which means nothing? Imagi nation has given figu re and character to centaurs, satyrs, and down to all the fai ry tribe, but titles baffle even the powers of fancy a nd are a chimerical nondescript. But this is not al l. If a whole country is disposed to hold them in contempt, all their value is gone and none wil l own them. It is common opi nion only that makes them anyth ing or nothing, or worse than nothing. There is no occasion to take titles away, for they take themselves away when society concurs to ridicule them. Thi s species
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of imaginary consequence has visibly declined in every part of Europe. and it hasteos to its exist as the world of reason continues to rise. There was a time when the lowest class of what are called nobility was more thought of than the highest is now. and when a man in armour riding through Christendom in search of adventure was more started at than a modem duke. The world has seen this folly fall, and is has fallen by being laughed at, and the farce of titles will follow its fate. The patriots of France have discovered in good time that rank and dignity in society must take a new ground. The old one has fallen through. It must now take the substantial ground of character, instead of the chimerical ground of titles; and they have brought their titles to the altar and made of them a burnt offering to reason. Ifno mischiefhas annexed itself to the folly of titles, they would not have been worth a serious and formal destruction, such as the National Assembly have decreed them; and this makes it necessary to inquire further into the nature and character of aristocracy. That, then, which is called aristocracy in some countries and nobility in others arose out of the governments founded upon conquest. It was originally a military order for the purpose of supporting military government (for such were all governments founded in conquest); and to keep up a succession of this order for the purpose for which it was establi shed, all the younger branches of those families were disinherited and the law of primogenitureship set up. The nature and character of aristocracy shows itself to us in this law. It is a law against evcry law of nature, and nature herself calls for its destruction . Establish family justice, and aristocracy falls. By the aristocraticallaw ofprimogenitureship, in a family of six children. five are exposed. Aristocracy has never more than one child. The rest are begotten to be devoured. They are thrown to the cannibal for prey, and the natural parent prepares the unnatural repast. As everything which is out of nature in man affects, more or less, the interest of society, so does this . All the children which the aristocracy disowns (which are all except the eldest) are, in general, cast like orphans on a pari sh, to be provided for by the public, but at
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a greater charge. Unnecessary offices and places in governments and courts are created at the expense of the public 10 maintain them. With what kind of parental reflections can be father or mother contemplate their younger offspring? By nature they are children and by marriage they are hei rs, but by aristocracy they are bastards and orphans. They are the flesh and blood of their parents in one line, and
nothing akin to them in the odler. To restore, therefore, parents to their chi ldren and chi ldren to their parenls--relalions to each other and man to society-and to cxtenninate the monster aristocracy, rOOI and branch, the French co nstitution has destroyed the law o f primogenitureship. Here then lies the monster; and Mr. Burke, if he pl eases, may write its epitaph. Hitherto we have considered aristocracy chiefly in one point o f view. We have now to consider it in another. Bul whether we view it befo re or behind, or s ideways, or anyway else, domestica ll y o r publicly, it is still a monster. In France, aristocracy has o ne feature less in the countenance than that it has in some other countries. It did not compose a body of hereditary legislators. It was not "a corporation of aristocracy," for such I have heard M. de Lafayette d escribe an English House of Peers. LeI us then examine the grou nds upon which the French constitution has resolved against having such a House in France: Because, in the first place, as is already mentioned, aristocracy is kept up by family tyranny and injustice.
Secondly, because there is an unusual unfitness in an aristocracy to be legislators for a nation. Thei.r ideas of "distributive justice" are corrupted at the very source. They begin life by trampling on all their younger brothers and sisters and relations o f every kind, and are taught and educated so to do. With what ideas of justice or honour can that man enter a house of legislation who absorbs in his own person the inheritance of a whole family of children or doles out to them some pitiful portion with the insolence o f a gift? Thirdly. beca use the idea of hered itary legi slat o rs is as inconsistent as that o f hereditary judges or hereditary juries, and as absurd as a hereditary mathematician or a hereditary wise man, and as ridiculous as a hereditary poet-laureate.
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Fourthly, because a body of men holding themselves accountable to nobody ought not to be trusted by an ybody. Fifthly, because it is continuing the uncivilized principles of the governments founded in conquest and the base idea of man having property in man and governing him by personal right. Sixthly, because aristocracy has a tendency to degenerate the human species. By the universal economy of nature it is known, and by the instance of the Jews it is proved, that the human species has a tendency to degenerate, in any small number , of persons, when separated from the general stock of society and intermarrying constantly with each other. It defeats even its pretended and end becomes in time the opposite of what is noble in man. Mr. Burke talks of nobility; let him show what it is? The greatest characters the world has known have risen on the democratic fl oor. Aristocracy has not been able to keep a proportionate pace with democracy.
The artificial noble shrinks into a dwarf before the nobl~ of nature; and in the few instances of those (for there are some in all countries) in whom nature, as by a miracle, has survived in aristocracy, those men despise it.
OR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM The French constitution has abolished or renounced lo/era/ion and intolerance also, and has established universal right of conscience. Toleration is not th e oppos ite of intol erat ion , but is the cOllllterfeit of it. Both are despotisms. The one assumes to itself the right of withholding liberty of conscience, and the other of granting it. The one is the Pope anned with fire and faggot , and the other is the Pope selling or granting indulgences. The fonner is church and state, and the latter is church and traffic . But toleration may be viewed in a much stronger light. Man worships not himself but hi s Maker; and the liberty of conscience which he claims is nOI for the service of himself but of hi s God. In this case, therefore, we must necessarily have the associated idea of two beings: the mortal who renders the worship, and the immortal being who is worshiped.
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Tolcnltion therefore, places itself not between man and man. nor between church and church, nOT between onc denomination of religion and another, but between God and man- between the being who worships and the being who is worshiped; and by the same act of assumed authority by which it tolerates man to pay his worship, it presumptuously and blasphemously sets up itself to tolerate the Almighty to receive it. Were a bill brought into Parliament entitled, "An act to tolerate or grant liberty to the Almighty to receive the worship of a Jew or a Turk" or "to prohibit the Almighty from receiving it," all men would startle and call it blasphemy. There would be an uproar. The presumption of toleration in religious maners would then present itself unmasked; but the presumption is not the less because the name of man only appears to those laws, for the associated idea of the worshiper and the worshiped cannot be separated. Who, then, art thou, vain dust and ashes! by whatever name thou art called, whether a king, a bishop, a church or a state, a parliament or anything else, that obtrudest thine insignificance between the soul of man and his Maker'? Mind thine own concerns. Ifhe believes not as thou believest, it is a proof that thou believest not as he believeth, and there is no earthly power can detennine between you. With respect to what are called denominations of religion, if everyone is left to judge of his own religion, there is no such thing as a religion that is wrong; but if they are to judge of each other's religion, there is no such thing as a religion that is right, and therefore all world is right or all the world is wrong. But with respect to religion itself, without regard to names and as directing itself from the universal family of mankind to the divine object of all adoration, it is man bringing to his Maker the fruits of his heart; and though these fruits may differ from each other like the fruits of the earth, the grateful tribute of everyone is accepted. A bishop of Durham, or a bishop of Winchester. or the archbishop who heads the dukes will not refuse a tithe sheaf of wheat because it is not a cock of hay, nor a cock of hay because it is not a sheaf of what, nor a pig because it is neither the one nor the other; but these same persons, under the figure of an established church, will not pennit their Maker to receive the various tithes of man 's devotion.
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One of the continual choruses of Mr. Burke's book is "church and state." He does not mean some one particular church or some one particular state, but any church and state; and he uses the renn as a general figure to hold forth the political doctrine of always uniting the . church with the state in every country, and he censures the National Assembly for not having done th is in France. Let us bestow a few thoughts on this subject. All religions are in their nature mild and benign and united with principles of morality. They could not have made proselytes at first by professing anything that was vicious, cruel, persecuting, or inunoral. Lik.e everything else, they had their beginning; and they proceeded by persuasion, exhortation, and example. How, then, is it that they lose their native mildness and become morose and intolerant?
It proceeds from the connection which Mr. Burke recommends. By engendering the church with the state, a sort of mule animal, capable only of destroying, and not of breeding up. is produced called. "the church established by law." It is a stranger, even from its birth. to any parent mother on which it is begotten and whom in time it kicks
out and destroys. The Inquisition in Spain does not proceed from the religion originally professed, but from thi s mule animal engendered between .'. the church and the state. The burnings in Smithfield proceeded from the same heterogeneous production; and it was the regeneration of this strange animal in England afterward that renewed rancor and irreligion among the inhabitants and that drove the people called Quakers and Dissenters to America. Persecution is not an original feature in any religion. but it is always the strongly marked feature of all law religions, or religions established by law. Take away the law establishment, and every religion reassumes its original benignity. In America, a Catholic priest is a good citizen, a good character, and a good neighbour ; an Episcopal minister is of the same description; and this proceeds, independently of the men, from there being no law establishment in America. If, also, we view this mattcr in a temporal sense, we shall see the ill effects it has had on the prosperity of nations. The union of
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church and state has impoveri shed Spain. The revoking the Edict o f Nantes drove the silk manu facture from France into England, and church and state are now driving the cotton manufacture from England
to America and France. Let then Mr. Burke continue to preach hi s antipolitical doctrine o f church and state. It will do some good. The National Assembly will not fo llow his advice, but will benefit by his folly. It was by observing the ill effects o f it in Eng land that America has been warned against it; and it is by experiencing them in France that the National Assembly have aboli shed it and, like America, have established universal righ, of conscience and universal right of citizellship.b b.
When in any country we see extraordinary circumstances taking place, they naturally lead any man who has a talent for observation and investigation to inquire into the causes. The manufactures of Manchester, Binningham, and Sheffield are the pri ncipal manufactures in England. From whence did this arise? A little observation wi ll explain the case. The principal and the generality of the inhabitants of those places are not of what is called in England "the church established by law"; and they or their fathers (for it is within but a fe w years) withdrew from the persecution of the chartered towns, where test laws more particu larly operale, and established a sort of asylum for themselves in those places. It was the only asylum that then offered, for the rest of Europe was worse. But the case is not changing. France and America bid a ll comers welcome, and initiate them into all the rights of citizenship. Policy and interest. therefore, will, but perhaps too late, dictate in England what reason and j ustice could nOI. Those manufactures are withdrawing and are arising in other places. There is now (1791) erecting at Passy, three mites from Paris, a large cotton milt. and several are already ere<:ted in America. Soon after the rejecting th e bill for repea ling the test law, one of th e richest manufacture rs in England said in my hearing, "England. Sir, is not a country for a Dissenter to live in-we must go to France." These are truths, and it is doing justice to both parties to tell them. It is chiefly the Dissenters who have carried English man ufactures to the height they are now at, and the same men have it in their power to carry them away; and though those manufactu res would afterward continue to be made in those places, the forei gn market would be losl. There are frequentl y appearing in the London Gazette extracts from certain acts to prevent machines and, as fa r as it can extend to, persons from going out of the country. (Coll/d.)
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The conspiracy being thus dispersed, one of the first works of the National Assembly. instead of vindictive proclamations. as has been the case with other governments, published a Declaration of the Rights of man, as the basis on which the new constitution was to be built, and which is here subjoined.
DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF CITIZENS BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF FRANCE The representatives of the people of France, formed into a National Assembly. considering that ignorance, neglect, or contempt of human rights are the sole causes of public misfortunes and corruptions of government. have resolved to set forth in a solemn declaration these natura l, imprescriptible. and unalienable rights; that, this declaration being constantly present to the minds of the members of the body social , they may be ever kepI attentive to their rights and their duties; that the act of the legislat ive and executive powers of government, being capable of being every moment compared with the end of political institut ions, may be more respected; and also Ihal the future claims of Ihe citizens, being directed by simple and incontestible principles, may always tend to the maintenance of the constitution and the general happiness. For these reasons the National Assembly does recognize and declare, in the presence of the Supreme Being. and with the hope of His blessing and favour, he following sacred rights of men and of citizens: I. Mell are bom , and always cOlltinlte.free alld equal ill respect of their rights. Civil distillctiolls. therefore. call be foullded ollly on public utility.
b. (Collld.) It appears from these that the ill effects of the test laws and church establishment begin to be much suspected. but the remedy of force can never supply the remedy of reason. In the progress of less than a century. all Ihe unrepresented pan of England, of all denominations. which is at least a hundred times Ihe most numerous, may begin to feel the necessity ofa constitution. and then allihose matter will come regularly before them.
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n. The end of all political associations is the preservation of the nalural and imprescriptible rights of man; and these rights are liberty, property, security, and resislance of oppression. Ill. The nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty; nor can any individual or any body of men be entitled to any authority which is nOI expressly derivedfrom it. IV. Political liberty consists in the power of doing whatever does not injure another. The exercise of the natural rights of every man has no other limits than those which are necessary to secure to every other man the free exercise of the same rights, and these limits are detenninable only by the law. V. The law ought to prohibit only actions hurtful to society. What is not prohibited by the law should not be hindered; nor should anyone be compelled to that which the law does not require. VI. The law is an expression of the will of the community. All citizens have a right to concur, either personally or by their representatives, in its fonnation. It should be the same to all, whether it protects or punishes; and all being equal in irs sight are equally
eligible to all honours. places, and employments, according to their different abilities. withoul any olher distinction than that crealed by their virtues and talents. VII. No man should be accused, arrested, or held in confinement, except in cases detennined by the law and according to the forms which it has prescribed. All who promote, solicit, execute, or cause to be executed arbitrary orders ought to be punished, and every citizen called upon or apprehended by virtue of the law oUght immediately to obey and renders himself culpable by resistance. VIII . The law ought to impose no other penalties but such as are absolutely and evidently necessary, and no one oUght to be punished but in virtue of a law promulgated before the offense and legally applied. IX . Every man being presumed innocent till he has been convicted, whenever his detention becomes indispensable, all rigor to him- more than is necessary to secure his person--ought to be provided against by the law.
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X. No man oUght to be molested on account of his opinions,. not even on account of his religious opinions, provided his avowal of them does not disturb the public order established by the law.
XI. The unrestrained communication of thoughts and opinions being one of the most precious rights of man, every citizen may speak, write, and publish freely, provided he is responsible for the abuse of this liberty in cases determined by the law. XU. A public force being necessary to give security to the rights of men and of citizens, that force is instituted for the benefit of the community, and not for the particular benefit of the persons with whom it is entrusted.
XIII. A common contribution being necessary for the support of the public force and for defraying the other expenses of the government, it ought to be divided equally among the members of the community, according to their abilities. XIV. Every citizen has ~ right, either by himself or his representative, to a free voice in detennining the necessity of public contributions, the appropriation of them, and their amount, mode of assessment, and duration.
Xv. Every community has a right to demand of all its agents an account of their conduct. XVI. Every community in which a separation of powers and a security of rights is not provided for wants a constitution. XVII . The rights to property being inviolable and sacred, no one ought to be deprived of it, except in cases of evident public necessity, legally ascertained, and on condition of a previous just indemnity.
OBSERVATIONS ON THE DECLARATION
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conformable to rights a lready declared. But it is questioned by some very good people in France, as we ll as in other countries, whether the
tenth article sufficiently guarantees the right it is intended to accord with; besides which, it takes off from the divine dignity of religion and weakness its operative force upon the mind to make it a subject ofhurnan laws. It then presents itselfto man like light intercepted by a cloudy medium, in which the source of it is obscured from his sight, and he sees nothing to reverence in the dusky ray.c The remaining art icl es, beginning with th e twelfth, are substantially contained in the principles of the preceding artic les; but in the particular situation in w hich France then was, having to undo what was wrong as well as to sct up what was right, it was proper to be more particular than what in another condition of things would be necessary.
Wh ile the Declaration of Right s .was before the National Assembly, some of its members remarked that, if a Declaration of Rights was publi shed, it should be accompanied by a Declaration of Duties. The observation di scovered a mind that reflected, and it only erred by not reflecting far enough. A Declaration of Rights is, by reciprocity. a Declaration of Duties also. Whatever is my right as a man is also the right of another, and it becomes my duty to guarantee as well as to possess.
c.
There is a single idea which, if it strikes rightly upon the mind cither in a _. legal or a religious sense, will prevent any man or any body of men or any government from going wrong on the subject of religion, which is thaI before any human institutions of government were known in the world there existed, if I may so express it, a compact between God and man from the beginning of time; and that, as the relation and condition which man in his individual person stands in toward his Maker cannot be changed or any ways altered by any human laws or human authority, thai religious devotion which is :l pan of this compact cannot so much as be made a subject of human laws and that all laws must confonn themselves to this prior existing compact and not assume to make the compact confonn to the laws, which, besides being human, are subsequent thereto. The fi rst act of man, when he looked around and saw himself a creature which he did not make and a world furnished for his reception, must have been devotion; and devotion must ever continue sacred to every individual man as it appears right to him, and governments do mischief by interfering.
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The three first articles are the basis of liberty, as well individual as national ; nor can any counuy be called free whose government does not take its beginning from the principles t}ley contain and continue to preserve them pure; and the whole of the Declaration of Rights is of more value to the world and will do more· good than all the laws and statutes that have yet been promulgated. In the declaratory eX.Qrdium which prefaces the Declaration of Rights, we see the solemn and majestic spectacle of a nation opening its commission, under the auspices of its Creator, to establi sh a government; a scene so new and so transcendently unequaled by anything in the European world that the name of a revolution is diminutive of its character, and it rises into a regeneration of man. What are the present governments of Europe but a scene of iniquity and oppression? What is that ~f England? Do not its own inhabitants say it is a market where every man has his price, and where corruption is common traffic , at the expense of a deluded people? No wonder, then, that the French Revolution is traduced. Had it confined itself merely to the destruction of flagrant despotism, perhaps Mr. Burke and some others had been silent. Their cry now is, "It is gone too far"- that is, it has gone too far for them. It stares corruption in the face, and the venal tribe are all alarmed. Their fear discovers itself in their outrage, and they are but publishing the groans of a wounded vice. But from such opposition the French Revolution, instead of suffering, receives a homage. The more it is struck, the more sparks it will emit; and the fear is it will not be struck enough. It has nothing to dread from attacks; truth has given it an establishment, and time will record it with a name as lasting as his own. Having now traced the progress of the French Revolution through most of its principal stages, from its comnlencement to the taking of the Bastille and its establishment by the Declardtion of Righls, I will close the subject with the energetic apostrophe of M. de Lafayette: "May this great monument raised to Liberty serve as a lesson 10 the oppressor and an example to the oppressed!''
See page ( 182) of this work.- N.B. Since the taking of the Bastille, the occurrences have been published; but the mailers recorded in this narrative
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OF HEREDITARY GOVERNMENl' Notwithstanding the nonsense--for it deserves no better name-that
Mr. Burke has asserted about hereditary rights and hereditary succession, and that a nation has not a right to fonn a government for itself, it happened to fall in his way to give some account of what government is. "Govemment," says he, "is a contrivance of human wisdom." Admitting that government is a contrivance of human wisdom,
it must necessarily follow that hereditary succession and hereditary rights (as they are called) can make no part of it, because it is impossible to make wisdom hereditary; and on the other hand. that
cannot be a wise contrivance which in its operation may commit the government of a nation 10 the wisdom of an idiot. The ground which Mr. Burke now takes is fatal to every part of his cause.
The argument changes from hereditary rights to hereditary wisdom; and the question is, Who is the wisest man? He must now show that everyone in the line of hereditary succession was a Solomon, or his title is no good to be a king. What a stroke has Mr. B!Jrke now made! To use a sailor's phrase, he has 'swabbed ~e deck" and scarcely left a name legible in the list of kings, and he has mowed down and thinned the House of Peers with a scythe as fonnidable as death and time. But Mr. Burke appears to have been aware of this retort. and he has taken care to guard against it by making government to be not only a contrivance of human wisdom but a monopoly of wisdom. He puts the nation as fools on one side and places his government of wisdom. all wise men of Gotham, on the other side; and he then proclaims and says that "men have a right that their wants should be . provided for by this wisdom." Having thus made proclamation, he next proceeds to explain to them what their wants are, and also what their rights are. In this he has succeeded dexterously, for he makes their wants to be a want of wisdom; but as this is but cold comfort, he then infonns are prior to that period. and some of Ihem, as may be easily seen, can be but very lillie known. e.
(From " Miscellaneous Chapter," Part I.)
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them chat they have a right (not to any of the wisdom) but to be governed by it; and in order to impress them with a solemn reverence for this monopoly government of wisdom and of its vast capacity for all purposes, possible or impossible, right or wrong, he proceeds with astrological, mysterious importance to tell them its powers in these words: The rights of man in government are their advantages; and these are often in balances between differences of good; and in compromises sometimes between good and evil, and sometimes between evil and evil. Political reason is a computing principle; adding, sub-tracting, multiplying, and dividing, morally and not metaphysically or mathematically, true moral demonstrations. As the wondering audience whom Mr. Burke supposes himself talking to may not understand all this learned jargon, I will undertake to be its interpreter. The meaning then, good people, of all this is thaI governmem is govemed by no principle whatever; that it can make evil good, or good evil, just as it pleases. In short. lhat governmelll is arbitrary power. But there are somethings which Mr. Burke has forgonen. First, he has not shown where the wisdom originally came from; and, secondly, he has not shown by what authority it first began to act. In the manner he introduces the matter, it is either government stealing wisdom or wisdom stealing government. It is without an origin, and its powers without authority. In short, it is usurpation. But, to arrange this matter in a clearer view than what general expressions can convey, it will be necessary to state the distinct heads under which (what is called) a hereditary crown or, more properly speaking, a hereditary succession to the government of a nation can be considered,r which are:
First, the right of a particular family to establish itself. Secondly, the right of a nation to establish a particular family. With respect to the firsl of these heads, that of a family establishing itself with hereditary powers on its own authority and independent of the consent of a nation , all men will concur in calling f.
(5« p. 161.)
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it despotism; and it would be trespassing on their understanding to attempt to prove it.
But the secolld head, that of a nation establishing a partioular family with heredilary powers, does not present itself as despotism on the first reflection; but if men will permit a second reflection to take place and carry that reflection forward bUI one remove out of their
own persons to that of their offspring, , they will then see that hereditary succession becomes in its consequences the same despotism to others which they reprobated for themselves. It operates to preclude the consent of the succeeding generations, and the preclusion of consent
is
despot~sm.
When the person who at any time shall be in possession of a government, or those who stand in succession to him, shall say to a nation, I hold his power in "contempt" of you, it signifies not on what authority he pretends to say it. It is no relief but an aggravation to a person in slavery to refiectlhat he was sold by his parent; and as that wh ich heighten the criminality of an act cannot be produced to prove the legality of it, hereditary succession cannot be established as a legal thing. In order to arrive to a more perfect deci sion on this head, it will be prop·er to consider the generation which undertakes to establish a family with hereditary powers, apart and separate from the generations which are to follow ; and also to consider the character in wh ich the first generation acts with respect to succeeding generations. The generation which first selects a person and pUIS him at the head of its government, either with the titl e of king or any other di stinction, acts its OWI/ choice, be it wise or fooli sh, as a free agent for itself. The person so set up is not hereditary, but selected and appoi nted; and the generation who sets him up docs not live under a hereditary government, but under a government of its own choice and establishment. Were the generation who sets him up and the person so set up to live forever, it never could become hereditary succession; and, of consequence, hereditary succession can only fo llow on the death of the first parties. As therefore hereditary succession is out of the question with res pect to the first generation, we have now to consider the character
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in which ,hal generation acts with respect to the commenci ng generation and to all succeeding ones.
It assumes a character to which it has neither right nor title. It changes itselffrom a legislator to a testator and affects to make its will , which is to have operation after the demise of the makers, to bequeath the government; and it not only attempts to bequeath but to establish on the succeeding generation a new and different form of government under which itself lived. Itself, as is already observed, lived not under a hereditary gove rnmen t but under a gove rnm e nt of its own choice a nd establishment; and it now attempts, by virtue of a will and testament (which it has not authority to make), to take from the commencing generation and all future ones the rights and free agency by which itself acted. But, exclusive of the right whic h any generation has to act collectively as a testator, the objects to which it applies itself in this case are not within the compass of any law or of any wi ll or testament. The rights of men in society are neither devisable nor transferable nor annihilable, but are descendible only; and it is not in the power of any generation to intercept finally and cuI off the descent. If the present generation, or any other, are disposed to be slaves, it does not lessen the ri ght of the succeedi ng generation to be free; wrongs cannot have a legal descent. When Mr. Burke attempts to maintain that the English Ilalioll did allhe Revolution of / 688 most solemnly renounce and abdicate their right for themselves and for all their poslerity forever, he speaks a language that merits not repl y and which can only excite contempt for his prostitute principles or pity for his ignorance. In whatever light hereditary succession, as growing out of the will and testament of some fonner generation, presents itself, it is an absurdity. A cannot make a will to take from B the property of Band give it to C; yet thi s is he manner in which (what is called) hereditary succession by law operates. A certain fonner generation made a will to take away the rights of the commencing generation and all future ones, and to convey those rights to a third person, who afterward comes forward and tells them, in Mr. Burke's language, that they have flO rights, that their rights are
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already bequeathed to him, and that he will govern in conlemp' of them. From such principles and such ignorance, good Lord, deliver the world! CONCLUSION
Reason and ignorance, the opposites of each other, influence the great bulk of mankind . If either of these can be rendered sufficiently extensive in a country, the machinery of government goes easily on. Reason shows itself, and ignorance submits to whatever is dictated to it.
The two modes of government which prevail in the world are. first. government by election and representation; secondly, government by hereditary succession. The former is generally known by the name of republic; the latter by that of monarchy and aristocracy. Those two distinct and opposite forms erect themselves on the two distinct :and opposite bases of. reason and ignorance. As the exercise of government requires talents and abilities, and as talents and abilities cannot have hereditary descent, it is evident thai hereditary succession requires a belief from man to which his reason cannol subscribe and which can only be established upon his ignorance; and the more ignorant any country is, the better it is fined for this species of government. On the contrary, government in a well-constituted republic requires no belieffTom man beyond what his reason can give. He sees the rationale of the whole system, its origin and its operation; and as it is best supported when best understood, the human faculties act with boldness and acquire, under this form of government, a gigantic manliness. As, therefore, each of those forms acts on a different base-the one moving freely by the aid of reason, the other by ignorance-we have next to consider what it is that gives motion to that species of government which is called mixed government, or, as it is sometimes ludicrously styled., a government of this, thaI. and I'olher. The moving power of this species of government is, of necessity, conuption. However imperfect election and representation may be in mixed governments, they still give exercise to a greater portion of
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reason than is convenient to the hereditary part, and therefore it becomes necessary to buy the reason up. A mixed government is an imperfect everything, cementing and soldering the discordant parts together by corruption to act as a whole. Mr. Burke appears highly digested that France, since the had resolved on a revolution, did riot adopt what he calls "a British constitution" ; and the regretful manner in which he expresses himself on this occasion implies a suspicion that the British constitut ion needed something to keep its defects in countenance. In mixed governments, there is no responsibility; the parts cover each other till responsibility is lost, and th e corruption which moves the machine contrives at the same time its own escape. When it is laid down as a maxim that a king can do 110 W/"olIg, it places him in a state of similar security wi th that of idi ots and persons insane, and responsibility is out of the question with respect to himself. It then descends upon the minister, who shelters himself WIder a majority in Parliament, which, by places, pensions, and corruption, hc can always command; and that majority justifies itself by the same authority with which it protects the minister. In this rotary motion, responsibility is thrown off from the parts and from the whole. When there is a part in a government which can do no wrong, it implies that it does nothing and is only the machine of another power, by whose advice and direction it acts. What is supposed to be the kind in mixed governments is the cabinet ; and as the cabinet is always a part of the Parliament and the members justifying in one character what they advise and act in another. a mi xed government becomes a contin ual enigma, e ntaili ng upon a cou;,try, by the quantity of corruption necessary to solder the parts, the expense of supporting all the (onns of government at once and finally resolving itself into a government by committee, in which the advisers, the actors, the approvcrs, the justifiers, the persons responsible, and the persons not responsible are the same persons. By this pantomimical contrivance and change of scene and character, the parts help each other out in matters which neither of them singly would assume to act. When money is to be obtained, the mass of variety apparent ly dissolves, and a profusion of parliamentary praises passes between the parts. Each admires with astonishment the
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wisdom, the liberality. the disinterestedness of the other; and all of them breathe a pitying sigh at the burdens of the nation. But in a well-constituted republic, nothing of this soldering, praising. and pitying can take place; the representation being equal throughout the country and complete in itself, however it may be arranged into legislative and executive, they have all one and the same natural source. The parts are not foreigners 10 each other. like democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy. As there are no discordant distinctions, there is nothing to corrupt by compromise nor confound by contrivance. Public measures appeal of themselves to the understanding of the nation, and, resting on their own merits, disown any flattering application to vanity. The continual whine of lamenting the burden of taxes, however successfully it may be practiced in mixed governments, is inconsistent with the sense and spirit of a repUblic . If taxes are necessary, they are of course advantageous; but if they require an apology, the apology itself implies an impeachment. Why then is man thus imposed upon, or why does he impose upon himself? When men are spoken of as kings and subjects , or when govemment . is mentioned under the distinct or combined heads of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, what is it that reasoning man is to understand by the terms? If there really existed in the world two or more distinct and separate clements of human power, we shou ld then see the several origins to which th,?se terms would descriptively app!y; but as there is but one species of man, there can be but o ne clement of human power, and that element is man himself. Monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy are but creatures of imagination; and a thousand such may be contrived. as well as three. From the revolutions of America and France and the symptoms that have appeared in other countries, it is evident that the opinion of the world is changed with respect to systems of government, and that revolutions 3re not within the compass of political calculations. The progress of time and circumstances, which men assign to the acc'?mplishment of great changes, is too mechanical to measure the force of the mind and the rapidity of reflection by which revolutions are generated. All the old governments have received a shock from those that already appear and which were once more improbable, and
s
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are a greater subject of wonder than a general revolution in Europe would be now. When we survey the wretched condition of man under the monarchical and hereditary systems of government, dragged from his home by one power or driven by another, and impoverished by taxes more than by e~emies, it becomes evident that those systems are bad, and that a general revolution in the principle and construction of governments is necessary. What is government more than the management of the affairs of a nation? It is not and from its nature cannot be the property of any particular man or family, but of the whole community, at whose expense it is supported; and though by force or contrivance it has been usurped into an inheritance, the usurpation cannot alter the right of things. Sovereignty, as a matter of right, appertains to the nation only, and not to any individual ; and a nation has at all times an inherent indivisible right to abolish any form of government it finds inconvenient and establi shed such as accords with it s interest, disposition, and happiness. The romantic and barbarous distinction of men into kings and subjects, though it may suit the condition of courtiers, cannot that of citizens, and is exploded by the principle upon which governments are now founded. Every citizen is a member of the sovereignty and as such can acknowledge no personal subjection, and his obedience can be only to the laws. When men think of what government is, they must necessarily suppose it to possess a knowledge of all the objects and matters upon which its authority is to be exercised. Tn this view of government, the republican system, as established by America and France, operates to embrace the whole of a nation; and the knowledge necessary to the interest of all the parts is to be found in the center which the parts by representation fonn . But the old governments are on a construction that excludes knowledge as well as happiness; government by monks, who know nothing of the world beyond the walls of a convent, is as consistent as government by kings. What were fonnerly called revolutions were little more than a change of persons or an alteration of local circumstances. They rose and fell like things of course and had nothing in their existence or their fate that could influence beyond the spot that produced them. But what
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we now see in the world, from (he revolutions of America and France,
is a renovation of the natural order of things, a system of principles as uni versal as trUlh and the existence of man, and combining moral with political happiness and national prosperity:
I. Men are born and always c011linue free and equal in respect to their rights. Civil distinctions, therefore, can be founded on ly on
public utility. II. The end of all political associations is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man; and these rights are liberty,
property, security, and resistance of oppression. III. The nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty; nor can any individual or any body of men be entitled to any authority which is not expressly derived from it. In these principles there is nothing to throw a nation into confusion by inflaming ambition. They are calculated to call forth wisdom and abilities and to exercise them for the public good and not for the emolument or aggrandizement of particular descriptions of men or families . Monarchical sovereignty, the enemy of mankind and the source of misery, is abolished; and sovereignty itself is restored to its natural and o riginal place, the nation. Were this the case throughout Europe, the cause of wars would be taken away. It is anributed to Henry IV of France, a man of an enlarged and benevolent heart, that he proposed, about the year 1610, a plan of abolishing war in Europe. The plan consisted in constituting a European congress or, as the French authors style it, a pacific republic, by appointing delegates from the several nations, who were to act as a court of arbitration in any disputes that mighl arise between nation and nalion. Had such a plan been adopted al the time it was proposed, the taxes of England and France, as two of the parties, would have been at least ten millions sterling annually to each nation less than they were at the commencement of the French Revolution. To conceive a cause why s uch a plan has not been adopted (and that, ins tead of a congress for the purpose of preventing war, it has been ca lled on ly to terminate a war after fruitless expense of several years), it will be necessary to consider Ihe interest of governments as a distinct interest to that of nations.
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Whatever is the cause of taxes to a nation becomes also the means of revenue to a government. Every war tenninates with an addition of taxes, and consequently with an addition of revenue; and in any event of war, in the manner they are now commenced and concluded, the power and interest of governments arc increased. War, therefore, from its productiveness, as it easily furnishes the pretense of necessity for taxes and appointments to places and offices, becomes a principal pan of the system of old governments; and to establish any mode to abolish war, however advantageous it might be to nations, would be to take from such government the most lucrative of its branches. The frivolous matters upon which war is made show the di sposition and avidity of governments to uphold the system of war and betray the motives upon which they act. Why are not republics plunged into war but because the nature of their government does not admit of an interest distinct from that of the nation? Even Holland, though an ill-constructed republic, and with a commerce extending over the world, existed nearly a century without war; and the instant the fonn of government was changed in France, the republican principles of peace and domestic prosperity and economy arose with the new government; and the same consequence would follow the same causes in other nations. As war is the system of government on the old construction, the animosity which nations reciprocally entertain is nothing more than what the ·policy of their governments excites to keep up the spirit of the system. Each government accuses the other of perfidy, intrigue, and ambition as a means of heating the imagination of their respective nations and increasing them to hostilities. Man is not the enemy of man, but through the medium of a false system of government. Instead, therefore, of exclaiming against the ambition of kings, the exclamation should be directed against the principle of such governments; and instead of seeking to reform the individual , the wisdom of a nation should apply itself to refonn the system . Whether the fonns and maxims of governments which are still in practice were adapted to the condition of the world at the period they were established is not in this case the question. The older they are, the less correspondence can they have with the present state of things. Time and change of circumstances and opinions have the same
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progressive effect in rendering modes of government obsolete as they
have upon customs and manners . Agriculture , commerce, manufactures, and the tranquil arts, by which the prosperity of nations
is best promoted, require a different system of government and a different species afknowledge to direct its operations than what might
have been required in the fonner condition of the world. As it is not difficult to perceive, from the enlightened state of mankind, that hereditary governments are verging to their decline and that revolutions on the broad basis of national sovereignty and government by representation are making their way in Europe, it would be an act of wisdom to anticipate their approach and produce revolutions by reason and accommodation, rather than commit them to the issue of convulsions. From what we now see, nothing ofrefonn on the political world ought to be hcld improbable. It is an age of revolutions, in which everything may be looked for. The intrigue of courts, by which the system of war is kept up, may provoke a confederation of nations to abolish it; and a European congress to patronize the progress of free government and promote the civilization of nations with each other is an event nearer in probability than once were the revolutions and alliance of France and America.
6 The Evolution of the State
We have dealt with the definition of a State, and, for the purpose of these leclUres, the definition given in the last lecture will govern the use of the word. Thai definition was: A State is a multi-human organ ism embodying a Life, inhabiting a definite Territory, with a government as its executive, specialising organs for its activities, and shaping its evolution to achieve a common end.
Wherever we find the whole of these characteristics, we have a State: wherever we do not find them, there is no State. In this lecture, I propose to trace the Evolution of the State from the Family to the Commonwealth or Empire, in a genera l way, from the simple to the complex, defining the Icnn used in each case, and thus making a framework for OUf future study, into which we shall have to fit a large number of details. Such an outli ne is necessary for clear comprehension and orderly thinking, and by your later reading, when your time for technical studenlship is over, you will be able, by intensive s tudy of any part of it, to acqui re as much more of detail as you like, without "losing sight of the forest because of the trees". We begin then with the need for definitions, and proceed to the s upplying of that need, showing also the place of the thing defined in the evolution of the State. DEFINITIONS Now there are certain terms used in Political Science which need careful and exact definition , for they are connected with the idea of the State, sometimes form constituents of the State, but are not identical
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wi th it. Hence, for useful di scussion, we must define each of them, for half the controversies which are carried on among us lend to be futile, because of the mi sunderstandings which arise from the lack of a common meaning attached to the terms used. One of the objects of Education is to substitute clear for confused thinking, and cl ear
thinking demands the use of a word to denote on thought and one thought only; for this we need accurate perception of the similarities and the differences between things. Similarities show the relation between two or more th ings, uniting them; differences show the peculiar characteristics of two or more things, separating them. Thus, the term Biped marks a similarity, a uniting relation, between birds and men; both are two-legged. The beak, wings and feathers of the bird, to name but three differences, mark it off as compared with the lips, arms, and skin of the man, into a smaller group, a subdivision of Biped. Science classifies by similarities, and separates its main divisions into smaller and smaller groups by differences, thus reducing into ordered relations and separati ons the confused masses of individual s of all sorts, sizes, a nd shapes. The theory of evolution is based on a discovery of hidden similarities under patent differences, as the fore-limbs of the bird and the man have a common fundamental structure, modified into a wing in the one, into an ann in the other. So also in our subject, since it is a Science-Political Science--we must use the scientific method with its admirable clarity, and therefore we must define the meaning of our terms. This lucidity in the use of words is one of the characteristics of the Keltic branch of the widely spread Aryan root-stock, the artistic type of the Aryan; the Kelts are arti sts in words, as in colour and fonn- words being verily the form of thoughts. As was said of the French: "Ce qui n'est pas clair, n'est pas francais" ; "That which is not c1ear-or, better, lucid--is not French." There are a number of words: Family, Tribe, Nation Empire or Commonwealth, Society, Government, Race, Society, Pecple, all of which have something in common- they are aggregations of human beings, the last