STUDIEN UND TEXTE ZUR GEISTESGESCHICHTE DES MITTELALTERS nOIl.t,)H1>ET VON
JOSEF KOCH
MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE TRANSCENDENTALS The Case if Thomas Aquinas
WtITEII.Ol.r1lHaT VON
PAUL WlLPERT UND ALBERT ZIMMERMANN
BY
HERAVSGEGEBEN VON
JAN IN
A. AERTSEN
JAN
A.
AERTSEN
Z1,.ISAMMENARBEIT MIT
TZOTCHO BOIADj1EV, MARK D.JORDAN tJND
ANDREAS
SPEER (MANAGING EOITOR:) BAND UI
MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE TRANSCENDENTALS
LEIDEN
.
E.J. BRJLL . NEW YORK' KOLN 1996
Published with financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources.
CONTENTS Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Preface
............................................. . . . . . . . . . . . ................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
Aertsen,Jan A. Medieval philosophy and the transeendentals : the case of Thomas Aquinas / by Jan A. Aertsen. cm. - (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgesehichte des p. Mittelalters, ISSN 0169-8125; Bd. 52) ) and index. Includes bibliographical references (p. ISBN 9004105859 (cloth: alk. paper) 1. Philosophy, Medieval. 2. Transeendentals. 3. Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, 1225?-1274----COntributions in doctrine of transccndcntals. 1 Tide. II. Series. B738.T73A37 1996 96-5485 III '.8-de20 CIP
Introduction....................................................................................
1
0.1. Medieval philosophy as "Christian philosophy" (E. Gilson) .......................................................................... . . turn ....................................................... "The I'IngulStlc "
0. 2. 0.3. ''The Olher spirit of medieval philosophy"
.
.
(A. de Libera) ................................................................... 0.4. Medieval philosophy and transcendental thought.....
..
3 10 14 17
Chapter One The Beginnings of the Doctrine'of the Transcendentals.......................................................................
Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnah:me
..
..
25
Aertsen, Jan A.:
1 1 PhT 1 tp th e Ch , ance11or' s Summa de bono......................... 1.2. The Summa thRologica attributed to Alexander of
25
Ktiln
Hales.................................................................................. 1.3. Albert the Great's Early Works.....................................
40 48
•
Medieval philosophy and the transcendentals : the case of Thomas Aquinas / by Jan A. Aertsen. - Lci
zur
Gei.tesge.chichte des Miudalter! ; Bd. 52)
ISBN 90--0+-10585-9
.
.
..
..
Chapter Two Thomas's General Account of the
NE:GT
T ransce nde ntals........................................................................ ISSN ISBN C
0169-8125 90 04 10585 9
Copyright 1996 � E.). Brili, /Adm, The NdkrlandJ
AU n,hts reserved. No part ofthis publication 11U9' be reproduced, trans!attd, swred in tl mrieool vstem, or trtmSTnitted in any form or by lUI) meam, electronic, mtehanico.l, pIro/()(;of!ying, recording permission.from the publisher. Aullwri
Fees are mbjld to �.
PIlINBD IN THK N:lTHD.LANDI
2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 2.4.
.
The resolution into something first............................. . The first known: Being (ens) .......................................... The problem of the addition to being........................... Explication of the special modes of being: .
.
..
The categories................................................................... 2.5. Explication of the general modes of being: The transcendentals................................................................. (JT otherwise, 2.6. The derivation of the transcendentals......................... 2.7. E valuation.......................................................................... .
.
..
.
Chapter Three Metaphysics and the Transcendentals..........
.
3.1. Thomas's commentary on Boethius's De trinitate 5.4 .. 3.2. The transformation of the concept of metaphysics 3.3. The prologue of Thomas's commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics......................................................
.....
.
71 73 80 84 88 91 witlwut 97 pricr wrilkn 103 113 114 121 124
3.4. The method of resolution and metaphysics....... .......... 3.5. The importance of Thomas's commentary on Metaph. IV 3.6. The inquiry into the "per se" accidents of being ... .. .. 3.7. Metaphysics and the first principle of demonstration 3.8. The question of being and the history of
130
philosophy........................................................................ . Concluding observations......................................... ... ....,
151 156
........... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........................................
,
.
3.9
VB
CONTENTS
CONTENTS
,
Chapter Four Being as the first TranscendentaL..................... .
4,1, The firstness of being .,........................... ........... .... ... .... 4.2. The knowledge of being (I).,.,.,.,.,.,.,.,.,.,',.,.,............... ... , 4.3, The knowledge of being (II) ......................................... 4.4. The ratio of being: Actuality.......................................... . .
.
.
..
.
. . "Belng 45 ' " and "th'lng " ...................................................... . 4.6. Conclusion.... ,. ,.. ,...... " .,..,......... .................. ...............,....... .
.
136 141 146
159 160 170 177 185 193 199
6.8. Excursus: "The true and what is made are convertible" (Vico).... ,. ,.". ,...,....... ,...... ,.,.............,..,.,.,..... . 6.9. The true and the false...................................................... 6,10. The order of the true and the good.................................
274 278 284
Chapter Seven Good as TranscendentaL..................................
290
.
7.1. 7,2, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, 7.6. 7.7, 7.8. 7.9.
The Platonic thesis: The good is beyond being........... The Manichaean thesis ....................,.., ..,..,...,..........,...... The ratio of the good..... " .. ,.. ,. .. ,... ,. . , . ,.. ,.. ,. ". ,. . ,. ,. .. , . , The convertibility of being and good .......................... . O�jections to the convertibility ....................................... The difference between being and goodness .............. .
.
.
.
.
.
.
..
.
.
5,1. 5,2. 5.3. 5.4,
The Philosopher: The convertibility of being and one Thomas: The convertibility of being and one . .. .. .... Transcendentality versus substantiality of the one..... Transcendentality versus accidentality of the one (Avicenna) .. . .. ,." ..,..,...,.........,."..,..,......,..,..,..,.....,.....,.. The one and the many.................................................... The one and the composed.............................................. The one and the good....................................................... The one and the true......................................................... .
.
5.5. 5.6. 5.7. 5.8.
..
.
..
..
Chapter Six True as TranscendentaL.........................................
6.1. A "magisterial" definition of truth: "The indivision of being and that which is� .. .. . .. .. . ... .. .. .... ... ............
6.2. 6.3.
6.4.
6,5. 6,6. 6,7.
.
.
..
.
.
...
.
.
.
.
"Truth is not in things, but in the mind" (Aristotle).. "There is the same disposition in being and in truth" Thomas's ratio of truth: "Adequation of thing and intellect",..... ,.,.,..,.,....,.....,...........................,...................,.,. Thomas's innovations in the doctrine of the transcendentals".,.,.. .. ,.,..,.,......,.,....,.,....,.,.,......,.,.,."...,.,.,. The convertibility of being and the true ....................... True all a relational trallNcendental.,..............................
201 204 207 210 212 218 231 237 241 243 244 246 250 253 256 262 269
299
303
306
The good of human action ........... ,.. ,..... ,... ,...... ,. . ,.. ,.. ,. . The good is the first in practical reason ....................... . The opposition between good and eviL...................... .
314 319 326 330
Chapter Eight Beauty: A forgotten Transcendental?........... ...
335
.
.
.
.
.
Chapter Five One as Transcendental.........................................
292 297
8.1. 8.2. 8.3. 8.4. 8.5. 8.6. 8.7.
Introduction. ,.........,.."..,......,...,......,.....,..........,......,.....,..,.. The ratio of the beautiful. ... ,...,...,...,.................................. Pseudo-Dionysius and the beautifuL............................ Two texts in the Summa theologiae.................................... Historical background: The Summafratris Alexandri .... Conclusions " ...,...,.,.. " .........,..........,...,."..,.........,...,..,..,..... The place of beauty .. . . . . .. .... .. . . .. . . ..
.
..
..
....
.
....
.......
...
.
Chapter Nine Transcendentals and the Divine . . ..
9.1. 9.2. 9.3. 9.4. 9.5. 9.6. 9.7.
..
...
.
.
......
......
.
.....
..
....
335 337 339
344
347 351 354 360
The transcendentals and the Trinity............................
361 372 378 387 395 400 408
Chapter Ten Conclusions " ..,..,......,...,...,..".".".....,..,...,.."..,..,.....
416
Being, Unity, Truth and Goodness as divine names God as cause of the maxime communia............................. Participation, Maximum and Analogy......................... Being in general (esse commune) and divine being.... Is there only one truth by which all things are true? Are all things good by the divine goodness? ....... ........
10,1. Sources for the doctrine of the transcendentals.. ,.".,." 10.2, Systematic importance.. . .. .... . .. . .. .. . .... . ............. ... 10.3, Medieval philosophy as a transcendental philosophy .
.
..
..
..
.
.
.
.
.
419 427 434
VlIl
CONTENTS
....,
439
Index Nominum., ,.,...,..,..,.. " .. " ...,.,..,...... , .. ,... , ..... ,..................,.. ,
455
Bibliography
..............................................................................
,
...
Index Rerum.... , . ,.. ,... . , ,. ,., .. , . , , .
.
...
.
.
.
..
.
.
..
,. , ,
....
.
..
,
....
,
....
,
....
,
....
,
....
....
,
...
459
PREFACE At the end of my inaugural address Medieval Reflections on Truth, delivered at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam on November 9, 1984, I committed myself, as is not unusual for a new professor, to a rather ambitious program. I announced that the medieval doctrine of the transcendentals would be "the subject of my research over the coming years. " The doctrine has indeed engaged me intensively throughout the last decade, and I have never regretted my choice. Inquiry into its history and systematic dimensions has confirmed my conviction that such investigation is of signal importance for the understanding of medieval philosophy. The present study concerns that part of my inquiry devoted to the thought of Thomas Aquinas, My work has profited from the support and encouragement of several persons and institutions, I would like first to express my gratitude to the Philosophy Department of the Vrije Universiteit for the ample room it gave to my research and for the stimulating discussions of our Research Group. The first chapters of this book were written during my tenure as Fellow of the Institute of Philosophy at the Catholic University of Louvain (September 1992February 1993). The matchless facilities and ambience of the oldest university in the Low Countries make it one of my favourite places to study, From the days of my dissertation studies in Lou vain onwards, I have enjoyed the friendship of Carlos Steel, the current President of the Institute. I thank him for a critical interest in my work spanning several years, I was provided with opportunities, on a number of occasions, to
present papers on parts of Illy research for discussion with col leagues. These exchanges were extremely enriching; they opened new perspectives and acquainted me with different approaches. I would like to mention (in chronological order) my lectures at the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies in Toronto (Walter H, Principe and Stephen Dumont), Cornell University (Norman Kretzmann), the University of Notre Dame (Mark D. Jordan), the University of Leiden (Proclus Symposium in honour of Lambert Marie de Rijk), the Catholic University of Louvain (Cardinal Mercier Lectures), the Boston Colioqium of Philosophy (Stephen
x
PRt:FACE
Brown). the University of Iowa (Scan MacDonald), the University
of Cologne (Albert Zimmermann)' the University of Roehurn
INTRODUCTION
(Thea Kobusch) and the University of Bonn (Ludger Honne felder). One of the most attractive elements of the study of medieval philosophy is its international character-in this respect it resembles the scholarly community in the Middle Ages. Since February 1, 1994 I have had the privilege of se.n>ing as Director of the Thomas InslitUle at the University of Cologne. From the very outset, I have �en able to rely 011 the unremitting assist ance of Andreas Speer. The final preparation of this study owes
much to the faculty and graduate students of the Institute. Bernd Roggenkamp and Martin Pkkave finalized the bibliography. Martin Tracey improved the English text with great precision. I would especially like to th.mk Nicola Senger, for her great efforts
in editing the manuscript, and Wouter Goris, who made the final corrections and composed the indices. Crateful acknowledgement of financial support should finally be made to the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), whose munificent grant made the wmpletion of the English translation of this study possible. For a substantial part of the translation, I could once more appeal to Donald Monon, who has translated several of my previous studies. I am grateful to him for this long-standing collaboration. Cologne, November 1995
The title of this book speaks of "Medieval Philosophy" and "the Transcendentals." It can he read as affirming that there is a philosophy in the Middle Ages and that this philosophy encom passes a doctrine of the transcendentals alongside many others. But our aims in this work are more ambitious. Our title means to suggest a more intrinsic relation between {he terms "Philosophy� and i.-anscendentals" !.han mere juxt:Jposition. We want to show that philosophy in the Middle Ages expresses itself as a way of thought which can be called "transcendental." The present book may therefore be seen as a conlIibution to the discussion of the question: what is philosophy in the Middle Ages? A recent review of literature offers a telling example of the relevance of this ques tion: "Unmistakably philosophical research about the Middle Ages has fallen into
a
crisis ( ...) It is even impOSSible to reach agreement
on the premise what philosophy means in [he Middle Ages.'" Is there a medieval philosophy? Every student of the intellet:.lual history of this period knows from personal experience that the question is not a rhelorical one. Consider tlle work of Bonaventure, who has been named "the most medievar of all medieval philo
Jan A. Aertsen
sophers.2 In 1992 a German translation of his Q!.latstiones disputatae
De scientia Christi was published in the well-known series of Meiner's PhUosophische Bibliothek.� Bonaventure himself, I believe, would have been less than happy to find his work published in a "Philosophical Library. � In his Hexaemeron he elaborates a hier archy of writings in which the Sacred Scriptures occupy the
highest place; the original works of the sancli and the Senlence.s of the magisl" the next places; and the books of the philosophi or sages of the world the fourth and lowest place.4 Bonaventure did not see
I
A. Speer and JHJ. Schneider, "Cas Miuelalter im Spiegel neuerer Uteratur", in: Thwloglsche QJJanalschriJt 172 (1992), p. 235. 2 Cf. E. Gilson, Tht PhilosOPhy oj SI. Bonavmflm, trans!' by F. J. Sheed, New York 1965, p. 4!17. l Bonaventure, VOlf! Wi;m!n Ch1i!ti (QuQtSli01ltJ di.sfJulllltu d, JCjmlia Chmll), ed. and transl. by Andreas Speer, Hamburg 1992 (Philosophische Bibliolhek
446) .
Bonayenture , CollationtJ in HtJCal!'lMf"OJl XIX.6 (Op"a omnia V, p. 421a): . "Slim cf'!{o quallior Rener.!. &erip"lrnrllm. circa q uae oporlN ordmate exerccn. ..
.
2
himself as a philosopher, and that is true of most of the thinkers that figure in histories of medieval philosophy. The contemporary historian, by contrast, is not so much interested in the scientia of Christ as in that of man. He will find in Bonaventure's work basic expositions about this issue. such as about the problem of the foundation of knowledge and the theme of illumination. The modern historian may be inclined to designate such expositions Bonaventure's "philosophy," bill does he do 110 with good reason?5 The problem of medieval philosophy is that its object is the out come of a hermeneutical intervention, of a modern reading and interpretation of texts that in their own right were never intended as pure philosophical reflection, There have been striking developments and shifts in recent decades in discussions of the object of medieval philosophy, and the debate is still far from over,6 In this introductory chapter 1 want first to analyze three different answers to the question "Is there a medieval philosophy?" that are (or were) important for the place of the Middle Ages in the history of philosophy, This analysis affords me an opportuniP:f to lake stock of the current study of medieval philosophy (0.1.-0.3.), I will then explain how I myself approach the period, indicating what, in my view, is' constitutive for the thought of the Medium Aevum (O.4.). This final section will clarifY the intention of this book.
Primi libri sunt sacrae Seriplurae (... ). xeundi libri sUllt originalia Sane· torum; tert.ii, Semcmiae magi$trorum ; quarti, doarillarum mundialium 8ive philosophorum." 5 Cf. on the problem of a Bonaventurian philosophy: A. Speer, "Meta· physica reducens. Metaphysik ab e:rste Wisse.nschaft im Ventandnis Bona YenUlras-, in: � rk Thiolqgu tHI(;ierznt pI mMiilmlf 57 (1990), pp. 142·149. 6 See the cOnlrihutions of Fe:rnand Van Steenberghe:n, Paul Vignaux and Tullio Gregory 10 the Symposium �L.a com:eption de: '" philosophiC': au Moyen Age� OIl the J'lflll International Congrcu of the "Sode.e lntnnationaie pollr I'Etude de: la Philosophie Medievale:- (Madrid, 1972), in: ....do5 rkl V CAl1Igr'tSO Intn'lloclOnal de FilO$ofia Medieval. Madrid 1979. Cf. W. KlulI:en, "Die ge�chich! liehe Erforschung der mittelalte:rliche:n Philosophie und die Nellscholaslik", in: E. Coreth, W.M. Neidl, G. Pfligersdorffer (eds.), Ch..urlicJu Philofophie im Iratholisrhen Dnlrtn rks 19. und 20. Jaltrhunrl.nU, vol. 2: Ruclrgrif! (lIIf uho/r.ulisr.htJ Erbr, Graz/Vitnna/Cologne 1988. p. :\88: MMan iSI nieht mehr gam �iche:r, WiLl dgendich 'Philosophic im Mittelalter' bcdcutC':t,M R. ImOOch, MLa philo
IIOphit rnedlcyaleM, in: DoctrintJ
C'?lfUlilit.
1111.1
p. 111: "Le
...
GoneT'S 1937·1987. Ritrrupmiw tt f1roJfMdillt:
df /lhiloJophi' tl t lanK'l' fro1lpliJt, ed. by A. Robine:t, Paris 1988,
me.ne de I'hilloirt' de: ]a philosoph;e medicyale toltt comme I'optlque leilln '.qllcll e II conyientlr.lt d'etudler eel objN est loin
d�b.t
d'61rt1 rlol,-
IlIr
I'objet
3
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
0.1. Medieval philosophy
as
-Christian philosophy �
(E. Gilson )
A turning point in the modern study of medieval philosophy was the work of Etienne Gilson (1884-1978), In hundreds of publications he spelled out the philosophical significance of the period, I there fore devote attention to his conception first. We arc well informed about Gilson's development, since he himself gives an account of it in his intellectual autobiography, Le phiwsophe et la thiologie.' His 1913 doctoral thesis dealt with freedom in Descartes, In seek ing the sources of the founder of Modern Philosophy, he made a discovery that went against the prevailing prejudice, according to whjch Lltere were just two periods in the history of philosophy, the ancient and the modern beginning with Descartes. Through his historical investigations it became dear to GHson that there was an authentic and original philosophical thought in the Middle Ages. He elaborated this insight in studies of Thomism and the philoso phy of Bonaventure. Gilson's newly acquired certainty of the ex:islt:nce of a medie\-'al philosophy, however, was shaken by his critics, They objected Lltat there is neither in Aquinas nor in Bonavenrure a distinctive philosophy, What Gilson had dubbed their philosophies were really nothing but "truncated theologies.''fI Gilson's answer came in his renowned book, The Spirit of Mediarval Philosophy, originally the Gifford Lectures of 1931-32. This work opens with the statement.: "It would be hard to imagine any expression more naturally apt to occur to the mind of the historian of mediaeval thought than Christian philosophy." Here we encounter the expression thai epitomizes Gilson's view. There is a philosophy in the Middle Ages, but its originality cannot be ex:plained without taking into account the innuence exercised by Christian revelation. He defines Christian philosophy as �every philosophy Which. although keeping the two orders formally 7
E. Gilson, U
philojoph, (I la thiologir, Pari$ 1960; Engl. transl. Tht Philosopher and Theology, New York 1962. His bibliogmphy is to h� found in Margarel McGrath, Etitnnt Gilson: .... Bil>iwgraphy/Une Bibliogmphu, ToronLO 1982 (Etienne: Gilson Serie� 3). For a pres.entation of Gilson's life and work:
L.K. Shook, Etitnne Gilson, Toronto 1984. See on Gilson's views Etimne C.won tf now: La phl�qphi� et .Ion his/atrt. Coiloque sur t'aclltalifi k la pnuie tl'Etief!n( Gilson, e:d. by M. Collralier, Paris 1980; A. d� LiberA, MUS etudes d� philoso phie mcdicvale en France d'Elienne Gilson a nos jOllU�, in: Gli Studi di Filo$lJjia Mtdiroau fm Otto, Nt;lIItCtfllo, cd. by R. Imbaeh and A. Maierlt, Rome 1991, pp. 2 1·33. II l� phi/moph' tl la th�ologi�, p, 106.
4
INTRODUCTION
IN'l't
distinct, nevertheles.'1 considers the Christian revelation as an indi�pensable auxiliary to reason. �
5
A more adequate example of what Gilson means are ph iloso
phical reflections about the origin of reality, inspired by the
Gilson's lectures were intended to provide "an experimental
Christian idea of crealio ex nihilo. ,Vhy is there something rather
demonstration of the reality of Christian philosophy" and to sub
than nothing in reality?� asks Siger of Brabant in his commemary
stantiate the thesis that medieval philosophy transformed ancient thought under the impulse of Christianity. He e1
on Aristotle's Mttaphysics.U Here we find the root of the basic question of metaphysics formulated by Martin Heidegger.13 The
thesis with respect to metaphysics, anthropology, the theory of
medievals renewed philosophical thought: their notions of being,
knowledge and ethics. The most crucial transformation for Gilson
of necessity and contingency, and of causality differ from those of
is what he calls the �melaphysics of Exodus," that is. ·a meta
Greek thought. The Middle Ages therefore merit a place within
physics inspired
by
COO's self-n�velalion 10 Mose.s in Exodus
"1 AM. WHO AM." (Ego sum qui sum).
3:14:
In Exodus. Gilson affirms.
the history of philosophy-and especially within the history of the question of being.
"the corner-stone of Christian phitosophy" is laid down: the
Yet Gilson '5 conception of medieval philosophy as MChristian
identity of being and God. '1"here is but one God and this God is
philosophy� provoked critical reactions from the outset, because it
Being, that is the corner-stone of all Christian philosophy, and it
was st:en as a threat to the autonomy of philosophy. The sharpest
was not Plato, it was not even Aristotle, it was Moses who put it in position.'"J()
opposition came from Louvain, in the person of Fernand Van Steenberghen. He acknowledges that Christianity has influenced
The Spirit is a fascinating work in which Gilson has shown
philosophy but denies that there are Christian philosophies, for "a
convincingly that philosophical thought came out of lhe Middle
philosophy would ceast: to be philosophy to the very extent that it
Ages different than it had entered them, and that its transforma
became Christian.�14 It is not my intention to present a systematic
influenced by Christianity. More than in Gilson's time,
analysis of the possibility of "Christian philosophy." I want to
contemporary philosophy is cognizant of the fact that all theo
formulate two objections to certain elements in Cilson's conception
retical thought is fed by pre-reflective experience. 1n the Middle
that have been a hindrance rather than a help to understanding
Ages, the Christian faith was the horizon of this experience.
the nature of medieval philosophy.
tion
was
Within this horizon, questions were formulated that are not to be
(1)
My first objection is of a historical nature. It is important to
found in a similar form in Greek philosophy. It is questionable,
recall Lhat the notion of "Christian philosophy� has originally in
however, whether the "metaphysics of Exodus" is a good example
Gilson a historical character. He arrived at this idea, as we saw. on
of the "Christian" innovation in philosophical thought. It seems
Lhe basis of his study of the history of philosophy. He describes the
rather to constitute an example of Lhe influence of philosophy on
notion of Christian philosophy himself as "the conceptual trans
the reading of Scripture. Several scholars have emphasized that the text of Exodus was interpreted within the framework of Neoplatonic philosophy. Werner Beierwaltes has remarked that "the so-called metaphysics of Exodus is the most unsuitable subject ( ... ) for wanting to demonstrate a genuine 'Christian philosophy.''' 11
II
E. Gillon, L ',jprit de ia Phi/oJophi, mtdiivak, Paris
1969; Engl. transl. Tht S/1i.rit of Mtdianlal Philosoph" Ntw York 1940 (repr. Notre Dame 1991), p. �7. 10 Tlu spirit of MrdiOlllal PhilcJoph,. pp. 51, 6�. cr. Ifltrodu.dkm Ii La ph.ifomphit a\'*UIIM, Pari. 1960. pp. '51l.
In: ,IIi/O'¥AUw Rs,.tdsdilu 16 (1%9), p. 199 in his review of K. KTemer, r�w Sin1\(hs'lAU ' '' , .. w. Wirhng auf T"'-aJ vorl Aquin, �iden lIN .... « IMI ed. IH1), Thlt boo.. ,. dlreclcd ..alnlt Gilson'. metaphysic.5 of Iud.... C.. up.cllJty p. XXVIII).
"Nr'"
II
lation of an observable historical object.Hlr. 12 Sigtr of Brabant. QuarsCif O ltJ
Neuve 1981, pp. 169-170): "si enim quatrawr quare c�t magi� aliquid in rerum natura quam nihilW. cr. Thomas Aquinas. S./h. 1,44.2 (for an analysis of thi5 text, see sect. �.8.).
1.'1 M . Heidegger. "Was ist Metaphysikr". in: Wtgmarktn. Frankfurt am Main 1967, p. 19: "die Grundfrage der Metaphysik ( ... J : Warum ist iiberhaupl Seiendes und n!chl vielmehr Nichts?" 14 F. Van Steenberghen, Introduction Ii I'itud, de /a philDlophie mUiiTiok. Louvain/Paris 19", pp. 78-113. 15 E. Oihon, "La nOlion de philosophie chretienne", in: Blllirl.i" d" la Sociili fra"�alJt a, phiuJJophit, Paris 1931. p.72: "ee que je cherche dan$ la notion de philosophic chrilienne. c'est une traduction concepLUdle d e ce que
je croil un objet hiltoriquement observabte: la philo$ophic dans son hal chri:lien."
6
INTRODUCTION
Now the tirst thing we C
,monastic spirituality. The monk is the true phiJosOPhus c:hristianus.16 [n Kholastic authors we instead find a n opposition. Albert the
7
INTRODUCTION
belonging to the domain of the fmite. the created. Nicholas of Cusa 'argues in his De docta ignorantia that !.here is really no appropriate name for God. Nevertheless, one can claim that God's most proper name i s "Unity," and Nicholas appeals to Deuteronomy 6:4 ("Hear, 0 Israel: the Lord our God is onc").2fl Different spiritual
Great and Thomas Aquinas conu-ast the philosophi to the sandi or
experiences of these authors wilt certainly have played a role in
phers and theologia.ns.
this diversity of views. Ultimately. however, their diversity derives the pag-.m thinke from different metaphysical cOllvictions. The Thatphilosophi Dionysiu!are regards
tiuorogi;
Duns Scotus speaks of the "comroversy" between philoso
endeavor to understand man and the world exclusively through reason; the saneli are the Christian thinkers who
" us
this end would be the vision of CodY' The �we
community" of believers is opposed to the philosophical tradition. In his Etienne Gilson Lecture of 1990 Mark D. Jordan observes: WI cannot find thal the epithet philosophus is ever applied by Thomas to a Christian."I!! This does not mean that Gilson's notion is without historical value. for the theologian's criticism of philosophers is usually based on rational argumentation. They oppose the "errors" of the philosaphi, that is, with the help of philosophy itself. We also note the intriguing fact that among the theokJgi there is a great diversity of views. An illustration of this ract is the wide range of opinion concerning the primary name of the first
principle. From what follows it will become clear that this issue is crucial for assessing Gilson's conception. For pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite in De divinir nominibus, Good is the primary name of God, while for Thomas, by contrast, it is Being (Es£e). But, in his first Parisian question, Meister Eckhart observes ironically that the Evangelist John does not say: "In the beginning was being (ens)" but rather "in the beginning was the Word." "Being" is seen as cr. H.M. Schmidinger, "ZlIr Geschichte des Brgriffs 'chrinllche Philosophie"' , in: Chri�tlirhe Philosophie im katlwli.Jeh,n D,nkrn del 19. und 20. jahrhundmJ vol. I, Gr:u/Vienna/Colognr 1987, pp. 29·45. ! 7 M.-O. Chenu. �Les 'philosophes' dans la philosophie chretiennc me dievalc" . in: &uue d�s 5cimc
16
Goodness as the primary name of God is a result. Thomas himself remarks, of his having followed the via Platonica.'!l The crucial questiOn becomes how this diversity among the
theologi is accounted for in Gilson's conception of "Christian philosophy.� In itself, his definition of �Christian philosophy" in
The Spirit allows for a plurality of such philosophies. In the impor tant third chapter dealing with the metaphysics of Exodus, he shows that thinkers as diverse as Augustine, Anselm of Canter bury, Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus together acknowledge the identity of being and God. Yel it is clear from the diversity just noted amongst the theologians that the metaphysics of Exodus, the cornerstone of Christian phHosophy, was not the communis opinio. In The Spiril Gilson says little about this question. He opposes "Greek thought,� which (in iu Platonic version) affirmed the
primacy of the Cood and the subordination to it of "existence," to "Christian thought," which under the influence of the Exodus text
atlil"med the primacy of being and the subordination of the Good to it. Medieval thinkers upheld "the Christian primacy of being" against pseudo-Dionysius.22 Gilson's interprelillion actually places Dionysius the Areopagite outside the tradition of Christian thoughL But that seems odd, since Dionysius's writings strongly influenced Latin theologians. I suggest that we allow a disseming medieva.l voice to be heard, that of Bonaventure in his Jti,�eTarium.. On his view, the divine can be
20 Dionysiu5 the Areopaghe, De divini� n(>milii/mJ ell. 2,1,31; ch. 4.l 5; eh. :� 13.3,452; Thomas Aquinas. S.th. 1. 13. 1 1 ; MeiSler Ec khart . QuarJtw i'armmm I n. 4 (LattiniJCM Wakt V, 40. 7·9) : Nil.hola� of Cusa, Dr doc/a ignorantia I, c. 24. n. 74-77 (�d. P. Wilpcrt. D ie /;elehrl� Urlwissmheill, Hamburg 1970, pp. 96-99). 21 Thoma! Aquinas. De fMlo 1.2: 'Platonici (... ) dicebant quod bonum ad plura $� exu:ndit quam en�. Et hanc uiam uidelUr sequtm Dioni5im in l ibra De diuini! nominibus. bonum preordinanl enti.w �� L'tjpnt de la phiwwphi, WltdiilJal" p. 55: �e al.so � 5 1,. n.l. I a� d p.5� . nt. 2. Cf. P. Aul:w:nque, �Elienne GiliOn et la quesiloll de 1 etre . Ill: Etltnn, Glb011 .•
,1 nmu: liJ philn.wf!hi, tl
JlJfI
hUlofTr. r:.l.ri, I!JHl. 1111. HI-ll.!l.
8
9
INTRODUCTION
lNTRODUCTION
comcmplated In two ways. One mode looks primarily to being itself (ipsum esSt), claiming that "He who is" is the first divine name; this is the Old Testament view (Exodus) . The other mode looks to goodness, calling it the first divine name; that is the New Testament view, for our Teacher (magister noster), Christ, attributes (his name to God exclusively (Luke 18:19). Dionysius therefore follows Chl"ist, according to Bonaventure. when he posits the Good as the primary name.!� In Gilson's works there is a manifest tension between the idea of "Christian philosophy'" and historical reality. The tension arises from the fact that the originally historical notion of "Christian philosophy" has acquired a normative content and is therefore unable to do justice to the pluriformity of medieval philosophy. In this philosophy "Being" is not considered the only legitimate possibility for naming the first principle, but one finds criticism of onto-theology as well. It is for this reason, 1 believe, that Gilson's successor in Paris, Paul Vignaux, introduced a different notion. In an address MOll the place of the Middle Ages in the history of philosophy" he proposes that medieval thought be approacbed as a "philosophy of religion." Such a philosophy, which has as its object "historically given religions, analyses the arguments of the medieval theologians without any obligation to adopt their views. In contrast to Gilson's conception of Christian philosophy, this approach does not imply a "commitment that is ullJ'a-philosophical."i4 Vignaux's orientation of medieval thought has, however, an important disadvantage. If one accepts his proposal, thought in the Middle Ages acquires an exceptional position in the history of philosophy. Between the ancient and modern periods there is an intermezzo during which philosophy is actually "philosophy of religion." (2) My second objection against Gilson's notion of "Christian philosophy" is of a philosophical nature. For Gilson a consequence of this notion is that the historian must explain medieval philo sophy in keeping with the theological order, that is, the order of the sacra doc/Tina, the theology of Christian revelation. This order
begins with the consideration of God and then descends to his effect: created reality. Such is Gilson's presentation of Thomas's philosophy in his book Le Thomisme. His point of departure are Thomas's proofs for God's existence in q. 2 of the first part of the Summa tht!ologiae. Gilson is aware that in doing so he is contraven ing the philosophical order, which ascends through creatures to the knowledge of God and in which proofs for God's existence stand thus at the end, not at the beginning. His argument for following not the philosophical but the theological order is that philosophy is subsumed within theology. Philosophical reflection has an instrumental function for the sacra doctrina and the order of this science must lherefurc:: also be its order.�'" The attachment of philosophy to theology is given ever grealer emphasis in Gilson's later works (One is reminded of the title of his autobiography, 'The Philosopher and Theology"). A Christian philosophy detached from theology is a non-existing entity. There is something of a paradox. in the evolution of his thought: Ihe notion of "Christian philosophy," which was originally intended to characterize the "spirit" of medieval philosophy, has increasing ly become an expression of tbe instrumental function of philoso phy in the service of Christian theology.!6 Wolfgang Kluxen has rightly observed that the consequence of this interpretation is that philosophy ultimately disappears from Thomism (and, with that, Thomism from philosophy).2' It cannot be denied that Thomas's work is thoroughly theologi cal in nature. Yet his theological synthesis contains certain undeniably philosophical accounts. It is legitimate to extract these accounts from the overarching theological synthesis, .�ince Thomas, in the first question of the Summa (which preceeds the proofs for God's existence), ascribes independence to philosophy hoth in method and in principle. My main objection to Gilson's
n
23 Bonaventure, itsn.,.-ariumV,2 (opera OfIIlil aV, p. 30gb): MDionysius sequens Christum dicit, quod bonum est primum nomen.24 P. VignaUll. MSur la place du Moyen Ag.:: .::n hisloire d.:: la philosophie�. in: Bulkfill tU i6 Soaiti froll{6i'w de P"ilowp"� 68 (19H). pp. 5-17. cr. id. . "C.ontribution au symposium 'La conception de Ja phllosophie au Moyen Age·. pp. 81-85.
25 E. Gilwn. u Thomume. i'llrrodudlO'Il Ii [a philoJoj>hie de Saint ThamaJ d'A'1usn, Paris 1965 (6th ed.), p. 49. Cf. Thollla!!, SeG. IV,I : "n;\lurali5 ratio per crealuras in Dei cognitionem ascendit, fidel vero cognitio a Deo in nos c conver�() divina revelation.:: d.::sc.::ndit�. Gilson follows the same order in his book on Duns Scotus (jttJn Duns Srot. i'ltrodvdiGn Ii ,ws pruitions f011dam.mlo[� Paris 1952). by beginnIng wi th the uistence of (he infiniLC being. 26 Cf. J.r. Wippel, "Thomas Aquinas and The Problem of Christian Philo50phy-. in: Melaph,Jical TlulMs ill Thoma.! Aquillas. W;u;hington. D.C. 1984, pp. 1·�3. 17 W. KIU)len, PhilosopleiJeht Elhilc 11M Thomas 11011 Aquill. Maim. 1964 (2nd ed. Hamburg 1980), p. XVIII.
10
11
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
presentation of Thomas's thought is that it fails to offer insight into
IS controversial today, because il is commonly understood in a
the order proper to philosophy. The interpreter's task is precisely to
normative way. that is, as assuming a direct connection between
underHand Thomas's thoughl from this order, that is, as
faith and reason.:?'} The term is here used in an historical sense;
I will return to this point in section
0.2.
"Tiu
philosophy.
medieval !.hought is a science of "the schools," which princ.ipally
0.4.
consists in the reading-and interpretation of the Middle Ages is found
linguistic tum "
in
lCXlS.
commemary
Philosophy in
on authoritative
writings--indeed. the period saw the development of a distinctive genre of commentary, that of the
qua,jt;o.
Because science and
The study of medieval philosophy has deepened and widened
philosophy were bound to texts, the student of the medieval univer
since the publications of Gilson's works. Not only have many texts
sity received thorough training in lhe disciplines of the
been edited fOT !.he first time, but also new approaches and thematic
QrteJ Jermocinale5.
emphases have been put forward. This leads one to wonder
sophisticated conceptual apparatus was developed for the analysis
whether medieval philosophy ought to be sought in a different
of the "properties of terms"-that is, the effect of a word's syntactic
direction from the one suggested by Gilson. Is it not more readily
context on its semantic function-and for the interpretation of
The
sentences. It. is on accoum of the "Scholastic" character of medieval
found in the
Summae logicae
lhan in the
Summae lheologiae?
second conception that has been important for orientation in the
Within
trivium,
the
the faculty of arts, an ever more
philosophy that logic and semantics play such a crucial role in it.
study of medieval philosophy represents a radical reversal of
An important effect of the logical-analytical approach is that
Cilson's; it is marked, one might say, by �the exodus of meta
medieval philosophy is not only granted a place in the history of thought but is even recognized as having a topical relevance. so
physics."
Logic,
semantics
and
the
philosophy of language
become lhe new centers of attention. This reversal is intimately connected with the "linguistic turn"
Current discussions of meaning and reference have a parallel in the distinction made in medieval terminist logic between
sig;niftca
in contemporary philosophy. The analytic approach to philosophy
tio and 5uppruitiu;
in the Anglo-Saxon world has stimulated a new, not merely
the modal logic of the fourteenth century; and the propositional
the semantics of possible worlds has rediscovered
historical interest in medieval texlS, since similar preoccupations
analysis of logical paradoxes has an equivalent in the medieval
and approaches have been discovered in them. Anthony Kenny,
literature about
for example, writes in his study of Wydif that �th� scholars and
his
sludems of tl1e fourtcenth. century were discussing problems and
way of p hiloliophizing, he argues, gives "a great possibility of
using methods which are current among Oxford philmophers
mutual understanding," because for logical problems like the Liar
today."' In the fourteenth a.� in the twentieth century, philosophers
paradox, the t.:ultural differences between the fourteenth and
devoted great attention to "the way in which terms have meaning,
twentieth centuries are of little import.ance.�!
the way in which sentences arc put together, the way in which
own
rophi.smata.
In a recent essay Sten Ebbest:n dt:scribt:d
way of doing philosophy
:1. '1
."
"'the sophismatic way
The codification of this �new medievalism" is which appeared
This
The Cambridge in 1982 under
human beings do things with words ( ... ) Like Wyclifs philoso
History of Later Medif!fJ(J1 Philf>jophy,
phy. Oxford philosophy is linguistic. philosophy. "2�
the editorship of N. KrelZmann, A. Kenny and J. Pinborg.·�2 Most
This approach is not unfounded. Just as Gilson's conception has its basis in medieval philosophy's concern with the contents of Christian revelation, so the justifICation of the logical-analytical ap proach lies in another characteristic element of medieval lhought. namely, it.<; ··Scholastic" character. The expression "Scholasticism"
29 See for a discu ssi on of lhis notion R. Schonberger, Was isl ScholclJtiH, Hi lde shdm 1991. �) A. de Ubera, PmJn- au MO')en Itgt', Paris 1991, pp. 68-72: "L'actualiti du
Moyen Age et Ie 'nouveau midii"isme'" � I s. Jo:b�5en , -DOing Philosophy the Sophi,matic. Way", in: Gli Studi di
Pilo..lOfia M,diroak fm Dllo t Novtcrnto,
�H A. !kllny, WydiJ. Ollford 198!), p. 5.
Rome 1991, pp. 331-359; p. 334.
u 'l"hI: C:a",bridl{t Hidory 01 LAlIT Mtdit'l.!al PAilowpAJ. From tAt Rtdi.s,ovny of Amloll, 10 III, IhJinltj(1alion of StJ!olaJlidHrI f1{)O.1600, rn. N. Krrtzmann/A.
12
13
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
noteworthy in this history. which provides a thematic survey of
Aquinas on the one hand. and the spirit of free inquiry in the
1100 and 1600,
is the dominant place
faculty of arts on the other. Clerical science is Mthe corporatt.:
of logic. About half of its one-thousand-some-odd pages volume are
transmission of traditional wisdom," for in the Middle Ages it was
devoted to it. The book documents the important achievements of
not the individual who taught, but the Church. through the clergy.
the medievals in this field. but the place it grnnts to logic is still
The task of the theologians was the unveiling of a truth already
thought in the period between
disproportionate. It stems from the conception of medieval philoso phy that underlies the Cambridge Histqry. Although it
is
a collective
possesd se though hidden. For the masters of arts, truth thing to be sought, and it
was
was
somt:�
this conception of truth, which made
work., to which fOTty-Qne writers contributed. i t is organized accord
their works so novel in the development of medieval thought.
ing to a certain general view.
Their commentaries on Aristotle were "philosophical, seeking,
In the �Introduclion." this conception is explained by the prin cipal editor. Norman Kretzmann. He wants to extricate medieval
hunting, critical, and in this way different from the clerical commentaries of the theologians. "�4
philosophy from what he calls "a philosophical ghetto;� "it is one
The designation "clerical"· that has found acceptance among
of our aims to help make the activity of contemporary philosophy
other historians is rather problematic as an historiographical
irllelleeLually continuous with medieval philosophy. H His strategy
category. The opposition sketched here is so crude that it almost
was therefore wa concentration on those parts of later medieval
takes the form of a caricature, If the masters of arts were such criti
philosophy that are most readily recognisable as philosophical to a
cal minds, then it is hard to understand why they held Thomas's
student of twentieth�century philosophy. M And from what follows
"clericalM commentaries on Aristotle in great esteem. Modern
it is clear that by such a student is of course meant especially one
experts confirm this prestige; Anthony Kenny is of the opinion
"working in the analytic tradition. H.��
that Aquinas's commentary on the Metaphysics "constitutes a
The premise on which this conception is based is qucstiomihlc.
philosophical classic in its own right. �.'I'" Noteworthy too is the fact
he
that the vast majority of original contributions to all kinds of
never would have accomplished his pioneering work. He redig.
philosophical themes originate not from the faculty of arts but from
covered medieval philosophy precisely by going against prevail
the [acuIty of theOlogy.3€>
If Gilson had employed the criterion of the Cambridge
HiJtory
ing assessments of students of philosophy. What I would call "the
The horizon of the study
of medicva.l philosophy has been un
postulate of modernity," that is, philosophical recognizability to the
deniably broadened in the Anglo-American world. The scholarly
modern mind, leads in the
work of Norman Kretzmann is a signific:ant instance of this trend.
Cambridge History
to the study of
medieval philosophy being dominated by logic and semantics.
Much less attention is paid to the W"dYS in which medieval
Since the appearanc.e of the Cambridge History, he has published a . number of studies on !.he medieval doctrine of the trMlscendentals
theology.�7
thinkers analysed philosophical and theological problems with the
and on Aquinas's thought, especially his philosophical
help of these instruments of thought.
Apparently there is more in medieval philosophy than theories
The result is
reduced picture of medieval philosophy, further
that are immediately recognizable to the modern linguistic mind.
diminished by the fact that philosophical theology is deliberately excluded. Naturally Ockham becomes the favorite author while Meister Eckhart must do with a simple mention (p.
458).
And what
of Thomas Aquinas, that thinker, who in Gilson's conception represents the apex of medieval thought? In this respect Charles Lohr's contribution is rt:vealing. He makes a sharp opposition between the "clerical science" of Albert the Great and Thomas
Kenny!.l. Pin borg, Cambridgr 1982. �� Ibid p. 3. .•
Medieval Interpretation of Aristotk�, in: Tht Cambridgt History of Laf" Mtdiroal Phi/{)sophy, p. ':H. 35 A. Kenny. Aquinas, New York 1980, p. 2(). 36 Cf. R. Schonberger, Was isf &hola.stiJcr, p. 90. .'17 Ser, for example N. KreLZmann, "Trinity and Transcendenrals�. in: R. Feenstra and C. Planlinga (eds.), Trinity. Incornation and Atonement, Notre Dam r 1989, pp. 79-109; id., �A General Problem of Creation: Why Would God Create Anything at All?�, in: S, MacDonald (ed.), Being and Goodn=. Th, Concept of 1M Good in Mtlaph,sia and Phiiosophit;lJ1 ThNllOp:J, Ithaca and London i!t9I, pp. :lO8-228. cr. N. Kreumann and E. Swmp (ed�.), The Cambridge Com �4
C.H. Lohr, -The
,
pt"mifnl tl) Aquin41,
Camhri-llK'" 19!1:1.
14
15
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
I regard the Camlnidge History as a work that is an important docu
happiness" constitute a denial of Gilson's thesis that medieval
ment of the "new" medievalism and fills a gap in research, but
philosophy is a "Christian philosophy. "�()
nonetheless as one whose general conception has become outdated
De Libera's conception possesses a certain reasonableness. Should one not seek medieval philosophy precisely in that place,
because of its one-sidedness.
where, for the first time in this period, it affirms its autonomy and presents itself as the supreme human good? What is surprising
0.3. "The other spirit of medieval philoJophy � (A. de Libera)
and interesting in De Libera's conception, however, is his assertion that this philosophical ideal is also a distinctive feature of the
How has the study of medieval philosophy developed in the last
Rhineland mysticism in the fourteenth-century, a movement
decade? Although it is impossible to distill a universally common
about which he has published a number of studies.41 What con
property, we can yet notice a certain trend. Several authors have
nection exists between the thought in the faculty of arts and that of
focussed on those thinkers who proclaim the autonomy of philo
Meister Eckhart remains unclear, however, in La philosophie
sophy and see philosophy as a status (state of life). Representative of
mediivale.
this tendency is the French scholar Alain de Libera. The third
A definite answer is provided in De Libera's recent book, Penser
conception of medieval philosophy we want to call attention to are
au Muym Age (1991). This study has a twofold purpose: to reflect on
the views he develops in two general studies,58 His conception
the place of the Middle Ages in the history of philosophy and to
concurs with the preceding one to the extent that he also seeks the
analyze a special phenomenon permeating the whole of western
locus of medieval philosophy in the faculty of arts. In De Libera, however, it is not the logical-semantic approach of these thinkers
history, the emergence of "the intellectual" in the thirteenth cen tury.42 What constitutes the intellectual as such is "the experience
that is central but their ethical doctrine.
of thought." This experience plays a fundamental role in De Li
In about 1250/60 there developed in the faculty of arts a new
bera's conception. It led him to the study of the Middle Ages, as an
ethics, a new ideal of life, that of the philosophical life, which De
autobiographical observation makes clear. De Libera recounts his
Libera calls "ethical Aristotelianism." Philosophical contemplation
search for an answer to Heidegger's question: ''What is thought?"
represents the perfect realization of what man essentially is; intel
To understand this question in its full scope he studied at once the
lectuality is the ultimate end of man. In a programmatic way this
medieval logical theories and the Rhineland mysticism.43
ideal was expressed by Boethius of Dacia in his writing De summo
De Libera distinguishes two kinds of intellectuals in the Middle
bono, which is also called De vita phiwsophi. To him a "philosopher"
Ages. One type are the university intellectuals, the masters in the
is " any person who lives according to the right order of nature and
faculty of arts, who about 1260 formulated an ethical-intellectual
who has acquired the best and ultimate end of human life. "�9 The
ideal of the end of man. The other kind of intellectual are those ac
intellectual destiny of man, "that is what we should want to call
tive outside the framework of the university. This type illustrates a
the spirit of medieval philosophy"-so runs the closing sentence of
development to which De Libera attaches great importance, name
124).
The formulation is
ly, "the deprofessionalization of philosophy. "44 Its most important
obviously directed against Gilson, one of his predecessors in Paris,
representatives are Dante and Meister Eckhart. The "experience of
" De Libera's La philosophie medievale (p.
and indeed the ideas of a "philosophical salvation" and a "natural
�8 A. de Libera, La phiZwophie mUiroale (Que saisje?), Paris 1989 (2nd ed.
1992): id., Pens" au Moyen Age, Paris 1991. �9 Botthii Dan Opt!m . OpUJw.la, Corpus PhiiosophorU!ll Dank-oru!ll Medii Aevi vol. 6.2 (ed. N.G. Green-Pedersen ) , Copenhagen 1976, p. 377: �Philoso phum autern voco omnem hominem viventem secundum rectum ordinem naturae, et qui arquisivit optimum et ultimum finem vitae humanae." "
40 De Libera himself articulates the opposition to Gilson in: "Les et.ndes de philosophie medievale en France d'Etienne Gilson a nos jours�, in: Gli Studi di FilO$ofia Mediroale, p. 32. 41 See in particular A. de Ubera, Introduction a la mystique rMnaru d'Albl'rl u, Grand a MaItre Eckhart, Paris 1984. 42 Pens" au Moyen A�, p. 9.
4� Ibid., p. 75. 44 Ibid. p. 12. .
16
17
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
thought" manifests itself in the latter in his preaching in the
In the Cambridge Huta? he is virtually ignored. For De Libera.
vernacular language and his philosophical asceticism, which finds expression in his notion of "Gelassenheit" ("release") and which De Libera identifies as the
crown
of ethical Aristolelianism.
De Libera seeks to recover the essential moments that led to the deprofessionalization of philosophy. The event that proved most decisive were the university condemnations of 1277. In that )'tar the bishop of Paris condemned a great number of propositions, including this provocative one: "There is no more exalted state of life (slaluJ") than to dc\'ote oneself to philosophy. "45 As an effect of this censure, the ideal of the intellectual life shifted to the world outside the univerSity. De Libera's recent book thus introduces important criteria for determining the pl::1ce of medieval philosophy: the notion of intel lectuality and the experience of thought. I have, however, two ques.
however. he enjoys a prominent place in medieval philosophy. the modd for which is the intellectuality of the master in the
faculty of arts.
This hrings me to a !;Ccond question. If the experience of thought
is constitutive for the intellectual, then it is difficult to see why its
locus should be restricted to the fac.ulty of arts and why the works of theologi like Bonaventure. Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus should be excluded. Their writings too are manifestations of intel lectuality. The same holds for Nicholas of eusa. since the experi ence of the limits of rationality, tersely expressed in his notion of docta ignorantia, is just as much an authentic experience of thought. For understanding the nature of medieval philosophy, the experi ence of thought must be lhemalized in a more fundamental and universal way than it has been by De Libera.
tions with respect to his conception. The first question concerns the connection made he tween the
0.4. Medieval phil4)sophy and transcendrntal thought
thought of the faculty of arts and that of Eckhart. De Libera does not make a stIong case for the assumption that Eckhart'5 project is to be understood against the background of the Parisian condemnation of 1277. I believe De Libera overestimates the importance of this
Is there a medieval philosophy? Thus far I have discussed three significant conc.eptions. those of Gilson. of the Cambridge HUlory
condemnation: he may have been inclined to do so by the fact thaI
and of De Libera. They have made substantial contrihutions to the
Church in 1329. Read together. the two censures might suggest
all three because they do not provide sufficient insight into the
a number of Eckhart's propositions were also condemned by the that there is some continuity between the thought of the masters in the aries and Eckhart's thought. The decisive question is therefore; Are Eckhart ' s intentions directed toward the ideal of the philo sophical life. the sCH:allcd crown of ethical Aristotelianism, as this was formulated by SoNhius of Dacia? I should want to deny this, although space does not permit the presentation here of my argu ments. Eckhan focuses on the connection of philosophy and Ch�i5' tian faith. not on their methodological separation. In any event we can identify the current interest in Eckhart's thought as a striking trend in the current study of medieval philosophy. This interest may be seen as a "correction" of previous conceptions of medieval philosophy.46 For Gilson. Eckhart falls outside "Christian" thought; 4.� The lelll of the 219 propositions is giv�n in Cha.,.tulan,,,'l Uni'lfrsilatis Pari5il'l5iJ (rei. H. Denille and A. Chatelain) vol I, P,uis 1889, pp. 5<14.55.
Pror' 4
40: "QIII",,1 non ell ellceJJenlil'f �1"t1l5, quam vacare phiIOSQphjt'.� cr. K. Fhuch. "Mrl_l!!r toxkharl lind dil' 'Dl'utM'hc MY'tik'. ZUI" Krilik
study of medieval philosophy, but I have formulated objections to
philosophical dimension of medieval thought. Now in order (0
make some progress in this question, I am interested in statement.'1 by medieval writers in which they personally indicate what they consider to he fundamental to their thought or what they regard as decisive for the possibility of philosophy. Such "cgo" statements are rclativcl}' rare among Scholastic authors, but they are not altogether abscnt. I mention four cX
5)
to the effect that the divine ' can be contemplated in two
ways. One mode looks primarily to being itself and claims "He who is" is the first name of God. The way in which Bonaventure elaborates the connection between the knowledge of being and the knowledge of God is particularly noteworthy. He refers back to his rines hiSiorioRraphiKhl'n .'kh!!mas". in: OJ, Plul"'r>Ph;, im 14. una 15. JaM· h.n!.dm. In In","""
I�IRK.
I" 043!1.
18
19
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCT10N
eXpOSltJOll in the third chapter. in which he had carried out an
those who claim the opposite destroy it.".'>!! �Being" is also for Scotus
analysis (resolu/io) of our concepts. The intellect knows what a
the first concept, wilhout which nothing can be known. Since this
thing is thro ugh the definition. A definition must be forme d
concept is last in the resoiutiQ of our concepts, it must be absolutely
through higher, that is, more general concepts, which must again
resol ution is not yet complete. for being can be thought of as
un iv ersal and absolutely sim ple. From this he concludes that "being' has only one meaning and is predicated of substance and accidem as well as of God aud creature in a uni\'ocal way. This univocity makes possible the science of being that is implied in every act of knowledge
im perfec t and perfect, changeable and unchangeable . dependent
Meister Eckhart remains the most controversial thinker of the
be defined through higher concepts, until one arrives at that which is most general. These are �being" and its conditions "one," "true," and "good." With the reduction to "being," however, the
.
and absolute. Now imperfections or privations are only known by means or posi tive determinations. The complete resolution of knowledge therefore shows that our intellect cannot understand any created being unless it is aided by the understanding of the
Middle Ages. But in the "Ceneral
most pure and absolute being.47 From this analysis Bonaventure
of Expositiones, are so dependent on the first, namely the Work of
concludes in ch. five that being which comes into the intellect first
Propositiones, that without it they arc of little use. Eckhart's first
is pure act; it is the di vine being . He regards this insight as fundamental; as he himself observes: "the writer of the Book of Causes (Liber De ca·usis) says: '!he first of created things is being , but ] [Bonaventure] say: 'the first of intellectual things is the first being' . ,..�
observation in the Prologue is instructive for his understanding of
"
Prologue
to his opus triparlitum,
he makes a number of observations which he apparently considers as foundational for this grand pr�iec t. According to one of them, the second book, the Work of Quaestiones, and the third, the Work
an axiomatic metaphysics. General terms (termini genrrale5) "being," "one," "true" and
'
"
"-
good
must not be imagined in the
manner of accidents, since they precede everything and are the first in things. The first four treatises of the Work of Propositionrs deal therefore with these general terms, which provide the philo sophical foundat.ion of the Opus tripartitum ·t
The most controversial doctrine of Thomas Aquina� in the
/
years followi ng his death is his doctrine of the uni ty of the
What do th ese "ego"·statemcnts of theologi teach us? They all
.
substantial form in human beings I t is impossible. Thomas argues, that there be another substantial form in man in addition to his intellec tual soul. The reason is that nothing is absolutely one except by that one form by which a thing has bein g; from the same source ::l thillg has both its being and unity Concerning the view of his opponenlS, who ace.ept a plurality of substantial forms. Thomas states that their view is contrary to the principles of first
have somelhing in common. The four statements all relate to that for which t.he term Ira1lscentUnlitJ was introduced in the thirteenth century (and for which the expression "transcendentals," since Suarez, ha... been customary) The doctrine of the transcendenlia. .
.
"
among which Mbciug." "one,� "true" and "goorl not just another doctrine
are reckoned, is
al
ongside many others, for it concerns
unily is
what is the first and the foundation of thought. Over time, my
removed from th ings and hence also their entity."49 There is an
conviction has grown that medieval philosophy can be regarded as
philosophy, since as a consequence of their doctrine,
U
intrinsic connection between the being and the unity of a thing.
•
a way of transcendental tho ugh t, as a scirnlia transcrndens; the expression appears in Duns Scotus in his commentary on the Meta
Being and one are convertible . In Duns Scotus we tind the statement: ''with the doctrine of the
physics.�� A generation before Scotus, however, Albert the Great
univocity of being I do not destroy (non des/ruo) phil osophy, but IActura in I &nl., d. 3 n. l i D (Opn"a Omnia XVI, p. 265) . .�1 PT010gul gmll1"ali$ in OPUJ lriparlll,jm, 11. 8 and n. 1 1 (Meister Eckhart, LatnnMch, W,r..\;t I, 152 3, 156). cr. J. Koch. "Sinn lind Struktur der Srhrifl_ auslegllngen Meiner Eckhil.rt�", in: Kb:in, s.:"rift�n I, Rome 1973, p. 413. .�� In Mttaph., pro!. (Opt'I'a Omnio ed. Vives VII, p. 5): "ig-itur necesse est 50
., lIin,.,.arium 1I1,� (Opr:ra Omnia V, p. 304). 411 ll,:tanrttron X, 1 � (Opera Omnia V, p. 379) . 411 V, H4bst. Jt,mr., c. 6, �".III. 1,76.3. We deal more eXlen$ively with
ThollllU'. vlr-w I tl
I-r.rt.
5.6.
•
-
e/i.5e aliquam scienti,un univer!l.alem. quae per 5e c.onsiderel ilia transcen den!i", e! hallc -'l"i�nriam VOC;UIl\1.\ Mer;lphysicam, quae dicitur a mfla, qllod esr
20
already emphasizes that "first philosophy" deals with the and
21
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
prima
tmnscendmtia.!o3
reason why Aristotle does not arrive upon lhe transcendentality of truth and goodness: "the Philosopher does not consider being in.�o
The beginning of the doctrine of the lranscendenlals coincides
with the moment at which, for the first time, the Latin world confmnted a comprehensive philosophical explanation of reality.
The reception of Aristotle's works in the thirteenth century forced
far as it flows from the first, wise and good being." He views being "insofar as the intellect terminates in it by resolving
(resolvens)
the
posterior into the prior and the composed into tJle simple." Aristotle
employed the method of !.he resolution or reduction or the contents
medieval thinkers to reneeI on the nalure of philosophy vis-a-vis
of our thought to a first concept.54 Over against the
Christian theology. Earlier in the Middle Ages there was no such
Albert posits the
pressing need to aC(OUIll for lhe proper foundation of philosophy.
origin from the first, true and good being. It is to this view of the
The transcendental way of thought is the answer to this challenge,
first ontological determinations that Albert himself subscribes.·\·\
for transcendental! are the
His opposition of the
prima
in a cognitive respect. In the
saneli.
Philosophus,
They considered being according to its
Philosophus and
the sancti shows his aware
reduction of the contents of our thought to self-evident concepts,
ness that different traditions of thought (both the Greek and the
they turn out to be the "firsts.�
Christian) and different motives affected the doctrine of the tran
This epistemological reduction is an important viewpoint for the
scendentals, as it came to be developed by the
theologi.
reconstruction of a medieval philosophy within a theological
The transcendental way of thought is neglected in the concep
synthesis. At the beginning of our Introduction, we observed that
tions of medieval philosophy discussed above. Although the doc
, the problem of medieval philosophy is that its object is the outcome
trine of the transcendentals is the core of medieval metaphysics,
of a hermeneutical intervention and a modern reading of texIS. But
the doctrine is not considered at all in Gilson's
in the texts themselves we find some justification for this recon
Cambridge History it receives only
struction in the doctrine of transcendentals, for these notions are
remains ouL�ide of consideration in De Libera's determination of
the conditions for all thought and the basis of philosophical
the place of medieval philosophy. One of the objectives of the
reflection.
preM:nt study is to show not only that the "for-gottcn" doctrine is
one
The Spirit. In the brief reference (p. 493), and it
We gain some insight into the way that medievals themselves
important for our understanding of medieval philosophy, but also
understood the doctrine of the transcendentals in a text from the
tbat the idea of medieval philosophy as a transcendental way of
commentary on the
Sentences
by Albert the Creal. He begins his
exposition by referring to the
Philosophus.
"According [Q th e
thought does not exclude the other conceptions, but incorporates them.
Philosopher 'being' and 'one' are before everything." This state
The conception of medieval philosophy as transcendental
ment may be regarded as a reference to the primary historical
thought expresses already in its termlnology a moment of continu
source of medieval transt:endcntal thought, namely Aristotle's
ity with modern philosophy, for the term 'transcendental' is
account of being and the one in book IV of the section
5.1.),
Metaphysics
(see
Alben's text, however, shows his awareness that the
generally reserved for the way of thought inaugurated by Kant. Kant brings the project of his three
Critiques together under
the title
Middle Ages have gone further than Aristotle, by claiming that "the Philosopher docs not hold that 'true' and 'good' are disposi tions concomitant with every being." Albert also indicates the
trans, el phyJiJ, scienlia., quaSi transcendens scientia, quia esl de transcen· dentibU5." On the importance of Scatus's transcendental thought fur the hislOry of philosophy, Ludger Honnddder has published �veral studies. Sec e'pecially Sdenlia lyallJrendnu. Dif /flnlfalf Bt5timmung d/!Y SeiendMit umi &alitiit in d",. Mtlflph,siil des Mitldalt� und d" Nruuit (Dunl SroluJ - Swirtl .Wolff · KaIN - Ptiru), Hamburg 1900. '' " , AIhrri the Great, 'n ' M,tapll. , tr.v:t. I, f;, 2 (I'd. B. Geyer, p. 5) .
•
51 We leave aside for now Ihe question whether Albert's interpretation i�
historically correct, to which we reLUrn in section 2.2. 55 In I Smt., d. 46, N. a. 14 (Op_ya Omnia ed. Borgnet, vol. 26. p. 450): "Dicendum, quod secundum Philosophum. anu: omnia sunt ens et unum. Philosophus enim non ponll, quod verum et bonum sunt dispositiones generaliter concomitanles ens ( ... ). Quia Philosoph\1� non con�iderat ens secundum quod nuit ab ente primo et UIIO et sapiente et bono, sed ipse considerat ens secundum quod stat in ipw intellectus resolvens poneri\l� in prius, el composiUlm in simplex ( ... ) . Et ideo sic generaJiter considerando ilita, lit consideraverunt Sancti, ciic:emus ( ... ) . Hoc autem ideo dieo, quia i�ta a Sanc:lis prima ponuntur et in quo1ibet".
22
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
of "Transcendental Philosophy," but he himself recognizes that this nocion has a long tradition. In the Critique of ?uTe Reason (8 113)
he points to the 'lr-.mscendental Philosophy of the Ancients" and quOtes the proposition
"
so
famous among the Schoolmen; quodlibet
ens est unum, verum. bonum," At the same moment, however. he
distances himself from the traditional conception. 'These supposed
things are 1I00hing else but logical of all knowledge oj things in generaJ" (B
lranscelldenlal predicates of requirements and criteria
1 14 ) . 'Transcendental" in the Kammn sense is concerned with the mode of our cognition of ohjects, insofar is possible
a prirni.
as
this mode of cognition
23
consider the medieval doclrine as a distinctive form within the tradition of transcendental philosophy. The French scholar S. 8reton wrote in 1963 that the doctrine of Lhe tTansccndentals is " classic and yet poorly known."·"i9 His
observAtion still holds. We only possess two general studies on this
subject, the first by H. Kniuermeyer, the other by G. Schulc mann.f'o Both studies go back to the 1920$ and must be regarded as
out of dale. Their main shortcomings are that they do not pay
sufficient attention to the historical and doctrinal background of the formation of the doctrine in the thirteenth century and fail to give an explicit analysis of the notion of transcendentality. A new
The Kantian perspective has strongly affectcrl the study of
history of transcendental thought in the Mirldle Ages is required.5t
medieval transcendental thought. An example of the connection of merlieval thought with "modernity" is to be found in Kurt Flasch's
The focus in this book will be on Thomas Aquinas ( 1 224/5-1274), a
important study on Nicholas of Cusa which contains a chapter,
representative of medieval thoughl, whose importance for the
entitled "Metaphysics and Transcendental Thought in the Middle
transcendental way of thought is often neglected or under
Ages.��6 Flasch does not refer here to the doctrine of the transccn
estimatcrl. Although libraries have been written on his thought,
dentals, for he wants to take the term 'transcendental' exclusively
and although we possess various studies of some aspects of his
i n a Kantian sense, that is, as transcendental-logicaP7
tran
doctrine of the transccndcntals, it is :'Ilriking that a comprehensive
scendental philosophy, in his view, is based on the idea that the
study of Aquinas's doctrine is lacking. This book will till this
world of objects is constituted by the human mind. Transcend
lacuna and wants to show that lhe doctrine of the transcendentals
Evtry
ental thought in the Middle Ages is therefore related to those
is not,
as
has been suggested, "a small, rather insignificant pan� of
thinkers who acknowledge a constitutive function of the human
his
mind, such as the German Dominican Dietrich of Freiberg (d.
thought. By the same token. the study will substantiate in an
after 1310), They show "a much more modern Middle Ages than it is generally supposed."511
metaphysics,"\! but is of fUlldamelllal imparlance for his
exemplary way the claims made in this seC[ion concerning Ihe conception of medieval philosophy
Yet this transcendental-logical approach seems questionable
thoughL
as
a transcendental way of
from a historical point of view. II makes the Kantian position the exclusive criterion for determining what transcendental thought is in the Middle Ages. Medieval philosophers, however. developed their own concepl of transcendentality, and it is this way of thought that Kaut called the YTranscendental Philosophy of the Ancients.� It would be more appropriate historically and philosophically to
56 K. f.·lasch, Di, Md Phy!'ilt dM Einrn bti Nikolaus von Klus. Prol>lemgtschicht � . llcht Slrffung und 51s/.tmotluh, Bedeutung, Leiden 1973, pp. 105 ff. 57 See the exten5ive note in ibid., p. 103. 5R [bid., p. 156. ce. on Dietrich of Freiberg K. Flasch, "Kcnm d ie mittel.
alterliche PhHosophie die konstitutive Funktion des menschH chen Den. kens? fine Un ters lLchung l.U Dietrich von Freiberg�, in: KanlJtudi m 63 (1972), pp. 182·206.
S\I S. Breton, "I:idee de transcend"nt"! et [a genese des transcenJantaul( chez Saint Thomas d·Aquin". in: Saini ThoJtlIU d'A'I'�in '''Ijourd'hu;, Pari.� 1963. p. 45. 60 H. Knittermeyer. Der Ttrminlll Tyam�und,.n[al it< .11!11UT hi.I/Orii
�J.E.
J.
JJ.t::.
24
INTRODUCTION
Thomas Aquinas was, however, not the first to formulate the doctrine of the transcendentals. The beginning of the doctrine is (0 be located in the first half of the thirteenth century; it coiltcides with the introduction of a volurninou., body of new philosophical literature into the Latin West. Not only the entire corpus amto leiicum, bUl also the writings of Arabic philosophers become available in translation at this lime. In the first chapter we will analyze the beginning of the docrrine of lhe transcendentals. It is, of course, a requirement of modern scholarship on Thomas \0 place his philosophy in its proper historical contexl. The fint chapter provides the background for Thomas's transcendental thought and enables us to see its traditional and innovative aspects,
CHAPTER ONE
THE BEGINNINGS OFTHE DOCTRINE OF THE TRANSCENDENTALS The first development of the doctrine of the transcendenws is to be found in thret: thinkt:rs, all of them active at the University of Paris, then the scholarly center of Christendom, in the first half of the thilteenth century: Philip the Chancellor, so called because he was the Cancellarius of the University from 1218 until his death in 1236; Alexander of Hales (d, 1245), who occupied the first Fran ciscan chair of theology from 1 236; and Albert the Great (d. 1280), who occupied one of the two Dominican chairs in the Theological Faculty from 1242 to 1218. In the present chapter we will investi gate the beginnings of the doctrine of the transcendentals in these three authors.
1 . 1 . Philip the Chancellor's MSumma de bono" The first scholar who pointed out the seminal significance of Philip the Chancellor for the theory of the transcendentals was Henri Pouillon. In 1939 he published an article that has since become classic, "The First Treatise on Transcendental Properties. ". The title "First Treatise" is slightly misleading, for Philip never wrote a separate LTeatise on this subjecL What Pouillon establishes in his article is that the introductory eleven questions of the Summa de bono, written ca. 1225-28, contain the first formulation of the doctrine of the transcendentals.'1 Pouillon's conclusions have been corroborated by a comparative inquiry of Philip's questions and a small group of questions in the
I "Le premier traite: des proprihes trallscelldallLaks, La 'Summa de bOllo'
du Challcdier Phi lippe , In: &tru� niQ$co/Q.tique tk philoJophie 42 (1939), pp.40"
77. 2 For the text of the: introductory qucstion, .\ee Philippi CanuUarii ParUitn�u Summa dt bono, vol. II. ed. N, Wlcki, Bem 1985, pp. 3.-36, For the dating of the Summa see N, Wicki, "Donnees de la tradition manuscrite et probleme5
d'hi5toire litteraire:", in: i&id" vol. I, p. 66·,
26
CHAPTER ONE
lU:GINNINCS OF TilE DOCTRINE OF THE TRANSCENDENTALS
Summa aurea of William of Auxerre (ca. 1220) ,3 In preparation for a discussion of the virtues William examines the nature of goodness (111, tract. X, c. 4).� He raises five questions, the first three of which are: "What is goodness?"; "What is the difference between bei ng (esse) and being good (esse bonum)?"; "What is the difere nce between the good and the true?", But in William's account there is 110 trace of Ph il ip's central concerns about the relations between
,
which our activity of �digging up" silver begins.6 He image of a silver mine to theoretical thought:
The beginni.ng of Philip's prologue is quite suggestive. Through his analogy to mining he makes clear that his in ten tion is to go "i.!lJ.��l}e grQ!-!�ld n_o.fJ h.�� .&!1J. .O!:lr J.ludcrsLan.dinK of question� n:tuSt be traced back 10 the underlying common principles. Apparently , he sees the go �d (b01lum) as such a fundamental principle, for immediately after the pas.s.':lg.c. c.i���... :r4HiR s.
.
The Prologue Prologue Philip explains his imention by meditating on a text. of Scriptur�, Job 28:1. the uuin versio n of which reads: Ha/N.l
In
the
awntu", vmarum .warum priflcipia, et aUf"O locus ell i71 quo conflalur (literally: "Silver has beginnings of iL.. veins, and gold ha.<; a place ,
where it is sifted"). "Gold" is. in his interpretation. "the wisdom of m oral.� , " while "silver" is "the understanding of questions" (inl.elligrnlia qUalJtionum). "Gold � relates to the perfec tion of pranicai reason, "silver" to the perfectio n of theoretical reasun. \Vhat. matters to Philip in this text is the phrase principia, for it is this notion that he lakes up: �ilver has starting points or principles, from � s. MacDonald. �Goodness as Transcendenr.a!: The Ear!y Thirlccnth· Cenlury Rcco\lcry of an Arist(lteiian Idea�. in: Topoi 1 1 (1992). pp. 17�H86. 5C";c al�o his Ph. D. dissertation Tht Mftaph)'jjcj of GoodntlS in Mtditual [>JlilOJ.oph, bi/ort Aquinru. CornC';ll University 1986. pp. 205-245. Appendix 7 (pp. 615-629) cOnlain$ a translation of substantial parts of Philip·5 que5tiom. � Sllmmll (1U"1I HI. Jean Ribailler e.a. (ed.). vol. I. Rome 1981J..7. pp. 143-170. .� Fur ('xamph·, Pouill
the
As silver is dug up from hidden Vt�ins as from its principles. so the Illlderstanding of questions is extracled from the commonne55 of principles (ex rommunilaupri7lcipiqrum). When thC';se principles are nol known. the reSl falls into darkness. Therefore the faith of those who ignore the nalure of the prillcil'lcs has suffered shipwreck. as is t..he case with (he Manichealls.7
f
beillg, good and true. Philip's Summa is a watershed in the develop ment of the doctrine of tht: tr.Ulscendcn tals. OUf inquiry into th� begin nings of the doctrine must therefore slaTt with this work. Even after Pouillan's artide there are reasons for taking a fresh look at the Summa de bono. One reason is that in 1985 the critical edition of th is work appeared, which corrects Pouillon's account on some points.·' The main reason, however, is that Pouillon's cxposi· tion is insufficiently attentive to Philip 's ordering of the text. Philip prefaces his introductory questions with a prologue, in which he states his intemion, and explains the structure of these questions and the division of the ."'·umma. An analysis of th is prologue will afford m a betler insight into the motives behind the gen esis of the dm;trinc of tht: tram,cendentals.
appl ies
27
.
.
(c
i
_.
_..
-
.
_
fi Summa dt bmw. p rol. (ed. Wicki. p . 4): kHo< argentum habet '1enarum suarum principia. ex quibll5 tamquam minera!e corpus edudtur. a quibm inripit:lllLlS.· 7 {Md.• pml. (c:d. Wic ki. p. 4 ) .
28
29
CHAPTER ONE
BEGINNINGS OF THE DOCTRINF. OF THE TRANSCENDENTALS
�piritual world, and an evil one that is the cause of the visible .af!d material world.� The challenge of the Cathari may explain why Philfp me Chancelior's docu-ine of the common notions is primari ly developed in view of the tr.mscendentality of the good. His Summa de bono might be intended as a response to the new variant of Manichaeism.9 The good is not the only common principle; Philip Slates in the prologue that "most common (communimma) are these: heing. one, true and good,HIt) This is the first indication in the Summa of a doctrine of the transcendentals, although he never uses the term tran$cendelltia in his work. What this transcendental perspective means is made clear in q. 2, where Philip opposes his approach to that of the natural philosopher who considers form in matter: "We, however, speak now communitfr, so that we comprehend divine being that is without matter, rational being, natural being and moral being. " l I The transcendental consideration is comprehen sive: it encompasses all domains of reality. Another term lhat Philip employs for the comt11Uni.'J5ima is '"the firsts" (prima) . This term expresses their cognitive priority: "being,"' '"one," " true," and �good" are called the first concepts (primae intmtio'les) . because there is not something prior into which they can be resolved (fial molulio) . I ! As is often the case, Philip does not elaborate this statement. but at least this much is clear: he sees a reciprocity between the firslness and the commonness of these concepts. They are first because they are most common, and most common because they are the first. The term intentiQ would become a standard phrase in the thirteenth-century discussion of the transcendemals. Umherto Eco interprets the expression secun· dum intenlionl!m as "with respect to the intentionality of the per cipicot,"l� but this interpretation is incorrect. The term illtnltio has
no subjectivisLic connotation at aJJ within the context of discussions of the transcendentals. The usc of this tcrm poillls to the influence of Arabic philosophy, for it�tentio is the Latin translation of the Arabic word ma'ua. As such, it has the same meaning as ratio, the translaLion of the Greek. Iog()S.I
M See R. Nelli. LA philO.lophie dll Ca/ha"sm�. u dllalism, radical au XIllt Jiicie, Paris 1975; J. JOliVt"I, "Logiquc: cath arc:: la scission de I'universel-, in: E. P. Bas (ed.), Mtdi,val Strnan/ir.• and M�taph'jicJ (Studies dedicated to L. M. de Rijk), Nijmegen 19f15, pp. 143-160. (/ cr. H. PouiUon , -Le premier tIaite�, pp. 74-5. 1 0 StmllM d� 00710, pro!. (c:d. Wicki, p. 4): �Communissima autcm hee �unl:
ens, unum, verum. bonum�. II Ibid., q. 2 ad :I (rd. Wield, p. 12). U Ibid., q. 9 (cd. Wicki, p. 30): "ens et unum et verum el bonum $Unt prllllll (... ) . Prill1e intentione• •implices dicuntuf, quia non e$t ante ipsa$ in qlle nat rel"lulJo, Ante prlnlll nun elt fl utxl in eonlln v('ni;1I dlflinitionem." U
If. ',('0, A.rt .IUI /1M"" in J/I., MUUlf ",(No
Y.le HIKH, 1'. 24.
14 Se� P. Engelhardt, "lntcntio", in: His/QrnCMJ W
Jianne) , Paris 1938. pp. 253-55. 1 5 Summn de bnrw. pro!. (ed. Wicki, p.4). 1 6 cr. q. 8 (�d. Wicki, p. 27), where the good is Mappropriated to the good of nature.-
30
31
CHAPTER ONE
BEGINNINGS OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRANSCENDJo:NTALS
things which are from the highest good insofar as it is good"
investigates �thc relation between good and being;" q. 2 "the rela
(qq. 5-7) .
tion hetween good and true;" q. 3 "the ordering of true with respeci
to good." It is striking that no separate Clueslion i.� devoted to "the one." From our a nalysis, however, it will appear that Ul'lUm is nut
D. Finally, "the division of created good" will be examined (qq. 10 and I I ) . tn these questions Ilhilip lays the foundation of the division of the Summa into three main parL�: "The good of nature"
(47
ignored, but rather is central to Philip's account of the transcen
questions), "the generic good" (5 questions) that concerns
human action and �the good of grace"
dentals.
(96 questions).
Noteworthy in the first question is that the transcendentality of
Before section 0 Philip inserts two oilier questions: "Are being
the good is not demonstrated. but presupposed. Philip's main
and being good the same for every created thing?" (q. 8) and "On
the predication 'Goodness is good'" (g. prompted by Boethius's De
9).17
hebdomadibu.{.
concern is the prohlem how the good can be defined. He begins
These questions arc
his discussion with a number of o�iectjons claiming that a defin.i
This work played an
don is impossible. The first of them is as follows:
important role in the evolution of medieval thougill. It became a textbook in the twelfth century, that has been called the
Bodiana,
Good and bein g ( tIls) arc inTerchangeable because whalevt'r is " being is good, and the converse. But being does nllt have a
Aetas
and was commented upon by Cilbert of Poitiers and
Clarembald of Arras.ls De
hebdotnfldiims
ddinilional account
is a response to a question
good.J9
asked of Boethiw; by a friend: "How can substances be good in
therefore neither does
The lirst premise of this argument states but does lIot really
virtue of the fact thai they are when they arc not substantially
explain the convertibility of good and being: Bonum el ens
good?" Boethius's refleclion OIl the relation between being and
vertuntur.
good fits quite well in the themes of Philip's introductory questions.
cot]
Philip uses here a term that would become the standard
term charaCleri7.ing the relation among transcendenwls. The krm
lis incorporation into the Summa shows a moment of continuity
"convenible" dtrives from the predication-theory articulated in
between the formation of the doctrine of the transccndentals and
Aristotle's
earlier medieval thought. Especially in Thomas Aquinas, who
Tnpi(:!J;.20
It means that subject and predicate are so
related that they are interchangeable in a proposition. In Meta
wrote a commentary on De hebdomndibu.s. the role of Boethius's
physiu
work will become clearly noticeable.
XI,
c.
3
(
1061<1 15-17). Aristotle introduces the nOlion of
convertibility with respect to be i ng and one, claiming that "that
Philip's division of the introductory questions reflects the two
which is one is also somehow being, and that which is heing is
main issues of the prologue. First, although heing, one, true and
somehow on�. " Another source is Roethiu!l, who
good are jointly the coml'mmis.fima, he will focus on the good; on the
term c(Jnvertitur to characterize the relation between being and
other hand, they are not only "commonly" predicated, but also
one.�1 Philip the Chancellor applies the notion of convertibility to
appropriated to God. Let WI consider how Philip elabor.J.[es these two
"good" and "heing" in order to expres,"1 their real idenlily.
issues.
Similarly, the second premise of the objection-that being has
no definition-is not explained. It formulates
The .systematization oj the "communi.ssima �
a
basic Aristotelian
idea (d. 2.3.): being cannot be ddined. for being is Hot a genus that can he specified by something different from it. That which differ�
A5 is announced in the i'mlogue, the first group of questions is concerned with "the relation of good to being, one, and true."
(diffinitivarn mtwnem);
Q.
I
11 See the iouoduction to q. 8 (cd. Wkk-i, p. 27): "Sed anu, qu;un laquam", de divisione bani tangamus quasdam questiones. que possun! ad bonum creatum generaliter referri vel appropJiari bono nature." 1M Cf. C. Sc.hrimpf. Dj� AnolrlenJdl1'l/' des Bue,hiUJ (De hebdomadiblU) all fJhiloMJflhud.n ullrbuda iUs Mifttlaltn-s, i.eiden L96G; M.·D. Chenu. 1.0. f"ioIa� au drna.�m' .IiMe, l'llrl� 1!1!i7, rho VI; Artas /JMriana, pp. 142·I!:iR.
1 9 Summa 21)
1'.84).
de bono. q. 1 (ed. '"Vicki, p. 5). Topica I,8 . 103b 7·17. Cf. Peter of Spain. 1'raclalus VI.ll (NI. De
Rijk.
2 1 Boelhius. ConlTlI Ell/yellen c. 4 {The The"u'gu;at Troda!,,-', eu.. Siewar. 0':.<1., ("'..ambridge , Mass. 1973. p. 94); �e5Se t:nim al.que unum convc:nimr et quodrUml[IlC unum CSI C�(.· Cf. Itl Tof,iMnlm I. c . 4 (MiK"I' 1'1. (;4, !) [ :iA).
j
,
,
,
CHAPTER ONE
BEGINNINGS OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRANSCENDENTALS
from being is nothing, but non-being cannot be a specifying
"undivided being;� i t adds something conceptual to being by
difference. Because the good is as common as being. good is like
"taking away division� from beingP
32
33
Philip's reply to the question as to the definability of the good is
wise undefinable. Although a strict defLOition is impossible, Philip observes thai the good nevertheless has �descriptions"
(nolijicatumes).
The firSl
an example of his intellectual independence. He claims that the third description of the good i n terms of indivision is the primary
derives from Dionysius the Areopagite: "the good is what is
and principle concept, despite the fact that the other two definitions
desired by all things." This character of the good as an end is also
are taken from such authorities as pseudo-Dionysius and Aristotle.
expressed by the formula that AriSlotIe employs at the beginning
"The good is what has the indivision of act from potency absolute
of his
lyor in some respccL"2( He explains the meaning of the two quali
Ethics: MAli things seek. the good.� The second description is
also taken from Dionysius: lhe good is multiplicative and diffu
fications "absolutely" and �in some respect." The former applies to
sive of being." The third description is "extracted from Aristotle
the first being, �for potency is identical with 3(;t in the divine
and other philosophers:" the good is what has the indivision of
essence;" the latter holds for other things, for their essences possess
act from potency absolutely or in a certain respecL "Tl
potency and so incompletion. Only the first being is "pure act."
After enumerating these three descriptions of the good, Philip
presents a counter-argument
(contra)
that considers the pOSSibility
The Aristotelian notions of act and potency are used by Philip as a specification of "indivision," which is the central notion in the
of a definition. Although the argument is not presented in a clear
definition of the good.
way, it contains tbe dements of his solution of the problem of
He does lIot explain, however, why the description in terms of
definability. It seems that good cannot be defined by something
indivisioll is the primary concept of the good. But in a reply [0 an
prior to it. If it is defined in terms of something prior to it and a
obje(;tion he gives an argument for his preference:
difference, it must receive being in its definition as the genus (on
The primary dcfinition of the good is given (.. .) by a (liITercnce mat CQnsists in a negation; for the prima must be determined in this way, as is the ca�(' of the one (unum).:.=!'>
assumption th;tt being is prior to good) together with something added as the difference. But what is added will be convertible with being. This is because what is added will be convertible with good, and good is convertible whh being. Philip concludes [hat the specifying difference cannot he added to being in order to limit the scope of reference of being
(ad wntrahtndum suppositum)-we
shall
come back to the term "supposit"-but can only be added in a con ceplUal respect
(quantum ad raJiunnn) . He next wonders what kind of
determination that would be. The question he raises here will be
The definition o f "one, � "undivided being. � must be the model for thl:: determinations of the other transcendentals, as Philip had already indicated in his argument
contra.
The attraction of the
model is that uone" adds something to "being" without this addi tion entailing a limitation of the extension of �one." "One" retains its comprehensive, transt:cndemal character because it only adds
come a central problem in the medieval dOClrine of the transcend entals. If the other
communinima
are convertible with being, in
what sense, theil, can they add .something to being? Philip argues that the good is immediately related to being, and is therefore not defined by being and some positive reality added to heing. The difference added to being by good must be understood according to the way in which uone� adds something to being. uOne" means
2' Summa d� WOIO, q. I (rd. Widi. p. 7): "E! ita [txmum \ non diffinietur per aliquam pOsiliollelll �uperadriitalll. sicut nrc lImllll c:um dicilUr unum est ens indivisum; 'indivisum' cuim ponil cn5 el privat ab enle divi$ionem_� My interpretaTioJl of Ihis argmJlf'nt diffef5 from SCOII MacDonald'� in his article �Goodness as Transcendental". in: T"poi 1 1 (1992). p. 178. He talf'� Philip's conclmion-that the diITereme in any definition of good can �pccif)' }� hr:ing only conccptllally withoul al$O "ca ....·illl( up� the corruponding realil to be �n ahsurd consequence. NOle, however, I,hal Philip him!IClf oh�rvn in his reply to this counter-argument (ed. Wick.i, p. B) that it ;� not a real ob eClion. 4 .')lunma de bonll. q_ 1 (ed, Wield, p . 7 ) : "Dicimu5 autc:m ratiunem illam rationc", primam el principalelll: bonum est habcn� i"divisionem aClus a potentia Simpliciler vel qllorlamm"do.� :fro //lid 'I' I (",1, Wirk.i. p. M), rns ('I
4
�1 Dionysius, D, div. nom. . (.. 4, 4; Aristotle, EtA. Nic.. I, 1 . 109401. 2. The ftcrond dncriplion nOl found nrbalilll i n Dionysiu$, bUl expressu a central
is
dr-lII!:nl (If hi, tt':lrhinl{ (cf.
r.
4. 4).
.•
34
BEGINNINGS OF THE DOCTRINE 01<" THE TRANSCENDENTALS
CHAPTER ONE
something conceptual: a negation. The importance of this model for Philip's interpretation of the relation of the good to being becomes manifest in q. 1, in his reply to the first objection: The fact that good and bein g are nmvcrtible docs not prevent one from d�scrib ng good in terms of being. Even though they arc con vertible with respect to the extension and scope of their supposits (suppusilrnum), the good goes beyond being conceptually (ratione), namely, through the fact that it is undivided from the e d or from the act that is called a complction.�6
!
n
Philip formulates an identity and a difference between good and being, and his view of the twofold relation between the transcendentals would be adopted by thinkers like Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. With respect to their supposits, being and good are convertible; but with respect to their concepts, the good goes beyond being, for it adds something to being. That is the reason why Philip is so concerned with the definability of the good-its ratio must be understood as a con ceptual determination of being. What needs further explanation is Philip's formulation of the identity among the transcendentals. What docs he mean when he slates that they are convertible according to their supposita? One is inclined to surmise a connection with the logical-semantic approach in medieval philosophy, that was described in the Introduction . One of the original developments in terminist logic is the theory of the properties of terms in which the distinction between significalio and suppositio is central. This connection is plausible chronologically, for lhe handbook of terminist logic, the Tractatus of Peter of Spain, was written in the 1230's. The theory of supposition distinguishes the different semantic functions a term can have according to the propositional context; the term can "stand for� (supponit) itself, for the universal form or concept, or for some suppositum contained under its concept. Because "supposi tion" is roughly analogous to "reference" in twentieth-century terminology, some scholars translate the identity of the transcen dentals according to their mpposita into modern philosophical language and interprete this identity as sameness in reference.27
21\
Ibid" q. 1 ad I (ed. Wicki. p. 8).
"
"
27 For the th�ory of supposition , s�e two contributions in th� Cambridgt
History of Latl':J" Mtdltval Phllo.w/lhy. L. M. d� Rijk, "The origins of the th �ory of t h e properties of I(,nns' (pp. 1!i1-173) and I'.V. Spadt·. "Tht, semantics of
35
Now the theory of supposition was indeed used for the descrip tion of the relations between the transcendentals in the fourteenth century. William of Ockham, for instance, states that when the terms "being" and "one" have "personal supposition," that is, when they refer to individuals of which they are truly predicable, they are identical; but when they have "simple supposition," they signify different concepts, since "one" connotes something other than Wbeing."28 Thirteenth-century authors, however, do not use the term suppositio in the context of the transcendentals. They prefer the term suppositum that has rather an ontological sense; it signifies the concrete things falling under a common nature. However, it is easy to connect this signification to supposition as property of a term, for any term signifying the common nature can stand for (supponit) each and any of the supposits of that nature. Philip follows the same strategy in the second question ("On the relation between good and true") as he did in q. 1. Although "true" and "good" are convertible, they nevertheless have different definitions. He presents five definitions of truth, that of Augustine in Soliloquia II, 5 ("that which is"), Hilary of Poitiers in De trinitate V, 3 ("that which declares or manifests being"), Anselm of C...anter bury in his dialogue De veritate ("rightness perceptible only by the mind"), the formula "adequation of thing and intellect," and, finally, a definition in terms of "individuation:" wthe true is the indivision of being and that which is (verum est indivisio esse et quod est). Which of these definitions, Philip asks, is the most appro priate? He objects to Hilary's definition, because the phrase "that which declares or manifests being" contains a reference to a knowing subject. The true must be defined "without any relation to an intellect."29 The definition, "adequation of thing and intellect," expresses according to Philip a secondary type of truth, namely,
[eons" (pp. 188-196). Cf. for th� us� of modern terminology in the study of m�di�val s�mantics, L.M. de Rijk, �On A ci�n t and Medieval Semant.in and Metaphysics", ill: Vivarium 15 (1977). p. 86; E. Stump and N. Kr�tzmann, "Being and Goodness', ill: S. MacDonald. Being and Goodness. The Concept of thr Good in Mrtaphysir.s and Philosophical T}�{Jlogy, IThaca and London 1991. p. 99, n. 4. 28 William of Ockham, Scriptum in I Smt.. d. 24, g. 1 ( OPera Thtol. IV, p.
n
85). 29
Summa de bono, g. 2 (�d. Wield, p. 13): "verum enim dicitur sine respectll ad int�lI�ctum·.
36
CHAYT£R ONI':
BECINNINGS OF THE DOCTI((NE OF THE TR....NSCENDENTALS
the truth of the sign. because the adequation in question must be
be (esse) and that which is are one," and "for every composite, to be
37
understood as that of a mental sign and the thing signified.�) From
and that which is are different. � In Cod, to be and that which is are
these objections it is obvious that he is seeking a purely ontological
identical� he possesses indivision in the highest degree (maxime) ,
definition of truth. Consequently, the center of Philip's discussion
and thus truth in the highest degree. Although in other things to
moves to the relation between being and the true. Augustine's definition 'The true is that which is" (id quod est)
be and that which is are diflerent, their truth consists in the indivisiol1 of these components.'6
seems to be a suitable candidate. lodeed, Philip is of the opinion
The central dement both in Philip's definition of the good and
that this definition indicates what truth is Jt'Cundum substanliam.3 1
in that of the true is the notion of " indivision." The explanation of
Yet he is not satisfied with this definition because it insufficiently expresses that by which "truth,n qua concept (ratio) , differs from "being." The statement "every being is true" threatens to become a
his preference must be sought in one of Aristotle's discussions ahoUl being and one, which became the basis for the medieval doctrine of the transcendentals. In book IV of the Metaphysics
(c. 2,
tautology, if the true does not go beyond being concepLUally.
lOO3b 22-25) Aristotle analyzes the relation between being and one.
Augustine's definition must therdore be Harticulated," and this
They signify "the same nature� in the sense that they follow lIpon
articulation gives rise to the fifth definition mentioned by Philip:
each other. bUl not in the sense that they are determined "by one
"the true is the indivision of being and that which is. "32
concept" (logos) . What is conceptually expressed by "one" is the
Philip regards this definition as the most appropriate and says that "it is taken a metaphysicis. �'3 The modern editor of the Summa de bono admits that he could not find the definition in Aristotle's MetaphYlics. He is in good company, for a similar remark was
"undividedness" of being: it adds a ne&ation to being. Philip's achievement is the extension of the Aristotelian model of the relation
between
being and one to the other transcendentals, the
true and the good.
their search was unsuccessful is not surprising, for it is plausible
In q. 3 of his Summa, Philip examines the order of vernm and bonum on the basis of their definitions in terms of indivision. The
that it was Philip himself who framed this definition in view of his
true is conceptually prior to the good, for the indivision expressed
systematization of the most common notions. He has borrowed the
by "truth" only rders to being
elements of the definition of truth from two "metaphysicians,"
expressed by '"good" includes the notion of end and the relation to
Aristotle and Boethius.�5
an end.n The most striking feature of Philip's doctrine is his
already made in the thirteenth century by Albert the CreaL". That
(ens), whereas the in division
The last part of the definition, the specification of "indivision" as
understanding of the communis.sima in terms of j"division. "One" is
that "of being and that which is," is based on Boethius's omology.
the Hrst determination of being. for it only adds indivision as such
Philip refers to two axioms in De hebdomadibus: "for C'.'e'l' simple, to
to being,� "true" and "good" add an indivision of a specific nature. The order of the transcendentals in the Summa de bono is:
�o
{bid., q. 2 (cd. Widd, p. 13): "illa diffinitio: vc:rjta.� est adequatio c:tt. approprillwr com parationi signi ad 5ignawm, �ccundum quod signum usten
dit rcm eue III CSl.�
Ibid.. q. 2 (cd. Wield, p. 13). Ibid., q. :.! (ed. Wicki , p. 1 1 ) : ·cum dicitur id quod est tria sccundum rationem designantur: Id ct esse et articulatio et equiva1et illi: verum est em habens lndlvisionem es�e et eillS quod est." ,.
n
� Su,"ma dt bmw q. 2 (ed. Wicki, p. I I ) . Cf. Roethius. Df lubdanuuiibUJ, prop. VII and VUI (ed. Stewart c.a., p. 42). �7 Summa dt 1>0010 q. 3 (cd. Wicki, p. 17): "Dico quod vcrum simpliciter prius
�3 H
dicitllr habens indillisionem esse et eius quod c�t. lion sit ex park cHlis, sciliCet ipsum usc tt ill quod
{bid., q. 2 (ed. Wield, p. 10). Albert the Great, De btmo, I, 1. 8 (Opera O"mia 1101. 28, ed. H. Kl lhle, MitnSler 19!>J, p. 15): "dichur quod lTaditur a metaphysicis sed non perspicue in'lcnilUr In libro.� �� On my interpretation Philip's phrase a melaphYJici5 does not rcfer to
Ariatotle's MelaphysicJ. Later in q. \I (ed. Wicki, p, IS) he nates that the def1nWon i! taken from ·philmophera.·
est intc:llectu quam bonum. Et hoc palel ex diffinitionibus. Verum enim
Non nominatur h i c qu(){l �t. In ratione aulelll bon;
pn::U!r e»t: ha�lUr intentio finis et comparatio ad finem (.1101 dicilur: bonum est habens indivisionem actus a potentia siv[C finis simpliciter lIeI quooam modo. EL ira patet quod verum naturaliter prius est quam bonllm.�
�8 Cf. ibid., q. 7 (ed. Wield, p. 27): "unum non ponil super cnl ni$i illdillisionem".
38
CHAPTER ONlo:
Ens
I
Unum: indivision
I
Verum: indivision of being and that which is
I
Bonum: indivisioll of act from potency ("rOd and 1M commonne.u af the good
Docs Ihe tranSl:cndenl.ality of the good mean that it is common to the highest good, Cod, and other things? In the Prologue Philip had observed that the good both belongs to the most common notions and is "appropriated" to God. How is the relation between what is common (commune) and what is proper (proprium) to be interpreted? Philip deals with this problem in q. 5 (De cummunitate huius intenliO'lis "bonum") .
A long oqjection argues the good does not seem to be a reality common 10 the highest good and the created good. For when the good is said of lhe highest good, it is identical with God himself. Just
BEGINNINGS OF THF. DOCTRINE OF THE TRANSCENDENTALS
39
the substance. The good said of God can therefore still be common, because it is said rlireclly and primarily of him, indirectly and secondarily of the creature. The terms commune and proprium refer, Philip emphasizes, to "the mode of saying.�9 The commonness "according to priority and posteriority" that Philip allribuleS to a lranscendenlal concept, is expres.sed by later thinkers in the thirteenth cenlul)' through the term "analogy. It is noteworthy that this notion is here absent in Philip.'"' Another aspect of the commonness of the good and the relation between the divine good and the created good is discussed in q. 7: "Concerning the flowing of things from lhe first� (De fluxu rerum a Primo) . Philip raises the question ·'why all things have proceeded from the first in accordance with the nature (ratio) of good rather than in accordance with the nature of wise, or powerful?" When the first principle is wise, why, then, are not all things wise that have originated from it? Philip points out that a similar question was already posed by Boethlus in De hebdomadibus: In light of the fact that Wall things are good in virtue of the fact that they have being," Boethius askes, "why are they not just in virtue of the fact that they have being?� In other words, why is it that good, and not just or wise, belongs to the communissima? In his reply Philip holds that there are three conditions COIl comitant with being: first, unity; second, truth; and third, good ness. The term �concomitam" shows once more the influence of Arabic philosophy. It derives from Avicenna, and is another expression for the convertibility and commonness of these conditions.41 Philip relates the three conditions of being to the three causal aspects of the first principle: efficient, formal and final. These aspects call be distinguished conceptually, but are one in reality. Every essence has the three conditions concomitant with its being insofar as it is from the lirst being. '·Each being is made ( e.fficiatur) to be one by the first being in accordance with the nature of unity, to be true by it insofar as it is the formal exemplary cause, �
39 Ibid., q. 5 (ed. Wicki, p. 23): �Dico crgo quod bonum quod didtur de Deo indiffcn:ns cst illi ct t:lmcn commune potest esse, quia directe ct secundum pTiu� didwT de ipso, indirecte el per J)(lSteriu� de (Tealura. Et ibi est accipere 'c.ommune' et 'propriuffi' quantum ad modum diCl::ndi.� 4() In a later text in the Su",ma (Dr 00110 nn/u"n, IV, q. 2. 2) Philip expressly says that predication according lO priority and po�teriority is the same i\.lI predication "an.:ording to analOgy" (UC\l.ndum anaiogiam) . 41 A"o'irl"rllla, Mdaph. Ill. T. j (c:d. Van Riet, p . 1 1 7 ) .
40
41
CHAPTER ONE
BEGINNINGS OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRANSCENDENTALS
and to be good insofar as it is the final cause. "�2 The transcend· entaHty of one, true, and good is founded on the creative causality of the first principle::. Philip's argument suggests that because this causality is threefold, there cannot he more hut three general conditions of being.
fratris Alexandri. Books I-Ill were to a large extent compiled before 1 245, the year of Alexander's death, and probably under his supervision. The main editor of the first book was Johannes of Rupella Gohn de la Rochelle), who as second magister regens of the Franci�cans was active with Alexander at the University of Paris.4� For the sake of cOllvenience, I will refer 10 Alexander as [he author of the Summa. The third treatise of book I deals with "the divine unity, truth and goodness, � because, as is there stl'ted, these three notions arc equally related to one another (.runt unius coordinalionis) .H The treatise is divided into three questions: On the unity of the divine nature (q. 1 ) ; On the truth of the divine nature (q. 2); On the goodnes.� of the divine nature (q. 3). In the introduction to the Hrst question, Alexander observes that the clarification of the issues concerning the divine unity requires first of all an investigation of the conceptions of "one� and "unity. � Q. 1 is therefore divided into three parts (membra), "On unil')! in gcneral,n "On the divine unity in particular," and "On the relation of the other unities to the divine unity. � The part about unity in general contains the ques tions: "What is one?" (c. 1 ) ; "On the rdation of one to being. true and goodK (c. 2); "On the diflerences of one and unity" (c. 3); and "What is the opposition between one ...nd many?" (c. 4). Alexander adopts the same procedure in the questions on the divine truth and the divine goodness. Thus, the third trealise of the Summa contains an extensive acc.:ounr of the transcendclltals, in which, in contrdst to Philip, "the one" is treated seperaldy and at length. In the Summa fratns Alexandri, the doctrine of the transcendcntals is integrated for the first time in a theological synthesis, it provides a mctaphysic."ll ground for reflection on the divine
Philip the Chancellor is an original thinker who deserves more attention in the history of medieval philosophy than he generally receives. His intention of going back into the "ground of thought" by reducing our understanding of questions to the communisrima remIts in the formation of the doctrine of the transcendentals. For the first time he brings together four basic notions, "being," "one," "true." and "good," and investigates the mutual relations. Several dements of his doctrine will determine subsequent discussions of the transcendentals. The first is his solution of the question con· cerning their identity and difference. The communis�'ima are Call' vertible according to their 5upposirs, but differ according to their concepL-;. The second i� the order of the most common notions. based on the notion of indivision. The third is his analysis of the relation between God and the transcendentals to the effect that the conditions concomitant with being arc founded on the threefold divine causality. But Philip's doctrine bears the c1car marks of a first draft. His account is rather terse and insufficiently explicit; it sometimes gives the impression of having been written in shorthand. It requires further elaboration and completion at m
2. The �Summa throlcgica � attributed
I.e Alexander of Hales
The doctrine of the trallscendentals wa..<; c}(panded by the Francis can masters of thc University of Paris. This is evident from the Summa theoiogica, attributed to Alexander of Hales. Strictly speaking, Alexander was lIot the sole author of (his work. It has been shown thaI several Franciscans were involved in t.he editing of the Summn 42
Sum",,, d� bon", q. 7 (ed. Wield. p. 26-7) : "Unde unaquequc esse".i;!.
habens hall (res rationes causarum Ires halx:( cundiliones que concomitantur esse ehu �cund\lm quod e.�1 a primo ente, ut a primo eme secundum ratJonem IInius efficiatur unumquodque ens unum, ab ipso $ecunduIII quod est causa formalis el(emplaris verum. secundum quod est finalis bonum." In the (onlinuation of this text Philip c:ollJideu why the om: is attributed to the effidem ('all,\(".
43 Alexander of Hales. Su",ma Ihmlr>giw yol. IV: Prol'gcmun" (co.!. Collegii S. BonavenUirae. Quaraechi 1948) . 44 Summa thenlogica I. tract. Ill, q. 1 (cd. Quaracchi. p. 1 1 2 ) . The third treatise (:Oven the pp. 1 1 2�200. cr. J Fuch" Dit Propritliitm dtJ Sdn5 bti Altxandt'l' von HaIrs, Munster 1930. 4!t Cf. Ph. BOhner. "The System of McI�physics of Ah:lIander of liales�. in: franciscan Sludih 26. New &-riC$ vol. 5 (194f) . pr. �14, e.p. PI". �'J2<��IM.
42
43
CHAPTER ONE
HF.GINNINGS OF TliE nOt."'TRINE OF TIlE TRANSCENDENTALS
questions of Philip's Summa, at times reproducing his text verba tim:f6 Philip's influence extends to the other two questions. The clearest example of it is to be found in q. 2, c. 2 ("Does the concept of truth differ from those of entity, unity and goodness?"). In Ihis text Alexander explains the relations among transcend· entaIl!. Ahh ough they "coincide in realily"-Alexander's way of charaClerizing cheir convertibility-, they differ in concept. "Being" (ens) and �entily" (entitas) have an absolUlc meaning. but "one " adds indivisioll to nu; thus, unity is simply the indivision of being. '"True" adds the indivision of esse to the indivision of t.tI�'; thus, truth is the indivision of being (esse) and that which is. "Cood" adds lhe indivision according to well-being (btme esse) to the indivision of /!tts and eHe; thus, the good is the indivision of act from its potency, for act is the completion or perfection of a thing ' s potency,47 This systematization of the conceptual differences between the transcendentals is based entirely on Philip the Chancellor's perspective , in which the notion of "iudivision" is central. Yet presently we shall see that Alexander in the Summa presenL� another systcmatization that has a manifestly different basis. Alexander calls the transcendentals "the firsts, The expression prima was also used by Philip the Chancellor, bllt the phrase has a different background in the Summa fratri.f AU1Cllndri. For Philip being. one. true and good are "the firsts," since they cannot be reduced to anything prior. They are that in which the analysis (Tl!Soiutio) of the intellect terminatcs. For Alexander the transcen denlals are �the first impressions" (imprtHionts) upon the imeJlect.
transccndentals. Au gustine .�tates in Dt ("nilall! that "the notion of good itself is impressed upon us."�8 Alexander regards being, one, true and good as notions that are impressed upon man by divine illumination."'}
VBeing" is the first intelligible; the other ""first impressions" upon the intellect arc the first determinations (dtterminationes) of being.50 Alexander realizes that the phrase "determination" can give rise to misunderstandings, because the determination of something usually im plies a restriction or limitation of its denota tion. (n replying to the objection that the determination of being by "one" means a restriction, he distinguishes two modes of restric tion: the first relates to the inteUigible content, the ratio inttllig endi; the second relates to the scope of the supposits, that follows the act of existing (aclus existendf) , In the first way the determination added by "one" restricts "being," for by the term "one," "being" is under stood under a determinate concept, that of indivision. But in the second way "being" is not restricted, for there does not exist any thing that does not participate ill unity.·�J Because the first determinations of being are "the first impres sions," they cannot be defined and made known by something prior to them, Their nOlificatio can only Occur by that which is logically posterior (per postmora), as by a negation or all effect consequent upon them,�2 Alexa.nder clarifies this by means of the concept of "one" that according to the Philosopher means "being undivided in itself and divided from others," Th� lirst part of the
�
�II Auguslin<:. IP IrilliUl/l VIII, c . :s , o. 4: "nisi <:5K( nobis impr<:ssa nOlio ;ps;us boni. � 4') U. Summfl IAn;Wgi�a. I. o . 345 (ed. Quaratchi I, p. 513). 50 Ibid. I , n. 72 (ed. Qua-rlltchi t, p. 113): �cum sit 'C08' primllm int.elti. gibik, dm intentio apud intellec!um est oma; primae ergo determillation<:s <:nli.� sun! primae impreuiones apud inteHectum: <:ae sunt unum, verum. bonum-. 5 1 Ibid. 1, n. 73 (ed. Qllaracc:hi I, p. 1 1 5 ) : �dic<:ndllm quod <:st coarctatio dupliciter: quantulII ad rationem intelligendi el quantum ad ambitum suppo sitorum, gui con5equirur :l.CIlIlI1 exislendL Dicendum ergo quod addita det<:r minatia lInitatis ad en� coarctal ipsum quantum ad rationem intelligendi; cum enim dieo 'unum', non int.elligitur ens sub quacumque ratione, sed sub determinata tali, quae est ratio indivisioni�. Quantum vero ad alllbiluTil suppositoruffi non (oarClat, q uia lion ellistit aliquod <:m quod non particip<:t unitatemM• 5� Ibid, I, II. 72 (ed. Quaracchi I. p. l l � ) : �[PriJllae detenninatione51 non poterllnt ergo habere aliqua priora speciaHter ad 5ui nolificationem. Si <:rgo notificatio fiat corum, hoc non e:rit nisi per po5teriora, lit per abn<:gationem vd dTet:tum cooKqLlenl<:m.�
The term imprusio may be derived from Avicenna's Mtlaph)'sics (I,
5), in which it is said of the primary notions that they "arc impressed by a first impression" (d. sect. 2.2,), But an other possible source, and an even more likely one, is Augustine, since his thought, as we will see, influences Alexander's doctrine of the e.
46 Mtmbrum r ( �On goodn<:ss in general�) deals with the qll<:5tio" "Are good and being the samei''' (e I , an. 1 ; d. Philip q. 1 ) ; (. 4 ("On the commonness of goodness in good things�) reprodllc<:5 verbatim the ,e", uf Philip's q, 5, Membrum " (�On the highest good") contains the ql1e�lion concerning "the flowing of oth<:r goods from the highen good" ( c . 3 ; cf. Philip q. 7). M""brum III (�On cr<:at<:d good") dis.cuss<:s the question from Soethius's Dr. htbdomadiUuJ: "Is creakd good good insofar as it has being and by virUle of its enence?" (c. 2; cr. Philip q. 8). Mtmbrum IV is d(:Voled to Ihe opF,sitlon ofevil lo good (cr, Philip q. 6), . . , lla .�ltlll l t�a I. tracl. III, n. R8 (ert. Qua�chl I, p, loW).
L .
"
45
CIlAPTER ONE
BEGINNINGS OF THE nOG TRINE OF TilE TRANSCENDF:NTALS
notion of one, �being undivideri, � is the negation of the opposite concept, that of division or multitude; the second part, "divided from others," is the effect consequent upon one, for unity brings about a distinction from other things,�-' The expansion of the doctrine of the transcendenlals in the Summa fmtris Alexandri becomes most evidcnt in a dense text in which "the first... are systcmatized from a variety of viewpoints, Q. 1, chapter two deals with the relation of one to being, true and good. The point of departure is the thesis that "being� is the first intelligible and that "one,H "true," and "goodH arc the first deter minations of being. The flrstne",� of being is not explained, and neither is the convertibility of being with the other transcen dentals. In the other questions as well these two ideas are always presupposed in the argumentation. What inlerests Alexander are the ways being is determined by the other " firsts." He distin guishes three modes: the first determination (i) is concerned with the being of things, insofar as it is considered in its own domain (in frropnu genert); the second (ii) is concerned with the relation of being to the divine cause; the third (iii) with the relation of being to the soul, "which is the image of the divine essence."�"' Alexander next works Out these modes of delermination. (i) From the viewpoint of being (esse) in its own domain, the determination of that which is (ens) is threefold. For ens is con sidered either absolutely or relationally, and its consideration in relation to something else is either according to a difference or according to a conformity, Whcn being is considered "absolute ly," that is, :-IS divided from others and undividerl in itsdf, it is determined by unum. When being is considered in relation to something else according to a difference, it is determined by utrum, for "true is that by which a thing can he discerned (discerni) . When being is considered in relation to something else according to a conformity or order, iL is determincd by bonum, for "good" is that in virtue of which a thing is ordered,!>�
(ii) From the viewpoint of the relation to the divine cause, being is likewise determined in three manners, for the divine causality is in three genera of cause, the efficient, the formal or exemplary, and the final. Although these kinds of causality are common to the Trinity, they arc "appropriated" to the three divine Persons the efficie n t causaliry to the father, Lhe exemplary causality to the Son, the tinal causality to the Holy Spirit.Yi As it flows from the divine cause, created being acquires a three fold "impression," by which it is disposed to stand ill a rdation of conformity to the cause. Unitfl$ is the disposition by which it stands in a relation of conformity with the efficienl cause. Just <\s the efficient caust: is une, so every creature has undivided being. Veritas is the disposition by which being stands in conformiry with the exemplary cause. Just as the exemplary cause is the first art (an), so every creature is an imitation of the divine art and therefore possesses truth. Bunum is that in viflue of which being is in conformity with the final cause. Just as the final cause is the supreme good, so every creature has an inclination to the highest good,;;7 (iii) From the viewpoint of [Iv relatWn [(j the JOU� there is again a threefold determination of being, for things are related to the soul
H
.��
Ibid. I,
n. 72 (ed. Quaracchi I. p. 113). I, n. 73 (ed, Quaracchi i, p. 1 1 4 ) : "clel.erTTlinanl cn i m ens !ecun. dum quod (onsideratur esse renlm in p ro prio generc, el etiam secllllfiulII rdaliollem cs.\t earum ad divinam ca\l�am, el scrulldum rd:uio nem rerum ad animam. quae est imago divinae essentiae.U Ibid. I, n, 7!' (ed. Qllaracchi I. p. 1 1 4-5): "Sccundum autem quod e�$e rerull) ron�i'kral"r in prop rio genere , tri plira fu r ell lis de te rm iTl atio. Aut � nim {'QlI5id"ratIIT ah�ol ul n ll\ alit rump.lfalUlll: el nJlllparillllJl1: al i t ,ecundlllll
54 Ibid.
differenliam aU I �eculldum cun�enielltiam. Secu ndu m quod ens aliquod consideramr a�l ul\l m. III di�i$u /!I ilb illiis d i n se indi�i�\lIIl . delerminatur
per ·u num · . Secundum vero quod considernlllr ;aliquod ens compar:uum ad alilld secundum diSlinClionelll, determinatur per '�erllm': 'verulII' enim est quo res hallet disc.emi . ScClmdum vero quod cOl1siderawr comparatun\ ad ali ud seulildurn convenientiam 5ivc: ordinern , dctermin:lIur per 'bollum': 'bonum' enim en ex quo res habe t ordinarL _�6 Ibid. t. n. 73 {ed. Quaracchl 1. p. l Ei}: "I tem . secundum quod esse rerum comparalur in �elatiune ad (:alUam d ivin am . si m i l i 11I odo trip li caLUr delerminatio. Causa enim divina est causa i n trip lici genere causae: emciens, formalis Uf exempla r, finalis. Quae (I',idem cau�\li la�, f.llm sit ("_Qm m uni.� 1011 Trinitat;, appropriatur III causa c:fficiens Paui. exemplaris Filio. linalis Spiritui S.1nclo.� !;7 Il.rid, I, n. 73 (ed. Quantcchi J, p. 115): ·Secundum hoc, esse i n crC:;Hura, quod flu;1 a c:allSa, tri plirem sonitur ImpressioneJ1), ut In (onfurmath)l\e ad c.ausam. Irnpressio ergo dispo sitionis in ('sse crealurac:, �er.llndllm quam iiI in conformitalC: ad efficient.em c.allsam, est unita.�: III siCul efficien� causa e�1. una, indivisa, m u i tip lirata in q Uilli bet creatura. sic fit. lit si bi possibile e!t, eue indivis um . item, i mprnsi o dispmirioni�, secundum quam fit. in f_onformitate ad caUliam furmale m exem plarem, est veritas: UI sicUI caus..1 exemplari! e$l ;ir� prima ,'erilalis, sic nealura, secllndum qllod sibi po ssibile e5l. fit in imitatione artis: et hoc. e�t hal><::re veritatem. Pr..elerea, inlpressio seCllndllm quam I1t in confol"lllitate ad causam finalem eSI bonum: III StCIII cau1I3. tinatis e�{ summa bonita', ,ie elliliDtI cre.aturat' ,i t inclinalio ct conformitas "d smnmam hnllitalt,m: t'! haec cst (fcalU rac hon iIM. ·
46
BEGINNINGS OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL5
CHAPTER ONE
in three ways, that correspond with the faculties of memory, intelligence and will. From the efficient cause there is unity in every being. in virtue of which it is ordered and preserved in memory. From the exemplary cause there is trulh in every being. in virtue of which it h, understood by the intelligence. From the final cause there is goodness in every being, in virtue of which it is loved by the will.58 Schematically represented, Alexander's systematization of the transcendentals runs as follows: Em is determined
(i) in irs proper genus
[
10 11\c divin!': GUIse
�
(iii) in relation to the human soul
f
(ii)
in relation
(a) absolutely: lUlU'" (b) in rdation to something else: (b 1) according to difference: ventm (b 2) according to conformity: bonum
(a) dJicienl cause - Father: u1Ium (b) exemplary cause - Son: vtTUm
(c)
final cause - H.
Spirit: bonum
(a) ordered in memory; WlUm (b) undentood by intelligence: (c) loved by the will: bonum
vnum
Alexander's systemaLization has three striking features. The first is its comprehellsive character. His systematization includes three orders: being (i) in its own domain, (ii) in relation to God and (iii) in relation to man. The £irst, ontological determination is obviously different from Alexander's systematization in term of "indivision" mentioned earlier. The second, theological determiniltion corre sponds to Philip the Chancellor's reduction of the three conditions concomitant with being to the divine causality. The third, anthro pological determination is an original moment in Alexander's account. 5H Ibid. I , Il . 73 (ed. Quaracchi I, p. 115): "Item . per com panuionem ad animam triplicawr eadem dClcrminalio. Nam esse rerum lripliciler 1:0'" paraUir ad animam: videlicet UI res ordinentur in memoria. perdpiantur intelligentia. diligantur voluntate. Est igl tur in eille quolibeL a c.ausa effi· ciente unilas. per quam ordinetur in memoria et Krvetur ( ... ) . Item. a causa exemplari Cit IIcrllas in quoli hel eme. per quam perdpialUr ah intelligenti:... Itenl, a ca m .. .. limdi eal boniW. per qU
47
The second feature is that, in contrast to Philip (he Chancellor's systematization, the "one" is no longer the model for the concep tual determination of the other transcendcntals. Transcendentals add to being not only a negation of division, but also a relation. Two of the three orders are completely based on a relational view point. The main distinction in tbe first, ontological determination is that between an "absolute" and a "relationar' consideration of being. The third salient feature of his systematization is the dominance of what might be called the "trinitarian" motive. Alexander con nects the theological determination with the Christian doctrine of the Trinity: the transccndcntals are appropriated to the three divine Pcrsons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The term "appropriated� also occurs in Philip the Chancellor's Summa, but there it refers to the distinction between what is common to all things and what is proper to God. For Alexander, "appropriation" refers to the distinc tion becween what is common to the triunc divinity Olnd what is treated as proper to one of the l'eniOns. The trinitarian foundation of the transcendentals in the threefold creative causality is constitu tive for the two other orders. , The ontological determinations of being are seen a� the.v�s�iges \ of the Trinity in the created world.M1 The descriptions of vernm, "that in virtue of which a thing can be discerned:' and of bonum, ··that in virtue of which a thing is ordered," arc taken from Augus tine's charLlcteristics of the ve.�tiKes of the divine in reality.GO The trinitarian motive comes to the fore even more clearly in the an- 1 thropological order. Man is more than a vestige, he is an "image" i of the Trinity because of his faCilIties of memoria-intelligellliavoluntas. a triad derived from Augustine (De trinitate, book X).�. 1'h.<: "cquncction of the: transcendentals with the Trinity is distinctive of the early Franciscan school. One of Alexanders studcnt<;, Bonaventure, illustrates this ohservation. In his Brroilo· quium, he sct.>;; forth tbe theory of the transcendentals in explanaLion of the appropriation of the attributes "unity," "truth," and "good ness" to the divine PersoIlS. Since the first principle is most perfect,
\
t
59 cr. ,bid_ I, n, S8 (cd. Quar"cchi I, p. 1 ...0 ) : "Isla" "rgo intenTiones non sc:paranlur ab essenda rei wlut vestigia primae causae, quae est TriniT.a� unim essentiae. " fill cr. the quot
Quar.�chi
1. pp. I l s-4I).
48
BECINNINGS OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE
CHAPTER ONE
the noblest and most generotl conditions of being arc found
in
Albert occupied the Dominican chair of
it
in the highest degree. These conditions are "one," "true, � and
, Ak_�
general conditions
'-- every bachelor had to
\
according to their concepts.til Bonaventure formulates the three
of being in terms of "indivision," a fact that great influence of Philip the Chancellor's doctrine of
the University
(d. l l 60)
a� 'i
Sentmces of Peter Lombard
te"xt500kin-··iJle -curriculum-of the Faculty of Theology:
comment upon this book. In Albert's commentary, the innovative aspect of the doctrine of the transcend
enuls with regard to the: rwelfth century becomes manifest. On
the transcendentals.
several occasions he brings up this doctrine, although in the
Sm
tences themselves of Peter Lombard no trace of it is to be found. In his commentary on the first book (dist. 46). Albert deals with truth
l . 3. Albert the ('mat's Early Wo-rks
and examines the relatiomhip berween being, aile, true, and good.
of the transcendentals was elaborated Ilot Dilly ill the
As we s<\w in the lntroduction (0.4.), he opposes the Philosophus,
Great (1 206/7·1280).fi� Only a limited part of his voluminous ceuvre
with every being, to the sancli, who considered being according 10
The doctrine
\ I wor-((s-bclonging
that Albert, when speaking of the saneti, had Dionysius the Areo
out of consideration, although this work contains an extensi�e'---
pagitc in particular in mind. A substantial part of his early works is
ac�?��.�f.t!_�nscendcntals (book I, tract. 6 deals_ "with Qne-, __�ue an� _g��d"). The reason is that this work cannot be counted among
the history of the beginning
of
to commenting on the complete curpus dw-nysi( lC1 H n.. (ii) In 1248 Alben retUTllI:ri to Colague to establish the shtdium
rievoted
transcendental
generale of the Dominicalls in Germany. Thomas Aquinas fol lowed him, studying in Cologne from 1248-52. We know from his repor/alio that Albert lectured in 1249 on De divinis nominibus of
thought before Thoma.� Aquinas. Alhert started the Summa after
1270, and this work is therefore later than the Sltmma of the same
name by his student Thomas. We will concentrate on some early
pseudo-Oionysius the Areopagile. As we shall see, an important
writings of Albert.(;�
(i) The first in chronological order is D� bono, completed before
1246. It wa.<; pan of" a number of treatises thal
together
aspect of this commentary, which has the form of qutles/ionl!s. is the
made up
names with
The next year Albert lectured on Aristolle's NicQtnachean Ethics. It
D� bono is modelled on Philip the Chancellor's Summa dr bmw, and
is quite remarkable that a master in theology lectured on moral
shows the influence of his theory of the transcendentals.
philosophy. It was the beginning of his systematic commenting
Another writing belonging to the period of 1242-48, in which
on the COrpu.f aristoldicum. The lectures on lhc Ethics are the first document
(Opna Omnia V. cli. QuardCchi, p. 215): -Quia enim primuuI principiuOl eSI nobiliuimum el perfcctills,mum, ideo conditiones enIii nohilissimae el gr.neralis§imae in eo reperiunmr in sum mo. Haec alilem �Ullt unum, flffUm, bonum, quae nun conU"ahu!lt. ens secundum sed secundum ratianffll. " 2 For Albert'� dOClrine see H . Kuhk', "Die Lehre A1hr.rIS des GroBen W)!1 dell Tranncndelll:llien". in: PhdoJopltia P�YUI7li.J, Abhal1dlung�n :u ihrn- Vtr gangfflheil und Gtgt"flwarl (Fe�lgabe Josef Ge)'5u), vol. I (ed. F.-J. von Rimclt:n). Bonavenwre,
confrontation of the Dionysian order of the divine
the theory of the trdnscendentals.
Albert's Summa d� lT�ltturis. A� the title already leads Olle to suspect,
61
I
I
its origin from the first, wise and good being. It seems plausihle.:
, will be considered here, and we shall leave his Summa JlregJ()r;i,ae
to
,
who did not regard "true� and "good" as conditions concomitant ;
milieu of the Franciscans, hut also by the Dominican Albert the
\
theology at
of Paris is the Commentary on the Sentences (completed 1246--49 ). Since
"good,� which do not contract being according to the supposits, but
testifies to the
49
TllANSCENDENTALS
Btmiloqu,mrn I, c. 6
of AJhcrt"s "tllm- to phiiosophy.M
"Dr bon(J�
SIl�a.'i!a,
The term transcendentia does /lot appear in Albert's early works, A phrase thal comes close to it is found in his commentary on Dionysius, where he Slates (hat "excepting Aristode in his Ethics,
Rc�ensbuTg 1930. pp. 129-147.
the p hilosop he rs
,
For Ihe daling of Albert'$ works, $CC J.A. Weisheipl, ''The Lire :mcl WOTh of SI. Albert the Great-, in: J.A. Weisheipt (cd.). I\I/mtus Magnll.l o"d Th� Sdml:l'), (;,-!IIt"" moratil!� EUO'j.I, ToTtlnto I!IRO, PI'. 13-51: A. de Libera, AlbllTl I, (fffmil ,1 If' !lhilf1lf1phi" I'lui. 1900, p. II I .
fi4
rarely discuss the good lhat runs through (circuit)
L. Stllrle�e, Di� dmf.
AiM! firm Gm/l'", 740-- 12110, Munkh
j
�"
50
51
C.HAPT�;R ONE
B[GINNINGS or THE DOCTRINE OF THt: TRANSCENDF.NTAI-S
all the genera,"65 That which runs through all the genera must
in this analysis the convertibility of good and being was pre"
"transcend" the single categories. In his tiber De praedicabilibus (from 1252-56)
he indeed speaks of "that which transcends
(trmlScendit) the genera, as 'thing' (res), 'one,' and 'something' (ali Here two transcendentals arc mentioned , thai we have not
qu;d),"'f.6
yet encountered before. They are taken, as the context shows, from " the Arabks," but do not
play a role
in Albt:rt's systematilalion of
what he calls "the most general and common
nes) . "67
Although
"the philosophers"
may have
concepts (in/entia
rarely spoken
about the
transcendental good, Albert deals with it extensively in his early
supposed. Albert splits Philip's first question into two parts anci introduces a group of questions concerning the commonness of the
good as a means of connecting the question "What is the good?"
(A) to that of lhe relation of good to being (C). Albert's ordering has
a logic of his own, hut his inquiry does not display the concern.� that motivate
his predecessor.
Philip's reference to the Manicheans
makes clear why he focuses is on the commonness of the good. In
De bono, there is no clear motivation for Albert's concentrAtion on
the good. Interestingly, he drops Philip's questions as to the
opposition between good and evil (q. 6).
three definitions I
i
B. ;"The commonness of the concept 'good'H (art. 2·5; Philip qq, 5,8,9) ;
In arL 1 rWhat is the good?") , Albert discusses or hetter "descrip tions" (assignationes) of the good. The first is de �!!�ti 9n "the good is what all things seek;" the second, 1 which"A1hert attributes to Avicenna, is the definition in terms of ! indivision : ;'the good i;'-ale- -inaiv'lslon of act from poteIlCY;" the � third is the definition in Aigazel ' s Metaphysics: �the good is an act, the apprehension of whtch is aecompariie"d"hy enjoyment." For all three definitions Albert adduces arguments pro and contra, 'j concluding that "these three definitions are well prOven, and the
questions: "Is good convertible with being?" (arL 6; Philip q. 1 ) and
good. "69 The first definition is given through that which is ordered
writings. The len articles of the first qucstion ("On the good according to the common concept of 'good'") of De bono bear
a
great resemblance to the introductory eleven quc!itions in Philip's
Summa de bona. Albert treats of the same subjects in a more
sophisticated way, but in an order diffcrenl from Philip 's. &8 The ten articles are divided into five:: sec.tions, in which Albert discusses:
A "What is the good?� (art. I; Philip q.I);
C. 'The relation of good to being," a section which contains (Wo Boethius's problem "Is every being good insofar as it is?" (art. 7; Philip CJ.
8);
D. 'The relation ofgood La true"
(an, 8-10; Philip qq. 2-3);
E. "The division of the good" (Note, however, that this subject is
not considcred hI q. I, but in q. 2).
As we saw, Philip's main concern in his first question---on Lhe relation between good and being-was the de1inability of the goo d; � d.t/in" "ollfinibu.l c. 4. n . 6 ad 2 (Opml Olllnia vol. 37(1. e d . Simon. p . 116). 66 Libn- D, prutdi(llbiMnlJ (. tract. [\I, c. .!I (cd. Borgnel. vol. l. p. 64). Cf. In I Perilunn., IraCI. It c. 5 (ibid., p. 393): �AHendlend\lm tamen est "1"00 nomina tranKlendentia infinilari non possnnt. sir.llt res , ens el aJiquid". S u m m a thlOlogiae I , tract. 6, q. 27, c. 3 (Opt'l"a omnia vol. 34/1, Milflsln 1978, p. 205): 65
SUI-
"Bonum dldt inlentionem communem el Ul de t.-ansccnllcnlibu5 omne
genus sinll el lens, et ideo ab ens sc:par.lri non poICS!." 67 See. for example, De bono q. I. 10, n. 38 (cd. Kuhle, p. 21); "verum et b0num in suis univc:rsali�silllis intc:ntionibus." On rt� and ali'1wid see Tholnas's accounl of the tranKcndcntals in ch. H. fiR Cf. S. MacDonald. The Me/aphysj" of Goodntll in Mtdini(,11 Philosophy, pp. 255-!l12.
Aristotle's
\
arguments proving them louch the essential features and nature of towards an end; the second is givcn conccrning perfect good: and
the third concerning the proper effect conSl.'t]uem upon gOOfl,7!l
In Albert's argument for the appropriateness of the definition in
terms
of indivision. the
notions
of perfection, end and ac tuality
play a central role. Every perfect thing,
considered as
such, has
been completed by an end, since it is not perfected before i t
the end;
every guod
is
reaches
good in virtue of the charaCter of an end;
therefore every good as such is perfect. Accordingly, every pert"c=ct
thing has pe rfecton i
in virtue of an
act conjoined with potency; but
good as such is perfect and is therefore the conjunction of act with
potency; consequently it is the indivision of act from potency." 69 Albert Ihc Great, Dt b.mc q . I . I , n. 7 (ed. Kilhle:. p.4): -Diccndum quod
diffinitiones boni supra induc.lae bcne probalae sunt et rationc� probanles tan lInl rationes et naturam boni, quam rc�piciunl difIjnitiones.� � lb;d. q. I. 1, n.IO (ad IIltimum) (cd. Ki,hle, p . 7 ) . 11 Ibid., q . I . I, n. 2 (ed. Kuhle, p . 2 ) : �Omnc pcrfectum 5(';Clln(\um quod huiusmodi est complctum per finern ; omne bonum est bonum sccundum ration em finis; crgo omnc bonum secundum quod tmiuSlllodi cn pcrfcC-Ium. l'rima pl'Ooomr per h<x, quod non est
rn
perfecta, anlfilu;U1l cc"'!t operatin
52
HF:GINNINGS 0..' THE DOCTRINE OF THE TKANSCENOENTALS
C:I-IAPTER ONE
The phrase "indivision" is prefer.t.hle. Albert emphasizes, to "con
junction," for indivision belongs to all things, but conjunction does
not. "Conjunction
to
requires something that conjoins act and poten
in book
53
IV of the Metaphy!>ics (c. 2). The first mode of analogy
consists ill the relation to one subject; .�o "being� is said analogi. cally in relation to substance that is the su�ject of every bei.ng. The '
cy, and therefore cannot be said of the divine, in whkh potency
second mode consists in the relation to one act; so it is said of a
and act are identical.72
doctor and of medical instruments that they "heal." The third
From art. 1 of De bono it appears that Philip's understanding of
the tr;,mscendentals, in which the notion of "indivision" is central, strongly influences Albert's discussion of the definition of good.
Later in this work, in art. 5, he explicitly states that lhc proper ratio of the good
s i
"indivision from [he end."
mode consists in the relati.on to one end; .�o "healthy" is said of an animal, a medicine, drink
and urine.
In nOlle of these three modes of anal ogy, the objection argues, lhe good is common. Not in the first way, because there is not one
subject in which every good is and from which it has its goodness.
But a diffcrent picture arises from Albert's account of the ques
Nor is it common ill the second W"dY, because lhe created and the
tion "What is truth?� in art. 8 . Here, wo, he begins by enumerating
uncrealed good are not related to the same act; moreover, the first
three traditional definitions. He adds a fourth one with the
good is good
comment that "on the basis of the mode of speaking by which
we
is it in the third way, because there is not one end of all that is
call 'true gold' that which has the true nature of gold and is not
good. Something is good in virtue of the indivision from the end
by its substance and not only in relation
to an act. Nor
mixed with someth ing else, truth is defined by some pe ople
that suits its nature. but things do not have the same end according
(quibusdam) as 'the indivision of being and that which is'."n But
to their natures.74
Phil ip s favourite definition of truth is not taken into consideration '
in Albert's subsequent discussion and is of no im porlance for his
determination of the concept of truth. This shows that for him. just as for Alexander of Hales, �indivision" is no longer the exclusive
Albert's reply to this objection is at the same time his general
reply to the quest.ion on the commonness of lhe good. (ts common ness must be reduced to the third mode of analogy. Although there
is not one end which every good attains as its inner completion.
viewpoint for the detcrmination of the tr,mscendentals. This fact
nevertheless there is one extrinsic end to which every crea ted
has important consequences for Albert's systemalil.,uion.
good is related, namely the highest good. All other things are good
The second section of De bono q . l deals with the commOIlIless of the cOIlcept "good." Art. 4 asks: "Is good said of the increated and
created good according to a common conc ept? In the second objection Albert advance� an argument that is historically interest ing. The commonness at i��lle cannot be that of a genus or a species, but· must be a commonness according to analogy (secun durn nnalogiam). Here the notion is named that was still absent in Philip's trc.. ment of the question Now there are three modes of ll analogy, that in Albert's reading were distinguished by Aristotle "
.
efficientis. Haec autem non cc:ssal., ni�i {l uanda attingit fincm. Sf:(.unda patd per �e. Inde sic: Omnc p.::rfecwm perfet:tionem halx:i. ah aetu e.oniuncto cum potentia; bonum autem in c:o quod bonulIl, est perfectum; ergo bonum in eo quod bonum, est coniunnio ae.lus cum potemia; ergo est indivisio actus a potentia �r consequem." 7'l Ibid., q. I . I , n. S (ed. Kilhle. p. 5). Albert's obscrv.:Hion echo':!! Philip. cr. Swnlllll dt bono, q. 3 (ed. Wid:.i. p. 19): -Ilem ill diffinitione veri et bOlli 'tilnilllr 'indivi.io', nun 'eoniullclio' vel 'pcarticipatio' vel aliquid POsilivum,
quia IIniverulhll dictum "'I per prlvationem.7) [)f �M q. I. K, II. 117 (ed, Kilhl!', II. Hi).
insofar as they are from and towards this good.7.� Albert traces the three modes of analogy back to book IV of the
Metaphysics, where Aristotle faces the problem of the unity of the: science of being (cf. sect. 3.5.). The Philosopher. however, does not usc the phrase Manalogy" in this text; the notion was developed in
the thirteenth century interpretation of Aristotle.76 Noteworthy in Albert's reply is his criticism of the "Aristotelian" model of analogy of being. He rejects the example with which Ph ilip the Chancellor had illustrated the commonness of the good. For Philip
71 Ibid. q. I . 4, n. J 7 (ed. Kuhle, p. 10). n Ibid. q. I . 4, n. 17 (ed. Kuhle, p. 10):
"Diccndulll, quod ihi est cum· I!\unitas proporrionalitatis (... ), quae redlldtur ad tertium modum analogiac. Licet cnim urlU5 finis nOll sit, quem attingat ornne bonum lit compleTll':!ntlim
SUllm, tamen unu� finis est extra. ad qUf:1tl .�f' habet omne bonum erratum, inquantum palest. Et hie finis cn summum bonum. Alia enim bona nOll SUIlI bona nisi ab illo et ad iIIud.· ?6
cr. Alben', conunc:ntal)' on
XVI/I, ffi. 8. ('.t"�r. pp.
16�5).
Mtla"h,�u" IV,
tract. I,
c.
4
(Opnll O","ia
54
CIl....P'Tl:R
BEGINNINGS OF THE VaCTJUNE. OF THE TRANSCENDENTAl.....
ONE
the good is common "according to priorily
fourth proposition of the is being
(esse),
Liber De causis:
55
'The first of created things
and there is no other created thing before it."8o This
anonymous work was regarded by Albert as a work that com plemented Aristotle's
Metaphysics,
although in fact it was an Arabic
thl'Ologica.1I1
presupposes a common subject.
adaptation of Proclus's Ekmentatio
relations of good to being and to true. Albert's view on the relations
discussion about the relations among the transcendentals. The
The third and fourth sections of De 00110 q. I deal with tbe
among transcendentals is based on Philip's solution. The relation is twofold: "heing." "one," "true," and "good� are convertible with respect to their supposits, but they differ concep!ually.77 Yet Albert's account contains some new elements. In art. 6 of De
bono,
q. I, he
discusses tbe convertibility of good with bcillg. He docs not introduce, as onc might expect. a twofold relation between good and being, but instead a threefold distinction: in one way good is posterior to being, in a second way it is prior to it, and in a third way it is convertible with it.7� (i) The posteriority of good to being concerns their concepts. The firstness of being was a crucial presupposition in Philip the Chancellor's theory, and yet he does not elaborate upon it. Alhert. however, presents arguments for the priority of being. For the concept of being is the concept of the man simple which is not analyzabk (nun est re.(o{veu) into an ything which is can.
ceptually prior to it. But good is analyzable into �bcing rdated To an e n d. �'i'J
"Being" is "the lirst cOllception of the intellect" and that in
which the resolution of the intellect terminates. The concept of "good" is posterior to being, since it is more complex and adds 10
being a relation to an end. II is interesting to note that Albert
cognitive priority of being with texts from a Neoplatonic ontological priority of being in the created realm. He cites a text from Dion�'Sius's De divinis nominibtu (c. 5) to the efl'cct that "being (esse) has been put forward before the
supports the
background that advance the
other participations of God ( ... ) because whatever exists participates
(ii) TIle priority of the good to being is a new element in the reason that Albert takes this priority into consideration is the authority of Dionysius the Areopagite, who, influenced by Neo· platonic philosophy, regards "good" to be the primary divine name. Albert endeavors to justify the Dionysian view fTOm the perspective of the transcendentals. "If one considers good and
being not in each and every thing but good in the first cause and being in created things, then being will be posterior to good. � He
illustrates the priority of good by long quotations from chapter fout in
De divinis nominibus,
from which it appears that "good in the first
cause is diffusive and communicative of being sun is of light."82
(esse),
just as the
(iii) If being and good are considered with respect to their sup· posits
(sufrPolifa) ,
that is, if one considers that which is a being and
that which is good, then good and being are convertible "becaUSe there is nothing which is 1I0t good either perfectly or imperfectly." The thesis of the convertibility is not worked out in as
De lxmo 1.6. Just
in Philip the Chancellor, rhe converLibility of being with the
otber transcendentals is presupposed, not explained.
is, at once "one," "true," and the Sentences AJbert subscribes to
\Vhy is something, insofar as it "goodr In his commeIllary on the view of the
$andi
who held that every being is one, true and
good, because it proceeds from the first, wise and good being,a� Their convertibility, that is. stems from the divine causality. This foundation can be called �lheol()gical.'"
as
long as the term is lIot
undel'Stood in oppm'ition to "philosophical," but as a further qualirl cation of it.
in being before it participates in all other participations," such as
life and wisdom. With special preference Albert also invokes the
;�
Cf. In 1 Sm/.. dist. I. q. 20 (ed. 8orgm:l, Paris 1893. vol. 25. pp. 45.6). De bonl) q. J. 6. n. 21 (ed. Kuhle, p. I I ) . � Ibid., q . I . 6, II. 2 1 (ed. Kuhle. p . I I ) : -Intentio e nIon enlis e$1 inten!.io �implichsimi. quod nUll est re!lOlvere ad aliquid. quod sil ",nle ipsum �enm'
dum ratiollem, Bnnum alilem resolvere e�l ill enl rel,lIuU! ad finem."
PKI De bonoq. 1.6, n. 21 (ed. Ki',hle. pp. 11·12). Cf. b, I &.,1., diM.. 1. 20. cr. Albe-rl, De millis d proteJsu uni,,.,.-ritatis (I fmmo ((l1U0 (Dpn(l 17/2, ed. W. F;tuu:r, pp. 5�1). M2 D� him", q. 1. 6, n. 21 (cd. Kuhle. p. 12).
Ml
II�
In I .\'rot. disl. 46, N, arl. l g and 14.
Om"io
56
BEGINNINGS OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRANSCENDENTALS
CHAPTt;R ONE
The commentary
on
Dionysius's "De diviuiJ nominibus "
One of Albert's main concerns ill his commentary is Dionysius's order of the divine names. The Areopagitc first deals with "the Good" (chapter 4), since he regards it as the primary name, prior even to "Being," which is discussed in the next chapter, whereas "the Onc" is explained in the final, thirteenth chapter. Sever.ll limes Albert asks himself whether this order is correct, and his objections are based on the order of the transcendental names.�4 That which is prior must be first dealt with. But being is the first
conception of the intellect. it is prior to the good, for according [0 the proposition from the Liber De cauro, "the first of created things is being." Albert also refers to another idea of this book, according to which being alone is through Cl"calion, while the good and alt other determinations are through information (per injormalionem) , that is, through an addition
(0
being.85 The good therefore pre
supposes being. Furthermore, the true seems to be prior to the good, for the cause of the true is the form of the thing in itself, \"hile tht: cause of the good is the form insofar as it has the aspeCl of an end. Yet the true is handled by Dionysius after the good in chapter seven.86 In our Introduction we pointed to the medieval discussion of the divine names in order to show that Gilson's cOJlception of medieval philosophy as Christian philosophy (in the sense of a "metaphysics of Exodus") is inadequate. Albert's philosophical justification of the Dionysian order of names provides another illustration of this inadequacy. His argument focuses on the relation between good and being, and is an elaboration of the view he already presented in De bono (q. 1. 6). Being and good can be considered in two ways. When they are considered in what is caused, being precedes the good, for the good Sui- Dt divillu "",,,,mibw L 3, n. :2 (ed. Simon, p. 101); t. 4, fi. 2 (p. 1 1 3); c.. 5 fl. 2 (p. 30$); t. 13, n . 2ft (pr. 44B-9). R� De Cawis, prop. IS : �Red�amml 3Ultm �t dic:lmus q uod I:IU prirnurn �Sl ( ...) causa causarurn, �l, si ipsum dat r�bus omnibu� tns, tunc ipsnm dal d� per modurn cr�adollis. Vita autem prima cia!. ei� quae sunt SIIb ea vitam non per modum £fe:tciorlis immo ptr modum forma�.· Atbert Super De dillilliJ nomifli_ �s c. 3, fl. 2 (C'<:!. Silllon, p. 101); t. 4. n. 4 (p. 115. 29--34): MOmne quod at per informatione m hab�t S� ex addhiono:: ad id quod infonnatur per ipsum; �d bonum, sieut dicitur in eommen LO Litwi Dt c.ausu, est per information�m nisi ends, quod dicitur esse per c:reationl:m: ergo bonum addi! aliquid supra ens." e. 5, n. 20 (p. 314). H� SIIp.rik divinis notfN'nlbw t. 4, n. :I: (cd. Simon, p. 1 1 4, 5-16). 114
,
57
is that which "informs� being. When they are considered in the cause, a distinction must be made between the cause
in habitu and
the cause in actu. From the first causal viewpoint, being again is prior to the good, but from the viewpoint of the cause that actually causes, the good is fIrst. Goodness is the immediate reason of the action of the first cause.R7 Alben advances two general considerations for the firstncss of the good. One is that the causality of the good is more universal than that of being. The causality of the good extends to being well
as
as
to non-being, that of being only to that which is. By the
good that which does nol exist is called into being. Albert points to an etymology that he ascribes to the Commentator (in this case, Maximu:> Confessor), according to which bonum is derived from the Greek verb boo, boos, i. e.,
"I
call." God is aptly named "good"
because he caUs everything into being from nothing.88 The other consideration is that the name signifying the cause of causes is the primary name. The cause of causes is the end, because it is the cause of the causality of the other causes. Now the good signifies the end as such and is therefore prior to being.!19 The causal perspective determines Dionysius's order of the divine names. We cannot know and name God as he is i n himself, but only insofar
as
he is cause. From this perspective
goodness is the first and hence the Art:opagite first deals with the good. His intention is to explain the names attributed to God on the basis of what proceeds from him.90 The method followed by Dionysius in De divinis nominibus is, Albert observes, "analytical" (modus Ttsolutorius) . This resolut'ion is not the reduction of the concepts of the intellect to a first con ception, bur tbe reduction of the caused to tht: cause.'" The subject matter of this book are "the names that make known the cause
87 Ibid. e. 3, n. 2 (cd. Simon, p. 102): c. 4, .... .3 (p. 114); c.5, n. 2 (pp. 303.
4).
Ibid. c. 4, n. 3 (ed. Simon, p. 114): c. 13, n. 2B (I" 448. 76-81 ). cr. Dt bono q. 1.6, n. 21 (�d. Kuhle, p. 12). On The Commtnt/JI{)T, see H.·F. Dondaine, L� wrP1 u diOf1piffl th r ullnw.Jiti d£ Paris (III Xlllt .'iit:l�, Rome 1953, pp. 84-S9. kg Super Dt diuinu IIOtItinibw c. 13, n. 28 (ed. SImon, p. 449,1-10) ' . .. 90 Ibid. e.3, n. 2 (cd. Simon. p. 102): "El secundum hanc eonSiderallOn�m dicil DionY5ius quod primo de�l determinari de bono, ( �m in�en dal . exponere divina nomina, quibu, nominatur deus per processlOne! IPSIlIS, �e(undum quod CS! in cAusa acmw; t. 4, n. 3 (p. L 14). 9 1 Ibid. c. I, n. " (cd. Shoon. pp. 2·:i). lIlI
.
•
58
RECINNINCS 01' TilE DOCTRINE OF THY- TRANSCENDENTALS
(:HAYT�R ONE
according to what is left in its effects. "9� All that is good comes from the good, all that is from the first being. But here a problem arises, which is another main concern in Albert's commentary. Commonness of names suggests commonness of properties. What could be the nature of conformity (convenimtia) between God and creature that is established by the causal relation between them? Already on the first page of his commentary, Albert notes that the attributes of the cause are said of the caused. not equivocally hut univocal1y. He adds that this uniYocity is of a special kind, namely a univocity of analogy (univocatio analogiaf�) . Things emanate from Cod as (i"om a univocal cause, by participating in the attribute that is in God in an absolute wayY� This com hi nation of univocity and analogy seems odd at first sight and needs explanation. Albert explains his understanding of univocal causality and of analogy in the second chapter of Super De divinis nominihuj, where he discusses the question "Whether all goods proceed from the first good?" The rlrst counter.u-gument n;ads: That which essential ly proceeds from one form belongs to one genus or species. But Aristotle has shown that what is good does not belong to one species. Therefore all goods do not formally proceed from one good."" The objection is based on Aristotle's criticism of Plato's Form of the Good in the first book of his Ethics (1096a 23-29) . Nothing that is common according to one form is found in ali the categories. But the good is found in all predicaments and is convertible with being. Therefore there is not one Tdea or Form of the Good. The core of the objection is that the good is not a genus, but is traIl scendental. Its commonness is consequently of a clifferent nature than the univocal commonness of a category. In his reply Albert distinguishes two kinds of form. The first kind is the exemplary form. II is common, not by predication but by what proceeds from it, as the form of the shoemaker is common 9'�
Ibid. c.
1 . n. I (cd. Sinton, p. I ) , 93 Ibid. c. I , n . l (cd. Simon, p. I ) : �De aurihuti! ellim (lI.usal: H:ien dum . quod non aequivoce, sed univoce: dicuntur de C
qualis potest esse ibi, qnae est analogiae ( ... ) . Nominatur cnim his nO!llinihus per ea quae �unt in nobis ab eo sicU{ a causa univo ca-: cf. n. 3 (1'. 2). cr. F.
us "NoltU djvi1U� ,t ltu:rs �rajs(Jfl.s" stt(Jfl. Sail1t Alb"! It Grond, C(JmmtntateuT du "De divini.! nominibui Paris 1963: A. de Libera, Albert u Grand If /a philmophu, pp. 80-100.
Rudlo,
1M
',
.�per Of dllljni.! nrn.linibuJ Co 2, n. 83 (ed. Simon,
p, 96, -49-5-4).
59
to all shoes. For- that reason it is not necessary that the form is participated in univocally hy every thing, but each participates according to its own possibility. The other form is common to many things by predication, and is the form of a genus or species. From one such form a plurality comes forth in a univocal way. The procession of all good things from one form must not he understood in the latter manner but in the former. They proceed from one exemplar and do not necessarily belong to one speciesY" Albert attempts to find a formal causality that is not categorical but does justice to the transcendental character of the good. But again he advances an objection derived from Aristotle's criticism of Plato's Form of the Good. "Against this seems to be that the Philosopher, in the first book of the Ethics, states that there is not one exemplar of lhe Cood for all goods" (d. 1096b 25-26) . At (his point it is instructive to consult Albert's commentary on the Ethics and to see how he evaluates Aristotle's criticism. On Albert's reading Aristotle interprets Plato's Form of the Good as the form of a genus that is predicated univocally of all goods. But is this really Plato's view? Albert refers to the CommentatoT, that is, to custratius of Nicca (ca. 1050-11 20), who holds (hal Aristotle wrong ly ascribes this conception to Plato. In defense of the doc_trine of the Ideas. Eustratius points out that Plato had distinguished three kinds of universals: the universal ante Tem which "precontains" the thing ami is the formal principle prorlucing the nature; the universal in re which is the nature distributed in act in a plurality of things; and the universal post Tem which the soul abstracts from the thing. By the Idea of the Cood, Plato meant the first kind of universal, the divine exemplar. Albert concludes that Aristotle's arguments against Plato's doctrine arc useless, when one understands. along with the Commentator, the Idea of the Good as one Form from which all things descend as from one exemplar, and which formally causes the goodness of all things."'fi lhid. c, 2, n . 83 (ed. Silllon, p. 97). 96 SUP" Ethi(am I. Icct. 5. n. 29 ( Op"'! Omnia 14/1. ed. W.
9�
"Dic4!udum secundum
Kubel, p. 25):
COII<"ltntalor"m, quod hoc falso impon;! ArislOI.des
Platoni. Oistingul l enim Plato trip lex universalc"; leeL 6. n . SO (p. 27): "Et hac quidem raliones Aristolelis necel<Sario co"Indudunl (ontra Viatonelll, sl ponebal "nam ideam omniuill bonoHlm. quae sit forllla gencris vel specie!
( ... ); 5i autem intdlexerit ideam unam, secundum quod omnia descel1(\um exemplariler ab uno primo, quod fOrlnaliter ",fricit omnia bona, ut dicit
r...,,,,mmralor, sic planum est, quod rat.iones nihil valent." For the Commentary of EU-'lrathI5, scc Eu�tratius, /11 f'rilllum Ari�/"tJoliJ Marolitlm lid Njr.omQ(.hu"" ed,
60
IlECINNINGS OF THE DOCTRINE OF
CHAPTER ONE
Both In his commentary on the Ethics and in !.hat on De divinis nominibus, Albert follows the same strategy. Just as he defends Plato against Aristotle's criticism of the Idea of the Good, so he defends Dionysius's concept of the causality of the good against Aristo telian objections. Besides the formal causality, in which one
THE
TRANSCENDENTALS
61
presents an oIltological foundation for the convertibility of the transcendentals. In chapter thirteen he explains the relation betv.reen being and one. Unum adds to ens the negation of division. This neg�tion
follows from the act of the form, insofar as the act is lerntinU5. A1bert
specific form is predicated ullivocally of cause and effecl. there is
distinguishes two acts of the form, which. however, arc not
another type of formal causality. in which one form is predicated
separated in reality. The first act of the form is that it gives being
according to priority and posteriority, that is, according to analogy. Already in De bono Albert had made clear that the modes of
(dat else) . Through its function of bestowing being the form brings about that something is being
(ens). The second act is that the form
analogy that were developed in the interpretation of Aristotle's
determines matter (terminat tnatmam). In virtue of its determinaLing
MetaPhysics were not applicable to the relation between God and the
function the form effects tbat something is undivided in itself and
transcendental properties. We encounicr the same exclusion in his
divided from others, that is, is one
commentary on Dionysius. He emphasizes several times that
is the principal act of the form and precedes the determiuating
there is not auy analogical conformity betv.rcen God and creature,
function, �beinK" is the first transcendental and "one" is conse
when analogy is taken as an order of two things to a third that is
quent upon it.99 The ontological foundation of the convertibility of
(unum). Since bestowing of being
prior to them, as being is prior to substance and accident. This
"being" and "one" on the twofold act of the forma is an original
mode of analogy would imply that there is something more
feature of Albert's theory.
simple than and prior to God. The only type of analogy that A1ben
Does this foundation al�o hold for "true" and "good?" Albert
accepts at the theological level is the order of what is caused to the
does not give a direct answer to this question, but there arc indica
exemplar. God is good in vitlue of his essence, all other things
tions in his work suggesting that the other transcendentals, 100,
participate in the good in diverse ways according to their approxi mations to the exemplary cause.U7 Albert's conception of analogy is
must be reduced to the ontological functions of the form. In the last
article of De bono, q. 1 , Albert discusses the convcrtibility of being
determined by his understanding of univocal causality as a
and true. The true that is cl)nvercible with being adds to being "a
causality of an exemplary form.
relation to the form or to that by which a thing formally is. "1 00 The
II is not surprising that, in accordance with the causal per
spective of De divinu notninibus, Albert's foundation of the converti
true is understood as the effect of the act of the form, by wbich
something is what i t is; it is the effect of the "forming" function.
bility among the transcendentals is mainly theological. Every
The good adds a relation to the end, it signifies that a thing is per
being is good, since it is related to the first good from which it
fected in virtue of the indivision of act from potency. So the goud
comes forth. In his commentary Albert states that the theological
appears to be the effect of the completing or perfecting function of
treatment of heing is different from the philosophical one. The
the form . The conclusion that Albert's dourine c_ontains
philosopher's intention is to deal with being that is the first
atic account of the convertibility and the difference of the
conception of the intellect and to determine its propenies and parts.
tr.mscendentals seems justified. The inner principle of the form
The theologian'S intention is to treat of bcing, imofar
as
system
it is said of
the cause of every being.98 Yct in his commentary Albert also P. Mercken (CArpIU Leidrn 197�).
a
Lo.linum C..ommenlariorum i11 AnsIOU/,," (dauurum VII I,
97 Sill- V, diuiflis nominilnu c. 2. 1'. 84 (rd. Simon. p. 98). C[ e. I, n. 56 (p. '51 : r. I�, n. 22 (p. 445); "Sed eSi lamen aliquis modus analogiae ipsius ad rreaturas. non I'l uod idrm sil in uaroque. u:d quia similitudo elus quid e�1 in cleo, invenitlLr in creilturil ar.rUndlilli malll virtutem,� UM Ibid. r. 5. n. I (p. '0'): -[t dJrh 'hlOlogictu" ad dUTerentlam philo�ophid
negotii de: en Ie, cuim intentio est determinare de: enle. in (IUod �tat re:soilltio
intellcnu$ 8icut in primam conctptionem, assignando passionC5 el partrs
eiu�; theologi autem intenlio est deu:rminare de emr. secundum quod dicitur de ca\l� umnis cnUs. prout ab ip� nuunl omnia exist,erllia.9Y Super l)" dillinis fltJl'llflib><J r.. I,. n. 7 (p. 436). See also c. t, n. 36 (ed. •. 20). Simon, ,
IIMI D! /)oM
q. 1 . 10, n. 38 (ed. Kuhle, p.
reiationeTn ad formam sive ad
id
ens addi! relalioncm ad finelll.'
20): "Verum cnim super ens addit
quo est res formalit.er. sinn ct bonum supt'r
62
63
CHAPTER ONt:
BEGINNINGS OF THE DOCTRINE OF TH£ TRANSCENDENTALS
explains that something is at dle same time being. one, lIue, and good; the diSlinct functions of the form explain the order and the difference of the first determinations of being, lU I But is Albert's theory of the transcendentals consistent?
divides this into two modes: one (a) based on absolute affirmation, the other (b) on affirmation relative to something extrinsic. 4a. The mode of signifYing based on absolute affirmation posits something in reality. ''White man," for instance, adds to "man" a mode of signifying and a reality. 4b. The mode of signifying based on affirmation relative to something extrinsic is again subdivided into two types of relations. 4b,1. The first type of relation applies to a thing as a result of a change in that thing. Albert names paternity and sonship as examples. Relations of this sort an� rcal, and the mode of signify ing based on the affirmation of such relations posits something in reality. 4b,2. But there are relations which do not obtain to a thing as a result of a change in the thing itself but rather from the change in something else. An example is the relation of being-to-thc-right caused in an immobile column by a motion of a man. Such relations arc conceptual rather than real. AJbert argues for the necessity of such conceptual relations on the grounds that. if such relations were real, the first principle would be most composed, since it has most relations, namely, to all things. The transcen dentals "true" and "good" belong to this mode of signifYing. They add to being conceptual relations; for one calls something "true in virtue of a relation to an Idea, and Mgood� in virtue of a relation to an agent moved by its goodness as end. lO� Next there follow three more sections that we only describe summarily: 5. "It is always in virtue of a relation to an end that something is called 'good'." 6. This claim is supported by the reference to an argument in
Albert's systematization of the transcendentals
In his commentary on Dt divinil nominibus, Albert twice offers a systematization of the transcendentals. The first is in chapter four, where he raises the question: �How is 'good' related to 'being'?"; the other is in chapter five. A recent inquiry into Alben's exposi tion in the first text cOndude� that he presents "two incomparible accounts" in it. To assess this conclusion we must examine the text carefully./I)� The background of the question is the idea, derived from the Uber De causis, that being alone is by creation, the good by informa tion. This background is suggested by the beginning of the solution of the question, where Albert refers to the view of "some people" who hold that the good adds some form to being. We will return later to their argument. Alben's own response opens with two statements that determine the continuation of his argument: I . "We say, however, that 'good' adds no reality to 'being' (ens) ." Thus the goodness of a thing is its essence (tHtntia), and the same holds for truth and unity. 2. "But they [goodness, truth and unity] add only a mode of signifying ( modus significandi)." Thus, goodness is the essence signified under another concept (sub alia rationt) . The discussion focusses therefore on the modes of signifying. They can be distinguished into two sorts, one based on negation, the other on affirmation. 3. The mode of signifying based on negation does not posit anything in reality but only concepLUally (in ratione) . for negation belongs to reason, not to nature. This is the place of the transcen dental wane," for it adds a negation to "being." "Oue" signifies being undivided in itself and divided from others. 4. Albert next inquires into the other member of the division of the modes of signifying, the mode based on affirmation. He again 101
cr. B. Mojsisch. kCrundlinien dr:r Philosophie Alberu de$ CroBcn�.
ill: Fu ilN.rgpr ZntJr./trift for � u.,,1 PIuJoJophie 32 (198�). pr. 3&�9.
IlJt Sut-" IN tlillilliJ twIItini/INJ (". 4, II. 5 (rod. Simon, p. 1 16).
Boethius's De JubdotTUJdibtu. 7. In dosing, Albert recapitulates his view of the relations
between being, one, true, and good. l()� Ibid. c. 4. n. 5 (ed. Simon, p. 1 1 6 ) . Note in particular: "Sunl aulcm quacdam relatione! quae non innMcuntur ex mUlalione rei, �cd polius ex mutationc aiteriU5, sic\Lt in columna immobHi causatur dextrum ex mOlu hominis; et tales relationes sunt potius rationes quam rcs. Alias oporteret. quod primum esset maxim .. composilum, quia habet plurimM relatione!. ad omnia scilicet. secunda Veto ad quacdam taluum. Et modum fundatulIl super tales relationes a.Mit \'Cruffi el bonum supra ens. DidlUr enim vc:rum Kcun dum respectum ad ideam. bonum vero 5ccundum respectum ad efficien(em mOlum sua bonitatc tamquam finc.�
64
BEGINNINGS OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL.'>
CHAPTER ONE
Albert's systematization of (he transcendentals can be represented schematically as follows:
1.
3.
The other u-ansccndcnuls add no reality La ttU, 2. but only modes of signifYing.
By negation (unum)
4. By afiirmation
� _ _ _ _ _ --" '---
4a. By absolute affinnation
4b,1. By affirmation of fe-.lI relation
4b. By affinnation rdative something extrinsic I
to
4b,2. By afIinnarion of a conceptual relation I
'""'�.
being related to an Idea
bonum:
being rchued to an end
{"\In Albert's systemaLization of the transa:ndentals we see lhe same ( tendency as in that of Alexander of Hales. In contrast to Philip the Chancellor's doctrine, "the one" is not the model for the determi nation of the other tr.mscendentals. As we noted before concern ing the definition of truth in De bono, the notion of �indivisioll is no longer the exclusive viewpoint in Albert. Unum is the only transcendental that adds a negation to being. What is new in Albert's systematization is thus his underSlanding of vt'Tum and bonum. They add something positive to being, namely a relation to something extrinsic. On this poinl the "theological" character of his foundation of the transcendentals becomes manifest, as appears from the way he clarifies statement (5) ("It is always in virtue of a relation to an end that sorneLhing is good"). This end can be in the efficient cause, and then "something is called 'good' that is convertible with being, because it is from the goOd."104 Against Albert's accounl it has been objected that he commits himself to two incompatible views. On the one hand, Albert mainM
1 01 Ibid..
4, n. 5 (td. Simon, p. 116): "Est tnim bonum semper st'cundum «'pecttlm ad fmem leC'lmdllm aliqllem modum, vd prout est in efficienle; el _Ie didtur bllnum, quod ronvtrlhur rum enle, quia ell a oono". c.
,
,
" V
r
65
tains the "No Reality Thesis," that is, the view that "good- adds no reality to "being, � but only a mode of signifying. He claims that goodness is a merely conceptual relational property entirely extrinsic to good things. Goodness does not require in the things signified as "good� a nature or ontological found,uion beyond that involved in �being." But on the other hand, Albert seems in the same (ext to maintain a more moderate view, the �Same Reality Thesis." He claims that the nature of goodness is to be identified with the natures or realities in virtue of which a thing is a being. The Same Reality Thesis is incompatible with the view that goodness is a merely conceptual relational property, for the Thesis implies that a thing's goodness consists in part in properties intrinsic to the thing itself. The conclusion of the criticism is "that Albert is confused." The accounts of goodness represented by the Same Reality Thesis and the merely conceptual relational account are different, incompatible accounLS.105 It seems to me, however, that the confusion is not on Albert's side. His systematization of the transcendelltals is based on the two statements with which his response opcns. 1 . "Cood" adds no reality to "being." Albert does not say: "good" is no reality. In order to eliminate any misunderstanding, he concludes: 'Thus, the goodness of a thing is its essence." 2. "Good," "one," and "true" add unly a mode of signifying. Albert immediately spells out the implication of this claim; lhus, goodness is the essence signified under another concept. H It is out of the question that Albert mliintains two radically different views in this text, "The No Rea,lity Thesi!�" alongside the more moderate "The Same Reality Thesis." He does not claim that goodness is a merely conceptual relation, just liS he does not claim that unity is a negation. Unity is heing signified under a negation ("undivided being"), goodness is being signified under a relation. What Albert formulates in the flr5t two statements of his argument is nothing other than his general view that the relations among the transcendcntals arc marked by identity and difference. There exists a real identity between being, one, true, and good; they are convertible according to their supposits. One could speak here of 'The Same Reality Thesis." There exists however a conaptual JH� S. MacDonald, "1lle Metaphysics of Goodness and the Doctrine of the Tralllcendt'nlah�, in: S. MacDonald (ed.), &ng ond Goodnm, pp. !I 1·:.5; � in partirul;\r p. 53.
66
BEGINNINGS OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRANSCENDENTALS
CHAPTER ONE
difference between the lranscendelHals, since their
mtionu
are
diverse. The other transcendentals add something to �being� in
because they are from the good. Thus, good does not add a form resting in the subject. 107 The solution of the question starts from tht': \'lew of wsome
this respect. That AJbcr('s account musl be interprt:ted in this way is proved by the end of the text
(7)
in which he recapitulates the results of his
(entitas) of a thing is called that through being (esse); i t is the first conception of the
analysis. The "entity"
wh ich a thi ng has
67
intellect. "Unity" is the same essence or form to which the mode
people" (quidam) ,1011 who, in contrast to the objector, hold that "good" adds something to Wbeing," namely, a kind of form partici pated from the goodness of lhe first cause. To the second argument
conlTa
they l"eply that "one does not call some subjeC[ 'good' in
virtue of a relation LO something exO'insic but in virtue of some
of the
form remaining in the subject." That one calls beings �good"
subject in virtue of the relation to the first Idea which it imitalc�; it
because they are from the good. musl not be understood in the
is the Mgoodness" of the subject ill virtue of the relation to the first
sense that one calls them "good" in virtue of a relation to an
ft
of indivisibility is added. The same form is the �trulh
eflil:icnl and final cause. Albert substantiates the correctness of his
extrinsic good, but in the sense that they participate in the form of
view by pointing out the absurdity of the opposite position. If the
goodness from the first good, just as they participate in the form of
eSSence were good or one, not through the same form but in virtue
being and in that of life. 109
of some added form, then again that added form would be good or one. not through itself but in virtue of another form, and
an
infinite
To the solution of quidam Alberl opposes his own solution: ''We
say, howevel" ... "
(Nos autem
dicimus) . Against the rival position he
regress would arise. Consequently, the first essence would not be
wants to make dear, first, that "good," like the other transcen
wholly good or oneYI6 Goodness and unity would lose their tran
dentals, does not add any reality, any kind of form, to being; and
scendental character.
second, that the concept of "good" consists in the relation to some
Albert's concluding observation indicates that his systematiza
thing extrinsic. He argues for the relational char.actn of "good" in
(5)
tion of the transcendent."lis has a polemic (enor. This purpose is also
the seclions
apparent from the unusual structure of the quav;tio: wHow is good
real relation posits something in reality and adds an accidtntal
and
(6).
This relation cannot be a real relation, for a
related to being?" After (our arguments suggesting thitt the good
fonn to a subject (section
adds something to being, there follow three arguments
relation.
second argument plays a role
CQntra.
The
ill Albert's reply to the question . It
reads: That of which the entire concept
(lola ratio)
Con!)iSlS in the
4h,I). The good must signity a conceptual
Albert's argument is consistent, not conrusing. That docs nol mean, however,
that his
view of the merely conceptual character
l"elation to something extrinsic does not add a fOl"m l"estillg in the
of tbe rdation signified by "'good" is convincing. Albert argues
subject. Thj� is especially the case when the relation does not
that if this relation were not conceptual, thc fiJ"St pl"inciple would he
Obtain (0 a thing from a change in the thing iL'lelf; for instance, the
most composed, since it is related to all things. But this considera
i()rm added to the
tion is not to the point. At issue is not the relation oflhe fiJ"St cause to
essence of
all other beings, but the reverse relation. Accol"ding to Albert
in the relation to something extrinsic, for we call beings Wgood�
himself "good that is convertible with being is said of something
relation of being-to..the-r-ight in a column is not
107 Ibid., c. 4, n. 106
SUI'" Dt di'lin!s nomi.,ilnu
(.
4. n. 5 (ed. Sirnun, p. 116): -Unde didmus,
quod entitas rei didtur, secundum quod in se consirleratur rc.� per eam cs�t: habens. prout est prima conn:ptio imellectll5. Unital! vero est eadem e��entia sive forma cum modo indivi5ibilitath, et eadem est vcritas subiec:t.i relatione a(1 i eam primam. quam imilatur, et bonitas subiecti relatione ad primum . . etfi �lcns finale 51 enl m c$$cntia esset bona vel una per aliquam rormam : . euer per aliam. et sic in infinitum irrlllr. rt priml1 addltam, lIIn(: Herum lila res non rnl:, eAAtt t),('flll vrl LIlla.·
�
4 (ed. Simon, p.1l5). 1 08 S. MacDonald, The Metaphysics of Goodness in MedieTJai Philwoph] brfarr
Aquinas, p . 334 suggests that these quidllm are twelfth..century commentators on Boethius, as Thierry of Chartres or Clarembald.
J09 Super De divinis nominibw c. 4. n . 5 (ed. Simon, p. 115): -Ad secundum dicunt, quod bonum non didwr secundum rdationem ad aliquid extra, sed �ecundum aliquam formam in subiecto manentem. Quod vero dicuntur entia eS5e bona, quia sun! a bono. non est intelligendum, quod dicantur bona secun dum re�pen\Lm ad bonum, a quo sunt, sed quia inquantum $Imt a bono, partid p;mt formam honiTatis ah ipso �ic\lt vilae et euemi....e d alia huiu5modi.-
-,...�'" -
68
"
•
,
•
BECINNINGS OJ,' THE DOC,TRINE OF THE TRANSCENUi':NT.... I ...
CHAPTKH. UN!':
because it is from the good.
>t
This I-datiull is a real relation, a
relation of dependency, Hul a merely conr.epwaJ relation. The problematic: aspecr of Albert's systematization of the tran sccndcmals comes c:ven more clearly to the fvre when we look into the other systemati:tatiull in his commemary on De divinis
nlJminibus, in chapter five. "Being
"
is the first conception of the
intellect and "that in which the analyzing intellec t
vens)
(in&lIllectus resoi
comes to a stand," when it n:duct:s a thing (0 jt.<; most Hni
versa.l predicate.- HI But how are the other transccndcntals related to
nOlion of "indivisioll." What is arldcd is
not
a nature, but a mode
that consists in a negat ion The order of "being" to .
011
69
"on e"
i s based
the twofold act of the form, The form gives being, by which it
effec.ts that something is a "being," and the form determines the potentiality of malter, hy which it effects that something is
o nc . "
"
Since bestowing of heing is the pri mary act of [he form, being is prior to one . 112
In this second syslemati1.ation, the additions of "true" and
"good" to "being" are no longer described as merely conceptual
natura,
being? Albert menrions three possible ways of convertibility.
relalions. Thf'y add a
nature (rwturam) Ciud the mode (modum). Thil; type of convertibility
true and the good. Another noteworthy aspect or his account is the
but Albert doe... not make clear how
(i) The first way is according to the supposiL (suPpositum) , [he
...nch a real addition is compatible with the transcendentalily of the
and enJiJ, cwo Latin terms for
imbalallce between the foundations of the convertihility of "being"
obtains for synonyms like
mucro
"sword ... (ii) The second way is acconling to the supposit, but not acc.ord� ing to the nature. This type oh tain s for the convertibility of "being"
with "one" and that of "ueing" with "true" an d "good . " The former is ontological, baseo on the dual act of the form, while rhe
latter i:; theological, based on the CH!atlve causalir.y of the first
with "t.fue" and "good." "Good" and "true" are predicated of every·
hf!ing.
and "good" add i' mode based on affirmation 10 "being, " namely, a
that being is on e, [me, and good . In the second systematization,
thi ng of which "being" is predicaleu, and cOIl\'ersely. But "true" re:larion, for a being is called "created" only in virtue of a relation
to the uncreated being of which it is a likeness. ''True'" adds a l sofar relation to the Idea, u
as
it is the pri nciplt: of knowing; "good"
adds a relation to the eno. Thus th ey add a nature to "being" and are not convertible with it according to their ILatun:!.s . l l l (iii) The thi.rd war i.s <.,uording to the !;UPP()�il 'lnd to the
nature, but not according to the mode. This type obtains for the
Transcendentals
are no synonyms.
It
is not Unugatory" to say
Alhen employs the term nugatio, "u:;e1ess repetition of the same," a phrase that is frequc.::l1l1y used by other thirteenth century authors in this context, I IS The other lranscendentals add something to "lJeing." The comparison between AllJert's two systematizations �hows that the probleUJ of the adrlition is becoming acute with regard to the Lrue and 'he good. This problem is caused by his departure from Pbilip the Chancellol's
solu tion ,
in which the
convertibility of "being" with "one,'" "One" adus to "being" the Ibid. c. 5, n. 20, 50[\1lio ( ..rI. Sim on, 314): �Dicendum. quod esse �i J[\pli dter secundum naturam et rationem esl prim nmnir.l11S a l iis; cst enim prima oonce ptio in rellectus el in quo intellectm re<;oI\'('n.� uhimo �tat," See abo ad 5: Mes�e HUll �ulI litur hie pro actll cssen tiae in sUPPOSiLO, sed pro ipso cnte, in fJlIO stat resolutio intc:llc:ctus. Qualll\'is enirn resolutiO composiri in simp lex stet In partes componentc:s, l'Wlell re:so lu tio in magis universale Slat in eo quod pr:ted i catur. » 111 Ibid. e.5, n. 20 (ad p rimum) (cd. Simon, p. 314); �qllaedam vera 111)
.
[converumtur] S('('_lInliuln sUPP01ilum, scod non secundum n;)luram, sicut ells cllm vern el bono. uia de qllibll.y.llmfJllc rr.tcdicatur ens. praedicatur bonum t:L Veto et e converso. Sed lam en bonum ct vcrum arlrlunr J\loc!lIm C] ucndam , qui l:omistit in affirmatione. supra ens. scilicet respectum l'Juendam; ni('itllr en im crealUm Iantuul per respectum ad ens increatum sku! similitudo ipsius, '..erum autem addi t r�speClum ad ideam �ecuIJdulII qllod eSl principillm cognoscendi. h(1MUm alltem addit respectum ad finelli, el ideu .II.1duIJt n a u ram qu an dam �llrra {'n�. unde �lInl flO�!erior" ipso el non conv�rtuulur CUIII eu :secundu m
q
,
nU!lIram.�
Ibid., c. 5, n. 20 (ad prinHII !l ) ( ed Simon, p. 314): MQll ajAdam vero converruntur secundum sllppositllm et secundum naturam, sed non secun dum mouulIl, sicut un um et �n�. C]uia de quibuscullll.{ue dicilUr unum ct rn.� C't e converso, tamen unum addil mo(hlm quendam supra ens. ( . ) Modus tamen, a.ffirmationC', sed tan tum ill fl �gati on e ( ...) . Et � lIt:m addit, nOli cOll sistit Idt"o n ullam naturam addl t supra ens. :«-:rl tamen ralion e illius modi est poSl.c rill� ellle. Quud :sic patel: forma ..nim c l eft forma Cl el\l teml in us
I I i!
.
"
�n
potentialitatis mat�riae, el illquannnn quidcm c:!01 forma, da t C�SI:', illlJu:mtum ,'ero eM lr.rminllS, terminat disollguendo ab aliis. lJorum o'IutCIlI OU::IIIUIII prior est dare esse, ct ifi('o ens quod relilltjuitur ex tali nClu. est pri.., IIno". 113 Ibid. c. 5. n. 20 (an primum) (ell. Simon p. 314): �Alioqllin esse n t em eL unum synon}'ma et haberenl eandem ekposilionem, e t C!l.� c:l nugatio. unum determinalur per alterum". Pe ter of Sp ai n gave the stan darn nugatio in his trca!.iu: of logic. ::;o:;e TructaluJ cailid afterwards dellmttOD S.It'm.1/t1l1� iQ!{1r.altiS "11,18 ( e . L.M. de RUk, As�en 1972, p. 94): "Nugatio elll clllMIt:m C't ex cad�lll parle lnudlls reperilio, III 'homo homo c llrrit' vd 'homo ratjonali.�,'. � .
qU�II��
o�
�
70
CHAPTER ONE
notion of "inclivision" is central. "Trut:" and "good" add some� thing positive, but how is this positive addition (0 be conceptualized? Thomas Aquinas faces the saJUe problem in his own theory.
CHAPTER TWO
Between the first formulation of the doctrine of the transcend. cntals by Philip the Chancellor and the carly works of Albert the
THOMAS'S GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE TRANSCENDENTALS
Great arc hardly twenty-five years. In this period the doco-ine experienced a rapid growth. Philip's view that there arc four common and primary nolions, being, one, true, and good, and that these fOllr are convertible with one another is adopted and elaborated by the Summa fratn's Alexandri and Albert the Great. Thomas Aquinas's work marks a new phase of transcendental thought i n the Middle Ages.
Thomas Aquinas never wrote a separate treatise on the transcen· dental!. In this respect he does not distinguish himself from hill predecessors or contemporaries. The first systematic works on this theme did not appear until the sixteenth century; one of the earliest samples is the Tmctatus de transcendentibus of Chrysostomus JaveUi (c.
1470..1538),
which was strongly influenced hy Thomas's teach
ings.1 From the absence of a separate lreatisc one may not infer, however, that the doctrine of the transcendentals is marginal or of minor importance for Thomas. That such a conclusion would �
premature can tx: clarified by a comparison with another doctrine, that of participation. Thomas provides no systematic account of this doctrine either, but the foundational role of the idea of participation in his metaphysics has been generally acnowledged since the
the
studies of Cornelio Fabro and L.�B. Geiger.2 Of course,
appropriateness of the analogy to participation Temains to be
demonstrated. This is one of the objectives of our study: to show that the theory of the transcendentals is foundational for Thomas's thought.
.
Although Thomas wrote a number of separate treatises like
Dl
lnu It �sentia) most of his works belong to the genre that was developed in the Middle Ages for scholarly disclUSions. the genre
of the quaestiones. One indication of the centrality of the doctrine of the transcendentals in his thought i.s the fact that he appeals to it
and takes it for grantt':d in answt':ring all manner of concrete
one
questions. Consider two randomly selected examples from
of
Thomas's earliest writings, his commentary (in tht': form of
qu(U!slionts) on the Se1tttnc� of Peter Lomb.'ud. I C. JaveUi, Opef"(� omnia I. uidcoA ]580, pp. 458a"",,69b. cr. M. TavUlll, �ChryI05l0mus Javelli (ca. 1470-1538). A Biobibllographlul Es.ay�, I n : 67 (1990) , pp. 347·78; and 68 (1991), pp. log...21. C. Fabro, La no,iont di ,""CJjilica di pCJTt#apa,io1l' UtOfldQ S. To«_so dl\'luino, Mihno 1939, 2nd. cod. Turin 19M; L,·B. Gcoller, La "r1jr:i� "N la philouJphi, d, S. ThtJ-., d 'Aqvfrl, Parh 1942, Ind. cod. 1955.
AnpticMm
-
.
. .
. .
.
-
THOMAS'S G:ENEItAL ACCOUNT OF THE TRANSCENDENTALS
CHAPTER 1'NO
At the beginning of the first book, Thomas discusses the question whether the distinction between the thre� divine Persons is a real distinction. Now according to Augustine, Father, Son and
73
The texts mentioned will serve as the basis for our investigation
and will henceforth be referrt':d to as the "basic texts." They arc suitable for a general introduction to Thomas's account of the
Holy Spirit are distinguished from each other not by something
transcendentals because'.: they provide an overall picture of this
absolute but only by lh�ir relations. Since "thing" means some
doctrine within different argumentative contexts and reveal the
thing absolute, it seems that the three Persons are not three
innovative aspects of his systematization. We take De veritate 1 . 1 as
"realities" (rt'S) and that there is no real distinction between them.
our point of departure for this chapter because this text contains
But in his reply Thomas points out that �thing" belongs to the
Thomas's most complete account and affords insight inlO the
transcendentals
(us est de transcendentibus)
and consequently can be
interests motiving trnnscendental thought. This article has been
said just as much of something absolute as of something that is
called, with some exaggeration, �the most dense and formal text in
relative.3 In the second book, the question arises "whether the same
the whole history of western thought. "7 Nevertheless De veritate 1.1
action can be good and bad." Thomas's reply begins with a
is unquestionably a "topica'" lext requiring patient analysis and
proposition based on an essential characteristic of transcendentals:
elucidation.R The present chapter follows therefore the structure of
"one and being are interchangeable" (unum d ern: convtrluntuT) .
this text, incorporating the other bask texts within it. In closing
This premise-for which he offers no explanation-is then applied
(2.7.) we assess Thomas's account and formulate a number of ques
to the moral activity.4 Elsewhere Thomas advances a certain
tions that determine the course of our investigation in the chapters
justification for wis usage. He observes that because the one, like
that follow.
the true and the good, belongs to the transcendentals, it is common to all things, and at the same time can be applied to single things.5
In various works, Thomas also gives explicit expositions of the
2.1. TM resolution intI) $omethingfirsl
transcendentals, but these usually deal with a specific transcen dental, that is, with unity, truth, or goodness. There are three texts,
The quaestio in De veritate 1.1 is "What is truth (quid sit veritas) ?".
however, that have a more general character and present the
The fLrst noteworthy point in this text is Thomas's approach to
doctrine in its entirety. The first text chronologically is the
this question. The same question was posed by Philip the Chan
commentary on the first book of the Sentences, 8.1.3, dating from
cellor in the Summa de bono (q. 2), by Alexander of Hales then in
the period of Thomas's baccalaureate in Paris (1252-56). It is a
the Summa th«Jwgica and by Albe.-t the C.-eat in De bono (q. 1.8). but
relatively short text on the question "whether the name 'He who is'
their approach is different from Thomas's. They collect a number
is the first among the divine names." The other two texts are both
of definitions of truth [rom the tradition, attempting to determine
found in the disputed questions De veritate, dating from the period
both what its primary ratio is and how the diverse definitions
1256-59. They are article 1 . 1 . "What is truth?", and article 21.1, "Does good add something to being?". We leave aside De natura gmms, the second chapter of which is entitled De tra7lscendentibus,
relate to each other. Thomas's approach is more formal and more
because the attribution of this work to Thomas is disputed.� 3 4 �
In I Sent., 2.1.5 ad \!. In 11 Sent., 40.1.4. S,/h. I. 93.9: ·Unum
autem, cum sit de transccndentibus, et communc est
omniblU, et ad singula potest aptari; skut et bonum et verum:· Sec for the dating of Thomas's works J. A. Weish'eipJ, Friar Th()'8llJs II·Aquino. Washington D. C. 1983, pp. 358-405, and for the question of the
6
authenticity of Dc natura gmtrlJ, p. 403. en. 2 of Dc natura grnnU bea,",- great Bimllarity tn Thomas'. elCposition i n Dt "ni J aI. 1 . 1. There is, hnwever, one
important e:xception. which concerns the definition of unum. In !he form�r . work ·one" is d�fmed in a positive way, ....hik . Thomas'$ dt:l�rmlnauon, In Dr veritalr and in his other works, is n�galive. 7 C. Fabro, "The TranscendentaJity of E'/5-E5Jr and the Ground of Meta p hysics-, in: /1I1rrnalilmal Philowphical Quarlrrry 6 (l966), p. 407. (I Dl venlalr 1 . 1 is a tex' often ci�d bu� seldom analyzed. See S. Breton. "L'idee de lranscendantal et la genese: des transcendantaux chez Saint
Thoma� d'Aquin-, in: Saint Thomas d'Aquin "W)O'Urd'huj, Paris 1963, pp. 45-74; M. O. Jordan, -rhe Grammar or 'Esse': R,e·reading Th�mas on the Transcen denials", in: Thr ThomiJI 44 (1980), pp. 1·26. F. Ulrich lues the lext for a "speculative development" in Homo ahyllUS. Dal Wapi! dt!' Slim/rage, Einsie deln 1961, pp. 213-258.
74
THOMAS'S GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE TRANSCENDENTALS
CHAPTER TWO
fundamental: he takes rhe "what is it?" question as such as the starting point, examining the conditions for all inquiry into what somdhing is. The method he follows in d�.iS,':l.!lalys�s)� _�hat of the..re.soluti.on _ :esoIU�!QL-"of h_um�n .J�no_wledgf: and scie!l(.e. . We d_ �he le�m U$olutio !'=,arlier, .io_.Philip and �.�r.� _ I �!:.� !���I?�� I!.. t They , , s en e ecau � l.tfCIVI/l ��_��}��_ "!� ��!,� la.!s �. ".be6r$l$,.: ,b s ��,S. !.�.!:I}.i� "'10 "/�UiO:> o.!..t�e in�� �!,���!!l �les..in t�.�_� l10til?_�s� Thomas works this idea ouCin1}t venlate 1 . 1 by applying it to the investigation of what something is. His argument begins with the thesis that in this inquiry a reduction to the principles, the beginning of rational knowledge. is necessary:
( Trdi«tI(?!'
Just
as in demonstrable matters a reduction must be made to . known to the intellect pe:r se, so likewise in investigating . is (quid est). Else one will fall into an infinite
regress in both , with the things )V 1R . .p.l:IUb c Dl . " .. . . , .- . . irC!ll' . 9 . - -- - ... , ..• _ " . .
.
.
result
that science
and
knowledge of
,., _.
In the opening passage two forms of acquiring knowledge are distinguished. The one form is the demonstration of a proposition; that is the order of scientia, for in the proper sense is knowledge on the basis of demonstration. The other form is the inquiry lnlO_\!��.tEl!!&J�i th�.t. .the definition E� --2lM2ffi!;!hlng.. 'o The two ...Q.\li f.� Qf...Q,Q� ! I � .LttJs� J£ ' orders are posited as parallel (.tietd ... ita) . because both requlre a reduction. In Thomas's argument for this necessity, an idea that is indispensable for understanding his train of thought remains implicit. His reasoning is more fully formulated in his comment ary on Boethius's Dt trinitate ("commentary" should here again be taken in a broad §ense, since this work is a collection of independ ent quatstiones occasioned by Boethius's text) . Article 6.4. �Can our intellect behold the divine form by means of some theoretical
science i�h!._2rj�£.2f.4iJJj!i! l�.f2r.
__
!I
Dt veril. 1 . 1 : " Si ellt In demonS[rabilibus oportet fieri reductioncm in
aliqua principia per 5e intelkctui nota ita investigando quid est uJ\umquodque, alias lIu-obique in infinitum iretur, et sic peri ret omnino sciemia el cognilio rerum", III T n In Botth. De Inn. 6.4. a text that we directly consider below, a dis tinction is made between Iwo kinds of theoretical Knowledge. one by means of demonstration (p" vialll dtlllonstTalionis), the other by means of definition (/NT viam diffinilionil) . According to Thomas a definition cannot h ave a propositional Itructure. because iI does not predicate something of something. A deflnitton is an oralia lignifying what somethins i5. See In P(JJt. Anal. I. lect. 19, 16�; II, lee(. 2, 42ft.
75
science?", C2¥1�.W.mas..Lo...CLO ..r.clk Il. rhepossibilitis. e limits ..and ��.��_�t.:!lectu'!.U.'!1J�wkdg.e� The beginning of his response reads:
the �h�ore.Ycal_,ci!!n(;.e>. y!e. �t��ys. .P���.e.d:, !�!?!l} ..s.�-E}�t�,��K pi� vjOl lsly kno. �.1) (p: , '!£.�l.. both in d�e!l }.'?!Is_tr; � �
In
..@f!'P_Jci..U!_ [ � � if�to�t����-i����'��d[�������!�1�:,'_�,�,� �el. 'h«'flt�::l sc i' e nceswoufd emll, b2.1'!:!_ �J� r_4;.m�<;t. '9 ,de.,rI!QQslJ"aJJoos."and ...,{\J··\::) _
•
e t :�� "o}ii�!9ns:, "";ith" �,esp�'l p. <.:J.
�11
�;ince J.he
il�! }ni�
qn.nol..�,Jrllye,rsed
II
IL
.
So t:very jns.!!!rLI)£.�ht;ore ti!=;'l J _..!£i!..��.�.� . is_ ,t�.�_��r�e>
(��!u�_��.snl)�J.t't�1..(d}'
The indispensable premise implicit in Thomas's reasoning in . ng �_Lll�!.. �.�i!:Jnjnr;:. i.o..Qpjry , prQ,ce�_d� ,:1J;"9_m _�QJlltllti n This basic idea of classical science derives '!\Q)Y. f l . .l l?,:_<.:':.���.J. from that part of Aristotelian logic, which is called analytica or reso lutoria.12 The PosteriOT Analytics opens with the statement (7la 1): "All ..�!�}���tl!..a� tc�cJ:ti.t�.g , and ,I�arnin� pr(),I:��d fr9!ll:"pr.e�X;�$tenl-" knowledge.," This wOrk was translated IIUO Latm about the mIddle orth�-�;ifth century and became part of the university education at the beginning of the thirteenth century. The necessity of pre-existent knowledge is already implied in the notion of scjentia as it is described by Aristotle in the P05tmoT AnalytiC5. Samba is generally translated as "science," but actually in the classical tradition the term has a much more specific sense than the modern concept of science. Sc(t;nli(J, 9cs.igl]�l!';§, ..r1.�1 so mu'::.�_a_ ��!!:'-£!J?!£p'2si.tio.(ls.�_,,: .men�1 s�te ,l � r ,habiJu5, c::I-!alJ:!c ..erisLic of which is that it is produced by a demonstration.,'� Scientia is g..ou�d�d k-;;o;redge·; ·on'i;; ·i.h�c -�o�cl�usions of demonstrative syllogisms are scientifically knowable in the proper sense. !.I:tat scitntia is demonstrative means at the same lime that it derl�;;:ti;e �c conclusion- is derived from - , ."of -, ·ti ..... __. ..r"the knowledge ----.. -.. ""�-f;;
De veritatt 1 . 1
is
_ - --'"
I I In Brut/!. Dr In7l. 6.4: Hin scientiis spe(ulatiuis semper ex aliquo prius noto procedilur, tam in c\emonstrlltionibus propositionum, quam eljam in inuentionibus diffinitionum ( ... ) Hie autem non en possibik in infinitum prou:dere, quia �ic om[,i, ,clentia perird, (::1, quantllm ad demonstrationes, <;t quantum ad diffinitiones. cum infinita non sit pertransire; unde omnls consideratio �eientiarum speeulalluaru!l1 reducitur in aliqlla prima". 12 In I POll. AnaL, prot.: ·et, quia iudicium certum de effectibll� haberi non potest nisi resoluendo in prima principia, idea pars hee analetica uocatur, id est resolutoria." 1.'1 In I Pmt. Anal. leet. 4: 'cum Kire nichil aliud esse uideatllr quam in/illi g"' ueritatem alicuius conelll.joni. p" �_rulraliDru1ll. · a. In VI Ethic., leeL 3: ·sdentia est habims d�mon.tralivlI', id eJt ell dem omtralione caullatus".
�:i�� t 1\..113.\'
76
CHAPTE.R TWO
THOMAS'S GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE TRANSCENDENTALS
propos!��E��u�_Ir._ _!<:'!��!I. th�. p-r:c;."" ise�__ c:)r._��e _s)'lIogi��· Samba has the "of �Qming "from.�,.or-_�o ut or: .(e.x) ·some
is no scientific knowledge at all. There cannot be because the principles from which the conclusions are derived remain unknowable because they themselves arc not demonstrated. The other posirion that Aristotle addresses maintains that there can be scientia of everything on the ground that a circular argument can be given for everything, which is to say that propositions can be demonslrated from each other. Aristotle refuses both positions. He rejects the conception that everything is scientifically knowable. The circular proof is a petitio prin£ipii: the same thing functions in the reasoning first as principle and then as conclusion, and vice versa. Aristot,1e also rejects the conception that nothing can be known through scientia. He does acknowledge, ho.w��e!'.� the_i_'"!l�_ssi��!�_�f �.� inf�nitc: regreSS::1i'h -thI5-VlCW" to 'which Thomas refers in De veritau 1 . 1 : the consequence of an infin ite regress is that science perishes. The reduclion must come to an end, but Aris(Otle attaches a different conclusion to this necessity than do his opponents (and Hans Albert in our lime). If the resolution is broken ofT at an arbitrary point, then the result is not scientific but hypothetical knowledge that rests on the mere assumption that the premise!; are true. The : ��s, reduction _ must end at something t��_t".J�_J.C!.��.!Y ..?_XJ!.�!.:.._.,n j��e��!!1.s_�Is!:!. b,�LP/!_�!.. prin·Ci£!�����.�?J?�·g��·E��in�_t�ioiig.� virtue of itself, immediateIv. T���fo��..it.. j!_.i.!!£.�'.able o( bv ':J. . p dem.2E.SJ-!:i!ti.Q� �---Aris'totle's conclusion is that there cannot be sci�t�a of every· . . thing. Not all human knowledge IS demonstrative; It must be differentiated. Knowledge of a principle is of a different nature than knowledge of a conclusion, is a different habitus than that of knowledge based on demonstration; it is intelltctu$.1 7 Insight into the principles is the ground for knowledge of conclusions. for what is per se is always the cause of what is per aliud. 1 � Thomas's reasoning in De vtritate 1 . 1 is a succinct summary of Aristotle's theory of science. The reasoning remains purely formal in the sense that the text does not indicate what the first principle, the foundation of scientia, actually is. The first basic text, however, In I Srotentiarum 8.1.3, provides a definite answer. It involves the
__
. �[Lmvp·\4
." .,>:.}�£!.�Es.e�J This problem, problem of "roundationalism," IS described by the German philosopher Hans Albert
§dS)�iYl.��!Y_· . .t� ,"q()gw'���rn�:�:�I�
�,�j;,i::�i.��;�!��']�,:•.��'h;;� " "
Although Aristotle is never mentioned in Albert's treatise, his work shows that the structure of demonstrative sdence had al.. ready given rise to a problem concerning foundations in his day. In the ftrst book of the Pruterior A.naiytics (c. 3), Aristotle discusses views of his contemporaries which anticipate Albert's trilemma regarding the problem of an ultimate foundation.1 6 One position is that there cannot be sMllia of anything. Argu· ments in support of this position take two forms. Qn�"E',ri'lpt.",rgues t,?at t�� .�!':I?�1!,,4Jc:"!!:J£1}9.4.��ig�.l5i�.<;i,s .�.a.:.�J.I�P.�ite r<:.sr�s,,�; bll;t the infinite is not traversable, and so one never reaches a firsr Where iilere�is"n';;-fifst�' (i;�-;;�;�io;-�r;;,�t" b�- known' through' the prior. The only alternative would seem to he breaking otI the analysis, stopping the process of reduction. This second variant leads, however, [0 the same consequence as the first, namely, that there
14 Both structural elements of .!cimlja--it i� demonstrative and derivative are indicated by Thomas in In Bodh. VI! Inn. 2.2: -ralio scicnlie consi.nal in hoc quod ell aliquibll$ I\oti� a!i;\ nec��io C:Ondudanlur", t.� H. Albert, TrtDliu on Cnlir,lJ/ &aJon, Princeton 1985. p. 18. 16 For Aristotle's theory of �dence. �ee Richard D. McKirahan, Princij)/eJ Dnd ProofJ, ArifMlt'J Thwry vf DnnOnitralilll! Srima. Princeton, New Jersey 1992. Cf. J. A, AUlKn. �Der Satl vom Widerspruch in d�r mittelalterlic:h�n Philo&Ophie: Baron von Munehhausen. Thomas von Aquin lind Nikolaus von Kues", in: K. Jacobi (ed.), Argummtati01lJlhwrit, ScMIlfl.!lisC/u F()¥'Jchungm tU dm logi.!ehm und semanluthm lUpin AlarreAllm Folgn'tlJ, Ldden 1993, pp. 707·727; S. MacDonald. abeory of Knowl�dge-, in: N. KrelZmann and E. Stump (eds.). Tlu Cambrid�t Compaftioft to Aquifta.J, Cambridge 199-', pp. 16()..195.
77
__
.
_
_ _ _ _�__._._ ._._" _'. _'••• ___.'-'�_'
. 17
__
..
• • • _, _.__ _._ •..__
_.
In I POll. AnoL. Jut. 7: "sciencia est tondusionum �t intellectus prindpiorum". Cf S.th. lI·II, 1.4. I" For Aristotle, see Anol. Poot. I. e. 3. for Thomas, see In IPosl. AnaL, lect. 7.
'\
78
CHAPTER TWO
79
THOMAS'S GEN'ERAL ACCOUNT OF TILE TRANSCENDENTALS
axiom thai "contradictories are not simultaneously true," That this
One may wonder what the nature of this resolution is. Is
principle is the first is no "dogmatism," for it underlies every
Thomas aiming at a logical analysis of concepts, a kind of
by Aristotle in the fourth book of the Metaphysics (c,3, l005b
most general genus? Oeing-Hanhoff has suggested that according
utterance and argument. The principle of contradiction is called
14)
"that which presupposes nothing," th<:_ an�)'pothl!'lii#"Uf-hum;� thought (cf. sect. 3.7.). If it would be denied. it is"incomprehensible how there could be intelligible discourse (c.
4,
lO06a 21ff.).
The core of the opening passage in De verilate
reconstruction of "Porphyry's trce,� through a reduction to the
opinion (fides vel ojJinio). Consequently, the result of the resolutio in
definitions. A resolution to something first is necessary in the
with the purport of Thomas's exposition. He draws a parallel
must proceed in the same way as in demonstr.ttive knowledge.19
tbe resolution of definitions to first conceptions. The end term of
latter domain as well. In investigating what something is, one
One does not find this idea in this explicit form ill Aristotle, but it is
essential for Thomas's argument. He extends the resolution of
propositions to first principles, familiar from the PosteriOT Analytics,
to the knowledge of definitions.
Cognition of the quiddity of something also requires antecedent
knowledge: it too is derh'ed from something known previously, for
but not yet scientifically certain.21 But this interpretation coutlicts
between the resolution of propositions to self-evident principles and
both reductions is not probable knowl�dge hut a first insight that is
the condition for scimtia. The analysis in De veritate
resolution of knowkdge.
The method Thomas uses in De Vrn/ate
1.1
1.1
is a
is not to be found in
either of the other two basic texts. The fascinating thing about this
text is that
the doctrine of the transcendentals is prepared through a
a defmition is formed from the concept of the genus and of the
reduction to that which is the foundation of knowledge and
be defined to something (hat is more generaJ and hence prior,
Kantian sense, because according to Kant, in transcendental
presents two examples of the need for previous knowledge in
Thomas's Tt!solutio is a going back to that first which is presupposed
difference. One desiring to know what "man" is red uces what is to namely �anjmal." In one of his Quodlibeta (VHf, 2.2) Thomas
investigating what something is. One who would know what
musica is must know beforehand what "art" is and what " singing"
is. The same holds for religious language. We cannot grasp what " charity" (caritas) is (viz., "a gift of God whereby the affect is
united with God") if we have no previous knowledge of what "gift" is, what "affect" is. and what ;ounion" is. Yet the resolution to
what is
previously known cannot proceed
indefinitely. An infinite regress would render th� formalion of
definitions impossible. The reduction of what something is comes to an end in "the first conceptions of the human intellect." which
are th� first because they are no longer understandable from
something else. To these first conceptions all definitions must be
reduced.�o )9
<:,noscenda.s concJusionu". o
Tn Bmlfl.. In tlln. 6.4:
science. This approach could be called "transcendental" in the
science the point is no longer to go forward but to go backward.2�
in all knowledge.
redllcitur in aliqua prima. que quidem humo non habet ne(el>Se addiscere alit inuenire. ne oporteat in infinitum proccdere, &et eorum notitiam naturaliter habet. Ef huiusmodi �unt prindpia rlemomtralionum ;"uelllonstJabilia ( .. .) , d d i am prime concepliones iolelleulIs, III. enlis,
cognosccndum pet $I: nolis ad
·omnl. con.i4eratio Kienliarllffi 'peculOltinarum
N
unius, et hllill�modi. i n
qlle opoTlC'! reduccrc omnts diffiniliones scientiarulll prediclarum.� QuodL VIII. 2.2: -De quibus eoam quid nOll po$SlImus. nisi resolvelldu in aliqua prius nOla; et sic quousque pelVl::niamus uSfl'le ad primas concepliones
siol. scirC'
humani hnt:lleclus. quae
�\Int omnibus n3turaliler nOlae."
�1
L. Oeing·Hanhoff, "Die Methoden der Mctaphysik illl Mindalter". In: Dit Metaphysik: im Mittdaft" (Miscellanea MediaevaUa 2 ) . Berlin 1963, p. 79. Cf. [n Post. Anal.• pro!.: "Per huiusmodi enim proccssIIIll {Jcil. rationis! . quan·
doque quidem, eLSi non fiat sciencia, fit tamen fides ut:! opioio ( ... j CI ad hoc ordinatur topica siue dyaletica". See also id., "Mctaphysik. Thomas von Aquin", in: Historischt� WOneYimcA d" Philo5ophit V, Darlll�'adt 1980, pp. 1 2 2 1·22. L.
Honnefelder concurs with this interpretation:
QuodL VIII, 2.2: "eodem modo prot:edil intellectus ad quiddiulem uni uscuiusque rei, per quem proccdit a prinCipiiS
\
dialectical process, it is not science that is obtained but belief or
De vrntate 1 . 1 is opinion, a knowledge that is dialectically probable
parallelism posited between the order of .scientia and that of forming
\
to Thomas the analysis of concepts belongs to dialectics. Through a
is the
1.1
,
"Ocr lweite Anfang der
Metaphysik. Vorl!.uS&elwngen, AIlS.atze und Folge" der Wiederbegnindung der Metaphysik im 13./14. Jahrhundert", in J. P. Beckmann e. a. (ed.), Phil.,.
wphie j", Mittthdln. £1Itwidlll.lIK3linim uwi Paradi�. Hamburg J987. p. 173. 2:!
Rtjlt.JUonm
1928, p.SO).
tur
Mnaple,Jik. 5075
(Akademie·Ausgabc vol.
XVlII,
Berlin
t
\1
so
81
CHAPTER TWO
THOMAS'S GENERAL ACCOUNT 01<" THE TRANSC.t:ND.t:NTALS
2.2. Thefirst known: Being (ens)
resolving the posterior into the prior. Thomas, however, does not follow Albert's interpretation. The idea that the resolutio of the
But what is the first conception of the human intellect, the end
question concerning what a thing is terminates in "being" as the
term of the resolution? The next passage in De veritate 1 . 1 provides
first conception of the intellect represents for him a change in
the answer:
perspective compared to Aristotle.
That which the intellect first conceives, as best known, and into which it resolves all its conceptions, is being (ens) , as Avicenna says in the beginning of his Metaphysics. �� The thesis that being is the first known we also encountered in Alexander of Hales and Albert the GreaL It is repeated by Thomas at many places in his work.24 We shall return later to the import ant implications of the firstness of being for the doctrine of the transcendentals. Now we want to call attention to a single aspect. From the thesis that being is the first conception, Thomas draws the conclusion that being is the proper object of the intellect, and is thus the primum intelligibile, just as sound is the primum audibile. 25 Sound is the formal aspect on the basis of which something is audible and capable of becoming an object for the sense of hearing. The same relation exists between being and intellect. Being is that on the basis of which things are capable of being known by an intellect, it is the prerequisite condition for every intelligible object, for something is intelligible insofar as it has being. That being is the first known is for Thomas at the same time a fundamental statement on Lhe relation between man and reality. The thesis that "being� is the first conception of the intellect is supported by a reference to the Arabic philosopher Avicenna, and not, as one might have expected, to Aristotle. Albert the Great, in his commentary on the Sentences, had argued
(d. 0.4.)
that the
Philosopher maintains that being and one are before everything, while denying that true and good are dispositions concomitant with being. Albert's explanation was that Aristotle considered being only insofar as the intellect �comes to a stand in it� by 2.'1 De vmt. 1 . 1 : Millud aut�m quod primo intd!ectus concipit quasi notis8i mum et in quod conceptioTles omnes rcso!vit e�t ens, ut Avic�nna dicit in principio suae M�taphysicae�. 24 In I Snit. 8. 1 . 3; D� vml. 2 1 . 1 ; 2 1 . 4 ad 4; De mle, pro!.; De pot. 9. 7 ad 15; ad 8 and 9 (in contL); S. tho I . .'>. 2; 1 1 . 2 ad 4; I-II. 55. 4 ad 1 ; 94. 2; In I Metallh., leet. 2, 46; IV. Icct. 6. 605; X, lect. 4. 1998; XI. !eCL 5. 2 2 1 1 . 2� S. tho I , 5.2: HPrimo aut�m i n conceptione int.elleeuu cadit ens ( . .. ) . Unde em e5t proprium obiectum intelleclIU: 1':1 �ic est primum intelligibile, 81nu .�OIH18 est prirnllm �lUdihile.�
Aristotle deals at length in the Posteriar Analytics with the way in which a definition can be formed of something. The process can not be interminable; the essential predicates of which a definition is constituted are not unlimited. The ascent to the most general predicate terminates in the genera generaliSlima, the categories of being.26 This conclusion is entirely consistent within the horizon of definitional thinking, for being itself is no genus
(d. 2.3.)
and
does not enter into the definition of something. With the thesis that "being" is the first conception of the intellect to which all defini tions must be reduced, Thomas goes a step further than Aristotle, and he is aware of having done so. He refers not to the "Philoso pher" in this context but to Avicenna. This reference is made not only in De veritate 1 . 1 but also in 21.1, and it is implicit, as we shall see, in the first basic text, In I &ntentiarum 8.1.3. We do not find this explicit reference to Avicenna among Thomas's predecessors. It draws attention to the Arabic background of the doctrine of the transcendentals. The text to which Thomas refers, the fifth chapter of the first treatise of Avicenna's Meta
physics, had a decisive influence on a great number of medieval thinkers.27 Upon comparing Thomas's exposition in De veritate 1.1 with Avicenna's account, we discover both similarities and differ ences. The idea with which the argument in De veritate 1 . 1 begins is taken from the Avicenna latinus. The parallelism that Thomas recognizes between the order of demonstration and the order of definition is posited by Avicenna, in order to justify his view that there are primary notions. These notions are "thing" (res) , "being"
(ens) and "the necessary" (necesse) . They are impressed in the soul by a first impression and are not acquired from other and better 26 Anal. Post. I, c. 19-22 (Thomas, !ecl. 31-36). Cf. In I De an" lecL 8: "Diffinitiones edam habent principium et fincm, quia non est ascendere in infinitum in generibus, set aecipitur quasi primum genus generalissimum, nee etiam descendere in infinitum in speciebus, set est stare in specie specialissima�. 27 Cf. E. Gilson. -Avicenna et Ie point de depart de Duns Scot", in: Archivtl d 'HilJoi,-, Doc/rinale ,1 Littmire i dlt Moyen Ag<' 2 (1927), pp. 89-149, esp. 1 07-1 17 .
82
83
CHAPTER TWO
TIIOMAS'S (;i':NERAL ACCOUNT OF THE TRANSCENDENTALS
known nolions. Avicenna argues that just as there are first principles, known through themselves, in the realm of assent (credulitas) , so also in the realm of conception (imaginatio) there are principles that are conceived pt:r Y. If one desires to indicate them to somebody. his doing so would thus not make an unknown thing known, but would merely draw attention to them or bring them to mind through the use of a sign. The position holding that every conception requires a prior conception would lead either to an infinite regress or to circularity. That which is most suited to be conceived through itself is that which is common to all things, as "thing," "being"' and "one. ''is The most striking difference between Thomas's exposition and Avicenna's is that the latter names three primary notions, "thing," "ki ng" and "the necessary," later the trio "thing," "being" and "one." A plurality of "firsts" is also in keeping with the argument with which De veritate 1 . 1 begins, for it speaKS of a resolution into "principles. � Yet Thomas reduces Avicenna's trio to just on� con cept: "being." Nevertheless, there is no absolute opposition here, for later in Dt verilate 1.1 he introduces "thing" and "one." Only Avi cenna's "necessary" is completely ignored by him. In other writ in gs Thomas speaks of "firsts" in the plural: �the first cnnceptions of the intellect, as being and One" (In Boethii De tnnitalt 6.4),
"conceptions known to all, as being. one and th('; good" (Quodlibet VIII, 2,2). In De potentia 9.7 ad 6 he even mentions four prima
211
Aviceona Latious
-
u!;er de philmophirt primtJ .llve sa�!fia divina I, c. 5 (ed.
S. Van Riet) Louvain/Leiden 1977, pp. 31-33: �Dicemus igilur qmxi res el. em
et nen:ne lalia 5Ufi! quod statim imprimuntur in anima prima impreS$ione, qU
(being, one, true and good). But even if Thomas recognizes a plurality of "firsts," "being" clearly has priority: it is the first among equals, the ma;c;me pnmum.1:9 The primacy of being is not upheld, however, in Avicenna's account. Another difference is that Avicl.":nna says that the primary notions "are impressed in the soul by a first impression (impres siont)," while Thomas employs the term conceptio. Avicenna's emationist world-vit":w underlies his terminology; he regards the primary notions as direct emanations from the cosmic Active Intellect. The term "conception," by contrast, expresses the inner activity of the human intellect itself in the forming of the first notions. What the intellect understands is formed in the intellect and, by analogy to "conception� in the realm of natural coming-to be, is called the conception of the intellect.3o The conuptio of being is not elaborated further in De vnitau 1.1. The same holds for the central thesis of this text; Thomas does not advance a single argument for the primacy of heing. In what sense can there be a first among the prima? He says more about this in In J Sententiarum 8.1.3, the hasic text dealing with the order among the divine names. He argues that the names "being," "good.� "one" and "tTue" precede the other divine namel> as far as understanding is concerned. Their firstness follows "from their commonness (communitas) . " He next proceeds to compare these names \",'ith one another in respe([ of their concepts. His argument IS as follows: Considered thus, being is simply and absolutely prior to the others. The reason is that bdn g is included in the concept of lhe others, but nOI convuscly. For the nrst that falls illlo the conception (imlq:ina tiont) of the intellect is being, without which nothing can be apprehended by the intellect. Just a5 the nf5� that falls into the assent ( CTtduLitate) of the intellen are the fint axIOms, and esp eC.ially this one: �contradictories arc not simullaneously l1ue.ft Thus all tJII� other [conceptions) are somehow incllldt:d in being, in a united and indistinct way, as in their principle.S!
9.7 ad 6. Cf. C.omp. ThtoL I, 38, . .. . In / Sm/., 8.1.3: Met sic simpliciter el absolute ens en priUS ahls. CUJus �l . Frimom ralio est. quia eos indudituf io inlellectu corom, d n o,:, e con�rso . cnim quod carlit in irnaKillillione inlellectm, etl ent, sIne (IUod nihIl polest t9
�)
Dt pot.
84
Although Avicenna is not mentioned explicitly, the influence of his Metaphysics upon this text is manifest. That appears not only from the idea of the parallelism between the order of demon stration and that of the concept, but especially also from the terms employed to indicate the two orders, lreaulitas and imaginalio, which are liLerdlly borrowed from the Aviunna latinus.�2 A new element in this text is Thomas's argumentation-very summary though it is-for the primacy of being. Bcing is included in any and everything that anyone apprehends}! The {jrst known is called the best known (notissimum) in De veri taU 1 . 1 . Being is so familiar to us that it usually remains hidden to us (hat human knowledge is principally a conception of being. Only in reHexive analysis, in [he resoiucio, does i( become clear that "without being nothing can be apprehended by the intellect." Being, �thal which is," is the Archimedean point of Thomas's thought. 2.3. The probkm oj the addition 10 king
From the thesis that being is the first known, Thomas imme diately draws a conclusion in De veritate 1 . 1 : "consequently all other conceptions of the intellect must be gained by an addition to �ing." After having followed the way of analysis, the resolutiQ, he now takes the opposite direction. that of "synthesis." Here. how ever, a problem arises: how is an addition to being possible? The wmal modes of addition are inconceivable in this case: Nothing, however, can be added to being as if it were extrinsic
in
the manner
in which
a d ifference
85
THOMAS'S GENERAL ACCOUNT Of TI-fE TRANSCF.NVf:NTALS
CHAPTER TWO
is added to
a
to
genus or
it, an
hane Arabi.:, vacant formalirmem. vel imaginaliunnn per intdkdlun. Aliam vero
ponit, sc.ilicet composilionem e t diyisionem intellectuum. quam Arab« yocant cnduti/fllem vel fidem.·
�� cr. S. tho I-H, 94.2: "Nam iIIud quod primo cadit in apprehentione, Cit
en_, cuitu Intellectu! includitur in omnibus quaecumque quis apprehendit."
subje<:t, because every nature is essentially being. It is for this reason that the Philosopher in Mdaphysics III proves that being cannot be a genus)"
accident to a
The problem that the addition to being poses is in essence the problem of Parmenides: how can being be differentiated? Such a differentiating factor would have to lie outside being, but outside being is nothing. Parmenides's conclusion is therefore that being is one. Against this argument Thomas objects, in his commentary on the Metaphysics, that such a view presupposes that being has one nature and ratio, as if it were a genus. But this view is incorrect since being is not a genus."!i The latter idea is also central in the passage cited from D� veritate 1.1. Aristotle develops the thesis that being is no genus in a discussion of the Platonists in the third book of his Metaphysics (c. 3, 998b 17�28), the book of the apmies. The seventh aporia concerns the question whether the first genera are the principles of things. If the highest genera are principles, then that holds especially for being and one, for according to the Platonists they are the commu nis.sima; they are predicated of all things. Bur Aristotle argues that it is impossible that being and one be genera. The core of his argument is that if "being" were a genus (and the same is true for "one"), a difference would have to be found which would restrict being to its various species. But no difference participates in the essence of a genus, for then a genus would be twice included in the definition of the species. A difference is outside the essence of a genus. There is, however, no difference at all to be found that would be outside of being, for what is outside of being is nothing, and non-being cannot be a difference. Therefore being cannot be a genus.36 Pierre Aubenque claims that Aristotle's argument is purely negative in character. The thesis thal being is not a genus t:xpresses that the universality of being is empty and contributes H
De vmt. 1 . 1 : MScd enti non potest addi aliquid quasi elilranea, per
modum quo differentia additur generi, vel accidens subiecto, quia quaelibet
natura euentialiter est en.; unde probat eliam Philosophm in III Mflaph,J. quod ens non pOlellt e!IK genus.�
!! 111 I Mlf4pA, leet. 9, 139: "Scd in hoc dccipiew.ntur, quia utlebantur Ientle qu»i una ratione et una natura lieul elt natura alicuiw generia; hoc enim ell iffiftotalbile. En. culm non Ctt genul, lied multlpllclter dicltur de dlverllil" II In JJJ MdlI�., lect. 8, 4SS; ScG. I, 25; S,IA. I, S.5; 111 V M"apA., lect. 9, 889.
cr. R.
Mcinerny, Sif4.", In
AuIoc, Thle H..ue
1988, pp. 44-50.
.
.
.._-
-
-.-
86
.\
I
CHAM'ER TWO
nothing to the definition of something. "Being" is a sign of poverty, it is not rom a genus. Aubenque therefore rejects Thomas's positive interpretation of the thesis in Dt veritate 1 . 1 according to which being is not a genus because no difference can be added to it; being includes all differences: "every nature is essentially being."37 In order to understand Thomas's interpretation, it is important to recall that his perspective in De vrntate 1 . 1 is different from Aristotle's. His concern is the resolution of intellectual knowledge into something first. The first conception of the intellect is being; "all the other conceptions are somehow included in being. united ly and indistinctly" (In I Sententiarum 8.1.3). Thomas sometimes calls being a genus in the broad sense, since it bears a cc,.tain resemblance to a genus because of its commonness (communitas) , In the strict sense, however, being is no genus but belongs to the tTansctmde1ltia.'� Thus Aristotle's propos�tion that being is no genus formulates in a negative way the special generality of being which Thomas expresses positively through the transcendentaHty or being. But how then can something be added to being? The lhird basic text, De vtritate 21.1 ("Docs good add-something 10 being?"), commences with a systematic analysis of this problem. Three ways are distinguished in which something can be added to something else. (i) Something adds a certain reality which is outside the essence of the thing to which it is added. An example or this mode is the addition of the accident "'white" to "body." (ii) Something adds by contracting and determining (per modum con trahendi el dettrminandt) something else. For instance, "man" adds something to "animal," but llot in the sense that there is in "man" any reality altogether outside the essence of "animal." �Animal" is contracted by this mode of addition, because what is contained determinately and actually in the concept of "man" is cOlllained implicitly and, as it were, potentially in the concept of '"animal." (iii) Something adds something purely in rcason, as in the case of the addition of "blind" to "man." What is added, blindness, is not a P. Aubenque, u problim, de l'ilY� chez Amlo/e. ESJai Jur Ia problimatiqu., ariJtoltliriro1it, Paris 1962, pp. 229-32. !.II /" II Smt., 34.1.2 atl I: �3i(. n eque bonum neque maluUl sum genera, sed �7
.sunt in tran!K-endent ibus quia bonum el ens COnVCf(Untllr.·
Cf. lk "",10 1.1 ad 11: ·proltt genu, did pOlest id quod genera trunsccndit, sicut ens et u ntlm � /J1 IV Mela�ll.. leu. 4, 583� IJ1 X MdRpll., lett . B, 2092': �Sed eSI qU3.'ii genus, q uia . habet ahqll\d de rauone generi!, inquantum elt comnlllni5.M "
,
TIIOMAS'S GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE TRANI;CENDENTALS
87
real nature but only a being of reason, namely a privation, a lack in the real order. By this addition the concept of "man" is contracted since not all men are blind.39 The question now becomes which of these modes can be involved in an addition to "universal being" ( ens univenfJle) . The first mode, the addition of something ,.eal, is excluded, since there is no natural thing which is "outside the essence of universal being. � Of course, something can be added to some particular being in this mode. In the second mode, the addition by contracting and determining, there are certain things that add to being, because being is contracted by the ten categories (grnera) . Each of the categories adds something to being, fo,. they signify a determinate mode of being. The discussion of the third mode, the addition of something purely conceptual, is focussed in De veri/au 2 1 . 1 on the addition of good to being. Good cannot add something to being in the second way of addition, because the good is, as being, divided into the ten categories and it must therefore: ado something merely conceptual 10 being ..w In the course of Thomas's discussion it gradually becomes dearer bow a further determination of the conception of "being" by means of an addition is possible. Being cannot be differentiated by something lying outside of being, for being excludes nothing. A fur-ther determination of being is only possible as an expression or explication of what is contained in !x-ing in an implicit and indcfmi[e way. This inner explication is formulated carefully by Thomas in De veritate 1.1. �y
D, vtril. 21.1,
in particular: �tripliciter pOlCSI aliquirl super alterum arlrlere: unu modo q uod addat aliquam rem quae sit extrd e�sentiam illius rei (ui dicitur addl (n.). Alio modo dicitur aliquid addere super alterum per modllm fontrahcndi et determinandi ( .. , ) . Tenia modo didtur aliq uid addere super ,,1(eOlln secundum ratiom:m lantum. q uan do �ilicel ali
See
88
CHAPTER TWO
THOMAS'S GENERAL ACCOUNT OF
Other concepts can add something to being only in the sense
in something else
term "being" itself. The crucial notion that Thomas introduces
of being.
modus essendi.
TRANSCENDENTAL"
89
is characteristic of the other categories that they have being only
that they express a mode of being that is not yet expressed by the here is
THE
(in alia) .
They express diverse accidental modes
In two places in his work, in his commentary on the
The determination of being does not occur
Meta
and in that on the Physics, Thomas presents a kind of
through external differentiations but through its inner modes. The
physics
addition to being is a
This explication can come
"deduction" and philosophical justification of the categories.44 In
special
both texts he derives the categorial modes of being by appealing to
mode of being. This corresponds with the second mode of addition
the diverse modes of predication. The first text comments on
2 1 . 1 , for being is in this way contracted and deter
Aristotle's division of being existing outside the mind into the
mode
categories. Thomas explains this division and observes, as he does
modal explication.
about in two ways. One is that the mode expressed is some in
De veritate
mined. The other is that the mode expressed is a
general
consequent to every being, a way that must correspond with the third mode of addition in
De veritate 2 1 . 1 .41
in
De veritate
1 . 1 , that being cannot be contracted into something
In this case something
determinate in the way that a genus is contracted to species
is explicated that belongs to being as such. Both modal explications
through differences, for being is not a genus. Being is therefore
demand closer scrutiny.
contracted to its diverse genera according to the different modes of predication. The justification for this procedure is that the modes of predication are dependent on the modes of being, "they follow
2.4.
Explication of the special modes of being: The categories
upon different modes of being." In whatsoever ways being is predicated, in so many ways something is signified to be.4� The
Physics.
The explication of the special modes of being occurs in and
same idea is advanced in the commentary on the
through
ten highest genera, which Aristotle called the
divided into the ten predicaments according to diverse modes of
categories. They form the first determinations of being, for the
being. These modes of being are proportional to the modes of
De veritate
predication. For when we predicate something of something else,
1 . 1 Thomas emphasizes the ontological character of these highest
we say that the latter is the former. That also accounts for the fact
genera. Being is found in "different degrees of entity" to which
that the ten genera into which being
different modes of being correspond. From these modes the
"predicaments. "46
the
categories contract being to some nature or essence.42 In
Being is
lS first divided are called
different genera of things are taken. He works this out only for
The categories cannot be reduced to each other; they each
substance, the first category. The special mode of being that is
express a distinct mode of being. Neither are they reducible to a
expressed by the name "substance" is subsistent being, being
generic principle above the categories, some "supercategory,"
through itself (per se) .4� He leaves it to the reader to conclude that it
hecause there is not a common genus of all predicaments.47 The categories do not add an extrinsic difference to being but contract
41
Illid. 1 . 1 : "��d secundum hoc aliqua dicuntur adder� super �ns in
{luantum �xprim\lnt modum ipsius entis qui nomin� entis non exprimitur, quod duplicit�r contingi!. Uno modo ut modus expressus sit aliquis sp�cialis modm entis { ... } . Alio modo ita quod modus expressus sit modus generalis consequem omn� �ns�. C. f·abro, "The Transc�ndcntality of Ens·Esse". p. 409. claims that the tint addition is Aristotelian, the s�cond Platonic or N� latonic. The latter claim does nOl seem to me to be correct. 4 Cf. S.th. I, 5.3 ad l. 4� De verit. 1 . 1 : "Uno modo ut modus expressus sit aliquis sp�cialis modlts �nti�; sunt enim div�r5i gradus entitatis secundum quos accipiuntur div�rsi modi essendi et iuxta ho� modos accipiuntur diversa rerum genera: substantia enim non addit super ens aliquam differentiam quae designet aliquam naturam superaddilam enti sed nomine substantia� exprimitur specialis quidalll modus (,I�endi, scilicet per Sf' ens, et ita est in alii� gen�ribus."
�
it. Being is at once and fwm the very beginning
(a principio),
44
Cf. J. F. Wippd, "Thomas Aquinas's Derivation of the Aristotelian Categories (Predic.am�n15)", in: J"umal oj the History of Phi!oJ&jJh)" 25 (1987), pp.
1 3-34. 4.� In. V Metaph., \ect. 9, 889: "Sciendum �st enim quod ens non porest hoc
modo conrrahi ad aliquid det�rminatum, skut genus contrahitur ad sp�ci�s per diH·erentias"; 890: "Unde oportet, quod ens contrahatur ad diversa genera secundum diversum modulll praedicandi, qui consequitur div�rsum modum essendi; quia 'quoties ens dicitur', idest quot modis aliquid pracdicatur, 'tnrjes ess� significatur', id�st tot modis significatur aliquid ess�." H, In lfl Ph,s., lerl. 5, 322. -17 In V MfJaph., \eel. 22, 1 126.
90
CHAPTER TWO
THOMAS'S GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THF. TRANSCENOENTALS
substance or quantity or quality-,'IR Iking cannot be separated from its modes. Therefor�. it is said "in many ways"
dicitu�.
certain unity. Being is predicated of substance and accident not univocally, as a genus is predicated of its species. nor equivocally, but
stcundum prius et postmus.
The "homonym( of being dis
covered by Aristotle is elaborated by Thomas, as we wiJI see (3.5.), in the notion of "analogy." Being is said "analogously" of sub stance and accident., which is 10 say according to the relation to one thing in which the
ratio
of being is found primarily and
perfectly. The focal meaning of being is substance. which is
ens
pt"r se. Being is said in a secondary reiipect of an accident, for this is an ens in alio.49 The notion of analogy does not occur in any of our three basic texts. That. is scriking because an aspect of the special generality of being is brought to expression through this notion. There is an intrinsic connection between the claims that being is not a genus, that it is transcendental and that it is analogously predicable.:.u Thomas's first modal explication of being incorporales a central doctrine of Aristotle's
Metaphysics.
Although being is no genus, it
can be divided into the genera of substance and accidents, which order the multiplicity of the real. Yet Thomas sets the doctrine of the categories in a specific framework that is not found in the Philosopher. The ctlegorics express most general genera
contract being.
special
2.5. Explication of tIlL genernl modes of bdng: TIlL lranscendenlals
(t'nJ multipLicitn
Yet there exists in the multiplicity of categoria1 modes of being a
modes of being, the
These insights prepare the next
step in the modal explication of being.
91
The explication of being can also, we are told in concern a
modus generalis consequem omne ens.
De Tlmtate 1 . 1 ,
Thomas has arrived
at the goal at which his entire preceding exposition aimed, namely the doctrine of the transcendentals. He does not render account of this renewal of metaphysical thought, but goes on immediatdy with the derivation of the modes of being belonging to every being (see
2.6.). Yet it is useful
LO
dwell on two general
aspects of this doctrine, the notion of transcendentality and the pmblem of the addition at the transcendental level. (i) The semantics of the terms that express a general mode of being is varied in Thomas's works. From the perspective of the
prima
resolution of knowledge they arc called the
or "first con
ceptions of the intellect." Considered from their extension, they are the
maxime communia,
common to all things.SI More often than his
predecessors, Thomas uses the word
lran.scmdentia,
although by no
means frequently. This term is not used in the three basic texts, but
it does appear later in De vmlale (21.3). In the technical philoso phical sense that the term
transcendens
acquired in the thirteenth
century, it occurs fourteen times in Thomas's work. Strikingly, half of these loci are concerned with "multitude"
(multitudo) .��
In the history of philosophy, the phrase "transcendental" has become the key term for a certain way of thinking and philoso
transcendens was
phizing. We observed, however, that the term
not
a common one in the thirteenth century. The characterization of the medieval notion of transcendentality as distinct from the modern notion must therdore not be based exclusively on an
analysis of this term. Equally important for understanding the 48 In VIII Mt
modo se habeant ex additione ad ens, sicut species �e hal>enl ell additione different.iarum ad genera. sed hoc ipsutn quod est ens, manifenum est quod ens non expectat aliquid addillLrn ad hoc quod fiat hoc, idest substantia, vel quantum, vel quale; sed 5t.11im a prinripia e�t vel substantia, vel quan!i!..." vel qualitas. " 49 cr. De prine. nat., c.. 6. See on lhl': mlio communis of the analogolls name: R. Mclnerny, Studit.! in Analo;c. plJ. 1-66. .�() This connection is, however, indkaled ill De natura gt,lms c. I (rondu �ion): -EI ideo ens genus non eu. sed e!t de omnibus communiter pn:di(abile analogice. Similiter dicendurn est de aliis -Irnnscen
medieval notion is the cognitive aspect of the the new philosophical term
transcendens
prima.
Yet the rise of
is significant. The phrase
suggests a surpassing, and in this surpassing the distinctive nature of the medieva,l transcendental way of thought becomes evident. 51 In De htMom., lecl. 2: "ea autem que in ImelleclU omnium cadunt sunt maxime o;:ommunia, que �unt ens., unum et bonum-. 52 Bc:sidc:s Dt WIll. 21.!I theM: text:! arc: If! I Strtl 2. I. 5 ad 2 ( ,-",) ; If! 11 Sinl., M. I. 2 ad 1 (boll"'''' d lIIlm li"' ); S. IA. I. �. 3 (!:Wice mw/iludo). ad ] (UflU1>l) . and ad 2 (mulliludo); S. th. I, 39. 3 ad 3 (rtJ); S. th. I, 50. !I ad 1 (,",ulti/udo): s. til. 1. 93. 9 (unu,"); ih Jpiril. emU. 8 ad 15 (1IIIfUillfdo); In JJ/ Ph,s.. leo;:t. 8 (1IIIfltlfudo); leci. 12 (",vUi/vdo); lh 1Jirl, W"'1Il. 2 ad 8. .•
92
93
CIiAPTEk TWO
THOMAS'S GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE TRANSGENOt:NTAI.S
Even if all transcendental philosophies agree with one another in that they reflect on a surpassing, they differ from one another in the naQlre and direction of this transcending movemcnt,·�� In a passage in De ovitall' Dei that was incorporated by Peter Lombard into his Sentmces (I, rlist. 3), Augustine expressly uses the verb "transcend" to charac.;terizc the purport of Platonic philosophy: "the highest philosophers understood lh� In Thomas's work the verb transcendne and its participle lranscendnlS occur regularly ill the Augustinian sense of "surpass." What is surpassed can be the domain of the material or lhe human; what surpasses is the spiritual or the divine. We mention some examples. The imelleuivc soul is a form that transcends (forma transcendens) the capacity of the body (De spiritualibus creatuns 9.3); the divine being (esse) �transcends" (transcendil) our way of understanding (In De causil', lect. 6); the divine good "transcends" the limits of the human nature (Summa theo[ogiae I-II, 56.6); there are two rules of human action: the one rule is connatural and proper to man; the other and primary rule is a mensura tmnsunciens, namely God (De virtutilrns cardinalibus, 2). Now what is the nature of the transcending that is expressed by the term tTanscendlms in ils Hew philosophical sense? Typical of the medieval notion of transcendentality is that what is surpassed are (he ca(egories.s.� While ill Kant the transcendental is concerned with the categories of reason, transcendental in the Scholastic sense is opposed to the categorial. This oppo�ition i� clearer in Thomas's stTUuuring of the modal explication of being in De veritate 1.1 th:an it is in any other thirteenth-century a\lthor.
The explication occurs in two directions: on the one hand, through the particular, categadal modes of being and, on the other hand, through the general modes of heing. The emergence of the term tmnscendffl.t in the thirteenth century bespeaks a philosophical reflection that is aware of its going further than the Aristotelian doctrine of the categories of being. Tr.mscendentals transcend the categories, lIamely. in the direction of heing ill general. For the correct understanding of this transcending movement, however, an important qualification is needed. The tran�cendentals tran scend the categories not in the sense that they signify a separate reality "heyond" the categories. The origin of the term transcendtms is not the Platonic-Augustinian ascent to God.�e Transcendentals surpass the categories because they run through all of them. They are not restricted to one or the categories but are common to them. This is expressed in the striking formulation: C ) in transcendentilnts, quae circumeunt omne fflJ.57
53
Sec the comparati\le 5fudy of Kant and Thomall's De vmlale 1 . 1 by N.
Hinske, "Vcrlchiedenhdt und Einhdt der tranuendentalen Philosophicn", in: Arcfliv fi ir BtgriJ J JgtJchichlt 14 (1970), p.
.•.
(li) Because transcendentals do not contract being but arc coexten sive with it, the problem of the addition to being becomes particu larly acute at this level. This problem i.� the cardinal question in Thomas's doctrine of transcendentals. He devotes much attention to it in his treatment of each of the transcendcntals. The most telling example is his extensive discussion in the third basic text. Question 2 1 of De veritate deals with the good (De bono) ; immediately in article 1 it is asked whether good adds something to being. In this text the dilemma to which reflection upon this addition leads is made perfectly clear. Either good adds something to beiIlg by contracting and determining it. in which case the good loses ils transcendental character and is no longer coextensive with being; or good adds nothing to being, in which case il would be a useless repetition of the same (nugalorie) to speak of "good being." Both alternatives are unacceptable. Thomas seeks a solution ill a purdy
44.
Peter Lombard, Sent. 1. d. 3: " UI enim Augustinus ail in libro Dt dfJitatt �tj (VIII. C. 6), 'Viderunt summi philosophi nullum corpus Deum C3�e; et
54
Ideo cuncla (oq>ora tranS(e(JderUllt, quaerenles Dcum. Viderunl eOam quid.
quid mUlabile est non esse summum DeUIll, omnlumque principium; et ideo omnem animam. mutabile�que spiritus transcenderunt.'." On Augustine'S use of "transcend," cr. N. Fischer. "Transzendiercn und Trannendenz in Augus tIns CAmJtsSir)1leJ�, in: L Honnefdder und W. SchuOler (cds.) , Tra,uu"d,n:,
Zu tiPUlft Grltndwarl lkr il4uiselun MdapIryJil, Pade-rOOrn 1992, pp. 1 1 5-136. �s cr. In II Se-nr., 27.1.2 obj. 2: "bonum transcendi! genu� qlla]jtatis",
•
.�(; Cuntra H, Knitterme-ye-r, Vn TUfiflinw 'Irll,U!undtfllal' in 5elnn' hi..lori· It:hen Enlwiddung bu Kant, pp. 8-9. U. K. lkirthlein, Dit TTannendt1ltalienkh,., dtr allen OntalaKit.
New York keil."
1972.
I:
Di� TrfJ!1.JundmlaliNlklm im Cmpu.., t\ristottliCl4m, Berlin
p. 2011. who 5peak� of an "in strenger Kategorienjenseilig
.� 7 n, uirl. cOtnIl1. 2 ad 8. cr. In X Mrlapli.,
lect.
j. 197�:
�Unlllll ("nn�elluitur
onlnia alia prae-dlcamenta e-I non ('.1 in alill'lO uno pnll:llinullenlo lantlml�: /n I F;lhi�., len. 6, II I .
94
95
CIIA»"f'l;R 'TWO
THOMAS'S GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE TItANSCE.NDENTALS
conceptual addition-it is the third way of addition, which is
signific�tion the essence of man as such. The ratio is usually
distinguished in this text (see 2.3.). What good adds to being is
identical with the definition (ratio enim quam significat nomen est
mtiunis tantum..'iR
In the second basic text, De veritale
de/initio) .53 Thomas's recognition that the first term is more com�
1.1.
the problem of the
prehensive is important for the theme of the transcendentals. Even something that cannot
addition is an issue especially in the objections. The question
be defmed, like the genera Kl!nemlissima, has
a ratio, whic h is signilied by the name of that thing.&I
"What is truth?" does not have the usual yes-no form of the qlUUstiQ
disputata, but from the objections it appears lhal the question actual·
This semantic model plays a central role in Thomas's work.
ly disputed is "whether truth is altogether the same as being."
The most striking example is an extensive quaestio in his cam men·
After seven objections supporting the idea that what is true is
tary on the first book of the Stnlencts (2.1.3.). which A. Dondaine
altogether identical with being. there follow fLve contrary argu
has shown to have been inserted by Thomas into the commentary
ments claiming that they are realty distinct. Otherwise it would be
nugatory to say "true being. "59 In his reply
lO the
at a later date. In this question Thomas wants to make clear that the
many attribules ascribed to God, such as wisdom and goodness. are
first contrary
in God one in re, bUl different in concept (ratione) . To this end he
argument, Thomas SLresses that it is not n:dundan t to speak of "true
discusses at length the relations between nomen, ratio and res. That
bt-:ing." The reason for this is not, however, lh,u the true and being differ in reality (in Te) , but that something is expressed by the name (nomen) "true" which is not expressed by the name �being."6() That
Thomas attaches great value to this discussion appears from his
is also the heart of the argumem in the body of art,
depends almost entirely on the understanding of these relations. 6�
1.1:
remark that the understanding of what is said in the first book
the other
The lriad nomen-ratio-res is also the model according to which Thomas considers the identity and the difference betwccn the transcendentals. But he adds to the Aristotelian model an element
transcendentals express a mode of being that is not expressed by the name (nomen) being itsdf.
]f we put together the key notions from De veritate
21.1 and 1.1,
semantic model that Aristotle developed in the beginning of the
which is prominent in medieval terminist logic. Thomas himself emphasiz"es that "concerning the properties of speech, attention
signify things immediately, but through the conception of the::
should be given not only to the thing signified (res signijicata), but also to the mode of signifying (modus jigni}iumdi) ," For instance,
intdlect.61 Words signify thi ngs according to the way they are
the name "man" signifies the essence of man, but it signifies
understood by the intellect. What the illtellect conceives of the
human nature in a sUPPosit,fif> The mode of signification of "man" is concrete: it signifies the common form or nature in a suppositum.
immediately,t\� The name �man," for example, expresses by ilS
The concrete term can therefore "supposil" or stand for everything
we get the triad: nomen-ratio-res. In this triad we recognize the
Perihtrmeneiaj ( l 6a 3). The core of this model is that words do not
thing is referred to as the ratio, which is signified by the name
contained under that nature.
.�8 Dt vtril. 2 1 . 1 : "Et id�o op.:mel quod \'�l nihil adda! super em vd addal aliquid quod sit in ratione tantum; si enilll adden:t aliquid reale oponerel quod per rationem boni contraherelllT ens ad aliquod speciale gen ..�. Cum amem ens sit id quod primo cadit in eonccptione inteilectU!, Ul Aviccnna dicit, oportet quod omn� aliud nomen vel sit synonymum coti, quod d� bono did non potesl CUIlI non nugatorie dicatur I'IlS bonum, vel addat aliquid ad minus s�cundum ralionem: et sic aporto::t quod bonum ex quo 1l01l contrahit ens addat aliquid super ens quad sit Talionis tantUIlI."' .'\\1 Ibid. 1 . 1 , sed contra I : ·'Nugalio est ei\l�dem inutilis repelitio'; .•j ergo \leTlLm UKI idem quod �ns, e!iH:l nugatio dum dicilUr ens verum, quod falsum eu; ergo non sunt idem. � flO Ibid. 1 . 1 ad J (in contr.). 61 Cr. In I Prrih., lect. 2, 5. 62 S.lh. 1, J.5.4: ·Ralio enim quam significal nomen, est conceptio inte l lerhll d� Te 8ignlnr"'ta p�r lIom�n.·
Thomas's most complete analysis of the relations between the:: tr.mscendentals co m es not in the expositions in De veritate, but rather in the first basic text, tbe commentary on the finit book of the
Sentences (S. 1 . 3) . lt compares the names "being," "good," "one� and "true" with each other in two ways, which make explicit the
63 S.lh. I, 13.1. Cf. In IV Md/Jph., lec:t, if., 733. 61 In I Snll., 2.1.3. 6!> lind. 2.1.3: ·ex hoc pendel fere tOlUS inidleClU5 eorum quae in 1 libro dicunlur·. cr. A. Dondaine, ·Sainl Thomas et la dispul� des altriblils divin$-, in: Af"chivum fra1rum pmediClilarum 8 (19:58), pp. 253-62. fi6 S.lh. 1, 39. 4.
I
96
CHAPTER TWO
THOMAS'!,: GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE TRANSCENDENTALS
twofold relation among the transcendentals first formulated by
97
the extension of their supposits is the same. That which is being is
Philip the Chancellor. First, the names can be compared sl!cundum
good, and that which is good is being.
each other, being identical in the supposit, and they never leave
importance for the second comparison between the transcendental
suppositum; win this way they are convertible (conveTtunlur) with
This distinction
between
the types of convertibility is of
one another."(01 The real identity hetween the transcendcntals is
names, made in In I SentenlwrUln
monness. In contrast to the categories, me transcenclentals do not
emphasizes that intenlia ill this. context has the same meaning as
transcendentals are identical in supposito, Thomas also employs the
between the transcendental names, because "one," "true" and
theologiae 11·[(' 109.2 ad 1) and "are identical secundum 1'em � (c.g., Summa lheuWgiaei. 5.1).
s.cendeO(ai terms are convertible, they are not on that account
each other, that of signification and that of predication. The former
Philosophy of the Ancients" by suggesting in his Critique of PuTe
expressed by their convertibility. which results from their com
exclude but include one another. In addition to the phrase that expressions that they Ware convertihle in subjecto" (e.g., Summa
8.1.3.
"Being," "good," "one," and
"true� can be compared in respect of their intenliones. Thomas
ratio.7'l Considered in respect of their concepts, there is a difference
"good" add something conceptually to "bcing . " n Although trao
synonyms, for synonyms signify the same thing according to the
In these formulations two different modcl.� are connected with
same rlltio.7� Kant radically misunderstood "The Transcendental
model concerns the semantic relation of nomen and res and the
Reason (B 1 1 3) that the Scholastic thesis: quodlibet ens est unum, verum, bonum is tautologicaL Again and again the thinkers of the thirteenth century emphasize that it is no tlugatio, no useless
mode of signifying something as a supposilum; the latter model
concerns the relation of suhject and predicate in a proposition. Now in every predication, even in predication
per accidens
(e.g., "a man is
repetition of the same, to say that being is one, true and good. The
white") , there is an identity in the subject or supposiLfiII This exter·
other transcendentals explicate conceptually what being is. This
dentals arc identical in lupposito. The nature of their identity
the transcendentals.
nal identily is obviously not meant when it is said that transccn
appears from their converlibk predication.69 But convertibility has
two forms. Some terms are convertible because they are synony·
explication forms the basis for Thomas's derivation and ordering of
mous, such as "tunic� and "garmenl." Other terms arc convertible
2.6. The derivation oj the transunlkntals
in the subject or supposit. That is the case wilh the transcendental
In all three basic texls Thomas presents a derivation of the
not because they are synonymous hut because they are identical
names.70 The distinction between the two types of convertibility is
transcendentals, an account of how ens is determined by the other
subject-terms are taken malerialiter, that is, a� referring to the supposit, predicates, by contrast, j()1"11Ialiter, that is, as referring to the
tion" by modern historians Oil analogy to Kant's deduction of the
based on a general rule of the theory of predication, namely, that
nature signifled.71 The identity of the tran�cendeJltals is material:
communia, His systematization in De veri/ate 1 . 1 is called a "deduc·
afniori conccp ts.7.� Rut Thomas's account never claims thal the
neces..�ity of the series of first concepts call be shown exclusively
on the basis of the logical functions of reason. We shall consider
6 7 In I
Simi., 8.1.3: "et �ic convenuntur ad invicem, et slInt idem in sU�r'sito, nee ullquam derclinquullt se" 6Y
Cf. S.Ih. I, 13.12.
Thomas relates convertibility to predication. See Dt vn1t. 1 . 2 obj. 2: �converti enim Nt (onversirn praedicari". 70 Cf. 111 IV Mdaph..., leet. 2. 548. 11 S./h. 1 11, 16.7 ad 4: "Ierminlls in $ubiecto p<>sims lenuur maH:rialilcr, ides! pro supp<»i!o: posiUls vero in praedic;uo, (enCI.ur tormali(er, idesl pro natura �ilCnjfie:lla." S.lh. I, 13. 12 . r::£. S.lh. 11·11, 47.4; "Bonum a.utem pote�1 did duplirher: unn mudo, materialiter, pro eo quod e�l bonum; alio modo. formnliler, 81wllndum ralionenl hOll;."
72 De lIef"!t. 2 1 .3 ad 5: "rum :totem comparamus iTnentionem boni et veri, intentio 5umitur pro ratione qmlm 5ignificat diffinit.io". 73 111 I .St-nt., 8.1.3: "Atia (. .. ) addunt !Ilper em, non qllidell1 nll.lIIr:l.Irl a1i�uam. sed ralionem�. 4 Dt: /H>I. 9.7 :td 13: uunum ('I I;:IIS eonvl;:r!unlllr secundum Sllppo.�it3; �d (;lmen unum andi! �e(undum r:lliQnem, priV3UOllell1 divisionis; el propter hoc non $"1"1[ $ynonyma, quia synonytlla sun! quae significa.nt idem sccIlndum rationem eaOldem." 7� cr. S. Breton, "L'id�e d� Iran�rendanlal", p. 57.
98
Thomas splits this description into two parlS and reserves the last
Thomas's derivations one after the other and then determine the
part for the content of aliquid: "being is called
similarities and differences among them. in
In addition to this mode there is a more positive relational mode
De veritate 1 . 1 is carefully structured. Thomas's primary order
of being, namely, Ute conformity
ing principle is that the expressed mode of being pertains either to
(in se) or in rclation to something else (in ordim: ad afiud) .76 The first group of transcendentals is further
(De atllma TlI,
8, 43th 2])
in a sense all thillgs. "1!1 This conformity can be
Positively it can be said of every being that
explication and consequence of the
it has a certain content, an essence, and this is expressed by the
seen
it �is
as an
resolutio to a first conception.
Reing is the first known. which means it is the proper object of the
(res) . The distinction between "beingK and �rhing" ens is derived [rom the aCl of being (actus e.urndt) while the name res expresses the quiddity or essence of something. name " thing"
intellect. When Thomas now states that the soul has an openness
is that lhe name
to all that is, then a "conformity" hetween spirit and being is expressed that was already implicit in the thesis that being is the
It is not until (his point thai Thomas indicates summarily what he
first known. This conformity is twofold, for in the soul there is
ratio of being; through the act of esse something is being (ens) and is so called. Negatively it can be said of every being
regards as the
both a cognitive faculty and an appetitive faculty. The conformity
of being to the appetite is expressed by the name "good," it,>
undivided. This mode of being is expressed by the name
conformity to the intellect by the name "true."�() With that, the
(unum), [or Olle is nothing other than undivided being {ens indivisv.I11}.77
"one"
to
suited hy nature to conform to every being. The human soul is such an entity; according to Aristotle
subdivided, since something can be affirmed and denied of every
is
(cllnveniffltia) of one being
another. The condition for such a rdation is solla:thing that is
e .... el1' being in itself
that it
�Qmdhing insofar as it
is divided from olhers."78
The exposition of the general modes consequent 011 every being
being regarded in itself.
99
THOMAS 'S GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE TRANSCF.NDENTALS
CHAPTER TWO
derivation of the transcendent.'lls is completed; Ihe remainder of the argument focusses on the definition of "truth."
With respect (0 tbe second group of u-anscendentals, the relation
Thomas's systematization of the general modes of being in
al ones, Thomas again introduces a subdivision. The relation of
veri.tate
one being to another can be regarded nrst of all according to their
L]
De
can be summari1.ed schematically as follows:
(uctmdum divisionem) . This aspect is expressed by the (aliquid) , a name that means literally "another whac� (qu
division
transcendental "something" I
by Thomas with the second of the two phrases Alexander of Hales and Albert the Great offer
:as
expressing the content of the concept
"one:" "being undivided in itself and divided from others,
�
76 H. Seidl, �Die aristotdischen Qudlen zur Tr.mszendenta1ien-Au£Stel lung bei Thom3S von Aquin, De veritate, q . I , an. r. 11\: Phitosophi5Chu
7S Ibid. 1 . 1 : �Si autem modus enti! accipialuT senllldo modo. scilicet secundum ardintm unill3 ad alterum. hoc. polest esse dupliciter. Uno modo
Jahrbuch 80 (1973), pp. 166-71. maintains lhat the identity and the difference of the transcendentals with respeCt to being an: the criteria for their order
sc:cun
ing. But �his interpretation Sf:ems mistaken, for the identity suulldttm r�", and the difference smmduIII mlionem are characteristic for all transcendentals in eneral and precede their division.
dieitur enim allquid quasi aliud quid, lllllie sinH ens diciwr unum in quan tum e�t indiviSlim in �e ita dicitllf aliquid in quantum est ab aliis divisum." Ibid. 1 . 1 : "Alio modo secundum convenientlam ullius entis ad aliud, CI.
;;
79
Dt umt. 1 . 1 : �Si primo modo, hO(: e51 dupliciter quia vel exprimiUIT in e�te a.liquid affirmative vel negative; non autem i"veniulr aliquid affirmative
hoc quidem non polut esse nisi ac.r.ipiatur aliquid quod nalum sit convenire
cum omni enle: hoc tiUlem en anima, quae 'quodam modo en omnia'. Ul
dictum absolute quod possit aceipi in anini cnle nisi essentla eius secundum quam esse dicitur. et sic imponilur hoc nomen res. quod in hoc differt ab ent;(:. secundum Avicennam in principia Metaphysicae, quod en:!> 5umitur ab actu emndi sc:d nomen rei exprimit quiditatem vel cssentiam entis; negatio
didtllf in III De anima". so Ibid. 1 . 1 : �in anima aulem en vis eognitiv.a el appctitiva; cOl1vtnientiam ergo tnth ad appetiluill exprimit hoc nomen bonum, lit i n principio Ethicorum dicitur quod 'bonum en quod omnia appelllnt', convenientiam vero
autem consequens omne ens absolute Cit indivisio, et hanc exprimit hoc
en tis ad inlellectum c:xprlmil hoc nomen vcrum.·
nomen unum: nIhil aliud enim e.t unlllli quam ens indiviSlIlII.·
j
100
THOMAS'S GENERAL ACCOUNT
CHAPTER TWO
r
every be ing in itself
[
every being in relation to
something else
affirmative : res
l
ne gative :
TRANSCENDENTAL'>
101
to be considered: the intellig ible character of its species (ipsam mtionem speciei) and the very act of being (ipsum esse) by which it subsists in that species. Tb us a being can be perfective in two ways. (i) It can be perfective only according to its species. In this way the intellect is perfected, for a being is not in the intellect according to its own, natural existence, but in a spiritual manner. It is this mode of perfecting that "the true" adds to being. (ii) A being can be perfective of another not only according to the intelligible aspect of its species, but also according to the act of being (esse) which it has in reality. This mode of perfecting is expressed by "the good," for whereas truth is in the mind the good is in things.84 Thomas's derivation of the transcendentals in De veritate 2 1 . 1 can be presented schematically as follows: Now, in any being two aspects are
unum
according to division: aliquid
according to conformity to the soul: to the in tellect:
OF THE
verum
to the appetite: bonum
,
The derivation of
somewhat
transcendentals in
different character
the argument
case
the
that
the
only
than
article
ha5 a
1 . 1 . It is preceded by
that is possible in the addition secundum rationem. The
addition to being
of transcendelll als is an
starting point
in
De veritate 2 1 . 1
and basis for
question of what can be added conceptually to being,
the first
conception of the intellect.
Such an
addition is only possible in two respects: Wwhat is
merely conceptual, however, can be of only two kinds:
a kind
negation
to being by "one," for it signifies "undivided" being. But "true" and "good" arc said positively, so they cannot add anything to being except a relation.81 This relation is a relation of reason, not a real relation, for real relation is one of the categories that contract being.H2 A relation of reason occurs when the relation consists in a dependency and is nonmutual. The su�ject of the relation does not really depend upon that to which it is related, but the converse does not hold. Such a nonreciprocal relation is found in all cases where thi ngs are related as perfective and perfec ti bl e. "True" and "good" must therefore add to the concept of being the relation of that which perfects (respectum perfectivi). R3 and
Addition to being secundum rationem
Thomas's derivation is therefore the
of relation." A negation is added
�J Ibid. 2 1 . 1 : "Id amem quod est ration is tantum nOll potest �sse duplex, scilicet llf'galio et aJiqua r�latio ( ... j . S�d verum et bonum pOSitive dicUIltur; und!:: non possunt addere nisi relationem quae sit rationis tantum.� 82 Ibid. 2 1 . 1 ad 3: "omnis r!::latio r!::alis �st i n genere determinato, sed relationes non reales possunt circuire omne ens." H3 Ibid. 2 1 . 1 : "IlIa aut!::m rdatio (.,.j invenitur esse rationis tan tum secundum quam didtur ref!::rri id quod non d!::p!:: ndN ad id ad quod refertur, sed e cUllv!:: r�o ("lllll ip�a rdatio quaedam dependentia sit (... ) . Et ita !::st ill
negation: unum
relation of perfective:
I according to the
species: verum
according to the
esse: bonum
The derivation of the transcendentals in the tir�t basic text, In I Sententiarum 8 . 1 . 3 , is very succinct. The other transcendentals, it is argued, add something conceptual to being. "One" adds the aspect of indivision, and because it only adds a negation "one" is the closest (propinquissimum) to being. "True" and "good," on the other hand, add to being a certain relation: "good" adds a relation to the ,
omnibus aliis quae se habent ut. mensura et mensuratum, vel perf!::Clivllm Cl perf!::ctibik. Ororter igitur quod venim et bonum super intellectum !:: ntis addant respectum perfectivi." H4 Ibid. 2 1 . 1 : "In qllolil)l>l autem ente �st duo considerare,sdlicel ipsam ration�m speciei e t esse ipsum quo aliquid mbsisUI in .�peci!:: ilia. Et sic aliqund ens lJOt!::st esse perf�ctivlIm duplkiter: lIno modo secundum ral.ionem speci!::i tamum, et sic ab ente perticitur intdkctus qui percipil rationern cntis, nec tamen ens est in eo s�cundllm esse naturale: et ideo hunc modum perficiendi addit verum super ens, ( ... j Alia modo ens �st perfectivum allerius non solum secundUllI rationem speciei sed etiam secundum esse quod habet in rerum natura, et per lmnc Illodum e�t perfectivllll1 bonum; bonum enim in r!::bus cst ut Philmorhll� dicit in VI Metaphysinl�."
102
CHAPTER TWO
THOMAS'S G�NERAL ACCOUNT OF THE TRANSCENllt:NTALS
103
end (finis) . "true" a relation to the exemplary form. For a thing is
tality in the basic texts are rather divergent. In In
called "uue" in virtue of the fact that it imitates the divine
the relations of "true" and ugood" arc considered with respect to
exemplar or is in a relationship to a cognitive power.S5
causality: the good is related to the end, truth to the exemplary
The ways in which Thomas derives the transcendentals and orders the plurality of prima in the three texts agree in the main, but there are also clear differences. The first agreement concerns the absolute primacy of Mbeing;" it is the maxime primum. The other transcendentals are posterior in the sense that they are explications
of being, and, as it were, "determinc" iLl'll> The second agreement is that in all texts the transcendentals are divided into two groups. In De veritate l . 1 the distinction is made between the modes of being that belong to every being in itself and the modes that belong to every being in retation to something else; in the other
texts the opposition is that between transcendentals expressing a
negation and those expressing a relation.
The differences between the three texts concern in the first place the number of transcendentals. There is consensus about the triad "one," "true" and "good," but in De vt:ritate 1.1
res
and afiquid are
mentioned as well. These transcendentals have an Arabic patri mony. "Thing," which is called a transcendental by Thomas at
I Sententiarum 8.1.3
form. [0 De veritate 1.1 they aTC regarded with res�cl to the rational soul with its cognitive and its appetitive faculties; in De tlmtall' 21.1
they aTC viewed from the two ways in which being can be perfective: according
to
its jfJecie.s and according to its esse.
These differences have been explained as a mark of Thomas's hesitancy to formulate his doctrine of transcendentals in a clefini live way or as a sign of a development in his views towarcl a more
ontological deduction in De vtritate 2 1 . 1 .88 The hypothesis of a development in Thomas's thought seems improbable because in a later text, in the disputed questions De potentia, "true" and Wgood�
are also understood in respect of the faculties of the rational souLs9 The question is whether Thomas's v.uious
other places as well. has a prominent place in the important fifth
chapter of the first treatise of Avicenna's Metaphysics. In the same
2.7. Evaluation
chapter. "something" is also namen a few limes as a synonym of �being. "S7
The second difference between the derivations concerns the relational transcendcmals "true" and "good." The innovation of
In this chapter three texts were analyzed in which Thomas
presenls a general account of the tcanscendentaJs. Comparison with the theories of Philip the ChancetIor, Alexander of Hales and
the medieval doctrine lies especially in these two determinations, for "true" and "good" arc not mentioned by Avicenna as first con
Albert the Great discussed in the preceding chapter shows Lhat the
ceptions. The ways in which Thomas grounds their transcenden-
Thomas does not simply take the fact that there are communis-
fI.� In I SeIH., 8.1.3: "Alia "ero quae dillimus, scilicet bonum, \'eHun ct
unum. addunt super ens. non qllidem naturam aliquam, se�1 ra�io�cm: sed unum addit ral.ionem indivisionis; N propter hoc eM propmqlll$.Slffillm ad
ens, quia 3ltd't tanlUm negationeln: verum 3\Hem d bonllm addunl rel3tio nem qU3md;un; sed bonum re1ationcm ad finem, veruIII �d;Hionem 3� for . m:un exemplarcm: ex hoc: enim unumquodque �'erum dlCilur quod .lmltatur
primary text. De uen!ate 1.1, contains a number of new elements.
The fint suggcstion is found i n J. F. Courline. Suart� rl Ie J)Jtime dt la mitaphysiqut. Paris 1m, p. 361. the second il' an anonymous review in the Rfl
Rasug>1I.I di Ielteratura IOmut,,:4. val. 8. p. 44. 89 De pot. �.7 ad 6: �Oporlet autem quod 31ia tria ,uper ens addant aliquid
quod ens non (Ontrah,H (... ). Hoc aUlcm esse non potest nisi addant aliquid
exemplar dlvinum, vel rdationem ad virtutcm cognmcitivalll -.
secundum utioncm ""ntum; hoc: aUlern c:st. vel negatio ( ... ) vel relatio ad
modum differentiae sielll et bonum. in gU3nlUIll viddicet cxpri IIIunt aHqllid . . circa ens quod nomine entis non exprimitur: cl secundum hoc: Intentlo cObs esl indefcrminala respectu inl.elllionis veri-.
aliquid [for thi, reading. sec R. W. Schmidt, Tht Domain of Logic accordmg to St. Thomas Aq" inas, The Hague 1966, p. 91. II. 481 quod natum �it referr' universatiter 3d ens: el hoc eSI vet inlel1c(.IOS. ad quem importat rel;uionem verum. aul appetitll5, 3d quem imporlal relationcm bonum". Thesc quat5tiontJ disp,dalat were held al RomC' in 1265-66 (lee for thb daling J. A. Weishc:ipl,
IHI
cr. De urn!. 1.10 ad 2: ��ed aliquo modo verum 5C h3bel ad ens per
117 Avicenna, Lib". dr philosopllia prima I. c. 5
(et!. Van
Cl aliqllid sun! nOlllina nluhivoca IInilll lulcntioni�."
Rkt, p.
34): �En! vero
Friar 'fhOJ/UU dl\quinn, 1'.
:i6:i).
104
CHAPT£R TWO
THOMAS'S GENERAL ....CCOUNT OF THE
sima fOT granted and reason from this assumption . Instead, he transcendentals from a cognitive perspective, intimations of which
are already to be found in his predecessors. His method is a
reflexive analysis of human k nowledge, a resolutio of our concepts to first conceptions. It is perhaps surprising to flOd such a cognitive perspective in the Middle Ages, since comparative studies of Kam's
transcendental philosophy and medieval transcendental thought usually emphasize the ontological character of the latter. Yet for Thomas, transcendental! are the prima of the cognitive order, the foundation of rational knowledge. The first conception of the intellect is "being." It can bt: expli cated through its modes. The distinction between special or catego rial and general modes of being is fundamental for such a modal exp lication . This d istinction comes more clearly to the fore in Thomas than in his predecessors; its novelty is also evidenced by the emergence of a new philosophical term, Iransctlndentia. In De tnrit.ate 1.1. for the first time, six transcendentals are presented. The general modes of being explicated by the other transcendentals manifest the different "faces" of being. They are an explicitation of being according to the aspect of its reality (res) , indivisibility (unum), division from others (aliquid) , knowability (verum), and appetibility (bonum). To what extent does De veritate 1 . 1 give a compl ete picture of the modes of being? Thomas knows very well that Aristotle, in his Metaphysics (Y, c. 7), posits "another mode of being" in addition to categori al being that exists outside the mind and is "perfect being"-namely, being in the mind.gO But his account does not mention this mode of being and does not explain its relation 10 transcendemaJ being. This does not mean, however, as we shall tee in chapter VI. that Thomas ignores the mental mode of being, for he discusses it in the framework of [ruth . Thomas's systematization in De veritale 1 . 1 displays similarities and differences to the theories of Albert the Great and Alexander of Hales. Their systematizations are no longer based on the notion of "in division," which was central for Philip (he Chancellor. In Albert's account verum and bonum add something positive to being. IHl In V Mdaplt.,
per
leet. 9, 889: "Primo distingui t ens, quod est extra animam, en ens pcrfeclum. Secundo ponit alium
!I I
decem praeciicamenta, quod
modum entia, �erLlnd\im quod tit lantum in mente".
,-,.;
105
namely a relation to something extrinsic. Their transcendentality is based on the causali ty of divine being: "true" expresses the relation to the Idea, ugood" the relation to the final end. Thomas follows Albert in his view of the relational character of vt'TUm and bonum. but not in his theological foundation. Alexander of Hales's systematization contains three de termina tions: an ontological, a theological and an anthropological one (1.2.). Several elements of Alexander's ontological determination appear in Thomas, such as the "absolute" and the "relationar consideration of being, and the partition of the l atter into a con sideration according to division and one according to conformity (convenienlia) . One clear difference, however, is that Thomas does not connen the consideration of being according to division with verum but with aliquid, and that he places "truc" as well as �good" under the c onsideration acc ordin g to conformi ty. Alexander's theological order is not found in Thomas's basic texts, but the determination of being in rclation to the human soul does appear in De veritau 1 . 1 . Yet for Alexander this determination applies to the triad unum-unum-bonum and not only to the true and the good. Moreover, Th omas's basis differs from Alexander 's. The latter's account is dominated by the trinitarian motive: man is the image of the Trinity on account of his faculties of memoria, intelligentia and voluntas. Thomas's basis for the relationality of utrue" and "goodH is the Aristotelian thesis that "the soul is in a sense all things." In comparison with Alexander and Albert, the most striking aspect of Thomas's derivation of the transcendentals in De veritate 1 . 1 is his determination of "true" and "good·'-it acknowledges the special place man has among o ther beings ill the world . This acknowledgement resembles He idegger's thesis of the priority of Dasein over all other beings. Heidegger actually refers to Thomas's exposition.gl The rational soul may. like every being, be an aliquid, something distinct from other tbings, but through its faculties it has a universal extension. The anima is the being that can accord with every being. Man is marked, we might say, by a transccn· dental openness.
endeavors to show their necessi ty. He develops his doctrine of the
;
TRANSCf:NDENTALS
L
cr.
M. Heidegger, }hi", anti TiM, ( tranllated by J. Macquarrie and York. and Evanllon 1962, p. 114.
Robinlon), Nt.w
E.
106
107
CHAPTER TWO
THOMAS'S GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE TRANSCENDENTALS
Thomas's general account of the transcendentals gIVes nse to a series of questions which structure OUf investigation in the chapters that follow. ( 1 ) As we established, Thomas develops his doctrine of the transcendentals from the perspective of knowledge. It has been rightly observed that the horizon of his discussion in De veritate 1 . 1 is more noetic than ontologica1.92 That raises the question of the philosophical intentions of his exposition. In the first section of this chapter (2.1.) we saw that according to L. Oeing-Hanhoff, the resolutio in De veritate 1.1 is an analysis of concepts belonging to dialectics. Through the analysis leading to the most general concept "being," it is therefore not the su�ject of metaphysics that is attained but rather that of dialectics. This is a POiOl that deserves serious consideration, for Thomas himself recognizes that there is a resemblance between dialectics or logic and metaphysics: both deal with the communia.9� Contrary to Oeing-Hanhoff's interpretation, we argued that the resolution in De veritale 1.1 is a reduction of knowledge to something first which is the condition for all rational knowledge. This reduction is not isolated from metaphysical concerns. There is an intrinsic relation between the method of resolution and metaphysics, as appears from Thomas's explanation of the title "metaphysics." This science is called meta-physics because its objects are discovered after those of physics, at the end of the process of resolution (in via resolutionis), as the more common after the less common.\!4 A. J. Reimers explicitly addresses the question of Thomas's intentions in De veritate 1.1.95 His thesis is that the purpose of this text is logical and not ontological. His first argument is that Thomas's "ultimate purpose is to define a word, namely, 'truth.'" Yet this approach yields too limited a picture of Thomas's inten tions. The question is: ''What is truth?," and Thomas looks into the conditions for every investigation into what something is. As we observed earlier (2.5.), it is evident from the arguments pro and
contra that the question actually disputed in 1 . 1 is whether truth is altogether the same as being. If Thomas were merely interested in a logical definition of truth, we are left with no explanation as to why he unfolds the doctrine of the transcendentals in precisely this text. That De veritate 1 . 1 concerns logic rather than ontology is, according to Reimers, evident from the kind of evidence that Thomas brings fonvard. He nowhere refers to the real order, save in a single respect. The sole exception is the phrase "the soul is in a sense all things." This interpretation of the text is also incorrect. An essential feature of De veritate 1 . 1 is the modal explication of being. Both the categories and the transcendentals express modes of being; they are not, as the author suggests, "modes of expression." Then Reimers's article takes a turn. Although the purpose of De veritate 1.1 is logical and not ontological, this does not mean that the text is not metaphysical. It deals with some fundamental concepts of metaphysics and lays the logical 'groundwork for future considerations of ontology. Thomas's arguments do manage to establish rules for using each of the transcendental names. They seek to ascertain in each case the ratio of the corresponding term. This interpretation correctly highlights the central role of the ratio in the text. Its precedence, however, does not stem from Thomas's intention to establish "a basic vocabulary." The role of the ratio is connected to the semantic model of nomen-ratio-res that Thomas uses to solve the problem of the addition. Transcendentals express modes of being by adding something to being secundum rationem. The doctrine of the transcendentals is literally an onto-logy. At the end of his article, Reimers argues that the doctrine of the transcendentals is not the ontological center of gravity for Thomas's metaphysics. Ultimately the ground of these predicates is not anything intrinsic to them; rather it lies in the fact that God is directly the author of being, the principle of intelligibility and goodness. A critique of this argument would require an extensive discussion of Thomas's conception of metaphysics. One aspect of the three texts we want, however, to emphasize immediately: the absence of a theological grounding of the transcendentals. From the discussions with Oeing-Hanhoff and Reimers, it becomes clear that to understand Thomas's account in De veritale 1.1 it is necessary to consider the doctrine of the transcendentals
92 J. F. Courtine, Suarez et Ie SJstimt de 1a mewfrhJsique. p. 360. 93 In I Post. Anal. . kct. 20, 1 7 l . 94 In Mttaph., prot.: "Dicitur enim ( ... j Melaf}hJ�ica, in quantum considerat
ens N ea quae consequuntur ipsum. Haec enim transphysica inveniuntur in via resoiutionis, sicut magis communia post minus communia�; In Boeth. De trin. 6.1. 9� ·St. Thomas's Intentions at De veritau 1,1», in; Doctar communis 42 (1989), pp. 175-83.
108
CHAPTER TWO
within a broader philosophical framework. We undertake such a consideration in chapter Ill, where we address the relation between metaphysics and the doctrine. Various themes from the present chapter. like the method of resolution and the problem of the addition. surface again there. (2) An essential moment in the doctrine of the transccndentals is the primacy of being. Being is the first conception of the intellecf; human knowledge is an understanding of being. But in the three basic texts Thomas says almost nothing about the reasons why being enjoys primacy, about the way in which being is known by man, or about the ralio of being. It is therefore necess.u-y to restale lhe question of being. We do this in chapl(:r IV. Thert: is a certain parallel between our conclusion that it is necessary to restate the question of being and the opening of Heidegger's Being and Tim,-. The first section is entitlt:d: ''The necessity for explicitly restating the question of Being. "96 Heideg ger argues that the question concerning the meaning of being is forgotten loday because of three prejudices. These prejudices are derived from D� vmlate 1 . 1 : being is the most universal that is implicit in every concept; it is indefinable; it i!ll self-evident (cf. Thomas's rlOtissimum). But for Thomas, the thesis that being is the first known does not render the question of being superfluous. There are twO indications that this is so, one a maner of fact and the other of principle. The fact: although Thomas appeals to Avicenna for the thesis of the primacy of being, he t ..,kes issue with the Arabic philosopher precisely as to the meaning of being (ratio entis) . In this discussion it becomes. clear why Thomas assigns a privileged position to being while Avicenna names a plurality of prima. The principle: in D� veritate 1.1, Thomas argues not only that being is the first and best known, but also that it is .hal into which the intellect resolves all its conceptions. There is a circularity in human understanding: "being" is both iL'I beginning and its end. Yet in this very movement there is progress. Human knowledge is from the outset a conception of being, but this beginning is only made explicit in the science Ihal considers being as being. (3) A third set of questions concerns Thomas's dertvdtion of the remaining transcendental:.. Their derivation has a rather abstract Hli
M.
Ih:ideKKer,
B�i"g and Tjm•.
!,p. 21-23.
THOMAS'S
GENERAL
ACCOUNT OF THE TRANSCENDENTALS
109
character in two respects. In the first place. the historical back· -ground of the diverse basic notions remains outside of considera· tion. To be sure, reference is made to Aristotle for the concept of "one" (i.e . . "indivision") and the concept of "good" (i.e,. its definition at the beginning of the EthiC5 as "that which all desire"), and to Avicenna for the distinction between tnS and res, but how the transcendental way of thought relates to the different traditions of thought remains hidden. From a systematic viewpoint, it is striking that Thomas adduces no arguments for the idea that being is one, true and good. Thdr convertibility is not explaint:d bUI is always presupposed in his derivations. Arguments for the converti bility are to be found in other texIS, in which Thomas considt:rs Ihe common notions individually. The philosophical motives of the doctrine of the transcendentals become particularly apparent in tht:se considerations of specific transcendentals. The order of the nomina transcend�ntia is explained in De veritate 21.3. After "being" comes "one"-the one is, as is stated in the first basic tal, "the closest" to being. After the "one" comes the "true;" "good� is the last in the series.97 It is in this order that we will deal with the triad "one," "true� and "good" in chapters V-VII. In addition to the traditional triad, two other rranscendentals are introduced in De veritate 1 . 1 : res and aliquid. Their transcendentality was not generally recognized in the Middle Ages. There seems to be no room for an expansion of the number of communissima if, as for Philip the Chancellor and Alexander or Hales. one. true and good are tbcologically founded in the threefold divine causality. In the DiJputationes Mt!taPh,sica� (3.2.3.-6), a work first published in 1597 that can be viewed as bringing the meciieval doctrine of the transcendentals to a close, Suarez argues that res and aliquid are not distinct transcendentals. but can be reduced to "being� and "one," respectively. Res belongs. according to Thomas. to the group of transcen dentals that pertain to every being in itself. He indicates the distinctive m.tio of "thing" by contrasting it with that of "being." While the name nlS is derived from the act of being, the name res expresses the quiddity or being. It therefore makes sense to deal
97 D, writ. 21.3: ·Unde islorum nominum transcendenLium tali! eat ordo. si u:cundum ae considen:nlur, quod pOlt ens en unulIl. deinde verum POSt unum, deinde post verum bonum."
110
THOMAS'S GENERAL ACCOUNT OF
CHAPTER TWO
with these two transcendeilials together in chapter IV on "Being," for they refer to the complex structure of that which is.
Aliquid, which is not named as a transcendental anywhere else in Thomas's work. will be discussed in the chapler on "One. � Thomas describes "something" as the reverse side of �one." In
2.6.
we saw that he split into two parts the phrase Alexander of Hales and Albert the Creat give as expressing the content of the concept
unum, and that he reserves the second part lor the content of auquid. 'Just as being is called one insofar as it is undivided in itself, so it is called Jomelhing insofar as it is divided from others" (De veritatt
1.1).
Aliquid belongs to the transccndcntals that pertain to every being �in relation to something else." One could sec this notion as expressing what is presupposed in the idea of relational transcen denlals. The condition for the relationaliry is that there is some lhing else (aliud) , that is to say, a multitude of beings. This suggests a connection between aliquid and multitudo. The term transcendens
(d. 2.5.)
is used most frequently by Thomas with respect to the last
notion, although �many� does not appear in any list of the transcendentals. A specific problem is posed by the beautiful (pulchrum) . Thomas mentions it in none of the three basic texts. Paradoxically, how ever, in the research of the last decades more attcntion has been de\'oted to the beautiful than to
over, some scholars have suggested that the beautiful has a central role in Thomas's doctrine. for it would be the synthesis of
THE
111
TRANSCENDENTALS
discussion of the divine unity, truth and goodness is based on an account of the transcendentals one, true, and good. The same connection appears in the construction of Thomas's Summa the()
logiae. In Summa theologiae 1,5 the subject is �the good in general" (De bono in communi) ; 1,6 deals with "the goodnes.� of God" (De bonitate Dei) . II is not by chance that discussions of the transcend entals often take place within the framework of the doctrine of the divine attributes. for ill these discussions there arises a problem, that Philip the Chancellor (Summa de bo,!o, q. Great (De bono 'good.
".
1.4)
5)
and Albert the
call that of "the commonness of the concept
If transcendelltals are, Oil the one hand, common names
and, on the other, divine names, that is, names proper to God. how then are these two kinds of naming related
to
one another? The
same question can be formulated in terms of tfanscendentalily and transcendence. What is the relation between the transcendentals that run through all the categories and God who i,� transcendent and beyond the catcgories?98 The tension
between transcelldentality and transcendence
appears from an essay by Jorge J. E. Crada about ''The Transcend entals ill the Middle Ages."'99 He presents the followillg under standing of transcendental: X
is a transcendental if and only if the extension of the
u':rrn that
na.mes X roi1lcide5 with the combined extensions or lhe terms that name each and every one of lht: ciltcgories into which beillK mily '
be divided.
transcendentals. We shall therefore devote a separate chapter (VlII)
But Gracia ohserves that i n Scholastic theology the transcenclentals
to the beautiful: "Beauty, A forgotten Transcendental?"
were applied to C'..od, who transcends all categories. That is the
(4) The final question concerns the first basic text, 1n 1 Sententiarum 8.1.3. Its COnlext is different from those of the othcr two text�, sinc.e it
reason that he puts forward a new understanding of transcen
deals with the order of the divine names. The doctrine of the
than a1ld includej'.H10 This sense of Mtranseendentality" cudcavors to
transcendentals is connected with a tradition stemming from
unite in one notion both transcendence ("is greater than") and
pseudo-Dionysius: "being," "good, � "one," and "true" are also
transcendental in the sense of " that which runs through all the
divine names. We already encountered this aspect in the Summa
categorics.M The quclltion remains, however, whether the twO
bono of Philip the Chancellor
(1.1.).
de
is greater
In the prologue Philip esta
blishes that the communis:Jima are sometimes "appropriated," thal is, treated as "proper" to Cod, for "being," "one," "-good," and "(rue" are predicates that are attributed to
dentality. in which the phrase Cflincidt>..s wilh is replaced by
God in Scripture.
Reflection on the divine names plays a prominent role in the development of Ihe medieval doctrine of Ihe transcendentals. The clearest example is the Summa fratri! Itlexandri, in which the
911 cr. J. A. Acr�n, kGood as Tra1lscendental and Ihe Transcc1I
,
-
"
,
"",
.
-
, .
.... . . " . "
112
CHAPTER TWO
marks of this notion of transcendentality can obtain at the same time. God is beyond the categories but does not run through all the categories)O I The question of the relation of the transcenclentals
CHAPTER THREE
and the divine is taken up in chapter IX. METAPHYSICS AND THE TRANSCENDENTALS
From its outset philosophy has reflected on being, unity, truth and goodness, that is, on the notions that were called
transcendentia
in
the Middle Ages. But it is not until the thirteenth century that we can speak of a proper doctrine of the transcendentals, in which these notions are interrelated in a systematic way. What are the reasons that the doctrine was formed then and what motives played a role in its formation? In view of the frequent references to Aristotle and Avicenna in the basic texts, it is natural to suspect a connection with the process that left a decisive mark on thirteenth century thought: the "reception" of Aristotle's works and the commentaries by Arabic philosophers in the Latin world. This connection is indeed essential for the formation of Thomas's doctrine of the transcendentals, but needs to be specified in order to render the genesis understandable. The phrase "reception" that is usually used to describe the intro duction of the
corpus aristotelicum can
be misleading. It suggests that
the attitude of medieval thought toward the new material was merely receptive. Actually the new texts from Greek and Arabic philosophy constituted a tremendous challenge, since they con fronted medieval readers with the problem as to the distinctive place and foundation of philosophical thought vis-a-vis Christian theology. This was particularly true in the case of Aristotle's
Metaphysics.
The study of this work led to an extensive discussion
among medieval commentators over the question of the proper subject of this science, which Aristotle had called "theology.". The result of this discussion is aptly characterized by Ludger Honnefel der as "the second beginning of metaphysics. "2 This second begin ning made room for a transcendental philosophy in the thirteenth
•
101
The medievals did not hold, as Gracia suggest.<;, that "insofar as God is • being, the categories presumably apply lO him (i.e., he is a substance, and so on)," God 18 nOI in a genus.
Cf. A.
Zimmermann,
�fn.
Onlolngi� od" MdaphY5ik? Di� Di5ir.UMioTl iiw den 13. lind 14. Jahrhunderl, Leiden-Cologne 1965.
L. Honnefelder, "Der zweile Anfang der Metaphysik. VorausselZungen, Ansatze und Fotgen der Wiederbegnindung der Metaphysik im 13./14. Jahrhundert", in: J.P. Beckmann e. a. (ed.), Philwophi, im Mil/daU"., Enlwid: lungslinim lind PamdilfllWl, Hamhurg 1987, pp. 165-186.
114
115
CHAPTER THREE
MI\TAPHY$ICS AND TilE TRANSCENDENTALS
century. In the present chapter we will explain this development and render plausible the thesis that Thomas's docLCinc of the transcendcncals presupposes a determinate concept of metaphysics. To clarify the relation between metaphysics and thc transcell dcn(als we will examine four themes. The tirst is the discllssion about the "object the medievals themselves used the term subiectum-of first philosophy. Thomas dC-dis systematically with the question as to what metaphysics is two times, first in his commentary on Boethim's De tnnitale, and later in the prologue of his commentary on Arinotle's Metaphysics (dateable ca. 1270). III 3.1.':S.3. we will analyze Thomas's commentary on Boethius to show that in his rcading of the text a transformation of the tradi tional concept of metaphysics becomes apparent; this is confirmed in his prologue to Aristotle's Metaphysics. The second theme (SA.) is Thomas's explanation of the method of metaphysics, which is also found in his commentary on De trinitate. Central in this exposi tion is the method of Ttsolulio, the notion that dominates his approach to the tra.nscendentals in the first article of De umlate. The third theme (3.5.-3.7.) concerns Thomas's commentary on bonk IV of the Mtlaphysics, which is of special imporlance for the relation between metaphysics and the transcendentals, but has received little nOlice in previous research.� Finally (3.H.) we will give attention to how Thomas actually practices the transcendelltal way of thougbt in his refleClion on the question of the origin of being.
consequence of his view of medieval philosophy as "Christian philosophy. .. This hermeneutic problem forces itself inevitably on the student of medieval philosophy because of its "scholastic" character (see 0.2.). To philosophi:z.e in the Middle Ages is. preeminently, to comment on an auctoritas. Now, undoubtedly, medieval com mentaries are of a different nature than modern ones. Their COIl cern is not pri.marily historical or philological; they are above all interested in lhe meaning and truth of a text. But that docs not alter the fact that a commentary belongs 10 a different genre than an independent treatise and must be read in a different way. Mter all, the first intention of the commentator is the explanation of and the reflection on the authoritative lext. The student of medieval philo sophy must always consider to what extent ideas are developed in the commentator's reading which transform the tradition, and so manifest a new and personal appropriation of it. From this point of view Thomas's commentary on Boethius's De trinitate is very instructive. The significance of this work for Tho mas's conception of metaphysics is generally recognized, but one aspect of his commentary remains virtually unnoticed in the con temporary literature. [n U"eating Boethius's text, Thomas inU"oduces an important hermeneutic distinction [hat is based on the univer sity practice of his time: the distinction between the exposition of a text and the disputation of a question. He first gives an expruilio. in which the author's intention is expounded and the content of the text is explained. Thomas pointedly distinguishes the exposition from the dispulatio,5 in which he raises a number of quaestiones, which afford him an opportunity to prohlemati.ze Boethius's text and to discuss selected themes in a more independent way. Therefore, we direct our inquiry to this wcommentary" first.
"-
3.1. Thomas's commentary
on
Roethius's �De trinitafe 5,4"
Thomas adrenes the question "What is metaphysics?" in two commentaries on all authoritative text. The fact that these discus sions occur in commentaries raises a hermeneutic problem. Do Thomas's commentaries . for instance on Aristotle' s Metaphysics, give a picture of his own conception of metaphysics alld of his personal thought, or is his only intention to present an o�jective exposition of Aristotle?· Gilson holds the latter position; it is it ,
,
cr. J.A.. AcrUen, "Die Lehre
I
,
i '
•
( 1 ) Boilhius s text In De trinitate Boethius intends to defend the teaching of the catholic faith that God is triune "from the deepest disciplines of 1974: Commtmoralillt St",diu vol. I. Torollto 1974, pp. 2 13-238; M.D. Jordan. Tht AII�gtd AristotllianiJ," of ThomaJ Aqr.dnaJ, Toronto 1992 (The Etienne CHiIOn Series, 1 5 ) . � In Bo,lh. lJ, Inn. . �:lIp. cap. 2: "el hullil parti' c:xpositio rclinqllitllr I\i,· plitlUi(lnl".
116
117
CHAPTER THREE
METAPHYSICS AND THE TRANSCEND[NTALS
philosophy."6 To that end he presents in the second chapter a three-fold division of the theoretical sciences into physics, mathe matics and theology. It is this part of the text that is relevant for our purposes. ' Boethius describes the characteristic differences between the objects of these sciences with two key terms in each case. Natural science considers what is in motion and is not abstract. �Abstract" has here an ontological meaning; it denotes separntion from matter, as appears from Boethius's explanation. "For physics is con cerned with the forms of bodies along with matter, which forms cannot be separated actually from bodies that are in motion." Mathematics considers what is not in motion and is not abstract, for it inquires into the forms of bodies apart (rom matter and thus apart from motion. These forms, however, since they exist in matter, cannot be separated from these bodies. The third theoretical science, theology. considers that which is not in motion and which is abstract and separable (sine motu abstracta atque separabilis), for ..the substance of Cod is without maUer and motion. � Boethius adds that these sciences are distinguished from one another not only as to their objects but also as to their methods. He refers to these methods only with three adverbs: in the natural sciences we must proceed according to the mode of reason (rationabilitn) , in mathematics according to (he mode of learning ( disciplinaUter) , and in theology according to the mode of intellect (intellectualiter) .7 Boethius's brief text is rather cryptic, but nevertheless permits a clear conclusion. His conception of metaphysics-a term that Boethius himself does not use-is theological. The subject matter of this science is marked by its separation from matter and thus possesses the highest degree of intelligibility. Metaphysics deals with being that transcends maller, that is, the divine substance. It is the science of what is transcendent.
things, and so Boethius sets forth the method suited to this inquiry by distinguishing it from the modi employed in the other sciences.' Boethius intends by this division to show what is distinc tive of theological science. Thomas next explains the features of the theoretical science!! that are mentioned by Boethius. He describes the third science with a plurality of names: it is "divine science or metaphysics or first philosophy." Because it principally considers the divine substance, it is called "theology" (by Boethius).Y
(2) Thomas's exposition
Thomas follows the liUera in his expositio closely. Noteworthy here is that he gives (he reason why &elhius presents a division of the sciences. Every inquiry must follow the method suited (modus congruus) to its subject. Boethius's inquiry is concerned with divine Boethhu. D# triftitlll" prol. (ed. Slew-art e.a., p. 4). ' lhtd.. r. 2 (p. 8).
S
(3) The disf.tttlation inq. .5.4
I t·
,
,
;i
I
�
Thomas discusses Roethius's text in twO series of disputations. Q. 5 deals with the division of the theoretical sciences, q. 6 with their methods. In q. 5 art. 1 he problematizes Boethius's three-fold divi sion and asks whether it is appropriate. This discussion acquires additional imponance because Thomas, in the arguments sed contra, connects the division with Aristot.l.e's statement in the sixth book of the Metaphysics (c. 1 , I026a 18) that "there will be three theoretical sciences, namely, mathematics, physics and theo logy." Boethius's division goes back to this passage, in which Aristotle argues (hat the knowledge of what is unchangeable and immaterial belongs neither to physics. for this science is concerned with changeable things, nor to mathematics. It rather belongs to "first" philosophy. So Thomas's discussion of Boethius becomes at the same time a discussion of Aristotle's theological concept of metaphysics. In art. 2 - 4 Thomas considers each of the three theoretical sci ences separately. Q. 5. 4 is of direct interest for us: ;'Does the divine science Ireat of what is without matter and motion?" The argument is carefully constructed; we must follow its reasoning closely. Thomas begins his reply by observing that we must know which science is called �thc divine science." This introductory remark seems rather odd: are there then several candidates for the title "divine science?" It is not unlil the end of Thomas's analysis that the import of his obsclVation becomes clear. 8 1ft BtU/h. Dt Inn., Exp. cap. 2: �illquirit modum congruum huic illquisi tioni per dlstinction�m a modis qui obseruantur in alii! sci�ntiis." \I Ibid. Exp. cap. 2: "£1 hoc probar per Dei subnantiam. d� qua scienlia diuilla cQn,ideral prillcipalll�r. unde el indr: nominaluT.·
][8
CHAPTER THREE
119
Mt:TAI'HYSICS ANI> THY. TR.... NSCENDENTAL'>
The point of departure of the disputation is a proposition from the
themselves; other principles are not subsisting realities, but are in
theory of science: "every science considers a subject-genus (genus
the things of which they are principles. Thomas illustrates this distinction with an example from physics: the celestial bodies are
subiutum), and it must investigate the principles of that genus,
since science is perfected through knowledge of principles. "10 The
principles of the former type, while form and matter
are
principles
of the lattel' type. The importance of this diSLinction is that the
term that needs further clarification s i subiectum. In modern philo sophy "suhject" generally rdus [0 the human subject, whereas
principles of the first kind can be considered in two ways and can
medieval thought "subjcct� and "object" have a different meaning.
studied not only in themselves but also as principles of other
the things known by such subjects are their objects. But in
be dealt with in two separate sciences. The celestial bodies can be
As we saw in 2. 1.. scitntia in the classical tradiLion has a much
things,ll In the next part of the disputation, Thomas comes to the essential
more spedfic sense than the modern concept of "science;"' the classical concept designates the mental state or habitus Ihat is
point of his account. II is not by chance that in the pl'cccding lines
produced hy a demonstration. The correlative of the habitus is the
he had mentioned an example from physics, for he now makes
is related to a power or habitus. For example, man, ass and stone are
common principles of any determinate gcnus, so too there are
related to sight under the one formal aspect (ratio) ofheing colored,
principles of all things insofar as all things agree in being
things, insofar as they arc intelligible or knowable by the intel
(secundum quod in mle communicant) . Such pl'inciplcs are therefore common ( communia) to all beings. But according to Avicenna
obiectum. The object is that in virtue of which a diversity of things
the transition to the metaphysical level. Just as there are certain
and color is the formal object of sight. The object of scientia are
IecL l 1 Subiectu1ll gives expression to another aspect of selen/ia. It is
something call be common in two ways: fint, by predication,
related to the science's content: �Everything Lhat is in a science
second, by causality. An example of the first commonness is form
must be contained under its subject. � What is scientifically known
that is predicated of all forms; an example of Lhe commonness by
is a conclusion in which something is predicated of something
causality is the sun, which is numerically one and the principle of
the subject This predication makes manifest a necessary
all things subject to generation. In both ways there are principles
else, i.
c.,
property of the subject with which a science deals. The reason
common to all beings.U
why Thomas introduces the notion of Msu�ject" is that Aristotle had argued in the
Poslmor AnalJtic.J that the unity of a
Thomas's interest is focused on the principles common hy
sciellce is
based on the unity of the subject-genus or simply of the subject.
13 In Bloelh. Dt lrin. q. 5.4: ·Set principiorum Iluo sunt genera.. Quedam
which underlies all propositions of that science.I\!
enim 5unt que e t sunl in se ip�is qu�"'am n:lture complete, el l>unt nichilominU3 principia alionlln. Siclll corpora cdesua stint quedam principi;t
Every .�cience must investigate the principles of its su�ject.
The next step ill Thomas's argument focusses
Oil
inferiorum corporltm, el corpora simplicia corporum mixtorulll; et ideo iSla non solum consideranlur in Kientiis ut principia SlInl, set ctiam ut sunt in 3!: ipsi� res qlta!:daill. Et propter hoc de eis non solum tractatur in scientia que
the principJes:
they are of two kinds. Some principles arc complete natures in
H)
considcrat ipsa principiata. se:t c:ti;un habcnt per se sdentiam sc:paratam. sicu! de corporibus celestihlu CSI quedam pars Kientic: naturalis preter illam in qua
Ibid. q. 5.4: ·Sciendllm siquidelll est quod quecllmque sdenlia c.onside:ral
dcterminatur de corporibus inferioribus ( ...) Quedam autcm sunt principia
aliquOtl genus 5ubiecl.ll1l1, oportet quod consideret principia illius gcneri&. cllm
qu!: non sum nature complete in se ipsis. set solum sunt principia naIUrarU!ll, skut unitas numeri, c:t punctus linee:. et forma et materia corporis phisici:
scic:ntia non perficiatur nisi per cognitionem prindpiorulll�. 1 1 Se:c: Ibid. q. 5.1, in which the notiOll of the �objectH of scien('.e is ceutntl. Cf. S./h. 1.1.3 for the example of the object of sight.
1 2 In I Sml., proJ. q. 1..4: ·subjectum habet ad sciemiam ad minus Ire:s comparatlonc:s. Prima e:st. quod quaecumque sunl in �dentia dc:bellt contine:ri mb sul::!jeeto.· Aristotle:. Poll. Anal. I. c.
lect. 42: "Scitncia dicitur
U"II.
28, 87a 38. Cf.
ex hoc quod 1St unitu
Thomas.
gmnU [Jol.
In f PIlJI. Anal. .
subie:ctil . " For
the ('.onne('.lion and the difference between "objecl" and "subject." sec: S./h. 1.1.7: "Sic enim At hahel luhiectum ad sdc:ntiam, sicut obiccl\im ad potc:ntiam
v1'1 hahltum.·
un de
,
huiusmodl
principia
non
tractantur
nisi
in
scientia
in
qua de
principiatis agitur.· H Ibid. q. 5.4: "Que quidc:m principia possunt did communia dllpliciter secundum Auicennam (.. .) : uno modo per predicationelll, sicut hoc quod dico: 'forma est commune ad omnc:s formas·. quia de qualibet predkalllr; alia modo per causalitate:m, Siellt dlcimu5 solem unum numero esse principium ad
omnia generabilia. Omnium autCm entium sunt principia communia non solum
secundum
secundum-.
primum
modum
( . . . ),
set
etiam
secundUIll
modum
120
METAPHYSICS AND THE TRANSCENDENTALS
CHAPTER THREE
causality. He proposes a causal hierarchy: "all beings are reducer! (reducurnur) to certain principles in a definite order (quodam gradu ef. ordine)." The principles of accidents are reduced to the principles of substance. and the principles of perishable substances La tbose of the imperishable. The ultimate term of this reducrion is the prin ciple of the being of all things. which principle is most perfect and supremely in act and therefore free fmm mailer. Divine things (res divlllod are of this sort.l!'> The causal reduction that Thomas here describes is identical in structure to his proofs for the existence of God in the Summa theowgiae. Since the divine is both the principle of all beings and a com plete nature in itself, it cau be studied in two ways. Insofar as it is the common principle of all beings, the divine is studicd by the philosophers. since by the light of natural reason human beings can consider divine things only through their effects. Consequent ly, Cod is treated in the science that considers what is common 10 all beings. This science, of which the subject is being-as-being ( em' in quantum est ens) , is called "divine sciencc" by the philosophers. The divine as it subsists in itself, however, can only be known insofar as it reveals and manifests itself. 16 Thomas concludes-and it is only at this point that lhe introduc lOry remark of his reply becomes understandable-that there are two kinds of theology (theologia sive scientia divina est duPlex) . The first is philorophical theology which is also called "metaphysics. The divine is not dlC su�jecl of this sciencc, bur being as such; the divine, however, is the principle of this subject. The second kind is the theology taught in sacred scripture. In this science the divine is the suhject. and is investigated as it is in itself. 1 7 �
Ibid. . q. 5.4: "Et quia id quod e�l principium e.!Sendi omnibus oponel eue maxime ens. ut dicitur in II Metaphiske, ideo huillsmodi principia oportet esse completissima; et propter hoc oportet ea esse maxime aelu. \II nichil ue! minimum habeilnt de potentia. quia actus est prior et palior potentia (... J; et propter hoc oportel COl esse absque materia. que est in potentia. el absque motll, qui tst actus existenti, in potentia. Et huiuslllodi �lInl res diuine". 16 Ibid. . q. !S.4: "tmde et huiusmodi res diuine non tractantur a philosnphis nisi prOUt sunt rerum omnium principia, el ideo pertnu:: ta nWf in ilia dattrina in qua ponun!ur ea que sunt communia omnibus enlibus. que habel JubieClUm ens inquantum est ens. Et hec sciemia apud eos sdentia diuina dicitur. Est autem aUus .modus, cognoscendi huiusmodi res non secundum quod per effectu5 manifenantur, 5Ct secundum quod ipse se ip� manifestant�. 1 7 Ibid., q. 5.4: ·una [Jcil. theologial in qua considerantur res diuine non lamqllam 5ubierIUm Kientie, sct tamquilm prindpia ILLlllerli, et talis est the� U
121
Thomas has formulated a reply to the question concerning the subject of metaphysics, but has actually not yet answered q. 5 arL 4 ("Does divine science treat of what exists without mattt:r and motion?") . At the end of the disputation, therefore, he formulates the two-fold character of theology in another way. This alternative formulation. which is more in keeping with the phrasing of q. 5 art. 4, is based on the terminology of Boethius and AristoLle, whose accounts of flTst philosophy were staled in terms of separation from matter. In q. 5 art. I. Thomas had maintained that it is typical of the objects of the third theoretical science that they do not depend upon matter for their being. Within these objects he distinguished be tween those that never exist in mauer, such as God, and those that do not necessarily exist in maller, such as being, potency and act. Thomas now goes back to this distinction. Philosophical theOlogy treats as its subject that which is separate from matter in the second sense; it treats that which is separate in the first sense as the principle of its subject. By contrast, the subject of the theology of sacred scripture is that which is separate from matter in the first, absolute sense.l� Thomas's argument in this disputation contains several import ant features. As we have seen, it concerns: (i) the point of departure concerning the structure of stUn/ia, its subject and the search for principles; (ii) the transition from a panicular domain of things to the level of the communia; (iii) the distinction between two types of commonness; (iv) the causal reduction to Cod; .md (v) the twofold study of the divine. On the basis of these features we are now able to indicate which transformations of the Greek concept of meta physics come to the rore in Thomas's disputation.
3.2. Tiu traruJonnation oj th� concept oj metaphysics The fiTlI important outcome of Thomas's reading of Boethius's text is the introduction of a second theology, Christian theology. This logia quam philosophi prosequntur, que alio nomine metaphisica didt.lIl'; alia uero que ipSM re5 diuin;u considera! propter se ipsas lit subiectum scientie. el hec est theologia que in sacra Scriplura traditllr." 18 Ibid., q. 5.4: -Theologia ergo philoliOphica determinat de separatis �c�ndo '�'od.o sirllt de. ,ubierlis, de Separa!i' alltem primo modo sicut de prin CIpIIS Jubu:ctl; theologta lIero :mere Scripture tracun de ICpar.l.tis primo lIIodo �icllt de luhiecti.".
•
122
CHAPTER THRI':E
theology is distinct from philosophical theology or metaphysics both in its source of knowledge-it rests on revelation-and in its sdentinc structure-its subject is God.l9 Thomas's main motive in his commentary is surely to make this distinction dear. In his treatise, Baelhius investigates the leaching of the catholic faith tbat Cod s i triune. In his tXPOsilio, Thoma'> point .. oul that every inquiry must follow the method suited to iL'i subject and that it is for this reason that Baethius presents the division of the theoretical sciences. But it turns out, although Thomas does not stale this explicitly. that this three-fold division does not open up the mode of knowing suiled LO the theme of Baethius's inquiry. Earlier in his commentary, Thomas had shown that cognition of the Trinity is not accessible (0 philosophy but is an article of faith based on divine revelation.lto To man's natural reason God is knowable only from hili effects. Therefore, philosophical theology does not render Christian theo logy superfluous, for the rational knowledge of God does not 1.:00cern the divine as it is in itself. There is need for another body of knowledge in addition to philosophical theology. The Summa theologiae starts with the question as to the necessity of this doctrine. [n q. 1 art. 1 , the necessity of Christian theology, not that of philosophy, is called into question. Every doctrine is concerned with being. for nothing can be known except the true. which is convertible with being. But all domains of being. even God him self. are treated in the philosophical sciences so that there appears to be no need of any other doctrine.:!1 In his reply Thomils argues that in addition to the philosophical sciences it doctrine based on divine revelation is required. Certain things that exceed human reason must be made known to human beings, since knowledge of them is indispcllsable for man's salvation.
1!t
The: view of P. Aubenque, u probUnu d� l'itrt! chn Aris/rJIt, p . 3 1 . n. 2, according to which metaphysics for TholIla.� has the same o�je:ct as Chrislj�n the:ology, namc:ly the divine Ihing�, and only differs from lheology by lt5 way of knowledge. is incorrect. '20 cr. In Bot/h. Dt 1ri>1. q. 1.4. sed contra: "DeulIl esse trinum et unllm e�t articulus
fidei�:
and the c.orpus articuli. . 2: "doctrina non po�set esse nisi de: ente: nihil o:: nim �CI' lur nisi verllm, qllod (urn f!nle conve:rtitur. Sed de omnibus enlibus l:-actatur in
\I I
S.th. 1,1.\ obj.
philolophids disciplinis, e:t edam de Dca: unde: q �ae:dalIl pa�� phlio50ph.lae dicitur fAfologic. •ive sdcntia divina, lit pate( pcr PhllosophulIl III VI Mdaph,�.
Non
ruil
IIl!!lIr necutarium, praetcr philosophicas di�ciplina5. aliam doctrl
mun h.�rl.·
METAPHYSICS AND THE TRANSCENDENTALS
123
The .second striking outcome of Thomas's reading of Bot:thius
is that the introduction of a theology based on revelation leads to
some distance from the theological conception of metaphysics. That is a general feature of "the second beginning of metaphysics� in !.he thirteenth century. The me
('1". 1.. lionndelde:r, "Ocr lweite Anfang der Metaphysik", pp. Cf. 11.. Zhlllllr.rlllann,
Onfolngi, odttr MffnpA]JiU,
p.
:J.!'i4.
167·168.
124
125
CHAYrER THREE
METAPHYSJCS AND THE TRANSCENDENTALS
"metaphysicar synthesis made from the viewpoint of the tran
the understanding of many modern thinkers metaphysics is
scendentality. Thomas does nOl put this theological synthesis first;
"speculative," since it goes beyond the boundaries of experience.
it seems to be an alternative for him by which one can undersfand
For Thomas, too,
the traditional views on the subject of first philosophy. The theo logical synthesis is formulated i n the tcnninology of Boethius and of Aristotle (in the sixth book of the Metaphysio). and TeslS all the transmalerialilY. which they regard
inlelligibili (y.
as
the central fea[Ure of
meta physics
is marked by
a
transcending move
ment, but lhis process is directed towards the most intelligible. He
explains what the most intelligible is from the operation of [he human intellect. Thomas's "cognitive" approach to metaphysics is,
in fact, one of the most remarkable aspects of his prologue.
"Highest intelligibles" can be understood in three ways. (i) The first way is taken from the order of understanding (ex ordine
intelligendi). Here intelligibility relates to causality, in that the
3.3. The prologue of Thomas 's commentary
on
Aristotk's �MetaPhysiC$ H
intellect derives its certainty from [he knowledge of causes. ''To
Thomas's commentary on Boethius to the second text in which he
know scientifically" (scire) is, according to Aristotle in his Postt.rior Analytics (I, c. 2), to have perfect knowledge of the cause. In his commentary on De trinitale (q. 5 art. 4). Thomas had expressed the
discusses the subject of metaphysics, the prologue of his comment
same idea by observing that science is perfected through know
ary on Aristotle's Metaphysics. The point of departure of this (ext is
ledge of principles. Therefore that science is the highest which
the idea that there mUst be a first and highest science, for when
considers the first causes.n (ii) �Highest intelligibles" can be
In this section we will relate the conclusions of the analysis of
several things are directed to one end, one of them must be director
understood by the comparison of intellect to sense (ex comparatione
or ruler and the rest directed or ruled. This finality obtains for the
intellectus ad sensum). From Ihis viewpoint intelligibility relates to
sciences, too, since they are directed to one encl, namely to the
universality, for the difference belween intellect and sense is that
perfection of man)N The thesis that science is the perfection of
sense knowledge is of the particular. while the intellect compre
human beings is not developed here by Thomas. The background
hends universals. Hence thai science is pre-eminently intellectual
of this view is the opening sblement of Aristotle's Metaphysics: �All
which deals with the most universal principles. "These are being
men by nature desire to know" (98Oa 21). Science is the good of
and that which is consequent upon being
man as man, for it is the fulfillment of his natural desire for knowledge. The Augustinian theme of "curiosity," the unvirtuous desire to know, plays no essential role in Thomas. According to him "every scientific knowledge (scientia) is good. -J!'.
(ens
t.l
ea quae
amse
quuntur NU). such as one and many. potency and aCl. �'!M (iii)
Highest intelligiblcsM can be understood from the very cognition
"
of the intellect (ex ipsa cognilwnt i7lttlkcJus) . From this viewpoint intelligibility relates to immateriality. for something has the
But what is the first and highest science? That must be the
power of intellect by virtue of being frce from matter. "Highest
science chat is "most intellectual," that is, the one that tre'il,' of the
intelligiblesH are therefore things which are altogether free from
"highest intel1igibles.'·�6 On this point in particular the distance
matter, such as Cod and tlle illtelligences.29
between the modern and the medieval mind becomes manifest In
�4
In Mttaph., pro!.: "quando aliqua plura ordinantur ad unum. oporlet
unum eorum esse regulans. sive regens, et alia regulata, sive rt:t:!;\. ( ... ) Omnes autem acienliae el artes ordinantur in unum, scilicet ad hominis perrectionem, quae est eiU5 beatitudo. Unde necesse est, quod una earum sit aliarum omnium rectrix�,
In I D" all. . lec!. l.�. cr. JA. Aert�n, Nalur-t and Cr-tatu,.�, ThomaJ AqulnaJ"'s Way of Tlwughl, Leiden/New York 1988, pp. 3.'S-40. �fI In h!ttap�., proJ.: "ita scientia debet eiiSC naturaliter aliarum reglllatrbt, 'B
quae maxunc: tntc:JtcclUati� ell. Haec alltcm C'II, quae cirra maxirne inleJti. gihilla vC'rtatur.-
�7
Ibid., pro!.: "Nam ex quibu$ inlellectus certitudinem accipit, videntur
esse intclligihilia magis. Unde, cum certitudo scientiae per intellCCl\lm acquiratur ex cau5is, causarum cognhio maxime int.cllcctualis esse videtur.
Unde et ilia scient.ia, quae prima! C8USa.>l considerat, videtur e55e maxime
aliarum regulatrix."
211 Ibid. • pro!.: "Nam, cum sensus sit cognitio particularium, intellectus per noc ah ipso differre videluT, quod univcrsalla comprenendit, Uncle et ilia scientia maxi me C'st intelle<:tualls. quae circa principia maxime universalia venalur. Quat' 'Iuidetn IlInt en•• et ea quae consequuntur en!, ut unum f'1 acllll. " Ibid .• prol.: "Nanl rum unll.qlllteqllC' re. ell hOI; iVIII villi Intellt!ctlvlI.m
mulla. potentia et
�\I
126
CHAPTER THKU'':
The three types of "highest intelligiblcs" correspond
METAPlfYSICS AND THE TRANSCENDENTAI.S to
127
the three
In this argument a first resemblance to the commentary on
definitions of first philosophy that are to be found in AristOtle's
Boethius becomes apparent. Thomas's consideration is based on
Metaphysics. First philosophy is knowledge of the highest causes (book I); it considers, in contrast to the particular sciences, being-as being (book IV); it is �theology,� since it deals with the immaterial
the theory of science, He applies the model of scientia developed by Aristotle in the POsteriOT Analy&jes to metaphysics. The structure of
and the divine (book
How Aristotle himself conceived first
causes of its subject. With the help of the logician Aristotle,
philosophy is a controversial question among scholars and a
Thomas invests first philosophy with a unit)' that it never had in
basic problem in studying his work. Is the science he is searching
the Philosopher himself.
Vl).
e\'ery science is that it has a subject-genus and that it considers the
for an "aporetic" science because of the fundameutal impossibility
This approach from the theory of science also appears unam
of connecting ontology and theology with one another?�O Joseph
biguously in the remainder of the prologue, in which Thomas
Owens, having considered the rccent discussions, concludes:
determines the subject of metaphysics, Although this science is
"This revisit slrf:nglhcns the stand that the science of be::ing qua being in Aristotle is a theology only,"' 1 By being-as-being,
concerned with the first causes. with being in general, and with the immaterial SUbS!.aIll:CS, it does not study any one of them
as
its
Aristotle means the divine substance. to which all other beings arc
subject, but only ens commune. "For the su�iecl of a science is that
related, Owen's position is in agreement with the theological
whose causes and properties we seek, but not the causes them
interpretation that prevailed among the Greek commentators in Late Antiquity, who strongly influenced Boethius's conception. The most important element of Thomas's prologue is his attempt
[0 synthesize Aristotle's divergent statements about the subject of
selves. "j5
The second point in common between Thomas's prologue and
his commentary on .Boethius is that he docs not adopt the thcologi· cal conception of metaphysics. His understanding of first philo
first philosoph)'. He argues that the threefold consideration of "the highest intelligibles" should not be attributed to different sciences,
sophy is transcendental. The subject of metaphysics is not the
but to one. For the immaterial substances (the third type) are the
Against this background the importance of the doctrine of the
first and universal causes (i) of being (ii), and it belongs to the
transcendentals is obvious, for this doctrine concerns being and its
same science to consider the proper causes of any genus and the
properties. The prologue mentions as examples of these properties
(subject-)genus itself. So it must belong La the same science to
divine, but "being and that which is consequent upon being."
"'one and many" and "act and potency." The:: mention of the latter
consider the separate substances and being in generAL (ens
notions is not contrary to the transcendental character of meta
commune), which is the genus of which these sub$tances are the
physics, for act and potency are more common than matter and
common and universal causes,�2
form. They are dealt with in this science insofar as they follow ens
commune, and not insofar as they are in changeable and material habeal, q\lod eu a matena lmmunis, oportl::t ilia eMe maxim!! intelligibilia, quae sunt maxinH! 3. materia -kparata. (...) Ea vero �unl maxime a materia
separata, quae: flon \antum a signata materia abstrahunt (...). 5f:d omnino 3. ma�ria se:nsibili. EI n on solum secundum raliom:m, siO.l1 mathemalica, 5f:d etiam Sl::cundum ene, sieut Deus eL intelilgentiae." !.(I Cf. P. Aubenque, 11 pmW"" dt l'itr, chn. Amlott, Paris 1962. � I J. Owens, "The Doctrine of Being in lhe Ar istoteli an Mttaphysics Revisited". in: P. Morewedge (ed.), Philtnophies of E:nsttnct, Ancifflt and Modtrn, New York 1982, pp. 3l-59: p. 54. Cf. id., The Dadrillr of &ing in th, Aristottlilln 'Mdaphy$lcs'. A Stll.d, in tlu Crull Badground of M,diroal 'fhfJugJII. Toronto 1963. U In Mdaph., prol.: �Haec aute", triplex eonsiderado, non divenis, sed uni scientiae auribui debet. Nam p�edictae subsl.l.ntiae 5f:paratae sunl univer aales et primile cauaae essendi. Elu5-dem au!l::m sc::ienliile est cOflsiderare caU5a5 propria. illicuiu. generis e\ genus iplum ( ...) . Unde oportet quod ad eamdem lcientlam pertineat conliderare sllb5�n\i;u ICparatas. et ens commune, quod
Lhings.:h Thomas underlines the necessity of the transcendental· metaphysical consideration: �Principles of this kind should not
remain completely unclarified, because without them it is impos sible to have a full knowledge of what is proper to any genus or
f
est enus, cuius sunl praffiietae subs�ntiac: communes ct uniw:rsalc:s causae.� Itrid., pro!.: "Ex quo apparel, quod quamvis bl3 scientia praediela tria
considerd. non tamen considerat quodlibeL eorum ut subketum. 5Cd ipsum solum ens commune. Hoc eniln en subieclUm in scient;a, cu;us causa, et pas.siones quaerimus, non llut.em ipsac causae alicuhll generis quaesili. " .H In &u'h. Dr lrin. 5.4 ad 4: "aellu et potentia IlInl cOinmuniora quam materia et forma"; In IX MelQPh. . JP.rt. I, 1770; SeC. 11.54.
CHAPTER THREE
128
!!pecies." They should not be studied in allY particular science, but in one
129
METAPHYSICS AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL';
Geiger from
scitmtia communis.��
1917. In this study he analyzes De trimrate q. 5 art. 3,
which COlllains an extensive account of abstraction.�!! Geiger's
The third point in common between the commentary on Boethius and the prologue is that
main conclusions were three-fold. First, Thomas comes to see that
al the end of the laller (ext
in addition to (\\'0 forms of abstra(.tion which are characteristic of
Thomas also proposes the theological synthesis of first philosophy
physic� and mathematics respectively, there is an intellectual
in terms of "separation:" "Although the subject of (his science is
operation proper to met"1.physics. This operation, which consists in
ms commune.
a negative judgment, he
the whole science is said to deal with what is separate
from matter both in being and in thought."36 This separation
calls separatio. Second, the judgment that
being is not necessarily material establishes for Thomas the
includes not only God, who can never exist in matter, but also that
subject of metaphysics. Third, this negative judgment presupposes
which can exist without maner, such
another, positive judgment: namely that there are immaterial
Thi:s
a.�
being in general.
ahemalive theological synthesis is inspired hy Avicenna.
beings. Tbe useparatislic" thesis implies, therefore, that being can
This is clearly indicated by a passage in Thomas's commentary
not be considered
on the sixth book of the
Mover or a separate substance is provcn.40
MttaphJ�icj,
in which he corrects
Aristotle's conception. First philosophy is not only concerned with
qua
being until the existence of an Unmoved
Such a view, however, seems to be
OIl odds with Thomas's con
what is separate from matter and motion, but also with sensible
ception of metaphysics.41 In the prologue transrnateriality is not the
things, insofar as they are beings. Thomas'!! perspective is that of
exclusive criterion of metaphysical intelligibility. The "highesl
his metaphysical synthesis, according to which first philosophy
imdligibles," which first philosophy considers, are of three sorL�:
extends to everything that is. Yet he next suggests, with reference
(i) the first causes; (ii) what is most universal, such as being and
to Avicenna, an alternative interpretation. One might say with
that which is consequent upon being; and (iii)
Avicenna that the common are separated
(separala)
(communia)
that which is
altogether separate from maUer. The subject of metaphysics
dealt with by this science
in being, not because they are always with
commune,
out matter but because they do not necessarily exist in matter.�7
is
ens
and what is sought in this science is the cause or prin
ciple of the subject. It is the universal cause of being which is
The majority of modern scholars are of the opinion thaI for
altogether separate from matter. and knowledge of these imma
Thomas transmateriality provides the entree to the subject of meta
terial substances is for Thomas the final end of metaphysical
physics and the condition for the transcendental consideration of
inquiry.4� Geiger's thesis reverses lhat order: knowledge of the
reality.SA This view goes back to an influential article of L.-B.
trans<:endent and lransmalerial being becomes the condition I"or the consideration of being in general.
�.� In M�taPh .. prol . : �H\liu$modi autem non drbent omnino indetermi·
nata remam:re, cum sinr his (ampleta (ognitio de his, quae sunt prQpria :a.licui generi "eI 'lpeciei, haberi non pouit. N�c iu�rul)) in una aliqul'l panicu. la,ri scienlia Iraclari dl::bcnc Illiia cum his unumfJllOdque gl::o,,,\ entillrn ad sui cognhionem indigeat, pari ral.ion� in qlialibel particulari scientia [ractar entuL Unde restat quod in una communi scientia huimmodi tractenlur". .56 Ibid., pro!.: "Quamvis :a.Ulcm mbic:ctuZl! huiu, scielHiae !it ens communc, dicitur talllcn Iota de his quae slInl sep:a.rata a materia secundum esse el rationcm." �7 In VI Mefaph., icC!. 1 , 1165: "Advertendum est aulem, quod lic.et ad consid�rationem primae philosophiae pertineant ea quae �"nt separata �um' dum cue el ralionem a materia et motu. non tamen M)lum e:a.; sed eti:l.m de unsibilibus, inqllanlurn sunt cntia, Philosophu! pcncrulatur. Ni�i forte dicamus, ut Avicmno dicit, quod huiusmodi communia de quibus haec scientia pencrutatur, dicuntur separ!lla secundum esse, non quia semper sint sine materia: �d quia non de neceuitale habcnt esse in materia, sicul m:a.lhe· matica." cr. A"icenna., Liber de phiwopltia pn_ l, c. 2 (cd. VOIO Riet, pp. 16-17). �� See, e. g., L. Ocing.Hanhoff, "MetaphYlik, Thomas von Aquin ", in:
H-jjloriuhlS Wiirtt'!""bud! d",. PhilosoPhi, V.
zweile
(oll. 1221·1222; L Honnrfcloer, -D�r
der Meta.phY'lil�. p. 175; r.t.D. JQrdan, Ordering Wisdom. '/"h� IIu.rarnry of PhlloJophiml DiHOOrsn in Il.quinQ.J, NQlre Damc 1980, pp. 15�163.
Anf:a.ng
39 "AbMraCiioo et 5epal'alion d'apres S. Thomas (In De Trinitate q. 5, art. 3) "', in: &vut dtJ Jeimf-ff philruophl'1'ltJ it tlliolngiqutJ !lI (1947), pp. 5-40; aiM> published in: L·B. C.eiger, PhdQsof1hit tI Slrinlu(Jlilt, Paris 1%3. pp. 87-124. cr. R.W. Schmidt, �L'emploi de la sipil-ntion en rnetaphysique�, in: Rrvu� fthilo.lCphllj1U dt Louuain 58 (19(0), pp. 373-:393. 40 Cf. J.e. Doig, Aquir,u.. on MtfaphysirJ, p. 246. 11 �e for a more extensive daborolllion of lhis poilll J.A. Aert.�en, "'Vas heiRI Met:a.physilo:. bei 1l10OliJ.$ von Aquinr. in: T. Cr,,-emer·Ruegenberg and A. Speer (eds.), Sa.tntia lind Il.r.s im Hoth· und Spatmitttlaltl':T. Berlin/New York 1994, pp. 217-239. Cf. J.F. Wippel, '"Metaphysics and SepoTatiu in Thomas Aquinas", in: Mtlophysiwl Thtmtl in ThomaJ AquintlJ. Washington, D.C. 1984. ,
y.
pp. 69-I04.
U Cf. In Mtlrlph., pro1. : "Nam cognitio ad '1111:111 rnruidcralio sd"nlj"e pl'ftinRit."
calisarlLlll alicuiu$ g�nerl�, nl fini�
130
METAPHYSICS AND TilE TRANSCENDENTALS
CHAPTER THREE
The interpretation :according to which Thomas, in his com
stparatio instead of the method of rtsoiutio he had followed in Dt vmiatt q. 1 art. 1 is simiJarIy mistaken.4� The fact that Thomas does not abandon the mentary on Boethius, uses the process of
131
Ratio is the mode of knowing proper to human beings. As Thomas writes elsewhere. �il pertains to human nature to ust: ..
reason in order to know the truth. �!> This mode of knowing is consequent UPOIl man's mode of being. He is not a purely spiritual
method of resolmion appears from the concluding lines of the
substance. but a soul unlled with a body. The human being is a
names corresponding to
terization of the rational mode of knowing and identifies two
prologue, ill which he explains that this science is given three
the "highest intelligibles." It is called
divirle .scin�ce or theoLogy, insofar as i t considers the separate sub stances. It is called first philosophy, insofar as it considers the first causes of things. It is called metaphysics, "insofar as it considers being and what follows upon it, for these transphysical things are discovered in the process of resolution (in via TtSolutionis) as the more common after the less common. � It is significant that Thomas reserves the name "metaphysics� here for the study of
coml1lUnia and gives an intrinsic, methodological reason for this reservation: viz., the objects of this science are discovered at the end of the process of resolution. Resolution is carried out in meta physics to the point, at which what is most general appears. This method is discussed at length in the sixth question in Thomas's commentary on Bocthius's
Dt trinitate, which
is devoted to the
modi
sciendi of the sciences. We must therefore occupy ourselves now with this text
"rational
animal.�
De lrinilalt 6.1,
In
Thomas gives a brief charac
features of it. The first is its dependence upon sense experience; man's intellective knowledge is derived from sensible things. The human soul is marked by receptivity and by potentiality. The second characteristic is its progression from one thing to another, as from the knowledge of an effect to the knowledge of its cause.
grasp the truth immediately, but by a process of inquiry, that is, by a di$cur$US. The rational mode of
Human beings do nOI
knowing is discursive. Thomas argues that this mode of knowing is particularly followed in the procedures of natural science. Because the rational mode of knowing is proper to human beings, one can rightly say that "among all the sciences, physics is most in conformity with the human intellect.�u What is the consequence of this conclusion for the human study of metaphysics? Does it mean that this science is beyond man's capacities? Thomas begins his discussion of the method of first philosophy with the statement: �JUS( a� we attribute the mode of reason to natural philosophy because i t adheres most closely to
3.4. The method oj Toollilion and metaphysics Q. 6 art. I discusses Boethius's statement that physics proceeds
ra'ionabifiw, mathematics disciplinaliter and theology j:nttlkctuaUtt:r. Thomas gives content to these adverbs and examines whether the methods mentioned are indeed typical of the three theoretical
the method of reason,
so
we attribute the intellectual mode to
divine science because it adheres must closely
to the method of
intcllcct."47 Thomas speaks carefully; he does not say that human metaphysical thought is a purely intellectual intuition and does not require a rational discourse. His point is that metaphysics
most
cuw�ly approaches intellectual consideration.411
sciences. The discussion about the method of the divine science is
Thomas makes a comparisoll hetween reason and intellect: they
difference between the two sciences with the distinction hetwecn
In I Elh,c., h:ct. 1 1 . 132. In Borth. De Inn. 6.1: "�l ita modus ral.ioni� maxhne in scientia naturali obseruatur, CI propt.er hoc 5cienua tlalUrn1i� inter alias est maxim e- hOlTlinis
focussed Oil its distinction from physics, for he connects the
intelkctus and ratio.H 4' L. Honnereldcr, "Metaphysik lind Transzendenz, Uberlegungen Z\I Johannes Duns SCotu� im Bl id: aof Thomas von Aqoin und Anselm von CanterburyW, in: L. Honnefdder and W. SchuBier (eds.), Transtll1dtlu, ZII einem Grundwort d� It/(miuhm Mdaph,rik, p. 145. H for this im portant distinction in Thomas'! tho ught , see the well· dOCllmented srudy by J Peghaire, 1l1ttlltdUJ tl Ratio uUm St. ThomaJ d'l\quin, t';lri� and OtTawa 19�6.
45 40
intdleaui (onformis." Ibid., q. 6.1: "�icut rationabiJil.cr pr()cedere attribuitur naturali philo.,o· phle eo {Iuod in ipsa maxim.;: olneru:ltur modus rarioni�, ita inte!!ectualiter procederc altrihui tur dilline scicntic eo qllod in ipsa maxime obserllal.lJr modus intell�(t\U. " cr. j�d; q. 6.1 ad I : Mi llle llcl:\U...Jitcr rro(cdere non auribuitur "delltie dUllne quaM rp.,a IHJn rariodnetllr profrdl':ndu de prinripii� ad «1IIr1\1,iflnr�, set Illlia rim ralinel"ari" r)! intrllrflUaJi nll1�idrr;l1iulli pmrhl!pli��iTl1aM.
�7
'
. .j�
•
152
cH.... p·n;R THREE
METAPHYSICS AND THt: TRANSCENDENTALS
are relat�d as multitude is to unity. It is distinctive of reason to disperse itself in the consideration of many things in order to gather the truth. It is proper to the intellectu.s, the mooe of knowing enjoyed by purely spiritual substances. to undersl3.nd immediate ly. in a single intuition, the truth of things,,9 In other texts Thomas compares the relation between reason and intellect with that between movement and rest. The ratio reasons, but the intellect knows non-discursively. The aim of these comparisons is to make clear that reason and intellect are not distinct cognitive powers but are distinct acts of the same power. Since multitude presupposes unity and every natural movement proceeds from something unmovable and ends in something in rest, the process of reason must be reduced to undersLanding as its beginning and its end.5o Although a human being acquires knowledge by the way of reason, he has a certain participation in the non-discursive, intel lectual mode of knowing.51 Intellectual knowledge is the beginning and the terminus of the process of reason. It is the beginning, following the way of compo sitiou or discovery (secundum viam compositioniJ vel invt11tionis) , since the process of reason is possible only when the discourse starts from an immediate insight. in which the intellect comprehends a multiplicity in unity. Again, intellectual knowledge is the termin us of the rational process, following the way of resolution (secundum viam ruolutionis) , insofar as reason gathers one simple truth from many things. The discursive movement ends in understanding. Thomas's intention in q. 6.1 is to show that "according to the process of resolution, the consideration of reason in all lhc sciences terminates in the knowledge of divine science� and thal therefore the consideration of divine science is supremely "i.ntellectual."5� Re'.lson advdnces ill a discourse fJ'om the one to (he other. This movement can occur in lWO ways. The tirst is securldum rem, as
when a demonstration is made through extrinsic causes or effects: either by composition when we go from causes to effects, o r by resolution when we proceed from efl'ccts to causes. The ultimate term of this resolution is attained when one arrives at the highest causes, which are the immaterial substances. The advancement of reason can also occur secundum rationem. Then we proceed accord ing to intrinsic causes: by composition when we go from the most universal forms to the more particular ones, by resolution when we proceed com'erseiy. The ultimate terlll of this resolution is therefore "the consideration of being and that which belongs to being as such." So it turns out that the two resolutions of reason terminate in thal of which divine science treats: the immaterial substances and that which is common to all beings. Hence the consideration proper to this science is supremely "intellectual. ''5'' Although Thomas does introduce a proces� going in the opposite direction from the way of resolution, i. e., the via compositionis, it is striking that he hardly says anything about the method of syn thesis. In this text he is only interested in lhe ultim;ate term of the resolution. But how precisely is the distinction between resolution secundum rationem and resolution .Jl!cundUtn Tem to be understood? One of the few scholars who foregrounds the methods used III medieval philosophy is Ludgcr Ocing-Hanhoff. According to his interpretation, resolution secundum rationem is the analysis of con cepts, which itself pertains to the domain of dialectics; resolution secundum rem is a "natural" (as opposed to "logical") analysis, because through this method not concepts hut a natural thing is resolved into its elements.34 This interpretation is founded on a
4�
Ibid. q. 6.1:
"Difh:rt illitem ratio au intell('Oll siclil mulliludo ab unitate
( ... ) eSt enim rationi� propriulll circa Illulta diffundi ct ex cis Ilnalll simplicem cognitionem colligerc ( ... ) Intelleclus autem e con ucrso Pf!" prius unam et simpHcem ueritatem con5idc:rant et in illa tOlius Illultitudinis co ilionem capiunt�. S.th. 1,79.B. Cr. II-H,B.l 3d 2. hI D' Timt. I!U; 16.1. �'l In BUfIIi. Dt bin. q. 6.1: "lila ergo consideral.io quc e�, te rm inus 101.iu� humane ratiocinalionis, maxime t.$l illtdlerUialis ronsidenllio. TOla ;Ullcm l:ullsidcralio rali onis rcsolueruis in omnibus scientiis ad cOllsidcralinnem diuiu!: K'icnuf' lennin;Ullr.-
�
!I"
Ibid., q.
G.1. See in
particular: -Ralio cnim
( ...)
133
proccdi( quandoqlle de
IIno in a1iud ItCcundum rem. Ul q\lando nt demOllSlr...tio per cau!las lIeI effcclus cxlI'inltCcos; componendo quidem cum proccdilur a causis ad efTeclus, quasi rewluendo cum procedilur ab clTcclibus ad cauus, W quod caUliC MlIlt effeclibus simpliciores el magiS immobilitec c t uniforlllller perlllanenleS; u[limlls ergo
terminus rerolutionis in hac uia est cum peruenitur ad causas slIpremas maxime simplict's, (jlle SUn(. substantie separate. Quandoqlle uero procedit de uno in aliud secundum ralionem, III quando est proc.e.•sII5 .\ec.undulll cau�a., imrinsl'cas; componendo quidem quando a formis maxime unillersalibus in magis particlllata proceditur, resoluendo alllcm (jllando e (onucrso, eo quod Ilniuersa[ius eSI shnpliclu3; maxime :lutem uniuersalia sunt que sunt commu nia omnibus cntibu$, et ideo terminu$ resolutlonis in hac uia ultinllu est consideratio en tis et eorum que sllnt enli.!> in qllanlum huiusmodi. Her alltcm Bunt de quiblls sdentia dillina considerat". !'I4 L. Oeing.Hanhoff, -Die Melhoden dc, Mctaphysik im Miuelaher". in: P. Wilpen (cd.), Du MtUJph]WI ilft MitldDllrr, llir Berlin 1963. pp. 71-91.
Unprung und iJr,., &deutUJ1g,
134
135
CHAPT£R THREE
METAPHYSICS AND THE TRANSCENDI!NTALS
scheme developed in the Dialectica of John Damascene, translated by Robert Grosseteste between 1235 and 1242. In this work the �divisive" method, that is, the method of the analysis of concepts, is distinguished from the "analytical" (rr.fQlutiva) method (also called "natural resolution"), through which the compo!\ed is re solved into the mon:: simple.55 But it seems doubtful that this scheme is congrueut with Thomas's account. If resolution secundum rationem were a rlialectic.d analysis of con cepts, then it is hardly understandahle how Thomas could connect the terminus of this resolution with the subjeci of metaphysics, the ens commune. If resolution secundum rem were an analysis of a thing into its elements, it is incomprehensible how such resolution could terminate in the separate substances. The distinction secundum mtionem / secundum retn is nol the opposition between "logical" and "nalural" analysis. Rather, it concerns that towards which the discursive analysis of reason is directed. This can be another thing, when something is reduced to its extrinsic causes, but this is not the only possible terminus. In resolution secundum ralionem, a thing is reduced to its inU-insic forms or principles. The two forms of resolution correspond to the two forms of com monness Thomas had distinguished in q. 5 art. 4 of his comment ary: commonness by predication and commonness by causality. This correspondence might be confusing at first sight, since OOth resolutions proceed by the analysis of causes. Yet it makes seme to relate resolution secundum rem to causal commonness and resolu tion secundum ratiunem to commonness by predication. The former resolution is an analysis of extrinsic causes and a reduction to the mOSt universal cau�. In q. 5 art. 4, Thomas had worked out only causal commonness by tracing the hierarchy of causes. Resolu tion .secundum ralionem is an analysis of intrinsic causes and a reduction to the most general form. The end-lerm of this process is "being,� that is, that which is predicated of all thing:!'..S6 That r�lution secundum mtionem c.oncerns commonness by predication does not compromise its metaphysical character, for the analysis is carried out to the ultimate form, by which something is being.
There exists an intrinsic connection between this resolution and resolution secundum rem, for the laller reduction is the reduction to the cause of being as being. The method of resolution is cenu-aJ to Thomas's account of the transcendentals in De veritate 1 . 1. In this basic text he pursues a resolution of knowledge in which the concepts of the intellect are reduced to being as Ihe first conception. The understanding of being is the beginning and basis of human rational activity. The cognitive priority of being indicates an essential difference be tween the metaphysical resolutions secundum rationem and secundum rem, for the terminus of the latter resolution, God, is not the first known but the final end of the human desire for knowledge. The difference between the two resolutions marks the distinction made by Thomas between the subject of metaphysics and the causes of this subject. The thesis that being is the first known implies that being is the proper object of the intellect (d. 2. 2.}-being is the formal aspect on the basis of which things are accessible to the intellect. Since being does not exclude anything, the intellect has the most com prehensive object (obiutum communissimum); it is ens universale.57 This description of the object of the intellect illustrates the cor relation between being and knowing in Thomas's thought. This connection s i apparent in the correspondence between the su�iect of metaphYSics and the proper object of the intellect, for both concern being in general. This transcendental openness of the mind is the condition of the possibility of metaphysics as human sCience. In De trinital� 6. I , Thomas mentions the method of composition or synthesis, by which we go from causes to effects or from the most universal forms to the more particular ones. He does not develop, however, an axiomatic metaphysics, although he was acquainted with a striking example of one. In his treaLise D� h".Jxto.. madibus, Boethius intends to deaJ with the problem of the goodness of being according to the method used in mathematics. He therefore starts by listing a number of axioms. In Thomas's view, mathematics is the only science in which the via lompositionis is possible for human beings.!>8 That may br: the reason lh,,( in his commentary all attention is focussed on the method of resolution.
�� John Dam:ucene,
DiD/utiw. VtI'lion of RobeT, iPomtnl#,
49 (ed. 0. A. At:rtsen, �Melhod and L
Colligan, Lotlvain and Padt:rborn 195�, p. 53). Cf. JA. Ml:laphysiu, 1111:: via ,-,.SQ/utWnu In Thomas Aquimu·, in: The New Sdtowticilm 63 (1989), pp. 405418. .�6 For "being" as cau,e, st:e S.th. 1,5.2 ad 2: "Ens fllI'em non importat habitucHnem raus;!e I1bi form;!Ji� ,anflull-.
.�7
S. th. I, 78.1. .'I!I cr. In II D, an
..
lerl.
S, 245.
136
CHAP1't:R THREE
METAPHVSICS AND
The metaphysical resolution (0 being has a "rdlexh'e" or circular structure in the sense that "what was first becomes the last."f>Y It is the reduction to that which is implicit in the knowledge of every thing, but {hat becomes now explicit in its intelligibility as being. This explication occurs in and through the doctrine of the transcendentals.
3.5. Tht: importana uJ Thomas's commrnlmy on "Metaphysics
lV�
The conception of metaphysics Thomas develops in his comment ary on Soe[hius's De trinitale and in the prologue of his comment ary on the Metaphysics elaborates on Aristotle's account in book IV of the Mt!taphysics. 1t is therefore worthwile to take also Thomas's commentary on this book into consideration. This commentary bears a personal stamp. not only by the presence of all kinds of obsclVations that are mostly introduced by the phrase "it should be noted" (sciendum est) , but also by Thomas·s distinctive arrangement of Aristotle's text. A general feature of Thomas's commentary is his attention to the inner connection between the books of the Metaphysics and [0 the structure proper to each of them. This concern is also apparent in his commentary on the fourth book. In the first lectio he explains the structure of this book., characterizing its central theme as the issue "which things this science considers."6u On Thomas's read ing. Aristotle's treatment of this theme is divisible into two parts. First, Aristotle "establishes (stabilit) the subject of this science." In this way. Thomas summarizes well the intention of the brief first chapter of Metaphysics IV. Yet by introducing the notion of �subjecl," which is absent in Aristotle's text, he places this theme more expressly within the framework of the theor}' of science than Aristotle himself does. In this respect the phrase "establishes." tOO, deserves attention. It is taken from Avicenna's Metaphysics, a text which served as the model for the scientific approach to .�!l cr. Dt vrnt. 22.12 ad I : ·cum in reflexione sit quaedam similitudo motus circularis. in quo est ultimum malUS quod primo trat principium, oportet sil" dicere in reflexione lit illud quod primo erat prius, foCcundo fiae po�{(:rius·. I n the very context of resolution, Thomas often rders to 5talement.5 of pscudo-Dionr-oiu5 the Areopagite about the cir(ularity in human knowledge. See, e.g.• Dt 1.mt. 10.8 ad 10. Cf. J. C. DoiK. A",.RQ..I em Mdaph,Jics. p. 7-4. 60 In IV I't1daph., It(l. I, !J29: "Dc quihul el{ conaideraliu hlllll� scienliae.·
THE TRANSC!NDENTALS
137
metaphysics for many medieval authors. Tract. I, c. 2 of his work is entitled De skJbilietldo subUctum huiw sdetltUu. and in this chapter Avicenna establishes being-as-being as the subject of this scicnce.&1 The second part of the treatment of the central issue consists in the discussion of three problems that Aristotle had raised in the third book, the book of the aporias. The first of these difficulties whether this science must consider substances and accidents simultaneously-is analyzed by Thomas in his first iectio, imme diately following on the question as to the subject of this science. His ar-rangemenl of the matter of Metaphysics IV thcrcfor-e implies that this book actually deaJs with three questions: not only (i) the question concerning the proper subject of metaphysics (by which this science is distinguished from the other sciences [lect. 1 ] ) , but also (ii) the question concerning the properties that necessarily belong to this subject (the per se accidentia enlli, such as one and many [lect. 2 - 4]); and (iii) the question whether this science must consider the principles of demonstration (lect. 5 fT.). From this arrangement an important conclusion can be drawn. On Thomas's reading, Metaphysics IV is concerned with three themes, that together constitute the structure of each science. ScUnlia refers to a conclusion, in which a property is predicated of a subject. For that reason, Thomas states in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics, "there are three elements to be considered in every science:" first, the subject-genus, of which the properties are sought; second, the properties or pr:r se accidtuts that art dtmon strated of the subject; third, the axioms (dignitates) from which the demonstration proceeds.6� It follows. on Thomas's view, that the three questions in Metaphysics IV present the complete structure of the science of metaphysics. In contrast to his prologue, the principles discussed in the third question are the principles of demonstration. In the prologue they are the universal causes of being. The analysis of this scientific structure of metaphysics matters greatly to the doctrine of the transcendentals. Nowhere does the essential connection between the conception of metaphysics and transcendental thought figure more prominently than in Tho mas's commentary on Metaphysics IV. The reply to the question as 6t
Libn- tit pIIiro.wphi.a priJntJ I, (. 2 (ed. Van Riel, pp. 9018). 6:i! In 1 Pwt. Anal., le(l. 15, 129. U. le(1. 18: -Olllnis enim demonltnuiua sdenda ejrca tria e�t·: In III Mila""., leci. 5, '90.
138
CHAYTER THREE
to the subject of this science leads immediately to the second question concerning the properties of being as such. which is concentrated on the transcendental "one." The third question (i. e., whether this science must consider the first principles of demon stration) concerns the foundation of human knowledge, an issue that was central. as we saw in our second chapter, in Thomas's reduction of our concepts to somelhing first known. In the present section we restrict ourselves to the first question; the other two problems will be discussed later Thomas first provides an extensive explanation of Aristolle's statement: "there is a science which studies being-as-being." The reduplication "being-as-being" is meant to indicate the difference between metaphysics and the other sciences. The subjects of the other sciences are also beings. Yet these sciences do not consider being·as-being, but only insofar as it is a particular kind of being, for instance, quantitative being. The other sciences are particular sciences. Metaphysics, on the other hand, is the scientia communis; it considers every being as be ing 63 The reduplication states the distinctive formal viewpoint of the science of being. But does .such a �common science" make sense? Is not a particu lar kind of knowledge, for instance, the knowledge that something is quantitative or mobile, more informative than the knowledge that something is a being? Thomas seems to anticipate an Objection of this kind, for he adds a remark on "the necessity of this science." He argues that being and its properties "should not remain unknown since the knowledge of other things depends 01\ them, just as the knowledge of what is proper to things depends on that of what is common.''fi4 Thomas observes in closing that Aristotle. in the remainder of chapter 1 , advances a sort of argument for the thesis that being is the subject of this science. In Metaphysics I first philosophy is defined as the search for the first principles and highest causes of things. But principles and causes are principles and causes of some nature. This nature can only be that of being. Therefore in this science we are seeking the principles of being-as-being. To this .
.
6� In IV Mttaph leet. 1 , 530; 532. Ii�
..
Ibid., leeL. l. 5'1: "Neeessitas autem huius scientiae quae speeulatur ens et per .c accidentla enlis, ex hoc apparet, quia huiusmodi non debe'm ignota remanere, cum ex cis aliorum dependeat cognitio: sieU! ex cognitione com'llunlum depeudet c.QgniliQ rerum pmpriarum . "
METAPHYS1CS AND TKE TRANSCENDENTALS
139
argument Thomas adds a funher inference, which agam illu
strates his propensity to view metaphysics from the theory of science. "Hence being is the subject of this science, because any science seeks the proper causes of its subjecl."M Although Thomas's commentary on book IV of the Mtlaphys;cs does not contain anything new concerning the subject of meta physics in comparison with the two texts we analyzed above (3. 1.3. 3.), lhe commentary is still instructive for the insight it affords in to his own conception of metaphysics What leaps to the eye are the resemblances, even at the level of formulations, of this text and the prologue of his commentary on the Metaphysics. In the two texts, the argument for the view that being is the subject of metaphysics is based Oll the character of scientia, and it is this view that constitutes the personal clement in Thomas's commentary on book IV. In both texts we also find an affirmation of the necessity of the study of the communia. These resemblances justify the conclu sion that Thomas's reading of Metaphysics IV was the foundation for the development of his own conception of metaphysics, which he formulates in the prologue The remaining part of the first lectiu is devoted to a crucial problem of metaphysics: if being is immediately divided into diverse genera and accordingly has a plurality of meanings, how can the science of being be a unily? This question is seen by modern scholars as a fundamental problem of Aristot1e's Mda phJSic.s. P. Aubenque speaks of an "aporia," that can be expreSSt:d in three propositions, all of them endorsed by Aristotle and primaJacie incompatible with one another: 0) there is a science of being-as being; (ii) every science is concerned with a specific genus; (iii) being is no genus.G6 Against this aporia ooe could object that in the second proposition the term "genus" is used in another sense than in the third proposition . Theology provides an example of a science whose subject-genus is not a genus in the strict sense. Neverthe less, the problem remains, in what the unity of the science of being consists, jf being is not related to the categories as a genus to a speCies. Aristotle proposes another type of unity. "Being is said in many ways, but in relation to one thing and one definite nature, and not .
.
fi� Ibid.,
lect. 1, 533: "('rgo ('ns elf subicctum huius scienliae, quia quaeHbct IfJentla nl. quaercnl C�IIIIU proprlu luI lubiec:li." M P. Aubemlue, u fmtbU- h "�N lA,f$ Ari ! l�... p. 222.
140
141
CHAPTER THREE
METAPHYSICS AND THE TRANSCENDENTALS
as a purely homonymous term," He illustrates this kind of predica tion with the famous examples of "health" and "medical," which are said of diverse things according to the relation to one thing. This type of unity is sufficient to guarantee the unity of a science. As Aristotle explains, Moot only in the case of what is sai d
then it is predicated '·equivocally" (aequivoct) , as "dog" is prcdi. cated of a star and of an animal. Thomas is aware of the fact that the Greek commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias had interpreted "being" in this sense, that is, as an equivocal term.69 Sometimes a term is predicated according to concepts that are different in certain respects and the same in others: different insofar as they imply different relations, and the same insofar as these relations
10 one notion does the investigatio n helong to the domain of one science. but also in the case of what is said in relation to one nature. ''67 In his commentary, Thomas regards Aristotle's accauOl as an
according
refer to one and the same thing. Then something is predic
answer to an aporia in the third book of the Metaphysics: does this science consider both substances and accidents? That seems to be the case, for metaphysics considers being: ill ge neral. But then the question arises as to whether the categorial diversity of suhstance and accident removes the unily of the science of being. The key term in Thoma�'s discussion of the text is "analob'Y," a notion that Aristotle does not use but that was advanced in the thirteenth
things, the first to which they refer is not their end or their efficient cause but their subject. The "focal meaning" of being is substance, that exists (hrough il«:lf.'rJ
century interpretation of Metaphysics IV,2. In Dt bono, Albert the Great (1. 3.) traces the model of "anaJogy" back to this classic text on [he spec ial commonness of being. Thomas summarizes his reading of Aristotle's text in a syllogism:
3.6. The inquiry into the "per se" acddent.s of being
Those things which have one term predicalect of them in common, not univocally but analogically, belong to the consideration of one science.
The second question discussed in Metaphysia IV, the question con cerning the necessary attributes of being, is a direct consequence of the structure of the science of metaphysics. As Thomas observes,
the term �being' is p redicated in this way of all beings. Therefore all beings, that is, both substances and accidents, belong to the considt:r.uion of one science which considers being-as But
a science should consider not only its subject but also the accidents proper to its subject. Therefore, "the science of being studies also
being.AA
The minor premise of the argument is examined at length. Being or that which is (ens nve quod est) is said in many ways. But
the proper accidenls of being (lJ'fltis per se accidentia) . "7� The terminology of per Sf! accidenlia, which Thomas introduces, has raised questions among modern exegetes. According (Q j.e.
it must be noted that a term can be predicated of different things in three ways. Somehmes it is predicated according to a concept (ratio) altogether identical. and then it is predicated "un..ivocally" (univlJU'). as "animal" is predicated. of a horse and of an ox. Some times it is prcdicated according to concepts emirely different. and 67 Aristotle. Mdaphyjio IV. c. 2, lOO3a 33- lOO3b 18. 611 In IV Mttaph., lect. I , 534: -Quaecumqlle communiu:r IInius recipiunl praedicationem, liceI non univo<e, sed anaJogice de his praedkel u r,
pertinent ad UniU5 Kienliae considerationem: sed ens hoc modo praedicatur de omnibus entibus: ergo omnia entia pertinent ad con5ideralionem unlus .dentiae, quae con.idera! enl Inquantum e.t ens, scilicet tam 511b:olanlias quam accidentia."
69 In I Ptrih., lcct_ 5, 70.
70 In N MttIlPh., lect. 1, 535.
71 Ibid.,
leet. 1, 536: "Item scicndum quod illud unum ad quod diversae
habitudinea rt:feruntur in analogiciJ, est unum numero, ct non mlum ullum ratione, JiCUI en unum illud quod per nomen univocum designatur. Et ideo ,
Ii
, ,
didt quod ens ctsi dicalUr multiplidler. non tamen dicitur aequivoce, sed per
rcspech.lffi ad unum; non qnidem ad unum quod sit solum ratione_ unum, sed
quod e�t unuln sicUi una quacdam
natura.�
7'l Ibid., lect. I, 539: -ita etiam et ens multipliciter dicit.ur. Sed lamen omne en$ dic1tur per respectum ad unum prim urn. Sed hoc primum non est finb vel emciens �icut in pnlcmissis exemplis, sed aubiectum."
7� lbid., leel..
1 , 529.
142
143
CHAPTER THREE
METAPHYSICS AND THE TRANSCENDENTALS
Daig, for example, "a problem arises (... ) when one asks if the per se accidents of being referred to in the opening paragraphs of this lesson are the nine categories."74 Yet the passage quoted from Thomas makes clear that the expression per se accidtmtia entis occurs in a context that is determined by the theory of science. So "accident" does not refer to the predicaments or categories, but to the doctrine of the predicables that explains the relation of subject and predicate in the proposition,n Thomas's terminology is fully consistent with the framework of the theory of science, into which he places Aristotle's text from the beginning. Every scientia must study the properties that per Sf belong to its subject. In addition to "per se accidents," Thomas also uses the terms primae passiones and propria for them.76 Although the expression "per se accidents" fits perfectly within the structure of the Aristotelian scien.tia, a serious difficulty none· theless arises when this notion is introduced into the science of being. A per se accident has two features. On the one hand, it is joined inseparately and necessarily, that is, per se, with the subject, for it is caused by the essential principles of the subject. On the other hand, a per se accident does not belong to the essence of the subject. Or to put it in a more technical way, such an accident is predicated of the subject according to the second mode of saying per se. In the first mode of saying per se, the predicate belongs to the essence and the definition of the subject, for example, "animal" predicated of "man." In the second mode of saying per st, the predicate does not belong to the essence of the subject, but converse ly the subject does enter into the definition of the predicate. An example of this second mode is the property "ability to laugh" (risibile) predicated of "man."77 A per se accident is outside the essence of the subject and adds something to it. But a relation of this kind becomes problematic at {he metaphysical level. Nothing can be added to being that is
extrinsic to being. The problem therefore is whether Thomas, through the notion of "per Sf: accidents of being," imports a model of science, which is oriented to the categorial order, to the science of being in genera1.78 In this science, the relation of a transcen dental property to being cannot adequately be expressed in terms of a per se accident. Actually we encounter here the problem of the addition to being at the metaphysical level, a problem that, in chapter II, turned out to be basic in Thomas's doctrine of the transcendentals. The second ll!ctio of Thomas's commentary is of direct rele vance to this problem, for it deals with a per SI! accident of being, namely, "one" (unum). In Metaphysics IV, 2 Aristotle makes a statement, that was regarded in medieval thought as fundamental for the transcendentality of the one and for the relation between transcendentals. "Being and the one are the same and are one single nature (Physis) in the sense that they follow upon each other ( ... ) but not in the sense that they are determined by onc concept (logos)" ( lO03b 22-25) . In this text Aristotle mentions two marks that are essential for the relation between being and one: identity in nature, and differencc in concept. One should note that these marks are not the same as the features of a per se accident, for the latter notion does not add something merely conceptual. In his commentary, Thomas does not enter directly into the question how the one can be a per se accident of being. He provides an explanation of Aristotle's arguments for the convertibility of being and one which goes beyond the text on a number of points. We will return to them in the chapters that follow (4. 5. and 5. 4.), but one asp'ect of his account is of interest for the problem of the per se accident as such. It is Thomas's critical discussion of Avicenna's treatment of the problem of addition. In Thomas's understanding, Avicenna acknowledges the con vertibility of being and the one, but is nevertheless of the opinion !hat the one adds something real to that of which it is said. The Arabic philosopher identifies the one that is convertible with being with the one that is the principle of number, and the latter kind of one signifies a reality added to the essence of something. The one that is the principle of number is convertible with being "in the sense that it signifies an accident that is inherent in every being,
7.. Aquinas on Metaphysics, p. 107. 7� See for the twofold meaning of 76 In IV Mttaph., leet. 4, 571.
"accident," De sPirit. Ct'f:at.
II.
"accidentia propria eonscquentia speciem , ut risibilc consequitur hominem et causatur ex principiis e�sentialibus speciei". De spirit. creal. I I : [propriuml nec est essentia rei, nec pars e�sentiae, sed aliquid praeter ipsam.M In V Metaph., lect. 22, 1 1 42: �Suundo modo dicimr accidens, quod inest alicui .ecllndum se, et tamen non est de substantia eius. Et hie e�t secundus mOdli1 dicendi per .eM. See for the modi diandi p,., &t, In I Prut. Anal., leet. 10, 84 fT,
77 S.th.
"
1,3.4:
711
Cf. K. Barthlein,
/Jir Tran,mndmtalimlehrr d" allen Ontologit, pp. 16-17,
144
CHAPTER THREE
METAPHYSICS AND THE TRANSCEND"EN'TAL.S
ability to laugh
145
(risibik) is convertible wi th man."79 Avi ceona wanlS to conceive the relation of a transcendental property to being according to the model of the property "the ability to laugh," which is a per u accident of human being and the classic example
In his reply, Thomas recognizes that risible is convertible with man, but nevertheless adds to man a nature that is outside the
of convertible predication.
way.1I2 Thomas implicitly recognizes here that the model of the
just as the
in his reaction, Thomas does not so much criticize the
model
of
esst:nce of man. The good, however,
if it has to maintain its
transcendental character, cannot add anything to being in this
se accidents
per
is inappropriate to conceive the relation of the other
identification of the one convertible
transcendentals to being. This notion cannot simply be introduced
with being with the one thal is the principle of number. The latter
into the science of being; at least it must be reinterpreted meta
a
per Sf! accident as Avicenna's
one pertains to some particular genus of being-the categol}' of
physically.lI�
It
is worth noting that Thomas himself displays a
quantity-and cannot therefore be convertible with universal
certain reticence with respect to the phrase
being. He argues:
use remains res....icted to the books
For, if the one is a proper and pn se accident of being. iI must be caused by the principles of bcing-as-being, just as any proper accident is caused by the principles of its subject. But it is not intelligible that the common principle s of being-as-being are the 5ufilcient cause of something having a particular mode of bei ng.R O
pn- se accidentia entis. Its
III and IV of his commentary on the Metaphysics. Only in one other place-Summa amlm Gentiles 1, 5O----does he use the same expression. and in this text he is referring explicitly to When Thomas,
Metaphysics IV.s4
in his discussion with Avicenna, wants to
indicate what the one does add to being, he no longer employs the
per se
model of predication. Convertibility is appropriate to express the
accident of being in order to make dear that the quantitative one
identity between being and the one but not their difference, for
In this argument Thomas employs the model of the
cannot be a property of being in general. But is the model itself
convertibility can concern a property that adds a nature to the
adequate for conceiving the relation of the onc and the other
subject. To formulate the difference between the
transcendentals to being? This model implies an
Thomas employs the semantic model of
ontological
dependency upon being, which seems difficult to reconcile with
discussed in sect.
the status of the other transcendentals as prima.
statement in
In one of the objections in
De veritate 21.
I,
the convertibility
between �man" and "the ability to laugh" is proposed as model for the relation between the good and being:
Just as the good and being arc convertible, so also are man and the ability to laugh. nu t although the Iattcr i5 convertible with man, it
nevertlleless adds something real to man, namely a property belonging to the order of accidems. Hence the good likewise adds somclhing rcal lo being.81
2.
transcendentals,
nomen-ratio-res
we
5. No doubt this model is inspired by Aristotle's
Metaphysics IV, 2
that being and one do not have the
same logos. The one adds only something in concept, namely a negation, to being. It signifies that being is undivided. In a posthumously published work,
Eticullc Gilson observes that
the transccnrlentals are convertible wilh being. not however with being as such but with being
a.� known.
The other transcendentals
;iTe given only in knowledge; for beillg itself they
differences
between the transccndcntals are concerned. Transcen·
dentals are really identical with being. hut
79
In N Mttaph., lett. 2. 557: �Dieebat alitem quod hoc unum converolUr
eum t:nte, non quia signiflcat ip,am rei substantiam vel t:ntis, sed quia significat acddens quod inhaere! omni enti, skut risibile quod convertitur cllm homine." ao llJid., leet. 2, 559: "Si eoim unum est proprium et per M! acddens entis. oportet quod ex principiis causetur entis in quanlUrn ens, situt quodlibet aedden, proprium ex prirlei piis sui subiecli. Ex principiis auu:rn corumunibus emb inquantum est ens. non hHe lligitor (:ausari
III
fh ttel'iL 21.1 obj. 10.
�2 Ibid. 2 1 . 1 ad 1 1 : "Tisibile quamvis (UJ\vertatur (,urn nomine, tamen addil aliquam naturam t:xtraneam super hominem. quae est praeter essentiam hom in is: sic "utem nihil potest addi super cn�". For an auempt at such a re-interprct.1tion, see lB. Lotz, "Zur Kon stitution der transzendentalen Bcstirnmungen des Seins narh Thomas yon Aquin", in: P. Wilpt:rl (ed.), Die Mttap"Jsik im Millelalter. Berlin 1063,
85
pp. 337 If.
Sr.G. 1.50: �Pcr se lIUlo:m acciclcntia COli.�. inquantum esl ens.. �unl unum eI mulla, III proballlr in lV Mttaph.. " II!'> E. Giben, CortJl.an'�J pllfi.oJpphilpm de I'ifre, Paris 1';183, PI). 115·117. - IV!
147
CHAPTER THREE
METAPHVSICS AND THe: TRANSCENDENTAL'.
respect to their concepts. Their differences do not lie in the onto. logical oroer, but in the cognitive order. Only in the relationship of being to the knowing subject is being differentiated and made explicit in a plurality of transcendental determinations. Metaphysics studies that which is cummon, being in general and the one consequent upon being. "It is t he:: function of the philosopher," Aristotle says in Metaphysio IV, 2 (lOO4b I ) , "to be able to consider all things." In this respect he resembles the dialeCtician or logician. Thomas. too, recognizes the resemblance: he speaks of ..the affinity" between logic and metaphysics, which becomes apparent in their subject matter. Logic deals with being and those auributes which belong to being; it is, as metaphysics, a sdentia communiJ.�fi In what does the distinction between the two sciences consist? Aristotle lays the emp h asi s on the different method.s of philosophy and dialectics. Thomas, in his commentary, explains the simi larity and the fundamental difference between logic and metaphysics through their subjects. He distinguishes two kinds of being: being that exists in reason (ens mlionis) and being as found in reality (ens ,�aturae) . The r.ommunia dealt with by logic are the concepts that reason forms in the mind, such as the intentions of genus and species. These beings of reason extend to all things of which real being c.:an be predicated. But although the subject of logic has the same extension as that of metaphysics, the meta physician's approach is quile different, since his resolution to that which is common is concerned with the things themselves.R7 Transcendenta1 thought is not the dialectical analysis of concepts.
formulated in book lll: does the consideration of the principles of demonstration belong to the same science that deals with the principles of being� In lutio 5 o f his commentary, Thomas discusses Aristotle's affirmative answer to this question. The answer is based on the distinctive character of metaphysics as .�cie,,'ia com.munis. Since the first principles of demonstration relate to being as such. the consideration of them belongs to the office of the metaphysician. That the first principles relate to being as such appears from the fact that all sciences use them. This follows from the fact that being can be predicated of the subject matter of each science. The particular sciences, however, do not usc the first principles in their universal extension, but insofar as they extend to the particular classes of beings which constitute the subjects of these sciences.�9 In [eetio 6, it is examined what the first and firmest principle of demonstration is. Three conditions are stated which such a prin ciple must meet. No one can be mistaken or be in error regarding it; the principle must not be hypothetical-Aristotle employs the Platonic phrase anhypotheton (IOOSb H)-that is, it must not pre suppose something. but must be self-evident; and, finally. it is not acquired by demonstration.itO These conditions are met by the principle �the same thing cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same thillg in the same rcsJXcL" Thoma...:; calls this principle (for which he in the iect;Q also gives the version "it is impossible for a thing both to be and not to be at the same rimel, "the axiom of all axioms" (dignitas lIrnnium dignitatum). Those mak ing demonslIaLions reduce all their argumen ts to this principle as the ultimate one in resolution (re.solvmdo) .!H This principle he had in mind , when in De ventate 1 . 1 he stated that in demonstrable matters a reduction must be made to self-evident principles.
146
3.7. Metaphysics and the first principle of df.f1lOtlstration The third theme discussed in Metaphysics IV is concerned with the third element in the structure of a !icientia, namely, the prindples from which demonstration proceeds. Aristotle's account in chapter 3 is intended to provide an answer to the problem he had H6
cr. In VII Mttaph., lect. 3, 1308: "haec scienlja [Hil. rnetaphy�itaJ habet.
qmmdam affinil.atem tum Logica propter IItrilisque communitalCUl." In Bolth. Dl Inn. q. 6.1: Mutraque �dentia communis est et circa idem �ubieclum quooammooo.M M7 hI IV M,'aph., lecl. 4. 574. Cf. In 1 Poll. A1IllL . leC!. 20, 1 7 1 . See R.W. Schnlitt\. n., Do_I" r>f i.oKic a«ording fo Sl. ThDllliU Aquirnu. pp. 42-45.
8S Mttaph. Ill, 99Sb 6-10; 99Gb 26-997a 15. Cf. Thomas Aquina.'!, In 111 Metaph., leet. 5, 387: "hie inlendlt dispul.are de con5idemtione principiorum dffllOnstrationiJ, ad quam Jcimliam ptrlilllat�. 119 In IV Metaph., leet. 5, 590.591 . 9() Ibid., lect. 6, 597.599. 91 Ibid., leet. 6, 603: "Et propter hoc omne$ demonstrationes redueunt suas propositiones in hane propositJom:m. situt in ultimam opinionem omnibus communem: ipsa enim est naturaliter principium et dignitas omnium dignitatllmM; 604: "inquanlum in hant reducunl demonstrantes omnia, sieul in ultimum remlvendo". See for Thoma.t'J different venions of the prjnciph:�: In I Prut Anal., leeL5, 50; In X Me/aph., lee(.. 5, 2211; S.Ih. '·11, 94.2; IHI, 1.7.
148
CHAPTER TIIRU
METAI'IIYSICS AND THE TRANSCENDENTALS
lectio 6 with a personal excursus that, as usual, is introduced by the phrase scimdum est and that goes far beyond the littera of the text. What is striking in this exposition is that he Thomas continues
anhypothtto11, the principle of contradiction. He shows that it is dependent (dllpelldd) on some
gives a foundation to Aristotle's
thing else, When one reconstructs how Thomas comes to this conclusion, his argument proves to be a synthesis of several insights from the philosophical tradition. The first momenl in the foundation of the principle of contra
149
kctio, he explains Boelhius's terminology. Boethius calls the axioms termini, "because in these principles the analysis (resolutio) first
of all demonstrations comes to an end." By this explanation Tho mas indicates that the axiomatic method actually entails the way of resolution. Soethius calls the axioms them someone is led
regullu. bec.ause through
to knowledge of the subsequent conclusions.94
But Thomas is primarily interested in thc phrase "commol) conception of the soul." He intcrprel..s it as a proposition that is self�vident, because the
diction concerns the notion of a proposition that is self-evident (Pfff
predicate is induded in the essence of the subject. He argues that
we saw in the first chapter. the reception of this LTeatisc played an
nected with the terms of which such propositions are composed.
se notum) and is inspircd by Boethius's writing Dt htbdomlldibus. As
important role in the beginning of the docLTine of the lranscen dentals because of its central theme, the relation between being and goodness. Thomas is not only interested in this issue, but also in a more general aspect of Boethius's work. which bears upon the
Boethius's distinction concerning common conceptions is con Universally self-evident are propositions that use terms understood by all human beings. That which falls in every intellect is the most general
(maxime communill). Terms of this kind are "being,"
"one" and "good. "95 These three notions are named by Thomas,
basis of transcendental thought as snch.
since through them he is able to give an order to Boethius's
DII hebdomadibu5 with an explanation of his method. He will proceed "as is usually done in mathematics."
Thomas reads Boethius's methodological introduction [rom the
Elemllnts he will put forward a number of axioms, which he calls ttrmini or regulae, on the basis of
foundation of the principle of COnlradiction is a continuing resolu
Boethius slarts
Accordillg to the model of Euclid's
which the argument that follows will be worked out and the question of the goodness of things will be solved. He lisl..s nine axioms of which the first provides a general description of the cognitive status of these axioms: Ma common conception of the soul
(communis animi conaplio) is a statement that anyone approves as soon as he hears it." These conceptions are distinguished by Boethius into two groups: some are known to all human beings, others only to the wise,'l2 In the preceding, fifth,
ltclio Thomas had
referred to this distinction of Soelhius.9� Thomas wrote a commentary on
Dt hebdomadibus. which was a
quite unusual text to comment on in the thirteenth century. In the 92
Boethiu5, De hel>domadibus (ed. Stewart e.a" pp. gS-40): OUt igitur in mathematica fieri solet ccterisqllc edam di�ciplini5. praeposui terminos regu lasque quibus CllnCla quae sequuntur effidam. (I) Communis animi conceplio est e�llntiatio qilam quisque probal audium. Hamm duplex modus est. Nam . una Ita communiS trl, lit omnium sit hominum (...) Alia vera est doctorum [allium. qllae tamen ex talibu5 comrnunibus animi conceplioniblls "cnil", 9� In IV Mtlaph leeL 5, 595; "Unde Boitius dicit in libro De hebdomaJibus, quod qu;u:dam SUIl{ per Ie nota sapien\ibus quae non S!lnt per se nota omnibus,- Thom;u refers to this distinction at several places in hili work. See especially S.th. 1,2.1. .•
axioms, which remains fully implicit in
DII htbdomadibus itself.
perspective of the transcendentals. The first moment in his tion: the reduction of self-evident propositions to the terms of which they are composed. The first principles of demonstration are composed of the transcendental nolioos. The second moment is the idea that there is
a certain order in
the apprehension of the most common notion!'. That which the intellect first conceives is "being." This is the reason, Thoma., argues in his commentary on the sciences
take
the
universally
Posterinr Analytics, that all
self-evident
proposition
"it is
impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the same time" from
metaphysics, since it is the office of this science (0 consider being and that which belongs to il.% Thomas always refers to Avicenna for the thesis that being is the first conception of the intellect. This thesis was widely invoked. not only by Aquinas but also by other thinkers of the
94 In De Mbdqm.. led. I. 95 Ibid.. leel. 2: -iIIe:: proposilionl!�
�unt mallime:: note:: que utuntul' tI:rmini� quos omne::s intdligunt; e3 autem que in intdlcctu omnium cadunt .�\lnt maxime communia, que $unt ens. unum et bonum". 96 If! I PoJ!. AnaL, Iccl. 5. 50.
150
151
CHAPTER THRt:E
METAPHYSICS AND THE TRANSCENOENTALS
thirteenth and fourteenth century. An explanation of its influence may be that Avicenna bases the firstness of being on the parallel. ism with the structure of demonstrative science. Just as propositions must be reduced to a first evident principle, so too the conceptions of the human intellect. The beginning of Thomas's account in De verillde L ) is completely determined by the idea of this parallelism tak.en from Aviccnna (d. 2. 2.). In his commentary on Metaphysics IV, however. Thomas goes a step further in comparison with both Avicenna and his own account in De venta/e 1 . 1. There is not only a parallel between the order of conceptual knowledge and that of demonslration, bUl that which is the principle in the order of conceptions is the foundation of that which is first in the order of demonstration. The point of departure of his argument is the Aristotelian view that the intellect has two operations. The first is the operation by which the intellect knows "what something is." the other the operation by which it composes and divides, that is, by which it forms affirmative and negative statements. In both operations there is something first. In the lirst operation the first that the intellect conceives is "being" nothing can be conceived by the mind unless "being" be understood. The principle "it is impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the same time" depends on the understanding of this first. For that reasun this principle is by nature the first in the second operation of the intellect.97 The new moment in Thomas's commentary is that he grounds the first principle of demonstration on what is absolutely first, i. e., "being." He gives what we might call a "transcendental" founda tion to the principle of contradiction. The term fundatur is used by Thomas himself in Summa theologiae I-II, 94.2. This text represents an exemplary synthesis of the different moments we have analyzed thus far. Thomas first mentions Boethius's distinction concerning that which is per se notum. Next he establishes an order
In the most common notions. Here Avicenna's view that "being" is the first known gets its place. Finally Thomas presents the relation of foundation he had worked out in his commentary on
97 Tn N MrMph., leet. 6, 605: "Ad huiu� autem evidentiam sciendllm est, quod, cum duplex sit operatio intel1eClu�: una, qua cognosdt quod quid est (... ) ; alia, qua componit ct dividit: in utroque e5t aliquod prim urn: in prim a quidem operatione est aliquod pri murn, quod £adit in conceptione intellcc�u�, 5dlket hoc quod di£o en.1.; nee aliquid ha£ operatione POlcSI men� £onClpl, nisi intclligatur ens. 1:'.1 quia hoc principium, impolSibile CSt csse c{ non ene: ,imlll, dependel ex intdkclU enlis ( ... ) , ideo hoc etiam princi pium CSt naturali tcr primum in lecunda operatione inteltectll5, s.cilieet componentia et dividenlj5. "
Metaphysics IV:
he�e �s
a cer: In m:.tn's appn�hension of the most common notions.. . tain order. For that which first falls under apprehenSion IS bemg, the understanding of which is included in all things whatsoever somc::i>ouy :.tpprehends. For this reason the fint i ndemonstra le . princip le , "it is imro�sihle 1.0 affirm and dl':ny snnultaneously. IS based (fo:ndat?tr) on the notions of bein g and �non_being."98
�
,
"
"
3.8. The question of being and the hislQry of philosophy The preceding sections may give the impression that Thomas's interest in the science of being is only of a theoretical nature. Such a suggestion, however, would be incorrect. His works furnish sufficient evidence that the transcendental way of thought is not mnely an abstract possibility for him. On the conlrary. the trdnscendental view turns out to be the perspective from which Thomas understands the evolution of philosophy. This reading is best supported by the sketch of the historical progress of philosophy that he presents in five writings: De potentia 3. 5; Summa contf'a Gentiles n,S7; In V/ll Physicae, lect. 2; De substantiis separatis c. 9, and Summa theologiae 1,44.2. We take the Jast text as point of departure, employing the other texts to complete our analysis. The question in Summa theologiae I, 44.2 i.� MWhethe prime . matter is created by God?" Thomas docs not say why he raises tim question after having shown in 44.1 that "it is necessary that every . being is created by God." The reason must be that the notion of prime moHter poses a special difflculty for the idea of creation. That appears from (he parallel texts in the Summa contra Gnitilr..s and the commentary on lhe Physics. The common supposition of the Creek philosophers was that "from nothing comes nothing" (ex nihifo nihil fit). On the basis of this supposition Averroes had controverted the teaching of the Christian faith about creation from nothing (ex nihilo) .Y9 F,very instance of coming-to-be requires something pre-
�
.')/1
.... Ih. 1.11,94.2. For the anillyai. of thi. text, .ee .eel. 7.8. In VTlI l'h,f., lect I, 97'. cr. Averroe�, In Ph],., VlII, t. 1'01. :-14 I m·h). \tll
,
(:.
4 (ed. Ven.,
152
153
CHAP'T£R TIiREE
METAPHYSICS AND THE TRANSCENDENTALS
existent, a substratum that in the final analysis is prime matter. In the first book orlhe Physics (c. 9, 192a 25-34), Aristotle demonstrates that prime matter is ungenerated and incorruptible, because it is the prerequisite condition for every becoming. If prime matter had come to be. it would already have to have been before its coming-le? be. It is in view of the special stalus of prime matter as substratum of every coming-to-be that Thomas presents the history of human reflection on lhe origin of things. An important feature of his account is the correlation of the history of philosophy with the order of human knowledge. Histori· cal rcason proceeds in keeping with the mode of knowing proper to human beings:
transcend the distinction between substance and accident with the inteliect."IO? Since accidental forms are sensible through them selves, they asserted that all forms are accidents and that the substance of things is matler, which they regarded as having no genesis and as incorruptible. The consequence of Ihis "material istic" way of thought is that coming-to-be W'dS understood as noth ing else than an. accidental change of a permanent substance, that is, as an "alteration" (alteratio) . As examples Thomas offers the processes of rarefaction and condensation, and of combination and separation. These accidental changes were auributed to causes like "Friendship and Discord" (by Empedocles) or "Mind" (by Anaxagoras) .IOS The second stage in the history of philosophy was reached when form was no longer regarded as accidenlal, but as substan tial. Later thinkers "resolved sensible substance.� into their essential parts of matter and form. �104 Matter is itself not actual, as the pre Socratics held, but pure potency that is brought into act through substantial form. The composition of form and matter makes it possible to acknowledge essential changes, the coming-to·be of substances. rn the �formal" way of thought coming-to-be is a generatio which terminates, in accordance with the Aristotelian adage "m.m generates man," in the species of that which is gener ated. These comings-to-be were attributed to more general causes, such as the oblique circle of the sun accordi.og to Aristotle (in De gentralione ll,lO, 336a 32) or the forms according [0 Plato.'1l!> Thomas points out, however, that the "formal" way of thought cannot he the last phase in reflection on the origin of things. In
The ancients in their consideration of the nature of things pro ceeded in accordance with the order of human knowledge. There fore , as human knowledge comes to intellectual insight starring from the senses, the first philosophers occupkd themselves with sensible thin s, and thence gradually reached the realm of the intelligible. J(
l
The evolution of philosophy corresponds with the dependency of human intellectual knowledge on sense knowledge. As a result of this dependency, the mode of knowing proper to human beings is the ratio. It is a mode of knowing marked by discursivity, that is, by its progression from one thing to another. The history of philosophy itself has the structure of a rational discourse. ]n the progress of philo�phy Thomas distinguishes three main phases. IOI Each of these phases is marked by " determinate way of thought that implies a distinctive vicw of the ontological structure of things. To these different ideas about the composition of things, there correspond three modes of coming-to-be or origin and three modes of causality. The history of philosophy starts with the pre-Socratics. Their thought dearly shows the sensory origin of human k.nowledge, for they were preoccupied with sensible things. They claimed that there existed no other beings (entia) but sensible bodies. Charac teristic of the first philosophers is that "they were not able to
]02 D� surul. $epar., 1 0:1
unt in
9.
I)on existimabanl esse entia
nisi corpora sensibilia. Quorum qui poncOOnl in cis mOlum, non considerab:ml mOlllnl nisi secundunl aliqua acddelltia, III pllta secundum rarilalcm et densitatem. congreg.uionem el segregationcm. Et suppan""n\c$ ipsam substantialll rorporum incrcalam, a.s�igl\abant aliqu...s causa� huiu!modi acddentaiium lra.mmutationurn, intdlectum, aut aliquid huiusmodi.-
104
105
11m Dt poi. 3.5: ·suundulll ordincm cognitioni! humanae procc»c:runt anliq lli in eonsideraliolle n"lurae rerUIll. Unde cum cogn itio humana a � . n$1L incipiens in intdleelttm perveniat priort5 pMlruophi cirea sensibilia rucrull! oceurati, el e... his paulatim in in tcl ligihilia pervenerunl." 10 Only in D,. subJ/. sfjJar., c. 9 doel Thomas diSling\li�h fOllr phases; he does 50 by making a di51innion wilhin the firM pha$�.
c
S.lh. 1,44.2: �anliqui philowphi paulatim. ct quasi pedetentim. intravcr cogn itionI'm veritatis. A principio enim. q uasi gro�iores exiSlentu.
UI puta amicitiam, lhem,
De subsl. upaT., c. 9.
S./h. 1,44.2: "Ult�riu5 vero procedentes, disdnxenull per intellectum inter rormam sUbsla n \ial�m el mau:riam, qllam ponebant im:reatam; (":\ per
ceperll..1 Iransmutationl'm fieri in corporibus secundum rormas eS5ential�s. Qllarum Iransmlltationum quarollm causa.s uoiversaliort::s ponebanl, ut obli qtlllm circu lum secundum Arinotelem, vel ideas, secundum Platonem: Thoma� ..lillx,rat.e. the Arbtoteli:;m and Platonic con ceptions of causality in lJ� .ubil. '�fI'" c. In. &e J. A. Aernell, Nalu,." and o,,,,lul'"l. pp. !l02-31O. ,
154
CHAPTER THREE
METAPHYSICS AND THE TRAN.';CENDENTALS
Summa theologicu I,44.2, he adduces an important consideration for
il. Matter is contracted by a form to a determinate species. just as
106
Ibid.
1,44.2: -Sed considerandum e�t quod materia per formam contra' hitur ad delt'rmin;l.1Mn speciem; �icut substantia alicuius speciei per accidens ei adveniens contrahitur ad determinatum modum essendi, ut homo contra' hitur per album. Utrique igitur consideraven�nt ens particular! (ll1adal1l . consideratione , vel in quantum est hoc tmS, vel mquantum est talt mi. El SIC rebu� CiUI$a.\! agen tes particulares assignavcrunt.� 107 Dt subJI. Jtpar. c. 9: �oportet igitur supra modum fiendi quo aliquid fit forma materiae adveniente, praeintelligere aliam rerum origincm". .
lOti
109
Ibid. . c. 9. S.th. 1,44.2:
"Et ul teri\i� aliqui erexnunt SI! ad eonsiderandum ens in· quantum est ens: et con�jderaverunt eausam rerum, non solum secundum quod Ulnt haec vel lalia, $ed �ecundum quod sunt tntia, Hoc igitur quod est calL&a rerlLm in quamum tunt entia, oportet eM!: causam rerum, non solum secun· dum qtlod sunt lalia per forma.'! acddentales, nec secundum quod sunt hate per
155
Characteristic of the history of philosophy in Thomas's under standing is the progrcl>Sion from a particular to a more universal consideration of being, When Aristode states that prime maller is ungenerdotcd, he is speaking of the particular mode of coming-to-be in nature. At this level it holds: "nothing comes from nothing," But Thomas insists that we arc speaking of the coming forth of things from the universal principle of being. NOl even maLLer itself is excluded from this coming forth. IIO Thomas centers the history of philosophy around the question of being. The transition from the second to the third phase is the decisive moment in this history. That transition is to be described as the transition from the c3tegorial level to the transcendental. In the first and second phases things arc considered insofar as they are such beings in virtue of accidental forms or these beings in virtue of substantial forms, The distinctive feature of the way of thought in the third phase is that it is transcendental, It inquires into the origin of being, taken in its generalness (ens autem communiter .mmptum) , I l l This approach marks the beginning of the metaphysical consideralion of reality. Thomas's sketch of the history of philosophy confirms the conclusion of the first sections of this chapter: the very conception of metaphysics has itself become tr.lIlscendcn(al. Thomas does not identify thc aliqui who finally raised them selves to the consideration of being-as-hcing. Did he have himself in mind? Qui� a number of alternative suggestions have been made,ll\! The opinion that Avicenna is mC:'lI1t has plausibility, for there is at least one text in which Thomas says that "some philo sophers," such as Avicelllla, havc recognized on the hasis of demonstration that God is the CreaLor of things.113 The philoso phical necessity of a science dealing with being as being is more important for Thomas, however, than the historical beginning of metaphysics. fornms mbstantiales, sed edam secundum omne illud quod pertinet ad esse illorum quoeumque modo.� , . . . 1 1 0 Ibid. 1.44.2 ad I : ·Ph!1o�ophus in I Ph,�ic. loqUItur de fien partlf.:ulan ( ... ) nunc autem loquirnur de rebus secundum emanationem (Carum ab universali princlpio essendl. A qua quidelll emaflatiune flee materia excludit\l�, lied. a primo modo factioni! e;IC:dudatur." I I I D, mbJI. Jtpaf'. c. 9. 1 1 2 Cf. lA. Aertw:n, Nature and OtalUfl, p. 200, n. 27. On Thoma§'s rias§ifl ration of Plato and ArhlOfle within Ihe philo,ophinl tradition, Me pp. 208-9. I l � 1" 11181"111., 2!U.2 ol!i. 2 .
156
157
CHAPTER THREE
METAPHYSICS AND THE TRANSCENDENTALS
One of the most remarkable features of Summa theologiae I, 44.2 is thal the idea of creation appears as the result and the completion of the internal development of human thought. The argument does not appeal to any text from Scripture. Thomas's philosophical reflection about the origin of reality is a more adequate example of Gilson's concept of "Christian philosophy" than the "metaphysics of Exodus" (eL sect. O. 1.). The Christian idea of creation is inter preted fTOm the perspective of transcendental thought as a causality that extends to being in general. "Something is called created because it is a being (ens), not because it is this being (hoc ens) ." I J4 In Thomas's account of the history of philosophy we recognize the two forms of resolutio, the resolutions secundum rationem and secundum rem, which he had presented as the methods of meta physics (3. 4.). On the one hand, human reason proceeds from the particular forms to the most universal ones. The ultimate term of this resolution is the consideration of being. In the parallel text in De substantiis separatis, c. 9, Thomas describes this process in terms of a type of resolutio that we have not yet encountered. It is the resolution of being imo its internal principles: in the last phase of the evolution of philosophy each thing is resolved into "that which is" and its "being" (esse) . On the other hand, a causal reduction occurs that terminates in the universal cause of being. Thomas's account shows the inner connection between the two resolutions for the fact that the causality of the first cause is universal can onl be understood, when the proper imelligibility of being-as-being is considered.
Thomas's conception of first philosophy has made clear that his metaphysics has its center "no longer, as up to now a certain tradi tion of Aristotelian predominance has accustomed us to think, in a treatise on substance and the categories, but on one concerning the transcendentals."1l5 The general conclusion we may draw from the analysis in this chapter is that Thomas's account of the transcendentals is not an isolated doctrine, but has an intrinsic connection with his metaphysical views. The most important aspects of this connection can be summarized in five points. (i) The first and most fundamental aspect is his view of the subject of metaphysics. Our analysis of the commentaries on Boethius's De lrinilale and Aristotle's Metaphysics has shown a shift from a theological conception of metaphysics, based on transmaterialtty, to an ontological conception, based on commonness. The subject of first philosophy is not the first being, that is transcendent, but being in general and that which is consequent upon being. Against the background of this shift, it becomes understandable why the doctrine of the transcendentals was first framed in the thirteenth century. The conception of metaphysics itself became transcen dental. (ii) The second aspect is the way in which God is considered in metaphysics. At the end of the second chapter (2.7.) we raised the question as to the relationship between the divine and the tran scendental. This relation has been found to be a causal one: the divine is studied by the science of being, insofar as it is the cause of its subject. That means that this causality extends to being-as-being and is consequently not categorical but transcendental. As it appears from his sketch of the history of philosophy, there is a close relation between a transcendental consideration of being and the study of the divine in Thomas's conception of metaphysics. (iii) The third aspect concerns the connection between metaphy sics and the method of resolution. Distinctive of the metaphysical consideration is the twofold reduction of reality to something ultimate. Secundum rationem this ultimate is that which is most common, i.e., being and its transcendental properties; secundum rem it is that which is first in the order of things, i.e., the universal cause of being.
;
3.9. Concluding observations In the second chapter we analyzed three texts in which Thomas gives a general account of the transcendentals. In the present chapter Thomas's doctrine has been placed in a broader philoso phical framework, that of "the second beginning of metaphysics." Central elements of the preceding chapter-the resolution into something first (2. 1.), the idea of being as the first known (2_ 2.), and the problem of the addition (2. 3. and 2. 5.)-were recon sidered, but now from a metaphysical perspective. Our inquiry into 114 S.lh. 1,45.4
ad I .
I I � C. Fabro, "The TnmsccndcnlalilY of £ns-Esu and the (;round of Mt�ta phy�in", p. 426.
158
CHAPTER THREE
(iv) The fourth point is the nolion of per se accidents of being. The significance of Thomas's commentary on Metaphysics IV is that it advances the three-fold structure of Lhe scientia communi.!:. which consists of its subject, the properties of the subject and the principles of demonstration. Bm the introduction of the notion of per St accidents into the science of being leads to a difficulty lhal was described in chapter II as the problem of the additio n to being. A per 5e accident is a predicate that is consequ en t upon the subject, but does not belong to its essence. It adds something real to the subjecL But transcendental properties cannot make such an addition to being. The structure of Aristotelian science cannot simply be applied to the study of the transcendentals. (v) The last element is Thomas's transcendental foundation of the first principle of demonstration. In this foundation the cognitive aspect of the doctrine of the transccndentals comes to the fore. Thomas develops his doctrin e, as we saw in chapter II, from the perspective of the Yt:$olutio of human kn owledge. Transcendentals are the first conceptions of the intellect. Being is the maxime primum, that is the condition of the possibility of cognition and science . With this Archimedean point we must occupy ourselves in the next chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR
BEING AS THE IlRST TRANSCENDENTAL
prologue to his De tnle el usentia, Thomas states that "being" (ens) and "essence" are that which is first conceived by the intellect. Interesting is the ex.planation he provides there of his reasons for devoting a separate treatise to these first conceptions:
In the
A small error in the beginning grows to a vast one at the end, according to the Philosopher in De eatia 1, 5. Now "being" and
�essence� are that which is fIrst conceived by the intellect, as Avicenna says in t.he begin ni ng of his Metaphysics. I n order to avoid errors through ignorance of these, we must therefore clarify their difficulty and state what is signified by the names "bcingH and "essence. �l
Thomas applies Aristotle's statement which in De caelo (271 b 813) con cern s the presupposition of natural philosophy that there cannot be an infinite body to the very starting point of human thought. An initial error with regard to the first conceptions leads eventually. Thomas thus suggests, to a faul ty understanding of the principles of metaphysics and of lhe entire doctrine of the tran scendentals. Hence it is necessary (0 clarify the prima inteUigibilia. ,
,
Thus lhis text confirms our conclusion at the end of chapter 1I: for
Thomas, the thesis that being is thaI. which is first conceived does lIot render the question o f being superlluous. The need for clarification applies to all three clements of this thesis, namely, ··being," "first," and "conceived by the intellect.n They correspond to the questions Thomas discusses barely if at all, as we saw, in thc hasic text!> about the transcendentals: first, why does being have primacy (4.1.)? second, in what way is being apprehended by man (4.2.-4.3. )? and third, what is the ratio of being (4.4.)? Thc clarification of these three related questions, which forms the core of this chapter, is indeed of systematic 1
De mle, pro!.: �Q\lia p31"\1US error in prilll:ipio magnus e.u in fine. secun
dum Philowphum in r Caeli el mundi (c. 5). ens autem et essentia sunt quae primo inldlel:tu (oncipillnWT. III didI Avkellna in prindpio sliar Mrlaph., ideo, nt: ex t:'Hlllll i)(IWTan ii a crr,lre (.o!Hingel, ad horlllll difCiclIlf.at("lIl a�ri("ndmll dinmdulll ("JI. (Illid 11()lIItOt: t:u("rHiae 1:1 enti5 �iRnilkrtllr�.
160
161
CHAPTER FOUR
BEINe AS THE FIRST TRAN!iCENOENTAL
importance, as th� prologue of De rote et es.senlia suggests, because it concerns the roundation of the theory of the transcendentals. Moreover, Thomas's explication is of historic importance. for he
and common to all. and we therefore eto not ascribe it to the wise man. In h is commentary, Thomas argues that what is most diffic u lt to know is most universal, since it is farthest removed
from the Sensible things from which all human knowledge slarts. Hence the most difficult science is the one that deals with what is most universal . 2 But Thomas himself advances an objection to this argument. Is
assumes a critical stance towards both the view of Avicenna, from whom he borrows the idea of first conceptions, and that of his contemporaries. In thi� critique Thomas's own form of transcen dental thought becomes apparent. Also striking in the prologue is that not only "being" but also " esSt:ncc" is pre se nted as the first con ception of the intellect. Essmtilt must be equivalent here with Tes, for this nOlion, and nol
no t that which is more universal known prior to that which is less universal? Human inrellectua1 k.nowledge proceeds i n d definite order. from common to more specific knowledge. We have a gene...ic concept, e.g., Manimal," before we have a specific concept, e. g., "man." This objection compels Thomas to make a distinction that is of central importance for his view of the firstncss of being. His reply to the objection is that what is more universal in simple apprehension is the first known, for that which falls first upon the intellect is "being," as Avicenna says. But in the investigation of causes the less common is first known, for we come to universal causes through particular causes. There is thus a discrepancy
essence, is explicitly mentiont:d in the passage of Avit:enna's Meta physics to which Thomas refers. The prol ogue of De tnte el turotia points to the close connection between ens and res, which we also found in the derivation of (he transcendentals in De vmiate 1 . 1 . There "thing" follows directly after "being and is counted among the transcendentals which pertain to every being in itself. This connection motivates our discussion of "thing" in this chapter. It is appropriate to discuss it here for historical reasons as well, since the later tradition denies thai res is a separate transc:el\dental and views it as 3110lher name for "being." We accordingly close the fourth chapter with a section about "being" and '"thillg" (4. 5.). "
ben..'een what is universal in causing (univet'solia in CGw:andQ) and what is universal by predication (univermua per praedicatwnem) . The latlcr is first known "in reference to us" (quoad nos) ; the former is later known to us, although it is ontologically (secundum na/uram)
prior.� We encountered the distinction between two types of commonness earlier, in the discussion of Thomas's conception of metaphysics, but in this text the distinction between commonness by predication and commonness by causality is associated with the diflerentiation of the cognitive first from the ontological first. The differentiation is elaborated in De veritate 10. 1 1 . In the tenth objection it is argued:
-1.1. The firstness of being The firstness of being is the foundation of Thomas's derivation of the transcendentals. In aU thret basic texts he affLrms the absolute primacy of be ing. Being is lhe first. because it is the lerminus of the resolution of our concepl.'I and is included in all concepts. As he states in one of the basic texts, "without being, nothing can be appreh ended by the intellect" ( In J Sentrntiarnm 8.1.3). A more prec ise stalemem of the fi rstne ss of being is found in Thomas s commentary on the Metaphysics. In book I, chapter 2 Aristotle enumerates six common opinions 011 wisdom and the wise man. Thomas agrees with Aristotle that the attributes assigned to wisdom all have in common their being related to knowledge of the first and uni\'ersal causes. But the arguments Thomas provides for this relation arc largely of his own making. One or the opinions mentioned is that we call "wise" one who is
Just as being
'
"hie to k.now difficult things. Knowledge or �nsible things is easy
that is
predicated of all is
the first
in commonness
(primu"," in commUl'ljta�) , so bc::ing whereby all is causro is the firsl in all causality (primum i'l causafitate), namely, God. Now. being that is
2
j
,
;I
,
In I Mtlal'''", leet. 2, 45. Ibid., Ic:CI. 2, 46: 'Sed dicc::ndum, quod magis univcrsalia secundum sim
pliccm apprehensionem sunt primo nota, nam primo in intdkctll cadit ens,
lit
Avicenna dicit. et priu� in intcllcuu cadit animal quam homo. (...) Sed quan
tum ad invc:stigationem naturalium proprielatunl el eaUS<1.rum. prius sunt nota minus communia; eo quod per causas p:uticulares. quae sunt lInius generis vel
speciei, pc:.....cnimu$ in caUilaS unh·cnales. Ea aUICm qu..c slInl IInivrrsalia In causando, 1unt pOSlerius nOla quo ad n05. liCe! sint prius nola �cundum
nalUram, quamvis univenalia pc:r prac:diulionc:m Joint aJiquo modo prills quo ad n05 nola quanl \\\lnul Ilni�rsalia, Ikel non prill. nOla quam lingulartll-.
162
BEING AS THE ."IRST TRANSC£NDENTAL
CHAPTER FOUR
first in commonness is the first conception of our intellect in this s(�te of life (in llalu: vi/U) . Therefore we can know immediately In its essence being thaI is fll�t in causality. In his reply Thomas rejects the parallelism between being that
IS
first in causality and being that is first ill commonness, The
former transcends aLi things; no other thing is in proportion (0 it.
Therefore. this being cannot be sufficiently knowlI by means of something else. What is first in commonness, by contrast, i§ apprehended ill the knowledge of each thing. for this heing i� cssentially the same for each thing. Hence, in this slate of life in which we know by means of species abstracted from things, we sufficiently know being in general
(ens commune) , bUl not
uncreated bcing � .
Read together, these two expositions-the commentary on Meta
physics
I,
2 and
Dc veritate
10. 1 I-afford a picture of how Thomas
understands the lirstncss of being, The firstness in question is a priority in the cognitive order; what is first in this order is being common by predication, not by causality. In adopting this view, Thomas rejects two rival conceptions, one that interprets the firstness of being in a different sense and another that denies the firstness of being. His opposition to these two conceptions is funda
163
of this method in his ltinerarium, which we mentioned In section
0.4. as an example of transcendental thoughL We know what a thing is through ilS definition. A definition is
formed by r�ducing the object defined to a higher, that is, a more
turn must be reduced to a still higher concept. and so on lIntii one attains ;\l last that which is most general (gnle1'alissima) . These are "being" (ens) and its lr3nSCen
general concepL This in ,
dental conditions: "one," �true." and "good." Hence everything that man conceives is implicitly known as "bcing.� Bonaventure, however, in distinction to Thomas, maintains that the reduction of human knowledge requires an additional step. With the reduction to "being� the resolutio is not yet complete, for being can be conceived as imperfect and perfect, changeable and unchangeable, dependent and absolute-Bonaventure men tions a series of disjunctions. that may have influenced the notion of disjunctive transcendentals, prominent in the doctrine of Duns Scotus. Now, imperfections or privations are only known by means of positive determinations. Therefore, the knowledge of the finite as finite must be based on the knowledge of the perfect, unchangeable and absolute being. In a complete resolution (intellec
tus plene resolvens) ,
it turns out that our intellect cannot understand
mental for understanding his doctrine of the Ir.mscendentals,
any created being when it is not aided by insight into the most
(i)
the conclusion that being which comes first ill the inlellect is pure
The
first conception takes the firstness of being in
the sense that
God is the first known. An adherent to this view is Thomas's contemporary, the franciscan Bonavc!1lurc. Tht:re exist structural
similarities between his thought and Thomas's, despite their different outcomes. Bona"enture also inquires into the foundation of every knowledge that claims certainty. Like Thomas. the method he follows in doing so is one of the reductio or resolulio of human knowledge,� Bonaventure provides a concrete elaboralion
. 4 D�
verit. 10.11 ad 10: "en5 quod est primum per communitatem, cum sit l�em per 7s,endam r�i cu.ilibet, nUll ius proportion em excedit, et. ideo ill cog· . . . muone clll1isJlbel rei lpsum cognosCLtur; sed ens quod primum est causa)iw.te e��edit improponionaliter omnes alias res, unde per nul1ill� ah.erill� cog· nillonem sllfficlellter cognosci polest; et ideo in statu viae. in quo per 'pecies 11 rebus abstractas imelligimu$, cognosdmus ells commune suffidcnl.cr, non autem ens in(realum.� cr. ibid. 10.12 ad 1 0 (in contrarillm): �en$ commuoe quod incognitum use non potest." . � cr. .A. Spee r, "MtlaphYlica rtduuns. Metaphysik als crlle Wi uens.charl 1m Verstandliis Bonavenlllras", in: R,.c/a/!ITM de Thiologie oncitnn� d medlivak 57 (1990). pp. 142-82.
pure and absolute being,1) F.-om this resolution Bonaventure draws
act;
it is the divine being
Yet
(esse divinum) .7
is this conclusion not contrary to human experience, for
which the knowledge of Cod is not the most evident knowledge? Astonishing to Bonaventure is the hlindness of the intellect, which docs not consider that which it sees first and without which it cannot know anything. He draws a comparison with the eye, which is so fixed on the plurality of colors that it does not see the very light whereby it perceives all the rest. Likewise our intellect,
fixed on finite things, fails 10 notice the light of being (esse)
itself. although this is the condition for all further knowledge.ll
6 Itinerarium III, 3 (Ope'fII Oll'mill V,
p. S04): "Cum 'privationes et defeclU� nullatenus possim (ognosci nisi ptr po�ilion�s' (Avtrroes. In III De anima)" non v�nit intdlectu� nO�I,er ut pltnt rnolllr.ns intdlectum alkuills entiulJ! creatorum, nisi iU1iIlIl'r ab i mc:lleclu �ntis jlllriMimi, a(tua1i�_�illli, completis simi et abwillti". 7 l�d. . V. 3 (Opml Qrnnill V, pp. 308-9). It Ibid. , V, 4 ( 0fJt"'1J Omnill V, p. W'J).
•
164
165
CHAI'TER FOUR
SEING AS THE FIRST TRANSCENDENTAL
Distinctive of Bonaventure's transcendental thought is the identi.
forms from images of phantasms. Therefore. forms of this sort are
fication of that which is cognitively prior with that which is
first known by our inlellect. Among thest: forms those are prior
ontologically prior: the divine being is the first known.
that first occur to the abstracting intellect. These are the ones that
In his commentary on Boethius's De trinita!e I.
3, Thomas raises
the 'l uestion: ;oWhcther Cod is what the mind knows first?" (Utrum dl':tJ.S sit fJrimu.m quod a mente cog'lloscitur) . His negative answer to this question is divided illto two parts. The first part is a direct criticism of the view that Cod is the first known; the second part is a positive elaboration of what is first known by man. Thomas starts by rejecting the opinion of "some� (quidam) , according to which the first lhat the mind knows, even in this life.
is God himself,Y This opinion is false for several reasons. To begin
have a greater extcn!lion. Hence the intellect first knows the more
universal, like "being" and "one. "10 From this Thomas draws the
conclusion that it is ahsolutely impossible that God is the first known. Rather. he is known from other things
The exposition in De trinitatt
(t"X alii.s).
1.3 makes clear Thomas's position
in the thirteenth-celilury debate about the first kuowu. The (irst intelligible is not that which is first simpliciter, that is, divine being.
but that which is first "for us," transcendental being . ! ! This position coheres with his ontological conception of metaphysics.
with. if God's essenCe were what is first known by the human
which we analyzed in the preceding chapter. God is not the
mind. it would follow that every human being is perfectly happy,
subject of this science but the final end of metaphysical inquiry.
since hum
(ii) Thomas's view of the firsUless of being has another polemical
thrust as well. It is directed against the "Platonists." His doctrine of the transcendentals has an anti-Platonic moment. This is import
Thomas next criticizes a more refined version of this position,
ant to obsenre in light of a strong tendency in the contemporary
According to this view the first that the intellect knows is God, not.
study of Aquinas to minimalize the differences between his
however. the divine essence itself, but the influx of its light
thought and Ncoplatonism.1'l
(injllUntia lucU iPsius) -and the criticism of Ihis view touches
Bonaventure. To Thomas's mind this view is untenable for two reasons. First. the light divinely implanted in man is a
natural light
t hat constitutes our intcHeclual faculty. In other words. knowledge of this ligh t is
IlOl
knowledge of the divine being but of the human
being, for this light belongs to the nature of the human species. Secondly. this intellectual light is not the first that the intellect knows because we know it only indirectly, through a reflection on our knowledge of something intelligible. No one understand!! that he understands unless he understands something intelligible. In the second part of his reply, Thomas elaborates hi!! own view
of the first that the intellect knows. The basic principle of his " account is that "all the knowledge of our intellect ill derived from the senses" (cugnilio intellectus nosiri tola derivetur a sen.m). Sense objects are made intelligible by the agent intellect, that abstracts
\I It is impos$iblc: to ide o r.ify with certainty whom Thomas h,u in mind
hne. l i e hinuelf may have constructed this view for the �"ke of the com. pletion Ill' h i� argument. ct. L Elden, Faith and Scimu: An Jnlmd\L�Ii"r\ 1(1 !iI, TlllIfflu.> · f::':/JtAli/in ;11 fWoi"'il I" 'nmllill', Rome 1974, pr. 3"')-�6.
To Thomas goes the credil for having been the first in the Middle Ages to recognize the true paternity of the anonymous
l.iber De mum, that was attributed 10 Aristode. In the prologue to his commentary, he points o u t that this book is an excerpt from the Elemenlalw theologica of Proclus.u His discovery was made possible
by the L"nin translation of the Elementalio, completed in 1268 by J!) In Bod"'. 0" Inn. 1.3: -E! ilHer hc(". ilia sunl priam, que primo inte!lectui abstraemi occurrunt: hec aUle m sum que plum com p rce oal ia SlIllI. primo nota intellectlli ". Cr. ad 3: "ilia que sum prima in genere corum que intellectus abstrait a p hantasm alibu� sint pri mo cognita a nobis, ut ens el unum ". I I Cf. ibid., 1.3 ad 2: "quamuis Deus sit in online intell igibilium prim urn sim licite r, non tamen e�t primum in online inteHigibil ium n obis . " I Cf. J. A. Aertsen, "The Platonic Tendency of Thomism and the Foundations of A quina�'s Philosophy·, in: Medioroo 18 (1992). pp. 53-70. !3 In De caUJ., pro!.: vunde videtur [ hie Liber de: Causis] ab aliquo philo soph orum arabum ex praediclO libra Procli el(Cerptu5�. For thi� commentary, sec W. Beierwalte5, "Ocr KOnlmenUlr ;tum 'Liber de causis' als neuplato nisches Element in der Philosophic des Thomas von Aquin", in: PhiloJo phurhe RUTldJChau 1 1 ( 1963). pp. J 92-215; Chr. d'Ancona Costa. "Saint Thomas leeteur du 'Ubf,r de Caulil'. Bilan rkl rechercbes contemporaines concernant Ie 'De caulil' et analyse de l'lnu:rpr�latlon lhomilte�, in: Revu, thomide 92
w
(i!192), pp. 7H5-817.
166
CHAPTER FOUR
8EING AS THE FIRST TRANSCENDENTAL
William of Moerheke. Thomas must have made a thorough study of Proclus' work, for in his commentary on the propositions in
De
In his treatise
refers again and again to the corresponding propositions
reality and the
from the
Ekmentatio.
(species) ,
Alben the Greal
had the genuine meaning of the famous fourth
proposition, 'Ihe first of created things is being"
(Prima rerum
Thomas underlines the
connection conceived by Platonism between the first principles of
cauru he
Thomas's discovery enables him to see more dearly than
De substantiis separatis,
167
prima intelligibilia.
Plato posits an order in the Forms
according to which lhe more simple
(simplicius)
some
thing is in the intellect, the more prior it is in the order of things. That which is first in the intellect is "one" and "good,� which
of
include each other. Hence Plato holds that the Form of the One or Good is the first principle of things. which he called "God. " 16
"Of all the principles which participate the diville
The transcendental way of thought is also directed towards the
character, the first and highest is Being. � Prior to it there is no
first and most general. But Thomas criticizes both the Platonic
further prindple save the One. The One alone has a longer reach
conception of the nature of that which is most general and its
lhan Being.1i Next Thomas explains extensively the philosophical
conception of the order of the
background of the fourth proposition.
"one" are prior [0 "being.'"
crtatarum est esse) . Prod us:
He traces this thesis back to proposition
138
According to the views of the Platonists, the more gener"l
(communius)
something is, the more separate
is more general is also prior
(prius)
(stparatum)
it is. What
in the order of things.
Ils
communissima,
in which "good" and
For the Platonists the mmt general is "separate," transcendent, and is the first cause of things, Their view is based on a reduction
Ollto
of concrete things to formal principles.17 This resolution has three
logical priority entails causality: it is participated in hy what is
marks. First, the formal prillciples are arranged according to lhe
posterior to
it,
:.tnd is its cause. The Platonist... hold further that "the
one" and Mthe good"
are
the most gent:ral
(commltnissima); these are
logical order of genera and species. What is more general is prior to the less generAl, for the species
can
be understood without the
even more general than "being." Thomas also advances a reason
particular features of the individuals belonging to that species, and
for their greater generality. According to the PlalOnists, "one" ami
the genus can be understood without its species. Second, the formal
"good" are predicated of something of which "being" is not predi·
principles are "abstract." The Platonists hold that what can be
cated, namely, primary matter. They regard primary matter as
separated in the iOlellect is also separate in reality. Third, in the
non-being because of its privation of every form. Yet primary
hierarchy of separate Forms the higher and more general is the
maUer participates in the good, for it desires the good,
cause
that is, the
of the lower and more particular formsYI
form. Even that which is ordered to a good call he called "good." From its greater gener.llily, it follows that the separate "one" (or "good") is the highest and first principle of things. After the "one" there is nothing so general as "being." Hence, in the Platonic view, separated being itself
(ipsum ens sepamtum)
is the first among
created things.I!> 1-4 ProCltl5, TIv ElemrtID ofTh� (ed. Dod(b, "". 122-23). 15 /11 De (QUJ" IcC!. 4: �CUiU5 quidem ratio est, secundum positiones platoni· cas. quia, sicut supra dictum est, quanta aliquid eSI communil1�, tanto poncban1, illud esse magis scparatum et quasi prius a posteriori bus participamlTI. el sic esse postcriorum cam....m. . In urdine allU:lll corum quae de rd.HI� dicunlUr, c:ommuniuimum pnnebant unum el OOoum. ct c:ommuni\l$ etiam quam ellS, quia bonnm yel uoum de aliquo inyenillir praedicari de quo nOll pr
quod est lId finem. Sir igitur summum
e( primum
rerum prinClplUlll
ponebant Platonid ipsum unum el, ipsum bonum sCp:lratulll, sed post unum ct. bonum nihil invenitur ita commune skill ens; et ideo ipsum ens separatum
ponebant quidem nealum, utpote participans bonimtem el ullitatem. tamen ponebant ip�um primum inter omoia creata.� Cf lcc.l. 2: "Proclus enim hane
proposition em ioducil M:cLlndum Plalonic-orum sUpposilionell, (I\li, universa lium ab:nrnCiionern ponemes. quanlo aliquid cst ailSUarlitl5 et universalius lanlO prius esse ponebanl.16
D� .!UilJl. $tpar. c. 1: �Jd alliCIn quod primo cst in illldlectu cst unum el
bonum. nihil enim intdligil qui nOll intelligil unum; ullum aulem el bonum .'Ie con�equuntur: unde ipsam primam idea1ll un ius, quod nomlnabat secundum se unum et secundum sc bonum, primum rerum prindpium esse ponebat, et hunc summum deurn esse dicebat. � 1 7 Cf. ibid. c. 6: "ft Plato inveuigando suprema enuuIn processit resolven· do in principia forrnalia". 18 De Jpi"t. /TMI. a. 3: -Considerayerunt Plalonici ordinern quemdam generum el specierum, et quod semper 5uperiu5 potest inlelligi sine inferiori; sinn humo line hoc hom inc, el animal sine hom inc, et �k deinceps.
l<:xi.�tillla\ll�rllnl tliam quud quldquiel est abstractuffi in inlellectu, sit abstrac·
168
BEING AS THF. )o"tKST TRANSC":ENDENTAL
CHAPTER FOUR
In Thomas'sjudgmcnt the roOt
(radix)
of the Platonic conception
raliontm)
169
to being?� Among the arguments suggesting the priority
is unfounded. I!! His recurring reproach of the Platonists is that they
of "the good," the second one is hased on the idea. mentioned by
simply project our abstract and general mode of knowing onto the
Thomas in his commentary on
concrete mode of being of things. Moreover, the more general
universal than being because participation in the good also extends
which is first known is not the first cause of reality. In fact, the
to non-being, namely, first matter. The discussion of these objec
De causis,
that the good is more
Plalonists confused the two rlistinCl kinds of resolution, resolution
tions we shall postpone to chapter VU on the Cood (7.5.), because
5tCllndum r"m into [he most univenai cause, and resolution secundum ralionem. Just in reaction to the Platonists, Thomas stresses
what illlt:rests us now is only the general principle underlying
the difference between the commonness of a universal and that of
Thomas's position. He presents as the
Md contra
argument the fourth proposition
the first of created things is being." It is surprising
a cause. A cause is not predicated of its effects. but a universal is
from
predicated of many Ihings and docs not subsist separately from
that this proposition functions as a counterargument, since the
Dt cawis:
..
them.�() As we saw, he makes a sharp distinction between "the first
original meaning of this thesis, of which Thomas was aware,
in commonness" and "the first in causality." The latter, because of
implies the real priority of good above being. A possible explana
its transc�ndence, is not directly accessible to human knowledgt!.
tion for the presentation of the proposition at this point is his cogni
The former, because of its predicative generainess, is the first that
tive approach to the question of priority. This question is for
is apprehended by the intellect. The first in the order of our
Thomas not one of
intellectual knowledge is not transcendent, but transcendental.
Thomas's doctrine of the transcendentals functions in this respect
metaphysical priority-in the preceding article in the Summa (I, 5.1) he had shown the convertibility of good and being-but of conctpllUJ.! priority. The discussion concerns what is
as a critique of knowledge.
first in the order of human knowledge. Considered from that
The second point of his criticism of the Neoplatonic position concerns the order of the
communissima.
This criticism acquires
extra significance because Thomas him�lf observes, ill his com mentary on the fourth proposilion from De causis, thai one of the
perspective, the fourth proposition from
proportionality of (created) being to our inlellecl.22
The cognitive approach is also dear from Thomas's reply to the question. He states the semantic model, which as we saw in
great authorities of Christian thought in the West, Dionysius the
chapter
Areopagite. followed the Platonists in this regard. In
scendentals. The
Dt divinis
Dt causis suggests a certain
II
is determinative for the differences between the lran
raao
signilled by a name is that which the
Dionysius deliberately places the Good before the name "Being" as the primary divine name.� l
intellect conceives of a thing and means by the word that stands
Summa Ihtologiat 1,5.2, where prior in concept (suundum
by the intellect. Now the first thing conceived hy the intellect is
nominibus,
Representative of Thomas's view is he raises the question '18 the good
for it. "Therefore, that is prior in concept which is first conceived being (ens)." Noteworthy is that this text, unlike
De verilatt 1 . 1 ,
adduces an argument for the priority of being: �for everything is tum in r��. Cf. In De stru., ieel. 6: MEt quia Plato ponebat communla, !ic.ut sunt s.eparat.\ seeundlUl\ rntionem, ita eli3m s�parata M!('.uotillm csac:
19 De lubsl. upar. c 2.
�� In X Melr:Ph., Ie<:t. 3, 1964: "Sed alia esf communitas universalis et causae.
Nam causa non praedicalur de suis dfcc.tibu5, quia non est id�m causa suiipsills. Sed universale e�t commune, quasi aliquid praedlcalUm de multis; et sic opor· tet ?uod aliquo modo sit unum in multis, et non SCOrliurn subsislens ab cis." 2 In D� C<JIU Icet. 4: MDion�ill5 amem ordlnem quidcm separatorum absUilit, Siclll supra dictum csl, ponens etlllldem ordin�m quem et Platonici in perrectionibua quae ceterae r�s participant ab uno prindpio, quod �S[ De\18; unde in IV" capitulo D# divinis nominibus. praeordinat nOlOen boni in Deo omnibm divlnls nominibul�. cr. De mala I . 2: "Et hanc uiam uidetur �qutu$ Diolliliu. in !ibm De diuloi! nominibu., bonum preordinafls enti.· ••
knowable only insofar as it is in act." Hence being is the proper object of the intellect and is the first intelligible, just as sound is the
first audible. Thoma.'i's conclusion is that being is therefore prior in concept. to the good.�
22 0'. In De wus., icCI. 6: "Sed setundum rei veritalcm QlUsa prima est stlpr.l ens in quanUlln eu ipsum elSe infinitum, ens aUlem didtur id quod finite: participal eMC, �t hoc est proponinnatum intellectui nonro cuius obieclUm est quod quid est". �3 S.fh. I. 5.2: "enl secundum rationem �5t prius quam bonum. Ratio enim .�ignif1cala per nomen, est id quod (tlncipit Intellec_lIiS de Tf:, et lignificat illud Iler vucem: iUud crR�' elt Ilfiut secundum rationt'm, qllod prhll cajlil in
170
CHAPTER FOUR
BEING AS THE FIRST TRANSCENDENTAL
The priority of being has an ontological basis, since it is founded on its actuality. Yet from this one may not infer that "being" is a kind of "super-transcendental," as C. Fabro appears to do when he writes: uEru insofar as it is the ground of the transcendentals is the transcendental of transcendentals. or simply, the transcendentaliz· ing one. "2� The firstness of king with respect to the other transcendentals is for Thomas always a wnceptual priority. Being is that which is first conCt�ived by the intellect. The question of the human knowledge of being thereby a'lSumes great imporlance.
ascdbc� this view to Avicenna, who holds that the intelligible forms flow inlO our mind by an active Intelligence. that is called "the Giver of forms."'t6 The second position is diametrically opposed to the first: forms. virtues and sciences are "implanted (indita) in things, and have no external CilUSC. hut are only brought to light by external activity." The knowledge of all things is concreated with the soul. In teaching. the soul is merely prompted to recall those things which it previously knew. Learning is nothing else than remembering. We recognize in this position Plato's views.n 1110mas next criticizes both of these posi£ions: they are absqlte mtione. The first view excludes the proximate causes by attributing all effects to first causes. The denial of the efficacy of natural causes might be construed as a recognition of the power of the divine causality and as an expression of "the glory of God." Yet in reality the opposite is the case. The idea of the impotence of nature �derogates from the order of the universe, which is made up of the order and connection of the causes." A way of thinking in which God and nature are competitors is alien to Thomas •he first cause grants from the eminence of its goodness !lot only to things that they arc, but also that they be cause.�. ��� The second view, that of "intrinsicism," is also rt:jected by Thomas. It leads to the same illogical consequence as the first position. The lower agents would only he causes pf:f accidens if their function were "to hring things from concealment into the open by removing impediments. "�9 For these reasons Thomas prefers to follow Aristotlt:. adopting a
4.2. Tfu knawledge of being (I)
The mo.st interesting text about the origin of intellectual knowledge is the famous qltaes/io de magistro in De vmtate 1 1.1 ("Call a mall teach and be called teacher, or only God?"). Thomas deals with the question concerning the acquisition of scit:ntific knowledge together with two other questions, of which the one belongs to natural philosophy, "the bringing (eductio) of forms to being," and the other to ethics, "the acquisition of virtues." These questions are handled together because Thomas discovers in these issues "the same diversity of opinions.-�5 The opinions about such different questions as the origin of material forms, the origin of virtue and the origin of scientific knowledge are apparently determined by an underlying option, which implies a comprehensive philosophi cal view. For our purposes it is not necessary to go into all the details of Thomas's exposition. What matters is how the diverse philosophiL'al views affect the question concerning the acquisition of knowledge. The first view advocates a complete "cxtrinsicism:� the origin of the forms, virtues and sciences is external (ab o;trin.w.co) . Science is caused in us only by an agent that is separate from man, Thomas conceptione inlelleclos. Primo atltem in conceptione intdleetus cadit ens: quia secundum hoc unumquodque rognos.cibiJe est, inquantull\ est actu ( ... ) . U"de ens eJl proprium obieclum intellectus: et sic en primum intelligibile, siem sonu� est primum audlhile. 'Ia ergo secundum ralionem prius est ens quam bonum."
24 C. Fabro. �he Transcendenlality of En5--EJSt", p. 420. 2.� D, vnil. 1 1 . 1 : �Dicendum quod in trihus eadem opinionum divenitas
invcnitur. scilicet in eductione formarum in ene, in acquisitione ViJlCltum et in ar.quilitione !lCi�nllarum.· Similarly in Dt !>iri. COI'"I'1. il. 8 and S.III. I-II,
6�.1.
171
.
26
Dt 11m'. 1 1 . 1 : ·�lmilit�r etiam pO'Hmt quod $Ci�ntja in nobis non
efficitur nisi ab agente separ,u..... unde Avkenna poui[ in VI Dc. nalUratib�,s . quod f()rmac j" telligibi1�5 effluulll in mentem nonram ab lnl.cHlgentla age!lte." 21
.
.
.
�aliqui dixerunt quod animae est omnium selenua COlioeill
(Md. 1 1 . 1 :
prima causa ex eminentia bonimti$ suae rebus aliis conren non SOJlU�\ quod cr. E. Gilson. The Spirit oJ Mtdlatval Phllwoplly. chapler 7: Ibe Glory of Cod" (pp. 128-47). l!9 Ib,d. 1 1 . 1 : ��i inferiora agenlia nihil ",Hud faciunt quam producere tit' �rllilo in manife5!um removendo impedillienta ( ... ) , sequetur qllod omnia siut. sed et quod causae sint".
inferiora "gemi:! nnn ;\Kam Ili,i per a('d(lem.�
1 72
173
CHAPTER FOUR
BEING AS THE FIRST TRANSCENDENTAL
middle position (media via) between the two views. With respect to
becomes understandable why he, as in De veritate 1 . 1, uses instead
the acquisition of scientific knowledge, this means that
of "impression" the term "conception," which expresses the intel
there pre--exist in us certain seeds of the sciences, namely, the first conceptions of the intellect, which immediately by the light of the agent intellect are known through species abstracted from sensible things. These conceptions are either complex, such as the axioms, or incomplex, such as the notions of "bcing� (en.�), "one," and the like, which the intellect immediately apprehends. In these universal principles all that follows is included, as in certain seminal notions. � The middle position is that science is by nature in man qua its beginning (secundum inchoationem) or aptitude (secundum aptitudinem) but not qua its perfection (secundum perfectionem) ,31 Initially, only seeds of scientific knowledge exist in human beings, the first conceptions, by which is meant here both the first principles of demonstrations and the incomplex notions. These form the universal principles of all further knowledge, which is acquired through study and inquiry. The acquisition of science requires the
discourse of reason (discursum rationis) -the application of general,
self-evident principles to determinate matters. ''When the mind is led from these universal notions to actual knowledge of particular things ( ...) , thcn one is said to acquire scientific knowledge."�2 The argument in De veritate 1 1 . I is focused not on the origin of intellectual knowledge as such but on the acquisition of science. This acquisition presupposes the prc-cxistence of the first concep tions of the intellect. The crucial question that remains is conse quently: what is the origin of these first conceptions, particularly of the notions of �being" and "one?" Aviccnna's answer to this question was that the primary notions "are impressed in the soul by a primary impression." Thomas however cannot adopt this answer, because he rejects the philosophical option of extrinsicism
lect's own activity (cf. 2. 2.). In De veritate 10. 6, Thomas criticizes Avicenna's opinion not only for its exclusion of the proximate causes, but for another unacceptable consequence: it implies that there is no necessary relation between intellectual knowledge and the senses.�3 In truth, all intellectual knowledge is derived from sensible objects, and this dependence plays an essential role, as we shall see, in Thomas's answer to the question. In De veritale 1 1 . 1 Thomas develops a complex account of the origin of the first conceptions: they are immediately (statim) known by the light of the agent intellect, but at the same time mediated per species abstracted from sensible things. The dual character of their origin is confirmed by a series of other texts. On the one hand, the moment of "innateness" is expressed: the first conceptions are known by nature (naturaliter); they are "im planted" in the human soul (indita or innata) and belong to a special habitus, which is called intellectus principiorum.31 On the other hand, the abstractive moment is recognized, that is, the dependence on sense experience. We know the first principles by abstracting them from singulars (abstrahendo a singularibus) ; our knowledge of them is caused from the senses (ex sensibus) .�5 A text in which both moments appear together is Thomas's commentary on De trinitate q. 6. 4. In it he argues that every inquiry of the theoretical sciences is to be reduced to firsts, which man does not have to learn or discover but which he knows naturally ( naturaliter) . Such are the first conceptions of the intellect, like "being" and "one." In the continuation of his argument, Thomas points ont, however, that "the knowledge of the first principles begins from the senses and memory."36 For this dependence on
which underlies it. Against the background of this critique, it ��
so
Ibid. 1 1 . 1 : ·pra��xistunt in nobis quaedam scientarium semina, scilicet
prima� conc�ptiones intellectllS quae statim lumine intellcctus agentis cogno5cuntur p�r s�cies a semibilibus abstractas. siv� sunt complexa sinH digni tat�s. siv� incomplexa Siclll ratio entis et unius �t huiusmodi quae statim intel lectu5 appreh�ndit; in istis alltem principiis universalibus omnia sequentia inclllduntur sinH in quibusdam rationibll� seminalibus". � I Cf. De Ilirl. com1ll. a. 8; S.tli. I-II, 51. I ; 63. I . �� D� Ilm/. I I . I : "quando ergo ex istis univer5alib\l� rognitionibus mens educiluf III arW rOKno5cal partiflilaria ( ... ), IUnc aliqllis diciwr scientiam ilcqulrrrr. "
Ibid. 10. 6: "Sed ista etiam opiniu non videtur rationabilis quia
�ecundum hoc non �ss�t ner:essaria dependcnlia inter cognitioncm mentis humanae et virtutes s{,lIsitivas ( ... j EI praelerea. praedina posilio tollit proxima rerum principia". 34 Ibid. 1 1 . I ad 5; S.th. I , 79. 12: "Prima autem principia sper:ulabilium nubis naturaliter indita, non pertinent ad aliquam spedalem potentiam; sed ad quendam specialem habitum, qui dicitur mtdlectu5 prindpirrrum, ut patet in VI Ethic. H 35 De an. a. 5; SeC. II, 83. % . In Boe/h. De tnn. 6.4: �Huiusmodi autem nalUralitt'r cognita homini manife.nanlUr ex ipso lumine intellt'clus agt'nlis. quod est hamini na11lrale; quo (Iuidem IlIllline nkhil manifeMalUr n()bi� nisi in quanlllm per ipsulll
174
CHAPTER FOUR
sense experience he refers to the final chapter (c. 19) of the second book of the PO$krior Anafylio-, in which Aristotle describes the W�\y in which knowledge of the first principles is established from sense knowledge. How is this complexity in the knowledge of the first conceptions of the intellect to be evaluated? Can the two moments be reconciled with each other? This question is a c.ontrovcrsial one in the second ary literature and has occasioned a great variety of interpretations." Three main positions can be distinguished within the debate. 0) The first maintains that the abstractive moment in the knowledge of the first conceptions renders their distinct status as transcenclentals questionable. In the discussion about the primum cognitum, Thomas's criterion for that which is first known to man is what first occurs to the abstracting intellect (De lrinilale 1 . 3) . 1)oes this criterion not lead, however, to putting knowledge of the transceudentais on the samc level as knowledge of other abstract concepts? There seems to be at most a difference of degree, in the sense that the transcefldental concepts have greater generaiity.3s One can go a step further and call into question not only the distinctiveness of transcendental knowledge for Thomas but even the possibility of transcendental thought as such. If the first conceptions of the intellect are dependent on sense experience, then they forfeit their lr.1I1SCClldclital character. since the content of these concepL<; is thereby restricted to material things. The substance of this radical criticism was already advanced in the Middle Ages by Duns &otu5. In his account of the Hrsl object of our intellect, Scotus attributes to TIlOmas the view that the quiddity of the materiai lhing (quidita.( rn matmalis) is the Hrst object, since this ohject is proportional to man's cognitive power. Scotus has various objections to this view. No faculty can know an object under an aspect (ratio) more general thlln thllt of its first ohject. The power of sight, for (;xamplc, knows nothing under a more general aspect than the ratio of color.
Bl':lNG AS
TRANSCENDENTAL
175
Yet the intellect knows something undcr a more general aspect than Thomas suggests, because it knows things under the aspect of being in general. It is on these grounds thal metaphysics is possihle for man. Being-as-being is known � se by us, or meta physics would be no more " tnHlSt:elldcntal science (scienlia lranscendens) than physics is. Therefore nothing that is more panicular than being (;3!l be the first ubjc:c.:t of our inteliecl.Y.l The core of Scotus's critique is therefore that Thomas's view of the knowledge of being ultimately excludes the possibility of a transcendental philosophy. (ii) The second position is that the conception of being cannot be the result of abstraction. We find this view in two most distin guished scolars of Thomism in our century, Cornelio Fabro and Etienne Gilson. In both the fact that Thomas's notion of being (ens) possesses a certain duality plays an important role: it signifies "that which has being" (id quod habet esse) or "what is" (quod est) . Thomas himself states that "it thus appears both to signify a 'thing' by the expression quod, an d 'existence' (tSSt) by the expression est. "40 If the notion of being, Fabro argues, includes in itself two dements, namely, essence or content and the act of being, this notion cannot be the effect of �ordinary" abstraction, which abstraclS only essence. The origin of the notion of being requires a form of "conjoint apprehension " of content on the part of the mind and of act on the part of experience.41 Gilson discusses (he theme of MKllOwledge and Existence" in the last chapter of his book Being and Some PhiUJsophers. In Thom
.'19 Duns Scotus,
phant,umala fiunt intelligibilia in acne hic enim 1:5t acttu intellectus agenti$, lit didLUr in III De anirna. Phantasmata autem a �em\l ar:cipillnlllr. unde principium cognitionis predictorum principiorum est e" �en511 et memoria. Ul palel per Philmophum in finl: P05�riorum�. �7 Cf. J. Owens. "Aquinas on Knowing E"istence", in: Th� Htllir.w "J Mdaph,$i(:j 29 (1975/6), pr. 670-90. �" Cf. o. n. Dulmjer. V" lJr/'lag llitar htl lransCI"ndmlak, 000f"/'l/ in ",.,band mtf H� diU " m KIm/, l.eiden l'J6fi, pp. 0-44.
THE FIRST
Ordinatio I, diS!. .s. p. 1, q. S (Opera omnia III. pp. 69-73). SI:I:
in particular: �[intellcctu�l cognoscit aliquid sub ratione cntis in communi, alioquin mClaphysica nulla esset Kientia ( ...) ens ut ens est communius sensi bili, per 51: intdligitur a nobis. alias metaphysica non es�et magis scientia transcendens quam phy.ica". 4() In I Pm leCl. 5. 7 1 . f l C. Fabro. "The TranKendentality of Eru-'£su· e$pedally pp. 423-27. cr. , I.. Dewan. ·S. Thorna. and the- Ground of Metaphysics·, in: Procudings of the Am.orit:Dn CiJllcoIic PlUlmnphiw/ AJ.wx:iation 54 (1980). pp. 141-54. .•
.
CHAPTER FOUR
BEING AS THE FIRST TRANSCENDENTAL
attained only in the second operation of the intellect, judgment. On Gilson's view, which has been called "Existential Thomism," the concept of being, the first conception of the intellect, comprises in addition to a simple apprehension of essence the judgment that something cxists.42 (iii) The third position emphasizes the innateness of the first principles of the intellect. A study that drew considerable attention in the Dutch language area was an article by D. M. De Peuer on "the origin of the knowledge of being." His conclusion is that this knowledge is a priori, that it is in man by nature. Dc Petter endeavors to do justice to Thomas's statements about the abstractive moment in the knowledge of the first conceptions and their dependence on sense experience by making a distinction between habitual and actual knowledge. The a priori knowledge of the first conceptions is habitual knowledge. Actual knowledge of these conceptions requires the operation of the agent intellect on sensible images. But the content of the first conceptions is not derived from sense experience but from the knowing subject itself. The opera tion of the agent intellect, which is called "abstraction, M is the introduction of the actuality of being into material things, which thereby acquire intelligibility.43 This interpretation is strongly influenced by the work of the Belgian philosopher Joseph Man�chal (1878�1944), who set out to re�think Thomas's metaphysics in a transcendental way (with "transcendentalM being understood here in (he Kantian, not in the medieval sense). The first intelligible, being, is regarded as the "formal condition or a priori rule" of knowledge.14 Characteristic of "Transcendental Thomism" is the idea that
To sum up, we encounter three strongly differing interpreta tions of the way in which Thomas understands the conception of being. According to the first, "Scotist,� position, Thomas's teaching rcnders any real scientia transcendms impossible; according to "Existential Thomism" the conception of being is not the result of abstraction but of judgment; according to "Transcendental Thomism" the knowledge of being is innate, an a priori condition of the intellect. Because this disagreement touches the basis of Thomas's doctrine of the transcendentals, it is absolutely neces sary to attain greater clarity on this point.
176
underlying the empiricistic explanations of abstraction, there existed in the thought of Aquinas a deeper transcendental concep tion of it, where "being� and "something which� are considered as a priori contributions of man's intellect, conditions of the possibility of every human knowledgeY;
42 4�
E. Gilson, Bnng and Somt Phiwsophers, es�cially p. 204.
D . M. De Peller, Begrip m wnlr.elijkMid. Aan de Df.!mijde van htt amceptual
Isme, Hilvef5um and Antwerp 1964, pp. 94-135. cr. H. Seidl, "Ober die
Erkenntnis erster, allgemeim:r Prinzipien nach Thomas von Aquin", ill: A. Zimmermann (cd.), Thoma!> von Atp.
177
4.3. The knowledge of being (II)
Thomas nowhere treats the cognitive origin of the conception of being as a separate theme. Nevertheless, we can arrive at a better insight into his position by analYLing carefully the various COIl texts in which he posits that being is what is first conceived by the intellect. On the basis of this analysis we shall make clear, in a number of steps, that none of the three interpretations in question is correct. (i) The first context in which the firstness of being is unfolded is the resolutia of human knowledge (2.1.). Because an infinite re gress is impossible, the investigation into what something is must come to an end in "the first conceptions of the intellect," which are first because they are not understood from something else but are known per se. Their knowledge is therefore a different hal7itus from that of knowledge based on demonstration; it is an inteUectus. Thomas's approach to the firstness of being is therefore a reflexive analysis, a reduction to that first which is �best known" (natissi mum) , because its knowledge "is necessary for understanding anything at all. �46 He is not interested in the firstness of being in the sense of "developmental psychology, � as is suggested III some modern studies referring to the investigations of Piaget.47 pp. 67--85 (76). 46 cr. In IV Metaph., lect. 6, 598: "ex quo ipsum est necessanum ad intelligendum quodcumque, oportet quod quilibet qui alia est cognmcens. ipsum cognoscat." 47 R. Allers (tram.), Thomal lion Aquin, Vb" das Sfill llnd da.l Wnw, Darmstadt 1965, pp. 118; A. Keller, Srm ott" Enltrm 7 Di, AllJ/'KUnK dr.• S"i". bn Thomas llQn Aquin in df'r hmtil{rn Schola.,·tik, Munich 1%8, p. 166, II. 118.
178
BEING AS THE FIRST TRANSCENDENTAL
CHAPTER FOUR
In vanous texts that deal with the resolution into first con ceptions, it is stated that these conceptions are known to man
naturaueer, This
knowledge is contra:.ted to knowledge acquired by
study and inquiry,4t1 When in
Metaphysics IV
three conditions are
slated which the first principle or demonstration must meet (cf.
habitus
is totally by nature
(totaliter a natura) ,
179
that is, through an
intrinsic principle.n For this reason onc has to object to De Petter's innatist interpretation, which distinguishes between habitual and actual knowledge of first principles. Solely the latter knowledge
would be related to sense images. But this claim is contrary (0
3. 7.), the third condition is that it is not ac'luiroo by demonstration.
Thomas's own exposition.S,'
Thomas adds that the principle "comes to olle by nature, so that it ft !l is known naturaiileT, and not through acquisition. 4 The distinction
known is stated is that of Thomas's foundation of the first principle
between natural and acquired knowledge expresses rhe distinClive character of the first conceptions from other concepts. The distinc tion is also of importance for understanding Thomas's statemelll in
De vmialll 1 1 . 1
that "there pre-exist in us certain seeds of the
sciences." This statement must not be interpreted as an affirmation of the
a
priori character of the first conceptions, for their pre
existence is a relative pre-existence, namely, with regard to the scientific knowledge which one acquires through inquiry':>!) The principle of science is not In
scientia,
but
in/ellectus.
De veritau 16. 1 Thomas describes the natural knowledge of
human heings as bearing a likeness to the knowledge of the purely spiritual substances, the angels. The natural way of know ing of tht: spiritual substances is �intel1ectual;" they see the (rllth immediately and without inquiry. The human way of knowing is to arrive at the truth through investigation, a discursive process. Proper to mall, that is, is the "rational" mode of knowing
(3. 4.).
Yet
man participate!! in the intellectual mode of knowing of the spirit
ual substances, a participation that is explained by the principle of continuity, formulated by pscudo-Dionysius: �Divine wisdom has united dle 'ends of the higher things with the beginnings of the
(ii) The second context in which the thesis that being is the first of demonstration
(3.7.). In his argument he distinguishes, follow
ing Aristotle, two operations of the intellect. The first is the opera tion by which the intellect apprehends the quiddity of something, that is, simple apprehension; the other is the operation by which the intellect composes and divides, that is, judgment. Thomas claims that what is first in the first operation of the intellect, being, is the foundation of what is first in its second operation: the principle "it is impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the same time" is dependent on the understanding of being. Here he clearly affirms that the concept of being belongs to simple apprehension. This statement contradicts the contention of "Existential Thorn ism" that the concept of being is a judgment or proposition.54 That "being" belongs to the domain of simple apprehension also became clear in !!ect.
4.1.
There we saw that Thomas distinguishes
what is universal in causing from what is universal by predica tion. The latter is the first known to that what is more universal
s, u
on the basis of the argument
ill simple ofrl»'ehmsion is the first known.
for "being" first falls upon the intellec.t.
An important element in the interpretation of Fabro and Gilson
is that "beingn possesses a certain duality.
Ens
means "what is"
lower." Man too possesses knowledge that is not discursive but immediate. Thi!! knowledge, which is the principle of all further knowledge, is a natural
habitw.
Thoma!! stresses however that even
in this habitual knowledge a difference from the purely spiritual substances remains, inasmuch as even this human knowledge is dependent on the senses.·� 1 It is ilOt true that in man the natural 4H See I'll 8"dli. Dt trill. 6.4; Qllodl. VIII, 2.2. Cf. Dt ViTI. r.omm. a. 8: kQuaedam [inlelligibiliaj statim a principio nalUralil.er homini innotescunt abs311t: $lIIdio et inquisltlom:". 4 III IV Mt/(JPh., lett. 6, 599. MI r:f. M . Tavuni. "Aquinas on the Preliminary Grasp of Beingk, in: Tht TM"uJl � 1 ( l �1S7), PI'. 55�74 (:.64). � I /), ,,,,"I. IIi. I : kUnile ,,' ;anin);!. hlllllall" {immllllll ad id qlt/ll! ill i,,�
supremum est, aliquid aningit de eo quod proprium en angelicae naturae, �dlicet ut aliqllorum cogniuoncm habeat subito et sine inquisitione, quamvis etiam quantum ad hot lnvenialllr angelo inferior, in quantullI in his etjam verilatem cognoscere non POleS! nisi a sensu accipiendo." �2 S.th. I-II, 51.1. cr. In /I 1'00/. AII(JL, len. 20: "unde: concludit quod neque preexistllnt in nobi� hahituJ principiorum quasi det.mninati et completi ( ... ) set habitm principionlll! fiu"l, in nuui. a $t'lJl. preexistente:." 33 The distinction between tlabilual knowledge and actual knowledge of the first principle� is in fact questionable as such. De Petter cite� De (Jnima a. 4 ad 6, where it i$ ,aid Ihilt the: pOS$ible intellect can only have �actual knowledgek ((J{/ualem (ognitiolltm) by tbe activity of the age:nt intellect. But here actual knowledge i� opposed not to habitual knowledge but to knowledge in l:0tency. . .. Cf. R. Mci nerny. Bting lind Prrdi(ati(Jn: ThmniJtir Intrrprtf(JtianJ, Washing ,un, U.C. 19MfI, ]Jp. IKI�7.
(quod est) . It cannot, therefore, be attained by simple apprehension,
which abstracts only the essence or quiddity of something. Yel Thomas's conclusion seems co he a ditIerent one. The starti ng
point of the rtsoiutio in De umtate 1 . 1 is the investigation into what something is (quid est) . The ultimate term of this reduction is
"heing , " which is no genus. The name "being" sign ities "what is" but docs not signify a mode of being determined by lhe genera..�·� The reason that "being" is the first conception of the intellect is that everything is knowable insofar as it is in act. When some thing is apprehended names a
as
ens, it is grasped thai it has being. En.f
thiog from the formality
181
BEINe AS TilE FIRST TRANSCENDENTAL
CHAPTER FOUR
180
of its act of being: it primarily
signifies "what is." Thus the concept of be ing is inclet:t1 com plex,
intellect to its object is worked out in an important text contm lJt11tile5 U, 83.
III
Summa
In this text the expre ssion "natu ral know ledge " that Thomas
uses with respect to the first conceptions acquires a deeper sense. Natural knowledge is the knowledge thul Ihe intellect has of its natural object (naturale obiectum). This object can on ly be one, for nature is always directed to oue thing. One power must thus naturally have onc object- Just as the natural object of sight is color, so the intcllt:c.:t, being olle power, must have one object-57
But what is the natural object of the intellect? It must be that
objeci under which (.rub
quo)
is included all that is known by the
intellect, just as under color is included all that is per St visible.
but not in the way a proposition is complex. The concept docs not
This object is none other than "being" (ens) . ''Th erefore, our
which is susceptible of truth or falsity. Thomas
being as such"-the term inology of the last part of the conclusion
signify the judgment "something exists," the kind of composition
explicitly denies
this kind of composition in the concept of being. In his comment
ary on a passage in Perihermentias that deals with the expression �i"," he writes about (he signification of "being: "
Ens does not principally signify that compmil,ion which is implinl : expression "is" ( lSI), but it -consignifies" il. insofar as it ... in tI signifies " thin g having ocing (rem habntttm lSse). TIlerdore, such a "consignitication - doe! not suffice for I,ruth or falsity-since the composition in whkh truth and falsity consist cannot be under stood except insofar as II connects Ihe extremes of the (�I)mposition.·'>6
intellect naturally knows being and that which belongs per se to is reminiscent of the way in which Thomas in his commentary
on Metaphysic.s ]V refers to the
transcendental allributes of being.
That the fourth book was in Thomas's mind while he was writin g this text is clear from the continuation of his account, in which he
states that the knowledge of first principles is founded
Uundalu.T)
upon this natural knowledge of being.�
From this text a conclusion can be drawn that contradict,.<; lhe
Scotist thesis. The formal object of the intellect is being as being;
the scope of the human intellect is transcendental. Therefore a
Our conclusion is that the thesis of "Existential Thomism," that
scientia transcendens is not impossible for man. Intellectual knowl
"being" is attained only in ju dgment, the second operation of the
edge is necessarily kn owledge of being. 59 This knowledge is
intellect, is incorrect. "Being" is attained in simple apprehension.
natural and therefore common to all men. All mcn share in the
The concept principally signifies "what has be ing, � "what is," a
powcr (vir/us) thal is the principle of this knowledge , namely. the
phrase that does not entail a judgment.
Light of the agent intcllcct.60 This light is, as 1110mas
(iii) From the thesis that being is the first known. Thomas draW5
immediately the conclusion that being is "the proper o�iect" of the intellect (Summa Iheologiat I, 5. 2). The term "proper object" ex presses the special relation between the human illlellect and bei ng
.
Being is the primum intelligibile, that is, the formal aspect on the basis of which things are accessible to the intellect. The rci
S.th. 1,13.11: MQuolibel, enim alio nUlUlne rictermin:l(llr aliquis modus �uhslanlhu:' rei: !i(Od hnr IIOIll�n Qui l('d � h,,"cl imlrlermimue lid olJJno-. See .\Ce!. 9. I. � hi I I'mh.• k .... rl, :W.
underscores
n SeG. n. 83: MAdh uc . Cum natur" �emper ordinctur ad unum. UILIlIS virlUtis oporu:t esse ttaturaliter unum obieuLlIn: �ictH "ism (olorelll, el auditu� wnulII. InlelJectus igiwT, cum �it una vis. est eius unulII naturale onic(1um. cllillS per se et naturaliter cognitionem habet." 5H Ibid. II, 83: "Hoc amem oportct esse id sub quo cOTTlprehendumur omnia ab intelleetu cognila: Sicul sub colore comprr.hcnclunlur omnes (otores, qui sunt per �e visiblle$. Quod non cst aliud quam tm. Naturalilcr igitur intelleclus noster cognoscit ens, et ea quae $11111. per sc entis inquantlllll . huiusmodi; in qua cognitione fundatur primorum principiurum nOlitia. III nOli I'.iU simul a/finruJrt a "'gart<, et alia huiusmodi. Bacc igilur sola p ri ncipia intelleclUs nOSIer naluraliler cognoscil, conclusiones :ltllem per ips.a-. Smt., !J8.IA ad 1: "qllidqllid cngnoscimr. cognoscilur 111 ens-. fiO '), ,1&. I, �,.!) ad �. .
!W Cf. In 1 .
CHAPTER
182
FOUR
in his discussion with Bonaventure. a natural light that consutUlcs our intellectual faculty. (iv) The text in Summa contra Gmtiks II, 83 is important for yet another reason. It appears in a chapter which defends the thesis "that the human soul begins to exist when the body does. � One of the opponenlS is Plato, as a representative of the view lhal the soul pre-exists. The epistemological consequence of his view is that "learning is nothing else than remembering," since the soul already possesses by itself the knowledge of all scientific truths. Against this position several arguments arc advanced, and the cited text about the natural knowledge of being appears in thi.5 context. Thomas's purpose with this text is to make dear thott our intellect only knows fir.;( principles by nature, but nOI conclusions. This inference could create the impression th,u at least a part of human knowledge is innate (0 the soul, and thus independent of sense experience. But in a subsequent passage Thomas goes a step further: eVl1I Ollr knowledge of the first principles themselves is caused in us from sensible things.GI The context ilSelf in which Thomas's account of the natural object of the intellect appears sheds light on an important motive in his view of the origin of the first conceptions. The union of body and soul is natural; there is dependence of intellectual knowledge on the senses. That is why Thomas consistently advances the dependence of the knowledge of being on sense experience. In his most extensive exposition of what is first known fo human beings, De trinitate 1.3, it is said that "all the knowledge of our imellect is derived from the senses." From this it is clear that Thomas's transcendental thought is of a different sort than 'Transcendental Thomism" suggests. The knowledge of being is not an a priori condition of the intellect, I!; not a formal category in the Kantian sense, which constitutes the object. According to Thomas the intellect is directed lO being in general (ms in universalt) , hut the created intellect is not related LO it as act. This relation is proper to the divine intellect, in which all II, 83: "Pl'"aeten:a. [d quod �r sensum in nobis acquiritur. non infuit anima� ant� corpm.. Sed ip$Otum principiorum cognitio in nobis cx Icntibilibul (allsatur: nisi cnim ai/quod 100um sensu p<:rccpiSllemIl5. no" �mus intdliKere: quod lot"", mtt. maiw partr, skut nee e3eem "31UIi aliquid perdpit de eoloribus. Ergo nee ipsotulll principiorum cogn/lio afTuit 3nimae ante corpu•. Multo igitur minus aliorum. Non igitur firma est Platonis r:uio quod anima full antequam corpori unirewr." AI
•
SeC.
BEING AS
TIfE FIRST TRANSCENDENTAL
183
being originally and virtually (virtualiter) preexists as III iu first cause. The relation of the human intellect to the intelligibles is marked by potentiality.6Q This receptivity is underscored by Thomas's use of lhe term conceptio, for on the b.1.sis of the notion of "conception" he compares the human intellect with a mother!"$ Thomas's complex account of the origin of the first conception!; in De verilale 1 1 . 1 is therefore the adequate expression of his view. The notion of "being� is immediately conceived at the moment when the human intellect begins to act, for the intellect is directed by nature to "'being." But being is always known through species abstracted from sensible things, for the act proper to the agent intellect is to abstract the intelligible from the sensible. The two moments cannot he separatt:d. hut they must be distinguished. The concept of "being" is not on the same level with other abstract concepts. It is naturally known and is in itself indeterminate to any mode of being. (v) Thomas himself indicates the special position of the first con ceptions with a striking formulation borrowed from Averroes: they are the "instruments" of the agent intellect. The first principles "'arc related to the agent intellect as certain of its instruments, because the intellect makes other things actually intelligible by means of these principles. "64 This comparison is not elaborated, hut it must mean, first, that "being" is known prior to anything else, for otherwise it could not h
62 S.th. I,
79.2: "Inl(II((1II5 ellim (...) babet oper:
M De Gr!. a. !); cr. ibid. a. 4 ad 6; De vml. AS
11.3; �odl. X,7 ad 2.
S.th. I-II, 55.-4 ad 1 : -id quod primo cadit in lntellectu, est ens: unde unicuique apprehenso a nobis attribuimus quod sit em". cr. Dt vmr. 21.4 ad 4; Dt pnl. 9.7 ad 8 and 9 (in conlr.) .
184
185
CHAPTER FOUR
8UNG AS THE FIRST TRANS<""ENDENTAL
Admill�dly. Thomas does state in a numbel" of places that the proper object of the intellect is the quiddity of the material thing.66
chapter III we found that there is a correspondence between the proper object of the intellect and the subject of metaphysics, for
But he always adds a qualification which makes clear that this
both are concerned with being in general (3. 4.). The Scotist thesis
quiddity is not the proper object in an absolute sense. The fir�t
that Thomas's conception excludes a scient-ia transcentUns turns out to
object of the human intellect �in the present state of life" (suundum
be without foundation.
praesentem statum) is not every being and true, but "being and true considered in material things. "67 The quiddity of the material thing is the object that is proportional to man, given his corporeal ity and dependence on sense experience.68 Thomas can likewise say
(d. 3. 4.)
that. among all the st:iences. physics is most in
human intellec., because
4.4.
Tlu "ratio" of being: Actuality
What is being? It s i the first conception of the intellecL, but from the
the rational mode of
beginning of Creek thought philosophers have struggled about the
knowing, which is proper to man, is particularly observed in
unders�nding of being. Aristotle calls this question '"the question
natural science. From this it does not follow, however, that a
raised of old and new and ever and that again and again
science of being is impossible for man.
embarrasses us,"71 In the basic text.'! on the transcendentals, it is
conformity with Ilu::
The formal object of the intellect, that is, that under which all
only in De vnltale 1 . 1 that Thomas indicates summarily the ratio of
that is known by the intellect is understood, is being, as is clearly
"being:" ens sumiluT ab actu essendi. Something is denominated
stated in Summa contra Gentiles II, 83. The intellect considers its
"being" from the act of being. In the same text, in answer to an
The condition of the
objection that cites an axiom from Boethius's De lubdomadibus, �to
object secundum communo!'m Tationem entis.
possibility of this consideration lies in the inteliect, since by the
be (esse) and what is (quod est) are diverse," the ratio of being is
intellect a human being can "become all things" (quI) est omnia
explicitly formulated. Thomas's explanation of dIe axiom is that
fim.) . The same idea is expressed in De venlak 1 . I by the phrase:
the act of being (esse) is distinguished from that to which that act
"the soul is in a sense all things.R On account of its immateriality,
belongs. 1'he ratw mtis, however, is derived from the act of being,
the human soul possesses a transcendental openness. From this
not from that to which the act of being belongs. "12
Thomas draws the conclusion that the power of the intellect is not diversified by a difference in beings, just as the power of sight,
One of Thomas's relatively rare �ego" statements concerns his understanding of heing. "What I call esse is the most perfect of all."
which sees its object under the ratio of color, is not diversified by
His argument is that act is always more perfect than potentiality.
the difference between white and black.59 Man does not have
Now, any form, such as humanity or fire, is understood to
separate faculties for knowledge of the necessary and knowledge
exist actually only in virtue of the fact that
of the contingent, for the intellect considers each according to the
evident, therefore, that what I call elSe is the actuality of aU acts,
same ratio of its object, namely,
secundum ratil)1lem mti{ d veri.70 In
and for
this
it
is held to he. "It is
reason it is the perfection of all perfections.'"7' The
distinctive feature of Thomas's understanding of being is the no 66 See, e.g., S./h. I, 84.7: "Intdlectus autem humanl, qui est coniunctus
corpori, proprium obiectum est quidditas sive natura in maleria corporali cxinen,"; 85.5; 89.1. 67 S.th. I, 87.3 ad 1 . 68 Cf. the well documented study by S. AdamClyk. De obiIClo formal; irUtlfmUl nOllri $uundum doclrinam S. Thomae Aquinatu, Rome 1933 (Analecla Gre oriana. vol. 2 ) . 6 5.111. I, 79.7. 70 Ibid.. I, 79.9 ad 3; �Nec tamen est simplicitcr diccnduln quod sit alia potentia qua inlc:llc:cluli cognosch necc:-ssaria. c:1 alia qua cognou:il conlin gentia: quia ulraquc: cognoKit secundum eandem ralionc:m ohierti. scilicet secundum radonem entis .::1 \lCri.�
l
tion of "actuality. � In his own judgment he differs in this respect
7 1 Metaph. VII, c. I, 1028b 2-4. 72 Dt ,,mI. 1.1 ad g (in contr.) .
7.'\
Dt pot. 7.2 ad 9; "hoc quod dico tHe c:st inter omnia pc:rfc:ctissimum;
quod ell: hoc patel quia actus c:st sem�r periculo potentia. Quadilx:t autem forma lignata non intelligitur i n aou nisi per hoc quod c:ssc: ponitur. Nam hnmanitas vel ignc:itas polut cons.idC:J"3ri ut in potentia maleriae exinen5, vel III in virtll1e agtllli,. alII C:liam III in inlc:llc:(tu; sed hoc quod habet tsjt, cffirilllr arhl exitlen•. Unde: patel quod hoc qllod dico nit til aclllalitas OIllIl1t1l1l 1«"IIIUIII, rl prf)pler hoc C1.I perfc:<:tlo omnium perfecllonum.w
CHAPTER FOUR
BEINe AS THE f"JRST TRANSCENDENTAl,
from Aristotle, who conceived "being" as the quiddity of some
meanings of esse and of what is or being (ens) with the difference
186 thing .74
It is also Thom as' s understanding of being as actuality that dis
tinguishes his thought fundamentally from another metaphysical co nception.
which arose from �lhe second beginning of meta
physics, " the scienlia transt:l!1ldros of Duns Seotus. For Seotus lOa "being" is the first known, the ultimate Lerm of the resolution of our concepts. Seotus also conceives "'being" in relation to iLS "to-be."
He understands being, however, not from its actuality. but from its logical possibility. "Being" and "possible" are interchangeable for him, for "nothing is being, the ratio of which includes
a
contra
diction" (/n IX Metaphysicorum, q. 2, n. 3). The ratio of being which
is distinctive to Scotus is based on the principle of contradiction: "being is that for which it is not repugnant to be" (ens, hoc est, cui non rejJll.gnat esse) .13 Thomas also discusses the relation between the
concept of being and the principle of contradiction, but sees the concept of bcing as the foundation of the first principle of theo
retical thought. The difference between Thomas's transcendental thought and Scotus's apparently goes hack to a different ullder standing of being, and it is therefore crucial to clarify the central moment of Thomas's concept. A clue for this clarification is provided by Thomas's comment
ary on the proposition just cited from Boethius's De kbdomadibw.
As we saw earlier (3. 7.), Thomas reads this treatise from the perspective of the transcendentals
(marime
communi,,) . Boethius's
"common conceptions of the soul," or axioms, have
order, sillce they are related
successively
a determinate
to "being," "one" and
�good." The second axiom is "To be and what is are diverse"
(diuenum est e.ue, tt id quod e.d) .76 Thomas hegins his commentary
with an important observation. The diversity affirmed by the
axiom is semantica1 in nature; it does not refer to things but to the meanings (rat-iones
Sell
intentionls) of the terms esse and ens. Only
later, in connection with the axioms bearing on the "one," will
Boethius apply the diversity to things. But what is meant by the diversity of rationes? Thomas compares the difference between the 14 In liT Stnl., 8.5 ad 2: "Philmophm non accipit
(jIt
n:cundum quod diciULr
actus entls ( ...) sed au ipil U\t pro quidditate 1),[ ratirmt qualll .rignifi,at dtfinilio.� 75 Ordinlilio IV, d.S, q . I , n.2 (ed. Vivh XVII, 7b). Cf. L. Honnefelder, Scimlia IrallscmdttU, pp. 3-56.
711 Cf. R.
McInerny, BOt/hill.J and AquinlU, Washington. D.C. 1990. pp. !)K ror a mrvey of the intt'rpretllions or this axiom.
•
161-
between the meanings of the infinitive "to run"
187
(currere) and of the
subject "that runs" (currens) . The diversity of meanings is a
difference in the modes of signifying . Esse and "to run" signify in abstracto, but
ens
and "runner" in wncrelo.71
The semanlical diversity between esse and
erlS
is, all Thomas's
reading. clarified by Boethius's elucidation of the second axiom:
"To he itself is not yet, but what is, when it receives the form of "
being, is and subsists
(Jprum mim
esse
nondum est, at
vtro
quod est,
acapta essendi Janna, est atque con.ristit) . "To be" does not signify something that is. it abstracts from the subjec t of being (mbiectum lssendi) and signifies the act as such, indeterminately. Therefore, we cannot say that "to be" "is," any more than we can say that "to run" runs. But �s "is, " insofar as it participates in the act of bei ng.
The shift in terminology in the commentary is noteworthy: Boethius says "receives the fo rm of being." which Thomas glosses as "participates in the act of being." E1Is, like "runner," signifies
the act as co ncretized in a subject which has it. Now, Boethius
states not only that ens "is, " but also that it "subsists." Does this claim not apply, however, only to substances? Thomas reminds us that "being" is an analogous term whose focal meaning IS suhstance, which is per se and in the proper scnse.7H
"
"
This commentary sheds light on Thomas's understanding of
being:. Being (nu), while the most general, is said
concrt:tely;"
"
it
signirles the concretion of subjeu and
ratio of heing
has a
ce rtain
complexity; it means "what has being."
In view of the diversity of meaning between
esse and
oms it is not
irrelevant that in Thomas's philosophy the first conception of the
intellect is "being" (ens). not
USt.
In comparative studies of the
views of Thomas and Heidegger on being, lher-e is a tendency to
ignore this difference.RC) But the first known is the concrete "what is," not "to be."
That the first conception of the intellect concerns a conere/um is
also clear from Thomas's discussion of the type of predication in which a concrete term is said of an abstract Olle (praedicatio conereti 77 In Dr lvcbdom. lect. 2.
7M
7g
Ibid., lect. 2. Ibid.• lect. 2: -Set id quod cst 5lue ens, quamuis sit commllni5simllm.
lamen (oncrdiue dicitur". HII St-e. (' .g. . J. B. i,ol1.. ·Ai�th�ill unci OrtIH,II��, Vt:uuch t:incr Drutung im 1.11'Ii Ir dr. r Sf hntaftrilr. •• in : 1'lIit(u,tpJii.lfM& jllh,blUh (}H ( I U!i!l). II. lW!i .
188
BEING AS THE FIRST TRANSCENDENTAL
CHAPTER FOUR
tU abstracto) . The historical
from the
TOOts of Ihis discussion lie in a question
Summa tk bono of Philip the Chancellor dealing with the
predication "goodness is good."Ill Is such a predication correct? h does not seem to be, for we can say neither that "whiteness is white" nor "warmth is warm." However, Thomas argues, we must distinguish here between special forms and general forms (formae generales) . In the case of the latter it is possible to predicate a concrete term of an abstract one. We can say "essence is bt:ing, " goodness is good," or "whiteness is being." The reason is that being is what first falls upon the intellect. F.\·erything we apprehend we apprehend, therefore, as "being," and consequem.1y as "one," "true" or "good," since these terms are convertible with "being." That is why "being" and the other three concreta can be predicated of abstracta. This does not hold, however, for the special forms, for these are not transcendental, they "do not follow "
inseparately (concomitantur inscpambiliter) the ratio of being." We do not apprehend everything under the aspect of "white " so that we are not compelled to say "whiteness is white.''!!2 Esse is said in abstracto. It signifies the act of being as such; accordingly, Thomas also uses the abstract term actualitas for it. We noticed the shift from "form" to ac t of being in his commental)', hut Thomas's exposition does not provide any further clue for un derslanding his notion of �actuality." What is striking, however, is .
"
"
his semantic approach to Boethius's axioms: his explanation is 81
based on the· different modes of signifying of concrete subject and infinitive. Civen this approach, it is appropriate to take into consideration another text dealing with the verb "to be." It is found in Thomas's commentary on Perihermeneias 1, 3.65 At the end of chapter three, Aristotle argues that a verb does not yet signify whether a thing is or is not, for the verb is not a sign of the being or non-being of a thing. He points out that even the verb "to be" is no different in this respect from other verbs. A text which has caused great difficulty for its commentators slates: even not the case when you say "is" alone, for it is by ilself "nothing," but it consignifies some composition which cannot be undr:rstoocl without the compound e1emenlS (1Gb 22_25) .84
That is
Thomas observes in his commentary that the Greek text has lhe
word "being" (to on) in place of "is" here, and he comments on both readings. His explanation of the first reading ("being") was presented in the previous section where we opposed the contention of "Existential Thomism� that the concept of tlIS entails a judg ment. We turn now to his explanation of the second reading. Thomas is intrigued by the fact that Aristotle speaks of the "consignification" of "is," which consists in its function as copula. Yet "consignification" presupposes a primary meaning. What ill the principal Signification of "is," on which Ihe "consignification" depends? His answer is: [Tht: verb �is ] signifies prim arily that which falls upon the intellect in the manner of actuality in the absolute sense-since �is, � absolutely speaking, sign ifies to be in act, and therefore it signifies after the manner of the verb. However, the actuality which the verb "i5� principally signifies is generally the actuality of every form or act, whether it be 5ubstantial or accidental. Thus. when we want to signify any form or act actually 10 be in some subject. we do so by means of the verb "is· ( ); and for this reason the verb �is· consequently signifies a r:ompnsition.8.'i "
SU/lima de bonn, q. 9 (ed. Wicki, p. .'10): MDe hac predicatione: bonitas cst
bona.·
82 Dr vnit. 21.4 ad 4: Maliter se habet in formi� generallbus et aliler in for
mis spedalibus. In formi� enim sp<:dalibu� non redpi!ur praedicauo cuncrcli de abstracto. ut dicatur Albedo est alba, vd Calor 01 calidus (...). Sed in fonnis
gencralibus huiusmudi praedicatio redpilur: didmu� cnlm quod e»C:nlia est ens, et boniw Ilona. cl unltas Ulla, CI � ic de aliis. Cuills ratio est quia iJlud quod primo cadil in apprehensione inu:lIeClus en ens, undc oporh:1 quod cuicumque apprehcmo per IntcllccwII\ inlCllecllu attribual hoc quod cst ens.. El ideo cum apprehcndil essentiilm aliruius entis, didt illam essentiam esse
ens; et similiter unamquamque formam generalem vc:l 8peciaJem, ut bonita! est ens, albedo est ens, el sic de aliis. Et quia quaedam sunt quae concomi tantur rationem entis inseparabHiter, ut unum, bonum Cl huiU5modi, opoTtet quod haec de quolibc:t apprehcnso praedicentur eadem ratione qlla ens: undc
dicimus essentia est una et bona, c:t similiter dicimus unifU est una ct bona. et ita. de bonitatc ct albedine el qualibet forma generali vet speciali. Sed album, quia est speciale, non concomitatur inseparabilittr rationem entis� unde poteS( apprehendi (orma albc:dinis sinc hoc quod auribuatur ei essc album. unde non cogimur dicere Albedo esl albaM; Dr pol. 9.7 ad 8 and 9 (in conlr.): -dc qllolibet corum praedicetur. ad I.
c:ns,
el alia tria concrel,,-;
S.lA. I, S!).4
189
...
83
Cf. A. Zimmermann, M'Ipsum enim [cst] nihil cst' (ArislOteles, Pc:rihcrm. I, c. 8). Thomas von Aquin iibc:r die Dcdeutung der Kopula-, in: A. Zinlmermann (cd.), Drr Begriff der &praeurdaJio im Mitttlaltrr (Miscellanea Mcdiaevalia 8). Scrlin and New York 1971. pp. 282-95.
R� The Latin text on which Thomas comments reads: MNcc si hoc ipsum
'cst' purum dilteri,: ipsc quidem nichil cst. Consignificat autem qua.ndam compositioncm quam line compositis nun elt intclligerc.· Sec In I Pnili.•
p. 25. 8$
I" I Pmh.. lect. 5: M51gnifiClit enim id quod primo cadit
modum aClualhatl1 abtolulc:, n;un
In Inlell«lu per
'ut' dmpllcher dirtum IllnlHul elK actu,
190
CHAPTER FOUR
191
BEING AS THE FIRST TRANSCENDENTAL
This text is central for grasping Thomas's understanding of
not composed of maller and form, does not possess complete
being. The primary significance of "is," he states, is "to be in act,"
simplicity. it is not its being
and he draws from this the conclusion that "therefore it signifies
determinative
after the manner of the verb," This conclusion poinlS to (he
considerations guiding Thomas's line of thought.
(t.Ut)'
(dtlerminativa)
but has it, because each form is
of being. The form determines a
thing to a specific mode of being, and is
(ip.sum esse commune).9/)
The verb is the subject-mauer of chapLer three of Perihernuneias.
not
being in general
We encountered these formulations earlier in Thomas's sketch
Proper to the verb is [0 signify something after the manner of an action or passion.86 The verb "'to be" must therefore also bring to
of the history of philosophy
expression some activity. But Thomas sees a fundamcnlal difl'er
that this phase cannot be the last. In the second phase being is
ence befWccn "to be" and the other verbs. Other verbs, like "to
considered under a particular aspect, because the form determines
run," signify accidental actions. "Esse," however, is not a second
a thing to a special mode of being. Only in the third phase, in
ary act, but the primary,''17 It is the prerequisite condition of act, the actuality of every form or act.
Esse
every
is the actuality of all
(3. 8.).
The second stage of the history
is marked by the wformal" way of thought, but Thomas stresses
which being is considered 3S being, is each thing "resolved into that which is and its being
{esse) ."
Thomas
formulates
the
things, "sincc il is related to everything as act. Nothing has
metaphysical resolution of things in the Boethian terminology of
actuality, except insofar as it
the real diversity. Things receive their
is."1I1I
From the principal signification
ts5t
from the universal
of "is," its copulative function must be understood. Because
cause of being; they are created. From a transcendental perspect
actuality is always the actuality of a form, we use "is" in joining
ive, creation is the causality that extends to being in general. From
subject and predicate to 5ignify that a form actually is in
this view-point Thomas imerprets the fourth proposition from
The ontological meaning of the diversity between
a subject.
ens and en'e
De
musil, "the first of created things is being (esse) ." The thesis does
comes to the fore in the continuation of Thomas's commentary on
not mean by
Boethius's
object of creation. "For something is called created because it is a
a. .... iom
De hebc/omadibus.
Whe.n:as, on his reading, the
second
expresses the semantic differences, the diversity is �applied
in the axioms concerning "the one." These axioms arc: (VII) "In a simple thing iLs esse and what is are one;" (VIII) "In
to things"
every composite. to be and what is are different. "MOJ The first
esse
a subsisting thing, hut the proper aspect of the
being (ens), not because it is this being The view that Lhe
esst of
(hot: ens) .""9J
things has an external origin
w
common to Thomas and Aviceuna. But [he Arabic philosopher draws a conclusion from the crcatedness of heing, which pro
Because �all that some
principle of things is marked by identity and simplicity. All other
foundly affecLs his understanding of being.
things arc composed in Ihc sense that there is a real difTereuee be
thing has, not through itself, hut from another. is olJl...ide
tween their �to-be" and "what is." Even a subsisting form, although
its essence," he concludes that the
eHe
(pmetn")
of every created thing is
outside its essence.!'! Being is added to a thing's quiddity in the et idl:o significat per modum ul:rbi. Quia uero actualita.s, quam principaliter significat hoc uerbum 'est', est eommuniter actualis omnis forme uel actus, subnancialls uel acddentaiis, inde est quod, cum uolumus $ignificare quam cunque formam uel actum actualiter inessc alicui subiecto, significamus illud per hoc uerblllo 'est' ( ...) ; et ideo ex consequenti hoc UerblUl\ 'est.' signifieal compositioncm. " 116 Ibid.. leel. 5: ·proprium autem uerbi est ut significet actionem": "est enim proprium uerbi significare aliquid per modum actionis ud passionis". M7 ce. S.th. J, 54. 1 : "Actio enim est proprie act.ualitas virtutis; SicUl esse en actualitas substantiae vel eS$entiae." �t\ S.ch. I, 4.1 ad 3: "ipsum elK: est perfectissimum omnium: comparatur enim ad omnia tit actus. Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi Inqllantmn est: unde iplum elSe eu a(".lualilall omnium rerum". 11\1 111 V, IIIbdolft., leet. 2: "Hie oslendit quomodo appliceh\r ad res". For an analyall of thet.e ..Iorot, au R. Mdnen1Y, BoIt/tilU alUl Aqwi1l4l. pp. :l 1 1 - l ti.
manner of an accidem, il is
a "concomitant" of a thingY�
Thomas too recognizes a Teal diversity in things; he even \10 91
ltnd.,
len. 2. S.th. I, 45.4 ad 1 . 92 Dt vrnl. 8.8: "Omne autem quod aliquid non hahtl a se ipso sed ab altero, est ei praeter essentiam suam; et per hunc modum probar Avicenna quod esse cuiuslibet rei praetcr primum em est aliquid praeter essentiam ipsius quia omnia ab alio esse habem.� 9� Avicenna, LiM de pltilosophia prima [, 5 (ed. Van Riel, p. 36): "Intellertul de ente comitabitur ilIam". For A.vicenna·J dO("lrine, .'Iel:' G. Verbeke, "Intro duction doctrinalc", in: ibid., pr. 62--80·. Cf. L. De RaeY11lackrr, "J.'i'tre .�don Avirenne cl �r:JOIl S. Tholl1;lI d' Afl tti n", In: Alli,,,lna (;olll lll,IIIfIf"tllion VoN,"", <:alntlla 19!'r6, I'P' I IU-� I .
CHAPTER. FOUR
192
accepts in some texts, e. g., in
Quodlibet II,
BEING AS
2. I , thai �being"
(esse)
is
an accident, when "accident" is taken in the wide sense of " whatever is outside
(praetn)
(ens)
19�
and "thing" is essential for his critique of Avicenna.
a thing's essence. � But he denies that
4.5. "&ing" and �Thing"
Being is called �accidenl," not because it be
longs to the genus accident but by virtue of a certain similarity to it: neither forms part of the essence of a thing.94 For Thomas there is a
Under the influence of Arabic philosophy, the everyday term
profound difference between the two senses of accident, to which
acquired a specific philosophical sense in the thirteenth century.97
he points in the same
0J,odlibet.
Being
(esse)
is an accident, not as
"Thing" is introduced by Thomas in his commentary on
TeS
Metaphy
though related accidentally to a substance, but as the "actuality" of
sics IV
any substancc.95 Here a new aspect of the notion of "actuality"
first argument for the convertibility of "being" and "one." This
as a transcendental property in connection with Aristotle's
comes to the fore Thomas conceives being in a way that is self
argument is that "one man"
consciously critical of Avicenna's understanding of being.
and "man" are the same thing, and nothing different is expressed
.
Thomas's view of the composition of essence and
esSt
(unus homo),
"being m�n" (ens homo)
in every
by repeating the terms ( l 003b 26 ff.). Thomas is obviously struck
created thing has two features. The first corresponds to Avicenna's
by the fact that Aristotle in his argument speaks not only of
view: in a composite thing, being cannot be caused by its essential
" being" and "one," but also of "man." He proceeds to give this last
principles, for no thing is the essential cause of its own being. It is
concept a transcendental twist through the notion of ·'thing":
caused by something else
(cawatum ab aho) .
The second feature
marks the difference from Avicenna: being is the actuality of every form.96 In other words, it is the act of "that which is," the inner principle of Ule concrete
ens.
Thomas takes issue with Avicenna especially in tex.ts where he deals with the transcendentals, since Avicenna's understanding of being has far-reaching consequences for the doctrine of the
communia. The most important text is Thomas's commentary on
Metaphysics IV, 2, a text in which a cenu-al question of the scUntia communis is raised: the question concerning the pr:r se accidents of being (cf. 3. 6.). A crucial role is played in the discussion by the notion "thing"
(res),
which is not found in Aristotle but is one of
the primary notions named by Avicenna in his
Metaphysics.
94 1# pol. 5.4 ad :J: -lSlt non dicitur accideos quod sit in genere accid.:!ntis,
si loquamur d.:! I.'�Joe substantiae (est enim actus ess.entiae). sed per quamdam similitudinem: quia non est pars essentiae. skul nee accidens.w Cf. Quodl. XII, 5.1. See J. Owens. "The Accidental and t.5sential Character of Being in the Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas", in: J. R. C:nan (cd.), St. Thomas Aqmnas on tht £:riJlnut of God, Gollnlw Papers ofJOMjJh Otw.ns, Albany N.Y. 1980. pp. 52-96. <JS
Quodl II.
2.1 ad 2: -eMf: est accidens, non quasi per accidens
Sf:
habe»5,
sed quasi actualitas cuiustib(:l substantiae-. % See for these IWO fealures S.th. I, 3.4: ·Opol"let ergo qllod iUud cuius es.-.e es.t aBud ab esscnlia sua, habeat esse caU5alum ab a1io ( ...) . 0poflel igimf quexl iplllill esse comparelur pOlentiam . •
•
FIRST TRANSCENDENTAL
Thomas's view of the relation between the transcendentals "being"
being is an acddent in the proper sense of the word, that is, a
calegorial accident.
TUt':
ad enentiam quae en aliud ab iplo. sltut actus ad
that th� name -man� is
imposed from the quiddity or nature of man, and the name �lhing- (us) from the quiddity only; but the name "being" (ens) is imposed from the Olct of being. and the name "aneW (unum) from order or the lack of division , for what is one is undivided being. What has an essence and a quiddity by reason of that essence, and what is undivided i n itself, are the same. Hence these three-res, ens, and unum si gn i fy absolutely the same but according 10 diverse concepts (rotitmtJ).98
It
should
be noted
-
Thomas introduces a conceptual difference between "thing" and "being" which does not make sense in Aristotle's meta physics. The
ratio of res
ratio of ens from
is taken from the essence or quiddity, the
the act of being. Yet they do not signify something
that is really different; they signify the same called
res
concretum,
which is
wht:n it is viewed from its essence or "reality," and
�ns
97 Cf. J. Ham("5se, ··Res' chez Ie! ameun philosophiques des l� et 13" sied.:!s ou Ie pa55age de la neutralite a la specificite", In: M. Faltori and M. BIanchi (cds.), Rzs. III" Colloquio Tnltrnalionllle del Lt5SicQ Tntdltltualt Europeo,
Rome 1982, pp.
91-104.
IV Mdaph., len. 2, 553: "Scicndum est enim quod hoc nomcn Homo. imponilur 11
91'1 Tn
,\,,;dditate t ... nlUm; hoc vero nomen Ens. imponitur ab aClu CMendi: et hoc nomen Unum ab ordine vel indivisione. Est enim unum ens indivisum. Jdem autem �Sl quod habet essentiam el quidditalem per ilIam e!ISCntiam, el q uod est in se indlviSllm. Unde iSla lria res, ens, unum, sIgn incant omnino idem. s.:!d se(:ltndum div.:!nas rationel.w
194
when it is viewed from its elSe or "actuality." Thomas bases the conceptual difference between ens and res on a real diversity in the
added to the essence. 1 U l BUl to Thomas's mind this view is incorrect. His argument is: though a I.hing's tjS( is different from its essence, it must not be understood to he �metJling added in the mallner of an accident but something constituted, as it were, by the "rincirles of the essence. Hence the name ens, which is imposed (to signil"y) from esse itself, signifies the same thing as the name imposed from the essence.ID2
structure of that which is. In every thing two aspects are to be considered. namely. its quiddity and its being (esse) . The name
Even
TI!$
is derived from the first component, the name ens from the !iCcond.
He attributes this distinction to Avicenna. not only in his deriva. tion of the transcendentals in De veritau 1 . 1 but also in other lexts.99
I n reality, however, this attribution obscures the fundamental diffen:ucc between the two thinkers.
Tn Avicenna's aCCOunt of the common notions and their differ ences, "thing" is the point of departure and has the central place. It signifies the "determinate nature" (certitudo) through which a thing is what it is. The term has primarily an ontological sense, as
�s clear from Avicenna's examples. Thus the
IS
certitudo of a triangle
that whereby it is a triangle, that of whiteness that whereby it is
white. The Avicenni:m sense of crrlitudo expresses the Greek
�
traditi n of intelligibility, which focuses on the essence of a thing hy poslIlg the question concerning what it is. Res signifies the
"what-ness" or C]uiddity of a thing, which Avicenna also describes as "its proper being" (esse proprium) . The quiddity proper to each thing is something other (praeter) than esse, ahhough the concept of
et!s cannot be separated from the concept of res. It is rather always concomitant with it, "for the thing has being either in the singular or in the estimation and inlellect." 1Uf! To Avicenna
primary trall!lcendental; his problem is how tht:
notions, l ike "be illg, can add something "
195
BEING AS THE FIRST TRANSCENDENTAL
CHAPTER FOUR
to iL
'"
thing" is the
other
common
Thal this interpretation is justified appears from Thomas's treat
Thomas's argument has not only been criticized by modern scholars; lO� it is also regarded as contradictory by his own contem poraries. Siger of Brabant found Thomas's position unintelligible
· y that. being is not. t.he es.
by the principles of the essence, is to affirm and to deny the same thing. Hl4 The formulation of Thomas's argument is surely not as clear as one might wish. So he seems to use the term "essencc� in abstracto, that is, as principle. when affirming the real diversity between esse and essence; and in concreto, that is, as substance, when affirming
that being is constituted by the principles of essence. Yet there can be no doubt about the iutelHioll and meaning of his argument. Thomas's critics do not sufficiently take the Avicennian back ground of the discussion into account. Avicenna's problem is how the common terms "being"
Thomas wants to make clear in the first place that the commun;a are not accidents. Hc adopts the same strategy when he engages
meO[ of Avicenna in his ('.ommentary on MelaphysiCl IV, Iccl. 2.
Avicenna in his commentary 011 Melaphysio X. In tJlis text, which
does not signify the substance of a thing hut something added to it,
between communia and accidents. There exists a similarity betwccn
He observes that according to the Ar.thic philosopher. the name ens and hc proceeds to explain the reasons how Avicelllla comes to
this view. I t follows from his doctrine of creation thai every
also deals with "being" and "one," Thomas makes a comparison them, because both do not signify something that subsists. Yet the difference is that communia signify the nature of that of which they
creature has bei ng (essf.) from another, and that a thing's being is thus different from its substance or essence. Now the name r.ns signifies " 10 he" (e's·se) and it therefore seems to signify something
�e In I Sml. . 6.1.1: 25.1.4: "secundum Avicennam ( ... ) hoc nomen 'ens' el 're�' differunl secundum quod est duo considerare in re, �cilicel . qmddllatem el r:nionc:m ('jus, C:I esSf' ipshu". !oo AVirl'"llIla, Ii".". d, -'l1,nllll dllllntJ 1, :1 (cd. Van Rit'I, fll'. 34-36). \19
](I!
In IV Mtlaph.• Ic:(.t. 2,
556.
102 Ibid., Ieet. 2, .'iS8: Esse cnlm rei quamvis sit aliud ab eius essentia, non "
tamen eM intdligendum quod sit a1iquod !upeT"oldditum ad modum acddcn tis, sed quasi constiluit.ur per prindpia e$.�enliae. Et ideo hoc nomen Ens quod imponitur ab ipso esse, significat idem cum nomine quod imponitur ab ipsa essentia. " JO� cr. K. Flasch, Oit Mtlaphysilt
1973, p. 75.
fhl Einrn
lwi NillO/au:; lion
KIU5,
IIH Siger of Ilmhmu, In Mr.lapk., "modun, q. 7 (I'(\. Dunphy, p. 4!i) .
•
Leiden
,
--- ,,..,,'
.
,
'
"
,
"
,
"
,
'
CH....PTt:R FOUR
196
,
.•
lec.t. 3. 1980: �III h()(' enim diffcrunl communia ab aoci
denub.,U, quamm utrisque sil commune non esse hoc aliquid: quia OIlJIIlllmi;, significant ipsam lIatllram sll ppositorum, non autem ac.cidenLia, �rt flliquam naturam additam.�; 1 9 8 1 : «Hoc auu:m non con5iderall� Avi�.mna poslIiI quod unum r.' �n.s sunt praedicata accidentalia, c:l qllod significant naturam arldit.'lrn supra ca de quibus dic.untur."
lOti Dt t1ltl,
habet cuC'.� 101 On us
c,
I:
·Sed esselilia
rtir.:imr
, ,
"
,
,
,
" .,, "
'"
"
"
II ,
,, ,
,,,,,,
"' ' '' ., , . '
"
,
,
, ,
,,
'
"
,
,, ' ,
'
"
'
,
,, " , , • • ,,
BEING AS THE FIRST TRANSCF.NDf:NTAL
are said. wllt:n�as accidents signify ...orne nalure added above the things or which they are predicated. This difference was ignored by Aviu.'una when he posited "one" and "being" as accident.;ll pralicates.IM How can Thomas now show that ens signifies the AAme realily as the nalne imposed from lhe essence, that is, re.�? The anSWt'T is that he adopts the Avice-Huian perspective of the prilmu.:y of essence in a way thaL is IIot unfaithful to hi� nwn \-'jews.. Being is received ann ddermiut!d by the essence, and is in lhis sense "constitutr:d" by il. In Dr mte Thomas d�"("Tibes I:urntia as that through which alld in which ens hal> hei ng. 106 Things acquire being through their natures, Consequently, ens does not signify another llature than "thing," With that, however, the most essential has not yet been said. ESll:, from which the name e1l.J is taken. is the vcry actuality of �very essence or nature ;lod, therefore, the inner principle by which a nature is. The notion of actuality makes cI(,:;\I- that Thomas's doctrine of the tmllsc.:endentals has a basis different. from Avicenna'5 doctrin e of tile t,:ommon notions, "Being," not. "thing," is the first transcendental, and this primacy dominates hilj doc trine_ Thomas's problem is how the other tramrendentah, c.:an add something to bang. Does "thing" really ha\'c a transcendental charader in Tho mas?I01 He states explicitly in two places thai "thing" belongs to the transcelldt:lllals (res est de tronsrnuten.tilnlJ) . I()� Yt:t various authors from Suarez to modern times hav� denied that res is a separate tran scendental, because ir i.� synonymous with ett$ .I09 This synonymy IO� I" X !tfnClph
.
secundum quod per earn ct in t:a ellS
U-dlli'lll�ndental �c S. Ducharme. "NoLe SUI tt: tr.mscendemal 're-5' selon SainI Thom:u�. in: R.nrtu dt I'UniomUi d'O/MUM 1 0 (lfJ40), KClion speciale pp. 85·-99"; J. Van de Wide, ·'Rr... �n ' ding' . Bijdrage tot een vergelijkende studic: van de zijmopvaHing in hel Thomlsme en bij Heideg as
'
".
"
"
"
",",.,."" """, , " " "
197
is rejected, howr-ver, by Thomas_ III his commentary on Meta ph'.fir;.� TV he applies, as we saw, lh� st=rnantic model of nomen mtin-Tes to "being" and " thing . " Tht!y signify the same reality but according to LlifTer"'lll rationes. Ens and res arc not synonyms. Thomas distinguishes two senses of -thing. � The first and primary meaning is onwlogical: that is called res which has a determinate and stable being (esse ratum et firmum) in nature_ This meaning, it is suggested, derives from the Latin mtUJ, "nt'tt'r " minate, "stable," "valid," According to t.hi� mt"an ing u.s signifies that which has a quidd iq' or essence, the A...icennifln "cel-titude." The second meaning i$ cogniti....e. Because a thiug is knowable through its essence, the name Tel' is extended to all that is apt to enter into knowh:dgt=. Thomas derives this meaning etymo logically fWIIl the verb reOT, nilS, "to think" or '"to opine." This Inoue of re!J' can signify things that have no stable being in nature, such as negations and privations. I 10 The second mod� is more general than the first, rranscendental mod�, but Thomas slre55e:o; that the extension of the second meaning of "thing" is not greater than that of "being," for a "thing of reason" (res mlioniof) is at tht: same lime a "bdng of reason" ( en.� mtioni.I). That every being is a th in g implit:5, on the one hand. that it is fixed ann stahle through its essence, and on the other haud, that we are rherf':by ahle to "think" the thing, for it is kuow"ble through its r-.ssence. From this the conclusion hits been drawn that to Thomas the transcendental "thing" is of decisive importance for the intelli gibility of bt:ing.II' But this interpretation is more Aviccnnian than Thomistic. For Thomas ens is the "first intelligible." because a thing is only knowable when it is in act. Ens does not signify, however, any determinate mode of being. Therefore we next a.sk what it is, and consider it as m. The convertibility of being and thing plays a role in the diM'uc; sion about the ontological stalus of evil. It is used as an argument against the purely privative character of eviL Since it is all undeniahle fa.-.l that thel'e is evil ill Ihe world.. evil is " thing and a
·
ger", in: TijdJduijl l.loor FiWsoJi� 24 ( 1 962), pp. 427-506. Cf. L Ocing-Hanhurf. '''Res' corn me concept transcendental et sur-tranSt:cndental", i n : RM, 1I1� bdnTItu.iMl�k del wsi«l IntlllLftua[, EuwJwO Rome 1982, pp. 2M-96. I! Ira I &nt., 2.1.3 ad 2; S.lh. t, 39.S ad 5. Wit cr. Wallace, '7hinK�' In: 'I'lu N6W (" o4IlAoIl( XIV, San
Co�IG
,
J. A.
F,.rydofHtlitJ
Francisco and ToronTO 1967, pp. 91-92. llll In II Smt., 37. 1 . 1 . cr. In I Sent., 25.1.4, A si mi lar distinction is to be found in Bona,"enture, In ll Sent. 37, dub. I (Dpt'J'(J Omnia II, p. 876). I I I r, Van de Wiele. -Le prublellll!: de la ..�rili nnl.nlogiqur d:,"� la ' philusophie de aaint Tt1(1mas", in: RlfI1U plliwtJfJhfipu tI, Loutl"''' 52 (1934.). JlJl. !'!!'t7-M.
----"--
""
198
, '''--' '
'
"
nature, for being and th ing are convertible. In his reply Thomas
does not point to the twofold me�U1ing of r�s but to t.hat or
"Being is said in two wav�" '
(d.
secl.
6. 2.). In
ens:
tbe first way it
i
sign.ifit:s the entity of a thin g. in tht: other the trUlh of a proposit on.
Ouly in the latter sen.
Thomas explains that "beiug
"
is convertihle with "th ing, " insofar
as "being" signifies lht.' entity or a thing,
il is divided
by
the ten
categories.ll:l Jt is Jloteworthy that the categories, th e frrst contrac
tions of being. are related to being in t.he seu� of "thing, � that is, to
being in its quitltliti\'e aspect. m From a trauscendental persperlive,
Aristotle's doctrine of the catego rit's must thus be se e n me tap hysics that views "what is" as The pe cul iari ty of
thing
"
"
1 99
BEING AS THE FIRST TRANSt.:I':NDENTAL
CHAPTER FOUR
as
a
us.
is thm it is the only transr:endelltal
Avicenna calls the cer!itudo of sumething. 1 16 Henry irle n tifies
ImS
with the second mod� of ,.....,\". Em is what has a quidrlitati....e being
(iSSt
quidditativum) . what is uetermined by tbe Ttltitudo, for lhe
phrases "quidrlitil.live being
"
and "fixed bein g
"
are conver tible. I 1 7
In this irlen t.ification a new ontOlogy become appart'llt: "being" is
understood, not from its actuality but from its esse utial reality. "
"
"
"
H�nry's dadrine had a gr eat inOuence on Dun s Scotus. It
t"x plains the difference, indicatt':d in 4.1., becwcen Thomas's tran
scenuental t hought and Scotm's . Mernphysics is possible in a. pll1mlily of forms. In Scotu S' s .�ci&ntia lmns£enden.s, being is underst.ood
from the stan dpoint of it'!!. "reality," which he calls tht:
(ratitudo)
fix ity
"
"
of something. In Thomas's metaphysics the act of being
is determinative for the concept of e1J5, for being is only underslood
as being from it!'> "actual ity.
n
based on an clemen t in thr: complt!x con cep t of be ing itself. Ens is
nothing other than "what is" (quod Nt) . -It thus app('ars Lo signify
both a thin g (rtm) by the expression quod and
t.fU
(St. " 1 14 This complexity makt:s understandahlt': that lrausccndcnral
thoug ht leave" room far vanom options. This b ecom e s manifest
when we compare Thomas's doctrine with th.ll of a th inker from
the next. generation. Henry of Ghent (d. Avir.enna's n otion of
res
1293). 115
and the disuuction between the (.1,1,'0
modes of " lhing, " the thing acr:ording to opinion and tht': thing
that has a stable being, con<;t.itule Henry's point of d e parture . For him the first and most genr:ral concept is res in the sense of
rnU.
reor,
h is common both to an iul� concept, !.hat is, a cont:l!pt of a
fictitious thing, such as a chimem, and a true concept, lhat is, a
concept of a true thing, whit:h is the nature and essence of some
thing and is cap ahle of actually existing in the outside in the
112
latter
S.th.
4.6. CondlJ,sion
by the t!xpression
....orld. .
Res
sense is derived from Talitu.do and signit1cs what
I, 4B.2 ad 2: "ens uuplkiter didtur. Uno modo, �t:t:o!n(hml quod
signifiear entitalem I'e], prnut dhdditur per decem rra..rlkamcnta: el �ic �on�rtitur cum re." (l'. Sr.C. III, 8 and 9. In cr. Quudt. I I , 2.1: �Scd verum esT. quod hoc nomen ,,,.s. secundum (juut! importal u'm cui competit huiu�modi t'$SI.", sic significat cSl>(' ntialll n:i. I' t diyidilur [W'f decem genera . In IX Mdaplt... Icel. I , 1769: �eJlS �Ii\.'irlitur uno modo seetln.d�m quod dicilul' {Iuid, scilicet substantia, aUl lj uall 1il3S, am qu.aHr.as, quod est dlvldere ens p�r decem praedicamenta". l l� In I Pmh.. It·Tt. fl.
In the preced ing c hap t�r it was shown lhat the doctrin� of th� lnmscendcntals
is not an isolated uoctrine but the expression of a
transcendental conception of metap hysics . In {his chaptt':r Ihe
transcendental way of thought proper to Thomas rook shape. Its distinctiveness appears in two forms. First, transcendental thought can be described most bro adly as
thought direct.�rl to lhe: first and common. This d�scriptjon is open to a numher of elaborations. Thomas
rejecl" l\onaventun:'s
"theo
logical " intel'pretalion of the tint and the "!'>eparatistic.:" interprcta·
tion of the Platonists. His argu ment is that llu.:' human intellect has no dirt'(.:t access to th e divine being and to that which is first by
causality. Thomas's d octrine of the cammunla is a critique of knowl
�uKe in which a sharp rli..t.inction is made between transcenrlent.l1 co mmonness and cau,�;'ll commonness. The first in a c ognitive
respect is not a transc('ncienl being but being: that i.� C'.ommon by predica tion . Being is the first transcendental because it is lhe.:'
condition of man's intellectual knowledge. Althollgh natur
"
1 1 .')
Cf. J. A.
Hmry II!
AeTlsen, *Tran$(cndentat
Ghent. Studj,J
( 1293) , louvain 1995.
in ComJlltmoralion
Thnllgtll in Hcnry of Ghent", ill
nf Ih, 'OOth .ointliv�nary u.f HiI Omth
Henry of Ghent, Qllodlibet V, q. :.! (I'd. Paris 1518, repro LOII\lain 1961. l!'l4rD) ; VII, qq. I and 2 ((:<1. G. A Wilson, in: Hmna dt Gandal.lU Opera Otl/'ila. �'()l. XI. Louyain 1991. pp. 2ti-'lH). ! Henry of (;ht'nI, Summa quotslionum ordmarium �4.'l (I"{\. R. Macken,
l l f;
17
Opem Omn ia, vol. XXVII, LOllyain 1991, pp. 174-7�.).
------'-"'�'" .
200
CHAPTER FOL"R
known, being is n�vt:=rlheless nol a formal
a
prim condition of
thought, as Transcendental ThomislIl holds. Man has an openness
to all that is, but hi.� r�lation to being in general is marked by
CHAPTER
FlV ..:
potentiality ann rt:ceptivity. Second, Thomas's trallscendental way of thought poses tht'
qut':stion c.oncerning that by virtue of which being is being. In his history or philosophical reOection on the origi n of being ca(".h thing is finally resolved into "that which is" and "its being"
(esSf') .
V..th at is n ovel in Thomas's ana1y�is, and wha.t by the same token
distinguishes it (rom the positions of Avicenna and Ouns $cOlliS, is his understanding of being as act. Actuality is not one of 1111:= modes that can belong to a being that is in itself possible, but is the
determination of being as such.
The two features of Thomas's transcendeutal way of thought
the cognitive ano the ontological-an� do�e1y connected. Some·
thing is knowahle, insofar as it i� in acl; something is, insofar as iL has ar.ruality. Because the ratio of being is derived from the pri mary act of being,
ens
is th e condition of intellectual knowledge,
and the ftrst in the orner of the transccndentals.
ONE AS TRANSCENDENTAL The other transcendentals add something to being. Th�y express a mode of being Ihat, though implied in the first tran."rendental, is not yet expTes..�ed by the name "bcing� itself. The': first exp1ication occur� with
qua bt:ing, it is other communia
th e Ollt'." Every being posse.,,��s unity;
"
undhrided. The
Ollt'
is firse in the sequenc:e of the
because, as is :SUlled in In I
Senlentiarum 8.1.3,
it is the
closcst to n
"
h eing. The alle enjoys priority for hi...torical reaSons as well, since
it. is the only transcendental for which medieV'dl scholars found a
dear ;.\I"liculation in Aristo tle s works. The doctrine of the one as '
u"anscendcntal is therdore thr- place where the genesis of the
medieval doctrine becomes visible. I It provided in Philip the
Chancellor's account the modd for understanding the other U'anscendentalf;.
The f;earch for unity ill! a basic concern in thr. h istory of philo
sophy. Accordiug to Hegel, the whole of philosophy i:s
uothing
<;
hut the study of the detCrminatiom of unity."" But what is unity?
Thomas ubserves that a diversity of conceptions of the essence of u n i ly is found both among the philo;>ophers and among the
magislri.� As far as
the philosophers are coucemed, he is faced with
three different tradition.� . The fin:;;t is the doctrine of Aristotle, who deals with unity in several books of his
MetaphysiC,J
(hook lV,
lcet.2 4; book V, lec.t.7-8 ; book X). The second is the Neoplatonic
On Thomi13', doa:lTin.. of unity, �e L Ocing-Ibnhoff. E11� ei unNffl alnvntuntur. Sfe{[",ng ",rut (�Mlt dt.i Grund.r.-ltuJ in dn Phitmophu da hi. Thoma.( ,"'" Aqum, MiIflN!t'r 1933; P.C. Courth, "L'un selon sain i Th()lTlas�, i n : Rtvue 'I 'homistt 68 (1968). pp. 198-240; St. KowalClyk, "Une tentati....e de description de ]'unilt tran!.C�ndental� ". in: &inl Thmnn.(. d·Aqll;lI. Pour It uptiime centmai1t d, sa marl, Lublin 1976, pp. 14�I?U. See also my Cardinal Mercier !LeHne, 111::111 at the Univ�rsili"· of l..t'llven: J.A. Aertsen, �Dc:nken van Eenheiu·. in: Tijd &rlirifi vwr Fiiasofit �'l (1990), pp. 399-420.
1
.
'.l
(�.W.F. H�gc:l, V01'ltsulIgen iiber
du FlIill13uJ1hil! d,..,. R6igion,
W".kt, vol. 15 (cd. Glockner) , StUII�iU"t 19'1K, p. 1 1 3. .� In 1 S,"t., 24.1.3: -de quiddilarc uniunis invenilur
In:
SDmtliche
diversil
T�mas.A�i��
•
!�amu7i.
-- _...."
..
--
"
"
,
"
,
----_. " "
CHAPTER FI ....Jo.:
202
n�is
�
Oll�, and bemg cOmes next as the firH of its c.rcaturcs. �ow this is, th ough . seU-conmtent. yet absolutely inconsistent with the mental universe ur Chri.-stiall thillk�rs, ill which being Gum"t be the first of
conception of �hc On , which Thomas encounters in commenting
on both the flnal d1lrteenth c hapter of Dionysius's 0" divir.is nominibus. which is devoted to the names "rerfecC and "One." and
the Lib" de ('ausis. The third is the discussion within Arabic
philosophy between Avicenna ann Averroe!; on the n atu re of the one. The diven;ity among the 1Ilagi.dri as
"-
oc:ca.o;ioned by a question
to the predication of numerical term!; of C..od in Peter Lombard's
Sentenr.es (book 1, d.
24). Christian faith teaches that there is one God
and that there a re three Persons, but in what seose can unity and
multitude be predicated of the divine? This; th eological question
�purrc='d iLS ll I �di� \'al commentators to an analysis of lh � com:t'pls
of one and multitude.
A first important aspect of the transcendental account of unity
that
it
is
implies a criticism of the Neoplatonic, transcendcnt view of
the One. In Enneads VI,9 ("On the Good or the One") , Plotinus
investigates whether being and one are the same. He formulates th� que!ilion in terms that clearly allude to one of Aristotle's argu ments for the convertihility of heing and one in Melaphysicj
Are "a man " a.nri
"mill
IV.
ma.n" thr. same thing? Plotinus an!lwers in
the negative . "' Man ' and
'
living being' and
'
ration al
'
arc many
parts, and these many are houno tugeuU!T by the one. 'Man' and 'uue'
ar� lhert!fon� differt!Ill, wheJl the fonnel' has parts and the
latler is pardess"
(VI, 9.2). The one is that whit:h
preservcs aU thi ngs. As principle of all things, i t
mai.ntaills allti
is
i tself none of
the things that are. The one is ramer "be)'ond bcingn (V, 5.6). To
indicate this conception of the One, Etienne Gilson introduced the
term
"henology,"" following a suggestion of Plotinus himself:
Being i.�
"
;1
trace of the On�. And if �omeone sa....s that the word
unai (being) h'ls been derived from the word
have hit upon the truth" (V, 5.G).
h�
(one), he may
Against the Nt!opialUl1il: lIIeLaphysit:s of Lhe One, Gilson sets the
� �
"C ri tiall" metaphysics of bein g. He elucidates thi!:! oppositioll by
pomtmg to the fourth proposition of the LIt�r de causis, "The first of
created things is being. " Gilson commcnts: L 'it"
d
!�t$S#1"',
Pari, 1948, p. 42. Cf. E.A. Wyllcr, -IIcnologic', in: HI,�lmur.hl.f 1'\.f1f'tI.'TPur.h fi� Phl!ruuphi,- III, lJaTllLsladl 1974. col. IO!:i9; w. Rc lcrwaltes, [l�lt.m dl'j BI11tn. Studim ,mr rU l lplatoniJdlro Philn.mphiL l£11fi ihrer . . WlrkunglgtJchuhtt', Fra� kfun ar,n Main 1985, p. 1 1 ; J-<\. Acmen, �Ontolog}'
..
203
ONE AS TRANSCENDENTAL
and Henology In Medu�val PhIlosophy (Thomas Aquinal, Maner [ckhan and BcrthuM or Momburg)". in: t.P. Boa and P.A. Meyer (cds.), On f'nulus and hu InjlTUflu m MNlirotJl �h,. Lritlr:n m92. pp. 120-140.
J ,
i5 �t"li!!ht N�uplatunislIl: the first prillcipl� is th�
namely, Cod.
Gilson's conclusion is lh'll "Oll� C
as
a Neuplalolli�t and as a Chrislian." Chantclerislic: of
medieval philosophy as
Christian philosophy" is the metaphysics
"
of Exodus. expressing the identity of God and Being. Therefore, "if the Christian God is first, and if He is Being. then Being is first,
and no Christian philosophy can posit anything above being, "5
However, Thomas's rejection of henologv is not based on the •
Idea of a "Christian ph ilosophy, but on his c onception of transct":n nt':n tal thonghr.. The doctrine of the transcendentals is offered "
•
as a c.rit.ici!':m of t.hr: Nr:oplat.oni.
4. 1 . we saw that
Thomas, an aly:r.i ng Ihl:' ph i losop h i ca l hackground of the fourth
proposition i n th e ',ibn' d� cawi..�, critid:r.t':'i the Platon ic account of the
communia .tnu of theil' order. TIle one is not prior t.o being, hilI.
cun\i�rtible with it. W� will fiul
(5. 1 . )
consider the authoritative
text for the medieval doctrine of the transcendenlais, Ari�totle's
disc ussion of the relation between being and one in the Meta
physic,,; next (5. 2.), we will analyze Thomas's argument for the ir convertibility in
Summa thtologiae
I. 11.1, his main systema tic
account of uni ty. and show the historical background of Aristotle's
expo.r;ition: (h� transcen den tality versus the substantiality . of the one in Platonism (5. 3.).
Another importan t ",speCI of Thomas's arcount of unity i� his criticism o f Avicenna. On Thomas's readi ng , the Arahk
philoso
pher �lcknowledges Ute lrauscendentality of the one , but iden tifi t':S
the me taphysical one that is t:onvertible with being and the
mathematical one that is the principle of number. Thum;as wo r ks
out the distinction between the transcendental Olle and the UIle that
be longs to the category of quantity more clearly th an his predecessors do
(5. 4).
Whereas the first sections of this chapter deal with the relation
� E. Gila.on, BGnK (J.nd So",,: PhiJDmfJhll1"5, Toronto 1952 (2nd cd.), pp. �0-3L ..nm book III thc EngliSh \'craaon of Ihc Frcnch original L'it'" d I't.SSfnCf, but 1.1 nnt
idcJllla.1 wi lh It.
e Thil ..peel II ncgJecced by W. Hanlr.ey. -Aquln;t,ll' or Unh),?-, In: f)I""JIlw -4 (1980), pp. US-172.
•
t'inl l"rlnclplc: &clng
-,,
-------
,
---- -"'"
--_."
,
CIlAPT!:R :tlVE
ONt: AS TRANSCENDENTAL
last two sections (5. 7.-5. B.) are concerned with its rdaLioIl to the transccndcntals good and true. But there are also SOIlle issues that are specific to the one qua one. The most cen tral is, of course. the relation between the one and the many (.�. 5.). 18 the irreducible fact of the multitude flf '-hin&- not neglected iJ' the philosophies of unity? The French philosoph el" Levinns has spoken of "the ancient privilf':ge of unity that was affinnl:'U from Parmenjrle� to Spi noza and Hegd . " Classkal ph ilosophy removes the multitude it initial ly 1:'1I(,:Ollnters by reducing the altcrity of things to the "same.'" St:hoiastic views of unity and multitude, bo....ever. . wert! more balanced than Levinas suggests. One of the most remarkable aspects of Thomas's doctrine is that he also count.. "multitude" among the tTanscendenfia. The "one " adds to "being" the notion of '·indivision." Thii'\ con ceptual non·identity deserves closer attention, because it affords <'In important entrance to under�tanrling the transcendental way of thought. The philosophical �ignifif"anf"e or the tmnscencienw.Jit)' of the one becomes apparen t when Thomas a pp lies thi:s ic.lea to a co mposect being whose unity raises some ptirticulaJ- prublems: the human being. Section 5. 6. deals with the onc and the composed.
determined by one concept" (lOO.�h 22-25). As we observed earlier (3. 0.), Aristotle formulates here the two features th a t chuacterize the relation betv.·een transcenrlent;lls: real iden tity and conceptual
204 of the one LO being, the
5.1. The Philosopher: The converlibilu] 0/ being and one
In the second chapter wc showed that Thomas attaches a special significance to book IV of the Metaphysics because of its treatm�nt. of three themes that together make up the structure of a nemomf.rativt' science; the subject of the �cience, the attrihlltes that ne.c.essarily belong to lhat mhject and the principles of demonslmliou. HOl\li.llg established in Metaphysics IV,I Lhal (hI:" subject malLer of meta phYSoics is bein g qua beillg, Aristo tle turns in c. 2 to the ptr Sf! attribu te of lJeillg, "the onc."1! It is in troduce d as follows : "Being and the one are the Soamc and one single nature in the sense that they follow upon each other ( ... ) but not in the sense that they are E. Levina.s, Tocaliti tt Injim, The Hague 1974- (4tll ed.), p. i!i. II For Arist()tJe's doctri!Jc of ullil"', MX K.. BarrhJp.in, nj� Tmrm;�dMf.'a1im
7
lthrt d6r altrn DTlluwKit I. nit Trn.f"I.;uf'l.d�n!alje1mh'� im Corpus Arislllteliffilf'l., pp. 109-370; L. Cou]uuilarit."lili, -L'etre et run chez Arl'tote�, in: Revue de phik.. slJPlm anr.imnt 1 ( 1 983), pp. -49-98; pp. 143-195; E. Halper. "Aristotle on the
Conyerribiltty of One and Belng�. In: Th, New SClJlaJlirinlJ 59 (1985). pp. 21.'l-
227.
difference.
The Philowpher adduces twu
arguments for the convertibility of being and one. The first argument ( l OO3b 26-32) is based on li nguistic considerations that are confirmed by physical evidence. The expressions "uue man," "being man," and "man" are the same. The addi tion of the terms "one" and "bei ng" does not ex pre:;:; :;omething different from the natur� of "man." Thi" c.on dusion is corroborated through a consideration of th� prnct:sses of generation and corruption. "'rt-len 3 man i!'> generated, hri'ng man is generated , and at the same time mill man. From th is it is de�u-l:,. apparent, as Thomas remark!'> in his c.omment..try (lect. 2. 552), that "one" is not liometh in g other thaLl "being," because any two th i ngll which are identical wilh o n e and the same thi ng arc iden tic.al with each other. In cunnection with this first argument Thomas introduces the transcendental "thing" (cf. 4. .5.). Aristotle's secolld ilrgument (1003b 32':33) is most concise: "the: .sub:;tallce uf each thing is one, and not per a.ccidens; and sim ilarly it is not a being accidentally. " Thomas elaborates upon thili argn ment in his co mm entary. If being ann one are not predicated substantially of a thing but by means of wmelhing .. dded, Ulere arise s an infinit� regreliilii. For being and one would have to be predicated also of that which is added. But art' th ey predicated substantially or ac.r.idel1laUy? If the latter, the same question would arise again, ann so on to infini ty. Therefore the first PQsition must he held, namely, Llmt the substance of a thing is one and being through itself.9 111 l:Ullneclion with the sccond argument, Thomas insert..s a lengthy discussion of Avicenna's view on the problem of the "addi tion" (d. 4. 5.). From both arguments Aristotle draws the conc:1l1!,ion that there 9
In N
ph Af do
.•
555: MQuod autcm ell& et unum pr:u:diulliur tit: sub$lantia cuiuslibet rei per 5C CI rlOn secundum an:id..,,!>, !li(" pOIf'" prohilri. Sj cnim praedic"rel1tur de )ui.r.;lan lia f"uiustih,., f("i per ali quod ens d nddilum. de iIIo ilerum nel.:l:ss.. �M pmedicari en � quia unumquodquc Cst unum el ens, .�UT p.rgo irf'rllm de hoC' pracdicatur per 5e. aul per aliquid aliud ac lditum . Si per aliquld aliud, iterum euet quaestio de iIIo addito, et �ic erit proceden: ulq ue ad infinitum. Hoc "litem e st impo5sibile: ergo 1I1:[t:�lIt: "sf sf.ar� in primo. !cilicet quod sub5umtia rei �il. Ulla r.1. em per se i psam et n()n per aJiqu id additulII. M leel.
2.
,
,
------ .
".. . . ..
206
"
,
I
"
"
CIIAPTJ::R FIVE
Tn Metaphysics X, c. l Aristotle asks what "one�
""
207
ONE AS TRANSCI':NDI:NTAL
are as many spedes of "one" as there are of "being." Just as h�i ng
,
i.t;. 1 /1 In this
is divided into the cattgorics, so the one is diversified: unity in the
investigation he employs hiF. usual method. Obstrving thaI "the
category of substance is "{he same"
in the category of
one is said in many way", " he draws up an inventory of the
quantity "t.he equal," in the category of quality "the similar." From
diITerent senses of the term. He distinguishes four modes of u ni ty
(idem),
Aristotle s cOllclusion it can he g
intention, as a modern interprett:T suggests, to place being
3
strict beyondness of the categories. "lIJ The purpose of his
exposition is (0 sho\\' thal they art;' both found in all th e categories.
thal can be dtvided into two groups. The criterion for die fint two modes is of a physical disposition: the indivisihility of molion.
These modes are "the cOlltinuous" and "the whole." The criterion for th e laufOr two modes is the unity of defi nition or apprehension.
' TrallSt:endcntals, Thomas says, "run through" a ll of them. I J Be
These morl�s are what is indivisible i n number, "the individual,"
cause the one is convertible with being. it is the office of the same
and what is iudivisible in species, "the universal"-the ohject of
science to investigate being as well as unity. The science dealing
knowl�dge aud science. It is from these four modes that what
with the on� and many "'is not distinct. [rom the science of hr.ing
in general. "IZ 01llology comprehends the doctrine of the one. In
Ml!taphJ!iics IV Aristotle
cio�s not mention what the
logos is of
unit)' is becomes apparent. Aristotle condudes ch at the rati(J of "o n e" is "indivisible" or "unciivlded.-16 "One" is a negative term; it
adds something concep tual to "being."
the one whereby it is distinguished from "being." This ratio is
clarified ill book X, which
ileals entirely
with th e one ,md the
many. Thomas opens his c.ommelltary on this book with a curious
fl":mal'k. He wants to show the il1lrinsic coherence of (he different
hooks of the MetaPh:�si(..�
5. 2. Thomas: The convertibility of being and nne In his two argumenLs for the convertibility of being and one,
inquiry into the one. The reason is that the Philo sop her has
Aristotle does not really clarity the ontological foulldation of thi§
the onc that is c.onveltible
considerations which are confirmt':d by referring to the processes
established in hook IV lhat this science ha... as ils subject being anci ....rith
being.n Th o mas would be the first
to acknowlecigt': that the formulation ht': e mp loys is rather 100Ilt':,
since he himself has descrihed, in his com me ntary on book th e one as
a
per se accident
TV,
of being. What is an essential attribute
of the F.ubjeet «.:allnot be at the same moment the subject il...t:lf. TIlal he nevt":rtheless speaks of a double subjt!ct of metaphysic!; in oruer
to elucidate the coherenrr"_ of the Books rv and X is another
indicatlOJi that I'or him "'he one" is closer to being than the other transcendentals. In his
xposition on
r:
the subject of metaphysics,
"the one " is expre�..ly mentioned as one of the issues studied by this science, whereas with �lhe true" and "th e good" this is not the
case. I "
10
II
K. lkil tJd�in, Dil TranntMtnlaljenJdlrl', I" 2 OS. cr. In X
Mttaph Iccl. 3, 1981: �,vd unum quod conV(:rtitur 1-11111 ent� .•
circuit omnia enlia."
12 In- Boelh. De trill. 5.1 ad 7. I � In X Mtwph., 1e!1"l. I , 11)20: "Sup�riu$ In quarln huius Philosophu.$
ollCndit quod isla sdenlia habet pro Ilibiecio ellS, �, unum, quod cum ente convr.ni tur. " I.. In- M,tafJlI. prol.: "Unde et ilia �r.ieflli a maxlmc csl inlel icctuotJis, quae .
inrerchangeability. The tirst argument is based upon linguistic of generation and corruption; the F.�c.ond is t.,ased upon predication.
Why is something one insofar
as
it is? Thomas surpasses Aristotl e
by est.ablishing a m etaphy.� ical fOllndation of the real identi ty between being and one in .�ttmmlt
lheQlogiae J,
11.1.
.As usual, the question is formulated in terms of the problem of
.. '!,! reply, addition: "does the one acid sol1lt!'thing to being?" Thoma.
of course, is affirmative, and he sp ecifics the sense of this addiliun: the one does not add
"
.1
reality to being, but on ly the negation of
division." Thi� statelll�nt must not he interpretr.ci in the sense that the one .\ignifies a neg-Alion that is, a concept or "being uf reason. "17 ,
''''That i� sigl1ifi�d by the one is being it...�If. TIle lrue definition of
cilCa prilll:ipia mmumc uni\·cuali.t venatur. Quat: '111iri(,1l1 sunt en,. et ea quae UJII��qlllmtur ens, lit unum cl mult.a". 15 A similar inq u i ry i! to be found in Mr.lt1fJlI. V. c. 6 (Thomas. lccl. 7 nd 8). a 1 6 In X Mttapll., Ieel. I, 19�2: MF.I omnia haec dicuntur unum per raLium�m unam. Kilicet per hue.: Iplnd est cue indivisibile. �am proprie Ullilm est ens in divisibile . .. 17 III this ��nse W. I\.lihn. Dos Primipimproblma in der Philruopllie dtJ ThomaJ
!/fIn Aql"fI (Bo(:humer S1\ldien
1982,
p.
17!51.
'
"
208
209
CHAPTF.R FIVE
ON"E AS TRANSCeNDENT"'.
as Thomas says elsewhere, is "being that is IIOt dividerl."I� In DI! fxJtenba, 9. 7 he cmphai'ii7.es thal the one signifies not only the indivision of a th ing, but the substance of a t.hing loge ther with its indivision: the one is the same as undivided being {ens indiui.\'t.t7n) .J9 From Ihe signification of one as undivided being Thomas immed iately conclude.� in Summa thl!nlflgitlt: 1 , 1 1 . 1 that one and being are t:Onvcrtible (ex /we ipso o.pparllt quod unum wnllf':f'tiluT cum entlf). His argument slarts with the disjunction "every being is eith�.. simple or r:olllpositc." To IInderstand why he jUlfoduces the� two concepts, we must turn to his commentary on De htbdo madibus. As we saw before, Thomas gives an order to Bocthius's axiOllls on tht: basis of the order of the transcendentals. The second group of the!;c axioms, which are concerned with the compo�d and the simple. is related to tht: one, for, Thomas explains, tht: concepts "composed" and ".�impl�" pertain to the ratio of "one.":w Starting [..om {he concepts of simplicity and compmitioll, Thomas investigates fhe relationship betwt!en being and one. What is simple is undivided both actually and potentially; the composed thing ha.� no being as long as its parts are divided, but only after they come together to constitute it. Obviousl)" therefore, the t.Ut of every thing consists in iudi\'ision; "th
In Summa lheologUu I, I L l thre� nbjections are advancc::d, each arguing that the ont: docs not add mr:reiy a concept to being, but something rral. According to the fir�t obj�ction, everything rhat is in a determinate genus adds something to being, which milS through (circllit) all genera. "One" �eem:> to be of this nature, .siut:e it is in a netenulmue genus.:!1 The fumlamental question raised by this nbjection is whether the one I:> really transcendental or helnngs to a category of br.ing. nle history of thought aboul unity "hows thal the thesis of the cunvertibility as sllch is still no gual'
unum,
III in. I &nt., 24.1.3 ad 3: �hacc est vt:ra riefinitio uoius: Ullum eSI cns quod non dividilur". 19 De fxJ'. Y.7: �Unum Vf:ro qune! ron\·cn.itur cum 1I:1I1f", non addit 5upm I'!ns . negalinnem divisionis, lion quod significt:l ipMl11l indivisiOilelll lantum, nisi sed substAA: CSt enim U7I"lnl1 iriem quod ens im.iivi.�um. � tll
In De hlhdfJlIt., 1t:I·J. 2. S.tI,. I. 1 1 . 1 : "dicendum 'luoU unum
ncn addit supra ens rem aliquam, s�d tantum lll'g
�
"1'l Ihid. T. 1 1 . 1 obj. 1: "Vitlelllr quod unum addolt aliquid supr.t "ns. Omne "nim quod est in aliquu gf'.nt'r� dClcrminalo. 5e hal)(!l ell addilionc ad ellS, quod circuit omnia gt:nera. Sed unum e5t in Kellere cleterminal.O: est elliffi prin :ipium l\lllllt'ri, qui CSt specics quantirali.�. to:rgo Ull\lm addit aliqllid supra ens. ";o!�
K.
Gluy, "Ari�lo[eln' ·l1lenrif': de� F.lncn auf der Balli. I[el l\uf'he' I der
-,.... , ,, ' " "
210
,
---".
.
CHAPTER FIVE
ONE
Thi� criticism, however, manifests its confusio n as to what "transc_endental" means. The discussion about the status of the one i... therefore of essential significance for understanding the transcendental way of thought.
5.3.
Transcendentality versus substantialif)' of the one
on the A1daphY:iics, Tho mas points out that Aristotle's exposition on being and OIl e in book IV should be read in connection with book III, the book of the aporias.24 The thesis of convertibility is meant as an answer to the eleventh aporia. which Aristotle calls "the hardest of all inquiry and most necessary for the knowledge of tmth" (III, c. 4. 1001a 4-5), The apuria is prese n te d in terms of two mutually �xclusi\'e position s. Are being and one the substance of things? This would im ply that they arc not attributes which are added to !'iomething else. but exist through themselves, a view which Aristotle asnibes to the Pythagoreans and Plato. Or i!'i f.hne some other reality that is the underlying substratum for being an d oue? This altemative view was taken hy the pre Socratic naturalists who held. for example, that ""'Olter or air is the substance of things.'!-' In the style of a mt":dieval quaestiu. Aristotle adduces arguments pro and contra for both positioIl s . His objection to the Platonic view is that it leads to mon ism . If being and one were a separate, subsisting substance, then nothing could be outside of it, for what is outside being is non being. Because being cannot be diversified by so mething that is ou tside being, Parmen ides claimed "being is one. "26 The tIlt' sis of the convertib ility uses literally the �ame expression: ens est unum� but there is a fundamental rliffr:rence between the Parmenidean statement and the tramcendental reading of it. In the second chapter of MeiaphY:iics X, Aristolle gives his solu tion to the aporia by arguing that the fIrst alternative is impossible In his commentary
-
.
Metaphy.sik�, ill: Einhrit fib C-.mndfraK' d" Philojophi�, Darmstadt 1985, pp_ 889l.
24
25
In III Maaph., lect.. 12. 501. Metaph. 111.1 996a 4-9; 111,4 IOOla 5·8. In his CUJIlmenlary. Thomas
und�rlines the importance of this aporia: "ex is1.a quaestionf' rlf'pf'ndel tola opinio Platonu et .PytAaxura�" (/n III M�taph., leo. 3,363). Cf. lec t. 12, 488: �ex hoc dc: pendel iudidum de: substantih r�rum". 'if> Miltaph. 111,4 1001a 29-b l . Cf. Thoma!, In I Playsic . lect. 6. 36. .
•
"
AS
211
TRANSCENDENTAL
His reasoning is that what is universal cannot be a subsisting substance. Now being and one are the most common because they are predicated of all things. Therefore, they cannot be the sub stance of things, as Plato believed (1053b 16-24). The rnajOl" pl-emise of the argument rests on the results of the inquiry into substance in book VII. That which is common is predicated of many things and exists in many things, But a substance is a determinate thing that subsists. If the one, as the Platonists claim, were a separate substanct':, then it could not be found in many things at the same time. The commonness of the one is not compatiblt': with its suhstan tiality. 27 Of principal interest in Thomas's c.ommentary are his efforts to make sense of and redeem the Platonic view of the one. It might ht": interpreted in the sense "that the one is common in the mann!':r of a cause." But he immediately emphasizes that this commonness differs from the commonness of a universal, since a cause is not predicated of its effccts.28 Thomas here reverts to a distinction that plays an essential part in his conception of metaphysics and in his discussion with Neoplatonic philosophy: the distinction between
commonness hy predication and that by causali ty. ,"Vhen the c.ommonness of the one i... taken in a c.ausal sense, it is true to s;ay that there exists a separate One. This One, however, is not, as the Platonists held, the subst..,nce or all things that are one but the cause <md prillciple of the uuity of Lhiugs.29 At the end of Metaphysics X. c. 2 (1051a 13-19), A istotle explores the relationsh ip between being and one, obsell/ing lhat "in a way. they signify the same reality. " Thomas distinguishes three r
27
Cf
In VII Mttaph., leet. 16, 1641: �Dicit quod hoc ipsum quod est unum,
non potest apud multa simul inveniri. Hoc enim est contra rationem unills, si tamen ponatur al i(juod unum per se cxistem ut substantia. Sed illud quod est COIIlIllUlle, f'�t. �iTllIlI apud multa. Hoc ellllll est ratio cOllllllunis, ut de mullis praedicetur, et in multis exI.�t:ll_ Patel Igitur quod unum quod est co m IIlUIll �, non potc�n essc sie unum quasi una substantia," 2ft In X Metaph., kct. 3, 1964: "Nisi forte diceretur commune per modum causae. Sed alia c�t communita� univenalis et causae. Nam causa non pl aedicalur de sui� effectibus, quia non es1 idem causa suii psiu s . Sed universale t'st. UIIIIIIIUTlt', 111la.�1 alll1uI11 prae[licalJllIl dt' 111ull.is; el sil: UPUllet quod aJiquo modo sh unum in multis, et non seorsum subsistens ab eis." 29 In III Mttaph. leet. 12, 501: "Huius autcm dubitationis solutio ab Aria totele in sequentibm traditur. Quod cnim sit aliquod separatllm, quod sit ipsum unum ct en�, illfra in duode cimo probabit, ostendens unitatem primi principii omnino serarati, quod tamen non est substantia omnium eorum quae �\lnt unum, sinH Plalnnici putahant .'ed rst 0ll1nil1ll5 unitath caU53 el prlncipillm .
,
.•
------ ...... '" '" ,
212
,
,
213
CHAPTER FIVE
ONE AS TRANSCENDENTAL
argulll�IlL:I i n Aristotle's account of this identity, which basically
independent works-Thomas d evo tes considerable attention to
repeat the argumenlS in M�taPhJsiC5 IV. First, the one, like being, is found in all categoril.':s ann is no t limited to any one of lh<":rn.
Second. the one, as being, does nut add some nature to the subjecl of whic h it is prerli...ated. AI-islotie advances the samt': l ingu isli(:
consideration that he employs in
Metaphysics
IV, 2: "o ne
mau"
does nOl expr(':�s so methin g differen t from "man." ThinJ. everv,
thing j!> one insofal' as i{ has being, for the dissol ution of a thing
mr:ans iu fall illLO Ilon-bcing . :\{)
Avic_enna's conceptio n. His m os t ehlooralt' desc:ripliou of the ptn;i tion of the Arabic ph ilosoph er is round n i 111 I SenlenliaTUm 21.1.3.
Although AviC:4;'uua :.u.:k.uowledged the convertibility of beillg
alld Ulle, he identified the tr.illscendental one with Ihe one that is
the prillc.:iple of num ber. As a result,. unit)' is seen as adding
something positive
convertibil i ty of being and one. Thi .. thesis appears to be directed against th e op ini on defending the �ub�tantiality of the one.51 TI"'dliSCendelltah are communia, not .mbsistentia. "One" is found throughout the categories and is no more a genus than being i�.
This insight allows the pOi'!.sibility to distinguish between the I.ru� and the false meaning of the statement " being is one." It is false
when it denies, with Panuenides, the m ulti pli city of htdng elmi
to thai to which it is joined, for
the one includes in its very notion bei ng
But what kind of
Aristotle's c.IiS(':u8sion of the Platonic view tt:'nninates in the
(aJiqwd positive)
esse
(esse)
that is not divided.
could this be? 11 cannot mc:an substantial
being, for then unit)' would not he found in acc iden ts. Kor can it
mean the heing (".ommon
1.0 !,>Ilbstance and accident, for
then thert':
would be a kind of nu m ber which is lIot an accident. The only
possibility is that it is accidental being; it is 011 acco unt of that bei ng
which is added lO the complete being of a substance that the subslrulCc i.s called "Ollt:." For is an accidcntal feature.:I�
Aviccnn
,
Thomas c:undudes, uIlity
Does this account do justice to the p ositio n of Aviccnna?�4 His
one . The sentence is true when it bears on /lome subslallc:e or
most importan t exposition on unity is in the third treatise of his
accident.��
Metaphysics.
At the end of chapter
2,
Avicenna summarizes his
view. lIe recognizes the convertibili ty of "bei ng� and "one" and
flA. TTallscendenlauty
wrms
t.hdr mn.-.r:pt.llal non.idt:ntity. 1'he one coincine!'i (pnrijiauuT) .....ith
accidentality of thf! om: (Avict'fma)
The- lranscendental view denies the SUbslillluali ty of the one .
bl"ing bec.;tuse the one, like being, is stlid of each or the f:;tt�ori(":",
but their concepts
An
olher challenge to the transcentiental view is a conception of unity
Ldwe�u the Ol l� and beillg til lhal neither signifies the su�li \I}Ce
of anylhillg.15 III I.·hapte-r 3. AVlc.:elllla investigales the tJuidc.lity of
wh ich Thomas encounter" i n the pO�I-Aristotclian philosophy, In
this conception the metaphysical one is identitied with the one
parLic:ular scien ce: mathematic!'>. This concep tion con.uitute.s a serious chal lenge, because it., r�preseJlt;tli\'e- is Avicenn", i. e., lhe philo so pher wh o "tro ng1)' inOuenced the menit:wl.l do cu i ue of the transcendentals. In all his expositions on un i ty-b oth in his commentary on the Metaphy.. ics and in his that hits iL� p1ac.e in
Ol
·
'IJ :!H
!r.
X Melllph lect. 3, 1!)7......77. .•
cr. F.. Rt'rri. -1.,(:
probleme de la substalltialiti: d.. l'�tr� �t de: ['un dauJ la Milaph)'JilJ,"" -' in: P. Au ben qu e (cd.), Ejud'.\ �IIT f(l Mitaphysiqut d:AriJtot� (Actel du VI SympoJium Aristotdir:um), Paris 1!)79, pp. 89·129. The alltllOf holds that S
!S� In 1 Sent,
'"ice una Cilim ( ) elit:i!, quod UIII1I11 quud (:ulI'o'erliluf 24.1.3: ".. rum I'ml", I'-!;t. irtl"m '1uoc:l unum quod {"n prindpium numl'ri; ... muh.imrtn rpHll" est numerus, CSt idem quod multitudo quae dividit cns; Ct sic vult quod utrumque ali qui d positive addat supra ea qui bus adjungitur, co quod in uno intelligitur e:�se non solum 'leut in su bj ecto, sed skut i llud quod clauditur in intellectu 51.10. Unde unum est (j uoddam esse quod non dlViditur. Et i�tud esse n ml dil:]! Il llnci sit I".��" sl1h�t;Hllia,.: '1"ia sic IlIJn inw:n irrl llr in an:idenLilms unilas ct numerus. Nee clbm cst esse commune ad substan tiam et ad accidens, . . •
quia sic inven in:tur aJiquis numenu qui non esset acci de ns . Sed dicit. quod est esse accidentis, ct per ilIud cne advenien� post esse completum �ubstantiae dicilur substantia una { .. , J , J::t sctundum hoc unitas dicit intcntlollem a(l:jd�nmlf'm·. 34 cr. T. O'Shaughne,sy, "St. Thomas and Aviccnna on the Nature or the Om:-, in: Grtgorianum 'II (1960), pp. 665-619; R.E. Ho u�r. Thomas AquiliM 0'1
TTrl11Jel7iMntal Unity. pp. [2(}'196. �5
Meitjph. III,2 (cu.
Van Riel, p. 114): -Cnum
autcm parificatur ad e:ne,
quia IlIlUfII dicitur III! IIIIUqUClIllI1! prat:die:amt:nturuHI, sit:ut t:IIS, :;c:d intclleetus eonlm, skin n0511, div�nn5 (:\1. C.on''('nillnl alllem in hOl"_ ({uOft 0111111111 ..orlllll sixnifical '1Ib1Illn1i;un lllkuim
rd,
et
imn lIoSlj
hoc."
. " ·
,
., '
.
""
,
.
"
'
"
,
'"
,
.,,,
_---_ ' " ,.
'"
, . ..
,
CHAPTER FIVE
ONE AS TRANSCENDENTAL
unity. Is unity said of accidents or of substances? Vlhen it is said of
is an acci de n t because it is identical with the one that is the
214
an:idents-and
this
term must mean here "p redicam e n tal "
accidents-it does nol belong to the category of substance, and that is "doubtful"
(dubium)
according to Avicenna. When the oue is
predicated of substances it is not their genus or difference, for the ,
one does not enter into the det1nition that determines the essence
of the substance , It is rather a concomitant (quidam concomitans) of the substance, of which the one
s i
predicated as an accident..'16
Avicenna's explanatio n gives rise to two comments. First, there
is a di rect connection between the accidental ity of "one" and that
of "being." In 4. 5. we saw that in Avicenna's metaphysics "thing "
(res)
is the primary trallsc�lldelltal. His problem is o n e of under
215
p rinc ip le of number. At the most, one can say that there are passages in his work which suggest such ht'giuuing: of
Metaphysics
all
identity. Thus, at the
III. he mentions two reasons for dealing
with unity in this particular place: uni ty has much in agreement
with the being that is the subject of this science, and it is the pri nciple of quantity.58 However, th e connection between the two
aspects of unity goes back to Aristotle himself, In the tenth book of
Metaphysics, after having established indivisibility as the essence of unity. Aristotle immediately turns to another character istic: "what especially constitutes the essence of the one is that the his
one is the fIrst measure of every genus, anrl particularly of the ge
standing how the oth�r COIIlmon notions can add something to it.
nus of quantity."39 Aristotle p erceives a direct con tin uity between
"'
the
something
which is the one as the principle of number.
Bei ng " is concomitant with "thing " in tht' sen se that it adds
real to "thing" in the manner of an accident. Now the "one" coincid es with "being" and th ey agree in that nei ther signifIes the substance of anything. Therefore, "one" must be an acci den t as well. The distinction between, on the one hand, th e mutual relation of "being" and "one," and, on the other hand, the
relation of either of them to "thing," also comes to expression in
ratio of the
one and its function as a measure, the paradigm of
Thomas' s reading of Avicenna is s trongly influenced by the severe criticism of "the Commentator," that is, Averroes, for it
is
the latter who accuses Avicenna of h avi ng confused two different types of u nity. In his commen tary on Metaphysics IV. 2, he por� trays
Avicenna
as the philosopher who "sinned much in holding
Avicellua's terminology. To express the relation between "being "
that 'the one' and 'being' signify disposi tions adnen to the eS!>ence
and "on�, " he uses the term
of a thing." His basic error was the inentification of the one that is
parificatw-;
to express the relation of
"being" and "one" to "thing," he uses the term
concomitans:
the
"
nature of u nity is the notion of accident and it belongs to th e universali ty of that which is concomiumt with thing. "37 Our second comment is that the accidentality which Avi cen o a
predicated of all categories with the one that is the princ.iple of nu mber. Number is an accident, "therefore, this man fAvic e nnal held that the one signifies an iu:cident. "10
Thomas critici£es Avice nna's position ext�lISively.
III
this
attributes to the one is not predicamental, but logical. He attempts to
criticism we can distinguish three issues. The first issue is the
determine to which of the p redicables unity belongs , and esta�
accidcntality of the onc. If the one adds a disposition to the thing of
bli shes that it is neither a genus nor a dif erence but an accident.
wh ich it is said, this leads to an infinite regress, for the added
Avicenna does not argue that the ooe that is convertible with being
unity will also be one, and this not by i tself but because of
f
someth ing else. One must therefore hold on to 36 Ibid. III,3 (ed. Van Riet. p. 117): �Dico igilur quod unhas vel dkitur rll" acddentibus vel didtur de substantia; cum autem dicitur de accidcntibus, non f"st SUiJNtilTlliil, t:t hoc est dubium; cum vero dicitur de substantiis, non didlUr de eis sinH genus nf"C sicut. diflen�lIt.ia ullo lIludo: non en im recipitur in ccrtificatione quidditatis alicuills .subw:mriaruHl, sf"d est quiddam comitar15 substantiam, sieul iam noni. Non ergo didtur de eis sinH gl."nll� vel sicuL differentia, sed sicut acddens," .�7 ibid. nUl (ed, Van Riet p, 121); "Certitudo unitatis est intentio acciden· tis el est de uuiversilate eorum quae concomitantur res.'" Cf. VII,I (ed. Van RiN, p. 349): ".'icia.� alltl"lIl quod ull um et ens iam parificantur in praedicatione sui de rebus, ita quod, de qllocllmquc dixeris quod ens lIllO n:spec tu iIlud potest esse un um alio respecIII." ,
•
" ""-
the view
of both
-'S Ibid. III,1 (ed. Van Riet, p. 108).
AriHotle M�taph. X. c. 1 1052b 17-19. 1 4 ) For Averroes' criticism, see In IF Mel.aph. .- CUlllm. 3 (ed. Ven" fa!' 67r B; n· ..:) : MAvic.t"nna alltf"m per.ravit m u ltllm in hoc, quod existimavit, (! (lOd �
,
,
unum et ens signifi
pp, 141.I7CJ.
r-" 216
I
CHAPTER FIVE
Aristotle and the c.ommt:ntator that a - thing is One U)' ilSclf, and that the onf: rh
with
being dot's lIul add
ff':ality to be ing , but only the negation of llivisioll.41
a
posi tive
The se< on d issue ill Thomas's criticism regards the tension
ONE A.S TRANSCENDENTAL
2li
core of Thomas's criticism of Avkenn a is that. beGHIse of the mentioned property, thi:'i one , in cont.rast with the tran scendental one, adds something real to that of which it is p redicated . The mathematical one signifjt's the being of measme.4-1
ou Avic4o'1llla'S view_ The one that belongs to a determinate calego
of Ihe one was discusst:"d in th.irlet"Jllh t:en· tury logical texts (an example is the anonymous �ophisma "Tanlum
being in general. We already discussed Thomas's argumt:nr in
sion is that he makes a clearer distinction betWeen the meta·
between thal whic.:b is trAllscendemal and that which is catcgorkal
l)' of being. namely. that of quantity. cannot be convertible with 3. 6. If the one is a per
se
accident of being, it is caulierl hy the':
principles of being as being. But the common prindples of being are not the sufficient cause': of l'iomethi ng h aving a p articlll�r mode
of being. Henc:.t: it. i:'l impos.<;ible that a being of a deLeI"miIlC.ltt;! genus
i!; an
.
of every being.4:!:
Avin..nna's theory
unum esl1 aud
ill t:ommefltaries.4'i A feature of Thomas's discus.
physical one and the mathematical one than other thinkers in the
thirteemh century. Albert the Great had based the convertibility of being and one on the dual act of the form ( 1 .
3.). The ftrst act of the (em); th e
form gives being and causes something to be a being
second act terminates matter and causes something to be on�
The third element of Thomas's lTiticism is lhe most crucial one.
(unum). The second act, Albert add!;,
is i nclined to the nature of an
Avicenl1u, he says, is dec.:eived by the "equivocity of the one."
accident, because 3011 that i s c.ons�qll�nt on th� bein g of a thing is
Then'! is the "1lIt=taphysical" one that runs through all the catego
an accident. This is the one that is the principle of number.-Io
ries. and
the "mathematical" onc.4� They signity something
different. What thcn is distinctivc of the latter type of unity?
Aristotlc distinguished between two kinds of quantity, namely,
discrete quantity, i. e., number, and continuous q uantity, i, e., extension. Characteristic of continuoUII quantity i!li not on ly that it. is
Ill. his
comment .. 1.ry on lhe St:nlt:nces, Th omas COIl siders the opinio� of sOIlle uIlnamed thinkers ( q u id am) who took an intermediate
position between the Aristotelian tradition and Avicenna. They agree with Aristotle that the one convertible wit1;l being does not add something positive to being. They agree with Avicenna that
divisible but abo that it can he nivinen into "hom og(':neou�" pariS,
the one convcrtible with being is identical with the accidental onc
originates n um beL Number is a multitude constituted I>y the
tually. But Thomas rt"j�t:tA I.hi!l> synthetic position. and his refuS<'I1
which can he count.en. From rlivision of contin uous quantity number of pouts thaI are ulldi\'ided, that is.
"olle. "
Iu the classical
tradition, "one" is lht'refol'e nol considt=red to be the fi�t number,
but to be Ihe print:iple of number. The one is the p rinciple of number, because it is the negation of quantitative division. From
this specific indiviSibility, the property results that is essential for
the mathematical one: it has the
ratio of measure (mensura),
The
that is the principle of number; the� unities differ only concep
acquires s pecial importanc.e hecansr. the crilici7.ed anonymous o pinio n i" that. of his t.e3c:her Albeft the Great. The difference
h�tw�en the transce nd ent .. 1.1 one and the mathem.atical OIle i.s 1101 only conceplu:.lI.�7 H
Itt IV Mrlaph., leci. 2, 560: �t:[1um vcro q uod cn principium flumcr! ratione m mensurae. quae est propria pauio quanti· tatis, et primo invcnilur in unitate. " In X .'vf.�taph." Icet. 3. 198 1 ; /11 I Sellt., . 24.1.3: �unum, secundum quod esl principium nunlt�ri, punit al iq uid alillil.uilI ad esse, Nc:i lir:d ��� lII�n�lInl�, rlljll.� ratio primo invenitur in unitate". Quodl. X , l . l ; Df. pot. 9.7. oj!\ The sophiJm4 '"nm/um "ilium esl," contained in the CoU�d.io stcu1ldo of the Bibliotheque Nationak, MS 16135, Willi probably composed ca, 1270. Altx-n the Great allude' to th't5e logical discussions in his commentary on the Metap}',· li,',!" IV, tract. I. c, !:i (cd. B. Ckyer, JI)J. 1 fi6..fi7 ). Cf. A. rl� Lihfora, -n'AvirfOfln� Ii. Averroe., et retour�, pro [56 ff. 46 Altxn the Creat, SUfNr" De divilliJ nolllinibtu. C. 5, n. 21 (ed. Simon. p. 314). 47 In 1 ,s,.n'., 24.1.�: �QlLldam \'ero medium inter utruroque tenent. r.onlehtientcJ Arlltotdi In hoc qlLod unum quod converlihlf cum ente. non addit aliqllid posilive ,upr:.a Id rill adJunKltur, Av1c:ennac \'ero in hot: quod
addit supra 5ubstantla m,
41 In I "'mI., 24.1.3; Qulldl. X , I . l ; S.th. I , I l . l ad 1 . Thomas incorpor."lu:s thi s c.riticism i n to hig explanation of Aristotle', �ccond argument for the con·
Metaph., Ieet. 2, 553. The infinitc regrcM argument derives from Averroe�. In IV },J�taPh., ":on1111 . S (ed, Vt:Il"
vertibiliry of be ing and one. See Iii IV fol. 67
F·G) ,
In !\' Mt/rlph.., l"'r.t.. 2, .'1.119, ,,' In X Mt/oph., lect. 3, 1')81: 42
.. Hoc autcm non comidcnm, AviCtnna posuit quod unum el ens sunt praedicata accldentaliol, et quod significant n...turam additam lupra ea de quibus dicuntur. Deceptu5 enim fuit ex aeqllivocationc uniul. " Cf. S.lh, 1,11.3 ad 2: ·unum se
-------,-" ., "
" "
,_ ...... ,
., .. ,"
''' ' ,,
ONI!:
(;HAPTF.R nVE
218
Thoma!'i arnve!'i at the differenn between the two unities by
disting�ish i ng mOl"e clearly than Aristotle did the
ratio of the
one
from its function as measure. Yet this docs not mean that the mathemalic.:al one stands outside the metaphysical one, for the
laUer is transcendental and consequently e xte nd" to all mooes of beiug one. When Thomas criticizes Avicenna for ht:ing dece ived
by the equivocity of the one, the term "equivOl"it.y" properly speal iug is not adequate, since a re lat.i on between both concepls of the "one" does exist. The
ratio of fhl":
one that is cOllvenible with being
is solely the negatio n of division. The fUllction as measure of the one that is the prindple of nllmber results froJU
particular form of
indivision, namdy, thf" n egrtliol l uf quantitative division . There is < ld later (posterius) between the therefore the order of earlier (priw) U
tvm types of one.-t.8 The nUllIerical one is a categorial specilication of the transcendental one.
AS
219
TRANSCENDENTAL
The relationship between unity and multitude ha... in Th om as 's
work several aspects which we will analyze successively.
(1 )
The
first aspect is n otional and concerns the rati(J of the one . Is the negation expre!>.�eci hy "one" <1 negation or privation of lllullitudd
If this i.\ the
the "one" wiD be posterior to UlJlullitmle" since a
case,
privation is both notionally and by nmure postt"'l"iu r to the
habitus.5C!
Rill. i s this posteriority compalible witb the status of the "one" as a
prinuu·y Huliuu?
(2)
When the one is not restricted to the category
of quan tity, is multitude then transcendental as well?
qu(U!slio
vnata in
(3)
The
Neoplatonism was: can a multitude proceed from
the one? Avicenna claimed that only one etiect can proceed fmm the One, a thesis that was condemned in the Parisian condemna
tion of
1277,:>1
The question as lO the origin of multitude also
exercises Thomas.
the
many
(4) Finally, the oppm:it.ion betw��n t.he
on� and
raises the qu�stion as to the kind of opposition that exists
betwet'.n a transc.endental <1nd its oppo.sik.
f).5. The one and the man,
(1)
The second objection to tht: c:onvertibility of being and one in
Summa theologiat!
I, 1 1 . 1
argiles: that which divides sumething
common is related to it hy :l.dd ition. But l.M:ing is divided by "one"
and "many." Hence it seems thal the
Ollt'
adds somethi ng (0
being, that is, is not coextt'lIslve .....ith being.49 Thi9 objection ques t.i ons the tJ1wsc.t:ndenlality of the onc on account of its opposition to
the many. This opposition requires further consideration.
The �nt'Si.;
of the primary notions
In the Aristotelian tradition as well as in Neoplalonisffi. the "one·· is a negative term. Plotinus expresses this negative c haracter in a
su�gestive way by associating the name "One" with the name or the Greek god Apollo, a
name
that is glossed as a-polla, the "non
m u l t i p l e . "!i'l Unity i� t.h� nt':gation
mu lti t.ude
of
conliiderations .�eem t.o point into lhe S
1n
Metaphys.ics
X, 3 Aristotle analyzes the
. Aristo tle's
rdatiol l uf the ulle tu
the many. This reiatiuIl is determiued by lhe uppusition o f didI, unum, secundum quod est pri nclplUm n umeri . ct secundum quu.... convcrtitur cUln cote, esse idem. et non difTerre nisi f,!liHue; el :
•
"illtlivisiIJlc"
is
called
and "divisiJ:yle,'" for that
....hich .
is divided or divisible
"many,'" and that which is undivided or i ndivisi ble is
(;aJled "one." In this opposition the "one" is the negative or
p rivative term. Privativc concepts are posterior to their positive
opposites . This implies that the many has priority over the one.
Aristotle admits this priority and adduces in explan ation that in sensation multitude is more easily; kno....n than indivisibility.55 .
Avicenna has a problem with A risto tle's analysis. It is difficult,
�u cr. S.th. 1,1 1.2 obj. 4. � I Aviccnna, Mttaph. TX,4 (cd. Van Riel. p. 481): "�mti edam quod ex uno, secundum qllod est \loum. non est nisi unum."' Cf. R. IIisaette, Enquitt sur itS
219 ar1ir.its r.ondamnris Ii PmiJ U 7 mars 1277, l
and Paris 1977, pp. 70-n',
, ,,
- •• _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
CHAYTEK
2l!O
"
I
UNE
fiVE
he states, to show the quiddity of the one. The nefi nition of the uue,
� th at which is nut divided," presupposes the conc.epl of a multitude. At the same lime. the "one" is positl.':d i n the definition of "the '
many.
"
fur instance as we say that multitude is �lhe aggregate of
unities."H Aviccnna's dirficulty i!l taken seriously by Thomas. In
his commentary on [he Mtfnphysic.j he raises a dubitatio with respect to Aristotle's conclmion that "the many" is prior in concept to the
one . " This conclusio,n It"ads to a circle in the ddinitiom or
"
the one ann the many. foJ' the one pertains to the con cept of multitude. Such ci rcularity is not acceptable, because it implit:!i\ that the
same
thing is balh lUure known and less known.c.!.
Thomas's solution to this problem represents a major innova tion He in troduces a distinction betv.·een the notions of "divi sion and multitude. " These are not identical, becau!'ie the latter concept contains more than the former. Divided things rio not constitute a multilude untess each one of them is undivided in itself. i.e., "olle." .
"
"
'A'hat is negated by the one is not mllltitude. but division. Not the ..
many" is prlor in concept to the "one," but "division." The raliQ of the one, "that which is not rlivided," is cOllSe4uelltly not circular.56 The division t.hat is presupposed in the one that is convertible
with bdng j" 110t the divisiou of continuous quantity, for this division lInrlerlies the one that is the principle of number. Th(': djyip,ion presently at slak� i s the division caused by contradiction.
Mrtaph. 1ll.3 (ed. Van Riet, pp. 114-15): MDitlicile est nobis nunc ostenderc q uidditatem unius. Si euim dil:l"rimus quod unum en id quod non dividi tur iam dixililus qum! unum est id quod non multiplieatuT H
Avicenna, .
nc:eessari u:
iam igilur flccl"pimus multitudinem in ostc:nsione unius. Necesse
�5t allipm multltudincm definiri per unum; unum enim est pri n dpi lLffi muhirudini5. Cl ex iJ>llo elt esse eiU$ ct ljuiddiliL� eills. Ileirtde q"..cumquc definitione definierimu5 multiLudiut:III, ponemus in C3. urtum necessaria. Dici mus coim quocl lI Iul ti lmln ('Sf :lggregatum ex unitatibus; iam igi tu r aceepilll1l5 unil.lll.em in definhione multitudinis, el etiam fecimus aliud q uia , cum posllimus nggregatum in deflnitione eius. vidctUT quod aggft::KaluUI sit ipsa m ulti ludo. Cum autem diximu! t){ unitatwu.s \'d U7ii.� vel ,.r Ilniti.l, i:1m Induximus verbum aggregationis, cuius \'crhi in(cntio non in telllgi tur nhi
per multitudillem.· 55 In X Md4/Jh ll'f'l. 4, 1995. �06 Ibid., I(,CI. 4, 19%: "Dicendum igitur quod nihil prohibcl aliq uid esse prius c{ posten us eodem secundum rationem, u;cundum diven;a ill �n ("on_ liderata. In multitudine enim comiderari POte�4 r:l !Ilmrl multiHido est, el ips:l divi sio . Ratione igitu r divisionis prior cst quam unum sc:cundum rRtioncm. Nam unum est Quod non dividilur. SI'("Illldum alllc:m quod cst muldtudo. postedu! cat uno sr:�ufldUIT1 ralion em cum multitudo dicatur aggregalio .•
,
\lniLat!JIT1.� ct'. S.lh. 1,50.3 ad 3: MununJ non eSI remotivum multit\ldjni�, Rd di"ilionh�.
AS TRANSCENDENTAL
221
a...
this being (hoc ens) is not that (Wud) being.5' Next Thomas derw:ri hes the genesis of the primal')' notions in the human in tellect. a sketch he gives not oIlIy in his commentary on the Mtdaphysiu bu t in a nUlubel' of other
Things are said to be divided insofar
places as well.f 08 In lhf: most complele text this genesis comprises five steps.
(De potentia 9. 7 ad 15),
(i) That which first falls into the intellect is oms. (ii) Second comes non ens, the ll egation of being. (iii) Upon these two is c.onsequent the notion of divisio. .From the fact that this being is not that being. we apprehend that it i5 divided from the olher
(divi.sum
ab abu). (iv) Next there follows the concept of unum, hecam.e
'"ie":
understand that this being is undivided in itself. (v) Finally we apprehend
multitudo.
insofar as we understand th""t. th is being is
divided from that being. and each one of them is one in itself. By means of this order Thomas int�nrls to show thai the cOlu.:ept
of "one" does not depend on the cOllcept of "multitude," but is prior
to it. Hi... ace.ount raises a numl"e.- of questions. Is the description of the genesis of the primary Ilutlom; (:omplete? Arc not some links lacki ng, since the transition from the second step (negation of
being) Lo the third (division) is problematic? Division- this being ..
is nol that being"-scems to presuppose a moment of alteri ty that docs lIot simply result from the negation of being. Leo Elders has argued that the concept of non-bt:ing that is second in Thomas's order is nOl a pur(': negati on , but a non-being in a certain respect
(secundum quid). It m�ans
that it is not this
being. but another being.59 For t.his interpretation of nun ens, he appeals to a passagt! in Thomas's c ommen tary 011 the Physics articulating a threefold meanill g of "non-being." [t can mean what i$i f:llse in a judgment; or what is in potency in contradistinction to what is ill act as such; or, thirdly. what is in po te ncy not in .
relauoll to being in act as such but to this being in act. Non-white,
for example, is non-being in this sense.51) .�7
/n. X 1·.1t/tJpA., leet. 4. 1997: "DiYisio aUlcm quae praesupponitur ad ratio ncm unius. secundum quod COn�Tlilur cum eme. non est di...isio 4uallul.aljl' continuae. quae pr.leintelliKitur uni quoti r.sl. prinr:ipium nllmc:ri. Sed eSI divUio qua.m GllJsat coulradic:I.;o, prOlll hoc ens 1"1 iIIud, dicuntur divisa. ex eo quod hoe 11011 !"Sf. il1l11:1. M
Ibid., leet. 4, lCY.)S: I'll / &nt . 24.1.� ad 2: D'- pot. 9.7 ad 15: /10 IV Afdath., lect 3. 566: S.th. 1.11.2 ad 4. Cf. Ttl BfH!th. D, trill. 4.1. .�!) L. Elden. "Lc: premkr pri ncipe de la vie intellectivc", in: H,n.Uf. thnmid,. 62 (1962), pp. 571-58u (574). r,n /11 II Ph,.,i(., 1"('1. 2. 6�: ierlto modo Ididulrl non ens quod ell in �g .
.
______ 0.'.
22'l
" . ' ,
ONE
cnAPTEK 1'1V£
Elders's interpretation of
i" based on the
non ms as another being
last sen�. but doe> not find support in the text cited. The third seuse refers to the abs�m:e of an
acddmtal determination
in
subj ect that
already �XiSlS. It docs not mean "the other" in the sellst= of a being in act essentially ditferent from this or that �illg. His suggestion
thal the nest opposition of being can only be opposition to another
being is not convinci ng . We must seek some other way of making intelligible the tramitian rroUl the negation to the division in Thomas s description of the primary notions. '
That which i!ii first conet:i ...ed is
enJ.
"Being" is the firu tran
scendenul ht-:cause someth ing is knowable insofar
as
it i" in act.
Thmngh this act it is distinguished from non�being, the second concept. According lO Thomas the first principl� of theore tical reason. the principle of con tradiction, is found ed on th est: two notioIls.f.1 Contradictory is only the opposition be tweel l being and
non being, not between this being and another be ing, for both -
accord with one another in that they have beiug. A dense text from his commentary on Boethius's
De lnmtale
is inSlructive on this
point. in explanatio n of the doctrin e uf the Trinity, BoethiU!i
explores the cause of plurality, observing that "the principle of plurality is otherness
(allmlu£) ."
Thomas immediately reinterprt':ts
this stat(';ment in terms uf division: the search for the
C31l1't':
plurality i� the search for the cause of division. Now hdng cannot be divided from being insofar
as
it is
divided from being except non being Thomas -
beillg is not divided
from thal being
.
ht'i ng
.
(,oncl
except insQfar
of
(etu)
Nothing is
udes that this
a.s
in this being
there is included the negation of that beillg.6� From this conclusion
it becomes clear that ilivisioll im plies not only an aflirmation and
a negation but also a relation or oue being to another being.
In this context it is important La recall th,u in the central tt:xl on
the
first condition of lhe relational transcendemals. The order or
OW!
the tram;cendentals, De
vmiate
1 . 1 , "division" is introducen
potenti
6! In BNtll. D, lrin... 4.1; �:-fon pot�1 aliiI'm hoc e�, quod em diuidatur Olb ente in qu"nlUm e5l em; nichil ;mlem diuiditur "b enle nisi non en!;, uncle f!t ab hoc t:nlt: nnn di uidi tur hoc ens ,nisi. per hoc quod ill hoc entt: illf:ludimr negalio illills ends". For the Inlf!rpretation of this lext, st:t' J.r·. Wippel, "Thomas Aquin as on the Distinction and Deriva.liull (1t' t.he Many from Ihc
One: A Di,,]eclk hetween Being and :.-..Iofllu·ing", in: � (1985). pp, 565-500.
,
,
-"
,
Th, RrlfJnII of Mrlaph,&itJ
.'\8
.
TRANS(:F.NnI'NTAL
being to another c:t.n he sectmdllm divisienem, and this is expressed by the name aliqllid. Being is called alrquid insofar as it is divided from other things. The sallle phrase is used by Thomas in his
de!«':ription of the Ihiru step in the genesis at the primar), notions:
when we unden.lalld that this being is not that being
,
we
apprehend thal it is divided from the other. The similarity between the forUlulations is
strong indication that
Of,
aliquid
m ust he
illcorporated in Thomas s sketch of the genesis of the pri mary '
notions. It expresses in a transcendental way t.he division of one being from another. .'i.liquid literally mean" another "
quid." The quiddilalive
a being is po.r;itively exp ressed by Ih� lnmscelldeillal being i!ii a "thing
."
aspect
res.
of
Every
fOf it has through its t'sseIH.:e or quiddity a stable
anri det.erminate mode of being. Every determination includes a
nr:gat ion . This beillg is not that being; th ey are opposed not as ,
beings as sut:h but insofar as they have determinate modt:s of be ing . Only if "being" is considered as "{hing" can one heing he
fonnally divided from another being. Our conclusi on to; that the transition from the negation of being to the division in Thomas's accou nt of the primary notions ill only comprehen sible if the cranscelldentals
rtS
and
aliquid are
takt:n into consideration.
The concept unum reslllt.� from the negation of lh� di\'isioll. It expresses that heing i!ii undivided
in us'elf
A1ex
Albert the r.reat inclilded another element in the definition of the one. namely, "that il is divided frum ochers" (see chapter I ) . Tho ma.o; U5uallv restricts the ,
The division frum oLher
raiio of the one to its internal indivision,li3 things ( aliquid) belongs to the notion of =
JI'Iullitudo, to which we now devote our attention.
(2) Multitude a.! tran.�(.eruLmtal The notion of "onc" signifies heing un divided in itself. \\o11en something is called "one," thill does not exclude lhere beiug anothcr being with which i t forms a lllultitude. 61 Thal uni t), is the
negation of division and not of mu ltiplici ly also has t:OIlst!quences
for Thomas s view of multitude. III his .....orks. this theme mainly '
M
An exception is D, an. a. 3: �unum q uot.lcjllt: t:flim, in qwmlllm est IInUm, se indiYimm, et ab a1iis clistil!l:t.um. H t)4 fh put. 3.16 ad :'I:. "N()n �nim ex hoc quod aliquid dicitur es.se unum. m::g:.ltur €jilin aliquid Mt extra ips-urn quod eum (:0 oonstituat multitlldinem".
est in
__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
...
��.'
"
,
"
,
f:HAPttR FIVH
224
ONE AS TRANSCENVt:NTAL
comes up in a strictly theologi(;al context. It is a good exampl e of
225
The correspond�nc:r betw�cn the one and lh� many extends
the stimulating influence of Christian revelation 011 philosophical
even further. for Thomas says expliCitly that muJdlude bt'longs to
reflection in the Middle Ages. Christian faith teac.hes lIot only the
the transcendentals.6S III the second chapter (2. 5.) we ubserved the
absolute unity of Gud, but also the unfolding of the one divine
rema.rkahle fact thal he uses the term tmnscmde"M, which occurs in
essence in three Persons. the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.
the philosophical meaning of "Lranscendelltal " only fourteen
In the divine itself there is thus a multilude, and it is precisely this
times in his works, especially in rdation to mulliludo. By this term,
aspect that demands clarification. In his discmlsion of the': Trinity
Thomas wallts to underscore that multitude is not limited to the
Thomas raises the question, inspired by Peter Lombard's St'f.tences,
category of quantity. But as is "'ppart-Ilt from the preceding, other
in what SoCnse numc::rical terms l::d.1l be said of God.1>!> We are here exdusivcly intereS[ed in his amtlysis of the notion of multitude. This analysis rum parallel ....ith . that of unity. The point of
f�tures of the U'afiScendental!'i abo apply to [he man)'. It belong!; to the p rimary notions and, like the other transcendentals, it only adds something conceptual to that of which it is predicated.
depa.rture is the notion of Mdhrision," since this is the cause of
An other aspect can he foulid i n a curious text in the Summa
multitude:.:. Now there
rhtowgiae
an!
two sorts of division, quantitative and formal. The nnmericaJ multitude that originates frolU the division of the continllous do!:::; not transcend the c:ategory of quantity and is founn i n materia] things only. Furthermore. there is a division cau�erl by the opposition of formal dr:fr-rmillatiuns. The multitude resulting from this division is n o t limited to th e category of quantity, but has a greater extension . Only such a multitu de is fuund in immaterial things and
G Ul
be predicated of the nivine.66
Just as Thomas ma.kes a distinction between the mathematical one and the transc.r.ndental une, so he recognizes two SOrls of
(I, 50.3), where the question is raised wht"ther angels exist
in great numbt':T. The mult.itude al issue here must be underslood, Thomas
5tre&."ir.�. in a tl-allscendcntal
sense.
The cenlrill idea in his argu
mr.nt is thal the greatest multiturlt': is not found in material, but in
immatel-ial lhings because of their pelfcction. God chiefly intr.nd.s the perfection of the univ�r� in uealing things. So the more
perft!ct things are, the greater the numbcr in which th t':y al'f� created.69 'lbe thesis that mul litu de is a sign of perfection is the complement of Thomas's view on the transcendentality of th�
multitude. Like the one that is convertible with heing, the 110n
"many," for transceno.-:ntals express general perfec tinni'> of being.
is said, but only a twufold negation "Multitude" expl'esses th at one
the transcendentals. III Thomas s most compl'-:It: acco u u t in Dr
quantitative "'many" does not add a reality (0 the things of which it .
Yet one may wonder .....hether multitude firs into the docU'ine of '
thing is not anotiler thing, lhat it is rlivided from the other; it
veritate 1 . 1 , it is nOl llamed. The ditficulty is th at traHsc�ndentals,
consists.6?
negatienes. prout �dlk�T aliqui d cst in s(: indivisum, cl pnlllT eST nb alio rlivisum. Quud qllidem dividi est unum corum 11011 p�se altcnlm. Dico ngQ. quod ill divinis non p raedi cantu .. umHlJ el mulrn quae pcrtinent ad genus quantiT,"is, sed u n um quod {;Onven,ililf r_lIm .enle. ct multitude ei (;orre
negates di\'isioll in relation (0 lhl': separate things of \\'hich it
t.I� In I Srol., 24.1.3; D, pol. 9.7; QulldL X.lot; Sill. I.�.3. Fo.. Thoma:'\'s view of multitude scc H..J. Tallon, -Docs Thombm l'\cglcc.t Muliilutit'r, in: Tile Nrw 5choia$tlCUflj �7 ( I YM), pp, 267-92. 66 See parlir.ularly Dl JJQt. 9.7: "1\'am c um uivisin muhltudincm C3uset, ind.ivisiu vt"ro unitatcm . oportet secunuulIl racionem divisionis de uno el 1111111,0 iudi(ium !umi. Est au te m �pm.erlam d ivisio quae omnino gt:III1S quantilatis cllccdit, quae scilicet f51 per aliquam oppositionclll foonah:m, quae lluJlam quan Litatem wllf·�mi!. Un de oportet quod multiludo hane divlsione m con5equens, Cl u ll um quod hane dhisionem privat. �illt maioris communltatis e( ambitus Ijuam genm qu::mtitatis. Est autellJ r.t ;(Ii a divhie secundum quanti t3lcm quae genus qualltitatis non trallS(:t'nrlil. Unde et mul titude (Oll$equens hane divisioneln, el unilas cam p..iY',lIts, sunt in gencre quantitatis: 6? Ibid. 9.'1: -Multi tudo autem r.i cerrespondens addlt IUpl'3. res, quae
dlcuntur
multae , quod unaquaeque carum sit un3, et quod una earum
altera, in qllo
•
,
non sit
c.:(JIl�istit rado distinction is. Et sic ( ... ) muhitudo addle dua!
!\pondeJJs.� cr. In X Mrtaph.,Iet:L -t, \998; S.th, I,IU!: ad I. M In 11l FhYJic.., IeCI. B, !S5i!; lpn, 12, 394; Stll. 1,30.3 and ad 2; !J().� od 1 . fi9 S.th. 1.50.3: "Ulld� dicendum Cit quod etiam angeli .�f'!:Ilnd\lm quod sunt immateriales !\ubstantlac, in quadam mu l ti LU lii rH'- maxima �unt. omnem i malerialf"m muhitudincm cxcedentes. (...) 1-:1 huius ratio est qua, cum perfec tin IIniveni sit iIIud quod [)eus prat't:i[luc in ten dit in creatione rerum, 4uantu aJiqua sunt magis perfecta, tanto in maiori e:l!CCSSli sun t Cl'f.:ata a Drn. SkU[ autem in corporilms artendhur cxceuw �ecun dum mat?;lIillldinem. ita in rebus incorporeiM [lOT("$( attcndi exceUU5 secundum �llllhjTUdlnem ( ... ) . Unde ratio Ilahilr I"SI quod substantiae immaterialt:s �lIr.edanl secundum multitudinem �lIbstantias mat.enales, quasi inulI1lrmrabililcr." Cr. ad 1: "in angelis 1H)I1 r'SI numerus qui est quan li tas di�(T�m, cau �atus ex di\'isione con linui : sr.�1 Cllusatus ex distinctioTle fornmr1Tm, prout multitudo e�t dc traTl�(;ellltf"nribus. Ut supra dictum est. "
,,
." " " . _ ' _ -
"
,
,-----
"
,
,
226
ONE AS TRANSCENDENTAL
CHAPTER FIVE
, •
such as the one, are convertible with being , whereas multitude belongs to beings, not to being. That may be lh�
reason
why Dl
,
.
of em an ati on. under the i n flu ence: of which Avice:nna and the
author of the U,," D� Gau.u:.� developed a theory of creation in which
of the "many," name
immeciiateiy hut gradually produced by the One. To admit that two or more dfects could immr.diatdy proceed from the One would be to introduc e some kind of multi
In chapter TIT we argued thal lhe transccndcntaJ way of thought
plicily illto God. and thus to compromise the divine simplicity.
vmtllt� 1 . 1 does not mention "multitude," but prt'St:J l tli auquid. This
transcendental exprt:.sses an essential ly, that one
being is divided
aspect
[I'OIII othersJfl
iududes more than whaL is usuallv referred to as the doctrine •
of
the tramlcendelltals. We get the impression thal Thom
duces willi "mulutude" a different type: of transcendental. Indr-rd
he says: "multitude belongs to the lranscen den tal.., inoofar as be
t.ht-:
form the primary differentiation.� of general . 72
Th� qu estio n is, however, what kind
A.s we noted, one of th� one in Summ.a
ohjections to
OUlolnglnt: 1, 1 1 . 1
of
division is here meant.
the cOllvertibility of being and
is that beillg is divided by "one" and
"m.my." What divides some:thillg common is related to it by addi tion. Therefore il
St:'t:fIIS
Thomas rt:jects this
that "one" adds somethi ng real to being.
arg u ment.
The Hone� is convertible with
"being" without adding some new disposition to it. Therefore, in dividing being into �oneH and "many" there can hI': no sug gestion of some disjunction or contraction
of being . Thr: di\'ision must be taken in the sense that being is divided by what is "one" absolutely (s,mplit:iter) and by what. is "many" in a certain respect (srcundum q"id). For ml ii ti tuci e ir...elf would nol be cUlllailled under "being"
unless il were in some way CQIlLailied under Monc. ''73
of thi ng1'i j" not
The only eff�c t which imlll�uial�ly proceeds [rom Cod is the highest intelligence, the First InteJligence.14 The furth�r lhe
proce35 of emanation moves a\\'ay from the One {he larger the ,
plurality becomes Multiplicity is a sign of imperfection. .
I low thoroughly this question occupied Thomas is evident from
ing is divided by the one and me many. "71
Thr- one and the many heing, the�' diviu� b t' iug ill
pll 1rl\lity
text mentioned earlier, his commentary
a
Commr:nting on fioethius's statement that the principle of plurality is otherness, he
is the
r\eoplato ni r doc tri n e
On al�uid SN' H. R. Schmitz, "Un tramccndantal mec.onnu�, ill: . J(JC!JIU-J Maritain 1981, n. 2, pp. 31-51.
CafHns
S.U,. I,SO.3. de primi, ., unum et mul m .. 7:l In I SnIt., 24.1 ..'1: MEt )il: :U:n "pl differcntiis e",is. set:umillm quod ens dividilur in unum ct multa, aClum (t in 24.1.4: �unum CI multa di"idunl en� commune." cr. In 111 Ph�t , lect. 12. 394. . . . . . . . 5,111. 1 . 1 1 . 1 ad 2: ..SIC Igltur em d'Vld,tll[ per Ull l lJU cl Inulta, Ilu;L'Ii per unum simpliciter. e t mulla sec ndu m l.[lIid. Nam rr ip.,n mllhitllflo non runlinrrrlllr mh elite, IIbi l uniluerrlll!' aliqllo 1I10d(l 'lib UIIO."
•
as
it includes the
Ilt'gatioll of that other being. Into this discussion Thomalii inserts, rdther abruplly, ac
cording
a
critic.:ism of AvicellJla's position. He observes that
to "some thinkers" pl u mli ly ill t.�aused by the first
principle in a certain order. 011 lhis view, only one thing can
proceed from the One. "'rom this fina effect two beings wuuld come forth-one from the first creature considered in itselr. and another from that same creature viewed in conjunction with its
Thomas rejects this account of plurality. One first effect can imitate- t.he firM. pri nci ple in a reliipect in which another falls short of lhal principle. ann it '.3n fall !lhmt in a respect in wh ich the other eLTect imitates t.he principlr:. In this way, Thomas con· cluut's. there can be man}' firsl effects in each of which there will came.7!i
The question "Whether a plurali ly un proceed from the One?"
in
sunt el in
u
the r.ame of division and explains that
one being is divided from another �ing i nsofar
is explicitly put forward
many medieval thinkers: "Can a multiplicity proceed from th�
potentiam�:
dir;C1Hi�r:r;
be a negation both of the fir-n prim:iple aJld of any other effect.76
A touchstone for assessing plurality is a question disClls.�ed hy
,I
trinitate 4. 1 .
,
( 3) Can a multitudeproceedfrom Ihe One ?
Oner The background of' this question
on D�
in De po/entia
�. 16. In his answer Thomas
H
J.F,Wippp.l, "Thro I.al.in A... it:t:llna a� a Source of Thomas Aquinas'! 1Ictaphysics", in: Frdburgff' 'hituhrift fllr Phil(IJoPhif: llntl. ThIlOI(Jgie 37 (.1990),
pp. 51·90, in particular pp. 72 if. 7!> In DOflh. De tnn. 4.1: "et secundum hoc quidam posuerunl quodam ordine
lit
plura.litatem ab uno primo causari, ab uno primo procedill primo unum, quod ,lilT) ('all�-' pilll'lllil;LIt'nt ClllIsliwal; t:l ex eo iam p06/iunt duo prou:dere: unum IICcundum SC' ipsum, aliud SC'cundum n)niunr:linnt'1Il iJlsjlJ� ad t:au�m." 7" Ihid. 4.1: MQuod dicere eum unum primum rM�il a1illuid imitari in quo alterum ab eo deficit, et defle r in quo a1tcrum ImilRlUr; eI sir. p065unt illllcniri plures primi effectU5, in quorum quoli�t est ncgatio Cl cauSe" el enet:lu� a lteri us IW:cllnduLli idem, uel secundum remotiorem dbtantlam roliarn ir) linn rodent.-
non cogimur,
el
ee
.
,
-------
,. , " "
228
CHAPTER FIVE
ONE
investigates a1 length the m e taphysical implication... of the': Avic�n·
(4) The oppn.cititm ht:tWl'.Im thf. r>1?e and
po...itive a..pect of m ul tipli ci ty. The plurality of thi ngs is
Aristotle distinguishes four Idnds of opposition: contradiction. the
nian claim. He empha...j7.(,,:�, more th an i n tht:: previo us text, the OlS
stich
in tended . it is 10 be attributed 10 (he wisdum of the first prilU.:iple.
The pel"fel.:lioll of the uJliver� requires the plurAlity and diversity of things. Divine goodness cdJlnol adequately be represented in the created world by one thing only. It can only be expressed by a plurality of things. because what is missing in [he one is
comple
mented by the othcr.77 Multiplicitfproves to be a sign of perfeclion.
the text i n De potentia Thomas raises an objection that
In
illustrates his understanding of plurality. In the fourth objection,
he presents an argument that is based on the proportion between causes and
effects. A
u niversal cause produces a universal e ffect, a
particular came 3 particular effec.t. Now God is the moiSt. un ivers::ll
cause, for his proper �{fect is that which is most univers.,l. namely,
being
(esse) .
BUI it is precisely with respect to being that all things
al:curu, i:lUU so lht! cause of being is not the cause of plurality. Tht: differences between things must be reduced to particular causes, In
his reply Thomas points out thc special universality of being
(ens). Being is related to what falls under being in a dilrerent way than a genus to its species. A species adds a difference to a genus, which is outside the essence of the genus. But what falls under being does nOl add anything that is outside being. That by ""hich
beings differ from each other i s also something that is. Therefore, "that. which is Ille cause of being-as-being must also be the cause of
all the differences of bei llg and t:ulISequently of the Vlun.tlilv . of . . thl1q�s. "711 Thls statement makes dear that multiplicity is an original datum; �such as things have bein g. so they have unity and plurality. "'9 eEL &:: UJII ipsa 1I11iv�ni jI�..-kt:li{j el IILllJlillldil!�1I1 t: l diversitat.t!UI ft!rllm r�ll"irat, quia in lma earum inveniri non p()le�1 prnpTeT ;ecessum a complemcnlo bonitatis primae; necesse f\lit ex :mppositione formae l � lenlae quod Deu! multas creaturas et dh'ersas producerel. ( ... ) SiC: igilur lcendum est, quod ab uno primo multitudo et divenitas creaturarum proces Slt, � on propter materiae neccssit.atem, llet pl·ople/, buuitalem, nee propter lXnllLatis ubligatiun�m; st!d t!)( nf[lin� sapil"ntial", 111 in tlivl"flIitJltt' (Tr.alur arum perfeedo consiSleret universi."
77
D� /wj. 8.16:
�
18
lbirl. 3.16 ad 4: Rsed ca quae eontinenlUr sub cnte, non addurll aliquid
sUPril ens quod sit exlril enentiiUll eius ( ... ) . Dponet
CI
•
AS TRANSCENDENTAL
pluralltal('l'II".
the many
opposition of privation and possession, that of conu-aries. and that of
relative terms. To which kind does me opposition of one and many belong? Aristotlr.'!; an�C'.:r in MdfiPh,sic.� X, chapter
3 is that they
al'e contrari es. In his commentary. Thoma.. provine" an explana· tion of Arislotle's position . It is evidt:nt that onr. anrl man)' art: not
opposed as cuntradictories, bt'.cause neither of them applies to non
being;
Iloll-be illg
jli Ileilher one nor many. That they are nol
opposed as relative terms is likewise evident, for lhe lenus one and many are used in an absolute sense. Since the one does not sigIlify
a pure prh'ation-as it docs not signify indivision as such bUl being
that is undivided-it is apparent that one and many are opposed not as pure privation and possession but as contraries.so Tn
Summrl thf.Ologiae T, 1 1 .2 Thomas devotes a separate article to
the opposition between un ity and multitude. His analysis is differ·
enl [rom the explani1 lion in his commentary on thr:
Af�taPhy.�iGJ.
The au:o uut is based on his fundi1mental distim:tion hetwr:r:n t\II.·o types of ullily and of multitude. According to whether r.hry art:
viewed from a calt'goril:al 01' a lr.u�elldental point of view, "one"
and �man}''' arc opposed to each
other in different ways.
TIlt"
one
that i s the principlc of the number is opposed to numerical multi
tude as the measure is to what is measured . .Between measure and
what is measured there exists a relative opposition, for they oppose
to ont: another according to their different relations. But the one that is conver tible
wit.h
hcing is opposed to multitude as the
undivided js to what is divided. They stand in privath't: opposition
to OIle �lnother; the "one" is the privation of "multitude. "81
However. Thomas'!; delt:rmillalioll of the opposition between the
transcendental onc and many is unsatisfactory for sevel<.\1 n�asous. In X Mttaph.• Icel. 4, 198&-1988. S./h. 1,11.2: �unum opponitur multi�. sed divenimodc. Nam unum quod I'M prinr:ipium 1Illlneri, npptmiLllr lIlulL.iludini ttuac t:�t numerus. ut mell�ura mensurato: unum enim htlbel r:lrionem primal' ml"lIS1Jrd�, �I. 1111111el ll� t:I"
so HI
multitudo mcnsurua per unum. ut p:UCl ex X Mdllph. Unum vero quod con"ertitur cum cnte, opponilur multitudini per modum pri\'ationis, tit illdivi,um diviw.M cr. bl 1 Sinlt., 24.1.3 ad 4, in ....hich .. a detailed anaJvsis is given nt lh� v,lriUllS Ihnlls uf uppusiljlJll Uelween tile one and the many: Note espN"ially: uSi amem \nquimllT de lmn qllll41 t:nnvr:rljIJlr CUIII 1::1111::. sic ullum habet ralioncm privationis C. .. ); et hl!. o»ponilllr mnhillldini, lIinu pri\',Uil[ hahilUi".
0' .."
______
,.,
CHAPTP.R FIVE
First, a privation always exp resses a lack. But unity cannot mean a deficiency. for 10811 of u n ity meaus loss of being (we consider this poin l more extenc;ivdy in the S4!t:tion on the one and the goon, 5. 8.). Secon rl, Thomas himself em phasizes that u n i ty tioes no t remove multi tu de but divisio n, and that the notiom of multitude and rlivi si on are 1I0t iden tical. In an other text he specifies the pri�'at i...e cha u.:ter of the oppo sition belween one and many by observing that unity is the privation of a d ivision that is preserved
l ike
ill multitude.S\! An even more striking correcti o n takes place in rep ly to an objection in Summa theologial! I, 1 1 .2 it�lf. There Thomas argues that no privation complr.t.f'ly tak�s ,lway th e being of a thing. Privation is not a pllr� neg�ljou, but negation in a subject;� blindness, for instanc�, is not said eo>xl:epl of a subject whose nature is to see. Yet ew:ry privation 1<1hs away some bei ng. On the basis of the� comiderations. Thomas makcs clear that privative o ppm.j. tion'" on " Inmscenut!lltal levcl arc of a special nature: "so in hf'ing. by reaso n of ilS ('UlIlmonncss, a privation of bdng h;lS il.'5 foun d a tion ill being; whkh is not the case in privations of .�r�c:ial forms, such as the privation of sight, or of whi te of:s.c;. "83 The privatioll of sight is not founded in sigh ... for this form is remon'u from the subject. Thc privation of heing, h owever, dOi:s (lul t:Jl ti rely take away being; it is a negatio n of being in II subject that exists. This privation, therefor!", has its foundatiun n i being. What app lies to ht>ing Clpp lit:s also to the one and the good, which are convertible wiLl. being. The privation or good is founded in some go od , allli similarly the rcmo'\'al (rematio) of u ni ty i� founned in so m e Lh ing one. "Hence it h ap pens that multitude is somet.h in g one and evil is something good."H4 This answrr m an i frsts a remarhble shift ill perspective: it is not th� one I.hat is c o nsidere d as a privation. but multitude. The rem OWlI of u nity is,
order. Evil arises from a lack of being; multitude however arises from being, tor that by which beings are divided is also so me th ing that exists. Because God causes the comrl�Te being of th ings, <'Ind not their tendency to not-being, he is t.h� principle of muhitude uol not of evi1.8!i Thomas's analr-is. of the relati on between the one aud the many revC':als a consmnt struggle to do justice, wi lhin lh� fr:lmeWOTk of the privative opposition, both to the one that is cOllv�rljule wilh being and to the many that likewise possesses.
n
"
ad 4: usic unum habet ration em privation is ( ... ) respectu divi�ioni5 quae lalvatur in multitudine�. 85 s.,I&. 1.11.2 ad I : �nutla privatio lollil LUGjlil�r f'sst', quia privado eSl negatio in Jubiccto, secundum Philosuphum. Sl':d Inm�n omnis privatio tollit aliquod. cue. Et ideo in en�, ratione 5uae communiLatis. accidit quod privalio entia fundatur ill erlle: quod non accidit in privationibus formarum spe ciaLium, lit vi5us vel albedinis, vel alicuiu, huiusmodi. � II� Ibid. 1,11.2 ad I : �Et sieut est de ente, ita est de uno et loollO, '1 1lar' ("(m vertunlur cum eme: nam prh. ,., similiter ren\Otlo unitali. fundatur in aliquo unu. }O:, f'xil1de ('()tlliflgit quod mulumdo elt quoddam Llnum, et lIlaium F.II. rtuoddam bon\lm�. ��
,
2�1
ONE AS TRANSCENDt:NTAL
11, 1 Sent.,
24.1.3
every privation on the level of the ('ommunifl., fou n ded
in the
one itself.
lInner!';tood as. suggesting that tht: oppm:iLion brtwt:en ant' and Illany exists is simii
Thomas's reply
could he
i
tran sc.:endentalitv. ,
5.6.
The ems
and the composed
Thomas's own argument for the convertibility of being anrl onC': 1!'i based on the notions of composition anrl "implici ty (d. 5. 2.). These noti on s play a ce n tral role in his metaphysics, ClS Thomas' s procedure i n the lw-:g-jnning of me Su.."m�a lltr:olvgiae iltust,dles. ..\fl�l· havi n g proved in q. 2 that Cod exislS, he next considers how he is. The first point of inquiry is llol wheo>lhcr Cod is good or almigh ty ur wise, but whether he is simple. Thomas shows the divine si mp lic ity in q. 3 b)' denyi ng all sorts of forms of composi tion of the first being. In God neither (he composition of form and matter (a. 2). nor the composition of subject and quiddhy or nature (3. 3), nor the composition of essence and es.�e (a. 4) can be acknow ledged. The last kind of composition inrlicaTes that the structure of being has become more complu with Thomas than with Aristotle. In Thomas's on tology, every cr�aturt': i s marked by the non identi ty of essenr.e and bei ng. T he gn�:aler c.omplexi ly of the ontologiud struc ture is also shown by Thom<'ls's i ntroductio n of the transcendental thi ng iIi "
"
-----
,, '
.
"
,
,
"
232
CHAPTER
FIVE
ONE
commenting on Aristotle s first argument for the conyertibility of beiIlg and one in Metaphysics IV. The co ncep tual non�identity betweell thing and "being" is traced to the distinction between essence and t$U. The name TtJ is derived from the '1uidctity or essence, the name ens from the act of bei ng Thomas is, as a modern critic remarked. a "thinker of differe ncf: , hur rloeo; h� al !lo think of the unity of the component<;?8& Against the backgroun d of this question the philo.c;ophical significance of the transcendental "one," which exprcssr: s the jndivision of that which is, <:OIlU:S to '
"
"
.
"
the forr:.
gives a concrete applicatiull of the transcendentalit), of the metaphysical olle ill two domains where composition raise9 spec ial problems:'" The first one is ChrisLology. Christ was truly God and lruly man. But how can nyo different natures be united in one person? Is Christ something that is one or two ( unum vel duo)? The gen eral answer is that being and one are convertihle. That means that if (here were two subjects in ChriRt ht': woulrl be absolutely two, and only one in a certain respect (.'i!':cundum lfuid) . But this vit:w would "take away Jems" (tolln-eJesl1,'m) , because every thing i s, in ...ofar a... it is one, and what is n ot .simpliciter oll e is also not .,amplicitf.r being , !!8 This applicati on of c.:onver tibi lity can lJt! Thomas
.
found already in Boethius, for in his In.''aUsc against the Christo·
10gical heresies of EUl),chcos and Ncslorius. he: expresses the vicw that being and one go logether: �ilat is nOt one cannot be at all, because bei ng and one arc convertible and whatever is, is one. "S') The other domain in which Thomas applies the convertihility of being and one is anthropo logy. More than any other h�ing, man is marked by complexity H� i� th � "hori:wn" of sp iritual nature and corporea1 nature, taking part in both nalures.90 WiTh plants h e shares the vegt':r.al.ivl"': life and with animab. the sensory .
86 cr. L.B. Puntc!, Analogit u:nd aeschichtlichkeil I: Philowphiegeuhichllich· kritischer VIITSUch UMr das GnHldpTflbltm an- MetaPIl,�ik, Freiburp;. Basel and
Vienna 1969, pp. 262fi. 87 For tlu: u:nll �apl)tication,- �,.,. .".th. 1,93.9: "U"llm alttem, cum �il tI,. Ir.In!\Cf'ndelltibus. N rommune eSI omnibus, ct ad singula potest aptari: sicut ct bonum ct vcrum.· R" SrC, 1V,.sS. Cf. De unitmt a. 3; a. 4: �c:x eodem dicitur ali�uid t:s�e ullum. et ens." S.t!I, lIJ,17.2 sed conLI·�. 89 CfJ'lIlw EUi)" hm., L 4 (rod. SIr-wart ".n" p, 94): Quod enim non est unum, nee ro1lo51': oml1in o pot..st; ,.551': enlm atqul': unum convertitur et quodcumque unum elt est.· !ill ('..1'. h. /IJ Slnt., prol. "
•
,
, ,
"
233
AS TRANSC,ENnF;NTAt,
life. At the same time, man takes part
,
ill spiritual life; he is a
rational animal. Given this complex struc ture ,
how can the unity
of man be conceived of and accounteu for? Many of Thomas's con temporaries, especially F.·am:iscan thinkers, assumed a plurality of form .. in man ill order to do justice to his particular complexity. Rut. Thomas rejecU thi� view. [n his opinion it is incompatible with the very prim :i ples of first phil osophy. More vigorousl), than any other philosopher in the thirteenth century, h� defends the unicity of the substantial form in man. This doctrine provoked '5trong reac· tions and was the most controver�ial asp<:ct of Thomas s th ough t in the years following his death .it1 Tho mas dea ls with th e u nity of form ill sewnl texts. As the starting po in t of our analysis we lak� De 5pirilualilnfs creaturis, a. 3, wheTf� the question is raise d as to whether the spiritual soul of man is united with the body through an intermediate ( medium). Directly i n th e beginning uf his answer he formulates the thesis of the cotlv�rlibility uf being and one as the general principle of hi!' :solution. Every thi ng is one insofar as it is being, and it ha.'I; heing and unit)' from the same source. Now every thing i!' a b e ing in a.c t by the form. The act of the form is tht" refoTe the reason th at something is one. llecause matter h�$ being, not by an ythin g ds� '
but directly b), the form, th(' union of form and matlt'r
mediated by an),th ing d�. Tf the
soul is
GUi l lo t
b�
the furm of the body,
there thus (.annot be an intf"nll�dial... between soul and
body,1)! Nr:xt. Thomas raises a diffic.:ulty (d-ubium) that gives him (hc oppo rt.unity to elabora te on his basic idea. The difficul ty that remains is the question of what the proper subject of the human suul i s � � In othe r words, wh at is the material substratum with .
·
9 t Cr. L. Hodl. �Neue Nacllrichten libel" die Pa.ti�er Veruft�i!lJlIg�11 th'r thomasi5chen Form!ehreM, in: SrhukHhfr �y (19fi1), pr. 17R·l!)fi; JA. Web heip l. F riar Thrmu:u d'Aqum(l, PII. ��K. 1f' 4 J),. .'plnt. crwt �. 3: ·Unumquodquc cnim �ecundum hoc est unum. sC'cl1ndum quod cst ens. Est autem unumquodque ens actu per formam, 5ivc ,ecundum esse substantia!e. sive se(;unduffi e� au:itlcllla.!t:: ulHh· nmni� forma elt actus; et per con5equeus eM ral.iu IHlil.ali.�, fJUit aliq\lid eSI unum. Sin1t igilur nOli est diu:n: Ilucwi "'" aliquod aliud medium quo materia habeat elSe per �\I:.Jm fonnam, ifl\ non poleS( did quod sit aliquod aliud medium uniens formam materlae \'cl subieeto. Secundum igitur quod anima est forma corporls, non potest cue ali quid medium inter animam et corpus.� Cf. S.lh. I.7fi.�: "Nihil enim est aimpliciter unum uisi per fOfmam U1Hun, pf'r fJllam ha�t ret eAlle: ah ("ud("Ol ("Il im !tahl"l ff'1 (JuoO �il ("lH, 1"1 quod sit IIna"; 1,76.7; .�·I'G. 11,7:'1, In 11 D. fin., lef!. t , 2M. II�
n,
.,piril.
tn'1I'.,
•.
�: ·Se'n mne
nubium reillt. qllin .11 prnprlum
--_. " " "
"
2:\4
,
..
.
,
--"
,
CHAPTER FIVE
ONE AS TRANSCENDENTAL
235
which the rational fionl a� form is united? Two different opinions exist concerning that question. Some hold that in one and the same individual there are many substantial forms, of which the lower serves as the substratum of the higher. First matter is not, so lhey argue, the immediate subjec.t of the last substantial form, but is its subject by means of a series of intermediate forms. Only insofar as matter has beeIl made perfect by the first fonn is it the proximate su�jcct of the second form, and the same applies with regard to every subsequent form up to the last form. The proximate subject of the rational soul is therefore not matter as such, but the body that has already been made perfect by the sensitive soul. According to others there is only one substantial form in each individual. To this one form an individual not only owes the fact that it is human but also that it is sensitive (anima!), a living being, embodi t"d, a '<;lIb,<;tance and being (ens). No other substantial fonn precedes the human soul. The series of predicates that belong to this OIle individual must not be traced hack to a real diversity of forms,94 Thomas sees as the source of the views in question two different approaches to reality, those of the Platonists and of AI'istotle. Characteri.�tic of the former is that their investigation of reality starts from intellectual concepts (rationes inttllip;ib1.les). The Platonisls considered things according to the logical order of the genera and the species , in which the higher and more general can be understood wi thont the lower. Moreover, they were of the opinion that everyLhing which c.an be c:onceived as separately also exists in reality sepm-ately. Thomas describes here the Platonic resolution of the less general to the must general of forms, considered as the highest principles of things.95
It is especially in the c.:ontext of the discussion about the sublltan tial unity of man that Thomas criticizes the Platonic view of the maxime wmmunia, a criticism that we examined above (4. 1 .) . The Plalolli<.: reduction to the most general is not an inner resolution of a thing, but a resolution secundum rem that removes the uuity of the mlalyzed thing-. In our text in D{{ ,�piri.tu.alilms cTcaluris, Thomas judges the position of the Platonists "impossible according to the true principles of philosophy that Aristotle has considercd."96 Their view is contrary to the principles of metaphysics, for its implica tion is, as he states in another text, that "unity is taken away from things and consequently both their entity and their diversity."97 With this cri ticism Thomas returns to the general principle he had formulated in the beginning of his reply to the question: there is an int.rimit: c.:unnection between being and the unity of a thing. Thomas's main argument against the doctrin e of the plurality of substantial forms is based on the notion of "act." If there wel-e to be many forms in an individual substa nce , then Lhis substance could not be one simpliciter. The reason is that fOHn is essentially act, and two acts do not con lltitute a unity in the strict sense. If an individual were "animal" and "rational" bv, h'.'o different forms , then a human heing would be nothing but an external unity, an "aggregate." Conllequently, it would not be a being simpliciter, for everything i,<; a heing insofar as it is one. Man's complexity can only be conceived as a true unity when the components relate to each olher as potency and act, for what is in potency hr:comes actual by the form.YIl \"hen the relation between hody and soul in
subiectum animae, quod comparetur ad ipsam sicut ma�ria ad fonnam ,w 94 Ibid., a. 3; "Quidam enim dicunt, quod sunt multac formac substamiales i n eodem i ndivirt uo, tjUarUIII una substernitur alteri; et sic materia prima non cst immcdiatum subiertum ull.imat' fonllae substantialis, sed subiicitur ei mediantibus formis rncdiis; ita quod ipsa materia, st't:luillum quod est sub Conna prima.. est subiectuffi proximum formac secundae; et sk cit'inct'ps uSl/ue at! ultimam formam . Sic igitur subiectum animae rationali� proximum, esf. corpus Pl"'rl"t't:tUIil anima sensitiva; et hUlc unitur anima rational is ut forma. AHa opinio est, quort in UflO illtli� iduo nOll est nisi una forma iubstantialis el secundum hoc oporter dicere quod pl."r formam substantialem, quae est forma humana, habet hoc individuum non solum quod .�it humu, sed quod sit animal, et quod sit vivum, et quod sit corpus, et lubstantia et rom. I!.t sic nulla alia forma 5ubstantialis praecedit in hoc homine animam humanam". 911 ibid., a. :i: "Hanlin alltem duarum opinlonulll diversitas ex hoc protedit,
sem per superius pott'sf inrelligi sine inferiori; sicm homo sill I' hoc homine, eL allimal �iT1t' hamine, e t s.i c deinccps. Existima\'erunt etiam quod quidquitl abstractum i n intcllectu. sit abstractllm in re; alias videbatur t'i� quod mtdlcctus abstrahens esset falsus aut vanus, �i Jmlla rros ahstracUl ei respon deret ( . . .) Unde posuerunt hominem ahstractum ab his hominibus; et sic deinceps usque ad ells �t. IInllm I:'t bonum, quod posuerunl mmmam rerum virt.ul.em. "
quod qllidalll ad inquircndam veritatem de natura rerum, proce��t:rullt �x rationibus intdligibilibus. et hoc fuit proprium Platonil.:urtllll; tplidam vero ex rebus sensibilibus, et hoc fuit propriulll philosophiae Aristotelis ( . .. ) _ COIl5ideraverllnt Platonici ordinem !Illt'mriam gene rum et specicrum, et quod
�M
96
a" 3: "Sed haec positio. secundum vera PhiiosupiIiae priTlf:ipia, quae consideravit Aristoteles, est impossibilis." Cf. D� sU/>Jt. sejm.,-. . Co 6: "To lli l dromum ( . . . ) praedicta posido etiam pnilosophiae pl-i m ae principia, auferens unitatem a singulis rebus et per ullI�eqll�lls vt'ram entitatem simul et rerum diversitatem." HK Ht JPiril. Cf"tat., a. 3: " n ull um individuum substantiae euet �illlpJiciter
Ibid.,
97
unum. NOli enim iii �implidter unum ex dllOhuM actlbu8, sp.d rox pntentia rot
"M..'••""
____.. ___
", . "
236
--, ,
, ,
t:HAP'T£R FIVE
man U:
237
ONE AS TRANSCENDENTAL
conceived as that between mauer, which is pure potency,
and substantial form. which is act, then one can undenaanrl that
is different from the one that is the princ iple of number, so indi viduality is not identical with nllmt':Tk_ai unity within a species.
man is one insotar as he is. Thomas's argument for the unity of 1>0111 and body in m.m is
metaphysical. It applil':s therefore to th� oornlogical structure of
things in general. Characteristic of c..e:al�d things is the difference ".Ut,
of essence and
Yet, Thomas
siders nOI only th eir UitI�I-
con
ence hill al�o their unity. The two compUllellts rdale tu each other
a." potency to ",ct. The act of t.eil lg is t.he
rn/io buth that
II
thing is
and that it is Olle, aud it is the metaphysical foundation of the cOJlvertibility of I>t-iug and one. Something is called
en!
insofar as
5.7. The one and the p;ood [n NeopialuJli:;m th e One and the Good arc identiJied. ·trl Thomas melltions this identification several times. A remarkable exam ple
is found in one of his Scriptural commentaries. In his explanation of Christ's prayer "so that they all are one" Uohn 1 7 : 2 1 ) , he po in ts out that according
to
the Platonists every thing ha.o; unity from the
it possesses actuality; it is called unum insofar as it is undivided by
same source from which it has good nes.... For the good is th.u
the act of bei ng.
whi ch preserves a thing, and a thing is preserved onl), through its
When the one sign ifies "undivided" (indivisum) being , it seems
un i ty. lOS Hence the PJatonists held that the ratio of the one is
unity with individualit.,T. In fact Thomali doelli
identical with thar. of the good. It was especially Boethius. Thomas
natural
to co nnect
describe the "individual" in the same terms in which he descri bes
the transcendental "one" (and aliquid) : "undivided in itself and
divided from others."9!J This suggests that the cOlwertibilily of (Jut! and he ing also
com preh
ends that of the indiyidual ami lu:iug.
A
no tes. who demonstrated this ideuLity. 104
In the thi.·d book of his �nsolatwn
�f Philosophy,
Boethius argues
that the one and the good arc thc samc on thc basis of the principle
that "things are of the samc essence, if their etfects, according to
few texts con firm (his cor:n�lation. among them, "everything pas
their nature, are not dHferellt." The proper effect of the one is
bt-iug. "100 This conclusion is illlcresling [rom a philo soph ical point
that is endures and subsists so long
�S:ies uuily alld individuality in (he same respect as it possesses
of view. for il sees individuality as a transcendental predicate.
"�da
The transcendental perspeCliW'.: is of importance for the
(0
e nsure the preservation and permanence of thingl'i. "Everything as
it is one, and perilihe!\ :.nrl is
destroyed as soon as it CCaJies to ht nne."105 Th:.t this effect is
likewise the eff�et of the good is apparent [mm the univt'fs."'l1
physical imerpretation of Thoma...·,.. conc�ption of individuality. In
striving for fielf-p,.es�rvation. "All things thaL aH� tlesu-e natumlly
most monograph s hili view iii rennetrl to the thesis that maHer is
to con tinne th�if subsiste nce and to avo itl harm." But that which
the prin c iple of inrlividuation.101 In reality , however, this th�sis is
...eeks t.o subsist desires to be Ollt:'. Therefore. all things desire unity
an abbreviation. If "individual" is cOll vertible with "om;," then the
same time
individmdity of
prinCiples that
fl
Ihing must be an: oun ted for by th e same
,U..::t;OUllt
of unity aJld being,
so
for "one" and
being.
"
"
As there are degrees
lhere are degrees of individuality. Jt is only
in material ' th ings that individuality presents itself as numerical
distinction based on matter. Just as the one convertible with being actu. in quantum id quod est potentia fit actu�. cr. In HII Metaph., iect. 5, 1767; D, lin., a. 1 1 :
1.29.4; lk an.. a. 3. Ad V..,.t" c. 108. Cf. IH an . . a. 1 ad 2: Munurnquodque secundum habet cue et individuationem. � D, lpiril. crftU.. a. 9 ad 3.
S.tll.
KJinRer, 1){J,j PrinJi/i Iln Individuatiull bn 11mmas Mlinalenchwanuc-h 1�&4.
111 1
cr. I.
Vim
idem
,'\l[1'il'1,
(o71mi(t unum �ldtrant). This universal finality is at the
the desire for the good, for the good can be described as that which all thi ngs desire.I06 102
cr. C. Steel, �L'un et Ie bicil. LeiS rai�ufls u'une id�T1.jtirati(}n rlan� In tradition platUJlidt:lllle�, ill: �Jlu! d"s sr.ir.nus phiiosaphiqlU1 t! thiologlquts 73
( 1 9H9), pp. 69-8..1}. 1(13 III Ioanntm c. 17. lect. 5, 22�8: "Dicit ergo hoc ut
:'-(am, ut Plat{)nici dil.:unt. ab hoc quaelibet re� habet unitatcm a qU{) habet bonitalem. Bonum eoim eH quod e�t rei cooservalhum; nulla auLem res nH1��J"Yatllr ni:\] per h{)e quod Dt ulla. El ideo ilnminl1s �ten.� rli.cipulorum perfectionem In l.Ilmitate, p�tit qllod �in( unum.104 !n [[ Post. Anal., len. 5: "iccundum opiniOllem Plaronis. qui penuit quod earu-m est ralio unius ct boni-: Ira lH div. IIDmin. c. 4, ket. 9, 421: 'Bonum enim ct unum in idem con(urrunt, ut Boethius probat in libro De conKllatione. � 1O!o fh wn.I. plitt 111. proia 1 1 (ed. Tester, p. 288) . ''''' 11M. III. pt'oaa 11 (ed. TCliler, p. 294). s
omnlM unum
Jill!.
_______'M'M'"
238
, '" . , ,,
239
C,HAPTF.R FIVF,
ONE AS TRAN�C,F.NOF.NTAT.
It is striking thOlt Thomas. in De vmtale 21. 2. quotes this text of Boelhius, but give; it
posi live ('nn(".t:'ption of the one. Fo.· MeiSler Eckhart the one is "'the n e gal.ion of the negation"-all expressio n tb at also occurs in
of the convertibility of the one and the good, but of that of lmng amI the good. All that alread}' ex.ists loves its own being and pr!"M"rves it with all its strength. Therefore, being iL'.elf character of the good
(cf. 7. 4.).
(ip,�um P.,UI!) has the
Another source for the identification of the one and the good was pseurlo-Dionysius the Art':opagitt". In the tllil'leenlh ;;\lu.1 fiua] chapter of De divini{ n01ninimL{, he discusses the name "Ollt.�" .uler "PerfC":cr." The Om: is jnM like the Good, a pfim:iplt' that diffuses itself; it is the cause of unit)' ill all things . Dionysius's statement 1'here exu.ls nothing that does lIul participate in the one" is cited by Thomas in Summa t.heowgiae 1, 1 1 . 1 (sed cantra). He interprets this
citation as support for his view that one does not add a reality to
being. but ignores the Neoplatonic intent of the statement: the identification of one and good. He even explidrly nt-nies the participative charac ter of the one . F.verything is one, not by partici pation, like the good, but hy il� ($..ence.101 'n Thomas's discussion of the trnnscendelltitls we see a tell denc), to emphasize the difference betwttll the
UlIt!
and the good. In contrast to the good, the one does nol illdudt' tht' aspect of perfection, but thal of indivisioll. The one is said solely secundum ralzonem negationi�; the good, on the other hand, adds something
.
Thomlls1 1V-and therdore a pure affirmation; it is even ..the mar row aud the summit of the purest aflirmation. " I l l The question must therefore be asked whether Thomas's nega live c onception of the one is satisfactory Is transcendental unity really, as Joseph Owens has claimed, "a negative aspecl" of exi�t enee-is it "merely lack of division?"l I :l Thr- conS('qucnce of its "negative staLUs" would be that th.("; one differs radically from the .
orner transcenctenlal....
if this ....ere . the case, Ihe fact lhal Thoma.<;, at rhl": t":n d of his llrgument [0'· the convc:"rlilJi.lity of being anri on e (Su"muL theuwgiil.e I, 1 1 . 1 ) , sa� that "ever)'thillg guards its unity as it gu ards its exislellt:e (esJe) " would remain incompre hensible. Why would the things guard something negative? Simihu·ly. how Thomas can base the unit)' of the composed on the However,
nuUon of "act" would also go unexplained. His negative conception of the one requires therefore further elaboration. The "one" above all signifies
bcing:
U
"
it posits
(/J<mit)
something.m It adds a nega
tion to being. to be sure, but [his does not imply thal the essence of unity is negative. The negation of divi...ion refer... rath�r to :l perfection. Indeed, one can finli r:vid�nce for such
an
interpreta
tion in Thomas'... wr iti ngs. In reply to the questi on "\\fhether the world is goverJleu by
This negative conception of the one encountered strong criti
one?" ( Utrum 1f/UUdllS gubernelur ab uno) in Summa theologiae 1, 103.3, Thomas Illakes dear thal the bc:n kind of government is govern ment by one. \\ e are only interested here in that part of his
thf" negative WOIy in
at:t:uunl in which he connects unity and gOOdness. He argues that to goyern is nothing else but 10 direct those governed towards an
positive to being. HlI'I cism, especially from authors in the Franciscan traoilion. AI'.c:ord
ing
to
Peter John Olivi (d. 129R), for t':xampl�,
which unity i ... expressed does not
rut-An
lhal it is
�
mere negation. The mtin of the �one" i � ...omething positjve; it signifies �\ perfec ti on . lOti Pout in t.he Domin ican tradition ilSed[ olle finds a
'
end, that is, to some good, Unit}'. ho\\'evt!r, belongs to the rn.ltn of
goodness. Thomas bases this thought on Roethius's proof in the
COn5alati01I
of Philosoph)" which
ht: horro....f>. her('. As all thi ngs
desire the good, so they rlesire the unity without which they
cannot exi�t, for anything exists to the ext�lll thal it is unc. So OIl� HJ7
Cr. De 1.Ient. :n.5 ad 8: �esseillia rei est una pt"r
i!�am, non propter ulla p
ease SUUIDi d ita nun t:!t et bono. S.th. 1,6.3 ad 1. lOR S.tA. 1,6.3 ad I: �unum non importat ralionem perfeetionis, sed indhisionia tanlum"; Ih 1.Iml. 21.5 ad 7: -unum quod con�rtilur cum t:1l1.e, diciHlr aeeulldulll rationem negalionis qwun adilil 1>iuVr.t t:nlli tM)Illlm all/"l'm non addlt Il�gatj(lne!ll 1>iupc:r ell:', .u�tI eius rdrio in positione consistir". 109 Peter John Olivi, Qvat.Jlimu,s in Stcundu. Librum St"lenl;!!,..""" q . 14 (cd. 8. Jansen, Quaracchi 1922·26. 1, p. 271). Cf. R.E. Houser. 'Tranlcendcntotl Unity In Petrus de Trabibll'''. in: FrantlJmn. StudUlf �9 ( 1979). pp. 49·104, "
110 lhwdL X, 1.l ad 3. 1 1 1 Eekhan, In Etc;.t n. 63 (LlV 11, 293.1-2): gunum tran$ccndens ill voce quidcm negatio eSI, sed in $ignificalo. cum ail negat io ncgalionis. cst mcra affirmalio"; In Ioh. n. 207 (LW Ill. l75.!i�): "nep;alio nC'�al.iunjs. quae: est medulla et a�1t purinimae amrm3Iiulli.�. 1 1 :1: .T. Owens, -Unity and Es�nr.e in St. Thnma� Aquinas. rp. 2!'il·2. I I' cr. �rwil. X,I.I: "hllimmodl U"","" t pmllt allquld In q\lRnlU11l In .110 imeliecT1I Includit en."; IJ, IXII. 9.7 lui R.
'' .. . ". .
______M'''... ' '
,
, .
.
.
'
.
,,'
,
CIL,,-PTER FIVE
240
I
I
'"OIHillla ault'm gnhforn
1 1 4 S�UI. I.I O:S.�:
BOCtlU5 probat ( ... ) . per hoc quod. sicut omnia de�iderant bonum. il" de5iderant IInitatem, sine qua e�e IlDn possunt. �alll u/JUIlIl.julX!cjUe inmntllm e5t, inqualltullI IIm!!11 cst: 111111.. vidt'lnHS IJlJ(ld rl:'."; repugmmt SUl'lf' dlvisloni (jllanlllm p
f
�
maxlmt' ("n� el maxi me indivisllmM; ad 1 : "!icel privatio secundum sc non rccipial magis cl minus, tamen secundum quod cius oppositum reci pit magis et minus, e!lam ipsa privativa rlicuntur !cc-undum m"gis ct minus." 5,0. 1,42:
ul1itatem�.
"Secundum hunc modum rei habet esse quo po!ollidct II� .�,G. IV,I: "linulUquodque. quanlo est magis IIIIUIII, lalllU I'SI nlagi� vir1110SlIfll CI dignius�.
,
,
,
241
ONl Alii TRANSCENDENTAL
perceives that things, as fa.r as p ossible, rt':�ilit di\'isiol\. For this reason the intention of the ruler aims at un ity or peace .1H TIlUmas connects the o ne and the gnorl in other texts as well. In a diS' cussion about the qut;t;.tion whether there can be st"ver
•
,
-_..
•
5,8. Thl: (me and the trw the order of the trAnscendentais the one precede! the tnte. Thomas also g ives a reason for this pri ority: "every thi ng i:s intelligible insofar as it is one."J:aI Thill litalr.meot points to iUi aspect of the one that is different from those which arose in previous sections. There. the discussionli of the thesis of convertibility and of the problem of compo!;itinn showed the ontological relevance of the one. Here its cognitive liiign i(icance cOllies lo the fore. V-ole have come ::.r.ross this cognitive aspect before. Wh.en Aristotle in Mr.taphJsics X, c. 1 discerns four modes of unity, his criterion for the latter two modes is the unity of definition or apprehension. The fourth mode is what is indivisible in specie..., the universal lhal is the object of science (d. 5. 2.). We have also seen that Thomas calls the first operation of the human in tellect, by which the intel l ect apprehends what a thi ng is, "the under standing of indivisibles (intelUgenlia inAivicibilium). We are (lOW in a p osition to see the reason of thi:r; designation. "Indivisibility" is the ratio of unily, and thi s feature helongs to the. species ,IUd essence of a thing. 1 11 1 The faa th at the definition of an essence contains several elements i s not a denial of its indivisibility. for Lhese components are related to each olher- as potency and act. a relation from which :'I true unity resul ts (d. 5. 6.). Whr:n Thomas slales lhal the one precedes the true since every thing is intellig ible insofar as it is one, he refers to a statement made by Aristotle in book IV of the Metaph)'sics: he who namely does not f.:onceive something one, does not conceive anyth i n g ( I O06b IO) . .1:t� In Metaphysic.s IV, c. 4, Arilitotlr: en ters into a di s cussion with those who deny the prin c iple of contradic tion . Th� condition for every statement and discu.5sion is that a IlCim� signif1es only one thing. Whal is signifi ed by the Ilallle is the definition of the thing. Wh en a name does 110l signify something one, nothing is sgnifi erl. This is because names signify concepts, and therefore no th ing hI signified when nothing is understood. But unless so methi ng one is undeJ"Stood, nothi ng is unders to od In
"
"
"
i
,
120 Dr 1,m/.
21.3: "\'crum autem pracsupponil unum, cum \'eri ratio ex apprehcmione int�lIectui perficiatur; uflumquodqut: >lult:1II jlltdligibil� ��I in quantum cst unumw• I tl Cf. ill lIJ Dt a1l., lect. I I , 7!:.2; 755.
Dr. writ. 21.�: Rfjui enim non imclligit unllm nihil inlelligil. lit dicit t'hilu.
•
---,..
, ,,
"
'. '
-
"
CHAPT1':K
242
FlVI':
because un deracan ding presupposes that the one is distinguished from the other. When names, however, sign ify no thing. every dispute becomes impossble l :l� This argument of Aristotle's has bt::en intr'llreled as the hiMori· cal source of the doctrine of the convertihility of one and being. An a prien axiom thal demandA of every po!>.�ihlt': nhjr:ct of human thought that it he an unum c.an only he ohtained hy reflection upon thr: ro�sihi1ity of thought as stich. The thesis of convertibility has it'> origin in " ph ilosophy of mind; it ("ests on the insight lh<J.l all th inking is tied to Ule principle of ideIltily,I21 This iIlLC1"prt=tatiuII of Kurt Fla�ch i s obviously influenced by Kant's transcendental philosophy, in which "1 th ink" is the deter m in ativc p rinciple of the transccndcntal o bject ( Critique of Pure RMson, B 1 18). Against this interpretatio n nm th ings need to be said. First. histo rically the origin of the doctrine of the converti b ili ry of be ing and one actually lies in an earlier p"s�ilge in M�taJJhpi(;.{ IV, nam� ly in chap ter 2, wh ere Aristotle ilrgues that hdng ano Ollt' are identiGl1 in re ality , but diITer conceptlll111y. St':conn, fh� tran 5('.ende nfal way of thought in the Middle Ages reduces oll r concepls to a fint thal is lht! cOlJ(liliuu for human kllowiu g . Fo r Thomas this first is not the intelligible or (he primiple of jd�mity, but bei ng, for something is only inlclligjbtc in sofar as it is in act. It is through rcflcction on this first that it becomes clear that every being is one. The one is a further explica" tion of being because: it adds the: characteristic of indivisibility. The one is not the condition for the understanding of king. hlll for rhr: understandi ng of the- tme. i
·
·
:
l�ct. 7, fil.fi: "Qllorl enim non signitic.S1f unum. nihil slgnUicat. El hoc sic proM-tur. Nomina significant intdlcctu,. 5i igi tur I1IMl Inlclllglmr, nil'll slgnificatur. Sed si non intelligilur unum, nihil inldligitllr; quia oportet quod qui intdligit ab aliis dilitinguat. E.rg() SI. non �igl1ilic31 unUlll, lion sigllifu:at." ]2. K. "·Ia!\dl. /JUi M�tnplty_fiJI d,_, r:mm, 11. .'i1.
123
.•
'n IV Mtlllph
CHAPTER SIX
,
TRUTH AS TRANSCENDENTAL hdng.
and "one," which we analyzed in the pr e ce din g chaptus, the m erlieval s fou n d important l�;lds in Aristo tle and Avicenna. Ari.<;totJe arguerl for the convertibility of beiug
For
"
the transcendent.als
"
"
"thing"
"
I
.
I
Fur a lIuney .and .liUIiWon of Tholll"�'s
;!,CCO\lnts
of
HUlh,
ICC
J
F.
, , ,' ", , " ,
" " . . . _ -
244
,
" . " " ,, " " . . ,,, " " ,
,
CHAPTER SIX
the most recent. It re minds us of
6.1. A �magisterial" tkfinitimJ of tmth:
-rhe indivision of being arm that which is u
history of philosoph}'. He presents c.1efinilions from Greek philo (Aristotle), thr: patristic �(-iud (Augustine and IiHarv of '
Poi tiers ) , early medieval thoug ht (Anselm of Canterbury), an d Arabic ph i losop hy (Avin�Jlua) . Among the many denn itio n� or truth t.he form ula "ad�quation of thi ng and intdlect" all;o appears which Thomas attributes to a J ewish p hilosopher of the tenth century, Isaac Israeli. Scholars have not hf':f':n able, hOwt::....�I', LO
locate l.his definition in his works.� In addition Thomas Ult:I1lions
an anonymous ddinition: "the true is the indivision of beiug and that which is" (ve1Um est indivi.{w �.uf! pt q1lod t'�t). Il is to this at first sigh t rather odd definition that we devote our initial aUt:ution. In another text, In I Srntentiarum 19. 5 . 1 , Thomas calls this dcfini. tion �magjsterial" (magistralis), thu:; marking it as the definition of the magistri of tht':: university. In deed, we find this dct1nition in Alexanol';( of Hales, Albt! rl the Great, and Bonaventure.' Of the definitions preseultd in De 'CJt'f'itate, the -indivi§io n" formula is thu... Wippel, -rrulll in Thnllla.� Aqlliaas-, in: Tne Review 6f Mdaph-JSic.s 43 (1989), pp. 29fi·�26, pp. M3·567. For lhe usue or ontological truth Ke C. Sohngen. Sn" und CegntsMnd. DaJ Jch�s1iJrhe Anol>! 'em " utn"" wnwriu71I",' ab f'ttrtdl'lflUnl ttlLfnph]Jiuh" unJ liitologucher �tkulalwn. MiinsLu 1 !J:tO; R. J. McCall, ·St. Thomas on OntOlogical Truth"', in: The Ntw SdI.oituJicis. 12 (14)38), pp_ 9-29;]. Va.n de Wiele, �Le �roLJIi:me cit' 1ft verite ontologique dans Ia. philosophie de in: R';'lfu philosophiqut .It L:m1Xl;1I 52 (1954), pp. 521-571; J. Wnh,.h..,t d,.,. mlTgt. £171' UnttTJlu.Jiung :u,.- Antllrof!oWgU rkl HQI;/unWdaJ/!'f ! .f, Munchen 1066 (4th ed.); R. n. Schmiu, Seill-Wah,.-hml-I',IoTt. Tho'll'ljll von Aquin u.nd LthTl von aeT Wah1)I�1 dl!T Dill�, Mitn8fer 1984; J. A. Acrtscn, "Wendi�g�n i? Waarhc:id: Amdmm van Ca�tcrbury, Thomas van Aq uino .. en Vico , 10: 71)(I..fr.hrift voor FtloJOfi' 49 (1981), pp. 187·229; id., "Truth as Transl:t!lldentnl in Thomas Aquinas", in: Topoi 1 1 (1992), pp. 159-71; G. Scilul:t.,
Pi:pt'r.
�
di,
Verita,s tst ada.equ.atio inltllectus tt rli. Unttr5uchungm zur Wah,.-heil.!","hT� dl'.f ThQmas von Aquin NlTd .z:ur Kritik Kant5 an �1jem ii.JJerl�Im� Wah1'hrits�grI/f, Leidcn 1993. 2 See J. T. Muckle, �ha;Jk hr�li's Definition of TruthM• In Archivu d 'Hiswi,-, /JorjrinaLfI '" l.iCl�j,.f. du Mrrym l1gr 8 (19�3), pp. 5-8. The definition
may be derived rrom Islamic Aristotelia.ns. such u Avcrroc6, to whom tIn: roltors or Bonavcnwre's works point as a possible source (Dpem omnia J, p, 707, n. 5). ce. abo Avicenna, LilN,- d, Philu.'irJphUi pTiflUl I, K (ed. Van Riel, p. !is): ·yeri�� C.,.) !ntelligitur dispositill dir:tionis vel inttlleclUs qui significal dlljOlUbOnem In .,re eueriun: clIm est ei aoqualil. � Alben Ibe l, reilt. nf. bor!:a I, q. I, a. 8 (c:d. H. Kuc:hle. p. 15); AJexander Hale., Sttm_ UunlozUu I, 1 , 3. 2, n. 88: Bona�nlure. Collationes it, HrlC
or
IV, 2
•
(0pIm OfItnUl V, p. 349).
beginning of the doeLI"ine of
be
tnu.:ed
Summa de Vorw of Philip the Qmm:dlor (st't' 1.1.). In the seco nd questio n of his work.. Philip discusses five defi"i· tions of (ruth which are also mentioned by Thomas in De 1!mtate. n amely. the definitions of Augustine, Hilary of Poitiers, Anselm. Lhe adequation formula, and, finally, the deRinition in terms of "indivision. ft Philip regards the last definition as the most appropriate . He obj�ct5 to Hi lary s definition in De frinitate V,3 ("truth is that which d�clares or manifesLS being") , because it contains a referlO lhe
mentions in De veritau 1 . 1 �vero,1 defilliLiuns of truth from the
�inl nlOlllas·
the
the tl-aliscendelll..,ls. sillC:t: lhe origill of Ute definition call
In his rcpl}' to the question concerning what truth is, Tho mas
sophy
24,\
TRUTH AS TRANSr:F.NDF.NTAI.
'
ence to a knowing �1thject. The definition "adt"qnation of thi ng and intellect" expresses, according to namely, the truth
Philip ,
a secondary type of truth,
of the sig n, because the adequation in questio n
must be umlenlloQd as thal of a mental sign and the thin g
signified. Obviou!:Ily he is seeking a purely ontological definition
of truth. Augustine' s definition "The true is that which is" (id quod est) indicates what truth is stntndum sub.stantiam, but it insufficiently expresses that by which "truth" qua concept (ratio) differs from "being . " Augustine' s definition must therefore be modified, and thi s mod ification g ive .� rise to the fifth definition mentioned by Philip: "the tOle i� the indivision of br.ing (I!.u�) and thaL which is." The last definition shows wh;a. philosophical imperatk:es IIntie rlie
(he incorpol"-lion of lnull within the dextrine of [he transcen denlals. The "magisterial" ddiuiliull for the transcendemality
arliculaks (win conditions
of the true. First,
truth
must � cUllu:ivt!u
purely ontologically; any relation to the intellecl must be elimi nated. Second, (futh must be conceived as a negation, as a kind of . "indivision . .
point of Thomas's discussion in De lJmtate 1 . 1 is in fact not differe nt from that of Philip 's discussion. The scholastic quaestio usually takes the form of a ''whether'' que stion ( "Wh ether x is the case? ") which can be either affirmed or de ni ed. The questi on raised in DIt lImta te 1 . 1 , however, is a "what" que stion ('"What is trurh? ") , hUf fhl": p rohlem that j" actu al ly discussed is the queuion whether the true is altogether identical with bei ng. The text begins ",;i{h a number of arguments clai m ing. on the basis of Augustine's definitiu n "the true is that which is." that being and The starting
th� trut= art: cumpl�ltdy identical. Thomas dt=scribes Augustine 's attempb in Soliloquia (1I.5) tu
define truth.
Onl! of the definitions he
enterlains says: "that is true which is such as it is seen by
the
X
--------_ .",
---. .
,
,
CHAPTER SIX
TRUTII
is will ing aud able to know." Aug ustine s ohj�r.t.ion . correct, something which no one to this rldinition is that, if it ....ere is capable of knowing: would not be true. The objection le::tds h im to the t.:oudusion that Hthc u-ue" must be de fin r.n as thai whit:h is."
'
"
'
0.2, "Truth is nol in things, but �n lhe mind" (Ari.stotk)
ba5ic idea runn in g through Thumas s discussion of truth like a scarlel thr(,.,'ld is thai reiatiull to the intcUcct is essential for truth. In all thrr:e writings ill which he presents a systematic aceOUfl( of truth, ht: dle5 a lexl [wm boole. V1 of AristotJe'5 Melaphysic.� (co. 4, 1027b 25) to the effect that "(ruth and falsity cio not exist, as good and evil. ill things, bUl in the mind," The pmper pla � of ITIlth is ill the illlt:llct.:t. This thesis forms a formic1ahle obstacle to <my purdy o ll tological conception of truth. Thomas accordill�I)' e mp l oys Aristotle s saying a:o; a counterargument to the vicw that truth resides solely in thing�.6 Thai he takes the statement of the Philo sopher as more than merely all argument from authority becomes apparen t wh�n we look at the context of Aristo tle s remark and Thoma:o;'s eommeutaI'y on it. In Mp.taphpics "1, L 4, Aristotle discusses one of the m�nnings of being Ihm he had distinguished in the Efth hook, n
The
'
(':
'
'
"
"
"
Thomas refers to Augustine's in Dr vmt. 1.1 obj. 1 and 2: 1.2 ob . 4; S.th. 1,16.1 o�i. 4. L. Oc:: ing-H3uhuff. F.n.1 4 tnut", collvmuntur, p. 180 negle cts the historical backgro\llld ur ·fllomn.,·s c oceplion of truth when he identifies Ihi& ('once� liull wi lh ftlilip's definilion. 1\ In I Smt.. 19.5.I; lh writ. 1.2 uti Wl'ltnJ and TrJP.; .').fh. 1,lfi.1 wi rmUr#. �
�
aH�mpl.�
o
AS TRANSCE�'JDENTAL
,
247
of subjec t and pr�di (.ate . The "veridical use of heing cone.nos t.h� composition and di....i· sion of concepts hy the int.t:ltt:d. "Being as what is true" i.:. being as a vcrhal copula a sign of the composition of subject and predicate in a sentence. This "beill�" th�refore has its origin in the intellect forming a proposition. Thus, the context of me statement dted by Thomas is �I di:>t:us:siol l in which truth is presented as connected with bt'ing. although in an entirely ditl"crem way than in the onto lUKical t:Uuception of truth. For in order to emphasize that being as what i!:i true" does nOl s ign ify something extra-mental, Aristotle then says: "Falsity and truth are not in things-it is not as if the good were true, and the bad were in itself false-but in thought."; It is striking that in his commentary on the M�laPhysics, Thomas enter!; at length into thi� dist.inction between the true and the good and gives n. philosophical just.ification for AriSlolle'� statement. This justilication, which I·ecurs in many other places in his work, is bast'c.l on the iusi�ht that a spiritual substance relates to realily in twu different ways.� A human being directs himself at thing,s by knuwing and desiring them. The o�iect of knowledge is truth. the o�i ect of desire is the good, Between the processes of knowing and des iring there is a fundamen tal di!tinction, which becomes evident in their termini. Cognition occurs when what is known is in the knower; i t is a pcocess of "assimilation" that is completed when the similit.lIrl� of I.he th ing koown is in the human ';0111. Trut.h i n clic ales Ihis completion or perfeclion o[ knowledge and is therefore in the mind . The appeti.le, oy cOlIll·asl, is not a pr?cess of assimihujoll but a rnuv�m�lIl to....�drd thiIIg�. It is ,I l l "inclination" toward a thing i n i tself, which is desirable because il is p�Jf�l· t. Good is therefore a perfection in things.9 This the truth of a propositional combin ation "
,
"
7 Aristotle '" text does not qu ite say what Thomas' s quotation states, bUl Thomas's reading i5 laken from the m edicvaJ Latin translation of the Arabic text. cr. .T. F. Wi ppel "Truth ill Thomas A4uinas", p. :m7, II. 5, 8 Ct. J)� 7!m/. :ll.�: "Cngn irio et voluntfls radicantur in substantia spiri mall su er diversas habitudlncs cius ad res." . In VI M�taPh." leet. 4. 12�4.: "Sciendum en aute , quod cum quaelibet cog nitio perticiatur per hoc quod aimilitlldo rei cognitae est in cognoscente; sieul perfectio rei cognit.:.l.t: t.:ullsisril ill hm: IpHMI hab�1. taJ�m tClrmam p�r quam ��t. r� tal i�, ita perrectio cognitlonls consistit in hoc. quod habet simllitudlnem formac pracdictac. Ex hoc autem, quod res cognita habet formam sibl debitam, dicitur eue bona; et ex hoc. quod aliquem defectum habet, dicilur eMe 1II i1la. e odem modo ex hoc quod (ogllosnn8 habet $imililudinem rei cOKnilac. didlllr habert: \·cn.m COl(nilionelll: ex hoc "cro, quou deflcil :ill tali �illlilihltli"l". didlur ral�alll cognilionl"m habeno. Sinn ergo hlmum �I malum
,
�
m
Et
"
....
.
,
'
248
,
"T"---- '" C.HAPTER
TRUTH .AS TRANSC,F.WD"F.WTAI.
SIX
c.nn(".h15ion does not exclude that u·uth aJoo bt' ... good. silll:C truth is the good specifi( to llt� iuldlecl. I n this use the intellect is regarded as a lhing lh41t. like every other thing. is called "good" t.hrough its perfection. which for the intellect exists in the Lruth of
knowledge. Hence this specific case confirms the general thesis that the good is in things and the true is in the mind.J() In Metaphysics VI, Aristotle draws a far-reaching conclusion from his discussion of "being as what is true." This kinn of being falls outside the inquiry of metaphyiUco;; it "must hI': pa!ii!'.ed over" by the M:iencr. ,.hal rleals with being-as-being. bc("..-m5e the cause of heing as�hal-is true is an operation of the intellect. Being in this sense belongs rather 10 logic or lhe ::;cieru.:e uf llll:: illldlect. Meta physics is concerned wilh n�alily outside the mimi, with the kind or being that falls under one of the categories.1 1 of The distinction that Aristotle makes here �.e��SIl.�:Q..rn.o:2£§-. " b :in 7), strongly .$. explwncd more cx(cnsivcly in Mttaphysics V
(c.
mfluenccd Thomas's thought. In manY ' places, as, for c:xamplc, at the beginning of De enJt it menliiz. he presents a twofold division of being which corresponds to Aristotle's dichotomy. .t Ihc;Jlnt mode of .... �ing (Iel us call it B I) is "outside the mind� and is .. .. . .. ....... .... .. , �.-" ...
. --......-- ...�. ��
-.
�
�----
designant perfeetiones. quae sunt in rebus: ita verurn et falsum dcsignam pcrfection es cognitionum"; 1240: MApparet etiam ex his quae hic dicuntur, quad verulll et falsulIl. ljuac:: sUlll olJiecla Lugnition is. sunt in mente. Bonum
.. m et maillm. quae �1H11 obier.ta appeti tus, SlUl1 in rebus." cr. De v....nt. 1.2:
...
�Mows au�m cognitivae \'!nutb termin atur ad anlmam ( ... ) s�d motus appetitivae terminatur ad res ( ... ) et quia bonum ( ...) dicit ordinern enlis ad appetitum, verum autem dicit ordirtem ad in lcllectum, inde cst quod Philosoplllls Ilil:il ill VI M':lal'llysit:all: 'JIIINI IK)l1II1II el malulII SUIiI ill rebus, Vf'rum
;Ullem et r"bum !Ium in menteft; S.tA. 1.16.1. For Ihe OOIllr.tll1 belWeen
Ihe aC19 of knowledge al1d appetite Ke, c.g., De "flirt. tOlII ,". a. 9: MActio intel· lectu� ( ...) est secundum quod aliqualiter assimilatur cognoscibili ( . . .) Actio autem virtutis appetitivae (on5i5til in quadam indinatione ad appe tibile �. l() In VI M�luph., lect. 4, IZ.sg: "Patel diam quud nihil pl'ohibel "erum em: 'Iuutltlam hontl!n, s..r:umhnn Ijllml illtt"llt"nu� rognosr.r:ns an·ipil.llr ul quall:dam
res. Sinu enim quaelibet alia res dldtllr bona slia perfectione, ita intellectm eo noscens, sua ..eritate." 1 Ibid., lect. 4. 1242: -Et idea (. . . ) est praetermittendum ( ... ) ens quod significat Yerum ( ... ) . lIIius �ero, �ciliu: t enOs �el'i, cau� est ( ... J operatio illldlr:l:tlls t:nmpnn r:n tis tot diviti r:n l.is. •:1 itir o IIt':rlind ad st:iclIliaJlI de inu�lIectu.w cr. In N MtUlph., leC(. 17, 736: '"Vennn amem el r�lsllm pertinent
,
proprie ad considerationem loglci: consequuntur cnlm ens in ratione de quo
considerat logkus: nam verum d faolsum sunt in mente", I ! 1h d71U. c. 1 ; S.lh. 1.5.4 ad 2; 48.� ad 2; SGG. Ill, 9; lh pet. 7.2 ad I ; lk malo 1 . 1 ad 19; QU!.ldL IX,�.2; In I 19.5.1 ad 1; If! IJ Sml., S4. 1 . 1 . Cf. T. Veres. l ·�i l e flHul:.unl"nlaJe urJtolugiM:ill! .l)idl Ut{)[]] ie illl Dellkcll des Thoma8 von Aquin", in: PhilosophisdwJ Johrbuch 77 (1970). pp. 8 1 -98.
Snit.,
��!f�c� "_. �c�use
249
it .I� .��et.h i!,g p��i.�iv�.- i.n � . �.��!I:-I�!�_� lI�e !>e.�.� t�a� is di�.irI� h.Y th� ten cal�' .g!!.�!e� �alld lh'�l .sigl! i.ft�s eilher . . a s�b �tance .or an ac.dd�nl. The sec:,:?nd llIo�e of being (B 2) is ��!ng as a verbal copula; it signifies . what exists only in the mind, namely, the truth of a propositional. compositi(m. " In his corii mentary on the Mttaph)'Sics, ihomas makes a number of observations concerning the relation between B I and n 2 that arc not to be found in the same form in Aristotle. Three of these prove to be directly rdevant for his analysis of (ruth. (i) R compares to 8 I as "an effect to its cause, for il is from a t.hing's " .j being . in reality that propositional trulh ann f",lsil.y follow, which our intellcct signifies by meam of the verbal copula 'is."'H Thoma� does not explain in what sense " cause" must be unde.-stood het·e. Of course, R I (".annot be an . "efficient cause," for a!S we saw, the rli.�l.h'("liol� bt':tween the two modes uf beiIlg : ��nsi�t�" .p�e�isely in TI1�Jact ' thai 'R" 2 is t:aused by all operation of the intellect. (ii) 'lEE.. domain of B 2 is more extensive than that of B 1. In the sense of B 2, �nylhini(:ioout- whi�h" a truc' proposition 'can be formed can be called a "being," even though it is a non-being according to B I, as is the case with negations or privations. \Ve can say, for example, that there is evil, but this does nol imply that t"vil is something positive in reality. H In most of lhe text... where Thomas presents the two modes of being, his conc.ern il; to clarify this second feature of the relat.ion between them. l� iii) B 2 is accidelltal lo B I. For the be- i' : ing of a thing, it is not esst:nlia1 lil'����"��e propo;iuu·n be affirmed '. .. of It. Kiiowledge' or scleIlce is ��llliO:llly related to a'nd ' dependent --;'-;po-;ti:etilily, bUl the reverse does nOl hold..6 ..
__
_
I
2 /4
-,
.
(fy
13
In V Mr.toplt..., leet. 9, 896: ·Scie-ndum est lIutcm quod iSle sceundus modw
eomparatu r ad primum, sieut effecws ad C3usam. Ex hoc eoim quod aliquid in rerum natura est. sequitur veritas et fabita, in propositionc, quam intcllec:tus 5ignificat per hoc verbum Est pruul c�l vt!rh;tJis (·opllia. � 1-4. Jbid" Ieet. 9, 896: ·Sed, Il lIi;t Illiquid, qllod PSI in se non em, inlellectm comirlerllt 111 qu oddam ens. sicut n egadarll::m ct hui usmodi . ideo quandoquc
dicitur esse de aliquo hoc sec un do modo. et non primo. Dicilur enim. quod caecitas ell secundo modo, ex eo quod vcra c�t propositio, qua dicitul' alil.J.uid es�e caecum; non ramen dicitur quod �il pri JIIU modo v�ra. . Nalll C':tr:dta� non habcl alil.J.uutl e!l\t' in fl'hllS, sed magis est privatio alicuius C'sse.w
I!'I See esp. S.th. 1,48.2 ad 2, where the dislinction between the two modes of being is his reply 10 an objc:ctiolt in which is argued. on the balis or the converlibility of "being and wlhins.· that evil is a bei n!l;: ·Propter huius aulem distinctioni! i!l;norantiam, ali4ui, l:oJ\sider.1nte� 'luud ;t1iflll;;u� rt"1I diclIlliur 1II:llae, vd fl lIlHl malUIJI ,Iiritllr r'UC' in rcohu.,. rredirlerunt quod malum e"�el reI (lllut"dnm.�
'"
it
16 hI V M,lal"'" lerl. IS. 1196: -Arc'ldll alllem IInlrulclue rr.1 quod il.lIlJllld de
•
______MU... "
•
..,.---_.. '"
CHAPTER SIX
In
summary, Thomas foll
e place �L�i��h
th
"
i� " n'o t, i.�- jhi·rig�_�
b\J-�_ in:- ::�e'- mind. The relation
belwt."t."u �jJlg alld truth is determined by the" distinction between two modes of being. Truth belongs (0 a seco ndary mC"Kit: of being, intra-mental being Thomas regards a.... AriMotlc:'s "definition" of .
lruth a statement in the fourth book of Ihe Mdaphyrit.s: 'To say of i:; lwt.". " 1 7
that it is nul. This "rlefinition" inili('.;ttcs a perspect ive Oll u- uth quite different from that. of Augu!! tinc , The tme is lIul ''Lhat which iS,n but is to say of that-Y.'hich-is that it is. Vie.....ed from this perspective, the conditions necessary for truth to be a transcendental property of being seem to
wh al
is
mat it is, and of what is. not
251
TRUTH AS TRANSCENDENTAL
b", .\bseIiL.
h aving the same
name and common ratio a�
it!';
effect., it follows
t.o he tnlt' is itself m ost ( tmnst:nulunt) the truth of things lhat
that whatever causes subsequent thing!';
true. "19 These causes surpa""
are Itot also surpass t he
are suhjec:1. fO gf':neral.ion and corl'llplioll. beCOtU.se they
true and somelimes tlot true. " They OOdies in truth and ill beillg. Uet.:au!St: the!St: causes
"somt':6mes c.r.le"tiaJ r '1l1se ...
but
have no
the cause of the being of olher th ings.l!n Since first
are
philosophy deal!> wilh the first causes of things, me tap hysics is by
the same token pa'l' excelltnt:e th e science of truth. )'rom this
reasoning Aristotle infers a final c oro llar),: Since those thi ngS"'l which are the cause of being of other things are true in the high est degree , it follows "that each thing is related to truth in the same way as it is to being �r, all Thomas put.. it, "that. there is th('; same "
6.3. -/'here is the same disposition in being and in truth "
\ This approach do es not give "\
J:I13S'S conception of truth.
Yn·"every" oelng.
Wll:it " i�
3
.,
' .'."
.'H " " H••_..,
complete pictme, however, of Tho
jHe"'al."o'acknrrwledges tIiarHle're·i�i1inll
�urpri�ing i s that for this idea Thomas· ". to Ar is tot le s MelaPh)'�ics. AI:; a cuuntuargument
again appei'lls again,lit object ions
t.hing" in b(';ing and in truth." Th ings which have a cause of their bein g also have a cause of their lrulh.2 l This argumenl must ha\'e had a strong app eal to Th omas for he makel:; me uf it iu his proofs for the exi ste nce of God and in his doctrine uf cr(;';{uon (see 9.S.). Mrlaphy;;ics II is also fundamental
d isposition of
'
,
fur hil:; view th at there is an intrinsic connection bcv.o.'een being and truth.
In
his reply to one of the o �jcctions in
De verilale 1 . 1 , hc
gges tiug that being and lrue cannot be can· vertible because u'uth is ouly in the illtellect. he cites a statement in book II of the Metaphysics (c. I. !J93b 30-3 1 ) : "There is the same disposition of things in being and in (ruth. "1M Here again it is instructive to examine the context of this state ment. Ln the fi rst. chapter of Mdaphysirs n, Ar istotlt: argiles thaI "ph i losoph)' is rightly callerl th e science of tru th . He wants to al l the philosophical dis(: ipl i n es. uU:Ulphysics make c:1t:ar I.hat.
gives an explanation of Aristo tlc s statement. The thesis that there
common both to lh� cause and its effect is the maximal instance
,it vcrissim urn �
su
"
of
pre-r.minen tly co nsi ders truth. Aristo lle's aI'gurm:nl starts from a general proposition: the cause of an attribute or property that is
(maximum) of that attribute. Fire, for example, is the hottest of things
because il is
the cause of
heat
in all other th i ngs , Th i s general
proposilion is then applied to truth.
The term "truth" is !>aiel
universally of all things, 'Therefore, since the cause of truth i� one
ipsa \'cre l'lffirmetur intellectu \'c! voce . Nam res non rcrc rtur ad sdentlam. sed c converso.· 1 7 In IV Mt/apA., keto 16, 721. cr. lect. 8. 65 1 . 18
S.jA, 1,16.3: ·Scd CQntra Cit quod dic.il PhilusophlLS (...) 'Iuml r.a.1P.1l1 f!SI
dispusilio rerllm ill
r.!iIoC el
verimJ.e."
'
is the same Mdisposition" in being and in
order (ordo)
truth means that
the
in both is identical. The reason is that "a thing is apl to
(adat1uttri) 1.0 f.he inlrllu.I. in the clegr�r: 1.0 whkh a th i ng has ent.i ty (etltftn,I ). C.onsequently, the nolion of tnJ,h follows upon t.hat of be i n g. ":!:2 Truth now appears no' as an br: conformed
In 1/ l"hlap�., h:Cl. 2, 294; Nom en autem veritatis non e5t proprium alicui sp eciei. scd se habet COllllHullit.r:r ad umnia en lia. Lmil:, Ijuia Hlml qnod t',�t r:a\l�a vr'ri1aJi�. I'M crHl�a communicans Cllm efTectu in nomine el ratione communi , sequimr quod ilIud. quod cst postcrioribu!I causa ut sint '>Ieta, 19
"
2() Ibid., leCt. 2, 295, � I Ibid., Icct, 2, 298: -Ex his aUlcm infert q uoddam corollarium. Cum enim il.a sil, l{uud ea, quar. �\lIIt. alii� r.all�a p's.";l"nrii, sint maxime vp.ra, �e'1l1i l\lr
quod unumquodque .sIeUt Sf' habet ad hoc quod sit, im ctiam sc habet ad hoc quod h abcnt vcrilatcm. Ea enlro. quorum esse n on semper eodem m odo se habet, nee \'eritas corum sem per manet. Et ea quorum e5�e habet causam. e liam \'eritatis CauS31l1 habeJlt.� :n n,. Ilmi. t . l ad �: �o ispo.si ti o non acci pi l u r ibi secundum quod est in gr-nC':rc qllalitads sed secundu m quod importat quendam ordincm: cum cllim ilia quae 'lin! causa aJiorum eS!en di sint ma.Jl;imc entia et illa quae sunl causa veritillti. sinf mill�ime vera, condlldit Philo�ophll5 quod idem est ordo alicl1i
rei ill enc et veritatc, ita .cilicet quod ubi im'enitur quod csi muime ena. cal mrulimc vcnlm. UIUlto net" 'hoc Ideo ell fJlli.:l p.ns p.1 _rllm ralione IlInl idem
"
TRUTH AS TRANSC�NDENTAL
CHAPTER SIX
inlramental mode of being hut. as having
,
253
clear that for 'Thomas thr-:rt' is no opposition , but an the c,onlnuy a
ontological dimen
causal relation between the truth of thc thing and the truth of the
Sion,
intellect. The dispmition of a thing is "the foundation aud causc"
Thc two approaches taken by Thomas rcsult in two basic
oCthe truth of the intellec.:1.2!\
conclusions about truth. The first approach based on Arilitotle's
In order to determjne the relation ht'.tween the two [J'uths. it is first necef>.'iary to ;tu:,wer a question .....hich is Hut expliCitly dealt
claim that truth is nol ill things bUl in the mind, relillhs in (he conclusion that "beillg-as-truc" falls outside metaphysics. The
with by Aristotle. His statements attribute different places [0 truth
second approach follows Aristotle's statement that. there is lht: same
but do nol say what truth is. This very question is tak�n up by
disposition in being and in truth and results in a cOIl(:eption of
Thomas in De vmtatt.
truth as being. Thomas himself speak... of a "twofold" truth, that of the intellect and that of the thing.23
The crucial question is, of course, whelhel' the two conceptions
of tnJth are compatible. Ari.'1totle does
6.4. Thomas's "ratio " oj trulh: "Adequation oj thing and inl�lkd"
not pose this question in his
Metaphysic.s. Modern .c;cholars have attempted
[0
resolve the dis
crepancy between books II and VI by positing a development in
In De veri!ate
Aristotle 's thought. On this view, the sccond book belongs t.o ;tn
definition which Philip the Chancellor had regarded
early, platonizing phase. Such a solution is foreign to Thomas
actually expresses the
bt:cause in his view the books of Aristotle's
Ml!laphyjics
ratio
w>
secondary'
of truth most completely: tnJth is "the
adequation of thing and imdlec.t.. o.:t1 This
form a
formula
is often con
unity.l!1 Thomas's procedure in dealing with t.he ontologie;tl c.:OIl
�idered to be the medieval defini tion of truth , From a historiGll
ception of truth suggests that he does not see t.he two conceplions as
perspective, that is incorrect, for it is only with Thomas that i( becOllles the primary ddinition.�!1
incompatible. He does not appeal to Augu.stine's definition of truth,
When we compare hi� three main accounts of truth with each
as one might expect, but appeals to Aristotle. A conscious stratcgy
that t.he
In his commentary on the Metaph)1Sics, Thomas does not explore
"anr.qllatiou" a(:quires growing significance for Thomas. In the heginning of his career, in his commentary on the Sentence\' (1,19.[;.1), he pre sentS th� definit.ion of Altselm of Canterbury ("Truth is rightncss
at any length the relation between these two conceptions. Tn his
perceptible only (0 lhe mind") as the most c:ompreheusive (comprt
other, it appears
cuuld underlie this choice. Prr.dsely by appt:aling to the same
philosopher, who claims 'hill the plan' of truth is (he intellect, Thomas suggesl.. that the two conceptions of truth belong together.
exposition of the second book, however, he does refer to the conception of Lrulh in the sLxth book. The fact that a thing is relaled
to bt:ing in the same way as to truth is "because the being of the thing is the uuse of the true idea that [he mind forms of the thing.
i
I I I
in the sixth book. "25 This obseIV3tion is not elabordted, yet it makcs
sed quia secundum hoc quod aliquid habet de entit:.t� �omrlllm hoc cst natum adacquari Intellcctui. et sic ratio \'cri ac:quitur ral.ioncm enti�." Cf. SeC, 1.62. 1(1411. c. 18, Iect.. G, 2365. cr. .... th. 1,16,� ad I : "vcrum est in rebus c:t in intdl«tu," !4 Thi� Yi�w .���ms to have regained support among modern studcnts (If Aristotlc. Sec J. Owens, "The Prescnt Status of Alpha ElaHun in [he Ariltotelian Metaphysics-, in: Archil) for G&schldi.te rJn Philosophie ij(j (1984), pp,
U S"?,,
148-69. t!l
1ft II M.taph., lect. 2, 298: "i:t hne ideo, quia cue rei Cit caula verae e)tutimationu quam men. h"bet de re. Verum enlnl et fal.utll lion elt in
defillition in terms of
hendms Otnn�5 vmtaJts o.cceptione.s) . In hi,.; last accounl, in the Summa ' lmologUu (1,16,1), the "'adequation" formula u\hs this place. In the
chronologically intermediate account De veritale
1.1,
Thom3s
arf3nges the various: definitions of trUlh from the (radition on the basis of the thrce clement1i contained ill the conformity formula:
For truth and falsity are not in things, hut i n the mind. as it is said
•
Thomas comes to th� conclusion that the
1.1,
--
the thing, the intellect, and the relatiun betv.'ccn these t\\'O.
rebus, 2e
std in me::n te::. lit dice::tl.lr ill s,."fO huh.l,. M
cr. In IX.
17 D, wril.
MdapA.,
II!4:L I I, 1898: "fttnd3me::ntum c:t cau:.:.a ,.r.ril:uis�.
1 . 1 : -,1(1aeqUl\lio intellcclus e::l �i dicill.ll'. t't i n hoc formalitCf
ratio veri perlicitur," 11:11 }o'or [rllth as �adequation" see:: ]. A. AeTUrn, Mt!diroal Rrj/fftions on Trulh: rei tt inttlt,,'uJ, inaug. address Free University, Amsterdam 19R4� and C. Pohner. ·Verll.•" eal adaequatlo inleIJcctu5 �t rci. Del' r;t'�prii.chs �Ittal del Thoma. von Aquln 111m Prohlem der UI:lCrein"imnnlnR". In:
AIlatqu41io
lAucArift jilt' PAiWopItudu FarJdtu'4g �7
(19AS), pp. !'i6�76,
, ,
..
--- '"
-- . " " , " " " ---_ .. .
254
, , , ,
CHAPTER srx
Truth or the true, he
255
TRUTH AS TRANSCENDENTAL
states, "c.."\11 be defined in three ways." The
truth. 'There is the same disposition in being an d in tru th, "
first way p e rtains to Ihat which precedes the essence of truth and
because it is on the basis of i.ts being that a thing il'i apt. t.o h�
thing . lu this gro up Thomas places the definitions of August.ine
is conformed or conformahlt: 10 thl" intdle(-.L "�I
upon which truth is founded
(fundatur>.
namely. the "en tity" of a
and Philip the Chancellor, who define truth in pllrdy o ncologi cal
conformed to the intellect. Every being is callen t.TU�, "insofar as it. The
adae'1uatin
formula not only expresses the relati on al
relation between
ddi.nerl acc:onii ng '-0 Chat in which the notion of truth. is formally co mpl rl ed (perficilur) . The definition of truth as adequation falls under Ihis ht:atJi.Jlg. Fiu ally. in a third way, truth can be definerl accordi ng to the eff!:ct thu.l follows upon it (secundum I'ffer.tu". const:qumlcm), namdy. knowl edge. It is in this !;ense that Hilary of Poitit'I":; says: "Truth is that
charact.er of t.ruth, hut also spttifies the
can re construct why Thomas pre ferred the rtdequat..iull formula to the other dcllnitions of truth. The rea�on must be that this defini tio n expresses most fulty the
truth, knowledge is the "efIect" of truth, The
t�nll:;. In the second way, truth is
which dec1arf'!s or manifests beiug." From this arrangeruenl uue
I'elational character of tru th.
Ir�':l�.� not, as Philip the Chan
held, a negation , but is rather a
( as
relation
between
two
c:el lnr
tr:rmlii, the
Tl!.S
TIal, f-the-an'�ii;,;tl���·RO·th-are essen gene ral name tor reality) an�
g - �� -;U
y
a ." s, "ror "the' ou h 'in " dlfferent · w altK r � io'jje'WYitate t.l ais ; t�'�-;':';� h
reJati"ori"of
q
:
aJae ;7alio -·wni'c. h
��'�j�it"fu. The n'oti"tYr'i of lrulll
as "conformity" therr.forl" enables him to illkgratt!' lhe
two
rlt:.-.c:ribed in Ihe pn:ocedillK st'(;liuJl as resulting in the trurh of the intellect and that of the thing, The rel.ltiou of intellect to thing is a relation completed by an approaches to truth
open.liun of the intellect, for knO'A'ledge is a process of assimila
tion.!!· Here is where the basic idea of Thomas ' s first approtlch
In
truth belongs. Because the end-term of tbe proces.c; of knowing, i.e.,
thing and
intellect. This relation must be "adequate;" "adequalionlt for Tho· . .. . lllitS IS a (.· UlIlIlU:lISUraUOIl. "�2 · Tht:' concept "truth" presupposes a lIlt!'aSUI'e
(menSItTa)
for the relatiun between thing and illtellect..\�
This normative mom ent, indispensable in every theory of truth,
becomes apparent in Thomas's arrangement of the definitions of tru th in De veritale. The entity of a thing is the "'foundation" of res,
then. is that
which measures.
The thing is the "cause " of the truth that is in the intellect.3• It is
this (".ausal reiati nn , alii Wf: ,�aw at. the enn. of the preceding .section,
that Thomas uses in his commentary on the Metaphysicl to
establ ish a (.o nneetion between Aristotle's approaches to truth in
book. II and in book VI. The
fact that he tak.es the relation between the truth of the thing and the truth of lhe intellect tu he a GlUSal relatio n suggests that he conceives the relation between the two
truths in the same way as that between the [Wo modes of being we
met earlier, extra-mental being (8 1) and being as true (IS 2). The
first characteristic of the relation between B l and B 2 is that they relate to each other as caulic and effecL�!i From tbe above discussion
of truth it has hecome dear that "cause" must be understood here in the !;(':nse of "mea.t;;u rr:" :mn
"foundal.ion . " I t hean; the features of
is in the intellect and is realized lw the in tellect, the inlellect pertains to the essence of trutb. To Thomas it is self-evident thO:lt "all who define truth in the right wa.y pl ace the inlellect ill its
an "exempJrtry cause,"
The relation of thing t.o i n telle ct consists in llIt' knuwability of the thing. Thi� know
3 1 De vent. 2 1 . 1 : "lIIwmquodque ens in tarltUffi dicitaT verum in quantum eM nmfOTllIatlllTl vd C:{llIfclrluahil� illtdlr.l:I\lj". 32 Ibid. 1.5: "Verltas adaequlI.llonem quandam et commemuratinn,.m
truth .
•
•
defi nilion. "�(l
Here Thomas can revert to the basic idea of the second approach to
The central place t.hat Thomas gives to tb e
adneq1J.fJ.tin formula in
his arrangement of the definilions of truth implies
criticism of
�
im orlal".
� Ibid. 1.2; In I l'mh., teet. 2, 29; In I Sent, 19.5.2 ad 2: "cum veritas !It
quaedam rectitudo �t comm�nsuratio, oportet quod in ratione veritatis intella·
�!I In I Sml., 19.5.1: �In ipsa operatiune inldl��ILls
( ... J I:muplf'tllr rf'lariu
ad;r,eqllationis, in q ua cOIl�islil ralin vt'fit...ti.'!...� �u De 11m/. '1. 1 . 1 : �r.t ide!) nmn�.� feCie difrmienlt's vern m pOrl1ln1 in eil!' dimni�ione in�eIlUUlm.� Cf. In I Pm",. leet. 5: �lIl1dr.. de quocunquc dical1lr !lerum. uponcl quod iit per rl"�pc:clum ad inlclkchuu,�
gitLlr men�lLra".
3� cr. [n I Perih., leeL 7: �SicUl in subieeto est lIerum 11('1 f:l.l�Llm in !!It:nLc. 1Il dicitur in VI Mcthaphislcc, in rc amcm �icul in cauQM• �!\ Sec Tbcmas'l own (onnuJation in In V MtfapA,. leu. 'J. 595: ·Uode �ribu propotltionil palest did veriw rei per Qusam. Nam ex co quod ret en Yel non Cit. or.1Io "era vel falu elL"
---
'"
,
---------,
...".. " ..,," '"
256
,
thf': definiciom uf Augustine ann Philip the Chancellor, Their
rlefinilions are too limited and are imperfed because they concern
only the foundation of truth. Thomas critidzcs in Augmtine's definition ("that which is") that i t does not
concept of umh, whic.h
express the complet�
ists in the conformity of thing :md
cons
something that follows upon every being. and �ue
h
..:al :d
commuma
or transcendentia. Thomal\ distinguishes two groups of
transcendentah. The
general mode of being nprcsscd by the first group pertains to
every being ill ilsdf
(in
)
se .
To this group
belong "thillg" (us) ,
intellect. He also proposes au alternative interpretation that unrlt:'r
which expn"sses the quiddity of that which is, and "one." It is
stands Augustinr:'s definitiun in an Aristotelian semt'. WheJl truth
siguifiutllt
is defined as "that which is," this "is" must be taken as siguifying
terms of the truth relation, res, as a transcendental. The gf" neral
lhat in De fJeritate
1 . 1 Thomas introduces one of the
the affirmatio n of a pwposition; its meaning then is thai there is
mode of being expressed by the second group pertains to ev(';ry
truth when that-which-is is said to be. August.i ne's definition is
being in relation to something else: (in ordint! ad aliud) . In contrast to
lransformt'd into llit! sense of intra·mental �ing (8 2), which the
Ph ilosopher c;;tlled "that which is tl"Ue."!J6
e
GiYen tlus uilicism, the qu stion arises how Thomas can still
give tru th
a
place in the doctrine of the
traltScendentals. for his
conception of truth involves a ti enial of Lhc view that Philip the Chancellor had regarded as
;\
condi tion for the cranscendentality
of the true, namdy, that tru th must be defined without any rr:ll'ltion to me intellect. It has been aq�-ued that by delining truth in relntiol l
to
the intellect, Aquinas leaves the level of metaphysics for thm of
the psychology of human knowledge.'7 From tht": analysis of the
Philip the <..:hanceUor·s view, a tramcendt':nral determination is not solely a negation, as in th('; case of "one," but caJi also
be- sumc
thing pmitive, namt':ly, a relation.38 The inlrodU(.:lioll of relational tranM":(':ndentals is not something uHique to Thomas. for it is alrr';\dy fou nd in
Alexander of Hales aud Albert the Creat.
Within the group of "relational" tramcendcntals, Thomas dis tillguishes
two types which cxpress
the two ways in which one
lx.-ing is related to another. that is, according to their division or at.:..:ording to their "conformity" (convenientia) . The condition for
the lauer relation is "something" whose nature it is to accord with
way in which Thomas conceives truth, we mu st thus turn to his
every being. The human soul, Thomas arguel\, ill �uch an e:n tit)',
concepti on of truth as transcendental.
tor, according to Aristotle in De anima, it "ill in a sense all things." In the soul
6.S.
ThomaJ's innovations
in tlu dvctrinr of the transcmdmtal.s
Thomas's investigation in Dt, veriJaie
1.1 into what truth is leads up
to the doctrine of the lrau:;(;t'lldcntals. As we saw in chapter II, he
reduces the qu,"st_ion "What is truth?" to that of the conilitiOIl of aU
rational knowledge. His method is the "reduc tion" 01- "resolution" of the contents of our knowledge to a first
n cep t,
co
�lx:-illg:' All
add something to bei ng in the s.eIlSt! lhat they express a mode ( modus) of it which i.� not. yet made explicit by the term "being" itself. Some terms express a ge-llcral mode of being, other conc.epts,
!lit lh writ. 1.1
ad I: "Vel dh:.emlum qllod cum dicitur \'crum �t Kl quod est.
Ii en nOr) accipitur ibi �t:cumillm quod �ignificat aCtllm usendi sed SeculIUulIl quod e�t flul.a illld!P"4':tlls componcntis, prout scilicet affinnatiullt:!11 propositio ni� 8i!/:lIilic3r. III ,�h sensus: V
�7
J.
Van de Wiele, -Lt IrR,blerne de la veritf ontologiqllC·,
p. 549.
there is both a cognitjv," power and an app
eti tive
powel".
The conformity of being to appetite is expressed by the term "gonil," i ts conformity to inlellel: l by the term "true. "!I9
Thomas's important iUl Iovation in the doctrine of the transcen dentals is tht! correlation he introduces between anima and being. He understands the transcendentals "true'" and "good" in relation to the faculties of a spiritual substance, man. Ilis doctrine, we m ight say, manilests an "amhropocentrism." This term, howr:ver,
has acquired a specific meaning after J. B. Metz 's rlt:ft;nce of the
thesis that with Thomas a new form of thought appe�rs which ,
in
contrast to the Greek form of thought, is anthrop"cenLric mlht"r than cosmon>:ntTic.. Thomas grasped-aJl(I MelZ finds evidence for this in
•
257
TRIJTH AS TRANSCENDENT....L
CHAPTER SIX
nil Ifflritate 1 . 1-that hU1I1
Ulkes precedence
:\II Cf. De veri!. 21.1: Mycrum c t bonum pO!>ilivt: JicullturM. :1\1 Ibid. 1 . 1 : "Hoc aUll:m est. anima, clun� "quodam modo est dicitur ill 111 Ue Anirn;l: in anima amem est vis cognith'a ct
O\ICT
that
omnia', ut appetitiva;
nlllv,.ni,.ntiam t'rgo ends ad apptetitum e)!.primit hoc nomen bonum. ( ... ) ronW!nicminnl
ynu
rr\li.� ad intr:]tc:etllm (,lIprimit hor_ nomen verI/ill. n
_______M".""
•
,
.
"
258
'
"'""
-----
TRUTII AS TRANSCENDENTAL
CHAPTER SIX
which is objeclj, ely prel'ie nt al'i ..
tht: model for the
understandiu g of
heing :'11 On ar.f':Ollnl of his anthropocenlTism, Tho mas may k
callttl "the r:\ther of modem thought." "Thfc' 'Cupt."ruicall Revolu tion in Ihoughl had already sel in before Kant ( '
plete;-d it".. 1 Il
::seem:;,
.
)
..
logically com�
however. that Mcu's conclusion is precipitous.
will become dear from what follows (sec esp. fi.7. and 6.S.) . The question is whether �anthropoccntrism" when used to describe
as
Thomas's thought has the same mean ing as it does in modern
thought generally. The touchstone for this question is the question
of truth, for the answer to it concerns the way in whir.h man i.�
related to reality. Thr.m:'l.s hase!>
the
speciotl place man has. ,HlJOIIK olht::)" 'Ut!illgs iu
th� world on Aristotle's statement in the third bouk of Dt: anima
(t:. 8,
431b 2 1 ) : "the .soul is in a seme all thiuKs. " III this t�xt Aristotle concludes his investigation intu lhe soul, and his aim is making dear ill wh�lt st!W:ie the soul is all things The pre So cratics held .
-
that the �oul actually is all things, since like is known o nly by
like. We know earth through earth fire thro ugh fire. To AriSlotJc, howevt::r, the soul is all slJtcies of things, in the sense that it can ,
a53imilate a ll forms, the intellig ib le fo rms th ro ugh the intellect
and the sensible form s through the
se
n ses. A human bei ng,
Thomas concludes in hilt commenlan>, i." "in a sense tatu", �'u. H4l! ,
A.-istotle'f> stalt:mt:nt play"," an important role in Thomas's wdl
i ogs. He uses it with respec t lu three themes which form Ihe
of his Imiu of t.haugllt ill DI! verilllk 1.1. The fu'sl lhC!l1le is the perfeclioll uf intellectual substances . Knowing beings are distinguished from non knowing beings in that the laller havc
background
-
only their own form. whereas knowing beings are bv nature able to assimilate also the forms of other things. Their nature has "a greater amp litude and extension .".f� I t is the privilege of a knowing ,
.co J.
K.
Mt'l:l:, (.'hf'I.ltb(.hr Anr.hf'0ptlUnlrik. UtbN' dit Dtnkform des Thoma$
Vtlll
A.quin, Munich 1962. p. 50; 52, 11 . 17. 41 J. B. Mea. op. cit.. p. 112. 42 In 1fT D, an., lect. 1:3, 790. Cf. S.th. 1,84.2 ad 2: "Aristoteles non posuit animam esse actu cOlllpusiLalli ex tJlIlllilms, skul. allti[(lli Nafllralt'�; �ed d.ixi1. qum!lJrnmr'/d1l lutlllttJlIJ �U' OlNnJn:, i nqllan tll m est in p ote l1lia ad omnill: per sensum quldem ad sensibilia, per in tcllcctum vcro ad intelligibil!a." u S.lh. J,I4..1: cognosccnri a a non wgnO$centibus in hoc distingullnlur. quia non cognoscentia nihil hahf:nt nisi fonnam suam LU'lIum: !ed cogno- scc", natum e5t habere formam ctiam rei aitc riu8. nam SpeCKS coKnili cit in cognOlCcnle. Uncle manircllum cst quod nalur.. rei nUll cugllU!lunt.is est llIa RI, ("uOIrC:lala r.t lim it;J.la: nalUm auttm rerum C{1gJl08Ccnlitlm tutbcl mai()rcrn ·
259
being that it is "in a sense aU things." Insofar as som eth ing is known, it is in the knower. 1n this way it is possi ble that the
perfection of the entire universe exists in one thing.i4 Through this perfection . the human soul acquires a likent:ss (0 God.oar. From this it is apparent Ihal Thoma!> dot·}; not, f".ont:rar}, to wh;u a
moctern intr.rpreter has �ugg��t.C":ct, I�av� th('; levr.l or mdaphysks
through
his
"anlhropoc.entrism.� For the human intell-==ct can be
viewed jn two w.trs. 011 Ihl! Ollt! hand the intellect is a del�r lIl i uate thiug aud a PCll' Iit:ulal' faculLy. But olle can alsu vit!W the intelle<:t-and this is Thomas's poinl of view-as a faculty with a universal scope, Has apprehe n sive of universal being."41) Man ' s horizon is u nlimited . An inte llectual substance has "more affini .
ty" to the whole of things than does any other substance. Through its intellect it is able to co mprehend the entire being
comprehl!nsiva}.47
(totius mtis
This transcendental openness of the mind if> the
c.onditinn for t.hr. rn�..jhility of mdaphysic"," as the sdenr:� of bt:ing
a....being
(d. 3.4.).
The second
theme in which
the idea that the soul is "in a � nse
all things" plays a role is the question of the distinction bet...e .' en the
:s
piritual fat:ultics of in tellect
and
will. A spiritual su�laUl':t::
possesses a kind of in finite ne!Js ; its object is being in gener,lI
(wJiversalittr crmnt nu) ."� liut in what way is it then still possible to differentiate among the spiritual faculties? In view of the univer sality of their objects, the distinction between intellect and will
cannot concern differe nt
things. The differentiation of the
faculties
derives from the different ways in which the same objecl is related
to the
soul. Thil> relation is Morold In one wa}', a th in g can be in .
ampiitudincffi ct c:x lensiolle m. Propter quod dicit Philosophu$ ( ...) quod
IlSI.t.UfJr!.ammndll mnnin.·
(lnima
4 Dr.
lIm'. 2.2. Cf. SeC. 1,44: "Inter perfectioncs au(em rerum potis..,imn e.�t quod aiiquid sit Inlcl!ccti...um: nam per hoc ipsum cst quodammodo omnia,
habens in ,c omnium perfcctionem . � 45 S.tfl. 1,80.1: "In habentibus autem cop;nitioncm, SIC determil1atur unum qUlldqllt' ad prnp ril lm ���t' nallJral!! p"r f"onnam nat.llralt'nl, quod lalllt'll t'.�1 recep livu m speclerum ...Uarum rerum: sicut senslIs recipil spedes omnium sensibilium, el Intellectu, omnium Intclliglbilium, ut sic anima hom in i, !lit omnia quodammodo !ecundum sensum et intellectum: in quo quodammodo co nitioncm habctltia ad Dei similitudinem appropinquant".
�
ij S.lh. I,X�.4 ad I .
&C. 1 11 , 1 1 2: "Nilturne amem inttllectualcs maiorcm habt<.nl affinitntcm ad totum q uam a.1la.e naturae: fla.m unaquarque in tdlN lualis subslamia cSt: quoda m modo omnia, i nqllan lum torius cntis comprchcnJi"a en suo
47
intellect,,·; 411
S,M.
1.76.1.
260
the soul not according to iL'i own Illode of being, but in a spiritual
manner, according to it.o;
spuies
expre!l�S Ihe formal characterisuc
or similifude. This relation
(ratio)
of knowability a.nd thus
indicates Lhe way in which being is the object of the intellect. lu another way. something is the object of the soul insofar ali the soul Il\ indiued to it in itself. This relation t'xprcsses the formal
c.har;,u': leristic of appt':lihility and indicates the way in which being is the o�icct of (he will.t9 From the second theme a third follows directly: thai of the transccndentality of the true and the good. The ration,,} soul is "in it
sense all things." The faculties of the soul are differentiated into
intellect and will according to the
'Taliones of the
universal object.
The ohjerJ_ of the intellect i!'l "the true,'" tor the true expresses the relation of being to knowledge; the o�iccl of the will is "the gooci," for it expa:sses the relation of being to appr.tite. The triad "being lrue--good" corresponrls, al> formal objects, with the triad ".<;001· int.ellect-will." The "true" and the "good" are convertible with "being," but differ fmm it conceptually.
scendentals in Philip the Chancellor, the correlation of 5pirit and
De veritale 1 . 1 .
contrast, the outological basis for t.hir:; rehHionality is man's tr<'tn scend�ntal op�nncss, as expressed by lh� Aristotelian lhesi!'l "the
soul is in a St!lIse all things." On Albert the Creat's theory, "trne"
and "good" add relations to "heing:" ut!ing is called "'true" in virtue of a rdottion to an id(!a. anrl it is called �good" in virtue of � relation to lhe end.!'" All reference to the human soul is absent.
The correlation of spirit and being is Thomas','; innovation. It
resullS from his conC".eption or £rulh as "ad(!qual.ion of lhing and intel1ect,� for this conc.eption tompcllcd a new consideration of the transeend(!ntal status of the (rue. I t is not.eworthy that for his predecessors the rel:ugnition of the relational character of the true has no
COli sequence
To what extent
is it an original contribution madt': by Thomas? Let u.� compare his "kws with those of Alexander of Hale.s and Albert the Creat. I n Alexander's account of the firM determinations of being, the
for their definitions of truth. According to
Alexander of Hales, onto logical truth is defined by two definitions that he sees as identical, AlIgus!.!qc's definition "I.hat which is"
and lhe definition in terms or--iu'ilivislo�. Albert the Gr�:lt regomJs Augustine's definition as �onvcrtible with being.!! 1
De umtate 1.1
III compari.son wit.h the beginning of the docu-ine of the tl-an
being is an important new clement in
261
TR.UTH A� TRANSCENDENTAL
CHAPTER SIX
Ihe
definition of the true that is
is Thomas's most complete exposition of tht! rran
scendcnr.als, Their l'iystematic..: arranRcment is marked by a careful
symmetrical cooi'Jtruclion, The tlnit transcendental is "being." The inner morles of being arc
made explicit by "thing," which
expresses its quiddity or essence, and "one," which signifies its
innivision. Th� relational transcenrlental$ c..:orrespond to the triad
"being-thillg-one;" but in reverse ord�L "Something" is the colln
relation of being to the human soul is o n e of his ordering
t.erpal l of "one," as Thomas himself states: ·just as being LI'i called
intt':rpreLation. First, relatioIlality is one of the WAyS in which the
insofar as it is divided from olhers."
principles (1.2.), but there are dear differences from Thomas's t.ransceudentals can he cousidercd and is therefore not distinrtive
for the true and the good, but holds atc;o for t.he one. Second, within the Franciscan milieu, thc basis of the anthropocent.rism is trinitarian. Man i!'l the image of God beC;,luse 01" th(! Augustinian
II'iad of the faculties memoria.inteUigerllia-voluntas. For Thomas, by
49 D� umt.
22.10: "Rt:1I :HII.t:m ad animam illl."enimr dllplic�m lJabimdinem hilberc : unOlm SeCIJUdllm quod ipsa H�S .:SI. in anima per modulll animae ct non per mooulll �tli, aliam secundum 'Iliad anima comparalul" act rem in suo eMe cxislc:urr_m. Ll sic ornectllill :Jnimac CSI aliquid dlll-l1idlcr: IIflO modo in QU
'one' insofar as it is undivi ded in ilself, so it is called 'something'
corresponrls with
.... l'rue"
''lhing,'' because the confonuily of being with the illt�lIect is
adequation in which heing is aS$imilated according 10 its "realily," that is, its quiddity or spedt:s. Finally, "good" C". orrespollcis with
"being," becaust: the conformity of being with '-he appelite is the ordering of the appt:lite to something in its own bein!2:. The
unfolding of the tr.anscendentals transpires in a drcular pattern. In the set:ulld chapter (2.6.) we found lhal in
De
verilale 'l l . 1 the
transcendentals "truc" and "good" are derived in a different way than ill �
De veritate 1.1,
Albert Iii.. (:r('al .
Sec secl. I.:i.
In thr. formc:'l· text they are considererl not
.'iupn Df JitJill. nomm. c. 4 {r.d.
� I A!¥.Jo:ander of Hales, Summa tlw!log1r.t1. T, Tract. Of Mn/J I, ii, n. �2 (ed. H. Kuehle. I).. 17).
3,
P. Simon, pp. 115-16).
n. 89: A1bert Ihe Great.
-------_ --..-'.."
,,
262
(:H."t.PTER SIX
'I'Kl.'TH AS TRANSCENDENTAL
from the thesis aflinla e,J[ quodammodo omnia, but from the twO ways
tl-allsc�ndenlality of the true, the point that needs further darifi· cation is therefore that of its convr:rtibility with "beillg." In the Summa thtologiat I,16.3 ( Utrum IN!7'Um d ens c011vertantur?) Thomas e:xplains thi� ...onvertibilily. His acgument draws a parallel to the com'ertihility between "being" and MgoO!> (iii) Insofar as a thing is in act, it is called h�ing kM), fo.· the name "being" is taken trom the act of heing. Ry this act it is distinguished from non-being.
in whic h a being GlIi be perfective of another. The tirst mode of perfecting is a«.:t:ording to it being's species and is expressed by -true," ror it is in mis way that the intellect is perfec�d . The second mode of perfecting is according to its esse and is expre"'-'W':tI by "good. to The ditlerences betv,:een the two texts do not justify the conci usion , however, thac Thomas's thought about the fnn$Cen dentals shows a de\'e1opmenl from an anthropocentric deduction to a more ontological ont:o The differenr.t:p;, bt:tw�en D� veritate 1.1 and 21.1 are primarily determ ined by the fact that their subjects are dilfentlll: the firsl It:'xt deals with the true, the last wilh the good. Both are relational transcendentals, but there aloe two dissimilarities between the U"uc and the good which make the perspective of the true the reverse of the perspct:tive of the good. The true is the end-term of a movement of things toward the soul; kn owledge is a process of assimilation. The good is the end-term of a movement of the soul toward things; appetite is an inclination. A second dissimilarity is th at while everything desires the good, one cannot say that "everything k.nows the true."�'� Truth i.� a perfectjon that can only be found in a spiritual substance. For these reasons it is natural that ill De vmtale 1 .1 the distinction b�lween Ihe Ime
"
"
5"
0.6. The' cmvmibility of bring and the true
Thomas relates the tran.c;cendental!'i "tTue" and goon" to lhe formal ohject... of th� faculties of intellect and will. fiy mean s of these two faculties a sp iritual substance relates to rea li ty in two differC!nt ways. Tn 6.2. we saw that on the basis ·of these different. relationships Thomas gives a philosophical justification for Aris tOlle's statement in A1elllphy.'iics VI: '"Truth and falsit), do not exist, as good and evil, in lhings, bUl in the milld. ,\Vilh respect to lhe "
'"
��
'" ,IIrif-. 22.1 ;:\d I and 2.
263
S.th. 1,1£.11: "Vr.TU1,l habl:'l "rdin�m ad cognitioncm. Cnumquodqu� autelll illl!1lanmm habet de cue, intantum est cognosdbile. Et propter hut: dicitur in III ae Animo quod anima tIt quodammodo OMma secundulII st"rlSUln et intcllcctum. E t ideo ( . , , ) convertitur cum t:lltt: ( ... ) vt"Tll m. Sed tamen ( . . . ) addit ( ... ) verum c:omparatiollt:1I1 ad inl.t'llertllm . w 54 S./h. 1,87.1: MIIllllll1l1llndque cognoscibilc cst secundum quod cst i n actll. ct IIOIl srocLlnfilim qtlod est in potentia. ut dic:itur in IX },fetaph. (c. 9): sic t:1)i1ll �li t1id est cns et V
�
MtfafJli
--------_ ''' ... .
264
,
,
"
CHAPTl',R SIX
TRUTH AS TRANSCF.NnENTAL
Actuality is the ground things. (iv) From
th is
of both the knowability and the entity of the coudus;ion "every being is true" follows,
The identity ht':(wel:n "being" and �trucn is
m
ediated
by the act
.of being. "Tmth is founded more on the use than on the quirlrl i ty " of a thing."!)6 This statemeut seems to contradict a conclusion of tht' p�ceding �ction to the effect that "truc" corresponds with thing, "
the
"
necess:u), rompQlu:nts (.If
thal whi.ch is, its tSJt and its es�nct":, are funoamental for truth.
The actuality is the
basis for
the
convertibility of "lll': ing" and
"true," as it was for the convertibil ity of "being" and "one." Tho
mas also uses
the principle that
it is in act" as
an
argumen t
for
"everything
is knowable insofar as
the the-sis that
"
being" is the
first
known (d, ch. IV). That-which-is docs not. however. enter the intellect in itJo own bei ng. II i.s "I't by its S/)tOtS to be conformed to the intellecr� as was said ill De veritau 21.1. Th i s aspect is expres.<;.erl by
thing ."
"
Thomas elucidates lhat-whcrcby-a-thing-is-knowable ell'.ewhere throug h
the Neoplalonic image of light.
Just. as in th e malt'rial
world th ings become visible through physical light,
through which things become k nowable fur tht' intdle<:t
so that
can also be called "light." The actuality of the thing is a ligh t, then, through which th e thing reveals itself to the mind,."i' or is "uncon cealed" in tht: terminology of Heideggcr, in whose thought the unity of truth and being is a core idea.� Through the identification of actuality with light, Thomas indicates two essential aspeC:f.s of ontological Lrl.llh. First, truth is actuality. which expresses what being is in itself. Second, truth is lucidity, which t':xpresses that
being reveals itself to something other, and is knowable. S6
/11 I Slt'fll., 19.5. 1: "Cum autem In rc sit quidditas CjU5 ct SUUffi C55C, ve!i I.a� hmnntur in esse rci magis quam in quidditate". ME.ltisl�nLial 'i holllisr�· put much emphasis on this t(:Xt. Cf. E.. Gilwn. lJ�mg and ,"irrm#. PhiJosopM:rs. p. 229. For a dbcuS$ion of this text, see .l. I'. V,!iprwi. lrmn i n Thomas Aquinas� Part II, in: Review of MelaPIi.��lr.� 4� (1990), pp. 550-56,
,
Il:'ct. 6, 168: "Ad cuius intellectum considerandum cst quud per tnmp." corporaJe "isibiHa !e"�ibiliter cognoKuntur. uude ilIlid Iwr quod aliquid cognoscitur, per similitudinem did potest. hlm"n. Prohat autem Philmophus in IX Met.aph, (c. 9) quod llIllullf'jundqlle cognoscitur per id quod est in actu et ideo ipsa aclualilas rei ,,�t quoddam lumen ipsius." !'>II Cr. Bnng and Ti"JIU. p. 62: MPhcnomcnoJogicai truth (rJu !USdwm'l#,U uf Bring) ill. Yf'rila.'l Iranscendcn talis"
57 IT. D�
•
WU.I.,
transcendental true.
The fint objection
which expresses the quiddity of something. Yel it is not see a con lnldic Lion bccwcen the tvoro views. Both
265
One might wonder whetht:r i n his argument for the conVf':rti bility of '"being" and "true" Tho mas has not moved far away fmm the \'it'w that the place of truth is the in tellec t. I nterestingly, in Summa lheologiat 1,16,3, he adV".inccs three objectio ns to this convertibility, al1 of which help to illuminate the proper nature of
as does its convene.
to
,
is
that rruth resides properl y in the intellecl,
\',:he
r eas being is properly in things, and that VCTum and ens are ther'efore n o t <.:onvertible.59 Against this i t m ight be said, as Thomas potu!:> out in his reply, that tht': oppos;itioll is not as absolute as is suggested. Truth is both in things and in the intellect, and thefe are also tWO modes of heing. extra-menUtI being
(B 1 ) and beillg as what is true (8 2). Bm this observation docs not take the edge off the objection. Although tht're is the same causal orot'!r �t\yeen the two truths a� hetween B l and B 2, the relation betw(:e=:11 the modes of being, on the one hand. and {he modalities of tru th, on the other hano, is not symmetrical. The primary sense of being is H 1 . But for Thoma... the primary sense of truth is not the u-u th of Ihe ming, al though the thing is lhe cause of the truth of the imelleet. In this respect there is a signifi· ('.ant diITerelice between Heidegger and Thomas. According to both , truth is said in a primary and in a s.c:tondary fash ion . A(:cordillg to Hcidegger, the unh iddenll ess of being which makes the lrUlh of the proposition possible should rank as the original t,·ulh.fiu According to Thomas, truth is not primarily found in being but rather in the intellect. even though the knowabilit.y of being is the foundation of truth . His argument is an inr.erest.ing new applicati on of the doctrine of analogy. This rlonrine was develope d by the IIlt'dievals with respect to "being" in their reading of the fourth book of the Mtwph,.«cJ (cf. .sect. 3.5.). "Being. " ahhough said iu many ways. is predicated "analogil..OiU),," that IS, in relation to one thing in which the=: ratio of bcing primarily is. S.U,. I,16.:i ohj. l . a. De wrl r . 1.2 obj. I . 60 M. Ht'irlegger. "Vom Wesen der Wahrtleil", in: Wtgm1Jrkm, Frankfurt alii Main 1967. pp. 80-81. For a romparison b�lWeen Thomas and Heidegger. �e ]. B. Lou, -Alethcia und Orlholcs. V,.nuch dner Deutung im Lichte def &holastlkM, in: Phil.os"l",isd/a Jalwbuclt 68 (1�9). pp. 253-68; B. Rioux, L'nn eI la vmri cilia. Hnlirl(g" el Sl. T1tomlll' d'Aquin, Montreal/Paris 1961!; J. Van de ,,'1
Wiele, lJjwWGrJThtlid. m On\Jwh"rgmhtid. Vngtlijlltnde studie UlJIlT dt nntologtJChl waarh.d ill lid Th"",ir"., '" 6i,j HnJ.,gpr. Leuven 1966; J. FelJermeler, "Wahr.
lIeit lind F.1tlttcnz
btt Heldeuer lind Thom.. ,on AqlllnM, In: Sallhr(" jtJ"rlN.thf!Jr Phiilu,.hil l&/G (1(171/'1.), pp. 119-70.
-
-
..
,_
,...,
.
_
.
.
...
.
-
266
CHAPTER SIX
TRUTH AS TRANSC,f.NnFNTII.I.
Here TholIla::; applil:'S the nolion of analogy to "truth" as it is found
com:ertihilir.y. Rut the prim a ry I.rue thal is in Ihe int ell ec t (T 1 )
both in things and ill tlH:� intellect in order to "how which mode i-s the focal meaning of truth. In De veritate
1.2
he raises the question "Whether truth is foun d
principally in the in tellect rather than in thing:;?" ThoIl1OlS'S rc::ply
starts by pointing out that what receives by prio ri ty the common predication of a term need not be the cause of other thil lgs having
lhat p re nkate. What rec e ive s by priority the common predicatiull
i� tha.t in which the mtio of Lhal predicate is complete. He iIluslrales th is o�n.'ation with the standard example of � heal thy. .. Although
medicine is called uhr:a.lthy" insofar as it is productive of health ,
yet the term "healthy" if; predicated by priority of animal, in which healLh i� primarily fou nd. Similar ly. the term "true" must
be predicated primarily of lhat in which th� c:oncep t of truth is completed. The relation of (.:01I[ormity is compl�ted in and through
the intellect. Therefore the truth of the intellect is the primary
sense of truth (T I ) ; the proper locus of truth is, as the Philosopher
claimed, in the mind. Truth belongs to the! thing 0111)' ill ary
a
second
"eose (T 2). namel)'. insola.r as it is adcquated to lhe iutellect.tiI
'Betwet'n the mode" of being and those of truth there is therefure!
110
symmetry with respt'c.t to th e order of primary and secondary: B 1
is related to B
2
a.<;
T 2 is to T 1 . neing is primarily in things, tru th
primarily in the inlellt"ct.. The first objection '1.ccordingly compds Thomas to modify the
thesis of convertibilily. Implicitly, he recogni7.C�s that the argument presented above
for the cOIl\,t'I·tibiiity between being " and "true" "
has only limited ,·alidit),. It perlaills exclusively to thi" relation between the secondary trUe
(T 2). that is tht' ontological tnle. ami B
I . They are interchangeable secundum substantiam, lht!' usual type of quae dicllntur per pri us CI postc:rius de multis, quod il l ud prill.� rl':dpial prat'tiicaLionem (ommun.is quod est e�usa allorum, sed iIlud in quo est prima ratio il liu.'l [:I1II1IlI I!!l1S compl eta, SICut unum per prius dlcltur de animali, in quo primo Jlf'rf�r.ta ralio sanitatis invenitur. quamvis medicin3. dieatur sana ut dfcctiva unilll.li.'l; �' idt'u, c �m \·en.un dicaw r per prius et posterius de pl uribus. oponet quod de 1110 per pnns dinllllr in 'Iun primu iU'o'enilur corupleta ralio veritaOl. Complcmcnlum au(:m cuiuslibel moms vel nrt'rariullis t:sl in suo lermiJlo. Motus autem cognhh:ae vinuul tc:nninatur ad animam (. .) ; et 'I"ia .(. .) . ver�m autem �icit : ; ordinem ad intdlectum. Inde est quod Phtlosophus dlcn III \>. Mt:taphysleae 51
quod
1J� veril.
1.2: "non oportet ill il1i�
( ...) verum autem
el fa15um sunt in mente . Res aUlcm nD� d;�tur �t'm
nisi st'c:undlllll quod est intellecllli adaequata, unde per pOJtenus IIlvemtur verum in rebus, per prim uUleln in in td lecl u. � Cr. In J 5mt., 19.5.1; S.th.. 1,16.1 �u.1 !'..
267
rannol. be interchangeable wit h B 1 ill this way. Thomas intro
duces another type of convertibiliLy fur
vertible with B 1
their relation. T 1 is con
i n lhe way in which what manifests is
"
(oll\'ertible with what is manifested. "(>::!' This new type is based on
tht!' idea that truth .
as
adequation, includes
the manifestation" of
..
the thing by the intellect. This manifestation occurs through the word, by which is primarily meant not the spoken outer worrl.
hut
the "inner" 'Word of the mind. Thi� worn is rhe terminus of the
procc=ss of knowing. It i... formed whenever Ihe intellect co nceives the th in g j ust.
<1..<;
it i... .63 l\ec.;m5e truth (i1·51 appeal'� with the won.!.
one f'::'In also !,;ay that the "true" ;)dds Lo "bt'illg" lht: noLiol1 of manifestation . &1
The �·t:wnd objection to the t.:ouvertibility of
fflS
and verum argues
that terms are nol CQuvel-lilJlt' when one has a greater extension thall
the other. Now, "truth" has a greater extension than '"being,"
�illce it extends to being and non-being. Thomas Cites Aristotle' s
.slatemelll lhat there is (ruth "when what-is is said to be and what-is n ot is said not to be." Therefore,
"beingW and "true- aTe not com'ert·
ibleY' As a matter of fact, this objection b,.ses the relation hernreen "truth � and "lx:ing" on one of the featllfes of the
datio n hetween
r
the two mo des of being distingllisberl by Thomas. The extension
B 2, heing
than that of B 1, because anything "boLlt which a trut' proposition can be formed is "being in the sense of B 2, t:'vell if it is a lIon.being according [0 B l , as is
of
as what-is-true, is grea ter
"
the case with lleg"dtiollS and privations. S./h.. 1,l fl.� :art I : 4,'erum eSI in rebus et in intcllcclu (...). Vcrum aUlcm quod e51 in rebus, convertiUlr cum eme secundum mbstantiam. Sed venlm quod b�
est in intcl!ectu. c()nvertitur cum ente, Ul manife5tatiHIm cum manire�lal(). Hoc enim e5t de ratiQne veri, \It dictum est." III De vail. 1 . 2 ati l , ll1t�st: lYl-le, of convertibility are called per p1"�dj,a/illn�m allil p" wn.wl'u:nlinm: ·�irll! �l!: iam dicti5 palel, vt:rtIm pt'r pri\L.� riic.i1Ur de intelleClll ve ro N per POSLCr!lIS de r(: �ibi adaequntn, et utroquc modo convcrtitur cum cnte. sed diversitnode. quia s.ccundum quod dicitur
ro""'eno
6�
•
h, Joan. 14:6, leu. 2, 1869. Cf. Dr writ. 4.2 ad I. cr. Qu.od!. X.4.l obj. 2: "Verllm addit lupra ens manife5lalionem.M 1,16.� obj, 2: �id quod Ie e:xhentiil ad en� r.! non oms. non rom..-:rti !lIr nUll cnle. Sed venLlll ac clttenclil ali en. ct nun Clll: !HUll "erliUl CRt I llIm[ r.�t ellie, el (1 "011 nun eftl nnn r.�r.. Erxn vr.rum r.1 ena non ('on�rlUntur.· cr. I), ,,,,",. 1 . 1 ul�i. 7.
M
F;� 5.111.
...
,...."
"
." "
.
,,,
---- "
"
CHAPTER SIX
268
269
TRUTH AS TRANSCENDENTAL
The referenc� tu lh� relation between the modes of being already sugges� the aIllo"Wer to lhe second objection. It is correct to say thal T 1, the truth of the intellect, has a greater extension than B
the "logical preconditions of our knowledge," "reflexive concept!," "determinations made by human reason of every o�ject. "68 Thomas r<:iects this kind of transcendental thought. The inten·
1. but not that "truth" has greater extension than "being.'" n 2 is also
tionality 01" knowing precedes
to this objection shows that enj and
not be sepacatt:d from being. But LItis does not mean that "bdng"
a mode of being, and mis mode is coextensive with T 1 . Thf: reply verum
are not convenible
because in all cases being is knowable through il�w:lf and is apt 10 be conformed ro the intell«l. rt is also possible thal wlml is ill itself
a non·being is made k.nowable by the inldlt'Ct, such lhat it
acquires tbe chameler of an eTl.J mliurris.fi6 This t:oncJusion comple ments Thomas's expusitiull ill
De veri/ale 1 . 1 .
its reflexivity. It is correct to say that
"being" cannot be understood without the "true," for the u-ue can· cannot be understood ,,-ithnUl th� "true" being undt"r!>toocI . It is not by understanding "being" that the
ratio
of the true is understood,
Thoma.'\i explains this with a comparison between "being" and
"intelligible . " Only because being is intelligible can being be
The modes of being
understood. But being can be understood without the aspect of
dis{:U.'$scd there are the categories and the transcendcntals; "ration·
intelligibility itself being understood. What is first known is
al being" is Hot mentioned as a mode of being. But when the
"being," not "the intelligible" or "the true." When it is said that
transcendcntals are communta, their relationship to "rational being"
"being" can only be understood under the aspect of truth. the
must be accounted for, and this is just what Thomas does in this
statement must be taken in the sense that the
reply to the objection that "true" is more extensive than "hr:ing."67
follows upon
third objection to the convertibility of "h�ing" Summa thMlngittP. 1,16.3 is thaT t.erms which are related The
(assequalur)
ratio
of the true
the apprehension of being.59 In Thomas's
and "true" in
order of the transcendentals, being and not its knowability is the
to each other
first conception of the intellect; the true is consequent upon being,
as prior ann posterior are not interchangeable with each otlv.:')".
Now il seems lhal lh� "lru� " is priOl· to "�iIlg," because being can
6.7. True as a relational tmmamdmtal
only be ullot!r::ltood ulld�r lh� as�cl of truth. Intelligibility is the prerequisite t:oudition of whakver a human being apprehends.
This objt!ction forms
a
new element in the discussion about the
primae}' of being. In the Middle Ages, under the intluence of Neo-
Allhough "bt"ing" and "true" are convertible, they an� not synon� mous. It is not redundant to say that every being is lrut!.'u "True
platonism, this discussion concerns primarily the relation between
expresses something thal is nor expressed by the namc "ut'iug;n
the one or the good and being, From the perspective of modern
it adds something to �bcing," namely, a relation to the intellect.
"
transcendental philosophy, the primacy of the "true" is moM. obvious because in il..� view being is always ht.ing t.hat is under· stood, as the ohjl':c:t.ion sllgge[l;£.... Thinking precedes being. It is tempting to try to interpret Thomas's doctrine in lhis lIIoueru, transcendental-logical sense. Indeed, it has been argued that lhe "twe" chanH;Lcrisliully expresses the relatedness of being to the knowiug (onsciousness, and that this mark also holds for the other tramn;cndentals. They are therefore not ontolop;ical properties, but
66 S.th. I,lG.3 ad 2: �non ens non habet in se unde cognuu:alur, �t:cl c:ngllu,
scilur
iutjualltulII iflll!lip.rrlls tilr.il. ilIlld r.llgm)l;r.ihilro. Ilnrle vc-rum fundatur In t:"t�, inf}u",nHlm non ens rst quoddam ens nllionis, �pprt"hC"nsum scilic(t a rntionC".� I'll 1 Snlt 19.5.1 ad S: D� wril. 1.1 ad 7. Cf. Ibid. 1.5 ad 2. 67 0. T. KobuKh, Stin und Sfn"tlrh" lIiJlmscht GTulldltgung arur Ontologif d", .'i/muAl. �iden 1981. pp. �29-�2. ..
68 W. Kuhn, Das Printipitnprobltl1l itt dff Ph-il'm"Jphi( del Tiwmm von Aquin, pp. 343·4-8. cr. my critical discussion "Trannendental venus kategorlaJ: Ole
Zwiespaltigk.cit von Thomas' Philosophie? Elne kritiKhe Studie", in: l!illurium 24 ( 1986), pp. 14�8. 69 S.fh. 1.16.3 ad 3. Ufo lk lJmt. I . l ad :l; In I Sf-ni., 19.!U ;ul 2: �lJupliciter enim dicitur aHquid non posse intelligi sine altero. Aut ita quod un um nno pouit intelligi si non ponatur alterum esse; et sic dicitur quod CiSI.' non potest intelligi sine vero, ,ieut ctiam non potest intelligi sine hoc quod est eue intelligibile. Sive ita quod quandoeumque intelligitur unum, intelligitur alt�rllm ( ..) . F.r. hor. Illudu ·�ss�' plll.�H inLdligi sine �ro, sed non e converso: quia "erum non est in radone cntis, sed ens in ratinnf' \·t:ri; sic:ut potesl aliqub intelllgere ens, et tamen non intelligit aliquid de' ratione intellt gibilitatis; sed nunquam potest lntelligl intelligibile. secundum hanc ratl� nem, nisi intelLigatur ens. Unde etiam patet quod ens est prima conceptio intrllet:lu5. � 711 V, writ. l o t ad I « I'lae contra obidulllllr): "ideo non elt nugalio cum dkitur 'em vc:rum' quill allqukl nprimltur nomine: veri quod lIun nprimilur nomine eillil. 1\011 ItnlplCr quod te dltl'etant. .
�
--- _.,," " , --,-
270
.
271
TR.UTH AS TRANSCENDENTAL
CHAPTER SIX
is measured. The relation of truth is such a nonreciprocal relation,
Thomas always lakes serioUldy I.h!' rt'lational character of onto
truth, 'lruth of thing!>, " he emphasiz1;'$, includes in its concept not only the enti ty of things, but ahsu Lhl!' rela tion of adequation to the intellect.71 The true is a I-elational transcendental. The question that rem<'l.i nll; is what the n ature of the relation is that truth adds to heing. Thomas's general solutioll Lu the p roblem of the addition is that the transcenden[;';ll.s add som eth ing to being, not Jtcundum rem, hut $tCll7ldmlJ rali.fJ'TU1n. The relation that Mtruth." adds LO "heing" i� there fon.' a relation of rcason. A lurlher argument for rhi$ conclusion is lh at every real relation is categorical, and that, in the ArisLOlelian system of categories, the rdation is an ac.ciden l that t:urnes to a subuance, But "tru th " cannot a.dd sH ch a relation to "being," since
for the thing is the measure of the
this relation needs 10 he tranlic:endental. It
e er, with Thomas's own basic intuition of the correlation betv.'een
logical
and must be p urely a �I:lti nn of
canuot
is thought to be in relation , not related to t.he
The rdation to the inlellecl lhilt rdation of reasun, whidl i:; like lhc
"true " adds to "being " is a relation between :'l measure and what is measured. At th is poin t, however, a prob lem ariscs to which several scholars have call ed attention.H One may wond er whether in this way truth can still be regarded as somc th ing intrinsic to things- If "thing! are called true in virtue of the truth in an intellect, "75 it follows that "being" is called "true" only b.... extrinsic denomination , This conclusion seems to conmet, how
therefore be real
�
Ibid. 1.8: �vt:lilas r�rtIm e"istentiulll includit in �ni ratione entitatem
Ibid.
2 1 . 1 ad 3: �omnis relalio realis �sl in gf'nere determinato. sed relationes non reaJt::s pUSlillll1 f'irr.llin' omne cns." cr. G. Siewc:rth, "Dic: tTalls;t.t:udelllalt' St-'Ihigkeil lind Verschic:denhch des ens und des veJ'um bei Thomas von Aquin�, in: PhiJoW/'hitmnjahrlnl(h 66 (1957). pp. 22·33. 13 Ibid. 2 1 . 1 : �1113 aUIc:m relalio (...) lovenilur t:Ht: ral,i nnis ,-a"l1Im secundum quam dkitur rcfern id quod /lUll tlelwmlf'1 ad id ad quod �fertllr, sed e con\'e�o cum ipsa reJat.iu quaedam d"pendemiA sil (.,,). E.t ita eSI in omnibus a lii s quae se hah�11I II I rnen!lllra et mt'nillurauun, yd pC':rft'cliYIIIIl et •\!
I'� rf'�rtihilr. �
the
lIUIl-JIlulu'tl
heing 3mi the soul. His argument for the convertibility of ens and verum is that being is knowable by virtue of its ac tuality, nnd th a t tht! human :iuul is "iII a :;t!II.se" all 1IIings." How can Thomas hold the vi�w thal LI-ulh is a t.-aUsc.':t'1H1Clltal lIloue or being and at the same tim e assert that being is -.:alled "true' by alt t!x trinsic denomination? The so lution to this ditlicul ty lies in his distinction between the two modes of truth. Being is called utrue" because it "is apt to bri ng about a true idea of itself;" truth is conceived here as knowability. It is noteworthy that Thomas consistently speaks of ontological truth in terms of "ap titu de. " Be ing is knowable through itself, on the basis of its tin of being. Knowability is tht'_ pos...i bi lit.y for tnuh, hut it is nOl rei tHllh in Ule formal sense, which is a conformity. Truth in the formal senst! is primarily in lht! illtdlt!Cl. and secowJarily in the thing insof
c::arum f't superaddit habiludincm adaequationis ad intel!ectnlTI humanum vd
di"inum�.
that under.st(lnd,o; it, hut beralls� the; intt:1I�c:t
is really relaled to the thing.
reason. Thomas never entertained th e possihility of a real lransc,endental relation.7't In nil T!ental,. 2 1 . 1 be givt!:i a more precise descrip tio n of th e rdation of reason UI.ll "truth.. adds to "b<:ing." This type of relation Ol':curs when the rdation (;oosists in a dependency and is 000mutual The subj ect of the relation does not real ly ctepr:nd \Jpon LhaL to which it is rdated, but the converse rio(':.� n ot hold. Thomas illustrates this by app e al ing to the relation betwee n scientific knowledJ!:c (scientia) and its obj ect. Wht"reas science depeIHls upon the object, the objeC l ooes nol. depend upon sciente. The relation ot science to its obj ect is real, hut that of the obj e c t to sci e nce is a relation of reason hec.anse the object is o nly lhought i n relation to science. Thomas goes all (0 givt! this example a general import. The same holds in all C'IS�S where things are related as measure and '.hat which is 1IIt!
intellect
truth of the intellect. The thing hecame the thing itself is really
r.
the "tru e "
14 Mt'
M"dieval
adds to
"being," the relation of an ob ect to science. he
j
J. Van de Wid�. �I�I vi-rili! 11II1Illugi1lue, 1" 5!'>1; J. A. At"fl�lJ. Trnth, pp. 10.11; J. F. Wippel, '7nuh in Thnmas
Reflections on
A qujnas� . pp. 324-25. if> S.fh. 1,16.8: \'eri tas propric (51 in solo inlc:llectu. re5 alltf:1T1 rllelllHur �'erae a �'eri ta tc: quae eM in aliqllo intell«tu.� 711 111 I Pfrill., 1f"I�L �, :!9. Cr. Ih� lJI!'f1t. 1 .4: "in rrlms aulr.m Ivr.rit;ll raIl improprlr ('I �e(,\lmlario�. �
". ,, ''' ' "
' " ,
,
272
CHAPTER SIX
TRUTH AS TRANSCENDENTAL
also employs to indicate a third feature of the relation between the
modes of being. Because exLramental being is not rlt':penden t on
the knowkdge which the intellect has of it, being as what-is-true
(8 2) is acciden tal
to B 1.
Likewise. the relation to the n i tellect must
the
adaequatio formula,
273
The criterion for the conformity is twofold,
namely, either the ns or the intelle.ctus, because a distinction mu!\t be made betw"een theoretical and practical reason. Sometimes the intellect i1'i that which measures. That is the case with pmctiwl
be acci dental tu the truth of a thing. Thomas dmws this <.:ondusiOIl
reason, that is, the intellect directed at m aking something . Practi
explit:itly. A thi ng
cal reason is the cause
is related ill an
dependent upon this intellect. 77
<-U'lifacts. They aloe ness of the form in
of th ings <-Uld is therefure the IIH,"wmre of t:a l led " true " insofar as they acquire the like the mind of their maker. The relation to the
At this point the limits of Thomas's amhropoccntrism become
practical intellect is essential for the truth of artifucts, for they are
clear. His thought does not manifest an "anthropocentrism " in the
dependent upon it. Sometimes. however, the relation is reversed,
modern sense in wh ich
B. Metz uses the term. A good example
and the thing serves as the measure of truth. That is the case with
of this is Thomas'l; attitude toward Augustine'� definition of truth,
th�Qretical reason, that is directed at knowledge for the sake of
"the tme is that which is." Earlier we saw that in
knowledge. The thing is that which measures, because it is prior to
J.
De
veri-tate 1 . 1 he
cri ticizes this definition because it concerns only the foundation of
truth and does
110t
express the
I.:
omplete
t:oIlt:ept
cUIlsists in the con formity of thing and inlellet:t..
uf truth whidl
Yet at other places
the knowledge the intellect has of it. It is in thi!\ way that natural
things are relatf':n to the intr-llect; they are the measure of m a n 's theoretical reason.so
he offers a certain justification for Augusti ne ' s definition. In this
definition of truth, the relation to the human intellect has been
Yet the relation to the human intellect is acciden tal for the truth of things, because this intellect i s nOl the cause of things. Thomas
eliminated, because what is accidental
therefore takes a further step based on the model of practical
(per accidtns)
is excluded
reason, The measure tor the truth of things can on ly be a product
from every definition.7ll If "truth" adds to "being" a relation to the intellect but the relation to the human intellect is not "essential" for things, then
ive intellect. in the manner that practical reason is for its artifacts. It is in this way that the creative intellect of God relates to all things.ll l
the u nfortunate consequence seems to be that "being" is called
Thomas traces the intell i gihi lity of rea li ty hack to its origin: the
real relation to the intellect, a
world is created, that is, made by the divine art. The relation to the
"tme" only per accidens. Only
a
rel."ltion of dependence , can be constitu tive for the tmth of things.79
This con clusion compels Thomas to relation between thing and intellect.
a further consideration of
the
divine Logos is essential for th e truth of things. Ontological truth has a divin e ground (cf. 9.5.).
was the
ul timate me
foundation of the conformity. The way in which this scheme was
human, and that they are said to be true in virtue of their
For Thomas th e
The concept "truth" presupposes a measure. At th e end of De veritate
to
a
1.1,
the various definitions of truth were arr.anged according
scheme in which the entity
(entitas) of a thing
presented suggested that it had universality. but in De veritate l . �
Thomas in fact acknowledges that the situation is more complex. It turns out that the measure of truth can be located
in
either term of
77
S.th. 1,16.1: "per accidem, autem [habet re.s onlint>mJ an int,.IIt'I:tum a quo cognoscibUis cn. � Cr. De vmt. 1.4: "Vcritas autt:m quat: dicimr de rebus in comparationt: ad intellectum humanum, est rebus quodam modo accidcn talis·; D, vent. 1 . 10. 7/1 S.th. 1,16.1 ad I . Cr. De vent. 1.2 ad 4.
7�
S.th. 1,16.1: �Per se quidem
d"pendt:t senmdum mum e�'t:·.
•
haln:t
[re� l
urdinem ad inlt:lll':ctum
a
(juo
80 D� veri}. 1.2: "Sed sciendum quod res aliter comparatur ad intellectum
practicum. aliter ad speculativum: intellectus enim practicus causat res. un de est mensura rerum quae per ip5um fiunt, sed intellt:ctus spt:culativus, quia accipit a rebu�, est (juodam modo motus ab ip5is rebus. et ita re� mensurant ipsum; ex quu palel quud res naLurdles, a quilllls inLellectus nusLer scienliam mh., lect. 3. 29. ar,ci it, menSllrant intellectum nostrum". Cf. In I p 8 De vmt. 1.2: "sed sunt mensuratac ab intcllcctu dh·ino. in quo sunt omnia sieut omnia artificiara in intellectu artificis". cr. S.t/a. 1.14.S: "scientia Dei est causa rerum. Sic enim 5cientia Dei se habet ad omne5 rei ereatal, 5ieut scientia artifida 51': habet ad artificiata. Scientia autem artifici8 est causa arlificiatorlllll" .
r
,
--,.. ,.,,", . --
274
C.HAPTER
,---,- .
"
SIX
275
TRUTH AS TRAKSCENlJEN'lAL p h ilmop hy as su ch . There is an
conformity to each : to the divine intellect insofar as they fulfil l that
intrin sic
connection between
ph i lo so phical th i nki ng and the conception of truth, a con nectio n
to which they are ordered by this intellect; to the hUIIl'an intellect
that is al ready indicat.ed hy Aristo tle when, in the second book of
insofar as they are apt to bring about true ideas of themselves . .But is more fundamental for the truth of things
the MeiaphysiLS, h e describes philosophy as "the science of truth. '"
Thi ngs are called true per.ie in_ relation to the divine intellect.83
implies a view of man s. attitude toward reality. It is ju st in think
the forml"r
relati on
Truth COIH.:enlS the relation between knowing and being and
than is the latter.H2
Given this foundation of truth, Thomas
nm
'
ing about "trut.h" that the complex process of the transformation of
advance a differt': n t
version of the thesis of the converti bility of be ing and the true. All
the medieval doctrine of the transcendentals to modern tr;mscr:n
dental philosophy becomes apparenl.
uatural things are related to the divine intelle ct as artifac ts to aIL
Therefore, each thing is said to be true insofar as it. has its own
form, according to which it imitates divine art; "it is in this way
�
•
An interesting link i n this historical development is Giambat ti sta
Vico (1668-1744), whose
ph ilosophical importance wa.s llUt ap
that being and the tnle are convertible, sinc� any natmal lhing i
p reciated until the twentieth century, In a brief excursus we want
the convertihility thesis contains two elemr:nts: evel-Y being is true
Vico's "basic thesL<;:" "th e true and what is made are convertible"
co nformed to divine art throuJ!:h its form."H4 This third version of (in th e sense of knowable) on the
heing is
ha. is �
of its own form ; every
factum conuertuntttr) .85 The term "convertible" points to
a relational
however, his thesis expresses distance from the tranfic:enrlental
transcendental. Against this hackground i t is understandahle that
the first basic text on the transcendentals, In
I'l
cont.inuity wilh the medieval doctrine of the transcendentals
divine p r-ac tical intellect. This la<;,t element expresses the ultimate as
( m:rum
�
true (in the formal sense) on the uasis of i ts rclation to th
consequence of Thomas's though t Ull the true
to pay attention to what the German philosopher Karl LOwith cal led
I Senlentiamm 8 . 1 . 3 ,
refers to an extrinsic cause only with regard to the tme . The "tme,"
it is said, adds to "heing" a relation to the exemplnr), form or a
relation to the cogni tive power.
indeed, Vico hiIIlself refers to the "Schools." At the same time,
on tological tradition. Luwith incolTectly sees in Vieo's thesis a Scholastic commonplace true are convertible.
( "top os") .
For the mediewls, bei11g and the
Vic.o's thesis is found in his work De antiquissima
Italorum
sapientin. Three volumes were plann ed, on metaphysics, physics and eth ics, but only the first appr-;ur-d, in 171O.sb Vico s Metaphpics '
tends IIlorc toward assertion than argumentation, but in two replies
6.8. Excursus: "Th� tnll' {md what is made aTe Cf)nlJertib/�'" (Vim)
to critical reviews of this work he explains his intentions more
For Tho mas the cOllvel-tibility of being and true is ultimately
founded in the divine art. Things are intelligible
because the,>,
;
are
produced by an intellect. The measure of the truth of th i l gs is
the divine pr actical reason, The model of productive knowledgr
would come to play an ever more important role in th e reflection
on truth . This development says something about the evolution of
. ,s per prius illest rri flllam secunD� v""'1 ��' . 1 . 2.. "pnma · au,f'rn ral1O ' vcntatt . . . . da. qllla pnu� est elU� comparaLIo ad mtell ectunl divillUIil ' Uflln hUnlan um-. l R3 Ibid. LUI: "rornparatio rei ad intellectuJIl di'VinUnl cst ci essent ialis et secundum eam per lie dicitur vera". . 1'14 In I leet. 3: "Et (juia omnia, edam natura[ia, companmlur art . . I�tellcctllm dllunum I>ICUt arLtfil:ia lia ad ancm, cOlll>eqllcll1> est ul qllf'lihet res hc � alUr esse lIera ecllndllm quod habet propriam formam l\�r ll n dll m quarn S2
P��.,
�
artem dJlII�Jam ( ... ) . Er hoc modo ens et ue.-um nmuerntntur, quia (jllehbel res nat.ll rai!s per s\lam formam arli dillinf' ronformatur." . IImtatu r
•
fully. Thus he states ill his second Risposta that his metaphysics is
intended to lay out the concept of "'tl ue being."R7 As he puts it
himself, "the most imporlant point" in this exp l icati on is th e
convertibil ity of verum and factum. His wUlk starts with that thesis: ··For the Latins, verum and factum are inten.:hangeable, or in the
language of the Schools, convertible."
8�
K. Li)with, 1-'ica',
Gnmd�atz: orrum
tt factum canOl'YtuntuT. Stint
thUJlngi.sc�
PramiS.l� l.md dlff= �i.ikul(,j",e KnllStrtUmzrn, Heidel�rg 1968. fl6 ¥,.'e quote this work. au:ordmg Lu Lhe edition (with German transla tion) bv S. OttO and H. Viechtb auef, GiamfmUl.Ila I,-'iGtI. Libel· 1lldaphy.mu.5 (Dt Ita/arum Jiapitnlia liber primlu), Mu n ich 1979. cr. Vicu. Stl�d�J Wnting5, cd. and trans. by L. Pompa. Cambridge 1982. H 7 Lib�7 mt/r.ph,.II(,U5, Risposta II (cd. Olto/ViedLt.baucr, p. 160): "Idea ("o ll1p i1;l di llH'lalbk" io IJlIclla ndla tjlLllle Ri uahiliKioI. I'rnle e 'I vero, e, prr dirla in IIlln, il vero Jo:me".
anliqu.j�sjma
"
'"
--
"
.0"
____
,
CHAPTER SIX
276
,
277
TRUTH AS ·ntAN.5CENDENTAL
This initial thesis is no t elaborated by VieD. The ferm that
esp�( ia.ll)' needs cla.rification is factum. Certainly here it does not
lHe'dU "fact"-with his thesis Vim docs not intend a nOlive theory
of correspondence. The factmn of the thesis must reall), be under
stood as the pa!\t. participle of the verb fac�� ( "do, " "make"). That is also clear from other formulations of the basic axiom which we
find scallered Ih roughout this writing. 10 ch. 1,2 Vieo designates
longer related to
being, which is knowable
"
"
by its
actu�llity, but to
what is made. The transcend�nta1 m� ani ng of Ntrue" is shifted to productive knowledge. In chapter
2
Vico ap plies his basi..:: th t=sis to the truth of the
human sciences. The convertibility of "true" and "what is made" functions as a transcendental measurt! for the possibilities and limits of the human m ind to aUain truth. Man cannot attain truth
"to have been made" as the meaSHr e of tbe true: vtri criterium ac
in his investi galion of the nature of things. The reason for thifi i. ..
regula". ipmm esst jr:cisse. The
of his Metaphy.fir.s
that man does not con lain within himself the elements by virtue of
and jaCtTf!.88 ''To make" is
which composite lhiugs exist; "the physicist cannot define thi ngs
conclusi o n
formulates an identity of the verbs
llerare
connected dosely by Vieo wi th "to know," Scientific knowledge
($cicnlia)
is knowledge
by means of a uemonsU'ation,
''The nemoll
from the true, that is. assign to everything its proper nature and make it from the true." God alone knows the physical things,
slralion is the same as the operation, and the true is the same as
because he created them. Only in the mathematical scienCes is
whal is made" (1,3), Science is desc.:ribed as cognition of t.he genus
truth accessible to man, for man does not find the elements of
01'
J)lathcmatical things ouuide himself, but wIISlru..:ts them himself.
mode by which a
thing
comes to be. and by mean� (If whic h
the mind makes (j(J(:i') the thing. as the mind com�s to kilOW the
mode because if arranges a thing's elemenr.<;.R9 Knowledge IS construction. From the thesis of the convertibility of "true" autl "what is
God .here is tht" r.�1 (rue, because he is the first Mahr; Ihe infmite truc, because he is the Maker of all Ihing': and the most
in
manifest to him hnth the extrinsic and
gll intrinsic elements of things, since he contains them.
in
God. This Slateml""n ! already reveals his distance from the
medieval view of truth. For Thomas God is the first true hecause he
is the first be ing. and God
is lruth
(cr. 9.1 . ) , Vico howevt:r can
no
longer a.ccept thi:;; on account of his thesis that the true is that
which is construded by the operation of the imellet:t. For Vico the first true is
i'l
C.od, because he is the
first Makf"r.91
Th� true is no
/!/! [bid., Conclusiu (t:d. Otto/Vicchtbauer, p. 148): �ELellim hah�s W'rarc Ct faccre idem e�st:�. tf!I lbUI. 1,1 (t"ri. Ono/Viechtbaucr, p. 36): ar.u rmr:to sciemia tit cognilio Reneri�, !It' ll modi, quo re5 fiat, el qua, dum mens r:ognosr:1t modum, qu ia �Iemellta r:ompon!!, rem faciat". 90 l&id. 1.1 (cd. Otto/Viechthauer, p. 34-6): '\oerum esse ipsulli factum; ac prolnde in Deo esse prilllum verum. quia DellS primu5 Fat:lor: iniinirum, quia offillium factOl-; �lCaclis�imum. quia cum eXlima, lUin intima rerum el re ae4enLaI elemenla, Ram contineLft I Thj, aspen i. negle<:ted in the study by V. Riifner, �En. el verum con
�
vertnnmr, FactuRl et I'erum
without uHderl)'iJlK matter and as though
from nothing, things, as it we" e:
a
point, a line, a surface." In this
way he fashion .. for h imself a world of shapes and numbers. The most c(";rtain sc.iences are lhose which resemble divine science in
f
is made. So it a pears that "the criterion and rule of the true is to
I \Ve maue u .1 It. • ..9
For Thomas, lOO, truth involves a measnre. This measure was
twofold, namely, the th ing or the intellect. Th� thing is the
\\'hat deselves attention in thi.c; pass.'lge is Vico's claim that the fir�t lrut:' is
cu'..ates,
their operation, insofar as in them the true is convertible with what
marle" Vico draws the conclusion that
exact Ullt' , btc.lUse it makCi
"Like God, man
l:Ollvertunlllr. Zur Problemalik mHtelalterlicller
measure for the truth of mlln's tlH�o..elic:a1 k.llowledge_ But {he
natural thing itself i� d ependent [O!' its lJ"uth on the divine creating intellect. In Vim's paradigm of lruth there is a reassessment of the
role of man's practical reason. Not the thing, bUl only the
human
pra(',t.ical i ntellec t is the measure for the U'uth of human scieno:.
Vico's interesl is no longer the correlation between being a n rl the so ul which "is in a sense all things," but the productive knowledge
or man.
lind neuzeitlil:her On tologie�, in: Phl.lmuphilrJus ja.hrb'll.ch 60 (1950), p. 424. \i� Libt'f mtlrJ/JAYJir:v.J 1,2 (ed. Onn!Viechtbauer, p. -44) : "CURl igitur sdentia nUllIalla Ilata sit ex men lis nonnle vi do, nempe summa dill brevitate, qUi!. ell:tm rell nmne. est, et qua quae nOlcere affectat non conti Ret, et quia nOll cOntiRet, vera quae .tudet non apcrah�r; cae certlal.mac 'IInt, quae originit
'Yleiurn luunt. et operatJone KienliH dlvlnilC! limllea ewdunt. tll[Klle In qlll btil verum el rilct.um conllerlllniur. Alq ue ell: hi., quae I\lnt hittenul dillert.,., umnlRIl fnllllCC!rr: IIcr:l, �rl criterium ae relul.m Iplum eMit 'ed••e",
_______ _. 1 1 ' , '
,
I
"
"
'
"
,
. . ..,----"
CHAPTE.R SIX
TRUTII AS TR .... N.sCENDENTAL
thesis of the convertibility of the tcue and what-is-made sets boundaries lO Ihe po�ibilities of humall science. Vico halts at the nature of mateI"i..,] reality. One could say that in Kant's philosophy the thesis is also extended to the study of nalUH�. In the preface to his Critique or Pure R'luscm, he writ<:s that Calileo ..nrl others saw th at reason has insig ht only into what it produces according to il.'J own design.'" Human reason provirles the measure for itt; ohjects. not accor ding to their cmpiri<.:�\1 c_ont.ent, but according to tl1eir formal stmcture. The subject <.:oustitutt:,.. through its trAnsCendenTal or aprirrri form s the object as object. In Kant the lfansformaLion or the "Transcendental philosophy of the Ancients" is completed. The tranS<:t:lldental "true" has become a logir:al criterion for the possib ility of the knowledge of things.9�
related t.o an intellect. Just as u'ulh comists i n the adequation of
278 The
"
6.9. The true and thefal1e
Thomas pays 4:onsid�rahle attention w its opposite, falsity. In De lJ.mtate q. 1 three qut'�tioos are devoted to it: i� there falsity in things (arL 10), in the senses (art. 1 1 ) . and in the intf'lIer:t (art. 12)? The s.1.me questions arise in the Summn. lheologiae I,li.l�:1. where a fourth question is added: are true and false con· trW"ies (art.. 4)? The first and lhe fourth questioll are uf importance for the transcendentality of lht" true. When being and Irue are convertible, how then can falsity be in th ings? Is not a conse quence of their convertibility that what is not t.rue does not exist? If there is falsity in th i ngs, then the true aIld the false are differell� tiations of beillg: nol ever;' being is true, but evc:ry being is either tnle or falsc.94 Furthennor�, if the truc is {;Ot'xtensjv� with being, how can Thomas argut' that th� true and thc blstc" nre contraries? The mark of a contr.Lry uppol)ition is that the oppositc:t. share a Lommon genus. But how i:s that po�sible at the transcendental level? We addres.� bOlh questiom ill this �ction. ( 1 ) In Thomas's discussion of the qu e sti on whether there i� fals ity in things, two central elements of his analysis of lru th recur. The first is that the truth of a t hing is relational; it is always
]n his
'H \14
expositiulls of truth
Critiq"lu. nf I'"W-e Rea.nm, B 1 1 4.
cr. In I Poj/. Annl., k(l 4. ""0: �Quod aUlem 1111/1 (,5l venun non (:"n: nam euc el c��c VCfllm cOllvror!.unlur.» Dt unit. 1 . 1 0. obj. l/: "",crlim c.onvcnlwr (lUll I"lllc ( J ; uRo ",UUIn non c.\t differentia divi�iva entls til rr'� alitlliil fal�a dkl • . .
P'IjIjII1111.
•
279
lhing .mri
intellect, so falsity comists in the i nequality (i?1tlequali las) of the tv,'O terms.Y5 For this reason Thomas rejects the o�iet:lioll which concludes, nn the basis of Augustine's definition "the true is that which i'S." that the false is that which is not ann that therefore no thing i� false. Augustine'S definition does not express fully the essence of truth; it is in relation to the intellect that a t.h ing is called tme according to whal it is and false according to what i t is 1101.% The second clement of his analysis is that thmgs are differently related to the divine intelle("l and to the human inte-llc(.'L Essential fOl" the truth of things is thc relation to the intellect upon which they depenn, that is, the divin� creat.iv� intellect. The differing relations to the two intellects stru(tllre Thomas's explanation of the falsity of tllings in De vtritate 1 . 10 and Summa thtologiae 1, 1 7 . 1 . in relation to the divine intellect no th i ng whatsoever can be called false. :since whatever takes place in things prou:eds from the ordinance of the divine intellect. Thomas ack.nowledges, however (in Summa lhtolograe I.11. 1 ) , t.hat voluntary agents are JX:rhaps (jorle) an exception, for they, in their acti ng and speaking. have the power to withdraw thcmselves from this ordering. In Dt! vttn!ate 1 . 10 hr. introduces a distinction in the relation of things to Lh� divine intellect. Insofar as things have a positive contt:nt they are related 10 this inlellect as Wth,11 which is measured" to its mea..... ure," because all these things an� r.:ceated by the divine art. Insofar as things are a negation or a defect, they are related to the divine intellect as that which is known" to its "knower.'" In this sense they are "adequateri" to the divine intellect, although God is 110 t 97 their cause. This epistemological relatiun is not. elaborated by Thomas even though it is somewhat problematic. What in particular remains undear is th e nature of this knowlerlge: does it imply receptivity on the side of the knower? In relat.ion to the human intcllnt, things can be calltd false, ..
"
9.', Ch vml. 1.10.
96 Ibid. 1 .10.1 ad 1; S./h. 1.17.l ad 1 . 91 De !�l. 1.10: "Inu:lIectul autem divino I..OlU?
mensuratum menMlrae, quantum ad ca quae in rr:l>m po5ilive dicunrur �'el inveniunrur. quia omnia huiuamodi ab ane dlvini intellc:ctu5 proven;unt: a1io modo licut cognltum ad cognOICCnI, et lie etiam negationes et defectul dh'ino intellcClui adaequantur quia omnia huhnmodi Deul cognoJdt 4uam'iis eo. non CAliset; palel erl!"o quod rei qualhercurwquc Ie habeat, rub quac.nm'lue rorma e:dltal �I prlvallone atll dereClU, lnteliectul divino adaequalur. et .ie paIN quod rei qllaellbet In comparadone lei InUlU.c:lum dlvlnum Yera ell-.
,
.
---,,,. ."
T---"- ,
,,,
CHAP'1'1':R SIX
Hu man
cognition
TRUTH .M:' TRANSCENDENTAL
has its origin in the senses. which arc directed
What i!'l; the nature of lhe opposition between true and false?
to th� ext�rnal af.drlent.,,> of somethi n g. Throu g h ies external
Three possibilities are investigated in Summa theologiat [,liA: true
th ing can l'iometimes give the impression that it is
and false are opposed either by way of contradiction, hy way of pr·i....tiull, .. ur as (;onU'arics. In all forms of oppo!.ition (he one term r�muves the other, but this can occur in rlifferenl degrees.. The strongest form of opposition is contrarlir.tion, because in it um: term fully removes the other and is the negation of it. PrivatiOIl is Jlul a pure negation, but n egation in a subject," that i!i, is founded in somethin g whose nature i t i.� to have the form of which it is deprived. The weakest form of opposition is the colltr.u-iety. for a contra!]' not only presuppo.�es a subject. bUl also determines somc. thing posi tive, namely, a common genu s. Blackness, for example,
appearance
�
.somt!1hillg oLher than what it is in reality. because it bears a rescm blam:!: to U la l olher. "'False" g old, for examrl<':, 001'$ not have the
nature of Kold. but ueales lilt:' impression of being gold, benmsC": il
has its color. A thing is therefore nllt.-u "[abe" insofar as on the basis of iLS external quaJities it is apt
w
prodm:e a false opi.nion. The
opposition bct\llc c n appearance and bei ng is a
wlldi lioJl
fOJ" Ihe
possibility of hu man error. Thomas stresses. however, th..l a thing does n ot cause falsi ty necessarily. be cause the human intellect is ahlt": 1.0 junge things, which is to say, to make a distinction bct\\ cen dec.eptive arpe:aranc:es and true being.\l� The fuct that in relation to the human intellect it i!'; possihle to speak of "false" th ings is no [�\Isif.i.cation of the the�i.� that t':vt':ry king is true, for twO reasons. In lh� first place they are not false absollltdy hut ani)' in a certain '
respect. Morco\'�r, lh� I'd�\tion Lo the human in tdle:c:t is not
essential but accidental lu lh� trulh of lhings. It is striking that Thomas in
Summa ihl'.ologiae 1,17.1 re!';ponr\!';
"
is the contrary of whiteness. but
a color il.��lfYIl)
it
agrees with its opposite in being
Is the opposition be t.....een true and false an opposition by way of
contradiction? Are they oppo se d as affirmation and negation, alii
"some" have said ?H H Thomas denies this, without going into this
p usi ti on any further. But h is dcnial can be explained from his analysis in an other text of the n a ture of the oppositions a t
a
critically to the argument sed contra, whi ch is ralher unu:!iual in the Summa. This arg umen t departs from a citation fwm Aug ustille, who claims in De vera religiont (c. 36) that "evel�)' body is a ll'u� hony ;)l1(l a false unity, " since it imitates uni ty without being it.
transcendental level. Since "being" j !'; the first c onception of lhe intellect and is not founded in .�omdhing. nothing can be uppused (0 it in (he manner of a privatio n 01' contrary. but o uly in the manner of a negation. In rhe case, however, of the "one." Mtruc"
Now everything imitatt':!'I; the ni"ine goodness, but fal ls short of it.
and
Therefofe fal si ty exi!'l;ts in all things . Thomas distances himself
frolll lhis argument, the consequenr.� of which is th at every
t:rt!ated thing is ill it�tf false. A defective likla.·ne.�" or representa
tio n does not involve as sur:h falsity. but on ly when it gives
occasion to a false opinion. Hence a thing is not always called false when it resc mbles something else.�
98 'bir/.. 1 . 1 1): �S�d ��Dmdum !':omparatiom:m ad intellcctum humanum i n vcnituf interduffi inO'lcqualit;ls rei ad intellectum qual" qllmiam fIlmlu e" ips
re (:ausatur. Res enlm notitiam sui facit in anima per ea q uae de Ipsa e!(leritis apparent, quia cognitio nostra a sensu initium sumit cui per se oblcctum sunt 5CIlSibilcs quali tates (. . .) ; et ideo. quando in aliqua re apparent sensiblle. qua lil.lllf'� d�mmllilr;ullt:s Ilaluram quae eis non mbc�t, dici tur res ilia esse falsa ( .. .) . Nee CRmen res est hoc nlOdo ('.am•• fal si talis in anima tjuod necessario faI.lta-tem cause!. quia vcritas ct falsitas praeciput: in iudicio anima.! �l'i�tllnf. ;mim;!. 'Vero in quantum de �bus iudicat non patimr 1\ rebus �d m agi� quocbm modo atJit: unde res non dicitur faha quia semper de se facial fat!alT\ arp�henlioneltl, sed qui;!. nilta esl facere per ea qu;!.e de ipsa appar�nt.� S.IIl. 1.17.1 ad -4 (lJuud in oppoIIiLUm obiidlur); "8imilitudO 'Vel reprae·
'v
•
(2)
281
goorl
"
found�d
"
matters
are
different, because (heir conccptions are
on "being ." TIle)' un have a contra!)· or privative opposi.
tion that is founded on being. The opposition bet\·.ecn true anrl
senlal.io d efi c.i cns non inducit rationcm f;!.isitatis, n i�i inquantum praeslal occaliioncm falsac opinion is. Unde non ubicumq ut: esl Nimilil.urin, elk.imr res falsa: sed ubicumq ue est talis simililudo, qual" nata est facere opi nion cm faham, non cuicumque. sed ut in I'lurihm." lOO Ibid. J,17.4: "Ad cuius c...irl.p.nti�m, sdcndum est quod negati o nequc ponit aliquid, IICqllt: d�tl"rminilt �Ibl aliquod subiectuffi. Et propter hoc, potell
did l.llm de en te quam de non ente; sicu t non videm et 11011 Sl!d�nl. Pl'iv:lLin autC'm non ponit allquld, Jed determinat sibi 5ubiectulIJ. L"t. �T1im negalio i n subiecto. u t dicitut in IV ,'4drJ.Ph.: �·all'�l.lIn CUIIll non rlir:inl r ni�i de eo quod cst natum 'Videre. Contrarium vero 1"1. ali q uid ponh, et subi cctum dctcrminat: enim eH ali4ua N(N'!cieli rolori5.� 0 ] lIJ11i. r.17.4: ""corum et fahum opponun tur ut contraria. ct non sicut affinnatio et negatlo, Ut qUidam dixerunt: It is not dear ",hum rhtll!la� h:t.� in mind here. Alexander of lJales say' in his SlnnmtO ihllmogiUJ 1,1 '� ''l.2,('.5 (ed. Quan,ah i I . n. 1 0 1 , p. 159): Oprmi lin -veri ad rabnm Cst non .iem artirmationit ,illJpliciter. ul I!:n "l iquid el n ihi l. sed ,kill artirmationis et nescatiunla In lIenl!:rc', \It homo et non-h.omo.·
n.i�m
"
282
CHAPTER SIX
false is not the same as mat bet\'\Ieen being ami non-being. Falsity
is not identical with pure nothingness.102 Is the opposition between
(nil" ancl
f.'ll se a privative opposi tion? A
thing is "fa1M';" which is apt to cause a raise iU4:'
so
the false must be a being
1l01I
(ens).
Be<:au� I'::lch bring as such is "true," [alsity thal exists in things must be fo u nded on somelhillg thal is lrue. I()� He...e an aspe<':l of the opposition l.H�lwt;'ell true
and
false is for mulated that is charac ter
iSIL!; of pi ivalivt;' oppositions at the transcendental level. We
t"m:uuntered its special n ature earlier in connection with the one and the many (5.5.) . .Every privation takes away some being, but is founded in a subject that is. Therefo re , in being, by reason of iu;
community. the privation of bdng has its fou ndation i n heing. and the same applies to the one that is c:onver tihlr- with being.
Thoma.� speaks in a similal" way of the rel...tion bet......een the uue
is not �cle�att';. Therefore. Thomas concludes. true aud false .\fe c:ontranes.
The reasoll Ihal Thomas in this text sp eaks exclus h'e ly of a
contral)' opposition is lhill he regards rhe true and the false not as
lhey are in things but as they arc in lhc intellect. The «true'" is th at
whil:h is
as
it is
apprehendtd.
(he �false" is that which is not as it is
apprehended. "To be" and "not to be" are contradictory, but to
apprehend being and not-being constitutes a contrary opposition , for
Aristotle proves in Perihennmeia.f (II,
c.
14, 2�h �5)
I.hat the opin ion
"the goorl is good " i� c.ontrary to the opinion "the good is not
goori."W6
Thomas's argu m ent ror his thesis that true and false are (;011-
fiualily of knowledge . The terminus of the process of knowing is
cum"lUnra
and <,:oIlv�rtible with being . As
e\lery priv
fabity is founded in something that is truC.104 The true enjoys an ontologi<:al priority over the falsc. It is remarkable. however. that in the
corpus articuli of Summa
theolQgiae 1,17.4
the opposition between tOle and falr,e il'; vit';wt":rl
exclusively as a
con tra
ry opposition. The mark of Ihi ... form of
In I &nt., 19.5.1 ad 8: "cns Cit prima i n le n tio inle:llectus; unde em! pr:r modUI1l ('.on trarie tatis I'd privatiullis, 5ed solulll
non pote:�1 aliquid oppon i
per rnodum ne:g;;nionis: q uid. �iUIl ipsulIl nun fUTHlatllr in ali(plIl, i!lJ 11 ..1' uppu.�illJm SIHUnj ()ppn�il;:t enim �l1nt circa idem. Sed unum. v('rum ('I bon u m, ��r.und\lm propri il� inlentiones, fundantur supra intcntioncm tntis. el ideo possunt habere opposi li on e m contrarietatis vel privationis fun datae super ens,
s!cut e:t ipsa super ens fundantur. Unde patet quod non eodem modo se: hailet
vcrum, e:t fahum , et malulll, et bonum, siellL ens el Ilu n ell5". 105 D� !Jeri!. I . I U ali f): "aliquirl ('xi,t('ns extra animam pro IfIntO dicilllr
fabum ( . . . ), quia n atll m est de sc facere falsam existimationem; quod autem nihil elt non est nalum de ,e fa.cere aliquam e:xistimationem q u ia non movet vlrtutem cognitivam: unde oporte:t quod ilIud q uod ral&um dicitur aJiquod ens sit; unde:, cum 01110(' ens ill q uan tlHl I lmilL�IIlCJdi sit v,"mlll, "run!'!. tal�iliil�1!1 in re llll.� ""i\l.. nll'm �lIrr:1. aliqunm verilntem fli ndari M. 1114 s.th, 1,17.4 ad 2: -falsum non fun datur in vero sibi conlrarlo. sicu( nee malum in bono slbi ('ontrario; se:d in e:o quod sibi sllbii ci tllr. Et hoc ideo in II1roq\lC 3('.c:idit. qui a vcrum el bonum comnmnia stln(, e:1 cOllverluntuT cum
cnlc; uncir .. 8ic.ul omnis privollio hmdatuf in �lIbie:(.lo quod cn cns, ila omne: fllndallir In aliqllo hono, cl umne fabulil in alilill" n:rn.M
lII"hun
1i:omethin g. Now, the
evil is founded ill sumething good . This is so because the
true and the good line
WI!
(ponit)
traries is that the false a�serls som�lhillg as w�l1. On� may wonder
The false is fou nded ill something lrue ......hidl is its p ro�r subje<.:l, as
opposition is that the contrary posits
false p osits some th ing. As the true posit." an apprehension in conform ity with the thing, 00 the false posits an ...pprehension lhal
Summa lhefJ[fJglae 1,17.1.
ann th� false in a reply to an objection in
just
283
TRUTH AS TRANSCENDENTAL
whelher lhis idea is sausfying from his own view of the inner
lhe tru�. Hence false knowledge is a knowing that has not attained
its end and is ac.cordingly in the strict 5ell5e not knowledge at aU. A false syllogism is really no syllogism, Thomas recognizes,m7 It
is thcrefore not the case tbat "[rue" and "false"' are specifications of
a common genus lik.e ''white'' and "black" are specifications of
"color. M A false opinion is
by the truth
Hl5
a
f.'liling,
.. norm. TnHh i�,
a.
a."
a
ct�fec.l. bet:anse it is measurerl
Spi n07.a &iYS, 7u)nn
Ibid.,
I. 17.4: MFal5111n aute:m aliq ui d poniL. Est enim ralsum. ut dicit M�laPh.. r.)o: r.1J 1J1lnd rlirilnr VI"I \'idl"lnr aliquirl I"SS(' quorl non f'�t, \'1"1 non esse qu od e�l. Sku I enim w:rum poni t aceeption em adaequatam rei, ita falsum acccption cm rei non adaequalam. Unde manife:stum e:st q uod verum et falsum sun t eon traria. " 106 Ibid. 1.17.4 ad 1: "id quod ClSt in rebus, cst vcrila5 n:i; scd id quod est ut apprehen&um. est vefllill intelkl:tIls, ill IjUO primo �.�t v� rias. Undr. r.t. fa.lslIll1 r.�T. id qllOlt non e�1 III nppreh ensum . Apprehendere au tem esse: et non esse, eommrietatem habet: Slcut probat Philo!ophus. in II Pmhn-m . . quod huic opinioni , brmum est bonum. co ntraria cst, bonum lion e.st bonum." Cf. I·ll,64.S ad 3: MQuam Yi s en i m �ue ct non esse: non sint COlllrana, se:d eon tradictorie: opposila, �i cunsidc:n:ULur ipsa si)pl iti f·al.a prout �unt in n'hllS, qllia altt'flIm t:�l .. ns, I"l nltcrum est pllre non ens: lamen si r ereran tur ad anum anlmac, utrumqllc ponlt aHquid. Unde esse ct non cue: silOt contradictoria: ,.;:d oplnio qua opinamu r qu od Dcn",,,, 1st honllm, est contraria opi nioni qua opinam ur quod bomun non t.lt bon...... IfI, In /I Sm4., 24.:�U ad 3. 11»1 W.KG I II, I'mf'. XLI.II, SrholiulJI. Philosophu� IV
t.
---- "
284
285
CHA.."'fJ£K SIX
TRUTH AS TRAN�CENDENTAL
6.10. The order of the true and the good
aloe considered in themselves, then their order is first be in g, then lhe one. next the true and finally the good. I I I
In a number of texts Thomas raises the question of the relation between the true.': and the good. This is worthy of note, because in hi s works the discussion usually remains restricted to the coo verti bi lity of a particu lar transcendental with Ming. There is reason, h owever, to devote separate attention to th e relation hem'cen the
true and the good. given the special place they occupy ill the doctrine of the lranscendenlais. They belong to the relational transcendentals, and they are the formal objects of the two facul ties
of a spiritual substance, intellect and will. The focus of Thomas's discussion is not so much the converti bility between the true and the good. It i s in fact presupposed that
they are convertible with each other, since the lrUe and the good are convertible with being. lOll The question is rather whether the tOle or the good is prior qua concept (sem1/.dum mtionnn) . This ques tio n also has an anthropological aspec t because of the correspond �nce of th� true amI th� good with the spiritual faculties of man. The t",lO main texts in which this them� appears are De venlale 2 1 . 3 and Summa tht'ologiad,16.4. 1 1 0 In De veritate 21.3 the starting poin t of Tho mas' s analysis of the order of the true and the good is his derivation of the transcen· dentals in the first article of q. 21. There he had established that the true and the good add to bei ng a relation of reason, namely, the relation of th at wh ich perfec ts (re�pf,ctivum plrrfu:tivi). Now, the order between perfectionli can he considl"red in two ways: fi rst,
from the side of the perfec tio ns themselves; second, from the side of lhal which is p erfectible.
\Vhen th� true and the good are t:ollsideI-ed ill the first way, that is, in themselves (secundum se), then the true is p rior to the good.
The reason is that the perfection of the true relates only to the species of a thing, while that of the good also includes its being
( e,sse) . The ratio of the good is thus more comprehensive than that of the true and adds an element to it. When the transcendentals
\Vhen however the order of the true and the good iii considered from th e side of that which is p erfectible ( ex parle perfectibilium) ,
then the good is prior to the true. There are two reasons for this. The Erst is that the perfec tion of the good extends to more things than that of the true. Through the true on ly those things can be perfected which are capable of assimilating for ms in an im· material way. that is, knowi n g substances. It is not the bei ng itself of a sto ne that is assimilated in knowledge, but its species. Through the good, however, material things too can be perfected, because
the good is perfective not only according to the spt'cies, but also
a..:t:o rding to the t!sse. For this reason all things desire the good, hut
not all know the true. 1 12 We rderred to the dissimilarity between the true and the good earlier in order to ace_ount. for the different perspectives in the derivatio n of the transcendentals found in De veritate 1 . 1 and 2 1 . 1 . Because "only the mind is perfet: tible through the trll!":,"113 the perspective in the first text is "anthropocentric."
III
Dt vm/. 21.3; �Considerando eq.;-u V�IUIII et hmlllm st'l:umiulll Sf'. sir
verum est priu� bono secundulIl rat.innem cum venllll sit perfe('[ivum alicuius
:secund um ratiml t'm speciei, bonum autem non solum �ecundum ration C': m speciei sed etiam secundum esse GUod habet in re: et ita plura includit in se ratio boni Guam ratio veri, e t se habet (juodam modo per additiolll�1Il ad illam. Et sic bonum praesupponit velUlIl, verulIl
immat.t'rialiter ali q uid recipiunt et sunt cognoscitiva; species enim lapidis c::st in ani m a, non autem se::cundum esse q uod halx t in lapide. Sed a bono nata sunl perfici etiam ilia quae:: secundum matedale esse aliquid relip i llll t , cum ratio bani in
HI!)
For the convertibility of the true and the good, �ee S.!h. 1,59.2 ad 3; 11II,I09.2 ad 1 . I I U Thoma;; also dis(\lue::s the:: relation betwee::n the:: true:: and the good in his rom mt' ntary Oil the Episll� tu the:: HebrcWli (c 1 1 , l�ct. 1 , !i!:i4), hul thi5 hrief �Xl does not add any'h in� eS�nfial 10 the two le)['� mentiolled.
huc cUllsistilt qUlld a.lilJllid sir perfe c:tivum tam secundum rationem speLiei quam etiam secundum esse, ut pri us dictum cst. Et ideo omnia appl"l\Inf bonum sed non omnia cognoscunt ve::rum; in utroquc enim ostendit\lr habitudo perfectibili! ad pcrfc::c tionC':m quae e::! t bOllum vel vcrum, scilicet in appe titu bani et (ogn i tione veri." Cf. 22.1 ad 1 : "et ideo omnia po�sl)nl apprlrrr bonum �ed nOli omllia (:ngIH1!K"f'rt' verUlfl."
Il,�
/lfid. 2 I .!'I ;ul l .
286
CHAPTER SIX
TRI:TH AS TRANSCENDENTAL
The :'I(:cond argument thOll, from the side of that wh ic h is
perfec.tible, the good is prior to the true concerns only knowing
beings. The), can be p�rfected both by the good and by the true, but this occur:> cadier Ihmugh me former than through the lauer. On aC4.:uunl of their participation in b eng. things an� perfected hy tht: i
287
aspect of the "ultimate . " I I G The ratio of the true, knowahility, i!;
therefore closer to being than is the ratio or the good.
The second argument (or the pri ority of the true i!'l that cognit.ion
naturally precedes appet ite. Since the true is related to cognition.
and th� good to lht: appetite, the lrute' is cum:eptually prior to the
good. and on account of their knowledge of something, they art':
goUd.1 I 7 Thomas does not say why cognilion naturally precedes
perfec te d by the true. But knowledge is posle...ior to being
appetite . This precedence does not seem self-evident, because in
(e,tv.) .
From this \icwpoint therefore the good precedes the tnle. 114
veritute 21.3
De
he had concluded that all things desire the good, but
Thomas's explanation in the parallel text, Summa lheologine t .16.4,
not all know the true. The appetitive power is not restricted to
is more direct. not maki ng any distinction between perCel.'tiom
knowing beings. since some things strive for an end that suits
and that which is perfeCljble, and shorter. One could wish that his
argumen13tion were more extensive. It is aha different in accen t from the previo Lls texl. Thomas's thesis is that absolutely speaking
(absolute loqul!ndo) , the true is prior argumen ts [01' this priority.
to good. He advances two
their nature without having an apprehe nsion of that end. Yet Thomas regards the phenomenon of a "natural appetite" as not in conflict with th� nniversal rule t.hat the appeti te follows cognil.i()n.
Things that. n aturn lly tend 1.0 nIl end follow not their own appre hension of this end, but that of someo ne else. They presuppose an
The first is based on their relationship to the first transcendental.
The true is closer to being than is the good, for the true is related to
being absolutely and immediately, while the mlill of the gnorl is
iIlteliect 1.1)' which the), an;: ol'der�d to thal end;ll!l "foJ' the ""lund
agen t, the end and the necessary means to th� �nd must be p redet�rm ined by some higher intellect. "119 The natural appetite of
consequent upon being. insofar as this is perfect and appetihlt:.ll.�
things follows the cognition of an intellect that established their
Hut why does the true have a more immediate relation to being
natures, that is, the divine intellect. So cognition precedes appetite,
than the good does, in light_ of the fact that Thomas's l"eOef.:lioJl ill
even in the case of non·kno.....ing beings.
De vemoU 21.3 suggt':st:'> the opposite? Tb�re he Imu argued that t.ht: good is perfectiYe in respec t of (hte'
by the goou on
esse and
that things arc perfected
the basis of their participation in being. The inten·
lion of his .malysis in
Summa thr% /fiae 1,16.4
In Summa IheologitU 1,16.4 two objections are rai�d which are also found in DII veritflu 21.�. hut the replies presented in the first text are philosophically mOI-e intel'esling than the ones in the
is strictly o ntological .
seco nd lexl. The fit st olljcrliou al-gul!S llml \Vh"l is IlIUI-e univel'Sal
In tllte' pr�te'ding article, dealing Wilh the convertibility of the true
is prior ill cOlll'e»t. l'o..... il �ellls thal the good is mor-e uuivte'rsal
aud being, Thomas had explained that the true has a rela tionship
to Imowlcdgc and that everything is knowable insofar as it has being
(cr. 6.6.).
The
ratio of the
good expresses appetibility. A thing
is appetib le, insofar as it is perfect. Consequently, the good has the
1 14
lhid. 21.3: �Scculldo quia ilia etiarn quae Ilata sunt perflci bono el vero,
per prius perficiumur bono quam vcro; ex hoc enim quod esse p:>rti d p
than the true. since the true is a particular good; it is the good of the
in tellect. The good is
related
LO
the true as mat which is common to
what i5 proper to somcthing.l� 1 1 6 Ibid. 1,5.1 ad 1: "Sed bonum dicit rationem perfecti, quod est appetibile: et per conset{ur:lls dicit ratiolle", u1Iimi.» f17 Ibid. T,16,1: uSecllndo npparet eli hoc, quod cognitio naturali 1eT praecedir
appctitum. Uncle, cum vcrum rClpicial cogn itioncm , bonum autcm appctitum . prius efit ,'erum quam bonum secundum rationem.� 118 De writ. 22. t ad 2: -Nee tamen hoc prohibetur pro:r hoc quod appetitus in
animaJibus [read accordiuR lO some manusc,-ipl1l: univenalilll.u] cORnitionelll �t:qllit\lr, 'Illia ill r!'ll\I� nnr.ur:1lihIlS �/'plitur apprehf'n�ionf'm Vf'l {:ngnif.ioTlI"TII. non mmen ipsorum appetendum sed ilIius qui ea in finem ordinat." Cf. S.Ih. 1-11,26. 1 . Ilg
12U
Sth. 1.19.•.
Soth. 1,16.4 o� . I; Dt writ. 21.� obj. 4. cr. S.I". 1 ,59. 2 obj. 3: "Sed bonum ct "crum videntur .e habere SiCUl commune: ct proprium: "am ,e:mm cit IlIllId1d<& II h"num, .dlkel iOlrllf'r.lu•."
--_... "
,
--_." ,
,
288
TRUTH AS TRANSCENOY.NTAT.
CHAPTER SIX
Thoma�',.. reply develops the important ide a that "the will and
another u nlimited .
the intellect mutually include on e
of a su b stance wh ose h orizon is
."
They are Th ey
are
the faculties
"lI-anst:end
ental" faculties in the sense that th ey extend to all that is. Because
poi nts out that the priority under discussion is a priority in concept
(ratione). That which is
point of view:
Now,
of the other. The i ntellec t understands that the will wills; the will
object of the intellect under the aspect of the tme. J 22 The assertion of
the o bjector that the true is a p�\lt.icular guod is correct within the urder of that whic h is app etib le Frum this it dues nut follow, however, that the good is prior to the true in an absolute sense, for in the order of that which is in te lligible , the good is related to the true as the particular to the u niversal 123 .
.
inLdlt'd finL appn·lwnds twing
Itsdf,
secondly, it.
,
"
st'cond, lind that of "good" thirll, ;Ilthuugh lite gnod is in things. 125
it follows that the diflerent formal objects of the two facultie s, the
good is somdhing true, or it wOlllrl not he i n telligihle; i t is the
tht'
apprehends that it understands being, thirdl}' it apprehends that it desires being. Hence the ratio of "bcing� is first, that of true
wills that the intellect undcrstands,12! From this mutual inclusion
the good , and conversely. The true is some good, or it would not be appetible; it is object of the will under the aspect of the good. The
prior in concept is prior in the intellect. He
then goes on to describe the order of the transcendentals fro m this
of their infinite horizon, the act of the one faculty includes the act
true and the good, include each other. The true is contained under
289
"
At no other place in his work does Thomas sketch the order of
the trallscendentals so completely from the perspective of human unders tanding .
Being
"
"
is the first known. Again it appea rs that
the in tentionali ty of knowle dge p,-et:edes its renexivity
.
Being
lIot intelligible. true knowledge ,
could not be apprehended by the intellect if it were
Insofar as being is of itself disposed to bring abou t it is called "true." The good " expresses the aspect of appetibilily and comes logically after the "true." The refore we must now foc us ou r inve stigation on this transcendental. "
The second objection against the priority of the true appeals to
Aristo tle s statement in Metaphysics \11, which we have often met '
in this chapter: "the true is not, like the good, in things but in the
mind." But that which is in things is prior to that which is in the
intellect, for our kn owledge is caused and measured hy thi ng s.
Therefore, 1\!1
the good is p riOl to lhe 11"ue. l 21 In his rejoinder Tho mas '
ad 1: �"olunta.s et intellectu5 mutuo se indudun t: nam intel lectus intelligit valuntatem, et voluntas vult i n tellectum intdligere, Sic ergo inter ilia quae ordinantur ad obieclum voluntatis, continentur etiam ea quae sunt inrelll: ' ctus; et I" ronvenlo. Undl" in orrlinl' appl"Tihilium, honllm Sf' hahN
S.th. 1,16.4
ut universalc, ct vcrum ut particularc: in ordinc autcm intclligibilium cst c conveno." cr. 1.82.4 ad 1 ; De viTt. comm. 6 ad 5: "&num et verum sunt obiecta duaru m partium animae, scilicet intellectivae et appetitivae: quae quidem duo hoc modo se habent, quod utraque ad actum alleri us operatu!'; sicut volunt..",", vult illtdl�ctlllll i ntl"lligt"rr., t't inf.l"lll"rtlis inlt"lligil. ,,'[)lllntatt"TIl vdle.'· 122 S.th. 1,59.2 ad 3; 79.11 ad 2; 82.4 ad I; 87.4 nd 2; II-ll,109.2 ad I ; D.. malo
6; Dt vmt. 3.3 ad 9: kVcrum Cl bonum sc inVlcCm drcuminccdunt." Dt virt. ,ammo 6 ad 5: MEt ideo haec duo, bonum e t verum, se invicem includunt: nam
bonum
est quoddam verum, in quantum est ab intelkctu apprehensum; prout sdlket intellectlls intelligif. volunllltt"TIl vdl .. bOIlIlIll, ..... 1 dJalll ill IjllLllltUIll intelligit aliquid t"ne bonum; similiter edam e t ipslI m \'ertlm est qlloddam bonu m intellectus, quod etiam sub voluntate cadit, in quan tum homo ...ult intelligere verum. K 12� S,th. 1,16.4 ad 1 : MEx hoc ergo quod verum est quoddam bonum, sequitur qllod bonum sit prlu. I n urdhll: appetibilium: n on aulem quod sit prills .lm llciter.K
�
I 4 5.tll. 1, 16,. obj, Ii /J, rll'l"it.
21.� obJ. I .
1:.15
;:}.Ih. 1.16.4 ad 2: "�ecllildulll hue est aJiq Ul d pnu�
ratione,
quod prius cadit in intellertll. lntelll"'r.tus
\
I
GOOD AS
TRA
291
NSCENDENTAL
ethical rdation to the other transcends the order of ontology. for the appeal to responsibility for the other breaks through the being CHAPTER
of an autonomous subjecL3
SEVEN
To understand the meaning of the thesis of the convertibility of good with being. it is of importance first of aU to situate it contex
GOOD AS TRANSCENDENTAL
tually within the history of philosophy. The thesis has a polemical
"All that is, insofar as it is, is good" (Summa contra Gentius Ill, 7). More than with regard to any other transcendental, the thesis of the convertibility of the good with being has provoked questions
and critical reactions. The thesis seems counter-intuitive, the negation of a basic datum of human experience. For is it not obvious that in our world things exist which are not good but bad, and that it would be betler if they did not exist? Does Thomas's statement not imply a denial of the reality of evil? The thesis "every being is good" (omne ens est bonum) is severely criticized by modern philosophers who draw
a
sharp distinction
between being and value, ontology and axiology. According to the German philosopher Max Scheler �this proposition is wrong if 'bonum' means more than valuable. For the 'omne ens' is. qua ens, indifferent to good and bad."1 The neoscholastic philosopher Johannes Hessen claims that the axiom is untenable. it makes sense only if the axiom means that "being� is susceptible to valuation, that it may be the subject of values, whether positive or negative. The proposition "every being is good" would. on such an interpretation, only affirm that reality is open to the realization of values.1! Philosophers inspired by the Jewish thinker Emmanuel Levinas are also extremely critical of the idea of the convertibility of being and good. While Levinas does not engage expressly in polemics with the Scholastic tradition, his philosophy is fundamentally
opposed to the thesis that every being is in itself good. On his view, Western thought is a philosophy of "totality," which reduces the original otherness of things to the same. The Western tradition, however, contains ideas that exceed the ontology of "the same." One such an idea is that the good is beyond being. According to Levinas this idea expresses the priority of ethics to ontology. The I
hob/,,,u of a Sociowg'J oj Kn(>Wltdgt.
English
trans.
by M. S.
Frings,
london 1980. p. 217, n. 141. 'l ··Omne eos cst bonum'. Krilischc Ullteuuchung cines altcn Axioms�,
i1\: /tre/ajv for PIWosopIW 8 (19!'.ift), pp. �17-29.
thrust against two rival conceptions: the Platonic vi� that the Good is beyond being
(7.1.), and the Manichaean doctrine of a radical
dualism of good and evil (7.2.). Historically, Ihe notion of the good
played a prominent role in the beginning of the medieval doctrine
of
the transcendeotals. It is no coincidence that Philip the
Chancdlor's first account of them is to be found in a summa d�
bono. Thomas's discussion of the mtio of good and his systematic justification of the convertibility of being and the good will be analyzed in
7.S. to 7.5.'
A treatise that was central in medieval reflections on the good was Boethius's De hebdomadibus. In connection with a passag� in Boethius's discussion of the question "How can substances be good in virtue of the fact that they have being when they art: not substantial goods?" Thomas introduces a difference hetween being and goodnes.'i
(7.6.), a difference that is often neglected by modern
critics. There is not only convertibility, but also a non-identity, which arises from the distinctive ratio of the good. Because it has the character of being "perfect� and "final." the "good" is last in the order of the transcendentals. � An example is thc Dutch philowpher Theo de Boer who in his bo01o:. en f'mJdi�. D� wiftbtgmU 0011 Emman1.ld l..I!Vinfl.l, �:mrn .1976. p. 20 .
TWJm fi/oMlfit
Opp�5 Lcvinas's thoughl 10 �an old and dominant tradItion philo50phy:· ern d hlmll'" lOftWl"llln'uT. . 4 For Thomas·s conceplion of thc good. see G. Mangdh,
III
_
II
We!otcrn
benc nel
pe..�jero flIosofico di S. Tommaso�, in: MHulla�a Franuxco.na 60 �1960). pp. 24L-:H6; J. Van de Wide, "He( thema 'Ens et bonum OOllvertuntur , Wordmg en filosofische l>etekcnis·, in: Tijd.IrlIriJl voor- Fium!14 26 (1964). pp. 186-:t53: B. Welte, -rhomas von Aquin liber dM Cute. EntWllrf cines System5�, in: /tuj d" . Spu.r d,s Ewigm, Fn:iburg 1965, pp. 170-84; E. Smith, T�' Goodnm oj Bnng an Thomi5tic Phi/oJuph)' and its Contnnpvrary Signiji(.fltlu. Washmgton, D.C. .1967; M. Hoenes, Em et BQn11m Convn-'1.InluT: Ein'- Dtutung del $chQ/as/uchm AXIOms unltr INJQndn-" Brick.sichligung atr MttaphyJi.k urn! dtr Ethil! del hl. ThomlJJ von �qu.an.
BamlJerg 1968; J. A. Aerm:n, -rhe Convertibllity of Being and Good 1n Sl. Thomas Aquinas-, in: T� NttJ! &lwlaslirixm 59 (1985), pp. 449-70; �. Mac Donald (rd.), Btin, and GoodntS5. Tht Conc'PJ oj Iht Good In Me�np}I'J�JtS and Philo5op1tical TAtoWg" h.haca and London 1991; D. M. Gallagher, AqUinas on . Goodncli3 and Moral Goodnc!lS�. in: D. M. c..llagher (cd.l. ThoJJUJJ AqUinas aM hu 1Jgaq. WuhinKtnn, D.C. 1994, pp. 57-60.
GOOD AS TRANSCEND�;N"'AI.
CHAPTEll SEVEN
The good is found in human beings in a special mode. for the good in general is the object of the faculty proper to them: the wilL It is in human actions that the moral good makes its appearance. One of the most interesting aspects of Thomas's transcendental way of thought is the relation he establishes between transcenden tality and morality. He gives a transcendental 'foundation to the first principle of practical reason, "the good is to be done and pursued" (7.7.-7.8.). This chapter ends with an analysis of thc opposition between good and evil. We already discus�d the problem of an opposition at the level of transcendentals in the sections on "The one and the many" (5.6.) and '7he true and the falsc" (6.9.). This problem becomes particularly acute with regard to the good, because the Manichacan thesis construes the opposition between good and evil in such a way as to exclude the transcendentality of the good.
7.1. The Platonic lhesis: The Good is beyQ11d being The most famous articulation of philosophy as agalhology comes in Plato's Republic, in which he claims that the Good is "beyond being" (509B). In book VI Plato deals with what he calls "the great est knowledge" in the education of the leaders of the state, namely, "the Idea of the Good. " 1t would be an illusion to think that to know all other things except the Good is of any avail, for this is "what every soul pursues and for the sake of which it does everything." But what is the Good iL'Iclf? To this question Plato gives only an indirect answer, by means of an analogy. He draws a comparison with something "most like the Good," the sun. As in the visible world the sun is the cause not ollly of the visibility of things but also of their generation and growth, so in the intelligible world the Good is the cause not only of the truth of things but also of their being. The Good itself is not an essence but surpasses being "in dignity and power." The transcendence of the Good proves to be based on its causality: it is the principle and "master" of being. Yet this transcendence does not seem to be construed by Plato as meaning that the Good is opposed to being. for later (518D) he calls the Good "the brightest of being."5 On Plato's Idea of the Good. see E. LIe Slrijd.er. �L'idec dll Bien dans la Rrpllblijluc de Plalon; Donnee, phil()logiqllt5 el siKnificalion phil()$ophiqlle�. �
,
,
\
293
Plato's view of the Good has been a powerful source of inspira tion for theologians and philosophers through the ages. Levinas is a dear exampit: of its influence in our time; in the preface to one of his earliest works, he asserts that his thought has been guided by Plato's statement that the Good is beyond being.1i He understands the Platonic thesis as an expression of the opposition between ontology and ethics, to the effect that the Good is placed outside the order of being. Moreover, the thesis has a religious dimension for Levinas: "the Invisible of the Bible is the Idea of the Good beyond Being."7 Clearly this view of the relation between being and good is the radical antithesis of a transcendental view in which the good is coextensive with being. Direct knowledge of Plato's works was rather scant in the Middle Ages. It was almost exclusively restricted to the Timaeus. The Republic was unknown to Thomas. but he was confronted indirectly with the Platonic thesis in two ways: through Aristotle's critique of the [dea of the Good, and through Dionysius the Areopagite, whose work. on the divine names held the priority of the good above being. We want to consider both 3\'enUes to lhe Platonic thesis. one after the other. (i) In the first chapters of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotk investi gates the question concerning what the good is in which human happiness consists. In 1,6 he discusses and criticizes the opinion uf the Platonists while acknowledging that such a discussion is difficult because it touches the views of friends. The Platonists held that there is a univcr�1 Good that is per St, the common Idea of the Good "
]n his commentary on the Ethics, Albert the Great had defended Plato against Aristotle's criticism. He concludes that Aristotle's arguments are useless (nihil valent) when one understands the Idea of the Good, along with "the Commentator" Eustratius of Nicea, as L'antiquili classiqut 99 (1970), pp. 45()...67; H.-G. Gadamer, Die Id" deJ Culm zwiscMn Plato Imd AristQteles, Heidelberg 1978. 6 E. Levinas, Dt I'tristenct a l'Q:i$tanl, Paris 1947. 7 Humanismt dt l'aulre 1wmm" Montpdlic:r 1972. p. 78.
in:
S For Arislotle'l critique s�e J. L. Ackrill. 8Ari�lotle on 'Good' and Ihe
lslomic PMI(l.lOphy and Iht ClasllC/l/ Tr/ldition. wa"}J Pwmltd to Richam Wal..,,-, O"rord 1972. Reprinted in: J.
Cal�gori�5�. in: S. M. Stem et al. (ed.),
Barnes. M. Schorleld :and R. Sorabji (cds.) . Arlieks 011 Aridott, II, London 1977, pp. 11-24. Sc� abo H. FI;uhar, "Th� Critique of PlalO's Theol)' of Id�as in
Arialoll�·.
ElhiC".-, in: A,rlirIa on Arillof/.r II, pp. 1-16.
•
294
CHAPTER SEVEN
one Form from which all things descend as from one divine ex emplar (see 1.3.). Thomas's commentary also rdativizes Aristotle's critique by introducing a distinction. It is not Aristotle's intention, he claims, to refute Plato's conception insofar as it teaches that there is one separate Good that is the essence of goodness and upon which all good things depend. Thomas notes that Aristotle himself, in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics, recognized such a separate Good. Aristotle's critique is focused on Plato's view that this separate Good is the common Form of all good things,lI Thomas's assessment of AriSlode's critique is ba!icd on the distinnion between what is common in vi.-lue of predication and what is common in vinue of causality, a distinction that is fundamental, as we have already seen (4.1.), for Thomas's discus sion of Platonism. In Plalo's Idea of the Good, these different types of commonness are mistakenly unified. There is a separate Good that is the cause of all good things, but its universality must be distinguished from commonness in the sense of a Form or Idea. Aristotle advances a number of arguments against the existence of a universal Idea of the Good. The most important is the second argument ( l 096a 23-29), which is based on his doctrine of the division of being into categories. On Thomas's rt�ading the argu ment runs as follows: the Idea is the ratio and essence of that which participates in the Jdea. Where there is not one ratio there cannot be one Idea. Now there is not one common ratio of the diverse categories, for nothing is predicated of them in a univocal way. But good is spoken of in as many ways as being is spoken of. It is found in all categories: in the category of substance, the good is God and mind; in that of quality, virtue; in that of quantity, meas ure; in that of relation, the useful. The condusion must therefore be that there is not one Good thai s i the common Idea or ratw of all good things.1O 9 IT! I Ethic., 1eeL 6: "Circa primulll
e51 quod Aristotiks non intendit improbare opin ionem Plalonis quantum ad hoc quod ponebat unum bonum separatum a quo dcpenderent omnia bona, nam et ipse Aristo tiles in XII Metaphysicae pooh quoddam bonum 5eparalum a tOIO univcrso ( ...) ; improbat autem opinion em Platonis quantum ad hoc quod poncbat illud bonum scparatum eMe quandam Ideam communem omnium bonorum." 10 IT! I EthIC., lect. 6. Note in parti(lllar: "Bonum alltem, sku! c! cns cum quo convcrtitur, invcnitur in quolibet praedicamento ( ...). Manifutum UI ergo quod non ut aliquod unum bonum commune, quod Kilicet $il idea vrl Tatlo communis omnium bonorum; alioqui n oporleret quod bon um non cOTl�jderandum
invenirelur in omnibus praedicamenti., &ed in uno fOlD.·
I. ,
coon AS
T.RANSCENDENTAL
295
In Aristotle's argument the emphasis is on [he categorial diversity of the good. Thomas does not deny this clement, but ill his commentary the accent is different. The good is found in all categories; it runs through all of them and is therdore convertible with being . 1 1 Aristotle's argument in the Ethics was interpreted in the thirteenth century as an indication of the transcendentality of the good. The good is not transcendent, that is, separate, but belongs to the communia. Aristotle's Criticism of the Idea of the Good poses a problem. His emphasis on the ca(egorial diversity of the good necessarily raises the question whether there remains allY unity in all that which we call "good." After all, he observes, the universal predication of the good does not 5eem to be a case of homonymy by mere chance. Aristotle suggests three possibilities (1096b 27-28) , without, however, declaring himself in favor of any one of them. Are things called "good" because they have come forth from one thing or because they are ordered to one thing or else by analogy (for example. the intellect is to the soul, whal lhe eye is to the body)? Two Aristotelian texts are central for the medieval doctrine of
Metaphysics
IV, ch. 2, which deals with the unity of being as a condition for the unity of first philosophy; the other is the quoted passage from the Ethics. In Thomas's commen tary on the latter text, the thirteenth-<:entury transformation of Aristotle's concept of analogy becomes evident, for he brings together under the heading of analogy all three of the possibilitiell suggested by Aristotle. Good is said of many things, not according to entirely different rationes, but by analogy, that is, by the same proportion. The analogolls predication of the good, which is a consequence of its transcendcntality, can occur in three ways: according to the dependence upon one first principle, according to the ordering to one end, or according to one proportion to different subjects, e.g., as sight is the good of the body, the intellect is the good of the soul. The first two ways refer to a separate good, the third one, which Aristotle himself called Wanalogy,"- refers to a goodness that is inherent in things. According to Thomas, Aristotle would prefer the third way, since in that case something is called "good" more properly, that is, on the basis of intrinsi(; denomination.l� In chapter IX (9.3.) we shall set: that this mode of
analogy. The fU'st is
I I CI. De _1<1 1.2 ad 4. Il! In I Ethic., le(:l. 7: -Ideo alilem hltnc
tertium modum pr.u:fert. fJllia
296
CHAPTER SEVEN
GOOD
analogy. which the medievals named the "analogy of proportion
Platonic thesis
the idea that the good is prior to being on account
Dionysian view to section
corpus dionysiacum. In De divini.5 nomin;bus Dionysius
7.5.,
where we shall analyze Thomas's
reply to the objections against the convertibility of being and good.
intends to elucidate the divine names Lhal manifest Cod's causality as
as
of its greater extension.l1 We shall postpone his discussion of the
(ii) Another avenue (0 the Platonic thesis that the Good is beyond
with respect to creatures, such
297
On the basis of his study of Dionrsius, Thomas sees the core of the
ality," is not the primary mode for Thomas himself.
being was the
AS TRANSCENDENTAL
the Good, Reautiful. Being, Life
and Wisdom.l� The primary of theS(': divine names for Dionysiu.� is the Good: "the sacred writers have preeminently set apart from all other names for the supra-divine God the name 'Good. "'14 "Good" is the first name, prior even to "Being." hs precedence
derives, as in Plato, from its causality. The Good that is above all existents manifests most fully the processions of creatures from God. Whereas the causality of the wGood," which Dionysius also compares with that of the sun, extends to what is and to what is not, the causality of "Being" extends only to what is. He therefore first considers "the Cood" (c. 4) and only thereafter "Being" (c.
5).
Thomas observes that Dionysius follows the Platonic way of thought in placing the good before being.15 In his commentary on
De divini.� nominibu.s he accounts for this precedence. The reason for it is that the Platonists regarded primary matter as a "non-being,"
since its essence is to possess no form. Nevertheless, primary matter is ordered to the good, a sign of which is that it strives most after the good. Now an ax.iom of the Platonists is that a cause is higher to the extent thal its causality exlends to more things. From this it follows that the Good is a more universal cause than Being. lt>
7.2. The Manu/uuan thesis ,
I
The second conception of the relation between being and the good which left deep marh in history is the Manichaean thesis. It denies in principle the goodness of being
as
being on the grounds
that it is evident that there are things that are evil by nature. It is impossible to reduce the opposite natures of light and darkness, life
and death, soul and body to a single source. As good fruit is brought forth by a good tree, so evil fruit is brought forth by an evil tree. Manichaeism, named after its founder Mani (216-277), teaches a radical dualism of two primordial principles: the Father of Light and Goodness, God, and the Prince of Darkness, also called
Hyk (Matter). The appeal
of this doctrine is that it acknowl
edges the reality of evil in the world on the': one hand without, on the other. burdening the question of God with the problem of the origin of evil. An important source for the medieval knowledge of Manichae
ism
was
Augustine. having himself spent yt':ars under the spell of
the religion. In book VII of his
umjtJsio"ru he describes how, after a
Laborious struggle, he finally Iil>erated himself from its dualistic acdpilur secundum bonitatem inhaerentem rebus, prim; a.utem duu modi secundum boniulem separatam a qua non ita proprie aliquid denorninalur." I � JJt dil,jnis rwminibus 2.3 (Migne PG 3, 64{)B). 1 4 Ibid. 4.1 (693B). Thomas explains Diony�ius's intention in In Dt div.
nomin. C. :So 227.
l !i D� malo 1.2: �EI hanc uiam uidetur sequtus Dionisius in libro De diuini�
nomlnibus. bonum preordlnans enti.�
1 6 In D� div. nomi1l.
c.
3, 226: "Et ad huiusmodi nominationem acc.ipien
darn, considerandurn est. quod Platonici, materiam a privatlone non distln guentes. ponebant earn in ordine non-entis (...) . Causalitall autem emis non . . se extendit nisi ad entia. Sit:: igitur secundum eos causahcru entu non �e extendebat ad rnateriam primam, ad quam tamen se extendit causalilas boni.
Cuius signum est quod ipla maxi me appetit bonum. Proprium autem P.M. effectul ut c.on\lert.ator per desiderium in suam callsam. Sic igitllr bonum est . unl\1erlalior el aldor causa quam ens. quia ad plura U� extendit elus 'au....liw." Cf. c.
4, lect. 2, 295-6. Sr.e also F. A. O'Rourke, PJ","o.DionYJi1U and
Ihe MtfO/Jhylj(,l of Aquifl4l,
Leiden 1992.
world view. Augustine is the author of a series of treatises directe<;t against the Manichees. The conclusion of this polemic is his De natura ban . 1 8 This work challenges the Manichaean thesis in two
i
ways. The first part (ch.
1-23)
employs rational argumentation; the
second part is based on scriptural texts which proclaim the univer sality and goodness of God's creation, like Genesis 1:31 ("And God saw everything that he had made. and, behold, it was very good").
17 De maU! 1.2: -Bonum habet ampliuimam extensionem, etiam am plio
rem quam ens, ut PJatonld, placuit." III Cf. A. A. Moon, Tile De Nalura Boni of Sai1l1 Augwtine, A Tmruwlion wilh an Introduction and (;0111"""10,,, Washington. D.C. 1955 (The Catholic University of America Patrlilic Serlel vol. 88). cr. ror the Auglluinian triad of IIIodus,
JjurUJ and ,,",0, nUl!J"]a. Aqulnu
In .Ii.lh. I, .'L�.
Augustine's argumentation starts with thr�e prOposLtaons, of which only the ftrst two are also endorsed by the Manichees: (i) the Supreme Good is God, who is immutable good; (ii) all other goods are from him alone. but because they are made out of nalhing, they arc mutable; (iii) every nature qua nature is good (eh. J ) . Augustine wants to show that it is inconsistent not to accept the third thesis and to introduce another kind of nature. an evil one, that Cod did not make. Every nature possesses three characteristics, which Augustine calls general goods (genualia bona): modus, species and ordo. He does not explain these noLions, but they express the being, the specific form, and the finality of each thing respectively. 'Where these three constituents are absent, there is no good and there is no nature. Each nature is therefore good. As long as a thing is, it is good.19 The Manichaean thesis again became a topic of discussion in the Middle Ages through the movement of the Cathari. This may explain, as we observed in chapter I, why Philip the Chancellor's account of the transcendentals is concentrated on the good and expressly refers to the Manichees. His Summa de bono may have been intended as a reaction to this new variant of Manichaeism, and thus the beginning of the doctrine of the transcendcntals as a philosophical response to the challenge of the Cathari. In a number of places in his work., Thomas argues against �thc error of the Manichees." One of his arguments is that what is cummOil to diverse things must be reduced to one principle. Now all things agree at least in the aspect of being (yatio essendt) . Therefore they must be reduced to one principle that is the universal cause of being. But being as such is good, which appean from the fact that every thing desires to be. The Manichaean view is "impossible. "IW From the analysis in this and the preceding section we can con clude that the medieval thesis of the transcendentality of the good was prepared philosophically by both Aristotle's critique of Plato'" Idea of the Good and Augustine'S critique of the Manichaean doctrine. The thesis "every being is good" also has a religious background, It is the expression of the universality of God's act of creation. LY Of' lIahmz btmi, t. :5.
�(t
GOOD AS
CHAPTI!R SEVt:N
298
C/. C.on/nJi01ltJ V11,12,IR.
D� fKl4. �.Ii. (1. Sd;. 111,7 :1I1c1 l�.
TRANSCENDENTAL
299
7.3. Tfu "1'Ot;o" of tht good What does Thomas mean by "good" and "goodness" when he uses these terms in a transcendental sense? In countless places he adopts the definition mentioned by Aristotle at the beginning of his Ethics (1,1): "the good is what all things desire" (bonum l!St quod omnia appetunt).'il Thomas endeavors (0 link. ArisLOtelianism with Neoplatonism preciselK on this matter of the 1'Olio of the good. For he refers at the same time to pseudo-Dionysius, who in De divinis nominibus (4.7) says that "all things desire the good and the best.''1!� The desirability of the good seems to be a common teaching of both traditions. In his commentary on the Ethic$, Thomas advances an interpre tation of the definition of the good that goes far beyond Aristotle's text. Aristotle begins his Ethics with the statement ( 1094a 1 3 ) : "Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and decision, is thought to aim at some good," and continues: "For this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that which all things desire." Aristotle's intention is to investigate the good for human being.f, and therefore he presents in his opening statement a swift inventory of human acts or deeds. The context of the defini tion of the good, which he cites in passing but does not discuss any further, is human activity. Thomas examines at length the definition "the good is that which all things desire." To begin with, he discusses the peculiar nalure of this definition formally t;Ollsidcred. Normally. what is stated by a delinition is the essence of a thing. A definition says what something is by reducing it to something more general, its genus, and by adding to the genus the specific difference. But the definition given of the good is not of this character, nor can it be. Thomas explains the reasoll for this:
21
See, for example, i n addilion lQ the bil$ic: text� on the transccndentals De vent. 1 . 1 and 21.1: ScG. T,!!7: HAl: II1,3, 7 and 16; Dr pot. 9.7 ad 6; Dr malo 1 . 1 ; In I Mrtaph., leel. 4, 7 1 ; lect. I ! , 179; In II Metaph., \eet. 4, 317; In De dlT!. nomin. L 1 , lect. 3, 87: c. 4, Ic:ct. 22, 5R9; S.th. I, 5.1. n Cf. SeC. III,3: "Hinc e�1 quod philosophi ddinicntes bonum dixenmt: Bonum tit quod 01111110 appelunf. Et Dionysiu�, " cap. de DlfJilllJ nominibus, dicit (1\1Od om1l1a bfmum tI optimum ,(mCl.!pi.!CUnl�. 'nle reference both to Arisl.odc and to p�c:ud()..Diony�iu.� (;m already be round in Philip I.he Chanrellor, Summa d� Mmo q. I (rd. Wkki, fl. (0).
300
COOD
CHAPTER SEVEN
One must keep in mind that the good is reckoncd among the lir5� . (prima) to such a degree, accordn i g to the Platonlsts, that the good IS prior to being. But. in reality. the good is convertible with being.� This explanation discloses that the good belongs to the
301
AS TRANSCENDENTAL
the broadest possible sense. All things, knowing and not-knowing, possess a tendt:ncy toward an t:nd; in this sense they
all
desire a
goOd.21 Thomas's second remark is that the definition must not be
undenitood to mean that there is one specific good that all things
tTanscen
deniM. Thomas interprets the good in a transcendf.:ntal sense by
desire. The good for human beings is different from the good for
animals. Every thing desires a good that suits its nature. The defi
referring to its firsmess and its convertibility �ith being. The mark of the lraoscendel1tals in a cognitive respect is that they are the first
(lxmum communit" sumptum). texts on the tr.mscendentals, De
nition expresses "the good in general"
conceptions of the human intellect. Against the Platonic thesis of
It is for this reason that in the basic
the priority of the Good, he opposes the interchangeability of good
veritate 1 . 1
and being. Neither of these points, however, is elaborated in his
and
21.1,
Thomas uses the phrase "the good is what all
things desire� as the definition of the transcendental good.
commentary.
Thomas's predilection for Aristotle's definition is surely con
Because the good belongs to the
prima
and is coextensive with
nected with its manifestation of the good as an end
being, it cannot be reduced to something more general nor manifested by something earlier
(priam).
Summa theologiae 1,5.4 he inquires into
(finis).
In
the question as to which type
In the definition cited by
of cause the notion of the good pertains. From the definition of the
Aristotle, the good is therefore made known by its effect. The
good he immediately concludes that it has the intelligiblity of a
proper character of this definition is according to Thomas thai it is
final cause: "since the good is what all desire, and this has the
per postmora.24
aspect of an end, it is clear that the good has the
Hence the definition does not mean to say that
ratio
of end. .,�...
something is good because it is desired but rather the converse:
"Good" and "end" have the same
something is desired because it is good. Through the effect, in this
aspect of desirable and the influence proper to the final cause is to be desired.29
case the appelite, the cause is manifested, that is, the good. The nature of the good is such that it is appetible. The
a posteriori
But in
Thomas explicitly Slates that "the
ratio
since the good has the
Thomas raises an objection to the
view that the good has the aspect of a final cause. The objection is based on another conception of goodness, a principle that is cited
character of the defmition of the good is misunderstood if the good is conceived only as "something relational to an
Summa theologiae 1.5.4
ratio,
appttitul. ":!�
of the good implies a
by many medieval autbors and was mentioned by Philip the
relation, not because the name 'good' signifies only a relation, but
Chancellor as one of the definitions of the good: "the good is
because it signifies something upon which a relation is consequent along with the relation itsdf. "26
diffusive of its being�
contemporaries, Thomas attributes this principle to Dionysius the
In his commentary Thomas also makes two obscr.>ations with
Areopagite. although he recognizes that it is not taken verbatim
respect to the content of the definition of the good. The first remark
from his works. The Dionysian principle, in contrast to the
concerns the v(:rb "desire"
(apjMtunt),
which could suggest that the
(bonum est diffusivum sui t'S.'ie).
Like most of his
Aristotelian definition, expresses not the appetibility of goodness
definition only holds for beings who possess knowledge and consciously intend an end. The term must be taken, however, in
In I Ethic., lect. I: "ipsum autcm lendere in bonum est appetere bonum. Unde et aClum [rtad: omnia] dixit appetere bonum, inquantum tendunt ad bonum." Cf. De urnt. 22.1: "utrum omnia bonum appetam"; In Dt htbdom., \eet. 3, 41: "Et ita cum culullibct rei sit aliquis appetitus uel intellectiuu5 lid �nsitiuus lid naturalis, coniloeqllcn5 est quod quelibet res appetat bonum". 28 S.th. 1,5.4: ·curn bonum sit quod omnia appetunt. hoc autem habet rationem finis; manifeuum ell quod bonum rationem finis importat.· Cf. In I Mttaph., lect. II, 179. �\I 171 1I Mftaph.• Icc!. 4, '17: "eadem cnlm ratio bonl et finl. Cit, nam bonum �It quod omnll . ppetunt". D, writ. 151.11: -Infiuere clu..e nn.U, ell appell et de.lderari". ('.J. 111,18. 27
2S In I Ethic., lect. I: "Circa quod considerandum est quod bonum numera·
tur inter prima. adeo quod secundum Platonicos bonum est prius enle, sed secundum rei YeritaLCm bonum cum ente convertitur." 114 Ibid., lect. I: "Prima autem non possum notificari per aliqua priora. sed notifiCarltlLr per poueriora, situt cil.uiloile per proprios dJectus." 2!i J. F. Crosby, "Are Being and Good Really Conyertible? A Phenomena loaical lnquiry". in: Tht NftIJ ScIJDla.J/i&i.lm57 (1983), p. 476. III D� v.nf. 2 1 . 6 : "ratio bonl relpectum implicat non quia ipsum nomen ' oonl algnlficet iplum relpectllm IOlum ted quia alilnirlCat id ad quod sequitur rnpec.tlw cum reapectil \.pIo."
stO.
,
S02
303
t.:HAYrER SEVEN
GOOD AS TRANSCENDENTAL
but irs productive side. So it seems that the good ha.� the ratio of an
cause In the way the sun is, but communicates itself in freedom.
efficient cause.�u
Thomas objects to interpreting Augustine's famous saying �Be
In his reply Thomas stales that "the good is said to be self
cause God is good, we existH (Df. dnctnrlll christiana I, 32) in the sense
diffusive in the manner in which an end is said to move." The
of efficient causality. �Good" refers ill Lhis sayiog to �good will."
same reinterpretation in the direclion of final causality is pre
The proper object of the will is the end and thus Augustine's
sented in other texts; ""hen it is said that the good in vinue of its
ratio is
diffusive, the diffusion is not to be understood as implying
saying is traced to the final cause.:\�
the operation of an efficient cause but as implying the relation of a fmal cause."'1 Thomas's interpretation has been called "counter
7.4. TM umvtrlibilily of being and good
inmiti\'c" by a modern critic on the grounds that "dl'"3.wing of the sort essential to final causation is contrary to diffusing." The
Thomas discusses the convertibility of being and good extensively
Dionysian principle is the expression of the productive side of
in two texts, Dt verilate 21.2 and Summa theologiae 1,5.1. In both texts
goodness and "it seems wrong-headed to propose reading it as
the ratio of the good is the slarting point and is shown to include the
expressing exclusively the attractive side of goodness. "�2
ratio
of being. so that the conclusion is justified that every being is
Thomas's reinterpretation of the Neoplatonic principle th�:ll the
good. Yet there are clear differences between the ways in which
good is diffusive of itself departs however not from an opposition
the connection between good and being is established in the two
but from a causal order between the attractive and the productive
arguments.
sides of goodness. The good as good has the aspect of an end
We consider first the argument in De lJtrilate 21.2. The ralio of
because of its appetibility. As such it is the principle of all causality.
the good is de§cribed there as "that which is perfective (perfectivum)
The good moves the agent to act, for the end is the cause of the
in the manner of an end." This description is taken from the
causality of the agent. Every agent acts for lhe sake of a good.:\� The
preceding article, one of the basic texts on the lr.lrlscendentals. In
motive behind the reinterprelaliorl of the Dionysian principle is
De venlalt 21.1 Lhe good is presented as a relational transcendental;
that its understanding in terms of efficient causality would imply
it is perfective of another according to its act of being (,..,sse). That
a necessary process of emanation. The Good. however, is not a ,u
S.th. 1,5.4 obj. 1; -bonum est diffusivum sui eMt. u t u vt:rbi.s Dion)'$ii accipi(Ur, quibus dicit quod /.Ircm"", GIl:l( tpW omnia suruultml d llmt (� d",. ""mill. 4.4). Sed em diffusivum importat rntionem GIU:lae dlicienlis. Ergo bonum habet rationem causae f:ftic.icnli.s." Cf. J Peghaire, �L'axjomc 'Ronum ut diffusivum $ui' dam Ie ncoplatonisme et Ie thomi�me. in: &UU, dt I'UnhMo'. Jilt d'Otlawa, Section speCiale, vol. 1 (1932), pp. 5·-30 •. L. De....'an. �St. Thomas and the Causality of Cod' s Coodnen". in: Laval ThiawgJqut d PhiloJtJ/'hique 34 (1978). pp. 291-304. �I S./h. I,SA ad 2; D, urnl. 2 1 . 1 ad 4: "Cum amem didtur quod bonum sit diffusivum secundum sui rationem. non eM intdligenda diffusio sccundum quod importat operation em causae efficientis �ed secundum quod importal habitudinem causae finalis". �� N. KrelZmllnn. "A General Problem of Creation: Why Would God Create Anything at A11?�. in: S. MacDonald (ed.), B�ng and Goodn".u, p. 220. �, &G. 1.S7: "Ratio vero boni est f:X hoc quod est appetibile. Quod est finis. QuI etiam movel agentem ad agendum. Propter quod didtur bonum ene diffu$ilJum sui tI t$#." /n I Senl,. 34. 2 ad 4: "bonum dicitur diffu.sivum per modum finis, secundum quod didwr quod finis movet effidentem." cr. I'll V Mttaph., kct. 2, 775: "Finis alltem est G\II:>.a efficientls non qnantulll ad eUe, acd quanlunl ad rationem causalilatil. Nam emciens eil causa inqLlantum n.glt: non autt-In aait nl.i caun linis.- D� f7nfl�. nal., c. 4.
which is perfective in this manner has the aspect of end with n:ganl LO thal which is pC!rfC!clC!d by it. fur this reason, Thomas
states, all who define the good correctly, place something pertain ing to the end in its definition. Hence Aristotle says "the good is
what all desire.H.'I!>
Taking this account as a !'.taning point, Thomas determines in
De ventale 21.2 that what has the ratiu of the end also has the ratio of the good. An end has two characteristics: It is sought and desired by things which have not yet attained the end; and it is loved by the things which already participate in it. Both features belong to its act of being (esse) . Those things that do not yet participate 54
S.lh. I.S.4 ad 4.
III
�5 D� "mi. 2 1 . 1 : "In quantum alJlem unum ens secundum esse suum est perfectivum alterillJ et consummativum. habet rationem finis r�spcctu illius quod ab eo perlicitur; el inde eSI quod omnes recte diffinientes bonum roTlllnt in ratione dus aliquid quod pertinel ad habitudinem finis: unde Philosoph us dicit in , Elhicorum quod 'bonum Optime diffinicrunt dicentes quod bonum e.,. (\II[)(I <>Illnia apprlullt'."
304
CHAPTER SEVEN
being tend towards it by a natural appetite; things that already possess being naturally love it and preserve being with all their strength. This last thought is illustrated through a citation from Boethius's Consolation of Philosophy. In 5.7. (,The one and the good") we saw that his argument of the universal tendency to self preservation is intended to show the identity of the one and the good. Thomas however draws the conclusion that being itself (ipsum esse) has the ratio of the good. In this way the connection is established between the notions of "good" and "being." It is impossible that there is any being (ens) that does not have esse. Therefore every being as being is good. Because the good includes the ratio of being, the good and being must be convertible.36 The core of this argument rests on the universal desire for be ing. In various places in his work Thomas appeals to this evidence from experience to show the goodness of being. The definition "the good is what all desire" refers not to one specific good to which all things tend, but to the good in general. Yet if one still seeks to determine the good to one thing, then this good, Thomas says, would be being (esse) , for all things desire the continuance of their being.�7 One may wonder, however, whether the appeal to this fact forms sufficient metaphysical justification for the good� ness of being, since the desire does not found goodness but pre� supposes it. Thomas himself recognizes that the universal desire for being is rather a sign (signum) of the goodness ofbeing.:o.H The argument for the convertibility of good and being in the Summa theologiae 1,5.1 proceeds in a differem way. It consists of four steps. The starting point is the ratio of the good, which is being "appetible." Naturally, Thomas refers here to Aristotle's definition at the beginning of the Ethics. 36
Ibid. 21.2. NOle especially: �Ipsum igitur esse habet ration em boni, unde
sicut impossibik est quod sit aJiquid ens quod non habeat esse. ita necesse est ut omne ens sit bonum ex hoc ipso quod esse habet ( . ..) . Cum autem bonum rationem entis indudat ( ...) , impossibile est aliquid esse bonum quod non sit ens; et ita rclinquitur quod bonum et ens convertantur.� 37 Ibid. 22.1 ad 4: ·Cum dicitur omnia bonum appetunt, non oportet bonum determinari ad hoc vel ilIud sed in communitate accipi quia unumquodque appetit naturaliter bonum sibi conveniens. 5i tamen ad aliquod unum bonum determinetur, hoc unum erit esse. Nec hoc prohibetur per hoc quod omnia esse habent quia quae esse habent appetunt enim eius continuationem.� Cf. De malo 1.1. �!i
SeC. II,
41; III, 107: "Esse autem, inquantum huiusmodi, est bonum: cuiul signum e�l. quod omllia tHe appaUllC
GOOD
AS TRANSCENDENTAL
305
The second step in the argument identifies "appetible" with "perfect." "Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only insofar as it is perfect, for all things desire their own perfection." In this step the transition is made from the concept of good to the nature of good.�9 Proper to the good as good is that it is perfect. What deserves attention is that Thomas introduces the notion of "perfect," not that of "perfective," as in De veritate 21.1. "Perfect" signifies something in itself, "perfective" is relative to something else. The notion of "perfect� was the subject of the immediately preceding question (q. 4) in the Summa theologiae. "Perfect� is what lacks nothing; it is defined by Aristotle as "that which has nothing outside itself" (cuius nihil est extra ipsum) .40 Perfect has the character of "complete." It is that which has attained its end. The third step is the identification of "perfect" with what is "in act" or actual; " everything is perfect insofar as it is actual." A thing is not completed when its potentialities are not yet actualized. It is not perfect until it has attained its proper act. Only then is the thing what it can and must be. By means of the notion of "act" Thomas is now able to establish the connection between good and being, "for to be (esse) is the actuality of every thing." With this final step the analysis has arrived at the foundation of the thesis that every being is good: "therefore it is manifest that good and being are really identical. � Yet they differ conceptually, since the good adds to being the aspect of appetibility.41 Thomas advances yet another argument for the goodness of being. In the beginning of his commentary on the Sentences, he presents a short argument based on the origin of things. Good and being are convertible according to their supposits, "because all 39 Thomas makes the distinction between the
ratio and llatura of the good
in SeC. I, 37: "Quod quidem patet et ex ipsa natura boni, et ex eius ratione. Naturaliter enim bonum uniuscuiusque est actus et perfectio eius. (... ) Ratio vero boni est ex hoc quod esl appetibile." �f) Phys. III, c. 6, 207a 9 (Thomas, kct. 1 1 , 385). 41 S.th. 1,5.1: "Ratio enim boni in hoc consistit, quod aliquid sit appetibile: unde Philosophus, in I Ethic., dicit quod bonum est quod omllia appelullt. Mani festum est autem quod unumquodque est appetibik secundum quod est perfec tum: nam omnia appetunt suam perfectionem. Intantum est autem perfectum unumquodque, inquantum est actu: unde manifestum est quod intantum est aliquid bonum, inquantum est ens: esse enim est actualitas omnis rei ( ... ) . Unde manifestum est quod bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem: sed honum dicit rationem appetibi1is, quam non dicit ell�.·
CHAPTER SEVEN
(.000
AS TRANSCENDENTAL
307
being (e.sse) is from the Good and towards the Good. "4t The thesis
to more things than the other are not convertible with each olher.
that each being is good has in Thomas, as it does in Augusti.nc, a
That applies to the rdation between good and being, since accord
religious background. The significance of lhe argument in Summa
ing to Dionysius the good 31so extends to non-being. ThOll whicll
theotogiae ),5.1 is that the convt:rtibility is grounded metaphysical
does not exist is called into being by Lhe good. The term bonum
ly, that is, from a consideration of being itself. The good does not
itself seems to express this power, for it is derived from boare.
come to a tbing from the outside, but it pertains to what is
which means "to cal1."46 The importance of this objection appears
mOSI
a
intimate to it, its being. For to be is to be in act, and to be in act is a
from the fact that Thomas, in Summa lheologiae 1,5.2, devotes
�rfection and therefore good.43
separdtc question to it: "Is the good prior to being?" This question
Just as in Thomas's arguments for the convertibility of being with the one and with the true, his understanding of being (esse)
constitutes a central moment in Thomas's discussion of Platonism
(cf. 4.1.).
as actuality is crucial in the argument for the convertibility of
Thomas's account of the identity of being and goodness by
being and good. Being is not some particular good alongside other
means of the notions of act and perfection raises the question of the
perfections like life and knowledge. The latter perfections arc
goodness of matter. This question is of importance in connection
desirable only insofar as they are actual. Nothing has actuality
with the Platonic thesis that prime matter is a non-being which
except insofar as it is. Hence in each of the other perfections usomc
nonetheless participates in the good. For Thomas, however, the
sort of being is desired. And thus nothing is desirable except being,
opposite problem seems to arise. He affirms that prime matter in
and consequently nothing is good except being."H For this rcason
some way is, but then asks whether it is good. The ratio of good is
"to be" wall called in the fourth question of the Summa "the most
that it is "appetible." Now, prime matter has the aspect not of
perfect of all things, for it is related to everything as act. "45
desirability, but of that which desires. Hence it appears to lack the
ratio of good. Consequently, not every being is good.47 The objection of aU ages against the convertibility of good and
7.5. O,iection.s b to the convmibiWy
being is the reality of evil. That which is divided is not convertible with one of the elements dividing it, as for example "animal" is
The thesis of the transcendentality of the good and its converti
not convertible with "rational." That seems to hold for being and
bility with being is directed against the Platonic thesis, as ex
good. Being is divided by the good and evil. for there are many
pressed by pseudo-Oionysius. (hat the good is more extensive than
t:vil things. Not every being, therefore.
is
good.411
being and the M.anichaean thesis which denies that the good is
A more specific objection concerns the goodness of mathemati
coextensive with being. The justification of the transcendental
cal objects. It is derived from Aristotle, who states in the third book
thesis should therefore 'be complemented by an explicit respon.'>C to
of the Metaphysics (c. 2. 996<1
these opposite positions. That occurs in Thomas·s replies to the
mathematicals." Yet they are beings, for every science investigates
objections he adduces against the convertibility.
something that is. Therefore the good and being are not con
The objection based on the Platonic thesis argues that things which are related to each other in such a way that the one extends
35)
that "there is no goodness in
vcrtiblc.49 In this section we want to consider (i) the question concerning the goodness of mathematical objects; (ii) the question as to the
42 In I SItIII., d. 1 . Exp. textu5: "quamvis bonum et em differan(. secundum
intentiones, quia a.lla est ratio boni et emis; lamen convertuntur secundum !UP OSita, eo quod omne esse est a bono et ad bonU!l\�. 4 Ci. S.lh. (,5.3. H Ibid. (,5.2 ad 4: "vita et M;ientia, et alia huiusmodi. sic appetuntur Ul sum in aClu: unde in omnil;lUs appetitur quoddam es....... Et sic nihil eu appetihile nill enl: el per con�quenl nihil est bonum nisi ens." 4.� Itl'id. 1 .... 1 ad 3.
�
goodness of prime matter; and (iii) Thomas's reply to the PlatonicIn I Smt., 8.1.3 obj. 2: Dt veri/. 21.2 obj. 2; S.th. 1,5.2 obj. 2. The same etymology of the terill bunum was pre,emed by Albert the Great in hi� 46
disws�ion
of the: good (1.3.).
47 S.th. 1,5.3 obj. 3. 4H De vtril. 21.2 obj. 6. cr. S.th. 1,5.3 ohj. 2. 4!1 1h l.ml. 21.:.! ..I�j. 4; .... lh. I.�.� C11�i. 4.
309
CHAPTER SEVl':N
GOOD AS TRANSCENDENTAL
Dionysian thesis. The opposition between good and evil will be examined in the final section.
already noticed that when transcendentals are communia, they also extend to what is a "being of reason" (ens rationis) . We found that Thomas elaborates this relationship with regard to "being-as-true." In his work we also find examples of the application of the convertibility of being and good to beings of reason. Does the will, Thomas asks, will only the good? The object of the will is the good, but the will tends not only to what is but also to what is not. Sometimes we will not to speak, and we also sometimes will things that are not actual but future. Does this mean the will does not will only the good, since good is convertible with being? In his rejoinder Thomas emphasizes that being in the real order (in rerum natura) is not the only mode of being. Negations and future events, insofar as they are apprehended, are beings too. Such beings can be apprehended under the aspect of good, and it is thus that the will tends to them.5� Remarkably, in his commentary on book III of the Metaphysics, Thomas speaks of the goodness of mathematical objects differently than he does in the Summa theologiae. There he states that in them the good is not considered under the aspect of the good and the end. Nevertheless that which is good is considered in Ihese objects, namely, being and essence. "Therefore it is false that there is no goodness in mathematicals," he claims, referring to book IX, where Aristotle would have established this conclusionY Thomas makes a distinction between the good in a formal sense and the good in a material sense. The good in a formal sense, that is, the ratio of the good, is not found in mathematicals, because they are abstracted from the end. What is found in them, however, is the good in a material sense, that is, that which is good. The reference to book IX of the Metaphysics is not entirely clear, since the question is not addressed there explicitly. Thomas prob ably has in mind the passage in which Aristotle states thal the properties of geometrical figures-for example, that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles-are found by division of the figures. Through this division what is potential in the figure is made actual.55 Thomas relates this actualization not to the goodness
(i) Do mathematical objects possess goodness? Thomas's answer In Summa theologiae 1,5.3 is negative. If mathematicals were separate beings in reality, there would be in them a good, namely, their very being. They are not, however, subsisting entities; they have a leparate existence only in reason. Mathematicals are abstracted from sensible matter and motion, and thus they are abstracted from the aspect of an end. From this it follows, although Thomas does not draw this conclusion explicitly, that the good does not exist in mathematicals, because the notions of finality and good ness are the same (cf. 7.3.). The impression that Thomas excludes these objects from goodness is strengthened by the concluding observation of his reply: "Nor is it repugnant that in some being of reason there is not the good or the aspect of the good, for the ratio of being is prior to the ratio of the good. "SO This remark seems odd. The conceptual primacy of being means that being can be understood without the necessity of understanding something other. This primacy does not mean, however, that being can be understood to be without the other transcendentals. "Being cannot be understood without the good in the sense that the intellect understands that some existent is not good."51 The other transcendentals are inseparable from being. The question of the goodness of mathematicals is a special case of a general problem. The doctrine of the transcendentals bears primarily on things having being outside the mind-the natural things that are divided by the categories. Thus Thomas can say that mathematical objects are good in virtue of their being in things. The very being of the line or the number is good.52 In this way they are however not considered as mathtmatical objects. In our analysis of the convertibility of being and the true (6.6.) we IiO S.th. 1,5.3 ad 4: "mathematica non subsistunt separata secundum esse: quia ,i subsisterem, esset in eis bonum, scilicet ipsum esse ipsol'um. Sunt
.utem mathematica separata s..:cundum rationem tantum, prout abstrahumul' a motu et materia: ..:t sic abstrahuntur a I'atione finis, qui habet I'ationem moventis. Non est autem inconveniens quod in aliquo ente secundum ratio nem non sit bonum vd ratio boni, cum ratio entis sit prior quam ratio boni". ftt D� veril. 21.1 ad 2 {in contrarium}. ft� Ibid. 21.2 ad 4: "ea d..: quibus mathematicus considerat, secundum ess..: quod habem in rebus bona slInt: ipsum enim esse linea..: vd numeri bonum elt-.
5�
S.th. I-II,8.l ad 3.
54 In III Metaph., lect. 4, 385: KUnde in eis non consideratur bonum sub nomine [rtad: ratione] boni et finis. Comideratur tamen in eis id quod est bonum, scilicet esse et quod quid est. Unde falsum est, quod in mathematicis non sit bonum, SiClH ipse infra in nona probat." �� Metaph. IX, c. 9, 1051a 21-23. .
.
CHAPTER SEVEN
GOOD AS TRANSCENDENTAL
but to the truth of knowledge: "whenever things are reduced from potency to act, then their truth is discovered. "56 But every act is as
comes to actuality. Thomas can therefore apply to prime matter the transcendental thesis that everything that is is good1.rsofar as it is
such a perfection, and this truth could therefore also be called a
a being. Prime matter is being in potency and, consequently, good
good.
in potency.·S9
3iO
311
In some texts however Thomas makes statements about the (ii) Being is divided by act and potency. Now act in itself is good,
goodness of prime matter which go further than a potential
for something is perfect insofar as it is in act. From this it does not
goodness, and he acknowledges that the Platonic thesis of a greater
follow, however, that potency in itself is an evil. Potency too is a
extension of the good contains a kernel of truth. In the
good. for potency is ordered to act and is proportionate to it. Thus
Gentiles
everything that is, whatever its mode of being, is good insofar as it
being. But from this it does not follow, Thomas emphasizes, that
is a being.57
matter which is being only in potency is only good in potency.
Prime matter is therefore good insofar as it is a being. But does
Summa contra
111,20 he reiterates that everything is good insofar as it is a
His argument is that "being" is said absolutely
(absolute),
while
it have the status of being? This question is essential for the
"good" also consists in order. So a thing is said to be good, not
evaluation of the Platonist thesis. They deny the convertibility of
merely because it is an end or has attained its end, but also because
being and good, for they place prime matter in the order of non
it is ordered to an end, which it has not yet attained. Consequently,
being. In his commentary on
matter cannot be called "being" absolutely
De divinis nominibus
Thomas ana
(simpliciter),
for it is a be
lyzes Plato's position. Plato corrected the view of the pre-Socratics,
ing in potency, but it can be called "good" absolutely because of its
who failed to distinguish between matter and form and held that
order to being. So it happens that "the good, in a sense, has a wider
prime matter was a being in act, such as fire or air. Plato perceived
scope
that underlying form is a matter which in its essence has no form. H e failed, however, to distinguish between matter and privation,
(ambitus)
than being." For this reason, Dionysius states that "the good extends to existing things and non-existing things. "60 Thomas presents a similar argument in
De malo 1.2.
where he
the absence of form. Accordingly, he called matter "non-being,"
wants to make clear that the good has the widest extension
and Dionysius followed him in this. But Aristotle has shown in
(amplissimam extensionem) ,
greater even than being. Good in itself is
that it is necessary to distinguish between
what is desirable in itself, that is, the end. But whatever is ordered
matter and privation, since matter is sometimes found under a
to an end has the aspect of good by virtue of this order. Now what is
form and sometimes under a privation. Privation is associated with
in potency towards the good is thereby ordered to the good, since to
matter accidentally.58
be in potency is nothing other than to be ordered to the end.
book I of the
Physics
Matter is not simply non-being, but is rather in potency towards form, for form is the end of matter and that by which matter first
Therefore, whatever is in potency, even prime matter, has by this fact the
ratio
of the good. Even though the Platonists mistakenly
regarded prime matter as a non-being, their view that the good
.'16 In IX Mttaph. , lect. 10, 1894.
.�7 SeG. III,7. Cf. D� malo 1.2 ad 8.
.'11:1 In Dt div. nomin. c. 4, lect. 2, 295: �Circa quod considerandum est quod
Plato correxit errorem antiquorum nat.uraliwn, qui non distinxerunt inter materiam et formam in rebus generabilibus et corruptibilibllS, ponentes primam materiam esse aliquod corpus in actu, ut ignem aut ahem aut aliquod huiusmodi. Intellexit enim Plato formal' corporali subesse materiam quae in sui essentia non habet aliquam speciem; sed (amen maleriam a privatione non distinxit, ut Aristotdes dicit in I Physicorum. Unde tam ipse qnam sui seclatores materiam appellabant �non-ens", propter privationem adiunctam. Et hoc modo loquendi etiam Dionysius utitur, quamvis secundum Aristotelem necessarium sit materiam a privatione distinguere, quia materia quanrloque invenitur sub forma, quandoque sub privatione; unde privatio adiungitur ei per arcidens." cr. In I l>hYI., lerl. 10.
extends to more things than being proves nonetheless to some extent true. For prime matter is only being in potency and has
59 De vrnt. 21.2 ad 3: "sicut materia prima est ens in potentia et non in actu, ita est perfecta in potentia et non in aclU, bona in potentia et non III actu. �
60 seC. III, 20. Note i n particular: �Et Iicet unumquodque sit bonum
inquantum est ens, non tamen oportet quod materia, quae est ens solum in potentia, sit bonum solum in potentia. Em enim absolute dicitnr, bonum autem etiam in ordine consistit ( ... ) . Materia ergo non potest simpliciter dici ens ex hoc quod est potentia ens, in quo importatur ordo ad esse: polest alltem ex hoc simpliciter dici bona, propter ordinem ip$um. In quo apparet quod bonum quodammodo amplioris est ambitus quam ens".
CHAPTER SEVEN
312
being as sllch through its form. It has potency, however, through itself. Since potency belongs to the
313
COOO AS TRANSCENDENTAL
ratio of the good,
it follows that
goodness belongs to matter through itself. til
In the order of predication the good does not have a wider scope than being, but being and good are convertible.63 Every being is good, and vice versa. This thesis implies a critique of Dionysius in
Thus Y,'e flOd in Thomas's discussion of the goodness of prime
two respects. First. the goodness of prime matter docs not entail the
matter twO series of statemems. On the one hand. he holds that
denial of its convertibility with being, since matter is not simply
prime maHer is good in potency, because it is being in potency. On
"non-being," as the Platonists claimed. Second, in the order of the
the other hand. however, he says that although prime matter is
transcendentals, being has a conceptual primacy over the good_
being in potency. it is good absolutely. With this statement he goes
The good adds something LO being, namely, the aspect of appeli
a long way with the Platonic thesis-too far, according to Van
bility,
Sreenberghen. He is of the opinion that Thomas makes a question
In the order of causality, however, the relation between being
able concession to Dionysius by unjuslly sacrificing the equivalen·
and the good is different. Because lhe good has the
cy of the transcendental notions of being and goOd.6� Is Thomas's
bility, it has the aspect of :I final C3use_ The end possesses primacy
position ambiguous?
among the causes: it is "the cause of C3uses, � for it is the cause of causality in all causes. Thus in causing
(iii) In his reply to objections based on Dionysius's view of the
ratio of appeti
(in causando) ,
thc good is
prior to being.64
priority of good over being, Thomas makes a distinction between
The distinction between the order of predication and that of
the order of predication and that of causality. This distinction may
causality is central for Thomas's imerpretation of thc Dionysian
De diuinis
view. Dionysius does not deal wilh the U3nsccndentals as such, but
According to Albert being and good can be considered
with the divine names, These names imply some causal relation
be influenced by Albert the Great's commentary on
nomini/nJ.s.
in two ways: in the caused and in the cause. When they are
in God, for we name Cod from crc3tures, as a cause from its effects.
considered in the former way, being precedes the good, but from
Dionysius therefore considers the divine names from the aspect of
the viewpoint of the cause that actually causes, the good is prior to
causality. Since the good is prior to being in causing, it is
being. Dionysius's order of the divine names is determined by the
understandable that he assigns the first place among the divine
being and good, Thomas also makes a twofold distinction, which
From the order of c.l.Usalily Thomas is ahle to offer a certain
causal perspec tive (cf. 1.3.). In considering the relation between
names to the Cood rather than to Being.1'.!'>
enables him to adopt a twofold strategy in the assessment of the
justification for Dionysius's statement that the good even extends to
Dionysian view. This twofold strateb'Y forms the broader context
non-existing things. To be sure, he emphasizes again that by the
within which Thomas can recognize an element of truth in the
non-existent we must understand not those things that do not exisl
De maw 1.2,
absolutely, but those which are potential and not actual. With this
his argument for the greater universality of the good is based on
proviso it can be said that the causality of the good has a wider
the universality of the desire for an end. So the priority of the good
scope than that of being. Being
Platonic view. In both
Summa contra C.enliles m,20
and
(ens)
implies the relation of a
lies in the teleological order.
61 Dt 1/1/110 1.2. Note in particular: "bonum habet ampJi"irnam eXLen sionem, eliam ampliorem quam ens, ut Platonicis placllit ( ... ) . Et quamuis materia distinguatur a priuatione et non sit non ens nisi per accidens, adhuc tamen hec consideratio quantum ad aliquid uera est: quia materia prima non dicilUf ens nisi in potentia et esse simpliciter habc:t per formam, set potentiam habet per se ipsam: et cum potentia pertineat ad rationem boni (...l, .sequitur quod bonum conueniat ei per se ip!ioaffi. M 6� F. Van Stcenberghen, ·Prolegomenu a la qU/lrla 'Via", in: RilJiJla di filtnDfw nl'lN«JWli(4 70 (1978), p. 104.
6.5 In I Sml., 8.1.3 ad 2: "bonum eu communius non secundum ambitum praedicationis, quia sic convenltur cum enu:, scd secundum rat.ionem causalitatis". De vml. 21.2 ad 2: �bonum non 5e extendit ad non entia per praedicationem." S.lh. I, 5.2 ad 2. 64 S.th. 1,5.2 ad I : "Bonum aulem, (um habeat ration em appNibilis, importat habitudinem causae finalis: cuius camalius prima est, quia agem non agit nisi propter finem. et ab agente materia movetur ad formam: unde dicitur quod finis ell causa causarum. EI �ic in camando, bonum est prius quam ens·. Cf. on the end al "the cauae of caoses" Dt prine. nil/' c. 4: �Unde didtur quod fini. eu calilloa calilarutn, quia est C3.Ula causalitatis in omnibus camis." Ii� S.Ih. I,!S.:! OKI I : In 1 .""" ., 8.1.:-1 ad 1 . cr. In Dt div. nOlllin. c. 3, 227,
314
315
CHAPTER SEVEN
GOOD AS TRANSCENDENTAL
formal cause only. either inherent Of extrinsic, that is, an exem· plary cause. lis formal causality extends only to those things which participate in the form and in actual being. Good has the aspect of the end, and the order of finality includes also those things which are merely potential. The causality of the good extends by virtue of its attractive power to that which does not yet participate in the form.6fi The first basic text on the transcendentals, In I Sentmtiarum B.1.3, may be seen as a summary of Thomas's position regarding the Platonic-Dionysian thesis. The question he raises is: "Is the name 'He who is' the rlnt among the divine names?" Tn his reply Thomas explains that the tommunia Mbcjng," Monc," "true,- and "good," viewed from their supposiu, are convertible with each other. Viewed from their concepts, being is absolutely prior to the other transcendentals; each adds something to it (see chapter II). The text has a conclusion, however, to which we have thus far devoted no anention. This conclusion discloses the second element in Thomas's strategy towards Dion)'Sius, that bearing on the order of causality. When the communia are considered according to the ratio of causality, then the good is prior, because it has the aspect of a final cause and the end is the first cause in the order of causality.57
being of the person.''ti8 Against this interpretation two things should be noted. First, when being is understood as actuality, no value can be outside of being. No person would have any nobility unless this perfection were actualized. As Thomas states, "every excellence (nobilitas) in any thing belongs to it according to its being. For a human person would have no excellence as a resuJt of his wisdom unless through it he Wffe wise. "'t>� Every being as Mug is good. The reduplicative statement expresses the formal viewpoint of the thesis of the convertibility. It is a metaphysical or meta· ethical thesis. A second point to be nOled is that Thomas not only defends the identity of heing and goodness but also introduces a real difference between the two. In the Summa lhrologiae 1,5.1 he explicitly presents both aspects. The first Objection to the convertibility in this text refers to 3 statement from Boethius's De hebdQmadibus: "I perceive that in nature the fact that things arc good is one thing, that they are is allolher.� Thus it seems that the difference between being and the good is not merdy conccptuaJ, but real.1O At issue in De hebdomndibus is (he question how all things are good. Thomas spells oul in his commentary what is presupposed by this question. The question how all things are good is meaning· ful only if it is assumed that all things are good. He reconstructs the following argument for this presupposition. (i) Everything tends towards its like-a premise based on the last of the nine axioms listed by Boethius at the beginning of his work. (ii) Everything that is seeks or tends towards the good-a premise advanced as the common view of the learned, and illustrated by Thomas with Aristotle's definition "the good is what all things desire." From (i) and (ii) it follows that everything that is is good, since that which tends towards the good must be itself good.71 We may call this conclusion from the thirteemh·century viewpoint the "transcend· entality claim." This claim underlies the question "how all
7.6. The dil/erence betwnn being and good'uss The thesis of the convertibility of being and good is often inter· preted in a 'moral sense and, on the basis of this understanding, sharply criticized. Values, it is objected, are irreducible to being; "the person as substantial, and the person as having nobility, excellence, dignity are to all eternity distinct dimensions of the
66
}n I Senl. I:U.3 ad 2; Dr vml. 21.2 ad 2; S.lh. 1.5.2 ad 2: "bonum .
� extenditur ad exisLentia et non cllistenti , non .'oecundum praedicationem, sed secundum causalitatem ( ... ) . quia bonum hahN rationem finis, in quo non solum quiescunt quae mOl in acm, sed ad ipsum etiam ea rnoventur quae In actu non sum, sed in potentia untum. Ens autem non importat habitudinem cau�e nisi formalis lanlilln, vel jnhaereJlti� vel ellemplari�: cuius call5alh� non !it extendh nisi ad ea quae sunt in anu.· 67 }n I Senl., 8.1.3: ·Si autem considerenlur s c undum ralionem cau5alitatis, sic bonum est prius; quia bonum habet ntionem causae finalis, csse autem r.uionern causae tllemplaris et effective lanlum in Deo: finis autem est prima causa In ralione causalilsti,:
e
68 J.
al�o jd.,
F. Crosby. "Are Being and Good Really Convertible?", pp. 495-94. Cf. "The rdea of Value and the Reform of the Traditional Metaphysics of
Bonum". in: Itltthtill. An lnln-nalionaljr>'Urn.cd of PhilroOfJIr] I (1977), pp. 231-3S6.
69 seC. 1,28. 711 S.lh. 1.5.1 obj. I: "Videl..T quod bonum differat !itcundum rem ab el'lle. Dicit eni m Boc:tiuJ. in libm tk HflxlrmL: /nl\l.__ in rdw aliud tSU quod sunl trona, t1 aliud I!.W' ,,,,Id ..mI. Ergo bonum differllnt set:undum rem." 7 1 }n In "'btlum. • le(·I. 3.
el tIn
316
CHAPTER SEVEN
GOOD AS TRANSCI!:NDENTAL
things are good� and is essential for understanding Boethius's exposition. His solution to the question how all things arc good begins with a kind of thought-experimeliL Let us remove from our minds. he
The proper meaning of "being" is that something 1S In act. An act is related to a potency. Therefore something is caller! HI insofar as it is first distinguished from something that is merely in potency. This primary act is the substantial being of each thing. A
says, the pre$ence of the fi.-st. divine good. What does this entail for the goodness of things? The consequence would be a non
thing is therefore B l by its substantial being. for example human being. By actualities added to the substance. such as white being. ;I thing is called "being in a cerl3in respect" (ens secundum quid) (B2), for these actualities belong to something that is already in act.7� With respect to the good, the comerst: applies. The concept Wgood" s;ays that somethi ng is perfect, and that it therefore has the aspect of being final (rationffll ultimi). Hence something is called G I when it possesses its ultimate perfection through acts added to the substantial being. A thing that has substantial being hut not the ultimate perfection it ought to have is called �good in a certain respect" (G2), because it has a certain perfection insofar as it is a bei ng. To be a human being is a good, but this is not identical to being a good human being.7!; Boethius's statement about the non-identity between being and being good is interpreted by Thomas as a reference to the differ ence between being absolutely and good simpliciter.77 There appears to be an inverse ordering between the two: What is Bl is, as being, only good initially G2; what is GI is a.ccidental in a.n ontological respect, B2. Without saying so expressly. Thomas dearly presents here a reillterpretation of BOethius'� view. For Roethius. the
identity in things between being and being good.12 Things would be good, (0 be sure, but their substantial being itself would not he good. Why is it necessary to accept this non-identity? Let us consider a substance which is white, round, heavy and good. If th� substance were not different from its attributes, the identification of the substance with its roundness. heaviness, whiteness and goodness would lead us to identify these attributes with one an other, but that is "contrary to nature." Let us suppose then that substances were nothing else except good. In that case there would no longer be any ground for plurality and distinction between
them. There is only one thing which is simply good and nothing else, namely. the first principle. Therefore all good things, jf they were nothing else except good, would be identical wilh this principle. But they arc not, and consequently the il."scnion that substances are nothing else except good is also false.n In a world without GOO things could not be good just insofar as they are. We will discuss how Bocthius finally n:solves this problem in
chapter IX, because his solution--to the effect that the heing it."clf of
things is good in virtue of its relalion to the first good-leads to another question: Arc all things good by the divine goodness? (9.6.). For the moment, we are only interested in the non-identity between being and being good which Roethius poses and to which Thomas refers in the flrst o�jection of Summa th.eologiae 1,5.1. Tn his reply Thomas argues that although bei ng and good are the same in reality, they differ conceptually, for "good" adds to Wbeing" the aspect of "desirableness." From this conceptual differ· ence, another real difference results, that betwccn being
72 Ibid.,
lect.
4:
"!lac enim suppo�ition(' facta, uidetur
bonitas et ip,um corum ene.� 7' Ibid., lecl. 4.
in ti.! a/iud tJst ipsa
H S.lh. 1.5.1 ad I: "lkel bonum el ens �inl idem W'cundum rem, fluia tnmen IlifTerunt &.ecllndum r.ttionem, non eodem modo dieitur ;Iliquld nu .iimpliriltT, (:t bemu," Ji"'flliri1tT.·
317
.
7.� Ibid. 1,5.1 ad I: '"Nam (.11111 ens dicat aliquid proprie eMe i n actu; aClIl� a�te � prop'ie ordincm habcar ad potentiam; sc(undum hoc simplicilu . ahqmd dlcrtur ens. �t.(I",dllm quod primo di-"'ernilur ab co quod est i n potentia tanlum. Hoc alltem e�t eue sut"lanliale rei uniu!;Cujllsqut.; unde per
!uum e5SC substantiale didlUr unumquooquc ens Simpliciter. Per actus autt.m superadditos. dicitur aliquid esse ucundum quid, Sieul e!l.-'Ie album �ignifitat e�e secundum quid: nOli enim csse album aufert esse in potentia simpliciter. clIm adveniat rei iam praeCl(istcnTi In actll."
76 Ima.. 1,5.1
ad
1:
"Sed bonum dk!! rationem perfetti, quod est appt.tibile:
et per consequr.m dicil rationem ultimi. Uncle id quod e5t ultimo perfectulll, dicilur bonum simpliciter. Quod autem non hahet ultimam perfectionem quam debet habere. quamv!s habc;!1 aliquam perfeUionem inquantum est actu, non tamen dicitur perfcctum secundum quid. �
77 Ibid. 1,5.1
simpliciter,
nec
bonum simpliciter,
�ed
in relrn5 aliud tst quod Junt, 5unt bona. d aliud quod re(t!rendum est ad esse bonum et ad esse simp/ici/Iff": ad I: MSic crgo quod dicit BoetilU quod
quia secundum primUIII aClUm tst aliquid ens simpliciter; et secundUIll ultimum, bonum �impliciter." Olher lexts aooul the difference between being
and the good are: lecl. 1, 269 .
S,C. 111.20; V, l,ml. 21.."1; 0, maw 1.2; In lh div. nOlllin.
r.
4,
�18
GOOD AS TRANSCENDENTAL
CHAPTER SEVEN
the absolute goodness of a thing can also be seen as its
lubnantial being of things is not good through itself, since this is
being
proper to divine goodness. Yet he
completed and perfected being.
must ascribe a certain goodness to
,
319
substantial being. for otherwise the transcendentality claim cannot
The difference between good in a certain respect and good
be maintained. His solution is that substantial being is good in
absolutely holds for every tinite thing, because in each of them, to
virtue of its relation to the first good. For Thomas as well the noo identity of being and being good has to do with the categorical
be and to act are not idelllical. This non-identity is of importance for the relation between the transcendental good aud the moral
division of being into substance and accident. However, unlike
good, for the subject maller of ethics is human actions.
Boethius,
he takes even substantial being itself to be good. II is good
in a certain respect in virtue of its own act of being. In accidental
acta
7.7. The good of human action
each thing completes the initial goodness of its substantial
being. The good is in both the category of substantial being
and
the
categories of aceiclemal being-and that is precisely the mark of a
In modern studie� on Thomas's ethics there is a strong tendency to
transcendental.
emphasize the autonomy of moral phiiosophy.SO Its autonomy is
In Summa lheowgiat 1,5.1, Thomas does not indicate wherein the complete goodness of a thing consists. Elsewhere he argues that luch completeness concerns the actualization of the facult'ies of a being in act. The perfection to which the appetite of every thing is directed is its operation, because through activity the faculties and powers inherent in its substance are actualized and its actuality completed. This actuality is called "the second act." The first act is the specific form whereby a thing has being; the second act is its
not only advanced in relation to moral theology but also, in
operation.7I1 By its first act, its substantial being, ;) thing is �being absolutely," by its second act, its activity, "good absolutely." But
keeping with a more general trend in philosophy which has been called "the rehabilitation of practical reason," in relation to meta physics. Ethics is not founded on the science of being. nor is the
principle of morality deduced from metaphysics. Ethics is based
nrst of all on "the aClual experience of the moral."81 In this sec.tion
and the next we want to show the importance of the transcendental way of thought and of its rcHection
all
the good fol' (he relation
between metaphysics and ethics. Part HI of the Summa theowgiat is concerned with .,;) moral con
from the terms "first" and "second" act it appears that the differ
sideration of human acts" (q.
ence between good in a certalll respect and good absolutely caunot
arc to be distinguished from acts of a human being (actus hominis) .
be described exclusively through the model of an inverse ordering
The latter are acts which, although found in human beings, are
of being and goodness. The first and the second act are continuous:
not attributed to them by virtue of their being human. Acts of
6,
pro!.) . Human acts (actus humani)
the first act is for the sake of the second act, and both arc an
growth and digestion are called "natural� rather than "human.�
actuality (adualitas) .79 Since acruality is always the actualization of
Properly human acts proceed from reason and will, the faculties
In I El.hi l., lect. I: "finale bonum i n qltod u:ndit appetitus IInillKuiusque ett ultima perfectio eills. Prima aulem perfectio 5('; habet per modum formae, teeunda autem per modum operationis.� De urnt. 1 . 1 0 ad 3: "dupJclt en perfeetio, scilicet prima et !;(';cunda: prima perfectio est forma uniuscuiusque
propcr to
a human being.SlI The
78
per quam habet es!;('; ( ... ); secunda perfecdo est operatio, quae e�t finis rei vel id er quod ad finem devenitur ( ... ) . Sed ex perfectione secundae consequitur in pl. rado bonltatis, quae consurgit ex fine." In IJ De w.�w, leo. 4: "quaelibet tnlm res appetit suam perfcctioncm sieut $uum finem. operatio aUlem est
r.
ultima rei perfectio (".), operatio autem en actus .M:cundus, tanquam perfectio
et finil operantis." S.th. 1,48.5; 1,105.5. N ct. D, spiri,. tnat., a. II: "Sicut autem [Plum e� t51 aCluaiitas quatdam ellentiae, ita optrari a[(ualitas operati"ae polcntiae scu "irlulis"; S.tA. l.�".l: "Actio cnim til proprie actuaiiw "inulis; sicul ease UI acwalit:u lubttanOae "et eaenliae."
tst
object of the will, the
rational
tin
See in particular the most importallt study of Thoma.'. ethiu in the last decades: W. Klultcn, PhilD.lrJphiJche Ethik bri Thomas tum Aquin, Maim 1964 (2d ed. Hamburg 1980), esp. part III (pr. 166-217). Cf. also id.. "Zum Gutsein des HandcJns�, in: Pliil<JsuphiS,�ts jfJhf-buch 87 ( 1 980), pp. 327-39; id., "Memphysik l1nd praktische VCrllunfl. Uber ihre Zuordnung bel Thomas von Aquin�, in: L Oeing-Hanhoff (cd. ) . TJWmlU von Aquin 1274/1974, Munich 1974, pp. 73-96.
SI
W. Kluxen.
Phi/osophU(hl Ethill, p. 169. S.th. 1·11,1.1. Cf. In I Ethic., lect. I: "Dico auu:m operalione� humanas quae procedunt a voluntale hominis s.r:cundum ordinem ralioni:o.; nam, si quae n ioni. Op4!ratioflc5 in homine inveniufllur quac f10n Sllbiaccflt "oJuntati Cl .. flon dicuntur proprie h umanac s.r:d nalu..-ale5. sicut palel de ope..-atiollibus
H\!
ani mae vegetabili:o".
321
CHAPTER SEVEN
GOOD AS TRANSCENDENTAL
appetite, is the good uncler the general aspect of good. and its transcendental openness is the ground of the freedom of the will. The good is found in human beings in a special mode (quodam specifJ[i modo) ,S3 In voluntary acts the moral good appears, since �Ihe genus morn begins where the reign of the will is first found. �84 Summa theologiae I-II, q. 18 deals with the goodness of human acts. Art. 1 opens with the statement: ''We must speak of good and evil in actions as of good and evil in things." Thomas adduces in explanation the correlation between being and acting: "because such as everything is, such is the action it produces:' The second act, the operation, is proponional to the first act of being. £.;Jeh agenl acts insofar as it is in act; its mode of acting follows its mode of being.lIs Yet it is not the intrinsic connection between things and their actions that Thomas investigates in q. 18.1-4. Things and actions are treated, as we shall see. as separate orders. First Thomas considers the goodness in the order of natural things. "Now in things, each one has as much good as it has being (esst) ' for good and being (tns) are convertible." For this con vertibility he refers to the first pari of the .summa. In our discussion of q. 5 .• it appeared that there is not only an identity between being and goodness but also a difference. In [-H,IS.• Thomas again intro duces the difference between good in a certain respect and good simpljcito!"(, which he now describes. not by the inverse ordering of being absolutely and good simpliciter but by the term "fullness of being" (Pltnitudo I!ssendi). Created things possess the fullness of being in a certain multiplicity (sllCundum divI!Tsa) , that is, only through a diversity of acts. Hence it is possible that a thing has being but still is lacking in the fullness of its being. Because thc fullness of being belongs to the very notion of good, a thing is said to be good absolutely if it has ils fullness. If a thing is lackillg in its due fullness. it is only good in a certain respect, namely. insofar i\.-; it is a being. Thomas next applies the transcendental perspective to the goodness of human actions. Because hcing and good are convertible. we must say " that every action has goodness insofar as it has being." If, however. a human action is lacking in something
that is due to its fullness of being, it is lacking in goodness and is said to be evil.lI6 In art. 2-4 of q. 18 Thomas works out the fullness of being (to which he rcfcn in art. 3 as "the fullness of perfection � and "the fullness of goodness") with regard to natural things and to actions. Since we are only interested in the outlines of his account, we restrict ourselves to a brief description of it. The first thing that belongs to the fullness of being is that which gives a thing its species. That which specifies a natural thing ill its form. that which specifies an action is ils object; "therefore, just as the primary .. of a nalural thing is derived from its form which gives it goodnes. its species, so the primary goodncss of a moral action is derived from its suitable object" (art. 2). Yet in natural things the fullnes..� of perfection does not consist solely in the specific form but also in supervening accidents, such as, for example. shape and color in a human heing. The same is the case with respect to operation. The fullness of its goodness also include!! its due circumstances of place and time. which arc as it were its accidents (art. 3). Finally, for both the goodness of things and the goodness of human actions. the relation to dle end chey depend upon is essential (art. 4).Just as a distinction must be made between the form and the linal end of a thing, so likewise between the object and the end of an action. When a pcrson gives an alms from vainglory. a good action is ordered to an evil end. At the close of art. 4 Thomas summarizes his analysis and reviews the element.� of the goodness of human action. This good ness is fourfold: lhe first concerns the action as such (its genus), the secorid is derived from its suitable object (its �pecies), the third from it... circumstanccs (its accidents). and the rourth from its end, as from the cause of goodness.
320
8� I'll II Sent., 27.1.2 ad 2. 114 In JJ Sent., 24.�.2.
�!> S.rA. 1·II,IS.]: "de bono et malo in aclionibus oportel loqui siclI! de 001)0 et malo in rebus: eo quod unaquaeque n::s 13Jem actiunem producil. qualis 1:51 ipsa." Cf. ibid. I,S9.1: "cum nihil operelur nisi inqllanltlOl e51 aCIII. modll� operandi unillKuiusque rei sequilllr modunl e�ndi ipsi ..,."
86
S.tll. J-n.IS.I: "In relm.� autem unumquodque tantum habet de bono.
quantum habet de esse: bonum enim. et en$ convertunwr, ut in Primo dictum est. Sol us auteJO Deus habe\. totam plenitudinem 5ui esse secundum aliquid unum et simplex: unaquaeque vero re� alia habet plenitudinem e�5endi �ihi convenientem �ecundllm diversa. Unde: in aliquibus contingi( quod quantum ad aliquid habcnt esse. et tamen eis a!iquid clefkil. ad plenitudinem essendi ei� debitam, (... ) Sed quia de ratione boni est ipu. plenitudo e��endi. si qui dem alinli aliquid defllerit de debita u.endi plenitudine, non dicetur simpli
dler bonum, u:d Ae(,undllm quid. inquanlum nl en& (" .) Sk igituT dicendum est (Illod olllllis Mlio, infl"3nlum habet 31iquid de esse. in lan lU1I1 habel de honilale: inquantlllll vero deficil ei aliquid de plenitllrline essencli qllae (trh...lnr ;1I'llrml hllmanar., lnlalll"'", l\r:flrll It b(IIII1'lIr, et li(: didltlr mala".
322
CHAPTER SEVEN
GOOD AS TRANSCENDENTAL
What interests us in 1-1I,18.1-4- is the: question of the intention of Thomas's analysis. The conclusion that the goodness of the action is/our/old plays an i.mportant role in Kluxen's interpretation of his ethics lIlat means to emphasize its autonomy. The fourfold good ness is seen as the expression of the special character of the mornl order.f17 This special character. it is argued, becomes manifest lhrough a comparison with Summa theologiae 1,6.3. In this text it is said that the perfection of a thing is thrufold: it consists in the being (t,Ut) that a thing possesses through its substantial form, in the accidents that are necessary for its perfect operation, and in the attainmem of its end.S!! [0 Thomas's analysis of human action in I II, q. 18, the first perfection, that of being, is divided into lWo elements, namely, the act as such and its specification. The act as such is the first, generic goodness, because as act it is a being and therefore possesses a certain goodness. Yet this goodness is not moral in character. Moral good and evil do not occur until the act is specified by its object. This specification must therefore be distinguished from the first goodness of the act, which is the foundation of the moral order; but this order itself cannot be deduced from the first goodness. The argument that in articulating the fourfold goodness of human action Thomas intends to express the special character of the moral order is not convincing. It is flot based on Thomas's own comparison of it with the goodness of things in q. 18, but rests entirely on a comparison with Summa theologiue 1,6.3. This com parison seems misplaced. because the lauer text dt':als with the pt:rfection of a thing that consists in its ultimate act, the activity. The complete goodness of a thing is the second act, which is the accidental completion of the first act of being. In [-lI,18.1-4, however, things and actions are treated as separate orders. That the action is the ultimate act of the thing remains outside of con sideration. The accidenlS mentioned in 18.3, such as color and shape in a human being, arc not the accidents that are necessary for perfect operation. If it had been Thomas's intention in q. 18 to show the uniqueness of the moral order, then this would have to
appear from his comparison with the order of things III tht': first four articles. What is most striking in Thomas's analysis is precisely Iht': parallelism that he develops between the two orders, in keeping with his starting point: "we must speak of good and evil in actions as of good and evil in things." He discu�s both the good of things and the good of actions according to the scheme of genus-species accidt':nl.S-t":nd. Tht': first element that belongs to the fuUnes5 of being of a natural thing is the form which gives it its species. This implies that in things as well !lpecific goodness is preceded by a generic goodness. The generic goodness consists in this, that as a natural thing it is a being and, as such-that is, as not yet specified to this or that being-is good.. It is this idt':a that is formulated in 18.1 with rt:ference to the thesis of the convertibility of being and good.&! Thomas's intention in 1-11,18. 1-4 is not to express the special nature of the moral order in contrast to the order of things, but to explain the goodness in human actions by analogy with the good ness in things. In both orders there is a generic goodness whereby something is good in a certain respect (G2), and a specific goodness as the first condition of the fullness of being whereby something is good simpliciw (GI). Thomas's procedure in this text sheds light on his view of the relation belWeen metaphysics and ethics. He considers lWO distinct orders, the good of natll�1 tbings--the bonum lIalurae--and the good of human actions--the btmum moris.90 His consideralion is based on me outcomes of his renection on Ihe good in general, namely, [he convertibility and the difference between being and goodness. There is a Slructure common to both orders, which is studied by the scirntia communis, metaphysics. Thomas's analysis in 1-1I,18.1-4 is a concrete application of his analysis of the transcendental good in 1,5.1 to which he refers.
87 W.
KM
Kluxen. PhiloJfJ/1huche Elhik, pp. 184-86. S.lh. 1.6.3: ·Perfectio autem alicuius rei triplex est. Prima quidem,
secundum quod in Suo esse constituitur. Secunda vero, prout ei aliqua aceidcn. lia llIperadduntur. ad suam perfenam operationem necenaria. Tertia vero por.rfectio aliclliul elt per hoc, quod aliquid aJiud altingit ,Inll finem."
323
1:19 This interpretation is confirmed hy the train of thought in a paraHei text. De malo 2.4: "ManifeSt.llll\ est autem quod non est eadem perfectio propria
omnium, set diuena diuersorum ( ... J . Vnde alher (lpone! acdpere bonum animalis et bonum hominis, et equi et bolli! { ... J . Et similiter dicendum est. in actibus de bono eL malo. Nam alia est consideratio boni et mali in actu secundum quod est actus, et In diuersis spccialibus actibusR• 9{J Cf. ibid. 2.5 ad 2: �en, et bonum conuertuntur simpliciter et in quolibet genere ( ... ) . Set uerum est quod eM limpliciter non conuertitur cum bono moris, 5icut nec etiam cllm bono ryatUTe.
"
325
CHAPTER SEVEN
GOOD AS TRANSCENDENTAL
There are, indeed, differences between the two texts. In the lattcr text the non-identity between what is good in a certain respect and what is good absolutely is related to the distinction between substantial being and accidental being, while in the former text it is related to the distinction between generic being and the fullness of being. That has to do with the fact that I-H, 18.1-4 deals with human action that is itself an accidental perfection. But the main point is that the order of natural things and the order of human actions are brought together in the transcendental consideration of the good. The purpose of the metaphysical interpretation is to make the structure of the morally good action understandable. It is not until he arrives at art. 5 ofl-II, q. 18 that Thomas explains the specific character of the moral order. He comes back to his exposition in art. 2, where he had formulated the first condition of the fullness of being and of goodness. Just as the primary goodness of a natural thing is derived from its form which gives it its species, so the primary goodness of a moral action is derived from its suitable o�ject. It is this specification of an action which Thomas works out in art. 5. When every action derives its species from its object, it follows that a difference of object causes a diversity of species in human actions. A difference of objects causes a diversity of species in actions, insofar as the objects are essentially referred to one active principle. A difference of objects that is essential in reference to one active principle (for instance, color and sound in reference to sense) may be accidental in reference to another active principle (for instance, to the intellect) . In human actions good and evil are essentially related to reason, "because the good of man is to be in accordance with reason" (bonum hominis est secundum rationem esse) . Consequently, the difference of objects, which specifies human actions, is the difference of good and evil in relation to reason. A human action is qua species good when its object is in accordance willi the order of rcason.9J Thomas adduces a brief and quite general argument for his view that the human good is to be in accordance with reason: "for
the good of each thing is that which suits it (con venit) according to its form." This argument points to the intrinsic connection between things and their actions, which remained outside of consideration in q. 18.1-4. The specific goodness of a human action is derived from its suitable object. What a suitable object of an action is can only be understood in corrclation with the substantial form of a thing, for the activity is the completion of the first act of being and its goodness. Because the distinctive form of a human being is that which makes him a rational animal, his good is to act in accordance with reason.92 Reason is therefore the rule and measure of morality (maralium mensura est ratio) .y� In I-II,18.5 a distinctive feature of Thomas's ethics comes to the fore: the correlation between morality and rationality. Moral acts are voluntary acts, but the will itself is not the measure of the goodness of an action. In contrast to natural processes, in which the rule regulating the action is the natural virtue itself, in voluntary actions the will must be regulated by a principle different from the will. This principle is human reason: the human good is to be in accordance with reason. "Only insofar as the good is ordered by reason does it pertain to the genus mans and cause moral goodness in the act of the will. "94 A point !hat requires clarification is the question of the nature of this rationality. Thomas criticizes that Greek intellectualism, according to which the possession of scientific knowledge (scientia) makes someone morally goody5 Moral goodness is related, not to the intellect, for the intellect is directed to truth, but to the will whose object is the good under the aspect of good,96 A human being is called "good absolutely" in virtue of his will, since the will concerns the whole human person and commands the acts of
324
!II
S.th. I-II,IB.5. See also the summary in 18.8: "actus omnis habet. spedem
ab obieClo; et actus humanus, qui dicitur moralis, habet. spedem all obiecto rclaro ad prindpium actullm humanorum, quod est rat.io. Unde si obiectum actus indudat aliquid quod conveniat ordini ration is, erit actus bonus seclllldlllll �lIarn �pecielll, .�kllt dare eleelllosynarn indigenti.�
92
In 1I Ethic., lecL 2: �bonum cuiuslibet rei est in hoc quod sua operatio sit
conveniens suaI' formae� propria autem forma hominis est secundum quam est animal rationale�. Soth. I-II,85.2: "Quae quidem convenit homini ex hoc ipso quod rationalis est: ex hoc enim habet quod secundum rationem operetur, quod est agere secundum virtutem. � y� ScG. III ,g. Cf. S.th. I-II,90.1: �Regula autem et mensllra humanorum actuum est ratio.� On reason as the principle of morality, see the remarkable study by L. Lehll, La rai.Ion rtgu tU fa moraliti d'a/=5 saint Thoma5, Paris 1930, pp. 44-77 (on I-II,18.5) . 94 S.th. I-II,l9.1 ad 3. Cf. C. Sted, "Natural and Moral Ends According to Thomas Aquinas�, in: J. Fallon and J. McEvoy (eds.), Finaliti ,t Intmtionaliti, Doc/rint thomi.Ite eI persfnclivr-s modt7'f/e$, Paris and Louvain 1992, pp. 1 1 3-26. 9.'1 Cf. Thomas's critiqm:: of �the opinion of Socrates" in S.th. I-II.5B.2. " Dt 11111. WIn,". a. 7. .
326
all buman powers. A human lH:ing possessing scientific knowl edge-Thomas offers the grammarian as example-is not good simpliciter, but only in a certain respect (secundum quid) . On the basis of his knowledge, such a person has acquired the capacity (facul tas) for good action, but knowledge of grammar does not guaTantee that a person will always speak correctly. A grammarian can voluntarily make a spelling mistake. Yet something is called good absolutely not insofar as it is in potency but insofar as it is in act.97 Moral goodness has a practical characte... The rationality that is tbe ordering principle of human action is consequently not theoretical but practical, for it is proper (0 practical reason alone to be directed to action and to be a motive power.9/! 7.8. The good is Ihefirst in practical mlSOn
Human reason is not the measure of things, but the measure of what is to he done by man. In forming its judgments. practical reason is aided by law. that is, "a rule and measure of acts through which someone is led to acting or is held back from it. "'J!I Thomas distinguishes several kinds of law. His classic exposition of natural law in Summa theologiae 1-[1,94.2 has been often discussed, but little attention is paid to a number of aspects of this text that are of importance for his doctrine of the transcendentals and for the relation between transcendentality and morality. LO() We will resU'ict our attention here to just these aspects. Noteworthy in this text in the first place is that Thomas elabo-. rates a structure for practical science that runs parallel to that of theoretical science. The a.nalogy between theoretical and practical reason. which is an original element in his ethics, forms the starting point of his t":Xposition: "Tht": precepts of natural law an� to practical reason as the first principles of demonstrations are to theoretical reason, for both are self·evident principles (principia per se nota). " Thomas works out this parallelism at various places in his work. Man possesses in both the theoretical and the practical S.th. I-II,56.S; De virl. WII'IIfI. a. 7 and ad 2. 98 S.ll!.. 1,79.11 ad I. \19 S.t.-\. I,9O.1. 1011 See for this tellt C. Crise:. '"The Fint Principles of Practical Re;uon�. 1970. pp. 340In: A. Kenny (cd.), 1'19'/-;II4J. A ColktlUm oj Critiml &lap, London 97
82.
GOOD
CHAI'TER SEVEN
AS TRANSCENUt:NTAL
�27
domain a non-discursive knowledge which forms the basis of all his further knowledge. Just as theoretical reason proceeds from principles which are naturally known, so pra(.;tical reason pro ceeds from principles which are the precepts of natural law. The habitu.� of these practical principles is called syndcresis. !O! It is described by Thomas as "the law of our intellect insofar as it is the habit containing the precepts of natural law, which are the principles of human actions. "102 The analogy between theoretical and practical reason is indica tive both of their agreement and of their difference. Practical and theoretical reason have the same formal structure of rationality: both proceed from first principles to conclusions. At the same time, the domain of practical thought is distinct from that of theoretical thought, for each has its own first principles. The analogy is therefore an indication of the autonomy of ethics. Yet this does not mean that the practical is separated from the theoretical. Theoretical reason and practical reason are not "two branches" of knowledge. They are not distinct powers, but differ only in lheir ends: theoretical reason is directed solely to the knowledge of truth, while practical reason directs truth to action. Its end is the operation. Practical rt":ason knows truth, just as Iheoreti cdl reason does, bUl regards the known truth as the norm (regula) of action. The striking term through which Thomas characterizes the relation between theoretical and practical reason is "exten. sian:" theoretical reason becomes practical only per exten:;ionem.HJ� There is no reason at all to minimize the significance of this expression. " Extension" implies that human reason is theoretical prior to its becoming practical. Thomas's analogy between theoreti cal and practical reason in Summa lheolcgiae 1-11,94.2 must also be understood as a relation between what is prior and what is laleL We must see what sense of priority is meant here. Both theoretical and practical reason proceed from self-evident first principles. Thomas proceeds to discuss the nature of these !O1
De .
veril. 16.1: ·Sicut autem animal; humanae est quidam habitus
. naturah5 quo prlnclpla speculativarum s.cicntiarum cognoscit, quem vocamm ·intellc�tUllI principiorum'; ita in ipsa C5t q llidam habltm naturalis primo . . ru� prmClploru� operabiJium. (Iliac SilO! naluralia principia juris naturalis; . . • 24. 2 ,. tjUl qUldcm habItus ad 'syndcresirn' pertinel. � cr. In /I �t . • S. ,'. 1.79.12.
LOI! 5.th. 1-11,94.1 ad 2. HI' 5.lh. 1,79. 1 1 ,cd rOlllra; lh .Jeril. 14.4; Itl III Yn,j 23.2.�.2. .
.
.
328
GOOD
(:HAPTER SEVEN
prOpositions and introduces a distinction between them thal is
De lubdomadibus.
AS TRANSCENDE.NTAL
329
The order among the most common notions throws light on the
are
priority of theoretical reason over practical reason. "Being� is
self-evident only to the learned, who understand the meaning of
analytically prior to any other concept and, since being is the
the terms of such propositions. Other axioms are universally self
object of theoretical reflection, theoretical reason precedes practical
evident, because the terms of these propositions are known to all. ](14
reason. The primacy of the good in practical reason is connected
Thus Thomas enters the domain of the transcendentals by reduc
with Thomas's view, put forward in his discussion of the Platonic·
ing the universally self-evident principles to the first intelligibles.
Dionysian thesis
derived from Boethius's
Some propositions
The next part of the argument is focused on the order among the ttanstendentals. That order is rdated to lhe apprehension of the
most common notions. That which the intellect first conceives is
(7.5.),
that, in causing, the good is prior to being.
The good has the aspect of a final cause, which itself enjoys prima cy among the causes. In the "extension" of theoretical to practical
reason. the good, which is last in the order of the transcendenta.ls,
"being," for its understanding is included in all things whalSOever
becomes first. This extension leads to another undel1>tanding of the
a human being apprehends. The remarkable thing in Thomas's
good. When we consider the good theoretically, we consider it
exposition is that he establishes a relation of foundation between
under the aspect of trut. So we can define "good" and reflect on its
the first conception of the human intellect, �being," and the first
ratio. When we consider good practically, we consider it insofar as it is the end of an action. Good is then considered as good, and is
principle of theoretical reason. The principle of contradiction, i. e., that " the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time," is founded on the notions of ubeing" and �not-being."I05
manifested in its practical character. 107
Thomas advances here an idea that he elaborates in his comment
Thomas to establish a relation of foundation between the notion of
physics and the first principle of demonstration"), he goes beyond
"good" and the first principle of practical reason. The ratio of good is "that which all dellire... Hence the first principle of practical reason is: "Good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided. "108
ary on boole. IV of the Metaphysics. As we have seen (3.7.: �Meta Aristotle by giving a transcendental foundation to the "axiom of all axioms" that Aristotle called the anhypothewn of human thoughL
The analogy between theoretical and practical reason enables
Thomas then makes the transition from theoretical to practical
This principle has the same structure as the principle of theoretical reason, insofar as both principles are marked by an opposition. IOg
reason, a transition that comes along with a change in what is first
But the first principle of practical reason, based on the notion of the
known: "as 'being' is the first that falls under the apprehension absolutely (simpliciter) , so 'good' is the first that falls under'the
good, has a normative character. The principal act of practical reason is to prescribe. l ]() Its first principle, "good is to be done," is
apprehension of practical reason." Being is the first known in the
"the first precept of the law" that directs human actions.
absolute sense, but �good� is the first concept of practical reason, for practical reason is directed to action. and every agent acts for an end. which has the nature ofgood. lIl6 S.lh. I-II,94.2: ·sicut dicil Boetius, in libro de HeM.,,,,., quaedam mnt dignitates vet propositionc5 per se nOlae communiter omnibu5: e\ huiusmodi 5UtH iliac propositiones quarum termini sunt omnibus notl ( ... ) . Quaedam vera propositiones sun\ per �e notae' solis sapicntibu5, qui terminos propositionum intelligunt. quid significent�. . 1M S.lh. 1-11,94.2: In his autem quae in appn:hensione omnlum cadunt, quidam ordo invenitur. Nam IlJod quod primo cadit in apprehension�, est cns, cutus intellectus includilur in omnibus quaecumque qUII apprehendtt. Et ideo primum principium indtmonsltabile est quod rnm tSt jilllul (Jffir:rw-�t .d . ntg(J�t, quod fundatur supra rationem enlis et non enos.: el super hoc prmclplo omnia ali3L fllndanillr, 111 dicitur in rv Mtwph,s.· ulil in apprehen. I(lf> S.lh. 1-11,94.2; "Skul aulenl enl ell primum quod ("•
IOf
"
sione simpliciler, ita bonum est primllm quod cadil in apprehensione practicae rationis, quae ordinamr ad opus: ornnc coim agcns agil propler finem, qui habet rationern boni.· 107 De lim/. 3.3 ad 9: "verum et bonum 51: invicem circumincedunt quia C . l verum est quoddam bonum' et bonum omne est quoodam verum: und!! ct bonum potest cOl1sidcrari cognitione speculativa prout consideratur veriw cilu lantllm, sieut cum diffinimus bonum ct naturam eius ostcndimus; poten etiam considerari pracllce 51 consideretur Ul bonum, hoc autcm est si comideretur in �antum CSI finis motus vel operationi!." I S.th. I-II,94.2: "El ideo primum principium in ratione practica cst quod fundatur supra ratinnt.m boni, quae est, Bonum tJI quod "m"itJ apf>rl.lmt. Hoc ttl ergo primum pracceptum h:gis. quod bonwm fJt I�dnldufll. d prwtqumdum, II _rum vi/Gndum. • 109 Cr. IH -.a/6 10. L 110 ,').Ih. 1-11.47.8.
330
CHAPTER
SEVEN
One of the main features of Thomas's account of natura) law in
Sutntna theologicu 1-11,94.2
331
GOOD AS TRANSCENDENTAL
said to be evil. considered as being, but only insofar as it lacks
is the central role of the doctrine of the
being , " I U Yet not every absence of good and being is an evil. That
transcendentals . 1 1 I Thjs conclusion is relevant [0 the nature of
a human being. fOT example. has no wings is not an evil for him,
philosophical
ethics for Thoma.'1. The basis of this discussion is
because the possession of wings does nOl belong to human beings
provided by Wolfgang Kluxen's fundamental study, in which he
by nature. Evil is not a pure negation, but a privation, that is, the
defended three theses: (i) it is possible and It:gitimate to extract a philosophical ethics from Thomas's theological synthesis in the
absence of what is proper to a thing by nature and what it ought to ha\·e.l l� A thing is said to be evil when its potentiality is deprived of
(ii) ethics as a practical science is independent of
its proper act. The Oppoliilion between good and evil is a privative
Summa
lJuologicu;
metaphysics as a theoretical discipline. Ethics is based on "the
one.
aClUa! experience of the moral;" and (iii) the unity of metaphysics
The conception of evil as a privation of being is the am;wcr to the
and ethics is established, not at the level of natural philosophical knowledge, but at that of thcology. 1l2
Manichaean thesis and expresses the transcendentality of the
Our analysis of Thomas's account of natural law leads to a
met with incomprehension and resistance, because the privative
conclusion diffcrcIll from Kluxen's third thesis. Metaphysics and ethics are joined together and connected at a
philosophical level
by
the doctrine of the transcendentals. They appear to have a found ing function: the first principle of theoretical reason is reduced to the first transcendental, being; the first principle of practical reason
good. In several modern thinkers. however. this conception has character of evil is equated with the denial of the reality of evil. As
K. Barthlein puts it, "the definition of evil
as
'privatio boni', which as a result of the convertibility of good and being led to a 'privalio entil', denies existence to evil as eviJ. "1 1.�
For Thomas, however, the doctrine of evil as a privation does not
but cannot be
mean the denial of the existence of evil. It is undeniable, he states,
separated from one another. The transcendental foundations of
that �there is evil in the world. Experience teaches and reason shows this facl." 1 16 But what is the meaning of "is," when we stale
to the good. Being and the good are different
prima,
theoretical thought and of morality point therefore to a connection
sdmu
is not based on
that there is evil? Does the "being� of evil imply that evil is a thing
"the actual experience of the moral;� it requires a renection on the
with a nature or essence, he asks, appealing to the thesis of the
foundations of praxis.
convertibility of
between meLaphysics and ethics. Ethics as
en.s
a n d res? In this context Thomas introduces the
(\\.·ofold division of being that we di$Cus.'\ed in the chapter
7.9. The opposition bdWl!M good and evil
on
Truth
(6.2.). The first mode of being is "outside the mind" and is divided by the categories. In this sense �heing� and "thing� are convert ihle, and 110 priv,uion is a being or thing. The second mode is
Every being as being is good, being and good are convertible. In
the int.roduClion {Q this chapter we already pointed to the fact that
"being as what is true� and signifies the truth of a propositional combination of subject and predicate. According to this second
being has provoked more critical
mode, anything about which a true proposition can be formed can
reactions than that of any other transcendental, because it seems
be called a "being." In this sense we can affirm that "there is evil,"
counter·intuitive. The bitter experience of the reality of evil is the
but this statement does not remove the privative character of evil.
the cOl1venibHity of
the good with
most powerful objection against the thesis of the convertibility. The consequence of this thesis is that the character of "being" is denied to evil, since evil is the opposite of the good. "No being is III
Cf . J. A. AerL�f:n, "Natural Law in the Light of lhe Doctrine of the Tnn$CCl1denlills", in: L. J. Elders and K. Hedwig (ed�.), 1.e1C r.I 1.ihtTtu�. Frudom and Law AC(Ylf1JinK tn Sl. Thnma.• Al{Uina.•, Valican City 1987, pr. !)9.J J 2. 1 12 W. Kllnu:n, I'hiulJfl/lhu':M £Ihil, np. pr. 9.,.100.
ll�
S.th. 1.5.3
ad 2. cr. 1,48.1: "cum ens, inquantum h'liusmodi, sit bonum, eadem est remotio utrorumque.w 1 1 4 SrG. 11I,6; S.lh. 1,4R.:\; 1.48.5 ad 1: "malum privalio est bani, et non negatio pllra ( . . . ) ; non omnis defectlu boni est malum. sed defectus boni quod nalUm �SI et debet habf:rj.w 1 1 5 K. Barlhl{'!n, IJi, Trll1ll1mdmlalll':tIlthr, dr:r allen O,lIoWgie, pr. 12·13. 1 1 (, In II .'Wnl., !"I 4 . I . J : w.impliriler dicilllll� mala cssc in IIniveno. lIoc ('111m ('I {'''periclIllll .lnl"('1 1'1 1""01.110 n,lrmlltw•
I
332
CHAPTER SCVEN
COOD
333
AS TIlANSCEN'D£N'TAL
The affirmation of the exislence of evil in the world does not mean that evil is a posiuw: reality. a thing with a nature or essence.117
Thomas's discussion of Augustine's definition of vinue as �a good
Thomas advances yet another objection against the privalive
quality of the mind, by which we live righteously" (De libero
character of evil, which is borrowed from "the Philosopher." It
arbitrio 11,19). Is this, Thomas objects, a suitable definition? No
seems that good and evil are opposed not as baving and privation
difference is more common than its genus, since it divides the
but as contraries, for Aristotle in the Categories regards the two con
genus. But "good" is more common than the genus of quality, for
cepts as a clear example of a contrary opposition. m In a contrary
it transcends every genus; it is convertible with being. Therefore
opposition each of the two opposites is a positive reality, a nature. Therefore evil is a nature. I III The same idea is expressed in one of
"good" should not be included in the defmition of virtue as a
the objections against the convertibility of being and good (0 which
The divisive aspect of good and evil also appears dearly in
difference of quality.
In his reply Thomas emphasizes that
although the good is convertible with being, the good is found in a
we referred in 7.5. What is divided is not convertible with one of its
special mode in human beings. The good has the character of an
dividing elements, as, for instance, "animal� is not convertible
end, fur it is that which all things desire, The distinctive mark of
with �rational." This applies to the good and being, since being is
human finality, however, is that human beings have choice, that
divided by good and evil, for there are many things that are evil. Evil is a reality. UU
they know the end as end and determine the end themselves.
Thomas recognizes iliat good and evil are not always opposed to
Therefore "good" and "evil" are specific differences of human
each other in the same way. For a certain domain of reality, the
acts. The good that is put in Augustine's definition of virtue is the good determined to a moral act. l22
opposition between good and evil is not a privative but a contrary
Central in this discussion is the idea that the difference between
opposition. He is aware that this view is not understandable without
being and goodness that holds for every finite being acquires a
further comment, for it seems to cancel the convertibility of being
special form in human beings, since human actions
are
not deter·
and good. His justification of it is based on a number of ideas we
mined to one particular good. Properly human acts are voluntary
encountered in the preceding sections.
acts, in which the moral good and evil appears. It is in the domain
The first idea is the difference between being and goodness Being absolutely (.simpliciter) is not identical with good
of morality that good and evil are contraries. Thomas understands Aristotle 's statement that the opposition between good and evil is a
.simpliciter, for a thing that has "being absolutely" in virtue of its
contrary opposition as a statement referring to this domain; �the
substantial being is only "good in a certain respect. " A thing is
Philosopher speaks here of good and evil insofar as they are found in moral matters. "I 'l!'
in the absolute sense is not convertible with being in the absolute sense. On the contrdlJ', this good diviths being. I :f'
In 7.7. we saw that in human actio us good and evil are
(6.6.).
"good absolutely" in virtue of the ultimate act it ought to have. Good
essentially related to reason, "because the good of man is to be in accordance with reason." Consequently, the difference of objects
I I I &G. 1II,9; S.th. 1,413.2 ad 2.
lI8 Calrgoriar c. 10, l i b 19-21. Cr. K. Jacobi, �'Gut' und 'schle
which specifies human actions, is the difference of good and evil 122 In II Sent., 27.1.2 ad 2: "quamvis bonum convertatur cum ente, tamen
quodam speciall modo invcnitur in rebus animalis ct habentibus declionem (... ). Cujus ratio cst, quia bonum dicitur ex ratione finis; et ideo quamvis invcniatur in omnibus in quibus est finis. tamen spedalius invenimr in ilUs qUile finem sibi praestituunt, et intc:ntionem finis cognoscunt; d inde cst quod habitus electiVi eX fine spcciem IKlrtiuntur; d propter hoc horurn habituum 'oonllm' et 'malum' lunt differentiae eonatitutivae, non quidem prout communiter ,umunlu,". cr. S.Ih. 1·11, 55." ad 2; D4 virt. annlll. 2 ad 2; "bonum quod l:Onverlitur (urn ent.:, non ponitur hie in dcflnitione vinllu,; acd bonum quod delermlnltur ad .ctum moralem: 12.' S,f". 1,48,l lld S.
.
CHAPTER SEVEN
334
in relation to reason. Evil is a contrary specification in the domain of moral acts. A
human action is
qua species
jecl good when its oh
is in accordance with the order of reason, evil when its object is
CHAPTER
repugnant to this order.
When, however, the opposition between good and evil i� a
BEAUTY: A FORGOTTEN TRANSCENDENTAL?
contrary one in moral acts, does not moraJ evil possess in that case a
determination and nalUre of its
own,
on the basis of which no n
8.1. IntroductUm
virtuous actions can be understood? This consequence would entail
a denial of the privative character of evil, for a privaLion cannot be a
specification ; it would mean the recognition of the existence of
something that is evil by virtue of its essence.
F.:J.
von Rintelen has
that the evil. nOll-virtuous act is the only exception to the thesis that "every being is goOd."I H
argued
Thomas would have rejected this view. The fact that evil in the
moral sphere is a specifying princi ple does not corllradict the doctrine of privation but presupposes it. The end of human action is something good, ":-;omething positive," since otherwise it could not be willed. The privative character of evil does not consist in the evil
act having no object but in the lack of conformity of that objcci LO
reason, the measure of morality. An evil act, such as adultery, is
deprived of the order of reason, which is man's good. The M:lIsual pleasure pursued is not evil in itself, hut it only becomes a mora.l
good in relation to reason. The specification of human acts by evil does not mean that something exists which is intrinsically evil. l '!!>
EIGHT
The question as to the transc.endemaJity of the beautiful in Thomas confronts us with a striking paradox. The discussion of beauty occupies a marginal place in his work; nowhere docs he devote a separate
quaestio to this subject
In none of the three basic texts on
the transcendentals (see chapter ll) is the beautiful mentioned as a transcendental property, nor is lhere any other text that explicitly states its transcendentality. Gilson has spoken in this regard of a
"forgotten transcenden tal. "1 Yet in the research on Thomas of the
last decades, more attention has been devoted to the beautiful than
to any o ther transccndental.� And most modern scholars claim that it does have a
Maritain's Art
transcendental stalUs ill Thomas.
and Schola.sticism
trend in research. He regards
gave a strong impulse to this
the beautiful as "the splendour of all
the transcendentals toge ther. '" Umberto Eco is also or the opinion that the beautiful is a transcendental, albeit in an implicit way. He admits that "Aquinas's text is fined with LincerLainLies and
hesitations,"� Hans-Un \Ion Balthasar holds that in the thirteenth
century "the question conce rning the transcendentality of beauty received general atte n tio n . �s Three German studies go a step E . Gilson, Elfmlt'1!t.i of CJtrnhd.... Phil.()Joph'j, New York. 1960, pp. 159-63: -rhe Forgotten Tram�:.endental: Pulchrv.'fIt. " 2 In addition to the 51udies menuoned hdow, �t:e: A. A. Maurer, Ab01J/ &auty, A Thomi>tic /lItcYfrrr/ahO"tl, Houstun 1983; M. O. Jordan, "The Evidence of the Tramcendentah and the Place of Beauty in Thomas Aquinas", i n : lnttmwtional Philosophical �art"ly 29 (1989), pp. 393-407; P. Dassdeer. "L'Ctre ct la beaute selon Saint. Thoma� d'Aquin", in: .J. Follon and J. McEvoy (eds.), Adua[;t,i d! fa. /lnuh midiit>a/t, Louvain-Ia-Neuve 1994, pp. 268-86. 3 Art and Srho/(I.J/icism. London 1939, p. 172, n. 63b. An elaboration of Maritain's view can be found in G. B. Phelan, "The Concept of Beauty in Sl. Thomas Aquinru", in: Selected Pnpe1$, TorOlllO 1967, pp. 155-80. 4 U. Eco, Tnt Aesthrtir.l of ThlmUJ.1 �qlli"a$, Cambridge, Mass., 1988. pp. I t s19: English trans. of II problroJO Is/dial i'l Sa", Tnmma.1O (2d augmented ed.), Milan 1970. � H.-U. vnn I\altha,ar, Herr/irhJltil. lint tllto!ogischt Atltnttik rnll, �:imiedf"ln I!lu!"i, p. ���). I
1�4 F.-J.
von Rlnlden,
Halle 19!12, p.
I ��
!l9.
Dtr Wtrtxtaddt in atr turopaischtn GruJtullllJ>idlulIR I ,
.lith. I-II,IR.5 :1(1 2; Sr.(;. III,RoH; Ih "'Ilk! 1 . 1 ltd 12.
BEAUTY: A FORGOTTEN TRANSCENDENTAL?
CHAPTER EIGHT
336
337
further and endeavor to show that the beautiful has a special place
In this chapter we examine critically the conclusions of modern
among the transcendentals and plays a central role in Thomas's
research. The guideline in our investigation is the thesis that the
thought. Francis J. Kovach arrives at the conclusion that the beauti
question as to the transcendentality of the beautiful cannot be
ful is wthe richest, the most noble, and the most comprehensive of
resolved until it has become clear what universal mode of being the
all transcendentals." It is "the only transcendental that includes all
beautiful expresses that is not yet expressed by the other transcend
the
transcendentals."6 In the judgment of Winfried
entals, and what its place is in the order of these properties. The
Czapiewski, the beautiful is the original unity of the true and the
result of our inquiry will prove to be diametrically opposed to the
good.7 Gunther P6ltner, finally, regards the experience of beauty as
dominant trend in modern research. Beauty is not a "forgotten"
"the origin from which Thomas's thought lives." The beautiful is
transcendental; the view that it is a distinctive transcendental finds
the unity of the transcendental determinations of being.S
no support in Thomas's work. But we should not want to argue
other
Against the opinions of this impressive series of scholars there is, however, one obvious hut weighty objection. If the beautiful
merely "deconstructively." In the last section (8.7.) we attempt to determine the proper place of the beautiful in Thomas.
were such a central transcendental for Thomas, as they suggest, why does he omit it in his most complete account in De veritate 1 . 1 ?
8.2. The "ratio" of the beautiful
Some scholars, like Eco, hardly take notice of this objection, although others do. For Maritain the question does not constitute a serious problem. The �c1assic table" in De veritate 1.1 "does not
In Summa theologiat 1,5.4, Thomas explains the proper ratio of the
exhaust all transcendental values." The reason that the beautiful is
beautiful. The context of this explanation is the discussion of the
not included is "that it can be reduced to one of them," namely, to
good (we return to this context in section 8.4.). In reply to an
the good.9 This argument is not very convincing. If the beautiful is
objection, Thomas provides a kind of definition of the beautiful:
really a transcendental, then it must add a value to being concep
"those things are called beautiful which please when they are
tually that cannot be reduced to another transcendental.
seen" {quae visa
placent) . 1 1
Two things are expressed hy this defini
Kovach recognizes that Thomas in De veritate 1 . 1 has elaborated a
tion. The beautiful is that which pleases and delights, it is that in
"complete system." The reason for the absence of the beautiful in
which the appetite comes to rest. The beautiful is ordered to appetite
the list must be that Thomas arrived at insight into the transcenden
and is thereby set in close relation to the good, for the good is the
tality of the beautiful only after De vmtate. Hence Kovach's thesis is
proper object of appetite. Yet at the same time the definition relates
that Thomas's thought exhibits an "immanent development" on
the beautiful to seeing, by which is not exclusively meant know
this point.1o A decisive role in �his development would have been
ing by sense. Beauty is related to the cognitive power.
played by Thomas's commentary on the De divinis nominibus of
Eco advclnces an objection to Thomas's definition: it introduces a
pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. In this commentary, which can
subjective condition for beauty ("when they are seen�) and thus
be dated to 1265-67, about ten years after De veritate, Thomas comes
points "to a denial of its transcendental status. " l � But this conclu
to see, according to Kovach, that the beautiful is a transcendental.
sion is not persuasive, for it does not take into account the peculiar character of Thomas's definition. It seems likely that he framed
fi Francis J. Kovach, Dit Asthttik dts Thomas
von
Aquin, Berlin and New
York 1961, p. 214; id., "The Transcendentality of Beauty in Thomas AquinasP, in: P. Wilpert (ed.), Dit Mttaph'jsik im Mil/tlall" (Miscellanea Mediaevalia vol. 2), Berlin 1963, p. 392. 7 W. Czapiewsld, Dru Schijnt bri Thamru van Aquin, Freihurg 1964. 8 G. Poltner, Schrmhtil. Einl! Unttrsuchung lum Ursprung de5 Dtnkrns bti Thomas von Aquin, Vienna 1978, p. 76. 9 J. Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 172, n. 63b. 10 F. J. Kovach, Dit A51Mlik, pp. 75-76, 183.
this definition by analogy to that of the good, which he had mentioned just before in the same text: wthe good is that which all things desire." Now as we have seen (7.3.), the definition of the good is a definition per posteriora, in which the good is determined through its proper effect. The definition of beauty has a similar II
12
S.th. 1,5.4 ad l . The Aesth,tir..l, p. 39.
BEAUTY; A FORGOTTEN TRANSCENDENTAL?
CHAPTER EIGHT
338 structure. The phrase
quae visa placent
defines the beautiful not
species to
the Son, and "usc"
(usus)
339
to the Spirit. Thomas, following
species with
through its essence but through what is posterior to it. "Something
the example of Augustine, identifies
is not beautiful because we love it; rather, it is loved by us because it
quently, he lists "perfection," "due proportion,M and "clarity" as the
is beautiful and goOd." 1 3 Thomas's definition does not introduce a
distinctive characteristics of beauty and elaborates their likenesses
subjective condition of beauty so much as it determines the beauti
with a property of the second Person of the Trinity. wPerfection"
ful from its proper effect. ''That which pleases when it is seen"
bears a likeness to what is proper to the Son insofar as he has in
does not say what the beautiful itself is.
himself perfectly the nature of the Father; the likeness of "due
What then is the essence of the beautiful? Later in the
theologiat! (1,39.8),
Summa
Thomas states that three things are required
"beauty."lti Subse
proportion" consists in the Son's being the expressed image
expressa)
(imago
of the Father; "clarity" bears a likeness inasmuch as the
Son is the Word which is the "light and splendor of the intellect,"
(integritas) or completeness (per[ectio) ; second, due proportion (debita proportio) or harmony (consonantia) ; and lastly, clarity or splendor (claritas), a notion that is explained
Thomas discusses beauty here is thus the theology of Trinity,
by an example: "whence things are called beautiful which have a
while the historical background is the doctrine of the trinitarian
bright color.M Yet this triad docs not seem to have an absolute force
appropriations in Hilary and Augustine.
for beauty. First, integrity
or canonical meaning. In other places Thomas mentions only two conditions; "clarityM and "due proportion," he says, go together in the
ratio of beauty.14 '
In all texts he is satisfied just to enumerate the
as John Damascene says.l7 The systematic context in which
In his commentary on the
Sentences,
Thomas also deals with
Hilary's appropriation and names three characteristics of
species,
pulchritudo. "According to Dionysius, two things come in the ratio of beauty, namcly, harmony and clarity." To
that is, of
conditions of beauty. He puts them side by side but does not
together
indicate their mutual relationship in such a way as to clarify the
these two the Philosopher adds a third characteristic, "for he says
posteriori definition of the
a
in the fourth book of the
beautiful.
To assess the place of beauty in Thomas's !.bought one should
Ethics
(c.
6)
that beauty only exists in a
great body. " l H Thomas mentions two sources here. The reference
Summa theologiae
always take into account the systematic and historical contexts in
to Aristotle plays no further role in his work; in
which he discusses the notion. The text in which he enumerates
1,39.8 the third characteristic has disappeared and been replaced by
Summa
"perfection." Thomas's reference to pseudo-Dionysius, however,
39.8 is concerned with
merits notice, for he names here the most important authority for
the properties that are ascribed to one of the divine persons, al
the medieval doctrine of the beautiful. We must therefore turn our
though they are nOl proper to one person but common to the entire
attention to the Dionysian tradition.
the three conditions of beauty belongs to that part of the
theologiae which
deals with the Trinity. Q.
Trinity. These properties are attributed in virtue of "appropriation," because they have a greater resemblance to what is proper to one person than they have
[Q
"appropriation," see sect.
9.7.). The core of 1,39.8 is Thomas's
discussion of the patristic tradition of Trinitarian appropriations, in particular that of Hilary of Poi tiers and Augustine. I S Hilary's triad of appropriations attributes eternity to the Father, 13 In Dc dill. nomin. c. 4, lect. 10. 439: �non enim ideo aliquid est pulchrum quia nos illud amamus, sed quia est pulchrum et bonum ideo amalllr a nobis�. 14 S.th. IT-TI,145.2: �ad rationem pulchri, sive decori. concurrit el. claritas et debita proportio�. ct". II·II,180.2 ad 3. B See Hilary. De trinitat� II, c. 1 (ed. P. Smlllder�, f" -orpus ChristJanorum, 8ni�s Latina 62. 38); Augustine, De Irinilate VI, 10 (cd. W. .J. MounTain, CCL 50. 241).
8.3, Pseudo-Dionysius and the beautiful
what is proper to another (for the notion of
Dionysius's intention in
De divinis nominibus
is to elucidate the
divine names that manifest God's causality with respect to the
S.lh. 1,39.8: �Spnjts autem, sive pulchriludo�. Thoma� refen 1.0 Augustine in Ad Vn-f. q. 57: "speciem interpretatur pulcritudincm." 17 S. th. 1,39.8: "Quantum igitllr ad primum, similitudinem habet Cllm proprio Filii. inquantuill est Filim habens in se vere Cl perfecte naturam Patris (... ) . Quantum vero ad suundum. convenit cum proprio Filii, inquanWIll est imago expressa Patris (...) . Quantum vero ad tmium, convenit cum proprio Filii, inquantuill eM Vtrbum, quod quidem lux est et spkndrn intellutus, ut Damascentls dicit (De fide tYrIhodo:.;a I, 13).� III In I Sent., �1.2.l. 16
341
CHAPTER EIGIIT
BEAUTY: A FORGOrTl!:N TRANSCENDENTAL?
creatures. The first of these names for Dionysius is, as we found in
itself and uniformly always beauliful.H Plato's description is
340
chapter VII, the "Good." "Beauty" is another divine name, which he discusses in dose connection with the "Good." Both are dis
eminently suited to show the uniqueness and transcendence of the divine beauty. It is these features that interest Dionysius. It is there
cllssed in the sa me chapter; in chapter fOllr Dionysius deals with
fore somewhat surprising that Czapiewski considers Thomas's
consideration of "Beauty" is introduced with the words: "This
essential to Dionysius's words, to be the (sole) text that undeniably
Beauty. "19 Dianysius does not refer to a scriptural text, but Thomas
beautiful.l!5
the "Good," then with "Light," and thereafter with "'Beauty." TIle
Good is praised by the sainted theologians as the BeaULiful and as
in his commentary does oITer references. He mentions Psalm 95:6
(PUlchritudo ill ccmspec'u Eius)
and the Song of Songs 1 : 15, where the
beloved is caned "beautiful. "'.!{I Dionysius's expo!Oition is focused on the question of how the names "Beauty" and WBeautiful� are attributed to God. He is called "beauty" since he confers beauty on all things according to their natures. God is the cause of the consonance and clarity in all things.�l Many thirteenth-century authors cite this passage. be cause it states what beauty is. Thomas, too. observes in his commentary that the ratio of the beautiful consists in these two features.22 We saw in the previous section that he lists three con ditions, wpcrfection," "proportion," and "clarity," but sometimes names only the last two. It now becomes clear that the dual formula stems from the authority of Dionysius. Thomas always refers to this text when he restricts the features of the beautiful to "consonance" and "c1arity."l!]
God is also called "Beautiful." Dionysius's txplanation of this
name provided the Middle
Ages-withoUl
anyone's being then
aware of il-with direct access to a text of Plato. For the Areopagilc
employs \'erbatim fhe formulations with which the Idea of the Beautiful is described in the Symposi.um (2IlA-B). The divine is "super-beautiful" because it is enduringly beautiful in the same mode and way; because it does not come to be and pass away, or
wax and wane; because it is not beautiful in one respect and ugly in another; nor beautiful for some and not for others. It is through
19 De divinis Ilominibw 4.7 (Migm PG 3, 701C).
20
In De div. nomin. e. "I, I�c'. 5, !J34.
21 De diviniJ llOminibu.s4.7 (701G). 2'1 In De div. ttllmin. e.4, keto 5, 339. 25 See, for Insranee, S.I� II-IJ,145.2: "sicu! acdpi poLest �x verbis DionysU, 4 . Nt>",., ad ratlOn�m pulchri ( ... ) concurrit et claritas et debita eap. tU Dill. proportio�.
commentary on this passage, in which Aquinas adds nothing implies the transcenclen tality, that is, the commonness of the For Dionysius there is not j ust a close connection between the good and the beautiful, but even an identity. The divine beautiful, he states, is in a threefold sense the cause of all things. It is the principle of all as their efficient cause; it is likewise the end of all
as their final cause, since all things are for the sake of the beautiful; it is, moreover, the exemplary cause, since all things are deter mined in accordance with it. Dionysius concludes that "the good
and the beautiful therefore are the same," since all things desire the good and beautiful in every causal respect and there is �no thing that does not participate in the rn:autiful and the good. "26 With the thesis of identity the Areopagite is a typical representa tive of Greek thought, for in Hellenic culture the beautiful and the good are brought together in a single notion, the
kalokagathia..n The
identity of the good and the beautiful is affirmed repeatedly in the remainder of chapter four. So when after his treatment of "Beauty"
Dionysius proceeds to the discussion of "Love ,� he begins his
exposition with the statement: "The beautiful and the good are for
aU things desirable and lovable."'lfl
We must now look ioto Thomas's comments on Dionysius's doctrine of beauty. Kovach sees a development in Thomas's thought, as we noted above, It is not until his commentary on
Dionysius's
De divinis nominibus
that Thomas recognizes the tran
scendentality of the beautiful.29 Bu t what dues does Dionysius's 24
De divinu nomini/luJ 4.7 (7010).
26
De divini.! nOl7linibu.$ 4.7 (704A) .
25 W. Czapiewski, [)as Schon.e hti Thol1lfJl. pp. 29-3 1 . 27 S�e for this notion R. Bubner. "Kalokagathia", in: HistonJcheJ Worl.,..- 1 976, pp. 681--84. Thorn[\.'; himself points to th� relationship belw�en the Greek names for "the good" (kaloJ) and "the beautiful" (ka/los) in In 1 $mt., S1.2.1 obj. 4.
/luch d.,..- Phiwsophit IV, Darmstadt 211
400.
2!1
Dt diviflu nominibus 4.10 (PG
S,
70SA).
a.
In De dlV. nomin. c. 4,
Icc!. 9,
See alao F. J. Kovac_h. "Der Elnnun der Schrift des Pseudo-Dionysius 'De divlnl. nomlnlblLl' .uf die Sch6nheillphilolophie des Thomas von
342
CHAPTER EIGHT
BEAUTY: A FORGOTTEN TRANSCENDENTAL?
343
Because 'he good is that wh ich all things desire, there belongs to . g that possesses of itself . of the good everythm the ratio of the raho desirability. Of that nature are light and the beautifuPI
text offer for the transcendental status of the beautiful? Is there evidence in Thomas's commentary to support Kovach's view? It should be emphasized from the outset that the Dionysian and the transcendental perspectives are quite diflerent. Dionysius's con
Thomas's structuring of chapter four brings out the close connec
cern is the transcendence of the divine, while the transcendental
tion between the good and the beautiful. In this way he expresses
perspective is ontological: it considers the most general deter
aptly the idea dominating Dionysius's account of the beautiful.
minations of that which is. Dionysius holds the primacy of the
Our second point is that Thomas's commentary clearly goes
Good, not of Being, and identifies the Good and the BeautifuL In
beyond Dionysius's text-sp.ecifically, with respect to the Diony
the order of the transccndcntals "being" is first, and �good"
sian thesis of the identity between the good and the beautiful.
ultimate. The possibility of conneCling the two perspectives lies in
Thomas's observation is worth citing in its entirety:
Dionysius's statement that �there is no being that does not
Al though the beautiful and the good are the same in reality (idtm subitcto)-because both clarity and consonance are con tained i n the notion of the good-nevertheless, they differ in concept. For the beautiful adds to the good an ordering to the power that is able to know that a thing is of such a kind.52
participate in the good and the beautiful," because in this statement the universal extension of the beautiful is posed. "Everything is beautiful and good according to its own form," Thomas observes in his commentary.30 The beautiful seems to be a transcendental. Kovach interprets Dionysius's statement and Thomas's comment
Thomas modifies Dionysius's thesis. He introduces a new
ary in this sense. Yet the question as to the transcendentality of
element, although he does not elaborate it. He asserts that there is a
beauty in Thomas is by no means solved in this way, for this
conceptual difference between the beautiful and the good. The
interpretation overlooks a decisive point. Dionysius posits an
beautiful adds to the good a relation to the cognitive power.
identity between the good and the beautiful, but he does not mean to say that the beautiful is a property of
being as distinct from the
By the same token it is striking that Thomas formulates the identity of and the difference between the beautiful and the good
good. This is, however, precisely the point at issue with respect to
in terms he usually employs in connection with the transcenden
the transcendentality of the beautiful.
tals. Eco stresses this point: ''These two features-being identical in
In Thomas's commentary two points in particular command
the subject, but differing
rationt---'afe features appropriate to tran
attention. The first is his structuring of the content of chapter four
scendental attributes. "�.'I Does Thomas therefore not suggest in this
of De
passage that the beautiful is
divinis nominibus, the most extensive chapter in the whole
a
distinct transcendental? This impres
work, which treats successively the Good, Light, Beauty, Love,
sion is reinforced by a later passage in his commentary. At the end
Ecstasy, and Zeal, and closes with a treatise on evil. Thomas would
of chapter four, Dionysius endeavors to determine the various types
not be ThOmas if he did not endeavor to discover a connection in
of evil by means of their opposite, the good. Thomas summarizes
this plurality of names and themes. In the first
lectio of chapter
four, he indicates what this order is: all these subjects arc directly
related to "the Good," the primary name. Evil is dealt with because evil is the opposite of the good, and opposites belong to the same
consideration. Love and the related notions arc dealt with because the act is known through the o�ject, and the good is the proper object of love. The reason that this chapter also deals with beauty is explained in the following manner:
A(�(in -. in: Arcliil! .fiir Geschiclite d",. PfliwsafJhie 63 . () In [), (Ill!. 1wmitl. t. 4, 1",·[. 5, 355.
(1981),
pp. \50-66.
the line of argument as follows: Dionysius first establishes the
ratio
of the good in general, and then what follows upon the general
ratio of the good. Beauty belongs to the latter, for "the beautiful convertible with the good" (pulchrum amvertitur cum bono) .34 31
IS
Ibid., c. 4, Icet. 1, 266: ·cum bonum sit quod omnia appctunt, ,\uaecumqu(' de se important appetibilis rationem, ad rationem bani pertinere videntur; huiusmodi autem sunt lumen et pulchrum". �2 Ibid. , c. 4, lect. 5, 356: "Quamvis autem pulchrum et bonum mnt idem mbiecto, quia tam claritas quam consonantia sub ratione boni continentur, tamen ratione differunt: nam pulchrum addit supra bonum, ordinem ad vim (O�nosdtivam illud esse huiusmodi." . .'1 Tht Aesthetics, p. 31. � � In De dill. nmnin. c. 4, lect. 22, 589-90.
BEAUTY: A FORGOTTEN TRANSCENDENTAL?
CHAPTER EIGHT Yet there is a fundamental objection to be raised against the interpretation that Thomas in his commentary views the beautiful as a distinct transcendental. Transcendentals express a general mode of being, they add something to it conceptually. Here Tho mas
does not speak, however, of the relation between the beautiful
and being, but of the relation between lhe beautiful and the good. The beautiful is convertible with the good and adds something to the good. It even seems to be a property of the good as good. This idea is strengthened by the fact that in the passage cited, Wclarityn and "consonance," which form the proper mtio of the beautiful, are said to be contained in the notion of the good (sub ratione boni). Eco, too, must acknowledge that "this explanation seems rather to assimitate the beautiful imo the good than to identify both of them with being."'� If one should object that the good is convertible with being and that an addition to the good therefore implies an arldition to being. then the place of the beautiful remains problematic in this argu mentation. According to Thomas the heautiful adds '"an ordering to the cognitive power," but in his order of the transcendentals, the good presupposes the true and the relation to the cognitive power is
345
In the Summa theologiae, Thomas speaks only in passing of the beautiful. He deals with the transcendentals good (I,5-6), one
(I.ll),
and true (I.l6), but he devotes no separate question to the beautiful. Actually, there are just two texts in the S u m m a that are of imparlance for the tr.lnscendental status of the beautiful. It is significant that the context of both texts is a discussion of the good, that the beautiful comes up only in the objections. and that these objections are based on statements from pseudo-Dionysius. The fint relevant text is Summa theologiae r,5.4. where Thomas raises the question of the kind of cause to which the good pertains. The first ohjection quotes tbe opening sentence of Dionysius's
exposition of beauty in De divinis
nmmnibu.s: 'The Good is praised as
beautiful." Now the beautiful, it is claimed. has the character of a formal cause. Therefore, the good must have the same character.
In
his reply to this objection, Thomas first emphasizes the real
identity of the beautiful and the good. They are the same in subject because they are based OIl the same reality, namely, the form. Yet they differ conceptually (ratione) . Proper to the good is relation to appetite, for the good is what all things desire: thus the good has the character of an f:nd (finis) . The beautiful, on the other hand, relates
that which " the true" adds to '"being." One can therefore not inler
to the cognitive power (vim cognoscitivam). Thomas then presents
addition would be equivalent to an addition to being.
("for those things are called beautiful which please when they are
pret the addition of the beautiful to the good in such a Wd.Y that this
the definition of the beautiful, which we have already discussed
Our conclusion must be that Thoma.� in his commentary does
seen") and works out an element of this definition, to which we
not come 10 the insight that the beautiful expresses a general mode
of being on the basis of which it would have to be included on the list as a new transcendental. Hc does diHance himself from Dionysius by claiming that the beautiful adds a relation to the cognitive power, a new clement that will still have to engage our attention (see 8.7.). But what the beautiful adds is an addition to the good. Thom
shall return shortly. His final conclusion is based
011 the cognitive
aspect of the beautiful. Because cognition is effected through assimilatiOIl, and likeness (similitudo) concerns the form, the beau tiful properly pertains to the notion of a formal cause.,fj Why do beautiful things please when seen? Thomas explains this by one of the features of beauty, due proportion: "sense delights in things rightly proponioned, as in things like unto itself, for the sense, too, is a kind of ratio, as every cognitive power."37 The art
�6 S.th. 1.5.4 ad I :
8.4. Two texts in the "Summa theologiae " The outcome of our analysis of Thomas's commentary on Dio nysius is confirmed by the fact that there is no emergence of the beautiful as trans<endcntal in his writings after this commentary.
·pulchrum et bonum in subiecto qUidem sunt idem, quia super eandem rem fundantur. scilicet super formam: Cl propter ho.:. bOrlum laudatur ut pulchrum . Sed ralione difTerunt.. Nam bonum proprie r\!$piCi! appetitu!ll: en enim bonum quod omnia appetunt. Et ideo habet ral.ioncm finis: nam appetitU5 est quasi quirlam mOlUS ad rCIII. Pulchrum ault:m re5picit vim cogno.\.Citj\-am: I)ulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placent. (...) Et quia cognitio fit per llMimilationem, similitudo all(f�rn �spicit formam, pulrhnull
�frie
pr
�rtinet ad rati�neln callne forn�alis.� . . . . ad I : Undt: pulchrum In debita proporuone (OIUI�tIt: quia
Ibid., 1.5.4
�rns\IH ddrrt:uur in rd)U� dthhe proport!ollatiA, �kllt In �!hi limllibLII; nam
r:1
CHAPTER EIGHT
BEAUTY: A FORGOTTEN TRANSCENDENTAl.?
historian Erwin Panofsky translates: "the sense, too, is a kind of
being. "�l But this "definitive" conclusion can certainly not be
reason" and understands this as a "visual logic." that plays an important role in his thesis that Scholasticism shaped Gothic architecture,58 But Panofsky is misled by the term ratio. which in this context certainly does not mean "reason." Thomas's idea is derived from Aristotle. who in tbe third book of De anima argues that sense perception requires a proportionality between the faculty of sense and its object. In his commentary on Aristotle's work. Thomas uscs the same formulations as in the Summa theologiat, though with one change: �sense delights in things proportioned, as in things like unto itself, for the sense, too, is a propoytio.
''39
The
meaning of ratio in Summa tlumlogiae 1,5.4 ad 1 becomes clear here: it means "proportion." Thomas's stau=ment that the sense is a kind of ratio has nothing to do with a "visual logic" of the
.sorl advanced
by Panofsky. The second relevant text is Summa theologiat I-II,27.1. "Whether the good is the only cause of love." [n the third objection, Thomas cites Dionysius's statement that the beautiful as well
as
the good is
347
inferred from these two texts. The beautiful is not identified with being, but with the good. The two texts in fact present a further elaboration of Thomas's observation in his commentary on Diony sius that the beautiful adds 10 me good a relation to the cognitive
power. But in both texts the transcendental status of tbe beaUliful remains unclear. The formulations ralher suggest that the beau tiful is a "specification" of the good: "the good" is that which simply
pleases, ·'the beautiful" is tbat tlu apprehension of which pleases. h is on the basis of these phrases that Cajetan in his commentary on
Summa thtologiae l-1I,27.1 ad 3 concludes that the beautiful is quaeda711 bani SptcitS.42 Thomas's texts offer no definite answer about the transceu dentality of the beautiful. But its status can be clarified by placing both texts in a broader context and considering them in connection with the discussions of the beautiful that took place earlier in the thjrteenth century."
lovable for all things. The good is thus not the only cause of love. In his rejoinder Thomas once again elaborates the conceptual difference between the good. and tlle beautirul. The ratio of the good is Mthat in which the appetite comes to rest." It pert.ains to the notion of the beautiful that the appetite comes to rest in the sight (aspectu) or knowledge of it. Thus it appears that the beautiful adds to the
good an ordering to the cognitive power. "Good" refers to that which simply (simpliciter) pleases the appetite; "beautiful" to that the apprehension of which pleases.4o Eco is of the opinion that these two passages "are definitive because (... ) they establish that beamy is a constant property of all being ( . . . ) . That is, beauty is identified with being simply as
sc:nsus ratio quaedam est, el omnis \1rIUS cognoscit��.· �fI E. Panofsk.y, Gothic AT,hll�ch(T� and Schola.!tiClSm, New York. 1974 ( 14th cd.: ht cd. 1951), p. 38; p. 58. S9 In III Dt an., lect. 2. . 40 S.th. I-Il,27.1 ad 3: ·pulchrum cst idem bono, sola rauonc dlffercns. Cum enim bonum sit quOO Qllltnia a#d14nl, de ratione boni esl quod in eo quieU";tur appctitu$; sed ad �ationem pulc�ri pertinet quod in ciU5 asPc:clU sell cognitione quictetur appeutus. (. .. ) lit 51C .patel quod pulchrum ad�lt s\lp�a . . bonum, quendam ordinem ad vIm cognosciUvam: Ita qu� bonu.m dl�atu� ld quod simpliciter complac�1 appetitui: pulchrum aucem dlcatur Id cmus Ipsa appreheOJio plac�l..
8.5. Historical ba�ground: The "Summa fratriJ Altxandri� Philip the Chancellor did not name the beautiful in his theory of the com711unissima. Neither was it mentioned among the transcend entals in the De bono of Albert the Creat. The beautiful was
discussed for the first time within the framework of the first dtler
minationes of being in the Summa tluowgica attributed to Alexander of Hales. In treating of the good, he includes an article on the relation between the good and the heautiful: 'Whether the good and the beautiful are the same in concept (secundum inlentionem) ?"U The
Summa leaves no doubt about the perspective from which this
41 The AI!SIIlftiGJ, p. 36.
-1.2 CajeUUl's commentary can be found in S. Thoma#: Aquinati.! Opaa Omnia (ed. Leonina), vol. 6, Rom� 1891. p. 192. 43 Cf. H. Pouillon, "La beaUle, proprictc transcendantale chez le� Scolasliques ( l 220-1270)�, in: An:hi� d'Hi.!toin Doctrinall d littirain du Maytn Agt 21 (1946). pp. 26�329. This study is valuabl� for ib docUI�l�ntation, bill its title suggCS15 mor� than it substanLiat�. See aoo J. A. AUl5Cn, 'Di� Frage nach der Trann:endc:ntalitat der Schonheit im Mittelaltcr", in: B. Mojsisch and O. Pluta (cds.), Jlistoria Phiwsophiat Mtdii Arvi. Studitn lur GtJchichtt dtr Philruophit dn Mitttlalttn (Festschrirt Kurt Flasch), Amsterdam 1991, pp. 1-22. H Alexander of Halu, Sw" .. tI IhUJlOfilQ I, tracl. III, q.3, art. 2, n. 103 (cd. .. Qlliuacchi J, pp. 162-65).
CHAPTER EIGHT
BEAUTY: A FORGOTTEN TRANSCENDENTAL?
question arises, for in the arguments pro, a number of statements of
efficient cause and the ex.emplary cause. But it is beyond doubt that
3411
pscudo·Oionysius are cited which affirm the identity. In the reply to the question, the Summa departs from ideas derived from Augustine. Augustine had distinguished between two kinds of good, the befitting or vinnallS
(honestum).
which is
sought for its own sake. and the useful, which is referred to something else. Moreover, Augustine had identirled horu$lum with intelligible beauty.�·� Through this identification Augustine in fact re-established the dose Lie between the moral good and the beautiful, a connection implied in the Greek term kalos, bUl which had been lost in the Latin by Cicero's translation hone.stum. On the basis of Augustine's ideas, the Summa concludes that the good, taken as honestum, is the same as the beautiful. But they differ, it is added, conceptually. In what does this difference con· sist? We have seen that Dionysius attributes a threefold causality to the beautiful: it is the efficient cause, the final cause, and the exemplary cause of all things. With respect to each of these three causes, Alexander works out the distinction between the good and the beautiful. The most important difference in terms of its historical effect is that concerning the final cause. As Alexander states, �the beautiful is a disposition of the good insofar as it please.� the apprehension (secundum quod est placiium apprehmsionl) , whereas the good relates 10 the disposition insofar as it delights our affection." Of importance in the text. furthermore. is the fact that in the reply to an objection it is recognized that the notion of the beautiful is derived primarily from the formal or excmplary cause, and the notion of the good from Lhe final cause..... When we compare the exposition in the Summa fratris Alexandri with the tcxts of Thomas presented in the previous section, we find striking similarities, Thomas uses similar formulations to mark
349
the core of his line of argument goes back to the Summa fratris
Alexandri. Yet the principal problem remains, namely, what conclusion can
be drawn concerning the transcendentality of the beautiful
from the account of Alexander of Hales? Eco is of the opinion thal the
Summa brought about an
important philosophical innovation on
this point-"it decisively solved the problem of the transcendental characte.r of beauty. and it.s distinction from other values. "i7 But this obseno'ation seems unfounded. We can establish two things. The first observation is a simple fact. Alexander of Hales gives the beautiful no place in the first "determinations of being," name ly, "the one," "the true," and "the good."�s Eco acknowledges this fact, but advances in explanation "the caution and prudence with which the medievals engaged in innovation." There was, after all, a traditional number of lranscendentals, and it was no small thing to alter it. 'The boldness of the innovation required caution in its implcmentation. "�9 This argument is not very convincing, in light of the fact that ten years after Alexander's Summa, Thoma� in De
vmtak 1 . 1
presents six transcendentals.
The second observation is that the Summa fratri!> Alexandri does
not speak at all about the beautiful as expressing a universal mode of being. The exposition is restricted to the differentiation between the good and (he beautiful. This differentiation is a new element in comparison wiLh pseudo-Dionysius. yet it still does not provicle a sufficient basis for the di�linctive transccndcntality of the beautiful. The beautiful in Alexander of Hales has been called an "epipheno menon" of the good;�) it is only discussed within the framework of the good. This determination of the place of the beautiful had a decisive influence on Thomas and other authors.51
the concepLUa[ difference between the good and the beautiful (the beautiful is "that the apprehension of which pleases�). He, too, recognizes that the beautiful relates to the formal cause, and the good to the final cause. There are also differences. Thus Thomas does not understand the form as an exemplary cause, but as an inner cause. Neither docs he mention additional differences between the good and the beautiful related to the notions of the 4�
19)
Tht
Su,"",a
rl:fcrs 10
•
41i
Su,"",a
IAfflIott:iCIJ I .
AU,I!1I5tinl:'s Dr dill/nis ' qua,.!tionibu.! 30 (Mim' Pl. 40.
Ir.lrl. Ill, 'I. �.2 ;ad 1 (�d. Quar.lcchi I ,
p.
Hi!').
47 U. Eco, Art and .Brallt}' i71 Ih, Mlddk Ages, New Haven and London 1986. p. 23 (English tran$. of ·SVilllppO dcl1'estetica medievale", in: Mom,nll e problnni di s/oria dell s/tliea /: Daf/ 'antidiila c/aHica al barncw, Milan 1959. pp. 1 15-230) . 4R Summa Iheologica I. lrac\. III, q. I , n. 73 (cd. Quaracchi I. p. 114): "ens eM prilllulll intdligibilc; primae alHem emis dctc:rminationes sunt 'unum' el. 'verum' c:t 'bonum·.49 The Amlitlia, p. 44. cr. Art and &auf], p. 24. 50 D. Halcour, Dif L,h�t !/Qm St:ha�" im Ra"m�n cUr Tro.nsU1ukntalitn/.th�, d",. MftaphY5ilr. dtf'" friihm Franz.islr.anrrschult von Pam. (unpublished diss.) Freiburg 1957, p. 55. 51 Cf. Al bert lin: Creal, SUMma th�PKia, I, Inlct. 6, q. 2f., arL 2. III (Op,ra "
CHAITI:!:R EIGHT
350
The only writing in the thirteenth century that explicitly says
BEAU'rY; A FORGOTTEN TRANSCENDENTAL? distinct, fourth transcendental, remained
an
351
isolated statemenL If
that the beautiful is a distinct transcendental is an anonymous
Bonaventure is the author of the anonymous treatise, then it is
treatise, attributed by some to Bonaventure, whose=: authorship is far
striking that in his other works he nowhere makes mention of the
from certain.5\! It concerns an excerpt from the Summa fralTis Alexandri to which the author, probably a student of Alexander's,
beautiful as a distinct transcendental and constantly restricts himself to the triad "the one," "the true," and "the good. ".�5 In
attaches his own conclusions. The chapter on the transcendentals
doing so he follows the opinion current in the Ihirteenth century.
begins with the statement that there are four general conditionts of being. "the one, the true, the good, and the beautiful." All four add something conceptually to �being:M "the one" relates to the effi
B.6. Conclusitms
cient cause, "the tIue" to the formal cause, "the good" to the final
cause. -rhe beautiful" encompasses all these causes and is com mon to them.55
The guideline of our investigation
was
the thesis thai the question
as to the transcendentality of the beautiful is only answered when
In this treatise the beautiful is thu5 given a place of its own in
it has become clear that beauty expresses a general mode of being
virtue of its synthetic function. This function is not further
not explicated by the other transcendentals. Our first conclusion is
explained or grounded. I suspect that the author arrived at his thesis
that such a clarification is not to be found in Thomas's writings. In
by bringing two ideas together. The first idea, derived from
modern scholarship the importance of this criterion has been
Alexander of Hales, is that the transcendentals are differentiated
insufficienlly recognized, with the result that Thomas's statements
according to their rdation to the divine cause. "One," "true," and
about the beautiful have been taken all tOO readily as affirmations
"good" differ because each expresses a distinct aspect of the divine
of its transcendentality. The doctrinal tradition that informs his
causality, namely, the effident. exemplary and final causes,
discussion is Dionysills's account of the beautiful. which identiJies
respeclivdy (st:e
1.2.).
The second idea is pseudo-Dionysius's state
the beautiful with the good. The Dionysian perspective and the
ment that the beautiful is the cause of all things in three respects.
ontological perspective of the transcendentab are never fully
Ihe good as well, 011 the basis of which
integrated in Thomas. The beautiful is not determined in relation
the Areopagite concludes that the good and the beautiful are
to the first transcendental, "being," bUI is discussed, following the
identical. But the anonymou� writer seems to have drawn from
example of Alexander of Hales, within the framework of the good.
this statement the conclusion that the beautiful, unlike the other
The beautiful docs not appear in Thomas as a distinct transcen
transcendentals, is related to all three causes.
dental property next to the triad �one-true-good."
In Dionysiu$ this supplies
10
Modern scholarship �ometimei'l conveys the impression that the
synthetic view of (pseudo-)Sonavemure is the medieval answer to
the question as to the transcendentality of the beautiful.!'i4 Against \his it must be emphasized that the thesis that the beautiful is a
Modern scholars who hold that the beautiful is a transcendenlai for Thomas have lried to indicate ilS It-ystcmatic place in the order of the communia. Kovach argues that it belongs al the end of the list of transcendentals. The beautiful is the final integration or the transcendentals; iI has a synthetic function. The uniqueness of the
O",nia, ed. Cologne 34/1: pp. 177-79): �Utr\1m bonum 1.'1 pulchrum �cundum communem intemionem sim idem vel diversa. " �� The text i5 edited by D. Ha1cour, "Tranatlu dr lran.r.tndtnlaW>'IJ,s en/is tondilionibus (Assisi. Biblioteca Comunale. Codex 186)", in: FrllnLisllan;5Che Studitn 41 (1959), pp. 41-106. The tide which Halcour has given 10 the treatise I. anachronistic. The term Iransund,ntoli. is unknown in the thirteenth century. .\� Tradalw dt ,ransulldt>italiM 1 . 1 (ed. HakO\lr, p. 65): "Dicendum, quod '.cae condiliones fundanlur supra. ens. addunt enim aliquam rationem (...). Sed pulcnlll\ circuil omnem caUS.:Ull el esl commune ad iSla."
� cr.
H.
U. von
BahhaJar. Hnrlicllbil III/I. p. !9.
beautiful is that it is the relation of being
10
the two faculties of the
soul, the cognitive and the appetitive. these faculties taken not separately but
jointly.56
Yet it is doubtful whether this "synthetic"
55 Bonaventure, BrtuilO(juium I, c. 6 ( Oprra Of/mill V. p. 215): "conditiones entis nobilissimae et gener.olliMimae ( ...) hac autem $lInl unum, wrum, bonum".
Cf K.
Peler. Die uhrt von der SdaimJaril (Well &n6ver1tUro, Werl 1964, p. 135. II.
IS. 56 F. J. Kova("h. OJ,, ..t#htli.t.
pp. 391-92.
pp. 212-14;
"'h�
'rran$("enc1entalily of !leamy-.
352
CHAPTER EIGHT
BEAUTY: A FORGOTTEN TRANSCENDENTAL?
De ventate
353
view of the beautiful fits into the doctrine of transcendentals.
Thomas's account in
Transcendentals do not stand apart from each other, but are
al transcendentals needs completion. The triad "soul-intellect-will"
marked by a progressive explication of being. As we found in the
posited by Thomas requires a corresponding triad of "beautiful
previous chapters, there is an order of the transcendcntals: being is
true-good."
the first, next comes the one, then the true, and finally the good. In
istic of the finite spirit, is rooted in the unity of the spirit, so
this order, what is later includes conceptually what is earlier: the
likewise the true and the good unfold from a unity, and this unity
good presupposes the true. Given this cumulative structure, there is
is the beautiful. But Thomas's train of thought is an essentially
no reason (and no room) for a unique transcendental, the beautiful,
different one and, I would add, a more satisfactory one from a
that would synthesize the other transcendentals. Transccndentals
transcendental point of view. He posits a relationship of correspond
have as such a real unity, which is founded in the first, "being,�
ence between "being-true-good" all the Olle hand and "soul
and a conceptual order, which is completed in the ultimate, Ihe
intellect-will" on the other. He justifies this correspondence from
�good. "
what we called the "transcendental openness" of the soul. The soul
1 . 1 concerning the positive relation
As the duality of intellect and will, which is character
Kovach is not alone in setting out to determine the place of the
is the being that can accord with every being. Now there is in
beautiful on the basis of Thomas's definition of it, which relates the
every spiritual nature, not only in the finite soul, an intellect and a
beautiful to both the cognitive and the appetitive powers. A similar
wil1.5� The acts of both faculties manifest the infiniteness of the
approach is apparent in Czapiewski, but on his view the beautiful is
spirit, for their formal objects are the true and the good, respective
not the transcendental that ends the list but the one that precedes
ly, which are convertible with being. The emphasis in Thomas's
the true and the good. The beautiful must be taken to be the one
relation of being to the two spiritual faculties of the soul, the
exposition is not on the finiteness of the spirit, but on its intentional infiniteness. There is in his doctrine no need whatsoever for a
intellect and the will. The beautiful is the original unity from
"hidden" transcendental that would be the unitary center of the
which the true and the good unfold. Yet this unity of the true and
true and the good. Our second conclusion is that the attempts of
the good remains hidden and cannot be adequately conceived. I t
various scholars to find a distinct place for beauty as a transcen
can only be approached from the different points of view of the !.rue
dental must be regarded as having failed.
and the good. The reason for this is that a finite spirit realizes it·.elf,
A strong discrepancy exists between Thomas's discussion of
precisely because of its finiteness, through the duality of intellect
beauty and the picture sketched of his position in the more recent
and will, to which the duality of the true and the good corresponds.
literature. Thomas has nowhere treated the beautiful for its own
That is why the beautiful cannot be given a place in the list of
sake, nor is it for him "the richest and the most noble" of all the
transcendentals.57
transcendentals. A factor that can help to explain this discrepancy
Czapiewski's ingenious solution is the converse of Kovach's. The
is that several scholars arc motivd.ted by an "aesthetic� interest.
beautiful is not the final synthesis of the transcendentals but the
The titles of the studies by Kovach and Eco speak of "The Aes
original unity of truth and goodness. Yet this solution gives rise to
thetics of Thomas Aquinas." In the thirteenth century, according
an objection similar to the one evoked by Kovach's. The idea that
to Hans-Drs von Balthasar, a "transcendental aeslhetics" was born.
the unity of the true and the good is based on an earlier transceIl
Thomas's statements on the beautiful are interpreted as constituting an aesthetic theory.60
dental-Czapiewski speaks of an "Urmodus"38-is inconsistent with the order of transcendentals stated by Thomas. In this order the posterior includes the prior conceptually, and not the prior the posterior. At the heart of Czapiewski 's interpretation is his view that �7
MI
W. Czapiew�k.i, LJ(1J
Ibid., p. 140.
Sdliin�
INri
Thumas,
pp. 121
31 .
-
.�9
cr. S.th. 1,19.1: "Dkendum In Deo voluntatem esse, sicut et i n eo est intdlectllS: voluntas enim intdlectum conseqllitur." 60 Cf. the critical studies of A. Speer: "Thomas von Aquin tlnd die Kunst, Eine hermeneutische Anfrage .!:IIr mittelalterlichen Asthelik", in: ATChip for Kulturgtschichtt 72 (1990), pp. 32�.45; "Kunst tlnd Schonheit, Kritische Uber legungen zur mittelalterlichen Asthetik". in: I. Craemer-Ruegenberg and A. Speer (eds.), Scitn/ia lind an im Huch· und Spa/miltdall"., Berlin �lnd New
354
BEAUTY: A fORGOTTEN TRANSCENDENTAL?
CHAPTER EIGJIT
Aesthetics a s an independent philosophical discipline amse in the eighteenth century. ft was only in the post-medieval period that the triad "true-good-bcautiJul" developed. 51 This development reaches its conclusion ill Kant. In the project of his three Critiques, beauty acquires an equal and independent place beside truth
( Critique of Pure Reason) and goodness ( Critique of PractiCfll Reason). In research on Thomas the tendency exists, inspired by Jacques Maritain, to project this development backward into the past. 62 A weight is given to the beautiful that it neve. had tor Thomas himself, because of a desire to develop a philosophical aesthetics ba�d on Scholastic principles.
355
condition of the beautiful. perfection. is of another lind than the other two. It is a generic condition that binds the beautiful (0 the good as good. The beautiful pleases because it is perfect. The fifth question of Summa theologiae I treats "of the good in general." Articles 1·3 concern the convertibility of "being" and Hthe good," articles 4-6 what is proper to the good. In article 4 Thomas discusses the question of the kind of cause to which the good pertains; it is in this text that he presents his definition of the beautiful. In article 5 he states the ratio of the good as good. in article 6 the division of the good. The lasl two articles arc also important for the beautiful. In article 6 the good is divided into the befitting (honestum) , which is desired for its own sake, the useful (utile), which is
8.7. The place of beauty If the beautiful is not a distinct transcendental after all, what then is its place? Thomas offers no direct answer to this question. In closing we will attempt to specify the place of the hcautiful. (i) "The beautiful is convertible with the good." For Thomas, following Dionysius. Ihe beautiful is identical in suhject with the good. Proper to the good as good is that it is "perfect" and has the
desired as a means to something else, and the pleasing (delectabik) , in which the appetite comes to rest. The Summa fratris Alexandri identified the beautiful with the primary good, the bonum honestum, with an appeal to Augustine. We find the same identification in Thomas: "Spiritual beauty consists in this, that man's behaviour or his action is well proportioned according to the clarity of reasOIl.
This, however. helongs to the ratio of the befitting (...) Therefore, hontstum is identical with spiritual bcauty."f>4 In article 5 Thomas teaches that the ralio of the good as good
character of something �complete." "Perfect" is what auains to its end, to its proper nature. The same is denoted in a negative way by
consists in three essential features, modus (measure ) , species, and
the te.m integrum, which expresses the removal of impairment.fi-� Now Thomas in the Summa theolagiae 1,39.8 names as the first
Manichees (see 7.2.). In Thomas's accoum of this triad, the notion
condition of the beautiful "integrity" or wperfection," for, so he explains, "those things which are impaired (diminuta) a.e by that very fact ugly . " Earlie. we saw that Thoma.� at times restricts the
ratio of the beautiful to two characteristics. There is a historical .eason for this, namely. the authority of pscudo-Dionysius, who mentions only "proportion" and "cla.ity." nut we can now also adduce a philosophical reason for the changing number. The filSt
York 1994, pp. 945-66. 61 Cf. P. O. Kristelkr, "The Modern System of the Ar1.s", in: RmaiHanu
Thl?vght and The Arts, Princeton 1980, p. 167. 6� See ArC and SChQ!aHidsm, esp. n. 55 (pp. 12+-28), where Maritain discusses S.Ih. 1,5.4 ad I from the perspective of Kant's CriIUfur ofJv.dg-nl. 6� I" De diu. nomin.. c. 2, lecL �, 115: "Intl1trum autem et perfectum idem
yidenlur esse; differunt lamell "'Iione: lIam perf«tum yidelur did aliquid in aUilllelldo ad propriam naturam. inlelrum autem per remolionem diminuTion!,-.
aIda, the triad developed by Augustine in his argumem against the of "form" is central. A thing is called "good" insofar as it is perfect. The perfection of a thing comes to be realized through its form. The form itself is signified by the specie5, for everything is placed in its species by its fo.m. Now the form presupposes certain things, and from the form certain things necessarily follow. The form presupposes commensuration of its principles, and this is signified by the modus. Following on form is an inclination toward the end, and this relation to something else belongs to the ordo. If the beautiful is identical with the good because it is perfect, then the beautiful must follow the ratio of the good as good. Indeed, 61
S.th. 1I-11.14S.2: "Et similiter pu\chritucln �piritua1is in hoc consinil quod converUlio hOnlinis, slve actio eius, $il bene proponionata �ecundLim $pj�ilualem rationh clarilatem. lIoc alltem peninel ad rouionem 1t0'ICSII (...). Et Ideo honestunl c�t idem spirimali decori. Und� Augu�ninu$ dicit. in libro Ium�d(ltnl oow inhlligibl{trn jlvuhritudirwrf, qu/JII! Jpiritu/Jinn Octv gint/Jriu� l JWS
Qw!:?t.:
fni1fmt dUJJIlUS. :
356 the
r.IIAPTEl{ EIGHT
Summa fratris Alexandri
BEAUTY: A FORGOTTEN TRANSCENDl':NTAL?
simply identifies the essence of the
357
doctrinal tradition which, together with pseudo-Dionysius. condi
beautiful with Augustine's triad of the good. In Thomas 100 we find
tioned Thomas's discussion of the beautiful, that is, the appropria
a statement lending in that direction. He argues that
tion of
when some thin g desires the good, by the same loken it desires the beautiful and peace; it desires the beautiful . insofar as the thing ill proportioned (mtJdifirallJ.m) and specit1cd (spttifica/um) in itself, features that are included in the ratio of the good C. .) Therefore, whoso�wer desires the good, de�ires the beautifuI.6.'i
species
or beauty to the second Person of the Trinity in
Hilary of Poitiers. This appropriation suggested the closeness of beauty and truth. for the property Wtruth" is attributed to the Son by medieval thinkers (see
9.7.:
-rranscendemals and the Triniry").
When Thomas deals with the appropriation of
species to
the Son, he
adduces as an objection the fact that, according to Dionysius, the
In this text Thomas connects beauty with the essential constitu
beautiful and the good include one another. Now Mgoooness" is
ents of the goodness of things, but he does not expand upon this
appropriated not to the Son but to the Spirit. Therefore, the same
connection. There arc remarks pertinent to this poi nt . however.
must hold for wbeauly." In his rejoinder Thomas points out that the
scattered throughout his work. Thomas's standard example of
proper ratio of beauty consists in claritas, and clarity has a certain
beau[)' as proportw is that a man is called beautiful by reason of the
similarity to what is proper to the Son, who is Word.69
The notion of daritas is the second factor that reinforces the
due proportion or " commensuration" of his members.G6 He llseS the first
connection of the beautiful to the true, for "clarity" is identified by
illustrate this con
Thomas with "truth" and the knowability of things. It is described
the same term "commensuration" to describe the feature of the good, and the same example
to
modus,
dition.tiI He claims that claritas, the other feature of beauty, refers to
the form.fill "Clarity" therefore corresponds to
sjJccies,
a term which
as "light. "10 The mark of light, both physical and spiritual, is that it makes things visible, It has the property of clarification
(man;.
Thomas, in his discussion of the Trinitarian appropa-ialions,
f�tatio); "therefore all that is manifest is called clarum."'l Hence
identifies with
clarity is the property on the basis of which a thing is able to
pulchri tudo,
The notion of clarity leads us to the
manifest and show itself.
second aspect of his doctrine of beauty. (ii) Thomas modifies Dionysius's identity thesis such that the
Il is characteristic of the beautiful that its apprehension is taken
beautiful is seen to add something to the good conceptually, Thus
as �appropriale" (convenittts) and "good."72 This knowledge of the
far we have not gone into the substance of this addition and the
heautiful must be a special type of knowledge, for the intellect
meaning of this modification. According to Thomas the beautiful adds to the good a rdation to the cognitive power. What is new in
medieval thought on beauty, compared with Greek thought, is this emphasis on the relation of the beautiful to knowledge
(cogniliQ,
apfrrehtnsio) .
The emphasis on the cognitive a!;pect leads to a shift of the place
of beauty, namely, in the direction of "truth." Its doser connection with the true is reinforced by two factors. The first of these is the 65 De t)ml, 22.1 ad I\!. �� In D� di1!. nomin. c. 4, lec!.. 5, 339; In I &nt., 31.2.1. TllOmas frequently IIses romuu;,uIl1alio as a synonym of f1roporti o. Sec, luI' instance. In Ik div. nomin. c. 4, ku.. 21, 554. �1 Cf. In D� div. nomin. c. 4, Jc:ct. 22, 589: �primo accipienda est raLlo boni 111
communi, ad quam tria pertinent: KIJicet commensuratio aliquorum ex quibus aliquid componitur, UI C...) pulchritudo Icst) commen_�'lratio memo
hrorllm". fiN
Ibid"
f.
4, kct. 6. !l67: "Forma iI\UellI a (Jua deperHh:1 propria mlio rei,
IH'I'liuet "d <'I:\ri, ..I('I1I; urdu .11111'111 ad Iinl'llI, ad f<)j\�ollallll:un".
apprehends things under the aspect of the true
(sub mtione uen).n
How then is the knowledge of the beautiful to be inlerpreted?
There is a hrief text in Thomas's commentary on the Smtences
69
In I Smt., 31.2.1 ad 4. Cf. ibid"
"'PerfeClhsima
d. 3, ex.p. primae parth lextu!: pulchritudo inteHigitur Filius'. Pulchrltudo consistit in
duobus. K-ilicet in splendore el parLiOlln proporlione. Ve rila.' aUlem habet sph:ndoris raliOllem et aequali� tenet locum proportion,s," 70 111 Job, c. 40: �Deus enim non habet circumdatum decorem quasi superaddihllll eius essentiae sed ipsa essenlia eius est decor. peT quem
iOlclligiwr ipsa darilas sive veritas." In IV Snil., 49.2.3 ad 7: "clarilaS dei dicilur veritas suae essentiae, per quam cogno�cibili5 cst, siellf. sol per suam claritatem". In loan., C. 1 , lect. 1 1 , 212: "Claritas Dei non cn aliud quam ciu! substantia: non cOlm •
5C:I�sam. 1 In II 8mt., •
7':l
cst lucc:ns per participationem
13.1.2, ."i,/h. I1-U,145.2 ad I:
luminis, sed per
"objectllm mnvellS appetitum cst bonum appre hC:lIll1m. Quod alltem in i psa apprc:hc:n5ione apparel decorum, accipilllr lit ('{)nvcniC:1l1 et bonum". 7� S.th. 1,82.4 ad I: "Illb ratione entil el veri. qllam apprehendlt in It'IICf' 11I1" •
358
CHAPTER EIGHT
BEAUTY; A FORGOTTEN TRANSCENDENTAL?
in which he posits a connection between knowledge and the good.
be understood according to the order of the processes in the mind.
He distinguishes two grades in knowledge there. In the first,
The first mental process is the apprehension of the true; next, the
intellective knowledge is directed toward the true; in the second,
true incandesces
conveniens and good.
(excandescit)
359
and takes the character of good; this
From such
in turn, finally sets desire in motion, for desire is not moved
knowledge follow love and delight.74 With respect to this second
unless directed by a prior apprehension. To these processes there
grade of knowledge, which we could call "affective," another text
corresponds, according to Albert, Dionysius's order of the names.
knowledge understands the true as
in
the same commentary claims that, within it,
extended to the good"
"the true is
To the apprehension of the true in the absolute sense there corre
{verum extendituT in bonum) ,75 Because Thomas
sponds "light;" to the apprehension of the true insofar as it has the
(apprehensioni (lutem veri secundum quod habet
describes the apprehension of the beautiful in the same terms he
character of the good
applies to the second grade of knowledge. this extension of the true
rationem bam)
to the good must be the place ofthe beautiful.
desire there corresponds "love. "77
there corresponds "the beautiful;" to the movement of
Another connection between knowledge and the good is to be
Albert connects the beautiful to the true but not to truth as such.
found in Thomas's discussion of the relation between theoretical
He distinguishes two forms of truth, a distinction that he traces
(7.8.), they are not two
back to two kinds of knowledge. One is the knowledge of theoreti
distinct powers, but the theoretical intellect becomes practical "by
cal reason, which is directed at truth as such; the other is the
and practical reason. As we have seen
(per extmsionem) .
This is possible because the objects of
knowledge of practical reason, which arises through the "exten
the theoretical intellect and of the practical intellect are related to
sion" of the true to the good. 7� The place of the beautiful is the true
each other in such a way that they confirm the unity of the two
that has acquired the character of good. In Albert's treatise one
(se invicem
finds systematically elaborated what we were able to discover in
The practical intellect directs the known truth to
Thomas only through a reconstructive interpretation of scattered
extension"
powers; "the true and the good include one another
includunl}."
something that has to be done. The theoretical intellect becomes
texts.
practical by extending the true to the good.76 With respect to this
The extension of the true to the good is the determination which
extension there is an analogy between the beautiful and the object
for three reasons seems to describe best the place of beauty in
of practical reason, since the beautiful must also be understood
Thomas. First, this determination does justice to the fact that the
a s
beautiful is not a distinct, "forgotten," transcendental; it also makes
the extension of the true to the good.
et
this fact understandable, since the beautiful is implied in the order
bono, which was long attributed to Thomas. It is in reality a reportatio prepared by Thomas of the lectures of his teacher Albert the Great, given in Cologne between 1248 and 1252, on Dionysius's exposition of the beautiful in De divinis nominibus. In the first ques
of truth and goodness. Second, in this determination the beautiful
justice to the fact that in the Middle Ages the place of beauty shifts
tion Albert reflects on the order of the names "Light," "Beauty,"
in
and "Love" in chapter four of De
transcendentals precedes the good.
We can find support for this interpretation in the text De pulchro
divinis nominibus.
This order must
retains its relation to the good. The beautiful has an appetitive moment; it is that which pleases us. Third, this determination does the direction of "the true," which
in
the order of the
74 In I S=.I., 15.4.1 ad 3: "Videmus aUlem in coglll(Jone duos gradm:
prim urn, secundum quod cognitio intdlectiva tendit in unum [carrigc: verum. Cf. the text in the next note]; secundum, prout verum accipit ut conveniens et bonum. 1':t nisi sit aliqua resistentia ex tali cognitionc, sequiTur arnor et ddectatio". Cf. Comp. thml. Co 165: "ex apprehensione conuenientis delectatio generatllr, stellt lIislls delectatur in pulcris coloriblls". 7.'1 In I S.m.I., 27.2.1: "Et quia potest esse duplex intuitus, vel veri simpliciter, vel ulterius secundum quod verum extenditur in bonum et conveniens'". 76 S. tho 1,79. 1 1 ad 2. Cf. Dt !,ml. S.S ad 9.
77 Albert the Great, SUp" Dt div. nomin. Co 4, n. 71 (Opn-Il Omnia 37/1, p.
181 ). "
Ibid. f. 4, fl. 7 1 : "quae est in intellectu practico per extensionem de vero in rationCIII boni�.
TRANSCENDENTALS AND THE DIVINE
361
raises two questions which touch the foundations of the transcen dental way of thought. The first question concerns the relation CHAPTER NINE
between the transcendence of the first principle and the claim that
ALS AND THE DIVINE T TRANSCENDEN
range of the transcendentals or arc the maxirm!' communia restricted
transcendentals arc common to all things. Does God faU under the
to finite being because they are caused? We will approach this
In this chapter we consider what we may call the theological aspect of Thomas's theory of the transcendentals. This aspect was prominent in the doctrine from its very beginning. In the Summa
dl! beno, Philip the Chancellor observes that being, one, true and good are G"omm1missima but are also "appropriated" to Cod, and he investigates the relation between what is common and what is proper to God. I n the Summa fratris Alexandri, the doctrine of the transcendentals serves as the metaphysical foundation for the account of �the divine unity, truth and goodness." The connection between the transcendentals and the divine comes particularly to the fore in Thomas's reflection on the divine names. The most striking example is the text that we used in chapter II as one of the basic texts on the transcendentals, In I
Sentmtiarum 8.1.3. This text actually addre§ses the question: ''Whe ther the name 'He who is' is the first among the divine names?" In his response Thomas ascribes a privileged position to "being,"
"good," "one" and "truc" as divine names. These names precede
the other divine names "because of their commonness (communi·
las)."
He sketches the order among the transcendentals, and this
order determines the order among the divine names. Section
9.1.
treats of the transcendental names of God.
question through an analysis of Thomas's view of the rdation between divine being and tsSt COmmune
(9.4.).
The other question bears upon to the relation between transcend
�nc�
and immanence. Are things called "true" and "good" by an
. mtrmSlC
form or through extrinsic denomination, that is, in virtue
of the divine truth and the divine goodness? The historical roots of
�
this qu stion lie in early medieval thought. In respect to truth, the source IS Anselm of Camerhury's dialogue De veritate, where good ness is concerned, the relevant text has surfaced more than once in ' the preceding chapters: Boethius's De hebdomadibus. Thomas s transcendental way of thought coheres with their efforts to found the truth and goodness of things. but at the same time transforms them
(9.5.-9.6.).
The last section of this chapter
(9.7.)
deals with the relation
between the transccndentals and the Trinity. The doctrine of the
�
Tri ity of the divine Persons belongs to the "theology of sacred Scnpture." That God is triune is a datum of revelation not access ible to natural reason, for the human intellect cannot arrive at cognition of Lhe proper attributes (prupria) of the Persons. The
�?
doc i l': of the
t�a�scendentaJs.
however. offers the possibility of
mg the Trllluy philosophically. y cJanf
Cod is Being, One, Truth and Goodness. The relation between the maximt G"ommunia and God is understood by Thomas as a causal relation. This coheres with his conception of metaphysics, accord ing to which being in general is the subject of first philosophy; it studies that which is concomitant with being and considers God insofar as he is the cause of the subject of this science. Transcend· ental!! are the road for man to philosophical knowledge of Cod
(9.2.).
The metaphysical relation between God and the transcend·
entals is worked out with the help of three models of predication, the Platonic model of participation, the Aristotelian model of the causality of the maximum, and the model based on the notion of analogy
(9.3.).
The causal relationship between God and the maxime communia
9.1. &ing, Unity, Truth and Goodness as divine namfi As we found in the chapters on the Good and the Beautiful' the authority for philosophical reflection on the divine names was Dionysius the Areopagite. The thirteenth century was not only the century of the reception of Aristotle, but also !.hat of the intensive study of the corpus dionysiacum, upon which both Albert the Great and Thomas wrote commentaries. In the prologue of his com mentary on De divinis nominibus, Thomas gives a characteristic of Dionysius's work. The Divine Names deals with the appellations of those perfections of which a similitude is found in creatures
•
362
363
CHAPTER NINE
TRANSCENDENTALS AND TilE DIVINE
because they descend from Cod into creatures; "thus all good
between the communia. Whe n we analyzed this model in the
things are from the first Good, and all living things from the nrst
Life. "I
Dio nysiu s discusses, among other things.
the
MCood" (c. 4), "Being" (c. 5), "Life" (c. 6), "Wisdom"
names
(c. 7),
"Virtue " and "Justice" (c. 8), "Peace" (c. I I ) . "Perfe(:f' and " One" (c. 13).
The multiplicity of names auributed to God raises for Thomas
the question whether this plurality is compatible with Cod's unity
second chapter (2.5.) we poinled to a quaestio in the commentary
on book I of the Senlenus (2.1.3) to which Thomas attaches great
V"'
as
appears from his remark that the understanding of what
is s."1id ill the first book depends almost entirely on it. In this text he
explains the relations between nomen-ratiD-reJi in answer to the
question of how the plurality of attributes is compatible with God's unity.
and absolute simplicit),. In God there is no form of composition at
The divine names signify one reality but by means of many
all-thus also not of substance and accidental attributes. because
and diverse concepts; therefore, they are not synonymous, since
what is composed requires something prior !.hat is the cause of the
synonyms signify one reality through the same concept. The
union of its components. The first cause, however, has no cause
necessity of a plurality of concepts is due to the inability of the
itself.2 Yet the multiplicity of names cannot be abandoned for the
human intellecL to rcpn:selll adequately Cod's perfection by a
sake of the divine unity, since this plurality finds support in the
single concept. At the same time, the plurality of concepts has its
Holy Scriptures themsclves.�
ground in the thing signified, God, not in its plurality but in the
Are the divine names then perhaps synonymous? Thomas
fullness of its perfection.�
investigates this possibility. He advances the counter-argument that
There
is an order in the plurality of divine names. For
synonyms, when connected with each other, result in a useless
Dionysius, in continuity with his Neoplatonic way of thought, the
repetition of the same (nugatio), as when we say "vesture and
Cood is the first name; for Thomas the transcendentals "being,"
"clothing." If all the divine names were synonymous, it would be
"one," "true" and "good" precede other names. The order among
nugatory to say "good Cod" or "wise Cod," which is clearly false.4
these four names is based on the orner of the cammuni.uima. When
Thomas Useli the term nugatio here, which he also employs in the
compared in respect to their concepts, �being" is simply and abso
context of the convenibility of the transcendentals. Although they are interchangeable, it is not nugatory to say "true being,'" for "true" expresses something that is not expressed by the word
lutely prior to the others. Henu:, Thomas s1,Ues in In I Smtenlia1Um
8.1.3, it as
s i
filling that "Being" be the most proper divine name.f' But
we noted in the chapter on the Good (stet. 7.5.), he also offers a
"being. "
certain justification of (he Dionysian view. Considered under the
are synonymous iIIustr,Hes ag-din the dose relation between this question and his discu5.�i()n ()f the t'd.IlsccndeJltais. The basis of his
feature or a final cause. And it is with reierence to causality thaI
Thomas's response to the question whether the divine names
reply is the semantic model of nomen-ratio-res: words do not refer immediately to things, but do so by means of concepts. This triad
formed the basis of his explanation of the identity and difference
1
In D� div.
nom!n., proJ., 1 . Cf. (.1., keto 3, 104.
� S.fh. 1,3.7. See aha sect. 5.7. � In De dil!. l"Iomin. C, I, leet. 3, 97. Cf. In 1 Sntt., 22.1.3: �('..ontra est quod in Scriptura inve:niuntur de: ipso multa nomina divi na. � � Dt fief. 7.6, se:d contra 0 ) ; S.th. I,13.4, �ed (antra. See for this iUlle , R. Schonberger, Nomina di!i1no.. ZUT thtologjjchtn Stmantik �i ThomaJ 1101l Aqlun,
Frankfurt am Main/Bern 1981, pp. 93-109; M. D. Jordan, -rhe Names of God �\nd the Iklng of Name$", in: A. J. Freddoso (ed.), The Exi5tfmCt (lnd Natu.re (1/ (" .ad, Nutre Dame 19f1!\, pp. 161-90.
aspect of causality, the good is prior to heing, hccalL'lc it has the Dionysius considers the divine names. Dionysius does not present
res
and aliquid
as
divine names; these
transcendentals are derived from another tradition of thought, Arabic philosophy. The fact that Oionysius is silent about them
:; l1i I Sent. , 2.1.3: «Unde: palet quod pluralitas istarum rationum non [anlUm est ex parle intelleau� nostri, sed etiam ex parte ipsius Dei, inquan tum sua pc:rfc:ctio sup erat unamqualllquc conr.cptioncm nom·i intclJcctus. Et ideu pluralitali istarum ratiunuUl respondet aliquid in re quae Deus est: non quid em pluralitas rei, sed plena perfectioN. Dt pot. 7.6; S.th. I,13.4: NEt ideo nomina Deo attributa, lieet signil1ecm I1nam rem, tam en . q ui a significant
cam sub ration ibm mullj� (:1 diver.�i�, non sun1 �nonyma." fo 111 I Sm.t. . 8 . 1 . !\ : "ex quo ctiam hahet quamdam decentiam ut �it propriissimum d ivill um nomen. "
CHAPTER
NINE
365
TRANSCENDENTALS AND THE DIVtNE
may k the reason wny in medieval philosophy "thing" and
understands being in an existentialistic senseY Gilson seems
"something" never received the general recognition that fell to
thereby to acknowledge implicitly that it is not the datum of
"being," �one," "true" and "good." We shall consider these
Revelation as such but its philosophical mediation that is decisive.
transcendental names of God one by one.
Thomas has not developed his metaphysics in the light of Exodus but has interpreteci this text in the light of his conception of being
Cod is &ing
as "actuality."
In the question dealing with the divine names in the Summa thro
in the context of the discussion of "Being" as a divine name in De
logiM Thomas adduces important considerations for the primacy of
potentia
the name "Being" or "He who is.» His first argument has a
questioned. Being is the most imperfect; it is indeterminate, and in
The locus classicus for Thomas's understanding of being is found
1.2.
In the ninth objection the attribution of esse to God is
semantic nature: "He who is" is the most proper name "because of
this respect comparable to ftrst mauer. Just as first matter is deter
its signification." Names have been devised to signify the form or
mined by all forms, so being must be determined by the
essence of things. But ;'He who is" does not signify some form, but
categories. 10 Thomas's rejoinder is one of his relatively rare "ego"·
being itself (ipsum esse) . The name therefore signifies that the
statement
being of God is his very essence. This identity belongs to Cod
actuality of all acts, and for this reason it is the perfection of all
(d.
4.4.: "The ratio of bt:ing"): "what I call esse is the
alone, for all created things are marked by the difference of
perfections."ll The first argument for the priority of "He who is" as
essence and being. Hence "He who is" most properly names God.1
a divine name is connected with this understanding of being.
Thomas elsewhere calls the identity of being and essence in God a "sublime lruth" that God himself revealed to Moses. When
Thoma-'ll'S second argument in the Summa thtowgiae is based on "the universality" of the name:
Moses asked the Lord: "If the children of Israel say to me: what is
For all other names are either less universal, or. if convertible with being, add somethin g above it in concept (sEOlndum raJionem ). Therefore, in a certain way t hey i nform a nd determin e bei ng U
his name? What shall I say to them?" the Lord replied: "I am who am"
(Exodus 3:14). In this way God shQwed that his proper name is
"He who is. "8 GQd's self-revelation in Exodus plays an important role in Gil son's conception of medieval philosophy. Although he acknowl edges that there is no metaphysics in Exodus, there is nevertheless a metaphysics of Exodus, which is the most crucial transfQrmatiQn Qf Greek philQsophy under the impulse Qf Christianity and the "cornerstone of Christian philoSQphy"
(0.1.).
Yel Gilson's thought
manifests a noteworthy development on this point. In his later works Aquinas appears as the exclusive representative of Christian
,
Thomas next explains the suitability of WBcing" as a divine name by connec.ting its universality with the negative moment in human cognition of God. '-\That God is in himself, his essence, remains hidden
to
human beings, pagan or Catholic.I'
9 Cr. 10:. ZUll'l Brunn. "u 'philosophic chri':tienlle' et I'exegese d' Exode !I:14 scion M. Etienne GHwn", in: ReI,", d, thiolngU tI de philMophj, 3. serie ]9 (1969), pp. 94-105. lO De pet. 7,2 ohj. �: "Deo, qui est perfeclissimus, id quod csl im�rfeetis.�l cue
�kUl
philosophy. In Gilson's view, Augustine remains strongly tied tQ
mum non est atlribuendum. Sed
being in an essentiaHstic sense, while Thomas, by contrast,
menta. Ergo sicut materia prima non cst in Deo, ita nee eue debet divinae substantiae atlribui. "
Greek lhough t in his exposition of Exodus because he interprets
It
7
S.th. 1,13.11:
"Primo quidem, propter slIi significationem. Non enim
lignificat formam aliQuam, sed ip5um esse. Unde, cum
cue
Dei Sil ip$a eius
e8sentia, et hoc nulli alii convenial ( ...) . manifestum en quod inter alia nomina hoc maxime proprie nominal Deum: unumquodquc enim denomi·
mUllr a slIa forma." I! St:G. 1,22.
e11 imperfectissimllm,
prima
materia: sieut enim materia prima determinatur per O!!llles fonna�. ita esse, (11m sit imperfc:(tis.�imllm, dcterminari hal'let per omnia propria praedica.
Ibid. 7.2 ad 9: 'Unde patN quod hoc quod dieD
�ue
cst actualitas omnium
netllum. et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfcClionllln." u 5.'1.. 1,13.1 1 : "Secundo. propter cilll univenalitalem. Omnia enim ali" nomina �unt minus communia; vel, 5i convcrtantur cllm ipso. tamen addun! ali qua mpTa ip5llm secundum rationem; unde quodammodo informant el determinant ipsum."
1.'1
Cf,
nllhulinl'
ihid. J,I!l.IO
111:(1111:
ad
5:
"Ipaalll naturarll Dei praUI In .e Cit, n('que
IIa:jCallll. rc)jCnOlCIt",
TRANSCENDENTAL.'> AND THE DIV[NE.
CHAPTER NINE
Now in this life our intellect cannot know th� essence itM:lf of God as it is in itself. According to whatever mode the intellect may determine what it understands about God, it falls shor! of the mode in which God is in himself. Therefore the less determinate the
names are, and the more universal and ahsob.ue they are, the more properly they are said of God. (... ) By any other name some mode of the substance of a thing is determined, bill the name kl-le who is � determines no mode of being. It is related indeterminately to all.'4
"He who is" is the most proper name, because it is in virtue of its universality the least improper. It does not signify any determinate i reply to the ninth objection in De potentia 7.2 mode of being. In h s Thomas had pointed out that the indeterminate character of lLJoSe is different from the indetermination of first matter. Nothing can he added to esse which is more formal than being itself. Esse is not determined by something else in the way that the potentiality of matter is determined by the act of a form: rather, being: is determined as an dict by a potentia1ity.!� Being can be determined by a form to a special categorical mode of being. It is then contracted to a genus and species. This explains why Thomas grants a privileged position to "being," "one," "true" and "good" as divine uames. They express gCDl�ral modes of being. However, as he points out in the second argument, the other transcendentals. although convertible with being, add something to it in concept. Being is the nrst transcendental, ,\nd is therefore the most suitable name of God. The two arguments in the Summa tlu:ologiae arc based on the core of Thomas's theory of the tram.ccndcntab: the nrSlneSS of being (ens) and his understanding of es.�t' as "actuality." The transcen dental way of thought is also manifest in his response to an objection which holds, under the influence of the Dionysian tradition, that the name "Good" is most proper to God. Thomas In tdlectu $ atltem noster non polc" ipsam Dei es.'I(:otiam cognosccrc in statu vhu�, kcuJldum quod in se cst; �ed quemcumquc modulli 14
l/lid. 1,13.11:
"
determinet circa id quod de Deo iJildligit. deficit a modo quo Deus in se est. Et ideo, quanto aJiqua nomina sunt minus delerminata, el magiS c,omrnunia el absoluta, tanto magis proprie dir.untuf de Oeo :II nobis { ...J . Quol ibt t ",nim
!
alia nomine detenninatur aliqui s modus suwtaJiliae rei: sed hoc nomen Qui ilullum modllm enendi determinat, sed se haM. indetemlin;tte ad
lSI
omnes." Cf. 1ft pol. 7.5. I. � Tn pm. 7.2 ad 9: �Nec intelligendum est, quod �i quod dko (JJt. illiquid ..ddalUt (ILlod sit eo formalius, [psum detcrminans, sicut actm potcn ti:un . (...) Nihil all(elll palest addi ad tJ.•, quod sil extraneullI ab ipso ( ... ) . Unde JlOil �ic determinalll f tJJI per aliud sicIl1 pole",ia per ar.(Um, scd magis sitU! aClu� per potenti
367
acknowledges that "Good" is the principal name of Cod insofar as he is cause, but not without qualification, "for absolutely speaking, 'being' is understood before 'cause: "H, C.oo is One
"Can God be called 'one?'� In Thomas's discussion of Ihis question he alway!'> refers to the biblical roots of this name in Deuteronomy 6:4: "Hear, 0 Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord.�17 In his commentary on the Sentences he establishes that Cod is one most truly and in lhe highest degree. Something is one insofar as it is undivided. Thomas's argument consists in showing a hierarchy of the various modes in which something can be undivided . There are degrees of unity (a conclusion which we used in 5.8. as an argument against a purely negative conception of unity). (i) The first distinction is between those things which are un divided per accidenj (such as Socrates and white) and those which are undivided per se; the latter are a more true mode of unity than the former. (ii) Among those things which are undivided per se. that which is undivided absolutely (simpliciter) is more one than what is undivided in a certain respect. That which is one in number is absolutely undivided. (iii) Thomas distinguishes a gradation within that which is one in number, dividing it into those things which are undivided in act, though potentially divisible (such as things composed of matter and form, or being and that which is [esse et quod est] ) , and those things which are undivided in both act and potency. (iv) The latter are of various sorts. The lowest is the point which includes another notion besides indivision in its definition, that of place. The undivided which does not include any notion beyond indivision itself is the unity which is the principle of numher. Yet this sort does inhere in something thal is not unity itself, its subject. Thus it is clear lhat tbe undivided in which there is no inherence in something else is most truly one. Apparently it is so obvious for Thomas that the highest unity is God himself that he does not draw the conclusion explicitly. He adds thal the highest unity is the principle of all unity .md the measure of every thing. for what is supreme Ifi S.th. 1, !.'J. l t ad 2. ., 'n I Smt., 24. 1 . 1 ; .'leG. 1.41/; S.•II,
1.11.3.
-. '- - . -�- --�.-- - --
369
CHAPTf:1t NINE
TJlANSCENDENTALS AND TilE DIVINE
( maximum) is the principle in every genus.11I This idea is taken from the first chapter of the second book of the Metaphysics, in which Aristotle argues that what is the cause of a property common to the cause and its effect is the maximum of that attribute (d. sect. 6.3.), In the Summa theologia� Thomas devotes a separate question to "the unity of Cod." In the construction of I, q. 11. the connection between the doctrine of the transcendentals and the divine becomes manifest. Art. 1 deals with the convertibility of "being" and "one" and their conceptual differences; art. 2 investigates the opposition between one and many. In art. 3 Thomas discusses the question "Is God one?" In the reply to an objection a distinction appears which is fundamental for his account of unity: tht: distinction between the quantitative one and the transcendental one. "One" which is the principle of number belongs to the genus of mathematicals and cannot be predicated of Cod. But "one" which is convertible with being is something metaphysical (quoddam metaphysiC1J.m) and can be said of God.19 In the corpus of q. 11.3 Thomas gives thr�c different reasons for the oneness of God.. In fact these arguments relate not to transcen dental unity but to the unicity of God: they are meant to refute polytheism. The question of unity and that of unicity, however, represent IWO different problems. Every being as being is undivided, but not every being is unique.�j) Transcendental unit}' is again cenual in [he last al"ticle of q. I I : "Is God supremely one ( maximt' unU$)?� Thomas's argument here is somewhat different from the one offered in his commentary on the Senttnces. "One� means "undivided being.� Thus if something is supremely "one," it must be supremely "being" and supremely "undivided." Thomas argues thal both features are proper to Cod. He is supremely being insofar as his being is not determined by any nature to which it belongs. He is subsi!>tent being itself, undetermined in every mode. The indeterminateness of being was one of Thomas's arguments for the primacy of "He who is" among divine names. God is supremely undivided, since he is
divided neither in act nor in potency by any mode of division. He is altogether simple. God is therefore supremely one.�1
18
111 I Snif.,
24.1.1.
Note in particular: MEl inde ut quod '!ua unitas CSt
principiulIl omllis unitatis
ct
menSlIla omnis rei. Quia mud quod
maximum, cst prindpium in quolibel genen:. ( ...) 19
S.th. 1,1 U ad 2.
lit didtur II Mel6/,h. �
nl
20 cr. F. Van Steenlx:rghen. u problime de l'eKiJlrou de Dieu dm'l$ IN emil de s. Thomas di\quil'l, Louvain-Ia-Neun: 1980, p. 300.
God if Truth At the beginning of the Summd
contra GmJiks (1.1) Thomas develop.�
the thesis that truth is "the ultimate end of the whole universe, and the consideration of the wise man aims principally at truth." He deliberately considers this thesis from a twofold perspective. First. he relates it to Christian revelation. Divine Wisdom testifies that it has assumed flesh and come into the world to make the truth known: "For this I was born. and for this came I into the world, that I should give testimony to the truth.. Uohn 18:37). Another text from the same Gospel to which Thomas refers in his discussions of Truth as a divine name is Jesus's pronouncement in John 14:6: "I am the Way, and the Truth, and the Life."2� In his commentary on this text, Thomas points to the correlation between "way" and "truth:ft "truth" is the end (terminus) of the "way." Christ i� lhe Way according to his human nature, the Truth according to his divinity. The end of the Way is the goal (finis) of human desire, for the desire proper to man is directed to the knowledge of truth.�� In the Summa contra Gentiles the thesis "truth is the ultimate end of the whole universe" is related not only to Christian revelation, but also to metaphysical knowledge: The t'hilosopher determines first philosophy, too, as kthe sci.::nce or truth, � not of any truth. but of that truth which is the origin of all truth, n amely, the truth which belongs to the firs t prin ciple of being of �11 things. Therefore, its truth is the prin ciple of all truth, for there IS the same disposition of things i n truth as in bcing.24 21
S./If. r.t 1.4:
�CUIll
unum sit ens indivisum , ad hoc quod aliquid sit maxi
unum . OPOI((:1 quod sil el maxime ens CI maxime indivisllm. Utrllmqut' a�lem compelit Dco. ESI euim maxime em" inquantum cst non haben5 Inc:
ahquod esse dcterminatum pcr aliquam naturam cIli advc:niat, sed est ipsum esse 5ubsisienS, omnibus modis indeterminatum. ESI cl.iam maKime indivi.
sum, inquantum neque dividi\lir ;ICtu neque potentia, secundum quemcunque modum divisionis, cum sit. omnibus modis simplex., UI supra ostensum est. Uode manifenum est quod Deus en max.ime unus: In I. is commenc.,u1' on D�
h'l1(}ma�lln.t.s,
leet. 2. Thollla! concludes from the subsistence of beiTig directly to It'! umty: MHo� autem non poltn eMe nisi unum. quia, si ipsum essr nichH . hud habel adm!XlUm preter id quod est ('!!Sf" <.-.). impossibile esl id quod e$l Ipsllm esse: muluplicari pel" aliquid dillersificans�. See also lJ,; entl', c. 5. n &C. 1,60, S.lh. 1,16.5. sed contra. �.'\ Sup". lmln. c. 14, leet. 2, 1868.
?
��
SeO.
1.1:
"Sed el Primam Phil()�ophi
rA�C
370
Thomas clearly has in mind the second book of the
expression in a semantic distinction. Every other thing is true
Metaphysics (c.
(verum) ,
I ) , where Aristotle demomtrates that "philosophy is righLly called the science of truth
0'
371
TRANSCENDENTALS AND THE DIVINE
C:HAP'f"ER NINE
but not truth (veritas), just as it is
ens,
not
semantic distinction bel:Ween the concrete term
and concludes that �each thing is rdated to
ens
ip.ru.m e.JSt.2!I
The
and the abstract
Dt hebdamadibw and
truth in the same way as it is to being." This statement plays a
term esst is derived from Boethius's axioms in
true is consequent upon being.
composed and what is altogether simple (d. 4.4.).
is meant to express the ontological difference between what is
central role in Thomas's view of the lranscendemaJity of truth: the The claim that "there is the same disposition in being and in truth" is also used in one of his arguments establishing that God is
God is Good
truth. "Disposition" means causal orrier, hierarchy. Since there is the same order in being and in truth, and since God is the first
In chapter VII on " Good as Transcendental" we saw that the
truth.l!� Another argument is based on the nOlion of "measure"
Thomas's account of the convertibility of being and good (7.4.). He
notions of '"appetible," "perfect," Nact" and csu are central in
being and (he cause of being. he is the first lIuth and the cause of
( mensura) .
can build an argument for the thesis "Cod is good" on each of
The concept of truth presupposes a measure for the
adequation of thing and intellect. In Thomas's accoullt of "True
these notions. Thus he presents the following reason, based on the
as
notion of "act."
a relational transcendental" (6.7.) the ultimate meaning of the
"The good is that which all things desire. " (... ) But all things, each according 1.0 its mode desire to be in act ( es.fc actu); thi� is clear from the fact that each thing according to its nature rcsins corruption To be ill act. therefore, constitul.cs [he ratio of the good ( ... ) . But God is Ixing in act, nOl in pOtcncy. Henr.c he is tru ly
definition of truth in terms of adequation is the conformity of the
.
thing with the divine intellect. The measure fOf the truth of things can only be a productive intellect, that of the Creator. That which is
.
the measure in any given genus is most perfect in that genus. Since the truth of a thing is measured by the divine intellect. God
good. '"
is the most perfect and highest truth.'l6
The intimate connection between the doclrine of the transcen
But what docs the conclusion "God is the highest truth" mean
dentals and the Good as divine name is manifest again in the
when truth is a relation of adequation of thing and intellect? The
construction of the Summa
thing that the divine imcllect tirst knows is its own essence. There is no "adequation" here, however, in the sense th�t one of the
desires its own perfection. He next elaborates the role of these
and his essence.?7 Intellect and Being are aile in the Origin. God is
notions in the order of causality. The perfection and form of any
Truth.
effect consist in a certain likeness to the agent, since every agent
The identity between God and Truth is worked out by Thomas
effects its lik.e. Therefore, "the agent itself is desirable and has the
in yet another way. Because the tfUC is consequent upon being:,
nature of the good." Cod is the first cause of things. and hence the
only (hat which is being itself ·is truth itself. This is proper to God
prinCipil lm
('$1
origo omnis
f:�sendi omni bus; unde
ct SlLa veritas est omnis \·eritatis prindpium: sic ('nim est dispositio rCTlIn) i n
vnilare sicu! i n \t�
�fi
'17
cue.·
In I 5,.,,/.• 19.5.1; SeC;. 1,62 (516).
SrG. [,62
(519).
IJt ,,,,"I. 1.7. Cf. S.th. l,lIi.5.
asks:
tioll." A thing is good insofar as it is appetiblc, and every thing
means primarily the "equality" (atqualitas) of the divine intellect
lIeriraLis, scilicet. quae penino::l ad primum
Q. 6.1
demonstration appeals to the notions of �appetible" and "perfec
divine essence are absolutely idemical. Therefore, in God truth
Hi.on/jam tttrila/i.l; nOli clliu�libcl, sed eius vcrtralis quat:
deals with goodness in
"Does being good belong to Codr The starting poillt of Thomas's
relata is the measure of the other. The divine intellect and the
alone. The difference between Cod and other true things comes to
tluologiae. Q. 5
gcneral, the next question with the goodness of God.
aspect of goodness belongs to God.:JO
, •
;
l
�� SCC.
29
"'CLt.
111,51.
Sec. 1,87; "Bonum 'Jt quod omnia appdunf (... ) . Omnia aurem appelunt t"SSe
secundum suum Inudum: quod palel ell: h.oc quod unumquOdque !l('cunduno naturam 5U;Ull repugn at r.oITuptioni. Esse igi lur 3Cl11 boni rationelll consdtuit (... ). Deus alltem en ens actu v�re bonIU." �n
non in potentia. U( supra ostensum
est. Est igilUr
5�cund\lm quod ut 3pp�tihik. " u id CSt, S.tfl. 1.6. 1 ; "BonUlli �nim aliq
372
TRANSCENDENTALS AND THE DIVINE
CHAPTER NINE
373
(apud modernos) . Thomas proceeds to sketch the Platonist approach
An important point in Thomas's discussion of the relation between being and good was the recognition of a difference
to reality which underlies their way of speaking.
(bonum simplicitc-) (cr. 7.6.). The concept "good" has the aspect of
to simple and "abstract� principles (abslmcta). Thus they posir the
The Platonislli want to reduce all that is composed and material
between "being absolutely" (fflS simpliciter) and "good absolutely"
existence of separate Forms of natural things, for example. Human·
being final. Hence something is called "good simpliciter" when it
possesses its ultimate perfection through acts added to i ts substantial
Being·in·itself. A concrete individual is not human being by its
siml>li,iter� expresses a dille renee between divine and crcaturely
called human being pn
being. The non-identily between "being absolutely" and "good
essence. but by participation in the separate Human Being. This is
goodness, because the': non-identity stems from the finiteness of
nature or species. The Platonislli apply this "abstract" approach not
St.
because it is identical with the human
only to the species of natural things but also to that which is most
things. "[n every creature to be and to be good are not the same
common (maxime cammum:a) , namely, "good." "onen and "being."
absolutely, although each one is good insofar as it is. �ll No fmile
They hold that there is a first, which is the essence of goodness, of
being attains (0 the perfection of its goodness through its substantial
unity, and of being-a principle. Thomas says, that we call "God."
being alone, but by means of a multiplicity of acts. Only God has
The other things are called "good." "onc" and "being" because of
his entire goodness in a manner which is one and simple,
their derivation from this first. Therefore the Platonists called the
namely, "in the fullness of hi s being.��2 "Being absolutely" and
first principle "the Good itself," "the Good
"good simpliciter" are identical in hi m .
of all good things."3�
per St, " or
"the goodness
Thomas next rejects the first application of the Platonic method:
9.2. God
as
there are no separate, subsisting Forms of natural things. But with
cause o/ the "maxime communia "
regard to the first principle of things, he recognizes the legitimacy of the Platonist reduction. In this respect their opinion is "the
"Being," "One," '1rue'" and "Good" are divine names that precede
truest" and in agreement with Christian faith. Therefore Diu
any other name because of their commonness. This priority raises
nysius called God sometimes "the Good itself," "the supergood," or
the question of the relation between what is most common and God. If transcendenlals are, on the one hand. me most common
"the goodness of every good. ":14
two kinds of naming related to each other? Thomas's prologue to
elements. He assesses its conception of the nature of things as
lu Thomas's evaluation Platonism has negative and positive
names and. on the other. names proper to Cod, how then are these
negative. subscribing to Aristotle's critique of Platonic "separa
his commentary on Dionysius's De divinis nominibtu suggest... an
tism." The essence or nalUre is not a subsisting Form but an intrin·
answer to this question.
sic feature of a natural thing, which is indicated by the definition.
[n the prologue he states the reasons why Dionysius's wrhings are difficult to read. The principal difficulty is that the Areopagite employs the style and manner of speaking of the Platonists. a style and manner that have fallen into disuse among modern thinkers
Unutllquodque amp-rn il.ppetit suam perfertioneJll. Perfectio autem et forma
effectus C�I quaedam similiwdo agenti�: cum omne agens agat sibi �imile. . Unde tpsum agem eSI appetibile. et habet rationem boni: hoc enim est quod de ipso appeli tuf. UI eius similitudo participetur. Cum ergo Deus sit prima causa effecliva omnium, manifestnm est quod sibi competit ratio !.>oni el ap�etibj)is. � J seC. 11],20: �Non Ighur cuilibet creaturarum idem est esse et bonum esse simfJidttr: licel quaelibel earum bona sit in quanUim cst.· •
�
Sth. I·Il.JR.!.
, I i
' ." ,
l
i I
t
33 In Dr. diu. nQmill., proi. Note in particular: MNec mlum huiusmodi abstractione Platonid considerauant circa ul!imlU !pedes rerum naturalium. sed etiam drca maxime communia, quae sunt bonum. unum �t ens. Ponebant. enim. unum primum quod en ipsa cssentia bonitatis et unitatis et esse. quod didmus Deum et quod omnia alia dicuntur bona vel una vel ent.ia per derivationcm ab ilIo primo." .''14 Ibid., prol.: "Haec igitur PlalOnicorulll ratio fidei non eonsonat nee veritati, quantum ad hoc. quod continel de speciebus naturalibus separatis. !ed quantum ad id quod dicebant cle prim o rerum Principio, verissima est corum opinio et fidei chrj'tianae conrona. Unde Dionysius Deum nominal quando que ipsum quiclcm bonlllll aul 5UperOOllum aut prindpale bonum aut bonilalem omnis !>oni.· For Ihl' rCallln why Thoma. emphub.e. the agretment with Chrillian faith, .ee M:CI. 9.6.
�74
CHAPTER NINE
How can things be beings if that by which they aTC should be
intenrion of De djvi7ii.� nominibu..s in the prologue to his commentary.
separate from them? Therefore the specifIC cl;sellce of a thing is not to be sought in the direction of separate Forms.s.� On me other
Dionysius wants to deal with the names of those perfections that maJlifesl God's causality in creatures.
hand. Thomas assesses positively the Platonic view of the relation
The c.Iarlfication of Thomas's view of the relationship between
of things to the first principle. This principle is transcendent and is
the transccndentals and God enables us to draw two conclusions_
the essence of goodness and being. Other things �tand in a relation
The first is metaphysical in nature. Thomas's acceptance of the
of participation to the first principle. Their being has been derived
legitimacy of the Platonic method is in keeping with his con
from the first, divine being.
ception of metaphysics. The principal outcome of chapter In was
Thomas's exposition might leave the impression that his twofolrl
that this conception is transcendental: metaphysics is the scientia
evaluation of PIOltonism corresponds to two different approaches to
communis. The subject of first philosophy is not the first, transcend
reality, which we could call "the nature approach" and "the crea
ent being, but ens commune and that which is consequent upon
ture approach. "36 Things can be regarded in themselves, which is
heillg. The divine is studied by the science of being insofar as it is
to say as having a nature with its own consistency and iuner
the cause of the sul:�.iect, that is, the universal cause of being. A
principles. The rlatonic "abstrAct" method is out of place here; it is
teHing example of the metaphysical resolution to the ultimate
"unreasonahle" (irratioliabilis) .37 Things can also be regarded in
cause is Thomas's sketch of the history of philosophical reflection
their relation to God, which is to say as creatures. For this
on the question of being in the Summa
approach. Thomas ack.nowledge!>, Platonism provides an adequate
thought that implies a different view of the origin of things and of
method to the maxime CQmmunia.
causality. The distinctive feature of the
Yet Thomas's altitude toward Platonism is more complex than the twofold evaluation in his commentary on Dionysius suggests.
began to inquire into the origin of being, taken in its generalness. This origin must be understood as "creation, � for to produce being
I•
The doctrine of the lranscendentals has an anti-Platonic moment:
(d. 4.1.).
This distinction makes de�r under what condition the Platonic method of the reduction to "abstractn principles is legitimate for
resolution ends in the universal cause of being, God. metaphysically speaking, a causal relation. Thomas afftrms this
Platonists that Thomas stresses the difference between the com the commonness by predic�tion and thal hy caus,;tlity.
absolutely pertains to the nature of creation. The metaphysical The relation between the transcendentals and the diville is,
It s i in reaction to the
monness of a universal and that or a cause, the distinction between
third phase is the
transcendental consideration of being"as-being. Philosophers
In earlier chapters we considered his critique of the Platonic con the more general something is, the more separate (separatu71I) it is.
1,44.2. He
(see 3.8.). Each of these phases is marked by a determinate way of
method. but it can lie in nothing else than the applicability of this
ception of the nature of what is most common, according to which
lheologiae
distinguishes three main phases in the development of philosophy
model. He advances no argument for the validity of the Platonic
they arc communi-a, not subsistentia
375
TRANSCENDENTALS AND THE DlVINE
conclusion explicitly: God is the cause of being qua being;"; ens i '
communI! is the proper effect of the highest cause, God.39 "It is
impossible that no effect whatsoever of God is known, since his proper effect is ens commU1le, which cannot be unknown. �u ..
The second conclusion, which is epistemological, is already
Thomas, This method is VAlid with respect W the maximt' communia,
implicit in the last statement the transcendentals open the way to
causality, that is, is regarded as the cause of what is mOsT common.
man's natural knowledge of God. In chapler VI we found that
insofar as the first principle, God, is regarded as common by
This interpretacion is consistent with Thomas's description of the ,!> In VII Mttaph., lect. 5, 1367. ."i See J. A. Aeruen, Nalurt and Leiden 1988.
-'7 Ci. S.th.
1,6.4.
Crtat"u: Tho"MlJJ
Aqulnas"s Way nj Tlwught,
Thomas's innoV"c.tion in the doctrine of the transcendentals is the 38 Dt poL 3.16 ad 4. �9 S.th. '-11,66.5 ad 4: "ens commune I'St proprius effl'ctu! cau�e altiuimac,
$Cilicel Dei.�
�() De lImt. 10.12 ad 10 (in conlrarium): "Nee p011'1t eul' quod flIlllus du! Iscilicet DeiJ I'ffccltls cogno,ralllr cum eiul en-eetus sil ens (Om.nunc quod inCOMnitllm elUe neln putt.I':
376
377
CHAPTER NINE
TRANSCENDENTALS AND THE l)IVINE
correlation he introduces between the human soul and being. He
for the convertibility of being and the true. They are interchange
understands the transcendental "true" in relation to the cognitive
power of a spi.ritual substance. The perfection of an intellectual
ahle, �since every natural thing is conformed to the divine 3I"t through ilS form" (sect. 6.7.). A thing is called Mtrue" insofar
as
it
being is that its horizon is unlimited; �the soul is in a sense all
resembles the exemplar in the divine intellect. This likeness
things." This transcendental openness of the mind is the condition
consists in the specific form, the
for the possibility of metaphysics
as
lhe science of being-as-being.
This openness is at the same time the condition for the possibility of cognition of God. The ralional creature is "capable of God."
The rational created nature alone has an immediate order to God, for the other creatures do not attain something univt'rsal ( ... ) Rut the rational creature, insofar as it kno....s. the universal ratio of good and being, has an immediale order to the univenal principle of bt:ing. 41 If transcendenlals are the way LO natural knowledge of God, and
species,
of something.�·� God is
related to the trulh of things as the exemplary cause. from the perspective of this causality, the creation of things is understood according to the modd of ""'art." The lheological foundation of the
good
as
transcendental is
expressed in a brief argument for the convertibility of good and being: "all being
(esse)
is from the good and toward the good."·fi
Every being is good, because it is willed by God; "the love of God infuses and creates goodness in things."-17 The divine goodness is
if the relation between the transcendenlals and the divine is a
also the final end of all things. So, Thomas points out, the
is only possible through his effects. Cod is not the first known but
is found in things, for egressing from the good, they tend toward
causa.l relation, then it is dear that philosophical cogniLion of God
the final end of metaphysical inquiry. Thomas himself describes knowledge by way of causality as "the foundation" (jundam,mtum) of his consideration of God in the Summa theowgiae.4� At the end of Summa
lheoWgiat I, q.
44, u-eating "the procession of
creatures from Cod," Thomas states that, although the first
principle of all things is one in reality. Cod's causality can be
differentiated in a threefold way. He is the efficient, the exemplary
dynamics of reality is a circular motion: "a circulation (circulutio)
the good. "4� The origin and end of all things prove to be identicaL
In this drculation-a central but neglected idea of Thomas's thought-the human being enjoys a special position. Owing to his transcendental openness, man alone is able to address himself exprcssly to God ill his acts of knowing and loving. Only man c
himself.49 The circulation of reality is completed ill the rational
and the fmal cause of creaturcs.4� With this threefold causality
creature.
"good." "Entity" refers to God as the efficient cause, "truth" to God
Thomas and his predecessors. Characteristic of medieval thought
Thomas connects the triad of trans<:endcntals "bcin�," " true" and as the exemplary cause, and "goodness" to him
as
final causc.44
The theological or divine foundation of thc transcendentality of
being is
the core of Thomas's sketch of the history of philosophy.
The thcological foundation of the tr.mscendelllais is common to
is that it inquires into the origin of being, into the ultimate ground of truth an� goodness. Yet there arc ditferences 100. The theological foundation is not for Thomas the first thing to be said in
The theological foundation of truth appears in one of his argumenlS "'.�
�I
S. lh. II-il,2.3: "Sola
autem oallira rationalis cream habet immedialum Quia ceterae creaturae non attingu n t ad aliqui d univer
ordinem ad Deum . sale ( ... ) natura autern rationaH�. inqu anturn cognoscil llnivenalcm boni et
cotis
ralionern. habel immedialllrn principium . • �2 S.th. 1,32.1 . cr. 1.12.12.
45 S.III. 1.44.4 ac.l1.
ordincm
ad
universale
e�scnc.li
De vent. 1.1. sed (onlra (5,: "DeliS cOlnparatur ad rC5 in habiludinc tripllci 5 causae, scilicet effect.ivae, exemp!aris el finalis, et per (IUandarn appropri3.tionenl entitas rerum refertur ad Deu(II ut ad causam dfic:icnlem, verlt;u. lit ad (ilusam ellcm p larem . bonitas ul ad Cillnam finalem". This attribution is Implicitly accepted by Thomas in hb reply. H
t6
�
Ibid. 1.5 ad 2. /11 1 Stnl., d. I ,
expo 1extus: "bonum e1 ens (... ) convermntur secundullI bonum ". cr. sr.c!. 7.1.
sup osila, eo quod omnr. esse r.M a bono Cl ad
4
�I!
�9
S./h. 1.20.2. In N Senl.. 49. 1.3. 1.
De unit. 22.2: ·unde solum ralionalis nalUr" paten !U!cundarios fines in ipsum Deum per quandam viam rcsolutionh deducue. ut �k ipsum Deum explidtc appetat.· Cf. J. A. Aertllcn. -rhe: Circulation·Mouvc and Man io Ihe TllOUght of Thomas Aq ui nu", in: L'hrnmne �I Jon Imi,,"s au Moym Axe (Aru of Ihe 71h inl(:rnalional Congres.s of Medicval Ph ilo,ophy) . V\ll. I. LOlivain·IOI· Nellvc 1986. Pl" 4�2·�9: id., "Naillr, Mcoleh lind tier Krcillauf der Dinge hel Thoma.� von A'l u in ", In: Mmuh ,m4 NtJ/ur im MiI/,latt" (Milr.cJJancll MediOlt"V'olIiOi vol, :11,1), Rrrlln/New Vur"'- 1001, pro 14'5-60.
->.-
-.-- . .- ..--- ._.
378
CHAPT£.R NINE
TRANSCENDENTALS AND THE DIVINE
explanation of the uanscendentality and convertibility of the
379
"Good" and the othcr transcendental names are not primarily
. primary notions but the final conclusion of his metaphysical
said of creatures; God is not called "good" by extrinsic denomina·
analysis. The theological foundation is absent in his basic texts
tion. The relation between the transcendentals and the divine is a
about the transcendentals, Another difference is that Thomas's
causal relation, but the ratio of this causality is that God himself is
predecessors speak of the triad "one" (and not "being"), "true" and
Being, One, True. and Good in an eminent way. This founda·
"good." Philip the Chancellor argues that there are three condi
tional relation is worked out by Thomas with the help of three
tions concomitant with being-unity, truth, and goodness-which
different models of predication. Each of these models would
he relates to the three causal aspects of the first prinCiple (1.1.). We
require in itself an extensive analysis. Two of them are discussed
encountered the same idea in Alexander of Hales's analysis of the
profusely in lhe literature on Thomas, but we will not go into the
flT!\t determinations of being. "one," "true" and "good." Thomas.
scholarly debates here. We are interested in these models only
however, except in his commentary on Dionysius. is silent aboUi
from the perspective of the transcendentals.
the causality of the One.
(1) Parlicipalion51 In a quodlibetal question Thomas introduces
9.3. Participation, Maximum and A7wlogy
a
model of predication
that was sharply criticized by Aristotle: God is the cause of the maxime communia, but it is not for this reason
It must � said that something is predicatcd of something i n two ways-cuc ntially or by parti ripation. �light, M for instam:e, is predicated of an illuminated body by J>3rcic ipation , but if there .....ere same separAted light then it would be predicated of it essentially.�t
that he is called Being, One, True, and Good. In the Summa
thtologiae 1.13.2 Thomas rejects the position of the lwelfth-century theologian Alain of Lille (d. 1204), according to whom names like "good� and "wise" signify, not God himself, but his relation to creatures. On this view the proposition "God is good" means that God is the cause of goodness in things. But if this wcre true, no reason could be given as to why some names more than others should be attributed to God. Since God is the cause of all things, even of bodies, to say "God is a body" would be as correCl as to say " God is good." Besides, this view would imply that all names attributed to God are said of him in a secondary sense (POlteTiUl) because they are derived from his effects. For these reasons Thomas defends the position that the name "good" signifies the divine substance. and is predicated substantial·
ly of God. The meaning of the proposition "Cod. is good" is not
"God is the cause of goodness;" it is �that which we call goodness in creatures preexists in God." and indeed in a higher way. God is not good insofar as he causes goodness, but rather the reverse: because he is good, he diffuses goodness in things.
In
support of
this view Thomas cites a well known text from Augustine's
De
d()Clnna christiana (1,32); "Because he is good, we:: are. ��o SO
S.th. 1.13.2.
huillsmodi
ideo aliter dicendum est quod quidem nomina significant Jub�lanliam divinam, et praedicantur
Note
in particular:
-£t
Thomas's hypothetical example allows no room for doubt that the Platonic model of predication is introduced here. Supposing there should be some separated light, it would be altogether uni-form. There would be a complete identity of �ubject and predicate; such a separated light would b� essentially light. But if light is predicated of an illuminated body, the su�jecl is something other than the
de Dco S\.bM.:mtialiler. sed ddiciunt a repraescnlalione ipsius. (...) (;um igilllr dicitur Dnu 1St bmllu, non est sensus. Dl!llJ 1..1 r.tl""a bt;>nilatu. vel Dl!W mm �.I !lUll",.: sed �t sensus, d i quod boniloll!m djn,""" in crtolttns fwlJNxUlit in lkv. et hoc quidem s('"(:undUIII modum alliorem. Unde ex hoI,; lion sequitur quod Df':O . <:ompetat esse bonum inquanUUll ClU.!at bonitalem: sed pOlius e <:onverw, tJuia est oomu, honi\.altl1l rebus ditfundit., secundum illud Augustini ( ... ) , iWluCHlh.I11l bonus tsl, sumuf. · 5 1 Cf. C. Fabro. Participation rl culUalitti ylon S. Thomas d:.1.qnin, Louvain 1961 � L.-B. Geiger. La partidpa/;(}n dans fa philcuOpl!it d� Saini Thomas d'Aquin, Paris 1953 (2nd. ed.). Sec aho J. F. Wippel, ''Thotn� Aquinas and Parlicipalionw, in: J. F. Wippel (cd.). Sludlt.! in Medieval Philcl.If!phy, Washington, D.C. 1987, pp. 1 1 7-5A; R. A. te Velde, PaTticipalion Il'ld S..bJlantiality in Thomas Aquina�,
�id�n and New York. 1995. !>2 Qwudl. 11.2. 1 : �Din:ndulU quod duplir:ili!raliquid de aliqlLO prnedicatnr: 14140 modo nselltialiter, alio /PIodo per po.rtidpatinnem. lux cnilll ptaedko.tur de ,'nrpurr: illUI"inllQ p.trfiri/HlljW, ud .i elllC:l iill'Illl IIIIl tep;traiol, t pr-;u:dicarelur 1Ir-
r-o.
lW�fttin/i�. ·
.... ... .... .. . ... .. '
CHAPT'U NINE
TRANSCENDENTAL') AND THE DIVINE
predicate. The body IS not light, but has it; it is light hy participa tion. 'To panicip
Predication per esst1lt;'am and per po.rticipationetll expresses, however, not only the difference between God and creature; it also signifies their intimate relationship. Participation implies causal dependence: "whatever is by participation is caused by what is by its essence, as everything fiery is caused by fire. "5� That which participates in being must be reduced to God as its cause. Thomas's application of the Platonic model to the maxime communia enables him to interpret the causal relation between the transcendent.Lll� and the divine as a relation of participation. The significance of this model for Thomas's thought appears from the fact that he understands the Christian idea of creation in lerms of participation. His argument in the Summa tluoLogUu (1,44.1) establishing that "every being is created by God� is based entirely on this nOlion. Whatever is found in anythillg by participation must be caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially. Now God is subsistent being itself, and this being can only be one. Therefore, all beings other than God are not their own being, but are beings by participation. From this it follows that all things which are diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be more Of Jess perfect, must be caused by one first Reing, which exists most perfectly. Thomas closes his argument with a refer ence to Metaphysics II, where Aristotle states that whatever is su premely (maxime) being and supremely true, is the cause of every being and of every truth.57 This reference to Aristotle is at the same time a reference to the second model used by Thomas to work out the relation of foundation between God and the transcendental,s.
According [0 this [distinction i n prerlicationJ then we must say th.'lt "being" (ens) is predicated essentially of God alone, because divine bein g (use) is subsi stent. and absolute being. Howeyer, i l is predicated of any crealUrc by participation, for no creature is its being but rather something having being_ So too God is called "good" essentially because he is goodness itself, bUl creatures an': called "good" by I'articipatioll because Ih�y have goodness. For anything is good insofar as il is, according to what Augustine says in De doc/rina chriJtiaruJ, that "insofar as we are, we are good..-)4
The distinction between being or good predicateci per e.Hentiam and being or good predicated per parlicipalionem is identified with the difference between God and creature. God alone is being by his essence. The diyine being is subsistent being:. of which the perfect identity excludes any form of multiplication. Consequently, "being" is said of all other things by participation. This mode of being is char.icteristic of the cr�aturely condition. No creature is its being, hut all have being.�� �3 171 Df h,bdtml., lecl. 2:
"Est autem participaTe qua.,i pancll) ca�re. EI idco quando aliquid particulariu:r rccipi' id quod ad allerum pertinel uniners.ali· lcr, rlicilur participarc il!ud". '1-4 Q'IlI1dI. 11,2./: �Secundlln\ ergo hO£ dicendurn est, quod cns praedicatur de 5010 [)eo t.wmIia/il,", co quod cue divinum c�t cue snb5iSIc:n� el absoluturn; de qualibel autc:m (rcatura praedic:alUr "" paniripat;,mem; nulla eninl crcaUiTa est suum esse. sed est habc:ns esse. Sic et Deus dicit"r bonus CSSf'n1.'alilcr. 'Illia eJt ipsa bonitas; crealur.te amem dicunlur bonae pcr participadonem. quia hahent ])onitalcm: unumquodque cnim, in quanlum eSI, bonum eM. secundum ilIud n SlmHI$.'� AU \Jstini in I d, DOdri�a th�sliana, quod 'in qILanhlm sun : u�s. . - r.r. S.th. 1,104.1: nlllnl� alilem rrralum cM cn' parliCtpallve . •
&
��
381
(2) The "Maximum"58 In the second book of the Melaphyjics (c. 1), Aristotle advances the following gent:ral proposition: that which causes something in other things which is predicated univocally of the cause and the i6
.�7
S.th. I,61.1. Cf. I,44.l ad I ; &G. 11.15.
S.th. 1,44.1. Note in particular: �necc:ssc est dicere omnt' quod quocumqut:
modo (51. a Dco e&$C. Si cnim aliquid invcnilur in aliquo per participatio nem. neccsse e�t quod causetuT in ipso ah eo cui I!Ilscntia!lter convenil (... ) Nece,se est igitur omnia quae dlvcTsificantur secundum divcrsam participa. tionern essc:ndi, lit sint pcrfcctiu$ \'(:1 minus perfccle, cau53ri ab uno primo cnte:. quod pcrfe:clissime: e ll. Unde (. .. ) Aristoleles dicil ( . ,, ) quod id quod C:51 maxi me ens et maxime verum, Cit causa omnis en lis et omnis vc:ri�. .'ioII Cr. V. Dc: Coue:snOKIr. "La (altylile dll mal.itnum�, in: IVvtu UJ snnta.
phiul.'Il>phiqutu II llIInIotiftm"8 (19�4), 'pp. 4"4-44; pp. 6�s.80.
.. . . ----
383
CHAPTER NINE
TRANSCENDENl'ALS AND THE DIVINE:
effect is said to be that predicate maximally. Fire. for instance, is
of things, but also of their being and truLb.61 The causality of the
the cause of heat in compound bodies. Since heat is predicated
first principle is transcendental. The appeal this model had for
univocally both of fire and of compound bodies, it follows that fire
Thomas appears from one of his "five ways" of proving the exist� ence of God in the Summa IJuQlogiae.
is hOttest. The key notion in this modd of predication is the
The fourth way is taken "from the gradation (toll: gradibw) found
causality of the moximum. Thomas associates this causality with the causality of that which, in the Platonic model of predication. is per
in things." Thomas works this gradation out
essentiam; illustrating both with the example of fire and heat.
edge of God with respect to the perfections "true" and "good."
as
a road to the knowl�
Aristotle proceeds to apply lhe general proposition to "truth."
Among things, there are some �morc" and some ""less" good and
One may wonder whether this application is altogether valid. The
true. "More" and "less" are predicated of diflerent things accord�
general proposition speaks of "univocal" predication and seems
ing as they resemble in different manners something which is
therefore to obtain only for things belonging to the same species.
the maximum. Thomas provides his standard example: a thing is
But is "truth" predicated univocally? The question will reappear in
said to be hotter insofar as it more nearly resembles that which is
the next model of predication. In his commentary on the Meta
hot maximally. There is likewise something that is the most true
physics, Thomas does not discuss this difficulty, but he does present
and. consequently, .
a reformulation of the original proposition, in which the term
greatest in truth are greatest in heing, as is said in the second book
"univocal" is dropped. He observes that the term "truth" is not
of the Metaphysics. The last part of the argument foregrounds the
proper to one species. but is common to all beings. "Therefore,
causality of the maximum: "therefore, there must be something
since the cause of truth is one having the same name and com�
which is to all beings the cause of their being and of every
man ratio as its effect, it follows that whatever causes subsequent
perfection; and this we caU Cod. "6�
things to be true is ilSelf most true. "59 That which is true maximal
ly is the caUl;C of being of other things. Aristotle concludes that
(3) Analogyti�
each thing is related to truth the same way as it is to being.
As we saw in chaptcr VI, Thomas's account of the transcen
A third model of predication, that of analogy, was devdoped in
dental character of truth is based on this text. He also employs the
connection with the thirteenth-century interpretation of AristoiJe.
idea that there is the same disposition or order in being and in
We saw in previous chapters that ilt his commentaries on
trulh ill his arguments that God is Truth. The Aristotelian model of
Aristotle, Thomas elaborates the notion of analogy especii\lIy with
the maximum is, however, not restricted lO truth, for Thomas applies
regard to two texts: Metaphysics IV,2, which deals with the problem
it to other t.ranscendentals as well. God is supremely ( maximt) one
of the unity of the science of being (sect. 3.5.); and Nicomrlchean
and therefore the principle of all unity (9. 1 . ) . In a text in the Summa
Ethics 1,6, where Aristotle criticizes Plato's Idea of the Good with the
theowgiat he extends the claim from Mtlaphysirs 11 to the transcen
argument that the good is found in each of the categories (7.1.). In
dental "good:" "There is the same disposition of things in goodness
both cases lhe model of analogy is intended to bring the categOTial
and in being. �(>41
diversity to unity at the transcendental level. The commonness of
Thomas's interest in this model is explained by the fact that, on
"being" and "good" is not that of a genus. But from the outset the
his reading of Metaphysics II, Aristotle demonstrates that the causality of the maximum is not only the cause of the movement
�9
In II Mtlopli. . leet. 2, 294: �Nomen alltem veritatis non est proprium alitu! specie!. sed 5e habet communiter ad omnia entia. Unde. quia illud quod est causa veritati5. (5t causa communicans cum efftau in nomine et rationt communi, sequitur quod illud, quod e51 posteriorihus causa ut sint vera,
ait verlulmum.M
"0 S.,h. 1-11.18.4:
"cadem cst dispmitio rerum in bonitatc, et in t'ue.M
61 Cf. In VIII PhYJ., lect. 2: ·Prob3.1 enim [AriMotelesl in II Mttapli., quod id quod eM maxime verum I!I maxi me en5, est causa esscndi omnibus , .
exiMentibus". 62 S.th. 1.2.3.
63 From the ahundant Iiteramre, we mention B. Monugncs. La dcx:lrin� d� I'analogit dt l'ilTt d aprb Soli'll Thomas d'Aquin. LouvainJPari� 1963 and. in addition. two studita by R. McInernr i-ogic oJ Anal�. An inltrprttalion of St. ThnmaJ, The Haguc 1961; and .I.i/..d.i'-l in A'NO.loo. The 1i;a.ll'IJe 196M.
384
CHAPT.ER NINE
medievals were primarily interested in another application of the notion of analogy, as one sees, for example. in Albert the Creat. Commonness by analogy provided an answer to the question how names like �bejng" and �good" are predicated of Cod and creatures. The theological application WdS the main motive behind the doctrine of analogy.
Thomas's reneclions on analogy surpass in depth those of his predecessors. Yet analogy does not occupy so central a place in hi.� writings as it does for modem Tbomists. Analogy is one of the models Thoma.� employs, and analogous predication is closely related to {he metaphysical doctrine of participation. The fact that scholarly attention focusses on this model stems from subsequent discussions of analogy among medieval thinkers. Already in the generation after Thomas, the analogy of being was c hallenged and became a controversial issue in the theory of the tran�cen dentals. Duns Scoms defended the univocity of being and claimed those who held the opposite destroyed philosophy. If there were I\ot a univocal concept of being, metaphysics as science of being would be impossible.fj1 Thomas always presents analogous predication as a mean between twO ex.tremes, univocity and equivocity. Nothing is predi cated "un ivocally" of God and other things, for such a predication is impossible when something is said of things according 10 priori ty and poste riori ty. There call be no doubt that nothing is predica ted of God and crcature� as though they were in the same order, but rather according to priority and posLeriority, since what is predicated of God is predicated essemially. He is called "being" because he is being by his very essence, and he is called "good because he is goodness itself. But in all other things "being" and "good" are predicated by participation.65 The ontological structure of participation excludes for Thomas the possibility of predicating "beingH univocally of God and creaturcs. to
64 Cf. R. Sdujllberger, Dit TransjoTmatio11 dts klaHischen &inJvn'stiindn;sus, Berlin/New York. pp. l22-240. M
385
TRANSCENDENTALS AND THE DIVINE
SeO. 1,32: "Quod praediratllr de aliquibus secundum prius el pu!teriu$,
certurn en univoce non praedicari ( ... ) Nihil autem de Deu et rebus aliis praedlcalur eodem ordlne, sed �ecu[)dum prim et pOMerius: cum de Deo omnia praedicen tur cnentialitcr. dicitur enim ens quasi ipsa essemia. et bonus quasi Ipsa bonita!; de aliis aUlelll praedicationes fillnl per participatio nem. �ir.U1 Sortes dicitLlr homo non quia sit ipsa humanita5. sed bumlinitlltC:nI hahcn�. Imp
An additional argument is taken from the application of analogy to the transcendentals. �Being" is not said univocally of ·substance ami accident, for substance is a being per se, whereas the defining realure of an accidcnl is being i n something. The diversi ty of thei r relationships to being prohibits the univocal predication of being. This holds a jOrliQri for Cod and creatures, because Cod alonc is subsistent being. Therefore, nothing is predicated univocally of them." On the other hand, no names are said of God and creatures in a purely "equivocal" way, as the Jewish thinker Moses Maimonides held. In "equivocals by chance, � for instance, "dog� said of an animal and a star, there is no order or relation of one thing to another; the attribution of one name to diverse things is entirely accidental. But in the names said of God and creatures there is the order of cause and caused (ordo causae et causati) . Thomas's argument against equivocal predication turns on the principle that "ever y agent effects something similar to itself." Every agent acts insofar as it is in act, and it effects something that is itself in act. Every effect bears some likeness to its causc. Since God is the cause of being of the creatures, there must be some likeness between them. This causal likeness is the ontological ground for Thomas's rejection of purely equivocal predication. If predicates were applied to creature and Creator equivoc ally, philosophical knowledge of Cod would be impossible.67 If names are not said univocally of God and creatures because of the order of priority alld posteriority, and also are not said purely equivocally because of the likeness of the effect to its cause, then these names are predicated in a third way, which is a mean betwecn what Aristotle called "synonymy" and "homonymy.� They are said "analogi(;a)]y,� that is, according to a relation or
fi6 Dt pol. 7.7: "Ell; quo patet quod dh"crsa habitudo ad e�se impedit univocam praedicationis entis. Deus alllem alio modo 51: habet ad esse quam aliqua alia creatura; nam ip$e est slIum esse, quod nulli alii (.realllra", comp",tit. Unde nullo modo univoce de Dco let} r.reatura dicitur.� 67 SeG. l,33: "Nam in his quae sunt a casu aequivoca, nullus ordo aut rC5pectus attenditur uniu� ael alt.ertllll, sed omnino per accidens est quod unum nomen rlivenli.� Tebll� attribuitur: non enim nomen impositum uni signifieat ipsum habere ordim:m ad aliud. Sic alltcm non en de nominibu5 quae de Deo dicuntur et ereaturis. Consicleramr enlm in huiusnJOrli nominum communi tate ordo eau...ae t't cauiali ( ... ) . Non iRilUr M:rundUIII pllr"m at'(luivocationem a1i1luid de De.n l".I r("bll�
.
.
- .-�----
..
�
386
sa7
CHAPTER NtNE
TRANSC[NDENTALS AND THE DIVINE
proportion to one thing. This model expresses both the difference and the unity of what is predicated.
understand the lranl'lCendental perfections according to the way they are found in creatures. Transcendental names, like "being" (ens), signify concretely, that is, by the mode of concretion proper to creatures. However, when the intellect altributes "being" to God, it "transcends" (transcendit) the concrete mode of signifying and attributes to God only what is signified.70
A certain evolution cOIn be discerned in Thomas's description of the modes of analogy; in his later works he distinguishes two modes.68 The one mode is the order of many to "something else" (unum alterum): something is predicated of two things in relation to a third thing that is prior to lhcm, as "being" is said of quantity and quality in relation to substance. The other mode is lhe order of two things to "one of themH (unum ip50rum), as "being� is said of substance and accident. Accident and substance are not related to a third thing, but the former I"ders to the latter. The names said of God and creaUires are predkated analogically, not according to the first mode, since one should then have to posit something prior to God, but according to the second mode. Thomas emphasizes that there remains a fundamental differ ence between the application of the analogy of being to the catego ries and its application in theology. When Wbeing" is predicated of substance and accident, it is said of substance by priority over acddent in two respects: according to the nature of the thing and according to the meaning (ratio) of the name. Substallce is prior to accident both in nature, insofa.. as substance is the cause of accident, and ill knowledge, insofar as substance i!' included in the definition of accident. But in theological analogy t.he order of knowledge is not identical with the order of being. Man arrives at cognition of God from other things; he names God from his effect!'. The reality signified by the name is predicated by priority of Cod. because this perfection emanates from God to creatures. But the ratio of the name belongs to God by posteriority. With respect to (he imposition oJ the name, the perfections arc first imposed on creatures since we first know lhem.6Y A uuciaJ distinction in the theological application of alialogy is the distinction between the thing signified by the name and the mode the name signifies (modus significandi) . The mode of signify ing of the divine names follows our mode of understanding. We f\II The mai n texts are
De pol. 7.7: SeC. 1,34 and S.th. U3.5.6. 1.34: �Quando veTO id quod e�t prius se(:unJum naturam, est posteriu$ secundum cognitionem, tunc in analogicis non est i dem ordo secundum rem u �cundum nOlJ)ini$ r.nionem ( ... ) Sic igilur, quia ex rebus aliis In Dd cognilionem pervenimu$, r("s nominum de Deo u rebu.!> aliis diclorllm per pr ius nl in Deo secundum suum modum, 5ed ratio nominis per fI�criu5.· a. S.th. 1,1�.6.
69 SeC.
The three models express in different ways that the causal relation between God and the transcendentals is not to Ix understood as the reason for denominating God Mbeing." WBeing" is predicated of God suhstantially and properly. The moSl importalll model is the Platonic model of participation because this indicates the onto logical difference between divine being and creaturely being. God alone is being, one. true, and good by his essence; all other things participate in these perfections, since they are caused by God. The Aristotelian model of the maximum introduces the idea of graded instantiations of a transcendental properly which are reduced to the causality of that which possesses this property maximally. The model of analogy illustrates how the transcendental names are predicated of Cod and creatures according to the order of priority and posteriority, because they resemble one another as a cause resembles jt.� effect.
9.4. Being in general (r.5st' commune) and divine being Thomas's elaboration of the relationship between the transcen dcntals and the divine inevitably raises the question of the nature of what is "most general" to whieh the transcendental way of thought is directed. The maxime comllumia are caused by what is Being, One, True, and Good essentially. But do they not lose their comprehensive character because of this causal relation? If they concern solely created being, they seem to be restricted to the domain of what is finite. For this reason a modern critic has 7() De pol. 7.'1 ad 7 :
"Intellectus autrm
nonrr hoc:
modo intdligit rs�e '1110
modo invcnimr in rebll.\ inferioribu! a quibus sdenliam capit. in quibus esse non est 5ublistens, sed inharrens. Ratio aUlem invenit quod aliquod cue subsistens sit: el ideo licet hoc quod diCllI1l tHt, significelur per mooum
conere.nionis I read: f-oncretionisl, tamen inlelieclUs 3ltribuens eS5e Oeo transcendit modliin significandi, altribuens Oeo id quod signifiraltlr. non allH�nl modmn siFCninrandi.-
388
389
CHAPTER NINE
TRANSCEND£NTALS AND TH..: DIVINE
concluded lhat the medieval docU'ine of the transcendentals khas
philosophical camps: "viewed (rom the perspective of Aristotelian
not constituted itself
as
a really transcendental philosophy. "71 Must
tHe communt'
ism, the term
is completely unusable for signifying
not th
God's reality; from the viewpoint of Platonism-Neoplatonism, it
is, afler
would really be consistent to signify God
aU, the first beirlg.
This fundamental probltm is especially conspicuous
ill the
,
have
between being in general
commonness insofar
and divillc being.
In
.
Kremer's thesis is bolh implausible :and unjustified. First,
discussion of (he way in which Thomas conceives the relation
(esse commune)
ml.me "74
as use COlll
no t iced
as
we
Thomas criticizes the Platonic conception of as
it views
CQmmunia as subsistentia. This
does
modern studies lhis relationship is interpreted in two different
not meall, however, rnal transcendentals arc something purely
ways. It has been argued that (i) God is identical with
logical having flO extramenlal reality. Thomas's poim is that trall
toUe
and (ii) that divine being is included in common being.
sccnrlentals do nOI exist as such in reality. that is, apart from
Our analysis of these views may clarify the distinctive feature of
concrete beings. Being in general is the subject of metaphysics. If
Thomas's transcendental way of thought.
it were nothing more than a being of reason, this science would
commU1V';
Klaus Kremer defends the thesis that Thomas entertains two
coincide with the study of logic.
incompatible conceptions of commonness. The first is the Platonic
Another ground is thai Thomas endeavors to justify the Platonic
conception, according to which the more general something is,
conception of what is most general by interpreting it in a causal
the more real it is. The purpose of Kremer's study is to show that
sense. He has thus two conceptions of commonness, that of predi
under the influence of Neoplatonic philosophy Thomas h
cation and that of causality, bUl these conceptions are not mutually
(!SSf1
Yet this identification
exclusive. On the contrary, they are meant precisely to connect the
clashes with the Aristotelian conception according to which that
Aristotelian and Platonic approaches to reality with one another.
which is common has no reality, but is something merely logical,
God is common by causality:
fied divine being with the
a being of reason
commune.
(ens rationis) .
Grnlik.J 1,26, where Thomas
Kremer points to
argues that God is not
Summa contra the esse rommU1l1'i.
One of his arguments is that what is common to many things does
general in being
(in
"the
e.utndo),
divine ess�nce is not something
since it is distinct from all other
things, but only in caUSitlg. "7� Kremer himself must acknowledge that there is not a single text in which Thomas identifies God with
in lhe order of thought
being in general. On the contrary Thomas explicitly maintains
alone. Thus "animal" is not something which exists apart from
the opposite view: "the divine being which is identical with the
Socrates and Plato and other animals except in the intellect thal
divine essence is not (he
abstracts the form �animal" from
expression for the divine being is ksubsistent being it.sell'
not exist
as
such apart from the many,
<:haracterislics.
Much less is
save
all individuating and specifying
esse commune
to be: regarded as
something which exists apart from all existent things, except in the intellect.
If
God were to be identified with the
esse cummune, it
.
esse commune. "76 Thomas's favourite
(ip.mm
esse subrulens) .
An explicit denial of the identification of God with esse commune
is to be found in Thomas's commentary on
De divinis fWminWus.
He
would follow as a consequence that God exists solely in the intel
comments on a passage in which Dionysius states that Wheing
lect.7� According to Kremer, Thomas's thought is locked into two
(esse)
7 t K. 8anhleln, Di$ Transut!dtnlallrn/.th1"� d" altro Ontologie I, pp. 9-11. 7� cr. H. Renard, "What is St. Thomas' Approach (0 Metaphysics?�, in: The NtlJ! SdlOtaJlicis11I 30 (1956), pr. 81-83. He distinguishes tns tranJctndmtalf..
which embraces God and creature, from t1tS commune. 7� ScG. 1.26: �Adhuc. QU(ld e�t commune multis, non cst aliquid praeter
muha nisi sola ratione. ( ... ) Multo igitur minus et ipsum esse commune est aliquid praeter omnes res existentcs nisi in intellectu solum. Si igitur Deus sit esse: commune, DellS non crit aliqua res nisi qllae �il in intdlectu tanlum. 05t('n�lLm a\Jtcm est supra Deum esse aliquid non solum in intellectu, sed in rerum nalllTa. Non c.t ighur Deus ipsum O:!lSe communo: omnium.-
itself is from a preexistent." On Thomas's reading Dionysius
shows here that Cod is the cause of es.ft
commune.
Being is said to be
"common," because nothing can be called an existent unless it has
esse. Esse commune 74 K. Kremer,
is related to God differently than the other
Dit ntupl(l./r)lIi-sche &i1lJphilosophit, especially pp. 356-72. Cf. C. Fabro, -Platonism, Nco-Platonism alld Thomism: Convo:rgencio:s and Divergences-, in: The New &lw/aslirum 44 (1970), pp. 69-100. 7� Quodl. VII,!.) ad I : -o:uentia divlna nOll en quid go:no:raJo: in essendo, (urn sit ab omnihul aliil di.�dnua, sed JOlum ill callsando-. 76 Dt pol. 7.2 ad 4.
391
CHAPTER NINE
TRANSCENDENTAl.S AND TilE DIVINE
existenLS arc. Thomas spdls out three differenc�s. First, other exist
Vries, that God is not included in the extension of being in
390
ents depend on
tsse
commUfle,
mune itself depends on
but God does not. Rather,
dje
C011/
Cod. The second difference is that all other
existents arc contained under
e.s.se commune itself,
but Cod is not.
Else ClmmlUnt rather falls under God's power. for his power is more extensive than is created eJse. As a third difference, Thomas notes that all other existenlS participate in esse, but God does not. Created �t
is rather a kind of participation in God and a likeness
As is clear from this text, Thomas identi.fies created being. This
esse
is.78
him."
commune
with
does not refer to a subsisting reality apart
from the concrete existents. It is not
(inhatrens) ,
tS5e
La
subsistens,
but inherent
signifying the formal principle by which every thing
As we noted in chapter IV (4.4.), he interprets in a similar way
the famous fourth proposition from things is being but th� proper
De causis,
"the first of created
(esse)." "Being" does not mean the created object, aspect (ratio) of the object of creation. For a thing is
called cre:ned because it is a being
(luJe ens) .�
(ens),
not because it is this being
Josef De Vries advances another view of the relation between
divine being and being in generaL He defends the thesis that
esse
general, for the cause does not belong to the domain of it...� effect. Another argument De Vries adduces is taken from the very texts in which Thomas brings out the difference between
commune
and divine being. Aquinas elaborates the dilTcrence by
mcans of the notion of "addition." Being in general is such that nothing is added to ii, hut its concepl does not exclude possible additions to it. He draws a comparison (0 animal taken in general. "Animal" considered as such does not include the difference "ra.tional," but neither does it preclude the possibility of this difference being added. Thomas is aware,
addition which he finds in
contra (;mtiles 11.15);
is common
"being is found
however, otherwise different"
to
(Summa
to all things" (Summa
be common to all things,
theologiae 1.65.1).
Yet this
argument is not convincing. The contexl of both texts is the doctrine of creation. Thomas wants to show that there is a corre·
esse cummune.
By contrast, the divine
addition can be made to it. On the basis of this twofold under· standing of "addition," Thomas concludes that the divine being is not the
esse commune.S2
De Vries argues that this conclusion is not inconsistent with his thesis that the
any addition.
(esse)
shows,
being is such that not only nothing is added to it, but also no
several texts, in which the universality of being is expressed with· out any restriction: "being
De veritate 1 . 1
is added to a genus. His point is to illustrate "the neutrality" to
F-sse commune
but also the divine being. "l!1I In support of his thesis he refers to
aJ>
that nothing can be added to "being" in the way that a difference
in Thom
commune
esse
esse commune
also encompasses the divine being.
signifies being as such, without any addition. When
treuled being, it is no longer conceived without Esse €ommUllt is therefore not identical with created
it is understood as being, but
is being in its unlimited extension, that also embraces
divine being. Compared to
esse
commum,
divine being
as
well is
"being with an addition," namely, with the addition tbat it precludes any addition. That the divine being is subsistent being to which nothing ca.n be added is not incompatible with the fact that
spondence between the order of effects and that of their cause,", That which is common in the effects must be reduced to a com· mon cause. Now, being is common to everything that is. Above all causes, then, there must exist a cause, whose proper action is to give being. Being in general is the proper effect of God. He is "the caU!�e of the 77 7A
len.
79
esse
univtrsQu in c..
5, lect. 2. 658--60. for the opposition between $ub.Jistm$ and inhaeTt7u:
In Dt div.
See
nomin.
all things."8! Both texts suggest, contra De
2: D, pot. 7.2 ad 7.
[n De
htbdom..,
S.th. 1,45.4 ad I. "0 J. De Vri u, "Oas 'eue commune' bei Thomas von Aqllin�. in: SdlOlastill :\9 (19641, pp. 16'-77; p. 168.
"'
,�(;. ILl!',: "Adhu(. Scc.undum ordinem efT('cnlUm np<m('1 r.'l� ordinem
c ansarum: eo quod cffeclus t:all�js 5ILis proport.ionati 5unt. Unde oporte[ quod, . ,. SlCut effect.us propm reducuntur in caU5a!; proprias. ita id quod commune est in effectibus propriis, rtd\lcat.ur in aliquam camam communem. (. . . ) Omnibu.�
autem commune est tHt. Oporici 19itur quod supra ollme� causas sit aliqua causa cuius sit dare es'l-C. Prima 3mI'm eaHsa Deus est". Cf. S.th. I,105.5: «ipse Dens I'M proprie causa ipsius esse ulliven;llis in rebus omnibus".
"' Dt tn,e,
. . Co :J. , . "Nec oporlel, 51' d'IC1I11US tl'lO(I Deus est esse lantum. ut 111 lilorum errorI'm incidamus qui ileum dixerunt esse illud esse nniuenale quo queJibct res formalitcr I'M. Hoc euim esse quod Deus est huius condicionis esl ut nulla sibi additio fie ri possit, unde per ipsam suam puritatem est esse distinctum ah omni esse ( ... ) . Esse autem commune skut in imdlecw �1I0 non includil aliquam additionem. Ita non indudit in inttlltclU SilO prtdsiontm a�dilionis; quia. �i hoc UIt:l, nichl l ponet int�lIigi esse in quo luper cue . ahqUld adderdur�; In I Sen'., 11.4.1 ad I : ScG. 1,26: D, pol. 7.2 ad 6: S.lh. I,.!!. 4 ad .
I.
Cf..J. F. Wippel. -A{ll1imu
�nd I'.rlifipillinn", p. 1M!, n. 40.
392
i
CHAPTER NINt:
the notion of subsistent being itself cannot be formed without an 'addition to the notion of esse communt.tI� De Vries's approach is predominantly logical; common being
seems to be conceived as the most universal genus. Such an
approach, however, ignores the metaphysical thrust of Thomas's
account. Thomas's refusal to identify God and esst! wmmune is
directed against a pantheistic world view. His intention is to show the transcendence of divine being by opposing God's subsistent
being to being in general. Esse commune is not a logical concept but a metaphysical principle. Thomas calls it "the formal being of aU
things" or �lhat by which everything formally exists. "84 This
principle is considered without any addition, but is susceptible of
addition. It can be contr.lcted by a form to a special mode of being.
Nevertheless, whatever addition one may make to being in
general, one will never arrive at a special mode of formal being,
which is the divine being.
Interestingly. Thomas himself lists in Summa contra Gentiles 1,26
four factors or reasons that led some to identify divine being with
common being and, consequently, to maintain a pantheislic position. The first is the misinterpretation of certain authoritative
texts. The second reason is the failure to distinguish the two modes of addition. Since the divine being receives no addition, it was thought that it is the common being of all things. The third
concerns the divine simplicity. Since God is "at the peak of
simplicity,'" some people held lhat the ultimale in the resolution of things found in our world is Cod, as being absolutdy simple. The
fourth rcason is an error with respect to God's immanence in things. When we say that God is in all things, this does not mean
that God is in things as a part of them, but as the cause of things
that is never absent in its efTects.S5 The first and the third reasons
merit further attention here.
85 J. De Vries. 01'. cit pp. 174-75. 804 S,C. 1.26: �eS5e formale omnium"; De enle.
I
TRANSCENDENTAU AND THE DIVINE
A possible source for the erroneous identification of God and
common being is a text of Oionysius. In chapter 4 of his Celestial
Hierarchy he remarks: "The being of all things is the super
essential divinity."86 On the basis of this remark, Thomas observes, some people wished
[0
infer that God is the formal being of all
Lhings, although this interpretation GUlnot be squared with
Dionysius's words. For, if the divinity is the formal being of things, it will not be above (super) all things, but among (inleT') all
things or even something of all things.1l7 Here again it becomes manifest that Thomas's main concern in the discussion of the
relation between divine being and common being is God's tran· scendence. The divinity is the being of all things as their efriciem and exemplary cause, not, however. in virtue of its essence.8B
The possible pantheistic reading of Dionysius's texts makes it
understandable why Thomas. in the prologue of his commentary on De divitlis nominibus, attends to the Platonic mode of speaking used by Dionysius, and explains the legitimacy of their approach
with respect to the first principle of things. In Ihis regard Ihe opinion of the Platonists is "in agreement with Christian faith"
(9.2.) Later in his commentary, Thomas warns that Dionysius's statement, "God is the esse for existents" (ipse est esse existentibus),
should not be taken to mean that God is the formal being of that
which exists. It should rather be understood in a causal sense
according to the Platonic mode of speaking.� God is the cause of esse
wmmune.
Another factor contributing 10 the identification of God and
common being is a metaphysical error. Those who accept the
identity fail to distinguish between the two modes of resolution that
are distinctive of metaphysics, the resolution secundum rationem and
that secundum rem (cf. 3.4. ) . The former is the reduction to the mO'jl
general form and terminates in being; the latter is the reduction to the most universal cause and terminates in God. There is a relation
.•
c. 5: -mud esse univenale.
quo qudibel res formaliter est.· . . . 8� SeG. 1,26: �Huic autem errod quatuor SUIH quae Vldentur praesutlsse
fomentum. Primum est quarundam auctoritatum intellectus perversu!. ( ..:l Secundum quod cos in hunc errorem J;'romovit, cs( rationis d�fecll$. QUia . . � . enim id quod commune est per addltlone� spectficamr mdIVldu�t\lr, . a�lima�rum divinum �, cui nulla fit addlUo. non essc a hquod propnum. led CIK cummunc omnium. (... ) Tertium quod eQl in hunc crrorem induxit, cil dlvinae limplidUtis considerauo. ( ... ) Quartum ellam quod e05 ad hoc inducere potuIt, Cit modlls loqucndi quo didmus Dcum in omnibus retrYJ em!'.
�d
86
Dt t:4d&ti hitrardlia c. 4.1
(ed.
Mignt PC 3, 1770).
87 S,C, 1,26: "Ex quo intelligere voluerunt ipsum elSe formale omnium rerum Dcum cue, nOll eooMderanles hunc illtcllcctum ipsi s verbis com.onum csse non posse. Nam si divinilas UI omnium esst. formah:. non cril super omnia. sed inter omnia. immu aliquid omniUIll.KR S./II. 1.5.8
CHAPTER NINE
394
between the termini of the two resolutions-God is the cause of being-but no identity. De Vries's motive for his thesis that esse commune also embraces God is his desire to safeguard the possibility of human knowledge of the divine. If common lH-:ing were identical with created being. then the scope of human knowledge would be restricted to fi nite being. If lhis were true. how could metaphysics get staTted?90 De Vries's thesis is. however, contrary to Thomas's conception of metaphysics. The subject of this science is being in general (.nu commune). Esse commune signifies the formal principle which i� required for allY concrete entity to be in act. God is not included in this nOlion. He is the extrinsic cause of the proper subject of metaphysics, the universal cause of being as such. Thomas's conception is completely in accordance with his interpretation of God's commonness as a commonness by causality. Cod transcends being in general. His position diverges from that of most of his contemporaries. Siger of Brabant, for instance, does not admit that being-as-being has causes or principles, for the implication of this stance is that every being has a cause or principle. The general causes investi gated by metaphysics are the causes of all caused being. With respect to the lotality of beings (Iota univenita,s entium) it makes no sense to ask ""why is there something rather than nothing?" There is no cause to be identified for the IDlality of beings. To seek one is to �sk why God is r
J.
Dc Vries, 0fI. cit, p. 176. L Slger of Brabant . 11'1 TV Mdaph., in: QuatJtion!J in Melap"yJjcam (ed. 9 Dunphy. pp. 169-70). Siger was influenced by Avicenna. cr. LiM Dt phl/omphia prima I. ('_. 2 (ed. Van Riel, pp_ 14-1rl). !II!
395
TKANSCENDEHTALS AND THE DIVINE
The first movement is a resolution by which things are reduced to what is most common in them. In this reduction the specific determinations of lhings are left outside of consideration. They are considered not as this or that being, but as beings. Reing a.. such does not signify dependence, nor does it imply any restriction. It is indeterminate with respect to every mode of bei ng Being is common to all gen era and is therefore called Mtranscelldcntal.� The fiest resolution moves on a horizontal plane; it is an intrinsic analysis of that which is. The formal principle whereby a thing is being (ens) is its act of being (esse) . This inner resolution is the condition for another resolution, the ascent to me most universal cause. Given the first resolution, it is clear that the most universal cause can only be me cause of being. for its causality is transcendental. The origin of being in general is understood as creation and explained in terms of participation. Being is the proper effect of God. He himself transcends being in general; God docs not belong to the domain of the maxime .
communJa.
Thomas's transcendental way of thought seeks both the inner principle and the extrinsic cause by which a thing is being. This interpretation is corroborated hy his reflections on truth and goodness, which engage us in the next two sections. 9.5. Is theu only QfU truth by which all trnngs are tnu:'! (".ad is not called "true" and "good" by extrinsic denomination; he is truth and goodness by his t:ssence. The problem now shirts to the truth and goodness of creatures. In his three main accounts of truth---the commentary on Ihe SentenceJ (1.l9.S.2), De vcritate (q. 1.4) and the Summa lheok>giae (I.J6.6)-Thomas raises the question: "is there only one truth by which all things are true?" If God is Truth, are things then called Mtrut:n in virtue of their relation to this Truth, that is, by extrinsic denomination? Because Thomas's reply takes issue particularly with Anselm of Canterbury's work De vrritatr, written about 1080-85,Y� it will be best to begin with a brief con sideration of the historical background of this question. Anselm's De veritate is a dialogue between a student and a !l� Anselm of Canterhury. D, v,,"Ialt, in: opna omnia voJ. I (ed.
S...hmiU. t:dll1hurKh HJ46, pp. 16!}'CJ9).
,
.
.
.
F.
S.
----
,, ---
S96
CHAPTER NINE
TRANSCENDENTALS AND THE DIVINE
master. The stud�nt opens the dialogue with an observation that
Anselm affirms the unity and tr.Inscendence of truth at the cost of
goes directly to the heart of AllSelm'lO problem of truth:
!\97
its multipliCity and immanence,
Since we believe that God is truth, and since we say that truth is in many other things, I would like to know whether we must confess that wherever truth is spoken of, God is that truth 9s
question, "Whether there is only one truth by which aU things are
The point of departure is a cTedal statement: "God is truth." What
taken in the proper sense (prfJjJrie) is found in the human or divine
.
does this identity entail and how is this truth related to the truth attributed to other things? In order to be able to answer this
The beginning of Thomas's answer, in
De vmtate
lA, to the
true?" leaves no doubt that his view differs from Anselm's, "Truth
�ntdlect." Truth is bolh primarily III
(primo) and in the proper sense
the divine intellect; it is in the human intellect in the proper Tl"ulh is not
question. one must first define the nature of truth. What is truth?
sense, though in a secondary mannt":r
truth from you." The Master's reply shows the difference between
sense. One of the distinctive features of Thomas's account of truth
The student says to the Master: "1 expect to learn a definition of the philosophical cultures of the elevcnth and the thirteenth centuries. The Scholastic disputations on the question "What is truth?" begin with the enumeration of a series of definitions taken from a long tradition. Anselm responds: "I do not remember to have found a definition of truth, but if you wish, let
us
inquire what
truth is in the diverse domains, in which we say lruth is." This inquiry forms the first part of the dialogue. Anselm investigates the truth of the enunciation (c.
2),
of thoughL (c. 3), of
the will (c. 4), of action (c. 5), of the senses (c. 6), of the essence of things (c. 7), and arrives at last at the following definition of truth
(c. 1 1 ) :
"rightness (rectitudo) perceptible to lhe mind only."
In the last chapter (c. 13) the question formulated at the begin ning of the dialogue is taken up again: "Is there only one truth in aU things in which we say truth is, or are there many truths as there are many things in which truth is said to be?" Anselm's con elusion is that �lhere is only one truth in all things." He identifies truth with the absolute measure for all else. This norm is unique,
for it is in no way dependem on the plurality of that which is meas ured. '"The supreme truth subsisting in itself
subJ'stens)
(summa veritas per se
is of no thing." Truth is said "improperly" of this or that
thing, "since truth does not have its being in the things, or from the things, or in virtue of the things in which it is said to be. "'94
!IS
Ibid.,
c. I (ed. Schmitt, p. 116): "Quoniam deum veritalem esse eredi mil,. et veritatenl in multis aliis dicimus esse. vellem KiTe an ubi(umque ilaS didtur, deum ealn !'Me faleri debc:arnus." ver c. IS (I'd. Sehmht, p. 199): "lmproprie 'hul\ls vel llIius rei' esse 94 dicitur, qlloniam ilia non in ip,i! rebut aut ell ipWs aut per ipsas in quibus es.sc: dichur habel ,"um e�.�
Ibid.,
(secundano),
merely something divine; a human truth is also truth in the proper is the special place he assigns to human beings. Concerning the truth in things, he states that it is found in them "improperly"
�nselm,
(improprit).
Thomas employs the same term here as
but with a different meaning, That truth is in things . Improperly IS for Thomas the consequence of the basic idea of his own conception of truth: the proper place of truth is the intellect.
Truth i s in things by reason of a relationship to the intellect,95 Thomas does not intend to claim, as becomes apparent later in his exposition, that things are only true in virtue of an extrinsic denomination. His general objection to Anselm' s view is that it is insufficiently differenciatt":d. Anselm speaks only about the truth of the divine intellect as the extrinsic measure of an things, This truth is one.?6 When truth is taken in the proper sense as truth of the human intellect, however, there are many truths about many things, as well as many truths in different intellects about one and Ihe same thing. When truth is taken broadly as truth of things, there art": as many truths as there are true entities, but there is only one truth for each.97 Thomas concludes his reply with two observations. Things arc
�t. 1.4:
9!> D� "Est ergo veritas in intellectu divino quidem primo et propne. In mll�I lectu vero hUinano proprie quidI'm sed secundario, In rebus , , autem ImprOprte et secundario, quia nonnis! per respectum ad alteram duarum �ritalulll.· 96 1 :4: �Si ergo accipiatur .veriras proprie dkta secundum quam sunt . . ?mnla prtnclpailter vera, SIC omnIa sunt vera una verilate, scilicet veritale I�telleclus divini; el sic Ans.etmm de veri Late loquitur in !ibm De veritalc". a. 1.6 ad 1. 1.4: "!i alH�m acripiallLr veritas improprie diela sc:cundam qual)) 97 . olnma dleunlur ven, JlC !1I1l1 plurillrn verorurn plure, verilatet, !ed IInh" vtrl lanttlm una veril:tll, " .
.
Ibid:
'M.d.
. � . • - . . -
398
399
TRANSCENDENTALS AND THE DIVINE
CHAPTER NINE
the human intellect,
general rule about analogous names which has given rise to
and not from an inherent form. But when things are said to he true
certain misinterpretations of his doctrine of analogy. The rule does
called true from the truth in the divine or
10
because of the truth which is present in the things themselves.
Llu:y arc so named (rom a form that is intrinsic to them.98 This
not mean that the form from which denomination is madt: exists i n only one of the analogates and that every analogous name
inherent form is the basil'! of the convertibility between being and
involves extrinsic denomination from what is first. It claims ratht:r
conformed to the divine intellect and conformable to the human
�opria
intellect. that is, capable of making itself known. The transcendence of truth is not a denial of the transeen
signifies the "foca] meaning" of the form which controls other secondart ways of signifying that form. I02
dentality of the true. Thomas consistently claims, at one and the
Note that Thomas does not apply the general rule about
same time, that "all things are true by the first truth as by the first
analogous names to truth in God. and truth in creatures, but to the
the true. Every being is true, because through its form i[ is
that the proper meaning of the name is found in one of them. The
ratiQ
does not monopolize the denominating form, but
exemplary cause" and "all things are true by a created trUlh as by
two modes of truth he distinguishes, the truth of the intellect and
an inherent l'orm .''9':1 In in 1 Sententiarum 19.5.2 ("Are all things true
that of things. Truth is in the intellect primarily and in things
by the increated truth?") he draws a comparison between the
only secondarily insofar as they are ordered to the divine intellect.
being and the truth of things. There is one divine esse by which all
Therefore, if we are speaking of truth as it exists in the intellect and
things exist insofar as they are dependent upon it as their efficient
according to its proper ratio, there are many truths in many
and exemplary cause. Nevertheless, the being by which each
intellects, and indeed in the same intellect insofar as it knows
thing exists formally is diverse. Likewise, there is one truth,
different things. But if we are speaking of truth as it exists in
namely the divine, by which all things are true insofar as they
things, then all things are true by the first truth, to which each is
depend upon it as their C
conformed according to its own emity (entitatem) . Thus, although
in created lhings by which each is said to be true formally
there are many forms or eS.'icnces of things, the truth of the divine
(jormaliter) YIO Each lhing is and is true, not by extrinsic denomi
The proper meaning of truth is found in intellect, divine or
nation, but in virtue of an intrinsic form. The third treatment of the question of the unity 01' truth, in the
Summa theologitu 1,16.6,
is based on the notion of analob,),' When
something is said analogically of many things, it is found accordillg to its proper meaning (propria mtio) in only one of them; the others are denominated from it. 101 Thomas formulates here !HI
intellect from which aU things are denominated true, is one. \03 human. With respect to the truth in things, Thomas's account emphasizes that each thing conforms to the divine intellect by
which it is true according to its own being. Its entity is the intrinsic measure ofils lruth.lt�
a
Il>id. 1.4: ·sed a veritate quae est in ipu reo quae nihil aliud eSl quam
enlilas inlcJJ�cl\li adaequata vf'l inlellectulll sibi adaequans, denuminaluf �iClit a formo. inhaerenu:-:". !:19 Ibid. 2:1.4 ad 5: "similiter e(im diMinguenrllllll est de veritalc. �r.ilice!. quod omnia sunt vera veritate prima sicut exemplari primo. cum tamen �il1t vera verilatC creata sicm forma inhaerente." 1 M In 1 SeJ'lt., 19.5.2: ·Unde dico, qllod sicut cst unum esse divin\lm quo omnia sunl, sicu!. a principio dfeetivo exemplari. nihilominus tamen in rebus diversls est divcnum esse, quo formaliter res cst; ita etiam est \lna veritas. scilicet clivina, qua omnia VeTa �\In{, sinH principia effectivo exemplar!. nihilominu$ !unt plures veritate� in rebus creari" quibus dicuntur verae formaliter.· lUt S.th. (,I G.tl; "Sed quando aliquid dicitur analogice de multis, illtld invenil1lr l('r'1ll dUIIl propriam rationem in uno eorum tanlum. a (!lIO alia delluminan tur.·
102 234-39.
See R. Mcinerny. Till Lop;ic of Ana/og)', PI" 18-23;
futhius and Aquina.!.
pp.
103
S.th, I . 1 6.6; �Si ergo loquamur de verit.'l.u,; prOUI existit in intellectu, �ecundum propriam rationcm. �ic, in mult.is intellectibus creatis �\1nt multae veritates; etiam in uno Ct �odo::m inlellC:CllI, .ecundum plura (ognita. ( ... J Si vero loquamur de veri tale secundum quod est in rebus, sic omnes sunt verae una prima veritate. cui UOUlll(1uodquc a��lrniJatur secundum suam enlitatem. Et sic. licet plures sint esscmiac vel formae rerum, talllen una est veritas divini intdlectu.�. se(:undurn quam omnes res denominantur verae." 1114 � , .. For IIIe d"lstmctlon mensura t;rclnrnua It communis and men5ura ",Iween . intrinuw, see De writ. 1.4 ad I ; 1..5; 1.6: "aliquid denominalur verum veri late prima quasi mensuril cJlTrinseca, sed veri tate inhaerente '1IIal! lnell.ura in'rin�efa".
.
_
._ ----
400
CHAPTER NINI:
TRANSCENDENTALS AND THE DIVINE
9.6. ATt' aU things good bJ t/u! divine goodn6s1
takes the ctntral theme of De hebdomadibus to be the polarity
The subject of q. 21 of
is "the good"
401
between the transcendentality of the good and the transcendence Art. 1
of the Good. If good is a common property because of an intrinsic
inquires into that which the good adds to being-it is one of
relation between being and goodness, the distinction between
Thomas's basic texts on the transcendentals; art. 2 d�als with the
created goodness and the divine goodness seems to disappear.
convertibility between being and the good; art. 3 with the relation
Because we
between the good and the t.rue. In art. 4 the question is raised "Are
illuminates the background of Thomas's reflections on the
aU things good by the first goodness?" In the arguments pro and
relationship between divine goodness and created goodness, we
contra Thomas refers several times to Boethius's
follow Boethius's account on the basis of Thomas's commentary,
De veritau
(De bono).
D� h�bdQmadjbu5.
In order to apprehend better both the problem at stake and
Thomas's reply to it, let us first consider this influential tteatise on the good.
which.
as
arc
interested in Boethius's treatise to the extent that it
it happens, keeps closely to the text and presents a careful
exposition.lOB
Thomas first explicates that Bocthius's question are good presupposes the claim
all things
things are good (cf. 7.6.).
The question itself is presented by Boethius in a form which Tho
Thomas's commentary on "De hehdomadibus" De hebdomadibus had
that all
how
mas calls a
a central place in Philip the Chancellor's and
Albert the Great's discussions on the good in general. Thomas wrote a commentary on Soethius's work, although it was quilt':
duhium,
i.e., a question in which two possible answers
are posed in opposition to each other. The dilemma formulated in
De hebdomadibus
pation?"IO!I
is: "Are things good by subs(anc� or by partido
unusual to do so in the thirteenth century. His commentary dates
This formulation suggests that "to he something by substance"
from his first Parisian regency (1256-59). the same period to which
and �to be something by participation" are mutually exclusive. But
belongs. L O!,) It seems not unreasonable to assume a
is this really a disjunction such that the two possibilities in ques·
connection between these writings, nor to surmise Ihat, in dealing
tion necessarily constitute a contradictory pair? Thomas examines
with the transcendental �good," Thomas felt the need to comment
this assumption extensively. The result of his analysis is that the
on Soethius's treatise.
disjuncts identified in the question are in opposition to each other
D� veritate
On Thomas's reading
is concerned 'with the
only when "participation" has reference to an accidental property
procession of good creatures from the good God."j(1fi This character·
of a substance. What is predicated of something "substantially"
ization of its contents is correct, although in fact Boethius's work is
belongs to it per .fe, because the predicate is implied in the essence
a response to the question: "How can substances be good in virtue of
of the subject (lor example, "ralional" said of man). What is predi·
lhe fact that they are when they are nol substantial goods?" In lhe
cated of something Wby participation" is an accidental property that
De hebdomadibus
first uclio of his commentary Thomas calls this a "difftcultn ques
falls outside the substantial being of the subject (for example,
tion and indicates the nature of the difficulty. If crealed suhstances
"white" said of man). As we saw in
Thomas himself applies
are good insofar as they exist, then they are substantial goods. But
the notion of participation to transcendentrus as such, but Boethius
9.3.,
to be a substantial good is proper only to God.\07 Thomas therefore
1 05
For the dating of these works. see J. A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomaj. 362; p. 382. l 6 Thomas gives lhi� characteristie in his eommentary on Boelhius's Dt trinll.atl, pro\. lQ' I" De AdJdam.., leu. I: "DicilUr eoim, quod svb,lla'flt'it crealf!. ;nqllantum 8unl, bone sunt. Cliln lamen dicatur, quod 5ubslAncic create nom $lInt wrulancialia oona. Sel hnr dkilur IIOliu. Dei proprium esse: quod enim COOIICOII alieu; in
d'Arsino, p.
in quantum sunt bone �unt, comequentcr uidetur quod sint substandalia bona. " 1011 Boethius's [('x. can IJ.e found in B()ot:thiu.s. The TMological Tra�tat�J and Tht Comolation 0/ Phi/o,lQPhy, ed. and tram. by H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand and S. J. Tnt",r, Cambridgc, Ma�. 1918, repr. 1973. pp. 3S·�. 1 . For an analysis of 6oethius's Irealise:, see S. MacDonald. �Boethill$'s Claim thaI All Substances are Good·. in: AnA", Jur Ge.JcAiclitt dn PAlosophit i 70 ( 1988), pp. 245-79; ror TllomM'1i o:ommcntary. !l«' R. Mcinerny, Botthiw.s tlnd "quinas, pp. 199-2'1 . . t(jIJ In /Jt AdM"'" len �.
, .""..."",.. ""
",'
.
.
--.-- -.
.
402
clearly takes "participation� in an accidental sense, II 0 According. ly the question how things are good comes down fa the question as to whether things are substanlially or accidentally good. The strategy adopted by Boethius ill to argue against both pans of the dilemma and to show that neither is tenable. (I) Are things _ good by participation? If they are, then they are not good per $f!.. But if things are not good per St, they do not tcnd toward the good, for everything tends toward its like. This consequence, however, contradicts the premise of the claim that all things arc good, namely that all things seek or tend toward the good. Therd�re. it is not the case that beings are good by participation. (11) Are they good then by substance? If they are, then things are good in virtue of their being. This means that being and being good arc identical in them. Then, however, they are like the first good. But the first good is God. Thus all things are ('..cd. But thi.� asst:rtiOU is absurd, and Lhe premise upon which the argument is based, namely that things are good by substance, is accordingly untrue. From (1) things are not good by participation-and from (n)-things are not good by substance-the COlldusion follows, on the assumption that being good by participation or by substance exhaust the possi bilities, thal things are in no way good. Yet this confliclS with the claim that all things are good, which is the presupposition of the question how things are good. 1I1 Boethius's strategy is intended to sharpen the problem of De hehdomadibus. The question how all things are good seems unanswerable in a way that is compatible with the thesis that all things are good. For two possihilities present themselves as replies to the "how" question: the categories of accidents and that of substance. The former account is untenable because it fails to do justice to the transcendental character of the good, while the latter account is untenable hecause it clashes with the transcendence of the first good. Is tbere a way out of this dilemma? In chapter VII we explained Boethius's rather complicated solution. It begins with a kind of thought-cxperimem in which the presence of the first good is removed from our mind. The outcome of this experiment is a non-identity between being and being good lind., IeCt. 3: �6oetiu5 aulem hie loquitur secundum ilium participatio nl. modunl qllo subieetllm pardcip:u accidens, et ideo ex opposito diuid!t. id quod substanciallter e( participatiue predicatuf�.
IIU III
l'R,ANSCENDENTALS AND THE DIVINE
CHAPTER NINE
16id., lect. 3.
403
things. In a world without God, things could not be good just insofar as they are (d. 7.6. ) . Boethius seeks to account for the goodness of the being jtself of things by re-introducing that which was set aside in the thought-experiment, the presence of the first good. Things would not be if they were not willed hy God, whose being is essentially good. Since the being of things is crealed and has flowed from the first good, the being itself of created things is good. Things are good insofar as they are, only because they are from the good. 112 Thomas sununarues Bot:thius's solution to the question of how all things arc good in the following way. The being of the first Good is good according to its very noti on because the essence of the first Good is nothing else but goodness. The being of the second ary, created, good is good indeed, not according to the notion of its essence (for its essence is not goodness itself but rather humanity or something else like Lhat), but in virtue of the relation to the first Good as cause: it is related to this Good as to the first principle and to the ultimate end. Thomas concludes that ueatures are called good with reference to God "in the way something is called healthy by being ordered to the end. health, and is called medical with reference to the an of medicine as efficient cause."I" In his commentary, Thomas does not take a sland against the Boethian solution, but restricts himself to its exposition. The con clusion of his summary does, however, contain a critical element. The creature is denominated Mgood" from its relation to an extrinsic good. Dealing with the question "Are things good by the divine goodness?" in De veritate 21.4. he presents Boethius's solution
III
112 lind., leel. 4: -�quiwr q\IOO quia tJU rerum ueatarum emmdt a w>lunfatr
illi\1s qui est essencialit.er bonum, ideo res create boTlt ,.sse dirontur. ( ... J Cum igitur ifnum �Je omniu.m rffl,ll:lJ jlu.nl a primo h"no. consequens cst quod ip", ...,. essr rerum creaLarum sit bonum, et quod unaqueque res ceeala inquantum est sit bona; set sic sohnn res creine nom rsswl b()ne i1l to quod nlnt. si esse carum non procederet a JUll'lmo bono. � I u lbUl., lceL 4: -Redil ergo eius wlulio ad hoc quod esse primi est secun dum propriam rationem bonum. quia natura d essencia primi honi nic:hll aliud est quam bonitas; esse autem secundi boni c:51 quidem bonum, non $l!Cundum raliorlt::m proprie enentie, quia essen cia c:iIlS non est ipsa boniLaS, set uel humanitas ud aliquid aliud huiusmodi, sel e5�e eiU5 habet quod sit bonum ex habhudine ad primum bonum quod eM dUI OlU.5il, ad quod quidem comparatur sicut ad primUIIl principiull\ el ad uttimUIll finelll per modum quo aliquid dicitur �anum quo aliquid ordinatur ad finem SanilatiS ef diclwf medidnak k(undum quod cst a prindplo efTe(liuo artis medicin(:.� cr. L.-B. Geiger, La parlicipalWn. daM fa phitawphif dt S. ThaWllU d A ' qui", pp. !6 fr.
-- -'-- --'
'
405
CHAPTER NINE
TRANSCENDENTALS AND THE DIVINE
in the objections as a case of extrinsic denomination. Every thing is
21.4 is different from that in his commentary on Dionysius. He
said to be good insofar as it has flowed from the first goodness, as
criticizes the Platonic position not only with respect to natural
Boethius puts it. ''Therefore, the creature is not denominated good
things but also with respect to that which is most common, the
from a formal goodness that exists in it, but from the divine
good. His criticisms are based on Aristotelian conceptions. With
goodness itself. " 1 1 4
respect to the Forms of natural things, the Philosopher has shown that things are what they are, not through an exemplar that is separated from them but through an intrinsic form. With respect to
Transcendence and immanence of the good
the Idea of the Good, Thomas repeats Aristotle's critique in the
In De veritate 21.4 Thomas first opposes that opllllOn which
Ethi cs (1,6).
identifies God's goodness with the formal principle of goodness
good, for good is found in different categories, and the categories of
that is intrinsic to things. He then presents Platonism as a reaction
substance and accident are not equivalent. According to the
against such a pantheistic position: "hence the Platonists said that
Platonic view itself, there is no room for an Idea of what is not said
all things are formally good by the first goodness, not as by a connected form but by a separate form (Jorma separala) . " Thomas
"Good" is not said in a univocal way of things that are
univocally. I ! fi
The focus of Thomas's criticism of the Idea of the Good is not, as in the case of natural things, the separateness of the Form but the
proceeds to sketch their approach to reality. The Platonists hold that that which could be separated in the
univocity Plato attributed to the good. Thus he follows here the As we saw
intellect is also separated in reality. Since "man" can be under
same strategy as in his commentary on the
stood apart from the concrete individuals, they posit a wseparate"
(7.1.), he emphasizes there that Aristotle's critique of the Idea of the
human being which they name "Human Being per se" or "the
Good is not intended to refute Plato's view that there is a separate
Idea of Human Being." Through participation in this Idea, in
Good upon which all good things depend. Aristotle's critique is
dividuals are called "human beings." Similarly, Platonism posits
aimed at the univocal commonness of this Form. The Good itself is
an Idea of the Good that is separated from all particular goods, since
not that by which all things are good formally, but is common by
the good common to all goods can be understood apart from this or
causality.
Ethics.
that good. Things are called "good" through participation in this
In De ventate 21.4 Thomas advances an additional argument
Idea. Yet there is a difference between the Idea of the Good and the
against Platonism that is based on an essential feature of causality:
Idea of Human Being. The latter does not extend to everything,
"the falsity of the Platonic position appears particularly from the
whereas the Idea of the Good has a universal extension. The
fact that every agent effects something similar to it." The principle
Good is the universal principle
that there is a likeness between cause and effect is central in
of all things, that is, God. The consequence of this position is that
Thomas's doctrine of analogical predication (9.3.). If the first
all things are denominated "good" from the divine goodness.I!5
goodness is the efficient cause of all good things, then it must
Platonic view implies that the per
se
Thomas's evaluation of the Platonic way of thought in De ventate
impress its likeness onto the things effected. This likeness is the ground for the intrinsic denomination of the good. Thomas
De vent. 21.4. obj. 2; see also obj. L 1 15 D� vmt. 21 .4: "Sed hoc differebat inter ideam boni et ideam hom in is. [[4
quod idea hominis non se extendebat ad omnia. idea autem boni �e extendit ad omnia etiam ad ideas. Nam etiam ipsa idea boni est [quoddam particu lare] bonum, et ideo oportebat dicere quod ipsum per se bonum esset univer sale omnium rerum principium, quod Deus est. Un de sequitur secundum hanc positionem, quod omnia denominentur bona ipsa bonitate prima quae Deus est". The words in brackets are the Leonine reading. However, tbe variant given in the critical apparatus, wbich reads
lan,
allquod instead
seems to be philosophically more meaningful.
of
quoddam particu.
concludes that each thing is called Wgood" through its intrinsic form, which is a likeness of the 'highest Good. Moreover (ultenus) ,
116
Ibid. 21.4: "Sed haec opinio a Philosopho improhalur llIultipliciter: tum ex boc quod quiditates et formae rerum insunt ipsis rebus particularibus (\. non sunt ab eis separatae ( ... j : mm etianl, suppositis idels. quid specialiter iSla positio non habt-at locum in bono, quia bonum non univoce dicitur de bonis, e( in falibus non assignabalur una idea secundum Platonem procedil contra ellm Philo�ophus in I E!hicOTlLIIl."
_
per quam viam
CHAPTER NINE
TRANSCENDt:NTALS AND THE DIVINE
each thing is good through the first goodness as by the exemplary and efficient cause of all created goodness. It is in this respect that "Plato's opinion can be sustained."1!7 Thomas accepts the Platonic position insofar as it does not imply that things are good solely by an e;dnnsic goodness. His point is that the causali ty of the divine good ness does not exclude that creatures are denominated good from their own goodness . l i B I n his rep ly to the objection that the creature is denominated good from the divine goodness in the way that something is call�d healthy from some extrinsic form of h ealth , Thomas makes an important distinction. There arc two ways in which a thing can be denominated with respect to another. Sometimes it is the relation itself which is the reason for the denom ination, as is the case with calling exercise "healthy" with respect to the health of an animal. In this manncr something is denominated from the extrinsic form to which it refers. Sometimes, however, a thing is denominated with respect to another, in such a way that the relation is not the re a 'ion for the denomination but the cause. In this way the creature is called "good" with respect to God.1I9 When "good" is attributed to the creature, the term does not mean the relation of dependency on God. The term "good" does not mean "is caused by God," although God's goodness is the cause or the creature's goodness. A parallel discussion of the goodness of th ings appears in the
come to a thing from the outside, but belongs to its own act of being
Summa theologiae 1,6.4. After having
shown
that
God
alone is good
his essence (art. 3 ) , Thomas addresses the question: "Are all th ings good by the divinc goodness? " (arlA). Noreworlhy in this text is his jed contra argument. It is not, as usual ly, based on an authority but upon Thomas's own view that he had explained i n the fifth question. The essential clement in his argument for the convertibility of being and good in q. 5.1 is that the good does not
by
IbUl. 21.4: "Spcdaliter tamen quantum ad propositum pertillet, apparel faisitaS praedictae posilionis cx hoc quod onme agens invenilltr sibi simile agere; unde 5i prima bonitas sit effecliva omnium bonorum. 0rorlet quod similillidinem sliam imprimat in rebus elTeail, et sic unumquodque dicetur bonum sicu! forma inhaerenle per similitudinem summi boni sibi inditam, 117
et ullerius per bonilalem primam SiClLl per exemplar el effeClivum omni�
bonitalis cn:atae. EI quanwm ad hue opinio Platonis SUSlineri potnt.118 cr. ibid. 21.4 ad 5: ipsa divina boniUlS dicalur esse bonum Oflln;s bon; in quantum est causa effici�ns prima et exemplari� omni� boni, �ille hoc quod excludalur bonitas Creali!.. qua creaturae denorninanlUr bonae sicU! forma inhaer�nt�.M ]]U
fbid. 2 1 A a d 2 .
(cf. sect. 7.4.). He builds his jed contra on this thesis: On the contr.uy, all things are good insofar as they are. 8m they are not called �bejngs" through the divine being, bllt through their own being. Therefore, all things are not good by the divine goodness, but by Iheir own goodness.l20
the corpus of the article Thomas again observes that Lhe Platonic view appears to be unreasonable in affirming th at there are separate, subsistent Forms of natural things. Still, it is absolutely true that there is something first that is essentially being and essentially good, which we call Cod. Hence everything can be called "good" and "beingH insofar as it participates in the first being and is good by way of some assimilation. In this way something is called "good" from the divine goodness as from the first exemplar, efficient and final cause. But this conclusion is not In
,
Thomas's final word: Nonetheless,
i called �good" from a likeness of the each thing s
divine goodncls inherent i n it which is the goodne ss furmally denominating it. And so there is one goodness of all things, and yet many goodnesses.l2:!
This account provides an excellent summary of Thomas's view of the relationship between created being, truth and goodness and the divinc being, truth and goodness. The transcendental way of the common principle that things
possess of thcir own. Good is transcendental: every being. as being, is good. The immanence of the good must not be denied in the interest of safeguarding tbe transcendence of the Good. That things are good th rough a goodness that is formally their own goodness does not thought
considers
their causal depen dence on what is the Good itself, The intrinsic goodness of a thing has, as likencllS of the divine goodness, its origin in the Good itself; it is a participation in what is essentially good. exclude
120
5. /11. (,6.4, !!-Cd ('.ontra: ·omnia sunl bona inquanlUm sun!. Sed non i dicuntur omnia entia per esse divinuffi, �ed per ess� propruRi. Ergo non omnia sunt bona bonjl'U� divina, sed oonitate propria." 121 Ibid. 1,6.4: "NihiJominus tamen unllmquodqu� dicitur bonum similitudine divinae bonitali� sibi inhaerente. qua� est formali(er .ma bonitas denominan5 ipsum . El .ic cst honilu uni!. omnium; el �tiam m\llla� honitate5. •
•
408
TRANSCENDENTALS AND THE DIVINE
CHAPTtR NINE
The second premise is concerned with the act of crealing,
9.7. The trnnscendentals and the Trinity
because this act is distinctive of God's causality. The premise is
in
one of the articles in his treatise on
The God of Christian faith is triune, In the divine itself there is
elaborated by Thomas
productivity, the eternal processions of the Persons. Father, Son,
creation (Summa theologiae 1,45.6: "Is it proper to ;lIlY Person to
and Spirit arc one in the divine essence, but are really distinct
creale?"). He refers to the principle that there is a likeness between
from each other by thtir relations of origin. There is thus a
cause and effect, since "every agent effects something like il.Sclf.
plurality in Cod. In his treaunent of the Trinity, Thomas raises the
K
Therefore the principle of the action can be considered from lhe
question, in what sense numerical terms can be said of God. and
action's effect. To create is to cause or produce the being (esse) of
in this context he explicitly states that multitude belongs to the transcendentia (see 5.6.). In the present section we will explo,.e the role the transcendentals play in understanding the Trinity. 1�2
being is idenlical with his essence, which is common to the three
things. So to create belongs (0 God in virtue of his being. God's
(s k.nowledge of the Trinity accessible to philosophy? Thomas's
divine Persons. That is why cfc=ating is not proper to one Person but is common to the whole Trinity.126
answer in the Summa theologiae is negative: "it is impossible to
By the way of causality philosophy can arrive at cognition of
arrive at cognition of the Trinity of the divine Persons by means of
the attributes of God's essence that Thomas calls the "essential"'
natural
attributes (essentinlia) or Hcommon" attributes, since they apply to
reason. " I l!] He had already taken this stand in his
commentary on De trinitate (q.1.4), in which Boethius endeavors to
each Person just in the way they apply to the divine essence. But
discuss the Trinity "f,.om the deep disciplines of philosophy" (ex intimis philosophiae disciplinis) . 1 24 Thomas's claim is not only that a
the Trinity of the divine persons cannot be demonstrated, for human reason has access neither to the proper attributes (propria)
rational proof of the existence of the three Persons is impossible in
whereby the Persons are distinguished from each other, such as
principle, but also that he can demonstrate that it cannot be proven.
paternity, filiation and spiration (or procession), nor to the nomina
The first premise of his argument expresses what Thomas
propria, such as "Wo,.d" for the second Person and "Love" for the
himself calls "the foundation " of his consideration of God: man
third.1 21 Knowledge of the mystery of the Trinity relies on divine
can auain knowledge of Cod hy means of natural reason only
revelation and belongs to the domain of Christian theology.
from creature.!!, that is, from his effects. What is accessible to
A1though Thomas rules out the possibility of a sufficient proof
human reason is the,.efore that which necessarily belongs to God
that there are three Persons, this denial docs not entail that philo·
insofar as he is the principle of all beings. The second premise is
sophy callnot make any contribution to understanding the Trinity.
that "the creative force of God is common to the whole Trinity and
Once lhe Trinity is posited, reason, he states.
distinction of the Persons." From both premises it follows that the
c1arirlcation is based 011 tht knowledge of the essential attributes, at
so pertains to the unity of the [divine] essence and not to t.he
can
be employed ill the clarification (maniJestationem) of this datum of faith.1 2S This
existence of the divine Persons is not accessible to humau dum quod en omnium entium principium : et hoc fundament.o usi sumus supra in .;:onsider::alione Dei. Virlus autem crealiva Dei e51 communis lOli Trinila(i: unde pertlnet ad unitatem euentiae, non ad dislinetionem personarum. Per
reason. 1 2.'" 1't2
See the valuable study of N. Kret1.rnann, "Trinity and Transcend ental!", in: R. Feenstra and C. Planlinga (eds.). Tri",ily. incarnalion a",d Alqnnnmt. Notre Dame 1989, pp. 79--109. 1 2� S.th. I, .'12.1: �hnpossibile est per rationem naturalem ad (.ognilionem Trinitatis divinarulll Personarum pervenire." 1 2� Boethius. De trinitate, pro!. For Thoma.s·� po!ition, 1ICe also
3.1.4; Dt vtri,. 10.1:5.
1�5
I", I Scot,
S.th. 1,32.1: Ostensum est enim supra quod homo per rationem natu
ralem in eognitionem Dei pervenire lion potest nisi ex t.reatoril. Cn:alurae alliem dueunt in Dei cognilionem, sieut effectus in causam. Hoc igitur solum
ratione naturali de Deo eogn05C1 pote�I, quod competere e i necessr: e" seelln·
rationem igitur naturalem cognosd po.uun l de Deo ea quae pertinent ad IIl1i· latem a§cntiae. non autem ea quae pertinent ad dbtinctionem Personarum.� 1 �6 Ibid. 1,45.6: "creare en propde causare Jive producere esse rerum. emil aukm omne agens agat sibi �imile, principium aClionis considerari polest ex aaionis effectu ( . . ) . Et ideo .;:reare convenit Deo se.;:undum suum esse: quod est eius eSll.erllia, quae est communi, {ribus Personi,. Unde creare non est .
f
pro rium alkui Personae, sed commune {Oti Trinitati." I 7 Ibid. 1.32.1 ad I: 'philosophi non .;:ognoverunt mYSleri UlIl Trinitati, divinarum Personarum per propria. quae llinl paternitat, filiatio et proceuio; (... ) Cognoverunt talllen quaedam eMClltialia attributa". . 121'1 Ibid. 1,:52.1 ad 2.
' . , ..,
.
- _ . _ , . _.....
CHAPTER
410
NINE
TRANSCENOENTALS AND THE DIVINE
which philosophy can arri�'c with certitude. The manifestation of the divine Persons through the essential auribmes is called "appropriation. " 129 Thomas gives the fonowing explanation of this concept:
411
thought. First, a thing is considered absolutely insofar as it is a being
(t'n.s); second, insofar
as
it is one; third, insofar as it has the
power to operate and to cause, fourth, it is considered according to the relation to its effect. Thomas next applies this four-fold con
To appropriate is nothing orh..:!" than to draw a common attribUl(: towafd a proper aurihuce ( commlllle lrahere ad prttfrum). ri Now an attribute common to the whole Trinity cannot be d....oIIYn toward a
sideration to God.132
i nstead of anolher-that would be incompatible with the c
beauty, and use," is adapted, It is in this context that Thomas seL�
proper attribute of a Person in virwe of ilS being suited 10 one Person
When God is considered absolutely according to his being, the appropriation noted by Hilary of Poitiers, "eternity, .specie.s or out the conditions of beauty we discusSt:d in chapter VJrI. The
the Persons-but rather in virtue of the fact that the common attribute is more simil :u to a proper attribute of one Penon than 10 a proper attribute of 3.1101her. ]�)
equality, and harmony or connection." When God's causal power
The criterion for the suitability of appropriating an essential
is considered, there is the appropriation wpower, wisdom, and
attribute to one of the Persons is the degree of similarity between a common alLribute and a proper attribute. Essential attributes refer to the same reality but arc different conceptually. Their conceptual differences provide the basis for Trinitarian appropriation. Thomas illustrate!! this procedure through examples. The essential attributes that pertain to intellect are appropriated to me Son, who proceeds in a manner associated with intellect, namely, as the Word. �Good ness" is appropriated to the Spirit, because it has a similarity with what is proper to the Spirit. who proceeds as Love, the object of which is goodness.'·"
Philosophical clarification of the Trinity
occurs via the process of appropriating common attributes
10
one of
the Persons. In
the Summa lhetJlogioe 1,39.8,
Thomas discusses prominent trios
of appropriated attributes from the patristic u-adiuoll. He imposes an order on these appropriations that is based on the order found in our consideration of creatures. Since the intellect arrives at cogni tion of God from creatures, it must consider God according to the mode derived from creatures. In considering any creature four aspects present themselves to the intellect in due order-and in this order we clearly recognize elements of the transcendental way of
129
Ibid.
UI9.7: " haec manifestatio Personarum per essentialia anribula,
aPfropriatio nominatur."
!ld D, vtrit. 7.3: "appropriare nihil est
aliud quam commune trahere ad proprium. lIIud aUlem quod est commune toti Trinitati non pOle�(. tTahi ad proprium alicuiu, personae ex hoc quod magis uni personae quam alii conveniat hoc enim ae qualitali personarum repugnan�t -, Kd ex h oc quod id quod est commune habet maiorem similitudinem cum propri o unius personae quam (11m proprio alterius." a. In I Smt., 31.1.2. 1!l1 The first exafnpk is given in 5.111. 1,39.7; the sewnd in D, writ. 7.3. _
consideration of Cod as one is the locus of Augustine'S trio: Wunity,
goodness," which is ascribed to Augustine. In reality, however, Abelard was the first to treat this trio systematically.'33 The con sideration of God's relation 10 his effects gives rise to a fourth
appropriation: "from whom, by whom, and in whom (Romans
1 1 :36)."
In addition to this four-fold consideration Thomas dis
cusses the attribute "truth" and establishes that it is appropriated to the SonyH Thomas does nut mention another appropriation, that of the transcendentals, although it is in keeping with the scheme on which his account is based. The reason may be that in the
Summa
theowgiae he investigates the appropriations of "the holy Doctors," whereas the appropriation of the transcendentals was relatively
new. wOne," '"true," and "good" appear in the traditional sets of
appropriations, but they were not brought together into one trio. Their Trinitarian appropriation was presented for the first time in Alexander of Hales's Summa. Traoscendcnrals are a preemi.nently suitable candidate for the appropriation of essential attributes, for two reasons. The first consists in their commonness. In this respect
�
I,�9.8:
"In con siden'llion e ;1II!.cm ali cui us creaturae, quatuor per ordmem nobiS occu rru n !. Nam /!rimQ c.onsidcraluT res ipsa absolute, in· quantum est en.s qu�dam. Stcundo au\('�m Cl.msideratio rei cst, inquantum est . consldcTatlO re est. secundUnl quod inest d virtus ad operandum el una. Tertia i ad causandum. Quarto autem consideratio rei est, secundum habimdinem quam habet ad causata. Unde haec eliarn quadruplex consideratjo circa Deum 1 2
S.th.
nobis occuTrit.· I�S See J. Chatillon, �Unitas, Aequalilas, Concordia vel Co n ne x io, Re. cherches 5I1r les origines de: la theorie thomine des appropriations (Sum. tllwl. I, q. 39, art. 7·8)", in: St. T/umwlJ ....9I.!ino�. 127-4·}974: (;omm'mMaliTIt Sludi',l vol. I, Toron lo 1974, p. !I!I9, 11. 6. I!W S.fll. 1,�9.fI.
412
413
CHAPTER NINE
TRANSCENDI!:NTALS AND THE DIVINE
they precede, Thomas observes, the other divine names. The other
.remains much more in the background of his work than it does in
reason is of a semantic nature: transcendcn(als refer to the same
the writings of the repre�ntatives of the early Franciscan school at
reality. but according to different concepts. When they are applied
Paris, Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure. Still, there is one place
to divine attributes, they all refer to the divine essence, but through
where the transcendentals are considered as appropriated attri
their conceptual differences they give an indication, and in that
butes. It is one of the contrary arguments in Thomas's most
way
a
clarification, of what is proper to the three Persons.
The appropriation of the transccndentals to the divine Persons is prepared through the connection of the maxime communia with
God's threefold causality of creatures. As we found in 9.2., Thomas
important text on the transcendentals, tries
10
De veritate 1.1. This argument
show that there is a real, not merely a conceptual, differ
ence hetw'een the transcendentals. It runs as follows: (i) "Things said in common of a cause and of the things caused
relates �being." "true," and "good" to God as [he efficient, exem
art: more unified in the cause (han in the things caused." Varia
plary and final cause of all things. ]0 the prologue of his commen
tions on this thesis, expressing the ontological distance between the
tary on the Sentences, he remarks that the temporal procession of
first cause and its effect, occur at several places in Thomas's work:
the creatures is derived from the eternal procession of the Persons.
"things divided in creatures are in God simply one. "U9
What is first, namely, is always the cause of what is later-another
(ii) In God these four-"being," "one," "true," and "good"-are
reference to Aristotle's exposition of the causality of the maximum in
appropriated in the following way. "Being" pertains to the essence,
the second book of the Metaphysics, '"Therefore, the first procession
"one" to the person of the Father, "true" to the person of the Son,
is the cause anrl reason of every subsequent procession."I�!'> The
"good" to the person of the Holy Spirit.
order of origin within the divine is the foundation for the produc tion of creatures. 1.% Although to create is not proper to one Person
(iii) The divine Persons are dininguished not only conceptually, but also really.
but is common to the whole Trinity. as Thomas had argued in
(iv) A
fortiori,
Summa iheologioe 1,45.6, he recognizes in the same text that the
in creatures the four transcendemals differ more than conccptually.140
divine Persons, according to the nature of their procession, have a
In his response, Thomas rejects the condusion of this argument
causality with respect to the creation of thing�. Efficient causality is
but implicitly accepts the appropriation of the transcendentals in
appropriated to the Father; the Son is the reason of the production of
the second premise. He accepts this premise, even though "being"
creatures ",s Word and exemplar, (he Spirit as Love and Good ness. l17 The appropriation of the transcelldentals 10 the divillc
is described in it as an appropriated attribute, whereas it really is a common attribute of the divine essence. His response consists in
Persons is the logical consequence of this idea.
pointing out three ways in which the argument is defective
Thomas n'ever presents the Trinitarian appropriation of the tran scelldentals ull miSL'lkably in his own voice. l lll This appropriation
l��
In 1 SnlI.. prol.: "sirUI tram�s a fll1vio dcrivalur, ita prOCC')$U$ tcmpor:'''I�ls-. p. !12.
(deficit) . The first two defects have to do with the notion of "appropria tion, � which is wholly misunderstood.
�Although the divine
Persons are distinguished in reality, aurihutes appropriated to the Persons differ not in reality but only conceptually." Appropri,ued
1 1\1 ScG. IV,II. 1i0 Dt I,lmt. 1 . 1 . sed contr
approprianlll r ut ens ad eMc'llIiam penincal, unam ad personam ratds, verum ad p�rsonall\ Filii, bonum ad personam Spiritus Saneti; personae autem divinae non solum ratione sed etiam re distinguuntur; unde de invicem non praedica.ntur; ergo mllilO fortins in ereaturis praediCla qualUor de.bent amplius qualn Tluione differre.-
414
TRANSCEND£NTALS
CHAPTER NINE
attributes are common attributes that are ascribed to one Person
because they have a greater similarity to what is proper to one Person than wilb what is proper to another. For this reason, and this is the second defect, '''lnae', which is appropriated to the Son, is not really distinguished from 'being', which remains with the essence."IoU Thomas singles oul the relationship between "being" and �true." because it is the subject of the disputation in De vt!ritau l.I, but the 'conclusion holds equally fo r "one" and "good" in relation to "being.The third defect concerns the theory of the trdnscendentals as such. The objector suggests a real distinClion among them, but the (aCl that being, " "one," "true," and "good" are distinguished con ceptually in God does not require them to be distinguished really in created things. There are attributes that are really one in God, not in virtue of their own nature but in virtue of that in which they are. Examples of these attributes are wisdom and power, which are really distinguished in creatures. Wisdom is really the same as power in God, not because it is wisdom but because it is divine. But "being," "one." "lItle," and "good" are really one in virtue of their own nature. I.}! Transcendental attributes arc really identical both in "
415
suggests that truth is the proper attribute of the Son, for he has a principle of origin and is the perfect image of the Father. IH In his reply Thomas ohserves that "truth" taken strictly (proprie) implies a relati onship between intellect and thing The first thing the divine intellect k.nows is its own essence. The divine intellect and the divine essence are not, however. made equal (adaequantur) LO each other. Their relationship is not that of measure and what is m easured the way in which the divine i ntelle c t is the measure of the truth of other things In God one of the relata is not the principle of the other. but the divine intellect and the divine essence are wholly identical. Truth in God means equality, not adequation (see sect. 9.2.). Every name that does not imply the notion of a princ iple (or of that which is from the principle) in the divine is said essentially So if "truth" is taken strictly in God, it is an essential attribute. Thomas adds that it is appropriated to the Son, like other things that pertain to intellect.H4 Augustine's definition holds for truth as an attribute appropriated to the second Person. The influence of Thomas's conception of truth as transcendental is dearly discernible in this account. One of the traditional appro priations he discusses in the Summa theologiae I,.39.8 is Augustine s trio "unity, equal ity and harm ony " Augustine also ascribes "equalit( to the Son, but his consideration is based on the unity of God. Thomas's approach is different. He deals with �cquality" [rom the perspective of trulh, and his explanation is based on his relational understanding o f truth. The appropriation of truth to the second Person is another example of the clarification of the Trinity by means of the transcendenta!s. .
,
.
.
'
.
C..od and in creatures.
Thomas's discussion of truth contains another text that is of
importance for the relation between the transcendentals and the Trin ity. Article 7 of the first question in De Imitate asks: "Is 'Truth' said of Cod essemially or pt:rsonally?" In other words is it all attribute of the divine essence or an attribute p roper to o ne of the Persons? One of Augustine'S definitions of truth is: "the supreme likeness to the principle. without any unlikelless. � This definition ,
1� 1
AND THE DIVINE
Ibid. 1 . 1 ad 5 (in eontrarium): "ratio ilia deficit in tribus: primo quia
ljuamvis personae divinac rc diuinguantur, appropriala lamcn pcrsonis non
differunt n: sed tanlum ratione; secunda quia etsi personae realiter ad invicem dininguantur non [amen realiter ab essent.ia distinguuntur. unde nee verum. quod appropriatur personae Filii, ab ente. quod se lenet e5scntiae�.
142
cx
parle
Ibid. 1 . 1 ad 5 (in eontrarium): "tertia quia etsi ens, unum. verum et
bonum magi� IIniantnr in Deo quam in rebus nealis, non tamen opone!. q1l0<1 ex quo distinguuntur in Deo quod in rebus creatis eliam distinp;uantur rcaliler: hoc cnim r.ontingit de illi! (plae non habent ex rat.ione sua quod sin t Un\lm SCC\lndum rem, slcu!. sapientia e t potentia, quae CUIll in Deo 'Ilnl unum secundum rem. in creaturis rcaliler distinguunl\lr; sed CIl!. \lIlum. vtrum et bonum secllndum ralianem 5uam ha�nt quod sint unum secllllulHU rem. unde ubicumquc: invcnianlUr. realiter IInllm sllnt.� ('..t'. Dt
"mI. 2 1 . 1 ad 5.
14�
Augustine. Dr .
S.th. 1,16 .'). ohj. 2.
144
""G
r�ligio"t.
c.
3u.
mentioned in De IJm!. 1.7, obj.
I
and
D, "mi. 1.7: "Ornne autem nomen quod in divinis rationem principii vel quod en ;l principio non im portal ( . . . ) t:Ssentialiter dicilUr. Unde in divini�, �i vcrita� proprlt: acdpiatur, eUr.nlialilr.r didtur: tamen approprialllr per!l(lllar. l'ilii �irut an e:1 ('!('ra quae: ad illtf:lkT!Um re:rltn�nl."
I 417
CONCLUSIONS
have cxtramental reality, for their generainess rests op the univer.salitas logica seu pratdicationu according to which !!omething is the more univcnai as it is the more potential. Berthold interprets transcendental being as a u'II.iversa/e logicum effected by the abstraction of the intellect.! Plato, by contrast, denies all three elements of the Aristotelian position: (i) there i:\ 110 convertibility between being, one and good; (U) being is not first among the communia; and (iii) being. one, and good, taken in their generalness. also exist in reality. Berthold accounts for this divergence by claiming that Plato based the generalness not on �predicative universality" but rather all universalilru theowgica rive stparationis. On the basis of �theological universality," something is lUore actual or active accord ing as it is the more univer!!aL That which is the most universal and consequently the most actual is the Good, which is identical with the One. "Good" is prior, more universal and more absolute than "being," since the good is the most universal cause of things, Berthold idemifies Dionysius the Areopagite as a proponent of the priority of the good to being, noting that the De divinis nominibus ,
CHAPTER
TEN
CONCLUSIONS A century after the beginning of the doctrine of the transcend. entals in Philip the Chancellor, we find a mosl interesting assess ment of the doctrine in the commentary on Proclus's Elernentatio theologica by the German Dominican Berthold of Moosburg (d. post 1361)-lhe only commentary on the last representative of late antique Neoplatonism composed in the Middle Ages.r The commentary is constructed such that it explains rirH what is presupposed (supposilum) by Produs's propositions. In this analysis. Berthold appeals again and again to two fundamentally different positions in the philosophical tradition. designated respectively by the names "Plato " and "Aristotle." These praecipui phiwsophi held different views of being, the one, and the good, which Berthold elaborates on the basis of a broad erudition.\! Aristotle posits certain com1llunia, which he called transctndentia, because these terms are not restricted to one category but "run through all of them (circumeunt) ." Transcendemals, to which "be ing," "one/ "true," and "good" belong, are therefore convertible with each other. Among the communw Wbeing" is first. It is the most formal of all concepts, because by means of it each thing is di�tin guished from nothingness or non-being. The other transcend eotals add lIomething in concept to being. "One," for instance, adds the nolion of "in division " to being. These communia do not I Berthold of Moosburg. E%fmjdio jUpn Ellimlffilalionem Ihwiogicam hoc/i;
fulog'I.IJ. Ptopo.Jitionts 1-13 (Corpus Philosophorum Telllonicorum Medii Aevi VI,I), ed. by M. R. Pagnoni-Swriese and I.. Sturle'e, Hamburg 1984. The
volume conlains a "aluable �lntroduction· by K. l'1a.�h (pp. xi-xxviii). See also A. de Libera, Introdudion d la fnydiqut rhmant d'MIIm it (Aand d Maitre Edharl, Paris 1984. pp. 317-442. J. A. Aertsen, "Ontology and Hcnology in Medieval Phi\DBophy (Thomas Aquinas. Master Eckhart and Berthold of Mooshurg)�, in: E. P. � and P. A. Meyer (eds.), 01, Proclw and !lis Influtnct in Medieval Philosophy, Ldden 1992, pp. 120-40. lI: E"poJitio, prop. 11A (ed. Fagnoni-Slurle.e, p. l85.21-22): "De primo lciendum, quod, Ul aliquallter tact\lm en super 1 clemento, ens. unum, bonum aliter accipiuntur ab Ari.stotelc et aliter a Plalone.� Our eltposition is based on Benhold', explanarion of the Jup/Xuilum of the firsl and that of rhe eleventh proposiLion.
presents the good as the first divine name. In contrast to the good, the most universal being is the first caIJ..ud, a claim asserted by the fourth proposition of the Liber-de wtLSis.i !I
Ibid., prop. llA (ed. Pagnoni.Swrl(C$e, pp. 185,23-18G,53): �Ari.�toteks
cllim (.'O) ponil quaed;ulI communia, quae VOC:ll tran�celldentia eo, quod circumeunt omne genus praedicanlenti, pUla (Cns. uounl. bOllum. verullI, res, quid $eu aliquid (...) . Inter quae lalnen ipsulll tn.� didt esse primam el formalissimam onlllium inlentionu/lJ formalium, qua un:lquaequc rCli differt a nihilo vel non enle $impliciler ( ...) Unde oponet, lit dicit. omnia alia addere super ens. quo<] de int.eJlectu cnLis non Silo EI talis addilio non potc�t eRie nisi Tadonis !antum (...) Ens aUlem sic a.ccepturn est cQnl1nunissimullI in se cotnnlUlJitate abnractionis. qualn effidt inlellc:clUs. qui effici! universali tateln in rebus. Et sic [psum ens non ha.bet esse in rerum natura nisi in anilna". cr. E;x:pmitiQ, prop. l A (ed. Pagnoni.Sturl�e, pp. n,5S-73.a9) . i Ibid., propoJitiQ l l A (ed. Pagnoni-Sturle$l:, pp. 186,54-J88,23) : -Non sic autern accipiuntur eru er bonum apud Plalonern, qui pOllit utrum que edam in 51111 univenalitate nceepturn esse In rerum namra. Non enim didt ea esse lmiversaiia universaJjlale logica seu praedicationi�, ubi, quanto aliquid est univenalius, tanlO est potendaJius. sed panil ea e$.5e uni\'crsalia uniw:rsalitale tileologiea sive separationis, ubi, quanta aliquid est universalius, tanto est actualius ita, quod univenali�simum est actu1\]iuimum. EI �r con�qu(Cn' dicit ens et bonum dislingui ab invicem re et ratione: sell intentione ita lam en, quod bonum sit prius, univel'5alhu, fonnaliu� cot absolutills non sorum ipso eme, 8ed etiam rnpeClII orunillJll illl(,lltionum formallum lleut Imlvt':r s
-�--"." -' -- -.'
----
-
--
418
CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER TEN
Berthold understands Platonism and Aristotelianism as opposed structures of thought, as two competing archetypes of philosophy.
419
interpretation of the transcendentia as having no being in extra mental reality is an implicit criticism of the doctrine.
Both philosophies mean to identify that which is first and most
Berthold's analysis of Platonic and Aristotelian structures of
general, but they part ways in their approaches to this question and
thought provides a point of departure for reviewing the historical
in their conceptions of the nature of that which is most general.
sources of Thomas's theory of the transcendentals (10.1.). This sur
The characteristic feature of the Aristotelian position is the tran�
vey will show that the origins are more complex than Berthold's
scendental way of thought, oriented to "universality of predica
account suggests. Section 10.2. gives a summary of the systematic
tion;" the Platonic position is marked by the "transcendence" of
aspects of the doctrine and their importance for Thomas's thought.
the first, a term conveyed by Berthold's expression "universality of
In the final section (10.3.) we return to the claim developed in the
separation." The generalness of the first results from its causality;
introductory chapter of this study: medieval philosophy can be
the first itself, however, remains "separated" from what is caused.
understood as a transcendental way of thought.
The Good or One is beyond being. For Berthold, the Platonic posi tion is superior to Aristotle's first philosophy, since it deals not only with being as being but also with principles that are above being.·>;
10.1. Sources 1m the doctrine 0/ the tmnscendentals
The "Plato" and "Aristotle" of whom Berthold speaks are patent ly medieval transformations of the two protagonists of ancient
The medieval doctrine of the transcendentals appeals to ideas and
philosophy. His "Plato" is in fact "a person with a double face": it is
uses elements from various sources. On the basis of our analysis in
Proclus-Dionysius.6 His "Aristotle" has also undergone a trans
the previous chapters, we can distinguish four traditions of thought
formation, for Berthold identifies Aristotle's philosophy with the
influencing its elaboration: the Aristotelian, Avicennian (com
doctrine of the transcendentals alone. Pierre Aubenque, however,
pletely ignored in older studies of the history of the doctrine of the
has emphasized that the transposition of a systematic theory of the
transcendentals), Boethian and Dionysian traditions.
His observation is correct, insofar as the medieval Aristotle is not
( I ) The Philosopher
transcendentals to Aristotle is "an error of Scholastic interpreters. "7 identical with the Greek Aristotle; in the latter there is certainly no systematic
The corpus aristotelicum is, of course, the main source. The develop
theory is an original achievement of thirteenth-century philoso
ment of a theory of the transcendentals is inconceivable without
phy. Berthold's commentary testifies to an henological reaction
the reception and study of Aristotle's works, even though the
against the transcendental way of thought that dominated medie
Philosopher is not its only sourcc, and the medieval reading of
val philosophy after the reception of the corpus aristotelicum. His
Aristotle is mediated by Arabic commentators. Thomas Aquinas
claim of the superiority of the Platonic position comes to expression
appeals to three Aristotelian tcxts in particular.
system of the transcendentals.8 The development of
a
in his presentation of the doctrine of the transcendentals. The
The most important of these is the fourth book of the Metaphysics. On Thomas's reading, this book is concerned with three themes,
between uni"f'1"5alitas praedicationis and llnivenalitas uparationis, bet.ween umV!7salt [ogicum and UnilieTsalt tMoiogicum. For lhe identity between tbe "good" and {be "one," see Expos., prrrp. 7A (I'd. Pagnoni-Sturlese. p. 140,37): "in prima et absolutissima intentione boni sive unius, quod idem est"; prrrp. 131 (ed. Pa�noni-Sturlese, pp. 221-22). E:xpos. praeambula C (ed. Pagnoni-Sturlese, pp. 65,454-66,458; p. 66,482485). 6
A. de Libera, Introduction Ii la mystique Thinane, pp. 388-89. 7 P. Au�nque, Le prolJlime de {'itn chez Aristote, pp . 203-4, in particular 204. n. 1 . II cr. ].-11. COllrline Suarez tI It lystbru· de la mf.laphysiqlu. pp. 347-48. ,
which together constitute the structure of each science: its subject, the properties of the subject, and the principles from which demonstration proceeds. In chapter one Aristotle offers an account of first philosophy which underlies Thomas's conception of the
subiectum of metaphysics. First philosophy studies being-as-being and the attributes that belong to being as such. In the next chapter Aristotle considers a per se attribute of being and investigates the relation between being and one. He characterizes their relation by
420
421
CHAPTER TEN
CONCLUSIONS
two features: real identity and conceptual difference. The ratio proper to "the one" is defined (in book X, c. 1 ) as "indivision. . Aristotle's account in the fourth book of the Metaphysics is not only the authoritative text for the convertibility of being and one, but also a starting point for the formation of the doctrine of the transcendentals. Its influence can be seen in Philip the Chan cellor, who, in his Summa de bono, presents [Dr the first time a systematic ordering of the communissima. His ordering follows the Aristotelian model of the relation between being and one, and extends it to trUlh and goodness. These notions must be defined in terms of �jndivision" as well. Concerning the relation between being and good, the central text to which the mediev
conclusion is altogether negative: Aristotle does not have a docLrine of transcendental being, unity, Lruth, and goodness. Aristotle's exposition in book II of his M�taPhJsiC5 is concerned with "founda tions of knowledge" and uprinciples of demonstration." In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle's only claim is that the good is found in all categories, not that there is .. convertibility between being and good, since he denies the goodness to mathematical entities. Aristotle's account of the relation between being and the one intends to show that being always "is under the form of identity" and is thereby knowable; being as one signifies "that which is conceivable. " Barthlein regards this idea as a formula for a "more acceptable" doctrine of the transcendentals, since it is "the outcome of reflection on the transcendental conditions of thought."10 The intention of Barthlein's book is historical: to provide insight into the doctrine of the transcendentals in ancient ontOlogy. It presents a useful survey of the relevant Aristotelian texts, but his interpretation of these texts is guided by his own modern presup positions about transcendental philosophy, that is, by what he calls a "more acceptable" theory. This prejudice is apparent from his definition of "transcendental." He describes the kernel of ancient ontology as the idea that being as such is "beyond the categories" and therefore canll.ol have the slightest determination in respect of its content. He opposes "transcendental" in this sense to "meta physical," which means the concern with that which is onto logically first, the divine being. Ir.anscendcntal" in the medieval sense, however, does not mean "beyolld the categories," but that which goes through all of them. Nor does the term "tr,lIlscen dental" expres.� an opposition to "metaphysical." for metaphysics is for Thomas the science treating communia. Barthlein's hook is another example of a tendency, criticized in the introduction to this study: that of investigating the history of medieval transcen dental t110ught from an exclusively Kantian perspeuive.
n
the Platonic Idea of the Good in Nicomachean Ethics 1,6. One of his argumenlS ( 1 096a 23-29) is based on the view that good, like being, is found in aU the categories. Good is spoken of in as many ways as being is spoken of. Therefore, there cannot be one common nalure of good things, for if there were, it would be spoken of in only one of the categories, not all of them. Thomas reads the Philosopher's argument
(2) Arabic philosophy The idea that the spirit of medieval philosophy is marked by the encounter of Christianity and Creek philosophy is an overdivided into three paru: texts in the corpUJ ariuott/icum concerning truth (pp. 22-96), concerning goodness (pr. 77-108), and nlncerning being and unity (p�. log.:-I70}. II �e. Barthldll·• •tuHm;sry or hi. 'Illdy. up. Qt., pr. �71.1U.
---_._'-
CHAPTER T�
t:ONCLUSIONS
simplification, because it ignores the mediating role, to use Thomas's term, of the Arabes. Not only the corpus anstoteiicum, but also Arabic philosophy, and in particular Avicenna's metaphysics. play a decisive role in the development of a systematic theory q1' the transcendentals. Avicenaa's influence is manifest with respect to th...ee themes: the discussion of the subject of metaphysics. the doctrine of the primary notions, and the relationship between being and one. In chapter onc of the first treatise of his Metaphysics, Avicenna observes that every science has its proper subject (proprium subiec- tum), but that it is unclear what the subject of "first philosophy� is. Is it "the exalted God" (Dt14s txctlStu) or is it the ultimate causes of things? Avicenna rejects both possibilities and sees out in chapter two �to esulblish" (stabilire) the su�ject of this science. The su�ject of first philosophy can only be bcing-as-being (ern inquantum ens) , which is common to all things.l ! Avicenna's account profoundly influenced Thomas's conception of metaphysics. The solution of the Islamic philosopher explains why medieval commelllatOrs prderred the ontological view of first philosophy presented in the fourth book of Aristotle's Metaphysics to the theological understand ing found in its sixth book. In the fifth chapter, Avicenna introduces his doctrine of the primary notions. "Thing," "being" and �the necessary" are im pressed on the soul by a tirst impression and are not acquired from other and better known notions. Later in the same chapter, Avi· cenna presents another list of primary notions. including "thing. H "being" and "one." His argument showing why it is necessary to accept primary notions is based on the parallelism between the orders of "assent," that is, judgment, and of "conception." Just as there are first principles that are known through themselves in the realm of assent, certain principles that are conceived per Sf- are rt:quired in the realm of conception. Avicenn,,'s claim of the necessity of primary notions lies at the foot of Thomas's account of the transcendentals in De veritate L 1. ill which he reduces our concepts to that which is first known. Yet another element in Aviccnna's text engages Thomas's attention. It relates to Avicenna's explanation of the concepmal differences
between the notions res and tns, specifically, its appeal to t-he ontological diversity of quiddity and being (esse) in things. The third point where the impact of Arahic philosophy on the medieval doctrine of the transcendentals becomes evident can· cernll transcendental unity. The nature of this unity was a subject of controversy between Avicenna and Averroes. According to Avicenna, Aristotle's account of the rclation between being and one in book IV of the Metaphysics admits of misunderstanding. His assertion that they signify "the same nature" can be taken to suggest that it is "nugatory" to predicate �one" of Wbeing.� Avicenna holds that the "one" adds a disposition to Wthing" in the manner of au accident; "one" signifies a "concomitant" accident of thing. Averroes criticizes Avicenna's view and accuses him of having confused two different types of unity, Avicenna seems to identify the one that is predicated of all categories with the one that is the principle of number. This criticism has its effect on Thomas's distinction between the one that is transcendental and the one that belongs to the category of quantity (d. sect. 5.4.).
422
II
Avin::nna, Li/m' dr phill>$ophio priWla
I. c.
2 (ed. Van Riel, p. 13).
423
(3) Boethius
A third source that has influenced the doctrine of the transcen dentals is Boethius's trealise De hebdomadibus. It addresses rhe question "How can substances be good in virtue of the fact that they have being (in eo quud sint) when they are not subs,"",ntial goods?" Boethius's reflections on the relation between being and good have a central place in the introductory questions of Philip the Chancel lor's Summa de bono and in Albert the Great's De bono. The import ance that Thomas attaches to this treatise appears from the fact th
I
424
I I
CHAPTER TEN
sophy and theology. Missing, however, in these attempts was a
comprehcll$ive metaphysical and epistemological framework, I i It is this perspective that Thomas's commentary is of interest. He
d�votes considerable attention to the methodological part of De
htbdomadibus.
virtue of their relation to the first good. Boethius's solution senres in the thineenth century as a model for the theological foundation of the transcendentals. The fiual part of De Mbdomadibus advances o�icclions to the proposed solution. One of them suggests that, f i all things are good
Thomas seeks a common basis for ðius'g axioms. The first axiom is not
425
CONCl,USIONS
SO
because they are from the good, then all things must be just since
much an axiom in the strict sense as a general
he who willed them to exist is jun. Boethius rejects this objection
description of the cognitive status of the axioms. It explains that '"a
by claiming that "good" is general (generate) , whereas "just" is
common conception of the soul" is "" statement that anyone
specific. All things are good,
approves as he heats it." The idea of "a common conceptionH can
reply, Boethius thus underscores the transcendental charactcr of
be connected in a natural way with Avicenna's doctrine of the
the good.
but nOt
all things are just. In his
primary notions. On Thomas's interpretation, universally self evident propositions are those which can be reduced to terms understood by aU human beings. Terms of this kind are the most general (maxjme communia), such as �being/ "one" and "good." These three notions underlie Boethius's axioms. Accordingly, Thomas proceeds to arrange the remaining axioms in three groups (cf. sect. 3.7.). He apparently sees the transccndelllais as the deep structure of Boethius's axiomatic method. The second pan of De hebdomadibus formulates the problem in the form of a dilemma: are things good by substance or by participation? It is in his commentary on this part that Thomas for the first lime renders a systematic account of the notion "participation." He explains the opposition between substantiality and participation by pointing out that Bacthius understands partici. pation as referring to an accidental property of a thing. Thomas attempts to overcome Boethius's dilemma by applying the notion
of participation to being and good as such, that is, properties."
to transcendental
The third part of the treatise presents Boethius's solution of the problem. The being itself of things is good, since their being has flowed from the first good.. Things are good insofar as they are, in
M. Dreyer, NikoIaIU llQl1 Amj"n.s: An jidn C6lholiu.u-F.il1 BrispidWI!T1t axiatnafuchtr Mdhod( (8dm"igc lur Geschichte der Philosophic und Thcologie des Mitldahers, Neuc Folge vol. 37), Munner 1993, p. 39; Id., "Regular. methode und Axiomalil. Wissensc:naflliche Methodik im Horizonl der IIrtt.l- Tradhion des 12. Jahrhunden.sw, in: I. Craelllel·.Ruegeoberg OInd A. Speer (cds.), ScUmili "nd an ill! Hach· und Spiilll!jlf�lalJ.".. (Misc. Mediaevalia vol. 22/1), Berlin/New York 1994, pp. 145-57: p. 157. " Cf. R. A. Ie Velde, Participation and Subd6nllolit] in Tlwrnru Aqum6l. pp. 8u cr.
(4) Dionysius the Areapagile At first sight it may cause surprise th
Oil
"predicative universality." Yet then; are reasons to view Dionysius as a source for the development of the dOl.:trine of the transcendentals. It is a fact that reflection on the
divine names plays a prominent role in
Thomas's doctrine. His lirst account of the lranscendentals, in his commentary
Oil
the
Sentences 0,8.1.3),
occurs within the frame·
work of a discussion about the order of the divine names. The possibility of connecting the Djonysian perspective with the transcendental perspective lies in those statements in De diuinis
nominibus in which Dionysius posit� the universal extension of the one and the good: "there is no being that does not participate ill the good and beautiful" (c. 4,7); "there is no being ,hal does not paTlicipalC ill the ulle" (c. 13,2).14
M.
..
. .
" � ""' .-
- -
.
426
CHAPTER TEN
CONCLUSIONS
It is true that the doctrine of the transcendentals has an anti Platonic moment, insofar as it criticizes the Platonic view of the substantiality and subsistence of the on the
Metaphysics,
comlnunia.
In his commenlary
Thomas points out that Aristotle's exposition on
being and one should be read as an answ-er to the eleventh aporia in b�ok III, which Aristotle caJls �the hardest of all inquiry" and Thomas describes as the queslion �on which Plato's entire view depends. nl3 The aporia
is presemed in terms of two mutually
exclusive positions. Are being and one the substance
(ouria)
of
things-a view which Aristotle ascribes to Plato--or is there some other reality that is the underlying substratum for being and one? Aristotle rejects the first alternative. since the commonness of being and one is not compatible with their substantiality.16 . Noteworthy in Thomas's commentary is his attempt to JUsufy .
427
The clearest expression of this complementarity is provided by the prologue of Thomas's commentary on
D� divinis nomi1libus,
in
which h e ohserves that Dionysius follows "LIle Platonic method.n Thomas accepts the Platonic reduction of all Lhat is composed and material to separate principles, insofar as it is applied to the
communia,
namely, �good,'" "one"
maxime
and "being." There i s a first
principle, God, who is good, one and being hy his essence and i s the cause o f what i s most common i n things.
III this way Thomas
succeeds in connecting the Dionysian tradition with the tran scendental way of thought.
De divinis nominibus
is a source of the
doctrine of the transcendentals because this work provoked exten sive discussions of the problem of how a Platonic ontology of the divine names can be integrated into a doctrine of
the cmnmunissima.
the Platonic view of the one. Il might he interpreted, he suggests, in the sense "that the one is common in the manner of a cause . "
10.2 . .!lystematic importana
When the commonness of the one is taken in " causal sense, it is true to say that there exists a separate One.
This One, however, is
not,
amcepLion insofar as it teaches that there is one separnte Good upon which all good things depend. Aristotle's critique is focused on Plato'S view that the separate Good is the common Form of all good things (cf. sect.
7.1.).
. . In his discussion of Platonic philosophy, Thomas's gtUdmg
principle is the distinction between commonness hy predication and commonness by causality. Rerthold of Moosburg employs the same distinction to characterize Aristotelianism and Platonism, but with a significant difference. A way of thought directed toward
�d
"predicative uniyersality" and a way of thought directed tow
"theological universality" represent distinct approaches to reala y. For Thomas, however, these are not mutually exclusive, but complementary ways of thought.
doctrine of the transcendentals. We place the
in Thomas's
epistemological
motif
first, one generally neglected in historical studies. Transcen dentals are
prima
in a cognitive respect, thl.,,), are the "first intelli
gibles." The importancc of this theme manifesLS itself in
De vmial#!
1 . 1 , where Thomas prepares his account of the transcenrlentals through a reflexive analysis, a
TCSQiutio,
of human intellectual
knowledge. This cognitive approach is taken from Aviceuna who draws a consequence from the notioll
of sdentia that captivates many
medievah. SciellLitic knowledge is knowledge: derived f,'olll some thing else, but its deri....ation from something prior cannot go on indefinitely. The principle of science cannot itself be
scientia.
Avicenna's originality consists in his claim that the impossihility of an infinite regress ohtains not only for th� order of demOllstrn tion but also for the order of conception. Our cOllcepts must finally be reduced to notions that arc known
per St.
Thomas adopts Aviceuna's teaching by reducing our concepl5 to
SaraeenllS) c. 4,7: -Non est aJiqllid e)(isu:nLium quod non partidpal pu\Chro e. bono-; c. 13,2: -Nihil eRim exislcnllum eu non partlelpans uno. B Aristotle, MtllJph,sics JII,"', 1001a 4--5; Thomas, In III MdOph. len. 3, !l63. If, Arislollc, Melaph. X, c. 2, 1053b 16-24. 17 In 111 Mtlaph., len 12, 501. Cf. sen. 5.3 . .
(i) A number of philosophical themes are at work
.
.
�
.
first intelligihles which constitute the conditions of all subsequent knowledge. They are the "seeds"
(semina)
of scientirlc knowledge
acquired through the discounc of reason. The origin of the lint conceptions lhemsclvc� is complex on Thomots's view, They are known "naturally," not hy Mtudy or inquiry. but
our natural
..
"
428
CHAPTER
TEN
knowledge of them is not to be understood as a formal a pnon condition of thought. All intellectual knowledge is dependent on sense experience. The primary notions are immediately con ceived at the moment when the human intellect begins to act and abstracts the intelligible from the sensible (cf. sect. 4.2. and 4.3.). The primary notions arc apprehended in a certain order. Although there is a plurality of �firsts," being (en.!') is the maxime primum. It has a conceptual priority. since something is intelligible only insofar as it has being. Without being, Thomas states, "nothing can be apprehended by the intelleCl." A novel element of his doctrine is the foundation of the first principle of demonstration on the concept of being (sect. 3.'7.). There is not merely a parallel ism between the orders of demonstration and of concepts, but a relation of foundation. Thomas gives a "transcendental" founda tion to the principle of demonstration, that is, the principle of contradiction, which Aristotle had called the anhypothtton of theoretical thought. That which is first conceived by the intellect is being common by predication, not by causality. The first intelligible is not divine being. Thomas criticizes the Platonists who claim that the order of knowledge is identical with the onLological order and that the cognitive first is the first, transcendent, being. His doctrine of the prima is thus a critique of knowledge. The order of the first inLelligibles follows Ihe analytic order of human \lOderstanding. Having conceived being, the intellect apprehends that it understands being. Being could not be appre hended if it were nOl knowable, that is, "lnle." The intellect thirdly apprehend.� that it desires being; it apprehends that being is "good." Although Ihe good is last in the order of the prima, it is the first concept of practical UruOR. Practical reason is ordered to action. and every action is for the sake of an end, which has the nature of good. (ii) The first conceptions are prima hecause they signify the maxi me commu»ia, that which is common to all things. Th,-")' transcend the Aristotelian categories and arc therefore called transcendentia. The opposition between categorial and transcendental appears from Thomas's structuring of the explication of the first concept in De veritate 1 . 1 . The explication of being occurs in two directions: on the one hand, through the particular modes of' being, expressed by the categories, and, on the other, through the general modes of
CONCLUSIONS
429
being, expressed by the tran.ft;tndentia. The second motif of the doctrine of the transcelldcntals is ontological. The transcendental explications are the subject matter of metaphysics, since this science deals with being-as-bt:ing and the attributes that belong to being as such. The medieval doctrine establishes for the first time in the history of philosophy an intrinsic conllection between four ba..-;ic notions: "being," "one," "true" and "good, � to which Thomas (in some texts) adds "thing" and "something." They are the same in reality but differ conceptually. Kant's criticism of �the lIanscen dental philosophy of the ancients"-that the dictum quodlibet ens est unum, vtrUm, bonum is tautological-is iudf incorrect. The other transcendentals are not synonyms of "being,� but add something in concept to it; they manifest the different "faces" of being. A distinctive feature of Thomas's doctrine is his understanding of being as "actuality." The ratio of ens is taken from the act of being (actus ttt.letldJ). Something is, insofar a..� it has actuality. This under· standing of em' determines the relation of the other transcendentals to being. The peculiarity of Ttl is that it is the only transcendt:ntal whose conceptual difference from Wbcing" is based on the ontological composition of that-which-is. The Tatio of TtS is taken from the essence or quiddity. "Thing" signifies �being," viewed from tbc "reality" through which it is what it is. The question which of the two, "being" or "thing," is the primary U'anscendent�l depends on the way in which the relation between essence and eS5e in things is conceived. For Thomas "being� is the primary transcendental. because esse, from which the ratio of ens is taken, is related to every form or nature as act to potency. .Eking is understood a.s being not from its reality bm from its actuality. Unum adds to "being" the notion of "indivision;" it signifies that being is undivided. The transcendental one studied by meta physics must be distinguished from the ont: that is studied by the science of mathematics, for the mathematical one belongs to a determinate category, that of quantity. Thomas's argument for the convertibility of being and one is founded on his understanding of esse as actuality. A thing's act of being is the ground for its being called wone,� becaust:, as act, it effects the indivision of all that is composed. Although the Tatio of "one" is t:xprt:S3ed by "indivision" in a negative way, it llevertheJeu signifies .omething po.ilive, a
. .---.--. . . ._-,- . .-
430
CUA.PTER TEN
431
CONCLUSIONS
perfection that could be describecl as "inner coherence, M or "heing
in fact the
whole." The thesis of tbe convertibility of being and one !;tands in
lranscendenlab. When the transundrotia are the prima of human
opposition to the doctrine of the plurality of substantial forms in
intellectual knowledge, and the first intelligibles are communil'!, the
each individuaL This doctrine, Thomas argues, deprives things of
distinctive mark of human beings must consist in their transcen
their unity and, consequently, of their being. sillce a plurality of
dental openness.
xplication of a basic assumption in the doctrinc of the
e
Thomas relates the true and good to the formal objects of the
substantial acts cannot constitute a true unity (cf. sect. 5.6.).
Verum adds to "being" a relation to intellect; it expresses that
spiritual facullies of human beings. The object of the intellect is
being is knowable, or apt to bring about a true idea of itself. The
being under the ratio of knowability; its object is the true. The
basis for the convertibility of being and true is the same as that for
object of the will is bdng under the
the convertibility of bei.ng and one: the act of being. Everything is
the good. The triad �bcing-lIuc-goodn corresponds to the triad
ralw of appetibility; its object is
knowable insofar as it is in act. Actuality is the ground of both the
"soul-intellect-will" as its formal object. The doctrine of the
knowabilily and the entity of things.
transcendentals provides a metaphysical basis for a theory of
Bonum adds to "being" a relation to appetite; it expresses being
knowledge and a theory of human action.
under the ratio of appetlbility. Just as in Thomas's arguments for
One of the most interesting eiemellts of Thomas's doctrine is the
the convertibility of being with the one and the true, his under
connection between transcendentality and morality. He gives a
standing of esse as actuaHty is crucial in his argument for the
transcendental foundation to the first principle of practical reason.
convertibility of being and good. The good as good is perfect;
Just as the first principle of theoretical reason is based on the
everything is perfect insofar as it is actual, that is, insofar as its
concept of "being," so the first principle of practical reason, "the
potentialities are realized. Every hcing as being is therefore good.
good is (0 be done and pursued, and evil avoided,n is based
The thesis of convertibility is directed against (WO rival con
concept of "good" (sect. 7.S.).
ceptions: the Platonic position thal the good is heyond being, and
(iv) The final motif in Thomas's docltine is theological. His con
the Manicbaean doctrillc of an ontological dualism of good and
sideration of the names of God is an adaptation of the Dionysian
evil.
Neoplatonic ontology of the divine names. The lranscendent::lls
(iii) The most original aspect of Thomas's doctrine is its anthro
are the primary names; "being," "one," "true� and "good" precede
pological motif: the correlatiOn of anima and being. In De writale 1 . 1 ,
the other divine names " because of their commonness." Thomas
h e understands the transcendentals "true" and "good" in relation
grounds the order among the divine names on the order among
to the human soul. The introduction of relational transcendentals
the transcendentals. His understanding of esse as actuality is also
as such is not something tUlique to Thomas. Alexander of Hales
cenLral in his argument that "He who is" is the most proper n'lme.
and Albert the Cr(:at already modify Philip the Chancellor's
ordering of the communis.sima, which is based entirely on the
011
lhe
The relation betweell God and the cQmmtwi.f$ima is a causal rda
tioll. God can only be known by natuml reason through his effeclS.
notion of "indivision," that is, on a negation. They acknowledge
Since that which is common to all things is Ihe proper effect of
the relational character of the true and the good, but they seek to
God's causality, transcendentals are the road for human philoso
account for this rclationality from a theological perspective. Alex
phical knowledge of God. It is on this point that the anthropological
ander and Albert refer the true and the good to the divine cause of
and theological motifs of Thomas's doctrine converge; it is owing
t"hings which is their (:xemplary form and final end. All reference
to their transcendental openness that human beings arc "capable of
to the human soul is absent from their explanations.
God. "
The anima is Min a sense all things." The perfection of an
The causal relation between Cod and the transcendentals is
intcl!(:ctual being is that it is able to assimilate the forms of other
worked out with (he help of three models: the Platonic modd of
things; its proper object
is heing in general. The recognition
of the
special place or human beings among other beings: in the world is
participation. the model of lhe causality of the maximum th;I1
Aristotle advancc!i in the !lCcolld book of hi"
Mtllaph,J;ta. and
the
432
CHAPTER TEN
433
CONCLUSIONS
1n chapter tn, however,
doerrine of analogy. The first model is the most fUlIdamental.
we
arrived at an entirely different
COIl
Thomas connects the=: doctrine of participatioo with the transcen
c1us:ion. We established that Thomas's commentary on Boethius's
dental way of thought. He rejects the Platonic application of the notion of participation to the genera and species of natural things,
De trinitau and the prologue of his commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics manifest a transformation in the conception of meta·
hut adopts it with respect to the
is being. one,
physics. We identified this transformation as a shift from trans
true and good by his essence; creatures participate in those
materiality to commonness. The subject of first philosophy is not
perfections (sect. 9.3.).
the first, divine being. but being in general (ens
maxime communia. God
Creatures are not, however, called being, one, true and good
metaphysics i� the scienlia
communis,
ommune) .
c
When
the doctrine of the transcen·
only in virtue of their relation to the divine cause. The theological
dentals l:annOl be an "insignificant" part of this Kienee, because
foundation of the transccndentals does not deny that everything is
the transcendentals are the conditions of being in general.
being, one, true and good in virtue of a formal principle, its own act
The second moment of Honnefelder's opposition between
of t!$je. Thomas's docu'ine explains the transccndentality of that
Thomas and Scotus pertains to the nature of Lhe epistemological
which-is by two resolutions: its inner resolution to the most
first, with which first philosophy is concerned. For Thomas this
gcneral formal principle and the resolution to the most universal
first would be grounded in precognition of the first cause, while for
extrinsic cause.
Scotus the first known is related to the terminus of the resolutio of our concepts. On Honnefelder's view, Thomas, in his comment
Ludger Honnefelder has published important studies of the
ary on De trinitate, abandons the method of resolution he had
transcendental way of thought of Duns Scotus and its influence on
followed in
modern philosophy. In several of his publications he contrasts
"separation" is a negative judgment. which means that being
Scotus's conception of ontology with that of Thomas. On his
not necessarily material. It presupposes another, positive judgment,
interpretation, the core of this opposition is that metaphysics for
namely, that thert:: are immaterial beings. The basis of this judg
Thoma.<; is an onto-theology, whereas for Scotus it is a
ment lies in precognition ("Vorgrirrl of unlimited being itsdf. t9
scientia
Dt veri/ate
1 . 1 and employs stp(Jralio in its place. The
is
Honnefelder's interpretation invites three observations. First, his
Iranscmdens. The doctrine of the transcendentals is said to form just
a small, indeed "iIlSignific:ant� part of Thomas's mctaphysics . tll
suggestion that Thomas in De
This picture, however, is in need of radical correction.
the method of resolution because this resolution leads only to belief
v
eritalt 1 . 1 would have abandoned
The opposition between Thomas and Scotus is worked out by
or opinion and not to a knowledge that is scientifically certain
Honncfelder in two directions. The first moment concerns the
lacks all foundation and is contrary to the tenor of Thomas's
subject of metaphysics. The criterion for Thomas, in contrast to
account. Thomas argues that, just as in the order of demonstration,
Scotus, is not the transcategorial generality of certain concepts, but
so
the separation from matter and motion. Tr.tnsmatcriality provides
be made to prilH.:iples that are known {ler
the entree to the science of metaphysics. First philosophy remains
reduce our concepts (0 a �first" that is the condition of all scientific
for Thomas
knowledge of things.
ultimately
the
consideratioll
of that which
is
likewise ill investigating what something is, a reduction must
on De Sf'e in
particular the final paTt of Honnefc:lder's dissertation, En.< inquantum .mi. Df'1" Br/:;riff de5 Stifffldtn all jolthn, "i. GrgtruI(ll1d df!'" M(.laph,Jik ',ach du iLlITe dI!J JohanntJ DUI1J Scota.•. Mlmster 1979 (2d ed. 1'J89}. pp. 397 IT.; id., -I:!.er zwrite Anfang der Melaph�ik.·; iJ., MMelaphyslk. .. ,Id Tranneo
dem:. Uherlegungell III johannes Dum ScOlliS illl Blick a\lf Thom� VOII Aqllin und AI)!ehn von Canu:rbury-, ill: I.. Honndc:lder and W. Schll»lu (eds.), I2 .. lit rint"III Gnm4ulQtt hr l.tauj�chm M�laplt.)J'*' P;ulerhotn 1992. pp. Trans undM
1 :l7..fi I .
Thi... 1
His intention is to
Secondly, it is incorrect to say that Thomas, in his commentary
transcendent. til
Je.
artide
ronn! Ihf' ha�l� (.r (>lU' diS("u,,�il>lI.
trinitale,
employs sepamtio instead of the method of
reJoiutio.
In section 3.4. we saw that in the sixth question of his commentary, Thomas closely connects the method of metaphysics with the method of resolution. He distinguishes two kinds of resolution: a
III Honnefeldtr'�
'
imerpn:talion is s,rollKly inl1uenf'ed by 1•.·8. Gelxer l view or the imponance or ,h,. Si'/MrtJllo ror 1110111...•• concepilon of melaphytkl. Me �en. �.!I.
, .
.
,
434
CHAPTER
resolution secundum rationem that terminates in the consideration of being and of that which belongs to being as such; and a resolution secundum rem that terminates in the universal cause of being. The former resolution is the condition for the latter; God is the final end of metaphysical inquiry. Thirdly, the view Honnefelder ascribes to Thomas concerning the epistemological first applies to Bonaventure morc than to Aquinas. Thomas explicitly rejects the thesis that God is in any way that which is first conceived by the intellect. His position in the thirteenth-century debate about the first in cognition is that this first is being that is common hy predication. Thomas's position, we noted above, is a critique of the Platonic position, according to which the first in the order of our intellectual knowledge is being that is common by causality. Interestingly, Duns Scotus criticizes in Thomas not the view Honncfelder ascrihes to him, but the opinion that the first object of the intellect is the quiddity of the material being (d. sect. 4.2.). The purpose of these critical observations is not to deny that there are substantial differences between Thomas's ontology and Scotus's. They are only meant to make clear that this opposition does not consist in the two moments suggested by Honncfclder. His interpretation rests, as it turns out, on a marginalization of the doctrine of the transcendentals in Thomas's thought.
10.3. Medieval philosophy
as
CONCLUSIONS
TEN
a transrendental philosophy
Our study started with an introductory chapter in which we dis cussed three representative conceptions of medieval philosophy those of Gilson, of the Cambridge History and of De Libera-and proposed an alternative approach. Thomas Aquinas served as a test case for this approach. The inquiry into his thought was intended to substantiate the claim that, more than the three conceptions discussed, the theory of the transcendentals provides insight into the properly philosophical dimension of medieval thought. This claim docs not deny the pluriformity of philosophy in this period; the idea of transcendentality admits of diverse elaborations. The accounts of Philip the Chancellor, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scoms and Meister Eckhart differ considerably from each other. Of course, there were also philosophical attempts to found the
435
autonomy of philosophy earlier in the Middle Ages, but it is not until the thirteenth century that they acquire a comprehensive metaphysical basis. We will conclude our study by showing that the understanding of medieval philosophy as a transcendental way of thought does not exclude the three other conceptions, but incorporates them. (i) In his book The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, Gilson argues that under the impulse of Christianity medieval thought transformed Greek philosophy. Medieval philosophy must be understood as "Christian philosophy," the most important innovation of which is "the metaphysics of Exodus." Gilson opposes "Greek thought," which affirmed the primacy of the good, to "Christian thought," which upheld the primacy of being and the subordination of the good to it. The consequence of Gilson's opposition is that the rorpus dionysia rum is actually placed outside Christian thought. We have seen, however, that Thomas endeavors, through the distinction between commonness by predication and commonness by causality, to connect Dionysius's Platonic way of thought with the transcen dental way of thought, and that he provides a justification for the Dionysian order of the divine names in which the Good is prior to Being. Gilson's opposition between Greek and Christian thought is problematic for another reason as well, inasmuch as it neglects the mediating role of Arabic philosopby.�o In the propositions from the Liber de causis, for instance, the medievdls encountered the idea of creation (prop. IV: "the first of created things is being"). Gilson's concepLion of medieval philosophy seeks to express the dose connection between philosophy and Christian revelation in the Middle Ages. The significance of the theory of the transcen dentals for this connection can be illustrated by Thomas's reflec tion on the origin of reality in his account of the history of philosophy (d. sect. 3.8.). In the first and second phases of this history, things are considered insofar as they are surh beings in virtue of accidental forms or these beings in virtue of substantial forms. In the third and final phase, a transition is made from the �o
In other �tudies GiI�on himself ha� railed attention to the important
rolt' of Arahic thillkcr�, ill particular of Avicenna. See, for example, "Avi n�lIIw {'II Ocddent. au Moyen Age", In: Arch'Tlll d'JIIIIDI" lJoclrinal# d Liltlra'" rlll Ml1jnl A,(II 44 ( I nB9) , pp, R9-121,
CONCLUSIONS
t.:HAPTER TEN categori:al level to the lranscendenlal level; the origin of being
In
general. that is. the crealion of things. is then considered. Thomas interprets the idea
of
creation in terms of causality with a
and another secondarily (per posterius), for instanc.e. "healthy" said
of "animal" and
of �urine."
Interestingly, the author goes beyond
this traditional example to add another application of this type of equivocation which concerns the nomina lranscendentia "thing, M
transcendental extension. The doctrine of the transcendentals has a theological motif. A
"being," "one," "the sameH and "diverse." Although the dating
of
particular aspect of the relation of the transcendcntals to the divine
the text is uncert(lin, the use of transcendentia constitutes one of the
COllcerns the doctrine of the Trinity, a doctrine lhal Gilson leaves
earliest known appearances of the term,�� [n the Summa MetensiJ,
out of consideration since it is inaccessible to natural reason. Tho
ascribed to Nicholas of Paris (c. 1240), two kinds of equivocation arc
ma�. like other medieval thinkers, employs the transcendentals
distinguished: equivoc.ation in the proper sense (proprie). when a
for a philosophical clarification of this mystery of faith (9.7.).
Gilson's interest
in the doctrine of the transcendefllals is
word possesses an actual ambiguity, and equivocation in a hroad sense
(co11lmunite1'),
when a
word
refers (0 many things, to one
marginal. In bis study of Thomas's philosophy, he refers to it only
among them prim(lrily and to others secondarily. The latter terms
once, when dealing with Thomas's account
are called a7laloga equivoca; the transcendentals
of
God's unity in
Summa theowgiae I, q, 11,�1 The locus of this discussion is consistenl
aliquid are offered as examples.H
ern,
unum, a n d
with Gilson's view that the historian must explain medieval
In the course of our study, we frequently found that the doctrine
philosophy in keeping wilh the theological order of sacra doclrina.
of the transccndentals makes use of important theories of terminist
From a philosophical point of view, however, the consideration of
logic. A semantic approach figures prominemly in the solutions to
the transcendentals as suc.h-in this case, the convertibility of be
two central difficulties. In explanation of the identity and lhe
ing and one-precedes their use as divine names. As r.Qmnuwissima
difference between the most common notiulls, the medievals
they are the basis for man's natural knowledge of God. Gilson's
employ theories of terminisl logic conc.erning (he modes of signi·
"theological" interpretation fails to after insight imo the order
fying and tJle distinction between signification and supposition. In
proper to philosophy.
the discussion of the transcendentals as divine names, Thomas appeals to the distinction between concrete and abstract terms
(ii) The logical-semantic approach has changed the study of medieval philosophy. ILS most lasting effect is that the historian is
(ens·
esse, vernm-ventas) and to !he distinction between ,.,s significata and modUJ sif:f1liJicandi in order to clarify the possibilities and limits of
now more disposed than before to devote attention .(0 the role of
human discourse about God. In short, the theory of the transcen
terminist logic in the development of philosophical or theological
dentals devotes great attention to "the way in which human beings
doctrines. This approach is also useful for our insight into the
do things with words."
geuesis of the doctrine of the transcendentals. It cannot be douhted that logical discussions play a role in its development. even though the exact historical t:onnections are still unclear. We want to drdW attention to two texts from the Logica modernorum that explicitly mention the nomina tmnscendentia in discussions of equivocation.22 In the so-called Dialectica Monacensis, a kind of equivocation is described that arises when a word signifies one thing primarily
� I l..t Thomismr,
2 ' L M. de kijk, LogiCll Modernorum: A ('..onlnbulwn /0 lh� Hutnry oJ F.ari)' Tflf'minu/ Logi� 11,1, Anc:n 1967, p. 508; 11,2, pp. 560-61 : KAd hllm; modum
redllcuntur omnes cquivocalione:s que sunt circa nomina trans(:cndenlia. Qualia sunt her: 'res', 'ens', 'unum', 'universale', 'ponibile', 'contingens', 'idem', 'diversum', Ct similia." De Rijk dates the Dil.llufica Monaan.i., 10 the last decades of the twelfth century (cf. ILL pp. 412·14), but today a later dating is accepted. The text is from lhe first quarter of the thirteenth cenlury (written mmmunication of L. M. de Rijk to the author, dated January 25,
1995).
pp.
120-2 L It i� noteworthy that Gilson gh'e, a (:entrai placr
(0 the doctrine of the lranscenden(ai5 only in a posthumously published work:
Ums/nnw philosophilf"G tk I'ih't, Paris 1983. 'tll cr. A. de Uber.Il, �D'Avicenne a Averro.C5, et retour. Sur les sour(:es arabes de: la t!leori<: scolastique de I'un tr.lns(:endantaJ�, pr. 142·-43.
�4 Ibid. 11.1. p. 475: "Et notandum quod rquivocauo (\"obu.'l modis a(:cipitllr, proprle et c.ummuniter, proprir qualldo ipsa diu;u multiplex est achl; commu· Iliter quando d;(I;o AI'! habrt ad plura. ad unum prius ct ad alia rx conuqurnu, E.l ak dieuntur ",naloga equivoc_a, alent 'en.', 'unlllll' et 'aliqu;d', que dkunlur primo de .ubltantl•• per [tOIleriu. autell! de quant itate ct qllalil,lIe et ("rlerh.�
--.
. "
CHAPTER TEN
438
(iii) Dc Libera has introduced important criteria for determining the place of medieval philosophy: the notion of the "intellectual"
BIBLIOGRAPHY
and the experience of thought. The spirit of medieval philosophy comes to expression in what he calls "ethical Aristotelianism," which teaches the intellectual destiny of man and the ideal of a philosophical life.
h ill difficult to sec, however, why the spirit proper to
medieval
phiJosophy should lie in an Aristotelian doctrine. In comparison to
De Libera's conception, medieval philosophy acquires a broader and morc fundamental basis in the doctrine of the transcen denials. It is a theory about the prima, the conditions of theoretical and practical reason. I n Thomas's account, the anthropological motif of the doctrine becomes explicit. Human beings possess through their faculties of intellect and will a transcendental
openness, thanks to which they are able LO attain that which is Truth and Goodness itself. The realization of this possibility constitutes man's intellectual destiny. If the t:xperience of thought is constitutive for the "intellectual," and jf the doctrine of the transcelldcntals is the articulation of a basic experience of thought, then the locus of medieval intellectual ity should not be restricted to the Faculty of arts, but must also in clude the works of
thtologi.
It is Parisian theologians who formulate
the first accounts of the transccndentals: Philip the Chancellor, Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. To show the importance of the transcendental way of thought for the last was the objective of the present study.
1 . SouTces ALBERT
Tin:
GREAT Dt IHIno. Opera Omnia XXVIll (editio Colonicnsis). Ed. H. Kuhle. Munster 1951. lk 'Guris d prou.m. ullivnTiwlu a PriItUl Causa. Opera Omnia XVII, 2: (ed. Colon.). Ed. W. Fauser, Munster 1993. Vt protdicabilibus. Opera Omnia I (editio Parisiemi5), Ed. A. Borgnet. Paris 1890. Sumllla Ihtologiat sivt d, miTahiti Jnffllia Dn I. Opera Omnia XXXIV, I (ed. Colon.), Ed. D. Siedler, Munster 1978. Supn Dian,siu", De divinis rwminibus. Opera Omnia XXXVII, I (ed. Colon.). Ed. P. Simon, Munster 1972. SUP" Ethica. Opera Omnia XIV. I (ed. Colon.). Ed. W. Kubel, Munner 1968/1972. SUfm' 1 Se1Ilentiarum. Opera Omnia 26 (ed. Pari�.), Paris 1893.
ALExANDER or HAU".i5
Summ4 Ihtologim I-IV. Ed. Coli. S. Ron:l\'enlurae,
Q"aracchi 1924-1948.
ANONVMUS
(Assisi, Biblioteca Comunale, Codex 186). Ed. D. Halconr. FraflziJlumiJw Sludien 41 (1959): 41-106. Trattatus
de
tra1IJUndenlolibus
en/is
coliditioflibuJ
ANSELM OF CANTERBURY D, vtrifJ;llt.
ARISTOTU
Opera Omnia I. Ed. F.S. Schmitt, Edinburgh 1946.
AfI<J"tica Posterioro. Ed. W.D. �, Oxford 1964. Caltgorioe. Ed. L. Minio-Paluello, Oxford 1949. Ethita Nicomachea. Ed. J. Burnet, Oxford 1900.
Ed. W. Jaeger. Oxford 1957. PhyJica. E.d. w.o. ROM, Oxford 1936. Topial. Ed. w.n. RoM. Oxford 1958. AUGUSTINI: De divt1'sis quaeJlionibus. Ed. A. Muuenbecher, Corpus ChristianorunI Series latina (CC SL) 44A, TumhouL 1975. De doctrina chriJtiana. Ed. W.M. Green, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclasticorum latinorum (CSEL) 80, Vienna 1963. Dt li�o arbimo. Ed. W.M. Green. CC SL 29,Turohout 1970. lk MIUra ooni.. Trans. A.A. Moon. Washington, D.C. 1955. lk tri"illlte.. Ed. W.J. Mountain, C<": SL 50, Tumhout 1968. De Vt1'O rdigioru. Ed. W.M. Grt:en. CSEL 77. Vienna 1961. Sofi/cquio. Ed. W. Hormann. CSEL 89, Vienna 1986. AVEKKOU Aristotelb Opera cum Averrois commentariis, Venedig 1562. (Repr. Frankfurt 1962) AVI(::l:I'INA Libr:r dt phifcsuphio prilfU1 Jiw stimlill dillinll. I: Books I·IV. Ed. S. Van Riet, Louvain/Leiden J977: II: Book, V·X. Ed. S. Van Riel, Louvain/Leiden 1980. MtlaphYlica.
1 . "
440
BERTHOLD OF MOOSBURQ Exposuio SUptr EleoMnfall!m""
rhft)logicam ?rocl;: I"rolDguJ. PropoJiti,mtJ 1·13. Ed. M.R. P�gnoni.sturlese/L. Slurlc:SC, Corpus Philosophornm Teuloni corum Medii Aevt VI,!, Hamburg 1984.
BoETHIUS
C..ontra Eutjchen. The Theological Tractal.eS. Ed. E.K. Rand/H.F. Slewa.rd, Cambridge, Mass.. 1918. (Rcpr. 1962) lk wnsolationt pltilowpAi/U. Ed. S. Tesler, London 1973. Ik /vbd01llodibw. The TheologiUiI Trnctates, Cambridge. Mas..!.. 191ft Dt trinitalt. The Theological Tractates, Cambridge, Ma!lS. 1918. .. Mignt: PL 64. In Tqpiro r u : lfI
BOETHIUS or DACIA OpuJ(iu.la. Opera m,2.
Ed. N.G. Green-rederun, Corpu� Philorophorum Danicorum MediI Aevi V1,2. Copenhagen 1976.
8<)NAVt.NTURE
BrfIViioqui",", Opera Omnia V. Ed. Coli. S. BonaventuIOu:, Quara.cchi 1891. Coliat1ontJ in Ht1'at"Ie'Trm. Opera Omnia V, Quaracchi 189l. 17, qualum' libros Stntrntiarum. Opera Omnia I-N, Quaracchi 1882-1889. Ilintl'a""m mtrIliJ ad D�m. Opera Omnia V, Quaracchi 1891. Quaestwn&) diJpulatat dt samtia Christi. Ed. and trans. A. Speer, Hamburg
1992. CAJ£TAN. TUOMAS
01:
t Summam Ihtologiae JU_IjU . Thomas Aquinas. Opera Omnia VJl (ed. Leon.), Rome 1891.
TilE AREOPACITJO:
De t:tJt{�ti hierorchia. Migne PL 3. D" diviniJ nomim/1u.s. Migne PL 3. De ditJiniJ nomi'lima (Latin tc:xt by Johannes S;uo,u;eIlUS). Thomas Aquinas.. In /ibrulll &Oli DiIm,YJii De divinis nominibus tXjlOsjtio. Ed. C. Pera. Turin
1950.
m Aristou/is. Opera Omnia i mbtifmi"'ot $UfJn' libros MdaphJ!iwnt 7. F..d. L Vives, Paris 1893. ucfura In libnlm N SmtniIUJm",- Opera Omnia 16. Ed. L. Vh-c.s, Paris 1894. Q,-du.ntio I, dis•. J. Opera Omnia (ed. Valicana) 3. Ed. A . Sepin�ki/C. Balk, Rome 1954.
ECKHART, M�ISTEII. Expruito i tibri lohtHlnis. Die lateiniM'_hen Werkc (LW) 3. td. K. Chrisl/]. Koch, Stuttgart 1936. Pr()tops l'"I!f'(J(iJ in Opw Inpartitum. LW l . Ed. K.. Weiss, Stuttgart 1%4. QuOtsli()ntJ Parisimus. LW 5. Ed. K Weiss, Stuttgart 1964. SU/JtT &�luio�lia. LW 2. Ed. A. Zimmermann/L Sturle$(:, Stuttgart 1992.
EUSTRATIUS
In Pnmum Aristotelis Mwolill.m ad Nicomachum. Corpu� Latinum Com mentariOfum in Aristotelem Graecorum VI.1. Ed. P. Mercken, Leiden
1973.
G.W.F. Vcwusungtn
ii1m' die Philosophie br Religi()n I. S:imtliche Werke 15, Stuugart
1928.
H�NIlY OF GUENT Quodli/xla, Paris 1518. (Repr. Louvain 1961) Summa quolJlilmum cwdinanum XXXI-XXXIV.
(I.OGICA MODEIlNOIlUM) Logir.a rnodtrnorum. A amtribution
Ed. L.M. de Rijk, AMen 1962·67,
or POITIEJtS
I() lJu HisWry ojEarl] Tmnini.Jt Logic_ 3 \'15.
NICHOlAS or CUSA
De datto igncwanlia. Ed. P. Wilpert. Die IJelehrte Unwinenheit I, Hamburg 1970. Pt.--rUt jOHN OLIVI Quatstillnts in S,cundum Lihrum Smttntiarum. Ed. B.Jansen. Quaracchi 1922". PETER LOMBARD Sentenlia,. Ed. I. Brady, Grott.aferrata 1972.
PETER 01' SPAIN
Tmctatu.s (Summuu /t;gicaks) . Ed. L.M. de RijJr., Assen 1972.
Summa de /)ono. Ed. N. Wicki, Corp us philosophorum medii aevi II, Bern
1985.
PLOTlN
Enneadts. Ed. P. Henry/H.-R. Sc.hwyzer, Oxford 1964-82.
P ROCLtrS Tht ElemmhofT�. Ed. E.R. Dodds, Oxford 196�.
PSEUDO-THOMAS AQUINA,�
lk na/um �nU. Ed. R.M. Spiaui. 0f'uJcula
Opera Omnia 27. Ed. R.
&. Inni/al,.. Ed. p, Smulders. CC SL 6�, Turnhout 19'79.
phi/mopltica, Turin L954.
ov BRABANT
QJlamiantJ in Metaphysical1$. Ed. W. Dunphy, Louvain-Ia-Neuvc 1981.
TIIO).l"5 AQ:UlNAS
..td V .... ". ; IWptn&$io od mop/nil" JoIItlnnnn d� Vmz/liJ d� J08 al1icuJlS. Opera Omnia XUI (ed. leon.), Rome 1979. W"Ip. TheoI.: (;Qmpntdium IhwlogttU. Opera Omnia XLI] (ed. Leon.), Rome
1979.
1h all.: QuatltionlS diJ�lalat dt anunIJ. Ed. M. Calcaterra/T. Centi. Qutusli""� disputcrlaf II. Turin 1965. Dt mk D, nit, n tsWltil1. Opera Omnia XUH (ed. Leon.),Rome 1976. Dt malo: Quaeslionts diJptt./olat dt malo. Opera Omnia XXIII (ed. Leon.). Rome 1982. Dr p()I.: D� potenluJ. Ed. P.M. l'ession. Quamiollts dupulalar II, Turin 1965. De ptitlC. nat. : De principii" na/l(rat. Opera Omnia XLIII (ed. Leon.), Rome
1976. crtaluris. Ed. M. Calcaterra/To GenIi. Quarstilmts disp1Jla/{u n, Turin 1965. De subst. �tPat.: De JubJtantiis uparalis. Opera Omnia XL (ed. Leon.),
De spirit. crlat.: De spinluatifllu
Rome 1967-1968. QlJa�tio disputata d, ulljont verbi incarnati. Ed. M. Calcaterra/T. GenIi. QuaMtilmts disputalat ll, Turin 1965. De vmt.: Quonli()nts diJputarat d, 1lmtalt. Opera Omnia XXII. I·! (ed. Leon.), Rome 197().1976. f), "irt. (/)mm.: p, I,irtuliks in m.,lIluni. t:d. P.A. Od('uo. QI.CGUI...." di.Jputatar II. TLlri n 196.�.
De uniont;
Macken. Louvain 1991.
HILl.RV
Opera Omnia 1 . uiden 15M.
Dialtdica. VersiQn of Raben Croueteste. Ed. O. A. Colligan, Louvain/Paderborn 19:5�. KANT, IMMANUEL Krilik _tin moun Vnnunft. Ed. Raymund Schmidt. Hamburg 1926. i Akademie-AusgalJe 18, Berlin 1928. lmrn LU,. Mtltlphysk. IU fl t10
SmEll
DUNS ScOTUS Qu&stitmtS
HEGEL,
JAVELL!. CHRYSOSTOMUS T,.adalus tk If'lJrlJamdenlihus. JOHN DAMA5Ct;Nt;
PHILIP THE CHANCELLOR
VIO
Cemmentaria in
DlONV�IUS
441
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BIBLIOGRAPHY In B�th. Dr tri.n.: Supn- Borllum Dr mnitatf.
Rome 1992.
In Dt an.: Snltenaa Libri De anima.
Opera Omnia L (ed. Leon.),
Opera Omnia XLV, 1 (ed. Leon.).
Rome 1984. In Dt caew: In lihTos AristoftiiI Dt catlo tt mundo.
2. Literature ACKRILL,
Ed. H.D. Saffrey, Fribourg/
Louvain 1954. In De div. nom. : In librnm Beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus expositio.
Ed. C.
Pera, Turin 1950. In De Mbdom.: ExpoJitio liUri B�tii Dt tbdomadibus.
Opera Omnia L (ed.
Leon.), Rome 1992.
In Dt JnlI.: Sen/enaa libri Dt IfflJU et sensato.
Opera Omnia XLV,2 (ed.
Leon.), Rome 1985.
In Ethic. : Sententia libri Ethicurum.
Opera Omnia XLVII (ed. Leon.), Rome
1969. In loan.: Lecturn super loannem. Ed. R Cai, Turin 1952. In lob: Expositio SUp" lob ad litteram. Opera Omnia
XXVI (ed. Leon.),
Rome 1965. In Mttaph. : In XII libros Mttaphysicornm Arislottlis txpositio.
Cathala/R.M. Spiani, Turin 1971. In pmh.: Expruitio lifni Ptry/7TTltnias.
Ed. M.R
Opera Omnia 1*, I (ed. Leon.), Rome
1989. In Phys.: In Aristottlis libms Physieurum,
Opera Omnia II (ed. Leon.), Rome
1884. In Post. Anal.: Expositio libri Postniurum.
Opera Omnia 1*, 2 (ed. Leon.).
Rome 1989. In Stnt.: Scriptum super libros Smtentiarnm
I-IV. Ed. P. Mandonnet/M.F.
Moos. Pari� 1929-47.
S.th.: Summa tlifowgiat.
1956. (ed. Leon. ) , Rome
Opera Omnia IV-XII (ed. Leon.), Rome 1888·1906.
VICO, GIAMSATTISTA Libtr mttaphysicuI (Df antiquiSJima Italorum sapientia lil>er primus).
Ed. and
tr.ms. S. Otto/H, Viechtbauer, Munich 1979. Stluttd WritingI. Ed. and trans. L. Pompa, Cambridge 1982. WILLIAM OF AUXERRE Summa auua. Ed. J. Ribailler. Vol. I, Rome 198(}"7, WILLIAM OF OCKHAM Scriptum in I Stnlentiarnm.
New York 1979,
ADAMCZYK, S. Dt obitc/o formali inttlkcl1u nostri ucundum doctrinam S. Tlwmat Aquinatis,
Rome 1933 (Analeeta Gregoriana 2).
AERTSEN,j. A.
Mtditval Reflution� on
Truth; Adatqualio rei el inttll�ctln
Inaugural address Free University, Amsr.erdam 1984. -- "The Convertibility of Being and Good in St. Thoma� Aquinas�. TM Ntw Scholrulicism59 (1985): 449·70. -- 7he Circulation-Motive and Man in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas", , m: L homme tt son unlvers au Mr.ryen Agt (Ans of the 7th International Congress of Medieval Philosophy) , vol. I, Louvain·la·N,,"ve 1986: 432·39. -- "Transzendental versus kategorial: Die Zwiespiiltigkeit von Thomas' Philosophie? Eine kritische Studie�. Vivarium 24 (1986): 143-58. -- �Wendingen in Waarheid: Anselmus van Camerbury, Thomas van Aquino en Vico". Tijdschrift VOOT Filosofit 49 (1987): 187·229, --�Natural Law in the Light of the Doctrine of the Transcendentals". L. j. Elders/K. Hedwig (eds.), ux tJ Li!Jertas. Frudom and Law Acwrding to 51. Thomas Aquinas, Vatican City 1987: 99·112. -- "Die Lehre der Transzendentalien und die Metaphysik. Der Kom mentar von Thomas von Aquin zum IV, Buch der Melaphysica". Freilm.rger 'Uitschrift for PhilOSOPh;'; und ThroWgie 35 (1988): 293-316. --NaluTt and CuatuTt. Thoma5 Aquinas's Way of Thought, Leiden/New York 1988. "Method and Metaphysics. The 'via resolution is' in Thomas Aquinas". Tht Nr:w Scholasticism 63 (1989): 405·418. "Denken van Eenheid". Tijdschrift V(}(ff Filruojie 52 (1990): 399-420. --�he Medieval Doctrine of the Transcendentals: The Current State of Research ", Bulletin dt philruophie mtdiivalt 33 (1991): 130-147. -- �Natllr, Mensch und der Kreislauf der Dinge bei Thomas von Aquin�. . Ill : fl!msch 1md Nalur 1m Milldalt" (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 2 1 / 1 ) , Berhn/New York 1991: 143·60. "Die Frage nach der Transzendentalitat der Schonheit im Mittelalter". B. Mojsisch/O. Pluta (eds,), Hiltoria Philosophiat Mtdii Arol. Studim zur Gtschichtr d" Philo,Iinw. Tht Concept of the Good in Mttaphysir.f and Phi/u'OPhical Theology, Ithaca/London 1991: 56-73, -- �nHh as Transcendental in Thollla� Aquinas". Topoi 1 1 (1992): 159.71 . -- ''The Platonic Tendency of Thomism and the Foundations of Aquinas's Philosophy". Mtdioevo 18 (1992): 53-70. -- "Ontology and Henology in Medieval Philosophy (Thomas Aquinas. Master Eckhart and Berthold of Moosburg)�. E.P. Bos/P.A. Meyer (cds.). On Proclus and his Injluenu in Mtdiroal Philosophy, Leiden 1992: 12{)'140. --"Der Satz vom Widerspruch in der mittelalterlichen Philosophie: Baron von Mflllchhausen, Thomas von Aquin und Nikolaus von Kues". K jacobi (ed.), Argumrntalionstlieone. Scholastisclie FMlchungm zu dm logi5ehtn lmd Iemanli.!chm Regtln korrek/en Folgerm, Leiden 1993: 707·727, -- "Was h ei Bt Metaphy!ik bel Thoma. von Aquln?", I, Craemer. Ruegenberg/A. Speer (ed•. ) , Stimlio und A.rJ itrJ Hoc". unit Spi'",i" 1l411,,.. �
Quodl. : Qua'5lionts quodlib�talts, Ed, RM, Spiazzi, Turin SeG. : Summa contra Gmtilts. Opera Omnia XIII-XV
1918-1930,
J. L. "Aristotle on 'Good' and the Categories�. S. M. Stern er. al.
(ed.), blamic Philwophy and Ihe Classical Tradition. EJ.\ays Pusenttd 10 Richard Walur, Oxford 1972. Reprinted in: J. Barnes/M. Schofield/R Sorabji (cds,), Anickl em Aristotlt II, London 1977: 17-24.
Opera Omnia III (ed.
Leon.), Rome 1886.
In Dt caus.: Supn- librnm Dt causis �xpositio.
443
Opera Theologica IV. Ed. I. Etzkorn/E. Kelly,
--
--
,,
444
-
(MiKcllanc:a Mc:diaevalia 22), Berlin/Nc:w York 1994: 217-239. "Trans<:endt:ntal Though t in Henry of Ghent". Hfflry 0/ Ghmt.
StIlJi(.J in
G:lmmemoratk,,1. 0( 1M 700111 Anni""",,,,] <1 Hi.s D,-ath (12.9) , Louvain 1995 (to
appear).
ALBERT, H. ALLr.ltS, R.
1965.
Tnatist on CritiGll( Rm.wn. Princeton 1985. (trans.) TlwlNLJ von: Aquin. Ubn- das Min und das Wt'$t'n, Darmstadt
/\NeON" CoSTA, CUlt. D' "Saini Thomas lecltur du 'Libt::r de: Gauss', Billm des
recherches conu:mporainc:s concr:rnant Ie: 'De causis' c:t analyse: de I'illlc:rpret�uion thomistc", Revue tlwmi5k 92 (1992): 785-817. AUftl:NQUE, P. u problimt de l'i l rt elln Andote. Enol lVT La prob/;ma/upu i
ari$loI.iiicinllu, Paris 1962.
- -Etienne:
Gilson <:1 la I'jllestion de: I'elre. M. Couraller (ed.), Etitnnt Gihon La philowphit It son huloiTt. CAdl(>tjlU $14" l'aduatili dt La p�nsit
et nous: d'Eiiennl Gil.son, Paris 1980: 79-92. BAR.THLtIN. K. Di, Trallutndmtalitnlthrl d" alttll Onto/ogit I: mt TrclIZszt>l dtnlaiitnl,hrt im CarpUJ AriJtott/icum, Berlin/New York 1972. BALTHAMR., H.-U. VON. Htrr/ichJui/. Eint IhtoWgischt At.lt/utill III/I, E imiedeln 196.'5.
BEIERWALTP:5, W. �Der Kommentar zum 'Liber de callsis' als neuplat(lni�ches Elemenl in der Philosophi e des Thomas von Aqllill �. PhilosophiJtht RU1IIUau.JU 1 1 (196!1): \92-215.
_ Review
of K. Kremer, D ie neuplatonische Seinsphilosophie und ihrc Wirkung auf Thomas von Aquin. Leiden 1966. Philosophudu Runduha" 16
(1969): 141-152.
- Dmh" d,,,, t·intn.
Sh�dim �ur nruplatonucMn Philruophit uTid ihT" WiTkuncsge Ithichlt, Frankfurt a. M. 1985. BEJAS. A. Vom Snmdtn uiJ Jokhffl �um Sinn des Seins. Die Tmmundmtalienlrhrt Dei Edith Sum und Thomas von Aquin, Frankfurt a. M. 1994.. BERTI, E. ¥Lc probleme dl: la 5ubnanlialite de I'ene el de I'un dans la Mitaph,Jill'U-, 1'. Aubenque (ed.), Elubs sur fa MttaphJliqUt d 'Aristolt
(Actc, du V1' Symposium Ari�olelicum), Paris 1979: 89-129. BOI!R, T. DE. Tuutn jiJM9jit tn pro/die.. De wijsMgtn'lt oon Em...an",1 Levinas. 83arn 1976.
BOnNER, Ph. ,he SYStcm of Mel
·
�
BRUNN, E. ZUM. �La 'philosophic [hrftienne' el I'exegese d'Exode 3:14 Sf'lon M. Elienne Gilson". &vue dt Ihiologi' tI dl philosophi, 3. �i;ric 1 9 (1969): 94-105.
BUBNEk, R. "Kalokagaf.hia". HidorischeJ WOrl"btuh d" Philosophit IV. Darm �tadt 1976: 6BI.6B4.
CHATlLLON, j. "Uniuu, Ae qualitas, Concordia vd Conncxio, Recherchcs sur 10:5 origines de la thi;orie thomist..: des appropriations (Sum. thenl. I, q. 39, art. 7-8)�. St. Thomf],S AquinaJ, 1274-1974: Commemorative Studies vol. I. Toronto 1974: !l37-379.
CHENU, M .-D. "Les 'philosophes' dans la philo50phie chretienne medievale". Revue deJ scinlm philosophiquts tI thiologiquts 26 (1937): 27-40. - La thiologie all dOIl�/me silm, Paris 1957. COUESNOGLE, V. DE. "La [:lUsalite du maximum". RellUI drs JeT/nelS "hilwo phll[lUJ rl l� 38 (1954): 4.34-44.4.; 658-680. CoVLQVBARITSIS. L "L'hre I:t I'un chez Arinote�. Rtwt de philosOPhu ancimnt 1 (l98�): 49-98; 14�195.
445
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
CoURTEs, P.C. "L'un �Ion Jainl Thomas-. Rtwe thomistt 68 (1969): 198-240. COUIUTIER. M. (ed.) Etim.!t (;tOOn tI .tou.s; /.a phWsophit II son histoi". Collnq'IU �ur l'actullliU dt Ia pensk d'Etimnt Cilson, Paris 1980. COURTlNE,j.F. Swim a l$ S]ue� dl fa miklph�, Paris 1990. CRAEMER-RuECENBERG, I. " Ens en fJuod primum cadi! in intellecuz' - Avi
Thomas von Aqllin". U. Tworuschka (ed), C.otw ul d" Ori�I, Goiles ist Ihr Ohid�t (Festsch r. A. Fala(uri), Cologne/Vienna 1991 : 133-
ttnna und
142. CR.OSI\y. J. F. •he Idea of Value and Lhe Rdornl of the Traditio nal Mctaphysics of B()fIum�. Akthna, Art InleOlalwrwl Journal oj PhilOJOPh., I (1977): 231-336.
-- -Are Bt:ing and Good Really Convertible? A Phe"lHncnological Inquiry". TIlt Nnu &Iwlrutirunt 57 (1983): 465-500. CZAPlEWSKI, W. DiU Schonf bti TJwmas vern Aquin, htiburg 1964. DASSELEEIl, P. "L'ilre el la beautc telon Saint Thoma.� J'Aquin". J. Fol lon/J. McEvoy (eds. ) , AQualil; d, fa pensif midj;'",lt, Louvain-Ia-Nellve 1994: 268-
286.
DEWAN, L. "Sc Thomas and the Causality of God's Goo
1953.
D R E 'i E R, M: Nikow.us von Am!ens; ArJ [raej cathoiiwt _ Ein IkiJpitlwtrit . aXlomaflJlh,r Methodt, Munner 1993 (Beitriige zur Geschichte der
--
rhilosophie lind Theologic des Mittc:laht:n., Neue Fol� 37). �Rcgl)larmelhoJe und Ax io matik. Wissenschaflliche Methodik im Horizont dcr aries-Tradition des 12. Jahrhunderu". I. Cracmcr. Rucgenberg/A. Speer (cds.), Sci...ntia und a,s Tm Hod!- 14M SplitmiU,lalt" (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 22/1), Berlin/New York 1994: 145-157.
DUCIiARMt:, S. "Note Slir Ie Iransceodt:ntal 'rel' scion Saint Thomas". Remit th l'Unillf'rJi ti d'OttaU'o. 10 (1940), �Clion special..:: 85.-99•. DU1NTJEII!, 0.0. 1ft ""'l'.Iag Mar Ad Iro.YU"ndmfDlt, vooral In wr-oond ...,1 HtUltl!K" tTl
Kant. Lriden 1966. EBflESEN. S. "Doing Phi loKlphy (eds.), Gli Studl di Fi/()Jofia
359. Eeo, U. Art and
Ihe Sophi�ll\atic Way". R. Imbach/A. Mairril Mtdlttlall jra Duo- � Nuvr.amlo. Rome 1991: 331-
Btaury in Iii, Middlt AgtJ, New Haven/London 1986 (English trans. of ·Sviluppo dell'estetica medievale". MQ1!Irnti t probleml di slona dtll 'tfltuca /; Dall 'antichild cla.ssica 1'.11 baro(co. Milan 1959: 115-230). -- Th� Aesthetics 0/ Thrrm.as Aqll;naS. Cambridge . Mass. 1988 (English trans. or Il problmw �strti co in San Tllmma.so. 2nd augment�d cd. Milan 1970). ELDERS, L. "Le prem ier principe de b vie intdl..:ctive". RtllUe tlwmistt 62 (1962): 571-586.
--Faith and SClenrt; An InlrvductiJm to Rome 1974.
Sf. Thtimas' t.xpositio in Botthii De innitate,
E N G E L H A RDT. P. "Intentio". HiHuriJehf'$ W"rttr6uch dey Philo!IOPhit IV.
Darmstadt 1976: 466-474. FA8RO, C. l.tl ""zion, di 'lMlajiJica di partf'ripa;iont secondo $. Tommafo d'AquillO, Milan 1939. (2nd ":11. Turin 1 950)
BI8L10CRAPHY
818L10GRAPHY
--Pmticipatum. tI (4usaWe 5don S. Thomas d'Aquin. Louvaln 1961.
-- �he Transcendentality of Ens·Eut and the Ground of Metaphysics". int""latKnial Philowphiml Quarter!) 6 ( 1966): 389-427. "Platonism, Neo-Platonism and Thomism: Convergencies and Diver· gences". Th, Ntw Smu15ticum 44 (1970): 69-100. FI:LLt:RMEIUI., J. ·Wahrhdt \!nd ["inenz bei Hc:idegger und Thomas \'on Aquin". &J/UHlrgrrJahrlN.di for PhiloSllpht i 15/6 (1971/2): 39-70, FISCHI:R, N. "TranS1endieren uml Tranuendem_ in AuguSlins Confessiones·. L.. Honndelder/W. SchuBler (eds.), Tmruundnu. lu rineon Gnnrdworl df'r klas.lls,hm MtlapJI'Jlik, Paderborn 1992: 1 15-1:56. F L A S C H , K. "Kennt die mittelalterlichc Philosophle die konstitulive Funktion dcs mcnschHchen Denke:n$? Eine Untersuc!mng zu Dietrich von l<'reiberg". Kantstudirn 63 (1972): 182-206. _
--Dit MetaPhyJik dts Einm Mi Nil!olau$ von KulJ. Probl8mgts�hichtlicht Sttlllmg und ",slrmllliJ�h� &deutung, uiden 1973. --"Meisler Eckhart nnd die 'Deutsche Myslik'. Zur Krilik eines historio graphischen Schemas�. O. Plllia (ed.), Di� P,"ltlJop,"� ron 14. und /j, Jahrllundm. In memoriam KanJloJnlJ Midiau/ri (1879·1947). Amsterdam 1'.)88: 439-463. FLASHAR, H. "The Critique of Plato's Theory of Ideas in Ari51otle's Ethic5�. J. Barnes/M. Schofield/R. Sorabji (eds.). ArticltJ ,m ArisloU, II. London 1977: 1-16. f'U(;IIS, j. Oil f't'opridii.tm dts &iru bft Altxandtr mm Halls, Mimster 1930. GADAMI:R, U. Co. 1Ji� Idtt du Gulm �wis(.hm Pla/o una AriJlQltltJ, Heidelberg 1 97& GAI.LACHI:R, D.
M. -Aquinas on Goodness and Moral GoodnellS-.
D. M. Galla
gher (cd.), ThfJInfU AquinaJ alld llis /.,(gary. Washington, D.C. 1994: 37-60. GEIGER, LB. La parriripation dam w l,hiim'1,hv dr S. TlwmaJ d'Aquin, Pari� 1942. 2nd. ed. 1953. ---Abstraction et �eparation d'apres S. Thomas (In Dc Trinitalc q. 5, a. 3)". Revue dtJ Jett'W!$ phiwsophlqu� �t Ihiolo!;ltp�tJ 31 (1947): 3-40. GILSON, E. "Avkenna et Ie point de depart de Duns Scot". Archivts d'fIiSWITt Doctrinalt tI Lir/iraiTt du M�tn Agr 2 l1927): 89-149. La nOlion de philosophic: chretienne-. Bulldin dt 16 &;,rieti fmnraut dt philruophic. 31 (1931): 37-35, -- L'itrr ,I /'eJJtIfCt. Paris 1948. --JtaU Dum &til. Inlmduc/.ion a lI.s pruitioru Iondamenla�s, Paris 1952. --Bring and Some PhilosopMrs. Toronto 1952 (2nd cd.). -- Introduction a til phi[oJ'1,hit c;hrilirntl', Paris 1960. -Eltmenu oj Christian Philosoph'}. New York 1960. -- £I phif{)J(Jpht tI la IhW/ogll, Pari� 1960. EngI. trans.: Tht Philolophn and Tluolog]. New York 1962. -- TIu ph.w>ophy vj .()[. Bon"wnl1m. Tran$. by F. J. Sheed, New York 1965. -I.e Tfwnris'lllt. Introduaion a la phif/)jop"j� dt Saini Thmlll" d 'Aquon, Paris 19for.i. --"Avice:nnc en O!:cident au Moyen Age-. Archivts d 'HiJu,ire Docttinalt tt utte-rai.,., du Mf7jrn Agt H (1969): 89-\21. -- L'tspril dt fa philoJophir mediillafe, Paris 1969. Eng!. trans.: Tht Spirit oj Mediatva/ PhiloJoph'}, New York 1940. (Repr. Notre Damc 1991) -- ComtanttJ philosophiqUlS d, I'ilrt, Pari, 1983. Cl.OY, K. "Aristotel�' Theorie aes [inen auf aer Basis de' Buches I der Meta physik-. Einhril an GnHldfr� dn PhiluM>jlhit. Darmstadt 198.!>: 73-101 . GOICHON, A.M. uriqu� de 1" /t.Jnpe phllosophiqut d'lbn Sma (Avicrnn�). Pari�
-- "
19:58.
GRAt:tA, J.J.E. "l'he Transcendentals in the Middle Age5: An Introdur.lion". Topol I I (IW2): 1 1 :5-120.
447
GRl:CORY, T. Symposium "La conception de la philosophic: au Moyen Age" at the: Fifl.h International Coogress of the -Societe Internationale pour l'Etude de la Philosophie Medievalc" (Madrid 1972). Aelas del V CongnJo Int"",adQ"oJl de Fil050fin Mtoii.roal, Madrid 1979: 49-57. GRI5t:Z, C. "The First Principles of Practical Realon", A. Kenny (ed.), AquinllJ. A Coiltdion fJj Critic41 Ways, London 1970: S4Q..a2. HALCOUR. D. Dit Ltllu vmn So:Mnm im Ro.hf1ltn der Tran.sunde7flaliml,hn dtr MdaphJsik dtT JriJhen FranuJkan"'Jd!uk von Paris, (unpublished diu.) Freiburg 1957. HALPI:R. E. -Aristotle on the Convertibility of One and Being". The N,," ScholaJllrum 59 (1985): 21�227. HAMESU, J. ··Res· chc:z les allteun philosophiqlle des 12<: et 13e si�de$ ou Ie passage de la neutralitc a la spedficitc". &s. fl!O CoUOifUio fnternationau d�1 l-essiro Intelltc/.ualt Europec., Rome 1982: 91-104. HANKEY. W. -Aquinas' First Principle: Being or Unity?". DirnlJJiuJ 4 ( 1980) : 1��172.
Ht:IDI:GGER, M. Being and Ti,,;t (Irans. by J. Macquarrie/E. Robinson), New
York/Evanston 196%. -- -Was is! Metaphysil;Y. M. Hcirlegger, W'gmar.4:tn, Frankfurt a. M. 1007: 1-19. -- 'Vom Weu:n der Wahrhc:il�, M. Heidegger, W'Rnlar.li:tfl, Frankfurt. a. M . 1967: 73-97. HI:SSI:N. J. �'Omne ens est bonum'. Kritlsdle Unlersu(hung eines alten Axioms". ATCAiv for PhilflJO/Jhit S (1958): 317-29. HINSRE, N. -Vers(hiedenhc:il und Eillheit der Irannendentalen rhiloso· phien-. Archi" for &grijJJgesrJmhtt 14 ( 1 970): 4 1 -AA.. HI5SI:TTE, R. EnqU;I� sur lu 219 artid'-J romiamneJ !i PariJ ft 7 mars 1277, Louvain/Paris 1977. H 6 D L , L. "Neue Nachrichten iiber die Pariser Verurtcilungf:n der thoma5i�hen Formlehre". SdiOI(JJI;1! 39 ( l 964): 178·196. I10ENI:S, M. Ens It Bonum Gm"munlur: Eiru Deutung dtJ J(JI/;/.aJliJcMn Axioms twIll'
M5undtrn &ri.icl!sichtigung drr MtlaPhyJik und dtr Ethik dtl hi. Thomas VOl'! Aquin, Bamberg 196fl. HONNEt'CLI)[R, L.. Em if/quantum tnl. lhT Btgriff dt.1 ��etldm au Joldlm au Gtgmstllnd drr Mt14Physilt nllch dI!f' LLhrt dr5 jollanna DullS Smtu�, Mill'lSler
1979 (2d ed. 1989). ---Die Rczeptlon des Kotischen Df:nlens im 20. J:lhrhunden". ThtolQgiuht Rtalrn�jklopiidi' IX, S.V. -DlIn� Scotus/ScOtiamll5 n", Berlin/Nc:w York 1982: 232·240. -- -Der ZWf:ile Anfang der Metaphpik. VOrau55elzungen, Ansatze und Folgcn du Wi�dcrbegr"ndllng d�r Metaphysik im 1 3 . / 1 4 , Jahrhundcrt". J. p, Bc:ckm�nn e.a. (cds.), PhiJlJsfJphit im Militia/tn.
EnhmrJcbmgJiitlitfl 14M Paradigrnn>, Halnburg 1987: 165-186. -- Stlff/lio trolUu.uieru. /)it i_ak Bwimmung der S�ndheil !md Rtalilal ill drr Mrn.plt')sik d,.s Mitlel6ltrn und der NtUuit (Duns &ottu - Suata -Wolff - Kanr
Hamburg 1990. --�Met.aphy�ik una Transzendcnz. Uberlegungen ZII Johannes Duns Scotus im Blick auf Thomas von Aquin tlnd An�cirn von Canterbury". L. Honnefcider/W. Schiilllcr (eds.), Tran5Undtllt. Zu tin.", GnmdWQt1 dfIY klaniJcilt'1l MttoJphpik. Paderbom 1992: 137-161. ---Tr:;uuzendc:nlaliloll und Moralit�lI. Zum rniuelaltcrlirhen Unprung zweier zenlralc:r Topoi der Ileuzeitlichen Philosophic". Thtoltlgucht (bwr1oudJrijt 172 (1992): 178-195. HousuI, R.E. "Transcendental t,lnily in Petrm de Trabibus-. FrancUr.an SWdits 39 (1979) : 49-104. - Pntct),
•
448
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Thomru AquiJ1a$ on Transttndtnlal Unity: ScJwlaJlj, and Amta/dian Prfdtu$ srm. Phi l. Di$5, Ulli�ersilY of Toronto 1980. IMUCH, R. "La philQMIphie midiivalc". A. Robinel (ed.), DQcfrine.J a Ccma/Jfs 1937./987. Rlirosptdild � fnrupntiw: Cinqutmtt tlrnI de pJIilo.wpllie tit l(lng'lu jmru:(Ji u. Paris 1988: 109-125. K.. ·'Oul' lind 'schlecht'. nit Aflal� ihn:r En lgegcllsctwl\g bei JACOIlI. Aristotelcs, bei einigen Aristoldcs-Kommc:ntatoren und bei Thomas _
von Aquin", A, Zimlllcrmann (ed.), gachichle vnd illr,,, York 1982: 2S-52,
Studim
1ur
ffliltewlterfichm Caste$
Qutlhn. (Miscdlam:a Mediaevalia IS). Berlin/New
JOLIvET, J. "logiquc cathare: la sdiiSion de I univend . t:. P. B05 (cd.), '
·
Medieval Slmanfir.s and Melaph,JiCJ (Slwdia dedicaud to L M. de Rill), Nijmegen 1985: 14S.160, J O "R O A N , M,D. "The Grammar of 'Esse': Re-reading Thomas on the Tmnscendelltal$". Tht Thomist 44 (1980): 1-26. -"The N::lmes of Got! and the Being of Names�. AJ. Fn:ddow (ed.). The En�tt1lt:l lind NlIl1l�t oj God. Notre Dame 1983: 161-190 Ordlffing Wisdom. Th, Hieraych, of Philosophical DiscoUYJel in AquinaJ, Notre __
Dame 1986. ''The Evidence of the Transc�nrlental� and [he Place of Beauty in Thoma� Aquina.�" bl/ematicmal Philosophical Quan«l, 29 (1989): 393-407. Th� Alltgtd Ari3tott/ialllsm oj Thom(15 Aquit!as, Toronto 1992 (The Etienne Gilson Series I S ) , KELUJI., A. &in ooer Enslro�� DM Ausltgung d,s Stins bri Thomas oon Aguin in der htutigtm Seho/ruille. Munkh 1968. KENNY, A. Aquif1as, New York 1980. - �l)'ttif, OKford 1985. KUNcr.il, I. Das Prinup d" Individuation ki Thomru von Aqum, Milnstcrschwar zach 1964. KLUXEN, W. PhilorophiHh, t't/ilil bei Thomas OOf1 Aquin, Maim 1964. (2nd ed.
_
,
_
Hamburg
_
IY80),
�Melaphysik und praklisehe Vernllft. Ubey ihre ZlIordmmg bei Thomas von Aquin". L Oeiog-H:mhofT (ed.) Thoma.J uon Aquin 1274/1974. Munich _
.
1974; 73-96.
449
KilI.M[,Il, K. Die ntuplc.tonisch, SftnJphilOJojJhM UTld ihre WiTl!ung aUf Thomas von Aquin, Leiden 1966. KltETZMANN. N. 1'rinity and Transcendentals". R. Feenstra/C. Plantingiu anJ Philowphical T�. hhaca/London 1991: 208-228. KRI:TZMANN, N./KENN ... . A./PtNBORG,J. (cds.) TM Cambridge HiJlory of LAter Medinl(ll Philosophy. From Ihe &diuolJery oj Arulolu, fO IIu Disintwation of Sdwla.iticis1fl 11{J().1600. Cambridge 1982. KRETZMANN, N,/STUMr. E, (cds,) Tht Cafllbridgt UJmpanion 10 Aquina.!,
__
Cambridge 1993. KRISTELl.ER, P.O. "The Modern System of the Arts�. JUnaiJ.fonu TOOught ond Th� Arts, PrincNcn 1980, KUHLE, H. �Die !.ehrc AJbcru des Grolkn von den Tranuendentalien�. F. J. von Rimdcn (cd.) , Philosophia Ptrefmis. I\bhand/ungffl tU ihyer Vtrg!lng�nhnt und Gegrnwart (FeJfgabtjoJrj GtrySl:r) 1, Rt:gensburg 1930: 129-147. K iI H N . W. DaJ Prinzipimproblem in d!:Y Philwopllie des Thomas lion Aquin (Bochumt:r Studien zur Philo50phie I), Amsterdam 1982. LF.HU, L. La mimn "glt dt la mf'Tl'Ol.Ifi d'apris MJim Thomas, Paris 1930. LEVINAS, E. Dt l'txiittnu Ii l'txiitant, Paris 1947. --Humanismt de l'aut.... OOm,""" MOl\lp�lIier 1972, -- Tolalilt rl InJini. 4!h cd. The ilague 1974. LiBERA. A. DE. Introduction ti la m]Jtiqut rhinant. d 'Albr:r1 It Grand Ii Maitre Ecllhart, Paris 1984. La philowphu midi",a� (Qu, JfJis1,t). Paris 1989. (2nd ed. 1992) I\lbm It Grand fi la philoJophit, Paris 1990. -- "us etudes de philosophie medievale en Franee d'F.tienne Gilson a nos jOur5�. R. Imbaeh/A. Maieru (cds.), Cli Studi di FilOJoJio Mtdiroakfra Ot/(} e Nweumto, Rome 1991: 21·'3. -
--
--Pnun au Moyen Ag', Paris 199J. --"D'Avic;enne a Avcrroes, el retour. SlIr les sources arabc" de la Iheorie seolaSlique de run uanseendantaJ-. Ilrabit Scintu:s and PhiJruophy 4 (1994):
141·179.
"Zum GUlSein de� Handdns� Philosophische.l jah�/N.dI 87 (1980): 327·39. �Oit geschichtliche [rforse.h\lng der miuelalterlichen rhil<»ophie und die Neu5ehol�Ulik". E. C.orelh/W.N. Ne idl /G. rnigendorffer (eds, ) ,
LOBATO. A. MFundamecnlo y Oesarrolo de los Ir::lnscendentah:s en Sanl0 Toma.,; de Aq uino Aquinas 34 (19') I): 203-221.
KNITT£IIM£YE/(, 1-1, Dty Tomninm 'fmrunmdrnto.{' in sriner hiJfornrilm Ell/wicke· lung biJ %u Kont, Marbllrg 1920. KOBUSCU, T. Stin und Spmcht. Histmsm, Grundl,gung .riner Ontologie dtr SJlYucht. Lciden 1 987. KOCH, J. "Sinn unci Struktur der Schriftausl�gungen Meister Eckharts", Xlfine Srilrijltrl I. Ro�e 1973: 5GY-428, KOVACH. F.J. Di, AsIJulil! d'$ Thomas I)I)n Aquin, Bedin/New York 1961.
LOTZ, J.B. WAletheia lind Onhotes, Versuch einer Deutung im Lichte der Scholastik�. PhilOJophisc/w Jahrbuth 68 (1959): 258-268. --"Zur Konstitution der tr;.n8u'nden!"len H,,�timmllng..n rl..� Scins nach Thomas von Aquin". p, Wi l pe rt (cd.). Die Mttaph,sik im Millrlall...-. Thr Unpnmg !Hld ihft Bedeutung. ( Miscell anea Mediaevalia 2), Berlin 1963: 334-340.
_
__
.
('JHullIC/u PhWsoph� im ltalholiJdJ,n lknkLn .w 19. und 20.jahrhundn'U. Vol, 2, Gnu:lVienna/C.ologne 1988: 362-390.
--
"The Transeendentality of Beauty in Thomas Aquinas".
P.
Wilpcn (cd.),
Die Mttaphysil! im Mifttlalt!:Y (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 2), Berlin 19fi3:
586-392. "Der EinfluS$ der Schrift des Pseudo-Dionysius 'De divinis nominibus' auf die Sehonhdlsphilosophie des Thoma' von Aquin". Archil! fur Gmhichl, d,.,. Philosophie 63 (1981): 15()...6.6 KOWALCZYK. 51. "Une If:ntalive de description de I'unite tranKendenulc", Snint l'hnmG.f d'l\quin. POllY I, s7!im, untmail')!' dt sa mon, Luhlin 1976: 143170.
_
-.
1.0HII, C,H. "nle Medieval 100Crprf'lalion or AristotleM. Tht Cambridge History of Laler Medieval Philosoph]. F�o"" tit, Ut.dUWrH!ry of Arillotlt to the Di..ll!ftgration af Sdw/QJticiJI" JJOOJ600. Cambridge 1982: 45-98.
L6wITH, K. Vico.! Crundsalt: utrum tt fa�jum conllNlunlur. Srinr Iheukigurhr PriimisJt und d!:Ytn siilr.ul6rt KonJtqutll1tn. Heidelberg 1968. MACDONALD, S. Tht Melaph]siu of Goodnm in M,.dif:lial Phi/amp", befMt Aquinas. Phil. Diss. Cornell University 1986. --�Boe,.hius's Claim that All Substances are Good.". Archiv jur Geschic!ltt dty Philruuphil!70 (1988): 245-279. -- "The Metaphysic., (If GoodneMl and the Doctrine of the Transcendentals�. S. MacDonald (cd.), &ingand Coodn!W, Ithaca/London 1991: 31-55.
-- "Good.ness as Transcendental: The Early Thirteenth-Century Rewvery of an Arislocelian Idea". 7opoi I I (1992): 173·186.
451
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
- "Theory of Knowledge", N. Kr("t2mannjE. Stump (cds.), Th, CamOn'dgt Ccrnpa7lWn to AquiflaJ, Cambridge 1993: 1 60·J 95. MANC:£I.L1, C. "II bene nel pt:micro filosofico di S. Tommaso", MiHtllanto Fro.null'A11IO 60 (1960); 241·346. MAIlE.CH.... L,j. LA poi"' M dlparl dt ta mi/.aph]sirpu. mi. V: i.e IlwmisNU! d""otU 10 phiWsop/fie criliqtu. LouV3in 1926. (2nd rd. 1 949) MARITAoIN.J. Art and SdIcI4.illCUm, London 1939. MAIlMUII.A, M.E. "A\;cenna on Primary Concept.' in the MCIaphy5ics or hi� al-Shira", R. M. Savol'}'/D. A. Agius (e
--"The Doctrine of Being in the AristOtelian Melaph,sitj - Revisit�d". P. Morewedge (cd.), Phi[OJophi", oj £xiSltnet. Ancimt and Mobm, New \'ork
450
.
McKJRAHAN, R.D. PrindplJ'J and Proofs. Aristotle's TMOT)' of Dnllonstrativt Sci�nu,
Princeton/New jer5ey 1992. METZ, J. B. Cllri.•llicht Anthropountrik.
Oller die Dmkform des TJwmaJ von Aquin,
Munich 1962. MOJSISCH, D. �Grundlinien der Philosophie Alberts des GroBen". Zritschrift /tjT Thrologit ,md Phiwwphle 32 (1985): 27·44.
Frti/Jurg�T
MONTACN£S, D. Ln doctrine de I'analogi' de l'it�e d'ap�ts Saini ThomaJ d�qui",
Lou\lain/t'ari� 1963. M U C K L E . j. T. "[saak. hraeli's Definition of Truth". {)o(.tritlal, tC Lilliram du MQ1n1 Agp 8 ( l 933}: �.
A�cJlivts
d'Hisloirt
NJ:LLI. R. LA philoSCPh� du WtllanH"t. Le dua/iJ_ rad" a/ au XIII, .•ii,//!, P:o.ris
1975.
O£J.NC,.. HANHOrf', L. t·ns
d unum. umvtl'tunIUT. SUlJung llrut C,hDll de Cn'UndJa/u,J in
dn- PhiWwphit d� hi.
T/wmas IIfm Aqt.lin. Mfmster 1953.
Wilpen (ed .), Dit i im Mil/dafl«. lliT Unprung und iliTl Btdl:ldll'lK' (Miscellanea i'tttCaph,slt Mediae�"alia 2), Berlin 19r.3: 71·-91. - "Metaphysik, Thomas V()n Aquin". HisloruclitJ lVUrt,.../Juch der I'hilm.l>frhie V, Darmstadt 1980: 1 2 1 2· 1 226.
- "Die Methoden
der
Melaphysik im Mitlelalter�. P.
- "'Res' comme concept transeend<,:ntal N sur·transcendental". M . Fauori/M. Bianchi (eds.), RtJ. Ill" Colloquu. Iflf�az.ianalt dd l�,Jriro InUluf/ual.e f."uT"tJ/JW, Rome- 1962: 285-96. O·ROUIO'f. F. A. Psevdt>-DionyriuJ arui the MetaphysU:.< of Aquirnu. Leiden 1992. O'SHAUCHNESSY, T. ·St. Thorllas and Avic�nna on the Nature of the One ". Grtgoriamlm41 (1960): 005- 679. OWENS, J. "Unity and Essence in St. Thomas Aquinas". Mtdicmml Sflldits 23 (1961): 24()·259. .
- Tht Doclrin� oj Bting in tht AriJtottlian 'Mtlaphysics'. A Sl!ldy in ti" Greek Backgruund ofMtdieval Thoughl, Toronto 1963. -An Eltmtntary Chris/ian MtttJphysics, Houston 1985. (Repr. of 1963) - "Aquinas as Aristotelian Commentator". St. Thomas Aquin.u, 1274-1974: C.ommtmorat;vc Siudies. Vol. r. Toronto 1974: 213-236. - "Aquina� 01\ Knowing Existence". The Rroiew oj MttaplrplCs 29 ( 1975/6):
67()..9(}. - "The Aecidental and Euential Charauer of Being in the Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas". J R. Catan (ed.), SI. 71wmas Aquinas on tht ExYlmet of Gcd, Colluud PaJwr� offauph Owm.s, Albany, N.Y. 1980: 57·96.
1982: 3�59,
--"The PreM:nI Slatus o( Alpha [Ialton in the Aristotelian Metaphysiu". dn PMlruopAit 66 (1984): ) 48-69. u An:hivfur Gac.lmtc PANOrSIi.Y, E. Gothic ATchiUdurt and SclwJallicUM, New York 1951. (14th cd. 1974). PEGHAIRE. J. �L axiome '801111m est diffusivum sui' dans Ie neoplatonisme Cl Ie thomismc", &tmc dt I'UniwrJiU d'Ottnwo, $cclion speciale, vol. I (I9�2): ""'. --ln1tll«lIU d Ralio uknl SI. Tlu,""u d )4quin, Paris/Ottaw"".t 19�. Ptn"ER, K.. Di� Lthn 0011 dn SclWnhtif rwt:h &natlt1ltura, Wert 1964. P£TTJ;:R., D.M. DE. Bq;rip m wtrMlijltlmd. Aan tk OI>enijde van het amctptlUlfi.nnc, Hi1versum/Antwerp 1954: 94-135. PHElAN, G. B. "The Concept of BeaUty in SI. Thomas Aquin
P1EPl:R, J. Wahmnl deT Ding',
£int Vnttmul!ung ttlT Anthropologie dt,J Hommittt{·
altt:rs, Munich 1966. (41h ed.) P6LTNI:R, G. Schiinhtif. £int UnltrJuehung lum Urspmng des Denkens I>ti TholfUU vorl Aquin, Vienna 1978. -- "Veritas cst adaequatio intellectus et rei. Dcr Gcsprichsbeitrag des Thoma..o; von Aquin zum Problem der Ubereinstimmung-. bilJchrift fur phjwsoph�che Forschung 37 (1983): 563·76. POUlLLON, H. �Le premier u-aitc des propriete. transcendantales. La 'Summa de bono' du Chancelier Philippe". Rtvu, nlDswlasfique de philmoPhit 42 (1939): 40-77.
tranKendantale chez les Seola.o;tiques ( 1 220-1270)". ArchiVt.J d'Hisloire Doctrinalt tI Lit/irair, du MUJnI Agt' 21 (l946): 263-329.
-- "La beaUle,
propriete
PUNTEl, LB. Analogie und GtscJiichllich1t.tit I: Philo.JDphitgt.Jchich/lich-kritl5ch" v"..·
such UM dIU Crulldprobltf1l d<"T MtlapAyji}r,
Fn:iburg/Basd/Vienna 1969, RA.l:YMA£III:R, L. OJ:. "L'ctre lelon Avicenne et selon S. Thoma.o; d·Aquin". AlIiunllo Com_atwn VoIumt, Calcuua 1956: 1 19-131. REIMERS, AJ. "St. Thomas's Im�ntion5 at De \leritate 1,1". Doctor wm."lImis 42 (1989):17!>-183. REI'IARo, H. "What is St. Thomas' Approach 10 Metaphysies?" Tlu New Swla.ilicis", 30 (1956); 64-83. RIJI;, LM. DE. "On Ancient an d Medicval Semanlies and Melaph)'$io". Vioorium 15 (1977): 61·110. --'"The origins of Ihe theory of the properties of terms". Call1bridge History of Laf" MtdiroaJ Philosoph,. Prom tAt &diJcrrotry of A.riltDtU to the Disil1ltgralwn QjScholasficism I1{)().I600, Cambridge 1982: 161-173. RINTELEN, F.]. VON. D" W",gtdOlZh in deT turopiiLsChm Gcisftsmlwicklung I ,
Halle 1937.
RIOUX, B. L'ilu el la viri/I chr.. Htideggtr tt St. T/wm.aJ d'Aquin,
1963.
RUI:LLo, F. lb "Noms divins"
MontTeal/Paris
tI feuTS "muons" selon Saint Albert le Grand, Com
menta/roT du "Dt diuini-s nominibw", Parb 1963. V. "Ens tl verum conwrtllntuT, Factum d verum ronvntunruT. Zur Problem atik mittelallerlicher und neuleitlicher Ontologie". PhilojDphischu Jahrbuch 60 (1950): 406-437. SCHELER, M. ProbltrM of a Sociology of Krwwlrdgt. English trans. by M. S. Frings,
RUFNI:R,
London 1980.
'christliche Philolophic'". (ed•. ) , Christlich, Philrn�hi'
SCHMIPINGJ:II., H.M. "Zur Gr:Khicht� des Begriff,
E.
Coreth/W.N. Netdl/G. Pfllngendorffer
l. . t 's
.
452
453
BIBLIOCRAPHY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
im JcalAoludl,n Dmk.tn du 1 9. lmd 20. jahrhund"/s. Vol. I, Craz/Vic:nna/ Cologne 1987: 29-45. SCHMIDT. R.W. "L'ecllploi de la �paralion en metaphysiquc", RnJ1J.t pllil<;10pAiqul dt Louwin 58 (1960): 373-y')3. -- TM Domain ofLogic amwding to St. T11DWU1J Aquinas, The:: Hague: 1966. SC"IoUTZ, H.R. 'Un lranscendantal meconnu", Calii"! jacqueJ ,Han/ai" 2
STEENBEIlGHEN, F. VAN. Symposium "La conception de la philosophic: au Moyen Age" at the Fifth International Congress of thc: "Soci':t': Internationale pour rElUde de \a Phi1o'l()phie Mi;dievalc· (Madrid 1972). Aetas dtl V Ctmgruo Inu-rnoeumaJ d, Filmofio MtdinJal, Madrid 1979. --Introd"dion a l"ilutit Ik La philoMJphit ",a/litXJ!t, LouV".tin/Paris ]974. --"I'rolegomtnes a la ql4ono via". Rivista di ftlosofoI n_sr.olastica 70 (1978):
SCHMITZ, R. B. $tin - Wahrlllil - Wort. Thomas
--
(198!): 31·51.
/JOJI Aqum und dt i LeATt v.m Ur Waln'Ant dn Dinge, Munster 1984. S(:1I6NIfIERCER, R. Nomina dimno: b., theologisr:hm Smuthll.l: 6ri ThoJ1l(U vcm Aquin, .
Frankfurt a. M./Bern 1981.
-Die TYornjormalitm dd lWu.!isrlw! Srinswr:standniJ.lt:l", Berli,,/New York 1986. - Was ill S,hiMsliH HildC:$heim 1991. SCHIUMI'f', G. Die I.riommsrhrift du Hoethiu! (D� IubdomMibUl) aU Philosophild�J
uhrfluch des MirttlaflerJ, Leiden 1966. SCHOLEM"NN, G. Dit uhrt VIln dtn Tranuendtntalitn in d.,.,- $cholallis�htn Phi/oJoPh!t (Fonchungen zur Geschichte der Philosophie und def Padagogik IV,!!), Leipzig 1929. S G H U L Z . G. VentQJ tJI odaequa tlo inttlluluJ t/ Tti. Unle1"Ju chungtn :ur Wah,.luihlthT� des Thl)1llas von Aqu;n und wr Krilik KantJ an tinlm ubtrl'lu-f,.-ten WahrhtirslHgrifj. Lc:iden 1995. SEIDL, H. "Die ari$totdi�chen Qudlen lIIr Transzendentalien-Aufslcilnng lJei Thoma$ von Aquin, De veri tate, q. I , art. 1�. PhiloJophiJcheJ Jahrbuch 80 (1973): 166-71.
-
Erkenlltni� I':nt.er, allgemeiner Prin.lipien m�ch Thomas von Aquin". A. Zimmermann (cd.), Thoma.. '!(In Aquln. WtTk und Wirkung im Licht ntutTtT ForJChung. (Miscellanea Medievalia 19). Berlin/New York �(;ber die
1988: 103-16.
SHOO)l;, L.K. EtitTl1It GiUmI, 'rorunto 1984. Sn:WI:R'TH, G. "Die trl\n!�endentak Selbigkeit lind Venchiedenheit dc� ens nnd des �'Crum bId TI.on.as von Aquin-. Philru&fJhiJdtCJ)ahrbtlU! 66 ( 1 957): 22·33. SIo1ITH, E.
Tht GoodnlJj of &ing in Thomistic Philm&fJhJ
Significtmu, WashiJ)gton , D.C. 1967.
and
Ib
Contt1llp.m1ry
und �Iand. Das sdwlruliJtiu Axiom 'tTU d unul7I carn.¥.nuntur' als Fundament rndflphpisc,," und thLologisd." Spdukltion. Mftnstcr 1930. SPADE, P.V. ,he M'm,mties of tenll��. Cambridge J/utory "/ J.at� MWltilal PMhm)ph,. From the fWll.lOO1'"1 of Arilwtk 10 tlu: Dilinlwalum of Sclwl4sliOJ'II1
S6HNC£N, G. .Stln
11()().1600, Caml)ridge 1982: 188-196. SPEr.R, A. Mttaph,sica reaucens, Metaphysik als enile W;.�sellschaft im Versuindni� Bonaventuras". &rhl'!Tchu tit Thiologit andennl tI tniA'ilm/e 57 "
-
(1990): 142·182.
"Thomas V(ln Aq!lin und die Kl1J1.�t, Eine hermeneutische Anfrage �llr mittelalterlichcn Asthetik�. Archiv fiir KultuTgeJchicht� 72 (1990): 323·345.
SchOnhcit., KritisdH:: UberJegungcn zur m ittelalterlichen Craemer.Ruegenberg/A. Speer (eds.), Scientia uwt arl im Hoch- und Spat'l/jitt�wltlf', Berlin/New York 1994: 945-966. SPEER, A.jSCHNJ.;IOEII., J.HJ . �Das Mittclalter im Spiegel neuerer LiteralUr".
- "_Kunst
und ASlhelik". I.
Thrologisch' Qy.artol.schrijt 172 (1992); 221-237.
STEEL, C. "L'un et
1c bien. Les raisons d'um:: identification dans la tradition p1atonicienne". &VUt dt$ sonICtJ phi/m&fJhiquu et Ihiowgiqut$ 73 (1989): 69 ... - "Natural and Moral End� According to Thomas Aquinas". J. Follon/]. McElloy (eds.), Finalili II lntt1ltj{malit�. Doctrint thomislt tI PtT.ipulw,j moderruJ, I'aris/Lou�aill 199'1: 1 1 3-26. ·
99-W!. Le � d.t ('triJlnUt tk Dim dans u, toils dl S.
Thomm
d:Alf1'm, Louvain
Ia-Neu\'e 1980.
STRIJCKER, E. DE. �L'idee du Rien dans la Rellublique de Platon: Donnees philologiques et Signification philosophi<]ue-. L'antil[l,iu cLanu,ut :S9 (1970): 45()..67.
"
STUIo1P, E./ KIlETZMAl'fN, N. Being and Goodness·. S. MacDonald (ed.), lking r f)f the Good in Mrlaph]lia and Philmophit:a1 T�, atld Goodnt.u. The Ctm.tpt Ithaca/London 1991: 98-1 28. STURLl:SE, L. Dit deutsche PhiloJoph� im Mit/llalttT. Von Brmifatius bjs zu Albm: dnn Grujkn 740·1280. Munich 1993. TALLON, II]. "Does Thoml�m Neglcc\ Multitude?". Thl NruJ Scholasticism 37 (1963): 267-92.
TAvtJzzl, M. "Aquinas on the Preliminary Grasp of Being". Tht Thom;st 51 (1987): 555·574.
--"Chrysostomu5 Javelli (ca. 1470·1 538). A Biobibliographical Enay". Angelirum 67 (1990): 347·78; and 68 (1991): 109-21. ULRtCH, F. lIomo alry.mu. /)(u IVYlgnis dtT Stimjro,v:" Einsiedeln 1961. VF.LDE, R. A. TE. PYlrticipalion and Su.blta1lllality 111 Thomas Aquino., Leiden 1995. VERBEKE, G. "Introduction doctrinale". A1Ji�,..na La/mIn Lib,.,. de philosophia prima jim JClmiia diuma I. Ed. S. V;\n Riel, Louvain/L�id�n 1977: 1*-122·. VERES, T. "Eine fundamernale ontulugiilodle Dichotomi� im Denken dc, Thomas von Aquin . i'hila.J(}phiJchfj Jahrb1lch 77 (1970): 81·98. VIGNAIJX, P. M(,.omribution au �ymposion 'La comeption de la philosophie au Moyen Age' .at the Fifth Jnternational Congrelili o f the 'Societe Internalionale pour l'Etude de la Philosophic Medievale'M (Madrid 1972). Ada.! dd V umgu.'() 11111'n1f1amwi dl FilosoJia Mtdiroal. Madrid 1979; -
81--85.
--
en hi�toirc de la philo.wphieM. Bulktln ,Ie kI Sodi t i .fra1lf6U� de Philosaflhie fXJ (1974): 5-17.
"Sur la place du Moyen Age
V RIES, J. DE. "OM 'use commune' bei Thomas von Aquin". ScholaJli" 39 (1964.): 163-177.
WALLACE, J.A. "Thing". TM N,UI Carlwlie Encyclofudia XIV, San Franci§co/ Toronto 1967: 9J·92. WEISHl:IPL, ].A. �The Ufe: and Works of 51. Albert the Great". lA. Weisheipl (ed.J, Albomul Mag'IlU.1 and Th" ScitnUj. C.Ql7lmnnomti1J� EnayJ, Toronto 1980: B·51.
--Friar ThomaJ d'Aquillo, Washington. D.C. 1983. WEI.TF., B. "Thomas von Aquin tiber d¥ Gutc. Entwurf dnes Systems". Auf atT Spur des Ewigm, Freiburg 1965. WTELE,]. VAN DE. �Le proble:mc de 1a verite ontologique dans la philosophie de saint Thomas". RnIU" philoJophiql/.t dt Lollvain 52 (1954): 521-71. -- "'Res' en 'ding'. Bijdrage tOI ecn IIcrgclijl::endc studie lIan dc zijns opvaning in het Thomismc cn hij Heidegger". Tijd$rhrifl TJ"",. Fi/owfit 24 .
(1962): 42U>OO.
--"Het thema 'Ens CI bon u m convertuntur'. Wording en fJlosofisc.he bet�kcni�M. TijrW:Jtrijl l.!Wr FilI)YJ{1t 26 (1964): 1l:!&'253 -- 7;ijmwaarh,id ffl Onvt'rlxlrgtnhtid, VtTgtlijktfldt $tudit 01JtT at (yfItologilchr waarhtid i1l htl ThomiJ11U! om bij H'-Id'ggtT, Lellven 1966.
454
BIBLIOGRAPHY
WIPPEL,
J.P.
J.�.
-rhomas Aq�i "as and The Problem of Christian Philo50phy8. Wippel . Mttaph'jncal Thtmts in Thomas Aquinas, Washington, D.C.
1984: 1-33. Me taph ysi cs
---
and
INDEX NOMINUM
S'pa,atio in Thomas Aquinu·. J.P. Wippel, Mtla_
ph]sim/. Theww in TIw'llUlS Aquinas.. Warnington, D.C. 1984: 69-104.
--rhomas Aqllln� on the D i�tincti on and Derivation of the Many from . the One: A Dial ectic between Being and NonbeingM• Th, Review of
Mdaph]5iCJ 30 (1985): 56�590.
--(homas Aquinas's Derivation of the Arisloldian Categorit$ (Predica menu) M. }OII.",QI of1M Hi.Jlury of PhilosDphy 25 (1987): 13-34. -- -Thomas Aquinas and Participation·. J.P. Wippel, Studies in Medieval Philo.roPhy, Walhingl.on, D.C. 19R7: 1 1 7-158. --iruth in Thomas AquinasM, TJu Revw of MelaphysiQ 43 (1989); 295-326 •
543-567.
Mctaphysics". F'rnburg" Uiuchnjt for Phllosophll lind Theologie 37 (1990): 51-90. W V l.l.£R, E.A. "Henologie". Histof'iJChu Worlef'bllch d,r Phiwsophie III, Darmswh 1974: 1059-1060. ZIMM"UMANN : �. Ontologit 00" MdapllJjiH D� DiJtllSlion li.btr dm �Iand d" Mdaphysik 1m 13. und 14. jahrhutldn1, Lddcn/Cologllc 1965. --'''Ipsum enim [est] nihil est' {Arislotdes, Periherm. I, (.3). Thomas von Aquin ubel" die Bedeutung der Kopula". A. Zimmermann (ed.), Ikf' Bt�JJ df'T &pra,unlatio im MiIl,(alttT. (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 8), Berlm/New York 1971: 282-295.
---rhe Latin' ,Avicell�a as, a
I
S�urce of
Thomas Aquinas's
see Peter Abelard ACKIULL, j. L. 293n AOAMCl.YII:, S. 18411 AUTSEN , J. A. 23n, 761\. Illn,
ABJ:LARO,
1 1 411, 12411, 12911, 134n, 15�1I, 15511, I65n, 19811, 20111, 20211, 24411, 253n, 26911, 271n, 291n, 3.3On, 3-47n, 37411, 377n, 4160 AlAIN or LiLLE 878. 423 ALBERT, H. 76, 77 ALBERT THE CRLH 6, 12, 19-21, 25, 34, .36, 48-70, 73, 74, BO, 8 1 , 98, 10!:l-I05, 110, I I I . 140, 166,217, 223, 244, 257, 260, 261, 293,307n. 312, 347, 349n, 358, 359, 361, �4, 400, 423, 430, 438 ALEXAND£R OF APIIIlOOlSIAS 141 ALEXANDER or HALES 25, 29, 54, 4()" 49, 52,64,73, !:1O, 98, 1O�105, 109, 110, 223, 244,257, 260, 26I, 281n, 347·351, 378, 411. 4.(3, 430, 438 ALGAZE.L 51 ALLERS, R 177n AN�XAGORAS 15� ANCONA CoSTA, CttJL D' IOSn ANSELM OF CAt<TI::RBURY 7, 35, 244, 245, 253, 361, �95-397 AlI.IS"fOTLE 4, 13, 20, 21, 31·33, 36, 37, 43, 49, 51-5�, 55, 58-60, 75-78, 80, 81, 85, 86,88-90, 94,99, 104, 109, 113, 114, 1I7, lIB, 121. 123128, 136-140, 142. 143, 145-148, 152, 153, 1 55, 157, 159, 160,165, 171, 174. 179, 185. 186, 189, 192, 193, 198, 201-207, 209-212, 215-220, 229, 231, 232, 234, 235, 241·244, 24�253, 255, 256-258, 262, 263, 266, 267, 275, 283. 288, 293-295. 298-302, W4, 305. 307, 309, 310, 315, 328, 332,333,339,346,361, 368--370, 373, 379, 381-383, 385, 405, 412, 416, 41&421, 422,423, 426, 428, 431,433 AUBENQVE, P. 7n, 65, 86, 122n, 126n, 139, 212n, 4HI AUGUSTINIC 7, 35. 36, 42, 43, 47, 72, 92, 244--246, 250, 252, 254, 256, 261, 272, 279, 280,297, 298. 303, 305.333, 338, 339, 348, 355. 356,
378, 380, 411, 414, 415 AVERROES lSI, 183, 202, 215, 216, 244n. 423 AVICDlNA 39, 42, 51, 8O-B4, 102, 108, 109, lI3, 119, 128. 1:s6, 137, t43145, 149-151, I55, 159-161, 17l-17!1, 191-196, 198-200, 202, 203, 205, 209, 212·220, 227.243, 244, mn, 422424, 427 BALTHASAR, H.-U. VON 335, 350n, '" B;'RTHLf:IN, K. 93n, 143n, 21)40, 2060, 331, 3880, 420, 421 BECKMANN, ] ' P. 790, 113n BEIERWALTES, W. 4, 1650, 20211 BERTHOLO or MOOSBUIlG 416-419, 425,426 BY-RTI, E. 212n BOER, TH. DE 291n SoETHIUS 30, 31, ::16, 37n, 39, 42n, 63, 67n, 74, IH .. 1 I7. 121, 122·]24, 126-128, 130, 135, 1 36, 148-150, 157, 164, 185-188, I9{}, 208, 222, 227, 232, 237-239, 291, 304, 315318, 328, .361, 371, 400404, 408, 423-425, 433 BOETIIIUS or DAr:IA 14, 1 6 BOHNER, Pif. 41n BoNAVENTURE 1,2, 7,8, 17, 18,47, 48, 162-J64, 182, 199, 244, 350, 351. 413, 434 Bos, F.. P. 28n, 202n, 4160 Bau'oN, S. 23, 7311, 97n BkUNN, E. ZUM 3f>5n BUJlNEk. R 3410 CAJ,>TAN 347 C..ATAN,j. R. 1920 , .... tN, A. 160 CHATU CIfATlLI.ON,J. 411n CHF.NU, M.-D. 6n, 30n
Clc£ao 348 C.l.....I!.UIBA.I.D or l\aRAs 30, 670 COMMENTATOR, �c:e Averroes, Eustr...tius
Confessor
of Nkca, Ma)(imU5
CoUESNOCI.t:, V. Dr. 3810 COULDUB�kITSI�, L 204n
456
lNDEX NOMINUM
CoURATIER, M. 3n CoURTts, P. C. 'lOin COURTINE.j. F. 103, lOOn, 418n CRAEMER.RuEGENBERG, I. 82o, 129n, 355n. 424n CROSBY,j. F. 3OOn, 315n
CZAPlEWSKI, W. 336, 34.1, 3!>2
DASSl:LuR. P. 3350 DENIPLE. H. 16n
Di:SCARTES, R. :3
DEWAN, L.
CADAM£Il. H.-C. 293n CAUl..f':I. G. 278 GALLACHER. D. M. 291n GEIGER, L-B. 71, 128-129, 3790,
KEu.u, A. l77n
NICIIOlJt.S OF CUSA 7. 17,22
KLUXEN. VV. 20, 9, 319n, 322, 330
O'ROURKE, F.
GILBERT OF POITIERS 50
KoSUSCII, TH. 268n
403n, 433
GILSON. E. In, �lO, 12, 14-17, 21. 56, 8In. 145, 156, 1710, 175, 176. 179, 202. 203, 264n. 335, 364,365, 434-
DANTE l!>
175n. 302n
DIETlucn or YIl.E18ERG 22
DIONYSIUS THE AaE(lPAGIT'E 6-8, 32, 33,49. 54-57, 60. l�n, 168, 178, 202,238, 293,296, 297, 299, !lOl, 306, !l07, 310--314, 336, 339-851,
354, 3.s6-359, 361·S63, 372-375, 378. 389, 393.405, 417,418,425, 427,
'36
GLOY, K.. 209
GmcHoN, A.-M. 290 GRACI.... j.j. E. 230. Ill, 1120 CilEEN-PEDERSEN. N. G. 14n GU:GORY. T. 2n CItISEZ. G. 326n
H...LCOUIl, D. 349n, 350n
HALPER. E. 204n
H...MUSE. j. 193n
KENNY, A. 10, I I . 12n. 13. 3260 KLINGER, l. 236n
KNITTERMI:YI:II.,
KRI:MEJI., K. 4n, 388, 389
KItIITZW.NN, N. 11·13, 35n. 76n.
302n. 408n, 412n KR1STELLER, P. O. 354n KUHLE, H. 48n KUIIN. W. 2070, 269n
LEHU. L.
325n
U"VINAS, E.. 204,
48o, 58n. 215o, 217n, 416n. 418n. 434, 4360, 438 LOHR, C. H. 12, l!1n
DONDAIS!;, A. 95
DIlEYEIl, M. 4240
HESS[?�, J.
M...cDoNALD, S.
DONDAtNE, H.-F. 57n
DUCHARMr., S. 1960 DUlNTJER, O. D. 174n DUMONT. S. 23n DUN PH Y, W. 5n DUNS ScOTUS 6, 7, 9n, 17-19. 'lOn,
163,174, 175, 183, 186, 199.200,
�4, 432-434
EBBESEN. S. 1 1
EcRHART, MI:ISTEII: 6, 7n, 12, 15. 16, 19, 239.434 Eco, U. 28. 335-337. 343, 346. 349,
'"
HEIDECCElt, M. 5, 15. 105. 108, 187.
290
HuJt.IlY or PoITiERS 35. 244. 245, 254, 338, 339, 357, 411 HINSKE. N. 92n
HISSETT.t, R. 2190
HOm., L 233n
HOENES, M. 2910
HONNEFELDER, L 20n, 23n, 79n, 92n, 113. 1230, 129n, 130n. 186n. 43'.!-434
HOUSER, R. 238n
E.
201n, 213o. 218ro.
IMBACtl, R. 2n, 3n
ELDERS, LJ- 1&4". 221. 222. 330"
Is.uc isRAELI 244
EUCLID 148
J... COBI. K. 76n. 3320 JAVI:LU. CHR. 71 JOHANNES or RUI'F.l.LA 41
EMPEDOClLS 153 ENGELu,umT, p, 29n
EUi!>TIlATIUi!> OF NICu. 59, 293 FABRO, C. 71, 73n. 88n, 1570, 170.
175. 179, 379n, 3890 FUUIlUdUEII., J- 2650
FISCHEIt. N. 92n FLASCII, K.. I6n. 22, 242, 416n FLASHAIl. H. 2930 FOLLON,j. 3250. !lSSn
FUDDOSO. A.J- �2 FUCHS. J 41n
JOHANNf;$ S...RACENUS 4250-426n
JOHN DAM...SCI1:NE 134, 339 JOHN DUNS ScOTUS. see Duos ScotuS JOHN Wvcur 10
JOLiVEr. J. 280 JORDAN. M. D. 6, 73n, I l5n, 129n. 33511, 362n
KA.N'T. l 2I, 22. 79, 92. 97. 104. 242, 258, 278, 354. 429
,
290 291n. 293
LIBEIlA, A. DE 3n. liro. 14-17, 21,
264,265 HENRY OF GHENT 198, 199
1<2 DONCE£L. J. 1760
W.
23. 931'0
KoV"'CH, F.]. 336, .HI, 342. 351-353 Kow"'LCZYK, ST. 20ln
Lon.]. B.
DOIG, J. C. 1 1 4n, 129n, 136o, 141-
H...NKEV.
H.
KOCH,j. 19n
2030 Hl:lIW10, K. 3300 HEGEL. G. W. F. WI. 204
435
457
INDEX NOMINUM
145n. 187n, 240n, 265n
L6WITH, K.. 275
13n, 23n. 2611. 330, 35n. SOn. 65n. 67n, 760. Illn,
291n, 302n, 40ln M....ERU. A. 3n M"'IMONlOES, M. 385 M...NGELU, G. 291n MA.NI 297
M"'RtCHAL, j. 176 M...RENBON.]. 23n M...RIT...IN,j. 335. 336, 354 MARMUIU, M.-E. 82n M...URER. A. A. 335n MAXIMUS CoNFESSOR 57 McC... Lt, R.]. 244n
McEvov,]. 325n. 335n
NICHOlJt.S OF P...RlS 437
A. 296n
O'SHA.UGHNESSY. T. 213n
OEIN('..HANHorr, L 79. 106n. 107,
1280, 133, 196n, 20In, 246n. g19n OTTO, S. 275n OWENS. J i l In. 1 14n, 126, 174n. 192n. 239. 252n
P...GNONI-STURLESE, M. R. 416n
P...NOFSkY, E. 346 ... P R MWIDES 85, 204. 210, 212
PEGHAIII.t,]. L30n, S02n PETER. K. 35In PETI:R ABELARD 4 1 1
Prn:.R JOliN OUVI 2S8
PIITER LOMBARD 49. 7 1 . 92. 202, 224 PETER or SP...IN 31n, 34, 690 PETTER. D. M. DE 176, 179
335n PHiur TH!! CH.\NCElLOR 2!r-42, 4648. 50-54. 54, 69. 70, 73, 74. 96, PHELAN, G.
B.
103. 104, 109-1 1 1 . 188, 20 I, 245, 246, 253. 254.256.257,260,291, 298. 299n, 301. 347. 360.378, 400.
416. 420, 423, 430. 434. 438 PI"'GET,j. 177
PII1:PER, J 244n PINBORG,J. II. 12n
PuTO 4. 58-60, 153. 167, 1 7 1 . 182. 2Q9.21 l , 292-294, 296, 298. 310,
340, 342, 383, 388, 405, 406. 41� 418. 426 PwTINUS 202, 219 PLUTA, O. 17n, 347n POLTNEII. G. 2530, S� POMPA, L. 275n
POIlPHVII,Y 79
MCGRATH. M. 3n McINERNY, R. 85n, 9On, 179n, 186n. 190n. 383n, 399n. 40In
POUILLON, �I. 25, 26, 28n. 347n
MI:IlCKI:N. P. 600 METZ, j. B. 257, 258, 272 MOJSiSCH, B. 620, 347n MONT...CNF.S, B. 383n MOON. A. A. 297n MOREW.tDGE, P. 126n MUC KLE, ]. T. 2440
Areopagile PUN'TEL, L B. 232n
McKIIlAHAN, R. D. 76n
Nnu. R. 28n NESTORIUS 232 NICHOL.U or AJilJ£H. 423
Pll.O(;LUS 55, 165, 166.416, ,118 PSEuoo-DIONY51US THE AREOPAGITE, see Dionysius the:
RA.n'M"'EKER., L. DE 191 n
ilA.ND. E. K. 4010 REIMERS. A. j. 106, 107
REN...RO, H. 388n RJBA.ILUR,]. 260 RIJII:. L. M. DE 28n, 34n. 350. 437n
Rt�. F.-j. VON 48n. �34 RIOUX. 8. 265n
,
}
INDEX NO"tlNUM
458
TAI.LON, H.} 224n
ROBLMT G"ROSSETESl'E 134 RUEU.O,
F. 58n
TAVUZZI, M. 7tn, 178n
RurNER, V. 2760
TESTER, S.], 401 n
ScHEl.. [R .. M. 2<JO
THOM"� Dr. VIO CAJETAN. sec
ScIiMIDINCElt, H. M. fm
ScHMIDT, R. W. 103n, 1290. I4lin ScHMITZ, H, R. 226" ScHMITZ, R. 8. 244n ScHNEIDER.j. H.J. I n
SCH()NBERCER, R. lIn, 13n, 362n,
G.
SOil
SCHULEM"NN, C. 23 SCHULZ. C. 2Hn
:)cHuBu:II., W. 9211,
51:101., H. 98, 176n SHOOK, L. K. 311 SU:WERTH, C. 270n
Ab!.tTill:.1 in Boethiu$ 116 in Plalonism 167-168
ULRICH, F. 73n VlLDE,
R. A.
TE 379n, 424n
l30n,
432"
SPEUI, A. In, 20, 1290. 162n, 353n,
318, 320,337, 34�346, 355,430
VICO. G. 275-278
and the origin of the first conceptions of the imelleo;t 173-
good is related to 287 nafUrally pren:ded by
A VRIES, J. DE 390-394 VIGNAUX. P. 2n,
WnsHEIPL,
J. A.
Acc.idenl transcendental5
WIELE,]. VAN I>� 196n, 19711, 2440,
SUAREZ, FR. 19, 109,
ZIMMERMANN, A. 1 13n , 123n, 176n,
STEEL, C. 237n. 325n
VAN 2n , 5, 312.
36811 STEWARD, It. F. 4U I n
S'rRIJCJ:;ER. E. DE 292n STURLE!'t:. J � 49, 416n
196
WILLIAM Of
189n, 332"
as
"" u
aaidmtia tntU 137, 141-146,
158 twofold meaning of 142, 192, 214
233n, 400n
STUMP. E. 13n, Mn, 76n
SPINOZA, B. DE 204. 283
F.
176, 427-428
48n, 72n, iUBn,
256n. 265n, 271n. 291n AU XERRE 26 WILLIAM Of MOERBEKE 166 WILLIAM Of OCKHAM 12, 35 WILPERT, P. 7n, 133n, 145n, 3J1Gn WIPPEL,J. F. 9n, 89n , 129n, 222n, 227n. 24.3n-244n, 247n, 264n. 271n, 379n, 391n WYLLER, E. A. 20211
424"
Ap�tite 99, 257, 260-262, 287-300.
'83
accidental status of being according to Avicenna and Thomas 191-192, 214
WICKI, N. 25n
SPADE. r. V. 34"
272.285 Andlfopology 4, 2:52, 284
and separation 129-130, 43;
WEJ.TE, B. 291n
G. 244n
Anthropocentrism 257-260, 262,
V£RlnK£, C. 1\;11 n
WALLACr., J. A. 1960
SMITH, E. 291n
Sn:ENflERGHEN,
Abstraction 59, J 29-130, 173-177,
VII'.CHTIIAOER, H. 275n
SIC}:)!, OF BJI.I\BANT 5, 195, 394 S6HNG�N,
Caj dan
VERES, T. 248n
384" SCHR.lMPi",
INDEX RERUM
T»TERRY OF CU,\IlTRES 67n
Aco
wmmunW and 195-196 in Philip �3
in Albert 52 and potency 127, 185-186, 208,
221. 235·236, 241, 263 of being 169·170, 175, 180, 185189, 208, 232, 240, 263, 277, 805306, %5, 429-430 intelllgibiti1y depends on 242, 263-264,430 fiUI V$. sec.ond 318 Action, human 72, 292, 299, 333· 334, 319·329, 428, 431
Addit.ion to being 32, 42, 56, 84-97, 100,
107-IOR, 143-145, J56, 158, 196, 201, 20+218, 226, 270. 344, 391· m problem of the addition in Avicenna 194-195, 2 1 4 ne!r.llivc: 33-:5-1, 37 three ways of 86-87
Aesthetic$
353-354 Analogy 39, 52·54, 58, 50, 90, 140141, 265-266, 295-296, 383-387, .32 in Albert 52-54 univochy of analogy (univocatio
analogia.-) 58
Angels 178, 22.0; number �Ir 225
((Jgnition 287 natural 2R7
Apprehension
simple apprehension as first operation of the intc:llect 150.
175-176. 179-180,207
concept of being belongs simple 179·180
10
as understanding of indi visibles 24.1
Appropriation of the transcendenUib 29, 38-
39, 45-47, 110, -110-415
Arts, Faculty of a� the locus of medieval sophy 14-15, 438
philo
Beauty (pulchrum) all the �ynthe!is of al1 tranKen denlal5 110, 335-336. 350-!52
m/ioof 337-339 u
that which p1ca�s 337·338,
346-348, :559
nnl a disunrl. I.ramccndcntal
351-354
and the: good 41, 339-344, 35'1-
356
add! a relation to the cognitive power :537. 343-347, 3r.&-357 ;u the extension of the true to the good 356-358 and c<w$
338-339, 357
Being
(ens)
hiM!)!), of the queSlion
of 5.
151-156, 191, 200,375, 435-436 prim� of 6, 7, 17. 54-57, 80-84, 102, I08, 135, 149-151, 1!'I9-170, 177, 196, 222,264, 268 univorhy of 1 8-1 9, 384-)185 additiun w, M'� Additlun
460
INDEX RERUM primarily said of the substance 38, 53-54, 141, 187 trans.cendcntals as Ont deter minations of 4S-46, 62, 88, 260, 347,34:9, 378 as first intelligible 43-44, aO8.01, 169, 176, 180. 197 absolute \"5. relational (omide· ration of 44, 47, 98-1OQ, 105 analogical predication of 53-54, 90, 1 39-141, 187 cognitive n. ontological prio rity or 54, 161-162, 164·165, If"
as the proper object of the intellecI 80, 99, 135, 180.181, 184, 260 is not a genus 81, 85--86, 89-90. 139, 180, 212 modal explication of 87·88, 90, 104, ]07, 201, )256-257 is divided into the categorics 89, 206.294 mtioof98, 18�193 intramental and cxlramentaJ being 104, 146. 197·198, 247. 250, 255, 26�272, 331 and the subject of metaphysiC! !W, 127-128 U"anscendentals al p". M am· dentJa of137, 141-146. 158 as the first among created things according to I.he PlalO nisu 55-56, 166, 169, 191, 202· 203, 390, 435 k.nowledg� of 17()'185 duality in Thoma�'5 notion of 175, 179-180 the dlfferenct hdweell �St and tm 186-190, 371 copulative fUII(.tion of 189·190, 24f3..249 and One 204-21 8 and Truth 250·253, 262·269 and the Good 303-319 and Thing 193-199, 423 Categories contract being 88. 154 deduction of the 89 and T1lOdi prmdicandi 89 analogkal unity in I.he mulliplicily or go, 295-296 Arbtotelian doctrine of the 90, 93
transcended by the lommunis sima 93 CauK/Causalil)' transcendentalily and 40, 55, 10�, 157,385 univocal 58, 60 causal relation betw�n God and the transcendental 60, 157 commonncS!J by, see Com ilIOn· aitt:ratio, gtnemtio and cnatio a:>; succe5.'lively understood mocks of 153-154
Chrisl unity of divine and human nalure in 232 Christian Philosophy 3-10, 15, 56, lIS, 156, 202-203, 364, 435 and metaphysics of Exodus 4, 56, 156, 203, �4, 435 v�, henology 202-203 Commentary 1 1 . 13 Commonness and analogy 52·.H of names lind of properties 58 by predication and by causalily 58, 119-123, 134, 161·162, 168, 179. 199, 2 1 1 , 294, 374, 389, 394, 426, 434-4$ Composit�/t:ompo�ilionl Cornposed and the on� 208, 251·237, 239 propositional composition 247, �,N9
Condemnation of 1277 and of 1329 I.
Contradiction principle of 78, 147·150. 158, 179, 186,222.241, 428 Thomas's transcendental foundation of tho:: principle of 14�150, 158, 179, 181, 186, 222, '''' ratio of being in Scows based
on the principle of 186 as a lind of opposition 229. 281 Convo::rtibility of transcendental terms of being and the one in Aris totle 31, 37, 202, 204-207, 210 lhcological foundation of the 55.60 ontological foundation of the 60, 207, 236 three po,-,ihle ways of f>R
INDEX two form� of 96 of being and the one in Thomas 207-210, 264 of being and the true in Thomas 262·269, 278
fWr Imudimli
onnn
qumtiam 266-267
\>S. fxr wn.J6-
of being and the good 290-291, 295, 297, 300 Creation as universal uluality 154, 191, 29!1 internaJ development of
human lhought completed in the idea of 156, 375, 436 and pal"licipation 3>81, !l9� Definition and the order of demonstration 74-79, 81. 84, 150 unity of 207, 241 De H,bM'llladibtLI of 6oethiu5 3{), 36, 39, 63, 135, 148-149, 185-186, 190, 208. 291. 315, 328, 361, 400404, 423 mathematical procedure in 148, 423-424 rel31ion between being and goodness as the central theme ofl48 Thomas's reading from lhe perspective of lhe tran5Cen dentals 186, 208 central place of the treatise in medieval rene::mcient Cause (fjficit"'lll) !l9, 45·46, vol,66, 140, 249, �2·!w3, 341,
461
RI:JlUM
348-.350, 376, .393, 398, 4()�,
'" Entity (mtittU) 4.2, 66, 198 EJJI
as actuality 98, 185-199, 365, 4.�31 as the primary act 190, 200 and lhe difference with �nl 186-190 and creation 191 the finl of created things 55, 56, 166, 169. 191, 2<12-203. 390, m
and indivision 208 E!Sence (ts.uratia) as fint conceived by the intd· len 159-160 Avic�nnian view of the prj. macy of the 196 Ethical Aristotdiarrism 14, 16, 4.58 Ethiar 4, 14, 4.9, 275, 290, 293 priority of ethics to ontology according to Ullinas 290-291, 293 su�ect of3t9 Ellil 197·]98, 230-131, 249, 282, 290, 297-298, 34.2 diK.ussioll about the ontologi. cal statllsof 197 and the thesis of the converti bility of being and the good 290
opposition between the good and 292 Exemplary CalISe (a-plar) 39, 4.546,58-60, I02-L03, 255, !74., 294, 314, 341, 348-3.'50, 376-377, 393, 398, 405-407, 412, 430 false/Falsity 243, 247, 249. 278-283 opposition with the trlLe 243. 278-21\3
propositional 247, 249 ontological priority of the trill' o\-c:r the 282 Final Cause/End (lim.s) .39-40, 45-46, 51, 57, 66, 102-103, 105, 14.1, 287, 291, 295, 298, �0()'303, '1� 314, 329, 34], 348, 350,363, 376, 407, 412, 430 Finn Known S()'S4, 99, 161.165, 177· 180, 186-187,422, US and God 18, 135, 162-165, 428, 4M ,II 1 IIIIrf 161, 1116, 1 '7'8
,
"
""
. _'-,- , .
,
462
•
INDEX RERUM
Formal Cause (frnma) two kinds of 58-59 Alben's doctrine of lhe two aCIJI of the 61, 68, 217 (',((ernal 17�171
,",5.
in ternal origin of
furma, gmt'mlu vajannat Jpeci� 188, 230
Thomas's rejection of the doctrine of the plurality of
and beau!.)' 4 1 , 339-344, 3.'>4-356 l.he Platonic:: [dea of the 58-60, 167, 292-2%, 383, 404-105, 420, 426 expr�Se5 the relation of con formity of being lO tbe appetilc 99,257. 260-261, 286 the ratioofthe Good 299-303 adds to being a relation to the
form� 233-235, 430 Found.uionalism, problem of 76
end 102, 105, 261 as I.hat which all desire 32, 5 1 , 109, 237, 285,287. 290, �301,
Generation
3O!, 304, !37,�3,371 3$ o�jeci of the will 292
God
and corruption 205, 207, 251
and the One 237-240 order of the true and Llle 284-
proofs for God s existence 9,
,.. and the e...il 292, 330-.'334
120. 231,251, 383
a.�
fint being 33, 39. 58, 123.
tranocenrlenee vs. transcendell
157. 203, 231, 276 and metaphysics 120-121. 165 as the finl'l! end of the humall
talilY of the 293, 295 as diff,uiw.m Jui US� 32, 55, 301-
dc:sire for Imowledge 135, 164165. 375-378 predication of numnical temu of 202, 224 3irnplidty of 231 namu propcr lO 6-8. 17, 1 101 1 1 , 361·372 primary namt of Cod C,..7 , 17, 55.57,296 as 'He Who is' 72. 314, 360, 364366, 368, 431 as Eking 364-367 rdation with the tfi� rommunt .�7-39.'i as Beauty 339-340 as One 367·369 ;u Trur.h 369-371 relatjon with the truth of Cfeatures �95-399
as Good 371-372, :�78 relation with the goodness of creature� 400407 as (ause of me marillK wmmunia 3940, 4547, 372·378, 420 different models of predication expres.�illg the causal relation b"rween God and the
maxim�
rommtmia 37&-387 t.ranscendentals and the Trinity 408·41 5 Good (btmum) in Philip the Chanccllor 37·39 in Alexander of Hales 41·46 in Alberl 49-70 in 'nlOm3$ Aquinas 29(1·334
302
and being: the good beyond being ::reconling to the l'latonists 55, 57, 1 68, 292-297, 306-307, 310312
Manichean thc:sis on the good 297-298,331 con...ertihJlity of being and
good 3 1 , 50, 5L 54, 55, 58, 2902<)1. 303-314. difference betwep.n being and goodn�� 314-319 as plrnilud" mntdi 320-321, 372 and end 32, 40, 45, 57, 102. 103, 105. 261, 291, ��3, 312-314 and morality: good of human anion 319-32(; good a l the lirst in pranical reason 326·330 Henology 202-203, 4 HI Idea 58, 63, 68, 105, 261. 263, 271,
274, 282, 292-29�, 298, SolD, 383, 404-405, 420
Imp,.-4.lw 42-43, 45, 81-83. 172-173.
m
ys,
conl:eptio fl3, 173
rndivid uali ty
and the one 236 :'11 a transcendental predical� 2,.. prin ciple of ;llIlividnru;nn 2:-16
46S
INDEX RERUM (ndivision 3$ added to being by Lhe one 33, 4243, 66, 68, 98. 100-101, 109, 201 , 204, 207, 208, 216. 223, 229,238, 420 description of the transcen denials i n lc:rms of 33, 36-37, 40, 42. 48, 51-52, 64, 104, 42f).
''''
and the. true !\6, 42, 52, 244-246 Intellec{ see Soul, faculties of the
being as the first conception of lhe 43, 54, 56, 60, 66-67, 8(}.84, 86, 100, 104. I08, 135, 149-151, 159-170, 176, 177, ISO, 185, 187189, 269, 281 being as me proper object of the 50, 99, 135, 175, 18(1...1 81. 184, 2fiO "'S. .l.en5e 125 \IS.
m:1;o 1 30-132, 178
correspondence between the subjeCl of Inetaphysir.s and Ihe ohject of the 135, 185 two operations of the: intellect 150, 17.5-1 76. 17<)
inldl« .l us agrn.s 83, 11)4...165, 173, 176, l il l , 183
origin of the fi�t (onc�ptions ofthe 173 -177, 427-428 potentiality of Ihe human 183,
''00
and truth 246-250, 253-256, 269274
mutual inclu�ion of intellecl and will 288 Intellertuab 15-17, 438 Intelligibility
related 10 otusaHty, universali ty and Immateriality 125, 126
(onneetion between the ",':It principles of reality and the
prima il1ldligibilia according to Ihe Platoni.�1.1; 166-167, 199 Avicenna's cnlilud" as 194, 197
depends on unity 241 depenrls on actuality 242, 263, ,.. ontologic..al Inllh as the expres sion of a thing'S 246, 264 (.f reality founded ill lt� cr(';'1lion 27�
[n/l'7I/irl 2H-�,I, 3H, !iU, �17,
Iflli
Judgement as second operation of tbe intellecl l50, 175-176, 179, ISO, 189, 422 Knowledge
foundation of2, 76-77, I:m, 162 resolution of human 74. 77,
104, 158, 162. 173, 177, 178, 242, 256 demonstrative ...s. deliniti...e 74-
79
circularity in human 108 �\lr(es of 120, 122 as del>endent upon sen!ie expe' rience I � l , 152, 161, 164, 173174. 176, 178, 182, 184, 280 Cod as the final end of the human desire for 135, 164, 165 critique of 168, 199, 428 ofheing 170-185 external Vl>. inlernal origin of
170-172 natural ...s. acquired knowledge
17S-182 as the effect following on truth 254-255 naurr.Uy precedes appet ite 287 Law, natural 326-330 Li�' .u Causu 5!)'56, 62. 165, 168-
169, I91, 202-203, 227, 390, 417, 435
Logic 10-12, 106-107. 146, 248, 346, :i88-:sil9, 436-437 medieval (ermjnj�1 logic 1 1 , 34,95, 436-437 lIlodal logic I I Man RO, 1 3 1 , 232·235, 257, 258, 260, 273, 277, 284 a composed being 204, 232·
�
"15
unicity of the 5ub5tanlial fOl'ln in 23.>.236 M the image of C>
Manichaeism 27-28, 51, 291, 292, 297·298, 306, 331, 355, 430 ManylMII\(ihlde 44, 9 1 , 110, t2�), 127, 1�2, 1.'i7, 2()\!, 201i, 217, 21H2S1 :u. IranKendrnlal
11l\-111I, 1111
III, 110, W04,
464
INDEX RERUM onC" and many as primary differentiations of being in general 218, 226 the: origin of 219, 22{)'228 distinction between division and 220, 224 two sorts of 224-225 adds merely something con· teptual 224225
as sign of �rfc:ction 225, 228 the: opposition of om: and many 229-231 God is principle of 231 Mathemaua 1 16-117. 129, J30, 1 3 5, 2l2, 277, 307-310, 429
goodneu of mathematical objects 308-310, 421 Maller (materia) separation from 116, 121, 12:3, 128, 432 prima materia 151-155. 166, 169. 2M, 296, 307, 31{)-Sl!l, 365-366
and thc: principle of individuation 236 Maximum 2:50, 368, 381-583, 420, 431
Measure 215-218, 270-273, 2:77·279, 283, 288,294, 325-326, 367, 370, 396-397, 399, 415
Medieval Philosophy problem of 2. 20 as Christian philosophy 3·10, 15,56, 115, 156, 203, 364. 435
linguistic turn in the study of 10-14
schola'!tic charact�r of 10, I I , 115
a.1
a transcend�ntal way of thought I, 19, 21. 23 hermen�utkal problt::m in th� study of 1 1 5 methods used in 133 Meuph)"'ics 5ubjectof l 06, 115-114, 120, 121, 125-150, 134-139, 157, 165, 204, 206, 215,419, 422,432
resemblanc� with dialectics 106, 146
as th� sci�nce dealing with be ing as being 108, 126, 154, 259 !l(:cond beginning of l I S , 12S, 156, 186 theological conception of 116, 1 1 7 , 1 2 1 , ItS. 126-127, 157
Inn�fofmaljOf1I of !he Cl'!"ek
INDEX II.£R,UM
conceptof 121-124
natur.tl object of the intelle<:1
129, 1:s4, 419
object of the will 260, 262, 284, 288, 292, 303, 309, 319, 325, 431
m�taphy5ical V$, theological synthesis of 123 -124, 128 ens commune ali subject of 127-
c_orrespondcnce between the objeCl of the in(ellect and the subject of 135, 185 differ�ncc betw�en Thomas's and &OIU�'5 conception of 186, 199
Neoplatonic me13ph)'$iu of the Olle vs, ·Christian- meta physics of being 202·to3 ofExodus 4, 7, 56, J56, 203, 364,
'"
Mod� of Signifying (lIWdw lignfi-
caOOI)
62-65. 95. IB7, 189, 190,
386--387, 437
based on negation 62 ba.$ed on absolute or relative affirmation 63 Modernity prutulatc: of 12 connection of me
coo m
Nugalw69, 93-94. 97, 296, 362, 423 Number one as principle of 145-1-14, 203, 209, 21i!-218
predication of numerical terms of God 202, 224 originates from the division of continuous quantlty 216 of angels 225 O�ect
181-182 formal 262, 284, 288, 4:H
One/Unity in Philip the Chancellor 31, ��, 37-40
conyertibillty with being in Aristotle 3 1 . 37, 202, 204-207, 210
only adds a negation 33 -34, 37, 61-62, 65, I()()..IOI, 1-tS, 207, 216, 219, 2�
and the many 41, 204, 2 18-231 indiYision as the ralio of 33, 42, 61, 98-10 1 . 109, 145, 201, 207-208, 216, 229, 238, 241-242, 367-369, 420, 429 as propinq1llssimum to being 101. 109,201
as principle of num�r 143,
203,209, 213, 21�217,220, 229 diversity of conceptions of the
eSSC'nce 01' 201-204 transcendentality 'is. substan tiality of the 203, 209, 210-212 tffill5Cendentality 'is. acdden tality of the 203, 209, 212-218 convertibility with being in Thoma! 207-210 the metaphysical and the mathematical one 21&-218, 368
and the composed 231-237 and individuality 236 and the good 237_240 and the true 241-242 as divine name 7. 367-369
Ontology,
see
Metaphysics
Onto-Theology, criticism of 8 Opposition four kind$ of opposition according 10 Aristotle 229, 281 of on� and many 229-231 of true and false 278, 281-283 of good and eyil 292 Ord�r philosophical vs. th�ological S10
Origin of reality 5, 114, 152-156 aile-also, gtn�miio and n-tario ;u different phases in the reflec· tion on the origin of reality 152-154, 200, 435-436
Thomas's view on the cogni tive origin of the conception of being 1'70-185, 427-428 of multitude 219, 226-228 Participation �, 43, 54, 58-60. 67,
71. 85, 132, 169, 178. 187, 2�, 286, 294, 303, m, 114, 341-342. 360, 373, 374, 379-381, 184, �7, 390, !i95, 4014{)4, 404, 424-425, 431-432 and creation 381, 395
Philosophy Autonomy of 5, 14, 4 3 5 as 0ppo$ed to Cltristian theology 6, 20, 1 1 3 proper order of to ;u a Statu5 14, 16 evolution of philosophy accord ing IQ the transcendental per· �p«t ive 151-156, 191, 200. 435...
as tilt: Kiem:e of truth according 10 Ari5lotle 250, 275, .20
as
"agathology" 292
Physics 28, 106, 1 16-117, 119, 129131, 159, 175, 184, 275, 277
m05t in conformity with the human intellect 1 3 1 , 184 PlatOnism 7. 92, 165-168, 202-203, 211, 226, 237-238, 293-294, 296300, 307,31�313. 360. 363. 372· 375, 379-�2. 387-389, 393, 404407,418, 425-427, 430-432,433
and the Cood 296--297, 373 Practical Rea$On 26, 275-278, 292, 319,326--330, 358-359, 428,431,
.'"
divine practical reason as measure of the truth of things 274 Predication different models of predicatiun 139-141, 379-387
convertible 143
subje
of demonstration and of definition 74-79, 81, 84, 150,
prudi£lJ1i{, Wlu:rdi tU aNtrado
284, 288, 4!U
In belnlI and In Inllh t�O-t!U
atC'ldtlntally (,., .�...,) 106
YS.
1!l5. 174-J75. 180-185, 260, 262,
179
187·188
.ubttanllalty {".",
v..
-----... '._" ' _ ' . " " . ' . ". ; . '. ', -
466
tNDf:X RERUM
INDEX RERUM
P rin cip le of the subject of a science 1 18-
119, 129, IS9, 142, 144 of bcing ai being 119, 13,8. 144, 216 of demon.utation 137, 138, 14&151, 172, 178, 179, U U , 204, 241,
419,428
innateness of (he first principles of the inlellen
176,
mil. 13�1�, 146, 15&.157. 167168, 234-235. 39�.394. 43�!l4 Revdation 120, 122-12:i, 361. 3&4365, 369,409, 435
Su�ect (.!ubltdum) of a science, see Scienct: ontological 232. 233 and predicate 190, 247
Sr:holastkism
Substance
character of the term
Scienu
of individ\lation 236 of practical reason 292 Manichaean duali5m oC297-298 Privation
Vi.
419
division of the theorelical sc.iences l l 6-122, 130 obiutum \'S. ""bier/urn of I 18 and its subject l l 8, 137, 139·
'IS. habi/llS 2HI, 229
Quaestio I I , 71 , 74. 94. U5, 210, 245 Quamity 215, 216. 219, 220. 224, 294, di�crete V!. continuous 216 Quiddity not the proper nhjcr:t of lhe inTellect ;n an absolute KOSC 184
itatio
as
inlerl\io 29, 97, 186 as part of the triad lIomtn-TaIiu
rtJ 94-9S. Hl7, 145, 169, 197, 362-363
140,295
Scmantin 10-12 Signi[Jcatio l l , 96, lBO, 189, 207-20f1,
241-242, 364, 437 v�. predication 96 Simple-Simplicity 208, 231, 240 and lhe ralio of the: (.loe: 20B, 231 ofGod 231, 240 Something (aliquid) 50, 98, 1110, WI!, 104, 105, 109. I l O. 223, 226, 2l6, 261,363--364
imported from Araloic philo Klphy !)(). 102 expre�s a relation
morc comprehen�ive than definition 95
lind i"uUulus
being to
13()'132, 178
mooe or knowing proper (0 human beings I!U, 152, 178 ad''ancculcm of reason JtcUndum rem and stamdum ratiO'11D11 132-J3::J
Relation
'r.latic realiJ V5. ftlaNO rationLj 63, 67-68. 100. 27()'271 . 284
exclusion of real transcendental relation 270
RtJo[utio
in Bonaventure 18, 163 of the cal1sed to the cause 57, 120, 121, 156
being as the endterm of Ihe
80-84, 134, 160, U:lO, 186, 242, 256 and memphysks 106, 130, 133, IJl4, U7
Jtcundul'l'l mti(ll'loml and ucundum
ifll
structun:: of 118-121. 127, 137,
negation 219, 2&7
429
(.!ci.mt.a)
II
is knowledge on the basis of demOIl�tralion 74, 118, 276 problem of foundati.)n "I' 7lj..77
177, 179
'15.
10-11
historical and 1I0nnative
of WI"
another .Jff.U,ndllm
dilli.JiOl'lmJ 98. 110. 223 and the one 109, 1 1 0
and multiuHle 110
S"plm"f1Ull4 I I
Sonl
as
image of the divine 44, 47,
105, 259
faculties of the 46-47, 99, 103, 105,257-260. 262, 284, 288,351· 352, 431, 438 and being 99, 105, 184, 257
marked by receptivity and by potentiality 1 3 1 , 200 as form of the body 233, 234 is in a sem", all things 99, 105, 109, 184, 257-261. 26:3, 271. 277, 288, 376, 430 rran�cendental openness of the 105, 135, 184, 259, 261. 320, �5S, 376, 431
V5.
obil'llum I 18
spiritual 132. 262, 21$4 SIIPI-i/O ] l . 34-35, 437 S"ppomum 32, 34-35, 43, 55, 65, 68, 95-97, 305, 3 1 4
T� \'5. phiW.JQPlli 6. 2 1
rheology philosophical 12. 13, 120-122 two kinds of 120-122 rheoret.ical Reason 26. 222, 273,
277, 326-330, 358-359, 431,438
rhing (r"5) imported froll) Arabic philo sophy 50, 102, 193, 422-423 expresses a poSitive mode of being in iL�e!f 98, 109, 257 and being 109, 19S-200, 214 as firu conception of the intd lect 80-tH, 160 central place in Avicenna 192, 194, 214
two sen�5 of 197-199 nlOm;sm 3, 9, 175. 176, 177, 179, lBO, 182, 189, 264n
Existential and Transcenden·
tal 176-177, 179, IBO. IB2, 189, 199, 2641'1 rr.Ul5a:ndent lll-112, 1 16, 1 23, 129, 157. 1 62. )fi8. 202. 292, '4 1-342. 374-375, 361, '392, 397-407. 418, 428,432
"ranscenden!.al in the Kantian sen� 22, 79.
92, 176, 242, 268-269, 278,421
modern and medieval tmn· scendenral llullIght 21·23, 9 1 , 268-269
Augustinian vs, new philoso. phical sense in Thomas 9J·93 transcendentality "'so transcen dence 111-112, 202 �ramce!ldentab (fmrucmdMlio) and mctaphysks 21, 1 13-158 in Philip the Chancellor 2'-40
in Alexander of Hales 4().
467
tion to being 32, 84-87 basic texts in Thumas on the 72-73
and Ihe divine names 1 ]0-1 1 1 anli-Plal0nic moment in Tholllall's docuine 165, 203. 426
Thomas's innovations in
the
docuinc 103-105, 256-262
and anlhropoc:cnuism 257-260, 262,272 as as
'�
the pnma 28, 42, 74, 9 1 , 144,
158, 219-223
relation bctw=n the 31-M, 37,
40, 42, 54, 61-70, 95-97, 143, 145, 193, 194, 204-205, 213, 260,343, 420 order b",tween the 37, 38, 56, 97-103. 109, 149, 168,208, 219223, 241, 269, 284-289,291, 328329, 342, 344,351-352,363 and the divine 50, 1 10-112, 157, 300-415 dedvation of the 97-103 number of 102, 109 Trinity 29. 45, 47, 71, 105, 1I5, 122, 202,222,224, 338-339, 357, 361, 408-415, 436
Irinitarian motive in the
Summa jrtUm Akxandri 47, 105
(:l>gnilion of the Trinity not
accessible 10 philosophy 122,
361, 408, 436 II
TriviUIll
True/Tnllh
in Philip Ihe Chancellor 28,
35-37, 39.40
in Thomas Aquinas 242-288 definitions of 3!'i, 244-246, 253256, 261
a�
the indivision of being and that which is 3:'-36, 42, 52, 244-
246
preceded by the one 241 as !he adequation of thing and in tell "'(t 35, 244-245, 253-256, 261, 272-273, 279, 370 3$
intramental being 246-250 ontological 250-252, 264, 271 relational chararter of 254, \!{;I, 269-273, 278-279
difference in Thoma.' and lId deJu{er a� ttl the primilry lenae (If !i(�1'j
.. .
. .."
.
', -
,, _ . . ' . '
468
INDEX RERUM
conv�rtibility with being 269, 274
in relation to both the divine and the human intellect 273274, 279-280
convenibility with what is made according to Vieo 275278
opposition with the false
243,
27S-283
and the good 56, 284-289 Unity, see One Universal M indivisible in species 241
207,
STUDIEN UND TEXTE ZUR GEISTESGESCHICHTE DES MITTELALTERS
object of knowledge and science 207, 241 universality of predication vs. universality of separation 4 1 7-
262-
418, 425 Universe 225, 228
Virtue (virtu!) Will
170
7. 9.
see Soul, faculties of the mutual inclusion of intelleCl and 288 ob�ct of the 260, 262, 284, 288, 292, 303, 309, 319, 325, 431
10. IL 12.
NOTHDURFT, K-D. Studitn {Urn EiTifluss Senecas auf die PhilMophit und 7heo{(}gie des 12. ]ahrhundertJ. 1963. ISBN 90 04 02175 2 ZIMMERMANN, A. (Hrsg.). VerqichnU ungedruckier KrmunenfaTe <)iT Metap�sik und Physik des AmtliteliS aus rkr 2)it von etwa 1250-1350. Band I. 1971. ISBN 90 04 02177 9 MCCARTIIY, J. M. Humtmistic EmphaseI in the Educational ThrnJCht of Vmc.mt ofBumvais,. 1976. ISBN 90 04 04375 6 WIlLIAM OF DONCASTER. Expljeatio Aphorismatum Philosophit:omm. Edited with Annota tions by O. WElJERS. 1976. ISBN 90 04 04403 5 PSEUDO-BoECE. De Disciplina &olarium. Edition critique, introduction et notes par 0. WEIJERS. 1976. ISBN 90 04 04768 9
13. JACOB!, K. Die MoMegriffi
anderm Kompmdien.
14. 15. 17.
18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.
26.
27. 28. 29.
�s
in den logischm Schrifim
12. und 13. Johrhundem.
du Wilhelm
!lOll
Shyrtswocd und
in
Funktionsbestimmung und Gehrauch
in der logischen Analyse. 1980. ISBN 90 04 06048 0 WEljERS, o. (Ed.). us que!itions � Craton et leurs commmtaires. Edition critique. 1981. ISBN 90 04 06340 4 HERMANN OF CARINTHIA. De Essmtiis. A Critical Edition with Translation and Commentary by CH. BIJRNE1T. 1982. ISBN 90 04 06534 2 JOHN OF SALISBURY. Entlulicus MaWr and Minor. Edited by J. VAN LAARHOVEN. 1987. 3 vols. 1 . Introduction, Texts, Translations; 2. Conum:ntaries and Notes; 3. Bibliography, Dutch Translations, Indexes. 1987. ISBN 90 04 078 1 1 8 RICHARD BRINKLEY. TIwny W Stntmtial Rtftrmce. Edited and Translated with Intro duction and Notes by M. J. FITZGERALD. 1987. ISBN 90 04 08430 4 ALFRED OF SARESHEL. Commentl1ry on the Metheora of Aristotle. Critical Edition, Introduction and Notes by J. K. Drrx. 1988. ISBN 90 04 08453 3 ROGER BACON. Compendium if the SIuq, W T"/wJlogy. Edition and Translation with Introduction and Notes by T. S. MALoNEY. 1988. ISBN 90 04 08510 6 AERTSEN, J. A. NaaJrt and Creature. Thomas Aquinas's Way of Thought. 1988. ISBN 90 04 08451 7 TAcHAu, K. H. Hrion and Ctrtittu.fe in the Age rif Ockham. Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Scmantics, 1250-1345. 1988. ISBN 90 04 08552 I FRAKES, J. C. Th Fate W F&I"tum in the Emb Middle Ages. The Boethian Tradition. 1988. ISBN 90 04 08544 0 MURALT, A. DE. L'Enjeu de 10. Philosophie MMiivale. Etudes thorrllstes, scotistes, occamiennes et grtgoriennes. Repr. 1993. ISBN 90 04 09254 4 LrvEsEY, S. J. TheoIoJg and Science in the Foummih Ontury. Three Questions on the Unity and Subalternation of the Sciences from John of Reading's Commentary on the Smtmces. Introduction and Critical Edition. 1989. ISBN 90 04 09023 1 ELDERS, L.J. Th Philosophical Thology ifSt T!urrnM Aquinas. 1990. ISBN 90 04 09156 4 WISSINK, J. B. (Ed.). Th EternitY if tk WorlJ in the Tlwught W TIwmns Aqumas and his Comnnporarles. 1990. ISBN 90 04 09183 I SCHNEIDER, N. Die Kcmnologit tks Franciscus � Marchia. Texte, Quellen und Unter suchunw:n zur Naturphilosophie des 14. Jahrhunderts. 1991. ISBN 90 04 09280 3 LANGHOLM, O. EcfJllomics in the MdierJal &lwols. Wealth, Exchange, Value, Money and Usury according to the Paris Theological Tradition, 1200-1350. 1992. ISBN 90 04 09422 9
