Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus: An Interpretation of Aristotle's Categories in the Late Thirteenth Century (Studien Und Texte Zur Geistesgeschichte Des Mittelalters)

CATEGORIES AND LOGIC IN DUNS SCOTUS

STUDIEN UND TEXTE ZUR GEISTESGESCHICHTE DES MITTELALTERS BECRONDET VON

JOSEF KOCH W£ITERGEFOHRT VON

PAUL WILPERT und ALBERT ZIMMERMANN

HERAUSGEGEBEN VON

JAN A. AERTSEN IN ZUSAMMENARBEIT MIT

TZOTCHO BOlADjIEV, KENT EMERY, JR., ANDREAS SPEER und WOUTER GORIS

(MANAGING EDITOR)

BAND LXXVII

GIORGIO PINI

CATEGORIES AND LOGIC IN DUNS SCOTUS

CATEGORIES AND LOGI C IN DUNSSCOTUS An Interpretation ifAristotle's Categories in the Late Thirteenth Century

BY

GIORGIO PINI

BRILL LEIDEN· BOSTON· KaLN 2002

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnalune Categories and logic in Duns Scotus : an interpretation of Aristotle's Categories in the late thirteenth century I by Giorgio Pini. - Leiden ; Boston ; Koln :Brill, 2002 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters ; Bd. 77) [SBN 9(H)4-12329-6

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CONTENTS

Preface

vii

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Introduction. Chapter One: Categories and Logic in the Thirteenth Cen....................... tury.

19

Chapter Two: Intentions and Modes of Understanding in Thomas Aquinas.

45

Chapter Three: Second Intentions in Henry of Simon of Faversham, and Radulphus Brito.

68

Ghent,

99

Chapter Four: Second Intentions in Duns Scotus . . Chapter Five: Scotus on the Logical Consideration of Categories.

138

Chapter Six: Scotus's Reading of Aristotle's 'Categories'

171

Bibliography Primary sources. ..... ................ Secondary sources Index of Names........... . Index of Subjects ......................

.

203 208 219 .

223

P REFACE

Several studies have been devoted to Duns Scotus's theological and metaphysical output. His contributions to logic and philosophical logic, however, have not received much attention. Scotus's com­ mentaries on Porphyry's Isagoge and Aristotle's Categories, De Interpre­ tatione, and Sophistical Rqutations have often been considered youthful works, and consequently have been neglected. When con­ sidered against their background, however, Scotus's logical com­ mentaries disclose a fresh and brilliant reading of Aristotle and bear witness to the lively debates of the end of the thirteenth century. In this work, I do not intend to provide a general assessment of Duns Scotus's contribution to logic. Rather, I focus on a specific question, namely why Aristotle's Categories were considered a logical work and, consequently, how logic was thought to deal with categories. With this question in mind, I approach Scotus and his contempo­ raries' writings and logical doctrines. Since Scotus is particularly careful when dividing the respective fields of logic and metaphysics, I hope that this study will also shed light on how thirteenth-century authors conceived metaphysics as the science of what there is in the world as opposed to the way it is understood. During the elaboration of this work, I have contracted a debt of gratitude to many people and institutions. Among the latter, I am happy to mention the Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa, where in 1997 I defended my doctoral dissertation on some of the themes with which I deal in the present study . I am also fond of remem­ bering my time at University College London (1996-97) and the De Wulf-Masion Centrum at the Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (1997-99). The Italian CNR funded my stay in Leuven during the summer 1997 (Short Mobility Program). The Onderzoeksraad ( Research Council) of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven granted me a junior fellowship in the year 1998-99. The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto (where I stayed in 2000-01, thanks to a fellowship funded by the Mellon Foundation) provided an excellent place where I could carry out the final revision of this work. Among the people who helped me, I am particuarly grateful to

viii

PREFACE

Francesco Del Punta, who saw the beginning of this research and always provided his precious advice on most various matters. Marylin McCord Adams, Stefano Di Bella, Gianfranco Fioravanti, Massimo Mugnai, and Dominik Perler read an Italian version of some of the ideas that resulted into the present study. Michael J. Loux and Claude Panaccio read a first version of this work.

All of

them suggested many corrections and improvements. If I was not able to follow their advice on every matter, this was only due to my incapacity. Concetta Luna read a first version of the Introduction. Roberto Lambertini and Andrea Tabarroni generously shared their knowledge of medieval logic with me and provided much needed encouragement. Alessandro D. Conti, Silvia Donati, Stephen D. Dumont, and Cecilia Trifogli provided me with materials, ideas, and friendship. Conversations with them gready clarified my con­ fused views and saved me from many faux pas. Carlos Steel, Jos Decorte, and all the people at the De Wulf-Mansion Centrum made my stay in Leuven most profitable and enjoyable. Andreas Speer has been generous with advice and friendship, as always. Any errors contained in this book, of course, are entirely my re­ sponsibility. I finally wish to thank all the friends who made me feel at home whether in Pisa, London, Leuven, or Toronto. T his book is dedi­ cated to them.

INTRODUCTION

Since the time of Aristotle, categories have been the subject of much debate. This is, in part, because they are central to two con­ nected but distinct philosophical areas: the study of what there is in the world and the reflection on how we think about it. It is agreed that categories are classificatory notions, but there are some recurring questions. First, what sorts of objects are classified by means of categories? Second, how many categories are there? Third, can we give a derivation of categories so that we can be sure that the list is complete? For a long time, the debate on the nature of categories took the form of a discussion of the correct interpretation of Aristotle's work known as 'Categories'. In this study, I will focus on the logical inter­ pretation of Aristotle's treatise offered by certain philosophers at the end of the thirteenth century. By that time, commentators on Aris­ totle had developed the view that logic was the science concerned with the way we understand the world, rather than the study of the way the world is - which was seen as the object of metaphysics. So conceived, logic was regarded as a second-order knowledge, the study of the properties our intellect attributes to things insofar as they are understood. These authors also maintained that logic deals with specific, second-order objects, the so-called second intentions. The logical study of categories was part of the consideration of the way in which we understand things in the extra-mental world. The main focus of my inquiry will be John Duns Scotus (1265/66-1308), who provides a very coherent reading of Aris­ totle's Categories, a brilliant exercise in what we now call the philos­ ophy of logic. Since his insights can be fully appreciated only if compared to the positions of his predecessors and contemporaries, I have devoted much attention to other authors, in the hope of re­ trieving Scotus from the isolation to which some historians have rel­ egated him. Scotus and his contemporaries faced many problems that are similar to those of contemporary philosophers interested in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of logic, but there are also important differences between the two. As a consequence, I have tried to maintain and explain the language and approach to

2

INTRODUCTION

problems typical of Scotus and of his contemporaries in order to understand their project as they were likely to understand it them­ selves. I have also made a special effort to avoid general tags such as 'nominalism' and 'realism', which may be helpful in other contexts but here may mislead. For example, Scotus is usually classified as a realist, but his logical doctrine of categories turns out to have re­ markably weak ontological presuppositions. In general, we must be cautious in our approach in order to distinguish between the re­ spective realms of metaphysics and the philosophy of logic: what applies in one field may not hold in the other. This work can perhaps be better seen as an attempt to recon­ struct a phase in the history of Aristotelianism: the interpretation of Aristotle's Categories as a treatise of the philosophy of logic con­ cerned with concepts called 'second intentions'. By the time this in­ terpretation was developed, the debate on the Categories had already had a long history. Consequently, I will now cursorily review the most famous interpretations of the Categories from the time of Aris­ totle to the mid-thirteenth century.

I.

Aristotle

Aristotle presents his so-called list of categories in several places in his writings. Yet only twice does he list ten items: in chapter four of the Categories' and in chapter nine of the first book of the TopicSl. Another important passage where Aristotle introduces the cate­ gories is in chapter seven of the fifth book of the Metaphysics, where he lists only eight items.3 There are many obscurities in these pas­ sages, and interpreters have not ceased discussing them. Specifically, it is not clear whether Aristotle is introducing one and the same di­ vision in all three passages. Recently, it has even been doubted that Aristotle intends to provide a classification. Even when Aristotle is thought to be introducing a classification, however, it is clear neither what he is classifying nor how he obtains the list of the so-called cat­ egories.' I Cat. 4,Ib25-2a4. , Top. 1,9,I03b20-39. ' Met. V, 7,IOI7a22-27. 4 M. Frede, "Categories in Aristotle," in Studits in Aristotle, ed. D. J. O'Meara (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1981),1-24, reprinted

INTRODUCTION

3

Surprisingly, in Cat. 4 the term 'category' does not even appear. There Aristotle presents his list as the list of meanings of what is said without combination. Scholars usually interpret "things said without combination" as nouns and verbs, i.e. the simple terms keeping their signification even when they are not part of a sen­ tence.5 In Top. I, 9 Aristotle speaks of the ten items known as cate­ gories as of "the genera of the categories," namely, according to the most likely interpretation, the genera of the predications. Thus, in the Topics Aristotle sees categories as the ways in which predicates are attributed to subjects in sentences. First, the predicate says what the subject is; second, the predicate says by which quality the sub­ ject is modified, and so on.6 In Met. V, 7 Aristotle again links the ways in which something is said to be by itself with the "figures of the categories," i.e. the genera of predications. There he says that all the things that the genera of predications signifY are said to be by themselves.7 Let us focus on Cat. 4, which may be seen as the place where the categories are first introduced. It is well known that Aristotle's Cate­ gories presents several problems, and some doubts have even been raised as to its authenticity." Even though these doubts are usually in Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 987). 29-48; D. Mor­ rison, "The Taxonomical Interpretation of Aristotle's Categories: A Criticism," in A. Preus andj. P. Anton, eds., Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, vol. 5, Aristotle's Ontology (Albany, N. Y.: SUNY Press, 1 992), 1 9-46; D. Morrison, "Le statut cat
4

INTRODUCTION

disregarded, other obscurities remain. To begin with, its title cannot be traced back to Aristotle. Moreover, its unity is suspect: the last chapters, the so-called postpraedicamenta, seem to be an addition that poorly corresponds to the preceding chapters.9

As well, the first

chapter, devoted to the notions of homonymy, synonymy, and paronymy, does not clearly belong in the rest of the treatise and has always given much trouble to interpreters.lo We are now used to considering the

Categories,

and in particular

chapters 1-9, as a treatise in which Aristotle introduces a series of divisions or classifications of things. In the first chapter, Aristotle classifies things into three kinds according to the relationship they bear to their names and the corresponding accounts: some things are homonymous, others are synonymous, still others are parony­ mous. In the second chapter, Aristotle presents two divisions. The first division examines "things that are said," which are divided into things said with combination and things said without combination. Second, "things that are" are divided into four classes, thanks to the two relations of 'being said of a subject' and 'being in a subject'. In the fourth chapter, Aristotle introduces the most famous division: he sorts out things said without combination - which he has intro­ duced in the second chapter - into ten genera or kinds of things ac­ cording to their meanings. II Although Aristotle does not specifically call these kinds of things 'categories', that was the name under which they soon became famous. Thus, Aristotle introduces several classifications in the first chap­ ters of the

Categories. But what is he classifying? According to

which

New York: de Gruyter, 1983), translated as "The Title, Unity, and Authenticity of the Aristotelian 'Categories'. " In Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy, 24-28. 9 Ibid., 11·24. Already Andronicus of Rhodes,in the first century BC,had main­ tained that the postpratdicamen/(J were spurious. See H. B. Gottschalk, "The Earliest Aristotelian Commentators," in R. Sorabji, ed.,Arislolle Ta r nsformed. mentators and tluir Influence (London: Duckworth, 1990),66-67. 10 See C. Luna's notes to Simplicius, Commentaire sur tes Catigorits. Traduction

mrnli, sous la direction d, Iiseraut Hadot. Fascicult Ill. Priambult aux Galigorits. Gommrn­ taire au premier chapitr, d, Galigon,s (Leiden-New York-K0benhavn-Koln: E. J. Brill 1990),43-50. For some modern solutions to this problem,Frede, "Title,Unity," 2324; S. Menn, "Metaphysics, Dialectic and the Categories," Revue de mitaphysique ttl de moralt 100 (1995): 320-21; M. Wedin, "The Strategy of Aristotle's Gaugories," Archi. for Geschichu der Philosophi< 79 (1997): 1-26; C. Shields,Order in Multiplici!y. Homonymy in the Philosophy W Aristotlt(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999),20-21; W. R. Mann, Th, Discovery of Things: Aristotle's Categories and Their Contlxt (Princeton: Princeton Up, 2000),50·57. II Gat. I, l a l-15; 2, l aI6-19; 2, la20-b9; 4,Ib25-2a4.

INTRODUCTION

5

principles is he making these classifications? And is he classifying the same kind of entities in each case? These questions are central to the interpretation of the Categories. The manner in which Aristotle refers to the things he classifies "things that are said" and "things that are" - leaves much open to interpretation. The most convincing, and now generally accepted, reading is that Aristotle is classifYing things in the world although he sometimes carries out such classifications according to linguistic and semantic criteria. Aristotle, however, follows these linguistic criteria only inasmuch as they allow him to say something about things in the world. It is now generally accepted that the relations 'being said of' and 'being in', introduced in chapter two, hold between things and are therefore metaphysical relations, even though they clearly have linguistic counterparts. The division resulting from the crossed application of these two relations is a division of beings, not of words. Homonymy, synonymy, and paronymy, on the other hand, depend on language, but Aristotle uses these notions in order to point to real features of extra-mental things. 12 The same is true for the ten items Aristotle lists in chapter four; he is speaking of the things said without combination, which are quite apparently words. Such words are divided according to what they signifY. So if the list of the ten significations of uncombined items is seen as the list of the kinds of being, it follows that Aristotle is introducing a classification of being by a semantic criterion. Lin­ guistic and semantic considerations are therefore used inasmuch as they reveal something of the structure of things. Modern interpreters, therefore, usually see the Categories as a treatise on what there is. This interpretation, however, poses a se­ rious problem.'3 For also elsewhere does Aristotle speak of what there is, namely in his Metaphysics, and what he says there is quite different from what he says in the Categories. How can we explain such diversity between the ontological accounts Aristotle provides in two of his most famous works? 12 Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories, 75-76; M. Frede, "lndividuen bei Aristoteles," An­ tike und Abendland 24 ( 1 978): 16-17,3 1 , translated as "Individuals in Aristocle," in Es­ S'!1s, 49-50, 63; M. J. Loux, Primary Ousia: An Essay on Aristotle's Metaphysics Z and H (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991),2-4, 1 3-48; F. A. Lewis, Substance and Predi­ cation in Aristotle (Cambridge: CUp, 1 99 1 ), 49, 53-63; Mann, The Discovery, 26,54, 1 95-204. " See M. Matthen "The Categories and Aristotle's Ontology," Dialogue 17 (1 978): 228-43; MenD, "Metaphysics, Dialectic," 332-37.

6

INTRODUCTION

Several solutions have been put forth. The most successful one is perhaps the evolutionary hypothesis. According to this interpreta­ tion, Aristotle's ontology has evolved from a youthful version he gives in the Categories to a mature and revised doctrine he provides in the Metaphysics, where he introduced the notions of form and matter into his ontology and sometimes openly contradicts what he had previously maintained. 14 Alternatively, it can be held that the Categories and the Metaplrysics are both treatises on ontology but do not propose alternative systems. According to this view, the differ­ ence between the two works is of method and purpose: the Cate­ gories gives an elementary treatment of the same topics that the Metaphysics considers in a more advanced way.15

2. Aristotle's Categories between logic and metaphysics The ontological interpretation of Aristotle's Categories, however, was not always universally accepted. Already in ancient times inter­ preters wondered whether Aristotle's Categories was a work of meta­ physics, concerning beings, or rather a work of logic, concerning simple terms or concepts. 16 It is

an

old and revered opinion of the Peripatetic school that the

Categories is a logical treatise. It is as a consequence of this opinion that the Categories is the first work in the standard edition of Aris­ totle's writings, due probably to Andronicus of Rhodes (first century B. C.).17 Boethus of Sidon (middle of the first century B. C.), a pupil

1 4 See for example]. M. E. Moravcsik, ''Aristotle on Predication, " Philosophical Re­ view 76 (1967): 90; R. Dancy, "On Some of Aristotle's First Thoughts about Sub­ stance, " Philosophical Review 84 (1975): 338; D. W. Graham, Aristotle's Two Systems (Oxford: OUp' 1987); Loux, Primary Ousia, 4-5, 49-51; Lewis, Substance and Predica­ tion, 143. l5 M. Furth,Substance, Form and Psyche; An Aristotelian Metaplfjsics (Cambridge: CUp, 1988). 16 P. Hoffmann, "Categories et langage seIon Simplicius. La question du «skopos» du traite aristotelicien des Categories," in Simplicius. Sa vie, son fEUvre, sa survie: Actes du Col/oque international de Paris, 28 sept. - ler oct. 1985, ed. I. Hadot (Berlin-New York: de Gruyter, 1987), 68-72; S. K. Strange, introduction to Porphyry, On Aristotle Cau­ gones (London: Duckworth, 1992), 5-7. For a general introduction to Late Ancient commentators, see R. Sorabji, "The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle," in Sorabji, ed., Aristotle Transformed, 1-30. 1 7 Strange, introduction to Porphyry, On Aristotle Categories, 7; P. Moraux, Der Aris­ toulismus bei den Griechen. Von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias, vol. I (Berlin-New

7

INTRODUCTION

of Andronicus, is also known to have maintained that the

Categories

is a work of logic. IS But the most prominent Peripatetic who adopts this view tury A.

is Alexander of Aphrodisias (beginning of the third cen­

D.).19 According to Alexander, in the Metaphysics Aristotle di­

vides simple beings and the corresponding simple concepts into ten genera, but in the

Categories,

which is a logical work, he only inci­

dentally deals with categorial being, for he mainly focuses on simple significative expressions insofar as they are significative.20 Alexander of Aphrodisias's name is, therefore, linked with the first appearance of the doctrine that categories can be considered in two ways, as the genera of beings and as signified by words. Meta­ physics considers categories in the first way, logic - and specifically Aristotle's

Categories

-

in the second. Many ancient and medieval in­

terpreters accepted this non-ontological interpretation of the

gories.

Cate­

Recently, some scholars have proposed a renewed version of

it. They maintain that the

Categories should

be seen as a dialectical

treatise or as a manual on dialectic, but in no way as a treatise on ontology. 2

I

The interpretation of the

Categories

as a work of metaphysics is

also quite old. Its most famous champion is Plotinus (A.

269170),

D. 205-

whose detailed criticism of Aristotle presupposes an onto­

logical reading of his treatise.22 Plotinus himself takes over the work of two other philosophers, Lucius and Nicostratus (second half of the second century), as Simplicius makes clear.23

York: de Gruyter, 1973), 45-94, 97-113; Gottschalk, "The Earliest Aristotelian Com­ mentators," 55-67. 16 Moraux, Der Aristotelismus, vol. I, 147-64; Gottschalk, "The Earliest Aristotelian Commentators," 74-77. 19 J. Barnes et at.,introduction to Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle Prior Ana­ {ytics 1.1-7 (London: Duckworth, 1991); R. W. Sharples, 'l\lexander of Aphrodisias: Scholasticism and Innovation," in W Haase and H. Temporini, eds., Arifstieg und Niedergang der Romischen l#/t 2.36.2 (Berlin-New York: de Gruyter, 1987),1176-243. 2Q Porph. In Cat. 58, 5-6, 27-9. See above, n. 17. 21 Matthen, "The Categories and Aristotle's Ontology;" MenD, "Metaphysics, Di­ alectic." 22 Plotinus Enn. VII, 1-24. See C. C. Evangeliou, "The Plotinian Reduction of Aristotle's Categories," Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987): 147-62,reprinted in Preus and Anton,eds.,Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, 47-67; Evangeliou,Arisrotle's Categories and Porphyry (Leiden-New York-K0benhavn·Ko1n: E. J. Brill, 1988),93-128; S. K. Strange, "Plotinus, Porphyry, and the Neoplatonic Interpretation of the Categories, " i n Haase and Temporini, eds.,Atifstieg, 964-70. 23 Simpl.ln Cal. I, 18-22; 73, 27-28. On Lucius and Nicostratus, see K. Praechter, "Nikostratos cler Platoniker," Hermes 57 (1922): 481-517, reprinted in Praechter,

8

INTRODUCTION

Plotinus's main insight is that Aristotle's classification of beings is not exhaustive, for it applies only to sensible beings and leaves out intelligible beings. He says: ". . . in their classification they [viz. , Aristotelians1 are not speaking about the intelligible beings: so they did not want to classifY

all beings, but left out those which are most

authentically beings. "24 (Trans. Armstrong. ) Plotinus's most famous pupil, Porphyry (A. D. ca

232/3 - 305), is Categories is

the first Platonist to adopt the Peripatetic view that the

a work of logic in order to counter his master's objections. Since the

Categories

concerns not beings but significative words, it does not

propose an ontology conflicting with the .Platonic one.25 Moreover, Porphyry agrees with Plotinus that Aristotle's

Categories

does not

deal with intelligible beings, but he thinks that this is due not to a defect on Aristotle's part but to the nature of his treatise since words, which are the subject matter of the

Categories,

are primarily

applied to material things. 26 Porphyry also takes over the opinion of one of Alexander of Aphrodisias's masters, Herminus (middle of the second century A. D.),27 that the

Categories

is a work for begin­

ners, where all the subtleties that only most advanced students can grasp are avoided.28 This logical and pedagogical consideration of the

Categories

allows Porphyry to reconcile Aristotelian logic and

Platonic metaphysics in a way that is influential on all the subse­ quent interpretations of Aristotle's treatise.

Kleine Schriften, ed. H. Dorrie (Hildesheim-New York: Olms, 1973), 101-37; P. Moraux, Der Anslotelismus, vol. 2 (Berlin-New York: de Gruyter, 1984), 528-63; Gottschalk,"The Earliest Aristotelian Commentators. " 24 Plotinus Enn. VI I, 1. 25 Porph. In Cal. 56,14-58,20 (transl. Strange, 31-35); A. C. Uoyd,"Neoplatonic Logic and Aristotelian Logic," Phronesis I (1955-6): 58-72; Hoffmann, langage," 72; Evangeliou, Aristotle's Categories; S. Ebbesen, "Porphyry's Legacy to Logic: A Reconstruction," in Ebbesen, Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle's So� phistici Elenchi, vol. 1, Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum,vol. 7, part I (Leiden-K0benhavn-Koln: E.]. Brill, 1981), reprinted in Sorabji,ed.,Anslolle Traniformed, 141-71; Strange,"Plotinus,Porphyry," 974. 26 Porph.ln Cal. 91,19-27 (transl. Strange, 81). 27 Moraux,Der Aruwtelismus, vol. 2, 363-74. " Porph. In Cal. 59,20-25 (transl. Strange, 37). Porphyry takes over this idea from Alexander of Aphrodisias's master,Herminus.

INTRODUCTION

9

3. The standard reading qf the Categories Simplicius, in his commentary on the Categories (written after A. D. 53 2), gives the fullest account of the Late Ancient debate on cate­ gories. He presents three main positions. Some think that the Cate­ gories concerns beings, while others believe that it concerns words, and still others, concepts. According to Simplicius, Alexander of Aphrodisias was the first to adopt the solution that has become stan­ dard, namely, that the Categories deals with the words signifying the ten genera of being by virtue of the ten concepts representing them. Porphyry embraces this position, which is also adopted in all extant Neoplatonic commentaries on the Categories. Simplicius him­ self adopts this view and also introduces the consequent opinion that categories are considered both in metaphysics and in logic from different points of views.29 Porphyry, in his extant commentary, presents the position Simpli­ cius attributes to him, but in a simplified form. He drops any refer­ ence to concepts as intermediate between words and things and says that the Categories deals with words signifying things. Probably, Por­ phy ry attributed a central role to concepts in his long commentary on the Categories, which has been lost. 30 Boethius, in his commentary written ca. 509-5 1 1 , almost always depends on Porphyry's short commentary.3J Specifically, he adopts Porphyry's opinion on the subject matter of the Categories as a work of logic dealing with significative words insofar as they are significa29 Simplicius gives the most complete account of the debate (In Cat. 12, 3-13). See Hofm f ann, 30 Porph. In Cat. 58, 5-20 (transl. Strange, 34-35). See Ebbesen, "Porphyry's Legacy to Logic." In his own commentary on the Categories,Simplicius quotes large sections of Porphyry's lost commentary, traditionally known as 'ad Gedalium" from the name of its dedicatee. (I thank Concetta Luna for this remark.) SL On the date of Boethius's commentary, L. M. de Rijk, "On the Chronology of Boethius' Works on Logic," 2 ( 1964): 125. On Boethius's dependence on Porphyry,j. Shiel, "Boethius' commentaries on Aristotle," Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies 4 (1958): 217-44, reprinted in Sorabji, ed., Aristotle Transflrm,d, 349-72. Shiel's conclu­ sions, however, should be corrected in the light of S. Ebbesen, "Boethius as an Aris­ totelian Commentator," in]. Wiesner, ed., Aristoteles: Wtrk und Wirkung, vol. 2 (Berlin­ New York: de Gruyter, 1987), reprinted in Sorabji, ed., Aristotlt Transformed, 373-91. Like Porphyry, Boethius planned to write a second, longer commentary on Aristotle's Categories, the only extant fragment of which is edited in P. Hadot, "Un fragment du commentaire perdu de Boece sur les 'Categories' d'Aristote dans Ie codex Bernensis 363, " Archives d'hirtoire doctrinalt et litteraire du M�tn Age 26 ( 1959): 1 1-27.

10

INTRODUCTION

tive. Properly speaking, Boethius maintains that the categories are not the ten genera of being but the words signifying them.32 Boethius's commentary on the

Categories

had much diffusion

the West.33 Through Boethius, the Peripatetic and Porphyrian inter­ pretation of the

Categories became standard among Latin commen­

tators, for whom Boethius was the only source on Late Ancient de­ bates, at least until Simplicius's commentary was translated in 1266.34 It is thus that the logical interpretation of the

Categories

became

dominant in the Latin West. Among the Arabs, Avicenna (d. 1037) agrees that the

Categories is a work of

logic, dealing with words more

than with beings. For that reason, he maintains that the doctrine of the categories, which is an ontological doctrine, is not contained in the

Categories,

but in works devoted to metaphysics.35

All Latin commentators on the

Categories

writing before the thir­

teenth century adopt Porphyry's and Boethius's descriptions of the

Categories

as a treatise concerning words insofar as words signifY

things, as Boethius says. Although they agree that the

Categories is a

work of logic, in the years immediately preceding the twelfth cen­ tury a debate developed

about the correct interpretation of

Boethius's formula.36 Should Boethius's sayings be interpreted in the sense that the

Categories is

a treatise entirely concerning words,

or should it be said that Aristotle sometimes speaks of words but at other times speaks of things, especially because words gain their properties from things? Supporters of the former interpretation posited categories

in voce.

Roscelin (ca. 1050-ca. 1125) and the

young Abelard (1079-1142) were among them. Supporters of the

" Boethius In Cat. 1 6 1 A. O. Lewry, "Boethian Logic in the Medieval West," in M. Gibson, ed., Boethius: His Life, Thought and Influence (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981): 90-1 34. 34 A. Pattin, introduction to Simplicius, Commentaire sur les Categories d'Aristote. Tra­ duction de Guillaume de Moerheke, ed. A. Pattin, vol. 1 (Louvain-Paris: Publications Uni­ versitaires de Louvain - Editions Beatrice Nauwelaerts, 1 97 1 ). " A. I. Sabra, ''Avicenna on the Subject Matter of Logic," The Journal of Philosophy 77 ( 1 980): 747-64; and especially D. GulaS, Avieenna and the Amtoulian Tradition. Intro­ duction to Reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works (Leiden-New York-Kebenhavn-Koln: E. J. Brill, 1 988), 265-67. 36 See J. Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard (Cambridge: CUp, 1997), 1 0816. On these Categories commentaries, see Marenbon, "Medieval Latin Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts. Before c. 1 150 AD," in Glosses and Com­ mentarns on Aristotelian Logical Texts. The SyriacJ Arabic and Medieval Latin Traditions, ed. C. Burnett, 77-127 (London: The Warburg Institute, 1 993). 33

11

INTRODUCTION

latter interpretation - including William of Champeaux (ca. 1068ca. 1122) and the late Abelard - posited categories pute on the reading of Aristode's

Categories should

with the debate concerning the nature of

in

reo This dis­

not be confused

universals, namely

whether they are words or things. Somebody can read the

Categories

as containing many statements about things while being a nomi­ nalist as far as universals are concerned. The case of Abelard pro­ vides enough evidence for this since he seems to have changed his interpretation of the

Categories from in voce to in re while remaining a

nominalist throughout his careerY Moreover, notwithstanding their different opinions on how to read the views continue maintaining that the

Categories, adherents to both Categories is a work of logic and

do not question Boethius's description of its subject matter.'s This is still the position of one of the last

nominates,

writing probably at the

end of the twelfth century.39

4.

The thirteenth century

Porphyry is undoubtedly the author who played the most important role in spreading the logical interpretation of

the

Categories.

Scholars maintain that he took over the logical interpretation from Peripatetics in order to reconcile Aristode's logic with Platonic metaphysics. Commentators coming after Porphyry adopted his po­ sition, even though they may have been unaware of the reasons be­ hind his choice. This situation went on until the beginning of the thirteenth cen­ tury, when the interpretation of the

Categories entered

a new phase.

Between the end of twelfth and the beginning of thirteenth cen-

37 Marenbon, The Philosop'" qf Peter Abelard, 108-09; Marenbon, "Vocalism, Nom­ inalism and the Commentaries on the 'Categories' from the Earlier Twelfth Cen­ tury," Vivarium 30 (1992): 51-61. 38 See for example Abelard, Glossae in Cat.,Il l: "Cuius etiam teste Boethio in hoc opere intentio est de primis vocibus prima rerum genera significantibus in eo quod res significant, disputare, hoc est carum significationem secundum naturas subiec­ tarum rerum aperire." On twelfth-century Nominales,see the monographic issue of Vivarium 30 (1992). On their position on the subject matter of the Categories, see S. Ebbesen, "Philoponus, 'Alexander' and the Origins of Medieval Logic," in R. Sorabji, ed., Aristotle Traniformed,456-58. 39 s. Ebbesen, "Anonymous D'Orvillensis' Commentary on Aristotle's Categories," Cahiers de l'lnstilut du Moyen Age grre et latin 70 (1999): 251-52.

12

INTRODUCTION

turies Aristotle's

Metaphysics,

which had long been lost to Latin au­

thors, became available to the West again.40 The knowledge of Aris­ totle's

Metaphysics implied a new consideration of the Categories, Metaphysics Latin authors could find a treatment of cat­

since in the

egories partially different from the one with which they were fa­ miliar in the

Categories. F irst, in the Categories Aristotle does not men­ Metaphysics. Second, in the Categories Aristotle regards substantial concrete indi­ viduals as primary substances, whereas in the Metaphysics he main­

tion matter, which plays a very important role in the

tains that the foremost and true substances are forms. Thus, interpreters had to find a solution to the apparent contra­ diction between what Aristotle says in the says in the

Metaphysics.

Categories

and what he

This problem, which is well known to con­

temporary scholars, became inescapable for medieval interpreters once they acquired familiarity with Aristotle's ingly, the old logical interpretation of the

Metaphysics. Surpris­ Categories kept its validity

and allowed commentators to solve this new problem. For them, in the

Categories Aristotle

speaks as a logician and considers the cate­

gories as significative words, whereas in the

Metaphysics he

speaks as

a metaphysician and considers the categories as the genera of ex­ tramental things. The doctrine of the twofold consideration of the categories, derived from Porphyry, assumed new importance for the interpretation of Aristotle's work and of the doctrine of categories in general. In this work, I treat the interpretation of the

Categories as

a work

of logic in the thirteenth century, after the translation and diffusion of Aristotle's

Metaphysics

in the West. This period is characterized

by the rise of the theory of second intentions in logic. Second in­ tentions are concepts of a specific kind, which constitute the au­ tonomous field of logic and give logic its status as a science separate from other sciences. Latin authors received the notion of second in­ tention from the Arabs and subjected it to debate at the end of thir­ teenth century. Since the debate on logic and intentions had mo­ mentous consequences for the doctrine of the logical study of the categories, I will dwell on the main doctrines of second intentions developed between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

40. G. Diem, "Les traductions greco-Iatines de la Metaphysique au moyen age: Le probleme de la Metaphysica Vetus," Archiv for Geschichte der Philosophie 49 (1967): 10-12.

INTRODUCTION

13

Second intentions are regarded as concepts and as mental enti­ ties, but the authors writing between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries carefully distinguished logic from psychology. They main­ tained that a concept can be considered in two ways, either with re­ gard to its mental existence or with regard to its intentional content. To the extent that a concept is something in the mind, it is studied by psychology. To the extent that a concept represents something and has content, it is studied by logic. A concept exists subjectively as an individual in the mind of each human being who possesses it, but its content is something universal and objective. Thus, the theory of intentions can be seen as an attempt to provide logic with its proper subject matter and to give it objectivity and independence of psychology. 'Syllogism', 'proposition', 'genus', and 'species' are terms signi­ fying second intentions, and thirteenth-century logicians maintain that logic deals with such concepts insofar as they have content and are representations. But the questions is, What do second intentions represent? Later medieval authors developed two answers to this question. Some held that second intentions represent the way in which we understand things, others maintained that they represent things in the world as conceived in a certain way. By the end of the thirteenth century, the doctrine of the twofold consideration of the categories was modified in order to accommo­ date it to the doctrine of second intentions. It was commonly held that categories can be considered either as kinds of beings or as foundations of second intentions. The controversy moved, there­ fore, from the nature of the categories to the nature of second in­ tentions viewed as the properties pertaining to the categories insofar as they are understood by us. What relationship holds between these properties and the real properties pertaining to categories as real beings? What precisely is "a category as understood by us?" And what relationship holds between a thing considered as understood and a thing considered by itself? These are some of the questions that I will consider when dealing with the authors of the end of the thirteenth century. I will focus on John Duns Scotus's commentaries on Porphyry's Isagoge and Aristotle's Categories, thought to have been written in the last decade of the thirteenth century." This work is intended as an 41

On dating Duns Scotus's commentaries, see R. Andrews tl at., introduction to

14

INTRODUCTION

introduction to Scotus's doctrine of the categories as developed in his logical writings, and more in general as a presentation of some of the main themes of Scotus's philosophy of logic. In order to un­ derstand Scotus correcdy, I will also turn my attention to some of his predecessors and contemporaries, including Thomas Aquinas (d.

1 274), Peter of Auvergne (d.

1 304), Simon of Faversham

(d.1 306), and Radulphus Brito (d. ca. 1 320), who were all active in the Paris arts faculty between 1 270 and 1 300. Before giving a brief sketch of what is to follow, I wish to make some general observations about the way in which the medieval au­ thors used the notion of a category. I will often refer to a category as a type of being or a basic essence, from a metaphysical point of view, or, from a logical perspective, as a predicate or set of predi­ cates of a certain kind. There seem to be two basic ambiguities in­ volved in such a notion. The first ambiguity is between an extentional and intentional in­ terpretation of what a category is. This is a particular case of the ambiguity concerning the notions of genus and species in Aristode. On an extentional interpretation, a category (or a genus or a species) is the set of all the items of a certain kind. For example, the category of substance is the set of all the substances, the category of quality is the set of all the qualities, and so on. It is according to this extentional interpretation that it is said that something "falls into" or "belongs to" a category. By contrast, with an intentional inter­ pretation, a category is what constitutes something as an item of a certain kind. For example, the category of substance is the type of essence that constitutes an entity such as Socrates , the category of quality is the type of essence that constitutes

an

entity such as

whiteness. It is well known that in Aristode's writings it is sometimes difficult, if not inapproriate, to divide these two interpretations. The same thing can be said about Aristode's medieval interpreters. When they spoke of categories, they conceived them as both exten­ tional and intentional notions. Sometimes one of the aspects pre­ vails over the other, other times the two aspects are intermingled in such a way that it would be futile to try to separate the two concep­ tions. One could be tempted to say that, when medieval authors

John Duns Scotus, Q;laestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge et Q;laestiones super Praedica­ menta Aristotelis, Opera Philosophica,vol. I (St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Insti­ tute, 1999), xxix-xxxi.

15

INTRODUCTION

spoke from a logical point of view, they conceived categories as predicates extentionally comprising the items falling into them, whereas when they spoke of categories from a metaphysical point of view they conceived categories as intentional constituents of things. This may be true in some cases; however, it is definitely not always the case. Usually, a modern reader can do nothing else than take this ambiguity into account, for a reduction of Aristotle's doctrine to a purely extentional or a purely intentional interpretation would result into an illegitimate simplification. A second ambiguity in the ancient and medieval use of the no­ tion of category arises when, on the one hand, a category is viewed extentionally as the highest genus predicable of all the less universal items falling into it or intentionally as constituting all the items of a certain kind, and, on the other hand, a category is considered as the whole hierarchy of items of a certain kind, whether these items are predicates, essences, or whatever. According to the first interpreta­ tion, a category is a predicate or an essence, such as substance or quality. According to the second interpretation, a category is a set of predicates or essences hierarchically ordered from the most uni­ versal to the least universal, such as the series starting with sub­ stance and ending up with Socrates, passing through the notions of animal and man. Interestingly, medieval authors were aware of this ambiguity of the notion of a category. Radulphus Brito, writing at the end of the thirteenth century, explicitly refers to it as two inter­ pretations of what a category is: on the one hand, a category is the highest genus in a hierarchy of items

coordinatione), on the

(genus generalissimum in aliqua

other hand a category is the whole hierarchy of

items from the highest genus to the individuals of that kind

ordinatio quae est a generalissimo usque ad individua)."

(tota co­

Brito, however,

did not consider this twofold interpretation of what a category is as causing particular troubles. He seemed to maintain that both as­ pects are present in the notion of a category, and that sometimes we focus on the first aspect, sometimes on the second. In what follows, we have to take into account this twofold interpretation of a cate­ gory, but again we can scarcely do more than register such an am­ biguity. If we had to separate all the occurrences of 'category' as 'highest genus' from the occurrences of 'category' as 'hierarchy of items', we would end up with the conclusion that medieval authors 42

See chapter 5,

n.

40.

16

INTRODUCTION

confused these notions. This conclusion, however, is not very inter­ esting. What is interesting is that medieval authors thought that these two meanings of 'category ' were both present in the notion of what a category is. The situation is similar to that of the notion of signification. If we had to reduce the medieval notion of significa­ tion to the contemporary notions of meaning and reference, we would be compelled to conclude that the medieval notion was ir­ reparably blurred, and put the discussion to an end!3 From a his­ torical point of view, however, what is interesting is precisely that medieval authors had such a confused or, better, complex notion of signification, and that they achieved remarkable results using this notion. The same remark applies to the notion of a category. It is a complex notion with a complex history, and in what follows I will try to reconstruct a particular moment of that history, from a par­ ticular point of view. I say in advance that not all ambiguities con­ nected with such a notion will be clarified. Nonetheless, I hope that some light will be shed at least on some specific aspects of the his­ tory of such a notion, notably on the distinction between a logical and a metaphysical consideration of what a category is. A second general remark concerns my way of referring to words, concepts, and things. In the writings of the ancient and medieval authors I will take into account, the distinction between use and mention of a term is sometimes blurred. Any way, I have tried to make it clear, wherever possible, on which occasions medieval au­ thors intended to speak of a word, of a concept, or of a thing in the world. I have adopted the convention of using single quotation marks to single out references to words (e.g.,'animal'), italics to single out references to concept (e.g., anima�, and plain character to refer to items in the world (e.g., animal). In what follows, I have devoted much attention to Thomas Aquinas and other authors such as Peter of Auvergne, Simon of Faversham, and Radulphus Brito. I do not intend to suggest that these were the only actors in the debate on intentions at the end of the thirteenth century, nor do I want to hold that Scotus was di­ rectly acquainted with the works of all these authors. We still know too little about the logical teachings in Paris and Oxford in Scotus's " See P. V. Spade, "The Semantics of Terms," in N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, and). Pinborg, eds., The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: CUp, 1 982), 1 88-89.

INTRODUCTION

17

time to give a complete and clear picture of the different positions held by different authors. What I will try to do, however, is to shed some light and give a first sketch of such debates. I have chosen those authors because their writings, which are relatively easy to ac­ cess since most of them have been critically edited, can help us re­ construct the main positions Scotus faced when commenting on Aristotle's

Categories.

I hope that I will at least be able to indicate

where the delicate points of the doctrine of categories and second intentions lie. So, for example, I have decided to treat Thomas Aquinas's approach to intentions quite extensively not because I maintain that his teachings had a direct influence on Scotus. I think that it is still premature to draw such a conclusion. It is unquestion­ able, however, that Thomas's teachings had a determinant role in setting the philosophical agenda for the authors of Scotus's genera­ tion, and that studying his doctrine of intentions is an excellent in­ troduction to the issues Scotus and his contemporaries faced. I will be content if I manage to give the general coordinates within which the debate on logic and categories took place at the end of the thir­ teenth century, even though so many points of the picture I will pro­ vide still have to be filled in. I have organized my work into six chapters. In the first chapter, I present the doctrine of the twofold consideration of the categories, in metaphysics and logic, as developed in the thirteenth century by authors writing before the introduction of the doctrine of second intentions. Since the common opinion at the end of the thirteenth century is that logic considers categories insofar as they are subject to second intentions, an understanding of the doctrine of second intentions appears to be a prerequisite to appreciate the doctrine of the logical study of categories. Accordingly, in chapters two, three, and four I turn to some of the most important views on second in­ tentions in the thirteenth century. Specifically, in the second chapter, I expound Thomas Aquinas's influential doctrine of intentions. Second intentions - or, as Aquinas says, simply 'intentions' - are re­ garded as concepts representing not things but other concepts. They are, therefore, concepts of concepts. In the third chapter, I present another doctrine of second intentions. Simon of Faversham and Radulphus Brito develop a doctrine according to which second intentions are not concepts of concepts but representations of things as related to other things. In the fourth chapter, I present Duns Scotus's doctrine of second intentions. Scotus's doctrine un-

18

INTRODUCTION

derwent several stages, from his logical works to his theological and metaphysical writings. It can be seen as a sophisticated version of Thomas Aquinas's view, developed in such a way as to respond to the criticisms to which it had been subject. After this long

excursus on second intentions,

I return to the doc­

trine of the logical consideration of the categories. In the fifth chapter I apply my analysis of second intentions to the case of cat­ egories, and I show the effects each doctrine of intentions has on the doctrine of the logical study of categories. Specifically, I de­ scribe how Duns Scotus and Radulphus Brito developed different views on the role categories play in logic. Finally, in the sixth chapter, I give a brief presentation of Duns Scotus's reading of Aristotle's Categories. Scotus saw Aristotle's treatise as a logical work, dealing not with extramental things but with the way we represent extramental things. His interpretation appears to be one of the most coherent from a philosophical point of view, and it attests to the autonomy that logic had acquired from other sciences by the end of the thirteenth century.

CHAPTER ONE CATEGORIES AND LOGIC IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

Scotus's doctrine of categories is based on the assumption that there are two ways of considering categories. First, metaphysics studies categories as types of beings. Second, logic studies categories in­ sofar as our intellect understands them and attributes some proper­ ties to them. I Since two different disciplines study categories in two different ways, there is no simple answer to the classical question: What is a category? If the question is asked from a metaphysical point of view, Scotus thinks that the correct answer is that a cate­ gory is one of the basic essences or types of being. If the question is asked from a logical point of view, however, he maintains that the correct answer is that a category is a type of being insofar as it is un­ derstood. Since Scotus also thinks that a thing considered as under­ stood is a concept, it follows that in logic categories are concepts, and precisely the basic univocal concepts representing things in the extra-mental world. What is the exact significance of the doctrine according to which categories can be considered in two ways? Specifically, what the metaphysical and the logical considerations of categories amount to? Moreover, is the doctrine of the twofold consideration of the categories original to Scotus? We can answer these questions if we look at Scotus's doctrine against its historical background. By doing so, we can realize both what Scotus owes to his predecessors and what he develops in an original way. In this chapter, I present the doctrine of the logical, as opposed to the metaphysical, consideration of the categories in the thir­ teenth century. First, I consider the views on logic and on the logical study of categories in authors such as Robert Kilwardby and Albert the Great, who wrote before the introduction of the doctrine of the so-called second intentions. Second, I give a general sketch of the doctrine of second intentions as the subject in logic of the authors I

Duns Scotus Super Praed.

q.

2,

n.

5 (OPh,

J,

258).

20

CHAPTER ONE

of the late thirteenth century. Third, I show how some of Scotus's predecessors and contemporaries link the doctrine of second inten­ tions to the doctrine of the logical study of categories. I postpone a more detailed account of second intentions to the subsequent chap­ ters.

I.

Robert Kilwardby on the logical consideration rif categories

Robert Kilwardby wrote his logical commentaries during his re­ gency as a master in the faculty of arts of Paris between 1 235 and 1 245, before he entered the Dominican order2. Since his concep­ tion of logic is not influenced yet by the doctrine of second inten­ tions, it is remarkable that he has already developed a doctrine of the twofold consideration of categories. This fact confirms that the two doctrines are originally independent of one another. Kilwardby's

conception

of logic

is strongly influenced by

Boethius. He maintains that the subject matter of logic is syllogism, which medieval authors regard as the main form of deductive rea­ soning. This opinion on the subject matter of logic is common both at Kilwardby's time and afterwards. Kilwardby also divides logic ac­ cording to the parts of syllogism, which are either material or formal. The matter of a syllogism is a proposition either potentially or actually constituting a syllogism. By contrast, the form of a syllo­ gism is its deductive structure. Since the

Categories and the De Inter­

pretatione

can be seen as dealing with propositions and their con­ stituents, these two treatises deal with the matter of syllogism. On

the other hand, the Prior Ana!Jitics analyses the deductive structure of syllogisms, whereas Aristode's other works on logic

!Jitics, Topics, Sophistical RifUtations)

(Posterior Ana­

deal with different kinds of syllo­

gisms and are subsequent to the division of syllogism according to its material and formal parts.3

2 For the dates of Kilwardby's logical commentaries, see O. Lewry, "The Oxford Condemnation of 1277 in Grammar and Logic," in English Logic and Semanticsfrom the End oj the Twelfth Gtntury to t1u Time oj Ockham and Burkigh: Acts oj t1u Fourth Euro­ pean Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, ed. H. A. G. Braakhuis, C. H. Kneep­ kens, and L. M. de Rijk (Nijmegen: ingenium Publishers, 1981), 277. i quote Kil­ wardby's works from O. Lewry, Robert KilwardhY1 Writings on the Logica vetus, Studied with Regard to Their Teaching and Method, (D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1978). , Robert Kilwardby Notulae super Praed. (ed. Lewry, 370.23-41).

CATEGORIES AND LOGIC IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

21

Kilwardby locates the study of categories in the part of logic dealing with of the matter of sy llogisms. This matter, as we have seen, is a proposition. Now, a proposition is in turn a speech made up of terms, considered not according to their grammatical features but insofar as they signifY something. Consequently, Kilwardby maintains that logic is a sermocinal science, dealing with syllogism considered as a form of speech. Categories fits in this conception of logic because they are the genera of the terms constituting the matter of syllogisms. Kilwardby takes for granted Boethius's opinion on the subject matter of the Categories, but he carefully distinguishes two questions. On the one hand, one can ask what the subject matter of the book called 'Categories' is. Kilwardby agrees with Boethius's view that Aristotle studies categories as kinds of terms referring to things through concepts. On the other hand, one may ask how categories can be studied. It is when dealing with this second problem that Kil­ wardby approaches the problem of the nature of categories. Kilwardby starts asking whether there can be a science of the first genera of things, for science is the knowledge of causes, but there are no causes of the first genera. He answers that there can be a sci­ ence of the first genera of things if they are considered as consisting of matter and form! What Kilwardby means is that any thing be­ longing to a category can be considered according to its constituting principles or causes, which are matter and form, since he assumes that any thing belonging to a category is constituted of matter and form. Thus, there can be a causal science of categories, inasmuch as there can be a causal science of things belonging to the categories. Kilwardby remarks, however, that the real philosopher, and not the logician, studies categories as composed of matter and form, for it is the real philosopher who deals with the principles of material things. Studying the principles of sensible substances, the real philosopher can first ascend from material to immaterial substances, then he can further ascend from the multiplicity of immaterial sub­ stances to the highest immaterial substance, i.e. God.5 • Ibid. (ed. Lewry, 368.25-29): '>\d hec ergo notandum: ad primum quidem dicimus quod generum primorum est sciencia, et est illorum accepcio possibilis per causam. Cum enim unumquodque eorum ex materia et forma aggregatum, sicut patebit in sequentibus, et ideo possibilis est eorum cognicio per sua principia." 5 Ibid. (ed. Lewry, 368.30-34): "Et hec cognicio est propria primo philosopho; con­ siderat enim in principiis substancie sensibilis, et consequenter in principiis sub-

22

CHAPTER ONE

By contrast, logicians, as Kilwardby remarks, do not discuss the nature of the categories but assume them as their subject. Conse­ quently, they cannot ask what kind of things categories are or what their principles are. Logicians can only demonstrate that some at­ tributes pertain to categories.6 What are these attributes pertaining to categories and how does logic study them? Kilwardby clarifies this point when focusing di­ rectly on the way both first philosophy and logic study categories: And what is asked after that is solved in this way, that the first philoso­ pher's attention is turned to those things [scil., the categories] without taking into account the relationship to speech. On the other hand, the logician's attention is turned to them because of that relationship. In­ deed, the first philosopher considers them as they are parts and species of being, whereas the logician considers them as they act as predicates and subjects. And in addition to this, the first philosopher's attention is turned to the parts of being only insofar as they are re­ duced to being. The logician's attention, however, is turned to being only with respect to its parts.7

In this passage, Kilwardby provides two reasons for the different treatment of categories in logic and in metaphysics. The first reason why the logical treatment of categories is dif­ ferent from the metaphysical is that logic considers categories as re­ lated to speech, namely as they function as predicates or subjects in a sentence. Here Kilwardby resorts to his notion of logic as a ser­ mocinal science, i.e. as the science dealing with speech and with the formation and use of sentences.8 He does not distinguish a rational

stande insensibilis, reducens ornnes substancias sensibiles ad insensibiles, et insensi­ biles ornnes ad unam . . . " 6 Ibid. (ed. Lewry, 368.37-44): "Set iste modus non est conueniens logica, quia genera prima sint ei pro subiecto et partibus subiecti. De huiusmodi autem in sci­ enda oportet supponere quia sunt quid sunt, passiones autem de cis per causas cognoscerc, et is est modus istius sciencie; supponit enim substanciam et quantitatem esse ex suis principiis, et de eis passiones inquirit et proprietates." 7 Ibid. (ed. Lewry, 369.5·14): "Et quod consequenter queritur soluitur per hoc quod intencio primi philosophi stat super hoc preter relacionem ad sermonem, in­ tencio vero logici per relacionem, quia primus philosophus considerat hee prout sunt partes et species enris, logicus veTO prout in predicacione et subieccione consistunt. Et preter hoc intencio primi philosophi non stat super partes entis nisi in quantum reducuntur ad ens; intencio autem logici non stat super ens nisi in suis partibus." • Robert Kilwardby Not. super Porph. (ed. Lewry, 359.29-3 1 ): "Patet eciam cui parti [ed., parte] philosophie supponuntur quia racionali aut sermocinali: racionalis enim non omnino a sermocinali absoluitur."

CATEGORIES AND LOGIC IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

23

from a sermocinal part of philosophy, since he maintains that a con­ sideration of concepts always implies a consideration of speech. This conception of logic will become obsolete after Kilwardby, but it is the common view at his time. Accordingly, Kilwardby main­ tains that logic considers categories as linguistic entities, namely as the genera of predicates and subjects constituting sentences. On the other hand, first philosophy considers the categories as types of being, regardless of our linguistic ability to form sentences. The second reason why logic and metaphysics treat categories differently is admittedly less clear. Kilwardby seems to suggest that metaphysics and logic look at categories from opposite points of views, for metaphysics reduces them to being whereas logic divides being into categories. Presumably, this is a reference to what Kil­ wardby has already said: logic regards the categories as ultimate principles and assumes both their existence and their nature whereas metaphysics considers the categories as beings and reduces them to their constituent principles. Since logic assumes the existence and nature of categories, the objects of its demonstrations are not the categories but their attrib­ utes. The attributes studied in logic are those dependant on the re­ lationship between categories and speech, i.e. the properties attrib­ uted to categories insofar as they act as predicates and subjects in sentences.

' In sum, Kilwardby separates two considerations of the cate­

gories. Categories are, by themselves, parts of being, and as parts of being they are studied in metaphysics. But categories can also be considered according to the role they play in a sentence, as the genera of subjects and predicates. Considered in this way, cate­ gories are dependent on our linguistic acts and are studied in logic.

2.

Albert the Great on the logical consideration qf categories

Some time after Kilwardby, probably between 1 250 and 1 264, Al­ bert the Great wrote his logical treatises.9 There he showed a con­ ception of logic quite different from Kilwardby's. In this respect, as 9 1t is difficult to date Albert the Great's logical paraphrases. It is now generally ac­ cepted that Albert wrote them after 1250 and before 1 264, with the exception of the paraphrases on the Topics and on the Sophistical refutations, posterior to 1 264. See]. A. Weisheipl, "The Life and Works of St. Albert the Great," in Albertus Magnus and

24

CHAPTER ONE

in many others, Albert's conception is strongly influenced by Arabic authors. Specifically, Avicenna's contribution seems to have been decisive.1O Like Kilwardby, however, Albert maintains that both metaphysics and logic deal with categories, and that logic considers categories insofar as they are connected with predication. Albert explicitly criticizes the conception of logic as a sermocinal science that Kilwardby and many others had adopted. According to Albert, science deals only accidentally with speech, for speech by it­ self is not meaningful, but science only deals with what is mean­ ingful. Speech acquires a meaning only insofar as there is a concept in the intellect corresponding to what is said in speech. Speech is, therefore, only instrumental to convey a meaning, in order to get from the unknown to the known, and it is not the proper subject matter of logic. I I What is then the subject matter of logic? Albert knows and criti­ cizes the opinion that holds that the subject of logic is the syllogism. He objects that syllogism is the main part, not the subject, of logic. Following Avicenna, Albert maintains that the aim of logic is to allow the intellect to proceed from the unknown to the known. In other words, logic's main function is to make inquiry possible, and the tool of inquiry is an argument that takes the mind from the un­ known to the known. The subject of logic is therefore reasoning (ar­ gumentatio), and all that logic determines can be reduced to rea­ soning.'2 Reasoning is the method by which the intellect proceeds in its in­ quiries. Since logic deals with reasoning, it is neatly distinct from the Sciences. Commemorative Essays 1980, ed.]. A. Weisheipl, (Toronto: Pontifical Insti­ tute of Mediaeval Studies, 1 980), 1 35-40; and R.·A. Gauthier, Pryace to Thomas Aquinas Sentencia libri de sensu el sensalo (ed. Leon., XLY.2), 9 1 0.920. Albert the Great's commentary on the Categories is dated at 1261 by the Leonine editors, see Thomas Aquinas, OJtodl. (ed. Leon., XXv, 2), 452. 1 0 On Avicenna's views on logic, Sabra, '�vicenna on the Subject Matter of Logic." 1 1 Albert the Great Liher de univ., tr. I, c. 4 (ed. Borgnet, I, 7): "Sunt tamen qui logicam interpretantur idem quod sermocinalem . . . Et ideo dicunt logicae generalis subiectum esse sermonem, prout est designativus rerum quae significantur per ipsum. Quam opinionem impugnat Avicenna dicens, quod sermo de se nihil signi­ ficat. Non ergo significat nisi secundum quod conceptus est in inteUectu instituenti. . . Propter quod logicus et ad se et ad alterum utitur sermone per accidens, e t non per se: quia sine sermone designativo procedere non potest ad notitiam eius quod ig­ notum est. . . " 12 Ibid. (ed. Borgnet, I, 6-7).

CATEGORIES AND LOGIC IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

25

metaphysics, which deals with things as extramental entities. It is true that sometimes one and the same thing can be considered in metaphysics and in logic, but in that case the two disciplines adopt different points of view. Let us take the concept to Albert, metaphysics considers

universal. According universal as an essence and as a dif­

ference of being, since things that are, are either individual or uni­ versal. By contrast, logic considers the concept

universal

as it ex­

presses the relationship between a predicate and a subject in a proposition, since the predicate is attributed to the subject as a uni­ versal. 13 Logic , however, refers to things as well, for the intellect, while reasoning, takes the extramental things into account and orders and compares them. By ordering and comparing things, the intellect can proceed from the unknown to the known. Albert maintains that being unknown and being known are themselves properties of things, but only of things as understood by the intellect, for being unknown and being known are properties of things insofar as they are subjects and predicates in sentences acting as parts of reasoning. Things are subjects and predicates not by themselves but only as the intellect orders them as subjects and predicates. According to Al­ bert, there are ten ways in which things can be ordered as subjects and predicates of propositions. These ten ways are the categories insofar as logic considers them. Albert, then, reduces the logical study of the categories to the study of reasoning, which is the proper subject matter of logic. The distinction between the metaphysical and the logical study of categories allows Albert to solve the question whether there can be a science of the categories, provided that categories are the first principles and that nothing can be demonstrated about first princi­ ples. Albert's response is that categories are first principles only in­ sofar as they are considered as essences and parts of being. Insofar as they are ways of acting as subjects and predicates, and insofar as they are ordered into genera according to the way they are subjects and predicates in propositions, categories do have properties and at­ tributes that can be demonstrated to inhere in them. It is in this second way that logic considers categories:

13 Ibid., tr. I, c. 1 (ed. Borgnet, I, 1 7). Albert often contrasts a logical with a meta­ physical consideration: see Super Cal., tr. 6, c. I (ed. Borgnet, I, 2 7 1 ); tr. 7, c. I (ed. Borgnet, I, 273); tr. 7, c. 4 (ed. Borgnet, I, 278).

26

CHAPTER ONE

But is not difficult to solve this. For these things [scil., categories) are first principles insofar as they are essences and parts of being. Insofar as they are something that can be predicated or ordered in a genus ac­ cording to this or that mode of acting as a predicate or as a subject, they are not considered as principles, but have many properties and attributes that can be demonstrated of them. And it is in this latter way that we deal with categories here. But insofar as they are parts of being and principles of diversity among things, in this way it is the first philosopher who deals with them, as those who devote themselves to the study of metaphysics can know. But this does not pertain to the present study, but must be considered by the logician. 14

Notwithstanding his different conception of logic, Albert is not too distant from Kilwardby when he describes how logic considers cat­ egories. Both authors stress that logic considers categories as sub­ jects and predicates, or as the genera of subjects and predicates. Unlike Kilwardby, Albert says that being a subject or a predicate is a feature pertaining not to linguistic but to mental entities. Logic sorts things out into categories according to their function as sub­ jects or predicates in propositions. Each category is further ordered within itself according to an increasing degree of universality. It seems that there are two aspects to be taken into account, as far as the logical consideration of categories is concerned. First, cate­ gories are the different ways in which something can function as a subject or as a predicate. Specifically, Albert seems to be thinking of the attribution of predicates to a primary substance. Let us take Socrates. If considered as a subject in a proposition, Socrates is a substance. The various predicates that can be attributed to him, such as 'man' and 'white', belong to one of the categories. Accord­ ingly, Albert maintains that categories can be derived from the modes in which a predicate is attributed to a subject. Second, each of the ways in which something acts as a subject or a predicate can be ordered within itself according to varying degrees of universality.

" Albert the Great Liber de Prad, tr. I, c. I (ed. Borgnet, J, 95): "Sed hoc solvere non est difficile. Haec coim, secundum rem et secundum quod sunt naturae quaedam et partes eotis, sunt prima principia. Secundum quod sunt aliquid praedi­ cabile vel ordinabile in genere secundum hune vel ilIum modum praedicandi vel subiiciendi, sic non considerantur ut principia, et habent multas proprietates et pas­ sianes quae sunt demonstrabiles de ipsis: et hoc modo agemus de ipsis hie. Prout autem sunt partes entis et principia diversitatis rerum, sic de ipsis agit primus philosoph us, sicut scire potest qui in metaphysica studendi ponit intentionem: quod non pertinet ad praesens negotium, quod logicus habet considerare."

CATEGORIES AND LOGIC IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

27

Following this pattern, Albert obtains hierarchy such a s "Socrates man - animal - substance." Both the composition of a predicate with a subject and the hier­ archical order of each genus within itself, according to Albert, do not pertain to things by themselves, but they are given by the intel­ lect to things when they are considered as related to argument. Re­ markably, Albert adopts Boethius's standard description of the cat­ egories but he adds a precision. Boethius says that the categories are the ten terms

(voces) signifYing the first genera of things. Albert adds

that the order by which genera are constituted, insofar as they are signified by categorial terms, is not present in the things signified, but it is something that reason positS.15 By contrast, metaphysics considers things by themselves, insofar as they are divided into ten different essences. These essences cor­ respond to the different ways in which they can act as subjects and predicates when considered by the intellect. In fact, it seems that the ten essences and the ten genera of subjects and predicates are not different things, but the same thing considered in two different ways. Although Albert is strongly influenced by Avicenna's conception of logic, he does not view logic as the science dealing with a specific class of concepts, the so-called 'second intentions'. Albert, there­ fore, still thinks that logic considers categories according to predica­ tion and to the relationship they have with reasoning, which is the subject matter of logic. Slightly after Albert, however, the concep­ tion of logic as the science of second intentions becomes dominant among Latin commentators, and the doctrine of the logical study of categories has to be reformulated by taking into account this new development.

3.

The rise rif second intentions

From the middle of the thirteenth century onwards, logic is de­ scribed as a rational science concerned not with language but with a special class of concepts, the so-called second intentions. This view of logic affects the doctrine of the twofold consideration of

" Ibid. (ed. Borgnet, I, \ 50).

28

CHAPTER ONE

categories. It is therefore necessary to give a short presentation of the general features of second intentions. By the end of the thirteenth century, the doctrine of second in­ tentions was not yet an organized and accomplished theory, but at best a series of insights. Many sides of that doctrine that would be debated in the fourteenth century were not yet fully elaborated. Here I present only some common elements of the doctrine as it was developed around the middle of thirteenth century. 1 6 Latin authors draw the distinction between first and second in­ tentions on the basis of what they find in the Arabs, specifically in Avicenna, and possibly in Al-Farabi. 1 7 The very word translation of Arabic terms

(ma'qul

and

ma'na)

'intentia' is the

meaning 'concept'.

Arabs, in turn, had drawn the elements for this distinction from the Late Ancient commentators, who had spoken of a distinction be­ tween, on the one hand, terms of first position, such as categorial terms referring to extramental things, and, on the other hand, terms of second position, such as 'noun' and 'verb', which refer to terms

of first position. 18

Thus, 'intention' and 'concept' are synonyms in Arabic sources, and a close tie between the two notions is detectable throughout the history of the doctrine of intentions in the Latin West. Some ambi­ guities, however, remain. Latin authors often regard intentions (and especially second intentions) as properties and relations. It is not clear whether or how such properties and relations can be legiti­ mately be considered as concepts. It is only during Scotus's time that light is shed on this point. Robert Kilwardby seems to be one of the first authors in the West to introduce the distinction between first and second intentions. In 1 6 For a general treatment of second intentions see C. Knudsen, "Intention and Imposition," in Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg, cds., The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy,479-95. 17 See K. Gyekye, "The terms 'Prima [ntentio' and 'Secunda Intentio' in Arabic Logic," Speculum 46 (197 1): 32-38; M. Grignaschi, "Les traductions 1atines des ou­ vrages de la logique arabe et l'ahrege d'Alfarabi," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litttraire du Moyen Age 39 ( 1972): 41-107; Maieril, "Influenze arabe e discussioni sulla natura della logica presso i 1atini fra XIII e XIV seco10," in La diJfosione delle scitn�e islamiche net media eva eurepeo (Rama: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1 987). 243�67. 1 8 Hoffmann, "Categories et iangage," 78-8 1 ; A. C. Loyd, The Anatomy oj Neopla­ tonism (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 36-4 1 ; A. De Libera, fA querelle des universaux (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1 996), 283. The distincion between first and second intention names was known to the Latin through Boethius, see Ebbesen, "Philoponus, 'Alexander' and the Origins of Medieval Logic," 456.

CATEGORIES AND LOGIC IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

his De

29

ortu scientiarum, written in 1 250 ca,'9 he says that extramental

things are first intentions. Names such as 'substance' and 'quality', which refer to extramental things, are names of first intentions. In addition to extramental things, however, Kilwardby assumes the ex­

rationes rerum. Second intentions are precisely these rationes. Unfortunately, Kilwardby does not explain what he means by 'rationes rerum'. It is remarkable, however, that he does not make istence of some

any reference to the role played by the intellect or our cognition in the formation of such

rationes.

Perhaps, these

rationes could

be seen

as modes of being pertaining to the extramental things. The names of these modes of being are the names of second intentions, such as 'universal', 'particular', 'antecedent', 'consequent'. Second inten­ tions can therefore be described as modes of being of extramental

being universal, being particular, being an antecedent in a syl­ being a consequent in a syllogism. Kilwardby adds that logic

things such as

logism,

and

is concerned with these second intentions.20

Kilwardby, thus, emphasizes the real existence of intentions. First intentions are the extramental things themselves whereas second in­ tentions are their modes of being. Things and their modes, on the one hand, and the names of things and of their modes, on the other hand, are the only elements of that theory. Slightly after Kilwardby, however, there appears a different view of intentions. This more so­ phisticated conception presents some common elements, the main one of which is the stress on concepts. Both first and second inten­ tions are now seen as concepts, and it is in this particular form that the doctrine of intentions will become common in the thirteenth century.21

L9 Robert Kilwardby De orLu scientiarum (ed. July, xv-xvi). '" Ibid. (ed.July, 157.459): "Hinc eliam palel quare [scil., logical dicilur esse de se­ cundis intentionibus et de nominibus significantibus secundas intentiones. Res enim ipsae sunt primae intendanes, et nomina eas significantia, cuiusmodi sunt substantia, quantitas et huiusmodi, sunt nomina primarum intentionum; sed rationes rerum, cuiusmodi sunt universale, particulare, antecedens, consequens et huiusmodi, sunt secundae intentiones, et nomina eas significantia nomina secundarum intentionum. Et dicuntur ilIae primae et istae secundae, quia primo comprehenduntur res et deinde ex consideratione et collatione rerum ad invicem colliguntur rationes earum," 21 Still in the fourteenth century, Adam Wodeham quotes the opinion according to which first intentions are the extramental things, but he remarks that this opinion is generally discarded since everyone agrees that intentions are concepts, See Adam Wodeham Lee/uTa secunda in librum pn'mum Sententiarum 23, q, un. (ed. Wood and GaI, 3, 304.25-32).

30

CHAPTER ONE

In the second half of the thirteenth century, everyone writing on intentions maintained that first and second intentions were con­ cepts. Scotus lists four meanings of the word

'intentio':

'act of

will ' ,

'formal account of something', 'concept', 'directedness towards an object'.22 Radulphus Brito, following Thomas Aquinas, maintains that the common meaning of

'intentio'

is 'that by which the intellect

is directed towards another thing', and adds that the intellect's un­ derstanding is such a thing.23 Henry of Ghent gives a different in­ terpretation of the word

'intentio',

as 'directedness towards what is

inner', but he also links intentions, directedness, and concepts.24 So intentions, in the theory of knowledge, are seen as concepts directed towards something and representing something. By common con­ sent, first intentions directly represent extramental things. Concepts such as

man and animal are the standard examples of first intentions, substance and quality are concepts of the same kind.25 (Here

but also

I use the term 'concept' in a deliberately vague way. Between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the very nature of concepts were debated, but I

will not dwell on the problem here.)26

" Duns Scotus /Up. par. II, d. 13, q. 1, n. 4 (ed. Vives, XXII, 44a): "Tamen hoc nomen 'intentio' aequivocum: uno modo dicitur actus volutantis; secundo, ratio for� malis in re, situt intentio rei a qua accipitur genus differt ab intentione a qua accip­ itur differentia; tertio modo dicitur conceptus; quarto, ratio tendendi in obiectum, sicut similitudo dicitur ratio tendendi in illud cuius est . . ... " Radulphus Brito n. anima 1, q. 6, in]. Pinborg, "Radulphus Brito on Univer­ sals," eakin's tk l'Instilut du Moyen Ag. grec .t latin 35 (1980): 124: "Et primo videndum est quid significetur nomine intentionis in communi. Unde notandum est quod in­ tentia est illud quo intellectus tendit ad aliud. Et haec est cognitio in ipso inte1lectu existens. Et hoc est manifestum per interpretationem quia 'intentio' est 'in aliud tentio'." See Thomas Aquinas, Summa thtologiae I-II, q. 12, a. I: "Intentio, sicut ipsum nomen sonat, significant in aliud tendere." " Henry of Ghent Qy.odl. V, q. 6 (ed. Badius, 161L): "Unde dicitur intentio quasi 'intus tentio" eo quod mens conceptu suo in aliquid quod est in re aliqua determi­ nate tendit, et non in aliquid aliud quod est aliquid eiusdem rei." 25 Some caution must be paid as far as Thomas Aquinas is concerned. Sometimes he uses the term 'intention' as a synonym of 'concept' or 'conception', other times he uses it to refer only to a concept representing another concept, namely to what other authors call 'second intention'. Notwithstanding these terminological peculiarities, Thomas Aquinas always maintains that intentions - both first and second - are con­ cepts. 26 See C. Panaccio, "From Mental Word to Mental Language," Philosophical Topics 20 (1992): 1 25-47; Panaccio, I.e discours intJrUur de PiIl"'n a Cui/illume d'Ockham (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1999), 1 77·20 1 ; G. Pini, "Species, Concept, and Thing: Theories of Signification in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century," M.duval PhiWsophy and Theology 8, 2 (1999): 21-52.

CATEGORIES AND LOGIC

IN THE THIRTEENTII

CENTURY

31

Second intentions are concepts, like first intentions, but they are acquired after first intentions. They are still described as "properties following from the modes of understanding" or as "relations holding between things." Only in Scotus's times will the relationship between these two different descriptions of intentions be fully clari­ fied, as we shall see. Whether second intentions are concepts or properties, however, a crucial question remains to be answered: of what are they concepts or properties? According to a widespread doctrine, second intentions are second-order concepts, namely con­ cepts representing concepts, and not things, or, alternatively, they are properties founded on the mode in which something is under­ stood, as opposed to the mode in which something is. As we shall see, however, this view of second intentions is not generally ac­ cepted. Other authors prefer to regard second intentions as con­ cepts representing certain modes of being of the extramental things. Be that as it may, everybody agrees that second intentions are notions such as genus,

species, dqinition, proposition,

and

syllogism,

even though there is some disagreement concerning individual27 and the copula 'is'.28 The distinction of first and second intentions interacts with the distinction between terms of first and second imposition. Latin au­ thors remark that the two distinctions are somehow related, but they also know that they are different.29 In general, the distinction be­ tween first and second imposition terms is considered as pertaining to grammar, for in a second imposition only the grammatical fea­ tures of a term are taken into account. Accordingly, second imposi­ tion terms are grammatical terms such as 'noun' and 'verb'. By con­ trast, the distinction between first and second intentions is between two kinds of concepts or two ways of considering an extramental thing. Consequently, names of second intentions signify not the grammatical features of a term but the way in which the thing sig­ nified by that term is understood. Typical examples of second in­ tention terms are 'species' and 'genus', which signify the concepts

species and genus. " See Duns Scotus Ord. I, d. 23, q.un. (ed. Vat., V, 35 1-63). 28 Scotus regards the copula as a second intention, but his position does not seem to have been universally accepted. See Duns Scotus Qjtaesliones. super Met. V, q. 5-6, n. 63 (OPh, III, 461). 29 See Knudsen, "Intention and Imposition," 484-85; Kretzmann, "Semantics," 369-70.

32

CHAPTER ONE

It must be admitted that the distinction between imposition and in­ tention is not always clear-cut. Some authors even use 'imposition' and 'intention' indiscriminately. For example, Thomas Sutton, writing around 1 270, divides the names of second intentions into names signifYing first imposition terms considered according to their grammatical aspects and names signifying first imposition terms considered according to what they mean. Names belonging to the first class are called 'names of second imposition', whereas names belonging to the second class are called 'names of second in­ tention'.30

4.

The subject matter qf logic

The doctrine of second intentions has a bearing on the doctrine of the logical consideration of the categories because logic is described as the science of second intentions. According to a passage of Avi­ cenna, frequently quoted at the end of thirteenth century, second intentions are the subject of logic: The subject of logic, as you have learnt, are intentions secondarily un­ derstood, which are added to intentions primarily understood, ac­ cording to the fact that through them one comes from the unknown to what is known . . . ' !

30 Thomas Sutton In Cat. (ed. Conti, 1 87): "Sed inter nomina secundarum inten­ tionum consideranda est quaedam differentia. Quaedam eoim eorum dicuntur de nominibus primae impositionis, sed non pro rebus significatis, sed pro nominibus sig­ nificantibus, ut cum dicitur 'homo est nomen', 'cunit est verbum'. Quaedam vero di­ cuntur de nominibus primae impositionis, sed non pro ipsis nominibus significan­ tibus, sed pro rebus significatis, ut cum dicitur 'homo est species', 'animal est genus', Non eoim est hoc nomen 'homo' species, neque hoc nomen 'animal' genus, sed res significata sic abstracta individuis per hoc nomen 'homo' est species, et res sig­ nificata abstracta a speciebus per hoc nomen 'animal' est genus." For the date of Sutton's commentary, se,e A. Conti, "Thomas Sutton's Commentary on the Categories according to ms. Oxford, Merton College 289," in The Rise if British liJgic: Acts if the Sixth European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics,ed. O. Lewry (foronto: Pon­ tifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1 985), 1 73. 3 1 Avicenna Liber de phil. prima (ed. Van Riet, I, 10.73-76): "Subiectum vero logicae, sicut scisti, sunt intentiones intellectae secundo, quae apponuntur intentionibus intel­ lectis primo, secundum hoc quod per eas peIVenitur de cognito ad incognitum ... " On second intentions as the subject of logic, see Panaccio, U discours intbieur, 228-50. Specifically on Thomas Aquinas, see R. W. Schmidt, The Domain Q/ Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas (rhe Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1 966), 94-129; R. Mcinerny, Aquinas and Analogy, The Catholic University of America Press: Washington, D.C., 1 993, 56-6 1 .

CATEGORIES AND LOGIC IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

33

In the second half of the thirteenth century, Avicenna's position was widely quoted with approval, but this does not mean that every­ body thought that second intentions were the proper subject matter of logic.32 Thomas Aquinas does not state that logic deals with second in­ tentions; indeed, the very term 'second intention' does not seem to belong to his technical vocabulary. According to Aquinas, logic deals with the acts of the intellect. Now, it is a doctrine taken from Aristotle and commonly accepted that there are three kinds of acts of the intellect. The first act is the understanding of simple essences. The second act is the composition of the concepts repre­ senting simple essences into propositional entities. The third act is the passage from the unknown to the known by way of reasoning, which is constituted of propositions connected one with another as premises and conclusions. Aquinas divides logic - namely, Aris­ totelian logic - into three parts according to which act of the intel­

Categories deals with the first act of De Interpretatione deals with the second act. The treatises (Prior and Posterior Anarytics, Topics, Sophistical

lect is taken into account. The the intellect. The other logical

Rqutations)

deal with reasoning, the third act of the intellect. 33

Elsewhere, Aquinas remarks that logic deals with being of reason

(ens rationis)

since by its acts the intellect produces beings of reason

or concepts. The first act produces simple concepts, the second act produces propositional or compound concepts, the third act pro­ duces argumentative concepts.34 Probably, Aquinas regards this second opinion on the subject matter of logic as equivalent to the first one. Slightly after Aquinas, however, Giles of Rome distin­ guishes one opinion from the other and prefers the second to the first one, for he maintains that the subject matter of logic is the ob-

32 See for example Bartholomew of Bruges's version of the debate on the subject matter of logic in S. Ebbesen and J. Pinborg, "Batholomew of Bruges and His Sophisma on the Nature of Logic," Cahiers de I'lnstitut du Moyen Age grec et latin 39 ( 1 98 1): iii-xxvi, 1-80. See also R. Lambertini, "Resurgant entia rationis. Matthaeus de Augubio on the Object of Logic," Cahiers de l'lnstitul du Moyen Age gTec et latin 59 ( 1 989): 10-30. 33 Thomas Aquinas In An. Post., Proemium I (ed. Leonina, I.* 2, 4). 34 Thomas Aquinas In Met. IV, lect. 4, n. 574; 1 7, n. 736. See Schmidt, The Domain of Logic, 52-57; I. Boh, "Metalanguage and the Concept of ens secundae inten­ tionis," in Thomas von Aquin. Werk und Wirkung im Licht neuerer Forshungen, ed. A. Zim­ mermann and C. Kopp, Miscellanea Mediaevalia I 9 (Berlin-New York: de Gruyter, 1 988), 53-70.

34

CHAPTER ONE

ject of the operations of the intellect, not the operations them­ selves.35 In the second half of the thirteenth century, however, most au­ thors still thought that the subject matter of logic is syllogism. Since the middle of the thirteenth century, that was a widespread doctrine in Paris, and Kilwardby had already adopted it, as we have seen.36 Both Peter of Auvergne and Duns Scotus upheld it,37 and Radul­ phus Brito, writing probably in the last decade of the thirteenth century, labeled it as 'the common opinion'.38 This means that these authors had to accommodate Avicenna's tenet that logic deals with second intentions with their view that syllogism is the subject matter of logic. Radulphus Brito and Peter of Auvergne openly say that both syl­ logism and second intentions, which are taken as identical with ra­ tional being, can be regarded as the subject of logic. These authors think that there is no contradiction between the two opinions, for second intentions are the subject of logic according to what they call 'community of predication'. This means that second intentions are predicated of everything logic treats, namely that logic only deals with second intentions. If something is dealt with in logic, it is a second intention, and vice versa. By contrast, syllogism is the sub­ ject of logic by way of attribution. This means that everything logic studies is aimed at the study of syllogism. If something is studied in logic it is either a syllogism or something that can be reduced to a syllogism as a part is reduced to its whole.39 Scotus too thinks that syllogism is the subject of logic, but he does not think that this opinion can be reconciled with other views. In fact, only syllogism satisfies all three necessary and sufficient condi­ tions to be the subject of a science, namely that its nature and exis­ tence be known, that its attributes are demonstrated in the science

" Giles of Rome Exp. in Soph. EI. 2rb, 2va-b. 36 C. Marmo, "Suspicio. A Key Word to the Significance of Aristotle's RiMtoTic in Thirteenth Century Scholasticism," Cahier! de I'lnstitul< du Moyen Age grec et latin 60 (1 990): 156-58. " Peter of Auvergne Super POTph., q. 3 (ed. Tine) 272; Duns Scotus Super Porph., q. 3, n. 20 (OPh, J, 16-17). 38 Radulphus Brito Super Porph., q. 3 (ed. Venet., 6va). ,. Peter of Auvergne Super PoTph., q. 3 (ed. Tine, 273); Radulphus Brito Super Poph., q. 3 (ed. Venet., 6va-b).

CATEGORIES AND LOGIC IN

THE THIRTEENTIi

CENTURY

35

of which it is the subject, and that everything considered in that sci­ ence be reduced to it.40 Scotus considers five opinions concerning the subject matter of logic. He takes the first three as equivalent. The first opinion states that the acts of reason are the subject matter of logic (which is Thomas Aquinas's position, as we have seen). The second opinion is that the subject matter of logic consists of second intentions (an opinion Scotus attributes to Boethius and not to Avicenna). The third opinion states that the rational being

(ens ralionis) is the subject

matter of logic (again, something we find in Thomas Aquinas). Ac­ cording to Scotus, these three opinions are incorrect because they fail to satisfY the first two conditions that should be met by the sub­ ject of a science. In fact, the nature and the existence of the acts of reason or of second intentions or of being of reason are not known in logic. Neither does logic demonstrate anything concerning the at­ tributes of the acts of reason or of second intentions or of being of reason.41 Scotus then reports the old opinion according to which the sub­ ject matter of logic is speech

(sermo)

and that logic itself is a ser­

mocinal science. According to Scotus, this opinion fails to satisfY the second and the third conditions, for logical demonstrations are not about the properties of speech and what is studied in logic cannot be reduced to speech.42 Finally, Scotus reports and criticizes Albert the Great's opinion according to which the subject matter of logic is reasoning (argumen­

tatio).

According to Scotus, reasoning does not even satisfY one of

the three conditions that the subject matter of logic should meet.43 Scotus leaves us with syllogism as the only candidate for the sub­ ject matter of logic. Syllogism satisfies all the three conditions for being the subject matter of logic: both its nature and existence are known in logic, logical demonstrations concern the properties of syllogism. For example, a logical demonstration shows that a syllo­ gism is valid or invalid, and validity is for Scotus a property of syl­ logism. Scotus also maintains that the issues concerning logic can be reduced to syllogism.44 40 Duns Seolus Super PQrph., q. 3, n. 20 (OPh, I, 1 7). Ibid., nn. 7-9, 12-13; n. 14 (OPh, 1, 1 4- 1 5). 42 Ibid., nn. 10, 13; n. 18 (OPh, I, 1 6). 43 Ibid., nn. I I , 1 3; n. 1 9 (OPh, I, 16). .. Ibid., n. 20 (OPh, I, 1 6- 1 7). •,

36

CHAPTER ONE

Scotus, therefore, maintains that second intentions are not, prop­ erly speaking, the subject matter of logic. Nevertheless, he thinks that logic deals only with second intentions, for second intentions do satisfY the third condition that the subject matter of logic must meet. Thus, it is true that second intentions are not the subject matter of logic, but logic deals with second intentions.

5.

Second intentions and categories: the case if Thomas Sutton

Robert Kilwardby and Albert the Great had already recognized that logic and metaphysics considered categories differently one from the other. By the end of the thirteenth century, the doctrine of the logical consideration of categories had to be accommodated to the new conception of logic as the science that deals with second in­ tentions. Admittedly, this conciliation raises a problem, for if logic studies only second intentions, it is not easy to see how categories can be studied in logic. In fact, it is beyond any doubt that cate­ gories are things of first intentions and that categorial concepts, such as the concept

substance

or the concept

quali!y,

are first, not

second, intentions. These concepts represent things in the extra­ mental world that exist regardless of whether or how we understand them. In this respect, categorial concepts are different from con­ cepts such as genus and

species,

which are posterior to first intention

concepts and represent the extramental world only secondarily. The following question naturally arises: If logic is only concerned with second intentions and if categories are first intentions, how can cat­ egories be studied in logic? Thomas Sutton is perhaps one of the first authors to connect second intentions with the doctrine of the logical consideration of the categories.'5 In his commentary on the

Categories,

he faces the

problem of reconciling the two doctrines. Predictably, his treatment of the topic presents a mixture of old and new aspects. Sutton deals with the classic question of whether categories, as studied in the book called

'Categories',

are terms or extramental things. Not sur-

".'I Thomas Sutton explicitly accepts the description of logic as the science of second intentions. See In Cat., Prol. (ed. Conti, 185): "Dicendum quod logica est de intentionibus secundis quae sunt communes et applicabiles primis intentionibus, sicut dicit Avicenna quod logica est de secundis intentionibus adiunctis <primis>."

CATEGORIES AND LOGIC IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

37

prisingly, his solution i s strongly influenced by Boethius. Categories are studied in Aristotle's

Categories

as the ten most universal terms

signifying the ten kinds of extramental things. Considered as signi­ fying something, categorial terms act as predicates or subjects in sentences. So far, Sutton's solution does not seem to be different from Kil­ wardby's and Albert's solutions, but Sutton adds a reference to second intentions absent in his predecessors. He states that in the

Categories, and in logic in

general, categories are studied not only in­

sofar as they act as subjects and predicates in sentences but also in­ sofar as they receive the attribution of second intentions. These second intentions pertain to categories insofar as they are consid­ ered as ordered to syllogism: Therefore, the book of the Categories, since it is a part of logic, is about the ten first words signifying the first kinds of things, as Boethius says, insofar as they are significative, and insofar as they can act as predicates and subjects, and insofar as other second intentions pertain to them as they are ordered to syllogism.'"

Sutton here seems to put two different conceptions of the study of the categories next to each other. He first introduces the old view according to which logic studies the categories as significative terms acting as subjects and predicates in sentences. Then he adds a ref­ erence to the new view of logic as a science of second intentions, for he says that categories are also studied insofar as other second in­ tentions pertain to them. Admittedly, it is not easy to see how Sutton can reconcile these two views. He seems to reduce the two views to unity by an appeal to what is traditionally regarded as the subject matter of logic, i.e. syllogism'" He maintains that logic studies cat­ egories as they are constituents of a sentence, and sentences are +6 Thomas Sutton In Cal. (ed. Conti. J 9 1): "Liber igitur Praedicammtorum, cum sit pars logicae, est de decem primis vocibus decem prima genera rerum significantibus - ut dicit Boethius - ut significantes sunt, et ut sunt praedicabiles et subicibiles, et prout aliae intentiones secundae eis conveniunt in ordine ad syllogismum. It See also In Cat. (ed. Conti, 193): "Conveniunt autem [scil., praedicamenta] in hoc quod sig­ nificantur per dictionem incomplexam, quae est terminus in syllogismo. Et sub hac ratione determinatur hie de praedicamentis, prout scilicet quodlibet eorum signifi­ catur per dictionem quae polest esse pars sylJogismi." 47 That the syllogism is the proper subject of logic is a classical doctrine, wide­ spread in Paris since the middle of the thirteenth century. See Marmo, "Suspia."o. A Key Word," 1 56-58.

38

CHAPTER ONE

premises or conclusions of syllogisms. Accordingly, logic considers categories as parts of syllogisms. The properties that categories pos­ sess when they are regarded as constituents of a syllogism are second intentions. Sutton, however, is unwilling to reduce Aristotle's

Categories

to a

treatise exclusively dealing with second intentions. He admits that

Categories concerns

much of the content of the

extramental things,

not terms signifying extramental things or second intentions per­ taining to categories. For instance, Aristotle states in the

Categories

that substance has the property of not being in a subject. Not being in a subject, according to Sutton, is a property pertaining to sub­ stance as an extramental thing, not as a subject-term in a sentence and as a constituent of a syllogism. Similarly, quantity has the prop­ erty of being either continuous or discrete, and this property per­ tains to quantity as an extramental thing.'a Why, then, does Aristotle study these properties in the

Categories, which is a logical treatise and

should accordingly be concerned solely with second intentions? In order to answer this question, Sutton remarks that there is a difference between the

Categories and the other logical treatises by Categories Aristotle considers the cate­

Aristotle. It is true that in the

gories as they are terms signifying something, but it is also true that categories, considered as terms, are first imposition terms, which signify extramental things. It is not surprising, therefore, that much of what is said in the

Categories concerns

extramental things and not

the terms by which they are signified. This interest in things singles out the

Categories from among the

other logical treatises, which deal

either with syllogism or with the parts of syllogism as signified by second imposition terms. For instance, in the

De Interpretatione Aris­

totle studies second imposition terms like 'sentence', 'assertion', 'negation'. In the Prior Anarytics he studies the second imposition term 'syllogism', considered in relation to its different figures. Ac­ cordingly, only the

Categories

deals with first imposition terms and

with the things they signify, whereas the other logical treatises deal with second imposition terms and with what they signify, which are not extramental things but first imposition terms.49 48 Thomas Sutton, In Cat. (ed. Conti, 1 88). 49 Ibid. (ed. Conti, 1 9 1): ')\d tertium dicendum quod quia deteminat hie de praedicamentis prout significantur per voces primae impositionis, quae immediate significant res et supponunt pro rebus, ideo multa dicta Aristotelis verificantur in hoc libro pro rebus ipsis et non <pro> vocibus, quia voces primae impositionis non sup-

CATEGORIES AND LOGIC IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

39

Therefore, Sutton finds room for a logical consideration of cate­ gories only by separating it from the rest of logic, but he also distin­ guishes the logical and the metaphysical consideration of cate­ gories. In order to obtain this result, Sutton turns to general terms pertaining to categories. He explains that there are two types of general terms. First, there are first imposition terms common to all categorial terms, such as the term 'being'. We could label these terms as 'metaphysical transcendental terms' (even though Sutton does not call them 'transcendental'), for metaphysics studies cate­ gories insofar as they are signified by these terms. Second, there are second imposition terms common to all categorial terms, such as 'universal', 'sayable'

(dicibile),

'most general genus'

(generalissimum),

and the like. We could call these terms 'logical transcendentals', since logic studies categories insofar as they are signified by such second imposition terms: . . . Among the things that are common to the ten categories some are of first imposition and some are of second intention. First imposition common terms are 'being' and the other things that pertain to being. And in this way metaphysics, which is about being as being as about its subject, deals with categories. On the other hand, second intention common terms are 'universal', 'sayable', 'most common genus', 'genus', 'signified by a simple word', 'capable of being ordered in a syllogism', and similar notions. And with regard to these common no­ tions it is not metaphysics but logic that deals with the ten categories.50

Sutton is not able to eliminate a tension from his treatment of cate­ gories. On the one hand, he stresses that logic studies categories as subject- and predicate-terms in sentences constituting syllogisms. Accordingly, logic considers categories as first imposition terms, and the logical study of categories is separated from the rest of logic,

ponunt pro vocibus, sed pro rebus. In sequentibus vera libris determinat de syl1o­ gismo et suis partibus non prout significantur per voces primae impositionis, sed per nomina secundarum intentionurn, quae supponunt pro vocibus primae impositionis complexis." 50 Ibid. (ed. Conti, 1 94): " . . . decem praedicamentis quaedam sunt cammunia quae sunt primae impositionis, et quaedam quae sunt secundae intentionis. Communia primae impositionis sunt ens et ea quae sunt entis; et sic de decem praedicamentis determinat metaphysica, quae est de ente in quantum ens ut de subiecto. Communia vero secundae intentionis sunt universale, dicibile, genus generalissimum, genus, sig­ nificatum per vocem incomplexam, ordinabile in syUogismo et huiusmodi. Et quantum ad ista communia non tractat metaphysica de decem praedicamentis, sed logica."

40

CHAPTER ONE

which is concerned with second imposition terms. If this is the case, then, it is not clear how the study of categories carried out in the

Categories differs

from the metaphysical study of categories. On the

other hand, Sutton states that logic studies categories insofar as second imposition terms such as 'universal' or 'most universal genus' are attributed to them. In this way, the logical and meta­ physical considerations of categories are different from one another, for metaphysics considers categories insofar as first imposition terms such as 'being' are attributed to them. Sutton does not explain what relationship holds between these two different conceptions of the logical study of categories. We shall see that other authors writing at the end of the thirteenth century will find a more satisfying answer to how logic considers categories.

6.

Categories as thefoundations if second intentions

Between 1 280s and 1 300s, some authors elaborate what we can label as the standard view of the logical study of the categories. Peter of Auvergne, the so-called Anonymous of Madrid, William Arnaldi, and Radulphus Brito provide a very similar treatment of this topic. They all assent that logic considers categories to the ex­ tent that they are subject to second intentions. These authors maintain that categories are not themselves second intentions but can act as subjects of second intentions. Logic studies categories insofar as second intentions are founded on them. This solution to the issue of the logical study of category seems to owe much to Thomas Aquinas, who does not present a systematic view on the topic but puts forward all the elements of the solution that will become standard. (Thomas Sutton uses Thomas Aquinas's writings in his commentary on the

Categories;

however, he does not

adopt his view as far as the twofold consideration of categories is concerned.) In a passage of his commentary on the

Metaphysics, Thomas Metaphysics,

Aquinas faces a dilemma. In the seventh book of the

Aristotle gives a refutation of the doctrine according to which uni­ versals are substances. In the course of his refutation, Aristotle states that a substance is not said of anything.51 But, as Aquinas re" Mel. VII, 13, I038b15.

41

CATEGORIES AND LOGIC IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

marks, this statement contradicts what Aristotle says about sub­ stances in the

Categories.

There Aristotle maintains that some sub­

stances are said of something, even though they are not in any­ thing.52 Secondary substances, in fact, such as man and animal, are universals said of first substances such as this particular man. Now, according to what Aristotle states in the

Metaphysics, secondary sub­

stances are not substances, for they are said of something. There­ fore, secondary substances are considered as substances in the

gories

but not in the

Metaphysics.

Cate­

How can these two contrasting

views be reconciled? In order to solve this conflict, Thomas Aquinas says that in the

Categories Aristotle

speaks as a logician and considers substance

our intellect understands it. By contrast, in the

as

Metaphysics Aristotle

speaks as a metaphysician and considers substance as an extra­ mental being independent of our understanding: But it must be said that in the Categories the Philosopher speaks ac­ cording to a logical consideration. But the logician considers things in­ sofar as they are in the mind, and therefore he considers substance in­ sofar as it is subject to the intention of universality according to the consideration of the intellect . . . But the first philosopher deals with things insofar as they are beings . . . 53.

Logic deals with the category of substance not as a kind of being, but only insofar as it is present to the intellect as a universal con­ cept. That is to say that logic considers substance insofar as our in­ tellect attributes universality to substance. Consequently, logic re­ gards substantial universals as substances, for those universal notions are identical with substances as they are understood by the intellect.

" Cat. 2, la20-22; 5, 2al4-19. Thomas Aquinas In Met. VII, leet. XIII, n. 1 576: "Sed dicendum quod se­ cundum logicam considerationem loquitur Philosophus in Praedicamentis. Logicus autem considerat res secundum quod sunt in ratione; et ideo considerat substantiam prout secundum acceptionem intellectus subsumit intentioni universalitatis . . . Sed philosophus primus considerat de rebus secundum quod sunt entia . . . " Thomas wrote his commentary on the Metaphysics ca. 1 270-72. See J.-P. Torrell, Initiation a saint Thomas d'Aquin. Sa personne et son (luvre (Fribourg-Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1 993), 502. On Thomas's treatment of modus logicus, see R. A. Te Velde, "Metaphysics, Di­ alectics and the Modus Logicus according to Thomas Aquinas," Recherches de thiologie ancienn, et mediivale 63 (1 996): 15-35. On Thomas's distinction between the subject matter of logic and metaphysics, see In Met. IV, lect. 4, nn. 570, 574. $3

42

CHAPTER ONE

Two elements of Aquinas's analysis will appear again and again in the works of subsequent authors. First, Aquinas regards the dif­ ference between metaphysics and logic as the difference between the consideration of the extramental things taken by themselves and the consideration of the extramental things as understood. Second, the category of substance is studied in logic as it is subject to a second intention, namely the intention of universality. It is the intellect that attributes this intention to substance. Although Aquinas mentions only one category, i.e. substance, and only one intention, i.e. universality, what he says can be easily generalized: metaphysics studies categories as they are beings, whereas logic studies categories as they are subject to second intentions. Thus, logic considers categories even though categories are not second in­ tentions. The influence of Aquinas's approach becomes apparent if we turn to some of the authors writing at the end of the thirteenth cen­ tury. Both the so-called Anonymous of Madrid and Peter of Au­ vergne inquire in their commentaries on the Categories about which discipline studies categories. 54 Their arguments pose the problem with clarity. According to a first argument, which is almost identical in both authors, it is the metaphysician's task to study categories, be­ cause the metaphysician studies being as being, and categories are the different kinds of beings and the modes into which being as being is divided. On the other hand, it can also be argued that it is the logician's task to study categories because the logician studies second intentions added to first intentions. According to the Anony­ mous of Madrid's formulation of this argument, categories are terms signifYing second intentions added to first intentions. Ac­ cording to Peter of Auvergne's formulation, categories are the sub­ jects on which second intentions are founded. In both cases, the study of categories seems to pertain to logic. To this question the Anonymous of Madrid answers that cate­ gories can be considered in two different ways. First, categories are 54 Anonymous of Madrid Super Praed., q. 3 (ed. Andrews, 125); Peter of Auvergne Sup.,. Praed., q. 3 (ed. Andrews, I I). These two commentaries were probably written in Paris in the 1270s: see J. Pinborg, DU Entwicklung d.,. Sprachtluorie im Mittelalter, Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters XlJI.2 (Munster: Aschendorlf, 1967), 86, n. 5 1 ; R. Andrews, '\<\nonymus Matritensis, Q¥aes­ hones super librum Praedicamentorum. An Edition," Cahiers de elnstitut du Moyen Age grec el latin 56 (1988): 1 1 7.

CATEGORIES AND LOGIC IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

43

considered as beings; metaphysics studies them in this way. Second, categories are considered insofar as what is included in a category is subject to an intention and insofar as categories are predicable no­ tions; logic studies categories in this second way. According to this author, categories can also be considered in a third way, namely as they are principles of movement and quiet. Natural philosophy studies categories in this last way.55 Peter of Auvergne, too, maintains that it is possible to consider categories in two ways. First, a category is considered according to its being or essence, and this is the way metaphysics studies cate­ gories. Second, categories are considered as that on which second intentions are based, and this is the way logic studies categories.56 William Arnaldi, author of a commentary on the

Categories

that

was wrongly attributed to Giles of Rome, adopts a similar view. He also makes an explicit reference to the role of reason in the forma­ tion of second intentions. Whereas metaphysicians consider cate­ gories as beings, logicians consider categories as the objects of the acts of reason since logic takes into account second intentions added to first intentions by reason.57 Radulphus Brito, too, asks whether the study of categories per­ tains to logic or to metaphysics in his commentary on the

Categories.

His solution is very similar to the solutions given by the authors con­ sidered above, and to Peter of Auvergne's position in particular. Brito maintains that categories can be regarded both as extramental things and

as

they are subject to second intentions such as genus and

" Anonymous of Madrid Super Prrud., q. 3 (ed. Andrews, 125): "Dicendum ad hoc quod praedicamenta possunt dupliciter considerari. Uno modo inquantum sunt entia, et sic pertinent ad metaphysicum. Alia modo inquantum sunt res praedica­ menti subiectae intentioni et secundum quod sunt res subicibiles vel praedicabiles, et ut hoc superius, istud vero ut inferius. Et sic pertinet considerare de hus ad di­ alecticum. Vel inquantum sunt principium motus et quietis, et sic pertinent ad natu­ rale<m>." 56 Peter of Auvergne Super Praed., q. 3 (ed. Andrews, 1 1): '�d hoc dicendum quod de praedicamentis possumus loqui dupliciter: aut secundum sui entitatem et essen­ tiam, et sic de consideratione ipsius metaphysici; aut secundum quod in ipsis fun­ dantur secundae intentiones, et sic ea logicus considerat." 57 William Arnaldi Super Praed. (ed. Venet., 1 5vb): "Notandum quod de praedica­ mentis determinat logicus et metaphysicus, sed diversimode. Nam metaphysicus de­ terminat de ipsis ut sunt entia, sed logicus prout cadunt sub actu rationis. Nam, ut dicit Commentator, logica tota est de secundis intentionibus adiunctis primis. Et di­ cuntur primae intentiones ut homo vel asinus; secundae intentiones autem dicuntur ut istae intentiones: genus et species, differentia, et sic de aliis."

44

CHAPTER ONE

species. Brito then draws two conclusions. First, categories as real be­ ings are not studied in logic. Second, categories as they are subject to second intentions are studied in logic. 58 He demonstrates the first conclusion by saying that logic, which is a rational science, cannot deal with real entities. He demonstrates the second conclusion by saying that since logic studies second intentions it must also deal with the things on which second intentions are founded.59 By the end of the thirteenth century, this is the standard opinion on the difference between the logical and the metaphysical consid­ eration of categories. All these authors say that logic studies cate­ gories as they are subject to second intentions. Accordingly, in order to understand what the logical study of categories is, it is necessary to turn to the doctrine of second intentions developed by these au­ thors. Only after such a consideration will it be possible to see how categories function as subjects of second intentions and conse­ quently how logic considers categories. Some interesting differences in the conceptions of second intentions will appear behind the ap­ parent consensus about the logical consideration of the categories we have just reviewed.

58 Radulphus Brito Super Praed., q. 2 (ed. Venet., 36ra): "Dicendurn quod praedica­ menta possunt accipi dupiiciter, uno modo ut sunt res vere extra animam existentes, alio vera modo ut supra ipsas fundantur intentiones generis et speciei, et sic de aliis. Tunc dieo duo ad questionem: primo quod scientia de praedicamentis secundum quod sunt entia realia non pertinet ad logicum; secundo dieo quod determinare de ipsis ut supra ipsa fundantur intentiones pertinet ad logicum." 59 Ibid. (ed. Venet., 36ra-b).

CHAPTER TWO INTENTIONS AND MODES OF UNDERSTANDING IN THOMAS AQUINAS

Several questions have been asked about second intentions. For ex­ ample, their ontological status has been hotly debated. Although Scotus and Radulphus Brito already raised this issue, it would re­ ceive more attention in the treatises on intentions written in the fourteenth century, including Haerveus Natalis

ibus,

De secundis intention­

where many opinions, including Brito's and Peter Auriol's, are

collected and criticized. 1 What type of entity is an intention? Either an intention is a real quality inhering in the mind or it is something with a special kind of being, usually called 'intentional being'. These are the two main answers, even though there is room for a great number of nuances. If intentions are regarded as real qualities, they are given a real kind of existence insofar as they inhere in the mind, which is called 'subjective being'. Still, it remains undecided what those qualities are. Some say that intentions, so considered, are identical with the intel­ ligible species received in the possible intellect. The early Thomas Aquinas and Roger Bacon' are among those who adopted this posiI Hervaeus Natalis De secundis intentionibus (Paris: 1489). For some information on Hervaeus Natalis's life and manuscripts, see T. KappeJi, Scriptares Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi, vol. 2 (Roma: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1975), 2 3 1 , 237. On the debate concerning the ontological status of second intentions, see the texts by Hervaeus Na­ talis, Peter Auriol, and Hugo de Traiecto edited by Pinborg, in his "Radulphus Brito on Universals," 1 30-42; D. Perler, "Intentionale und reale Existenz: eine spatmitte­ lalterliche Kontroverse," PhilosophisehesJahrbueh 102 ( 1 995): 261-78. See also R. Lam­ benini, "Le teorie delle intmtiones da Gentile da Cingoli a Matteo da Gubbio. Fonti e Hnee di teodenza," in L'insegnamento della logiea a Bologna nel XIV seeolo, ed. D. Buzzetti, M. Ferriani, and A. Tabarroni (Bologna: Istituto per la storia dell'Univer­ sita, 1 992), 293-3 1 7 . Lambertini focuses on Bolognese authors, but his remarks are extremely useful to grasp the whole debate between Brito and his supporters on the one hand and Hervaeus Natalis on the other. See also D. Peder, "Peter Auriol vs. Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality. A text with Introductory Remarks," Archives d'his­ tom doetn'nal< e/ littiraire du M
46

CHAPTER 1WO

tion. Indeed, in the fourteenth century this position is labeled as "a very old opinion."3 Others hold that, ontologically speaking, inten­ tions are identical to the acts by which the intellect understands. Many Franciscans, including William of Ware and the late William Ockham, seem to have maintained some variant of this position.4 By contrast, intentions can be considered to have a special status, which only pertains to mental entities and does not belong in the categorial framework. Accordingly, intentions are said to have ob­ jective being, namely the kind of being typical of something insofar as it is an object of the intellect. This position seems to derive from Thomas Aquinas's mature doctrine of the inner word or concept. In later years, Aquinas came to think that concepts are different from both intelligible species and acts of the intellect; instead, they are the final resUlts of understanding and are produced by acts of understanding. Whereas intelligible species are real qualities in­ hering in the mind, concepts or inner words are not real beings but enjoy a special kind of being, which is variously called 'intentional', 'mental', and, especially after Aquinas, 'objective', which applies when something is considered as an object of understanding. This was, for example, the position of the early Ockham. Scotus himself, although he refuses Aquinas's conception of the inner word, was a defender of the objective being of intentions.5 Facing this dilemma on the ontological status of intentions or concepts, some authors Optics, Epistnnology and tk Foundations if Smwntics 1250-1345 (Leiden-New York­ K0benhavn-Koln: E. J. Brill, 1988), 1 1-26. 3 J. Pinborg and S. Ebbesen, '�onymi quaestiones in Tractatus Petri Hispani [·111 traditae in codice Cracoviensi 742 (anno fere 1 360)," Calliers de l'Institut du Moyen Age gTe, et latin 41 (1982), 23: "Nota: opinio prima et antiquissima de secundis intention­ ibus ponit duas conclusiones, quarum prima est ista, quod species inteUigibilis sit in­ tentio prima. " • William of Ware Sent. I, d. 27, q. 3 in M. Schmaus, Dtr Liber Propugnatorius des Thomas Anglicus und die Lehruntersehiede �wisehen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus. II. Teil: Die Trinitarisehen LehrdifJeren�en, Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, XXIX.I (MUnster: Aschendorff, 1930), 253*-71*. On Ockham, see the following note. See also Duns Scotus Leet. 1, d. 27, q. 1-3, nn. 3242, (ed. Vat., XVII, 352-54) and Ord. I, d. 27, q. 1-3, nn. 48-61 (ed. Vat., V, 84-88). 5 See for example Thomas Aquinas De Pot., q. 8, a, I. On Thomas Aquinas's ma­ ture theory of the concept, see W. W. Meissner, "Some Aspects of the Verbum in the Texts of St. Thomas," The Modern Schoolman 36 (1958): 1-30; Panaccio, "From Mental Word," 1 26-29; R. Pasnau, Theories if Cognition in the Later Middle Ages (Cam­ bridge: CUp, 1997), 256-71. On Aquinas's early doctrine of the concept, see J. Chenevert, "Le verbum dans Ie commentaire sur les Sentences de Saint Thomas d'Aquin," Sciences ecelisio.stiques 13 (1961): 1 9 1-233, 359-90. On the debate con-

INTENTIONS OF UNDERSTANDING IN THOMAS AQUINAS

47

prefer the first solution, while others prefer the second one, and still others try to formulate an intermediate position, which is the result of a mixture of elements taken from the other two. The question concerning the ontological status of intentions or concepts, however, is only one among the various questions that can be asked about intentions. Another question focuses on the fact that intentions are representations of something. As Thomas Aquinas remarks, a mental image can be considered in two ways: first, as something in itself, second, as representing something else.6 If con­ sidered in the first way, a concept is addressed according to its onto­ logical status, as we have seen. If it is considered in the second way, however, it is the representative capacity of the intention that is ex­ amined. In the last case, the paramount question is what an inten­ tion represents, and not what it is. This question is further con­ nected to the issue of what causes an intention, for it is usually maintained that a representation is caused by the thing it repre­ sents.1 In this chapter, I focus on the second issue concerning intentions, for it is insofar as second intentions are representations that they are

cerning the so-called objective-existence and mental-act theories, see M. McCord Adams, William Ockham (Notre Dame, In.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 73-107; Panaccio, Le discours inthieur, 1 77-20 1 . In general on objective being, see O. Boulnois, "ttre, luire et concevoir. Note sur la genese et la structure de la conception scotiste de I'esse obiective," Collectaneafranciscana 60 ( 1990): 1 1 7-35, and A. de Muralt, "La doctrine medievale de l'esse obiectivum," in A. de Muralt, L'enjeu de la philosophie midiivale: etudes thomistes, seotistes, occamiennes et grigoriennes (Leiden-New York-K0ben­ havn-Ka1n: E .]. Brill, 1991), 90-167. See also L. Dewan, "Obiectum. A Note on the Invention of a Word," Archiv,s d'histoire doctrinal, ,t littiTaire du Moyen Ag' 48 (1981): 37-96. 6 Thomas Aquinas Sent. I, d. 27, q. 2, a. 3 (ed. Mandonnet, 1, 663): " . . . in speciem vel in imaginem contingit fieri conversionem dupliciter: vel secundum quod est species talis rei, et tunc est eadem conversio in rem et speciem rei; vel in speciem se­ cundum quod est res quaedam; et sic non oponet quod eadem conversione conver­ tatur quis per inteUectum in speciem rei et in rem; sicut quando aliquis considerat imaginem inquantum est corpus lapideum, et inquantum est similitudo Socratis et P1atonis." See also Sent. II, d. 12, q. 1, a. 3, ad 5 (ed. Mandonnet, II, 31 1). 7 Thomas Aquinas D, VeT., q. 2, a. 5, ad 1 7 (ed. Leon., XXII, 1 , 65): '�d septimum decimum dicendum quod hoc modo aliquid cognoscitur secundum quod est in cognoscente repraesentatum et non secundum quod est in cognoscente existens: similitudo enim in vi cognoscitiva existens non est principium cognitionis rei se­ cundum esse quod habet in potentia cognoscitiva sed secundum relationem quam habet ad rem cognitam; et inde est quod non per modum quo similitudo rei habet esse in cognoscente res cognoscitur sed per modum quo similitudo in intellectu exis­ tens est repraesentativa rei . . . "

48

CHAPTER TWO

important to the doctrine of the logical study of categories. In fact, we have seen that many authors at the end of the thirteenth century maintain that logic studies categories to the extent that second in­ tentions are founded on them. We must, therefore, take into ac­ count what kind of relationship holds between second intentions and their foundations and examine how something can act as a foundation for a second intention.

I.

Two views if second intentions

By the end of the thirteenth century, two theories of second inten­ tions as concepts had gained common currency. On the one hand, Thomas Aquinas and his followers stressed the role that the intellect plays in forming intentions. They maintained that the intellect pro­ duces intentions by reflecting on itself and on its first act of cogni­ tion. By reflecting on itself, the intellect establishes a relation be­ tween itself and what it understands and between its own concepts. In Aquinas, an intention seems to play a twofold role, as a relation and as a concept. An intention is the relation that the intellect causes when it reflects on itself, but an intention is also the concept by which the intellect represents its objects as related to itself or to one another. On the other hand, authors such as Simon of Faver­ sham and Radulphus Brito state that the intellect produces second intentions not by reflecting on itself but by comparing two extra­ mental things against each other. According to Aquinas, then, in­ tentions (i.e. second intentions) are not concepts representing extra­ mental things (i.e. first intentions); instead, they are concepts consequent to or dependent on the way we understand extramental things. Consequently, Aquinas opens the way to conceiving second intentions as second-order concepts or concepts of concepts. By contrast, Simon of Faversham and Radulphus Brito maintain that both second and first intentions represent one and the same object, namely an extramental thing. First and second intentions differ merely with respect to the way they represent an extramental thing: first intentions represent it essentially, i.e. according to its own essence, whereas second intentions represent it relatively, i.e. by comparing it with other things. Accordingly, these authors do not see second intentions as second-order concepts, for second inten­ tions are concepts of extramental things exactly as first intentions

INTENTIONS OF UNDERSTANDING IN THOMAS AQUINAS

49

are. Both doctrines connect second intentions to relations. For this reason, an analysis of the notion of rational relation will be essen­ tial to understand the difference between these two doctrines. In­ deed, second intentions and rational relations are two notions not always neatly distinguished. The question of how intentions are founded on reality and what they represent is certainly linked to the question concerning their ontological status. The proponents of the theory according to which the intellect causes second intentions by reflecting on its acts favor the view that second intentions have objective, not real, being. By contrast, those who maintain that second intentions represent ex­ tramental things usually view them as real qualitites inhering in the mind. Both these two approaches to intentions will have great influ­ ence, and it seems that, in a revised version, they are still present in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century authors.a In this chapter, I present the first conception of second inten­ tions, which is that of Thomas Aquinas and his followers.

2.

Intentions asfounded on modes qf understanding in Thomas Aquinas

Thomas Aquinas does not devote a specific treatment to intentions. Furthermore, as is well known, he does not comment either on Por­ phyry's

Isagoge or Aristotle's Categories,

which are the standard places

where authors introduce their views on intentions. Still, it is possible to give a reconstruction of Aquinas's doctrine of intentions from passages scattered throughout his works. Even though a sophisti­ cated doctrine of intentions emerges from an analysis of these pas­ sages, we should not forget that many issues concerning intentions would become problematic only after Aquinas. Sometimes, he seems to present elements of both conceptions of second intentions I have previously mentioned, although the first model is clearly dominant. Finally, one should remember that Aquinas speaks of in­ tentions whereas the authors after him speak explicitly of second in-

8 See L. Hickman, Modern Theories of Higher Level Predicates. Second Intentions in the Neu�eit (Mtinchen: Philosophia Verlag, 1 980), 32-53, 103-25, 1 32-6 1 . Hickman labels the first approach 'rationalist conceptualism' and the second approach 'realist con­ ceptualism'. See also Lambertini, "La teoria delle intentiones," 3 1 7.

50

CHAPTER 'IWO

tentions, even though he occasionally speaks of "second things un­ derstood" (secunda intellecta).9 Both in his commentary on the

De Potentia,

Sentences and in his later questions

Aquinas provides a full account of the relationship be­

tween an intention and an extramental thing. IO The two treatments seem to be compatible with each other. Let us turn first to what Aquinas says in

Sent.

I, d. 2. The framework of Aquinas's treatment

of intentions is the classic semantic theory that Aristode provides at the beginning of his

De Interpretatione. II

There, Aristode describes

the semantic relation of signification as involving words (or, as Aquinas says, names, i.e. categorematic expressions), concepts, and things. Concepts function as mediating elements, since words di­ recdy signifY concepts, which in turn represent extramental things. Thus, words signifY extramental things via concepts. 1 2 Aquinas maintains that the concepts present i n our mind can be related to the extramental things in three ways. He presents his clas­ sification of concepts as a classification of words, which are sorted out into three different classes according to which kind of concepts they signifY. First, a word may signifY a concept that represents an extramental thing. For example, the word 'man' signifies a concept (the concept

man), which in turn represents an extramental thing (a

man in the extramental world). Concepts of this kind are immedi­ ately founded on reality. Aquinas explains the immediacy of this foundation by saying that the it is the extramental thing that makes the concept true, for a concept is true if it faithfully represents the extramental things it is intended to represent. In other words, the

9 On the use of the term 'intentio' in Thomas Aquinas,see A. Hayen,L'Intentwnnel dans La philosophie de Saint Thomas (Paris: De,dee de Brouwer, 1942), 1 83-97. 10 Thomas Aquinas's commentary on the Sentences stems from his first period of teaching in Paris (1252-54). In 1256 it was not yet completed. The questions De Po­ Imtia were disputed probably in 1 265-66. See Torrell,Initiation tl saint Thomas d'Aquin, 485, 489. On Aquinas'S doctrine of intentions in general, see Schmidt, Tht Domain of Logic, 94-1 29. yerm. I, 2 (ed. Leortina, 1.* I, to- I I). I I Thomas Aquinas In Per 12 All the authors writing at the end of the thirteenth century accept Aristotle's se­ mantic theory presented at the beginning of Peri hermmeias, but they give very dif­ ferent interpretations of it, in particular concerning the meaning of 'concept' and the role of the intelligible species. Aquinas himself changes his mind on this subject in the course of his career. See Pini, "Species, Concept, and Thing, " 36-39, 43-47. The debate on signification, however, does not seem to be immediately relevant for the relationship between second intentions and extramental things.

INTENTIONS OF UNDERSTANDING IN THOMAS AQ.UINAS

51

extramental thing is the immediate cause of the truthfulness of the concept: The conception of the intellect can be related in three ways to what is extramental. Sometimes what the intellect conceives is a similitude of the thin� existing extramentally, as for example what is conceived about thIS name 'man'. And this conception of the intellect is imme­ diately founded on the thing, insofar as the thing itself, by its confor­ mity to the intellect, causes the intellect to be true and the name sig­ nifying that concept to be said properly of that thing. 13

Not all words, however, signifY concepts representing things. Some words signify concepts "following from the mode of understanding extramental things," as Aquinas states. Such concepts are intentions the intellect adds to what it understands. For instance, the word 'genus' does not signify a concept representing something extra­ mental; it signifies a concept the intellect produces by reflecting on its act of understanding extramental things. First, the intellect un­ derstands animals in the world and represents them by the concept of animal. Second, the intellect turns back to the understanding it has acquired and attributes the intention genus to the concept of an­ imal. Consequently, the intention

genus

does not represent extra­

mental animals, but, as Aquinas says, it follows from the mode of understanding extramental animals: when we understand animals by the concept

animal,

we understand them under a certain mode,

and the intention genus follows from that mode of understanding. How can we interpret the notion of "following from a mode of understanding?" Aquinas is not explicit on this regard. It seems, however, that the contrast Aquinas wants to draw is clear: on the one hand, there are concepts founded on extramental things and representing them, on the other hand, there are concepts founded on the mode in which such extramental things are understood. What is a concept such as genus founded on? Aquinas distinguishes between a proximate and a remote foundation. The proximate " Thomas Aquinas Sent. I, d. 2, q. 1 , a. 3 (ed. Mandonnet, I, 67): "Ipsa conceptio inteUectus tripliciter se habet ad rem quae est extra animam. Aliquando enim hoc quod intellectus concipit est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sicut hoc quod concipitur de hoc nomine 'homo'. Et talis conceptio intellectus habet fundamentum in re immediate, inquantum res ipsa, ex sua conformitate ad intellectum, fadt quod. intellectus sit verus, et quod nomen significans ilium intellectum proprie de re dic­ tatur."

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CHAPTER lWO

foundation is something in the intellect, for what makes a concept such as genus true is not the fact that there are animals in the world but the fact that we understand animals as animals by the concept

animal,

namely according to a certain degree of universality and

not, say, as men, horses, and so on. Still, a concept such as genus is also founded on reality, for its remote foundation is an extramental thing: in the example of genus and

animal, the remote foundation of genus is the extramental animals the intellect understands: Sometimes, however, what a name signifies is not a similitude of a thing existing extramentally, but is something following from the mode of understanding an extramental thing. And so are the inten­ tions that our intellect adds, as for example what is signified by this name 'genus' is not a similitude of something existing extramentally, but by the fact that the intellect understands animal as present in many species, it attributes the intention of genus to it. And although the proximate foundation of such an intention is not in a thing but in the intellect, nevertheless its remote foundation is the thing itself. For example, the intellect understands the nature of an­ imal in man, in horse and in many other species. From this it follows that understands that nature as a genus. To this con­ cept by which the intellect understands the concept of genus there im­ mediately corresponds no extramental thing that is a genus. However, to the understanding from which this intention follows there corre­ sponds something. 14

Concepts such as genus, even though indirecdy, do represent things in the world, and are still somehow founded on an extramental thing. So, when using them, the intellect does not give up its func­ tion of representing something in the world. Aquinas says that the intellect "is not false." He suggests that these concepts are similar to mathematical objects, which are produced by abstraction but are still founded on the extramental world: 1-4 Ibid.: '1\liquando autem hoc quod significat nomen non est similitudo rei exis­ tentis extra animam, sed est aliquid quod consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem quae est extra animam: et huiusmodi sunt intentiones quas intellectus noster adinvenit; sicut significatum huius nominis 'genus' non est similitudo alicuius rei extra animam existentis; sed ex hoc quod intellectus intelligit animal ut in pluribus speciebus, at­ tribuit ei intentionem generis; et huiusmodi intentionis, lieet proximum funda­ mentum non sit in re sed in intellectu, tamen remotum fundamentum est res ipsa. Verbi gratia, intellectus intelligit naturam animalis in homine, in equo, et multis allis speciebus: ex hoc sequitur quod intelligit earn ut genus. Huic intellectui quo intel­ lectus intelligit genus non respondet aliqua res extra immediate quae sit genus; sed intelligentiae ex qua consequitur ista intentio respondet aliqua res."

INTENTIONS OF UNDERSTANDING IN THOMAS AQUINAS

53

Hence the intellect that adds these intentions is not false. And it hap­ pens similarly for all the other notions that follow upon the mode of understanding, as for example the abstraction of the mathematical entities and similar things. 15

Still other words signify concepts that do not have any foundation in the extramental world. These concepts represent neither extra­ mental things nor the ways the intellect understands extramental things. For instance, a concept such as

chimera lacks any foundation

in reality, either directly or indirectly. Aquinas regards these con­ cepts as false since they do not represent anything in the world: Sometimes, however, what is signified by a name does not have any foundation on a thing, either proximate or remote, as for example the conception of a chimera, for it is neither a similitude of an extra­ mental thing nor does it follow from a mode of understanding a thing in the extramental world. And therefore it is a false conception.16

Admittedly, there is a point in Aquinas's account that needs clarifi­ cation. He says that the second type of concepts follows from the way the intellect understands extramental things. How should this formula be interpreted? Aquinas refers to the notion of "way" or "mode of understanding"

(modus intelligendz).

Briefly, one and the

same thing can be understood in different ways or modes. For ex­ ample, the same animal, say a horse, can be understood both as an individual horse, Bucephalus, as a member of the species Horse, and as a member of the genus Animal. The thing understood in these three ways is one and the same thing, and its mode of being remains the same. What changes is the way the intellect under­ stands and represents that thing. The intellect forms concepts of the second type, such as

genus

and

species,

by turning from the extra­

mental thing it understands to the mode of understanding it. The nature of this reflection of the intellect on itself becomes clearer if

1 5 Ibid.: "Unde inteUectus non est falsus qui has intentiones adinvenit. Et simile est de omnibus aliis qui consequuntur ex modo intelligendi, sicut est abstractio mathe­ maticorum et huiusmodi." 16 Ibid.: ')\J.iquando vera id quod significatur per nomen non habet fundamentum in re, neque proximum neque remoturn, sicut conceptio chimerae: quia neque est similitudo alicuius rei extra animam, neque consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem aliquam naturae: et ideo ista conceptio est falsa."

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we turn to Aquinas's other treatments of intentions, notably to his questions De Potentia.

3. In

De Pot.,

Intentions and extramental things in Thomas Aquinas q. 7, a. 9, Aquinas divides the objects that our intellect

understands into two classes. First, the intellect understands extra­ mental things. Second, the intellect turns towards what Aquinas calls "intentions following from the mode of understanding." Here is a clear correspondence with what he had said in his commentary on the Sentences since the first class of objects can be easily identified

Sen­ tences, whereas the second class of objects is identical to the second type of concepts of the Sentences. In De Pot., Aquinas is more precise concerning the second things understood (secunda intelucta). The intellect acquires them when re­ with the things represented by the first type of concepts of the

flecting on itself and understanding that it understands and the way in which it understands. These intentions are, therefore, quite dif­ ferent from the concepts by which the intellect represents extra­ mental things. Here, Aquinas explicitly says that it is the mode of understanding that is understood when the intellect reflects on itself: For the first things understood are extramental things, towards which the intellect is first turned in order to understand them. The second things understood, however, are called intentions consequent to the mode of understanding. For this mode is what the intellect secondly understands inasmuch as the intellect reflects on itself, and under­ stands that it understands and the mode in which it understands." (Trans!. mine.)

Aquinas deals with the same issue also in another passage of the De Pot., q. 7, a. 6. Here he explains that the intellect first understands extramental things, and second, it reflects on itself. In its first act of cognition the intellect knows extramental things, whereas in the second act the intellect understands that extramental things are un­ derstood. These two stages of understanding are two different acts. 11 Thomas Aquinas De Pot., q. 7, a, 9 (ed. Pession, 207-08): "Prima enim intellecta sunt res extra animam, in quae primo intellectus intelligenda fertur. Secunda autem inteUecta dicuntur intentiones consequentes modum intelligendi: hoc enim secundo intellectus inteUigit inquantum reflectitur super seipsum, intelligens se intelligere et modum quo intelligit."

INTENTIONS OF UNDERSTANDING IN THOMAS AQUINAS

55

Each of these acts produces a concept to which there corresponds a thing. In its first act, directed towards extramental things, the intel­ lect produces a concept to which there corresponds an extramental thing. Elsewhere Aquinas calls this first concept 'inner word'. This is what is generally called 'first intention'. In its second act, which is directed towards the mode of understanding, the intellect produces a concept to which there corresponds an extramental thing as un­ derstood. This second concept is what is generally called 'second in­ tention'; For by the fact that the intellect reflects on itself, just as it understands things existing outside the mind, so does it understand that they are understood. And so, just as there is a conception or notion of the in­ tellect to which the thing existing outside the mind corresponds, so is there a conception or notion to which the thing understood corre­ sponds as understood. For instance, to the notion or conception of a man there corresponds the thing outside the mind, while to the notion or conception of a genus and species there corresponds only the thing understood. 16

This clarifies the expression according to which intentions follow from the way the intellect understands. Intentions are concepts that the intellect produces when it reflects on what it has understood. They correspond to the way things understood are understood just as the concepts of the first kind correspond to extramental things. Such a correspondence can be interpreted as a relation of repre­ sentation, in the light of the fact that Aquinas maintains that the in­ tellect understands a mode of understanding when it reflects on it­ self and produces an intention. In another passage of his

De Potentia,

Aquinas explains again

what the second act of the intellect produces. When the intellect considers the things understood as understood, it attributes some properties to them. For example, the intellect attributes the property of being a species or of being a genus to a thing understood. In the 18 De Pot., q. 7, a. 6 (ed. Pession, 20 I): "Ex hoc enim quod intellectus in seipsum re­ flectitur, sicut intelligit res existentes extra animam, ita intelligit eas esse intellectas; et sic, sicut est quaedam conceptio intellectus vel ratio cui respondet res ipsa quae est extra animam, ita est quaedam conceptio vel ratio cui respondet res intellecta se­ cundum quod huiusmodi; sicut rationi hominis vel conceptioni hominis respondet res extra animam; rationi vero vel conceptioni generis aut speciei respondet solum res intellecta." Here and in the following quotations I slightly modify the translation provided in Thomas Aquinas On the Power of God, transl. the English Dominican Fa­ thers, vol. 2 (London: Burns Oates and Washbourne Ltd., 1933), 36.

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CHAPTER TWO

extramental world, nothing corresponds to these properties, prop­ erly speaking, for being a species and being a genus are not some­ thing in the extramental world. These properties pertain to things only insofar as they are understood and are in the mind: Now there are certain notions to which nothing corresponds in the thing understood. But the intellect does not attribute the notions of this kind to the things as they are in themselves, but only as they are understood, as is evident in the case of the notion of genus and species and of other intellectual intentions. For in the things that are outside the mind there is nothing that is a similitude of the notion of genus or species,I9

Even though being a species and being a genus are properties to which nothing corresponds in the extramental world, Aquinas re­ marks that

species

and

genus

are concepts truthfully representing

something: as he states, they are not "false concepts." In fact, these concepts are not attributed to extramental things as they are inde­ pendent of our understanding; on the contrary, these concepts are designed to represent the things we understand to the extent that those things are in the mind. Again, the notion of attribution seems to be equivalent to the notion of being founded on, which is in turn equivalent to the notion of representing. Since they represent things as they are in the mind, and since things are understood and are in the mind either as species or as genera or as similar notions, these concepts represent something truthfully and are not merely ficti­ tious concepts: And yet the intellect is not false. For the notions of the kind of these notions, namely genus and species, are not attributed by the intellect to things as existing outside the mind but only as existing therein.20

Interestingly, here Aquinas adds a precision to what he had said in his commentary on the

Sentences

concerning the foundations of in-

19 De Pot., q. 7, a. 6 (ed. Pession, 20tb): "Sunt autem quaedam rationes quibus in re intellecta nihil respondet; sed ea quorum sunt huiusmodi rationes, intellectus non attribuit rebus prout in se ipsis sunt, sed solum prout intellectae sunt; sicut patet in ra� tione generis et speciei, et aliarum intentionum intellectualium: Dam nihil est in rebus quae sunt extra animam, cuius similitudo sit ratio generis vel speciei." 20 Ibid.: "Nee tamen intellectus est falsus: quia ea quorum sunt istae rationes, scil­ icet genus et species, non attribuit rebus secundum quod sunt extra animam, sed solum secundum quod sunt in intellectu."

INTENTIONS OF UNDERSTANDING IN THOMAS AQUINAS

tentions. In his commentary o n the

57

Sentences, h e had recognized that

intentions are concepts truthfully representing something because they are founded on something extramental, even though remotely so. Now in the

De Potentia Aquinas says that intentions are truthfully

representative concepts because they are attributed not to extra­ mental things but to things as they are in the mind. Here, Aquinas puts more emphasis on the purely mental foundation of intentions. In the

De Potentia,

however, Aquinas also says that second inten­

tions have a foundation in reality, for as first intentions are immedi­ ately based on extramental things so second intentions are somehow based on extramental things, but not immediately so. Only through first intentions are second intentions founded on extramental things. After understanding things, the intellect reflects on itself and sees that the essence understood (for example, the essence of animal) is understood in a certain way (for example, as a genus). Although nothing extramental immediately corresponds to the concept repre­ senting the way an extramental thing is understood, the extra­ mental thing is still the remote foundation of such a concept. This passage of the

De Potentia

is almost identical to the passage in

Aquinas's commentary on the

Sentences:

Something in reality corresponds to a concept in two ways. First, im­ mediately, that is to say, when the intellect conceives the form of a thing existing outside the mind, for instance of a man or a stone. Sec­ ondly, mediately, when, namely, something follows the act of under­ standing, and the intellect considers it by reflecting on itself. So that something corresponds to that consideration of the intellect medi­ ately, that is to say, through the medium of the understanding of that thing. For instance, the intellect understands the nature of animal in a man, a horse, and many other species. From this it follows that the in­ tellect understands that nature as a genus. To this act of under­ standing, whereby the intellect understands a genus, there does not correspond immediately outside the mind a thing that is a genus; and yet there is something that corresponds to the understanding upon which this intention follows." 21 De Pol., q. I , a. 1 , ad IO (ed. Pession, 10- 1 1) : " . . .intellectui respondet aliquid in re dupliciter. Uno modo immediate, quando videlicet intellectus concipit formam rei alicuius extra animam existentis, ut hominis vel lapidis. Alia modo mediate, quando videlicet aliquid sequitur actum intelligendi, et intellectus reflexus supra ipsum coo­ siderat illud. Uncle res respondet illi considerationi intellectus mediate, id est medi­ ante intelligentia rei: verbi gratia, intellectus intelligit naturam animalis in homine, in equa, et in multis aliis speciebus: ex hoc sequitur quod intelligit earn ut genus. Huic intellectui quo intellectus intelligit genus, non respondet aliqua res extra immediate quae sit genus; sed intelligentiae, ex qua consequitur ista intentio, respondet aliqua

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As previously mentioned, second intentions according to Aquinas result from the reflection of the intellect on itself and on the way it understands something. How does this reflection exactly take place? Aquinas provides some details in his commentary on the De Interpre­

tatione, where he states that the intellect forms intentions such as genus and species by adding them to the nature understood insofar as it compares that nature understood to extramental things: For sometimes something pertaining to the only action of the intellect is attributed to it [sci!. to the universal] considered in this way [sci!., according to the being it has in the intellect] ; as for example, if it is said that man is predicable of many or is a universal or is a genus or is a species. For the intellect forms such intentions by attributing them to the nature understood, insofar as it compares it to the things that are outside the mind.'2

It is this comparison between the nature understood - or concept and the extramental things that the intellect carries out by reflecting on itself So, as we have seen, the first product of understanding

an

extramental thing is a concept directly representing that extra­ mental thing. Thanks to its first act, the intellect forms a concept that is identical to the essence of that extramental thing insofar as it is understood (an

intellectum

or

natura intellecta).

Then, the intellect

reflects on this concept, produced by its first act, and compares it to the extramental things represented by that concept. Through that comparison, the intellect becomes aware of the mental status of its concept (identical to the nature insofar as it is understood), for when it compares a concept and a thing, the intellect recognizes what, in the thing, is dependent on the way in which that thing is under­ stood. Second intentions are the concepts that are founded on the aspects of the things understood depending merely on their being understood. Admittedly, there remains some obscurity in Aquinas's doctrine of intentions. It is clear that intentions are concepts, and that they res." I slightly modify the translation provided in Thomas Aquinas On the Power of God, transl. the English Dominican Fathers, vol. I (London: Burns Oates and Wash­ bourne Ltd., 1 932), 7. " Thomas Aquinas In Peryerm. I, 10, on Aristotle's De into 1 7b 1-2 (ed. Leonina, I." I, 51): "Quandoque enim attribuitur ei [seil., universali] sic considerato [seil., se­ cundum esse quod habet in intellectu] aliquid quod pertinet ad salam actionem in­ tellectus, ut si dicatur quod homo est praedicabile de multis aut universale aut genus aut species; huiusmodi enim intentiones format intellectus attribuens eas naturae in­ teUeetae, secundum quod comparat ipsam ad res quae sunt extra animam."

INTENTIONS OF UNDERSTANDING IN THOMAS AQUINAS

59

are concepts representing not extramental things but modes of un­ derstanding. Aquinas, however, also regards intentions as properties and relations established by the intellect. Thus, there seems to be a basic ambiguity in Aquinas's treatment of intentions between inten­ tions as concepts and intentions as properties. It is probably because Aquinas sees intentions as properties that he says they are "founded on" and "following from" the modes of understanding while he avoids saying that they represent such modes of understanding, even though, as we have seen, such relations can be legitimately in­ terpreted as representations.

4. Intentions and relations in Thomas Aquinas Be that as it may, according to Aquinas, the intellect produces an in­ tention by comparing things considered as understood to things considered as extramental. Let us return to Aquinas's example of the concept

man.

The intellect understands man as a universal, i.e.

as a species. The species is the mode in which the intellect under­ stands the extramental essence of man. This mode of under­ standing becomes an intention when the intellect reflects on the op­ eration by which it understands the essence of man. Then the intellect does not consider man as an extramental essence but as the universal concept

man. According to what Aquinas says, the intellect man, which is internal to

reflects on itself by comparing the concept

the intellect itself, to the extramental thing corresponding to such a concept. Two elements must be distinguished in Aquinas's notion of in­ tention. First, there is the reflection of the intellect on its operation. Second, there is the comparison the intellect draws between a mental notion and the extramental thing represented by that no­ tion. The comparison and the reflection of the intellect on itself take place at the very same time?3 In the passages we have considered so far Aquinas emphasizes the reflection of the intellect on itsel£ Other times, however, he fo­ cuses his attention on the comparison drawn by the intellect. It is in

23 See C. Boyer, "Le sens d'un texte de St. Thomas: De Ver. 1, 9," Gregorianum 5 (1924): 424-43; F.-X. Putallaz, Le sens de La rijlexion che� Thomas d'Aquin (Paris:J. Vrin, 1991).

60

CHAPTER TWO

these passages that he puts forward his analysis of intentions as ra­ tional relations. It is worthwhile considering the passages in more detail, since the notions of second intention and rational relation will be closely connected in the authors writing after Aquinas. In

Summa theologiae,

q. 28, a. I , Aquinas explains that there are

two kinds of relations. 24 First, there are real relations, which are founded on the nature of related things. It follows that things re­ lated in this way are ordered one to the other according to their own nature. As an example, Aquinas introduces the case of a heavy body and the intermediate place to which it tends by nature. Second, there are rational relations, which are founded not on the nature of the related things but on the act of apprehension by which reason compares them. As an example of rational relations, Aquinas mentions the comparison made by the intellect between the concepts man and animal. By comparing one concept to the other, the intellect forms the intention of a species correlated to a genus. The relation between the concept

man and the concept an­ imal is founded not on the natures of these two things, but on the in­

tellect confronting them: The things that are said in respect to something properly signifY only a relation to something else. This reference sometimes is in the very nature of things. For example, this is the case when some things are ordered one to the other according to their natures and have an incli­ nation one to the other. And it is necessary that the relations of this kind be real. For example, in a heavy body there is an inclination and an order towards the intermediate place, so that a certain relation is in the heavy body itself with respect to the intermediate place. And sim­ ilarly in the other cases of this kind. Sometimes, however, the relation signified by the things that are said to be with reference to something else is only in the apprehension of reason comparing one thing to the other. And then the relation is only rational, as when reason compares man to animal as a species to a genus 'S (Transl. mine.)

,. See M. G. Henninger, Relations. Medieval Theories 1250-1325 (Oxford: OUp, 1 989), 1 3- 1 7. On rational relations, see A. Krempel, La doctrine de la relation che{ Saint Thomas. Expose historique et systematique (Paris:]. Vrin, 1 959), vol. 2, 487-505. On rela­ tions and intentions, see Schmidt, The Domain of Logic, 163-74. 25 ST I, q. 28, a. 1: 'lEa vero quae dicuntur ad aliquid, significant secundum pro­ priam rationem solum respectum ad aliud. Qui quidem respectus aliquando est in ipsa natura rerum; utpate quando aliquae res secundum suam naturam ad invicem ordinatae sunt, et invicem inclinationem habent. Et huiusmodi relationes 0poftet esse reales. Sicut in corpore gravi est inclinatio et ardo ad locum medium: unde re­ spectus quidam est in ipso gravi respectu loci medii. Et similiter de aliis huiusmodi. Aliquando vero respectus significatus per ea quae dicuntur ad aliquid, est tantum in

INTENTIONS OF UNDERSTANDING IN THOMAS AQUINAS

6l

Sometimes Aquinas is more precise with regard to rational rela­ tions. In his commentary on the

Sentences he

specifies that there are

four kinds of rational relations. First, relations are rational when they are not founded on anything real. Second, relations are ra­ tional when there is no real diversity between their extremes. Third, relations are rational when one of their extremes is something non­ existent. Fourth, relations are rational when they are founded on other relations. Relations such as "being a species of a genus" be­ long to the first kind. 26 It must be noted that in the passage of the

Summa theologiae just

quoted, the comparison that the intellect draws is between two things understood, not between the concept of something - or the thing as understood, as Aquinas says - and the extramental thing represented by that concept, as Aquinas had maintained in

De Pot.,

q. 7, a. 6. In fact, Aquinas, in De Pot., q. 7, a. l l , recognizes that both comparisons are possible: either the intellect compares a con­ cept to an extramental thing or it compares one concept to another concept. In both cases, the intellect produces an intention.27

5.

Giles qf Rome on intentions

Even though Aquinas does not adopt the standard terminology of 'first' and 'second intentions', he develops a sophisticated doctrine of the relationship between intentions and extramental things. This doctrine provides a general framework for the authors who suc­ ceeded him. ipsa apprehensione ralionis conferentis unum alteri: et tunc est relario ralionis tantum; sicut cum comparat ratio hominem animali, lit speciem ad genus." 26 Sent. I, d. 26, q. 2, a. l (ed. Mandonnet, It 630-31): "Et hoc contingit quatuor modis, scilicet quod sint relationes ralionis, et non rei. Uno modo, ut dictum est, quando relatio non habet aliquid in rei natura supra quod fundetur . . . Secundo modo quando relatio non habet aliquem realero diversitatem inter extrema, sicut relatio idemitatis . . . Tertio modo quando designatur relatio aliqua entis ad non ens . . . Quarto modo quando poni­ tur relatio relationis: ipsa enim relatio per seipsam refertur, non per aliam relationem." 27 De Pot., q. 7, a. 1 1 (cd. Pession, 2 1 2): "' . . . sicut realis relatio consistit in ordine rei ad rem, ita relatio rationis consistit in ordine intellectuum; quod quidem dupliciter potest contingere: uno modo secundum quod iste ordo est adiventus per intellectum, et attributus ei quod relative dicitur; et huiusmodi sunt relationes quae attribuuntur ab intellectu rebus intellectis, prout sunt intellectae, sicut relatio generis et speciei: has enim relationes ratio adinvenit considerando ordinem eius quod est in intellectu ad res quae sunt extra, vel etiam ordinem intellectuum ad invicem."

62

CHAPTER lWO

Some elements in Aquinas's doctrine remain obscure. Specifi­ cally, it is clear that intentions are representations of modes of un­ derstanding extramental things, but intentions are also concepts that are said to be following from the modes of understanding. How can the same thing be a concept and a relation or a property? An answer to this question could be that an intention is a relation of reason, and as such it has a merely conceptual existence. All the same, it is not clear how a relation can be a representation of a mode of understanding. Aquinas seems to maintain that an inten­ tion can be both a relation or a property

and a representation of the

mode in which the intellect understands things. It is not easy to see how these two points are to be reconciled. Moreover, Aquinas says that intentions are founded on the modes of understanding, but he also admits that extramental things are the remote foundations of intentions. What does this role of remote foundation imply? Can extramental things be described as the cause of second intentions or is the cause of intentions the intellect? Aquinas seems to leave open the question of how much the struc­ ture of second intentions tells us about the structure of the world. Both Giles of Rome and Peter of Auvergne follow Aquinas's treatment of the subject closely. They maintain many aspects of Aquinas's doctrine, including the view that second intentions are produced by the intellect through a turn towards things as under­ stood. Neither Giles nor Peter, however, seems to make any refer­ ence to the most revealing aspect of Aquinas's doctrine, namely the idea that intentions are founded not on things but on our modes of understanding. In a question of his second

Qy.odlibet,

Giles of Rome provides a

short but complete treatment of the distinction between first and second intentions.28 According to Giles, the intellect is first directed towards the essence of an extramental thing. By itself, this essence is not universal and the intellect does not understand it as a universal. Giles is referring here to the famous and widespread doctrine ac­ cording to which the essence of something is by itself neither uni­ versal nor individual. This doctrine derives from Avicenna29 and is " Giles of Rome's second QJ
ttrature quodlihllitjue de J 260 a 1320, vol. 1 (Le Saulchoir,

INTENTIONS OF UNDERSTANDING IN THOMAS AQUINAS

63

present in the writings of many authors, including Albert the Great,30 Thomas Aquinas,31 Henry of Ghent,32 and Godfrey of Fontaines.33 Giles of Rome connects this classic doctrine to the dis­ tinction between first and second intentions. According to Giles, only in a second stage does the intellect turn again towards its ob­ ject of knowledge and see that the essence understood is something common to many things. Accordingly, only in this second stage does the intellect attribute universality to

the

essence

understood.

Whereas the intellect's understanding of an essence as something extramental is a first intention, the intellect's understanding of that same essence as universal

is a second intention and is obtained

though the intellect's reflection on its own object.34 Giles does not speak of second intentions as of entities founded on the way our intellect understands things. He only refers to the in­ tellect's turning, not to its own first act, but to the object of its first act of understanding. Moreover, it is not clear what the intellect "finds" when it turns back to the object of its first act. Is the uni­ versality it finds a feature of the thing itself or is it a feature of its mode of understanding? Giles does not pose the problem, and it is now difficult to see what his answer would have been. Presumably, he does not pose the question because the problem of the real foun­ dation of intentions will become a crucial issue only to the authors who succeed him.

30 See for example Albert the Great Met. V, tr. 6, cap. 5 (Opera omnia, XVl. I , 28586); cap. 7 (Opera omnia; XVI. I , 287-88). 3 1 Thomas Aquinas De ente et essentia, cap. 3 (ed. Leonina, XLIII, 374.26-90); De Pot., q. 5, a. 9, ad 16 (ed. Pession, 155). " Henry of Ghent (}]Iod!. III, q. 9 (ed. Badius, I, 6OVO-61vOl. SeeJ. Paulus, Henri de Cando Essai sur les tendances de sa mitaphysique (Paris: Vrin, 1938), 67-103. " Godfrey of Fontaines (}]Iod!. 6, q. 6 (ed. De Wulf and Hoffmans, 140). See ]. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought if Co4frey if Fontaines. A Study in lAte Thirteenth-Cen­ tury Philosophy (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1981), 28. 34 Giles of Rome (}]Iod!. II, q. 6 (ed. De Conninc, 62b-63a): " . . . dicendum quod in­ tellectus primo aspectu fertur in ipsam essentiam secundum se sive in ipsum esse es­ seotiae. Per istam tamen lationem sive per istum aspectum ipsa essentia non appre­ henditur per intellectum ut est quid universale. At vero quando intellectus se convertit supra ipsum esse essentiae et videt quod illud sit commune multis, tunc dicit quod illud esse sit quid universale. Ideo cognitio essentiae est intentio prima. Dieo 'prima' quia est obiectum intellectus secundum lationem primam. Cognitio autem universalis est intentio secunda. Dico 'secunda' quia est obiectum intellectus non se­ cundum lationem primam, sed prout reftectit se supra illud quod cognovit et nunc videt esse commune multis."

64 6.

CHAPTER TWO

Peter of Auvergne on intentions and his criticism of Thomas Aquinas

Peter of Auvergne, writing his logical commentaries in the 1 270s,35 seems to have been strongly influenced by Thomas Aquinas's ap­ proach to intentions. In a certain question follows his commentaries on Porphyry's

"de universalibus", which Isagoge and on Aristode's

Categories, Peter explains how the intellect produces first and second intentions.36 Second intentions are not representations of things in­ sofar as they exist outside the mind. They are the product of the re­ flection of the intellect on its own first operation. According to Peter, the intellect produces first and second inten­ tions by two different movements. By a first movement, the intellect turns towards an extramental thing, or, more properly, to the essence of an extramental thing, which is its proper object. By a second movement, the intellect turns towards the thing already un­ derstood. It is at this second stage that the intellect takes into ac­ count what Peter of Auvergne calls the 'conditions' of the thing un­ derstood. To these conditions, the intellect gives second intention names such as 'genus'Y So Peter, like Aquinas, regards second intentions as produced by the intellect through a second movement, directed towards things as they are already understood. The main point, however, remains ob­ scure: what are the "conditions" that the intellect takes into account when it reflects on its first act? Are they real properties pertaining to the things themselves, of which the intellect merely becomes aware? 35 See R. Andrews, "Peter de Alvernia, Qjlaestiones super Praedicamentis," Cahiers de l'lnslitut du Moyen Age gT" et latin 55 (1987): 3. 36 These quaestiones de uniuersalibus - contained in ms. Firenze, Bib!. Mediceo-Lau­ renziana, cod. plut. XlI sin. 3, 7va-8va - are edited by Pinborg in his "Peter of Au­ vergne on Porphyry," Cahiers de l'Instilut du Moyen Age grec et latin 9 ( 1973): 64-68. For

a description of the manuscript, see S. Ebbesen and]. Pinborg, "Studies in the Log­ ical Writings attributed to Boethius de Dacia," Cahiers de ['Instilut du Moyen Age gree et

latin 3 (1970): 3-5.

37 Peter of Auvergne Super uniu. (ed. Pinborg, 64): "Supra res autem ipsas intel­ lectus duplicem habet matum. Unum quidem quo directe et immediate movetur in suum obiectum, quod ipsum quod quid est esse dicitur, et sic acquirit cognitionem de ipsius rei natura sibique nomen imponit [ipsamque repraesentans] sicut est 'homo' vel 'anima' vel 'Sor', quorum unumquodque idcirco primae intentionis dicitur nomen, quia conceptum significat intellectus in rem primo intendentis. Alium vero motum habet super rem iam apprehensam, quo, post [post: prius ed.] ipsius appre­ hensionem, movetur ad considerandum ipsius conditiones quibus perspectis secun­ dae intentionis nomen attribuit, ut puta 'universale'." See De Libera, La querelle, 294-95.

INTENTIONS OF UNDERSTANDING IN THOMAS AQUINAS

65

Are they intentional properties pertaining to the things only insofar as they are understood? Again, it is difficult to see which answer Peter would have preferred. Peter somehow clarifies this point in a passage of his commentary on the Categories. As we have seen, in the Summa theologiae Aquinas describes intentions as rational relations founded on the apprehen­ sion of the intellect. Peter of Auvergne, in his treatment of rela­ tions, raises a crucial point that Aquinas had left obscure. Some think, Peter states, that a rational relation is founded on a rational, as opposed to a real, thing. He goes on to say that a ra­ tional thing is by common consent something that depends on an operation of the intellect for its existence: for example, an actual universal such as a genus or a species. It is maintained that the in­ tention of a species, constituted by the relationship between a species such as man and a genus such as animal, is a rational rela­ tion because it is founded on a rational thing - the actual universal

man.

Now, Peter points at a major defect of this position. It is true

that the thing on which the relation

being a species of is

founded is a

rational thing, because it is an actual universal, but saying that something is founded on a rational thing is different from saying that it is reason that founds something on a rational thing. In fact, as Peter remarks, the relation founded on a rational thing is not a rela­ tion established by the intellect; on the contrary, that relation is de­ pendent on the very nature of the thing on which it is founded. For instance, the relation between a genus and a species, which is an in­ tention, is founded on a rational thing, but it is not reason that causes it. Between genus and species there is a certain relation be­ cause of the nature of genus and species, not because of a compar­ ison established by the intellect. So the nature of genus and species, not the intellect, causes the relation holding between them: Some people, however, said about the question whether a relation is something rational or natural, that there is a relation that is founded on a rational thing, such as the opposition is founded on the affirma­ tion and the negation. Such a relation, as they say, is rational. But this is not true, because what is founded on a rational thing is not some­ thing founded by reason on things themselves. On the contrary, it is founded on things themselves by virtue of the nature of such things. Hence the relation holding between genus and species is not founded on these things by reason. On the contrary, that relation is founded on things by virtue of the nature that one of these things has with respect to the other. But that relation is called a natural thing because it is

66

CHAPTER 1WO

caused by the nature of such things. Nevertheless, it is true that, if that relation were founded on those things by reason, then it would be a rational thing, as they say'·

Peter's criticism is based on the distinction between a relation founded on a rational thing and a relation founded by reason on a rational thing. According to Peter, second intentions are relations founded on rational things, but by virtue of the very nature of such things, not by virtue of the action of the intellect comparing them. Thus, the things on which intentions are founded are rational, but this does not entail that the relation founded on them is rational. In order to clarifY his distinction, Peter puts forward an example. If you hit the clapper of a bell, the movement of hitting depends on your will; however, the fact that hitting produces a sound only de­ pends on the nature of the bell and of the clapper, not on your will . Similarly, genus and species are things caused by reason, since they are actual universals, but the relation between genus and species is caused by their nature, not by reason. A second intention is pre­ cisely such a relation.39 Second intentions, insofar as they are relations, are not caused by the intellect according to Peter. They depend on the intellect and they are secondary with respect to the intellect's first operation of understanding, directed towards extramental things. In fact, second intentions are relations founded on things understood by the intel­ lect, but these relations are caused by the nature of the things un­ derstood, not by the intellect. In the light of Peter's remark on the cause of rational relations, we can make the hypothesis that the 'conditions' Peter of Auvergne considers as the causes of second intentions in his commentary on

" Peter of Auvergne, Super Prad. q. 47 (ed. Andrews, 67-68): "Quidam tamen dixerunt de hoc cum quaeritur utrum relatio sit res rationis vel naturae, dieunt quod quaedam est relatio quae fundatur supra res rationis, sicut oppositio supra affirma­ tionem et negationem, et talis relario, ut dicunt est rationis. mud tamen non est verum, quoniam ilia res quae fundatur supra res rationis non est aliquid funclatum a ratione supra ipsas res, sed per naturam talium rerum fundatur supra ipsas. Uncle re­ latio quae est inter ipsa genus et species non fundatur supra istas res a ratione, sed per naturam quam habet una istarum rerum respectu alterius fundatur relatio supra illas. Sed dicitur res naturalis, cum a natura talium rerum causetur. Cum hoc, verum est quod si a ratione fundaretur supra istas res tunc esset res rationis, sicut ipsi di­ cunt." 39 Ibid.

INTENTIONS OF UNDERSTANDING IN THOMAS

the

Isagoge

AQUINAS

67

are real features pertaining to the nature of the things

understood. These conditions are not caused by the intellect. Nei­ ther does the intellect posit those conditions in things when it un­ derstands them. Consequendy, second intentions are relations founded on real properties, and so the intellect, by reflecting on its object, does not produce the features on which intentions are founded, but only knows them. Thus, Peter of Auvergne's concep­ tion of rational relations opens the way to a doctrine of second in­ tentions alternative to Aquinas's, a doctrine where intentions follow not from modes of understanding, but from modes of being of the extramental things.

C HAPTER THREE SECOND INTENTIONS IN HENRY OF GHENT, SIMON OF FAVERSHAM AND RADULPHUS BRITO

In the last chapter, I focused on Thomas Aquinas's account of in­ tentions as properties following from and founded on our modes of understanding. Thomas develops this approach in two directions. First, he maintains that intentions are produced by the reflection of intellect on itself. Second, he describes intentions as rational rela­ tions founded on the intellect's apprehension of extramental things. As we have seen, Peter of Auvergne raises a critical issue concerning the notion of a rational relation. It is true that rational relations and intentions among them - are founded on things understood by the intellect, but this does not amount to saying that the intellect is the cause of intentions. In fact, Peter maintains that the relation holding between a species and a genus is founded on the nature of the things themselves. Accordingly, the intellect understands but does not cause intentions, properly speaking. In this manner, second intentions can be regarded as representations of real properties, not of modes of understanding. This second approach to second inten­ tions, implicit in Peter of Auvergne's remark, is more consciously developed by other authors. In this chapter I shall take into account the positions of Henry of Ghent, Simon of Faversham, and Radul­ phus Brito.

I.

Henry rif Ghent on second intentions

In an article of his

Summa quaestionum ordinariarum

probably dating

from 1 282,' Henry of Ghent deals with the question, "Whether 'person', as used in the Trinity, is a term of first or second inten­ tion." Here, he gives a well-organized account of intentions, where new and old aspects are characteristically intermingled. First, I J. G6mez Caffarena, "Cronologia de la «Suma» de Enrique de Gante por relaci6n a sus «QuodHbetos»," Gregorianum 38 ( 1 957): 1 33.

HENRY OF GHENT, SIMON OF FAVERSHAM, RADULPHUS BRITO

69

Henry defines second intentions as relations established by the in­ tellect among different things. Second, he explicitly says that the in­ tellect establishes such relations by considering real properties of things, not modes of understanding. Third, he makes no mention of the reflection of intellect on itsel[ Henry divides names into three groups. First, there are names that signifY things independently of any consideration of the intel­ lect. These names are names of individual entities, such as 'Paul' and 'Peter'. Second, there are names that signify both a thing and a concept or intention of the intellect. These names - i.e., universal names such as 'man' and 'animal' - signify a thing to the extent that they represent a nature existing in singular and extramental things, whereas they signifY a concept to the extent that such a nature is considered as abstracted by the intellect. The concept signified by such names is a first intention.2 Third, there are names that signifY a pure intention or concept. These are the names of second inten­ tion, such as 'genus' and 'species'. These intentions, which are en­ tirely dependent on an operation of the intellect, are called 'second' because the intellect forms them only after conceiving universal first intentions. They concern both universals and individuals.3 Henry adds a clarification about these intentions caused by the intellect as concepts concerning universals and individuals. He says that the intellect takes these concepts as representing properties concerning mainly extramental things. Specifically, these intentions are relations holding among extramental things as they are com­ pared to one another by the intellect

(respectus et habitudines inter ipsas res comparatas adivincem consideratione inteilectus).' Consequently, second intentions are concepts with a purely mental existence and are relations established by the intellect among things as understood

(universals) or as existing (individuals). Through such concepts, therefore, the intellect represents some properties pertaining to ex­ tramental things, not properties merely pertaining to names of things, which constitute grammatical intentions: :./ Henry of Ghent Summa quaest. ord., art. 53, q. 5 (ed. Badius, II, 64vH). 3 Ibid" 64vl: "Caetera vero quae per considerationem inteUectus considerantur sive operantur, et circa universalia et circa particularia, sive mediate sive immediate, sunt intentiones pUTae. Propter quod nomina eis imposita vocantur nomina inten­ tionum, sed secundarum, quia, post conceptam rationem universalis realiter, concipit eas intellectus et circa universalia rerum et circa singularia." 4 Ibid.

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CHAPTER THREE

But these intentions are of two kinds, since some are taken by the in­ tellect as properties concerning mainly things, while others as proper­ ties concerning the names of things. Of the first kind are logical in­ tentions, such as, on the one hand, the notion of universal, i.e. of a genus or a species or a differentia and of the other similar things, con­ cerning the universal notions of things, and, on the other hand, 'indi­ vidual', 'particular' and the other similar notions concerning each thing . . . Of the second kind are grammatical intentions . . . 5

Henry of Ghent explains how the intellect forms these intentions by analyzing the notion

dividual when

individual.

The intellect forms the intention

in­

it considers a thing in comparison with other things,

both universal and individual. For example, the intellect can con­ sider Paul in comparison both with the species

man

and with other

particular men such as Peter and John. When Paul is compared with

man,

he is considered as a thing determined and not divided

into less universal things. By contrast, when Paul is compared with other particular men, he is considered as distinct from them. The second intention individual is the way in which the intellect conceives Paul according to this twofold relation.

Individual,

then, is a relation

established by the intellect among things, both universal and indi­ vidual, and satisfies the definition of second intention given by Henry of Ghent: . . . this name 'individual', applied to irrational substances, is not the name of a thing but the name of a second intention, which is nothing else than the mode in which the intellect conceives something with re­ spect to what is superior and what is collateral to it. namely as some­ thing determined and not divided into another thing below it but di­ vided from what is at its same level. . . 6

Henry of Ghent also introduces a distinction between abstract and concrete intentions. Mter sorting out names into the three classes 5 Ibid.: "Sed istae [sci!. intentiones] sunt in duplici genere, quia quaedam 5unt ac­ ceptae ab intellectu ut proprietates circa res principaliter, quaedam vero ut propri­ etates circa nomina rerum. De genere primo sunt intentiones logicales ut sunt ratio universalis, generis scilicet et speciei et differentiae et huiusmodi circa universalia rerum, individuum particulare et huiusmodi circa singula rerum . . . De secundo genere sunt intentiones grammaticales . . . n 6 Ibid., 66r-vT: "" . hoc nomen 'individuum' circa substantias irrationales non est nomen rei sed nomen intentionis sccundaet quae nihil a1iud est quam modus quo in­ tellectus rem concipit respectu superioris et collateralis, ut deteminatam et non di­ visam in a1iqua sub se atque divisam ab eo quod. est iuxta se . . . "

HENRY OF GHENT, SIMON OF FAVERSHAM, RADULPHUS BRITO

71

that we have mentioned (names signifying things, names signifYing concepts and things, and names signifYing only concepts), Henry re­ marks that names do not always stand for what they properly signify. Sometimes a name actually stands for what it signifies, and in that case supposition and signification are the same. Other times, how­ ever, a name stands not for what it signifies but for what it names.' For example, the first intention name 'man' can stand either for what it properly signifies, namely for humanity, or for what it names, namely a particular man in the extramental world. In the sentence, "man is a species," 'man' stands for what it signifies (a concept), whereas in the sentence, "a man runs," 'man' stands for what it names (an individual man).8 Similarly, a second intention name such as 'species' stands sometimes for what it properly signi­ fies, other times for what it names. 'Species' stands for what it signi­ fies in the sentence, "species is a rational intention and a universal," where 'species' stands for a pure concept and a relation of reason. On the other hand, 'species' stands for what it names in the sen­ tence, "a species is what is predicated of several numerically dif­ ferent things." In fact, when we say that a species is predicated of individuals, 'species' stands for the different species man,

horse,

and

so on, not for a relation of reason established by the intellect, for what is predicated of extramental individuals (i.e. of individual men and horses) are the concepts man and

horse,

and not the concept

species." Henry here uses a distinction that will be widely adopted in the following period and will be known as the distinction between ab-

, For the distinction between supposing (suppositio), signitying (significatio), and naming (appellatio), see L. M. de Rijk, "The Origins of the Theory of the Properties of Terms," in Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg, eds., The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosopi!Y, 1 61 -7 1 . 8 Henry o f Ghent Summa quaest. "d., art. 53, q . 5 (ed. Badius, 11, 66vV). 9 Ibid.: "Similiter in nomine significante intentionem. Verbi gratia, species in quacumque enunciatione panitur, supponit rationem universalis, quae est respectus quaedam et intentio quam significat, et aliquando supponit pro ipsa, ut cum dicitur "species est intentio rationis et universale quiddam," aliquando vern supponit pro appellato vel quasi, ut pro homine aut asino aut huiusmodi, ut cum dicitur "species est quae praedicatur de pluribus differentibus numero," ubi definitur species non ut est intentio abstracta et ut supponit pro suo significato, sic enim non praedicatur de differentibus numero, non enim vere dicitur "Petrus est species," "Paulus est species," sed definitur ut est in re cuius est et ut supponit pro ipsa sub indifferentia quadam ad quamlibet illorum, cuiusmodi sunt homo, asinus et huiusmodi, quae praedicantur de solis individuis suis."

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stract and concrete intentions. Henry himself calls an intention as it stands for what it properly signifies 'abstract intention'. According to Henry, a second intention name, as it stands for what it signifies, signifies only the intention abstracdy considered, which is a concept of the intellect. On the other hand, when a second intention name stands for the extramental thing it names, it can be said that the thing itself is part of what that name signifies in a large sense. 10 In this way, Henry draws the difference between, on the one hand, ab­ stract intentions, which are concepts and modes of understanding, and, on the other hand, concrete intentions, which are the things understood through such concepts. Thus, Henry can maintain that an intention is not only a pure concept of our mind but also a thing as it is understood, if it is understood concretely. This position, which we shall find again in Radulphus Brito, is remarkably dif­ ferent from Thomas Aquinas's, since Thomas thinks that intentions are the ways in which our intellect understands things, and that in no sense are they identical with the things understood. The things understood, according to Thomas, are what following authors call first, not second intentions.

2.

Simon if Faversham on second intentions as relations

Simon of Faversham wrote his logical commentaries in the Paris art faculty around 1 280. 1 1 I will take into account Simon's commentary on Peter of Spain's Summulae logicalesl2, his commentary on Aris­ tode's Categories, and his sophism, "Whether 'universal' is an inten­ tion"". In these three works, Simon of Faversham provides an ac­ count of second intentions that reminds Thomas's but is also different in some important respects. His position on second inten­ tions can be summarized in four points.

10

Ibid. See S. Ebbesen et ai., introduction to Simon of Faversham Quaestiones super libro Elenchorum, ed. S. Ebbesen et al. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1 984), 5, 1 3. 1 2 See L. M. de Rijk, "On the Genuine Text of Peter of Spain's Summule Logicales," Vivarium 6 ( 1 968): 69- 1 0 1 . 13 T. Yokoyama, "Simon o f Faversham's Sophisma Uniuersale est intentW," Mediaeval Studies 3 1 ( 1 969): 1 - 1 4;]. Pinborg, "Simon of Faversham's Sophisma Universale est in· /entio: A Supplementary Note," MedUuval studies 33 ( 1 97 1): 360-64. II

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First, Simon of Faversham does not say that second intentions are produced by the reflection of the intellect on itself. Instead, he says that the intellect produces second intentions by an accidental or relative consideration of extramental things. Second, Simon de­ fines second intentions as things understood by the intellect ac­ cording to a relative consideration. Third, Simon explicitly distin­ guishes between a concrete and an abstract consideration of intentions. If considered concretely, intentions are things under­ stood in a certain way, whereas they are concepts of the mind if they are considered abstractly. Fourth, Simon denies that second in­ tentions, abstractly considered, are fictitious concepts, because in­ tentions are based on real properties pertaining to extramental things independently of our understanding of them. Accordingly, the intellect forms second intentions by considering properties per­ taining to things themselves, and not to things as understood. In his notes on Peter of Spain's Summulae, Simon provides a clear definition of first and second intentions. A first intention (i.e. a first intention abstractly considered) is the concept through which the soul understands an extramental things by itself and by an essential consideration

(sub intellectu eius essentiall), namely paying attention to

the essential features of the thing and abstracting these essential features from the individual conditions pertaining to the thing as it exists: A first intention is the first understanding or concept of something, by which the mind conceives that thing and its nature by itself and under its essential understanding, insofar as that thing is abstracted from all its individuating conditions. " This, however, is not the only way in which an extramental thing can be considered. An extramental thing can also be considered under an accidental or relative consideration. Admittedly, it is not immediately clear what Simon of Faversham means by "accidental or relative consideration." He says that by the first consideration the intellect considers a man as a man or as an animal or as something

14 Simon of Faversham Super Summulas (ed. de Rijk, 94): "Intentio prima est primus intellectus sive conceptus rei quo anima rem et naturam rei comprehendit secundum se et sub inteUectu dus essentiali prout res ab omnibus condicionibus individualibus est abstracta."

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rational, whereas by the second consideration the intellect considers a man as a species or as a definition or as a thing defined. Such an understanding of man is a second intention (i.e. a second intention abstractly considered): A second intention, on the other hand, is the second understanding or concept of something, by which the mind apprehends something not by itself and under its essential understanding, but under an acci­ dental or respective understanding. For example, when the mind un­ derstands a man not as a man or as an animal or as rational, but as a species or as a definition or as something defined, then such an un­ derstanding of a man is called 'second intention'. IS

Simon of Faversham gives a detailed account of the intention genus.

A logical genus is a second intention caused by the intellect and ap­ plied to the thing understood. The intellect, when it considers things as understood and not as extramental, attributes the inten­ tion of universality to them. For example, the second intention genus denotes an essence understood as related to the specifically different things sharing in it. 16 Simon explains what he means when he says that a genus denotes a nature not in itself but in relation to the things that share in it (its

supposita)

by saying that a genus is a rela­

tive being. This relation a genus expresses is the relation between the essence understood and the things sharing in it. 1 7 When he states that 'genus' denotes an essence understood rela­ tively, Simon makes use of the notion of denotation. This happens to be a reference to an issue commonly debated by authors writing at the end of the thirteenth century. This brings us to the fourth point mentioned above, the distinction between concrete and ab­ stract intentions. Simon draws a parallelism between concrete acci-

15 Ibid.: "Intentio autem secunda est intellectus sive conceptus rei secundus, quo anima apprehendit rem non secundum se nec sub inteUectu essentiali sed sub intel­ lectu accidentali vel respectivo. Verbi gratia, quando anima intelligit hominem non inquantum homo vel animal vel rationale, sed inquantum species vel diffinitio vel diffinitum, talis intellectus hominis vocatur intentio secunda." 16 Ibid" 92: u . . . per genus loycum intelligimus nil aliud nisi secunclam intentionem ab intellectu causatam ad supposita forma et secundum speciem differentia." On this passage, see De Libera, La querelle, 290. 1 7 Simon of Faversham Super Summu/as (ed. de Rijk, 92): "Et dieo denolantern essen­ tialem et quiditativam naturam etc. quia genus est quoddam ens respectivum."

HENRY OF GHENT, SIMON OF FAVERSHAM, RADULPHUS BRITO

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dental terms such as 'album' and second intention terms. IS Ac­ cording to Simon, a term such as 'album' signifies the composite of a white thing and of the form of whiteness. The term

'album'

signi­

fies both these entities in an accidental way. Similarly, a second in­ tention term such as 'genus' signifies both an extramental thing (say the essence of an animal), which is the subject of the intention 'genus', and the intention of generality, which is the relation estab­ lished by the intellect between the essence of the animal and its

sup­

posita: In the same way, when we say 'white', I understand an accidental form, such as whiteness, and also the thing subject to that form. And because it is in this way in the case of the concrete of a real accident, also in the concrete of a notion it will be in such a way that, since a genus is a concrete accident of an intention and of a notion, it will signify two things, namely the intention of genus and together with this the thing subject to that intention.'" 'Genus', as a concrete term, does not uniquely signify the essence understood, nor does it merely signifY a relation to its

supposita.

'Genus' signifies both the essence understood and a reference to its

supposita.

In fact, the essence understood is not signified as such but

as related to its

supposita.

The reason why 'genus' is a relative being

is that it is an essence considered as related to its

3.

supposita.

Simon if Faversham on the realfoundation if second intentions

Simon of Faversham clarifies how second intentions are founded on real properties when he described the formation of universal con­ cepts. In order to produce an actual universal concept not only must the intellect actually understand an essence, it must also compare that essence to its these

supposita. Only when the intellect finds out that supposita are not different one from another with respect to the

18 See S. Ebhesen, "Concrete Accidental Terms: Late Thirteenth-Century Debate about Problems Relating to such Terms as 'album'/' in N. Kretzmann, ed., Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy. Studies in Memory if Jan PinboTg (Dordr<:cht-Boston­ London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1 988), 1 07-74. 19 Simon of Faversham Super Summulas (ed. de Rijk, 91): " Sicut quando dicimus 'album', hie intelligo accidentalem formam, ut est albedo, et etiam rem subiectam tali forme. Et cum hoc ita sit in concreto accidentis realis, in concreto rationis erit ita quod cum genus sit concretum accidens intentionis et rationis, duo signili.cabit: in­ tentionem generis et cum hoc rem subiectam illi intentioni."

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nature considered, does it attribute to that nature the intention of universality: But it must be added that, in order for the nature of something to be universal in act, it is not sufficient that it is understood in act. But when the intellect apprehends the nature of something by comparison to its supposits, and when the intellect considers that the supposits agree in that nature, so that one supposit does not differ from another as far as that nature is concerned; then the agent intellect produces the intention of universality in that nature and takes that nature as something predicable of many things.20

So far, Simon's account does not seem to differ from Thoma,s Aquinas and his followers' doctrine of intentions. Like Thomas and his followers, Simon thinks that the intellect, while forming con­ cepts, carries out two successive considerations. By a first consider­ ation, the intellect understands the essence of an extramental thing. By a second consideration, the intellect compares the essence un­ derstood to its supposita. Only at this second stage does the intellect attribute universality to the understood essence. A difference between the two approaches, however, becomes ap­ parent if we take into account the relationship between second in­ tentions and extramental things. Simon of Faversham recognizes that the intention of universality is a concept that is only present in the soul. Through the attribution of universality, the intellect forms the concepts of genus and species, which only exist in the soul: The intention of universality is a certain concept in the mind, attrib­ uted to things. Genus, species, and similar notions, which do not have being outside the mind, are said to be concepts of this kind.21

It is also true that universality is a property that the intellect attrib­ utes to things only as they are understood, not as they exist extra­ mentally. This is valid for all intentions. 'Genus' and 'species' can 20 Simon of Faversham Sophisma (ed. Yokoyama, 9; corr. Pinborg, 361): "Sed ad­ dendum quod ad hoc quod natura rei fit actu universalis non sufficit quod fit actu in­ tellecta; sed cum natura rei apprehenditur ab intellectu per comparationem ad sup­ posita, et inteUectus considerat quod supposita in ilia natura rei conveniant, ita quod quantum ad naturam illam unum suppositum ab alio non differt; tunc inteUectus agens agit in ea intentionem universalitatis.et accipit ipsam ut aliquid praedicabile de pluribus." 21 Ibid. (ed. Yokoyama, I I ; corr. Pinborg, 362): "Intentio universalitatis est con­ ceptus quidam in anima, attributus rebus. Huiusmodi autem conceptus dicitur esse genus vel species et huiusmodi, quae non habent esse nisi per animam."

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name either things subject t o intentions, such a s an animal o r a man, or the intention to which such things are subject. In the second case, 'genus' and 'species' designate things that have only mental being: man is a species not according to the being it has ex­ tramentally, but only according to the being it has in the mind, that is insofar as it is understood.22 What, then, is the cause of second intentions? Simon of Faver­ sham does not hesitate to posit the intellect as the cause of second intentions, for it is the intellect that considers the things understood and that compares them to their supposits.23 We must further in­ quire, though, how the intellect causes second intentions. Is the re­ lation caused by the intellect founded on properties inhering in the things understood insofar as they are understood or is it founded on real properties? It is at this point that Simon of Faversham deviates from Thomas, for he maintains that the relation established by the intellect is founded on real features of things, not on features de­ pending on their being understood. For the intellect is moved to cause intentions by some real properties present in the things. Simon calls the real properties that move the intellect to cause in­ tentions 'appearances'

(apparentia),

a term we will find again in

Radulphus Brito. It is for this reason that the intentions considered by the logician are not fictitious: Since the intellect causes such intentions and is moved by appearances in the thing, and because of this the intellect attributes different log­ ical intentions to different things because of different properties . . . for this reason logic is taken from properties of the things, for otherwise logic would be something made up by the intellect, which we say it is not.24

Simon goes on to say that for this reason it was not a logician who discovered logic. In fact, logic considers intentions, not the nature of things, but the intellect causes such intentions by taking into ac­ count the nature or essence of extramental things. Thus, the one

:l:l

Simon of Faversham Super Porph., q. 4 (ed. Mazzarella, 23-24). Ibid., q. 12 (ed. Mazzarella, 32); see also q. 26 (ed. Mazzarella, 48) Ibid., q. 2 (ed. Mazzarella, 19): "Cum autem intellectus causat tales intenciones, et movetur ab apparentibus in re: et propter hoc intellectus diversas mtenciones log­ icales attribuit diversis rebus propter diversas proprietates . . . Ideo tota logica accip­ itur a proprietatibus rerum, quia aliter logica esset figmentum intellectus, quod non dicimus." 23

24

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who discovered logic had to turn to the essence of things themselves and was in fact not a logician.25 Thus, both Thomas and Simon of Faversham regard intentions as relations established by the intellect, but while Thomas maintains that these relations are founded on the intellect's apprehension and on properties pertaining to things only insofar as they are under­ stood, Simon maintains that the intellect, when comparing the essence to its

supposita,

discovers that these share a real property,

which is independent of our understanding. Even though Simon still maintains that the intellect is the cause of second intentions (be­ cause it is the intellect that compares an essence to the things that share that essence), he denies that the properties on which second intentions are founded are merely mental. Since the intellect recog­ nizes that an essence is predicable of specifically different things, it attributes the second intention genus to that essence. Similarly, when the intellect apprehends that an essence is predicable of numeri­ cally different things, it attributes the intention essence:

species

to that

. . . if the intellect apprehends a nature as predicable exclusively of things specifically different, it attributes to that nature the intention of genus. However, if it apprehends a nature as predicable exclusively of things numerically different, it attributes to that nature the intention of species, and similarly in the other cases.26

For Simon of Faversham, as for Aquinas, then, second intentions are only in the intellect, and the relation they denote is established by the intellect. Simon, though, limits the role of the intellect to rec­ ognizing the presence of a real property in things sharing in the same essence. Accordingly, there is a correspondence between in­ tentions and extramental things. When the intellect attributes dif­ ferent intentions to different essences, there is a different real prop­ erty corresponding to each intention:

2� Ibid.: "Ex quo sequitur quod qui logicam invenit, logicus non fuit; ex quo enim consideravit naturas rerum logicus non fuit, cum logicus, secundum quod logicus, non considerat de naturis rerum, sed intenciones solas; vel si consideret, hoc solum est, ut sub intencionibus sunt." " Sophism. (ed. Yokoyama, 9): ..... quod si intellectus apprehendit ipsam de pluribus differentibus specie solum praedicabilem, attribuit sibi intentionem generis; si autem de pluribus differentibus numero solum praedicabilem, attribuit ei inten­ tionem speciei, et sic de aJiis."

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The intention of universality, since it is not a pure fiction, is caused by some real property. And therefore it happens that the mind attributes different logical intentions to different things, according to different properties of things."

Simon's doctrine of the intellect's role in forming intentions can be re­ constructed as follows. F irst, the intellect considers extramental things, say various animals such as men, horses, and so on. Then the intellect realizes that such things have a real property in common, called 'apparens', which, in the case of animals, is the property of being sensitive. Starting from this real property, the intellect forms a concept common to all things having that property. This concept is the ratio in­

telligendi 'animal'.28 So far, the intellect is still dealing

with first inten­

tions, direcdy representing things taken according to their essence. The intellect forms the second intention genus when it considers the re­ lation between the essence

animal and

the things sharing in the real

property of being sensitive, namely the various species Man, Horse, and so on. Here Simon of Faversham's analysis seems to be very close to what Peter of Auvergne had already noted. Peter of Auvergne stat­ ed that the intellect establishes a relation on the basis of a property pertaining to the nature considered. In the same manner, Simon of Faversham remarks that the relation between the essence

animal and

its supposits is based on a real property independent of the intellect's consideration. It is true that the relationship between an essence and the things sharing in it can be described as a predication, which is an act of the intellect, but it is also true that man is an animal whether the intellect knows it or not. Therefore, a predication is nothing more than the way in which the intellect represents a relation based on real properties of extramental essences.29 27 Ibid. (ed. Yokoyama, B; corr. Pinborg, 361): "[ntentio autem universalitatis, cum non sit purum figmentum, causatur ex aliqua proprietate reali. Et ideo contingit quod anima diversas intentiones logicales attribuit diversis rebus secundum diversas proprietates rerum. " " Sup" Porph. q. 20 (ed. Mazzarella, 39): "Dico tunc quod genus non significat unam quiditatem, sed significat diversas quiditates diversarum specierum secundum quod sub aliquo conceptu communi veniunt apud intdlectum, et iSle conceptus com­ munis sumitur ab aliquo communi apparenti in reo Ab operacione coim senciendi, que apparet in homine et in asino et in hove et in multis aliis, elicit intellectus unam rationem intelligendi communem, suh qua significantur diverse species per nomen generis. " ,. Ibid. q. 22 (ed. Mazzarella, 44): "Dieo ad hoc quod verum est quod predicari est actus rationis; si enim nos circumscriberemus intellectum, nihil predicaretur; tamen circumscripto intellectu adhuc homo esset animal. . . n

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At times, Simon of Faversham even speaks of predications be­ tween essences. Such a predication is the real relation holding be­ tween an essence and the things sharing in it (its supposits). That re­ lation holds whether the intellect knows it or not, and is only represented, not caused, by the predication, "man is an animal," made up by the intellect,30 for

animal is

predicated of

man

not in­

sofar as it is a concept of the intellect, but insofar as it is an essence of a certain kind, to which certain real properties pertain.31 Since the intellect forms an intention such as genus by considering such real properties, a second intention does not represent a prop­ erty pertaining to something only insofar as the intellect under­ stands it. Maybe one could still say that a second intention repre­ sents a mode of understanding, but then it should be added that such a mode of understanding is parallel to and caused by a real property of the thing understood. The presupposition of such an approach is that there is an iso­ morphism between real properties of extramental things and second intentions: even though second intentions are relations es­ tablished by the intellect, they reflect real properties present in ex­ tramental things independently of the intervention of our intellect. We understand something as a genus because of some real proper­ ties present in that thing, and according to Simon of Faversham, second intentions are true concepts because they are based on real properties, not because they truthfully represent the way in which our intellect represents things.

30 Ibid., q. 22 (ed. Mazzarella, 42): "Cum ergo dicimus genus predicari de specie, non est hoc intellegendum de intencione, sed est intelligendum de re subiecta inten­ ciani. Cum igitur dicimus, Homo est animal, hie predicatur genus de specie, quia hie predicatur aliqua natura, cui applicabilis est intencio generis; res ergo subiecta in­ tencioni predicatur." See also q. 22, (ed. Mazzarella, 44; text quoted in the following note); q. 26 (ed. Mazzarella, 48-49). 3 1 Ibid. q. 22 (ed. Mazzarella, 44, with modified punctuation): "Et cum dicis ul­ terius quod, cum animal predicatur de homine, est aliquid comprehensum a ratione, verum est, sed non sequitur, Non predicatur de homine, nisi cum est comprehensum a ratione, ergo predicatur de eo sub ea ratione. Non sequitur, sed verum est illud quod, nisi intellectus esset, animal <non> predicaretur de homine, tamen sub ea ra­ tione non predicatur de homine . . . Sic ergo apparet quid est quod predicatur hie, Homo est animal, quoniam illud quod predicatur est natura et quiditas animalis im­ portata per diffinicionem."

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Simon if Faversham on the three kinds if second intentions

Simon of Faversham also connects second intentions with the doc­ trine of the three operations of the intellect. This connection is an interesting development of the doctrine of intentions, missing in both Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent. Radulphus Brito, how­ ever, will maintain it and further elaborate on it. According to a doctrine universally accepted in the thirteenth century, there are IwO different operations or acts of the intellect. The textual basis for this doctrine is a passage of Aristotle's De anima on the understanding of simple and complex entities.32 The first op­ eration of the intellect is the apprehension of simple essences. By this operation, the intellect forms simple concepts such as

animal.

man

and

The second operation of the intellect follows after the first

and consists in composing and dividing the simple concepts the in­ tellect has formed. By this second operation, the intellect forms mental propositions. This second operation is generally called "of composition and division." If the intellect composes two concepts, these concepts are attributed one to the other in an affirmative predication. For example, the IwO simple concepts

man

and

animal

are composed in the affirmative predication, "man is an animal." On the other hand, if the intellect divides two concepts, the one concept is said not to pertain to the other in a negative predication. For example, the IwO simple concepts man and vegetable are divided one from the other in the negative predication, "Man is not a veg­ etable". Quite often, a third operation of the intellect is added to these Iwo. This third operation consists in the organization of the mental propositions produced by the second operation in an ordered argu­ ment or reasoning. It is through this third operation that the intel­ lect forms syllogisms. 33 The apprehension of simple essences, composing and dividing, and reasoning are the three operations by which the intellect forms concepts and operates. Both Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome (and, later, Duns Scotus) refer to these three operations of the intel-

" Aristotle De an, III, 6, 430a26-28. See Thomas Aquinas In Peryerm. I, I (ed. Leonina, 1.* 1 , 5). 33 Scotus lists the three operations in Super Periherm, op. sec., Prol., n. 1 (ed. Vives, 1, 581).

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lect to distinguish three parts of logic and three corresponding works or group of works of Aristotle. First, there is the study of simple concepts produced by tbe first operation of tbe intellect, which is carried out in the

Categories.

Second, tbere is the study of

the mental propositions formed by the second operation of tbe in­ tellect, which is carried out in tbe

De Interpretatione.

Third, tbere is

the study of reasoning, produced by tbe third operation of tbe in­

(Prior and Rethoric and

tellect, which occupies Aristotle's extant logical treatises

Posterior Ana!Jtics, Topics, Sophistical RifUtations, Poetics are sometimes added). 34

to which

Simon of Faversham maintains that the three operations of the intellect give rise to tbree different kinds of intentions. First, tbere are second intentions such as

species and genus,

which are said to be

simple because tbey are based on simple objects, such as man or an­ imal, or, alternatively, because they are caused by the first operation of tbe intellect. Second, tbere are composed second intentions, such as statement and proposition. These intentions are called composed or complex because they are based on the inherence of a predicate in a subject, or, alternatively, because they are caused by tbe second op­ eration of tbe intellect that attributes a predicate to a subject. Fi­ nally, tbere are some even more complex second intentions, such as

syllogism

and

argument,

which are based on complex objects such as

reasoning. Alternatively, these last intentions are called 'more com­ plex' because they are caused by tbe third operation of tbe intel­ lect.35 This division of second intentions into tbree kinds fits well into Simon of Faversham's general account. I have said tbat Simon of Faversham describes a second intention as a thing understood in a relative way, namely according to a relation established by the intel­ lect between the thing itself and otber tbings. Simon of Faversham maintains that the intellect can establish this relation according to each one of its three acts: it can establish such a relation on a simple entity, a propositional entity, or an argument.

34 Thomas Aquinas In Periyerm., I, I , (ed. Leonina, 1.* 1 , 5); In An. Post., 1, 1 , (ed. Leonina, '*. 2, 4-5); Giles of Rome Super Sopko El. (ed Venet., 2rb, 2va-b); Duns Scorus Super Periherm., op. sec., Pro!., n. 1 (ed. Vives, " 581). See chap. I, par. 4. 35 Simon of Faversharn Super Summulas (ed. de Rijk, 94).

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83

Second intentions and things as understood in Radulphus Brito

So far I have considered two approaches to second intentions. Ac­ cording to Thomas Aquinas, intentions are properties following from and founded on the modes in which we understand things. Ac­ cording to Simon of Faversham and, to some extent, Henry of Ghent, second intentions are both first-order concepts and relations based on real features of things understood. Only afterwards, how­ ever, will these two approaches be considered as alternative theories. Radulphus Brito, a contemporary of Scotus who wrote his logical commentaries at the Paris arts faculty around the last decade of the thirteenth century, seems to have been one of the first to provide a doctrine of intentions where various elements from Peter of Au­ vergne, Simon of Faversham, and Henry of Ghent are fully devel­ oped and organized.36 Brito's doctrine will enjoy some diffusion. Both Haerveus Natalis and Peter Auriol, in their treatments of in­ tentions, will take him into account.37 Scotus and Brito hold opposite positions on some relevant topics, but it is not easy to establish whether they influenced one another. Therefore, I will not suggest any relative chronology between these two authors. Other authors, too, may have been involved in the de­ bate on second intentions, and they may have been the direct target of either Scotus or Brito. It is clear, however, that Scotus and Brito developed two alternative approaches to intentions, and here I will take them into account as champions of such approaches. Brito's doctrine of intentions centers on his conception of the status of things as understood. By Brito's time, it was generally 36 Radulphus Brito's logical writings stem from his activity as a master of arts in Paris and date to the years between 1295 and 1305. See J. Pinborg, "Radulphus Brito's Sophism on Second Intentions," Vwarium 1 3 (1 975): 1 1 9; W. Fauser, Der Kom­ mentar des Ratlulphus Briw
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agreed that the object of the intellect (i.e. what the intellect under­ stands in its normal activities) is an extramental thing. Specifically, the intellect was thought to understand the essence of an extra­ mental thing. It is a basic tenet of the Aristotelian psychology, how­ ever, that when a thing is understood by the intellect it becomes in a way identical to the intellect itsel( This doctrine is based on a pas­ sage of the De anima, where Aristotle states the identity between the intellect and what the intellect understands as far as immaterial en­ tities are concerned.38 Such a thesis was generally taken as a general description of what takes place in intellectual understanding, both in created and in uncreated intellects. Medieval authors articulated this point by saying that what is known is in the knower in the way in which the knower is.39 Since the intellect is immaterial, an extra­ mental thing, in order to be known and to become somehow iden­ tical with the intellect, must acquire an immaterial status. Thus, there seemed to arise a contradiction: on the one hand, it was recognized that the object of the intellect is something extra­ mental; on the other hand, it was said that such an object, in order to be known, must be immaterial and internal to the intellect. An obvious way out from this contradiction was to distinguish between the object of the intellect as considered in itself and as considered as

understood. The intellect understands something that, by itself, is

external to the intellect, but when such a thing is considered as it is understood by the intellect, it is internal to the intellect and it enjoys a mental status as an object of knowledge (this peculiar status is what will be called 'objective being'). A thing, then, can have two kinds of being, a material being and an intellectual or intentional or objective being as it was variously called. The first kind of being is that of extramental existence, the second kind of being is the one a thing acquires when it is considered as an object of understanding. Usually, it is said that the intelligible species is that by which an ex­ tramerital thing becomes something present in the intellect. The elements of this position can be found in Aquinas's doctrine of the concept. Actually, Aquinas changes his mind concerning 38 Aristotle De an. III, 3, 430-3-4. See also ibid., III, 8, 431 b2 1 , b29. 39 See Thomas Aquinas Sent. de Anima, liber II, cap. XII (ed. Leon., XLV, I , 1 1 5): "Unumquodque autem recipitur in aliquo per modum sui. Cognitio autem omnis fit per hoc quod cognitum est aliquo modo in cognoscente, scilicet secundum similitudinem: nam cognoscens in actu est ipsum cognitum in actu." See also STI, q. 85, a. 2, ad I .

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what a concept is, for in his early writings he maintains that a con­ cept is a quality inherent in the mind, i.e. an intelligible species, whereas from the

Summa contra Gentiles onward he

distinguishes be­

tween the intelligible species, which is that by which something is understood and present in the mind, and the inner word or con­ cept, which is the thing as it is present in the mind. According to Aquinas's mature doctrine, the inner word or concept is not a real quality, but a product of the act of understanding that has a special kind of intentional being. In his maturity, Thomas also distinguishes the thing that is understood and the mental concept representing such a thing. The thing that is understood is something outside the mind, whereas the concept of that thing is a representation pro­ vided only with intentional existence. There are other passages, however, where Thomas seems to assume that the thing understood is identical to the mental concept. Consequently, he seems to think that the mental concept of something is identical to the thing itself insofar as it is understood.40 It is likely that Aquinas did not see these two conceptions as alternative. He may have contended that a thing understood is conceived as an intentional entity and as a con­ cept only when it is compared with what it represents, namely with the thing itself insofar as it is something outside the mind. Only when it is compared to extramental essences, is a thing understood considered as an intention, to which intentional properties pertain. Thus, the thing understood is by itself something extramental, but when it is considered as understood it is something mental. This solution, however, is subject to criticism. Radulphus Brito maintains that there are two aspects in the notion of 'thing under­ stood'. On the one hand, there is an extramental thing. On the other hand, there is the mode in which that thing is understood, which is something mental. The mode of understanding can be predicated of the thing understood and can denominate it, as when we say, "man is a species." By such predication, we say that the essence of man is understood and that it is understood as a species. It is still true, however, that the essence of man remains an extra­ mental thing, even when it is understood. It follows that those who maintain that the thing understood as understood is something ex­ clusively mental are wrong, for what is in the intellect is only a mode +0 See for example Thomas Aquinas De Pol, q. 8, a. I; In Pn ytrm. 1, 2 (ed. Leonina, I.' I , 1 0- 1 1). See Pini, "Species, Concept, and Thing," 44-50.

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of understanding, which, by itself, is a mental quality or species by which the extramental thing is understood. From this, it is clear that Brito refuses the notion of objective being as a special kind of being that a thing enjoys when it is conceived as an object of under­ standing. When something is understood, it is not present in the in­ tellect in a special way. The thing that is understood remains an ex­ tramental thing, and in the intellect there is only the intelligible species or concept by which the intellect understands its object. In this respect, Brito maintains, a thing understood can be com­ pared to a natural agent. As the agent produces an effect in the pa­ tient but by itself is outside the patient, so the thing understood pro­ duces an understanding in the mind, but by itself is outside the mind. What is in the mind is not the thing understood, but the "being understood" of the thing understood, which is its mode of understanding: Hence it must be observed that when we speak of a thing understood we refer to two aspects, since we refer both to the thing that produces the understanding and to the mode of understanding that denomi­ nates the thing. Therefore it must not be said, as some people say, that the thing understood as understood is in the mind. This is false, since when we speak of a thing understood we refer to two aspects, namely the thing and the mode of understanding, and therefore the thing un­ derstood insofar as it is understood is not in the intellect. Just as the agent as agent is not in the patient so the thing understood as under­ stood is not in the intellect, but the being understood of the thing is in the mind, whereas the thing is outside the mind, since being under­ stood is being active in the intellect, although it is signified in the mode of a passion, and therefore, just as the agent is not in the a­ tient, so the thing understood as understood is not in the intellect. 1

R

41 Radulphus Brito SuP<' Porph., q. SA (ed. Pinhorg, 1 16.62-72): "Unde notandum quod qui dicit rem intellectam dicit duo, quia dicit rem quae est effidens intellec­ tionem et actionem intelligendi, quae denominat rem. Ideo non debet did sicut quidam dicunt, quod res intellecta ut intellecta est in anima. Illud falsum est, quia q� dicit rem intellectam ut intellectam dicit duo, scilicet rem et rationem intelli­ gendi, et ideo res intellecta ut intellecta non est in intellectu: sicut agens secundum quod agens non est in passo ita res intellecta ut intellecta non est in intellectu, sed esse intellectum rei est in anima, res autem extra animam est, quia esse intellectum est esse activum in inteUectu, licet significetur per modum passionis, et ideo sicut agens non est in passo, ita res intellecta ut inteUecta non est in inteUectu." There is also a similar difficulty concerning the notion of "thing signified" (res signifo;ata) and the distinction between rtS signifo;ata and signifo;atum. See E. J. Ashworth "Significa­ tion and Modes of Signitying in Thirteenth-Century Logic: A Preface to Aquinas on Analogy," Med;'val Philnsophy and Tholngy 1 (1991): 52-53.

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Thus, i n the debate o n the nature o f the object o f the intellect, Brito maintains that the object of the intellect is something extra­ mental even if it is considered as understood. The fact that some­ thing is understood by the intellect does not mean that that thing is in the mind, but only that its mode of understanding is in the mind, and Brito identifies that mode of understanding with the intelligible species.42 The debate on the status of the object of the intellect, when con­ sidered as understood, is relevant to the doctrine of second inten­ tion for apparent reasons. Let us generically define a second inten­ tion as a property pertaining to a thing understood. If a thing as understood is something extramental, its properties are real features of extramental things. By contrast, if a thing as understood is some­ thing mental and internal to the intellect, its properties are merely mental entities. Thus, the difference between the two approaches to second in­ tentions I have sketched may be seen as dependent on which con­ ception of the object of the intellect is adopted. As well, the position an author takes on second intentions depends on his position on first intentions, for a first intention (i.e. a first intention concretely conceived) is the intellect's object considered as a thing understood.

6. Abstract and concrete intentions Brito takes over the distinction between abstract and concrete in­ tentions that we have already found in Simon of Faversham, and he links it to his conception of the two aspects present in the thing un­ derstood. He maintains that the thing understood itself is a con­ crete intention. By contrast, he calls the mode in which that thing is understood an 'abstract intention'. We can describe Brito's distinc­ tion of abstract and concrete intentions as a distinction between the form and the content of concepts. The form of a concept, ac­ cording to Brito, is the act by which we understand something, whereas the content of a concept is the thing understood by such an " See Radulphus Brito, Super Porph, q. SA (ed. Pinborg, 1 1 6): "Et cum dicitur quod intentio secunda rem denominat ut dicendo 'homo est species" dicunt quod homo est species ut est in intellectu. Sed isti male dicunt quia homo ut est in intellectu nihil aliud est nisi species vel cognitio hominis. Modo cognitio hominis non est homo; ista enim falsa 'cognitio hominis est homo',"

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act. For example, the concept

man is a concrete first intention, since

it is an extramental thing understood by our intellect. The act by which we understand the concept

man is an abstract intention. Brito

maintains that this act is a quality present of the mind. Like Simon of Faversham, Brito refers to concrete accidental terms in order to show that concrete intentions are not pure concepts but extramental things conceived by the intellect. Concrete accidental terms such as

'album'

not only signifY an accidental nature, but also denominate

the subject in which such a nature inheres. Similarly, concrete second intention terms, such as genus and

species,

signify both a con­

cept and the thing understood through that concept; accordingly,

ratio ratio.43

the corresponding concrete intentions are constituted both by a

intelligendi and by

the thing understood denominated by that

Furthermore, Brito maintains that there are two modes of under­ standing. First, something can be understood according to its proper mode of being. Second, the same thing can be understood according to a mode of being it shares with other things, namely insofar as that thing is related to those other things. Brito associates these two ways of understanding to first and second intentions, respectively". By combining the distinction between abstract and concrete in­ tentions and the distinction between first and second intentions, Brito obtains the following fourfold division: (a) an abstract first in­ tention is the understanding of something according to its proper mode of being and to its phantasm; (b) a concrete first intention is a thing understood according to its proper mode of being; (c) an ab­ stract second intention is the understanding of something according to a common mode of being, to the extent that such a thing is re­ lated to other things; (d) a concrete second intention is a thing un­ derstood according to a common mode of being:

., Super Porph., q. SA (ed. Pinborg, 1 14.41-46): "Et quod universale in concreto dicat ista duo, scilicet rem et rationem intelligendi, hoc probo, quia sicut se habent accidentia absoluta ad sua subiecta, ita se habent intentiones secundae ad sua obiecta. Modo accidentia conereta absoluta sic se habent ad sua subiecta quod di­ cunt ipsum accidens ut denominat subiectum. Ergo intentianes secundae in concreto dicunt formaliter rationem intelligendi ut denominat ipsam rem."
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A first intention in abstract is the first knowledge or first intellectual understanding of a thing by its first and proper mode of being. A first intention in concrete is the thing itself insofar as it is first understood according to its proper appearance or its proper mode of being, as for example a man insofar as it is understood as something capable of sensation or as something capable of reasoning. And I say in the same way about the other things as I say about man. By contrast, a second intention in abstract is the mode of understanding something insofar as it is in several things. Such an understanding is not an absolute un­ derstanding of something, but a relative one. In fact, a thing is under­ stood as it is absolute before it is understood as it is in several things. On the other hand, the second intention universal in concrete is that thing insofar as it is in several things. And what I say about universal I also say about the other incomplex intentions and the other intentions attributed to an incomplex thing by the first operation of the intellect, such as predicate and subject. The same is true for the other intentions according to the different mode of being found in them 4S

By this fourfold classification, Brito presents a systematic doctrine of second intentions, where elements present in Henry of Ghent and Simon of Faversham are organized and developed.46

7.

Brito on the cause if second intentions

Some features of Brito's approach to intentions are worth noting. First, he makes no reference to the intellect's act of reflection on it­ self in forming second intentions. By contrast, he simply defines a

ipsum intelligere ut est reperibilis in pluribus et de pluribus praedicabilis. Et homo sic cognitus vocatur secunda intentio in concreto." 45 Super Porph., q. 7A (ed. Pinborg, 98.57-100.71): "Modo primo vide.mus quid sit intentio prima et quid secunda, tam in abstracto et in concreto. Intentio prima uni­ versalis in abstracto est prima rei cognitio vel intellectio secundum proprium modum essendi ipsius rei. Prima autem intentio in concreto est res primo modo intellecta se­ cundum proprium apparens vel modum essendi ipsius rei, sicut homo secundum quod intelligitur ratiocinans vel sentiens dicitur prima intentio, et sicut dieo de homine sic intelligo de aliis. Secunda intentio universalis in abstracto est ratio inteUi­ gendi rem ut est in pluribus, et talis non est intellectio rei absoluta sed respectiva, quia prius est intelligere rem absolute quam ut est in pluribus. Sed intentio secunda universalis in concreto est res intellecta ut est in pluribus. Et sicut dico de universali, sic intelligo de aliis intentionibus incomplexis et attributis rei incomplexae iuxta primam operationem intellectus, sicut est praedieatum et subiectum et sic de aliis se­ cundum diversos modos essendi ibi repertos." See also Super de anima I, q. 6 (ed. Pin­ borg, 1 24); Sophisma, n. 50 (ed. Pinborg, 1 4 1 -42). 46 For a table illustrating Brito's classification of intentions, see Marenbon, Later Medieval Philosophy, 142.

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second intention as a relative understanding of an extramental thing (according to an abstract consideration) or as an extramental thing as understood as related to other things (according to a con­ crete consideration). Second, even though it is the intellect that es­ tablishes the relations constituting second intentions, these relations are not based on a mode of understating of the intellect, but on a real property and mode of being pertaining to extramental things themselves.

As was the case with Simon of Faversham, if we take into ac­ count only the abstract consideration of second intentions it may seem that there is not a great difference between the accounts of Thomas Aquinas and Brito. Brito admits that a universal, consid­ ered as an abstract second intention, is the way of understanding something as present in several things

pluribus).

Similarly, a species

(ratio intelligendi rem ut est in

is the way of understanding something

as present in several numerically different things, and a genus is the way of understanding something as present in several specifically different things.·7 So far, there seems to be no difference from Thomas Aquinas's account. Aquinas, however, thinks that the prop­ erty of being present in several things is based, not on extramental things and their modes of being, but on things as they are under­ stood and on their modes of being-understood. The intellect knows such a

i by ratio intellgendi

reflecting on the mode in which it knows

things. Therefore, Aquinas maintains that when we attribute the second intention

universal to something we do not say anything con­

cerning the extramental world, we only make a statement con­ cerning the way in which we understand the extramental world. By contrast, Brito says that the mode of understanding something as present in several things is directly based on the modes of being of extramental things. It is true, therefore, that second intentions rep­ resent the modes of understanding things, but since these modes of understanding are parallel to and based on the modes of being of extramental things, second intentions reveal the structure of the ex­ tramental world: Now, all these modes of understanding are taken from some modes of being present in reality. For example, the mode of understanding something as it is in several numerically or specifically different things

47

Super Porph.

q.

5A (ed. Pinborg, 70.1 23-28).

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is taken from the mode of being that is 'being in several things for­ mally or quantitatively different'.4B

The only difference between first and second intentions, according to Brito, is that the former are taken from proper modes of being of things, whereas the latter are taken from common or relative modes of being. The common modes of being, however, are no less real than the proper ones: .. .just as the mode of being from which a first intention is taken is real, so also the common mode of being of something from which a second intention is taken is real . . . .•

It is true that the intellect plays some role in forming second inten­ tions, but that role is the same that it plays in forming first inten­ tions. According to the common opinion, universal concepts of first intention such as

man

and

animal

are caused by the extramental

thing together with the agent intellect. The extramental thing has a proper mode of being, which acts on the sense through the phan­ tasm, namely through a sensible image. From this phantasm, the agent intellect abstracts a universal notion, which represents the ex­ tramental thing. This universal notion is received by the possible in­ tellect, which plays a purely passive role as a receptacle of concepts. Brito is fully aware that this account of how first intentions are formed,

if applied to the case of second intentions, is incompatible

with the doctrine of second intentions of Thomas. In fact, Thomas thinks that second intentions pertain not to the extramental things but to their modes of understanding. Consequendy, second intentions are caused by the things as understood and as mental entities. The advo­ cates of Thomas's account maintain that things as understood are no­ tions stored in the possible intellect at the end of the process of under­ standing extramental things. Therefore, they think that the possible intellect plays the role of efficient cause in forming second intentions.

43. Ibid. (ed. Pinborg, 70.1 29-32): "Modo omnes iSlae rationes intelligendi sumuntur ab aliquibus modis essendi in re, sicut ista ratio quae est ratio intelligendi rem ut est in pluribus differentihus numero vel specie sumitur ab ista modo essendi qui est esse in pluribus differentihus formaliter vel per quantitatem." See also q. 5B (ed. Pinborg, 7 1 . 124-31). See also Sophisma, n. 52 (ed. Pinborg, 144) 49. Radulphus Brito Sophisma, n. 58 (ed. Pinborg, 147): " . . . sicut modus essendi a quo sumitur prima intentio est realis, ita etiam modus essendi communis rei a quo sumitur secunda intentio est realis . . . "

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Brito directly opposes this account. He thinks that second inten­ tions - like first intentions - are caused by the modes of being of things together with the agent intellect. The possible intellect is not the efficient cause of second intentions, but their passive receptacle. The real cause of second intentions is primarily the extramental thing and, secondarily, the agent intellect:

As

the first understanding according to the proper mode of being of something is related to the thing understood under the proper mode of being, understood through phantasms, so the second under­ standing of something according to its common mode of being is re­ lated to the thing understood under the common mode of being, un­ derstood through phantasms. Now, in the first understanding according to the proper mode of being of the thing, the possible in­ tellect only receives that understanding and does not cause it. In the same way, therefore, in the second understanding of the intellect ac­ cording to the common mode of being of the thing, the possible in­ tellect will be only a subject and a recipient, not an agent. In this way, just as a thing, as it is under its proper mode of being, can move the possible intellect, so, as it is under the common mode of being, un­ derstood through phantasms, will it be in a position to move the pos­ sible intellect, and so the possible intellect will not be an agent on that occasion. 50

Brito insists several times on this point, presumably because he real­ izes that it marks the most important difference between his account and an account of second intentions like that of Thomas.51 He adds that second intentions are accordingly said to be 'second' only be­ cause they come after first intentions, since something is understood as an absolute thing before being understood as compared to other things. Second intentions, however, are not second because they are effects and representations of first intentions stored in the possible 50. Ibid., n. 53 (ed. Pinborg, 144-45): "Sicut prima cognitio secundum modum es­ sendi proprium rei se habet ad rem cognitam sub modo essendi rei proprio fantasiato ita secunda cognitio rei secundum modum essendi communem rei se habet ad rem cognitam sub modo essendi rei communi fantasiato. Modo in prima rei cognitione secundum modum essendi rei proprium intellectus possibilis est solum recipiens istam cognitionem et non causans. Ergo eadem modo in secunda cognitione intel­ lectus secundum modum essendi communem rei intellectus possibilis erit solum subiectum et recipiens et non agens, ita quod sicut res sub modo essendi proprio rei potest movere intellectum possibilem, ita et res sub modo essendi communi fan­ tasiato poterit ipsum intellectum possibilem movere, et ita intellectus possibilis non erit ibi agens." See also Super Porph., q. 4, (ed. Venet., 8rb); q. 7A (ed. Pinborg, 1 00.89- 102. 1 22), q. 7B (ed. Pinborg, 1 03.79- 1 0 1 ). " Super Porph. q. 7A, (ed. Pinborg, 108. 1 96-201); Super de anima, I, q. 6 (ed. Pin­ borg, 125).

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intellect. First intentions are a necessary condition for second inten­ tions, since first our intellect understands something in itself and only afterwards does it compare it to something else. Nevertheless, first intentions are neither the cause nor the foundation of second intentions. 52 The extramental thing, and not the thing as under­ stood, is what a second intention denominates, that on which it is based, and that by which it is caused: If universal is taken as a second intention in concrete, in the same way it must be said that, with respect to what is material in it, it is not caused by the intellect, since, just as a first intention denominates the thing understood by first understanding, so a second understanding or a second intention denominates the thing insofar as it is secondarily understood. In fact, just as this statement is true: "Man is understood absolutely," so also this statement is true: "Man is something under­ stood as present in many things." But this being understood as in many things is what is signified by the name 'universal'. But the thing that is understood in that way can exist without the operation of the intellect."

Since second intentions are caused immediately by the modes of being of extramental things and not by the things understood or first intentions, second intentions are not second-order concepts or "concepts of concepts." According to Brito, this is proved by the fact that our intellect cannot have two actual intellections at the same time, but that would happen if second intentions were con­ cepts of concepts since our intellect would have both a first inten­ tion and a second intention attributed to it, and both of them would be actual at the same time. By contrast, Brito maintains that a second intention is a concept coming after a first intention, but not founded on the first understanding of something insofar as that un­ derstanding is in the intellect. A first and a second intention are not ;, Super Porph., q. 7A (ed. Pinborg, 104. 1 32-50); Sophisma, n. 54 (ed. Pinborg, 1 45). :':1 Super de anima, I, q. 6 (ed. Pinborg, 1 25-26): "Si autem sumatur universale pro se­ cunda intentione in concreto eodem modo dicendum est quantum ad illud quod est ibi materiale: non est ab intellectu quia sicUl prima intentio denominat rem quae in­ teUigur primo intellectu, sic secunda intellectio sive secunda intentio denominat rem ipsam secundum quod secundario intelligitur. Sicut enim haec est vera "homo ab­ solute intelligitur" sic haec est vera "homo est aliquid intellectum in pluribus." Sed tale esse intellectum ut in pluribus est quod significatur nomine universalis. Sed res ista quae est sic intellecta potest esse sine operatione intellectus." 54 Super Porph., q. 7A (ed. Pinborg, 104.1 32-42): "Sed ulterius notandum est quod quamvis universale quod est secunda intentio praesupponat rem primo intellectam sicut cognitio respectiva praesupponit absolutam, non tamen intelligo quod univer­ sale quod est secunda intentio fundatur supra primam cognitionem rei quae est in

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simultaneously present in the intellect - which, according to Brito, would be impossible; rather, a thing is understood as a second in­ tention only after it has been conceived of as a first intention. 54 The intellect, then, is that which understands something as a second intention and a necessary condition of a second intention, but it is not what causes a second intention. A thing's mode of being and the relationship that such a thing has with other things cause a second intention. The intellect still plays a role in the formation of second intentions, since a concrete second intention is a thing un­ derstood and an abstract second intention is a mode of under­ standing, but the intellect only understands the relation on which a second intention is based. It does not cause it. As Brito says, the re­ lation of one thing to another is attributed to something under­ stood, but not to its being understood. 55

8.

Logical dqinitions

Second intentions can be attributed to things, as Brito admits. This happens in predications such as "man is a species" or "animal is a genus." Such predications, however, do not attribute mental proper­ ties (say, being a species) to things conceived as mental entities (man). If a thing understood, say man, is conceived as a mental en­ tity, it is nothing else than a mental quality, and it is not to such a quality (presumably, the intelligible species of man) that we attribute the property of being a species. When we say "man is a species" we state that man, as an extramental essence, is understood by our in­ tellect as a species. Thus, we are making an accidental predication because it is not part of the essence of man to be understood by our intellect. Consequently, in such predications the property of being understood is denominatively predicated of extramental things. 56 intellectu, ita quod illae duae cognitiones, scilicet prima rei intellectio et secunda sint simul in intellectu, quia impossibile est duas intentiones distinctas simul esse in intel­ leetu. Modo universale ut dicit secundam intentionem est quaedam intellectio. Ideo ista intellectio non potest simul esse cum prima intellectione in inteUectu. Sed debet inteUigi quod rei quae prius fuit secundum se et absolute intellecta postea attribuitur secunda intentio . . ." See also Super Porph., q. 7B (ed. Pinborg, 105. 1 1 4-30); Super de anima, q. 6 (ed. Pinborg, 1 26). �5 Radulphus Brito

"Zum Begriff," 54. 56 Super Por ph., q.

Sophisma

"Omnis homo est amnis homo," quoted in Pinborg,

1 7 (ed. Venet., 21 va-22va).

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Brito maintains that logic considers things taken according to their common modes of being, namely as concrete second inten­ tions, and logical definitions are definitions of concrete second in­ tentions. For example, Porphyry's definition of a genus is that it is something predicated of several things specifically differentY When dealing with this definition, commentators usually ask whether what Porphyry defines is a thing or a concept. According to Brito, the de­ finition of a genus is neither of a thing taken absolutely nor of an intention taken absolutely. Porphyry defines a concrete intention, namely a thing considered according to its common modes of being and as related with other things. When a genus is predicated of something, what is predicated, Brito maintains, is an extramental thing, not a concept. It is true that predication is an operation of the intellect, but the intellect predicates something according to certain properties or modes of being of things themselves. For example, since an animal is an extramental thing with a mode of being by which it is predicable of its species, the intellect can predicate

animal

of men and horses. Therefore, Brito concludes that in the definition of the concrete intention cause of the intention. 58

genus,

the thing that is predicated is the

Logic deals with concepts similar to genus. Whenever logicians de­ fine second intentions, they mention the extramental things that cause those intentions. It is, therefore, impossible to define second intentions on a merely conceptual level. All logical definitions, namely all the definitions of second intentions, refer to something extramental since logical intentions are defined by referring to the things to which they pertain, which are extramental. 59 Brito's account of logical definitions fits his conception of inten­ tions. Something is understood in a certain way because its own na­ ture is of a certain kind. For example, an animal is understood as a genus because Animal has a mode of being such that Animal is predicated of Man and Horse. The mode in which something is un­ derstood reflects its mode of being and is caused by it. Thus, there are modes of being parallel to modes of understanding. Logic,

" Porphyry Isagoge 2.14- 1 7. See Boethius's translation (ed. Minio-PalueUo, 6.257.2): "Tripliciter igitur cum genus dicatur, de tertia apud philosophos sermo est, quod etiam describentes adsignaverunt genus esse dicentes de pluribus et differen­ tibus specie in eo quod quid sit praedicatum, ut 'animal'." " Radulphus Brito Super POTph., q. I I (ed. Venet., 15rb-1 6rb). " Super Praed., q. 4 (ed. Venet., 39va).

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which is the science of concrete second intentions, considers things according to properties and modes of being that are real and not caused by the intellect.

9.

Intentions and the second and third operation if the intellect

What I have said so far concerning Brito's approach to second in­ tentions, however, should be restricted to one class of second inten­ tions, as Brito himself admits. Similarly to Simon of Faversham, Brito distinguishes three types of second intentions. First, there are simple second intentions, such as

species and genus, which pertain to

the first operation of the intellect (i.e. the formation of simple con­ cepts). Second, there are more complex intentions, such as

question, proposition,

and

conclusion.

statement,

This second type of intentions

pertains to the second operation of the intellect (i.e. the act of com­ posing and dividing simple concepts). Third, there are the most

induction and syllogism, which pertain to the third operation of the intellect (i.e. reasoning). 60

complex intentions, such as

Brito maintains that the possible intellect plays no role in the for­

species and genus, for they are efficiently caused by the extramental things. Such mation of the first kind of second intentions, such as

concepts do indeed represent extramental things and not mental entities, according to Brito. With regard to intentions pertaining to the second and third operations, however, Brito's position is more complex. In his

Qyestions on the Soul he

maintains that these inten­

tions are entirely caused by the extramental things, and that the in­ tellect is completely passive with regard to these intentions as it is with regard to intentions of the first kind. 6 1 Some time afterwards, however, in his

Sophism on

second intentions, Brito admits that it is

not easy to decide what causes these intentions. He finally opts for the possible intellect - as opposed to the extramental thing - as the efficient cause of second intentions of the second and third kinds. The reason for this

is that predicating and reasoning do not exist in

the extramental world: it is the intellect that causes them when it is informed by an understanding acquired through its first operation.

As a result, species and genus are representations of the extramental 60 61

Sophisma (ed. Pinborg, 142-44). Super de Anima III, q. 2 (ed. Fauser, 1 20).

HENRY OF GHENT, SIMON OF FAVERSHAM, RADULPHUS BRITO

97

things by which they are caused, whereas proposition and ryllogism are representations of mental operations and are caused by the intel­ lect: But what shall we say about the other intentions attributed to some­ thing according to the second and the third operation of the intellect? I say that these intentions such as ryllogism, induction, proposition, etc . , are caused by the intellect, since the intellect, as it is made actual and as it has the first understanding of something, is what composes a predicate with a subject, for example, "a man runs." In fact, this sen­ tence or union of a predicate with a subject would never take place if there were not an intellect, for even if in reality a man ran, neverthe­ less only the intellect composes this complex, "a man runs," from those terms . . . Hence, as what is composed according to the second and the third operations of the intellect depends on the intellect, so and even more will the understanding based on those operations de­ pend on the intellect. 62

The intentions representing such predications and such arguments are therefore representations of entities caused by the intellect.

As

Brito admits in his Sophism, it is true that such intentions are caused by the object they represent, like second intentions of the first kind. It must be taken into account, however, that in this case the object repre­ sented is a mind-dependent entity, and therefore second intentions of the second and third kinds are entirely caused by the intellect: Nevertheless, when the intellect understands this complex item, "every man runs" or anything of this kind, just as in the first opera­ tion of the intellect the cause of that cognition was the object , so also in the understanding by which I understand the complex that stands for something else in the premises, this un­ derstanding is not efficiently caused by the intellect, rather it is caused by the object. But that complex object was dependent on the intellect, and so from the first to the last stage a second intention attributed to it was dependent on the intellect.63 62 So phisma, n. 55 (ed. Pinborg, 145-46): "Sed de aliis intentionibus attributis rei se­ cundum secundam et tertiam operationem intellectus, quid dicemus? Dieo quod istae causantur ab intellectu cuiusmodi sunt syllogismus, inductio, propositio etc., quia intel­ lectus factus in actu et habens primam rei cognitionem habet componere praedicatum cum subiecto ut homo currit. Ista enim oratio vel unio praedicati cum subiecto numquam esset, si intellectus non esset. Licet eoim in re esset quod homo curreret, tamen ilIud complexum "homo currit" non est compositum ex istis terminis nisi per in­ tellectum . . . Unde cum complexum secundum secundam et tertiam operationem intel­ lectus dependeat ab intelJectu, multo rortius cognitio ibi rundata dependebit ab intellec­ tu." See also the short rererence in Super Porph., q. 7A (ed. Pinborg, 100.7 1). 63 Sophisma, n. 55 (ed. Pinborg, 146): "Tamen cum intellectus intelligit illud com-

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Consequently, Brito restricts and qualifies the statement that second intentions are not caused by the possible intellect but by the modes of being of extramental things, for this is true only for the second intentions of the first kind such

as

i spec�s

and genus. The cause of

propositional and argumentative second intentions, however, is the intellect, and for these intentions Aquinas's account seems to main­ tain its validity, since these last intentions represent not extramental things but other concepts, namely the compositions the intellect carries out.

plexum "omnis homo currit" vel quodcumque alius, sicut in prima operatione intel­ lectus obiectum erat causa talis cognitionis, ita et in ista cognitione qua intelligo com­ plexum positum pro alia in praemissis, ista intellectio non est effective ab inteUectu imIno ab abietto. Sed illud obiectum complexum dependebat ab inteUectu, et ita a primo ad ultimum secunda intentio sibi attrihuta dependebat ab inteUectu."

CHAYfER FOUR SECOND INTENTIONS IN DUNS SCOTUS

So far I have described the two main approaches to second inten­ tions developed in the second half of the thirteenth century. Where should we collocate Scotus?

As I will argue in this chapter, Scotus's

approach to intentions is quite close to that of Aquinas. Generally speaking, Scotus considers second intentions as founded on proper­ ties pertaining to things as things are understood and are in the in­ tellect. Scotus's doctrine of intentions, however, must be recon­ structed from scattered evidence. There are three main blocks of texts that must be taken into account. The first references to inten­ tions are found in Scotus's logical commentaries, where intentions are presented as concepts founded on things considered according to their cognitive being and as notions produced by the intellect's reflecting on itself. Second, Scotus refers to intentions in an often

Sentences (both in the Lec­ tura and in the Ordinatio), where he describes second intentions as ra­

quoted passage of his commentary on the

tional relations pertinent to the intellect's act of composing and comparing things between themselves. Third, Scotus makes some remarks on second intentions and rational relations in his

on the Metaphysics.

Questions

It is here that Scotus gives a solution to many

thorny issues of the doctrine of intentions and provides his most ac­ complished treatment of the topic. In this chapter, I present each one of these accounts of intentions. Surely, the first one precedes the remaining two, but I do not take a position as to the chronolog­ ical relationship between the remaining two, even though I main­ tain that the third one is more developed. I It is clear, however, that Scotus, in each one of his treatments, proposes something very dif­ ferent from Simon of Faversham's and Radulphus Brito's doctrines of intentions. ] On dating Duns Scotus's commentaries on the Sentences and Q¥estions on the Meta­ physics, see A. B. Wolter, "Reflections on the Life and Works of Scotus," TJu American Catholic Pililosophical Q!larter!1 47 (1 993): 1 -36; "Reflections about Scotus's Early Works," in L. Honnefdder, R. Wood, and M. Dreyer, eds., John Duns ScoWs. Meta­ P/rlsics and Ethics (Leiden-New York-Ko1n: E. J. Brill, 1996), 37-57; S. D. Dumont,

1 00

CHAPTER FOUR

I.

Seotus on three considerations if an essence

In his commentary on Porphyry's

Isagoge,

Scotus describes second

intentions as accidents inhering in first intention things.2 This de­ scription, however, is too vague to understand what kind of doctrine of second intentions he adopts. Specifically, it is not clear whether second intentions are accidents inhering in things insofar as things are in the mind or in the extramental world. That Scotus adopts the first option is clear from his distinction of the ways in which the sig­ nification of a common term can be considered. According to Scotus, the signification of a common term such as 'man' can be considered in three ways. First, it can be considered according to the being it has in the individuals for which it stands

(supposita),

which Scotus calls 'material being'. According to this

consideration, a term such as 'man' signifies individuals such as Socrates and Plato. Some attributes pertain to things so considered, the so-called common accidents, such as being white and being tall , which are called 'common' presumably as opposed to individual­ ized accidents, such as 'the whiteness of Socrates' or 'the tallness of Plato': One must know, however, that what is signified by a common term signifying a true nature can be considered in three ways. In a first way, according to its being in the supposits, which is said its 'material being', and in this way the common accidents in­ here in it.'

"The Question on Individuation in Scatus's Qyaestiones super Metap1!Ysicam," in Via Scati. Methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoli: Au; del CongrtSso Scotistico Inter­ na,donale, Roma 9-11 marzo 1993, ed. L. Sileo (Rama: PAA - Edizioni Antonianum, 1 995), 193-227. On Scotus's logical commentaries, see above, Introduction, n. 4 1 . :.! Duns Scotus Super Porph.., q . 1 2 , n. 7 (OPh, I , 55): " . . . universalia, cum sint in­ tentiones secundae, accidunt rebus primae intentionis." Not only second intentions, but also their definitions inhere in first intention things as accidents in their subjects. See Super Po,ph, q. 9-1 1 , n. 21 (OPh, I, 48): "Ad ,ecundam quae,tionem dicendum quod hoc [scil., "homo est universale"] est vera eo modo quo nunc dictum est, hoc accidens inest rei, quia ilia modo definitio intentionis inest rei." 3 Ibid. (OPh, I, 46): "Sciendum tamen quod significatum termini communis, sig­ nificantis veram naturam, tripliciter patest considerari. Uno modo secundum esse in suppositis, quod dicitur esse materiale eius, et hoc modo insunt ei accidentia com­ munia. Secundo modo consideratur absolute secundum esse quiditativum, et sic in­ sunt ei praedicata essentialia. Tertia modo ut per formam inteUigibilem ab inteUectu apprehenditur, quod est esse cognitum, et sic insunt ei intentiones." See D. O. Dahlstrom, "Signification and Logic: Scotus on Universals from a Logical Point of View," Vivarium 18 (1 980): 99- 102.

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101

This is the way an essence signified by a common term is considered as related to the individuals from which it has been abstracted. Second, the signification of a common term can be considered according to its quidditative being, namely according to its essence. The attributes pertaining to a nature so considered are its essential attributes, such as being a rational animal or being a substance. In fact, these attributes are essential to man and pertain to his essence as considered in itself: In a second way <what is signified by a common term> is considered absolutely according to its quidditative being, and thus the essential predicates inhere in it · Third, the signification of a common term can be considered as something understood by the intellect. By virtue of an intelligible species (which Scotus calls 'intelligible form), an extramental thing becomes present to the intellect as something provided of 'cognitive being', a special kind of being that something enjoys when it is con­ sidered

as

an object of understanding. Second intentions pertain to

things when they are so considered, namely insofar as they are pre­ sent to the intellect as its objects. Scotus explains how the intellect forms second intentions. This process can be split into three stages. First, the intellect considers an essence, for example the essence of man, neither as it is in individual men nor as it is in itself, but insofar as it is a universal concept predicable of many things. Then the in­ tellect finds in the essence of man, considered as a universal con­ cept, some property, i.e. the property of being predicated of many things, and from this property the intellect is moved to cause a second intention, for example the intention

universal.

Finally, the in­

tellect attributes that intention to the essence that has the property of being predicated of many things: In a third way <what is signified by a common term> is considered inso­ far as it is apprehended by the intellect through an intelligible form, and this is its cognitive being, and so the intentions inhere in it. In fact, the in­ tellect, when considering the nature of man as one in many and said of many, is moved by a property found in the nature so considered to cause an intention. And once that intention is caused, the intellect attributes it to the nature, of which it is a property and from which it is taken. 5 • Super Porph., q. 9- 1 1 , n. 16 (OPh, I, 46-47): "Secundo modo consideratur absolute secundum esse quiditativum, et sic insunt ei praedicata essentialia.·· S Ibid., nn. 16- 1 7 (OPh, I, 47): "Tertio modo ut per formam intelligibilem ab in-

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It must be remarked that here Scotus is not drawing a distinction between different meanings of the word 'universal'. Instead, he dis­ tinguishes three ways in which our intellect can consider what is sig­ nified by a universal term such as 'man' or 'animal'. Since in Duns Scotus's account what is signified by such a term is an essence or na­ ture, he is providing a distinction concerning the ways in which our intellect considers the essences it understands.

As is clear, the third

consideration of an essence - as something considered as under­ stood to which the intellect attributes some properties consequent to its being understood - corresponds to Aquinas's account of how the intellect forms intentions. Some observations must be made concerning Scotus's account of intentions. First, it is clear that intentions pertain to an essence only insofar as that essence has cognitive being.

An essence acquires cog­

nitive being by virtue of an intelligible species, but its cognitive being is different from the being of an intelligible species: it is the kind of existence that something has insofar as it is considered as an object of understanding. Second, a second intention is not a prop­ erty of a thing insofar as it is in the intellect, but it is something caused by the intellect (presumably, a concept) that follows from a property of a thing considered according to its cognitive being. Third, the intellect is the cause of an intention, even though it is moved to cause that intention by considering some properties of a thing understood. In order to understand better Scotus's conception of intentions, it is necessary first to look more closely at the idea that an essence can be considered in three ways. Second, it will be useful to focus on the notion of a thing considered to the extent that it is understood, in order to understand why Scotus maintains that such a thing, from which second intentions are taken and to which they are attributed, is something in the intellect.

tellectu apprehenditur, quod est esse cognitum, et sic insunt ei intentiones. Intellectus enim, considerans naturam hominis unam in multis et de multis, ab aliqua propri� etate reperta in natura sic considerata movetur ad causandum intentionem; et illam causatam attribuit ilti naturae cuius est proprietas a qua accipitur." , Simplicius In Cal. 82, 35-83, 20; Avicenna Liber dt phil. prima, V, 1 (ed. Van Riet, 228.24-36); Logica I (ed. Venet., 2rb). See De Libera, Lo qrurtlle des univnsaux, 182-89; Uoyd "Neoplatonic Logic," 59-6 1; Uoyd, The Anatomy ,!! Ntoplatonism, 67-68; D. L. Black, "Mental Existence in Thomas Aquinas and Avicenna," Mediaeval Studies 61 (1999): 47-5 \ .

SECOND INTENTIONS IN DUNS SCOTUS

2.

1 03

The threifold consideration if an essence in Henry if Ghent and in Seotus

Scotus'S doctrine of the threefold consideration of an essence is his version of a widespread doctrine, which cannot be regarded as orig­ inal to him in any way. This is the celebrated doctrine of the three ways in which an essence can be considered, first, as it exists in the extramental world as an individual; second, as it is in itself; and third, as it exists in the mind as a universal. This doctrine, which is first developed in the Neoplatonic commentaries on Aristotle and reaches Latin authors through Avicenna,6 was commonly accepted at least until the first decades of the fourteenth century. Many au­ thors, including Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome, Godfrey of Fontaines,7 and Simon of Faver­ sham,s explicitly endorsed it in one form or another. Duns Scotus himself referred several times to this doctrine, notably in his treat­ ment of individuation in the

Ordinatio.9

Thanks to the doctrine of the threefold consideration of an essence, it is possible to distinguish how a universal exists in the ex­ tramental world and how it exists in the intellect. On the one hand, there is the thing of which the universal is predicated, on the other hand there is the universal notion predicated of that thing. The thing of which the universal is said is an essence that is in itself nei­ ther individual nor universal. It is the intellect that gives universality to that essence. \0 Scotus speaks of three kinds of being: material, quidditative, and cognitive. His phrasing is close to Henry of Ghent's distinction of natural being

(esse naturae), being of (esse rationis).' , Like

rational being

the essence

(esse essentiae),

and

Scotus, moreover, Henry of

Ghent associates this distinction with a distinction of three kinds of attributes. Essential properties, namely what is contained in the de7

8

See above, chap. 2, nn. 27-3 1 . Simon o f Faversham Super Perih
9 Duns Scotus o..d. II, d. 3, p. I, q. DOis, "ReeUes intentions." 10 See Thomas Aquinas Sent. I, d.

19, q. I, a. I (ed. Mandonnet, I, 486); In Met. VII, lect. XIII, no. 1 570; STI, q. 85, a. 3, ad I ; STla lae, q. 26, a. 6. See]. Owens, "Common Nature: A Point of Comparison Between Thomistic and Scotistic Meta­ physics," MediMval Studies 1 9 ( 1 957): 6-7. II. Henry of Ghent �odl. III, q. 9 (ed. Badius, I, 61 v 0). See Paulus, Henri de Gand, 67-103;. Henninger, Relations, 44-45.

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finition of something, pertain to things considered according to their essential being. 12 Accidents present in individuals pertain to things considered according to their material being. Finally, acci­ dents of another kind pertain to things considered as they are ra­ tional beings, namely the accidents attributed to something as it is in the mind: Therefore one must understand that, with regard to the quiddity and the nature of a thing whatsoever, there can be a true understanding in three ways . . . just as <something> has three modes in being. In fact, something has a first being of nature outside in the things, it has a second being of reason, and it has a third being of essence. For an animal, when taken with its accidents in the singulars, is a natural thing (res naturalis) ; when taken with its accidents in the mind is a rational thing (res ratlOnis); and when taken by itself is an es­ sential thing (res essentlae) . . . 13 Although Scotus's doctrine of the threefold consideration of a thing is not new, what is peculiar is his insistence on the intellect's role in forming second intentions.

3.

The thing understood insqfor as it is understood

Scotus maintains, as we have seen, that second intentions pertain to something when it is considered "insofar as it is apprehended by the intellect through an intelligible species," and that when some­ thing is considered in this way it is said to have cognitive being. In his logical commentaries, Scotus does not explain what he intends by a thing considered as understood, and this is not surprising since an analysis of that notion seems to pertain to psychology more than to logic. In order to prevent some misunderstanding, however, it is now necessary to sketch briefly what Scotus means by "a thing con-

" Henry of Ghent Qyodl. III, q. 9 (ed. Badius, I, 6 I rO): '\<\nimal enim ex eo quod est animal et homo ex eo quod est homo, scilicet quantum ad definitionem suam et intellectum secundum se absque consideratione omnium aliorum quae concomi­ tantur illud, non est nisi animal tantum vel homo." 1 3 Ibid.: "Est igitur intelligendum quod circa quiditatem et naturam rei cuius­ cumque triplicem contingit habere intellectum verum . . . sicut et tres modos habet in esse. Unum eoim habet esse naturae extra in rebus, alterum vero habet esse rationis, tertium vero habet esse essentiae. Animal eoiro acceptum cum accidentibus suis in singularibus est res naturalis, acceptum vero cum accidentibus suis in anima est res rationis, acceptum vero secundum se est res essentiae . . . "

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sidered insofar as it is understood by the intellect." Here I will not go into detail in Scotus's theory of concepts, which would require much space and effort. I only give an outline of what he intends by 'thing understood as understood' and 'concept' in the passages where he deals with logical matters. The thing considered as understood is, for Scotus, a concept that kind of concept with which logic deals. 14 Briefly, Scotus adopts Aristotle's doctrine of the identity between the knower and the known: when something is known, it becomes identical with the knower, and it is present in the knower. IS With regard to abstractive intellectual knowledge or understanding, the thing understood is present in the intellect by way of an intelligible species. Such ' a species is a real quality produced by the concomitant action of the phantasm or sensible image and the agent intellect. Phantasm and agent intellect impress the intelligible species into the possible intel­ lect, which receives it as a real quality. By that species, the object be­ comes present to the intellect, and acquires a special kind of being, different both from the real being of the extramental thing and from the real being of the species present in the intellect. This being is called 'cognitive' or 'objective being', and is that kind of being that something has when it is considered as an object of under­ standing. Thus, when something is understood it becomes present to the intellect as a purely intentional object, even though Scotus in­ sists that such an intentional object can come into being only thanks to the real action of the phantasm and the agent intellect, which produce a real species in the possible intellect. 1 6 This is, very briefly, Scotus's doctrine of concepts. It is different from Aquinas's because Scotus thinks that a concept is not some­ thing produced by the act of understanding, as Aquinas does. The intellect, when it understands something in act, does not produce anything, but finds its object as something given to it by way of an intelligible species. 17

" Duns SCOIUS Super Pr.ed., q. I , n. 18 (OPh, I, 253). See chap. 5, n. 4. Aristotle De an. III, 4, 430a3-4. See also ibid., III, 8, 43 1b2 1 , b29. See chap. 3, nn. 38-39. " Duns Scotus Ord. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. I, nn. 348·5 1 , 359, 375, 382, 386 (ed. Vat., III, 209-1 1 , 2 1 6-18, 228, 232-33, 235). See also Appendix A, ad 2 1 7 , 1 6 (ed. Vat., III, 363). On objective being in Duns Scatus, see Boulnais, "ttre, luire et concevoir," 1 29-34. 11 Scotus explicidy criticizes Aquinas's doctrine or the inner word in Ord. I, d. 27, q. I, nn. 55-57 (ed. Vat., VI, 86-87). IS

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Here some attention must be paid to Scotus's terminology. In

(species (obiectum), and

Scotus, we must distinguish between the intelligible species

intelligibilis),

the object of the act of understanding

the act of understanding itself

(intellectio actualis).

The intelligible

species is a real quality inherent in the mind and is the real term of the act of understanding; it is also that by which a thing understood becomes present to the intellect in an intentional (as opposed to a real) way, i.e. as an object. The object is the thing understood con­ sidered insofar as it is understood and insofar as it is in the intellect; it has intentional, objective or cognitive (as opposed to real) being, and it is the intentional term of the act of understanding. 18 The act of understanding is a real quality inherent in the intellect, and is what Scotus identifies with the inner word of which Augustine speaks.19 Scotus admits that the term 'concept' and its synonym 'in­ tention', are equivocal, since it can be used to signifY both the object or thing intentionally present in the intellect and the act of under­ standing. 2o In what follows, I will adhere to Scotus's usage, and I will call 'concept', in Scotus, the object of the intellect provided with in­ tentional, as opposed to real, being.

4.

The intellect as the cause qf second intentions

In his logical commentaries, Scotus maintains that second inten­ tions - i.e. the accidents inhering in things to the extent that they are objectively in the mind - are notions caused by the intellect when the intellect takes into account the properties pertaining to things insofar as they are understood. Consequently, second inten­ tions do not depend on properties and relations existing in the ex­ tramental world. In this respect, Scotus's approach to intentions is close to Aquinas's. On at least two occasions does Scotus present the reflection of the intellect on itself as the cause of second intentions. Aquinas had 18 See the texts referred to above, n. 16. 19 See the texts referred to above, n. 1 7. 20 Duns Scotus Theor., VIII, n. 1 (ed. Vives, V, 1 9a): "Conceptum dieD, quod actum

intelligendi terminal. . . Sicut autem intentio aequivoce dicitur de obiecto et de aetu, ita et conceptus." The authorship of the Theoremata has sometimes been contested. See C. Balit, "La questione scotista," Rivultl dijilosoJia n,o·sco/astica 30 (1 938): 23545; Balie, Ratio critiuu editionis operum omnium I. Duns Scoli, vol. 3 (Roma: Edizioni An­ tonianum, 1951), 30-32.

SECOND INTENTIONS IN DUNS SCOTUS

1 07

already maintained that the intellect forms intentions by an act of self-reflection. He had maintained that the intellect, after a first op­ eration by which it turns towards extramental things, reflects on it­ self and compares the concepts it has formed to the extramental things those concepts represent. By this comparison, the intellect understands that it understands and forms an intention following from the mode in which it understands. Scotus takes over Aquinas's reference to the reflection of the in­ tellect on itsel£ It is by reflection that the intellect understands itself, its operation, and the mode in which it operates, Scotus says. 2 1 The intellect can reflect on its operations several times, and every time it reflects it forms a second intention. There is, however, only one ex­ tramental thing corresponding to all intentions, for each one of these intentions represents neither a different extramental thing nor a different mode of being but the mode in which the intellect un­ derstands an extramental thing. As it happens, the intellect under­ stands its mode of understanding by reflecting on its own operation. Scotus concludes that the cause of intentions is the intellect, not the extramental thing or one of its modes of being.22 In the passage concerning the three considerations of what is sig­ nified by a common term, Scotus explicitly describes intentions as notions caused by the intellect when the intellect takes into consid­ eration what could be called the intentional properties of things (i.e., those properties that pertain to things insofar as things are un­ derstood by the intellect). Elsewhere, he defines second intentions as whatever is caused by the sole consideration of the intellect.23 In this respect, Scotus follows Aquinas and opposes Brito, who says 21 Duns Scotus Super Porph., q. 5, n. 4 (OPh, I, 28): "Igitur intellectus potest cognoscere illum modum sive rationem universalis per se et sub propria ratione. Hoc modo, reflectendo, cognoscit intellectus se et suam operationem et modum operandi et cetera quae sibi insunt." " Super Praed., q. 3, n. 13 (OPh, I, 271): "Sed tamen ubique est aliquid correspon­ dens illi modo, sed non ita vere sicut intentio causata ab intellectu, mota ab ilia exstrinseco. Similiter, inteUectus considerans per illam unam speciem, potest millesies reflectere se supra suam operationem considerando, et quaelibet consideratio aliquid est, nihil habens extrinsecum sibi correspondens, nisi tantum primum obiectum pro occasione, in quantum illud movet primo intellectum ad considerationem." Ibid., q. 9-1 1 , n. 28 (OPh, I, 50): " . . . res non est causa efficiens intentionis sed intellectus." See also ibid., q. 1 5, n. 23 (OPh, I, 8 1 -82). 23 Super Porph., q. 34, n. 6 (OPh, I, 2 1 5): ')\lio modo [scil., accidens] significat idem quod intentio secunda, scilicet quidlibet quod causatur a sola consideratione intel­ lectus, et isto modo omnia quinque universalia sunt accidentia."

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that the intellect does not cause second intentions but only receives them." How does the intellect cause second intentions? Scotus says that the intellect causes a second intention when it is moved by a property that it finds in an essence considered as "one in many and said of many."25 Since "one in many and said of many" is the classic Aris­ totelian definition of a universal, we could say that the intellect is moved to cause a second intention when it considers an essence as a universal. Elsewhere Scotus draws the distinction between essence and universal: the essence is the object of the intellect and what the intellect understands, whereas the universal is the mode in which the intellect understands an essence. Since the object and its mode of understanding are essentially distinct, the intellect can acquire a concept of each of them and can understand each of them distinctly:

The first object of the intellect, namely the 'what it is' is understood under the aspect of a universal (sub ratione universalis). That aspect (ratio), however, is not essentially identical with that 'what it is', but it is its accidental mode. Therefore, the intellect can know the difference between its first object and that mode, since it can distinguish all the things that are not essentially the same.26 Therefore, when the intellect considers an essence as universal, it distinguishes the essence and the mode in which that essence is un­ derstood. The property that moves the intellect to cause a second intention is a property pertaining to an essence only as conceived under the mode in which it is understood. It is such a property that moves the intellect to cause a second intention. For example, an essence considered as universal has the property of being predicable of individuals, and the intellect is moved by that property to cause the intention species. 24 See above, chap. 3, par. 7. " Duns Scotus Super Porph., q. 1 1 , n. 1 7 (OPh, I, 47): "Intellectus enim, consid­ erans naturam hominis unam in multis et de muitis, ab aliqua proprietate reperta in natura sic considerata movetur ad causandum intentionem; et illam causatam at­ tribuit illi naturae cuius est proprietas a qua accipitur." " Ibid., q. 5, n. 4 (OPh, I, 27-8): " . . . primum obiectum intellectus, scilicet 'quod quid est' intelligitur sub ratione universali. Illa autem ratio non est idem essentialiter cum ilia 'quod quid est', sed modus eius accidentalis. 19itur intellectus potest cognoscere differentiam inter suum primum obiectum et ilium modum, quia potest distinguere inter omnia quae non sunt essentialiter eadem." See also ibid., q. 4, n. 6 (OPh, I, 23): "Quidquid autem intelligitur, intelligitur sub ratione universalis."

SECOND INTENTIONS IN DUNS SCOTUS

1 09

Being universal is only the mode in which our intellect under­ stands its object, not a property of the object itself There is an es­ sential difference between the essence understood and the mode in which it is understood, and there is no ground to state that there is a parallelism between the essence's mode of being and its mode of being understood.

As Scotus states in his Ordinatio, by a first understanding the in­ tellect comprehends its object under the mode of universality without understanding the mode of universality itself In fact, uni­ versality is a mode of understanding, not a feature of the object un­ derstood, since the thing understood, by itself, is neither universal nor individual. Scotus adds that, although the intellect always un­ derstands something in terms of universality, it does not attribute that universality to its object. Only at a second stage, when the in­ tellect reflects on its first operation (i.e. its understanding extra­ mental things), does it understand the mode in which it understands things. Only then can it attribute that mode - universality - to things understood. This is the way the intellect forms a second in­ tention: But not only is the nature itself indifferent of itself to being in the in­ tellect and to being in a particular - and therefore also to being uni­ versal and to being particular or singular. It does not primarily of it­ self have universality even when it does have being in the intellect. For even though it is understood under universality (as under the mode of understanding it), nevertheless universality is not a part of its primary concept, since it is not a part of the metaphysical concept, but of the logical concept. For the logician considers second intentions applied to first ones, according to him [sci!., AvicennaJ . Therefore, the first in­ tellection is an intellection of the nature without there being any co­ understood mode, either the mode it has in the intellect or the one it has outside the intellect. Although universality is the mode of under­ standing what is understood, that mode is not itself understood. (trans!. Spade, 64)27

" Ord. II, d. 13, p. I, q. I, n. 33 (ed. Vat., VII, 403-4): "Non solum autem ipsa natura de se est indifTerens ad esse in intellectu et in particulari, ac per hoc et ad esse universale et particulare (sive singulare), - sed etiam ipsa, habens esse in intellectu, non habet primo ex se universalitatem. Licet eoim ipsa intelligatur sub universalitate ut sub modo intelligendi ipsam, tamen universalitas non est pars eius conceptus primi, quia non conceptus metaphysici, sed logici Oogicus enim considerat secundas intentiones applicatas primis secundum ipsum). Prima ergo intellectio est naturae ut non cointelligitur aliquis modus, neque qui est dus in intellectu, neque qui est eius extra intellectum; licet iUius intellecti modus intelligendi sit universalitas, sed non modus intellectus." I quote from P. V. Spade's translation in his Five Texts on the

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5.

The "occasion" rif second intentions

Provided that Scotus maintains that the intellect is the cause of second intentions, what role does he attribute to extramental things? Scotus says that things move the intellect to cause intentions, and he draws a difference between the main cause (principalis causa) and the occasion

(occasio) of intentions. The first is the intellect, whereas the

second is an extramental thing. A thing, therefore, is not deprived of any role in forming second intentions, but it is definitely not the main cause. Scotus also describes the occasion of intentions as their matter and their origin, as opposed to their efficient cause, and Scotus refers to it by adverbs such as

casionaliter.28 These

materialiter, originaliter,

and

oc­

adverbs suggest that a thing is a material or nec­

essary condition for the production of intentions. A thing in the ex­ tramental world provides the occasion or the possibility for the intellect to cause an intention, because the intellect causes an inten­ tion by reflecting on its understanding of that extramental thing. Thus, if there were no things to understand, the intellect would not cause any intention. An intention, however, is founded not on a property of an extramental thing but on a property of a thing as understood by the intellect, which for Scotus is a concept and a mental entity, as we have seen. Because extramental things play the role of occasions of inten­ tions, second intentions are not fictitious concepts deprived of any foundation in the extramental world, namely concepts representing non-beings such as chimeras and other similar things.29 On the other hand, because extramental things are not the causes of second intentions, there is no one-to-one correspondence between intentions and extramental things or properties, and it may happen that one and the same thing corresponds to many intentions. 30 Medieval Problem '!! Universals: Porphyry, Boelhius, Abelard, Duns Scotus, Ockham (Indi­ anapolis: Hackett, 1 994), 64. On the distinction between a metaphysical and a log­ ical concept in Duns Scotus, see O. Boulnois, "ReeUes intentions: nature commune et universaux selon Duns Scot," Revue de Mitaphysique et de Morale 97 (1992): 2 1-26. 28 Super Praed., q. 3, n. 1 3 (OPh, I, 271). See above, n. 22. 29 Super Porph., q. 4, n. 12 (OPh, I, 25): "Dico quod effective [scil., universale] est ab intellectu, sed materialiter sive originaliter sive occasiomlliter a proprietate in rej figmentum autem non sic; igitur non est figmentum." 30 Super Praed., q. 3, n. 13 (OPh, I, 270).

SECOND INTENTIONS IN DUNS SCOTUS

III

Why does Duns Scotus deprive the extramental thing of any effi­ cient role in forming second intentions? How can he maintain that second intentions are not fictitious concepts while stating that their only cause is the intellect? The answers to these two questions lie in the fact that Scotus sees second intentions as concepts founded on concepts, namely on properties pertaining to things as they are in the mind, whereas others, such as Radulphus Brito, see them as concepts founded on properties pertaining to things insofar as they extramental. Scotus thinks that second intentions such as genus and

species are

represen­

tations of modes of understanding, or concepts caused by the intel­ lect when considering a thing insofar as it is understood. Both Scotus and his rivals maintain that extramental things play a causal role in the production of first intentions. Actually, RaduI­ phus Brito maintains that the thing is the only cause of first inten­ tions, whereas Scotus thinks that both the thing and the agent intel­ lect act together as causes of first intention concepts representing extramental thingsY Since the possible intellect does not have any content by itself, when it forms its first-order concepts it receives its content from outside, namely from the extramental things under­ stood through sensible and intelligible species. Whether the agent intellect plays only a secondary role, as Brito maintains, or a causal role, as Scotus maintains, the objective ground for concepts repre­ senting extramental things is assured by the fact that the extra­ mental things act as causes or at least con-causes of the concepts themselves. Thus, Scotus and his contemporaries refer to causality to explain the intentional character of our concepts: first-order con­ cepts truthfully represent extramental things because they are caused by extramental things. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Radulphus Brito, fol­ lowing Simon of Faversham, maintains that both first and second intentions are concepts founded on and representing extramental things and real properties, if we take intentions in an abstract way. Alternatively, Brito and Simon of Faversham maintain that con­ crete intentions, both first and second, are extramental things con­ ceived according to certain real modes of being. It is not surprising that Brito regards extramental things as the efficient cause of both 31 Radulphus Brito Super d, Anima IIJ, q. 2 (ed. Fauser, 1 09-26). Duns Scotus Ord. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 2, nn. 486-503 (ed. Vat., IIJ, 289-98).

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kinds of intentions. Scotus, however, maintains that second inten­ tions are founded not on extramental things and their modes of being but on their modes of being understood and on the proper­ ties pertaining to them insofar as they are understood. Since a thing conceived as understood is a representation of an extramental thing and is a first intention, a second intention can be seen as a repre­ sentation of a first intention and of properties pertaining to a first intention insofar as it is an intention. A second intention can be de­ scribed as a second-order concept, or a concept of concepts, ac­ cording to Scotus. Extramental things, which cause first intentions, do not cause second intentions. The intellect, when forming second intentions, does not receive anything from outside and does not turn to properties pertaining to extramental things. Instead, it reflects on its activity and takes into account the mode in which it understands extramental things. Thus, the intellect can form several second in­ tentions to which there corresponds one and the same extramental thing, for the intellect can reflect several times on what it under­ stands by its first operation, taking into account different intentional properties each time: . . . I say that a thing is not the entire cause of an intention, but is only its occasion, insofar as it moves the intellect so that it considers in act, and the intellect is the main cause. Therefore in the thing a lesser unity than the unity of the intention is sufficient, since it is sufficient that the intellect be moved by something external to cause many no­ tions by <simple> consideration, and to these notions there are no correspondent things in reality, simply speaking . . . the intellect, when considering something through that one species, can reflect on its op­ eration thousands of times by that considering, and each considera­ tion is something that does not have any external correspondence ex­ cept only the first object as an occasion, insofar as it is what first moves the intellect to that consideration . . . " Nevertheless, the concepts the intellect forms by reflecting on its op­ eration do have some real ground, for extramental things still play 32 Ibid. (OPh, I, 270-7 1): " . . . dieD quod res non est tota causa intentionis, sed tantum occasia, scilicet in quantum movet intellectum ut actu consideret, et intel­ leetus est principalis causa. Ideo minor unitas sufficit in re quam sit intentionis, quia sufficiet intellectum ab aliquo extrinseco moveri ad causandum multa per considera­ tionem, quibus non correspondent aliqua in re . . . intellectus considerans per illam unam speciem, potest millesies reflectere se supra suam operationem considerando, et quaelibet consideratio aliquid est, nihil habens extrinsecum sibi correspondens, nisi tantum primum obiectum pro occasione, in quantum illud movet primo intel­ lectum ad considerandum."

SECOND INTENTIONS IN DUNS SCOTUS

1 13

some role in forming intentions - not that of main causes but that of occasions. That is to say that an extramental thing is what is un­ derstood by the operation on which the intellect reflects when it forms second intentions. This is enough to give some real ground to second intentions and to differentiate them from fictitious con­ cepts. Throughout this discussion, Scotus adheres to Aquinas's position regarding the foundation of intentions on things. Scotus's distinc­ tion between the main cause and the occasion of intentions can be seen as a device to make Aquinas's account more cogent.

6. Second intentions as relations The intellect causes second intentions by reflecting on its operation and, as Scotus says, "by considering." The object of such a consid­ eration is the thing understood according to its cognitive being, i.e. according to the features pertaining to it insofar as it is a concept of the mind. Such features, according to Scotus, are relative. For ex­ ample, an animal is understood as a genus because the intellect re­ lates it to its inferiors, such as men and horses. The intellect's con­ sideration is therefore both a return of the intellect to its first object and a comparison between different objects. Thomas Aquinas has a similar position, for he also identifies the reflection of the intellect on itself to a comparison. Aquinas, however, sometimes maintains that the extremes of that comparison are the concept formed by the intellect on the one hand and the extramental thing represented by that concept on the other. Other times, Aquinas thinks that the ex­ tremes compared by the intellect are two concepts, such as and

man.

animal

Scotus adopts this second position: the intellect considers

two concepts. The intellect, by considering one concept as related to another, establishes a relationship between them. This relation­ ship is the second intention. For this reason, Scotus affirms that second intentions are relative entities, which correspond one to another. A genus is relative to a species and the other way around; a differentia is relative to the genus it divides and to the species it constitutes and the other way around. Scotus acknowledges that all second intentions are of this kind, and he puts forward several examples: genus/species, first substance/second

substance,

universal/particular,

cause/effect,

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sign/ thing signed. The extramental things corresponding to such intentions only have an accidental relationship one to another, whereas the intentions inhering in them are essentially correlative and simultaneous.33 In his commentary on the

Categories,

Scotus explicitly says that

second intentions are rational relations. As rational relations, second intentions do not belong to any of the categories, for the cat­ egories are kinds of extramental things, but intentions, insofar as they are not real but rational relations, are beings provided with a merely intellectual existence. Therefore, second intentions can somehow be reduced to the category of relation, but to the extent that they are rational relations they do not belong to any of the cat­ egories, properly speaking. In this respect, they are like fictitious en­ tities and non-beings. In this manner, Scotus takes a stance in the debate on the onto­ logical status of second intentions. Since second intentions do not have real being, they lack what it is usually named as 'subjective being', they only exist as objects of thought and their being is iden­ tical with their being considered by the intellect, and so they only have the so-called 'objective being'.34 With regard to this issue, too, the difference between Scotus and Brito is noteworthy, for Brito maintains that second intentions (at least those relative to the first operation of the intellect, by which the

33 Super Praed., q. 1 3, n. 45 (OPh, I, 376). Ibid., q. 27, n. I (OPh, I, 447): " . . . se­ cundum Porphyrium, genus refertur ad speciem et e converso . . . consimiliter potest argui in omnibus intentionibus fere relativis adinvicem, ut de prima substantia et se­ cunda, de universali et particuiari." This is an argument contra, but Scotus endorses it, as far as intentions - not their subjects - are concerned. See ibid., n. 14 (OPh, I, 450). Ibid., q. 43, n. 20 (OPh, I, 557): "Variatio est de istis intentionibus 'causa' et 'ef­ rectus', 'signum' et 'signatum' et de his quae suhsunt. Intentiones coim rcferuntur per se et simul sunt. Sed ea quae subsunt non referuntur nisi forte per accidens et ideo ilia non sunt simul." 34 Ibid., q. I I , nn. 14- 1 6 (OPh, I, 346-47); ibid., n. 23 (OPh, I, 349-50): "Ad omnia ohiecta de istis quinque - concretis, intentionibus secundis, privationibus, non-eo­ tihus et potentiis - posset responderi quod, lieet haec possint intelligi sub aliqua ra­ tione intelligendi et praedicari inter se sub ratione alicuius universalis et statum esse ad aliquod universalissimum, quod in quantum attribuitur ei ista intentio est di­ veTSum ab istis decem, tamen stat tantum decem esse generalissima rerum. Quia non quodlibet intelligibile, sed ens secundum se dividitur in haec, V Metaphysicat, et ita nullum istorum est ens secundum se distinctum ab istis decem." See also Ord. IV, d. 1, q. 2. n. 3 (ed. Vives, XVI, IOO-Ot). See A. Maurer, "Ens diminutum: a Note on its Origin and Meaning," Mediaeval Studies 1 2 (1950): 2 1 6-22.

SECOND INTENTIONS IN DUNS SCOTUS

l iS

intellect forms simple concepts) have real or subjective being. Specif­ ically, they are qualities and belong to the category of quality.35

7.

Scotus's second account qf intentions: the second operation qf the intellect

Simon of Faversham and Radulphus Brito had divided intentions into three kinds, according to which operation of the intellect they pertained to. Scotus seems to maintain that their classification is wrong, for all intentions are rational relations established by the second operation of the intellect, namely the operation of com­ pounding and dividing simple concepts. Scotus adopts this position not in his logical commentaries, but in his commentary on the Sen­ tences, where he gives his most famous account of first and second intentions. This account corrects and modifies, but only partially, the conception of second intentions that Scotus himself had pre­ sented in his logical commentaries. In the new account, there is no reference to the reflection of the intellect on itself as the cause of second intentions, but the role of the intellect in forming second in­ tentions remains central. What is more, Scotus now provides an ex­ planation of how the intellect causes second intentions by com­ paring things between themselves. In his Ordinatio, Scotus defines a first intention as a concept im­ mediately caused by a thing without any further intervention of the intellect. Thus, by a first intention the intellect understands some­ thing but does not cause anything.36 By contrast, Scotus defines second intentions as rational relations. Scotus adds that second in­ tentions are the rational relations pertaining to the extreme of the second operation of the intellect - the operation by which the intel­ lect composes and divides or at least compares two things between themselves: . . . every second intention is a relation of reason, not any whatsoever, but the one pertaining to the extreme of the act of the intellect com­ posing and dividing or at least comparing one thing to anotherY

" Radulphus Brito SophisrM, nn. 56-57 (ed. Pinborg, 146). 36 Duns Scotus Ord. I, d. 23, q.un., n. 20 (ed. Vat., V. 360): "Omnis eoim conceptus est intentionis primae qui natus est fieri immediate a re, sine opere vel actu intellectus negotiantis. . . " 37 Ibid., n. 10 (ed. Vat., V, 352): "Ornois intentio secunda est relatio rationis, non quaecumque, sed pertinens ad extremum actus intellectus componentis et dividentis

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This is Scotus's most famous account of second intentions. Some thirty years after Scotus, as Tachau has observed, Adam Wodeham commented that such a definition of second intentions was not used anymore, because it was too subtle. Scotus's definition, however, seems to have influenced several English authors, including Richard of Campsall, Walter Chatton, and William Ockham.38 It seems that Scotus here intends to stress that the a second in­ tention is a relation understood by the intellect. This is a point on which all authors agree. As Peter of Auvergne had already re­ marked, though, this is not enough to make such a relation rational, for the intellect can know a relation pertaining to a thing under­ stood without being the cause of such a relation. The relation that the intellect knows might be founded on the nature of something. In that case, the intellect only understands that relation, it does not cause it. According to Scotus, however, not only does the intellect understand, it also causes a second intention as a relation. Thus, a second intention is a relation and a comparison established by the intellect. Second intentions are rational relations pertaining only to the second operation of the intellect, Scotus maintains. If they were re­ lations understood by the intellect but holding between extramental things independently of the intellect's understanding, they would not pertain to the second operation. Since the concept of a relation is a simple concept, the intellect can understand it by its first opera­ tion. In that case, the intellect does not compose the extremes of that relation by way of its second operation. On the contrary, the extremes are related to one another by virtue of their own nature. The intellect then does not cause such a relation, but only under­ stands it, and this understanding takes place by a simple concept. Simon of Faversham and Radulphus Brito thought that that was

vel saltern conferentis unum ad alterum (hoc patet, quia intentio secunda - se­ cundum omnes - causatur per acturn intellectus negotiantis circa rem primae inten­ tianis, qui non potest causare circa obiectum nisi tantum relationem vel relationes ra­ tionis." I have modified the translation provided by Tachau in her Vision and Certitude, 63. See, with some caution, S. Swiezawski, "Les intentions premieres et les intentions secondes chez Jean Duns SC01," Archives dJhistQire doctrinale et littiraire du Moyen Age 9 ( 1 934): 205-60j C. Verhulst, '� propos des intentions premieres et des intentions sec­ andes chez Jean Duns Scot," Annales de l'lnstitut de Philosophie de I'Universiti Lihre de Bruxelles 7 ( 1 975): 7-32 38 Tachau, VlSion and Certilute, 64.

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117

the case for second intentions, as a matter of fact. These two au­ thors, as we have seen, maintained that second intentions pertain to

all three operations of the intellect: the apprehension of simple items, composition and division, and reasoning. As Brito explained, the intellect causes only second intentions pertaining to its second and the third operations. Intentions such as genus and species, by con­ trast, are simple concepts based on a relation existing in the extra­ mental world independently of the intellect's understanding. The intellect understands that relation but it does not cause it, and the intellect understands that relation as a simple concept and repre­ sents it as a second intention pertaining to its operation, such as

genus and species.

Since Scotus thinks that the intellect always plays a

causal role in forming intentions, however, he maintains that no second intention pertains to the first operation of the intellect, which only understands things but does not cause them. Moreover, since second intentions are comparisons, they specifically pertain to the second operation of the intellect, not to the third.

8.

Seotus's second account if intentions: rational relations

Scotus, like his contemporaries, distinguishes a subject and a term that constitute the extremes of the relation. The relation itself is based on a feature of the subject (for example, its whiteness) and tends towards the term. The feature of the subject on which the re­ lation is based is its foundation.39 Like Aquinas, Scotus gives three necessary and sufficient conditions for a relation to be real. First, the foundation of a relation must be something real, i.e. a mind-in­ dependent feature of a mind-independent thing. Second, the sub­ ject and the term of the relation must be real and really distinct things. Third, the relation must be based on the foundation and di­ rected towards the term not because of any comparison established by the intellect but only because of real features present in the ex­ tremes'
For this commonly accepted terminology see Henninger, Relations, 5. Duns Scatus Quodl., q. 6, n. 33 (ed. Vives, XXV; 277). See Henninger, Relations, 25, 69. See also, for similar formulations, Lectura I, d. 3 1 , q. un., n. 6 (ed. Vat., XVII, 424-25); Ord. I, d. 3 1 , q. un., n. 6 (ed. Vat., VI, 204). 39

40

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mind-independent feature of a;

(ii) a and b are really distinct things;

(iii) the similarity between a and

b

is caused by the whiteness in a

which is similar to the whiteness of

b independently of the intellect's

intervention. Conversely, a relation is rational if any one of these three condi­ tions is not fulfilled. Not all rational relations are second intentions, but all second intentions are rational relations. Some relations are rational because they fail to satisfY the first condition, such

as

a re­

lation between two terms one of which is unreal, for example, a fu­ ture event. Other relations are rational because they fail to satisfY the second condition, such as self-identity, whose two terms are not really distinct, but

are,

as a matter of fact, one and the same term

taken twice. Second intentions are rational relations because they fail to satisfY the third condition, since a second intention is a rela­ tion that is caused by a comparison established by the intellect.41 Now, the intellect can establish comparisons only by its second op­ eration (composing and dividing). Scotus remarks that everybody agrees that the intellect causes second intentions by considering first intention things. Since the only thing the intellect can cause con­ cerning a thing understood is a comparison or a rational relation, it follows that second intentions are rational relations pertaining to one extreme of the second operation of the intellect, which is a re­ flection and a comparison at the same time: This [i.e. that a second intention is a relation of reason pertaining to the extremes of the second act of the intellect] is clear, because a second intention - according to everyone - is caused by the act of the intellect dealing with a thing of first intention, and can cause, with respect to the object, only a relation or relations of reason.42

Scotus maintains that the intellect forms second intentions by con­ sidering first intention things, i.e. the things it has already under­ stood by its first operation. This second consideration, Scotus thinks, is identical to a comparison established by the intellect. It is 41 A second intention fails to satisfy the first condition, too, since its foundation is cognitive being, and not a real feature of an extramental thing. 42 Ord. I, d. 23, q. un., n. 1 0 (ed. Vat., V, 352-53): "hoe patet, quia intentio secunda - secundum orones - causatur per actum inteUectus negotiantis circa rem primae in· tenionis, qui non potest causare circa obiectum nisi tantum relationem vel relationes Tationis." I modify the translation provided by Tachau in her Vision and Certitude, 63.

SECOND INTENTIONS IN DUNS SCOTUS

I lg

worthwhile noting here that Scotus makes no reference to the re­ flection of the intellect on itself as the cause of intentions. This is different from what he had said in his logical commentaries. Here, Scotus does not maintain that the comparison the intellect estab­ lishes is a return of the intellect to its first operation. Still, a point re­ mains obscure in Scotus's second account of intentions. He says that second intentions are rational relations pertaining to the ex­ tremes of the second operation of the intellect. But what does Scotus regard as the extremes of these relations? A passage of Scotus's Qyestions on the Metaphysics sheds some light on this issue. There Scotus defines a universal taken as a second in­ tention as a rational relation present in something predicable and directed towards that of which it is predicable. The name 'uni­ versal' signifies such a relation. For example, the intellect establishes a relation between the concept of animal taken as a predicable and the concept of man taken as that of which it is predicable. 'Uni­ versal', as a second intention name, signifies that relation (of course, that relation is established by the intellect's second operation)." An­ imal and man are the extremes of the relation established by the in­ tellect. When the intellect takes animal and man as the extremes of the re­ lation it establishes, both animal and man are considered not as ex­ tramental things but as concepts and objects understood. In fact, the relation of predicability the intellect establishes does not depend on the nature of animals and men taken as extramental things; it depends on the intellect's understanding of animals and men in a certain manner (specifically, animal is understood as a universal as compared to men). The extremes of a second intention as a relation are therefore things considered insofar as they are in the intellect that establishes the comparison between them. 44 Accordingly, Scotus's account of second intentions as rational re­ lations can be summarized as follows. First, the intellect considers extramental things. These extramental things are represented by " Duns Scotus Qj<est. in Met. VII, q. 18, n. 38 (OPh, IV, 347). 44 Ibid., n. 42 (OPh, IV, 348): "De primo modo potest intelligi secunda opinio, quia ista comparatio, quae est intentio secunda, non est nisi obiecti ut in intellectu com­ parante." The English translation is taken from John Duns Scotus Questions on the Metaphysics, transl. A. B. Wolter and G.]. Etzkorn, vol. 2 (St. Bonaventure, N.V: Fran­ ciscan Institute Publications, 1998), 299. I deleted an integration of the translators, namely the reference to individuals as that to which universals are referred.

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way of first intention concepts. Second, the intellect considers these first intention concepts. This second stage consists in two acts of the intellect. On the one hand, the intellect turns to itself and considers the things understood as concepts. On the other hand, the intellect establishes a comparison between these concepts. These are two dif­ ferent aspects of the same operation. By this operation, the intellect considers first intentions insofar as they are mental entities and draws a comparison between them. The intellect carries out this consideration and comparison by its second operation, of composi­ tion and division. A second intention is precisely the comparison the intellect causes by considering two entities insofar as they are pre­ sent to it. Second intentions are thus concepts produced by the intellect's compositional activity even though sometimes this is not apparent. They are concepts representing a relation between two things un­ derstood and so pertaining either to one of the two extremes or to the union of the two extremes.45 Second intentions pertaining to one of the two extremes of a relation are, for example, genus, species, universal, and so on. Second intentions pertaining to the union of the two extremes are, for example, inhering (inesse), being present to (adesse), and copulative being (esse).

9.

Scotus's third account if intentions: rational relations understood

In his logical commentaries, Scotus presents second intentions as produced by the reflection of the intellect on itsel£ He also speaks of intentions as relations of reason. In his commentary on the Sen­ tences, Scotus still maintains that the intellect is the cause of inten­ tions and again defines second intentions as rational relations, but he no longer mentions the reflection of the intellect. Rather, he refers to the second operation of the intellect, of composing, di­ viding, and comparing. There is a problem, however, with Scotus's new definition of second intention. When he justifies his definition, he assumes that second intentions are caused by the intellect in " Lec/u,a I, d. 23, q. un., n. 12 (ed. Vat., XVII, 306): "Intentio secunda est relatio rationis, et non quaecumque, sed relatio rationis pertinens ad acturn intellectus, qui est componere et dividerej uncle intentiones secundae pertinent ad unionem vel ad extrema unionis (ut praedicati et subiecti)."

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121

order to deduce that they are caused by the second operation of the intellect. It can be contended that what Scotus assumes as uncon­ troversial is precisely what is subject to controversy. In fact, not everyone is willing to admit that the intellect is the cause of second intentions; philosophers such as Simon of Faversham and Radul­ phus Brito concede that the intellect plays a necessary role in forming second intentions, but they advocate that only extramental things and their modes cause second intentions. Simon of Faversham and Radulphus Brito concede that second intentions are rational relations, because they are relations under­ stood by the intellect, and at the same time maintain that intentions are not founded on the operation of the intellect but on a mode of being of things. For example, these authors agree that the intellect represents the relation between animal and man by the concept of a genus, but they also maintain that such a relation is founded on the nature of animals and men independently of the ability of the in­ tellect to understand them. This is the gist of Peter of Auvergne's objection to Aquinas's .conception of rational relations. The same objection could be leveled against Scotus's conception of second in­ tentions as presented in his commentaries on the Sentences. So how can Scotus still assume that second intentions are rational relations caused by the intellect? Scotus himself takes into account this objection in his Qyestions on the Metaphysics, where he provides a detailed analysis of rational relations. Here Scotus clarifies two points, namely both which relationship holds between a rational re­ lation and a second intention and what relationship holds between a property of a thing understood and a second intentions as a rep­ resentation of a mode of understanding. So far, there has been some confusion between these notions. Some medieval authors seem to have regarded these notions as synonyms, and Scotus him­ self does not pay much attention to their distinction in his other treatments of the issue. Second intentions are concepts and are ra­ tional relations, it is said. But are these descriptions equivalent or do they pick up different aspects of second intentions? Are all rational relations concepts and second intentions? In his Qyestions on the Metaphysics, Scotus finally explains the relationship between rational relations and second intentions. He starts with an analysis of ra­ tional relations and ends up with what can be seen as his third ac­ count of second intentions. I do not intend to suggest that what I call a 'third account' is

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Sentences. Actu­ Q!lestions on the Metaphysics confirms, in many respects, what he had already said in his logical and Sentences commentaries. It is true, however, that in his Q!lestions on the Meta­ physics Scotus approaches the issue of the intellect's role in forming rational relations in a greater detail, and it is in the Q!lestions on the Metaphysics that Scotus gives his answer to the issue of the founda­ chronologically posterior to the commentary on the

ally, what Scotus says in his

tion of second intentions. Scotus first provides his definition of a rational relation. A rela­ tion is rational

if (a) it is founded on a rational being, and (b) it does

not inhere in something insofar as it exists but only insofar as it is understood by the intellect in comparison with another thing. Ac­ cording to this definition, second intentions are rational relations. Actually, it even seems that every rational relation is a second inten­ tion, for this definition of rational relation seems to be equivalent to the definition of second intention Scotus had provided in his

Sen­

tences commentary. Scotus remarks that there is a difficulty concerning this definition of rational relation. As it happens, this difficulty is the one Peter of Auvergne had raised about the reason why a relation is said to be rational. It is said that a rational relation is founded on a rational being, but what is the role of the intellect in founding rational rela­ tions? As Scotus observes, there are two possibilities: either the in­ tellect founds and causes the relation or the intellect only under­ stands a relation as founded on a rational being but does not cause it. Thomas Aquinas had chosen the first possibility. According to him, a rational relation is founded on the apprehension of the in­ tellect comparing one thing to another, but this position, Scotus now remarks, presents a problem. In fact, the intellect can cause something in only two ways. First, the intellect can cause a com­ pound concept - say, 'golden mountain' - out of simple concepts. Since a rational relation is a simple concept, this is not the way the intellect causes rational relations. Second, the intellect can cause something by producing an intellection, but

if rational relations

were caused by the intellect in this way, they would still be real in the sense of 'extramental', even though they would depend on the intellect for their existence. Something can have extramental exis­ tence, in fact, while being dependent on the intellect as far as its for­ mation is concerned, according to Scotus. This is the case of intel-

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lections and sciences, which are mind-dependent and caused by the intellect but are nonetheless extramental things with a real catego­ rial being, for intellections are actions and sciences are qualities. Thus, if rational relations were caused by the intellect in the same way intellections and sciences are, nothing would prevent rational relations from being real and extramental - which is a contradic­ tion. Such relations could still be called 'rational', but only because they would somehow depend on the intellect, not because they have a mental or intentional mode of being. As extramental entities, such relations would be real, since the intellect acts as a real entity when it causes them.46 Therefore, Scotus maintains that, if rational relations are caused by and founded on the apprehension of the intellect, they are either compound concepts or real things. Rational relations, however, are simple concepts provided of a merely mental existence. Therefore, neither of the two options open to Aquinas's approach is viable. Scotus then considers the other possibility, that a relation is ra­ tional because it is understood, but not caused by the intellect. Peter of Auvergne had suggested this solution, and Simon of Faversham and Radulphus Brito built their doctrines of second intentions on this suggestion: second intentions are relations in the intellect, but founded on modes of being of extramental things. As Scotus re­ marks, according to this view there is only one relation with two modes of being, one in the extramental world, the other in the in­ tellect. Thus, the case of a relation is analogous to that of an object, say a rose, considered insofar as it exists and insofar as it is under­ stood in the mind. The fact that the intellect understands the rose does not prevent the rose from being real as an extramental being." According to Scotus, however, the intellect not only understands, but also causes a rational relation. This is true not because a ra­ tional relation is founded on an act of the intellect, as Aquinas had maintained; Scotus remarks that that would not prevent the relation from being an extramental entity. On the contrary, the rational re­ lation caused by the intellect is founded on the thing the intellect understands insofar as that thing is considered by the intellect.48 Already in his questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, Scotus had said .. Duns &otus Qjuusl. in Mtl. V, q. ., Ibid., nn. 40, 42 (OPh, III, 580). .. Ibid., n. 43 (OPh, III, 581).

1 1 , nn. 39, 42 (OPh, III, 579-80).

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CHAPTER FOUR

that the subject of a second intention is not the intellect but the thing considered insofar as it is understood. By contrast, Brito main­ tains that a second intention is founded on the intellect and that it is attributed to an extramental thing as to its cause. For that reason, Brito thinks that intentions are real entities (qualities). Scotus, in his Q)/estions on the Metaplrysics, maintains the position he had presented in his questions on Porphyry, but he now explains his doctrine in much more detail. Scotus shifts from the issue of the status of a rational relation to that of its foundation. The object of investigation should be the on­ tological status of the object of the intellect when it is considered in­ sofar as it is understood. Scotus maintains that, when the object of the intellect is considered in that way, it has existence only insofar as it is in the intellect and in the very act of understanding: If you ask: what really is a conceptual relation? The [proper) response is: Ask what the object of the intellect insofar as it is understood really is. For it has no existence except in being understood "

We have already noted that Brito had also remarked that the crucial issue in order to ascertain the nature of second intentions is the status of the object of the intellect when conceived as understood. Is it something provided with merely a mental existence, or is it a fully extramental thing understood by the intellect? Brito, as we have seen, adopts the second answer. By contrast, Scotus maintains that the object of the intellect, considered insofar as it is under­ stood, is a mental entity, a sort of internal object, whose being is identical to its being understood. Whereas Brito thinks that a thing understood, as understood, is still an extramental thing, Scotus maintains that a thing understood, as understood, is a concept. Consequently, for Scotus 'concept' means not only the mental entity by which we represent something, but also that thing itself insofar as it is understood. A concept for Scotus, then, is not only the concep­ tual form of an act of understanding, but also its content, when it is considered as understood. Since a rational relation is founded on a thing considered as understood, it follows that such a relation is a property of a mental entity, and as such has a purely mental exis49 Ibid., n. 44, (OPh, III, 581-82): "Si quaeratur 'quid realiter est reJatio rationis?' Responsio: quaero primo 'quid realiler sit obiectum intellectus inquantum intellig­ itur?' Nullum eoim esse habet nisi in 'intelligi'." I modify Wolter's and Etzkorn's translation (Q!ustions on the Metaphysics, vol. I , 530).

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tence. I t i s for this reason that the intellect not only understands but also causes rational relations, Scotus maintains. Such relations are established by the intellect among mental entities and do not follow from real modes of being of extramental things. Scotus arrives at this doctrine of rational relations by correcting Aquinas's doctrine. According to Aquinas, a rational relation is founded on the apprehension of the intellect comparing entities among themselves. But in this way, as Scotus remarks, a rational re­ lation is always a relation between the intellect and something else, and it is never a relation between two entities considered by the in­ tellect.50 By contrast, Scotus maintains that the extremes of the re­ lation caused by the intellect are not the intellect itself and an ex­ tramental thing, but two things considered insofar as they are understood. It follows that second intentions are founded not on the intellect and on its operation, but on the thing understood as a mental entity.51 It also follows that Scotus can distinguish between two acts of the intellect that Aquinas had identified: the act of comparing and the act of reflecting. According to Scotus, rational relations are caused not by a reflection of the intellect on itself, but by a comparison the intellect makes between two things considered to the extent that they are present to the intellect itsel[ The intellect carries out this comparison by directly considering the things as mental entities. The intellect's reflection comes about only at a second stage, when the intellect turns to the relation is has caused and gets an under­ standing of it. Thus, Scotus can distinguish between the act by which the intellect causes rational relations and the act by which the intellect understands them: It is also false that a rational relation stems from a reflex act of un­ derstanding. For it comes to be by a first or direct act of the intellect comparing this to that. But when the intellect reflects, thinking of its comparison qua object, then the conceptual relation is not caused but only considered, and it is a logical consideration. 52

;0 Ibid, n. 41 (OPh, III, 580). " Ibid., n. 43 (OPh, III, 581). Ibid., n. 44, (OPh, III, 581-82): "Falsum est etiam quod actu reftexo intelligendi fit relatio rationis; fit enim primo actu, scilicet directo, intellectus comparantis hoc ad illud. Quando autem reflectit, intelligendo comparationem iSlam ut obiectum, tunc non causatur rdatia rationis, sed consideratur, et est consideratio logica." I modify Wolter's and Etzkorn's translation (Questions on the Metaphysics, vol. I, 53l). ;' :.1

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Thus, Scotus can clearly distinguish between a rational relation and a second intention. Properly speaking, the intellect causes a rational relation founded on things considered as understood. Then the in­ tellect turns to that relation by what Scotus calls 'logical considera­ tion' and represents it by a second intention. A second intention is, therefore, a rational relations as understood, and as such a second intention is a concept. In his

Sentences commentary Scotus blurs the

distinction between rational relations and second intentions, but in the

Questions on the Metaphysics

he precisely states that a second in­

tention is a rational relation as understood by the intellect. Logic is the science that considers not relative modes of being but rational relations caused by the intellect and founded on things regarded as understood.

1 0.

Concrete intentions as concepts

In the passage from his commentary on Porphyry's

Isagoge

that I

have quoted above, Scotus states that an intention is a property per­ taining to something according to its cognitive being. This remains true for all his accounts of second intentions, and marks a strong difference between Scotus and Brito. For Scotus, an intention is not something pertaining to an extramental thing as it is considered in a certain way, as Brito maintains. By contrast, Scotus maintains that an intention is something pertaining to a purely mental entity, i.e. to the thing considered according to its being understood. Since an in­ tention is a property of a mental entity, it is itself a mental entity. Brito, however, would agree that an intention is a property of a thing understood, considered as understood, for he remarks, as we have seen in the previous chapter, that a thing understood as un­ derstood is not a purely mental entity, but an aggregate of an extra­ mental entity and a mental mode of understanding. Accordingly, Brito

distinguishes between

abstract and concrete

intentions.

Someone attributes an abstract intention to a thing by taking into account only the way in which a thing is understood whereas a con­ crete intention is attributed to a thing according to both the thing and its mode of understanding. Consequently, concrete intentions such as genus and species represent an aggregate of things and modes of understanding, and are not pure concepts. Scotus, however, thinks that a thing understood as understood is

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a purely mental entity, not an aggregate o f a n extramental thing and its mode of being understood. Consequently, an intention, whether concrete or abstract, is a purely mental entity, representing only the mode of understanding. This is Scotus's position when he asks whether the definition of genus given by Porphyry is a definition of a thing or of an intention. Scotus reports the opinion according to which Porphyry defines a thing taken under an intention, namely a thing understood considered as understood in a certain way, for example as a genus.53 This is Simon of Faversham and Radulphus Brito's position. Scotus, by contrast, thinks that concrete intentions such as genus and species are pure concepts and represent modes of understanding. Porphyry gives definitions of pure concepts and in­ tentions, not of extramental things understood in a certain way. In fact, the notions present in such definitions, such as being predicated if something, are intentional notions, and as such pertain not to things but to intentions: It must be said, therefore, that what is defined is by no means the thing. . . nor the aggregate [of thing and intention] , since it is an acci­ dental being, of which there is no definition . . . nor the thing as it is under an intention, since that will be either an aggregate or a thing or an intention. By contrast, what is defined is the pure intention. For only that to which the definition primarily inheres per se is defined, and that is the pure intention, because the notions which are in the definition are intentional, namely 'being predicated of several things', etc., and this can primarily pertain per se only to an intention.54

Scotus agrees with Brito that intentions such as genus and species are concrete intentions, but he provides a very different interpretation of this fact. According to Brito, species and genus are concrete inten­ tions because the terms 'species' and 'genus' signifY extramental essences and the modes in which those essences are understood. These modes of understanding are abstract intentions. Conse­ quently, terms signifYing intentions abstractly differ from terms sigS3 Super Porph., q. 1 4, n. 6 (OPh, I, 69): ')\d quaestionem dicitur quod res sub in­ tentione definitur, quia sic consideratur res a logico." " Ibid., n. I I (OPh, I, 70-7 1): "Dicendum quod res nullo modo definitur propter rationes faetas. Nee aggregatum, quia illud est ens per accidens, cuius non est defin­ itia . . . Nee res sub intentione, quia ilIud vel erit aggregatum, vel res, vel intentio. Sed intentio sola definitur, quia illud tantum definitur cui per se primo modo ioest defin­ itia. Illud est sola intentio, quia quae ponuntur in definitione sunt intentionalia, scil­ icet 'praedicari de pluribus' etc., quae impossibile est primo modo convenire nisi in­ tentioni, igitur etc."

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nifYing intentions concretely, for the former signifY concepts whereas the latter signifY aggregates of things and concepts. Scotus, by contrast, thinks that concrete intentions are pure con­ cepts. These intentions are called 'concrete' because they are con­ cepts such as genus and species as attributed to things. In other words, a term such as 'species' signifies a second intention, not as some­ thing in its own right but as a mode of understanding a thing. Still, the second intention signified by the term 'species' is only a mental entity, even if signified as attributed to extramental things. Accordingly, Scotus thinks that a term signifYing an intention ab­ stractly and a term signifYing an intention concretely signify one and the same thing. The two terms differ only in their modes of sig­ nifYing. An intention is signified abstractly as something in itself, whereas it is signified concretely as attributed to first intention things. Since logic considers intentions as attributed to things, it considers them according to their concrete mode of signifYing: One must know, however, that an intention can be signified in con­ crete and in abstract. In the first way it is signified by this name 'genus' and properly as an intention, because according to this it can be applied to a thing. And therefore it is here signified insofar as it is signified by this name 'genus', namely as it is an intention. 55

Scotus's analysis of concrete and abstract intentions as different modes of signifying the same thing is parallel to his treatment of the signification of abstract and concrete accidental terms such as 'whiteness' and 'white'. According to Scotus, both 'whiteness' and 'white' signifY the form of whiteness. 'Whiteness' signifies the form as conceived in itself, whereas 'white' signifies it as conceived as at­ tributed to a subject that is said to be white.56 In a similar way, con­ crete and abstract names of intentions signify the same, namely a concept, and they differ only in the way of signifYing it. Interestingly, Simon of Faversham and Brito's accounts of con55 Ibid. (OPh, I, 7 1): "Tamen 'intentio' potest significari in concreto vel in ab­ stracto. Primo modo significatur per hoc nomen genus, et proprie secundum quod intentio, quia secundum hoc est applicabilis rei. Et ideo secundum quod significatur per hoc nomen genus, definitur hie, scilicet ut est inteRtio." 56 Super PrlUld., q. 8, n. 14 (OPh, I, 3 1 7): "Dicendum quod si contingat subiectum et accidens unieD actu intelligere, et composito ex eis unum nomen imponere . . . illud nomen non significat utrumque sub propria ratione. . . NuDum autem nomen potest utrumque significare, nisi sit aequivocum, sub propria ratione . . . Ideo dicendum quod nomen concretum non significat subiectum, sed tantum formam."

SECOND INTENTIONS IN DUNS SCOTUS

1 29

crete and abstract intentions is parallel to their accounts of concrete and abstract accidental terms. They think that an abstract acci­ dental term such as 'whiteness' signifies the pure accidental form, whereas a concrete accidental term such as 'white' signifies both the form and the subject to which that form is attributed, as they are parts of an accidental aggregate." Scotus maintains that there is no abstract term corresponding to concrete terms such as 'genus' and 'species'. The intention con­ ceived in an abstract way is signified by periphrasis such as 'intentio generis' or 'intentio specie!'. These expressions signifY second intentions without taking into account the fact that they are predicated of and attributed to first intentions.58

I I.

Intentions as modes and as objects rif understanding

Scotus also distinguishes two ways in which second intentions can be considered, ut modus and ut quid. First, intentions are usually con­ sidered as modes of understanding something else. Second, inten­ tions are considered as something in themselves, namely not as modes of understanding but as objects of understanding. In this second way, intentions are in turn understood by virtue of certain modes of understanding, that is by virtue of certain intentions. In the predication "genus is a species of universal," for example, the intention genus is considered as something in itself, whereas the in­ tention species is the mode under which the genus is conceived: genus, as one of the five predicables, is considered as a species of the in­ tention universal. Such a predication states that generality or intentio generis is a kind of universal. In this predication, genus is not consid­ ered as a mode in which our intellect understands something but as something in itself:

:>7 See Ebbesen, "Concrete Accidental Terms," 1 1 7-18. As Ebbesen remarks, Brito seems to have embraced that position with some hesitation. See ibid" 1 34. 58 Duns Scotus Super Por ph., q. 27, n. 26 (OPh, I, 1 72): '�d aliud dico quod eius [scil., differentiae] abstractum non significatur uno nomine sicut nee abstractum generis, speciei vel accidentis vel proprii, quae omnia constant esse conereta. Sed potest exprimi per circumlocutionem sic 'intentio differentiae'; et illud non praedi­ catuT de rationali."

1 30

CHAPTER FOUR For any of these intentions can be taken as something or as a mode. For when it is what is understood, then it is something. On the other hand, when it is the aspect (ratio) under which something is under­ stood, then it is taken as a mode . . . Here "a genus is a species" is true insofar as 'genus' is taken as something, because in comparison to 'universal', which is its genus; whereas 'species' is taken as a mode, because it is under that mode that 'genus' is understood in comparison with 'universal',59

Scotus thinks that it is perhaps up to the metaphysician to study in­ tentions considered as things in themselves, for it is the metaphysi­ cian who studies what kind of things there are and what kind of ex­ istence they have. By contrast, the logician studies second intentions as they are attributed to first intentions and as modes of under­ standing.60 Thomas Aquinas had already said something similar, for he had maintained that a concept can be considered either as some­ thing in itself or with regard to its capacity of representing some­ thing else.6 1 By his distinction of 'modus' and 'quid', Scotus distinguishes two modes in which a second intention can be regarded. This distinc­ tion should not be confused this with another distinction he draws between two meanings of a term. Some terms, Scotus says, are equivocal. They can signifY either a first or a second intention. Scotus provides several examples. The case to which he pays most " Ibid., q. 7-8, n. 20 (OPh, I, 39): "Quaelibet istarum intentionum potest aeeipi ut 'quid' vel ut 'modus'. Quando enim est illud quod intelligitur, tunc est quid; quando autem est ratio sub qua aliud intelligitur, tunc accipitur ut modus. Secundae ergo in­ teotiones non opponuntur nisi utrumque accipitur ut quid vel utrumque ut modus. Haec autem 'genus est species', ut vera est, accipitur genus ut 'quid', quia in compa­ ratione ad universale quod est suum genus; species ut modus, quia sub tali modo in­ telligitur genus respeetu universalis." See also Super PrQld.,q. 38, n. 43 (OPh, I, 52425): " . . . dico quod non est inconveniens duorum accidentium intentionalium utrumque esse in utroque ut in subiecto. Quia quodlibet intentionale, praeter hoc quod est modus intelligendi alterius, est inteUigibile per se. Quando est modus intel­ ligendi, habet rationem accidentis; quando est intelligibile, est quid, et potest intelligi sub aliquo quod est modus intelligendi eius . . . " See also Super Porph., q. 26, n. 7 (OPh, I, 1 62) on the differentia ul quid and ut modus. 60 Super Porph., q. 14, n. I I (OPh, I, 7 1): "Tamen forte ut 'quid est' [seil., intentio] habet definiri a metaphysieo." See also Super Porph., q. 7-8, n. 28 (OPh, I, 42): " . . . did potest quod metaphysicus omne ens reale considerat, non ens rationis cuiusmodi est universale ut hic loquimur. - Vel conceditur quod considerat intentionem in quantum ens; non tamen sequitur 'intentionem in quantum intentio', quia non sunt idem." 61 See above, chap. 2, n. 6.

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attention is that of the term 'differentia'. If 'differentia' is taken as a first intention name, it is an abstract name signifYing a relation be­ tween two things. Scotus repeats an often quoted example by Por­ phyry. When we say, "Socrates as an old man differs from Socrates as a young man" or "Between Socrates as an old man and Socrates as a young man there is a difference," 'to differ' and 'difference' are first intention names, since they signifY extramental things. Specifi­ cally, 'to differ' and 'difference' signifY the real relation between Socrates as an old man and Socrates as a young man. On the other hand,

if we take 'difference' as a second intention name, it is a con­

crete name signifYing an intention that can be attributed to what acts as the formal principle of a difference taken as a first inten­ tion.62 For example, the difference between Socrates as an old man and as a young man has a formal principle that can be considered as the foundation of the real relation that the term 'difference' sig­ nifies. That formal principle, say the youth present in Socrates as a young man, is a difference, if we mean by 'difference' a second in­ tention term. For youth is understood as that by which Socrates as a young man differs from Socrates as an old man.63 Scotus mentions other cases of equivocal terms signifYing either a first or a second intention. 'One' and 'many',64

'proprium',65

'acci­

dent',66 'inhering' and 'not inhering'67 are all terms of this kind.

" Super Porph., q. 27, n. 16 (OPh, I, 1 68): " . . . dieo quod differentia potest esse nomen primae intentionis vel secundae. Primo modo est nomen abstractum, et sig­ nmeat relationem, et est species multitudinis ut 'multum' est differentia entis. Se­ cunda modo est concretum, sicut et alia nomina intentionum de quibus hie agitur, et transumitur a differentia ut est nomen primae intentionis; significat autem inten­ tionem applicabilem ei quod est principium formale differentiae ut est res primae in­ tentionis." 63 Ibid, n. 1 7 (OPh, I, 1 69): "Et quod dicit Porphyrius quod Socrates senex differt a se puero, non est quia differentia ut est intentio sit in uno extrema et denominet ipsum sic 'Socrates differt'; sed sic est illud ad propositum: si Socrates senex differt a se ipso puero, igitur differentia est inter extrema ut differentia est nomen primae in­ tentionis. Igitur in altero extremo est aliquod principium quod dicitur differentia ut differentia est intentio. IUud est pueritia, igitur pueritia est differentia communis." 64 Ibid., n. 27 (OPh, I, 1 7 2-73). 65 Ibid., n. 7 (OPh, I, 1 9 1 ): "Intelligendum tamen quod 'proprium' est aequiv­ ocum, quia potest esse nomen primae impositionis, et sic opponitur communi . . . Alio modo 'proprium' est nomen secundae impositionis significans intentionem, scilicet praedicatum convertibile non praedicans essentiam . . . " 66 Ibid., q. 3 1 , nn. 9-1 1 (OPh, I, 196-97): "Sciendum autem quod 'accidens' ae­ quivoce est nomen primae impositionis et secundae. Primo modo significat naturam extra animam, secundum quod Aristoteles V Metaphysicae dividit ens in substantiam et accidens. Secundo modo adhuc est aequivocum. Uno enim modo idem est quod

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The distinction between terms signifYing either a first or a second intention is different not only from the distinction of an intention taken as a

modus or as quid, but also from the distinction between ab­

stract and concrete intentions. As we have seen, one and the same second intention can be considered both in an abstract and in a concrete way. By contrast, it is two different things, one of first and the other of second intention, that are equivocally signified by a name such as 'differentia'. The fact that such a name is abstract when signifYing a first intention and concrete when signifYing a second intention does not have anything to do with the distinction between abstract and concrete intentions.

1 2.

Predication rif second intentions

Second intentions that are concretely conceived are attributed to first intention things considered as understood. This attribution is carried out in predications such as "man is a species."68 In such predications, second intentions figure as modes of understanding. How does Duns Scotus analyze this attribution of second intentions to first intention things? Medieval authors usually accept predications such as "man is universal" and "man is a species" as well-formed. These predica­ tions, however, can be analyzed in two different ways, according to

'praedicatum non-essentiale', et sic est idem quod 'esse in' secundum quod 'esse in' distinguitur contra 'dici de' in principio Praedicamentorum . .. Alia modo est intentio sumpta a proprietate in re, sub qua et eius opposito potest intelligi cuius est accidens sine repugnantia." 67 Ibid" q. 35, n. 8 (OPh, I, 221): "Ubi sciendum quod 'adest et abest' (sive 'inesse et non inesse', quae ponit Aristoteles in sua definitione) sunt aequivoce nomina primae impositionis et secundae. Ut sunt nomina primae impositionis, dicitur VII Melaphysicae 'accidentis esse est inesse'; et hoc de accidente reali de quo loquitur ibi . . . Alia modo 'aclesse' vel 'abesse' est nomen secundae impositionis e t significat praedi­ cationem eorum quae sunt extra essentiam subiecti vel alterius generis a subiecto, sicut 'praedicari de' dicit propriam praedicationem essentialium quae sunt in eodem genere cum subiecto." 63 On the history of the analysis of such predications, from Porphyry and Dex­ ippus to Boethius, see Uoyd, Tiu Anatomy if Neoplatonism, 39-43, and Ebbesen, "Philoponus, 'Alexander' and the Origins of Medieval Logic," 457. For Thomas Aquinas's approach to this question, see G. Klima, " 'Socrates est species': Logic, Metaphysics and Psychology in St. Thomas Aquinas' Treatment of a Paralogism," in Argumenlations/heorn: Schoiastischtn Forschungen zu den logischen und semantisch.. Regeln Korreklen Folgerns, ed. K. Jacobi (Leiden-New York-K6In: E.]. Brill, 1 993), 498-504.

SECOND INTENTIONS IN DUNS SCOTUS

1 33

which theory of intentions is adopted. Radulphus Brito thinks that such predications are not different from ordinary predications such as "man is an animal." Both sentences express first-order predica­ tions. The only difference is that the concept animal represents a proper mode of being of man, whereas universal and species repre­ sent a common mode of being of their subjects. By contrast, Scotus maintains that second intentions such as universal or species do not represent modes of being of extramental things, but modes of un­ derstanding the extramental things. Consequently, he regards sen­ tences where a second intention is predicated of a first intention thing as radically different from sentences expressing first-order predications such as "man is an animal." Both Brito and Scotus maintain that second intentions are predi­ cated of extramental things accidentally since second intentions do not represent essential properties of the things signified by the sub­ ject-terms. But Brito and Scotus hold this position for different rea­ sons. Brito thinks that a predication such as "man is universal" is ac­ cidental because the predicate represents a property pertaining to a thing considered as related to other things: being universal is a property of man when it is considered as related to individual men. That property, however, is grounded in a real mode of being of the thing considered. By contrast, Scotus thinks that a predication such as "man is universal" is accidental because the predicate represents a property pertaining to a thing considered as understood. The re­ lationship between the thing and the intellect is accidental because it is not part of the essence of an extramental thing to be under­ stood by the intellect. Consequently, Scotus thinks that when we say, "man is universal," we are not saying anything concerning the essence of man as it is a mind-independent essence; we only repre­ sent the accidental relationship between that essence and our intel­ lect. What we mean is not, "man, as compared to individual men, has a universal mode of being," but only, "man is understood by our intellect as a universal. "69 Scotus, however, is aware of an objection to his account of how second intentions are predicated of things. As it happens, this ob-

69 Super Porph., qq. 9-1 1 , nn. 2 1 -23 (OPh, I, 48): '\\d secundam quaestionem di­ cendum quod est vera [scil., "homo est universale"] eo modo quo nunc dictum est, hoc accidens inest rei quia ilIo modo definitio intentionis inest rei,"

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jection corresponds to Brito's position.1° One could object that the concept species is predicated of man because the concept of many things, but the concept

man is said man is said of many things because

human nature is really contained in each individual man. This is true of human nature insofar as it is considered according to its ma­ terial, not its cognitive being. Thus,

species is

predicated of a thing

because that thing has a certain mode of being, not because it ac­ quires some properties only as it is understood. Therefore, the ob­ jector concludes, a predication such as "man is universal" is true if what the term 'man' signifies is considered not as it is in the intellect but as it exists in the extramental world according to its material being: Against this, 'species' inheres in man insofar as man is said of several things, etc. But it is said of those things only insofar as it is in them, and that is according to material being. Therefore, the roposition is true in the first way [sci!. according to material being] .'

p

Scotus answers this objection by showing that the objector's account of predication is wrong. In order to show that, Scotus refers to the technical distinction between a predication as performed

exercita)

and as designated

(praedicatio (praedicatio signata). '2 A performed predi-

70 For an explicit opposition to Scotus's approach, see Radulphus Brito Super Porph., q. 8A (ed. Pinborg, 1 16-18): ... . . istae secundae intentiones denominant rem non sicut subiectum suum sed sicut causam agentem [ed.: agenten], ut dicendo 'an­ imal est genus' ista denominatio est effectus de sua causa. <*> 'homo est cognitus ut est reperibilis in pluribus numero differentibus', ita etiam ista 'homo est species' est denominativa quia ista intentio secunda causatur ab obiecto in anima. Verum est quod aliqui dicunt ad istam rationem, concedenclo maiorem. Et cum dicitur quod in­ tentio secunda rem denominat ut dieenda 'homo est species', dicunt quod homo est species ut est in intellectu. Sed isti male dicunt quia homo ut est in intellectu nihil aliud est nisi species vel cognitio hominis. Modo cognitio hominis non est homo; ista enim est falsa 'cognitio hominis est homo' . . . Et ideo non est verum quod dicunt, immo dicendo 'homo est species' esse cognitum hominis praedicatur denominative de homine sicut dicendo 'paries videtur' visio denominat parietem, et tamen visio non est in pariete sicut in subiecto, immo est in oculo, sed denominat parietem sicut obiectum et causam quae causat visionem in oculo." 7] Duns Scotus Super Porph., qq. 9wl l , n. 22, 136: "Contra hoc: species inest hornini secundum quod dicitur de pluribus etc. Sed non dicitur de illis nisi secundum quod est in illis, et hoc est secundum esse materiale. 19itur primo modo est propositio vera [scit., secundum esse materiale]." 72 On the distinction between praedicatio exercita and praedit:atio signata or significata and more generally on the distinction between actus exercitus and actus signatus see G. Nuchelmans, "The Distinction actus exercituslactus significatus in Medieval Semanw tics," in Kretzmann, ed., Meaning and Jrifertnce, 74 and I. Rosier, "La distinction entre

SECOND INTENTIONS IN DUNS SCOTUS

1 35

cation is a first-order predication actually carried out. A designated predication is a second-order description of a performed predica­ tion, so it is not, properly speaking, a real predication but a sign and a name of a real predication. Scotus provides some examples of performed and designated acts: the verb 'to deny' is a metalinguistic sign of what the negation 'not' performs in the first-order language, and the verb 'to predicate' is a metalinguistic sign of what the copula 'being' performs in the language. A predication such as "a genus is predicated of a species" is not a real first-order predication stating something of extramental things. Rather, it is a sign or de­ scription of first-order predications such as "man is an animal."73 So far, Scotus is only reporting a commonly accepted doctrine con­ cerning predication, but he adds that in a performed predication the predicate is a first intention, namely a concept representing an extramental thing, whereas in a designated predication the predi­ cate is a second intention, which signifies a thing only as understood in a certain way. 7. Scotus's point is that when the objector says that species inheres in man because "man is predicated of individual men" is a true predi­ cation, "man is predicated of individual men" is a designated, not a performed, predication. Accordingly, that predication is true if con­ sidered as a second-order predication belonging to the metalan­ guage and as a sign of real first-order predications performed in the language. In fact, if that predication is considered as a first-order predication stating something about the world, then it is false, for 'man', in order for the predication to be true, cannot stand for its supposits, namely Socrates, Plato and so on; 'man' must rather stand for a universal notion. Therefore, in "man is predicated of in­ dividual men," 'man' is not taken according to its material being, and the whole sentence is a second-order predication, a sign of first­ order predications actually performed such as "Socrates is a man" and "Plato is a man." Only these last predications state something about the world and only in these last predications man is taken acactus exercitus et actus significatus dans les sophismes grammaticaux du MS BN lat. 1 66 1 8 et autres textes apparentes," in Sophisms in Medieval Logic and Grammar. Acts of the Ninth European Symposium for Medi£va/ Logic and Semantics, ed. S. Read (Dordrecht­ Boston-London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1 993) 231-6 1 . " Duns Scotus Super Porph., q . 14, n. 1 2 (OPh, I, 7 1-72). 74 Ibid. (OPh, I, 7 1): ')\.liud sciendum quod 'esse' in rebus primae intentionis illud exercet quod 'praedicarP signat in secundis intentionibus."

1 36

CHAPTER FOUR

cording to its material being. Since the subject of a designated pred­ ication such as "Man is universal" must be

man taken as a universal

concept present in the intellect, we are dealing with second inten­ tions, that is with the modes in which we understand the extra­ mental world, not with the way in which the world actually is. Scotus can concede that the predication,

"man is predicated of in­

dividual men," must be true in order for the predication, "species inheres in man" to be true, but in order for "man is predicated of individual men" to be a true there does not need to be an extra­ mental mode of being of individual men thanks to which we can attribute

man to them.

The truth of

"man is predicated of individual

men" does not immediately depend on how things are in the world. Rather, its truth depends on the modes in which our intellect un­ derstands the world. Thus, it is not necessary that men have a certain mode of being, but only that they are understood in a cer­ tain way, namely as universals. If our intellect understands all men as a species, the predication is true; otherwise, the predication is false.75 Consequently, it is wrong to refer to the truth conditions of predications where second intentions are predicated of things in order to make inferences on what there is in the world; the only in­ ferences that can be made concern our modes of understanding the world. In his LectuTa, Scotus still adopts this analysis of the predication of second intentions, and he links it to his conception of the distinction between abstract and concrete intentions. Since he considers second intentions as representing not things understood, but rela­ tions established by the intellect between things, he maintains that second intentions, even when they are considered concretely, are concepts of concepts, not concepts of things. This is contrary to what Henry of Ghent, Simon of Faversham, and Radulphus Brito had maintained. According to Henry of Ghent, as Scotus remarks, 'species' signifies a thing understood in the sentence ')\ species is what is predicated of several numerically different things," since 15 Super Porph., q. 9-1 1 , n. 23 (OPh, I, 48): '\<\d hoc dico quod species ioest homioi secundum quod 'homo' praedicatur de individuis, loquendo de praedicatione sig­ nata, non de praedicatione exercita, id est non secundum quod est idem suppositis, et illud est primum membum distinctionis." The distinction to which Scatus is here referring is the familiar one among the three ways in which what is signified by a common term can be taken: as identical with its supposits, as in itself, and as a thing understood by our intellect. See above, nn. 3-5.

SECOND INTENTIONS IN DUNS SCOTUS

137

what is predicated of numerically different things is not a second in­ tention, but a thing understood or a first intention concept. 76 Against this account of predication of second intentions, Scotus observes that the predication, "a species is what is predicated of nu­ merically different things," is not an actually performed predication

(praedicatio exercita),

but a designated predication

(praedicatio signata).

Thus, it is not a predication stating something about the world, as Henry assumes. Rather, it is a second-order description of a class of first-order predications; it describes how we understand the world and how we attribute concepts to things, not how things are in the world. Therefore, in predications of that kind 'species' stands for a pure concept, not for a first intention thing, contrary to what Henry assumes.77 Thus, Scotus can reject Henry's conclusion that second intention terms, if taken in concrete, signifY extramental things. Both in abstract and in concrete, second intention terms signifY concepts representing rational relations and say something about the way we understand the world, not about the way the world is.

76 uctura I, d. 23, q. un., n. 9 (ed. Vat., XVII, 305): "Propter rationes tamen dicunt quod intentio secunda patest intelligi in abstracto vel in concreto: Primo modo, non supponit pro re primae intentionis nee praedicatur de re primae intentionis; uncle non dicitur vere quod universalitas agit vel quod animal sit universalitas. Si autem accipitur secundo modo, in concreto, sic supponere patest pro prima intentione et praedicari de re primae intentionis; uncle haec vera est 'animal est universale'. Et sic definitur universale quod est species, cum dicitur quod 'species est quae praedicatur de pluribus differentibus' etc.; 'species' enim non praedicatur ilia intentio secunda, sed ilIa res pro qua stat praedicatur." See also Ord. I, d. 23, q. un., n. 8 (ed. Vat., V; 351). 77 uctura I, d. 23, q. un., n. 32 (ed. Vat., XVII, 3 1 3): "Quod etiam dicunt de specie quod definitur, hoc non est pro eis, quia est praedicatio signata et praedicatio ex­ ercita: ibi autem definitur species per praedicationem signatam, non exercitam; et ideo stat pro secunda intentione, sicut est et praedicari signatum."

CHAPTER FIVE SCOTUS ON THE LOGICAL CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORIES

Second intentions become relevant to the doctrine of the logical, as opposed to the metaphysical, consideration of categories in the last decades of the thirteenth century, as I discussed in the first chapter. In the second chapter, I presented Thomas Aquinas's account of in­ tentions as second-order concepts produced by the relfection of the intellect on itself. Aquinas sees intentions as concepts representing not things but the modes in which our intellect understands things. He also puts forward a conception of intentions as rational relations founded on the understanding of the intellect. Peter of Auvergne, however, casts some doubts on the causal role Aquinas attributes to the intellect in forming intentions. In the third chapter, I presented another approach to second intentions, developed by authors such as Henry of Ghent and especially Simon of Faversham and Radul­ phus Brito. Reacting to Aquinas's view of intentions as second­ order concepts, these authors maintain that second intentions are first-order concepts founded on real properties pertaining to extra­ mental things. Moreover, they distinguish abstract from concrete in­ tentions and classifY intentions into three kinds according to the op­ eration of the intellect involved in forming them. In the fourth chapter, I turned to Duns Scotus's conception of second intentions as second-order concepts and rational relations caused by the intel­ lect. Scotus's approach to second intentions is developed in his log­ ical commentaries,

physics.

Sentences commentary,

and

OJiestions on the Meta­

Even though some elements remain constant in all these

works, Scotus's doctrine becomes more and more sophisticated and ends up as a revision of Aquinas's account. Second intentions are fi­ nally seen as concepts representing rational relations caused by the intellect's comparison of two things understood. We can now return to the doctrine of the twofold study of the cat­ egories.

As we have seen in the first chapter, in the final decades of

the thirteenth century it was usually held that logic considers cate­ gories as foundations of second intentions. Since, as we have seen,

SCOTUS ON THE LOGICAL CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORIES

1 39

there are two main doctrines of second intentions, we must now de­ termine to which extent each of these doctrine influences the doc­ trine of the logical consideration of the categories and the interpre­ tation of Aristotle's Caugories. In this chapter, I focus on Scotus's case and I compare his views to those of the advocates of different doctrines of second intentions.

1.

Categories as considered by reason

Scotus adopts a version of the doctrine according to which logic studies categories as foundations of second intentions. He says that categories can be considered in two ways, either as beings or as con­ sidered by reason. Scotus also describes the second way of consid­ ering categories by saying that categories can be considered insofar as certain properties caused by the intellect are attributed to them: To the question it is responded that the ten categories can be consid­ ered in two ways. In a way, they are considered insofar as they are being. In another way, they are considered insofar as they are consid­ ered by reason, or insofar as some property caused by the intellect is attributed to them. ' Metaphysics considers categories in the first way, whereas logic con­ siders them in the second way. Properly speaking, logic studies the properties attributed to categories, and it considers categories only accidentally, to the extent that they are the subjects of such proper­ ties. Scotus also assumes that logic considers categories as concepts and as generalissima.2 All these formulations can be explained in the light of Scotus's

I Duns &otus Super Prad., q. 2, n. 5 (OPh, J, 258): "Dicitur ad quaestionem quod decem praedicamenta possunt dupliciter considerari: uno modo in quantum sunt entia; alia modo in quantum considerantur a ratione, sive in quantum aliqua propri­ etas causata ab inteUectu eis attribuitur." , Super Praed., q. 1, n. 1 1 (OPh, J, 251): ')\d quaestionem dici potest quod iste liber non est de decem vocibus ut de primo subiecto. " , sed est de aliquo priore, quod re­ spectu vocis significativae tantum habet ratianem significati." Ibid., n. 18: '�d aliud dieo quod logica nee est scientia realis nee sermocinalis . . . medium inter rem et ser­ monem vel vocem est passio . . . ita potest a1iqua scientia esse de conceptu per se; haec est logica." lbid., q. 2, n. 7 (OPh, I, 258-59): "Ostenduntur enim de eis passiones sibi inhaerentes in quantum sunt generalissirna . . . Patet istis, in quantum sunt generalis­ sima, inesse hanc passionem 'dividi in species· . . . "

1 40

CHAPTER FIVE

doctrine of intentions. Let us consider Scotus's first two descriptions of the logical study of the categories. According to Scotus, logic considers categories as they are considered by reason and as the in­ tellect attributes second intentions to them. As we have seen, Scotus maintains that second intentions are caused by the intellect. Neither the intellect nor extramental things, however, are the subjects in which second intentions inhere. The subjects of second intentions are things as understood. Moreover, Scotus maintains that such things, insofar as they are understood, are purely mental entities, identical to our intellect's modes of understanding. It follows that the properties attributed to such things as they are understood de­ pend on their intentional being and their being understood. Let us now take into account the categories. Let us consider them not as types of being independent of our understanding but as they are understood by us. If considered in this manner, categories are purely mental entities. Such mental entities have properties, which are caused by the intellect and follow from their being understood by the intellect. Scotus, in his description of how logic studies cate­ gories, refers to these intentional properties caused by the intellect and attributed to categories. These properties are what logic con­ siders, according to Scotus. Thus, Scotus maintains that logic studies categories as founda­ tions of second intentions, for second intentions are the properties attributed to categories as understood. Therefore, his first two for­ mulations of how logic considers categories are equivalent, for second intentions, which are properties caused by the intellect, are attributed to things considered to the extent that reason knows them. Since a thing understood, which is that to which second inten­ tions are attributed, is a purely mental entity and a concept, it fol­ lows that Scotus can also describe the logical study of categories in another way. He maintains that logic considers categories as con­ cepts. This follows from Scotus's doctrine of the object of logic: logic is the science dealing with things as understood, and things as understood are concepts. In this way, Scotus corrects Boethius's saying that logic considers categories insofar as they are the most general terms signifYing the genera of being.3 According to Scotus, logic considers categories not as terms, but as something preceding J

Boethius In Cat. I, 1 60A-B.

SCOTUS ON THE LOGICAL CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORIES

141

terms, for a term signifies a concept in the mind. That concept, in turn, represents an extramental thing and precedes the term signi­ fYing it, for it is possible for a concept to represent something without being signified by a term, but it is not possible for a term to signifY something without signifYing a concept. Between things and terms, therefore, there are concepts, and concepts are dealt with by logic:

I say that logic is neither a real nor a sermocinal science, because it considers neither speech nor the attributes of speech, nor does it con­ sider its subject under the aspect of speech. Rather, it appears that such a division is insufficient in this way: between the thing and the speech or word, there is the concept as something intermediate. Therefore, just as there is a science per se about things and a science per se about significative words, such as grammar and rhetoric. . . so there can be a science per se about concepts, and this science is logic. Hence logic must be said to be a rational science per se, not only because it is transmitted by reason, like any other science, but also because it con­ cerns concepts formed by an act of reason ' It follows that logic deals with categories insofar as they are con­ cepts, since the mental properties logic considers are attributed to categories insofar as they are concepts. Scotus gives his solution to the old question concerning what categories are: terms, concepts, or things? By themselves, categories are things, for they are the types of essences of real things. In logic, however, categories are considered as concepts.

As to Boethius's position of categories as terms, Scotus

regards it as a formulation of how logic considers categories. He in­ terprets Boethius as saying that since logic deals with the ten genera of being insofar as they are signified by ten terms, logic deals with

• Duns Scotus Super Pra,d., q. I , n. 18 (OPh, I, 253): u . . . dico quod logica nec est scientia realis nee sermocinalis, quia nee sermonem nee passiones sermonis consid­ eral, nee suum subiectum sub ratione sermon is. Immo quod iSla divisio sit insuffi­ ciens sic ostenditur: medium inter rem et sermonern vel vocem est passio; ergo sicut est aliqua scientia per se de rebus, aliqua per se de vocibus significativis, ut gram­ matica, rhetorica . . . ita patest aliqua scientia esse de cooceptu per se; haec est logica. Uncle per se debet dici scientia rationalis, non tantum quia traditur per rationem skut quaelibet alia scientia, sed cum hoc quod est de conceptibus formatis ab actu rationis." On Scotus's doctrine of signification see D. Perler, "Duns SCONS on Signi­ fication," Medieval Philosophy and Th£owgy 3 (1 993): 97-1 20; Pini, "Species, Concept, and Thing;" Pini, "Signification of Names in Duns Scatus and Some of His Con­ temporaries/' Vivarium 39 (200 I), forthcoming.

1 42

CHAPTER FIVE

categories as concepts since something is signified by a term insofar as it is a concept.5 It is another question, of course, to ascertain the ontological status of such concepts taken as mental entities. That is the problem of the ontological status of intentions, which I have already men­ tioned. What is important to stress here is that Scotus, at least in his logical works, maintains that concepts are identical with the things understood considered as understood and as they have an inten­ tional existence in the mind. To develop this issue is not relevant to the question of how logic studies categories, and pertains more to the philosophy of mind than to the philosophy of logic.

2.

Categories as highest genera

Scotus also asserts that logic studies the properties inhering in cate­

(generalis­ sima).6 Scotus has already said that logic studies categories insofar as gories insofar as categories are the most common genera

they are understood, insofar as they are concepts, and insofar as in­ tentional properties are attributed to them. Scotus's new description of how logic considers categories may look surprising, for it is the metaphysician, not the logician, who is usually said to consider cat­ egories as the highest kinds or genera of being. Scotus, of course, does not say that categories are the most basic types of essences only because our intellect understands them. He draws a sharp distinction between the metaphysical notion of cate­ gories as types of essences and the logical consideration of cate­ gories as the most common genera. He agrees that substance, quality, quantity, etc. are the ten types of essences of extramental things, whether our intellect understands them or not. Categories have a real status in the world, and they are not mind-dependent classifications of reality. Instead, Scotus intends to make another point. By now, we should already be familiar with Scotus's contention that a genus is not a mode of being of extramental things but a mode of under-

, Super Pro
SCOTUS ON THE LOGICAL CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORIES

1 43

standing of the intellect: genus is not something existing in the world but is the mode in which we understand an extramental essence. Similarly, categories are extramental types of essences, but they can be understood as common genera by our intellect. Thus, to say that logic considers categories as the most common genera is to say that logic considers categories not as essences but as the most universal univocal concepts by which our intellect understands the extra­ mental essences. Thus, categories are considered as the most common genera insofar as they are conceived as understood by our intellect. According to Scotus's doctrine of intentions, it could be said that categories are studied in logic since the intellect establishes a rational relation between a type of being as understood and all the things belonging to that kind as they are conceived by the intel­ lect. This relation is that of being a common genus. Between the way categories are and the way they are understood there is no parallelism. In fact, Scotus thinks that categories as types of being have nothing in common, but that the intellect can under­ stand them under a common concept. The common mode in which categories can be understood is precisely the concept of most common genus. No single thing, however, corresponds to that con­ cept. In reality there are only substances, qualities, quantities, etc. that do not share any common feature among themselves. There is nothing that is by itself a most common genus, for a most common genus is just the way in which our intellect understands the ten types of essences of things. Because the intellect is able to consider each category in this same way, namely as a category and a highest genus, the logical study of categories has its unity:

. . . some univocal intentional notion can be attributed to things of every genus, because the diversity in things of first intention among themselves does not prevent the intellect from being able to conceive them by the same mode of conceiving. But intentions are attributed to them insofar as they are conceived by the intellect, and therefore in­ tentions specifically identical can be attributed to diverse things.) In the extramental world, there are substances, qualities, quantities, and so on. These things belong to different types of being indepen7 Super Praed., q. 3, n. 8 (OPh, I, 269): " . . . aJiquid intentionale univocum potest ap­ plicari rebus omnium generum, quia omnis diversitas in rebus primae intentionis inter se non impedit ipsas posse concipi per eundem modum concipiendi. Inten­ tiones autem eis attribuuntur in quantum ab inteUectu concipiuntur, et ideo inten­ tiones eaedem specie possunt diversis rebus attribui."

1 44

CHAPTER FIVE

dently of our understanding of them. The fact that we conceive these types of essences in the same way, namely as categories or most common genera, is only a feature of our mode of under­ standing, and there is no common mode of being that corresponds to it since categories are immediately diverse. Since logicians merely consider categories as praedicamenta or gen­ eraiissima, not as essences, they cannot give the reason why one cat­ egory differs from another. Logicians must assume the distinction among categories from metaphysicians, for categories can be distin­ guished only when they are considered as essences. For example, substance is distinguished from quality only when it is considered as substance, not when it is considered as a highest genus, i.e. as one of the most common univocal concepts we can form about the world, because all categories are highest genera to the same extent. There­ fore, logic cannot demonstrate the distinction among categories.s

3.

Thomas Aquinas and Henry if Ghent on the structure if categories

Scotus's doctrine of the logical consideration of categories can be better appreciated if compared to that of some of his predecessors and contemporaries. First, Scotus's doctrine can be seen as a devel­ opment and correction of Thomas Aquinas's and Henry of Ghent's treatments. Although Aquinas alludes to the doctrine of the twofold consideration of the categories, he never goes into detail. Henry of Ghent, by contrast, even seems to ignore the doctrine according to which categories can be considered in two ways. Some elements in Aquinas's treatment of the categories can be pinpointed. Aquinas maintains that categories, conceived as the genera of beings, are constituted of two elements. Sometimes, he speaks of two rationes constituting categories.9 Other times, he speaks of being and mode of being. to His most mature formulation 8 Super Prad., q. I I , n. 26 (OPh, I, 350-5 1). See below, chap. 6, par. 5. 9 Thomas Aquinas Sent. I, d. 8, q. 4, a. 3 (ed. Mandonnet, I, 244): "Sed in uno­ quoque navern praedicamentorum duo invenio: scilicet rationem accidentis et ra­ tionem propriam illius generis, sicut quantitatis vel qualitatis." On Aquinas's doctrine of categories see Henninger, Relations, 1 3-7. 10 Sent. IV, d. 12, q. I , a. I (ed. Moos, IV, 499): " . . . dicendum quod inesse non dicit esse accidentis absolute, sed magis modum essendi qui sibi competit ex ordine ad causam proximam."

SCOTUS ON THE LOGICAL CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORIES

1 45

of this doctrine, however, seems to be the one that makes reference to a composition of ratio and being. Each category has a proper ratio, Aquinas says. To that essence pertains a being of a certain kind. Since a substance is a thing with an essence that is not in an­ other thing, not being in another thing is the mode of being proper to substance. By contrast, accidents are things whose essences are in other things, so 'being in another thing' is the mode of being proper to accidents. Thus, if being is taken into account, all accidental categories de­ pend on substance, since their being is to inhere in a substance." In addition, quantity and quality depend on substance not only for their being but also for their rationes, for the ratio of quantity is to be a measure of a substance and the ratio of quality is to be a disposi­ tion of a substance. Relations, by contrast, depend on substances only because of their being, while their ratio expresses a comparison with something external.'· Aquinas does not say anything explicitly pertaining to the other accidental categories. Aquinas also maintains that the mode in which a category is sig­ nified is taken from its mode of being. And as far as accidental cat­ egories are concerned, the mode in which they are predicated is also taken from their mode of being. For example, substance, to which the mode of being not in another thing pertains, is signified as something that is not in something else. If a substance is predicated of something, it is predicated as something identical to the subject. '3 On the other hand, quantity and quality are signified as something inherent in a substance, whereas relation is said with reference to something distinct from the substance in which it inheres. ' 4 In its general features, Henry of Ghent's doctrine of categories is not very different from Aquinas's. Admittedly, his terminology can 11 ST I, q. 28, q. 2: ')\d cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod in quolibet Dovern generum accidentis est duo considerare. Quorum unum est esse quod com­ petit unicuique ipsorum secundum quod est accidens. Et hoc communiter in om­ nibus est inesse subiecto: accidentis eoim esse est inesse. Aliud quod potest consid­ erari in unoquoque, est propria ratio uniuscuiusque illorum generum." See also ST III, q. 77, a. I and Quod!. IX, q. 3, art. un. (ed. Leon., XXY. I , 99). " STI, q. 28, a. 2. ,OJ In Met. V, lect. 9, n. 889; In Plrys. III, lect. 5, n. 332. See]. F. Wippel, "Thomas Aquinas's Derivation of the Aristotelian Categories (Predicaments)," Journal rif the History oj Philosophy 25 ( 1 987): 1 3-34. 1 4 De Pot., q. 8, a. 2 (ed. Pession) 2 1 7) for the accidental categories; and also In Met. V, lect. 9, n. 889; In Phys. III, lect. 5, n. 332

1 46

CHAPTER FIVE

be confusing, since Henry calls category, and

res what Aquinas calls the ratio of a ratio what Aquinas calls the esse of a category.

Like Aquinas, Henry of Ghent thinks that each category can be analyzed into two elements or constituting aspects.15 First, there is the thing of a category

(res praedicamentz),

which is an extramental

essence. Second, there is the mode of being proper to that category

(ratio praedicamenl:!) .

For example, a substance is an essence whose

mode of being is not being in a subject and being something by it­ self: . . . one thing is the thing of a category (res praedicamenl:!), another thing is the mode of that category (ratio praedicamenl:!). The thing of a category is whatever is by its essence and nature contained in the order of some category. The mode of a category is the proper mode of being of the things that are contained in that category. \6 Both the

res praedicamenti and

the

ratio praedicamenti are

necessary in

order to constitute a category as a type of being and to differentiate one category from the others. 17 By the notion of mode of being proper to each category, Henry can offer a justification or deduction of the Aristotelian categories. All the items belonging to a category share a very general mode of being, namely 'being caused'. This common mode of being makes the categorial beings different from God, whose being is uncaused. The common mode of being caused is divided into two less general modes. First, there is the mode of being in itself, which is proper to the items belonging to the category of substance. Second, there is the mode of being in something else, which is common to the items belonging to one of the accidental categories. Being in something else is in turn divided into two less general modes: being in some­ thing else in an independent way and being in something else with respect to another thing. Being in something else in an independent way is in turn divided into being a quality of something and being 15

See Paulus, Henri de Gand, 152-63; Henninger, Relations, 48-52. Henry of Ghent Summa, a. 32, q. 5 (ed. Macken, XXVII, 79): ... . . aliud est res praedicamenti, aliud vero ratio praedicamenti. Res praedicamenti est quidquid per essentiam et naturam suam est contentum in online alicuius praedicamenti; ratio praedicamenti est proprius modus essendi corum quae continentur in praedica­ mento." 17 Ibid.: "Ex quibus duobus, scilicet ex re praedicamenti et ratione essendi eius, quae est ratio praedicamenti, constituitur ipsum praedicamentum et diversificatur unum praedicamentum ab alia." 16

SCOTUS ON THE LOGICAL CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORIES

1 47

a measure or quantity of something. On the other hand, being in something else with respect to another thing is divided into seven relative modes of being, each of which is proper to the items be­

longing to one of the last seven categories. 1 8 Aquinas and Henry's approach to categories presents some ob­

vious advantages. They can explain how a category can perform the twofold task of being a classificatory notion and of being identical with the things classified themselves. Aquinas and Henry capture this twofold character of a category by distinguishing two different ontological constituents of categories

(ratio

and being for Aquinas,

res and ratio for Henry). According to Aquinas and Henry, therefore, categories are essences of a certain kind, to which certain modes of being are at­ tributed. The main modes of being are the ones taken from

Cat.

2,

namely 'being i n a subject' and 'being not in a subject'. 1 9 These two relations are interpreted as constituting the being of the categories.

4.

Scotus's twqfold consideration as an alternative to the composition of categories

Scotus's formulation of the doctrine of the twofold consideration of categories offers an alternative to an approach such as Aquinas's and Henry's. According to Scotus, categories are not constituted by two

metaphysical

aspects.

Instead,

categories,

metaphysically

speaking, are simple things and essences. Everything is identified as something thanks to its essence, which is an essence of a certain type. Scotus seems to maintain that it is not possible to divide a thing from its mode of being, and this may be the reason of Scotus's suspicion concerning the distinction between being and essence.20 Of course, Scotus, like Henry of Ghent, does not have a purely ex­ tensional view of categories, so when he states that categories, meta­ physically speaking, are things, he does not mean that a category is merely the set of all the things belonging to a certain kind. Instead, he identifies a category with a type of essence, which is neither in-

18 Ibid. (ed. Macken, XXVII, 80); QJtodl. V, q. 6, (ed. Lovan., 1 6 1 0); QJtodl. Xv, 5, (ed. Lovan., 5770). 19 Cat. 2, la20-b6. '" Ord. Iv, d. I I , q. 3, n. 46 (ed. Vives, XVII, 429).

q.

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dividual nor universal. Individuals belong to their species but not to their essence; rather, they are really identical to their essence, and their essence is what constitutes individuals as things.21 Scotus, of course, thinks that things can be sorted out in species and genera. For example, animal can be sorted out in man, horse, and so on. Species and genera, by themselves, however, are logical no­ tions depending not on the way an essence is, but on the way it is understood. Properties such as not being in a subject or being in a subject, are not extramental modes of being, but intentional notions pertaining to essences only insofar as they are considered as under­ stood. Thus, Scotus maintains that categories can be considered in two ways, logically and metaphysically, and not that they are consti­ tuted by two ontological components. According to Scotus, Aquinas and Henry confuse the way in which we consider categories - i.e. as classifYing notions - and the way categories are - i.e. as essences and mind-independent things. Categories, metaphysically consid­ ered, differ from one another by themselves and as immediately di­ verse things, not because of a mode of being that somehow pertains to and is separated from them.22 Henry of Ghent considers a property such as 'not being in a sub­ ject' as a real mode of being constituting the category of sub­ stances. By contrast, Scotus regards this same property as an inten­ tional property, pertaining to the category of substance only insofar as substance is considered by the intellect as a highest genus.23 In the extramental world, there is no mode of being which corre­ sponds to the intentional property of 'not being in a subject': that is to say, there is no mode of being separable from the category of substance itself. Scotus does not deny that sometimes there may be a correspon­ dence between an intentional property of categories and a real thing in the extramental world. His point is that, since such a correspon­ dence is not something regularly found, it would be misleading to rely on a general parallelism between the intentional and real plan. For ex­ ample, besides the rational relation of being in a subject, there is the metaphysical relation of inherence of an accident in a substance. This relation is not one between a predicate and a subject in a proposition, " See Duns Scotus Qjlaest. in Met. VII, q. 7, n. 22 (OPh, IV, 1 53-54). 22 QgaeSI. in Met. V, q. 5-6, n. 81 (OPh, III, 466): "Concedo ergo diyisionem esse sufficientem, et quod distinguuntur realiter." Ibid., n. 76 (OPh, III, 465). " Super Praed., q. 259, n. 7 (OPh, I, 258-59).

SCOTUS ON THE LOGICAL CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORIES

1 49

but a relation between two essences considered by themselves and re­ ally distinct from the essence of the real accident. 2' Scotus explicitly recognizes that the term 'to inhere' is equivocal, since it can be either a first intention term signifying a real relation or a second intention term signifying a relation between a predicate and a subject. The metaphysician considers the real relation between an ac­ cident and a substance, whereas the logician deals with the inherence of a predicate in a subject. It is this last kind of inherence that is con­ sidered in the Categories. This logical inherence is defined as predicat­ ing a notion external to the essence of the subject, and is opposed to the relation of 'being predicated of', which is defined as predicating a notion belonging to the essence of the subject: . . . one must know that 'being present' and 'being absent' or 'inhering' or 'not inhering', which Aristotle posits in his definition, are equivocal to first and second intention. Insofar as they are names of first inten­ tion it is said, in the seventh book of the Metaphysics, context. 2 and after: "The being of an accident is inhering," [Metaph VII, I , 1028a1 8-20j and concerns a real accident, about which he speaks there . . . In another way 'inhering) or 'being present' is a name of second intention and signifies the predication of the things that are outside the essence of the subject or in a genus different from the one of the subject, just as 'being predicated of' bespeaks the proper essen­ tial �redication of the things that are in the same genus as the sub­ ject. 5

Even if there seems to be a parallelism between second intentions and real properties, it must be observed that the real relation of in­ herence is mirrored only in an imprecise way by the predication carried out between concepts. In fact, being in or inhering, as a second intention, is the mode in which a predicate is attributed to its sub­ ject when it is external to the essence of the subject. To this mode of predicating, however, there corresponds no mode of being of the " QJ'aesl. in Mel. VII, q. I, nn. 12-14, 1 8-20 (OPh, IV, 93-94, 96). 25 Super Porph., q. 35, n. 8 (OPh, I, 2 2 1 ): "Ubi sciendum quod 'adest et abest' (sive 'inesse et non inesse', quae ponit Aristoteles in sua definitione) sunt aequivoce nomina primae impositionis et secundae. Ut sunt nomina primae impositionis, dic­ itur VII Metaphysicae 'accidentis esse est inesse'; et hoc de accidente reali de quo lo­ quitur ibi. . . Alio modo 'adesse' vel 'abesse' est nomen secundae impositionis et sig­ nificat praedicationem eorum quae sunt extra essentiam subiecti vel alterius generis a subiecto, sicut 'praedicari de' dicit propriam praedicationem essentialium quae sunt in eodem genere cum subiecto." See also Super Porph., q. 3 1 , nn. 9- 1 1 (OPh, I, 1 96-97), where Scotus considers 'accident' as a second intention as synonymous to 'inhering' as a second intention.

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real accidents conceived as mind-independent entities, for it is true that there is an inherence that is a first intention and a real relation holding between substances and accidents, but this inherence, ac­ cording to Scotus, is not the mode of being of accidents. Inherence as a first intention is really different from the accidents' essences and is a relation added to them.26 Consequently, from the fact that all accidental predicates inhere in their subject in the same way it cannot be inferred that there is a mode of being common to all the accidents conceived as real beings. This is why Scotus rejects Henry of Ghent's deduction of the categories: accidents, as mind-indepen­ dent essences, are immediately and completely diverse, and there is no common mode of being corresponding to the common mode in which accidental predicates are attributed to subjects in sentences.27 Scotus's distinction between logic and metaphysics implies that some problems can be posited and solved only in logic whereas other problems can be posited and solved only in metaphysics. For example, any question concerning predication is a logical question, but any question concerning the real distinction among categories is a metaphysical question.

5.

Peter qf Auvergne on the nature qf categories

Scotus's approach to categories is also different from those of his contemporaries who admit that categories can be studied in two ways. Scotus's originality is a consequence of his doctrine of second intentions. Peter of Auvergne, among others, maintains that a category is something taken from a property common to all things univocally contained in it.28 What kind of property is the common property from which a category is taken? Is it an intentional property or is it a real property pertaining to things independently from their being 26 Quaest. in Met. VII, q. I (OPh, IV, 91-1 01); Ord. IV, d. 12, q. I (ed. Vives, XVII, . 518-59). " Q!laest. in Met(lph VII, qq. 5-6, nn. 73-76 (OPh, III, 464-65). 28 Peter of Auvergne SUP<' l'raed. q. 24 (ed. Andrews, 41): "InteUigendum quod ad hoc quod aliquid sit praedicamentum tria exiguntur. Primum est quod supra ipsum non sit genus. Secundum quod habeat modum praedicandi distinctum ab omnibus aliorum praedicamentorum. Tertium est quod accipiatur ab aliqua proprietate com­ muni in qua conveniant omnia quae sub ipso sunt contenta."

SCOTUS ON THE LOGICAL CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORIES

151

understood? Peter of Auvergne seems to favor the second answer. It is true that he maintains that categories can be considered in two ways, in metaphysics and in logic, but he also maintains that a con­ stitutive aspect of a category is a logical feature, namely having a distinct mode of being predicated. This mode of being predicated is in turn taken from a real property common to the things con­ tained under that category. It follows that Peter of Auvergne does not clearly distinguish what pertains to a category insofar as it is a logical entity from what it pertains to it insofar as it is a real entity. Peter's confusion between the metaphysical and the logical as­ pects of categories is not surprising, since he maintains that the log­ ical properties of categories, such as being predicated in a certain way, directly depend on real properties. Accordingly, he maintains that a category simultaneously plays a logical role and a metaphys­ ical role.29 Let us consider the case of substance. All substances have the property of being something by themselves, which is a property per­ taining to them not as they are understood but as they are real be­ ings. It is on such a real property common to all substances that the category of substance is based. 30 The category of substance is therefore univocally predicated of all substances because it is based on a real property all substances share. Thus, the way a category is predicated is a common notion derived from a real property of the things contained under that category. All this has noteworthy consequences for the study of categories. Since Peter of Auvergne maintains that there is a parallelism be­ tween modes of predication and real properties constitutive of cat­ egories, he thinks that two things are in the same category if and only if a univocal common notion is essentially predicated of them.31 This criterion for belonging in a category entails some sur­ prising consequences in the case of concrete and abstract items. Since the category of substance is univocally predicated of all con-

29 Ibid., q. 54 (ed. Andrews, 75): "Ad quod dicendum quod relatio est genus gen­ eralissimum, cuius ratio est quoniam illud est genus ad aliqua plura, quod dicit es­ sentiam et quiditatem ilIarum, et quod sumitur ex aliqua proprietate communi in qua conveniunt omnia ilia quae sub ipso sunt; relatio autem est huiusmodi." 30 Ibid., q. 16 (ed. Andrews, 28): "Nam omnia quae in genere substantiae sunt, conveniunt in aliqua proprietate quae est per se stare, a qua proprietate sumitur genus quod est substantia; ideo etc." " Ibid., q. 15 (ed. Andrews, 26).

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crete substances in a concrete way (such as man, horse, etc.) but not of abstract substances (such as humanity, horseness, etc.), he con­ cludes that only concrete items are in the category of substance. The case of the accidents, by contrast, is opposite because any acci­ dental category is univocally predicated of accidental abstract items but not of concrete ones. For example, quality is univocally predi­ cated of whiteness and tallness, not of white and tall. Then Peter of Auvergne maintains that only the abstract items belong to an acci­ dental category.32 By contrast, Scotus maintains that what constitutes a category is having an essence of a certain kind and being a certain kind of real being, whereas the mode of predication does not play any role in constituting a category. Therefore he concedes that both abstract and concrete items of a certain kind belong to the same category. Both whiteness and white are qualities, Scotus maintains, because whiteness and white are two ways of referring to the same essence insofar as it is considered either in abstract (whiteness) or in con­ crete (white). It is true that quality is essentially predicated only of whiteness, but that fact merely concerns predication and does not have any bearing on the question concerning which category an item belongs to.33

6.

Simon if Faversham on the nature if categories

Simon of Faversham explicitly says that a category is a real extra­ mental being. Like Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, he also maintains that each category is composed of a thing (res) or essence and of a mode of being (modus essendi). For example, substance is a thing to which there pertains 'being not in something else' or the mode of being of subsisting in itself and being subject to other things. By

32 Ibid., q. 53 (ed. Andrews, 74): " . . . ornne genus dicit quiditatem et essentiam suarum specierum [ed.: speciarum] et nihil plus. Quia si sic, tunc non praedicaretur de eiis in quid. Nunc autem relativum, cum sit quoddam concreturn, includit aliquid quod diversum est a relativis in quantum relativa sunt, scilicet subiectum. Et sic patel quod non sit genus, quia etiam importat diversas essentias, sicut dictum est." " See Duos Scotus Super Praed., q. 8, o. 14 (OPh, I, 3 1 7); Super Porph., q. I I , o. 23 (OPh, I, 349-50), quoted above, chap. 4, o. 33.

SCOTUS ON THE LOGICAL CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORIES

153

contrast, accidents are things to which there pertains the mode of being in something else.34 Simon adds, however, that a category's mode of being is identical to its ratio praedicandi, that is to the mode in which that category is predicated of the things that are contained in it.35 Other times, he says that the mode of predicating is not identical to the mode of being, but is nonetheless derived from it.36 Be that as it may, it is clear that Simon maintains that categories consist of modes of predication that are either based on or identical to modes of beingY For this reason, although he presents a category as a real ex­ tramental being, he can also describe it as the hierarchy of the pred­ icates ordered according to different degrees of universality.38 The modes of predication constituting a category as a hierarchy of pred­ icates are also the modes of being - or in any case closely parallel to the modes of being - constituting a category as an extramental being. 34 Simon of Faversham Super Praed., q. I (ed. Mazzarella, 73): "Iterum quodlibet predicamentum habet partes constituentes ipsum: quodlibet predicamentum consti­ tuitur ex duobus, scilicet ex re et ex modo essendi sibi superaddito. Uncle res cui competit talis modus essendi, qui est esse non in alia, est substantia; res autem cui competit iSle modus essendi, qui est esse in alia, est accidens . . . " Ibid., q. 13 (ed. Mazzarella, 86-87): "Predicamentum enim substantie constituitur ex duobus, scilicet ex re et ex modo essendi sibi superaddito; ilia enim requiruntur in omni predica­ mento, per que predicamenta ad invicem distinguuntur. . . ". Ibid., q. 40 (ed. Maz­ zarella, 1 30): " . . . predicamentum substantie accipitur a tali modo essendi secundum quem aliquod subsistet in se ipso, predicamentum accidentis accipitur a tali modo es­ sendi secundum quem aliquid existit in alio; unde esse in se et esse in alia dividunt substantiam et accidens." 35 Ibid., q. 1 3 (ed. Mazzarella, 87): " . . . sed predicamenta non distinguuntur solum penes essencias, quia videmus diversas essencias contineri sub uno predicamento, ut essencia hominis et asini; requiruntur ergo diversi modi essendi per quos distin­ guantur; et iste modus essendi est formalior in predicamento quam res, et dicitur ratio predicandi; et ideo quodlibet predicamentum constituitur ex re et ratione pred­ icandi." 36 Ibid., q. 12 (ed. Mazzarella, 85): "Predicamenta enim distinguuntur penes modos essendi, quia distinguuntur penes modum predicandi; propter hoc enim dis­ tinguitur substantia ab aliis. Sed modi predicandi sumuntur a modis essendi sicut modi significandi . . ... " On quantity, Super Pra,d. q. 33 (ed. Mazzarella, 1 1 4). On relation, q. 12 (ed. Mazzarella, 84). In general, q. 12 (ed. Mazzarella, 85). 38 Super Praed., q. I (ed. Mazzarella, 7 1): " . . . predicamentum non est nisi coordi­ nacio predicabilium [ed.: probabilium] secundum sub et supra . . . ". Ibid., q. 41 (ed. Mazzarella, 1 32): "Predicamentum enim non est aliud quam coordinacio predica­ bilium secundum sub et supra, ita quod in predicamento relationis possimus facere unam arborem . . . "

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It is interesting to note how Simon of Faversham describes the log­ ical consideration of the categories. Not logic, but metaphysics (which he calls 'divine science') deals with the essences of things. Logic deals with categories insofar as they have a certain mode of predication,39 but Simon also maintains that categories are com­ posed of an essence and of a mode of being, which is either iden­ tical to or is parallel to a mode of predication, as we have seen. It can be said, therefore, that logic studies categories not according to their essences but according to their modes of being, and such modes of being are as real as the essences of categories.

7.

Radulphus Brito on categories and their logical consideration

Radulphus Brito gives a more sophisticated treatment of categories than Simon of Faversham, but his approach is basically the same. Brito explicitly asks whether a category is a real or rational being. He answers that a category is both a real and rational being, ac­ cording to the way in which it is considered. In fact, each category can be considered in two ways: first, as a highest genus, i.e. as the most universal genus in a hierarchy of predicates; second, as the whole hierarchy or coordination contained under a genus, from in­ dividuals up to the most universal genus. Each of these ways in which a category can be considered can be taken either logically or metaphysically"o If a category is considered as a highest genus, it can be identified to what is subject to the concept of highest genus, i.e. to a real dif­ ference of being. Alternatively, a category as a highest genus can be seen as the intention of a highest genus, namely as a genus above

39 Ibid., q. 1 (ed. Mazzarella, 74): "Et ex hoc apparet quomodo diversimode coo­ siderat ista scientia [scil., logical de eis [seU., predicamentis] et scientia divina, quo­ niam scientia divina considerat de eis ut sunt quedam essencie et partes entis; in ista autem libro [scil., Predicamentorum] non determinatur de predicamentis secundum quod sunt res materie absolute, sed secundum quod habent talem modum predi­ candi ve1 talem; et ideo dicitur liber Predicamentorum." Ibid., q. 23 (ed. Mazzarella, 98): .. . . . logicus non considerat essentias rerum . . . " 4() Radulphus Brito Super Praed., q. 4 (ed. Venet., 39va): "Dicendum quod praedicamentum potest accipi pro genere generalissimo in aliqua coordinatione vel pro tota coordinatione quae est a generalissimo usque ad individua, sicut aliquando dicimus quod genus generalissimum est praedicamentum in aliqua coordinatione, aliquando autem totam coordinationem .vocamus praedicarnentum."

SCOTIJS ON THE LOGICAL CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORIES

1 55

which there can be no other genus. A category considered in this manner is an intention and a rational being." By contrast, if a category is considered as the hierarchy of what is contained under a highest genus, it must be remarked that such a hierarchy is ordered according to two different criteria. First, the hi­ erarchy is ordered according to more or less common modes of predication. A category considered in this manner is something rational because, as Brito admits, there is no mode of predication if there is no corresponding intention. Second, the hierarchy is or­ dered according to real properties of the predicable things. A cate­ gory considered in this manner is something real because the prop­ erties according to which it is ordered are real.42 Brito, then, distinguishes a category as a real and rational being. Elsewhere, he specifies that a category as a rational or logical entity is the ordering of predicates or the set of the things ordered ac­ cording to increasing degrees of universality. A metaphysical cate­ gory is the same thing when considered as a difference of being.43 One could ask, however, whether it is the intellect that causes the modes of predication constituting a category as a coordination of predicates. According to Brito's doctrine of second intentions, the answer is No. Categories, even when considered as rational beings, 41 Ibid.: "Si accipiamus praedicamentum primo modo, adhuc potest dupliciter considerari, aut quantum ad rem quae est subiecta intentioni generalissimi aut quantum ad intentionem. Si consideretur quantum ad rem subiecta intentioni gen­ eralissimi, sic generalissimum est aliquid reale, quia praedicamentum illa modo est differentia realis eDtis, sicut substantia, quantitas, et sic de aliis. Si consideretur quantum ad intentionem sic est aliquid rationis, cuius ratio est quia generalissimum est quaedam intentio conereta [ed.: cum creta] , modo omnis intentio secunda cone­ reta [ed.: cum creta] est ens rationis, ideo etc," 42 Ibid. (ed. Venet., 39va-b): "Si autem praedicamentum accipiatur pro tota coor­ dinatione, ut dictum est, sic potest accipi adhuc dupliciter, quia vel ista praedica­ menta ordinantur penes modos praedicandi magis communes et minus communes vel penes proprietates reales rerum positarum in ista coordinatione. Si accipiatur primo modo penes modos praedicandi superioris et inferioris, sic praedicamentum est aliquid rationis, quia modus praedicandi est aliquid rationis (numquam enim erit modus praedicandi, si intentio hon erit); ergo coordinatio praedicabilium sumpta penes modum praedicandi est ens rationis . . . <Si> autem accipiatur ista relatio penes proprietates reals, sic praedicamentum pro ista coordinatione est aliquid reale, quia suum fundamentum est aliquid reale, scilicet praedicamentalia ordinata penes pro­ prietates reales." 43 Ibid., q. 6 (ed. Venet., 4Iva): "Praedicamentum logicum est ordinatio praedica­ bilium vel res ordinatae secundum superius et inferius et sub ista ratione. Praedica­ mentum metaphysicum est ipsa res ut est quaedam differentia entis, sicut substantia ut est differentia distincta entis a qualitate, et sic de aliis."

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have properties that are not caused by the intellect and do not de­ pend on their being understood. It is true, therefore, that categories appear in logical definitions, but this does not mean that they are rational beings, for there are two kinds of logical definitions ac­ cording to Brito: definitions entirely consisting of logical terms and definitions through genus and differentia but not entirely consisting of logical terms. The second kind of logical definition clearly con­ tains a reference to extramental things, but even if the definitions in which categories appear are of the first kind that does not mean that categories are merely and exclusively rational beings. For the first kind of logical definitions, too, refer to their objects and their causes, which are real modes of being of extramental things. Since every logical definition contains a reference to real and extramental items, Brito concludes that a category, even when it is part of a log­ ical definition, is not necessarily a merely rational being.44 Accordingly, it is not surprising that Brito says that a logical catego­ ry and a metaphysical category are really one and the same thing. Brito maintains that two things are really identical if they have the same properties, but a category considered as a logical entity and a category considered as a metaphysical entity have the same proper­ ties. Therefore, they are really identical. For example, substance has

the property of receiving contraries both when it is considered as the

hierarchy of predicates ordered according to different degrees of uni­ versality and when it is considered as a difference of being. The only difference between a logical and a metaphysical category is the way they are considered, which is a difference of

rationes, as Brito says.45

.. Ibid., q. 4 (ed. Venet., 39vb): " . . . dieo quod diffinitio logiea est duplex. Una est quae datur ex terminis logicalibus, alia est diffinitio logica quae datur ex genere et differentia quamvis haec non sit in terminis logicalibus. Modo quocumque modo ac­ cipiatur diffinitio logica, ibi ponitur aliquid reale. Si coim accipiatur ultimo modo, non est dubium. Si edam primo modo, adhuc ponitur ibi aliquid reale, quia istae in­ tentiones logicales habent diffinire per sua obiecta." 45 Ibid., q. 6 (ed. Venet., 4 I va): "Tunc dieD duo ad quaestionem, primo quod praedicamentum logicum et metaphysicum quantum ad rem non distinguuntur, se­ cunda dieo quod quantum ad rationes formales secundum quas considerantur a metaphysico et a logico distinguuntur. Primum declaratur sic, quia illa non distingu­ untur quantum ad rem quorum sunt eaedem proprietates reales; sed praedica­ mentum logicum et metaphysicum sunt huiusmodi; ergo etc . . . Quantum ad rationes formales distinguuntur, quia logicus considerat praedicamenta penes modos praedi­ candi superioris de inferiori et penes illud praedicamentum logicum est praedica­ mentum formaliter. Sed praedicamentum metaphysicum non dicitur metaphysicum penes modos praedicandi superioris de inferiori, sed magis ut est quaedam differ­ entia entis."

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157

Brito maintains that a category has the same properties whether it is considered logically or metaphysically because of his doctrine of second intentions. Second intentions attributed to categories rep­ resent real common modes of being, which are attributed to cate­ gories according to their real being. Thus, for Brito the logical con­ sideration of the categories differs from the metaphysical one because they consider the same properties in a different way, not be­ cause they consider different properties. In logic, such properties are considered as properties of a hierarchy of predicates; in meta­ physics, they are considered as properties of a difference of being. As we have seen, Scotus adopts a different view, for he thinks that the logical properties of categories are not identical with the real properties considered by metaphysics. Whereas metaphysics con­ siders real properties pertaining to categories as types of mind-in­ dependent essences, logic considers the properties attributed to cat­ egories insofar as categories are concepts and mental entities. Such logical properties are caused by the intellect and represent the mode in which the intellect conceives categories, not their modes of being.

8.

The subject matter qf the Categories

Thanks to his doctrine of how logic studies categories, Scotus can give an original solution to the classical question concerning the subject matter of the Categories. Since something can constitute the subject matter of a science only if it has some kind of unity, Scotus's contemporaries commonly hold that there must be a common and unifying notion under which categories are studied in logic, pro­ vided that their consideration in logic is scientific. The way in which categories can constitute a single subject matter in metaphysics is not controversial. The common answer is that categories are studied in metaphysics as they have an analogical unity, because each category is attributed to substance as one of its features. Consequently the being of accidental categories can be somehow reduced to the being of substance. Aristotle himself pro­ vides the ground for this answer since he says that the question about being can be reduced to the question about substance.46 Scotus, in his logical commentaries, agrees that categories, meta16

Met. VII, I , I 028b2·4.

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physically speaking, have an analogical unity centered on substance, to which all accidents are attributed.47 But what gives unity to the logical study of categories? Here, Aristotle cannot be of any help, so different authors propose various solutions. They all stress, however, the importance of notions such as 'sayable'

(dicibile)48 and 'capable of being ordered in a genus' (or­ dinabile in genere). In the first half of the thirteenth century, several authors had already maintained that the subject matter of the Cate­ gories is the incomplex sayable being, capable of being ordered in a genus!9 Johannes Pagus, whose commentary on the Categories date 47 Duns Scatus Super Praed., q. 2, n. 1 1 (OPh, I, 260): " ... ens non convenit univoce omni enti extra animam . . . ". Ibid" q. 4, n. 38 (OPh, I, 285): "Ideo lens' a rneta­ physico in IV et VII M,taphysic.. ponitur analogum ad substantiam et accidens, quia scilicet haec quae significantur, in essendo habent ordinem . . ... Scatus consistently holds the opinion that being is analogous to the categories, metaphysically speaking, because the accidental categories are really ordered to and dependent on substance: see Ord. I, d. 3, p. I , q. I , nn. 162-63 (ed. Vat., III, 100-01). Scotus, however, changes his mind concerning the logical issue of the univocity/equivocity of being, since he first thinks that the term 'being' signifies each category separately, then he comes to maintain that 'being' signifies a single concept whenever it is used to refer to a cate­ gory or a categorial item. See S. P. Marrone, "The Notion of Univocity in Duns Scotus's Early Writings," Franciscan Studils 43 (1983): 347-95. On Scotus's notion of univocity in general, see S. D. Dumont, "The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Fourteenth Century: John Duns Scotus and William Alnwick," M,dituval Studils 49 (1987): 1-31; Dumont, "Transcendental Being: Scotus and Scotists," Topoi I I (1992): 135-48; Dumont, "Srotus's Doctrine of Univocity and the Medieval Tradi­ tion of Metaphysics,n in Was ist PhiLosophit im Mittelalter? Alden des X. Internationalm Kongressesfor millelalterliche Philosophil der Sociiti InternatWnak pour I'Etwk ik la Phiwso­ phil Mtdiivak, ed. J. Aertsen and A. Speer, Miscellanea MediaevaJia 26 (Berlin-New York: de Gruyter, 1998), 193-212; O. Boulnois, J,an Duns Scol sur la connaissanc, d, Dieu el l'univoati ik l'llanl: OrdinalUi 1 - DistinctWn 3 - I" parti.; OrdinatW 1 - Distinction 8 - I" parti.; CollatW 24 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1988). 48 The notion of dicibilt, 'sayable', possibly derived from the Stoic [elUon, is known to Latin authors thanks to Augustine (?) De diakctica, IV (ed. Pinborg" 127), which is quoted by John of Salisbury M,talogicon, III, 5 (ed. Webb, 142). See N. Kretzmann, "Medieval Logicians and the Meaning of Propositio," Journal if Phiwsop/v! 67 (1970): 773; G. Nuchelmans, Theories if 1M PropositWn: Ancienl and Medilvai Conc,ptWns if 1M Bearers if Truth and Falsi!JI (Amsterdam-London: North Holland Pub. Co. 1970), 1 16; A. Graeser, "The Stoic Theory of Meaning," in The Stoics, ed.J. M. Rist (Bedeley­ Los Angeles-London: University of California Press, 1978), 88. On the Stoic kkton, see A. A. Long, "Language and Thought in Stoicism," in Problems in Stoicism, ed. A. A. Long (London: University of London-The Athlone Press, 1971), 75-113; M. Frede, "The Stoic Notion of a [ekton," in Companions to Ancient Thought. 3. LAnguage, ed. S. Everson (Cambridge: CUp, 1994), 109-28. 49 See C. LaBeur, ""Logique et theorie de l'argumentation dans Ie "Guide de l'e­ tudiant" (c. 1230-1240) du ms. Ripoll 109," Diawgue 29 (1 990), 340, 353 n. 14; R. Andrews, "Thomas of Erfurt on the Categories in Philosophy" , in Was isl Phiwsophie im Mitlelalterl, 801-08.

SCOTUS ON THE LOGICAL CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORIES

1 59

to c. 1 230, adopted this opinion and John of Siccavilla described it as famous.5o All authors writing in the thirteenth century seem to adopt it. Kilwardby, for example, connects the two notions of dicibile and ordinabile, and interprets them in the framework of the old view of logic as a sermocinal science. The subject matter that gives unity to the logical study of categories is the notion of signifYing expression (sermo significativus), strongly reminiscent of Boethius. Kilwardby links the notion of signifYing expression to that of ordinatio - i.e. the respective order among expressions of different generality - and to that of dicibile i.e. what signifYing expressions signify.51 Albert the Great maintains that the unitary subject of the logical study of cat­ egories is the notion of "capable of being ordered as a predicate or as a subject insofar as something is designed by a term indicating such an order." This amounts to saying that categories are studied in logic as they are subjects and predicates ordered into different kinds according to their different modes of predication and, within each kind, according to different degrees of universality. 52 The same opinion, only slightly modified, is also common around the end of the thirteenth century. Thomas Sutton proposes the no­ tion of "being signified by an incomplex term, which acts as a term in a syllogism."53 Peter of Auvergne introduces the notion of "being incomplex as it is capable of being ordered in a genus."54 Martin of -

50 See Ebbesen, "Philoponus, 'Alexander' and the Origins of Medieval Logic," 459; Johannes de Sieeavilla (?) (Robertus Kilwardby attrib.) Notulae super PTaediea· menta, quoted in O. Lewry, Robert Kilwardby's Writings on the Logica vetus, 9 1 : "" .ct est quaedam celebris opinio quae ponit quod ens incomplexum dicibile ordinatum in genere est hie subiectum . . . " See also Andrews, "Thomas of Erfurt/' 806. 5 1 Robert Kilwardby Notulat super Praed. (ed. Lewry, 369. 1 9·25): ')\d quod no­ tandum quod unitas istius sciencie est ab unitate generis subiecti; genus autem subiectum est simplex sermo significativus, que quidem significado non absoluitur ab ardine, que quidem ordinacio non est separata a rebus. Non sunt ergo genera prima secundum se distincta subiectum, set magis ut sit ad unum dicibile, ipsum or­ dinabile, in quo quidem conueniunt et uniuntur ipsa genera prima." 52 Albert the Great Liber de Praed. I, I (ed. Borgnet, 95a): "Ex his planum est quid sit huius libri subiectum: est enim subiectum ordinabile in ratione praedicabilis vel subiicibilis, secundum quod stat sub voce talem ordinem signante. Et sic patet qualiter ista scientia est una ab uno subiecto. Partes autem huius subiecti sunt or­ dinabilia secundum diversum modum praedicandi in substantia, et accidente et in accidentibus secundum omnia novem genera accidentium." 53 Thomas Sutton In Cat. (ed. Conti, 193). � Peter of Auvergne Super Praed., q. 2 (ed. Andrews, 1 0): .. . . . talia sunt praedica­ menta, attribuuntur enim enti incomplexo secundum quod ordinabile in genere . . . "

1 60

CHAPTER FIVE

Dacia adopts the same opinion. He affirms that the subject matter of the

Categories is the incomplex sayable, identical with the capacity

of acting as a subject or a predicate (ratio subicibilis or praedicabilis). 55 Simon of Faversham maintains that the Categories considers things insofar as they are attributed to the "incomplex sayable being, capable of being ordered in a genus according to different degrees of universality." For example, the

Categories

studies sub­

stance and other categories insofar as in each category there is something capable of being ordered according to its universality. 56 The same opinion is present in Brito, who thinks that the subject matter of the

Categories

is categories considered as "incomplex

sayables capable of being ordered in a genus according to different degrees of universality."57 Brito also says that categories, considered in this way, have a unity of analogy, because they all are attributed to the notion according to which they are considered. 58 He presents this opinion as the one on which all commentators agree. Scotus does not agree with this view. He is aware of this opinion, but he criticizes it. He sees two main faults in the notion of 'incom­ plex being capable of being ordered in a genus'. First, if that notion refers to an extramental being, as Brito's conception of second in­ tentions seems to require, then it is an accidental notion consisting of an aggregate of extramental and mind-dependent beings. The extramental aspect is the notion of being whereas the mind-depen­ dent aspect is the reference to notions such as

capable qf being ordered in a genus,

sayable, incomplex, and

which all are second intentions rel-

" Martin of Daeia Super Prad, q. 2 (ed. Roos, 1 56). �6 Simon of Faversham Super Praed., q. I (ed. Mazzarella, 74): "Similiter omnia que hie [sell., in libro Predicamentorum] considerantur, hahent attributionem ad unum, et ilIud est ens dicibile incomplexum ordinabile in genere secundum sub et supra." " Radulphus Brito Super Praed., q. 3 (ed. Venet., 38vb-39ra): "Dieo quod dieibile incomplexum ordinabile in genere secundum sub et supra est hie subiectum, quia illud quod est primo natum in scientia ilia sub cuius ratione omnia hie determinata determinantur et de quo et cuius partibus hie determinatur et ad quod omnia hie de­ terminata habent attributionem est hie subiectum. Sed dicibile incomplexum est huiusmodi. Ideo etc." 58 Ibid., q. 1 (ed. Venet., 37va): " . . . omnia praedieamenta hie considerantur ut sunt dicibilia incomplexa ordinabilia in genere secundum sub et supra. . . Unde no­ tandum est quod ad unitatem scientiae non requiritur unitas scibilis secundum genus vel secundum speciem, sed sufficit unitas analogiae vel attributionis, sicut meta­ physica est una scientia quae est de ente quod est unum secundum attributionem. Ita dieD in proposito quod unitas subiecti in ista scientia non requirit quod sit unitas [ed.: una] secundum genus vel secundum speciem, sed sufficit quod sit unitas secundum attributionem ad hoc quod ista scientia dicatur una."

SCOTUS ON THE LOGICAL CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORIES

161

ative to the understanding o f our intellect. Second, if the notion of 'incomplex being capable of being ordered in a genus' is meant to refer only to mind-dependent being, it incurs in the defect of useless repetition

(nugatio),

both because mind-dependent being is included

in each element of the notion and because sayable, incomplex, and ca­ pable if being ordered in a genus all imply one another, since what is predicable is capable of being ordered in a genus and the other way around, and only what is incomplex is predicated. Consequently, the subject matter of the logical study of categories would be a random series of qualifications repeating the same thing several times. 59 Notwithstanding some slight differences in formulation, the de­ fenders of the traditional opinion on the subject matter of the

egories assume

Cat­

that logic considers categories as predicates, for they

seem to take 'sayable' as a synonym of 'predicate'. Perhaps Scotus's motivation for criticizing them is that he maintains that it is not suf­ ficient to say that categories can be considered as genera of predi­ cables capable of being ordered according to their universality, for the capacity of being ordered in a genus is not a sufficient condition to be a category. Fictitious entities, too - which do not have real ex­ istence - and second intentions - which have a merely intentional existence - can be ordered in genera according to the way in which they are predicated. According to Scotus, however, neither fictitious entities nor second intentions belong to a category. Their ordering does not constitute a category because the necessary and sufficient condition for belonging to a category is to have an essence of a cer­ tain kind, not to be capable of being ordered in a certain genus. If the subject matter of the

Categories were

'being capable of being or­

dered in a genus,' fictitious and purely mental entities would be part of their scope, but this is false. For Scotus, the Categories only deals with real categories considered insofar as they are understood.60 Scotus's own opinion on the subject matter of the Categories is linked with his tenet that logic studies categories to the extent that some properties caused by reason are attributed to them. He con­ tends that a notion caused by the intellect and attributed to the cat­ egories can be univocal to all the categories, even though the cate­ gories themselves are related to one another by real analogy. In fact, " Duns Seotus Super Pra,d., q . 2, nn. 10- 1 8 (OPh, I, 260-62). Ibid., q. 1 1 , nn. 1 1- 1 4 (OPh, I, 345-47).

60

1 62

CHAPTER FIVE

nothing prevents a notion caused by the intellect from having a unity greater than the unity of the thing to which it is attributed. Scotus can adopt this position because of his doctrine of second in­ tentions, according to which the cause of second intentions is the intellect and not an extramental thing taken according to one of its modes of being. Consequendy, second intentions attributed to things not necessarily reflect the real modes of being of things. Thus, there is no need to postulate a single mode of being corre­ sponding to the univocal intentional notion that the intellect attrib­ utes to categories. Scotus calls such a univocal intentional notion

category or most common genus. Since

the logical consideration of cat­

egories takes into account properties of the categories considered, not as different types of beings, but as understood as categories and most common genera, 'category' and 'most common genus' are the notions giving unity to Aristode's

Categories:

Therefore one can answer that here the ten categories are considered insofar as something caused by reason is attributed to them, since they cannot be considered by the logician otherwise. And in that way they have not only a unity of analogy, but also of univocity. And that no­ tion univocal to them, in that way, is something intentional, which is here the first subject-matter and which can be called 'category' or 'most common genus'. For all properties that are here determined of categories er se, are determined of them insofar as categories have the ratio 0 a most common genus or a category.6 1

l

Scotus's solution amounts to saying that

genus are

category

and

most common

second intentions describing the mode in which our intel­

lect understands categories. Since categories are studied in logic in­ sofar as intentional properties pertain to them, and since intentional properties pertain to categories insofar as categories are considered according to the mode in which our intellect understands them, Scotus concludes that category (praedicamentum), or most common genus (generalissimum), is the unifYing notion of the logical study of cate­ gories. 61 Ibid., q. 2, n. 19 (OPh, I, 262): "Ideo diei potest quod hie eonsideratur de decem praedicamentis in quantum eis attribuitur aliquid causatum a ratione, quia aliter non possunt considerari a logico. Et ilia modo non habent fantum unitatem analogiac, sed etiam univocationis; et illud univocum istis ilia modo est aliquod intentionale, quod est hie primum subiectum. mud potest nominari 'praedicamentum' vel 'gener­ alissimum', quia amnes proprietates quae per se determinantur hie de istis, determi­ nantur de eis in quantum habent rationem generalissirni vel praedicamenti."

SCOTUS ON THE LOGICAL CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORIES

1 63

By his conception of logic as the science that takes into account the modes of understanding and not the modes of being of things, Scotus thus provides an elegant and simple solution to the old ques­ tion of the subject matter of the matter of the

Categories is

genus because Aristotle's

Categories.

He says that the subject

the notion of category or most common

Categories

considers categories as under­

stood by our intellect, and our intellect understands categories as categories or most common generic concepts.

9.

The properties if categories

Scientific knowledge of the categories must meet certain criteria. Its subject matter must be one, as we have already said. Moreover, it must be possible to demonstrate that some properties inhere in that subject matter. These are the properties Aristotle treats in his Cate­ gories. I have already drawn the attention to the fact that Scotus thinks that those properties are intentional whereas others maintain that they are real. In the

Categories,

much space is devoted to the properties per­

taining to categories, but not much else is said concerning each cat­ egory. Why does Aristotle consider the properties pertaining to cat­ egories in more detail than he considers categories themselves? Simon of Faversham maintains that the science of categories deals with the properties of categories because their essence is unknown to us. Consequently, in order to know something about categories, the only viable option is to study their properties.62 Scotus, however, does not agree with this position, for he maintains that the logical consideration of categories has nothing to do with the study of their essence. The fact that the essence of categories is unknown to us does not explain why the

Categories

studies the properties of cate­

gories more than categories themselves. 62 Simon of Faversham Super Praed., q. I (ed. Mazzarella, 73): "Sed scientia de predicamentis habetur ex prioribus nobis, posterioribus autem simpliciter; essencie eoim predicamentorum nobis occulte sunt, skU( essencia cuiuslibet rei. Et ideo Philosophu5 in determinando de predicamentis, solum determinat de eis quod ip­ sorum proprietates, ut quoad substantia non suscipit magis et minus, et quod sub­ stantie nihil est contrarium, et talia quantum ad hune acturn substare; et secundum hoc comparat substantiam prirnam et secundam ad invicem. Et omnia ista sunt pos­ teriora simpliciter quiditate substantie, priora tamen quoad nos."

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According to Brito, the Categories considers the properties of cat­ egories but only by accident, in order to have a better under­ standing of categories in their real being. Such an understanding of the real being of categories is necessary in order to acquire an un­ derstanding of categories as foundations of second intentions.63 In fact, it is a consequence of Brito's doctrine of second intentions that an understanding of second intentions depends on an under­ standing of the things to which they are attributed since those things are the causes of intentions. Scotus, however, sees things differendy. I have already said that he thinks that logic considers intentional and not real properties. He also maintains that those properties constitute the proper subject with which the Categories deals per se, whereas categories are consid­ ered only by accident. Accordingly, Scotus provides an account op­ posite to Brito's, for Brito maintains that the

Categories studies

cate­

gories per se and their properties by accident, whereas Scotus thinks that the

per se.

Categories studies categories by accident and their properties

Categories are studied in logic only insofar as intentional

properties caused by the intellect are attributed to them. These properties are what logic considers per se. The categories, as types of being, are not the causes of such properties, but only the occasion, according to Scotus's doctrine of intentions. Thus, only insofar as categories are the occasions for such properties does logic considers them.

1 0. The causes if categories The commentators writing at the end of thirteenth century agree that there can be scientific knowledge of categories in logic even though they do not always agree on what the subject matter of that knowledge is, on which properties logic demonstrates, and on which role such properties play in Aristode's

Categories. Another character-

63 Radulphus Brito Super Praed., q. 2, (ed. Venet., 38vb): " . . . istae passiones non sunt per se et primo intentae, sed propter maiorem cognitionem praedicamentorum secundum suum esse reale, ex qua maiori cognitione praedicamentorum ipsa sunt magis nota ut supra ipsa fundantur intentiones secundae. Et sic logiells, quasi in­ duens sibi formam metaphysici, multa de praedicamentis secundum esse reale deter­ minat propter hoc quia cognitio praedicamentorum secundum suum esse reale valet ad cognitionem eorum ut supra ipsa fundantur intentiones secundae."

SCOTUS ON THE LOGICAL CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORIES

1 65

istic of scientific knowledge is that it is knowledge of causes. Cate­ gories, however, are unanimously regarded as first principles and as not reducible to anything more fundamental. Consequently, cate­ gories are said to have no cause. Therefore, all commentators face the question of how it is possible to have scientific knowledge of cat­ egories, if the categories themselves do not have causes. Peter of Auvergne solves this problem by extending the meaning of 'scientific knowledge'. He says that it is not true that every sci­ ence is knowledge through causes, for a science can also be a non­ causal knowledge by definition and description. This is the case of categories, which are studied in logic by virtue of definitions and

descriptions. 64

Like Peter of Auvergne, Simon of Faversham solves this problem by saying that the science of categories is not knowledge though causes. First, he maintains that logic provides not a science of cate­ gories, properly speaking, but a science of their properties, because the essences of categories are unknown. Second, Simon of Faver­ sham maintains that the study of the properties of categories is un­ dertaken through effects (scientia quia), not through causes (scientia This means that in studying categories we start from

propter quid).

what is first to us, not from what is first by nature, as it is apparent from the fact that in the

Categories

Aristotle lists several properties

without deducing them by any principle.65 Such a deduction is im­ possible since it would be a deduction of properties from the G4 Peter of Auvergne Super Praed., q. I (ed. Andrews, 9): "Cum quaeritur utrum de praedicamentis possit esse scientia, dicendum est: ad hoc quod de aliquo sit scientia requiritur quod ipsum habeat causam et etiam causam per se . . . Requiritur etiam quod ipsum sit universale. . . Nihilominus tamen potest esse scientia de aliquo, quae idem est quod certa cognitio ipsius, et haec datur per definitiones et descriptiones; et hoc modo patest esse scientia de praedicamentis, cognoscuntur enim per quosdam deflnitiones et descriptiones. Et cum non habeatur de praedicamentis scientiam per causam, cum ipsa non haheant causam, tamen isto modo per definitiooes et descrip­ tiones potest de hiis esse scientia." 6.S Simon of Faversham SUP" Praed., q. I (ed. Mazzarella, 74): .. . . . demonstracio autem duplex est, scilicet demonstracio quia et demonstracio propter quid; et ideo scientia duplex est, quedam adquisita per demonstracionem propter quid et quedam adquisita per demonstracionem quia. Prima habetur per causarn, secunda non; et per talem demonstracionem habetur scientia libri Predicamentorum: habetur ex pri­ oribus quoad nos, non ex prioribus quoad naturam; et ideo concedo quod ipsa non est per causam." See also ibid. (ed. Mazzarella, 73): "Sic ergo de predicamentis est scientia, et ilia non est ex prioribus et nocioribus simpliciter, sed ex prioribus et 00cioribus quoad nos. Unde Philosophus hic non procedit demonstrative, sed magis nominative et exemplariter. II

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essence of categories, but the essence of categories, according to Simon, is unlmown.66 Radulphus Brito maintains that there are two possible replies to the question concerning the causes of categories. Brito's first reply

is identical to Simon of Faversham's: the science of categories is a science that argues not through causes through effects

(scientia quia).

(scientia propter quit!)

but

The science of categories demon­

strates that some properties pertain to a category by examining in­ dividual cases and by assuming the existence of a universal property by induction from individual effects. For example, logic demon­ strates that the property of not being in a subject pertains to sub­

stance because neither first nor second substances are in a subject.6 7 Brito's second reply to the question concerning the causes of cat­ egories is that categories have causes but only when reason con­ siders them as something sayable. Such causes are the modes of being of categories, from which the modes of predications are taken. Brito, however, admits that Aristotle does not proceed in that way in his

Categories since

the categories. 68

he only provides an

a posteriori science

of

Scotus's solution to this problem is similar to Brito's second an­ swer, but with an important difference. Scotus thinks that cate­ gories, considered by themselves as types of beings, do not have causes. Categories have causes, however,

if considered according to

their properties, especially their intentional properties, which inhere

66

See above, n. 62. Radulphus Brito Super haed., q. I (ed. Venet., 37ra� " . . . de praedicamentis est scientia quia. Scire quia est quando aliquid scitur a posteriori et ab effectu et per partes sive per causas remotas. Modo Philosophus dat hie nobis scientiam de praedicamentis a posteriori, ut [ed.: unde] quando probat substantiam non esse in subiecto, hoc probal a posteriori et per partes substantiae, scilicet dicendo "prima substantia non est in subiecto,secunda substantia non est in subiecto, ergo etc." " See also ibid. (ed. Venet., 37vb): "Dico quod de ipsis [scil., praedicamentis] non est sci­ entia per demonstrationem propter quid, cuius medium est diffinitio subiecti,tamen per demonstrationem quia et divisionem potest esse scientia de ipsis etc." 68 Ibid. (ed. Venet., 37va-b): '�d primam [scil., rationem] , cum dicitur "omnis sci­ entia est per causam, " verum est loquendo de scientia propter quid, sed scientia quia non oportet esse per causam . . . vel potest negari minor, quia licet praedicamenta se­ cundum esse reale non habeant causam propter quam possint sciri... tamen praedicamenta considerata ut habent rationem dicibilem bene habent causas sicut modos essendi ex quibus sumuntur modi praedicandi ipsorum. Tunc isto modo non dat hie Philosophus scientiam de istis,immo a posteriori, ut dictum est. " 67

SCOTUS ON THE LOGICAL CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORIES

167

i n them insofar a s they are considered by reason.69 Scotus, like Brito, thinks that the science of categories can be a science through causes because it studies categories insofar as reason considers them. Scotus also thinks, however, that those causes of categories are not the modes of being from which the modes of predication are taken. In fact, according to his doctrine of second intention, the intellect and not the modes of being cause the intentional properties studied by logic. Therefore, Scotus maintains that the causes of cat­ egories with respect to their intentional properties are the modes in which the intellect understands the categories, not their modes of being.

I I.

Things in the Categories

By the end of the thirteenth century, as we have seen, everybody agreed that Aristotle's Categories was a treatise on categories as con­ sidered in logic. Although there were different views on how logic considers categories, all commentators held that such a logical con­ sideration must be distinguished from a metaphysical one. Meta­ physics considers categories as things and types of being, whereas logic considers them differently, either according to some common modes of being or as genera of predicates or as foundations of second intentions or as concepts. Why, then, does Aristotle's

Categories

mainly consist of remarks

concerning things, not predicates or concepts? As a matter of fact, much of what Aristotle says in his Categories seems to be at odds with the interpretation of that work as a logical, not a metaphysical, trea­ tise on the categories. Porphyry had provided a classic response to this problem, which was known to Latin commentators through Boethius. Both Por­ phyry and Boethius say that in the

Categories Aristotle

takes into ac-

69 Duns Scotus Super Praed., q. 2, n. 28 (OPh, I, 264): ''l\d primum argumentum principale dieD quod licet illorum [scil., praedicamentorum] in se non sit aliqua causa, tamen respectu suarum passionum habent causam, praecipue respectu pas­ sionum intentionalium quae insunt eis in quantum considerantur a ratione. Et quod dicitur "nihil est prius cis naturaliter", verum est in se; tamen respectu inhaerentiae passionis intentionalis potest eis aliquid esse prius naturaliter."

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count the ten terms signifying the ten genera of things. Since the terms are taken into account insofar as they signifY something and since they signifY things, it is not surprising that the logician consid­ ering the significative terms also considers what they signifY, namely things. Thus, Porphyry and Boethius conclude that this is why the Categories contains many observations concerning things and not termsJo Scotus moves an objection to this response. If we say, with Por­ phyry and Boethius, that logic deals with things because it deals with terms signifYing things, it follows that logicians should have a definite understanding of things because when one of two correla­ tives (i.e. a term signifying a thing) is understood, the other (i.e. the thing signified) is understood as well. This conclusion, Scotus ob­ serves, is unwanted, for logicians do not have a definite under­ standing of things, because this is something only metaphysicians can acquire. One could respond that a term is primarily a sign of a concept, not of a thing, according to a doctrine of signification widespread in the thirteenth centuryJ l Again, Scotus objects that a concept is in turn a sign of a thing, so logicians, if they deal with categories as concepts, should also deal with them as things. Scotus remarks that this argument not only is against Boethius's (and Por­ phyry's) explanation of why Aristotle speaks of things in the

gories,

Cate­

but it also risks undermining the notion of logic as a science

dealing with concepts. Scotus, however, points out that it is not nec­ essary that, when a relative item is understood, its correlative is also understood in all its features. In fact, those who understand a rela­ tive item must understand only the features pertaining to its correl­ ative insofar as it is a correlative. It is true, then, that in order to know categories as concepts we have to know the things of which such concepts are signs, but it is sufficient to know such things only to the extent that they are represented by concepts, not insofar as they are things by themselves. It is therefore clear that logicians must know things only to the extent that they are represented by 70 Porphyry In Cat. 58.21 -29; Boethius In Cat., 163B: '1\tque ideo necesse fuit quo­ dammodo disputationem de rebus quoque misceri, ita (ut dictum est) ut non aliter nisi ex rebus proprietates in sermonibus apparerent, atque ita non de rebus proprie, sed de praedicamentis, id est, de ipsis rerum significativis vocihus in eo quod signifi­ cantes sunt serien disputationis orditur." 11 See Duns Scotus Super Periherm., op. sec., nn. 4-6 (ed. Vives, I, 583). See Pini, "Species, Concept, and Thing," 25-27.

SCOTUS ON THE LOGICAL CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORIES

1 69

concepts. Scotus can conclude that what Aristotle says about things in the

Categories

concerns things not by themselves, but only insofar

as they are represented by concepts. 72 Interestingly, Brito faces the same problem but assumes a dif­ ferent position. He thinks that Aristotle in the

Categories

considers

categories as things in order to obtain an understanding of the second intentions founded on them. Because of his doctrine of second intentions, Brito maintains that we have an understanding of second intentions only if we know the things on which such inten­ tions are founded. Consequently, he thinks that logicians must as­ sume the metaphysicians' role and must consider things, which are the foundations and causes of intentions. For this reason logicians study many things concerning the real being of categories. 73 While Brito thinks that it is due to the very nature of second in­ tentions that logic deals with things and with categories as types of being, Scotus maintains that the consideration of things is merely accidental to logic. It is true that Aristotle in his

Categories

often

speaks about things, but he does so only in order to shed more light on intentional predicates. Speaking about things is pedagogically useful, but not necessary to obtain knowledge of intentions.74 Scotus does not hesitate to say that Aristotle is rather careless with the ex­ amples he provides.75 Aristotle often speaks of things only to show

" Duns &otus Super Praed., q. I , nn. 22-26 (OPh, I, 255-56): "Contra hoc: "cog­ nito uno correlativorum definite, cognoscitur et reliquum," per Aristotelem cap. 'De relatione'. Ergo si logicus considerat vocem in quantum est significativa rei, oportet eum cognoscere rem definite. Quod videtur inconveniens . . . Ad primum istorum postest did quod vox non est primo signum rei sed conceptus, quem oportet logicum considerare non ut primum subiectum, sed propter cognitionem primi subiecti. Contra: conceptus est ulterius signum rei; igitur adhuc sequitur quod 0poftet rem cognosci. Istud argumentum non est tantum contra Boethium, sed etiam contra di­ centes logicam esse de conceptibus. Ideo potest dici quod non oportet propter unius relativi cognitionem alterum cognosci quantum ad omnia quae sibi insunt in se, sed tantum quantum ad ilia quae insunt ei in quantum refertur ad aliud. Hoc autem modo non est inconveniens rem cognosci in logica in quantum est significatum per conceptum." " Radulphus Brito Super Praed., q. 2 (ed. Venet., 38va), quoted above, n. 63. 74. Duns Scotus Super Praed., q. 2, n. 7 (OPh, I, 259): "Et si de aliquibus aliis quae istis generalissimis insunt, in quantum sunt entia, hie determinatur, hoe non est prin­ cipaliter ad propositum. sed ad maiorem manifestationem ilIorum quantum ad praedicata intentionalia." 7.5 Ibid., q. 5, n. 21 (OPh, I, 299): "Sicut communiter de exemplis non multum curat [scil., Aristoteles] nisi quod sint vera ut sunt ad propositum, hoc est quod ars sua sit vera in eis."

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something about the logical notions attributed to them, and he often mentions other people's opinions not because he agrees with them but in order to show that the science concerning such things is true. In other words, he is not interested so much in how things are but in putting forward some logical remarks on the way we under­ stand things. Thus, Scotus observes that one should not pay too much attention to Aristotle's examples, especially in his logical works.16

76 Ibid, q. 20, n. 25 (OPh, I, 4 1 2): "Ita, frequenter, quando loquitur [scil., Aris­ toteles] de aliquo, ubi non est proprius locus determinandi veritatem, de illo utitur communi sententia aliorum, usque alibi ubi locus est de ilio veritatem determinare; dummodo ars possit dari secundum sententias aliorum sicut et secundum veritatem propriam. Ita paene de omnibus exemplis in logica; quia si sic sit vel non, non curat; sed quod ars sit vera in istis, si haec sint talia."

CHAPTER SIX SCOTUS'S READING OF ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES'

So far I have shown how Scotus's approach to logic and second in­ tentions has influenced his interpretation of Aristotle's Categories. Scotus maintains that logic is the science dealing with the modes in which our intellect understands things and that those modes do not reflect the modes in which things are, for second intentions are con­ cepts representing modes of understanding things and not modes of being. Like many of his contemporaries, Scotus regards the Cate­

gories as

a work devoted to the logical study of the highest genera,

but he also maintains that the properties studied in the not real but intentional. Accordingly, the

Categories

Categories are

deals with the

way we know the basic kinds of beings, not with the way in which the basic kinds of beings are. Of course, Scotus must also account for the numerous passages where Aristotle seems to be talking about things and not about the mode in which we know them. According to Scotus, those passages deal with extramental things only acciden­ tally, for things are considered as providing an occasion for second intentions to be caused. In the previous chapter I gave a general account of how Scotus reads the Categories. In this chapter I intend to follow Aristotle's Cat­

egories

more closely in order to reconstruct Scotus's interpretation

topic by topic. As will become evident, Scotus's reading is remark­ ably coherent and original.

I.

Equivocity and univocity

Since Late Antiquity, interpreters have debated for which reason Aris­ totle opens the Categories with a presentation of homonymy, syn­ onymy, and paronymy since the first chapter of his treatise seems to be disconnected from what follows. Interpreters have sometimes tried to explain it in the light of the treatment of categories in chapter four. 1 1

See above, Introduction, n. 10.

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CHAPTER SIX

Attempts of this kind were common at the end of the thirteenth century. Peter of Auvergne maintains that homonymy bespeaks the relationship between being, which is above the categories, and the cat­ egories themselves. On the other hand, synonymy bespeaks the rela­ tionship between the categories and the things contained in them. Fi­ nally, paronymy bespeaks the relationship between things belonging to different categories.2 Some traditional questions have always been asked concerning homonymy, synonymy, and paronymy. The foremost question is: What kind of items are said to be homonymous, synonymous, and paronymous? It is clear from what Aristotle says that he regards things and not words as homonymous and synonymous, even though it is true that in at least one occasion he also refers to syn­ onymous words.3 Late ancient commentators developed a classical solution to this problem, which Boethius adopted and handed down to medieval commentators. It is said that things are homonymous and synonymous insofar as they are considered in relation to words signifying them by virtue of concepts" Scotus belongs to this tradition. Like Boethius and his Latin fol­ lowers, he calls homonyms 'equivocals', synonyms 'univocals', and paronyms 'denominatives'. It is a consequence of Porphyry and Boethius's approach that the relationships of homonymy and of synonymy can be considered either actively or passively. They are considered actively when the relationship from the word to the thing is taken into account whereas they are considered passively when what is taken into account is the relationship from the thing to the word. Specifically, Scotus calls the word with respect to which two or more things are equivocal 'equivocating' calls the corresponding things 'equivocated'

(aequivocans), and he (aequivocata).5 He also

says that, when something is said to be equivocal, it is considered according to two different relations. According to a first relation, such a thing is related to the other things equivocally signified by the

, Peter of Auvergne Super Praed., q. 7 (ed. Andrews, 15).

3 De gen. et corr. 322b29-32, where Aristotle considers 'contact' as a word said in

many ways. See in general T. Irwin, "Homonymy in Aristotle," Review if Metaphysics 1981 (34): 523·44; Shields, Order in Multiplicity, 1 2 . .. See Luna's notes to Simplicius Commentaire sur les Categories, 43-50. Boethius In Cal. 1 66C. ' Duns Scotus Super haed., q. 5, n. 10 (OPh, I, 295). See E.]. Ashworth, ')\nalogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic: Aquinas in Context," Medieval Studies 54 ( 1 992): 97.

SCOTUS'S READING OF ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES'

1 73

same name. According to a second relation, such a thing is related to the name signifying it.6 Equivocal (or, better, equivocated) things are signified by the same word, but do not have the account

(ratio

in common, as Aristotle says. Similarly to what he says about equivocity, Scotus calls the name designating univocal things 'univocating' (univocans), whereas things

substantiae)

are said to be 'univocated'

(univocata). Two or more

things are uni­

vocated under a name if they have both the name and the account

(ratio substantiae)

in common. Whereas an equivocal name signifies

each of the things equivocated under it, a univocal name does not signify any of the things univocated under it but signifies their common account. For example, the term 'animal' does not signify either man or horse, which are univocated under it, but signifies the common account of animal (something like 'living being capable of motion'), which is common to men and horses. In the case of equiv­ ocity, of course, there is no such a common account. 7 The interpretation of the expression

'ratio substantiae' raises some

problems. Scotus interprets such an expression

as

meaning 'essen­

tial intellect', namely the concept that our intellect forms about the essence of something. If two things can be understood by the same concept, which is in turn signified by the same name, such things are univocated under such a term, whether or not they have essences of the same kind. Scotus thinks that the expression

substantiae'

'ratio

signifies the concept under which an essence is under­

stood, and not the essence or the definition that corresponds to that essence.s There is a great difference between these two interpreta­ tions, for if ratio substantiae is identified with the essence, it follows that all univocal things have the same essence and that consequently they belong to the same category. Peter of John Olivi had already criticized the identity between ratio and essence. According to him, Avicenna was the first to pose that identity, and many authors, in-

6 Duns Scatus Super Praed., q. 5, n. 1 0 (OPh, I, 295-96): "Et ita aequivocum in­ c1udit duplicem relationem et active sumptum et passive: scilicet habitudinem ad ae­ quivocans, quae relatio est suppositionis; et habitudinem ad aliud aequivocatum, quae rclatio est aequiparantiae." 7 Ibid., q. 6, nn. 6-7 (OPh, I, 302-03). 8 Ibid., q. 5, n. I I (OPh, I, 296): .. . . . ratio substantiae, id est essentialis inteUectus. . . " See also Super El. Soph., q. 15, n. 6 (ed. Vives, II, 22). See Ashworth, '1'.nalogy and Equivocation," 1 05.

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CHAPI'ER SIX

eluding perhaps Thomas Aquinas, had then assumed it.9 Scotus elarifies that logicians consider two things as univocal if they are un­ derstood under the same concept, but it is not necessary that those two things have the same essence for this condition to be satisfied. Natural philosophers, by contrast, have a stricter notion of uni­ vocity, and consider two things as univocal only same ultimate form, namely

if they share the if they have the same essence.1O Some

maintain that to have the same account

(ratio substantiae)

implies to

be essentially the same, Scotus admits. He responds that only things that have the same proper and complete account are essentially the same, but this is not the case for univocals, which have the same ac­ count but not the same proper account. I I Scotus maintains this conception of univocity in his theological works. It is thanks to this conception that he can develop his famous and controversial doctrine of the univocity of the concept of being. 12 In his questions on the

Categories, however,

there is no trace

of this doctrine. 1 3 Scotus's conception o f univocity i n his questions o n the

Categories

is also coherent with his conception of intentions, for univocity and equivocity are intentional properties. Consequently, according to Scotus, univocity and equivocity pertain to things insofar as things 9 Peter of John 01ivi Sent. II, q. 7 (ed. Jansen, 1 45-46): "Communis autem opinio quae Avicennam et philosophos sequi videntur tenet quod ubi est dare plures ra­ tiones reales, ibi est dare aliquo modo plures essentias. Probationes autem ad hoc ad­ ducere non videntur curasse) quia hoc pro primo principia videntur fere uhique sup­ posuisse . . . " 10 Duns Scotus Super Prad. q. 7, n. 1 1 (OPh, I, 3 1 0): " . . . univocum apud 10gicum dicitur omne illud quod per unam rationem devenit ad intellectum secundum quam dicitur de multis; apud naturalem non est ornne tale, sed tantum quod est unum se­ cundum ultimam formam completivam. Uncle dicitur VII Physicorum: "In genere rnultae latent aequivocationes", quod tamen logicus non diceret." See also Super Praed., q. 7, nn. 9-10 (OPh, I, 309), concerning what in reality corresponds to the univocal logical notion of a genus. 1 1 Super Ptaed., q. 6, n. 4 (OPh, I, 302): "Item, quorum substantia essentialis est eadem, ipsa sunt eadem essentialiter. Sed univoca univocata habent eandem ra­ tionem substantiae univocantis. Ergo omnia univocata essent eadem essentialiter, quod falsum est, quia sic homo et asinus essent idem essentialiter." Ibid" n. 1 5 (OPh, I, 305): '�d tertium dieD quod quorum est ratio substantiae propria et completa eadem, ipsa sunt eadem; sed univocatorum non est ratio eadem propria, lieet ratio univocantis sit eadem cis, quia ilia nulli univocato est propria." " Duns Scotus Ord. l, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, n. 1 36 (ed. Vat. IV, 221). See S. D. Dumont, "Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus," in Routkdg, History of Philosophy, vol. 3, ed. J. Marenbon (London-New York: Routledge, 1 998): 3 1 9-20. 13 See Marrone, "The Notion of Univocity," 35 1 .

SCOTUS'S READING OF ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES'

1 75

are understood, not insofar as they are taken according to their essence. It follows that Scotus does not consider surprising that Aris­

Categories, for Categories concerns the study of the logical properties of catego­

totle deals with those concepts at the beginning of the the

rial beings, and univocity and equivocity are properties of that kind. I.

2.

Analogy

Sometimes interpreters have spoken of two interpretations of equivocity or homonymy. First, it can be said that two things are equivocal if not only they have different accounts but their accounts also do not have any relationship to one another. Second, it can be said that two things are equivocal if they have the same name and different accounts whether or not their accounts have something in common. According to the latter interpretation, equivocity includes the so-called focal meaning, which pertains to things whose ac­ counts are referred to one and the same thing. According to the former interpretation, between equivocal and univocal things there is room for an intermediate class of things that have different ac­ counts connected to one another in some way. These things are said

to be analogous. 1 5

In the last decades of the thirteenth century, it was common to distinguish among different species of equivocity and analogy. 16 Scotus's position on this issue is noteworthy. He maintains that when we talk of analogy we should distinguish a logical point of view from a metaphysical one. From a logical point of view, uni­ vocity and equivocity are notions mutually exclusive and jointly ex­ haustive, so there is nothing intermediate between them. From a metaphysical point of view, however, there is room for analogy,

14 Duns Scotus Super El. Soph., q. 15, n. 6 (ed. Vives, II, 22): "Unde in re potest esse analogia, sed in voce significante nulla cadit prioritas vel posteriorita� . . . Hoc etiam patet per signum, quia Aristoteles in libro Praedicammtorum, ubi determinat de vo­ cibus significativis, nullam mentionem facit de his quae in re sunt analoga, sed solum ibi de univocis et aequivocis." 15 Irwin, "Homomymy in Aristotle," 1 1- 1 2. 16 Ashworth, '�nalogy and Equivocation," 1 05-22; C. Marmo, Semiotica e linguaggio ",!lUi Scolastica. Pang;, Bologna, E1:fo.rt /270-/330. La semiotica dei modisti (Rom.: Istituto storieo italiano per i1 Mediaeva, 1 994), 325-28.

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which must be seen as the real dependence of one essence on an­ other essenceY First, let us consider the problem of analogy from a logical point of view. Scotus thinks that logic deals with intentional properties of things and with the way things are understood and signified. Like many of his contemporaries, including Simon of Faversham, he dis­ tinguishes three species of analogy. 18 The third kind of analogy is the metaphorical use of a term imposed to signify something prop­ erly and then transferred to signifY something else metaphorically. This kind of analogy may be important in rhetoric and poetry, not in logic. Let us focus on the two first kinds of analogy to which Scotus refers. According to the first kind, there is analogy if a term signifies only one account (ratio) present in different degrees in different things.19 An anonymous commentary on the

Sophistical RifUtations

and Radulphus Brito maintain that the term 'being' is analogous in this way.20 Scotus notices, however, that this kind of analogy,

if con­

sidered by the logician, is a case of univocity. In fact, Scotus main­ tains that it is sufficient for two things to be understood under one account or concept in order for them to be univocal, as we have seen. Thus, logicians do not consider the way in which that account is shared by the univocated things because they only deal with the way in which something is understood and signified, not with the way in which it exists in the extramental world. But the way things participate in the same account is a feature of the extramental

11 See below, n. 23. Scotus moves a detailed criticism to logical analogy also in Super Soph. El., q. 15, nn. 1-8 (ed. Vives, II, 20-23), on which see R. Prentice, "Uni­ vocity and Analogy according to Scotus's Super Libros Elenchorum Aristoltlis," ArchilJts d'histoire liltiraire el doctrinalt du Moyen Age 35 ( 1968): 39-64. On the relationship be­ tween univocity and analogy in Scotus, see O. Boulnois, "Duns Scot, theoicien de I'analogie de I'etre," in Honnefe1der, Wood, and Dreyer, eds. John Duns Scotus. Meta­ physics and Elhics, 293-3 15. " Duns Scotus Super Pra,d., q. 4, nn. 27-29 (OPh, I, 280-82); Simon of Faversham Super Soph. EI. (quaest. novae), q. 9 (ed. Ebbesen ,I al., 1 23-24); Incerti Auctores Super Soph. EI., q. 823 (ed. Ebbesen, 3 1 5- 1 7). 19 Duns Scotus Super Praed., q. 4, n. 27 (OPh, I, 280-8 1): "Ponitur autem analogia in vocibus tripliciter: vel quia significat unam rationem primo, quae in existendo di­ versimocle convenit duobus vel pluribus, quae dicuntur analogata." 20 Incerti Auctores Super Soph. Eltnch, q. 823 (ed. Ebbesen, 3 16); Radulphus Brito Super Phys., q. 14, Utrum ens sit unum rationis ad substanlwm et accidentem, ffiS. Firenze, Bib!. Naz. Centr., Conv. Soppr. E. I . 252, fols. 6rb-7ra. I thank Silvia Donati for calJing my attention to Brito's passage.

SCOTUS'S READING OF ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES'

177

world, not a feature of our way of understanding or signifying something in the extramental world.21 According to the second kind of analogy, there is analogy if a term signifies several accounts

(rationes), which are connected to one

another by a relationship of attribution. This attribution is reflected in the way the analogous term signifies the various accounts since that term signifies one account primarily and the others secondarily. This is the usual way in which people talk about analogy. Peter of Auvergne and Simon of Faversham are some of those who recall this kind of analogy. Specifically, these authors maintain that the term 'being' is analogous in this way.22 Scotus, however, thinks that this analogy is simply impossible, for it presupposes that the mode of signifYing of a term is parallel to the mode of being of an extra­ mental thing. Actually, the defenders of this kind of analogy main­ tain that a term signifies several accounts, primarily and secondarily, because such accounts are real properties attributed to one another. Scotus, however, notices that this assumption confuses logic and metaphysics, i.e. it confuses the mode of signifying of a term with the mode of being of a real property. These two modes should not be confused because there is no necessary relationship between them. In fact, as Scotus remarks, the mode in which a term signifies is determined by the mode in which that term has been imposed to things, but it may happen that a term is first imposed to something that then turns out to be secondary and dependent on another thing. That term, however, has first been imposed to signifY a de­ pendent thing because we know the dependent thing before knowing the thing on which it depends. In other words, the mode of signifying of a term depends on and is parallel to the mode we un­ derstand something, but the mode we understand something does

21 Duns Scotus Super Praed, q. 4, n. 30 (OPh, I, 282): "Voces analogicae primo modo videntur esse apud logicum simpliciter univocae. Quia genus, secundum log­ icum, est simpliciter univocum; licet ratio, quam primo significat, diversis speciebus secundum ordinem conveniat." 22 Peter of Auvergne Super Met. VII, q. 2, ed. A. Monahan in Nine Mediaeval Thinkers: A Collection r!! Hitherto Unedited Texts, ed. J. R. O'Donnell (Toronto: Pontif· ical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1 955), 160: "Ens igitur non dicitur penitus ae­ quivoce, nee etiam penitus uDivQce, sed dicitur de omnibus entibus secundum aoalo­ giam, videlicet secundum diversas rationes, ut habet habitudinem ad aliquam rationem unam." Simon of Faversham Super Soph. El., quaestiones veteres, q. 18 (ed. Ebbesen et al., 78); ibid., quaestiones nouae, q. 9 (ed. Ebbesen et aI., 123-24). See Ash­ worth, ')\nalogy and Equivocation," 1 20.

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not necessarily reflect the mode in which something actually is. 23 Let us now consider things from a metaphysical point of view. Scotus maintains that two things can depend on one another, and in that case they are analogous. The metaphysician, therefore, con­ siders analogy as an intermediate case between having essences dif­ ferent and independent of one another and having the same essence. The logician, however, posits nothing intermediate be­ tween equivocity and univocity because each term signifYing several things either signifies each of them under a different concept or sig­ nifies all of them under the same concept. In the first case, the term is equivocal; in the second, it is univocal. The logician

is not inter­

ested in ascertaining the real relationship holding among the things signified.24 It follows that, according to Scotus, the logician is not entided to speak of analogy, not even in the case of the term 'being'. The term 'being'

is for Scotus equivocal, from a logical point of view. Of

course, we should add that this is Scotus's opinion in his Aristotelian commentaries. In his theological works, Scotus describes the con­ cept of being as univocal. His approach to the issue, however, does not change radically. Both in his logical and in his theological works Scotus holds that only the metaphysician can speak of analogy, which is a real relationship among essences, whereas the logician,

" Duns Scotus Super Prad., q. 4, n. 28 (OPh, 281): ')\Iio modo ponitur analogia in vocibus, quia unum significatur per prius per vocem, et reliquum per posterius. Cuius causa ponitur: quia significare sequitur intelligere. Quod igitur per prius intel­ ligitur alia, si significetur per eandem vocem per quam et illud aliud, per prius sig­ nificabitur. " Ibid., n. 32 (OPh, I, 282-83): "Secundus modus analogiae supra dictus videtur impossibilis. Quia contingit ignorare simpliciter prius, quando nomen im­ ponitur posteriori, quia posterius simpliciter potest esse nobis prius, et ita prius intel­ ligi et prius significari. Si ergo secunda vox ista imponatur priori simpliciter, mani­ festum est quod significabit per posterius illud cui primo imponitur, quia illud semel significavit primo, igitur semper. Vox enim postquam imposita est, non mutatur in significando illud cui imponitur,igitur ordo rerum non concludit ordinem in signifi­ catione vocum." ,. Duns Scotus Super Praed., q. 4, nn. 27-36 (OPh, I, 280-84); n. 38 (OPh, I, 285): "Intelligendum tamen quod vox, quod apud logicum simpliciter aequivoca est, quia scilicet aeque primo importat multa, apud metaphysicum vel naturalem, qui non considerat vocem in significando sed ea quae significantur secundum illud quod sunt, est analoga, propter illud quod ea quae significantur, Hcet non in quantum signifi­ cantur, tamen in quantum existunt, habent ordinem inter se. " (I slightly modified punctuation.)

SCOTUS'S READING OF ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES'

1 79

who deals with the way things are understood and signified, only speaks of equivocity and univocity.25 Scotus remarks that this conclusion explains why in the

Categories

Aristotle mentions only equivocity and univocity but not analogy, Since the

Categories is

a work of logic, Aristotle avoids any reference

to analogy, which Scotus thinks is a metaphysical notion.

3.

Denominatives

After homonyms and synonyms, Aristotle introduces paronyms or, as Latin commentators say, denominatives. Denominative things are signified by terms differing only in their grammatical ending. The main case of denomination discussed in thirteenth century is the re­ lationship between an abstract term, such as 'whiteness' the corresponding concrete one, such as 'white'

(albedo), and (album), The con­

crete term is sometimes called 'denominative' because it takes its denomination from the abstract, from which it differs only with re­ gard to its ending. The recurring question is whether a denominative or concrete term signifies the same thing as the corresponding abstract. For ex­ ample, does 'white' signifY the same as 'whiteness' or does 'white­ ness' signifY an accidental form whereas 'white' signifies not only that form but also the subject in which that form inheres? Scotus, too, faces this question, and his answer is coherent with his general interpretation of the

Categories.

We have seen that he

thinks that the categories are not genera of predicates ordered ac­ cording to different degrees of universality. According to him, the

" Duns Seotus Super Sopko E/., q. 15, n. 7 (ed. Vives, II, 22): '\o\d aliam rationem di­ cenduro est quod naturalis et etiam metaphysicus ipsas res considerant. Logicus autem considerat res Tationis, et ideo multa sunt univoca apud logicum, quae di­ cuntur aequivoca apud naturalem. Naturalis eoim diceret quod corpus aequivoce dicitUT de corpore superiori et ioferiori. Sed logicus diceret quod de utroque diceretur univoce. Uncle a quibuscumque potest logicus abstrahere unam ratianem communem dicuntur ilia in ilIa ratione communi uniri vel univocari; unde, quia in corpore superiori et inferiori contingit reperire unam ratianem communem, quae haec et ilia corpora conveniunt in habendo tres dimensiones, ideo logicus dicit tam haec quam illa in ilia ratione communi uniri. Sed quia naturalis applicat suam con­ siderationem ipsis rebus, et alia est natura corporis corruptibilis et corporis incor­ ruptibilis, ideo naturalis dicit quod corpus dicitur de hoc aequivoce et de ilIo. n See also Q!laest. in Met. IV, q. I, n. 70 (OPh, III, 315- 1 6); Ord. I, d. 3, p. I , q. 3, nn.162-3 (ed. Vat., III, 100); Ord. I, d. 8, p. l , q. 3, n. 83 (ed. Vat., IV, 19 1).

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categories are the basic types of essences, which logic considers

as

understood. It is not an order of predication that constitutes a cate­ gory, but a type of essence. By contrast, many authors think that a category is constituted by a certain kind of predication ordered in a genus. Accordingly, they maintain that the case of abstract and con­ crete terms is just an example of the principle according to which two things that cannot be ordered in the same genus of predication do not belong to the same category. In fact, a concrete and an ab­ stract item cannot be ordered in the same genus of predication be­ cause they are not predicated of one another (neither "white is whiteness" nor "whiteness is white" is a well-formed predication). It follows that the concrete item does not belong to the same genus as the corresponding abstract. Peter of Auvergne, as we have seen in the previous chapter, explicitly reaches this conclusion.26 Scotus takes a different position. Since it is the type of essence, not the mode of predication, that constitutes a category, it does not matter whether the concrete item is predicable of the abstract or the other way around in order to establish whether they belong to the same category. According to Scotus, it only matters that con­ crete and abstract terms signify the same essenceY It is true that they cannot be predicated of one another, but that only means that they signify the same essence as conceived in two different ways, in an abstract or in a concrete way. This is a difference not of essences, but of modes of conceiving. Once more, Scotus thinks that the con­ fusion between logic and metaphysics induces his contemporaries to what he regards as a mistake of categorial classification.

4.

'Being in' and 'being said of'

In the second chapter of the

Categories,

Aristotle puts forward two

divisions. The first is the division of the things said with and without combination. The common interpretation states that these things are sentences - said with combination - and their terms - said without combination.28 The second famous distinction Aristotle in­ troduces is presented as a division of the "things that are." Things " Peter or Auvergne Super !'raed., q. 10 (ed. Andrews, I I); See above, chap. 5, n. 32. " Duns Scotus Super !'raed., q. B, n. 14 (OPh, I, 3 1 7). " Cat. 2, 1016- 1 9.

q. B

(ed. Andrews, 1 7).

SCOTUS'S READING OF ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES'

are divided thanks to two relations,

a subject.

181

being said if a subject and being in

These two relations single out four classes of beings: (a)

general objects or universal substances, namely things said of a sub­ ject but not in a subject; (b) particular properties or individual acci­ dents, namely things in a subject but not said of a subject; (c) gen­ eral properties or universal accidents, namely things said of a subject and in a subject; and finally, (d) individual objects or indi­ vidual substances, namely things neither in a subject nor said of a subject.29 Scotus maintains that the two divisions concern things insofar as they are understood, and that Aristotle's sayings must be interpreted accordingly. The interpretation of the first division - between things said with and without combination - is not particularly prob­ lematic, for Scotus suggests that when Aristotle introduces his first division as a division of things said, he is not referring to sentences and terms, but to the concepts sentences and terms signify. Scotus's interpretation of the second, fourfold division, however, is less straightforward, for Aristotle explicitly introduces it as a division of the "things that are," and this fact is at odds with Scotus's view that here Aristotle is dealing with concepts. Scotus maintains that when Aristotle introduces the second division as a division of things that are, he must be read as referring to things that are in the mind and have rational existence. 30 Scotus, by his interpretation, takes a position against those who consider the two relations

begin said if a subject and being in a subject

as holding between extramental things, for he maintains that these relations are intentional and not real since they hold between things only insofar as they are understood. By contrast, Peter of Auvergne and Simon of Faversham think

being said if a subject and being in a subject are two real relations constituting categories in their real being.3 1 Following Avicenna, Simon of Faversham says that not being in a subject - namely, subthat

Cal. 2, l a20-b9. See Frede, "Individuals in Aristotle," 49-50, 6:1. Duns Scotus Super Pra,d., q. I , n. 15 (OPh, I, 252): ')\d aliud dico quod in se­ cunda divisione dicit Aristoteles "eorum quae sunt"; quod sicut ex ilia non sequitur subiectum huius libri esse aliquid rcale cui per se convenit esse, sic nee hie sequitur subiectum esse vocem cui per se convenit dici; ideo dicit "dicuntur", id est 'concipi­ untur'. Et "sunt" in secunda divisione sumitur pro eadem: 'sunt' secundum ra­ tionem." 31 Peter of Auvergne Super Pra,d., q. 12 (ed. Andrews, 22). Simon of Faversham Super Pra,d., q. 12 (ed. Mazzarella, 83); q. 13 (ed. Mazzarella, 86). :.19

30

1 82

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sisting in itself - and

being in a subject are

two real modes of being,

by which substances and accidents are characterized, respectively. 32 Radulphus Brito holds a similar position.33 These authors think that the fourfold distinction the two relations produce is a distinction of real beings. Simon of Faversham accordingly maintains that a sub­ stance is said to be primary because of two real acts, subsisting and being subject to properties.34 Scotus adopts a different position. He maintains that 'being in' or 'inhering' is an expression equivocal to a first and a second inten­ tion. As a first intention,

being in is

a real relation, pertaining to the

nine accidental categories. Aristotle deals with that relation and those categories in his

Metaphysics. As

a second intention,

being in

is

an intentional relationship, pertaining to things not considered in themselves but insofar as the intellect understands them. Logic deals with the intentional meaning of 'being in'. Taken as a second in­ tention term, 'to be in' means 'to predicate a non-essential predi­ cate'. Similarly, 'being said of' is an intentional term that means the same as 'predicating an essential predicate'. 35 Scotus, therefore, thinks that the fourfold distinction Aristotle puts forward in

Cat.

2 is not a division of things into substances and

accidents. It is the metaphysician who considers substances and ac­ cidents, but the division of the Categories is logical and is carried out according to intentional relations. Accidental predicates attributed to a subject, as opposed to real accidents, inhere in the sense of in­ herence Aristotle describes in

Cat.

2. These accidental predicates

are to be distinguished from real accidents, which are extramental 32 Simon of Faversham Super PrlUd., q. 1 3 (ed. Mazzarella, 86): "Propter quod dicit Avicenna secundo Metaphysice sue quod ratio predicamenti substantie est quod sit res cuius esse est non in alia, et ratio predicamenti accidentis est quod sit res cuius esse est in alia." 33 Radulphus Brito Super Prtud., q. 8 (ed. Venet., 43vb): " . . . omne ens aut est per se subsistens aut in alia existens." 34 Simon of Faversham Super Praed., q. 5 (ed. Mazzarella, 77): " . . . substantia dieM itur duplici actu, scilicet ah aetu suhsistendi et ab actu suhstandi. Prima substantia subsistit proprie, et ideo dicitur proprie substantia ah actu suhsistendi. Principaliter etiam substat, et ideo dicitur principaliter substantia ab actu substandi." " Duns Scotus Super Porph., q. 3 1 , nn. 9, I I (OPh,I, 1 96-97): "Sciendum autem quod 'accidens' aequivoce est nomen primae impositionis et secundae . . . Secundo modo adhuc est aequivocum. Uno enim modo idem est quod 'praedicatum non-essentiale', et sic est idem quod 'esse in' secundum quod 'esse in' distinguitur contra 'dici de' in principio Praedicamentorum. Quia quod 'dicitur de' est praedicatum essentiale; quod 'est in' non-essentiale." Super Porph., q. 32, n. 16 (OPh, I, 204). Super Porph., q. 23, n. 7 (OPh,I, 2 1 5);q. 35,n. 8 (OPh,I, 221), quoted above, chap. 5, n. 25.

SCOTUS'S READING OF ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES'

1 83

beings. Thus, when we say "quality is an accident" by 'accident' we mean a first intention term, and therefore we are not referring to the relation

being in Aristotle introduces in Cat.

2.

The relation of being said rif is an intentional relation, too. It fol­ lows that, according to Scotus, substances are divided into first which are not said of anything - and second - which are said of something - not in the way a genus is divided into species, but as a subject is divided into accidents. In fact, substance is divided into primary and secondary when it is considered only insofar as it is un­ derstood and not according to its real being. So considered, sub­ stance is divided into first and second insofar as some accidental properties pertain to it.36 These accidental properties are the rela­ tions of being said rif something and

not being said rif something. They are

accidental to substance because they pertain to substance only to the extent that it is understood, and being understood is not essen­ tial to substance. So if there were no intellect, there would be no di­ vision between primary and secondary substances, according to Scotus. Specifically, a second substance is not something indepen­ dent of the intellect, but is a mode of predication, which depends on how our intellect understands something.37 This position on first and second substances happens to be very different from the stan­ dard one, as Thomas Aquinas endorses it. Aquinas agrees that the division into first and second substance is not the division of a genus into species because nothing is contained in second substance that is not contained in first substance. He maintains, however, that such a division is the division of a genus according to its different modes of

" Duns Scotus Super Praed., q. 12, n. 31 (OPh, I, 363): "Nota quod divisio sub­ stantiae in primam et secundam non est divisio generalissimi in species, sed subiecti in accidentia, quia 'substantia' secundum quod intelligitur - secundum quam con­ siderationem pertinet ad logicum - dividitur in intentianes sibi accidentes." 37 Duns Scatus Super Por ph., q. 4, n. 9 (OPh, I, 24): "Secundae autem substantiae, ut ibi loquitur, non sunt praeter operationem intellectus. Probatio minoris: Dividit in principio capituli substantiam in primam et secundam. Si igitur ilIa divisio valeat, se­ quitur quod membra, ut ibi intelligit [scil., Aristoteles in principio Praedicamentorum], opponuntur. Sed quod est 'secunda substantia praeter operationem intellectus' non opponitur primae substantiae, sed est idem sibi. Igitur non intelligit de secunda sub­ stantia quoad illud quod est ens praeter operationem intellectus." Ibid., n. 1 1 (OPh, 1, 24): " " . dico quod secundae substantiae, ut ibi loquitur [scit., Aristoteles in prin­ cipio Praedicamentorum] , sunt accidentia non realia, de quibus ponit aliud membrum, scilicet 'esse in', sed intentionalia, quibus per se competit 'dici de'." It must be noted that here Scotus considers the inherence that Aristotle introduces in the Categories as a real accident, contrarily to what he says elsewhere. See above, n. 35.

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being, and not a division of a subject according to its accidents. Consequently, the division into first and second substance is grounded on real modes of being and not on a merely intentional consideration of substances.38 Scotus proposes a similar interpretation of the rule concerning predication Aristotle gives in as

'dictum de omni et de nullo'

Cat.

3. This rule is commonly known

and is of central importance for Aris­

totle's syllogistic. It states that

if something is predicated of some­ is predi­

thing else, everything that is predicated of the first thing

cated also of the second thing.39 Is this a rule concerning the relationship of things among themselves, or is it a second-order lan­ guage rule concerning second intentions? According to Simon of Faversham, such a rule bespeaks how things subordinated to one another belong to the same category, considered as a genus of pred­ ication.40 Scotus, however, maintains that this rule concerns second intentions, and this is why the logician is interested in it. Therefore, it is not a rule describing how things are related to one another but how predication works among concepts. It only means that what is more universal than a certain universal concept in a genus is also more universal than a less universal concept in the same genus." Admittedly, Aristotle seems to be speaking of first intention things, but, as Scotus notes, he is not referring to a first-order predication

(praedicatio exercita)

but to a predication signified

(praedicatio signata).

Accordingly, he is speaking of concepts and things understood, not of something pertaining to things insofar as they are extramentaJ.42

38 Thomas Aquinas, De Pot., q. 9, a. 2, ad 6 (ed. Pession, 228): ... . . cum dividitur substantia in primam et secundam, non est divisio generis in species, - cum nihil contineatur sub secunda substantia quod non sit in prima, - sed est divisio generis secundum diversos modos essendi. Nam secunda substantia significat naturam generis secundum se absolutam; prima vero substantia significat earn ut individualiter sub­ sistentem." " Cat. 3, I b l O- 1 5. Aristode states the same rule in Anal. Pr. I, I, 24b27-3 1 ; 14, 32b38-33a5. 40 Simon of Faversham Super Pra,d., q. 3 (ed. Mazzarella, 76): "Dico ad hoc quod regula sic est intelligenda, quod quando aliquid reale et in linea predicamentali dic­ itur de predicato, illud dicitur de subiecto . . . " 41 Duns Scotus Super Praed., q. 9, n. 14 (OPh, I, 331): "Sed ad quaestionem tunc est dicendum quod regula est vera, quia per se datur de secundis intentionibus, sicut logicus debet loqui, et sumendo 'praedicari' proprie, quod est 'prae alio diei'. Tunc tantum et non plus significatur per regulam: 'quod est prius priore in genere est prius posteriore' vel 'quod est superius superiore est superius inferiore', cuius veritas nulli dubia est. n ., Duns Scotus Super Praed., q. 9, nn. 15- 1 7 (OPh, I, 33 1 -32).

SCOTUS'S READING OF ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES'

185

5. Sufficientia praedicamentorum:

The distinction and derivation if categories In the fourth chapter of the

Categories,

Aristotle introduces the ten

notions that became known as 'categories'. This is one of the two places where the list includes no less than ten items.43 These ten no­ tions are described as what non-compound expressions signifY.

Cat. 4 sr4Jicientia praedicamenlorum: they

Since Late Antiquity, authors commenting on

usually deal

with the issue of the

ask whether

the categories are ten and only ten. Typically, they show that the Aristotelian list is complete by providing a derivation of it. By the end of the thirteenth century, there were two common ways of de­ riving the categories, either from the modes of predication or from some basic modes of being." Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas give a derivation of cate­ gories from the modes of predication.<5 Aquinas's derivation, which he proposed in two variants, was widely adopted by commentators on the

Categories.

According to Aquinas, the categories are not dis­

tinguished by way of

differentiae

because being is not a genus de­

scending into species, but a transgeneric notion or transcendental. Categories are distinguished by modes of being, and to each mode of being there corresponds a mode of predication. It follows that it is possible to obtain the modes of being - and therefore the cate­ gories - from the different kinds of predication, i.e. from the ways in which a predicate can be attributed to a subject in a sentence. Since Aquinas maintains that a predicate can be attributed to a sub­ ject in ten different modes, it follows that there are ten categories. The crucial passage in Aquinas'S derivation is the correspon­ dence he posits between modes of being and modes of predication. Aquinas argues for such a correspondence by remarking that each time a predicate is attributed to a subject, it is said that the one

.. Cat. 4, lb25-2a4. See also Top. I, 9, 103b20-39. 4+ See G. Pini, "Scotus on Deducing Aristotle's Categories," in fA tradition midiivalt des CaligorilS (Xlle-XVe siicles): Xllle Synposium europien de logique et de s""antique midii­ vais, ed. J. Biard and I. Rosier, forthcoming. ., Albert the Greal Liber tk Praed., IT. I, cap. VII (ed. Borgnel, I, 163-64), Thomas Aquinas In Met. V, leel. IX, nn. 889-893; In Phys. III, leel. V, n. 332. See]. E Wippel, "Thomas Aquinas's Derivation of the Aristotelian Categories;" Wippel, Tiu Meta­ physi
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thing is the other. In each predication the verb 'to be' links the sub­ ject to the predicate. For Thomas, this entails that the verb 'to be' has as many meanings as there are modes in which a predicate is at­ tributed to a subject. Thus, when we say, "Socrates is a man," 'to be' means a substance; when we say, "Socrates is white," 'to be' means a quality, and so on. Moreover, Aquinas maintains that to each of these meanings of the copula there corresponds a different genus of being, namely the genus 'substance', the genus 'quality', and so on. By this way, Aquinas obtains the genera of being or categories through an analysis of predication. Other authors derive the list of the Aristotelian categories by re­ ducing them to some basic modes of being. Simon of Faversham and Radulphus Brito, for example, derive the categories from two basic modes of being, being not in a subject and being in a subject. The mode of being not in a subject, which pertains to accidental being, is then subdivided until the nine accidental categories are obtained. Simon of Faversham, unlike Brito, does not distinguish this way of deriving the categories from the derivation from the modes of pred­ ication, for, like Aquinas, he thinks that there is a correspondence between the modes of being and the modes of predication. Occa­ sionally, he even states that categories are constituted by the modes of predication themselves.<6 Scotus maintains that categories are the most basic types of essences but that Aristotle does not present them as such in

Cat.

4.

Here categories are considered as they are understood and as con­ cepts. Consequently, Scotus first asks whether it is up to the logician to argue for the distinction among categories. He replies that, not the logician, but the metaphysician must deal with the distinction among categories and provide their derivation since categories are distinguished insofar as they are mind-independent essences, not in­ sofar as they are understood. Considered as they are understood, categories are not distinguished from one another since they are all most universal generic concepts on an equal footing. It follows that the logician must accept the distinction among categories from the metaphysician and cannot give any derivation of or justification for

'" Simon of Faversham Super Praed., q. 12 (ed. Mazzarella, 83-85); q. 13 (ed. Maz­ zarella, 86); Radulphus Brito Super Praed., q. 8 edited by W E. McMahon in "Radul­ phus Brito on the Sufficiency of the Categories," Cahiers de {'Institut du Moyen Age gTec ,I lalin 39 (1981): 8 1 -96.

187

SCOTUS'S READING OF ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES'

it. Accordingly, Scotus does not provide any justification o f the list of the categories in his logical writings, but he says that perhaps the metaphysician can provide such a derivation:

It must be said that there are only ten highest genera of things, whose distinction is not drawn according to something merely logical, but according to the essences themselves. For the intention of the highest genus is only numerically varied in them [scil. the categories] . Hence, regarding what here is difficult, this question is more metaphysical than logical. Therefore, it is enough to know that things are so, al­ though the metaphysician perhaps must or can know why they are

SO,47

In fact, Scotus maintains that it is impossible to give a derivation of the categories, even from a metaphysical point of view, as becomes evident when he deals with the issue of the

torum in his Q.uestions on the Metaphysics.

sufficientia praedicamen­

Here Scotus gives a detailed

confutation of the attempt to derive categories from the modes of predication. He maintains that those who tried to give such a de­ rivation were guilty of a number of technical errors. Their main fault, however, was to assume a close parallelism between modes of being and modes of predication.'" Such an assumption is a sign of the confusion between logic and metaphysics that Scotus thinks is typical of many of his predecessors and contemporaries. Before Scotus, Peter of John Olivi had already leveled this general criticism at the parallelism between modes of being and modes of predica­ tion.'9 Olivi had drawn the conclusion that, if categories can be de­ rived from the modes of predication, then they are distinguished not as types of essences but only as different accounts or

rationes,

By

contrast, Scotus maintains that categories are distinguished as di­ verse essences, and therefore he concludes that they cannot be de­ rived from the modes of predication. Scotus also thinks that the attempt to derive categories from a limited number of modes of being is mistaken. As Scotus remarks,

47 Duns Scotus Super Praed., q. 1 1 , n. 26 (OPh, I, 350-5 1): "Dicendum quod tantum sunt decem generalissima rerum, quorum distinctio non sumitur penes aliquid log­ icum tantum, sed penes ipsas essentias. Ipsa enim intentio generalissimi est tantum variala numero in istis. Uncle quoad illud quod difficultatis est, magis metaphysica quam logica. Ideo sufficienter hie scitur quia ita est, quamvis forte metaphysicus de­ beat vel possit scire propter quid." .. Duns Scotus Q.uaest. in Met. V, q. 5-6, nn. 73-80 (OPh, III, 464-66). ", Peter of John Olivi Sent. II, q. 28 (ed.Jansen, I, 483-86).

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this way of deriving categories either is not conclusive or demon­ strates the opposite of what it intends to demonstrate, which is that categories are the ultimate genera of being that cannot be derived from anything more basic.50 Scotus's main point is that the distinction among categories is a metaphysical and not a logical topic. His position seems to be quite original among Latin commentators. Radulphus Brito is perhaps the only author similar to Scotus in this respect. Like Scotus, Brito thinks that it is not up to the logician to argue for the distinction among categories because the distinction among categories con­ cerns extramental things, but the logician does not deal with extra­ mental things but with second intentions attributed to things. Brito, however, adds that the logician can pose the distinction among cat­ egories by accident.51 Because of this addition, Brito's approach to the issue is different from Scotus's, for Brito maintains that the logi­ cian can legitimately assume a metaphysical habit and can deal with an issue that by itself is metaphysical. Logicians can do it because they deal with the intentional properties founded on the categories, and such properties, according to Brito's doctrine of second inten­ tions, are caused by the categories themselves considered as genera of being. Such intentional properties can be properly known only if their causes are known. It is not surprising, therefore, that the logi-

,. Duns Scatus Q!
SCOTUS'S READING OF ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES'

1 89

cian can deal with a question that, properly speaking, is metaphys­ ical, such as the question of the distinction among categories. 52 Brito devotes an entire question of his commentary on the Cate­ gories to the issue of the srifJicientia praedicamentorum where he presents two different attempts to derive categories from some basic modes of being.53 By contrast, Scotus maintains that categories, considered as kinds of being, are only the occasions and not the causes of the inten­ tional properties founded on them. Consequently, logicians neither can nor must deal with metaphysical issues in order to get a full under­ standing of their field. Any passage from logic to metaphysics is completely impossible for Scotus, and logicians cannot posit the distinction among categories even by accident.

6.

The properties rif categories

Aristotle devotes chapters five to nine of the Categories to the analysis of single categories: substance, quantity, relation, quality, and the follow­ ing ones. Porphyry seems to have given the classical reading of this central part of Aristotle's treatise. According to Porphyry, after Aristo­ tle gives a short illustration of each category by way of examples in chapter four, he proceeds with a more detailed treatment of each cate­ gory by analyzing their properties. Porphyry maintains that these properties should be true propria (i.e. properties pertaining to all the el­ ements that belong to a certain category and only to them), but he ad­ mits that only some of the properties Aristotle takes into account satis­ IY this requirement. Some properties also pertain to elements belonging to other categories; others do not pertain to all the elements of a certain category but only to some of them. In any case, these properties allow Aristotle to illustrate the nature of each category, provided that no category can be defined. 54 (Since categories are the highest genera that do not have any genus above them, they cannot be defined, as every definition includes the genus and the difftrentia of the difiniendum.) Boethius, as usual, adopts Porphyry's interpretation, and hands it down to Latin commentators. 55 Since, according to this interpretation, chapters 5-9 introduce

" Ibid. (ed. Venet., 4Ovb-41 ra). 53 See above, n. 46. 54 Poprhyry In Cat. 93.25-94.28. " Boethius In Cat. 1 89D-1 90C.

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several properties of the categories, Latin commentators wonder about the nature of such properties. Scotus maintains that the prop­ erties that Aristotle considers inhere in the categories as highest genera, i.e. insofar as they are our most universal generic concepts.

Being univocal(y predicated, not being in a subject, and signifying something qf a certain kind are all properties that pertain the substance insofar as it is considered as a highest genus and as understood. With re­ gard to the other categories, the properties Scotus thinks must be treated in the

Categories are such as being divided into species, having many species, not having a supervening genus: For some properties inhering in them [viz., in categories] insofar as they are highest genera are what is shown, such as, concerning sub­ stance, 'being univocally predicated', 'not being in a subject', and 'sig­ nifying apparently something of a certain kind'. Similarly, concerning the other categories it is determined in this way, since the other cate­ gories are divided into species insofar as they are such [viz., insofar as they are highest genera] , and those species are in turn divided into other species, and nothing is above them that descends into them by division. It is clear that the properties 'being divided into species', 'having many species', and 'not having a supeJVening genus' inhere in them insofar as they are highest genera .'6

Scotus admits that in the

Categories Aristotle

also deals with other

properties, which would be difficult to consider as pertaining to cat­ egories as they are understood. These are properties such as, for a substance,

not having a contrary, not being subject to more or less, and being subject to contraries. These properties pertain to categories to the ex­ tent that they are beings, but Scotus thinks that Aristotle deals with them not because they are the main object of his interest, but only because their consideration can shed some light on the intentional

properties logic considersY Scotus's position is very different from 56 Duns Scatus Super Praed., q. 2, n. 7 (OPh, I, 258-9): "Ostenduntur eniro de eis passiones sibi inhaerentes in quantum sunt generalissima, ut de substantia 'univoce praedicari' et 'non esse in subiecto' et 'videri significare hoc aliquid'. Similiter de aliis generibus determinatur secundum talem rationem, quia in quantum talia in suas species dividuntur, et ilIae ulterius in alias, et nihil est supra ea quod descendat in ea per divisionem. Patet istis, in quantum sunt generalissima, inesse hanc passionem 'di­ vidi in species' et 'habere multas species subalternas' et 'non habere genus suprave­ niens'." �7 Ibid.: "Et si de aliquibus aliis quae istis generalissimis insunt, in quantum sunt entia, hie determinatur, hoc non est principaliter ad propositum, sed ad maiorem manifestationem illorum quantum ad praedieata intentionalia."

SCOTUS'S READING OF ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES'

191

those of Peter of Auvergne, Simon of Faversham, and Radulphus Brito, According to these authors, the properties Aristotle considers in the

Categories are real

and cause the intentions attributed to cate­

gories.58

7.

The properties if substance

Scotus, as we have already seen, interprets the division between pri­ mary and secondary substances as a division of substance according to its intentional accidents. He maintains that by this division Aris­ totle only introduces two modes of considering a substance, not two kinds of substances. 59 A classical issue concerning substance is to as­ certain the place of substantial differentiae in the categorial frame­ work. Porphyry had already tackled this problem, and other com­ mentators followed him.60

As Aristotle says, 'not being in a subject' is something common to all substances. He adds that not only substances but also substantial differentiae are not in a subject: both

man

and

rational are

not in a

subject. So Aristotle seems to say that differentiae, even though they have a property in common with substances, are not substances. Ac­ tually, in Met. V, Aristotle lists the differentiae of substances as be­ longing to the first species of quality; therefore, substantial differen­ tiae, such as rational, belong to the category of quality. This position, however, would pose serious problems, for if substantial differentiae are qualities, it would follow that some essential constituents of sub­ stances are accidents. Consequently, the priority of substances over accidents would be questioned.61 Facing this dilemma, thirteenth-century interpreters agree that a differentia is a substance and not a quality even though it belongs to the category of substance only in an indirect way or, as they say, "by reduction." Peter of Auvergne explains the peculiarity of differen­ tiae by admitting that they are predicated in quale but not in quale ae­

eidentale.

Differentiae indicate qualitative but not accidental aspects

58 See above, nn. 3 1 -33. 59 See above, par. 4. 60 Porphyry In Ca/. 94.29-96.2. 61 Cal. 5, 307, 2 1 -22; Me14ph V, 14, I 020b I 3- 1 5. See Duns &otus Super Praed., q. 14, nn. 1 , 4, 6, and 8 (OPh, I, 379-80). On the categorial status of the differentia, see Morrison, "Le statut categoriel des differences."

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of substances. He also recognizes that differentiae are a sort of ex­ ception in the categorial framework, for they are substances as forms are, but do not belong to the category of substance directly, since only compound substances are in the category of substance, properly speaking.62 Simon of Faversham, too, maintains that differentiae are not qualities because they do not inhere in something that is already in act and they pertain to the essential account of something. He re­ marks that categories are distinguished from one another according to different modes of predication taken from different modes of being. A differentia is not a quality because it is predicated not simply

in quale but in quale quid of a

substance. In other words, a dif­

ferentia predicates an essential quality of a substance.63 The solutions of Peter of Auvergne and Simon of Faversham are based on the distinction between the mode of predication of differ­ entiae and the mode of predication of qualities. Clearly, Scotus cannot accept a similar explanation, for he maintains that cate­ gories are not constituted and distinguished by modes of predica­ tion. Something is in a category and is distinguished from the things in other categories because it has an essence of a certain kind re­ gardless of the way our intellect understands and predicates it. Ac­ cording to Scotus, the metaphysician does not consider 'to be pred­ icated in

quale' as a sufficient condition for something to be a quality.

Something is a quality if and only if it is a quality by its essence.64

" Peter of Auvergne Super Praed., q. 2 1 (ed. Andrews, 38-39): "Et ad hoc di­ cendurn: videtur quod duplex est substantia. Est coim substantia quae est compo<s>itum et est substantia quae est simplex. Et ista adhuc est duplex, quaedam est materia, quaedam autem forma. Cum igitur quaeritur utrum differentia sit sub­ stantia, dicendum quod non est substantia quae est compositum sed est substantia quae est simplex, scilicet forma." Ibid., q. 59 (ed. Andrews, 80-8 1): "Sed ad istud est dicendum quod differentia substantialis non est qualitas secundum quod hie definitur quaJitas." .3 Simon of Faversham Super Praed., q. 45 (ed. Mazzarella, 141); ibid. (ed. Maz­ zarella, 1 42): " . . . dieo quod predicamenta distinguuntur penes diversos modos pred­ icandi, qui sumuntur a diversis modis essendi. Cum dicitur quod differentia substan­ tialis predicatur in quale, dico quod extendendo modum predicandi in quale, differentia predicatur in quale. Et tu queres: Quomodo tunc distinguetur [ed.: dis­ tinguendo] modurn differentie substantialis a modo predicandi qualitatis? Dico quod hoc modo, quia qualitas que est predicamentum predicatur in quale absolute; sed differentia substantialis non predicatur in quale absolute, sed magis in quale quid; ex hoc quod imponat formam predicatur in quale, ex hoc quod imponat substantiam predicatur in quid; et ideo ratione tocius dicitur predicari in quid." 64 Duns Scotus Super Praed., q. 14, n. 5 (OPh, I, 380): "Si dicatur quod Aristoteles

SCOTUS'S READING OF ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES'

1 93

Since substantial differentiae are by themselves identical to sub­ stances, they are substances too. For this reason, differentiae are not qualities. It is true that differentiae are not by themselves in the cat­ egory of substance since they are neither individuals nor species of substance. This fact, Scotus observes, does not prevent differentiae from inhering in substances

per se and not

accidentally as qualifica­

tions or quantifications.65 It is still true that Aristotle, in the

Categories, seems to assume that not being in

substances and differentiae are distinct, for he says that

a suldect is

a property both of substances and of differentiae. This

does not cause any trouble to Scotus, for he reads Aristotle as saying that

not being in a suldect,

which is an intentional property of sub­

stance, pertains not only to what is a substance by itself but also to what is a substance because it is identical to a substance.66 The fact that Aristotle in the

Metaphysics refers

to substantial differentiae as

to a species of quality, poses a more serious problem because, as we have seen, Scotus thinks that the metaphysician considers something as a quality

if it is a quality essentially. Therefore,

Scotus does not say that Aristotle in the

Metaphysics

sees the sub­

stantial differentia as a quality because it is predicated According to Scotus, however, in

Met.

in quale.

V Aristotle introduces not

a classification of the different species of qualities but a list of the different meanings of the word 'quality'. As Scotus remarks, in

Met. V Aristotle often speaks of the modes in which a term is meant rather than of the kinds of beings a term signifies. Therefore, nothing prevents him from saying that substantial differentiae are qualities, according to some meaning of the word 'quality' but that,

intelligit in V quod hahet modum praedicandi 'in quale': Hoc non videtur verum, quia metaphysicus a logico differt in hoc quod metaphysicus considerat ens in quantum ens; logicus in quantum consideratur a ratione. Quod ergo habet solum modum praedicandi 'in quale', quamvis a logico posset aliquo modo did qualitas, non tamen a metaphysico nisi sit essentialiter qualitas." 65 Ibid., n. 1 0 (OPh, 381): ''Ad quaestionem poteS! diei quod differentia in genere substantiae est substantia, quia est idem per se ei quod est per se substantia. Non tamen est species vel individuum in genere substantiae, nec per se substantia. Verior tamen est talis praedicatio 'rationale est substantia' quam ista 'quantum est sub­ stantia', quamvis utraque necessaria et utraque per accidens. Prima enim est per ac­ cidens, non quia aliquid est substantia cui accidit rationale, sed cui per se inest ratio­ nale. Sed secunda est per accidens, quia illud est substantia cui accidit quantum." 0; Ibid., n. I I (OPh, I, 381).

1 94

CHAPTER SIX

metaphysically speaking, they are not a species of the category of quality.67

8.

Predication and the uni!J if categories

Scotus considers also the categories following substance according to their intentional properties. Specifically, he thinks that these cat­ egories can be regarded as genera because they have the property of being predicated of different species. Admittedly, this property alone cannot distinguish one category from another, but logicians can consider each category as understood and as a genus predicated by itself of its species, once they have assumed the real distinction among categories from the metaphysician. The criterion of predi­ cation is still useful, for it allows Scotus to regard each category, not as a type of essence, but as a genus and, what is more, as one genus. This is the criterion Scotus follows: If there is only one notion pred­ icated by itself of different species, those species are contained in one genus and the category taken into account is one. Scotus draws this conclusion for quantity and relation.68 Presumably; the same criterion applies to quality and the other categories. Once more, Scotus's approach is different from Brito's. Brito maintains that a category derives its generic unity from one

communis intelligendi,

ratio

which is in turn taken from one mode of being

common to all the species of that genus. Such a genus is a category

if there is no other genus above it and if it is predicated according

67 Ibid., n. 14 (OPh, I, 382): '�d quartum dieD quod Aristoteles, ut in pluribus in V, dividit voces in significationes et in modos diversos accipiendi, quod ad minus facit de qualitate. Non enirn earn dividit, ut generalissimum, in species, ponens differen­ tiam substantiae esse primam speciem eius, sed dividit haDe vocem 'qualitas' in sig­ nificata; et unum significatum eius est "differentia substantiae"." 68 Duns Seotus Super Prad., q. 16, n. 8 (OPb, I, 393): "Dieendum quod quantitas est genus, quia praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie in quid, ut de quantitate continua et discreta. Quia quaestio 'quid' de utroque eorum, convenienter respon­ detur 'quantitas'. Et est generalissimum, quia non habet genus superveniens. Nihil enim de eo praedicatur in quid nisi ens, quod non est genus, quia nec univocum." Ibid., q. 25, n. 10 (OPb, I, 426): "Dieendum quod generalissimum in genere rela­ tionis est unum, quia secundum unam rationem dicitur de omnibus suis inferioribus, quae ratio est habitudo ad aliud. Et quia omnes relatianes habent eundem modum denominandi substantiam, videlicet in comparatione ad aliud ut accidentia quia eodem modo denominant substantiam, sunt unius generis."

SCOTUS'S READING OF ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES'

195

to one notion and by itself of its species.69 According to Brito, the cause of the generic unity of a category is not simply the existence of a notion predicated by itself, but the existence of a mode of being from which that notion is taken.

9.

The last categories and the postpraedicamenta

After dealing with substance, quantity, relation, and quality, in Chapter 9 of the Categories Aristotle turns to the remaining cate­ gories.70 He treats these last categories only cursorily. Medieval commentators usually explain that what Aristotle has said con­ cerning the previous categories is sufficient to shed some light on the last six categories. Specifically, Aristotle's treatment of relation is important, since the last six categories depend on relation.7I Scotus takes a different position. Not surprisingly, once more he refers to the fact that the

Categories is

a work of logic. He says that

the species into which the last six categories are divided as highest genera are unknown to us. We also ignore the properties pertaining to these categories insofar as they are considered by reason. It is therefore natural that the

Categories,

which deals with those species

and those properties, do not treat the last six categories in great length. This does not imply that we know nothing about real prop­ erties pertaining to these last categories, but Scotus remarks that it is physics or metaphysics, not logic, that deals with the properties pertaining to these categories according to their natural being. 72

69 Radulphus Brito Super Praed., q. 14 (ed. Venet., 49va-b): " . . . quod habet unam rationem communem intelligendi secundum amnes suas species sumptas ex uno modo essendi communi omnibus speciebus suis est unum genus. Modo quantitas est huiusmodi. Ergo etc. Maior patet, quia unitas generis sumitur ex unitate rationis intelligendi. Minor declaratur, quia modus essendi ipsius quantitatis a quo prius SUffi­ itur eills ratio intelligendi est quod dat esse subiecto divisibile in partes eiusdem rationis." See also q. 25 (ed. Venet., 59vb): "Dicendum est quod relatio est unum genus quia illud quod habet unam rationem communem secundum suam speciem sumptam ex modo essendi communi reperto in suis speciebus est unum genus." 70 Cat. 9, I l b l - 15. The lines I l b l O- 1 6 are now considered as spurious, see L. Minio-Paluello, forward to Amtotelis Categoriae eJ Liber de Interpretatione (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 949), v. 7 1 Albert the Great Liber de Praed., tr. VI (ed. Borgnet, 270); Martin of Dacia Super Prad. (ed. Roos, 2 1 8). " Duns Scotus Super Pra,d., q. 26 (OPh, I, 507-8): "Notandum quod de istis duobus et de aliis quattuor subsequentibus, breviter pertransit Aristoteles: vel quia

1 96

CHAPTER SIX

The last section of the Categories is constituted by the so-called In the last chapters of his work, Aristode deals

postpraedicamenta.

with different notions, such as opposition (Chaps. 1 0 and I I ), pri­ ority (Chap. 1 2), simultaneity (Chap. 1 3), movement (Chap. 1 4), and having (Chap. 1 5). There has been much debate concerning the meaning and the place of the

postpraedicamenta.

Contemporary

interpreters usually maintain that these chapters are misplaced. Consequendy, they doubt the unity and coherence of the Cate­ goriesJ3 By contrast, medieval interpreters tended to consider the Categories as a unitary treatise and consequendy made an effort to justifY the treatment of the postpraedicamenta in the light of what Aristode previously discusses. For example, Brito says that the post­ praedicamenta are the things whose knowledge is necessarily conse­ quent to the knowledge of the categories. He is so litde inclined to admit that their treatment is somehow misplaced or casual that he even provides a derivation of them.7' Scotus stresses that the treatment of 'priority' and 'movement' is logical since such notions are dealt with as properties of the things belonging to the categories insofar as they are considered by reason. In the Metaphysics, on the other hand, Aristode distinguishes several species of priority insofar as priority is a difference of being.75 With regard to movement, Scotus maintains that the logician deals with it as something transcendental, which can be reduced to different cat­ egories since it pertains to things in different categories. The natural philosopher deals with movement from a different point of view, as its principle is matter or form, or as movement is caused by the principles of a natural bodyJ6

species eorum in quas essent dividenda, secundum quod sunt genera, non sunt notae, nee passiones eorum quae insunt eis secundum quod considerantur a ratione. De his autem passionibus, quae insunt eis secundum esse naturale eorum, plenius determi­ natur in libris naturalibus et Metaphysicae; de 'actione' et 'passione' in III Physicorum et in De generah'one; de 'quando' et 'ubi' in IV Physicorum, in hoc quod determinatur ibi de loco et tempore . . . ; de 'positione' et 'habitu' aliquantulum V Metaphysical. Et ita determinatio hie habita de istis sufficiens est quantum ad logicum." 73 Frede, "Title, Unity and Authenticity," 1 1-24. See above, Introduction, n. 9. 14 Radulphus Brito Super Praed., q. 34 (ed. Venet., 67rb). 75 Duns Scotus Super Pra,d., q. 43, nn. 10- 1 1 (OPh, I, 553-54). Scotus is referring to M,t. V, I I , 1 0 1 8b9-a23. 76 Duns Scotus Super Praed., q. 44, nn. 1 8- 1 9 (OPh, I, 563). Albert the Great had already given a similar explanation of Aristotle's treatment of these notions in the Categories, see Liber d, Pra,d., tr. 7, chap. I (ed. Borgnet, I, 273).

197

SCOTUS'S READING OF ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES'

1 0.

Seotus's omissions

So far I have traced Scotus's method of reading Aristotle's

gories.

Scotus's interpretation centers on the fact that the

Cate­ Categories is

a work of logic, concerned with the properties pertaining to the cat­ egories as they are understood and as they are concepts. Thanks to this insight, Scotus tries to give a coherent reading of Aristotle's treatise. Admittedly, not all Scotus says can be interpreted in this way. Nevertheless, I think that it is true that Scotus's interpretation, although similar to that of many of his contemporaries, is original because of his attempt to follow this logical reading with coherence. Scotus's general interpretation of the

Categories

is confirmed by

what Scotus does not take into account. In fact, there are some omissions that become significant

if compared to what his contem­

poraries state. These omissions do not seem to be unintentional, for they always concern topics Scotus would define as metaphysical and that he would consequently regard as misplaced in a logical work. The first example of how Scotus purposely avoids some issues is the question concerning the

srdficientia praedicamentorum. As

I have

already remarked, Scotus explicitly says that the logician assumes the real distinction among categories from the metaphysician, for it is the metaphysician,

if anyone, who can explain why there are ten

and only ten categories and demonstrate that they are really distin­ guished from one another. Logicians cannot say anything about these topics since they deal with the intentional properties that the intellect attributes to categories, not with categories as mind-inde­ pendent essences. For this reason, Scotus does not provide any de­ rivation of the categories in his commentary on the

Categories. 77

Another example of Scotus's approach is the question whether or not the category of substance is compound. Commentators usually deal with this topic while treating

Cat.

5. Presumably, this question

was originally connected with the Platonic criticisms leveled against Aristotle's

Categories.78 By the

thirteenth century, however, the point

seems to be a difference between Aristotle's

physics.

Categories and his Meta­

Aristotle does not mention matter while treating substance

77 Duns Scotus Super Prad, q. I I , n. 26 (OPh, I, 350-5 1). See above, par. 5. 78 See above, Introduction, par. 2. See A. Tabarroni, IUUtrum deus sit in praedica­ mento': Ontological Simplicity and Categorial Inclusion," in LA tradition midiJvale des

CaUgorin, forthcoming.

1 98 in the

CHAPTER SIX

Categories,

but in the

Metaplrysics

he introduces matter as one

of the ways in which substance is said to be a subject. 79 Interpreters ask whether it is possible to reconcile the

Categories

with the

Meta­

physics. The classical answer to this question can be traced back to the first Neoplatonic critics of Aristotle. They maintained that the

egories

Cat­

only deals with material things. Consequently, they inter­

preted the substance of the

Categories

as the composite of matter

and form. Porphyry explicitly takes over this position, which reached Latin commentators through Boethius.Bo By the end of the thirteenth century, there was a consensus that the substance of the

Metaphysics,

Categories was the same as the composite of the

but interpreters focused on the difference between cre­

ated and uncreated substances. Only created substances, according to them, belong to a category whereas the uncreated substance is out of the categorial framework. Some authors, in order to explain that immaterial created substances belong to a category, introduce the composition of being and essence in addition to the usual com­ position of form and matter. They maintain that every creature is composed of being and essence whereas in the creator being and essence identical. Thomas Aquinas seems to have played an essen­ tial role in developing this doctrine.B! Peter of Auvergne, Martin of Dacia, and Simon of Faversham agree that substance, taken as a category, is composed of being and essence. Simon of Faversham also thinks that the composition of being and essence is identical to the composition of mode of being and thing seen, characterizes each category. B2

(res),

which, as we have

Among the commentators at the end of the thirteenth century, Radulphus Brito seems to be the only one who takes a different po­ sition. According to him, substance as a highest genus is not com-

79

Met. VII, 3, 1029a 1-2. See above, Introduction, nn. 25, 26, 32. On Thomas Aquinas's distinction between being and essence, see J. F. Wippel, MeUlplrysical Th,mes in Thomas Aquinas (Washingont, nc.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1 984), 107-6 1 ; S. MacDonald, "The Esse/Essentia Argument in Aquinas's De ent"t essentia," The]ournal rif the History rif Philosophy 22 ( 1 984): 157-72; W. Patt, '�quinas's Real Distinction and Some Interpretations," The New Scholasticism 62 ( 1 988): 1 -29; Wippel, The Metaplrysical Thought rif Thomas Aquinas, 132-76. 82 Peter of Auvergne Super Praed., q. 1 7 (ed. Andrews, 30); Martin of Dacia Super Pra,d., q. 1 3 (ed. Roos, 1 72-73); Simon of Faversham Super Pra,d., q. 20 (ed. Maz­ zarella, 92-93). 80 81

SCOTUS'S READING OF ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES'

1 99

pounded but is common to composite and non-composite sub­ stances. The only constitutive property of the category of substance is the mode of being 'not being in something else', from which the

ratio substantiae is taken. this mode of being is common to composite and non-composite substances. Yet, Brito also maintains that logic must deal with the topic whether or not the category of substance is composed.83 Scotus, however, does not deal with the topic of the composition of substance in his commentary on the

Categories.

In the light of

what I have said so far, it seems that this omission is not uninten­ tional. In fact, Scotus maintains that substance is simple or com­ pound only if considered as a mind-independent essence. Logi­ cians, however, consider substance as an essence understood and as a concept of our mind. Considered in this manner, substance is a simple concept, which is neither simple nor compound with respect to the composition of matter and form, for being simple or com­ pound with respect to the composition of matter and form is a real property of things. In other words, such a property pertains to things insofar as they are mind-independent essences. Since the

egories studies

Cat­

substance from a logical point of view, it is not sur­

prising that Scotus omits the treatment of the composition of sub­ stance in his commentary. Similarly, Scotus does not deal with a question closely connected to that of the composition of substance, namely whether or not God belongs to a category.84 The standard answer to that question is that God does not belong to the category of substance, because God is simple, whereas all categorial substances are composite.85 83 Radulphus Brito Super Praed., q. 10 (ed. Venet., 46va-b): "Et ideo dieD aliter ad illam quaestionem quod substantia in communi ad illam substantiam simpiicem et compositam est genus generalissimum et ratio huius est quia ilia substantia est genus generalissimum cui competit modus essendi a quo sumitur ratio substantiae, quae est genus generalissimum. Modo modus essendi a quo sumitur ratio substantiae quae est genus generalissimum competit substantiae in communi ad substantiam simplicem vel compositam, Ergo ilia substantia communis ad iIlas est genus generalissimum. Maior patet, et minor probatur, quia ratio substantiae quae est genus generalissimum sumitur ab eo quod est per se subsistere. Modo per se subsistere competit tam sub­ stantiis simplicibus quam compositis (sic intelligentiae sunt per se subsistentes sicut substantiae compositae). Quare etc." 84 See Tabarroni "'Utrum deus sit in praedicamento'." 85 Peter of Auvergne Super Praed. q. 1 7 (ed. Andrews, 30); Simon of Faversham Super Praed., q. 13 (ed. Mazzarella, 87); Martin of Dacia Super Praed., q. 14 (ed. Roos, 1 74).

200

CHAPTER SIX

Peter of Auvergne, Simon of Faversham, and Martin of Dacia all maintain this view.86 Once more, Brito adopts an original position, for he maintains that God can be considered as belonging to the category of substance or that, alternatively, He can be reduced to it. Brito's position is coherent with his conception of the category of substance as something common to simple and compound sub­ stances.8' Scotus, however, apparendy thinks that this is not a logical question because it is necessary to turn to the real essences of ex­ tramental things to decide it. Whether or not God belongs to a cat­ egory is something dependent on God's real nature, and not on the way our intellect considers Him. So Scotus asks this question in his commentary on the

Sentences where

he introduces his famous doc­

trine of the univocity of the concept of being.88

As we have seen, Scotus maintains that the logician must assume the real distinction among categories from the metaphysician. This is why Scotus does not deal with the question whether categories are real beings. The most controversial case among categories is rela­ tion. Since relations depend on the essences they link, it is difficult to consider them as real beings. Accordingly, they are traditionally regarded as the weakest categorial beings, as Averroes says.89 Peter of John Olivi and Henry of Ghent had already cast doubts on the reality of relation.90 Not surprisingly, both Peter of Auvergne and Radulphus Brito ask in their commentaries whether relation is a real being.91 Scotus, like Brito, maintains that relations are real things, really distinguished from the other categories. Actually, in his questions on the

Metaphysics

and in his

Sentences commentary, he pays much at­

tention to this issue, and he can be regarded as one of the fiercest

86 Peter of Auvergne q. 1 7 (ed. Andrews, 30); Simon of Faversham, q. 1 3 (ed. Maz­ zarella, 87); Martin of Dacia, q. 1 4 (ed. Roos, 1 74). " Radulphus Brito Super Praed., q. 1 0 (ed. Venet., 46vb): " . . . prima causa potest considerari vel ut est per se existens, et sic sibi attribuituT ratio generis, vel ut est per­ fectissimum subsistens, et sibi attribuitur ratio differentiae. Vel aliter potest did quod prima causa non sit in genere per se subsistendo, sed per reductionem." 88 Ord. I, d. 8, p. I, q. 3 (ed. Vat., IY, 1 69-229); Lee!. I, d. 3, d. 8, p. I, q. 3 (ed. Vat., XVII, 1 6-47). 89 Averroes In Mel. XII, com. 19 ( ed. Venet., 306B). 90 Peter of John Olivi &n!. II, q. 14 (ed. Jansen, I, 264); Henry of Ghent Summa quaes!. •rd., a. 55, q. 6 (ed. Badius, II, 1 12S). See Henninger, Reilltions, 52-54. 91 Peter of Auvergne Super Praed., q. 46 (ed. Andrews, 64); Radulphus Brito Super Praed., q. 23 (ed. Venet., 57vb-58vb).

SCOTUS'S READING OF ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES'

201

champions of the reality of relations.92 In his commentary on the

Categories, however, he does not even mention the

issue. In the light

of what we have seen so far, this absence can be seen as a conse­ quence of Scotus's coherent approach to the

Categories as a work of

logic and of the neat distinction he draws between logic and meta­ physics.

92 Duns Scatus Qjlaest. in Met. V; q. I I , n. 50 (OPh, III, 583): "Relatio realis non est eadem res cum fundamento, quia nulla unitiva continentia." See also Ord. II, d. I , q. 4-5, n. 275 (ed. Vat. , VII, 136); Leel. II, d. I , q. 4-5, n. 184 (ed. Vat. , XVIII, 61 -66). See Henninger, Relations, 68-78.

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INDEX OF NAMES Abelard, Peter see Peter Abelard Ackrill,J. L. 30, 50 Adam Wodeham 290, 1 16 Adams, M. McCord 470 Aertseo, J. 1580 Albert the Great 19, 23, 230, 24, 240, 25, 250, 26, 260, 27, 35-37, 63, 630, 103, 159, 1 590, 185, 1850, 1 950, 1 960 'Alexaoder' 1 1 0, 280, 1320, 1590 Alexander of Aphrodisias Go, 7, 70, 8, 80, 9 AI-Farabi 28, 280 Andrews, R. 1 30, 420, 430, 640, 660, 1 500, 1 5 10, 1520, 1580, 1 590, 1650, 1 720, 1800, 1 8 1 0, 1 920, 1 980, 1 99n, 2000 Andronicus of Rhodes, 40, 6, 6o, 7 Anonymous D'Orvillensis l i n Anonymous of Madrid 40, 42, 420, 430 Aotoo,J. P. 30, 70 Aristotle vii, I, 2, 20, 3, 3D, 4, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 10, I I , I I 0, 1 2-14, 140, 15, 1 7, 18, 33, 37, 38, 380, 40, 4 1 , 49, 50, 500, 580, 64, 72, 8 1 , 8 1 0, 82,830, 84, 840, 103, 105, 1 050, 1 3 10, 1 320, 1 39, 1 49, 1 490, 157, 158, 162-169, 1 690, 1 70, 1 700, 1 7 1 , 1 72, 1 720, 1 73, 1 75, 1 750, 1 79- 1 8 1 , 1 8 1 0, 182, 183, 1830, 184, 1 840, 185, 186, 189- 1 9 1 , 1920, 193, 1 940, 195, 1950, 196, 1 960, 197, 1 98 Armstroog, A. H. 8 Ashworth, E. J. 860, 1620, 1 730, 1 75n, l 77n Augustioe 106, (?) 1580 Averroes 200, 2000 Avicenna 10, lOn, 24, 240, 27, 28, 30, 320, 33-35, 360, 62, 620, 1020, 103, 109, 1 73, 1 740, 1 8 1 , 1820 Badius, I. 300, 630, 690, 7 1 0, 1 030, 1 040, 2000 Balic, C. 1 060 Barholomew of Bruges 330 Barnes,]. 30, 7

Biard,J. 1850 Black, D. L. 1020 Boethius of Dacia 640 Boethius 9, 90, 10, IOn, I I , 1 1 o, 20, 2 1 , 27, 280, 35, 37, 950, 1 1 00, 1320, 140, 1400, 1 4 1 , 1 420, 159, 167, 1 68, 1 680, 1 690, 1 72, 1 720, 1 89, 1890, 198 Boethus of Sidoo 6 Boh, I. 330 Borgoet, A. 240, 250, 260, 270, 1590, 1 850, 1 950, 1 960 Bouloois, O. 470, 1 030, 1 050, 1 100, 1580, 1 760 Boyer, C. 590 Braakhuis, H. A. G. 200 Brentano, F. 30 Burnett, C. I On Buzzelli, D. 450 Chenevert,]. 460 Cooti, A. 320, 360, 370, 380, 390, 1590 Craig, E. 30 Dahlstrom, D. 0. 1 000 Dancy, R. 60 De Coooioe, P. D. 630 De Libera, A. 280, 640, 740, 1020 de Murault, A. 470 de Rijk, L. M. 90, 200, 7 1 0, 720, 73n, 740, 750, 820 De Wulf, M. 630 Dewan, L. 470 Dexippus 1 32n Diem, G. 120 Donati, S. 1 760 DOrrie, H. 80 Dreyer, M. 990, 1 760 Dumont, S. D. 990, 1 580, 1 740 Duns Scotus seeJohn Duns Scotus Ebbeseo, S. 8n, 9n, 1 10, 280, 330, 460, 640, 72n, 75n, 830, 1 290, 1 320, 1 590, 1 760, 1 770 Etzkorn, G.J. 1 1 90, 1 240, 1 250 Evangeliou, C. C. 70, 8n Everson, S. 1 58n

220

INDEX OF NAMES

Fauser, W. 830, 950, I I I n Ferriani, M. 45n Frede, M. 2n, 3n, 4n, 5n, 158n, 1 8 1 n, 1 96n Furth, M. 6n Gal, G. 29n Gauthier, R.-A. 240 Gentilis de Cingulis 450 Gibson, M. IOn Giles of Rome 33, 34,43, 6 1 , 62, 62n, 63, 63n, 8 1 , 82n, 103 Gillespie, C. M. 3n Glorieux, P. 620 Godfrey of Fontaines 63, 63n, 103 Gomez Caffarena,j. 68n Gottschalk, H. B. 40, 7n, 8n Graeser, A. IS8n Graham, D. W. 6n Grignaschi, M. 28n Gutas, D. I On Gyekye, K. 28n Haase, W 70 Hadot, I. 4n, 60 Hadot, P. 9n Haeveus Natalis 45, 45n, 83, 83n Hayen, A. SOn Henninger, M. 60n, 1 03n, 1 1 7n, 1 44n, 1 46n, 200n, 201 n Henry of Ghent 30, 30n, 63, 63n, 68, 68n, 69, 69n, 70, 7 1 , 7 1n, 72, 8 1 , 83, 89, 103, 1 03n, 1 04n, 1 36, 1 37, 1 38, 1 44-146, 146n, 147, 148, 150, 1 52, 1 74n, 200, 200n Herminus 8, 8n Hickman, L. 490 Hiz, H. 30 Hoffmann, P. 60, 8n, 90, 280 Hoffmans,j. 63n Honnefelder, L. 99n, 1 76n Hugo de Traiecto 45n Incerti Auctores 1 760 Irwin, T. 1 72n, 1 75n Jacobi, K. 1 32n Jansen, B. 1 74n, 187n, 200n Johannes Pagus 1 58 John Duns Scotus vii, I, 2, 13, 130, 14, 1 4n, 1 6-19, 19n, 20, 28, 30, 30n, 3 1 , 34, 34n, 35, 35n, 36, 45,

46, 46n, 8 1 , 81 n, 82n, 83, 99, 99n, 100, lOOn, 1 0 1 , 102, 103, 1 03n, 1 04, 105, 1 05n, 1 06, 1 06n, 107, 107n, 108, 1 08n, 109, 1 1 0, l I On, 1 1 1 , 1 1 1n, 1 1 2- 1 14, 1 14n, 1 1 5, 1 15n, 1 16, 1 16n, 1 1 7, 1 1 7n, 1 18, 1 1 9, 1 1 9n, 120-123, 123n, 124-129, 1 29n, 1 20, 1 3 1 , 132n, 1 33, 1 34, 1 34n, 135, 1 35n, 136-1 39, 1 39n, 140, 1 4 1 , 1 4 1 n, 142-144, 147, 148, 1 48n, 149, 1 49n, 1 50, 152, 152n, 1 57, 1 58n, 160, 1 6 1 , 1 6 1 n, 162-164, 1 66, 1 6 7 , 167n, 168, 1 68n, 169, 1 69n, 1 70-172, 1 72n, 173, 1 73n, 1 74, 1 74n, 1 75, 1 75n, 1 76, 1 76n, 1 77, 1 77n, 1 78, 1 78n, 1 79, 1 79n, 180, 1 80n, 1 8 1 , 1 8 1 n, 182, 1 82n, 183, 183n, 184, 1 84n, 1 86, 187, 187n, 1 88, 1 88n, 189, 190, 1 90n, 1 9 1 , 1 9 1 n, 1 92, 1 92n, 193, 1 94, 1 94n, 195, 1 95n, 1 96, 1 96n, 197, 197n, 199, 200, 201 , 20 1 n John of Salisbury 158n John of Siccavi1la 159 July, A. G. 29n Kahn, C. H. 3n Kappeli, T. 45n Kenny, A. 16n, 28n, 7 1 n Kirwan, C. 3D Klima, G. 1 32n Kneepkens, C. H. 20n Knudsen, C. 28n, 31 n, 83n Kopp, C. 33n Krempel, A. 60n Kretzmann, N. 160, 280, 3 1 o, 7 1 o, 75n, 1 34n, 158n Lafleur, C. 158n Lambertini, R. 33n, 45n, 49n Lewis, F. A. 5n, 6n Lewry, O. IOn, 20n, 2 1 n, 22n, 32n, 159n Lindberg, D. 45n Uoyd, A. C. 8n, 28n, 102n, 1 32n Long, A. A. 158n Loux, M. 5n, 60 Lucius 7, 70 Luna, C. 4n, 9n, 162n MacDonald, S. 198n Macken, R. 1 46n, 147n Maieru, A. 280

INDEX OF NAMES

Mandonnet, P. 47n, S i n, 6 1 n, 103n, 144n Mann, W. R. 4n, 5n Marenbon, J. lOn, I I n, 83n, 89n, 1 74n Marmo, C. 34n, 37n, 1 75n Marrone, S. P. 158n, I 74n Martin of Dacia 159, 160, 1 60n, 195n, 198, 198n, 1 99n, 200, 200n Matthen, M. 5n, 7n Matthew of Gubbio 33n, 45n Maurer, A. 1 1 4n Mazzarella, P. 77n, 79n, 80n, 103n, 153n, 154, 1 60n, 163n, 1 65n, 1 8 1 n, 182n, 1 84n, 186n, 192n, 1 98n, 199n, 200n Mcinerny, R. 32n McMahon, W E. 1 86n Meissner, W W 46n MenD, S. 4n, 50, 7n Minio-Paluello, L. 95n, 195n Monahan, A. l 77n Moos, M. F. l 44n Moraux, P. 3D, 6n, 7n, 8n Moravcsik,]. M. E. 6n Morrison, D. 3D, 1 9 1 n Nicostratus 7, 7 n Nuchelmans, G . 1 34n, 1 58n O'Donnell,]. R. l 77n O'Meara,]. 2n Olivi, Peter of John see Peter of John Olivi Owens,]. 103n Panaccio, C. 30n, 32n, 46n, 47n Pasnau, R. 46n Patt, W 198n Pattin, A. I On Paulus,]. 63n, 103n, 1 46n Perier, D. 45n, 1 4 1 n Pession, P. M. 54n, 55n, 56n, 57n, 6 1 n, 63n, 1 45n, 184n Peter Abelard 10, IOn, I I , l i n, I I On Peter Auriol 45, 45o, 83, 83n Peter of Auvergne 1 4, 16, 34, 34n, 40, 42, 42n, 43, 43n, 62, 64, 64n, 65, 66, 66n, 67, 68, 79, 83, 1 1 6, 1 2 1 - 1 23, 1 38, 150, 150n, 1 5 1 , 152, 159, 1 59n, 165, 165n, 1 72, 1 72n, 1 77, l 77n, 180,

22 1

1 80n, 1 8 1 , 1 8 1 n, 1 9 1 , 192, 192n, 198, 1 98n, 199n, 200, 200n Peter of John Olivi 1 73, 1 74n, 187, 187n, 200, 200n Peter of Spain 46n, 72, 720, 73 Philoponus l I n, 28n, 1 32n, 159n Pinborg, ]. 16n, 28n, 30n, 33n, 42n, 45n, 46n, 64n, 7 1 n, 72n, 75n, 76n, 79n, 83n, 86n, 87n, 88n, 89n, 90n, 9 1 , 9 1 n , 93n, 94n, 95n, 97n, 1 1 5n, 134n, 158n Pini, G. 30n, 50n, 85n, 141 n, 168n, 185n Plato 30n Plotinus 7, 7n, 8, 8n Porphyry vii, 6n, 7n, 8, 8n, 9, 9n, 1013, 14n, 34n, 35n, 49, 64, 77n, 79n, 87n, 88n, 89n, 90n, 91 n, 93n, 94n, 95, 95n, 97n, 100, l OOn, l Oi n , 107n, 108n, I IOn, 1 1 4n, 123, 1 24, 126, 127, 127n, 1 29n, 1 30n, 1 3 1 , 1 3 1n, 1 32n, 1 33n, 1 34n, 1 35n, 1 36n, 1 49n, 152n, 167, 1 68, 168n, 1 72, 182n, 183n, 189, 189n, 1 9 1 , 1 9 1 n, 198 Praechter, K. 7n Prentice, R. 1 76n Preus, A. 3D, 7n Putallaz, F.-X. 59n Radulphus Brito 14-18, 30, 30n, 34, 34n, 40, 43, 44, 44n, 45, 45n, 48, 68, 72, 77, 8 1 , 83, 83n, 85, 86, 86n, 87, 87n, 88, 89, 89n, 90, 91, 9 1 n, 92, 93, 94, 94n, 95, 95n, 96-98, 107, I I I , I l ln, 1 1 2, 1 1 4, 1 15, 1 1 5n, 1 1 6, 1 1 7, 1 2 1 , 1 23, 1 24, 126, 127, 1 28, 129n, 1 33, 134, 1 34n, 1 36, 1 38, 154, 1 54n, 155-157, 160, 1 60n, 164, I 64n, 166, 1 66n, 167, 169, 169n, 1 76, 1 76n, 182, 182n, 186, 1 86n, 188, 188n, 189, 1 9 1 , 194, 195, 1 95n, 1 96, 1 96n, 1 98, 199, 1 99n, 200, 200n Read, S. 1 35n Richard Campsall I 16 Rist,]. M. 1 58n Robert Kilwardby 19, 20, 20n, 2 1 , 22, 22n, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 29n, 34, 36, 37, 159, 159n Roger Bacon 45 Roos, H. 195n, 1 98n, 199n, 200n Roscelin 1 0 Rosier, I . 134n, 185n

222

INDEX OF NAMES

Sabra, A. I. I On, 24n Schmaus, M. 46n Schmidt, R. W. 32n, 33n, 50n, 60n Schofield, M. 3n SCOIUS, John Duns see John Duns ScoIUS Sharples, R. W. 7n Shiel,j. 9n Shields, C. 4n, 1 72n Sileo, L.I OOn Simon of Faversham 14, 16, 17, 48, 68, 72, 72n, 73, 73n, 74, 74n, 75, 750, 76, 76n, 77, 77n, 78- 82, 82n, 83, 8790, 95, 103, 103n, I I I , 1 15, 1 1 6, 1 2 1 , 123, 1 27, 128, 136, 138, 152, 153, 153n, 1 54, 1 60, 160n, 163, 163n, 165, 1 65n, 166, 176, I 76n, 177, 1 77n, 1 8 1 , 1 8 1 n, 182, 182n, 1 84, 184n, 186, 1 86n, 1 9 1 , 192, 192n, 1 98, 198n, 1 99n, 200, 200n Simplicius 4n, fin, 7, 7n, 9, 9n, 10, I On, 1 02n, 172n Smith, R. 3n Sorabji, R. 3n, 4n, 6n, 8n, 9n, l in Spade, P. V. 16n, 1 09, 1 09n Speer, A. 1 58n Strange, S. K. 6n, 8n, 9n Swiezawski, S. 1 16n Tabarroni, A. 45n, 197n, 199n Tachau, K. 45n, 1 16, 1 16n, 1 1 8n Te Velde, R. A. 41n Temporini, H. 7n Thomas Aquinas 14, 16, 17, 18, 24n, 30, 30n, 32n, 33, 33n, 35, 40, 4 1 , 41n, 42, 45, 45n, 46, 46n, 47, 47n, 48-50, 50n, 5 1 , 51n, 52-54, 54n, 55, 55n, 5658, 58n, 59, 59n, 60-63, 63n, 64, 65, 67, 68, 72, 76, 77, 78, 8 1 , 8 1 n, 82n, 83, 84, 84n, 85, 85n, 86n, 90-92, 98,

99, 102, 1 02n, 103, 1 03n, 105, 1 05n, 107, 1 1 3, 1 1 7, 1 2 1 -123, 125, 130, 132n, 138, 1 44, 1 44n, 1 45, 145n, 1 461 48, 152, 172n, 174, 183, 184n, 185, 185n, 186, 198, 1 98n Thomas of Erfurt 1 58n, 1 59n Thomas Sutton (Anglicus) 32, 32n, 36, 36n, 37, 37n, 38, 38n, 39, 40, 46n, 159, 1 59n Tine, A. 34n TorreU,j.-P. 41n, 50n Trendelenburg, A. 3n Van Riet, L. 32n, 62n, 102n Verhulst, C. 1 16n Vives, L. 30n, 81 n, 82n, 1 06n, 1 14n, 1 1 7n, 1 47n, 168n, 1 75n, 1 76n, 1 79n Walter Chatton 1 16 Wardy, R. 3n Webb, C. C. I. 1 58n Wedin, M. 4n Weisheipl,j. A. 23n, 24n Wiesner,J. 3n, 9n William Alnwick 158n William Arnaldi 40, 43, 43n William Burley 20n William Ockham 20n, 30n, 46, 46n, 47n, I IOn, 1 16 William of Champeaux I I William of Moerbeke IOn William of Ware 46, 46n Wippel,j. 63n, 1 45n, 185n, 1 98n Wolter, A. B. 99n, 1 1 9n, 124n, 125n Wood, R. 29n, 99n, 1 76n Yokoyama, T.

72n, 76n, 78n, 79n

Zimmermann, A.

33n

INDEX OF SUBJECTS Abstract and concrete intentions 7074, 87-90, 95, I I I , 1 26-1 29, 132, 1 36138 Abstract and concrete accidents 74, 75, 128, 129, 152, 179, 180 Abstraction 52, 73 Accidental consideration 73, 74, 1 3 3 Accidents 1 06, 1 4 5 , 146, 148-150, 153, 1 8 1 -183; common 1 00, 104 Acts of the intellect 35, 46, 54, 55, 8 1 , 82, 88, 96, 1 06, 124, 125 (see airo First act of operation of the intellect; Sec­ ond act or operation of the intellect; Third act or operation of the intellect) Analogy 160, 1 75; of being 157, 158, 1 76, 1 78; metaphysical 1 75, 1 78, 1 79; logical 175-178; three kinds of 1 76, 1 77 Apparens, Apparmtio. 77, 79 Being said of 4, 5, 4 1 , 1 8 1 - 1 84 Being 39, 40; as copula 3 1 , 120, 186; cognitive 1 0 1 -1 04, 106, 1 1 3, 126; ma­ terial 100, 103; objective 13, 46, 49, 84, 105, 1 14; of reason or rational 33, 35, 103; and essence 198; quidditative or essential 1 0 1 , 103, 1 04; subjective 13, 45, 1 14 Capable of being ordered in a genus (or­ dinabi" ingenere) 158-161 Categories: as a logical treatise 6- 1 1 , 18, 38, 167, 195; as a metaphysical trea­ tise 5-9; as a work for beginners 8; as a youthful work 6; as concerning the way we understand things 18; authen­ tiey of 4; subject matter of 8-1 I , 2 1 , 38, 157- 1 63; unity o f 4 , 157, 1 7 1 , 1 72, 196 Categories: as a hierarchy 15, 16, 26, 27, 1 5 3- 1 55, 157, 159, 160; as con­ cepts 7, 9, 16, 26, 1 40, 1 4 1 -1 44, 186, 197; as constituted of matter and form 2 1 , 198; as constituted by two el­ ements 144-147, 152, 154, 197; as essences 25, 27, 142, 144, 147, 152, 1 6 1 , 166, 167, 180, 186, 187; as genera

generalissima 15, 16, 39, 142-144, 1 48, 154, 162, 1 90, 198; as immediatelydi­ verse 1 44, 1 48; as meanings 3, 5, 7, 9, 1 2 , 27, 37, 38, 185; as rational beings 154-1 56; as real beings 154-156; as subjects or foundations of second in­ tentions 13, 1 7, 37, 40-44, 48, 1381 40, 169, 188; as things 1 , 2, 4, 7, 9, 16, 37, 43, 1 69; as words 8, 9, 10, 12, 16, 2 1 , 27, 37, 38, 1 40, 1 4 1 , 167, 168; considered accidentally in logic 139, 164; derivation of 185-188 197; dis­ tinction among 144, 148, 185-187, 200; in the Metaphysics 2, 3, 5, 6, 1 2 ; in the Topics 2, 3; intentional vs exten­ sional interpretation of 14, I S; logical consideration of categories I, 1 1- 1 3, 1 5 , 1 7- 1 9, 2 1 -26, 32, 39-44, 48, 1 391 44, 150, 154, 157- 1 59, 1 6 1 , 164, 167, 1 7 1 , 186, 188, 197; last six: 195; metaphysical consideration of cate­ gories I , 10-13, 1 5 , 19, 2 1-25, 39-44, 139, 1 44, 147, 150, 154, 167, 186, 187, 197; number of 1 , 8, 185-189; principles or causes of 2 1 , 22, 25, 26, 164-167; properties of 22, 23, 25, 26, 40, 140, 1 63- 1 66, 1 75, 189- 1 9 1 , 1 94, 195, 197; twofold consideration of 1 2 , 1 3, 1 7, 19, 20, 23, 24, 27, 28, 36, 39, 40-42, 138, 139, 144, 147, 1 5 1 ; unity of 194, 195 Comparison between a concept and a thing 58, 6 1 Comparison between concepts 60, 6 1 , 1 1 3, 1 19, 120, 125, 1 38, 143 Comparison between something and its supposita 74-76, 78 Comparison between two things 66, 69, 70,82, 1 1 5, 125 Concepts 9, 1 2 , 1 3 , 16, 19, 28, 30, 3 1 , 33, 36, 4 1 , 46, 50-53, 59, 69, 76, 84, 87, 102, 105, 1 1 0, 120, 124, 128, 1 33, 137, 163, 167, 168, 173; representa­ tive 54, 55, 57, I l l , 168, 169; false 56; fictitious 56, I I I , 1 1 3; common 143 Correspondence between intentions and things 78, 80, 1 10, 148

224

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Definition 3 1 , 165, 189; logical 94--96, 156 Denomination (paronymy) 4, 5, 1 79, 180 Dictum de omni ,t de nufro 184 DiiJerentiM 1 9 1 , 192, 193 Equivocity (homonymy) 4, 5, 1 7 1 - 1 76, 1 79; of 'being' 1 78; of terms of first and second intentions 1 30-132 Essence 14, 59, 64, 75, 78, 85, 94, 1 0 1 , 102, 108, 1 2 7 , 133, 147, 1 48, 154, 1 73, 200; three consideration of 62, 63, 100-104; unknown to us 163, 165, 166 Essential attributes or properties 1 0 I , 103, 1 33 Essential consideration 73 Examples 169, 1 70, 189 Fictitious entities 1 6 1 First intentions 28-3 1 , 36, 42, 48, 55, 6 1-64, 69, 73, 88, 9 1 , I I I , 1 1 2, 1 1 5, 1 1 8, 1 20, 1 30, 137, 184 First act or operation of the intellect 33, 66, 8 1 , 1 1 4, 1 16 Form 12, 2 1 , 196, 198 Genus 1 3 , 1 5 , 27, 31, 36, 43, 5 1 -53, 55, 56, 58, 64-66, 68, 69, 74-78, 80, 82, 96, 98, I I I , 1 1 3, 1 1 7, 120, 1 2 1 , 126, 1 29, 142, 143, 1 48, 184, 190, 1 94; definition of 95, 1 27, 128 God: whether He belongs to a category 199, 200; as the highest immaterial substance 2 1 , 146 Grammar vs logic 3 1 , 69, 70 Homomymy see equivocity Identity between the knowing intellect and the thing known 84, 85, 105 Imposition of terms 28, 3 1 , 32, 38, 39 Individuals 69, 70, 100, 103, 108, 133, 135, 1 36, 148, 1 8 1 Inherence (being in) 4 , 5, 145-148, 153, 1 8 1 ; as first intention 1 3 1 , 1 49, 150, 1 82; as second intention 120, 1 3 1 , 1 49, 150, 1 8 1 , 182 Inner word (verbum) 46, 55, 85 Intellect 24, 25, 33, 4 1 , 46, 48, 53, 58, 1 0 1 , 1 1 2; agent 9 1 , 92, 105, I I I ; pos-

sible 45, 9 1 -93, 96, 98, 105; as cause of second intentions 73, 75, 76, 77, 91, 96-98, 102, 106-109, 1 1 0, 1 1 5, 1 1 6, 1 1 8, 1 20-1 26, 140, 1 6 1 , 162, 164 Intelligible species 45, 46, 85-87; 1 0 1 , 102, 104-106, I I I Intention 28, 30, 32, 1 06; ontological status of 45-47, 1 1 4, 142, 1 6 1 (see also first intentions and second inten­ tions) Logic 1 , 1 2 , 20, 77, 95, 105, 126, 128, 1 4 1 , 163, 168-1 7 1 , 1 88, 1 89, 199; as a rational science 22, 24, 27, 1 4 1 ; as a sermocinal science 22, 24, 35; subject matter of 20, 24, 27, 32-36 Matter 1 2 , 2 1 , 196-198 Modes of being 29, 53, 67, 90, 92-94, 107, I I I , 1 1 2, 123, 126, 1 33, 134, 142, 1 44-149, 152-154, 162, 166, 167, 1 77, 185, 186, 195, 197; proper 88, 89, 9 1 ; common 88, 89, 9 1 , 95, 157, 167 Modes of understanding 31, 51, 53, 54, 59, 62, 68, 69, 80, 85, 86, 90, 95, 108, 109, 1 2 1 , 1 2 7 - 1 30, 132, 136, 137, 1 40, 1 42-144, 163, 1 7 1 , 1 77 , 1 78 Names 69 Nominalism 2, 10, 1 1 Not being in a subject 38, 4 1 , 146-148, 152, 1 66, 1 8 1 , 183, 190, 1 9 1 , 193, 199 Object of the intellect 46, 84, 86, 87, 97, 1 0 1 , 105, 106, 109, 123, 1 24 Paronymy see denomination Phantasm 88, 89, 105 Postpr..dicamenta 4, 196 Predicables 1 6 1 Predication 3, 22, 24, 34, 8 1 , 82, 1 0 1 , 103, 108, 1 1 9, 1 2 7 , 1 3 3 , 145, 1 49, 1 5 1 - 1 53, 155, 159, 167, 180, 1 82-187, 190, 194, 195; designated (pr..dicatio signata) 1 34-- 1 37 , 1 84; in qual< 1 9 1 , 192; in quid 192; of an essence 78-80, 95; of intentions 7 1 , 85, 94, 129, 132-137; performed (pr..dicaho ,xercita) 134-137, 184 Properties: intentional 55, 56, 65, 76, 77, 85, 87, 99, 1 0 1 , 102, 106-108,

225

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

1 1 2, 126, 133, 134, 139, 140, 150, 1 5 1 , 157, 163, 1 64, 166, 1 7 1 , 1 75, 188, 190, 193, 195; of substance 38, 1 9 1 - 194; of things 25, 29, 64, 78-80, 87, 150, 156, 157, 163-165, 1 9 1 , 195; Proposition 1 3 , 20, 25, 3 1 , 82, 96, 97, 148 Propria 189

90, 95, 107, 1 15, 1 1 6, 120; following from the modes of understanding 5 1 , 53-55, 59, 62, 68, 83, 107; foundation of 5 1 -53, 57, 58, 62, 63, 65, 66, 68, 75, 78, 93, 99, 1 1 0, 1 1 1 , 1 1 3, 122, 1 24, 138; occasion of 1 1 0- 1 1 3, 1 7 1 ; ul modus 129, 1 30, 132; ul quid 129, 130, 132

14, 29, 30, 36, 142, 143, 145, 183, 186, 189, 1 9 1 - 1 95 Quantity 142, 143, 145, 189, 195

33, 8 1 , 1 1 5- 1 1 7, 1 1 8, 120, 1 2 1 50, 69, 7 1 , 72, 75, 1 00102, 128, 1 4 1 , 142, 145, 168, 179, 190; p"prius ,Iposterius 1 77, 178 Species 1 3, 31, 36, 43, 53, 55, 56, 58, 65, 66, 68, 69, 7 1 , 76, 77, 82, 96, 98, 109, I l l , 1 1 7, 120, 1 26-129, 132, 133, 135, 1 48, 190, 1 94, 195 Subjects and predicates 22, 23, 25- 27, 37, 39, 82, 1 48, 150, 159, 1 60, 185 Substance 1 2 , 14, 27, 29, 30, 36, 40, 1 0 1 , 142, 143, 145, 146, 148, 1 5 1 , 1 52, 157, 158, 186, 189, 1 9 1 - 193, 195, 1 97-200; primaty or first 12, 26, 4 1 , 166, 1 8 1 , 183, 1 84; secondary or second 4 1 , 166, 1 8 1 , 183, 184 S'!lJicimtia pratdicammtorum 185-1 89, 197 Syllogism 13, 29, 31, 38, 96, 97, 159; as the subject matter of logic 20, 24, 34, 35, 37, 38

Quality

Ru.tio subslantW I 73 Realism 2, I I Reasoning 33, 8 1 ; as the subject mat­ ter of logic 24, 25, 35 Reflection (of the intellect on itseiD 48, 49, 53, 54, 58, 59, 63, 64, 67-69, 73, 89, 99, 106, 107, 1 1 2, 1 1 3, 1 19, 120, 125, 138 Relations 147, 189, 195; of reason or rational 49, 6 1 , 65, 66, 68, 99, 1 18, 1 2 1 - 1 26, 143; real 1 1 7, 1 1 8, 200, 201

Relationship between first and second intentions 92-94, 1 1 2, 1 1 8, 1 30 Representation 50- 52, 56, 57, 59, 85 Sayable (dUibile) 39, 158- 1 6 1 , 166 Science 165; quia and propUr quid 165, 166

12, 1 3, 1 7 , 20, 27, 28, 29, 31, 36, 37, 40, 42-45, 48, 55, 6 1 , 64, 69, 88, 9 1 , 155, 1 6 1 , 1 84, 1 88; as accidents 1 00; as concepts 13, 1 2 1 , 128; as concepts o f concepts 1 7, 3 1 , 48, 5 1 , 57, 93, 1 1 1 , 138, 1 7 1 ; as rela­ tions 28, 3 1 , 48, 59-6 1 , 65-70, 78, 99, 1 1 3- 1 15, 1 1 6, 1 1 7- 1 20, 1 2 1 , 122, 1 38; as representations of real properties 1 7 , 48, 66-70, 77-80, 83, 9 1 , 93, 138; as the subject matter of logic 32-36; as things and qualities 13, 45, 49, 1 1 5; cause of 47, 49, 62, 65, 66, 77, 79, 80, 89-94, 96, 1 1 0, 1 1 2 , 164; classification of 8 1 , 82, 96; definition of 70, 73, 88-

Second intentions

Second act or operation of the intellect

Signification

Synonymy S�t univocity 13, 19, 4 1 , 5558, 6 1 , 62, 68, 72, 74, 77, 78, 82-87, 90, 94, 1 0 1 , 102, 1 04-106, 1 1 3, 120, 1 2 1 , 123, 1 24, 126, 127, 140

Things as understood

Third act or operation of the intellect 33, 8 1 , 96, 1 1 7

Transcendentals

39

1 1 , 1 3 , 25, 29, 40, 4 1 , 59, 62, 63,65, 69, 70, 72, 75, 90, 1 0 1 - 1 03, 108, 109, 1 1 9, 129, 132-1 34, 1 8 1 , 184 Univocity (synonymy) 4, 5, 1 5 1 , 1 6 1 , 1 7 1 - 1 76, 179; o f 'being' 1 74, 1 78

Universals

STUDIEN UND TEXTE ZUR GEISTESGESCHICHTE DES MITTELALTERS

3. Koch, J. (Hrsg.). Humanismus, Myslift und Kunst in der Welt des MiIJe/QlIers. 2nd. impr. 1 959. reprint under consideration 4. Thomas Aquinas, Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate. Ad fidem codids auto­ graphi nee non ceterorum codicum manuscriptorum recensuit B. Decker. Repr. 1965. ISBN 90 04 02173 6 5. Koch, J. (Hrsg.). Arlts liberaks. Von der antiken Bildung zur Wissenschaft des Mit­ te1alters. Repr. 1 976. ISBN 90 04 04738 7 6. Meuthen, E. J("c'" und Heilsgeschichu bei Gt¥hoh von Reichersberg. 1959. ISBN 90 04 021 744 7. Nothduril, K.-D. Stndicn
25. Livesey, S. J. Theolngy and Scimce in the Fourlmtth Century. Three Questions on the Unity and Subahemation of the Sciences from John of Reading's Commentary on the &nunces. Introduction and Critical Edition. 1 989. ISBN 90 04 09023 I 26. Elders, L.]. The Philnsophical Theolngy ofSt Thomas Aquinas. 1 990. ISBN 90 04 09156 4 27. Wissink, ]. B. (Ed.). The ElmJity of the World in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas and his Contemporaries. 1 990. ISBN 90 04 09183 I 28. Schneider, N. Die Kosmolngit des Franciscus de Marchw. Texte, Quellen und Unter­ suchungen zur Naturphilosophie des 14. Jahrhunderts. 1 99 1 . ISBN 90 04 09280 3 29. Langholm, O. &onomics in the Meditval Schools. Wealth, Exchange, Value, Money and Usury according to the Paris Theological Tradition, 1200-1 350. 1 992. ISBN 90 04 09422 9 30. Rijk, L. M. de. Peter of Spain (Petrus Hispanus Portugaknsis): Syncaugoreumata. First Criti­ cal Edition with an Introduction and Indexes. With an English Translation by Joke Spruyt. 1 992. ISBN 90 04 09434 2 3 1 . Resnick, I. M. Divine Power and Possibili� in St. Peter Damian's De Divina Omni­ potentia. 1 992. ISBN 90 04 09572 I 32. O'Rourke, F. Pseudo-DWnysius and the Metaphysics ofAquinas. 1992. ISBN 90 04 09466 0 33. Hall, D. C. The Trinity. An Analysis of St. Thomas Aquinas' Expositio of the De TriniUJu of Boethius. 1992. ISBN 90 04 0963 1 0 34. Elders, L. ]. The Metaphysics of Being of St. Thomas Aquinas in a Hiswrical Perspectio<. 1 992. ISBN 90 04 09645 0 35. Westra, H. ]. (Ed.). From Athens w Chartres. Neoplatonism and Medieval Thought. Studies in Honour of EdouardJeauneau. 1 992. ISBN 90 04 09649 3 36. Schulz, G. Vnitas tsl aditquatio inlelltclus et rei. Untersuchungen zur Wahrheitslehre des Thomas von Aquin und zur Kritik Kants an eioem uberliefenen Wahrheitsbegriff. 1 993. ISBN 90 04 09655 8 37. Kann, Ch. Die Eigenschaflen der Termini. Eine Untersuchung zur Perutilis logica Alberts von Sachsen. 1994. ISBN 90 04 096 1 9 I 38. Jacobi, K. (Hrsg.). Argumentationstheorie. Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen und semantischen Regeln korrekten Folgerns. 1993. ISBN 90 04 09822 4 39. ButteIWorth, C. E., and B. A. Kessel (Eds.). The Introduction of Arabic Philnsop/iY inw Europe. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09842 9 40. Kaufmann, M. Begriffi, Satl;<, Dinge. Referenz und Wahrheit bei Wilhelm von Ockham. 1 994. ISBN 90 04 09889 5 4 1 . Hulsen, C. R. Zur SemantiJc anaphorischrr Pronomina. Untersuchungen scholastischer und moderner Theorien. 1 994. ISBN 90 04 09832 I 42. Rijk, L. M. de (Ed. & Tr.). NICholas ofAutreeourt. His Correspondence with Master Giles and Bernard of Arezzo. A Critical Edition from the Two Parisian Manuscripts with an Introduction, English Translation, Explanatory Notes and Indexes. 1 994. ISBN 90 04 09988 3 43. Schonberger, R. Relation als Vergleich. Die Relationstheorie des Johannes Buridan im Kontext seines Denkens und der Scholastik. 1 994. ISBN 90 04 09854 2 44. Saarinen, R. Weakness of the Will in Meditval Thought. From Augustine to Buridan. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09994 8 45. Speer, A. Die entdeckte Natur. Untersuchungen zu Begrundungsversuchen einer "scien­ tia naturalis" im 12. Jahrhundert. 1 995. ISBN 90 04 1 0345 7 46. Te Velde, R. A. Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas. 1 995. ISBN 90 04 10381 3 47. Tuninetti, L. F. "Per Se Notum". Die logische Beschaffenheit des Selbstverstandlichen im Denken des Thomas von Aquin. 1 996. ISBN 90 04 1 0368 6 48. Hoenen, MJ.F.M. und De Libera, A. (Hrsg.). Albertus Mngnus und der Alhertismus. Deutsche philosophische Kultur des Mittelalters. 1 995. ISBN 90 04 1 0439 9 49. Back, A. On Reduplication. Logical Theories of Qualification. 1996. ISBN 90 04 1 0539 5

50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

63. 64.

65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71.

72. 73. 74.

Etzkorn, G. J. Iter Vaticanum Franciscanum. A Description of Some One Hundred Manuscripts of the Vaticanus Latinus Collection. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10561 I Sylwanowicz, M. Contingent CausaliD' and the Foundations of Duns Scatus' Metaplrysics. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10535 2 Aertsen, J.A. Medieval Phiwsophy and the Transcendenlllis. The Case of Thomas Aquinas. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10585 9 Honnefelder, L., R. Wood, M. Dreyer (Eds.). John Duns Scotus. Metaphysics and Ethics. 1 996. ISBN 90 04 10357 0 Holopainen, T. J. DWlectic and Theology in the Eleventh Century. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10577 8 Synan, E.A. (Ed.). Queslions on the De Anima of Aristotle by Magister Adam Burley and Dominus Walter Burley 1997. ISBN 90 04 1 0655 3 Schupp, F. (Hr.;g.). Abbo von Fleury: De syllogismis hypotheticis. Textkritisch heraus­ gegeben, uber.;etzt, eingeleitet und kommentiert. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10748 7 Hackett, J. (Ed.). Roger Bacon and the Sciences. Commemorative Essays. 1997. ISBN 90 04 100 1 5 6 Hoenen, MJ.F.M. and Nauta, L. (Eds.). Boethius in the Middle Ages. Latin and Verna­ cular Traditions of the Consolalio philosophio£. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10831 9 Goris, W. Einheit als Prin<;ip und <.iel. Ver.;uch uber die Einheitsmetaphysik des Opus lTipartitum Meister Eckharts. 1997. ISBN 90 04 1 0905 6 Rijk, L.M. de (Ed.). Giraldus adonis O.F.M. : Opera Philosophica. Vol. I.: Logica. Critical Edition from the Manuscripts. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10950 I Kapriev, G. . . . ipsa vita el veritas. Der «ontologische Gottesbeweis" und die Ideenwelt Anselms von Canterbury. 1998. ISBN 90 04 1 1097 6 Hentschel, F. (Hrsg.). Musil< - und die Geschuhte der Philosophi. und Naturwissenschajlen im Mittelalter. Fragen zur Wechselwirkung von 'musica' und 'philosophia' im Mittelalter. 1998. ISBN 90 04 1 1093 3 Evans, G.R. Gelling it wrong. The Medieval Epistemology of Error. 1998. ISBN 90 04 1 1 240 5 Ender.;, M. Wahrheit und Notwendiglr.eit. Die Theorie der Wahrheit bei Anselm von Canterbury im Gesamtzusammenhang seines Denkens und unter besonderer BeIiicksichtigung seiner Antiken Quellen (Aristoteles, Cicero, Augustinus, Boethius). 1999. ISBN 90 04 1 1 264 2 Park, S.C. Die &<;eplion der mittelalterlichen Sprachphilosophi. in der Theologic des 7homas von Aquin. Mit besonderer Berucksichtigung der Analogie. 1999. ISBN 90 04 1 1 272 3 Tellkamp, J.A. Sinne, Gegensliinde und Sensibilia. Zur Wahrnehmungslehre des Thomas von Aquin. 1999. ISBN 90 04 1 1 410 6 Davenport, A.A. Measure of a Different Greatness. The Intensive Infinite, 1250-1 650. 1999. ISBN 90 04 1 1 481 5 Kaldellis, A. The Argument of Psellos' Chronographia. 1999. ISBN 90 04 1 1 494 7 Reynolds, P.L. Food and the Bot[y. Some Peculiar Questions in High Medieval Theo­ logy. 1 999. ISBN 90 04 1 1 532 3 Lagerlund, H. Modal �Iwgistics in the Middle Ages. 2000. ISBN 90 04 1 1 626 5 Kohler, T.W. Grundlagen des phiwsophisch-anthropologischen Diskurses im drei<;ehnlen Jahr­ hunderl. Die Erkenntnisbemuhung urn den Menschen im zeitgenossischen Versmnd­ nis. 2000. ISBN 90 04 1 1 623 0 Trifogli, C. Oiford Physics in the 7hirteenth Century (ca. 1250-1270). Motion, Infinity, Place and Time. 2000. ISBN 90 04 1 1 657 5 Koyama, C. (Ed.) Nature in Medieval 7hought. Some Approaches East and West. 2000. ISBN 90 04 1 1966 3 Spruyt, J. (Ed.) Matthew of Orlians: Sophistaria sive Summa communium distinctio­ num circa sophismata accidentium. Edited with an introduction, notes and indices. 200 1 . ISBN 90 04 1 1 897 7

75. Porro, P. (Ed.) The Met/inial Concept of T""". The Scholastic Debate and its Reception in Early Modem Philosophy. 200 1 . ISBN 90 04 12207 9 76. Perler, D. (Ed.) AncienJ and Met/inial Theories ofIntentionaliJy. 200 I . ISBN 9 0 0 4 1 2295 8 77. Pini, G. CaJegories and Logic in Duns &otus. An Interpretation of Aristode's Categories in the Late Thirteenth Century. 2002. ISBN 90 04 1 2329 6