Locke's Analysis of Language and the Assent to Scripture J. T. Moore Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 37, No. 4. (Oct. - Dec., 1976), pp. 707-714. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-5037%28197610%2F12%2937%3A4%3C707%3ALAOLAT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A Journal of the History of Ideas is currently published by University of Pennsylvania Press.
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LOCKE'S ANALYSIS O F LANGUAGE AND
T H E ASSENT T O SCRIPTURE
Locke's theory of language, in Book Three of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding,' is better known than some of the relations between it and some of Locke's ideas on Christianity, especially, the nature of true Christian assent. I shall outline some of these relations and indicate how they contribute to a greater understanding of the unity of Locke's thought. My intent is neither critical nor evaluative; rather, it is an attempt to break some new ground and show some connections within Locke's thought which have not been adequately explored. For Locke, the object of the understanding when a man thinks is an idea,2 and the primary means of communicating ideas is through the convention of language. The capacity of men to make and use sounds as "signs" or "marks" of their ideas is what distinguishes men from all lower animal^.^ The association between words and ideas is entirely arbitrary, since it is according to Locke, always the result of agreement among men.4 The conventional nature of language is a basic reason for the confusion among men with respect to what they say and mean, and accounts in large measure for certain crucial problems about the nature of knowledge which occur in the process of assent. Before proceeding to our analysis of language and how it relates to religious assent it is necessary to determine what Locke means by "assent" and the condition of understanding which must necessarily precede it. To do this, we look briefly at Locke's general theory of knowledge, as outlined in the Essay. Locke defines knowledge as "the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas." Where no such perception exists-in any of the three "degrees" (intuitive, demonstrative, sensitive) which Locke notes-one may only "fancy, guess, or believe," but not know: one has then only opinion or faith.5 The distinction between knowing and assenting occurs here and is crucial for our discussion. In the act of knowing one actually perceives-"seesw-some relation of agreement or disagreement among ideas. Any relation among ideas is expressed by a proposition so that, strictly speaking, on Locke's analysis, knowledge (or assent) is of (or to) propositions rather than ideas.'j To know, 'John Locke, A n Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. with Introd. by John W. Yolton, 2 vols. (London, New York, 1961); hereafter Essay. 31bid., 111, 1, 1-8; IV, 2, I. 2Essay, I, 1,8; 11, 1, 1-2. 41bid., 111, 2, 2. See Hans Aarsleff's interesting article on Locke's conventionalism and Leibniz's criticism of it in "Leibniz on Locke and Language," American Philosophical Quarterly, 1 (1964), 165-88. 51bid., IV, 1, 2. For excellent discussions of various problems associated with Locke's use of terms such as "perception" and "agreement and disagreement," see R. I. Aaron, John Locke (London, 1947), 219-37, and D. J. O'Conner, John Locke (New York, 1967), 153-75. 61bid., 111, I, 5. 707
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then, that some proposition is true one must have perceived or seen that truth as a relation among one's ideas, the objects of one's consciousness. On the other hand, when one believes a proposition to be true (as when he assents to its truth) he receives it as true-not on the basis of perceived relations among any of his ideas but on the basis of certain "inducements" which are distinct from the proposition itself. What makes one believe (assent to) some proposition is, as Locke further states it, something "extraneous" to that which is itself to be believed.' Locke distinguishes two kinds of assent in the Essay. There is the assent involved in probability, which is ultimately a function of the capacity of one's own experience and the veracity of the testimony of other^.^ And there is religious assent, which is prior to that condition of the understanding called faith. This kind of assent has a special object and thus a unique determinant. In sharp contrast to the assent involved in probability, religious assent, directed toward revelation, is brought about by the special testimony of God which is in itself always sufficent to induce such assent. Since God "cannot err and will not deceive," one can never doubt the truth of what one knows by revelation. It is for this reason that Locke characterizes faith as a "settled and sure" principle of assurance which never leaves any room for doubt or hesitati~n.~ Leaving aside questions as to how one knows that a particular situation involves revelation-a problem related to but distinct from that which we are consideringlo-we must note one absolute restriction which Locke places upon assent to revelation. This restriction is that what one assents to must be understood prior to the assent itself. As we shall see, this restriction has profound implications with respect to the relation of language to assent. To understand something, Locke says in the Conduct of the Understanding, is to perceive either a certain or a probable relation among ideas." Obviously, one cannot understand something that involves a contradiction or is plainly contrary to one's own know1edge.l2 There are other cases, however, in which one might not be able to understand something and therefore not be able to assent to its truth-for example, when the meanings of the words one hears or reads are not clear or when they are used in an unusual sense. In such cases, according to Locke, even when one knows that some proposition is true because it is revealed, one may still not be able to assent to it. It is with just such cases as these that Locke is concerned when it comes to the nature and the limit of Christian assent to Scripture. Having seen, now, the nature of assent and 'Ibid., IV, 15, 3. T f . the entire discussion of probability in the Essay, IV, 15; also Aaron, op. cit., 247-52 and O'Conner, op. cit., 190-94 for excellent discussions of Locke's concept of probability. gIbid.,IV, 18,8; IV, 16, 14; IV, 17, 24. 1°Cf. my dissertation, "Locke's Concept of Faith" (University of Kansas, 1970), 33-43. "John Locke, Some Thoughts on the Conduct of the Understanding in the Search for Truth, ed. Thomas Fowler (London, 1901), 17. 12Cf. Essay, IV, 18; for full discussion of what Locke means by something being "contrary to reason" see my discussion in "Locke's Concept of Faith," 40-43.
understanding, we may return to the discussion of language in order to see fully the kinds of problems which language may create with respect to assent. On Locke's analysis, it is an ironic fact of language that while it serves as the vital means of communication (and, hence, unity) among men, it is also frequently a source of confusion (and, hence, disunity). Just as a language may bring men together for the "comfort and advantage" of society, so it may drive them apart; just as it is essential to the development of knowledge, so it may contribute to the distribution of ignorance.13 Such negative features of language-which may be alleviated but never entirely rerno~ed~~-resultfrom what Locke calls "imperfections" inherent in language and certain "abuses" to which it is subject. An examination of some of these imperfections and abuses will enable us to see some of the difficulties, on Locke's analysis, of understanding and assenting to Scripture. The chief obstacle to human understanding in the communication of ideas occurs when the words which are used do not excite the same ideas in the hearer as they do in the speaker. That this can even happen is due to one of the basic imperfections of language-that language is not natural but is instead the product of human experience, need, and convenience.
. . . since sounds have no natural connexion with our ideas, but have all their significations from the arbitrary imposition of men, the doubtfulness and uncertainty of their signijication, which is the imperfection we are here speaking of, has its cause more in the ideas they stand for than in any incapacity there is in one sound than in another to signify any ideas, for in that regard they are all equally perfect. l5 The most significant problems with language occur in connection with those complex ideas which Locke characterizes as the ideas of mixed modes. l6 These ideas are especially crucial in the development and communication of political, moral, and religous knowledge. The development of such ideas is almost entirely the result of the voluntary activity of men and the need they have for them. Since they are the products of need rather than common experience they will vary as need varies from time to time and place to place within the community of men.17 Since ideas of mixed modes are literally "creatures of the understanding,"18 they have no archetypes-models or referents-in nature or within common experience. They lack, therefore, the common or general frame of reference within human experience in general to which people may appeal or with which a check can be made in case of misunderstanding.lg A second reason why the ideas of mixed modes may cause problems of understanding is that they are often so complex. Thus, says Locke, men are not always able to make the basic ideas which they use precise enough for mutual understanding. Even a term as apparently simple as "gold" may vary in meaning from person to person, and if this is so it is no wonder that with terms such I4Ibid., 111, I I, 2. 13Essay, 111, 11,4. I6Ibid., 11, 12,4-5; II,22. 151bid., 111, 9. 4. L81bid.,I II,5, 5. 171bid., 111, 5,7; also 11, 22,7. IgIbid., 111, 9, 8. For further discussion o f Locke's concept o f mixed modes: David Perry, "Locke on Mixed Modes, Relations, and Knowledge," Journal o f the History of Philosophy, 5 (1967), 219-36.
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J . T. MOORE
as "grace" or "faith" there may be cases of severe misunder~tanding.~~ The problem of understanding would seem to be particularly crucial in the case of written rather than oral communication. In such cases the reader is not able to inquire directly and immediately into the meaning of the words (and, hence, the ideas) involved. In the case of ancient texts written in ancient or foreign languages the problems may be even more acute, because in most such cases the words read today are not the original words but are in fact those of various translators and editors. Locke notes certain legal terms which may cause problems in translating from one language to another. Such words are scarcely "empty sounds" in English, yet one will seldom find words in another language which stand for them exactly. As further examples, Locke notes the case of the standard Latin terms "hora," "pes," and "libra" and the familiar English terms "hour," "foot," and "pound." In each language these are common and well understood terms, yet according to Locke the ideas connected with these terms will vary from culture to culture. For this reason one cannot simply replace one term with the other. Often not even dictionaries will be of any real assi~tance.~' If what Locke says of ordinary texts or of political and moral texts is true, it is equally true of religious texts-even of Scripture. Locke is quite emphatic in arguing that Scripture is no different than any other ancient text in respect of possible obscurities which may render our understanding of it difficult. Indeed, he notes, the many volumes of interpretation and commentary which have been written on Scripture are "manifest proofs" of this possible obscurity.22Even knowing that Scripture is revealed is no help in overcoming obscurity.23Such obscurity as exists is not the fault of God but is the virtually inevitable result of the fact that Scripture is written in human language. God may be free of error and deceit but men are not. Since the Word of God must be clothed in human language it becomes subject to all those problems inherent in that artifact of communication. Thus: Though everything said in the text be infallibly true, yet the reader may be, nay, cannot choose but be very fallible in the understanding of it. Nor is it to be wondered that the will of God, when clothed in words, should be liable to that doubt and uncertainty which unavoidably attends that sort of conveyance, when even his Son, whilst clothed in flesh, was subject to all the frailties and inconveniences of human nature, sin excepted.24 The problem which Locke presents is obvious for the man who desires to be a Christian. If Scripture is laden with obscurity and if it is the duty of the Christian to seek in its pages for the law and the inspiration of God,25then it is clear 20Essay,111, 2, 3; III,9,6; III,9,9.
211bid.,111, 5,8. 221bid.,I II,9, 23; also III,9, 10.
23A Second Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity, Works, VIII
(London, 1823), 242; hereafter Second Vindication. 24Essay,III,9, 23. 25Thisis a constantly recurring theme: e.g., the Second Vindication, 228, 233, 289, 408; also John Locke on Education, ed. Peter Gay (New York, 1965), 148, hereafter Education; and Locke, A Second Reply to the Bishop of Worcester, Works, 111, 459, hereafter Second Reply.
that one needs to exert special effort and practice special diligence not to fall victim to misunderstanding and thus be unable to assent or, worse perhaps, assent to what is not truly the Word of God.2" In the face of such problems in reading, understanding, and assenting to Scripture, is there any assistance from non-Scriptural sources available to the person who desires it? On the whole, Locke is extremely skeptical about seeking assistance from others. There are two basic reasons for this. One has to do with the nature of language, the other with the process of understanding and assent itself. Let us examine some further aspects of language. In the first place, there are the natural imperfections of language which have already been noted. The man who writes under the inspiration of God and revelation must first understand the relation of ideas and the meanings of the words by which such is communicated. But he can understand only within the framework of his own ideas and experience. Other men of the same or a later time must then understand his attempt to communicate that revelation or inspiration. They can do so, however, only within their own framework of experience and language. Each additional commentary or interpretation can only complicate an already complicated situation. It is no wonder, then, that Locke concludes in the Essay that truth does not mellow with age or become more firm with the passage of time. What was originally true and understandable may never be understood or accepted as true at a later time simply because it has been told and retold until its original truth and meaning are lost. In "traditional truths," says Locke, each remove from the original weakens the force of the proof. The more hands the tradition has passed through, "the less strength and evidence" it receives from them.27 At the same time, original mistakes may become more difficult to discover and they will thus become more firmly entrenched the longer they are believed to be true. Thus: A mistake is not the less so and will never grow into a truth because we have believed it a long time, though perhaps it be the harder to part with; and an error is not the less dangerous nor the less contrary to truth because it is cried up and held in veneration by any party, though it is likely we shall be the less disposed to think it so.28 There is a second problem with respect to language which faces those who seek to understand and assent to Scripture. In addition to the several natural imperfections of language there are also what Locke calls "abuses" of words-certain "wilful faults and neglect~"~~-whichmen may commit through either ignorance, carelessness, or design to deceive. According to Locke, there are seven such abuses,30but while all of them are of interest in a consideration of his general theory of language, only two are directly related to our discussion. The "most palpable" abuse of language is when men use words without any clear and distinct ideas to which they refer; or, which is worse, 26SecondVindication, 356-57; also Essay, III,9, 10. 27Essay,IV, 16, 10. 2 8 C f .t he essay "Study" in Lord Peter King, The Life and Letters ofJohn Locke, with Extractsfrom his Journal and Commonplace Book, 2 vols. (London, 1830), I, 192. 301bid.,111, 10, 2-22, 24. 2gEssay,111, 10, 1.
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J. T. MOORE
when they use them as "signs without anything ~ignified."~~ This kind of abuse can occur in two ways. In the first case, analysis will show, Locke argues, that some men sometimes use words which "in their first original and appropriated use" do not stand for any distinct ideas at all. This is particularly true of certain religious sects and schools of philosophy that simply "coin new words" which either have "no determinant collection of ideas annexed to them" or else refer to inconsistent ideas. Such words are thereby but "empty sounds," says L o ~ k e . ~ ~ Locke gives no specific examples of such a gross abuse of language, but his several requests to Bishop Stillingfleet to show him just where in Scripture the concept of,the Trinity occurs may indicate his desire to characterize such a term as "empty."33 The second abuse of words which is relevant to the problem of assent is what Locke calls an "affected obscurity" in words. Such obscurity may appear in several ways, for example when men apply old words to new or unusual significations, when they introduce new and ambiguous terms without defining them, and when they put terms together in ways which obscure their ordinary meaning.34 On this point Locke is particularly critical of the Scholastics-those "learned disputants" and "all knowing doctors" whose "artificial ignorance and learned gibberish" have prevailed, he says, until the current age. What better way, he suggests, to defend absurd doctrines than to mask them in obscure jargon?35 Nor are those who play with moral and religious language and who pretend to interpret the will and Word of God any more free from Locke's attack. Nor hath this mischief stopped in logical niceties or curious empty speculations: it hath invaded the great concernments of human life and society; obscured and perplexed the material truths of law and divinity; brought confusion, disorder, and uncertainty into the affairs of mankind; and, if not destroyed, yet in a great measure rendered useless those two great rules, religion and justice. What have the greatest part of the comments and disputes upon the laws of God and man served for but to make the meaning more doubtful and perplex the sense? What have been the effects of those multiplied curious distinctions and acute niceties but obscurity and uncertainty, leaving the words more unintelligible and the reader more at a loss?36 It is therefore clear, on Locke's account, that there may be little gained from reading the interpretations of Scripture which are made by others. Locke does not deny utility to all commentaries, but even those written with no intent to deceive must face the natural imperfections, if not the abuses, of language. One can never be sure that a mistake has not been made. The Word of God is an infallible source of information and instruction, but there simply are no 3'Ibid.,111, 10, 2. 321bid. 3 3 L o ~ k Letter e, to the Bishopof Worcester, Works, III,67; Essay, 111, 10,3-4. 34Essay,111, 10,6. 351bid.,111, 10,9. 361bid.,111, 10, 12; IV, 9,9.
infallible guides to understanding it.37 Even if such infallible guides did exist they could only supplement but never replace the personal effort and understanding necessary for assent. Given the nature of language and the extent to which it is subject to both imperfection and abuse, it is clear that one must be careful and diligent in one's reading of Scripture if one is truly to understand and assent to the divine content within. For Locke, "humility and singleness of heart" are not sufficient in themselves to induce understanding and assent. Rather, one needs to study Scripture with every rational tool a ~ a i l a b l eLocke . ~ ~ himself offers several rules and procedures in various works which he feels will assist the individual in , ~ ~a discussion of these falls beunderstanding and assenting to S ~ r i p t u r e but yond the scope of our Those individuals who are aware of the problems of language and therefore of the possibility of misunderstanding and error can find that truth which they seek in Scripture if they look with diligence and care. No more can be demanded of an individual who seeks to be a Christian than that which he finds . ~ ~ no man can be asked to assent to and understands within S ~ r i p t u r e Thus, anything but Scripture and no man's assent can be forced-a point of crucial importance for the policy of toleration which Locke advocate^.^^ Finally, if the individual cannot assent to that which he cannot understand, then each man can assent only so far as he does understand. Each man can and must discover for himself those fundamental articles or propositions to which he will assent and in virtue of which he will call himself a Christian. Thus: This catalogue of fundamentals, every one alone can make for himself; nobody can fix it for him; nobody can collect or prescribe it to another: but this is, according as God has dealt to every one the measure of light and faith; and has opened each man's understanding, that he may understand the Scriptures. Whoever has used what means he is capable of, for the informing of himself, with a readiness to believe and obey what shall be taught and prescribed by Jesus, his Lord and King, is a true and faithful subject of Christ's kingdom; and cannot be thought to fail in anything necessary to salvation.43 This link between Locke's theory of language and his views on the nature of Christian assent may be somewhat surprising to those contemporary readers who are familiar only with Locke's major and best known work, the Essay Con37Second Vindication, 376.
38SecondReply, 341-42; Education, 116.
3gE.g., Second Reply, 341-42; Education, 116; Letter to Richard King, cited by
George W. Ewing in his Introduction to his edition of Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, as Delivered in the Scriptures (Chicago, n.d.), 216; also Locke, A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles o f S t . Paul (Boston, 1832). 40Seemy "Locke's Concept of Faith," 120-28. 41SecondVindication, 355-56,359,387. 42Seemy "Locke's Concept of Faith," 53-87 for some discussion of Locke's views on toleration; also Locke's request for "charitable" attitudes toward those who differ in their understandings of Scripture, Essay, III,9,22. 43SecondVindication, 233.
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cerning Human Understanding. A study of Locke's life and various other works-most of which deal primarily or exclusively with religious topics-will indicate, however, that such a relation between works and ideas is natural. Locke had an intense and lifelong interest in religion and it may well be that such interest guided and directed some of his work. This discussion of Locke has been one attempt to show connections among several of his works. Much more needs to be done, however, because the more we explore such connections the closer we shall perhaps come to perceiving a new unity within Locke's thought. Phillips University.
