Leibniz, Humboldt, and the Origins of Comparativism

Series III

AMSTERDAM STUDIES IN THE THEORY AND

LEIBNIZ, HUMBOLDT,

HISTORY OF LINGUISTIC SCIENCE

AND

General Editor E. F. KONRAD KOERNER (University of Ottawa)

THE ORIGINS OF COMPARATIVISM

•

STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE LANGUAGE SCIENCES Edited by Advisory Editorial Board

Ranko Bugarski (Belgrade); Jean-Claude Chevalier (Paris) H. H. Christmann (Tiibingen); Boyd H. Davis (Charlotte, N.C.) Rudolf Engler (Bern); Hans-Josef Niederehe (Trier)

TULLIO DE MAURO and LIA FORMIGARI University of Rome

R. H. Robins (London); Rosane Rocher (Philadelphia) Vivian Salmon (Oxford); Aldo Scaglione (New York)

with the assistance of DONATELLA Dl CESARE, RAFFAELLA PETRILLI and ANNA MARIA THORNTON

Volume 49

Tullio de Mauro and Lia Formigari (eds.) Leibniz, Humboldt, and the Origins of Comparativism

JOHN BENJAMIN$ PUBLISHING COMPANY AMSTERDAM/PHILADELPHIA 1990

Contents

Foreword

vii

Part 1: Leibniz to Hnmboldt

Le voyage de Schreiten: Leibniz et les debuts du comparatisme finno-ougrien Daniel Droixhe Leibniz on Particles: Linguistic form and comparatism Marcelo Dascal Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Leibniz, Humboldt, and the origins of comparativism I edited by Tullio De Mauro and Lia Forrnigari ; with the assistance of Donatella Di Cesare, Raffaella PetriUi, and Anna Maria Thornton. p. em. (Amsterdam studies in the theory and history of linguistic science. Series III, Studies in the history of the language sciences, ISSN 0304-0720; v. 49) Papers in revised versions of the actual presentations at the Conference on Leibniz, Humboldt, and the origins of Comparativism held in Villa Mirafiori, Rome, Sept. 1986. Includes bibliographical references. Includes indexes. 1. Comparative linguistics -- History -- Congresses. 2. Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von, 1646-1716 -- Contributions in linguistics -- Congresses. 3. Humboldt, Wilhelm, Freiherr von, 1767-1835 -- Congresses. I. De Mauro, Tullio, 1932. II. Formigari, Lia, 1931III. Conference on Leibniz, Humboldt, and the Origins of Comparativism (1986 : Rome, Italy) IV. Series. P73.lA5 1990 417'.7 -- dc20 89-17687 ISBN 90 272 4532 0 (alk. paper) CIP ��

.

© Copyright 1990 - John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint,:microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. ·

3 31

Vulgaris opinio babelica: Sui fondamenti storico-teorici della pluraliti\ delle lingue nel pensiero di Leibniz Stefano Gensini

61

Leibniz and Wilhelm von Humboldt and the History of Comparative Linguistics Robert H. Robins

85

Die Siikularisierung des Tertium comparationis: Eine philosophische Erorterung der Urspriinge des vergleichenden Sprachstudiums Tilman Borsche

103

Descent, Perfection and the Comparative Method since Leibniz Henry M. Hoenigswald

119

Part II: Hnmboldt and the Aftermath

Humboldt et Leibniz: Le concept interieur de Ia linguistique Jiirgen Trabant The Philosophical and Anthropological Place of Wilhelm von Humboldt's Linguistic Typology: Linguistic comparison as a means to compare the different processes of human thought Donatella Di Cesare

135

157

vi

CONTENTS

Wilhelm von Humboldt und das Problem der Schrift Christian Stetter

181

Da Humboldt ai neogrammatici: Continuita e fratture Paolo Ramal

199

Foreword

Part Ill: Comparative Linguistics before and after Humboldt

Representation and the Place of Linguistic Change before Comparative Grammar SylvailJ Auroux

213

The Place of Friedrich Schlegel in the Development of HistoricalComparative Linguistics Konrad Koerner

239

Lautform, innere Sprachform, Form der Sprachen: Il problema della comparazione e classificazione delle lingue in Heymann Steinthal Mario Barba

263

Comparatismo e grammatica comparata: Tipologia linguistica e forma grammaticale Pierre Swiggers

281

Afterword Tullio De Mauro

301

Index Nominnm

311

Index Rerum

319

Index Lingnarnm

327

In September 1986, a Conference on "Leibniz, Humboldt and the Ori­ gins of Comparativism" , sponsored by the Department of Language Sci­ ences of the University of Rome "La Sapienza", was held in Villa Mirafiori, Rome. The papers included in this volume are the revised versions of the actual presentations. Professor R. H. Robins, who unfortunately had been unable to attend, kindly sent us his paper for publication. Both Leibniz and Humboldt are authors in whose work we find a pas­ sionate interest in the history and development of languages combined with a strong theoretical commitment. Mentioning their names in conjunction with the idea of linguistic comparativism appeared to us as a proper way to draw attention to a contribution by these scholars in the history of the subject and also to promote discussion on the relationship of theory and practice in linguistic research in more general terms. In sending the book to press we can say that, thanks to the scholars who attended the Conference and enlivened it, our expectations have been fulfilled. Our special thanks, however, must also be extended to the institu­ tions and people who have made the Conference possible. The University of Rome "La Sapienza", the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche have provided substantial financial support. The secretary of the Department of Language Sciences, Mrs Carolina Vidili, has served with her usual professional skill in the organisation of the Confer­ ence. Donatella Di Cesare, Raffaella Petrilli, and Anna Maria Thornton have worked diligently and strenuously to prepare the final copy of the papers and acted, in all stages, as associate editors. Last but not least men­ tion should be made of the series editor, Konrad Koerner, who spent a large portion of his recent visit to Italy to go through all manuscript print­ outs with his keen eye. Rome, May 1988

Tullio De Mauro Lia Formigari

Part I: Leibniz to Hnmboldt

Le voyage de 'Schreiten'

Leibniz et les debuts du comparatisme finno-ougrien Daniel Droixhe

Universite de Liege

On sait Ia place attribuee i\ Leibniz dans l'histoire de Ia linguistique ou­ ralienne. II fut "l'un des premiers i\ supposer !'existence de rapports histori­ ques entre finnois et hongrois" (Robins 1971:210), relations qu'il etendra en direction du samoyede. H. Arens (1969:98-99) reproduit le passage de Ia fameuse Brevis designatio qui popularisa ses idees en Ia matiere. On vou­ drait, en reexaminant celles-ci, faire le point sur une tradition a laquelle el­ les doivent beaucoup. Ceci permettra notamment de reconsiderer Ia traduc­ tion fran�aise de l'Essai fournie par A. Jacob au debut de sa Genese de Ia pensee linguistique (1973). Le passage en question se refere tout de suite a Tacite et a Ia Germanie. II faut considerer comme une autre grande nation septentrionale les Fin­ nois que Tacite nomme Fenni, et dont il a d6crit avec admiration [lisons: etonnement] les moeurs sauvages, semblables a celles que nous pouvons voir aujourd'hui chez les Lapons sylvestres ou les Samoyedes. (Jacob 1973: 54; Dut. IV/2:192)

Nombre de travaux ont expose !'importance exceptionnelle qu'a prise, dans l'historiographie allemande, un livre place par Arnaldo Momigliano en tete (avec I'Iliade) des "cent ouvrages les plus dangereux qui aient ete jamais ecrits" (v. Ia courte bibliographie dans Etter 1966:150). Depuis que Ia Germanie avail ete revelee aux humanistes, par le pape Pie II, autrement dit Enea Silvio Piccolomini, qu'on va retrouver, puis surtout par Conrad Celtis (1492), celle-ci alimentait toute !'argumentation relative a la nature et a l'origine du peuple allemand, landis que !'ensemble de son oeuvre se muait en repertoire de lieux communs pour la discussion philosophico-mo-

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DANIEL DROIXHb

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rale, chez des commentateurs attitres, quasi professionnels, comme Ber­ negger et son gendre Freinsheim, au XVIIe siecle. Dans le domaine linguistique, Tacite offrait, avec Cesar, un temoigna­ ge crucial concernant l'epineux probleme des rapports ethniques entre Cel­ tes et Germains. Tandis qu'un Hotman de La Tour (1573) faisait s'accorder les deux auteurs sur l'ecart separant langues germaniques et gaulois, lequel devait se rapprocher plutot du breton de Grande-Bretagne, d'autres, com­ me Gronov le jeune, rappelaient que "la britannique fut tres differente de la gauloise, ainsi que le dit Tacite dans la Vie d'Agricola". Le chapitre 46 de la Germanie, qui decrit les Fenni, fut aussi !'objet d'abondants commentai­ res, la question principale etant de savoir si ces populations a la limite de l'animalite pouvaient avoir un rapport historique quelconque avec les Ocr­ mains - qui n'etaient pas eux-memes des mieux !otis, dans la relation de Tacite. Aux frontieres du monde connu se presentent les Peucins ou Bas­ tames, les Venethes et les Fennes. Les deux premieres nations, qui s'eten­ dent de la mer Noire vers le Nord, offrent un degre de civilisation suffisant pour etre comptes dans la famille germanique. Les Peucins, en particulier, "ant une langue, un genre de vie, des etablissements et des maisons tout semblables a ceux des Germains" (ed. Perret 1983: 100). En quoi Tacite ne se trompait pas. Evoquant Ia langue des Estes au chapitre precedent, il a peut-etre voulu, avec autant de raison, marquer sa singularite, son type fin­ nois, par rapport au germanique voisin, quand il ia rapproche de celle des Bretons plutot que des parlers des Sueves. II ne s'aventure pas sur ce sujet, pour ce qui est des Fennes. Chez eux, 'etonnante sauvagerie': "hideuse mi­ sere, salete de tous, torpeur des grands; pas d'armes, pas de chevaux, pas de penates; pour nourriture, l'herbe [ . . . ]" (ibid. ) . On considere generalement comme une conquete importante le fait d'avoir apparente finnois et lapon. Encore faut-il preciser que le premier terme a parfois designe, a l'origine, ce que recouvre aujourd'hui le second. Ce serait Ia cas de Tacite, oil !'appellation de Fenni conviendrait mieux aux populations de !'extreme Nord, designes par les Norvegiens sous le nom de Finn (Meillet & Cohen 1952:281). Le rapprochement ou Ia confusion sont en tout cas tres anciens. Comme le souligne Leibniz en se referant au plus celebre historien des Goths, qui ecrivit au VIe siecle, "Jornandes appelle deja Scridi-Finnois les peuples que nous denommons Lapons". Des specia­ listes du domaine, tels que M. Zsirai ou B . Collinder, ont fait remonter l'apparentement a un Norvegien du IXe siecle, Ottar (ou Othere) de Halogoland, chez qui les Lapons, egalements designes sous le nom de Finnes, sont rapproches pour Ia langue des Careliens du groupe finnois.

Rencontrant cet apparentement chez Joseph-Juste Scaliger (1540-1609) (1599; texte Mite en 1610), G. Bonfante l'a juge 'digne d'un grand esprit' (v. aussi Stehr 1959:16). Et sans doute Ia classification linguistique de la Diatribe sur les langues europeennes occupe-t-elle une place non negligeable dans les etudes finno-ougriennes, d'autant que, comme on a essaye de le montrer (Droixhe 1978:63-64), elle profita d'une bonne diffusion via !'erudition anglaise, de sorte qu'on retrouve le couple finno-lapon chez E. Brerewood (1565?-1613) dans un fameux ouvrage sur Ia diversite des langues et des religions, des 1614. Le terme meme de 'Scridi-Finnois', dans !'interpretation etymologique qu'en donnait Ia tradition, comporte nne idee de dispersion qui va caracte­ riser plus specialement Ia famille finno-ougrienne, importante pour Ia re­ flexion linguistique de Leibniz parce qu'elle offre a celle-d, preoccupee de continuite geographique tendant vers une harmonic generale, l'exemple d'une ancienne unite rompue par l'arrivee de langues d'un autre type (Aarsleff 1982 [1969]:92-93). Reprenons le texte de Leibniz tel qu'il se presente dans Ia traduction que nons suivons, apres qu'on ait annonce Ia 'grande famille' des Fenni.

·

De fait, Scheffer nous a enseigne recemment, en s'appuyant sur l'Ctude de la langue, que Lapons et Finnois avaient une origine commune. Jornandes appelle deja Scridi-Finnois (ce que par un voyage Schreiten avait permis de faire) les peuples que nous d6nommons Lapons. Mais ils Ctendaient da­ vantage leur parente vers !'Orient. Les Hongrois, peuple apparentC aux Finnois, en rnontrent un indice manifeste puisqu'ils sont, d'apres les sour­ ces s(ires de Jornandes, venus de l'intf.rieur �e la Scythie et, cornme on le dit aujourd'hui, de regions proches de la Siberie [ . . . ]. C'est pourquoi, se­ lon moi, l'ancienne grande nation qui s'etendait de !'ocean Baltique a la mer Caspienne a l'arrivee des Slaves ou des Sarmates fut coupee en deux, amputee de toute une partie. (Jacob 1973:54; Dut.IV/2:192)

Rappelons que le Strasbourgeois Johann Scheffer (1621-1678), qui connait bien le monde septentrional puisqu'il enseigne a Uppsala, avait donne en 1673 son Lapponia, qui prend lui-meme appui, avec !'ensemble du comparatisme finnois, sur un certain mouvement de description des langues parlees dans cette region. Citons au mains Erik Schroder et son Lexicon latino-scondicum de 1637 (Papay 1922:4), un vocabulaire !atin­ suedois-finnois de 1644 qu'utilisera Martin Fogel, les travaux, commandes par Ia motivation religieuse classique, de Joh. Tornaeus et d'Eskil Petraeus, eveque d'Abo (Turku, non loin d'Helsinki), vers le milieu du siecle (1648-49), etc. La litterature specialisee conna!t ces noms depuis longtemps.

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DANIEL DROIXHE

LEIBNIZ ET LE FINNO-OUG RIEN

On chercherait en vain, par contre, celui de Schreiten dans les repertoi­ res appropries. Et pour cause: il s'agit du verbe allemand qui signifie "mar­ cher". L'original donne: "Et jam Jornandi Scridi-Finni dicuntur (a cursu, nam schreiten est passus facere) quos hodie .Lappones appellamus" .1 Les Scridi-Finnois sont ainsi nommes a cause des courses auxquelles il s'adon­ nent, notamment pour trouver de Ia nourriture - par reference a "faire des pas". Leibniz suivait ici nne longue tradition interpretative qui remonte, au­ tan! qu'on puisse juger, a Ia Chronique des Lombards de Paul Diacre, du VIII' siecle. On y lisait que ces peuples nordiques tirent leur appellation "du fait de s'elancer" a Ia poursuite des animaux sauvages. "Ce qu'il entend par Ia", commente en 1531 Beatus Rhenanus, le,ma!tre de Ia critique philo­ logique de Tacite a l'epoque (Borst 1960:1073; Schellhase 1976:61-62), "est facile a comprendre". Et de rappeler, comme le fait Leibniz, le sens de "scriten chez les Germains" (p.174). Appartenant a un genre d'homme chez qui les conditions de vie ont essentiellement developpe Ia mobilite, les La­ pons sont encore, selon nne interpretation que Ia culture classique donne de leur nom, des errants, des 'exiles' sortis du berceau ethnique (Richer 1776: 14). La famille finnoise se presente par nature comme etendue et divi­ see. Par qui fut operee Ia liaison avec le hongrois, pour Ia premiere fois? La question a ete souvent discutee, et les affirmations de Leibniz qui feront au­ torite sur le point etaient deja ebranlees dans Ia premiere histoire du com­ paratisme finno-ougrien, celle de E.N. Setiilii, Jaquelle semble rester, soit dit en passant, nne des meilleures introductions aux debuts de ce comparatisme (mais on ne dispose toujours que du texte finnois). II ne pent etre question ici que de rappeler Jes grandes !ignes du debat. Leibniz ecrivait, dans nne Jettre du 1698: "je sais depuis longtemps que le finnois et Je hongrois ont beaucoup de rapport" (Wieselgren 1883:30-31). Le chemin avail sans doute ete ouvert par Ia classification de Scaliger, qui n'appariait pas seulement finnois et lapon, mais Jes mettait dans un groupe de Jangues a problemes, etrangeres aux autres parlers europeens, avec Je hongrois et Je celte (Tabu­ la sexta). Dans le Bref essai comme dans Ia Dissertation sur l'origine des Germains (Dut. IV/2:204), Leibniz attribue Ia decouverte a Comenius, ain­ si que Je fait egalement Johann Georg Eckhart, !'auteur de I'Histoire de !'etude etymologique de !'allemand, collaborateur du precedent et editeur de ses Collectanea etymologica, dans nne oeuvre moins connue, Jes Com­ mentarii de rebus Franciae orienta/is (1729, II/31, chap. 82:437). Paul Hun­ falvy, Je grand specialiste du XIX' siecle, reprit !'attribution (Stehr 1957:17sv.).

Apres que Setiilii ait cherche en vain dans Jes volumineux Opera didac­ tica de Comenius Je franc rapprochement qu'annon<;ait Leibniz, d'autres (dont A.O. Vertes) vont y reperer deux passages qui expliquent Ia paterni­ te accordee au pedagogue. G.J. Stipa (1974), plus recemment, a voulu re­ placer ceux-ci dans leur contexte et a soumis au meme type d'examen J'ap­ parentement entre hongrois et finnois chez un second pnlcurseur que men­ tionne Leibniz: Je Suedois Stiernhielm (1598-1672), connu par son etude comparee du gotique et des langues scandinaves. Le constat est analogue dans chaque cas. Selon Stipa, leurs conceptions generales empecheraient qne le rapprochement en question prenne place dans nne vraie vision genealogique, suffisamment consciente et structuree. L'objection majeure vise !'idee que Comenius et Stiernhielm se seraient faite de I' origine des concordances: ces dernieres resulteraient plut6t des contacts de voisinage. L'examen du vocabulaire utilise d'ordinaire pour evoquer les relations his­ toriques entre Jangues (matres, filiae, sorores, etc.) n'impliquerait pas de descendance organique, dans des systemes qui confondent trop parente, survivance de racines primitives et analogie produite par melange. Ainsi, Comenius signale comme nne singularite tel trait syntaxique commun aux deux langues et il met en parallele leur mot pour designer Ia tete. Mais, toujours selon Stipa (1974), Jes expressions de 'langues-meres' et 'filles', se referant a Scaliger qui refusait Ia parente des matrices, per­ draient beaucoup de leur sens genealogique, ce qui les rendrait en somme equivalentes a 'tres anciennes' et 'plus recentes' (velut matrices): Ia reduc­ tion pent surprendre. Par ailleurs, Jes reticences de Scaliger, transposees, n'enlevent tout de meme rien a Ia perception d'une communaute d'origine chez des propagines dont Comenius, et on Je comprend, ne voit pas com­ ment expliquer Ia ressemblance. De meme, cette perception ne se dilue pas necessairement dans les analogies generales attribuees a une certaines sur­ vivance de racines elementaires. On pent tres bien affirmer qu' "il n'y a guere de parler, sons le ciel, qui n'ait quelque mot ou forme sonore en com­ mun avec l'Mbreu", croire que ces heritages se sont repartis au hasard, et remarquer entre deux Jangues nne parente specifique, sans que ce dernier concept soit vide de son sens. On ne pent pas reprocher a Stiernhielm (1598-1672) l'encombrante persistance de Ia monogenese Mbralque; il ia recusait ouvertement. La cri­ tique, a son endroit, va done s'affiner. Elle reperera des emplois d'affinitas oil le contexte, Ia paraphrase tirent le mot vers le sens de commercium. On argumentera aussi sur Ia base des distinction entre Jangues 'primaires ou cardinales', celles formees par melange et dialectes, pour resituer J'analogie

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DANIEL DROIXHE

LEIBNIZ ET LE FINNO-OUGRIEN

finno-ougrienne dans le cadre d'une sorte de chimie des langues elementai­ res, dont les autres tiendraient leur 'communaute de substance'. On est bien loin de Ia formulation nue, faussement claire nous dit-on, de l'essai De l'origine des langues, place par Stiernhielm en tete de son edition des Evan­ giles gotiques d'Ulphilas (1671): "Ce qui m'etonne beaucoup, c'est le nom­ bre de mots que j'ai trouves communs au finnois, dans le Lexique hongrois de Molnar [ . . . ]". Ce dernier ouvrage fut egalement utilise par un homme qui a revendi­ que nair sur blanc, quant a lui, l'honneur d'avoir decouvert l'apparente­ ment, en se fondant aussi sur un autre ecrit de A. Molnar (1574-1636), Ia Nouvelle grammaire hongroise de 1610, sur une Bible finnoise de 1642 (Stehr 1957:9) et sur un recueil de Mots latins avec equivalent suedois et finnois deja mentionne (1644, consulte dans !'edition de 1668). Le Ham­ bourgeois Martin Fogel (1634-1675) fait figure de pere fondateur depuis qu'E. N. Setiilii trouva en 1888-89 son manuscrit De finnicae linguae indole observationes de 1669, evoque peu avant comme etant a Hanovre par le grand specialiste du hongrois Pal Hunfalvy, ainsi que sa breve mais eclairante correspondance avec Johann Scheffer, !'auteur du Lapponia. Plusieurs etudes parues ces dernieres annees dispensent de revenir lon­ guement sur Fogel, et en particulier le petit' livre edite a sa memoire par W. Veenker (1986), qui fait tres bien le point sur Ia litterature du sujet, avec une mise en evidence des questions relatives a Ia bibliotheque de Fogel. La liste d'equivalences lexicales etablies par celui-ci reste impressionnante, comme Ia recherche d'autres types d"arguments', grammaticaux, pour fon­ der Ia parente; voir a ce propos !'article que lui a consacre G. Lako (1969).2 On comprend que Fogel ait eu le sentiment d'etre un pionnier. Dans une lettre a J. Scheffer (1621-1679) du 14 mai 1673, il ecrit: "Je constate que le Iapan differe du finnois a Ia maniere d'un dialecte et je suis le premier, si je ne me trompe, a avoir observe que l'un et !'autre sont en fait des rejetons du hongrois". On voudrait que son Etymoscopie donne mains !'impression qu'il s'est laisse emporter par son elan, et qu'on sente mains pointer Ia fameuse these de l'origine orientale du hongrois, qui pr6ferera !'alliance historique avec Ia langue du peuple de Dieu et qui touchera encore Gyarmathi (cf. les com­ mentaires de M. Zsirai et V.E. Hanzeli). Meme a titre d'experiences com­ paratives, certains rapprochements etaient fait pour obscurcir, en tout cas aux yeux d'observateurs exterieurs, !'image qu'il laissait de Ia parente finno­ ougrienne, quand "il compare Ia langue des Samoyectes avec le courlandais"­ c'est-a-dire avec le Jette: rapprochement sans avenir - "au encore le turc avec

le hongrois", "ou le chaldeen, l'hebreu et le perse" (Kangro 1969:26-27). II suffit, pour se rendre compte des malentendus qui ant pu survenir des l'epoque de Fogel, de considerer Ia liste de ses manuscrit dressee dans l'in­ ventaire de sa bibliotheque, telle qu'elle est reproduite par W. Veenker (1986:62-64): on y releve une Commentatio de affinitate linguae turcicae et ungaricae qui annonce clairement, et malheuresement, Ia cou]eur, tandis qu'on ne peut rien deviner de Ia these contenue dans le De finnicae linguae. II y a Ia une autre raison possible de l'oubli ou tomba Fogel pendant un cer­ tain temps - a quai Leibniz lui-meme ne serait pas tout a fait etranger. . La relation que celui-ci entretint avec le linguiste est une affaire a Ia fois bien connue et qui reste, pour le fond, assez obscure, comme le souli­ gne W. Veenker. Ce dernier rappelle comment Leibniz, qui est en corres­ pondance avec Fogel des 1671, vint en personne a Hambourg, dans l'ete 1678, pour negocier notamment l'achat de sa bibliotheque par le due de Brunswick, l'erudit etant mort trois ans plus t6t et Ia veuve s'appretant il li­ quider son encombrante succession (environ 3600 livres). On a reguliere­ ment cite les !ignes par lesquelles Leibniz deplore Ia perte 'amere' d'un "homme dont le savoir et Ia rare maturite de jugement etaient connus" (Dut. VI/1:4). A son depart de Hambourg, fin aoilt, Leibniz emportera, avec le contrat de vente, un serieux paquet de manuscrits pour consultation personnelles, "57 Stiick" dira-t-on. II enverra meme un serviteur en em­ prunter une trentaine d'autres. C'est en vain qu'on les lui reclamera (A 3:391). De Iii la presence des ecrits de Fogel a Hanovre, ou les avaient ras­ sembles !'argent du due et le vif interet que leur portait Leibniz (pour ne pas parler de negligence: apres tout, qu'en aurait fait une famille qui sem­ blait pour !'instant plus interessee qu'interessante?). Le De finnicae lin­ guae, d'autre part, etait passe regulierement dans les collections ducales, avec mention au catalogue imprime en vue d'une vente publique qui n'eut pas lieu. II serait done exagere d'accuser Leibniz d'avoir tout occulte de !'heritage de Fogel, par un 'emprunt a long terme' de ses manuscrits. On pourrait aussi lui reprocher, et on I' a fait, d'avoir omis son nom dans le passage de Ia Brevis designatio ou il traite de Ia famille finno-ou­ grienne et cite certaines sources: Comenius, Scheffer et ses Lapons, ou le temoignage de personnes passablement obscures concernant un parler de !'Empire des Tsars. Un oubli est toujours possible, meme s'il est avere que Leibniz utilisa regulierement les manuscrits de son devancier (Veenker 1986:63-65, au il est surtout question de references medicales, philosophi­ ques et mathematiques). Mais n'est-il pas plus vraisemblable que le fait tra-

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duit en somme Ia progression de ses interets, a partir du moment ou il com­ mence pour de bon ses recherches sur cette famille ougrienne? La parente avec le finnois est acquise ; c'est deja de l'histoire ancienne, en tout cas dans l'itineraire personnel de Leibniz. Il souffit de Ia placer sons l'autorite d'un grand nom, et celui de Fogel est un peu mince - une reference pour inities. La curiosite preoccupee d'origine se concentre desormais sur !'investigation dans les zones peripheriques, archaiques, et tout specialement Iii ou il pa­ rait se situer le berceau de Ia nation 'finnoise': dans cette "Scythie interieu­ re qui se trouve comprise entre !'Ocean, le Pont-Euxin et Ia mer Caspien­ ne", ainsi que dit une lettre de 1692 (a un destinataire non identifie; A 8:596). On connait les suites de ce projet d'enquete (notamment a partir des etudes classiques d'Adelung sur Ia contribution de Catherine II au com­ paratisme ainsi que de W. Guerrier et L. Richter sur Leibniz et Ia Russie; Muller 1986:20-21). Leibniz a par ailleurs neglige Fogel dans un autre sens, plus serieux, et on n'a pas non plus manque de le remarquer: son etymologisme est reste ferme a Ia suggestion d'un autre elargissement comparatif, vers Ia grammaire, d'ou !'orientation de sa linguistique historique vers 'une pure recherche de vocabulaire' (Stehr 1957). Avant d'en venir a certains aspects de cette recherche, etendue de plus en plus vers !'Est, il faut nous arreter il une derniere source du rapproche­ ment finno-ougrien. L'idee etait dans !'air du temps et sans doute pourrait­ on ajouter ici l'un ou !'autre nom, comme celui de Johann Trester (1666), souvent cite. Mais le chercheur dont il va etre question est pour l'histoire de Ia linguistique d'une tout autre importance. Dans sa jeunesse, Leibniz rencontre a Francfort un homme qui, dit-il dans Ia Dissertation epistolaire sur l'histoire i!tymologique (§25), "n'ignorait pas Ia convenance du finnois et du hongrois", et dont l'entreprise de com­ paraison generale des langues va faire sur lui forte impression: Bengt, ou Benoit, Skytte (Seta!ii 1892:33, 53, 61-63; Schulenburg 1973:31; Aarsleff 1975: 134). Skytte est aujourd'hui passablement oublie, car il n'a fait parai·tre aucun ouvrage. Mais Ia place qu'il occupe chez Leibniz doit refleter quelque chose de celle qu'il tint chez certains connaisseurs, en particulier ceux qui s'interessaient aux langues du Nord. Il etait en relation etroite avec Stiernhielm (v. aussi de Vrieze 1975:349), qui a peut-etre un peu attire !'attention a ses depens. Il est remarquable que Skytte soit egalement en rapport avec Fogel: son nom est associe au Definnicae linguae indole obser­ vationes, dans Ia lettre de 1669 ou celui-ci annonce !'envoi de son etude a Cosme III de Medicis, a !'instigation duquel elle avait ete realisee.

Leibniz evoque Benoit Skytte des Ia premiere lettre a Ludolf, du 19 (?) decembre 1687, un document tres souvent reproduit, non seulement dans !'edition de Johann David Michaelis de leur correspondance, mais deja, en partie, par le premier grand periodique allemand d'actualite litteraire et scientifique - !'equivalent des Nouvelles de Ia Republique des Lettres ou des Mi!moires de Trevoux les Entretiens mensue/s (Monat/iche Unterredungen) de Wilhelm-Ernst Tentzel, en 1689 (A 5:28-33; Dut. VJ/1:87-91; Waterman 1978:19-21; Aarsleff 1982:954). Il le place, avec son compatriote Stiern­ hielm, en tete de ceux qui 'ont cherche vainement l'harmonie de quantite de langues'. C'est en termes analogues qu'il s'exprime a leur sujet dans Ia Brevis designatio, en notant qu'il travaillerent sans grand succes. La men­ tion se repete dans d'importantes lettres linguistiques il Huldreich von Ey­ ben (26 mars 1691; A 6:442), a S. La Loubere (1662-1729) (2 juin 1692; A 8:296), puis a J. Sparwenfeld (1655-1727), un correspondant des plus choisis, recommande par ses 'lumieres extraordinaires' en matiere de langues (6 dec. 1695 a La Loubere; Wieselgren 1883:8.)

10

Un baron suedois avait amasse les mots radicaux ou principaux de plu� sieurs langues. Mais il est mort [en 1683] et je n'ai pu apprendre oU ses re� cueils soot devenus, qui devraient etre curieux, suivant ce que j'ai pu com� prendre de ce discours. II etait senateur du royaume, mais il avait souffert une manihe d'ostracisrne pendant la minorite du roi.

"II ne savait pas oil le conduisaient ses recherches", ajoute Leibniz a !'in­ tention de conseiller von Eyben, qui peut faire valoir une enquete analogue sur les voces radicales, adressee par lui a Johann Ludwig Prasch, qui l'aurait d'ailleurs mal utilisee dans sa Dissertation sur l'origine germanique de Ia lan­ gue /atine (1686). Et toujours revient le souvenir de jeunesse: "Mr Bengt Skytte me disait un jour lui-meme [ . . . ]", "Skytte m'a une fois raconte [ . . ]" (lettre du 22 juillet 1692 ii un certain Georg Friedrich Cordemann, secn!tai­ re il Hanovre ; A 8:48.) Malgre le scepticisme exprime plus haut a propos des resultats de l'en­ treprise, Leibniz fit de celle-ci un symbole. Le projet du Suedois est cite parmi ceux dont Ia realisation fait encore defaut a une science moderne, avec une 'Geographie polie et complete', une histoire universelle tiree des bons auteurs, une histoire contemporaine traitee conformement ii Ia 'digni­ te' du sujet, etc. (au 'polyhistorien' Morhof, 1690; A 5:661). Il est decide que Ia linguistique comparee figurera parmi les grandes disciplines qui cons­ tituent Ia memoire humaine. L'Otium Hanoveranum de Feller conclura: "Skytte accompli! un tres grand travail en matiere de connaissance des Ian.

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gues [ . . . ] II estimait a bon droit que son ouvrage sur Ia langue universelle valait trois cent mille thalers" (p.151; reprod. dans les Leibnitiana de l'ed. Dut. VI/1:298). Notons pour terminer que les references associant Skytte et Stiernhielm ne font pas explicitement allusion a Ia parente finno-ougrienne, dans les passages qu'on a pu voir. A Sparwenfeld, autre Scandinave, Leibniz dit il nouveau ignorer, en parlant des ecrits de Skytte, "si cela s'est perdu". Par bonheur, ce n'etait pas le cas. Le volumineux manuscrit d'un Sol praecipuarum linguarum qui consigne ses enquetes comparatives s'est notamment transmis dans les col­ lections portant le nom du philologue Johan Ihre, digne successeur de Stiernhielm, qui sont conservees il l'universite d'Uppsala (Grape 1949:4345; autre manuscrit il ia Bibliotheque royale de Stockholm).' II montre une enorme et emouvante mise en oeuvre de materiaux qui depassent le cadre des langues ordinairement rapprochees, a l'epoque, par exemple par le re­ cours systematique au polonais. Le Jette et Ia 'lingua britannica' sont aussi invoques, comme chez Boxhorn. Procedant souvent par families de concep­ ts, Skytte commence !'exploration des ressemblances a partir de sa langue maternelle, ouvre les nombreux dictionnaires qu'il a sous Ia main et aligne, avec plus ou moins de selection, des termes corresponda·nts. Son Solei! des langues est done d'abord un inventaire ou !'operation de regroupement, de comparaison peut jouer de maniere assez inegale. Certains articles repro­ duisent des series de mots sans qu'il y ait, de toute evidence, de parente possible entre une partie de ceux-ci: sous !'entree 'fille', on trouvera aussi bien les anglais girl, maid, wench, les germaniques meyd, metse, les suedois mo et modon, entre quelques mots bretons rassemblants, et les fran9ais garce, pucelle, putain, voisinant avec parthenos. C'est dire qu'il est difficile d'apprecier si !'auteur, dans son vaste dessein, envisage !'existence de famil­ Ies specifiques. Les racines hebralques interviennent aussi tres reguliere­ ment. Mais comme on a essaye de le montrer a propos de Georg Cruciger (Harmonie des quatre langues cardinales, c'est-a-dire l'hebreu, le grec, le la­ tin et !'allemand, 1616), l'obeissance a Ia theorie traditionnelle et son appli­ cation n'empechent nullement de s'orienter, dans Ia comparaison des lan­ gues europeennes, vers un certain nombre de regles fondees. A c6te de Ia reverence il l'hebreu primitif, il y a toute Ia pratique. Dans les deux echan­ tillons du Solei! qu'on a examine, on ne voit guere apparattre Ia le9on que Skytte a pu tirer de cette derniere concernant le finnois, constamment invo­ que, mais sans reference au hongrois qui ne semble pas utilise. Skytte

croyait sans aucun doute a une certaine convergence entre le finnois et les autres langues europeennes (a fortiori puisque !'harmonisation allait vers l'hebreu): le rapprochements des termes qui signifient "diable", "oreille", ou "foule, peuple" en temoigne. Le finnois perkel "diable" est mis en rap­ port avec perkos ''noin1tre". La comparaison des mots finnois, suedois, latin et allemand pour "oreille" permet d'avancer Ia 'regie' d'une addition des sons k ou h a l'ini­ tiale de mots commen9ant par une voyelle, comme Ia proximite de joucko et d' ochlos, "foule", invite a supposer un phenomene similaire avec j. Le nom du tisserand, dans les glaces du Nord (kangan) , rappelle celui de Ia quenouille allemande (Kunkel) , etc. Mais tous ces rapprochements impli­ quent-ils que Skytte n'ait eu aucune notion de parentes plus restreintes, d'une division en families plus homogenes? On vient de voir qu'il se preoccupait de regles de correspondances. Malgre quelques resultats dus a des devanciers, Ia tache restait ecrasante. On peut etre dec;u par certaines tentatives de mise au clair, par exemple quand il regroupe les cas censes prouver que "C et L mutantur" dans les parlers europeen les plus varies. Mais dans !'ensemble, le travail de compa­ raison paratt remarquable, pour l'epoque: il faudrait l'evaluer par rapport a ce qu'on trouve chez Cruciger ou chez les e!eves de Heinrich Schaeve, il Stettin (1652). Ainsi, on notera que le rapprochement des lat. granum, suedois korn et polonais ziarno mene il poser, tres ponctuellement il est vrai,• une equivalence g!k z ouvrant sur le principe de palatalisation de ces occlusives en slave. Le grec meirax "fille, gar9on" est apparente de ma­ niere correcte au breton merch "fille", ainsi qu'a un "valaque merga". Une serie de mots germaniques commen9ant par h- (Haupt, Halm, suedois ho auj. "auge, abreuvoir", angl. hive "ruche") est ponctuee de formes latines avec initiale en c-, dont certaines correspondent evidemment au terme alle­ mand, tandis que d'autres offrent un lien plus incertain: caput, calamus, ca­ vum, cupa (ce dernier est en effet apparente il hive, et Skytte paratt ici sen­ sible a une convergence semantique vers !'idee de "creux"). Qui dit mieux, a part Boxhorn, avant !'age de Leibniz? Celui-ci ne pouvait manquer de se risquer lui-meme il l'harmonisation universelle des langues, avec une prudence qui, conformement il ses princi­ pes, revet d'abord Ia forme de l'enchatnement graduel, de l'elargissement de proche en proche. Le cas des langues finno-ougriennes illustre bien Ia re­ montee vers l'origine il travers Ia recherche, toute historique, progressive, des sources orientales de !'Occident. On peut voir comment se developpe

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celle-d dans !a correspondance avec le jesuite et mathematicien polonais Adam Kochanski (1631-1700). II y aura lieu d'examiner d'autres correspon­ dences, quand on disposera d'une edition complete, comme celle avec Ger­ hard Meier ou le Nantais Mathurin Veyssiere de La Croze (1661-1739), cette derniere prenant le relais des echanges avec Ludoif apres sa disparition. La Croze, bibliothecaire du roi de Prusse, reste une figure des moins connues; il est parfois mentionne comme orientaliste, notamment a cause de certains discussions qu'il eut avec Leibniz, a propos du chinois et du copte. On ai­ merait en savoir davantage sur ses travaux relatifs au 'sclavon' ou a l'arme­ nien, une langue qui fut longtemps rangee dans !a famille semitique (Teseo Ambrosio, P.V. Cayet de Palma [1525-1610], au XVI' siecle; B . Walton, l'editeur de la Bible polyglotte de Londres au XVII'), pour entrer dans !a famille europeenne avec les grands philologues Edward Bernard, souvent cite par Leibniz, et Wachter vers 1730, qui herite de !a classification linguis­ tique de ce dernier. La position de Leibniz lui-meme, sur !a question de l'armenien, parait plut6t tournee vers le passe. Les debuts de !a correspondance avec Kochanski montrent sur quels temoignages il s'est appuye dans sa marche vers !'Est, pour constituer une image de !a 'Scythie' qui marquera cette classification, dans les aspects posi­ tifs comme dans ceux qui le sont moins. Une lettre de decembre 1691 (A 7:487) commence par rappeler que "certains ont observe de nombreux rap­ ports entre finnois et hongrois" et que Leibniz "a souvent desire chercher s'il y avait en Scythie interieure des peuples don! !a langue se rapprochait de cette derniere". II y a tout de suite partage entre famille hongroise et fa­ mille slave: on se demande a laquelle appartient une ethnie de Transylva­ nie, les Siqli ou Ziculi (Szekler). On s'interesse aussi au lithuanien, qui of­ frirait "bien des vestiges du latin". Memes questions dans une lettre a Lu­ dolf du mois precedent (non reproduite par Waterman 1978:455). On y mentionne cette fois !a langue des Wendes du duche de Lunebourg, en Basse-Saxe, "qui est slave"; Leibniz a ''decouvert recemment" qu'elle etait melee d'estoilien, "de sorte qu'il est vraisemblable que ces peuples sont venu par !a Baltique et Ia Prusse". L'este, quant a lui, est nettement separe de la famille slave, comme on va le voir. Leibniz s'etait beaucoup occupe, au printemps de 1691, de ce parler des Wendes, dont il avail obtenu un echantillon qu'il annote soigneusement. L'episode a ete evoque par K. Bit­ tner et R. Olesch. Il laissera des traces dans le passage du Bref essai causa­ ere aux Slaves (Dut. IV/2:191), oil il est encore rappele que les Hongrois sont "alterius gens originis".

L'idee d'une origine orientale des peuples europeens est une de celles qui traversent toute Ia reflexion historique de Leibniz. C'est, au moment ou il se met a ecrire sur ]e sujet, un fait indiscutable et deja traditionnellement reconnu en ce qui concerne certains Germains. La notation du gotique de Crimee vient de loin; Leibniz invoque sans cesse le temoignage fameux de O.G. Busbecq (1522-1592) (cf. Tischler 1978). Bien qu'elles l'impressionnent moins que prevu, les correspondances entre perse et allemand vont dans le meme sens. L'effort portera des lors sur !a convergence entre l'origine des peuples qui composent !'Europe occidentale autour du noyau celto-ger­ manique, d'une part, et Ia provenance des Finno-Ougriens de !'autre. Comme dit Ia Brevis designatio, en un passage souvent cite, "on pourrait appeler japhetique tout ce qui est commun aux langues septentrionales; j'ai aussi coutume de parler de cello-scythe" ('septentrional' s'opposant ici, dans un sens tres general, aux Iangues semitique-meridionales). "J'y rapporte done ce qui est commun aux Germains et aux Grecs [ . . . ] mais egalement ce qui unit les Germains aux Sarmates, Finnois, Tartares". On sait comment les Europeens seront montres progressant "pour ainsi dire selon la trajectoire du solei!". Des lettres a Kochanski ou a Tommaso Fantoni, theologien au Colle­ ,, gium romanum, insistent sur le fait que le meme "ventre des nations a pro­ duit "les Sarmates et les Hongrois, et aussi les Germains" (A 7-8:614 et 262). Cette provenance ne de mande pas de grandes discussions, pour ce qui est des Sarmates ou Slaves. Au sujet des Hongrois et de leur parente, Ia chronique, fort opportunement, va apporter les elements d'un parallelisme qui sera decisif, puisque la triade formee par le germanique, le slave et le hongrois induit a les situer sur le meme plan et a ]es penser comme des uni­ tes relativement distinctes, ce qui n'encouragerait pas a concevoir un re­ groupement des deux premieres face a un ensemble finno-ougrien constitue en famille veritable. Au contraire, Leibniz, en se referant a Ia geographic plut6t qu'a un examen proprement genealogique, comparatif, confondra langues slaves et finnoises, avec les parlers tartares, sous !'etiquette de 'scythique', ambigue et malheureuse parce qu'elle detourne vers !'Est un mot qui avait symbolise chez les meilleurs auteurs !'unite linguistique irano­ europeenne.s Celie qui annon<;ait Bopp. Les indices sur le parcours ancien des Hongrois, Leibniz va les rassem­ bler a partir d'une communication que lui adresse Kochanski (A 7:534). Un jesuite hongrois capture par des Turcs ou Tartares et vendu comme esclave aux environ de Ia mer Caspienne aurait trouve chez ses maitres une langue proche a Ia sienne. Peut-etre s'agit-il, comme l'indique Waterman

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(1978:71), du dominicain Julian, qui vecut au XIII' siecle et qui aurait de­ couvert des populations hongroises ou de type hongrois aux abords de l'Ou­ ral, pres de Ia riviere nommee Bielaia, dans une region ou se parle au­ jourd'hui le tcheremisse. Leibniz note que Ia 'narration kochanskienne', qu'il repercute avec enthousiasme vers Ludolf, fait penser a celle qu'on lit "chez Aeneas Sylvius au sujet de Peres franciscains ayant penetre en Tarta­ rie pour diffuser l'Evangile" (a Tentzel, 16 mars 1692 [A 7:629]). Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini, ou Pie II , un humaniste de Ia premiere heure, disparu en 1464, avait rapporte !'episode dans sa Cosmographie publiee en 1531. Ce type d'information dut etre assez repandu, piusque le roi Mathias Corvin, autre figure importante des debuts de l'humanisme, envisagea de fair venir ces cousins de Tartarie en Hongrie, dans Ia seconde moitie du XV' siecle, comme le rapportent d'anciens historiens hongrois (Orosz 1964). Deux auteurs ajoutent des temoignages concordants (Papay 1922:3, qui complete Schulenburg 1973). Le Polonais Mathias de Mechovia (milieu de XV' siecle-1523), ou de Miechow, ou plus couramment en fran�ais de Michou (que Waterman [1978:25] confond avec Wilhelm Mechow (auteur d'une Philosophie morale) remarque dans son Traite des deux Sarmaties de 1517 "qu'il y a des vestiges de langue hongroise dans le Juhra", region si­ tuee au dela de l'Oural, oil se parlent effectivement les langues ougriennes de l'Ob: J'ostiak et le vogoul. A cote de Michon, Leibniz mentionne un au­ teur qui interesse mains l'histoire de Ia linguistique, Herberstein et ses Commentaires moscovites de 1549 (A 7:614, 629). Leibniz avait demande a Kochanski de faire enqueter sur ces Jangues de Siberie "par le moyen des agents, marchands et missionnaires" . Le jesui­ te polonais avait obtenu pour cela l'appui de son souverain. "C'est de quoi j'attends les effets", ecrit-il it Justel. Mais un contretemps intervient: "J'ap­ prehende que cette chose ne soit oubliee [ . . . ]" (A 8:596). II reste pourtant une autre voie d'enquete. Le P. Grimaldi qui doit remplacer en Chine un missionnaire mieux connu, le P. Verbiest, "mandarin et president du Tribu­ nal des mathematiques", se voit contraint d'emprunter une route qui le menera par Ia Perse et par les 'Tartares Usbecs'. C'est !'occasion "de s'in­ former un peu plus particu!ierement des Jangues de ces peuples de Ia Scythie orientale". Kochanski servira d'intermediaire. Dans une importan­ te Jettre adressee a celui-ci en mars 1692 (A 7:612-13), Leibniz enumere, en esquissant un partage entre 'tartares' et 'non tartares', des peuples au sujet desquels il faudra enqueter: Kalmouks, Astrakans, Kazans, Bachkirs, etc., d'un cote; Circassiens ou Tcherkesses, Tcheremisses et Samoyedes, d'autre

part. La lettre rappelle ensuite ses interrogations sur le berceau hongrois qu'a chance d'etre le Juhra et pose en termes images Ia question de Ia contt­ nuite geographico-linguistique. Je ne nierai pas que certaines nations, quelquefois, sont etablies comme une ile en M6diterranee, en ce qu'elles presentent une brusque rupture avec toutes leurs voisines, comme le montre l'exemple des Hongrois.

II vaudrait Ia peine, pourtant, de chercher que! rapport ant avec ceux-ci les Zicules de Transylvanie, deja mentionnes. On pent esperer trouver sur le terrain le fil qui liera telle et telle langue, et qui formera Ia trame de l'histoi­ re, pour ceux qui les parlent. On vient de citer divers peuples de !'empire russe. II est une region qui va prendre plus d'importance. Bien que ses habitants semblent encore, dans Ia lettre du mois de mars, ranges parmi les Tartares, une autre lettre a Kochanski, de Juillet (A 8:349-50), designe le "Paskatir", c'est-a-dire ce qui est "aujourd'hui appele Baskirie" ainsi que le precise Je Bref essai, com­ me le lieu "d'oii. sont sortis les Hongrois, car leur langue y est en vigueur". Les Bachkirs sont en effet de langue finno-ougrienne (tcheremisse). Leib­ niz a decouvert Je "vrai siege de l'ancienne Hongrie" (A 8:350) en relisant Guillaume de Ruysbroeck (1215-1256), ou Rubruquis, celui qui avait egale­ ment, au milieu du XIII' siecle, attire !'attention sur un rapport entre ger­ manique et parler de Ia 'Tatarie Crimee'. L'idee sera reprise dans le Brefes­ sai (mais a nouveau, Ia traduction figurant chez A . Jacob est inadequate). Avec ]'aide d'Eckhart, elle sera lancee dans un assez large public, comme celle de Ia parente finno-ougrienne: les lecteurs des Memoires de Trevoux de novembre 1708 pouvaient en prendre connaissance en lisant le compte rendu de I' Usage et exellence de I'etude etymologique en histoire (Callewaert 1986, II, 230). D'une maniere generale, ce plaidoyer pour l'histoire des lan­ gues considerees comme documents privilegies, si vigoureusement popula­ rise par Leibniz, doit avoir marque certaines traditions d'etude en meme temps qu'il leur fournissait un cadre de classement pour les langues de 'tou­ tes les Roussies'. On a bien !'impression, par exemple, de retrouver les echos de Ia Brevis designatio dans les vues de V.N. Tatiscev (1686-1750) (vers 1730) rapportees par F.M. Berezin (1984). La classification, bien sur, est une chose, et on peut soutenir, comme ce dernier, que Ia description donnee par Lomonossov dans l' Histoire de I'ancienne Russie (1754-58), oil on retrouvera notamment les Wendes slaves chers a Leibniz, "est plus exacte que celle four­ nie par celui qu'on considere comme un fondateur des etudes finno-ou-

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grien, P.J. von Strahlenberg (1676-1747)" (Berezin 1984:65). Autre chose est Ia comparaison methodique, dont on sait ce qu'elle doit a !'ecole hongroise. Ainsi se dessine a partir de Ia miraculeuse Scythie le vaste empire lin­ guistique etendu jusqu'aux Finnois, 'veritables aborigenes' des pays nordi­ ques, comme I'explique encore Ia Designatio. Leur localisation "en de�a et au deJa du golfe de Botnie", disons a !'Est et au Nord, confirme ce point, qui est capital pour l'histoire ancienne des Germains, puisqu'elle donne a penser que les Scandinaves, leurs cousins, sont les habitants plus recents de ce pays oil ils refoulerent les autochtones vers l'interieur, et que Ia Scandi­ navie ne doit done pas etre le berceau de Ia famille germanique. Celle-ci se place au centre d'un autre grand domaine qui englobe notamment le monde latin sons Je signe du prototype 'celtique' - deja. La meme lettre il Ko­ chanski invoque J'exemple connu par Ia Designatio: Je mot 'scythe' pour designer les Amazones, aeorpata , qui signifie "tueuses d'hommes", rappel­ le d'un cote Je terme vir on !'allemand Herr, de !'autre Je latin vulgaire bat­ tuere, attestant Ia commune origine orientale des deux langues. Derniere composante du trio des langues souches venues de !'Est europeen, le slave n'est pas oublie: "dans ta langue", dit Leibniz il Kochanski, "laquelle n'est pas moin repandue par le monde que le germanique, je pense qu'il ne man­ que pas de choses remarquables susceptible$ d'eclairer les origines des peu­ ples". On retrouvera Ia meme appreciation de Ia famille 'sarmate' dans le Bref essai. L'elargissement des perspectives se poursuivra quand Leibniz recevra de Nicolas Witsen des Notre-Pere siberiens que reprendront les Collectanea et qui lui permettront surtout de rapprocher les langues samoyedes de !a fa­ mille finno-ougrienne, ce qu'A. Stehr (1957) considere comme sa contribu­ tion plus personnelle au comparatisme ouralien. On y ajoutera nne inter­ vention de Sparwenfeld qui allait tout il fait dans le sens des orientations d'enquete decidees par Leibniz. Celui-ci ecrit au premier, dans une Jettre du 6 decembre 1695 (le courrier par Jequel Witsen communique ses speci­ mens est de 1697-99): "Je suis bien aise d 'apprendre que le langage des Sa­ moyedes est voisin de celui des Lapons [ . . ]" (Wieselgren 1883:7). Les deux peuples sont d'ailleurs consideres comme nne 'race particuliere' par un voyageur qui "avait partage Ies hommes en certaines tribus, races ou clas­ ses" - mais Leibniz a oublie sa source: il doit s'agir de Fran�ois Bernier (c. 1625-1688), qu'on mentionne parmi les premiers auteurs de classification anthropologique. La correspondance avec Sparwenfeld recapitule pour le reste les eta pes du comparatisme finno-ougrien et rappelle quelques themes .

LEIBNIZ ET LE FINNO-OUGRIEN

19

, majeurs: 'cognation des 'Finnoniens et Lapons', extension aux Hongrois, puis vers les 'Siberiens' (et meme bien au deli\), presence du slave dans Je 'pays de Lunebourg', etc. Ces enchevetrements de cultures ramenent im­ manquablement Ia question de Ia continuite: En effet, c'est un de mes 6tonnements que souvent des peuples voisins ont des langues si differentes; comme les Gerrnains et les Slaves. Peut�etre que les anciens peuples qui etaient entre deux et qui faisaient un passage moins sensible d'une langue a l'autre ont etC extermines.

La meme correspondance (Jettre du 27 decembre 1698) eclaire un au­ tre episode de l'enquete leibnizienne, cursivement evoque dans Bref essai et detaille par Setiilii (1891), de sorte qu'il n'est pas necessaire de s'y attarder beaucoup. L'information est completee par quelques lettres (notamment en fran�ais) adressee il Witsen, il un certain T. Grote et au tres interessant Erik Benzel (1675-1743), en qui A. Noreen designait un precurseur possible de Grimm pour Ia Lautverschiebung. On y voit les tentatives de Leibniz pour obtenir de "Monsieur Fabricius, envoye de Sa Maj. de Suede en Per­ se", une relation precise concernant !'experience vecue par un de ses servi­ teurs, un Finlandais , Henrik Brenner, " lequel, devant payer les Tartares qui avaient fourni des chevaux, trouva qu'ils comptaient comme lui [ . . . ]" (Wieselgren 1883:30; Setiilii 1891:63-64). Mais le marchand hollandais est un homme il chercher "les trafiques et les gains" plut6t que les 'curiosites'. II fournit son rapport "plus volontiers qu'exactement". L'anecdote, meme sans les 'circonstances' esperees, n'en confirme pas moins Ia these generale. Leibniz croit que Ia rencontre a eu lieu sur le bord du Volga du cOte du Nord, trois ou quatre journees plus haut que la ville d' Astracam, d'oU je sais que quelques nations, et on dit les Hongrois, ont tire leur origine. Ce quartier, qui est a present fort deserte et mal peupl6, a ete autrefois aussi bien peuple qu'aucun pays du monde. (Ibid.)

On peut egalement lire chez Setiilii (1891) ce qui touche a !'integration de l'este et du live dans Ia famille finno-ougrienne. La question illustre un point des plus importants, pour Ia lecture de Leibniz et Ia reconstitution exacte d'un etat final ou evolutif de sa classification des langues. Une telle reconstitution, precisement, est-elle possible, quand on considere Je carac­ tere indecis de certaines formulations? Sans doute serait-il vain de deman­ der nettete ou coherence absolues il des textes souvent ecrits au fil de Ia plume, malgre le souci de clarification et de methode qui fait de Leibniz un chercl!eur moderne, et un des premiers dans le domaine de l'histoire des Ian-

20

DANIEL DRO!XHE

LEIBNIZ ET LE FINNO-OUGRIEN

gues. La notion d'estonien et sa relation a la famille finnoise sont exemplai­ res, a cet egard. On remarque d'abord que l'este se presente plus d'une fois comme une entite sepanle, voire comme le chef d'une famille linguistique mise sur le meme pied que les grandes families europeennes: "presque tous les peuples du Nord de !'Europe sont allemands ou esclavons ou estoniens" (lettre de 1692 a un destinataire non identifie; v. aussi Ia lettre a Ludolf du 18 avrit 1692 [A 8:277-78] = Waterman 1978:24-26). Est-ce des ce moment ou par Ia suite que le mot estonien a pris le sens generique de finnois? En tout cas, les Considerations de Leibniz sur Ia lettre du P. Pezron de 1699 oil celui-ci expose a Nicaise ses idees concernant 'l'origine des nations' repe­ tent que les 'veritables Hyperboreens' doivent etre les 'Finnois ou Estes' (Dut. VI/2:85). Une lettre a Henri Justel (1620-1693), nettement anterieure il est vrai, enumere par ailleurs de maniere separee l'este et le hongrois dans un passage oil il est question, en principe, de families linguistiques ­ mais que peut-on tirer vraiment d'une telle fa9on de s'exprimer?

ne. Le Bref essai parait ici en retrait, i\ nouveau, et il ne serait pas juste de le considerer comme une sorte de testament scientifique de Leibniz en Ia matiere. Ceci vaut probablement pour d'autres ecrits des derniers annees, destines en particulier a Pierre le Grand ou a son entourage, au moment oil le 'beau dessein' qu'a forme le tsar de 'debarbariser sa nation' suscite t'es­ poir d'enquetes nouvelles. Stehr constate que le Denkschrift de novembte 1712 presente au general Bruce (reproduit par L. Richter) garde a la paren­ te finno-samoyede un caractere de supposition: Ia lettre a Sparwenfeld etait aussi d'un ton plus decide. Faut-il voir la te simple effet d'une prudence qui etait requise dans un texte destine i\ Ia publication? On peut aussi croire qu'a joue une saturation affectant une pensee en quelque sorte affaiblie par Ia repetition. On a parfois !'impression que Leibniz, a force de redire une these initiate pour en obtenir des verifications, revient sur Ia note hypothe­ tique de depart, au moment des comptes. L'espoir d'une unite qui devien­ dra celle des langues ouraliennes, imprime si vivement dans s.!'s premieres recherches, aurait plus d'eclat que Ia realite decouverte et continuerait de marquer les travanx de synthese. La convergence vers Ia Siberie indiquait-elle par ailleurs Ia direction pour Ia recherche d'une origine plus lointaine? Dans Ia lettre ou it repond a Leibniz au sujet du 'jesuite hongrois' retenu en Tartarie, dont les informa­ tions manquent de precision a son gout, Ludolf souligne que

Si nous connaissions par ce moyen des langues et des oraisons dominicales les peuples de la Scythie int6rieure, nous pourrions mieux juger des origi­ nes des nations, car une bonne partie de celles de l'Europe est sortie de ces pays compris entre l'Oc6an septentrional, la mer Noire et Caspienne. On connaitrait s'il y en reste encore qui ont rapport avec l'allemand, slavon, estonien et hongrois. (24 mai 1692 [A 8:276-77])

Un fragment de lettre a Sparwenfeld de 1697 cite par Setiilii parait enlever tout doute quant a la parente des Estes et des Finnois. On a remarque chez les Permiens ou vers ces quartiers des mots appro­ chants des paysans de la Livonie. Cela me confirme dans mon opinion que les peuples depuis les Lapons jusqu'aux Tartares derriere la mer Caspien� ne etaient d'une race approchante, oii il faut rapporter les Finnoniens, Es­ tiens et Livens, Permiens, Samoyedes, etc. ; et meme les Hongrois qui abi� taient entre Ia Siberie et la mer Caspienne.

Mais Ia Brevis designatio publiee en 1710, dont on attendrait un point final, est plus reservee. Ainsi que le note A. Stehr (1957), Leibniz se borne a y donner l'apparentement comme probable. Plus frappante encore est Ia comparaison entre Ia le9on que tire le Bref essai et Ia meme lettre a Sparwenfeld du point de vue de l'etendue de Ia fa­ mille. Celle-ci
21

si nous pouvons croire que !'Orient, c'est-a-dire Ia Mesopotamie et les re­ gions voisines sont la patrie des premiers hommes, on doit affirmer que leurs colonies gagnerent les regions du Nord par la route Ia plus courte, et non en faisant le detour de Ia mer Noire. (A 8:316; Waterman 1978:27-28)

Dans une lettre de Ia meme epoque a La Loubere (A 7:553-54), Leib­ niz depasse quant a lui Ia patrie siberienne en invoquant le langage du Siam. Tentative toute conforme a ce qu'annoncent le Bref essai et sa foi en une langue 'naturelle', si proche deja de ce que cherchera de Brosses: "it existe un grand nombre de mots qui s'etendent de !'Ocean atlantique jusqu'aux mers du Japon [ . . . ]" (ibid. ) . Le siamois dit savang pour "ciel", terme qui "pourrait avoir du rapport a Taiwan dieu des Finnois (si je ne me trompe)". La comparaison, cette fois, ne se refuse aucune analogie. Le "heaven des Anglais", "l'aicenu des Biscayens; le debbessis des Livonois; Ie nebesit des Esclavons, nubes et nefele des Latins et Grecs, nefoedd du pays de Wales, le menyegbe des Hongrois ne s'en eloignent guere" (ibid. ).

22

DANIEL DROIXHE

Dans sa tendance a l'universalite, cette expansion rencontre pourtant, a contre-courant, les exces repulsifs de l'hebreu langue mere. Leibniz veut croire a la possibilite d'une conciliation generate ; il dira dans le Bref essai qu' "il se peut que l'hebreu conserve mieux que les autres langues les vesti­ ges les plus archaiques, puisque nous ne possedons d'aucun peuple de livres plus anciens". Sa correspondance accueille avec une politesse toute chre­ tienne la demonstration de Thomassin en faveur de la theorie traditionnelle (Schulenburg 1973:69-70): "Je n'arrive pas a me persuader que l'hebreu est la langue primitive [ . . . ]". Il reserve le meilleur de son ironie a ceux qui de­ tournent une croyance au nom du patriotisme, comme Olof Rudbeck le jeune, qui; en digne fils de son pere, finirait par trouver trace des tribus d'Israel dans le parter des Lapons (Epistolaris dissert. , §27; Schulenburg 1973:74). Pour le reste, si son image de la langue-mere a des reflets de de­ sacralisation, il est parfaitement en paix avec sa conscience: puisque recol­ ter Je Notre'!Fere en diverses Jangues c'est Je repandre, de sorte que "toutes Jouent Je Seigneur" (on se souvient d'Erasme imaginant Ia "gloire de Ia Croix" chantee par le Jaboureur breton a sa charrue, par I'Indien) "Ia piete n'est pas mains interessee que Ia curiosite" aux enquetes qu'il preconise (lettre a Kochanski de juillet 1692 [A 8:352]). Dans la recherche de !'unite primitive , Ia famille finno-ougrienne occu­ pe une position-clef. Anterieure a J'arrivee des Scandinaves, "coupee en deux" par celle des Slaves, elle se recommande par son archaisme. "Cha­ que fois que !'on rencontre une sonorite identique ou quelque peu modifiee qui soit commune aux Bretons, aux Germains, aux Latins, aux Grecs , aux Sarmates, aux Finnois, aux Tartares, aux Arabes (ce qui n'est pas rare du tout), on est en presence d'une survivance de l'ancienne langue commune" (Bref essai). La longue Jettre a Sparwenfeld du 27 decembre 1698 parle du finlandais comme d"une autre mere langue' (Wieselgren 1883:30). Celle-ci est en outre tournee vers I' Asie par Ia parente samoyede, tandis que l'ou­ verture impliquee par !'expression traditionnelle de "lingua hungarica seu hunnica ", qu'utilise !'article 46 des Leibnitiana (Dut. VI/1:301) est recusee, dans J'Essai, par Je rattachement des Huns aux Slaves, dont on sait combien ils sont differents des Hongrois. Il s'agira done maintenant de trouver des convergences entre cette fa­ mille finnoise et ce qu'il y a de plus central dans l'histoire linguistique de !'Europe occidentale, c'est-a-dire Je tronc celto-germanique. Le meme arti­ cle 46, developpant l'exemple qui etait deja celui utilise par Comenius et qui ouvrait Ia liste comparative de Fogel , rapproche Jes mots designant Ia

LEIBNIZ ET LE FINNO-OUGRIEN

23

t
24

DANIEL DROJXHE

ou l'incendie du ghetto de Francfort au debut du XVIII' siecle ne font pas apparaitre chez ses contemporains un antisemitisme regie, au sens oii nous l'entendons (Sorlin 1980)? Foyer de l'origine des Europeens, Ia Scythie en a le prestige, mais offre aussi !'image de Ia nature brute, sauvage. La longue marche des peuples qui en sont sortis (dans tous les sens de !'expression) , cet autre 'voyage de Schreiten' fut accumulation d'histoire, travail de culture. Il convient de dis­ tinguer entre eux et les nations demeurees 'scythes', rassemblees par leur primitivisme et leur situation peripherique autant que par Ia comparaison des langues - apres tout, les Finno-Ougriens sont bien different des Turcs avec lesquels les fait voisiner Ia classification leibnizienne. Les Indo-Euro­ peens conquerants se sont reveles 'en suivant Ia course du solei!', Ia prover­ biale errance du Scythe dont nous parle aujourd'hui l'histoire n'etant en somme que Ia forme premiere du dynamisme qui va porter leur civilisation. NOTES I.

II faut signaler encore, a un autre endroit de la traduction (p.47): "Sur une large part de notre continent subsistent, dans les langues actuelles, des traces d'une langue ancienne qui s'est tres largement rC.pandue [ . . . ]. Je ne veux pas introduire ici I'observation trop re� battue de Saccus, auteur partout cite, sans l'avoir bien examinee au prealable ( ... ]". Une traduction ancienne du passage, parue dans !'Esprit de Leibniz (1772 11:213�14) r6tablit: "Je ne me fonde pas sur I'observation faite au sujet du mot sac, qui est si rebattue que je n'ai point examinee: mais je citerai en exemple un mot connu deja depuis longtemps des anciens Celtes: c'est celui de mar", etc. Sur cet exemple, cf. Martinet (1986:241). Ail� leurs, Leibniz analyse le nom de Childiric pour montrer que tout nom propre, a l'origine, avait une signification, une 'raison d'etre'. La tenninaison �ric signifie "vaillance, force"; "il n'y a pas tellement longtemps, dans certains livres gennaniques, g6ants et heros etaient encore appeles Recken". Un commentaire de Venance Fortunat permet d'inter­ preter le reste du nom de Chilptric. Celui�ci 6quivaut a 'aide puissante'. La traduction fran\faise ajoute sans transition: "Hulpe nous apporte aujourd'hui ce secours" (p.46). On lira plut6t: "En effet, le mot Hulpe { Chilp-] d6signe aujourd'hui encore I'aide, le secours". =

2.

Je n'oublie pas que ce dernier, voici quinze ans, a Budapest, documenta mes premieres recherches sur le sujet. Mes remerciements d'aujourd'hui vont encore aux S6minaires fin� no-ougriens des Universites de Hambourg (Prof. Veenker; Dr. T. Fazekas, souvent solli­ cit6) et de GOttingen (Prof. J. Gulya).

3.

Des copies d'une partie de ces mss. m'ont ete aimaiblement fournies grace a MM. L. Ger­ holm et C.-0. von Sydow. MM. S. Lundkvist, des Archives royales, et S. Ostergren, de !'Office des Antiquit6 nationales, ont par ailleurs faci!it6 rna recherche. L'ouvrage de Skytte ne porte pas de pagination; on se r6fere en principe, dans ce qui suit, aux cinquan­ te premieres pages.

LEIBNJZ ET LE FINNO-OUGRIEN

25

4.

Mais voir aussi 1'6quivalence d6gagee des termes relatifs au gibet, en polonais et en fran­ �ais - a partir d'un exemple boiteux.

5.

II est dommage qu'un manuel comme celui de G. Mounin, qui rappelle comment Leibniz separe un groupe 'ouraloaltalque' de Ia famille rassemblant la plupart des langues europeennes, continue d'inverser les designations de 'scythique' et de 'celtique' respec­ tivement attachees a ces deux families.

REFERENCES

Aarsleff, Hans. 1969. "The Study and Use of Etymology in Leibniz" . Studia Leibnitiana - Supplementa 3. 173-89. (Reprod. dans From Locke to Saussure par H.Aarsleff, 84-100. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1982.) . 1975. "Schulenburg's Leibniz als Sprachforscher, with some obser­ vations on Leibniz and the study of language". Studia Leibnitiana 7:1. 122-34. Arens, Hans. 1969. Sprachwissenschaft. 2e ed. Freiburg & Miinchen: Alber. Beatus Rhenanus. 1542. In P. Cornelium Taciturn annotationes. Lyon: Gryphe. Berezin, Fedor M. 1984. "Lineaments d'une linguistique historique et com­ paree en Russie au XVIW siecle". H. E.L. 6:2.55-67. Bittner, Konrad. 1931-32. "Slavica bei G.W. von Leibniz". Germanoslavica 1 .3-32, 161-234, 509-557. Borst, Arno. 1957-63. Der Turmbau von Babel. 5 vols. Stuttgart: Hierse­ mann. Bouda, Karl. 1937. "Die finnisch-ugrischen Studien in Deutschland". Ungarische Jahrbiicher 17 .167sv. Callewaert, Joris. 1986. Les "Memoires de Trevoux" (1701-1710) 1nventaire des articles linguistiques et essai de synthi!se. Dissert. en Phil. romane, Katholieke Univ. Leuven, dactyl. Droixhe, Daniel. 1978. La linguistique et l'appel de l'histoire. Geneve & Paris: Droz. Egenolff, Johan August. 1720-35. Historie der teutschen Sprache. Leipzig: Martini. (Reprod. , Leipzig: Zentralantiquariat der D.D.R., 1978.) Etter, Else-Lilly. 1966. Tacitus in der Geistesgeschichte des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts. Basel & Stuttgart: Helbing & Lichtenhahn. ---

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Grape, Anders. 1949. Ihreska handskriftssamlingen i Uppsala Universitets Bibliotek. Del II. Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell. Gulya, Janos. 1974. "Some Eighteenth-Century Antecedents of Nineteenth-Century Linguistics: The discovery of Finno-Ugrian". Studies in the History of Linguistics ed. par Dell Hymes, 258-76. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press. --. 1978. S. Gyarmathi. Budapest: Akad. Kiado. Gyarmathi, Samuel. 1799. Affinitas linguae hungaricae cum Unguis finnicae originis grammatice demonstrata. Gi:ittingen: J. C. Dieterich. (Repr. avec une introd. par Miklos Zsirai, Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press 1967, Trad. anglaise et introd. par Victor E. Hanzeli, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1983.) Hanzeli, Victor E., voir Gyarmathi 1799 (trad. de 1983). Jacob, Andre. 1973. Genese de Ia pensee linguistique. Paris: A. Colin. Kangro, Hans. 1969. "Martin Fogel aus Hamburg als Gelehrter des 17. Jahrhunderts". UA!b 41. 1-4 (Gedenkband M. Fogelius Hamburgensis), 14-31 . Lako, Gyi:irgy. 1969. "M. Fogelius' Verdienste bei der Entdeckung der finno-ugrischen Sprachverwandtschaft". Ibid. 3-13. Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. 1768. Opera omnia. Ed. par B. Dutens. 6 vols. Geneve: de Tournes. (= Dut.) --. 1923-70. Siimtliche Schriften und Briefe. Ed. par la Deutsche Akad. d. Wiss. zu Berlin. Allgemeiner politischer und historischer Briefwechsel, 8 vols. Darmstadt-Leipzig-Berlin: Akademie-Verlag. (= A 1 , A 2, etc.) --. 1710. "Bref essai sur l'origine des peuples deduite principalement des indications fournies par les langues". Traduction fran�aise dans Jacob (1973:46-62) . ---. s.d. Epistolaris de historia etymologica dissertatio. Hanovre: Niedersiichsische Landesbibliothek, Ms IV 469, 68-104. . Cf. Wieselgren 1883. Martinet, Andre. 1986. Des steppes aux oceans: L'indo-europeen et les "lndo-Europeens". Paris: Payot. Meillet, Antoine & Marcel Cohen, eds. 1952. Les langues du monde. 2 vols. Paris: Champion. Muller, Jean-Claude. 1986. "Early Stages of Language Comparison from Sassetti to Sir William Jones (1786) " . Kratylos 31.1-31. Olesch, Reinhold. 1962. Juglers laneburgisch-wendisches Worterbuch. Ki:iln & Graz: Bi:ihlau.

Orosz, R. A. 1964. Finno-Ugric Linguistics prior to 1799. Dactyl. , class Wells. Papay, Jozsef. 1922. A magyar nyelvhasonlitas tortenete [Histoire du comparatisme hongrois]. Budapest: Mag. Tud. Akad. Paul Diacre. 1532. De gestis Langobardorum libri VI. Bale: Froben. Poliakov, Leon. 1971. Le mythe aryen. Paris: Calmann-Levy. Richer, Adrien. 1776. Histoire moderne des Chinois, des Japonais, des Indiens, etc. Vol. : 27 (Histoire des terres polaires). Paris: Saillant et al. Robins, Robert H. 1971. Storia della linguistica. Bologna: Il Mulino. Scaliger, Joseph Juste. 1599 [1610] . Opuscula varia ante hac non edita. Ed. par Isaac Casaubon. Parisiis: apud Hadrianum Beys. Schulenburg, Sigrid von der. 1973. Leibniz als Sprachforscher. Frankfurt: Klostermann. Setiilii, Emil Nestor. 1891. Lisiii suomalais-ugrilaisen Kielentutkimuksen historiaan [Essai sur l'histoire de Ia linguistique finno-ougrienne] . Hel­ sinki. (Reprod. dans Suomi 3:5. 183-212, 1982.) Skytte, Bengt. [avant 1683] . Sol praecipuarum linguarum subsolarium. Ms. autographe. Bib!. de l'Univ. d'Uppsala, fol., 464 pp.; Bib!. royale de Stockholm. Sorlin, Pierre. 1980. L'antisemitisme allemand. Paris: Flammarion. Stehr, Alfred. 1957. Die Anfiinge der finnisch-ugrischen Sprachvergleichung (1669-1771). Dissert., Univ. Gi:ittingen, dactyl. Stipa, G. J. 1974. "Sprachverwandtschaftsprobleme zur Zeit von Comenius und Stiernhielm". ALH 24.351-58. Tacite. 1983. La Germanie. Ed. par Jacques Perret. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. Tischler, Johann T. 1978. Neu- und wiederentdeckte Zeugnisse des Krim­ gotischen. ( = Innsbrucker Beitriige zur Sprachwissenschaft - Vortriige und kleinere Schriften 21. ) Innsbruck: Inst. fiir Sprachwiss. der Univ. Innsbruck. Tourneur, Victor. 1905. Esquisse d'une histoire des etudes celtiques (= Bib!. de Ia Fac. de Phil. et Lettres, 15.) Liege: Vaillant-Carmanne. Veenker, Wolfgang, ed. 1986. Memoriae Martini Fogelii Hamburgensis (1634-1675): Beitriige zur Gedenkfeier in Hamburg am 17. Apri/ 1984. ( = Mitteilungen der Soc. Uralo-Altaica, 7. ) Hambourg. Vrieze, F.S. de. 1975. "Academic Relations between Sweden and Hol­ land". Leiden University in the Seventeenth Century ed. par Th. H. Lun­ singh Scheurleer & G.H.M. Posthumus Meyjes, 345-65. Leiden: Brill.

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Waterman, John T. 1978. Leibniz and Ludolf on Things Linguistic: Excerpts from their correspondence (1688-1703) . Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. Wieselgren, Harald. 1883. Leibniz' bref till Sparfvenfelt (1695-170) . Stoc­ kholm: Eggstroms. (Repr. in Antiqvarisk tidskrift 7:3. 1-64, 1884-85.) Zsirai, Miklos, cf. Gyarmathi 1799 (1967 reprint)

out analogies with Welsh? And what is the part of cultural/racial exclusion in the parting between European languages and those of the 'inner Scythia', in a classification which couples Finno-Ugrian and Turkish? Those are some of the questions broached in the last part, while the 'schreiten topic' reappears to some extent in the long historical walk of the Scythian-Indo­ Europeans, who knew how to step out of the peripheric areas of primitivism.

28

SUMMARY

The idea of dispersion was attached to the 'Fenni' nation since Tacitus and his commentators, especially Beatus Rhenanus (1531). The name of the 'Scridi-Fenni' was commonly explained by the German verb schreiten, "to walk" (and not for the name of some ancient traveller or scholar, as Schreiten was at times translated). This idea of a large ethnic and linguistic family crossed, in the 17th century, the discovery of similarities between Finnish and Hungarian. The attribution of the discovery to Comenius and Stiernhielm is reappraised in the light of G. Stipa's criticism, tor whom the so-called 'comparison' does not take place in a sufficiently conscious genealogical perspective. Scaliger's polygenism is here invoked. Other restrictions should be applied to Martin Fogel (1634-1675) without taking back his usual title of 'father of the Finuo-Ugrian studies'. His relationships with Leibniz are now well-known. The same cannot be said of the Swedish Bengt Skytte, a typical figure of pre-comparatist period, and another source in the development of those early studies. The Leibniz' correspondence extrait allows to see how he himself worked out the search for the Finno-Ugrian cradle in the South-Urals area: in the 'Juhra' (where the Ugrian languages of the Ob, Ostiak and Vogul are actually spoken); or in the 'Paskatir' (now Bashkiria), with Tcheremiss, i.e. , Finno-Ugrian, populations. The constitution of the family is consider­ ed through the adjunction of Estonian (which seems to be, in the generic sense, a synonym for 'Finn') or Permian. The correspondence with Kochanski, Sparwenfeld and others shows how Leibniz follows an intuition which keeps an hypothetical character in the Brevis designatio, even at the moment of synthesis, when the correctness of his hunch is fully confirmed by his informants. What was, for Leibniz, the place of the Finno-Ugrian family in the reconstruction of a general proto-language? Why does he especially point

29

Leibniz on Particles

Linguistic Form and Comparatism Marcelo Dascal

Tel Aviv University

1. Perhaps the best known discussion of 'particles' by Leibniz are his comments on chapter 7 of book III of Locke's Essay, called "On particles". According to Locke, 'particles'

are the words whereby it [the mind} signifies what connexion it gives to the several affirmations and negations that it unites in one continued reasoning or narration (Essay 3.7.2).

They are "words which are not truly by themselves the names of any ideas" thus being an exception to Locke's main semantic thesis. But they are necessary for propriety of expression, since -

To think well, . . . [a man] must think in train and observe the dependence of his thoughts & reasonings one upon another; and to express well such methodical and rational thoughts, he must have words to show what con­ nexion, restriction, distinction, opposition, emphasis, etc., he gives to each part of his discourse (ibid.).

An account of the particles cannot, therefore, merely name and list their categories. Their 'significancy and force' must be explained in terms of the several views, postures, stands, turns, limitations, and exceptions, and several other thoughts of the mind . . . [since] they are all marks of some action or intimation of the mind. (Essay 3.7.4)

What Locke is here saying is that the particles, when correctly used, reflect the argumentative structure of mental discourse. But this structure is not conceived by him in formal terms, i.e. , as logical structure. It has been suggested that Locke proposed here an innovative account of the particles as illocutionary force indicators, since the 'intimations of the mind' they are

32

33

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claimed to stand for might be taken to be the different mental states or propositional attitudes expressed by different speech acts (Wierzbicka 1976:328). But his own description of the particles as expressing the con­ nexion between various affirmations and negations suggests the more con­ servative view that he is simply taking the class of conjunctions as paradig­ matic of the class of particles. His appeal to something like propositional attitudes is just the way he finds to provide for them an account that fits his mentalistic semantic outlook. The analysis he suggests, then, consists in the identification of the mental attitudes the particles allegedly stand for, a pro­ cedure that yields no insight whatsoever into the logical structure of either mental or verbal discourse. ! Eventually, just as in the case of nouns, this could be developed into a systematic classification of the kinds of "actions and intimations of the mind" expressed by different particles. Yet, since such a development wouldn't presumably contribute to his main aim in the Essay, namely the critique of real essences, Locke does not bother to pur­ sue further the analysis of particles.2 In the light of such meagre results and prospects, as compared with Leibniz's own work on this topic, it is surprising to notice the mild tone of the latter's criticism of Locke's handling of the particles. But the criticism is nonetheless substantial. The only point of agreement - and a major one, for that matter - is the adoption of an epistemic viewpoint for discussing the issue. Thus, Leibniz endorses Locke's complaint against the grammati­ cal tradition which has devoted more attention to gender, moods, tenses and other epistemologically irrelevant grammatical features than to the par­ ticles. Since the particles are the marks of the operations of the mind, they deserve more careful attention by anyone interested in an analysis of the understanding, for "nothing would be more apt to reveal the various forms of the understanding" (NE 3.7.3; GP 5:311).3 At the end of the chapter, Leibniz complains that Locke has not 'gone deeper into the details of the actions of the mind' (tours de !'esprit), which are marvelously reflected in the use of particles: (NE 3.7 .6 ; GP 5:313), and concludes by insisting that "a precise analysis of the meanings of words [i.e., the particles] would help to make known the operations of the mind more than anything else" (ibid.). The general rationale for this insistence is here presented in its clearest form: "languages" - says Leibniz - "are the best mirror of the mind". Behind the sharing of this epistemic viewpoint, however, disagreement is not hard to detect, even in the above remarks. It appears already at the level of the methodical consequences to be drawn from this general

attitude. For Locke, it is by reflecting on one's thought processes that one can detect the "postures of his mind in discoursing", in terms of which the meaning of the particles is to be explained. For this purpose, grammatical classifications of the particles as well as their usual dictionary explanation by. means of examples or near synonyms are completely useless. It is our direct access to our own mental discourse that provides the touchstone for a correct account of the use of the particles. By improving the description of "the several views, postures, stands, turns, limitations, and exceptions, and several other thoughts of the mind, for which we have either n one or very deficient names" (Essay 3.7.4), we will be in a position to explain the mean­ ings of the particles. Thus, the particles, like the names of the 'mixed modes', could be said to "lead our thoughts to the mind, and no further" (Essay 3.5. 12). Not because they are "of man's making only" (Essay 3.5.11), i.e., without a 'natural model' (which is what distinguishes the names of mixed modes from those of substances), but rather because they express directly the mind's attitudes. Whereas no species of a mixed mode can exist without a name holding together the various ideas arbitrarily com­ bined in it, so that "the names of mixed modes always signify [. . .] the real essences of their species" (Essay 3.5 .14), no such dependence on language is to be found concerning the "actions or intimations of the mind". We dis­ cover indeed that the latter exist in "a great variety, much exceeding the number of particles that most languages have to express them by" (Essay 3.7.4). Consequently, there cannot be a one-to-one correspondence between the particles and what they express, and most of them must be multiply ambiguous. However, whereas ambiguity is considered by Locke to be vexing for other words, so that one "should use the same word constantly in the same sense" (Essay 3.11 .26), no such care is needed in the case of the patticles. Here, contextual disambiguation (cf. Essay 3.11 .27) is the rule rather than the exception; hence to try to follow the above recommendation for the particles would be impossible. For the same reason, it would be useless to try to provide definitions for them (as we are urged to do for the names of the mixed modes). Yet, none of these facts is seen as a problem, because whatever a particle m eans in a given context can be easily gathered thanks to our direct acquaintance with our natural mental actions. To be sure, such actions "are diligently to be studied", if we wish to give a proper semantic account of the particles, but it is such an account that depends on that study, and not the other way around. The former goal is to be achieved not via linguistic analysis but by direct intuition of our mental operations.

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While Locke relies on the mirroring relation between mind and lan­ guage in order to illuminate the latter via our direct knowledge of the former, Leibniz is in fact proposing to use the same relation in the opposite direction: the nature and variety of the mental operations is not the given, but rather the explanandum; and the way to provide an explanation is to elaborate an independent and precise analysis of the meanings of such key linguistic expressions as are the particles. This inversion of perspective has multiple consequences. First, the rejection of Locke's multiple ambiguity thesis. This thesis was illustrated, in Locke's only example, by listing five different meanings of the English particle but. Leibniz's reaction to this is to look for the com­ mon meaning underlying all of Locke's renderings. He begins by observing that there is only a partial correspondence between but and its usual coun­ terparts in French (mais) and German (al!ein, aber, sondern). Though this fact might justify positing a number of different meanings for but, Leibniz insists in his quest for a common underlying meaning, which he finally describes as 'setting up limits, and a non plus ultra, either in the things or in the discourse' (NE 3.7.5; GP 5:312). He goes as far as conjecturing that the etymology of both but and mais shows that their sources conform to this general meaning: mais would come from Latin magis, while but is allegedly derived from the old Teutonic word but, bute, which means something "to dwell"), roughly an "end" or French but fixed, a dwelling (beuten (NE 3.7.5; GP 5:313).4 The rationale for attempts such as these (the doubt­ ful etymologies notwithstanding) is the principle of parsimony, applied in semantics as everywhere else in Leibniz's thought: do not multiply senses beyond necessity. He is prepared to admit that in some cases no single 'gen­ eral or formal signification' can be found for all the uses of a particle, but this does not mean accepting unlimited multiple ambiguity. Quite on the contrary, he is convinced that "we can always reduce all the uses of a word to a definite number of significations. And this is what ought to be done" (NE 3.7.4; GP 5:311). Parsimony means reduction of mnltiplicity, disorder and complexity to unity, regularity and simplicity. This is to be achieved by means of analysis. And analysis, in the case of meanings - of the particles as of any other expression - means definition. This implies a rejection of Locke's sugges­ tion that the mere identification of the actions and intimations of the mind expressed by a particle would suffice for semantic purposes. No 'abstract explication' is sufficient. Rather,

35

one must arrive at a periphrase, which can replace it [the particle], just like the definition can replace the defined. Once the effort will be made to look for and determine these substitutable periphrases for all the particles, as far as possible, then and only then we will have ordered their significations. (NE 3.7.5; GP 5:312)'

If, in addition to providing a means for 'regler les significations', such pe­ riphrases are also to provide any insight into the kinds and nature of the operations of the mind, they must satisfy two other requirements: to be reductive and systematic. That is to say, they must pave the way for an explanation of the meanings of all the particles in terms of the meanings of a small set of basic, essential, elementary ones, and to do so in a principled way. Just as only the set of elementary simple concepts in terms of which all other concepts can be defined qualifies as an 'alphabet of human thoughts', so too only the fundamental particles correspond to the basic operations of the mind. This in turn requires a principled classification of the parts of speech, and of the place of particles therein. Whereas Locke mentions "prepositions and conjunctions", and actually concentrates only on the lat­ ter, Leibniz explores systematically the idea that particles express the struc­ ture of our thoughts, i.e., their 'form' (as opposed to their content),6 an idea which would become the basis for is principled distinction between particles and other words as well as for the sub-classification of the parti­ cles. The brief remarks of the Nouveaux Essais thus sketch a program for the investigation of the particles with a view to their epistemic import which requires: (a) parsimony, (b) regular significations, (c) substitutable defini­ tions, (d) reductive analysis, and (e) principled classification. At the time he wrote the NE, Leibniz had already done much work along the lines of such a program.? It is to these texts, which contain many of his substantive contributions to 'rational grammar', that we should now turn our attention, in order to understand the import of this program. The first problem faced by Leibniz in accounting for the linguistic 'par­ ticles' was to decide what kinds of expressions should be included, on prin­ cipled grounds, in this class. As in other fields of inquiry, Leibniz was well acquainted with the medieval and Renaissance writings on the subject. But, though useful to his endeavor in many respects, these writings did not give _ between their own conflicting ways of classify­ him the me�ns to adjudicate mg the partiCles and distinguishing them from other kinds of words. For the 2.

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same reason, he could not simply follow any of his contemporaries. He had to work out his own principled way to deal with this issue. An overview of this background, however, is necessary for understanding Leibniz's con­ tribution. The medieval tradition itself, though stemming from a common source, namely, Priscian's grammar, contained conflicting points of view for dealing with the particles. Grammarians, working within a Latin-based model, relied upon a formal-syntactic criterion, which led to a major divide of words into declinable and indeclinable ones. The latter included adverbs, conjunctions, prepositions, and interjections. Logicians, on the other hand, employed the semantic criterion of 'independent signification', which pro­ duced the division between categorematic and syncategorematic words. This allowed for the inclusion in the latter class of expressions such as the quantifiers and some 'auxiliary verbs' (for ex., begin), in addition to the paradigmatic prepositions and conjunctions. Both in the Middle Ages and later the investigation of the particles evolved under the influence of these conflicting formal-syntactic and logi­ cal-semantic criteria. In the semantically and ontologically based specula­ tive grammars of the 'modistae', the syncategoremata posed a serious prob­ lem. For, since they do not refer to an entity or to a mode of being, they do not possess, properly speaking, a 'modus significandi'. This led some of the modistae to view such words as not really belonging to language, i.e., as being mere 'auxiliaries'.• Since they had, nevertheless, to be somehow accounted for, the way to do this was to deal with them not in semantico­ ontological terms, but rather in a more formal way. Accordingly, their mode of signifying was characterized simply as the 'modus despondentis' (the dependent mode), without further specification. Their meaning was held to be 'confused' if considered without the addition of the meaning of the categoremata they were supposed to be attached to.9 The 'modern' logi­ cians, on the other hand, though sometimes attempting to provide semantic descriptions of the meanings of the syncategoremata, 10 generally adhered to the similar view that such words, in ·and by themselves, had no (clear) meaning.11 In both cases, this could lead to the multiple ambiguity view we found Leibniz criticizing in Locke's account. Leibniz mentions, in his Analysis Particularum, three late Renaissance treatises on particles, 12 which I was unable to consult. They seem to have consisted mainly in alphabetical lists of the particles containing explana­ tions of their various senses and illustrations of their uses by well-known

Latin authors.13 Leibniz criticized these treatises for concentrating on the unusual meanings and uses of the particles, while omitting their 'common and proper' significations.14 Furthermore, they employed the traditional four types of indeclinabilia as the basis for classification, a scheme which was retained even for languages such as Hebrew which did not fit it straightforwardly.!' Tursellinus, however, provided a metaphor for charac­ terizing the role of the particles that must have left its impression upon Leibniz. He compared the structural role of the particles in ensuring the coherence and aptness of a sentence to that of the membranes and nerves that hold together the bones and other more 'material' components of the body.16 It is not unlikely to see this idea as underlying Leibniz's most gen­ eral distinction between 'words' and 'particles' as being respectively the 'matter' and the 'form' of a sentence (see note 44 below) , albeit modified and re-interpreted in accordance with the new outlook characteristic of the seventeenth century's 'epistemic turn' .17 This kind of formulation was not unusual at the time. It can be found in George Dalgarno's (c. 1626-1687) works of 1661 and 1680, John Wilkins' (1614-1672) work of 1668, and the Port Royal Grammaire generale (1660). Any of them may have been the immediate source of Leibniz's distinction. What is original, however, is the way Leibniz applied such a criterion. Dal­ garno considers the particles to be the 'cement' of any sentence, so that an account of their use is the main task of Syntax.!' He goes as far as claiming that "the practice of the art of logic and grammar consists entirely in cor­ rectly using them [the particles]" (Dalgarno 1661:78) , and argues that he was the first of the artificial language inventors of the 17th century to give due weight to this fact. He divides all primitive notions into 'material' and 'formal'. The former include nouns and verbs, the latter the 'formal parti­ cles'. He reports to have listed about three hundred particles, many of which are however composed, being reducible by logical analysis to a limited number of primitive ones (Dalgarno 1661:80). These particles are represented in his �ymbolism by little dots attached to the capital letters which represent the 'material' notions, just like case inflexions attached to nouns. He offers no substitutable periphrases for the particles and is not bothered by their multiple ambiguity. Wilkins divides all words into two classes, integrals and particles. But, instead of speaking of 'form' and 'matter', he plainly relies on the medieval notions of independent signification and consignification, which underlied the theory of categoremata and syncategoremata (Wilkins 1668:298, 304).

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Being concerned only with 'natural' grammar, whose task is to "contain all such Grounds and Rules as do naturally and necessarily belong to the Philosophy of letters and speech in the General" (p. 297), he departed sub­ stantially from the Priscian scheme of parts of speech (Robins 1967:121). Amongst the particles, for example, he included the copula, treated inter­ jections as 'substitutive' of sentences and thus comparable to pronouns, and distinguished a special class of 'transcendental' particles (cf. Salmon 1972:35), which, when added to a term, modify its sense in specific ways; for exampje, the word ripe with the addition of the particle 'metaphor' will have its sense enlarged to mean "perfect" (Wilkins 1668:323) ; the particle for 'place' added to metal will yield the meaning "mine" (p. 328). Wilkins acknowledged that it is very hard, regarding the particles, to establish the "just number of such as in all kinds are necessary, and to fix their proper significations", but insisted that this "ought to be done in a Philosophical Grammar" (p. 304). Wilkins' work was closely studied and annotated by Leibniz (for ex., V£:328-393; VE:910; C:184-85; V£:923), and has left many traces in Leibniz's grammatical writings, both explicitly (for ex., VE:357, 376, 398, etc.) and implicitly (for ex., the diagrammatic represen­ tation of the meanings of spatial prepositions (V£:351, 516; C:291) which resembles the one found in Wilkins (1668:311); the discussion of derivation and composition employing concepts and examples strongly reminiscent of Wilkins' (V£:373-375); etc.). The Port Royal Grammar bases its 'most general distinction of words' on ' the broadest distinction of what goes on in the human mind' , namely the distinction between an 'object of thought' and 'the form and manner of our thought'. The latter's main type is judgement, but it refers also to "con­ junctions, disjunctions, and other similar operations of the mind, as well as all other movements of the mind, such as desires, orders, interrogations, etc." (Arnauld & Lancelot 1676 [1660]:29-30). The two main classes of words are, accordingly, those that 'signify the objects of thoughts' and those that signify 'the form and manner of our thoughts'. The former includes names, articles, pronouns, participles, prepositions and adverbs, and the latter, verbs, conjunctions and interjections (Arnauld & Lancelot, 29-30). The traditional group of particles is thus dismembered, especially due to the surprising location of the prepositions in the first group. Presum­ ably, one of the reasons for this is Port Royal's equation of the role of prep­ ositions with nominal case inflexions (p. 88), but there should be other reasons as well, t9 since from the same equation one might alternatively con-

elude, with Wilkins and Leibniz, that case inflexions are to be classed as 'particles'. Though Leibniz rarely mentions the Port Royal Grammar, he was no doubt influenced by this work as well as by the Port Royal Logic (Arnauld & Nicole 1683 [1661]). However, he departed from Port Royal not only in the specific issue just mentioned, but also in his ultimate rejec­ tion of the mentalistic interpretation of the notion of (linguistic) form as being exclusively and directly related to 'mental operations'.

38

The authors briefly discussed above do not exhaust the grammatical, logical and philosophical background for Leibniz's treatment of the subject, but they provide enough perspective in order to appreciate Leibniz's own attempts to characterize the set of 'particles' and account for their mean­ ing. zo In spite of apparent divergences, I think such attempts converge to a coherent conception. Leibniz rejects from the outset the traditional morphological criterion of indeclinability, and adopts instead a functional approach. From this point of view, particles are said to be - rather conservatively and uninfor­ matively 'auxiliary vocables' (VE:339) which, along with the affixes, are to be distinguished from the class of 'terms' (names, verbs, adverbs, inter­ jections). The nature of their 'auxiliary' function is left unspecified. Con­ sequently, the class appears to be rather heterogeneous, for it includes pro­ nouns or 'auxiliary names' such as quis and ille, auxiliary verbs such as sum and habeo, auxiliary adverbs such as quomodo and sic, as well as preposi­ tions and conjunctions. The function of the latter two kinds of particles is described in a some­ what more substantial way. The former serve to attach 'obliquely' (i.e., not by way of adjectival modification) a term either to the subject or to the predicate of a sentence, whereas the latter serve to join several proposi­ tions. These very succint remarks have two important consequences. First, conjunctions linking terms within a sentence (as in Petrus et Paulus Romae fuerunt) are to be interpreted as derived from conjoined sentences (Petrus Romae fuit, et Paulus Romae fuit) . Second and more important, from a functional point of view, prepositions are equivalent to those grammatical cases that also express obliquity: 3.

A term is obliquely linked to another either by a case or by a preposition; it seems that all linking by case can be reduced to [linkin�d by a preposi� tion, a case being thus a sort of contraction of a preposition.21

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This equivalence had already been noted before. Girolamo Ruscelli (d. 1566) following Pietro Bembo's (1470-1547) work of 1525, had suggested in 1581 that certain particles (for ex., It.di) sometimes function as segni di casi (as in padrone di casa, "master of the house") , rather than as prepositions properly speaking, as in sono partito di casa, "I have left the house" (Ro­ bins 1967:101). George Dalgarno, a century later, contends, more gener­ ally, that all particles are derived from predicable names, and concludes that "all particles are in fact cases, i.e., modes of nominal notions" .22 Leib­ niz too, in later writings, tries to explore the possibility of generalizing this equivalence and its implications, but he proceeds in a much more cautious way. If both a case inflection and a preposition have the function of expres­ sing the same type of connection between two terms, it is as redundant to have both of them as it is to have gender and number repeated in, say, a noun and its modifying adjective. Hence, "in a philosophical language, cases are unnecessary when prepositions are used, and when cases are used one can do without prepositions".23 This poses, however, an obvious problem: since there are many more prepositions than cases, if the former are simply suppressed leaving only the latter, the result will be ambiguity. For instance, in Petrus est doctus cum Johanne, the case inflexion of the second noun is unnecessary because its force is already expressed by the particle cum ( V£:928). Suppose, however, you proceeded the other way around, replacing the original sentence not by Petrus est doctus cum Johannes, but by Petrus est doctus Johanne. This very same allegedly non-redundant form would be obtained by applying the proposed procedure to Petrus est doctus sine Johanne. Dalgarno's solution was to reduce the prepositions to a rela­ tively small set of basic ones, and to assign to each of them an inflexion, regardless of the traditional grammatical case. Though this is unobjectiona­ ble from the point of view of creating an artificial language, it simply bypas­ ses the problem of explaining the differential role of the structures actually found in natural languages.24 Leibniz, instead, restricts the generality of the equivalence by introducing a distinction between 'purely formal' and other prepositions, and claiming now that only the former are equivalent to the cases.25 Accordingly, accounting for the function (and meaning) of the 'purely formal' prepositions amounts to characterizing, in a general and non-ambiguous way, the meaning of the corresponding grammatical cases. In this task, he can rely upon the work of grammarians such as Francisco Sanchez de las Brozas (1523-1601) and his disciple Kaspar Schoppe (15761649), who tried to attribute to every form a single meaning.26 As for the

other prepositions, which, though not 'purely formal', are also, in a sense to be specified below, 'formal', they require an independent treatment, involving an analytic effort to define precisely their meaning and function. A similar strategy could in principle be applied to the conjunctions as well. From a purely syntactic point of view, prepositions and conjunctions are analogous: "Just as prepositions govern the cases of nouns, so conjunc­ tions govern the moods of verbs".27 Wilkins is criticized for proposing, instead, to liken the relation prepositions/names to the relation adverbs/ verbs.28 But can one infer from the alleged syntactical analogy between con­ junctions and prepositions that there is also a functional equivalence between 'purely formal' conjunctions and moods? Here the problem is more acute than in the preceding case, since there are even fewer moods than cases. Though he seems to be convinced that ideally such an equiva­ lence should obtain, Leibniz prudently leaves the question open: There is a difficulty as to whether there ought to be as many moods of verbs as there are purely formal conjunctions, just as we wanted there to be as many cases of nouns as there are purely formal prepositions. It seems that, in the same way, a governing conjunction is unnecessary when a mood is used, and conversely that a mood is unnecessary when a governing conjunction is used [ ] . 29 ...

One may wonder why Leibniz considered this to be a 'difficulty', whereas he showed no hesitation whatsoever in the case of prepositions, even though he could avail himself of a strictly syntactic criterion for iden­ tifying the 'purely formal' conjunctions. Conjunctions indeed fall neatly into two syntactical classes, subordinative ('governing', in Leibniz's ter­ minology) and coordinative ('non-governing'). But no such purely syntactic distinction can be made for prepositions, since all of them are, strictly speaking, 'governing'. If, nevertheless, some of them can be said to be 'purely formal', then such a notion must be explicated in terms that go beyond such purely syntactic notions as government. If we go back a few paragraphs, we can try a fresh, semantic start. Prepositions share with conjunctions a connective function: "Prepositions connect names, conjunctions connect whole propositions". 30 If we take this function as paradigmatic for the whole class of particles, we may begin to see some way of making principled decisions about the membership of the class and its subdivision. For one thing, the class will include all expressions which serve to 'connect', and will exclude those that do not have such a function. Auxiliary verbs, especially the copula, will stay. Pronouns, which

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have a 'substitutive' function, will go.3I Adverbs no longer constitute a single class. Those that have a 'modifying' function are not particles at all, whereas those having a 'connecting' function, such as the interrogative an, will stay." But we will also be led to ask what are the general grounds upon which the distinction between 'connecting' and 'non-connecting' words is based, and what are the differences, if any, between the ways in which prepositions, conjunctions, and the copula 'connect'. As far as I can see, Leibniz envisages three different - though not unrelated - ways of answering these questions. The first, which might be called 'epistemic', consists in distinguishing what is conceived from the 'mode of conceiving'. This seems to correspond to the Port Royal distinc­ tion between 'objects' and 'forms' of thought, which sets aside the first operation of the mind (conceiving) from the others, i.e. judging, reasoning, ordering (Arnauld & Nicole 1683:59). But Leibniz's linguistic application of such epistemic notions is utterly different from Port Royal's. For him, the class of words which are signs of concepts includes only names, whereas all the other parts of speech are said to be signs of modes of conceiving, and are here collectively called 'particles'.33 These include inflexions, affixes, auxiliary verbs (all other verbs being reducible to est plus a name), as well as prepositions and conjunctions.34 !f Leibniz's 'modes of conceiving' were to be interpreted in accordance with the Port Royal scheme of mental oper­ ations, they would provide no basis for explaining the differences between the various kinds of particles, for, as a matter of fact, conjunctions alone are, according to Leibniz, accountable for judgement, reasoning, and argumentative ordering. 35 While verbs could be somehow accomodated as 'conjunctions' of the first kind (serving to form a judgement), prepositions, which connect several names to form a single name,36 would be left without an epistemic correlate. Unless, of course, there is an additional 'mode of conceiving', not envisaged by Port Royal, which it is the proper job of prep­ ositions to express. "Prepositions are based on relations of things", Leibniz goes on to say in the text under consideration (the Characteristica Verba/is) . With this statement, he abandons the preceding 'epistemic' account of the semantics of particles, and begins to explore an 'ontological' approach. For clearly he does not hold that there is a special mode of conceiving or perceiving 'relations of things'. On the new approach, the connections of terms expres­ sed by means of prepositions are not generated by the mind's activity, but correspond to relations actually obtaining between things. The various kinds of prepositions should therefore be correlated with the different types

of relations. And indeed, Leibniz makes use here of his general classifica­ tion of relations in two main types, 'convenientia' and 'connexio':37 A relation of one thing to another is either of agreement (convenientia)'or of connection (connexio). A relation of agreement is either of similarity or of dissimilarity. To this category belongs analogy, i.e., the comparison of similarities. A relation of connexion is either of subject to adjunct, or of adjunct to adjunct, or of subject to subject.3S

Notice that Leibniz does not bother to explain here the nature of the two main types of relations, since he has already done so elsewhere.39 His only concern is to illustrate how these different relations are expressed by differ­ ent prepositions. Thus in expresses the connexion between subject and adjunct, as in doctrina in homine est laudanda; it seems to denote specifi­ cally the inherence relation between accident and substance (Burkhardt 1980:117). Cum, on the other hand, may express any connexion whatsoever, thus Jacking a more specific meaning. These are the only examples here discussed by Leibniz, who doesn't seem to be happy with this kind of analysis of the meaning of prepositions. The reasons are obvious. 'Expres­ sing relations' is not a distinctive mark of prepositions. Other particles such as conjunctions and the copula express relations too. Even certain nouns (for ex., father) and adjectives (for ex., big) are relational (though Leibniz believes their relational aspect can be paraphrased away by means of parti­ cles). It is not surprising, therefore, to see that the Analysis Particularum, written a few years after the Characteristica Verba/is, generalizes the 'ex­ pressing relations' account to all the particles: As all the relations of notions are expressed by particles, the analysis of particles is of great interest for understanding notions that involve rela� tions.40

What is distinctive of prepositions now is the alleged fact that their proper meaning always refers to a spatial relation.'! In terms of the standard leib­ nizian classification of relations, this means that, primarily, all prepositions denote a sub-class of the relations of 'simple conjunction'." But, again, this is not exclusive of prepositions, since adverbs and conjunctions can denote such relations too. In fact, in this text the general classification of relations is not invoked, since it does not correspond in any way to the four classes of particles now acknowledged, namely prepositions (and grammatical cases), conjunctions, adverbs and pronouns. The re-inclusion of pronouns in the class of particles is indeed significant , for one can ask what kind of 'relation'

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LEIBNIZ ON PARTICLES

- ontologically speaking - do pronouns denote? No less strange, from this point of view, is the explanation of the 'particle' inquam as meaning "reassumtio sermonis, post ambages", i.e., return to the main topic after a digression (VE:524-25), or of the particles ergo and igitur as signs of an inference (VE:524). This suggests a shift of perspective, possibly indicated by the use of the term 'respectus' instead of 'relatio'. The relations particles express are not necessarily 'external' to discourse and referentially denoted by them. They can also be relations obtaining among the elements of discourse itself. Pro­ nouns are a case in point: the relations they 'stand for' are substitutivity relations between discourse elements. In this capacity they can be said to belong to the 'form', rather than to the 'matter' of discourse. And it makes sense to include them in the class of particles because this class is now con­ ceived as having the generic function not only of expressing but presumably also of giving 'form'. The Analysis Particularum already privileges this 'formal' conception of the role of the particles, for it distinguishes between two classes of adverbs, those - like prudently, piously - of which there are as many as there are adjectives and which pertain to the 'matter of discourse' , and those which pertain to the 'form of discourse', only the latter being properly called particles. 4' But it is in the De lingua philosophica that this distinction becomes finally the basis for Leibniz's classification of the parts of speech, and for his definitive account of the particles:

According to Leibniz, the 'formality' of particles manifests itself in the fact that, unlike words, they are 'general'. Thus, pronouns are particles because they have a 'general use' (VE:354). For Burkhardt (1980:115) this simply means that each particle has a formal meaning whkh is 'suffident for all the examples' [of its use]. Of course this must be true, If the particles are to satisfy the requirement of 'regularity'. But it cannot be all there is to 'for­ mality', since obviously nouns and other words belonging to the 'matter' of language also have meanings 'sufficient for all the examples' of their use. The 'general use' characteristic of a particle is 'formal' rather because it functions as a sort of inference schema. For instance, the 'general use' of the pronoun ego, namely 'identical to the speaker' ,45 combined with the contextual information that, say, John is the speaker of a given sentence, allows one to replace ego by John in that sentence. Similarly, the 'true analysis' of the meaning of "if L then M", namely, that "it cannot be simul­ taneously assumed that L is true and M is false" is arrived at by an effort to show that conversion by contraposition must be a direct consequence of the meaning of 'if . . . then' (VE:522). But a case such as 'if . . . then', where the whole meaning of a particle is explained in terms of its inferential powers is the exception. Perhaps such cases correspond to what Leibniz calls 'purely formal' particles, though these include also particles of much weaker logical force, such as the genitive which, as a general sign of 'obliquity' , expresses only the existence of a relation between two terms without specifying its nature (VE:1062-63). As a rule, however, a particle has more 'substance' and cannot be explained only in terms of its logical properties. 46 Thus, sym­ metry is a property of the relations expressed by cum, sine, apud, et and many other particles, and must follow from their meanings, but it does in no way exhaust such meanings (VE:515). Since inference is a function of structure or 'form' for Leibniz, whatever inferential power the particles have is a result of their role as structure markers. They are thus 'formal', ultimately, because, when used according to their regular signification, their very presence makes 'form' tangible.47 Yet, it is essential to notice that Leibniz speaks here of discursive or sentential (i.e., linguistic) form, rather than of logical form. Neither the inferential powers of the particles, nor the fact that in the Generales Jnquisitiones (one of his main logical-conceptual texts, written at about the same time as the De Lingua Philosophica) Leibniz also relies upon the general distinction between terms and particles (C:357-58; P:47-48) and adumbrates a logical analysis of the latter, should mislead us into equating

Vocables are either words or particles. Words constitute the matter, parti­ cles the form of discourse. Hence, there are words for all the variety of things: there is an infinite number of nouns, of verbs, and of adverbs, as much as of notions. Thus, we have the noun risus (laugh), the verb rideo (to laugh), and the adverb ridicule (laughingly) but there is neither a pro­ noun, nor a preposition nor a conjunction which contains the notion of laugh. Therefore, I call the noun, the verb, and the adverb words, and the preposition, the conjunction, and the pronoun (as well as auxiliary verbs), particles. Words are specific; particles are general. Words belong in the Dictionary, particles, in the Grammar.44

It is impossible, within the limits of this paper, to do justice to the rich­ ness of detail of the De Lingua Philosophica and related texts. I will rather concentrate on elucidating the notion of 'form' here employed and showing some of its implications. 4.

45

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the 'formal' and the logical roles of the particles. To be sure, some of them - such as the copula, the quantifiers, the inference indicator ergo - are carriers of logical form par excellence. Furthermore, all particles have logi­ cal properties to which it is important to pay close attention in their descrip­ tion. For example, cum in Petrus est doctus cum Johanne allows for the replacement of Petrus by Johannes and vice-versa in the same sentence, but not everywhere, as is permitted, say, by a particle denoting identity (V£:928). The identification of such properties is important because it amounts to determining which inferences are licenced by which particles. Even pronouns have, in this respect, a 'logical force', since they licence cer­ tain substitutions. But the specific role of the particles as carriers of the 'form' of discourse does not lie in their logical force alone. After all, the conceptual structure of complex terms - which belongs to the 'matter' of discourse - also licences inferences (for ex., from homo to anima{)." It might well be true that, at the deepest possible logical level, all the particles could be analyzed in terms of the six 'marks' of simple partial terms listed by Leibniz, namely �coincident with', 'subject' and 'predicate', 'is', 'every', and 'some' (C:362; P:53), i.e., in terms of identity, predication, and quan­ tification. But, though such an analysis - if feasible at all - could be said to provide the ultimate semantic account of the particles, it would hardly be of any help in accounting for their differential role as structuring compo­ nents of discourse. For only with the help of a complex 'transformational' mechanism could it be shown to correspond to the recognizably different work performed (at a 'shallower' structural level) by the various types of particles. It is at this 'shallower' level I submit that Leibniz's distinc­ tion between 'form' and 'matter' primarily applies. It amounts in fact to the discovery of an autonomous level of 'linguistic form', related but not reduc­ ible to logical form. 49 Leibniz compares the role of the particles to that of the signs for arithmetical operations:

generalizes arithmetics, and is often mentioned by Leibniz as a 'specimen' of his Universal Characteristic, is also domain-specific. Viewed as a lan­ guage, its 'matter' consists in terms that represent (possibly unspecified) quantities, whereas its 'form' consists in 'signs', some of which at least are domain-specific, while others (for ex. the vinculum) are not. The former signs, furthermore, may not be 'purely formal' in that they contain implicitly also some 'matter'. Similarly, in the Geometric Characteristic (see GM 5: 141-68; DAS:167-174), there will be 'formal' signs representing specifically geometrical relations, along with more general logical signs. In each of these cases, therefore, there is a level of 'form', distinct from 'mat­ ter' or 'content', but not identical to pure logical form. That the same is true of language is suggested not only by the above comparison, but also by Leibniz's use of expressions such as 'Grammatical Characteristic' (V£:1007; C:406) and 'Verbal Characteristic' (C:432-35; DAS:175-80). The former refers to a discipline which should account for specifically grammat­ ical inferences (see note 46). The latter, though apparently serving as a step towards the Universal Characteristic and though still accounting for the particles in terms of the epistemic notion of 'modes of conceiving', clearly faces the stubborn resilience of 'linguistic form'. In fact, just as the association of the particles with linguistic form does not exclude the possibility that some of the particles directly represent logi­ cal form, so too it is not incompatible with the three other approaches dis­ cussed above, namely the syntactic, the relational/ontological, and the epis­ temic. Provided, of course, that none of them purports to tell the whole story about the particles. The text of the De Lingua Philosophica indeed explores freely all of these approaches, as well as the logical and the 'purely discursive' ones, within the general framework provided by the form vs. matter distinction. Some of the passages previously quoted were drawn from this text. The 'purely syntactic' approach is illustrated by the attempt to explain prepositions and conjunctions in terms of the notion of govern­ ment, by attempts to establish what cases are 'properly' governed by what expressions (V£:364-67), by distinguishing adverbs from conjunctions in terms of whether their scope is one or more sentences (enuntiationes), etc. The ontological approach is illustrated by the use of the general classifica­ tion of relations, by the spatial account of the meanings of prepositions (V£:361-65), by the quickly abandoned suggestion that - analogously to prepositions - the primary meaning of conjunctions might be related to time (V£:362),51 etc. The appeal to 'modes of conceiving' and mental

46

Particles differ form words as in algebra the signs differ from the quantities or numbers, though some signs signify also numbers. For ex. '+' signifies "+1", and '-a'/'+a' signify respectively "+a" multiplied by "-11+1". There are also signs which are not of quantities, such as the signs of con­ nexion, like the vinculum, and the signs of equality. so

This comparison provides a precious indication of the nature of the 'formal­ ity' expressed by the particles. Arithmetical operations, which are domain­ specific, cannot be equated with logical operations. Algebra, which

47

48

49

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states, though less frequent, is also present in this text. For example, the interrogative pronoun quis is explained in terms of the mental state 'ignor­ ance cum desire to know' of the speaker,52 the imperative mood is said to mean a 'declaration of desire' serving to express, according to the relative status of speaker and addressee, a request, a persuasion, an order, or merely a permission,53 and particles like finally , furthermore, so far, etc. are said to reflect the states of mind of the speaker and to help in ordering speech (V£:524). The class of particles includes also the copula, the quantifiers, and adverbs of negation/affirmation and modality. Though such particles lend themselves to a direct logical analysis, their investigation in this (grammati­ cal) context discloses dimensions of form not usually represented in logi­ cally-oriented accounts. For example, in addition to the two 'primary adverbs' of negation (non) and affirmation (revera), one must acknowledge adverbs that weaken or strengthen an affirmation or negation, as in A forte (verisimiliter, probabiliter, possibiliter) est B or A necessaria (certo) est B. As for the adverbs that indicate modality, their examination reveals that there are more modalities than the four logical ones, i.e. , possibility, neces­ sity, impossibility and contingency (V£:368). Finally, certain pronouns are explained in terms of intradiscursive rela­ tions, for ex., the same = 'that which shortly before in another question has been designated or pointed at'," and Leibniz also points out the need to account for such essentially discursive or text structuring elements as into­ nation, pauses and punctuation signs (V£:375). Given such a variety of kinds of particles and of ways of explaining their meanings, aren't we back to where we started, i.e., with an extremely heterogeneous set of linguistic expressions vaguely defined as 'auxiliary words' or simply as the old 'syncategoremata'? In a sense, yes. For, though the membership of the class has been systematically enriched as well as pruned in the way, what 'unifies' it is still rather ill-defined. Yet, though admittedly elusive, the notion of 'linguistic form', which all the particles somehow allegedly embody, at least suggests an original kind of unification to be sought. Each particle may have a specific function - logical, epis­ temic, denotative, purely syntactical, or discursive - in terms of which its meaning is ultimately to be explained. In addition to that, however, in their linguistic manifestation through the particles, the interplay of such func­ tions yields a structural texture which cannot be simply reduced to any of these other levels, and must be considered in terms of its own categories

and constraints. In so far as the study of the particles is, for Leibniz, the study of grammar, this amounts to delineating a non-reductionist program for 'grammar'. The identification of such a program in Leibniz's writings should lead to a radical reappraisal - which cannot be done here - of the relationship between his linguistic and logical studies. Roughly, it becomes clear that the former are not merely preliminary steps for the latter. In particular, 'ra­ tional grammar' can no longer be seen as just the a posteriori complement to the purely conceptual a priori way of building the Characteristica Uni­ versalis (cf. Schmidt 1955, Arndt 1967). Other aspects of Leibniz's linguistic investigations should also be reappraised. For not only rational grammar, but also less universal and regular aspects of language - such as etymology -, which clearly have little to do with logic,55 deserve to be properly and systematically investigated as contributions to our understanding of the specific nature of linguistic phenomena.56 But it is to the implications of the above program for the role of a com­ parative study of languages that we should now turn our attention. Observe first that, if 'linguistic form' were reducible to logical form , or to modes of conceiving, or else to ontologically determined relations of things, then, on Leibniz's rationalistic assumptions, it could not vary across languages. On such a view, whatever differences are actually observed amongst languages should be conceived as irrelevant to grammar. Furthermore, though the comparison of languages might be of some help in the discovery of linguistic form, it would be by no means essential to this task, the privileged method being a top-down analysis based on the preferred reducing level (logical, epistemic, or ontological). On the other hand, given a non-reductionistic position, variability of linguistic form becomes at least possible, and a more substantial role both for the empirical investigation of languages and for comparatism could be envisaged. But the possibility thus opened by non-reductionism could as well be quickly blocked by postulating that linguistic form, though not reducible to other levels, is itself universal. In fact, Leibniz's insistence on 'regularity' suggests exactly that. Thus, when grammar is said to be con­ cerned with describing 'the regular signification of all particles, inflexions, and collocations', it is also called 'universal' and 'rational' (C:35), and is said to cover the meaning of 'everything general in language' ( C:353; DAS:163). Anomalies as well as peculiarities of particular languages can be 5.

51

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overlooked, because the aim of such a grammar is not didactic but rather to provide a precise analysis of words.'7 As a part of the 'philosophical lan­ guage', it should retain only what is 'absolutely necessary for expressing the mind's judgements' .ss Furthermore, in so far as such a grammar is strictly regular, it can be found in Latin as well as in any other language. Hence, the grammatical regularities of all languages are but parts and examples of this 'philosophical grammar'.59 It would seem, then, that - as far as grammar is concerned - only in their 'anomalies' can languages truly differ. Variability is thus excluded from the 'general use' of the particles which must be, as we have seen, 'reg­ ular'. The latter, furthermore, can be disclosed by the careful investigation of any individual language, and does not require, therefore, a comparative analysis. Presumably, the dictionary, as opposed to the grammar, may involve more substantial differences between languages. Thus, Leibniz observed that 17th-century German had a rich set of 'terms of art' for con­ crete matters, but lacked expressions for metaphysics, being thus forced to employ borrowed or 'impure' terms in this domain. This was a contingent fact, reflecting the historical and geographical vicissitudes of the language and of its speakers. As such, it could - and should, according to Leibniz ­ be modified by the concerted action of diiigent scholars. Such dictionary gaps do not impair the 'expressive power' of a language, because they can be either diachronically eliminated in the course of the language's develop­ ment, or synchronically circumvented by the use of suitable circumlocutions (cf. UG:59). But a language whose 'form' is not substantially 'regular', i.e. , whose 'grammar' does not share at least a substantial portion of 'universal grammar', being instead mostly 'anomalous', is simply inconceivable. Nevertheless, a significant amount of variability is possible even in grammar, and language comparison turns out to be necessary for achieving the aims of 'rational grammar'. After his attempt to analyze the meaning of but in the Nouveaux Essais, Leibniz points out that

only way to disclose their 'regularity' is via comparative analysis. Since, however, it is impossible to know, from the inspection of a single language, whether we are in presence of a 'strange variation', an 'anomaly', or a 'nor­ mal' grammatical detail, a multiple-language perspective is necessary for the correct analysis of linguistic form. Being necessary for the specifically linguistic task of revealing 'linguis­ tic form' , comparatism may also turn out to be advantageous (and perhaps even necessary) for obtaining knowledge about other domains from knowl­ edge about language. Consequently, if we adopt for example the point of view of the epistemological interest of the study of particles he shares with Locke, it becomes apparent why it is highly appropriate for Leibniz to insist that it is the set of languages, rather than (a single) language which is 'the best mirror of the human mind' and that the compilation of dictionaries and grammars of all the languages of the universe and their comparison will be extremely useful not only for the knowledge of things, but also 'for the knowledge of our mind and of the marvelous variety of its operations' (NE 3.9.9; GP 5:317).

50

NOTES 1.

..

2.

Formigari's (1970:173-95) account makes clear that this particular focus of Locke's semantics is a direct result of its main concern, namely, to provide a critique of 'real essences', replacing them by 'nominal essences'. One might add that, whereaS the thesis that nouns, though indirectly referring to external things, refer primarily to mental entities, had to be laboriously defended against 'realist' semantics, the corresponding thesis for the particles was much less questionable, and hence needed no further atten­ tion. On the other hand, being 'purely subjective' (i.e., without a 'model in nature'), the meanings of the particles involVe, like those of the expressions denoting 'mixed modes', a higher degree of arbitrariness, and hence may not be amenable to a systematic and detailed semantic account.

3.

NE stands for Nouveaux Essais. For the other abbreviations see the reference list. When quoting from the pre-edition (VE), I add, whenever available, a reference to a published

since languages vary in usage in strange ways, it would be necessary to investigate much more in detail the examples in order to reach enough reg� ularity regarding the meanings of the particles. (NE 3.7.5; GP 5:313)

Due to these 'strange variations', a language may conflate in a single parti­ cle (with a single regular meaning) the regular meanings of two or more particles of another, or a language may lack inflexions and constructions that another has, and so on.60 Such variations are not 'anomalies', since, though sometimes 'strange', they involve regularity and generality. Yet, the

"Locke puts particles aside from his main thesis and concentrates on categorematic terms, nouns and adjectives, in which the naming function may be considered uppermost. [ .] having set the particles aside he has little further to do with them ... The formal proper* ties of language have no significant place in Lockean semantics: by excluding from integ* ral consideration all but the naming function Locke inevitably suggests that language is an aggregate of signs rather than a formal system" (Land 1974:8). "Tranne che per una breve trattazione dei sincategoremi, Ia discussione verte tutta attorno a una semantica dei nomi. II nodo problematico delle dottrine linguistiche di Locke non e la semantica della pro­ posizione, rna i1 rapporto fra nomi e cose" (Formigari 1970:175).

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aliquam proprietatem competere videbam in coniungendis et construendis verbis, et in quibus significatio aut constructione verborum mutatur, aut grammatica ratione con­ stituitur" (p. xi). His 'commentary' is in fact a completely new book, where the part of Tursellinus' original is hard to determine.

edition as welL Translations are my own, unless the quotation is followed by the mention of a translated edition of Leibniz's writings. I have endeavored to provide in the notes the original Latin texts. 4.

A satisfactory analysis of but remains a desideratum to this day. For a pragmatico·seman­ tic analysis of the meaning of this and related expressions, see Dascal & Katriel (1977) and the bibliography therein.

5.

Leibniz's requirement of substitutivity as a condition for an appropriate semantics of the particles is praised by Wierzbicka {1976:328-29), who tries to fulfill it in her own account.

6.

Recall that, instead of Locke's talk of 'postures of the mind', Leibniz speaks of "formes de l'entendement" (NE 3.7.3; GP 5:311).

7.

Many - though not all - of these texts, which Couturat often only listed or published fragmentarily, are now available in VE. They were written mostly in the decade 1677-87. The most important ones are: "Analysis grammatica ad characteristicam seu linguam generalem condendam" (VE 926-30; C:284-85), "Analysis particularum" (V£:514-32), "De lingua philosophica" (V£:353-76; C:288-90; ?:15-16), "Characteristica verbalis" (VE:1057-61; C:432-35; DAS:175-80), and "Analysis linguarum" (C:351-54; DAS:16166). To this one should add the "Generales inquisitiones de analysi notionum et ver­ itatum" (C:356-99; ?:47-87).

8.

See Robins (1951:85; 1967:80). For the Modistae, "verbs stood at the pinnacle of the lin­ guistic microcosm because just as the other animals are submissive to man, so the inflec­ tions of the other parts of speech in a sentence are ultimately submissive to the verb [ ... ] · And just as the organisms capable of fewest adaptations are ranked lowest in the kingdom of nature, so the indeclinables, the syncategoremata, are the most inferior parts of speech" (Kretzmann 1967:375).

9.

This is a view expressed by Siger de Courtrai; see Bursiii-Hall (1971:125, 132).

10.

William of Sherwood, in his treatise on syncategoremata, provides semantic rules for the quantifiers. For example: "The term 'every' or 'all' requires that there be at least three appellata [for the terms to which the sign is attached]" (Kretzmann 1967:373). See also Kneale & Kneale (1962:248).

11.

"Strictly speaking, a syncategoremata signifies nothing, but when added to another word it makes that word signify something, or makes it supposit for something or some things in some definite way, or exercises some other function having to do with a categorema" (William of Ockham, quoted in Kretzmann 1967:373). Notice that the Modista Michel de Marbais is opposed to this (Bursill-Hall 1971:131).

12.

H. Tursellinus (De particulis latinae orationis, Roma 1598), G. Stewechius (De particulis linguae latinae Colonia 1580), and A. Durrerus (De Particulis Linguae Latinae, Lipsia 1624).

13.

This kind of work was very popular, until quite recently. Tursellinus' book, for instance, was re-edited many times, most recently by Hand (1829). In his preface, Hand discusses the practice of each author to reproduce and expand preceding works, which led to recur­ rent charges of plagiarism. He criticizes Tursellinus and some of his later editors for lack of systematization of the material, for not considering the full context of a sentence (and even more) in order to explain the meaning of a particle, for unexplainably including in the class of particles the pronouns, as well as for other evils. He excludes also those adverbs which, according to him, belong to the lexicon, and retains only those "quibus

53

14.

"[. . . ] autores qui scripsere de particulis {. . . ] annotare tantum usus quosdam et sig­ nificationes non vulgares, communibus et maxime propriis omissis quod nollem factum" (V£:514). Recall Leibniz's requirement of regular explicit definitions; cf. Kukenheim (1974:101).

15.

As in Johannes Reuchlin's (1455-1522) Hebrew grammar of 1506 (Robins 1967:96). Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) (1924:304, 327-28) saw in the fact that Hebrew prepositions have a plural inflexion a good reason for classifying them as 'relative or prepositive names'. He may have relied on Ramus' use of number as the basic criterion for the clas­ sifications of parts of speech (cf. Robins 1967:102-103).

16.

The only explicit quote from Tursellinus in Hand's Commentary is this: "parva quidem res in speciem et exilis, sed ad usum magna, ac plane necessaria. Nisi vero obscurum est, quantum momenti habeant in corpore ad motum usumque membrorum molles ossium commissurae, nervi, ceteraque, quibus artus omnes apti connexique inter sese continen­ tur, Quippe sine his coniunctionibus et quasi vinculis non secus atque humanum corpus sine nervis dissoluta, minimeque inter se apta et cohaerens languet oratio. Itaque non immerito fortasse Caligula ille Caesar hoc nomine Senecam irrisit, quod eius scripta arenam sine calce esse diceret" (Hand 1829:x-xi).

17..

See Dascal (1976; 1978:68-70).

18.

In the Ars Signorum (1661:78), G. Dalgamo stresses the importance of particles, and compares their role in the sentence to that of the soul in man, to that of the nerves and ligaments in the human body, etc.: "quae ita se habent ad Orationem ut anima ad hominem; vel Tendines Nervi & ligamenta ad Corpus; vel Caementum ad Aedificium. Subductis enim Particulis ex Oratione, quid remanet? Nisi mortuum Cadaver, sine forma hominis? Vel soluta membra sine forma corporis; vel cumulus lapidum sine forma domus?". In the Didascalocophus (1680:62) he returns to the same topic, employing slightly different similes: "All our Syntax consisting in the cement of auxiliary Particles. To treat of Syntax then in English, is to shew the use of the Particles, in forming words into Sentences. For, to explain these Notions separately, were to build Castles in the Air; and to form sentences without them, were to make ropes of sand" (see also Salmon 1972:123n.). All these images are strongly reminiscent of Tursellinus.

19.

For a discussion of this issue, see Swiggers (1985) and Dominicy (1984:57-60, 151ff. ).

20.

A more comprehensive survey of the relevant Leibnizian background should discuss also the grammatical work of F. Sanchez, K. Schopp, Gerhard Johannes Vossius (1577-1649) and Julius Caesar Scaliger (1484-1558), as well as Joachim Jungius' (1587-1657) Logica Hamburgensis. For the latter, see Kangro (1969), and note 46 below.

21.

"Tenninus cum termino oblique concurrit vel per casum vel per praepositionem licet omnis concursus per casum videatur reduci posse ad praepositionem, casum enim est quasi praepositionis contractio" (VE:315).

22.

" . . . accuratius enim examinando omnium Notionum Analysin Logicam, percepi nullam esse Particulam, quae non derivetur a Nomine aliquo Praedicamentali; & omnes Par­ ticulas esse vere Casus, seu Modos Notionum Nominalium" (Dalgarno 1661:80).

54

MARCELO DASCAL

23.

"Sane in lingua philosophica adhibitis praepositionibus non est opus casibus, et adhibitis casibus careri potest praepositionibus" (VE:354; C:288; ?:15).

24.

Dalgarno's preference for the uniformly 'inflexional' solution is further motivated by his concern with the communicative function of his Character, which requires, according to him, as much brevity as possible. Leibniz, on the other hand, is more concerned with perspicuity of form, which Can be better achieved by clea.rly marking structural features by means of 'visible' particles. This is why he prefers to 'translate' cases into particles and not vice-versa, in the philosophical or universal language: ''itaque uti ex lingua particulari transferatur aliquid in universalem, mutantur casus vel flexiones in particulas" (V£:928).

25.

"Tot deberent esse casus quot sunt praepositiones pure formal�s; seu quae a specialibus abstrahunt, et pro modis particulis haberi deberent" (V£:355).

26.

"Particolarmente interessante e in Sanzio Ia trattazione dei casi e delle preposizioni, dove alia regolarita sintattica si accompagna un tentative di unificazione anche in campo semantico, con l'attribuzione ad ogni fonna di un unico significate: 'Genitivus perpetuo significat possessorem, sive active, sive passive capiatur ... Nam possessor et res possessa nomina relata sunt . . . quum alterum sine altero nequeat intelligi' (Sanctius, De Causis: 48 quoted after Giuliani & Puglielli [1973:6]). For Leibniz's discussion of the meaning of the genitive, see V£:1063. See also Chevalier (1968:52-55).

27.

"Ut praepositiones regunt casus nominum, ita conjunctiones regunt modes verborum" (V£:355; C:288; P:15).

28.

" . . . praepositiones refert ad nomina, ut adverbia ad verba, sed longa aliter esse osten­ dimus, conjunctiones potius se habent ad verba, ut praepositiones·ad nomina. Verba se habent ad adverbia ut substantiva nomina ad adjectiva" (V£:910). Wilkins (1668:309) had written: "These [the prepositions] having such a subserviency to Nouns, in respect of which, they are by some stiled Adnomia, or Adnomina and Praenomina, as Adverbs have to Verbs". But, it should be pointed out, he considered both adverbs and conjunctions as belonging to the same class, namely, that of 'connexive particles' (p. 312).

29.

30. 31.

32.

33.

"Vocabula sunt signa vel Conceptuum, ut Nomina, vel modorum concipiendi, ut caeterae partes orationis" (V£:1059; C:432; DAS:175); "Modi concipiendi designantur particulis" (V£:1060; C:434; DAS:177). On Leibniz's explicit use of the Port Royal classification of mental operations, see V£:195.

34.

Adverbs are not mentioned in this context, but in so far as they are said elsewhere to "modify the assertion", they can be seen as "modes of asserting", i.e., as falling within the general category of "modes of conceiving".

35.

"Conjunctiones sunt connexiones plurium nominum ad fonnandum judicium seu pro­ positionem aut plurium propositionum, sive ad formandam ex pluribus unam pro­ positionem, sive ad formandam unam Orationem id est compositum ex propositionibus. Quod compositum est ratiocinatio, vel tractatio" (V£:1060-61; C:434; DAS:177).

36.

"Praepositiones sunt connexiones plurium nominum ad formandum unum nomen" (ibid.).

37.

Though his terminology varies somewhat (comparatio vs. connexio (C:355); comparatio vs. conjunctio (A VI:i 277)) the classification remains substantially the same throughout his work. Its most elaborate form is to be found in the notes for a revised edition of the Nova Methodus (A VI:l. 277-78), and can be schematized as follows:

of comparison (metaphor) relations

"Difficultas est an tot esse debeant modi verborum quat sunt conjunctiones nude for­ males, quemadmodum tot voluimus esse casus nominum quot sunt praepositiones nude formales. Videtur eadem modo non opus esse conjunctione regente cum adhibetur modus,·et contra non opus esse modo cum adhibetur conjunctio regens . . . " (V£:355; C:288; P:15). "Praepositiones jungunt nomina, conjunctiones jungunt integras propositiones" (V£:106); see also Burkhardt (1980:119-20). "Pronomen est nomen quo significatur aliud nomen hue repeti vel hie subintelligi debere. Cuius usus in eo est, ne semper priora nomina repetere necesse sit" (V£:348); "Prone­ men est nominis vicarium" (V£:349); "Nomen duplex est vel enim notionem per se con­ tinct, vel innuendo aliud nomen; illud absolute Nomen dici sole, hoc pronomen" (V£:1062). Pronouns belong in fact to an expanded class, containing also 'pro-verbs' and 'pro-sentences' (V£:354). "Diversae plane naturae particulae male sub adverbii appellatione miscentur; nam exemM pli gratia: an, adverbium interrogandi quidnam commune habet cum adverbio fortiter id est cum fortitudine. Itaque haec quae vocant adverbia interrogandi malim referre ad con­ junctiones. Haec tamen diligentius consideranda" (V£:349).

55

LE.IBNIZ ON PARTICLES

simple (synecdoche) of conjunction of connexion (metonymy)

� �

examples eodem et diverse simili et dissimili aequali et inaequali toto et parte parte et comparte loco, tempore other 'adjuncts'

\ c�usa et �ffectu ( s1gno et s1gnato

For a discussion of this classification, its correlates, and uses, see Dascal (1978:106-118). 38.

"Relatio rei ad rem est vel convenientiae, vel connexionis. Relatio convenientiae est vel similitudinis, vel dissimilitudinis. Hue pertinet analogia, seu ipsarum similitudinum com� paratio. Relatio connexionis est vel subjecti et adjuncti, vel adjuncti et adjuncti, vel sub­ jecti et subjecti" (V£:1061; C:434; DAS:177).

39.

For ex., in terms of such notions as 'co-presence' and 'co-essence' (A VI:l.285; see Das­ cal 1978:!06-109).

40.

"Cum omnes Notionum respectus particulis exprimantur, magni erit momenti par­ ticularum Analysis ad notiones intelligendas quae respectus involvunt" (V£:514). Notice the epistemic direction of this text. Given the rejection of the 'modi concipiendi' approach, however, Leibniz's position here cannot be simply interpreted as equivalent to Locke's similar claim that particles express relations.

56

MARCELO DASCAL

LEIBNIZ ON PARTICLES

57

though in some languages manifesting themselves by nominal endings , should not be taken for genuine cases (V£:356-57).

41.

"Notandum est omnes has praepositiones Latinorum in propria sua significatione notare respectum localem, translate vero aliis quoque respectibus designandis adhiberi" (VE:514; see also VE:351-52).

52.

42.

Burkhardt (1980:117) mistakenly considers temporal, spatial, and causal relations as being relations of 'convenientia'.

"Quis? iHe quem ignoro et scire cupio. Quis hoc fecit? significat: volo scire notas ipsius A, seu subjecti in propositione:A hoc fecit" (V£:359).

53.

43.

"Adverbia duorum sunt generum, alia magis ad materiam sermonis pertinent, qualia sunt innumera, scilicet tot, quot adjectiva [ . . . ] Alia vero adverbia magis pertinent ad formam orationis et constituunt particulas. Et ut paucis dicam Adverbia vel sunt vocabula (scilicet primaria) vel particulae" (V£:527). In the light of the text quoted in the following note, he should have said 'voces' rather than "vocabula (scilicet primaria)".

"lmperativus modus designat voluntatem declaratum, quod fit petitione, persuasione, imperatione prout superioribus, aequalibus aut inferioribus loquimur, interdum permis­ sionem tantum indicat imperativus . . . " (V£:371).

54.

"Idem est, ille qui proxime ante in alia quaestione, erat designatus vel demonstratus" (VE:359).

"Vocabula sunt Voces aut particulae. Voces constituunt materiam, particulae formam orationis. Hinc voces per omnem rerum varietatem ducuntur, infinita sunt nomina, infinita verba, infinita adverbia, imo tot quat notiones. Ita habemus nomen risus, verbum rideo, adverbium ridicule; sed neque pronomen neque praepositionem neque con� junctionem habemus quam risus notio ingrediatur; itaque nomen, verbum, adverbium appello voces, at praepositionem, conjunctionem et pronomen (imo et verba auxiliaria) particulas. Voces ad sp�cialia descendunt; particulae sunt generales. Voces pertinent ad Dictionarium, particulae ad Grammaticam" (V£:353; partly in C:288 and ?:15).

55.

Leibniz argUes that semiotics (which includes 'linguistics') cannot be equated with logic, as suggested by Locke, since this would import into the "science of judging, reasoning, and discovering" the arbitrariness and indefiniteness of the "Etymologies of words and of linguistic usage" (NE 4.21.4; GP 5:504).

56.

Leibniz criticizes Sanchez and Schoppe for leaving etymology out of their 'philosophical grammar' (V£:348). He himself, on the contrary, devoted much effort to etymology (cf. Aarsleff 1969), which he considered to be related to grammar. Recall that, traditionally, 'etymology' was conceived as the theory of the parts of speech (cf. Kukenheim 1974:169).

57.

"Respicienda autem est maxime Grammatica regularis, minore Anomaliarum cura, quia haec Grammatica non tam ut lingua discatur, quam ut accurata fiat verborum analysis, conscribenda est" ( C:36).

58.

"Reducenda omnia alia ad ea quae sunt absolute necessaria ad sententias animi exprimendas" ( C:281).

59.

"Grammaticae autem generalis tantum pars est Grammatica Latinae vel alterius cujusque linguae, quatenus regularis est, et anomalis caret. Itaque omnes omnium linguarum Grammaticae regulares sunt tantum partes, speciminave Grammaticae philosophicae" (GP 7:28; VE:795).

60.

" ... quod aliqua lingua caret quibusdam flexionibus et variationibus et compendiis exprimendi quas altera habet; nonnullae etiam linguae quasdam significationes in alia diversas et forte in aliis etiam flexione distinctas, sub una flexione comprehendunt; ita Germani vocativum a nominativo flexione non distinguunt" (GP 7:28; VE:795).

44.

45.

"Ego idem quod loquens, quando scilicet sermo est de praesenti locutione" (V£:359). Cf. "Ego idem est quod, nunc loquens" (VE:l066).

46.

In modern terms, we could perhaps express this by saying that the meaning (and the 'logic') of most particles cannot be explained iri purely extensional or truth-functional tenns. In Leibniz's terms, the same claim is made by saying that some inferences - nota� bly those involving obliquity - are based on principles of grammar, rather than of logic proper (C:36; 244) .

47.

Explicitness and tangibility (recall his metaphor of the 'filum Ariadnes') are, for Leibniz, the most general requirements of 'formality' (cf. Dasca1 1978:212-14).

48.

The structure of complex concepts, to the extent that it is a result either of composition or of derivation, being thus representable by certain affixes or suffixes, also involves par­ ticles (cf. VE:348, 373).

49.

On the relative independence of grammar from logic in Leibniz, see Dascal (1971). Burk­ hardt, though recognizing this trend, still prefers to maintain the accepted view that, for Leibniz, grammar is essentially subordinated to logic (cf. Burkhardt 1980:93�94, 138). In so far as Leibniz indeed strives to define a specific level of 'linguistic form', Land (1974) is correct in stressing Leibniz's role in the evolution of the notion of form in linguistics. But his choice of Leibniz's logical texts to support this point is, I believe, misguided.

50.

"Particulae differunt a vocibus, ut in algebra signa a quantitatibus sive a numeris, possunt tamen quaedam signa simul esse numeri, ut '+' significat "+1", et '- a'/'+a' significat "+a" per "-1/+1" multiplicatum. Sunt tamen et signa quae non sunt quantitates, talia sunt signa connexionum, ut vincula, item signa aequalitatis" (VE:354). The vinculum is a scope indicator, in Leibniz's usage (cf. GP 7:206-207; DAS:184-85).

51.

When discussing verb forms, Leibniz warns us not to assimilate aspects such as the inchoative, frequentative, augmentative, etc. (which abound in languages such as Geor­ gian) to moods (which are related to time), just as comparative degrees and gender,

REFERENCES

Aarsleff, Hans. 1969. "The Study and Use of Etymology in Leibniz". Akten des Internationalen Leibniz-Kongress, Hannover, 14-19 November 1966 (= Studia Leibnitiana, Supplementa, 3), 173-89. Wiesbaden: F. Steiner. Arnauld, Antoine & Claude Lancelot. 1676 [1660]. Grammaire Generale et Raisonnee. Facsimile of 3rd ed., ed. by Herbert E. Brekle. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1966. & Pierre Nicole. 1683 [1661]. La Logique ou /'Art de Penser. Ed. by Louis Marin, based on the 5th ed. Paris; Flammarion, 1970.

--

58

59

MARCELO DASCAL

LEIBNIZ ON PARTICLES

Arndt, Hans Werner. 1967. "Die Entwicklungstufen von Leibniz' Begriff einer lingua universalis". Achter Deutscher Kongress fur Philosophie, Heidelberg 1966: Das Problem der Sprache ed. by Hans-Georg Gadamer, 70-71. Miinchen: W. Fink. Burkhardt, Hans. 1980. Logik und Semiotik in der Philosophie von Leib­ niz. Miinchen: Philosophia. Bursill-Hall, G.L. 1971. Speculative Grammars of the Middle Ages: The doctrine ofpartes orationis of the Modistae. The Hague: Mouton. Chevalier, Jean-Claude. 1968. Histoire de Ia Syntaxe: Naissance de Ia notion de complement dans Ia grammaire franqaise (1530-1750) . Geneve: Droz. Dalgarno, George. 1661. Ars Signorum, vulgo Character Universa/is et Lin­ gua Philosophica. London: Hayes. (Repr . , Menston: Scholar Press, 1968.) ---. 1680. Didasca/ocophus or The Deaf and Dumb mans Tutor. Oxford: the Theater. (Repr. , Menston: Scholar Press, 1971.) Dascal, Marcelo. 1971. "About the Idea of a Generative Grammar in Leib­ niz". Studia Leibnitiana 3.272-90. (Repr. in DAS; see below under Leib­ niz.) ---. 1976. "Language and Money: A simile and its uS:e in the 17th cen­ tury philosophy of language". Studia Leibnitiana 8. 187-218. (Repr. in DAS.) ---. 1978. La Semiologie de Leibniz. Paris: Aubier. --- & Tamar Katriel. 1977. "Between Semantics and Pragmatics: The two types of 'but' - Hebrew 'aval' and 'ela"'. Theoretical Linguistics 4. 143-72. Dominicy, Marc. 1984. La naissance de Ia grammaire moderne: Langage, logique et philosophie a Port-Royal. Bruxelles: Pierre Mardaga. Formigari, Lia. 1970. Linguistica ed empirismo nel Seicento inglese. Bari: Laterza. (English translation: Language and Experience in 18th-Century British Philosophy. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins, 1988.) Giuliani, M. Vittoria & Annarita Puglielli. 1973. "Aspetti teorici dell'ellissi nella tradizione grammaticale". Unpublished typescript. Hand, Ferdinand. 1829. Tursel/inus seu De Particu/is Latinis Commentarii. Vol.I. Leipzig. (Repr. , Amsterdam: A.M. Hakkert, 1969.) Kangro, Hans. 1969. "Joachim Jungius und Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Ein Beitrag zum geistigen Verhiiltnis beider Gelehrten". Studia Leibnitiana 1. 175-207. Kneale, William C. & Martha Kneale. 1962. The Development of Logic. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Kretzmann, Norman. 1967. "Semantics, History of". The Encyclopedia of Philosophy ed. by Paul Edwards, vol. VII, 358-406. New York: McMil­ lan & Free Press; London: Collier-Macmillan. Kukenheim, Louis. 1974 (1932]. Contributions a /'histoire de Ia grammaire italienne, espagno/e et franqaise ii /'epoque de Ia Renaissance. Utrecht: H&S Publishers. Land, Stephen K. 1974. From Signs to Propositions: The concept ofform in eighteenth-century semantic theory. London: Longman. Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. A = Siimtliche Schriften und Briefe. Hrsg. von der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 1923- . C Opuscu/es et fragments inedits de Leibniz. Extraits des manus­ crits de Ia Bibliotheque royale de Hannovre, par Louis Couturat. Paris: F. Alcan, 1903. (Repr., Hildesheim: O!ms, 1966.) DAS = Leibniz: Language, Thought and Signs. By M. Dascal. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins, 1987. (Appendix contains trans­ lations of several Leibnizian texts.] GM Leibnizens mathematische Schriften. Hrsg. von C.!. Gerhardt, 7 vols. Halle: 1849-63. (Repr., Hildesheim: Olms, 1962.) GP Die philosophische Schriften von G. W. Leibniz. Hrsg. von C.I. Gerhardt, 7 vols. Berlin: Weidmann, 1875-90. P Leibniz - Logical Papers. A selection trans!. and ed. with an introduction by G.H.R. Parkinson. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966. UG = "Unvorgreifliche Gedanken, betreffend die Ausiibung und Verbesserung der teutschen Sprache". Deutsche Schriften, hrsg. von G.E. Gurhauer, vol. l, 440-86. Berlin, 1838. (Repr. , Hildesheim: Olms, 1966.) VE = G. W. Leibniz - Vorausedition zur Reihe VI - Phi/osophische Schriften. Manuskriptdruck, Leibniz-Forschungstelle der Universitat Miinster, 1982-. Locke, John. 1961 (1690]. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Ed. by John Yolton, 2 vols. London: Dent. Robins, Robert H. 1951. Ancient and Medieval Grammatical Theory in Europe. London: G. Bell & Sons. ---. 1967. A Short History of Linguistics. London: Longman. Salmon, Vivian. 1972. The Works of Francis Lodwick: A study of his writings in the intellectual context of the seventeenth century. London: Longman.

60

MARCELO DASCAL

Schmidt, Franz. 1955. "Leibnizens rationale Grammatik". Zeitschrift fur philosophische Forschung 9.657-63. Spinoza, · Baruch. 1924. Compendium Grammatices Linguae Hebraeae. Spinoza Opera ed. by Carl Gebhardt, vol.I, 283-403. Heidelberg: C. Winter. Swiggers, Pierre. 1985. "Mot et partie du discours dans Ia grammaire fran­ �aise aux 17eme et 18eme siecles". Mot et Parties du Discours ed .. by Pierre Swiggers & Willy van Hoecke, 38-74. Leuven: Leuven Univ. Press. Wierzbicka, Anna. 1976. "Particles and Linguistic Relativity". International Review of Slavic Linguistics 1 .327-67. Wilkins, John. 1668. An Essay towards a Real Character, and a Philosophi­ cal Language. London: S. Gellibrand for J. Martin. (Repr., Menston: Scholar Press, 1968.) SUMMARY

Different modes of analysis and classification of the particles proposed by Le1bmz are surveyed and compared with those of his predecessors and cont�mporaries. It is agreed that, in his mature account, Leibniz assigns to particles the role of bearers of the form or structure of sentences and dis­ course. But he carefully distinguishes this kind of 'form' from sheer logical form. He may thus be credited with the attempt to provide a non-reduc­ tionist account of 'linguistic form'. Though this level of form involves regu­ lanty and, therefore, universality, it can only be properly identified through the observation of variability across languages: an important role for com­ paratism is thus established within Leibniz's framework.

'Vulgaris opinio babelica' Sui fondamenti storico-teorici della pluralita delle lingue nel pensiero di Leibniz Stefano Gensini

Universitii di Cagliari

1. Uno dei tratti certamente piii stimolanti della ricerca linguistica di Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) sta nel rovesciamento che in essa si attua del punto di vista tradizionale secondo cui Ia molteplicita degli idiomi andrebbe considerata, in omaggio, piii o meno sottinteso, all'idea del '-pec­ cato' commesso con Ia costruzione della Torre di Babele, un limite della condizione umana. Ancora ai suoi tempi, infatti, il mancato riconoscimento della interna necessita della varieta delle lingue si intrecciava alia ben nota teoria della monogenesi a partire dall'ebraico, langue-mere dei popoli della Terra, e si alimentava all'idea di una sapienza originaria del genere umano. Come e stato messo acutamente in luce da Paolo Rossi (1979:155sgg. ; 226sgg.), per queste vie resisteva in Occidente una filosofia della storia de­ gli uomini e del mondo, imperniata sulla cronologia biblica accreditata, tesa a escludere ogni ipotesi interpretativa di tipo materialistico. Per Ia verita, come gli studi compiuti nell'ultimo trentennio (da Bon­ fante a Borst, da Metcalf a Drolxhe) hanno permesso di capire, l'intensa at­ tivita filologica ed erudita della seconda meta del 17° secolo aveva leota­ mente eroso le basi della concezione tradizionale, grazie soprattutto alia ac­ quisita consapevolezza dei diversi tipi di parentela delle lingue. (Si pensi solo alia esplosivita culturale delle tesi di Hiob Ludolf (1655-1712) sull'unita della famiglia 'semitica'.) Resta i1 fatto che in Leibniz Ia revisione del mito babelico si sposta dal piano storico-filologico a quello teorico-linguistico, che presuppone e sviluppa i1 primo, con importantissime conseguenze per Ia filosofia generale del linguaggio e per Ia concezione filosofica dell' individuo umano. Come ha scritto, opportunamente, Ia Schulenburg (1973:4-5),

62

STEFANO GENSINI Die Verschiedenheit der Sprachen ist also in Leibnizens Meinung mit der Verschiedenheit der menschlichen Naturen von Anbeginn gegeben. Sie gilt ihm nicht mehr als ein Fluch aus den Tagen des Babylonischen Turm­ baus. Ja, er hat in ihr letzen Endes nicht einen Mangel, sondern eine Sch6nheit der Welteinrichtung gesehen.

Tutto questo pone non pochi interrogativi allo studioso. Come conci­ liare il Leibniz 'protocomparatista', attivatore ed educatore di un'intiera ge­ nerazione di filologi e linguisti, con il teorico della characteristica universa­ lis, con l'elaboratore di astratti sistemi logico-simbolici che, come si sa, han­ no fatto scoprire nel filosofo tedesco uno dei grandi interlocutori del pen­ siero del nostro secolo? Dove riconoscere, se c'e, un elemento di unificazio­ ne teorica a livello di filosofia del linguaggio? Oppure si deve, con Heintz (1973), amettere una sostanziale scissione fra i "due" Leibniz, fino ad attribuirgli una doppia semantica, !'una rivolta ai linguaggi formalizzati, l'altra aile lingue storico-naturali? L'obiettivo del nostro studio (che si inquadra nel tentativo di giungere a un'edizione critica e interpretativa della Epistolica de historia etymologica dissertatio,t del 1712, tuttora non pubblicata) non e di trovare una risposta definitiva a interrogativi cosl complessi, rna, in via preliminare, di: (a) verificare su alcuni testi leibniziani assunti come esemplari le arti­ colazioni concettuali dell'idea della pluralitil delle lingue; (b) desumerne, se possibile, i lineamenti di una teoria, propria a Leib­ niz, del linguaggio comune e delle lingue storico-naturali; (c) inserire tali posizioni nel panorama della storia delle idee sui lin­ guaggio dall'antichitil all'etil moderna; (d) saggiare, attraverso alcuni primi sondaggi, il rapporto fra !'idea del­ la necessaria pluralitil delle lingue e Ia generale filosofia della cono­ scenza sviluppata da Leibniz: in altri termini, cominciare a verificare, su un punto specifico, se esista unitil nell'ideario linguistico leibniziano. 2. Procederemo in que! che segue a un'analisi il pili possibile attenta di al­ cune classiche pagine leibniziane, che chiedono d'esser lette unitariamente, come sviluppi successivi di uno stesso tema. Jl primo testo di cui ci occupe­ remo e il frammento De connexione inter res et verba, del periodo 1677-1685, pubblicato dal Couturat nei suoi Opuscules et fragments inedits (C*: 151-52): Leibniz is referred to by sigla of the various text editions provided in Part A of the 'Riferimenti bibliografici' at the end of the paper.

PLURALITA DELLE LINGUE IN LEIBNIZ

63

Certam quandam et determinatam inter Res et verba connexionern esse dici nequit; neque tamen res pure arbitraria est, sed causas subesse opor­ tet, cur certae voces certis rebus sint assignatae. Ex institute rem fluxisse, non potest dici, nisi de Unguis quibusdam artificialibus, qualem Golius Si­ nensem esse suspicatus est, et qualem Dalgarnus, Wilkinsius aliique con­ finxere. Primigeniam ortam protoplastis usurpatam, quidam fluxisse putant ab institute DEI, alii ab Adamo, viro divinitus illustrate excogitatam , tunc cum nomina animalibus imposuisse traditur. Sed talem linguam vel omni­ no intercidisse, vel in ruderibus tantU.m nonnullis superesse oportet, ubi ar­ tificium deprehendere difficile est. Habent tamen Linguae originem quan­ dam naturalem, ex senerum consensu cum affectibus, quos rerum specta­ cula in mente excitabant. Et bane originem non tantllm in lingua primige­ nia locum habuisse putem, sed et in linguis posterills partim ex primigenia partim ex novo hominum per orbem dispersorum usu enatis. Et sane sae­ pe onomatopoeia manifeste imitatur naturam, ut cum coaxationem tribui­ mus ranis, cum st nobis significat silentii vel quietis admonitionem; et r cur­ sum, cum hahaha ridentis est, vae dolentis.

Come e stato osservato da Heinekamp (1972:469), in questo appunto l'analisi del rapporto lingua-realtil (e quindi, implicitamente, della dimen­ sione conoscitiva del linguaggio) prende la forma di un'inchiesta sull'origine delle lingue. Con ogni evidenza, Leibniz prende qui le distanze - dalla tesi 'realista' (per cui le parole, fondandosi su una certa et deter­ minata connexio, disvelerebbero l'essenza delle cose) ; - dalla tesi 'convenzionalista' (per cui le lingue avrebbero un rapporto 'puramente arbitrario' con la realtil) . Interessante e che Leibniz limiti la sfera di validitil della tesi convenzio­ nalista (e si badi che ex instituto traduce normalmente anche nei suoi scritti il katii syntheken del De interpretatione aristotelico) aile lingue artificiali, le sole in cui operi e domini incontrastata la decisione razionale umana, nella sua completa arbitrarietil. L'intensa esperienza condotta da Leibniz non solo sui testi di Dalgarno e Wilkins, rna, proprio in quegli anni, sui procedi­ menti di formalizzazione tecnica di un linguaggio assumibile come universa­ le e utilizzabile a fini di scoperta, gli fa correttamente individuare l'indefi­ nitamente ampio spazio di manipolabilitil del materiale linguistico in sede di convenzionamento. A questo punto Leibniz prende di petto l'ipotesi della Natur-Sprache, rimessa in auge nella cultura tedesca dal mistico Jakob Bi:ihme (1575-1624) e diversamente attiva in molti classici del pensiero del 17" secolo, dove spesso si intrecciava a motivi nazionalistici. Si pensi almeno all'ipotesi della Grundrichtigkeit della lingua tedesca sostenuta da Justus Georg Schottel

65

STEFANO GENSINI

PLURALITA DELLE LINGUE IN LEIBNIZ

(1612-1676) nell'AusfUhrliche Arbeit von der Teutschen Haubt-Sprache (1663) e largamente influente nelle societa linguistiche dell'epoca. Leibniz, che pure non era insensibile a tali teorie, sgombra comunque il campo da ogni tentazione "ricostruttiva": senza mettere in discussione, in linea di principia, !'idea biblica della monogenesi, esclude che !a lingua originaria sia attualmente recuperabile o riconoscibile in qmilcuna delle lingue viven­ ti. Prende ora corpo !a posizione originate di Leibniz: le lingue, egli dice, hanno un'origine naturale, che opera (1) nella lingua originaria e (2) nelle lingue successivamente discese in parte da questa, in parte "ex novo homi­ num per orbem dispersorum usu": anche dopo, quindi, che l'azione genera­ trice della lingua originaria aveva cessato i suoi effetti. La teoria leibnizia­ na, come si vede, esplicitamente contraddice !'idea tradizionale dell'ispira­ zione divina di Adamo. Anche per il capostipite del genere umano dovette valere lo schema creativo visualizzato nella figura seguente:

termine affectus, una sola delle quali, a dire !a verita, e utilizzata da Heine­ kamp. Alludiamo alla definizione secondo !a quale "Affectus [est] animi impetus vel impressio, ut in corpore excusso" (cit. in Grua II:523). II passo sembra implicare, se lo si Iegge isolatamente, un'accezione puramente pas­ siva dell' affectus: una sorta di registrazione psichica della modificazione de­ terminata da un agente fisico. In realta, Leibniz attribuisce agli affectus una ben pili rilevante funzione soggettiva:

64

spectacula rerum

--?

excitant in mente

--7-

affectus

l

(vige un) consensus

1

soni

--?

linguae

Schema 1

Come esempio di tale consensus Leibniz cita l' onomatopea, il cui principia l'imitazione "analogica" della realta. Dunque il linguaggio nascerebbe dalla sintesi di un dato psicologico (gli affectus) con una modificazione della realtil. fisica (soni). I! significato delle lingue non andrebbe cercato, di conseguenza, immediatamente nella realta, rna nella rifrazione che questa subisce in mente hominum. Si tratta a questo punto di capire le modalita di tale rifrazione: dal frammento De connexione sappiamo solo che essa implica un atteggiamento imitativo nei confronti degli spectacula rerum. Un huon sussidio per sciogliere l'interrogativo ci viene dall'importante frammento De affectibus, datato 10 aprile 1679, e dunque pressoche contemporaneo a! nostro testo. Si deve anche qui riconoscere a Heinekamp (1972:481 n.98) il merito d'aver segnalato per primo l'utilita di un raffronto. Leibniz ragiona in questi appunti in margine a! trattato Passions (Ams­ terdam, 1650) di Rene Descartes (1596-1650) , e offre diverse definizioni del e

III. Affectus est cogitatio animum occupans, vel si mavis occupatio animi a cogitatione. Affectus animi impetus vel impressio, ut in corpore excusso. Occupatio animi est determinatio ad aliquid cogitandum. Potest autern co� gitatio animum determinare etiam ad aliquam cogitationem sibi dissimi­ lem, sed cognatam. Affectus est status anirni a cogitatione una ad aliam prae alia deterrninati (Grua 11:523). Affectus est determinatio animi ad quandam seriem cogitationum. Determinatio est status ex quo quid sequitur nisi quid aliud impediat. Ita­ que determinatio praesumptionem facit futuri, donee impedimentum adesse probetur. Series est multitude cum ordinis regula. Affectus est in animo, quod impetus in corpore. Nam ut affectus est deter­ minatio anirni ad quandam seriem cogitationum obeundam, ita impetus idem est quod determinatio corporis ad quandam Iineam motlls percurren­ dam (Grua 11:526).

La catena incrociata di definizioni, cos! tipica dell'attenzione di Leibniz all'esplicitezza formale dei termini usati nel ragionamento, ci fa capire che ogni affectus, eventualmente (non necessariamente) occasionato da agenti esterni, fa scattare un flusso di pensiero, il quale procede ora per somiglian­ za ora per relativa dissimiglianza (dissimilem sed cognatam). La serie delle cogitationes 'occupa' dunque !'animo, e procede liberamente finche non sia fermata da un nuovo ostacolo. Tornando con questi dati nuovi a! De connexione, possiamo supporre che il corrispettivo psicologico degli spectacula rerum (collocato , evidente­ mente, al livello dell'umanita primitiva) sia un processo sensibile il quale in­ nerva e condiziona un processo di pensiero. Di conseguenza il consensus che gli uomini cercano di istituire fra i soni che vanno a produrre e i dati of­ ferti !oro dalla realta, non e trasparente, rna e gia in qua!che modo filtrato dalle funzioni della mente. L'effetto di rifrazione (e dunque di modificazio­ ne soggettiva) immanente al linguaggio si riduce ovviamente a! minima nel caso delle popolazioni primitive, dove piii diretto e il rapporto fra mens e

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spectacula che si attua nelle onomatopee , rna anche in tal caso (come si ve­ dra meglio in seguito) l'effetto sussiste, tant'e vera che a spectacula simili corrispondono, da popolo a popolo, affectus e dunque soni malta diversi . Apparirebbe cosl fondato, statu nascenti, l'intreccio di naturale e di arbitra­ rio (ovvero di volontario) proprio del linguaggio umano. Se questa interpre­ tazione fosse esatta, potremmo anche forzare un po' !a lettera (non lo spiri­ to!) della pagina leibniziana concludendo che essa riconosce il carattere 'radicalmente storico' (non pure arbitrario) delle lingue.

pendenza dagli impetus naturali dell' animo umano. II meccanismo dell'ono­ matopoiesi e quello sopra illustrate: i vocaboli vengono costruiti nel fuoco di una spinta emotiva, adattando forme foniche aile tensioni psicologiche (affectus) ingenerate per occasiones. La rudis barbaries delle origini (nozio­ ne, come si vede, profondamente contrastante con !a tesi tradizionale della sapienza primitiva) e presentata da Leibniz come principia di necessaria va­ riazione, aderente alia acc.identalita delle situazioni comunicative (ut sese occasiones dabant). Cib che pili conta, tale spinta variazionistica si riflette nelle profonde modifiche che alterano, nel tempo, i significati originari del­ le parole, mentre si alimenta all'ulteriore elemento di differenziazione lega­ to alla specifica conformazione fisica delle etnle (organaque ipsa loquendi) . Nel meccanismo della origine 'naturale' delle lingue e dunque implicata un principia di moltiplicazione che investe: (1) gli animi dei varii populi; (2) le !oro caratteristiche articolatorie; (3) gli affectus anche di una singola cornu­ nita e, a! limite, di ogni individuo, in fasi diverse della propria storia. La sintesi di naturale e arbitrario che si attua nelle nozione di storicitii corrisponde a queste indicazioni teoriche: il data 'naturale' e rappresentato dall'ineliminabile adattamento analogico (altrove: consensus) di suoni e affetti; il data 'arbitrario' dalla inevitabile, accidentale molteplicita, nella spazio e nel tempo, di tali scelte. Viceversa le lingue artificiali (e Leibniz torna a fare i nomi di John Wilkins (1614-167?) e George Dalgarno (1616-1688) e Jacob Golius (1626-1667)) hanna uno statuto intieramente ar­ bitrario: di esse pub dirsi a ragione che sono "ex institute profectae et quasi lege conditae". La formulazione pili completa ed esplicita di tale punta di vista si trova a mia conoscenza nei seguenti passaggi della Epistolica dissertatio:

Cercheremo di saggiare l'ipotesi affacciata alla fine del § 2. analizzando due testi fondamentali dell'ultimo Leibniz, !a Brevis designatio del 1710 e, limitatamente ad alcuni passi, !a Epistolica dissertatio, comunemente attri­ buita al 1712. Citiamo anzitutto dalla Brevis designatio: 3.

Illud enim pro axiomate habeo, omnia nomina quae vocamus propria, ali­ quando appellativa fuisse, alioqui ratione nulla constarent. [ . . . }. Tales detegunt sese primae origines vocabulorum, quoties penetrari potest ad radicem tes onomatopoifas. Sed plerumque tractu temporum, crebris translationibus veteres & nativae significationes mutatae sunt aut obscura­ tae. Neque vero ex instituto profectae, et quasi lege conditae sunt linguae, sed naturali quodam impetu natae hominum, sonos ad affectus motusque animi attemperantium. Artificiales Linguas excipio { . . . ] . At in linguis pau� Iatim natis orta sunt vocabula per occasiones ex analogia vocis cum affectu, qui rei sensum comitabatur: nee aliter Adamum nomina imposuisse credi� derim. Quanquam autem hinc facile intelligatur, multa peculiaria vocabula labenfi tibus seculis facta esse a variis populis, maxime cUm rudis barbaries plus impetus quam rationis haberet, prorumperetque utcunque ab affectu in so� nos, ut sese occasiones dabant; variatumque fuisse, prout erant animi, or� ganaque ipsa loquendi, quorum non omnibus nationibus aeque facilis usus (cit. da Dutens IV, 2:186-87).

Torneremo in seguito, con maggiori particolari, sulla nozione di nome 'appellative'; limitiamoci per adesso a osservarne !a pertinenza a una fase arcaica della sviluppo linguistico, quando e scarsa, se non inesistente la ca­ pacita umana di distinguere le caratteristiche che diversificano un individuo reale da un altro. II seguito della citazione conferma e approfondisce il contenuto concet­ tuale del De connexione. Leibniz ribadisce il carattere geneticamente non convenzionale delle lingue storico-naturali, e piuttosto ne definisce la di-

Verum quidem est, nomina rebus naturalia non esse; sed tamen hoc quoq(ue) verum, hominum deliberatione non nisi raro esse constituta. [In� fatti le lingue artificiali, come quelle costruite da Wilkins e Dalgarno] . . . in usum non sunt traductae. MediUm itaq(ue) tenendum est, quae et Platonis mens fuit, habere verba fundamentum in natura, etsi concurrant multa ex accidenti. Diversi enim nominum impositores, suos quisq(ue) respectus, suos affectus, suas occasiones, suam etiam commoditatem secuti, diversa iisdem rebus a diversis qualitatibus, interdum et casibus, vocabula dedere (§14). Sed nunc de linguis apud populis receptis agimus. Credibile autem est, in quantum pririli homines, aut etiam populi postea a lingua protoplasti de­ viantes, propria vocabula sibi effinxere, accomodasse sonos perceptionibus affectibusq(ue); atq(ue) usos initio interjectionibus seu brevibus particulis,

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STEFANO GENSINI ad affectus suos accornodatis, ex quibus tanquam feminibus paulatim natae sunt linguae (§15). [le lingue nacquero . .. ] etiam quia sparsi per terras homines, novas voces sibi fecere, per naturalem quandam indinationem ad onomatopofesin, et veteres facile obliterilrunt. Nam et pueri saepe inter se verba fabricant adhibentq(ue), et generatim linguae sponte sua mutantur; nisi figantur per literaria monumenta, quod typographia inventa facilius fiet (§22).

II punta di maggior noviti\ sta, ci pare, nell'approfondimento della ne­ cessaria diversificazione 'sincronica' delle lingue. II principia che abbiam detto della 'storiciti\' scatta nelle diverse reazioni psicologiche dei nomi­ num impositores dinanzi, a! limite, a "cose identiche": i vocaboli, e quindi le lingue, sono diversi perche gli uomini guardano le cose da punti di vista (respectus) diversi, ne evidenziano differenti qualitates in ragione di mute­ voli affetti e circostanze, persino di diversi bisogni (commoditatem) . L'in­ treccio di naturale e arbitrario emerge qui a piena consapevolezza e di\ una spiegazione formale del meccanismo variazionistico delle lingue: il quale, come e ben comprensibile, a maggior ragione opera in diacronia e in diato­ pia (sparsi per terras homines (. . . ) veteres [voces] obliterarunt), salvo non venga arginato dagli uomini stessi, con le !oro tradizioni- letterarie, con Ia forza della scrittura e della stampa. Un dato forse nuovo e lo spostamento dell'aggettivo natura/is a desi­ gnare il bisogno onomatetico del genere umano: col conseguente, suggesti­ ve, parallelo fra Ia creativiti\ e adattiviti\ linguistica dei bambini e l'intrinse­ ca mutevolezza delle lingue. Osservazione, questa, che (con notevoli affini­ ti\ con le successive teorizzazioni d'un Vico) rafforza l'ipotesi del carattere sensuoso, non intellettuale, delle lingue arcaiche. Ad animi umani dominati dalla rudis barbaries, in cui poco possono ra­ tio e consilium, corrispondono evolutivamente forme linguistiche centrale sulla sfera della sensibiliti\, livello primario della conoscenza. Riprendendo un'osservazione dell'occasionalista Johann Clauberg (1622-1665) nell'Ars etymologica Teutonum (1663), Leibniz afferma (nella Epistolica dissertatio, § 23) che i significati linguistici dapprima investirono qualiti\ sensibili e suc­ cessivamente, raffinandosi le coscienze, furono trasportati a designare res incorporeas. E' il caso, esemplare, del gr. pneuma che (come aveva gia rile­ vato John Locke (1632-1704) nel prima capitola del libra III dell'Essay) da una originaria significazione di flatus era stato condotto a significare spiritus. Viene insomma in luce un Leibniz attento alia dimensione che direm­ mo 'tentativa', 'adattiva' dell'attivita linguistica, in cui il processo medesi-

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mo della significazione si innesta nella "fatica" di segmentare l'esperienza attraverso parole. Torna utile ricordare un passaggio delle Generales inqui­ smones del 1686 (l'anno del Discours de metaphysique!) in cui il filosofo sembra voler mettere a fuoco Ia soglia inferiore dell'esprimibiliti\: Termini primitivi simplices [sunt] omnia ilia phaenomena confusa sen­ suum, quae clare quidem percipimus, explicare autem distincte non possu­ mus, nee definire per alias notiones, nee designare verbis (C:360).

Allo stesso ordine concettuale appartengono le osservazioni del terzo libra dei Nouveaux Essais volte a correggere Ia teoria lockiana dei 'termini generali'. Qui Leibniz non intende in alcun modo negare Ia funzione sche­ matica del nome, o insomma que! carattere generico del significate in cui consiste la possibilitii conoscitiva pili profonda delle lingue; piuttosto, gli preme d1stmguere, da una generaliti\ connessa alia fase della "perfezione" del linguaggio, una diversa fase di generaliti\ connessa alia sua originaria inopia (condizione che pero quotidianamente si riproduce nella comunica­ zione umana). E' quanta si ricava dal seguente passo: . . . e� meme les [termes] plus generaux, estant moins charges par rapport aux �dees ou essences, q?'ils renferment, quoyqu'ils soyent plus compre­ henslfs par rapport aux mdividus, a qui ils conviennent, Us estoient bien souvent les plus aises a former, et sont les plus utiles.

E si stabilisce cosl un sistema di corrispondenze fra il linguaggio infantile, Io sforzo comunicativo di chi conosce poco una lingua e Ia fase 'appellativa' delle lingue storico-naturali: Au�si voyes Vous que les enfans et ceux qui ne savent que peu Ia langue qu'ds veulent parler, ou Ia matiere dont ils parlent, se servent des termes generaux comme chose, plante, animal, au lieu d'employer les termes pro­ pres qui leur manquent. Et il est seur que tous Ies noms propres ou indi­ viduels ont este originairement appellatifs ou generaux (NE:III 1 G V:255). =

I significati linguistici, il momenta onomatetico nel suo complesso van­ no dunque inquadrati geneticamente in un processo espressivo condiziona­ to dalle capaciti\ conoscitive oggettivamente maturate e dalle contingenze in cui l'enunciazione avviene. A Filalete-Locke, a questa puntt:i, Leibniz mette in bocca il gia ricordato principia clauberghiano per cui "A sensibili­ bus ad intellegibilia quamplurima vocabula sunt traducta" ( aurea regola F dell'Ars etymologica Teutonum, ripresa, in anni successivi, nel progetto dei Collectanea Etymologica). Ma Ia considerazione conclusiva che ne trae Teofilo ci riconduce nel pieno di quella teoria della genesi naturale e della

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storico diversificarsi delle lingue che abbiam visto operante lungo oltre trent'anni dell'ideario linguistico leibniziano:

(Dio dii agli uomini Ia facolta di servirsi del linguaggio, rna l'uso che questi ne fanno nel costruire le lingue sta intieramente nelle !oro mani); - dii consistenza teorica alia negazione della tesi dell'ebraico langue­ mere, negazione che Leibniz poteva desumere da Gerhardt Meier (16461703) e Hiob Ludolf (e in tal senso si esprime nettamente pili volte, dalla lettera a Hermann von der Hardt (1660-1746) degli inizi del 1696 ("Ego non possum mihi persuadere primitivam esse . . . " (Schulenburg 1973:71n.]) agli importantissimi §§ 26 e 27 della Epistolica dissertatio, dove si schiera risolutamente col filone revisionista della vulgaris opinio babelica, da Filastrio da Brescia (IV sec. d.C.) a Georg Stjernhjelm (1598-1672): cf. Metcalf 1974 e Droixhe 1978:45sgg.), rna che viene ora sorretta da forti ragioni di principio; - introduce, nel paradigma tradizionale della storia dei popoli e delle lingue, una dimensione di 'profonditii' (quella della originaria barbarie del genere umano, e di conseguenza della dilatabilitii dei tempi antichi) che si ricollega a! filone 'lucreziano' di certo pensiero tardo-seicentesco (cf. Rossi 1979: 150sgg.), destinato a scardinare un segmento decisivo delle sistema­ zioni teologiche.

C'est que nos besoins nous ont oblige de quitter l'ordre naturel des idees, car cet ordre seroit commun aux anges et aux hommes et a toutes les intel­ ligences en general et devroit estre suivi de noqs, si nous n'avions point egard a nos interests: il a done fallu s'attacher a celuy que Ies occasions et les accidens, oil nostre espece est sujettie, nous ont foumi; et cet ordre ne donne pas l'origine des notions, mais pour ainsi dire l'histoire de nos decouvertes (NE:III l G V:255-6). =

II passo appena citato dei Nouveaux Essais conferma ancora una volta: (a) l'inerenza del linguaggio comune a una sfera (almeno primariamen­ te) non razionale; (b) l'incidenza dei fattori accidentali, e in primo luogo del bisogno, nel­ la dinamica evolutiva delle lingue; (c) Ia variabilitii sincronica e diacronica dei significati (che possono in ultima analisi esser letti come "monumenti" delle varie fasi di sviluppo delle conoscenze umane: NE:III 2 = G V :264). Possiamo a questo punto tirare le prime conclusioni, rispetto agli obiet­ tivi di indagine fissati alia fine del § 1 . Aile spalle del Leibniz 'curioso' (I'espressione e di Leroy) indagatore di lingue e dialetti, animatore di inchieste sui campo che si estendono dalla Sassonia aile lontane Russie all' Asia, sta una teoria nettamente definita del­ la necessaria pluralita delle lingue. L'affermazione di Sigrid von der Schu­ lenburg, da cui siamo partiti, risulta pienamente verificata alia Juce ..dei no­ stri sondaggi. Tale teoria salda (1) una visione immanentista (naturale) della genesi delle lingue con (2) una prospettiva storico-variazionale della dina­ mica Iinguistica sia in sincronia, sia in diatopia, sia in diacronia; i1 termine medio di tale saldatura e (3) un'idea dei processi di onomatesi (sui duplice versante del significato e del significante, per usare termini moderni) imper­ niata sull'attivitii psichica dei par! anti, che funge da filtro (soggettivo) tra Ia lingua e Ia realtii. Le conseguenze che Leibniz ricava da questa operazione filosofica sono moltep!ici: - smantella il milo della ricostruibiliti\/riconoscibilitii della lingua primi­ tiva; - non rifiuta l'ipotesi monogenetica, rna sottopone (in linea squisita­ mente teorica) Ia stessa lingua adamica allo schema della 'naturalis origo'.

4.

5. II riferimento finale a Lucrezio non puo essere considerato un caso. Molto opportunamente, come si ricorderii, Ernst Cassirer valorizza, nel pri­ mo volume della sua Philosophie der symbolischen Formen (1923), que! momento nella storia del pensiero occidentale in cui alia rivendicazione em­ piristica e razionalistica del 'contenuto teoretico' del linguaggio, si affianca Ia diversa tesi della "derivazione del linguaggio dall'affetto, dal pathos della sensazione del piacere e del dolore" (Cassirer 1961 (1923] :105), o insomma Ia concezione 'naturale' dell'origine delle lingue attinta alia filosofia di Epi­ curo e a! V libra del De rerum natura. Cassirer fa il nome di Giambattista Vico (1668-1744), vedendo nel filosofo italiano un profondo teorico della sostanza soggettiva del Jinguaggio. Non fa invece il nome di Leibniz, del quale anzi altrove critica l'incomprensione della "specifica particolaritii del linguaggio come Jinguaggio verbale" (1961 (1923:84) e piuttosto unilate­ ralmente esalta l'intreccio fra problematica linguistica e problematica "logi­ ca generate". Eppure , se un precedente si puo indicare delle considerazioni Jeib­ niziane esposte nei § § 2-3 del presente Javoro, segnatamente della tesi dell'origine naturale delle lingue, della funzione mediatrice degli affectus, del rapporto reciprocamente adattivo di sensazioni e suoni, della dipen-

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denza dell'evo!uzione del linguaggio dai bisogni (onde gli uomini hanno abbandonato l'ordre nature! della conoscenza), questo precedente va risolutamente trovato net paragrafo linguistico della celebre Epistula ad Herodotum del greco Epicuro e nella teoria lucreziana della utilitas. L'ipotesi qui affacciata si alimenta in primo luogo a un riscontro di carattere testuale. I punti di convergenza del passo epicureo (Epistula ad Herodotum, 75-76) con le conclusioni di Leibniz possono essere individuati come segue: (1) negazione del carattere convenzionale del linguaggio primitivo, colto nella sua genesi ("H6then kal til on6mata ex arches me thesei genes­ thai"); (2) funzione propulsiva dei pathe e dei phantasmata e presenza, in questi, di un radicale principio di differenziazione, che si col!ega alia diver­ sita di natura propria di ogni ethnos ("all'autas tas physeis ton anthr6pon kath'hekasta ethne idia paschousas pathe kal idia lambanousas phantas­ mata"); (3) nesso fra attivita psichica ("pathe kal phantasmata") e suoni emessi per significare (" . . .idios ton aera ekpempein stell6menon hyph'hekaston tOn pathon kal ton phantasmaton"); (4) ulteriore elemento di differenziazione connesso a varieta di tipo diatopico ( . . . kai he para tolis t6pous ton ethnon diaphora eie") ; (5) presenza della convenzione nelle lingue, una volta che queste si siano formate e si tratti di de!imitare entita circoscrivibili razionalmente ("hysteron de koinos kath'hekasta ethne til idia tethenai pros to tiis del6seis helton amphib6lous genesthai allelois kai syntomoteros deloumenas"). Le convergenze col testo lucreziano sembrano invece limitarsi ai punti seguenti: (a) funzione diversificatrice della natura (umana) ("At varios linguae sonitus natura subegit mittere": De rerum natura, V, 1028-29); (b) importanza del bisogno nella genesi del linguaggio ( ... et utilitas expressit nomina rerum": V, 1029); (c) corrispondenza fra varieta delle sensazioni e varieta dei suoni a queste relativi ("quid in hac mirabile tantoperest re,/ si genus humanum, cui vox et lingua vigeret,/ pro vario sensu varia res voce notaret?": V, 105658; "ergo si variis sensus animalia cogunt,/ muta tamen cum sint, varias emittere voces,/ quanto morta!is magis aequumst tum potuisse/ dissimi!is alia atque alia res voce notare!": V, 1088-90). Non trova invece seguito, nei testi leibniziani finora esaminati, l'insistito nesso posto da Lucrezio fra linguaggio animate e linguaggio umano.

Le coincidenze concettuali sopra elencate non abbisognano di molti commenti. Dovendosene piuttosto discutere le fonti, ci troviamo costretti a proporre alia filologia leibniziana il de!icato compito di accertare tempi e modi dell'assorbimento da parte dell'autore della Teodicea delle tematiche linguistiche del materialismo antico. Un problema e certo rappresentato dall'assoluta discrezione di Leibniz su questo punto: anche se e ben com­ prensibile che un fi!osofo cosi impegnato sui piano metafisico-teologico e cosl permanentemente aspirante a posizioni di assoluto rilievo politico-cul­ tura!e abbia esitato a dichiarare i suoi debiti nei confronti di un pensiero tanto in odore di eresia come quello epicureo. Cio che si puo escludere e l'ignoranza, da parte di Leibniz, dei testi sopra rammentati: gia nel 1666, anno di pubblicazione della Dissertatio de arte combinatoria, conosce e cita gli scritti di Petrus Gassendi (1592-1655) su Epicuro, raccolti in Opera omnia (Lione, 1658); di Diogene Laerzio, grande tramandatore dei principali testi epicurei, cita il De vitis, dogmatis et apothegmis eorum qui in philosophia claruerunt libri X (nell'edizione di Gil­ les Menage (1613-1692), Londra 1664) in una importante lettera a Theodor Aethet Heinrich von Strattmann (1637?-1693) del 1689 (A I 5:447) dedicata a i!lustrare i criteri per costruire una bib!ioteca universale del sapere; di Lucrezio pili volte cita singoli versi del poema, con un atteggiamento che tradisce ampia consuetudine col testo (per esempio in una lettera del 1714 a N. Remond: cf. G III:605-8). Non v'e dunque dubbio che Leibniz cono­ scesse i due grandi pensatori materialisti: ci sembra plausibi!e ch'egli ne abbia ripreso il nucleo centrale della dottrina !inguistica, limandola degli aspetti pili compromettenti (si e visto come il principio della naturale dif­ ferenziazione sia combinato con Ia tesi monogenetica; e si e altresl visto il si!enzio leibniziano su ogni troppo spinta analogia animale/uomo) e approfondendo!a sui piano psicologico (!'affectus implica anche Ia pos­ sibilita di accensione delle facolta ragionative) . In tale forma, e giustificato concludere esser toccato a Leibniz un posto non marginate nella rimessa in circuito, all'interno della cultura europea, di un frammento della filosofia del linguaggio dell'antichita Ia cui mediazione e stata finora ascritta a! solo Giambattista Vico.

"

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In questi paragrafi conc!usivi desideriamo delineare l'itinerario di una possibile ricerca che, partendo dal gruppo di testi e questioni finora di­ scussi, miri a rispondere a! problema (d) posto in § 1 : se e in che modo sus­ sista una relazione tra Ia teoria della varietit linguistica costruita da Leibniz 6.

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a ridosso della querelle sull'origine delle lingue e [a sua generate concezione filosofica della conoscenza. Che sia legittimo procedere (almena in via ipotetica) in tal sensa appare ormai scontato, visti i risultati conseguiti dalle ricerche sul nesso pensiero/ linguaggio inaugurate dai preziosi appunti di vacca e Vailati, e dallo studio capitate di Couturat (1901), e culminate nel libro La semiologie de Leibniz di Marcelo Dascal (1978), in cui il carattere implexus verbis del pensiero umano costituisce uno strumento essenziale della ricostruzione esegetico­ critica. Dal nostro punta di vista, si tratta di proiettare la fisionomia che il lin­ guaggio storico-naturale assume nella visione di Leibniz su quello schema del processo gnoseo logico fissato per la prima volta neUe Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis (1684) e successivamente approfondito nei Nouveaux Essais: uno schema in cui, a ragione (Preti 1953, Mugnai 1976), e stato vista uno snodo decisivo del pensiero logico-linguistico leibniziano. Livelli di intreccio fra problematica semiotica e problematica gnoseologica sono evidenti dalla lettera del testa di Leibniz: ad esempio, il luogo della cognitio adaequata, nella misura in cui e accessibile agli uomini, appare riservato alla notitia numerorum, o piu precisamente alia cogitatio caeca vel etiam symbolica dell'algebra e dell'aritmetica, che suppliscono persino le capacita rappresentative della mente attraverso i lora sistemi di segni; fuori, invece, dalla portata dell'uomo, e quindi delle sue possibilita di immaginazione ed espressione, e quella cognitio intuitiva della schema generativo del reate che solo risiede nell'intelletto divino. Il luogo del linguaggio naturale va pertanto ricercato nei gradi inferiori della conoscenza, segnatamente in quel passaggio dalla cognitio obscura alia clara, nella sua interna articolazione di clara confusa e clara distincta, che accompagna le menti umane nella progressiva identificazione degli oggetti della realtii. Vista 1) che una obscura notio "non sufficit ad rem repraesentatam agnoscendam" e dunque sembra collocarci al di sotto della soglia inferiore della esprimibilita (cf. supra, 3); e 2) che il linguaggio umano, nella sua fase fisiologica iniziale di rudis barbaries, si fonda sui sensi e gli affetti da questi accesi: il luogo gnoseologico che piu concretamente si identifica con la condizione d'uso quotidiano del linguaggio e la cognitio clara confusa; quella, cioe, cum scilicet non possum notas ad rem ab aliis discernendam sufficientes separatirn enumerare, licet res ilia tales notas atque requisita revera habeat, in quae notio ejus resolvi possit: ita colores, odores, sapores,

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aliaque peculiaria sensuum objecta satis clare quidern agnoscimus et a se invicem discernimU:s, sec simp!ici sensuum testimonio, non vero notis enuntiabilibus (G IV:422).

A questa livello gli uomini sono in grado di discriminare la realta "ubi occurrerit" (C:219), rna lo fanno senza esplicitare razionalmente i criteri di distinzione con cui operano, che restano in tal modo limitati alla sfera dei sensi. E' la fase in cui le parole si caricano, come Leibniz si esprime in piu punti, di "innumerabiles ambiguitates" (C:72), di queUe parum constitutae significationes (C:71) cosl tipiche del linguaggio nel suo usa comune (" . . . ob fallacissimas ambiguitates verborum quibus homines utuntur" : C:338). La vaghezza, la variabilita dei significati additata da Leibniz e spiegata ampiamente, com'e o dovrebbe esser nota, nel terzo libra dei Nouveaux Essais: qui il filosofo tedesco chiarisce senza equivoco la storicita delle cono­ scenze che si riflettono nel linguaggio. Si ha a che fare, da una parte, con la provvisorieta, ogni volta rinnovata, delle nozioni umane, che procedono asintoticamente verso definizioni sempre piu approfondite delle caratteri­ stiche con cui operano; da un'altra parte, con le leggi del procedere storico (vs. naturale) della conoscenza, che dipende dagli accidenti e dai bisogni che condizionano le comunita umane: C'est que nos besoins nous ont oblige de quitter l'ordre nature! des idees, car cet ordre seroit commun aux anges et aux hommes et a toutes les intel­ ligences en general et devroit estre suivi de nous, si nous n'avions point egard a nos interests: il a done fallu s'attacher a cetuy que les occasions et les accidens, oil nostre espece est sujette, nous ont fourni; et cet ordre ne donne pas l'origine des notions, mais pour ainsi dire l'histoire de nos decouvertes (Nouvaux Essais:Ill 1 G V. 256). =

In tal sensa, poco oltre (Nouveaux Essais:III 6 = G V:296) Leibniz giun­ gera a dire che le nostre determinazioni delle specie fisiche "sont pro­ visionelles et proportionelles a nos connoissances", distinguendo dunque nettamente fra lo statuto ontologico del reate e lo statuto storico, va­ riazionale, delle nozioni e delle parole a queste corrispondenti. Una ragione ancor piu interna della variabilita del linguaggio (una ragione tecnica, 'di sistema', nel sensa di Jolley (1984:102sgg.)) va peril a nostro avviso ritrovata nella celebre teoria leibniziana delle 'piccole perce­ zioni' che in ogni istante contraddistinguono la vita psichica della monade, e di cui solo una parte emerge al livello della coscienza (o della 'apper­ cezione'). Questa sezione della gnoseologia proposta nei Nouveaux Essais e stata variamente interpretata. Studiosi inclini a valorizzare gli aspetti

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innovativi del pensiero leibniziano ne hanno apprezzato il contributo a una pili moderna e dinamica visione della psicologia umana (confortati peraltro da!l'insistito parallelo che Leibniz suggerisce con i 'corpuscoli' della fisica) ; altri hanno un po' unilateralmente messo l'accento sui rapporto della teoria delle percezioni insensibili col recupero dell'innatismo gnoseo!ogico e con !a polemica antilockiana. II dato a nostro parere pili importante e che per tale via Leibniz viene delineando una concezione dell'individuo gravida di conseguenze per !a teoria generale della conoscenza e, que! che pili ora ci preme, per !a teoria delle lingue. Per un verso, infatti, l'infinita dei mutamenti che !'animo umano subisce attraverso le petits perceptions e il tramite del suo legame con il resto dell'universo, in omaggio alia Iegge di continuita e alia tesi dell'armonia prestabilita che, come in ogni altro testo, sono anche qui !a cerniera concettuale della metafisica leibniziana. Per un altro, questa inde­ finitamente varia attivita psichica e !a chiave di un inarrestabile processo di differenziazione, che rende ogni essere in ultima istanza diverso da tutti gli altri: J'ai reroarque aussi qu'en vertu des variations insensibles, deux chases individuelles ne sauroient estre parfaitement semblableS, et qu'elles doi� vent tousjours differer plus que numero. [ . . . ] Cette connoissance des per� ceptions sensibles sert aussi a expliquer pourquoy et comment deux ames humaines ou autrement d'une meme espece ne sortent jamais parfaitement semblables des mains du Createur et ont tousjours chacune son rapport originaire aux points de vue qu'elles auront dans l'univers (NE, Preface G V:49-50). =

La sfera della sensibilita fonda dunque l'individualita delle sostanze e con­ diziona in modo permanente !a stessa sfera della coscienza: anche quando non appercepiamo le variazioni della nostra psiche, esse operano e ne alterano insensibilmente !a struttura. Sicche ogni monade e, per essenza, un 'punto di vista' sui mondo, ch'essa rappresenta o esprime (i termini sono di Leibniz) in modo originale, senza peraltro stravolgerne l'essenza, !a quale sussiste indipendentemente da ogni processo conoscitivo. La metafora del diverso punto di vista o 'scenografia' da cui e possibile guardare a! mondo e frequente, in Leibniz, fin dal Discours de metaphysique del 1686: . . . toute substance est comme un monde entier et comme un rniroir de Dieu ou bien de tout l'univers, qu'elle exprime chacune a sa fa�on, a peu pres comme una meme ville est diversement representee selon Ies dif�

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ferentes situations de celui qui la regarde. Ainsi l'univers est en quelque fa9on multiplie autant de lois qu'il y a de substances ecc. (DM:44).

Lo stesso argomento torna nei Nouveaux Essais, Iii dove Filalete e Teofilo dibattono del rapporto tra essenza e definizione (NE:!II, 3), e Teofilo­ Leibniz suggerisce che iJ n'y a qu'une essence de la chose, mais il y a plusieurs definitions qui expriment une meme essence, come la meme structure ou la meme ville peut estre representee par differentes Scenographies, suivant Jes dif­ ferentes costes dont on Ia regarde (NE:III 3 G V:273). =

Tornano alla mente le espressioni usate in altri contesti da Leibniz per descrivere il processo grazie a! quale gli uomini giungono a nominare (sia pure provvisoriamente e tentativamente) !a realtii che li circonda: Diversi enim nominum impositores, suos quisq(ue) respectus, suos affec­ tus, suas occasiones, suam etiam commoditatem secuti, diversa iisdem rebus a diversis qualitatibus, interdum et casibus, vocabula dedere (cf. supra, § 3.).

La diversificazione delle lingue, necessaria pendant dei diversi processi di reazione psicologica a! mondo (nello spazio e nel tempo) sembra iscriversi senza difficolta nella indefinita molteplicita degli scenari relativa all'attiviti\ delle monadi. D'altra parte, l'invarianza delle essenze, comandata dalla irrinunciabile scelta metafisica di Leibniz, garantisce in ultima istanza del !oro convergere verso una harmonia originaria di cui, beninteso, non e dato ricostruire indizi sicuri attraverso le testimonianze storiche. Unita e molte­ plicita si bilanciano dunque reciprocamente, anche dal punto di vista delle teorie linguistiche, ed e facile allo studioso moderno avvertire il punto in cui !a cornice metafisica fa argine alla conoscenza positiva; ci sembra co­ munque importante osservare che nei parametri della sua gnoseologia Leib­ niz poteva trovare ragioni per sostenere, senza tema di gravi contraddi­ zioni, Ia sua tesi della radicale storicita delle lingue. E va dato atto a! filosofo tedesco che, nel concreto dell'indagine filologico-linguistica, !a per­ suasione, come s'e detto insuperabile, della segreta concordanza delle lin­ gue, non viene fatta pesare pili di tanto: l'attenzione dello studioso e sempre centrata sui meccanismi della differenziazione etnico-storica delle lingue e dei dialetti; sono fin troppo note le cautele opposte da Leibniz a chi superficialmente e per saltus, forzando le leggi della storia, amava stabilire inesistenti etimologie armoniche fra idiomi lontani e diffici!mente imparen­ tabili, almeno a!lo stato attuale delle conoscenze umane (cf. Aarsleff 1969 passim) .

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7. Un diverso argine alla spinta differenziatrice del linguaggio Leibniz riconosce invece nelle risorse razionali dell'uomo. Nei Nouveaux Essais viene nettamente chiarita "cette indetermination du langage, ou l'on man­ que d'une espece des loix qui reglent la signification des mots" (NE II:29 = G V :242), e dovrebbero ormai essere evidenti i motivi filosofico­ gnoseologici di cio. Leibniz tuttavia lavora da un capo all'altro della sua esistenza a un progetto di sistemazione enciclopedica del sapere che, appoggiandosi a segni di valore convenuto, serva da sintesi e insieme da strumento di conoscenza. La characteristica, nelle varie forme assunte attraverso un cinquantennio di riflessioni, doveva essere la chiave di questa complessa operazione non solo semiotica, rna politico-culturale. Si e spesso riconosciuta una frattura tra questa Leibniz e l'indagatore di lingue e dialetti diversi cui fin qui ci siamo riferiti. Eppure lo schema del processo della conoscenza risalente alle citate Meditationes del 1684 sembra indicare che il linguaggio umano, passando dal grado della cognitio clara confusa a quello della cognitio clara distincta, non altera le sue leggi fonda­ mentali, rna ne modifica solo il funzionamento. Questo nuovo livello di conoscenza, infatti, consente di operare "per notas [ . . . ] et examina suf­ ficientia ad rem ab aliis omnibus corporibus similibus discernendam" (G IV:423). E il suo strumento caratteristico e la definitio nomina/is (distinta dalla rea/is, in larga misura fuori della portata umana), "quae nihil aliud est, quam enumeratio notarum sufficientium". A parte il fatto (chiarito a piu riprese nei Nouveaux Essais) che ogni definizione nominate e relativa allo stadio storicamente raggiunto dalla co­ noscenza, ed e dunque sempre aggiornabile e perfezionabile, importa che definire esplicitamente un insieme di caratteristiche fra le infinite attribui­ bili a un individuo (NE III:3) richiede un'attenta manipolazione del materiale linguistico. Richiede porre un freno alla 'imperfezione' delle parole, aile loro naturali ambiguita; richiede limitarne e specificarne le regole d'uso fino a trasformarle in termini fungibili nella comunicazione scien­ tifica e filosofica, nell'insegnamento. Abbiamo in altra sede illustrato la valenza teorica che il concetto di terminus assume nel pensiero linguistico leibniziano (cf. Gensini 1987). Qui dobbiamo solo ribadire che il mec­ canismo di terminizzazione delle parole sta per Leibniz dentro le parole medesime: risiede nella possibilitii umana di infrenare !'indetermination dei significati, ricorrendo appunto al potenziale semantico delle lingue storico­ naturali.

In un frammento non datato, Methodus docendi, Leibniz spiega come si puo e si deve modificare il carattere poco strutturato ("parum con­ stitutae": cf. supra, § 6.) delle parole, e indica significativamente l'impor­ tanza dell'arbitrio umano in questo processo di determinazione: Sed ut scientiae perfecte tradantur opus foret accuratis terminorum omnium qua licet definitionibus ac significationibus vocabuJorum bene constitutis, tanquam si de integro linguam aliquam condere vellemus (C:160).

D'altro canto, nei Nouveaux Essais il filosofo illustrera in termini anche piu generali i meccanismi attraverso cui lingue speciali e persino gerghi riposino sulle risorse del linguaggio storico-naturale: era stato questo il caso di Wil­ kins e Dalgarno, le cui lingue di convenzione erano state "forgees des langues deja connues", senza attentamente eliderne "ce qu'il y a de la nature et du hazard dans les langues qu'elles supposent"; e gli stessi gerghi vengono formati ordinairement sur les langues ordinaires ( . . ) soit en changeant la signifi­ cation re�ue des mots par des metaphors, soit en faisant des nouveaux mots par une composition ou derivation (NE III:2 G V:258). .

,

=

Nel caso del linguaggio filosofico-scientifico si tratta piuttosto di !avo­ rare a un apparato di definizioni e di significati strutturati che rendano inequivoco e percio trasmissibile il pensiero: e in tal senso si puo dire che lavoriamo "tanquam si de integro linguam aliquam condere vellemus". Ma e, questo, un obiettivo raggiungibile? Possono concretamente gli uomini arrivare ad azzerare le distanze stabilite dai diversi idiomi sino al punto di riconoscersi in un sistema convenzionalmente (storicamente) determinato di valori semantici? La domanda non appare affatto retorica, se si pensa a quanta inquietudine Leibniz nutrisse per lo stato della lingua tedesca e per la sua possibilita di contribuire attivamente al dibattito teorico europeo. Si sa anche che l'obiettivo di un sistema linguistico-filosofico adeguato alla encyclopedia nova conscribenda sarebbe rimasto per Leibniz motto lon­ tano. Egli ne aveva pero indicato la possibilita epistemologica e la base lin­ guistica, mettendo in gioco, in fasi diversamente significative della sua ricerca intellettuale, la persuasione (come oggi diremmo, in termini hjelmsleviani) della 'onniformativita semantica' delle lingue storico-natu­ rali: direttamente connesso all'intreccio gnoseologico fra sfera della sen­ sibilita e sfera razionale, fra cognitio clara confusa e cognitio clara distincta, questo principio era emerso nel commento al testo del Nizolio:

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Et quidem verissirnurn est, nullam rem esse, quae non explicari terminis popularibus, saltern pluribus, possit (G IV:142);

si era riaffermato nel cuore degli anni dedicati aile ricerche logiche, nel quadro di un ragionamento sui meccanismi di formalizzazione e di 'ab­ breviazione' del pensiero tramite i sistemi simbolici: Quoniam autem variae sunt hominum linguae, est nulla fere et quae non jam satis exculta sit, ut quaelibet in ea scientiae tradi possint (Analysis lin­ guarum, 1678 C:352); =

per riproporsi ancora in sede di dibattito politico-culturale, negli Unvor­ greiffliche Gedancken, per sostenere Ia possibilita di portare il tedesco al livello delle pili colte e ricche lingue europee; giacche "Es kann zwar end­ lich eine jede Sprache, sie sey so arm als sie wolle, alles geben (UG § 59). In tal senso, davvero, l'indefinita variabi!ita delle lingue, Ia plastica indi!ter­ mination del !oro spessore semantico, anziche vietare Ia via alia scienza sembrano formare Ia garanzia che quella via possa essere percorsa. L'ipotesi che in conclusione ci sentiamo di affacciare e che proprio il prin­ cipio della onniformativita (desumibile da testi come quelli ora citati, rna a dire il vero sotteso a quasi ogni pagina leibniziana) rappr\'senti il punto di unita teorica dei 'due' Leibniz: e che dunque a buona ragione il geniale pre­ cursore delle moderne metodologie logico-simboliche abbia scelto di dedi­ care ampia parte delle sue fatiche a comprendere e a valorizzare Ia va­ riabilita storica del linguaggio e delle lingue. NOTE L

Avverto che qui e altrove userO Ia dizione Epistolica de Historia Etymologica dissertatio anziche Epistolan·s ... , perch6 e certamente Ia prima quella impiegata da Leibniz (nei suoi Observata quaedam occasione Thesauri Linguarum Septentrionalium Hikkesiani, Ms. IV 441. f> 4r.) per riferirsi alia lunga lettera�saggio preparata in risposta alia Historia Studii Ety�o�ogici Linguae Germanicae (Hanoverae: Apud Nicolaum Foersterum, 1711) dell alltevo Johann Georg Eckhart (161)4.1730), e immaginata come prefazione ai Collec­ tanea Etymologica. La dizione Epistolaris . . . e stata (per ragioni evidentemente extrates· tuali) preferita da Sigrid v.d. Schulenburg nel saggio "Leibnizens Gedanken und Vor­ schliige zur Erforschung der deutschen Mundarten", Abhdl. d. Preuss. Akad. d. Wis­ senschaften. Phil. Hist. Klasse 2:5n.3 (1937), e poi generalmente adottata dagli studiosi.

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A. Opere di Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Allgemeiner Politischer und Historischer Briefwechsel. A cura della Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1950sgg. C = Opuscules et fragments inedits. A cura di Louis Couturat. Paris: F. Alcan. 1903. DM = Discours de mi!taphysique et correspondance avec Arnauld. Texte et Commentaires. A cura di Georges Le Roy, 3a ed. Paris: Libraire philosophique J. Vrin, 1970. Dutens = G.W. Leibnitii Opera omnia (. . .) collecta studio Ludovici Dutens, tomes I-VI. Genevae, 1768. G = Die philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz. A cura di C.I. Gerhardt, voll.I-VII. Berlin: Weidmann, 1875-90. (Si cita dalia ristampa anastatica, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1978.) Grua = Textes inedits d'apres les manuscrits de Ia Bibliotheque Provinciale de Hanovre, a cura di G. Grua, vols. I-II. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948. NE = Nouveaux Essais sur l'entendement humain pars l'auteur du systeme de l'harmonie preestablie. G, vol.5, 39-509. UG = "Unvorgreiffliche Gedancken betreffend die Ausiibung und Verbes­ serung der Teutschen Sprache". A cura di Paul Pietsch. Wis­ senschaftliche Beihefte zur Zeitschrift des Allgemeinen Deutschen Sprach­ vereins 30. 327-56 (1908). A

=

B. Letteratura critica Aarsleff, Hans. 1969. "The Study and Use of Etymology in Leibniz". Studia Leibnitiana. Supplementa, vol.III ( = Akten des Internationalen Leibniz-Kongresses, Hannover, 14-19 November 1966), 173-89. Bonfante, Giuliano. 1954. "Ideas on the Kinship of the European Lan­ guages from 1200 to 1800". Cahiers d'histoire mondiale 3.679-99. Borst, Arno. 1957-63. Der Turmbau von Babel: Geschichte der Meinungen iiber Ursprung und Vielfalt der Sprachen und Volker. 4 vols. Stuttgart: Hiersemann.

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Cassirer, Ernst. 1923. Philosophie der symbolischen Formen. Vol.!: Die Sprache. Berlin: B. Cassirer. (Si cita dalla tr. it. Firenze: La Nuova Italia 1961. ) Couturat, Louis. 1901. La logique de Leibniz d'apres des documents inl!dits. Paris: F. Alcan. Dascal, Marcelo. 1978. La semiologie de Leibniz. Paris: Aubier Montaigne. Droixhe, Daniel. 1978. La linguistique et l'appel de l'histoire (1600-1800): Rationalisme et revolutions positivistes. Geneve & Paris: Librairie Droz. ---. (a cura di) 1984. Genese du comparatisme indo-europl!en . ( = HEL 2.5-138) . Paris: S.H.E.S.L. Dutz, Klaus D. 1984. "Natiirliche Sprache und/oder ideale Sprache? Zwei Ansatzpunkte bei der Betrachtung der Sprach- und Zeichentheorie im 17. Jahrhundert". Fallstudien zur Historiographie der Linguistik: Heraklit, d'Ailly und Leibniz hrsg. von Klaus D . Dutz & Peter Schmitter ( = Arbeitsberichte 2) , 35-61. Miinster: Institut fiir Allgemeine Sprachwis­ senschaft der Westfiilischen Wilhelms-UniversiHit. Epicurus. 1960. Opere. A cura di Graziano Arrighetti. Torino: Einaudi. Gensini, Stefano. 1987. "Terminus: linguaggio scientifico vs. linguaggio comune da Galilei a Leibniz". Le vie di Babele a cura di Donatella Di Cesare & S. Gensini, 16-30. Milano & Casale Monferrato: Marietti. Heinekamp, Albert. 1972. "Ars characteristica und natiirliche Sprache bei Leibniz". Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 34: 3.446-88. --. 1976. "Sprache und Wirklichkeit nach Leibniz". History ofLinguis­ tic Thought and Contemporary Linguistics a cura di Herman Parret, 518569. Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter. Heintz, Giinter. 1973. "Point de vue: Leibniz und die These vom Weltbild der Sprache" . Zeitschrift fiir philosophische Forschung 27.86-107. Jolley, Nicholas. 1984. Leibniz and Locke: A study of the "New Essays on Human Understanding". Oxford: Clarendon Press. Lucretius. 1969. De rerum natura. A cura di Enzio Cetrangolo, con un sag­ gio di Benjamin Farrington. Firenze: Sansoni. Metcalf, George J. 1974. "The Indo-European Hypothesis in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries". Studies in the History of Linguistics: Tradi­ tions and Paradigms a cura di Dell Hymes, 234-57. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press. Mugnai, Massimo. 1976. Astrazione e realta: Saggio su Leibniz. Milano: Feltrinelli. Preti, Giulio. 1953. II cristianesimo universale di Leibniz. Milano & Roma: Bocca.

Rossi, Paolo. 1979. I segni del tempo: Storia della terra e storia delle nazioni da Hooke a Vico. Milano: Feltrinelli. Schottel, Justus Georg. 1663. Ausfiirliche Arbeit von der Teutschen HaubtSprache. Braunschweig: C.F. Zilliger. Schulenburg, Sigrid von der 1973. Leibniz als Sprachforscher a cura di Kurt Miiller. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Vailati, Giovanni. 1911. Scritti (!863-1909) . Leipzig & Firenze: Barth & Seeber.

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SUMMARY

This paper tries to shed light on a neglected aspect of Leibniz's linguis­ thought, namely, his ideas about linguistic varieties, seen as a conse­ tic quence of ethnic, cultural and social differences, but also as a specific character of human language. It is argued that theoretical reason for the Leibnizian interest in languages and dialects can be drawn from his view about the origin of language, which radically contradicts the traditional positions about 'adamic language' and about Hebrew as 'langue-mere' of mankind. The synthesis of 'natural' and 'arbitrariness' taking place in ordinary language (as against the conventional nature of constructed languages, like the characteriitica universalis for instance) is discussed in an important series of passages leading from 1680 to the late Epistolica de historia etymologica dissertatio (1712) . Looking for the genesis of this revolutionary standpoint, it is further argued that Leibniz places himself (in a very special way) in the philosophico-linguistic perspective of Epicurus, Lucretius, and Vico; the findings correct the well-known opinion of Cassirer on this point. In the last part of the paper the author tries to add to this a re-interpretation of Leib­ niz's theory of language variety on the philosophical view of knowledge as sketched in the Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis and in the Nouveaux Essais. The result is a homology between the Leibnizian theory of 'radical historicity' of languages and his views about the necessary differ­ ences between the ways individuals look at the world. In Leibniz's outline of the degrees of human knowledge, ordinary language corresponds to the so-called cognitio clara confusa, the real connection between the dimension of sensitivity and the dimension of understanding. The conclusion is, that ordinary language in Leibniz's theory becomes the basis even of the for­ malized languages and that the inner reason of this may be seen in his belief (clearly expressed in the Unvorgreiffliche Gedancken) in the semantic omniformativity of historical languages.

Leibniz and Wilhelm von Humboldt and the History of Comparative Lingui stics* Robert H. Robins

University of London

1. It is impossible to give a definite date for the origin of comparative lin­ guistics without either theoretical or chronological arbitrariness. Charles Hockett's rashness in proposing 1786 as the date of the first 'breakthrough' in the subject is shown both by reading the considerable body of prior work in the field before then and from reading the whole of the Third Anniver­ sary Discourse (Jones 1799 [1786] :19-34), of which the famous 'philologer' paragraph formed just one part. In the western tradition, a long one, the Greeks compared the dialects of their language with one another and looked for a source in the genealogy of the founders of their people, the three sons of Hellen (Uhlig 1883:46263; Plutarch, Moralia 9.15.747). The Romans, in line with their general intellectual subservience to the Greeks, and generalizing from their knowl­ edge of the origin of the Latin alphabet, regarded Latin as derived from Greek with some barbarian admixture. Some comparative studies of the two languages were undertaken, but little theoretical interest was shown in regard to other 'barbarian' languages. However, the official recognition of Christianity as the religion of the Empire necessitated the recognition and the study of Hebrew, the language of the Old Testament, as one of the three Sacred Languages (the languages inscribed on the Cross) ; and as knowledge of European and other vernacu•

My colleague Dr. Theodora Bynon kindly read through a draft of this paper and made a number of most helpful comments, particularly on the section dealing with Humboldt. I have learnt much from her, but she is in no way responsible for any judgements or mis­ judgements to be found herein.

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lar languages increased these had to be fitted into the Biblical tradition of the dispersion of mankind after the Tower of Babel and the catalogue of languages and peoples set out in Genesis 10-11. This grew into the tradition of the Sprachenlisten, inventories of the known languages of the world suc­ cessively fitted into the Biblical framework, usually placing Hebrew at the head, between the third and the seventeenth centuries (Borst 1959:929-52). Comparative linguistics, despite its earlier history, was in many respects a Renaissance product, inspired by interest in the vernacular lan­ guages of Europe, especially the Romance languages, and their obvious links with Latin, the universal second language learned at schooL The his­ torical relations between Latin antiquity and modern Europe provided, perhaps for the first time, a fixed and demonstrable temporal framework for the comparison of languages and the diachronic study of linguistic change. Two sets of observations forced themselves on people's attention, the typological similarities and differences between the ancient and the modern languages of Europe, and the numerous likenesses in items of their vocabularies, especially between Latin and the Romance languages. Dante, living just before the dawn of the Renaissance in Italy, had picked out four words for 'yes' as diagnostic for four major modern languages, and Joseph Justus Scaliger (1540-1609) used the words for 'God' to establish his four matrices linguae, corresponding to the Germanic, Greek, Latin, and Slavic families (Robins 1979:165-67). Although Scaliger denied any cognation between his four language groups, Renaissance scholars had already become aware of many lexical similarities between the Germanic languages and Latin and Greek (Bonfante 1953-54:680-86). Etymology had been gradually moving away from its position in antiquity of 'unfolding the true meaning of words' (Uhlig 1883:14) towards a more historical search for earlier stages in languages and perhaps the ori­ gins of individual words, though a conflation of these two ideas persisted, as in Isidore !.29.1-2: "Etymologia est origo vocabulorum [ . . . ] dum videris unde ortum est nomen, citius vim eius intelligis". Together with the historical frame provided by Latin and the Romance languages, the Renaissance saw a rise in the scientific study of history in general and the systematic search for and use of available evidence, rein­ forced, especially in northern Europe, by secular and nationalist interpreta­ tions of the past encouraged by the Reformation and the incre�sing power of nation states. In the German speaking area of Protestant Europe, recov­ ering from the Thirty Years War, the Lutheran translation of the Bible,

nationalist feeling, and the more general interest in the vernacular lan­ guages gave rise to the writing of grammars, the preparation of dictionaries, historical researches, and movements for the better cultivation of the Ger­ man language (Padley 1985:84-99). These various and interrelated trends in linguistic thinking were developing alongside a still generally respected and officially sustained 'Mosaic' tradition of human history based on a fairly literal reading of the Book of Genesis. This was the Europe in which Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) worked, travelled, corresponded, and exercised his intellect. He is best known for his mathematical and philosophical, including theolog­ ical, writings. But he was a typical though an outstanding Renaissance polymath, involving himself in the whole field of the knowledge and learn­ ing of his age; perhaps he belonged to the last generation in which such polymathy was possible for one man. Theodor Benfey (1809-1881) wrote on him as 2.

der griindlichste Polyhistor, oder vielmehr der umfassendste aller Denker, welche je in der Geschichte der Wissenschaft gewirkt haben, ein Mann, der aile Gebiete menschlichen Wissens und Forschens mit seinem gewalti­ gen Geiste sich nicht bloss unterworfen hatte, sondern in grossem MaBstabe erweiterte (Benfey 1869:243).

Not all his language-related writings are relevant to this essay, but his work on specifically linguistic questions and on'the German language was extensive; Schulenburg's (1973) bibliography lists more than twenty items directly or indirectly involved in questions of language (309-311; cf. Mueller 1985). Like other scholars in the era before that of full-time profes­ sionalism, he was a public servant in a number of German states, working professionally in the fields of law, diplomacy, politics, librarianship, and historiography. All this will have lent strength to any practical steps he may have taken, and he is well known for his insistence on the collection of voc­ abularies and texts (especially of the Lord's Prayer) from the lesser known languages of Europe and elsewhere, in particular from the expanding Rus­ sian Empire and from parts of Latin America (cf. Tovar 1984). He was the author of tracts on the improvement of the status and condition of the Ger­ man language (Schulenburg 1973:116-20; Mueller 1985:377). One of them, his Unvorgreifliche Gedanken, betreffend die Ausilbung und Verbesserung der teutschen Sprache (Leibniz 1966 1:440-86), shows Leibniz sharing in the general sentiments of his compatriots and drawing the implications of

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those sentiments: if the German language was to attain its rightful place in Europe, and if the intellectual achievements of German speakers were not to pass unregarded "wie zerstreute und abgebrochene Blumen" (Schulen­ burg 1973:116), then there was a need for academies and learned societies like the Accademia della Crusca of Italy and the Academie of France (§36), and a major task for any such body would be the study of the vocabularies of all the main dialects of the language (§32), and eventually the production of a comprehensive historical dictionary, a Glossarium etymologicum for the German speech community (§§77-78). Leibniz was a founder and became the first President of the learned society that ultimately (1744) became the Berlin Akademie der Wissenschaf­ ten (Mueller 1985:375-77). This was from its first days a focus for linguistic studies, especially of German (cf. its later sponsorship of Herder's prize essay), and its first publication was Leibniz's Brevis designatio meditationum de originibus gentium ductis potissimum ex indiciis linguarum (Leibniz 1768 [1710], IV:2. 186-98; cf. Benfey 1869:246). How far was he influential in the development of linguistic theory in the historical field? Benfey (1869:243) was enthusiastic but Aarsleff (1975:387; 1983:9) is rather less so. One factor is that some of his writings were not published until some time after they had been written. How far his thoughts were original is not always clear, but it is clear that in the themes on which contemporary students of comparative and historical linguistics were working Leibniz was an active, insightful, and clear-thinking partici­ pant, and his work therein, that of the outstanding intellect of his age, merits examination in the context of the history of linguistics. This exami­ nation, which extends far beyond the scope of this essay, is better done in relation to his own age than as an attempt to look 'Whiggishly' for 'anticipa­ tions' of later and current theories and methods. Among the ideas and lines of research attracting attention in the 17th century were the diffusion of the languages of Europe from a common source, itself no longer extant, and the identification of the main genealog­ ical branches to which these languages, those of the Near East, and ulti­ mately those of the entire world might be shown to belong. Andreas Jager (1686) and Georg Stiernhielm (1598-1672) had both published on this, and Stiernhielm's work of 1671 was well known to Leibniz and subject to his criticism (Schulenburg 1973:99). Together with linguistic scholarship of this sort, there continued the more adventurous attempts to identify a still living language as the surviv-

ing first language of mankind, or to link a specific modern language, usually the writer's own language, directly with a prestigious ancient tongue. Of the former, Goropius Becanus (1518-1572) with his assertion that Flemish Dutch was the first language is the best known exponent, and he was much quoted by his contemporaries, but he was not the only representative (cf. Swiggers 1984). In the latter pursuit several French scholars had sought immediate etymological connections between French and Ancient Greek. Charles Estienne (1504-1564) had declared (Feugere 1853:18, 193, 208) that on both typological and etymological grounds French is more closely related to Greek than Latin or any other Romance language (one of his etymologies is Greek kephale and French chef, "head"). Perion (1555:41) argued the same case, citing the Greek and French words for the adverbial "for": gar and car (cf. Bouelles 1533). Some Germans, to further the pre­ stige of their own language, claimed a special cognation between it and the classical languages (Prasch 1686a; 1686b; Morhof 1682). All such efforts had somehow to be accomodated within or reconciled with the Biblical tra­ dition. Leibniz was actively concerned with these and kindred studies, and corresponded freely about them with his contemporaries. But he felt the need to play a cautious role between the findings or the supposed findings of current research and the traditional Biblical system (cf. Schulenburg 1973:69-70). Such an attitude of circumspect compromise is consonant with what has been said of his general position in regard to the publication of his thoughts: those ideas that would most severely shake established religious positions were toned down or kept for private circulation (cf. Russell 1946:604; Hampshire 1956:143). Gently mocking 'Goropianism' (cf. NE II:30-32), Leibniz also doubted the identification of Hebrew in any known form with the source of all human languages: Linguam Hebraicam primigeniam dicere idem est ac dicere truncos arborum esse primigenios { . . . ] Illud tantum quaeri cum ratione potest, an lingua Hebraea cum cognatis sit origini vicinior quam ceterae. (Feller 1718:80)

Within the traditional system he identified two major branches, Aramaic and Japhetic (to use his own terminology), and he assigned the southern languages, Arabic, Hebrew, and the other Semitic languages to the Aramaic branch, and the European languages, with the exception of Bas­ que, to the Japhetic branch, dividing this latter into Scythian (today's

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Finna-Ugrian and Altaic languages) and Celtic, for him a regional term. Thus whatever antiquity he was prepared to recognize within Hebrew, he firmly placed the language, as it was known, at a particular place in a sub­ branch of a main branch (this 'downgrading' is somewhat comparable to the similar treatment of Sanskrit, once revered as identical with or very near to the Indo-European Ursprache, by Schleicher in his Stammbaum presenta­ tion of the family). Leibniz's Celtic covered the Indo-European languages of Europe itself (NE II:18-21). Rather than assigning a priority between Greek and German as others had sought to do, he set out the two lan­ guages, along with many others, as both sprung from the same source (Leibniz 1768, V:341-42): "Etsi non putem Teutonica ex Graecis orta, puto tamen Graeca et Teutonica ex communi fonte Scythico fluxisse." On Bas­ que he conceded himself nonplussed as regards its origin and its historical cognation (Leibniz 1768, IV:2. 194; Wieselgren 1885:31). But he conceded to the traditionalists that Hebrew was probably closest in some respects to the primal language (NE II:20), and he certainly maintained his expressed belief in the possibility of the ultimate monogenesis of human speech (Leib­ niz 1768, IV:2.188): " . . . dicendum [ . . . ] potius (quod magis sacris Literis consentit) ceteras gentes unius gentis aut stirpis emissaria coloniasque fuisse . . . " (cf. Aarsleff 1969). In these and in other instances he did his best towards the implications of the data that he was studying and the tradition that he did not wish wholly to reject. (We remember that the goodness of God was a central component and support of his philosophical system, as set out in his Essais de theodicee sur Ia bonte de Dieu of 1710.) But specifi­ cally on the Biblical account of the origin of language diversity he admitted difficulty·in reconciling the three descendants of Noah with the multitude of contemporary peoples (Schulenburg 1973:170), and he gave it as his convic­ tion that a primal language would necessarily have been primitive and that all languages are continually in a state of development (NE II:8). In correspondence (Leibniz 1768, VI:2.225-26) he expressed his doubts whether the lingua Adamica or Paradisiaca was Hebrew; in any case it had long since ceased to be spoken, and there had been a multiplicity of lan­ guages before the Flood, such as was brought about again after the Tower of Babel. Within his overall and potentially universal classification of languages Leibniz devoted particular attention to the history and development of Ger­ man in its great dialectal variation, complementing his practical efforts on behalf of the language. In this work he was convinced that etymology,

properly used, held the key to the history of peoples (Aarsleff 1969), and this determined his appeal for vocabularies from around the world. This is seen again and again in his writings: Dissertatio de origine Germanorum (Leibniz 1768, IV:2.198-205), Brevis designatio de originibus gentium ductis potissimum ex indiciis linguarum (ibid. , 168-98), Disquisitio de origine Francorum (ibid. , 146-67), Collectanea etymologica (Leibniz 1768, VI:2.1232). But here too he balanced his own deductions with the traditional con­ ceptions of his time. Man's original vocabulary was not arbitrary, but was based on a harmony between words and things (Leibniz 1768, IV:2. 187) :

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In Iinguis paulatim natis orta sunt vocabula per occasiones ex analogia vocis cum affectu, qui rei sensum comitabatur; nee aliter Adamum nomina imposuisse crediderim.

In this support for the predominant role of sound symbolism in man's pri­ mal language, he closely follows the Stoic doctrine of protai phOnai, with languages subsequently losing much of this symbolism through successive sound changes, though he felt able to point to considerable vestiges among the modern languages of Europe. There is no doubt that he took etymology very seriously as the princi­ pal tool of the language historian, and he engaged in extensive correspon­ dence on the subject with other scholars, in particular the distinguished lin­ guist Hiob Ludolf (Waterman 1978 and further references). Scorning those who maintained a connection on the basis of single apparent similarities between words, he warned that "saepe verissime etymologiae parum sunt verisimiles prima aspectu" (Schulenburg 1973:61), and that above all there was the need for cumulative etymological testimony for it to be reliable (Wieselgren 1885:32). He took note of lexical correspondences between German and the classical languages (Leibniz 1768, VI:2.162) which were to form the basis of Grimm's Law a century later (some of his pairs of words would not be accepted as etymologically linked today). It would, however, be a mistake to see him as theoretically in advance of his age. The idea of language families sprung from no longer extant parent languages, believed ultimately to have descended from a monogene­ tic single language, was shared by several people. His etymologies, though more thorough and cautious than many earlier and some contemporary assertions, were still fairly loosely based on resemblances, even though he insisted on cumulative evidence. 'Letters', he wrote (Leibniz 1768, VI.2:89), change easily; so the Latin rhotacism that gave the pairs Papisius - Papirius, and Fusius - Furius jus-

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tify the identification of the Celtic god's name Esus with the Greek Ares. Other connections that he proposed or approved were: Greek holos and German all, Germanic bold and its cognates and Latin pollentia, Germanic kesen ("eligere") and Latin Caesar, and Latin damnare and German Damm (Collectanea etymologica [Leibniz 1768, VI:2, pp. 68, 158, 160, 162]). He happily accepted the Varronian tradition of Latin as 'semi-Greek' (ibid. , V :502), and accounted for the palatalization of the Latin velars in Romance by saying (ibid., VI.2:160): "Mollities fecit, ut Italis K robustum et virile in C effeminatum mutaretur". Schulenburg (1973:287-88) remarks on Leibniz's less critical accep­ tance of etymological possibilities in Celtic, on which he had less control and less material than on Germanic. Admitting the ease with which 'letters' can change or drop out (Leibniz 1768, VI.2:179), he wrote to Hiob Ludolf (1624-1704): "Etymologica res conjecturis, non demonstrationibus agitur" (Schulenburg 1973:61). Leibniz's etymology was not, and was not envis­ aged as, an exact science such as the Neogrammarians demanded as its status (cf. Leskien 1876:xxviii). August Friedrich Pott's (1802-1887) "ver­ lockende Syrene des Gleichlauts" (1833:xii) had another century for her songs. Perhaps his most positive individual contribution to historical linguistic research was practical and methodological. The encouragement that he gave, from a position of political eminence and intellectual renown, to the systematic collection of material for comparative studies is well known; and the importance he laid on place names as prime evidence for the earlier dis­ tribution of peoples, though he may not have been the first person to do this, has had a lasting impact. Among place names he expressed a special interest in river names (NE II:30; Leibniz 1768, IV:2.204: "multum ad quaestionem hanc (sc. de origine Germanorum) accuratius definiendam facerent etyma locorum, fluviorum maxime et montium"). It was this sort of evidence that convinced him, as it convinced Wilhelm von Humboldt that the Basques formerly occupied a much more extensive territory i Iberia than the small Pyrenean area in which they dwelt in his time and as they do today (Wieselgren 1885:31). Research of this type, proposed by Leibniz, has been taken up in this century in the Hydronymia Germaniae programme, sponsored by the Akademie der Wissenschaften of Mainz (Krahe 1949; 1954; 1964; Geiger 1963, and further references).

present-day comparative-historical linguistics: Sir William Jones (17461794), Jacob Grimm (1785-1863), Rasmus Rask (1787-1832), and Franz Bopp (1791-1867). The 18th-century had seen a great deal of work on the comparison of languages, both in terms of etymological connections and typological similarities; both aspects had been extensively treated in articles in the Encyclopedic fram;aise, and the whole subject had received tremen­ dous stimulation from the impact of Sanskrit on European scholarship at the end of the century. 18th-century Europe had been aware of the difference between typol­ ogy and etymology; but both were cited as evidence for historical affilia­ tion, sometimes on the same side, sometimes as rivals. The clear recogni­ tion of the difference between them, the persistence of lexical inheritance as against the mutability of structural type, and the consequent reliance on the former for genetic classification, was the work of the early and middle 19th-century, leading much more clearly to a Kuhnian paradigm for histor­ ical linguistics than anything in preceding years. Typical of 18th-century attitudes was the recognition of exactly the same facts about Sanskrit and the modern languages of northern India by Nathaniel Brassey Halhed (1751-1830) and William Jones and the diametri­ cally opposite conclusions that each drew from them. Both saw the etymological links between the Sanskrit and the modern vocabularies, and both noted the structural differences exhibited by the verbal inflexions and the verbal phrases. Halhed (1778:ix) declared that on the evidence of the etymologies the Hindustani language(s) were "indubitably derived from the Sanskrit" although "the inflexions by which the words are affected and the modes of grammatical regimen are widely different". But Jon.es (1799:2526), despite his admission that "five words in six" in Hindi are derived from Sanskrit, argued that the typological diversity of the languages in "the inflexions and regimen of verbs" precluded any relation of descent, assert­ ing that Hindi was a surviving original language of India which had been heavily invaded by Sanskrit loanwords. On the same sort of ground an arti­ cle in the Encyclopedic (Diderot & d' Alembert 1772:263-64) had asserted that French was not descended from Latin, but was the continuation of a previous Celtic language which had incorporated much Latin vocabulary during the period of Roman rule. Humboldt understood well what was going on in linguistic research and linguistic thinking, and he was keenly interested in it. Like Leibniz he was a man of affairs and a public servant for much of his life, and, as with Leib­ niz, historical linguistics only ocupied one part of his intellectual interest.

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3. Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835) was a contemporary or an older contemporary of several of those generally regarded as founder figures of

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But Leibniz had been a philosopher in his wider fields of study, whereas Humboldt's wider interests were in general linguistics, or, more particu­ larly, in present-day terms the philosophy of language. His concern was with language as such and with every different language on which he could get primary or secondary source data. In 1812 he wrote:

Bopp submitted successive chapters to him as he wrote them (Lefmann 1897:44); in their extensive correspondence (Lefmann 1897) we can read much detailed discussion of questions on the Sanskrit language and Sanskrit literature. Humboldt in turn sent chapters of the Verschiedenheit to Bopp (GS VII:6), and Humboldt's incomplete sketch of Sanskrit is derived largely from Bopp's work (GS VI:398). One important contribution by Humboldt to comparative linguistics was an administrative one; it was he in his capacity of Minister in charge of public education that saw to it that in the newly created University of Berlin there should be a Chair of Oriental Literature and General Philology, unit­ ing the two rapidly developing subjects, Oriental (including especially Sanskrit) literature and comparative linguistics, and that Bopp should be the first incumbent, in 1821. The pride of place accorded to these two sub­ jects through the century in German universities and through successive modifications of the place of Sanskrit within the Indo-European family was recognized in the title of Benfey's Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft und orientalischen Philologie in Deutschland (1869). Benfey (p. 279) referred to Humboldt as "der grosse Mitbegriinder der neueren Sprachwissenschaft". Humboldt was able in his later years as a linguist and as a public ser­ vant in the Kingdom of Prussia to give powerful support to comparative­ historical linguistics as an essential component of German university educa­ tion. But it is clear that his own interests in the study of the history of lan­ guages were different. He was concerned with the history of peoples, and with the history of their languages as part of that wider history; and like Leibniz he took notice of the widespread survival of Basque place names, especially river names, in parts of Spain where no contemporary evidence of a Basque speaking population could be found (GS IV:166-68). In some of his papers and in his correspondence with Bopp he carefully discussed etymological questions, and he praised the work and the insights of Bopp in this field (GS VII:358, 111). Humboldt made it clear, however, that comparative-historical linguis­ tics, as it was being currently developed, was not his prime concern. Throughout his life he was impressed with a dislike of narrowness in educa­ tion and scholarship, and in his conception of Bildung generally (cf. Sweet 1978:37). For him typology, indeed, was not an end in itself; but by com­ paring the structures of languages, their Bau, the linguist could follow man's striving for perfection and his simultaneous linguistic and intellectual progress towards higher levels of civilization.

l'etude de cette diversite des langues offre deux points egalement dignes de fixer notre attention: !'idee de !'ensemble de touts ces diff6rens idiomes, et celle de l'individualite de chacun en particulier. (OS III:339)

After studying Latin and Greek at school and several other languages subsequently, he kept up a lifelong interest in language and languages whenever time and opportunity served. The progress and results of his lin­ guistic researches were published among his entire collected works (19031907), and culminated in what was intended as the introduction to his study of the classical Kawi language of Java, which he did not live to complete, and which is now treated as a separate book, Die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues, posthumously publi;;hed in 1836. This book has been hailed by Leonard Bloomfield (1935:18) as "the first great book on general linguistics". Considering the long span of Humboldt's writings in linguistics, from 1795 to near his death, his views and his conclusions are re'llarkably consistent throughout. On the development of Indo-European comparative-historical linguis­ tics from the late 18th century Humboldt kept himself well informed, and his interest in Sanskrit was intense, as a language, for its literature, and for its importance in the emerging Indo-European family. Like so many of his contemporaries he was fully persuaded of the excellence of its highly devel­ oped grammatical structure: Die Sanskrit-Sprache ist unter den uns bekannten die atteste und erste, die einen wahrhaften Bau grammatischer Formen und zwar in einer solchen Vortrefflichkeit und Vollsti:indigkeit des Organismus besitzt, daB in dieser Rilcksicht our wenig spi:iter hinzugetreten ist. (GS IV:313; cf. GS VII:294).

He went along with the contemporary picture of Sanskrit as at or near the head of the Indo-European family (GS VII:98, 168, 224), with Greek being closely related to it (Lefmann 1897:78). He retained an open mind on the question whether Sanskrit was an indigenous Indian language or one brought in by invaders (1828:76-77). In his Sanskrit studies he worked closely with Franz Bopp. Bopp's Sanskrit grammar was his principal handbook in learning the language, and

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ROBERT H. ROBINS Die Sprache ist eine der Seiten, von welchen aus die allgemeine menschliche Geisteskraft in bestiindig Hitige Wirksamkeit tritt. Anders ausgedriickt, erblickt man darin das Streben, der Idee der Sprachvollen� dung Dasein in der Wirklichkeit zu gewinnen. Diesem Streben nachzuge­ hen und dasselbe darzustellen ist das Geschaft der Sprachforschers in seiner letzten, aber einfachsten Aufl6sung (GS VII:17).

While he distinguished the two approaches to the comparison of lan­ guages, etymological-historical and typological, he firmly asserted that he regarded the typological comparison of grammatical and semantic struc­ tures as the more profound direction for linguistic research (cf. GS V:382). His editor, Heymann Steinthal (1823-1899), thought fit to write: Eben so ist auch die historisch-vergleichende Gramrnatik des lndoger­ manischen [ . . . ] fiir die Sch6pfung seiner Ideen iiber Sprache von keinem irgend welchen Belang gewesen. (Steinthal 1883:13)

Humboldt's conception of linguistic comparison, though related to the his­ tory of people and languages, was not set in the same historical context as 19th-century comparative work came to be. His concern was for comparing language structures, semantic and grammatical, as indicators of the mental and intellectual capacities of nations within a wider context of human clas­ sifications (cf. GS 1:399, one of his earliest. publications). His frame of ref­ erence was the continuous evolution of language and of languages, histori­ cal in that sense, but not strictly temporal in the way that Indo-European studies were becoming ("Denkt man sich, wie es doch das Natiirlichste ist, die Sprachbildung sukzessiv, so mull man ihr, wie allem Entstehen in der Natur, ein Evolutionssystem unterlegen" (GS VII:156]). For him change was developmental, of the ways in which languages could become more efficient as vehicles for thinking and for communicating thought, and this was intimately linked with the advancement of civilization, "die Ergriin­ dung des Zusammenhanges der Sprache mit der Bildung der Nation" (GS V:7; cf. GS IV:310; 429-30). Volkommenheit was the key concept (GS IV:17): "Dall nur die grammatisch gebildeten Sprachen vollkomme Angemessenheit zur Ideenentwicklung besitzen, ist unliiugbar. " I n certain respects, moreover, he was clearer than some of his contem­ poraries on the differences in theory and method between typological and historical comparison. In a letter to August Wilhelm Schlegel (1767-1845) he distinguished three aspects of 'comparative grammar', comparison of the semantic content of grammatical classes and categories (e.g., whether the verbs of a language have a passive voice), the means whereby grammatical

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distinctions are maintained (e.g., affixes, vowel alternations, etc.), and the actual inflectional morphs themselves ("die wirklichen Laute"); and it was this last that carried the greatest weight in historical affiliation (Hoenigswald 1984:98; cf. 1986: 175-76; GS VI:S-9, 21, 78-81, 83). This clarifies Friedrich Schlegel's (1772-1829) reference to "die innere Struktur der Sprachen oder die vergleichende Grammatik" (1808:28). But it was still comparative grammar, the comparison of inflectional morphs, rather than general lexical etymologies, that constituted the key, in Humboldt's eyes, to genetic relations (cf. GS IIJ:290). And he declared that in his studies "eine Ursprache anzunehmen . . . scheint mir unniitz und misleidend" ( GS V:392), in this way distancing himself, as far as his own interests were involved, from one of the main themes of historical linguistics since the time of Leibniz and before. Thus while Humboldt showed an interest in the nascent comparative­ ' historical linguistics of the early 19th century, and encouraged Bopp and others to pursue these studies along with Sanskritic studies, and himself showed his insights into the methodology of this branch of linguistics, in his own thinking as a general linguist and a philosopher of language he remained a man of the 18th century, perhaps the last fully representative of that century in linguistics. He had strong links with the Ideologues (cf. Desirat et a!. 1982), though he regarded their work as in some respects too facile (Sweet 1978:220-21). He kept in touch with American scholars work­ ing on Indian languages, data from which he rated as of the highest impor­ tance in his typological studies, in particular with John Pickering (17771846), John Gottlieb Ernestus Heckewelder (1743-1823), and Peter Stephen Duponceau (1760-1844), the last named being especially interested himself in typology and in the synchronic comparison of the languages of the Old and the New World (Sweet 1980:399-401; GS V:7; GS VII:285). Such studies began to lose their interest during the 19th century as strictly etymological historical linguistics achieved its prime place, above all in the German universities. It is in our own times, beginning with Edward Sapir (1921:127-56) and continuing through the work of such scholars as Roman Jakobsen (1958) and Joseph Greenberg (1960; 1974), that Humboldt's typological comparatism has come back to its rightful place in linguistic studies. Neither Leibniz nor Humboldt can be said to have initiated or to have been involved in the 'origin' of comparative linguistics, unless these terms

4.

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are deliberately adjusted to fit such a statement. Nearly a hundred years separates the two, and conditions had changed at the end of the 18th cen­ tury, particularly since the full impact of Sanskrit on European scholarship had been felt. They were similar to. each other in being both non-professionals as far as linguistics was concerned, and in the field of linguistics, broadly envis­ aged, both were known primarily for their work on the philosophy of lan­ guage. Both were eminent in public life and both used their positions and reputations to further linguistic studies, Leibniz by investigating worldwide collections of data and Humboldt by his influence on the universities of a resurgent ; Germany. In neither was historical linguistics the primary interest. Leibniz was a polymath whose main concern for language lay in logic and universal communication systems, and Humboldt ranged widely over the whole field. Probably Leibniz gave more specialist attention to his­ torical etymologies than Humboldt, if we judge by the total output of their linguistic publications. Humboldt's position would seem to have been that comparative-historical studies and the pursuit of detailed etymologies were an important development with a great potential, but that this was not for him the really vital aspect of language study. He encouraged others, and he learned from them; he discussed the details of their work with them; but he preserved his own more general interest and his own standpoint. We notice throughout his work how much more fascinated he was with Sanskrit as a language of a particular excellence and with its literature than with its place in the Indo-European family, on which he was prepared to accept what was being said by others. In th� long history of comparative linguistics Leibniz and Humboldt each worked within their own times and in the context of their times. Each was preeminent among his peers, and their achievements, practical and theoretical, deserve to be carefully examined, critically evaluated, and greatly respected.

. 1983. The Study of Language in England 1 780-1860. London: Athlone Press. (Repr. of 1967 Princeton Univ. Press edition.) Benfey, Theodor. 1869. Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft und orientali­ schen Philologie in Deutschland. Munich: Cotta. Bloomfield, Leonard. 1935. Language. London: Allen & Unwin. Bonfante, Giuliano. 1953-54. "Ideas on the Kinship of the European Lan­ guages from 1200 to 1800". Cahiers d'histoire mondiale 1.679-99. Borst, Arno. 1959. Der Turmbau von Babel. Voi.II. , part 2. Stuttgart: Hiersemann. Bouelles, Charles de. 1533. Liber de differentia vulgarium linguarum et Gal­ lici sermonis varietate. Paris: Stephanus. Desirat, Claude et a!., eds. 1982. "Les Ideologues et les sciences du Ian­ gage". (=HEL, 4). Lille. Diderot, Denis D . & Jean le Rond d'Alembert. 1772. Encyclopedie. Geneva. Feller, Joachim F. 1718. Otium Hanoverianum. Leipzig. Feugere, Leon, ed. 1853. H. Estienne, Conformite du langage franqois avec le grec (1659). Paris: Delalain. Geiger, Theodora. 1963. "Die iiltesten Gewiissernamen: Schichten im Gebiet des Hoch- und Oberrheins". BNF 14.213-29. Greenberg, Joseph H. 1960. "A Quantitative Approach to the Morpholog­ ical Typology of Languages". IJAL 26. 178-94. ---. 1974. Language Typology: A historical and analytic overview. The Hague: Mouton. Halhed, Nathaniel. 1778. A Grammar of the Bengal Language. London: Hoogly. Hampshire, Stuart, ed. 1956. The Age of Reason: The 1 7th century philosophers. Selected, with introduction and interpretive commentary. New York: New American Library of World Literature. Hockett, Charles F. 1965. "Sound Change". Language 41. 185-204. Hoenigswald, Henry M. 1984. "Etymology against Grammar in the Early Nineteenth Century". HEL 6:2.95-100. 1986. "Nineteenth-Century Linguistics on Itself'. Studies in the History of Western Linguistics ed. by Theodora Bynon & P.R. Palmer, 172-88. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. Humboldt, Wilhelm von. 1903-1907. Gesammelte Schriften. Ed. by Albert Leitzmann. Vols. I-IX. Berlin: B.Behr. (Listed below under volume number, and referred to by the siglum GS in the paper.) --. 1795. Plan einer vergleichenden Anthropologie. I:377- 410.

REFERENCES

Aarsleff, Hans. 1969. "The Study and Use of Etymology in Leibniz". Studia Leibnitiana, supplementa 3. 173-89. . 1975. "The Eighteenth Century, including Leibniz". Current Trends in Linguistics ed. by Thomas A. Sebeok, voi.XIII: Historiogra­ phy of Linguistics, 383-479. The Hague: Mouton.

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1812a. Ankundigung einer Schrift uber die vaskische Sprache und Nation nebst Angabe des Gesichtspunktes und Inhalts derselben. III:288299. . 1812b. Essai sur les langues du Nouveau Continent. III:300-341. . 1820. Ober das vergleichende Sprachstudium. IV: 1-34. . 1820-21 . Prufung der Untersuchungen uber die Urbewohner Hispaniens vermittelst der vaskischen Sprache. IV:57-232. . 1821. Ober das Entstehen der grammatischen Formen und ihren Einfluss auf die Ideenentwicklung. IV:285-313. . 1822. Ober den Nationalcharakter der Sprpchen. IV: 420-435. . 1823. Inwiefern liisst sich der ehemalige Kulturstand der eingeborenen Volker Amerikas aus den Oberresten ihrer Sprachen beurteilen. V:130. . 1824-26. Grundzuge des allgemeinen Sprachtypus. V: 364-475. . 1826. Untersuchungen uber die amerikanischen Sprachen. V:344363. . 1827. Ober den Dualis. VI:4-30. . 1828. An Essay on the Best Means of Ascertaining the Affinities of Oriental Languages. VI:76-84. --. 1827-29. Sanskrita Sprache. VI:398-486. . 1836. Ober die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues. VII:1-344. (Repr. , Darmstadt, 1949.) Jager, Andreas. 1686. De lingua vetustissima Europae. Stockholm. Jakobson, Roman. 1958. "Typological Studies and Their Contribution to Historical Comparative Linguistics". Proceedings of the Eighth Interna­ tional Congress of Linguists ed. by Eva Sivertsen, 17-25. Oslo: Oslo Univ. Press. Jones, Sir William. 1799. Works. Vol.I: Anniversary Discourses and Other Papers ed. by Anna M. Jones. London: Robinson. Krahe, Hans. 1949. Ortsnamen als Geschichtsquelle. Heidelberg: Winter. . 1954. Sprache und Vorzeit. Heidelberg: QueUe & Meyer. . 1964. Unsere iiltesten Flussnamen. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz. Kuhn, Thomas S. 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2nd en!. ed. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. Larucea de Tovar, Consuelo. 1984. "Jose Celestino Mutis (1732-1808) and the Report on American Languages". HL 11 .213-29. Lefmann, Salomon. 1897. Franz Bopp: sein Leben und Wissenschaft. Nachtrag: Briefwechsel zwischen Franz Bopp und Wilhelm von Hum­ boldt. Berlin: Reimer.

Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. 1768. Opera omnia. Ed. by L. Dutens. Geneva: apud Fratres de Tournes. . 1961. Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain. Frankfurt am Main: Insel. ( =NE) . 1966. Deutsche Schriften. Ed. by G.B. Guhrauer. Hildesheim: Olms. Leskien, August. 1876. Die Deklination im Slawisch-Litauischen und Ger­ manischen. Leipzig: Hirzel. Manchester, Martin L. 1985. The Philosophical Foundations of Humboldt's Linguistic Doctrines. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins. Morhof, Daniel G. 1682. Unterricht von der deutschen Sprache und Poesie nach deren Ursprung, Fortgang und Lehrsiitzen. Kiel: Neumann. Mueller, Hugo J. 1985. "Leibniz as a Linguist". Scientific and Humanistic Dimensions of Language ed. by Kurt R. Jankowsky, 375-86. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: J. Benjamins. Padley, George Arthur. 1985. Grammatical Theory in Western Europe 1500-1700: Trends in Vernacular Grammar I. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. Perion, Joachim. 1555. Dialogorum de linguae Gallicae origine eiusque cum Graeca cognatione. Paris: S. Nivellium. Pott, August Friedrich. 1833-36. Etymologische Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Indo-Germanischen Sprachen. 2 vols. Lemgo: Meyer. Prasch, Johann L. 1686a. Dissertatio de origine Germanica linguae Latinae. Ratisbon: Emmericus. ---. 1686b. Mysteriorum linguae Teutonicae. Pars prima: De divina origine huius linguae. Ibid. Robins, Robert H. 1979. A Short History of Linguistics. 2nd ed. London: Longman. Russell, Bertrand. 1946. History of Western Philosophy. London: Allen & Unwin. Sapir, Edward. 1921. Language: An introduction to speech. New York: Harcourt & Brace. Schlegel, Friedrich. 1808. Ober die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier. Heidel­ berg: Mohr & Zimmer. (New ed., with an Introd. by Sebastiana Timpa­ naro, Amsterdam: J. Benjamins, 1977.) Schulenburg, Sigrid von. 1973. Leibniz als Sprachforscher. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann. Steinthal, Heymann, ed. 1883 . Die sprachphilosophischen Werke Wilhelm's von Humboldt. Berlin: Diimmler.

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Stiernhielm, Georg. 1671. Evangelia ab Ulfila Gothorum in Moesia Epis· copo ex Graeco Gothice translata. Stockholm: Wankif. Sweet, Paul R. 1978-80. Wilhelm von Humboldt: A biography. Vols. I-II. Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press. Swiggers, Pierre. 1984. "Adrianus Schrieckius: De. la langue des Scythes il !'Europe linguistique". HEL 6:2. 17-35. Uhlig, Gustav, ed. 1883. Grammatici Graeci. Vol.I. Leipzig: Teubner. Waterman, John T. 1978. Leibniz and Ludolf on Things Linguistic. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. Wieselgren, Harald. 1885. "Leibniz' bref til Sparfvenfelt". Antiqvarisk tidskrift for Sverige 7:3. 1-64.

Die Sakularisiemng des tertium comparationis. Eine philosophische Erorterung der Urspriinge des vergleichenden Sprachstndinms bei Leibniz und Humboldt Tilman Borsche

SUMMARY

Both Leibniz and Wilhelm von Humboldt devoted much time and thought to questions about language and the history of languages. Neither of them was a full-time professional linguist, bnt both were men of public affairs for whom linguistic studies were additional activities of the highest importance. Each in his way was typical of the age in which he lived and worked. Leibniz was especially concerned with etymology and etymological methods as a key to a knowledge of the past history and the historical rela­ tions of languages. Humboldt, though very simpathetic to contemporary Indo-European historical linguistics and Sanskritic scholarship, was himself more interested in the general linguistic question of the typological development of languages as the instruments and the manifestations of their speakers' nationhood and civilization.

Universitiit Bonn

1. Das vergleichende Sprachstudium hat keine lange Geschichte. Erst in der Zeit Wilhelm von Humboldts erreichte das Denken einen Wende­ punkt, an dem das Problem der 'Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprach­ baues' grundsiitzliche Bedeutung erlangen konnte. Sprachbetrachtungen friiherer Zeiten erscheinen uns von daher nur als Vorgeschichte, gewisser­ maBen als Materialsammlung fiir eine neue Art der Fragestellung. Denn sie blieben stets anderen, 'hoheren' Zwecken untergeordnet. Zur Erliiuterung dieses Gedankens m6chte ich einige markante Bei· spiele aus der reichen Tradition dessen nennen, was heute als Gebiet einer eigenen Disziplin, der Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft, vielfiiltig und fruchtbar bearbeitet wird.I Herodot (ca. 484-425 a. Chr.), der scharfiiugige Beobachter fremder Lander, fremder Volker, fremder Sitten, vergleicht, wenn er sich einmal den Sprachen zuwendet, lediglich einzelne Namen (cf. Historiae, z.B. I 57-58, IV 110). Damit verhiilt er sich nicht anders als auch heute noch jedermann, der, mit fremder Rede konfrontiert, erstmals tiber diese Fremdheit zu reflektieren beginnt. Herodot berichtet uns, daB man etwas hier so, dort anders benenne. Das tertium comparationis der verschiedenen Namen ist die allen gemeinsame und sprachfrei gegebene Sache oder Person. Sprache tritt nur unter dem Blickpunkt der Benennung in den Gesichtskreis des Beobachters. Die Orientierung der Sprachbetrachtung am einzelnen Wort bleibt fiir die gesamte Antike kennzeichend.2 Auch Augustin (354-430), der 800 Jah-

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re spiiter das antike Erbe vereinfachend zusammenfaBt, sucht in der Viel­ falt der Sprachzeichen nach der Einbeit des Bezeichneten. Nur sucht er sie nicht mehr naiv in der Sache, sondern stoisch geschult in der Bedeutung. Seine subtilen Analysen unterscheiden bereits die Extensionsgleichheit (z.B. von nomen und verbum, die beide 'soviel' wie Wort bedeuten k6n­ nen) von einer Gleichheit der Intension, die er, vielsagendes Beispiel, in der ]ateinisch-griechischen Entsprechung von nomen und onoma als offen­ kundig gegeben ansieht (cf. De magistro 5, 12-7, 20; dazu Borsche 1985:237-38). Nur ein starker Glaube an die verborgene IdentiHit der Be­ deutung kann Augustin uber die offenkundige Differenz dieser heiden W6rter in ihren jeweiligen einzelsprachlichen Kontexten hinwegtiiuschen. Diese Identitiit der Bedeutung ist fur ihn im zeitlosen verbum nullius lin­ guae repriisentiert (cf. De Trinitate XV 10, 17-16, 26). Das christliche Denken uber die Verschiedenheit der Sprachen in Mit­ telalter und friiher Neuzeit wird von zwei Grundfiguren gepriigt, die beide die Erkliirung der Vielfalt mit ihrer Verurteilung verbinden. Die eine Figur beruft sich auf die Sch6pfungsgeschichte. Sie geht auf Philo von Alexan­ drien (25 a.Ch.-50 p.Ch.) zuriick (cf. De opificio mundi 148; Legum a!lego­ ria II 15). Adam als unmittelbares Gesch6pf Gottes erkannte die Dinge und benannte sie mit ihren wahren Namen. In dem MaB, in dem wir uns von unserem Stammvater entfernen, degeneriert die Erkenntnis, und mit der Zeit wird auch die Sprache korrumpiert. Erneuerung ist nur von einer Ruckkehr zu den Ursprungen zu erwarten, zur adamitischen Ursprache. Das Ziel ist die Aufhebung der Zeit. - Die andere Figur beruft sich auf die Geschichte vom Turmbau zu Babel.' Die Vielfalt der Zungen ist nicht eine Folge der Zeit, sondern eine Strafe Gottes fiir den Ungehorsam der Men­ schen. In der Einheit der Sprache drohten sie zu vie! Wissen, zu vie! Macht, zu vie! Gottiihnlichkeit zu erlangen. In heiden Figuren erscheint die Identi­ tiit des Denkens als der Ursprung, als die Wahrheit und das Ziel. Sie wird von der Differenz nur im Moment verstellt und gebrochen. Diese Differenz ist zu iiberwinden, sei es in der Zeit oder erst am Ende aller Tage. Die sprachphilosophischen Betrachtungen von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) geh6ren, so m6chte ich im folgenden argumentieren, mit hinein in diese Vorgeschichte des vergleichenden Sprachstudiums. Dennoch markieren sie eine bedeutsame Wendung des neuzeitlichen Den­ kens, durch welche sie eigenes Gewicht erlangen und Beachtung verdienen. Denn obwohl Leibniz den Vorrang der Einheit gegeniiber der Vielfalt nie­ mals in Frage stellt, gieBt er doch neuen Wein in die alten Schliiuche. Er er-

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forscht die Besonderheiten der verscheidenen Sprachen ohne das adamiti­ sche oder das babylonische Vorurteil gegen die Verschiedenheit. Die histo­ rische Motivation dieser befreienden Wendung mag vielfiiltig sein, ich mochte hier lediglich ihre philosophischen Konsequenzen skizzieren. Die sprachphilosophischen Betrachtungen von Leibniz gehen von den zeitgen6ssischen Er6rterungen uber die M6glichkeit einer Universalspra­ che, Universalschrift, Universalgrammatik aus. Bezeichnenderweise er­ scheinen die Unterschiede zwischen Grammatik, Schrift und Sprache auf dieser Ebene der Fragestellung als unwesentlich. Sein konkreter Anknup­ fungspunkt - zumindest einer, an dem sich die Entwicklung des Gedan­ kens gut verdeutlichen liiBt - ist der Brief von Rene Descartes (1596-1650) an Mersenne zu diesem Thema vom 20. Nov. 1629 (Descartes, Oeuvres, hrsg. von Adamffannery 1 , Paris 1897:76-82), den Leibniz fiir sich kopiert und kommentiert. 4 Bekanntlich begruBt Descartes in diesem Brief das Pro­ jekt einer Universalsprache im Prinzip, macht seine Durchfiihrung jedoch abhangig 'von der wahren Philosophic', man kann auch sagen, von der wahren Bestimmung der Begriffe. Hinter dieser Stellungnahme steht die auch heute noch gelaufige Sprachansicht, nach welcher aile sprachlichen Zeichen mehr oder weniger gelungene Darstellungsformen - die einschlii­ des von ihnen unabhiingigen gige Metapher spricht von 'Einkleidungen' Gedankens sein sollen. Die der Sprache vorausliegende wahre Natur der Sache gilt als das ideale tertium comparationis alles Wort-, Text- und Sprachvergleichs. Das philosophische Problem der Sprache liegt danach al­ lein in dem mehr oder weniger guten Gelingen dieser Darstellung. Fur Des­ cartes ist dies allerdings nicht nur ein Problem der Sprache. Er sieht hier weit mehr noch das Problem der Geschichtlichkeit des Menschen, den Skandal, daB wir als unmiindige Kinder geboren werden und genotigt sind, die Vorurteile unserer Eltern zu iibernehmen, bevor wir und sogar damit wir dereinst selbstiindig urteilen k6nnen. Welch ein Segen ware da eine im wahren Wissen fundierte Sprache! Sie wurde es dem Denken (jugement) 'fast unm6glich machen, sich zu irren'. Wiihrend Descartes die natiirliche Prioritiit des Denkens vor seiner sprachlichen Einkleidung betont, die auch Leibniz nicht bestreitet, verweist dieser auf die Tatsache, daB sich unser Denken in sprachlichen Zeichen vollzieht, was auch jener nicht leugnen wiirde. Bei Leibniz liegt jedoch stiirkerer Nachdruck auf der Einsicht, daB unsere Erkenntnis notwendig an Zeichen gebunden bleibt. Leibniz greift damit die augustinische Skepsis ge2.

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geniiber der Eigenstandigkeit philosophischer Erkenntnis auf, ohne aller­ dings dessen theologische L6sung des Erkenntnisproblerns zu iibernehrnen, wie sie sich bei seinern Zeitgenossen Malebranche wiederfindet (cf. z.B. De la recherche de la verite III 2, Kap.6). Jedenfalls wird, bei Leibniz wie bei Augustin, die Erkenntnis zu einern Problem der Interpretation von Zei­ chen. Nun besistzen wir aber keine vollkornrnenen, d.h. unzweideutigen und unrnillverstiindlichen Zeichen der Wahrheit. Wir rniissen uns also vor­ liiufig der uns geliiufigen unvollkornrnenen Sprache bedienen, urn die Er­ kenntnis der Wahrheit zu f6rdern. Da uns ein urspriinglicher oder intuitiver Zugang zur 'wahren Philosophie' nicht rn6glich ist, rniissen wir eine diskur­ sive Anniiherung suchen, und zwar iiber solche Zeichen, die uns gegeben sind. Die Akzentverschiebung weg von der natiirlichen Prioritiit der Ideen, die unangetastet bleibt, hin zur historischen Prioritiit der Zeichen, die nie geleugnet wurde, hat weitreichende Konsequenzen fiir die Beurteilung der Vielfalt und Verschiedenheit der Sprachen und aller anderen historischen Phiinornene. Aus der Erfahrung, daB der archirnedische Punkt des Wis­ sens, den Descartes noch glaubte finden zu k6nnen, fiir uns unzugiinglich bleibt, gewinnt die Uberlieferung als das fiir uns Zugiingliche neue Bedeu­ tung, findet neue Beachtung. Leibniz fordert uns daher auf, das von ande­ ren bereits Geleistete sinnvoll zu nutzen. Er selbst sucht und sarnrnelt, sich­ tet, ordnet und vergleicht, urn allenfalls zu ergiinzen und zu verbessern. Dieses Graben nach Bruchstiicken der Wahrheit irn Acker der Geschichte erstreckt sich auf aile Bereiche des ernpirischen Wissens, insbesondere aber auch auf die Sprachforschung. In dieser neuen Einstellung zur Tradition wird die Vielfalt der Phiinornene von ihrern traditionellen Make! der Ver­ derbnis befreit. Das adarnitische und das babylonische Vorurteil sind iiber­ wunden. Der Kontext jedoch, in den Leibniz seine ernpirischen Forschungen einbettet, liillt keinen Zweifel daran, daB das neue Interesse an der Vielfalt der Phiinornene grundsiitzlich subsidiiir bleibt und diesen keinen authenti­ schen, sondern nur einen heuristischen Wert zugesteht. Irn Blick auf das Ziel wahrer Erkenntnis liegt der Zweck beispielsweise der Sprachforschun­ gen fiir ihn unveriindert und ganz irn Sinn der cartesischen Vision letzlich in der Erfindung einer Universalsprache. Neu gegeniiber Descartes ist ledig­ lich die Annahrne, dall ernpirische Sprachforschungen einen niitzlichen, vielleicht sogar einen unentbehrlichen Beitrag zur Anniihrung an dieses Ziel zu leisten verrn6gen.

Die Erforschung der Sprachen ist wie aile Wissenschaft auf das Ziel wahrer Erkenntnis ausgerichtet. Doch das bedeutet fiir Leibniz nicht, dall sich auch die Sprachen selbst auf diese Funktion, fiir die die Wissenschaft sie verwenden rn6chte, festlegen und einschranken lassen .5 Worte dienen niirnlich auch dern Ausdruck und der Mitteilung von Affekten ; sie haben die Macht, Menschen zu bewegen. Die Sprache ist zwar "eine behalterin der willenschaft", zunachst und vor allern aber "eine dolrnetscherin des ge­ rniiths".6 Gelegentlich untersucht Leibniz die affektiven Valenzen sprachli­ cher Phiinornene (cf. z.B. NE III passim). Die rneisten Ansatze konkreter Sprachanalysen, die sich in seinen Texten und Manuskripten finden, dienen jedoch dern grollen Plan einer characteristica universalis. Diese ist nicht nur als ein universelles Mittel der Verstandigung intendiert wie die zeitgen6ssi­ schen Entwiirfe, auf die Leibniz sich bezieht. Sie ist vielrnehr als ein univer­ selles Mittel des Verstandes konzipiert ('organum mentis', cf. GP VII:32), mit dessen Hilfe man einerseits gefundene Wahrheiten darstellen, rnitteilen und tradieren, andererseits aber auch neue Wahrheiten auf rnechanische Weise finden kann. Sie ist konzipiert als das "Verurn Organon Scientiae Generalis" (GP VII:205). Aufgrund dieses Vorzugs glaubt Leibniz, daB sich sein Projekt 'unendlich' iiber aile vergleichbaren Versuche erhebe. Das Problem der characteristica universalis als einer Syrnbolik der Wahrheit lag von Anfang an in ihrern Alphabet (cf. z.B. GP VII: 184-89). Die Analyse der Zeichen mull irgendwann zu Elernenten vordringen, die nicht weiter analysierbar, nicht definierbar sind. Diese prirnitiven Begriffe des rnenschlichen Denkens sollten denn auch irn Kalkiil des Verstandes durch primitive Zeichen dargestellt werden. Ihre vollstandige Aufzahlung, ware sie rn6glich, ergabe das von Leibniz irnrner wieder gesuchte natiirliche "Alphabet" des rnenschlichen Denkens. Ein solches Alphabet konnte und rniillte die Funktion eines Bindeglieds zwischen characteristica universalis und scientia generalis iibernehrnen, wenn es rn6glich sein sollte, Relationen des Zeichensysterns auf Relationen der Wirklichkeit abzubilden. Es reprii­ sentierte die letzten 'data', die allem Kalkiil der Wahrheit unkalkulierbar zugrundeliegen. Die M6glichkeit der Erkenntnis der Wahrheit hiingt also ab von einern natiirlichen und universellen Alphabet einfacher BegriffeJ Wie aber k6n­ nen wir dieses Alphabet alles moglichen Denkens, das wir nicht kennen, von dern Leibniz aber annirnrnt, daB es in unserern Geist verborgen liege, tatsachlich finden, fiir uns entdecken? Die Antwort auf diese Frage ist klar und einfach und nach dern zuvor Gesagten auch nicht iiberraschend: indern

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wir das wirkliche Alphabet der menschlichen Gedanken aufsuchen, und zwar in dem, was uns zuganglich ist, in der Geschichte des Denkens. Diese Antwort bestimmt den logischen Ort des vergleichenden Sprachstudiums fiir Leibniz. Gott allein weiB die ganze Wahrheit wirklich. Aber er ist 'wie einer von uns' ("quasi unus ex nostris" [GP VII:139]; "comme un d'entre nous" [GP Il:125]), sein Denken und unser Denken sind von derselben Art. Der Unterschied liegt darin, daB in ihm in unendlicher Vollkommen­ heit vereint ist, was sich in endlichem Denken nur unvollkommen, zerstreut und fragmentarisch findet. Wir sind also im Besitz gottlicher Wahrheiten, wenn auch zunachst und zumeist nur auf undeutliche Weise ("Omnem mentem esse omnisciam, confuse" [C:10]). Diese Wahrheiten gilt es aufzu­ spiiren, zu sammeln, zu ordnen, zu verdeutlichen. Wir finden sie insbeson­ dere in den Biichern der Alten und, wo uns diese fehlen, in den Sprachen der Volker (cf. GP V:264, 317). Im Zusammenhang solcher Oberlegungen und bezeichnenderweise zur Abwehr der Kritik John Lockes (1632-1704) an der Verlai3lichkeit histori­ scher Studien im allgemeinen, fai3t Leibniz sein Pliidoyer fiir empirische und vergleichende Sprachforschungen folgendermai3en zusammen:

dem Akt des Verstehens zumindest unbewuBt repriisentiert und reaktiviert wird. Gerade solches Lob der Sprachforschung macht jedoch deutlich, dai3 man, in der Siehl von Leibniz, die Sprachen nicht um ihrer selbst willen stu­ diert, nicht wei! jede von ihnen als eine 'geistige Individualitiit' schon und des Studiums wert ware, wie Humboldt sich ausdriicken wird. Auf die Mo­ tivation des Sprachstudiums durch aui3ere Zwecke wurde in diesen Tagen mehrfach hingewiesen. Die aui3ere Motivation bezieht sich jedoch nicht nur und nicht in erster Linie auf andere empirische Studien, wie etwa auf die seinerzeit vie! diskutierte Frage nach der origo gentium (cf. dazu neben der Brevis designatio auch GP V:264, 317), sondern vor allem auf metaphysi­ sche Fragen. Aile empirischen Studien dienen nach Leibniz 'hoheren' Zwecken.' Auch das Sprachstudium dient dem Versuch, der wahren und natiirlichen Ordnung der Begriffe vielleicht ein Stiick niiher zu kommen. Diese Ordnung selbst aber liegt aller Vielfalt ihres sprachlichen Ausdrucks voraus. Denn, wie Leibniz uns in aller Deutlichkeit wissen lai3t: 'Die ldeen haugen keineswegs von den Namen ab' ("les idees ne dependent point des noms" [NE II:22; GP V:198]). Diese Ordnung ist vielmehr 'den Engeln, den Menschen und allen Intelligenzen iiberhaupt gemeinsam' ("commun aux anges et aux hommes et it toutes les intelligences en general" [NE III: 1 ; GP V:255]). Um sie aber zu finden, um sie fiir uns zu entdecken, sind wir auf die 'Gelegenheiten' ("occasions", GP V:256; cf.281 u.v.a.). und 'Umstiin­ de' ("accidens", ibid. ) verwiesen, denen das menschliche Geschlecht auf­ grund seiner korperlichen Natur unterworfen ist. Deshalb mag es wohl hilf­ reich, vielleicht sogar unumgiinglich sein, wenn man eine "Grammaire Universelle" zu schreiben versucht, 'die Grammatiken mehrerer Sprachen zu vergleichen' ("de comparer les Grammaires de plusieurs langues"). Denn so kommt man auf Gedanken, die einem andernfalls entgangen sein konnten. 'Allerdings' - so schliei3t Leibniz auch dieses Pliidoyer fiir den Sprachvergleich -

Mit der Zeit wird man W6rterbticher und Grammatiken von allen Spra� chen der Welt anfertigen, und man wird sie miteinander vergleichen. Das wird von groBem Nutzen sein sowohl fiir die Erkenntnis der Dinge [ ] als auch fiir die Erkenntnis unseres Geistes. (On enregistrera avec le temps et mettra en Dictionnaires et en Grammaires toutes les langues de l'univers, et on les comparera entre elles; ce qui aura des usages tres grands tant pour la connoissance des choses [ ] que pour la connoissance de nostre esprit) (Nouveaux Essais III:9, GP V:317). ...

...

An den Sprachen selbst also laBt sich vieles iiber die wirklichen Gedanken der Menschen Iemen. Sie sind, wie Leibniz kurz zuvor am Ende einer Eriir­ terung der grammatischen Partikel bemerkt, der beste Spiegel des menschlichen Geistes' ("le meilleur miroir de !'esprit humain" [GP V:313]). Andernorts wird er noch deutlicher. Worter sind fiir uns zunachst oft nur 'leere und taube Gedanken' ("Ia pensee [ . . . ] sourde et vuide d'intelligence" [GP V:265]), die aber einen verborgenen Sinn tragen, der deutlich wird, wenn wir sie bei Gelegenheit naher analysieren. So bewahren die Wiirter Spuren vergangener Erkenntnisse iiber das aktuelle Wissen, Erinnern und Vergessen hinweg; und beim Reden eilt bisweilen die Zunge dem Denken voraus ("lingua praecurrente mentem" [ C:156; GP VII:14]). Die Sprachen sind wie ein Archiv der Geschichte des menschlichen Denkens, das in je-

in der Wissenschaft selbst, losgelOst von ihrer Geschichte oder ihrem Da­ sein, ist es gleichgiiltig, ob sich die VOlker der Ordnung des Verstandes an­ gepal3t haben oder nicht (Cependant dans la science meme, sepan'!e de son Histoire ou existence, il n'importe point, si les peuples se soot conform6s ou non il ce que Ia raison ordonne. [NE III:5; GP V:280-81])

Abschliei3en mochte ich diese Bestimmung des logischen Orts des ver­ gleichenden Sprachstudiums mit einem langeren Zitat aus einem Text, den Leibniz in seiner Muttersprache verfai3t hat. In bildlicher Ausdrucksweise,

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die an Luther erinnert, erliiutert er hier die Bedeutung der empirischen Wissenschaften und vor allem ihre Grenzen auf eine ungewiihnlich plasti­ sche und eindringliche Art:

macht, die als 'seine' Erscheinungen gelten. Die Vielfalt dieser Erscheinun­ gen offenbart, was in der Einheit des Begriffs enthalten sein kann. Die Be­ stimmung ihrer Differenzen bestimmt zugleich das Wesen der Sache. Dabei ist es wichtig festzuhalten, daB das Denken, das auf diese Weise Erfahrun­ gen mit historisch gegebenen und als bekannt vorausgesetzten Begriffen macht, nicht einfach das expliziert und fiir sich deutlich macht was an sich und immer schon in der Idee der durch den N amen bezeichneten Sache enthalten gewesen ist, sondern daB das Denken auf diesem Weg der Erfahrung dem allgemeinen Namen eine bestimmte Bedeutung allererst verleiht. Die Explikation des Namens ist der Sache wesentlich; oder, gegen Leibniz gewendet, die Idee ist in der Tat durch ihre Namen bedingt - "les idees dependent de leurs noms". Diese radikale Wendung in der Deutung der menschlichen Erkenntnis hat Humboldt, in kritischer Ankniipfung an die Kantische Erkenntniskri­ tik, zunachst in seinen friihen Studien zur Anthropologie entwickelt. An­ thropologie versteht sich als die Wissenschaft vom Menschen. Traditionell aufgefaBt, miiBte sie mit einer Definition ihres Gegenstands beginnen. Doch was der Mensch sei, wer kiinnte das sagen? Und was der Begriff Mensch bedeutet, wird nicht nur nicht definiert, Humboldt bemiiht sich nicht einmal urn seine Analyse. Der Begriff des Menschen wird unanaly­ siert, undefiniert als bekannt vorausgesetzt und dann in der griiBtmiiglichen Vielfalt 'seiner' Erscheinungsformen betrachtet. Er ist mir ja auch, wie je­ der Begriff, nur insofern bekannt, als ich in der Lage bin, verschiedene Er­ scheinungen als Erscheinungen von ihm zu verstehen. Erst eine so!che Viel­ falt von Erscheinungsformen erfiillt den Begriff, indem sie ihm bestimmten Inhalt gibt. Die Bestimmung des Begriffs kann folglich niemals endgiiltig abgeschlossen sein. Jede neuartige Erscheinungsform, die als eine Erschei­ nungsform von ihm verstanden werden kann und verstanden wird, 'erwei­ tert'9 den Inhalt des Begriffs, nicht etwa nur seine Ausdehnung. Vollkommen analog zu dieser Konzeption der Anthropologie entwik­ kelt Humboldt spater auch sein Modell des vergleichenden Sprachstu­ diums. Der Begriff der Sprache wird unanalysiert, undefiniert als bekannt vorausgesetzt und dann in der griiBtmiiglichen Vielfalt 'seiner' Erschei­ nungsformen betrachtet. Erst die Erfahrung wirklichen Sprechens und die Erforschung verschiedener Arten zu reden macht deutlich, was Sprache sein kann. Daher bezeichnet das 'vergleichende Sprachstudium' auch nicht mehr nur einen besonderen Zweig der Sprachforschung. Dem neuen Be­ griff von Wissenschaft zufolge ist vielmehr aile Sprachforschung notwendi­ gerweise vergleichend.

Ich vergleiche sie [sc. diese Wissenschaften] mit der kundschafft so ich ha� be von den gaBen einer groBen stadt, wie etwa PariB oder London, welche mir dienet so lange ich darinn wohne, hernach aber keinen Nuzen, an sich selbst auch keine vollkommenheit und verbeBerung bringet; also ist es be­ wand mit Sprachen, mit der Histori, mit der Geographi, mit Genealogie, Wappenkunst, angenommenen Rechten und Gebrauchen der VOlcker, ja selbst mit der Exeperimentalnachricht der gewohnheiten der Natur, in so weit ich in diesen Dingen nicht gelegenheit zu einer sonderbaren weij3heit und betrachtung finde { . . . ] Also auBer daB uns des Erdbodens Natural­ und Civil-kundschafft in diesem Leben und Menschlichen Umngang :i. l)thig, so kan sie unser wahren vollkommenheit nicht dienen, es sey denn daj3 sie uns gelegenheit gebe, ewige und allgemeine wahrheiten zu finden, so in allen weltkugeln, ja in allen zeiten, und mit einem worth bey Gott selbst gelten miiBen, von dem sie auch bestandig hehrtlieBen; inzwischen gestehe ich gern, daB auch diese kundschafften nOthig und bef6rdernswiirdig seyn; man kan aber diejenigen so sie allein besizen, nicht vor verstandig und noch weniger fiir Weise, am allerwenigsten aber fiir gliickseelig halten (GP VII:114-15; Hervorhebungen vom Verfasser).

Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835) sieht die Welt aus veranderter Perspektive. Ich iibergehe die Geschichte zwischen Leibniz und Humboldt; zum einen wei! sie unendlich komplex ist, wie aile Geschichte im Reich des Geistes, zum andern wei! der typologische Wandel, urn den es mir hier geht, gerade an den beiden Polen, die unsere Gastgeber zum Thema der Tagung gewahlt haben, besonders deutlich hervortritt. Wenn Humboldt verschiedene Phanomene, beispielsweise verschiede­ ne Sprachen, miteinander vergleicht, dann geht er vom Allgemeinen, im Blick auf welches sie verglichen werden sollen, aus und sucht das Besonde­ re, das sie unterscheidet. Das tertium comparationis wird durch den Namen der Sache, im Beispiel durch den Namen 'Sprache', benannt und als ein Gemeinsames des zu Vergleichenden vorausgesetzt. Was es ist, wird jedoch nicht definiert, nicht analysiert. Ausgehend von der Voraussetzung, daB die im Namen genannte Einheit 'etwas sei und nicht vielmehr nichts', richtet sich der Blick des Forschers auf die Vielfalt dessen, was man als verschiedene Erscheinungsformen jener Einheit anzusehen und zu verstehen gewohnt ist. Humboldt nennt das den 'Erfahrungsweg' des Denkens (cf. Ober den Geist der Menschheit [GS II:324-34]). Unter der Voraussetzung eines gege­ benen Begriffs werden Erfahrungen mit denjeinigen Erscheinungen ge3.

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In pointierter Wendung gegen die traditionelle Sprachauffassung, wie auch von Leibniz noch vertreten wurde, liiBt sich mit Humboldt festhal­ sie ten: Es gibt keine ewigen Ideen in den Sprachen oder hinter den Sprachen, es gibt keine natiirliche universelle Bedeutung. Das wird man auch als Sprachforscher vielleicht noch zugestehen. Aber die Konsequenz des Hum­ boldtschen Gedankens geht weiter: Es kann niimlich auch keine ewige Idee der Sprache selbst geben. Stattdessen sieht sich das wissenschaftliche Sprachstudium gen6tigt, eine zweckmaBige "Sprachidee" vorauszusetzen, durch welche die Grundkategorien eines wissenschaftlichen Sprachbegriffs, wie beispielsweise die Unterscheidung von Grammatik und Lexikon, expli­ ziert werden.JO Allein im Blick auf ein hypothetisches 'Analogon' der Idee der Sprache bleibt es m6glich, Sprachen sinnvoll und sachgemiiB zu unter­ scheiden, zu bestimmen, eben zu vergleichen. Allerdings, und darin liegt das Neue und Charakteristische des vergleichenden Sprachstudiums nach Humboldt, das tertium comparationis des Sprachvergleichs, das tertium comparationis aller Rede, das als ein Reich der Ideen jenseits von deren vielfiiltiger sprachlicher Einkleidung gesucht wurde, ist siikularisiert. Es ist vom Himmel herabgestiegen in den FluB der Zeit. Identitiit der Bedeutung oder das in der Rede geformte Denken konstituieren sicli im Moment und nur fiir eine gewisse Zeit. Sie konstituieren sich dadurch, daB der artikulier­ te Laut der Stimme vernommen wird, den der Geist in jenem Obergang, der so gut erscheinendes Verschwinden wie verschwindendes Erscheinen gennant werden kann, "zum Ausdruck des Gedanken fiihig zu machen" vermag (Kawi-Einleitung [GS VII:46]). Was fiir die Sprache im allgemeinen (le langage) gilt, gilt auch fiir die besonderen Sprachen (les langues), die speziellen Gegenstiinde des verglei­ chenden Sprachstudiums. Die Einheit einer besonderen Sprache wird, be­ vor man beginnt, sie niiher zu erforschen, unanalysiert, undefiniert als be­ kannt vorausgesetzt. Sie ist eine historisch gegebene 'geistige Individualitiit' (Verschiedenheiten [GS VI:l51]). DaB sie eine Einheit bilde - Humboldt nennt diese Einheit einer Sprache zur Unterscheidung von der Einheit logi­ scher Allgemeinbegriffe auch ihren 'Charakter' -, "fiillt klar in die Augen, driingt sich unabweisbar dem Gefiihl auf" (GS VII:48). Die Aufgabe ihrer systematischen Darstellung besteht darin, das "Bestiindige und Gleichf6r­ mige" in der fiir sie charakteristischen Art, "den artikulirten Laut zum Ge­ dankenausdruck zu erheben" (S.47), aus der wirklichen Rede, aus vorlie­ genden Texten zu eruieren. Doch erscheint die 'Form' der Sprache, die das Resultat einer solchen Darstellung ist, immer nur als ein "durch die Wis-

senschaft gebildetes Abstractum" (ibid.). Sie gibt dem klaren Begriff ('co­ gnitio clara confusa', nach Leibniz) dieser Sprache, von dem alle Forschung auszugehen hat, einen bestimmten Inhalt, indem sie jenes "Gefiihl in Er­ kenntniss" verwandelt; zugleich aber "verdunkelt" sie auch "die Anschau­ ung der lebendigen Eigenthiimlichkeit" ( GS VI:147). Neuartige Erschei­ nungsformen 'erweitern' auch hier den Inhalt des Begriffs. Die neue Auslegung der menschlichen Erkenntnis verkehrt das tradi­ tionelle Verhiiltnis von Wort und Bedeutung, von Rede und Sinn. Sinn und Bedeutung erfi.illen sich erst und nur im jedesmaligen Sprechen oder Ver­ stehen, sei es laut oder Ieise, redend, lesend, deutend, jedenfalls im wirkli­ chen Obergang vom Zeichen zum Bezeichneten. Sinn und Bedeutung sind also nicht mehr an sich vorgegeben, im Zeichen hingegen eingekleidet, sei es darstellend oder verstellend, offenbarend oder verbergend; und die Wahrheit zu erfassen heiBt nicht mehr, die ewigen Gedanken Gottes nach­ zudenken. Vielmehr bilden sich Sinn und Bedeutung unserer Gedanken im wirklichen Sprechen und Verstehen. Sinnbildung ist die Interpretation ge­ gebener Begriffe. Rede ist somit wesentlich bezogen auf andere Rede von gleicher Art, und alles Sprechen und Verstehen ist Antwort auf vorausge­ gangene Rede. Denn was der Sinn einer Rede gewesen sei, kann, falls er fraglich geworden ist, nur durch neue Rede gesagt werden, die selbst wie­ der fraglich werden kann. Rede ist sinnlos, wenn sie nicht als Antwort auf friihere Rede verstanden werden kann. Sie muB bekannte Worte verwen­ den, auch wenn sie sie auf neue Weise deutet und fi.igt. Rede ist gleichfalls sinnlos, wenn sie nicht erneute Antworten m6glich sein liiBt. Absolut erste und absolut letzte Worte sind keine sinnvollen Worte mehr. In dieser Auslegung hat sich die Funktion der Sprache gewandelt. Ihre Zeichen dienen nicht mehr der Repriisentation ewiger Wahrheiten, son­ dern der Interpretation anderer Rede. Sie sind weder abbildend (rein re­ zeptiv beziiglich der Sachen) noch erzeugend (rein spontan beziiglich der Sachen), sondern stets beides zugleich oder, wie Humboldt sich ausdriickt, 'umgestaltend' (GS VII:47). n Die andere Rede, durch welche die Interpre­ tation getragen und gebunden wird, ist die 'Macht der Sprache' als der be­ reits sinnvoll artikulierte Laut, dessen die gegenwiirtige Rede zur Bildung und zum Ausdruck des gegenwiirtigen Gedankens stets bedarf. Auch in der Einsamkeit gedacht ist jedes wirkliche Wort ein kreatives Echo von zuvor Gesprochenem, zuvor Vernommenem. Die Wende von Leibniz zu Humboldt, die die Geburt des vergleichen­ Sprachstudiums einleitet, kann auch logisch interpretiert werden. Sie den

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erweist sich dann als eine Umkehrung in der Rangordnung der ModaliHi­ ten. Leibniz dachte in skotistischer Tradition das Wirkliche als einen Grenzfall des Moglichen. Alles, was jemals wirklich war, ist oder sein wird, erfaBt nur einen verschwindend geringen Teil dessen, was widerspruchsfrei denkbar und insofern moglich ist. Die wirkliche Welt ist eine von unabseh­ bar vielen moglichen Welten, die Gott in aile Ewigkeit denkt und aus de­ nen er die beste erwahlt, urn sie in raumlicher und zeitlicher Erscheinung wirklich werden zu lassen. Auf dieser Grundlage ist alles, was wir jemals wirklich denken, entweder unmog!ich, indem es einen Widerspruch ent­ hiilt, ode� es ist bereits von Gott gedacht. Aus der Perspektive Gottes kann es nichts Neues geben. Der Mensch hat ihm nichts zu sagen. Humboldts neuer Begriff des menschlichen Denkens hingegen impli­ ziert eine Prioritiit des Wirklichen vor dem Moglichen. Jedes wirkliche In­ dividuum erweitert durch sein Dasein, das unableitbar und unvorhersehbar ist, den Begriff, d. h. die Moglichkeit der Sache, die es reprasentiert. Allein die durch gegebene Begriffe interpretierte Wirklichkeit offenbart, was unter diesen Begriffen moglich ist, und sie eriiffnet neue Moglichkeiten. Die Moglichkeit einer Interpretation und immer neuer Interpretationen er­ wachst aus der Wirklichkeit, sie geht ihr nicht voraus. In· diesem Sinn kann es auch niemals eine endgiiltige wahre (oder falsche) Interpretation geben, wohl aber eine im Moment als notwendig (oder unmoglich) erscheinende, ggf. eine solche, die altgewordene Notwendigkeiten (oder Unmoglichkei­ ten) aufhebt. Erst in dieser neuen Rangordnung der Modalitaten gewinnt die Ver­ schiedenheit der Sprachen zentrale Bedeutung fiir die Sprachbetrachtung und die Sprachbetrachtung zugleich zentrale Bedeutung fiir die Philoso­ phie. Denn das Studium jeder wirklichen Sprache eroffnet neue Raume der Interpretation, und zwar einfach dadurch, daB es andere Begriffe erschlieBt und dem Denken andere Wege weist. Das vergleichende Sprachstudium dient also nach Humboldt weder der Erfindung einer Universalsprache noch der Vermehrung des allgemeinen Wissens, das, wie Leibniz und seine aufgeklarten Nachfahren auch heute noch traumen, die Menschen al!er Volker in der Einheit der Wahrheit dereinst verbinden soli; sondern es dient der Bildung von Individualitiiten. Das Eindringen in fremde Arten zu reden erweitert den Horizont des eigenen Denkens, gerade indem es die in­ dividuellen Unterschiede verdeutlicht. Denn die Sprache "verbindet, in­ dem sie vereinzelt" ( GS VI:125). Das Reden selbst ist babylonisch. Es ist seiner Natur nach Unterscheiden, Trennen und Verbinden - eben Verglei-

chen. Auf der Suche nach der als zugrundeliegend vorausgesetzten Einheit der Bedeutung produzieren wir, indem wir reden, eine Vielfalt von Stand­ punkten, Ansichten und Redeweisen. Besonders deutlich bringt Humboldt diese dialektische Natur der menschlichen Rede zum Ausdruck, wenn er formuliert: Sie, die Sprache, "baut wohl Briicken von einer Individualitat zur andren und vermittelt das gegenseitige Verstandniss; den Unterschied selbst aber vergrossert sie eher" (GS VII:169).

ANMERKUNGEN 1.

Ich iibergehe bier die allgemein bekannten Stationen dieser Geschichte und verweise nur kurz auf einige weniger beriicksichtigte, aber, wie mir scheint, doch aufschluBreiche Tex� te.

2.

Cf. Historisches WOrterbuch der Philosophie, Bd.6, 1984, s.v. "Name I. Antike". - Die Andersartigkeit des antiken Sprachdenkens, das einen Begriff der Sprache im modernen Sinn gar nicht kennt, findet sich in eindringlicher und nachdenkenswerter Weise entwik­ kelt bei J. Lohmann (1952).

3.

Zur Fiille dieser Tradition cf. das vierbiindige Werk von A. Borst (1957-63).

4.

In etwas anders gelagerter historiographischer Absicht zieht P. Verburg (1968:563-70) aufschlu6reiche Verbindungen von Hobbes zu Leibniz. Er zeigt, wie sehr Leibniz nach dem Vorbild des sonst so vie! kritisierten Englanders die Zeichennatur der Sprache be­ toot. Symbolisch wird diese Verbindung daran sichtbar, daB er das beriihmte Diktum "words are wise mens counters [ ...} but they are the mony of fooles" (Leviathan I 4, cf. De homine 4) w6rtlich iibernimmt (cf. Leibniz C 30 und Unvorgreiffl. Gedancken §7). Charakteristisch fiir die Leibnizsche Position ist jedoch die Tatsache, daB er bei dieser einseitigen Charakterisierung der Funktion der Sprache nicht stehenbleibt.

5.

Auch H. Poser (1979:314-19) betont die unterschiedlichen Zwecksetzungen, durch wel­ che Leibniz die Erfindung bereichsspezifischer Kunstsprachen, die durch die ars characte­ ristica ermOglicht werden soli, von der Erforschung historisch motivierter natiirlicher Sprachen unterscheidet, die von 'Philologie' und 'Critique' (GP V:317) zu leisten ist.

6.

Ermahnung an die Teutsche, zitiert bei Heinekamp (1972:487), der mit iiberzeugenden Argumenten eine voreilige Reduktion des Leibnizschen Begriffs der Sprache auf ihre spe­ zielle Funktion der Erkenntriis kritisiert. Dies ist noch ausfiihrlicher belegt in Heinekamp (1975).

7.

Das Problem der Erkenntnis einfacher Begriffe, das als ein Grundproblem der Leibniz­ schen Philosophie angesehen werden kann, wird ausfiihrlich er6rtert in Borsche (1983).

8.

Heinekamp (1972:485) zieht aus der richtigen Feststellung, daB das Sprachstudium "nicht nur Hilfsstudium fiir die Geschichtswissenschaft" ist, den unbegriindeten SchluB, daB die Sprachen nach Leibniz "auch urn ihrer selbst willen" zu erforschen seien.

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9.

Zur terminologischen Bedeutung dieses unscheinbaren Ausdrucks bei Humboldt, cf. Borsche (1981:123-37).

10.

Zum Problem der Konstitution eines wissenschaftlichen Begriffs der Spracbe nach Hum� boldt, cf. Borsche (1981:202-206 und Teil 3 passim).

11,

Zu Humboldts Grundged'anken einer Synthesis von Spontaneitat und RezeptiviHit des Menschen in der Sprache und bei der Bildung der Begritfe, cf. J. Trabant (1986:15-42).

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

A. Primiir(iteratur Leibniz wird zitiert nach GP il

;I ,,

Jl

ll

I

I

NE C

=

= =

Die philosophischen Schriften. Hrsg. von C. I. Gerhardt. 7 Bde. Berlin: Weidmann, 1875-90; daraus: Nouveaux essais sur I'entendement humain Opuscules et fragments inedits. Hrsg. von Louis Couturat. Paris: F. Alcan, 1903.

Humboldt wird zitiert nach GS

=

Gesammelte Schriften. Hrsg. von der PreuBischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. 17 Bde. Berlin: Behr, 1903-1936.

B . Sekundiirliteratur Borsche, Tilman. 1981. Sprachansichten: Der Begriff der menschlichen Re­ de in der Sprachphilosophie Wilhelm von Humboldts. Stuttgart: Klett­ Cotta. . 1983. "Zeichenhafte Erkenntnis und Wahrheit der primitiven Be­ griffe nach G. W. Leibniz". Der Mensch und die Wissenschaften vom Menschen hrsg. von G. Frey & J. Zeiger, 1047-55. Innsbruck: Solaris. . 1985. "Macht und Ohnmacht der Wiirter. Bemerkungen zu Augu­ stins De magistro". Kodikas/Code 8.231-52. Borst, Arno. 1957-63. Der Turmbau von Babel. 4 Bde. Stuttgart: A. Hier­ semann. Heinekamp, Albert. 1972. "Ars characteristica und natiirliche Sprache bei Leibniz". Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 34.448-88. --. 1975. "Natiirliche Sprache und Allgemeine Charakteristik bei Leibniz". Studia leibnitiana, Suppl, 15. 257-86.

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SAKULARISIERUNG DES TERTIUM COMPARATIONIS

117

Lohmann, Johannes. 1952. "Das Verhiiltnis des abendlandischen Men­ schen zur Sprache". Lexis 3:2.5-49. Poser, Hans. 1979. "Signum, notio und idea: Elemente der Leibnizschen Zeichentheorie". Zeitschrift fiir Semiotik 1.309-324. Trabant, Jiirgen. 1986. Apeliotes oder der Sinn der Sprache: Wilhelm von Humboldts Sprach-Bild. Miinchen: Wilhelm Fink. Verburg, Pieter A. 1968. "Ennoesis of Language in 17th Century Philoso­ phy". Lingua 21.558-72. SUMMARY

It is well known that both Leibniz and Humboldt compare languages. Similarities, which lie in the nature of the field, are obvious. What they do, however, is not quite the same type of thing. The underlying concept of lan­ guage, the general epistemological foundation and, therefore, the purpose of studying languages is distinctly different between these two authors. The article presents and discusses these differences by first dealing with Leib­ niz's position on these questions, and subsequently with Humboldt's views. Leibniz takes all empirical studies to be auxiliary studies. It is their purpose to lead us to knowledge, because our mind virtually contains all possible ideas. But we depend on external occasions and suggestions to realize it, because we have no actual knowledge of ideas and no intuitive access to it. Consequently, we have to rely on signs that represent ideas and which can lead us symbolically to their knowledge. In this sense the study of languages may be most useful .and is indeed indispensable. The historical variety of words and expressions may offer us changing glimpses of the unchanging truths, which are held to be the invariant focus of linguistic comparisons. For Humboldt this realm of ideas beyond language has itself become historical. Ideas can no longer be held to be independent of words. The variety of linguistic phenomena constitutes real differences. As these do not symbolize underlying non-linguistic unities, no extra-linguistic motive is needed to justify their study. These differences in language and languages, allowing the differentiation of meaning in actual speech, are the primary object of a linguistics that is comparative by nature. A given concept is determined and continuously developed by applying it to the various appearances that are considered to be 'its' appearances. Thus definitions of

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given terms will always remain preliminary. Meaning is no longer discussed in terms of what possibly, i.e. eternally, can be understood, but of what we actually, i.e. now and here, do understand. Universals in linguistic theory - not language - are scientific constructs serving descriptive or explanative purposes. But they can no longer be taken to be invariably fixed points of comparison.

Descent, Perfection and the Comparative Method since Leibniz Henr� M. Hoenigswald

University of Pennsylvania

To the robust linguistic practitioner Leibniz is a puzzle and a scandal: the great mathematicizer of knowledge, the champion of a characteristica ' universalis, had no eye for the formal properties of natural languages, even where he speaks of 'les langages'. His linguistics was associated with his activity as a diplomat, historian, lawyer, and man of action, and not with his mathematics. His passion was for 'words', and in 'etymology' he saw a tool for the understanding of world history - including, to be sure, the special history of speech itself as a characteristic of mankind. How original was Leibniz in these things? George Metcalf (1974:251) has sketched for us the principal points on which 17th-century and 18th­ century writers were agreed.' First, as Metcalf says, there was "the concept of a no longer spoken parent language which in tum produced the major linguistic groups of Asia and Europe". Then there was - and I continue quoting Metcalf - "a concept of the development of languages into dialects and of dialects into new independent languages". Third came "certain minimum standards for determining what . words are borrowed and what words are ancestral in a language", and, fourth, "an insistence that not a few random items, but a large number of words from the basic vocabulary should form the basis of comparison". So far Metcalf (1974). He does not include three other items, no doubt because they were just a little less com­ mon. Let us add them here. They are, fifth, the doctrine that 'grammar' is even more important than words; sixth, the idea that for an etymology to be valid the differences in sound - or in 'letters' - must recur, under a princi­ ple sometimes referred to as 'analogia';2 and, finally, the old mystical belief, credited to none other than Jacob Boehme (1575-1624) himself, that

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the lingua Adamica (the vehicle of Adam's identifying God's creation, and presumably the antecedent of all known language and languages) must have had special and recognizable primordial properties distinct form the proper­ ties of its descendants. Jean-Claude Muller (1986) has conveniently filled us in with further detail. For instance, the notion of the lost proto-language finds clear expression in Marcus Boxhorn (1612-1653), whose work Leibniz knew and quoted (he was an early proponent of the 'Scythian' hypothesis of Euro­ pean origins); the notion likewise finds expression in Saumaise, as we know from Daniel Droixhe (1978; cf. Muller 1986). Advocacy of the basic voc­ abulary as the paramount source from which to infer ethnic history cer­ tainly appears in the exchange between Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and Jean De Laet (1593-1649) in 1642 (Muller 1986:17). As to the emphasis on grammatical structure as against mere vocabulary, this is something which we are now used to seeing cited as the exceptionally advanced idea of Hiob Ludolf (1624-1704), the Semitist famous for his work on Ethiopic (Arens 1969:105-106); but this is only because Theodor Benfey (18091881), who is the brilliant architect of our fable convenue, has Ludolf on his list. The fact is that J. De Laet says the same thing decades before H. Ludolf in very much the same words and that neither one of the two seems to be making any great claims to novelty (Metcalf 1974:247). To the matter of 'analogia' or phonological recurrence we shall return shortly. If we permit ourselves the anachronism we may say that Leibniz's etymologies often strike us as 'sound' - quite a few of them are plausible in ·.the modern sense. This could be an accident, and irrelevant. But there may also be better reasons, in harmony with what might be called the 'soundness' of Leibniz's conception of history in general. For his word explanations he wants controls because he wants history to be concrete, contingent, and specific, rather than speculative and somehow predictable from the first principles. And before we go on, we must remember t!lat what we would call 'prescientific' etymology has a way of appearing under two seemingly opposite guises: either as a permissive casting about among a variety of languages, often allowing multiple explanation with no feeling that incompatibility could be fatal - or, contrariwise, as yet another step in some single-minded argument designed to prove that the language in ques­ tion has one and only one particular ancestry. Leibniz has no use for the former kind.' He joins his friend and corres­ pondent, the just mentioned Hiob Ludolf, in stressing the need to rely on

basic rather than peripheral vocabulary, on the plea that children learn the basic words first and that these are, therefore, 'older ' - a rather dangerous adjective to use. He insists on proceeding stepwise by first considering obsolete but documented items, then localisms, then the smaller sub­ families which can be recognized by inspection and which had been so recog­ nized, and then finally attempting the grand sweep, possibly to account, monophyletically, for all of humanity. The truly Leibnizian comment here is that nature allows no sudden leaps and that gradual dialectal differentia­ tion is, in fact, almost a matter of observation. Again with Ludolf, he occa­ sionally touches on 'analogia', though we must be careful: this is not neces­ sarily a hint at the strong controls which we call 'correspondences' when they occur in fixed form for a fixed pair of languages (say, between a p of Latin and an f of Germanic) , because it can just as well be something much weaker, namely a perception of quasi-universals under which some kinds of 'correspondence', phonetically speaking, are more often encountered than others among possible language-pairs world-wide. "Saepissime inter se mutantur populis h et g; ita quos Latini germanos Hispani vacant her­ manos" (Schulenburg 1973:264-65): this is used as an argument to connect the ethnic Germani with the quite un-Hispanic Hermi(n)ones. As Metcalf _(1974:215) puts it, "interchangeability, once established, could be applied to any potential cognates in any language in any age". Insofar as there were controls, what did they accomplish? For one thing, they gave no aid and comfort to those who believed that mankind spoke Hebrew before the dispersal. Leibniz apparently had little to say about Babel. But he sided with those who held that the Adamic language could not have been Hebrew because the latter, like any other known lan­ guage, "owes too much to art", to use the words of Daniel Morhof (16391691), an author whom Leibniz appreciated; all known languages are accomplished rather than primitive (Borst 1957-63:1464). To Leibniz 'primordiality' seems to have meant the Boehmean unity of sound and meaning. He sees that unity surviving, in scattered and hidden traces, sometimes in one language and sometimes in another. These remnants may be salvaged by a proper etymological effort which relies heavily on the recognition of onomatopoeia and other kinds of sound-symbolism. It is in this sense that Leibniz never tires of celebrating what he calls 'connection' but deprecating 'derivation'. To 'derive' a known language from sonte other equally known and equally un-Adamic language would amount to denying the movement from the paradisiacal non-arbitrary to the prevailing

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arbitrary condition. Even to us heirs of the nineteenth century, to whom reconstruction has become a very different thing indeed, reconstructing still means keeping the retentions and discarding the innovations -- only that we have entirely different ways of telling the two apart. At this point it behooves us to raise a question which concerns not so much stated beliefs as it concerns ways of proceeding and the tacit assump­ tion behind them. Like other students, including ourselves as well as uncounted earlier ones, Leibniz sees in a given language an object endowed with identity. Leaving aside mere nomenclature (e.g., the fact that Old French and Modern French are both called 'French') we hold fast to the idea of identity even though we will also allow, in the best peripatetic fash­ ion, that this object called a language can change its properties - albeit slowly, precisely because nature abhors abruptness. Somehow, as our fore­ bears saw, it is necessary for this preservation-under-change to distinguish between core and periphery, between inheritance and accretion. Only thus can a language be located at the end of a line of descent, and it is only this that gives meaning to particular findings of derivation, connection, and what we understand by genealogic classification. Lines of descent split apart but do not converge; there is filiation but there is no fusion. Considering the price to be paid for the finding of a criterion of true inheritance, and considering also the many other metaphors that are available say, the kaleidoscopic reordering of elements, the mighty river with its tributaries and its delta, and what not- considering all these, the staying power of the notion of exclusive ancestry for languages is truly remarkable. Later chal­ lengers like 'mixture' or even the 'wave theory' of the 19th century were not really victorious. Just conceivably the line of descent could well be an artifact, to be judged in no other way than by its productivity. However that may be, the concept of 'descent' itself should be added to our list of motifs as the eighth item, and the most pervasive of the lot. The case of Leibniz and language teaches us a subtle lesson in the his­ tory of scholarship. It would be impossible to see in Leibniz the inventor of a sovereign principle or the discoverer of a decisive truth, such that that principle or that truth could be said to have been incorporated in our pat­ rimony from then on. Yet his merit was great. His feeling for the concrete­ ness of history - for the uniqueness of particular histories, in fact - may have been his most potent legacy, precisely because it was more practice than doctrine. He himself was, however, guided by it toward a quite explicit integration of the various motifs which existed in the intellectual world

around him. More clearly than others he saw that postulating a lost proto­ language is not merely a possible construction sanctioned by authority but is the way in which a belief in descent and a belief in the special nature of Adam's language will fit together. To his eagerness for the development of controls we have alluded; while we do not know how, exactly, he would have handled 'analogia', it is clear from his praise for H. Ludolf's pointed, polemical use of that principle that he attached real weight to it. This taste for sharpness is, however, subordinated to the business of establishing logi­ cal compatibility, and even of reconciling opposing ideologies, much in keeping with Leibniz's well-known irenic strivings in other contexts. Monogenesis, for instance, is a question which he leaves open, hinting that hierarchies of reconstruction could lead to an overall proto-language though of course he remains firm in his rejection of Hebrew in that capac­ ity. Between him and the younger Scaliger of an earlier day there was at least a temperamental difference. The material disagreement between Leibniz and most of his contem­ poraries concerns grammar; and although this is a matter of default rather than commission it is important. Leibniz certainly does not appear to share Ludolf's urgency in putting 'grammaticae ratio' in the center of the argumentation. The more we think about it, the more striking this reluc­ tance becomes. We shall see why. W.H. Barber (1955) has sketched for us the ups and downs of Leibniz's reputation at the time of his death in 1716 and afterwards. There was always the hurdle of it really not being possible to get at much of his writ­ ing, and of course his thoughts on language in particular were among the least known. (It is symptomatic that Aarsleff (1967:130]) should have reason to believe that William Jones, in the English environment of his time, did not know Leibniz.) However, when it comes to Leibniz's creative role as the first mover in the language-collecting campaign of the imperial governments in St. Petersburg, his achievement survived him brilliantly because it had come to exist as an institution within an institution. The czars were on the scene, and the second Kamtchatka Expedition was outfitted in 1733-43. A little later, the new and youthful University of Gottingen became a center of East European studies under the guidance of the highly political August Ludwig von Schl6zer (1735-1809), whose personality is somewhat reminiscent of Leibniz's own. Thanks to his initiative and sup­ port the most impressive linguistic enterprise of the mid-18th century came to pass, namely, the comparative study of Finno-Ugric. 4 It is indicative that

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Johann Eberhard Fischer (1697-1771) was on the Kamtchatka Expedition, had his monograph De origine Ungrorum published by Schlozer, and had one of the two surviving copies of his Siberian Vocabulary end up in the Gottingen library, where it still is (or was twenty years ago). To Johann Christoph Gatterer (1727-1799), one of the liveliest and best-informed Got­ tingen luminaries, that work was "das einzige seiner Art [namely an etymological dictionary] in der Welt". This was not quite true but it came close to the truth. In tone, the Finno-Ugric undertaking was forward-looking and inde­ pendent. The subject matter had certain intrinsic virtues. The languages of the North and East were outside the pale from the vantage point of the scholarly establishment at the European center of things. They were not encumbered, either, with the problems that arise from the peculiar cultural traditions in the Latin world, with the Latin language extinct and alive at the same time. Germanic material had already benefited somewhat from its distance from the Mediterranean region; Leibniz had an antiquarian fond­ ness for it and was sometimes inclined to look to Germanic for Adamic treasures. (In a similar vein Vico held that German was one of the 'heroic' languages.) There was not much danger of confusion threatening from the direction of ethnocentric value judgements , at least outside of Hungary; once Pal Beregszaszi (1750-1828) had lost the battle, the path was clear for the 'positivist revolution' - to use Droixhe's (1978) expression. The data, too, were in congenial shape since they had been gathered for the purpose and did not have to be pried loose from a welter of historical, philological, and literary lore. There is a quality in all of this which I assure the reader is not lost on anyone who has undergone the impact, exhilarating and austere both, of American Indian languages and of Amerindian linguistics. Droixhe is right in pointing out that Janos Sajnovics (1733-1785), in his Demonstratio of 1770, not only mentions grammar but gives it his prefer­ ence ("vocabula . . . et quod praecipuum est [ . . . ] affixis et suffixis utendi rationem . . . ") and, best of all, carries it out - for example in remarking on the lack of number concord after numerals. Preachment and practice were sometimes more in harmony here where everything had to start from scratch than they were in older fields. Characteristically, also, J. Sajnovics's theoretic disquisitions are frequently concerned with the question of how some truth propounded by him can be known. And as to another critical point, that of 'analogia', it is a fact that J.E. Fischer observed, or reported the observation, that the Hungarian sounds h and f correspond to stops in

the other Finno-Ugric languages. Samuel Gyarmathi's (1751-1830) more famous book was done under Schl6zers' eyes. It is less tidy but much richer than J. Sajnovics' in that it has the fuller Finno-Ugric underpinnings which A.L. Schlozer and Gottingen could provide. Its title is, of course, by way of a manifesto: "Affinitas [ . . . ] grammatice [emphasis supplied] demonstrata". On the other hand, as Gyarmathi's biographer, Miklos Zsirai (1966 [1951]:67), notes with regret, 'analogia' is slighted, and only the lucidity of the data themselves saves the author from going wrong. He certainly did not exploit J.E. Fischer's hints. Still, all this was magnificent. And yet, what difference did it make? Janos Gulya's (1974:266) verdict is that "a true revolution was not effected", and adds some perceptive and sobering reflections on the fate of Kuhnian paradigms in intellectual history, which is always a social and institutional history as well. Rasmus Rask (1787-1832) knew of J. Sajnovics and S. Gyarmathi but few others did. In our historiographical vulgate of several generations ago there are expressions of mild surprise at an unex­ pected accomplishment but there is no real sense of wonder, and in the Finno-Ugric field itself there were going to be obstacles. Even now major phonological problems have not been settled, in part no doubt because an ill-advised antistructuralist cultivation of narrow-transcription phonetics in the intervening past had held things back. Aside from this, the later fruit of Leibniz's influence, what strikes us as we return to the earlier decades of the century? A great deal to be sure; and yet, while the story which we have just discussed may be called positivistic, G. Mounin (1967:148) justly speaks of a century of theorizing. Wolffian philosophy was probably not a good breeding ground for ideas that would have carried forward the serious exploration of language. On the other hand, some of the theorizing was excellent and relevant - this is especially true of Turgot's famous essay on etymology. Also, there was Johann Georg Wachter (1673-1757) who should not be judged by his Prolegomena but by the substance of his Glossarium Germanicum brought out in 1737, a number of years before J .E. Fischer's Glossarium Sibiricum traveled to Schlozer. Wachter is known to Germanists but the linguists' canon leaves him unsung because Theodor Benfey (1869) would not have him. I must leave it to others better versed than I am to do justice to the Set­ tecento. However, things changed around 1800, as everybody knows. S. Gyarmathi's life overlapped with Wilhelm von Humboldt's, Humboldt's with August Friedrich Pott's (1802-1887), and Pott's long lifespan with Karl

II

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Brugmann's (1849-1919). What best characterizes our heroic age, the 19th century, are its immense achievement and its schizoid ways: what was done was one thing, what was said about what was done was another. One sus­ pects that a less antiphilosophical attitude would have made the sailing a lit­ tle smoother. But then, workers engaged in an .absorbing creative task do not necessarily want to step back at every turn and contemplate their busi­ ness. Instead they are inclined to let the dynamics of the res ipsa prevail, quite ready to follow wherever it takes them. It is true that reflection was by no means missing, but it was likely to turn into one of two things. When associated with technical argument, it would serve as a shorthand appeal to certain ways of thinking, interpreting, and inferring which were second nature to any practitioner. When directed at outsiders such as philosophers, the 'general public' and academic colleagues including the irritable brethren in the philological camp it was a matter of reconciling the fragile and subtle methodological insights that were emerging from the daily toil with an over­ powering baggage of intellectual folklore and intellectual fashion. Take language DESCENT. The metaphor is old and familiar; it fits in with the Bible as well as with the Greeks. It had theological implications for the position of man in creation. Its elaboration into the scheme of the family tree is also an old motif; on it depended the notion of classification and of language families. It was not much criticized until later, though in many ways the fit cannot be called overly good. Language procreation had to be thought of as parthenogenetic (that was the point of insisting on the exclu­ siveness of lines of descent of which we spoke earlier) . The separateness of the generations is matched but crudely, either when a conventional label alters ('Anglo-Saxon' becomes 'English') or when there is proliferation (Latin ends where the Romance languages - all of them - begin; it is the mother and they are the daughters) . To be sure, this did not do any harm. It was specific controversies, such as the one about the relationship between Classical and Vulgar Latin or between Sanskrit and Indo-Aryan which showed what was really meant. The question was whether Sanskrit, ancient as it is ("whatever its antiquity", as Sir William Jones said in 1786) exhibits innovations not found in the vernaculars. Since we call this way of separating innovations from retentions (that is, of 'reconstructing') the 'comparative method', it turns out that 'comparison' (taken in this technical sense) is a primitive, and that the notion of the line of descent, somewhat paradoxically, follows from it. But how does one identify innovations? Some innovations - at first blush the less interesting ones, as a matter of

fact - as Turgot had known very well, produce 'analogia' because they consist in the replacement of two contrasting sounds by one throughout the vocabulary. This happens, for instance, to the Norman French words in Middle and Modern English. It also happens to the Old English words in Middle and Modern English. Is Middle and Modern English as a whole the descendant of French or of Old English? The decision is, formally speak­ ing, arbitrary ; but since we are pledged to the exclusivity of descent, we will decide this on such grounds as the basic vocabulary. Here we must pay homage to Humboldt. On two separate occasions Humboldt went on record to express himself in a manner that could not have been clearer. Anna Morpurgo Davies (1975:627-28; cf. Hoenigswald 1984) calls attention to one of his last writings, a paper read to the Royal Asiatic Society. There is also a more explicit formulation made in a letter to August Wilhelm Schlegel (1767-1845) several years earlier. In it Humboldt distinguishes (1) the presence or absence of grammatical categories (for ex. "is there a passive"), (2) the mechanics of expression (for ex. affixation, vowel alternation, and what not), and (3) the particular morphs that have grammatical meanings such as the privative alpha of Greek. Much to the presumable discomfiture of those who like to complain about Humboldt's philosophical opacity he opts for the third criterion because it is 'the most specific' of the three ("der speziellste"). Nor is this all: the third, he says, "hat eine sehr genaue Ahnlichkeit mit der Mitteilung wirklicher W6rter" . Quite so - morphs with grammatical meaning (particles, affixes, etc.) are part of the basic vocabulary, as we might say, and two seemingly separate items in the arsenal of the older linguistic tradition (see above) have been collapsed into one. Perhaps it is worth mentioning now that Sajnovics (1770) and Gyarmathi (1799), who follows him in this, had not sharply dis­ tinguished the three criteria, nor had other proponents of grammar-against­ lexicon. Which of them William Jones had in mind when he spoke of "the forms of grammar" as proof of the Indo-European relationship is not clear. Later, of course, criterion (1) and (2) became the cornerstones of typologi­ cal classification when the latter was distinguished from classification by descent. The 19th and 20th century have changed the idea of 'descent' in a man­ ner which is ever so characteristic of the history of linguistics: the concept was secularized, but it was not discarded. It was instead filled with an oper­ ational content and retained - not only because it was on the books but because it was productive; we would not want to be without genealogical

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classification, language families, the distinction .between inherited and bor­ rowed vocabulary, and the rest. Something similar happened to the idea, and to the ideals, of reconstruction. In a general way, there is more con­ tinuity here; to reconstruct, as we have said, is still to identify retentions and then perhaps to extrapolate therefrom. To many thinkers of the past it had been a challenge to classify phenomena and linguistic elements which in their opinion were intrinsically early and those which were intrinsically recent. Thus Leibniz would look for the extant traces.of the primordial lan­ guage which he was sure there was a means of recognizing as such. In the last century, however, uniformitarianism triumphed; and a real triumph it was, so pervasive that it affected every worker and every subject, and finally so much taken for granted that it was not even much discussed any longer. This was the end of reconstruction by qualitative inspection. Hence­ forth proto-languages, whether extant or only reconstructed, were different from their descendants, of course, but the differences were of the same order as were differences such as may be observed among descendants - in fact, among any languages. Reconstructed proto-languages, we now say, must be typologically plausible. Among the terms that were bandied about in the realm of qualitative inspection many frankly expressed value judgements: crudeness, rawness, primitivity, but also degeneracy, on the one side; sophistication, excellence, and even PERFEctiON (but also primeval purity and poetic originality) on the other. William Jones praises Sanskrit for having "a wonderful structure [a loaded word, as we know] , more perfect than the Greek, more copious than the Latin, and more exquisitely refined than either", from all of which he draws the conclusions for which we quote him so often. Humboldt goes to great lengths to declare, and then to qualify, his evaluations, his agoniz­ ing over Chinese being a prominent case in point. This is not the place to go into the entire relationship between the routine of reconstruction and the ideal of perfection; only to recall, very summarily, that there were several schools of thought, though they were not always neatly separated in the persons of scholars. According to one position there was primordial excel­ lence followed by a fall from grace; this we can find in some of Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829). Jones was alluding to the other, opposite position. There was also the doctrine of growth and decay which crops up later. This doctrine is worth looking at for a moment, because it is possible - though this needs further study - that it, too, has an operational aspect. At the time of which we speak it had become clear that there were two procedures

to recover the past, namely, the triangulation of the 'comparative method', and so-called 'internal reconstruction'. Inasmuch as the two address them­ selves to the phonological shapes of morphs and words, they may be eleg­ antly combined into one single algorithm, if one so wishes. But they differ in power - as long as we can triangulate and, say, reconstruct Indo-Euro­ pean from Sanskrit and Greek, the combination is in order. If we have only one language to start from, internal reconstruction, as the name says, is the only way. The internal reconstruction of morphs and words rests mainly on the analysis of the alternations (as when we infer from a study of Greek ilOUn paradigms that meli, the nominative of the word for "honey", geni­ tive melit-os, had lost a final t through sound-change). Such alternations (here between VO# and VtV) may reveal the conditional sound-changes, or splits, that brought them about, but they cannot preserve evidence of simple merger. Only the comparative method can do that. This means that once a proto-language is reconstructed by the combined algorithm, further probing into its antecedents can be undertaken only in ways wich must dis­ tort them seriously and one-sidedly. It will look as though the complexion of things had altered, and even reversed itself at the point of filiation. As Wallace Chafe (1959:495) said of a similar situation, this is the only direction in which internal reconstruction permits us to go; but the fact should not be taken as evidence that languages regularly develop [from such-and-such a type into such-and-such another). Rather it should be taken as a limitation of our method . . .

And finally, what of COMPARISON? I t was Joseph Vendryes (1875-1960) who remarked on the oddity of the term 'comparative grammar'. To the ordinary reader, 'comparative linguistics' conjures up comparison for com­ parison's sake; i.e., what we now call typology. The 'comparative method' (if we restrict it, as some do, to the phonological recovery of morphs) is of course not that kind of ordinary comparing at all; it is a technical matching procedure under which 'correspondences' among daughter languages are reinterpreted as phones and allophones of the parent language. Details do not matter; but let us recall that the beginnings lie with 'analogia' and with figures like Johann E . Fischer of Kamtchatka fame, and the achievement with those in the last and in this century who hammered out, by trial and error and not by prescript, the consequences of the circumstance that when contrasts are merged along a line of descent these mergers are irreversible by definition. Thus, where of two related languages one exhibits a contrast while the other shows homonyms in the corresponding word pair, the latter

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has innovated and the former has retained the earlier state of affairs. This is impeccably uniformitarian: it is not that the different front vowels that once distinguished meet from meat are archaic features in themselves, ascer­ tainable as such by qualit.ative inspection. It is rather that the matching technique so quaintly called 'comparative' tells us that they are relatively archaic in this particular case. All this was done routinely, long before it was formulated. These three motifs, descent, perfection and 'comparison', have had different histories; yet these histories resemble one another in their prob­ lematics. Their most intriguing trait is the manner in which they are con­ nected and in which they exhibit the virtuous circularity which we encounter so often when we deal with language and with the concepts we choose to employ in order to marshal the phenomena. We must learn all about their history and about how they were seen individually and jointly. In the immense and gratifying present-day production in our historiography it is remarkable how often it happens that a 'discovery' or a 'first mention' has to be moved upward in time. In the given case, what does this mean? How were connections between different discoveries discovered? To what extent are we the victims of treacherous shifts in our terminology and of Koyn5's manie de Ia recherche des precurseurs? What is the fit between maxims and their alleged applications? How did innovation fare in the scholarly world? It is a joy to see the picture become fuller and fuller as more and more such questions are asked and answered, and as we break the fetters of a stereotyped historiography.

REFERENCES

1::1

NOTES 1.

Muller (1986:12). These things were made more or less explicit in the context of the socalled Scythian theory.

2.

The word was also used in other meanings.

3.

I draw freely on Schulenburg (1973) and Gulya (1974).

4.

Muller (1986:22-23); Gulya (1974). This applies, passim, to what follows.

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Aarsleff, Hans. 1967. The Study of Language in England, 1780-1860. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. Arens, Hans. 1969. Sprachwissenschaft. 2nd ed. Freiburg & Miinchen: Alber. Barber, William Henry. 1955. Leibniz in France. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Borst, Arno. 1957-63. Der Turmbau von Babel: Geschichte der Meinungen uber Ursprung und Vie/fait der Sprachen und Volker. Stuttgart: Hierse­ mann. Chafe, Wallace. 1959. "Internal Reconstruction in Seneca". Language 35.477-95. Droixhe, Daniel. 1978. La linguistique et l'appel de l'histoire (1600-1800): Rationalisme et revolutions positivistes. Geneva: Droz. Gulya, Janos. 1974. "Some Eighteenth Century Antecedents of Nineteenth Century Linguistics: The discovery of Finno-Ugrian". Hymes 1974.25876. Hoenigswald, Henry M. 1984. "Etymology against Grammar in the Early 19th Century". HEL 6:2.95-100. Hymes, Dell, ed. 1974. Studies in the History of.Linguistics: Traditions and Paradigms. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press. Metcalf, George J. 1974. "The Indo-European Hypothesis in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries". Hymes 1974. 233-57. Morpurgo Davies, Anna. 1975. "Language Classification in the Nineteenth Century". Current Trends in Linguistics ed. by Thomas A. Sebeok, voi.XIII: Historiography of Linguistics, 607-716. The Hague: Mouton. Monnin, Georges. 1967. Histoire de Ia linguistique des origines au XXe siecle. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Muller, Jean-Claude. 1986. "Early Stages of Language Comparison from Sassetti to Sir William Jones (1786)". Kratylos 31. 1-31. Schulenburg, Sigrid von der. 1973. Leibniz als Sprachforscher. (= Verof­ fentlichungen des Leibniz-Archivs, 4). Frankfurt a.M. : Klostermann. Zsirai, Mikl6s. 1951. "Samuel Gyarmathi, Hungarian Pioneer of Compara­ tive Linguistics". Acta Linguistica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 1.5-16. (Repr. in Portraits of Linguists ed. by Thomas A. Sebeok, voi.L58-70. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966).

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HENRY M. HOENIGSWALD

SUMMARY Change, comparability, and descent, applied to language, are ancient terms. The present article traces some aspects of the gradual yet profound transformation, over the last few centuries, of their content. Comparison for (typological) comparison's sake came to be distinct from the matching of contrast with homonymy which is sometimes called the Comparative Method. This procedure and its corollaries were used to establish and corre­ late lines of descent along which replacements, or 'changes' occur. These concepts became more and more uniformitarian (in the geological sense) : there was no room left for typological ideals of primordial perfection or primordial simplicity to serve as criteria for the ancestral role. Special attention is paid to Leibniz, to the eighteenth century, to Wilhelm von Humboldt, and to later linguistics.

Part II: Humboldt and the Aftermath

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Humboldt et Leibniz: Le concept intt�rieur de Ia linguistique*

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1.0 Seit Leibnitz

En dehors de Ia correspondance et en dehors des notes sur les cours de philosophie de Samuel Engel,1 Humboldt ne cite que trois fois le nom de Leibniz dans ses ecrits.2 Ces citations se trouvent toutes les trois dans le meme texte, ii savoir dans Ia deuxieme des trois grandes introductions ii Ia linguistique, Ueber die Verschiedenheiten des menschlichen Sprachbaues, de 1827-29. Une citation se refere, dans le cadre d'une critique de creations linguistiques intentionnelles ("absichtlichte Spracherzeugung" [G. S. VI:191 ]), ii Ia problematique de Ia langue universelle: 'Le grand Leibniz lui-meme a con<;u !'idee d'inventer une langue universelle' ("Der grosse Leibnitz selbst fasste die Idee einer zu erfindenden Universalspracbe", [p.189]). Les deux autres citations concernent Ia linguistique comparative que Humboldt appelle allgemeine Sprachkunde. II faut commencer par Ia deuxieme citation pour bien comprendre Ia premiere. Humboldt y loue A.W. Schliizer (1735-1809), dont il avait suivi les cours ii Gottingen, d'avoir reconnu !'importance des langues Amerindiennes pour Ia Sprachkunde. Et il poursuit: 'C'est bien lui le premier qui, depuis Leibniz, a renouvele le vrai concept de cette science parmi nous' ("Er hat wohl iiberhaupt seit Leibnitz zuerst wieder unter uns den wahren Begriff dieser Wissenschaft aufgefasst" , [G.S. VI:136], c'est moi qui souligne: J.T.).

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Je remercie Bernadette Runge-Feron et Peter Klaus de !'aide qu'ils ont apportee a la re­ daction de ce texte.

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Leibniz est done cite comme etant celui qui aurait developpe Ia vraie conception de Ia Sprachkunde. Dans Ia premiere citation pourtant, l'ap· preciation de Leibniz me semble plu!Ot ambigue. Bien que cite comme ini­ tiateur de ]'allgemeine Sprachkunde, son nom est en m
La linguistique bien com;ue est, dans une perspective en meme temps philosophique et anthropologique (c'est-a-dire empirique) , etude de Ia for­ mation de Ia pensee. Quand il blame Ia linguistique traditionnelle et contemporaine de ne pas suivre ce concept interieur, Humboldt ne s'adresse done pas a Leibniz. Mais en faisant voisiner le nom de Leibniz et Ia critique des concepts errones, il suggere neanmoins que celui-ci n'est pas entierement innocent de cette deviation du bon chemin. Que Humboldt, en effet, voie dans Leibniz non pas seulement l'initia· teur du 'concept interieur' mais en meme temps un des responsables de Ia motivation 'exterieure' et de Ia reduction de Ia linguistique a Ia problemati­ que genealogique ressort d'un autre texte qui contient nne discussion detail· lee des conceptions linguistiques de Leibniz, c'est-a-dire du premier dis­ cours academique de 1820 "Ueber das vergleichende Sprachstudium in Be­ ziehung auf die verschiedenen Epochen der Sprachentwicklung" ('De l'etu· de comparative des langues en rapport aux differentes phases de !'evolution du langage').

La veritable importance de l't'!tude des langues reside dans Ia participation de Ia langue a Ia formation des representations. Dans ceci, tout est contenu, car ce sont ces representations dont la somme constitue l'homme ("Die wahre Wichtigkeit des Sprachstudiums Jiegt in dem Antheil der Sprache an der Bildung der Vorstellungen. Hierin ist alles enthalten, denn diese Vor� stellungen sind es, deren Sumrne den Menschen ausmacht", G.S. VI:119; c'est moi qui souligne: J.T.).

2.0 Ex indicio linguarum

2.1 Quand Humboldt prononce ce discours a l'Academie Royale de Berlin, il est parfaitement conscient de Ia tradition du lieu oii il se trouve: sans nommer explicitement le nom de Leibniz, il se refere tres clairement a ce­ lui-ci, qui est le fondateur de cette institution, et a Ia tradition linguistique que Leibniz a fondee. s Pour son public, l'intertextualite est claire: deja le choix du sujet - !'etude comparative des langues - renvoie necesairement au celebre memoire academique, Ia Brevis designatio, que Leibniz avait dedie a ce sujet. Et Ia premiere phrase du discours de Humboldt fait nette­ ment echo ;\ ce texte leibnizien: L'etude comparative des lartgues ne peut conduire a des connaissances cer� taines et importantes sur le language, revolution des peuples et la forma� tion de l'homme que si on en fait une etude propre qui ait son utilite et sa fin en elle-meme. (G.S. IV:!)

Ceci repond au titre de !'article de Leibniz dans Ia premiere publica­ tion de Ia jeune Academie Prussienne, les Miscellanea Berolinensia de 1710: Brevis designatio meditationum de Originibus Gentium, ductis potissi­ mum ex indicia linguarum. Ce titre pr6nait visiblement I' hi!teronomie de Ia linguistique: !'etude des langues devait servir a Ia recherche des origines des peuples, les langues etant prises comme des indices, comme des moyens

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LE CONCEPT INTERIEUR DE LA LINGUIST!QUE

d'une recherche dont Ia finalite n'etait pas les langues elles-memes. La pre­ miere phrase de Ia Brevis designatio le precise: Ies Iangues sont considerees comme des documents de Ia recherche historique, comme des 'monuments anciens', capables de nous conduire par deJa les frontieres de l'histoire, jusqu'aux origines des peuples: "Cum remotae Gentium Origines Historiam transcendant, Linguae nobis praestant veterum monumentorum vicem" (Leibniz 1710:1). 6 C'est Kant, bien sur, qui s'interpose entre Leibniz et Humboldt quand celui-ci revendique une linguistique qui porte sa finalite en elle-meme. 'Por­ ter son utilite et sa fin en soi-meme' est une periphrase du concept d'auto­ nomie, concept central chez Kant. Plus precisement, Ia revendication de l'autonomie transfere au domain des activites scientifiques un concept que Kant developpe dans le cadre de son esthetique, a savoir I' ideal de Ia beautt! qui se base sur l'autonomie de l'homme:

n om de son fondateur Humboldt - nous J'avons vu - appelle , dans Ver­ schiedenheiten, Leibni J'initiateur du vrai concept de Ia Sprachkunde, de son 'concept interieur'. Mais de cette conception vraie nous ne trouvons rien dans Ia Brevis designatio qui ne presente Ia recherche linguistique que comme une activite scientifique heteronome , comme discipline ancillaire de J'histoire ou, plus exactement, de Ia recherche paleo-historique. II faut done chercher dans d'autres textes leibniziens. Et , bien sur, on trouve toute Ia ri­ chesse de Ia pensee linguistique de Leibniz dans le troisieme livre des Nou­ veaux Essais. La, Leibniz montre - a cote de Ia recherche empirique des origines' qui reste une finalite importante pour Leibniz - d 'autres fins de Ia linguistique qui correspondent bien a ce que Humboldt appelle son 'concept interieur'. Repondant a Ia plainte de Philalete-Locke sur l'obscurite des langues qui augmenterait encore dans Ies vieux livres, Theophile-Leibniz, selon sa strategie argumentative dialectique ("Ces remarques sont bonnes, mais [. . ]"), repond que, au contraire, les vieux Jivres sont des tresors de connaissanees qu'il faut seulement savoir utiliser. On doit etudier tous les Jivres anciens pour avoir acces a des connaissances qui autrement seraient perdues. Et quand on a Ju ces livres, il faut etudier les langues, toutes les Jangues, car en elles se trouvent eacbees d'autres connaissances:

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Seul ce qui porte en lui-meme la fin de son existence, I'homme, qui peut determiner Jui-m!me ses fins pad� raison [ . . . ], seul done, parmi tous les objets du monde, cet etre qui est l'homme est capable d'un Ideal de Ia beaute. (Critique de Ia faculte de juger, § 17 Kant 1968:74). =

Par analogie, n'est susceptible de !'ideal de Ia science (ou disons plutot: da Ia Kunde, de !"etude') qu'une activite scientifique non determinee par des fins 'exterieures', que celles-ci soient dictees par une pratique ou par quelque autre discipline scientifique. II s'ensuit qu'un objet qui porte sa fin en soi-meme (!'Homme, par exemple) est particulierement bien approprie a une telle activite scientifique. Les objets de Ia Sprachkunde, les langues, doivent done etre etudiees non pas tellement comme des instruments ouverts a des usages divers, mais comme portant leur finalite en elles-memes. Puisque Ia fin des langues est le discours ("der zweckmiissige Gebrauch" , G.S. IV: 12),7 c'est dans les textes que I a linguistique trouve un objet langa­ gier qui porte sa fin en lui-meme.s L'apogee de Ia linguistique, Ia 'cle de voilte' ("Schlussstein" [G.S. IV:13]) de !'etude comparative des langues, est done ce que Humboldt appeile !'etude du caractere des langues , forme ul­ terieure des langues saisissable seulement dans les textes. L'etude des struc­ tures des langues, qui sont des outils pour un usage ulterieur, tout ce que Ia linguistique synchronique ou diachronique considere comme son domaine propre, n'est que propedeutique a cette etude-la (Trabant 1986, ch. 6.2.2). 2.2 Bien que Ia premiere phrase de son discours efface d'un geste imperial toute une prestigieuse tradition de discussion au sein de l'Academie, liee au

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Et quand il n'y aurait plus de livre ancien a examiner, les langues tiendront lieu de livres et ce sont les plus anciens monuments du genre humain. On enregistrera avec le temps et mettra en dictionnaires et en grammaires tou� tes les langues de l'univers, et on les comparera entre elles; ce qui aura des usages tres grands tant pour [a connaissance des choses, puisque les noms souvent repondent a leurs proprietes (comme I'on voit par les denomina­ tions des plantes chez les diff6rents peuples) que pour la connaissance de notre esprit et de la merveilleuse varieti de ses operations. Sans parler de l'origine des peuples qu'on connaitra par le moyen des etymologies solides que Ia comparaison des langues fournira le mieux. (N. E. III, IX, 9; c'est moi qui souligne: J.T.)

Dans Ia connaissance des choses et dans Ia connaissanee de !'esprit de ] 'homme que vehiculent les langues,' on peut, sans trop faire violence a Ia pensee humboldtienne, reconnaitre Ia 'participation des langues a Ia forma­ tion des representations' dans Jaquelle reside 'Ia veritable importance de Ia linguistique'. Ceci ne veut pas dire que Jes positions de Humboldt et de Leibniz coincident. La difference fondamentale est mise en evidence par Borsche (dans ce volume) quand iJ oppose a !'affirmation leibnizienne que "les idees [platoniciennes!] ne dependent point des noms" (N.E. II, XXII,

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4) Ia paraphrase de Ia conception humboldtienne: 'les idees dependent de leurs noms'. Mais, malgre ces divergences profondes, Ia mise en relation de Ia recherche linguistique aux questions metaphysiques justifie !'opinion de Humboldt selon laquelle Leibniz serait le fondateur du 'vrai concept' de ]'allgemeine Sprachunde. Quand Humboldt, dans. son discours academique, preconise sa conception d'une linguistique philosophico-anthropologique autonome et repousse implicitement toute conception linguistique Mtero­ nome et exclusivement empirique, comme Ia recherche genealogique ex in­ dicia linguarum, il oppose done dans un certain sens Leibniz ii Leibniz.

manite, par des reconstructions linguistiques comme celles de Leibniz qui, ii partir des mots de langues actuelles, arrive tres rapidement ii une 'racine' onomatopeique. Citons par exemple Ia premiere reconstruction onomatopeique de Ia Brevis designatio. De !'element germanique rik (que !'on trouve dans des noms propres comme Teodoricus ou Fridericus), Leibniz arrive ii !'inter­ pretation onomatopeique selon laquelle /r/ representerait un mouvement qui serait obstrue par !'obstacle cree par !k/: "Ex ipsa enim natura soni, lite­ ra Canina [c'est-ii-dire r] motum violentum notat, at K finale ejus obstacu­ lum, quo sistitur" (Leibniz 1710:2). Car "Tales detegunt sese primae origines vocabulorum, quoties penetrari potest ad radicem tes onoma­ topoiias" (Leibniz 1710:2). La prudence que Leibniz exige de Ia recherche etymologiquelo trop souvent il l'oublie Iui-meme dans son enthousiasme onomatopeique et son desir de retrouver Ia lingua antiqua dont Ia demarche onomatopeique ("ex analogia vocis cum affectu, qui rei sensum comitabatur") correspond pour lui ii celle de Ia langue adamique: "nee aliter Adamum nomina imposuisse crederim" (ibid.). A ce genre de reconstructions hardies et souvent fantaisistes, Humboldt avait oppose, en 1812 deja, les reflexions suivantes (d'ailleurs tout ii fait leibniziennes):

2.3 Le rapport intertextuel entre Ia Brevis designatio et "Uber das verglei­ chende Sprachstudium" une fois etabli, on se rend compte que le dialogue de Humboldt avec Leibniz ne s'arrete pas ii Ia premiere phrase que nous avons commentee jusqu'ici, mais qu'on peut - et qu'on doit - interpreter "Uber das vergleichende Sprachstudium" dans son ensemble comme un commentaire des conceptions linguistiques de Leibniz. Nous essayerons done, dans ce qui suit, de saisir les elements les plus importants de ce dialo­ gue intra-academique, qui tourne autour du concept des origines gentium. Humboldt proteste non seulement contre l'instrumentalisation de Ia linguis­ tique pour Ia recherche historique, mais il detruit aussi l'espoir leibnizien de pouvoir jamais elucider, ii travers ]'etude des langues, !'evolution prehisto­ rique et l'origine des peuples et des langues. Plus precisement, Humboldt resout le probleme des origines gentium en y distinguant deux aspects, un aspect trans-historique (origo) et un aspect historique (cognatio). 3.0 Historiam transcendere: origo

3.1 "Cum remotae origines gentium historiam transcendant", comme les origines lointaines des peuples transcendent l'histoire, et que, pour repren­ dre des termes de Humboldt, 'l'origine du langage transcende toute expe­ rience humaine' (G.S. IV:24), il ne faut pas en parler selon Humboldt. Ou plus exactement, on ne peut rien en dire scientifiquement, si parler scienti­ fiquement veut dire parler 'historiquement' ou - ce qui ii l'epoque veut dire Ia meme chose - 'empiriquement'. La recherche linguistique ne peut pas nous renseigner sur les origines gentium, parce qu'elle est elle-meme re­ cherche historique et qu'en tant que telle elle ne peut transcender l'histoire. Cela veut dire qu'il faut abandonner tout espoir de jamais remonter jusqu'ii Ia premiere creation du language, jusqu'au berceau des peuples et de l'hu-

separes par un intervalle immense de l'origine des langues, ne pouvant guere nous transplanter dans les idees et les sensations de ceux qui les pre­ miers profererent ces sons qui par mille et mille alterations sont venus jusqu'a nous, vivant tres probablement sous un ciel, sur un sol, au milieu d'un monde d'objets entierement diffCrents, nous ne pouvons que rare­ ment retracer avec exactitude les rapports dCHcats dont l'observation leur a fait allier certains sons a certains objets. (G.S. III:323) 11

Humboldt ne nie done pas !'idee d'une origine onomatopeique ou, pour prendre un terrne encore plus general, d'une origine iconique des mots,12 mais il ne voit aucune possibilite de reveler cette origine par !'analy­ se linguistique et il propose une autre solution du probleme de l'origine: comme nous sommes 'separes par d'immenses lacunes de l'origine des na­ tions et des langues' (G.S. III:322), Humboldt distingue deux etapes dans !'evolution du language: Ia periode de l"orgauisation' (Organisationsperiode) et Ia periode de !'elaboration (Ausbildungsperiode). La premiere va de l'origine du language jusqu'ii l'achevement de Ia formation des organismes des langues, c'est-a-dire jusqu'a l'accomplissement de Ia structuration des langues. Nous ne pouvons rien savoir historiquement ou empiriquement de

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la periode d'organisation. C'est pourquoi, des le debut, Humboldt proteste done centre une linguistique poursuivant '!'idee chimerique d'une langue originaire' ("die chimarische Vorstellung einer Ursprache", [G.S. VII:598]). Seules soot accessibles a la recherche historique les structures toutes faitesn et leurs transformations ulterieures dans la seconde periode.

3.2.3 La contribution de Leibniz a !'acquisition de cette position pent t\tre resumee dans les trois elements suivants qui sont des elements d'une criti­ que de l'ancienne conception instrumentaliste et representative du langage:

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3.2 L'impossibilite d'une recherche historique de l'origine et de la premiere epoque ne signifie pas que, d'une fa�on wittgensteinienne, nous soyons obliges de nous taire totalement. Au-deJa de l'histoire, nous pouvons tou­ jours parler de l'origine transcendantale du language. Ou, pour reprendre les formules de Ia Critique de Ia raison pure, si nous ne pouvons rien dire du debut tempore] ('anheben') du language, nous pouvons tout de meme es­ sayer de saisir la source transcendantale ('entspringen') du langage, le 'pro­ dige de l'origine des langues, qui ne peut jamais etre explique, mais qui en quelque fa�on se reproduit journellement sous nos yeux' (G.S. III:324). Comme une theorie de l'origine transcendantale du langage coincide avec ce qu'on appelle la philosophic du langage, on devrait maintenant en­ trer dans Ia comparaison detaillee de Ia philosophic du langage de Humboldt et de Leibniz. Je me contenterai des quatre remarques sitivantes. done 3.2.1 Le tournant transcendantal de la problematique de l'origine Kant de nouveau - marque plus clairement que toute autre chose Ia diffe­ rence entre Ia pensee humboldtienne et Ia philosophie pre-kantienne14 qui justement ne faisait pas de distinction nette entre le debut tempore! et Ia source transcendantale. Quoiqu'on en dise, toute Ia theorie linguistique de Humboldt s'integre dans la philosophie kantienne (Liebrucks 1965; Scharf 1977; Borsche 1981). Les distances que cette philosophic prend, en general, a l'egard de Leibniz, on peut les presupposer egalement chez Humboldt qui, en adoptant le cadre kantien, se distancie consciemment de Ia philoso­ phic leibnizienne de sa jeunesse.

3.2.2 Ce que Humboldt apporte dans ce cadre kantien - et ce par quai il le depasse - c'est Ia theorie de Ia synthese de Ia pensee comme synthese langagiere, comme synthese necessairement historique (individuelle) et dia­ logique (Trabant 1986, ch.1). La philosophic du XVIIIe siecle s'etait deja acheminee vers cette position; Ia linguisticite de Ia cognition n'est done pas une invention ex nihilo de Humboldt. Mais c'est Humboldt qui a tire les consequences de cette intuition en l'integrant dans Ia pensee Ia plus avan­ cee de l'epoque qui etait celle de Kant.

3.2.3.1 Leibniz - comme Condillac d'ailleurs depasse Locke justement par le fait qu'il /ie le langage plus intimement au processus cognitif, qu'il en fait une partie constituante. La position de Locke correspond encore tout a fait a Ia conception linguistique traditionnelle critiquee par Humboldt (cf. supra 1): chez Locke, le langage est con�u comme un instrument dont Ia fonction est de fixer et de communiquer aux autres une pensee essentielle­ ment pre-lingustique: les mots soot "marks for the ideas within his own mind, whereby they might be made known to others, and the thoughts of men's minds be conveyed from one to another" (Essay III,I,2). Quand Leib­ niz (N.E. III,I,2) ajoute que le langage "sert encore a l'homme a raisonner a part soi", il en augmente le poids cognitif - et creatif - en face de cette seule fonction mnemonique et communicative. 3.2.3.2 Le second element de Ia critique de Ia conception traditionnelle du langage, est Ia critique de /'arbitraire du signe au sens etroit du terme (criti­ que qu'on retrouvera aussi plus tard chez Condillac):15 "Neque vera ex ins­ titute profectae, et quasi lege conditae sunt linguae, sed naturali quodam impetu natae hominum, sonos ad affectus motusque animi attemperan­ tium" (Leibniz 1710:2). Dans les Nouveaux Essais, Leibniz retorque a Ia these lockienne de !'"institution arbitraire en vertu de laquelle un tel mot a ete volontairement le signe d'une telle idee"t6 que, en effet les significations des mots "ne soot point determinees par une necessite naturelle, mais elles ne laissent pas de l'etre par des raisons tanto! naturelles, ou le hasard a quelque part, tan!Ot morales, ou il y entre du choix" (N.E. III,II,1), c'est-a-dire qu'elles soot dues a un jeu entre necessite et liberte, nature! et arbitraire. Humboldt suit Leibniz de pres quand il affirme que "le langage est image et signe en meme temps, ni entierement produit de l'empreinte des objets, ni entierement produit du choix arbitraire des locuteurs" (G. S. IV :29; cf. a ce sujet Tra­ bant 1986, ch. 3.2). C'est exactement cette position intermediaire entre le hasard et le choix, entre les raisons naturelles et les raisons 'morales' qui fait de !'etude des langues une discipline interessante, parce que c'est dans cet espace in­ termediaire - ce 'Spielraum' ( G.S. VII:65) - que se situe ce que Leibniz appelle Ia "merveilleuse variete des operations de !'esprit" (N. E. III,IX,9) et Humboldt Ia 'diversite des visions du monde' ("Verschiedenheit der

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,,

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Weltansichten" [G.S. IV:27]) que !'etude comparative des Jangues doit mettre en Jumiere. Dans le contexte de cette critique commune de l'arbitraire du signe, Ia coincidence qui suit me semble tout a fait remarquable: on trouve deja chez Leibniz J'exemple prefere de Humboldt pour demontrer Ia motivation (par­ tielle) des signifiants. II s'agit du son 'W' dont Humboldt, en 1806, constate l'iconicite dans Wolke, Wage, Welle, Walzen, Wind, Wehen (G.S. III: 169) ou, en 1835, dans wehen, Wind, Wolke, wirren, Wunsch (G.S. VII:77). On retrouve ce 'W', pratiquement avec les memes exemples, dans Jes recon­ structions de 'racines' onomatopeiques dans Je §49 des "Unvorgreifliche Gedanken" et dans Jes Nouveaux Essais (III,II,1).1'

epiphanies du Meme, ou, selon une formule Jeibnizienne, 'les perspectives d'un seul selon les differents points de vue de chaque Monade' (Monadologie, §57). Pour Humboldt, l'identite de Ia nature humaine permet de depasser ]'obstacle que constitue Ia diversite.'9

3.2.3.3 Au pessimisme du mythe de Ia Tour de Babel qui presente Ia diver­ site des Jangues comme un malheur, un chiltiment et un obstacle, Leibniz oppose son optimisme de Ia multiplicite, sa joie devant Ia diversite conque comme richesse. A Ia plainte de Locke-Philalete que les mots s'interposent tellement entre notre es prit et la verite des chow ses qu'on peut comparer les mots avec le milieu au travers duquel passent les rayons des objets visibles, qui repand souvent des nuages . sur nos yeux (N.E. Ill, IX, 21),

Leibniz avait replique "que les Iangues sont Je meilleur miroir de !'esprit humain" (III, VII, 6) et de "Ia merveilleuse variete de ses operations" (III, IX, 9). Et Humboldt reprend ces verreries metaphoriques dans le passage suivant de son Essai fran�ais: "toutes les langues ensemble ressemblent a un Prisme dont chaque face montreroit !'universe sous une couleur diffe­ remment nuancee" (G.S. III:321). Cette joie devant Ia diversite des Jan­ gues, troisieme element de Ia critique a Ia tradition , est, bien sur, un reflet linguistique de Ia monadologie. Comme Ia pluralite des monades sert a re­ fleter et a multiplier l'univers, ainsi Ia pluralite des langues est creation de rich esse. 18 Contre J'uniformisation linguistique de l'humanite, Humboldt affirmera dans un esprit leibnizien: [ . . . ] et comme I'esprit qui se manifeste dans J'univers ne peut jamais etre connu d'une maniere exhaustive par un ensemble donne de visions [An­ sichten] et comme chaque nouvelle langue decouvre toujours quelque cho, se de nouveau, il conviendrait au contraire de multiplier les differentes lan­ gues tant que le permet le nombre des etres humains qui habitent la terre. (G.S. III:167-68).

II n'y a aucune raison de desesperer de cette diversite des Weltansich­ ten parce que les differentes langues sont, malgre cette diversite, des

3.2.4 Malgre ces concordances, Ia difference entre Humboldt et Leibniz quant au jugement qu'ils portent sur !a diversite des langues, est particulie­ rement bien visible dans Je probleme de [a langue universelle, evoque au debut de notre article. Dans son discours academique, Humboldt effleure cette question en disant qu'une telle langue peut avoir, a Ia rigueur, un usa­ ge tres restreint, pour les 'concepts generables par des pures constructions' (G.S. IV:21), c'est-a-dire pour les mathematiques et pour Ia terminologie scientifique. Leibniz, au fait, ne pensait pas a remplacer les langues naturel­ Jes par une langue universelle. Mais son projet de construction d'une lan­ gue universelle devait neanmoins couvrir tout le vaste domaine des sciences et de Ia philosophie (cf. Heinekamp 1972). Humboldt doute de Ia possibili­ te d'une construction d'une telle portee: iJ affirme que ce serait une 'illusion folie' ("thiirichter Wahn") de croire qu'on puisse 'sortir du cercle determine et limite de Ia langue maternelle' (G.S. IV :22) moyennant Ia construction d'une caracteristique universelle.zo S'il y a linguisticite de Ia pensee, si le monde (exterieur et interieur) nous est donne par le language, iJ nous est toujours donne par une langue determine. C'est seulement en entrant dans un autre cercle linguistique, et non pas en sortant des cercles des Jangues, que nous pouvons depasser le cercle d'une langue determinee; cette voie menan! au dehors d'une langue est praticable parce que Ia diversite des lan­ gues repose sur une unite universelle du language, le monde exterieur et le monde interieur - 'Ia nature humaine' - etant les memes pour tous Jes hommes. Humboldt accepte done comme un destin ineluctable le 'milieu historique' ("geschichtliche Mitte", [G. S. VII:47]) dans lequel nous som­ mes places et qui nous place necessairement dans des langues differentes. Leibniz par contre, tout en acceptant Ia multiplicite des langues, reste hante par Ia nostalgie de l'origine qui est nostalgie de Ia langue adamique. Cette nostalgie se satisfait, ou en re-construisant Ia langue du passe, ou en construisant Ia langue future; Leibniz les appelle l'une et !'autre lingua adamica. 21 3.3 Mais Humboldt ne serait pas Humboldt s'il maintenait strictement, en ce qui conceme le probleme de l'origine, sa position modeme, c'est-a-dire Ia position qui n'admet plus de conjectures pre-historiques mais seulement

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des reflexions transcendantales d'un c6te et des recherches 'historico-empi­ riques' de !'autre. S'il critique Jes conjectures prehistoriques, Hu� boldt, toujours souple dans sa maniere d'argumenter, n'en avance pas moms cer­ taines hypotheses sur Je debut tempore! du language, sur Ia lente evoluti?n des Jangues, apres !'invention - 'd'un seul coup' (G.S. IV:15) - du pnn­ cipe Jangagier, jusqu'au point de 'cristallisation' des structures des lan­ gues,22 Mais ces affirmations, que nous avons presentees ailleurs (Trabant, a paraitre: §4), sont toujours clairement marquees comme etant des hy­ potheses.

se contraire de Ia polygenese que Friedrich Schlegel avail renouvelee dans son livre de 1808):

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4.

Historia: cognatio

4.1 Apres avoir detruit tout espoir de retrouver Ia langue adamique 'radi­

cale et primitive', pre- ou post-historique, cette 'idee chimerique d'une lan­ gue originaire', Humboldt ne nie pourtant pas que Jes Jangues ex1stantes (:t toujours achevees dans leurs structures) portent des traces de leur parente, de leurs 'cognations et migrations' (N. E. III,II,1), 'vestigia cognationis' (Leibniz 1710:3), et que !'on doit pouvoir etudier historiquement ou empiri­ quement, c'est-a-dire sur Ia base du materiel linguistique disponible, ces rapports genealogiques. Mais, en ce qui concerne cet aspect historique du . probleme des origines gentium, Ia reponse de Humboldt est un appd a Ia prudence, et en tant que tel une critique des conjectures souvent hard1es de Leibniz. En ce qui concerne Jes parentes des Jangues, Leibniz part de !'hy­ pothese de !'existence d'une seule langue originaire ("lingua antiqua com­ munis") , dont on trouverait encore des vestiges sur tout le continent eura­ sien23 tandis qu'en Afrique et en Amerique Jes traces se seraient perdues . car "repetitae corruptiones corruptionum omnia tandem origini� lineame�­ ta confundunt" (Leibniz 1710:3). A partir de cette "langue radiCale et pn­ mitive" (N. E. III,II,1), Leibniz commence a construire sa celebre genea­ logie en y introduisant une premiere scission, d'un c6te les langues japheti­ ques - du Nord - et de !'autre, Jes langues arameiques. - du Sud: "Li�­ guas ex antiqua ilia Jatissima fusa derivatas in binas species non male diVI­ demus" (Leibniz 1710:4). Voici comment Humboldt critique et transforme ces theses Jeibniziennes: 4.2.1 La monogenese des Jangues est en principe une hypothese plausible,

bien qu'elle ne puisse pas etre prouvee historiquement (pas plus que Ia the-

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La possibilite que plusieurs parlers soient nes sans connexion des uns avec les autres ne peut pas etre contestee en general. Mais il n'y a pas non plus de raison contraignante de rejeter la supposition hypoth6tique d'une connexion universeUe de tous Jes parlers. (G.S. IV:5).

Tout en penchant vers Je monogenetisme ou plut6t vers Ia these d'une "connexion universelle de toutes Jes langues", Humboldt transforme pour­ taut cette speculation sur l'histoire de l'humanite en reflexion methodologi­ que: "Nons devons done considerer comme une maxime de Ia recherche lin­ guistique de chercher Ia connexion aussi Jongtemps qu'on peut en reconnaitre quelque trace" (G.S. IV:6). 4.2.2 Apres !'accumulation considerable des connaissances linguistiques pendant Je xvnr• siecle - accumulation qu'on peut d'ailleur largement at­

tribuer a !'influence de Leibniz - Jes conjectures genealogiques de Leibniz ne sont plus acceptables, si elles ne sont pas entierement fausses non plus. Humboldt trouve (en 1820) que ce qu'on a dit jusque-la des relations ge­ nealogiques des Jangues manque de fondement serieux. Humboldt propose done de faire preceder Jes recherches genealogiques par un vaste exemple d'etudes synchroniques, d'etudes structurales de toutes Jes Jangues du mon­ de. En plus, avant d'avancer des hypotheses audacieuses sur Ia parente des Jangues, il faudrait d'abord elaborer les principes d'une telle recherche en travaillant sur des Jangues dont nul ne conteste Ia parente genealogique elle-meme: c'est ce qui, plus tard, constituera pour Humboldt Ia grande conquete de Bopp et de Grimm pour Ia linguistique: 'Tant que sur ce do­ maine, !'on ne procede pas du connu a l'inconnu, on se trouve sur un che­ min glissant et dangereux' (G.S. IV:13). Avec cette affirmation, Humboldt detruit pratiquement Ia plus grande partie du texte de Ia Brevis designatio qui, a partir de Ia page 4, consiste en des hypotheses assez osees - des 'Muthmassungen' (G.S. IV:ll) - sur 'Ia descendance des nations les unes des autres selon leurs Jangues' ("Abstammung der Nationen voneinander nach ihren Sprachen", G.S. IV:ll). 4.2.3.1 Apres Jes propositions de Schlegel (1808) n'est plus acceptable,

comme c'est le cas chez Leibniz, une recherche comparative qui se base principalement sur Ia comparaison de lexemes.24 Schlegel avait propose une grammaire comparative, une comparaison de Jangues basee sur leur char­ pente interne ("innerer Bau"). Quand, dans son discours de 1820, Humboldt

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postule comme premiere regie de toute etude comparative 'd'etudier avant toute chose chaque langue connue dans sa coherence interieure' ("in ihrem inneren Zusammenhange", G.S. IV:10), i1 pense a Ia grammaire et au lexique, le terme de 'st,ructure' (Bau, Struktur, Organismus) englobant l'un et !'autre depuis son Essai sur les langues du Nouveau Continent de 1812. Mais suivant Schlegel, seuls les paralleles grammaticaux comptent comme preuve d'une parent!! entre les langues. Puisque 'les elements princi­ paux de Ia langue, les mots, passent facilement de langue en langue' (G.S. IV :25), ils ne disent rien sur les relations genealogique entre ces langues. Les formes j;rammaticales, par contre, ne voyagent pas si facilement de lan­ gue en langue, 'puisque, de nature plus fine et plus intellectuelle, elles resi­ dent davantage dans l'entendement qu'elles n'adherent, auto-explicatives, aux sons' (ibid. ) . Quand on trouve des formes grammaticales identiques dans des langues differentes, elles sont, par consequent, de bonnes preuves de Ia parente de ces dernieres.

4.2.3.2 Bien que, pour Ia !inguistique comparative toute entiere et pour Ia problematique genealogique en particulier, Ia comparaison des mots ne mene pas a des resultats serieux, Humboldt - fide!e au cadre leibnizien ­ reprend cependant les mots, les lexemes, comme unites de ri!fi!rence de son premier discours academique. Mais les mots ne lui servent plus tellement pour discuter le probleme de Ia linguistique comparative, mais pour illus­ trer Ia problematique proprement philosophique, l'origine du langage dans une perspective transcendantale, Ia synthese articulee de Ia pensee (G. S. IV:4). 4.2.3.3 Ajoutons ici qu'il y a, malgre !'orientation lexicologique de sa lin­ guistique, chez Leibniz une intuition de Ia pensi!e structurale qui se trouvera largement developpee chez Humboldt. Leibniz remarque que !'on peut tout dire dans n'importe quelle langue, mais que, malgre cela, il n'est point in­ different qu'une langue exprime un concept par un seul mot ou qu'elle soit obligee de recourir a des periphrases.zs Et il reconnait clairement que les lexiques ne coincident pas: 'Or, je ne crois pas qu'il y ait une seule langue dans le monde qui chaque fois puisse rendre les mots d'autres langues avec Ia meme energie et aussi avec un seul mot' (U. G. , § 61). Humboldt ecrit, dans son discours academique, en etendant !'argumentation leibnizienne au domaine grammatical: mot n'est pas toute la langue, mais il en est la partie la plus importante, il est ce qu'est l'individu dans le monde vivant. Aussi n'est�ce absolument Le

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149

pas indifferent qu'une langue fasse une periphrase pour ce qu'une autre exprirne par un seul mot: ni pour les formes grammaticales [. . . ] ni, non plus, pour la designation des concepts [c'est-8.-dire dans le lexique}. (G.S. IV:20)

Dans un autre texte, son troisieme memoire academique, Humboldt (1822) repete cette argumentation leibnizienne, mais en se referant aux for­ mes grammaticales. Tout en concedant que I'on peut tout exprimer en tou­ te langue, il s'oppose a I' 'indifferentisme grammatical': 'Ce n'est pas ce qui peut etre exprime dans une langue qui decide de ses avantages et de ses fai­ blesses, mais ce a quoi elle inspire et encourage de sa propre force interieu­ re' (G.S. IV:287-88). C'est Ia bel et bien Ia tradition du fameux adage struc­ turaliste de Jakobson: "Languages differ in what they must convey, not in what they may convey".

4.2.4 Pour clore Ia presentation de Ia problematique de Ia 'cognation' des peuples et des langues, de Ia problematique purement historique, je vou­ drais evoquer le fait que Humboldt accepte Ia these de Ia Brevis designatio suivant laquelle "novae facile linguae nascuntur mixtura et corruptione cae­ terarum" (Leibniz 1710:3). II approuve entierement !'idee de mixtura et corruptio comme raisons de Ia creation de nouvelles langues. II attribue meme un poids enorme a Ia discussion de ce phenomene: car si nous ne pouvons pas saisir Ia periode d'organisation pre-historique, nous pouvons l'etudier historiquement ("die Organisationsperiode sogar geschichtlich ver­ folgen" [G. S. IV :7]) quand les langues existantes se melangent et degenerent, quand de nouvelles langues se forment a partir de langues deja formees: Cette confluence de plusieur parlers est un des moments principaux dans Ia genese des langues; soit que la nouvelle langue regoive des elements plus ou moins signifiants des autres langues [ ] soit que des langues cultiv6es se degradent et degenerent. (G.S. IV:5; cf. Trabant 1989) ...

La problematique de Ia creation de nouvelles langues, discutee par Hum­ boldt a plusieurs reprises a propos des langues romanes, constitue l'enjeu theorique de sa Somme, de !'oeuvre sur le kavi (Humboldt 1836-39). 5.0 Der grosse Leibnitz

Sans nous expliquer sur quels arguments il fonde son jugement, Aar­ sleff (1975:404) doute que Leibniz ait eu une grande influence sur Ia pensee linguistique. Probablement soup<;onne+il, comme dans le cas de Humboldt,

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JURGEN TRABANT

que !'importance de Leibniz ait ete exageree outre mesure par l'historiogra­ phie (allemande). En appui a ses doutes, il cite un jugement de S. von Schulenburg (1973) qui met en relief !'action de Leibniz en faveur de la dialectologie allemande et semble ainsi rectuire a ce domaine !'importance de Leibniz. Mais, a part le fait que telle n'etait certainement pas !'intention de Schulenburg, il n'y a aucune necessite historiographique de reduire !'importance de Leibniz pour la linguistique et la philosophie du langage. En ce qui concerne !'etude comparative des langues, Humboldt, qui avait un jugement historique assez sagace, avait cite Leibniz comme pere de !'allgemeine Spachkunde. Benfey (1869) avait qualifie Leibniz d'ancetre de la nouvelle ecole historico-comparative dont il etait le porte-parole. Breal, propagandiste de la nouvelle linguistique 'allemande' en France, dans sa preface a la traduction fran<;aise de Bopp est parfaitement conscient de la tradition qui mene de Leibniz a Bopp via Herder et Windischmann (De Mauro 1970:69). Et si !'on trouve ces auteurs peu crectibles a cause de leur intentions historiographiques 'monumentales', de recentes recherches 'antiquaires' temoignent cependant du rayonnement indeniable qu'ont eu les activites linguistiques de Leibniz: Haarmann (1976:226-27), par exem­ ple, attire !'attention sur le fait que l'entreprise de Pallas est due a nne pro­ position de Leibniz. Et on pent ajouter que L Hemis (1735-1809) se refere explicitement a Leibniz dans ses compilations linguistiques et qu'il y a pro­ bablement nne influence indirecte de Leibniz sur A. Court de Gebelin (17251784) via Ch. de Brasses (1709-1777). Ainsi, pour ailleurs, Leibniz s'insererait tres bien dans la tradition qu'Aarsleff lui-meme croit devoir mettre en relief pour le xvn• siecle quand il met en doute !'image d'un siecle cartesien en matiere linguistique, c'est-a-dire d'un siecle a ecrasante predominance de grammaire generate, et quand il suppose comme egalement caracteristiques de ce siecle les collectionneurs de materiaux historiques concrets sur les lan­ gues historiques, comme M. Fogel de Hambourg (1634-1675). Pour ce qui est des questions de philosophie du langage au sens etroit, !'importance de Leibniz me semble hors de doute (par exemple pour de Brasses, pour Herder), et ne serait-ce que par la discussion de ses vues que nons trouvons dans Humboldt. Une telle influence ebranlerait bien sur cer­ taines convictions historiographiques cheres a Aarsleff, puisqu'elle invali­ derait enormement sa these d'un Humboldt 'ideologue': elle montrerait que la plus grande partie des soi-disant idees 'ideologiques' de Humboldt proviennent en fait de !'heritage leibnizien.

151

NOTES 1.

Dans son chapitre 14 sur les bases leibniziennes de la pensee de Humboldt, Borsche (1981) part de ces notes. Pour Ia transformation ultCrieure de Ia c6h!bre hiCrarchie leibni­ zienne des idees, surtout en ce qui concerne la 'distinction' et Ia 'determination' des mots, cf. Borsche (1981:269-70) et Trabant (1986:79-80).

2.

Menze (1965:312-13 note 12) exagere certainement !'influence de Leibniz quand il t'!:crit que Ia pensee de Humboldt serait plus fortement influencCe par Leibniz que par Kant.

3.

Humboldt pretere le terme 'Sprach-kunde' - en opposition a Sprachenkunde - 'pour rappeler immediatement par cette expression que le langage est en principe un et que ce n'est que ce langage humain unique qui se manifeste diff6remment dans Jes innombrables langues du globe' (G.S. VI:112). A cause de cette unite du langage humain, 'allgemein' veut dire 'universel' et non pas 'global' ou 'englobant toutes les langues', bien que, pour n�aliser ce but, Ia allgemeine Sprachkunde soit bien obligee d'6tudier toutes les langues: l"allgemeines Sprachstudium' 'porte ce nom [de 'allgemein'] parce qu'elle s'6fforce d'6tudier le langage en general et non pas parce qu'elle veut englober toutes les langues, ce a quoi elle est seulement contrainte a cause de cette fin' (G.S. VI:13-14).

4.

Dans le memoire academique sur le duel, qui date de Ia meme epoque (1827), Humboldt reprend cette critique quand il regrette que la linguistique tende a se reduire a Ia recher­ che genealogique (G.S. VI:7) et a se perdre dans Ia collection de fait positifs (G.S. VI:6). Que Ia Sprachkunde, dans les descriptions des langues exotiques, ne soit qu'une teratolo­ gic linguistique, ne s'interessant qu'aux curiosites linguistiques ("Beispiele sonderbarer grammatischer Eigenheiten liefern", [G.S. VI:118]) au lieu de fournir des descriptions structurales, est un autre reproche que Humboldt adresse a Ia linguistique contemporai­ ne; reproche que l'on trouve des les premieres esquisses de son projet linguistique des an­ nees 1810.

5.

Humboldt reprend aussi le second evenement important de cette tradition seculaire, qui est, sans aucun doute, l'essai de Herder sur l'origine du langage, 6crit pour 1'Academic en 1770 (cf. Trabant 1985).

6.

Cf. Leibniz "Et les langues en general etant les plus anciens monuments des peuples, avant 1'6criture et les arts, en marquent le mieux l'origine des cognations et migrations" (N.E. Ill, II, 1).

7.

Cf. "Solange man sich nur mit dem Organismus der Sprachen beschaftigt, betrachtet man sie bloss als Werkzeug zu m6glichem Gebrauch. Was aus ihnen werden kann, muss erst dieser entscheiden. Der zweckmassige Gebrauch wird aber fiir sie immer zur Bildung" (G.S. IV:13, ms.). Cf. aussi Ober die Verschiedenheit... (G.S, VII:165) olt Humboldt op­ pose Ia langue, en tant que 'structure exteme' et outil, a la finalite de la langue ("Zweck derselben"): "Das Werkzeug ist vorhanden und es fallt nun dem Geiste anheim, es zu ge­ brauchen und sich hineinzubauen".

8.

II faudrait cependant pr6ciser que les textes, la Rede, dans lesqueis Humboldt trouve realisee Ia finalite de Ia langue, ne sont pas les textes quotidiens, pratiques ou scientifi­ ques dans un sens 6troit, mais les textes litteraires, philosophiques et historiques ainsi que le 'langage de la vie dans ses conditions naturelles' ("Sprache des Lebens in seinen na­ tiirlichen Verhaltnissen" [G.S. IV:29]), parler en dehors des contraintes pratiques et pu­ rement reterentielles.

152 9.

10.

LE CONCEPT INTERIEUR DE LA LINGUISTIQUE

JURGEN TRABANT Cette distinction leibnizienne ne correspond pas a la distinction humboldtienne entre 'Weltansicht' et "Ansicht von dem Organismus des Denkens" (G.S. IV:397), qui sont des vue subjectives de deux 'mondes' diffCrents, du monde ext6rieur et du monde int6rieur, et qui correspondent plut6t a Ia distinction entre lexique et grammaire. Les expressions leibniziennes se referent toutes les deux aux 'Welt�Ansichten' dont elles designent les ele­ ments objectifs et les 6I6ments subjectifs. Cf. les affirmations suivantes dans la Brevis designatio: "Sed plerumque tractu temporum, crebris translationibus veteres et nativae significationes mutatae sunt aut obscuratae" (1710:2) ou: "[ ... ] et repetitae corruptiones corruptionum omnia tandem originis linea� menta confundunt". Dans les Nouveaux Essais, les langues, malgre leur origine 'physi� que', sont vues comme 'derivatives' ou comme 'extremement alterees', il faut done pren� dre garde a ne pas 'goropiser' (N.E. III, II, 1).

153

19.

Sur Ia profonde solitude de la monade chez Leibniz et Humboldt, cf. Menze (1965:147).

20.

Pour une critique plus detaillCe de Ia Begriffsschrift, ct. le m6moire de Humboldt sur l'ecriture alphabetique (G.S. V:ll2-13).

21.

Heinekamp (1972:470, n.82) remarque que Leibniz appelle parfois la characteristica uni� versalis aussi 'lingua adamica'. Quant aux fondements philosophiques de cette preseance de !'unite sur Ia diversite, cf. Borsche (dans ce volume).

22.

Les monades leibniziennes aussi naissent 'tout d'un coup' (Monadologie, §6sv.) et transforment continuellement, cf. Menze (1965:317, n.5).

23.

Cf. N.E. III, II, 1: "De sorte qu'il n'y a rien en cela qui combatte et qui ne favorise plutOt le sentiment de l'origine de toutes les nations, et d'une langue radicale et primitive".

24.

Cf. "Der Grund und Boden einer Sprache sind die Worte" (U.G. §32).

25.

"Es kann zwar endlich eine jede Sprache, sie sei so arm als sie wolle, alles geben [ ... J. Al­ lein, obschon alles endlich durch Umschweife uod Beschreibung bedeutet werdeo kann, so verliert sich doch bei solcher Weitschweifigkeit aile Lust, aller Nachdruck in dem, der redet, und in dem, der hOrt: dieweil das Gemi.it zu lange aufgehalten wird" (U.G. §59).

se

11.

Cette citation provient de l'Essai sur les langues du nouveau continent, ecrit en fran9ais en 1812. En 1820, quand Humboldt se retire de Ia vie politique et commence a participer aux activites de l'Academie, il avait d'abord pens6 a presenter une traduction de ce texte com� me premier discours acad6mique (cette traduction figure dans les Gesammelte Schriften sous le titre "Versuch tiber die Mexicanische Sprache"). II ecrtt finalement un texte entierement nouveau, Ober das vergleichende Sprachstudium, mais il n'en est pas moins que les reflexions de 1812 en sont le point de depart.

12.

Dans !'Introduction a l'oeuvre sur le kavi, § 18, il ia renouvelle comme une hypothese pro­ bable.

REFERENCES BIBLIOGRAPHIQUES

13.

Cf. Humboldt "On n'a pas encore trouve de langue au�dela de l a frontiere de Ia forma� tion grammaticale complete, aucune n'a ete surprise dans le flot de la genese de ses for­ mes" (G.S. IV:3).

14.

Herder inclus, bien sUr (cf. Trabant 1985).

15.

Cette opposition s6miotique est consid6r6 par Aarsleff (1975:396) comme Ia divergence principale entre Locke et Leibniz.

16.

Seules les langues artificielles aprioriques, "qui soot toutes de choix et entierement arbi� traires" (N.E. III,II,l) comme les langues construites par Dalgamo et Wilkins, corres­ pondent a cette conception. Deja Ies langues artificielles apostCrioriques ne soot jamais purement arbitraires, mais "de choix mete avec ce qu'il y a de Ia nature et du hasard dans les langues qu'elles supposent" (ibid.).

17.

La reprise des castors leibniziens constitue un autre in dice du fait que Humboldt connais­ sait les textes de Leibniz a fond: en ce qui conceme les bases de la societe, Leibniz oppose a Hobbes (homo homini lupus) sa conception irenique, a savoir que "les meilleurs hom� mes, exempts de toute mCchancete, s'uniraient pour mieux obtenir leur but { ... } comme les castors se joignent par centaines pour faire des grandes digues [ . .] (N.E. III,I,1). Humboldt, tout en consentant a cette vue des fondements de Ia societe, precise cepen­ dant, dans un de ses premiers textes sur le langage, qu'un tel d6but de la societe est im­ pensable sans langage: "Eine sprachlose biberartige Gemeinschaft unter Menschen ist schlechterdings ein widersprechender Begriff' ( G.S. VII:596).

Aarsleff, Hans. 1975. "The Eighteenth Century, Including Leibniz". Cur­ rent Trends in Linguistics. Ed. par Thomas A. Sebeok, vol. XIII: Historiography of Linguistics, 383-479. The Hague & Paris: Mouton. Benfey, Theodor. 1869. Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft und orientali­ schen Philologie in Deutschland seit dem Anfange des 19. Jahrhunderts mit einem Rii.ckblick auf die frii.heren Zeiten. Miinchen: Cotta. Borsche, Tilman. 1981. Sprachansichten: Der Begriff der menschlichen Rede in der Sprachphilosophie Wilhelm von Humboldts, Stuttgart: Klett­ Cotta. . (dans ce volume). "Die Sakularisierung des tertium comparatio­ nis". De Mauro, Tullio. 1970. lntroduzione alia semantica . Bari: Laterza. (1ere 6d., Bari: Laterza, 1965.) Dutz, Klaus D . 1983. Zeichentheorie und Sprachwissenschaft bei G. W. Leibniz: Eine kritisch annotierte Bibliographie. Mit einem Anhang: Ulri­ ke Klinkhammer: Sekundiirliteratur zur Sprachforschung im 17. Jahrun­ dert. Munster: Institut fiir Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft. Gessinger, Joachim. 1980. Sprache und Bii.rgertum: Sozialgeschichte sprach­ licher Verkehrsformen im Deutschland des 18. Jahrhunderts. Stuttgart: Metzler.

.

18.

Sur le rapport entre monadologie et diversitC des langues, cf. Heinekamp (1972:484-85) et Menze (1965:242). Selon Menze, on retrouve dans la monadologie les Clements princi­ paux de !'influence de Leibniz sur Humboldt.

---

154

155

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LE CONCEPT JNTERIEUR DE LA LINGUIST!QUE

Ginschel, Gunhild. 1977. "Schwerpunkte der Entwicklung der Sprachwis­ senschaft an der Akademie". Schildt 1977.12-13. Haarman, Harald. 1976. "Die Klassifikation der romanischen Sprachen in den Werken der Komparativisten aus der zweiten Hiilfte des 18. Jahrhunderts (Rudiger, Hervas, Pallas)". In Memoriam Friedrich Diez. Ed. par Hans J. Niederehe & H. Haarmann, 221-43. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Harnack, Adolf. 1900. Geschichte der Koniglich Preuj3ischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. 3 vols . . Berlin: Reichsdruckerei. Heinekamp, Albert. 1972. "Ars characteristica und natiirliche Sprache bei Leibniz". Tijdschrift voorfilosofie. 34:3.446-488. Humboldt, Wilhelm von. 1903-36. Gesammelte Schriften. 17 vols. Ed. par Albert Leitzmann et alii. Berlin: Behr. (Reimpr., Berlin: de Gruyter 1967-68) ( = G.S. I, G.S. II, etc.) . ---. 1974. Introduction a !'oeuvre sur le kavi et autres essais. Trad. de !'allemand par Pierre Caussat. Paris: Ed. du Seuil. Kant, Immanuel. 1968. Critique de Ia faculte de juger. Trad. par A. Philo­ nenko. Paris: Vrin. Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. 1710. "Brevis designatio meditationum de Origi­ nibus Gentium, ductis potissimum ex indicio linguarum". Miscellanea Berolinensia ad incrementum scientiarum . . . 1-16. Berlin: Johan. Christ. Papenii. --. 1717. Collectanea etymologica. Ed. par J. G. Eccard. 2 vols. Hannover: Foerster. (Reimpr., Hildesheim: Olms, 1970 .) ---. 1966. Nouveaux Essais sur l'entendement humain. Ed. par Jacques Brunschwig. Paris: Garnier Flammarion. --. 1983. Unvorgreifliche Gedanken, betreffend die Ausiibung und Ver­ besserung der deutschen Sprache. Zwei Aufsiitze. Ed. par Uwe Piirksen. ---. 1983. La Monadologie . Ed. par Emile Boutroux. Paris: Delagrave. Liebrucks, Bruno. 1965. Sprache und Bewuj3tsein. Bd. 2: Sprache. Wilhelm von Humboldt. Frankfurt am Main: Lang. Locke, John. 1961 [1690]. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 2 vols. London: Dent; New York: Dutton. Menze, Clemens. 1965. Wilhelm von Humboldts Lehre und Bild vom Menschen. Ratingen: Henn. Mladenov, Stefan. 1950. "Voltaire im Unrecht gegen Leibniz als genialen Sprachforscher". Miscellanea Academica Berolinensia: Gesammelte

Abhandlungen zur Feier des 250jiihrigen Bestehens der Deutschen Aka­ demie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, II,l. 15-29. Berlin: Akademie­ Verlag. Neff, Landolin. 1870. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz als Sprachforscher und Etymologe. Erster Theil. Heidelberg: Avenarius. Robinet, Andre. 1978. Le langage a !'age classique. Paris: Klincksieck. Scharf, Hans-Werner. 1977. Chomskys Humboldt-Interpretation. Ein Bei­ trag zur Diskontinuitiit der Sprachtheorie in der Geschichte der neueren Linguistik. These de doctorat, Univ. de Dusseldorf. Schlegel, Friedrich. 1808. Uber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier. Heidel­ berg: Mohr & Zimmer. (Nouvelle ed., Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1977.) Schildt, Joachim ed. 1977. Erbe-Vermiichtnis und Verpflichtung. Zur sprachwissenschaftlichen Forschung in der Geschichte der AdW der DDR. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag. Schulenburg. Sigrid von der. 1973. Leibniz a/s Sprachforscher. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann. Suchsland, Peter. 1977. "Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716): U ber sein theoretisches und sein praktisches Verhiiltnis zur deutschen Sprache". Schildt 1977:32-59. Trabant, Jiirgen. 1985. "Humboldt zum Ursprung der Sprache. Ein Nach­ trag zum Problem des Sprachursprungs in der Geschichte der Akade­ mie". Zeitschrift fiir Phonetik, Sprachwissenschaft und Kommunikations­ forschung. 38:576-89. ---. 1986. Apeliotes oder Der Sinn der Sprache: Wilhelm von Humboldts Sprach-Bild. Miinchen: Fink. (a paraltre). "Jenseits der Griinzlinie". Der Ursprung der Sprache. Ed. par J. Gessinger & W. von Rahden. Berlin & New York: de Gruyter. ---. 1989. "Entre Raynouard et Diez: Humboldt romaniste". Actes du XVIII' Congres International de Linguistique et Philologie Romanes, Treves 1986. --.

SUMMARY

When in 1820 Humboldt delivered his first paper on the comparative ' study of la guages befor d the Prussian Academy of Sciences, he was fully

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156

J0RGEN TRABANT

aware of the tradition of that institution: The Academy had been founded by Leibniz and the first article in its first publication, the Miscellanea Berolinensia (1710), was Leibniz's Brevis designatio of the origin of nations by means of linguistic investigations. Humboldt's speech was a reply to that Leibnitian text and can be interpretated as a commentary on Leibniz's lin­ guistic conceptions: First of all, to Leibnitian heteronomy Humboldt, in a Kantian framework, opposes the autonomy of linguistic studies (in a sub­ sequent text, however, Humboldt approves of Leibniz's philosophical moti­ vations of linguistic research as corresponding to its interior concept). The historico-empirical reconstruction of the origin of nations ex indicia lin­ guarum being impossible, Humboldt solves the problem of the research on the origines gentium by distinguishing the transcendental aspect (origo) from the really historical one (cognatio). Even if the Kantian philosophical revolution differentiates Humboldt's approach sharply from Leibniz's, Leibniz has taken important steps towards the recognition of the linguistic­ ity of thought by his critique of the traditional instrumental and representa­ tive language theory. (Leibniz's platonicist attitude towards the characteris­ tica universalis, nevertheless, marks clearly the fundamental difference.) As far as historical research (cognatio) is concerned, Humboldt contrasts Leib­ niz with a century of factual and methodological insights in comparative studies. In his major work, Humboldt tries to develop Leibniz's theorem of mixtura and corruptio as the sources of the creation of new languages.

The Philosophical and Anthropological Place of Wilhelm von Humboldt's Linguistic Typology Linguistic comparison as a means to compare the different processes of human thought Donatella di Cesare

University of Rome

To Stephen D. Dowden Ich mOchte [ . . . ] entwickeln, wie der grammatische Bau in allen seinen Ver� schiedenheiten doch nur gewissen, einzeln aufzuzablenden Methoden folgen kann. Mit diesen Methoden selbst aber betrachte ich natiirlich den EinfluB jeder auf den Geist und das Gemiit [ . . . ] und kniipfe also das Sprachstudium an die philosophische Dber­ sicht der Bildungsf3.higkeit des Menschen­ geschlechts und an die Geschichte. Wilhelm von Hurriboldt in a letter to F. G. Welcker of 3 Dec. 1828 (1859:144) 1. A historical outline of linguistic typology would have to clear away numerous theoretical doubts as well as confront a variety of historical and historiographical issues.

1.1 For example, it would first of all be necessary to ascertain which epoch would reveal an interest in the study of linguistic typology. Because the idea of linguistic diversity is closely connected with it, we must assume that its traces would be distinguishable even in periods preceding the foundation of

"

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linguistic typology as an autonomous discipline, which, as we know, occur­ red during the era of Romanticism (cf. Coseriu 1972; Gipper & Schmitter 1979; Ramat 1976a, 1985; Renzi 1976). In fact, a typological interest in lan­ in the work of G.W. guage is evident - to mention only two names Leibniz (De Mauro 1965:55-56) and in that of Adam Smith (Coseriu 1968). Moreover, the occasional observations of various other scholars, who took part in the lively controversies surrounding the question of the merits and demerits of different literary languages between the 17th and the 18th cen­ turies, are frequently of great interest (Robins 1973). Going back even farther into. the past, we would likely arrive at the inquiries of the Greeks and the Romans, who - as Humboldt put it were "zu sehr in ihren heimischen Sprachen befangen" (Verschiedenheiten [GS VI:119]) to under­ stand the value of comparing them with others. Yet they could not altogether avoid reflecting on linguistic differences, as the controversy between the anomalists and the analogists plainly indicates.

on it. A history of the field would need to uncover and analyze other equally profound and essential reasons. First of all, there was a preference accorded to empirical research because it seemed better equipped to satisfy the demands of comparativism. In the positivistic atmosphere of the times, empirical research promised concrete and tangible results. By contrast, the study of theoretical foundations seemed too obscure, an approach so philo­ sophical that it could be abandoned with no ill effect. Typology originated as an autonomous and systematic discipline within a theory of language that, because of its complexity, would have been sub­ jected from the very beginning to reductions, misunderstandings, and equivocations of every kind. The results of these confusions would have manifested themselves even in the field of typology because of the theory's closely interconnected parts. I am referring, as is perhaps already evident, to Wilhelm von Humboldt's theory of language. The historian of linguistic typology would have to grapple with many and varied issues, but a major chapter would certainly have to be dedicated to Humboldt's achievement as founder of the discipline.

158

1.2 A hypothetical history of linguistic typology would also be plagued with the problem of finding a guiding theme within the vast and heterogeneous panorama of relevant studies. Even in ·more recent times, discontinuity has characterized the development of the typology of lan­ guage. The questions it raises have tended to be addressed obliquely and in a random fashion, or at times glossed over entirely. Predominating are philosophico-literary inquiries that typically focus attention upon the superiority, perfection and greater beauty of one language as opposed to others. They offer solutions to the questions they pose by resorting to extra­ linguistic criteria, and their dubious judgements have no doubt had a far­ reaching negative effect on the foundation and development of linguistic typology as a rigorous discipline. 1.3 At first, linguistic typology seemed destined to be ephemeral, and in fact it survived only as a minor trend in the shadow of a similar discipline that was asserting itself at the same time: comparative-historical linguistics. As Jakobson (1971:524) observed Premature speculations on linguistic kinship soon gave way to the first tests and achievements of the comparative historical method, whereas questions of typology retained a speculative, prescientific character for a long time.

Typology's initial failure was not due only to the observations and sub­ jective judgements that the philosophico-literary tradition had bequeathed

More and more linguists are in agreement that we owe the founding of linguistic typology to Humboldt (Coseriu 1972 and elsewhere; Gipper 1965:9; Gipper & Schmitter 1979:82-83; Morpurgo-Davies 1975; Ramal 1974, 1985; Telegdi 1970), but there are still some who believe that Frie­ drich Schlegel (1772-1829) and August Wilhelm Schlegel (1767-1845) origi­ nated the discipline.

2.

2.1 For a long time, the mistaken opinion of August Schleicher (18211868) and August Friedrich Pott (1802-1887) went undisputed. According to them, Humboldt took from August Wilhelm Schlegel (1818:14) the tripartition of language into 'isolating' (isolierende) , 'agglutinative' (agglutinierende), and 'inflectional' (flexierende) languages.1 To these, they suggest, he went on to add a fourth group, the 'incorporating' (einver­ leibende) languages. It will not diminish the reputation of the Schlegels or of Adam Smith - from whom Humboldt drew many points for his typology (Coseriu 1968, 1980a:157-58, 1980b:199-200) - to make two critical obser­ vations. The intuitive form of the observations of Smith (1762) and of F. Schlegel (1808) and A.W. Schlegel (1818) make them precursors, not foun­ ders, of linguistic typology. Only with Humboldt did the true import of their reflections become clear, for it was he who developed them in a

160

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"' 'II 'II

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Ill '" Il l

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HUMBOLDT'S LINGUISTIC TYPOLOGY

wholly different context, one that gave them a significantly different mean­ ing. Nor it is really accurate to speak of them as precursors except in a qual­ ified sense; they classified languages, in the philosophico-literary tradition, in order to discover the most superior class.2

Analogie, Sprachform, and Sprachbau, we will try to shed some light on what Humboldt meant when he spoke of 'Sprachtypus'. The clarification of this concept should help to find solutions to the problems currently facing linguistic typology.

2.2 Humboldt - whose originality overturned the linguistic tradition of the time and whose contribution to the field has yet to be fully recognized - never intended to elaborate a classification of languages. Moreover, he was the first to introduce the concept of 'type' into linguistics, and his sys­ tem stands in manifest contrast to the era's practices of classification. How­ ever, his concept was so fraught with the other fundamental and complex aspects of his thought that it must have been perceived as overly compli­ cated. Thus it was reduced to the more common and less awkward concept of 'class', and as a result, the beginnings of the theoretical discipline of typology, with its long series of more or less unmotivated classifications, became a sterile - perhaps even retrogressive - branch of comparative linguistics. This initial interpretation of Humboldt's concept of 'type' found confirmation among the Humboldtians themselves, for instance in the works of Heymann Steinthal (1823-1899) of 1850 and 1860 and Franz Nikolaus Finck (1867-1910) of 1910. It persists even to this day, not only in specific works of linguistic typology such as that of Skalicka (1979:316), but even in Telegdi's article bearing the significant title "Humboldt als Begriin­ der der Sprachtypologie" (1970:34). Humboldt undoubtedly provoked this misunderstanding, at least in part. He was attempting to escape the traditional understanding of linguis­ tic differences in order to introduce an utterly new perspective through his original conception of language. His alternation between the terms 'type' ("Typus") and 'class' ("Klasse") expresses his vacillation between the tradi­ tion and his own original work. In order to avoid a common error, it is wise to distinguish two separate tendencies in Humboldt's texts: the one is internal to his theory, the other is external to it. In the first, Humboldt develops the concept of 'type' and explicitly raises objections to the classifi­ cation of languages. In the second one, which occupies much less space , he makes some concessions to classification (Coseriu 1972:134) and al!ows himself more or less debatable judgements about the perfection of languages.3 In instances of this sort it is necessary to adopt a criterion of hermeneutic coherence. We shall take up his first tendency, the one that is internal to his linguistic theory. With the help of its key concepts, i.e.,

Humboldt derived the concept of 'type' directly from Goethe (Cassirer 1945:114ff. ; Benes 1958:40).' The influence comes as no surprise, for Hum­ boldt regarded Goethe as an individual realization of humanity's most ele­ vated form. Goethe was decisive for Humboldt's intellectual development, influencing both his theory of knowledge and his comparative anthropology (Leroux 1958:232ff. ; Marino 1976:33ff. ; Ivaldo 1980:47ff.). 3.

3.1 Many points link Humboldt to Goethe: common to both authors' philosophies is the centrality of the anthropological question, which leads to a shared interest in man in general but also to a special interest in human creativity. Thus it is no accident that the term 'Typus' emerges for the first time in Humboldt's writings in a passage from the Plan einer vergleichenden Anthropologie (GS I:378), which he wrote around 1795. Though in many ways incomplete, the Plan remains a fundamental work. Humboldt obvi­ ously conceived of it in close coordination with Goethe's comparative mor­ phology (1790; 1795), a work from which he expected to draw some useful insights on comparative analysis (Marino 1976:33). Humboldt's intention in the Plan was to give a precise account of the principles and methods of comparative anthropology. Its overarching theme is the diversity mamfest in the human world, a veritable leitmotiv in Humboldt's work. In Humboldt, as in Goethe, the urge to compare was borne of an enthusiastic interest for the sphere of diversity which, dominated by relationships of affinity and disparity, extends infinitely between the poles of individuality and univer­ sality. Orientation in this sphere, the ability to compare the various forms, is for Goethe (1795) not simply a matter of grasping its distinctive features, of limiting oneself to single elements. Instead, it is necessary to grasp the singularity of the form in its totality, i.e., the type that subtends individual form, the way in which the parts are gathered into a whole. This coherence, this structure of functions, according to Goethe, for whom everything is organic, makes it possible to trace a function back to its type, to the over­ arching web of connections of which it is a part, and vice versa. For this reason the type, the principle of an organism's formation, must constitute the basis of every comparison. Goethe suggests that forms must be

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analyzed and judged not on the basis of external, but of internal end; not by their correspondence with external needs, but by internal organization. This thought influences Humboldt's linguistic theory at a fundamental level.

4. But how could comparative linguistic study provide a decisive con­ tribution to philosophical anthropology? What did Humboldt hope to achieve through the comparison of different languages? And what could be the reason why he extended his comparison even to non-Indo-European languages, to Basque, to Chinese, to American Indian and to Polynesian languages, - "rough and primitive" tongues disdained by most learned people of the time?

3.2 After a series of anthropological writings, Humboldt seems almost sud­ denly to abandon the field. Just as suddenly - if we leave aside his earlier philological training there emerges the interest in language. How is the sudden shift to be explained? Is Humboldt about to give up his plans for a new philosophical anthropology, his vision of a new philosophy with man in his totality at its center? Is he moving away from his friend and teacher Goethe? Upon careful examination, we see that the apparent change is decep­ tive; his new studies are much more a fundamental result of his anthropological work. He has taken up a humanistic theme that reaches back to the Greeks, one to which both he and Goethe were attached. He understands language as the key that will unlock human nature. In his anthropology, Humboldt had sought to understand the diversity of human nature, and language - which belongs to all human beings, which is the highest, clearest, and most tangible form of thought through which human creativity is revealed offers him a promising avenue of investigation. To comprehend the diversity of human nature, one must begin by com­ prehending the diversity of human language. For Humboldt the value of comparative linguistic study resides in its use toward understanding man; it is a need that arose from his anthropology. Humboldt's project focused primarily on the study of Basque (Trabant 1985:168), and sent him on a journey to the Iberian peninsula. The result was an attempt to describe the Basque language; see his Fragmente der Monographie ilber die Basken of 1801-1802. During this period his strong relationship to Goethe remained undiminished, and perhaps became even stronger: we can see this from the fact that Humboldt introduced in the Fragmente (GS VII:598), one of his first linguistic studies, the concept of 'type'. Moreover, he ascribed to it a fundamental role in comparative linguistic study. Cassirer (1945) rightly pointed out to a link between Goethe's mor­ phology and modern structuralism. Even from a historical point of view, the connection is represented by the concept of 'type' that Humboldt intro­ duced into linguistics.

4.1 In a passage from Ober die Verschiedenheiten (GS VI:119), Humboldt censures the dismissive attitude of his era toward the languages of 'primi­ tive' peoples: . . . giebt es doch auch jetzt noch viele, welche die Zergliederung von Sprachen uncultivierter Nationen kaum fiir mehr, als fiir eine Beschaf­ tigung miissiger Wissbegierde halten, h6chstens geeignet, auffallende, aber wenig weiter fiihrende Aehnlichkeiten entfemter Sprachen aufzude­ cken, und Beispiele sonderbarer grammatischer Eigenheiten zu liefem. { ] Auch bei uns dankt die allgemeine Sprachkunde die Aufmerksarnkeit, die man ihr, etwa seit Leibnitz Zeiten geschenkt hat, weniger ihrem innem Begriff, als dem Streben, die Verwandtschaft der VOlker etymologisch aufzufinden, und der Geschaftigkeit der, unbekiimmert urn den augenblicklichen Zweck, alles Wissbare unermiidet zusammentragenden Gelehrsamkeit . ...

This reduction of linguistic comparison to a simple pastime for the erudite hides a fundamental theoretical presupposition that still persists. In Hum­ boldt's times, August Ferdinand Bernhardi's (1769-1820) writings published between 1801 and 1805 are an example of this reductionist effort. The force of this presupposition insinuates that the grammatical variety of languages is a superficial phenomenon of little consequence because all human beings share the power of reason, which suggests in turn that there must be a shared logical structure underlying all languages. Every language, then, ought to reflect this structure in its grammar. Compared with the study of universal logical structure, the analysis of grammatical differences can only appear as absolutely marginal. Humboldt's position is completely different. Following Kant, but going beyond him in many aspects of his gnoseological theory, Humboldt asserts that thought exists only through language, or rather, through the historical languages. Thus there is no one universal way of thought but many possible ways of thinking which are realized in the different languages - all equally worthy because human creativity generates them all. The basic affirmation

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of linguistic pluralism which distinguishes Humboldt's position explains his interest in the study of languages, which is not and cannot be a merely eru­ dite interest, but is a philosophico-anthropological one. Through the com­ parison of languages, Humboldt aimed at finding the historically realized ways in which human thought has been proceeding (cf. Trabant 1985: 16670).

self establishes a correlation between language's organic unity and its analogical configuration, when he observes "dass Alles in einer Sprache auf Analogie beruht, und ihr Bau, bis in seine feinste Theile hinein, ein organischer Bau ist" (Ankiindigung, 1812 [GS III:295]). From this perspec­ tive he holds

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4.2 Given the new perspective within which such a comparison must be made, it is necessary to clarify the criteria of its method. Humboldt criticized earlier attempts at comparison for analyzing details and trivia, and for neglecting what is essential in every language, namely the cohe­ sion (Zusammenhang) of its individual structure (see Verschiedenheiten [GS VI:119]). It was already a dominant idea of the time that in order to ascertain the differences between two languages, it was necessary to com­ pare their structures; F. Schlegel (1808:44) is an example. The idea had been present in Humboldt's early writings as well (Berichtigungen und Zusiitze of 1811 [GS III:249]). Returning to it, he asserts throughout his writings that the comparison of single elements alone is insufficient; com­ parative linguistic study must take organic wholes into account. However, what distinguishes Humboldt is the penetrating depth with which he explores the metaphor of 'organism'. From this point onward, and more precisely - as we will see from his dynamic conception of language,' we can follow him in his solitary journey toward the foundation of linguistic typology. 5.1 Significantly, Humboldt uses the concept of 'analogy' to specify the criteria of comparative method. It is the tool that should uncover the inter­ connections (Zusammenhiinge) of a language. Many works display his interest in and use of analogy, but it is particularly obvious in a little known essay that deals with the theme expressely: An Essay on the best Means of ascertaining the Affinities of Oriental Languages of 1828 (GS IV:78-80). Indeed, Humboldt bases his notion of language as an organic whole on the idea of 'analogy'. Given that language is not an aggregate, because "es giebt nichts Einzelnes in der Sprache, jedes ihrer Elemente kiindigt sich nur als Theil eines Ganzen an" (Vergleichendes Sprachstudium, of 1820 [GS IV:14-15]), analogy is the nexus linking "jeden einzelnen Theil in ihr aufs festeste mit allen iibrigen" (Brief an Schiller of September 1800). Without analogy, the image of the organism would remain obscure; Humboldt him-

Man kann die Sprache mit einem ungeheuren Gewebe vergleichen, in dem jeder Theil mit dem andren und aile mit dem Ganzen in mehr oder weniger deutlich erkennbarem Zusarnmenhange stehen (Kawi�Werk; {GS VII:71]).

This 'nexus' is analogical in character, and thus language reveals itself as "ein zusammenhiingendes Gewebe von Analogieen" (Kawi-Werk; GS VII:278). 5.2 From this perspective, the supporting concept of Humboldtian linguis­ tics - the 'Sprachform' - takes on a sharper profile both in its synchronic value ("Form") and in its diachronic value ("Formung"). By way of the analogy principle, we can piece together what Humboldt means when he writes: Die charakteristische Fonn der Sprache hangt an jedem einzelnen ihrer kleinsten Elemente, jedes wird durch sie, wie unmerklich es im Einzelnen sey, auf irgend eine Weise bestimmt. (Verschiedenheiten [GS VI:245}; Kawi-Werk; [GS VII:48])

Form, which bestows upon a language its ideal unity, the condition of its existence (Kawi-Werk [GS VII:278]), reveals itself - if we take into con­ sideration the inward link that characterizes it in the interconnecting of every single element - to be a great interweaving, a network of analogies which, one interwoven with the other, constitute the unique way of seeing the world that is immanent in any given language. But we know, too, that form has not only a synchronic but also a diachronic dimension; it is to be assumed that form shapes and reshapes substance analogically, in accor­ dance with the principle that simultaneously characterizes its structure and guides its actual structuring. This is the principle of 'type', i.e., the Goeth­ ean principle of formation that underlies each and every organic whole, the unique way in which any such whole interconnects its parts. If form gives language its unity, then type gives it its individuality, that makes it distinct from all others. From the perspective of the inward link that - within a language - connects all of its elements to the whole, it can be asserted that

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type is the unique law of analogy that interpenetrates and conditions all of language so that each of its elements is manifestly 'typical'.

Bild eines organischen Ganzen" (Kawi-Werk [GS VII:45]). Language's innumerable details have to be assembled into a unity, the same unity that is the condition of its existence. The scholar must follow this path if he wishes to approach the secrets of language and attempt to unveil its essence (Kawi-Werk [GS VII:49]). It is not a question of neglecting or ignoring peculiarities; instead, one must avoid seeing them as isolated facts. They are to be examined insofar as it is possible to discover within them the method of language formation, the general type (Kawi-Werk [GS VII:51 ]). Humboldt's descriptive method in the Mexikanische Grammatik,6 written about 1825, indicates the progression of steps involved in the study of lan­ guage: from single facts, to the reconstruction of the internal organization, and finally to the type, the general principle that holds the organization together. Now, if the type of formation of a language represents, so to speak, the final aim of the analysis of a particular language, it is simultaneously, in Humboldt's view, the foundation of comparative linguistic study:

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5.3 In his essay Ober Goethes Herrmann und Dorothea (1798), Humboldt argues that all things can be thought only "unter der. Bedingung eines durch­ giingigen inneren Zusammenhangs" (GS II:128). The need to find con­ nections is basic to human thought. The desire "diese ungeheure Masse ein­ zelner und abgerissener Erscheinungen in eine ungetrennte Einheit und ein organisiertes Ganzes zu verwandeln" (129) constantly guides man's intel­ lectual activity: Wohin der Mensch nur immer seine Blicke richten mag, da sucht er den Begriff eines gegenseitigen Zusammenhanges, einer innern Organisation geltend zu machen (GS 11:128) .

Every language, then, is borne of this intimate need common to all men, but every language unfolds it differently according to its own Jaw of anal­ ogy. The force of Humboldt's words in his Essai sur les langues du nouveau continent of 1812 is similar, when he writes that a language represents "en quelque fa�on tout l'univers sous un meme type" (GS II:�19). This princi­ ple of formation, which allows some links while excluding others, inevitably leads language to certain procedures of connection that enable it to main­ tain itself as an organic whole. It can therefore be deduced that a con­ stituent element of type is its value of possibility (Scalicka 1976b:110). The basic correlation between Humboldt's concepts of 'analogy' and of 'type' - and therefore also between 'type' and 'Sprachform' - emerges even in the early writings. In a particularly symptomatic passage from the Fragmente (GS VI:600) Humboldt outlines the perspective of someone learning a language, a perspective that is opposite to the native speaker's. While the native speaker already possesses the linguistic type that allows him to speak even just a single word of that particular language (Ver­ gleichendes Sprachstudium [GS IV:15]), the language learner, on the con­ trary, must begin with a single form and go on "einen allgemeinen Typus der Form der Sprache abzuziehen" (GS VII:600), i.e. , the principle of its formation. To put it another way, he must find "den Geist ihrer Analogie" (GS VII:600) which constitutes the truly crucial moment in learning any new language. 5.4 The linguist's perspective resembles that of the language learner in its basic contours. He must gather together and tie up the loose ends "in das

Urn [ . . . ] verschiedne Sprachen in Bezug auf ihren charakteristischen Bau fruchtbar mit einander zu vergleichen, muss man der Form einer jeden derselben sorgfaltig nachforschen. (Kawi-Werk [GS VII:45]).

Humboldt is wary of the facile and misleading juxtaposition of isolated ele­ ments; the point of reference in any comparison can only be the Sprachtypus. Thus in any comparative linguistic study, it is first of all imperative to find the general type of the linguistic forms that are under scrutiny (Mexikanische Sprache [GS IV:252]). Humboldt's emphatic reiter­ ation of this point offers us the answer to a problem in contemporary lin­ guistics: to provide a foundation for the theoretical priority of typology in any comparative study (Coseriu 1980a, 1983; Hjelmslev 1963; Ramat 1976b; Skalicka 1979). If the primary aim of any linguistic study is to determine the general type, the principle that guides the formation of a language, the problem is then that of concretely detecting this type. As I shall sketch below, Hum­ boldt's solution is an index to the originality of his position.

6.

6.1 In the preceding observations, language as form seemed to be a web of analogies in which every part is joined to the whole by a more or less dis­ tinctly identifiable nexus. This nexus is to be sought in the part of language in which form largely predominates: grammar (cf. Swiggers 1985). Much

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more than vocabulary, grammar constitutes, . as we noted earlier, "ein Ganzes von Analogieen" (Verschiedenheiten [GS VI:254]), and through grammar it is possible to penetrate into the structure of vocabulary, which seems looser and far less compact than that of grammar (cf. Ver­ schiedenheiten [GS VI:140]). This is why Humboldt never tires of reiterat­ ing that similarities and differences between languages can be established only through the comparison of grammatical form (Verschiedenheiten [GS VI:249, 254]), since lexical items are far less typical and less closely linked to the whole.

i.e., to make the unity of its form emerge, linguistic analysis must first of all detect the syntactic construction type. For even though form is more evi­ dent in grammar - in what Humboldt refers to as "Gesetz, Richtung, Verfahrungweise" (Von dem grammatischen Baue [GS VI:348]) - syntactic type nonetheless determines the grammatical organization of language. Particular grammatical forms are structured in strict dependence on the syntactic type (Grundziige [GS V:449]). Consequently, the path to linguis­ tic form passes through the syntactic type. It alone can disclose what Hum­ boldt calls 'die grammatische Ansicht' of a language ( Grundziige [GS V:445]). In the syntactic type we can grasp the peculiarity of language, its way of making connections. Syntactic type is the fundamental point of ref­ erence needed to ascertain the affinities and differences between languages. The diversity of languages, essentially an intellectual diversity (cf. Kawi­ Werk [GS VII:192]), a diversity among the ways of the thought-process, cannot but exist in the synthesis toward which every language leads its speaker.

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6.2 Humboldt's comments in this respect seem hardly to differ from those of, for example, the Schlegel brothers, who also had emphasized the impor­ tance of grammatical structure for a comparative linguistic study.' However, it is precisely Humboldt's dynamic conception of language that leads him far beyond this position. In language, he observes, "nichts [ . . . ] ist statisch, alles dynamisch" (Verschiedenheiten [GS VI:146]), and so it "muss immer von der Seite ihres lebendigen Wirkens betrachtet werden, wenn man ihre Natur wahrhaft erforschen [ . . . ] will" (ibid. ) . As a system of words and rules, language is nothing but "ein todtes Machwerk" (Kawi-Werk [GS VII:46]). Close analysis reveals within it a network of analogies, more evi­ dent in the grammar than in the vocabulary, but nonetheless analogies that are, as it were, crystallized - the 'linking event' has already occurred and is finished. But the character of a given language is not to be sought in the designation of objects nor in its grammatical details. The principle of its for­ mation, the law of analogy peculiar to it, is manifest in the syntactic connec­ tion of speech. A language's distinctive character "aussert sich minder in der Bezeichnung der Gegenstiinde, als in der Anordnung des Ganzen der Rede" (Die Sprachen der Siidseeinseln [GS IV:42]). The linguistic type, the particular way in which thought proceeds - the way in which connections occur within a language - ought to be sought in speech, for the act of speaking is, in the thought of Humboldt, the creative act par excellence. 6.3 The comparison of languages requires not so much, or not only, atten­ tion to grammatical structure, but much more the analysis of the syntactic type. Humboldt deals with the centrality ofthe 'syntactic type', or the Con­ structionstypus for linguistic study in two of his fundamental works: Grundziige des allgemeinen Sprachtypus (1824-26) and Von dem grammati­ schen Baue der Sprachen (1827-29). In order to form a concept of language,

6.4 Because the syntactic connection is realized concretely as the indi­ vidual act of speaking, linguistic analysis must begin with Rede. This aspect of Humboldt's project conforms utterly with his thesis that "die eigentliche Sprache in dem Acte ihres wirklichen Hervorbringens liegt" (Kawi-Werk [GS VII:46]). In his view, all inquiries that aim at penetrating the living essence of language must always consider the connection of speech "als das Wahre und Erste" (ibid. ) . Since speech (Rede) manifests a language's specific procedure (Sprachverfahren), Humboldt suggests that we must begin with the individual speech act in order to piece together the type of syntactic construction of that language in its general form. By abstracting from what is individual within the speech acts, we should be able to identify the 'allgemeinen Redetypus' (Von dem grammatischen Baue [GS VI:360]) that is present in the mind of every speaker and that is the basis of every utterance ( Grundziige [GS V:454]). Yet because the syntactic construc­ tion's general form never appears concretely, since it can only be expressed through the mediation of the individual utterance, this operation is any­ thing but simple. The individuality of a language is actually only relative, because true individuality can exist only in the isolated linguistic act: "Erst im Individuum erhiilt die Sprache ihre letzte Bestimmtheit" (Kawi-Werk [GS VII:65]). When the individual speaks - and this Rede is an act of free­ dom - he makes use of the tools that language puts at his disposal, words

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and the ways of making connections, to express his own thoughts crea­ tively. s Even though thought can develop only in conformity with syntactic type, it inevitably bears the mark of the speaking individual, of individual speech. In Rede, a dialectic between freedom (Freiheit) of the speaker and regularity (Gesetzmiij3igkeit) of language takes place (Grundziige [GS V:455]).

cally occurring language is, in its turn, achieved only in the individual type of speech. The universal exists only in the individual: "ces deux extremites de nos idees et de nos connoissances, s'expliquent toujours reciproque­ ment, et ne peuvent etre comprises que l'une par le secours de !'autre" (Essai [GS II:340]). Such is the origin of difficulties in linguistic study, which must recognize what is typical within homogeneity. In fact, universal­ ity and individuality in language

7. This dialectic within language leads us to yet another that takes place within language as a whole. It is the dialectic between universality and indi­ viduality. Now we should be able to elaborate the concept of type more fully as well as to grasp the relationships that tie one language to others and that render absurd the division of languages into closed classes. 7.1 Proceeding from the anthropologically conditioned presupposition of mankind's unity, Humboldt is able to affirm the profound homogeneity of all languages (cf. Grundzuge [GS V:383]; Verschiedenheiten [GS VI:246]): Car le genre humain a, de meme qu'une nation et qu'un individu, sa sphere d'idees dont il ne sauroit sortir, et une langue d'un type et d'un caractere determint!:S, avec la difference seulment, que ce type et ce carac­ tere admettent au dedans de leurs limites respectives un nombre ind6finis� sable de varietes par lesquels seuls ils peuvent �tre apperr;Us et approfon­ dis" (Essai [GS III:339-40]).

This passage tells us that there is a general type of language distinct from the general type of a particular historical language, even if Humboldt uses 'allgemeiner Typus' to describe both. The Mexikanische Grammatik allows the most precise specification of the general linguistic type, which is an 'in­ nerer Grundtypus' that must ultimately be identified with the 'Bildung des Satzes' (Mexikanische Grammatik: 177). Every language achieves this fundamental aim differently. Indeed, every language has its own type, its own individual means of making connections, whose general form must be deduced from individual speech. On the other hand, each distinct instance of Rede, in its specificity, achieves the general type of language in a differ­ ent way. Therefore, even though the syntactic type is present in the mind of each speaker, Humboldt suggests that we must assume that there is "eine, wenn gleich innerhalb engerer Griinzen verschiedne individuelle Auffas­ sung des grammatischen Typus" (Von dem grammatischen Baue [GS VI:375]). The general type of language, then, is present only in a particular type peculiar to a historical language; and the general type of the histori-

k6nnen daher nur in der Idee getrennt werden, und man muss, obgleich das Individuelle, als die unmittelbare Tatsache, bloss wahrgenommen, nicht zergliedert ftir den Verstand dargestellt werden kann, doch soviel als moglich beide in ihrer Einheit auffassen" (Grundziige [GS V:394]).

7.2 The dialectic between individual speech and language together with the role that Humboldt ascribes to Rede, the individual, creative act, make it possible to modify the linguistic type in actual speech. The realization of the general type of language cannot be accomplished passively, as Hum­ boldt admits even the existence of individual type, though within certain limitations. From here proceeds the transformation of the functional princi­ ples that organize language. And from here, too, from the knowledge that linguistic type supports a variety of individual realizations, there arises the idea of the co-existence within a single language of several types, several ways of linking.' In the Kawi-Werk where, significantly, Verfahren and Methode tend to supplant the term Typus, Humboldt (GS VII: 144) observes that it is possible to discern the traces of the three types - 'inflec­ tional', 'agglutinating' and 'incorporating' - in most languages: Aile Sprachen tragen eine oder mehrere dieser Fonnen in sich und es kommt zur Beurtheilung ihrer relativen Vorziige darauf an, wie sie jene abstracten Formen in ihre concrete aufgenommen haben oder vielmehr welches das Princip dieser Annahme oder Mischung ist? Diese Unterscheidung der abstracten mOglichen Formen von den concreten wirklich vorhandenen wird, wie ich mir schmeichle, schon dazu beitragen, den befremdenden Eindruck des Heraushebens einiger Sprachen, als der allein berechtigten, welches die andren eben dadurch zu unvollkommen­ eren stempelt, zu vermindern (Kawi-Werk [GS VII:255]).

The co-existence of several types within one system does not threaten the unity of a language, which is a condition of that language's existence. "Jene Einheit aber - Humboldt asserts - kann nur die eines ausschliesslich vor­ waltenden Princips seyn" (Kawi-Werk [GS Vll:161]). What assures the unity of the system in spite of the presence of several types is the predomi-

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nance of one method over others; where such a method "bestimmt vorwal­ tet und zum Mittelpunkt des Organismus wird, da lenkt sie auch den gan­ zen Bau, ·in strengerer oder loserer Consequenz nach sich bin" (Kawi-Werk [GS VII: 144]). The degree of a language's functional coherence depends on the extent to which its type predominates, Sanskrit, Chinese, and the Mex­ ican language (Nahuatl) are, in Humboldt's view, examples for the almost complete
Humboldt sought to determie typological affinities as well, and he distin­ guished them from all other possible relations of similarity between lan­ guages, Anticipating the needs of contemporary linguistic typology (Jakob­ son 1958; Hjelmslev 1963; Skalicka 1979; Coseriu 1980a, 1983), Humboldt refers to languages of the same Gebiet as having only lexical elements in common; languages of the same Stamm as possessing grammatical elements that evince a genetic relationship; languages in which the same Sprachtypus is realized and which share a syntactic connection and so also grammatical organization; languages that are associated only by virtue of the fact that they are human languages (Verschiedenheiten [GS VI:294]), Humboldt carefully distinguishes typological affinity from any other sort of affinity but especially from genetic relationships10 - and thereby Jays the founda­ tions for typological linguistics as an autonomous discipline within linguis­ tics.

7.3 It will have become obvious that a concept of linguistic type such as Humboldt's cannot serve as the theoretical justification for the classifica­ tion of languages, In many passages of his works Humboldt directly opposes such classifications, In his earlier work, possibly under the prevail­ ing influences of the time, Humboldt wants to form "independamment des affinites historiques, des classes naturelles des Jangues telles que les etablis­ sent Jes naturalistes" (Essai [GS III:326]). Yet as early as in his Grundzuge of 1824-26 he juxtaposes the concept of class to that of individuaL Lan­ guages cannot be subdivided like the objects of nature, that are defined according to shared rather than distinctive traits (Verschiedenheiten [GS VI:150-51]), The human world operates on the opposite principle, In it, and in its highest manifestation - language - it is not possible to extract traits between the two poles of universality and individuality that allow the constitution of a kind, of a class, As individual human beings cannot be classified, so also are languages in their individuality not susceptible to clas­ sification, The operation of generalizing would cost language the living indi­ viduality (cf. Grundzuge [GS V:472]) that is its fundamental constitutive principle, Therefore, languages are not different as kinds, but as individu­ als; yet the possibilities of affinities and analogies between languages remains intact, Humboldt speaks of 'gemeinschaftliche Analogie' (Frag­ mente [GS VII:600]), and holds that elements of one language as well as those of many languages can fall under the Jaw of a shared analogy, The co­ existence of several types in one particular language can be offered in evi­ dence, These analogies run through language, as it were, horizontally, but without providing the justification for classifying, In order to avoid any mis­ understanding that might lead to identifying typology with classification,

173

8. The concept of type - for Humboldt as for Goethe before him - con­ stitutes the one essential reference point in the complex sphere of linguistic diversity, The discernment of types, Le., of the ways in which human thought has been realized historically, is a fundamental task of the linguist; and in responding to this anthropologically motivated project, the linguist re-discovers the philosophical as well as historical aspects of his discipline,

NOTES 1.

Coseriu's work has made a decisive contribution toward the correction of the misun· derstanding that has shaped the reception of Humboldt. Cf. esp. Coseriu (1972), but also (1979b, 1980a, 1980b, 1983), Ramat takes up the problem as well (1974:439-40), but even in recent works the mistake persists. It generally occurs in tandem with the identification of linguistic typology with language classification, and the reduction of Humboldt's thoUght to that of his forerunners, in particular the Schlegels. For example see Renzi (1976); Robins (1973:16-17); Sgall (1971, 1986); Skalicka (1979),

2.

The recurring use of tenus such as 'class', 'kind', 'genre' and 'species' bears out their intent to classify. Friedrich Schlegel writes of "zwei Hauptgattungen" (1808:44) and his brother August Wilhelm refers to ''trois classes" {1818:14).

3.

Humboldt's preference for Greek over other languages is well known. His works fre· quently and explicitely state that Greek is the most perfect language, superior even to Sanskrit (Verschiedenheiten [GS VI:241]).

4.

Even in anthropology, as in epistemology and in the theory of language, the inflUence of Kant must not be unduly emphasized. Lia Formigari has led me to realize that Humboldt

174

could not have been unaware of the concept that "Schelling had elaborated in his philosophy of nature. Renzi's thesis (1976, �sp. p.58) on the relationship between the sci� ence of nature and the science of language fails to convince us. According to it, Friedrich Schlegel proceeded from Goethean morphology to th� introduction of typological linguis­ tics. But Renzi (1978:58) himself notes the difference between Goethe and Schlegel: for the latter there is a clear OpJ?OSition between the organic and the mechanical; for Goethe, everything is organic. The distinction is not trivial if we consider its consequences for typological linguistics. Friedrich Schlegel separates 'inflectional' or organic languages i.e., those that have arisen organically - from languages without 'inflection', i.e., with no organic basis. Humboldt, by contrast, views every language as an organism. 5.

This is why it is impossible to agree with Ramat, who ascribes to Humboldt ''una visione sostanzialmente 'fissista'" (1974:439; 1976:49) of language and linguistic development. We shall. return to this point in the discussion of the possibility of several linguistic types co-existing within the same language.

6.

The Mexikanische Grammatik was first discovered some years ago among Humboldt's manuscripts at the Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz in West Berlin. I am in­ debted to the kindness of Erendira Nansen-Diaz for giving me access to the as-yet unpublished edition that she has prepared.

7.

Humboldt differs from the Schlegels above all in giving priority to syntax (Syntax) over grammar (Grammatik) in linguistic analysis (BeneS 1958:9). Ramat (1974:439-40) has cor­ rectly observed that Humboldt shifts linguistic typology from the level of morphology to the functional level of syntax. But to this must be added an equally· or perhaps more fun­ damental difference: Humboldt's dynamic conception of language prompts him to seek the peculiarity of the syntactic connection not within the system, but within the Rede.

8.

According to Humboldt, creativity informs every linguistic act. In this regard, Steinthal (in Humboldt 1884:624) observes: "Sowohl als Logiker, wie als Aesthetiker war H. in die Frage vertieft: wie bildet sich die Synthese? und so als Sprachforscher: wie ist die Synthese des Satzes (fast hiitte ich gesagt: der synthetische Satz) mOglich? die wirklichen Dinge erscheinen vereinzelt; die Wissenschaft und die Kunst fasst sie synthetisch zusammen: hierauf geht aile Erkenntnislehre und aile Aesthetik. Sprechen ist auch eine kiinstlerische Uebung; die Rede, und zuniichst der Satz, ist eine kiinstlerische Gestalt. Wenn nun H. fragt, wie hat GOthe, Homer seine Synthesen vollzogen? so fragt er auch, wie die Barmanische Sprache die ihrigen vollzieht."

9.

According to Ramat (1974:435) it is possible "scorgere il limite di Humboldt nel non aver operato la distinzione metodologicamente indispensabile tra lingue come realta storiche e tipi linguistici come modelli astratti". For Coseriu (1972, 1980a, 1983) it is Humboldt him­ self who formulated the idea that has now become a fundamental principle of linguistic typology (SkaliCka 1979), namely, that several linguistic types can and do appear within a single language.

10.

HUMBOLDT'S LINGUISTIC TYPOLOGY

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I therefore cannot agree with Renzi's contention (1976:64) that in Bopp's work, as in Humboldt's, "i 'tipi' linguistici coincidono sempre con famiglie genealogiche". It is more likely that genealogical classification supersedes typology because of the Humboldtians' mistaken concept of 'type', on the one hand, and because of studies of genetic kinship, on the other.

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REFERENCES

Adelung, Johann Christoph. 1806-1817. Mithridates oder allgemeine Sprachkunde mit dem Vater Unser als Sprachprobe in bey nahe fiinfhun­ dert Sprachen und Mundarten. 4 Teile. Ed. [beginning with vol.II] by Johann Severin Vater. Berlin: Vossische Buchhandlung. Benes, Brigit. 1958. Wilhelm von Humboldt, Jacob Grimm, August Schleicher. Winterthur: P.G. Keller. Benveniste, Emile. 1952-53. "La classification des langues". Conferences de l'Institut de linguistique de l'Universite de Paris (11). (Repr. in Problemes de linguistique generate by E. Benveniste, vol.I, 99-118. Paris: Gal­ limard, 1966.) Bernhardi, August Ferdinand. 1801-1803. Sprachlehre. 2 vols. Berlin: Friilich. (Repr., Hildesheim: Olms, 1973.) . 1805. Anfangsgrilnde der Sprachwissenschaft. Ibid. Bolelli, Tristano. 1965. Per una storia della ricerca linguistica: Testi e note introduttive. Napoli: Morano. Borsche, Tilman. 1981. Sprachansichten: Der Begriff der menschlichen Rede in der Sprachphilosophie Wilhelm von Humboldts. Stuttgart: Klett­ Cotta. Cassirer, Ernst. 1945. "Structuralism in Modern Linguistics". Word 1 .99120. Coseriu, Eugenio. 1968. "Adam Smith und die Anfiinge der Sprach­ typologie". Wortbildung, Syntax und Morphologie: Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von Hans Marchand ed. by Herbert E. Brekle & Leonhard Lipka, 46-50. The Hague: Mouton. . -.--. 1972. "0ber die Sprachtypologie Wilhelm von Humboldts: Bin Beitrag zur Kritik der sprachwissenschaftlichen Oberlieferung". Beitriige zur vergleichenden Literaturgeschichte: Festschrift fUr Kurt Wais zum 65. Geburtstag, 107-35. Tiibingen: M. Niemeyer. . 1974. Synchronie, Diachronie und Geschichte: Das Problem des Sprachwandels. Miinchen: Wilhelm Fink. . 1979a. "Synchronie, Diachronie und Typologie". Sprache: Struktu­ ren und Funktionen by E. Coseriu, 77-90. Tiibingen: G. Narr. . 1979b. "Semantik, innere Sprachform und Tiefenstruktur". Ibid. , 177-86. --. 1979c. "Humboldt und die moderne Sprachwissenschaft". Arnold Cikobavas (dabadebis 80 c'listavisadmi midzghvnili k'rebuli)(= Festschrift A. Cikobava) , 20-29. Tbilissi. --

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. 1980a. "Der Sinn der Sprachtypologie". Typology and Genetics of Language ed. by Thorben Thrane, Vibeke Winge et a!., 157-70. Copenhagen: The Linguistic Circle of Copenhagen. . 1980b. "Partikeln und Sprachtypus: Zur strukturell-funktionellen Fragestellung in der Sprachtypologie". Wege zur Universalienforschung: Sprachwissenschaftliche Beitriige zum 60. Geburtstag von H. Seiler, 199206. Tiibingen: G. Narr. . 1982. "Naturbild und Sprache". Das Naturbild des Menschen ed. by Jorg Zimmermann, 260-84. Miinchen: Wilhelm Fink. . 1983. "Sprachtypologie und Typologie von sprachlichen Ver­ fahren". Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft, Sprachtypologie und Textlin­ guistik: Festschrift fUr Peter Hartmann, 269-79. Tiibingen: G. Narr. De Mauro, Tullio. 1965. lntroduzione alia semantica. Bari: Laterza. -Finck, Franz Nikolaus. 1910. Haupttypen des Sprachbaus. Leipzig: G.B. Teubner. (Repr., Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1961.) Forrnigari, Lia. 1977. La logica del pensiero vivente. Bari: Laterza. Gipper, Helmut. 1965. "Wilhelm von Humboldt als Begriinder modemer Sprachforschung". Wirkendes Wort 15.1-19. & Peter Schmitter. 1979. Sprachwissenschaft und Sprachphilosophie im Zeitalter der Romantik. Tiibingen: G. Narr. Goethe, Johann Wolfgang. 1790. Die Metamorphose der Pflanzen. Goethes Werke, vol.I. Weimar: Weimarer Ausgabe, 1887-1919. . 1794. Zur Morphologie. Goethes Werke, vol.I. Ibid. . 1795. Erster Entwurf einer allgemeinen Einleitung in die vergleichende Anatomie. Goethes Werke, vol.I. Ibid. Hjelmslev, Louis. 1963. Sproget: En introduction. Charlottenlund: The Nature Method Center. Humboldt, Wilhelm von. 1859. Wilhelm von Humboldts Briefe an F.G. Welcker. Ed. by Rudolf Haym. Berlin: R. Gaertner. . 1884. Die sprachphilosophischen Werke Wilhelm's von Humboldt. Hrsg. und erkliirt von Dr. H. Steinthal. Berlin: F. Diimmler. . 1903-36. Gesammelte Schriften. Ed. by Albert Leitzmann for the PreuBische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin: B. Behr. (Cited as GS plus volume.) Plan = Plan einer vergleichenden Anthropologie [1795] ; GS I, 12. Herrmann und Dorothea = Asthetische Versuche. Erster Teil: Ober Goethes Herrmann und Dorothea [1798]; GS II, 2.

Berichtigungen und Zusiitze = Berichtigungen und Zusiitze zum ersten Abschnitte des zweiten Bandes des Mithridates iiber die kantabrische oder baskische Sprache [1811]; GS III, 8. Ankiindigung = Ankiindigung einer Schrift iiber die vaskische Sprache und Nation nebst Angabe des Gesichtspunktes und Inhalts derselben [1812] ; GS III:288-99. Essai = Essai sur les langues du nouveau continent (1812]; GS Ill, 9. Vergleichendes Sprachstudium = Ober das vergleichende Sprachstudium in Beziehung auf die verschiedenen Epochen der Sprachentwicklung [1820]; GS IV, l . Mexikanische Sprache = Versuch einer Analyse der mexikanischen Sprache [1821] ; GS IV, 4. Grundziige = Grundziige des allgemeinen Sprachtypus [1824-26] ; GS V, 14. Die Sprachen der Siidseeinseln = Ober die Sprachen der Siidseeinseln [1828] ; GS VI, 4. Affinities = An Essay on the best Means of ascertaining the Affinities of Oriental Languages [1828]; GS VI, 7. Verschiedenheiten = Ober die Verschiedenheiten des menschlichen Sprachbaues [1827-29] ; GS VI, 10. Von dem grammatischen Baue = Von dem grammatischen Baue der Sprachen [1827-29]; GS VI, 12. Kawi-Werk = Ober die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einflufi auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts [1835]; GS VII, 1. Fragmente = Fragmente der Monographie iiber die Basken [1801-1802]; GS VII, 2. Ivaldo, Marco. 1980. Wilhelm von Humboldt: Antropologia filosofica. Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane. Jakobson, Roman. 1958. "Typological Studies and their Contribution to Historical Comparative Linguistics". Proceedings of the Eighth Interna­ tional Congress ofLinguists ed. by Eva Sivertsen, 17-25. Oslo: Oslo Uni­ versity Press. (Repr. in Selected Writings by R. Jakobson, vol.I, 523-32. The Hague: Mouton, 1971.) Leroux, Robert. 1958. L'anthropologie comparee de Guillaume de Hum­ boldt. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. Marino, Luigi. 1976. "Wilhelm von Humboldt e l'antropologia comparata". Wilhelm von Humboldt nella cultura contemporanea ed. by Luigi Heil­ mann, 11-41. Bologna: II Mulino.

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Milewski, Tadeusz. 1976. "Presupposti per una linguistica tipologica". La tipologia linguistica ed. by Paolo Ramat, 193-238. Bologna: Il Mulino. Morpurgo-Davies, Anna. 1975. "Language Classification in the Nineteenth Century" . Current Trends in Linguistics ed. by Th.A. Sebeok, vol.XIII: Historiography of Linguistics, 607-716. The Hague: Mouton. Ramal, Paolo. 1970. "Tipologia strutturale". LeSt 5.315- 25. . 1974. "Attualita del pensiero di Wilhelm von Humboldt a propo­ sito della tipologia linguistica". Proceedings of the Eleventh Interna­ tional Congress of Linguists ed. by Luigi Heilmann, vol.I, 439-43. Bologna: Il Mulino. . 1976a. "Del problema della tipologia linguistica in Wilhelm von Humboldt e d'altro ancora". Wilhelm von Humboldt nella cultura con­ temporanea ed. by Luigi Heilmann, 43-65. Bologna: Il Mulino. . 1976b. "Introduzione". La tipologia linguistica ed. by Paolo Ramal, 7-46. Bologna: Il Mulino. . 1984. Linguistica tipologica. Bologna: Il Mulino. . 1985. "Wilhelm von Humboldts Sprachtypologie". ZPSK 38.590610. . 1986. "Is a Holistic Typology Possible?". FoL 20. 3-14. Ramisvili, Guram. 1981. "Uber die philosophischen Grundlagen der Sprachanthropologie". Logos semantikos: Studia linguistica in honorem Eugenio Coseriu, vol.II, 269-73. Berlin & New York: De Gruyter; Madrid: Gredos. Renzi, Lorenzo. 1976. "Storia e obiettivi della tipologia linguistica". La tipologia linguistica ed. by Paolo Ramat, 47-78. Bologna: Il Mulino. Robins, Robert H. 1973. "The History of Language Classification". Cur­ rent Trends in Linguistics ed. by Thomas A. Sebeok, vol.XI: Diachronic, Areal and Typological Linguistics, 3-41. The Hague: Mouton. Schlegel, August Wilhelm. 1818. Observations sur Ia langue et Ia litterature provenqales. Paris: Librairie grecque-latine-allemande. (Repr., Tiibingen: G. Narr, 1971.) Schlegel, Friedrich. 1808. Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier. Heidelberg: Mohr & Zimmer. (Repr. , with an introduction by Seba­ stiano Timpanaro, Amsterdam: J. Benjamins, 1977.) Sgall, Peter. 1971. "On the Notion 'Type of Language'". TLP 4.75-87. . 1986. "Classical Typology and Modern Linguistics". FoL 20. 15-28. Skalicka, Vladimir. 1976a. "Un 'costrutto tipologico"'. La tipologia linguistica ed. by Paolo Ramat, 303-310. Bologna: Il Mulino.

--. 1976b. "Tipologia linguistica e sviluppo linguistico". Ibid. , 109-14. --. 1979. " Uber den gegenwartigen Stand der Typologie". Typologische Studien by V. Skalicka, ed. by Peter Hartmann, 312-34. Wiesbaden: F. Vieweg. . 1986. "Ist eine Typologie mi:iglich?". FoL 20.81-86. Steinthal, Heymann. 1850. Die Classification der Sprachen, dargestellt als die Entwickelung der Sprachidee. Berlin: F. Diimmler. . 1860. Charakteristik der hauptsiichlichsten Typen des Sprachbaues. Zweite Bearbeitung der Classification der Sprachen. Ibid. Swiggers, Pierre. 1985. "Categories grammaticales et categories culturelles dans Ia philosophic du langage de Humboldt: Les implications de Ia 'forme grammaticale'". ZPSK 38.729-36. Telegdi, Zsigmond. 1970. "Humboldt als Begriinder der Sprachtypologie". Theoretical Problems of Typology and the Northern Eurasian Languages ed. by Laszl6 Deszi:i & Petr Hajdu, 25-34. Amsterdam: R.B. Griiner. Trabant, Jiirgen. 1985. "Nachwort". W. v. Humboldt, Vber die Sprache: Ausgewiihlte Schriften ed. by J. Trabant, 159-174. Miinchen: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag. Uspenskij, Boris Andreevich. 1962. Principles of Structural Typology. The Hague: Mouton.

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SUMMARY

Guided by his anthropological interests, Humboldt founds linguistic typology on the diversity of human nature. Language, which belongs to all human beings and is the highest, clearest and most tangible form of thought through which human creativity is revealed, offers him a promising avenue for investigating such a diversity. The diversity that language presents in the form of historical languages becomes the object of comparative linguistics, which through the comparison of different languages aims at finding the historically realized ways in which human thought has been proceeding. Humboldt derives the criteria of his comparative method from Goethe's morphology, from which he takes in particular the concept of "Typus". A comparative linguistic study must take into account languages as organic wholes. Each language is a "Form", a network of analogies, one interwo­ ven with the other, which constitute a peculiar world-view. Moreover, form has not only a synchronic but also a diachronic dimension; it is to be

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assumed that form shapes and reshapes substance analogically, in accor­ dance with the principle that simultaneously characterizes its structure and guides its actual structuring. This principle is the type, which governs the formation of the organic whole. It is to be sought where it is clearly man­ ifest: that is, in the syntactic connection of speech. The linguistic type (i.e. the particular way in which thought proceeds, the way in which connections occur within a language) ought to be identified in speech (Rede), as the creative act par excellence. From the acknowledgement that a linguistic type supports a variety of individual realizations arises the idea of the co-exis­ tence, within a single language, of several types or several ways of linking. Traces of the three types - 'inflectional', 'agglutinating' and 'incorporat­ ing' - can be found in most languages. What assures the unity of a lan­ guage, in spite of the presence in it of several types, is the predominance of one type over the others. The degree of a language's functional coherence depends on the extent to which a type predominates. A concept such as "linguistic type" cannot serve as a theoretical basis for a classification of languages. In many passages of his work Humboldt directly opposes such a classification: inasmuch as they are individual, languages are not susceptible of classification. ·

Wilhelm von Hnmboldt nnd das Problem der Schrift Christian Stetter

Technische Hochschule Aachen

DaB sich Humboldts Sprachphilosophie ausgehend vom Fragment Ober Denken und Sprechen (1795/96) aus zwei hauptsachlichen Quellen entwic­ kelt, der Transzendentalphilosophie Kants und Fichtes einerseits und der in der Abhandlung Ober den Ursprung der Sprache (1772) entfalteten Anthro­ pologie Herders andererseits, kann als gesichert vorausgesetzt werden (cf. Stetter 1988a). Auf diesen heiden Quellen baut das in der Akademie-Vor­ lesung von 1820 umrissene Programm einer allgemeinen Sprachkunde auf, das explizit erstmals im Essai sur les langues du nouveau continent von 1812 formuliert worden war. Ihr zentrales Anliegen ist das Studium der "faculte du langage de l'homme" (Essai § 9 = GS III:308), der Sprachfiihigkeit, deren erste, fiir sein Denken bestimmend bleibende Definition Humboldt bereits im Wallenstein-Brief an Schiller vom September 1800 gelingt. Sie ist die F3.higkeit, innere Gedanken und Empfindungen und auBere Gegen� sHinde vermOge eines sinnlichen Mediums, das zugleich Werk des Men� schen und Ausdruck der Welt ist, gegenseitig aus einander zu erzeugen, oder vielmehr seiner selbst, indem man sich in beide theilt, klar zu wer­ den" (Humboldt, WW V:198).

Diese Definition findet sich nicht zufallig an diesem Ort. DaB Sprache das bildende Organ des Gedanken ist, bestimmt diese zunachst logisch als notwendige Bedingung des Denkens, mithin der Erkenntnis, sowohl "des Einzelnen in abgeschlossener Einsamkeit" wie der Gesellschaft (cf. Grund­ ziige §§ 25 und 31-32). Doch impliziert der beriihmte "Hauptsatz" der hum­ boldtschen Sprachphilosophie, der ja aus der zitierten Definition der Sprachfahigkeit unmittelbar folgt, die Einsicht, daB jedwede Erkenntnis, insofern sie nur als sprachlich vermittelte moglich ist, dem vermittelnden

,,

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HUMBOLDT UND DAS PROBLEM DER SCHR!Ff

Medium nicht nur ihre logische Strukturierung verdankt, damit auch lnter­ pretierbarkeit und Kritisierbarkeit, sondern daB dariiber hinaus die Art sei­ ner Geburt den Gedanken als asthetisches Produkt ausweist, als Resultat des Spiels der Einbildungskraft mit den Formen der je verfiigbaren Spra­ che. lm Akt der Artikulation empfangt er nicht ll\lr, abhiingig vom jeweils entfalteten diskursiven Zusammenhang, seine definitive logische Form, mithin Geltung, sondern dariiber hinaus das Gepriige einer bestimmten as­ thetischen Gestalt, in der sozusagen ein OberschuB an Deutungsmoglichkei­ ten im Signifikanten angelegt ist, den kein logisch linearisierter Diskurs je­ mals auszuschopfen imstande ware. Zwar wird das Wort in der Rede "als Gauzes" vernommen, d.h. logisch kategorisiert, jedoch als artikuliertes Gauzes.

Diese Einsicht ist bereits in Humboldts Uberlegungen zur Asthetik vor­ bereitet. Das 'Reich der Wirklichkeit' begreift er in der Schrift Ueber Go­ thes Hermann und Dorothea (1798) als nur extensional erfaBbare Menge von Objekten. Dies ist strikt kantisch gedacht: die Erscheinung fiir sich ist da, 'gegeben' in Kants Terminologie; als solche braucht sie sich nicht "durch Ursache und Folge zu rechtfertigen". "Die Welt zerfallt in Tatsa­ chen", wird analog ein Jahrhundert spiiter der junge Wittgenstein formulie­ ren und der Logik damit das sie fundierende Extensionalitiitsprinzip lie­ fern.2 Demgegeniiber ist das 'Reich des M6glichen', der Phantasie dadurch gekennzeichnet, daB seine Elemente, wie Humboldt in Anlehnung an Kants Begriff des transzendentalen Ideals (KrV B 599ff.) formuliert, "nicht anders, als unter der Bedingung eines durchgiingigen inneren Zusammen­ hangs gedacht werden" k6nnen. Dergestalt als 'moglich' entworfene Ge­ genstande sind daher "im strengsten und einfachsten Sinne des Worts idea­ lisch" (WW II: 139), das entwerfende Organ ist die Einbildungskraft. Urn die Qualitiit einer cognitio clara et distincta gewinnen zu k6nnen,' muB der Gedanke nach dem zitierten ersten Hauptsatz und dem daraus entwickelten sog. 'Urtypus aller Sprachen' im Wort veriiuBert werden. Die­ ses wird als im intersubjektiven Gebrauch schematisierte Gestalt Objekt und bleibt aufgrund seiner Funktion doch subjektiv; es bezeichnet, was es bedeutet, aber bildet es nicht ab. Diese Funktion ware, da das Wort verall­ gemeinerte Gestalt ist, objektiv zu nennen. Ebensowenig indiziert es ledig­ lich eine von ihm giinzlich unabhiingige Bedeutung: Vielmehr gibt das Wort AnlaB, sich unter ihm einen Gegenstand "nach den verschiedensten An­ sichten" ( WW II:62) vorzustellen. Jedoch ist aufgrund der 'bestimmten Ge­ stalt' des Wortes das Feld der durch seine AuBerung in der verbundenen Rede eroffneten Denkm6glichkeiten begrenzt' durch die in der betreffen­ den Sprache moglichen Redeverbindungen, d.h. die M6glichkeiten, den betreffenden Term unter eine syntaktische Kategorie zu subsumieren, und durch den Reichtum an Oppositionen, die ihn innerhalb des 'W6rtervor­ raths' des Sprachsystems charakterisieren. Die mit einem einzigen Wort ausgelegten Moglichkeiten, einen Gegenstand zu denken, grenzen in der Tat ans Unendliche - die moderne Linguistik beginnt erst, diese in Hum­ boldts oben zitierter Kennzeichnung der Artikulation ausgesprochene Ein­ sicht zu bestiitigen. Zurecht begreift Humboldt daher das Wort als Individuum einer Welt sui generis

Nun ist dasjenige - so schreibt Humboldt - was die Artikulation dem blossen Hervorrufen seiner Bedeutung [ . . . ] hinzufiigt, dass sie das Wort unmittelbar durch seine Form als einen Teil eines unendlichen Ganzen, ei� ner Sprache, darstellt (Grundzuge §36 = GS V:384).

Artikulation beruht auf dem Prinzip der Identifizierung von Signifikanten­ formen nach MaBgabe minimaler Differenzen zu anderen in der langue schematisierten Signifikanten. Humboldt begreift Sprache daher bereits im Essai als System sich differentiell bestimmender Terme, denen durch ihren Gebrauch in der parole allererst ein bestimmter Wert zugemessen wird (cf. Essai §14 = GS III:322, Anm.; Grundziige 91ff. = GS V:421ff.). Jede Sprache ist somit eine in bestimmter Weise organisierte Struktur, 'structure organique' in der Terminologie des Essai (§14 = GS III:321), in Humboldts sonst geliiufiger Bezeichnungsweise ein 'organischer Bau', in dem, wie es in der Akademievorlesung von 1820 heiBt, jedes "nur durch das Andre, und Alles nur durch die eine, das Ganze durchdringende Kraft besteht" (WW III:3): das Sprachverm6gen. Jeder konkrete 'organische' Sprachbau ist dessen Produkt; es verkniipft die Elemente der Struktur im Wege ihrer Artikulation zu einem System, denn das grundlegende Verfah­ ren der faculte du langage beim Aufbau des Systems ist die Analogie. Be­ reits im Essai formuliert Humboldt das Grundprinzip, daB in einer Sprache (langue) alles ohne Ausnahme auf einer Analogie beruhe (Essai §14 = GS III:321). Die Artikulation jedes Terms kann nicht anders als in Analogie zu bereits bestehenden erfolgen - mag diese nun dem einzelnen Sprachbe­ wuBtsein noch erkennbar oder nur noch historisch rekonstruierbar sein. Der 'asthetische UberschuB' an Signifikanz, den der sprachlich artikulierte Gedanke gegeniiber seiner logischen Geltung aufweist, verdankt sich so der Vernetzung seiner Elemente im System der je.veiligen Sprache.1

zwischen der erscheinenden ausser, und der wirkenden in uns in der Mit­ te", das "insofern mit einem Kunstwerk Aehnlichkeit hat, als es durch eine

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CHRISTIAN STETIER sinnliche, der Natur abgeborgte Form eine Idee mOglich macht . . . " (WW Il:60, 62).

Seine Vernetzung im System der Sprache, die in der Sprachstruktur ange­ legten intensionalen Deutungen des Terms durch andere bereiten - wie Humboldt im Fragment iiber Latium und Hellas (1806) formuliert - den Zusammenhang allererst vor, "den das Denken in der Welt zu fin den, und in seinen Erzeugnissen hervorzubringen bemiiht ist" (ebd. 63). Die Sprache determiniert nicht das Denken; dies ware eine irrige Vor­ stellung, die die Humboldt-Rezeption zumal des 20. Jahrhunderts aller­ dings lange beherrscht hat. Ihr System von Termen, ihre Netze von Analo­ gien bieten vielmehr der Einbildungskraft Formen an, die, wenn sie zweck­ miiBig gebraucht werden - fiir den Kantianer Humboldt ist dies niemals auf eine Regel zuriickzufiihren -, zu sinnvollen Gedanken gebildet werden konnen. Beziiglich Humboldts Sprachphilosophie hat man gelegentlich von ei­ nem Widerspruch zwischen organischer und struktureller Sprachbetrach­ tung gesprochen (cf. etwa Giels und Mattsons Kommentar in WW V:463) - zu Unrecht. Wenn er Sprache als organischen Bau bezeichnet, dann be­ greift er sie als System, dessen Struktur allerdings ganz 'im Sinne des Orga­ nismus-Begriffs Kants auf einen bestimmten Zweck bin organisiert ist, eben den der Bildung des Gedanken. Aus diesem Grunde weist er in den Grund­ ziigen (Humboldt, 1824-26) auf die Isomorphic von sprachlicher und logi­ scher Artikulation bin. Der 'Geist' bildet den Gedanken, indem er das kon­ tinuierliche diskursive Denken in Grundteile zerlegt, "deren Zusammenfii­ gung Iauter solche Gauze bildet, welche das Streben in sich tragen, Theile neuer Ganze zu werden" . In dieser Form begegnen sich Denken und sprachliche Artikulation "wie in einem verkniipfenden Mittel" ( Grundziige §21 = GS V:375). Die Artikulation des Gedanken kann auf die des sprach­ lichen 'Ausdrucks' abgebildet werden, wei! beide - mit dem friihen Witt­ genstein zu sprechen - dieselbe 'logische Form' haben.' Erst in dieser Ab­ bildung wird der Gedanke klar und deutlich, und zwar auch fiir den Den­ kenden selbst. 'Es' denkt sozusagen in ibm, was aber, wird ibm erst durch die Funktion der Versprachlichung verstandlich. So ist "das Sprechen eine nothwendige Bedingung des Denkens":6 Der Gedanke ist der sinnvolle Satz.7 Im AnschluB an Herder und, wie man hinzufiigen muB, von vomher­ ein in Opposition zur bald sich positivistisch in zahllosen Detailuntersu­ chungen verlierenden historisch-vergleichenden Sprachwissenschaft (einige

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Hinweise darauf finden sich in der Akademie-Vorlesung von 1820 und in den Grundzilgen; cf. Stetter 1988a) deutet Humboldt Sprache anthropolo­ gisch als Medium der Bildung des Menschengeschlechts. Der Sinn des . ver­ gleichenden Sprachstudiums konne nicht nur darin liegen, die Verschieden­ heit der Sprachen als 'naturhistorische Erscheinung' zu beschreiben. Selbst dies ware i.ii. schon vie! verlangt, denn es erforderte, wie Humboldt im Es­ sai oder spater in den Grundzugen zeigt (Essai §§14ff. = GS III:321ff.; Grundzuge §§56ff. = GS V:400ff.), vollstandige synchronische Strukturbe­ schreibungen einzelner Sprachen auf den Gebieten Lautsystem, Wortervor­ rat und Syntax sowie auf dieser Basis Strukturvergleiche verschiedener Sprachen. Im Gegensatz zu Bopp oder Grimm fordert Humboldt also eine systematische synchronische Linguistik. Die Verschiedenheit der Sprachen miisse dariiber hinaus, so besagt das in der Akademie-Vorlesung von 1820 entfaltete Programm, philosophisch als 'intellectuell-teleologische Erscheinung' (WW III:6ff.) begriffen wer­ den; dies erforderte eine Beschreibungsperspektive, die die Differenzen des Formenreichtums der einzelnen Sprachen unter dem Gesichtspunkt der daraus resultierenden Konsequenzen fiir die Artikulation von Gedanken darstellte. Eine Grundfigur der herderschen Preisschrift aufgreifend vergleicht Humboldt das menschliche Sprachvermogen mit dem 'Naturinstinct der Thie­ re'. Der Sprachsinn, dessen Produkt die je einzelne Sprache ist, sei gleich­ sam ein "intellectueller Instinct der Vernunft" (ibid. 11). Das Subjekt, dem er zuzuschreiben ist, ist auf der h6chsten fiir Humboldt denkbaren Allge­ meinheitsstufe die Nation. Die philosophische Bedeutung der Sprache liegt fiir ihn ja darin, daB in ihren schematisierten Formen zwar die Spuren indi­ vidueller Einbildungskraft, der die "faculte du langage" unter asthetischem Gesichtspunkt zugerechnet werden muB, eingegraben sind, daB diese je­ doch - wie dies die Theorie des 'Urtypus der Sprachen' beschreibt - im intersubjektiven Gebrauch so verobjektiviert werden, und zwar Terme ebenso wie ihre Kombinations-, mithin Interpretationsmoglichkeiten,s daB sich daraus ein iiberindividuelles Allgemeines bildet, das eine Menge von Sprachsubjekten allererst zu einer Sprachgemeinschaft vermittelt. Das We­ sen der Sprachen, so schreibt Humboldt in den Grundzugen, scheine ibm verkannt, der geistige Process ihrer Entstehung nur scheinbar erkHirt und ihre machtige Einwirkung auf das Gemiith unrichtig gewiirdigt zu werden, wenn man das Menschengeschlecht als zahllose zu derselben Gattung ge­ h6rende Naturen, und nicht vielmehr als Eine in zahllose Individuen zer­ spaltene (betrachte]. (GS V:383)

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Die anthropologische Funktion der Sprache wird man danach nur be­ greifen, wenn man die Verschiedenheit der einzelnen Sprachen und Sprachtypen als in diese gelegte strukturelle Bildungsmittel im Sinne des herderschen Gesetzes der Progression der Gattung• nimmt. In ihnen arti­ kuliert der Sprachsinn der Nationen 'Weltansichten' aus. Um dies zu verstehen, mull der Prozell der Artikulation noch einmal genauer betrachtet werden: In die Priigung des Wortes geht "die ganze Art der subjektiven Wahrnehmung der Gegenstiinde iiber" (GS V:387). Die Analogie, die seiner Bildung zugrunde liegt, vernetzt den Term in bestimm­ ter Weise mit anderen. So repriisentiert - in Begriffen der peirceschen Se­ miotik gesprochen - jeder Term eine gelungene Abduktion,JO in der die logische Geltung eines Gedankenabschnitts dadurch zur Deutlichkeit ge­ bracht wird, daB er in die bestimmte Form des Wortes gefaBt, also indivi­ dualisiert wird und vor dem Ohr sinnliche Geltung gewinnt. Dies wiederum affiziert das Gefiihl. Sinnliche und Empfindungsgeltung kann andererseits wie das Wort nur besitzen, sofern es auch logisch gilt. Miiglich ist dies Humboldt im semiotischen Schliisselparagraphen der Grundzuge erliiutert - nur dadurch, daB "dieser Sinnen- und Gefiihlsgehalt zugleich, und wie­ der synthetisch, als Stoff vernichtet und als Form erhalten wird" (GS V:420), - eine der riitselhaftesten Aussagen Humboldts, die erst verstand­ lich wird, wenn man bedenkt, daB seine Sprachidee - wie oben bereits an­ gedeutet - vollstandig aus der kantischen Asthetik entwickelt ist. Die be­ schriebene Transformation des Staffs in Form ist aus logischen Grunden er­ forderlich; Sinnlichkeit und Intellektualitiit wiiren anders nicht zu vermit­ teln, und so ist dies nach Humboldt "das Werk der Einbildungskraft [ . . . ] , der Vermittlerin der entgegengesetzten Naturen in der Menschheit" (ibid.). Die hier beziiglich der verschiedenen Geltungsdimensionen des Wortes be­ riihrte Problematik hat in allgemeiner Form Kant im Schematismus-Kapitel der Kritik der reinen Vernunft ausfiihrlich eriirtert, und hieraus ergibt sich unmittelbar die Liisung des Problems: Die Formung der sinnlichen und Ge­ fiihlsgeltung des Wortes kann nur qua Schematisierung geschehen. Der Term ist nichts anderes als das Produkt der in seine Priigung eingegangenen Analogien. Jeder AnalogieschluB aber beruht auf einer partiellen Identitiit, mithin auch partiellen Differenzen. Daher ist die jedes einzelne Wort cha­ rakterisierende differentielle Vernetzung im Sprachsystem sein Schema .ll Hierin liegt der Grund dafiir, daB, wie Humboldt formuliert, "jedes Wort einer Sprache eine gewisse Weite fiir die Miiglichkeit verschiedenarti­ ger Vorstellungen besitzt" (GS V:418), denn sein Schema gestattet durch­ aus verschiedenartige Anwendungen in der Rede.

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[Daher ist Verstehen] kein Zusammentreffen der Vorstellungsweisen in ei� nem untheilbaren Punkt, sondern ein Zusammentreffen von Gedanken� spharen, von welchen der allegemeinere Theil sich deckt, der individuelle­ re Oberragt (GS V:418-19).

Im organischen Bau einer jeden Sprache, in den sie charakterisieren­ den morphologischen, lexikalischen oder syntaktischen Strukturen ist die Arbeit der je individuellen Einbildungskraft zu einer iiberindividuellen Struktur verobjektiviert, und so wie jede individuelle Sprachpriigung eine spezifische Weltansicht, niimlich die Wahrnehmungsperspektive des einzel­ nen, repriisentiert, so entfaltet die 'structure organique' der Sprache eine besondere nationelle Weltansicht. Hieraus ergibt sich unmittelbar der zwei­ te, durch Liebrucks sogenannte 'Hauptsatz' der Sprachphilosophie Humboldts: Durch denselben Act, verm6ge welches der Mensch die Sprache aus sich heraus spinnt, spinnt er sich in dieselbe ein, und jede Sprache zieht urn die Nation, welcher sie angeh6rt, einen Kreis, aus dem es nur insofern hinaus­ zugehen m6glich ist, als man zugleich in den Kreis einer andren Sprache hinilbertritt" (GS V:387-88).

"Hierin ist", nach Humboldt, "der Grund und der letzte Zweck aller Sprachuntersuchung enthalten" (WW III:20). Ihr Ziel kann nur darin beste­ hen, im Wege des Sprachvergleichs das Subjektive einer jedeu in besonde­ ren Sprachformen artikulierten Weltansicht auszusondern und das Objekt, die Summe alles Erkennbaren, "m6glichst rein davon auszuscheiden" (ibid., 20-21). Erst in diesem teleologischen Zusammenhang, damit zugleich aber auch - wie der erste 'Hauptsatz' belegt - an systematisch zentraler Stelle gewiunt das Thema der Schrift fiir Humboldt Interesse. Dessen Verfol­ gung, iiuBerlich angeregt durch die Entzifferung der Hieroglyphenschrift durch Young und Champollion, f6rdert in seinem Werk Spuren eines, mit Derrida zu reden, Logozentrismus zutage, der sich in latentem Wider· spruch zu der bislang skizzierten, durch das Prinzip der Differenz charakte­ risierten Sprachidee Humboldts befindet, und es k6nnte sein, daB dieser Widerspruch die Ursache fiir manche Briicke in seinem Alterswerk ist, et­ wa das Auseinandertreten von 'Nominal-' und 'Pronominalansicht' der Sprache, Relikte universalgrammatischen Denkens in den Grundzugen und in der Schrift Vom grammatischen Baue der Sprachen (1827-29) , letztlich die fiir unser Thema bedeutsame Opposition von 'innerer' und 'auBerer' Sprachform.

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Eingangs der Schrift Ueber den Zusammenhang der Schrift mit der Sprache (1823-24) skizziert Humboldt wiederum die oben beriihrte Idee ei­ ner progressiven, anthropologischen 'Gesetzen' folgenden 'geistigen Bil­ dung' der Gattung Mensch (cf. GS V:31-32). Dem Sprachstudium kommt in dieser Hinsicht besondere Bedeutung zu, wei! Humboldt die Verschie­ denartigkeit von Sprachstrukturen und -typen als Indiz eines unterschiedli­ chen, je spezifischen nationellen Sprachsinns begreift. Die Idee, die histo­ risch vorliegenden Erfahrungen von in ihrem Typ differenzierenden Spra­ chen, insbesondere die strukturellen Differenzen zwischen den amerikani­ schen und indoeuropiiischen Sprachen, teleologisch zu deuten, hatte Hum­ boldt bereits in der Akademie-Vorlesung Ueber das Entstehen der gramma­ tischen Formen von 1822 ausfiihrlich entwickelt, und in Konsequenz dieser Konzeption widerspricht er - wie der Brief an A.W. Schlegel vom 30. Dez. 1822 belegt - . sowohl Jacob Grimms Idee eines sukzessiven Sprach­ verfal!s vom vermeintlichen Hochstand des Germanischen zu den nivel!ier� ten Formen des Neuhochdeutschen oder gar Eing!ischen wie auch Schlegels Auffassung eines strikten Unterschieds zwischen agglutinierendem und flektierendem Sprachtypus (cf. WW V:260f.). "Das Wesen der Sprache", so formuliert Humboldt den Grundgedanken seiner Konzeption 1820,

WW III: B). So implizierte etwa Bopps Arbeit iiber das Konjugationssy­ stem der indoeuropiiischen Sprachen den SchluB, daB sich die Flexionsen­ dungen in deren Verbalsystem aus urspriinglich agglutinierten Pronominal­ formen entwickelt haben. Sprachentwicklung deutet Humboldt dergestalt als sukzessive Ausson­ derung verschiedener Typen von sprachlichen Zeichen. Waren zuniichst im Schema des Wortes die objektive Funktion der Gegenstandskonstituition und die je subjektive Perspektive und Geltung fiir das jeweilige Individuum miteinander verwoben, so werden diese Funktionen im Zuge der Progres­ sion der Sprachen getrennt. In der Aussonderung formaler Typen mit rein syntaktischer Funktion verobjektiviert der Sprachsinn der Nationen not­ wendige Bedingungen der Gedankenbildung, so daB sich am Ende der Ent­ wicklung aller Sprachen in den universellen formalen Typen das transzen­ dentale Subjekt in Form einer Universalgrammatik selbst zur Erscheinung gebracht hiitte. Nirgends zeigen sich die dogmatischen Ziige in Humboldts Denken deutlicher als in diesem Zusammenhang. Hatte er im Essai von 1812 noch sehr klar demonstriert, daB der Begtiff einer Universalgrammatik notwen­ digerweise leer sein miisse (GS II:308), so verdichten sich im Kapitel iiber die "Redeverbindung" der Grundzilge und insbesondere in der Schrift Von dem grammatischen Baue der Sprachen, die Liebrucks (1965:14) sehr deut­ lich als den eigentlichen 'Skandal' in Humboldts Werk empfunden hat, Mo­ tive, die in der Tat als Antizipation der chomskyschen Idee substantieller Universalien gelten miissen.12 Wenn er auch betont, daB "nur der ge­ schichtliche Weg", d.h. empirische Detailstudien, "wesentlich zur Erkennt­ nis des Sprachbaues" fiihren konne ( GS V :450), und wenn er auch die Re­ de als das "in der Natur zuerst und urspriinglich Gedachte" (S.447) be­ greift, in dieser Einsicht also die moderne Sprechhandlungstheorie antizi­ piert, so postuliert er andererseits doch unvermittelt eine logische Gram­ matik und folgt hierin der aristotelischen Reduktion des Logos auf den lo­ gos apophantikos: "Die Gesetze des Denkens enthalten die Grundbestim­ mungen der Grammatik" (GS V:451), und was Wunder, daB er diese am besten im Griechischen, der "vollkommensten al!er Sprachen" (ibid.), realisiert sieht. Umstandslos liiBt er "die vier ersten Casus der Declination von selbst und nothwendig aus der Kategorie der Relation" flieBen (S.452) und tadelt das Sanskrit, daB es "Verben des Gebens, statt sie mit der Dop­ pelbeziehung des Dativs zu verkniipfen, oft mit dem Genitiv construirt" (GS VI:342). Die Regression von der kantischen Idee der Kategorie zur aristo-

besteht darin, die Materie der Erscheinungswelt in die Form der Gedan­ ken zu giessen; ihr ganzes Streben ist formal, und da die W6rter die Stelle der Gegensttinde vertreten, so muss auch ihnen, als Materie, eine Form entgegenstehen, welcher sie unterworfen werden (WW 111:13).

Die Formalisierung des Gedanken kann auf drei verschiedene Weisen geschehen, die Humboldt als Progressionsstufen im herderschen Sinn ver­ steht: 1) Die Form des Satzes wird "in Gedanken hinzu verstanden". Fiir diese strukturelle Moglichkeit hat sich beispielsweise das Chinesische in sol­ cher "Reinheit, RegelmiiBigkeit und Konsequenz" entschieden, daB es sich "durch diese Vorziige", so versucht Humboldt diesen 'Skandal' in seinem System zu heilen, "unbedingt den vollkommensten Sprachen an die Seite" stellt (GS V:321). 2) Die Satzform wird durch "in sich bedeutende Wor­ ter", die neben dieser syntaktischen Verwendung auch lexikalisch ge­ braucht werden, "mithin als Stoff' bezeichnet. So werde z.B. in der Karai­ bensprache der Term daco einmal als tempusanzeigendes grammatisches Morphem verwendet (aveiridaco = wenn du wiirst), zum anderen aber als Lexem (oruacono daco = am dritten Tage; cf. WWIII:35). 3) Die Satzform wird durch "Worter grammatischer, also formaler Bedeutung" man wiir­ de heute eher von grammatischen Morphemen sprechen - bezeichnet (cf.

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telischen ist offenkundig. Freilich ist zu bedenken, daB die logischen Para­ doxien einer derartigen Konzeption erst ein Jahrhundert spiiter, niimlich in Wittgensteins Tractatus, deutlich werden.n Bedeutsam wird die Schrift fiir Humboldt nicht nur, wei! sie die in der 'Cultur', der Bearbeitung der Sprachen gemachten Fortschritte sichere und verbreite, sondern wei! sie dariiber hinaus "den Grad der erreichbaren Vollkommenheit" der Sprachen fordere und steigere (GS V :33). "Es hat mir", so eroffnet er die Akademie-Vorlesung Ueber die Buchstabenschrift und ihren Zusammenhang mit dem Sprachbau von 1824,

V: 113). Ihr Vorzug gegeniiber anderen Schrifttypen bestehe darin, "die rei­ ne Gedankennatur der Sprache" durch keinerlei bildlichc Vorstellungen zu st6ren, dem Denken des Begriffs "Vogel" beispielsweise durch die Form der graphischen Repriisentation die Vorstellung eines Storchs oder Greif­ vogels zu unterschieben. Sie allein fiihre dem Sprachsinn das Prinzip der Artikulation bis zur letztm6glichen Ebene, der der Phoneme, "rein und an­ schaulich" vor Augen:

bei dem Nachdenken tiber den Zusammenhang der Buchstabenschrift mit der Sprache immer geschienen, als wenn die erstere in genauem Verhalt­ niss mit den Vorzligen der letzteren sHinde, und als wenn die Annahme und Bearbeitung des Alphabets, ja selbst die Art und vielleicht auch die Erfindung desselben, von dem Grade der Vollkommenheit der Sprache, und noch urspriinglicher, der Sprachanlagen jeder Nation abhienge. (GS V:J07)

Wie der Sprachtyp Riickschliisse auf den ihn produzierenden Sprachsinn zuliiBt, so nach Humboldt auch die Wahl des Schrifttypus. Es sei ein beden­ kenswertes Phiinomen, daB wahre Bilderschrift ailein in Aegypten einheimisch war [ ] dass die Figu­ renschrift sich auf den Osten Asiens beschrankt [ . . . ] , dass es in dem iibri­ gen Asien seit den iiltesten Zeiten mehrere Buchstabenschriften gab, und dass Europa urspriinglich gar keine Schrift besass, aber sehr friih gerade diejenige empfieng und bewundernswiirdig benutzte, welche die Fort­ schritte der Sprache und die Ideenentwicklung am meisten bef6rdert (GS V:33-34). ...

,

Humboldts Hierarchic von Sprachtypen agglutinierender, isolierender und flektierender Sprachtypus - entspricht eine Hierarchic von Schriftty­ pen: Bilder- und Begriffsschrift, danach die Figuren-, schlieBlich die Buch­ stabenschrift. In seiner Auffassung der Schrift scheint Humboldt damit ganzlich von der europiiischen Tradition bestimmt zu sein. Es sei "das tonende Wort ( . . . ] gleichsam eine Verk6rperung des Gedanken, die Schrift eine des Tons" (GS V:109). Dies liest sich wie eine Ubersetzung der beriihmten Passage aus Aristoteles' Peri hermeneias, wonach die Elemente der gesprochenen Rede 'Symbola' der Eindriicke der Seele seien, die Elemente der Schrift wiederum Symbole derjenigen der Rede.14 Durchaus im Sinne dieser vielzi­ tierten Textstelle definiert Humboldt die Buchstabenschrift als "einfaches, durch keinen Nebenbegriff zerstreuendes Zeichen des Zeichens" ( GS

Das alphabetische Lesen und Schreiben - so Humboldts Resiimee n6thigt in jedem Augenblick zum Anerkennen der dem Ohr und dem Auge fiihlbaren Lautelemente, und gew6hnt an die leichte Trennung und Zu­ sammensetzung derselben; es macht daher eine vollendet richtige Ansicht der Theilbarkeit der Sprache in ihre Elemente in eben dem Grade allge­ mein, in welchem es selbst tiber die Nation verbreitet ist. (GS V:115)

Insbesondere vermag allein die Buchstabenschrift die reinste Form der Flexion, niimlich die Binnenflexion, den ganzen von der Indogermanistik beschriebenen Mechanismus von Ablaut, Schwund-, Dehnstufe etc. ada­ quat zu reprasentieren. Indem so die Buchstabenschrift dem Sprachsinn sein formales Prinzip sinnlich vor Augen fiihrt, befriedigt sie gewisserma­ Ben das ihm immanente Streben nach Formalitiit, und so bewirkt sie dassel­ be wie die Auspriigung rein grammatischer Sprachzeichen, niimlich der Ideenentwicklung "einen eigentlichen Schwung" (WW III:39) zu geben. Wiederum ist dies ganz im Sinne der kantischen Asthetik gedacht: die Ein­ bildungskraft wird befliigelt, wei! sich die ihr gegebenen Formen als zweck­ miiBig fiir das Geschiift der Gedankenbildung erweisen. Herders Anthropologie weist auch hier den Weg. Die Schrift ist ab­ gesehen von ihren praktischen Zwecken - Medium geistiger Bildung des Menschengeschlechts. Zum einen konstituiert sie, indem sie Uberlieferung erm6glicht, den Raum der Geschichte. Zum anderen wirkt sie als Medium formaler Bildung. Sie macht ein "ganz anderes Nachdenken" tiber Sprache moglich, "als wenn das verhallende Wort bloss im Gediichtniss eine blei­ bende Stiitte findet'' (GS V:109). Ihr Gebrauch wirkt auf den Sprachsinn zuriick. Mehr oder weniger vollkommen fiihrt sie diesem das formale Prin­ zip der Gedankenbildung, die Artikulation von Einheiten, vor Augen und bietet damit dem Geist in der Auspriigung schriftlicher Einheiten ein Indiz fiir die mehr oder weniger gelungene Ubereinstimmung der sprachlichen mit der logischen Gliederung der Rede, die, wenn der Gedanke vollkom­ men gebildet sein soli, "wie aus Einer Form gegossen seyn" miissen (ibid.). Augenfiillig korrespondiert der Vorrang, den Humboldt der Buchsta­ benschrift einriiumt, dem, den er dem flektierenden Sprachtypus zumiBt. In

192

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HUMBOLDT UND DAS PROBLEM DER SCHRIIT

diesem Sinne ware er, zumindest auf den ersten Blick, der Epoche des La­ gozentrismus bzw. Ethnozentrismus zuzurechnen. Wie vertriige sich dies aber mit den einleitend skizzierten, auf dem Prinzip der Differenz aufbau­ enden Grundziigen seiner Sprachphilosophie? Die genaue Lektiire der humboldtschen Texte zur Schrift gibt keine eindeutige Antwort. Den dargestellten "logozentrischen" Motiven wider­ sprechen andere. Insbesondere zeigt sich, daB Humboldts Definition der Schrift im allgemeinen keineswegs von Derridas Kritik am Mythos der Re­ prasentation getroffen wird:

se als "Buchstabe" terminologisiert,1' doch rein distinktiv. Im Abschnitt tiber das "Lautsystem" der Grundziige ist dieser Gesichtspunkt in aller Klarheit entwickelt. "Jeder Laut hat [ . . . ] eine eigne Sphiire, in welcher er einen bestimmten, aber bei weitem nicht den einzig mi:iglichen Punkt ein­ nimmt" (GS V:401). Die Okonomie des Ton- bzw. Lautsystems16 zeigt sich jedoch erst bei der Bildung von Silben bzw. Worten. Die 'Vollkommenheit' eines phonologischen Systems bemiBt sich allein an seinem Potential der Bedeutungsdifferenzierung (cf. insbesondere GS V:403ff.), ist also ein ab­ geleiteter Wert. Nicht einmal hinsichtlich der Repriisentation grammati­ scher Formen kann der Buchstabenschrift ein prinzipieller Vorrang gegen­ iiber der Figurenschrift eingeraumt werden. Diese ist ebenso wie jene durch das Prinzip der Arbitraritat des Zeichens bestimmt; in der Entwick­ lung der chinesischen Schrift wurde ein urspriinglich gewiB gegebener iko­ nischer Sinn bestimmter Radikale getilgt, diese konventionalisiert. DaB das Zeichen ·J..c "Mensch" bedeutet, ist seiner Gestalt nicht zu entnehmen, denn im Zeichen fiir das Pluralmorphem ( 111 ) wird dasselbe Schema kei­ neswegs ebenso gedeutet. Eine strukturelle Oberlegenheit ki:innte der Buchstabenschrift nur dann eingeraumt werden, wenn die Anzahl gramma­ tischer Forrnen in einer Sprache unendlich ware. Dann allerdings gabe sie ein Verfahren an die Hand, diese Menge mit endlichen Mitteln zu repra­ sentieren. Gegeniiber jedem beliebig graBen 'Wi:irtervorrath' muB aber die Anzahl grammatischer Morpheme kleiner, also endlich sein. Diese sind durch Figuren ebenso darzustellen wie durch Buchstabenkombinationen, die graphische Distinktheit der Figuren vorausgesetzt. Zurecht definiert Humboldt 'Schrift' im engeren Sinn als "Zeichen, welche bestimmte Wi:irter in bestimmter Folge andeuten". Denn dies ist die fiir die Bestimmtheit des Gedankens hinreichende Bedingung. Das Wort, nicht das Phonem, ist fiir Humboldt das logische Individuum in der Sprache (cf. Grundziige §72 = GS V:410). An einer Stelle in den Grundziigen anti­ zipiert Humboldt sogar die durch die Gestaltpsychologie des 20. Jahrhun­ derts beeinfluBte Idee eines 'ganzheitlichen' Lesens:

Unter Schrift im engsten Sinne kann man nur Zeichen verstehen, welche bestimmte W6rter in bestimmter Folge andeuten . Nur eine solche kann wirklich gelesen werden. Schrift im weitUi.ufigsten Verstande ist dagegen die Mitteilung bloBer Gedanken, die durch Laute geschieht (GS V:34).

Eine Auffassung der Schrift als 'Zeichen fiir Zeichen' laBt sich hieraus nicht ableiten - im Gegenteil: Die Extension des Begriffs 'Schrift' iiber­ steigt bei Humboldt die von 'Sprache'. Deren Begriff beschrankt er "bless auf die Bezeichnung der Gedanken durch Laute"; unter 'Schrift' dagegen versteht er "jede andere Bezeichnungsart der Gedanken, so wie die der Laute selbst" (GS V:35). Dies kehrt, selbst wenn Spraclie das in der Ent­ wicklung der Gattung friiher ausgepragte Zeichenmedium ist, ihr Verhalt­ nis zur Schrift geradezu urn. Auch wenn diese "urspriinglich immer Be­ zeichnung der Sprache" ist, so konnen sich doch, selbst im Sinne der 'enge­ ren' Definition, Schriften entwickeln, in denen der Gedanke nur in der gra­ phematischen Repriisentation seine individuelle Bestimmtheit erhalt, wah­ rend beziiglich Schreibendem und Entzifferndem ein Spielraum mi:iglicher lautlicher Reprasentationen gegeben ist. Die Figurenschrift des Chinesi­ schen ist dafiir das klassische Beispiel. Explizit beschreibt Humboldt diesen Fall, und dennoch bleibt die bier­ mit schwer vereinbare Bevorzugung der Buchstabenschrift - schwer zu vereinbaren, weil Humboldt bei ihrer Wiirdigung ausdriicklich von ihren praktischen Vorteilen, die allerdings auf der Hand liegen, absieht (cf. GS V:108). Nur auf den ersten Blick kann Humboldts Argumentation in der Vorlesung Ober die Buchstabenschrift iiberzeugen. Die dart reklamierte Parallelitat von Bestimmtheit der "Idealitat" und Vollkommenheit des "Tonsystems", aus der er den Vorzug der Buchstabenschrift gegeniiber andren Schrifttypen ableitet, triigt. Auch wenn das Alphabet "ein mehr oder weniger vollstandiges System von Ti:inen" reprasentiert (cf. GS V:403), so ist der Wert des Phonems, das Humboldt charakteristischerwei-

Wort kann [namlich in logischer Hinsicht] allerdings auch als unteilbares Ganzes genommen werden, wie man auch in der Schrift wohl den Sinn ei­ ner Wortgruppe erkennt, ohne noch ihrer alphabetischen Zusammenset­ zung gewiB zu sein .. . (GS V:384) .

Sieht man von Praktikabilitatsgriinden wie leichterer Erlernbarkeit ab, die allerdings betrachtlich sind, ist die These des Vorzugs der Buchstaben-

194

HUMBOLDT UND DAS PROBLEM DER SCHRIFT

CHRISTIAN STETTER

vor der Figurenschrift nicht zu hal ten. Hinsichtlich der Artikulationsfiihig­ keit sind beide Systeme iiquivalent. Diese These ist - wie gezeigt - aus Humboldts sprachphilosophi­ schen Annahmen nicht ableitbar. Es bleibt eine Erkliirung des Wider­ spruchs: die historische Situation, aus der heraus Humboldt dachte. Fiir ibn ist der Begriff der biirgerlichen Nation durch die Merkmale gemeinsamer Abstammung und einer Sprache definiert, deren Identitiit - wie die Grundziige (GS V:379f.) zeigen - durch ein und dasselbe Lautsystem ver­ biirgt ist. In ibm liegt, dank des Spiels der Einbildungskraft, der Appell des Vernehmens 'derselben' Sprache an das Gefiihl, mag sich die logische Gel­ tung des in ihr Gesagten auch his zum Widerspruch ausdifferenzieren. Hinzu kommt die den indoeuropiiischen Sprachen eigentiimliche Bin­ nenflexion, die dem Chinesischen fremd ist und die in der Tat durch das Sy­ stem der Buchstabenschrift 6konomisch erfaBt werden konnte. Der von der Identitiit einer Sprache her gedachte Begriff der Nation ein Gebilde wie das chinesische Reich nicht iibertragbar. Die logo­ auf war zentrischen Spuren in Humboldts Denken sind historisch-politischer, nicht sprachphilosophischer Natur. Die pragmatische ZweckmiiBigkeit der durch eine beliebige Anzahl von Dialekten substituierbaren Figurenschrift fiir das Reich der Mitte iiberstieg seinen Erfahrungshorizont. Von daher blieb ihm auch die Einsicht verschlossen, daB sich in der chinesischen Schrift, etwa beim Verfassen von Gedichten, deren iisthetische Form wesentlich auf den mit den Schriftzeichen verbundenen Konnotationen beruht, ein 'Spiel der Differenzen' mit graphischen Radikalen entwickelt, das der Buchstaben­ schrift fremd ist. Der his heute kaum realisierten Modernitiit seines sprachphilosophi­ schen Denkens tut diese Beschriinkung keinen Abbruch. ANMERKUNGEN !.

2.

Die Logik abstrahiert, da sie cine 'Aussage' nur unter a priori gegebenen Wahrheitskrite� rien betrachtet, natiirlich legitimerweise von dieser Dimension und kann so eine 'Sach aw ge' als Abstraktion aus einer Menge extensional oder (in schwB.cherer Version) intenstow nal iiquivalenter Aussagen begreifen (cf. Lorenz 1970:81ff.).

�

Dies geht natiirlich auf Freges Vorbild zuriick (cf. Begriffsschrift, §5). Die Definition der 'Bedingtheit', d.h. der Subjunktion, beruht auf dem ExtensionaliHitsprinzip. Doch bleibt dessen philosophische Bedeutung aufgrund der definitorischen Vorgehensweise Freges unexpliziert. Dies leistet der Text Wittgensteins dann in aller Radikalitat.

195

3.

Zur Bedeutung Leibniz' fur Asthetik und Erkenntnistheorie des 18. Jahrhunderts, cf. Borsche (1981:!56ff.).

4.

Mag dieses innerhalb dieser Grenzen prinzipiell wiederum unendlich sein, faktisch ist es immer endlich.

5.

Cf. Tractatus 2.18. Bin 'realistisches' MiBversUindnis dieser Rede von 'Abbildung' wird durch unsere folgenden Satze ausgeschlossen. Tatsachlich dUrften die sprachphilosophiw schen Dbereinstimmungen zwischen Humboldt und schon dem friihen Wittgenstein weit grOBer sein als immer angenommen. Doch bedfirfte dieses Thema einer eigenen Untersu­ chung.

6.

Cf. Grundziige §25, GS V:377. Humboldts Formulierung ist durchaus irn strengen fonnalw logischen Sinn zu lesen.

7.

Cf. Tractatus 4. Bei der Konzeption des Sinnbegriffs geht der friihe Wittgenstein dann freilich andere Wege; dies ist durch die Themenstellung des Tractatus bedingt. Doch bis hierin ist die Parallele zwingend. Das 'ist' im Satz 4 ist kein Versehen; wie der vorhergew hende Satz 3.5 belegt, ist 4 zu lesen als: die Ausdriicke 'Gedanke' und 'sinnvoller Satz' sind aquivalent.

8.

Der Gedanke, daB erst seine Verkniipfung mit anderen Tennen einen sprachlichen Term interpretierbar machen, ist systematisch insbesondere von Charles Sanders Peirce (1839w 1914) im Begriff der Interpretantenrelation entwickelt worden. Cf. hierzu Stetter 1983: 288ff.

9.

Cf. das 'vierte Naturgesetz' bei Herder (1979 [17?2]: 100ff.). Alle vier sag. 'Naturgeset­ ze' des zweiten Teils der Preisschrift, die weniger miBverstiindJich als Grundsi:itze einer Theorie der Evolution der Gattung Mensch zu bezeichnen waren, sind bier in ihrem sy­ stematischen Zusammenhang zu betrachten.

10.

Cf. Verschiedenheiten §47 (WW 111:200ff.): "Das Wort ist kein Gegenstand, vielmehr den Gegensti:inden gegeniiber etwas Subjektives, dennoch soU es im Geiste des Denkenden ein Objekt, von ihm erzeugt und auf ihn zuriickwirkend werden. Es bleibt zwischen dem Wort und seinem Gegenstande eine so befremdende Kluft, das Wort gleicht, allein im Einzelnen geboren, so sehr einem blossen Scheinobjekt, die Sprache kann auch nur so zur Wirklichkeit gebracht werden, dass an einen gewagten Versuch ein neuer sich an­ kniipft".

11.

Auf dieser Basis IieBe sich der 'dunkle' Begriff der inneren Sprachform ohne Schwierigw keiten explizieren. Auch dies muB allerdings einer weiteren Studie vorbehalten bleiben.

12.

H.W. Scharfs Kritik an Chomskys Versuch, seiner Idee einer generativen Grammatik durch Bezug auf das bekannte Diktum aus der Einleitung ins Kawi-Werk philosophische Aura zu verschaffen (Scharf 1977), bleibt natiirlich hiervon ganz unberiihrt. Chomsky hatte sich in der Tat eher auf den grammatischen Bau berufen kOnnen.

13.

Wittgenstein zeigt, daf3 sich die Weltabbildung, damit den Satz, ermOglichende logische Form nicht mehr sagen, d.h. deskriptiv erfassen HiBt. Sie kann sich nur noch zeigen (cf. hierzu Stetter 1988b).

14.

Zwar hat H. GUnther versucht, die 'reprasentative Lesart' dieser Stelle zu modifizieren, m.E. jedoch nicht iiberzeugend. Das tauta des bei Aristoteles folgenden iibemachsten Satzes bezieht sich zwar, wie GUnther (1983:25-26) richtig feststellt, sowohl auf grammata wie aufph6nai, doch faBt es lediglich diese heiden Arten als semeia zusammen und grenzt

,,

196

CHRISTIAN STETTER

HUMBOLDT UND DAS PROBLEM DER SCHRIIT

197

sie gegeniiber den pathemata bzw. den diese erzeugenden pragmata jlb� ·Inwiefem diese semeia etwas bedeuten, ist aber im ersten Satz gesagt.

SUMMARY

15.

Cf. Grundziige §§56ff. [GS V: 400ff.]: "Alphabet" = "System ihrer [der Sprache] articu� lirten Laute" (400).

16.

Humboldt verwendet, obwohl er 'Laut' und 'Ton' sorgfiiltig unterscheidet, beide Begriffe synonym.

This essay compares Humboldt's view of language with that of script. It is shown in what way his conception of language follows from his idea of esthetics derived from Kant's Kritik der Urteilskraft. Following Derrida, the idea ofthe relativity of "sprachliche Weltansichten" (linguistic conceptions of the world) is in opposition to the tradition of logocentrism; it is based on the principle of difference. This seems to be in contradiction with Hum­ boldt's view of the alphabetic script. It is shown however that his idea of script is compatible with that of language, and that his high esteem of the alphabetic script results from the specific historical situation at the begin­ ning of the 19th century.

BffiLIOGRAPIDE

Borsche, Tilman. 1981. Sprachansichten: Der Begriff der menschlichen Re­ de in der Sprachphilosophie Wilhelm von Humboldts. Stuttgart: Klett­ Cotta. Gunther, Hans. 1983. "Charakteristika von schriftlicher Sprache und Kom­ munikation". Schrift, Schreiben, Schriftlichkeit: Arbeiten zur Struktur, Funktion und Entwicklung schriftlicher Sprache hrsg. von K. B . Gunther & H. Gunther. Tubingen: M. Niemeyer. Herder, Johann Gottfried. 1979. Ober den Ursprung der Sprache. Text, Materialien, Kommentar. Hrsg. von W. Pross. Munchen: C. Hanser. Humboldt, Wilhelm von. 1903-36. Gesammelte Schriften, hrsg. PreuBische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 17 Bde. Berlin: Behr. (Zitiert als GS). ---. 1960. Werke in fiinf Biinden. Hrsg. von A. Flitner & K. Giel. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. (Zitiert als WW). Uebrucks, Bruno. 1965. Sprache und Bewuf3tsein. Bd.2. Frankfurt am Main: Akademische Verlagsanstalt. Lorenz, Kuno. 1970. Elemente der Sprachkritik. Frankfurt am Main: Suhr­ kamp. Scharf, Hans Werner. 1977. Chomskys Humboldt-Interpretation: Ein Beitrag zur Diskontinuitiit der Sprachtheorie in der Geschichte der neueren Linguistik. Diss., Univ. Dusseldorf. Stetter, Christian. 1983. "Peirces semiotische Schemata". History of Semio­ tics ed. by Achim Eschbach & Jiirgen Trabant, 277-310. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins. ---. 1988a. "Uber Denken und Sprechen: Wilhelm von Humboldt zwi­ schen Fichte und Herder". In Vorbereitung. ---. 1988b. "Die logisch-semiotische Problemstellung in Wittgensteins Tractatus". In Vorbereitung.

Da Humboldt ai neogrammatici Continuita e fratture Paolo Ramat

Universita di Pavia I

Rispetto al quadro cronologico generate del convegno il mio coi:J.tribu­ to risulta forse un po' eccentrico, trattando il periodo da Humboldt ai Neo­ grammatici. Tuttavia proprio l'adozione di un punto di vista contrastivo, se non proprio comparativo in senso stretto, risulta spesso utile per mettere pili chiaramente a fuoco le rispettive peculiaritii. Spero quindi di non essere del tutto fuori tema. Il titolo della presente comunicazione riprende, parafrasandolo, quello del primo capitolo del bel libro che Lia Formigari ha dedicato al linguaggio nella filosofia della Romantik (Formigari 1977). Nella sua storia della lin­ guistica del 1869 Theodor Benfey (1809-1881) sottolineava il cambiamento metodologico radicale (oggi alcuni parlerebbero di mutamento di 'para­ digma scientifico') intervenuto con la linguistica storico-comparata, che per prima avrebbe dato digniti\ scientifica allo studio delle lingue rifondando su altre basi anche quanto di giusto si poteva trovare nella linguistica prece­ dente. Un giudizio analogo troviamo anche in un outsider non digiuno di lin­ guistica quale Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) pili o meno negli stessi anni: in una delle ultime pagine dell'Anti-Diihring (1878) egli contrappone decisa­ mente la ricerca linguistica degli ultimi sessant'anni, da Franz Bopp (17911867) Jacob Grimm (1785-1863) e Friedrich Diez (1794-1876) in poi, alla 'grammatica tecnica' del signor Diihring con tutte le sue minuzie e arbitra­ rieti\. In una lettera a Karl Kautsky (1854-1938) del 1891 egli prevede inol­ tre che l'impiego del metodo comparativo (nella fattispecie per quello che riguarda lo studio del diritto) fara finalmente saltare i vecchi schemi qegli studiosi di preistoria (Ramal 1983:186).

.,

'

201

PAOLO RAMAT

DA HUMBOLDT AI NEOGRAMMATICI

Cio e vero - nell'uno come nell'altro giudizio critico - da un punto di vista strettamente fattuale e positivista: che e poi quello che interessava sia allo storico della linguistica che a! filosofo del materialismo dialettico, !'uno e l'altro fondando il loro giudizio sulla grande scoperta - grazie appunto a! metodo comparativo - dell'esistenza di leggi evolutive. II metodo compa­ rativo permette infatti per Ia prima volta di costituire una solida base di dati su cui fondare le affermazioni d'ordine generale. Come e nolo, tale giudizio diventera poi communis opinio nei manuali di storia della linguistica, almeno fino agli anni '60 di questo secolo - in molti dei quali manuali si fara incominciare Ia storia della linguistica tout court con Bopp e i primi comparatisti, relegando a! massimo tra i precursori i due precedenti secoli. Ma come per molti altri cosiddetti 'mutamenti di paradigma scientifico' Ia realta e pill complessa, molto pill articolata e sfumata. Tra Ia linguistica del 18' secolo e quella del Romanticismo esistono, certamente, contrappo­ sizioni rna anche - come e stato sottolineato ormai da molti studiosi (cf. Formigari 1977:VIIsg.) - notevoli continuita, a cominciare dall'idea di confrontare lo sviluppo della lingua ad un processo naturale, che inizia a prender piede gia nell'ultimo trentennio del lS' secolo, per esempio coi fra­ telli August Wilhelm von Schlegel (1767-1845) e Friedrich von Schlegel (1772-1829; cf.Bahner & Neumann 1985:128sg.). Da qui si sviluppera poi !'idea di un'assoluta autonomia delle regole di trasformazione dei suoni come fenomeni naturali, che e Ia premessa per Ia scoperta della regolarita delle leggi fonetiche. II termine stesso di 'comparazione' (Vergleichung) e 'comparato' e di tradizione settecentesca: Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) nella Abhandlung uber den Ursprung der Sprache (1772) parla di una 'philoso­ phische Vergleichung' delle lingue per arrivare a comprendere Ia mentalita e le caratteristiche spirituali dei popoli, secondo un programma che oggi potremmo chiamare di etnolinguistica e che fu proprio anche di Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835). Johann Severin Vater (1771-1826), professore di teologia e bibliotecario a Konigsberg, distingue fra 'allgemeine Sprach­ lehre' e 'vergleichende Grammatik' subordinando Ia seconda ai concetti generali della prima (Ramal 1974). La dimensione comparativa nasce dunque, prima che nella prospettiva propria della linguistica storica, in quella filosofica della varietas linguarum (v. sopra Gensini: [000-000]) e si trasformera progressivamente nella prima via via che i successi della grammatica storica indoeuropea faranno passare in secondo piano ogni altra problematica.

A proposito della dimensione storica della comparazione, e stato detto che Franz Bopp fa della grammatica comparata senza storia linguistica mentre Jacob Grimm fa storia linguistica senza grammatica comparata (Schlerath 1986:9). Ma anche in questo caso, a! di Ia dell'elegante slogan, le cose stanno in modo pill complicato di una semplice alternativa. Bopp, che come Humboldt rivendicava alia linguistica piena autonomia cioe indipen­ denza da preoccupazioni d'altro ordine (come era stato, per esempio, in Leibniz), dice espressamente in una nota lettera del 1815 a Karl J. H. Win­ dischmann (1775-1839) - un anno prima del Conjugationssystem! - di vo­ ler fare dello studio delle lingue uno studio 'filosofico e storico' (cioe tanto generale quanto empirico) (Bahner 1985:472-73), ed e innegabile che alia base della comparazione, sia nel Conjugationssystem, col tentativo di di­ mostrare l'origine della coniugazione in una agglutinazione del verbo copu­ la a basi verbali, sia nella Vergleichende Grammatik del 1833, vi siano istan­ ze di ordine generale, o come si diceva allora, filosofico (cf. Antinucci 1975). In questo senso Bopp si avvicina molto a Wilhelm von Humboldt, col quale sono del resto ben noti anche i rapporti personali di reciproca stima. A chiarire come i due intendono il rapporto tra comparazione e storia e in­ teressante citare un passo della lettera indirizzata a Bopp dopo Ia recensio­ ne di quest'ultimo alia Deutsche Grammatik di Jacob Grimm (Bopp 1827; cf. Bahner & Neumann 1985:193):

200

Die Fortsetzung Ihrer Rezension ist vortrefflich. Die wahrhaft neue Methode, deren Einftihrung man gr6sstentheils Ihnen dankt, die Umwand­ lungen der Sprache aufzusuchen u . bis ins kleinste Detail zu verfolgen, entwickelt sich mit jeder Ihrer Arbeiten mehr u. verbreitet ein helleres Licht iiber das Sprachstudium. [ . . . . ] Es liegt immer mehr am Tage, welch einen Vorzug Sie vor Grimm schon darin besitzen, dass Sie das Studium von der Wurzel aus auffassen, da Grimm Ieider es nur von einem Zweige aus ergreift u. bei der mangelnden Kenntnis des Indischen, nicht einmal in die Tiefe gehOrig zuriickgehen kann. Es ist unendlich zu bedauern, dass Grimm nicht in einer Zeit schrieb, wo das Studium des Sanskrit ihm gewiss nicht fremd geblieben seyn wiirde, aber zu bewundern, dass er ohne das­ selbe so unglaublich viel leistete (corsivo mio:P.R.).

Si veda a questo proposito quanto Grimm stesso scrive a Karl F.W. Lachmann (1793-1851) circa Ia 'recensione' di Bopp alia Deutsche Gramma­ tik (Leitzmann 1927:510; Schlerath 1986:16): Bopps abhandlung, wiewohl keine recension meines buches, ist ehren­ werth und mir ganz recht, sie fiihrt meine, natiirlich sehr schwache verglei­ chung mit dem sanskrit weiter aus und berichtigt. Dber manches wird sich

202

PAOLO RAMAT streiten lassen. Allein was er rnir zugestehet, _ist schon viel und genug, wenn ich bedenke wie naturalistisch und auf gut gliick ich aus dem deut� schen in das sanskrit hinein gehauen babe (corsivo mio:P.R.).

Per Bopp come per Humboldt, il quale anche a! termine della lettera ora ricordata sottolinea Ia necessitil di unire Ia dimensione speculativa a quella storica, lo studio comparative ha necessariamente una base storica, pur rispondendo a finalitii d'ordine speculative, filosofico, universale e a priori rispetto all'approccio empirico. Ancora una citazione da Humboldt: Das geschichtliche Studium kann zwar niemals Vollstandigkeit gew§.hren [ . .. ]. Es muss aber durch das vergleichende Sprachstudium dreierlei geschicht­ lich dargestellt werden: 1. wie jede Sprache die verschiedenen, bei dem Bediirfniss der Rede vorkommenden Aufgaben lOst? ( . . . ] 2. wie und wo­ ran die Sprachen, welchen wir einen Iangen Zeitraum hindurch folgen k6nnen, Veranderungen in ihrem Inneren erfahren haben? 3 . welche Ver­ schiedenheiten in Wortbau und Redefi.igung die naheren und entfernteren Verwandtschaftsgrade in Sprachen gemeinschaftlicher Abkunft zulassen? (Humboldt 1963:Ill, 65-66; cf. Swiggers 1985:732).

Ma anche per quanto riguarda Jacob Grimm si pub dire che, almeno in linea teorica, Ia sua impostazione non diverge da quella- di Humboldt e Bopp: nella Prefazione alia prima edizione della Deutsche Grammatik (1819) egli distingue nello studio scientifico della grammatica tre momenti: quello fi!osofico-speculativo, quello critico (cioe normative) e quello stori­ co che descrive lo svi!uppo (Sonderegger 1985:52). Le differenze con Bopp e Humboldt, rilevate anche dai diretti protagonisti, sono differenze di ac­ cento piuttosto che di impostazione di fondo, dovute anche a! fatto che Grimm e principalmente non un indoeuropeista rna un germanista, animato fra l'altro da intenti nobilmente nazionalistici tipici del Romanticismo che raccoglie i fermenti verso le varie autonomie nazionali esistenti all'interno dell'impero asburgico (Bahner 1985:466-67; Wiesinger 1985:521-22; Souder­ egger 1985:45). Per contro l'indoeuropeista Bopp, cui erano peraltro del tutto estranei gli interessi e gli entusiasmi anche civili di un Grimm o di uno Humboldt, si serve della comparazione interlinguistica per ricostruire Ia forma originaria (e in essa trovare conferma delle sue ipotesi generali) ed e quindi naturalmente meno interessato a seguire nei particolari Ia storia in­ lerna di questa o quella lingua. Non e ora il caso di addentrarsi nella discus­ sione circa l'impostazione filosofica che traspare nella Deutsche Grammatik e nelle altre opere di Grimm, soprattutto nella Akademievorlesung del 1851, Uber den Ursprung der Sprache, dove vi e i1 tentative, peraltro non

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riuscito, di unire Ia tesi tradizionale della progressiva decadenza della lin­ gua originaria con le risultanze della linguistica storica che mostrano invece un progredire delle forme (cf. Gessinger 1985:665sgg., il quale riporta an­ che brani della corrispondenza di Grimm con Humboldt a proposito di questo specifico problema, che mostra come ancora alia meta del secolo persistessero preoccupazioni d'ordine filosofico, per non dire ideologico, caratteristiche della linguistica settecentesca [v. anche Telegdi 1985:56162]). All'altezza di Humboldt, Bopp e Grimm, si e verificato pertanto un importante cambiamento nell'accezione del termine, pur tradizionale, di 'comparazione' (Vergleichung), cosi come lo si trovava per esempio in Frie­ drich W. J. Schelling (1775-1854), pur !oro contemporaneo - sui piano cronologico, non certo su quello ideologico-politico! Questi, filosofo della Restaurazione postnapoleonica, vede nella comparazione interlinguistica il mezzo per provare l'unitii originaria della coscienza collettiva del genere umano (sia pure con l'eccezione delle lingue amerindiane ed asiatiche . . . : v. Formigari 1977:70-71). AI di Iii delle profonde differenze con Ia filosofia del linguaggio illuminista, giustamente sottolineate da Lia Formigari (1977: VIII), per quello che riguarda il concetto di comparazione, anche Schelling ne fa un uso strumentale, teso a dimostrare una tesi predeterminata, non un procedimento metodologico fornito in se di capacitil euristica. Con Bopp, e piu ancora con Grimm e con Humboldt, il metodo comparative si e affran­ cato invece da presupposti di carattere ideologico e l'accento tende sempre piu a cadere sulla differenza delle lingue poste a confronto - anche per i motivi storico-politici interni alia Germania cui accennavo piu sopra non solo sulla !oro omogeneitii sostanziale. In Schelling troviamo un uso ideo!ogico, astorico e in una prospettiva che si colloca volutamente a! di Iii dell'orizzonte fenomenico, come reazio­ ne a! naturalismo linguistico settecentesco, del concetto di parentela lin­ guistica e di quello ad esso ormai strettamente connesso di comparazione. In un certo senso e proprio tale uso, cosi contrario alia prassi scientifi­ ca ormai invalsa (Ia Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie e del 1826), a facilitare, a rendere necessaria per i linguisti, Ia separazione della filosofia del linguaggio dalla ricerca linguistica empirica e storica (Formigari 1977:72-73). Tale separazione Iibera Ia strada alia seconda e, ancor piu, alia terza generazione di linguisti (quella dei Neogrammatici) per uno studio materia­ le, empirico, delle lingue; studio cui stanno di fronte notevo!issimi problemi

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pratici, senza piu il fardello delle preoccupazioni filosofiche ed ideologiche. Nello stesso anno (1850) in cui Schelling pubblica le sue Vorbemerkungen zu der Frage tiber den Ursprung der Sprache, nelle quali sono riprese le tesi della Philosophie der Mythologie circa Ia parentela delle lingue umane in un ordine ideale, l'ormai anziano Jacob Grimm, osservando Ia situazione dall'interno, come addetto ai lavori, inizia Ia sua lezione alla Accademia di Berlino sull'origine del linguaggio - un tema classico, ancora ricorrente ­ parlando della profonda trasformazione (durchgreifende Umwiilzung) veri­ ficatasi nella linguistica, come nella botanica e nell'anatomia comparate, rispetto a quando Herder esattamente settanta anni prima aveva trattato lo stesso tema, nella stessa sede. Torniamo con cio ai giudizii di Benfey ed En­ gels (rna gia anche di Humboldt) gia ricordati, circa lo sviluppo della lin­ guistica. Nel clima positivista postromantico - scrive Benfey - 'Ia considera­ zione astrattamente filosofica delle cose ando progressivamente perdendosi per dar luogo a quella scientifica [cioe storico-positivista]', (Benfey 1869:323; v. Bahner & Neumann 1985:7). Nella incipiente divisione tra fi­ losofia e linguistica gia a! momento della sua pubblicazione postuma (1836) l'Introduzione alia lingua kavi di Humboldt e un'opera sorpassata, nel suo tentativo di sintesi tra problematica filosofica e analisi storica (Trabant 1985:576-77). Se per Humboldt il confronto tra le lingue, il 'vergleichendes Sprach­ studium', e ancora, per dirla con le parole gia di Adelung nella prefazione a! Mithridates ( 1806), un mezzo per riconoscere cio che e caratteristico di ciascuna lingua (Ramat 1974:109) e se lo studio di tutte le lingue e per lui un mezzo per conoscere "i confini della spirito umano" (Verlato 198384:610n.10), queste preoccupazioni d'ordine filosofico sono ormai scompar­ se nello studio comparato dei Neogrammatici. Per Humboldt il confronto interlinguistico serve ad evidenziare la diversita della Geisteskraft dei varii popoli e del suo realizzarsi in quanta em!rgeia; anzi, proprio l'esistenza di questa differenza (Verschiedenheit) fonda !a necessita di una comparazione interlinguistica - a base storica poiche Ia differenza stessa e conseguenza delle diverse condizioni storiche in cui i popoli si sono sviluppati. Per i Neo­ grammatici il confronto interlinguistico e il mezzo per recuperare, in base a rigide regale di corrispondenze fonetiche, una protolingua, vista come pro­ datto finito, come i!rgon e non come eni!rgeia. Anche !a ricezione di Grimm da parte dei Neogrammatici e indicativa in questa sensa. Essi sottolineano in Grimm principalmente il modo con cui

egli tratta Ia fonetica storica (rotazione consonantica, meccanismi dell'apo­ fonia) trascurando il quadro ideologico-culturale in cui si inquadra latotali­ ta dell'opera di Grimm - cioe da un Jato lo spirito nazional-romantico del­ la ricerca sulle origini della nazione tedesca: "nella nostra patria contro na­ tura divisa . . . ", come egli scrive nella Geschichte der deutschen Sprache (1848; cf. Bahner & Neumann 1985:143); dall'altro Ia problematica filosofi­ co-speculativa circa le origini del linguaggio e l'ipotesi di decadenza da uno stato linguistico originario di perfezione cui gia accennavo. Nella Geschi­ chte der germanischen Philologie (1891) cosl scrive Hermann Paul (18461921):

205

Durch Grimm war mit einem Male eine imponierende Fiille von regelmas­ sigen Lautentsprechungen zwischen den verschiedenen Dialekten und Zeitraumen nachgewiesen und was das Wichtigste war, diese Fiille war nicht erreicht durch zuf31liges Herausgreifen, sondern durch eine konsequente Durcharbeitung des Materials, die Regelmiissigkeit erschien also als etwas im Wesen der Sprache Begriindetes und davon Unzertrennliches. (Paul 1891:88; cf. Bahner & Neumann [1985:9] e anche Fleischer [1985:4921).

Come si vede, una valutazione che coincide strettamente con quella gia ricordata dal Benfey. Per Hermann Paul, e per i Neogrammatici in genere, il solo approccio scientifico alia lingua e quello storico: e in questa sensa essi possono richia­ marsi a Grimm come al !oro predecessore - ancorche il concetto di storia in Grimm non sia quello positivista, di accertamento di dati di fatto oggetti­ vi, pl'oprio dei Neogrammatici; rna indubbiamente e propria anche di Grimm Ia cura del certum storico: un esempio di cio e costituito dalla cura filologica nella edizione dei testi quale prerequisito indispensabile per una linguistica storica non fantasiosa. Esattamente venti anni �opo Ia Geschichte der deutschen Sprache di Grimm (1848), anche Wilhelm Scherer (1841-1886) pubblica un'opera dallo stesso titolo: qui sono scomparsi i romantici entusiasmi per il periodo delle origini come momenta edenico del germanesimo. L'accento e sulle leggi storiche che determinano causalisticamente e meccanicamente l'evolu­ zione, come hanno. ben vista le scienze naturali: siamo nel 1868, alia vigilia o quasi delle Morphologische Untersuchungen di Karl Brugmann (18491919) e Hermann Osthoff (1847-1909), il manifesto del gruppo dei Neo­ grammatici! Del pari sono scomparsi nell'opera di Scherer i problemi glot­ togonici sull'origine del linguaggio che ancora nel 1850 occupano Grimm e che collegano Grimm alia tradizione settecentesca e poi a Johann Georg

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Hamann (1730-1788), Humboldt, Schelling, ecc. Nel 1866 fu fondata la So­ ciete de Linguistique de Paris e nel suo statuto veniva, come e noto, stabili­ to che nessuna comunicazione riguardante l'origine del linguaggio poteva essere arnnnessa. In Grimm l'approccio storico alla lingua e funzione della storia di un popolo nella sua generalita, per cui anche la Deutsche Grammatik del 1818 e - come egli scrive al suo maestro Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861) - "nicht sowohl eine Grammatik als eine Geschichte der Sprache" (Cheru­ bim 1985:680): la lingua e una testimonianza pili viva che non ossa, armi o tombe per ricostruire la storia di un popolo (Grimm 1848:4; v. Wiesinger 1985:521), come gia aveva affermato Humboldt. Per Paul e i Neogrammati­ ci, invece, la storia di una lingua e la disciplina che la studia - la linguistica storica - diventano oggetto di ricerca in se e per se (anzi l'oggetto per ec­ cellenza della ricerca linguistica): la comparazione e lo strumento tecnico mediante il quale raggiungere il momenta iniziale di questo sviluppo storico per poi da esso discendere fino allo stato attuale - con un cammino che e, anche programmaticamente, inverso a quello cercato da Grimm (cf. Cheru­ bim 1985:682). Riassumendo quindi e schematizzando l'evoluziorie del concetto di si comparazione - con tutti i rischi che simili operazioni comportano . . . possono sostanzialmente individuare tre fasi significative per il costituirsi di tale concetto in termini scientificamente rilevanti: 1) Il progetto razionalistico di una lingua universale, da Cartesio a John Locke (1632-1704), a Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) - di cui considera il confronto interlingui­ non mi sono occupato in questa sede stico come vOlto a provare la sostanziale omogeneita e le comuni origini del­ le lingue umane: il confronto e sostanzialmente astorico, ancorche sia vero - come sottolinea giustamente De Mauro (1965:57) - che Leibniz ebbe chiaramente coscienza della dimensione storica delle lingue arrivando ad impostare programmi di ricerche storico-filologiche quali un Glossarium Etymologicum della lingua tedesca. Ma quando egli afferma: "Io credo ve­ ramente che le lingue siano lo specchio migliore dello spirito umano" (cit. in De Mauro 1965:58), egli non pensa in termini di relativismo linguistico, bensi a una specie di dizionario mentale avente validita universale. Infatti il brano ora citato cosi prosegue (cit. in De Mauro 1965:58):

2) Dalla crisi dell'interpretazione logicizzante ed universalistica del lin­ guaggio emerge il relativismo storico-culturale del Romanticismo: la diver­ sita delle lingue e anche diversita di strutturazione dei contenuti; il pensie­ ro, in fondo, non preesiste al linguaggio, rna ne e condizionato nella sua stessa forma. E' questa sostanzialmente la posizione anche di Humboldt, pur se mitigata ancora dal riconoscimento della fondamentale identita, o omogeneita, delle lingue umane in quanto tali, tutte copia (Abbild) del Iin­ guaggio umano come facolta generale, caratteristica della specie (Ramat 1984:178). In questa prospettiva di relativismo la comparazione interlin­ guistica e una necessitii pratica con profondo valore conoscitivo. E l'accento cade per Humboldt sulle Verschiedenheiten des menschlichen Sprachbaues, non certo sulle omologie di fondo (Ramat 1984:175). Su questa linea si col­ loca anche Jacob Grimm, con una maggiore accentuazione della prospetti­ va storica e ricostruttiva - in questo a differenza, per esempio, anche di Rasmus Kristian Rask (1787-1832) il cui studio comparato e impostato pili in un senso tipologico e sincronico con inclusione delle fasi Iinguistiche mo­ derne (Sonderegger 1986: 129-30), o di Bopp che non prende in considera­ zione per la sua grammatica comparata il vedico rna il sanscrito classico in quanto questo rispecchierebbe meglio il tipo linguistico indiano. 3) A partire da Franz Bopp, di cui pure abbiamo visto gli interessi teo­ rid d'ordine generale, si sviluppa sempre pili una comparazione dotata di una sua propria tecnica. Questa tende col tempo ad imporsi come disciplina autonoma e, nel clima positivista della seconda meta del 19o secolo, a costi­ tuirsi come Ia scienza linguistica tout court in un contesto culturale nel quale la storia e vista anche e soprattutto come sviluppo simile a quella che e l'evoluzione biologica degli organismi viventi. A parte si collocano i tentativi di proseguire la complessa visione del linguaggio di Humboldt al di la della posizione positivista della linguistica storico-comparativa: figure come Karl Ferdinand Becker (1775-1849), Karl Wilhelm Ludwig Heyse (1797-1855), Heymann Steinthal (1823-1899) e an­ che Hans Conon von der Gabelentz (1807-1874), che si sforza di reagire all'esclusivismo del metodo storico-comparativo (Hassler 1985:567sgg.), ri­ masero per lungo tempo ai margini del dibattito linguistico e furono per molto tempo di fatto ignorate. Nel giii ricordato "Auseinanderfallen von Philosophic und Sprachwissenschaft" cui allude Trabant (1985:577), la lin­ guistica filosofica si trasforma progressivamente in psicologia del linguaggio (Formigari 1977:113) e la philosophische Sprachvergleichung non ha pili senso: cio che importa e ormai la vergleichende Sprachwissenschaft.

[e credo] che una rigorosa analisi dei significati delle parole possa mostra­ re, meglio di ogni altra analisi, come funziona l'intelletto.

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Se ora anche noi vogliamo, per chiudere, concederci alia comparazione e confrontiamo fra !oro le varie fasi storiche del concetto stesso di compara­ zione, possiamo constatare che esso ha seguito uno sviluppo storico coeren­ te con Je idee-guida dei singoli momenti storici (come per esempio !'idea stessa di 'storia' - da universalis del genere umano in quanto tale, a parti­ colare e nazionale, a natura/is); e, viste Ia sua rilevanza e significativita, plaudire pertanto all'idea di farne il tema di un convegno a carattere stori­ co.

Gessinger, Joachim. 1985. "Sprachursprung und Sprachverfall bei Jacob Grimm" . ZPSK 38.654-71. Grimm, Jacob. 1848. Geschichte der deutschen Sprache. 2 vols. Gottingen: Dieterich. Hassler, Gerda. 1985. "Zur Auffassung der Sprache als eines organischen Ganzen bei Wilhelm von Humboldt und zu ihren Umdeutungen im 19. Jahrhundert". ZPSK 38.564-75. Humboldt, Wilhelm von. 1961-64. Werke in fUnf Biinde, a cura di Andreas Flitner & Karl Giel. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Leitzmann, Albert, a cura di. 1927. Briefwechsel der Bruder Jacob und Wil­ helm Grimm. Jena: Verlag der Frommanschen Buchhandlung (W. Biedermann). Paul, Hermann. 1891. "Geschichte der germanischen Philologie". Grund­ riss der germanischen Philologie a cura di H. Paul, vol. I. 9-51. Strass­ burg: Karl J. Triibner. Ramal, Paolo. 1974. "Das typologische Sprachproblem im 19. Jahrhun­ dert". ZPSK 29. 495-98. . 1983. Voce "grammatica storica". Dizionario Marx Engels, a cura di Fulvio Papi, 185-90. Bologna: Zanichelli. ---. 1984. Linguistica tipologica. Bologna: II Mulino. Schlerath, Bernfried. 1986. "Eine friihe Kontroverse urn die Natur des Ablauts". 0-o-pe-ro-si: Festschrift fur Ernst Risch zum 75. Geburtstag a cura di A. Etter, 3-18. Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter. Sonderegger, Stefan. 1985. " Die Briider Grimm - Philologie, histori­ sche Sprachwissenschaft und Literaturgeschichte". Die Bruder Grimm: Dokumente ihres Lebens und Wirkens a cura di D . Hennig & B . Lauer. Kassel: Weber & Weidemeyer. Swiggers, Pierre. 1985. "Categories grammaticales et categories culturelles dans Ia philosophie du langage de Humboldt: Les implications de Ia 'for­ me grammaticale'". ZPSK 38.559-63. Trabant, Jiirgen. 1985. "Humboldt zum Ursprung der Sprache" . ZPSK 38.676-89. Verlato, Micaela. 1983-84. "L'identita di pensiero e linguaggio secondo F. Schleiermacher: Sull'idea della relativita linguistica nel romanticismo tedesco". Quaderni patavini di linguistica 4.133-71. Wiesinger, Peter. 1985. "Jacob Grimm und Wilhelm Scherer als Sprachhis­ toriker" . ZPSK 38.519-32.

RIFERIMENTI BIBLIOGRAFICI

Bahner, Werner. 1985. "Jacob Grimm im wissenschaftsgeschichtlichen und internationalen Kontext der deutschen Sprachwissenschaft in der ersten Halfte des 19. Jahrhunderts" . ZPSK 38.426-80. & Werner Neumann, a cura di. 1985. Sprachwissenschaftliche Ger­ manistik: Ihre Herausbildung und Begrundung. Berlin: Akademie­ Verlag. Benfey, Theodor. 1869. Geschichte der Sprachwissenschdft und orientali­ schen Philologie in Deutschland seit dem Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts mit einem Riickblick auf die fruhern Zeiten. Miinchen: Cotta. (Rist., London & New York: Johnson, 1965.) Bopp, Franz. 1827. "Uber J. Grimm's Deutsche Grammatik". JahrbuchfUr wissenschaftliche Kritik Febr. 1827, 251-303; Mai 1827, 737-59 (Rist., Vocalismus oder sprachvergleichende Kritiken uber J. Grimm's deutsche Grammatik und Grafts althochdeutschen Sprachschatz mit Begrundung einer neuen Theorie des Ablauts. Berlin: Nicolai, 1836). Cherubim, Dieter. 1985. "Hat Jacob Grimm die Historische Sprachwissen­ schaft begriindet?". ZPSK 38. 672-85. De Mauro, Tullio. 1965. Introduzione alta semantica. Bari: Laterza. Engels, Friedrich . 1878. Herrn Eugen Diihring's Umwiilzung der Wissen­ schaft. Philosophie. Politische Oekonomie. Leipzig. (Rist., Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, Werke, voJ. 20. Berlin: Dietz, 1951-52.) Fleischer, Wolfgang. 1985. "Zur Geschichte der Grimm-Rezeption aus Jinguistischer Sicht" . ZPSK 38. 489-99. Fonnigari, Lia. 1977. La logica del pensiero vivente: Il linguaggio nella fifo­ sofia della Romantik. Bari: Laterza. ---

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PAOLO RAMAT SUMMARY

This paper examines the evolution of the concept of cross-linguistic comparison, from Humboldt to the Neogrammarians, and shows how the focus of comparison progressively shifted from an achronic, general ('philosophic' ) point of view to a diachronic, historically oriented one, quite in line with the developments of the comparative and reconstructive method in linguistics. The change in viewpoint is connected with the cul­ tural evolution from Enlightnement thinking to Romanticism and, sub­ sequently, to the Positivism of the neogrammarian period. It is shown that these changes must also be seen in the light of the socio-political evolution of Germany during the 19th century.

Part III: Comparative Linguistics before and after Humboldt

210

PAOLO RAMAT SUMMARY

This paper examines the evolution of the concept of cross-linguistic comparison, from Humboldt to the Neogrammarians, and shows how the focus of comparison progressively shifted from an achronic, general ('philosophic' ) point of view to a diachronic, historically oriented one, quite in line with the developments of the comparative and reconstructive method in linguistics. The change in viewpoint is connected with the cul­ tural evolution from Enlightnement thinking to Romanticism and, sub­ sequently, to the Positivism of the neogrammarian period. It is shown that these changes must also be seen in the light of the socio-political evolution of Germany during the 19th century.

Part III: Comparative Linguistics before and after Humboldt

Representation and the Place of Linguistic Change before Comparative Grammar* Sylvain Auroux

CNRS & Universite Paris VII

One may certainly characterize 19th-century linguistics (up to and including the Neogrammarians) as one whose orientation is essentially his­ torical. But in so doing, one has not really said very much. Grammarians obviously did not wait for the 19th century to notice that languages change. Still, everything depends on the way in which that change is represented. The 19th century did not become sensitive all of a sudden to an historical dimension which other periods had unjustly overlooked because they lacked a scientific linguistics. It provided itself with the theoretical means to represent linguistic change in another way. It changed the object's model and the model of scientific structure. If one wishes to reach an understanding of the way linguistic change may be otherwise represented and of the problems posed by its representa­ tion, it will be necessary to provide some very general means for visualizing that representation. In my opinion, the simplest means for visualizing is to start with the way Aristotle constructed the concept of movement in the Physics. Movement is the fact that a subject S moves from one property X to a Property Y (cfr. Fig. 1). This article is an abridged version - translated by Jay Tribby of The Johns Hopkins Uni� versity, Baltimore, Md. - of the third chapter of a forthcoming book to be entitled Le langage et Ia contrainte de Ia science. In the interest of presentation, the author has decided not to weigh the text down with notes and references. Indispensable bibliographi� cal references - and those only - have been integrated into the text.

214

LINGUISTIC CHANGE BEFORE COMPARATIVE GRAMMAR

x -- - - - - - - Y

Saussure's comment that "etymology is neither a distinct discipline, nor a part of evolutionary linguistics. [I]t is only a special application of principles relative to synchronic and diachronic facts" (Cours . . . , Ap. Third part; n° 2834 in the Engler edition). One of the natural dimensions of movement is space. Nevertheless, one can easily make an abstraction of it, such as, for example, when one constructs a family genealogy. The tree that results from this has a temporal dimension only; whether or not the different members of the family were born and Jived in different places is not a pertinent question. Comparatists will have a tendency, until the appearance of linguistic geography and the resurgence of a diffusionist model (the so called 'wave theory'), to employ the genealogical model. Saussure will point out that

'

"

"

"

"

'S /

/

/ /

/

/

Fig. 1

X and Y may be words of the same language or each of a different lan­ guage, two states of the same language, two different languages, sounds, abstract structures such as phonemes or syntactical schemas; S may be a language, a people, a region, even an observer. The possibility of choice leads one a priori to assume that the study of linguistic mobility is a com­ plex question dependent upon delicate theoretical decisions. Difficulties also arise from the choice of the referentials with respect to which mobility may be identified. The point of departure, the initial measure of compari­ son is almost always the maternal language one speaks; the ability to move away from that central point of comparison, an ability which permits one to situate that language in its place among other languages, was only acquired at a late date, and at first through myth, in the sacred genealogy of the Renaissance, which made all languages descend from Hebrew. It appears natural to relate the movement to time, but the conception of the different elements of the movement differs according to the type of temporality under consideration. Consider the following etymological derivation which I borrow from the article "Etymologie" which Turgot wrote for the Encyc­ lopedie:

(1)

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SYLVAIN AUROUX

lat. /dies! > lat. ldiurnus/ > ital. lgiorno/ > fr. /jour/

The derivation Idies! > Idiurnus/ can be related to the temporality of the process of enunciation or to the logical time of the morphological deri­ vation. There is an after and a before, that which one signifies when one says that one form 'comes from' the other, when one considers the way in which, by speaking, I create this form by means of that form, or when one has in mind only the general types of these two forms. But one may also make use of temporality which is that of the time of the world considered as a form of universal chronology. In this case, without a doubt, there is a point of view from which /dies/ and !diurnus/ are seen as synchronous, because they have belonged to the 'same' language, which is not the case for !diurnus/ and /giorno/ or /jour/. ',1J.ese are difficulties which will elicit

language differentiates itself in time and, at the same time, in space [ . . . J. These two things (which one wants in order to have a precise view of the events) must always be considered at the same time and head on.

He added , "[B]ut we are obliged to separate them (in theory) so that we may proceed with orderliness" (Premiere Conference ii l'Universite de Geni!ve, 1891; Engler fasc.4, p.60.1). It was in this way that he pointed to the theoretical problem which studies on linguistic mobility have always found so intractable. The objectification of the dimensions of change and their separation are epistemological operations of great importance that should not be taken for granted. In the modern era, one has often begun by giving linguistic mobility a spatial referent, by first indicating the location of the new lan­ guage that one would encounter. It is in the Cosmographic of A. Thevet (1515) that the Our Father is used for the first time, in order to provide a sample of foreign languages (Thevet surveys twelve languages: Arabic, Turkish, Syrian, English, Scottish, Slavic, Polish, German, Swedish, Fin­ nish, Lapp, Latvian, and continental Caribbean). One has begun from the space occupied by the observer, as one can see in all kinds of reports, travel accounts, and other histoires naturelles et morales which seem to constitute the canonical form for the Renaissance to the 18th century. One presents the space of the world. The Westerner moves within that space, then he relates his voyage by describing what he sees and encounters; glossaries, linguistic remarks, observations on the history of peoples encoutered and their institutions all graft themselves onto the account. In 1795, in his lessons at the Ecole Normale, C. Volney (1757-1820) will maintain that 'Voyages [ . . . ] are the best historical materials that we could wish for'. The vast compilations

' '

' '

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of the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century, which will aim to inventory the languages of the world, will begin most of the time for a starting point of a geographical nature, which determines, for exemple, the project of Mithridates oder allgemeine Sprachenkunde of J. C. Adelung and J. S. Vater (1806-1817), even if for Monboddo (On the Origin and Progress of Languages, 1773-92) , Lorenzo Hervas (1784, 1800-1805), or A. Court de Gebelin (1773-82) the ultimate aim is to reconstitute the evolution of man and of the faculty of language. The most important clas­ sification of languages in the period is that of the Venetian geographer A. Balbi (1781-1848), which is entitled Atlas Ethnographique du Globe, ou classification des peuples anciens et modemes d'apres leur langue (1826). Conrad Malte-Brun (1775-1826), founder of the Societe Geographique, considers limiting the classification, that is to say the similarities, using a spatial principle. The anthropologist Charles d'Orbigny (1806-1876) formu­ lates the principle, which he borrows from the geographer, in this way: 'In the philosophical study of the structure of languages, the analogy between a few roots only acquires value when one can link them together geographi­ cally' (L'homme Americain, 1839:147). It is obvious that for us a travel account, a monograph on an exotic lan­ guage, a classification according to geographical principles are not history of languages. What we think of as history supposes an essential, and above all linear, relation to temporality. But one must understand that this con­ ception is a result that was not provided beforehand. If we wished to scrutinize the works of the 16th or 17th centuries using such a conception we would not understand anything about the transformation that our mod­ ern concept of history has represented. This is why I propose to consider more generally the studies of linguistic mobility in the general sense that we have just defined, that is to say, before a certain choice of options with respect to the referentials and the objects studied has clearly delimited what one might possibly call 'history'. Thus restored to its most general sense, linguistic mobility, of which what we call linguistic change is only one part, concerns, above all, difference and distortion; linguistic mobility does not become an essential problem until the Renaissance, with the great dis­ coveries. In a real sense, a new world offers itself to the mind; one will make oneself a collector, one will take inventories, compare, classify, ask oneself what comes from what. Starting in 1555, the Swiss doctor Konrad Gesner (1516-1565) will publish his Mithridates sive de differentiis lin­ guarum tum veterum tum quae hodie; between 1613 and 1619 the Thresor de

l'histoire des langues de cet univers of Claude Duret (d.l621) will appear, in which history has its etymological meaning of 'recension'. It is without a doubt this movement born in Renaissance - that is, on this terrain and with the assistance of materials accumulated over many centuries - that will make possible the birth of modern comparatism. As a scientific structure, the study of linguistic mobility differs substan­ tially from the works of the grammatical tradition, so much so that contacts between the two have been quite rare. The theoretical goal of grammar is to determine the set of rules governing the construction of the speech chain. Grammar is not particularly separable from the didactic of languages. As for linguistic mobility, its study has had practical designs of the political and/or colonial sort (see, for exemple, Charles de Brasses's Voyages aux terres australes, 1757), to which religious propaganda will be attached. As concerns the European vernaculars, since the 16th century the constitution on Europe as a political entity has motivated nations to undertake research into their origin and their legitimacy. Because of this, historical hypotheses bring political returns. (In France, for example, it is obvious that the hypothesis of a Celtic origin would tend to remove the country from the domain of Roman law, in which the sovereign concedes the imperium to his vassals.) The practical interests to which studies of mobility remain subordi­ nated do not necessarily cause a distortion of analyses, nor do they consti­ tute insurmountable barriers. On the contrary, one can see that the growth of goal-oriented research engenders in the end, by its sheer mass, research whose most immediate interest is a pure interest in knowledge. The emer­ gence of this interest is evident, in many cases, by the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century: The first volume (1800) of the famous Catalogo de las lenguas de las naciones conocidas of Lorenzo Hervas y Panduro (1735-1809) is thus the first complete treatise on Amerindian lan­ guages written by the Spanish Jesuit, a Vatican librarian, using the works of his missionary colleagues. It is clear, nevertheless, that the sociological component of these studies of mobility remains under the influence of prac­ tical interests. This will not concern pedagogues or men of letters, as is the case with the grammar of the classical languages and European vernaculars, but missionaries, explorers, administrators, collectors and erudites. It is perhaps in their theoretical component that the studies of mobility differ from grammatical studies in their most characteristic fashion. The most important difference, I would suggest, is the structure of the empirical

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element of this theoretical component. The grammar of tradition, that which studies the classical languages and vernaculars, always relies on the competence of native speakers, and virtually never on linguistic remnants. Philologists, who have rarely been good epistemologists, have accused gen­ eral grammar(ians) of lacking an empirical base. They have done so because they have not understood that general grammar uses other sets of data from those for studies of mobility. For the phenomena of mobility, competence is inoperative; taking inventory of data as a cognitive, autono­ mous practice, which explains why it could begin in the milieu of collectors and erudites, who often had no theoretical competence of any note. The first correlations could be made successfully for vocabularies of approxi­ mately fifteen words, assembled by people who knew nothing about lan­ guages, and which were subsequently compared by people who were even less knowledgeable. The empirical datum of the studies of mobility is not merged with the assertion of a fact by means of abstract terms which make a recognition of the fact dependent upon thet theory. The datum is first and foremost a thing, for exemple, the Eugubine tables discovered in 1444, the Codex Argenteus found in 1563, the Codex Mendoza, the texts of the Oaths of Strasbourg, the Gothic Bible of Ulfila, etc. This concrete existence at the foundation of knowledge has important consequences, which one can see clearly by following the history of Etruscology as described by B . Carra de Vaux (b.1867), for example, in his work dedicated to La langue Etrusque, sa place parmi les langues (Paris: Champion, 1911). From the Renaissance to the beginning of the 20th century the discipline progressed by bringing together a considerable mass of data, without in any way advancing the classification of the language or the description of its structure. The empir­ ical dimension of the studies of mobility suppose the accumulation of data which are relatively independent of any theoretical mutations. Their development is submitted to a social temporality measured in long cycles. It takes time to assemble the data, information is scarce, dispersed, and, admittedly, quite costly (voyages, collections of manuscripts and inscrip­ tions, studies of dialects) . This undoubtedly explains the very early appear­ ance of a project for a history of linguistics, a project of interest to those (such as Leibniz, J. B. Bullet [1699-1775], A. Court de Gebelin [1725-1784]) who were to study the mobility. For them, it was a question of taking an inventory of the relevant data; from catalogues which have reached us we know that they set up and used libraries with vast holdings.

But realistically, such a quantity of information can be assembled and manipulated only by the machinery of stable institutions (public libraries, universities, learned societies, specialized journals, etc.), which requires relatively heavy investments. Without a doubt, their products will constitue the most characteristic and the most successfull achievement of the new sci­ entific structure characterized by the organization of the German university. The results of research undertaken before 1800 are nonetheless far from negligible, as a quantitative study (the only meaningful study in this area) easily demonstrates this. The example of the Spanish production of the works of Amerindian languages is illuminating in this respect. At the beginning of the 19th century this production greatly surpasses sev�n hundred original titles, more than two hundred of which date from the 16th century alone, with almost three hundred for the 17th, and about two hundred from the 18th century. If one refers to the different languages studied, one can present the following estimation: At the end of the 16th century, the Spanish patrimony weighs on thirty-three languages; at the end of 17th, eighty-four languages; at the end of the 18th, one hundred fifty­ eight languages (cf. Auroux & F. Queixalos, Pour une histoire de Ia linguistique amerindienne en France [Paris: Societe d'Ethnolinguistique Amerindienne, 1984], p. 3). The production differs substantially according to the country: In the same period, the French production, for example, in all related subject areas, considered together barely attains a third of the Spanish production on the Amerindian topic. The study of the French tradition, because it will lag further and further behind from the start of the take-off of comparatist studies, provides a good example for studying the theoretical and practical obstacles to the development of the new science. Theoretical works on linguistic mobility are relatively rare and are con­ centrated in the second half of the 18th century. Other than Besnier's remarks in his Discours sur Ia science des etymologies, included in the 1694 edition of the Dictionnaire etymologiques by G. Menage (1613-1692), one can rely on only the Dissertation sur les principes de I'etymologie par rapport a la languefranqaise by C. Falcone! (1671-1762), which appeared in Tome XX of the Histoire de l'Academie des Incriptions et Belles Lettres, the famous Traite de Ia mecanique des langues ou des principes physiques de l'etymologie (1765) by the President Ch. de Brasses (1709-1777), the Histoire naturelle de Ia parole (1776) of Court de Gebelin, and the not less famous article "Etymologie" in the Encyclopedie (1752), from the pen of A.-R.

220

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Turgot (1727-1781), who collaborated on several studies on dialect while he was the intendant of the Limousin. This article played an important role due, without a doubt, to the exceptional means of diffusion provided by the Encyclopedie, but also to its intelligent, if not original, synthesis of the themes of the period. One should add to this the intervening changes which occurred between the publication of the Encyclopi!die (1751-72) and the Encyclopi!die Mi!thodique. The three tomes dedicated to grammar and bel­ les-lettres in the latter (1782-86), under the direction of N. Beauzee (17171789) and J. F. Marmontel (1723-1799), are not mere reiterations of most of the articles.written for the former. New articles concerning our topic have been added, certain of which bear the label 'history of languages'. As all of the articles are assigned a label, one can see that their way of viewing mobility is not exactly the one we would understand as history. A modern reader interested in surveying the ensemble of data concerning the history of lan­ guages would have to look for them among many fields within the outline of the system of knowledge which, at the end of the work, divides the different articles according to their subject matter (see Fig.2). This dispersion among five rubrics correspond to the fact that in the opening classification there is no history or comparaison of languages.

of the data assembled by the French demonstrates that in that country investigators never made much progress as far as European languages are concerned. In 1769, when J. Ihre (1707-1780) publishes his Glossarium Suigothicum, a synthesis of numerous earlier works, there is not one French work on the Germanic languages, not anything original on northern Europe, even if the resident consul for Copenhagen, E. Mallet (1713-1755) publishes a monograph in 1755. It is obvious that the French have an idea of European unity, an idea which comes quite naturally when the geographical boundary predominates, but they represent that unity by privileging Celtic as a common ancestor, a language brought to public attention through studies written by Celtic scholars and Celtic enthusiasts ('The Celtic language may be considered the primitive language of Europe since it was the stem of its ancient languages', Court de Gebelin, Le Monde Primitif, V, 1778, p. XCIIi) . It is undoubtedly because of an absence of data that one does not find in France works analogous to that of the Englishman J. Parsons, who publishes his Remains of Japhet, being Historical Inquiries into the Affinity and Origin af the European Languages in London in 1767. The development of comparatism is not, however, a simple question of data. The assertion of a link of parentage between two languages is not a datum, it is the referential sighting of a fact dependent upon the theoretical terms (for example, the notion of family relation) that make it possible. In scientific practice, the similarities, before being facts, are hypotheses which must be confirmed or shown to be false, and which provide a basis for dis­ cussion. In the face of an increase in data, proposed hypotheses have more often been a matter for the fantastic than for the accumulated experiences of the discipline. In 1606, Guichard postulates the Hebraic origin of all lan­ guages; in his well known work on Les moeurs des sauvages ami!riquains compari!es a celles du nouveau monde (1724), which is often considered the birth of comparative ethnology, J.-F. Lafitau (1681-1740) maintains that the Amerindian peoples are of Pelasgian origin; in 1757, Granval sees the origin of French in the Celtic tongue, an idea shared by several good minds and one to which we shall return, while Le Brigant (1720-1804) sees it as the primitive language of all mankind (1787 and passim); one of the official Orientalists of the Academie des Incriptions, J. De Guignes (1721-1800), argues in favour of an Egyptian origin for the Chinese, a thesis which is contested by the Arabic scholar le Rouix des Hauterais (1724-1795) in the course of a well-known polemic; as for the principal theorists of linguistic mobility, De Brosses and Court de Gebelin, they support the existence of

I. Division III. The written word IV. Division . Figurative Language. I. Figures of diction V. Division. Etymology VI. Division. Application of the principles to languages VI . I. Individual languages Fig. 2

The structure of the empirical element of the studies of mobility links their development to a particular linguistic training on the part of inves­ tigators, or, to be precise, to the availability of certain data. The location of a language within any classification depends, quite simply, upon the lan­ guages to which it is compared, just as the configuration of the general clas­ sification depends upon the ensemble of data used. Obviously, this consti­ tutes a developmental constraint for mobility studies. At first one began by comparing anything and everything, whether it was a question of 'confor­ mity', 'analogy', 'resemblance' or 'affinity'. This practice was a comfort to the idea of a universal harmony of languages, linked to the theme of a primitive language, which certain people still believed might be Hebrew (cf. the Harmonies Hi!brafques of E. Guichard, 1618). In any event, the state

rii

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an organic primitive language. If we think back to the above-mentioned example involving Etruscan, there is no room for thinking that the situation necessarily attests to an absence of seriousness. The study of languages has long be considered, notably by Leibniz, an indispensable aid to the study of peoples and migrations. This orientation supposes an empirically un­ acceptable axiom, one people, one tongue. One can also reverse this axiom. By using historical testimony on migrations, and with hardly any other linguistic argument than that of the names of the migrating people, C. Ch. de Peysonnel le fils (1727-1790), the resident consul of Smyrna, identifies the Slavic origin of Serbo-Croatian for the first time, in 1756. Only the linguistic thought processes, not the truth of the similarities, will be of interest to us. As far as a recognition of linguistic mobility is concerned, it is helpful to distinguish between genetic mobility and positive mobility. A genetic study organizes abstract states; for example, it claims that, in linguistic development, concrete terms come before abstract terms. This ordering structure does not necessarily correspond to a precise chronology and, in particular, the events which are examples of each state may be preceded by events which are examples of a later state. That is, here are many series of chronologically ordered events which can exemplify the stages of an unfold­ ing process. Positive or historical development may be defined by an axiom of historicity;

Guignes, which will also help us to bring to light one of the foundamental aspects separating the 18th century studies of mobility from the comparatism which follows. . . . This learned man takes note of a well known fact: 'An mflmty of travellers have already noticed that in the Indian languages and even in Sanskrit, the learned tongue of these peoples, there are many Latin and Greek words' (Histoire de l'Academie des Inscriptions [Paris 1770] p.327). He quickly invokes the axiom of historicity: "One must not los� oneself m conjectures, nor go all the way back to the time of the Flood, m order to _ explain why we find Latin and Greek words in Indian languages": m effect, everything is explained by the contacts and borrowings between languages (ibid.). About fifteen years later, William Jones (1746-1794), in the fre­ qutmtly cited passage of his famous 1786 address before the 'Asiatic Soci­ ety' of Calcutta, will note that the 'affinities' between Greek, Latm and Sanskrit are "so strong that no philologist could examine all three of them without believing that they came from a common source, which perhaps no longer exists". The 'discovery' of the relations between Sanskrit and the European languages is not, as Jones thought, a simple question of affirming the resemblance between them, as the myth will perpetuate after him. Cer­ tainly, these resemblances were quite obvious and had been noticed for a very long time, but to move from their observation to the assertion o a common origin is an intellectual operation presupposing a way of seemg things which was not that of De Guignes. A. Koyre showed years ago that the birth of Galileian physics was not due to the discovery of a new fact, but to the appearance of a new theoretical structure which permitted one to contemplate unknown facts, and above all, to interpret facts which were already known in another manner. This model may not be of universal application, but in any case it describes fairly well what occurred at the birth of modern comparatism. It is not a new fact that changed the course of science, as all the histories of linguistics claim, it is a theoretical mutation that will allow facts to be interpreted differently. A passage of one of the rare work of dialectology written by a French speaker, the Swiss E. Bertrand, concerning the canton of Vaud, sum­ marizes perfectly the functioning of the sociological model which dominates the conception of linguistic mobility in the Classical Age:

(2)

If a positive or historical state precedes another, then for each state there is one attested fact and one only, such that this order­ ing structure is maintained in a universal chronology.

A certain number of prudent authors adopted this axiom. 1t is clear that any assertion of the sort founded in physics or biology, just as with the 'laws' of general grammar, finds itself in the same situation as an assertion of origin and violates the axiom of historicity. By acknowledging (2), one is Jed to no longer concern oneself with the problem of the origin of lan­ guages, since one refuses to discuss states to which chronologically attested facts do not correspond. An attitude such as this is summarized perfectly by Turgot: 'The etymology is sound in the chain [ . . . ] [of] alterations as a suc­ cession of facts known directly or proved by reasonable inductions' (art. "Etymologie", Enc. Methodique, II:27). This axiom of historicity is not necessarily a felicitous one in all of its applications; to be sure, it blocks speculation, but it also blocks any reasoning which is the least bit general. One sees this ih a characteristic passage by the famous Orientalist De

�

�

Exchanging one language to adopt another is, for a people, not the work of one moment . To accomplish this, centuries are required. It is usage, it is commerce with neighbours, it is the mixing of nations, war and con�

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quests, revolutions and turmoil, transmigrations and colonies which give rise to the formation of new languages and to their introduction into a Country. Conquests in particular extend the tongue of the conquerors and corrupt or strengthen those of the vanquished. Sciences, in the shade of peace, embellish them and perfect them all. The less a people cultivates the sciences and the arts, the more difficultes it is for them to perfect their language: the more a people are free, the less easily they adopt that of other Nations. (Recherches sur les langues anciennes et modernes de Ia Suisse et principalement du canton de Vaud, Geneve 1758:1M2)

The subject of linguistic change - and this is obviously an option that may appear parodoxical - is thus a people situated in space. Its essential cause is the mixture of languages. In 1750, in a text which he never pub­ lished, Turgot advanced the idea that 'the progress of languages which were never mixed would be very slow, there would be more additions than changes in the words, which would be merely softened a bit' (cf. D .Droixhe "Un plan inedit de Turgot pour un discours sur l'origine, Ia formation et le melange des langues [vers 1750)", Marche Romane. 24:1-2 [1979) p.220). In the article langue anglaise in the Encyclopedie Methodique (II, p.45) Louis de Jaucourt (1704-1779) supports the same theses that one finds more or less everywere. In fact, if one considers the ensemble of texts one notice three principal causes of change. First, external causes such as climate, the prog­ ress of civilization, and linguistic politics; next, the mixing of languages; and finally, the wear of time. This last cause might de compared to an inter­ nal principle of change; nonetheless, it remains unessential. Through a reading of the Turgot text just cited one sees immediately the distance that separates this type of model of mobility from those which will come to light­ with comparatism, one of the principal hypotheses of which will consist of making change the natural state of language.

�' Fig. 3

T

, L, L, L,

L,

Fig. 4

L'

r L,

L,

L,

L 10 L 11 L 11 L 13

Fig. 5

225

Positioned in space, the model of the mixing of languages corresponds to Fig. 3, which is to a certain extent a theory of waves. If one changes the ref­ erential, and if one wishes to use time, which corresponds in a certain way to a retrospective sighting, one obtains Fig. 4. The diffusionist model of lin­ guistic change is generally incompatible with a tree structure, representad in Fig. 5. One can see this by following, for example, the treatement of Polynesian languages in a manuscript study (1772) by Court de Geoelm, dedicated to the language of Tahiti. This study is full of interesting views on the linguistic unity of the 'Southern seas'. In it, following the ideas pre­ sented by A. Reeland (1676-1718) back in 1708, the author interprets the resemblances between the languages as evidence of a common origin, a projection of Malay toward the East (cf. S. Auroux & A. Boes, "Court de Gebelin [1725-1784) et le comparatisme: Deux textes inectits", Histoire­ Epistemologie-Language, 3-2:45-48 [1982)). In a later version, he will be more precise: the analysis of the languages spoken in the Southern seas [ .. . J proves that these languages depend closely on the Malay tongue [ . . . ] such that the entire southern part of our globe appears united by a common language. (Monde PrimitifVII:538 [1781])

A projection of the movement onto Fig. 5 appears possible; the nodes the tree are as much dates as they are geographical locations of different of languages. This possibilty is purely accidental; it holds as long as the case being considered respects the double condition of having only one superior node and of not accounting for any possible ralations between lower notes (it is assumed that there is no communication between the Oceanic islands); if not, one falls back on the two preceding models. If one follows Court de Gebelin principal conclusion, it is difficult to say that it corresponds for­ mally to the identification, expected after the proposed linkages, of what we would call an Austronesian family. The author expresses it in this way: 'We see that the language of Thaiti is one link of a chain which, by mixing with the tropical, embraces all of the Southern islands of the Old and New World' (Auroux & Boes, Zoe. cit. , p.56). The diffusionist model assumes continuity of linguistic movement and thus renders problematic - when only one language is in question the resulting definition of different lan­ guages. In a certain way, as Court de Gebelin says explicitly, we are always faced with the same language. To arrive at the notion of the linguistic fam­ ily, one must constitute classes of equivalence among the ensemble of lan­ guages, starting from the predicate 'having language X as a common ances-

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tor'. Only the model of Fig. 5, in which every node of level n is dominated by a single node of level (n-1), assures the transitivity necessary to a rela­ tion of equivalence. One may interpret the arcs of Fig. 4 as signifying '"being a source of", or more precisely, "having words which come from". This relation is not itself transitive, and if one reasons as if it were, one can demonstrate any kind of relationship one pleases. The continuist conception of linguistic movement poses the fundamen­ tal problem of the criteria for linguistic identity, a problem which, in and of itself, precludes any solution. The method that consists of comparing voc­ abulary hardly provides any clarifications, as Beauzee's notes in the article "Langue" of the Encyclopedie demonstrates: The analogy of words cannot be a significant proof of the filiation of ian� guages, unless one wishes to say that all the modern languages of Europe are respectively the daughters and the mothers of each other. (Encyc­ lopedie, p.249)

This conclusion, to which Meyer's law will later return, is found in Lafitau, on the dialects of the Algonquin and the Huron (Moeurs des sauv­ ages ameriquains comparees aux moeurs de !'ancien terns [Paris, 1724], pp.476-77). It is a consequence of the diffusionist model. Beauzee tnes to avoid this inconvenience by basing linguistic identity on grammatical, and no longer lexical, criteria. This lead him to take up again the typology of abbe Girard (1677-1748), and to distinguish between analogous languages, which respect the analytic order of thought, and transpositive languages, which do not. A language corresponds to a certain genius, a grammatical schema which is all its own: 'Above all, the principal and indestructible genius of all idioms consists in syntax'. A language may be the source of another only under the condition that it belongs to the same typological class. We move away from a model by diffusion to approach what we might call a model by germination, according to the metaphors in use during the century that follows. Unfortunately, the position regarding an indestructi­ ble core of identity brings Beauzee to notice the profound differences between the syntactic structures of French and Latin (cases, articles, auxiliaries, personal pronouns, tenses) and to conclude that Latin cannot be the origin of French. His developmental model correspond to Fig. 6. In admitting a certain continuity in the typological variations, and in intimat­ ing that Italian might have changed class under the influence of Celtic, he does not apply the typological criterion with much coherence.

LINGUISTIC CHANGE BEFORE COMPARATIVE GRAMMAR Celtic

French

227 Latin

English

Spanish

I I

Italian l

- - - - - - - - - - - -- -

_ _ _____ _

analogous languages

transpositive languages Fig. 6

Beauzee will return to the history of French in the Encyclopedie Methodique, devoting a special article to it which did not exist in the Encyc­ lopedie. He will present an evolutionary schema that one may summarize by Fig. 7. Celtic Ninth c. Rustic Roman ------ Tudesque or Roman language (court) (people) Tenth c. French Twelfth c. ------- Greek Fourteenth c. ------- Italian 1535 French official language

j

Monuments:

Oaths of Strasbourg Philomene Norman laws

Fig. 7

French is definitively a Romance language, the Celtic contribution is limited to a few words: 'Although our language is a corruption of Latin, mixed with several Greek, Italian, and Spanish expressions, nevertheless we have retained many words whose origins appears to be Celtic' (Enc. Meth., II, p.125). Beauzee's fixed view prohibits him from privileging the mixture of languages: linguistic mobility is thought of as either an alteration in primitive identity or a spatial displacement. The opposite theme, the increase in the number of terms in a language as a function of the progress of civilisation, would not alone suffice to think of the change as a linguistic innovation. For that, it will be necessary to break with the idea that mobil­ ity is something continuous, indeed something imperceptible like that slight movement which, from generation to generation, distances the language of our ancestors from our own.

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The French are hardly interested in the close similarities between the Indo-European languages. The first French work dedicated to these lan­ guages is the book by J. Pereire (1715-1780), Observations sur treize des principales langues de !'Europe (1799), of which only the first part of the first volume, which is not very historical, ever appeared. This deficiency corresponds to the basic reasons we have analyzed up to this point. They are summarized perfectly in the Arbre Genealogique des langues mortes et vivantes, which a certain Felix Gallet dedicated to the abbe Sicard (17421822), the famous teacher of deaf-mutes, head of the general grammar course at the Ecole Centrale. We can date this tree to about 1800: we reproduce it .in Fig. 8. If the idea of genealogical tree is tacitly understood in the metaphor of mother languages and daughter languages, Gallet's tree is the first systematic genealogical schema of which we are aware. It appears about fifty years before the trees of August Schleicher (1821-1868) and the Czech Ladislas Celakovsky (1799-1852). The weaknesses of the French school, however, are seen immediately. Like the Table of compared languages which figures in the first tome of Monde Primitif, from which Gallet drew his inspiration, the tree is of astonishingly poor quality given the period in which it is executed. It consists of about sixty languages; Hervas claimed that Court de Gebelin had knowledge of only one-fifth of the languages in the universe; Adelung and Vater will multiply by ten the number of languages surveyed; Balbi will succeed in presenting seven hundred, while predicting that the world's languages must number near two thousand. The similarities presented testify to both a clear perception of European unity and a state of knowledge that is already obsolete. Sanskrit - Indic - appears in a corner next to. Chinese and Tartar, far from the European languages attached to Celtic, whose close ties to the primitive language must lead one to view it as a sort of 'proto-European', not as one of the languages directly known. Hungarian remains attached to the Slavic family. Geek and Latin are still considered descendants of Hebrew. Even more-than the similarities, it is the form of the tree itself which is remarkable. As we saw above with reference to the Fig. 6, a genealogical tree theoretically makes an abstraction of the spatial dimension. The tree of Fig. 8 is in fact a transitional form in which one is still able to detect that dimension. The trunk of the tree in centered on Europe, and one still dis­ tinguishes the North, the East, and the West. 'Mexican' and the Slavic branch, however, are not where geography would place them. The location of the branches of the tree is thus no longer totally geographical, nor is it Fig. 8

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yet a pure depiction of chronology and the similarities among languages. The most astonishing aspect is undoubtedly the persistence of the dif­ fusionist model, which one recognizes by the fact that certain segments of the tree intertwine to form new branches with one another. If one takes the example of French, and if one is interested in what dominates it in the chronology, one sees that the schema of its ancestors corresponds to the structure of the temporal projection of the diffusionist model, such as it is presented in Fig. 4 above. Conceived in this way, the tree does not succeed in separating linguistic families; it permits every confusion, such as, for example, that of classifying Hebrew among the ancestors of French through the intermediary of Greek. Certainly, historical knowledge progressed during the 18th century. Besides the materials we have just analyzed, the constant additions to the dictionaries of Menage or Ducange (1610-1688) attest to this and, in a general way, so does the better utilization of documents (old translations, maps, treatises, place names, etc) . It is symptomatic not only to see an article "Romane (langue)" appear in the Encyclopedie Methodique, but even more so to find in this article the presentation of the text of the Oaths of Stras­ bourg. Still, the theoretical elements employed attest to the same ambiguities and the same hesitations as the global models analyzed above. In relation to what we know of later camparatism, certain of them should be considered impediments, in the same sense that the model of the dif­ fusionist position was an impediment. In that perspective, it seems to me that the three privileged points acting as impediments, and which remain for us to study, are the attachment of linguistic change to 'figure' , the role accorded to the word and to the concept of the root, and finally, the pre­ dominance of monogeneticism. Linguistic mobility is first conceived under the concept of figure. For semantics it is a question of the trope and for phonetics, one of metaplasm, which Beauzee definies in this way: General name which one gives in grammar to the figures of diction, that is, to different changes which take place in the material of words, for what­ ever cause and in any way whatsoever, but nevertheless in any way they please and with the authorization of usage. (Enc. Meth. , II, p.529; emphasis added: S.A.)

A 'figure' is a transformation which marks the passage from a sound X* to a sound Y*, or from a sound X* signifying idea X to another meaning of the same sound , which I summarize in the schemas (3c) and (3d) , derived from (3a) and (3b), which describe the relati<>n of meaning.

(3)

abcd-

231

f (X) = X* f-1 (X') = X F' (X') = Y* F (f-1 (X') ) = Y

The change of 'letter' is one of the oldest theoretical instruments of etymologists and comparatists. Metaplasm is thus the ancestor of the phonetic law. By this, I mean to say that it embraces the same domain, while representing it in a different manner, in the same way that , for exam­ ple, our concept of the complement has as its ancestor the notion of the 'syntax of regime'. It is obvious that 'figure' concerns mobility in general (discoursive variants, variants in dialect, the position of two languages in a relation of correspondence), and not simply 'historical mobility'. The clas­ sic use of the notion of figure is only governed by two principal hypotheses. On the one hand, one must always be able to define an ensemble located at the beginning and another at the end of the series, in the way that the ensemble of primitive meanings of words and the ensemble of the figurative meanings function, respectively, for tropes. On the other hand, one must be able to define the functions designated F and F' in (3). The classic works state that the sounds of a language constitute a definite ensemble: the metaplasm thus always unites two 'letters' belonging to one or several lan­ guages. Like the trope, it is the object of a classification whose headings are: prothesis, apharesis, syncope, epenthesis, apocope, paragogue, con­ traction, metathesis and commutation. Without a doubt, we have a theoretical material produced by a long tradition whose essential elements will cross over into historical linguistics. Thus, what is important is the way one applies it. The list of examples 4-11 has been selected, unless otherwise indicated, from articles in the Encyc­ /opedie Methodique (1782-86). (4)

humilis < humble; numerus < nombre; cineris < cendre; pul­ veris < poudre; mel < miel; fel < fie!; bene < bien; rem < rien; laterna < lanterne; thesaurus < tresor; funda < fronde.

(5)

gr. nessa < anas; gr. kreas < cara; gr. morphe < forma.

( 6)

'The Spanish have brought [ . . . ] a quantity of Latin words into their language by changing f to h; for example, hablar (to speak) from fabulari, hazer (to do) from facere, herir (to wound) from ferire, hado (fate) from fatum, hido (fig) from ficus, hogar (hearth) from focus, etc.' (art. "Commutation").

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(7)

amavisti < amasti; relligio < religio.

(8)

deluvium < deluvie < delu - ie (art. "Commutation").

(9)

platea < piazza; blanc < bianco (art. "Etymologie").

(10) Fr. nom ¢> Ger. name ¢> Eng. noun ¢> Finnish nime (Court de Gebelin, 1776) (11) pous, pes, piede, pie, pe, fuss, foot, foet, voet (C. Denina, La clef des langues, 1804, t. 3, p. XXIV). The diversity of these examples amply demonstrates the ambiguity of metaplasm as a representation of linguistic mobility: it is not bound a priori in a privileged fashion to the temporal dimension. The commutation of item (6) is an authentic phonetic law of Spanish; as is item (9) for Italian. But metaplasm can represent variants or poetic licenses (cf. example 7) just as well as it can represent simple, set correspondences between different lan­ guages. If one takes quotation (10), for example, Court de Gebelin merely states that where is an Iii in Finnish, there is an /o/ in French, an lou/ in English, an /a/ in German. It is a matter of noting a principle of variation; the sounds of each of the languages cited constitute, in turn, the beginning and ending ensembles of the 'figure'. No· temporal relation orients these ties; a temporal relation could exist only between each of the sounds and the sound of an original language which is not under consideration. There are numerous ways of presenting generalizations starting from observed metaplasm. The most simple involves the familiar classification of different items. This is what one finds in example (5); each French word is assigned a corresponding word in Latin, all instances are grouped together because each correspondence is an example of epenthesis. The figure type classifies the example in a manner which is of little interest to the history of languages; it assigns no necessity, no regularity which is unique to a given sound. One proceeds from one word to the other according to a principle which assumes that a sound disappears in the interior of the first word. Usage decides the disappearance (cf. the italicized passage in the definition of metaplasm), and depending upon the words; nothing prevents usage from deciding differently for the same letters. The second form of the general representation consists of asserting global correspondences between the different possible sounds. Court de Gebelin is undoubtedly one of the first to use the expression 'law' to designate this type of assertion. This is a question of correspondences of the type in sample (10), examples of which

LINGUISTIC CHANGE BEFORE COMPARATIVE GRAMMAR

233

are found in all the world's languages: 'These principles or laws occur in all languages, whatever they may be, anytime and anywhere'. From this 'the history of peoples becomes a matter of calculation' (Monde Primitif, vol I , p.83). One may represent Court de Gebelin's method by the series of axioms which he himself provides in his Histoire naturel/e de Ia parole (1776), and which we synthesize in (12). (12)

Chap. VII First Principle. Languages are merely the dialects of one single language. Second Principle. The differences which reign between languages do not prevent them from having the same origin. Third Principle. The first language is composed of monosyllables only, taken from nature, painting it with physical objects and the source of all words. Fourth Principle. Only the comparison of the greatest possible number of languages can lead to the primitive language and to the true etymology of each word. Fifth Principle . The more words are a part of common usage, the more they undergo change. Chap . VIII First Principle. Change or alterations in vowels do not prevent one from recognizing the origin of the words. Second Principle. Change or alteration of some of the consonants in a word do not prevent one from recognizing the origin of words.

Principles such as these permit one to demonstrate rigorously almost anything. It is a consequence that Turgot had brought to light in the article "Etymologie" in rejecting 'etymologies founded upon the possibility of any random change whatsoever' (Enc. Method. , t. 2, p.31): 'We will not listen to one who, to justify a change in Italian etymology from the Latin I pre­ ceded by a consonant in r, would put forward the example of Portugese and the affinity between the two sounds'. From this comes the fixation on a clear referential for linguistic mobility: As far as changes are concerned, it is necessary to 'study their succession just as one studies historical facts' , and to limit oneself to a variation 'fixed on certain languages, focusing on cer­ tain dates, according to the order of the places and the times' (ibid. ). In this way Turgot arrives at a viable conception of the phonetic law, although far from comparatism, since it concerns only one language. He gets rid of the contingency stubbornly attached to metaplasm so as to explain regularity by means of the compulsory equalization of pronunciations: 'In no languages is pronunciation arbitrary, because everywhere one speaks to be understood'. Whereas 'figure' remained attached to the unity of the word which gave it

234

its definition, 'phonetic law', on the contrary, expresses a regularity which depends only upon sounds which are present, a regularity which cannot be predicted by any definition of figure. Between figure and phonetic law there is a double relation. Both work on the same material, that which places sounds in corresponding relations with one another. This explains why, for example, one finds already in quotation (11) above elements con­ cerning the first consonantal change in the Germanic languages. It is obvi­ ous that phonetic laws are not born spontaneously in Rask's brain; they come from knowledge accumulated by way of the different figures he has inventoried. But the concepts of linguistic change which correspond respec­ tively to figures and to phonetic laws have incompatible theoretical struc­ tures; the passage from the one to the other is not a question of a better observation of phenomena, it is a theoretical mutation. Without a doubt, it is the system of De Brosses-Court de Gebelin that best demostrates that the role of the word in etymology might have been an important impediment to the development of comparatism. These two authors organize etymological derivations by word families. De Brasses employed the term universal archeologist to designate a table in which the words of all the world's languages would have a place according to the stage of derivation that they represent, under the word of the primitive language which constitutes its root. In the plans for Monde Primitif, Court de Gebe­ lin foresaw a 'Comparative Dictionary of Languages', which never appeared: In this dictionary words will be arranged individually under the primitive word from which they derive . It groups numerous word companies by genealogical trees whose root is the primitive word, just as a flag serves as a rallying point. (Auroux & Boes 1982:42)

Word families defined in this manner are necessarily independent of the languages to which each of their members can belong. A language is nothing other than a treasure of words. If one wishes to visualize different languages and, at the same time, different word families, one must undoubtedly resort to a schema such as the one in Fig. 9. One notices easily that the lines which link words of the same language allow room for all of the combinations of the diffusionist model. It is obvious that the comparison of different languages first took the word as its basic element. The resemblance between words of related lan­ guages is an intuitive fact, as least for those closest to one another. This undoubtedly accounts for the large number of exact etymologies (about 56

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percent) in the dictionary of Menage. But the development of etymological researches leads to codifying the procedures which permit the recognition of resemblances that are no longer necessarily immediate facts. One of the most important theoretical terms among those used in procedures codified in this way is that of the 'root'. In the article "Racine" of the Encyclopi!die Mi!thodique, Beauzee offers the following definition (vol.III, p.275): In general, one assigns the name of Root to every word from which another is formed, be it in the same language or in another: with this dif­ ference, that one may call generating Roots those words which are primi­ tive with respect to those derived from them, and elementary Roots those words which are simple with respect to those which are composed from them .

Derivation encompasses inflection, which receives the name of gram­ matical derivation, as well as the addition of prefixes and suffixes, baptized philosophical derivation. It seems that for Beauzee the distinction between composition and derivation is conveyed, in the end, by the position of the added element before and after the root, respectively. Court de Gebelin presents an analoguos theory, with composition (besides the combination of two roots) being carried out by the addition of a preposition, while deri­ vation is carried out by the addition of an ending, be it a specifying, declin­ ing, or conjugating ending. In their natural application to linguistic mobility, the classical concep­ tions of the root, which often vary in their detail, obey the same theoretical design: Turgot, for example, holds that etymologists must first reduce a word to its root before looking for its origin (cf. also Beauzee, article "For­ mation", Encyclopi!die Mhhodique, vol.II, p.120 or A. Fulda [1841-1886], Sammlung und Abstammung germanischer Wiirzelworter [Halle 1776], p.59). This means that the origin of a wofll is an anterior state of its root, or if you

236

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like, that transformation in mobility which is meaningful for theory act first upon the root. To be sure, this thesis is absurd: in the etymological sequence (2) employed at the beginning of this paper, one would not be able to com­ prehend the passage from /dies/ to !jour/ starting from the root /die-! if one did not use the derivative !diurnusl (actually ldiurnuml, from which ldjorn/ in the poem by Alexis). Even if this is refuted - and for good reason - in the shrewd practice of later etymologists, the roots are seen as being fairly constant in the process of mobility. The hypothesis is that the change of the morphological system leaves unchanged the system of roots, excepting a few permutations in letters. The notion of the family of words leads to monogeneticism, which remains the most common hypothesis before the turn of the 19th century. Both De Brosses and Court de Gebelin postulate the existence of an organic language which is the origin of others and whose words are the roots of other languages. It seems to me that Beauzee accepts this theory in a number of articles in the Encyclopi!die Methodique. The theoretical hypothesis of monogeneticism will be abandoned from the start of com­ paratism. It is not a question, however, of a thesis contradicted by facts. If one wishes to look in all the world's languages for words which resemble one another, one will surely find them. Court de Gebelin spent his life doing this, and one can say that the most immediate empirical evidence speaks more in favor of his theory than that of his adversaries, as it spoke more for Aristotle than for Galileo, more for Ptolemy than for Copernicus. Those who rejected monogeneticism from the field of their concerns did not do so because they had discovered new facts contrary to the hypothesis. Rather, they made the decision not to account for the hundreds of facts, facts well known and often debated, which argued in favor of a parentage of all languages. In his commentary on Court de Gebelin, Lan­ juinais (1753-1827) in his Preface to the new edition of Histoire naturelle de Ia parole (1816), who is nonetheless a fervent Christian whose entire belief leans in favor of monogeneticism, will simply note that 'such affinities would not serve to understand other languages, not to affirm the filiation of peoples'. If word families lead to monogeneticism, the latter is more or less unfavorable to similarities by language families. One easily sees this by fol­ lowing Court de Gebelin in his studies on Tahiti and the Polynesian lan­ guages, of which we are fortunate to posses three different versions, spread out over a period of about twelve years (see Auroux & Boes 1982, for details).

Antoine Court de Gebelin the official representative of the reformed churches, begins by making comparisons with the vocabularies of other islands in the Southern seas, to which he adds Malay. This leads him to note the parentage and, consequently, to recognize something similar to a linguistic family. It is a result of no interest to him: what he is looking for is to prove the thesis of monogeneticism. To this end, later versions will add to the number of languages previously compared. In the last edition (1781), it is the Phoenicians who are at the origin of the languages of the South Pacific. The search for an universal parentage creates in a certain way a parasitic design which interferes with the research into localized similarities. Comparatism will be able to develop only by first removing this interference. This is the way that in 1799 Gyarmathi, in order to demonstrate the syntactical resemblance between Hungarian, Lapp and Finnish, will retain only those examples which not only are not instances of the rules belonging to general grammar, but which have no corresponding elements in the other languages of Europe. Bopp will state, in a more gen­ eral fashion, that one must not move beyond the roots proper to a certain linguistic family. To achieve results, the comparison of languages assumes not exactly the assertion of the original plurality of languages, but at the very least a sort of methodological polygeneticism. That obviously implies new models of the object. REFERENCES

Auroux, Sylvain & A. Boes. 1982. "Court de Gebelin [1725-1784) et le comparatisme. Deux testes inectits". Histoire-Epistemologie-Language 3:2.45-48. & F. Queixalos. 1984. Pour une histoire de Ia linguistique amerin­ dienne en France. Paris: Societe d'Ethnolinguistique Amerindienne. Droixhe, Daniel. 1979. "Un plan inedit de Turgot pour un discours sur l'origine, Ia formation et le melange des langues [vers 1750)". Marche Romane 24:1-2, pp.2-220.

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SUMMARY

Grammarians did not wait for the 19th century to notice that lan­ guages change. In order to understand the representation of linguistic

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change before comparative grammar, we propose to use the Aristotelian concept of mobility, which asserts that a subject S moves from one property x to a property y. The choice of real objects for the elements {S, x, y,} was a matter of theoretical discussion and maturation. The emergence of com­ parativism was not a matter of mere empirical knowledge but the effect of a theoretical mutation, which will reject the classical diffusionist model, the monogenetism, and replace the use of the concept of figure by the one of phonetic law.

The Place of Friedrich Schlegel in the Development of Historical-Comparative Linguistics* Konrad Koerner

University of Ottawa

UHLAN VON SLAGLE (1937-1986) 1M MEMORIAM 0.0 Introductory Remarks

I have chosen to talk about the contribution of Friedrich Schlegel to historical-comparative linguistics rather than about August Schleicher as originally intended, for two reasons: First, I noted from the final program that there was not a single paper offered on Schlegel, whose Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier of 1808 was instrumental in getting the type of work going that led to the establishment of linguistics as an autonomous discipline, and that, as a result, his contribution to the field deserved to be discussed in the context of this symposium. The other reason is that we may safely say that by the time of Schleicher (1821-1868), and to no small degree owing to his own efforts, comparative-historical linguistics had become a recognized field of academic study; besides, Schleicher's place in the history of linguistic science can now be regarded as thoroughly established (cf. Koerner 1982; Bynon 1986). If Leibniz was one of the most important Anreger of comparative work in linguistics, Humboldt, though his initial interest in language study was aroused through his first-hand contact with Basque in 1801 (cf. Sweet 1978:240-41), began writing papers on language and individual languages '(<

For a much more detailed version of this paper, see Koerner (1987).

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for eventual publication only from 1812 onwards, i.e., several years after the Schlegel's book had already made its mark in European intellectual cir­ cles and enticed no other than Franz Bopp to follow in his footsteps. In other words, at least in chronological terms, Schlegel preceded Humboldt's contribution to linguistic research and, as I hope to show in this paper, established a program that provided subsequent generations of scholars with a first, albeit tentative, frame of reference.

earlier publications would then be regarded as precursory only. Once 1816 had become the accepted point of reference, and since later authors of his­ tories of linguistics have tended to copy or at least to rely heavily on earlier accounts, Schlegel's book was mentioned but not read, a phenomenon we have witnessed occuring again with the so-called 'Chomskyan Revolution' in our days; regard the treatment of Bloomfield's Language (1933). How­ ever, serious research in the history of the language sciences undertaken during the past fifteen years or so has shown that these facile schemes are far from adequate, and that we must read the original texts again, and with careful attention to their historical and intellectual contexts. If we engage in this contextualizing process, we would also have to mention that around 1800 there were a number of books published which indicate that there was a heightened interest in developing a more adequate, both theoretical and practical, framework for the study of lan­ guage in general as well as of individual languages and language families in particular. Perhaps Benfey was justified in saying that Gyarmathi's Affinitas represents the first scientific language comparison, but like the work of others devoted to non-Indo-European languages before him and at the turn of the 19th century, it did not receive the attention that it could have otherwise (cf. Koerner 1975:725-26). However, other publications of the late 18th and early 19th century should be mentioned which suggest the diversity of views regarding the study of language available at the time on the market of ideas. Thus mention should be made of Daniel Jenisch's (1762-1804) Philosophisch-kritische Vergleichung und Wurdigung von vier­ zehn iilteren und neueren Sprachen Europens of 1796 (Berlin: F. Maurer) , which Timpanaro (1977:xxxi) has rightly shown to belong to a tradition of language comparison that "consisted in the attempt to demonstrate the superiority of one language over another, either from an esthetic point of view or that of 'expressive clarity' and practicality". There is a little connec­ tion between this older evaluative and no doubt less scientific tradition and the type of comparison we find in Gyarmathi's work for instance,except for the idea of 'comparison' between languages. Another book that may be mentioned here is Johann Arnold Kanne's (1773-1834) Ueber die Verwandtschaft der griechischen und lateinischen Sprache of 1804 (Leipzig: Rein), which, despite its fanciful etymologizing (which, by the way, captured the enthusiasm of the young Jacob Grimm), was approaching the interests of comparativists like Bopp and Rask later on. Another line of tradition, which only at the turn of the 19th century was

1.0 Friedrich Schlegel's Contribution to the Establishment of Historical and Comparative Linguistics

The place of Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829) in the annals of linguistic science has become more assured in recent years, largely owing to the work of Ursula Struc-Oppenberg (1975, 1980) and Sebastiano Timpanaro (1972/ 1977). In Theodor Benfey's (1809-1881) informative Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft (Benfey 1869:357ff.), Friedrich Schlegel was given his due, but scholars of the junggrammatische Richtung, notably Delbriick (1882), and later historians of linguistics (e.g., Pedersen 1931) have tended to downplay his importance in the development of linguistics as a scientific enterprise. While Struc-Oppenberg, a philologist, has presented us with a thorough account of the textual sources from which Friedrich Schlegel has drawn for his own work, Timpanaro has provided both the intellectual atmosphere of the period and the reasoning behind Schlegel's approach to language study. Without a doubt Timpanaro's 35-page essay of 1972, of which an English translation appeared five years later, has been the most thorough analysis of Schlegel's contribution to 19th-century comparative linguistics to date. I shall refer to this paper on a number of occasions in the discussion of Schlegel's Sprache und Weisheit der lndier that follows. 1.1 Language Comparison and Comparative Linguistics Unlike Leibniz and Humboldt, Friedrich Schlegel's importance in the history of linguistic science rests on one work only, namely, his Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier of 1808. It appears that partly because of its very date Schlegel's work usually received cavalier treatment in later his­ tories of linguistics, as it did not fall within the neat framework that they had come to adopt. The year 1816, the date of Bopp's Conjugationssystem, was soon picked as marking the beginning of linguistics as a science, and

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receiving wider attention in Germany, appears to harken back to 17th and 18th century French work done under the label of 'grammaire generale et raisonnee' (cf. Sweet 1980:396). However, their main source of inspiration is Kant's philosophical framework, which aims at the discovery of logico­ linguistic universals, but which because of its a priori nature were not recov­ erable through the empirical study of language. In this context, works by August Ferdinand Bernhardi (1769-1820) and Johann Severin Vater (17711826), both close contemporaries of Friedrich Schlegel, should be men­ tioned. Traditionally, Friedrich Schlegel is credited with the first use of the term 'vergleichende Grammatik' (cf. Benfey 1869:363; Niisse 1962:42, and many others: see Gipper & Schmitter [1979:46] for a list of further refer­ ences). However, as Timpanaro (1977:xxx) has pointed out, a similar term can already be found as early as 1801, in the index of Vater's Versuch einer allgemeinen Sprachlehre (p.259) as well as in the text itself (p.xvi), where the author speaks of 'vergleichende Sprachlehre' alongside with 'ver­ gleichendes Sprachstudium'. Two years later, in his review of Bernhardi's two-volume Sprachlehre of 1801 and 1803, the elder Schlegel, August Wilhelm (1767-1845), spoke of 'vergleichende Grammatik' (A.W. Schlegel 1803:203), and again two years thereafter Vater distinguished clearly between 'vergleichende Grammatik', an empirical undertaking which matches forms and grammatical systems in order to discover whatever fea­ tures languages share, and 'allgemeine Sprachlehre', which searches for anything universal and valid for all languages, which however is attainable only through speculation (cf. Vater 1805:15-16; Timpanaro 1977:xxxiiif). In other words, it is clear that Friedrich Schlegel had his forerunners and immediate sources of inspiration, to which we should add, in his case, the exposure he received to the writings of Sir William Jones (1746-1794) and to Sanskrit through Alexander Hamilton (1762-1824), from whom Schlegel took private lessons during 1803 and 1804, thus making him the first conti­ nental European to learn this ancient language whose discovery did so much in bringing about comparative Indo-European linguistics in the 19th century.

of 'structured whole', 'grammar of a language'. A similar use of the term can be found in Friedrich Schlegel's Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier one hundred years earlier, when he refers to Indic as being of an organic structure ("die Structur der Sprache [ist] durchaus organisch gebil­ det" [Schlegel 1808:41]). However, unlike Saussure in whose theory of lan­ guage 'organisme' or 'systeme' (his favourite term) becomes a metalinguis­ tic expression, the reference to 'organic' in Schlegel is made with regard to language types, and in contrast to 'mechanical' ("mechanisch") - cf. sec­ tion 1.2 below. Scholars (e.g., Benware 1974:4-5; Timpanaro 1977:xxxvii) have referred to Herder, Schelling, and others as sources for Schlegel's con­ cept of 'organic' (see also A.W. Schlegel 1803:302) . But I believe that we should be prepared to find at least an undercurrent in Schlegel's argument which derives from those natural sciences which, during the late 18th and the early 19th century, were making considerable advances, namely, (Lin­ mean) botany, comparative anatomy, (evolutionary) biology, and geology. It is true that we find only one direct reference to comparative anatomy in Schlegel's book, namely, in an often quoted passage from chap­ ter 3, but other passages seem to suggest that at least botany and probably also biology had an influence on his thinking. The best known passage should, however, be quoted first. Schlegel, in his chapter "Von der gram­ matischen Structur", advances an argument in favour of establishing lan­ guage relationship and common ancestry of particular languages on the basis of shared grammatical features, and it is in this connection that he remarks:

1.2 The Organism Concept of Language Those familiar with the Cours de linguistique genera/e will not have failed to notice that Saussure frequently employed organisme in the sense

Jener entscheidende Punct aber, der bier alles aufhellen wird, ist die innre Structur der Sprachen oder die vergleichende Grammatik, welche uns ganz neue Aufschliisse tiber die Genealogie der Sprachen auf iihnliche Weise geben wird, wie die vergleichende Anatomie iiber die h6here Naturge­ schichte Licht verbreitet hat. (Schlegel 1808:28; italics mine: KK; for an English translation, see Timpanaro 1977: xviii)

Heinrich Niisse, in his book Die Sprachtheorie Friedrich Schlegels, argued (Niisse 1962:41) that Schlegel had been particularly successful in advancing the study of language because of his introducing the organism concept into linguistic theory; however, he claimed that this concept was nothing but a metaphor that presented itself quite independently of the natural sciences which, in his view, came into prominence only later in the 19th century. Such a view cannot be upheld in view of the general historical context in which Schlegel's book was written, not to mention biographical details (see below).

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Even if we accept the possibility that Schlegel was not aware, during his lengthy sojourn in Paris (1802-1807, with interruptions), of Augustin Pyramus de Candolle's (1778-1841) voluminous Plantarum historia suc­ culentarum; ou, Histoire d,es plantes grasses (Paris: Dufour & Durand, 28 instalments, 1799-1803), which constituted a considerable advance over Linne's rather shallow plant taxonomy, or of Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck's (1744-1829) Systeme des animaux sans vertebres (Paris: Deterville, 1801), which was one of the most influential books in early 19th century biology, it cannot be ruled out that Schlegel was at least superficially acquainted with the w'?rks of Georges Cuvier {1769-1832), whose Leqons d'anatomie comparee appeared, in five volumes, during 1800 and 1805 (Paris: Bau­ doin). This is indeed most probable if we consider the position(s) that Cuvier held in French science at the time, the popularity of his public lec­ tures on the subject, and the fact that soon after his arrival in Paris in autumn 1802 Schlegel secured a letter of recommendation from him (cf. Korner 1958:52). According to Struc-Oppenberg {1980:425) Schlegel men­ tions Cuvier's work on fossils explicitly in his unpublished 'Oriental Notebooks'. (Perhaps we might add that Cuvier, for his part, was born near the Wurttemberg border, receiving his early scientific training at the Mann­ heim Karlsschule, where Friedrich Schiller had pursued medical studies a few years earlier.) Timpanaro (1977:xxxvf.), who was inclined to believe that Friedrich Schlegel "probably was thinking of Georges Cuvier's Leqons d'anatomie [comparee]", agrees however with Niisse's (1962:42) other claim that there was no 'evolution of languages' in Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier comparable to the evolution of species. While it is true that Cuvier held to the fixity of species - like Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (17521840) in his Handbuch der vergleichenden Anatomie (Gottingen: H. Diet­ rich, 1805), as Timpanaro believes, it does not necessarily follow that Schlegel subscribed to the same view, even if it was, at least in France (be­ cause of Cuvier's prominent place in organized science) the majority posi­ tion. I shall return to this question in Section 1.4 below. Let us first con­ sider Schlegel's classification of languages which is closely related to both the newly developed comparative view of language and the organism con­ cept sketched above (1.1-2) as we shall see from what follows.

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1.3 The Two-Fold Typology of Language As we have noted earlier, Schlegel engaged in a kind of language com­ parison which had little to do (pace Timpanaro) with either the evaluative type of language comparison or the non-empirical, deductive approach of the general grammar tradition. His comparison of languages was based on the analysis of language structure, of grammatical features, and with a view to establishing beyond any shadow of a doubt that the classical languages of Europe as well as other language groups (like Germanic) were indeed genetically related to those of India and Persia. However, as Timpanaro (1977:xxxi-iv) has pointed out, traces of both older kinds of characteriza­ tion can still be found in Schlegel's work. In particular, Timpanaro (p.xxxivf.) suggests the evaluative nature of comparative linguistics, in the form of Schlegel's 'organic'/'agglutinative' (a term actually not used by Schlegel) distinction, which led, in its ideological form to a 'divine'/'feral' dichotomy among languages and peoples, might have to be reckoned with (though I believe that Timpanaro is stretching his argument a little in this instance). It is true that Schlegel's two-fold distinction of language types contains value judgements; however, they are by no means in the extreme form encountered in the later 19th century which frequently had racist overtones. It appears to me that Schlegel arrives at his typological distinc­ tion through his concern with establishing beyond doubt what at least since Leibniz has been a widely held proposition, namely, that the various Euro­ pean languages were genetically related. Hervas and Kraus during the 1780s had already pointed to grammatical structure as the probably best criterion to be used by the investigator, and Gyarmathi had applied the principle successfully in his 1799 work proving the kinship of Finnish and Hungarian once and for all. (We should recall that the similarity or identity of lexical items could frequently be interpreted as being due to borrowing, and that orthographic and phonetic similarity was by no means a sure guide prior to the discovery of 'sound laws' by Grimm and others; hence the many wild schemes of etymologizing found before the 19th century.) In other words, Schlegel wanted to establish the affiliation between major European languages and certain Oriental ones, and this he felt was only possible by demonstrating that they shared resemblances of a mor­ phological and grammatical kind. In this connection, Sir William Jones' celebrated statement about the genetic relationship between Sanskrit, the

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classical language of India, and European languages, in particular Greek, Latin, Germanic ('Gothic'}, and Celtic, as well as Persian, all languages which Schlegel investigated for his 1808 work, should be recalled. Schlegel followed Jones' lead, and acknowledged his indebtedness (Schlegel 1808:iii, 85) to him, but he did not clearly adopt Jones' in .fact correct assumption that the original language from which these languages derive probably did no longer exist. Thus after first seeming to adopt the view that Sanskrit was the matrix of the (other) Indo-European languages, among which he counts, though with reservations (pp.3-4), Slavic and Celtic as well, he later on hedges the issue by asking what the original language might have been like if Sanskrit was, albeit the oldest, a derived language too (p.62), and eventually adopting this for a fact (p.66). Interestingly enough, Bopp (1816:9) took a similarly ambiguous line when he states that his eventual goal is to prove that "an allen Sprachen, die von dem Sanskrit, oder mit ihm von einer gemeinschaftlichen Mutter abstammen" the grammatical techique of prepositional determination could be traced back to the original language (Ursprache). In his project, Schlegel rejects the traditional "etymologische Kiinsteleien" by which scholars had attempted to esiablish language relationships and their "Veranderungs- oder Versetzungsregeln der Buch­ staben" (1808:6). Instead he argues that the complete identity ("vollige Gleicheit") of words had to be established in order to realize such a goal, though he is realist enough to concede:

relevant (con)texts. (We may recall that historisch was frequently seen in contradistinction to 'philosophical', in order to contrast 'empirical, induc­ tive' and 'hypothetical, deductive', as is clear not only from the writings of Jacob Grimm, but can also still be found in Hermann Paul's Principien of 1880!) Yet it is interesting to read in a letter that Friedrich Schlegel wrote to his brother ten years earlier: "Mir ekelt vor jeder Theorie, die nicht his­ torisch ist" (Neumann 1967:16, n.13). Timpanaro is correct however when he notes that Schlegel confines his investigation to one language family only, leaving aside other groups such as Semitic, the American Indian languages, and Chinese, which however he regards as a curious example ("merkwiirdiges Beispiel"} of a language exhibiting an extremely simple morphological structure (Schlegel 1808:45). Yet before presenting his views on linguistic structure in general, Schlegel provides (pp.7-26) a series of examples from Greek, Latin, Persian, and German (including Old High German and Low German, p.22}, at times even from Celtic (e.g., p.22) or Slavic (p.23), to demonstrate that these var­ ious forms are, despite the changes they may have undergone, derived ("abgeleitet", cf. pp.16, 18, etc.) from Indic. It should be added that Schlegel not only compared lexical items, including the well-known terms for 'father', 'mother', 'brother' and 'sister' (p.8), but also case endings (pp.S-9), particles (pp.10, 16}, pronouns (pp.21-22), and other simple basic elements of language ("einfache Grundbestandtheile der Sprache" [p.9]). Given the audience Schlegel had in mind, namely, the intellectual elite of his time, it is understandable that regular dictionary words were more often referred to than grammatical items. In chapter 3, "Von der grammatischen Structur", however, where he sets out to discuss the previously held assumpion according to which Indic was the oldest among those genetically related languages, and that it would have to be the source of all these other (related} languages ("ihr gemeinschaftlicher Ursprung", p.27}, we note that Schlegel refers to a number of grammatical features, i.e. , comparative endings, diminutives, morphological markers for person, number, tense, mode, and the like as well as other grammatical features (28ff.) . When discussing the case end� ings in German, for instance, Schlegel suggests taking into account the older Germanic dialects such as Gothic, Old Saxon, and Icelandic (p.33), concluding with the following observation (p.34}:

Freilich wenn sich die Mittelglieder historisch nachweisen lassen, so mag giorno von dies abgeleitet werden, und wenn statt des lateinischen f im Spanischen so oft h entritt [und] das lateinische p in der deutschen Form desselben Worts sehr haufig f, und c nicht selten h, so griindet dieB aller­ dings eine Analogie auch fiir andre nicht ganz so evidente Hille. (Schlegel 1808: 6-7)

And when Schlegel continues that these intermediate forms or at least the general parallelism of such correspondences would have to de proved his­ torically ("historisch nachgewiesen", p.7), we may ask ourselves whether Timpanaro (1977:xxxii-vi passim) is right when he argues that Schlegel's procedure in deriving all the European languages from Sanskrit is basically inspired by an "anatomy of fixed species" (p.xxxv), devoid of evolutionist content, a subjet that will be taken up in the next section (1.4}. We should probably be careful however in not identifying 'historisch' in Schlegel's work with our modern understanding of the term before having studied the

Es kann [ . . . ] bei der Betrachtung dieser alten Denkmahle der germani­ schen Sprache nicht der mindeste Zweifel iibrig bleiben, daB sie ehedem

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It hardly needs to be pointed out that Schlegel regarded Germanic as the (intermediate) source language for all these attested languages mentioned earlier, especially when we note that he is referring on the same page to the Romance languages as showing a parallel development. Changes from the earlier states are seen as caused by the regular use of these languages ("Abschleifung des gemeinen Gebrauchs") and the general tendency toward ease of expression ("Abbreviatur zum leichten [ . . . ] Gebrauch", p.35). The older languages, Indic, Greek, and Latin, however, have still retained the same grammatical features, at times to the extent of being identical in all three. They all follow the "Gesetz der Structur" (p.38), though not all equally well. What they (including the modern varieties) have in common is the . . . Gleichheit des Princips, alle Verhiiltnisse und Nebenbestimmungen der Bedeutung nicht durch angehiingte Partikeln oder Hii.lfsverba, sondern durch Flexion d.h. durch innre Modification der Wurzel zu erkennen zu geben . (Schlegel 1808:35)

Schlegel illustrates his principle with reference to, among others (e.g. , suf­ fixes, p.37), the infixes in Sanskrit and Greek marking tense differences, thus in effect extending the notion of 'root' beyond the regular understand­ ing of the term. But what is important for Schlegel in his argument becomes clear in the next chapter of his book, "Von zwei Hauptgattungen der Sprachen nach ihrem innern Bau" (44-59), which has been the subject of Jenghty discussions in histories of linguistics as it is commonly regarded as the statement concerning language types which was so influential in 19th­ century linguistics, despite its limitations, one may add (cf. Morpurgo Davies 1975:657-58) . In this chapter Schlegel points out that not all languages follow the same 'Sprachprinzip' that he found most perfectly adhered to by Sanskrit, but that there are many others of a rather different, in fact oppositive grammar ("durchaus entgegengesetzten Grammatik", p.44). These are languages that do not make use of the change within the root of a word but of a technique by which particular grammatical functions such as number or tense are expressed with the help of an added word ("hinzugefiigtes Wort"); we would now say: separate morpheme, a technique of which Chinese exhibits the most extreme instance. But Schlegel, referring to material he got access to through the offices of Alexander von Humboldt ·

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(see p.44, note) and referring to Wilhelm von Humboldt with respect to Basque (p.45, note), mentions a variety of other languages, including American Indian, as belonging to the same grammatical type. Schlegel concedes that in some instances these last-mentioned lan­ guages appear at times to make use of the technique of inflection, but he remains confident to be able to distinguish between these two basic species ("Gattungen") of language (p.48). Moreover, he envisages successive stages in the development of both language types, beginning with Chinese at the lowest rung of the ladder, followed by Coptic, Basque, the American Indian languages, and eventually Arabic and its cognate dialects. Note that Schlegel speaks of "Stufengang der Sprachen" (p.49). Although he is aware of the diversity of the languages found in the Americas, he maintains that they nevertheless all follow the same plan, arguing (p.50): " . . . die ahnliche Structur deutet auf ein gleiches Princip der Entstehung". And Schlegel offers the following explanation for the differences between these lan­ guages and those that are like Sanskrit or (classical) Greek: The former, in Schlegel's opinion, characterized by their use of 'Affixa', i.e., individual items loosely attached to words, and this in a mechanical fashion; by con­ trast, the other group of languages exhibits the organic technique of 'Fle­ xion', and it is for this group that he reserved the highest praise: In der indischen oder griechischen Sprache ist jede Wurzel wahrhaft das, was der Name sagt, und wie ein lebendiger Keirn, denn weil die Ver� haltniBbegriffe durch innre Veriindrung bezeichnet werden, so ist der Entfaltung freier Spielraum gegeben, die Fiille der Entwicklung kann ins Unbestimmte sich ausbreiten, und ist oftmals in der That bewun� drungswiirdig reich. (Schlegel 1808:50-51)

And Schlegel goes on to explain that despite this diversity of development, these languages, as they derive from those original roots, maintain their basic characteristic through thousands of years, whereas those many other languages - and Schlegel goes on to list a variety of language groups and language forms around the world (52-54) - do not share these traits. In these languages . . . sind die Wurzeln nicht eigentlich das (what the term suggests]; kein fruchtbarer Same, sondem nur ein Haufen Atome, die jeder Wind des Zufalls Ieicht aus einander treiben und zusammenfiihren kann. (Schlegel 1808:51)

As a result, Schlegel (p.52) argues, these languages are not organically grown and therefore, unlike Indic or Greek, they tend to be more complex,

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more artificial in structure, to the extent that it becomes nearly impossible to trace them to a common ancestor. In fact, Schlegel (p.56) believes that the development of the languages using affixation instead of inflection show the opposite direction in their development: while the latter type shows a development towards a simplification of structure, even to the extent of los­ ing the beauty and art ("SchOnheit und Kunst") of the ancestorial language, the languages of the former type become more and more structurally com­ plex. It appears however that part of the reason for referring to the down­ ward development of the inflectional languages is that Schlegel wishes to forestall the criticism of one-sidedness and prejudice. Thus he has many nice words to say (p.55) about the dignity, vigor and artfulness of Arabic and Hebrew (whose 'inflectional' character he fails to recognize), and later on he lauds the beauty and expressive power of Quechua (p.58), a native language of South America. It is difficult for us today to understand (not to mention appreciate) Schlegel's argument, and one may wonder why his book could have exer­ cised the influence on 19th-century linguistics that it did. One reason for this may be that Schlegel's ideas were so much in line with the intellectual currents of the time, in which the distinction between 'organic' and 'mechanical' played an important role. Thus Friedrich Schlegel's elder brother, August Wilhelm, who ten years later introduced the influential 'synthetic'/'analytic(al)' distinction into linguistic typology, offered the fol­ lowing elucidation of the 'organisch'1-'mechanisch' distinction in his famous lectures on dramatic art and literature of 1808, i.e., the year in which Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier appeared:

mechanischer durch auBere Anfiigung" (1808:51). It seems clear that Fried­ rich Schlegel's dichotomy of flectional and affixional languages and between organic and mechanical or atomistic types is not based on empiri­ cal evidence but largely on a preconceived idea. Had he compared Modern English with Chinese for example, he would have found it difficult to main­ tain the view that their grammatical organization was miles apart; or had he carefully studied any of the Semitic languages, he would have had to admit that their triconsonantal base, where semantic specification is achieved by modification of the root vowels, would have qualified Hebrew and Arabic for example as 'inflectional' (cf. his hedging remarks, p.49f. ), indeed as flectional languages par exellence. Anna Morpurgo Davies (1975:657), who rightly found Friedrich Schlegel a 'problematic figure', felt that Timpanaro, who had studied his classification of languages at considerable length (see Timpanaro 1977:xviii­ xx et passim), had not sufficiently stressed that nowhere in Schlegel's book "is there a clear statement of the distinction between linguistic comparison which aims at genealogical results and linguistic comparison which aims at typological statements or classification". This is true, but for Schlegel there was no such contrast as he reserved the terms 'organic' and 'flectional' for those languages only which we call Indo-European. These characteristics allow him to maintain their genetic affiliation, even after many of them have undergone considerable structural changes.

Form is mechanical when, through external force, it is imparted to any material as an accidental addition without reference to its quality; as, for example, when we give particular shape to a soft mass that it may retain the same after its induration. Organical form, again, is innate; it unfolds itself from within, and acquires its determination contemporaneously with the perfect development of the germ [ . . . ] . In a word, the form is nothing but a significant exterior, the speaking physiognomy of each thing, which, as long as it is not disfigured by any destructive accident, gives a true evi� dence of its hidden essence . (A.W. Schlegel 1846 [1808]:340)

Here we recognize a parallelism between F. Schlegel's linguistic views and those of his brother concerning literary art, when Friedrich adds to his characterization of the non-flectional languages quoted earlier that their manner of composition is "eigentlich kein anderer, als ein bloB

1.4 Language Origin and Linguistic Evolution In his careful analysis of Friedrich Schlegel's linguistic thinking, Sebas­ tiana Timpanaro (1977:xxxvii and elsewhere) argued that despite all appearences, Schlegel subscribed to "an anatomy of fixed species" (p.xxxv). If applied to Schlegel's separation of the Indo-European lan­ guages from all others and his denial of their similarity in terms of structure, Timpanaro is correct: Schlegel envisaged no crossover between those basic language types and maintained polygeneticist views which were quite in line with Establishment science, especially botany and comparative anatomy. However, Timpanaro's statement (p.xxxvi) that Lamarck's "great evolutio­ nary work, the Philosophie zoologique, appeared only in 1809, i.e., one year after Schlegel's book", is no convincing evidence for his argument that Schlegel's linguistic ideas were not influenced by evolutionist currents that can be found in 18th-century philqsophy as well as science (as Timpanaro

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himself suggests, p.xxxv) . Indeed, Paul Salmon (1974), in his well­ researched article on "The Beginnings of Morphology", has shown that much of the 18th-century climate was imbued with biological metaphors and evolutionist thinking, to the extent that it becomes difficult to interpret this other famous observation in Schlegel's Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Inder as not in contradiction with Timpanaro's interpretation that there was no hint of "an evolutionist concept of 'linguistic organism'" in the following passage:

the style of Sanskrit legal text and that of the Latin of Cicero (p.68) - Indic undoubtedly was much simpler and much more prosaic; its poetry stemming from a much later stage of development. The antiquity of the language , he holds, could be proved historically on the basis of terminological usage or etymologically from compounds ("historisch aus dem Gebrauch der Ter­ minologie, oder etymologisch aus den zusammengesetzten Worten" [p.6 9]). In the concluding chapter of the linguistic portion of his book, "Von der Verschiedenheit der verwandten und von einigen merkwiirdigen Mit­ telsprachen" (71-87), Schlegel discusses at length questions of change and language mixture, which, as Timpanaro (1977:xxiv) has pointed out, antici­ pate substratum theory usually associated with Ascoli, Schuchardt, and others at the end of the 19th century. Thus language contact and the result­ ing borrowings make it at times difficult, Schlegel holds, to identify all the 'Sanskritic' languages, rendering it necessary to consider what we may call the external history of a given language in addition to submitting it to minute morphological analysis (p.72; see also p.74). In his discussion of linguistic contamination and the question of lan­ guage descent, Schlegel drew particular attention to Armenian, in which he found many similarities with Latin, Greek, Persian and German roots (p. 77) and, what is more important, agreements in grammatical structure (p. 78). However, he is not quite ready to include Armenian in those derived from Indic (or belonging to the Indo-European language family, as we would say), but recognizes it as curious intermediary ("merkwiirdiges Mittelglied") between this language group and others. Here we may realize that the material available to Schlegel was limited, as he points out on sev­ eral occasions in his treatise (e.g., pp.81-82 note), which is obvious when he sees himself unable to determine that Zend and Pahlevi are in fact 'Sanskri­ tic' languages (p.79). In short, if we note that Schlegel speaks of one language beitig derived ("abgeleitet") from another, of external histories of languages, of language mixture, and the like, it becomes difficult to maintain that he was not con­ sidering a historical, evolutive component in his linguistic argument, inde­ pendent of whether or not we assign his use of 'historisch' a modern interpretation.

Genug, wenn bier nur in das Ganze Ordnung gebracht und befriedigend angezeigt ist, nach welchen Grundsiitzen etwa eine vergleichende Gram­ matik und ein durchaus historischer Stammbaum, eine wahre Entstehungsgeschichte der Sprache, statt der ehemaligen erdichteten Theorien vom Ursprunge derselben, zu entwerfen ware. (Schlegel 1808:84; English translation in Timpanaro 1977: xxxvii)

As noted earlier (1.1 above), we should not jump to conclusions with regard to the semantics of 'historisch' in Schlegel's book, but the context in which it occurs makes an interpretation in the sense of "historical, develop­ mental" quite suggestive ("ein durchaus historischer Stammbaum"), as it would be difficult not to see in a genealogical tree something dynamic evok­ ing succession, if not 'diachrony'. The above quotation derives from the sixth and last chapter of part one ("Erstes Buch") of Schlegel's book, in fact from its second-last page. The preceding chapter was devoted to glottogeny ("Vom Ursprunge der Sprachen"), in which he goes over the language origin question again which had received such wide attention as a result of Herder's 1770 prize essay. In it Schlegel puts forward a polygeneticist position with ingredients of its own. Thus, in agreement with his earlier view of the existence of (two) dif­ ferent basic types of language, he denies that every language has begun in the same manner, for example by onomatopoia or on the basis of emotional and 'endeictic' cries which were subsequently conventionalized (cf. Schlegel 1808:66). Although he concedes that Indic may not be the original form of the language from which all the other flectional languages are derived (p.62), he maintains that its clarity of expression and beauty of structure was original, comparable to a living texture which developed and formed itself through its own inner strength ("einem lebendigen Gewebe, das nun durch innre Kraft weiter fortwuchs und sich bildete" [64-65]; cf. A.W. Schlegel's remark of 1808 cited earlier in this paper). In earlier stages on the language - and Schlegel refers to William Jones' comparison between

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2.0 Concluding Observations

It has become difficult for us today to fully appreciate the work of a scholar written at the turn of 19th century. While we may find it demand­ ing, if not at time impossible, to recreate the context in which a particular thinker worked out his system, to recognize its sources as well as its innova­ tions, on the one hand, we may be tempted to give interpretation to a pas­ sage or statement on the basis of our current understanding of the field and thus distort the author's intentions, on the other. The reading of Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier today is a case in point. While we might at times be surprised at certain insights, we may also be wondering why this book had the impact it had and led, as Timpanaro and other scholars have in recent years pointed out again, to the establishment of linguistic science ip the 19th century. The following observations should be made as they certainly had some­ thing to do with the success of Schlegel's book, namely, that it revived and reinforced ideas that we found expressed by 18th-century writers on lan­ guage such as Leibniz and others (cf. Timpanaro 1977: xii, xiv; Salmon . 1974:318-21). This we may illustrate by a quotation from A Discourse con­ cerning the Confusion of Languages at Babel by the English divine William Wotton (1666-1727) - with whom Leibniz had a correspondence - writing shortly after Leibniz' Brevis designatio (1710) the following among others: My argument does not depend upon the Difference of Words, but upon the Difference of Grammar between any two languages; from whence it proceeds, that when any Words are derived from one Language into another, the derived Words are then turned and changed according to the particular Genius of the Language into which they are transplanted. I have shewed, for Instance, in what Fundamentals the [standish and the Greek agree . I can easily afterwards suppose that they might both be derived from one common Mother, which is and perhaps has for many Ages been entirely lost. (Wotton 1730 [1713]:57; quoted in Salmon 1974:315) '

Wotton in fact showed (pp.17ff) that the tense system of Latin, Greek and Germanic for example was quite different from the aspectal system in Hebrew, though it is true that he did not go so far as to question the myth of Babel, which had been debunked by the time Schlegel was writing. But Schlegel maintained in part the 18th-century idea of the 'genius' of a par­ ticular language in the form of language reflecting the 'national character' of its people.

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Apart from suggesting that William Jones' famous remark was not that original after all, especially when we note that he included the language of "the ancient Egyptians of Ethiopians" as well as Chinese and Japanese to the group of Indo-European languages in subsequent addresses (Timpa­ naro 1977:xiv; cf. also Schlegel 1808:85, where Jones is criticized for es­ pousing a monogeneticist view), the quotation from Wotton also shows that the discovery of Sanskrit was not necessary for the establishment of com­ parative-historical linguistics. (The work of Rask and Grimm is another case in point.) However, given the late 18th-century craving for ideas from the East, the discovery that most of the European languages were in fact related to Indic provided a tremendous boost to the enterprise, and Schlegel's elaboration on this idea, together with a number of ideas of his own, was bound to receive wide attention, even though its initial reception in German-speaking lands was somewhat mixed, not to a small extent because of Schlegel's conversion to Catholicism and his acceptance of employment at the Austrian imperial court, the symbol of reactionary poli­ tics. A few examples may suffice to indicate the important role that Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Inder played in the development of linguistics as a separate discipline. We have already mentioned Franz Bopp (17911867), whose first work, Ueber das Conjugationssystem der Sanskritsprache in Vergleichung mit jenem der griechischen, lateinischen, persischen und ger­ manischen Sprache (1816), is still widely referred to as marking the begin­ ning of comparative-historical linguistics. It should be pointed out in the present context (beyond what Karl Joseph Windischmann acknowledged in the 'Vorerinnerungen' to Bopp's study, p.viii) that it was largely Friedrich Schlegel's book which enticed the young student at the recently created University of Aschaffenburg to embark on Oriental studies (cf. Neumann 1967:10ff). More importantly, Bopp followed Schlegel's suggestions in a number of ways. The emphasis on the investigation of grammatical features for the proof of genetic affiliation, perhaps more often preached than prac­ tised in Schlegel's book, is clearly in evidence in Bopp's work. In particular, Bopp followed up on a suggestion in Schlegel's chapter "Von der gram­ matischen Structur", in which he had pointed to the investigation of the sys­ tem of conjugation (in contrast to declension) as a fruitful line of research (cf. Schlegel 1808:29), in effect making it the centre of his attention. (That Bopp should add some 150 pages, in fact one half of his book, of transla-

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tions from ludic poetry is just another indication of how much he emulated Schlegel's example.) Perhaps still more obvious is the impact that Friedrich Schlegel had on his elder brother August Wilhelm (1767-1845), whom he persuaded to undertake the study of Sanskrit in Paris, and who. became the first incum­ bent of the newly created chair of ludic studies at the University of Bonn in 1819. Apart from contributing to the field from 1815 onwards, August Wilhelm Schlegel established a periodical, Indische Bibliothek (1820-30), and trained future scholars, among whom the Norwegian-born Christian Lassen (1800-1876) became one of the foremost Indologist in Germany. Those familiar with Humboldt's linguistic writings will find a consider­ able number of indirect and direct references to Schlegel's Sprache und Weisheit der Inder, especially with regard to Schlegel's ideas on language structure and linguistic classification (cf. Humboldt 1820 and 1822). But even in his later work, including his famous Einleitung to the Kawi language of Java, "Ueber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaus und ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts", pub­ lished posthumously in 1836, we find the following statement about Schlegel's contribution to linguistics, even though he disagrees with Schlegel's "Eintheilung aller Sprachen":

epic by the same, which begins with a /audatio of Friedrich Schlegel's importance in the development of Sanskrit studies and historical-genetic linguistic research (Hamilton 1820:431-32), thus adding a British voice to the discussion (cf. Koerner [1987:341] for the relevant quotation). We could add many later 19th-century comments on Schlegel's signifi­ cance in the study of language, especially from the later 19th century and, of course, historical accounts of linguistic science, but it may suffice to sum up the place of Friedrich Schlegel in the emergence of comparative-histori­ cal (as well as general) linguistics in the following manner: More than a 'philologischer Anreger' (Klin 1967), Schlegel paved the way for a com­ parative linguistics based on grammatical structure rather than on lexical items ·or phonetic similarity; at the same time, he replaced the traditional (and mostly fruitless) discussion about the origin of language by an histori­ cal investigation of attested languages, and he provided the first impetus to the study of language types. Somewhat simplified, we may see Friedrich Schlegel's work - "one of the venerable documents of modern linguistic science", as W.F. Twaddell (1942:151) called it 135 years later - as having in fact initiated three lines of 19th-century linguistic research, namely, Comparative Grammar (Bopp 1816ff.), Historical Linguistics (Grimm 1819ff), and Language Typology (A. W. Schlegel 1818; Humboldt 1820ff). These three trends were effectively united two generations later by August Schleicher (1821-1868), albeit in a positivistic framework in which Hum­ boldt's philosophical concern had no place. However, it was Schleicher's program of historical-comparative (Indo-European) linguistics which domi­ nated the discipline until the 1920s, when the Humboldtian tradition, trivialized by Schleicher and his followers (cf. Delbriick 1882:27-28), was revived in Germany, Italy, and a few other countries, and when Saussure's posthumous lectures on general linguistics began to inspire new generations of scholars outside the traditional power houses of linguistic research. Con­ sidering the tremendous advances made in the study of language since the beginning of the 19th century, it is understandble that few linguists of today would pause to reflect upon the pioneering work of one of our intellectual ancestors to whom we owe much more than we might ever realize.

Es ist aber bemerkenswerth und, wie mir scheint, zu wenig anerkannt, dass dieser tiefe Denker und geistvoller Schriftsteller der erste Deutsche war, der uns auf die mehrwiirdige Erscheinung des Sanskrits aufmerksam machte, und dass er schon zu einer Zeit bedeutende Fortschritte darin gethan hatte, wo nlan von allen jetzigen zahlreichen Hiilfsmitteln zur Erlernung der Sprache entblosst war. (Humboldt 1963 [1830-35]: 515, note)

Here Humboldt recognizes Friedrich Schlegel's position as a pioneer. We have already mentioned that Schlegel's book was soon translated into French, in part in 1809 and in full in 1837 (cf. Struc-Oppenberg 1975:ccxvi) ; i t also appeared i n English i n 1849 (cf. appendix to Schlegel 1977 [1808]). Perhaps still more importantly, it is interesting to note that no lesser scholar than the Dane Rasmus Kristian Rask (1787-1832) advised a British Anglo­ Saxon scholar, as late as 1824, to read Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der lndier in support of his belief that "the European languages of the Gothic stock [i.e., Germanic] are related to those of India and Persia" (cf. Mor­ purgo Davies 1975:622, n.34). As well, we may to refer to the last publica­ tion by his former mentor, Alexander Hamilton (1761-1824), a review of Bopp's Conjugationssystem together with a Latin translation of a Sanskrit

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REFERENCES

Humboldt, Wilhelm von. 1963. Schriften zur Sprachphilosophie. Ed. by Andreas Flitner & Klaus Giel . Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buch­ gesellschaft. [Contains, inter alia, Humboldt 1820, 1827-29, and 1836 (1830-35).] Jenisch, Daniel. 1796. Philosophisch-kritische Vergleichung und Wiirdigung von vierzehn iilteren und neueren Sprachen Europens. Berlin: F. Maurer. Jones, Sir William. 1788 [1786]. "The Third Anniversary Discourse, deli­ vered [ . ] by the President of the Society [ . . . ]". Asiatick Researches 1.515-31. (Repr. in A Reader in Nineteenth-Century Historical Indo­ European Linguistics ed. by Winfred P. Lehmann, 7-20. Bloomington & London: Indiana Univ. Press, 1967.) Kanne, Johann Arnold. 1804. Ueber die Verwandtschaft der griechischen und lateinischen Sprache. Leipzig: Rein. Klin, Eugeniusz. 1967. "Friedrich Schlegel als philologischer Anreger (1802-1808)" . Germanica Wratislaviensia 1 1 .83-103. Koerner, E.F. Konrad. 1975. "European Structuralism: Early beginnings". Current Trends in Linguistics ed. by Thomas A . Sebeok, vol XIII: Histo­ riography of Linguistics, 717-827. The Hague: Mouton. . 1980. "Pilot and Parasite Disciplines in the Development of Lin­ guistic Science". Folia Linguistica Historica 1.231-24. 1982. "The Schleicherian Paradigm in Linguistics". General Lin­ guistics 22.1-39. . 1987. "Friedrich Schlegel and the Emergence of Historical-Com­ parative Grammar". Lingua e Stile 22:4.341-65. Korner, Josef. 1958. Krisenjahre der Romantik. Vol. III: Kommentar. Bern: A. Francke. Lamarck, Jean Baptiste. 1801. Systeme des animaux sans vertebres, en table generale des classes, des ordres et des genres de ces animaux. Paris: Deterville. ---. 1809. Philosophie zoologique; ou, Exposition des considerations relatives a l'histoire naturelle des animaux; [ . . . ] . 2 vols. Paris: Dentu. Morpurgo Davies, Anna. 1975. "Language Classification in the Nineteenth Century". Current Trends in Linguistics ed. by Thomas A. Sebeok, vol XIII: Historioghaphy of Linguistics, 607-716. The Hague: Mouton. Neumann, Giinter. 1967. Indogermanische Sprachwissenschaft 1816 und I966: Zwei Vortriige [ . . . ] . Innsbruck: Sprachwissenschaftliches Institut der Leopold-Franzens-Universitiit. Niisse, Heinrich. 1962. Die Sprachtheorie Friedrich Schlegels. Heidelberg: C. Winter.

Benfey, Theodor. 1869. Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft und orientali­ schen Philologie in Deutschland [ . . ] . Munich: J. G . Cotta. (Repr. , New York: Johnson, 1965.) Benware, Wilbur A. 1974. The Study of Indo-European Vocalism in the 19th century, from the beginnings to Whitney and Scherer. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins. (New printing, 1989.) Bernhardi, August Ferdinand. 1801-1803. Sprachlehre. 2 vols. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. (Repr., Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1973.) Blumenbach, Johann Friedrich. 1805. Handbuch der vergleichenden Anatomie. Gottingen: H. Dietrich. Bopp, Franz. 1816. Ueber das Conjugationssystem der Sanskritsprache in Vergleichung mit jenem der griechischen, lateinischen, persischen und germanischen Sprache. With a preface by Karl Joseph Windischmann . Frankfurt/Main: Andreiiische Buchhandlung. (Repr. , Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1975.) Bynon, Theodora. 1986. "August Schleicher: Indo-Europeanist and gen­ eral linguist". Studies in the History of Western LinguiStics ed. by Th. Bynon & F.R. Palmer, 129-49. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. Candolle, Augustin Pyramus de. 1799-1803. Plantarum historia succulen­ tarum; ou, Histoire des plantes grasses. 28 instalments. Paris: Dufour & Durand. Cuvier, Georges. 1800-1805. Ler;ons d'anatomie comparee. 5 vols. Paris: Baudoin. (Other ed., Paris: Crochard & Fantin, 1805.) Delbriick, Berthold. 1882. Introduction to the Study of Language; A critical survey of the history and methods ofcomparative philology ofIndo-Euro­ pean languages. Trans!. from German by Eva Channing. Leipzig: Breit­ kopf & Hartel. (New ed. , Amsterdam: J. Benjamins, 1974.) Gipper, Helmut & Peter Schmitter. 1979. Sprachwissenschaft und Sprach­ philosophie im Zeitalter der Romaruik. Tiibingen: G . Narr. Gyarrnathi, Samuel. 1799. Affinitas linguae Hungaricae cum Unguis Fen­ nicae originis grammatica demonstrata; nee non vocabularia dialectorum Tataricarum et Slavicarum cum Hungarica comparata. Gottingen: J.C. Dietrich. (English trans!. , with an introduction and notes, by Victor E. Hanzeli, Amsterdam & Philadelphia: J. Benjamins, 1983.) Hamilton, Alexander. 1820. Review of Bopp (1816), and Bopp, ed. & trans!. , Nalus (London , 1819). Edinburgh Review 33.431-42. .

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Pedersen, Holger. 1931. Linguistic Science in the Nineteenth Century. Trans!. from Danish by John Webster Spargo. Cambridge, Mass. : Har­ vard Univ. Press. Salmon, Paul B . 1974. "The Beginnings of Morphology: Linguistic botaniz­ ing in the 18th century". Historiographia Linguistica 1.313-39. Schlegel, August Wilhelm. 1803. "Ankundigung: Sprachlehre von A.F. Bernhardi". Europa: Eine Zeitschrift ed. by Friedrich Schlegel, 2.193-204. . 1818. Observations sur Ia langue et Ia litterature provenqales. Paris: Librairie grecque-Jatine-allemande. (Repr. , together with an introduc­ tion by Gunter Narr, Tubingen: TBL Verlag, 1971.) , ed. [and main contributor]. 1820-30. Indische Bibliothek. 3 vols. [of several fascicles each]. Bonn: E. Weber. . 1846 [1808]. Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature. Trans!. by John Black. London: H.G. Bohn. (Repr., New York: AMS Press, 1965.) Schlegel , Friedrich. 1808. Ueber die Sprache uns Weisheit der Indier: Ein Beitrag zur Begrundung der Alterthumskunde. Heidelberg: Mohr & Zimmer. (New ed., with an introduction by Sebastiano Timpanaro, Amsterdam: J. Benjamins, 1977.) . 1809. "De Ia langue et de Ia philosophie des Indiens". Appended to Essai de Ia premiere formation des langues, et sur Ia difference du genie des langues originales et des langues composees by Adam Smith, trans!. into French by Jean Manget, 111-229. Geneva: Manget & Cherbuliez. Struc-Oppenberg, Ursula. 1975. "Uber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier [of F. Schlegel]". Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe ed. by Ernst Behler et al., vol. VIII:1, clxxxvii-ccxxx. Munchen-Paderborn­ Wien: F. Schoningh; Zurich: Thomas Verlag. [Introd. to the critical ed. of Schlegel 1808.] . 1980. "Friedrich Schlegel and the History of Sanskrit Philology and Comparative Studies". Canadian Review on Comparative Literature 7.411-37. Sweet, Paul R. 1978-80. Wilhelm von Humboldt: A biography. 2 vols. Col­ umbus: Ohio State Univ. Press. Timpanaro, Sebastiano. 1972. "Friedrich Schlegel e gli inizi della linguistica indoeuropea in Germania". Critica Storica N.S. 9.72-105. . 1977. "Friedrich Schlegel and the Beginnings of Indo-European Linguistics in Germany". Schlegel 1977 [1808], xi-lvii. [Trans!. of Timpa­ naro (1972) by J. Peter Maher, ed. by E.F.K. Koerner.]

Twaddell, William Freeman. 1943. "Fr. Schlegel's Criteria of Linguistic Relation". Monatshefte fur deutschen Unterricht 35.151-55. Vater, Johann Severin. 1801. Versuch einer allgemeinen Sprachlehre, mit einer Einleitung ilber Begriff und Ursprung der Sprache [ . . . ] . Halle/Saale: Renger. . 1805. Lehrbuch der allgemeinen Grammatik, besonders fUr hohere Schulklassen, mit Vergleichung iilterer und neuerer Sprachen. Ibid. Wotton, William. 1730. A Discourse concerning the Confusion of Lan­ guages at Babel. London: S. Austen & W. Bowyer.

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Lautfonn, innere Sprachfonn , Form der Sprachen. II problema della comparazione e classificazione delle lingue in Heymann Steinthal Mario Barba

Universitii di Roma

1. Un convegno dedicato alla ricostruzione dell'idea comparatista da Leibniz a Humboldt non dovrebbe, a rigore, occuparsi di Steinthal. I primi lavori di Heymann (Chajim) Steinthal (1823-1899) appaiono tra i1 1847 e il 1855, nell'epoca del comparatismo scientifico maturo, mentre il metoda di Franz Bopp (1791-1867), Rasmus Kristian Rask (1787-1832) e Jacob Grimm (1785-1863) si accinge a tentare, con August Schleicher (18211868), Ia ricostruzione della protolingua all'origine delle diverse lingue in­ doeuropee attestate: un'evoluzione che segnerit una nuova tappa nell'appli­ cazione del concetto di Iegge fonetica all'analisi dei sistemi morfologico­ grammaticali. Ma, e noto, Ia nuova scuola comparativa si afferma trascurando le questioni piu generali, di norma filosofiche, presenti nella cultura linguisti­ ca precedente. Steinthal, a! contrario, negli anni in cui l'estensione del nuo­ vo metodo a famiglie non indoeuropee corrisponde a! progressivo rifiuto di speculazioni 'non scientifiche', si occupa di linguaggio nella prospettiva di una piu vasta teoria della conoscenza, recuperando l'istanza filosofica anco­ ra viva nel giudizio che Humboldt dava della comparazione nella memoria Ueber das vergleichende Sprachstudium del 1820: Ia comparazione appartie­ ne ad una piu ampia Sprachkunde che deve definire l'essenza del linguaggio umano in generale; lo studio delle lingue, della !oro storia e dei !oro princi­ pi costitutivi, non puo non concernere direttamente Ia riflessione antropo­ logica e gnoseologica. Steinthal sembra voler conciliare storia delle lingue e teoria generale o filosofia del linguaggio, raccogliendo l'eredita di Humboldt, soprattutto in

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campo tipologico, con uno schema di classificazione che ordina tutti i dati storico-descrittivi delle diverse lingue mediante criteri o principi generali. Questa relazione si propone di interpretare lo schema di Steinthal, non sen­ za pen) aver prima discusso dei suoi principi e del problema teorico e meto­ dologico che ne e alia fonte: Ia concezione della lil)gua come forma e come organo formativo del pensiero.

L'unica eccezione all'insufficienza delle tipologie e l'ipotesi di classifi­ cazione suggerita da Humboldt, un tentativo da rivalutare e criticare nello stesso tempo perche corretto e Jegittimo nelle intenzioni, rna sostanzial­ mente errato nei risultati. Dalla critica alia classificazione di Humboldt, Steinthal trae Je conclusioni necessarie a definire due nuove classi tipologi­ che, Ia classe delle lingue 'con forma' (Formsprachen) e Ia classe delle lin­ gue 'senza forma' (formlose Sprachen), che non corrispondono alia riparti­ zione morfologica: le lingue 'con forma' comprendono sia !a flessione in­ doeuropea, sia le lingue semitiche, che determinano grammaticalmente le radici consonantiche mediante Je vocali, sia l'egizio-copto, che pure usa il procedimento di semplice 'annessione' (Anfii.gung) delle particelle gramma­ ticali, sia infine una lingua palesemente isolante come il cinese; analoga­ mente, le lingue 'senza forma' comprendono sia le lingue isolanti indocine­ si, sia i vari gradi di annessione dei monemi realizzati dalle lingue polinesia­ ne, uralo-altaiche e americane. Ma il vero fine della critica di Steinthal e Ia rivalutazione eli quegli aspetti del pensiero humboldtiano che rendono possibile una teoria generale del linguaggio ed una corretta spiegazione della diversitit storica delle Jin­ gue. II concetto di 'forma' della tipologia di Steinthal deriva direttamente, infatti, dall'approccio strutturale a! problema della 'essenza' del linguaggio, che gia in Humboldt ha un importante risvolto epistemologico nel tentativo di definizione degli scopi della linguistica e nella conseguente diversificazio­ ne dei livelli di analisi. Sara dunque proprio Ia critica ad Humboldt il nostro punto di partenza nell'interpretazione dello schema tipologico di Steinthal e del problema della forma linguistica che ne e l'origine.

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Lo schema appare per Ia prima volta in un breve studio del 1850, Die Classification der Sprachen, dargestellt als die Entwicklung der Sprachidee, ristampato dieci anni dopo con nuovi capitoli e un nuovo titolo, Charakte­ ristik der hauptsiichlichsten Typen des Sprachbaues. Nel 1860 Steinthal ag­ giunge anche una dettagliata descrizione morfologica e grammaticale di diverse lingue e famiglie linguistiche: cinese, indonesiano (rappresentato dal siamese e dal birmano), polinesiano (maleo-daiacco) , altaico (jacutico), americana (messicano e groenlandese), egizio-copto, semitico (arabo), indoeuropeo (greco e tedesco); rna nell'una e nell'altra edizione Ia parte centrale e dedicata ai principi generali della classificazione: precisa sud­ divisione di compiti tra le discipline afferenti il linguaggio, problema della sua origine, rapporto tra grammatica e logica (o tra linguaggio e pensiero) , funzione del linguaggio nel processo della conoscenza, dalla semplice cos­ cienza sensibile animate al concetto astratto. Temi ai quali Steinthal sembra tenere piu che alia classificazione vera e propria, affidata, negli anni succes­ sivi, alia rielaborazione di Franz Misteli (1841-1903). Del definitivo Abriss der Sprachwissenschaft, che comprende anche una nuova descrizione dei tipi caratteristici, Steinthal fara uscire a suo nome nel 1871 solo il primo vol­ ume con il titolo Die Sptache im Allgemeinen. Einleitung in die PsychoIogie und Sprachwissenschaft, mentre il secondo, Charakteristik der haupt­ siichlichsten Typen des Sprachbaues, appare nel 1893 a nome di Misteli. D'altra parte, gilt nella rassegna delle precedenti tipologie, da Adelung a Humboldt, Steinthal lascia chiaramente intendere che il maggior limite della classificazione delle lingue in tipi morfologici, o, come dice August Friedrich Pott (1802-1887), 'fisiologici' , e cioe flessivo (analitico e sinteti­ co), agglutinante, incorporante e isolante, consiste nell'assenza di una piu ampia riflessione sulla natura del linguaggio umano che possa fornire il vero criteria della classificazione; poiche nessuno, ne August Wilhelm von Schlegel (1767-1845) ne Friedrich von Schlegel (1772-1829), ne Bopp, ne Pott sembra sottrarsi a questa lacuna, occorre senz'altro definire i principi generali di nuove classi piu adeguate in cui ridistribuire i tipi morfologici tradizionali. 2.

Nel primo volume dell'Abriss (1871), che riprende le tesi della Cha­ rakteristik, deli' Ursprung der Sprache (1a ed. 1851) e della Grammatik, Lo­ gik und PsychoIogie, ihre Prinzipien und ihr Verhiiltnis zueinander del 1855, Steinthal definisce Ia classificazione come quella parte della allgemeine Sprachlehre o Sprachphilosophie che ha il compito di mediare tra Jo studio del Wesen der Sprache ("es ist bier die Frage: was ist die Sprache iiber­ haupt? wie ist sie geworden? welches sind ihre constitutiven Elemente? was leistet sie dem Geiste?") e Ia besondere Sprachlehre che studia "die wirklich von den Viilkern geschaffenen Sprachformen", Je diverse grammatiche par­ ticolari delle lingue storiche (1871 :29-30). La classificazione deve unire le singole 'grammatiche' in un quadro riassuntivo del patrimonio linguistico dell'umanitit, superando l'astrattezza dello studio generale con il costante riferimento alia realtit storica (ed evolutiva) delle diverse lingue nazionali. 3.

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Si potranno cosi conciliare i dati empirici dello studio storico con i 'principi generali' del linguaggio, realizzando il progetto di Humboldt, sen­ za incorrere nelle inestricabili contraddizioni che avevano condizionato la riuscita del suo tentativo. Contraddizioni nate soprattutto dalle considera­ zioni teoriche generali che Humboldt vuole trarre dalle sue 'geniali' analisi dei piu diversi fenomeni storici (Steinthal 1888: 106): per Steinthal, nella teoria di Humboldt e ancora troppo vivo il logicismo della grammatica clas­ sica, che ha eletto a categoric universali categoric grammaticali caratteristi­ che solo di alcune lingue (1860:72), e che induce a 'misurare' il grado di perfezione delle lingue storico-naturali nell'espressione delle forme logiche del pensie�o. Da qui il limite della sua classificazione, riassunta da Steinthal nello schema n . 1 (1860:70):

Consideriamo innanzi tutto il problema del metoda. Abbiamo detto delle contraddizioni di Humboldt. A ben vedere, cio che Steinthal rimpro­ vera ad Humboldt non e tanto d'aver parlato in modo contraddittorio del linguaggio, quanta piuttosto di non aver risolto le contraddizioni insite nella sua stessa natura dopo averle brillantemente portate alia luce. Da una par­ te, il linguaggio e patrimonio comune di tutta la specie umana: quindi, uni­ ta; dall'altra, si manifesta sempre in diverse lingue nazionali, opera dei di­ versi popoli che le parlano: dunque, pur se interpretata geneticamente , di­ versita. Il linguaggio, di piu, e evidentemente attivita, parlare, em!rgeia; rna e anche qualcosa di gia prodotto da altri, un t!rgon che condiziona e deter­ mina l'attivita linguistica del singolo. Si tratta allora di un condizionato pro­ cesso riproduttivo, comprensibile solo diversificando l'analisi del livello di­ namico del parlare individuale dal livello piu statico (rna anch'esso soggetto a trasformazione nel tempo) del parlare della comunita, fissato nelle lingue nazionali. La vera 'essenza' empirica del linguaggio consiste nella continua tensione tra atto linguistico individuale e forme storiche delle diverse lin­ gue. Ma anche se il fine principale dell'analisi linguistica e l'interazione tra atto e risultato del parlare, e necessaria trattare i diversi livelli secondo cri­ teri piu adeguati a ciascuno di essi. Pertanto, l'intuizione di Humboldt deve essere sviluppata in un sistema scientifico di concetti molto piu precise. Come nota, Steinthal riprende la distinzione di Karl Wilhelm Ludwig Heyse (1797-1855) tra Menschensprache, Volkssprache e Reden des einzel­ nen Menschen (Bumann 1965:23). Caratteristica peculiare della specie umana e la Sprachfiihigkeit, Ia physiologische Kraft di produrre suoni arti­ colati per esprimere un 'contenuto' ( Gehalt) interiore. Ciascun individuo esercita questa facolta mediante singoli atti o gegenwiirtige Handlungen producendo Sprachmaterial, elementi riproducibili ogniqualvolta si intende esprimere lo stesso contenuto. L'insieme di tutto lo Sprach'material caratte­ ristico di un popolo costituisce eine Sprache o die einzelne Sprache, la deter­ minata lingua nazionale o storico-naturale (Steinthal 1855: 137-38). Lo studio della Sprachfdhigkeit e di competenza della fisiologia e della psicologia: la posizione di Steinthal nel movimento che diffonde in Germa­ nia una lettura psicologica della critica trascendentale di Kant, e in partico­ lare dello schematismo, e argomento complesso, cui si puo qui solo accen­ nare (cf. Poggi 1977:546-60). In ogni caso, questa livello di analisi concerne la potenzialita fisiobiologica della specie umana di esprimere suoni articola­ ti e di progredire mediante il linguaggio dalla semplice percezione sensibile al pensiero astratto .

A)

B)

Lingue piii imperfette

Lingue piii perfette

a)

lingue a particelle senza espressioni caratterizzanti il verbo

maleo-polinesiaco birmano

b)

lingue pronominali che caratterizzano verbo mediante pronomi affissi

lingue iimericane

a)

isolanti

cinese

b)

flessive

a) b)

semitico indoeuropeo

Schema 1

E' gia stato mostrato come in realta questo schema sia una costruzione di Steinthal (Coseriu 1976:161-63) che non rende giustizia alia tipologia di Humboldt, niolto meno Iigida in quanto priva di classi vere e proprie . Ma la critica di Steinthal e ugualmente importante perche evidenzia due problemi piu generali, strettamente correlati, presenti nella ricerca di Humboldt: la specificazione del livello di analisi linguistica su cui basare una possibile tipologia e l'elaborazione di una compiuta teoria semantica, senza la quale e impossibile definire la natura, 0 la struttura generale, delle lingue piu diverse.

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Psicologica e anche l'analisi del parlare individuate, sottoposto per Stein thai alle leggi che regolano i rapporti tra le rappresentazioni psichiche; di nuovo, si tratta di un'interpretazione linguistica della psicologia herbar­ tiana, di grande interesse per una teoria della comprensione e per lo studio dei rapporti tra atto individuate e trasformazione diacronica (cf. Steinthai 1860a; Christy 1983:64-71). E' compito infine della ricerca storica e della filologia esaminare le for­ me dello Sprachmaterial prodotte dai diversi popoli, il risultato pili imme­ . diato della vita spirituale delle comunita umane. Dunque proprio le Volks­ sprachen costituiscono l'oggetto della comparazione e della classificazione. Ma Ia classificazione delle Volkssprachen deve tener conto della totali­ ta unitaria che esse costituiscono in quanto universale concreto, insieme og­ gettivo delle forme spirituali prodotte dall'umanita o Sprachidee. La Sprachidee di Steinthal e un concetto che risente dell'influsso del particolare hegelismo di Heyse, che in der Substanz der Hegelschen Philosophic lebend, aber sie beherr� schend, [ . . . ] erstrebt in der Philosophic die Vers6hnung des abstracten Allgemeinen mit den empirischen Besonderheiten, urn so ein concretes Allgemeinen zu gewinnen" (Steinthal !860:75):

si tratta di un hegelismo il cui concetto dominante non e quello dello spirito assoluto e del sistema compiuto, rna il concetto dello spirito oggettivo, dello sviluppo fenomenologico delle diverse forme di cultura e civilta realizzate dallo spirito nella storia. Cib che accomuna le diverse lingue nella Sprachi­ dee di Steinthal e Ia definizione humboldtiana del linguaggio umano in ge­ nerate come bildendes Organ des Gedanken, condizione genetica essenzia­ le della costruzione del mondo rappresentativo: in questi termini, il fine vero della classificazione non pub per Steinthal che essere senz'altro etno­ psicologico. Come Ia sua Volkerpsychologie (ancor pili che psicologia socia­ le, vera e propria antropologia generale) studia Ia diversita delle forme so­ ciali e culturali umane, Ia classificazione ricostruisce attraverso Ia diversita della struttura morfologica Ia diversita di costruzione del mondo rappresen­ tativo realizzato da ciascun popolo nella sua lingua. Questa "morfologia dello spirito" non pub prescindere da una compiuta definizione dei rapporti tra linguaggio e pensiero, e dalla considerazione strutturale della forma pe­ culiare di ciascuna lingua.

COMPARAZIONE E CLASSIFICAZIONE IN STEINTHAL 5.

269

Humboldt, ricorda Steinthal (1860: 32), ha scoperto durch die empirische Betrachtung der einzelnen Sprachen [ . . . ] , daB jede eine ganz eigentiimliche, die Eigentiimlichkeit des sie redenden Volkes ge­ treu abspiegelnde Form habe, - che ogni lingua e - ein System, nach welchem der Geist den Laut mit dem Gedanken verkniipft.

Certo, Humboldt attribuisce diverso valore ai vari 'sistemi'. La sua classifi­ cazione tiene conto del diverso influsso degli Sprachsystemen sullo spirito dei popoli per mostrare quale ne incrementa lo sviluppo, e quale lo ostaco­ la. Ma !'idea di fondo resta valida: Ia classificazione delle Volkssprachen pub aver luogo solo considerando ciascuna di esse come un 'organismo', un insieme sistematico di elementi significanti correlati tra !oro e formati secondo un principio unitario. La prospettiva sincronica dell'organismo of­ fre a Steinthal la possibilita di conciliare Ia diversita storica delle lingue con Ia teoria generale della struttura linguistica, attribuendo di pili all'analisi una precisa valenza gnoseologica. La concezione del linguaggio come 'orga­ no formative del pensiero' , se evita di confinare le lingue a semplice espres­ sione di un identico contenuto logico, richiede necessariamente una ade­ guata teoria semantica che possa mostrare il ruolo essenziale del linguaggio stesso nell'attivita intellettuale. Per Steinthal, come per Humboldt (Barba 1986:1 1-19), una lingua consiste nella forma conferita a! suono articolato a! fine di distinguere e for­ mare il contenuto rappresentativo del pensiero, cosi che i rapporti sistema­ tid tra le diverse combinazioni di suoni esistono in funzione dei rapporti si­ stematici tra le rappresentazioni. La forma peculiare di ciascuna lingua, che l'analisi comparativa ricostruisce dal punto di vista storico-evolutivo, Ia teo­ ria giustifica dal punto di vista strutturale, e Ia classificazione analizza dal punto di vista dei suoi rapporti con altre lingue, risulta dal rapporto tra Lautform e innere Sprachform, tra Ia forma esterna conferita alia materia fonica nella distinzione ed espressione del contenuto intellettuale e Ia forma interna, il complesso sistematico di concetti e di forme rappresentative di­ stinto dalla forma del suono articolato. La diversita della forma linguistica, che comprende tanto Ia Lautform quanto Ia innere Sprachform (Steinthal 1855:xxii), non e solo diversita della 'tecnica' di costruzione delle grammati­ che mediante mezzi fonetici (1860:8), bensl innanzi tutto diversitii dei fini raggiunti mediante le Lautformen, e cioe Ia diversita dei modi in cui i popoli costruiscono il !oro mondo rappresentativo mediante l'analisi linguistica delle intuizioni (1860:104). La classificazione deve considerare dunque an-

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che Ia forma interna, ed avere un principio 'interne' e semantico da affian­ care al criterio morfologico.

Poiche si realizza mediante l'uso del suono articolato, il processo di formazione e distinzione delle rappresentazioni, come appare nella pro­ spettiva genetica della psicologia della coscienza, e di natura intrinsecamen­ te linguistico. La scelta dei suoni significanti non e pen) convenzionale o in­ tenzionale: Ia produzione dei suoni e un "movimento riflesso" della psiche in trasformazione che collega "istintivamente", senza riflettere, una intui­ zione data a tutte quelle rappresentate dallo stesso contrassegno distintivo. Allo stesso modo, Ia psiche non sa di essere essa stessa all'origine delle rap­ presentazioni che stanno per le intuizioni. Le cose autonomamente formate sono proiettate all'esterno, e le appaiono come cose reali. L'autocoscienza che forma le rappresentazioni e in realta 'autocoscienza istintiva' (in�tinctives Selbstbewuf3tsein; Steinthal [1855:295-306]). II suono dunque e senz'altro segno materiale ("korperliches Zeichen", "sinnlicher Anhaltspunkt" [1855:303]) di un contenuto intuitive, di un si­ gnificate (Bedeutung), rna il riferimento avviene necessariamente mediante una rappresentazione caratteristica di una specie di intuizioni, di una forma interna costituita dall'intuizione dell'intuizione, astraendo un determinate particolare della percezione. Di conseguenza, Ia psiche nota dell'intuizione solo cib che Ia forma interna distinta dalla forma esterna mette in evidenza: "die Anschauung erhalt [ . . . ] our den Werth, den der Laut von ihr verkiin­ det'' (1855:311). Nella ricostruzione genetica della trasformazione dell'intuizione in rap­ presentazione, Steinthal attribuisce un ruolo importante all'cinomatopea. Non si tratta perb di una riproduzione intenzionale di un'impressione sensi­ bile mediante i suoni. La 'analogia' tra l'intuizione e il suono prodotto da un movimento riflesso degli organi fonatori e condizionata dalle leggi sog­ gettive della percezione, che e gia formazione spontanea del dato stimolo esterno (1855:259-64; 312). In ogni caso, Ia forma interna assume immediatamente il valore di con­ trassegno antonomastico di tutte le intuizioni possibili di uno stesso oggetto costituito, e, qual che sia Ia sua origine, sparisce dalla coscienza. Nella di­ mensione reale dell'uso delle lingue noi non partiamo dalle intuizioni per distinguere delle rappresentazioni, rna comprendiamo le cose guidati dalle parole, dal sistema semantico che risulta dalla stratificazione nel tempo dei diversi modi di denotazione impiegati dalle comunita etniche e nazionali nel corso della !oro storia. Indubbiamente, entro certi Iimiti, l'etimologia pub ricostruire Ia storia della formazione della materia intuitiva delle rappresentazioni attraverso Ia

La psicologia del linguaggio di Steinthal, parte di quella composita cor­ rente di studi che con Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841), Theodor Fechner (1801-1887), Hermann Lotze (1817-1881), Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-1894) e Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) culmina nella fondazione del­ la psicologia scientifica nella seconda meta del XIX secolo, interessa gli sto­ rici del pensiero linguistico non solo per i rapporti, non privi di contrasti, con Hermann Paul (1846-1921) ed il positivismo della scuola neogrammati­ ca, rna anche per una ricostruzione dello sviluppo delle idee di 'segno', 'si­ gnificate', 'rappresentazione', nonche di 'forma simbolica' nel senso di Cas­ sirer: dal concetto humboldtiano di 'forma interna' Steinthal elabora auto­ nomamente una teoria della funzione rappresentativa del linguaggio. Senza il linguaggio, l'uomo resterebbe al livello della semplice cono­ scenza sensibile animale, che non oltrepassa lo stadio dell'intuizione. Sebbe­ ne l'intuizione sia gia, in una certa misura, una produzione spontanea, per­ che guidata dalla capacita dei sensi di percepire in una forma determinata gli stimoli esterni, essa resta vincolata alia presenza di lin 'dato' , di un 'questo-qui' empirico. L'intuizione, sintetica, consiste solo di un complesso di percezioni dei sensi, inanalizzato neUe sue parti e incomunicabile, in quanto prodotto esclusivo dell'individuo in immediate contatto con il dato esterno. Ma Ia psiche (See/e) pub intuire Ia stessa intuizione, isolare una delle percezioni che formano il complesso intuitive, ed elevarla a contrassegno (Merkmal) caratteristico del tutto associandovi dei suoni articolati. In questo nuovo atto spontaneo della psiche Ia coscienza di qualcosa di deter­ minate si trasforma in autocoscienza, nella rappresentazione di un'intuizio­ ne mediante un solo particolare arbitrariamente astratto dall'insieme delle diverse percezioni sensibili. II rapporto diretto con un oggetto esterno non sara piu necessario per produrre una risposta della coscienza: l'intuizione diventa rappresentazione (Vorstellung) di una cosa stabile, identificabile e riconoscibile a prescindere dalla infinita serie di determinazioni intuitive ca­ ratteristiche, spesso irripetibili nella dimensione spaziale e temporale. In al­ tri termini, rappresenteremo sempre un universale, una specie, mediante un solo particolare che rende identico cib che per l'intuizione sensibile pub essere anche infinitamente diverse. 6.

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COMPARAZIONE E CLASSIFICAZIONE IN STEINTHAL

forma della materia fonica, seguendo anche le affinita o le parentele di lin­ gue della stessa famiglia (1855:313-14). Ma, di fatto , ciascun parlante ha sempre dinanzi a se un prodotto determinato, che, pur se destinato a tra­ sformarsi nel tempo, puo essere solo appreso nello sviluppo dell'intelligenza e delle capacita cognitive e sociali.

rapporti in cui alcune di esse ne appercepiscono delle altre. In questo pro­ cesso (evidentemente, entro certi limiti, creativo) le rappresentazioni si sus­ seguono in serie associative lineari, perch6, per Steinthal come per Her­ bart, Ia coscienza e solo una parte della psiche, ed e troppo 'stretta' per contenerle tutte nello stesso istante. Senza dubbio, Ia dinamica delle rappresentazioni linguistiche e per Steinthal solo una delle forme dell'attivita psichica e dell'appercezione. Le serie associative di rappresentazioni si susseguono incessantemente nella psiche dell'individuo, dinamica per definizione, regolando i processi pili di­ versi, anche quelli in apparenza elementari, come riconoscere un volto dopo anni o trovare una chiave tra varie altre, tutti, in realta, molto com­ plessi. Steinthal afferma chiaramente che nella fenomenologia della co­ scienza vi e una buona parte di attivita psichica che non dipende direttamen­ te dal linguaggio, che una serie di funzioni del sistema nervoso centrale e periferico prescindono dalle parole (1871 :48-60). Eppure, a! pensiero rap­ presentativo linguistico, che prepara Jo sviluppo del pensiero Jogico astratto senza poi identificarsi con esso, egli conferisce uno status privilegiato, senz'altro superiore a qualsiasi forma di pensiero intuitivo sia dal punto di vista genetico sia dal punto di vista funzionale. L'attivita intellettuale vera e propria e possibile solo con Ia formazione dell'intuizione in una Vorstel­ lungswelt, mediante il sistema semantico delle lingue storiche che distingue 'cose', 'sostanze', 'attivit3.', 'attributi', un soggetto 'id e un 'non-io' in modo diverso, e che in modo altrettanto diverso attribuisce funzioni specifi­ che aile rappresentazioni nell'appercezione. La costruzione di rapporti appercettivi tra rappresentazioni e dunque condizionata dalla forma interna delle Jingue. In altri termini, Ia vera fun­ zione appercettiva della forma interna, che esprime l'essenza stessa del lin­ guaggio, non si riferisce tanto all'atto convenzionalista del denominare o alia designazione di singole rappresentazioni, bensi alia coerenza interna del sistema di associazioni delle Vorstellungen nell'analisi linguistica dell'in­ tuizione, a! modo di costruzione che, di conseguenza, e J'oggetto principale della classificazione.

7. Nella prospettiva sincronica dell'organismo Je diverse lingue umane costituiscono altrettanti sistemi rappresentativi spontanei, soggettivi, che creano un mondo originale di oggetti e relazioni. L'intuizione dell'intuizio­ ne, o rappresentazione, o Jinguaggio, e un'attivita formativa che articola il complesso intuitivo in elementi distinti e crea nuovi rapporti tra Je parti. Come Je singole rappresentazioni, anche Ia !oro composizione non e una semplice copia del complesso intuitivo percepito, bensi un'operazione spontanea, "Sache der Subjektivitiit" (1860:87). In pratica, Je lingue scelgo­ no quali rapporti fondare tra Je rappresentazioni in base alia !oro forma ca­ ratteristica. II concetto di forma, principio di strutturazione della materia fonica e della materia sematica in un insieme organico, non concerne solo Ia Wortbildung, Ia formazione di rappresentazioni distinte, bensi anche quella che Humboldt definiva Redefugung, Ia concatenazione dei complessi di suoni articolati nella catena par!ata. In effetti, gia in Humboldt il concetto di 'discorso' (Rede) , vero risulta­ to della determinazione formale della materia fonica in unita significanti, tendeva a superare i confini tradizionali tra lessico e grammatica, tra i concetti di 'parola' e 'frase' (cf. Borsche 1981:225-55). La 'meccanica psi­ chica' di origine herbartiana che Steinthal pone a fondamento dei rapporti associativi tra le rappresentazioni offre nuovi elementi allo studio della for­ ma dell'enunciato e del contrasto tra Je unita Jinguistiche. Consideriamo intanto Ia natura del sistema di rappresentazioni che si presenta a! parlante come ergon determinato, da apprendere a poco a poco. Esso filtra il rapporto con il mondo della percezione attraverso una serie di forme che si appercepiscono reciprocamente. L'appercezione, in cui culmi­ na !a trasformazione dei processi elementari della percezione, e un nuovo processo dinamico sottoposto aile Jeggi psicologiche dei rapporti tra le rap­ presentazioni: "Apperception definiren wir [ . . . ] als die Bewegung zweier Vorstel!ungsmassen gegen einander zur Erzeugung einer Erkenntniss" (1871:171). Le rappresentazioni, pur se gia formate e distinte come pro­ dotto storico, non solo si dispongono sempre in molteplici combinazioni di­ verse, rna inducono sempre a nuove produzioni, alia costruzione di nuovi

Seguendo il principio che in una lingua e elemento di forma interna cio che viene distinto mediante una forma esterna del suono articolato, Stein­ thai rileva una significativa diversita tra i vari sistemi semantici. In alcune Jingue, le forme rappresentative dell'intuizione espresse dal!e parole hanno un'ulteriore forma nella frase che presenta (darstellt) o esprime le serie as8.

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sociative ('sintagmatiche') di rappresentazioni. Esiste dunque una 'forma formate' della 'forma materiale' delle nippresentazioni che da !oro una fun­ zione specifica nell'appercezione. Aile lingue definite 'senza forma' man­ cherii proprio la forma 'formate': le parole si susseguiranno nella catena parlata senza alcuna distinzione di funzione specifica, o , se qualche funzio­ ne sara distinta, essa sara indicata da elementi di forma 'materiale', imme­ diatamente riferiti ad un significato intuitivo riconoscibile, e congiunti in una parola. Le lingue con forma, invece, hanno elementi espressivi che de­ terminano la forma delle rappresentazioni materiali senza alcun riferimento alla forma del contenuto intuitivo. Appare chiaro che l'oggetto della classificazione di Steinthal e la forma della grammatica, ricondotta alla storicita della forma interna e alla funzio­ ne rappresentativa del linguaggio in generate. I concetti di 'forma' e 'mate­ ria' sono qui riferiti alla definizione delle categorie grammaticali: la distin­ zione tra rappresentazione 'formate' e 'materiale' con cui Steinthal classifi­ ca le lingue non concerne la natura delle parole, bensl la forma del giudizio espresso dal modo di costruzione della frase. Certamente, Steinthal parla di 'materia' (Stoff) e 'forma' (Form) anche a proposito delle singole parole. Una rappresentazione linguistica e sempre 'materiale' in quanto riferita ad un aspetto percettivo del contenuto, riferi­ mento concreto particolarmente evidente quando, ad esempio, una lingua esprime un plurale con una parola che significa 'molti', o una preposizione con un sostantivo che significa 'schiena' (1860:317). Ma significato "concre­ to" o materiale e significato 'astratto' o formate sono determinazioni fluide, che dipendono dall'evoluzione e trasformazione storica del patrimonio se­ mantico delle lingue. L'uso puo trasformare in astratto un significato con­ creto: e il caso delle preposizioni indoeuropee, o anche della forma messi­ cana tlan, passata dal significato originario di "testa" a quello pili astratto di 'su, sopra' (1860:318). In realtii, tutto cio che in una lingua ha una Lautform e una forma (in­ terna) data spontaneamente al contenuto intuitivo, e costituisce il significa­ to. La forma interna o Ia rappresentazione non "denomina" una cosa, rna costituisce la cosa in un giudizio, sussumendo un particolare, l'intuizione data, sotto un universale, l'insieme di tutte le altre intuizioni rappresentate dalla stessa specie. La predicazione del giudizio e gia presente in enunciati composti di una sola parola, come mostra l'apprendimento del linguaggio nella prima infanzia: enunciati come 'pane', 'Carlo' sono giii articolati in un subjectum costituito e in un predicato costitutivo, anche se qui il subjectum non ha espre$sione linguistica perche corrisponde alla determinata intuizio-

ne spazio-temporale di un dato o all'intuizione empirica che il parlante ha di se stesso. Da cio consegue innanzi tutto che l'unica origine delle parole consiste nella funzione rappresentativa, e che nessuna delle 'parti del discorso' tradi­ zionali e veramente necessaria (e universale) per la formazione linguistica dell'intuizione. Per Steinthal, il problema dell'origine verbale o nominate delle parole non sussiste: la rappresentazione linguistica non e in origine ne nome ne verbo, ne Dingwort ne Thiitigkeitswort, bensi essenzialmente Merkmalswort, denotazione di un tratto del contenuto intuitivo eletto a rappresentante di una classe generate di intuizioni empiriche diverse, rico­ nosciute, da quel momento in poi, come la stessa cosa. Come la parola 'crea' la cosa (esprimendone percio, dicono giustamente i mistici, l'essen­ za), cosl si distingue 'la qualitii', l'attivitii', e ogni altra possibile determina­ zione: si tratta sempre di 'parole-schema' che rendono possibile la forma­ zione dell'intuizione empirica mediante una classe arbitraria, astratta dai ri­ sultati della percezione (1855:318-30). Il rapporto diretto tra intuizione e rappresentazione e pero un caso li­ mite molto particolare. Di norma, il linguaggio funziona in modo diverso. La forma interna delle lingue storiche non consiste di rappresentazioni che valgono come "Abbreviatur" dell'intuizione, bensl di rappresentazioni che, in se, sono solo un 'posto vuoto', riempito, determinato in rapporto ad altre rappresentazioni. La frase vera e propria esprime un giudizio pili com­ plesso, in cui non si sussume un'intuizione sotto una rappresentazione, ma una rappresentazione sotto un'altra rappresentazione (1855:334-35). Ri­ spetto a questo giudizio di determinazione tra rappresentazioni, tutte le for­ me linguistiche (interne, e dunque anche esterne) sono materia, Stoffwor­ ter: sostanze o sostantivi, verbi o attivita, qualitii o aggettivi, avverbi, pro­ nomi (o le forme dell'intuizione empirica dell'io del parlante e, da qui, dell'ascoltatore; cf. Stein thai [1855:363]). In alcune lingue, come le indoeu­ ropee, esse appaiono ulteriormente formate in categorie grammaticali che segnalano funzioni specifiche. Ma il giudizio di determinazione tra rappre­ sentazioni puo aver luogo anche senza distinguere il nome dal verbo, il sog­ getto dal predicato: una rappresentazione che funge in un caso particolare come subjectum di una predicazione non deve essere necessariamente espressa da un soggetto grammaticale. In altri termini, la nostra costruzione 'soggetto + verba' puo corrispondere in altre lingue ad una successione di forme indifferenziate dal punto di vista della funzione grammaticale, ad una semplice successione di forme (dell'intuizione) senza forma (delle stesse rappresentazioni).

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Ovviamente, lo studio comparative non potrit non rilevare le differen­ ze tra i sistemi peculiari delle varie lingue. Alcune di esse formano ulterior­ mente le rappresentazioni mediante altre rappresentazioni espresse da Lautformen che hanno solo la funzione grammaticale: e il caso della flessio­ ne indoeuropea, rna anche· del vocalismo semitico. Altre lingue determina­ no le rappresentazioni mediante rappresentazioni che, pur se agglutinate aile precedenti, non oltrepassano Io stadio degli Stoffworter senza forma, perche appaiono come semplici forme del contenuto intuitivo senza ulterio­ ri distinzioni. Una lingua come Ia mongolica avril solo in apparenza delle forme che possono tradurre il nostro verbo: in realtit, le forme che denota­ no il decorio di un'azione, distinto da un essere che permane, saranno al­ trettanti 'nomi', sorta di participi cui si aggiunge un pronome personate: in­ vece di 'amo', 'ami', si dira piuttosto 'io amante', 'tu amante' e cosi via. II mongolico, lingua altaica, e per Steinthal un caso interessante perch€ fa parte di quelle lingue 'senza forma' che non Iasciano tutti gli elementi isolati, e che seguono dunque un criterio di congiunzione delle parti. Tali lingue possono dare l'impressione di distinguere, con l'uso, delle funzioni diverse. Ma anche se traduciamo alcune !oro forme con il nostro verbo, ed altre con dei sostantivi, si tratta solo di una distinzione intuitiva (che concerne solo il contenuto o il significate) tra la rappresentazione di un'azione e la rappresentazione di qualcosa che permane, una differenza cosi rilevante da impedire di determinare una proprietit mediante una rap­ presentazione che determina un movimento. Cosi, anche se le unitit aggluti­ nate saranno in distribuzione complementare, avremo sempre delle deter­ minazioni formali realizzate "von Seiten der materiellen Bedeutung", o del­ le forme, che "nur die materielle Bedeutsamkeit betreffen" (1860:325-26). Tutte le lingue 'senza forma' sono quelle che non formano ulterior­ mente gli Stoffworter nella costruzione di rapporti sintagmatici di rappre­ sentazioni. Questo criterio di classificazione 'psicologico', cioe semantico e sincronico perch€ riferito alia forma interna e al sistema di rappresentazioni peculiare di ciascuna lingua, si esprime nella Gestalt che le parole assumono nella combinazione appercettiva di rappresentazioni. E' giusto considerare il criterio morfologico nella classificazione, perch€ anche nella forma ester­ na consiste la capacitit delle lingue di costituirsi come sistema dato che si impone al parlante con Ia 'forza' (Macht) e l'autoritit del prodotto storico. Ma il vero principio della Nebensetzung o giustapposizione isolante delle rappresentazioni, della Anfiigung o 'annessione', e della Anbildung o 'trasformazione organica' della parola e interno e semantico (1860:319).

10. II criterio 'psicologico' e il criterio 'morfologico' permettono di classificare la peculiare Form delle Volkssprachen (risultato del rapporto tra Lautform e innere Sprachform) nello schema n . 2:

276 9.

A.

Lingue senza forma

1.

giustapponenti

2.

modificanti

A.

Lingue con forma

1.

giustapponenti

2.

modificanti

I.

Lingue indocinesi Lingue polinesiane

a)

che esprimono le determinazioni del contenuto con raddoppiamento e prefissi

II.

b)

che esprimono le determinazioni del contenuto mediante elementi posposti alia radice

III.

Lingue uralo� altaiche

c)

che esprimono relazioni e determinazioni del contenuto mediante incorporazioni

IV.

Lingue americane

v.

a)

mediante semplice annessione (Anfugung) degli elementi grammaticali

b)

mediante alterazione (Wandel) interna della radice

c)

mediante suffissi veri e propri Schema 2

Cinese

VI. Egizio copto

VII. Semitico

VIII. lndoeuropeo

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Da rilevare Ia classificazione del cinese tra le lingue 'con forma'. Seb­ bene dal punto di vista morfologico sia una lingua isolante, il cinese distin­ gue le funzioni di soggetto e predicato mediante Ia posizione regolare as­ sunta dalle parole (in confronto all'indoeuropeo, semplici 'radici'), segna­ lando Ia formazione di una rappresentazione grammaticale distinta nella materia semantica. Per identificare e rappresentare le categorie sintattiche il cinese usa, potremmo dire, Ia posizione come elemento di forma dell'espressione, laddove le lingue flessive impiegano dei suoni articolati. Quanto aile altre classi, e innegabile lo status privilegiato che Steinthal riserva alia flessione indoeuropea Ira le altre lingue con forma. Le Sanskrit­ Sprachen sono le piu 'organizzate' nella distinzione di materia e forma delle rappresentazioni, le pili armoniche nell'articolazione di tutti i rapporti pro­ posizionali, le piu riuscite nel determinare il significato e l'eufonia delle Lautformen (1860:331). Ciononostante, non solo il complesso sistema grammaticale delle lin­ gue indoeuropee, con Ia sua ricca disfinzione di parti del discorso, di casi e di coniugazioni non pull essere considerato per Steinthal un universale logi­ co di espressione del pensiero, rna si mostra anche inadeguato a compren­ dere i peculiari sistemi semantici di rappresentazione distinti dalle lingue mediante Lautformen ed un caratteristico Typus des Sprachbaues. Si tratta di un risvolto storico-tipologico importante della sua teoria semantica, dell'interpretazione psicologica della forma interna di Humboldt e del concetto di rappresentazione: nella prospettiva di Steinthal lo studio com­ parativo delle Volkssprachen o dello Sprachmaterial e indissolubile dall'analisi del processo di espressione e comunicazione all'origine delle forme storiche del parlare, e da una teoria generale della comprensione fondata sulla peculiaritii strutturale dei sistemi di rappresentazione lingui­ stica. Se si e d'accordo con quest'assunto e difficile negare a Steinthal il meri­ to di aver colto e sviluppato subito, anche magari a costo di un certo isola­ menlo, il senso piu vero e profondo della ricerca di Humboldt.

Borsche, Tilman. 1981. Sprachansichten: Der Begriff der menschlichen Rede in der Sprachphilosophie Wilhelm von Humboldts. Stuttgart: Klett­ Cotta. Bumann, Waltraud. 1965. Die Sprachtheorie Heymann Steinthals: Darge­ stellt im Zusammenhang mit seiner Theorie der Geisteswissenschaften. Meisenheim am Glan: A. Hain. Christy, Craig. 1983. Uniformitarianism in Linguistics. (=Studies in the History ofLinguistics, 31.) Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Coseriu, Eugenio. 1976. "Sulla tipologia linguistica di Wilhelm von Hum­ boldt: Contributo alia critica della tradizione linguistica". Wilhelm von Humboldt nella cultura contemporanea a cura di Luigi Heilmann, 133164. Bologna: II Mulino. Heyse, Karl Wilhelm Ludwig. 1856. System der Sprachwissenschaft. Hrsg. von Heymann Steinthal. Berlin: Diimmler. Humboldt, Wilhelm von. 1820. Ober das vergleichende Sprachstudium in Beziehung auf die verschiedenen Epochen der Sprachentwicklung. Werke, a cura di Andreas Flitner e Klaus Giel. Vol. III (Schriften zur Sprachphilosophie), 1-25. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1963. Poggi, Stefano. 1977. I sistemi dell'esperienza: Psicologia, logica e teoria della scienza da Kant a Wundt. Bologna: II Mulino. Steinthal, Heymann. 1850. Die Classification der Sprachen, dargestellt als die Entwicklung der Sprachidee. Berlin: F. Diimmler. . 1855. Grammatik, Logik und Psychologie, ihre Prinzipien und ihr Verhiiltnis zueinander. Ibid. . 1860. Charakteristik der hauptsiichlichsten Typen des Sprachbaues. Ibid. 1860a. "Assimilation und Attraction, psychologisch beleuchtet". Zeitschrift fur Volkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft 1.93-179. . 1871. Abriss der Sprachwissenschaft. I. Teil: Die Sprache im Allge­ meinen. Einleitung in die Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft. Berlin: F. Diimmler. (2a ed. ampliata 1881.) . 1888. Der Ursprung der Sprache im Zusammenhange mit den letzen Fragen alles Wissens. 4a ed. Ibid. (1a ed. 1851).

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RIFERIMENTI BIBLIOGRAFICI

Barba, Mario. 1986. Forma della lingua e creativita in Humboldt ( = Lin­ guaggio alia 'Sapienza'; Serie 'ricerche', 4.) Roma: II Bagatto.

279

280

MARIO BARBA

SUMMARY

Heymann Steinthal's (1823-1899) typological studies bring together the history of l;mguages and the general theory of language with a classification scheme which orders all the descriptive and historical data by means of general principles. This paper presents Steinthal's scheme and discusses the problem at its source, namely, Wilhelm von Humboldt's (1767-1835) con­ ception of language as 'form' and formative organ of thought. For Steinthal, the different Weltansichten achieved by national languages are displayed not only in their semantic systems of single representations, but also in the structure of their grammars and in the way they construct syntagmatic and apperceptive relationships between one representation and another. According to Steinthal, the grammatical structure and the rules of syntax also depend on the diverse innere Form of languages as distinguished by means of the articulated sounds.

Comparatismo e grammatica comparata,

tipologia linguistica e forma grammaticale* Pierre Swiggers

N.F. W. O. , Louvain

sono diversi modi di indagare sulla storia - e le tipologie proposte dai filosofi, da Nietzsche (1874) fino a John Passmore (1967; Swiggers 1983:67-68), lo dimostrano a sufficienza. La riflessione storiografica nella sua applicazione alia linguistica (o a! pensiero linguistico) non puo limitarsi a cio che insegna o preconizza il manuale di metodologia storica di Langlois e Seignobos (1898; cf. Swiggers 1987): Ia ricostituzione del fatto storico. Lo stato di quest'ultimo e pure problematico, come hanno dimostrato le ricer­ che sulla storia delle scienze di Alexandre Koyre e di Thomas Kuhn (basti pensare alia nozione problematica di 'scoperta', Kuhn 1970:52-65). Piii in generale, i filosofi e gli storici delle scienze si sono accorti della secondarie­ tii (secondness nella terminologia di Peirce) dei fatti rispetto ai nuclei teorici - comunque siano chiamati: teorie, modelli, paradigmi, o formazioni dis­ corsive - e rispetto alia !oro materializzazione sociale (mi riferisco qui alia costituzione di cynosure (termine proposto da Hymes 1974), di gruppi so­ ciali (Merton 1968,1973; Mullins 1973; Murray 1983), di pratiche istituzio­ nali 0 accademiche, e di un mercato, Secondo Ia terminologia del Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1982; Chevalier & Encreve 1984). La nozione di 'comparatismo' offre un'illustrazione interessante di questa problematica complessa: non si puo negare che si sia costituito un tipo di formazione discorsiva centrata sulla comparazione di lingue, e che questa formazione discorsiva si sia ristretta cosi da formare un paradigma di ricerche nel secolo scorso. Ma Ia stessa strutturazione di quest'evoluzione 0.

Ci

Ringrazio Emilia Bonnanno e il mio collega Serge Vanvolsem per Ia correzione stilistica del mio testo.

f

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TIPOLOGIA LINGUISTICA E FORMA GRAMMATICALE

crea problemi: occorre andare piu in Iii dell'enumerazione di nomi e di tito­ li, e descrivere i parametri che organizzano la discussione e che, per la !oro dinamica interna, la fanno cambiare di statuto. Difatti, la questione essenziale che lo storico del pensiero linguistico (o della Sprachphilosophie nel senso di Coseriu [1970-72]) deve porsi nei confronti del comparatismo e questa: come si e passati dal comparatismo alia grammatica comparata? La datazione dell'apparizione di quest'ultima sembra porre pochi problemi: Antoine Meillet (1866-1936), nel suo Apen;u du developpement de Ia grammaire comparee (1937: Appendice I, 453-483), e categorico: "La grammaire comparee a ete creee au debut du XIXe siecle par les savants allemands et danois" (Meillet 1937:453; Swiggers 1985a:183-84). Sarebbe infondato accusare il maestro francese di miopia storica: il Meillet e conscio della lunga preistoria che risale ai papiri greci (Schmitt 1977:9-11; Wouters 1979:213-14, 283-97) dove sono raffrontate forme grammaticali di diversi dialetti, e il cui culmine si trova nell'epistolario a proposito dei rapporti fra il sanscrito e le lingue europee (Gaston Laurent Coeurdoux [1695-1780], William Jones [1746-1794], Paolino da S. Bartolomeo [1748-1806]),' rna qui non si tratta di grammatica comparata. II criterio decisivo e quello del metodo - che permette di separare !a grammatica comparata dal com­ paratismo, e non e sorprendente che il primo capitolo dell' Introduction di Meillet sia dedicato a! metodo della grammatica comparata. La grammatica comparata si inserisce nel contesto delle "recherches methodiques que le XlXe siecle a instituees sur le developpement historique des faits naturels et sociaux" (Meillet 1937:456) .2 La grammatica comparata corrisponde allora a una formazione discorsiva (nel senso di Michel Foucault), in quanto si focalizza su un tema (l'inferenza, tratta da similitudini, che va verso l'ammissione di una parentela attestata dai rapporti storici), e in quanto permette una discussione sulle tecniche di descrizione. Dunque: quali sono i componenti di questa formazione discorsiva? La questione mi sembra essere importante, perche rispondendovi si potra indicare cio che separa !a grammatica comparata dal 'comparatismo' che la precede. Distinguo tre componenti (legati intimamente) nella grammatica comparata:

corrisponde a un aspetto del problema generale della comparazione (di lin­ gue) , e della giustificazione stessa della !oro descrizione comparativa.

(1) (2) (3)

la nozione di 'forma grammaticale'; la nozione di 'tipo linguistico' e !a nozione di 'mutamenti sistematici' come transizioni.

Nel seguito i!lustrero ciascuno di questi componenti, indicando !a !oro portata (potenza), interdipendenza e maturazione storica. Ciascuno di essi

283

La nozione di 'forma grammaticale' corrisponde al problema del para­ metro di comparazione: che cosa si deve (o si pub) comparare, quando si giustappongono delle lingue? II comparatismo del Cinquecento, del Seicen­ to e del Settecento, benche riconosca la possibilita di una segmentaz10ne piu raffinata (mi riferisco qui aile osservazioni sulle corrispondenze fra 'suo: ni' (cognatio litterarum), si riduce alia comparaz10ne d1 parole (d1 lessem1 costituiti): numerali (come negli scritti di F. Sassetti [1540-1588],3 Schulze,' Pere Coeurdoux5) , nomi di divinita, nomi di parentela. I risultati sono inte­ ressanti, non soltanto perche indicano una profonda similarita (poco impor­ ta qui se quest'ultima viene interpretata come una prova di parentela gene­ tica o come !a testimonianza di contatti intensivi) , rna anche perche talvolta fanno intervenire delle unita lessematiche che possono inserirsi in parole piil complesse: mi riferisco al caso delle preposizioni/prefissi (come in Schrieckius 1614; Swiggers 1984a:21-22). La grammatica comparata appro­ fondirii l'analisi, con la definizione di forme grammaticali, costituite da una radice• e da affissi (prefissi, infissi, suffissi) ; piu tardi verra !a scoperta dei formativi tematici, e della distinzione tra suffissi derivazionali e suffissi fles­ sionali. Poco importa (almeno per la mia esposizione) que! raffinamento teorico all'interno della grammatica comparata; bastera affrontare su questo punto l'introduzione alia grammatica comparata di Bopp (1868) e quella del Compendium di Schleicher (1861-62), e ambedue con il capit?lo "Principes de !a morphologic" nell'Introduction di Meillet (1937). Poco 1m­ porta anche il fatto che il comparatismo semitico avesse raggiunto uno sta­ dio piu avanzato rispetto alia grammatica comparata indoeuropea: per una 'strana determinazione' stabilita dai materiali linguistici (cioe !a stessa strut­ lura delle lingue semitiche, basata su una radice discontinua), i lessicografi giudei e arabi del Medioevo erano gia arrivati (Bacher 1974; irschfeld 1926; Swiggers 1979; Terre 1980) a trattare in modo separato rad•c• e aff1ss1 (classificando anche le consonanti in relazione a! !oro ruolo nei due tipi di segmenti).7 Cio che importa, invece, e l'utilizzazione tecnica della form� gramtnaticale al livello della comparazione. Osserviamo, ad esempiO, che il comparatismo fa appello a volte alia 'struttura grammaticale/interna' (cioe ]a compositio): e il caso di Thomas Stephens (1559-1619) nella sua lettera del 24 ottobre 1583 al fratello Richard,8 di Saumaise (1643; Dr01xhe 1978:90-91; Muller 1984a) e di Leibniz (nella corrispondenza con Ludolf, e 1.

�

284

PIERRE SWIGGERS

nella Brevis designatio.)9 Ma che cosa ne risulta, concretamente? In ogni caso, non ne risulta una comparazione di strutture grammaticali specifiche. E si nota che Leibniz accorda un peso importante alia similarita osservata fra lessemi. Come stanno le cose negli scritti di Humboldt (Swiggers 1985b; Tra­ bant 1985)? Si sa che Humboldt esplicita Ia nozione di forma grammaticale come correlazione mediatrice tra una sostanza linguistica e das Denken. Le forme grammaticali sono un modo specifico di rappresentazione dei rappor­ ti grammaticali, e devono essere situate rispetto alle diverse fasi della for­ mazione progressiva della grammatica. La forma grammaticale ha un ruolo doppio nell'interazione del pensiero e della lingua: e, allo stesso tempo, uno strumento passivo (che risulta da una codificazione) delle espressioni del pensiero, e uno strumento attivo che permette al soggetto di manifestar­ si nella lingua. Le lingue si distinguono, nell'espressione dei rapporti, per l'elaborazione delle forme grammaticali. Darum, dass sich mit den Bezeichnungen fast jeder Sprache aile gramma� tischen Verhiiltnisse andeuten lassen, besitzt noch nicht auch jede gram� matische Formen in demjenigen Sinne, in dem sie die hochgebildeten Sprachen kennen. Der zwar feine, aber doch sehr fiih1bare Unterschied liegt in dem materiellen Erzeugniss und der formalen Einwirkung. (Hum­ boldt 1961-64 III, 34)

La forma grammaticale mette in rapporto una materia e una forma particolare. Nella messa in rapporto di questi due aspetti le lingue possono diversificarsi in modo significativo: sarebbe sbagliato ritenere le forme di lingue diverse come equivalenti dal punto di vista grammaticale, nonostan­ te le eventuali corrispondenze nella traduzione. In che consiste allora la forma grammaticale? Per Humboldt, consiste nella fusione - o nell'integrazione reciproca - della materia e della forma. La materia proviene dall'appercezione dell'oggetto: e !'idea corrispondente alia designazione degli oggetti come sono percepiti. Allo stato puro, ]a ma­ teria si esprime per parole separate, Ia cui funzione e di nominare gli og­ getti. La forma corrisponde a un atto creativo; serve a Iegare gli elementi del discorso. Die W6rter, und ihre grammatischen Verhiiltnisse sind zwei in der Vor­ stellung durchaus verschiedne Dinge. Jene sind die eigentlichen Gegen­ stande in der Sprache, diese bloss die Verkniipfungen, aber die Rede ist nur durch beide zusammengenommen mOglich. Die grammatischen Verh�Utnisse kOnnen, ohne selbst in der Sprache iiberall Zeichen z.u haben,

TIPOLOGIA LINGUISTICA E FORMA GRAMMATICALE

285

hinzugedacht werden, und der Bau der Sprache kann von der Art seyn, dass Undeutlichkeit und Misverstand dabei dennoch, wenigstens bis auf einen gewissen Grad, vermieden werden. (Humboldt 1961�64, p.III, 37-38; cf. ibid., p.54)

Per l'espressione della forma, si dispone di tre mezzi: (a) Si puo suscitare ]'idea di un rapporto - senza che questo sia segnato lin­ guisticamente - attraverso la riunione di parole; in tal caso, Ia lingua pos­ siede una grammatica senza vere forme grammaticali: Wenn eine Sprache z.B. die Casus durch Praepositionen bildet, die an das irnrner unveriindert bleibende Wort gefiigt werden, so ist keine grammatis­ che Form vorhanden, sondern nur zwei Worter, deren grammatisches Verhiiltnis hinzugedacht wird; e�tiboa in der Mbaya Sprache heisst nicht, wie man es iibersetzt, durch mich, sondern ich durch. Die Verbindung ist nur irn Kopf des Vorstellenden, nicht als Zeichen in der Sprache. (Ibid.)

(b) Si puo marcare il rapporto attraverso un segno che lo rappresenta nel modo di significare gli oggetti. (c) Si puo integrare l'espressione dei rapporti con quella degli oggetti, es­ sendo i rapporti dei 'modificativi' degli oggetti. Questo e 'der wahre Begriff einer grammatischen Form' (l'unita di una tale forma grammaticale spesso viene segnalata dall'accento) . Si riconoscono qui le tappe del percorso tipologico che va dalle lingue isolanti alle lingue flessive (Hagege 1982:5; Swiggers 1985b:735). Questa ti­ pologia, un po' imprecisa, e operativa per il fatto che permette di valutare globalmente a quale tappa formativa si trova una lingua al momento dell'osservazione. Appare qui l'opposizione tra lingue con grammatica les­ sicalizzata e lingue con lessico grammaticalizzato. Humboldt oppone Ia lin­ gua cinese alle lingue indoeuropee. In queste ultime, ogni parola appartie­ ne a una parte specifica del discorso, e possiede non soltanto una individua­ litil lessicale, rna anche un'identitil grammaticale. Nel cinese, le parole di­ pingono le cose, rappresentate in modo discreto (separativo) nel discorso; qui le parole non offrono che il contenuto del discorso. La langue chinoise emploie tous les mots dans l'etat oil ils indiquent l'idee qu'ils expriment, abstraction faite de tout rapport grammatical. Tous les mots chinois, quoique enchaines dans une phrase, sont in statu absoluto, et ressemblent par�la aux radicaux de Ia langue samscrite [ . . . ] . La langue chinoise renonce a Ia distinction precise et minutieuse des categories gram� maticales, range les mots des phrases d'apres l'ordre moins restreint de Ia determination des idees, et donne aux periodes une structure a laquelle ce svsteme est applicable. La langue samscrite, les langues qui ont une affinite

286

evidente avec elle, et peut�etre d'autres encore sur lesquelles je ne vou­ drais rien prejuger ici, etablissent. la distinction des categories grammatica­ les comme base unique de leur grammaire, poursuivent cette distinction jusque dans leurs dernieres ramifications, et s'abandonnent, dans Ia forma­ tion de leurs phrases, a tout l'essor que ce guide sUr et fictele leur permet de prendre. (Humboldt 1969:74, 108-109)

Per quanto riguarda !'uso ch� e stato fatto della nozione di forma grammaticale, osserviamo che negli scritti di Humboldt essa serve soprat­ tutto ad opporre tipi di lingue, e non tanto a giustificare l'organizzazione in­ lerna della grammatica comparata. Sara solo con Bopp e pili tardi con Schleicher che !a segmentazione delle forme grammaticali nell'indoeuropeo permetterai (1) di porre il problema dell'appartenenza tipologica (dal punto di vista morfologico) dell'indoeuropeo e delle varie lingue indoeuropee attestate. Bastera ricordare Ia postulazione di una fase agglutinante primitiva - pos­ tulazione che non e senza rapporto coi modelli d'analisi sintattica del Sei­ cento e del Settecento (si veda, ad esempio, l'analisi proposta da Bopp del morfema derivazionale sya del futuro indoiranico, morfema che viene ana­ lizzato come una forma del verbo 'essere' (Bopp 1868 II, .543-44), e l'evolu­ zione verso un tipo flessivo con radice variabile; (2) di definire !a famiglia indoeuropea rispetto ad altre famiglie: e cio che fa Schleicher (1861-62) separando le lingue indoeuropee dalle lingue se­ mitiche e dalle lingue altaiche (Schleicher 1876:2-4). Pili tardi, il valore di discriminazione che assume !a nozione di forma grammaticale sara messo a profitto da Trubetzkoy (1939), Benveniste (1935,1948) e Kutylowicz (1964, 1977). Si noti che !a grammatica comparata si e sviluppata per Ia scelta di strutture come parametro di comparazione: strutture morfologiche (Bopp), morfologiche e fonetiche (Schleicher),10 e pili tardi sintattiche.ll La seconda nozione che vorrei analizzare e quell a di 'tipo linguistico' . Questa nozione corrisponde a! dominia (estensione) della comparazione. Pili in particolare, l'elaborazione della nozione corrisponde a una necessita pragmatica: quella di formulare dei principi restrittivi che, di fronte a una gamma di spiegazioni equivalenti, permettano di rafforzare !a probabilita di una di esse. Prendiamo il caso della comparazione di lingue: l'obbiettivo e quello di spiegare le concordanze (similarita) osservate fra lingue particola­ ri. Queste concordanze possono spiegarsi in cinque modi almena: (1) come una coincidenza fortuita;

. 2.

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287

(2) come il risultato di un prestito (prestito che a volte puo avvenire a distanza);12 (3) come il risultato di una diffusione areale (bastera pensare qui agli studi di M. Emeneau, e aile controversie tra Sapir e Boas; cf. Emeneau 1980; Darnell & Hymes 1986); (4) le concordanze possono interpretarsi come epifenomeni dell'unita fondamentale del linguaggio (cio che Karl Schuchardt [1859-1943] chiamava elementare Sprachverwandtschaft; cf. Swiggers 1986); (5) le concordanze si basano su un'unita filogenetica, e le lingue mani­ festanti queUe concordanze risalgono a un antenato comune. E' interessante osservare che le risposte 1 , 2 e 5 sono le opzioni che si presentano nella critica testuale: errori comuni (e indipendenti), lezioni copiate, e lezioni comuni che provengono dall'antenato comune: X

y

X

a

b

a

b

Fig. 1

Per provare Ia parentela di lingue che present ana delle concordanze (o per aumentare !a probabilitil di una tale parentela) !a nozione di tipo lin­ guistico e cruciale: partendo dalla tipologia, si possono definire delle strut­ lure grammaticali. E non sara necessaria, a mio parere, ricordare che se­ condo il Meillet Ia grammatica comparata raffronta delle serie intere, mani­ festanti delle omologie strutturali (e il suo valore probante aumenta quando queste omologie fanno intervenire delle serie di forme irregolari, come ad esempio le forme del verba 'essere' [Meillet 1925:27;1937:32]). Cosl si ca­ pisce perche Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829) abbia scritto: Jener entscheidende Punkt aber, der hier alles aufhellen wird, ist die inne� re Structur der Sprachen oder die vergleichende Grammatik, welche uns ganz neue Ausschliisse iiber die Genealogie der Sprachen auf ahnliche

288

Weise geben wird, wie die vergleichende Anatomie tiber die h6here Na� turgeschichte Licht verbreitet hat. (Schlegel 1808:28)

Non e necessaria ricordare qui Ia maturazione della tipologia linguisti­ ca nel seco]o scorso (Coseriu 1968,1973; Horne 1966; Morpurgo Davies 1975; Ramat 1973; Renzi 1976). Vorrei rilevare che Ia tipologia linguistica funziona come quadro restrittivo rispetto alia parentela postulata fra lingue osservate: neli'Ottocento questa tipologia e centrata sulla composizione morfologica delle parole, e non sull'assenza/presenza di certe classi di paro­ le, come l'articolo, e neanche sull'ordine delle parole.!J La tipologia viene definita rispetto al parametro di comparazione che e stato scelto: cioe Ia forma grammaticale. E viene applicata a lingue osservate: non c'e una ri­ f]essione a proposito di tipi possibili ed impossibili, elemento teorico diven­ tato di importanza cruciale nelle ricerche attuali sulla ricostruzione della fo­ nologia e della sintassi dell'indoeuropeo (Gamkrelidze & Ivanov 1973, 1984; Gamkrelidze 1976, 1981; Ramat 1980; Shevoroshkin & Markey 1986). Devo passare al terzo componente della grammatica comparata: Ia no­ zione di 'cambiamenti (mutamenti) sistematici' come transizioni. La gram­ mati.ca comparata non pub non essere storica, per motivi diversi: Ia rendo­ no storica non soltanto il suo obbiettivo fondamentale, dimostrare Ia paren­ tela genetica di certe lingue, rna anche Ia sua materialita primaria. La nozione di cambiamento sistematico in qualita di transizione corris­ ponde a un terzo problema della comparazione: quello del non sequitur del­ la comparazione (di dissomiglianze) . E' pur vero che !'aporia essenziale del­ la comparazione risiede nel fatto che non si pub mai dimostrare che due lin­ gue non siano apparentate. Tuttavia, abbiamo visto che Ia tipologia per­ mette gill di rafforzare Ia probabilita di un'ipotesi di parentela genetica; al livello della spiegazione delle dissomiglianze, l'ipotesi sara resa pili proba­ bile quando si riesca a trarne delle leggi di trasformazione. E' interessante rilevare che le leggi formulate dalla grammatica comparatai4 si distinguono per un aspetto essenziale dalle regolarita riconosciute negli scritti di lin­ guisti del Cinquecento o del Seicento , come Fernao de Oliveira (d.1581) ,I5 Bernardo Aldrete (1565-1645; cf. Gauger 1976) o il Padre Besnier (Besnier 1984):16 Ia differenza e che le leggi della grammatica comparata non riguar­ dano parole giustapposte (forme italiane/spagnole/portoghesi), rna defini­ scono dei processi di transizione rispetto alia serie (di fonemi, in generale). 3.

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289

Si deve notare che questo componente teorico completa quello della ti­ pologia linguistica: se Ia tipologia linguistica definisce il quadro (condizio­ nale) delle concordanze e delle dissomiglianze, Ia nozione di cambiamento fonetico come transizione permette di capire l'attuazione di una differen­ ziazione all'interno di un tipo. Cosi il terzo componente - corrispondente all'aporia fondamentale della grammatica comparata - permette di indica­ re quali evoluzioni sono piu probabili, perche piu sistematiche. E' pur vero che il modello della grammatica comparata non si e costi­ tuito in un sol tratto: mancavano molti legami nella descrizione dell'attua­ zione dei cambiamenti, come l'impatto dell'analogia e d'altre leggi, seman­ tiche (Bn"\al 1897), del linguaggio, l'importanza delle situazioni di bilin: guismo (Haugen 1953,1972; Weinreich 1953),17 gli effetti dell'acquisizione del linguaggio da parte di adulti e bambini (Bickerton 1981)18 e gli effetti diacronici della norma sullo sviluppo delle lingue. Del comparatismo e della grammatica comparata si possono studiare le 'figure' (nel senso hegeliano), le concezioni e le pratiche. Mi sono limitato qui allo studio delle concezioni. Era mio intento definire in che modo Ia grammatica comparata del 19° secolo costituiva una formazione discorsiva ben distinta dal comparatismo che l'ha nutrita; certo, e possibile riconosce­ re anticipazioni, a livello dei principi e dei metodi, e identificare 'precurso­ ri', rna l'irriducibilita di queste due formazioni e innegabile. L'opera di Besnier, di A. Schrieckius, di C. Saumaise (1588-1653), di Leibniz o di Stiernhielm (1598-1672) non merita Ia qualifica di 'grammatica comparata'. In conclusione, occorre mettere in rilievo le limitazioni della grammati­ ca comparata: questa subisce l'influsso del suo oggetto - Ie lingue europee e, in minor misura, le lingue semitiche e ugro-finniche: per queUe lingue, Ia comparazione assume Ia forma di una spiegazione delle mutazioni di segmenti in certe serie di forme. Que! modello non sembra operativo, ad esempio, nel caso delle lingue aranda (Boretzky 1982), dove i cambiamenti 'regolari' si fanno in modo suppletivo ( suppletivismo in parte condizionato da fenomeni di tabu). Si affaccia cosi un problema per lo storiografo e per l'epistemologo della linguistica: quale sarebbe l'aspetto della grammatica comparata se il suo oggetto fosse stato costituito da tali lingue? 4.

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NOTES l.

2. 3.

4.

5.

Per Coeurdoux ("RCponse au Memoire de M. I'abbe Barthelemy", testa letto aii'Acade� mie des Inscriptions, 1785) si veda: Arlotta (1969), Castets (1931), Godfrey (1967) Mayr­ hofer (1983) e Muller (1986:24-25); per Jones: Cannon (1964, 1970, 1984), Hoenigswald (1974), Mukherjee (1968), Muller (1986: 25-31), R. Rocher (1980); per Paolino da S. Bartolomeo: L. Rocher (1961, t 977). Per il contesto generale, si veda I'opera di Benfey (1869). Per iJ 'metoda comparativo' come concetto storiografico si veda Hoenigswald (1963, 1986), Orlandi (1962), Wells (1979). Del Sassetti si veda soprattutto ta lettera a Bernardo Davanzati (22/1/1586): "Sono scrjtte le !oro scienze tutte in una lingua, che dimandono sanscruta, che vuol dire bene articolata, della quale non si ha memoria quando fusse parlata, con avere (com'io dico) memorie an­ tichissime. In parlanla come noi Ia greca e Ia latina e vi pongono molto maggior tempo, si che in sei anni o sette se ne fanno padroni: e ha Ia lingua d'oggi molte case comuni con quella, nella quale sono molti de' nostri nomi, e particularmente de' numeri 6, 7, 8 e 9, Dio, serpe, e altri assai" (cf. M_l.lller 1986: 15). "Ais ich kurz darauf Kirendum anfing zu Iemen, so befand ich, dass sie in ihrer Numera­ tion fast Iauter pure lateinische WOrter hiitten. Hier fragt sichs: Woher die Brahmanen diese WOrter gekriegt? Ob sie selbige von der Portugiesischen Sprache abgeborgt, die nun mehro 200 Jahr in Indien bekannt worden, oder ob sie selbige vor vielen Jahren her von den ROmero und alten Lateinern bekommen?" (Benjamin Schulze, lettera a Th. A. Francke, 23N!ll/1725; cf. Droixhe [1978:76-77] e Muller [1984 b:38]). Cf. la descrizione di Muller (1986:24): "Coeurdoux includes four lists: one of 'Termes Samskroutans fort ressemblans ou les memes en Latin et en Grec', two of Sanskrit words shared exclusively with either Greek or Latin, and a last list of Sanskrit words from the sphere of basic vocabulary. The comparative lists include the numerals from 1 to 21, 30, 40 and 100, the pronouns, the paradigm of the verb substantive in the present indicative and in the optative, and also such valid cognate�sets as skt. vidhavii lat. vidua, skt. dan­ tam lat. dentem, skt. dattam lat. datum, skt. amrta gk. ambrosia, skt. mrtyu lat. mars etc. The presentation of similarities between these languages is not however li­ mited to vocabulary lists; Coeurdoux dwells on the presence of three numbers (singular, dual, plural) in Sanskrit and Greek, both in the nominal and in the verbal system, he also notes the presence in both languages of the syllabic augment and the use of 'privative al­ pha'".

291

7.

Cf. le classificazioni di Aharon ben Moses ben Asher e di Saadia Gaon (Swiggers 1979:186).

8.

Cf. Schurhammer (1957) e Muller (1986:14-1 5): "The earliest informed notice about In­ dian languages as such is contained in a letter by the English Jesuit Thomas Stephens (1549�1619) to his brother in Paris: On October 24, 1583, he reports from Goa: 'Linguae harum regionurn sunt permultae. Pronunciationem habent non invenustam et compositio� nem Iatinae grecaeque similem; phrases et constructiones plane mjrabiles. Literae syllaba�rum vim habent, quae toties variantur quoties consonantes cum vocalibus, vel mutae cum liquidis combinari possunt'". ·

9.

Per Leibniz, si vedano gli articoli di Droixhe e di Gensini in questa volume; anche Water� man (1978), Aarsleff (1969, 1975) e Schulenburg (1973).

10.

Perle concezioni di Schleicher sulla morfologia, si veda Schleicher (1859, 1861); cf. l'ana� lisi di Bynon (1986).

11.

Cf. Friedrich (1975), Lehmann (1974, 1976), Schmalstieg (1980:166-88) ; punto di vista tradizionale in Krahe (1972). Per una riflessione metodologica, si veda Dressler (1971) e Watkins (1976).

12.

Cf. il caso dell'estensione di un vocabolario tecnico.

13.

Come era il caso nel Settecento, cf. Swiggers (1982:41�47; 1984:23-26).

14.

Cf. il catalogo in Collinge (1985).

15.

Sulle concezioni di Fernao de Oliveira, si veda Coseriu (1975).

16.

Si veda anche Ia mia recensione nel Bulletin de Ia Societe de Linguistique de Paris 81. 74�79 (1986).

17.

Per il caso di Meillet, cf. Swiggers (1985a:191-92),

18.

Si veda gia Borrichius (1704) per la relazione fra cambiamento linguistico, diversita delle lingue e contesto d'acquisizione del linguaggio .

=

=

6.

=

=

=

"Au xvrne siecle, Ia racine Ctait un nom rudimentaire qui d6signait, en son origine, une chose concrete, une representation immediate, un obJet qui se donnait au regard ou a l'un quelconque des sens [ ... ]. Bopp admet lui aussi que les verbes soot des mixtes obtenus par la coagulation du verbe avec une racine. Mais son analyse differe sur plusieurs points es­ sentiels du schema classique: il ne s'agit pas de !'addition virtuelle, sous�jacente et invisi� ble de Ia fonction attributive et du sens propositionnel qu'on prete au verbe €tre; it s'agit d'abord d'une jonction mat6rielle entre un radical et les formes du verbe €tre ( .. . ]. Par suite, ce n'est pas l'adjonction de €tre qui transforme une 6pitbete en verbe; le radical lui� meme d6tient une signification verbale, a laquelle les d6sinences d6riv6es de la conjugai� son de €tre ajoutent seulement des modifications de personne et de temps". (Foucault [1966:301-302]; cf. Rousseau [1980]).

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---. 1861-62. Compendium der vergleichenden Grammatik der indoger­ manischen Sprachen. 2 vols. Weimar: Bohlau. ---. 1876. Compendium der vergleichenden Grammatik der indogerma­ nischen Sprachen. 4a ediz. Ibid. Schlegel, Friedrich. 1808. Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier. Ein Beitrag zur Begrundung der Altertumskunde. Heidelberg: Mohr & Zim­ mer. (Rist., Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1977.) Schmalstieg, William R. 1980. Indo-European Linguistics: A new synthesis. University Park & London: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press. Schmitt, RUdiger. 1977. Einfuhrung in die griechischen Dialekte. Darm­ stadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Schrieckius, Adrianus. 1614. Van t'beghin der eerster volcken van Europen, in-sonderheyt vanden oorspronck ende saecken der Neder-landren, XXIII boecken. Ypre: F. Bellet. Schulenburg, Sigrid von der. 1973. Leibniz als Sprachforscher. Frankfurt: Klostermann. Schurhammer, G. 1957. "Der Marathidichter Thomas Stephens, S.J.: Neue Dokumente". Archivium historicum Societatis Jesu 26.67-82. Shevoroshkin, Vitalij V. & Thomas L. Markey (a cura di). 1986. Typology, Relationship and Time. Ann Arbor: Karoma. Swiggers, Pierre. 1979. "L'histoire de la grammaire hebraique jusqu'au XVIe siecle". Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica 10. 183-193. , ed. 1982. Gabriel Girard: Les vrais principes de Ia langue franr;oise (1 747) . Nouvelle edition, avec une introduction. Geneve & Paris: Droz. . 1983. "La methodologie de !'historiographic de la linguistique". Folia Linguistica Historica 4.55-79. . 1984a. "Adrianus Schrieckius: De la langue des Scythes a !'Europe linguistique". Droixhe 1984. 17-34. ---. 1984b. Les conceptions linguistiques des encyclopedistes: Etude sur !a constitution d'une theorie de Ia grammaire au siixle des Lumieres. Hei­ delberg: J. Groos; Leuven: University Press. . 1985a. "La linguistique historico-comparative d'Antoine Meillet: Theorie et methode". Cahiers Ferdinand de Saussure 39.181-95. . 1985b. "Categories grammaticales et categories culturelles dans la philosophie du langage de Humboldt: Les implications de la 'forme grammaticale"'. Zeitschrift fur Phonetik, Sprachwissenschaft und Kom­ munikationsforschung 38.729-736. . 1986. "Linguistique generate et linguistique romane chez Hugo

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Schuchardt". Actes du XVIlie Congres de Linguistique et de Philologie romanes (Treves, 1986). ---. 1987. "Remarques sur le langage historiographique". Cahiers de 1'/nstitut de Linguistique de Louvain 13:3-4. 29-48. Tene, David. 1980. "The Earliest Comparisons of Hebrew with Aramaic and Arabic". Koerner 1980.355-77. Trabant, Jiirgen (a cura di). 1985. Wilhelm von Humboldt: Ueber die Spra­ che. Ausgewiihlte Schriften. Miinchen: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag. Trubetzkoy, Nikolaj S. 1939. "Gedanken tiber das Indogermanenpro­ blem". Acta Linguistica 1 . 81-89. Waterman, John T. 1978. Leibniz and Ludolf on Things: Linguistic Excerpts from their correspondence (1688-1703). Berkeley: University of Cali­ fornia Press. Watkins, Calvert. 1976. "Towards Proto-Indo-European Syntax: Problems and pseudo-problems". Papers from the Parasession on Diachronic Syn­ tax ed. by S.B. Steever, C. A. Walker & S.F. Mufwene, 305-326. Chica­ go: Chicago Linguistic Society. Weinreich, Uriel. 1953. Languages in Contact: Findings and problems. New York: Publications of the Linguistic Circle of New York. Wells, Rulon. 1979. "Linguistics as a Science: The case of the comparative method". The European Background of American Linguistics, ed. by Henry M. Hoenigswald, 23-61. Dordrecht: Reidel. Wouters, Albert. 1979. The Grammatical papyri from Graeco-Roman Egypt. Contributions to the study of the "ars grammatica" in Antiquity. Brussel: Paleis der Academien. SUMMARY

The purpose of this article is to analyse, on the conceptual level, what crucially distinguishes the period of 'pre-comparativism' from comparative grammar. The essential distinction between both types of discursive forma­ tion lies in the integration, within comparative grammar, of three funda­ mental notions: 1) that of 'grammatical form' ; 2) that of 'linguistic type', and 3) that of 'systematic mutations'. Each of these notions is linked with different aspects of the comparative method: the notion of grammatical form is correlated with the problem of the parameter of comparison (what should be compared?), that of linguistic type is correlated with the problem

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mutations' with the of the domain of comparison , and that of 'systematic (we can never arison comp epistemological problem of the non sequitur of show that two languages are not genetically related ). en pre-com­ This conceptual analysis allows one to distinguish betwe er, Leibniz, Stier­ parativism (Oliveira, Alderte, the 'Flemish' school, Besni to pomt to the and ar, gramm nhielm, etc.) and 20th-century comparative oldt had an Humb which 'transformations' of the comparative practice, in typology), ge important role (cf. the notion of grammatical form/langua t of cemen advan although he did not, strictly speaking contribute to the comparative grammar.

Afterword* Tullio De Mauro

University of Rome

0. Four recurrent themes have emerged from the various papers and dis­ cussions, t\lat have made up this symposium on Leibniz and Humboldt.

The first is the status - today - of studies on the history of ideas and linguistic thought. 1.0

1.1 It was almost twenty years ago - in 1969 - that I wrote a postface to he Italian translation of Maurice Leroy's Les grands courants de Ia lingui­ stique moderne. In this afterword I tried to emphasize the importance of tak­ ing a fresh look at the past - in other words, of using historiography to recapture the sense of classical and medieval linguistic thought and, most of all, to give new life to the linguistic theories developed by 17th and 18th century European philosophers. It was a new and challenging idea, but lit­ tle did anyone imagine (or at least, little did I have the foresight to imagine) how much it would develop over the next two decades. There has been an authentic explosion of studies on the history of ideas and linguistic research. Two recent international conferences have enabled us to see just how far our discipline has come these past few years. I am referring to the ones held at Mistretta and Catania-Messina in 1984, the proceedings of which have been edited by Lia Formigari and Franco La Piparo and published by Editori Riuniti (Rome, 1988). These Sicilian conferences made it clear that we may now consider ourselves to have adequately re-evaluated the views of the The following presents an English version - translated by Patrick Boylan - of Prof. De Mauro's concluding remarks given at the conference.

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history of linguistics and I use the term 're-evaluate' neither polemically nor condescendingly - expressed so lucidly by Michel Breal (1832-1915) and August Friedrich Pott (1802- 1887), the former in his introduction to the French translation of Bopp's Grammaire comparee (1866), and the latter in his long analysis Wilhelm von Humboldt und die Sprachwissenschaft, pub­ lished as the first volume of the Calvary edition of Humboldt's Ver­ schiedenheit (1876). These two authors, as well as lesser known Italian lin­ guists from the mid 1800s, such as Bernardino Biondelli (1804-1886), demonstrated an awareness of the long incubation period leading up to a true vergleichende Grammatik. For without a doubt the roots of compara­ tive grammar are to be found in European philosophy and in the elabora­ tions of European culture between the 17th and 18th centuries - in par­ ticular, in the work of Leibniz. From the Sicilian conferences emerged another consideration: Ger­ many seems to have been the privileged soil from which linguistic ideas and research emerged, which were to develop into a paradigm or modele d'objet for comparative grammar, and which subsequently spread throughout Europe. Why was this so? In a certain sense, this Rome symposium is an attempt to answer just that question. But what I am really . trying to say, and emphasize, is that we will be able to truly understand the differences between Humboldt's views and those of Leibniz, as well as the differences between Leibniz and his cultural environment and tradition, only if we grasp the rich network of historical donnees in which each elaboration is situated - just as A.F. Pott and M. Bn!al did a century ago. Such a firm grasp of the history of linguistic thought was the privilege of only an elite among the linguists of the older generations (for example, Pieter A. Verburg (b. 1905) and Antonino Pagliaro (1898-1973) or, closer to our generation, E. Coseriu, H. Aarsleff, and a few others) ; but it should now be considered a point of departure for any linguistic study. Indeed, it should be an integral part of the institutio of any future linguist. A careful re-evaluation of the complex network of historical donnees is, therefore, necessary in the present case but not only in the present case ­ and at this point I should like to recall the useful distinction between don­ nees and modele d'objet that Sylvain Auroux proposed at the beginning of our symposium. Moreover, re-evaluations of this kind raise (or ought to raise) a good many questions regarding the modele d'objet itself- not only of linguistics but of the history of linguistic ideas and researches. (Permit name-giving inevitably requires me to call our discipline in this manner making a choice.)

Now that we have (or should have) sufficient material at hand and the necessary background knowledge, just what do we want to do with it all? To what kind of analysis do we want to submit this mass of material?

·

1.2 During our discussions, this question seemed to remain hidden from view. Paolo Ramal brought it out into the open, to some extent at least; Auroux, too, perhaps. But all in all it remained the unasked question behind every discussion. What exactly are we doing; what is it that we want to do? For example, do we want to consider the various moments we iden­ tify in the history of linguistic research as the result of the internal develop­ ment of linguistic thought? Or do we want to consider them also as the pro­ duct of external stimuli? For example, are we to attribute primary impor­ tance to the fact that Humboldt read Lorenzo Hervas y Panduro (17351809), who had read Leibniz, who in turn had read Mario Nizolio (14981576), and so on and so forth until we construct a genealogy entirely ex­ plainable from within the history of our discipline? Or, without overlooking (as far as possible) the internal relationships that may exist, are we to situate each historical development within the context of the various and particular pressures exerted by the society and culture of each single period? The second solution would appear to me to be the better. May I make a confession? I have a religion: I am an 'externalist'. In our culinary rites, we externalists like to mix our ingredients, not nibble at them separately. We favor the corruptio - just as Leibniz did. Thus, we prefer to believe that a theoretical development should be seen as the point at which a theoretical tradition intersects with new socio-cultural demands stemming from the environment. Incidentally, this approach means that we still have a great deal of work before us. Two problem areas have to be explored in the period going from Leibniz to Humboldt (and, of course, not only then). 1.2.1 First, the period was characterized by the necessity of teaching and learning the hegemonic language that was dominant in a given area and, accessorily, foreign languages. As to the latter, Auroux has indicated how important they were actually considered; these wandering Europeans felt the need to collect, classify, catalog and comment on them in great detail. But the European travellers of that period were something more than wan­ derers. The Greeks and then the Romans had been wanderers and yet had left nothing similar to what we might even vaguely call comparative linguis-

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tics, much less comparative linguistics in the narrower sense introduced in the 18th century.

capitals was, of course, a handicap in international political struggles; and it also created problems for the internal development of the modern nation state: just how and at what price was the cultural unification to take place? German intellectuals in Leibniz's time were in a position - and, indeed, were obliged - to recognize the central role of linguistic homogeneity in the formation of a nation.

1 .2.2 The second problem area to explore is the language policy or policies actually practiced with respect to the various languages, whether regarded as hegemonic or not. Questions to ask in this connection would be: What written traditions were to be encouraged with respect to the various spoken traditions? What local languages, having more than local extension, were to be favored to the point of suffocating other local linguistic traditions? Just how were specialized formal languages to be created? The preceding considerations may seem somewhat abstract. But these problem areas are the very ones that all of us have inevitably encountered in our studies - all of us here and all of us who study language and lan­ guages, from Aristotle's predecessors to our fellow linguists and - si minima /icet - ourselves. For it is from that encounter, it is from struggling with the kind of questions just mentioned, that we have gathered the resolve to fight for a particular theoretical position rather than another. So much for the first recurrent theme in this symposium. The second is as follows. While the various papers and discussions did not directly consider the orientation of linguistics in our society, they did show - and exceedingly that Leibniz raised just that question with respect to his society. If well we had organized this symposium with hindsight, we would probably have wanted to include a larger number of historians of 17th-century society. I do not wtsh to take up too much of your time, but I would like to insist upon the fact that we cannot properly comprehend Leibniz and his histori­ cal specificity unless we situate him with respect to at least three donnees. 2.0

2.1 The first is the political crisis following the Thirty Years War. That crisis consolidated the formation of large multilingual empires in Europe; it offered new possibilities for national languages to develop. And within this general context there is the specific context in which Leibniz found himself: he was in the only European country which Fernand Braude! correctly con­ stdered comparable to Italy, from the standpoint of the densite de villes each o�e with its own physiognomy. To use Brandel's expression , German was, wtth Italy, the only polycentric country suffering from - and delight­ ing in - the 'eminent weakness' of having as many capitals as there were urban centers with differentiated traditions and outlooks. This wealth of

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2.2 The second donnee is the great advancement of technology, of which Leibniz was a protagonist. Technology here means something as concrete as finding and transforming raw materials, such as coal. From an occupa­ tional standpoint, Leibniz was first of all an engineer: hence, his constant reference to praxis; his claim that scientific discourse, constructed with words from ordinary language, ought to have repercussions in ordinary activities; his desire to construct a methode that would produce universals translatable (if valid) into ordinary knowledge and thus grounded in praxis. This was a very serious endeavor. Leibniz constructed theories and metatheories because he really wanted to develop, among other things, mine pumps that would evacuate water from the Hartz pits even more rapidly. This forgotten image of Leibniz ought, in my opinion, to appear in all those manuals of the history of philosophy which present Leibniz as a metaphysical powdered wig. The manuals would have all to gain, not only from the standpoint of their historical accuracy, but also from the standpoint of their internal theoretical foundations. 2.3 The third and last donnee is the expansion of the sciences: the creation of the various philologies and historical sciences (with Leibniz at the fore­ front) and of the natural and exact sciences. Here we have another new and fertile problem area to explore, rich in implications for linguistics: what is the relationship between these new worlds of knowledge grounded in praxis, and the ordinary knowledge expressed by ordinary language? It seems to me that two kinds of answers have been given to the gen­ eral question of defining the specific problems Leibniz had to face. Coseriu gave the first kind of answer. During the discussions as well as in his paper, which I hope to be able to comment on again in these conclud­ ing remarks, Coseriu mentioned the existence of 'another' semantics for Leibniz. And he clearly showed, I believe, Leibniz's response to the social and cultural problems created by the donnees I mentioned previously. For Leibniz, the royal road leading to a solution started with the construction of

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a theory of meaning. Coseriu tended to present Leibniz's theory, at least during our discussions here, as a collage, a striking juxtaposition of theories: on the one hand, we find the theory of the species civiles and, on the other, as Coseriu rightly pointed out, the theories of the universal and possible species. The second kind of answer, it seems to me, was proposed by Gensini and Dascal. I quite agree that it is the question of 'meaning' which leads Leibniz to discover the fundamental questions he raises concerning lan­ guage: what is meaning and how does it relate to the organization and con­ tent of sentences or, more generally, of signs at any level whatsoever from the usus vulgaris to the more formal or formalized discourse of the societates doctorum. In other words, Dascal and Gensini appear to suggest that Leibniz had but one theory of meaning; the semantics of formalized languages is therefore to be considered a specification of that theory under certain conditions. But the fact that I, too, share this view of Leibniz is neither here nor there; what is essential is, in both instances, the fact of having historically situated the questions that Leibniz set out to answer, as well as his answer itself - completely semantic or semantico-syntactic or whatever it be.

achieve accuracy. Many sentences do not seem to follow. A literal transla­ tion into another language accentuates these oscillations of thought and would make the text even more incoherent. Christian Stetter, Donatella Di Cesare , Ludwig Jager, and Paolo Ramat have analyzed this phenomenon but, at the bottom of it all, I believe there is simply the enormous complexity of the source material. Pott had already indicated how numerous the sources were, but it is also important that we realize how heterogeneous they in fact were, from the standpoint of chronology, of historiography, and of epistemology. Humboldt was clearly working in a tradition which unearthed all possible documentation. You can see the influence of Johann Georg Eckhardt (1674-1730) and the tradition of Germanic Philology, as well as Hervas y Panduro, as Coseriu has magist­ rally demonstrated. There is certainly also a knowledge of French linguists, of the French grammaire gen
306

Let us now consider the third main theme or thread that ran through our discussions in this symposium. It is the internal analysis of the Ver­ schiedenheiten, of Humboldt's Verschiedenheit, and the analysis of the relationship between Humboldt and Leibniz. It would appear to me that we have a fairly good idea, after this sym­ posium, of the books on Humboldt's bureau (to use Trabant's image). There was certainly Leibniz, as Trabant himself has clearly demonstrated. And then there was a whole series of works the heterogeneity of which reflects - and perhaps explains by itself - the oscillations and waverings so characteristic of Humboldt's writings. I am not simply speaking of the longitudinal oscillations, i.e. , the changes in time; that would be of little consequence. I am speaking of the waverings and even radical changes of perspective that may be found from one page to the other - not in differ­ ent points of a single book but, as is the case with Saussure, on a single page! Perhaps we can comment on this fad more amply in the Italian edi­ tion of Humboldt that Donatella Di Cesare is preparing. Whoever has tried to translate Humboldt into another language - the English translator comes to mind, as does the French translator - knows how difficult it is to 3.0

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cultivating their own minds, their own independence, their own freedom, their own disciplinary studies; and this eclectic gathering together of indi­ vidual scholarship is a metaphor of how Humboldt proceeds when he attempts to explain what language is, what linguistic education should be, how political society should be organized to exploit the vast potential of language in order to further develop the infinite freedom of the mind. This, needless to say, is not in Leibniz, nor could it be. And yet, there is a certain continuity, in fact an important continuity. Trabant pointed out a few elements, among which I would like to recall the notion of mixtura et corruptio taken as a value. Pott, too, seemed to have liked Humboldt's treatment of this notion as well as Humboldt's exemplification of the Italian language as mixtum and corruptum, Rome being considered the prime center of linguistic corruptio and thus the linguistic capital of Italy.

the "boo" or if anyone did, he didn't realize what it meant.) So, how is it, then, that the model of understanding inherited from Franz Bopp (17911867) , Hermann Osthoff (1847-1909) and Karl Brugmann (1849-1919) fell to pieces at the slightest impact with Chomsky? How is it that the only islands of resistance to the Chomskyan onslaught in the 1960s and 1970s were to be found - not among the hardy comparativists and so-called his­ torians but rather among the scattering of linguists who still held, declaredly or implicitly, that the interplay of systematic correspondences was not to be taken as a value in itself, but rather as a possible application of a philosophical vision which was much more articulated and much more complex. That vision saw languages as historical processes. Thus, in order to understand our today in order to build our tomorrow (as Nietzsche has so admirably taught us), we have to understand just what Humboldt's notion of 'linguistic comparison', so rich and detailed, came to mean after him. The richness was left to one side, and only the detailed, analytical work was kept - Pott himself set the example. His Etymologische Forschungen (1833-36; 1859-762) are a crucial text; they take a stand against any talk of meaning and syntax and ordain that a proper linguistic study should concern only phonetics and morphology.

Finally, we come to the fourth and last recurrent theme in our sym­ posium: the fracture separating Humboldt from what followed him. Paolo Ramal did an excellent job of defining Humboldt's position: like that of others it is a position of transition, although more than that.. But in order to understand linguistics today, I think we should try to find the discriminating factors which have made Humboldt the first and forgotten archangel of the future Humboldtian linguistics which Donatella Di Cesare's generation of linguists will give us, as well as the last spokesman of a great linguistic tradi­ tion beginning in the 17th century. Moreover, the concept of 'comparison' could probably stand to be explored in greater depth. Swiggers, Ramat, Coseriu, Auroux have given us precious and instructive analyses which distinguish the words 'compari­ son' and 'comparative' in the 18th century and then after Humboldt. And I would agree that, as was pointed out so clearly, Humboldt's 'comparison' is basically an 18th-century concept; what we would consider 'comparison' stricto sensu, i.e., in the way Bopp or the Neogrammarians did, is only a section or instrument of Humboldt's philosophical comparison. But I believe there is more to be grasped in the transformation of the concept of 'comparison'. How is it, for example, that the myriad of empiricists and his­ torians that filled the universities in Germany, Russia, France and America forgot all their principles and became devout Chomskyans, at least for a few years, when one day Professor Chomsky said "boo!" (It didn't happen in Italy, but only because of the cultural isolation and little familiarity with English that characterized the country in those years; no one even heard 4.0

This last point permits me to conclude my remarks with a working proposal: that is, an encounter on the change in the notion of 'comparison' after Humboldt. Another possible theme for an encounter, if you prefer, could be the point brought home by Coseriu and Gensini, one that I am particularly fond of and which might help us bridge the gap between historians of lin­ guistic thought and historians of European culture and political life. I am speaking, in Kuhnian terms , of the Epicurean paradigm. Epicurean linguistics assigned to the physis the possibility of construct­ ing various languages and thus different scientific elaborations, the prole­ pseis and all intellectual endeavor. Materialist and naturalist, Epicurean lin­ guistics circulated widely throughout Europe - openly in England , a free country, and undercover in Italy and Germany, where there was much less freedom. (There was however still enough freedom for Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) to establish contact with Neapolitan epicureans in the 17th cen­ tury, to give but one example.) Now, the question is: What influence did the re-discovery of the fifth book of Lucretius have on the philosophy of language in the 17th and 18th 5.

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centuries? I already mentioned the influence on Leibniz, and then on Hum­ boldt, of the rapid development of the sciences, among which the historical sciences. This new model of knowledge, joined to the discovery of what Vico called 'sterminate antichitil' (infinite regression of the past) created a shock, a feeling of alienation from the historical present which, in a uni­ verse considered to be only 5000 years old, had previously been thought to occupy a significant slice of cosmic time. The discovery of the endless reaches of what we know to be cosmic time certainly weighed on the cos­ mographies of that period, but also on such historical endeavors as the clas­ sification of languages. Perspectives changed. New models were needed to generate faits of interest to science and philosophy. It would therefore seem worthwhile to study the bestioni of Epicureans in relation to the rise of the linguistic sciences. There was a general move­ ment to desecrate all institutions - law, state, monarchies - which the French and Anglo-Saxons put into practice and which the Italians and Ger­ mans, not in a position to start revolutions, elaborated theoretically . . . and not too badly at times.

Index Nominum

A. Aarsleff, H. 5, 10-11, 57n, 77, 88, 90-91, 123, 149-150, 152n, 291n, 302 Adam 63-64, 66 Adelung, J.Chr. 10, 204, 216, 228 Aldrete, B. 288 Alembert, J. le Rond d' 93 Alighieri, D. 86 Ambrosio, T. 14 Antinucci, F. 201 Arens, H. 3, 120 Aristotle 190, 195, 213, 236, 304 Arlotto, A.T. 290n Arnauld, A. 39, 42 Arndt, H.W. 49 Ascoli, G.!. 253 Augustinus 103-104, 106 Auroux, S. 219, 225, 234, 236, 302-303, 308 B. Bacher, W. 283 Bahner, W. 200-202, 204-205 Balbi, A. 216, 228 Barba, M. 269 Barber, W.H. 123 Beatus Rhenanus: see Rhenanus, B. Beauzee, N. 220, 226-227, 230, 235 Becanus, G.: see Gorp, J. van Becker, K.F. 207 Bembo, P. 40 Benes, B. 161, 174n Benfey, Th. 87-88, 95, 120, 125, 150, 199, 204-205, 240-242, 290n Benveniste, E. 286 Benzel, E. 19

Beregszaszi, P. 124 Berezin, F.M. 17-18 Bernard, E. 14 Bernegger, M. 4 Bernhardi, A.F. 163, 242 Bernier, F. 18 Bertrand, E. 223 Besnier, P. 219, 288-289 Bickerton, D. 289 Biondelli, B. 302 Bittner, K. 14 Bloomfield, L. 94, 240 Boas, F. 287 Boehme, J. 63, 119, 121 Boes, A. 225, 234, 236 Bonfante, G. 5, 61, 86 Bopp, F. 15, 93-95, 147, 150, 174n, 185, 189, 199, 201-203, 207, 237, 240-241, 246, 255-257, 263-264, 283, 286, 290n, 302, 308-309 Boretzky, N. 289 Borrichius, 0. 291n Borsche, T. USn, 116n, 139, 142, 151n, 153n, 272 Borst, A. 6, 61, 86, 115n, 121 Bourdieu, P. 281 Boxhorn, M. 12-13, 23, 120 Braude!, F. 304 Breal, M. 150, 289, 302 Brenner, H. 19 Brerewood, E. 5 Brosses, Ch. de 21, 150, 217, 219, 221, 234, 236 Brugmann, K. 126, 205, 309 Bullet, J.-B. 218 Burkhardt, H. 43, 45, 54n, 56n Burnett, J. (Lord Monboddo) 216

312

INDEX NOMINUM

Bursill-Hall, G.L. 52n Busbecq, O.G. de 15 Bynon, Th. 85n, 239, 29Jn

li l ll

C. Callewaert, J. 17 Cannon, G .H. 290n Carra de Vaux, B. 218 Cartesius: see Descartes, R. Cassirer, E. 71, 83, 161-162, 270 Castets, J. C. 290n Catherine II 10 Cayet de Palma, P.V. 14 Celakovsky, L. 228 Celtis, C. 3 Chafe, W.L. 129 Champollion, J.F. 187 Cherubim, D. 206 Chevalier, J.-C. 54n, 281 Chomsky, N.A. 189, !95n, 240, 308-309 Christy, C. 268 Cicero 253 Clauberg, J. 68 Cluvier, J. 23 Coeurdoux, G.L. 282-283, 290n Cohen, M. 4 Collinder, B. 4 Collinge, N.E. 29Jn Comenius, J.A. 6-7, 9, 22, 28 Condillac, E. Bonnot de 143 Copernicus, N. 236 Cordemann, G.F. 11 Corvin, M. 16 Coseriu, E. 158-160, 167, 173, 173n, 174n, 266, 282, 288, 291n, 302, 305309 Cosimo III de' Medici 10 Court de Gebelin, A. 150, 216, 218-219, 221, 225, 228, 232-237 Couturat, L. 62, 74 Cruciger, G. 12-13 Cuvier, G. 244

lld

D. d'Alernbert: see Alemhert

I,

'

II� ',, i

1'\ :

-U

Dalgamo, G. 37, 40, 53n, 63, 67, 79, 152n Dante: see Alighieri, D. Darnell, R. 287 Dascal, M. 52n, 53n, 55n, 56n, 74, 306 Davanzati, B . 290n Davies, J. 23 De Guignes, J. 221-223 De Laet, J. 120 De Mauro, T. !50, 158, 206 Delbriick, B. 240, 257 Denina, C. 232 Derrida, J. 187, 192, 197 Descartes, R. (Cartesius) 64, 105-106, 206 Desirat, C. 97 Di Cesare, D. 306-308 Diderot, D. 93 Diez, F. !99 Diogenes Laertius 73 Dominicy, M. 53n Dressler, W.U. 291n· Droixhe, D . 61, 71, 120, 124, 224, 283, 290n, 29Jn Ducange, Ch. 230 Duponceau, P.S. 97 Duret, C. 217 Durrerus, A. 52n E. Eckhardt, J.G. von 6, 17, 80, 307 Egenolff, J.A. 23 Emeneau, M.B. 287 Encreve, P. 281 Engel, J.J. 135 Engels, F. 204 Engler, R. 215 Epicurus 71-73, 83, 309, 310 Erasmus of Rotterdam 22 Estienne, Ch. 89 Etter, E.-L. 3 Eyben, H. von 11 F. Fabricius, L. 19-20 Falcone!, C. 219

INDEX NOMINUM Fantoni, T. 15 Fazekas, T. 24n Fechner, Th. 270 Feller, J.F. 11, 89 Feugere, L. 89 Fichte, J.G. 181 Filastrio da Brescia 71 Finck, F.N. !60 Fischer, J.E. 124-125, 129 Fleischer, W. 205 Fogel, M. 5, 8, 9-10, 22, 28, !50 Formigari, L. 51n, 173n, 199-200, 203, 207, 301 Foucault, M. 282, 290n Francke, Th.A. 290n Frege, G. !94n Freinsheim, J. 4 Friedrich, P. 29Jn Fulda, F.K. 235 G. Gabelentz, H. C. von der 207 Galilei, G. 223, 236 Gallet, F. 228 Gamkrelidze, T. 288 Gaon, S. 291n Gassendi, P. 73 Gatterer, J.Ch. 124 Gauger, H.M. 288 Geiger, T. 92 Gensini, S. 78, 200, 29ln, 306, 309 Gerholm, L. 24n Gesner, K. 216 Gessinger, J. 203 Gipper, H. 158-159, 242 Girard, G., abbe 226 Giuliani, M.V. 54n Godfrey, J .J. 290n Goethe, J.W. 161-162, 165, 173, 174n, 307 Golius, J. 63, 67 Goropius Becanus: see Gorp, J. van Gorp, J. van 89 Granval 221 Grape, A. 12 Greenberg, J. 97

313

Grimaldi, le Pere 16 Grimm, J. 19, 93, 147, 185, 188, 199, 20!-207, 241, 245, 247, 255, 257, 263 Gronov, A. 4 Grote, T. 19 Grotius, H. 120 Guerrier, W. 10 Guichard, E. 220-221 Gulya, J. 24n, 125, !30n Gunther, H. 195n Gyarmathi, S. 8, 125, 127, 237, 241, 245 H. Haarmann, H. 150 Hagege, C. 285 Halhed, N.B. 93 Halogoland, 0. de 4 Hamann, J.G. 206 Hamilton, A. 242, 256-257 Hampshire, S. 89 Hand, F. 52n, 53n Hanzeli, V.E. 8 Hardt, H. von der 71 Hassler, G. 207 Haugen, E. 289 Hauteraies, M.A.A. le Rouix des 221 Heckewelder, J.G.E. 97 Hegel, G.W.F. 268 Heinekamp, A . 63-65, 115n, 145, 152n, !53n Hellen 85 Helmholtz, H. von 270 Herbart, J.F. 268, 270, 272-273 Herberstein, S. von 16 Herder, J.G. 88, 150, 151n, 181, 184, 186, J95n, 200, 204, 243, 252, 307 Herodotus !03 Herv;!s y Panduro, L. 150, 216-217, 228, 245, 303, 307 Heyse, W.L. 207, 267-268 Hirschfeld, H. 283 Hjelmslev, L. !67, 173 Hobbes, Th. Jl5n, 152n Hockett, Ch.F. 85 Hoenigswald, H.M. 97, 127, 290n Homer 174n

314

INDEX NOM!NUM

INDEX NOMINUM

Home, K.M. 288 Hotman de la Tour, F. 4 Humboldt, A. von 248 Humboldt, W. von 85, 92, 94-98, 102· 103, 109-115, 116n, 117, 125, 127-128, 135-150, 151n, 152n, 153n, 155-162, 164-173, 174n, 181· 192, 194, 196-197, 200-203, 206-207, 210, 240, 249, 256· 257, 263, 265, 266-269, 278, 280, 284· 286, 302-303, 306-310 Hunfalvy, P. 6, 8 Hymes, D.H. 281, 287 !. Ihre, J. 12, 221 lomandes 4-5 !valdo, M. 161 Ivanov, V.V. 288 J. Jacob, A. 3 Jager, A. 88 Jager, L. 307 Jakobson, Fl. 97, 149, 158, 173 Jaucourt, L. de 224 Jenisch, D. 241 Jolley, N. 75 Jones, W. 85, 93, 123, 126-128, 223, 242, 245-246, 252, 255, 282, 290n Julius Caesar 4 Jungius, J. 53n Justel, H. 20 K. Kangro, H. 9, 53 Kanne, J.A. 241 Kant, I. 111, 138, 142, 156, 163, 173n, 181, 183-184, 189, 197, 242, 267, 307 Katriel, T. 52n Kautsky, K. 199 Kirchmaier, G.G. 23 Klin, E. 257 Kneale, M. 52n Kneale, W. 52n Kochanski, A. 14-15, 18, 22, 28 Koerner, E.F.K. 239, 257

Korner. J. 244 Koyre, A. 130, 223, 281 Krahe, H. 92, 291n Kraus, Chr.J. 245 Kretzmann, N. 52n Kuhn, Th.S. 93, 125, 281, 309 Kukenheim, L. 57n Kurylowicz, J. 286 L. La Loubere, S. de 21 Lachmann, K.F. W. 201 Lafitau, J.F. 221, 226 Lako, G. 8 Lamarck, J.-B. 244, 251 Land, S.K. Sin Langlois, Ch.V. 281 Lanjuinais, J.D. de 236 Larucea de Tovar, C. 87 Lassen, C. 236 Le Brigant, J. 221 Lefmann, S. 94-95 Lehmann, W.P. 291n Leibniz, G.W. 3, 5, 28, 31·32, 34-57, 60· 69, 71-80, 83, 85, 87· 93, 95, 97-98, 102-114, 115n, 117, 119-125, 128, 135· 150, 151n, 152n, 153n, 156, 158, 163, 195n, 201 , 206, 218, 222, 239-240 , 245, 254, 263, 283-284, 289, 291n, 302-308, 310 Leitzmann, A. 201 Leroux, Fl. 161 Leroy, M. 70, 301 Liebrucks, B. 142 Linnaeus, C. 24.3-244 Lo Piparo, F. 301 Locke, J. 31·34, 36, 51n, 55n, 57n, 68· 69, 108, 139, 143, 152n, 206 Lohmann, J. 115 Lomonossov, M.V. 17 Lotze, H. 270 Lucretius 71· 72, 83, 309 Ludolf, H. !1, 14, 16, 20-21, 23, 61, 71, 91-92, 120·121, 123, 283 Lundkvist, S. 24n

M. Malebranche 106 Mallet, E. 221 Malte-Brun, C. 216 Marino, L. 161 Markey, T.L. 288 Marmontel, J.F. 220 Martinet, A. 24n Mayrhofer, M. 290n Mechovia, M. de 16 Mecho)V, W. 16 Meier, G. 14, 71 Meillet, A. 4, 282·283, 287, 291n Menze, C. 151n, 152n, 153n Merton, R.K. 281 Metcalf, G.J. 61, 71, 119·121 Menage, G. 73, 219, 230, 235 Michaelis, J.D. 11 Michel de Marbais 52 Michou: see Mechovia Miechow: see Mechovia Misteli, F. 26 Molnar, A. 8 Monboddo: see Burnett, J . Morhof, D.G. 11, 89, 121 Morpurgo Davies, A. 127, 159, 248, 251, 288 Moses ben Asher, A . 291n Mounin, G. 25n, 125 Mueller, H.J. 87-88 Mugnai, M. 74 Mukherjee, S.N. 290n Mullins, N.C. 281 Muller, J . c. 120, 130n, 283, 290n, 291n Murray, S.O. 281 .

N. Nansen-Diaz, E. 174n Neumann, G. 247 Neumann, W. 200-201 , 204·205, 255 Nicole, P. 39, 42 Nietzsche, F. 281, 309 Nizolio, M. 79, 303 Noah 90 Noreen, A. 19 Niisse, H. 243-244

315

o.

Ockham: see William of Ockham Olesch, R. 14 Oliveira, F. de 288, 291n Orbigny, Ch. d' 216 Orlandi, T. 290 Orosz, R. 16 Ostergren, S. 24n Osthoff, H. 205, 309 P. Padley, G.A. 87 Pagliaro, A. 302 Pallas, P.S. 150 Papay, J. 5, 16 Parsons, J. 221 Passmore, J. 281 Paul, H. 205-206, 247, 270 Paulinus a S. Bartholomaeo 282, 290n Paulus Diaconus 6 Pedersen, H. 240 Peirce, Ch.S. 186, 195n, 281 Pereire, J. 228 P6rion, J. 89 Perret, J. 4 Peter the Great 21 Petraeus, E. 5 Peysonnel , C.Ch. de 222 Pezron, P. 20 Philo Alexandrinus 104 Piccolomini, E.S. 3, 16 Pickering, J. 87 Pius II: see Piccolomini, E.S. Plutarch 85 Poggi, S. 267 Poliakov, L. 23 Poser, H. 115n Pott, A.F. 92, 125, 159, 264, 302, 308· 309 Prasch, J.L. 89 Preti, G. 74 Priscian 36, 38 Ptolemaeus, C. 236 Puglielli, A. 54n Pyramus de Candolle , A. 244

316

INDEX NOMINUM

Q. Queixalos, F. 219 R. Ramal, P. 158-159, 167, 173n, l,74n, 199-200, 204, 207, 288, 303, 307-308 Ramus, P. ( P. de Ia Ramee) 53n Rask, D.R.K. 93, 125, 207, 234, 241, 255-256, 263 Reeland, A. 225 Renzi, L. 158, 173n, 174n, 288 Reuchlin, J. 53n Rhenanus, B. 6, :is Richer, A. 6 Richter, L. 21 Robins, R.H. 3, 38, 40, 52n, 53n, 86, 158, 173n Rocher, L. 290n Rocher, R. 290n Rossi, P. 61, 71 Rousseau, J. 290n Rubruquis: see Ruysbroek Rudbeck, 0. the younger 22 Rudbeck, the older 23 Ruscelli, G. 40 Russell, B. 89 Ruysbroeck, G. de ( Rubruquis) 17 =

=

s.

Sajnovics, J. 124-125, 127 Salmon, P.B. 252; 254 Salmon, V. 53n Sanchez de las Brozas, F.: see Sanctius, F. Sanctius, F. 40, 53n, 54n, 57n Sapir, E. 97, 287 Sassetti, F. 283 Saumaise, C. 120, 283, 289 Saussure, F. de 215, 242, 257, 306-307 Savigny, F.C. de 206 Scaliger, J.C. 53n Scaliger, J.J. 5-7, 28, 86, 123 Schaeve, H . 13 Scharf, H.W. 142, 195n Scheffer, J. 5. 8-9

Schellhase, K.C. 6 Schelling, F.W.J. 174n, 203-204, 206, 243, 307 Scherer, W. 205 Schiller, F. 164, 181 Schlegel, A.W. von 96, 159, 173n, 188, 200, 250, 252, 256-257, 264 Schlegel, F. von 97, 128, 147-148, 159, 164, 173n, 174n, 200, 239, 243-251, 253-257, 264, 287 Schleicher, A. 90, 127, 228, 239, 257, 263, 283, 286, 291n Schlozer, A.L. 123-125, 130 Schmalstieg, W.R. 291n Schmidt, F. 49 Schmitt, R. 282 Schmitter, P. 158-159, 242 Schoppe, K. 40, 53n, 57n Schottel, J.G. 23, 63 Schrieckius, A. 283, 289 SchrOder, E. 5 Schuchardt, H. 253, 287 Schulenburg, S . von der 10, 22, 61, 7071, 80, 87-90, 92, 121, 130n, 150, 291n Schulze, B. 283, 290n Schurharnrner, G. 291n Seignobos, Ch. 281 Setala, E.N. 6-8, 10, 19 Sgall, P. 173n Shevoroshkin , V.V. 288 Sicard, R.A.C., abbe 228 Siger de Courtrai 52n Skalicka, V. 160, 166-167, 173, 173n, 174n Skytte, B . 10-13, 28 Smith, A. 158-159 Sonderegger, S. 202, 207 Sorlin, P. 24 Sparwenfeld, J.G. 12, 18, 20, 22, 28 Spinoza, B. 53n Stehr, A. 5-6, 20-21 Steinthal, H. 96, 160, 174n, 207, 263265, 268-269, 280 Stephens, R. 283 Stephens, T. 283, 291n

317

INDEX NOMINUM Stetter, Chr. 181, 185, 307 Stewechius, G. 52n Stiernhielm, G. 7-8, 10-12, 28, 71, 88, 289 Stipa, G.J. 7, 28 Strahlenberg, P.J. von 18 Strattrnann, Th.A.H. von 73 Struc-Oppenberg, U. 240, 244, 256 Sweet, P.R. 95, 97, 239, 242 Swiggers, P. 53n, 167, 202, 281-285, 287, 291n, 308 Sydow, C.-0. von 24n

Vater, J.S. 200, 216, 228, 242 Veenker, W. 8�9 Venantius Fortunatus 24n Vendryes, J. 129 Verburg, P.A. 115n, 302 Verlato, M. 204 Vertes, A.O. 7 Veyssiere de La Croze, N .M. 14 Vico, G.B. 68, 71, 73, 83, 124, 309-310 Volney, C.F.C. de 215 Vossius, G. J. 53n Vrieze, F.S. de 10

T. Tacitus 3-4, 6, 23, 28 Tatiscev, V.N. 17 Telegdi, Z. 159-160 Tentzel, W.H. 11, 16 Tene, D. 283 Thevet, A. 215 Thomassin, L. 22 Timpanaro, S. 240-246, 251-255 Tischler, J.T. 15 Tornaeus, J. 5 Trabant, J. 116n, 142-143, 146, 149, 151n, 152n, 162, 164, 204, 207, 284, 306, 308 Tr6ster, J. 10 Trubetzkoy, N.S. 286 Turgot, A.R.J. 125, 127, 214, 219, 222, 224, 233 Tursellinus, H. 37, 52n, 53n Twaddell, W.F. 257

w.

u.

Uhlig, G. 85-86 Ulphilas 8, 218 v.

Vailati, G. 74 Varro, M. T. 92

Wachter, J.G. 14 Walton, I. 14 Waterman, J.T. 11, 14-15, 19, 291n Watkins, C. 291n Weinreich, U. 289 Welcker, F.G. 157 Wells, R.S. 290n Wierzbicka, A. 32, 52n Wieselgren, H. 6, 90 Wiesinger, P. 202, 207 Wilkins, J . 37-39, 41, 54n, 63, 67, 79, 152n William of Ockham 52n William of Sherwood 52n Windischrnann, K.J.H. 150, 201, 255 Witsen, N. 18 Wittgenstein, L. 183, 194n, 195n Wolff, Chr.F. von 125 Wotton, W. 254-255 Wouters, A. 282 Wundt, W. 270 ·

Y. Young, G. 187 Z. Zsirai, M. 4, 8, 125

Index Rerum

A. Adjective 43, 51n Adverb 36, 38-39, 41-44, 47-48, 52n Affect 107 Affinity 223, 233 Affix 42, 249 affictional 251 affixation 250 Agglutinative (agglutinierende) 159, 171 Algebra 46 Alphabet of human thoughts 35 Amazons 18 Ambiguity 33-34, 36-37, 40 Ana/ogia: see Analogy Analogie: see Analogy Analogy 121, 124, 127, 129, 161, 166168, 182, 184, 186, 289 gemeischaftliche Analogie 172 network of analogies 165, 168 analogical 64, 165 analysis logica 53n Analytic 250 Ancestor 231 common � 250 Anthropology 111, 162 philosophical - 162-163 anthropological 170 Apperception 272 Arabs 22 arbitraire du signe 136, 143-144 Arbitrariness 51n, 57n, 83 arbitrary 66-68 arbre geneatogique 228 Article 38 Articulation 182, 184, 186 Aspect 56 Astrakans 16

Ausbi/dungsperiode 141 Autonomy 138 Axiom of historicity 222 B. Babel 61, 121, 144, 254 Basic vocabulary 119-121, 127 Bastarnae 4 Bau, organischer 147-148, 165, 167, 182, 184 innerer 248 Berliner Akademie 137, 151n, 152n, 155-156 Bilingualism 289 Biology 243 Biscayans 21 Borrowings 223, 253 Botanic 243 Bretons 4 but 34 -

c.

caractere des langues 138 Case 39, 43 case inflections 37�38, 40 cases of nouns 41 Categoremata 37 categorematic 36, 51n Celts 4 Change(s) 224, 289 systematic - 282 dimension of - 215 internal principle of - 224 Characteristica universalis 47, 49, 78, 107, 145 Cheremiss 16 Chronology 307

320

INDEX RERUM

Circassians 16 Class 160, 170, 172 Classification 35, 172, 173n1 220, 264266, 269, 276 - of languages 160, 172, 244 typological - 127, 251 Cognitio obscura 74 intuitiva 74 - clara confusa 74, 78 - dara distincta 74, 78 - adaequata 74 Cogitatio caeca vel etiam symbolica 14 Comparatism: see Comparativism Comparative 308 - anatomy 243 - anthropology 161 - grammar 129, 257, 282 - linguistics 85, 303 (see also: Linguistics) - method 126, 128, 200 - morphology 161 --historical linguistics 199, 257 Comparativism 6, 31, 49, 51, 60, 129, 159, 161, 163, 167-168, 185, 237, 241242, 282, 307-309 Comparison: see Comparativism Compilations 215 Compounds 253 Concept 111, 113-114 Conjunction 32, 35-36, 38-44, 47 coordinative - 41 subordinative - 41 Connection 121, 161 Consignifications 37 Contacts 223 Continuist conception of linguistic movement 226 Convention 72, 79 Conventionalism 63 Copula 38, 41-43, 46-48 Correspondence(s) 129 Persian-Germanic -- 15 systematic -- 309 corruptio 149, 303, 308 �

�

Creativity human - 161-163 linguistic - 168 D. Data 221 (see also: donnees) Decay 128 .Declinable 36 de/initio nomina/is 78 Definition 34-35 densite de villes 304 Derivation 121, 214 Derived 253 Descendants 128 Descent 126-127 Dictionary 44, 50 mental - 206 Diffusionist model 215, 225, 230 Discourse 112-115, 151n formal - 306 formalized - 306 mental - 31-33 verbal - 32 Diversity 161-162 - of languages 68, 77, 136, 157, 162, 169, 173, 265, 267 - of people 72, 83 donnees 302 (see also: Data) E. Einbildungskraft: see Imagination einverleibende: see Incorporating Empirical - base 218 - datum 218 Encyclopedia 79 Encyc/opi!die 220 energeia 267 English 21 Epicurean(s) 309-310 - linguistics 309 - paradigm 309 Epistemic - turn 37 - viewpoint 32

321

INDEX RERUM Epistemology 307 Equivalence 226 Erkenntnis: see Knowledge ergon 267 Erscheinung: see Phenomenon Essences real - 32-33, 51n Etymology 34, 49, 57n, 77, 86, 90-91, 93, 97, 102, 119-120, 219 etymological 92, 214 Europeans 303 Evolution 244 biological - 207 evolutive 253 Externalism 303 external history 253 external stimuli 303 F. figure 230, 234 Finns 4-6, 20-21, 23 Fixity of species 244 Flectional 251 (see also: Inflectional) Form!Form 161, 165-168, 170, 264-265, 267, 269, 271, 273, 277 formal - 274 grammatical ....,. : see Grammatical linguistic - 31, 45-47, 60 logical - 45-46 material - 274 - of a sentence 37 - of discourse 44 Lautfonn 269, 274 Sprachform: see Sprachfonn Formal - discourse: see Discourse - languages: see Languages Formalization 80 Formalized - discourse: see Discourse - language: see Language Formation 161, 165, 167 principle of - 165-168 Formung: see Formation Freedom 170, 309 Freiheit: see Freedom

G. Gebiet 173 Gelegenheit 108-110 Genealogical - tree 252 - relations 146-147 Genetic affiliation 251, 255, 288 Genitive 45, 54n Genius of the language 254 Geology 243 Germanic Philology 307 Germans 4, 15, 310 Germination 226 Geschichte: see History Geschichtlichkeit: see Historicity Gesetzmiifligkeit (see also: Regularity) 170 Glottogeny 252 God 104, 108, 113-114 Goths 4 Government 41, 47 Grammaire generale et raisonnee 37�38, 42, 242 Grammar 44, 49-50, 119, 127, 148, 163, 167-168, 174n, 217 comparative - 147, 242, 282-283, 288-289' 302 general - 218, 222, 245, 307 historical - 200 philosophical - 38, 50, 57 rational - 35, 49-50 (see also: Grammaire generate et raisonnee) speculative 36 Grammatical differences 163 - form 168, 284, 286 - function 275 - structure 120, 168, 283 - subject 275 Greeks 21, 126, 158, 162 Grimm's law 91 Growth 128 Grundrichtigkeit 63 �

�

H. harmonia 77

322

INDEX RERUM

History (Geschichte) 106, 108-109 - of ideas 301 - of languages 216, 263 ,....., of linguistic ideas 302 - of linguistic research(es) 301-303 - of linguistic thought 301 historical 75, 246-247, 253 Historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) 77, 83 105 Historiography 307 Hungarians 5, 15, 20-22 Huns 22 L

Idee 106, 109, 111-112 idee de langue 307 Illocutionary force 31 Imagination (Einbildungskraft) !82-183 Incorporating (einverleibende) 159, 171 Indeclinable 36-37, 52n Indetermination 78, 80 Individual 171-172 - speech 170 Individuality 76, 109, 112, 114-115, 161, 165, 169-172 Individuum 76, 169 Inflection (inflexion) 37, 42, 49, 52n, 249-250 inflectional (flexierende) 159, 171, 174n (see also: Flectional) Innatism 76 Innovation(s) 127, 130, 227 inopia 69 Institutions 219 Interjection 36, 38-39 Internal - development 303 Interpretation 106, 113-114 Isolating (isolierende) 159 Italians 310 ],

Junggrammatiker: see Neogrammarians K. Kalmuks 16

Karelians 4 Kazans 16 Knowledge (Erkenntnis) 104-108, 111, 113 ordinary - 305 L. Language Adamic - (lingua Adamica) 120121, 141, 145 ancient - (lingua antiqua) 141 animal - 72 artificial - 40 common - 75 formalized - 306 human - 72, 83 mother - 23, 61, 71 ordinary - 305 organic-primitive - 221 (see also: primitive -) origin of - 63-64, 67, 142, 206 original - 142· philosophical - 40, 50, 79 primitive ...... 72 scientific - 79 universal - 105-106, 114, 135, 145, 206 Language affiliation 245 Language contact 253 Language kinship 146, 148, 203 Language policy 304 Languages analogous - 226 artificial - 37, 63, 67 foreign - 303 formal - 304 hegemonic - 303 historical-natural - (lingue storiconaturali) 62, 69, 74, 78-79 local - 304 national -- 304 new - 149 plurality of - 61-62 transpositive - 226 Lapps 3, 5-6, 18, 22 Latins 21

INDEX RERUM Law 232, 289 Lexicon 52n, 148 lingua A'damica: see Language, Adamic lingua antiqua: see Language, ancient lingue storico�naturali: see Languages, historical�natural Linguistic - families 230 - identity 226 - type 282, 286 (see also: Type) - typology 288 (see also: Typology) Linguistics historical - 231, 257 historical-comparative - 158, 255 (see also: Comparative) Uvs 20-21 Logic 49 M. Materialism 73 Matter --- of a sentence 37 --- of discourse 44 Meaning 69-70, 72, 75, 306, 309 Mechanical (mechanisch) 243, 250-251 Merkma/swort 275 Metaplasm 230 Method 171-172, 282, 305 Methode: see Method methode: see Method mixtura: see Mixture Mixture 149, 224, 253, 308 Mobility 214 genetic - 222 positive - 222 Modality 48, 114 possible worlds/real world 114 modele d'objet 302 modus significandi 36 Monad 75-77 Monadology 144 Monogeneticism 7, 61, 64, 146, 236, 255 Mood moods of verbs 45, 56n

323

imperative - 48 Morphology 162, 174n, 309 morphological 277 -- structure 247 --- markers 247 N. Name 38-39, 103-104, 110-111 Natur-Sprache 63 Natural 66-69, 75, 83 linguistic naturalism 203 natura/is origo 70 Need 72 Neogrammarians 204-206, 210, 213, 308 Noun 32, 37, 43-44, Sin 0. Obliquity 45 obliquely linked 39 Onomatopoeia 121, 271 onomatopeic - origin 141 - root 141, 144 Operations of the mind I mental opera­ tions 32-35, 39, 42, 55n Organ 181 Organic 174n, 243, 249, 250-251 organic whole 165-166 Organism (Organismus) 148, 152n, 161, 172, 174n, 242-244, 269 Organisationsperiode 141-149 origines gentium 138-140, 146 P. Paradigm 125, 309 Parsimony, principle of 34-35 partes orationis: see Parts of speeCh Participle 38 Particles 37, 60 Parts of speech, parts of discourse (partes orationis) 31, 35, 38, 42, 52n, 53n, 57n (see also under individual parts of speech) Perfection 128 Periphrase 35, 37 Permians 20

324

INDEX RERUM

Peucini: see Bastarnae Phenomenon (Erscheinung) 110, 113114 Philosophy of language 203, 282 Phoenicians 237 Phonetic law(s) 200, 231, 245 Phonetics 309 physis 309 Point of view 76 Polygeneticism 145, 252 Positivism 210 Predication 274-275 Preposition 35-36, 38-39, 41-44, 47, 53n spatial - 38 Procedure (Sprachverfahren) 169, 171 Pronoun 38, 41., 44-46, 52n interrogative 48 Propositional attitudes 32 Psychology - of language 207 psychological 267-268, 276-277 ......

Q. Quantifiers 36, 46, 48 R. Realism 63 Reconstruction 122-123, 126, 128-129, 141 internal - 129 Rede: see Speech, Discourse Reductive analysis 35 Referential 225, 233 Regularity 170 Relations 42-44, 47 Relativism linguistic - 206 Resemblances 245 Retention(s) 126, 128, 130 Romans 158, 303 Romanticism 158, 210 Root 235, 248 s.

Samoyeds 16, 20 Samiatians 5. 15

Scandinavians 18 Schematisierung 186 Schrift: see Writing Semantic onnifonnativity 79, 80, 83 Semantics 62, 78, 269, 305 Semiotics 57n Sensibility 76, 83 Sentences 306 Siberians 19 Siculi 14 Sign 104-107, 113, 136, 306 Singularity 161 Slavs 5, 22 Societates doctorum 306 Societe de Linguistique de Paris 206 Species species civiles 306 possible - 306 universal - 306 Speech 112-115, 168-171, 174n, 182, 186, 191 Speech act 32, 169, 267 Sprachbau 160 Sprachfahigkeit 267 Sprachform 160, 165, 269 Sprachidee 268, 307 Sprachkunde 135-136, 138-140, 151n, 181 Sprachsinn 185, 188, 191 Sprachverfahren: see Procedure Stamm 173 Stammbaum 252 sterminate antichitil 310 Stufengang der Sprachen 249 Structuralism 162 Structure (Struktur) 148, 161, 163, 165, 243, 245, 249-250 grammatical -: see Grammatical logical - 31 tree - 225 Struktur: see Structure Substratum theory 253 Sueves 4 Syncategoremata 37, 48, 52n syncategorematic 36

INDEX RERUM Syntax 37, 53n, 174n, 309 syntactic connection 168-169, 173, 174n Synthesis 142 Synthetic 250 System 243, 269 symbolic - 80 semantic 273 �

T. Tartars 19 (see also: Uzbeks�Tartars) Taxonomy plant - 244 Term 78, 221 termine: see Term Thought 163, 166, 173 Time 104, 112 Totality 161 trope 230 Type/Typus 160-161, 165-166, 171, 174n allgemeiner Redetypus 169 allgemeiner Typus 170 Constructionstypus 168 language - 161, 167, 173, 243, 248, 252 linguistic - 168, 172, 282, 286 morphological - 264 syntactic - 168-170 Typology 93, 129, 157-159, 167, 172173, 173n, 174n, 226, 257 typological 96-97, 102, 251 ...... comparison 172 - linguistics 161, 174n, 288 Typus: see Type u.

Uniformitarianism 128, 130 Unity 267 Universal 171 --- archeologist 234 ...... Characteristics: see Characteri� stica universalis harmony of languages 220 ..._

325

Universality 161, 170-172 Urtypus der Sprache 185 usus vulgaris 306 utilitas 72 Uzbeks-Tartars 16 (see also: Tartars) v.

Variability - of language 75, 80 - of meaning 70 Variety 83 --- of sensations 72 - of sounds 72 diathopic - 72 Veneti 4 Verb 37-39, 44 auxiliary - 36, 39, 41-42, 44 Verfahren: see Procedure Verschiedenheit 185, 306 (see also: Diversity) Verschiedenheiten 139, 306 Volkerpsychologie 268 Vo/kssprachen 267-268, 277 Vorstellung 270 Vorstellungswelt 273

w.

Wave theory 215 Weltansicht 143-144, 152n Wend 14 Word 183, 186, 288 Writing (Schrift) 190-193 z.

Ziculi: see Siculi Zusammenhang 164, 166

Index Linguarum

A. Altaic 90, 264, 277, 286 American Indian languages 124, 135, 163, 166, 217, 219, 247, 249, 264, 266, 277 Amerindian languages: see American Indian languages Anglo-Saxon 126, 310 Arabic 89, 215, 249-251 Aramaic 89, 146 Aranda 289 Armenian 14, 253 Austronesian languages 225 B. Basque 89-90, 95, 162-163, 249 Birman 264, 266 Breton 4, 12-13 Britannic 4 C. Caribbean 188, 215 Celtic 6, 15, 90, 92-93, 221; 226-227, 246-247 Chaldean 9 Cheremiss 16�17 Chinese 14, 128, 163, 172, 188, 192, 194, 221 , 228, 248 , 251, 255, 264, 266, 277, 285 Coptic 14, 249, 264, 277 Courlandais: see Latvian E. Egyptian 221, 255, 264, 277 English 12-13, 34, 53n, 126, 215, 227, 230, 251, 306, 308

Middle - 127 Modern - 127, 251 Estonian 4, 14, 19-20, 28 Et�iopic 255 Etruscan 222 European languages 89, 215, 223, 228, 237, 245-246, 255, 289 F. Finnish 3-6, 8, 10, 12-14, 20 , 22, 28, 215, 230, 245 Finno�Ugrian languages: see Finno­ Ugric languages Finno-Ugric languages 10, 12, 15, 19, 28-29, 90, 123-125, 289 Flemish Dutch 89 French 12, 34, 89, 93, 122,221, 226-227, 230, 302 Old - 122 Modern - 122 Norman -... 127 G. Georgian 56n German 12-13, 20, 28, 34, 50, 86-88, 9092,215, 230, 247, 253 Old High - 247, 264, 310 Low - 247 Germanic 15, 86, 92, 124-125, 221, 234, 246-248, 254 Gothic 7-8, 15, 246-247, 256 Greek 12-13, 85-86, 89-90, 92, 94, 127129, 173n, 223, 227-228, 230, 245, 247-249, 253-254, 264, 290, 303 Groenlandese 264

328

INDEX LINGUARUM

H. Hebrew 7, 9, 12-13, 22-23, 37, 53n, 61, 71, 86, 89-90, 121, 123, 228, 250-251, 254 Hindi 93 Hindustani 93 Hungarian 3, 6, 8, 12, 14, 20, 22, 28, 124, 145 I. Icelandic 247 lndic 223, 228, 246-249 (see also: Sanskrit) Indo-Aryan 126 Indo-European 90, 94-96, 98, 127-128, 228, 246, 251, 253, 255, 257, 264,266, 277' 285-286 Indo-Iranian 286 Indochinese 277 Indonesian 264 Italian 227, 230, 301, 306 J. Japanese 255 Japhetic 15, 89, 146 K. Kawi 94, 149 L. Lapp 4, 8, 215 Latin 5, 12-13, 34, 36, 50, 56n, 85-86, 89, 91-94, 124, 126, 128, 223, 226-228, 230-231, 246-248, 253-254, 256, 290 Latvian 8, 12, 215 Lettish: see Latvian Lithuanian 14 Livonian 19-20 M. Malay 225, 236, 266 Mexican language 167, 170, 172, 228, 264 (see also: Nahuatl) Mongolic 276 Mordvin 20

INDEX LINGUARUM

w.

N. Nahuatl 172 (see also: Mexican Ian� guage)

Tatar 15, 228 Teutonic, Old 34 Turkish 29, 215

Walachian 13 Welsh 23, 29

0. Oriental languages 254 Ostiak 16

u.

Uralo-Altaic languages 21, 227

z.

P. Permian 20, 28 Persian 9, 246-247 Polish 12-13 Polynesian languages 163, 225, 236, 264, 266, 277 Portuguese 231 Q. Quechua 250 R. Romance languages 86, 89, 92, 126, 227 s.

Samoyed 3, 8, 18, 22 Sanskrit 90, 93-95, 98, 126, 128, 172, 173n, 223, 245-246, 249, 253, 255-256, 285, 290 (see also: lndic) Saxon 247 Scottish 215 Scythian 15, 23-24, 89-90, 120, 130n Semitic languages 14, 89, 247, 250, 266, 277, 283, 286 Southern - 15 Serbo-Croatian 222 Siamese 21, 264 Siberian 124-125 Slavic 13-15, 18, 20, 23, 86, 215, 228, 246-247 Slavonic: see Slavic Spanish 227, 230 Swedish 5 , 12-13, 215 Syrian 215 T. Tahiti, language of 225 Tartar: see Tatar

v.

Vogul 16 Votyak 20

Zyryan 20

329

In the STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE LANGUAGE SCIENCES (SiHoLS) series (Series Editor: E.F. Konrad Koerner) the following volumes have been published thus far, and will be published during 1990: 1. KOERNER, E.F. Konrad: The Importance of Techmer's "lnternationale Zeitschrift fUr Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft" in the Development of General Linguistics. Amsterdam, 1973. 2. TAYLOR, Daniel J.: Declinatio: A Study of the Linguistic Theory of Marcus Teren­ tius Varro. Amsterdam, 1974. 2nd pr. 1989. 3. BENWARE, Wilbur A.: The Study of Indo-European Vocalism; from the beginnings to Whitney and Scherer: A critical-historical account. Amsterdam, 1974. t.o.p. 2nd pr. 1990. 4. BACHER, Wilhelm: Die Anfiinge der hebriiischen Grammatik (1895), together with Die hebriiische Sprachwissenschaft vom 10. his zum 16. Jahrhundert (1892). Amster­ dam, 1974. 5. HUNT, R.W. (1908-1979): The History of Grammar in the Middle Ages. Collected Papers. Edited with an introduction, a select bibliography, and indices by G.L. Bur­ sill-Hall. Amsterdam, 1980. 6. MILLER, Roy Andrew: Studies in the Grammatical Tradition in Tibet. Amsterdam, 1976. 7. PEDERSEN, Holger (1867-1953): A Glance at the History of Linguistics, with par­ ticular regard to the historical study ofphonology. Amsterdam, 1983. 8. STENGEL, Edmund (1845-1935), (ed.): Chronologisches Verzeichnis franz6sischer Grammatiken vom Ende des 14. bis zum Ausgange des 18. Jahrhunderts, nebst Angabe der bisher ermittelten Fundorte derselben. Amsterdam, 1976. 9. NIEDEREHE, Hans-Josef & Harald HAARMANN (with the assistance of Liliane Rouday), (eds): In Memoriam Friedrich Diez: Akten des Kolloquiums zur Wis­ senschaftsgeschichte der Romanistik/Actes du Colloque sur l'Histoire des Etudes Romanes!Proceedings of the Colloquium for the History of Romance Studies, Trier, 2. -4. Okt. 1975). Amsterdam, 1976. 10. KILBURY, James: The Development of Morphophonemic Theory. Amsterdam, 1976. 11. KOERNER, E.F. Konrad: Western Histories of Linguistic Thought. An annotated chronological bibliography, 1822-1976. Amsterdam, 1978. 12. PAULINUS a S. BARTHOLOMAEO (1749-1806): Dissertation on the Sanskrit Lan­ guage. Transl., edited and introduced by Ludo Rocher. Amsterdam, 1977. 13. DRAKE, Glendon F.: The Role of Presc.riptivism in American Linguistics 1820-1970. Amsterdam, 1977. 14. SIGERUS DE CORTRACO: Summa modorum significandi; Sophismata. New edi­ tion, on the basis of G. Wallerand's editio prima, with additions, critical notes, an index of terms, and an introd. by Jan Pinborg. Amsterdam, 1977. 15. PSEUDO-ALBERTUS MAGNUS: Quaestiones Alberti de Modis significandi. A critical edition, translation and commentary of the British Museum Inc. C.2LC.52 and the Cambridge Inc.5.J.3.7, by L.G. Kelly. Amsterdam, 1977. 16. PANCONCELLI-CALZ!A, Giulio (1878-1966): Geschichtszahlen der Phonetik (1941), together with Quellenatlas der Phonetik (1940). New ed., with an introd. arti­ cle and a bio-bibliographical account of Panconcelli-Calzia by Jens-Peter KOster. Amsterdam, n.y.p. 17. SALMON, Vivian: The Study of Language in 17th-Century England. Amsterdam, 1979. Second edition 1988.

18. HAYASHI, Tetsuro: The Theory of English Lexicography 1530-1791. Amsterdam ' 1978. 19. KOERNER, E.F. Konrad: Toward a Historiography of Linguistics. Selected Essays. Foreword by R.H. Robins. Amsterdam, 1978. 20. KOERNE� , E.F. Konrad (ed.): Progress in Linguistic Historiography: Papers from the Internatwnal Conference on the History of the Language Sciences, Ottawa, 28-31 August 1978. Amsterdam, 1980. 21. DAVIS, Boyd H. & Raymond K. O'CAIN (eds): First Person Singular. Papers from the Conference on an Oral Archive for the History ofAmerican Linguistics. (Charlotte, N. C. , 9-10 March 1979). Amsterdam, 1980. 22. McDERMOTT, A. Charlene Senape: Godfrey of Fontaine's Abridgement of Boethius the Dane's 'Modi Significandi sive Quaestiones super Priscianum Maiorem. A text edi� tion with English trans!. and introd. Amsterdam, 1980. 23. APOLLONIUS DYSCOLUS: The Syntax of Apol/onius Dyscolus. Translated, and with commentary by Fred W. Householder. Amsterdam , 1981. 24. CARTER, M .. (ed.): Arab Linguistics, an introductory classical text with translation and notes. Amsterdam, 1981. 25. HYMES, Dell H.: Essays in the History of Linguistic Anthropology. Amsterdam ' 1983. 26. KOERNER, Konrad, Hans-J. NIEDEREHE & R.H. ROBINS (eds): Studies in Medzeval Lmguzstlc Thought, dedicated to Geoffrey L. Bursill-Hall on the occasion of his 60th birthday on 15 May 1980. Amsterdam, 1980. 27. BRE:VA-CLARAMONTE, Manuel: Sanctius' Theory of Language: A contribution to the hzstory of Renaissance linguistics. Amsterdam, 1983. 28. VERSTEEGH, Kees, Konrad KOERNER & Hans-J. NIEDEREHE (eds): The History of Linguistics in the Near East. Amsterdam, 1983. 29. ARENS, Hans: Aristotle's Theory of Language and its Tradition. Amsterdam, 1984. 30. GORDON, W. Terrence: A History of Semantics. Amsterdam, 1982. 31. CHRISTY, Craig: Uniformitarianism in Linguistics. Amsterdam 1983. 32. MANCHESTER, M.L.: The Philosophical Foundations of Humboldt's Linguistic Doctrines. Amsterdam 1985. 33. RAMAT, Paola, Hans-Josef NIEDEREHE & E.F. Konrad KOERNER (eds): The History of Linguistics in Italy. Amsterdam , 1986. 34. QUILlS, Antonio & Hans J. NIEDEREHE (eds): The History of Linguistics in Spain. Amsterdam, 1986. 35. SALMON, Vivian & Edwina BURNESS (comps): A Reader in the Language of Shakespearean Drama. Amsterdam, 1987. 36. SAPIR, Edward: Appraisals of his Life and Work. Edited by Konrad Koerner. Amsterdam, 1984. 37. 6 MATHUNA , Sean P.: William Bathe, S.J., 1564-1614: a pioneer in linguistics. Amsterdam, 1986. 38. AARSLEFF, Hans, Louis G. KELLY & Hans-Josef NIEDEREHE (eds): Papers in the Hlstory of Lmgutstzcs. Proceedmgs of ICHoLS Ill, Princeton I984. Amsterdam ' 1987. 39. PETRUS HISPANUS: Summulae Logicales. Translated and with an introduction by Francis P. Dinneen, S.J. Amsterdam, 1990. 40. HARTMANN, R.R.K. (ed.): The History of Lexicography. Papers from the Dictio­ nary Research Centre Seminar at Exeter, March 1986. Amsterdam, 1986.

41. COWAN, William, Michael K. FOSTER & Konrad KOERNER (eds): New Perspec­ tivess in Language, Culture, and Personality. Proceedings of the Edward Sapir Cente� nary Conference (Ottawa, 1-3 October 1984). Amsterdam, 1986. 42. BUZZETIJ, Dino & Maurizio FERRJANI (eds): Speculative Grammar, Universal Grammar, and Philosophical Analysis of Language. Amsterdam, 1987. 43. BURSILL-HALL, G. L., Sten EBBESEN & E.F. Konrad KOERNER (eds): De Ortu Grammaticae. Studies in Medieval Grammar and Linguistic Theory in Memory of Jan Pinborg. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1990. n.y.p. 44. AMSLER, Mark: Etymology and Discourse in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1989. 45. OWENS, Jonathan: The Foundations of Grammar. Amsterdam, 1987. 46. TAYLOR, Daniel (ed.): The History of Linguistics in the Classical Period. Amster­ dam, 1987. 47. HALL, Robert A. jr. (ed.): Leonard Bloomfield, Essays on his Life and Work. Amsterdam, 1987. 48. FORMIGARI, Lia: Language and Experience in 17th-century British Philosophy. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1989. 49. DE MAURO, Tullio & Lia FORMIGARI (eds): Leibniz, Humboldt, and the Origins of Comparativism. Proceedings of the international conference, Rome, 25-28 Sep­ tember 1986. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1990. 50. KOERNER, Konrad: Practicing Linguistic Historiography. Selected Essays. Amster­ dam/Philadelphia, 1989. 51. KOERNER, Konrad & Hans-Josef NJEDEREHE (eds): History and Historiography of Linguistics. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1990. n.y.p. 52. JUUL, Arne & Hans F. NIELSEN (eds): Otto Jespersen.' Facets of his Life and Work. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1989. 53. OWENS, Jonathan: Early Arabic Grammatical Theory. Heterogeneity and Standardi� zation. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1990. n.y.p. 54. ANTONSEN, Elmer H. (ed.) with James W. Marchand and Ladislav Zgusta: The Grimm Brothers and the Germanic Past. Amsterdarn!Philadelphia, 1990. n.y.p.