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Language Policy and Language Issues in the Successor States of the Former USSR Current Issues in Language and Society (Unnumbered) Wright, Sue Multilingual Matters 1853594636 9781853594632 9780585359632 English Language policy--Former Soviet republics, Former Soviet republics--Languages. 1999 P119.32.F6L36 1999eb 306.44/947 Language policy--Former Soviet republics, Former Soviet republics--Languages.
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Language Policy and Language Issues in the Successor States of the Former USSR Edited by Sue Wright
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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Language Policy and Language Issues in the Successor States of the Former USSR/Edited by Sue Wright Current Issues in Language and Society (Unnumbered) Includes bibliographical references 1. Language policyFormer Soviet republics. 2. Former Soviet republicsLanguages. I. Wright, Sue. II. Series. P119.32.F6L36 1999 306.44'947dc21 99-38842 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 1-85359-463-6 (hbk) Multilingual Matters Ltd UK: Frankfurt Lodge, Clevedon Hall, Victoria Road, Clevedon BS21 7HH. USA: UTP, 2250 Military Road, Tonawanda, NY 14150, USA. Canada: UTP, 5201 Dufferin Street, North York, Ontario M3H 5T8, Canada. Australia: P.O. Box 586, Artarmon, NSW, Australia. Copyright © 2000 Sue Wright and the authors of individual articles. This book is also available as Vol. 6, No. 1 of the journal Current Issues in Language and Society. All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the publisher. Printed and bound in Great Britain by Short Run Press Ltd.
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Contents Editorial Sue Wright
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Between Russian and European Hegemony: Current Language Policy in the Baltic States 6 Uldis Ozolins Ethno-Linguistic Relations in Contemporary Latvia: Mirror Image of the Previous Dispensation? Frank Knowles
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Social Conditions for the Implementation of Linguistic Human Rights through Multicultural Policies: The Case of the Kyrgyz Republic 57 Matthias Koenig Kyrgyzstan: The Political and Linguistic Context Sue Wright
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Editorial Sue Wright School of Languages and European Studies, Aston University, Birmingham, B4 7ET In this issue of Current Issues in Language and Society we return to the question of language rights: the rights of minorities to remain monolingual if they so wish and the rights of governments to promote the language of the majority as the official language of the state. The central question is once again the thorny problem of whether linguistic rights are fundamental human rights, and therefore inalienable and individual, or whether they must be treated as group rights, since communication is necessarily an activity which involves more than one individual. The context of this discussion is the situation of the Russians in the Near Abroad, a negologism coined to designate the states which formed after the collapse of the USSR. The USSR included 130 nationalities and well over 100 languages, the total number dependent on the definition of what differentiates a dialect from a language (Kirkwood, 1989). In the immediate aftermath of the Russian Revolution, Lenin proposed a very idealistic and ambitious policy of absolute equality for all the languages of the USSR. There have been suggestions (e.g. Crisp, 1989) that Lenin sought by such policies to forestall any nationalist backlash against the Soviet empire. Nonetheless, whatever the motivation, korenizatsiia, the policy of rooting communist ideals in the Republics through the agency of local elites and through the medium of the local language, was a feature of the first decade of Soviet power. Up until 1934 the Soviet system put important resources into the codification, standardisation and development of functions and terminology in many languages within the state. Non-Russian speaking citizens were able to maintain their existing linguistic traditions. The large number of languages in which official text books were published within the USSR (104 in 1934) exemplified this. The growth in literacy was one of the major achievements of the early Soviet period (Crisp, 1989) and literacy outside the Russian speaking areas was in the local language, for the vast majority. Stalin's accession to power brought about a change of attitude. There was no tolerance of nationalism of any kind and a number of anti-nationalist purges took place. The concept of Soviet patriotism became clearer and was enforced. Russian became a compulsory school subject in 1938. The russification of local languages was decreed. Collectivisation destroyed the traditional base of many local communities. Industrialisation brought large numbers of Russian speakers into the other Republics. An increasingly jacobinist, dogmatic and tyrannical centre jettisoned any lip-service to equality (Simon, 1982). Use of the Russian language inevitably increased throughout the USSR. The shift to Russian continued under Kruschev. The 195859 Education Reform set aside the philosophy that children should be taught in their mother tongue. Choice of language was now the prerogative of parents. How much this was a real choice is thrown into doubt by the statistics for mother tongue and Russian medium schools. For example, Kreindler (1989) reports that from 1959 onwards all Karelian schools started teaching in Russian from the first grade.
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There was evidently little manoeuvre for choice there. The move to Russian was understandably most acute for nationalities within the Russian Republic. In the non-Russian Republics there was some retention of local languages in the early years of schooling. However, under pressure in the Brezhnev era all the education systems increased the amount of time devoted to Russian. The language situation at the beginning of perestroika has been summed up by Kreindler in the following way The position of national languages in the Brezhnev period was eroding as Russian expanded its role in the schools, in party and state offices, in publishing and in the economy. While the Leninist theory of language equality was never repudiated and national languages were not attacked directly, it was Russian, a major world language that was lavishly and vigorously being promoted by the state. The view that national culture and national language need not necessarily coincide, that Russian alone can fulfil most cultural needs continued to gain ground. Giving up one's language and shifting to Russian was now deemed 'progressive', 'mature', 'according to the laws of natural development'. (Kreindler, 1989: 56) The Soviet Union had a better record on the recognition of national (including linguistic) rights than it did in many other areas of human rights and it compares well with many states in the Western world whose linguistic minorities have been forced to assimilate to the majority language. Nonetheless, it was not able to reconcile the apparently irreconcilable: the organisation of communication to promote the successful coexistence of all sectors of a linguistically diverse society in its public sphere and to represent that society's identity to itself and to the greater world, with the recognition of different linguistic traditions coexisting within one policy and having equal rights and functions. Brubaker (1996) reminds us that the Soviet Union was distinctive in the way it codified and recognised nationhood and nationality at the sub-state level. It repressed individual nationalisms but institutionalised territorial nationhood and ethnic nationality as social categories. The aim may have been to acknowledge, and thus diffuse, nationalism. In the long term the hope was that it would wither away to be replaced by a marxist version of internationalism. The reality was that the constitution of national Republics within the USSR actually helped nationhood and nationalism to flourish by defining Republics as the homeland for particular ethnic groups. In the wake of communism and the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, the nationalising elites in the successor states find themselves in the position of having to manage multi-ethnic and multilingual populations. This results in part from the way that boundaries were drawn by Moscow when the Republics were constituted and also from the mosaic of peoples which always existed within each Republic. The absolute congruence of ethno-cultural borders and territory was as much a fiction in this part of the world as in any other. The migration policies of the Soviet era increased this heterogeneity. Many Russians went either willingly or by decree to the other Republics to provide the technical and industrial work force of industrialisation. In the decade before independence the number of Russians resident in the other Republics was very high, having reached a post-war peak in the 1970s (see Table 1).
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Table 1 Republic Percentage of Russians Ukraine 21.1% Belorussia 11.9% Lithuania 8.9% Latvia 32.8% Estonia 27.9% Moldavia 12.8% Georgia 7.4% Armenia negligible Azerbaidzhan 7.9% Kazakhstan 40.8% Uzbekistan 10.8% Turkmenistan 12.6% Tadzhikistan 10.4% Kirghizia 25.9% Source: 1979 Census, reported in Kirkwood 1989. The linguistic outcome of this migration, together with the language policy described above, was asymmetrical bilingualism. Most of the Russians in the Near Abroad are monolingual in Russian. Most contact between them and the Titular nationalities of the successor states to the Republics to which they moved is in Russian, assured by the personal bilingualism of a large proportion of the autochthonous population. As the political elites in the new states have (re)established independent political institutions, attempted to create a post-Soviet civil society and (re)affirmed a sense of nationhood among their populations, the Russians have found themselves marginalised, in no small part because political life, civil society and identity have been bound intimately with a renascence of languages which they do not speak. Language laws dethroned Russian as the principal language of political and public life and replaced it with the various languages of the former Titular nationalities. The essays in this collection discuss the linguistic aspect of dilemmas in the current political situation. Can the successor states to the USSR implement 'one language, one nation, one state' policies in the classic 19th century tradition? Does a group which was formerly dominant and privileged have the right to demand the continuation of its privileges (particularly linguistic) after the end of its domination? How can the triadic relations among nationalising states, national minorities and the external homelands to which these minorities 'belong' be best managed? We have chosen two case studies to illustrate the theoretical problems. The policies of the Soviet era have left both Latvia and Kyrgyzstan 1 with large numbers of Russian speakers resident within their borders. The language mosaic is a very clear example of the complex legacy of the old system as these two states build new structures in both the economic and political domain.
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Uldis Ozolins puts the case for the Latvian decision to make Latvian the sole official language of Latvia. He argues that the Latvians found themselves in the position of a majority whose language had been minoritised by the Soviet form of colonisation. Only by requiring the Russians who remained among them after independence to speak Latvian could they progress from the classic situation of asymmetric bilingualism which they inherited from Russian domination. He demonstrates that a continuation of the arrangement, by which Russian speakers did not need to expend personal energy and resources acquiring a second language while Latvians did, was never an option in the post-Soviet context. He approves the decision not to allow Russian and Latvian to coexist as national languages. This would either have perpetuated the former situation or would have proved destabilising, since a society in which two linguistic groups cannot regularly achieve intergroup communication is likely to polarise. He thus approves the citizenship laws which decree that Russians cannot acquire Latvian citizenship without demonstrating a high degree of competence in the Latvian language. He reminds the reader that a language requirement is not unusual practice in the acquisition of citizenship (although formal examinations may be less usual) and notes that the Russian speakers in Latvia are directing their energies to increasing the speed at which citizenship is granted rather than overturning the language requirement ruling. Frank Knowles gives a short historical overview of RussianBaltic relations. He explains the sense of injustice and resentment at loss of statehood which persisted in Latvia and which meant it was unlikely that there would be a successful outcome to the Communist Party's endeavours to promote the concept of a Soviet family of peoples, living and working harmoniously together. He understands the Latvians' desire and right to repeal the legal structures forced on them by outside intervention, but at the same time draws attention to the new inequalities that the various proposed laws will bring about. Matthias Koenig's paper is a survey of various theories of nationalism and the function of language in its constructs. He sets the resurgence of nationalist projects in the last part of the twentieth century within the context of globalisation and finds that this latter appears to intensify and encourage the desire for a recognition of ethnic specificity. Within the successor states of the USSR, he finds ethnic revivalist and nationalist tendencies threaten the transition to democracy. Using data from Kyrgyzstan he links Kyrgyz nationalism with a desire to make Kyrgyz the language of the state. The Kyrgyz government is faced with the dilemma of correlating the need to respond to the desires of ethno-nationalists, the need to promote the institutional structures of a common public sphere and the need to act democratically in regard to linguistic diversity. Koenig evokes the linguistic rights enshrined in international law to suggest how governments should proceed. He rejects assimilationist and differentialist solutions and opts for a multicultural approach. The territorial model of multiculturalism as applied in Switzerland and Belgium is seen as inappropriate where populations are intermingled as in Kyrgyzstan, and regional monolinguism as liable to the same criticisms as national monolinguism. The socio-cultural variant of multiculturalism as practised in some countries of immigration, such as Australia, is given as a model which conforms with linguistic rights. Applying this to the Russians in Kyrgyzstan does of course present some problems in that
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the Russian speakers are not in the usual migration situation where newcomers have little power and influence; the Russians were in a dominant situation and in demanding that Russian remain a language of power are hoping to retain some of that advantage. Sue Wright's paper provides more political and linguistic context for the Kyrgyz situation. She finds that at the time of independence the KyrgyzRussian divide mirrored a number of other cleavages. Kyrgyz speakers tended to be poorer, to be muslim, to live in the country, were more likely to be unemployed, less likely to be educated. Kyrgyz who had shifted to Russian tended, like the Russians themselves, to be richer, to live in the town, to be employed, to be educated. They were less likely to be practising muslims. The language issue was thus a symbol for mobilisation on a range of issues. In the decade following independence the language question has not commanded the centre stage as it has in Latvia. This is in part because citizenship is not tied to competence in Kyrgyz, because many Russians have solved their communication problem by leaving the country, because Kyrgyz speakers have achieved more control than previously and because the pressing economic and political problems that beset the country appear to have eclipsed the language issue. Notes 1. Kirghizia in the Soviet period; Kyrgyzstan in the post-Soviet period. References Brubaker, R. (1996) Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Crisp, S. (1989) Soviet language planning since 1917. In M. Kirkwood (ed.) Language Planning in the Soviet Union. London: Macmillan. Kirkwood, M. (1989) Language planning: Some methodological preliminaries. In M. Kirkwood (ed.) Language Planning in the Soviet Union. London: Macmillan. Kreindler, I. (1989) Soviet language planning since 1953. In M. Kirkwood (ed.) Language Planning in the Soviet Union. London: Macmillan. Simon, G. (1982) Nationsbildung and Revolution von Oben. Geschichte und Gesellschaft 1982/2.
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Between Russian and European Hegemony: Current Language Policy in the Baltic States Uldis Ozolins Department of Politics, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia There has recently been significant intensification of conflict over issues of language and citizenship in the Baltic. After giving a brief historical background to the language situation in this region, this article examines the recent politics of the Baltic language laws which restored the national languages as the sole official language of each country and, in the case of Estonia and Latvia, the citizenship laws which required Soviet period settlers to pass a language test for citizenship. In the early 1990s this was essentially an international relations conflict between the Baltic countries and Russia, which strongly defends the former status and privileges of 'Russian speakers' and continues to exert pressure on these issues today. However, in recent years a perhaps even more serious conflict has arisen between the Baltic states and Western European organisations, particularly the OSCE, which defines the conflict as one of national minorities, and whose recommendations may have a bearing on acceptance of the Baltic states into wider European structures. Research shows the conflict has only to a limited extent been a local conflict between the different language communities: contrary to the urgings of some leaders, Soviet period settlers overwhelmingly accept the legitimacy of language laws, and language use patterns have now progressively changed from those of the Soviet period. Despite this, there has continued to be intense pressure on the Baltic states, which culminated in the OSCE forcing changes to citizenship laws upon Latvia, leading to a closely fought referendum in that country in October 1998. The OSCE campaign has been based upon invocations of international norms in language and citizenship which are found to be poorly jurisprudentially based, and concerned to impose a single model for language relations quite unsuited to the Baltic situation. There are few countries in the world in which language policy has been more central to issues of national life and politics than in the Baltic States. There are few other countries, also, where language policies have become involved in as tangled a web of political relations, particularly international political relations. While in any country aspects of language policy may raise interest and even considerable passions, in the Baltic States, and especially for Estonia and Latvia, local disagreements or conflicts have been massively overshadowed by international concerns. One of the paradoxes in the Baltic is that the degree of local mobilisation on these issues is minute compared to the degree of pressure that has been placed upon the Baltic States from both East (in the shape of Russia) and West (a host of European bodies from the Council of Europe [CE] to the European Union [EU] to particularly the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]). While it will be shown that language policies are generally agreed to even by those alleged to be most negatively affected by them Soviet period settlers and that there is even a degree of support for aspects of present citizenship policies, we see nonetheless that international sensitivities, reaction, and misunderstandings at times seemingly deliberate misunderstandings abound.
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Recent political turmoil, a partial boycott of Latvia by Russia, a hotly contested referendum on citizenship issues in Latvia, and related changes to citizenship laws in Estonia have served to direct international attention increasingly to this region. At the moment Estonia and Latvia are able just to maintain their chosen and widely supported language and citizenship policies. Their continued ability to do so will be a test of their ability to sustain their independence in the face of both Western and Eastern hegemony. Of broader interest, it will also be a test for language policy itself: whether chosen language policies that are essential to the survival of small cultures and languages can be maintained, and what other political and institutional pressures threaten such policies. Historical and Linguistic Background Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have shared a common 20th century history of being provinces of the Tsarist Empire, gaining independence in the confusion of the Russian revolution and Germany losing World War I, being illegitimately incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940 after the MolotovRibbentrop pact, and ultimately dramatically regaining their independence in the turmoil of the breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1991. Despite this common 20th century history, the three countries are in fact cross-cut by different historical experiences, and also by an important linguistic division. Excellent historical overviews are provided particularly by Kirby (1990, 1995), and also Thaden (1985), Clemens (1991), Hiden and Salmon (1991) and Lieven (1993). Estonia and the greater part of present-day Latvia, then known as Livonia, underwent intense German colonisation from the 13th century, led by the Teutonic Knights. German barons were the major landowners, while trade was fostered through the Hanseatic ports of Riga and Tallinn. The Christian influence changed from Catholic to Lutheran in the region as a result of the Reformation. A brief period of Swedish rule in the 17th century ended with the Swedish defeat at the hands of the Russian Empire and the treaty of Nystad in 1721. The area then came under the Russian Empire until World War I, but with extensive privileges granted to the German landowners and burghers, the 'Czar's loyal Germans', who retained significant political and cultural influence during this period (Henricksson, 1983). Lithuania's history was different. Christianity came later to this region, as the Lithuanians stopped the downward and eastern push of the German knights in the 13th century. Lithuania became one of the great powers in Eastern Europe in the following centuries together with its fraternal Polish Duchy, ruling at its height from the Baltic to the Black Sea, by which time Poland had become the increasingly dominant partner. Catholicism was adopted as a result of this alliance, and Lithuania has remained Catholic throughout its history. Cut back by growing Muscovy power and attacks from other quarters, the PolishLithuanian alliance eventually ceased to exist as a result of the successive divisions of Poland in the 18th century between the Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Prussian empires, with the territory of present day Lithuania and the south-east corner of present-day Latvia becoming part of the Russian Empire. Linguistic features cross-cut this historical analysis. While Latvian and Lithu-
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anian are closely related Indo-European languages distinct from Slavic or Germanic languages, Estonian is a Finno-Ugric language, close to Finnish. All three have Latin scripts. Lithuanian is of especial linguistic interest as arguably one of the more ancient and best preserved of the Indo-European languages. Latvian and Lithuanian have survived as the only modern Baltic languages, Old Prussian the largest by far of the other known Baltic languages having ceased to be spoken since the end of the 18th century. This survival has been in an environment of surrounding (and colonising) Slavic and Germanic languages, which have left some influence in terms of loans and adaptations, but Latvian and Lithuanian remain quite distinct languages. FinnoUgric has also had an impact on Latvian, particularly on stress and some lexis, making it only partially mutually intelligible with its close relative Lithuanian. A national awakening in the latter half of the 19th century followed Gellner's (1983) classic model of growing national selfawareness among an educated elite and assertion of a cultural maturity, with a flowering of a literature in the vernacular and the beginning of cultural self-identification. Tsarist policy towards local languages and intellectual self-expression varied from laissez-faire acceptance to hostility under various administrations. Occasional russification attempts foundered as not only local Baltic vernaculars but also German and Polish interests defended their own language use. At one time the Latin script was banned for Lithuanian; at other times extensive literacy programmes in the vernacular in local schools and parishes were able to function untrammelled. Estonians and Latvians in particular were able to achieve high rates of literacy in their mother tongue and in German and/or Russian by the end of the 19th century, and no longer needed to 'pass' as one of these nationalities. This growing consciousness turned into a political consciousness through the ensuing dramatic historical events and opportunities the 1905 revolution, World War I, and the collapse of Russia and Germany. All three Baltic States became independent in 191819 in the confusion of the end phase of World War I which saw the Russian revolution, Soviet Russia suing for peace with Germany, and Germany in turn losing the war. The Baltic states had to win their de facto independence militarily both against renewed German and Soviet attacks, and even attacks from the 'White' armies of ex-Tsarist forces which still regarded these provinces as part of an indivisible Russia. Western powers wanted the Baltic states to be independent of Germany and also independent of the new Soviet government in Russia. Independence was finally secured in 1920 with peace treaties with the Soviet government. As independent States after WWI the three Baltic states, together with all other Eastern European nations, were subject to the various proposals on national minorities developed during the Versailles peace talks and the subsequent formation of the League of Nations. These proposals were drafted explicitly to contain incipient ethnic tensions which, it was widely held, had led in the end to the Balkan conflicts that ignited World War I. They provided for countries to sign Minorities Treaties which included protection for minority languages, cultures and religions in order to join the League of Nations. Significantly, they were only demanded of the new states of Eastern Europe, and did not apply to Western Europe or other countries (Burgess, 1999). The Baltic states all readily accepted various forms of cultural autonomy,
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many of which had in fact been in place even during the latter years of the Tsarist regime. All three states were multinational, with varying proportions of German, Russian, Jewish, Polish, Gypsy and other minorities. (More demographic data is given later.) Internally, various languages were used for a variety of purposes. Minority schools were maintained with state assistance throughout the period of independence, and allowance was made for particular languages to be used for administrative or legal matters in certain circumstances. Significantly, foreign policy considerations were also important, particularly in Lithuania, where tensions were heightened by the intervention of the Poles and their occupation of the Vilnius region from 1920 until World War II, causing a tighter rein to be kept over Polish in Lithuania and Lithuanian in Poland. Despite these variations in policy, and despite some individual minorities actively working against the independence of these states, the Baltic states were able to observe the Versailles/League of Nations strictures on minority rights and minority languages as well as anywhere in Eastern Europe (von Rauch, 1974; Loeber, 1993). Despite the heavy imperialist legacy of German, Russian and to some extent Polish, the Baltic states were significantly able to develop as effective nation-states, expanding the use of their State languages until they fulfilled all vital administrative, business and educational functions. Education in the vernacular was prized, with Estonia and Latvia, in particular, rapidly expanding their education systems including higher education, where teaching in German or Russian was steadily displaced until all higher education was in the vernacular. The Baltic States were incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940 following the MolotovRibbentrop pact of August 1939, a sinister and still too little understood alliance between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany that opened the way to Germany's subsequent invasion of Poland, and which has had consequences to the present day for the 'borderland' countries of Eastern Europe from Finland in the north to Moldova in the south. The pact divided these countries into Soviet and German spheres of influence, and led to the Soviet Union delivering ultimatums to all the Baltic countries and Finland. Finland resisted the ultimatum, leading to the FinnishSoviet winter war in 193940. The Baltic states were subjected to provocation and fabricated incidents and eventual ultimatums of their own. The Soviet Union occupied the Baltic states in June 1940, and, after sham elections, the three states were incorporated into the Soviet Union, though the legality of this was not recognised by most Western governments, and remained a bone of contention in international affairs since that time (Vizulis, 1990; Kirby, 1994; Chernichenko, 1998). The Soviet occupation led to a reign of terror and mass deportations in June 1941, followed swiftly by the German invasion as that country opened its second front against the Soviet Union. The Germans in turn brought repression of Jews and previous collaborators with the Soviet Union, but also tried to recruit allies among the Balts. After their treatment at the hands of the Soviets this strategy had some success: a sizeable army of Balts fought alongside the Germans until the end of the war, when the Soviets restored their power in the Baltic (Lieven, 1993).
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Language and Population Policies under the Soviet Union The Soviet Union's language policies have received extensive scholarly attention and only the aspects of most salience to the Baltic situation will be dealt with here. Leninist principles originally stressed the equality of all languages and a determinedly multilingual approach to spreading socialism throughout a vast, highly differentiated and multinational country. This multinational basis was enshrined in the explicit formulation of a Union, with distinct Republics representing the main nationalities. As a result, in all Republics local languages served a virtually full range of sociolinguistic functions, with school systems, higher education, cultural and publishing activities all carried out in the Republic language. In some Republics other local languages also had official currency in more local settings. With the growing influx of Russian settlers in the non-Russian Republics, particularly after World War II, institutions would be duplicated for Russian speakers, with Russian language schools, publishing etc. However, only the Republic language and Russian received consideration speakers of other languages not in their home Republic would have the choice of, for example, sending their children to Russian-language schools or schools in the Republic language. (The only exception to this was some Polish schools in Lithuania.) Overwhelmingly, such settlers chose Russian language institutions, leading to a situation where in many Republics a process of russification occurred within the non-Russian republics, When current discourse refers to 'Russian speakers', this will include many for whom Russian may in fact not be a first language. We return to these intricacies below. Also, Russian language schools often did not teach the local national language, but Russian was a compulsory and regularly expanded subject in local language schools (Kreindler, 1985; Knowles, 1989; Druviete, 1997). The major consequence of the influx of Russian-speaking settlers was asymmetrical bilingualism. The influx of monolingual (or russified) Russian speakers created a situation where these people expected to be able to work and receive any service in Russian; Russian-speaking workers or officials could work using Russian alone when working or providing services, which meant that locals needed to be able to speak Russian in order to work with these Russian speakers or receive services from them. The obligation to become bilingual was thus squarely on the shoulders of the local population, while Russian speakers could continue to be monolingual. This situation increasingly meant that de facto Russian became the language of many work and administrative contexts. Specific policies also demanded the use of Russian in some higher functions such as submitting dissertations for higher degrees, or achieving various professional, Party or other qualifications. The languages other than Russian faced the danger of being restricted in their sociolinguistic functions; Rannut lists the following areas in which Estonian language use was eliminated in favour of Russian: 'banking, statistics, the militia (Soviet police), railway, naval and air transport, mining, energy production . . . Gosplan (state planning) and the KGB . . . [and] everything connected with military purposes' (Rannut, 1994: 198). The spread of the 'international' language, Russian, did not occur in an ideological vacuum. The independence of the Baltic states before World War II, and
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the extent of support for the German side during the war made them ideologically suspect. The return of Soviet power after the war saw further mass deportations, suspicion of nationalist tendencies, continual linking of Baltic nationalism to fascism, and constant portrayal of these states as having been liberated and developed by the Soviet Union. For Soviet period settlers, there was thus no understanding expected or desired of local Baltic identity, history of an independent past, or language. Attitudes towards the local languages were also influenced by these ideological dispositions: some settlers were openly antagonistic to such nationalist attributes; most settlers, however, had no or little contact with the language and simply saw the language as of no concern to them. This has led, in Rannut's view, to large numbers of settlers being characterised by 'their rootlessness, their lack of interest even in their own culture, language and ethnicity, and complete indifference to the indigenous population' (Rannut, 1994: 201). A fraction of settlers however also came to know the local cultures through personal or institutional contact, and supported them in the late 1980s, as we see below. Despite these ideological representations, the Baltics retained an aura throughout the Soviet period of being the most 'Western' of the republics, and became a favourite destination both for retired military personnel, and for those designing the expansion of industry. Eastern Estonian oil and shale deposits attracted numerous new industries, all of which were almost exclusively staffed by Russian settlers. Latvia, despite having no natural resources, was even more favoured as a site of industrial expansion including heavy industry, with workers, raw materials and energy all being shipped in for production. Lithuania, having less industry and more agriculture as a base, and with greater Lithuanian representation in the Party, was able to avoid massive industrial expansion and concomitant influx of settlers (Misiunas & Taagepera, 1993; Rannut, 1994). Soviet language policy also changed over the late 1970s, with greater emphasis on the use of the Russian language and heavier promotion of 'internationalisation', often carried out on the basis of secret memoranda from Moscow, seemingly in response to the 1970 Census which showed the Russians had become a minority in the Soviet Union (Taagepera, 1993: 100). Considerable disquiet was aroused in all the non-Russian republics when there began to be talk of a 'Soviet nationality', a clear departure from previous emphasis on the Soviet Union being a federation of nationalities. The demographic outcome of these policies has now become central to issues in the Baltic. The massive immigration into Estonia and Latvia caused a sharp diminution in the proportion of the Titular population, as shown by comparing their proportion from the last pre-war Census in each country, and the 1989 Soviet census (Table 1). The Lithuanian figures need explanation; the pre-war figures are based on what was independent Lithuania (including Klaipeda, subsequently reclaimed by Germany). In the inter-war period the Vilnius region was part of Poland. This region was also by far the most ethnically mixed, with significant Polish and Jewish populations. With the Vilnius region included, the figure for Lithuanian nationals falls to around 70%. We thus see a particularly dramatic fall in the proportion of Latvians in the population in Latvia, and almost as dramatic a fall for Estonians in Estonia, while
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Table 1 Baltic states: percentage population by ethnic origin: 1930s and 1989 Last pre-war Census 1989 Estonia Estonian 88.1 61.3 Russian 8.1 30.3 German 1.5 0.2 Swedish 0.7 0.0 Jewish 0.4 0.3 Ukrainian 3.1 Belarussian 1.8 Others 1.2 2.9 (Total 1989: 1,565,662) Latvia Latvian 77.0 52.0 Russian 8.8 34.0 Jewish 4.9 0.9 German 3.3 0.1 Polish 2.6 2.3 Belarussian 1.4 4.5 Lithuanian 1.2 1.3 Ukrainian 0.01 3.4 Others 0.79 1.5 (Total 1989: 2,666,567) Lithuania Lithuanian 80.6 79.6 Jewish 7.2 0.3 German 4.1 Polish 3.0 7.0 Russian 2.3 9.4 Belarussian 0.2 1.7 Others 2.6 2.0 (Total 1989: 3,674,802) (Adapted from Melvin, 1995; Nørgaard, 1996; Vardys, 1965) Lithuania has maintained or even increased the percentage of Titular nationals within its territory. Pre-war minorities, except for Russians and other Slavs, had in all cases fallen as a proportion by 1989; moreover, many who then counted their nationality as German or Jewish were not from the pre-war minorities in their respective Baltic country, but were Soviet period settlers, in most cases having lost their language and being russified. The concentrations of Russians differed somewhat in Estonia and Latvia: in Estonia there was a significant concentration of population in the border region of East Estonia, heavily concentrated in the industrial town of Narva and surrounding towns; the other major concentration was in Tallinn. In Latvia, on the other hand, there was a large Russian concentration in south eastern Latvia in
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the Latgale province around Daugavpils, but the majority of these (apart from military) were from the pre-war minority; Russian settlers were also dominant in all major cities including Riga, where Latvians represented only a third of the population. Figures on language competence revealed in the Census show the dramatic effects of this population influx and the associated attitudes towards language: according to the 1989 Soviet Census, only a minority of non-Titular nationals claimed fluency in the respective national languages (Table 2). Table 2 Baltic states: percentage of non-titular nationals fluent in the national languages State % Estonia 14.9 Latvia 22.0 Lithuania 37.5 (Kolstoe, 1995: 89) Language Initiatives from the Late 1980s and in the Post-Soviet Period The Gorbachev period in late 1980s was to see decisive changes to the Baltic republics, but the relations between these republics and the reformists in Moscow were often complex and changed dramatically over time. The national turn in Baltic politics came first with a series of open challenges to Moscow on a number of different issues, including commemoration of previously forbidden issues such as national days and days of Soviet deportation ('calendar demonstrations'). Until 1987 these incidents could still arouse repression from Soviet authorities, but by 1998 these became a tide of national feeling that could no longer be repressed, and Moscow's willingness to use repression diminished: the former national anthems and other symbols were used in public once more (Lieven, 1993; Gerner & Hedlund, 1993). Gorbachev was at first extremely hostile to assertions of nationalism: on his first visit to the Baltic in February 1987 he attacked 'reactionary Baltic émigré circles and their Western supporters' and praised the Russian soldier as a liberator and defender against foreign invasion. He supported the strengthening of 'internationalist' education and the need to eliminate 'extreme nationalist tendencies in some parts of the Soviet Union'. He also attacked aspects of the Estonian economy. But these actions strengthened Baltic resolve, not least within the Party, to press for more autonomy particularly in economic issues. Gorbachev, perhaps realising his error, began to support greater regional autonomy (Gerner & Hedlund, 1993). The next phase from 1988 saw 'popular fronts' formed in the three republics that demanded greater autonomy and finally sovereignty. These fronts were composed of diverse groups, including national communists, as well as radical nationalists. All three popular fronts however specifically sought and to an extent gained the support of non-Titular nationals, who also wanted greater local autonomy, and supported Baltic moves to redress past wrongs. The popular
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fronts immediately put pressure upon the governments in the three republics, targeting the formerly rubber-stamping, but now increasingly self-assertive, Supreme Soviets (Trapans, 1991; Thompson, 1992; Sprudzs, 1993; Gerner & Hedlund, 1993). Taagepera notes that 'At first, Gorbachev seemed delighted with such a reformist initiative from below, expecting it to be simply socio-economic and democratic within the general framework of a Russian-speaking state, because this is how Gorbachev saw the USSR' (Taagepera, 1993: 135). These changes in national feelings reflected what was to become a decisive struggle within the ruling communist party between Moscow-oriented centralists and reforming national communists (Taagepera, 1993; Dreifelds, 1996). The battle among the communists had loosened the grip that the Communist Party Politburo and Central Committee had over the Supreme Soviets, and from around 1988 these bodies began to act as real legislative bodies, with increasing influence exercised by the national communists. Popular fronts now pressed the more responsive Supreme Soviets to declare greater autonomy, to address issues of national importance and reinstate practices and institutions of the pre-war independence era, and to reinstate the former status of the Titular languages as the official State language. Language Laws. Language laws were passed in all three Baltic states in 1989, as they were in most other non-Russian republics, reasserting the primacy of the State languages, making provision to radically expand their status and sociolinguistic functions, and in many cases implicitly or explicitly restricting the role of Russian in public life. These laws mandated the State language as the language for administration in all republic institutions, and the testing of competence of employees in that language. The teaching of the State language would be strengthened in Russian-language schools and in higher education, and its use expanded in the media. All public signs must be in the State language, thus replacing the previous system where they were either bilingual or (increasingly) in Russian alone. All correspondence from public authorities to residents would be in the State language, but it was possible for people to use other languages in dealing with these institutions or handing in documents. There were slight variations among the republics. The Estonian Supreme Soviet changed the draft law and inserted that officials be bilingual in Estonian and Russian. In the Lithuanian legislation the language testing of people in public contact positions would apply only to public officials; in Estonia and Latvia it would apply to workers who had contact with the public in the private sector as well (Grin, 1991; Maurais, 1991; Ozolins, 1994; Nørgaard, 1996). The key requirement of this legislation was for those in positions of public contact to need to be competent in the State language at a level appropriate to their position. The criteria adopted in the Baltics for determining who needed language attestation was not nationality but education: those who had not had their education in the State language needed to prove their language competence by passing language tests. These tests were determined at various levels (three levels in Latvia and Lithuania, six levels in Estonia): thus, a caretaker would have to pass a test at the lowest level where the emphasis would be, for example, on the
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ability to understand simple questions, to give directions and respond to requests from tenants etc.; while high level professionals or ranking public officials would need to be fluent in the State language in both written and spoken forms covering areas of their expertise. All three Language laws stipulated periods by which certain clauses came into effect, particularly clauses on language attestation: 1991 in Lithuania (subsequently extended to 1995), 1993 in Latvia and Estonia, in order to give time to those who needed to attend classes or otherwise learn the language to the required level. The failure to pass a language test could then become a reason for dismissal or not getting a particular job. The Language laws were a radical response to the growing dominance of Russian in these republics, but the long lead times gave many the impression that the laws would never seriously to be brought into effect. While much else proved difficult for the Baltic governments to implement during this period of general economic decline, in fact there was a determination to implement the Language laws and, to jump ahead for the moment, in 1992 many residents in Latvia were shocked to see the process of language testing commencing. Perhaps no other action on the part of the governments more clearly signalled the desire to change the language regimes of their republics; in Latvia, for example, by June 1993 a total of 135,000 people had been tested, of whom 67% passed (Nørgaard, 1996: 179). We discuss the language tests further below. But as Nørgaard notes, 'adoption of pro-Baltic language laws in 1989 led to pressure by the Russophones to maintain the language privileges they had held in the Soviet era' (1996: 178). Pressure on the Baltics came both from without and within. In response to these moves across all the non-Russian republics, Moscow countered with a law of its own declaring Russian the official language of the Soviet Union, a move ignored in the republics which now openly challenged the authority of central laws and passed laws which increased their own autonomy (Gerner & Hedlund, 1993). Opposition from within came from increasingly mobilised pro-Soviet forces chiefly among the russophone military and managers, who organised themselves as 'Interfronts' and saw these language laws as directly challenging the status quo, and being symptomatic of quite unacceptable national chauvinist tendencies and opposition to the Soviet Union. Taagepera, describing the local reaction in Estonia, comments that: a number of colonists protested the requirement that within two to four years all officials and salespeople become sufficiently bilingual to give service both in Estonian and Russian. Previously, Russian was required, Estonian optional. Now the extremists among the colonists considered the new parity discriminatory. (Taagepera, 1993: 148) We return to this reaction to and defence of russophone monolingualism below. Finally, one particular problem of implementation of the Language laws arose in Latvia. In the renewed Saeima (parliament) elections of 1993, some members were elected who had not passed language attestation, in direct contradiction to the Language law which stipulated the highest level of attestation for such positions of public representation. The Saeima eventually decided to overrule the language requirement on this occasion, allowing these deputies to remain. After the successful innovation of language attestation, the Language
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law had taken a step backward; it would not be the last time that legislators showed themselves not committed to their own Language law. Language laws have been revised in Estonia and Lithuania in 1995, removing the last vestiges of a two-language policy, with Russian treated as any other minority language. However, a similar attempt at reformulating the Latvian law has floundered, initially on politicians' reluctance to address such a law and their general lack of interest in language policy, and more recently as a result of criticisms of the draft from the OSCE, detailed below. Towards Independence The Language laws were among the most significant pieces of substantive legislation made by the Supreme Soviets at this time, but they were overshadowed politically by other legislative acts testing the limits of republic power against an increasingly impotent and reactive centre. The growth of the Popular Fronts at this time matured into mainstream activity as they successfully competed in elections, most significantly the 1990 Supreme Soviet elections in their republics, bringing a host of nonCommunist candidates into public office for the first time to form majorities in all three Supreme Soviets. These bodies passed a series of provocative acts which in various gradations asserted greater local authority in law-making and an increasing rejection of Moscow authority, culminating in 1990 in declarations of independence in all three Baltic States (Lithuania 11 March; Estonia 30 March and Latvia 4 May). In Lithuania's case this was to take effect immediately; in the case of Estonia and Latvia an actual implementation date would be worked out after a transition period (Kolstoe, 1995). This brought an immediate reaction from Moscow which placed an economic ban on Lithuania, and increased local mobilisation both for independence (with massive demonstrations in support) and against it, with increasingly belligerent opposition coming from the Interfronts. Crucial at this time was the participation of non-Titular nationals in the Popular fronts. Despite the activities of the military and russophone nomenklatura, there was only limited support for their anti-independence stance from russophones as a whole: an increasing proportion of settlers supported independence, and this support grew after the bloody events of January 1991 when Soviet forces attacked civilians in both Vilnius and Riga. This incident attracted international condemnation, and marked the low point of BalticUSSR relations. Many in the Baltic had also by this time lost faith in the Soviet reform process, and a deadly three-corner game ensued, between Baltic Supreme Soviets and their popular support; Gorbachev and his increasingly floundering Soviet reform efforts; and the local Interfronts and other pro-Soviet forces; each of these opposed to the other two. An additional element was the coming to power as President of the Russian federation Boris Yeltsin, who strongly supported Baltic independence, and bypassed Gorbachev in dealing directly with the Baltic republics (Trapans, 1991; Kolstoe, 1995). Among the agreements Yeltsin made at the time with the Balts was a common approach to citizenship and treatment of each other's nationals. Securing this was important to Yeltsin given the negative attitudes towards Russians often expressed, particularly against those in the Interfronts. In January 1991, at the same time as the Soviet army moved on Vilnius, agreements were signed
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between Yeltsin and Estonia and Latvia, including a guarantee that any person in the respective territories when the agreement was signed 'has the right to receive or retain citizenship in the RSFR or the Republic of Latvia (Estonia) in accordance with his free expression of will' (Kolstoe, 1995: 116). This agreement was ratified by Estonia and Latvia immediately; however, because of strong anti-Baltic sentiment in the Russian parliament, ratification of the Estonia treaty was delayed by a year, and the agreement with Latvia was never ratified (Kolstoe, 1995). The Baltic republics rapidly pressed on with moves for independence. Aware of Gorbachev's intention to have a referendum on maintaining the USSR as a new union, the Baltic republics organised their own pre-emptive referenda on independence, in FebruaryMarch 1991. All residents could vote in these referenda. There was a massive 'Yes' vote to restore independence in all three: 78% in Estonia, 74% in Latvia, and 85% in Lithuania. The figures indicated that significant numbers of non-Titular nationals had voted for independence, particularly in the case of Latvia, but also in Estonia (Melvin, 1995; Kolstoe, 1995). The eventual regaining of independence during the abortive coup of August 1991 has been extensively covered elsewhere. As newly independent but economically threatened countries, an immediate challenge the Baltic states faced was the issue of citizenship. Citizenship Closely linked to the issue of language laws are citizenship requirements, and it is these that have led to the most widespread international interest in developments in the Baltic states. Here, Lithuania has taken a different approach to that of Estonia and Latvia, and we concentrate on the situation in these latter two countries. Much to the surprise of Russians, who had always seen Lithuanians as very anti-Russian, Lithuania decided even before gaining independence to take the so-called 'zero option' in deciding citizenship: that is, all residents legally residing in Lithuanian territory (military and other special security groups aside) would be granted citizenship on signing a declaration that they would obey the Lithuanian constitution (Kolstoe 1995: 138). Lithuania took this step in the light of the relatively small number of non-Lithuanians in the population, and the relatively high level of Lithuanian competence among non-Titular residents in the country. Lithuanians believed that their small minority groups were well on the way to becoming fully integrated into Lithuanian society. This path was explicitly not chosen by Estonia or Latvia. Despite the agreement reached with Yeltsin in early 1991, the relatively large size of minorities, and the low level of competence in the local languages made such a move politically impossible, and this was further compounded by reactions to the very active anti-independence involvement of some Soviet period settlers. The Baltic states all considered that they were not new states constructed ab initio from the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, but rather were the renewal and continuation of the pre-World War II independent states, and issues of citizenship needed to be worked out on the basis of citizenship of these original states. Citizenship would be granted to those who were citizens in 1940, and their descendants. A process of naturalisation, much debated, would be worked out for others. This approach to renewal of a status quo ante rested also on the common Western understanding that these States had been forcibly incorpo-
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rated into the Soviet Union in 1940, and hence Western refusal to recognise this incorporation which had lasted right up to regained independence in 1991. Estonia moved relatively quickly to institute citizenship, reactivating and amending its old citizenship law in February 1992, based on citizenship for those who were citizens in 1940 and their descendants, and beginning a process of naturalisation immediately for the nearly 500,000 who were non-citizens. Naturalisation required candidates to demonstrate basic proficiency in Estonian. The test included a listening comprehension on everyday subjects, a conversation on everyday topics and on aspects of Estonia's history, geography, national symbols and culture, a reading comprehension on general information in Estonian, and writing a simple letter or filling in forms. Concessions were made to elderly candidates who were exempt from the written part, and to those who were disabled. In the education sector, the level of Estonian required in Russian language schools also satisfied naturalisation criteria (Rannut, 1994: 207). A number of naturalisations were also made on the basis of conspicuous contribution to the regaining of Estonian independence, or other community contribution. Despite constant Russian reminders that this was a retreat from the 1991 agreement with Yeltsin, the quick start to the naturalisation process blunted much criticism of the law. Conflict with Moscow flared again, however, in 1993, when Estonia proposed a complex Aliens Law which required permanent residents to renew their residency every five years, giving cause for concern that this could lead to expulsions. After heated criticism and intervention from the OSCE (then CSCE), a new player in this field, controversial aspects of the law were dropped (Kolstoe, 1995: 122). The issue of citizenship and naturalisation were to be much more complex in Latvia. Latvia adopted a resolution in October 1991 declaring the 1940 basis of citizenship, thus leaving around 700,000 residents without citizenship (Nørgaard, 1996: 190). A naturalisation law was proposed, requiring 16 years residence, knowledge of Latvian and Latvian history, and an oath of loyalty, but this only reached its first reading, and the law as a whole languished for nearly three more years, finally being passed only in June 1994. This interminable period of waiting caused great confusion and uncertainty, and was made worse by the bloodymindedness of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration which made it difficult for non-citizens to register as permanent residents, a requirement for any future consideration of citizenship (Nørgaard, 1996: 191ff). The Saeima could not agree over a final Citizenship Law, adopting one version in June 1994 which caused grave concern as it instituted very small yearly quotas eligible for citizenship. This version was criticised by Western organisations and vetoed by the President. Finally, in July 1994 an amended law was adopted with quotas being replaced by a graduated scale of applications, or naturalisation 'windows', starting with people under 20 who were born in Latvia, who could be naturalised from 1996, with the final cohort (the most elderly born outside Latvia) being eligible from 2003. Language and related requirements are generally the same as for Estonia, but there were initially no concessions in the language requirements for elderly candidates. A few other categories of person could claim immediate citizenship, including spouses and children of citizens, and those who had conspicuously served Latvia. One other criterion by which citizenship could be gained immedi-
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ately however seems to have been a genuinely unique clause: those persons' who have an excellent command of Latvian' (Nørgaard, 1996: 196). This provision is extremely interesting as it serves to underline the linguistic rather than ethnic basis of the Latvian citizenship laws. Criteria would not have been difficult to work out, as the demand here is for a standard well above that asked of ordinary applicants, so the eligible number of persons would have been small. However this provision was much discussed in the press and fears were expressed about its objectivity, and in the end it was not proceeded with it seems an opportunity lost. Western organisations did not object to this citizenship law, seeing it 'as an expression of the maximum possibility of political compromise under existing circumstances', not to mention that it resembled or was more liberal than many such laws in Europe or elsewhere in the world. The law was also important in opening the door for Latvian membership of the Council of Europe, despite the protests of Russia (Nørgaard, 1996: 194). Problems of implementation of these citizenship laws however were numerous, with eventually some changes and simplifications to the language tests in Estonia, continued debate and prodding from the OSCE on the rate of naturalisation, problems of teaching the languages (partly solved by international aid), and a very slow take-up rate in Latvia from 1996. We discuss more recent developments further below. Reactions to Baltic Language and Citizenship Laws: The Literature The loss of official status for Russian was and continues to be loudly condemned by Moscow; even before the gaining of independence and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Typical of such a response was the article by Viktor Alksnis, the 'Black Colonel' in Foreign Affairs in 1991: Alksnis was himself a Latvian, but allied himself with the forces such as the Interfronts seeking to hold the Soviet Union together and attack any manifestation of nationalism or separatism. Alksnis argued that the language laws and mooted citizenship moves disenfranchised a significant proportion of the population, were motivated by national hatred and revenge, and were against international standards in human rights. Even after independence, many individuals in the Interfronts continued to work in some cases for reunification with Russia, and more generally for repealing language and citizenship laws. Despite the activism of certain leaders, the Interfronts failed to garner popular support, and struggled to gain any numbers for their meetings or demonstrations. Compared to the massive popular mobilisations in favour of independence by local Balts (and significant numbers of non-Balts), the Interfronts fizzled (Taagepera, 1993; Dreifelds, 1966; Kolstoe, 1995). An important factor in this activity was the continued presence of the Soviet Army after December 1991 the Russian Army and other military forces and installations in the Baltic states. Ridding the Baltic states of this presence was the first major foreign affairs and defence task for the new countries, but this was made more difficult by threats from Russia to link the issue of withdrawal to the issue of discrimination on language and citizenship grounds against Russian speakers. Intense diplomatic pressure, from Western countries as well, finally
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persuaded Russia not to make this link and the military departed, the last leaving Latvia in August 1994. This withdrawal has not been without substantial consequences for nationalist and communist forces inside Russian politics, it was seen as a Great Betrayal, abandoning Russian speakers to their fate, and fuelled calls, of which Zhironovsky's became the best known, to reunite greater Russia (in his case from Finland to Alaska). Zhirinovsky also drew some support from the diaspora (Kolstoe, 1995: 177). Foreign relations experts in Russia, more mindful of Western power and perspectives, have given an alternative view: Having recognized the independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania without any reservations or conditions (such as the status of the sizeable Russian minorities there), Russia eventually dropped its ineffectual attempts at linking their status to the withdrawal of forces . . . In a display of enlightened internationalism, Moscow decided to take the case of the Russian minorities in the area to the UN, CSCE/OSCE and Council of Europe. (Trenin, 1998: 181) These bodies took an extremely close interest in the Baltic in subsequent years: from an Estonian point of view, Rannut almost wearily recounts in his 1994 article how since 1991 there had been some 15 human rights missions to Estonia from various bodies, 'none of which has found any gross or systematic violations of human rights' (Rannut, 1994: 208). Latvia had a similar experience, but by contrast Lithuanian's zero option was praised by Russia. Again, several Russian authors have criticised what are seen as inadequate responses on the part of international delegations to Estonia and Latvia; Konovalov and Evstaviev (1995) express the view that Russia's hoped-for support from international bodies on this issue has been compromised by the double standards used on former Soviet countries, where practices condemned elsewhere in the world have been allowed to pass. Moreover, the world should realise that such double standards have serious internal consequences in Russian politics: citing an instance in 1993 where CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel: in his mission to the Baltic states, did not notice any ethnic minority violation; this should be remembered as an example of the kind of approach that produced internal turmoil in the Russian political establishment. (Konovalov and Evstaviev, 1995: 178) These authors maintain that discrimination against the Russian minorities was still palpable in the Baltic, and survey the situation elsewhere in the post-Soviet states as well, particularly noting the antagonistic attitudes towards Russians in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and the absolute necessity of a 'zero option' citizenship as the first step towards satisfactory resolution of potential ethnic conflict. Here they give a memorable if somewhat bizarre analogy to the Estonian and Latvian citizenship restrictions, which in their view: surprisingly resembled the charter of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which grants the opportunity to live in Palestine after Israel is exterminated only to those who lived there before 1948 (i.e. the creation of Israel). (p. 164)
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At the same time, they accepted language requirements for certain positions, for 'the necessity to know the native language of the title nationality as a condition for occupying official positions seems normal' (p. 177). However, not all eastern authors shared the view of irreparable discrimination in the Baltics or elsewhere. The Ukrainian, Shamshur (1994), and the Russian, Rudensky (1994), for example, agreed the Estonian and Latvian legislation may meet the letter of international law, but the insecurity felt by the non-indigenous population over issues such as proposals for repatriation, or uncertainty over their status, means the Baltic states could be faced with greater alienation from this sector of population, as well as heightened and increased calls for regional autonomy, though the absence of violent confrontations to date gives hope of resolving these issues through moderate leadership. Zevelev gives a broader context to the issues facing the Russian diaspora. He points to the fact that, apart from the specific case of the Transdniestra region in Moldova, there has been virtually no violence in any of the Republics that became independent, and that this degree of peace should be appreciated. He cites three important factors for this. One is internal to Russian politics: any support for ethnic separatism in the 'Near Abroad' would unleash centrifugal forces in the Russian Federation itself (more than Chechnya alone). A second factor is the nature of the diaspora itself: unorganised, and not capable of mobilisation because 'political or any other mobilisation, solidarity and cooperation along ethnic lines are entirely new concepts for the formerly dominant people' (Zevelev, 1996: 279). A third factor however that has largely helped maintain peace is the weakness of Russia: despite its rhetoric, it has not been able to convince any of the other successor states to the USSR of the desirability of such developments as dual citizenship, for example. Moderation rather than assertiveness has been (or was he was writing in 1996) the dominant approach, a major contribution to peaceful outcomes. In Zevelev's view, opponents of moderation on the other hand demanded: three highly assertive policies: (1) trade sanctions against Latvia and Estonia as punishment for their citizenship policies towards Russian speakers; (2) pressure for the elevation of Russian language to the status of the second official language in states with a significant Russian-speaking population (Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Moldova, Latvia and Estonia); and (3) pressure for the self-governance of Russian communities within the 'Near Abroad'. (Zevelev, 1996: 276) Looking from an overall strategic perspective, Kozhemiakin and Kanet (1997) argue that the Baltic states were treated differently by Russia than other successor states because of the protection given to the Balts by the West: a situation of 'Baltic exceptionalism' developed in which Russia was given a relatively free hand to deal with issues (including security and military issues) in other post-Soviet states, but not in the Baltic. The Russian views of the Baltic are of importance in their sensitivity to the link between Russian external policies of support for Russian speaking minorities, and internal political consequences in Russia, not all of which we can explore in depth here. As we shall see, the oppositional view cited by Zevelev has steadily gained ground since 1996.
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Western scholars have an even more disparate set of views about Baltic issues related to language policy. At least four main approaches can be discerned in the literature. Those Western authors who had earlier studied language policy in the Soviet Union have been eager to study the changing status of Russian and the new official state languages, not least to see the long-term effects of Soviet language policy and the changes wrought in the post-Soviet regimes in reaction to this (see Knowles, 1993; Knowles, this volume). Marshall (1996) has a beautiful analysis of the factors that paradoxically both held the Soviet Union together linguistically, and tore it apart. Of this group Kreindler (1997) is the most critical of the new regimes in their handling of language and citizenship issues. A second group of authors had previously written on other issues in language policy, but became interested in the Baltic as they were struck by similarities or differences to language issues to other parts of the world. Interestingly, in the very early years of Baltic independence, authors who had been interested in the Quebec language situation wrote about the Baltic, with an emphasis on formal, legal and policy-making aspects, and have maintained their interest (Grin, 1991; Maurais, 1991, 1992, 1997, 1998). Maurais (1998) provides considerable data on recent events in the Baltic and commentaries that pay particular attention to the detailed implementation of language and citizenship policies. He gives broadly positive theoretical and ideological evaluations of the Baltic endeavours. David Laitin, who is cited extensively below, transferred from his previous interest in African language policy to do in-depth studies of the post-Soviet situation and Estonia in particular, with an emphasis on phenomenology and micro-studies of individuals adapting to new language situations, as well as an interest in economic and political incentives for particular language use. His collaborator Jerry Hough who did much of the rich survey work for Laitin, is perhaps the clearest author of all in pointing to the endless dynamism of situations where language and identity are rapidly being redefined. He argues that survey or policy analysis work needs to be backed up by more qualitative studies and field work, using anthropological methods to go beyond what are often crude questions in surveys and simplistic policy choices, and demonstrates this in a number of interrelated studies undertaken by himself and Laitin in Russia and the former USSR to reveal a plethora of different outcomes in language use, language acceptance and language change at individual, community and regional level. He also brings in to the discussion an emphasis on economic incentives, as well as struggles over identity: . . . we will never understand the evolution of language use and of linguistic politics if we do not understand both the incentives for individual language use both the legal requirements and the economic opportunities and the struggle of those trying to change the incentives created and enforced by the state. Nor will we understand the politics of these regions unless we understand the complexity of the struggle over language. Language is intimately associated both with identity and with economic opportunity, and, as such, it is the fulcrum of political struggle in multi-linguistic societies. (Hough, 1996: 116) Skutnabb-Kangas and Philipson have importantly drawn Baltic authors into
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their anthologies (1994), and provided depth to the discussion on linguistic human rights. Skutnabb-Kangas' own contribution to analysing Baltic language policy is significant, in that she is able to put this in the context of wider struggles over minority language and linguistic discrimination, and comes to an extremely important insight into the situation in Estonia and Latvia, based on the previous era of linguistic imperialism: Russian is thus a majorized minority language (a minority language in terms of numbers, but with the power of a majority language), whereas the Baltic languages are minorized majority languages (majority languages, in need of protection usually necessary for the threatened minority languages). (Skutnabb-Kangas: 1994: 178) Maurais in this regard speaks of 'regional majority languages', i.e. languages which may have a majority of speakers in a particular region, but may be subject to any number of pressures internally and externally because of other wider factors. Such languages may need particular assistance to retain their functions: If the goal is to achieve a situation where two unequal languages would finally be equal, then this cannot be achieved through granting similar rights to the languages. Hence the need for some sort of affirmative action programs . . . (Maurais, 1997: 150) A third group of authors came to the Baltic situation from other concerns in European or post-Soviet affairs, particularly ethnic relations, international relations, integration or peace studies, and for them the anticipation, explanation and analysis of ethnic conflict (or the lack of it) is paramount. Significantly, the most negative attitudes to the Baltic come from those concerned with European integration; some, like David Arter, a Professor of European Integration in the UK, have made their minds up with great certainty: In the Baltic states, the principal obstacle to national integration has stemmed from the imperialistic attitude of the political class representing the indigenous majority towards the ethnic minorities of the former Imperial power (Russians, Belarusans and Ukrainians) . . . Hard-line nationalists held that citizenship should be conferred only on those who lived in the Baltic republics before 1940, along with their descendants . . . (Arter, 1993: 247) A similar if less absolute critique of the Baltic approach to national integration is made by Smith et al. (1994), who stress the exclusion aspect of Estonia's and Latvia's language and citizenship laws in contrast to Lithuania's inclusive approach. They argue that this has led to considerable alienation among non-citizens in Estonia and Latvia, but the level of political mobilisation is extremely low. This remains a puzzle for the authors, who advance several possible explanations including the lack of recognised elites, the discrediting of the Interfronts, and most of all the heterogeneity of the Russian community, with few common features except a language and (a problematic) self-identification as Russians living outside their former home. The authors quote Semyonov's description of the Baltic Russians as being a 'motley, unorganised mass, which in a political sense does not represent movements and parties but a crowd' (p. 203).
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Meanwhile, the state is systematically excluding people on the basis of language testing which ensures that 'language will function as a key resource for the strengthening and reproduction of core cultures and as an obvious social stigma' (p. 191). Their evidence for alienation and views of citizenship and language is based on a survey of Russian residents in four cities (Riga, Daugavpils, Klaipeda and Narva) which show overwhelming condemnation of citizenship laws and language laws, but whose results can be contrasted with a number of other surveys around the same time showing in some cases quite different attitudes to language in particular, and aspects of citizenship requirements as well (see below). In a subsequent and more theoretical study (Smith et al., 1998), the authors trace a number of discourses that have been effectively used by the nationalising governments of Estonia and Latvia to limit the inclusion of the Russian diaspora. The use of 'draconian' language laws has also enabled these states to create structures favouring the majority group in areas like employment, thus bringing instrumental rewards as well as persuasive discourses of core nation, de-Sovietisation, a scientific standardising state and a return to Europe. Estonia and Latvia are: aspiring to the idea of the 'one nation-state community', one in which all residents are expected to speak the same language and in which the national culture will therefore be secure throughout the political homeland. (Smith et al., 1998: 103) They have been able to go some way to realising this aspiration because of Western help, and a loophole: That the West is willing to accommodate such nationalising states is in part linked to geoeconomic and geopolitical interests, but it is also bound up with the Baltic states having found a convenient loophole in international law in which a Western community had never accepted their de jure incorporation into the USSR, and therefore logically has had to acknowledge their new status as 'restored citizen-polities'. (p. 109) To call the fundamental issue of status for the Baltic states for the past 60 years a 'loophole' is certainly a new interpretation. Even more interestingly, Smith et al. seem the most militaristic of all authors studied when they argue that Russia, despite its often hostile rhetoric to the Baltic states, has basically turned its back on the diaspora, and that Russia could have done more to defend the rights of non-citizens by linking the withdrawal of the army to guarantees of rights (p. 117). This can be contrasted with the views of Russian authors mentioned above. Finally here, a perhaps unexpected intervention that must be mentioned came from popular historian Francis Fukuyama in the USA, not previously known for his interest in this region, who brought some heat into this issue by asserting that Baltic language and citizenship policies were discriminatory, and should be strongly opposed by the US government ('Trapped in the Baltics', New York Times, 19 December 1992). Clearly, the policies of the Baltics were catching the attention of many commentators of radically different orientation, who were expressing frustration at the apparent inability to change this situation. Several authors have asked why it is, that, faced with such (seemingly) clear
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violations of rights of Russian speakers, popular protest and mobilisation has been so scant, and why stability rather than intense ethnic conflict has characterised the Baltic states. The result of research evidence, presented below, that many Russian speakers see the objectives of the language laws and aspects of the citizenship laws as quite legitimate, are difficult for both Moscow and some Western commentators to accept. A small fourth group of somewhat isolated but significant scholars come to questions of the Baltic again not from a language background, but this time from a concern for human rights, particularly their legal aspects (see also Koenig in this volume). de Varennes gives a useful broad overview of international norms in regard both to language and to citizenship, stressing the importance of a number of human rights instruments, going back to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and before, and arguing that a number of matters have now become increasingly settled in international law: these include the need to understand a language of court proceedings if charged with a crime (directly linked to notions of non-discrimination), and non-interference by the state in matters of private language use and treatment of linguistic minorities. de Varennes believes that the systematic regard to this body of emerging law can help overcome present ethnic conflicts, not least in the Baltic. One of the clearest injunctions for protection of minority language use, repeated now in various international instruments, is Article 27 from the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights: In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language. (ICCPR, 1966) As we shall see, this stricture on private activity, and what constitutes private activity, has come up in relation to the language laws in the Baltic. These laws do not, for example, prohibit or demand the use of any particular language in a private interaction, but do insist that those with contact with the public even in private enterprises must have a demonstrated capacity in the official state language. On such issues as sign-posting, correspondence and record keeping however, and on the language to be used in formal meetings, there are stronger legal requirements, and there has now been conflict between the Baltics and international organisations on some of these. A crucial consideration is whether any particular use or non-use of a minority language is discriminatory, and in de Varennes view this can only be done by looking at intentions and the reach of legislation, and examining the particular linguistic situation in any case. Clearly a state is not obliged to use all or even any minority language in any particular instance, but systematic refusal to use a language officially when it is used by a large sector of a population could become discriminatory in placing an unfair burden on the speakers of the minority language and favour speakers of the majority language in the labour market and in other ways. On the question of having more than one official language, de Varennes points
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to the well-known cases of Switzerland and Belgium maintaining a number of official languages, where the sharp boundaries drawn have overwhelmingly helped maintain peaceful relations between the language groups, and he recommends the Baltics examine this approach for relevance to their own context. On citizenship, de Varennes argues that while there are no overall international agreements on citizenship as on other substantive issues, nonetheless aspects of non-discrimination law also apply in this area: particularly once a process of naturalisation or other access to citizenship is started, this must conform to general anti-discrimination guidelines. Also, the arbitrary deprivation of citizenship will almost always be discriminatory, as well as any moves that lead to statelessness. de Varennes here argues hard against a strong body of opinion that there are no international standards on citizenship: he cites the opinion of two Council of Europe experts on Estonia's then-proposed citizenship legislation in 1991: As regards the human rights aspects of this problem, it should first be noted that neither the European Convention on Human Rights nor any other international human rights convention recognises the right to a certain citizenship as a human right. Consequently, it must in principle be left to each state to determine the conditions for acquiring its citizenship . . . (cited in de Varennes, 19956: 132) de Varennes sees these comments as 'unfortunate', because they seem to imply 'that governments have no legal obligations to apply principles of non-discrimination in matters relating to citizenship' and implies 'there is no place for human rights considerations except in avoiding situations of statelessness' (p. 132). He cites one international case, the Costa Rica Naturalization case in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights which agreed with the requirement for Spanish, but a dissenting judgement in that case also pointed out that a state cannot ignore the particular linguistic situation that obtains in a country: Equality and non-discrimination cannot function in a vacuum nor, therefore, without the specific conditions of the society in which people live. In this regard, my concern comes form the fact that there are among the country's own native-born people persons and substantial communities that do not know the Spanish language or that do not know it well . . . (cited in de Varennes, 19956: 134) For the Baltic situation again, in de Varennes' view, the crucial factor is that of the proportion of the population negatively affected. Considering the size of the excluded population, and the objective difficulties faced by Russian speakers in learning Latvian or Estonian, he argues that it could be held that the language requirements in these citizenship laws become onerous: The exclusive preference given to Latvian and Estonian seems disproportionate and unreasonable as an attempt to rectify past Soviet practices, bearing in mind the number of permanent residents . . . A better approach may be to have both the official language and Russian included as part of the naturalization process. (pp. 1378) The evidence from Estonia and Latvia on how onerous language requirements
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are is dealt with below, where we also comment on de Varennes proposed 'solutions' to ethnic conflicts. Another view is put by Hungarian György Szépe, who has become intimately involved in a number of official, nongovernmental and academic moves to devise agreements on minority and language issues in Europe, and has written some of the most sensitive articles on language situations in Eastern Europe. In an article on language policy in Eastern Europe (1994), he takes account of work on linguistic human rights and comments specifically on the Estonian situation: This is a very complex issue; we have to admit that human rights (and linguistic human rights) are very important and central issues, but they are not adequate tools to solve the problems of an entire historical age. The invasion of the new coloniser exemplified by the Russian immigrants to Estonia after the occupation of that small country in 1940 can endanger the existence of the linguistic community of the country. Estonia's reaction in requiring a positive attitude to the language of the country by the (former) colonisers is not a novel aggression but a restitution of the previous peaceful stage. (1994: 47) He ends by offering one reminder: 'Without interfering in the dispute, may I remark that human rights are meant to protect the underdog rather than the (past, present or potential) overdog', and in his view there are no doubts as to who has been (and very much still is) the underdog in this context. We will return to these issues in further sections of this paper dealing with the OSCE and other European bodies. To complete this brief review of literature, some Baltic authors need to be noted. We have already used the work of Mart Rannut who has been a significant author in this field since the early 1990s (e.g. Rannut, 1991). Chair of the National Language Board in Estonia and prominent in international meetings and conferences related to the Baltic, his work gives a most powerful insight into the underlying ideology of Soviet language policy, and into the renewed tensions over language policy now as Russia continues to defend the former status of the Russian language in the new circumstances of independence. Rannut particularly points to the deliberate foreign affairs use of the Russian minority in the 'Near Abroad' as embodied in the Karaganov doctrine, the work of the Fund for Foreign Policy of Russia, a think tank opposed to the moderate policies of Russia in the early 1990s. Karaganov laid out a strategy of using the presence of Russian settlers as a valuable asset to advance Russian interests in all post-Soviet successor states in a range of spheres from the military to the economic to the political, ensuring a rein is kept on the policies of these new countries (Rannut, 1994; Kolstoe, 1995). Ina Druviete is Latvia's leading sociolinguist and has an extensive body of work including surveys of the language situation in that country and policy reports (Druviete, 1995, 1997, 1998) and she has also written what is perhaps the best single paper on these language issues in the Baltic (Druviete, 1997). This paper is particularly useful as it addresses a number of conceptual issues in the debate over language and citizenship policies in the Baltic states. She also presents an excellent account of the sociolinguistic obstacles a language such as
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Latvian must face in its attempt to secure its status, and the particular post-Soviet forces that stand in the way of this. First, when discussing the 'Russian minority' in the Baltic, she takes up Skutnabb-Kangas' point that we are dealing with a very special case of a minority in the Baltic situation, which many of the aspects of minority legislation or international agreements on minorities do not address. For example, to the extent that we are addressing issues of historical minorities, say the Russians, Jews, Germans or others who were identifiable minorities and all citizens in the pre-war era, all of these persons and their descendants are in fact citizens now, have education provided in their language, and all other attributes of cultural autonomy usually denied during the Soviet period. However, it is the Soviet-period russophone settlers, or rather the monolingualism of these settlers, that is at issue. These people never formed a minority in any conventional sense, and their insistence on using Russian only created the asymmetrical bilingualism already referred to. Russian was the dominant language and retains much of its force in the Baltic today. The question is how to change this situation so that a right seldom considered in commentaries the right of the majority Titular nation to receive services in the official state language can be respected: The demand for the right to stay monolingual is the background and the essence of the linguistic human rights problem of the Russian-speaking population in all the Baltic states (Druviete, 1997: 181) It is in her work on the necessary sociolinguistic preconditions for particular language policies to be effective that Druviete makes her most significant contribution. The basic consideration is: what needs to be done to enable Latvian to actually exercise its function as the official state language, in a situation where many sociolinguistic functions might still be fulfilled by Russian? The Baltic states have thus pursued policies first of all to defend and enhance the status and range of sociolinguistic use of their national languages, and then to ensure that other languages can be treated as minority languages, guaranteeing 'equal status for all minorities, without special exemption for the Russian minority' (p. 168). She argues that 'integration' in this context cannot be based on adopting a two official languages policy as this would perpetuate russophone monolingualism and the asymmetrical bilingualism for the Titular nation. Integration must precede citizenship, and any proposed granting of citizenship to all before a satisfactory level of integration was achieved 'would have been dangerous for national statehood' (p. 169). Integration must be based on ensuring the national language becomes part of the repertoire of all minorities. She points to the considerable advances that have been made in this regard in language attestation, use patterns, and attitudes of minorities towards the official state language, detailed in the next section: The present process of change in the linguistic hierarchy is slow but satisfactory and must not be artificially interrupted due to an incorrect interpretation of linguistic human rights. (p. 183) Unfortunately, in her view, such sociolinguistic considerations seem rarely to be taken into account in the debate, and focus on rights and pressing for a two
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official languages policy when the alternative is now clear and appropriate, can only in fact undermine linguistic human rights: Baltic countries represent a unique case, probably not taken into consideration when universal declarations on linguistic human rights are written. Their situation shows that the linguistic human rights of state language speakers can also be infringed and that the official state language in an independent country may be an endangered language at the same time. (Druviete, 1997) Such views were also put forward by Broks et al. in their study of democratic stability in Latvia. Despite a number of threatening economic, social and political problems, Latvia had in fact been able to successfully develop a stable democratic system, and many supposedly threatening factors such as the restriction on citizenship had not led to severe conflict, but indeed may have been the reason for enduring stability: It is not easy to explain why limitations on the accessibility of citizenship have not led to extensive political protests by those people who have found themselves outside the ring of citizens. Paradoxically, limitations on citizenship have proved to be a fundamental element of Latvian political stability. Had suffrage been extended to all of Latvia's permanent residents, including those people who opposed the idea of an independent state [ . . . ] a serious constitutional crisis and political check-mate could have occurred. There is every reason to believe that this situation could have provoked uncontrolled ethnic conflicts. (Broks et al., 1996/97: 110) The Evidence on Attitudes to Language and Citizenship The key to understanding why there has not in fact been overt ethnic conflict but rather relative harmony in the Baltic states comes from inside the Baltic States themselves. Empirical data throughout the 1990s show considerable legitimacy of the language laws and the place of national languages, plus general tolerance of Russian, and some interesting systematic social differences among monolingual Russian speakers to learning and using the national languages. Evidence that local Russian speakers did not necessarily support the view of themselves as being illegitimately excluded by language and citizenship laws can be drawn from a number of sources. A key series of findings here has been in the work of Rose and his colleagues at Strathclyde, who have comprehensively surveyed the 'barometer' of public opinion in the Baltic states over half a decade. A striking result came in their 1994 study (Maley & Rose, 1994) which specifically studied the Russian population in all three Baltic states. Asked to respond to the proposition 'People like us should not be made to learn a Baltic language', more than half the respondents in fact disagreed (see Table 3) A number of other items in this survey also showed a radical departure on the part of these Russian respondents from the views current in Moscow or in parts of the Russian-language press that there was massive and unjustifiable discrimination against the Russian-speaking minority, and Rose was moved to issue a press release with his study, claiming there was a noticeable reduction in ethnic tensions in the Baltic. Subsequent work by Rose and Maley also asked about the
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Table 3 'People like us should not be made to learn a Baltic language' (%) Russians in Russians in Russians in Estonia Latvia Lithuania 11 13 9 Strongly agree 26 21 24 Agree 36 5 30 Disagree 22 22 25 Strongly disagree 5 19 12 Don't know (Maley & Rose, 1994: 56) issue of citizenship. As a rule, the great majority of non-citizens in the Baltic support the idea of the zero-option, do see themselves as being excluded, and are often dismayed at being deprived of citizenship (Smith et al., 1994; Evans, 1998). But they are reluctant to mobilise politically on this issue. Closer questioning reveals in fact more complexity in attitudes to citizenship: in their 1995 survey, Maley and Rose found that in Latvia some two-thirds of non-Latvians agreed to a greater or lesser extent that people who want to become citizens should pass a language examination as part of that process; half of all non-Estonians in Estonia agreed as well (Maley & Rose, 1995: 40). Similar responses were gained in a study by Laitin (1996a), this time of Russians in four post-Soviet countries Estonia, Latvia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. It should be noted that Russians' language proficiency in the Titular language in these various republics differed greatly: from the 1989 Census again, compared to the situation in the Baltic detailed above, 33.3% of those in Ukraine and just 0.86% of those in Kazakhstan spoke the Titular languages (see Table 4). As can be seen, there is overwhelming support for having Titular languages as compulsory school subjects, and strong support in both the Baltic republics for residents being fluent in the Titular language. The low level of knowledge of Kazakh on the part of Russians there clearly influences views on this point. Interestingly, even on the very hard question of assimilation, almost half the Russians do agree that assimilation in Latvia will be their best future. The figure for Estonia is much less, reflecting the far greater compact of Russians particularly in the east of Estonia who lack a viable Estonian surrounding in which assimilation could be thought to be possible, and also a substantially different orientation to taking on Estonian features, as discussed elsewhere in this paper. We refer however to the difficulties of Laitin's use of this concept of 'assimilation' below. Table 4 Attitudes towards Titular languages and assimilation; Russian respondents in different republics, % agreeing EstoniaLatviaKazakhstanUkraine 'All permanent residents should be fluent 58.2 70.6 23.0 36.9 in the Titular language' 'Titular language should be a required 95.8 95.2 64.4 84.7 subject in school 'The best future for Russians in this 7.9 48.4 7.7 23.1 republic is to assimilate (Laitin, 1996a: 7)
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Druviete's studies attempted to get a finer-grained picture of attitudes to language issues in Latvia, combining survey results with interviews to probe language attitudes. In a study of non-Latvians in Latvia, she found that a crucial variable was whether respondents expected to gain citizenship or not. Of those who did not expect to gain citizenship, some 30% had no desire to master Latvian; whereas for those who did expect to gain citizenship the figure was only 5%. Age differences were also important, with older residents often feeling they were beyond learning the language (Druviete, 1995: 68). Her studies, like several others, also show that at the societal level there are generally tolerant attitudes towards Russian speakers; many Balts will automatically switch to Russian when talking to Russians; there is no overt confrontation, which again makes local Russian speakers more positive towards the majority and towards the clearly indicated need to learn the official state language. Also significant is the changing pattern of language use that can now be observed, with over 350,000 gaining language attestation, all state services being able to communicate in the official state language, increased teaching of the official state language in schools and a quite successful policy of public signage decyrillisation, changing the streetscapes from their former bilingual or mostly Russian propaganda signs. Some original insights into the linguistic and social situation among the Russian population came from Volkovs' study of Russian youth in Latvia. He found interesting gender and class differences in attitudes on language and related matters: young women overwhelmingly wished to learn Latvian and for their children to learn it; among men the figure was substantially less, however those from the most affluent families were least likely to favour learning Latvian (Volkovs, 1996; Druviete, 1995: 30, found similar results). Yet the attitudes of well-off young men are well known in post-Soviet life, and widely despised. It seems then, that most resistance to Titular language and citizenship laws comes from the remnants of the old guard of militarists and nomenklatura, together with this brash new class of well-to-do young men; an alliance which is quite at odds with the disposition of the majority of Russian speakers. (Those who feel they are too old to learn the language should not per se be counted as part of this oppositional group.) Apart from differences over politics, Volkovs also argues that these pronounced cleavages among the Russian community indicate rapid fracturing and disintegration of this community. Volkovs' work is one of the few in this field that goes beyond ethnic distinctions to look at other salient social categories as explanations for particular linguistic behaviour, and such approaches in future research are to be desired; possibly too much attention has been given to ethnic differences alone; as argued above, the Russian-speaking population is very highly differentiated in terms of social class. By far the most comprehensive understanding of post-Soviet language policies comes in the exhaustive work of David Laitin (1998), who as a linguistic ethnographer has spent time doing considerable field work to back up broader survey work. In his qualitative studies he has looked at the varied, flexible and individual ways in which Russians have responded to the language and citizenship laws, and in the case of Estonia the considerable efforts made by individuals to learn Estonian, even in situations where they do not hear it regularly spoken. He sees these attempts to accommodate to the situation as a willingness to assim-
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ilate into Estonian society. With little variation, the Russians see their future to lie in Estonia, and give scant support to irredentist or Russian interventionist or even local political mobilisation to solve minority issues. Laitin's more general conclusion is that, given its high degree of ethnic segmentation, conditions would on first consideration seem very unfavourable for Estonia to develop as a classic 'nation state'. However, the status of Estonian, the clear identification of many Russians with a future in Estonia, the overall non-threatening behaviour of Estonian society and government towards them, their willingness to take individual solutions rather than collective mobilisation on language, citizenship and other matters, as well as Estonia's economic success relative to Russia, all militate in favour of Estonia being able to successfully re-establish a classic nation state. In Laitin's view, Estonia has tipped the scales towards a stable nation state which will grow in legitimacy, and economic rationalisation will bring about increased language rationalisation (Laitin, 1996b, 1998). One problematic aspect of Laitin's thesis however is his use of the concept of 'assimilation' to describe the potential end-product in Estonia. Without going into the substantial theoretical debates and even more substantial polemic that this concept has raised in many parts of the world, Laitin all too readily translates a willingness to find individual solutions to learning the local language and coping with the possible task of gaining citizenship as steps to 'assimilation'; three factors however count against this. As Laitin's own survey shows, only a tiny proportion (7.9%) of Russians in Estonia support the idea of assimilation. Moreover, Laitin in his other work (Laitin, 1996b) has suggested that because of the difficulties of learning Estonian for the Russian minority, English may well become the language of interethnic communication in Estonia a view very much to be doubted. Finally, however, it is not assimilation in any sense that is demanded by either language or citizenship laws, but a capacity in a language, and indeed the Titular nationalities are themselves quite sceptical of massive assimilation occurring, particularly in Estonia (see also Evans, 1998). The higher figure on support for assimilation from respondents in Latvia in Laitin's survey suggests a more open result is possible there, and the greater degree of intermarriage, a greater degree of closeness in language, and a historical and very real present example of assimilation where many Russians and Latvians in south-east Latgale are very intermixed can be cited as reasons for this. Here, Laitin's related concept of 'competitive assimilation' may have some play; that is, where people will 'assimilate', in the sense of learning the language, precisely to gain the material benefits of better jobs or a better cultural life. The view that economic rationalisation will lead to language rationalisation is an interesting hypothesis for the future. For the moment, the influence of economic factors may lie elsewhere: that the intensified Russian economic crisis of recent times may make Russians even less eager to rock the boat in Estonia, and reduce support for irredentism and other pro-Russia mobilisation. Thus, the view that the Baltic states are illegitimate and should not continue to exist as such are held by a vociferous but tiny and declining part of the settler population; the view that Russian speakers are discriminated against by language requirements a long-term charge by Russia and many Western commentators or bodies interestingly does not find majority agreement
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among the local Russian-speaking population. Rather, many previously monolingual russophones are learning and using the official state language. And while citizenship is a more contested issue, with stable support for a zero-option, again more complex attitudes are revealed as most non-citizens accept the legitimacy of language requirements. Hegemony from East and West The failure to mobilise significant numbers of Soviet-era settlers, the general social peacefulness and lack of overt conflict has meant that those opposing language and citizenship requirements have had to use other approaches, particularly appeals to international forums, use of international pressure, and quite recently in Latvia isolated acts of provocation, to have their views heard. We detail these below. Two factors here are particularly important. First, we have cited a number of Russian authors from the mid-1990s who basically saw the Estonian and Latvian approach to citizenship as wrong, but disagreed sharply over whether or not such approaches were discriminatory or met international standards of respect for minorities. In 199798, however, the Russian official position hardened on this issue and there was renewed international pressure to oppose Estonian and Latvian policies, and to back such opposition with sanctions. The degree of intensity of this campaign rose directly with the growing financial crisis inside Russia itself during this period. Secondly, the period from 1996 has also seen far more interventionist approaches to the Baltic states on the part of European organisations. If the reactions from Moscow are a continuation but intensification of previous postures, the desire of the Baltic states to enter the EU and possibly NATO has raised the possibility of local decision-making being influenced or even overturned by European bodies on a whole range of issues from economic affairs to institutional requirements to, it turns out, language policy. In 1993, an OSCE (then still CSCE) report on Estonia reiterated the findings of most international bodies at the time of the reasonableness of these language policies: Estonia tries to develop a comprehensive language policy that offers Russian-speaking citizens sufficient opportunities to fully identify with Estonia and live as loyal citizens while using their own language ( . . .) For various reasons many Russian speakers perceive the policy presently followed by the government as insufficient or unreasonable. This explains to a great extent the concerns expressed by some residents regarding the human rights situation in Estonia. (quoted in Druviete, 1997: 169; see also Huber, 1995) In more recent years however we have seen a carrots (EU) and sticks (OSCE) approach to the Baltic states, characterised by a seemingly growing antagonism to Baltic language initiatives which has ranged from paternalism to ultimatums and threats not to accept the Baltic states into European bodies such as the EU if certain changes are not made to policies. In his highly critical review of the operations of the OSCE on minority rights, Burgess (1999) argues that the OSCE has reincarnated the old League of Nations approach to minorities, limiting itself in a very selective way again only to minorities in Eastern Europe, and then only to
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some of these, and this has been accepted by Eastern European countries for the sole reason that they are so anxious to gain entry to European bodies. Again the reasons are more to do with foreign relations issues than care for linguistic minorities or linguistic issues, with an additional factor in the case of the Baltics being a European fear of seeing large numbers of stateless Russian speakers who could constitute a future wave of migrants to the West. There is a basic incompatibility between Baltic views of the essence of the problem being the need to eradicate lingering imperialist practices and using the state to guarantee the development of the national entity and national languages; and European and some international views applying legalistic and constructed views of minorities and linguistic rights developed in quite different contexts where the concern is to limit the state in the name of individual rights. This difference of viewpoint is not close to being resolved. We examine the OSCE's role in citizenship issues below. The OSCE has also since 199697 become active on the issue of a proposed new Language law in Latvia, and made a number of criticisms of Latvian language issues. In 1997 it objected to the draft Language law which prescribed regulation over a number of language issues in private companies, just as the 1989/1992 law had done. Thus, those in public contact positions in private companies had to pass an appropriate language attestation, and there were strictures on sign-posting, labelling, and use of the State language in documents, correspondence and formal meetings. Drawing particularly on Clause 27 of the ICCPR and other international safe-guards on freedom of expression, the OSCE has at length given legal opinions on the incompatibility of regulations in private activities except for a small defined set of concerns, e.g. health and safety, security (OSCE, 1997). In 1998 it has maintained this stance, demanding changes to the draft law which has maintained these clauses and which has been strongly defended by language policy makers in Latvia (OSCE, 1998; Hirsa Latvijas Vestnesis, 20 April, 1998). It is not clear why the OSCE has increased its opposition recently to items of legislation that have been in effect for some time. There are many grounds on which the highly legalistic opinions of the OSCE and others can be challenged. Apart from those criticising the OSCE's overall approach to rights (Burgess, 1999; Chandler, 1999), others have argued that international agreements and conventions do not specifically outlaw the approach to citizenship in the Baltic states (e.g. Vallens, 1995; Skolnick, 1996), or have challenged the view that they are against broadly established democratic principles (Chinn & Truex, 1996). Moreover, the reasoning of the OSCE or other authorities examined on our literature review above can certainly be challenged, whether on jurisprudential or other grounds. In the highly politicised context of such reasoning, it would be unsatisfactory to leave such matters to legal argument alone. Private Use of Language The OSCE regards the demand that people in public contact positions in private businesses be able to interact in the official state language infringes universal rights of self-expression and freedom of language, but this view seems highly contestable. Hirsa (1998), Director of the State Language Centre in Latvia, makes a number of points on this:
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First, Article 27 of the ICCPR characterises the private and community use of language in a specific way: 'such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to [ . . .] use their own language'. In what sense is a commercial interaction a situation of interaction 'in community with other members of their group'? It could well be interaction with a member of some other group. In what way should language not be seen in terms of any other way that a state may wish to regulate commercial interactions e.g. for consumer protection, or even non-discrimination in this case discrimination against people wishing to use the official state language? Secondly, it can be asked how is ensuring that an enterprise has the capacity to operate in the official state language an infringement of the rights of anyone, including the right to freedom of expression? The Baltic language laws' concern is not to regulate language use in individual situations, but to ensure that there is capacity for transactions to be accomplished in the national language if requested. Other languages may well continue to be used, as individual language interactions in contact with the public are not and will not be monitored by the law. Thirdly, the OSCE has also objected to the prescription that the official state language is used in official meetings, documentation etc., of the workplace. Yet here the appeals to self-expression or 'in community with' considerations seem quite far-fetched: the typical workplaces in the Baltic (as increasingly elsewhere in Europe or the world) are in fact multi-national, with persons from various groups coming together; the Quebec precedent is a useful one here, which has maintained that the official language be used at this level despite attempted challenges. Apart form Hirsa's comments, it should also be noted that the situation is made even more ludicrous by the fact that there is now concerted pressure on Eastern European states by European bodies (and wider afield e.g. the IMF) to privatise previous state industries. It seems incoherent for there to be allowable language regulation of employees of, say, a major utility company when it is a state enterprise, but not the day after this company is privatised to serve essentially the same functions. (Of course, some favour privatisation as precisely a way of evading such laws). Moreover, as Hirsa comments, in purely private businesses that have never been part of the public sphere, the small size of the market dictates that often there are very few choices available for consumers: being forced to use businesses who cannot deal with clients in the official state language could arguably be a far greater infringement of rights than requesting that an employee who has frequent contact with the public be capable of speaking the official state language which an increasing proportion of employees have become capable of doing through steady implementation of Language laws. Finally, while the OSCE says that there can be reasonable reasons for regulation of private business (public safety, health regulations etc.), there is in fact a stronger force majeure argument why languages should to this extent be regulated in private enterprises. This relates back to the intention of the legislation, which is to ensure the capacity to have all services available in the official state language, as a deliberate shift from past linguistic practices and as a way of reversing previous enforced language hierarchies. In many societies language is the most substantial and abiding quality that gives a nation its distinctiveness
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and is a centrally held value of that society. Language policies that essentially preserve that culture and uniqueness are fundamental, and the means used to ensure this in the Baltic including a pragmatic regulation of some aspects of language in private enterprises, may be perfectly proportional and reasonable to this end. Moreover, Maurais makes the point that in the case of private enterprises state intervention is essential because: . . . one must realise that the individual is helpless. An individual alone cannot bring about such a massive change in a business firm, let alone in a whole society. In other words, one must do away with voluntarism. The state has to set the rules and provide some sort of control . . . (Maurais, 1997: 151) Moreover, one can find reflections of this in debates on international law relating to language rights: In the 'Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights' drafted at a conference of non-governmental organisations in Barcelona in 1996, the 'Preliminaries' list the following among considerations needing to be taken into account in determining language policy: . . . that invasion, colonization, occupation and other instances of political, economic or social subordination often involve the direct imposition of a foreign language or, at the very least, distort perceptions of the value of languages and give rise to hierarchical linguistic attitudes which undermine the language loyalty of speakers; and . . . that the languages of some peoples which have attained sovereignty are immersed in a process of language substitution as a result of a policy which favours the language of a former colonial or imperial power . . .' (Barcelona Declaration, p. 5 of text) The Baltic states would of course see this consideration as directly applying to them, and their language policies as being devised specifically as a response to this situation. Some European leaders have supported this view (Bildt, 1994). Thus, any arguments over conformity to international standards can arguably be met on their own terms. We can see clearly an OSCE policy of increasingly reining in features of Baltic language and citizenship policies that in many cases are fundamental to the promotion of the national languages and expanding their sociolinguistic functions. It is of concern here that the OSCE seem to have hardened and retrospectively altered their views on provisions that will promote the national languages (as in the 1993 CSCE view on Estonian language laws), favouring now ideologies of supposed freedom of choice and safeguarding of the private sphere which will palpably serve to maintain past linguistic hierarchies and, moreover, threaten to undo the considerable progress that has been made in changing language attitudes and language use. Thus, a sea-change seems to be taking place. It is not clear if this is a change only in the OSCE itself, or whether it reflects a broader shift where other European bodies are perfectly comfortable with the idea of a reversion to aspects of a two-official languages policy in the Baltics, not to mention a zero option in citizenship. 1
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de Varennes: Onerous Demands and Ready Solutions? Equally debatable are views such as those of de Varennes that Baltic language and citizenship policies are unreasonably onerous on the russophone minority. We see in fact already a decided move from the monolingualism of the past: in Latvia for example now some 388,000 people have passed the language attestation (Latvia Integration Committee, 1998); while not everyone needing to pass a language attestation was from this minority, the overwhelming proportion of candidates were, and this is a figure that represents over one-half of all non-citizens. Other research detailed above has shown the steady increase in knowledge of the national language. Perhaps what seemed onerous previously is turning out not to be such. Views of what is onerous may thus be tied to static conceptions of any sociolinguistic situation. How viable are the 'solutions' that de Varennes offers? de Varennes seems to equate 'solutions' with 'no longer having russophone complaints'. He is certainly not alone in this, but the alleged solutions need to be closely examined. Most curious is his argument that for naturalisation law the requirement to be competent in the official state language is unduly harsh and 'a better approach may be to have both the official language and Russian included as part of the naturalisation requirements' (199596: 138). This sounds ambiguous, but his examples of this kind of approach are instructive, relating to the view that naturalisation requirements should be related to the overall linguistic composition of the nation. He cites the example of the UK where an applicant for naturalisation can satisfy language requirements by being competent in either English or Welsh or Gaelic; in Canada, either English or French; by analogy, Russian should be included along with Estonian or Latvian in the Baltic case, so that an applicant would be approved if they spoke either Russian or Estonian/Latvian. This argument, an example of how legal reasoning can serves us so poorly in this area, simply begs the question by proposing the 'zero option' under the guise of legal precedent. When talking of solutions, de Varennes also assumes that only the present policies can cause conflict; yet in fact any move to a two-official languages policy would bring a massive reaction, and only force the Titular nationalities to once again go through the whole process of mobilisation and confrontation in defence of their identity, culture, language and political power that occurred in the late 1980s. Druviete (forthcoming) has detailed a number of other objections to de Varennes' approach. A Referendum on Citizenship, or on Access to Europe? The referendum in October 1998 in Latvia on citizenship issues has been a major landmark. Despite constant Russian and occasional Western institutional objections to certain aspects of language and citizenship policies, detailed above, Latvia had from 1996 embarked on a course of naturalisation (beginning naturalisation first of young adults born in Latvia), and it believed that major issues and conflicts over citizenship were, if not ended, at least receding. The events of March and April 1998 changed this completely. Writing in the quasi-official International Affairs, the Head of the Directorate for International Humanitarian and Cooperation and Human Rights at the
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Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Teimuraz Ramishvili, has eloquently stated how Russia saw what happened next: . . . dispersal and beating of a peaceful demonstration of old-age pensioners in Riga, a procession of veterans of the Latvian Voluntary SS Legion, bomb explosions in a synagogue, at Soviet war monuments, near the Russian embassy . . . . . . There is more to this conflict than the discrimination of non-Latvians alone, for it seriously calls into question the maturity of all institutions of civil society, which are unable to cope not only with social problems but also with manifestations of extremism, anti-Russian moods, anti-Semitism, and sheer fascism. (Ramishvili, 1998: 116) The events were in fact even more interesting than Ramishvili describes, but their causes may differ radically from those manifestations of extremism he proposes. Small demonstrations of pensioners and sometimes other groups, of various nationalities, protesting outside government offices on a number of issues usually economic issues, but occasionally citizenship or discrimination issues, have been a common and generally unremarked occurrence in Riga. On March 3 1998 however, when policemen allegedly shoved a few protesters to make way for traffic, a number of local and international journalists rarely seen at such routine demonstrations were on hand to report the matter instantly to the world, which invoked an immediate and furious response from Russia. In the following weeks the mentioned explosions occurred again, uncharacteristic in generally peaceful Riga, and for which those responsible have never been found. A regular march of World War II veterans was internationally attacked as a demonstration of fascism. A partial economic boycott was imposed on Latvia by Russia, and Russian politicians railed against such incidents. The Latvian government was repeatedly wrong footed, and Russia kept up its diplomatic pressure on Latvia, and on European institutions negotiating with Latvia over various matters including details of citizenship and language laws. European concern was aroused, particularly on the part of the OSCE. For Russia, the demands were what they had always been: the adoption of the zero option for citizenship, and declaring Russian as the second official language. The OSCE and other bodies had more limited aims, but did propose two specific recommendations on the citizenship law that would make citizenship easier to obtain (details are given below) and put strong pressure on Latvia to adopt these, pressing the point when Russia was running its campaign so vigorously. With regard to this MarchApril period, those with long memories recalled that such acts of 'extremism' were not being alleged for the first time: it was precisely these sorts of incidents which inter alia were used by Stalin as a basis for intervening in the Baltic states in 1940, fabrications and planned provocations used by the Soviet Union as a pretext for restoring order and taking over the Baltic governments (Kirby, 1994). The reader may well muse over whether this was a case of nationalist, anti-Semitic and anti-Russian extremists throwing bombs; or whether this was an orchestrated campaign by those interested in potentially destabilising the Latvian government.
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Leaving this question aside, events moved rapidly. The Saeima heatedly debated the OSCE recommendations on changes to the citizenship law, and agreed to two amendments. The strongest nationalist party in the Saeima, Fatherland and Freedom, whose member Guntars Krasts was Prime Minister at the time, reacted strongly to those amendments, and organised a gathering of signatures, as provided by the Constitution, to refer the amendments to a referendum. The required number of signatures (10% of electors) was easily gathered, and the matter was put to a referendum on October 3, concurrently with the scheduled Saeima elections. European bodies, the USA and major Western figures urged voters not to repeal the adopted amendments. The referendum proposition to repeal the amendments to the citizenship laws and revert to the original law was defeated by 52.54% to 44.89%, a close but decisive enough result. European bodies congratulated Latvia on showing it wished to integrate and welcome its Russian minority, and that it was willing to abide by international standards on these matters. Russia also praised the result as a step in the right direction, and foresaw an easing of tensions and a lessening of strident demands from Russia. (RFE/RL Baltics Newsline 5 October, 4 & 5 November, 1998). European Parliament members stated that if the amendments had been repealed in the referendum, this would have greatly harmed Latvia's chance of accession to the fast track talks on EU membership (RFE/RL Baltics Newsline 4 & 5 November, 1998). Latvia's President and its Foreign Affairs Ministry saw the result as a great victory for Latvia in averting diplomatic isolation and clearing the way for fuller integration into Europe. In recognising such positive and indeed fulsome praise for the good sense of Latvian voters, it is a little sobering to look at just what in fact the proposed amendments will now do to the citizenship law. The first amendment abolishes the naturalisation 'windows', by which some candidates would have had to wait until 2003 to be eligible to apply for citizenship, and allows all adults to apply immediately. The second amendment grants citizenship, on the parents' request, to all those children born in Latvia to non-citizens after August 1991, when Latvia regained its independence. That is the extent of the amendments. The basic naturalisation requirements of a language test, oath of loyalty etc. has not changed (except for the children born since 1991). This is nothing like the zero option, and maintains in greatest part the citizenship and language requirements as they were. The praise seems too fulsome. What were the real issues here? Again, considerations of these is sobering for those concerned with language policy. Initially, the debate raged over the substance of the amendments were the naturalisation windows too restrictive? Would the language requirements be diluted if there were too many applicants at once? Or would the windows make people frustrated, and the effect of this upon interethnic relations. Debate over the generally agreed more radical proposal on children gaining naturalisation, without a language requirement, raised similarly well identified issues regarding language, population, status of former USSR citizens, and questions of what international agreements on state-lessness really said. However, the nature of the debate swiftly changed to one where the question that dominated had little to do with the intricacies of citizenship or language, but
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one that was foreign affairs dominated: would rejecting the amendments make Latvia internationally isolated, and make her road to European integration that much more difficult or indeed impossible? The coalition of major parties pushing for Latvia to join the EU and potentially also NATO, stressed the danger of isolation if the amendments were rejected; the Foreign Affairs Minister Valdis Birkavs particularly stressed that Latvia could find itself in an position where Western countries would do nothing to counter the attacks made on Latvia by Russia (Lauku Avize, 11 August 1998). For many, this argument started to gain sway, and debate turned to which referendum outcome was more likely to leave Latvia more exposed to Russia and her pressure: people similarly nationalistic in outlook argued equally that changing the law would make citizenship too easy to obtain and undermine Latvian statehood; or that repealing the amendments would deliver up Latvia to the mercy of Russia without Western support. In a significant move, the Western-based World Federation of Free Latvians hitherto very conservative on naturalisation and wanting the tightest possible naturalisation procedures urged voters not to repeal the amendments as rejection of the OSCE recommendations would seriously harm Latvia's chance of acceptance into Europe. By contrast, Prime Minister Krasts who supported repealing the amendments warned Western countries not to push Latvia on this issue as this in turn might lead to increased anti-European sentiment. These debates by this time rarely touched on the substance of the amendments; clearly, the referendum was gaining a symbolic value for both sides far beyond the modest proposals it contained. This symbolic value was to prove decisive. Interestingly, in surveys conducted on the referendum some decisive differences were found along predictably ethnic lines (some three-quarters of Russians voted against repeal, whereas Latvians were almost evenly split), but also along education lines, with some two-thirds of voters with higher education voting against repeal; those with higher education usually have a stronger pro-European stance (Baltic Data House, unpublished survey, 1998). One significant event in the build-up to the referendum was a question directed to the OSCE as to whether this would be the last demand that the OSCE would make on Latvia in regard to its citizenship laws; the OSCE after some consideration replied this would be its last demand, and also repeated this to Estonia when the parliament there was considering the amendment on stateless children (RFE/RL Baltics Newsline 22 & 23 October, 1998). The aftermath of the referendum has seen a number of changes at least in mood in Latvia's relations to Europe and Russia, but also some unexpected continuities, and developments both in Latvia and in Europe that call into question at least some of the referendum's achievements. We are writing about very recent events here. The question Latvia is now asking Europe is how quickly will expansion of the EU proceed? In recent months it has become clear that for many reasons expansion of the EU, even for the fast-track nations, may well be a longer-term process than originally thought, with an indecisive EU meeting in November 1998 not setting firm dates for the fast track countries (including Estonia), and accession looking like being put off for the next rank of candidates (including Latvia and Lithuania) until well into the next decade ('Thatcher's vision becoming reality',
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Guardian Weekly, November 22, 1998:6). Indeed, it could be questioned whether language and citizenship requirements are at all relevant in the bigger question of accession to the EU. Estonia also in late 1998 accepted the OSCE proposal to grant citizenship to children born in Estonia since 1991 to non-citizens, but did it need to do so?. When the EU looked at Estonia's earlier bid for membership, its report mentioned citizenship and related issues only briefly, and gave a positive evaluation of Estonia's human rights record; it suggested in passing that Estonia look at the issue of potentially stateless children, but the main thrust of the report was on structural aspects of Estonia's economy and institutions, and clearly it is these that will define Estonia's fate (European Commission, 1997). One can still ask would a negative result on the referendum thus have affected Latvia's chance to join the EU? Or would broader structural issues still be the dominant factor? Latvia also discovered immediately after the referendum that this was by no means the end of OSCE demands on a range of other issues. Within days of the referendum another missive from the OSCE continued its previous attacks on the new proposed Language Law, as detailed above. An equally worrying element in OSCE thinking at this time is their attack on Estonia's requirement that all candidates for elected office, whether at national or local government level, have an understanding of Estonian. This had earlier been a political football in Estonia with toing and froing between the Riigikogu (Parliament) and the President on who should decide on candidates' language competence, but the OSCE Minorities commissioner, Max van der Stoel, argued strongly that the voters should decide who they wanted to represent them, regardless of the language they spoke. This is a most significant move, as it demonstrates once more fundamental OSCE attitudes towards language issues and its easy acceptance of features of a two-official languages state. Latvia's relations with Russia warmed a little after the referendum. This warmth then took a curious turn. In January 1999, for virtually the first time since Lithuania had taken the zero option on citizenship and been praised by Russia for it, Russia attacked Lithuania over its treatment of minorities, particularly Russians and Poles, signalling a new and more difficult phase in Lithuanian-Russian relations. Russia contrasted Lithuania's shortcomings here and compared them to Latvia's willingness to move in the right direction on these issues (RFE/RL Baltics Newsline 18 December, 1998). Russia's broader concern with Lithuania here appears to be over its enclave Kaliningrad, which Russia accesses via regulated channels through Lithuania, and the potential social and economic catastrophe that Kaliningrad is facing, including having to receive Lithuanian and others' food parcels in the winter. Praising one Baltic nation and in contrast abusing another is a standard Russian tactic of attempted divide and rule, which will bear close watching. Internally in Latvia, there has been a jump in numbers of candidates applying for citizenship, but immediately after the referendum one specific language issue flared up: in the Russian-language press and radio, views were put that the referendum results meant that now Russians would no longer have to speak Latvian; the amendments meant the citizenship laws no longer had any real teeth, and citizenship would be obtained on demand if candidates insisted hard enough. Europe wanted above all a symbolic victory in the referendum, a symbolism little based on understanding of language and citizenship issues in the Baltic
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states. It is for the champions of Europe to explain how an amendment process meant to bring about greater integration, resulted in some Russian speakers claiming that the referendum result meant they did not need to bother to learn Latvian at all. As, has been argued here, many European bodies have in fact little interest in national languages or cultures, regard the Baltic states as erring in not adopting a two-official languages policy, and see the Baltics' language and citizenship policies as an unnecessary irritation to both Europe and Russia, it is doubtful whether this outcome of the opposite of integration will trouble them: the object was to discipline a recalcitrant state, not to seriously address what factors do or do not make for integration. Conclusion We have seen to what extent the Baltic states are now caught in a struggle for hegemony between Russia and the West. The promise of European integration has taken on the aspects of a bidding game, with demands being fostered on a carrots and sticks approach of entry to Europe. The pressure from the East meanwhile continues on the single theme that not retaining all the linguistic privileges that settlers enjoyed before independence is gross discrimination, regardless of what the actual previous situation of dominance and suppression was, and the manifest absence of any suppression now. We have also presented a critique of both international agreements on human rights and language issues insofar as they may apply to the Baltic states, and of the main organisation charged with monitoring this in Eastern Europe OSCE. Arguments over international standards and infringements of rights now take on the appearance of a relentless search for more infractions which in all likelihood will not be infractions of any international norms at all, however rapidly hypotheticals to that affect are floated. The changes in OSCE perspectives and hardening of positions outlined here suggests also that this body is not reflecting international standards, but legislating them. For this author, while the pressure from the East over minorities will continue and may lead to more bitter conflicts such as in 1998, rather more worrying still are responses from some representatives from the West, particularly the now standard injunction from the OSCE that any regulation of languages must threaten the liberties of individuals and therefore should not be proposed. The actions of the OSCE, like those of the League of Nations before, are attempts to 'civilise' what are perceived to be unacceptable local behaviours for selfish or blind ethnic interests (Burgess, 1999). But the policies in the Baltics are not the actions of extreme nationalists, nor the behaviour of wayward politicians unfamiliar with Western norms and the ways things should be done in an ethical world. The loser in this highly politicised game is language policy itself; every possible political or social construction is put on language policy (ethnic exclusion, enforced monolingualism, 2 discrimination, transgression of individual rights, primordial nationalism) but actual language consequences of policies are little regarded. One looks in vain in the recent documents of the OSCE or other watchdogs for any description that shows an understanding of the language situation in the Baltics. One looks in vain also for any understanding that the language situation is dynamic and has changed significantly since the Soviet
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period. As Maurais (1998: 213) has warned, this means that issues of language rights come to be pursued only by legal argument and lawyers, with little appreciation of language issues, and language policy experts need to reclaim this discourse. Until the lawyers with a fierce desire to enshrine seemingly universal prescriptions in highly specific, complex and changing situations are replaced or augmented by staff who understand language policy, then to that extent language policy of any kind remains under threat, and international bodies lose credibility if their advice is so unidimensional. The pressures put on the Baltic states to conform to often invented international norms pose a considerable problem for those concerned with language policy and for those concerned with linguistic human rights. The question here is, if the kinds of proposals introduced in the Baltics are opposed because they are held to be infringements of rights, how will it be possible to alter imperialistic language situations anywhere else they may occur in the world? There are ways in which the Baltic states may be considered sui generis and posing a unique language situation, but they are not essentially different to any other nation emerging from an imperialistic language situation, and the world has not seen the last of these. The 'solution' given to possible conflict in such situations by authorities championing individual liberties is, strangely, to allow essentially imperialistic relations to continue. This will not be accepted by those wishing to end imperialistic linguistic relations and, indeed, there is no reason to accept them as international law instruments (the Barcelona declaration specifically mentions such cases). In the Baltic case there is however continuing reluctance by international bodies to characterise the Soviet era language policies (and continuing insistence on keeping them) in terms of imperialism. An essential aspect of the debate on language policy in the Baltic is that the linguistic situation there is dynamic and gradually changing a successful outcome of language law and related policy implementation, despite resistance and setbacks. As such, the Baltic situation represents a moving target for supposed universal and fixed principles of laws or agreements. The degree of dynamism we have detailed even calls into question the standard descriptions previously given of the sociolinguistic situation we can no longer talk of only a minority of non-citizens speaking the national language, or a massively resistant or immovable russophone monolingual community. The situation of the 1989 Census has now steadily been changing, making it understandable why Druviete (1997) talks of the 'slow but satisfactory' (and, it would be reasonable to add, cumulative) change in the linguistic hierarchy. A changing situation must bring changed assumptions even from its fiercest detractors, or bodies trying to draw fixed lines in the legal and political sand. The charge of discrimination against the Baltic states and the image of russophone minorities as honest folk caught up in postSoviet political games may be appealing to some, but it essentially misses the point. While many honest folk are caught up in this situation, a diminishing but still loud fraction specifically oppose language policy or citizenship requirements because these threaten their previous linguistic dominance, and associated political dominance. The Baltic states will not be official twolanguage states for good reason. And, from the evidence we have presented, it is precisely the majority of honest folk who
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have begun to change their own language use patterns, and who increasingly appreciate the legitimacy of present language policies in the Baltic. Correspondence. Any correspondence should be directed to Dr Uldis Ozolins, Department of Politics, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Victoria 3083, Australia (
[email protected]). Notes 1. The author's own experience of this outlook occurred at a language policy conference in Leuven in 1994 when one of the highest ranking officials of the European Bureau of Lesser Used Languages, during a break in proceedings, was earnestly chatting about their own experiences in Estonia: 'Well we had a look at the situation there, it seemed pretty clear to us, you must have two official languages, one Estonian, one Russian. But the Estonians wouldn't have it! It had to be Estonian only!' Interestingly, he did not make these views publicly when there was a chance for him to do so at conference sessions. I must immediately say that from some other members of this Bureau I have had genuine interest in and concern for language issues in the Baltics. 2. The absurdity of this point on wanting to impose monolingualism was made apparent in practice during the activities of the Carter Center in Estonia. This institution was established by former US president Jimmy Carter and is concerned with reducing international conflict and spreading democratic reform. In the mid 1990s it worked on a project bringing together ranking Estonians and Russians from the Narva region to find a common approach to disputed issues over language, rights, regional autonomy and related matters. A major theme of these meetings was the charge of Estonian inflexibility and imposition on matters of language and other issues. As recounted by a Carter Center representative at the International Applied Linguistics Congress in 1996, at these meetings the Americans present were all monolingual in English (and worked through interpreters); the Russians were monolingual in Russian (and worked through interpreters); the Estonians spoke Estonian, and Russian, and English. Bibliography Alksnis, V. (1991) Suffering from self-determination. Foreign Policy No. 84. Arter, David (1993) The Politics of European Integration in the Twentieth Century. Aldershot: Dartmouth. Baltic Data House, unpublished survey 1998. Barcelona Declaration (1996) Universal Declaration on Linguistic Rights.http://www.unesco.org/most/inngo11.htm Bildt, C. (1994) The Baltic litmus test. Foreign Affairs 73 (5). Broks, J., Ozolins, U., Ozolzile, G., Tabuns, A. and Tisenkopfs, T. (1996/97) The stability of democracy in Latvia: Prerequisites and prospects. Humanities and Social Sciences Latvia (double edition) No. 4 (13), 1996; No. 1 (14), 1997. Burgess, A. (1999) Critical reflections on the return of national minority rights regulations to East/West European affairs. In K. Cordell (ed.) Ethnicity and Democratisation in the New Europe. London: Routledge. Chandler, D. (1999) The OSCE and the internationalisation of national minority rights. In K. Cordell (ed.) Ethnicity and Democratisation in the New Europe. London: Routledge. Chernichenko, S. (1998) Ethnic Russians in the Baltic. International Affairs 44 (3). Chinn, J. and Truex, L.A. (1996) The question of citizenship in the Baltics. Journal of Democracy 7 (1). Clemens, W. (1991) Baltic Independence and the Russian Empire. New York: St Martin's Press. Dreifelds, J. (1996) Latvia in Transition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Druviete, I. (1995) (ed.) The Language Situation in Latvia: Part I [in English]; Part II [in Latvian]. Riga: Latvian Language Institute.
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Druviete, I. (1997) Linguistic human rights in the Baltic States. International Journal of the Sociology of Language No. 127. Druviete, I (1998) Republic of Latvia. In C. Bratt Paulston and D. Peckham (eds.) Linguistic Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. Druviete, I. (forthcoming) Language policy in a changing society: Problematic issues of the implementation of international linguistic human rights standards. In M. Kontra et al. (eds) Approaching Linguistic Human Rights. Budapest: OSI. Economist Intelligence Unit (199697) Country Reports: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. European Commission (1997) Commission Opinion on Estonia's Application for Membership of the European Union. Luxembourg: European Commission. Evans, G. (1998) Ethnic schism and the consolidation of post-community democracies: The case of Estonia. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31 (1). Fukuyama, F. (1992) Trapped in the Baltics. New York Times, December 19, 1992. Gellner, E. (1983) Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell. Gerner, K. and Hedlund, S. (1993) The Baltic States and the End of the Soviet Empire. London: Routledge. Grin, F. (1991) The Estonian languge law: Presentation with comments. Language Problems and Language Planning 15 (2). Guardian Weekly (1998) Thatcher's vision becoming reality. 22 November. Henricksson, A. (1983) The Czar's Loyal Germans. Boulder: East European Monographs. Hiden, J. and Salmon, P. (1991) The Baltic Nations and Europe. London: Longman. Hirsa, D. (1998) On the OSCE Bureau's commentary on our draft State Language Law [in Latvian]. Latvijas Vestnesis, 20 April. Hough, J.E. (1996) Sociology, the State and language politics. Post-Soviet Affairs 12 (2). Huber, K.J. (1995) Preventing ethic conflict in the new Europe: The CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. In I.M. Cuthbertson and J. Leibowitz (eds) Minorities: The New Europe's Oldest Issue. Prague: Institute for EastWest Studies. International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] (1966) 999 UNTS 171. Kaiser, R.J. (1994) The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Karklins, R. (1994) Ethnopolitics and Transition to Democracy: The Collapse of the USSR and Latvia. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and London: John Hopkins University Press. Kirby, D. (1990) Northern Europe in the Early Modern Period: The Baltic North, 14921772. London: Longman. Kirby, D. (1994) Incorporation: The MolotovRibbentop Pact. In G. Smith (ed.) The Baltic States: The National SelfDetermination of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. London: Macmillan. Kirby, D. (1995) The Baltic World, 17721993: Europe's Northern Periphery in an Age of Change. London: Longman. Kirch, M. and Laitin, D. (1994) Changing Identities in Estonia: Sociological Facts and Commentaries. Tallinn: Estonian Science Foundation. Knowles, F. (1989) Language planning in the Soviet Baltic Republics: An analysis of demographic and sociological trends. In M. Kirkwood (ed.) Language Planning in the Soviet Union. London: Macmillan. Knowles, F. (1993) From USSR to CIS and beyond: Visceral politics vis-à-vis ethno-linguistic realities. In D. Ager, G. Muskens and S. Wright (eds) Language Education for Intercultural Communication. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. Kolstoe, P. (1995) Russians in the Former Soviet Republics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Konovalov A. and Evstaviev, D. (1995) The problem of ethnic minority rights protection in the newly independent states. In I.M. Cuthbertson and J. Leibowitz (eds) Minorities: The New Europe's Oldest Issue. Prague: Institute for EastWest Studies. Kozhemiakin, A.V. and Kanet, R.E. (1997) Russia and its Western Neighbours in the 'Near Abroad'. In A.V. Kozhemiakin and R.E. Kanet (eds) Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
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Kreindler, I. (ed.) (1985) Sociolinguistic Perspectives on Soviet National Languages. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Kreindler, I. (1997) Multilingualism in the successor states of the Soviet Union. Annual Review of Applied Linguistics, No. 17. Laitin, D. (1996a) Language and nationalism in the post-Soviet Republics. Post-Soviet Affairs 12 (1). Laitin, D. (1996b) Language planning in the former Soviet Union: The case of Estonia. International Journal of the Sociology of Language No. 118. Laitin, D. (1998) Identity in Formation: The Russian Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Latvia Integration Committee (1998) Draft report on Latvian language situation in Latvia. Riga: unpublished. Lauka Avize [periodical] (1998), 11 August. Lewis, E.G. (1972) Multilingualism in the Soviet Union. The Hague: Mouton. Lieven, A. (1993) The Baltic Revolution. New Haven: Yale University Press. Loeber, D.A. (1993) Language rights in independent Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, 19181940. In S. Vilfan (ed.) Ethnic Groups and Language Rights. Aldershot: Dartmouth. Maley, W. and Rose, R. (1994) Nationalities in the Baltic States: A Survey Study. Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy. Maley, W. and Rose, R. (1995) New Baltics Barometer II. Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy. Marshall, D.F. (1996) A politics of language: Language as a symbol in the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its aftermath. International Journal of the Sociology of Language No. 118. Maurais, J. (1991) A sociolinguistic comparison between Québec's Charter of the French Language and the 1989 language laws of five Soviet Republics. Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development 12 (1&2). Maurais, J. (1992) Redéfinition du statut des langues en Union Soviétique. Language Problems and Language Planning 16 (1). Maurais, J. (1997) Regional majority languages, language planning, and linguistic rights. International Journal of the Sociology of Language No. 127. Maurais, J. (1998) (ed.) Les Politiques Linguistiques des Pays baltes. Special Number of Terminogramme. Québec: Office de la langue française. Melvin, N. (1995) Russians Beyond Russia: The Politics of National Identity. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. Misiunas, R.J. and Taagepera, R. (1993) The Baltic States: Years of Dependency (2nd edn). Berkeley: University of California Press. Nørgaard, O. et al. (1996) The Baltic States after Independence. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. OSCE (1997) Opinion on the compatibility of the Draft Latvian State Language Law with international standards. The Hague: Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (unpublished letter 22 September). OSCE (1998) Compatibility of the Draft Law on the State Language of the Republic of Latvia with its international obligations and commitments. The Hague: Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (unpublished letter 23 March). Ozolins, U. (1994) Upwardly mobile languages: The politics of language in the Baltic states. Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development 15 (2&3). Ozolins, U. (1996) Language policy and political reality. International Journal of the Sociology of Language No. 118. Payin, E. (1994) Disintegration of the empire and the fate of the 'Imperial Minority'. In V. Slapentoch et al. (eds) The New Russian Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. Pettai, V. (1996) The games of ethnopolitics in Latvia. Post-Soviet Affairs 12 (1). Phillipson, R. and Skutnabb-Kangas, T. (1995) Linguistic rights and wrongs. Applied Linguistics 16 (4). Ramishvili, T. (1998) Latvia and Estonia: Human rights violations in the center of Europe. International Relations 14 (2). Rannut, M. (1991) Linguistic policy in the Soviet Union. Multilingua 10 (3). Rannut, M. (1994) Beyond linguistic policy: The Soviet Union versus Estonia. In T.
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Skutnabb-Kangas and R. Phillipson (eds) Linguistic Human Rights: Overcoming Linguistic Discrimination. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. von Rauch, G. (1974) The Baltic States: The Years of Independence. London: Hurst. RFE/RL [Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty] (1998) Baltics Newslinewww.rferl.org/newsline/search/ Rudensky, N. (1994) Russian minorities in the newly independent states: An international problem in the domestic context of Russia today. In R. Szporluk (ed.) National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, Armonk: M.E. Sharp. Skolnick, J. (1996) Grappling with the legacy of Soviet rule: Citizenship and human rights in the Baltic States. Law Review 54 (2). University of Toronto Faculty of Law. Shamshur, O. (1994) Current ethnic and migration issues in the former USSR. Current Issues in Language and Society 1 (1). Skutnabb-Kangas, T. (1994) Linguistic human rights in education. Language Policy in the Baltic States. Conference Papers. Riga: Gara pupa. Skutnabb-Kangas, T. and Phillipson, R. (eds) (1994) Linguistic Human Rights: Overcoming Linguistic Discrimination. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Smith, G., Aasland, A. and Mole, R. (1994) Statehood, ethnic relations and citizenship. In G. Smith (ed.) The Baltic States: The National Self-Determination of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. London: Macmillan. Smith, G., Law, V., Wilson, A., Bohr, A. and Allworth, E. (1998) Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sprudzs, A. (1993) The Baltic Path to Independence. Buffalo: William S. Hein. Szépe, G. (1994) Central and Eastern European language policies in transition (with special reference to Hungary). Current Issues in Language and Society 1 (1). Taagepera, R. (1993) Estonia: Return to Independence. Boulder: Westview Press. Thaden, E. (1985) Russia's Western Borderlands, 17101870. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Thompson, C. (1992) The Singing Revolution: A Political Journey through the Baltic States. London: Michael Joseph. Trapans, J. (1991) Towards Independence: The Baltic Popular Movements. Boulder: Westview Press. Trenin, D. (1998) Russian and Western interests in preventing, managing and settling conflicts in the former Soviet Union. In B. Coppieters et al. (eds) Commonwealth and Independence in Post-Soviet Asia. London: Frank Cass. Vallens, D. (1995) The Law on Aliens controversy in the Baltic states. Review: International Commission of Jurists Vol. 54, June. Vardys, V.S. (ed.) (1965) Lithuania Under the Soviets, 19401965. New York: Praeger. de Varennes, F. (1995/96) The protection of linguistic minorities in Europe and human rights: Possible solutions to ethnic conflicts? Columbia Journal of European Law 2 (1). Fall/Winter. Vizulis, I. (1990) The MolotovRibbentrop Pact of 1939: The Baltic Case. New York: Praeger. Volkovs, V. (1996) The national self-esteem of the Latvia Russian youth [in Latvian]. Latvian Journal of Sociology and Political Science No. 7. Zepa, B. (1996/97) State, regime identity and citizenship. Humanities and Social Sciences, Latvia (double edition). No. 4 (13) 1996; No. 1 (14) 1997. Zevelev, I. (1996) Russia and the Russian diaspora. Post-Soviet Affairs 12 (3).
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Ethno-linguistic Relations in Contemporary Latvia: Mirror Image of the Previous Dispensation? Frank Knowles School of Languages and European Studies, Aston University, Birmingham B4 7ET Latvia, like the other Baltic states, experienced a sense of injustice and resentment at the loss of statehood. The Balts were the least likely groups to subscribe to the ideal of a Soviet family of peoples living together harmoniously and communicating in Russian. In the post-Soviet period, the Latvians exercised their legal right to determine their own citizenship criteria. In the first draft of the laws, citizenship was based on the situation in Latvia when it was taken over by the Soviet Union in 1940. It included, all those resident in Latvia on 17/6/1940 and those who were subsequently deported from Latvia; it excluded the large numbers of Russians who had arrived since that time. The citizenship laws which were eventually adopted were more favourable to the Russians but the actual administrative process of naturalising half a million Russian speakers will only proceed slowly. The Russian-speaking population remains in a relatively disadvantaged position. A Brief History of Latvia Since achieving the status of independent polities at the end of the First World War the so-called Baltic States, i.e. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, have worn a mantle of geopolitical significance which far exceeds what might be reasonably expected on the basis of their size. Situated at the eastern end of the Baltic sea they have had the role thrust upon them of acting as a buffer between the great powers represented by Germany and Russia, the latter then transmogrifying itself into the Soviet Union. Geopoliticians such as Mackinder (1919) and Unstead (1923), in developing tentative theories about the (geo)politico-cultural topography of Central and Eastern Europe, came to conclusion that it would be reasonable to refer to a so-called 'belt of political change' in Europe, running like a geological fault-line from south to north and embracing Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland. Another but similarly appropriate analogy from the physical world would be that of tectonic plate theory, particularly when the notion of a so-called 'shatter belt' or 'shatter zone' was invoked with regard to the above-named countries. Thinking of this type was proceeding within many governments, whose concern was to come to terms with and possibly capitalise on the disappearance or degrading of no less than four pre-World War I empires: the Austro-Hungarian empire, the Turkish empire, the Russian empire and the recently-unified German empire, with its foreign policy accent on 'Drang nach Osten', a policy principle maintained by German governments between the two World Wars and, of course, apotheosised by Hitler. The final phase of the First World War saw German and Soviet forces battling for military and political control of Latvia until Germany managed to defeat
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Soviet opposition in February 1918, whereupon the Latvians seized the opportunity to proclaim independence which was, however, short-lived as Soviet forces soon managed to re-establish control. In 1919 Soviet authority was overthrown by British naval forces acting in concert with German counterparts. In August 1920 Latvia's new democratic government was finally given widespread diplomatic recognition. This included full and normal diplomatic recognition by the Soviet Union which signed and ratified the Treaty of Riga in August 1920. Latvia became a member of the League of Nations a year later and, on the domestic front, adopted a new democratic constitution at the same time. The era of democracy and civil rights in Latvia attracted approval from many other countries. It was, however, to last only just over a decade. In 1934 a military coup took place with the complicity of prime minister, Karlis Ulmanis, and Latvia joined the growing series of European countries ruled by that type of government. In terms of its economic configuration Latvia remained a prevalently agrarian but nonetheless viable country of slightly less than two million people distributed across the ethnicity spectrum. The main non-Latvian residents were Germans, Jews and Russians, the vast majority of whom were holders of full Latvian passports. As the 1930s moved towards their close, the Latvians and their political leaders were, like the citizens of many other countries, big and small, facing but not yet confronting the geopolitical threat to the continued existence of their small country. They had few friends, and Hitler and Stalin were most certainly not among them. Latvia's 'distance' vis-à-vis Britain, however, raised the spectre of possible duplicity in the minds of British political analysts and others. Neither did the Latvians seem to be earnestly seeking the friends and security (perhaps limited) that alliances could offer. All this played right into the hands of Latvia's enemies. In October 1939 Latvia, as a result of force majeure, became involuntarily ensnared in an unwanted reciprocal agreement with the Soviet Union. The annexation of the Baltic states was gradual but inexorable, culminating in August 1940 with 'requests' to the Soviet government from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to be admitted to the Soviet commonwealth of peoples as the 14th, 15th and 16th Soviet Socialist Republics, respectively. The Sovietisation of these new territories began immediately and heavy-handed methods were used including mass deportation of 'undesirables' to other, distant areas of the USSR. However, barely ten months later, after the commencement of hostilities between the Axis powers and the USSR in the summer of 1941, Latvia was rapidly occupied by German forces. Four years of suffering followed with the country split in its allegiances. During this period many Latvians fought on the German side against the Soviet Union. The issue which caused most Russian outrage and which earned Moscow's long-term distrust was the establishment and deployment of independent and autonomous Latvian SS units. In the meantime, the German government ordered the exodus of the ethnic German population from Latvia and their resettlement in the Polish western territories by then emptied of their indigenous population. By 1944, it had been clear for some time to politicians, geopoliticians and military analysts that the liberation of Eastern Europe would be achieved by the Soviet armies and the forces that their political and ideological allies in the east were able to raise. As the eastern and western fronts began to close on each other,
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Table 1 Population development in Latvia by size and ethnic allegiance 1959 1970 1979 1989 000's % 000's % 000's % 000's 1298 62.0% 1342 56.8% 1344 53.7% 1439 17.1% Latvians 556 26.6% 705 29.8% 822 32.8% 1451 17.3% Russians 62 2.9% 95 4.0% 112 4.5% 100 Belarusans 1.2% 29 1.4% 54 2.3% 67 2.7% 441 Ukrainians 5.2% 60 2.9% 63 2.7% 63 2.5% 11 Poles 0.1% 32 1.5% 41 1.7% 38 1.5% 31 Lithuanians 0.4% 37 1.7% 37 1.6% 28 1.1% 14 Jews 0.2% 19 0.9% 29 1.2% 30 1.2% 4920 58.5% Others 2094 100.0% 2364 100.0% 2503 100.0% 8407 100.0% Total recognition of these harsh realities and their potentially dangerous personal consequences for the 'wrong sort of people' triggered off a huge exodus of population, especially among military personnel not fighting under direct Soviet military and political control. The Warsaw Uprising and the fate of its military personnel was a clear indication of what could be expected. The end of the Second World War hence saw Soviet military forces not only entrenched in their occupation zones in Germany and Austria, but ruling by means of proxy governments in 'now liberated, now occupied again' countries, including Latvia. The indigenous populations of the Baltic states had reluctantly to accept that genuine democracy would not be on offer. The Soviet government renewed the process of assimilating Latvians (and Estonians and Lithuanians) to Soviet ideology and the reality of Soviet society. The Baltic Republics had another problem to contend with in the post-War era. Their little countries became magnets for immigrants from other areas of the Soviet Union. In some cases the importation of labour was enforced, in others not. Be that as it may, the net result was a growth of population and a further widening and deepening of its ethnic spectrum. After 1945 Latvia became home to representatives of over a hundred different ethnic origins. This historical account has been presented at some length because it explains the sense of injustice and resentment at loss of statehood which persisted in Latvia and which meant it was unlikely that there would be a successful outcome to the Soviet government's endeavours and the efforts of the Communist party of the Soviet Union to promote the concept and reality of a Soviet 'family of peoples' living and working harmoniously together and giving a model for peaceful multiculturalism to the rest of the world. Asymmetrical Bilingualism in the Soviet Era Latvian is a Baltic language, in the genealogical sense. Together with Lithuanian, it is the only modern and established representative of the Baltic branch of the Indo-European family of languages. Prussian became extinct over two centuries ago and Latgalian failed to achieve its speakers' aspirations for full literary status and is now considered a dialect of Latvian. Structurally speaking, Latvian
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is a complex, inflecting language which also possesses a significant degree of tonality. It has a much more complex system of tenses, gerunds and participles than Russian. Latvian has definite versus indefinite adjectival forms, and structures noun clusters according to a sort of 'Saxon genitive' principle, which is left-branching and thus at odds with Russian. Element order is also in contrast to Russian. Latvia has had a literary standard form for well over a century and the period of political independence between the wars is acknowledged to have greatly assisted its evolution, giving the vocabulary and structures necessary for a language of state and used for all administrative, social and cultural purposes. The language contact situation in Latvia led to some exchanges. The number of Latvian lexical items introduced into Russian, however, was small. The cliché phrase, vis bus kartiba (from Latvian viss bus * kartiba*) meaning 'it'll all be OK' which is used phatically is one of the few. The effects on Latvian have been far more extensive. In particular there has been the wholesale incorporation or modelling of a very large stock of Russian words which themselves came into existence to denote the multiple realia and ideological and intellectual concepts of Soviet society. Many previously existing words have been resemanticised in order to align the denotations (and connotations) with their Russian benchmarks. This asymmetry was always likely, given the fact that the Latvians learnt Russian in far greater numbers than the Russianspeaking immigrants learnt Latvian. This social fact stemmed in part from the political purposes of language planning in the USSR. The Russian language was promoted to foster 'internationalism' within the USSR, to provide a medium for the Sovietisation of the population, to homogenise modes of thought and expression on a Moscow model and to counter any nonSoviet cultural hegemonies. It stemmed also from a somewhat colonial relationship between the incoming Russian-speakers and the autochthonous population. The latter had to accommodate; they became bilingual. The former remained monolingual in the majority. This was aided by patterns of settlement. Riga, with a population on 1/1/96 calculated to be 856,281 people, is the domicile of virtually the entire population of Latvia's ethnic Russians and allowed immigrants to remain apart from the host population. The increase in Russian speakers in the USSR as a whole, reported in USSR statistics (from 76% in 1970 to 81.9% in 1979), was mirrored over the 1970s and 1980s in the Baltic Republics where a 10% increase was reported. Russian-medium press was on the increase. Education and conscription had proved to be agents of linguistic unification in the Baltics as in so many other cases of nation building. Some Latvian parents chose Russian-medium schooling for their children, presumably for reasons of career advancement and mobility aspirations. The number of school children being taught through Russian exceeded the number of children with Russian as a mother tongue throughout the Soviet period.1
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The Post-Soviet Era In Halbach's opinion (1992), the first impetus for political and economic reform and change in the twilight period of the Soviet Union's existence came pace Gorbachov primarily from the Baltic States where a determined search was being conducted for a non-violent and rational way out of the stultification and frustrations of the Soviet planned economy lottery. As is often the case, the trickle began to turn into a stream and then into a flood, sweeping all before it. Hence, these developments inevitably soon relinquished their closet status and became politicised as they emerged into the public domain. What had initially been a sober and perhaps even technical debate about macro- and micro-economics turned into a public debate about the wrongs of past history, about ecology and resources, about culture and identity. Local battles about deforestation, nuclear power stations, coupled with the larger national debate on khozraschët (i.e. proper financial accounting) placed an accent on key issues, the substance of which had been side-stepped for decades. The case for change was unanswerable and momentum performed its task admirably in establishing a climate for a genuine type of perestroika unfathomed by Gorbachov himself. Discourse changed and things changed, and vice versa! The language shift towards Russian is a small but significant element in dissatisfactions which led to the events of the late 1980s and 1990s and Latvian secession from the USSR. Uldis Ozolins deals with this in his paper in this volume and I will not repeat details here. Suffice it to say that one of the strands in the independence debate was a desire to counter the russification of the autochthonous population. The massive presence of Russian speakers had provoked a backlash and a desire for the renaissance of the Latvian language. The Latvians now face the challenge of managing the reintroduction of Latvian into public and political life without provoking new inequalities or hostilities. During the long Cold War years, Latvia (alongside Estonia and Lithuania) was a major 'front line' of the USSR's geopolitical and military posture. This meant that thousands of Soviet military personnel were posted to the Baltic 'outpost'. For a large majority of the personnel concerned it was an eye-opening and highly popular place to be. Living standards were much higher than virtually anywhere else in the Soviet Union and otherwise unavailable products were on sale there. These advantages made many individuals keen to return to the Baltics after demobilisation. Now many ex-military are, in a sense, trapped there in a somewhat alien environment by circumstances, unable to emigrate back home or even back to their native regions in Russia, Ukraine or wherever. They are in an even more difficult position than the large numbers of workers sent to Latvia during the period of massive and rapid industrialisation in the post-War period, since their chances of acquiring citizenship are low (see below). Managing Difference and Ensuring Rights Every sovereign state has the right, preferably within a democratic and open parliamentary process, to introduce new legislative measures, to amend, update or discard legislation and associated legal instruments previously enacted. Latvia has the perfect right to do this. This freedom is often encumbered by previous legislation or, increasingly in the modern European context, by
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supra-national agencies to which certain powers have been exported or devolved. A world-wide movement towards internationalisation can be detected here. No comment is on offer here about how such legal asymmetries should be navigated, cleared or even circumvented! International law, in the substance of the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR], is currently and constantly widening the purview of its work and influence. Latvia has to work within this new order. Reviewing citizenship laws is always problematic: the issue of the differentials and/or overlap between citizenship and residence is a well-known conundrum in that, unless nationality status is automatically conferred on a person at birth, either by birth to 'criterial' parents or by consanguinity, it is possible for a person to forgo nationality status or be saddled with dubious nationality status. It is accepted that an extrapolation of the logic of nationality status can lead to such difficulties, if a given state has come into existence by unilaterally seceding from its parent body. In Latvia's case, the original obligatory 1940 transmogrification of Latvian citizens into Soviet citizens was declared null and void. This major decision of state cleared the way, at least initially, for a suitable definition of what criteria must be satisfied by any claimant of Latvian nationality. The solution chosen was to admit without question (subject to documentary or equivalent evidence) the following categories of people as Latvian citizens (quoted from Ziemele, 1998): (a) citizens of Latvia on June 17th 1940 and their descendants with a fixed abode in Latvia on Independence day; (b) citizens of Latvia on June 17th 1940 and their descendants not having a fixed abode in Latvia on that day but wishing to relocate permanently to Latvia; (c) children in custody or persons who have been in custody in the territory of Latvia and are [sic, i.e. were] born in Latvia. Further arrangements, seen as more controversial and partial by many 'on the periphery', such as Russians, were also promulgated with respect to application for naturalisation as a Latvian citizen. There have, it must be said, been accusations of bureaucratic delay and chicanery in the processing of naturalisation applications being submitted by ethnic Russians, such that the Russian government felt the need at one stage to call for United Nations assistance and protection for applicants. The small print of these regulations sets out certain positive criteria which must be satisfied. These are, it should be said, commonly found in naturalisation procedures elsewhere: (a) swearing a solemn oath of loyalty to the Latvian constitution; (b) familiarity with the rights and duties of loyal citizens; (c) documentarily proven renunciation of former citizenship in any other country; (d) a basic ability to speak, read and write Latvian; (e) permanent uninterrupted residence in Latvia since Independence Day (4/5/90); (f) a legal source of income and verified taxation status.
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Table 2 Population development in Latvia by size and ethnic allegiance 1959 1970 1979 1989 1996 000's % 000's % 000's % 000's % 000's % Latvians 1298 64.1% 1342 58.7% 1344 55.2% 1439 53.7% 1416 56.7% Russians 556 27.5% 705 30.8% 822 33.7% 911 34.0% 757 30.3% Belarusans 62 3.0% 95 4.1% 112 4.6% 114 4.3% 107 4.3% Ukrainians 29 1.5% 54 2.3% 67 2.7% 41 1.5% 67 2.7% Poles 60 3.0% 63 2.8% 63 2.6% 11 0.4% 65 2.6% Others 19 1.0% 29 1.3% 30 1.2% 491 18.3% 84 3.4% Total 2025 100.0% 2287 100.0% 2437 100.0% 2680 100.0% 2496 100.0% Certain negative criteria were also publicised which, if present, would nullify any application for naturalisation. Among these are: (a) previous service in the armed forces or security apparatus of foreign countries; (b) previous activities contrary to the maintenance of the Constitution; (c) previous or on-going involvement in fanning racial or ethnic friction; (d) certain types of court convictions. Comparisons of these more recent 'ordinances' are favourable, when viewed alongside those reported shortly after Independence day. The proposed hierarchy of categories of people who could be considered for conferment of Latvian citizenship was then as follows: (a) people of ethnic Latvian (or Livonian) parentage, living in Latvia but not yet naturalised; (b) citizens of the ex-USSR (or their descendants), qualified under the 1919 Latvian citizenship law but still remaining unnaturalised; (c) people of non-ethnic Latvian stock, residing in Latvia on 17/06/40; (d) people forcibly deported to Latvia during World War II ('Great Patriotic War') (Belarusans, Greeks, Jews, Lithuanians & Poles); (e) people who have successfully completed a Latvian language course and have accumulated five years residence prior to applying for residency; (f) members of a 30,000-strong group of ethnic Estonians or Lithuanians who have accumulated five years' residence prior to applying for residency; (g) people who have been married to ethnic Latvians for at least ten years and who have accumulated five years' residence prior to applying for residency; (h) current residents who have performed outstanding services to the Republic of Latvia. These provisions would have admitted a further 232,000 people to Latvian citizenship. It was also proposed to operate an additional quota system based on 10 years' residence and a proven command of basic Latvian. Even so, most of the Russian speakers would have remained ineligible. The new legislation is an improvement for this category but it should be noted that the actual administrative process of naturalising the 500,000 people eligible may be expected to proceed very slowly.
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Notes 1. For an in-depth discussion of Latvian- and Russian-medium schooling and the educational statistics 19451985 see Knowles (1989). Bibliography Ager, D. (1997) Language, Community and the State. Exeter: Intellect. Benz, P. (ed.) (1995) Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer. Braudel, F. (1985) The Perspective on the World. London: Fontana. Caplan, R. and Feffer, J. (1996) Europe's New Nationalism: States and Minorities in Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Close, P. (1994) Citizenship, Europe and Change. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Denber, R. (ed.) (1992) The Soviet Nationality Reader: The Disintegration in Context. Oxford: Westview. Ereshchenko, M. and Grishina, R. (1995) Natsional'ny vopros v vostochnoy Evrope [The Ethnic Question in Eastern Europe]. Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences. Eriksen, T. (1993) Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives. London: Pluto. Fernandez-Amesto, F. (ed.) (1997) The Times Guide to the Peoples of Europe. London: The Times. Gerner, K. and Hedlund, S. (1997) The Baltic States and the End of the Soviet Empire. London: Routledge. Goddard, V. et al. (eds) (1994) The Anthropology of Europe: Identity and Boundaries in Conflict. Oxford: Berg. Graham, B. (ed.) (1998) Modern Europe: Place, Culture, Identity. London: Arnold. Grigorievs, A. (ed.) (1996) The Baltic predicament. In R. Caplan and J. Feffer (eds) Europe's New Nationalism: States and Minorities in Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Halbach, U. (1992) Das sowjetische Vielvölkerimperium: Nationalitätenpolitik und Nationale Frage. Mannheim: BI Taschenbuchverlag. Kalashnikova, V. (1997) Natsional'nye otnoshenia: Slovar' [Ethnic relations: A dictionary]. Moscow GITs Vlados. Kibelka, R. (1991) Auch wir sind Europa Zur jüngeren Geschichte und aktuellen Entwicklung des Baltikums Baltische Pressestimmen und Dokumente. Berlin: Aufbau Taschenbuch Verlag. Kinder, H. and Hilgemann, W. (1966) dtv-Atlas zur Weltgeschichte (I/II). Munich: dtv. Kirby, D. (1995) The Baltic World 17721793: Europe's Northern Periphery in an Age of Change. Harlow: Longman. Knowles, F. (1989) Language planning in the Soviet Baltic Republics: An analysis of demographic and sociological trends. In M. Kirkwood (ed.) Language Planning in the Soviet Union. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Melville, N. (1995) Russians Beyond Russia: The Politics of National Identity. London: RIIA. Neumann, I. (1996) Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations. London: Routledge. O'Leary, S. and Tiilikainen, T. (1998) Citizenship and Nationality Status in the New Europe. London: Sweet & Maxwell. Pounds, N. (ed.) (1961) Geographical Essays on Eastern Europe. The Hague: Mouton. Pounds, N. (1966) An Historical Geography of Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sakkeus, L. (1994) The Baltic states. In S. Ardittis (ed.) The Politics of EastWest Migration. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Short, J. (1993) An Introduction to Political Geography. London: Routledge. Smith, G. (ed.) (1990) The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union. Harlow: Longman. Smith, G. (ed.) (1996) The Baltic States: The National Self-determination of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Swain, G. and Swain, N. (1993) Eastern Europe Since 1945. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Taylor, P. (1993) Political Geography. London: Longman.
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Unstead, J.F. (1923) The belt of political change in Europe. The Scottish Geographical Magazine 39, 183192. Valentej, D.I. (ed.) (1985) Demograficheskij Entsiklopedicheskij Slovar' [An Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Demography]. Moscow: Sovetskaja Entsiklopedija. Wanklyn, H.G. (1941) The Eastern Marchlands of Europe. London. White, S. et al. (eds) (1993) Developments in Soviet Politics. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Ziemele, I. (1998) The citizenship issue in the Republic of Latvia. In S. O'Leary and T. Tiilikainen (eds) Citizenship and Nationality Status in the New Europe (pp. 187204). London: Sweet & Maxwell. Zvidrin'sh, P. (1986) Naselenie Sovetskoi Latvii [The Population of Soviet Latvia]. Riga: Zinatne. Zvidrins, P. (1989) Demografija [Demography]. Riga: Zvaigzne.
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Social Conditions for the Implementation of Linguistic Human Rights through Multicultural Policies: The Case of the Kyrgyz Republic. Matthias Koenig Institute for Sociology, University of Marburg, 35032 Marburg, Germany This paper begins with a survey of various theories of nationalism and the function of language in its constructs. The resurgence of nationalist projects in the last part of the 20th century is set within the context of globalisation which is seen as intensifying and encouraging the desire for a recognition of ethnic specificity. Within the successor states of the USSR, ethnic revivalist and nationalist tendencies threaten the transition to democracy. Data from Kyrgyzstan show how the Kyrgyz government is faced with the dilemma of correlating the need to respond to the desires of ethno-nationalists, the need to promote the institutional structures of a common public sphere and the need to act democratically in response to linguistic diversity. Linguistic rights enshrined in international law are proposed as the structure within which governments should act. Assimilationist and differentialist solutions are rejected in favour of a multicultural approach. The territorial model of multiculturalism as applied in Switzerland and Belgium is seen as inappropriate where populations are intermingled as they are in Kyrgyzstan. Regional monolinguism is shown to be liable to the same criticisms as national monolinguism. The paper ends by suggesting that the socio-cultural variant of multiculturalism as practised in some countries of immigration, such as Australia, is a possible model for Kyrgyzstan. In the wake of recent social transformations, cultural diversity has become a major source of social conflict and political debate. Whereas classical modernisation theories assumed the successive disappearance of solidarity groups characterised by particular cultural, religious and linguistic identities, it is the world-wide spread of the capitalist economic system, of the nation-state and of an international legal system based on universalistic norms that is again giving rise to socio-political movements reaffirming, rediscovering or reconstructing such identities. On the level of international order, a consequence of this trend has been the increased involvement of ethnic movements in armed conflict (cf. Diamond & Plattner, 1994). Yet, the reaffirmation of particular identities also challenges democratic mechanisms of social integration and conflict resolution on the national level. National democracies have classically presumed a certain degree of cultural homogeneity. Increased cultural diversity, however, is calling for new types of democratic policies, which recognise particularistic identity claims and, at the same time, strengthen social integration in the national polity. Such policies are mainly discussed under the label of 'multiculturalism' (cf. Inglis, 1996). Of particular interest to this discussion of 'multiculturalism' is the analysis of linguistic diversity, because it challenges a core assumption of classical theories of democracy. Conceiving of rational discourse as constitutive for political legitimisation in democratic societies, these theories presuppose that one language fulfils a function of social integration at the societal level. 1 However, the assumption of linguistically mediated integration, that is of the
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existence of a sphere of 'public discourse' or of a 'community of communication', cannot easily be warranted in multilingual societies. Language policies instructed by general principles of democratic governance have therefore to respond to the questions of how the identity of linguistic groups can be respected and how, at the same time, equal participation of each linguistic group in a shared public sphere can be guaranteed. This paper aims at contributing to the discussion of multicultural policies by analysing the effects of global transformations for social integration in the nation-state and by developing a framework of democratic governance, in which multicultural language policies can be situated and through which international human rights standards can be implemented. It argues that multicultural language policies are most likely to succeed in the double task of respecting particular identity claims and maintaining social integration in a shared public sphere. In order to account for the complexity of the issues involved, this paper adopts an interdisciplinary approach, through which a social science analysis of contemporary language conflicts and social conditions of democratic governance is coordinated with a legal analysis of linguistic rights as well as a policy analysis of multiculturalism. Its first part, therefore, provides a social science analysis of social transformations causing linguistic diversity and political conflicts over language issues. In the second part, the most important international conventions and declarations setting standards for the protection of linguistic rights will be analysed in their capacity to provide a normative basis for the formulation of multicultural language policies. In both parts, the major argument will be illustrated by an analysis of language conflicts and language policy development in the Kyrgyz Republic, a state explicitly committed to democracy (Anderson, 1999), yet affected by the problematic role of linguistic diversity in the process of post-Soviet state-formation and nation-building. By approaching the problem of linguistic diversity in the Kyrgyz Republic from a more general perspective, however, the paper wishes to provide analytical tools for further comparative studies on the themes of ethnic conflict and multicultural policies. In particular, it wishes to explore the potential of approaching problems of democratic governance in multicultural societies from an interdisciplinary perspective. Part 1 Language and Social Integration under Conditions of Modernisation and Globalisation This section discusses conceptual and theoretical instruments available for analysing the social consequences of linguistic diversity. An analysis of the function of language in social interaction and its role in the constitution of ethnicity, informed by the sociology of language and sociolinguistics, provides the basis for a structural explanation of language conflicts in the modern nation-state and their changing logic under conditions of globalisation. The analysis of language conflicts in Kyrgyzstan serves as an example of how ethnic groups are politically mobilised along linguistic boundaries in processes of post-Soviet social transition.
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The Social Function of Language and the Construction of Ethnicity In general, the social function of language is regarded as a mechanism of social integration. However, a closer analysis of language instructed by sociology of language and sociolinguistics gives a more differentiated account of the role of language in social interaction and in the construction of 'ethnicity'. The Role of Language in Social Interaction Sociological theories of language generally analyse language as a system of communication and as a system of representation. It is evident that social interaction between two individuals requires a shared system of communication. Analytically, it can be shown that without shared systems of communication, participants in social interaction would fail in cooperating, that is in coordinating their respective action plans. Although not the only one, language is the most fundamental of such systems of communication, both in an evolutionary and a psycho-developmental sense. It has been argued that the evolutionary emergence of human society is mediated by linguistic structures which allow the human organism to acquire the competence to understand the other through symbolic interaction. A similar learning process has been regarded as constitutive for the socialisation and the identity-formation of individuals. Hence, the social process of reaching understanding, the coordination of action, and the socialisation of individuals have been identified as core functions of language (Habermas, 1984). It can be concluded, that it is by its communicative function that language contributes to social integration. The second social function of language is most prominently theorised in the sociology of knowledge (cf. Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Luckmann, 1984). Here, language is analysed not only as a system of communication on the level of social interaction but also as a system of representation providing a shared world-view on the level of society. Reality as it is perceived by members of a social group is considered to be the result of a social process of externalisation, objectification and internalisation which is mediated by systems of representations and, above all, by language. Speaking a language is to share a common reality with others. By providing a common world-view, language therefore plays a crucial role in the constitution of a group consciousness and the symbolisation of collective identity. Hence, it is not only by its communicative but also by its symbolic function that language contributes to social integration. Differentiating these two functions is an important tool for analysing the relation of language to ethnicity and its changing nature under conditions of modernisation and globalisation. The Role of Language in the Construction of Ethnicity The relation of language and ethnicity has been extensively debated in the discipline of sociolinguistics. It is often stated that language is a constitutive factor of ethnicity, in so far as it fulfils a communicative and a symbolic function at the same time. It is useful, however, to go beyond this general account by relating sociolinguistics to other theoretical approaches to 'ethnicity', which have come to the fore of academic discourse in the context of post-colonial social science in the early 1970s. 2 There are mainly three theoretical approaches to the phenomenon of ethnicity: primordialism, constructivism and instrumentalism. While it is only in
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its extreme forms that primordialism sees ethnicity in socio-biological categories (van den Berghe), it generally assumes social groups to be characterised by features such as territory, religion, culture, social organisation or language which are considered to be objectively 'given'. It is true that this theory of ethnicity had a strong influence, especially in the Soviet school of ethnology (Shirokogorov, Bromley, Gumilev). However, this approach is not tenable on methodological grounds, because it gives an ontological or essential status to collective entities, whereas social science needs to interpret and explain their emergence, their stabilisation and their change over time by reconstructing ethnicity from the subjective perspective of the actor. Such an approach can be traced back to the understanding of ethnicity in Max Weber's interpretative sociology, in which 'ethnic groups' are defined as ' . . . those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of custom or both, or because of memories of colonisation and migration' (Weber, 1968: 389). 3 This approach has been developed in different directions by constructivist and instrumentalist theories of ethnicity, which focus on the subjective interpretation of objective features such as territory, religion, culture, social organisation and language. The constructivist approach was most prominently formulated by Fredrik Barth who views ethnic identity as the result of a complex social process in which symbolic boundaries are continuously constructed and reconstructed by the use of mythologies, an historical account of a common past or language (Barth, 1969). The instrumentalist approach to ethnicity pays more attention to the processes of political mobilisation and manipulation by which social groups are constituted on the basis of ethnic attributes such as nationality, religion, race or language. Instead of regarding these two approaches as being mutually exclusive, they should be regarded as complementary; while the former focuses on the socio-cultural construction of ethnicity, the latter emphasises socio-political (and economical) factors underlying the formation of ethnic groups. Now, both the constructivist and the instrumentalist approach to ethnicity can be related to certain strands of sociolinguistics. In correspondence to the argument which explains ethnicity as the result of processes of symbolic boundary-making, many linguists see language as the most important symbolic vehicle for the construction of collective identity (cf. Fishman, 1977). In empirical and applied sociolinguistics, patterns of language use in situations of linguistic diversity including mechanisms of language acquisition, causes of language maintenance, bilingualism and language shift among linguistic minorities have been studied in order to elucidate such a linguistic construction of ethnicity (cf. Dow, 1991). In more recent sociolinguistics, there have been attempts to focus rather on the political and, particularly, on the economic factors underlying patterns of language use and, hence, on the instrumental aspect of language. It could be shown, for instance, that deprived socio-economic status is correlated to minority language status and that this, in turn, affects individual language use.4 Although these sociological and socio-linguistic approaches to ethnicity are useful in understanding the dynamics of group formation, they need to be complemented by a socio-historical analysis of the emergence of the modern nation-state. It has, in fact, only been in the context of modern state formation and
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nation building that ethnicity and language have become sources of political mobilisation and political conflict. Dynamics of Language Conflict in the Modern Nation-State The specific patterns of integration in modernity can be explained by an increased functional differentiation of social subsystems. The emergence of a capitalist world system, the political system of nation-states and a universalistic legal system have been accompanied by the wider use of generalised symbolic media of communication such as money (cf. Luhmann, 1982). As Habermas argues, this process has in many spheres of social interaction caused the substitution of language-mediated social integration by systemic integration (Habermas, 1984). However, it is mainly by an analysis of changes in the pattern of social integration, or social cohesion, and their socio-linguistic repercussions within the modern nation-state, that modern forms of ethnicity and corresponding types of language conflicts can be explained. 5 Analysis of Changes in the Pattern of Social Integration Problems of social integration in the modern nation-state have been the result of different, yet interrelated processes of social change, including the structural dynamics of bureaucratisation, industrialisation, legal rationalisation and, not least, the construction of 'imagined communities' (Anderson, 1983). The two main models for constructing modern nation-state, the 'civic' and the 'ethnic' model of the nation-state, have both supposed a strong degree of social cohesion on the societal level (Brubaker, 1992; Ignatieff, 1993). The civic (or contractual) model of the nation-state, typically formulated in Republican political theory, assumed that in the modern nation, bonds of particularistic solidarity would be replaced by formal citizenship and a legal system founded on universalistic norms, especially on individual rights. It was supposed that social integration could be achieved by establishing a de-ethnicised public sphere in which social conflicts would be resolved democratically and by recourse to constitutional provisions. In contradistinction to this concept of a political constitution of the nation, the ethnic (or descent) model of the nation-state, related predominantly to German Romanticism, assumed that social integration in the modern nationstate was based on the shared identity of a Volk. State formation was therefore considered an instrument for the self-articulation of a pre-existent national community, characterised by common historical origin and destiny, shared culture, mentality and custom and, not least, a common language. The mobilising force of this model of the nation-state is proven by the success of nationalist movements in the 19th and early 20th century.6 There are several ways in which both models of the nation-state have been interwoven with the ideal of monolinguism.7 In general, monolinguism can be regarded as a component of those policies of cultural homogenisation, which were caused by the states' attempts to meet functional requirements of industrialisation and bureaucratisation (Gellner, 1983; Weber, 1979). In so far as the political promotion of a single language was aimed at guaranteeing the efficiency of public communication in a complex and differentiated society, language in the modern nation state has become reduced to its instrumental, communicative function.8 At the same time, however, the construction of
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modern nation-states, assuming the congruency of cultural nation and political state, has also emphasised the symbolic function of language (cf. Wright, 1997: 219225). In the civic (or contractual) model of the nation-state, in which language was supposedly disconnected from any representation of collective identity, the inclusion of all citizens in a common polity was perceived to have as its precondition a certain linguistic unity. Thus, in the French Republic the ideal of strict monolinguism was implemented through various homogenising policies, e.g. through administrative centralisation and a uniform education, and has rendered the French language a symbol for Republican identity. The existence of regional linguistic minorities in the French territory has, therefore, deliberately been ignored (cf. Giordan, 1992a). The exclusionary impact of the ideal of monolinguism is even more obvious in the ethnic (or descent) model of the nation-state, since the assumption of a common cultural and linguistic heritage is one of its organising principles. It can be concluded that nation-building has been based on large-scale policies of homogenising culturally and linguistically diverse populations. 9 To assess the potential of linguistic diversity to cause ethnic conflicts, it is therefore imperative to analyse the effects of the two models of the nation-state, and their common ideal of monolinguism, on the formation of ethnic and linguistic minorities. Modern Ethnicity and Corresponding Language Conflicts The dynamics of the modern nation-state have had a double effect on linguistic minority groups. On the one hand, the (re)ethnicisation of language in the ethnic model of the nation-state as well as the general ideal of national monolinguism have caused discrimination against non-dominant linguistic groups. National governments have typically responded to the presence of linguistic minorities on their territory by language policies aimed at extinguishing the respective minority languages, be they regional languages, immigrant languages or indigenous languages. Monolingual policies of status planning have mainly been aimed at the legal establishment of an official language in the areas of media, education and political communication, whereas monolingual policies of corpus planning have intended to modernise and standardise the use of the official language by codifying phonetic, semantic and grammatical aspects of the language. On the other hand, however, the successive establishment of a legal system based on the recognition of individual rights and supportive of a de-ethnicised understanding of language has highlighted the illegitimacy of discriminating against minorities on grounds of their respective language and has provided linguistic minorities with resources for claiming legal and political recognition. As shown by historical research on language groups in Europe in the 19th and the 20th century, it is precisely this double dynamics of modern nation-building that accounts for the reconstruction of linguistic minorities as ethnic groups affirming their particular identity and claiming their recognition in the political sphere (cf. Vilfan, 1993). A socio-historical analysis of identityconstruction of linguistic minorities, therefore, proves what can be generally said about any construction of ethnicity, be it founded on race, on religion, on nationality or on language: it is an inherently modern phenomenon related to structural problems of social integration in the modern nation-state. It follows that ethnic or language
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conflicts are not caused by the symbolic resources for identity-construction per se but are related to complex processes of political mobilisation (Smith, 1997: 200). As will be shown below, these dynamics are reinforced by more recent processes of globalisation. Globalisation and the Reconstruction of Ethnic Identities In the last decade, 'globalisation' has become a core concept in the social sciences as well as in other discourses. Referring to the experience of an increasing compression of time and space and, thus, drawing attention to large-scale social and cultural transformations, it challenges the national focus of classical social sciences. In fact, functional differentiation does not primarily occur on the level of modernising national societies but on the level of modern world society, in which autonomous social subsystems (economy, science, law, etc.) cross national boundaries (cf. Luhmann, 1982). However, it is again crucial to focus precisely on the effects of globalisation for patterns of social integration and cohesion in the modern nation-state, in order to grasp the logic of contemporary ethnic and linguistic conflict. Patterns of Social Integration in the Modern Nation-State On the one hand, it has been argued that globalisation is to some extent undermining the sovereignty of the nation-state as regards its capacity to control economic, cultural and social systems. 10 The international flux of financial markets, the autonomy of transnational corporations, the world-wide dissemination of information by electronic media and increases in international migration are, in fact, seriously reducing the sovereignty of the nation-state. On the other hand, however, it has been pointed out that globalisation by no means diminishes the dominant structural role of the nation-state and national governments within the global political system (Mann, 1993). That the nation-state is indeed highly institutionalised in the political system is shown by the proliferation of post-colonial nation-states after World War II and the formation of successor states after the break-down of the Soviet Union. Correspondingly, both the civic-political model of the nation-state, with its emphasis on the constitutional guarantee of individual rights and citizenship, and the ethno-cultural model of the nation-state are shaping modes of political organisation and mobilisation on a global scale. It seems that both trends, the institutionalisation of the nation-state as dominant structural feature of the global political system and the reduction of its scope of action, account for the proliferation of ethnic groups articulating claims for recognition in the political arena. Of particular importance in this respect is that international law is increasingly imposing universalistic legal frameworks on emerging nation-states. Indigenous people, regional minorities and immigrants, formerly subjected to homogenising policies, discrimination or genocide, have gained more autonomy over the nation-state by means of international standards which were absent during European state-formation. In addition, the cultural dimension of globalisation, that is the relativisation of traditional identities (cf. Robertson, 1992), seems to provoke the reassertion and reconstruction of particular identities. The major result has been the emergence of ethno-political movements drawing on nationalism, religious or sectarian belonging, race and
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language as resources for the construction of particular identities and for their political mobilisation. It can be concluded that globalisation intensifies the above-mentioned dynamics of ethnic mobilisation and eventually exacerbates the conflict between different ethnic groups over political power. The Logic of Contemporary Linguistic Conflict. There are various forms in which globalisation intensifies the construction and political articulation of ethnic identities. With regard to language groups, globalisation is producing linguistic diversity on the national level by the following mechanisms. Increases in international migration have diversified the population of 'old', monolingual nation-states. While the USA, Canada and Australia have had long experiences with immigrants of different linguistic backgrounds, European and East Asian states have equally become confronted with large-scale immigration induced by refugee movements, asylum seekers, permanent emigration and market-driven labour migration. Furthermore, in the processes of post-colonial state-formation, for instance in Africa, India and the Pacific Rim, national borders were drawn without taking into account the presence or absence of social cohesion in the respective territory. It should be obvious, that each attempt at monolingual language policies in these states, which are characterised by a complex arrangement of mother tongues, languages of inter-ethnic communication and international languages, would produce conflict between linguistic groups (cf. e.g. Jahr, 1993; Mansour, 1993). One of the regions, in which the structural constraints put on social cohesion on the national level by the processes of modernisation and globalisation are most obvious, is Central Asia. State-formation in the newly independent Republics, which was induced by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, has been accompanied by ethnic revivalist and nationalist tendencies which are threatening the transition to democracy (cf. Brubaker, 1994; Khazanov, 1995; Smith, et al., 1998; Tishkov, 1997). It is in this context that the dynamics of ethnic conflict and its causes in nationalist monolingual language planning under conditions of linguistic diversity, such as in Kyrgyzstan, have to be understood. Language Conflicts, Nationalism and Post-Soviet State-Formation in the Kyrgyz Republic As in many other post-Soviet states, language controversies have been an important dimension of political conflict in Kyrgyzstan after 1990. On the basis of the theoretical framework developed above, this section analyses linguistic change under Soviet rule, in order to explain the politicisation of ethnic identities in the process of post-Soviet state-formation. Linguistic Change under Soviet Rule The inclusion of the Central Asian region into the Soviet Empire dramatically transformed social structures in Kyrgyzstan. Firstly, the introduction of Soviet administrative and economical structures forced Kyrgyz nomadic tribes to change their patterns of social organisation by settling in Soviet kolkhoz and adopting new forms of agricultural production. Secondly, the Soviet policy of relocating entire populations was particularly pronounced in Kyrgyzstan, which eventually became the Soviet Republic with the highest percentage of Russians (in 1989 32% of the population) and a considerable number of Uzbeks (in 1989
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Table 1 The percentage of growth of the urban population in Kyrgyzstan, 19261989 Year Percentage Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of urban indigenous indigenous Russian urban of Russian vs. whole urban vs. whole urban vs. vs. whole vs. whole population indigenous whole urban Russian urban population population population population 1926 12.0 0.8 4.7 38.7 38.0 1939 18.5 3.6 10.1 44.4 49.8 1959 33.7 11.0 13.2 57.8 51.8 1970 37.4 14.5 16.9 65.9 51.4 1979 38.3 18.3 22.9 68.6 46.4 1989 38.2 21.7 29.6 69.9 39.1 Source: Khazanov (1995: 261, Table 4.2) 13% of the population). Thirdly, the process of modernisation in Kyrgyzstan was accompanied by the emergence of ethnic stratification, with the Russian fraction of the population being the politically dominant ethnic group. In addition to their political dominance, the level of education and vocational training was highest among Russians, who also participated more actively in the industrial and in the administrative sector. Finally, while the Kyrgyz population did not remain unaffected by rapid urbanisation, it is significant that in the 1950s the majority of the urban population was Russian (see Table 1). The unequal inclusion of Russians and Kyrgyz in the processes of industrialisation and urbanisation resulted in a situation of asymmetrical bilingualism. To be sure, Soviet language policy did not simply impose the Russian language on the non-Russian populations. On the contrary, the Leninist ideology of 'language building' (korenizatsiya) was explicitly aimed at modernising and standardising the national and minority languages of the multi-ethnic Soviet Empire (Desheriev, 1984). In the case of the Kyrgyz language, for instance, a member of the Turkic language group written in Arabic script since the islamisation of the Kyrgyz tribes in the 18th century, Soviet language policy adopted several measures of corpus planning, such as the introduction first of Latin (1928), then of Cyrillic (1940) as the standard script, the codification of the language through dictionaries and textbooks and the translation of modern Soviet vocabulary into the titular language. But despite this concept of 'language building', the Russian language eventually became dominant in Kyrgyzstan. Besides a stronger political emphasis on the dissemination of Russian as vernacular language after the Second World War and its ideological legitimisation by the 'Soviet people' doctrine in the 1980s, the major factor for this 'russification' was the dominance of Russian in the modernising sectors of society. In the educational system, for instance, the use of Kyrgyz as language of instruction correlated negatively with the level of education. Figures of 1990 show, that the percentage of students receiving education in Kyrgyz was 23.4% in higher education (76.3% in Russian) and 18.0% in special secondary schools (81.1% in Russian), while it was relatively high on the level of vocational schools (49.2%) and in secondary schools (55.6%) and quite common in primary schools in the countryside (Khazanov, 1995:2501; Tables 1.3 and 1.4).
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Table 2 Knowledge of Russian and of titular language in Kyrgyzstan in 1989 Nationality (Percentage of Fluency in Fluency in population) Russian Kyrgyz 37% Kyrgyz (52%) 12% Russians (32%) 39% 4% Uzbek (13%) 94% 2% Ukrainian (3%) 95% 0.3% German (2%) Source: Tishkov (1997: 90, Table 5.1) Similarly, Kyrgyz was hardly used in the public domain, as is shown by the near absence of books, newspapers, radio and television channels in that language in the late 1980s. The dominance of the Russian language increased the number of bilingual speakers among the Kyrgyz people, and it sometimes even induced an entire language shift from Kyrgyz to Russian, especially among the urban Kyrgyz intelligentsia. As a consequence of these socio-structural and linguistic developments, Russian became the vernacular language in the economic, administrative, and educational system and the major instrument of inter-ethnic communication in Kyrgyzstan (see Table 2). It should be emphasised that the spread of Russian in the Soviet Republics, although a concomitant to the totalitarian imposition of modern social structures, was less the result of nationalist identity politics drawing on the symbolic function of language than the effect of structural changes favouring the use of Russian as the language of wider communication. It was only during postSoviet processes of state-formation and nation-building that the symbolic function of language has come to the fore of public debate. Politicisation of Ethnic Identities in Post-Soviet State-Formation Although most post-Soviet nationalist movements have their roots in the 1980s, it was primarily after the disintegration of the Soviet Union that the ethnic model of the nation-state became the dominant political ideology in many of the former Soviet Republics. Since liberation from the totalitarian system of the Soviet Union was often regarded as identical with independence from Russian domination, hostility against the Russian population was a typical feature of post-Soviet nationalism. Nationalism has, however, also caused intra-ethnic conflict among the Kyrgyz, in so far as the urban Kyrgyz, who had switched to Russian as vernacular language and lost linguistic competence in the Kyrgyz language, were denounced as traitors (mankurts) of Kyrgyz ethnic identity (Kolstoe, 1995: 232244). In both inter- and intra-ethnic conflict, language has therefore functioned as an important symbol in the construction of ethno-national identity. The re-emergence of an ethno-national Kyrgyz identity was instrumentalised by political elites in the early process of postSoviet state-formation. The constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, for example, adopted three years after the declaration of independence on 5 May 1993, contains a strong inner tension between a
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civic concept of the people (narod) of Kyrgyzstan and an ethnic concept of the Kyrgyz people (natsiia), when it states in the Preamble: We, the people of Kyrgyzstan strive to secure the national renaissance of the Kyrgyz and to defend and develop the interests of the representatives of the other nationalities, who together with the Kyrgyz make up the people of Kyrgyzstan. The nationalism underlying the process of state-formation in Kyrgyzstan has, in particular, been operative in language policies guided by the ideal of monolinguism and aimed at excluding the Russian population (cf. Huskey, 1995; Bohr & Crisp, 1996). While language legislation in the 1980s provided for official bilingualism, the 1990 Language Law nullified the official status previously given to Russian and laid out a successive transition to the exclusive use of Kyrgyz as official language. Similarly, it was agreed, in 1993, to reintroduce the Latin script, in order to restore a non-Russian national identity (Huskey, 1995: 552; Kolstoe, 1995: 236239). As an effect of the emergence of ethno-national movements and their instrumentalisation in the process of post-Soviet stateformation, there has been a considerable emigration of Russians and other nationalities towards Europe and Russia, especially among the skilled labour force. From 1989 to 1990, for instance, the rate of urban Russian out-migration increased by almost 40%, reaching a peak in 1993 (cf. Khazanov, 1995: 252, Table 2.1; UNDP, 1997:54, Table VI.2). This increase of out-migration of highly educated Russians, along with discrimination in the labour market against those who stayed, has had damaging effects on the Kyrgyz economic system. It is less clear, however, to what extent the rise of ethno-nationalism based on the reconstruction of linguistic identity has actually induced language shifts to Kyrgyz, or whether it has solely functioned as rhetoric for the legitimisation of social exclusion in the economic and political sector. Empirical social research on linguistic revival movements in some post-Soviet societies has shown that such inverse language shifts in the context of ethno-nationalism are conditioned by a complicated set of factors, such as the perceived prestige of the respective languages, inter-generational linguistic change and patterns of language use in the public sector. 11 Within the analytical framework outlined above and illustrated by the Kyrgyz situation, one can highlight the core dilemma of contemporary language policies in democratic states. On the one hand, public policies are called to respond democratically to increases in linguistic diversity and to the political claims of ethnic identity groups. On the other hand, they have to promote the institutional structures of a common public sphere in a situation in which the vacuum left by the de-legitimisation of a nationalist conception of the state is threatening social integration and eventually causing ethnic conflict. It is this dilemma to which democratic governance in multilingual societies has to respond. Part 2 Linguistic Rights and Their Implementation through Policies of Multiculturalism This section shifts from a social science analysis to a normative, yet context-sensitive reflection on problems of linguistic diversity, aimed at the
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formulation of policy-recommendations. It will be argued that adopting multiculturalism provides a democratic response to the structural dilemma of language policies outlined above. While the discussion of multiculturalism has been dominated by philosophical arguments pertaining to the legitimacy of cultural differences and group rights in liberal democracies (cf. Benhabib, 1995; Gutmann, 1994; Kymlicka, 1995b), the following discussion attempts to formulate an institutional-normative justification for the adoption of multicultural language policies on the basis of international human rights standards pertaining to linguistic rights. As in the first part, the main argument is highlighted by an exemplary analysis of language policies in the Kyrgyz Republic. Linguistic Rights in International Law Early provisions concerning the status of linguistic minorities can be found in some international treaties in the 19th century and, at the end of the First World War, in the framework of the so-called minorities treaties overseen by the League of Nations and aimed at protecting national minorities in Europe. Granting persons belonging to minorities the right to equal treatment and non-discrimination, the right to citizenship and the right to establish schools and other institutions in order to preserve their national peculiarities, these treaties obliged the state to respect and, in some cases, even to support the use of minority languages in private and public. 12 However, it was only after the Second World War, that linguistic rights have explicitly been understood as a component of universal human rights, especially under the United Nations. Hence, there are a number of international legal standards of linguistic rights which are related predominantly to human rights principles such as equality and nondiscrimination. Although the question of minority rights was originally not explicitly addressed in setting human rights standards, the UN General Assembly asked the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the Commission on Human Rights to elaborate more specific provisions on the rights of members of minorities as early as in 1948. As a result of four decades of debate, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (UN Declaration) on 18 December 1992 (cf. Capotorti, 1979; Bloch, 1995). In the following, a brief overview of major conventions and declarations pertaining to linguistic rights, especially to the rights of member of linguistic minorities will be given, in order to examine in some more detail the provisions set fourth in the UN Declaration. Finally, the legal and political implications of such linguistic rights will be related to the social science analysis of language conflict outlined above. Conventions and Declarations Pertaining to Linguistic Rights The International Bill of Human Rights, consisting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted and proclaimed by the UN General Assembly in Resolution 217A (III) on 10 December 1948, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), both adopted by the UN General Assembly on 19 December 1966,13 commits the member states to the basic principles of equality
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and non-discrimination which are also prescribed in the UN Charter (Articles 1 and 55). Whereas some other human rights, such as the freedom of expression (Article 19 UDHR and Article 19 ICCPR) and the right to an interpreter in criminal proceedings when an accused does not understand the language used in court (Article 14 (3) ICCPR), have indirect implications for linguistic rights, the rights to non-discrimination and to equal treatment directly affect the individual's linguistic rights, since they regulate state activities involving linguistic preference. The general prohibition of discrimination and unequal treatment is stated, above all, in Paragraph 2(1) of the UDHR which reads: Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinctions of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status (General Assembly Resolution 217 A III). This principle is restated in Articles 2(1) and 26 of the ICCPR. Now, the right to non-discrimination and equal treatment has particular implications for members of linguistic minorities, because, given a sufficiently high number of minority language speakers, the state may legitimately be obliged to provide special institutions and mechanisms to implement the principle of nondiscrimination. Thus, the UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education, adopted on 14 December 1960, recalling the principle of non-discrimination (Article 1) stipulates in Article 5(1): The States Parties to this Convention agree that: . . . It is essential to recognize the right of members of national minorities to carry on their own educational activities, including the maintenance of schools and, depending on the educational policy of each State, the use of the teaching of their own language, provided however: That this right is not exercised in a manner which prevents the members of these minorities from understanding the culture and language of the community as a whole and from participating in its activities, or which prejudices national sovereignty . . . (UNTS, Vol. 429: 93). By formulating provisions of how to implement the principle of non-discrimination in the educational system, the UNESCO Convention is, in fact, the first international convention addressing expressis verbis one of the rights of members of minorities. Similarly, the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 7 March 1966, on the basis of a broad definition of 'racial discrimination' confirms the principle of nondiscrimination of minorities (UNTS, Vol. 660: 195). Aimed at specifying the implications of the principle of non-discrimination, these two conventions have in fact paved the way for a more refined understanding of the rights of members of minorities. There are some early international provisions granting specific rights to members of linguistic minorities in the areas of education, media and political participation. The International Labour Organization Convention (No.107) Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries (1957) urges in Article 23 to
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provide, if practicable, for education in the mother tongue and eventually for progressive transition to the national language (UNTS, vol. 328: 247). Besides the non-discrimination articles in the UNESCO Convention and in the anti-discrimination convention mentioned above, the most important article referring to minority rights has been Article 27 of the ICCPR. This article has been incorporated, with small alterations, in other international legal instruments such as in Article 30 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 20 November 1989, and in several Council of Europe and CSCE documents. It reads: In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language (UNTS, Vol. 999: 171 and UNTS, Vol. 1057: 407). A close analysis of this article shows that it implies two requirements. Firstly, it presupposes the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of language, as covered by the international legal conventions and declarations mentioned above; secondly, it additionally obliges the state not to interfere in the affairs of linguistic minorities (cf. Mullerson, 1993). The requirement that persons belonging to minorities shall not be denied the right to use their own language is, however, more ambiguous than it seems. In fact, Article 27 is neither clear on whether the state shall not only permit the private and public use of minority languages but shall also use the minority language in the conduct of its own affairs, nor on whether the state is obliged to take positive action and to promote the minority identity in order to implement this right. Most legal scholars agree, in fact, that Article 27 does not impose any requirements on the state to use a minority language in the conduct of its own affairs and that it does not oblige the state to provide facilities for the promotion of minority identities. On these grounds, it has been criticised by Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson (1994: 83) for promoting 'covert assimilation-oriented toleration' of linguistic minorities. Both the privatepublic issue and the question of protection through promotion are resolved in later provisions which pay more attention to the right to cultural identity. As human rights scholar Stavenhagen has argued, notwithstanding the principles of non-discrimination and equality, the right to cultural identity requires an extension of the individualist understanding of human rights and calls for recognising the necessity to develop more effective means of protecting the identity of minorities, since the right to cultural identity can only be enjoyed in community with others (Stavenhagen, 1995). The first comprehensive and universal standard setting international declaration acknowledging the necessity to promote minority identities and explicating the rights of members of minorities is the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. The UN Declaration The UN Declaration, which has been analysed extensively by de Varennes (1997), is based on the principles of Article 27 ICCPR, the prohibition of discrimination of minorities and the obligation to non-interference, which it reformulates
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in Article 2(1) and 2(5). However, it goes beyond the principles of non-discrimination and equality by obliging the state to proactively protect and promote the identity of minorities. 14 As a programmatic provision, the UN Declaration states in Article 1(1): States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories, and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity (UN General Assembly Resolution 47/135). The formulation of this provision is sufficiently broad to allow for context-specific specifications regarding the implementation of the obligation to promote the identity of minorities. As suggested by Article 4(2), the programmatic provision rests on the conviction that it is through the promotion of the collective identity of minorities that the principles of non-discrimination and equality of individuals are safeguarded. States shall take measures to create favourable conditions to enable persons belonging to minorities to express their characteristics and to develop their culture, language, religion, traditions and customs, except where specific practices are in violation of national law and contrary to international standards. This provision would, for instance, oblige the State to prohibit acts of intolerance demeaning a minority language and its speakers as well as to enforce this prohibition by legislation. As suggested in de Varennes' legal analysis, the UN Declaration implies obligations and recommendations for both private and public language use of a minority language. The UN Declaration unambiguously obliges the State to allow private language use in private, in public and in collective action. It is obvious that it would violate the principle of non-discrimination to prohibit the use of a minority language in private, such as for example in the private choice of names and their script. Moreover, the State must not prohibit the use of a minority language in situations where the public is affected, especially in private media including books, newspapers, radio or television. Finally, the State, while not obliged to provide financial support, must not prevent the use of a minority language in collective action, such as maintaining associations and establishing private schools where the minority language is the language of instruction. The UN Declaration also refers to public use of a minority language. With regard to education, for instance, it provides in Article 4(3) and 4(4): (3) States should take appropriate measures so that, wherever possible, persons belonging to minorities have adequate opportunities to learn their mother tongue or to have instruction in their mother tongue. (4) States should, where appropriate, take measures in the field of education, in order to encourage the knowledge of the history, traditions, language and culture of the minorities existing within their territory. Persons belonging to minorities should have adequate opportunities to gain knowledge of the society as a whole.
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Although formulated as less binding than the other articles, these provisions are aimed at promoting the identity of linguistic minorities through education and at furthering mutual understanding of majority and minorities. The desirability of support for minority language education and for inter-culturalism in education, as formulated in the UN Declaration, confirms that an inclusive approach to the presence of minorities in States has been adopted in international law. The concern for the promotion of the identity of minorities as expressed in the UN Declaration is reformulated in other recent international human rights provisions, such as paragraph 19 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights on 25 June 1993, in which it is stressed that, through the provisions set forth in the UN Declaration, the fundamental principles of non-discrimination and equality are to be implemented (UN Doc. A/CONF.157/24). On the European level, a similar understanding of linguistic rights has emerged during the past decades. Thus, the Council of Europe has adopted the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages on 2 December 1992 which, among other objectives, stresses the values of interculturalism and multilingualism and calls for the protection and promotion of regional or minority languages (Article 7). 15 It commits the member states to eliminate discrimination in the areas of jurisdiction, public services, economic and life. It specifies that states should make available pre-school, primary, secondary, vocational, university and continuing education in the regional or minority language within their respective territories (Article 8), and that they should facilitate the creation and maintenance of media in the minority language (Article 11). Similarly, the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting on the Human Dimension of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, adopted 29 June 1990, urges the member States to both protect and promote the linguistic identity of minorities on their respective territory on the basis of the principles of non-discrimination and equality, and it specifies a variety of mechanisms to attain this goal (Articles 31, 32, 33, 34, 35).16 Legal and Practical Implications of Linguistic Rights Analysing the progression of linguistic rights provisions from assimilation-oriented toleration to explicit promotion of linguistic minorities finally calls for addressing the question, how the preservation and promotion of the identity of linguistic minorities is coordinated with the functioning of the public sphere. At the outset, it should be emphasised that most legal scholars agree on an individualistic understanding of linguistic rights.17 The protection and promotion of linguistic minorities are seen as instruments of implementing the individual rights to non-discrimination, equality and cultural identity. This interpretation is supported by the very definition of 'minorities' in international law which sees auto-categorisation and the subjective intention to safeguard a particular identity, besides the numerical factor, as constitutive factors of a 'minority' (Allardt, 1992; Symonides, 1995). This definition of a 'minority' is well in line with the social science approach to 'ethnicity' emphasising the subjective perspective of the actor. Now, conceptual coordination of the promotion of minority identities with the functioning of the shared public sphere can be achieved by using the distinction between different domains of society as developed by human rights
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scholar Asbjorn Eide. While the promotion of minority identities can be located in what Eide has called 'separate domain', there is a necessity to ensure social integration in a 'common domain', although the principles of non-discrimination and equality have to be acknowledged therein. It would be the task of constitutional provisions and public policies on the national level to find context-sensitive ways of combining these two domains by multilevel mechanisms of power-sharing, in order to achieve 'pluralism in togetherness' (Eide, 1994; 1995). At this point, the analysis of international human rights standards converges with the social science analysis which has shown that in the 'common domain', that is in the economic and the political sector, symbols of collective identity are increasingly deethnicised and substituted by generalised media of communication, while they are proliferating in the 'separate domain', that is in the sphere of particular identity groups. While in the former, language is reduced to its instrumental function, it maintains a symbolic function in the latter. Both analyses therefore suggest that complex models of power-sharing and political participation are best-equipped to maintain peace and stability among ethnic groups and thus to respond democratically to the dilemma of social integration under conditions of globalisation. The most prominent of such models is multiculturalism. Multiculturalism: A Framework for Democratic Language Policies The term 'multiculturalism', as it is used in public debate, comprises mainly three different meanings. In its demographicdescriptive meaning it refers to the fact of cultural or ethnic diversity, in its ideological-normative sense it applies to philosophical arguments underlining the legitimacy of claims to the recognition of particular identity groups, and in its programmatic-political sense it pertains to policies designed to respond to the problems posed by diversity (Inglis, 1996: 1518). In the following, multiculturalism is understood in its third meaning, that is as a set of programmes and policy initiatives addressing ethnic and, in particular, linguistic diversity. As a policy strategy, multiculturalism can and should be subjected to an empirical evaluation regarding its success in managing ethnic conflict. Hence, some examples of multicultural policies, their potential and their problems will be given. Multiculturalism as a Political Strategy. Adopting multiculturalism as a policy strategy is an integral part of developing new forms of democratic governance which respond to the structural dilemma of integration in the nation-state. The concept of 'governance' has come to the fore of political debate in the international community since the late 1980s and has been used by representatives of different ideological convictions for a variety of purposes (cf. de Alcántara, 1998). It is generally associated with the shift of power from the public to the private sector, with the strengthening of civil society, and with institutional reforms within the public sector. It has particularly attracted the interest of policy-makers involved in the management of social reconstruction in post-communist states. If used in the context of theories of financial and economic restructuring, the concept of governance often supports trends of marketisation and privatisation which in fact diminish democratic representation and participation in a common polity. In contradistinction to
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those ideologies of mere economic liberalisation, recent political theory has emphasised that democracy presupposes the existence of civil society as an autonomous sector, separate from both the administrative and the economic system, and characterised by a pluralism of actors, voluntary civic associations, and interest groups. 18 The functioning of civil society, in turn, requires a pluralistic public sphere in which citizens are actively involved, and it also implies the commitment of all individuals and groups to shared principles of the constitution. Although it does imply a certain shrinking of the administrative state, democratic governance does therefore not imply a shrinking of the public domain. As regards the problem of ethnic and cultural diversity, multiculturalism can be inscribed into the framework of democratic governance, in so far as it recognises certain claims for recognition of ethnic or cultural identity groups within a pluralistic civil society, while strengthening mechanisms of public consensus formation based on a collectively acknowledged constitution (Habermas, 1994). It thus provides a normative model of social integration which respects the structural distinction between 'separate domain' and 'common domain' as mentioned above (see also Kymlicka, 1995a: 173192; Rex, 1996). The characteristics of multiculturalism in the area of language planning can be highlighted by contrasting it with other models of language policy. Drawing on typologies developed in legal and policy analysis, one can roughly discern three ideal types of language policies: assimilationist, differentialist and multicultural language policy models (cf. Inglis, 1996: 37; SkutnabbKangas & Philippson, 1994: 80; Stavenhagen, 1996: 191202). The assimilationist model of language policy is guided by the ideal of monolinguism, as described above, and is aimed at the linguistic homogenisation of society. Although linguistic minorities might be tolerated and members of linguistic minorities be granted the right to equal treatment, assimilation-oriented policy strategies discourage the maintenance of the non-official minority language, for instance by educational policies fostering monolingual instruction in public schools in the official language. Whilst the differentialist (or exclusionist) model of language policies is equally guided by the ideal of monolinguism, it systematically excludes linguistic minorities. In some moderate cases, it allows linguistic minorities to build parallel institutions, such as schools, private media, associations in their own language. By marginalising the parallel institutions of linguistic minorities, however, the differentialist model intends to restrict the participation of persons belonging to those minorities in mainstream institutions of society. The multicultural (or pluralist) model of language policies aimed at political power-sharing and an equal participation of linguistic minorities in the public sphere, has two subtypes. The regional variant of multiculturalism, mainly instructed by Lijphart's concept of consociational democracy, intends to achieve non-discrimination, to guarantee equality treatment and to promote the identity of linguistic minorities by territorial subdivision, federalism and multilevel arrangements of political representation (Lijphart, 1977). The socio-cultural variant of multiculturalism protects and promotes the identity of linguistic minorities allowing and encouraging the creation of parallel institutions (schools, media, civic associations), which are granted equal status in the public sphere. To provide for a functioning communication in the public sphere, it particularly promotes bi- or multilingualism in education and media
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(Edwards, 1994). Both, the regional and the socio-cultural variant of multiculturalism are principally well-equipped to implement the human rights principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment as well to promote the identities of linguistic minorities (cf. Inglis, 1996; Stavenhagen, 1996). Examples of Multicultural Policies In addition to the normative justification of multicultural language policies by human rights standards, the preferential option for such policies also requires an assessment of their empirical impact. Such an empirical analysis of existing multicultural language policies in Australia, Canada and the European Union demonstrates that, although historical traditions and local conditions might call for a combination of different types of language policies, the socio-cultural variant of multiculturalism has the greatest potential for a peaceful management of ethnic conflict rooted in linguistic diversity. However, it equally shows that ignoring the instrumental relevance of link languages or languages of wider communication actually disadvantages minority groups, most notably in the economic and political sector but also in civil society. The regional variant of multicultural language policies has a long tradition in Switzerland and Belgium, countries which have often been considered ideal models of consociational democracy. The Swiss constitution, for instance, declaring French, German and Italian as both national and official languages and Rheto-Romansch as national language, has established a regime of cantonal sovereignty, according to which each linguistic group has control over public schools, public media and so forth in their respective cantons, while non-discrimination clauses accommodate for the respect of individual linguistic rights within the canton. On the national level, institutional arrangements are provided to ensure equal representation and participation of the main linguistic groups in legislation, jurisdiction and administration. However, the empirical limitations of the Swiss model of power-sharing between linguistic groups have not gone without notice. Legally, the regional model with its focus on the principle of territoriality does not resolve the problem of reconciling individual linguistic rights with the promotion of the identity of linguistic minorities. Moreover, this model often reinforces economic and political inequality, because it does not take into account the inferior status of minority languages such as Italian in Switzerland. Finally, it aggravates mutual ignorance between linguistic groups, because it lacks mechanisms such as multilingual education which would strengthen social cohesion on the national level (cf. Furer, 1992; Rossinelli, 1992; Grin & Sfreddo, 1996). In Belgium, where a similar model of regional power-sharing has evolved, the public discussion of these limitations has resulted in a constitutional reform, in which the principle of territoriality has been complemented by the principle of linguistic self-determination. Hence, both the three Regions (Walloon, Flemish and Brussels Region) and the three Communities (French, Flemish, and German-speaking Community) enjoy autonomous status and are coordinated by a highly complex institutional arrangement (Delgrange, 1995). The controversies over the Swiss and the Belgium model of consociationalism show that urbanisation, increased mobility and economic interdependency seriously
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limit the empirical effectiveness of the regional variant of multicultural language policies to implement linguistic rights. Similar limitations of multicultural language policies adopting a regional approach can be discerned in the process of European integration. Within the framework of the EC and the EU, the preservation of linguistic diversity has mainly been understood as a political goal on the supra-national level, leaving unaffected the ideal of national monolinguism. 19 Since the early 1990s, however, accelerated European integration has given rise to a new concern for regional or linguistic minorities, to sharp criticism of the ideal of national monolinguism, and to the promotion of multicultural language policies on the national and subnational level. This has, for instance, led to the adoption of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992) by the Council of Europe (cf. Giordan, 1992b). Based on the principle of territoriality, however, the Charter only supports the regional variant of multicultural language policies, while it explicitly excludes the linguistic rights of immigrants. The exclusion of immigrant languages from this policy strategy, however, is at odds with their increasing relevance in European societies. For instance, the number of Turkishor Arab-speaking immigrants in Europe is measured in millions. Although there have been attempts, for instance in the European Committee on Migration, to foster integration and equal opportunities policies towards immigrants, language policies have mainly followed the assimilationist or differentialist model. While it is true that public debate in several countries, especially in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, is increasingly becoming aware of the cultural, legal and economic importance of maintaining the linguistic identity of immigrants, for instance through 'immigrant minority language instruction' (IMLI), educational policies in most European countries have been reluctant in shifting to a socio-cultural model of multicultural language policies which would include the protection and promotion of immigrant minority languages.20 Since the socio-cultural model of multicultural language policies overtly supports the linguistic identity of both regional and immigrant minorities and includes strategies such as IMLI, it is not surprising that it was first adopted by countries facing largescale immigration, especially by Canada and Australia. In Canada, increases in immigration have resulted in attacks on the policy of anglo or franco-conformity and in the eventual adoption of the 'policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework' in 1971, confirmed by the 1988 Multiculturalism Act. In the area of education, fluency in both the mother tongue and one of the two national languages has been the primary objective of multicultural language policies, and it has been implemented by supplementing national language(s) instruction by IMLI and bilingual education (cf. Fortier, 1994). While social integration of immigrants coming from diverse linguistic backgrounds has been generally strengthened by multicultural language policies in Canada, the case of Quebec illustrates some problems of such policies within a bilingual framework. The adoption of multicultural language policies in the 1970s tended to weaken the status of French and to favour the use of English as high-status language of upward mobility among immigrant and ethnocultural communities in Quebec (cf. Cummins, 1984). As a reaction, Quebecois language policies have shifted back to preferential treatment of French, in order to affirm the identity of a 'distinct francophone society' although with limited success (cf. Bourhis,
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1994). In Australia, the adoption of multiculturalism meant the shift from a strictly monolingual and assimilationist policy to the recognition of linguistic rights of both Aboriginals and immigrants from diverse linguistic backgrounds (cf. Ozolins, 1993). The motivating factor for this change in public policy being the valuing of Asian languages as important tools for international trade. It was only in the 1980s that public policy regarded the recognition of identity claims of linguistic groups and the promotion of internal cultural and linguistic diversity as the foundation of social integration in Australia. The strategies of multicultural language policies, codified in the National Policy on Languages programme, are aimed at facilitating education in both English and immigrant languages (IMLI) and instruction on cultural diversity, at establishing multilingual media, such as the Special Broadcasting Program which disseminates information in up to 63 languages, and at providing public services for non-English speakers, such as the Translating and Interpreting Service (Smolicz, 1994). As early as the mid-1980s, however, it was observed that since the national language was still functioning as the main instrument of communication, the 'ethnic option', that is the mere promotion of minority identities, ran the risk of reinforcing existing power differentials in the economic and political sector (Bullivant, 1984). As a consequence, public policy in Australia has moved to more complex models of multicultural language policies promoting the use of minority languages while, at the same time, furthering linguistic competence in a language of wider communication. It can be concluded that multicultural language policies not only conform with international human rights standards pertaining to linguistic rights, but also seem to be empirically more effective in reducing ethnic conflict than assimilationist and differentialist policy strategies, where they succeed in balancing the legitimacy of particular linguistic identities and the linguistic requirements of a functioning economic and political system. 21 Respecting the differentiation between a 'separate domain' and a 'common domain', therefore, constitutes an effective democratic response to the structural dilemma of social integration in contemporary nation-states. The following explores in some more detail the development of language policies in the Kyrgyz Republic, in order to assess the potential of multicultural language policies to manage ethnic conflict under conditions of post-Soviet state formation. Developing Multicultural Language Policies in the Kyrgyz Republic The basic assumption of this paper is that constitutional reforms, democratic legislation and public policies responding to ethnic conflict should be guided by a social science analysis of the causes of such conflicts and the eventual effects of public policies. This is even more pertinent for ethnic conflict in Post-Soviet societies where ethnic and language policies have been informed by the still influential Soviet school of ethnology and its primordialist theory of ethnicity (Banks, 1996: 1724; Tishkov, 1997: 712). Formulating multicultural language policies in post-Soviet societies, therefore, presupposes a critical analysis of existing ethnic policies. Post-Soviet language policies in Central Asia have been strongly affected by the ethno-cultural model of the nation-state and the ideal of monolinguism, the result being a moderate form of differentialist language policies (cf. Kreindler, 1997). Thus, Article 5 of the Kyrgyz constitution states:
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(1) The official language of the Kyrgyz Republic shall be the Kyrgyz language. (2) The Kyrgyz Republic shall guarantee preservation, equal and free development and functioning of the Russian language and all other languages which are used by the population of the Republic. (3) Infringements of the citizens' rights on the ground of absence of knowledge and command of the official language shall not be allowed. While certain basic linguistic rights seem to be acknowledged in this provision, the political instrumentalisation of Kyrgyz ethno-linguistic identity in the process of state formation and nation building has, as mentioned above, caused ethnic conflict along linguistic lines and has resulted in considerable Russian emigration. In addition to its potential of generating ethnic conflict, such a moderate differentialist language policy violates the rights of members of linguistic minorities. It is true that language policies in the Kyrgyz Republic need to respect the specific demands of the formerly dominated Kyrgyz fraction of the population and their need to be defended against russophone monolinguism. To the extent that ethnic identity is symbolically expressed through language, public recognition of the identity claims of the Kyrgyz people indeed implies the preferential treatment of the Kyrgyz language as a 'minorised majority language' in education, media and public services (see Ozolins in this volume). But the promotion of the Kyrgyz language must not be carried through at the expense of the linguistic rights of Russians and, in particular, of other minority speakers in the Kyrgyz Republic. Moreover, special status seems to be appropriate for the Russian language, which has operated as primary language in the educational system, as language of inter-ethnic communication and as an important link language for economic and political integration in the Central Asian region. Therefore, the adoption of multicultural language policies, for instance by establishing bilingual education and multilingual media system in the framework of a pluralistic political system, seems to be a context-sensitive and more democratic strategy of promoting social integration in the new Kyrgyz Republic. The ethno-national thrust of the constitutional and legal provisions regulating language use in Kyrgyzstan has in fact been an issue of many public controversies (cf. Smith et al., 1998: 151; Anderson, 1999: 47). The protest not only of Russians but also of urbanised and highly educated Kyrgyz against the subordination of the Russian language and the growing awareness of the negative repercussions of monolingual language policies, such as increased ethnic conflict, emigration and disintegration in the region, have eventually resulted in modifications of the monolingual doctrine. After a series of jurisdictional and legislative activities, Russians and Germans were granted dual citizenship and a decree issued to make Russian an official language in those regions where the majority of the population spoke Russian. On the initiative of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, who recognised the importance of Russian in the economic sector as well as in inter-ethnic communication and therefore urged for the adoption of official bilingualism (Akaev, 1997: 148), the Lower House of the Parliament, in a draft constitutional amendment passed in March 1996 and approved by the Constitutional Court in late 1996, proposed to grant the Russian language official status. In revision of Article 5, it states:
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In the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian language can be used as an official language. Although the Kyrgyz Parliament failed to pass the amendment in June 1997, 22 these developments can be interpreted as signs of a moderate shift from strict monolingualism to more pluralist language policies, combining the regional with the sociocultural variant of multiculturalism. This, of course, has by no means precluded the strengthening of the Kyrgyz language in the areas of education and public media. On 16 January 1998, for instance, the President signed a decree which promotes the idea of corpus planning of the Kyrgyz language and establishes a special council responsible for coordinating and controlling the use of Kyrgyz as a state language.23 However, these attempts should be related to the framework of an evolving pluralistic language policy. The support of the Kyrgyz language in the educational system, for instance, has been complemented by the establishment of institutions with non-titular languages of instruction, such as the Kyrgyz-Russian-University, the Kyrgyz-Uzbek University, the Kyrgyz-American Faculty and the Kyrgyz-Turkish University. Also, the strengthening of Kyrgyz media has not hindered the proliferation of various Russian and Uzbek newspapers, radio and television channels and has therefore strengthened a pluralistic civil society. The scope of this paper does not allow an empirically based evaluation of the effectiveness of the moderate shift to multicultural language policies in the Kyrgyz Republic. However, an indication that Russian emigrants are returning to Kyrgyzstan suggests that this moderate policy shift has been successful in improving inter-ethnic relations. Pluralistic language policies based on international human rights seem to be well-equipped to foster social integration and should, therefore, be a core component of democratisation in multilingual societies such as the Kyrgyz Republic. Conclusion Several conclusions can be drawn from the analyses presented in this paper. Firstly, it could be shown that ethno-linguistic conflicts in Kyrgyzstan were induced by the state's differentialist language policies which, in turn, were a side-effect of the social dynamics of post-Soviet state formation and nation building. Implementing principles of democratic governance in this specific context seems to require a shift from differentialist to multicultural language policies. Secondly, the main argument of this paper suggests that multicultural policies in general are both well-adapted to implement human rights standards pertaining to minorities and more likely to achieve social integration in multi-ethnic societies than assimilationist and differentialist policies. Although their actual success remains to be evaluated by comparative empirical research (cf. Medrano, 1996), they seem to provide a more viable policy strategy for the management of ethnic conflict, in so far as they correspond to the structural transformation of patterns of social integration in the nation-state under conditions of globalisation. Thirdly, the paper has demonstrated that an interdisciplinary approach, coordinating social science with legal and policy analysis on a conceptual and substantive level, is highly fruitful for analysing problems of democratic governance in multicultural societies and has great potential for further theoretical development. It is in this direction that policy-relevant
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research on social integration in societies characterised by cultural, linguistic or religious diversity should be advanced. Acknowledgements This publication was prepared in the framework of the UNESCO/MOST training project on Democratic Governance in Multicultural and Multi-ethnic Societies, funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation. It has been published as MOST Discussion Paper No. 30 by UNESCO in 1998. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of the following persons in preparing this paper: Paul de Guchteneire, coordinator of the UNESCO/MOST democratic governance project, as well as Ali Kazancigil and Nadia Auriat from UNESCO/MOST; furthermore, Rémy Dor, Riva Kastoryana, Michèle Lamont, Juan Díez Medrano, John Rex, Fernand de Varennes, and Sue Wright. Notes 1. The most widely discussed theories of democracy which are based on an analysis of language or emphasise the role of communication in democratic processes are Rawls' theory of public discourse (Rawls, 1971) and Habermas' theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1984). Habermas, for instance, argues that it is the very structure of language and communication from which the principles of democratic legitimisation can be theoretically deduced, and that in modernity the potential of communicative rationality inherent to language has, at least partially, been realised. 2. It should be noted that since then, the use of 'ethnicity' as a theoretical category which originated as an attempt to overcome classical theories of 'tribalism', has continuously declined in anthropology, while it has gained prominence in the public discourse about the construction of identities and about the legitimacy of their claims of recognition (Banks, 1996). This reflects the fact that modern ethnicity, as will be shown later, is highly political in character. 3. It should be pointed out that according to this line of reasoning ethnic membership, presumed identity or likeness, created especially by the language, do not as such constitute a social group but merely facilitate the formation of a social group, especially in the political sphere (Weber, 1968:389). On the further development of a Weberian theory of ethnicity cf. Rex (1986). 4. These themes are at the core of what has recently been called the 'economy of languages'; cf. Grin and Sfreddo, 1996. 5. While classical theories of modernity have tended to neglect the historical importance of the modern nation-state, the analysis of globalisation has drawn new attention to types of social integration achieved by state-formation and nation-building (cf. Arnason, 1990; Greenfeld, 1992; Kazancigil, 1986). 6. It should be noted, however, that the mobilising force of the ethnic model of the nation-state does not imply any ethnic roots of modern states, as suggested by Smith (1981). Instead, as Gellner (1983) has shown, 'nations' are invented by nationalism. Analyses of 'ethnogenesis' show that ethno-political nation-building is often predated by state-formation (cf. Staevenhagen, 1996: 15). 7. Following William Mackey (1992), this paper uses a terminological distinction between linguistic pluralism on the level of individual linguistic competence (mono-/multilingualism) and on the level of the nation-state (mono-/multilinguism). 8. In his analysis of assimilation policies in the USA, Fishman (1972) has tried to conceptualise the (instrumental) function of language for 'nationism' by distinguishing it from the (symbolic) function of 'nationalism'. 9. Thus, in the turmoil of the First World War, Max Weber has pointed out that 'today, in the age of language conflicts, a shared common language is pre-eminently considered the normal basis of nationality' and that the strive for monolinguism has to be interpreted as a national ideology (Weber, 1968: 385).
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10. This has been a major theme of many theories of globalisation (A. Giddens, R. Robertson, I. Wallerstein); on conceptual problems cf. Arnason (1990). 11. With regard to the Baltic states, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan, these factors have been explored in empirical studies by Laitin (1996); see also Ozolins in this volume. 12. On earlier provisions concerning linguistic rights cf. Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson (1994) and de Varennes (1997: 24). 13. Cf. United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS), vol. 999: 171 and vol. 993: 3. 14. A similar shift from assimilation-oriented toleration to the promotion of the minority identity can be observed if comparing Article 28 and 30 of the International Labour Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (1989) with Article 23 of the older ILO Convention No. 107. 15. Cf. European Treaties Series (ETS) No. 148. 16. The general thrust of these provisions is confirmed by the Oslo Recommendations Regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities, passed by the Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relation on request of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in 1998. 17. It should be noted, however, that there has been a controversy over the question whether some collective rights, including the rights of minorities, have to be acknowledged beyond the right to self-determination. Most human rights scholars, however, agree on the primacy of individual rights (cf. Eide, 1995; Stavenhagen, 1995; Symonides, 1995). 18. For a political theory of civil society and democracy based on Habermas' social philosophy cf. Cohen and Arato (1992). 19. The wish to preserve linguistic and cultural diversity on the supra-national level is articulated in several EC and EU documents, most recently in the Preamble and Article 126 of the Treaty on the European Union signed in Maastricht in 1992. For an analysis of the European Community's language policy see Coulmas (1991), who argues for practical multiculturalism with a focus on the economic aspects of language use. 20. The Research Group on Language and Minorities at Tilburg University is currently carrying out a comparative study on language policies in European countries to investigate problems and chances of adopting IMLI in national educational policies (cf. Extra, 1997). 21. On the basis of a comparative empirical survey on ethnic conflict management carried out by UNRISD, Stavenhagen summarises that multicultural ('pluralist') ethnic policies were best for managing ethnic conflict in general, while he acknowledges that the effectiveness of any particular policy can be expected to depend on a variety of specific circumstances (Stavenhagen, 1996: 202). 22. Although continuously debated in Parliament, the language problem has not yet been solved. In a new draft law on the state language, the National Commission on the State Language has recently rejected proposals to give Russian the status of either an official language or the language of inter-ethnic communication; cf. RFE/RL Newsline, 5 August 1999. The author is grateful to Britta Korth for information provided on recent developments of this controversy. 23. Cf. RFE/RL Newsline, 17 January 1998; Vecherny Bishkek, 4 February 1998; and CISLMP-Bishkek, 8 February 1998. References Akaev, A. (1997) Let the bell of conscience ring. Central Asia and Culture of Peace Journal (Bishkek: IICAS). Allardt, E. (1992) Qu'est-ce qu'une minorité linguistique?. In Henri Giordan (ed.) Les Minorités en Europe. Droits Linguistiques et Droits de l'Homme (pp. 4654). Paris: Éditions Kimé. Anderson, B. (1983) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Anderson, J. (1999) Kyrjyzstan: Central Asia's Island of Democracy? (Post-Communist States and Nations, Vol. 4). Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers. Arnason, J.P. (1990) Nationalism, globalization and modernity. In M. Featherstone (ed.)
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Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity (pp. 207236). London: Sage Publications. Banks, M. (1996) Ethnicity: Anthropological Constructions. London & New York: Routledge. Barth, F. (ed.) (1969) Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference. Bergen, Oslo & London: Universitets Forlaget & George Allen and Unwin. Benhabib, S. (ed.) (1995) Democracy and Difference: Changing Boundaries of the Political. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Berger, P., Berger, L. and Luckmann, T. (1967) The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. Bloch, A-C. (1995) Minorities and indigeous peoples. In A. Eide, C. Krause and A. Rosas (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (pp. 309231). Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Bohr, A. and Crisp, S. (1996) Kyrgyzstan and the Kyrgyz. In G. Smith (ed.) The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States (pp. 385409). London: Longman. Bourhis, R.Y. (1994) Ethnic and language attitudes in Quebec. In R.Y. Bourhis (ed.) Ethnicity and Culture in Canada: The Research Landscape (pp. 322358). Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Brubaker, R. (1992) Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Brubaker, R. (1994) Nationhood and the nationalities question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia. Theory and Society 23 (1), 4778. Bullivant, B.M. (1984) Ethnolinguistic minorities and multicultural policy in Australia. In J. Edwards (ed.) Linguistic Minorities, Policies and Pluralism (pp. 107140). London: Academic Press. Capotorti, F. (1979) Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. New York: United Nations. Cohen, J. and Arato. A. (1992) Civil Society and Political Theory. Cambridge: MIT Press. Coulmas, F. (1991) European integration and the idea of the national language. In F. Coulmas (ed.) A Language Policy for the European Community: Prospects and Quandaries (Contributions to the Sociology of Language 61) (pp. 144). Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Cummins, J. (1984) Linguistic minorities and multicultural policy in Canada. In J. Edwards (ed.) Linguistic Minorities, Policies and Pluralism (Applied Language Studies) (pp. 81106). London: Academic Press. de Alcántara, C.H. (1998) Uses and abuses of the concept of governance. International Social Science Journal 155, 105113. Delgrange, X. (1995) Le fédéralisme belge: la protection des minorités linguistiques et idéologiques. Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique en France et à l'Etranger 11561191. Desheriev, Y.D. (1984) Social progress and sociolinguistics. International Social Science Journal 36 (1), 2139. de Varennes, F. (1997) To Speak or Not To Speak: The Rights of Persons Belonging to Linguistic Minorities. Perth, Australia: Murdoch University. Diamond, L. and Plattner, M.F. (eds) (1994) Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy. Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Dow, J.R. (ed.) (1991) Language and Ethnicity (Focusschrift in Honor of Joshua A. Fishman on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday, Volume II). Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company. Edwards, J. (1994) Multilingualism. London & New York: Routledge. Eide, A. (1994) Peaceful and Constructive Resolution of Situations Involving Minorities. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of Human Rights. Eide, A. (1995) Minorities and indigenous peoples: Equality and pluralism. In L.-A. Sicilianos (ed.) Nouvelles Formes de Discrimination/New Forms of Discrimination (Publications de la Fondation Marangopoulos pour les droits de l'hommes (FMDH) Série no. 2) (pp. 229143). Paris: Éditions A. Pedone/UNESCO. Extra, G. (1997) Immigrant minority languages in education. Newsletter of the European Cultural Foundation 20 (3).
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Fishman, J. (1972) Language and Nationalism: Two Integrative Essays. Rowley, MA: Newbury House. Fishman, J. (1977) Language and ethnicity. In H. Giles (ed.) Language, Ethnicity and Intergroup Relations. London: Academic Press. Fortier, d'Iberville (1994) Official languages policies in Canada: A quiet revolution. International Journal of the Sociology of Language 105/106, 6997. Furer, J-J. (1992) Le plurilinguisme de la Suisse: un modèle? In H. Giordan (ed.) Les Minorités en Europe. Droits Linguistiques et Droits de l'Homme (pp. 193208). Paris: Éditions Kimé. Gellner, E. (1983) Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell. Giordan, H. (1992a) Les langues de France: de l'hégémonie républicaine à la démission de l'Etat. In H. Giordan (ed.) Les Minorités en Europe. Droits Linguistiques et Droits de l'Homme (pp. 129144). Paris: Éditions Kimé. Giordan, H. (1992b) Droits des minorités, droits linguistiques, droits de l'homme. In H. Giordan (ed.) Les Minorités en Europe. Droits Linguistiques et Droits de l'Homme (pp. 939). Paris: Éditions Kimé. Greenfeld, L. (1992) Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Grin, F. and Sfreddo, C. (1996) Minority Language and Socio-Economic Status: The Case of Italian in Switzerland (Cahiers du départment d'économie politique No. 96.10). Genève: Université de Genève. Gutmann, A. (ed.) (1994) Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Habermas, J. (1984) The Theory of Communicative Action. Translated by Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press. Habermas, J (1994) Struggles for recognition in the democratic constitutional state. In A. Gutmann (ed.) Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hadlow, M. (1992) The Situation of Mass Media in Central Asia. Paris: UNESCO. Huskey, E. (1995) The politics of language in Kyrgyzstan. Nationalities Papers 23/3. Ignatieff, M. (1993) Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Inglis, C. (1996) Multiculturalism: New Policy Responses to Diversity (MOST Policy Papers, No. 4). Paris: UNESCO. Jahr, E.H. (ed.) (1993) Language Conflict and Language Planning (Trends in Linguistics, Studies and Monographs 72). Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Kazancigil, A. (ed.) (1986) The State in Global Perspective. Paris & Aldershot: UNESCO & Gower Publications. Khazanov, A.M. (1995) After the USSR: Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Kolstoe, P. (1995) Russians in the Former Soviet Republics. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Kreindler, I. (1997) Multilingualism in the successor states of the Soviet Union. Annual Review of Applied Linguistics 17, 91112. Kymlicka, W. (1995a) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Kymlicka, W (ed.) (1995b) The Rights of Minority Cultures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Laitin, D.D. (1996) Language and nationalism in the post-Soviet Republics. Post-Soviet Affairs 12 (1) 424. Lijphart, A. (1977) Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven & London: Yale University Press. Luckmann, T. (1984) Language in society. International Social Science Journal 36 (1), 520. Luhmann, N. (1982) The Differentiation of Society. Trans. S. Holmes and C. Larmore. New York: Columbia University Press. Mackey, W.F. (1992) Mother tongues, other tongues and link languages: What they mean in a changing world. Quaterly Review of Education 22 (1), 4152.
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Mann, M. (1993) Nation-states in Europe and other continents: Diversifying and developing, not dying. Daedalus 122 (3), 115140. Mansour, G. (1993) Multilingualism & Nation-Building. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. Medrano, J.D. (1996) Some Thematic and Strategic Priorities for Developing Research on Multi-Ethnic and Multi-Cultural Societies (MOST Discussion Paper Series, No. 13). Paris: UNESCO. Mullerson, R. (1993) Minorities in Eastern Europe and the former USSR: Problems, tendencies and protection. The Modern Law Review 56 (6). Ozolins, U. (1993) The Politics of Language in Australia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rawls, J. (1971) Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University. Rex, J. (1986) Race and Ethnicity (Concepts in the Social Sciences). Buckingham: Open University Press. Rex, J. (1996) Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State. London: Macmillan. Robertson, R. (1992) Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture. London: Sage Publications. Rossinelli, M. (1992) Le droit des langues en Suisse. In H. Giordan (ed.) Les Minorités en Europe. Droits Linguistiques et Droits de l'Homme (pp. 173191). Paris: Éditions Kimé. Skutnabb-Kangas, T. and Phillipson, R. (1994) Linguistic human rights, past and present. In T. Skutnabb-Kangas and R. Phillipson (eds) Linguistic Human Rights: Overcoming Linguistic Discrimination (Contributions to the Sociology of Languages, No. 67) (pp. 71110). Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Smith, A.D. (1981) The Ethnic Revival in the Modern World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smith, D. (1997) Language and discourse in conflict and conflict resolution. Current Issues in Language and Society 4 (3), 190214. Smith, G. et al. (1998) Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smolicz, J. (1994) Australia's language policies and minority rights: A core value perspective. In T. Skutnabb-Kangas and R. Phillipson (eds) Linguistic Human Rights: Overcoming Linguistic Discrimination (Contributions to the Sociology of Language, No. 67) (pp. 235252). Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Stavenhagen, R. (1995) Cultural rights and universal human rights. In A. Eide, C. Krause and A. Rosas (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (pp. 6377). Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Stavenhagen, R. (1996) Ethnic Conflicts and the Nation-State. London: UNRISD/Macmillan. Symonides, J. (1995) The legal nature of commitments related to the question of minorities. In L-A. Sicilianos (ed.) Nouvelles Formes de Discrimination/New Forms of Discrimination (Publications de la Fondation Marangopoulos pour les droits de l'hommes (FMDH), Série no. 2) (pp. 197216). Paris: Éditions A. Pedone/UNESCO. Tishkov, V. (1997) Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and After the Soviet Union: The Mind Aflame. London: UNRISD/Sage Publications. UNDP (1997) National Human Development Report of the Kyrgyz Republic. Bishkek. Vilfan, S. (ed.) (1993) Ethnic Groups and Language Rights (Comparative Studies on Governments and Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 18501940. Volume III). Dartmouth: European Science Foundation, New York University Press. Weber, E. (1979) Peasants into Frenchman. London: Chatto and Windus. Weber, M. (1968) Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology. Edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich. New York: Bedminster Press. Wright, S. (1997) Language as a contributing factor in conflicts between states and within states. Current Issues in Language and Society 4 (3), 213237.
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Kyrgyzstan: The Political and Linguistic Context 1 Sue Wright School of Languages and European Studies, Aston University, Birmingham B4 7ET, UK The Kyrgyz were ruled by the Russians for more than a century. Originally a nomadic people, they constituted the rural population of Kirgizia under Soviet rule. The residents of the towns were Russians who had migrated to provide the work force for industrialisation and the more russified Kyrgyz. In the post-Soviet period, the Soviet Socialist Republic of Kirgizia became independent Kyrgyzstan and adopted among much other new legislation a law which made Kyrgyz the official language. The large Russian minority had a number of reasons both political and economic to leave Kyrgyzstan. The language shift required of them was one. In the late 1990s, the Kyrgyz government made concessions in order to stem the departure of a class they felt to be vital to the well-being of the economy. The Historical Context The origins of the Kyrgyz are still a matter of debate among historians (Abramzon, 1971, cited in Huskey, 1997a). They are most likely a mix of peoples descended from the Turkic tribes of the Altai and Irtysh, the Mongols and the original inhabitants of Tian-Shan mountain range which spans Kyrgyzstan. They were a nomadic people until well into the 20th century. In the 19th century, their lands were divided, ruled by the Russian Czarist empire in the north2 and the Kokand kingdom of the Uzbeks in the south. In the Russian version of history, the Kyrgyz are said to have welcomed Russian rule which was less brutal than that of the Uzbeks. However, this welcome did not extend to a desire to fight for Russia in wars in far-off places. When the Russians ordered the general mobilisation of Kyrgyz men for the First World War, there were riots and uprisings. The Kyrgyz resistance was put down with brutality and in a population of 780,000 in 1916, some 100,000 to 120,000 Kyrgyz are believed to have been killed; an equal number fled across the border into China. Despite this massacre, which might have provided a mobilising event for national consciousness and resistance, there is little evidence that the Kyrgyz possessed any kind of national consciousness at this time (Huskey, 1997a). Loyalty to family and clan was, on the other hand, always very pronounced. The physical geography of Kyrgyzstan is no doubt partially responsible for this. High mountain ranges separate the Kyrgyz into five distinct regional groups between which communication is physically difficult and contact restricted. In addition, the five major valleys where there is settlement orient the Kyrgyz to different influences: the Ferghana valley leads to Uzbekistan, the Chui valley to Kazakhstan; the Naryn region borders China. The Russian Revolution was the event which brought political identity to the Kyrgyz as a group. In October 1924 the Bolsheviks set up the Kara-Kirgiz Autonomous Region. By 1936, this had become the distinct Kirgiz Soviet Socialist Republic. In the early years of communism there were not enough educated Kirgiz to provide the elite necessary for local government and administration. In
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the early period, party officials and state bureaucrats were thus mostly Slav or Tartar. However, Moscow planned for the indigenisation of political power in this early phase of the Revolution. Education for the Kyrgyz allowed a generation to enter Soviet political life. At the same time, the Kyrgyz language was encouraged in line with language policies throughout the USSR, and began to be the language of a proportion of political life. All official documents were translated in Kyrgyz which thus acquired the vocabulary and structures necessary for a language used in political institutions. Stalinist repression brought devolutionary practices to an abrupt halt and this first generation of Kyrgyz politicians was swept away in Stalin's purges. In the Stalinist period many ordinary Kyrgyz were killed, deported or fled to China (Baker & Prys Jones, 1998). More Slavs came in to take over positions of power. The second generation of Kyrgyz to become a national political elite in the Soviet period were chosen for their malleability and sycophancy (Huskey, 1997b). During this period the Russian language affirmed its domination in a number of public domains, as the language of administration, politics, education and civil society in the towns. It was the language of public discourse and of personal opportunity. This was the same in all the Soviet Republics where Russian was promoted as a lingua franca to build USSR solidarity and as a means of assimilating groups to Soviet ideals. If Kyrgyzstan went further than other Republics on the language issue, this was in part because of the very pro-Moscow elite in Bishkek. Henceforth, social promotion and access to power would be through slavish adherence to the Russian line and in the medium of the Russian language. Schooling was increasingly in Russian, particularly in the northern provinces. Huskey (1997b) records that only one Kyrgyz medium school was opened in Bishkek 3 in the half century between 1939 and 1989 and that only three schools in the capital (out of 69) used Kyrgyz as the primary medium of instruction. Not only did Russian oust Kyrgyz from public use, it also affected the very structure of the language; Russian vocabulary and syntax influenced the development of Kyrgyz, which is a Turkic language, quite unlike Russian. This russification was in part deliberate policy. A directive of 1934 ordered the maximum number of sovietisms. The Cyrillic alphabet was adopted in 1940. Kyrgyz National Identity and the Soviet Period In the Soviet period, the Russians dominated the Kyrgyz but also gave them the means to see themselves as a national group. First of all, the Kyrgyz had territory with frontiers which bore their name. Secondly, they had the symbols of statehood that the USSR developed for all the Republics. Thirdly, education allowed the evolution of a Kyrgyz elite. Fourthly, the Kyrgyz language had been codified and standardised.4 The Russians also provided the 'Other' against which the Kyrgyz could define themselves. It is easy to understand how resentment built, as the Kyrgyz began to identify themselves as a group exploited by outsiders, turned into a minority in their own homeland, and marginalised culturally and economically. Economic exploitation was seen to have two strands: on the one hand Kyrgyzstan's commercial relations with Moscow were always to its disadvantage. It suffered both the classic handicap of a largely rural, less developed region
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trading with a modern industrial metropolis and the quasi-colonial imbalance inherent in the RSSR's relationship with other Republics. On the other hand, any modernisation and industrialisation that did take place in Kyrgyzstan largely by-passed the Kyrgyz themselves. Slavic immigrants provided the workforce for modern industry and engineering projects, and made up a high proportion of the urban population. The Soviet era might have brought the country into the modern era; it did not bring its population with it. Many Kyrgyz remained in the country, working on the land. The ethnic Kyrgyz became a minority in Kyrgyzstan through massive immigration from Russia and the Ukraine after the Second World War. In addition to Slavic in-migrants there were a large German-speaking ethnic group and significant numbers of Uzbeks (mainly in the west), Kazakhs (mainly in the north) and Tatars (mainly in the east). The USSR census records only 40.5% of the population in Kyrgyzstan as Kyrgyz in 1959. Because of higher birth-rates among the autochthonous group this percentage rose slightly (to 42.6% by 1970 and 47% in 1980) but the ethnic Kyrgyz still remained a minority right until the end of the Soviet period. Russian settlement during the 74 years of Communist control meant that eventually the Slavs constituted one quarter of the population. Settlement within Kyrgyzstan was uneven: in the south along the Chinese border ethnic Kyrgyz remained the majority; in the north some cities, particularly the capital, Bishkek, were mainly Russian and Russian-speaking. 5 So a northsouth split in settlement joined the urbanrural and industrialagricultural division to keep Slavs and Kyrgyz separate. Since the Slavs were likely to be in the better paid industrial sector in the towns in the north and the Kyrgyz in the poorer agricultural sector in the country there were consequences in terms of the relative prestige of the groups, and their languages. The Russian speakers could see no economic nor any other imperative to learn the language of the people among whom they lived. This was generally the case throughout the USSR. The 1989 census recorded that only 4% of Russian mother tongue speakers knew one of the languages of the other Republics of the USSR, although 25,300,000 Russians lived in these republics. On the other hand, the percentage of non-Russian mother tongue speakers who spoke Russian was 62.2% and the numbers of those of non-Russian origin who had assimilated to Russian was 16.3 million according to the 1979 census.6 In all the Republics the very numerous in-migrant Russians remained monolingual and forced the autochthonous populations to become bilingual, producing a situation of asymmetrical bilingualism and causing the marginalisation of the cultures of the autochthonous populations along with their languages. Political Reform, Kyrgyz Nationalism and the Language Laws. The Kyrgyz were not in the forefront of the 1980s movement for political reform, mostly because the Kyrgyz political class was both conservative and repressive. The language laws which were to be a mobilising issue for the nationalists were passed by the USSR as a whole and thus the revitalisation of the Kyrgyz language came from outside rather than from within Kyrgyz society. Economic difficulties typical of the last decade of the Soviet period but intensified in Kyrgyzstan provided the catalyst for local mobilisation. A high birth rate
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among the Kyrgyz had led to high levels of unemployment among the Kyrgyz in the countryside. Rural over-population led to an exodus to the cities, which provided few solutions; a trifling minority found jobs and homes. The disadvantage of a sector of the population seemed to be clearly correlated with ethnicity and/or language group. Those who were gainfully employed and well-housed were the Slavic in-migrants or the russified northerners. Resentment built up, particularly among young Kyrgyz men, the group who were most likely to be touched by unemployment and shanty town living. A grassroots movement started in 1989 which rung concessions from the authorities on squatting and house building. As in the rest of the USSR, the situation developed very quickly. The language laws and the move towards competitive parliamentary elections provided a focus for growing Kyrgyz nationalism which had been percolating, fuelled by a growing perception of exploitation and unequal treatment. The Kyrgyz language law was brought in two years before independence, in September 1989. This law made Kyrgyz the official language of the republic and Article 8 required goods and services to be offered to the public in that language. The Kyrgyz saw this as redress and the Russians saw it as divisive and punitive. Although Russian was to retain a role as the language for interethnic communication in the USSR as a whole, the Russians, few of whom had any competence in Kyrgyz, were furious. They foresaw their marginalisation in Kyrgyz political and economic life and a number of backlash organisations formed to express their interests. 7 Other non-Kyrgyz speaking sectors of the population were angry too, particularly the Uzbeks, who agitated for the redrawing of boundaries to allow them to join Uzbekistan. Conflict between the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks on this issue as well as disputes over land led to fighting in 1990 and hundreds of deaths. The political climate was tense as the first elections approached. The situation was complex. Language reinforced all the other cleavages. Kyrgyz speakers were also likely to be muslim, southern, rural and poor. Russian speakers including russified Kyrgyz were likely to be non-muslim, northern, urban and slightly more prosperous. The quarter of Kyrgyz who were russified included the educated elite capable of providing Kyrgyz political leadership. The non-russified Kyrgyz had very strong clan and tribal loyalties which were to colour the political landscape. The 1990 election of the president of the Republic produced no outright winner and Askar Akaev, a scientist who had not previously been a politician, was brought in as a compromise candidate. As events developed he proved less meek than had been expected (Huskey, 1997a). At first things went well. He was a vigorous opponent of the anti-Gorbachev coup. Declaring support for a free market and democracy, he made friends in the West. He made great efforts to reconcile the various elements of Kyrgyz society. Post-independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan seems as if it might move with some measure of success to become a democratic polity with a market economy. A free press, political parties and considerable financial investment from the West appeared to be promoting the process. However, there were problems ahead. The economy was in great difficulties. Particular Kyrgyz problems such as natural disasters (earthquakes and landslides) in the early 1990s and the burden of factories that had no function outside
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the Soviet system (e.g. those that made torpedoes) combined with the general problems of the post-Soviet world such as demands from the West that market reforms should be implemented rapidly and the existence of an inadequate infrastructure with out of date plant and inefficient distribution networks. Kyrgyz' incomes fell by 20% in 1993 (Huskey, 1997a). The language law together with this swift and deep decline in the industrial sector caused non-Kyrgyz speakers to leave the republic in large numbers. Between 1989 and 1993, nearly 200,000 Russians departed and their proportion in the population dropped from more than 24% to 18%. Half the 100,000 Germans left to go to Germany where citizenship laws allowed ethnic Germans (Aussiedler) to settle or to the Volga region (Haarmann, 1998). The president believed the exodus had to be halted. Not only did the country need those who provided the technological expertise in many industries, but he, personally, required the support of the Russians and the russified elite in the north. His platform of consociational government would be eroded by their departure. This led him to veto the land reform that designated the land and mineral rights of Kyrgyzstan as the 'wealth of the Kyrgyz'. In 1993 he suspended by decree the implementation of the language laws. A new Russian-medium university was established in the capital to reassure the Russian speakers. The exodus was slowed but not halted. In 1994 an estimated 42,900 Russians left Kyrgyzstan compared to 66,400 in 1993 (Codagnone, 1998). At the same time, however, the expectations of the ethnic Kyrgyz had to be met. So the 1993 constitution stipulated that candidates for the presidency must speak Kyrgyz. Democracy under Attack Four problems have bedevilled Kyrgyz politics since the mid 1990s: the president has become progressively more authoritarian; the political class, including members of parliament, has been revealed as corrupt; regional power, in the form of clan politics has grown at the expense of central power, and representation of the other ethnic groups in Kyrgyz has been much reduced. At loggerheads with parliament which he sees as reactionary, the president, Akaev, has become increasingly authoritarian (Economist, 24/10/1998; Financial Times, 16/9/1994). He has been accused of a number of anti-constitutional acts designed to increase his power and reduce that of his opponents: he changed the constitution, which is outside his remit; he cut the number of seats in the parliament to limit its influence; he created a non-elected Security Council accountable to him rather than to parliament; he changed rules so that he could hold onto power past the constitutionally defined limit; he closed newspapers that were critical of him; he imprisoned some of his opponents on spurious charges; he tends to call referendums when he is blocked or when he wishes to increase presidential powers; in September 1994, he dissolved parliament and ruled by decree until the February elections. Western commentators have found 'his inclination to disregard parliament disturbing' (Economist, 24/10/1998). In addition, his early reliance on a multicultural ticket seems to have been overtaken by a belief in regionalisation as a way to build a power base. He set up regional authorities
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responsible to the president only, hoping to use their support for his fight against parliament. The 1995 parliamentary elections were to a reduced number of seats in parliament (President Akaev had cut MPs from 350 to 105). In these elections regionalism triumphed. The representatives of local political and economic elites took seats, and national parties with national policies were eclipsed. The new system of single member districts reinforced regional political power bases and traditional clan politics ensured the election of the clan representative. CSCE observers approved the elections as generally democratic but journalists reported a number of instances of bribery, fraud and intimidation (Huskey, 1997a). Gift-giving and patriarchs voting by proxy for their whole family were the two most usual accusations. Regionalism has tended to increase the presence of Kyrgyz-speaking Kyrgyz in the parliament as opposed to Russian-speaking Kyrgyz. The effect of this cut in seats was a reduction in representation for non-Kyrgyz. They are now estimated to make up 42% of the population, but only gained 18% of the seats (Huskey, 1997a). A further problem of the 1995 parliament was the large number of members under investigation for corruption. Some members appeared to have stood in the elections principally to gain immunity from prosecution on a variety of charges (Huskey, 1997b). Since the elections the president has appealed to the new political class not to be so corrupt. The Language Question in 1999 The growth of regional power against a weak centre, the defence of democratic freedoms against an increasingly autocratic government and the difficult task of encouraging a healthy economy where control has been replaced by licence were the first order problems in the latter half of the 1990s. Managing the Kyrgyz affirmation of linguistic and cultural dominance in a multiethnic state and retaining the commitment of the non-Kyrgyz were on-going preoccupations of the political class, but pushed from centre stage by the need to deal with the more immediate issues of corruption, lack of respect for the constitution and regional factionalism. Nonetheless, the language issue is of central importance even if eclipsed for a while. The promotion of one language in a multilingual situation will produce a situation which may cause new inequalities, new frustrations and ultimately new violence. Akaev knows this and in his policies has always sought to find a way of accommodating the Russian speakers within the country and maintaining good relationships with Russia itself. 8 In 1993, he suspended implementation of the 1989 language law which had set a target date for all administrative and educational institutions to be Kyrgyz medium. His 1995 election manifesto called for the restoration of Russian as a national language on par with Kyrgyz (Economist, 11/2/1995). He then supported a constitutional change giving Russian the status of an official language, which after long debate was eventually approved by the Constitutional Court and passed by the Lower House of the Parliament in early 1996. However, failing to redress the balance after decades of Russian domination perpetuates the old inequalities and old frustrations. The newly awakened national consciousness of the Kyrgyz and the rise in regional power make it
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unlikely that the majority of Kyrgyz speakers will accept a return to anything which evokes the former imbalance. It is indoubtedly for this reason that in 1998 the Upper House of the Parliament rejected the constitutional amendment. In fact, the National Commission on the State Language has recently submitted a new draft law on official language to the government, in which the role of Kyrgyz is enhanced, while proposals to give Russian the status of either an official language or the language of inter-ethnic communication are rejected (RFE/RL Newsline 5/8/1999). At the same time, however, the Commission is currently pursuing language policies aimed at promoting bilingualism among the population. There is, of course, no easy solution to the Kyrgyz dilemma and the language question reflects, as ever, the state of power relationships. Notes 1. This essay owes a large debt to the work of Eugene Huskey and his very comprehensive studies of Kyrgyzstan in the 1990s. 2. Gradually annexed between 1855 and 1876. 3. The capital of Kyrgyzstan, previously called Pishpek, then Frunze. 4. It only acquired a written form in the early 20th century. 5. Russian domination in Bishbek actually predates the communist period. In 1916 Bishbek had 14,000 residents of whom 8000 were Russian (Huskey, 1997a). 6. Census figures quoted from Paulston and Peckham (1998). 7. For example, the United Council of Labour Collectives. 8. Kyrgyzstan cannot take the same tough line with Russia that Latvia does. There are no alternative networks to join. The other power in the area, China, is not an option. In fact Russia still aids Kyrgyzstan with border defence on the KyrgyzChinese border (Economist, 18/2/1995). References Abramzon, S. (1971) Kirgizy i ikh etnogeneticheskie i istoriko-kul'turnyi sviazi. Leningrad: Nauka. Baker, C. and Prys Jones, S. (1998) Encyclopedia of Bilingualism and Bilingual Education. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. Codagnone, C. (1998) The new migration in Russia. In K. Khoser and H. Lutz (eds) The New Migration in Europe. London: Macmillan. Economist (24/10/1998) The man who knows best: Kirigizstan's reform struggle. Economist (11/2/1995) Leave it to the boss. Economist (18/2/1995) Common property, dependent states. Financial Times (16/9/1994) Kyrgyz fear their tiny nation will fall into iron hands. Haarmann, H. (1998) Multilingual Russia and its Soviet heritage. In C. Bratt Paulston and D. Peckham (eds) Linguistic Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. Huskey, E. (1997a) Kyrgyzstan: The fate of political liberalization. In K. Dawisha and B. Parrott (eds) Conflict, Cleavage and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Huskey, E. (1997b) The politics of demographic and economic frustration. In I. Bremner and R. Taras (eds) New States, New Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Paulston, C. and Peckham, D. (1998) Linguistic Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.
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