Jose Marti and the Emigre Colony in Key West: Leadership and State Formation

JOSE MARTI AND THE EMIGRE COLONY IN KEY WEST

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JOSE MARTI AND THE EMIGRE COLONY IN KEY WEST Leadership and State Formation C. Neak Rorming

RRAEGER

NewYorl<

Westport, Connecticut London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Ronning, C. Neale. Jose Marti and the Emigre Colony in Key West: Leadership and state formation / C. Neale Ronning. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-275-93 368-7 (alk. paper) 1. Marti, Jose, 1853-1895-Leadership. 2. Cuba-Politics and government -1878-1895. 3. Cubans - Florida - Key West - Political activity—History—19th century. 4. Revolutionists —Cuba— Biography. 5. Statesmen—Cuba—Biography. I. Title. F1783.M38R7 1990 972.91'05'092-dc20 89-38802 Copyright © 1990 by C. Neale Ronning All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 89-38802 ISBN: 0-275-93 368-7 First published in 1990 Praeger Publishers, One Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10010 A division of Greenwood Press, Inc. Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984). 10

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Contents 1. Introduction

1

2. The Odyssey of Marti

7

3. Cuban Key West

19

4. TheTriumphant Arrival of Marti

40

5. The Transfer of Leadership: I

51

6. The Transfer of Leadership: II

65

7. The Military-Intelligence Question

83

8. Unauthorized Uprisings

98

9. Depression and Party Finances 10. A Style of Leadership

106 126

Appendix: Documentary Highlights

146

Bibliography

163

Index

169

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1

Introduction

"Modern democracies have to answer the problem of leadership in the mass state if they want to survive the challenge of dictatorship." Thus wrote Sigmund Neumann (1965: 45) in the midst of the turbulent 1960s. Since the time of that writing, many democracies have come and gone. Others, in the name of their struggle against dictatorship, have found it expedient to adopt many of the very measures that we usually associate with dictatorship-surveillance of citizens, covert actions, misinformation campaigns, censorship, and coercion. The problem is very much with us today. Jose Marti was deeply concerned about the problem of leadership and democracy nearly a century before Neumann and others expressed their concern in the 1960s. Not only was he aware of it as a theoretical problem, he was obsessed with resolving it in political practice. With him, the question of leadership was inseparable from the goal of Cuban independence. Almost all of his life, certainly all of his adult life, was passionately dedicated to the task of delivering Cuba from Spanish domination. But he demanded more than independence. There were many other Cubans who were equally dedicated and even sacrificed their lives for the goal of independence. What set Marti apart from so many of his contemporaries, however, was an equally passionate dedication to another ideal. That ideal might best be stated as the building of a democratic, just, and stable republic, a true republic, not merely the constitutional forms masking a real dictatorship. He had analyzed and actually experienced too many of these in Spanish America. They were frequently referred to as "the corrupt republics."

2 JOSE MARTI Marti was also convinced that if a democratic republic was the goal, the process of state formation could not wait until independence was achieved. The process had to begin immediately, in conjunction with the independence struggle itself. Here indeed was where he parted company with most of the veteran leaders. They would have turned the task of liberation over to a band of military heroes, leaving the process of state formation for some supposedly more propitious time after the victory over Spanish domination. But Marti envisaged quite a different process. The achievement of meaningful independence had to be a political and social process as well as a military one. Thus, a special kind of leadership would be the key element, not just a leadership that could recruit and inspire loyal followers for the coming military campaigns, but one that could instruct in the elements of democratic state formation. This had to take place while the "battle" was in progress. How can we explain the emergence of Marti as the authoritative leader of the Cuban Revolution? He was young, chronically ill, nervous, small of stature, intellectual, and, it has been said, hopelessly romantic. These are not the qualities usually associated with the charismatic leader of a war for independence. They are hardly the qualities that we might expect to have appealed to the veteran leaders of the earlier wars for independence. But Marti was clearly a charismatic leader. "Charismatic leadership is a very special subtype of leadership with unusual qualities not found in leadership in general" (Willner 1984: 5). What were the special qualities exhibited by Marti? How were they manifested? In what context were they shaped and with what results? These are some of the questions this study will attempt to answer. Dankwart Rustow (1970: 23) has observed that "successful leadership . . . rests on a latent congruence between the psychic needs of the leader and the social needs of his followers." That is undoubtedly true, but the concept of "psychic needs" leaves a lot of room for definition. For example, Peter Berger (Berger and Nuehaus 1970: 14), also writing in the turbulent 1960s, asserts that "it is possible to be moved to political commitment-not because one needs it psychologically but because one chooses to involve oneself in the plight of one's fellow men." The implication there is that "to involve oneself in the plight of one's

INTRODUCTION 3 fellow men" is not a psychic need ("because one needs it psychologically") but something of a different category. Rustow, on the other hand, would seemingly include all the categories mentioned by Berger within his concept of psychic need. In the case of Marti, his beliefs, values, ideals and goalsand especially the tenacity with which he held them-were things that endeared him to his followers and were an inseparable part of his leadership qualities. "How to achieve a functional accommodation of truth, self interest, and reason was the central question posed by Marti. . . . His works are replete with ideas on the purpose of the state and its relations to society" (Ripoll 1984: 3). His beliefs, values, ideals and goals-and the possibility, indeed the practicality of implementing them-are the key to an insight into what seems to have been the driving force behind his tireless efforts. He was obsessed with putting his ideals into practice, and he was fully convinced that they would prevail. Whether one chooses to think of this as a "psychic need" or a wish "to involve oneself in the plight of one's fellow men" seems unimportant. Be that as it may, our main interest here is in the style of successful leadership that resulted from a deep and special kind of commitment rather than the sources of that commitment. The other side of Rustow's equation-the social needs of the leader's followers-will also concern us. Thus the immediate and principle focus of this study in leadership and state formation is Marti's relationship with the large, bustling, thriving and sometimes radical emigre colony at Key West, Florida. That particular focus was chosen for a number of reasons. The Cuban emigre colony at Key West played a central, perhaps the central role in the emergence of Marti as its leader and as the authoritative leader of the Cuban independence movement from 1891 until his death in 1895. It did so partly because of its size (probably more than one-third of all Cuban emigres in approximately a dozen emigre colonies in the United States), its socioeconomic composition, its strategic location, and its widely acknowledged reputation as the leading repository of revolutionary activity and leadership when Marti made his successful bid for leadership. Key West also had a special personal significance for Marti. The Cuban community of Key West was living proof to him that Cubans had the qualities needed to build a new society and a new

4 JOSE MARTI state. Key West was already a microcosm of a new and free Cuba that had been transplanted to the tiny island. He never tired of using it as an example to lift the spirits of his corevolutionaries everywhere. It was a laboratory and a model for what was fundamental to Marti's concept of state formation. "The noble Key . . . the exemplary Key . . . the beauty of the Key . . . the generous Key" were only a few of the expressions he used to convey his deep feelings for the spirit of the place and its people. Finally, there are advantages in focusing on a single community. Cubans were a very community-oriented people, and Marti's leadership reflected that characteristic. It was directed toward and inspired by the life of the communities with which he worked. He saw all Cubans as a single community, but within the larger "family" there were very distinct communities, communities that had an identity and special inspirational value of their own. Key West was outstanding among them. Marti's style of leadership was, of course, conditioned by his own experiences and his conscious preparation for the task. Thus we begin with a chapter called "The Odyssey of Marti." Here I trace very briefly the major events in his life prior to the first of his several visits to Key West, on Christmas Day, 1891. Then, since it has been suggested that there was some connection "between the psychic needs of the leader and the social needs of his followers," we will look at the bustling Cuban community of Key West at about the time of Marti's arrival. We will need to know something about how and when that unique community developed, its socioeconomic composition and, to use Rustow's expression, "its social needs." Over a period of about three years, Marti made several historic visits to Key West. There he campaigned, organized, and otherwise promoted the work of revolution in Cuba. He made numerous public appearances, enjoyed personal contacts, and displayed his persuasive skills in discussions with veteran leaders, tobacco workers, and numerous patriotic associations on the island. From New York, and even en route among the far-flung emigre colonies, he carried on a voluminous correspondence with dozens of Key West residents in all social categories-tobacco workers, journalists, military leaders, factory owners, and other entrepreneurs. A prolific journalism, via his own newspaper Patria (established in March 1892) provided another form of

INTRODUCTION 5 communication with this and all other emigre colonies. From the record of these highly personal forms of communication there emerges a style of leadership that is distinctly that of Marti. The major part of this study will analyze these sources, particularly as they relate to specific events and challenges in Marti's short career as leader. A concluding chapter attempts to weave together and analyze more systematically the various techniques, skills, and qualities displayed by Marti as well as the response of this important Cuban community to his efforts. The product and the final chapter itself is called "A Style of Leadership." A final observation needs to be made at this point in order to alert the reader to unexpected "signposts" in Marti's style of leadership as we move among the events and individuals with whom he interacted. Professor Rustow (1970: 1) tells us that most of the leaders in his study on leadership were innovators. That certainly was the case with Marti, even though the qualities of successful leaders and leadership had fascinated him throughout most of his life. He observed and drew conclusions, but he was hardly one to imitate. The principle sources of data may be divided into three categories: First, there are the memoirs or personal histories of a number of Marti's contemporaries. These were people who knew him, worked with him, or otherwise observed him in action. They were, of course, very familiar with the community: often it was their community of which Marti openly sought to make himself the leader. They include accounts by some of the veteran leaders who lived in Key West at one time or another. In a few cases the accounts were written by an immediate family member of a veteran leader, apparently relying on oral history as well as documentary sources. Others, such as Enrique Trujillo, editor of New York's El Porvemr, were well informed about people and events in Key West through their journalistic or other participation in the independence movement. Second, Marti's own writing, a voluminous correspondence and journalistic activity, is available in several published editions of his complete works (the most recent comprising 28 volumes) and in later supplementary publications of more recently available documents and letters. Such material is fundamental in understanding the personal element in his style of leadership. Finally, the two categories mentioned above are, of course,

6 JOSE MARTI supplemented by several biographies of Marti, histories of Cuba, and monographs on the Cuban wars for independence. All translations are mine, unless otherwise indicated.

2

The Odyssey of Marti It was afternoon—I remember it well—when the steamship, beautifully decorated, out of that respect which foreigners have, which sometimes tells more about the future than about respect itself, moved serenely over the blue sea, toward a pier filled to overflowing. The air was golden, and the sun's rays sparkled as if in combat with one another. Could that island, built and beautified by Cubans, belong to others? . . . They opened their arms to the new arrival.

Thus Jose Marti (1963, 4: 298-99) recorded some of his sensations upon approaching and landing at Key West in the late afternoon of Christmas Day, 1891. The reader who detects a providential note in those words of "the Apostle, the Evangelist, the Master, the Martyr," as he was variously referred to by his contemporaries, might keep this in mind as we follow Marti in Key West. It was undoubtedly accidental, but interesting to note nevertheless, that his first visit coincided precisely with the twelve days of Christmas-December 25 to January 6. That visit would be only the first of several. The arrival in Key West, preceded by a visit to Tampa a month earlier, marked a crucial turning point in the "odyssey of Marti." For him, Tampa was the cry of the eagle; Key West was the burst of sunshine. He was, of course, not referring to his own career but to the announcement and rebirth of the new and final phase of the Cuban independence movement. The two, however, were inseparable in his own mind and in the mind of his loyal followers.

8 JOSE MARTI Our real interest is in what followed upon that "providential" arrival in Key West on December 25, 1891. But we need to place all of this in perspective, and so we must go back, even so briefly, to 1853 and identify some of the important events and places in the life of Marti as he moved about and prepared himself, sometimes consciously, for the task of leadership. Jose Julian Marti y Perez was born in Havana on January 28, 1853. His parents were of modest background; his father was a minor official in the Spanish military and his mother an emigrant from the Canary Islands. Fortunately, Marti's talents were recognized by one of Cuba's outstanding poets and educators, Rafael Maria de Mendive. He took the boy into his school and into his home, where he soon met and impressed members of Havana's intellectual and artistic circles. Here he met Fermin Valdes Dominguez, a fellow student from an affluent family. He remained Marti's closest friend throughout his life. Marti was 15 years old when the Ten Years War (1868-78) broke out. Prior to this there had been sporadic uprisings, the most important being the Narciso Lopez expeditions of 1848 and 1850. In 1868, while there was a revolution in Spain itself, a group of Cuban patriots met on a plantation in eastern Cuba and drafted the Grito de Yara, the independence proclamation. A republic was set up, usually referred to as the Republic in Arms, and a prominent landowner named Carlos Manuel de Cespedes became Provisional President. There was always friction within the movement, and in 1873 Cespedes was deposed from leadership, only to be killed in an ambush by Spanish soldiers. Poorly armed Cuban rebels carried on the struggle against Spanish troops, with the cost of some 200,000 lives and millions of dollars in property. In 1878 the Treaty of Zanzon brought the war to a close with promises of reforms and local autonomy form the Spanish government. Not long after the Ten Years War broke out, Marti became swept up in the patriotic fervor. In 1870 he was arrested, convicted of disloyal activities, and sentenced to six years at hard labor. After six months, enough to permanently destroy his health, he was pardoned through the intercession of influential friends. In January 1871 he was deported to Spain. There Marti took up his university studies (again with the help of friends), and

THE ODYSSEY OF MARTI 9 by October 1874 he had passed his examinations for degrees in law and philosophy at the University of Zaragosa. For the next six years, after a brief visit to Paris (1874), Marti earned his living as a teacher and writer in Mexico, Guatemala, and Venezuela. In between these short stays he returned clandestinely to Cuba in January 1877, using his second given name and his maternal family name-Julian Perez. He remarked to a friend that even in deception some honesty should be practiced. He stayed for only two months. That same year he was married to Carmen Zaya Bazan who was from a wealthy Cuban family then living in Mexico. After the treaty ending the Ten Years War (1878) he returned openly to Cuba where his son was born. He practiced law briefly, but the more important fact was that, now an adult, he made many contacts which would be useful to him later. Chief among these contacts was the young mulatto lawyer and journalist Juan Gualberto Gomez. He would later become Marti's main agent on the island when it was organized under the Cuban Revolutionary Party. Marti was soon deported again for revolutionary activity. He went to Spain and after brief stops in Paris and New York, Venezuela became his residence and place of work for about six months. His stay there was cut short because he fell into trouble with Venezuela's dictator Guzman Blanco (he had run into the same problem in Guatemala and Mexico), and on July 29, 1881 he sailed for New York. That "cup of poison," as he called it (Marti 1965, 20: 90-91), became his "permanent" home in exile until he returned to Cuba in 1895. He spent far more of his adult life in New York than anywhere else. In New York he earned his living as a teacher, translator, and writer. As a journalist he was the New York correspondent for some of Latin America's leading newspapers, including La Nation of Buenos Aires. His writings became known and praised throughout Latin America and in Europe. He was something of a precursor of the great Uruguayan journalist-scholar Jose Enrique Rodo in his defense of Latin culture and civilization, confronted by doctrines of Anglo-American racial superiority so popular in the United States in the last half of the nineteenth century. He was an able critic of United States imperialism and of the dehumanizing aspects of capitalism in the United States.

10 JOSE MARTI In addition to all of this, he served in consular and diplomatic posts for the governments of Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. But his work for Cuban independence soon brought protest from the Spanish government, and rather than embarrass his friends, he resigned (by this time he also needed more time for his revolutionary activities). Whatever his occupation, the struggle for Cuban independence was always on his mind, and except for a short time after 1884, it was always something in which he took an active part. Veterans of the Ten Years War soon recognized the young activist and propagandist as one who could contribute to their cause. He had written the manifesto or proclamation for an 1880 uprising-the Guerra Chiquita (little war) led by Calixto Garcia—and helped drum up enthusiasm for the same cause. Marti's effective use of words became legendary with listeners and readers alike. He has been referred to as "the Victor Hugo of Cuban prose" (Mora y Varona 1952: 234). Ruben Dario (1983: 72) the great Nicaraguan poet, observed that "I have never found, even in a Castelar [a famous Spanish orator-educator], such an admirable conversationalist. He was pleasant and informal, gifted with a prodigious memory. . . . I spent unforgettable moments with him." His effect upon an audience was already widely known in New York. It was precisely this last quality that was a source of great interest but also a cause for suspicion among veteran leaders. They required his skills as much as they mistrusted them. The real problem was that Marti was more than a skilled orator. He had his own ideas and principles, mixed with a very strong will, all of which soon brought him into open conflict with two principal veteran leaders-General Maximo Gomez and General Antonio Maceo. This conflict had such large repercussions in Key West and for the future of the whole independence movement that it must be summarized here. In 1884, General Gomez, a Dominican who had emerged as the military leader of the Cuban independence movement, was planning another uprising. His associate was General Maceo, who was also one of the principal leaders of the Ten Years War. Marti had already begun to openly question the efforts by heroic leaders of a small expeditionary force who expected, without advanced planning and without justification, that the island would rally to arms. In a letter to Gomez on July 20, 1882, Marti

THE ODYSSEY OF MARTI 11 (1963, 1: 1968, 170) briefly stated his position: "I have rejected all agitation for more of those pernicious cliques of the past wars." In the same letter he suggested the formation of a revolutionary party, although it is not quite clear what he meant by that term. These were ideas that were in the process of development and it would be difficult to say at what stage they were in at this point. Marti also believed that the independence movement, in order to enlist broad support, would have to declare itself for something more than simply the separation from Spain. On the same day that he wrote to General Gomez, he wrote to General Maceo stating some of the principles involved. As he saw it, "the Cuban problem needs, rather than a political solution, a social solution, and . . . the latter cannot be achieved except through mutual love and forgiveness between the races." The objective would have to be "a country in which . . . all the diverse elements will begin, from its founding, to enjoy real rights in the true conditions of a long and peaceful life" (Marti 1963, 1: 172-73). These, like his ideas on organization, were in the process of development. We return to the plans underway for the Gomez-Maceo expedition in 1884. Late in that year Gomez and Maceo arrived in New York to talk with Marti, whose collaboration had been sought to organize support from the New York emigre colony. They sensed what Calixto Garcia had understood four years earlier-that Marti was the master of agitation and propaganda (Ibarra 1981: 48). But Gomez envisaged a very subordinate role for the young orator, a role that was more in keeping with Gomez's ideas concerning civil-military relations in time of war. Those ideas in turn grew out of experience in the Ten Years War (the problem of civilian "interference" and "obstruction") and we must again digress briefly in order to put those ideas in perspective. Both Gomez and Maceo had opposed the political settlement ending the Ten Years War and blamed it on weak civilian politicians of the Republic in Arms (the government set up during the war). Over the years, both had been quite frank about their views on civil-military relations. Gomez (1968: 192) spoke of the need for a "revolutionary dictatorship," without the "effeminate" interference of civilian politicians: "Can one by chance cite a revolution in the world that does not have its

12 JOSE MARTI dictatorship?" he asked. And Maceo (1950, 1: 245) was equally clear on this point: "One head will direct politics and war, and we will be the laws and defenders of order." As noted, both leaders, pragmatists that they were, sought Marti's collaboration for plans that were already under way. As part of these plans, Maceo was to go to Mexico on a very sensitive mission and Marti was to accompany him. Marti showed enthusiasm for the undertaking and in conversation in Gomez's New York hotel room, he expressed some of his own ideas and made some suggestions which annoyed the old leader (Marquez 1965: 219-20). Gomez quickly and crisply interrupted him: "Look Marti, limit yourself to what the instructions tell you, and as for the rest, Maceo will do all that needs to be done" (Lizaso 1974: 188; Ripoll 1971b: 87). Marti left the room courteously, some have assured us, and that marked the beginning of a long break between the old leaders and the emerging new leader (Turton 1986: 13; Hernandez 1968: 142). Two days after these conversations, Marti wrote to Gomez. In a long letter of October 20, 1884 he bluntly stated his concerns and his disagreement with the general's concept of the independence movement. A people is not founded, General, in the same way that one commands a military camp. . . . What are we, General? The modest and heroic servants of an idea that warms our hearts, the faithful friends of a people who have fallen on bad times, or [are we] the brave and fortunate military leaders who, with whip in hand and spurs on the heels of their boots, are preparing to lead a people into war, only to lord it over them in the aftermath? . . . No, no, for God's sake: do you set out to suffocate thought even before finding yourself leading an enthusiastic and grateful people? (Marti 1963, 1: 177-79). With that, Marti effectively withdrew from further participation in the plans that were under way. Gomez did not reply to the letter, considering it insulting (Ibarra 1981: 63). But he wrote to Juan Arnao (who we will meet later, in Key West) asking him to serve as an intermediary for a reconciliation (he also contacted others). These efforts were of no avail and Gomez

THE ODYSSEY OF MARTI 13 openly expressed his bitterness. In a letter to Amao he referred to Marti as one of those men "who cannot operate in any sphere without claims to dominate." He firmly believed that Marti had found out that this would not work "with this old soldier" and thus the conflict arose. Gomez then told Amao that he paid little attention "to orators and poets." What he sought instead was "powder and bullets and men to go with me to the battlefields of my country to kill its tyrants." Thus Marti was simply one of "those atoms that in no way influence the destinies of people" (Ripoll 1971b: 90). Maceo also corresponded with veteran leaders in Key West, expressing feelings similar to those of Gomez. He wrote to Arnao speaking of Marti's "duplicity and unsteadiness," his "Machiavellian plans based upon infamy and slander," and of "his retrograde tendencies" (Ripoll 1971b: 83, 93). The veteran leaders in Key West, mostly dedicated followers of Gomez, were equally outraged: "In Key West Marti's name was spoken with sullen scorn" (Manach 1950: 231). The response of three influential members of that community (either at the time or shortly thereafter), each of whom we will meet later and learn more about, illustrates the bitterness and suspicion that they harbored. It will also help to understand the context in which Marti found himself when he arrived there in 1891. On December 1, 1884, Colonel Fernando Figueredo wrote to Gomez expressing his doubts about Marti. He was said to be a visionary whose ardor, revolutionary vehemence, and restless activity were distrusted. "I have had [bad] reports concerning his firmness of judgement," he wrote (Ibarra 1981: 79). On January 15, 1885, Amao wrote to Gomez, with an expression of bitterness and sarcasm for which he was known. The honorable seiior has been coaxed, pampered and caressed so that he might deign to join us with his powerful influence and his touching of hearts; exciting and exalting patriotism with the magic incentive of his word, he has raised stones and turned them into gold. Our submissions and homages have been without effect to this most eminent personage (Ibarra 1981: 79-80).

14 JOSE MARTI Francisco Lamadriz (also spelled Lamadrid), who would later be Key West's most venerable patriarch, wrote to Gomez in a similar tone on June 20, 1885. He noted that Marti had been a powerful supporter of General Calixto Garcia in 1880 and of the plans for the government that Calixto would establish. But according to Lamadriz, he agreed with the general only because he was offered a prominent political role in that government (Ibarra 1981: 82). Gomez continued in his efforts for the formation of the projected expedition, and he prepared a "manifesto" with the help of Lamadriz. Both leaders were quite articulate, but they could hardly compare with Marti. Another Gomez collaborator politely recommended that it be reviewed and edited by Marti. Gomez understandably declined, but he admitted that it would be an excellent idea: "Revolutionary manifestos are like love letters; it is essential that reading them produce a sensation, that the writer feel a lot of love and fire in his soul. . . . In that case, no one would say more or [say it] more beautifully than Jose Marti" (Ripoll 1971b: 95-96). By 1886 plans for the Gomez-Maceo expedition had collapsed, in large part because funds had not been forthcoming. In August Gomez issued a circular in which he spoke of "swallowing in silence the bitterness of disdain" which some people had offered him (Trujillo 1896: 22). In his diary he lamented that he had been abandoned like a leper: "there are only a few left with me-the old soldiers of the Ten Years War" (Gomez 1968: 184). Marti continued to reject any compromise on what he saw as fundamental principles. On July 6, 1885, Enrique Trujillo's El Avisador Cubano in New York published a long letter (more of an article!) from him: "I do not want for my people wars of fanatics or nominal liberties. . . . War is nothing more than the expression of the revolution" (Marti 1963, 1: 182). Veteran leaders in Key West continued to receive reports such as this, which they frequently interpreted as signs of inaction or selfaggrandizement. In 1887 General Juan Ruz wrote to Marti from Key West, seeking his opinion on a future attempt to liberate the island. In his reply Marti repeated his stand, emphasizing planning and the need to have a movement worthy of the Cuban people who were "tired of serving ill advised or ambitious valiants." But he

THE ODYSSEY OF MARTI 15 showed interest in the general's plans (Marti 1963, 1: 200). General Ruz came to New York were he discussed his ideas with Marti and other prominent separatists in the area. The group also included Francisco Sellen, who has been described as one of the great journalists of Key West (Castellanos 1935: 226). A report on the meeting, edited by Marti, seemed to cast doubt on the enterprise as it was conceived. The report emphasized the need for a return to the original civil meaning of the Ten Years War and subordinated military needs to those "of joining the emigre centers together in one magnificent democratic enterprise" (Maiiach 1950: 243). Both Ruz and Sellen returned to Key West where they expressed their bitterness in an interview with Jose Dolores Poyo, editor of El Yara (Castellanos 1935: 226, 234). As noted, in Key West and elsewhere Marti's behavior was severely criticized. As Ibarra (1981: 80) has observed, "the emigre leaders . . . could not imagine . . . the deep emotional disturbance that agitated the spirit of Marti, because their only aspiration was that Gomez and Maceo might carry out war in Cuba, in order to return in the hour of triumph, with airs of the lords of the revolution." For Marti it was a question of what the revolution stood for, what were its goals and how they would be achieved. The situation in which the veteran leaders found themselves must have been one of frustration. They must have sensed that they could not accomplish their goals without someone like Marti, but on the other hand, they were not willing to accept his terms. Marti remained on the sidelines of rebel action until he began to renew his participation in 1887. We will refer to those activities later, in another context, when we turn to a discussion of Key West in the decade of the 1880s and early 1890s. Meanwhile, we must move ahead to our final episode in this odyssey of Marti prior to his arrival in Key West. That episode took place in Tampa, Florida, a newer emigre colony sometimes referred to as the younger brother of Key West. In October 1891 Tampa's two revolutionary clubs invited Marti to come there as an honored guest and speaker. The presidents of these two clubs and many of the members were promoters of the rights of labor: Nestor Carbonell openly characterized himself as socialist, and Ramon Rivero had maintained close ties with the Havana anarchists of the 1880s

16 JOSE MARTI (Poyo 1986: 21). We mention this because, as we shall see later, it was a sign of an important change in the composition of the Cuban independence movement, something that would become even more evident when Marti arrived in Key West. It was not simply Marti's fame as an orator that prompted the invitation from the Tampa workers. As a matter of fact there was no shortage of renowned hometown orators in Tampa and Key West (Castellanos 1935: 237-42). Marti was only first among his many peers. It is more likely that Marti's well-known stand on issues of social justice and his humanitarian posture were as important as his fame as an orator (Poyo 1986: 21). In his letter of October 26, 1891, to Enrique Trujillo, director of New York's El Porvenir, Carbonell reported that "there is no shortage of people here who know a great deal about seiior Marti." It might also be pointed out that the workers were paying the expenses for the trip. Thus, in the letter just quoted, Carbonell informed Trujillo that "next Tuesday you will be sent the amount necessary, which at your convenience, you may give to seiior Marti for his ticket" (Trujillo 1896: 63). Only three of the many important events of his Tampa visit will be mentioned here. On November 26, Marti held a meeting at the house of Cornelius Brito, a prominent black labor organizer, "in order to establish La Liga, a society analogous to that [of the same name] in New York" (Trujillo 1896: 75). Marti had been a supporter and participant in the activities of the New York club. With the help of Marti, New York's La Liga had been founded by a prominent black Cuban, Rafael Serra, whom, two years earlier, Marti had invited to the annual October 10 celebration in order to underline his position on the race question. The association's purpose was to help and educate non-white Cubans and Puerto Ricans. Marti was elected honorary president and gave much of his time teaching classes there (Turton 1986: 24). On the evening of the 26th, Marti gave his now famous "Liceo speech," one filled with allegorical and biblical reference which his audiences found so spellbinding. He spoke of "an eagle ascending . . . a rising sun, and an army that advances" (Marti 1963, 4: 272). There were also references to his vision of a future with social justices: "the revolution of justice and of equality, for the recognition and open practice of true liberties . . . equitable methods of adjusting the conflict of interests . . . of

THE ODYSSEY OF MARTI 17 the equitable and just demands of the generous black, the black brother" (Marti 1963, 4: 274-76). The correspondent for New York's El Porvenir reported an extraordinary ovation (Trujillo 1896: 73). Others have described this scene more colorfully: after the speech, the front rows advanced toward the stage where Marti found himself in a sea of abrazos. Women stood on chairs waving hats, gloves and handkerchiefs. "People cried" (Mafiach 1950: 274). "He spoke. And from the tribune they carried him on their shoulders, and to the strains of the Himno de Bayamo [the Cuban National Anthem] they paraded through the streets" (Marquez 1965: 293). The enthusiastic Tampa emigres printed 5,000 copies of a pamphlet containing the Tampa speeches. The pamphlet was widely distributed free of charge (Trujillo 1896: 75) and undoubtedly many copies reached Key West within a short time. They were certainly read aloud by the readers in the cigar factories. Shortly after the Liceo speech Marti sat down with a group of workers and wrote what came to be known as the Tampa Resolutions. They were certainly not very revolutionary statements as we think of that term today. They did, however, go beyond what had been the traditional political definition of the movement (independence) and, at least by implication, included Marti's vision of social justice. The "revolutionary organization" mentioned in the text was not for the present or future domination of any class. It would be an organization for seeking "according to democratic means . . . a just and open republic; united in territory, united in law and united in work and friendship; built by all for the good of all" (Marti 1963, 2: 272). Whether these resolutions were written "in the heat of these meetings or the result of a previously conceived plan [by Marti]" (Ibarra 1981: 110) is a question that has been raised by a number of Marti scholars. It was probably a combination of both a previously conceived plan and worker participation (Poyo 1983: 334). But the style and content was clearly that of Marti. On the evening of the afternoon in which they were drafted, the resolutions were read at a farewell celebration for Marti. Ramon Rivero, one of the labor activists who had invited Marti, read the resolutions to the assembled enthusiasts. They were "approved with vivas and acclamations" (Carbonell 1952: 130). Marti's departure from Tampa was something of a dress

18 JOSE MARTI rehearsal for what would happen in Key West about a month later. The correspondent of New York's El Porvenir reported that 4,000 enthusiasts were at the station to see him off (Trujillo 1896: 74). It is worth noting that only a small group had met him upon his arrival—about 50, some have said. That, however, might have been due partly to the torrential rain and the late hour of his arrival (Carbonell 1952: 130; Mafiach 1950: 270). But such minor adversities were not known to dampen the enthusiasm of Cuban patriots. Be that as it may, it is clear that his short stay in Tampa had generated great enthusiasm and had won many friends. Marti returned to New York and we must return to Key West. We will need to see what that "Cuban city" was like in approximately 1890 in order to understand why it played such an important part in the emergence of Marti as the authoritative leader of Cuban independence.

3

Cuban Key West With the dawn of that radiantly beautiful day, the passengers of that ancient wanderer of the sea, which brought the Cuban refugees, rustled up on deck shouting: The Key! What happy moments for those poor Cubans who, like the other Puritans-those of Mayflower, came in search of the land of liberty. . . . What joy; what immense happiness for everyone. I also wanted to see the Key. There, way in the distance, we could make it out like a tiny point. . . . A bustling multitude waited on the pier, everyone trying to get to the front. They were the Cuban emigres that were waiting for us, to embrace us like brothers.

That is the way in which Juan Perez Rolo (1923: 8-9) recalled his boyhood arrival in Key West in 1869. He went on to become a tobacco worker, carpenter, cabinet maker, baker, journalist, author, revolutionary orator, and member of several patriotic clubs (Castellanos 1935: 144). Thousands of Cuban refugees duplicated his experiences. Prior to 1868, there were only a few Cubans on the Key. Some of those had been involved in the Narciso Lopez expedition of 1850 and could not return to their homeland. A few others were there for other reasons. The first large influx of Cubans came during the Ten Years War (1868-78). Spanish persecution was the initial cause, but very quickly the development of a thriving cigar industry provided

20 JOSE MARTI employment incentives for thousands of workers. Cubans were largely responsible for the rapid growth of that industry, both as workers and factory owners. Estimates of the Cuban population on the island are conflicting and, obviously, only an approximation. Census figures, where available, are also open to question. Cubans frequently shifted their residence between Key West and Havana and, later, between Key West and Tampa. Many single individuals lived with families, and even the conscientious censustaker could not have accounted for them. One source lists 9,890 Cubans in Key West at the end of the Ten Years War (Castellanos 1935: 227). Another lists some 8,000 cigar workers in 1873, five years after the beginning of the war (Westfall 1984: 23). Since most of the workers were Cubans and many had families the total number of Cubans would probably have reached at least Westfall's estimate. Yet another source lists only 5,500 Cubans in 1885 (Poyo 1983: 208). The 1890 census showed a Key West population of 18,080 (Browne 1973: 173) and an estimate for 1893 gives a figure of 21,000 (Westfall 1984: 48). Cuban writers who lived in Key West at the time have insisted that Cubans made up a majority of the population. Since the Cuban population fluctuated so greatly, that assertion may or may not be consistent with another estimate that approximately one third of the Key West inhabitants throughout the final 30 years of the century were Cubans (Poyo 1983: 207-208). The same estimate gives about 7,000 Cubans for 1890, the peak year for the cigar industry. A Cuban population of seven to ten thousand seems a reasonable estimate for the years 1891-94, the years that Marti was most active on the island. A contemporary of Marti estimated that there were about 25,000 Cuban exiles in all the United States at that time (Cruz 1895: 99). That would mean that approximately one-third of all Cubans in the United States were in Key West. The Cuban population of Key West declined sharply in 1894 as a result of the strike of that year: 2,000 were said to have gone to Tampa in that year alone (Deulofeu 1905: 84). In spite of this, a resident of that time reported much later that there were still 12,000 Cubans in Key West in 1896 (Castellanos 1935: 155). That figure is difficult to accept for a time when others reported that "Key West became deserted" (Trujillo 1896: 80).

CUBAN KEY WEST 21 Whatever the numbers, Key West was the most important emigre center during the years with which we are concerned (Trujillo 1896: 80; Amao 1900: 225). As we shall see, Marti frequently reminded Key West Cubans of this fact in his speeches and in his voluminous correspondence with many of them. But the size of the emigre colony was by no means the only consideration; many other attributes of that colony placed it in the forefront of revolutionary activity and made it of special importance to Marti. In many ways Cubans formed their own community but were the principal contributors to the development and wealth of the larger community. The majority of the cigar workers were Cubans, and some of the large factories and many smaller ones were owned and operated by Cubans. Eduardo Gato (1), Teodoro Perez, and Caytano Soria were among the most important. Gerardo Castellanos, one of the prominent veteran military leaders and the father of the Castellanos frequently cited here, operated a factory employing some 200 workers-a medium-sized factory (Castellanos 1935: 184). A few of the very large factories were the center of small "factory towns," or colonies on the periphery of the main city. A cluster of small houses built around the factory was serviced by shops, restaurants, and other needed establishments. The original part of the city, inhabited mainly by the Anglo Americans, was known to Cubans as Conco Taon (Conch Town, for the original residents who were known as Conchs). That, of course, was the location of most of the shops and other commercial establishments. In 1871, a group of Cubans "desirous of having a place where they could meet to talk about Cuba and conspire for its liberty" founded the San Carlos Institute (Alpizar 1947: 23-24). This quickly became the center of Cuban culture and patriotism on the Key. It was held in such esteem and affection that Ann Street, the location of the first small building in which it was housed, was known among Cubans as "San Carlos Street" (Perez 1923: 13). When Marti arrived, the San Carlos had been relocated on Duval Street where a more modern version still stands. Cubans had their own doctors, pharmacists, morticians, and even a few of their own Protestant ministers; Reverendo Manuel Deulofeu Lleonart, frequently cited here, was one of them. They had their own hotels; the Hotel Monroe on Whitehead and

22 JOSE MARTI Division (now Truman Avenue) streets was a famous place of conspiracy and refuge for exiled patriots. Cuban restaurants, coffee shops, bars, shops, clubs, club houses, and schools were everywhere. Community social life and patriotic events often took the forms of veladas (festivities at night) held in the San Carlos, in Cuban clubs, and even in private homes. Processions preceding or following these events were equally important. Newspapers were an important part of Cuban life, and as soon as refugees came they began publishing their own. El Republicano, La Igualdad, El Patriota, El Yara, and El Pueblo were among them. In 1887 a bilingual version of The Equator appeared: The Equator-El Ecuador (Castellanos 1935: 213-24). Ramon Rivero, an anarchist labor leader whom we will meet again later, was the editor of the Spanish edition of that paper (Deulofeu 1905: 85; Castellanos 1935: 225). El Republicano was for a time edited by Federico de Armas, a prominent member of patriotic clubs and one who openly proclaimed socialist doctrines (Poyo 1985: 31). El Yara, edited by Jose Dolores Poyo, was opposed to the political propositions of anarchism, since they held that an independent Cuba with only a new ruling class would not benefit the workers. Thus, Poyo characterized them as pro-Spanish (Poyo 1985: 34-35). Labor activists in turn criticized El Yara and the traditional leaders for placing patriotic matters above social issues (Poyo 1983: 319). Patriotic clubs were formed upon the arrival of the first refugees, and in the 30 years between 1869 and 1899, more than 80 clubs were formed (Castellanos 1935: 155). Clubs came and went, and most Cuban men were probably members of more than one club. There were also clubs for women, youth, and even children. Probably more patriotic clubs were established in Key West than in all the other refugee centers combined (Alpizar 1947: 41-45). Cubans had their own musical band of some 25 members, which played an important part in patriotic activities. It met and serenaded visiting patriots, headed the frequent parades on patriotic days, and added color and excitement to meetings at which local orators practiced their art. La Libertad, as the band was called, was directed by no less than a veteran of the Ten Years War who was also a clarinetist of considerable talent. Veteran Jose Rogelio Castillo y Ziiniga (usually, Rogelio Castillo) was of Colombian nationality and also worked as a typographer

CUBAN KEY WEST 23 on Poyo's El Yara as well as a selector (escogedor) in a tobacco factory. He was a prominent member of the important Cuban Convention of which more will be said later. The band undoubtedly had a number of musicians of considerable talent, including Rafael Fit, who later played with the Havana Symphony Orchestra and gave private lessons in Havana (Castellanos 1935: 168-69). The Key West emigre community was the most "Cuban" of any of the major refugee centers. In Tampa, a large number of Spanish and Italian workers gave that colony a more cosmopolitan atmosphere. A writer in El Porvenir in 1890 claimed that there were 5,000 Asturian tobacco workers in Tampa at that time (Poyo 1983: 320). In other colonies such as those in Mexico, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic, the Cubans were more assimilated into the host country. And in New York the Cubans were dispersed in clusters in Brooklyn, Manhattan, and other places. They were simply overwhelmed by the size of the host city. That was not the case in Key West. Castellanos (1935: 143) maintains that in Key West, Spanish displaced English, even for work in public offices. The natives (Conchs) learned Spanish and the shops sought to offer the products that Cubans wanted. The lawyer or merchant who did not know Spanish could not make a living. During festivals, there were 100 Cubans flags for every one American flag. Those are undoubtedly exaggerations by one who fondly warmed to his topic, remembering the wonderful days of the past. But even taking that into account, Key West was much like a Cuban city, as many visitors at the time were quick to notice. Four Cubans represented Monroe County in the Florida legislature, five Cubans served as justices of the peace in Key West, and at least one of them, Angel de Lono, became a county judge. Carlos Manuel de Cespedes, son of the late president of the Republic in Arms, was elected mayor of Key West in 1875. He delivered the annual Fourth of July speech in English in 1876 (Brown 1973: 118; Key of the Gulf, July 8, 1876). By the mid-1880s, Cuban political activists in the United States and elsewhere recognized Key West as the most important center of rebel activity. It had replaced New York, which had been the center of rebel activity during the Ten Years War and for several years thereafter (Poyo 1983: 205; Castellanos 1935:

24 JOSE MARTI 204). The economic prosperity based upon the cigar industry made it the best source of money for the revolutionary cause. But there were other reasons that were equally important. The largest concentration of military veterans to be found in one place outside of Cuba was in Key West. Ibarra (1981: 58) has pointed out that the nucleus of the movement at that time was made up of 17 generals and various colonels of the Ten Years War. Serafin Sanchez, Carlos Roloff, Juan Ruz, Rogelio Castillo, Gerardo Castellanos, Fernando Figueredo, Rosendo Garcia, and Emilio Aymerich were all influential generals, colonels, or comandantes who lived in Key West at one time or another. The proximity to Cuba was, of course, one reason why they chose Key West—to be ready at a moment's notice. Climate and life style in Key West were much preferred over those in New York. Communication with other emigre centers in Central America, the Caribbean, and southern United States was also an important consideration. In 1885, General Gomez, by consensus the supreme military leader of the rebel movement, placed the central junta in the hands of the veteran leaders of Key West (Poyo 1983: 205). The fact that he had been unable to get the cooperation of Marti and others in New York no doubt influenced his decision. The decision was welcomed by the Key West leaders and prompted new efforts there to form a more centralized structure. On September 20, 1884, the general called together the main political leaders who met in the cigar factory of Cespedes, Perez, and Navarro. According to this account, that meeting marked the foundation of "the glorious Cuban Convention" (Alpizar 1947: 71). Another account places the Convention's foundation in 1888, at a mass meeting in San Carlos (Casasus 1953: 200). Castellanos (1923: 200), whose father was a prominent member, places its founding in December 1889 in the home of Emilio Aymerich, a war veteran who lived at 1317 Duval Street and operated a famous school for Cuban children. Finally, the convention secretary during its entire existence places its origins in 1891: "In the early days of 1891, on the initiative of the old emigre Gerardo Castellanos, a patriotic association was founded under the name 'Convention,' with a membership selected from among the oldest and most meritorious of the patriotic colony" (Figueredo 1916: 37). The various dates and places that have been offered for the

CUBAN KEY WEST 25 Convention's formation are probably accounted for by a casual use of words such as "founding" or "origin." They also attest to the several years of effort that had gone into the process before Marti arrived on the scene. Furthermore, by that time Key West was virtually the only scene of any significant revolutionary activity (Mafiach 1950: 221; Castellanos 1935: 252). Each member of the Convention was obligated to organize at least one new club (Castellanos 1935: 166). They obviously took this obligation seriously, and that no doubt helps to account for the large number of clubs that were formed in the late 1880s and early 1890s. In these and other activities the name "Cuban Convention" was never to be used. Instead, club Luz de Yara was the name used publicly. Exactly what function this secrecy of names fulfilled is not clear. Most secret organizations are not very secret and it may well be that secrecy helped to assure the members themselves of the seriousness and importance of their undertaking. It was a small organization, without any formal responsibility to the Cuban community of Key West or elsewhere. A sense of responsibility undoubtedly existed, however. Given its secrecy, there could be no community participation in elections or procedures for approval of its action. The organization was supposedly limited to 25 members (Alpizar 1947: 73; Poyo 1983: 287), although Castellanos (1935: 166-67) list the names of 46 members and in a later work reports that there were "some twenty-seven" (1944: 93). It appears that an informal relationship existed between some of the clubs and the Convention, especially those founded by Convention members. But this was a matter that would have to await Marti's organizational skills. Even within the confines of its own organization, the structure was highly centralized. It placed much of its action in the hands of an executive committee of three. In addition to specific powers, such as the "execution of Convention agreements" and "those matters which the Convention declares of an excessively delicate nature," article 19 added "all exclusively revolutionary acts which are not in opposition or contradiction to the agreements of the Convention or those regulations" (Alpizar 1947: 77). The centralized character of the institution provided a precedent for the centralized organization which Marti put together shortly thereafter.

26 JOSE MARTI The Convention certainly marked the most advanced stage in revolutionary activity. Francisco Lamadriz, Key West's venerable patriarch, was elected president; Jose Dolores Poyo, editor of El Yara, was vice president; Fernando Figueredo, one of Key West's most influential military leaders, was secretary. These three veteran leaders made up the executive committee mentioned above. Several agencies or committees were established to carry out various kinds of conspiratorial activities: War, Treasury, Propaganda, and Correspondence. Probably the most important of these was the Committee for Correspondence headed by Poyo, General Serafin Sanchez, and Juan Calderon. They communicated with rebels in Cuba as well as with emigre leaders in Central America, the Caribbean and the United States. Three prominent entrepreneurs, of whom we will learn more later, were head of Treasury: Eduardo Gato, Carlos Recio and Caytano Soria. War, presumably in charge of planning military strategies for aiding rebels when war broke out, was under Figueredo, Sanchez, and Rogelio Castillo (the Colombian band director and veteran of the Ten Years War). Propaganda was headed by Poyo, Manuel P. Delgado (Poyo's son-in-law), and Gerardo Castellanos (Alpizar 1947: 71-79; Castellanos 1935: 165-67; Poyo 1985: 28789). We will meet all of these Key West leaders again later in our discussion. Although the Convention did have working-class members, none was included in the committees just described. Furthermore, membership did not include any of the prominent labor activists who played such an important part in the life of Key West at the time. During 1892 its membership included, among others, eight tobacco workers (two of them veterans) five merchants and shopkeepers, five cigar manufacturers, one lawyer, one journalist, three teachers, and one reader (Poyo 1983: 352). It was, then, reasonably representative of the community make-up. But the actual exercise of power was limited to only a few of the community's more prominent veterans. Implicit in the convention's charter was a new strategy, a strategy that moved much closer to what Marti had been preaching for some time. Expeditions planned and launched from outside Cuba would no longer be the mode of operation as had been the case in the past. The revolt would have to be set off from within Cuba, and only after planning and propagandizing had made it likely that a revolt could be ignited in all parts of

CUBAN KEY WEST 27 the island simultaneously. Help would, of course, be forthcoming from the outside. Article 26 of the Convention's charter provided that "at no time or for any reason will the Convention urge or suggest an uprising to their counterparts within the island, limiting themselves in that respect to backing them up and providing assistance when they think it opportune" (Alpizar 1947: 78). It is obvious from what has been said above that the process of forming a central revolutionary structure had been going on for a number of years in Key West and that it was well advanced by the time that Marti arrived in 1891. That made the Cuban Convention the more venerable to the small community of dedicated veteran leaders who had labored together during those years. It was part of a situation that would challenge Marti in his bid for leadership when he arrived in 1891. But even as the veteran leaders of Key West were busy organizing and propagandizing, there were signs that not all was well within the revolutionary movement. By the time that Marti arrived in Key West, nearly a quarter of a century had elapsed since the opening of the Ten Years War. A new generation was emerging with new perspectives and new interests. Some of the veteran leaders were themselves well aware of this. In November 1890 Gomez wrote to Figueredo, saying that Cuba's future "is destined to be resolved by arms, but that is something which must be organized by new men and not by the military element, [which is] in my opinion very worn out" (Poyo 1983: 294). The heroic, self-proclaimed leaders of countless sporadic uprisings, those proclaimed within Cuba or those that began with expeditions from outside the island, had been singularly unsuccessful. Time and time again, hopeful and optimistic generals had passed through Key West, proclaiming the final offensive that would liberate the country. They were the object of warm demonstrations of sympathy and support from the generous cigar workers and their employers. In this way, collections of five, ten and fifteen thousand dollars were made (Castellanos 1935: 204-5). That strategy was becoming less and less promising, even as the revolutionary focus shifted to Key West, where the veterans were organized. The Gomez-Maceo plans of 1884-85, warmly received by Key West veterans, did not receive the financial support expected and required from the Key. Colonel Figueredo, among other things a popular Key West lecturer on the

28 JOSE MARTI Ten Years War, tried without success "to revive the emigres who had lost their course" (Azcuy 1930: 45). Another of the veteran leaders who had been among the most active in trying to revive the spirit of the emigre, later recalled that "the revolution appeared to have expired" (Arnao 1900: 258). If questions of strategy had reached a serious impasse, newer social questions were even more troubling. Time and prosperity were changing the political and social attitudes of Cubans in Key West. But there were other perhaps more important reasons. It had something to do with the type of emigres that came to Key West as the successful cigar industry developed. In New York, the early center of revolutionary support, it was principally shopkeepers, professionals, and a few artisans who had established themselves. A few very wealthy Cubans had also gone there. In Key West and in Tampa, those who settled were fundamentally from the Cuban proletariat. In New York the majority were political emigres; in Key West they came for economic reasons (Ibarra 1981: 140-42; Amao 1900: 225; Castellanos 1935: 203). Nevertheless, as one of the veterans pointed out, these workers "had proved to be an inexhaustible source of support for all expeditions" (Amao 1900: 225). But by 1886, independence had not been achieved and workers' willingness to forego strikes and other forms of social militancy in order to ensure funds for expeditions seemed to be endangering the growth and cohesion of their labor organizations. Many workers even suspected that the Cuban entrepreneurs of the cigar industry had used self-serving arguments, in the name of Cuban independence, to discourage strikes (Poyo 1985: 30-31). All had not been entirely peaceful, in spite of the workers' strong inclinations to support the independence movement. Castellanos (1935: 182) has referred to "the bitter struggle of 'selfish and raging bourgeoisie against the noble and always humiliated working class' (a phrase then current)." Indeed, Marti's arrival in 1891 had been preceded by more than a decade of strikes and other forms of protest. These events, of necessity covered only briefly here, have been carefully researched and ably analyzed by historians Gerard E. Poyo (1983, 1985, 1986) and L. Glenn Westfall (1977, 1984). In 1875, the first cigar workers' strike in Key West was organized by Federico de Armas, editor of Key West's El

CUBAN KEY WEST 29 Republicano. He had been active in the Socialist International in Madrid prior to his arrival in the United States and openly proclaimed socialist doctrines in his Key West newspaper. In the last half of the 1880s, socialist organizers came to dominate the labor movement (Poyo 1985: 31), unions became larger, workers showed greater militancy, and strikes were more frequent. Key West labor leaders communicated with their counterparts in Havana, and radical newspapers from both cities were read by the readers in the cigar factories. The reader (lector) in the cigar factory was a key factor in the development of social consciousness among the workers. He was engaged and paid for by the workers to read aloud to them while they were working. It was a distinctly Cuban innovation, provided to relieve the boredom of work. It obviously did much more than that. A wide range of newspapers was read in addition to many other works. Works on the struggle for liberty, the French Revolution, the campaigns of Garibaldi, and the books Don Ouijote and Les Miserables were especially popular. There were said to be factories where Don Ouijote was read ten times (Castellanos 1935: 182-83, 200). In 1885 another serious strike took place. The attitude of the workers was conveyed in a broadside that was widely circulated throughout Key West: "Let us wage relentless war on those who have oppressed us and now show us no mercy. Let us employ the force of right, and if that does not avail, resort to the right of force" (Westfall 1984: 35). In 1888 some 1,000 workers gathered in Key West's Jackson Square in support of striking workers in Havana. This enthusiastic demonstration prompted two anarchist organizers to come from Havana to lend support for additional organizing efforts in the Key. Obviously, independence was no longer the sole objective of many, perhaps most, in the emigre community as it had been during the Ten Years War and a few years thereafter. In 1889-90 serious strikes occurred again in several Key West factories. Workers demanded payment according to the quality of the cigars they produced. The practice had been to pay the same price for each cigar made, regardless of the quality. The anarchists and other organizers had carefully planned this strike and did their work effectively. The workers organizations were so strong that by January 1890 the factory owners were

30 JOSE MARTI forced to accede to most of the demands of labor (Westfall 1984: 44-45). It appeared that the anarchists' program for social reforms had replaced the workers' dedication to political altruism. Union newspapers in Key West and anarchist-socialist newspapers reflected the growing worker concern over social issues. Questions were raised concerning the meaning of independence. In 1889 El Productor, a Cuban paper, asked: "Is it that an independent fatherland consists in having its own government, in not depending on another nation . . . although its citizens are in the most degrading slavery?" (Poyo 1985: 33). About the same time, a Key West newspaper, El Cubano, carried a similar message: "All over the world, workers have served as cannon fodder in political revolutions; they have served as the human ladder on which the ambitious of all times have risen to power and riches" (Poyo 1985: 33). Another perspective was offered by Carlos Balifio, a journalist and labor leader in Key West: "I do not believe that slavery has been abolished . . . instead of domestic slavery for the blacks only, we have industrial slavery for blacks and whites" (Poyo 1985: 32). Both socialists and anarchists argued that independence as it was conceived by the traditional leaders would only be the exchange of Spanish exploitation for exploitation by local Cuban capitalists and landowners. These leaders, veterans of the Key's Union de Tabaqueros, first established in 1879, were the very people who came to dominate the labor movement in Key West and Tampa in the last half of the 1880s-Carlos Balifio, Guillermo Sorondo, Ramon Rivero, Oscar Martin, Eduardo Pajarin, and Martes Leal. They were supported by a number of like-minded or sympathetic journalists who helped to extend their influence (Poyo 1985: 31). We refer to leaders from both Tampa and Key West because they so frequently shuttled between the two communities. The tri-weekly Olivetti (the steamship on which Marti arrived in 1891) made the journey in about six hours. It was reported to be "the fastest coastal steamship in the United States" until well after the turn of the century" (Browne 1973: 81; Key West Directory 1893). Many other ships provided more frequent if less rapid transportation. Some of the leaders also changed their place of residence from time to time. Ramon Rivero, for example, moved from Key West to Tampa. Nestor Carbonell, a socialist and

CUBAN KEY WEST 31 veteran of the Ten Years War, moved to Key West in 1889 where he wrote for El Pueblo. But his activities "disgusted more than a few in the locality" and he decided to leave for Tampa (Castellanos 1935: 122). Some of the radical leaders charged the veteran leadership with plotting against the interest of the workers. The Key West correspondent for El Productor complained that whenever a strike was called, the chieftains, through their newspapers, would begin a fund raising drive for this or that general, and this poor people when they were told of the fatherland's needs would not object and would return to work like tame lambs, with the strike lost, prices reduced and ready to empty their pockets into the hands of strangers. . . . These are their exploiters (Poyo 1985: 34). As Poyo (1985: 34) has pointed out, the principal patriot leaders had always urged moderation but had never opposed labor organization among the cigar workers. But there was obviously a conflict of interest here. Strikes and disruption of production obviously meant less money for the revolutionary cause. And some of the civilian leaders, tobacco manufacturers, and merchants especially, had their own reasons to oppose strikes. Eduardo Gato explained his opposition to the 1890 strike: The fathers of the strike are some forty or fifty restless creatures, never satisfied even if they were in paradise, and they have fomented discord. To please these unhappy spirits is impossible, for they are of a rambling nature, and they have infected the others, who are principally hard workers. These trouble breeders are principally bachelors, without the responsibility of family and home (Westfall 1984: 45). Other cigar manufacturers and even merchants expressed similar sentiments. A decline in the cigar industry, of course, meant a serious decline in business throughout the community. Gato was convinced that an alliance existed between the Spanish government and the anarchists. Mortal enemies though they were, the Spanish government was pleased with anything that

32 JOSE MARTI obstructed the independence movement, and the anarchists saw that same movement as at best a diversion from the real cause of the workers. Both parties offered assistance to workers who wanted to return to Cuba (Westfall 1984: 45). Clearly there were serious problems for the independence movement in Key West. Flor Crombet, one of the generals of the Ten Years War, had come to Key West in April 1888 to try to rekindle the revolutionary fire in that most hopeful of emigre colonies, but he found it "in a state of complete demoralization" (Lizaso 1974: 200). Unity among the emigre colonies still eluded the veteran leaders. Within Cuba the situation was no better. "The great revolutionary leaders and caudillos appeared benumbed" (Castellanos 1935: 252). Whatever its local accomplishments might have been, the Cuban Convention remained essentially a Key West organization. In fact even its charter provided only that "the first duty of the convention will be to associate cordially with all interior or exterior elements of the island which aspire for independence" (Alpizar 1947: 78). There was still no such thing as a revolutionary organization that covered all the emigre colonies and Cuba. Indeed, there had not been anyone up to this time with the sophistication and leadership skills to unite conflicting elements within each community, much less the far-flung communities themselves. The goal of independence under the leadership of the veterans had not been reached and its future looked unpromising. Workers' efforts to move toward social justice in their place of exile had not been very satisfactory either. They had organized and they had gone on strike, but, activists argued, their situation remained much the same. What was worse, "there was in fact little confidence that emigres were capable of revolutionizing Cuba" (Poyo 1985: 34). The time and the place were ready for Marti. This is what Castellanos (1935: 260) had in mind when he observed that "the youth of Key West, avid for action, or as a reflex to the Tampa initiative, wanted to see in Marti the longedfor Messiah." Only eight years after Marti's arrival, Juan Amao (1900: 258), veteran and patriarch of Key West, made a similar observation: "As all people of the world create their own idol, it was . . . Marti whom the Cubans worshiped, like the indians worshiped the sun." Marti, better informed than other emigre leaders, observed and analyzed the relationship between the independence movement

CUBAN KEY WEST 33 and the social unrest in the Florida communities. The veteran leaders had seemingly ignored this or perhaps did not have the sophistication to understand it. These propositions are fundamental to understanding Marti's emergence as the leader of all emigre communities. His views on labor, racial, and strategic questions were known in Key West. We discuss the three aspects (labor, racial, strategic) of the problem together because they are so closely related and indeed were seen that way by Marti. Shortly after his arrival in New York in 1880 Marti revealed his outrage over racism in a speech to the emigre communities there. "Man has no special right because he pertains to one race or another," he said. "Everything that divides mankind, everything that categorizes, separates or confines them is a sin against humanity" (Marti 1963, 4: 183). The speech was later printed in pamphlet form (as was the case with many of his speeches) and would almost certainly have been read by the readers in the cigar factories of Key West. His writings were also frequently published in New York's emigre newspapers, which circulated within all of the emigre colonies. Prior to his Key West arrival in 1891 Marti had also corresponded with several members of that emigre colony on these and other matters of concern. He had met some of them in New York, either as residents there or when they were passing through on revolutionary or other business. Jose Dolores Poyo was known to Marti, as he was known almost everywhere because of his newspaper El Yara. In October 1887 Marti wrote to Martin Morua Delgado, a black labor leader and editor of Key West's El Pueblo. He wrote in response to a misleading letter that had been published in that paper concerning his views on social and other issues. "Profound is the pain," he said, "after [my] long years of modest labor to make impossible in Cuba the establishment of a government in which all elements and classes are not included under conditions of true liberty." It was, he emphasized, of special concern to him that the published misinformation not go unanswered in Key West, where "the emigres have never allowed the fires on their altars to be extinguished" (Marti 1963, 1: 206-7). In the midst of the strikes in the cigar factories in 1889 he wrote to Serafin Bello on November 16. Here he gave his views on social justice, workers rights, and racial equality. On the matter of the immediate issues of workers rights, he carefully

34 JOSE MARTI prefaced his remarks with the observation that these were local matters and would have to be settled locally. But if, as he had been told, the strike was the result of maltreatment of the workers and disdain for their rights, it was all the more serious: "My heart goes out to the workers like a brother." He related this to their struggle for independence: it would be necessary to understand the just demands of all social elements for anyone who wanted to study and understand the problems of Cuba. Finally: The man of color has the right to be , treated according to his qualities, without reference to his color. . . . The worker is not an inferior being, nor should he be isolated and governed by brute force, but rather by opening to him, in a brotherly way, the considerations and rights which assure peace and happiness among a people (Marti 1963, 1: 254-55). Marti obviously recognized a kindred spirit in Jose Dolores Poyo, editor of Key West's El Yara. On November 29, 1887, he wrote: "In eight years of constant patriotic inquietude, never have I dared to ask for an exchange of views with those with whom I have most desired it, with the exemplary Cubans of Key West." Obviously having now taken the liberty to do so, he briefly summarized his position: "We must announce to the country and maintain with our own arts, a program worthy of attracting the attention of a people who are not about to follow the first one who, taking advantage of a saintly name, wishes to make himself its leader" (Marti 1963, 1: 212). Social issues and strategy were clearly joined. Planning and organization for a concerted uprising throughout Cuba would have to replace the emigre expeditions of the past which expected a sudden outburst of revolutionary fervor when they landed. But planning and organization required a program that would attract the support of all Cubans. He wrote on these matters to the veteran leaders in Key West. On October 20, 1887, he wrote to General Juan Ruz. Here he confined himself to strategy, but he included references that implied the need to confront social issues. Thus he referred to the emigre colonies who were tired of serving valiant figures, badly advised or guilty of ambition and apparently "incapable of

CUBAN KEY WEST 35 understanding or helping, at the opportune time, a movement that would be worthy because of the extent of its support and respect" (Marti 1963, 1: 200). In December of 1887 he wrote to Juan Amao, one of the patriarchs of the Key West community and of the independence struggle. Here he stressed the need for unity "within a democratic spirit and in a relationship of equality." Revolutionary sympathies must not be twisted or brought under control of any interest group for the domination of a social class or the unlimited authority of either a military or social group, or of one race over another (Marti 1963, 1: 214). Marti's views on racial equality and social justice had been made quite clear, and they were certainly known in Key West (Poyo 1983: 319-49). That is certainly fundamental to an understanding of Marti's conquest of leadership and authority. But there are two other closely related circumstances that also must have attracted this generation to Marti. Throughout Latin America a new generation was becoming more and more outraged by increasingly violent manifestations of doctrines of cultural and racial superiority in the United States. We will only note here that the nature and popularity of those doctrines were exemplified and summarized by a clergyman's admonition to his fellow North Americans in a best-selling book published in 1885: "Move down upon Mexico, down upon Central and South America, out upon the islands of the sea, over Africa and beyond. And can anyone doubt that the result of this competition will be the survival of the fittest" (Strong 1885: 159). An abundance of U.S. writing as well as U.S. policy itself made it clear that these were the prevailing views in the United States (LaFeber 1963: 62-101). Marti was well known throughout the continent for his defense of Latin culture and civilization. His abundant writings on these subjects have been collected and published in many collections (Marti 1980: 1982). Cubans living in the United States who were constantly exposed to North American attitudes of racial superiority, especially black Cubans, must have shared the reaction of their generation throughout Latin America. It was less than five years after Marti's death that Jose Enrique Rodo's Ariel was hailed by the youth of Latin America as a defense of their civilization and a beacon of hope. It was also hailed as a condemnation of crass materialism in the United States, though

36 JOSE MARTI that was probably not Rodo's intention. Marti was both a precursor and contemporary of the great Rodo (1872-1916). The second circumstance was simply the confusion and malaise that prevailed within even this most organized of emigre colonies. It was partly a consequence of the generational and other differences that divided the community. A resident of that time described the situation: In 1891 I was an emigre of the most modest means in Key West when Marti's projects became known there. . . . In spite of the aspiration for independence, the emigres were divided by classes and even by age and by provinces. The old people accused the youth of lack of courage, of our lukewarm love for our country, all of which prevented us from doing what they had done. Those from Camaguey scoffed at those from Havana for our lack of effort in '68 [the Ten Years War]. The factory owners, the escogedores [selectors] and the other tobacco workers looked at each other with distrust (Mufioz 1917: 344). As already noted, it was indeed the situation described above that led another resident, though only a boy at the time, to conclude that "the youth of Key West . . . wanted to see in Marti the longed-for Messiah" (Castellanos 1935: 260). Or, as another contemporary put it, "he revived the dying and flickering spark in the soul of a generation that was tired and without faith" (Tejera n.d.: 129). Of course, not everyone in Key West liked Marti's ideas. His disputes with Gomez were still remembered there. His call for a pluralist political organization based on democratic principles implied timidity and a return to the political problems of the Ten Years War. In the minds of some emigres, he was associated with the middle-class colony of New York, with their talk of compromise and annexation to the United States. Marti was no radical and he only expressed his sincere beliefs on social issues. Had he wanted to play the role of demagogue, he could have done so superbly. Reporting on Marti's performance in a literary and philosophical debate in Mexico in 1875 (Marti was then only 22 years of age), El Eco de

CUBAN KEY WEST 37 Ambos Mundos observed that "at a time of popular commotion, this young man will be a terrible thing in the public plaza" (Marquez 1965: 91). Yet, as we shall see in the next chapter, it was the workers with their support who provided the opportunity for Marti to demonstrate his abilities of leadership. It is remarkable, then, how little it took in the way of promises for the workers to offer him their support. Certainly one reason the workers supported Marti, as Gerald Poyo (1983: 335) has observed, was that "the Cuban workers had never heard the patriot leadership express itself on social issues with such sympathy." And this was not the first time that Marti's appeal had touched the workers. While living in Mexico he represented the Chihuahua workers at a labor congress in January 1876 (Deulofeu 1905: 112; Lizaso 1974: 256) during the liberal government of Benito Juarez's successor. There, as in Key West, his sympathy on social issues obviously came through without resort to radical or extremist rhetoric. He was simply known as a friend of the workers. Workers and others as well were undoubtedly more impressed with what Marti's life represented, his ideas and his values, all of which came through in his writing and speeches, than they were in precise promises. They had undoubtedly heard promises before. Marti obviously realized that too radical an appeal to workers would alienate other essential communities of support in the emigre colonies. There were soon problems in that respect in New York. As we shall see, he was forced to turn to affluent cigar manufacturers and merchants when party finances were in trouble. Unity of all emigre factions was absolutely essential. Yet one cannot follow Marti's leadership activities, and especially his communication with his constituencies, without a feeling that all of this was as much a matter of principle as it was of pragmatism. The enthusiasm shown by workers in Key West and the other Florida emigre colonies was only the beginning. From that point onward it depended on his qualities of leadership. As we follow his interaction with the large and complex emigre colony in Key West, we will attempt to show in more detail what these qualities were and how Marti used them to take control of the Cuban independence movement. Our arena of observation will be Key West, which in spite of everything and because of many factors still had to be the

38 JOSE MARTI center of rebel activity. Luis Lagomasino, a veteran leader who frequently passed through Key West, recalled that as 1890 drew to a close, only Key West remained as an outpost of revolutionary struggle (Deulofeu 1905: 112). Colonel Fernando Figueredo (1916: 42), a resident of Key West and among the most popular veteran military leaders there, also looked back on these eventful days in one of his many published works on the Cuban struggle: "Why? Why? did he [Marti] prefer Key West and select it as the base for his propaganda and organization? Ask why the sun rises in the east." He then goes on to give us a less enigmatic answer: "Because the legendary Key was already consecrated by the history of patriotism, as the cradle of our liberties, because all the caudillos had proclaimed it as the patriotic center of greatest power, through its example of union which it had always offered to exiled Cubans." In spite of all difficulties, patriotic sentiment was beginning to be revived in some places as the decade of 1890 began. In Cuba it had become obvious even to conservatives that Spanish promises of reforms and autonomy were not forthcoming. It appeared to be the right time and Key West was the right place.

CUBAN KEY WEST 39 Note 1. Eduardo Hidalgo Gato, more correctly, Eduardo Hidalgo. Contemporaries, including Marti, used Eduardo Gato, or simply Gato. He and other Cubans probably resigned themselves to the inability of North Americans to understand the mystery of Spanish names. Accordingly, they sometimes used the last (the maternal) of their two family names. Gato will be used here for the sake of consistency. The same form will be used for other names where that was apparently the practice. Juan [Fernandez] Ruz is another example of the practice.

4

The Triumphant Arrival of Marti On December 23, 1891, accompanied by many members of the directorates of the "Ignacio Agramonte" club, the Patriotic League of Tampa and the Cuban Band of Ibor City, directed by Felipe Vazques, the eminent Marti set foot on the secular rock of patriotism, the Mount Aventino of the Cuban spirit, which is called Key West. On the pier he was received by an immense multitude of emigres . . . [with] Cuban and American banners and flags. A musical band accompanied the organization committee in order to receive Marti. The first ones to come forward and greet Marti were Jose Francisco Lamadrid [Lamadriz], President of the Cuban Convention; Genaro Hernandez, representing the organizing committee and Jose Dolores Poyo. When the venerable patriarch and eminent patriot Jose F. Lamadrid approached Marti, the two embraced with tears in their eyes. At that moment Marti said: "I embrace the old revolution," and Lamadrid answered: "And I embrace the future revolution" (Deulofeu 1905: 152-53).

Marti's arrival in Key West was more than just another colorful event, although it certainly was that. After all, virtually every veteran hero had passed through the Key at one time or another and, as Castellanos observes, they had been the object of warm demonstrations of support and generous "metallic contributions." They included Crombet, Cisneros, Aguilera, Bernabe Varona, the Sanguilys, Leoncio Prado, Pio Rosado,

THE TRIUMPHANT ARRIVAL OF MARTI 41 Antonio Zambrana, Hernandez, Maceo, Gomez, the Agiieros, the Quesadas, Aldama, and others (Castellanos 1935: 204-5). This demonstration was different, however. All observers agreed that the size and enthusiasm of the reception and the demonstrations on succeeding days surpassed anything seen before in the Key. More important than size and enthusiasm, however, was the very nature of the cause that brought the demonstrators to the pier at the foot of Duval Street. This demonstration and reception was the first step in a transfer of power, and many of the participants caught up in this and other events that followed must have sensed as much. Whatever they might have sensed, their participation was a key element in a drama that was taking place in Key West in 189192. It was already a demonstration of Marti's leadership and power; more would follow. For these reasons I think it both essential and interesting to describe these transcendent events in more detail than might otherwise be warranted. What follows, then, is in fact the description of a new process, one that had begun in Tampa a month earlier. It is a description of the way in which workers and others were participating in, indeed were the driving force behind, the transformation of leadership and the independence movement. Some of the participants were seasoned activists from the labor conflicts of the 1880s. These events, described below, show not only their dedication and determination but their understanding of the possibilities of public demonstrations as symbols of authority. Marti's success in Tampa was the subject of much interest and discussion in Key West. A contingent of Key West Cubans had been on hand to hear and meet him in Tampa. The contingent included labor activists and others who brought back first-hand reports (Marquez 1965: 296; Manach 1950: 271). Two people in Key West were especially active upon their return. Jose Dolores Poyo published a supplement to El Yara giving details of Marti's speech and praising the patriotic meetings. According to Nestor Carbonell (1916: 92-93), one of the organizers of the event in Tampa, Poyo himself attended at least one of the meetings and had obviously talked with Marti: "One memorable day in November 1891 . . . in the center of that large building . . . the tireless patriot Jose Dolores Poyo, who introduced Marti, was at the tribune . . . explaining that he came to offer the gratitude of his loyal friends, the sons of labor."

42 JOSE MARTI Poyo was informed of the now-famous "Liceo speech" in detail by Francisco Maria Gonzalez, a young stenographer who had been sent to Tampa to record the speech (Marti 1963, 4: 173). Gonzalez was introduced to Marti, talked with him, and was overwhelmed by his presence (Deulofeu 1905: 109; Trujillo 1896: 72). At an early age Gonzalez was already the director of two revolutionary papers in Cuba before moving to Key West in 1888. He has been described as a "fiery and cultivated" orator (Castellanos 1935: 214), who was also "an assiduous reader of history and philosophy" and could "discourse without preparation . . . as in the true Atheneum, on law and beauty" (Deulofeu 1905: 187). Not one to wait for things to happen, Gonzalez immediately took advantage of his position of reader in Gato's huge cigar factory. Instead of beginning with the usual reading of newspapers, he launched into a discourse on the providential qualities of Marti and the spectacular reception he had been given in Tampa. Then he asked his fellow workers why Key West should not also have a chance to show its love and gratitude to the great leader. He personally carried this same message in his conversations throughout the Cuban community (Deulofeu 1905: 147-48). "Arms uplifted, stamping on the floor with each phrase, he saw in Marti the genius of the revolution" (Marquez 1965: 296). The extension of an invitation to Marti obviously became a lively political question in the Key. Accounts of the process differ somewhat, but are important because they tell us much about the political climate in which events would take place. Juan Amao (1900: 256-57), one who was very much involved in these events, offers this version: "Stimulated in Key West by the example of Tampa, the fervent patriots Martin Herrera and Caytano Soria [both members of the Cuban Convention] sent a letter to Marti inviting him to come and fulfill the wishes of the inhabitants of Key West who made up the outstanding patriot element." Marti then wrote to Lamadriz, president of the Cuban Convention, asking if his presence in the Key would have a favorable result. Lamadriz brought the matter before the Convention, which voted fifteen to two in favor of an invitation. The two who opposed were among the most prominent members of the association-Juan Amao and Fernando Figueredo. But apparently the opposition of two prominent

THE TRIUMPHANT ARRIVAL OF MARTI 43 members was not sufficient to forestall a positive reply: "The preceding cautions were disregarded, obeying the law of the majority," and the Convention agreed to "the appointment of three representatives for the reception of Marti and a letter of approval." Marti had also written to Poyo thanking him for the article in El Yara and making it clear that he would welcome an invitation. No one, he said, could be more anxious than he was "to place what remains of my heart in the hands of the Key. . . . I bum with desire to see the Key with my own eyes." But, he continued, how could he come of his own accord "as a wellknown beggar who comes in search of friends"? Would people not think that it was because he wanted publicity or, even worse, because he was trying to impose his ideas on others? The latter possibility was especially troubling to him, "a man of simplicity and love who trembles at the thought that his brothers might fall into the authoritarian and fraudulent politics of the corrupt [malasl republics." He then turned to a theme he would embellish upon time and again: the exemplary qualities of Cuban Key West. "It is my dream that every Cuban might be an entirely free political being, as I understand the Cuban of the Key is." He would be happy to obey the command of these free political beings: "it is so pleasant to obey the command of one's compatriots!" (Marti 1963, 1: 275-76). As one of his biographers has observed, it was an invitation to be invited (Mafiach 1950: 278). Poyo published Marti's letter in El Yara, and the campaign to bring him to Key West was on its way. It was taken up by a small group of energetic, enthusiastic, and indomitable workers. We have already referred to Jose Maria Gonzalez, the reader in Gato's tobacco factory. A brief reference to another member of the group will be helpful in understanding who these workers were. Angel Pelaez was bom in Cuba in 1866 (he would have been 25 years of age when Marti arrived); he received an excellent education and was already in trouble with the Spanish authorities at the age of 19. He fled to Key West where he learned the trade of escojedor (selector) in a cigar factory. There he founded the club Lares de Yara and soon became known for his great eloquence in both speech and writing. According to Castellanos (1935: 283-84), "Pelaez, along with Gualterio Garcia and Francisco Maria Gonzalez made up Marti's favorite trio."

44 JOSE MARTI (Marti corresponded warmly with all three during the next few years.) Pelaez played a leading role in bringing Marti to Key West. He was elected president of the committee formed for this purpose, gave an impassioned speech in the cigar factory where he worked and, along with several others, went from door to door, factory to factory, collecting funds to pay for Marti's trip. But it would not be an easy job. From Pelaez's own account, there was little evidence of much enthusiasm among the traditional leaders: A worker, Seiior Angel Pelaez, believed that, at that time, Marti was the only one who could arouse some from their sleep and others from their indifference, unite the divided emigre elements and find a practical solution to their common aspiration. Another worker, Gualterio Garcia, also saw Marti as a predestined [leader]. Both of them, along with Jose Gonzalez Pompes, Frank E. Volio [usually spelled Bolio], Aurelio C. Rodriguez and Genaro Hernandez called their companions together at the San Carlos theater (Pelaez 1896: 147). But at that meeting little enthusiasm was shown among the veteran leaders (Azcuy 1930: 57-58). It seems that even those who attended, let alone those who became the committee to invite Marti, recognized themselves as bucking the mainstream in their community. They evea saw themselves as renegades: The exiles Iproscriptos] who gathered at the San Carlos were not many, the ones who elected the organizing committee made up of Angel Pelalez as President; Gualterio Garcia, Secretary; Frank E. Volio, Treasurer; Aurelio C. Rodriguez, Jose Pompes and Genaro Hernandez, members. . . . [Later] Francisco M. Gonzalez and Serafin Bello were added (Pelalez 1896: 148-49). Serafin Bello was an old friend and supporter of Marti. Other than Bello there was not one committee member from among the illustrious traditional leaders of the Key. Later, Marti

THE TRIUMPHANT ARRIVAL OF MARTI 45 referred to "that simple committee of the Key" when he reported to New Yorkers on his triumphant visit (Marti 1963, 4: 294). It appears that most of the veteran leaders were not even very enthusiastic about cooperating with the workers after the committee was formed. Pelaez (1896: 147) recalled the difficulties faced by the committee of modest workers. There was a difficulty, and that was the impossibility of the committee going to all the factories within a short time, because nearly all of the members were poor workers, [they were] on the committee in the spirit of patriotism and without pay. Each day meant for them the loss of one day's salary which was their bread, the life of their family. To overcome this problem . . . they used the little carreton [probably a small mule-drawn cart] of Jose G. Pompes. Apparently the patriotic factory owners were not prepared at this stage to give their workers time off to pursue the task of organization and collection of funds. As we shall see, however, they did join the bandwagon later, when several became generous contributors to Marti's organization. Another Key West resident at the time recalled a similar context of doubt and lack of enthusiasm. I, who was an enthusiastic supporter of Genaro Hernandez, Angel Pelaez, Frank Bolio and Gualterio Garcia, when they went from factory to factory, soliciting among the workers the necessary funds to pay for Marti's first visit to Key West, remember as if it were yesterday the phrases with which the old men expressed their skepticism concerning Marti's personal character and temperament (Mufioz 1917: 394). The skepticism which Mufioz observed was evident especially among the members of the Cuban Convention: "The Cuban Convention, composed mainly of veterans of the war and veteran emigres, did not participate in the preparation and maintained a wait and see attitude" (Carbonell 1935: 15). The committee was able to collect the necessary funds, however, and

46 JOSE MARTI an invitation was sent to Marti. Pelaez as president of the committee was chosen to draft and send the invitation. Marti replied as follows (Deulofeu 1905: 149; Castellanos 1935: 254): Seiior Angel Pelaez: I accept with lively satisfaction. I must preside at a meeting here on Saturday evening. I can leave for Tampa by train on the twelfth [of December] and arrive there on the twenty-second. Marti The committee did not simply wait for Marti to arrive. On December 22, the day of his expected arrival in Tampa, they distributed a manifesto "To the Cuban people." It was probably written by Pelaez and was widely distributed throughout Key West. Although it was addressed especially to the Cuban youth, it clearly had a meaning for all: "The moment has arrived in which it is necessary for the Cuban youth to lend itself, with acts of unquestionable significance, to the fulfillment of the duty imposed upon them by the memory of so many heroes." It recounted the many sacrifices of Marti, including "the distinction, in the early years of his youth, of dressing in prison garb and dragging the chains of a political convict." The committee reminded their compatriots that "we are writing the first page of the new revolution." At this point "we ask and count on the cooperation and assistance of all those who . . . are united among the faithful missionaries, among the believers Iprofesosl of today" (Deulofeu 1905: 149-51; Castellanos 1935: 255-56). The reference to Marti in prison garb was a useful strategy, since Marti had frequently been criticized for not having participated in the Ten Years War. The references to "the new revolution" and "the memory of so many heroes" were probably inspired by Marti. Lamadriz's now-famous remark on meeting Marti at the pier-"I embrace the future revolution"-was perhaps not entirely original. The manifesto was intended for more than the Key West colony. It was sent to all emigre centers and published in the Cuban press as well as in El Porvenir of New York (Castellanos 1935: 255-56). On December 24 Marti sent another telegram to the organizers announcing his imminent arrival at the Key (Deulofeu

THE TRIUMPHANT ARRIVAL OF MARTI 47 1905: 151): 111 but close to the Nobel Key.

Marti

On the morning of the next day, December 25, the day of Marti's arrival, the following flyer was distributed throughout the colony. It was handed out, door to door, and posted in conspicuous places. To the Cuban people: The meritorious patriot Jose Marti is at our doors. The ship that brings him will arrive at our shores this afternoon. Let us give a demonstration of our patriotism, marching together, receiving our brother compatriot, dear friend, eloquent tribune who, sacrificing everything, rushes to wherever he is called, wherever inescapable duties call him. Let us go together to where our heart impels us. Let us rush to clasp in our loyal arms the one so full of light, of faith and hope, who we will actually see, in order that all of us, united in genuinely Cuban thoughts, may engrave-engrave on high-the name of these exemplary and suffering emigres who today more than ever join us in an effective demonstration which we all demand. The political clubs, societies and corporations who wish to do so, as well as the fair sex and all the people, should come this afternoon, to the pier where the steamship Olivetti will tie up carrying our beloved brother Jose Marti (Deulofeu 1905: 151-52; Castellanos 1935: 258-59). The actual arrival, described in the opening passage of this chapter, was something of a popular consecration of leadership. In Tampa, Marti had been joined by an entourage complete with a musical band. With him were members of the two Tampa Clubs that had invited him there in November, including Ramon Rivero and Eligio Carbonell. He arrived with all the trappings of leadership.

48 JOSE MARTI Castellanos (1935: 259) tells us that it would be no exaggeration to say that an absolute majority of Cubans were at the pier. Houses and shops had been vacated. Marti refused the carriage that was offered to him, preferring to walk with the crowd-"on the wings of the love of my people." Flags were everywhere and in front of the club Patria y Libertad, at the initiative of Serafin Bello, there was a musical band (Castellanos 1935: 259, 261). The triumphal procession made its was to Duval House (sometimes called the Hotel Duval) at 119 Duval Street, only a few blocks from the pier. This was said to be the best hotel in Key West and was run by Madam Josephine Bolio, "a French woman of distinguished bearing and exquisite charm" (Alpizar 1947: 85). It advertised "ventilated rooms, nicely furnished for the traveler" (Key West Directory 1893: 215). The organizers had obviously spared nothing in order to show their respect for the honored guest. It is interesting to note also that Duval House stood across the street from the Russel House (114 Duval Street) which was then the office of the Spanish Consul General, Pedro Solis. Intentional or otherwise, it must have given many Cubans a certain delight to put Marti right under the nose of the Spanish representative. As the crowd entered Duval House, Genaro Hernandez, the representative of the reception committee, jumped up on a chair and introduced Marti. Marti's brief impromptu speech, presumable delivered from atop the chair also, was a paean to Cuban Key West with careful references to justice: The medicine is here, Cubans. . . . Here lies the comfort of the soul. . . . Here lies the love of this sacred home. Although not the legitimate one that I dream of in my fever and delirium, the one of definitive justice for my people, this one has the best yeast to raise it and to nourish its roots with the pure and sincere tears like those of this young man [Genaro Hernandez} and yours (Marti 1963, 4: 289). Marti was very ill when he arrived and the reference to medicine, fever and delirium might very well have been prompted by this. But these references as well as references to the tears and suffering of the Cuban exiles were all part of a biblical-

THE TRIUMPHANT ARRIVAL OF MARTI 49 milenarian frame of reference which Marti frequently employed. He also spoke of "this conjunction of pain and this perseverance in sacrifice . . . [of] the country redeemed . . . in our temporary residence in a foreign land." We will see many other examples of such references as we move along. That evening a banquet was offered for Marti at Duval House, which boasted the "finest dinners . . . equal to Delmonicos" (Key West Directory 1893: 65). Again the organizing committee had planned it well. Marti was seated between the two most renowned patriarchs of the Cuban community-Jose Francisco Lamadriz and Juan Amao (Trujillo 1896: 83; Castellanos 1935: 262). More than a decade earlier, Marti had arranged for Lamadriz to speak at Steak hall in New York. The veteran conspirator was then president of the New York committee that was trying to raise funds for the Calixto Garcia expedition. When he moved to Key West in 1880, Marti provisionally occupied the post that Lamadriz had filled until that time (Figueredo 1916: 33). Juan Amao, whom Marti (1963, 1: 33), later addresses as "Seiior Don Juan," had been a conspirator since 1850 and was equally revered in the Cuban community of Key West (Azcuy 1930: 59). Neither of the old conspirators was particularly enthusiastic about Marti, but it seems clear that neither was strongly opposed to him either (Castellanos 1935: 254; Amao 1900: 226-29), even though Amao had been opposed to extending an invitation in the first place. The fact that Marti was seated between the two patriarchs has been treated as a matter of transcendental importance by all the reporters of the event-those who were in Key West at the time and those who later reported on the basis of recent oral history (Trujillo 1896: 83; Castellanos 1935: 262; Alpizar 1947: 85; Perez 1928: 25). It must have had an equal effect on the community at large. In a community in which elders were highly respected, this at least symbolized a certain "provisional acceptance" by the old revolution. But there were also representatives of other constituencies, including Ramon Rivero, the labor organizer and journalist from Tampa. Marti was introduced by Fancisco Maria Gonzalez, the reader-orator form Gato's factory. In spite of his severe illness, Marti managed to survive "an extravagance of toasts and poetic recitations" and delivered three speeches of his own in the course

50 JOSE MARTI of the evening. Outside Duval House, "Duval Street was invaded by the public" (Castellanos 1935: 262; Trujillo 1896: 83). Marti's condition worsened, and on the morning of December 26 it became critical. The Cuban community had its own exile doctors and one of them, Eligio Palma, who was also a member of the Cuban convention, was brought in. His stately home still stands at 1208 Duval Street, several blocks from where Marti was staying. Dr. Plama prescribed total rest and no visitors until the prohibition was lifted on January 1. These were historic events, crowded into a single afternoon and evening. They played an important part in the transfer of leadership which was in fact already under way. There would be much more of the same when Marti renewed his hectic schedule on January 1. The veteran leaders would have their say in conversations within clubs and with members of the Cuban Convention, but the mass of Cubans, mostly workers, would have their say in the streets, the tobacco factories, and in other clubs.

5

The Transfer of Leadership: I The invitation from Ibor City Tampa was truly the cry of the eagle. The invitation from Key West was the full burst of sunshine (Carbonell 1952: 142).

In the hectic days between January 1 and January 6, Marti and his enthusiasts moved resolutely ahead in the process of establishing his leadership. Their activities took a number of forms, all of which show an instinctive understanding of the components of authority and leadership, by his promoters as well as by Marti himself. A delegation of workers from the cigar factory of Eduardo Gato came to Marti and asked him to make the factory of that self-made millionaire his first stop. The huge factory was set among hundreds of little houses and was the center of what was known as Barrio de Gato. According to Castellanos it employed some 700 workers (1935: 266). Marti wisely consented. He could hardly have made a better start. The workers were expecting him, of course, and they had decorated the factory with multicolored hangings and cuban flags. Marti arrived, surrounded by a retinue of more than a hundred enthusiastic supporters. The huge building vibrated with the "thunderous applause and indescribable cheers" of the workers (Trujillo 1896: 85). As was customary, introductory speeches were offered by several members of the entourage. Anyone reading the personal accounts of the numerous veladas and public functions in Cuban Key West could only conclude that the number of speakers who demonstrated their oratorical skill prior to the main speaker was a measure of the importance of the latter. The point was obviously well made in this case, and

52 JOSE MARTI Marti, after what must have been a long wait, obliged with an impromptu oratorical display of more than an hour (Castellanos 1935: 267). Doors had to be closed because "the streets had invaded the workplace" and filled it to capacity. "The daily labors of the serious workplace were paralyzed as it was turned into a temple of civic festivities," reported the correspondent of New York's El Porvenir (Trujillo 1896: 85). The workers at Gato's factory presented Marti with an album containing dozens of inscriptions declaring their admiration and support for the emerging leader. Poyo (1986: 22) offers us a particularly moving example of these inscriptions: "The independence of Cuba will be an indisputable fact when all Cubans think like the eminent Cuban orator Jose Marti." Observers, participants, and others have described a similar scene of "organized pandemonium" as Marti went from factory to factory. He spoke in all the factories, according to Castellanos (1935: 268)—possibly a bit of poetic license but certainly indicative of the extent of his coverage of the community. Crowds joined the entourage in the streets until it seemed as if all the Cuban community was being swept up in this storm of mass participation (Perez 1928: 15; Trujillo 1896: 85; Castellanos 1935: 266-68; Carbonell 1952: 137-38; Marquez 1965: 297-99). There were similar scenes at Caytano Soria's large factory. The building was elaborately decorated with palm branches, a special festive touch which still survives in a few places in Cuban Key West. When the entourage came into view they were announced by a trumpet and 18 salvos (Lizaso 1958: 146-47). This was clearly more than a friendly reception. The process of leadership transference was moving along. The entire community seemed to be participant and witness. Nothing like this had ever happened before in any of the emigre communities. It could not have happened in New York where, as has been noted, emigres were far more dispersed throughout the large metropolis and the tobacco workers, the foundation of these activities, made up only a small part of the colony. Marti's stay in Tampa had been much briefer; he arrived at midnight on November 25 and left for New York on November 28 (Lubian y Arias 1984: 24). The sensation there seems to have been his Liceo speech, although he had visited some factories on the day of his departure and had met with local leaders. Only a small crowd had met him at the train station but enthusiasm grew

THE TRANSFER OF LEADERSHIP: I 53 during those few days until the largest public demonstration was at his departure, where it was said that some 4,000 people saw him off (Mafiach 1950: 277). As noted, reports of that enthusiasm were brought to Key West and were used in preparation for the mass displays that have been described. A great public meeting had been set for December 26 at Key West's San Carlos, but because of Marti's illness it was postponed until January 3. An hour before the event was scheduled to begin, it was necessary to close the doors because the entire theater was packed. In the San Carlos and in the streets outside, more than 5,000 people had gathered (Castellanos 1935: 264). A long list of local orators preceded Marti's speech of more than an hour. El Porvenir's Key West correspondent described the memorable speech in words that tried, but clearly failed, to evoke the rhetoric of Marti. His speech was listened to with religious unction, interrupted from time to time with warm applause. His easy and gentle words, like the cooing of the enamored turtledove, flowed gently like the soft fleeting breeze that perfumed the air, offering a delightful ambrosia to the soul. At the rostrum he has something of the Evangelist and his words have much of what Christians attribute to the Divine Martyr of Golgotha (Trujillo 1896: 84). During those days and evenings Marti also held conversations with individual clubs and other patriotic associations, where he outlined his ideas and plans. Here, in a more intimate atmosphere, he would use his remarkable persuasive skills to make followers out of those workers who were not already convinced. He sat down with labor activists, including anarchists, to persuade them of his design for the Cuban Revolution. One who knew him well reported that "with his logic and seductive persuasion, he made a humane and practical revolutionary out of the die-hard anarchist" (Cruz 1895: 99). Others who knew him have offered similar accounts of his skills in action with the workers of Key West (Mufioz 1917: 343-47). No wonder, then, that the editor of Patria, one of Marti's closest assistants, could refer to "his [Marti's] beloved workers, the emigres of Key West" (Figueroa 1903: 378). Comelio Brito,

54 JOSE MARTI who had heard Marti in Tampa, is said to have convinced his friend Ruperto Pedroso, a black saloon-keeper, to give a luncheon in his home in Marti's honor (Mafiach 1950: 281-82). Clubs competed for the honor of initiating Marti as a member of their association. The fact that they did not have to wait long after his recovery is demonstrated by a large bronze emblem that hangs over the door of an old building still standing at 728 Duval Street. In this place, the location of perseverance lodge No. 6 of the order of Caballeros de la Luz Jose Marti Apostle of the Independence of Cuba was initiated on January 3, 1892 The activity in the streets, the factories, and the clubs clearly demonstrated the popularity of Marti. That is something which we must keep in mind when we consider what was undoubtedly the most important phase of his efforts during his first visit to Key West: the formation of a revolutionary party. The crucial hurdle in this process was the Cuban Convention. Its importance in Key West has already been discussed. What must be emphasized here is that it was an association that perceived itself as the legitimate center and leader of the Cuban struggle for independence. Colonel Figueredo, probably the most influential member of the Convention, has left no doubt about his perception of the organization (remember, it was publicly referred to as Luz de Yara, for reasons of secrecy): Luz de Yara, perhaps a year prior to the organization of the Cuban Revolutionary Party was [already] a perfect organization. . . . Luz de Yara, by means of its committees of war and correspondence, had [already] revolutionized a large part of the island [Cuba]. . . . In Key West, the club received all the agents from the island of Cuba (Deulofeu 1905: 168; Azcuy 1930: 52).

THE TRANSFER OF LEADERSHIP: I 55 What was now going on in Key West could hardly have been perceived as anything but a challenge to the "perfect" organization. One need not question the sincere patriotic motives of such an association in assuming that its members would probably not take lightly the idea of having its functions replaced by another organization. The situation was the more delicate because at least three influential members of the organization had serious doubts about Marti as a potential leader—Amao, Figueredo, and Lamadriz. Recollections of the Marti-Gomez controversy of 1884-85 were still evident. Perhaps the strongest opposition came from Figueredo. In order to understand the importance of this influential leader in Key West as well as within the Convention, it will be helpful to know more about him. Fernando Figueredo Socarras was bom in 1846 (he was seven years older than Marti) of two prominent families in Camagiiey. He received his higher education in engineering in the United States and returned to Cuba to participate in the Ten Years War. During the war he was, among other things, secretary to the president of the Republic in Arms, Carlos Manuel de Cespedes, chief of staff under General Manuel de Jesus Calvar and in 1876, he was elected deputy from Oriente and made Secretary of the Legislative Chamber of the Republic in Arms. He could and did claim both civil and military experience. In 1878 he and a large contingent of the Figueredo and Socarras families went into exile, first in the Dominican Republic and, in 1881, in Key West (Figueredo 1916: 34; 1964: cover). By this time, the families were said to be in dire straits and were aided by Key West tobacco entrepreneur Teodoro Perez (Deulofeu 1905: 225). He quickly became one of the most prominent and respected members of the Cuban community. He gave a series of popular lectures on the Ten Years War which were first published in 1885 (Figueredo 1964). Clearly an accomplished writer, he was also one of the local orators (Castellanos 1935: 146; Deulofeu 1905: 225-27). His North American education and knowledge of English made him a valuable liaison with the Anglo-American community. He was elected a member of the Florida legislature in 1884, and later he became Superintendent of Public Instruction for Monroe County. His close friend Carlos Manuel de Cespedes, son of the late president of the Republic in

56 JOSE MARTI Arms, whom Figueredo had served earlier, was elected mayor of Key West in 1876 and was closely associated with both the Cuban and Anglo-American communities (Browne 1973: 118). Clearly Figueredo was a force to be reckoned with. And he was not favorably disposed toward Marti. By his own account, he was not even in favor of inviting Marti to Key West. "I was opposed, and when he arrived I did not go, as did everyone, to the pier to receive him. I did, however, contribute to the banquet given on his arrival" (Figueredo 1916: 39-40). His opposition was further shown by his absence at the banquet to which he had contributed (Mafiach 1950: 280). Figueredo undoubtedly recognized Marti as a powerful force with which to contend. He later recalled that "Marti seized every opportunity to extract the fullest advantage from that visit and to obtain from that enthusiasm [shown in Key West] every gain that it offered to him" (Figueredo 1916: 39). That might explain his somewhat ambiguous position, that is, of not being present for the arrival of Marti or attending the banquet, while contributing toward its expenses. The day after Marti's arrival he did in fact call on Marti, along with Lamadriz and Poyo. But, as he later made clear, in this case he was acting as a delegate for the Cuban Convention (Figueredo 1916: 39-40). Marti moved resolutely and judiciously, carefully recognizing the primacy of the Convention. On January 3 he gave an extended and elaborated version of the Tampa Resolutions-now under the rubric of Bases of the Cuban Revolutionary Party—to a triumvirate (Figueredo, Poyo, Lamadriz) representing the Convention. Later he met with the apparently not too enthusiastic members of the Convention in a secret meeting at the home of Gerardo Castellanos on Duval Street (Castellanos 1944: 128-29, 215). Apparently there was yet another meeting with the triumvirate when, as Figueredo (1916: 41) later recalled, Marti "had not slept during the entire night: he had spent it coordinating and putting on paper his grandiose thoughts, the admirable work on the rules and bases of the Cuban Revolutionary Party." Marti obviously employed the full extent of his persuasive skills. According to one of Figueredo's biographers: Lamadriz, Poyo and Figueredo listened to the marvelous propagandist with noticeable excitement.

THE TRANSFER OF LEADERSHIP: I 57 They heard him declare that he had not gone to Key West anxious to be the object of showy receptions. He was there only to begin organizing the war for the independence and liberty of Cuba. Marti then set forth his plans based principally on the unification of the emigre colonies, that is, on founding a party, broader than the Convention, which would bring together all the emigre associations (Carbonell 1935: 16). One senses from that account that Marti might have been a bit concerned that the popular demonstrations of support had only served to reinforce the suspicions of the veteran leaders. He obviously did not want to be seen as the outside agitator who was using the masses to invade their territory. According to the same account, when the three had taken leave of Marti they exchanged impressions in the street. Poyo said, "Let's help this man by offering him our patriotic support and our cooperation." To which Figueredo added, "And let it not be said if he fails that the Convention was to blame" (Carbonell 1935: 16; Castellanos 1935: 263). Marti received a favorable reply and called a meeting on January 5, 1892. Twenty-seven Cubans including Marti, attended. Three delegates represented the Tampa Clubs, ten represented clubs in Key West, Marti represented New York and 13 were socalled "invited delegates" who did not represent any specific local club. Of the 13 invited delegates, 11 were members of the Cuban Convention (they appeared without affiliation for reasons of secrecy) and two of those representing specific Key West clubs were also Convention members. Thus the Convention was well represented, with 13 of the 27 members in attendance (Deulofeu 1905: 160;, Castellanos 1935: 271; Poyo 1983: 295, 350-51). Minutes, fortunately preserved, were kept by Marti's enthusiastic supporter Francisco Maria Gonzalez, who had been one of the movers in bringing Marti to Key West. Marti chaired the meeting, probably the most important of his career. It was, as the minutes recorded, a meeting of "the presidents of individual political groupings of Cuban separatists of this locality [Key West] as well as political groups . . . from Ibor City in Tampa and various respected persons not affiliated with political clubs, but considered favorable to the sacred cause of liberty and

58 JOSE MARTI independence of Cuba." Marti, "the prominent representative of the independent political associations of New York, where he resides, presided" (Deulofeu 1905: 156; Castellanos 1935: 268). Marti had prepared the groundwork for the meeting and it seems likely that a majority of those in attendance were at least open-minded and willing to listen and be convinced by the visitor from New York. We have already noted that many of the veteran leaders already believed that new leadership was necessary. Of the delegates who were members of the Cuban Convention, Poyo, Soria, Perez, Gato, Castellanos, Bello, and Herrera were probably sympathetic to Marti by this time. Representatives of the Club Ignacio Agramonte and the Liga Patriotica Cubana of Tampa were on hand. They had been instrumental in bringing Marti to Tampa and had accompanied him to Key West for the festive and sensational arrival there on December 25. Labor leaders and other supporters were also present as representatives of various clubs: Carlos Borrego, Francisco Camellon, Carlos Balifio, and Francisco M. Gonzalez. Carlos Balifio had been president of a club named after the great Spanish anarchist Fermin Salvoechea (Thomas 1971: 305). He has been described as a cultivated and restless writer, a tireless promoter of radicalism and the rights of labor, always fighting for the just demands of the workers (Castellanos 1935: 225-26). We have seen examples of his writing in an earlier chapter. Carlos Borrego and Francisco Camellon were influential members of the black community in Key West. They arrived in Key West in the 1870s and were active in the independence movement and in local political affairs (Poyo 1986: 22). Marti's reading of the Bases, "slowly and clearly," was the first order of business. The Tampa resolutions (the earlier version of the Bases) called only for a "revolutionary organization"-a generic reference. In Key West Marti moved beyond that concept. Each of the eight articles of the Bases began with the words "the Cuban Revolutionary Party." The existence of the party was now taken for granted, and it was the party of the Cuban revolutionary movement: "The Cuban Revolutionary Party is constituted in order to achieve . . . the absolute independence of the island of Cuba" (Marti 1963, 1: 279). In Key West, the principles of the movement were also stated more elaborately and clearly. Thus the Cuban Revolutionary Party rejected "the authoritarian spirit and

THE TRANSFER OF LEADERSHIP: I 59 bureaucratic composition of the colony" in favor of "a new and sincerely democratic people, capable of overcoming, through dedicated work and the equilibrium of social forces, the dangers of sudden liberty in a society [hitherto] organized around slavery" (Marti 1963, 1: 279). The equilibrium of society and the need for controlled liberty reflected Marti's own philosophy and must have allayed the fears of some of the delegates who might have suspected Marti of unleashing a radical revolution. But the party also rejected the idea of "a victorious group which considers the island as its spoils Ipresal and domain." Instead, it called for a "war which must be made for the honor and good of all Cubans" (Marti 1963, 279-80). The minutes record that the Bases were approved "decisively" (definitivamente) and it was agreed that the documents should be submitted to the various clubs for their final approval. (I have translated definitivamente as "decisively" because translating it as "definitively," the more literal translation, might be misleading. The Bases were to be submitted to the clubs for approval, and thus they were, strictly speaking, not definitively approved.) The assembly then empowered Marti to draft the statutes that would govern the new party. It also named Francisco Gonzalez as "interim secretary" for the coordination of communications between Marti and the various clubs concerning approval of the projected statutes. Approval of the Bases and authorization of Marti to draft the statutes was a remarkable accomplishment. It should be emphasized that the drafting of the statutes was not to be the work of a committee; it was handed over to Marti unilaterally. The appointment of Gonzalez as coordinator in Key West was no less a victory. The job of coordination would be a strategic one and it was important to have it in the friendly care of Gonzalez, who "saw in Marti the genius of the revolution" (Marquez 1965: 296). Clearly Marti had walked away with the meeting. Three different but converging perspectives on the Key West meeting tell us much about the reasons for Marti's success. Castellanos (1942: 93) has pointed out that Marti was far more than a spellbinding orator. He was also a highly skilled, convincing, and disarming debater. "Although that assembly was made up of well-intentioned persons and some highly cultured patricians, one must agree that they were not qualified to contend with the skill and capability of Marti."

60 JOSE MARTI The recollections of a Convention member who was a delegate at the meeting also suggest that most of the delegates were indeed overwhelmed by Marti's skill and eloquence. Juan Calderon made these observations in looking back at what had happened: Nothing was analyzed . . . nor were any observations made, nor were any clarifications requested. Everything was reduced to the most complete and premeditated acceptance of what Marti had proposed. ... In a chorus, three or four of those present recommended approval, and the rest of us who watched, listened and remained silent, found ourselves sanctioning that which had been so eloquently articulated, [something] which in reality very few of us understood until much later (Trujillo 1896: 86-87). The recollections of Colonel Figueredo offer us yet another perspective on Marti's success. It appears that Marti went out of his way to convince the Convention that he was only adopting and extending their work. It is worth noting here that many episodes in Marti's career show that he was indeed a master of that tactic. Figueredo later recounted what had happened when he, Poyo, and Lamadriz visited Marti while the latter was confined to his bed at Duval House. The three delegates talked about what the Convention was doing in Key West and Marti talked about his plans for a party: "It would be the same as the Convention [but] on a larger scale. Anyway, 'from what I can see,' the agitator added, 'everything is done here and I only have to attend to the other emigre centers'" (Figueredo 1916: 40). Figueredo also leaves the impression that the Convention had indeed been Marti's model: "If this organization which is called 'the Convention' had provided no other service than the incontestable fact of its having served as the firm and solid base for Marti's creation of the Cuban Revolutionary Party, that would be sufficient recognition of its great practical utility" (Figueredo 1916: 38). Castellanos and others offer a third perspective: many of the veteran leaders, recognizing the powerful projection of Marti, were making virtue out of necessity. Thus Castellanos (1944: 119-20, 129) has referred to "the final moments when the

THE TRANSFER OF LEADERSHIP: I 61 organization with all its components was falling into the orbit of Marti and the Revolutionary Party, . . . [when the Convention] was liquidated." The idea of Marti taking over the organization was probably preferable to the idea of his replacing it. This view perhaps explains Figueredo's assertion that it had served as a solid base for the new party of Marti. The assertion is not without foundation, but the differences between the old organization and the new one in the process of creation were many and important. Marti's style of leadership is certainly the better explanation for their apparent willingness to be "co-opted"-at least for the moment. "Conquer but do not defeat" was a part of Marti's style. As we shall see, however, the Convention was still alive and there would be other difficult hurdles ahead. The statutes of the party were yet to be written and, what is more important, they would have to be approved. What would happen when Marti, with his eloquence and skill, was no longer present in Key West? Perhaps the committee of enthusiastic supporters that had invited Marti was aware of this. Perhaps the committee had this in mind when the events of the final day were organized and promoted with the same zeal as the provisions for Marti's arrival. They must have understood the impact of these public events on the public mind. They were so much a part of the process of the transferral of leadership that it is worth looking at them in some detail. They were far more colorful events. A final gala event at the San Carlos and another triumphal procession, this time to the pier, were planned for the night of January 6. On the morning of that day, flyers were once again distributed and posted throughout the city (Deulofeu 1905: 163; Castellanos 1935: 274). To the Cuban People: The hour has come for the necessary final manifestation in honor of our beloved guest Jose Marti. Today he leaves us for New York, and, with this in mind, the committee hopes that not a single Cuban lover of liberty will lack the good will and fraternity to bid farewell to the honored patriot who

62 JOSE MARTI holds within himself only love, affection and respect for all those of good will. "The farewell tonight at eight." The Organizing Committee Key West, January 6, 1892 The interesting detail about the flyer is the fact that no place of meeting is mentioned for the final event. Obviously, everyone knew where it would be: where else but the "cathedral of Cuban patriotism . . . the house of the Cuban spirit . . . the soul of Cuba?" Those are only a few of the titles which residents bestowed upon the legendary San Carlos on Duval Street. The gala event seems to have surpassed even the previous events. And it was more than just another demonstration of Marti's popularity, although it was indeed that. Martin Herrera, Serafin Bello, Jose Pompes, and Genaro Hernandez offered speeches building up to the featured guest. It is noteworthy that all except Martin Herrera had been prime movers in the efforts to bring Marti to Key West, and Herrera and Bello were the only veteran leaders. Both Herrera and Bello were members of the Cuban Convention at one time or another (Alpizar 1947: 73; Castellanos 1935: 166-67; Deulofeu 1906: 164). A word about Martin Herrera might help to understand the importance of his participation in this public event. He came to Key West in 1869, among the first wave of emigres. A devoted reader of the French Revolution, that upheaval is said to have been a major inspiration in his life. More than almost any other Key West Cuban, except perhaps Poyo, he was a symbol of endless personal sacrifice and tireless work for the cause of Cuban independence. Among his many occupations, simultaneous or sequential, he operated the Hotel Monroe, which stood on the comer of Whitehead and Division Street (now Truman Avenue). The hotel, a rambling two-story structure, was always on the verge of bankruptcy and frequently insolvent because Herrera was seldom paid for food and lodging. It was a place of refuge for countless Cubans passing through the Key or planning to establish temporary roots there. It was also a place of conspiracy, meetings, and much talk of heroism and rebellion. In addition to being a hotel keeper, Herrera at one time or another operated a cafe, a restaurant, grocery store, meat market and general store

THE TRANSFER OF LEADERSHIP: I 63 (Figueredo 1916: 58-74; Castellanos 1935: 191-93). He was indeed among the most celebrated and respected of Cuban emigres. Marti of course addressed the packed and enthusiastic house, but perhaps the most important aspect of the meeting was the first public reading of the Bases of the Revolutionary Party. This time the reading was done not by Marti, but by his friend Fancisco Maria Gonzalez, "with his sonorous voice of an organ" (Castellanos 1935: 274). "They [the Bases] were greeted with an explosion of applause and loud vivas, giving approval to that which was being articulated, the bond that united all emigre Cubans for the 'Obra Magna'" (Deulofeu 1905: 164). The public reading of the Bases was far more than a "media event," to use a term of modem usage. It was indeed that, but it served three other purposes. First, it made sure that mmors would not be floating about. The Bases could not be portrayed as dangerous and self-serving (for Marti) or serving the goals of classes, cliques, or interests. The public would know the details in advance. Second, it could be made clear that they had been approved by a variety of patriotic leaders at the historic meeting on January 5. Finally, the wider public was given an opportunity to participate. The public was indeed given an opportunity to approve even before the club presidents had ratified the decision of the January 5 meeting. For those still reluctant, it must have carried a message: events were moving ahead of them. Any of the veteran leaders who were still in doubt must have experienced a sense of frustration. They were being challenged by an outsider in their own bailiwick. They had never been able to organize the masses, but Marti had done in a few days what they were unable to do and in fact did not have the skills to accomplish (Ibarra 1981: 49). Colonel Figueredo (1916: 39), writing some 14 years after the event, shrewdly analyzed the situation as only he could do. He referred to the popularity of Marti as shown in the many public demonstrations. But he sensed that Marti wanted more than just popularity: he "seized every opportunity to extract the fullest advantage from that visit and to obtain from that enthusiasm [shown in Key West] every gain that it offered to him." In those few days Marti had accomplished at least four things. First, he had demonstrated mass support even beyond

64 JOSE MARTI what he might have hoped for. This consolidated the influence of his most enthusiastic supporters and probably brought the uncommitted into his orbit. Doubters and opposition were at least forced to take note. Second, and related, he had begun to give the struggle a set of objectives beyond the mere political aims of independence. This would be a "peoples' war" for the good of all Cubans, not just a struggle in which ends and means were placed in the hands of a small, self-appointed clique of heroes. Third, he had established a circle of new friends and enthusiastic supporters, and he had strengthened ties with a few old ones. This circle formed a "family" within the larger "revolutionary family," one within which he could continue the process of consolidation and extension of his leadership. As will be seen, his personality, interpersonal skills, and attention to minute details played an important part. Finally, he was already in the process of building the new Cuban state, a state that was to be built on the foundation of principles which he never ceased to call to the attention of the "family."

6

The Transfer of Leadership: II It is truly beautiful to see a revolutionary party that chooses to follow the radical work of its forefathers while creating new roots (Marti 1963, 1: 389).

Back in New York, a first order of business was the Secret Statutes of the Cuban Revolutionary Party. A prominent Tampa leader has stated that Marti wrote the statutes in a Tampa meeting with him and three others on November 25, 1891 (Poyo 1983: 322, n.28). If that were the case, then they had already been written a month before Marti arrived in Key West. Much depends upon what is meant by "wrote the statutes." The minutes of the January 5 meeting in Key West show only that it was agreed that "Sr. Marti should be charged with drafting them fredactarlasl in accordance with what had been said" (Castellanos 1935: 270). The context in which that statement appears suggests that "drafting them" conveys the proper meaning in English. A reasonable assumption, then, is that they were indeed sketched out at the meeting in Tampa, presented as principles or a basis for discussion in Key West, and then rewritten or drafted by Marti. It will be remembered that the Bases had also been considerably amplified between the Tampa and Key West meetings, and they, unlike the statutes, were approved decisively (definitivamente) or, possibly, "in final form," to use a contextual translation. Under the statutes, patriotic associations or clubs were the foundation of party authority. All associations of Cubans in favor of independence who accepted the Bases and program of the Cuban Revolutionary Party could belong. These were to be the

66 JOSE MARTI freely constituted associations in each emigre colony, and they would have one vote for every 20 to 100 members. The presidents of the various associations in each colony would make up what was called the Advisory Council (Cuerpo de Consejo) and that council would in turn elect its own president and secretary. The councils, through their presidents, were the formal intermediaries between the delegate of the party and the associations in the emigre colonies. Presumably there would be one such council in each emigre colony. They were supposed to authorize the communication that presidents of the associations wished to direct to the delegate. They could also begin and carry out a process for removal of the delegate. Such a process would begin with a resolution by majority vote in any council. The resolution would then be passed on to other councils for their consideration. The associations or clubs in all the emigre colonies would elect annually the delegate (head or president) and treasurer of the party. The designation "delegate" rather than "president" was preferred by Marti because it better conveyed the idea of responsibility to the associations and their members who were the foundation of the whole party structure. Ibarra (1981: 113) also tells us that in Cuban historiography the presidential regime suggested a concentration of powers and lack of immediate responsibility. Furthermore, there had been a president of the Republic in Arms during the Ten Years War. That had left a very controversial and bitter issue which Marti probably preferred to leave behind. But the use of the term "delegate" for what was in fact the highest office of the party could not disguise the fact that the delegate was for all practical purposes given a free hand in running the party. That was indeed something that brought sharp criticism. Delegate and secretary had to face election each year, however, and that provided a democratic argument in favor of the statutes. Associations were to collect funds through regular contributions for war and for an action fund. It was later agreed that the war funds (one-half of collections) would be retained by the clubs for employment when the war broke out. The action fund (also one-half of the collections) would be sent on to the party treasury. Action funds were intended for organizing and

THE TRANSFER OF LEADERSHIP: II 67 promoting the cause of independence and otherwise promoting the revolutionary movement. The delegate was required to: carry out the aims of the party; extend the party organization, especially in Cuba; oversee a thrifty administration of party funds; render an annual account of action funds at least one month prior to annual elections; inform local party councils of all necessary news; and receive approval of the treasurer for all payments made with action funds. Paragraph six of article five in particular opened up a wide latitude of authority: to judiciously use all possible resources for propagation, publication, and defense of revolutionary ideas. The statutes allowed total autonomy of the internal affairs of the associations, while concentrating party affairs in the hands of the delegate. As noted, the latter could be dismissed if the councils so decided and, additionally, he had to stand for election each year (Marti 1963, 1: 281-84). The Secret Statutes of the Cuban Revolutionary Party present an interesting example of the innovative leadership of Marti. They reflect his philosophy of the necessary and proper relationship between democratic accountability and the requirements of effective leadership. The very origins of the statutes were indeed a reflection of that innovative leadership. This was not to be the task for a committee that might deliberate endlessly and come up with a bag of unworkable compromises. It was to be the work of a single individual, acting upon duly granted authority. It would be submitted to the fundamental or grassroots associations for approval or rejection. With any other procedures it seems unlikely that a workable document could have been produced and put into operation. The statutes show an ability to reconcile centrifugal and even contradictory needs and forces. The need for centralized and decisive action at the top was reconciled with genuine grassroots input at the base of the organization in a way previously unknown in the rebel organization. On March 14 the first issue of Partia appeared. There Marti carried on a tireless campaign in favor of the statutes. In the first issue he referred to the "patriotic rebirth that dawned in Tampa and Key West." And in a long article, "Our Ideas," he explained the ideals and philosophy of the party (Marti 1963, 1: 315-22, 325). On April 3, another long article explained in more detail its nature and purpose. Here he spoke of it as an

68 JOSE MARTI accomplished fact: "The Cuban Revolutionary Party is the Cuban People. . . . After twelve years of incessant and silent work the Cuban Revolutionary Party has emerged-tested and purified." The party would rescue the Cuban people "if its methods are in conformity with its [noble] origins and purpose; it will perish and fail to rescue, only if it deviates from its sublime spirit" (Marti 1963, 1: 366, 369). Key West, with by far the largest number of clubs, was crucial in the process of approval of the statutes. Marti did not sit back and wait for things to take their course, and from New York he carried on a vigorous correspondence with an astounding number of people whom he had met while visiting the island. Some of them he had known earlier through correspondence or personal contact. It was not simply the approval of the statutes that was to be decided; his own election as delegate was also an issue. While he seems not to have mentioned his own election in this correspondence, surely everyone knew that he was a candidate. Before we turn to his Key West correspondence, we will need to take a brief look at what was happening in New York, which was important for what Marti wanted to have happen in Key West and other emigre colonies. Marti lost no time in organizing New York. There were problems, however. As always, the big city was difficult to handle. There were old resentments, quarrels, jealousies, and reservations growing out of the past, and they were firmly entrenched in the emigre colony there. New York Cubans were also concerned that Key West with its radical tobacco workers was trying to take over the revolution, and Marti's triumphal reception there did not help matters. All of that had been reported in emigre newspapers. Was not Marti dangerously courting these elements in his bid for power? Yet, as we shall see, New York was in many respects less of a problem than Key West, so far as the immediate task of statutes and elections was concerned. After all, Marti was in New York where he could and did employ those same skills and talents that had served him so well on the Key. Only a few days after his return to New York, a meeting of the club Los Independientes was called, and the club quickly approved the statutes. Enrique Tmjillo (1896: 106-7), editor of New York's El Porvenir, complained that only 13 members had attended the meeting, including Marti. What was worse, he

THE TRANSFER OF LEADERSHIP: II 69 continued, there was virtually no discussion and no questions were asked. (It will be remembered that Juan Calderon, a member of the Cuban Convention, had made this same complaint about the meeting in Key West at which the Bases were approved.) At the New York meeting of Los Independientes Tmjillo cast the only dissenting vote. Then in rapid succession, Tmjillo reported, four more clubs were formed. This was quickly followed by the same rapid approval of the statutes, without discussion and without questions. Tmjillo now complained, and probably with good reason, that "the clubs were not constituted to discuss the statutes but only to approve them." He made his protests known in club after club. The statutes, he protested, provided for a dictatorship within the revolutionary movement and they "sanctioned an absolute dictatorship for one year." Tmjillo's strong opposition to what was going on probably had much to do with his suspicion of the primarily working-class Cubans in Florida, especially in Key West, and his fear of an increasing influence of labor radicals in the independence movement (Poyo 1986: 24). But Tmjillo's complaints that all was being done too quickly and without sufficient discussion or opportunity for dissent should not be taken lightly. He was indeed objecting to what he perceived as Marti's style of leadership, and he was calling attention to the dangers inherent in a popular charismatic leader with mass appeal. He soon found out the limits of dissent. His protests were singularly unsuccessful in the face of Marti's growing popularity and skill. All four clubs approved the statutes quickly and easily. But his attacks continued until the four New York clubs voted to declare him no longer a member of the Cuban Revolutionary Party. They even went beyond this and placed El Porvenir on a sort of "voluntary index." According to the clubs, it was not to be considered appropriate reading for party members (Tmjillo 1896: 137-42). According to Poyo (1983: 303), the reading of El Porvenir in the Florida cigar factories was prohibited. A frustrated Tmjillo sought allies and support in Key West. He was undoubtedly aware of lingering doubts and potential opposition to Marti among some of the veteran leaders. In an open letter to Poyo's El Yara, he appealed for support (Tmjillo

70 JOSE MARTI 1896: 144-45). But his appeal did not receive the sympathy that he probably expected. Poyo's letter of reply was polite but firm: What do we [in Key West] have to do with that? Does not our esteemed friend [Tmjillo] belong to three or four clubs of the party in New York? Why not, using the discretion which Cubans ought to, discuss your points of view there? The director of El Porvenir should understand that what has happened is regrettable; and although we do not assume that your attitude has placed you outside of patriotic dogma, we are obliged to tell you that we Cubans should respect the party that we have spontaneously accepted (Trujillo 1896: 145-46). Marti (1965, 20: 502) also appealed to Poyo: "The director of El Porvenir is the only Cuban who, directly or indirectly, has put forth until today the slightest doubt or objection to our plan and the only one who voted against the unanimous vote of the others in the only club which then existed—that of Los Independientes." Marti had won more battles and his efforts continued. The New York vote meant more than just four votes in favor of the statues. Within a few days the clubs that had approved notified Key West by telegram that their approval had been registered (Maftach 1950: 291). As we shall see, these telegrams of approval were read in the Key West tobacco factories to rounds of applause. It all helped to maintain the momentum that Marti needed. As noted above, Marti now opened a period of correspondence with an astounding number of people in Key West. Some of the correspondence carried explicit appeals to old and new friends for a rapid approval of the statutes. But letters of thanks, praise, and simply remembrance made up a large part of the correspondence, and that correspondence served the same purpose through more subtle means. It was part of a pattern of close interpersonal relationships that marked his style of leadership and endeared him to the entire community. Letters were circulated from family to family and read at public gatherings, veladas, and in the factories. The fact is a part of the oral history of the Key West Cuban community, something which is

THE TRANSFER OF LEADERSHIP: II 71 still mentioned among many of the older descendants of those who lived there when Marti won their support. Marti now showed his remarkable talent for remembering the names and personal details of virtually everyone he met. He also remembered the names of wives and children. Membership of informal groups of friends or associates was also fixed in his mind. We will have more to say on this in our final chapter, but a few examples drawn from the first crucial months will illustrate the point within the context of the immediate objective of statute approval. In January he wrote to Angel Pelaez, the tobacco worker who had done so much to bring Marti to Key West. Among many things, the letter referred to someone who apparently had been slighted by Marti's failure to bid him goodbye. "Seek him out without flattery or fear. Do not give him any reason-for there isn't any—to think himself ignored. Attend to this immediately and do your best." Then he advised Pelaez to use a technique that he himself frequently used: "Ask some favor of him." There are references to Poyo and Bello, and there are especially fond remembrances for Balifio (the journalist and labor activist), "full of intelligence and reason," and to "that sincere Gonzalez Acosta" (Marti 1963, 1: 298). In another January letter, this one to Serafin Bello, he remembered "that sacrificing Pelaez, and the prudent [Gualterio] Garcia, and the gentleman [Frank] Bolio, and the energetic [Jose] Pompes, and the loyal [Genaro] Rodriguez." He closed with a special remembrance "to Carlos Manuel [de Cespedes]: "I like him very much" (Marti 1963, 1: 300). Carlos Manuel de Cespedes was a son of the Cuban patriot for whom Key West's San Carlos theater was named. The father, also named Carlos Manuel de Cespedes, was a former president of the Republic in Arms during the Ten Years War. He had been assassinated in Cuba and thus his martyrdom was duly consecrated in the name given to the theater-the San Carlos. The younger Cespedes had served as mayor of Key West, was close to Figueredo and, needless to say, was a favorite within the Cuban community (Alpizar 1947: 17; Browne 1973: 117-18). Wives and children were remembered, usually by name. In January he wrote to his loyal supporter Ceferino Cafiizares: "Pardon, faith and a kiss on the hand to your exemplary [wife] Natividad." A postscript may or may not indicate that names

72 JOSE MARTI could be forgotten: "Give my greeting to the noble wives of Vidal and Paco" (Marti 1965, 20: 402). Nearly every letter, no matter the pressure under which it was written, carried similar personal touches and remembrances. Marti was well aware that the Cuban Convention was still an important organization in Key West. He was also aware of Figueredo's influence within the organization and of his attitude toward him. Ibarra (1981: 128) maintains that Figueredo headed the opposition to Marti and that he and the Convention did everything in their power to defeat him. There is also evidence that the Convention was in contact with conspirators in Cuba and the Dominican Republic and that plans were under way even while Marti was in Key West on his first visit. How much they might have told Marti about this is not clear (Lagomasinos 1897: 9-12). If such activities were indeed under way, that would have been additional reason for the Convention to resist invasion of their turf at this time. Poyo (1985: 301) has also observed that the Convention's activities in Cuba were well under way and that one element of the veteran leadership of key West led by Figueredo, Castellanos, and Castillo was still reluctant to reveal the information. It was certainly a time of uncertainty in Key West, and one can easily understand why veteran leaders would resist being pushed into a new organization under a new leader. Figueredo and others might have retreated a bit during Marti's visit and the displays of mass popularity, but the contest was not over yet. Marti did not sit back and wait for events to take their course. He worked on a number of fronts simultaneously to bring the Key into his orbit. His pen and a vigorous correspondence with Key West were the chief instruments of his campaign. From this point on in particular, the sheer volume of his correspondence is overwhelming. Blanche de Baralt (1931: 111), who knew him well, has observed that "in his slender and nervous hand, the pen was something that seemed to be a part of his very being." One of his first letters upon returning to New York was addressed to Figueredo on January 15. Here he addressed the colonel as "Grande Figueredo." The letter was so full of praise that even one familiar with Marti's style and the cultural traditions within which he wrote is likely to suspect a bit of flattery. He spoke of

THE TRANSFER OF LEADERSHIP: II 73 the pride of having known one of the most truthful of men. I will always see you as I saw you for the first time, with your soul in your eyes, avoiding those who do not understand you, giving of yourself like a giant child, to those who appreciate your powerful soul. . . You and I are both sons of Bayamo [Figueredo's home] because I have something of Bayamo in my soul, the intrepid and natural soul of Bayamo, and we are both sons of truth and nature. . . . Years come and go, Figueredo: neither you nor I exaggerate or lie, nor do we engage in words of useless friendship (Marti 1963, 1: 294). Marti then turned on the praise for Key West. This is a practice and style that would be repeated in letters to almost everyone he had met there in January. He obviously sensed the pride and attachment which the emigres had for their adopted, albeit temporary, home which they had built on the tiny island. He obviously knew also that letters were a way of expressing his high regard for the community that had received him so generously: "There I felt myself small. I felt that the light of the sky had fallen upon my head. Your Key? It is the very essence of our republic. . . . I am the one who can tell you about your Key" (Marti 1963, 1: 295). He also took the opportunity to tell Figueredo about his own self-sacrifice and dedication: "I have given everything for my country, even the peace of my home. This wagon of mine mns fine, except for the axle, which is broken. Between the satisfaction of frivolity and the austerity of exile, I had to choose, and it has cost me my life's happiness" (Marti 1963, 1: 294). Neither in this letter nor in his next letter of February 9 is there any reference to the statutes, his own election to office of delegate, or the urgency of the situation. Instead, he used a technique which he would later recommend to Angel Pelaez, one of his enthusiastic supporters among the tobacco workers: "Ask some favor of him." The favor that he was now asking had to do with what became known as the "Collazo affair." Marti had become involved in a polemic with a group of veterans living in Havana and had used words in his Tampa speech (November 1891) which

74 JOSE MARTI they regarded as insulting. A letter signed by Enrique Collazo and others appeared in Havana's La Lucha on January 6, 1892. It accused Marti of cowardice, of living off the money of tobacco workers, and of other serious faults. The letter even challenged him to a duel (Ibarra 1981: 116-23; Marquez 1965: 301-4). Now Marti turned to Figueredo and others in Key West for advice and assistance. He prepared a reply to Collazo but wanted approval from Key West. Thus his letter to Figueredo continued: The letter from Collazo was waiting for me here. . . . I am answering it. I have sent Poyo the letter [of reply] and I truly desire that he will tell me that the reply seems to him a good one. I need your public approval. I deserve your public approval (Marti 1963, 1: 295). Figueredo and others in the Key decided to send a delegation to Havana "in order to arrange . . . the termination and suspension of the incident provoked by the letter which Sr. Enrique Collazo published" (Marti 1963, 1: 301-2). Carbonell (1935: 16) maintains that "when Marti was mdely treated by Collazo, Aguirre and Roa, Figueredo placed himself almost openly on the side of the latter [Collazo et al.]." The fact that he now wanted to help patch things up shows that he at least regarded Marti as a principal figure within the revolutionary movement. A committee of prominent Key West Cubans was sent to mediate the affair. It included Teodoro Perez and Ramon Dobarganes; they would act in the name of the Key West emigre community. Tmjillo (1896: 104) reports that there were three in the delegation. But before sending the delegation, veteran leaders asked for Marti's concurrence, and on February 9 Marti again wrote to Figueredo about the matter. The letter thanked "such a good friend" and warmly agreed to the proposed initiative. It closed with great praise for Figueredo, the one who "has sheathed his sword without surrendering his heart" (Marti 1963, 1: 304). As noted, neither of Marti's letters to Figueredo contains any reference to the statutes or to the question of their approval. Figueredo seems to have remained aloof on this matter, and Marti sought the help of others to bring him into his orbit. In April he enlisted the help of Teodoro Perez: "Ask Figueredo on my behalf for his patriotic letters in his own special

THE TRANSFER OF LEADERSHIP: II 75 style, and for the affection which I do not want him to deny me" (Marti 1963, 1: 304). In March he wrote to General Serafin Sanchez hinting for his help also: "Figueredo has forgotten me" (Marti 1963, 1: 310). Sanchez, now a Key West resident, was an important and influential figure among the veteran leaders and Marti's correspondence with, as well as on behalf of, the general offers further insight into his style of leadership. Marti had corresponded with Sanchez since the latter's early exile days in the Dominican Republic. When the general moved to New York he became a friend of Marti: "The figure of General Serafin Sanchez, associate of Agramonte . . . and admirer of the skill and military genius of Maximo Gomez, frequently appeared through the doors of Marti's office [in New York]. The young general . . . wanted to help Marti" (Marquez 1965: 306). General Sanchez, though young, was highly respected among the generals of the Ten Years War and among other traditional leaders. In 1891, shortly before Marti's first visit to Key West, the general had decided to move to Key West. He would be closer to Cuba in case of a sudden uprising there and, as noted, Key West was still the center of revolutionary activity. But the ambiente of Key West, a part of Cuba transplanted to a smaller island, was also more to his liking. He began working as a selector in the tobacco factory of his friend and associate Gerardo Castellanos. Working there he developed a close association with the tobacco workers and became closely identified with them. For reasons not entirely clear, opportunity in the Castellanos factory was limited and Sanchez sought work elsewhere (Castellanos 1935: 279; Castellanos 1944: 131). This is where Marti enters the picture and the story of his efforts to help Sanchez is of more than passing interest. It offers an excellent example of one important element of Marti's style of leadership: immediately acting as guide and protector of the new revolutionary family, even while the process of forming the party was only beginning. He turned to Eduardo Gato, the self-made entrepreneur and millionaire, for help. In addition to being very wealthy, Gato was apparently one of the earliest supporters of Marti. Visiting in Havana in December of 1891 he became aware of the animosity and controversy building up around what we have referred to as the Collazo affair. He immediately sought out the antagonists in order to argue in defense of Marti, "whom he

76 JOSE MARTI had known intimately and had learned to love and admire in all his sublime excellence" (Alpizar 1926: 7). (Had Gato told Marti about this when he returned to Key West?) On January 23, 1892, Marti wrote to Gato, whose large factory apparently offered greater opportunities. He recommended Sanchez as "one of the men of greatest dignity and integrity that I know, the most judicious and generous, and one who is truly useful for Cuba." But, he continued, there was not sufficient work for him in the factory of his friend (Castellanos) and his stay in Key West was not assured unless something more suitable could be arranged. Would Gato arrange employment? (Marti 1965, 20: 403-4). Gato, as always, came through with suitable employment, and in March Marti sent him a warm letter of thanks that must have flattered both Gato and Sanchez: nor can I forget that in my opinion you have the greatest of distinctions, and that is to have opened your generous arms to men of solid merit and clean heart like my friend, the valiant and judicious Cuban Serafin Sanchez. . . . He might have gone to other places but his genuine Cuban heart brings him to the Key, to wait [to take arms] and earn his living by his daily labor. He was the one of whom I spoke to you and for him I asked your friendship (Marti 1963, 1: 309-10). About the same time (March) he wrote to Sanchez, expressing his faith in the cause of Cuban independence which was now being organized. He made it clear that he needed the general's help: "Can we let such beauty die, Serafin? . . . Who will do what we have to do if we do not do it together? No one, no one, will be able to do it" (Marti 1963, 1: 310). He kept up a warm correspondence with Sanchez~"to see a letter of yours is tme contentment" (Marti 1963, 1: 374). And he set about as intermediary to bring other members of his revolutionary family together. To his old friend Serafin Bello he wrote: "I would like to see you become a friend of Serafin Sanchez. I like Serafin Sanchez" (Marti 1963, 1: 374). A postscript to a letter to

THE TRANSFER OF LEADERSHIP: II 77 Sanchez shows that the two had indeed become friends (Marti 1963, 1: 375). Sanchez and Figueredo were not the only military figures that Marti tried, successfully it seems, to bring into contact with friends in particular and the revolutionary family in general. In January he wrote to his friend Cerafino Cafiizares: "111 since I left [Key West] . . . nor do I have to make excuses to so good a friend as you for not being able to lift a pen to write to you, nor do I need to recommend to your affection the excellent Cuban, [Comandante} Gerardo Castellanos" (Marti 1965, 20: 401). Sanchez, Figueredo, and Castellanos were all central personalities in the promotion of Marti's organization and leadership. But it would be a mistake to assume that his careful cultivation of these and other key figures was simply a matter of cool calculation aimed at gaining approval for his statutes. It was a part of Marti's very personality and inseparable from his style of leadership. His close and warm interpersonal relationship had long preceded this and would continue after he had gained his objective. Nevertheless, the assumption here is that it did indeed play an important part in Marti's emergence as the leader of the independence movement. With each passing day Marti became more restless and concerned about the fate of his project. According to Enrique Collazo (1900: 424), a one-time enemy later turned friend, "he slept little, ate less and moved about a great deal." By March there is a real sense of urgency. In some of his correspondence, especially with Poyo and his new-found friends among the tobacco workers, there are very direct and forthright appeals for approval of his statutes. Key West was holding things up. He wrote to Poyo expressing his deep concern about "the delay of news form there concerning the ratification and proclamation of our party." Surely "we would be committing a real crime [by] wasting time while war might break out in Cuba, not strong and organized as we want it, but weak and localized as the [Spanish] government desires." But he noted that he was in a difficult situation because "the smallest demonstration of pressure on my part for these ratifications . . . might have seemed like an effort to push the ideas with which I have been prominently associated" (Marti 1965, 20: 501-2). Marti also enlisted the help of his old friend Serafin Bello. In a brief letter he reminded him that "we are about to bring

78 JOSE MARTI about the republican war—the lasting republic—to serve, immediately, everyone who comes in good faith and follows the right road. But [it all must be] for a good end and through good means" (Marti 1963, 1: 311). On March 24 he wrote to Bello again, this time a long letter expressing his concern that a letter sent to Francisco Maria Gonzalez might not have been read to an assembly of club presidents as he had asked. Above all, he impressed upon him the need for a quick ratification of the statutes so that at least a majority of clubs would have ratified by April 8. He did not specifically name culprits but complained that "they seize upon every sort of evil." Decisive action was absolutely necessary: "The spirit is with us and we of the tme war will yet lead the country if we do it in time." He reminded Bello that the party, key to decisive action, did not exist until a majority of the clubs had ratified the statutes. Without the party, he reminded him, "those of 68" would conduct the war and "we will have a situation like the American republics. What does not go forward retreats. I put the good work in your hands" (Marti 1963, 1: 349-52). It was fortunate for Marti that Francisco Maria Gonzalez held the strategic position of Secretary of the Committee on Recommendations (coordinator of correspondence and activities relating to approval of the statutes) in Key West. Perhaps a final reminder that he was one of the members of the committee that had brought Marti to Key West will not be out of place. On March 23 Marti sent him a long letter written in a very formal and precise style. But it also carried the feeling of one possibly let down by old friends. First, he called his attention to the fact that, on a single day, clubs in Tampa and New York had quickly and unanimously approved the statutes (but note again Tmjillo's version of the "approval"). In Marti's words: In Tampa, one session was enough for approval by the "Liga Patriotica" and the club "Ignacio Agramonte." One session was also enough in the [New York] clubs "Independientes," "Jose Marti," "Pinos Nuevos," "Borinquen" and "Independientes de Cubanacan." Each one of these, except for the last two, promptly sent you by cable an announcement of their adherence to the party (Marti 1963, 1: 346).

THE TRANSFER OF LEADERSHIP: II 79 Unity was of the utmost importance and the primacy of Key West was emphasized. The suspicions of a previous era must not be allowed to reappear among the revolutionary emigres, a large part of whom are found "in our noble Key" (Marti 1963, 1: 346). He could not believe that Key West would be an obstacle: I assume for my part that there will not have been any unnecessary delay and that the Cubans of Key West who enthusiastically proclaimed union during a recent visit would not be the ones who might delay and obstruct the union of all Cubans. . . . It is indeed a cause of anguish for every patriotic heart. . . . But I know very well that we have seen the bad and that we will find the solution (Marti 1963, 1: 346-348). He invited Gonzalez, in compliance with his duties, to convene a meeting of the presidents of the clubs of the locality in order to inform them of progress thus far and to invite them to declare in favor of the party (Marti 1963, 1: 345). Gonzalez had indeed been doing his job. Some of the uncertainty no doubt came from the nature of the postal service in 1892. Mail went from New York to Tampa by the so-called "fast mail train." The Mascote or the Olivetti picked up the mail "after the arrival of the Fast Mail train over South Florida" and sailed for Key West on Mondays, Thursdays, and Saturdays (Key West Directory 1893). A meeting was called for March 17 at the San Carlos. Fortunately, the minutes of this meeting, kept by the loyal Gonzalez, have also survived (Deulofeu 1905: 197-99). Gerardo Castellanos was chosen to preside. The names of clubs in Tampa and New York that had approved the statutes were read to the assembly. The names of 15 Key West clubs that had supposedly approved were also read (the Cuban Convention and Luz de Yara were treated here as separate entities). But there was apparently some confusion as to whether four of the 15 had indeed ratified. Serafin Bello presented a motion that a meeting of all the presidents of clubs that had accepted the Bases and the statutes be convened, in order that they might record the decision of their respective clubs.

80 JOSE MARTI Gonzalez, Secretary of the Committee on Recommendations, called a meeting for March 26. El Yara reported that 12 clubs, including Luz de Yara were present at the meeting. An Advisory Council was formed, apparently made up of the presidents of the 12 clubs that had attended the meeting. El Yara, reporting on the meeting, observed that "the Cuban Revolutionary Party was now in a new stage among us" (Tmjillo 1896: 115). By April 10, 34 clubs from eight emigre colonies had approved the Bases and statutes. Thirteen were from Key West, seven from New York, five from Tampa, five from Kingston (Jamaica), one each from Philadelphia, Boston, Ocala, and New Orleans. Thus Key West still accounted for more than one-third of all clubs, even after a rapid formation of new associations in New York and other places. Marti had also been elected delegate and Bejamin Guerra, a successful merchant, was elected treasurer (Ibarra 1981: 128; Turton 1986: 33). Proclamation ceremonies were held simultaneously in all the emigre centers on April 10. The ceremony at Hardman Hall in New York offered a special tribute to Key West: "That night the place of honor was given to the Key West emigre colony, more generous in all its merits and virtues than has been recognized" (Carbonell, 1952, 2: 161). A festive ceremony was held at Key West's San Carlos, at which time the respective club presidents formally and publicly approved the Bases and statutes. El Yara reported on April 11 that "many beautiful women occupied a place of honor on the main floor. The locale was completely filled." The meeting began about 8:00 p.m. "after a brilliant sinfonia." Poyo opened the ceremonies "with a short but expressive" summation of events. Each of the club presidents, including Fernando Figueredo, Serafin Bello, Juan Amao and Jose Maria Gonzalez, addressed the assembly (Deulofeu 1905: 201-3). This was indeed another cmcial victory along the way in Marti's quest for leadership. It might have been this event which Castellanos (1944: 119-20) had in mind when he referred to "the final moments when the organization [especially the Convention] was falling into the orbit of Marti and the Revolutionary Party." Once again, Marti did not rest on his laurels. His correspondence continued and even increased. A first order of business was to assure everyone that they had made the right decision. Upon reading El Yara's glowing account of the ratification ceremony in the San Carlos, he immediately wrote to

THE TRANSFER OF LEADERSHIP: II 81 Poyo expressing his Krausian philosophy of harmony. In a letter of April 18 he wrote of that momentous event: "There along the same road, the worker, the man of color, the lawyer, the merchant, the ex-president of the Republic" (Marti 1963, 1: 399). And in another letter he promised Poyo that "as soon as the confirmation of my duties is in my hands . . . I will comply, and like a religion, with fear I will comply and with affection. There will be no rest of satisfied vanity. Father and son I will be in these duties, and that comer [Key West], again an example, will have no reason for regret" (Marti 1963, 1: 397). The expression "father and son" requires some comment. Poyo was only 16 years Marti's senior so it was not likely a reference to age difference. Rather, he would be the leader, but an obedient leader. There is also the symbolism of the revolutionary family (although Marti does not seem to have used precisely that term) which comes through more and more in his correspondence and speeches. He would be the head of the family (father) but he would also be the obedient head of the family (son). We will have much more to say about this in our final chapter. Marti directed his reassuring thoughts to a number of people in Key West but Poyo was clearly a key figure. Those thoughts could be faithfully carried in the pages of Poyo's El Yara. Poyo was elected president of the advisory council in Key West (the body of club presidents) and communicated with all its members. He was also the president of the Cuban Convention, having been elected to that post following the death of Lamadriz. Although much remained to be done in order to give life to the party, it was now indeed a reality. And with it came a new source of authority for Marti. Thus far his authority was a personal matter—it came from his special skills and qualities that set him apart from other would-be leaders. To that he could now add the authority that comes from an organization or institution, the authority of office. He wrote of this and of the future to Teodoro Perez: "Today the authority that you vest in me arrives. . . . Whatever we wish will be. We are a new and good people, and we must show it in the campaign that we are undertaking" (Marti 1963, 1: 395). The party's democratic structure now gave a new generation, including labor activists, access to influential positions within the organization, something that had been previously

82 JOSE MARTI lacking in the structure and make-up of the revolutionary movement. The clubs, in which rank-and-file Cubans played a prominent role, were the foundation of the party. The new structure also made it possible for Marti to move into his position of leadership. On April 16 he paid tribute to some of the concerns of that new generation. In a lengthy article in Patria, certainly read in the tobacco factories of Key West, he discussed the importance of the decisions that had been ratified on April 10. The crowning achievement, in his opinion, was that it refuted once and for all the old belief that Cubans were "incapable of order and discipline, of their own thought, of electoral politics and representation, of delegated authority and responsibility, of bringing together diverse interests [voluntades] into the common good, of the essential idea of government by the people" (Marti 1963, 2: 295-96). For Marti, the process of state formation was already under way.

7 The Military-InteUigence Question The collapse of Spanish authority in Latin America ushered an era of predatory militarism. The leaders of the revolutionary armies who secured independence and claimed the credit for creating and consolidating the new republics emerged as the new mlers. Within each nation undisciplined, ambitious local chieftains vied for supreme power. Politics became the plaything of the military (Lieuwen 1960: 17). The purpose of the Cuban Revolutionary Party was "to order [ordenar] . . . a generous and brief war" that would ensure peace and happiness for all Cubans (Marti 1963, 1: 279). We use the translation "to order" principally in the sense of promoting or organizing an orderly war, not simply in the sense of giving a command for its initiation, as the English translation might suggest. The latter concept was in fact included, however. Wars are not organized or initiated without a military command of some kind, even if we are only talking about a small uprising. In the kind of war that was called for in the Bases, a military organization was obviously the more essential and certainly could not wait until some future date. Yet the statutes of the party said nothing about such a command. On June 29, 1892, Marti instmcted the presidents of the various advisory councils to call together the locally affiliated military leaders of the Ten Years War to cast their vote for a supreme military chief (Ibarra 1981, 129). He might have been using an implied authority under article 5 of the statutes which required the delegate "to extend the revolutionary organization"

84 JOSE MARTI (Marti 1963, 1: 282). However that may be, his action was clearly an example of a decisive leadership style. He not only moved ahead decisively but did so in a manner that apparently pleased the military and bound them to the party. The very fact that he went ahead in this fashion was an implicit recognition of the existing, if somewhat informal, military command structure that had come out of the Ten Years War. The leaders could hardly object to this, and it was apparently left up to the advisory councils to determine who they were. This apparently pleased the leaders and, as expected, General Gomez was chosen when the votes were counted in mid-August. Some writers have argued that this skillful strategy had the effect of binding the military to the party and its democratic structures, inasmuch as the selection had been carried out under its authority (Ibarra 1981: 129; Turton 1986: 35; Maiiach 1950: 31). However that may be, the meaning of "binding the military to the party" leaves considerable room for interpretation, and as we shall see, it certainly did not solve Marti's problems. The statutes were not only silent on the matter of a military command; they said nothing about civil-military relations, an old constitutional problem which Marti probably chose to leave until a more propitious time. Although an important step had been taken, the relationship between the military and the party were at best implicit. The military leaders and others clearly had their own interpretations. There is evidence that they had been planning an uprising even while Marti was in Key West (Lagomasino 1897: 9-12). However that may be, it seems clear that they became deeply involved within a short time after the party statutes had been approved. One of the conspirators from Cuba has left his personal account, which follows (Lagomasino 1897: 9-15). In the middle of 1892, Poyo, then president of the Cuban Convention, called a group of conspirators to Key West. At the time, they were apparently in the Dominican Republic, where Gomez had summoned them from Cuba for a council of war. On June 22 the delegation of conspirators arrived in Key West and on June 24 they met with a special session of the Convention in Figueredo's large house at 1220 Duval Street. "The club 'Luz de Yara' [Cuban Convention] had summoned its own members through the pages of El Yara." The conspirators presented a plan for an uprising which involved the Sartorio (also Sartorius)

THE MILITARY-INTELLIGENCE QUESTION 85 brothers, of whom more will be said later. General Gomez was to be the leader and General Sanchez was to be a chief of department. The plan called for the uprising on August 24, exactly two months after the Key West meeting. Obviously organization had been under way for some time. It should be pointed out here that the conspiracy did not necessarily mean that the veteran leaders were acting deceptively. As emphasized above, the relationship between military activity and party activity was not clearly outlined in the statutes. Perhaps the most that can be said is that they were acting against the spirit of those documents. The plan was well under way when Marti got wind of it and mshed to Key West. He arrived there on July 7, 1892 for his second historic visit. Once again, his Key West supporters had done their job well, and he was received by even greater and more enthusiastic crowds than had been the case on his first visit (Tmjillo 1896: 142; Lizaso 1974: 223; Carbonell 1952: 174). On July 13 he expressed his delight in a letter to his secretary in New York: "Shall I tell you . . . of the multitude at my arrival, much greater than before, of conversations by the cartload, of the entire population in clubs, and women, and children, of Liceos and receptions?" (Marti 1963, 2: 67). In the "conversations by the cartload" he must have used his usual powers of persuasion. And the atmosphere of demonstrations by the multitude certainly must have had their effect on the veteran leaders. On July 12 the generals offered a banquet in his honor. Marti wrote of "the glory of . . . the banquet of last night [with] this poor one who has been so envious [este pobre envidiosol surrounded by the generals of the war, the chiefs, in the three departments, the most intimate friends of Gomez." The banquet was attended by most of Key West's generals as well as Gomez' adjutant, Rafael Rodriguez. The generals, Marti continued, "declared their adherence to the party and empowered me, with equal nobility, to write their own act of adherence . . . of this [I will tell you] much in private: nothing [should be said] until the publication, unless El Yara talks. Never have I been so touched or so proud: (Marti 1963, 2: 67). Marti obliged the generals and wrote a statement that was more than one of adherence; it was also another statement of principles and objectives that Marti had long espoused. The next day, a stream of generals visited him at Duval House, one by

86 JOSE MARTI one, "as if they carried a torch that would light the flame in their souls." They signed the declaration which Marti had written for them (Marquez 1965: 314). Marti's declaration, which now became the declaration of the generals, spoke of "the ardent love of liberty which brought us to take up arms." In it the generals pledged that "we will not stain with tyranny the honor which we have gained in liberty." They spoke of "the constitution of a free people" and pledged that "our sword is on the side of law and order." It was a long document in the style so typical of Marti. The closing statement was in the form of a solemn pledge: "It is our agreement, in the hour that we consider supreme, to declare . . . our faith in the Cuban Revolutionary Party." The historic document was signed by 11 veterans (Ripoll 1971, 31-34). The military leaders had chosen Gomez as their leader and 11 veterans, among the closest associates of Gomez, had declared their adherence to the party. But Gomez had not been directly involved in any of this. That was a matter which Marti would take care of very quickly. We will discuss his relations with Gomez, but we must first look at another matter which was vital to Marti, one which he dealt with on this same trip to Key West, using the momentum of his agreement with the military leaders. Marti needed to rationalize and centralize the chaotic information process within the revolutionary movement. Rumors were constantly flying about; travelers and visiting patriots brought their own biased accounts of what was happening in Cuba. Others brought an equally biased account of what was happening in the emigre colonies when they returned to Cuba. Everyone seemed to have an equally reliable story, depending on the listeners. The country was ready for war; what were the emigres waiting for? The country had lost its enthusiasm; something had to be done. All that was needed was a call from without or within. Cubans living in Cuba also received conflicting and biased reports of what was happening in the emigre colonies. Massive help from the emigres could be expected; emigres were only waiting for something to happen in Cuba. And so the rumors flew back and forth. What Marti needed was objective, first-hand information in order to avoid the disastrous mistakes of the past, the small impulsive uprisings that were without sufficient support. He also needed to inform those in Cuba of the dramatic events of the last

THE MILITARY-INTELLIGENCE QUESTION 87 few months, the formation and acceptance of the Cuban Revolutionary Party. A centralized intelligence service would strengthen Marti's hand in dealing with those who were still reluctant to accept his leadership (reluctant, perhaps, in spite of declarations to the contrary). The very matter that had brought him to Key West on this trip no doubt made all of this very clear. The son of the first agent that Marti sent to Cuba tells us of the new leader's thinking: "Marti had no confidence in indirect reports, the products of enthusiasm or pessimism, depending on the emigres, active veterans, veterans who had surrendered to the comforts of peace, limping autonomists. Nor [did he have confidence] in the followers of Maceo, nor of Gomez, nor of the Convention. He would send his confidential agents everywhere" (Castellanos 1944: 137). While his own intelligence service would add to the authority and stature of Marti and the party, it would also significantly reduce that of the Cuban Convention. The Convention had long prided itself as a major repository of information, and it seems clear that some of its members had not yet given up on maintaining the image. Whenever an important patriot from Cuba passed through Key West, he was invited to a special meeting with the Convention, usually at the home of Castellanos or Figueredo. We have already mentioned the important meeting of June 24 and the events which brought Marti to Key West in July. They were precisely the kinds of things that Marti had to keep under control if he was to remain in charge of the party and the movement. Marti needed agents in whom he had confidence, agents who would be directly responsible to him and to him alone. He moved quickly and decisively to achieve his objective. A few years after the selection of his first and certainly a very important agent, Jose Dolores Poyo recalled the process in a letter to the son of that first agent: I have consulted the notes that I have saved from those times. . . . With the help of those notes I am very pleased to give you the following information. In late July of that year [1892], Jose Marti, who was in Key West encouraging and uniting the Cubans against Spain, invited generals Carlos Roloff and

88 JOSE MARTI Serafin Sanchez, Sr. [Commandante] Gerardo Castellanos Leonart and me to discuss matters related to Cuba. The meeting place was the restaurant of Domingo Abelar [at 720 White Street]. . . . Marti said he needed a civic-minded, pmdent patriot to go to Cuba to instruct, work, sound out opinions, organize revolutionary clubs; in short he needed someone to carry out an important mission. Immediately Roloff, Sanchez and I suggested Castellanos. Castellanos accepted (Castellanos 1923: 93). A few details about this important agent and his first mission to Cuba will help us to better understand the significance of what was happening in Key West in July 1892. Gerardo Castellanos Leonart was bom in La Esperanza in 1841. During the Ten Years War he had been a close friend of Sanchez and Figueredo as well as most of the other generals of that war. He had wealthy and influential contacts in Cuba, always a bonus in case of trouble with the Spanish authorities. But there were other things to recommend him as well. In Key West he had first worked and learned his trade in the cigar factory of Samuel Woolf. He was able to accumulate some savings, and with the help of some friends in the business he opened a small factory of his own. This eventually grew into an establishment employing some 200 cigar workers. As a successful cigar manufacturer he frequently traveled to buy tobacco leaf and other things necessary for his business. That would be the avowed reason for his mission in the service of Marti. In addition to this he would claim to engage in business related to the livestock industry in Camagiiey and the coffee and lumber industry in Oriente. All of this would help to confuse the Spanish authorities. For good measure, he was a friend of the Spanish consul in Key West, a fellow Mason who apparently would not ask too many questions (the consul did, however, advise the Spanish authorities to follow Castellanos). His large house at 521 Division Street (now Truman Avenue) had been the place of many conspiratorial meetings and Marti had been there as well. Castellanos would be "the envoy extraordinary of the party's Delegate [Marti]" (Castellanos 1923: 54-57; 1942: 138-39, 155-56).

THE MILITARY-INTELLIGENCE QUESTION 89 Ironically, it seems unlikely that anyone except a prominent member of the Cuban Convention could have filled such a post. The agent had to have the confidence of the veteran leaders of Key West and in Cuba as well. As we shall see, one of his immediate tasks was to terminate the conspiracy that had been planned with the help of the Convention and was still in progress in Cuba. That would certainly require the help of a prominent member of the organization in order to make it very clear where it now stood. Marti's pmdent consultation with Poyo (now the president of the Cuban Convention), Sanchez, Roloff, and Castellanos (prominent members of the Convention) made the prospects look encouraging. The first order of business was the termination of plans for the uprising set for August 24. Lagomasino (1897: 18), one of the conspirators, reports that Marti "sent us as his representative, Sr. Gerardo Castellanos, who communicated the order to suspend the uprising, which was done by coded telegram to the Sartorio brothers." It is not clear from his account whether the coded telegram was immediately sent form Key West or upon the arrival of Castellanos in Cuba. Given the gravity of the situation and the urgency of time, it seems likely that it would have been sent from Key West. If that was indeed the case, which seems likely, then it raises some interesting questions. The telegram was apparently sent by Castellanos. Did Marti believe, as has been suggested here, that the authority of a prominent Convention member was necessary in order to terminate a conspiracy in which the organization had been involved for some time? Or was he suggesting that, since the Convention had been improperly involved, it was now their responsibility to denounce the conspiracy? The latter does not seem likely inasmuch as it was not in keeping with his style of leadership. More likely, he sought to give full authority to his agent from the outset. But he clearly needed the support and cooperation of the prestigious Convention members, and he was well aware of this. Evidence of this concern can be seen in a letter to Poyo (now President of the Convention) written on August 9. This apparently involved another agent (Lizaso 1958, 165), but the lesson is clear: "I beg of you and of Fernando [Figueredo], that you write to Holguin [where the uprising was set to take place], to Sartorio [a leading conspirator], announcing that the agent is on his way, who will introduce himself with the

90 JOSE MARTI name, assumed, of course, of Peter McFarland. And the Key?" (Marti 1963, 2: 203). But we are moving ahead of our story, and we must return to Marti's instruction to Castellanos. The latter came to New York for several long interviews, after which the formal instmctions were handed to him (Lizaso 1958, 165). The detailed instmctions were dated August 4, 1892. Castellanos was to bring back a full report on what was happening in Cuba. Above all, he was to inform Cubans on the island of what was happening in the emigre colonies~the formation of the party, its acceptance and authority, the election of the delegate, and other details. There were to be no future uprisings until the island was ready and appropriate instmctions were forthcoming from the party (Marti 1963, 2: 85-87). These lengthy and detailed instmctions must stand as a tmly remarkable document in recording the steps in Marti's consolidation of leadership. Here we find Marti issuing instmctions to one of the most important and respected leaders of the past, and a member of the Cuban Convention. It is a masterpiece of determination and skill. It leaves no doubt who is in command, yet it is completely disarming in its modesty. Excerpts cannot do justice to his skills, but limitations of space leave no choice. Explain the greatness, the scope and the energy of the party. . . . Find out for me all the revolutionary elements in Las Villas and the men and the local opinions that must be dealt with. Organize the revolutionary elements for me so that there will be a nucleus in every region . . . and each of them in regular communication with the delegate. And if practical, open sources of funds where there may be men for this (Marti 1963, 2: 85). Having laid out the general purpose, Marti turned to more specific matters: "Of [specific] persons, what can I say? That, you know better than I do." Having made this disarming disclaimer, however, he comes up with an impressive list of names and places. If nothing else, it clearly demonstrated the new leader's command of the situation. In order to make this even more clear, he promised a "corrected list" that would be sent

THE MILITARY-INTELLIGENCE QUESTION 91 to the address that Castellanos would give him. He had strong words of praise for his new agent: "Few men, Gerardo my friend, would be able to successfully carry out the mission that I have thmst upon you." The letter of instmction closes in a style typical of Marti: "I offend you with more talk . . . I, in your absence, will be worthy of my agent" (Marti 1953, 2: 88-89). It seems that the Cuban Convention wanted to retain at least a formal demonstration of its former importance. We are told that it gave its approval to Castellanos (Castellanos 1944: 138-39). And Marti sent a formal letter to the president of the Convention informing him of the mission and explaining its terms and objectives. It was signed "The Delegate, Jose Marti" (Marti 1963, 2: 89-90). The mission was to be so secret that Castellanos did not even tell his wife about it. We are told that he even took the clothes that he would be needing to his factory and kept them there until the day of his departure (Castellanos 1944: 142). "Be careful with your [Spanish] Consul," Marti had warned in an earlier letter to Castellanos (Marti 1963, 2: 71). In the August 4 letter, he told him that he had placed Poyo in charge of providing the funds. Poyo was appropriately instructed on the matter (Marti 1963, 2: 82). Castellanos carried out his mission with brilliance, loyalty, and tact. His first step was to follow up on the telegram and see to it, as diplomatically as possible, that the conspiracy under way was in fact terminated. Lagomasino (1897: 18-19), one of the leading conspirators in Cuba, tells us that Sr. Castellanos heard . . . gratifying phrases for the author of these lines, phrases that supported all the contenders and insisted that to destroy these plans would be to betray our country and that they were prepared to die rather than permit such a betrayal. Confronted with such assertions, Sr. Castellanos let us know, in particular, that he was very satisfied with the spirit and harmony that prevailed among us. It is clear that Castellanos was confronted with doubts and even opposition to Marti and the new party. In those situations he seems to have acted not only as envoy extraordinary, but also

92 JOSE MARTI as the personal advocate for the new leader. His reported conversations with General Julio Sanguily offer an example. Sanguily, who was anything but enthusiastic about Marti, tauntingly asked about the armies and funds which Marti had at his disposal. The well-prepared agent, "smiling within himself," replied that everything was in order, "not only in the expeditionary forces of volunteers but in the millions of pesos deposited in the party coffers under the care of Benjamin Guerra." Sanguily reportedly "stroked his beard and smiled" (Castellanos 1944: 167). Castellanos must have been convincing, however, because Sanguily himself eventually became one of Marti's agents. Shortly after this, Marti wrote to Poyo in Key West that "General Sanguily is returning to Cuba, charged [by me] with a tmly important commission, whose costs are estimated at four hundred dollars, the payment of which this delegation assigns to the action funds that have presently accumulated in the treasury of the council" (Marti 1965, 2: 503). Upon completion of his mission, Castellanos reported directly to Marti in New York on October 9, 1892. His report had to be entirely from memory because notes would have been too dangerous. Only after this report did he return to Key West for a report to the Cuban Convention, and then only with the authorization of Marti. Figueredo, the Convention's secretary, later recalled that "I still remember that, duly authorized by Marti, the Convention met in my home and Commandante Castellanos gave his report. What a grandiose scene. . . . Here in my own home, in my house on Duval Street . . . where Marti had been heard in his exposition of the Bases of his revolutionary program" (Azcuy 1930: 123). Figueredo's recollection that the meeting had been "duly authorized by Marti" is important. Sometime after Marti's July appearance in Key West, the Cuban Convention agreed that it would not send agents to places where Marti had agents or was about to send them. On August 18 he wrote to Figueredo, Secretary of the Cuban Convention, that The Delegate sees with great favor the fact that the Convention, in support of the harmony which is convenient for our sensitive efforts, has ceased to send agents where there are agents of the Delegate or

THE MILITARY-INTELLIGENCE QUESTION 93 where they are about to arrive. In this respect it is important to say that the agent for Oriente should now be within his jurisdiction (Marti 1963, 2: 119). Castellanos made a second difficult mission for Marti, and he probably would have made others, but Marti believed that his exposure in Cuba had already made any future missions far too dangerous (Castellanos 1944: 247). Other prominent Key West agents included Eduardo Gato, Teodoro Perez, and Carlos Recio. We return to our report of Marti's second triumphant visit to Key West in July 1892. He was immediately aware of what a success those few days, July 7 to July 16, had been. On his way back he told his secretary: "Key West is now completely in order, like an army within the party, . . . the alliance between arms and ideas, the adherence of the generals to the party" (Marti 1963, 2: 70). Marti's triumph in Key West was followed immediately by an equally triumphant tour of other Florida exile communities: Tampa, Jacksonville, Saint Petersburg, Thomasville, Saint Augustine, and Ocala (Maiiach 1950: 296). There was something special about this tour, however. Now he travelled in the company of two Key West generals—Serafin Sanchez and Carlos Roloff (Tmjillo 1896: 149). Both were close and respected friends of Gomez and the other veteran leaders. This was certainly a way of demonstrating that the military leaders had accepted the new civilian leader. Remember that Marti had instructed his secretary not to say anything about the generals' pledge of allegiance to the party until it was published in due time. Due time, it turned out, was not until September 3, when it was published in Partia (Marti, 1963, 2: 67). This was an excellent interim measure, probably more effective for the masses who saw the entourage than was the published version. The military veterans had accepted Marti—that was the message. Writing only three years after the event, Enrique Tmjillo (1896: 142) suggested another interpretation of events. He reported that at the time there were mmors floating about that General Roloff was promoting another expedition but that Marti had been successful in persuading him to abandon the idea. If that were indeed the case then it would be useful to put the mmors to rest.

94 JOSE MARTI But Roloff and Sanchez might possibly have served another purpose. Military leaders have a way of trusting the accounts and opinions of their generals. The two of them could effectively convey convincing information about Marti's mass support in the other emigre colonies. The other colonies provided the desired setting. From Tampa he telegraphed to his secretary of a "splendid meeting [in the] open air last night. Grand procession [of] Spaniards, working men, in our honor, with standards, fervent speeches, declaring help [for] independence. Leave for Ocala, Jacksonville occasion" (Marti 1962, 2: 68). And from Ocala he informed him of a "magnificent night! Thousands of souls" (Marti 1962, 2: 70). These were the things that could be reported. And for good measure he was also accompanied by his now-fervent Key West supported Jose Dolores Poyo. El Yara carried accounts of triumph after triumph. As always, the readers in the cigar factories read these accounts to the workers. The July visit to Key West had been an important one. The uncompromising support of the veteran leaders had been sealed. Even Figueredo, perhaps the most reluctant of all, expressed his change of attitude a short time later. On December 21, 1892, following another visit by Marti, he wrote to General Gomez: "Marti has just left, leaving behind him concord, harmony and patriotism. What a man, my friend. . . . With every visit he adds something to the structure which now seems satisfactory" (Poyo 1983: 310-11). And Carbonell (1935: 17) tells us that Marti not only stayed at Figueredo's home "whenever he came to Key West" but there was also one room in his large house designated "el cuarto de Marti"—Marti's room. And "later the horrendous news of the death of Marti at Dos Rios [May 19, 1895] filled him, as it did all emigres, with an unspeakable grief." Finally, Figueredo himself recalled at a later date that "that predestined one, in whose temples radiated the aura of the martyr, conquered and subdued me as he conquered everyone around him" (Deulofeu 1905: 228). Cuban revolutionaries now had a party that was democratically organized on the foundation of autonomous associations in most of the emigre communities. The party had a delegate, a treasurer, and, under the authority of the delegate, an intelligence network was being formed. The principal veteran

THE MILITARY-INTELLIGENCE QUESTION 95 military leaders had chosen their commander-in-chief (as of midAugust), and they had pledged their allegiance to the party in an eloquent document written by Marti. But the commander-in-chief had not been a party to any of this, and he had not yet been formally asked to assume the post. This presented an especially delicate question because of the 1884-85 controversy between Gomez and Marti. But things were now ready for a reconciliation. Marti was in a stronger position than ever. The principal military leaders, now Marti supporters, were anxious to close the old rift. Gomez, statesman that he was, was equally anxious to patch things up. In fact, he had always believed that he had been misunderstood and usually had good things to say about Marti along with his criticisms. Late in 1891 he had asked Sanchez to secretly get in touch with Marti (which he did), and Marti promised to keep Gomez informed (Manach 1950: 230, 289-90). Later, Sanchez asked Marti if Gomez was receiving Patria, to which Marti replied: "As for Gomez, why should not the newspaper be sent to him" (Marti 1963, 1: 375). In April 1892, Marti also promised Sanchez that one of the first things he would do would be to attend to the Gomez matter: "From these quarters, Serafin, expect only nobility, and, if I need a model, I will find it at a certain worker's table [probably a reference to Sanchez, who worked in Gato's cigar factory]" (Marti 1963, 1: 375). But he continued to delay (Manach 1950, 299), and to Sanchez's suggestion that he write to Gomez, he replied: "That I should write to Gomez!" (Marti 1963, 1: 406). That was also in April, and obviously the matter had been discussed during Marti's visit to Key West in July. Events now moved rapidly to a conclusion. On August 18, Marti wrote to Sanchez informing him that "I am reading and weighing everything that you tell me, and what you say about Gomez arrives very opportunely." He was now ready to act: he promised to take the first ship for Santo Domingo before the end of the month. And "concerning Gomez, of whom I only expect greatness, I will speak to him personally." In another August letter to Sanchez, he makes the inevitable and necessary sound millennial and providential: "I am writing to the Old Man; and we are entering, Serafin, into a time of greatness." At the close of the long letter he tells Sanchez that "I am looking forward to the interview with Gomez, which I see as the

96 JOSE MARTI definitive preparation for the formidable work of next winter" (Marti 1963, 2: 121-22). At least two other important veteran leaders in Key West played a part in the reconciliation. Figueredo had also encouraged Marti to write to the general, and on the same day that he wrote to Sanchez (August 18), Marti wrote: What is this, Fernando, about [my making] efforts and sacrifices with respect to Gomez? Do you not . . . know that in me there is not one particle of egoism or presumption, or self-concern or self aggrandizement, that death is my pillow and Cuba is my dream . . . and in this spirit, confident that the brave Old Man [Gomez] knows and understands it, I will go, in the simple honesty that he already knows in me, to see the glorious Gomez. Thus, I will open a river of love, and those who follow me will have to enter by that river (Marti 1963, 2: 123). Two August letters also inform Poyo of the decision to meet the general: "I will go and I will give Gomez his assignment. . . . I am going to Santo Domingo" (Marti 1963, 2: 82, 125). While Figueredo, Poyo, Sanchez, and others in Key West were working to close the old rift, there were others who seemingly preferred to keep it open. Enrique Tmjillo, editor of New York's El Porvenir, wrote to Gomez on June 27: "I suppose you are aware of the organization which has sprung up here." Then he added that in spite of the protests which he had made against the defects in that organization, a deaf ear had been turned (Tmjillo 1896: 154). On August 25, Gomez replied to Tmjillo in a thoughtful and clearly conciliatory letter. He had read in El Yara and in letters from friends "that the revolutionary spirit was being reborn in the emigre centers, encouraged by Marti and other compatriots." As for the errors in the statutes, he had similar reservations, but he concluded that "we have to begin somewhere." Anyway, he added, these things (political) did not concern him and he could not offer an opinion. He was always ready to help, however, but "in the field of action" (Tmjillo 1896: 155-56).

THE MILITARY-INTELLIGENCE QUESTION 97 On September 11, 1892, Marti was warmly received at the general's hacienda near Montecristi in the Dominican Republic. Three days of conversations produced the so-called Agreement of Montecristi. Fields of activity were defined: there would be civilian direction, under the authority of Marti, in all the initial work of preparation and coordination for the hour of battle. Once the war was initiated, military leadership would be under the command of General Gomez (Manach 1950: 303-7). On September 13, Marti wrote his formal offer to Gomez: "Today I offer you this new labor without fear of refusal. I have no more remuneration to offer you than the pleasure of sacrifice and the probable ingratitude of men" (Marti 1963, 2: 162-63). It is interesting to note that the version of the letter that was later published in Patria said "I invite you" (Yo invito a Ud.) rather than "I offer you" (Yo ofrezco a Ud) as stated in the original letter to Gomez. There were also a few other editorial revisions as well (Marti 1963, 2: 160, n.12). (The editors of one collection of Marti's works rendered the changes in the following way, with changes in the Patria version inserted in brackets within the original letter to Gomez: "Yo ofrezco [invito] a Ud., sin temor de negativa, [a] este nuevo trabajo, hoy que no tengo mas remuneration que brindarle [para ofrecerle] que el placer del sacrificio y la ingratitud probable de los hombres" (Marti 1963, 2: 162-63).) Gomez's reply has been repeated many times: "From this moment you can count on my services" (Tmjillo 1896: 160). His letter from which the quotation was taken was, as one might expect, considerably shorter than that of Marti and was without the cosmic philosophical embellishments so much a part of the latter's correspondence. Marti returned to Key West on November 9 for a formal report to the Cuban Convention on his conversations and agreement with Gomez. There were more rounds of meetings with veteran leaders and clubs. He delivered a speech in English (discussed in Chapter 9) to the North American community, explaining the aims of the Cuban revolution (Casasus 1953: 228). It was shortly after this meeting that Figueredo wrote to Gomez in the letter quoted above: "What a man, my friend".

8

Unauthorized Uprisings

By all appearances, Marti's position of leadership was now firmly established. The party had indeed been accepted by a large number of autonomous political organizations, the principal veteran military leaders had pledged their adherence in writing, and Gomez and Maceo had accepted the positions of highest leadership of the military. But all was not well. There were still patriots, especially in Cuba and New York, who either remained on the sidelines or were openly opposed to Marti. It seems that Marti's agents, probably not wishing to disappoint their popular leader, had not always informed him about those in Cuba who questioned his credentials as the leader of the revolution (Manach 1950: 308). Marti was certainly more popular and better known within the emigre colonies than he was within Cuba itself (Collazo 1981: 22-23). In New York, opposition to Marti was headed by Enrique Tmjillo, especially in the pages of El Porvenir. In Cuba, lack of authority, if not opposition, was sometimes expressed in the form of unauthorized uprisings. Rumors of such uprisings, both actual and in the planning stage, became more and more disturbing to Marti, even while his new organization expanded and consolidated its authority. It was not always clear whether ambitious leaders hoped to preempt the plans of the party for their own benefit or whether the reputed success of the organization raised hopes that help would be forthcoming from the emigre colonies if events in Cuba were to force their hand. Spanish intrigue and false orders were also suspected. These were certainly serious challenges to Marti's leadership. The way in which he dealt with these challenges tells us much about his style of leadership. In Chapter 7 we saw that

UNAUTHORIZED UPRISINGS 99 mmors of plans for an uprising brought him to Key West only a few months after the formation of the party and his election as delegate. There he acted decisively but with great discretion. Three other episodes in which Key West again became the focus of his attention must be mentioned. Rumors were circulating about an expected rebellion scheduled to break out on March 20, 1893. Nothing came of it but it was deemed to be of sufficient importance to prompt a strong statement from Marti in Patria. In a long article he denied that any rebellion had indeed been about to break out. The article made it clear that the party intended to avoid any "puerile and premature landings" by inexperienced heroes and "wretched and show-off expeditions from Key West" (Marti 1963, 2: 275). Marti then took advantage of the situation to strengthen the image of the party: "The functionaries of the Party of the Revolution are men, men prepared to die for Cubans. . . . They are the fathers of yesterday who return—and their sons." Then he restated the aims of the party. It was not intended to bring any victorious group to power in Cuba which would regard the island as their booty and domain. Neither would it recognize factions, castes, or exclusions among Cubans (Marti 1963, 2: 274). Those remarks not only strengthened the image of the party; they implicitly placed the aims of those in opposition to the party in doubt. Did they not accept these noble aims? Is that why they were not prepared to accept the authority of the party? "They were only playing the game that Spain wanted them to play. No such expedition was or is about to leave Key West under the command of the Delegate of the Revolutionary Party" (Marti 1963, 2: 276). In spite of Marti's efforts to meet the problem it soon became obvious that the situation was not under control. The challenge to his leadership soon became open and concrete. On April 24 news reached New York of an uprising in the vicinity of Pumio, Holguin. Spontaneous meetings of support were held in emigre colonies and enthusiasm ran high in New York, Tampa, and Key West. Once again, the leaders were the Sartorio brothers who had been involved in the conspiracy set for August 1892. In the moment of euphoria they were proclaimed heroes (Tmjillo 1896: 172). Marti was campaigning in New Orleans at the time, but he was informed about the events and mshed to Key West to take control of the situation. He notified

100 JOSE MARTI Gonzalo de Quesada, his secretary in New York: "I am going to the Key to face difficulties." Gonzalo was also instructed to inform the press that the uprising, if indeed there was one, was spontaneous or had been precipitated by Spanish intrigue. The party's position was left open: "We will watch carefully and we will do—not what may be in the interest of ambitious revolutionaries-but what is in the interest of the island" (Marti 1963, 2: 319). It was indeed a difficult situation that he faced. This kind of uprising was contrary to everything that he had spoken and written about. The very fact that he had made his position so clear in the pages of Patria, in correspondence, and public speeches openly threw the challenge in his face. He had not been consulted and there were even mmors that something was going on between Key West and the Sartorio brothers (Tmjillo 1896: 178). In Key West, as expected, he found enthusiasm running high. Clubs were being formed, public meetings were held, and money was being collected everywhere. On May 3, in a wire to Gonzalo, he said that it "confirms the situation foreseen by the party . . . ordered madness" (Marti 1963, 2: 319). At the home of Teodoro Perez, 1123 Duval Street, a large banner ran across the entire second-story veranda. It had the names "Sartorio" at one end and "Marti" at the other. "Cuba" was printed between the two and the Cuban flag was draped above. Marti even posed for a photograph here with a large group of enthusiasts. The photograph may still be seen in Key West's Monroe County Public Library. The picture is indeed a faithful record of Marti's dilemma. (The photograph carries an apparently inaccurate date). Vexed though he was, he expressed his willingness to assist should the uprising demonstrate sufficient strength and public support. He could hardly have done otherwise. If he condemned it or even remained on the sidelines he would have been left behind if the uprising proved to be successful. His claims to leadership would have been seriously damaged. If he openly condemned it and if the uprising failed, he might have been blamed for the failure. There were many critics who already accused him of indecisiveness and timidity. The situation was difficult and the choices were few. As it turned out he made the right choices.

UNAUTHORIZED UPRISINGS 101 The uprising had little support in Cuba: the Sartorio brothers and a few followers were soon reduced to asking the Spanish authorities for amnesty. Marti now moved quickly to employ his motto of the essence of leadership-to turn obstacles into advantage without compromising principle (Marti 1964, 14: 60). He wasted no time. On May 6 he wrote to Gomez from Key West, addressing him now as "my General and my Friend." Here was an opportunity to bring "the general and friend" into his confidence and share the difficult problem. That is precisely what he did: You cannot imagine what my life is like. . . . I have spent all my strength . . . in saving the tme revolution from the only thing that threatens it-from the treason of those who once served it and today serve the Spanish government. . . . [Because of] the news of the feared uprising of Holguin [I have had to} abandon everything in order to take into my hands the agitated reins in the Key (Marti 1963, 2: 321). He then made it clear that he viewed the unauthorized uprising as a serious challenge to Gomez's authority as commander-in-chief as much as it was to the head of the party. It was also an unfriendly act: "The apparent friends of the uprising aspired to perturb you and destroy . . . the plans that we have been preparing." But he closed his letter on a triumphant note. He makes it clear that he is now on top of the situation, that he has turned adversity to the advantage of the party: "I have been able to transform the reported defeat . . . [into] more union than we ever had, with a strong and reflexive enthusiasm. . . . [In] three days since I arrived, I have raised $30,000 in the face of defeat in the Key alone. . . . Commissions, newspapers, collections, people from Cuba. I am surrounded by everything at this very moment" (Marti 1963, 2: 321-23). It had indeed provided an unexpected opportunity to collect additional funds for the party treasury. In a communication to Gonzalo Quesada, apparently written before the uprising had ended, it appears that he even planned to take full advantage of it. He spoke of "the magnificent contribution of the workers . . .

102 JOSE MARTI $20,000 in one day. . . . The Key is boiling around me." Then he looks to the immediate future: "With the present results of the uprising, it does not seem possible that it will be put down before we have acquired the resources necessary for the larger war." And then: "Keep in reserve Isigilol a very brief article about this in which the principle will be that the outcome confirms our predictions" (Marti 1963, 2: 320-21). From his sickbed in Key West (he was ill again on this visit) he issued the first edition of his vigorous condemnation of all such uprisings. Known as the Purino Declaration, it is said to have been written at Figueredo's house where Marti was a guest of honor. The declaration was first published and widely circulated as a pamphlet; later it was delivered in a speech by Marti at Hardman Hall in New York. It was finally published in Patria on May 27, 1893 (Carbonell 1935: 17; Marti 1963, 2: 33549; Marquez 1965: 344). The Patria version was a lengthy statement of nearly 7,000 words-lengthy even for Marti. It condemned the unsuccessful uprising, which had not been the product of any order issued by the Cuban Revolutionary Party. That party was "the only party" of the Cuban stmggle for freedom. Here was an opportunity to state and elaborate once again what the party stood for and to point out the sources of its strength. "The party owes its strength neither to demagoguery nor passion, but to the analysis and understanding of our problems." The Cuban Revolutionary Party was a party "created and mled by the vote of the united emigre colonies." The author was identified as "the Delegate of the Revolutionary Party, Jose Marti." It was suspected also that the Holguin fiasco might have been precipitated by Spanish intrigue-false orders by Spanish agents acting in the guise of rebels. Whatever the origins of uprisings, it demonstrated the need to organize and control the clandestine organization within Cuba. Marti immediately took advantage of the Holguin fiasco to do just that. We get a picture of what he had in mind from a May 1893 letter to one of his agents in Cuba. He first explained the need for such action, growing out of the recent events. Then he turned to the organization and the work itself.

UNAUTHORIZED UPRISINGS 103 This work will be carried out in isolation, and in order to do that, each municipal district will have a delegate [or agent] who will concentrate exclusively and only within his district, without knowing or having any connection with the work of the others. In spite of this, when the moment arrives, the movement will be unanimous and simultaneous throughout the island. This is done so that if for any reason one [delegate] is taken by surprise, the [Spanish] government will not be able to pick up the trail of the conspiracy. For the direction and supervision of this work, there will be a Central Delegate for the entire island with final authority in all cases. He will transmit orders through the Provincial Delegates, with whom each one of you will deal directly. And to facilitate your assignment, you are authorized to recmit and use all practical measures at your disposal. I salute you and all the good Cubans of your district (Marti 1963, 2: 325). Marti had scarcely returned to New York when there were more mmors of the same trouble—an unauthorized uprising in Cuba. On June 14 he wrote to Figueredo: "I am keeping an eye on las Villas: it appears to be another Pumio, perhaps more serious. Or someone's hand has been forced ahead of time and unnecessarily" (Marti 1963, 2: 355). Rumors continued and in September he wrote to his secretary: "In strictest confidence, because it is important, I am going to the Key. I think it will be my last trip. Keep it quiet" (Marti 1963, 2: 392). That trip had more to do with declining revenues and spirits caused by the depression, a matter to be discussed shortly, but in his report on the trip, there are hints that the danger of unauthorized uprising might well have been on the agenda (Marti 1963, 2: 397-99). The two problems were closely related, however. There were persistent reports that rebel leaders in Cuba suspected that nothing was being done in the United States and that they saw pessimism growing at home. That was the very thing that might inspire leaders to wait no longer and issue their own call to arms. An August letter to Gomez was full of concern about these matters (Marti 1963, 2: 389-91). Another August letter to Sanchez said:

104 JOSE MARTI "Julio [Sanguily] writes to you that the country does not want war, that I ought to be in Key West sending people to Cuba" (Marti 1963, 2: 383). More serious mmors came later. On November 6 there were reports of an uprising, this time at Lajas. Federico de Zayas seemed to be the head of it, and it was mmored that he was acting in cooperation with four emigres in Key West. Rumor also had it that agents had actually been sent from Key West to work with the movement. To make matters worse, de Zayas had given a formal promise not to start a revolt until he received definite orders from the party (Tmjillo 1896: 190-91; Manach 1950: 319). Marti immediately contacted Key West leaders and expressed his concern. On November 7 he wrote to Sanchez and told the general that, if necessary, "I will go to the Key for a few hours, to see [things] at close range and to see what we can do" (Marti 1963, 2: 420). A week later he wrote to Sanchez again, this time expressing both concern and irritation. He pointed out that what had happened was contrary to specific orders carried by his agent only a few weeks earlier. Those orders had been received with the most formal promise not to begin a rebellion at this time. Again he suspected intrigue on the part of the Spanish government (Marti 1963, 2: 422-24). In a November 16 letter to Poyo, he also held out the prospect of cooperation "in case this uprising turns out to be something more than it now appears to be . . . in case . . . it justifies our help" (Marti 1963, 2: 425). On December 15, the day after his arrival in Key West, he wrote to Maceo assuring him that things were under control: "From here I can do what we talked about and I had it ready . . . just in case, against the instmctions sent to the island and against my express order . . . the uprising might have spread by means of a false order under my name" (Marti 1963, 2: 459). To his secretary he wrote: "I have avoided the dangers, I took advantage of them and we are on our way, speeches meetings, and a world" (Marti 1963, 2: 462). On December 17 a general assembly of clubs in Key West voted "to declare their confidence in Marti, who has kept the revolutionary forces intact and has saved them from the distrust planted by the uprising at Lajas" (Casasus 1953: 240). It appeared that unauthorized uprising were under control. But there were already other problems, especially a serious

UNAUTHORIZED UPRISINGS 105 depression in the United States and the problems of party finances growing out of the depression.

9

Depression and Party Finances

In 1893 a financial panic hit the United States. Unemployment, strikes, catastrophic business conditions, and increasing radicalism seemed to threaten the social structure and peace of the country. A graphic summation of the panic at its height was presented in the usually optimistic Commercial and Financial Chronicle on September 16: The month of August will long remain memorable as one of the most remarkable in our industrial history. Never before has there been such a sudden and striking cessation of industrial activity. Nor was any section of the country exempt from paralysis; mills, factories, furnaces, mines nearly everywhere shut down in large numbers, and commerce and enterprise were arrested in an extraordinary and unprecedented degree. The complete unsettlement of confidence and the derangement of our financial machinery, which made it almost impossible to obtain loans or sell domestic exchange and which put money to a premium over checks, had the effect of stopping the wheels of industry and of contracting production and consumption within the narrowest limits, so that our internal trade was reduced to very small proportionsin fact, was brought almost to a standstill~and hundreds of thousands of men thrown out of employment (White 1983: 4).

DEPRESSION AND PARTY FINANCES 107 Marti carefully observed the events around him and interpreted their causes, consequences, and implications for his Cuban emigre communities. In many ways, what was taking place was a logical sequence to what he had been saying about North American society and its values for a long time. It had lessons for Cuban revolutionaries. In an article published in Patria on August 19 he spoke of "the crisis through which the United States was passing." It had a special message for any Cuban emigres who might have lost enthusiasm for establishing their own independent country: "The North [the U.S.] has been unjust and greedy; it has been more concerned with assuring a fortune for a few than with creating a country for the good of all." The signs were clear, and the message was unmistakable: "The North is becoming a closed society and is full of hatreds. . . . Today more than ever, when this uncertain refuge is beginning to close, it is essential to create our own country" (Marti 1963, 2: 367-68). In Patria of August 26 Marti again wrote of what he saw in the United States: "Rich against poor, Christians against Jews, whites against blacks, small farmers against merchants, West against Southwest" (Marti 1963, 2: 379). But for Cubans he expressed hope. The poverty that they were suffering was not caused by their revolution but by the poverty now afflicting the United States. "The Revolutionary Party, with the strength of all Cuban emigres, and with the representation of all of them, is going to conquer the homeland which is now lacking: (Marti 1963, 2: 368). The financial panic soon had serious consequences for Key West, especially for the Cubans living there and for their independence movement. The effects on the tobacco industry were devastating. Cigar factories closed, unemployment was high, and labor leaders accused the factory owners of taking advantage of the depression by lowering salaries. The Spanish government saw an opportunity to undermine the independence movement by offering support for Cubans who wanted to leave Key West (that "nest of scorpions"). Many families were transported back to Havana on Spanish ships (Westfall 1984: 46). These problems were soon reflected in a serious decline in contributions to the party. The panic in the United States also renewed the threat of U.S. annexation. Expansionism was seen by some North American politicians as a solution to problems at home, and Cuba was a prime target. Annexationist sentiment in

108 JOSE MARTI the United States rekindled a similar hope among some in Cuba. Within Cuba there was also the danger of impatient patriots jumping the gun and trying yet another uprising. There was also the danger of renewed interest in the promises of autonomy which Spain offered from time to time. Marti commented: "Some agitate impatiently and other seek solace in silence" (Marti 1963, 2: 371). It was a trying time for the independence movement, just when things had been progressing for more than a year. Marti issued a stream of communications with his followers and made several trips to communicate directly. The depression and its consequences could not have come at a worse time for Marti and the party. The workers had been generous in their financial sacrifices, but even in the best of times their limited resources were only partially made up for by their numbers. And even those contributions were extended by pledges of some entrepreneurs, such as Eduardo Gato, to match the contribution of their workers. Early in 1893 Marti made it clear that more money would be needed, and he explained why. On March 9, he wrote a joint letter to four affluent Key West entrepreneurs: Eduardo Gato, Carlos Recio, Manuel Barranco, and Teodoro Perez. He explained to them that in less than a year and with a little more than three thousand dollars he had managed to unite and extend the revolutionary movement in the United States and Cuba. But now a rapid and substantial purchase of arms and equipment was necessary. Thus he was appealing to these four distinguished members of the Key West community: "I know of your credit and influence in that island of Cuban liberty which you have ennobled with your industry and strength of patriotism . . . in that glorious Key." He asked that they collect a sum of twelve to fourteen thousand dollars over the next months (later in the letter, an amount of about thirty-five thousand dollars is mentioned for the longer term). That, however, was a "sum that will not be used without the approval of the auditor named by the contributors to ascertain its proper use and of which a detailed account will be given by the auditor." Probably trying to soften the impact of his request, he added that, in his opinion, it would be only fair that from now "until the day in which the war begins, efforts will be made to reduce the proportion of the private contribution of the Key" (Marti 1963, 2: 239-43). It is interesting to note that on the same day (March 9,

DEPRESSION AND PARTY FINANCES 109 1893) he wrote to Francisco Ibem, reporting his "decision to return the funds of that dear club 'Cayo Hueso' because in reality they are not needed. Be careful not to offend anyone. Never will I forget that enthusiasm, that showing of confidence. . . . Affection is my word for that club, a word I do not use in vain" (Marti 1963, 2: 243). A similar letter was sent to the wealthy merchant Carlos Recio, also a member of the club and one of the four tapped for money in the first letter quoted above (Marti 1963, 2: 244). The reason for returning the funds ($654.28) was explained in a long letter to the president of the club: these were action funds (for organization, propaganda, etc.) and now that the party was "at the gates of war" it was appropriate that they be converted and held by the clubs as war funds. Furthermore, since they were not needed for their original use, the delegate wished "to create a public understanding within our organization of the respect which a party must inspire in a people which has often been asked to make useless sacrifices" (Marti 1963, 2: 234-39). The same point was emphasized in a letter to his enthusiastic supporter Martin Herrera: "This candor of returning the funds to the club, funds which in reality we do not need-because of anticipated ordinary funds-will contribute to the respect that we need" (Marti 1963, 2: 233). The point was deemed worthy of four or five letters! On March 18, he wrote again to the group of four prominent entrepreneurs. The topic again was money, but now there should be more of it, and it was needed with greater urgency. Far from considering himself involved in mere preliminaries, he had now "entered upon all the labor which . . . will produce the substance and state of spirit to immediately bring to the island all the men and arms expected of us." He then harked back to his theme of a new and different war: "The delegation [Marti] had not wanted to turn to various persons whose number and social position, due to the almost entirely hostile or indifferent circles in which they move, might debilitate . . . an enterprise. . . . We have to begin our work with the loyal, the old hands, the few." The reference was probably to the small, upper-class, New York-based supporters of previous efforts. He was now asking Key West for fifty-nine thousand dollars within a month, two-thirds of the total which he hoped to collect from all the emigre colonies: "The emigre colonies will come through, and the Key will be the first [to come through] with its

110 JOSE MARTI part of the sacred sum, in spite of shortages and alarms about business. . . . It seems incredible how little is needed for it [the enterprise]" (Marti 1963, 2: 265-67). Signs of financial problems began to appear. On March 2 he found it necessary to remind clubs of their dues (Marti 1963, 2: 324). And in a July circular, financial problems were not specifically mentioned but the presidents were told of his recent travels to accelerate the work of the revolution. He spoke of the sacrifices that were being made. Heroic efforts were needed and he found heroism everywhere: "First, let no one slow their pace, even though there is poverty." On July 25, a letter to Sanchez shows concern mixed with his usual expression of optimism: "The prevailing poverty will end in time. I do not think it will obstruct us" (Marti 1963, 2: 357, 358-62). In spite of the storm clouds, money was apparently continuing to come to the treasury. As late as August 4, 1893, the treasurer wrote to Gualterio Garcia: "The Gato factory sent me $4,168. You sent me the amount of $4,312.57" (Casuasus 1953: 229). Those, however, might well have been funds that had been collected over a period well before that date. As events looked more threatening Marti only redoubled his efforts in Patria and in his voluminous correspondence. His technique of turning adversity into advantage appears again: "The greater the agony in the foreign land, the greater the necessity to win, quickly, a homeland." He tried to put down mmors that depression in the United States would seriously endanger the momentum of party activities: "The Revolutionary Party does not live off the United States, and the crisis in the United States only affects it through the pain which it is forced to witness in the poverty of its Cubans and Puerto Ricans." Yet he saw hope through firmness and patience: "Key West, the center of greatest production, awaits with huge sacrifices the early and inevitable hour when the consumption of present stock obliges the buyers to place new orders" (Marti 1963, 2: 367-71). Since Patria was regular reading in the cigar factories, these messages obviously reached Key West. But in September Marti decided to go there and to other Florida emigre colonies. He was now head of the revolutionary family and it was his obligation to be with it in times of adversity. But he was becoming more and more concerned that he was too much in the limelight, and, as his report suggests, he was trying to avoid publicity. Nevertheless,

DEPRESSION AND PARTY FINANCES 111 his presence was needed. Back in New York, he tried to make the most of the visit. On September 23, Patria carried an account of "the latest and sudden trip of the Delegate of the Revolutionary Party to Florida. He fell upon Key West . . . and did . . . all that he had to do" (Marti 1963, 2: 398). The report of what was happening in Key West and the Cuban colony's reaction to adversity carried a lesson in state formation for all Cubans: Perhaps misery was painfully evident everywhere [in Key West], but the best smile was put on to receive the delegate, And the enthusiasm, more powerful and spontaneous than ever, reached the sky. . . . But that is not the lesson, . . . rather [it is] in the tender delicacy with which the city of Key West, punished by persistent shortages, hid its pains from the one who today requires all the community's valor and support in order to attend to the pains of our country. . . . Women put on their best white dresses and children hailed the country that is being bom (Marti 1963, 2: 398-99). The message was clear. Here was a people clearly capable of founding a new society and a new state. The doctrine of Marti had long been that the new country's social problems would be solved and justice would be achieved through the kindness and willingness to sacrifice that he saw everywhere in the Cuban emigre colonies and especially now in Key West. What mattered now was "to reveal the candor and innate nobility of the Cubans." This was especially so because "the only real enemy of Cuban happiness is the lack of confidence among many Cubans." Thus it was proper and "even obligatory to point out the clear proof of nobility which the Cuban people, the people of the emigre colonies, have shown during the last and sudden visit of the Delegate of the Revolutionary Party to Florida" (Marti 1963, 2: 398). The article was appropriately titled "The Lesson of a Journey." Here were vivid examples of national character which the unfortunate crisis gave him the opportunity to display and put to a useful purpose.

112 JOSE MARTI Articles and reports continued, but one additional example must suffice. On October 6 Patria carried a special article on the heroic efforts of Key West. It noted that Patria did not as a rule find it necessary to point out such things because sacrifice is what revolutions are made of. But there was something tmly special going on in Key West in this time of adversity, and in order to inform readers everywhere, it reprinted a document that had been published in El Yara. That document was signed by the members of a committee of "tested emigre veterans" who in spite of the most adverse conditions, were collecting additional fluids to be handed over to the party. The secretary of the committee was none other than Fernando Figueredo, now one of Marti's staunchest supporters (Ripoll 1971, 2: 110-11). Along with a prodigious journalism, it was necessary to reach as many people as possible on a personal level. In October he encouraged Poyo: "Let's keep up the fire. . . . We will fall, and it will only make us stronger. I have read it in the sky" (Marti 1963, 2: 407). And in November he had words of comfort for Francisco Ibern: "Poverty is not weakening us" (Marti 1963, 2: 454-55). The situation remained critical and Marti again saw the need to go to Key West where he could interact directly and personally with the community. He arrived there on the evening of December 14 and stayed again at the home of Fernando Figueredo. A telegram to his secretary carried the personal and optimistic touch that was so much a part of his leadership: "Fernando sends an abrazo. Here [there is] poverty, loyalty and the certainty of doing what I have proposed" (Marti 1963, 2: 462). And on December 15 he wrote to General Maceo: "I am here after three days of anguished efforts in Tampa in order to put a little more flour in the bread; and here I am doing the same" (Marti 1963, 2: 459). When he left Key West on December 20, he wrote a long letter to his friend Poyo. It was full of expressions of nostalgia and praise for that special emigre community: I cannot express the love, affection and just pride and appreciation which, in the name of our country, we owe to the emigre colony of Key West. . . . Never have I seen grandeur more pure than that which I have seen in my people during these days. . . . I

DEPRESSION AND PARTY FINANCES 113 have wanted to say goodbye, and I have not been able to. . . . I am feeling very deeply . . . the purest and strongest that a people can do, we are doing (Marti 1963, 2: 462-63). The troubles that Marti had observed during his December visit became more serious. Factories reopened but owners demanded concessions which the workers believed to be unfair. The cigar workers went on strike in a number of Key West factories. This threatened disaster for everyone in a community so dependent on the cigar industry, and only beginning to recover from the ongoing depression. But Marti could not (and most likely did not want to, in any event) abandon the workers who had done so much to project him into leadership and with whom he was so popular. Memories of the strikes and violence of the 1880s prompted a strong reaction by the North American community. In January 1894 some of the community leaders went to Cuba and illegally recruited Spanish workers as strike-breakers. They were offered protection and tempting salaries. Cuban leaders tried all legal means, but they could get nowhere with the Key West judicial and law enforcement establishment. The North American attorney who eventually came to the aid of the Cubans described the situation quite correctly: "The whole situation was most peculiar, a circumstance aggravated by the isolation of Key West, encouraging certain politicians to do as they pleased and their pooled interest demanded" (Rubens 1932: 35). Serious violence empted and arrests were made as outraged Cubans desperately resorted to methods more in keeping with the nature and traditions of Key West politics. They resorted to force in order to prevent Spanish workers from landing. Eventually, they declared a total boycott of all non-Cuban establishments and got their necessities from Tampa, naturally at higher prices (Rubens 1932: 34). Marti was now asked to play the role of counselor and guardian of his island community. Cuban leaders sent word to New York. Manuel Patricio Delgado, Poyo's son-in-law and an activist in these events, later recalled that "Marti was asked to send a lawyer because those [lawyers] of the Key, naturally, were not about to take on the difficult mission of bringing charges against one of their own" (Delgado 1933: 77). The fact that the

114 JOSE MARTI Cubans of Key West turned to Marti is significant. Now, especially, he emerged as the indispensable and irreplaceable leader. It was assumed that, somehow, he would find a way to lead them out of this tragedy, and they were quite correct in their assumption. Here we must emphasize again two of the many qualities that set Marti apart and qualified him for the many tasks that he would perform. He seems to have made a highly favorable impression on most of the people that he met, and he seems to have remembered and remained in touch with virtually all of them. He had a network of dedicated and useful associates and friends throughout the world, as demonstrated by the help and loyalty provided by Horatio Rubens. About a year prior to the problems in Key West, Marti had met Horatio Rubens, a young North American attorney, who, like so many, was very favorably impressed with the Cuban leader. In his own words: We who knew him at the time felt that here was a man equipped by Divine Providence for his great work in laying the foundation for emancipation of his people. . . . In that moment [of our meeting] I knew I had never seen a more magnetic man, never perhaps even imagined a man of so extraordinary a personality (Rubens 1932: 28, 30). Rubens immediately promised Marti that, if needed, he would do what he could to further the cause of Cuba. Marti replied that he might well need his help in the future. When trouble came to Key West in early 1894, Marti went to Rubens at once. He told him quite frankly that the invasion of Cuban rights in Key West would spell disaster for the Cuban Revolutionary Party; it would interrupt the flow of needed funds and possibly even terminate them. It would be essential to supply Key West with legal counsel immediately (Rubens 1932: 16). Rubens agreed to leave for Key West that very evening. But as already noted, when he arrived he found the judicial and political system so mired in corruption and favoritism that he realized at once that he would have to go elsewhere. Fortunately, he had the connections and skills to do so. Marti and Rubens went to Washington, where Marti contacted Secretary of State

DEPRESSION AND PARTY FINANCES 115 Walter Q. Gresham. Rubens contacted Secretary of the Treasury John G. Carlisle and Attorney General Richard Olney. He also managed to get the support of Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor (Rubens 1932: 16, 39-40). They were initially successful in Washington, and warrants for the deportation of the illegally imported Spanish workers were issued. Rubens was asked by the Attorney General to return to Key West in order to keep him informed. Back in Key West, the local authorities tried further obstmctionist measures including the issuance of writs of habeas corpus. Rubens again appealed to Washington: I cabled the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General that the writs had been granted and Olney immediately took the matter on appeal. The appellate court decided, as everyone knew it must, that the judge had no right to grant the writs, and ultimately the imported Spaniards were returned to Cuba (Rubens 1932: 43). The legal victory was a pyrrhic one. It had taken a long time, and, meanwhile, factories began to move to Ocala, Tallahassee, Tampa, and other Florida centers. With them went cigar workers and their families. On March 31 Patria reported that 2,000 Cubans had already left the Key (Ripoll 1971 a: 120). And Carbonell (1935: 17) tells us that five or six thousand eventually left. The latter estimate is probably an exaggeration, but it gives us a picture of how these events must have been perceived at the time. But we have moved ahead of our story. What is more important for us is the way in which Marti reacted to the crisis as it developed and to its aftermath. A brief review of some of the highlights of his efforts will show four patterns of leadership activity. First, he kept the Key West community informed of his deep concern and of what he was doing (or could not do for political reasons). Second, he tried to keep the other exile communities informed of the facts; this was done partly to avoid mmor, and partly to offer an example to others of how the "noble Key" reacted with sacrifice and grandeur. Third, he constantly interpreted the events to emphasize two lessons: Cubans were

116 JOSE MARTI capable of building their own state and, above all, events made it more clear than ever that Cubans must do so. Finally, he sought, as only he could do, to minimize the damage of deteriorating relations with the Anglo-American community within which Cubans had to live until they had their own country. While Rubens was seeking a remedy in the courts, Marti had been active in many others ways. He had intended to go to Key West in order to see what he could do, but he had only gone as far as Tampa. Rubens was convinced that his presence in the Key would only create a more explosive situation and urged him not to go. He even had a local committee, including Figueredo, Perez, and Poyo, write to him with the same advice. Marti reluctantly agreed, but it put him in a very delicate situation. These were the very workers who had done so much to project him into leadership. What would they think of a leader who was not with them on the battlefield? He made every effort to let his Key West friends know of his concerns and of his reasons for not being there. On January 18 he wrote to Poyo of the pain that he felt for him and for all the Cubans who were victims of these events. Above all he wanted to express his pain in not being able to be with the community: "But I understand the situation and perhaps I can put it in a few lines which you can publish in El Yara without risk or provocation." He then tells Poyo how he would have liked to be there in order to communicate directly with the North Americans, "to speak to them in their own language and move what remains of their hearts and their sense of liberty . . . [but] I am the last person who, for vain and unjustifiable show, would insist on provoking a conflict from which we could not honorably emerge or an injury, however light, to the Cuban Revolution." Unfortunately, he continued, he would soon have to leave Tampa: "The greatest valor, which is that of sacrificing one's own impulses to the conveniences of the rest, compels me to tear myself away from Tampa and continue north where duty now awaits me" (Marti 1963, 3: 38, 42). On the same day he wrote to General Sanchez, now addressed simply as "my dear Serafin": "You better than anyone else understand my indignation and my sacrifice at not going [to Key West]. But the Cuban Revolution should not be sacrificed by using me. . . . Nor should I be the one to bring about the conflict which they desire" (Marti 1963, 3: 39). And in another

DEPRESSION AND PARTY FINANCES 117 letter to Sanchez he expresses his frustration at not having an opportunity to communicate directly with his adversaries: "My idea was to fly there and speak to them in English" (Marti 1963, 3: 15). When there appeared to be hope, he was quick to let the community know. On January 25 he wrote to Sanchez: "At this time it appears that everything has been won. . . . Rubens' . . . last telegram tells me that he leaves tomorrow 'to see that everything is complied with and to see that orders are carried out'" (Marti 1963, 3: 43). It was not only the veteran leaders such as Poyo and Sanchez who received Marti's attention. To Gualterio Garcia, the tobacco worker, he wrote: "I immediately continued my trip with Rubens to prepare for the battle that I knew they would give us~ that of political disturbance. And there [in Key West] the battle took place; but they found it to be a fortress." This was by way of explaining to him why he had not written sooner. In another letter he brought Gualterio into his confidence and solicited his help: "Tell me everything which in your judgement I should know, in order to guide me in what I have to write about there" (Marti 1963, 3: 15, 16). That solicitation was indeed important because Marti regularly wrote about these events in Patria. He did so to keep faith with the Key West community as well as to inform and inspire the other emigre communities by the example of the Key. Two lessons were always carried in the Patria articles. First, Key West was an example of Cuban courage, strength, and love. It was proof that they were the foundation of a new and better society. Second, it proved again, even more clearly now, that Cubans must establish a new state and a new society. The land of exile, in which Cubans had put so much faith, had betrayed them because of greed and indifference. A long article in Patria on January 27 was full of rebuke for the North Americans who, turning their backs on their own Revolution, had brutally betrayed the Cubans who "arrived at the Key with so much love for their land of refuge." But the future was still bright: "Whoever desires a country of their own, let them conquer it. . . . To Cuba! our whole soul tells us, after this deception of the Key, after this brutal blow" (Marti 1963, 3: 48, 51). In order to bring the message to the North American public, a special supplement to Patria was published with an English translation of the article (Marti 1963, 3: 54-63).

118 JOSE MARTI Correspondence with the Key West community carried the same messages. In early April he wrote to Gualterio Garcia: "These disturbances, because of their very terror and bmtality, have been beneficial to the Key. . . . There is no secure factory except upon our own soil." And he wrote the same thoughts to Poyo. "I always saw it: I saw it from the moment I arrived. We have been sleeping upon the hatred of the city that we have enriched, the hatred of the vile people, hostile to the just and patient pre-eminence of the Creole and mestizo race which they disdain" (Marti 1963, 3: 109, 111, 41). Serafin Sanchez and others received similar messages. To Sanchez he wrote: "What a time these Americans pick to meddle in our affairs! From what I have seen, everything is low and venal in matters where respect, pmdence, gratitude, and humane and republican affinity ought to prevent interference" (Marti 1963, 3: 15). Unfortunately, no amount of optimism and praise for Cubans could disguise what was happening. Words of resignation were now more and more mixed with old expressions of hope. In March Marti wrote to Gualterio Garcia: "Perhaps the Key will adjust." But by April he wrote to him sadly of "the inevitable flight from the Key. . . . The Key will always exist, although I am tmly beginning to be fearful of its final fate, because . . . [of] the discredit and tribulations of what remains . . . and the tendency of the masses to follow the greatest number" (Marti 1963, 3: 86, 109). Words of comfort and consolation were more and more in order. On March 24 he wrote to Poyo, praising "the valiant clubs . . . that have kept the revolutionary organization on its course. The chronicle of Key West, which is the chronicle of our liberty, will not forget their names." And to the loyal tobacco worker, Gualterio Garcia, there were similar words of consolation: "In the condition of the Key, you should not blame yourself because there is a shortage of clubs, when the probable and fearful [explanation] is that all have disappeared" (Marti 1963, 3: 95, 110). He also expressed his concern for Poyo and for Manuel Patricio Delgado, Poyo's son-in-law. They had led the stmggle in Key West and had incurred the wrath of the Anglo-American community. "Since the exodus is growing worse," he suggested, perhaps it might be better for Poyo to follow "to where the anxiety may be less and the sadness that visibly affects him may be alleviated" (Marti 1963, 3: 110-11).

DEPRESSION AND PARTY FINANCES 119 The regular work of revolutionary momentum had to go on, however. With the annual elections for the party delegate coming up on April 10, there was concern over the declining number of Key West clubs with the minimum of 20 members. He asked Gualterio Garcia to do everything that he could to have the clubs that could not bring their members together canvass a vote on the basis of individual members and report the vote to the council. "As many clubs as have 20 members prior to April 10, whatever the state of their treasury, may legitimately vote." Then there was a special appeal: "Much of this work rests on your shoulders because of the local danger of Poyo being too visible" (Marti 1963, 3: 110). But all of this adversity could also be put to good advantage. Cubans could profit from observing the vile as well as by observing virtue. They could respond, as indeed they were responding, in their own characteristic way-with humanity and concern for others. They could begin building their new society here and now, one not based upon greed. To Poyo, as president of the council of club presidents, he advised: "Call together the presidents [of the clubs]. Let each one take upon himself the problems of his members" (Marti 1963, 3: 42). On March 2, Patria offered a picture of pathos, challenge and hope in what was certainly one of Marti's more moving and poetic compositions. Again, the picture is allegorical and biblical. The expelled community looks again toward the horizon, and with their children in their arms, with the sun overhead and the sea around them, it searches for another comer where the evil of man does not leave them hungry and roofless. . . . Beautiful was the Key, but even more beautiful will be any other comer, with the beauty which their hearts pour out in unity, honor and sacrifice. Why lament an event that has made the Cubans better and more united? To suffer is to triumph (Ripoll 1971, 2: 116-17). Loss of party funds was but one consequence of the decline of Key West. It was potentially a serious blow to the party in yet another way. Key West had always been a special place among the exile communities. On April 21, Patria carried an article calculated to give heart to Key West as well as to inform

120 JOSE MARTI the other communities. It praised a celebration on the Key commemorating the founding of the Cuban Revolutionary Party. The celebration was praised for a number of reasons but one in particular was noteworthy: "It disproves . . . that Key West has now ceased to be the heart of Cuba that it once was. What it was, it is today." This was only a part of his efforts to restore the Key, to keep it as "the heart of Cuba." When things cooled down, he went there to offer his support. We have noted how he reluctantly kept the lowest possible profile during the turbulent period of the strikes and their immediate aftermath. He had even interrupted all communication with the advisory council there until March 24 (Marti 1963, 3: 93). For such a passionate believer in the efficacy and necessity of communication as an integral part of his leadership, this must have been greatly fmstrating. He firmly believed that tmth would triumph (Rexach 1985: 175) but that communication was essential for the whole process. More than once he had lamented during the difficult days of January: "If only I could go there and speak to them in English." In order to put this in perspective for Key West in particular we need to go back for a moment, to an earlier and happier time when Marti visited the island and did just thatspoke to them in their own language. Marti had long tried to bring the Cuban message to the North American public. That was an essential part of maintaining good relations between the host country and the emigre colonies. Even at the peak of prosperity and generally good intercommunity relations in Key West, he obviously was aware of problems. On December 3, 1892, Patria carried a report of his efforts to confront precisely those problems. At the request of the Equator Democrat of Key West, Marti gave a speech in English to a packed house at the San Carlos. "The great majority were North Americans" and on the platform Marti was surrounded by "the principal Americans of the Key." He reminded the North Americans of their own stmggle against tyranny and praised them for their hospitality and the refuge which they were offering their Cuban brothers and sisters. Then he tried to put the two stmggles in perspective: the Americans should not judge the Cubans from today's point of view. They appear to scorn the Cubans, he emphasized, because Cuba has not done what they did a century ago. But the American colonies had three centuries of their own life (autonomy) when they threw off the English yoke,

DEPRESSION AND PARTY FINANCES 121 and Cuba has had only lived 50 years of its own culture. Ten of those years had been spent in unsuccessful wars for freedom (Marti 1963, 4: 333-34). On May 16, 1894, Marti returned to Key West with a similar message for the North Americans. Manuel Patricio Delgado, then editor-in-chief of El Yara, heard the speech and recalled later that "he [Marti] gave, in English, the best speech that I have heard or that I have read." Before an audience of North Americans, Delgado continued, he proclaimed the Cuban cause to be that of Key West, of brothers united. In such a cause, Marti assured his audience, the events of January would not come between them. "I still see him, as one transfigured, on the humble stage of San Carlos" (Delgado 1933: 75-76). He found conditions distressing yet inspiring in the Key of May 1894. He was ill again on this visit, as he had been on at least two previous visits (Lubian y Arias 1984: 25). In an undated letter which the editors of his works have placed at an earlier date, but which might have been from this visit, he informed Gonzalo Quesada: In bed, very bad. Much merit in the people and many noble hearts. Here I am surrounded by a guard of love. . . . How different this Key of souls and self-sacrifice which makes one cry, from the turbid Key which was presented to us earlier, and I see that only the remnants are left (Marti 1965, 20: 397). In a San Carlos speech to the Cuban community, reported in El Yara on May 19, he did his best to revive spirits. Here among the remaining tobacco workers he reminded them again that their revolution was not being made in the interest of any class or group, but "for the good of all Cubans." He also lashed out at impatient would-be-heroes: "One can gamble with one's own life but not with the death of others. The Revolutionary Party . . . will never launch a premature revolution." He then asked his audience: "Can I continue to be confident in my people, whose patriotism revives me, whose voice gives me courage to continue the journey?" According to El Yara. "a noisy affirmation, mixed with vivas for the speaker resounded throughout the area" (Marti 1963, 4: 335).

122 JOSE MARTI He soon learned of a serious problem that had resulted from his visit. Workers in one of the large factories declared a strike on the point that the rules of the house had not allowed Marti to speak there. He expressed his deep appreciation, respect and sympathy for "my fellow workingmen," but he asked them a favor: I feel that I can ask of you a favor. Your action can harm, in a most unfavorable moment, the sacred cause, the American cause, I serve with the most respectful discretion. Your action comes to endanger the prospects of final peace, and settlement of deep sorrows, in this city. It is your duty to me, in simple justice, to remove all pretext to represent me as a disturber in this locality, or a man willing to procure further disquiet and enmity, regardless of the mortal sadness of a workless home. My love of country is with me the ardent love of justice, and of the welfare of men, and the art of advancing their body of rights without unnecessary or violent stmggle against its enemies (Marti 1963, 3: 178). In spite of all of Marti's efforts and his expressions of optimism, Key West would never be what it had been for the Cuban Revolutionary Party. Back in New York, he wrote to Poyo on July 7: "According to the lists that I see, not a dollar has come into the treasury from the Key. And according to the calculations, subscriptions were to be more than $3,000. Your collection is indispensable" (Marti 1963, 3: 226). That same month he sent a letter to Fermin Valdez Dominguez, a boyhood friend who had moved to Key West in April: "On Tuesday I am sending an intimate letter to the factories, for you to read [to them] with energy and love—or whatever may be appropriate in each factory. This has to go to the heart of the matter" (Marti 1963, 3: 223). One additional example among the many must suffice to emphasize the continuing problem. In November he wrote again to Poyo, this time asking him to try to raise funds for payment to General Sanguily, who was returning to Cuba as his agent: "I know that the council must not have an abundance . . [but] I ask you again . . . that efforts be made to raise the

DEPRESSION AND PARTY FINANCES 123 amount of the note so that the brave and beloved general may help me" (Marti 1963, 3: 382). On a more specific level, it was necessary to keep the veteran leaders and his many supporters infonned that, in spite of all that had happened, money was coming in and the concrete, day-to-day preparations were well under way. Volume 3 of his Obras completas, frequently cited here, records much of these careful communications, often in coded form. A summary cannot do justice to it, but a few examples will give an idea of the nature and scope of his efforts to inform. On May 10, he wrote to Sanchez: "Here I am, bent over, writing to the entire island, to our leaders, to those who can help us have everything we strictly need within two months" (Marti 1963, 3: 165). On May 30, he wrote to an associate in New York, expressing his faith that funds were forthcoming: "I have seen it in that beautiful Key, when six hundred hearts at the Gato factory . . . greeted with tender madness this poor skinny man who had just asked them for another contribution, which they gave him" (Marti 1963, 3: 191). And for Ramon Rivero he had these words: "Now we are in a time of silent and decisive activity. Everything depends on those who lead" (Marti 1963, 3: 126). To a group of his loyal workers, all of whom we have met earlier in this story-Garcia, Rivero, Pelaez, Diaz, and Pompes: "I am going, and you are going with me. That is what I have promised, and thus it will be in our expeditionary organization— incredibly accelerated by favorable events" (Marti 1963, 3: 244). On September 2, he could inform General Sanchez that "I think everything is ready. . . . I am preparing the ship and the arms" (Marti 1963, 3: 243). And on October 27 he informed Gato that "the final hour is here . . . the campaign for the liberty of Cuba." But that was a rousing introduction to yet another request for money. He urgently needed five thousand dollars (in the form of a "loan"), and he did not make it easy for Gato to refuse: Ah my friend: with that [$5,000] what tranquility! Without it what terrible agony. . . . Since I began this work of salvation I have been living like a dog, and I do not complain. . . . Will you give me those moments of glory and respite—perhaps the last in my life, or will you leave me alone in my pain and

124 JOSE MARTI responsibility . . . crawling and begging to save our country, begging in vain, licking the ground like a dog? I will do that if you like. I hope that I do not have to do it (Marti 1963, 3: 310-11). Then he turned on a bit of what some might call flattery: "You love work, and you only see riches as the triumph of work. You know that I admire in you, with a certain brotherly fondness, the bravura with which you have made your mark among men." And, finally, there is a mixture of "business" and challenge: "Would you lend $5,000 to a merchant and not to Cuba? Give me one more reason to take pride in a Cuban." Gato was known throughout Key West as an "easy touch" when it came to patriotic contributions (though he was otherwise known to be quite parsimonious) and that might explain the postscript to the letter: "Absolutely no one knows or will know of this letter" (Marti 1963, 3: 311-12). Gato, as always, came up with the money, and on November 10 he received a letter of profuse thanks. Marti assured him that "I do not call everyone my brother; allow me to call you brother." And in December he wrote: "Would that you were not as rich as you are, so your friend could tell you how much he respects you" (Marti 1963, 3: 345, 444). What follows is beyond the scope of this study, since the focus of much of the revolutionary activity now shifted to points outside Key West and, what is more important, Marti's style of leadership was already well established. His great accomplishment was that of inspiring, organizing, and uniting the Cuban emigre colonies for the invasion of Cuba. He had done more than that. He also labored to create the kind of citizen who would be the foundation for a new and better state and society. In recounting and analyzing his efforts in Key West we hope to have laid the foundation for a more systematic analysis of his style of leadership. That will be taken up in the next chapter. If only to complete the odyssey of Marti for the reader who may be unfamiliar with the rest of the story, a brief account of some relevant events is in order. Those events will also serve as a point of reference for some of the analysis in the next chapter. After much planning and feverish last-minute activity, the party's first expeditionary force was to leave for Cuba in January 1895. The heart of the expedition was to sail from Femandina,

DEPRESSION AND PARTY FINANCES 125 Florida-the so-called "Fernandina Plan." A measure of the movement's success under Marti may be had in the organization and size of the operation. Casasiis (1953: 249-53) provides the best account. Three ships with men, arms, and munitions would leave, supposedly carrying "workers" and "agricultural equipment" for a large agricultural operation to be developed in Central America. One ship with arms and munitions for 200 men would pick up Maceo and volunteers in Costa Rica. A second ship, also with arms and supplies, would go to Key West to pick up a contingent of more than 200 volunteers under the command of Sanchez and Roloff. The third ship would take Marti and other leaders to the Dominican Republic, where they would pick up Gomez with more than 300 additional men. The head of each expeditionary force carried $2,000 to help convince public officials of the legitimacy of the undertaking. Due to the negligence, or worse, of a Cuban collaborator, the expedition was discovered by U.S. authorities and prevented from leaving. At the request of the Spanish government, Marti's activities had been under observation by U.S. authorities for some time, and this was obviously one of those times in history that the U.S. chose to "honor its obligations under international law." Thanks to Horatio Rubens, Marti's lawyer friend, some of the supplies were rescued, but it was a serious setback for the independence movement. Marti tried as best he could to put the pieces back together, and on January 31 he joined Gomez in the Dominican Republic. On April 1 he accompanied the general to Cuba, where uprisings were already in progress. Gomez had tried to convince Marti to return to New York in order to resume his vital leadership of the emigre communities, but he gave in to Marti's relentless arguments. Shortly after arriving in Cuba, Gomez conferred upon Marti the rank of major general. On May 19, Spanish forces surprised Gomez's troops and Marti, contrary to the general's prior orders, charged into the skirmish. His death under these circumstances has been convincingly attributed by a number of writers to a sacrificial suicidal objective, but equally convincing arguments have been offered to refute the interpretation (Gray 1962: 32-22).

10 A Style of Leadership A TIME AND A PLACE Chapter 2 described the immediate context in which Marti's successful bid for leadership flowered. What was evident there was a coincidence of context and personality. Marti had waited carefully—silently and painfully, he often said~for that crucial moment. He alone appears to have had the sophistication and analytical skills to recognize the significance of that time and place. The importance of the emigre colonies of South Florida, especially Key West, with their radical tobacco workers, was quickly apparent to Marti. His eloquent statement of objectives and principles, expressed long before his close relationships with the workers, obviously had a special appeal at that moment. Centuries earlier, Machiavelli confronted the problem of organizing the Italian city-states into a unified nation-state. He observed that a powerful leader was needed in two special situations: at the birth of an organization and at a time of serious crisis. But he believed that the successful leader depended on the power of cunning and force. That eventually became perhaps the most widely touted model of successful leadership, not only for politics but for business, educational, and religious organizations as well. Yet even in Machiavelli's time the model was not successful. His single powerful leader did not emerge to unify. In a ceaseless power stmggle among princes, despots rose to power only to be overthrown sooner or later by another of their kind. They were all able practitioners of the art that Machiavelli prescribed.

A STYLE OF LEADERSHIP 127 Marti's model was a different one. His model will be portrayed here by the use of several categories, but a common thread mns through all of them. As the reader explores these categories, perhaps the model advanced by William James, paraphrased by Jennings (1960: 8), will be helpful to keep in mind. The ideal leader "was a beginner, an initiator, who persuades others to achieve, that is, execute. The relationship is not of power, but of understanding that exists between the leader and the follower." AN ORATOR AND PENSADOR If time and place provided the initial opening for Marti to move into a position of leadership, his quality as the supreme orator-pensador made it possible for him to first move into that time and place. I have resisted the temptation to provide an English word equivalent to pensador: instead, we offer a Spanish dictionary definition: "a person who is dedicated to profound thought." For Marti, both parts of that hyphenated label were of equal importance. Much has been written about his legendary skill before a crowd. But "orator" is used here in a broader sense as well-the conversationalist, the persuader in individual contacts, and the one who could turn the printed word into a special form of "oratory." Examples of Marti as the persuasive conversationalist have already been offered here. One additional example will remind us of the importance of that quality. A one-time "doubter" is speaking: I had just left Havana, where the idea of a revolutionary movement was generally considered as madness. . . . Nevertheless, Marti who saw things from outside and received information from obscure and modest agents assured me that a revolutionary sentiment prevailed throughout the island and that in Havana we were living on a volcano without knowing it. His last words, which I shall never forget, had an accent of somber conviction and prophetic premonition (Armas y Cardenas 1908: 173-74).

128 JOSE MARTI No one was more aware of the power and importance of oratory than Marti. "Oratory," he wrote, "like heroic force is scattered about in the breast of mankind; it is like the gigantic cannons that rest, in anticipation of war, in the formidable merlons of castles, perhaps gathering rust if they are not called into battle" (Marti 1964, 13: 57). But oratory could only have that power and majesty if it fulfilled certain conditions. First, it had to be informed: "The orator needs a general knowledge of history, which provides proof; of literature, which makes it pleasant; of the arts, which makes it beautiful; and of the science of politics, which provides a foundation. . . . Expression is not possible without content" (Iduarte 1982: 123). Oratory also had to be dedicated to a noble cause. Thus he responded to someone who had described him as grandiloquent: "All of this is ridiculous and puerile when the one who has those capacities fails to dedicate them to the public service, with the modesty and supreme purity demanded by their country (Iduarte 1982: 124). Above all, the purpose had to be genuine: "Words are dishonorable when they do not have behind them a heart that is clean and upright" (Marti 1963, 4: 248). While he was aware of the power and majesty of oratory he was also aware of its limitations: "The orator shines through what he says, but he wins definitively through what he does" (Marti 1964, 13: 55). How did Marti rise to the challenge of winning through what one does? For a part of the answer we move on to Marti as the decisive actor. THE DECISIVE ACTOR A number of qualities converged to form the kind of decisive actor that we see in Marti. One who carefully observed him in his own time underlined two fundamental attributes: "His prodigious intelligence had at it service a dominating, tenacious will of iron" (Tejera n.d., 129). We have seen that will expressed early in his career by a determination to wait for the proper moment. The isolation of waiting was relieved only by the firm conviction that he was standing on his principles. Following immediately upon his triumph among the workers in Tampa, he moved resolutely but discreetly to conquer Key West, the fortress of leadership and traditions that was

A STYLE OF LEADERSHIP 129 indispensable in his plans. His letter to Poyo was, as we have seen, an invitation to be invited. It was successful, and after a triumphant reception in the Key, largely organized by local workers, he wasted no time in pushing through the Bases of the Revolutionary Party. He was then given a free hand in drafting the statutes for the new party envisaged in the Bases. Once the statutes were drafted in final form, Marti undertook an innovative campaign to gain their approval. This involved the organization of new clubs in a number of places, a strategy which critics, with considerable justification, said was intended for the approval of the statutes rather than a discussion of their merits. In Key West, the thmst of his campaign was a vigorous and highly skilled, personal communications efforts with veteran leaders and workers of the community. Once the statutes were approved, he acted quickly to bring the military leaders into the new organization. First he polled the leaders to determine who would be their maximum leader. The results of the poll, which were never in doubt, were not final until August, but the strategy probably helped to bring the military leaders into his orbit, and it prepared the way for his second trip to Key West in July 1892. Again, he was undoubtedly assisted by another triumphant mass demonstration, reportedly even larger and more enthusiastic than the first one had been. At the request of the generals, he actually wrote their declaration of adhesion to the party, something which gave him another opportunity to eloquently state the aims and principles of the party—this time within the context of crucial military support. No wonder, then, that Fernando Figueredo, an early doubter of the new leader's capacity, would soon marvel that each time he appeared in Key West he added something to the revolutionary organization. During his July 1892 visit to Key West he also laid the foundation for his network of intelligence agents. This was done with the concurrence and active support of veteran leaders in the Cuban Convention. The decisive actor was also manifest in Marti's response to challenges to his authority. It was in fact these challenges that bought him to Key West on a number of occasions. Unauthorized uprisings in Cuba, planned contrary to his instmctions, were among the challenges. He found it necessary to go to Key West where he would be close to the scene of action

130 JOSE MARTI and in the center of the traditional seat of power. Lasswell and Kaplan (1950: 154) in their classic study of power observed that "the leader is respected in part because of his personal qualities, in part because of the possession of power itself, he enjoys prestige" (emphasis added). Marti, astute observer of history and leadership that he was, must have realized that unauthorized uprisings would be interpreted to mean that he did not in fact possess real power. They were, therefore, a threat to his prestige as well as to the success of the independence movement. It is significant that he always emphasized the possibility that there had been false orders for an uprising, issued through Spanish intrigue and by Spanish agents. This had the advantage of suggesting that there was no challenge to his leadership from within the movement. It also made it possible for him to assume a leading role in the fait accompli by taking the position that if the uprising showed real potential, help from the party would be forthcoming. Fortunately for Marti, all of the unauthorized uprisings were fiascos and he then moved quickly to take advantage of the situation. In an 1881 article he had observed the value of the kind of response that he now employed. There he wrote that politics is the art of inventing a response to each new setback or obstacle along the way. But the response must not be contrary to the ideals or principles which the leader pursues (Marti 1964, 14: 60). Thus his immediate response, once the situation was clarified, was to issue a stinging condemnation and a restatement of the principles, aims, and role of the party. He then used the occasion to strengthen his network of communications and intelligence within Cuba. The decisive leader was clearly the innovative leader. Decisive action through innovation may also be seen in his concept of party funds. He envisioned and built a stable source of money through the regular contributions of clubs. Some of his visits to Key West did in fact provide the occasion for special collections of considerable magnitude. But there is no evidence that this traditional form of fund-raising was the only reason for a particular visit. The new system served a number of purposes, some of which will be discussed later. Here it will only be noted that it strengthened the position of the party leader by providing a modest foundation for organization, propaganda, and support of personal agents and necessary travel.

A STYLE OF LEADERSHIP 131 If the confident leader is the decisive leader then Marti's style of "conquer but never defeat" was clearly a sign of both confidence and decisive action. Doubters, the disinterested, and even his enemies frequently became his staunch supporters. The Cuban Convention of Key West, including some of its most influential members, provides a prime example. They were conquered, but not defeated. THE ADMINISTRATOR-COMMUNICATOR The decisive actor emerges not only in the more important decisions or the response to crises. In the day-to-day functioning of the party another facet of the image emerges. We see this especially in his vast communications network; sometimes it was formal, sometimes informal, but always personal. His published letters to Key West Cubans show more than 50 correspondents, and that is undoubtedly only a part of a larger total. Letters were no less formidable than his speeches: a torrent of words-poetry, ideas, praise, anguish, hope, advice, and personal remembrance. Sometimes he sensed that he had been carried away: "Callo por no parecer verboso [I will shut up so I do not sound verbose]" (Marti 1963, 2: 456). Each letter often carried a message for three or four people besides the recipient and an admonition to write, write, write: "This letter, Poyo, I want you to read to Serafin [Sanchez], Fernando [Figueredo] and Teodoro [Perez]" (Marti 1963, 1: 406). Above all, administration and communication were to be two-way streets, and no one could be left out. To the general he wrote: "What kind of friend are you, who does not frequently send me the medicine of your letters, like the doctor goes to the house of the patient?" The affluent merchant was advised: "Do not take me as an example of your letter writing, and answer in the next mail." The cigar worker was urged to "write to me constantly, because your affection, pure and simple, is much needed." And the club member was asked to "tell me about the club" (Marti 1963, 2: 230; 1963, 3: 99; 1963, 2: 475; 1963, 1: 486). The formal party structure was above all a communications network, and in many ways it was a highly effective structure. Marti communicated directly with the presidents of the advisory councils in each of the communities. This was more than an efficient way of communicating information to each of the many

132 JOSE MARTI clubs; it was also a way of receiving information form the clubs and their community. He also communicated with club presidents on matters of both general and specific concern. Individual club members also felt free to communicate with the delegate and did so frequently. Letters to club presidents on a potentially sensitive matter were sometimes quite openly supplemented with letters to one or more individual members in order to make sure there would be no misunderstanding. Another vital part of his communications system was a roster of personal agents or commissioners. We have seen how this network was begun during his second visit in Key West in July 1892. Comandante Castellanos was only the first of many agents who traveled about Cuba and elsewhere. We have also noted the obvious: that it was important for him to have reliable information in the face of rumors and misinformation floating about among the numerous travelers. The agents also served another purpose, although one that might not have been Marti's intention. Having accurate information at his command and the ability to let it be known was a sign that he was on top of events. That in itself was an important factor in the prestige of leadership and power. In his letters to leaders in Key West there are frequent references to his agents, often using code names for obvious reasons of secrecy. A letter to Sanchez carried this message: "I received a cable from Fermin [Valdes Dominguez] in which he tells me: 'your agent William [Eduardo Gato] in Havana'. . . . Arrange the forms so that William in no way appears in them" (Marti 1963, 3: 410-11). A similar communication was sent to General Gomez, but with some additional explanation: "Now I have a cablegram from V. Dominguez which tells me 'your agent William is in Havana,' which means that Gato has placed the two thousand dollars in Havana" (Marti 1963, 3: 200). And Poyo is informed that "all my agents are now on the island" (Marti 1963, 3: 96). Since the Cuban Convention had agreed that it would not send agents to those places where Marti had sent his own, it probably served also to define territories, at least in the early months of Marti's leadership. Patria, Marti's New York newspaper, was a vital part of his communication system. It circulated in all the emigre communities and a single issue was passed among many families. In the cigar factories of Key West it was standard material for the

A STYLE OF LEADERSHIP 133 readers. Castellanos (1935: 239) relates the case of Ceferino Canizares, who in his orations spoke only a few words of his own; the rest was a reading of a complete issue of Patria. Patria was more than a newspaper through which Marti could reach the members of the revolutionary family, however. Aspiring writers could see their own patriotic words in print in this most prestigious revolutionary journal. This message went to one of the many fortunate: "In Patria I will say what I ought to; but here [in this letter] I want to tell you that the pedants of the pen would have real trouble writing with the virility and fluency, with the clarity and ideas with which Ecos [de la Emigration] is written" (Marti 1963, 3: 277). And a Key West worker who had sent a patriotic essay received a promise that "Patria will put that patriotism where the world can see it" (Marti 1963, 1: 486). For Marti, oratory, decisive action, administration, and communication were only instmments of something much greater. For that reason, however, they were not only imperative, they were worthy of any effort and sacrifice. They were instmments of a call to greatness. A CALL TO GREATNESS Marti successfully conveyed the idea that he was leading a tmly millenarian movement, the ushering in of a new era. There was, however, no promise of an age of abundance and bliss. That might indeed be difficult to understand in our contemporary society which has been urged to do battle under a gospel of greed. For Marti, that would have cheapened and destroyed a noble cause. He sought to bring out more noble instincts in his followers. Death in pursuit of justice could be the greatest triumph: "Others lament necessary death; to me it is a pillow, a yeast and a triumph of life" (Marti 1964, 9: 173). To Martin Herrera he wrote: "We are working for the dignity and well-being of all mankind" (Marti 1963, 2: 234). To Serafin Sanchez: "Can we let such beauty die, Serafin?" (Marti 1963, 1: 310). To the young tobacco workers he promised: "We are going to suffer and love one another greatly in the stmggle which only lack of judgement and love can interrupt" (Marti 1963, 3: 244). And to yet another Key West worker: "We will establish the home of love" (Marti 1963, 3: 240).

134 JOSE MARTI The millennium was already under way. "Do you not feel, as I do, the cold of that sublime dawn?" he asked his listeners in a speech of October 10, 1887 (Manach 1950: 242). And in Tampa he spoke of "this night of glorious resurrection" (Marti 1963, 4: 272). Cubans had themselves shown that they were already living in the midst of that great transformation. Their suffering and sacrifice in exile were training them for the new society and the new state that they were building on the foundation of love, mutual respect, and justice. Everywhere in Key West he saw examples of this, which he called to the attention of all Cubans. He reminded the president of the Club Cayo Hueso that "we live . . . sprinkling our blood upon the land, and with the transparency and humility of the apostles" (Marti 1963, 2: 235). Other Key West Cubans received similar words of faith, encouragement, and praise: "We are an army of light and nothing will prevail against us. . . . The purest and strongest that a people can do, we are doing" (Marti 1963, 2: 362). The call to greatness was a call that transcended the interests of Cubans. The ideals of the Cuban stmggle were the ideals that had always inspired humanity, and their triumph in Cuba would be a triumph for all. No wonder, then, that allegorical, biblical, and mystical references abound in the rhetoric of the followers as well as of the leader. What is especially revealing is the way in which Key West became woven into this allegorical-biblical-mystical fabric which Marti designed and his followers helped to weave. In July 1893, with the dark clouds of depression hovering over his enterprise, Marti wrote to all the clubs about the "sublimity and abnegation" in Key West and "the radiant martyrdom of those who are ready to die for the very people who dishonor us" (Marti 1963, 2: 359). We have already noted his words in Patria of March 2, 1894, where the vision of Exodus is called up: "The expelled community [the Cubans of Key West] looks again to the horizon, and with their children in their arms, the sun overhead and the sea around them, it searches for another comer where the evil of man does not leave them hungry and roofless." The followers tried to match the eloquence of Marti in their allegorical, biblical, and mystical references to their adopted island. Deulofeu (1905: 152, 231), the Cuban protestant minister

A STYLE OF LEADERSHIP 135 who lived there at the time, referred to "the secular rock of patriotism, that Aventine of the Cuban spirit that is called Key West." The Aventine, it will be remembered, was one of the seven hills of Rome and a legendary place of refuge. He also notes that "the Apostle of Political Redemption" found in Key West "his most solid base for his work of redemption and justice." General Gomez, a visitor though not a resident of Key West, referred to it as "the high mountain on which the ark rested after the flood" (Alpizar 1947: 19). But it was for the leader himself that the most biblical of references were reserved. In a speech given in Key West only about eight months after Marti's death, Esteban Borrero (1916, n.p.) referred to him as "the Prophet, the Apostle, the Christ of the present revolution." And in 1895, the year of his death, another follower wrote that "when he made his pilgrimages . . . he went from triumph to triumph, acclaimed as a messiah, listened to as a prophet" (Cmz 1895: 100). That year, of course, saw a great outpouring of anguish: Marti "was like Moses of antiquity, appointed to carry out the divine work of redemption of his people. . . . [His death] has converted Boca de Dos Rios [the place of his death] into the Mount Golgotha of Cuban redemption" (Zayas 1895: 145). In all of this there was something important going on which should be called to the attention of the readers. Lasswell and Kaplan (1950: 156) have pointed out that "identification is likely to occur . . . with those to whom prestige is accorded: the respected tend to be incorporated into the self." Marti certainly contributed to this process with his references to his followers, although references were directed more to the community, especially that noble community of Key West, than they were to individuals. There were references to individuals, however, which the reader has undoubtedly caught in the preceding discussion. We offer one additional example because of the words as well as the recipient. Of Teodoro Perez, the affluent cigar manufacturer, he said: "In your heart [you are] the Evangelist" (Marti 1963, 1: 403). For one who believed so passionately in the power of tmth, a cause so great could not fail. Perhaps that explains his frequent expressions of optimism in the face of adversity.

136 JOSE MARTI THE OPTIMIST Juan Amao (1900: 258) offers us a colorful summation of the style and impact of Marti's unflagging optimism: The intrepid Delegate . . . continued more and more to fire the patriotic spirit in his oratorical displays, with phrases so touching that the people believed them as an article of faith. For the sake of history they must be included [here] as a dream-"the horse is saddled—everything is done-there is nothing else to do—the bride is ready-the wedding day is close at hand." . . . And since all people create their own idol, it was Marti whom the people worshiped as the Indians worshiped the sun. Cubans had stmggled so long and so many uprisings had failed since Narciso Lopez made his first attempt more than 40 years earlier. Given the background of these years of fruitless sacrifice it was essential to point to light on the horizon. This was something that Marti could do better than almost anyone else. Yet, precisely in order to avoid a repetition of the past, patience and planning had to replace spontaneity and bravado. As early as 1882 he had told Gomez that "to wait is a manner of winning" (Marti 1963, 1: 168). Here was a contradiction, and Marti's response was obviously something of a contradiction. Perhaps this sheds some light on the unauthorized and unsuccessful uprisings that took place in spite of efforts to prevent them. If everything was ready, was it not time to light the fuse? Was it not reasonable to expect that help would be forthcoming? It certainly sheds light on his insistence that he should join the 1895 expedition as an active participant following the disaster at Femandina. Immediately after the events at Femandina, he wrote to Poyo: "Do not fear for me. I know how to suffer and make a comeback. . . . We will be reborn. We are surrounded by more help and respect, and more faith, than ever. . . . Read these lines to Serafin [Sanchez]" (Marti 1963, 4: 15). There was, however, a positive side to the constant expressions of optimism. Would the movement that had just begun have survived the difficult period from mid-1893 through much of 1894 without such expressions from one whose words, to

A STYLE OF LEADERSHIP 137 paraphrase Arano, were taken as an article of faith? "The prevailing poverty will end in time: I do not think it will obstruct us" (Marti 1963, 2: 357). That was what Marti told Sanchez on July 25, 1893. We have seen many other similar expressions of hope. But the explicit references were probably no more important than the many more indirect or subtle ones. Hardship, poverty, and sacrifice were helping to educate, mold, and test an afflicted community for the difficult task under waythe formation of a new society and a new state. That was indeed an expression of optimism, but it was also more than that. It was a form of education. Education was a necessary part of leadership. TO LEAD IS TO EDUCATE Writing only four month after Marti's death, Manuel de la Cmz (1895: 95-100) tried to point out the essence of his leadership. Oratory, he emphasized, "does not accomplish these miracles." Above all, "he was in large measure the educator of his Cuban people, . . . with his logic and seductive persuasion." The leadership of Marti focused on two broad aspects of education. The first and most obvious was the one that we usually associate with schools and other places of formal education. This involved the acquisition of knowledge and skills that would enable the individual to live a full, useful, and satisfying life. He frequently wrote about this and when he came to Key West he made a point of visiting Cuban schools in order to encourage and emphasize a sense of purpose. It was a memorable day on the Key when Marti visited the school of Emilio Aymerich at 1317 Duval Street. The curriculum there had been influenced by a series of articles that Marti published in La America, advocating the substitution of the literary for the scientific spirit. In addition to some of the usual offerings, it included instmction in what would now be called manual arts, practical arts or vocational education. Marti participated in examinations at Aymerich's school, heard students give demonstrations of their proficiency in several fields, and he gave his usual discourse (described as "short"). For the students he emphasized the importance of what they were doing as preparation for a nation built on liberty, justice, and peace (Castellanos 1935: 123-24). Such was the sensation of this event

138 JOSE MARTI that it is still recounted by a few Key West residents whose ancestors were at the school or who otherwise learned of it from oral history. In a visit to the more advanced Escuela Laica on the comer of Division and Duval Street, he lectured on "methods and systems of education." As always, he made a point of relating what the students were doing to the great process that was already under way: "Schools like this are the true founders of the republic" (Castellanos 1935: 121). Marti was equally interested in a less formal type of education, one more specifically directed at the great enterprise that he was leading. That was the acquisition of certain attitudes, patterns of behavior, and community skills that would lay the foundation for the new society and the new state. We have seen how Marti the educator called the attention of his "students" in Key West and elsewhere to the fact that their hardships and sacrifices were a part of this process and proof that it would succeed. Above all, he needed to convince Cubans of their own dignity and of their ability to meet any challenge. No detail was too small to receive his full attention. In September 1894, in the midst of the hectic final preparations for the invasion of Cuba, he took time to write to the president of a Key West girls club, telling her how important was the club's contribution of $31.25: Martin Herrera has placed $31.25 in my hands, as a contribution of your girls club to the work of independence of their country, the honor of its men and the happiness of its women. Never has money seemed so beautiful to me until now. That which moves men to so much vileness comes today to strengthen my will, to stop the bleeding of wounds. Who know, girls of the club, what wounds will be healed with this balm, what flag can be purchased with this offering. Not I, but my country, kisses your hand (Marti 1963, 3: 259). The collection and proper use of money was always treated as a vehicle for education. There was probably something in Marti's poetic sense of contradictions that gave him a certain delight in this. The use of money, the root of so much villainy,

A STYLE OF LEADERSHIP 139 could serve the process of forming the new society. Always, the amount was unimportant. To a Key West cigar worker he sent a detailed letter thanking him for news that he and twelve companions had agreed to contribute twenty-five cents per week to the revolutionary cause. Then, in an answer to a question in the letter, he takes great care to explain the proper division of funds between local and party treasuries (Marti 1963, 1: 485). The affluent Gato, Perez, or Recio received no more grateful attention for their thousands of dollars than did the cigar workers for their twentyfive cents. We have already seen that he returned money to clubs in order to "create an understanding in the public, meaning in our organization, of the just respect which . . . a party must inspire" (Marti 1963, 2: 238). He reluctantly went along with a proposal to create a lottery as a means of raising revolutionary funds. But in a letter asking the loyal and reliable Teodoro Perez to serve as supervisor, he took the opportunity to educate. He noted that a lottery would surely be rejected once Cubans had their own country, "because of the weakness of character which the expectation of a source of well-being other than work produces in mankind." Meanwhile, in addition to producing party funds, it would take money away from the existing Spanish lottery, something that was a fact of life. Finally, the strict and proper administration of funds could also serve as an example (Marti 1963, 2: 189-90). Leaders also had to be educated. Club leaders were reminded of their responsibility to their community. In the midst of the depression, he urged, "let each one take upon himself the problems of his members" (Marti 1963, 3: 42). Leadership was a duty of those who had the capacity to lead and the leader's calling was a special one: "Now Ramon, we are at a decisive stage. Everything depends on those who lead (Marti 1963, 3: 126). And Marti himself had to educate by making himself the prime example for leaders: "Ah Poyo! If you were to come here [to Brooklyn] as one day you must, you will understand how a dead man raises himself by sheer bravo (Marti 1963, 2: 223). The majesty of the calling could also be emphasized by a bit of humor: "I am like the old man in the French story, very dashing in the salon, while propped up by his rouge and elegant dress, but only a dried old husk on the way home in his carriage when the

140 JOSE MARTI makeup and artificial youth are gone" (Marti 1963, 2: 101). That was to Serafin Bello. A REVOLUTIONARY FAMILY When Marti promised Poyo that he would be both father and son it was indeed another of Marti's poetic expressions, but it had a special meaning in the context of Key West and Marti's revolutionary family. Key West was an extended family within the larger revolutionary family! "In the great workshop [of the Key], those of the most wretched origins and those with the loftiest family names live together, seated together in party councils; [they are] the lawyer who wants new laws, the medical doctor who wants a clientele of free men, the revolutionary who won his status in war, the worker who earns the right to feel equal through the sacrifice of his work in exile" (Marti 1963, 1: 427). When Serafin Sanchez moved to Key West, Marti sent him a warm message: "What I wish for you and envy you is the fiesta of friendship in which you are going to live with the loyal souls in that good Key" (Marti 1963, 2: 467). And when Feimin Valdez Dominguez, his closest boyhood friend, moved to Key West he was enthusiastic: "From the sun and the land the flower is bom; and from the Key and you, I know now what will be bom. . . . How I love that generous Key, and [even] more now because of you" (Marti 1963, 3: 147-48). He saw himself as head of that special revolutionary family, but he was also only one among equals in a family where many were his seniors. On the birth of a son in the Teodoro Perez family he wrote: "All that faith and all our love for Cuba is what I personally am going to bring to the cradle of your son, who is not only yours. Have we not been like brothers and have we not shown that we were while he was on his way to this world?" (Marti 1963, 2: 454-55). And the dedicated Poyo was asked to "imagine that I am with you tonight, seated in one of your armchairs between you and Clarity" (Marti 1963, 2: 356). We have frequently reminded the reader, perhaps too often, of his capacity to remember names and of his remembrance of wives, children, and special circles of friends. But that was one of the features of his leadership. No one was too high or important to receive the most personal and friendly touch; none

A STYLE OF LEADERSHIP 141 were so insignificant that they could go unnoticed. He went out of his way to emphasize the last point. When Gualterio Garcia mentioned a friend (Francisco Diaz Silveira) who did not think that Marti knew him, he replied: "It may be that he does not know me but I know him; because of my obligation and pleasure of knowing a pure and loyal Cuban wherever he may be, . . . and as for the offer that Diaz Silveira is making me, I have tears in my eyes upon thanking him" (Marti 1963, 2: 268). Diaz had arrived in Key West at the age of 13 and was 22 when Marti wrote about him. He was employed as a cigar worker, wrote for El Yara, went on to become a poet of considerable merit, and rose to the rank of colonel in the army of liberation (Castellanos 1935: 171). As head of the revolutionary family Marti took upon himself the responsibility of looking after the family as a whole and each individual member. No job was too difficult and no detail or person too insignificant. We have seen how Key West turned to Marti during the troubles of 1894 and how he responded. We have also seen how he called upon Eduardo Gato to help General Serafin Sanchez when he moved to Key West. And Poyo received a request to help a veteran military leader who would be spending some time in Key West on his way to Cuba. The veteran had left everything in Guatemala in service of the cause, and Marti asked Poyo to offer him all help and consideration (Marti 1963, 2: 356). He also wrote to Sanchez informing him that the soldier was a close friend of Rogelio Castillo, the Colombian veteran who lived in Key West. Personal concerns were as important as financial or other practical matters. Franciso Ibern, introduced earlier as a solid supporter of Marti had a young son who attended Tomas Estrada Palma's school for young Latin American's at Central Valley, New York. Marti was a frequent visitor at Estrada's home and on March 23, 1893, during one of those visits, he took time out to report on the boy's progress: "I write concerning your son, whom Estrada is keeping happy and whose delicate face shines on the bench of advanced students. I see him through the window, playing in the snow. He speaks a lot of you and his Mother" (Marti 1963, 2: 243). General Gomez's son "Panchito," a favorite in Key West, was also at Estrada Palma's school for a time. On the same day that Marti wrote to Ibern, he wrote to his friend Martin Herrera

142 JOSE MARTI (remember, he was the hotel-keeper and jack-of-all-trades in Key West): "Pancho is growing up. Estrada has no more devoted disciple, nor a more solid one. He has gained weight, and his color is better; his shoulders are broader and his countenance has improved. He is especially careful about his dress, and he is attentive, loving and dignified" (Marti 1963, 2: 233). It was important that every member of this extended family know one another. When his friend Fermin moved to Key West, he wrote to Gualerio Garcia: "Need I tell you that I hope that you will be a brother to Fermin? That he is warm hearted and scmpulous, loving as a child. . . . Love him as if he were me, and more, because he deserves more." He also asked Gualterio to help Fermin find suitable living quarters and to contact Fernando Figueredo "who knows of opportunities." As for the quarters, "a home . . . with two rooms would be enough, suitably furnished for his profession [as a medical doctor]" (Marti 1963, 3: 111-12). Gato was also contacted and on april 17, 1894, Patria reported that a banquet in Fermin's honor had been held at the large Gato house, now standing at 1209 Virginia Street. Letters almost always carried some personal details, of which we have already offered examples. Personal detail is frequently included with what might appear to be more important revolutionary business. But what could be more important revolutionary business? The promotion of the family image helped the followers and associates identify with their leader. Sometimes Marti explicitly promoted this identification. To Martin Herrera he wrote: "This soul of mine is like yours" (Marti 1963, 2: 234). And Fernando Figueredo was told that "you and I are both sons of Bayamo [Figueredo's home], and we are the sons of tmth and nature" (Marti 1963, 1: 294). But it seems that sometimes even the sons of tmth could stretch things a bit. To Franciso Ibem, known in Key West as a man of very few words, Marti wrote: "Neither you nor I are men of many words" (Marti 1963, 2: 421). Ibem, yes! But Marti? The solid Ibem no doubt recognized and appreciated the compliment, but he surely must have smiled to himself, though he was said not to do too much of that either. Above all, there is always the image of togetherness, the we. When plans for the invasion of Cuba were well under way, he wrote to four workers: "I am going, and soon, and you are going with me. Thus I promised and thus it is" (Marti 1963, 3:

A STYLE OF LEADERSHIP 143 244). He also reminded his readers of Patria how the Cubans of Key West liked to refer to him as "the Delegate brother" (Marti 1963, 2: 399). THE RIGHT TO LEAD Marti firmly believed that he had a "right to lead," but the statement requires careful and immediate clarification. He believed in the "right to lead" only in accordance with a concept that has its roots deep in Hispanic culture, and expressions of that concept go back to at least to the Spanish jurist-theologian Francisco Suarez (1548-1617). It received a more recent statement by the Spanish philosopher Jose Ortega Y Gassett (1932: 75): "The select man [qualified leader] is not the petulant person who thinks himself superior to the rest, but the man who demands more of himself than the rest." That, and only that, was the foundation of Marti's conviction that he had a "right to lead." Here he was speaking in the best Hispanic tradition. He had earned the right by painfully waiting in silence, as he often stated it. In El Avisador Cubano, July 6, 1885, he wrote: "If I suffer in silence . . . it is to save my country. I will do everything, everything in the world that is noble to create in my country a humanistic people [un pueblo de hombresl. . . . And I do not want for them fanatical wars or nominal liberties." He had earned the right by careful preparation. Even his more formal education served this purpose. He had, of course, made it a point to study great leaders and extract principles from that study (Marti 1964, 14: 157-63). But there were more subtle efforts. In 1880 he wrote to a friend: "Struggling to dominate this beautiful and rebellious English!—three or four months more and I will be on my way" (Marti 1964, 20: 285). It would later serve a useful purpose: "He knew how to talk to American politicians in the somber language that the Saxon appreciates." And his informal or practical education was equally important: "He knew how to talk . . . to our confusing and emotional people; to the blacks . . . oh! with what language he could talk with the blacks" (Tejera n.d., 129). He had earned the right to lead through hard work and sacrifice. It has been emphasized here that his frequent references to his own work and sacrifice, often in the context of his exhaustion and illness, were intended to set an example to other

144 JOSE MARTI leaders. But they also served to confirm his own credentials: "Everything, Figueredo, I have given for my country, even the peace of my household" (Marti 1963, 1: 294). The final phrase requires some explanation. His wife and son remained in Cuba, except for a short visit to New York, and Marti blamed this unhappy state of affairs, in part at least, on the failure of his wife and her family to understand his commitment to Cuban independence and their unwillingness to make similar sacrifices. Expressions of commitment and dedication often took on a biblical or religious character. When the party statutes had been approved and he was first elected delegate, he made this solemn commitment to Poyo: "I shall confirm it by completing and cleansing my life, if it is not already free, from all thought or fault which could hamper my absolute service to my country" (Marti 1963, 1: 404-5). That is not quite the image of the saint going into the desert to cleanse his soul, but it does have a similarity of style and purpose. What is remarkable is the extent to which his conviction of himself was conveyed to his followers. The workers' manifesto, announcing his first arrival in Key West, spoke of him as the one who, "sacrificing everything, rushes to wherever he is called . . . one so full of light, of faith and hope, whom we will actually see" (Deulofeu 1905: 151-52). Does not the final phrase, "whom we shall actually see," have a certain mystical quality to it, especially when read in the context of the entire manifesto? Walter Lipmann, writing not about Marti but about leadership in general, has probably conveyed as best one can the meaning of Marti's right to lead. "Great works are not for the faint hearted who doubt themselves. Yet only with that humility which opens men's minds to wisdom, can greatness be understood" (Rossiter and Lare 1965: 78). MARTI AND HISTORY Because of Marti's short life and even shorter period of active leadership (about three years), scholars have found it difficult to resist the temptation to project him into a future that might have been. Hugh Thomas (1971: 316-17), for example, concludes that "had he lived he would doubtless have been the first president of an independent Cuba, and it is impossible to believe that Cuban history would have been the same thereafter."

A STYLE OF LEADERSHIP 145 The analysis presented here would seem to confirm that conclusion. Troubling questions come to mind, however. Would his Krausian philosophy of the harmony of society have had the same appeal and application in the real life of an independent Cuba that it had among emigres and other Cubans struggling against Spanish domination? But why not evaluate him in terms of what was and what remains? "Great changes in the history of an organization or society generally result form the innovative effort of a few superior individuals" (Jennings 1960: 1). That would certainly apply to "what was" in the case of Marti. He was able to unite the far-flung emigre communities as no Cuban had ever been able to do until that time. That was a considerable feat in itself, and the extent of the Femandina preparations certainly shows the material success of that unity. The abmpt end to the Femandina expedition seems to be best explained by the lack of discretion (or possibly worse) of a tmsted collaborator on the one hand and the unpredictable and often cynical attitude of the United States concerning its "obligations under international law." There are many ways and conditions of uniting a people, however, and what stands out in any evaluation of Marti is the way in which it was accomplished-the ends and the means. In trying to instill in his people a sense of their own dignity and the nobility of their cause, he worked with conviction and passion to convince them that their attitudes and methods must never betray that noble cause. With one beautiful and simple phrase, he conveyed the message to Teodoro Perez: "We are a new and good people, and we must show it in the campaign that we are undertaking" (Marti 1963, 1: 395). Above all, the leader must always exemplify the best in a people and a cause. That is what remains.

Appendix: Documentary Highlights Translations by Guillermo Arias TO THE CUBAN PEOPLE, DECEMBER 22, 1891 [The following manifesto was probably written by Angel Pelaez, the cigar worker who did so much to bring Marti to Key West. It was distributed by hand and posted throughout Key West on December 22, 1891. The language tells us much about Marti's popularity and about changes in the Cuban independence stmggle.] Encouraged by the noble and patriotic example of our predecessors, and realizing that the time has come when it becomes necessary for the Cuban youth to demonstrate their readiness to fulfill the duty imposed by the memory of so many heroes that have sealed with extreme sufferings their love for our unfortunate country, during the ten years of constant war and more than thirteen of humiliating deception; and wishing, for the sake of honor, to emulate those who have seen their temples become gray with the passage of time, without trembling or retreating in their aim to work in favor of liberty and independence of the nation, we are here today to begin the formation of a decidedly revolutionary course of action, in such a manner that we will deserve the benevolent welcome of those who have preceded us in this sacred work and who certainly will not deny us their support and advice, in order to facilitate, in our inexperience, the most fruitful manner to achieve our cause. Our illustrious countryman Jose Marti is unquestionably

APPENDIX: DOCUMENTARY HIGHLIGHTS 147 among those compatriots who, because of their civic abnegation and special accomplishments, are able to lead us in our task. His record of humility and dedication is sufficient proof of his qualifications to serve as our mentor and guide. During the first years of his youth Marti had the distinction of wearing prison garb and dragging the chains of a political prisoner. Ever since, he has always been a kind, honest and tireless worker in the labor of patriotism. With the virility duly appreciated by men of warm hearts, he did not hesitate in sacrificing honors and conveniences, which he possessed as the official representative of several South American Republics. He gave them up in order to carry out the supreme duty and the supreme honor of raising his voice as a Cuban patriot in the legendary commemoration of October 10, 1868. To animate us with his sensible and eloquent words, to show everyone the veneration and love for the flag that so gallantly waves, we have invited this meritorious brother to honor us with a visit, whose consequences will no doubt be beneficial to the organization of the good Cubans in this Key, encouraging the passive spirit of some, and congratulating the few who, with more perseverance and good fortune, have preached year after year, and day after day, a doctrine of love and duty toward the beloved homeland. In order to give this act the importance and validity it ought to have, we beg and rely upon the cooperation of all those who feel for Cuba, whether among the missionaries of long standing or the newer believers of today. To work, then, and let us write the first page of the new revolution that may be happier, although never more honorable than the one initiated on October 10, 1868. Key West, December 22, 1891. The Organizing Committee: The President, Angel Pelaez The Treasurer, Frank E. Volio The Secretary Gualterio Garcia The Members: Aurelio C. Rodriguez Jose G. Pompes Genaro F. Fernandez

148 JOSE MARTI SPEECH IN KEY WEST, DECEMBER 25, 1891 [A multitude of enthusiastic Cubans and some curious North Americans met Marti upon his first arrival in Key West. He was escorted along Duval Street to Duval House, where Genaro Hernandez, one of Key West's young orators, stood on a chair and introduced the honored guest. Although seriously ill, Marti delivered this impromptu speech, presumably from the same chair.] The medicine is here, Cubans. . . . Here lies the comfort of the soul which, like the body, also becomes ill and dominated by passion, thus sometimes losing its strength and enthusiasm. Here lies the love of this sacred home. Although not the legitimate one that I dream of in my fever and delirium, the one of definitive justice for my people, this one has the best yeast to raise it and to nourish its roots with the pure and sincere tears like those of this young man [Genaro Hernandez] and yours. This powerful feeling of affection is a medicine that the visitor grateMly appreciates; for the physical pain subsides, the zest returns and the joy becomes immense. The visitor is unable to speak with flattery to those whose company he has yearned for. Yet grateful is he for what he senses and sees, and without futile reservations he is able to tell you that he embraces you with the firmest of confidence and entirety of soul. However, the soul of our people is dispersed and nostalgic in cold lands which lack the fire of our sun and the dignity of our palms. Today I can tell you without a doubt that I have seen the great majority united and now I feel them much closer; sometimes with intense pain, and other times with admiration, but always with spiritual respect for having created and maintained a number of patriarchs loyal to a single ideal within the small confines of this Cuban niche: the noble Key. This conjunction of pain and perseverance is a sacrifice, for wishing to live in one's own home, built with friendly hands, though weakened perhaps by constant vigilance. Heroic for the tenacity in their attempts at liberation, it will be sanctified with the blood of our brave soldiers. They will be compensated at the

APPENDIX: DOCUMENTARY HIGHLIGHTS 149 banquet of cordiality and sincerity for our redeemed country, joyously embracing each other, deserving for having paid the price of our cause. In a grateful land let us establish the fmitful seed of our republic as already constituted in the modus vivendi of our temporary home in a foreign land. Then, united in love and aims, we the Cubans will erect a home for the exiles in the same generous manner that you have built a temporary way of life with one goal in mind: a sacrifice for our nation that we will triumphantly bring to the Capitol. Understand, that without scrutiny or malicious intent, I feel in the eyes of all those surrounding me a desire and determination that we are without a doubt capable of bringing about this realization. This communion of souls and joining of hearts, full of love and sincerity, rejecting the passion that once might have weakened us—by moving too fast or not having been cautious enough-is an omen, a feeling of approaching the opportunity. With benefit of time and efficacy for all, we will be able to talk heart to heart and devise a master stroke. Thus, all that is energetic and humble in our people, all that is great and sublime, may fly to the heavens of our destiny: the eagles and the doves! (Marti 1963, 4: 289-90). SPEECH IN KEY WEST, JANUARY 3, 1892 [The Key West correspondent for Enrique Tmjillo's New York newspaper, El Porvenir, sent this report on Marti's first formal speech in Key West. The speech was given at the historic San Carlos on Duval Street, the center of Cuban patriotic, cultural and social events—"the soul of Cuba . . . the cathedral of Cuban patriotism." Unfortunately, the correspondent tells us nothing about the content of Marti's speech. He seems to have been swept up in the emotions of the crowd and overwhelmed by the presence of Marti and his effect on the audience. As such, it gives us a feeling of what that event must have been like and serves to document the times and conditions that projected Marti into the leadership of Cuban independence.]

150 JOSE MARTI Jose Marti's presentation to the people [of Key West] was made by the legendary veteran patriot Jose Francisco Lamadriz on the night of January 3 [1892] in the historic San Carlos. The event was attended by so many people that it was necessary to close the doors at about seven o'clock because the balconies, the isles and every comer of the large building could not accommodate another person. A total silence prevailed when the venerable patriarch Mr. Lamadriz presented the distinguished guest in one of those good, sober and thoughtful speeches. He faithfully fulfilled his commitment. Marti, whom all of you know, returned the salutation in the way that an orator of his capacity would. Following this, the tribune was occupied by Seiiores Armas, Bias Lopez, Perez, Bello, Martin Herrera, Corbet, Genaro Hernandez and Marti. Francisco M. Gonzalez gave a summary. It would not be possible to do justice to each of the orators because, in addition to being beyond my means, it would take too much space, and I propose to be brief, out of consideration for the readers of this newspaper. Suffice it to say that all who spoke were inspired beyond words, and that not a single word of discord troubled that memorable patriotic fiesta. But I will say something, nevertheless, about the hero of the evening, the notable citizen whom we have all entertained and shown our highest esteem, consideration and respect during these days when he was among us. His speech was listened to with religious unction, interrupted at times with warm applause. His easy and gentle words, like the cooing of the enamored turtledove, flowed gently like the soft fleeting breeze that perfumed the air, offering a delightful ambrosia to the soul. At the rostmm he has something of the Evangelist and his words have much of what Christians attribute to the Divine Martyr of Golgotha. Upon concluding his brilliant oration, he was acclaimed by the people who, not content with hearing him only once, called him to the cigar factories to honor him (Tmjillo 1896: 84-5). MINUTES OF THE MEETING, JANUARY 5, 1892 [These minutes, rather awkwardly transcribed in the original, are self-explanatory, except that the

APPENDIX: DOCUMENTARY HIGHLIGHTS 151 expression "abroad" referred to groups outside Cuba. They suggest that the assembly might have intended at first to draft the statutes of the party at this meeting. Possibly the complexity of the undertaking prompted the assembly to delegate that authority to Marti. This was probably the most important meeting that Marti ever chaired. It marked a turning point in his career.] In the city of Key West, on January 5, 1892, the presidents of various political associations of Cuban separatists of this locality, as well as official representatives of the Cuban Patriotic League and the Ignacio Agramonte Club of Ibor City in Tampa, and various respected persons not belonging to political clubs, but considered to be favorable to the sacred cause of liberty and Cuban independence, all of whose names are given at the end of this declaration, met by invitation in a private place, the Duval Hotel. The president was Mr. Jose Marti, the distinguished representative of the independent political groups of New York, where he resides. He gave a summary explanation of the objective for which the assembly of political club presidents and knowledgeable patriots was called. Ample consideration was given to the lamentable situation of the enslaved homeland of Cuba, due to the insolent and ruthless hand of the despotic Spanish government and the candid and trusting attitude of a people who hope for the best from the metropolitan authorities. However, without any reason, it imposes practices that are rejected by all elements that aspire to the Cuban separatist ideal. He said, how indispensable it was for Cuba's citizens living abroad to bond in union and cordiality for a single cause and to help in the supreme undertaking of her emancipation from Spain. With this thought in mind, he called on men of good will who, with honest enthusiasm and unshakable faith, wish to fulfill their duty together with recognized men of action. Present were members of the Cuban separatists of the locality, the Ibor City Club of Tampa, and the rest of the honorable congregation. The plan, which he called the Bases of the Cuban Revolutionary Party, must be examined thoroughly and judiciously in order to understand the harmonious thought of the whole assembly, after they have completed the duties that he has taken the liberty of requesting of them.

152 JOSE MARTI Following that, Mr. Marti slowly and clearly read the project of the resolutions in question, the Bases of the Cuban Revolutionary Party, to be organized abroad, a project which had been drafted and presented two days earlier by Mr. Marti for the approval of the separatist triumvirate composed of J. F. Lamadriz, J. D. Poyo and F. Figueredo, and previously accepted by them in principle. With the exception of Mr. Lamadriz, whose illness prevented him from attending this assembly, the project was accepted by those who made up the assembly on the evening of January 4, 1892. Acceptance had been preceded by an examination of each and every clause, with frank, honest and sincere observations requested by Mr. Marti, thus confirming in a unanimous and profound spirit the above mentioned document. It was approved in the final form on the following night, January 5, 1892. Mr. Marti again asked if there were any doubts concerning the spirit of any of the articles in the document. It was agreed by the presidents of each of the groups present to submit the document for consideration to the members of their respective clubs, and to the association of independent clubs in other localities, in order to be examined, studied and discussed by all, and after a thoughtful consideration and understanding, to be accepted as a judicious plan, to make it a positive reality. In the tme and irrevocable union of all separatist groups abroad, all would be in direct communication with each other, not only among the Cuban emigres who think of the political ideal of independence, but also among other independent political groups united to cooperate in the most efficient manner, offering their ideas and generous action to the final organization, the Cuban Revolutionary Party, whose clauses are printed below and whose objective is to promote and accelerate the monumental task of the liberty and independence of the island of Cuba. Accordingly, it was definitely agreed to give copies to the political associations represented in the assembly, to those of Ibor City Tampa, to any others known to exist, to those requesting it for their information and examination, and to any others whose existence might become known in the future, whether in this locality or elsewhere. When this point was concluded, the assembly proceeded to a concise and reasoned discussion of the Bases and Statutes under which the Cuban Revolutionary Party would operate. It was agreed that Mr. Marti should be in charge of drafting them in

APPENDIX: DOCUMENTARY HIGHLIGHTS 153 accordance with what had been mentioned and approved in principle by the presidents of all the groups present in the assembly. The assembly was in favor of appointing an interim secretary to carry out the duties of informing the various bodies and receiving the data, documents, etc., that Mr. Marti would send from New York. The undersigned, President of the Cuban Patriotic League in this locality, was elected to serve until this assembly would again meet and agree as it might deem proper. It was agreed to send a copy of the resolutions, with the provision that they might be modified with a fundamental preamble, to all the revolutionary newspapers abroad. It was also agreed that minutes of everything that took place on the evenings of January 4 and 5 should be included in the documents. With all due respect and the greatest decorum, the meeting was adjourned. All parties expressed their desire and hope that this close union would lead the emigre communities and political associations, guided by the separatist ideal, to the prompt and effective achievement of liberty and independence for the island of Cuba. It was 7:30 in the evening. Key West; January 6, 1892. In witness thereof, the Secretary, Francisco Maria Gonzalez (Deulofeu 1905: 156-60). SPEECH IN KEY WEST, NOVEMBER 23, 1892 [The report in Patria below is self-explanatory. We merely note that it was a part of Marti's efforts to inform the North American public of the ideas and objectives of the Cuban stmggle for independence and place it in a perspective that North Americans would understand.] On [November] 23, at the request of the Equator-Democrat, Mr. Marti delivered a speech in English. The San Carlos was completely filled; the great majority were North Americans. Colonel Horatio Crain presided, accompanied on the platform by the principal North Americans of the Key-the Honorable Wm.

154 JOSE MARTI Bethel, Colonel C. E. Merrill and Messrs. R. A. Monsalbatje, J. W. Sawyer, Richard Kemp and J. A. Day. At 8:15, Colonel Crain opened the evening event with a beautiful discourse presenting Mr. Marti. For some time the applause delayed the opening of our Delegate's magisterial speech. His speech lasted for two hours, and not for one instant did the thousands of persons fail to listen with attention and enthusiasm. The orator spoke of the hospitality of the country and of the refuge that Cubans have found in Key West, where their children were bom, where they have buried their dead, where they have been welcome in the hour of sadness. "Americans," he said, "should not judge Cuban efforts from the perspective of today. They appear to scorn Cubans because Cuba did not do what they did a century ago; but the Americans had three centuries of life [autonomy?] when they threw off the English yoke, and Cuba has had only fifty years of its own culture. Ten of those years were spent in a fruitless war for liberty. If one were to place the Americans in the position of their ancestors of 1776, they would understand how different the stmggle is. The difference of language has been the foundation of many misunderstandings concerning the Cuban cause. It is unjust that a country that has existed for three hundred years should scorn a military colony of fifty years." He insisted that Spaniards were not hated; but oppression, the corrupt government of Spain and the Spaniards who try to affix chains to those who do not want to be slaves were indeed hated. "We will fight anyone who tries to suffocate our love of liberty-even if it be a parent or relative, in the same way that you Americans fought your parents and relatives." The Delegate conscientiously analyzed the difference in composition, character, society, government and tendencies of Spain and Cuba. He showed that Cuba is superior to Spain in civilization, political ideas and wealth; and it cannot be expected that a metropolitan country that is unable to resolve its own problems will be able to resolve those of its colony. He explained the reasons for the failure of the Cuban autonomists and pointed out that all they had received from Spain was a doubling of taxes and the denial of rights. He clearly put forth the reasons why annexation would not be suitable for either Cuba or the

APPENDDC: DOCUMENTARY HIGHLIGHTS 155 United States. Friendship and commerce between the two countries, yes. He concluded amid thunderous applause, asking the continuation of North American sympathy for the enslaved homeland that desires to achieve its independence. Colonel Crain closed the memorable evening event, responding for the Americans of Key West and assuring the Delegate that Cuba will have the sympathy of the United States. The American newspapers devoted long articles to the event, an event that made a profound impression on the entire city (Patria, December 3, 1892: Marti 1963, 4: 333-34). IN THE BELOVED KEY, FEBRUARY 16, 1894 [The depression of 1893 and the strikes of 1894 were devastating for Key West. Marti frequently wrote about the island as an example of Cuban kindness and nobility, a symbol of hope, and a lesson for all Cuban revolutionaries. What follows is one of the best examples]. Our first thought has to be for those of us who suffer, even though there are other secure reasons for us to have a constant and vital enthusiasm. Wherever there are Cubans, there is unity, development, and advancement: every day is a step forward. But even if that were not the case, we will regain more vigor with perseverance, a symbol of our patriotism, as in the quiet suffering, yet decisive action of our brothers of Key West. They do not lament the loss of their employment, for they are brave men, and so are the others, and all united will work for the future of their children, in a nation where now only the lords, the august and celestial beings have a secure bread. Those who under the pretext of working in defense of nominal liberties are able to make a living off real corruption, and the cynics are able to accommodate themselves to any situation as long as there is bread on the table and vulgar passion in the bedroom! Only compassion or the shameful humiliation of those engaged will stop the lashes that punish so much guilt or the fire that bums it!

156 JOSE MARTI It is not the loss of confidence for independence that the Cubans of Key West lament. Today they need it more than ever, today they feel in themselves the agony and the solitude of their people. Today with more spontaneity and tenderness than ever, with more generosity and unity, they will give their warm loyal souls to those that swear to live and die for them, or die of humiliation and pain if there would be no other way to die! The horror is what the Cubans of Key West lament. However, for the political consequences of our nation inebriated with bloodshed, it may be healthy and necessary to observe the uniformity of these bmtalities and tyrannies in the country whose children seal their love and hope with their bodies which nourish its roots. Most of our people are gentle, generous and loving. Except for some ill-bred ones who drip from the colony like pus from a wound, or the small group of followers, that for fear of the despot, use his ill manner and viciousness as their pattern, or through lack of character and harmony in their lives, engage themselves in malicious thoughts or infliction of pain on lives of others, Cuba is a nation that loves and believes and enjoys believing and loving others. Today the Cubans of Key West observe how their fruitful land is being controlled by terror, and how the free will of their people is threatened. Oh! What an incredible thing, to obtain one's own free will, the freedom of a people that still are slaves in America; the happy rebellion of a group of confessed accomplices of foreign tyrany is being observed against the apparent justice of the nation that passes as the first republic of the world. Like the man who arrives and writes that he found Key West as if a hurricane has swept it away; and the other that says "in Key West everyone looks like they were attending a wake," and another one that says "I feel like a real North American, however, when I see the impotence of the United States in this plot and the indifference with which the citizens are being treated, I confess that I wish that every Cuban in the United States would arm himself and fight to conquer his nation." If a stranger feels in such a manner, what do we feel? Brothers, it does not matter. They have arrived too late! What is done is done, and they cannot change that! Even in the Key, has not this constant persecution made us better, more noble and stronger? If before there was only one, today there are ten: is it not tme, brothers? Then, with the confederation of Cubans from all walks of life, stronger than ever before, more loving and

APPENDIX: DOCUMENTARY HIGHLIGHTS 157 united from this incredible injury, let us advance with serenity to gain liberty. No, our eyes are not dry when we think of the beloved Key; however, we are invigorated and everywhere the embrace is stronger! (Patria, Febmary 16, 1894; Marti 1963, 5: 73-74). SPEECH IN KEY WEST, MAY 18, 1894 [In May 1894 Marti came to Key West to repair damaged relations with the North American community. He also came to lift the spirits of the Cuban community that had been devastated by the aftermath of the strikes in January. As part of this effort, he brought General Gomez's son with him and introduced him to the community. El Yara's report on the event, reprinted below, is an excellent portrayal of Marti's effect on his listeners.] In the midst of applause the Delegate ascended to the tribune. And with the tenderness of a father, he introduced the son of General Gomez to the people and spoke of the glory of this illustrious soldier as of the sun, where only a few words are necessary. When speaking of Marti, as of the sun, we cannot be verbose, for our pen is not skillful enough to eulogize the oration of this excellent speaker. The state of our political situation was the theme of his speech, which he delivered with the clarity and logic of a philosopher, for which he is well known; painting the times with beautiful images and profound thoughts, to which the audience listened avidly, as if it wanted to engrave these thoughts deep into its consciousness. The work of the Revolutionary Party, founded on the explicit declaration of its Bases, cannot be more frank, more real or fmitful. Its purpose is not to bring to the country a victorious group who considers the Island its booty or domain, but to prepare abroad, by every means possible, the war that is necessary for the good of all Cubans. One can play with one's own death, he said, but not with the death of others. And the Revolutionary Party's aspirations are

158 JOSE MARTI to minimize bloodshed and sacrifice, and never to unleash Cuba into a premature revolution for which the nation is not prepared. After he exposed the situation, in a simple manner he asked: "May I continue to be confident in my people, whose patriotism reanimates me and whose voice encourages me to continue in the journey?" An ovation mixed with vivas for the orator resounded throughout the auditorium. The crowd trembled when a sublime image was painted of Cuba tied to the rock of ignominy. Cuba was like the stoic demigod, a robber of the divine fire and inventor of the arts, subjugated and oppressed, yet scorning the cmelty of the bloody vulture which was devouring his entrails, while the churning and powerful sea was crashing against the erect Caucasus, as if powerless to break the bonds of the first martyr of progress and liberty. Marti descended from the tribune in the midst of thunderous applause, and with brief, simple and eloquent words, Mr. Poyo declared the meeting adjourned (El Yara, May 19, 1894; Patria, May 29, 1894; Marti 1964, 4: 335). LETTER TO HERRERA

GEORGE

JACKSON

AND

SALVADOR

[The following letter is presented here as an example of Marti's style of leadership in his relations with workers during difficult situations-his stmggle to balance justice and pragmatism within a democratic context. The original letter was written in English and it is reproduced here without editing. Brackets around the place and date indicate that they were supplied by the editors of his work.] [Key West, May 18, 1894] To Messrs. George Jackson and Salvador Herrera. Friends: It comes just to my knowledge that my fellow workingmen of Falk's and Mayer factory have declared a strike on the point

APPENDIX: DOCUMENTARY HIGHLIGHTS 159 that the rules of the house were opposed to my visit to the factory, or were incompatible with that feeling of resistance to all kind of oppression of which they justly believe me to be the representative. This action, my friends, grieves me most deeply. I must be grateful for all kindness to the work of brotherhood and justice shown in any visible regard toward my person: but speaking to tme men, as I know I am doing, I must resent any action, however essentially just it might be, that might be construed in criminals hands as fostering in any way, or in some wise helping, to increase the calamity of a town I love as if it were my own, and to whose desertion I should never contributeor to end ultimately in that separation between Cubans and Americans that I have helped to make impossible, and the last remnants of which I am, in my private capacity, actually engaged to change, with all hope of success, in a lasting and practical peace. Allow me, friends, to end my work. Do not be an obstacle to it. Let you not be the cause to have me misrepresented as the instigator of your present trouble, when you know well that in no occasion have I lent my hand to the domestic stmggles of Key West, and that, in this case, I have not had the least knowledge of, or interference in your action. I feel that I can ask of you a favor. Your action can harm, in a most unfavorable moment, the sacred cause, the American cause, I serve with most respectful discretion. Your action comes to endanger the prospects of final peace, and settlement of deep sorrows, in this city. It is your duty to me, in simple justice, to remove all pretext to represent me as a disturber in this locality, or a man willing to procure further disquiet and enmity, regardless of the mortal sadness of a workless home. My love of country is with me the ardent love of justice, and of the welfare of men, and the art of advancing their body of rights without unnecessary or violent stmggle against its enemies. I do not intrude upon your opinions. I do not forejudge on the merits of your strike. I do not advise you to yield on what you do not deem wise to recognize as just. The point may be right: but the occasion is wrong. It might be said that I am the instigator of it; and I am not the instigator. I am placed by you in such a position that, in most delicate moments, I may appear as the fosterer of the domestic divisions that I am successfully healing-that I am healing without those public manifestations that from me might be taken as an undue intrusion or as unworthy

160 JOSE MARTI condescension toward the wrong-doers, of both of which I am incapable. Yield now, friends, as a favor to me, in justice to me. Delay your representations, if you still believe them just, and be as vigorous in them as you conscientiously believe it right to be, but do not allow any one to believe that they have been promoted by me. Can I be of service to you between today and tomorrow, when I am going? I will serve you. I do not wish to believe that you have been intentionally offended. But in the moments in which, in my private capacity, without indecorous deference to the ill advised counselors of past grievances, I am endeavoring to remove the last seeds of disaffection between Cubans and Americans, however deep the Cuban wound may be-let you sacrifice for the moment any right of yours, for the sake of the work of peace and friendship in which I am engaged. I love you. You will understand me. Hear me with your hearts. (Marti 1963, 3: 177-79) Jose Marti OUR YARA, SEPTEMBER 15, 1894 [Among the many legendary Cubans of Key West, few could equal the stature of Jose Dolores Poyo. His newspaper El Yara was equally legendary. Both suffered a devastating blow from the strikes and turmoil of January 1894. Here Marti pays tribute to the noble Cuban and calls attention to the welcome revival of his patriotic work.] To see the determination of an honorable man that has stmggled is beautiful. Seeing him suffer, and exhibited with the effect of his pain one gains the strength to oppose evil, seeing him rise triumphant from the road of sacrifices with the sun shining in his face, seeing him defend with his own blood, without compensation, at the cost of medicine for his children and shoes for his grandchildren, a single idea that will only triumph when its defender receives the resplendent welcome of the tomb. Rays of courage and love are seen in these invincible men. Jose Delores Poyo is that kind of man; even when everything was

APPENDIX: DOCUMENTARY HIGHLIGHTS 161 falling down in Key West and the deserted houses were like the somber and silent trees of the cemetery, when everything was changing and confusing, his newspaper ceased publication, while the decorous pilgrim traveled among the new settlements of Florida. Now he is back in his own arena, and from the mist, the old and beloved printing press came out to open the doors of enlightenment. At his small table, he is again writing his chastisement and words of disdain, his pmdent and sad editorials, in precise and up-to-date language. If his colleague is ill, with his youthful energy, he will tirelessly do the entire paper-from the editorial to the advertisements. It can be said of him what the chronicler Juan de Castellanos said of the Conquistadores of Colombia; those hundred and sixty six men who would never have been able to enter America, if it was not for the divisions between the Chibcha chiefs Zipa of Bogota and Zaque of Tunja: They did not eat exquisite stew neither sugarplums nor cinnamon candy The watch was their only sleep Their weapons were their only mattress With the hands of a singular writer, he will operate the press as the pressman cannot do-because the idea of honor cannot wait, because the daily sentence for criminal acts must be handed down, because his conduct cannot for a single day be stained by shameful or calumnious indifference. Tmly, mankind sometimes shines. Now that the Cuban newspaper has resumed its operation, let's listen to his noble words in two of his first articles (Patria, September 15, 1894; Marti 1963, 5: 54-55).

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Bibliography (Note: In-text citations have used the short version of Spanish family names. Thus, "Alpizar" in the text becomes "Alpizar Poyo" in the bibliography.) Alpizar Poyo, Raoul. 1926. Eduardo Hidalgo Gato. Habana: Julio Arroyo. . 1947. Cayo Hueso y Jose Dolores Poyo. Habana: Fernandez y Cia. de Armas y Cardenas, Jose. 1908. "Marti." Revista cubana 29: 170-75. Amao, Juan. 1900. Paginas para la historia de Cuba. Habana: La Nueva. Azcuy Alon, Fanny. 1930. El partido revolucionario y la independencia de Cuba. Habana: Molina, de Beralt, Blanche. 1931. "Marti, caballero." Revista cubana 29: 9-21. Berger, Peter L., and Richard J. Neuhaus. 1970. Movement and Revolution. New York: Doubleday & Co. Borrero, Esteban. 1916. Alma cubana. Habana: La Pmeba. Browne, Jefferson. 1973. Key West: The Old and the New. Gainesville: University of Florida Press. Carbonell, Nestor. 1916 Resonancias del pasado. Habana: La Pmeba. . 1935. Elogio del Coronel Fernando Figuredo Socorras. Habana: Siglo XX. . 1952. Marti, came y espirito. 2 vols. Habana: Seoano, Fernandez y Cia. Casasus, Juan J.E. 1953. La emigration cubana y la independencia de la patria. Habana: Editorial Lex.

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Castellanos Garcia, Gerardo. 1923. Soldado y conspirador. Habana: Editorial Hermes. . 1935. Motivos de Cayo Hueso. Habana: UCAR, Garcia y Cia. . 1944. Mision a Cuba: Cayo Hueso y Marti. Habana: Alfa Collazo, Enrique. 1900. "Cuba independiente." Revista cubana 29: 422-29. . 1981. Cuba independiente. Santiago de Cuba: Editorial Oriente. de la Cmz, Manuel. 1985. "Marti." Revista cubana 29: 92-106. Dario, Ruben. 1983. Autobiografia. Managua: Ediciones Distribuidora Cultural. Delgado, Manuel Patricio. 1933. "Marti en Cayo Hueso." Revista cubana 29: 72-80. Deulofeu, Reverendo Manuel. 1905. Marti, Cayo Hueso y Tampa. Cienfuegos: Antonio Cuevas Y Hermano. Fernandez Retamar, Roberto. 1978. Introduction a Jose Marti. Habana: Casa de las Americas. Figueredo Socarras, Fernando. 1916. Lauros y evocaciones. Habana: "La Pmeba." . 1964. La Revolution de Yara. 1868-1878. Habana: Editorial Pueblo y Education. Figueroa, Sotero. 1903. "Jose Marti." Revista cubana 29: 37278. Gomez, Maximo. 1968. Diario de campana. Habana: Instituto del Libro. Gray, Richard Butler. 1962. Jose Marti, Cuban Patriot. Gainesville: University of Florida Press. Hernandez, Eusebio. 1968. Maceo: dos conferencias historicas. Habana: Instituto del Libro. Ibarra, Jorge. 1981. Jose Marti: dirigente politico e idiologo revolucionario. Mexico, D.F.: Nuestro Tiempo. Iduarte, Andres. 1982. Marti escntor. Mexico, D.F.: Joaquin Mortiz. Jennings, Eugene E. 1960. An Anatomy of leadership: Princes, Heroes and Supermen. New York: Harper & Brothers. Key of the Gulf. 1876. Key West: n.p.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 165 Key West Directory. 1893. Key West: Equator-Democrat Publishing Co. LaFeber, Walter. 1963. The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Lagomasino, L. 1897. La guerra de Cuba. Vera Cmz: "Las Selvas." Lass well, Harold, and Abraham Kaplan. 1950. Power and Society. New Haven: Yale University Press. Lieu wen, Edwin. 1960. Arms and Politics in Latin America. New York: Praeger. Lizaso, Felix. 1958. Marti and the Cuban Revolutionary Party. Vol. 4 of Guerra y Sanchez, Ramiro, Jose Perez Cabrera, Juan Remos, and Emeterio Santovenia (eds), A History of the Cuban Nation. Habana: Editorial de la nation cubana. . 1974. Marti, Martyr of Cuban Independence. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Lubian y Arias, Rafael. 1984. Episodios de las guerras por la independencia de Cuba. Miami: Grenada Art Service. Maceo, Antonio. 1950. Ideologia politica: cartas y otros documentos. Habana: Sociedad Cubana de Estudios Historicos e Internationales. Manach, Jorge. 1950. Marti: Apostle of freedom. New York: Devin-Adair. Marquez Sterling, Carlos. 1965. Marti, ciudadano de America. New York: Las Americas. Marti, Jose. 1963-1973. Obras completas. 28 vols. Habana: Editorial Nacional de Cuba. . 1980. Nuestra America. Buenos Aires: Losada. . 1982. Politica de nuestra America. Madrid: Siglo XXI. Mora Y Varona, Gaston. 1952 "Marti." Revista cubana 29: 23236. Munoz, Victor. 1917. "Jose Marti." Revista cubana 29: 170-75. Neumann, Sigmund. 1965. Permanent Revolution. New York: Praeger. Ortega y Gasset, Jose. 1932. The Revolt of the Masses. New York: W.W. Northon. Pelaez, Angel. 1896. "La primera jomada de Jose Marti en Cayo Hueso." In Deulofeu, R.M., Marti Cayo Hueso y Tmapa (1905). Cienfuegos: Antonio Cuevas y Hermano, pp. 147-49.

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Poyo, Gerald E. 1983. "Cuban emigre communities in the United States and the independence of their homeland, 1852-1895." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida. . 1985. "The anarchist challenge to the Cuban independence movement, 1885-1890." Cuban Studies 15: 29-41. . 1986. "Jose Marti: architect of social unity in the emigre communities of the United States." In Christopher Abel and Nissa Torrents (eds), Jose Marti: Revolutionary Democrat. Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 16-31. Rexach, Rosario. 1985. Estudios sobre Marti. Madrid: Player. Ripoll, Carlos. 1971a. Escritos desconocidos de Jose Marti. New York: Eliseo Torres. . 1971b. Jose Marti: letras y huellas desconocidas. New York: Eliseo Torres. . 1984. Jose Marti, the United States and the Marxist Interpretation of Cuban History. London: Transaction Books. Rossiter, Clinton and James Lare (eds). 1965. The Essential Lippmann: A Political Philosophy for Liberal Democracy. New York: Random House. Rubens, Horatio S. 1932. Liberty: The Story of Cuba. New York: Brewer, Warren & Putnam. Rustow, Dankwart A. 1970. Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership. New York: George Braziller. Strong, Josiah. 1885. Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis. New York: Baker & Taylor. Tejera, Diego Vicente. n.d. "Jose Marti (esboso)." Revista cubana 29: 126-29. Thomas, Hugh. 1971. Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom. New York: Harper & Row. Tmjillo, Enrique. 1896. Apuntes historicos. New York: "El Porvenir." Turton, Peter. 1986. Jose Marti: Architect of Cuba's Freedom. London: Zed Books. Vitner, Cintio. 1975. Ese sol del mundo moral. Mexico, D.F.: Siglo XXI. Westfall, L. Glenn. 1977. "Don Vicente Martinez Ybor, the man and his empire: the development of the clear Havana industry in Cuba and Florida in the nineteenth century." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 167 . 1984. Key West: Cigar City U.S.A. Key West: Historic Key West Preservation Board. White, Gerald T. 1983. The United States and the Problem of Recovery after 1893. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. Willner, Ruth Ann. 1984. The Spellbinders: Charismatic Political Leadership. New Haven: Yale University Press, de Zayas, Lincoln. 1895. "La apoteosis de Marti." Revista cubana 29: 143-50.

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Index Abelar, Domingo, 88 Agreement of Montecristi (1892), 97 Agiieros family, 41 Aguilera, 40 Aguirre, 74 Aldama, 41 America, La, 137 Anarchists, 15,29,30, 31,53 Anglo-American community, 55,97, 116,117,118,120-21,143 Annexation, 36,107 Argentina, 10 Ariel (Rodo), 35-36 Armas, Federico de, 22,28-29 Arms (for invasion), 123,125 Arnao, Juan, 12-13, 35,42,49,55, 80; on Marti, 32,136,137 Assimilation (by Cubans), 23 Asturian Emigres, 23 Autonomy (for Cuba), 108 Avisador Cubano, El (New York), 14 Aymerich, Emilio, 24,137 Baliiio,Carlos,30,58,71 Baralt, Blanche de, 72 Barranco, Manuel, 108 Barrio de Gato, 51 Bayamo, 142 Bazdn, Carmen Zaya, 9

Bello, Seraffn, 44,48,58, 62,79, 80; Marti's letters to, 33,71,76,77-78, 140 Berger, Peter, 2-3 Blacks, 58,143; Cuban, 16, 35 Blanco, Guzmdn, 9 Boca de Dos Rios, 135 Bolio (Volio), Frank E., 44,45,71 Bolio, Josephine, 48 Borrego, Carlos, 58 Borrero, Esteban, 135 Boston, 80 Boycott (1894), 113 Brito, Cornelius, 16,53-54 Caballeros de la Luz (club), 54 Calder6n, Juan, 26, 60, 69 Calvar, Manuel de Jesus, 55 Camell6n, Francisco, 58 Canary Islands, 8 Caiiizares, Ceferino, 71,77,133 Capitalism, 9 Carbonell, Eligio, 47 Carbonell, Nestor, 15,16,30-31,41,74, 94,115 Carlisle, John G., 115 Casasus, Juan J. E., 125

170 INDEX Castellanos Garcia, Gerardo (historian), 21,23,24,25,28,32,40,43,48,51, 52,59, 80,133 Castellanos Leonart, Gerardo (veteran military leader), 21,24,75,77, 88; in Cuban Convention, 26,56,58,72, 79, 87; as Marti's envoy, 88-92,93, 132 Castillo y Zufiiga, Jos6 Rogelio, 22,24, 26,72,141 Cayo Hueso Club, 109,134 Census, 20 C6spedes, Carlos Manuel de (Republic in Arms provisional president), 8,23, 71 C6spedes, Carlos Manuel de (mayor of Key West), 23,24,55-56,71 Cigar factories, 19,20,21,28,29,31, 33,37,88; depression and, 107; relocations, 115; strikes, 28,113; support from, 24,27,42,45,110,132, 139 Cisneros, 40 Clubs, patriotic, 25, 65-66,68-69,78, 82,100,129,130,131-32,139; decline of, 118-19; number of, 22,25, 68,80 Collazo, Enrique, 74,77 Collazo affair, 73-74,75 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 106 Communication, 4-5,86-87,115,120, 129,131-32; with Cuba, 86,90,130 Conchs (Key West natives), 21,23 Conco Tdon (Conch Town), 21 Costa Rica, 23,125 Crombet, Flor, 32,40 Cruz, Manuel de la, 137 Cuba, 1,98,102,103 Cuban Convention, 23,25, 32,40,42, 79, 81,89; charter, 27,32; formation

of, 24-27; Martf and, 45,54,56,57, 60-61,72,87,91,92,97,131 Cubano, El (Key West), 30 Cuban Revolution, 2,53 Cuban Revolutionary Party: Advisory Council (of club presidents), 80,81; advisory councils, 66,83,131; bases of, 56,58-59,63,65,69,79, 83,129; declaration of the generals, 86,129; delegates in, 66-67,103; democratic structure, 81; elections, 119; formation, 9,54-61,68; organization, 6567,94,131; purpose, 83,99,102; statutes, 59,61,65,67,68-70,74,7780, 83, 85,96,129. See also Financial support Cubans, 4,20,111; roles of, 23 Cuerpo de Consejo (Advisory Council), 66 Dario, Ruten, 10 Delegate (in Cuban Revolutionary Party), 66-67,103; Central, 103 Delgado, Manuel Patricio, 26,113,118, 121 Delgado, Martfn Morua, 33 Democratic principles, 36,59 Demonstrations, 129; as symbols of authority, 41 Deportation, 115 Depression, 103,105,106, 107,108, 110,134 Deulofeu Lleonart, Manuel, 21,134- 35 Diaz Silveira, Francisco, 123,141 Dicatorship, 1,11 Dobarganes, Ram6n, 74 Dominguez, Fermfn Valctez, 8,122, 140,142 Dominican Republic, 23,55,72,75,84, 97,125 Duval House (Hotel Duval), 48,49,50, 60,85

INDEX 171 Eco de Ambos Mundos, El, 36-37 Education, 137-38,143 Emigre colonies, 3, 23,24,26; unification, 57. See also Key West Equator The (El Ecuador), 22 Equator Democrat (Key West), 120 Escogedores (selectors), 36 EscuelaLaica, 138 Estrada Palma, Tom£s, 141 Family symbolism, 81,140-42 Femandina Plan, 125,136,145 Figueredo Socarrds, Fernando, 38,56, 63,71, 84,96,112; background, 24, 55-56,88; in Cuban Convention, 26, 42,54,56-57, 60,72, 87,92; in Cuban Revolutionary Party, 60,61, 80; Martf letters to, 27,72-74,103, 116,142,144; as Martf's supporter, 94,97,102,112,129,142; opposition to Martf, 13,55-56,72,74,75 Financial support, 114,119,122; action/war funds, 66-67; cigar industry, 24, 37,110; clubs, 66,110,130,138; depression and, 103,107; Martf s appeals, 101-2,108-19,123-24 Fit, Rafael, 23 Garcfa, Calixto, 10,11,14,49 Garcia, Gualterio, 43,44,45,71,110, 119; Martf s letters to, 117,118,123, 141,142 Garcfa, Rosendo, 24 Gato, Eduardo Hidalgo, 21,39,75-76, 93,141,142; in Cuban Convention, 26,58; factory of, 42,43,51,52,95; funds from, 108,110,123- 24; on strikes, 31 G6mez, Juan Gualberto, 9 G6mez, M&rimo, 36,41,94,135; in Cuban invasion, 125; -Maceo plans (1884-85), 10,11,14,27; Martf con-

troversy, 10,11-13,36, 55,95-97; Martf letters to, 10-11,12,101,103, 136,141; military leader, 24, 84-85, 86, 87,97,98,101 Gompers, Samuel, 115 Gonzalez, Francisco Marfa, 44,57,58; in Cuban Revolutionary Party, 59,63, 78-80; as reader-orator, 42,43,49 Gonz£lezAcosta,71 Gonzalo de Quesada, 100,101 Gresham, Walter Q., 115 Grito de Yara (independence proclamation), 8 Guatemala, 9,141 Guerra, Benjamfn, 80,92 Hardman Hall, New York, 80,102 Havana (Cuba), 7,15,20,29,107; Cubans return to, 107 Hernandez, Genaro, 40,41,44,45,48, 62 Herrera, Martfn, 42,58,62-63,109, 133,138,141-42 Holgufn, 89,99,101,102 Hotel Monroe, 21-22,62 Ibarra, Jorge, 15,25,72 Ibern, Francisco, 109,112,141,142 Ibor City (Tampa), 51,57 Ignacio Agramonte Club, 40,58,78 Igualdad, La, 22 Independence movement (Cuban), 1,3, 7,10-11,16,41; issues, 30; leadership in, 1,2, 3,10,24, 32,41; proclamation (1868), 8 Independientes, Los (club), 68-69,70,78 Intelligence network, 86-87,94,129, 130 Invasion (of Cuba, 1895), 125,142 Italian 6migr6s, 23 Jackson Square, Key West, 29

172

INDEX

Jacksonville, 93,94 James, William, 127 Jennings, Eugene E., 127 Kaplan, Abraham, 130,135 Key West, 13,38,51; Cubans in, 19-20, 21,23,28; decline in, 115,118,119, 120,122,134; Marti's 1891 visit, 4, 7-8,40- 50,51; Martf s 1892 visit, 85,93; as a model, 3-4,117; as movement center, 23,25,93,99,134-35 Kingston, Jamaica, 80 Krausian philosophy, 81,145

Lottery, 139 Lucha, La (Havana), 74 Luz de Yara (club)(Cuban Convention), 25,54,79,80,84

Maceo, Ant6nio, 41, 87,98,104,112; Cuban invasion and, 125; G6mez plans (1884-85), 10-12,14,27 McFarland, Peter, 90 Martf y P6rez, Jos6 Julidn: administratorcommunicator, 131; arrests, 8; correspondence, 4,70-73, 80,110,116, 118,123,131,138,139,141-42; death (1895), 94,125; on death, 133; the decisive actor, 128-29; deportaLabor issues, 33 tions, 8,9; diplomatic posts, 10; early Labor movement, 29,30,41,107; supyears, 8-9; as educator, 137-40; famiport from, 15,16,22,53,115. See ly, 9,144; goals, 1-2,3; health, 2, 8, also Strikes 49,60,102,121; as lawyer, 9; as Lagomasino, Luis, 38,89,91 leader, 2-3,4-5,51,90,114,124, Lajas, 104 144; opposition to, 15,74,98-99; as Lamadriz (Lamadrid), Jos6 Francisco, optimist, 135-37; the orator, 10,16, 14,26,40,42,46,49,55,56,60, 81 53,59,127-28,136; Otepensador, Language (in Key West), 23 127; the persuader, 59,127; on Lares de Yara (club), 43 politics, 130; on the revolution, 15; Lass well, Harold, 130,135 surveillance of, 125; the teacher, 9, Latin culture, defense of, 35 16; the translator, 9; the writer, 4,9, Leadership: in democracy, 1; education 10,123 and, 137; qualities, 2,5,126; models, Martfn, Oscar, 30 126-27 Mascote (boat), 79 Leal, Martes, 30 Mayor (Key West), 23 Lector (reader), 29 Mendive, Rafael Maria de, 8 Legal counsel, 114. See also Rubens, Mexico, 9,23,36,37 Horatio Military, 83; civil relations, 11, 84,85; Legal issues, 114-15 Martf and, 83-84,93,129; uprising "Lesson of a Journey, The" (Martf), 111 plans, 84-85, 89,91 Libertad, La (band), 22-23 Montecristi, Agreement of (1892), 97 "Liceo speech," 16,17,42,52-53 Mufioz, Vfctor, 45 Liga,La, 16 Music, 22 Liga Patri6tica Cubana, 40,58,78 Lipmann, Walter, 144 Nacion, La (newspaper, Buenos Aires), Lono, Angel de, 23 9 Lopez, Narciso (expeditions), 8,19,136

INDEX 173 Names (Spanish), 39n Navarro, 24 Neumann, Sigmund, 1 New Orleans, 80 Newspapers, 29,33; anarchist-socialist, 30; in Cuban life, 22,29,42; union, 30. See also individual newspapers New York, 24, 57; Cubans in, 23,36, 37, 52, 80; Marti in, 9,11,45,68-70; opposition in, 98; as rebel center, 23, 28; view of Key West, 68-69 Obras completas (Martf), 123 Ocala, 80,93,94,115 Olivetti (steamship), 30,47,79 Olney, Richard, 115 Ortega y Gasset, Josd, 143 Pajarfn, Eduardo, 30 Palma, Eligio, 50 Paraguay, 10 Paris, 9 Patria (newspaper), 93,95,107,142; es-_ tablishment of, 4,67; on Key West, 112,115,119-20; Martf statements in, 4, 67, 82,97,99,100,102,110, 117,119,120,143; on Martf, 53, 111; readership, 110,132-33 Patria y Libertad (club), 48 Patriota, El, 22 Patriotic League of Tampa, 40,58 Pedroso, Ruperto, 54 Peldez, Angel, 43-44,45,46,71,73 Pensador (Martf as), 127 Perez, Teodoro, 24, 55,58,74,93,100, 135; Marti letters to, 81,108,116, 123,139,140,145 Philadelphia, 80 Pompds, Jos6 Gonzalez, 44,45,62,71, 123 Porvenir, El (newspaper, New York), on 6migr6s, 23; manifesto in, 46; on

Martf, 17,52, 53; opposition to Martf, 68-69,70, 98; prohibition of, 69; Trujillo, editor of, 5, 16, 17, 18,6869,96 Postal service, 79 Poyo, Gerard E., 28,31,37, 52, 69,72 Poyo, Josd Dolores, 62, 80; in Cuban Convention, 26,56-58, 60, 84, 89, 119; editor, 15,22, 33, 34,41, 42,43, 69-70,74; Martf s letters to, 77, 81, 87, 89,91,92,96,104,112,116,118, 122,129,139,140,141,144; Martf supporter, 40,94 Prado, Leoncio, 40 Productor, El (Cuba), 30, 31 Proscriptos (exiles), 44 Pueblo, El (Key West), 22, 31, 33 Puerto Ricans, 16 Purino Declaration, 102 Purnio, Holgufn, 99 Quesada, Gonzalo, 121 Quesadas family, 41 Racial issues, 9,33-34,35 Reader (lector), 29, 33,42,94,133 Recio, Carlos, 26,93,108, 109 Republic, 1-2, 8,17; "corrupt," 1 Republicano, El (Key West), 22, 29 Republic in Arms, 8,11,23,55, 66,71 Revolution: aims, 64; first expeditionary force (January 1895), 124; organizing, 4,27, 54; strategies, 26-27 Revolutionary family symbolism, 81, 140-42 Rivero, Ramon, 15,17,22, 30,47,49, 123 Roa, 74 Rodo, Jos6 Enrique, 9,35-36 Rodriguez, Aurelio C, 44 Rodriguez, Genaro, 71 Rodriguez, Rafael, 85

174 INDEX Rolo, Juan P6rez, 19 Roloff, Carlos, 24,87-88, 89,93-94,125 Rosado, Pfo, 40 Rubens, Horatio, 114,116,117,125 Russel House, 48 Rustow, Dankwart, 2-3,5 Ruz, Juan, 14-15,24,34 Saint Augustine, 93 Saint Petersburg, 93 Salvoechea, Fermfn San Carlos, Cuban Convention formation, 24 San Carlos Institute, 22,44; founding of, 21; Martf at, 53,61-62,120,121 San Carlos theater, 44,71,79, 80 Sanchez, Serafin, 24,77, 85, 88, 89,93, 94,141; in Cuban Convention, 26; in Cuban invasion, 125; Martf s letters to 75-76,95,103,104,110,116-17, 118,123,133,137,140 Sanguily, Julio, 40,92,104,122 Santo Domingo, 95,96 Sartorio (Sartorius) brothers, 84-85,89, 99,100,101 Sellen, Francisco, 15 Serra, Rafael, 16 Ship (for invasion), 123,125 Social issues, 30,34,37 Socialist International, 29 Social justice, 16,17 Social solutions, 11 Solfs, Pedro, 48 Soria, Caytano, 21,26,42,52,58 Sorondo, Guillermo, 30 Spain, 1,8,11,32 Spanish 6migr6s, 23 Spanish government, 107,108,130; U.S. and, 125 Spanish language, 23 Steak Hall, New York, 49 Strike-breakers, 113,115

Strikes, 120; cigar workers, 28,113; criticism of, 31; of 1885,29; of 188990,29-30,31,33-34; of 1894,20, 122; increase in, 29; as strategy, 28, 31,32 Sudrez, Francisco, 143 Tallahassee, 115 Tampa, 7,30,99,112,113,116,134; Cuban Republican Party in, 78; Cubans in, 20,28,57, 80; ethnic groups in, 23; factory relocations, 115; Martf in (1891), 15-18,41,46, 47,51,52,59,65,73; Martf in (1892), 93,94 Tampa Resolutions, 17,56,58 Ten Years War (1868-78), 8,9,10,11, 14,15,60,63, 83,66; Cuban movement in, 19,23; goals, 29; military and, 84; veterans, 24,27,30, 32,33, 36,44,45,55 Thomas, Hugh, 144 Thomasville, 93 Tobacco industry, in depression, 107 Tobacco workers, 4,23,26, 36,52,68, 70,121,126. See also Cigar industry "To the Cuban People" manifesto (Tampa, 1891), 46 Treaty of Zanz6n (1878), 8 Trujillo, Enrique, 5,14,16,68-70,74, 93,96,98 Unemployment, depression and, 107 Union de Tabaqueros, 30 Unions, 29 United States: critics of, 9; Cuban invasion attempts and, 125,145; Martf on, 107,110 University of Zaragosa, 9 Uprisings, 136; 1892 plans, 84-85,89, 90; 1893,99-101; 1895,124-25,136;

INDEX 175 Martf on, 99, 102; unauthorized, 98100,103-4,108,129,130,136; Uruguay, 10 Varona, Bernab6,40 Veladas (night festivities), 22, 51,70 Venezuela, 9 Veterans, 24, 83; acceptance of Martf, 93,95 "Victor Hugo of Cuban prose," 10 Westfall, 20,28

Woolf, Samuel, 88 Workersrights,33-34 Yara, El (newspaper, Key West), 23, 112,121,141; Delgado of, 121; on the movement, 80,94,96; Mart6 in, 43,116,121; position of, 22,41,6970, 84; Poyo, editor of, 15, 22, 33, 34, 81 Zambrana, Antonio, 41 Zayas, Federico de, 104

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About the Author C. NEALE RONNING is Professor of Political Science at the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research. He has also taught at Princeton, Tulane, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Columbia, and the Ohio State University. He is the author of several books on Latin America, including Law and Politics in Inter-American Diplomacy and Intervention in Latin America. His most recent book (with Albert P. Vannucci), Ambassadors in Foreign Policy, was published by Praeger in 1987.