Counterhegemony in the Colony and Postcolony Edited by
John Chalcraft and Yaseen Noorani
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Counterhegemony in the Colony and Postcolony Edited by
John Chalcraft and Yaseen Noorani
Counterhegemony in the Colony and Postcolony
Also by John Chalcraft THE STRIKING CABBIES OF CAIRO AND OTHER STORIES: CRAFTS AND GUILDS IN EGYPT, 1863–1914
Counterhegemony in the Colony and Postcolony Edited by
John Chalcraft and
Yaseen Noorani
Editorial matter, selection and introduction © John Chalcraft and Yaseen Noorani 2007. All remaining chapters © their respective authors 2007. All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2007 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–0–230–01918–8 hardback ISBN-10: 0–230–01918–8 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Counterhegemony in the colony and postcolony/edited by John Chalcraft and Yaseen Noorani. p. cm. Papers presented at the workshop held on 9-10 July 2004 at the University of Edinburgh. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–230–01918–8 (alk. paper) 1. World politics. 2. Revolutions. 3. Power (Social sciences) I. Chalcraft, John T., 1970– II. Noorani, Yaseen, 1966– D32.C68 2007 325'.3––dc22 10 16
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Contents List of Figures
ix
Acknowledgements
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Notes on Contributors
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Introduction John Chalcraft and Yaseen Noorani
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Part I The State and Politics: Nationalism and Revolution Chapter 1
Chapter 2
Hegemony, Counterhegemony and the Mexican Revolution Alan Knight The Fetishism of Identity: Empire, Nation and the Politics of Subjectivity in Algeria James McDougall
Part II Intellectual Formations: Authority and Opposition Chapter 3
Chapter 4
Chapter 5
Redefining Resistance: Counterhegemony, the Repressive Hypothesis and the Case of Arabic Modernism Yaseen Noorani Hegemony and Liberation: Mao Zedong and Zou Taofen in Early Twentieth-century China Rana Mitter The Road through Africa: Imperial Nationalism and Diasporic Racial Consciousness in Post-slavery Barbados Melanie Newton
Part III Counterculture: Normative Tension and Ambiguity Chapter 6
Chapter 7
Reading, Hegemony and Counterhegemony in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic Benjamin C. Fortna Celebratory Ramadan and Hyperpiety in a Mexican Standoff: Counterhegemony in the Crossfire Walter Armbrust
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Part IV Popular Struggle: Manoeuvre and Contestation Counterhegemonic Effects: Weighing, Measuring, Petitions and Bureaucracy in Nineteenth-century Egypt John Chalcraft Chapter 9 Hegemony from Below: Print Workers, the State and the Communist Party in Peru, 1920–40 Paulo Drinot Chapter 10 The Politics of Institutional Subversion: Organized Labour and Resistance in Zambia Adrienne LeBas Chapter 11 How Do Activists Act? Conceiving Counterhegemony in Durban Sharad Chari
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Chapter 8
Index
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252 275
List of Figures Figure 6.1 Chaos in the Classroom: parodic representation of a ‘hoca’ in a ‘new-style’ school Figure 6.2 A ‘new-style’ teacher is subjected to similar treatment
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Acknowledgements The idea for this volume arose in 2002 during conversations between the editors when we were colleagues in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Edinburgh. We shared the enthusiasm of many for the sophisticated analyses of power which Gramscian notions of hegemony had unleashed. In spite of many hours of hair-splitting argument, however, we were unable to get genuine clarity on the important, corresponding concept of counterhegemony. Further enquiries convinced us that we were not alone in finding existing understandings of the notion problematic and vague. The idea, therefore, for a scholarly collaboration involving a workshop and an edited volume aiming to grapple seriously with this complex issue was born. The workshop was held on 9 and 10 July 2004 at the University of Edinburgh, and the chapters published here are its fruit, along with further contributions from those joining us subsequently. Our aim has been to add theoretical content to the concept of counterhegemony on the basis of in-depth historical research of little-known, but important, episodes of resistance in the global South. We would like to thank all the contributors for their hard work throughout the process, and for putting up with our pedantry. We are also grateful for the valuable criticism of our anonymous reviewers at Palgrave Macmillan. Special thanks go to both Laleh Khalili and Rachana Kamtekar for critique, support and encouragement throughout the process. We gratefully acknowledge the support of the University of Edinburgh, and funding from the School of Literatures, Languages and Cultures, the Edinburgh Development Trust and especially the Edinburgh Institute for the Advanced Study of Islam and the Middle East, which supported and underwrote our project from the beginning. Finally, in editing this volume, we pay homage to all those whose resistance has not been accommodated by history.
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Notes on Contributors Walter Armbrust is Albert Hourani Fellow at St Antony’s College and University Lecturer at Oxford. He is also a Fellow of the Middle East Centre at St Antony’s College. He previously held assistant professorships at the University of Michigan and Georgetown University. His Ph.D. is in Anthropology from the University of Michigan. One of his most important publications is Mass Culture and Modernism in Egypt, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. John Chalcraft is Lecturer in the History and Politics of Empire/Imperialism in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). He previously held a lectureship at the University of Edinburgh and a research fellowship at Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. His Ph.D. is in History from New York University. One of his most important publications is The Striking Cabbies of Cairo and Other Stories: Crafts and Guilds in Egypt, 1863–1914, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2004. Sharad Chari is a Lecturer in Human Geography in the Department of Geography and Environment at the LSE, and Honorary Research Fellow in the School of Development Studies at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. He was previously a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Michigan Society of Fellows while an Assistant Professor in Anthropology and History at the University of Michigan. His Ph.D. is from the Department of Geography at the University of California at Berkeley. One of his most important publications is Fraternal Capital: Peasant-workers, Self-made men, and Globalization in Provincial India, Stanford: Stanford University Press, and Delhi: Permanent Black Press, 2004. Paulo Drinot is Lecturer in History at the University of Manchester. He previously held lectureships at the Universities of Oxford and Leeds. His D.Phil. is in Modern History from the University of Oxford. He is co-editor of Más allá de la dominación y la resistencia: estudios de historia peruana, siglos XVI–XX (Beyond Domination and Resistance: Studies in Peruvian History, Sixteenth to Twentieth Centuries)(Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2005). Benjamin C. Fortna is Lecturer in the Modern History of the Middle East at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. He previously held a lectureship at Washington University in St Louis. His Ph.D. is from the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, University of Chicago. One of his most important publications is Imperial xi
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Classroom: Islam, Education and the State in the Late Ottoman Empire, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Alan Knight is Professor of the History of Latin America at Oxford University. He is director of the Latin American Centre at St Antony’s College, Oxford. He previously held a Chair at the University of Texas at Austin, and a lectureship at the University of Essex. His Ph.D. is from Oxford University. One of his most important publications is The Mexican Revolution, 2 Vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Adrienne LeBas is Assistant Professor of Political Science and African Studies at Michigan State University and Prize Research Fellow at Nuffield College, University of Oxford. She received her Ph.D. from Columbia University. One of her most important publications is ‘Polarization as Craft: Explaining Party Formation and State Violence in Zimbabwe’, in Comparative Politics 38 (July 2006). James McDougall is Assistant Professor in the Department of History at Princeton University. He previously held a research fellowship at St Antony’s College, Oxford. His D.Phil. is in Oriental Studies from the University of Oxford. One of his most important publications is History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Rana Mitter is University Lecturer in the History and Politics of Modern China at the Institute for Chinese Studies, University of Oxford. He previously held lectureships at Universities of Warwick and Oxford. His Ph.D. is from University of Cambridge. One of his most important publications is A Bitter Revolution: China’s Struggle with the Modern World, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Melanie Newton is Assistant Professor of History at the University of Toronto. Her Ph.D. is from the Faculty of Modern History, University of Oxford. One of her most important publications is The Children of Africa in the Colonies: Free People of Color in Barbados in the Age of Emancipation, 1790–1860, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, forthcoming. Yaseen Noorani is Assistant Professor in the Department of Near Eastern Studies, University of Arizona. He previously held a lectureship at the University of Edinburgh and was a visiting professor at the University of Michigan. His Ph.D. is from the Department of Comparative Literature, University of Chicago. One of his most important publications is ‘Heterotopia and the Wine Poem in Early Islamic Culture’, in International Journal of Middle East Studies (August 2004).
Introduction John Chalcraft and Yaseen Noorani
We have . . . to add to the concept of hegemony the concepts of counter-hegemony and alternative hegemony, which are real and persistent elements of practice. Raymond Williams The collapse of the Soviet Union, the failure of Third World nationalism, the ascendancy of contemporary neoliberalism and the growth of right-ofcentre opposition movements have served in recent times to underline multiple criticisms of naïve or romanticized notions of resistance. Emancipatory nationalism can be seen as a derivative, essentialist discourse; socialism as Eurocentric, authoritarian and economistic; liberalism as imperial, disciplinary or both.1 In the ruins of a once-defiant resistance studies, scholars have built up an ever more elaborate conceptual framework for understanding the subtle workings of an apparently all-conquering capitalist modernity. Eclipsing former notions of authentic resistance, we have the concept of hegemony, which transforms what once appeared as resistance and agency into the activation of incorporated subjects, who, through their own activity of self-formation, including ostensible ‘resistance’, work largely unwittingly to sustain the ruling order.2 In the light of this considerable body of scholarship, outright assault on the established order appears as the preservation of hegemonic structures with new content. The contestation and manipulation of dominant terms by subalterns can be seen as consolidating the legitimacy of these terms. Inversion, parody and counterculture can be seen as ritualized satisfactions permitted only in authorized spaces. And surreptitious subversion – James C. Scott’s ‘weapons of the weak’ – can be seen as the manifestation of an inevitable gap between public rhetoric and reality, a disjuncture which allows subaltern groups some meagre room to manoeuvre without endangering the status quo.3 ‘It can be persuasively argued,’ writes Raymond Williams, ‘that all or nearly all initiatives and contributions, even when they take on manifestly alternative or oppositional forms, are in practice tied to the 1
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hegemonic: that the dominant culture, so to say, at once produces and limits its own forms of counter-culture.’4 Increasing sophistication on the question of hegemony, however, has not been matched by a more developed conceptual or substantive understanding of resistance or counterhegemony, as Williams recognized. If anything, notions of resistance have become ever more elusive. In view of this longstanding problem, our aim in this volume is to provide the concept of counterhegemony with theoretical content, while bringing to light important but little-known or misunderstood episodes of resistance in the colonial and postcolonial world. We focus broadly on the global South – with contributions from Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America – in order to break down familiar but often arbitrary boundaries drawn by Area Studies, and to move away from Eurocentric conceptions of paradigmatically ‘modern’ forms of hegemony and resistance. For these conceptions are often tied to some notion of advanced capitalism, by which they substitute one principle for the whole uneven formation, and end up arrogating the burden of world-historical oppression and salvation to the West. Whereas the study of empire from elite perspectives has long enjoyed a community of scholars and a distinctive literature, those studying colonization and empire critically, and ‘from below’, have often been fragmented into different disciplines and different ‘peripheries’ of the world system. But hegemonic and counterhegemonic processes sharing family resemblances have been at work, whether in China or Turkey, Algeria or Mexico, Zambia or Peru, and this volume aims to draw out some of these substantive themes through an unusual, global collaboration. Contributors to the volume take up specific instances of resistance associated with colonialism, tradition, nationalism, revolution, popular struggle and counterculture in the colony and postcolony, presenting fine-grained accounts that revolve around the enigmas posed by counterhegemony and suggesting ways of working through them. The volume, therefore, advances the scholarly debate not only by squarely addressing the problematic nature of resistance given our current theories of hegemony, but by offering distinctive ways of rethinking resistance and counterhegemony as analytical categories. We believe that the essays in this volume take us beyond loose and unexamined notions of resistance, providing a point of departure for recasting current conceptions of hegemony so as to account for the counterhegemonic processes that are all too often either nullified or romanticized. Our primary contribution, then, is to look at specific hegemonic formations across the global South in the light of the resistances that they engender, often require, and which in some cases lead to their undoing, not in some abstract terms of the human yearning for freedom, but in terms bound up in the hegemonic relations in which forms of resistance originate, but sometimes outrun.
Introduction
3
Gramsci, hegemony and counterhegemony Hegemony is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as ‘[l]eadership, predominance, preponderance; esp. the leadership or predominant authority of one state of a confederacy or union over the others: originally used in reference to the states of ancient Greece, whence transferred to the German states, and in other modern applications.’ The term has long referred to the leadership of one state or political unit over a series of subordinate political units. The innovation of Marxist-Leninism was to use the term with reference to a social class instead of a polity. Hence in the writings of Lenin, Bukharin and Stalin, hegemony became the leadership of one class, above all the proletariat, over others in a system of political alliances.5 In this formulation, hegemony was something desirable, to be sought by the rising working class. With the Italian socialist Antonio Gramsci, the concept was significantly reformulated and enriched. Gramsci retained the idea that hegemony involved the leadership of a fundamental social class defined by its relation to the means of production. But for Gramsci, hegemony had been first achieved by the bourgeoisie, during the period in which this class led social emancipation, but was now illegitimately and cunningly withheld from the proletariat, thus explaining from a Marxist perspective delays in the anticipated socialist revolution. More importantly, hegemony for Gramsci meant not just a set of strategic and political alliances with other social groups, but a distinctive form of political, moral and intellectual leadership. Hegemony was the product of an ideological struggle – a war of position fought in the redoubts and trenches of civil society – in which a unity was forged out of diverse interests, and the narrow ‘corporate’ interests of the fundamental social class were widened and identified with universal interests, partly through compromise, but also through persuasion and education.6 A widening of narrow corporate interests was a necessity because first, capitalism was not destroying social groups, especially the peasantry, who remained non-proletarian and non-bourgeois: such groups had to be incorporated in one way or another. And second, consent was increasingly necessary for effective leadership because of mass politics on the one hand and a broadened scope for state action on the other. The result of hegemonic struggle was a political, moral and intellectual unity, a historic bloc exhibiting a collective will, which became the new ‘protagonist of political action’.7 Power in this formulation is not a matter of simple domination, but of direction, direzione – the construction from the elements of the national-popular and ‘spontaneous philosophy’ of what Gramsci called a ‘collective personality, a collective soul, a collective will’.8 This collective will was capable of acting historically. Hegemony, for Gramsci, therefore, is not a matter of brainwashing, the simple imposition of ruling ideas, false consciousness and straightforward ideological mystification. Instead, it is ‘the capacity of a
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fundamental class to articulate to its discourse the ideological elements characteristic of a given social formation’.9 What of counterhegemony? For Gramsci, the socialist struggle involved replacing the hegemony of the bourgeoisie with that of the proletariat. This struggle involved not only the work of creating a new proletarian hegemony, but of countering the hegemony of the bourgeoisie, not through a direct assault on state power through a Leninist vanguard party and a war of manoeuvre, but through ideological struggle and a war of position. This war was to consist in a process of disarticulation-rearticulation, as Mouffe puts it, of ideological elements,10 partly carried out by organic intellectuals tied to the proletariat, contesting the organic intellectuals of the bourgeoisie. The guerra di posizione (‘war of attrition’) did not involve a complete and sweeping replacement of world views, but a more drawn-out ‘process of transformation’, reform, ‘attrition’ and ‘rearticulation of existing ideological elements’.11 The proletariat was to build an alternative cultural formation autonomously anchored in ‘cooperatives, workers’ councils, communists party sections’ and so on.12 This ‘organization of consent’13 would form a historical bloc linking other groups under proletarian leadership, which must be exercised prior to taking state power. As Gramsci wrote in the Prison Notebooks: What matters is the criticism to which such an ideological complex [bourgeois hegemony] is subjected by the first representatives of the new historical phase [proletarian hegemony]. This criticism makes possible a process of differentiation and change in the relative weight that the elements of the old ideologies used to possess. What was previously secondary and subordinate, or even incidental, is now taken to be primary – becomes the nucleus of a new ideological and theoretical complex.14 Hence, Gramsci’s version of counterhegemony was a gradual process of criticism, a ‘strategy of power pursued through a cultural work’,15 in Nadia Urbinati’s striking phrase, involving reform, disarticulation and rearticulation of ideological elements in such a way as to create a new collective will – a political, moral and intellectual unity – bound to the leadership of the proletariat.
After Gramsci Gramsci’s writings have proved to be a rich source of inspiration for scholars, above all since the 1970s, when interest in Gramsci revived. With the growth of Eurocommunism, Marxists committed to historical materialism and socialist politics but ready to entertain the importance of politics and ideology used Gramsci’s non-reductive formulations. 16 Post-structuralists and discourse theorists saw in Gramscian hegemony a way to develop radical
Introduction
5
understandings of the politics of social representation, while making a thorough break with Marxian economism, teleology and reductivism. 1 7 Foucauldians assimilated Gramscian hegemony to notions of diffuse, capillary power.18 Those studying the non-West saw in Gramsci’s notion of subaltern social groups a way to conceptualize social structure outside of Marxian economism and Eurocentrism.19 International Relations theorists have drawn on theories of hegemony and counterhegemony to move beyond a relentless focus on the traditional power politics of the state, and engage with historical materialism, political economy, class and ideology.20 Even Weberians interested in legitimacy borrowed from Gramsci’s work on consent. All those working with repressive or extractive models of power, moreover, could understand hegemony as an explanation for consent, order, social control or the paradoxes of false consciousness. Nonetheless, while the concept of hegemony proliferated, enabling more sophisticated analyses of leadership and power (although becoming more polysemic and occasionally unwieldy in the process), the notion of counterhegemony remained elusive, vague or underspecified, leaving resistance, as it were, as a theoretical lamb to the slaughter. Gramsci’s own notion of counterhegemony has run into heavy criticism with the breakdown of historical materialism and socialist conviction. Gramsci’s structure depended on what discourse theorists plausibly see as a kind of essentialism: ‘with regard to the privileged position of the working class, and with regard to “the last redoubt of essentialism: the economy”’.21 Few remain committed to the notion of fundamental social classes, or to the normative, teleological givenness of the content and direction of socialist politics.22 Hence, as Plotke puts it, ‘there is no longer any particular agent naturally entitled to be hegemonic [or counterhegemonic]. . . . The term itself is now yet another question rather than an answer.’23 Indeed, in Gramsci, the subjected classes must be seen as passively cooperating in their own subjection due to the effects of ideological and cultural institutions upon them. These classes can only be awakened to self-fulfilling agency by a class that is beyond the reach of hegemonic power due to its unique social position, that is, the working class. Without the aid of a universal class that is inherently the subject of a new hegemony and not an object of the old one, the dominated classes would remain in the thrall of hegemonic institutions indefinitely. But Gramsci’s redemptive social class – the proletariat – has been stripped of this status with the collapse of the Marxian metanarrative of historical materialism, dissolving concrete notions of counterhegemony in the process. Nor are the stagism and developmentalism of Gramsci’s conceptions of a phase of bourgeois hegemony followed by a new historical phase of proletarian hegemony given much credence any longer.24 Marxian economism has hardly been able to withstand the battering delivered by Laclau and Mouffe’s critique, not to mention the interventions of those who have shown that power, meaning, gender, race,
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geography and so on, all enter into the dynamics of ‘the economy’ and thus deconstruct base/superstructure models of causation and priority.25 Hence the principal meaning, form and normative certainty of Gramsci’s counterhegemonic programme, which depends ultimately on a Marxian metanarrative, have effectively collapsed. The principal attempt to specify a post-materialist and yet Gramscian solution to the problems of hegemony has been made by post-structuralists Laclau and Mouffe. Their reformulation of hegemony as the terrain of the political posits an absolute divide between pre-modern ‘sutured’ societies, characterized by a fixed, inescapable, legitimate social hierarchy, and modern ‘unsutured’ societies, in which social identity is discursively fluid and subject to continuous hegemonic articulation and rearticulation within political formations whose legitimacy is always contingent and provisional. This absolute divide was made possible by the irruption of democratic discourse in 18th-century Europe, which introduced the power to destabilize the formerly closed and unassailable discourses of social hierarchy. For Laclau and Mouffe, forms of resistance existed in pre-1789 societies, but could only become antagonisms, politicized collective struggles, when invested with the ideal of equality.26 An antagonism is an instance of resistance against a relation of subordination as such. Hegemony is the articulation of a set of antagonisms in a bid for social power. This view repudiates any fixed human nature on the basis of which one could identify objective cases of oppression. Nevertheless, Laclau and Mouffe seem to regard the democratic revolution that inaugurated modern society as moving towards the increasing elimination of social inequalities as it pervades the different domains of society, a movement to be embraced by the ‘left’. The categories central to modern society, liberty and equality, cannot in their view be given any fixed content, yet nonetheless must remain ethically normative and politically regulative. And though there is no principle by which to know what is ‘left’ and what is ‘right’, their struggle for hegemony continues to constitute the political, and there somehow remains a normative compulsion to side with the left. With this model, Laclau and Mouffe attempt to eliminate many of the difficulties besetting hegemony and resistance by turning hegemony itself into political resistance and social order at the same time. Their model, however, is highly problematic when applied to the non-West, a failure that points to its internal flaws. The model acknowledges resistance in pre-democratic societies, but does not explain where such resistance comes from given that there can be no inherently oppressive relations. Further, there is no explanation for the emergence of democratic discourse, which is regarded as inherently external to the legitimizing discourses of hierarchical, pre-modern societies. The origin of politics therefore, of the possibility of social antagonism and hegemonic articulation, was miraculously conceived in Europe at a specific point in time but is otherwise alien to social relations and struggles. Colonial and
Introduction
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postcolonial non-Western societies that are not democracies and in which liberal political ideals are not the only ones apparently flounder in some unfathomable no-man’s-land lying between the ‘sutured’ and ‘unsutured’. And the notion of ‘strategic essentialism’, which flows from Laclau and Mouffe’s thinking, whereby a worker, or a woman, or a black or an immigrant posits his or her own unity artificially in order to seize political rights, is surely hobbled by the fact that this is based on a deliberate construction – in political struggle what could be impugned as a deception. Can such a notion really be serviceable in life-and-death struggles? And what is to prevent the rich, the male and the white from employing just such a strategic essentialism? Michel Foucault asserts that wherever there is power, there is also resistance.27 But he never adequately explains the nature of this resistance, how it is generated or its relationship to power. Disciplinary and capillary power can break down or malfunction, it would seem, but whether this adds up to practice of counterhegemony is unclear. It is surely implicit in Foucault that certain social sectors benefit materially from the smooth running of a disciplined social order, but the notion of resistance is problematic because where power is so diffuse, deriving neither from the interests of a social agent nor from a unifying principle, no one can really know who or what is in control or how or what to resist. Similarly, in Pierre Bourdieu’s work, it is clear that certain sectors benefit through material and symbolic appropriation, but due to the nearly absolute alignment of structured, structuring dispositions – the habitus – with social fields containing a pre-constituted range of occupiable positions, in combination with the sociological axiom that all actions of all agents are aimed at maximizing some form of social capital, resistance is in every case a misrecognition, or the preserve of a tiny, somehow enlightened vanguard of reflexive sociologists.28 Hegemonic structure produces our consciousness, so it is virtually unthinkable that our consciousness could exist outside of such structure. Social theorists influenced by Foucault, Bourdieu and other poststructuralist thinkers encounter similar problems. Timothy Mitchell, for example, in a powerful critique of James C. Scott’s ‘weapons of the weak’, speaks of hegemonic effects as forms of political domination which work ‘through the shaping of what can be thought and said, by this defining of what presents itself as “reasonable” and “realistic”’.29 Hegemony in Gramsci, Mitchell notes, is not merely about ‘domination at the level of ideas’ but concerns ‘non-violent forms of control exercised through the whole range of dominant cultural institutions and social practices, from schooling, museums, and political parties to religious practice, architectural forms, and the mass media’.30 Mitchell argues that in this context there is no such thing as context-free rationality, as rational calculations ‘will always depend on estimations and suppositions that are the effect of a set of hegemonic relations’.31 Power works in part therefore through ‘creating truths and subjects and sites of apparent autonomy’.32 The problem with this, however, is who
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or what is power, this ghastly figure credited with such omnipresence and facility, that stands behind the production of interests, structures, agents and forms of representation. Without a clear specification of the sources and dynamics of this power, the question of resistance or counterhegemony remains vexed and unanswered, as we do not know who or what to resist, or even why we should be resisting. That Mitchell’s own conception of power makes resistance elusive does not mean that Scott’s ‘everyday forms of resistance’ can provide us with some sort of counterhegemonic panacea; far from it. First, the status of footdragging, dissimulation, pilfering, slander and the like are unclear even in Scott’s work – whereas at times they seem to be credited with the power to restructure social relations, they are at others merely individualistic reflexes incapable of generating progressive change. Moreover, ‘weapons of the weak’ may create the illusion of agency while reinforcing radically asymmetric relations.33 Further, such weapons are even more amply available to the powerful than they are to the weak. Second, Scott’s understanding of hegemony ignores Gramsci’s contribution to the development of the concept and takes us back to a hoary and materialist Marxian notion of hegemony as the imposed mystifying ideology of the ruling class. Beyond this, Scott has no need of counterhegemony, even in what would be an older sense of demystification and consciousness-raising, as he argues that subordinate groups are not mystified in any strong sense as to their own interests. Their apparent consent is merely an artefact of the public transcript where subordinates feign agreement with dominant norms. Hidden transcripts, available in off-stage utterances outside of the glare of power, can supposedly give us a glimpse of how far subordinate groups penetrate and demystify the notions of the powerful. Even if one agreed with these problematic formulations, which assume a radical distinction between the ‘hidden’ and the ‘public’ and ignore the forms of power at work in intimate or off-stage settings, they do not even get as far as addressing the subtler Gramscian notion of hegemony, and by extension counterhegemony, which is neither about simple false consciousness on the one hand nor autonomously granted legitimacy on the other, but involves subtler combinations of coercion, inequality and consent in the production of common sense and the forging of dominant values, meanings and aesthetics in the context of their effectivity in power relations. As Jackson Lears puts it, ‘hegemonic culture depends not on the brainwashing of “the masses” but on the tendency of public discourse to make some forms of experience readily available to consciousness while ignoring or suppressing others.’34 E. San Juan has attempted to go ‘beyond postcolonial theory’ in building up a notion of a counterhegemonic collective subject-in-process of a nongeographical ‘Third World’ and its national-popular based on an idea of development constructed from creative and non-instrumental reason that makes human beings, not gross national product or technology, the goal of
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social production.35 But San Juan returns to the pre-Gramscian materialist notion of ideology as mystification, and resistance becomes a matter of exposing the evils of capitalism-imperialism and the subsequent creation of a rather unproblematic unitary collective subject. This formulation pays scant attention to the thorny problems of subjectivation (that is, processes where the active energies and identities of political subjects are engaged), consent, compromise and incorporation that are at work in the making of hegemony and have dogged authenticist and consciousness-raising notions of resistance. As Mitchell rightly puts it, ‘hegemonic ideologies always offer significant claims to those they are directed against.’36 Counterhegemony can hardly, therefore, be a matter of simply exposing evil. Humanity as a goal is vague enough, moreover, and it might be admitted that the quasireligious modernist faith that some new form of social production will bring a golden age is currently at a low ebb. It should be clear from the foregoing that the notion of counterhegemony remains elusive. If hegemony, as Raymond Williams claims, is properly defined as the limits of the possible and the sensible, ‘the whole lived social process as practically organized by specific and dominant meanings and values’,37 then there has been little progress on what he saw as the ‘major theoretical problem’, namely: to distinguish between alternative and oppositional initiatives and contributions which are made within or against a specific hegemony (which then sets certain limits to them or which can succeed in neutralizing, changing or actually incorporating them) and other kinds of initiative and contribution which are irreducible to the terms of the original or the adaptive hegemony, and are in that sense independent.38 It is of course ironic that so often Gramsci’s work has been used to underline the ‘futility of efforts to change past and present capitalist societies’ and hegemony is often seen as something imposed on inert masses from above, whereas Gramsci was ‘above all else . . . a revolutionary strategist . . . [and] championed a political and ideological struggle for hegemony’ in the name of socialism.39 The task of building up concepts of counterhegemony is clearly far from easy. It requires judgements about who or what is in power and who or what is subordinated or disempowered; about whether power is zero-sum and predatory, collective and enabling, or diffuse and capillary in nature; about whether meaning is mystificatory (deluding subjects as to their best interests), autonomous (a matter of rational, genuine, autonomous choice by fully informed and aware subjects) or discursively produced (an effect of signifying practices of power); about the processes by which power relations are reproduced or destabilized and the role of coercion, politics, economics and culture. Specifying counterhegemony, furthermore, is often linked to
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fundamental judgements about human nature and grand metanarratives of historical change.
History, theory and the global South The present volume aims to tackle some of these problems by extending and enriching existing notions of counterhegemony on the basis of studies of episodes of power and resistance. Our cases are mostly historical, reaching back to the nineteenth century, as we consider that the need for an analysis of concrete, existing relationships, historical context and irreducible contingency loom large in the assessment of counterhegemony. Since theorists are often dogged by ahistoricity and historians and social scientists by empiricism, the attempt in this volume is to experiment with the interface between theory and history, mindful of the perils and complexities attendant thereon. The more historically minded among us feel that counterhegemony provides an important but underused concept through which to make sense of the past and present. The more theoretically minded among us think that empirical material can be useful for developing the concept of counterhegemony. All of us take seriously the tension between history and theory and have come to divergent resolutions. Conceptual development is here based on case studies from the global South in order to try to avoid the Eurocentric tendency to define counterhegemony by some principle at work in ‘advanced capitalism’, and then applying this definition to the rest of the world, which is consequently found to be lacking or deviant and thus unable to participate in proper resistance.40 The Marxian tradition, for example, has often seen underdeveloped proletariats the colonial world over as incapable of proper forms of socialist resistance. Post-structuralists such as Laclau and Mouffe posit that non-Europe cannot engage in politics proper, the liberatory struggle for hegemony, until the democratic discourse of 1789 takes root there. Or, to pick one more example, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, reworking the Marxian tradition in postmodern, anarchic and optimistic ways, set much store by the fact that advanced capitalism generates forms of ‘immaterial labour’ – a kind of tertiarysector labour involving self-direction and decision-making – a labour form which for Hardt and Negri creates the possibility of spontaneous and creative revolutionary action. Where such labour is lacking – as, for example, in Africa, parts of Asia, the Caribbean and Latin America – revolutionary potentialities presumably must languish in the ‘waiting room of history’.41 These theories collude in a ‘selective tradition’ – ‘a deliberately selective and connecting process which offers a historical and cultural ratification of a contemporary order’42 – which constructs a universalized Western history as the figure of salvation and font of true resistance. In a world marked by imperialism and radical asymmetries in the exertion of transnational power, such a selective tradition only seems to ratify and glorify the agency of the West in a way
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which reproduces Western hegemony rather than some new form of counterhegemony. The focus on the colony and postcolony is not supposed to be simply an empirical move, as if we expected the orphan factual to do all our work for us, but is a partly heuristic displacement device for vivifying the problems of Eurocentrism. Putting cases from Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and Latin America together in comparison and conversation is no guarantee of conceptual progress, but a deliberate self-positioning against the disciplinary boundaries erected in nineteenth-century colonial Europe among oriental studies (situated mostly in Asia), anthropology (situated mostly in Africa and Oceania), history (situated mostly in Europe) and those developed during the Cold War under the rubric of Area Studies. These powerful distinctions – part of a ‘selective tradition’ enshrining the West – do little justice to identifiably similar forms of power and resistance operating across the tricontinental area within processes and discourses of colonialism, nationalism, revolution, capitalism, civilization, race, commodification, literary production, education, identity formation and so on. This is not to suggest that the global South is the only site of subalternity, or that the global South represents a unitary subject, either in-itself or for-itself, but to call attention to regular and identifiable coercive inequalities, economic, political and cultural, at the global level, past and present.
Counterhegemony as rearticulation Gramsci’s counterhegemony, as discussed above, involves not an outright, violent assault on the established order, but a gradual process of disarticulation and rearticulation, a ‘war of attrition’ (guerra di posizione) in the ‘redoubts’ and ‘trenches’ of civil society. This notion of rearticulation is central to how most of the varied contributions in this volume understand counterhegemony. We show how the latent contradictions, selectivity, fractures, instability, insufficiency and contingent strength of existing forms of hegemony, subsisting within and between the structures of political, economic and cultural power, could be and have actually been exposed, deepened, manipulated, transformed and converted through material and cultural processes of counterhegemonic rearticulation. Each of the contributions in the volume addresses some aspect of this in order to single out and clarify some of the diverse mechanisms involved. Our debt to the work of Laclau and Mouffe derives from their development of the notion of hegemonic (re)articulation, but our conception of rearticulation is neither based on the Eurocentrism of a post-1789 logic of equivalence, nor does it take place exclusively at the level of culture, or even discourse, if discourse is understood as signifying practice of power productive of subjectivity. Instead, because individuals and groups are located within sometimescontradictory networks of cultural, economic, military and political power,
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to adopt the useful divisions proposed by Michael Mann, forms of breakdown, conversion, redirection and linkage take place not merely within cultural structures, but within and between economic and political structures.43 Not simply a cultural reductivism, our concept of counterhegemonic rearticulation is therefore more materially grounded than that of some versions of post-structuralism, taking seriously the relative autonomy of different social logics and historical contingency, but in no way involving a return to economism or modernist metanarrative. Many of the contributors would agree with Randolph Persaud, who writes that counterhegemony is not a single, unified set of practices, ‘nor need it be a strategy aimed at transformations which occur all at once. Counter-hegemony is more likely to be effective by proceeding from one trench to another’.44 The illustrative exposition of counterhegemonic rearticulation in the volume is through-written in that conceptual elements overlap, but emphases on the various mechanisms of rearticulation, historical contexts and fields of contest vary. The volume is divided into four parts corresponding to four different fields of contest – state politics, intellectual formations, civil society and subaltern struggle. These fields of contest present common problems, involve similar political actors, and entail somewhat comparable counterhegemonic forms and tasks. Part I, entitled ‘The State and Politics: Nationalism and Revolution’, is concerned with power relations at the national level, involving nationalist movements, the state and political parties. Alan Knight’s opening chapter surveys revolution, nationalism and political struggle in twentieth-century Mexico in terms of the concepts of hegemony and counterhegemony. Knight shows how forms of hegemony have contingent strength, and that successive hegemonic forms in post-revolutionary Mexico have had thick, thin and partial forms. In this conception, counterhegemony is a logically inextricable element in the open-ended construction of different forms of political, economic and cultural hegemony. The strength of these forms is always shifting, partly because of the ways in which different political, economic and cultural logics contradict one another, and also because historical logics bring new and unforeseeable elements onto the scene which both shape and can be seized on by diverse claimants. James McDougall’s chapter attempts a similarly synoptic view of anticolonial nationalism, state-building and exclusionary identity politics in twentieth-century Algeria, a country which held an iconic status in the discourse of the ‘Third Worldism’ of the 1950s and 1960s. McDougall probes the fundamental question of liberation, the Mecca of so many movements of resistance and opposition, demonstrating the dependence of discourses and representations of liberation on the categories of the oppressive order to which they are opposed. McDougall argues that the forms of colonial and commodity logic embedded in supposedly authentic and autonomous Algerian nationalism were the key flaws which should be held responsible
Introduction
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for the subsequent failure of the post-independence project. In other words, McDougall’s more pessimistic chapter suggests that while a successful counterhegemonic movement (Algerian nationalism) was able to constitute itself through battening onto existing structures and discourses, these derivative linkages in turn caused its downfall, as they ultimately reinforced the original hegemonic categories associated with commodified forms of political identity. Genuine counterhegemony, argues McDougall, can only be found in an as yet unrealized pluralization of the political field. Part II, entitled ‘Intellectual Formations: Authority and Opposition’, is about moments of contestation and rearticulation in which intellectuals seek to enhance their authority and effect social change by drawing on existing social resistances to rework the prevailing hegemonic discourses. Such intellectuals redefine existing social resistances into new discourses of order that challenge the dominant order and thereby enhance their own authority. Yaseen Noorani’s chapter on Arab literary modernism expands on the theme of liberation broached by McDougall’s paper. Noorani argues that hegemony is conventionally understood in terms of the ‘repressive hypothesis’ – the idea that domination is based on the repression of an innate human desire for freedom. This is evident not only in Arabic literary modernism itself, with its quest for social liberation from oppressive tradition through visually autonomous perception, but in influential critiques of literary modernism that see it in the service of capitalist hegemony. Noorani attempts to show the untenability of the repressive hypothesis in evaluating countercultural ‘practices of freedom’ like modernism. Such practices are better understood as counterhegemonic rearticulations of resistances already present in the social order. Noorani proposes, in other words, that resistance be understood as constitutive of hegemonic order rather than as external and inimical to it. Rana Mitter’s chapter on the reinterpretation of Confucianism in early twentieth-century China deals with another kind of intellectual counterhegemonic rearticulation. Mitter shows how the once-popular but now largely forgotten intellectual Zou Taofen did not claim utterly to reject the broadly hegemonic Confucian tradition in the name of an alternate hegemony of Western modernity, but persuaded a wide audience through gestures which worked subtle transformations on both discourses. Mitter sees counterhegemony therefore not as a matter of a radical break, nor as the activation of an authentic tradition, but as the rearticulation of existing norms, this being the only way to avoid the hegemonic traps set for those who would attempt to overthrow the established ideological order in toto. Melanie Newton’s chapter takes the reader further back in time to focus on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Barbadan intellectuals and elites and the rearticulation of British colonial discourse in the Caribbean. Newton shows how Barbadan elites identified themselves with the British civilizing mission to Africa, while claiming that they themselves were capable of carrying out
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Britain’s imperial mission, thus implicitly challenging aspects of the racial hierarchy embedded in such imperial discourse. The latent contradiction between race and civilization, which remained just that among the white ‘civilizers’ of the metropole, became visible when black colonial subjects took on the mantle of civilizers, battening on to one aspect of dominant hegemony, while surreptitiously substituting this principle for that of the racial hierarchy. Over time, this potentially counterhegemonic manoeuvre played some role in more explicit challenges to racial hierarchy, pan-Africanism and the anticolonial nationalism of later years. Part III, entitled ‘Counterculture: Normative Tension and Ambiguity’, is concerned with contests in the cultural institutions Gramsci identified with civil society: here the chapters tackle education and religion, respectively. These cultural institutions are seen as necessary for hegemonic order but their meaning, it is suggested, cannot be controlled. This does not automatically mean, however, that such institutions will necessarily be politicized in counterhegemonic ways. Benjamin Fortna’s chapter discusses education in the late Ottoman Empire and early Turkish Republic. In Fortna’s exposition, state power and market forces are by no means working together in a seamless hegemony in the field of education. Instead, their contradictory operations involve a hegemonic fracture, in that the subversive encroachment of market forces on state authority creates a space for potentially counterhegemonic parody and satire in independent magazines for children. Walter Armbrust’s chapter, more pessimistically, examines in ethnographic mode the religious ritual of Ramadan in late twentieth-century Egypt, finding it to be in important senses ‘counterhegemony proof’. Armbrust argues that everyday appropriations of Ramadan have long been inextricably linked to the competing hegemonic projects of the state on the one hand and the Islamists on the other. But these hegemonic projects are not linked to fundamental classes based on relations to the means of capitalist production, as in Gramsci, but instead on different appropriations of the modern. Counterhegemony is therefore unthinkable aside from a project challenging the fundamental bases of Egyptian modernity. Here the only limited room granted for counterhegemony comes in concepts such as ‘holiday fatigue’. Finally, Part IV, entitled ‘Popular Struggle: Manoeuvre and Contestation’, examines struggles waged by various subaltern groups, including workers and shanty-town dwellers, attempting to better their social situation by manoeuvring within hegemonic frameworks. They do so, it is argued, by reworking elements necessary to the hegemonic order but whose meaning or practical application cannot be entirely controlled. To achieve this reworking, popular struggle must articulate ‘illegitimate’ resistances into legitimized grievances and demands in a strategic manner. John Chalcraft’s chapter studies protests surrounding weighing and measuring in nineteenth-century Egypt. What would normally be conceived of as resistance or even counterhegemony is rewritten as a mode of hegemonic expansion, involving a ‘fallen’ version of subaltern agency. Chalcraft argues that popular protests
Introduction
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couched in dominant languages at linguistic and practical sites of hegemonic articulation worked to suture and identify diverse social interests in a process of hegemonic deepening which is by no means a matter of narrow co-optation and exclusivist incorporation by elites. In this reading, where the normative valence of (counter)hegemony is deliberately ambiguous, counterhegemony becomes the process whereby these sites of hegemonic articulation are broken up and coercion becomes visible. Paulo Drinot’s chapter on print workers in Peru in the interwar period makes a comparable argument. Where Chalcraft writes of ‘hegemonic expansion’, Drinot advances the idea of ‘hegemony from below’, where workers seek versions of consensual or hegemonic relations with the authorities which allow them some room for manoeuvre. For Drinot, groups accept their own hegemonization in return for concessions of various kinds. Among Peruvian print workers, this strategy, counter-intuitively enough, took the form of involving themselves in the counterhegemonic projects of communism after the breakdown of more hegemonic relations with the state in the early 1920s. Workers were all along aiming to reconstitute some sort of hegemonic bargain with the state in return for their abandoning a form of counterhegemony. Adrienne LeBas takes up the question of counterhegemony with regard to workers in post-independence Zambia. Her chapter illustrates the notion that hegemonic structures contain certain resources, originally used to maintain hegemony, which can be turned to counterhegemonic purposes by subaltern groups pursuing their own interests. In a story of ‘institutional subversion’, she demonstrates how Zambian workers were able to use the pre-existing communications networks and various political resources of initially governmentcontrolled unions to gradually build and pursue counterhegemony from the late 1960s to the present. Institutions that were designed for top-down government control became the basis for cohesive opposition. The final chapter by Sharad Chari stays in sub-Saharan Africa but focuses on forms of popular mobilization in former ‘Indian’ and ‘Coloured’ townships of Durban, South Africa. Pursuing the question ‘How do activists act?’ Chari explores the counterhegemonic possibilities of spaces for the production of social value which are outside of or in contradiction with the spaces and logics of capital accumulation, wage-labour and the degradation involved in the drug and sex trades. Homes, streets and interstitial contacts ‘at the church door’ and elsewhere are sites for the creative production and definition of social value, sites which have the potential to become the seedbed for militancy or for rearticulation as a counterhegemonic bloc.
Conclusion Although some contributors are more pessimistic than others, the volume overall aims to provide illustrations and arguments supporting a conception of counterhegemony as a drawn-out process of cultural, political, economic and social rearticulation. In terms of the four forms of resistance noted at
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the outset – outright assault, manipulation, counterculture and surreptitious subversion – the volume generally argues for the utility of an expanded notion of ‘manipulation’, rewritten as rearticulation. Our notion of rearticulation goes beyond the mere contestation and modification of hegemonic terms, to encompass a potentially radical reconfiguration of hegemonic structures – thus including in its purview elements of the other three versions of resistance. This form of rearticulation, in other words, does not merely reinforce existing dominant categories. We argue that hegemony is, in principle, a process, an open-ended form of construction, not a once-andfor-all achievement. Hegemonic forms are contingently strong. They are partial, relatively thick or thin and include latent contradictions and fractures, as well as meanings and resources that are not fully controllable. As Mark Rupert puts it, hegemony is ‘the unstable product of a continuous process of struggle, a “war of position” . . . hardly a foreclosure of the horizons of meaningful political contestation’.45 These instabilities and contradictions, as well as forms of historical contingency, can be exploited by intellectuals and subaltern groups and other political subjects. Hegemonies do not rely on a singular and pure repression – the fallacy of the ‘repressive hypothesis’ – but are often actively constructed by diverse claimants – through processes of hegemonic expansion or the search for ‘hegemony from below’. This means that there can be no decisive or ultimate liberation from a hegemonic order. The notion that there is a sharp and universally recognizable difference between just, legitimate rule and unjust, illegitimate rule, based on how compatible this rule is thought to be with human nature, cannot guide our analysis. For the most part, the chapters in this volume seek to understand the genesis and nature of resistance movements and their relation to the hegemonic order in which they arose, while bracketing the question of whether these movements ‘liberated’ anyone or bettered their lives. And certainly, we have not attempted to address the more fundamental question of whether counterhegemony has ever brought about, or can ever bring about, a better society. Nevertheless, giving up the idea that hegemonic rule is based on some form of objective oppression does not mean that we must surrender the hope that social relations can be made more just. It means, rather, that our notion of justice must be anchored in the norms, processes and aspirations of specific social formations. In developing concepts of hegemonic analysis at diverse locations in the colony and postcolony in Asia, Africa, Latin American and the Caribbean, we aim above all to break down the Eurocentric conception that counterhegemony involves processes that begin or are somehow more advanced in the powerful countries of the global North. Counterhegemony does not require the industrial proletariat, a well-developed bourgeoisie, the immaterial labour of the multitude or the logic of democratic equivalence instated by 1789: radical politics and counterhegemonic processes are far more rich, continuous and plural than this.
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Notes 1. Respectively, Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986); Joseph A. Massad, Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth Century British Liberal Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, first published 1975, translated by Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1979); Edward W. Said, Orientalism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978); Timothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 2. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971); Perry Anderson, ‘The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci’, in New Left Review, 100 (1976–7), pp. 5–78; Foucault, Discipline and Punish; Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, first published 1972 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Chantal Mouffe, ‘Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci’, in Gramsci and Marxist Theory, Chantal Mouffe ed. (London, Boston and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), pp. 168–203; Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, first published 1985, second edition (London: Verso, 2001); Joseph V. Femia, Gramsci’s Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); Ranajit Guha, Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric and Symbols in Contemporary Syria (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Zizek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left (London: Verso, 2000); Antonio Gramsci, The Antonio Gramsci Reader, edited by David Forgacs (New York: New York University Press, 2000); Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). 3. James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985). 4. Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 114. 5. As Laclau and Mouffe put it, ‘political leadership within a class alliance’, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, p. 55. 6. Mouffe, ‘Hegemony and Ideology’, pp. 168–203, esp. 178–81. 7. Mouffe, ‘Hegemony and Ideology’, p. 184. 8. Cited in Walter L. Adamson, ‘Beyond “Reform or Revolution”: Notes on Political Education in Gramsci, Habermas and Arendt’, in Theory and Society, Vol. 6, No. 3 (November 1978), pp. 429–60, esp. 431. Power here is communicative, involving a dialogue towards concerted decision. As Adamson writes on p. 431, ‘Proletarian revolution is the establishment of this sort of power, not a dictatorship of the proletariat, but an ascending “historical bloc” becoming a state’ 9. Ibid., p. 198. A subaltern social group referred most meaningfully to either the proletariat before achieving hegemony, or a group such as the peasantry which is not a fundamental social class and thus not a fit subject to exercise hegemony over other groups. Indeed, there are no other groups – it is essentially for hegemony over the peasantry that the bourgeoisie and the proletariat were competing in Gramsci’s view.
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10. 11. 12. 13.
Mouffe, ‘Hegemony and Ideology’, p. 193. Ibid., p. 192. Adamson, ‘Beyond “Reform or Revolution”’, p. 430. As Michèle Barrett puts it in ‘Ideology, Politics, Hegemony: From Gramsci to Laclau and Mouffe’, in Mapping Ideology, edited by Slavoj Zizek (London: Verso, 1994), pp. 235–64, esp. 238. Quoted in Mouffe, ‘Hegemony and Ideology’, p. 191. Nadia Urbinati, ‘From the Periphery of Modernity: Antonio Gramsci’s Theory of Subordination and Hegemony’, in Political Theory, Vol. 26, No. 3 ( June 1998), pp. 370–391, esp. 370. Urbinati here refers to hegemony, but the form of counterhegemony as a strategy to forge a new hegemony involves the same principle. For a useful overview, see Anne Showstack Sassoon, Gramsci’s Politics, first published 1980, 2nd edn (London: Hutchinson, 1987). Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. See, for example, Massad, Colonial Effects, p. 3. For a useful overview of the changing shape of Subaltern Studies from the 1970s to the late 1990s, see Vinayak Chaturvedi ed., Mapping Subaltern Studies and the Postcolonial (London: Verso, 2000). Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Enrico Angelli and Craig Murphy, America’s Quest for Supremacy and the Third World: A Gramscian Analysis (London: Puiter Publishers, 1988); Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Stephen Gill ed., Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); James H. Mittelman ed., Globalization: Critical Reflections (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996); Mark Rupert, Ideologies of Globalization: Contending Visions of a New World Order (London: Routledge, 2000); Randolph B. Persaud, Counter-Hegemony and Foreign Policy: The Dialectics of Marginalized and Global Forces in Jamaica, Foreword by Robert Cox (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001); William I. Robinson, Transnational Conflicts: Central America, Social Change, and Globalization (London: Verso, 2003). Barrett, ‘Ideology, Politics, Hegemony’, p. 247. Especially in the wake of the sustained hammering given Marxist economism and essentialism in Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Plotke, Social Movements, 1995, p. 135. See also David Plotke, ‘What’s So New About New Social Movements?’, Socialist Review 20, 1 (1990), pp. 81–102. See Dipesh Chakarbarty’s extensive criticism of what he calls ‘historicism’, in Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 6–16. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. For an excellent discussion, see William Sewell, ‘Towards a Post-materialist Rhetoric for Labor History’, in Rethinking Labor History: Essays on Discourse and Class Analysis, edited by Lenard R. Bernstein (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993). Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, esp. pp. 176–93. Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977 (New York: Random House, 1980). Bourdieu, Theory of Practice. Timothy Mitchell, ‘Everyday Metaphors of Power’, in Theory and Society, Vol. 19, No. 5 (October 1990), pp. 545–77, esp. 552. Mitchell, ‘Everyday Metaphors’, p. 553.
16. 17. 18. 19.
20.
21. 22. 23. 24.
25.
26. 27. 28. 29. 30.
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14. 15.
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31. Ibid., p. 555. 32. Ibid., p. 564. 33. Cheating at the weighing out of grain at harvest time, for example, may give the peasant ‘the illusion of having more power and manoeuvrability than is actually the case – that is, these ineffective but psychologically satisfying forms of resistance could in fact contribute to false consciousness, blinding people to the painful reality of the extent of their powerlessness and exploitation’. Christine White quoted in Mitchell, ‘Everyday Metaphors’, p. 555. 34. T. J. Jackson Lears, ‘The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities’, in The American Historical Review, Vol. 90, No. 3 ( June 1985), pp. 567–93, esp. 577. 35. E. San Juan, Beyond Postcolonial Theory (London: Macmillan, 1999). See also E. San Juan, Hegemony and Strategies of Transgression: Essays in Cultural Studies and Comparative Literature (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995). 36. Mitchell, ‘Everyday Metaphors’, p. 552. 37. Williams, Marxism and Literature, p. 109. 38. Ibid., p. 114. 39. George Lipsitz, ‘The Struggle for Hegemony’, in The Journal of American History, Vol. 75, No. 1 ( June 1988), pp. 146–50, esp. 146–7. Having said this, of course, the peasantry in Gramsci were indeed in a position of having the hegemony of a fundamental class imposed upon them from above. 40. Studies of counterhegemony in the global South are few and far between. A notable exception is Persaud, Counter-Hegemony and Foreign Policy. See especially Chapter 6. 41. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); for a useful critique see Gopal Balakrishnan ed., Debating Empire (London: Verso, 2003). The phrase ‘waiting room of history’, comes from Dipesh Chakrabarty’s critique of historicism in Provincializing Europe, p. 8. 42. Ibid., p. 116. 43. Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1, A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 1–34. 44. Persaud, Counter-Hegemony and Foreign Policy, p. 49. 45. Rupert, Ideologies of Globalization, p. 11.
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Part I The State and Politics: Nationalism and Revolution
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1 Hegemony, Counterhegemony and the Mexican Revolution Alan Knight
I take the concept of hegemony, as developed by Gramsci, to be a useful – if somewhat blurred1 – notion, which seeks to explain a palpable fact: that, despite the glaring inequities evident in many societies, the rulers and elites of these societies do not necessarily have to resort to regular and extensive repression in order to maintain themselves. Coercion alone is not the secret of their success. Though we owe the development and deployment of the concept to Gramsci, it is one which – in different guises – crops up in diverse theoretical contexts. Long before Gramsci (or Marx), David Hume observed that ‘nothing appears more surprising to those who consider human affairs with a philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the many are governed by the few; and the implicit submission, with which men resign their own sentiments and passions to those of their rulers’.2 And, while Gramsci introduced ‘hegemony’ to the Marxist conceptual family (where it sits alongside its rather more disreputable cousin ‘false consciousness’), there are more distant ‘bourgeois’ relatives, such as ‘consensus’, the ‘common culture’ and (Weberian) legitimacy.3 The multiplication of these kindred concepts seems to suggest that there is something to the notion; and, indeed, any reading of history will throw up socio-political orders which depend heavily on coercion, as compared to those which, despite no less glaring inequalities, manage to survive and reproduce themselves without resorting – at least not nearly as much – to the knout and the noose. In seeking to explain this pervasive phenomenon, Gramsci’s notion is helpful and should not, I think, be discarded.4 But it should be clarified and ‘operationalized’, that is, deployed in particular historical contexts. This chapter looks at ‘revolutionary’ Mexico – that is, the Mexico which emerged from the revolution of 1910 and, rhetorically at least, was ruled by the victorious ‘revolutionary’ regime down to 2000.5 The chapter is historical, not theoretical: I do not propose to clarify or critique Gramsci’s arguments, but to use them – and others – in eclectic and utilitarian fashion.6 ‘Hegemony’ (and counterhegemony) are my ‘organizing concepts’, which I take roughly for granted, and use to the extent that they are useful.7 That said, I will briefly 23
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outline the analysis which follows. Hegemony denotes a form of authority which does not depend wholly or principally on coercion and the threat of coercion; counterhegemony implies a challenge to hegemony which is in some way systemic, which goes beyond limited and particular resistance and challenges the bases of authority. Revolutions, for obvious reasons, offer good examples of such confrontations; no less interesting (though less studied) are the subsequent processes whereby triumphant revolutions strive for hegemonic consolidation. In developing the analysis in the Mexican context I stress that it is important to clarify whose hegemony is at stake: in particular, I contrast forms of political hegemony (attaching to regime, state or nation) and forms of socio-economic hegemony, which relate to the socio-economic order, or (occasionally) to the entire ‘mode of production’. We should also recognize the hegemonic or counterhegemonic pretensions of non-state actors, such as the Catholic Church. I deploy these arguments using a conventional threefold periodization: the armed revolution (1910–20); revolutionary reform and state-building (1920–40); and revolutionary retreat and routinization (1940–80). This sequence prompts several conclusions. An initial revolutionary mobilization, in the guise of popular liberalism, mounted an effective counterhegemonic challenge to a sclerotic old regime, but proved incapable of establishing a new hegemonic regime; the latter emerged later, in more piecemeal fashion and depended on institutional innovations (parties, schools, ejidos, sindicatos) as much as any ideological resources. Hegemony had to be worked at; and success was never more than partial. Over time, the new regime gelled, but in the process it lost much of early élan and came to depend on elaborate systems of patronage and clientelism. Political polarization, which had been marked during 1910–40, declined during the years of the Cold War; erstwhile antagonists (including the Catholic Church) settled for pragmatic accommodations. By the 1950s a ‘thin’ hegemony (at best), based on spoils, patronage and economic growth, supplanted the hegemonic confrontations of the revolutionary years. Yet even thin hegemony proved vulnerable to the recession, inflation, and state-shrinking of the 1980s and ’90s. Today, the hegemony of the revolution, thick or thin, is largely a thing of the past; but the hegemony of the capitalist socio-economic order is stronger than ever. Revolutions offer promising terrain for the study of hegemony, since, almost by definition, they provide illustrative moments when hegemony has demonstrably failed. Indeed, it is only at a time of mass protest and upheaval that we can confidently say that hegemony has failed.8 Of course, hegemony may fail in the absence of revolution, its failure being manifest in naked repression or, perhaps, socio-political ‘implosion’ (a kind of revolution manqué: a breakdown of hegemony which lacks any counterhegemonic alternative and which results in social fragmentation, violence and anomie).9 Despite prolix debate, there is a rough consensus that revolutions – that is, ‘great’ or ‘social’ revolutions – embody two aspects or phases: first, a fundamental struggle for power between rival forces, wedded to rival visions, and
Hegemony, Counterhegemony and the Mexican Revolution 25
involving what Tilly refers to as a situation of ‘multiple sovereignty’;10 this leading, secondly, to a process of revolutionary triumph and state-building which marks a major break with the old regime. Several qualifications must be made: a power struggle may not result in a revolutionary triumph (witness China’s Taiping rebellion); the struggle must involve contrasting visions (the Wars of the Roses would not count); and there must be substantial voluntary popular mobilization on at least one side (thus, a struggle between mercenary armies would not qualify). The dual sequence can be reformulated in ‘hegemonic’ terms: during the struggle for power, rival hegemonies are in play (sometimes two, sometimes more); a successful revolution – one that destroys the old regime and creates a durable alternative11 – must in some measure establish its own hegemony, unless it is to rule solely by virtue of coercion. Revolutionary regimes may incur significant opposition and resort to significant repression (hence, the Jacobin Terror; the Kronstadt repression of 1921; Mexico’s Cristero War, 1926–9); but I can think of few that relied wholly or overwhelmingly on repression.12 Most counted on a real measure of genuine – even ardent – popular support. They were at least partially ‘hegemonic’. But there is also a third phase to the story, one that is not diagnostic of ‘revolution’, but which seems a likely result – or, we might say, requiem. The mature revolutionary regime, if it survives domestic and external challenges, is likely to go the way of bureaucratization, consolidation and conservatism. It may retain its self-proclaimed revolutionary – ‘socialist’, communist, or nationalist – credentials, but as its leaders age, as vested interests are created, and as new forms of inequality are introduced or old forms are enhanced, so the ‘revolutionary’ claim begins to ring hollow. At this point, hegemony may fail and the regime may falter. Or the regime may build an alternative (weak/thin) hegemony, based on self-interested patronage and clientelism rather than revolutionary ideals. This, the perceptive reader may have guessed, is roughly the Mexican story, which parallels others.13 However, before turning to that story and putting some historical flesh on these skeletal conceptual bones, I think it useful to make three loosely theoretical clarifications. First, when we talk of hegemony, we should clarify whose hegemony is at stake. Second, this clarification rapidly leads to a rather obvious conclusion: that hegemony is never complete and is, to varying degrees, contested. Third, and no less obvious, struggles for hegemony are shifting processes; hegemony is not a given. And even when it seems to be a given – when it seems secure and preponderant – it has to be worked at; it depends on mechanisms of, let us say, acculturation; and we should ask what those mechanisms are. Such an inquiry is likely to lead in an institutional direction: towards schools, churches, parties, unions, newspapers and the mass media.14 The first point is perhaps the most complex and demands greatest attention. When we talk of hegemony – and counterhegemony – we would do well
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to ask: the hegemony of who or what? In general, hegemony refers to the political regime and, by extension, the socio-economic order which that regime underpins or oversees.15 Such a perspective, which I will largely adopt, derives from the concept’s Marxist provenance. We should be careful not to devalue the term by applying it too promiscuously, by – for example – attaching it to specific governments and administrations. (The same caveat would be in order if we were considering the cognate term ‘legitimacy’.) Administrations can be unpopular, but an unpopular administration does not shatter the hegemony (or legitimacy) of a political regime and a socioeconomic order.16 Indeed, systemic hegemony may depend on the possibility of removing unpopular administrations – sacrificing a part in order to preserve the whole (I give an example below, relating to Mexico in 1911). The relative stability of consolidated democracies derives in large measure from this safety valve.17 By occasionally ‘kicking out the bums’, voters can nurture the fond belief that they exercise genuine democratic control and can even achieve systemic change, if they so desire.18 But non-democratic regimes often have their safety valves too: authoritarian regimes may be responsive to public opinion;19 monarchical regimes may typically sacrifice the ‘bad advisers’ of the kind in order to maintain the greater hegemony of monarchical rule.20 A string of bad administrations, of course, may undermine systemic hegemony: people begin to blame the system rather than the individual incumbents (in part, this is what happened in Mexico during the twilight of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional [PRI]) after 1982). If administrations represent relatively transient episodes, regimes, states and socio-economic orders are grander and more enduring edifices, whose claims to hegemony are crucial. By regime I mean the form the state adopts, irrespective of transient incumbents: monarchical, oligarchic, authoritarian, totalitarian, democratic, polyarchic. (We can adopt whatever typology we like, starting with Aristotle). The democratic to authoritarian and back to democratic switchback which Latin America had ridden throughout the twentieth century involves such changes (some accomplished by means of ‘social’ revolution, most by more prosaic processes of coup, rebellion and piecemeal democratization). Current debates about the degree of democratic ‘consolidation’ in Latin America are, it seems to me, addressing the question, whether democratic regimes are now ‘hegemonic’ – whether, in other words, they are backed by durable mainstream opinion, which makes them ‘the only game in town’.21 At a yet more profound level, we may consider the hegemony of the state and the socio-economic order (by which I mean the basic distribution of economic power and resources). I will consider the latter first. A rather reductionist approach would equate this with the ‘mode of production’ (a phrase which, 30 or so years after its theoretical heyday, now has a slightly antiquarian sound). There is nothing wrong with categorizing societies according to their ‘mode of production’; indeed, to say – for example – that a society is
Hegemony, Counterhegemony and the Mexican Revolution 27
capitalist is to package a good deal of useful information in a one-word label. (And it is a lot more informative than saying that a society is ‘modern’ or ‘traditional’ or ‘Western’.) The problem with modes of production is not that they are unimportant or meaningless (far from it), but rather that they tend to change slowly, over time; they are like the tectonic plates of the social world which, while they may sporadically generate big upheavals, do not shift and transform themselves in the short term, but follow the slow rhythms of geological time. Meanwhile, a great deal goes on atop the tectonic plates (that is, the modes of production) which they do not directly influence and cannot therefore explain.22 Even ‘great’ revolutions do not usually achieve brisk transformations of the mode of production. Twentiethcentury ‘socialist’ revolutions may rapidly subvert capitalism (Cuba would be a good example); but other revolutions – roughly, ‘bourgeois’ revolutions, like the French and perhaps the Mexican and Bolivian – achieve no such rapid or drastic socio-economic change; they do not install ‘bourgeois capitalism’ on the smoking ruins of ‘feudalism’. However, even if they do not revolutionize the mode of production, they do substantially change the socio-economic order;23 they go beyond ‘mere’ political change, and their character as ‘great’ or – better – ‘social’ revolutions depends on this socioeconomic accomplishment. Classic examples in the Mexican case would be the campesinos’ successful campaign for land reform, which provoked bitter landlord opposition, and – a secondary, somewhat more muted conflict – the working class campaign for union rights, for better pay and conditions, and, in some cases, for outright workers’ control of enterprises. These campaigns involved not only political battles, which hinged on state policy and access to power, but also local agrarian confrontations (land seizures, lobbying, litigation, skirmishes and assassinations) and analogous shop-floor struggles. Though these relationships are complex in practice, we can make a fairly clear analytical distinction between the hegemony of the regime (the form the state adopts) and the hegemony of the socio-economic order, which we can define maximally (but rather unhelpfully) as a given ‘mode of production’ or, more modestly but more usefully, as a given distribution of economic power and resources, in both field and factory. ‘Political’ revolutions involve the first, ‘social’ revolutions the second.24 Social revolutions are likely to embody political revolutions, but the reverse does not follow. The ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688 was a political revolution which broadly consolidated the socio-economic status quo. The Mexican Revolution, I argue, followed the pattern of social revolutions which – like the French – changed both political and socio-economic structures, but without achieving a rapid and thorough transformation of the mode of production (such as occurred in Cuba after 1959). We may therefore depict administrations and regimes as concentric circles; and, alongside, overlapping but distinct, stand two similar concentric circles: socio-economic orders and modes of production.25
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[Nation-]State (Mexico)
Regime (revolutionary/ populist) Administration (Calles, Cárdenas)
Mode of Production (capitalist)
Socio-Economic Order (reformist/agrarian)
So far, so neat. But there is an outer (political) circle which also warrants a mention – and here things get more complicated. Administrations and regimes are both manifestations of the state; they can come and go without the state disappearing. The Latin American switchback – from democratic to authoritarian and back to democratic – did not involve the dissolution of the state.26 Almost by definition, the state claims some sort of hegemony; the classic Weberian formulation of the state’s monopoly of legitimate force says as much;27 and most hegemonic battles, including most revolutions, involve battles for control of the state. Hence the familiar ‘Tocquevillean’ sequence, whereby the successful revolution seizes and strengthens the state it has just recently overthrown.28 This view fits the Mexican story quite well. But, even in Mexico, there were revolutionary groups who were leery of state power, who, rather than seeking to seize the state and cast it in their own image, as would-be hegemons are meant to do, were chiefly concerned to weaken and even dissolve the state. Such anarchist/anarchisant forces were, of course, even stronger in other revolutionary contexts: in Nestor Makhno’s Ukraine, for example, or in the Spanish Revolution of the 1930s. These revolutionary actors sought to dismantle – or, at least, substantially weaken – state hegemony without apparently desiring to forge their own hegemonic statist alternative. However, such actors are relatively unusual and their appearance on the stage has tended to be brief.29 The Tocquevillean sequence reflects a kind of Weberian logic: states are hard to get rid of; they are seen as the essential political carapace of nations; and forces both domestic and international tend to reinforce processes of statebuilding – even if these processes are messy and only partially successful.30 As the last sentence suggests, there is a closely related institution whose fate is wrapped up with that of the state and whose ‘hegemony’ may also be moot: the nation. It is sometimes taken for granted that revolutions occur within nation-states and serve to perpetuate them. Indeed, the Tocquevillean sequence could be extended from ‘state’ to ‘nation-state’: revolutions, like the French (and the English, Russian and Chinese?), destroy old regimes but proceed to construct not only stronger states but also stronger nations than had existed before. Or, in the case of nationalist movements (whose revolutionary status, of course, may be debated), success
Hegemony, Counterhegemony and the Mexican Revolution 29
involves the creation of entirely new nations: the United States in 1776, Algeria in 1962. Although the Mexican Revolution has been (rightly) seen as nationalist revolution and (wrongly) termed a ‘war of national liberation’,31 it seems clear that almost all the Mexican revolutionaries – and the vast majority of their enemies too – were sincere patriots or, if you prefer, nationalists, who eagerly subscribed to the notion of the Mexican nation.32 They differed profoundly over both the regime and the socio-economic order which Mexico should adopt (hence the revolution happened), but they endorsed the idea of a Mexican ‘imagined national community’. True, their ‘imagined national communities’ were not identical (were Cuauhtémoc and Hidalgo, or Cortés and Iturbide, the true fathers of the Mexican nation?); but they all agreed that a national community possessed of defined borders, territory and shared history existed. To that extent nationalism was hegemonic and the survival of the nation was not a basic issue during the Revolution.33 We could contrast this hegemonic nationalism with revolutionary struggles elsewhere in which the survival – or creation – of the nation-state was at stake. A century before the 1910 Revolution, Mexican patriots fought a long war against Spanish colonialism and finally triumphed, turning the colony of New Spain into the Mexican Republic. Cuban nationalists fought a similar war twice, in 1868–78 and 1895–8. These were genuine wars of national liberation, in which the fates of potential nations were determined. By and large, however, such nationalist forces did not set out to subvert the entire socio-economic order, still less the ‘mode of production’. More recently, in contrast, Latin America has witnessed radical and revolutionary movements which repudiate the very legitimacy of the nation-state, which they see as racist, exploitative and neocolonial: the starkest example would be Peru’s Sendero Luminoso. Given the sheer strength of the nation-state dyad, it is difficult to disaggregate the two elements: after all, potential nations who lack states (for example, the Kurds, or the Aymara of Peru and Bolivia) are destined to remain ‘submerged’ nationalities; conversely, most twentieth-century revolutionary movements – and virtually all the Mexican revolutionaries of 1910–40 – assumed that Mexico was a nation and, as such, required a congruent state. (In this respect, as Florencia Mallon points out, they differ from Sendero, which fought against an illicit nation-state in the name of an ‘Andean utopia’.)34 While some Mexican revolutionaries – like Zapata – favoured a relatively weak, decentralized state,35 they did not repudiate the idea of the nation and, to that extent, they took it for granted that the patria needed some protective political carapace.36 So far, I have argued that we should disaggregate hegemonic claims and loyalties according to two analytically distinct – but in practice linked – categories, depicted in the two concentric circles: roughly, the political category/circle (embracing ephemeral administrations, more durable regimes, and yet more durable nation-states); and the socio-economic category/circle, which may be maximally defined as a ‘mode of production’ and, more modestly and usefully, as a ‘socio-economic order’. But hegemony may attach to
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other grand institutions or relationships.37 Like the State, the Church can experience crises of hegemony: somewhat suddenly (as in the Protestant Reformation in sixteenth-century northern Europe); or gradually (the slow erosion of religious attitudes and church attendance in twentieth-century Western Europe). In Catholic countries like Mexico, Church and State have, since the Enlightenment, engaged in a protracted war of positions, sometimes testing their respective hegemonies against each other (for example, Mexico in 1917–40), sometimes coming together in a tight embrace in opposition to third – would-be hegemonic – rivals, such as Communism.38 It is, I think, quite right to dignify this struggle as ‘hegemonic’, since the collective actors – Church and State – are powerful, endowed with ample resources and – sometimes – possessed of starkly contrasting visions. In the Mexican case, as in others, the revolutionary state saw itself as actively engaged in subverting the perverse hegemony of the Church (‘hegemony’ was not the usual term, but closely analogous terms were common currency). In return, the Church sought to subvert the anticlerical state and – in the eyes of Catholic militants at least – set out to build the kingdom of Christ on earth. This was a quintessential battle for hearts and minds or, in other words, a struggle for hegemony. The Church–State confrontation is perhaps the clearest example of such a hegemonic struggle. It overlapped other, less clear-cut, confrontations: between agraristas and landlords, workers and bosses, conservatives and radicals. Taken together, these several struggles were a logical consequence of the revolution, which had toppled the political old regime, undermined the prerevolutionary socio-economic order, and sharply polarized Mexican society. For about a generation (1910–40) politics involved high stakes and profoundly uncertain outcomes: a classic revolutionary/post-revolutionary outcome. It follows from this scenario that hegemony was contested, with several collective actors being involved. By referring to hegemonic ‘contestation’ I mean much more than run-of-the-mill politics, in which the rules of the game are roughly known and observed by most major players and their room for manoeuvre is consequently constricted (that, as I note in conclusion, would more accurately describe post-1940s Mexico).39 While, during 1910–40, there was, as I have said, general acceptance of the Mexican nation-state (that collective identity was, we could say, hegemonically established; Mexico was a patria forjada),40 both the political form of the state and the make-up of the socio-economic order were matters of serious dispute. And these disputes were ‘hegemonic’ in the sense that, in prosecuting them, rival actors – caudillos, caciques, prelates, parish priests, union bosses, teachers, peasant leaders – competed intensely for mass support, putting forward substantially different visions of how Mexico should function. It follows that there was no established hegemony, but rather a hegemonic struggle. Needless to say, this was a shifting struggle, displaying marked variations over time and place. The revolutionary state seemed to triumph here (in the
Hegemony, Counterhegemony and the Mexican Revolution 31
state of Morelos, for example, or on the left bank of the Yaqui River); while the Church carried the day elsewhere (for example, los Altos de Jalisco). The Laguna region became – like the railway union or the Poza Rica section of the oil-workers union – a bastion of radicalism and even Communism, while Chiapas, in contrast, boasted a powerful reactionary landed class, Oaxaca a clutch of conservative local caciques, and Monterrey the cream of Mexico’s industrial bourgeoisie. These major variations were spatial or sectoral; but there were also important shifts over time. So, in the second, more historical part of this chapter, I shall offer a highly schematic resumé of the course of the Revolution and the regime it engendered, relating the story to the notions of hegemony already introduced. We can readily discern three distinct periods: (1) armed revolution (1910– c. 20); (2) revolutionary reform and state-building (c. 1920–c. 40); and (3) revolutionary retreat, ‘routinization’ and bureaucratization (c. 1940–c. 80).41 The Revolution began in 1910 and, like several other revolutions, it took most observers by surprise.42 There was no premonitory phase of febrile tensions and worried diagnoses. True, the lead-up to the 1910 presidential election generated an unusual degree of popular interest and involvement, beginning in 1908–9. But this did not presage social revolution: other Latin American countries turned such tricky corners (for example, Argentina in 1912–16); and many would have agreed with the German diplomat who in 1910 considered ‘general revolution’ to be ‘out of the question’ – ‘as does public opinion and the press’, he added.43 However, when Mexico’s brief political opening was abruptly closed by the government in 1910, it provoked protest and, by 1910–11, armed rebellion. At this point, the scale and depth of popular discontent, hitherto concealed, became starkly apparent. Throughout northern and central Mexico, rebel movements suddenly prospered, enjoying broad public support.44 Alarmed by the intensity of rebellion, riot, land seizures and ‘banditry’, the government came to the negotiating table and, in the hope of preserving as much of the political and socio-economic status quo as possible, sacrificed the ageing president, Porfirio Díaz (a typical – but in this case futile – authoritarian ploy for survival). Two features of this initial revolutionary episode are, for our purposes, noteworthy. First, there is abundant evidence of the old regime’s lack of hegemony (or, if we wish to be bolder, loss of hegemony). Public opinion was broadly revolutionary. The desire for change was widespread. When old regime interests tried to fight back, they found themselves outnumbered and (metaphorically) outgunned: in 1909–10 official efforts to counter the nascent opposition by mounting mass rallies proved abject failures (the old regime lacked both the means and, more important, the masses); and when, a year later, paladins of the past like Chihuahua’s boss Luis Terrazas confronted popular insurgency, they did not dare arm their own peons and retainers for fear the guns would be turned on them.45 Thus, while we have
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no survey data, no focus groups, with which to gauge the popular mood, it seems clear that the old regime lacked hegemony. It did not engage with Mexican society, eliciting loyalty; rather, it rode on top, digging its spurs into a refractory burro, until, finally, the burro bucked and unseated its unloved master. We can, more cautiously, go further and suggest that, over time, the old regime had actually lost hegemony. This is, of course, a tricky argument. It is easier to show – in dramatic circumstances like 1910–11 (or 1917) – that hegemony is lacking. It is another thing to argue for its existence: maybe, as James Scott says, we too readily assume hegemony when what we are seeing is simply the grudging quiescence created by compulsion and disguised by popular dissimulation and elite self-deception.46 However, I think there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the early Díaz regime (1876–c. 90) enjoyed a greater measure of popular support, legitimacy, or hegemony: it was the heir to the patriotic liberal generation of Juárez; it had brought peace and stability after years of upheaval; it had successfully promoted economic growth. From the 1890s, however, the pendulum swung: stability began to look like ossification; growth proved highly regressive; and vigorous caudillos in the prime of life (Diaz was 46 when he took power in 1876) became the elderly, over-weight, out-of-touch politicos who now deferred to a new generation of cosmopolitan technocrats (the ‘cientificos’).47 Luis Terrazas, who had led popular militias against the common Apache enemy back in the 1880s, now became the aged, hugely affluent and deeply unpopular boss of the ruling clique in Chihuahua. The mature Porfirian regime of the 1900s thus increasingly justified its rule – to the extent that it felt the need to justify it at all – in terms of technocratic competence and economic growth. The second notable feature of 1910 is that the opposition successfully deployed a counter-ideology or counterhegemonic claim: roughly, that of patriotic liberalism. The revolutionaries laid claim to the old mantle of Juárez, which the Porfiristas had carelessly shrugged off; where the Porfiristas were elitist, authoritarian, self-regarding and xenophile, the opposition was popular, democratic, disinterested and patriotic. This was not a notably radical counter-ideology; its historical provenance was, we might say, Victorian, mid-nineteenth century in origin.48 It was also pretty vague. But as a mobilizing ideology it was highly effective: first, because – irrespective of its philosophical virtues or consistencies – it exercised a strong historical appeal;49 and, second, because its appeal was broad and unifying – it could bring together the progressive middle classes of the burgeoning cities, the bulk of the infant labour movement, and peasant communities who faced a dual attack on both their material resources (land and water) and their cherished political autonomy. The specific demands of these groups – of the peasants in particular – were sometimes socio-economically radical, but they could be assimilated to the broad cause of popular liberalism, at least for the time being. The Revolution thus depended on specific
Hegemony, Counterhegemony and the Mexican Revolution 33
political and economic grievances – which varied from place to place and sector to sector – but it began under a common popular liberal banner. A final observation on 1910–11: the revolutionary banner had, in a sense, been snatched from the emaciated fingers of the Porfiristas. Popular liberalism had buoyed the early Porfirian regime in the 1870s and ’80s; by the 1900s, the regime found its old images and slogans being turned against it. This pattern, we will note, was repeated some 70 years later, as the (PRI) regime’s rather dog-eared ‘public transcript’50 – a transcript of reform, agrarianism and nationalism – was taken up and proclaimed by the opposition, not least by the Zapatistas of Chiapas. The revolution which began in 1910 continued for nearly a decade. Twice, broad revolutionary coalitions confronted and defeated the forces of the old regime (in 1910–11 and 1913–14). A third bout of civil war (1914–15: the ‘war of the winners’) pitted rival revolutionary factions against each other. By 1917, although violence remained endemic, the basic issue – who would rule Mexico? – was settled and a new reformist constitution had been promulgated. The story of this decade is immensely complicated, not least because of the sheer variety of Mexican revolutionary politics (‘many Mexicos’ meant ‘many revolutions’).51 But, for our immediate purposes, two points deserve emphasis. First, while the gravitational power of popular liberalism helped bring together the broad opposition coalitions of 1910–11 and 1913–14, it was quite incapable of maintaining these disparate coalitions in defiance of strong centripetal forces: those of class, ethnicity, region, generation and personal faction. With its broad, diffuse, emotive appeal, popular liberalism was effective as a ‘counterhegemonic’ ideology, espoused by the successful – but highly diverse – opposition to both Díaz (1910–11) and Huerta (1913–14); but it was much less use as a programme of government, especially of activist revolutionary government. It was an ideology of state contestation, not of state construction. In particular, as I have already suggested, a good many insurgents saw popular liberalism as a means to weaken the central government, to enhance local and provincial autonomy, and to gratify the strong attachment to the patria chica (literally, the ‘little fatherland’) felt by many Mexicans, well-to-do and plebeian alike. Zapata was leery of the central government, which he mistrusted and certainly did not want to appropriate.52 The great popular caudillo of the north, Pancho Villa, though more ambivalent, also displayed a relative indifference to Mexico City and the south; his ambitions were focused on his northern homeland, especially Chihuahua, Durango and the Laguna; and, in contrast to his chief rivals, Carranza and the Sonorans, he did not seem to entertain a hegemonic blueprint for the political takeover and transformation of Mexico. Those rivals, though militarily weaker, possessed such a blueprint: it involved seizing the south (especially Yucatán), allying with organized labour, combating, as they saw it, a hostile and reactionary Church, and adopting a stiff-necked nationalist attitude
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towards the United States and major foreign interests, notably the booming oil companies. While practical circumstances partly dictated these contrasting policies,53 it also seems clear that the Carranza/Sonora faction behaved the way they did because, unlike Villa and (a fortiori) Zapata, they nurtured a vision of a centralized nation-state, with them at the head of it, and rival powers – the church, the provinces, the oil companies – brought to heel.54 Popular liberalism could not form the basis of this ambitious hegemonic project. Even more important – since any hegemonic project demands methods and resources as well as inspirational ideas – the victorious revolutionaries had to set about fostering institutions which would grapple them to Mexican society, a society that was still sharply divided, often suspicious of ‘the centre’, but conveniently war-weary, thus disposed to tolerate the formation of a Tocquevillean new regime. The revolutionaries, in other words, were determined to avoid the fate that had overtaken Díaz: heading a state which lacked social penetration and which, even without knowing it, forfeited its claims to legitimacy/hegemony. They did not want to be bucked off the burro they had so recently mounted. To this end, the revolutionary regime (c. 1920–c. 40) proved creative and quite successful in its forging of new ‘hegemonizing’ institutions: the ejido (the agrarian reform community), which gave the peasants land, on a grand scale, but in return for their clientelist dependence on the state; the labour movement, which also received benefits (union recognition, arbitration, collective contracts, and a range of informal perks), so long as it, too, struck a bargain with the state; the federal school, which brought education – for a time, ‘socialist’ education – to the masses, while inculcating principles of revolutionary nationalism; and the revolutionary party (the PNR, 1929–38; the PRM, 1938–46; and finally, since 1946, the PRI), which pulled together the disparate regional and sectoral components of the winning coalition, placing them under the loose control of a clientelist machine which came to monopolize all major political offices. I am again schematizing a very complex process, which is the subject of intense debate. If we stand back and generalize about the period in question (c. 1920–40), a couple of points emerge. First, the relative success of the revolutionary hegemonic project derived from its incorporation of popular demands and interests. Historians of Mexico have argued at length whether the revolutionary state was a ‘top-down’ imposition on a resentful people, or a genuinely popular regime, dedicated to national well-being and reflecting mass involvement (which was the heroic self-image of the official party). The predictable answer is that it was both, and, again, that the balance varied from time to time and from place to place. Top-down imposition was more evident in, say Jalisco, where anticlerical policies provoked a major Catholic rebellion in 1926; popular engagement and reform can be seen in Morelos in the 1920s or the Laguna in the 1930s, both of which experienced genuine land reform and the partial empowerment of popular leaders.
Hegemony, Counterhegemony and the Mexican Revolution 35
Second, it follows that revolutionary hegemony was patchy: we find some regions (and sectors) marked by popular mobilization and social reform; and others where resentment and resistance are more apparent. Indeed, these contrasting outcomes were two sides of the same coin. A radical land reform – as demanded by the campesinos of Morelos or the Laguna – was bound to offend both rich landlords and some well-to-do rancheros (the ‘peasant bourgeoisie’, as they have been called).55 Allying with organized labour – the Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana (Mexican Regional Workers’ Confederation [CROM]) in the 1920s, the Confederación de Trabajadores de México (Confederation of Mexican Workers [CTM]) in the 1930s – would similarly offend the burgeoning industrial bourgeoisie, especially the powerful ‘Monterrey group’. Promoting secular, ‘socialist’ and (briefly) sex education would inevitably antagonize Catholics, who had their own highly effective counterhegemonic institutions to rely on: the Church hierarchy, the parish system, private schools, the Catholic intelligentsia and a slew of mass Catholic organizations, embracing youth, parents, women, businessmen and some provincial elites. In a context of continued class and ideological polarization – the inevitable backwash of the armed revolution of the 1910s – the choices made by state actors, as they set about their work of reform and reconstruction, were bound to be somewhat divisive. Revolutionary leaders could not please all of the people all of the time. And some leaders – Múgica, Cárdenas, Tejeda, Carrillo Puerto – were genuine radicals, propelled to power by the preceding social upheaval and committed to root-and-branch reform. Of course, many revolutionary leaders also trimmed and compromised; and some threw in their lot with conservative vested interests (notably in the south). We could therefore hazard a kind of hegemonic map of the revolutionary period (1920–40), taking in both regions and sectors; and we could reduce it, highly schematically, to three blocs: (1) those Mexicans who, for reasons of idealism or selfinterest or both,56 positively endorsed the revolutionary state and its works (those, in other words, who actively subscribed and contributed to the hegemonic project); (2) those who were bitterly opposed and who, in some salient cases, had the organizational capacity to mount vigorous opposition (the Catholic Church would be the best example; but the Monterrey group, and big business in general, also counted; these, we might say, could deploy the ‘weapons of the strong’);57 and, in between, (3) a large middle ground occupied by Mexicans who were broadly neutral, who, rather in the manner generically described by James Scott, were suspicious of the state (and often of the church too),58 who regarded politics as a dirty game best avoided, but who were obliged, nonetheless, to reckon with the growing power of the revolutionary state, and who pragmatically, even cynically, adjusted to changing circumstances, looking out for their own and their family’s interests, deploying the well-known ‘weapons of the weak’ (foot-dragging, dissimulation, gossip, black humour).59 The numerous inhabitants of the middle ground did
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not propose a coherent counterhegemony; but they could quite successfully challenge the rival hegemonic projects which were directed at them from both wings, statist and clerical. Thus, we find both the revolutionary state and its arch-rival the Catholic church uttering almost identical complaints: that the Mexican people – workers and peasants in particular – were dirty, feckless, uneducated, superstitious, violent, macho, ill-disciplined, hard to control, and overly fond of drinking, gambling, blood sports, brujería (witchcraft) and casual sex. With apologies, I offer another diagram, which seeks to capture this threefold division of Mexican society: ‘Hegemonic map’ c. 1920–40
<--- ‘hegemonized’ a. revolutionary commitment; popular support and empowerment; ‘bottom-up’ input
middle ground b. indifference, footdragging, ‘weapons of the weak’, popular degeneracy, pragmatism, incoherence
counterhegemony ---> c. rival projects (for example, Catholic, big business); organized opposition; ‘weapons of the strong’
Even as the revolutionary period drew to a close – as the generation who had fought in the revolution died out and their policies ran into the sand – so these divisions remained clear. The 1940 presidential election was famously dirty and violent, involving both outright (‘counterhegemonic’) opposition and a good deal of popular abstention and cynicism (the protest of the middle ground). The decade which followed saw a major transition: cities grew and the countryside languished; a new political generation took power; radical policies lost their lustre; and the World War and Cold War combined to propel Mexico to the right, and into a closer relationship with the United States. By means of both coercion (for example, the forcible purging of the industrial unions) and clientelism (the distribution of favours to both elite and mass beneficiaries), the PRI came to dominate the political system, absorbing into its massive entrails a host of groups and interests who had hitherto remained outside. Meanwhile, some groups were ejected (good taste prevents me from pursuing the metaphor too far): the radical left, some union leaders, militant peasant activists. In other words, the PRI shifted to the right, casting some of the left into limbo, while absorbing erstwhile outsiders, including some business groups and provincial elites.60 The Party could never swallow up the Church, of course, but a cautious modus vivendi was now established between these old antagonists who, while they did not fall into a warm embrace, could at least agree that Communism was a greater common evil. This transition laid the groundwork for the prolonged ‘peace of the PRI’, which endured about a generation (roughly, 1950–80). During these years
Hegemony, Counterhegemony and the Mexican Revolution 37
Mexico experienced stable civilian government and sustained economic growth: a record unusual within contemporary Latin America and evidence, it is usually assumed, of the sustained hegemony or legitimacy of the revolution. It could be argued, however, that Mexican stability, growth and legitimacy/hegemony derived less from the continued implementation of the revolutionary project than its progressive abandonment – some would say, a little histrionically, its ‘betrayal’. During these years the party monopolized political office, engineered the endless election of its candidates, kept organized labour and the peasantry under a loose clientelistic control, and established favourable conditions for business (with low taxes, high tariffs, subsidies and state contracts). Living standards tended to rise (and, until the 1970s, inflation remained low); but inequality increased. This, as leftist critics pointed out, was hardly a revolutionary or even an actively redistributionist political economy.61 It is therefore hard to believe that the stability of the regime and the social order derived from eager popular endorsement of the revolutionary project. Polls – which begin to be of some use by the 1960s – suggest that many Mexicans still valued the goals and aspirations of the Revolution, but few believed that the regime was actively fulfilling them; on the contrary, faith in politicians – and in other state agents, including bureaucrats, official union leaders and the execrated police – was notoriously low.62 Mexicans thus displayed something of a schizoid – but understandably schizoid – political culture: they endorsed revolutionary principles but rejected ‘revolutionary’ políticos. Indeed, it was the extra- and anti-PRI left which, increasingly, took up the old slogans, icons and principles of the Revolution, turning them against a regime which, in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary and therefore of growing scepticism, claimed still to be governing in the name of the Revolution and for the good of all. This increasingly odd situation was finally resolved, after a fashion, in the neoliberal 1980s and ’90s, when, like the Peronists of Argentina, the PRI formally ditched many of its old revolutionary and nationalist credentials, ending the agrarian reform, privatizing state assets and embracing markets, free trade and NAFTA. Now, the anti-PRI left could wave the old banner of the revolution even more vigorously: rebels in Chiapas assumed the iconic name of Zapata; and a new leftist-nationalist party, the PRD, was formed under the leadership of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, son of the great reforming president of the 1930s, Lázaro Cárdenas. If, during its heyday (1950–80), the PRI did not build its hegemony on a faithful fulfilment of the revolutionary project, on what was its hegemony based? For there can be little doubt that, despite recurrent coercion, the PRIísta state did enjoy a measure of hegemony and did not – like the military regimes of South America or the ethnocidal government of Guatemala – rely on extensive, root-and-branch repression. In my view (and there is little by way of conclusive proof), the PRI enjoyed a kind of ‘weak’ or ‘thin’ hegemony, based on effective clientelism and corruption, backed up by
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occasional coercion, on the whole creating an image of permanency which made systematic opposition difficult.63 In other words, the PRI ruled successfully in large measure because viable and attractive alternatives were not on offer; and because sufficient modest benefits were distributed to the mass of Mexicans (these included a measure of civil peace and limited prospects for individual and family advancement); while much juicier benefits were distributed, conditionally and often corruptly, to power-holders within the system. To a degree, therefore, that system became ‘naturalized’. There was no alternative; the dull compulsion of everyday life made most Mexicans settle – quite rationally – for the ‘limited good’ offered by the PRI rather than the hypothetical alternatives proposed by a minority of radical leftists, militant Catholics and quixotic liberals.64 The system held together so long as there were benefits to distribute (in this respect, much of Mexico’s political trajectory is eminently explicable in cold, calculating, material terms: we need not resort to fanciful ideological or discursive explanations. Hegemony, we might say, was a knife-and-fork question).65 The system began to fail when the benefits were cut off by debt crisis, inflation and recession in the 1980s. Ordinary Mexicans now found their livelihoods threatened: over a period of some 20 years real living standards barely improved. Elite Mexicans also found that the PRI was no longer lady bountiful. The private bankers were expropriated in 1982; and the PRI itself split in 1987, when the left within the party realized that they had been supplanted by state-shrinking neoliberal technocrats. What had been key mechanisms of the system – extensive clientelism, collaboration with the private sector, powerful presidentialism and stern party discipline – all began to break down. The breakdown confirmed the secret of previous success which, again, may be depicted diagrammatically: ‘Hegemonic map’ c. 1950–80
<--- ‘hegemonized’ a. residual revolutionary ideals; PRI apparatchiks
middle ground b. clientelist organizations (ejidos, sindicatos); state employees; caciquismo; webs of corruption; electoral fixing; popular pragmatism and cynicism
counterhegemony ---> c. radical left, dissident unions; militant Catholics; dogged liberals
If, in conclusion, we compare the ‘hegemonic maps’ of the two periods under consideration (1910–40 and 1950–80), we note some important changes. In the second map the ‘hegemonized’ bloc (a) has been drained of
Hegemony, Counterhegemony and the Mexican Revolution 39
much of its old popular content; it now consists chiefly of residual official rhetoric and party apparatchiks (comparisons with Eastern Europe would not be wholly fanciful). The ‘dominant ideology’ now seems to perform the role that Abercrombie, Hill and Turner regard as its principal function: to integrate, justify and gladden the hearts of ruling elites.66 In contrast, the counterhegemonic bloc (c) has recruited an increasing number of disillusioned leftists - Communists, dissident unionists, peasant radicals and even some PRIísta defectors – who now invoke the Revolution in opposition to the so-called revolutionary regime.67 They cohabit uneasily with liberals and Catholics who had never been reconciled to the PRI machine. In the middle ground (b), where, at best, a ‘thin hegemony’ prevails, we find a vast population who have little love for the PRI (though they may retain some lingering attachment to unfulfilled revolutionary aspirations), who see active, consistent (‘counterhegemonic’) opposition to the PRI as both futile and risky, and who are snared in sticky webs of clientelism and corruption. Perhaps most striking of all is the huge growth of this middle ground which, we might say, provided the solid foundation of the Pax PRIísta during its heyday. Between c. 1950 and c. 1980 Mexico was much less polarized than it had been in 1910–40. Violence declined; after 1952, presidential elections were anodyne; and the economy grew steadily. (It was against this bland backdrop that the 1968 student massacre came as such a shock.) Charitable observers praised Mexico for its remarkable consensual stability.68 What had happened, as my ‘hegemonic maps’ seek to show, is that the profound battles of the revolutionary period, pitting rival hegemonic projects against each other, had yielded to a more prosaic form of controlled machine politics, which served the interests of the well-to-do (both inside and outside the PRI), while deflating popular expectations and curtailing popular empowerment. A kind of consensus prevailed, but it was an ideologically narrow consensus of elites and businessmen which worked by excluding extremes of both left and right and by subduing – coercively or clientelistically – the rambunctious politics of the revolutionary years.69 If the middle ground of ‘thin hegemony’ afforded the foundation for PRIísta rule, it is not surprising that, with the seismic shifts of the 1980s and ’90s (the debt crisis; chronic inflation; three serious recessions; the 1987–8 schism in the party itself), the ground began to shift and (thin) hegemony finally crumbled. It was not the PRI’s abandonment of the old hegemonic project of the Revolution which brought about its downfall in 2000, for that abandonment had occurred long before.70 Rather, it was its inability to keep middle-ground machine politics – the provision of jobs, land and perks – ticking over. The PRI, nonetheless, lives on, an opposition party with a significant base, but depleted clientelistic resources. The presidency, which since 2000 has been in the hands of the pro-business, pro-Catholic PAN (Partido Acción Nacional) is a shadow of its former PRIísta self, lacking both political cohesion and a solid popular constituency. (Having campaigned long and hard
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against PRI populism and clientelism, the PAN are poorly placed to construct their own versions.) As elsewhere in Latin America, the neoliberal (‘Washington’) consensus of the 1990s has lost some of its lustre and the PRD (Partido de la Revolución Democrática), the chief legatee of the revolutionary nationalist project, may yet win the presidency in 2006. At the time of writing ( July 2005), Mexico lacks a hegemonic party, bloc or project (whether that makes it unusual is another matter). Political competition – much greater now than before 1980 – is largely confined within narrow bounds: enhanced pluralism has not brought enhanced polarization.71 In these respects, Mexico more closely resembles ‘western democracies’ now than in the past. It is not clear, however, whether Mexican democracy is ‘consolidated’ – that is, ‘hegemonic’, invulnerable to contingent crises and upheavals. Some observers, too, would question the hegemony/legitimacy of the Mexican nation-state, which faces the – probably exaggerated – threat of Americanization to the north and the – possibly exaggerated – challenge of Indian/Zapatista protest to the south. What is undoubtedly ‘hegemonic’ – eagerly endorsed by some, grudgingly accepted by many – is the capitalist mode of production; or, more specifically, the highly regressive socio-economic order which Mexican capitalism has perpetuated for over 50 years, under successive governments, projects and regimes.
Notes 1. Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill and Bryan S. Turner, The Dominant Ideology Thesis (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1980), pp. 11–15. 2. David Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 29. 3. Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, The Dominant Ideology Thesis, pp. 31–6, which notes, I think correctly, that some ‘bourgeois’ theorists – such as Weber and Mannheim – are closer to Marxist tradition (in this respect) than often supposed. 4. As I have argued elsewhere, James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), is a persuasive work and a valuable corrective to glib assumptions about subaltern false consciousness, which Mexicanists should take seriously: Alan Knight, ‘Weapons and Arches in the Revolutionary Landscape’, in Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico, edited by Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), pp. 24–54. However, I think Scott goes rather too far in jettisoning more subtle variations on this theme, such as Gramsci’s (see Domination and the Arts of Resistance, pp. 90–1). I discuss this further in n. 63 below. On the historical pervasiveness of inequality, note the – impressionistic but cogent – comments of Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism (Vol. 2) The Wheels of Commerce (New York: Harper and Row, 1982), pp. 466–7. 5. I offer a periodization of Mexico’s short twentieth century later. There is a problem of nomenclature here, which relates to substantial matters of historical interpretation, and which might be summed up by asking: ‘when did the Revolution stop?’ Thus, when should we, as historians, stop using the ‘revolutionary’ label? We may all agree the Revolution began in 1910, but some would see closure occurring as
Hegemony, Counterhegemony and the Mexican Revolution 41
6.
7.
8.
9.
10. 11.
12.
13.
14.
early as 1917 or 1920 (so, what came after was ‘post-revolutionary’); some would favour c. 1940; while the ruling party still claimed ‘revolutionary’ credentials a generation later (although, as its oxymoronic name proclaimed, it was both ‘revolutionary’ and ‘institutional’ at the same time, hence the PRI, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional). Since I incline to the 1940 ‘closure’ view, I am happy to refer to the regime of the 1920s and ’30s as ‘revolutionary’, but I would find it hard to sustain this usage beyond c. 1940; so, for the later decades, ‘revolutionary’ requires inverted commas. On the benefits of ‘deliberate eclectic[ism]’ (what might be called picking theoretical horses for empirical courses), see Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968), pp. 4ff. So, what follows is a historical analysis of Mexico (and a few other places) which deploys Gramscian (and a few other) concepts, without claiming to provide either a textual exegesis of these concepts (there is only one direct citation of Gramsci) or a theoretical unpicking of Gramscian thought. As Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, points out, the absence of upheaval does not necessarily denote hegemony; subaltern compliance may be grudging, fearful and/or pragmatic – informed by hard experience rather than shared consensual values. Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, The Dominant Ideology Thesis, offers similar arguments. On ‘implosion’, see Matei Dogan and John Higley, ‘Elites, Crises and Regimes in Comparative Analysis’, in Elites, Crises and the Origins of Regimes, edited by Matei Dogan and John Higley (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), pp. 10–11. Charles Tilly, European Revolutions, 1492–1992 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 10. The ‘durable alternative’ may take several forms: as I later note, some rather reductionist analyses wish to reserve the label ‘social revolution’ (or suchlike) for rapid transformations of the entire social and political system, even the ‘mode of production’. But this is very high hurdle to clear, and few putative revolutions would make it. For that reason, I lower the bar to ‘socio-economic order’; and I would readily include anticolonial and nationalist revolutions which also spawn ‘durable alternatives’ to the status quo ante. Ultimately, the point of such labels is to advance knowledge and understanding; they are ‘heuristic devices’ which should be judged according to their utility, not their ‘veracity’. Hence there is plenty of scope for reasonable dissent. Stalinism was ferociously repressive, but it also had a solid base of support and did not rule by terror alone: Sheila FitzPatrick, Everyday Stalinism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 224. Perhaps the clearest case of revolution-by-terror (and little else?) would be the Khmer Rouge; although recent revisionist work on Mao seems to point (excessively?) in the same direction: Jung Chang and John Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (London: Cape, 2005). The ‘others’ being chiefly ‘bourgeois’ (or, more cautiously, ‘non-Communist’) revolutions like the French (1789) and the Bolivian (1952). I have developed these comparisons elsewhere: Alan Knight, ‘Revisionism and Revolution: Mexico Compared to England and France’, in Past and Present, 134 (February 1992), pp. 159–99; and ‘The Domestic Dynamics of the Mexican and Bolivian Revolutions’, in Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective, edited by Merilee Grindle and Pilar Domingo (London: ILAS, 2003), pp. 54–90. Here we encounter, among other things, that quaint old villain of yesteryear, Althusser’s ‘Ideological State Apparatus’: Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, The Dominant Ideology Thesis, pp. 23–4.
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15. The choice of verb obviously implies a distinct relationship between regime and socio-economic order or, as some would say, between base and superstructure; in the interests of rigorous eclecticism, I am avoiding commitment to any specific formulation; furthermore, I do not think the argument requires one. 16. Of course, a particularly unpopular, incompetent or abusive administration may provide the proximate cause of a major political upheaval: here we enter a familiar terrain of ‘triggers’, ‘catalysts’ or ‘last-straws-that-break-camels’-backs’ (see, for example, E. J. Hobsbawm, ‘Revolution’, in Revolution in History, edited by Roy Porter and Mikulás Teich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 15–16. But such distinctions involve a hierarchy of causation and proximate causes require powerful ulterior causes if they are to ‘work’. After all, bad administrations are common, major political upheavals quite rare. 17. There is an obvious element of tautology here: ‘consolidated’ democracies are, by definition, those which have survived for some time and weathered crises, thus displaying their ‘consolidation’. Those which collapse reveal, ex post, that they were not really ‘consolidated’, even if – like Uruguay before 1966 – they looked as if they were. Nevertheless, there is an element of durability attached to some democracies which, I suggest, is closely linked to their capacity both to circulate and (sometimes) to censure elites. Conversely, regimes which have fallen victim to major rebellions and revolutions have typically been highly centralized, corrupt and personalistic (in a word, ‘Sultanistic’): Batista in Cuba, Somoza in Nicaragua, the Shah of Iran, for example. 18. I do not dispute the many ‘desirable consequences’ of representative democracy (see Robert A. Dahl, On Democacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 45ff., which includes a useful ten-point list). However, bringing about substantial systemic change is not usually one of them. Democracy often works by preventing worse outcomes (such as wars, famines, civil rights abuses, corruption with impunity). It is a commonplace that no socialist transformation has occurred as a result of the ballot box. When Allende threatened to contradict this commonplace, he was ousted and killed. 19. Albert Speer, who coordinated the German war economy, considered it ‘one of the oddities of the war’ that Hitler ‘demanded far less from his people than Churchill or Roosevelt did’, the explanation being ‘the [Nazi] regime’s anxiety not to risk any shift in popular mood’: Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), p. 214. It should be said that Speer’s views are open to question; and his inclusion of Roosevelt and the US in this comparison is particularly questionable. 20. On the phenomenon of ‘naive monarchism’, see Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, pp. 96–103 (though Scott is, of course, sceptical about it). Eric Van Young, The Other Rebellion: Popular Violence, Ideology and the Mexican Struggle for Independence, 1810–21 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001) offers a (colonial) Mexican version. The phenomenon is not, however, limited to old regime monarchies: for example, a similar ‘dissociative process’ appears to have insulated Hitler from criticism: Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich. A New History (London: Pan Books, 2001), p. 266; Richard Grunberger, A Social History of the Third Reich (Harmondsworh: Penguin, 1974), pp. 41–2. 21. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 10. 22. There are parallels here with Braudel’s famous tripartite scheme of historical change: modes of production, we might say (though Braudel did not), are products of the longue durée; revolutions and regime changes are, more precisely, part
Hegemony, Counterhegemony and the Mexican Revolution 43
23. 24.
25. 26.
27. 28.
29.
30.
31. 32.
of ‘social history, the history of groups’; while lesser political flux – coups, revolts, changes in government – forms part of l’histoire événementielle, ‘a history of brief, rapid, nervous fluctuations’: Fernand Braudel, Ecrits sur l’Histoire (Paris: Flamarrion, 1969), pp. 11–12 (extracted from La Méditerranée et le monde mediterranéen à l’époque de Philippe II). How substantial is substantial? I make a stab at this recurrent conundrum in fn’s 11 and 24. Again, the problem of scale arises: how much political change is required to turn a political revolt or coup into a revolution and how much social change is demanded of a ‘social’ revolution? It is not difficult to come up with reasonable – sounding formulations: see, for example, Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 264 (‘rapid, fundamental and violent domestic change’), and Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 4–5 (‘rapid basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures’). But these definitions merely pad out the problem (how fundamental is fundamental, how rapid is rapid, how basic is basic?). Ultimately, since attempts at rigorous quantification are likely to fail, we have to rely on good judgement and informed intuition. I recognize that my ‘circles’ are in fact oblongs. The presence of ‘[nation]state’ in the left-hand oblong is explained later. Chile would probably be the best example of the state – police, courts, civil service – surviving and functioning through successive regime changes. Elsewhere in Latin America, however, state failure – verging on ‘implosion’ (see n. 9) – has been apparent in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and, most recently, Bolivia. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 156. Jack Lively, The Social and Political Thought of Alexis de Tocqueville (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), pp. 154, 208; Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, pp. 161, 285. The Ukrainian Makhnovschina lasted about four years, much the same as the Anarchist thrust during the Spanish Revolution and Civil War. Zapatismo flourished for a decade before, in the wake of Zapata’s death in 1919, a new leadership came to terms with the central government. Many lesser Mexican rebel movements – which I have termed serrano (literally, ‘highlanders’) – were fundamentally anti-state, but they failed to endure or achieve lasting results: Knight, Mexican Revolution, Vol. 1, pp. 115–27. The question why states are hard to get rid of is rarely asked (is it a silly question?). If we rephrase the question as: ‘what functions do states perform?’ we will, of course, elicit a plethora of answers – Aristotelian, Thomist, Hobbesian, Lockean, Marxist and so on. Some – externalist – explanations would involve the international state system (which may be said to subsume colonialism), which obliges populations to acquire states, like it or not. Internalist explanations would, depending on their provenance, stress peacekeeping, the adjudication of disputes, the protection of property, the defence of class privilege, elite rent-seeking, the provision of economic externalities, making possible ‘the good life’, and complying with reason, providence or the will of God. John Mason Hart, Revolutionary Mexico: The Coming and Process of the Mexican Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), p. 373. There were a few exceptions, perhaps the most striking being the Yaqui Indians of Sonora, who played a major role in the Revolution, but who – in part – repudiated the yori (white/mestizo) nation state and fought for some kind of ethnic autonomy.
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33. The survival of the nation was seen, by some, to be at risk from US intervention; but Mexico’s internal struggles – which were the basic fuel of the Revolution – did not revolve around the question of the nation. Thus, whoever triumphed (Díaz, Madero, Zapata, Huerta, Villa or Carranza), the preservation of the patria remained squarely on the political agenda – as a shared assumption, rather than a source of contention. Leaders often alleged that their rivals were vendepatrias – traitors bent on selling out the country – but this was partisan invective, not proven fact. 34. Florencia E. Mallon, Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 311, 327. 35. On the political beliefs and practice of Zapatismo, see John Womack Jr, Zapata and the Mexican Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), pp. 20, 62, 87, 107–8, 172–3, 195, 204–5, 224ff. 36. Alan Knight, ‘Peasants into Patriots: Thoughts on the Making of the Mexican Nation’, in Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Winter 1994), pp. 135–62, makes a distinction between Mexican patriotism – a basic shared allegiance to the ‘imagined political community’ of the patria – and nationalism, which denotes a more aggressive, ambitious and integrative commitment to nation-building (by means of schools, mass organizations, and the media). It follows that the former is more ‘bottom-up’ and even ‘organic’, the latter more ‘topdown’ and instrumental. The terminology may be disputed, but the distinction, I think, remains useful. Accordingly, Zapata and his ilk were patriots rather than nationalists. Mallon, Peasant and Nation, gives nineteenth-century examples of this divide (though uses different terminology). 37. Again, there must be some criterion of significance, otherwise ‘hegemony’ (like, for example, ‘charisma’) rapidly suffers conceptual debasement. We can certainly speak of the (putative) ‘hegemony’ of the state, the nation, the Catholic Church, Communism, democracy, capitalism and, perhaps, of ‘neoliberalism’ or even consumerism. But to refer – let us say – to the ‘hegemony’ of boy bands, reality TV, Coca-Cola or Manchester United would be unhelpful: first, because these items do not cross the necessary threshold of significance (in terms of scope, longevity and impact); and, second, because they do not, in Gramscian fashion, legitimize or challenge structures of power. There are intermediate cases (for example, Blairism) which, I think, fail on the first criterion but not the second. 38. Franco’s Spain would be a good case of the second scenario. I later note how Mexico has slowly moved from the first towards the second. 39. There is an interesting parallel with early modern England, which also experienced a period of polarization and contestation with the civil war and its aftermath (c. 1640–88), followed by political stabilization, a constriction of ideological options, and the rule of an effective oligarchic ‘machine’ (post-1715). 40. The phrase – a ‘forged fatherland’, i.e., a ‘nation constructed’ – derives from the classic work of Manuel Gamio, Forjando Patria – pro-nacionalismo (Mexico: Porrúa, 1916). 41. There is a final fourth period, post-1980, which, as I briefly mention in conclusion, witnessed the breakdown of the ‘revolutionary’ regime and the onset of political pluralism and alternancia; however, I don’t propose to analyze this new dispensation, which is too recent to permit historical investigation. 42. ‘There have never been greater events . . . better prepared yet less foreseen’: M. W. Patterson, trans., De Tocqueville’s L’Ancien Regime (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), p. 3. 43. Friedrich Katz, The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States and the Mexican Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 3, quoting Karl Bünz.
Hegemony, Counterhegemony and the Mexican Revolution 45 44. 45. 46. 47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55. 56.
Knight, Mexican Revolution, I, chap. 4. Knight, Mexican Revolution, I, pp. 51, 53, 182. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance. The científicos, a small, rich, educated clique, closely associated with foreign business, claimed a ‘scientific’ grasp of society, derived from Comtean positivism; they supplied the intellectual legitimation and financial know-how of the later Porfirian regime. Parallels have been drawn between them and the neoliberal technocrats of the 1990s. There were more radical currents swirling around upstream of the Revolution, notably those which carried forward the Partido Liberal Mexicano (PLM), led by the Flores Magón brothers (hence its alternative label, Magonismo). As its name suggests, the PLM began with an impeccably liberal ideology and programme; but it was soon radicalized by persecution and exile and became a loosely anarchosyndicalist movement, committed to armed insurrection. Its insurrections failed, however, and its appeal remained narrow. Even among the newly organized working class, Magonista influence was quite limited and eclipsed by popular liberalism: see Rodney Anderson, Outcasts in Their Own Land. Mexican Industrial Workers 1906–1911 (Dekalb: University of Illinois Press, 1976). On the nineteenth-century origins and appeal of patriotic liberalism, see Mallon, Peasant and Nation; and Guy P. C. Thomson with David G. LaFrance, Patriotism, Politics and Popular Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Mexico (Wilmington: Del., SR Books, 1999). Scott’s phrase for the official discourse and public stance of regimes, which he contrasts with the ‘hidden transcripts’ – the ‘offstage’ counter-discourses – of subalterns (see Domination and the Arts of Resistance, pp. 2–5). The phrase, which derives from Lesley Byrd Simpson, Many Mexicos, first published 1941 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), has come to denote the mass of local and regional research, from which we derive the image of a much more complex, heterogeneous and fragmented Revolution than was previously assumed. Womack, Zapata, p. 219, describes Zapata’s and the Zapatistas’ diffident and short-lived occupation of Mexico City – during which time, Zapata ‘holed up in a grimy, gloomy little hotel a block away from the railroad station where trains left for Cuautla’, the chief town of his home state. To some extent, the Carrancistas’ power-hungry descent on southern Mexico – as well as their alliance with organized labour – was a reflection of their weakness; Villa, who had a solid base in north-central Mexico and a bigger, apparently better, army, was expected to drive them into the sea; so they had to find resources and recruits wherever they could. It is worth mentioning that the military victory of Carranza – more specifically, Obregón – over Villa in 1915 was not, in my view, the product of these contrasting ‘visions’; Villa was defeated because he lost the crucial battles and he lost the crucial battles because he adopted the wrong tactics. The explanation is military, not political. However, the contrasting visions – roughly, Carrancista centralization versus Villista decentralization – were important in determining what came next; the ‘war of the winners’ therefore mattered and had major implications for Mexico’s political future. Frans J. Schryer, The Rancheros of Pisaflores: The History of a Peasant Bourgeoisie in Twentieth-century Mexico (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1980). It is important to distinguish two contrasting kinds of ‘self-interest’: one was collective, exemplified in, for example, community struggles for land (especially
46
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62. 63.
Alan Knight ejidos – communal land grants); another was individualist (or, perhaps, familial) and involved more particularist quests for ejidal plots, jobs or other perks and positions. In both cases, the Revolution could bring material rewards; but collective struggle was more disinterested and classically ‘revolutionary’ (it involved group solidarity and individual self-sacrifice), while individual and family advancement was more instrumental and self-interested. The former is more significant in the present (1910–40) context; the latter, as I go on to argue, increasingly became the norm in later (post-1950) years. A reversal of Scott’s well-known title/concept (see n. 59), which is propounded in Alan Knight, ‘Cardenismo: Juggernaut or Jalopy?’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 26 (1994), p. 100. By ‘church’ I mean the organized Catholic Church, not the Catholic religion. In fact, a good deal of Mexico’s intense religious life – especially Indian/peasant religious life – was conducted by lay people within communities over which priests exercised rather distant and tenuous authority. Furthermore, clerical attempts to impose authority often met with rebuffs, resistance and evasion. James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). This threefold typology – crudely, the enthusiasts, the neutrals and the opponents – could, of course, be made more complex. A somewhat similar – but fourfold – typology of Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia is provided by Richard Overy, The Dictators: Hitler’s Germany, Stalin’s Russia (London: Penguin Books, 2005), p. 305, which discerns ‘those who believed; those who enjoyed or profited from or were happy to identify with the new order through opportunistic association; those who displayed an apathetic outward compliance, but inwardly sustained an unspoken conscientious objection; and finally those whose intolerance for [sic] the regime . . . manifested itself in forms of dissent, opposition or resistance’. Overy’s second category (‘those who enjoyed’) is, in my version, split between the pro-regime enthusiasts and the middle-ground neutrals; for me, the former are not simply ‘those who believed’, but also those who – out of self-interest and ‘opportunistic association’ – forged close, supportive ties to the regime, irrespective of normative convictions. Of course, the three regimes were different, and ‘belief’ was probably a stronger force in Overy’s two cases than in mine. This major socio-political shift, spanning the 1940s and ’50s, has been only sporadically investigated. The older studies of Mexican politics, written during the regime’s heyday, focused on elites, formal institutions and ‘the centre’, hence they did not penetrate deep enough to grasp it. Occasional local and regional studies have illustrated the regime’s absorption of – and absorption by – provincial elites, businessmen and caciques (bosses). The trend is captured in several of the analyses in Alan Knight and Wil Pansters, eds, Caciquismo: Machine Politics in Twentiethcentury Mexico (London: ISA, 2006). Pablo González Casanova, Democracy in Mexico (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); Roger D. Hansen, The Politics of Mexican Development (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971). Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes in Five Nations (Boston: Little Brown, 1965). ‘Between consent and force’, Gramsci noted, ‘stands corruption/fraud (which is characteristic of certain situations when it is hard to exercise the hegemonic function, and when the use of force is too risky)’: Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell
Hegemony, Counterhegemony and the Mexican Revolution 47 Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), p. 80. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, pp. 72, 74, proposes a ‘thin version of false consciousness’, stressing naturalization (‘the dominant ideology achieves compliance by convincing subordinate groups that the social order in which they live is natural and inevitable’). While such a view, Scott says, is ‘eminently plausible’ and, indeed, has become ‘almost an orthodoxy’ among social scientists (p. 75), he believes it is ‘fundamentally wrong’. The question is complicated and demands careful – hence rather lengthy – consideration. Scott is right to point out that subalterns have frequently rebelled and protested while remaining within the ideological or normative confines of ‘the prevailing social order’ (thus, turning the ‘official transcript’ against their leaders). However, frequent protest is not the problem that ‘hegemonic’ theory, in its different forms, primarily seeks to address; rather, it focuses on frequent passivity. Regarding ‘passive’ situations, Scott concedes that ‘the thin theory of naturalization is far more persuasive [sc. than the ‘fat’ theory of hegemony] because it claims nothing beyond the acceptance of inevitability’; but he then discards the theory because, he says, it wrongly assumes that ‘the absence of actual knowledge of alternative arrangements produces automatically [sic] the naturalization of the present, however hated that present may be’ (p. 80). This is an oddly idealist formulation which places great emphasis on ideational resources and options. (It also skews the argument [1] by needlessly introducing ‘automatically’ and [2] by adding ‘however hated the present might be’, which arguably begs the question). As I see it, bowing to the inevitable and making the best of a bad job does not mean that – in principle – better alternatives are unknown or inconceivable. For most of the last century, millions of Mexicans were fully aware that Americans were much better off than they were; but this did not impel them to rise up against the PRI (in fact, migration and remittances were probably effective safety valves which mitigated social tension and protest). The ‘naturalization’ of PRI rule depended, squarely but not solely, on a sober calculation that securing a radically different and better Mexico (be it American or socialist or Catholic-corporatist) was not feasible and would likely prove counterproductive. Sober calculations were more important than ideational resources. And such calculations were conditioned not simply by the fact or fear of coercion, but also by considerations of jobs, education, land, public works and other state benefits. 64. The ‘limited good’ was a concept developed by anthropologists working in Mexico, who argued that the poor saw life as a zero-sum game, which in turn encouraged subaltern suspicion and anomie rather than solidarity and cooperation: see George Foster, ‘Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good’, American Anthropologist, Vol. 47 (1965), pp. 293–315. While this was no doubt a considerable reification, it did capture some elements of Mexican ‘subaltern’ life which are relevant to the present discussion; furthermore, if we take the ‘limited good’ as a socio-political outcome, rather than some psychological given, we can see how the regime of the PRI often worked to promote division, rivalry and competition, thus making subaltern solidarity and contestation much more difficult. 65. There are possible parallels here with Eastern Europe where ‘from the late 1950s, ideology was no longer the cement – to use Gramsci’s expression – that held these societies together . . . what had developed was “goulash communism” . . . an implicit social pact in which elites offered the prospect of material welfare in exchange for silence . . . (and) the outcome was a society that was highly materialistic, atomized and cynical’: Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, p. 2.
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66. Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, The Dominant Ideology Thesis, p. 3. 67. Compare Poland where, by the 1970s, ‘Communist ideology became a threat to the social order in which it was embodied’: Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, p. 3. 68. Robert E. Scott, Mexican Government in Transition (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964). 69. Sylvia Maxfield, Governing Capital: International Finance and Mexican Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990) is a cogent analysis of the elite alignments which underpinned financial, fiscal and political stability during the heyday of the PRI, c. 1950–80. 70. Compare Vincent T. Gawronski, ‘The Revolution is Dead. Viva la revolución!: The place of the Mexican Revolution in the Era of Globalization’, Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Summer 2002), pp. 366–7, which argues that, for decades, ‘support for the [PRI] system’ rested on ‘ideological foundations and culture’; but that, ‘as globalization bears down heavily on Mexico, the traditional ideological and cultural sources of legitimacy are withering’. 71. The causal relationship bears inspection: it may be that, in Mexico, as elsewhere in Latin America, political pluralism (roughly, democracy – though some would say ‘low-intensity democracy’) has precisely depended on an absence of polarization; democratic politics works so long as there is a narrow consensus and certain policies are off-limits. If the range of debate expands and polarization ensues (compare, for example, in Venezuela), democracy starts to look a lot more fragile. It is true that events is Mexico since the time of writing (summer 2005) have provoked political polarization; although the leftist PRD did not win the presidential election of July 2006, it came very close, amid allegations of fraud, government chicanery and media bias. Despite extensive protests, however, the result stands and representative democracy survives (with all its faults and limitations, to be sure). In light of my final argument, it should be stressed that the enhanced polarization of 2006 had less to do with radically opposed economic projects (the PRD was and is not Chavista) than with flawed and contentious political processes.
2 The Fetishism of Identity: Empire, Nation and the Politics of Subjectivity in Algeria James McDougall
[D]iscourse does not simply express struggles or systems of domination – it is for it, and by it, that one struggles. It is itself the power which has to be seized.1 In the mid-1970s, Ernest Gellner wondered why greater numbers of socialist pilgrims, seeking the ideal revolutionary state, did not make for Algeria, despite the country’s anticolonial heroism, developmental ambition and resonant vision for the unfettered sovereignty and dignity of what could then still optimistically be termed the Third World. After all, the eminent anticommunist observed, ‘the promised land must be somewhere’. He found the answer in the apparently paradoxical centrality of Islam to the Algerian project of liberation.2 In more recent years, a far more real and acutely bitter paradox saw Algerians themselves fleeing their country, desperate to escape the violence and poverty into which everyday life there had descended – and, for many, the atrocious forms since taken both by the political articulation of ‘Islam’, and by its manipulation and repression. The queue of visa applicants winding down the hill from the consular entrance at the French embassy in Algiers is depressingly long and slow moving. An Algerian journalist, living in France, remarked on the anniversary of independence in 2002: ‘Forty years ago, Algerians did not want to have anything to do with France, and now, those who manage to get a visa to live there consider themselves more than lucky.’3 For Algerians, as for many in formerly revolutionary Africa and Asia, the ‘promised land’, in a savage twist of history, has tended to become the ex-colonial metropole.4 To some, of course, especially in France, this state of affairs provokes a sadistic Schadenfreude, while even nominally sympathetic commentators not infrequently relish a posteriori teleological wisdoms which purport to explain the inevitable ‘failure’ of the revolution’s promise and the persistent ‘failure’ of Algeria to transcend its inherited social and cultural divisions and achieve an integrated, holistic ‘identity’, ‘to come into its own’, as if the country’s problems were to be understood as some sort of adolescent crisis of ego. It is a curious feature of 49
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non-Marxist accounts of recent histories of radical politics in Asia and Africa that they so often cleave to one of the most useless features of an obsolete Marxist orthodoxy – treating ‘the Revolution’ as an ideal-typical point in a predetermined theory of developmental stages, and writing it off when it unsurprisingly ‘fails’ to deliver what could never in actuality be expected of it.5 The problem, of course, is precisely that the promised land is nowhere. The story of revolutionary and post-colonial Algeria is one of an endless process of struggle, not of progress towards the resolution of all struggles. If a progressive politics (or historiography) is still possible, it is in recognition of the fact that something other than class, national, racial or gender oppression remains to be overcome and that these subjectivities themselves are problematic even as categories through which resistance is empowered and ‘liberation’ fought for. The diagnosis of (post-) revolutionary struggles in Algeria, and their persistent foreclosure, requires something other than a litany of the failure of idealized schemes of national self-assertion, democratic transition or the utopian Islamic state. Such schemes have themselves tended to reproduce confining categories of subjection and modes of domination. In light of this, what is needed is an empirical investigation of the mechanisms of the production and appropriation of symbolic power within Algerian society, and the ways that these have prevented a more liveable, coexistent pluralism consonant with the inescapable plurality of Algerian histories, cultures and selfhoods, and open to a freer negotiation of possible futures. Such an opening of the political field might be ‘counterhegemonic’ in an ultimate sense of forcing an indefinite suspension of the monopolization of authority in the name of any singular social ‘truth’. What Algeria’s history has actually produced, though, has been counterhegemonic attempts on power in the more restricted sense of a series of exclusivist moves to hegemonize the symbolic goods of social truth from within, and against, a dominant system. At the end of the colonial period, the emergence of nationalism in colonial society’s cultural and political fields established an ultimately successful counter-order (or counterhegemony in this restricted sense). Since independence, the nationalist symbolic order has in turn become subject to challenges framed in its own terms, but these have been unable to establish successful alternative orders (whether in democratic pluralism or a substitute authoritarianism), let alone achieve the further counterhegemonic move of pluralizing the political field beyond the grasp of any one claimant. Central to this dynamic has been a certain logic of the production and appropriation of social power which might usefully, if only metaphorically, be grasped as a kind of ‘commodification’, and fetishism, of identity. It is this logic that this chapter seeks to discern. Algeria’s revolution did not ‘fail’. It succeeded, against overwhelming odds, in achieving its aim – the establishment of its independent state – and while it thereafter remained unfinished, the potentialities opened up by its
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rupturing of political order and social hierarchy being catastrophically unrealized, this cannot be equated with ‘failure’ except through a misrecognition of the nature of the revolution itself. Algeria’s revolution was the necessary establishment of a counter-order (that is, a parallel, and then a successor, disciplinary apparatus) to the specific form of colonialism out of which it grew. That the war of 1954–62 and the massive social mobilization and upheaval it occasioned did not simply result in the erasure of antagonism and the institution of freedom in equality is entirely unsurprising. More significant is what it did produce – an overturning of the colonial order and the institution of a new one, among whose immediate results was the decisive amputation of a whole realm of possibilities from the rapidly restructured social and political order that emerged from the unstable revolutionary moment. This foreclosure did not come about because ‘true’ modernization and liberation could not be achieved through a project conditioned, in part, by the persistence of Islam as the basic cultural code underpinning solidarity and legitimacy, as if the recourse to religion were the fatal flaw in the process, an unmodern vestige which nationalism failed to dislodge (or a deviation of the emancipatory struggle into a persistently archaising ‘false consciousness’). The limits of revolutionary freedom, and the actual process of its limitation, arise not from the elements of the project themselves – the relative proportions of its contents which would be somehow in themselves ‘progressive’ or ‘regressive’ – but from the relation in which they are constituted. The actuality of the revolution itself was what foreclosed its own unrealized potentialities, not through the working-out of a structural logic of ‘traditionversus-modernity’, but through the particular contingencies of a ‘hegemonic rearticulation’.6 To understand the revolution in Algeria, its emergence and its aftermath, the ways in which both empire and nation have been constituted, and the impasse of identity politics into which subsequent social struggles have fallen, we have to abondon every scheme of a determining structure of the social and its historical transformation – whether as the self-manifestation of a ‘people-class’, the ‘origins and development of a nation’7 or ‘the revolution that failed’. Instead, we might examine a series of political moments in which relations of power constituting the social field coalesce around contingent ‘nodal’ or ‘condensation points’ (or ‘quilting points’, to use Zizek’s translation of Lacan’s point de capiton), and at which particular forms of political subjectivity are produced, materialised, and appropriated. It is through the dynamics of this hegemonic conflict that particular conceptions of ‘ourselves’ emerged, not in absolute opposition to, but out of, the confining categories of objectified otherness, whose repressive and divisive force was thereby simultaneously subverted and preserved in the emergent, emancipatory and already authoritarian order of nationalism. It is in this process, too, that the ground was laid for an ultimately selfdestroying pattern of contest through the idioms of later identitarian ˆ ˆ
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demands – none of whose eventualities, of course, were determined in the struggles of anticolonialism, but whose conditions of possibility were being established even as the first spokesmen for ‘the nation’ were demanding that they be heard.
Ourselves out of others The analysis proposed here, then, operates on the level of discourse and symbolic order, but this ought not to be taken as a focus on the ‘ideal’ as against the ‘material’. It should be clear that it is the materiality, the effective force in praxis, of discursive formations that makes the notion of discourse itself interesting and useful. The return to political economy and ‘hard surfaces’ now demanded by critics of the less heuristic aspects of poststructuralism ought to have the decidedly salutary effect of regrounding analysis of the operations of discourse in the ‘real social life’ of production, appropriation, domination and struggle, but this should not mean a return to mechanically ‘sociologistic’ conceptions of the social. To articulate a historical analysis at the level of the symbolic is not to ignore ‘the real’, but to seek to apprehend the more elusive aspects of its constitution, the semiotic processes of the establishment and maintenance of systems of power, and the construction of legal codes, behavioural norms, ‘common-sense’ orthodoxies and internalized patterns of self-censorship through the symbolic structures which regulate apprehension of the world and the possibilities of action in it. Perhaps the most durably significant mechanism of imperial order in this regard was the legal foundation of the social and political division of privilege on which the entire colonial edifice was founded, and which lay in the basic terms of categorization of the population. It was in the citizenship and ‘personal status’ laws (code du statut personnel) which governed the legal position of different population groups that colonial rule was, at its most basic level, established. By a decree of 14 July 1865, the indigenous Jewish and Muslim population of Algeria was declared to be French in nationality, but not in citizenship.8 Instead of the rights and duties of citizenship (fundamentally expressed in the jurisdiction of French civil and criminal law), Jews and Muslims of Algeria continued to be governed, in civil matters, by their own religious codes, according to the engagements given by the generals of the conquest to respect religion, property and trade (and later, in addition, tradition, customs and law). Jews and Muslims as such, and not merely as ‘natives’, thereby found themselves members of a post-Ottoman, colonial millet of a decidedly modern type. In its historically specific form of conceptualizing the world and ordering society, French colonialism reconstituted these communities in carefully objectified categories, ‘French’ by ‘nationality’ – since ‘Algeria’ was simply another part of France – but, since governed by a special civil code, un-French in civic status.
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The exceptions made to this ‘un-Frenchness’, as well as the specific ‘privileges’ (in the strict sense of the word) applied through it, illustrate the way the statut had come to operate by the time of the First World War. First of all, the Jewish community, the competencies of whose rabbinical courts had already been reduced to virtually nothing, was granted citizenship en masse by a decree (known as the décret Crémieux) of 24 October 1870. Algeria’s Jews thereafter came to identify themselves as French, just as the colony’s Spanish, Maltese or Italian immigrants did, such that they would eventually (despite the rabid anti-Semitism widespread among the colonial population, as in the metropole, in the late nineteenth century, and the temporary stripping of their citizenship under Vichy) form a significant part of the peuple pied noir which found itself ‘repatriated’ into exile at the end of the war of independence. It was thus Islam, and the nominal sovereignty of Islamic law in civil matters, which thereafter remained the principle dividing ‘subject’ from ‘citizen’ in colonial Algeria. On the one hand, by 1914, Algeria’s ‘Muslim Frenchmen’ (Français musulmans) were eligible for conscription – for the duty of male citizens to die in defence of the republic. On the other, they were also subject to a massive system of special repressive legislation (the indigénat, instituted as a temporary ad hoc measure in 1881 and surviving until 1944) which took the place of French (and, of course, Islamic) criminal law in the regulation of the life of the Algerian Muslim community. On the clearly defined and easily policed category of indigène musulman (as the Français musulman became by quotidian slippage) was thus founded every procedure of discrimination, from inequality of salary to exclusion from the franchise and susceptibility to the draconian special legislation (lois d’exception constituting as crimes a vast array of activities not ordinarily criminalized under the standard penal code) from which Algerians suffered and which constituted their experience as colonized subjects, excluded, by a subtly half-measured inclusion, from la cité française.9 The issue of reforming the status of Algerians in the post-1918 period was articulated around the question of the right to full citizenship, and whether this citizenship could be accorded dans le statut, that is to a person of Muslim ‘personal status’. Under the terms of the 1865 act, most Muslim Algerians could not accede to full citizenship – that is full electoral enfranchisement, civic rights and escape from the indigénat – except by abandoning their ‘Muslim personal status’, that is, their subjection to Islamic law in civil matters. In a society where the colonial presence made this one remaining shred of autonomy the last redoubt of an Islamic communal self-identification, this was, of course, something the vast majority would never do.10 Thus, after the failed attempts at the physical cantonnement – restriction to reservations – of the indigenous population in the nineteenth century, the repressive device of the statut personnel served as an effective means of judicial cantonnement through the first half of the twentieth century.
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The statut personnel was thus the site in which the colonial oppression of Algerian Muslims was organized and exercised. At the same time, it was the key symbolic space of community cohesion – a strictly sacred space whose limits marked the boundary between apostasy and belonging. Although it was perhaps never intended by the lawyers who drafted it as so diabolical a device (here, as elsewhere, one has the strong impression that colonial legislators had little idea what they were actually doing), the colonized’s status of oppression in Algeria was legislated into existence in the very space from which the colonized not only could not, but would not, escape. This doubling of the category at the heart of colonial politics is the key to the dynamics of the interwar period. The statut was the key pretext for the exclusion of the majority population from that social and political ‘emancipation’ which France claimed to bring, but resolutely refused to deliver, and which Algerian spokesmen up to the mid-1940s continued to demand.11 The notion of ‘assimilation’ has served in the historiography of Algeria as a slogan, a fiction and a myth (in the sense of a structuring narrative), from both colonialist and nationalist points of view and, more particularly, for those spokesmen for colonized Algeria who fit neatly into neither scheme. From 1912 to 1936, sons of the Algerian notability, parsimoniously admitted to French schooling and the liberal professions, sought to engage the colonial system on its own terrain and in its own terms, staking everything on the supposition that, given sufficient pressure and with a little clarity of vision, the myth of France’s generous civilizing mission could be materialized in the political emancipation and socio-economic empowerment of their ‘miserable and backward’ compatriots. Having perfectly internalized the imperial vision – or rather, the unselfconsciously sincere humanism of a system which failed to perceive its own thoroughgoing and brutal cynicism12 – the so-called évolués of the Young Algerian movement argued tirelessly in newsprint, on election platforms and in the National Assembly itself that the only imaginable resolution of the unbearable contradictions of colonialism must be found in enfranchisement and partnership.13 The ‘assimilation’ they desired, however, had never, even in its moment as ‘policy’,14 served the declared purpose which they wished to see it actually fulfil. It was to be, at most, a pressure valve to siphon off the potentially dissatisfied ‘native élite’ while keeping the terrifying mass of the ‘semicivilized’/‘semibarbaric’ in a safely suppressed and permanent state of exclusion. Those who refused to be co-opted and who insisted, instead, in the name of the Republican trinity (liberté, égalité, fraternité) that Algeria’s indigenous workers and peasants, too, must now be made into Frenchmen alongside the others, found themselves inexplicably labelled as ‘nationalists’ and were ultimately harried by the system they sought to reform into the ranks of those whose project – the recourse to arms and the systematic violence of a necessarily long and terrible armed struggle – had been precisely what they had long sought to avoid.
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The ‘ulama, the army and the nationalist symbolic order The failure of the ‘assimilationist’15 project occurred concurrently with a shift which was simultaneously political and linguistic in the terms of the debate. While the argument raged around the unbreakable kernel of the statut personnel musulman, a metamorphosis occurred in the category itself, turning it from an inflexible instrument of politico-legal repression into an irreducible principle of religio-cultural resistance, in its Arabic rendering al-shakhsiyya ’l-islamiyya, ‘Islamic personality.’ It is important to note, here, that I am not – of course – supposing that it was this colonially imposed categorizing that made Algerians recognize themselves in Islam, any more than it was the exploitation of the religious criterion by the imperial order that ‘made’ Algerians Muslims. The significance of the category established in the statut personnel – the collective condensation symbol for all Algerians’ colonized subject status – resided in its institutionalization as a category, as a ‘nodal point’, a single master-signifier which, in the magical-rational way of modern classificatory operations, reduced the actual, historical heterogeneity of everything that might be called ‘Islam’ in Algeria to a single, rigid and defining term, ‘the Islamic personality.’ A newly formed political category – ‘Algerian identity’ – was thus condensed in this one symbolic space; we might almost say, in this single symbolic commodity, or even, commodity-fetish, the dry product of jurisprudential labour ‘changed into something transcendent’,16 a contingent social relation between people expressed as a necessary relation between ‘things’: the reified gods of ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’, ‘civilization’ and (precisely) ‘Barbary’. As well as instituting a repressive category consigning millions of people to subject status in an untrammelled police state, however, this move also implied a new cultural-political subjectivation. It unwittingly enabled a fundamentally novel form of cultural authority within colonized Algerian society, one that did not simply found itself on the accumulation of cultural capital (scriptural and/or charismatic) within a highly diversified and decentralized religious field (regional seats of learning, individual ‘poles’ of sanctity, locally embedded sites and lineages of veneration, multiple turuq17 and mobile tolba18 whose connections and itineraries ranged across the Islamic world) but which established a new kind of centre within the field. This centre was a space which could be occupied and from which the whole religiocultural field could be reordered; a commodity which could be appropriated and relative to which the other symbolic products of the field itself – the pedagogy of kuttab and zawiya, the practices of talib and mrabit19 – could be judged and classified as ‘orthodox’ or ‘heretical’. Not, again, that such conflicts over the ‘truth’ of religion were themselves new; disputation over the legitimacy of doxa and praxis was the stuff of Islamic as of every other religious history from its inception, from the arcane sciences of isnad criticism,
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through the illuminary warfare of the Maghrib’s Almoravids and Almohads to the rigorist zealotry of peninsular Wahhabism. What is new in colonialism and the islah (modernist ‘reform’) of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is the way in which, in this new symbolic order, it became possible to think, enunciate and practice ‘orthodoxy’ such that its position as ‘the true Islam’ was not simply one of the historically temporary ascendancy of one element among other, relatively equal, elements in a constantly fluid relationship, but represented a fundamental hierarchical restructuring of the field such that a particular formulation of ‘Islam’ could be codified and (precisely as a commodity-fetish) abstracted from the real historical contingency of its manufacture, and thus establish itself not simply as a momentary and fleeting ‘glimpse’ of absolute orthodoxy, that of a historically specific movement embodied in an eschatological mahdi or mawl al-sa‘a (a redeemerfigure, frequently occurring in the millenarian anticolonial revolts of the nineteenth century) but as orthodoxy itself, firmly grounded in temporal continuity and the institutions of this world, as ‘the Islamic personality’. Moreover, it could be durably institutionalized as such, its competitors disqualified and consigned to an equally durable status of ‘archaism’, ‘magic’ or ‘superstition’ from which they would have the greatest difficulty in recovering. (Again, this is not to say that further shifts in the field are impossible, but to highlight the newly powerful form of hierarchy which comes to govern it.) The Islamic modernist movement in Algeria, beginning at the end of the nineteenth century and institutionally established from the mid-1920s with the appearance of al-Muntaqid, ‘Abd al-Hamid ben Badis’ first press mouthpiece, and then in the Association of Algerian Muslim ‘ulama (AUMA) from 1931 onwards, effectively appropriated to itself this new commodity of ‘Islamic personality’ and thus placed itself in a position of considerable social power relative to the other social and political forces of Algerian society.20 While initially pursuing the Young Algerians’ goal of ‘loyal partnership’ with the metropolitan power, by the mid-1940s the ‘ulama had come to see the problem of religious reform and renewal with which they were most concerned as irresolvable except in the broader context of the political question of independence. Caught short in their own, gradualist project by the National Liberation Front’s (FLN’s) unforeseen declaration of war, the Islamic reformists, like the francophone electoralist inheritors of the ‘assimilationist’ position, were eventually obliged to take their place in the ranks of the unifying revolution, whose leaders and foot soldiers had already largely absorbed their vision of a single, authoritative national culture of Islam and Arabism, even if their (as yet undecided) political projects were principally concerned with quite other matters.21 The production of an authoritative doctrine of national identity in the space of subjection established by imperial order was thus a significant aspect of the gradual autonomization of Algerian national, political and
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cultural fields from those of French Algeria. In an elementary sense, of course, this is entirely unsurprising: ‘all or nearly all initiatives … even when they take on manifestly alternative or oppositional forms, are in practice tied to the hegemonic … the dominant culture, so to say, at once produces and limits its own forms of counter-culture.’22 The discourse of the colonizer, in imposing itself so brutally as the only possible language of the space and the people appropriated into the ‘possessions’ of colonialism, had to become, not only an aspect (and again, even less the mere expression) of the system, but itself the very power by which, and for which, the colonized would struggle; the power to reconstitute the social which had to be seized. This is not to say that the colonized had ‘nothing left to imagine’,23 but that their new-formed imaginaries were necessarily bound up in conditions not of their own choosing. Furthermore, as the production of a particular kind of meaning with which the (new) social world was to be endowed, such self-definition was an act not simply of the emancipatory self-expression of the colonized community, but already an exercise of power over the terms of that self-expression – an attempt, indeed, to determine and dominate the terms in which that ‘self’, the collective subject of national liberation, might conceive of, and express, its self. This emergence of a counterhegemonic nationalist order from within the structures of the empire, through a long process of contest in which the mechanisms of imperial order themselves became ‘the seat and the stake’24 of hegemonic conflict, had, however, still to be realized in full through the prosecution of a war. Not that this ‘identity demand’ was itself the object of the armed struggle, except in the limited sense that the practical political agenda of establishing a sovereign national state had to be understood as the goal of ‘the people’ whose expression the state would (supposedly) be, and it was the ‘ulama who had effectively asserted how ‘the people’ were to be defined. Recognition of this was expressed in the FLN’s founding statement of war aims, in the assertion that the goals of the struggle included ‘the realization of Maghribi unity in its natural Arab and Muslim context’. In the expression of the revolution in its heartland, the countryside, the mobilizing discipline of a rigorous Islam and the communal solidarity that went with it (though built on solid foundations of local social mores developed more out of generations of penury and strict village ethics than from reformist Islamic thought per se) were important idiomatic aspects of the way in which Algerians understood and experienced the struggle. The intentions of the revolutionaries from the outset, however, had little to do with any metaphysical or psychological ‘recovery of selfhood’ and everything to do with the entirely pragmatic political project of state-building, and the war engaged to achieve this end brought with it its own unpredictable and ungovernable vicissitudes. Through the seven long, bitter and fratricidal years of the war, the counter-state established by the FLN and the military hierarchy which came
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to dominate it wove their own, deeply fissured, secretive, conspiratorial and factional history, and the establishment of that state as sovereign in 1962 divided the spoils accordingly. It was the investment of the ‘ulama in, their claimed authority over, the crucial discursive resources of history and culture that gave them their symbolic strength relative to their rivals who lacked the cultural capital to claim this space as their own domain. Their ideological structure objectifying ‘the people’ was central to the functioning of the post-colonial order, dominated and directed by a purely military power-élite whose rule rested on their carrying the gun (against the French in the maquis and against their brother-rivals both there and elsewhere) and on dense networks of personal loyalties, but whose position and decisions had to be legitimized by a set of values and a historical narrative attributed to, and serving to interpret, the revolution, its state and their people. Having served an essentially instrumental and mobilizing, rather than foundational and programmatic, role in the prosecution of the war of liberation, the ideology of the ‘ulama was assigned a subordinate, but nonetheless significant, role in the division of labour and privilege after 1962. The reformist ‘ulama of the colonial period had seen their mission as cultural and pedagogical, and it was in these activities that they most conscientiously invested their efforts. At independence, of course, their mission (like that of the infrastructure of the zawiya which had preceded and, for a time, competed with them), to provide instruction in the two essential disciplines of the Arabic language and the Islamic religion, was taken over by the institutions of the state’s ministries of National Education and Religious Affairs. There were struggles over this: at first a limited autonomy was granted to the surviving elements of the pre-independence educational system (the ‘free schools’) which the AUMA had painstakingly constructed from the early 1930s through the mid-1950s, and some establishments were run under the ‘Original Education’ wing of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which was initially constituted with such ta‘lim asli as part of its nomenclature and prerogatives. These remnants, however, were absorbed into the Ministry of National Education by decree in 1977.25 There nevertheless remained a considerable degree of influence, diffused through these same institutions or embodied in particular figures (most notably Ahmad Taleb Ibrahimi, son of the AUMA’s second and last President and an influential Minister of both Education and Culture) whose effect was such that ‘after independence, the vision of the ‘ulama served to “nationalise” Algerians’.26 But rather than pursuing the construction of an open, plural, culturalpolitical space founded on the country’s diverse historical inheritances and allowing the expression of its multiple contemporary creativities, a single, authoritative vision of ‘the national personality’, as the complement in the cultural sphere to the authoritarian monolithism of the military-security state, restricted ‘legitimate’ culture to the purview of that confining category over which the ‘ulama had struggled so hard to assert their control.27
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By accepting their place in the state and becoming its salaried functionaries, in return for the franchise on the language, cultural, family and educational policies which most concerned them, the ‘ulama achieved a limited success for their project, now transmitted through the apparatus of the state, whose constitution and, later, nationality and family laws, enshrined their vision of what ‘Algerian’ meant.28 They also, however, thereby gave up any possibility of creating in independent Algeria an autonomous, depoliticized religio-cultural field, one in which the country’s various potential modes and mechanisms of ‘self’-expression could flourish, and within which their own role as ‘ulama – as those whose responsibility, among all the other forces of the social body and independently of its ruling powers, of al-amr bi’l-ma‘ruf wa ’l-nahy ‘an al-munkar (to ‘enjoin good and forbid ill’) – could finally be recovered. Instead of freeing up the cultural domain for the recomposition of expression of civil society, then, they reproduced the colonial regime of power within which a strictly demarcated and politically invested cultural doctrine served as a controlling instrument of state. And like the colonial order before it, the nationalist system was unable to prevent its categorical modes of subjection from being turned into the means of further struggle. In each of its central components – language and religion – and again, precisely because of the authoritarian assertion of a single, dominant definition permitting of no legitimate contest outside its own limits, the postcolonial symbolic order of national selfhood proved vulnerable to unforeseen reappropriation and contest, in the former case by reaction against the perceived excess and exclusivity of the system, in the latter by a magnification and exorbitation of the system’s own professed values against its apparent compromise of them.
Politics of culture and virtue The most significant challenges to the postcolonial order in the 1980s and 1990s came from Berberism and Islamism, the estranged twin responses to the authoritarian monism of the cultural and political order of nationalism. Each has posed, and has been (mis)understood by outside observers, as an inevitable ‘resurgence of the repressed’, asserting underlying truths of Algerian selfhood. But again, rather than manifesting the irrepressible upsurge of ‘primordial identities’, the formulation of new phases of the postcolonial hegemonic conflict that would ultimately, in 1992, break down into outright warfare has to be viewed as the resubjectivation of actors within a political field structured by the symbolic order of nationalism. The inheritance of a founding myth of redemptive violence, the social veneration of the revolutionary martyrs, and the symbolic artefacts of ‘Algerian identity’ are at once more subtle and more tangible factors in the country’s recent history than are notions of some Arab-Islamic or Berber ‘bedrock’ of Algerian selfhood. Each movement ought, then, to be examined in this light.
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The question of the relationship of Kabylia (the mountainous, Berberophone region that has been the centre of Amazigh self-assertion) to the central state, and the language question more broadly, which is bound up in, but not coterminous with, the Kabyle issue, have often been sublimated in accounts by outside observers, and actors from the region, and especially through the activism of the Kabyle diaspora, into an overarching ‘Berber question’, conceived of as an ethnic minority issue analogous to that of Armenians or Kurds in the Middle East. This, in historical terms, is a formulation of somewhat dubious value – although it does now seem that the issue has become ethnicized by the persistence of the conflict, particularly since 1980.29 Rather, the Kabyle issue has been constituted of a syndrome of factors of revolt which have crystallized around, and found both the opportunity and the idiom for their expression in the question of linguistic and cultural ‘recognition’. This demand for cultural or ‘identity’ recognition has served above all as a sublimation, and particularist local expression, of a more basic and widespread demand for political recognition, as citizens30 whose due dignity has been consistently denied them by a state which, in all its aspects, is seen to express only hogra/thamheqranith (disdain, contempt) for the people by whom and for whom it claims to exist.31 The first instantiation of a ‘Berber question’ in Algerian nationalism was of precisely this kind – the ‘Berberist crisis’ of 1949, which caused a major internal conflict and purge in the revolutionary populist party, the PPAMTLD,32 was initiated by a dispute over antidemocratic practices in the party leadership; the argument was translated through the issue of the party’s territorial organization into that of cultural pluralism and the alleged ‘ethnic divisiveness’ of the leadership’s opponents (who happened to be Kabyles).33 The 1949 crisis, one of many taboo subjects in Algerian history until relatively recently, ultimately contributed to the long history of Kabylia as a restive fronde in independent Algeria. This history, persistently misrepresented as an ‘ethnic’ struggle, or, in terms more directly derived from a colonial mythology still current in some French circles, especially common in the French media, and not infrequently reiterated by Kabyle activists themselves, as an age-old contest of ‘democratic, secularrepublican’ Kabyles against ‘despotic, fundamentalist-theocratic’ Arabs, is a notable example of the capacity of political struggles actively to engage in the production of symbols which, translating their causes and demands into culturally specific terms, both misrepresent the underlying dynamics of the struggle itself and contribute to new (and more aggravated) forms of conflict which begin to operate in the terms of the original misrepresentation. Subsequent episodes of the story have all followed a similar logic, from the insurrection of Hocine Aït Ahmed, Mohand Ou El Haj and the FFS in 1963–434 (which began as a revolt against the establishment of authoritarianism and over access to power-sharing but, through its particular opposition to the strident Arabism of President Ben Bella, became identified as a
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specifically Kabyle and ‘Berberist’ dissidence) through the ‘Berber Spring’ of 1980 (a student strike and protest against the state’s crass heavy-handedness, which spread throughout the country and marked the first real challenge to the system, but whose main outcome was a specifically culturalist Berber movement and which is now memorialized as a Berber uprising and annually celebrated as thafsut imazighen),35 to the ‘printemps noir’ of 200136 and the long-running, sporadically violent, crisis that followed (and which remained basically unresolved, if, on the whole, exhausted, into the mid2000s). Deprived of the political space, language or institutional means to advance an integrated critique of the state system and a thoroughgoing project for its reformulation, contest has centred on the sphere of culture.37 The apparent centrality of cultural aspects of the struggle – the symbolic acts and slogans most visibly adopted, such as the effacing of the Arabic portion of road-signs with black spray-paint, the Amazigh flag and banners in tifinagh (the ancient Berber alphabet) and/or French carried in demonstrations – and the cultural means and moments of expression, in particular through music,38 have served to limit, more effectively than the state alone ever could, the appeal of the movement beyond Kabylia and the Kabyle diaspora when, in fact, it was founded on, and has also articulated, more general demands concerning the relation of state to society with which all Algerians would most likely agree (the end of hogra and the democratization of the system). So much has this become true that, while Kabyle activists insist, vociferously and above all else, that their demands are made as Algerians and are those of all Algerians, it is perfectly commonplace to find other Algerians who are convinced that ‘the Kabyles do not consider themselves as Algerians’39 and who identify the Kabyle ‘mouvement citoyen’ as ethnic divisiveness and potential secessionism. It seems likely that the recently-created fringe minority movement in Kabylia and (perhaps especially) in the diaspora which, having most thoroughly internalized and reproduced the ethnicization of the Kabyle struggle, now demands regional autonomy, is taken much more seriously by non-Kabyle Algerians than it is by Kabyles themselves.40 The expression of Kabylia’s protests as a politics of identity has arguably been the greatest factor both limiting their impact on Algeria as a whole and contributing to the internal dissipation of their energies. The inability of the protest movement in 2001, which for a while looked as if it might spread significantly beyond Kabylia itself, effectively to mobilize opinion and activism elsewhere in the country, and the swiftness with which the state, the media and other regions in fact marked the troubles down as expressions of Kabyle particularism, demonstrates both the self-defeating limitations of the movement’s self-expression in primarily cultural terms, and the tenacity with which the postcolonial system has confined conflicts to this sphere, and has kept them from overwhelming the political domain itself.
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The second contest faced by the nationalist order, however, came much closer to doing so, although it is now becoming possible to see just how limited was Islamism’s real political challenge, to what extent it has failed in its stated aspiration to overcome the ‘corrupt’ postcolonial system and has in fact served its perpetuation. It did, of course, seem at the end of the 1980s and through the middle of the 1990s that Algerian Islamism really threatened (or promised, as one will) entirely to submerge the cultural field and to sweep victoriously into political power. The Islamist reading of events since 1962 was in a sense the obverse complement of that of Berberism – that the FLN’s state had indeed failed to deliver the ‘true’ goals of the revolution, but that these, rather than the cultural plurality and democracy advocated through the idioms of diversity expressed in Kabylia’s movements, had in fact been the establishment of an ‘authentic’ Islamic social order. This, the true expression of Algeria’s historic and cultural personality, had been abandoned by the ‘ulama (unworthy successors of Ben Badis, who was reimagined in official history as the spiritual father of the revolution) who had allowed themselves to be bought off by the state, traduced by the ‘atheistic socialism’ of President Boumedienne’s development project and undermined by the alienating presence of ‘deformed’, denaturalized francophone intellectuals who ‘corrupted Algeria’s youth’ and threatened the return of colonialist power in the most intimate realm of the nation – its cultural, religious and family life. This misperception of the revolution and the staking of a claim to its inheritance in place of the ‘thieves’ in the power structure was, like the Berberist alternative, an oppositional strategy firmly embedded in, and derived from, the dominant ideological structures of the nationalist order (in the narrative of national history, the symbolism of the paternity of the revolution, the ownership of its mission and the authority to interpret its meaning; above all, in the claim to authority over the cultural definition of ‘Algeria’ and ‘Algerians’ and the political expression of this definition in a new social order). An exorbitation of the revolutionary FLN’s own discourse, the Islamist vision was carried in embryo within the nationalist order. Islamism was enabled as a form of competition for a better place in the division of privilege (for disadvantaged arabophone graduates, conservative petits bourgeois, unemployed and frustrated young men – and women – ideological illuminaries, Egyptian ikhwangi or Afghan anti-Soviet jihadi sympathizers) by the very failure of the ‘ulama-in-the-state to re-establish a religious field as part of a necessarily plural civil sphere beyond the state’s control, and by their prior establishment of the doctrine of ‘the (Algerian⫽) Islamic personality’ as a fixed essence, a commodity which could, once they were seen to have proven unworthy guardians of it, be declared once more open to (re)appropriation. The actual political indigence of the Islamist project, their utopian populism articulated around the eschatological slogan of an ‘Islamic state’ whose actual form, other than general social conservatism and public ‘re-moralisation’, was
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never clearly expressed or, in all likelihood, clearly agreed upon among its proponents,41 did not prevent their making an affectively strong statement, rearticulating the (equally vacuous) nationalist ideological principle of the need for the people to ‘become themselves again’ (redevenir eux-mêmes, a key slogan of the ‘cultural revolution’ under Boumedienne). This transposition of the conflict from debate over practical policy to the invocation of a salvific panacea which of itself would supposedly make social divisions, antagonism, injustice and iniquity disappear is an extreme instance of the concentration of contest in the idiom of identity as itself the site of the problem and of politics. That this left the Islamist movement open to the manipulative orchestration of elements of the system itself now seems beyond doubt,42 but the extreme crisis which their initial popular success and its instrumentalization caused in the system – leading to the overt intervention of the military, the suspension of the electoral process and the resignation of President Benjedid – brought about the implosion of the system itself and the recourse to the naked, unmediated and extreme use of violence, with the outbreak of an armed insurrection and the resort by the state to emergency measures of repression to preserve itself. In an atrocious passage à l’acte, the fantasies of revolutionary inheritance and cultural-political representativity, previously deployed and disputed in symbolic slogans and ritual, were pursued in armed conflict over the bodies of citizens, with each antagonist performing an allotted role – defenders of the republic and its institutions against ‘a programmatic regression’, virtuous executors of the true destiny of the community in the face of tyrannical unbelief. The paradox, once again, is that the Islamists’ bid to hegemonize the symbolic goods of community in a neo-fundamentalist reappropriation of ‘the Islamic personality’ constituted, not a liberation from confining alienation in the final achievement of selfhood, a recovery and fulfilment of history, but on the contrary another repressive move attempting to take possession of the symbolic commodity of Algerian ‘personality’ and simultaneously refiguring it, in a largely imported43 ideological reaction whose aspiration to dominant political authority most Algerians would ultimately refuse.
The resilience of the state and reconstitution of the symbolic order The limits of the Islamists’ challenge to the hegemony of the state’s order – and the fact that their project was indeed contained within this hegemonic relation and was not a radical attempt to overthrow the system itself – would eventually be most clearly demonstrated by the effectiveness of the reconstitution of the nationalist status quo ante by ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Bouteflika, brought to the Presidency by the army in the spring of 1999 and reinstalled (largely by his own devices) in the election of 8 April 2004. Bouteflika’s greatest success in domestic policy has been the successful reabsorption of
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the Islamist movement into a logic of ‘fraternal’ allegiance within the system. The gamble of Chadli Benjedid – that the Islamists could be mobilized to provide populist support for a strong presidency which would, while making the appropriate concessions to them, push through its program of drastic economic and social reforms, against its opponents in the ‘old guard’ of the FLN and the army – cost Chadli his job, and its failure plunged Algeria into a decade of terror. With the exhaustion of the armed rebellion and the need to come to some accommodation, Bouteflika appears (at the time of writing) to have succeeded where Chadli failed, establishing an administration devoted to neoliberalism and geopolitical realignment along with the re-establishment of a unanimist factional coalition supporting a strong presidency largely emancipated from its rivals in the power structure. Although the symbolic structures of the state seemed in the mid-1990s to have been definitively shattered in the dispersal of their elements between competing and armed claimants to succession, the state itself has proved intensely resilient, and has recomposed its signs of legitimate authority, its systems of integration and exclusion and its prerogatives of order, around its undiminished infrastructure of coercive force. At the same time as Bouteflika’s presidency reintegrated the Islamists under the banner of ‘national concord’ and ‘reconciliation’ – rehabilitating the ‘brothers who have strayed from the straight path’ in a surrender with honour, amnesty and amnesia – there has been an equally decisive and effective exclusion of the Kabyle movement, whose accommodation (in terms limited, of course, to the cultural sphere, through integration of thamazighth into school curricula and the incorporation of ‘Amazigh identity’ as a factor of nationhood) goes hand in hand with the continued barring of their demands for accountability, pluralism and effective participation. By resorting systematically to a strategy of boycotting the political system (in the respectively legislative, municipal and presidential elections of 2002, 2003 and 2004), Kabylia has, by a supreme irony, sealed the effectiveness of its own exclusion and isolation.44
Conclusion What does the fate of these movements tell us about the operation of hegemony, and the possibilities and limits of counterhegemony, in Algeria? No domination, as we know, is ever total, and the structures of power and resistance do not operate in binary antagonism; there are always elements of the symbolic order itself which prove susceptible to attempts at their inflection, recomposition, reappropriation. In a system built on the claim of popular revolutionary emancipation, spaces are not lacking for those who seek to contest the authoritarian structures which emerged from the factional struggles of nationalist politics and the fratricidal progress of the war of independence. The postcolonial emergence of counterhegemonic movements seeking to recover the autonomy of a self-creating, self-directing political
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community, however, is fraught with difficulties, some of which are of their own making. Neither the ‘Berberist’-democratic nor the Islamist-authoritarian movements have been able to create a counter-order to that of the nationalist state (as the FLN’s nationalist state-project did in supplanting the political field of colonialism), nor have they been able to gain sufficient control over the discursive formations of state power so as to undermine it from within its own categories of legitimation and subjection (as the ‘ulama did in the colonial cultural field). The persistence, from colonialism and nationalism through recent challenges to the postcolonial dispensation, of a politics privileging the articulation of domination and its contest in cultural terms has been a major factor in the unfolding, and continual foreclosure, of these hegemonic conflicts. The colonial order and its own internal contradictions, having first set up a particularly intractable framework of white minority rule, produced in turn a nationalism which became a successful – indeed, paradigmatic – vehicle of emancipation but which never resolved the conflicting visions of history, community and the future which lay within it. Indeed, it was never the intention of the revolutionary elite to do so, and in the establishment of the state as the preservation of their hard-won dominance and the vehicle of their forced-march developmental agenda after independence, the dangerous luxury of contradictory debate, plural political competition and, alongside them, plural cultural and religious fields open to a multiplicity of visions of ‘Algeria’ articulated by different ‘Algerians’, was ruled out in advance. This was not the revolution’s failure – it was thought to be a condition of its success. The preserved privilege of a centralized, unitary doctrine of national selfhood did not, however, prevent it from becoming the object of contests. Indeed, it perhaps bound it to become so. The subject-politics of a fetishised identity, the framing and mobilization of social conflict in the idioms, and on the basis, of ‘selfhood’ and ‘otherness’, is a durable legacy of imperial forms of order and the culturally articulated visions of nationalism that emerged from them. As Mahmood Mamdani has shown in the (yet more terrible) case of Rwanda, ‘the failure to transcend these identities is at the heart of the crisis of citizenship in postcolonial Africa’.45 Mamdani’s focus on the establishment and institutionalization of particular political identities through colonial rule, and the postcolonial perpetuation of (and organization of violence through) these same categories, obviously has a different significance in the case he examines to that under discussion here. But in Algeria, too, as we have seen, the colonial and postcolonial exercise of power and attempts at its subversion have all been trapped in a similar logic. In this sense, Algeria’s travails are another instance of the widely shared patterns of postcolonial crisis afflicting the continent and the ‘decolonized’ world more generally. In Algeria, as elsewhere, no movement of resistance to the persistent disenfranchisement and alienation of ordinary people as citizens relative to the political system
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governing them has yet emerged which has not itself replicated (or, as in the case of Berberism, allowed itself to be diverted so as to replicate), in its own struggle by and for the systems of symbolic power, the same tendency to reproduce relations of objectification and domination through every promised subject of emancipation. Such a conclusion may be bleak, but this has been only an account of a history that remains unfinished. If resistance ‘does not operate outside power’ but is necessarily ‘imbricated within it’,46 the dynamics of the production of counterhegemonic possibilities, and the constraints they impose, have to be understood. Every category of repression (as ‘woman’, ‘black’, ‘Algerian’ or ‘Muslim’) contains the possibility of its reappropriation because each mechanism of subjection produces a space of subjectivation. But the exploitation of such apertures might yet become, not determined by a fixed (and even less a ‘strategic’) essentialism of ‘identity’ but open to the possibilities of political imagination. Hegemony may be inescapable, but can never be complete, and there remains to be created a mode of resistance which would be capable of seizing the power to reopen the potential to transform the social world, without falling instantly back into its repressive enclosure. Therein lies the challenge of a newly ‘radical democracy’, and of the reinvention of a politics beyond identity.
Notes 1. Michel Foucault, L’Ordre du discours (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), p. 12 (emphasis added) 2. Ernest Gellner, ‘The Unknown Apollo of Biskra: The Social Base of Algerian Puritanism’, originally published in Government and Opposition, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Summer 1974), pp. 277–310, repr. in Muslim Society (Cambridge, 1981), p. 277. On the disjunction between Algeria and what Third Worldist radicals in the West (and particularly in France) sometimes thought it stood for, see Hugh Roberts’ critique of Robert Malley, The Call from Algeria: Third Worldism, Revolution and the Turn to Islam (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996), in The Battlefield Algeria, 1988–2002: Studies in a Broken Polity (London: Verso, 2003), chap. 13. 3. Ferid Khelifati, for www.news.bbc.co.uk, 5 July 2002. 4. A poignant observation of this dynamic is given in Merzak Allouache’s film Bab el Oued City (1994). 5. The earliest critique from a leftist perspective is Arslan Humbaraci, Algeria, a Revolution That Failed: A Political History Since 1954 (New York: Pall Mall Press, 1966). The idea has longevity, however: George Joffé, Algeria: The Failed Revolution (London: RoutledgeCurzon, forthcoming). 6. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, first published 1985, 2nd edn (London: Verso, 2001). 7. John Ruedy, Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation, first published 1992, 2nd edn (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005). 8. The best exposition of the legal intricacies is in Michael Brett, ‘Legislating for Inequality in Algeria: The Senatus-Consulte of 14th July 1865’, in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 51 (1988), pp. 440–61.
The Fetishism of Identity 67 9. As Étienne Balibar points out: ‘We must … observe that the exteriority of the “native” populations in colonisation, or rather the representation of that state as racial exteriority … is by no means a given state of affairs. It was in fact produced and reproduced within the very space constituted by conquest and colonisation … and therefore on the basis of a certain interiority.’ ‘Racism and Nationalism’, in Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities (London: Verso, 1991), pp. 42–3. Similarly, Robert Young writes of ‘the appropriation of the other as a form of knowledge within a totalising system’ in the realization of an ‘economy of inclusion’. Robert Young, White Mythologies: Writing History and the West (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 4. 10. A gradually increasing number of exceptions was granted, making citizenship ‘dans le statut’ available to certain categories of the population (war veterans, administrative office-holders and so on), but the general principle remained that the ‘statut’ must be voluntarily resigned by an individual seeking full naturalization. Such renunciation was, of course, opposed by the sanction of the community in general and by the ‘ulama in particular. Charles-Robert Ageron numbers naturalizations at around 40 per year on average during the 1920s and 157 per year in the 1930s. Histoire de l’ Algérie contemporaine, 2 Vols (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1979), Vol. 2, p. 316. 11. The Jonnart law of 1919 enlarged the Muslim constituency eligible for citizenship, but in fact set up a formidable series of barriers in the criteria that had to be met. The Popular Front’s 1936 Blum-Viollette bill, which looms so large in French liberal historiography, was nothing more than a marginally more generous variation on the same theme. The 1947 statute of Algeria transformed matters, giving citizenship of the French Union to all Algerians, but minority rule was preserved by the cantonnement of the ‘Muslim vote’ in a second college, where 1,300,000 electors, voting on behalf of a population of 8 million, voted for the same number (60) of Algerian representatives as the 532,000 voters of the first (almost entirely European) college. 12. For a detailed case, see Fanny Colonna’s historical sociology of education in Algeria, Instituteurs algériens, 1883–1939 (Paris: Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1975). 13. This movement – a necessarily simplifying abstraction of a dense and varied series of histories – begins with the generation of Dr Benthami ould Hamida, Omar Bouderba and Chérif Benhabylès, who began to write and speak out from 1908 to 1914; they were followed by the brief but notable career of the amir Khaled ibn Hashemi (grandson of the amir ‘Abd al-Qadir ibn Muhy al-Din who had led the state-building movement of ‘primary’ resistance in the 1830s–40s) in 1914–23, and finally Dr Mohamed-Salah Bendjelloul, Ferhat Abbas and others in the 1920s–40s. 14. During the first 20 years of the Third Republic, see Ageron, Histoire de l’Algérie, Vol. 2, chap. 1. 15. It should be noted that the label is unsatisfactory in that the later representatives of the movement (after the ‘first generation’ of 1908–19) sought the extension of full citizenship to all Algeria’s inhabitants without regard to race or religion and hence with the preservation of Muslim ‘personal status’. The ‘dilution’ or abandonment of Islam, either as an element of social life or as cultural inheritance, sometimes assumed to be inherent in the notion of (cultural) assimilation (and present to a greater of lesser extent in some of the more pronounced Francophile and secularist tendencies of other groups) was never envisaged by them. 16. Karl Marx, Capital (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1976), Vol. 1, p. 76. I intend this usage figuratively, as a metaphor for the way that the social production of
17. 18.
19.
20.
21.
22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.
28.
29.
James McDougall identities is realized in the abstraction of the categories of subjectivation from the ‘ownership’ of their subjects. Or, to put it the other way around, in the alienation of the producers of a certain subjecthood from the means of their subjectivation in the very moment of its creation. Identity emerges, not as an open field of social relations into which anyone can pour meaning, but as a ‘thing’ appropriated and set up, totem-like, to which those in whom it is supposedly incarnated must bow down. This ‘fetishism’ (which I use, as I take Marx to, with some irony) does not imply a simple illusion or mystification; the point is to try to grasp the effective force in praxis of the mechanism that leads instantly from an apparent opening of agency to the closure of subjection. Religious orders or ‘brotherhoods’, generally incorporating mystical, Sufi elements. Itinerant religious specialists and teachers. See Fanny Colonna, Les versets de l’invincibilité: Permanence et changements religieux dans l’Algérie contemporaine (Paris: Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1995). Kuttab – Qur’anic elementary school; zawiya – teaching and welfare institution of a Sufi order, generally organized around the tomb of a saintly founder and run by descendents transmitting charismatic baraka, ‘blessing’; mrabit – (in French ‘marabout’) such a saintly ancestor, or descendant, one ‘bound’ away from the mundane world and dedicated to God. The classic general study of the early development of Algerian islah is Ali Merad, Le Réformisme musulman en Algérie de 1925 à 1940: Essai d’histoire sociale et religieuse (Paris & the Hague: Mouton, 1967); to this invaluable but inevitably dated work must now be added important studies by Colonna, Les versets de l’invincibilité, and her student Kamel Chachoua, L’Islam Kabyle: Religion, État et Société en Algérie (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2001). A detailed critical account is offered in my History and the Culture of Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). For an account of the position of the ‘ulama relative to the revolution, see my ‘S’écrire un destin: l’Association des ‘ulama dans la révolution algérienne’, Bulletin de l’Institut d’Histoire du Temps present, 83 (June 2004), pp. 38–52. Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), p.114. Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 5. Louis Althusser, ‘Ideologies and Ideological State Apparatuses’, first published 1970, repr. in Mapping Ideology, edited by Slavoj Zizek (London: Verso, 1994), p. 138. Colonna, Les versets de l’invincibilité, p. 352. Mohamed Harbi, L’Algérie et son destin: croyants ou citoyens (Paris: Arcantère, 1992), p. 29. The FLN veteran, intellectual and politician Mostefa Lacheraf was perfectly clear on the dangers of this development as early as 1963 in ‘L’avenir de la culture algérienne’, Les Temps Modernes, 209 (October 1963), pp. 720–45. Art. 4 of the 1963 constitution (art. 2 of the 1976 constitution and subsequent revisions) declared Islam to be the religion of state. Legislation on nationality and inheritance rights in Algeria later also made adherence to Islam the crucial criterion for inclusion in the national community. After much hesitation, a markedly conservative family code was enacted in 1984. For the Berber question as a minority rights issue, see Tassadit Yacine ed., Les Kabyles: Éléments pour la compréhension de l’identité berbère en Algérie (Paris: Groupement pour les droits de minorités, 1992). For Berbers as a proto-national ethnie, Bruce Maddy-Weitzmann, ‘Nationalism in the Making? The Berber Question
ˆ ˆ
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30.
31. 32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
in Algeria’, in Minorities and the State in the Arab World, edited by Ofra Bengio and Gabriel Ben-Dor, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 31–52. Hugh Roberts, ‘Towards an Understanding of the Kabyle Question in Contemporary Algeria’, The Maghreb Review, Vol. 5, No. 5–6 (September–December 1980), pp.115–24, gives a class analysis of the early movement. On the subsequent ethnicization of the question in the diaspora, and the problematic dynamics of the local and transnational aspects of the struggle, see Paul A. Silverstein, ‘Martyrs and Patriots: Ethnic, National and Transnational Dimensions of Kabyle Politics’, in Nation, Society and Culture in North Africa, edited by James McDougall (London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 87–111. It is the term ‘citizen’ which is most obsessively used, both deliberately and automatically, as a kind of reflex, in the self-description of Algerians and their social movements, even when such movements themselves neither manifest in their organization nor openly express in their slogans and demands an actual vision of equal, democratic participatory citizenship. The movement of the ‘aarush (assemblies of village delegates) which emerged in Kabylia in the wake of the violence of April–May 2001, a grassroots organization bypassing political parties and describing itself as a ‘mouvement citoyen’ but which excluded women from its deliberations, is the most striking contemporary example. The FLN’s slogan, bi ’l-sha‘b wa li ’l-sha‘b, is emblazoned on all public administrative buildings in Algeria. The Parti du peuple algérien, founded in 1937 and clandestine after 1939, and its electoralist legal cover, the Mouvement pour le triomphe des libertés démocratiques, the popular independentist movement which would eventually give birth to the FLN through a major schism in 1953–4. On the ‘Berberist crisis’, see Mohamed Harbi, Aux origines du FLN: le populisme révolutionnaire en Algérie (Paris: Bourgois, 1975), and Omar Carlier, ‘La production sociale de l’image de soi. Note sur la “crise berbériste” de 1949’, Annuaire de l’Afrique du Nord, 23 (1984), pp. 347–71. Aït Ahmed, one of the founding leaders of the FLN, and Mohand Ou El Haj, guerrilla chief of wilaya IV (the FLN designation for Kabylia), formed the Front de Forces Socialistes, returned to the maquis in September 1963 and began a revolt against the regime of Aït Ahmed’s erstwhile companion (at arms and in jail) Ahmed Ben Bella, who had triumphed in the factional fighting of August–September 1962 with the aid of the army ‘of the frontiers’ formed by Houari Boumedienne in Tunisia and Morocco (and against opposition from the remaining interior guerrilla groups) to become Algeria’s first President. Aït Ahmed was arrested in October 1964 and condemned to death, but the sentence was commuted and he later escaped into exile. The FFS became a legal political party in 1989. The ‘Berber Spring’ began with a student sit-in at the university campus in Tizi Ouzou (Kabylia’s principal town) in protests at the administration’s cancellation of a lecture on Berber poetry by the charismatic linguist, writer and anthropologist Mouloud Mammeri. When the campus was forcibly evacuated by riot police, three days of rioting followed, and the ‘Berber Cultural Movement’ was born. Thafsut imazighen, ‘the Amazigh Spring’, refers to the ethnonym now current in the Berber movement to identify Berbers as a group (amazigh, pl. imazighen, ‘free man’ or ‘noble’). The ‘Black Spring’ began on 18 April 2001, with the shooting by gendarmes and death in custody of a high school student, Massinissa Guermah, in the commune of Beni Douala in Kabylia, followed by a series of violent confrontations between
70
37.
38.
39. 40.
41.
42.
43.
James McDougall Kabyle youths and gendarmes resulting in 123 dead and several hundred injured. The rioting lasted several weeks before, between two meetings held on 3 and 10 May, a leadership of village delegates emerged (‘Coordination des aarchs, daïras et communes’, popularly known as the ‘aarush) to coordinate protests in the aftermath of the violence. This is not to say that no such project has been forthcoming – the FFS, Algeria’s oldest surviving opposition party, presents a comprehensive programme for a new constitutional assembly and the refoundation of the state in a Second Republic. But the persistently closed political system both passively (through its simple inadmission of real contest) and actively diverts oppositional energies into other fields, where it not only gives them space to express themselves but encourages them to do so (as in the gendarmerie’s violence of spring 2001 in Kabylia, and in the manipulation of Islamism as a populist channelling of opposition), thus preserving the political realm in the hands of its power brokers. The inability of forces such as the FFS, despite its claims to be a ‘national’ political party and its global agenda, to establish a significant constituency beyond Kabylia and Kabyle communities elsewhere is the best indicator of the success of the system in this regard. Most notably the emblematic figure of Kabyle singer Lounès Matoub, who wore military uniform on stage and called for armed resistance to Islamism. He was assassinated near Tizi Ouzou on 25 June 1998, and while responsibility for his murder was claimed by the Islamist GSPC, his rioting supporters in Kabylia were immediately convinced that the state had been somehow responsible. The case continues to elicit considerable controversy, and Matoub remains an iconic figure – in March 2004, in one locality in the Soummam valley, the south-eastern girdle of the Kabyle region, I saw a poster hoarding for the presidential campaign (divided into six spaces, one for each of the candidates) plastered with his image in every space. N.B. also: tifinagh – the neo-Lybic alphabet revived by the Berber cultural movement and often now used to write thamazighth (the Berber language in its Kabyle dialect), and the Amazigh (that is, Berber) flag – a horizontal tricolour of blue, green and yellow (representing the geography of tamazgha, the Berberist designation for North Africa: from north to south, the Mediterranean, the mountains and the desert) with the tifinagh letter aza (z), now the ubiquitous sign of Amazigh identity, in red across the centre. Conversations in Algiers and Constantine, March–April 2004. The Mouvement pour l’Autonomie de la Kabylie (MAK) was announced in a press conference in Tizi Ouzou on 16 April 2003 by its spokesman and founder, the singer Ferhat Mehenni. (See the movement’s website at www.makabylie.info). See the preoccupations (immediate domestic crisis resolution; global Muslim solidarity; nothing of substance in between) of the FIS’ 15-point platform, published in al-Munqidh 16, repr. in L’Algérie par ses islamistes, edited by Mustafa al-Ahnaf, Bernard Botiveau and Franck Frégosi (Paris: Karthala, 1991), pp. 49–51, and other texts in the same volume. See Hugh Roberts, ‘Doctrinaire Economics and Political Opportunism in the Strategy of Algerian Islamism’, in Islamism and Secularism in North Africa, edited by John Ruedy (London: Macmillan, 1994). The newer neighbourhood mosques in Algeria, and some of the more iconic religious buildings of the past 30 years, above all the monumental ‘Amir ‘Abd alQadir mosque in Constantine, are notable for their deliberate Middle Eastern architectural echoes and their resolute lack of any distinctively ‘traditional’ Maghribi features (particularly notable is the predominance of multiple, slim,
The Fetishism of Identity 71 cylindrical minarets over single, solid, square ones). Asked about this, an Algerian colleague remarked, ‘It’s Wahhabism, it’s a fashion – c’est pas de chez nous, ça.’ The fashion of Islamism is, of course, also evident in dress, for both men and women. This is immediately noticeable in Algeria, where older, local forms of veiling (the ha’ik and triangular lace voilette), practised mainly by older women, are distinctively different to newer, mashriqi forms (headscarf, chador or burqa), and the ‘Afghan’ qamis is a visibly new type of male attire. 44. This is made all the more effective by the structural opposition of Kabylia’s politics between the two major parties in the region, the FFS and RCD (Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie, an offshoot of the Berber Cultural Movement of the early 1980s). In the legislative elections of 2002, both parties boycotted the vote; in the municipal election the following year, however, the FFS participated against an RCD boycott, while in the presidential election of 2004 the RCD leader, Said Sadi, stood against calls for a boycott by the FFS and the movement of the ‘aarush. In each case voting was prevented, in some cases by intimidation and violence, and those standing for election were condemned as ‘traitors’ by those opposed to participation. 45. Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p.14. See also Ussama Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History and Violence in Nineteenth Century Ottoman Lebanon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000) and Gyanendra Pandey, Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 46. Young, White Mythologies, p. 87.
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Part II Intellectual Formations: Authority and Opposition
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3 Redefining Resistance: Counterhegemony, the Repressive Hypothesis and the Case of Arabic Modernism Yaseen Noorani I don’t give a shit about dying, when you’re into revolution you have to die, and you can’t be a revolution unless you’re willing to die. Artie Sternlicht, hippie rebel in E. L. Doctorow, The Book of Daniel Literary modernism, despite the apocalyptic proclamations issued by many of its seminal practitioners, has now the status of a defunct artistic movement, an outmoded phase of Western culture, universally regarded as a failure in its broader cultural aims, and often subject to scorn and ridicule in respect of the revolutionary claims associated with it. Nevertheless, literary modernism and the debates surrounding it have played a key role in the evolution of ideas about counterhegemony in the twentieth century. The claim that hegemonic structures operate at the level of the psyche lay at the basis of the assault upon the bourgeois social order of early twentiethcentury Europe mounted by avant-garde groups and other modernist practitioners, whose politics ranged from the extreme left to the extreme right.1 In the Arabic context, where modernist techniques took root after World War II, modernism was and continues to be associated with the overturning of the traditional order and its values. Through the course of the twentieth century, modernist ideology has interacted with social theories, from the Weberian to the structuralist, in pressing the view that subjectivity is shaped by structures of domination. All of these outlooks share the underlying assumption that hegemony – political order relying on the apparently noncoerced reproduction by social subordinates of their subordinate status2 – is founded upon the repression and deformation of that which is authentically human and/or natural, that which impels human beings towards freedom.3 Insofar as modernist artistic practices purported to access and gave expression to this primal zone, wherein lie our irreducible desires for personal and social happiness, they have been available to politically minded attempts to theorize counterhegemony. 75
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Consideration of the continued resonance of central modernist assumptions, alongside the theoretical repudiations of modernism and its evident historical failure, enables us to raise fundamental questions about the nature of resistance and hegemony. One of the most persistent and coherent lines of attack upon modernism was initiated by its contemporary Georg Lukacs and has been taken up more recently by Frederic Jameson. The critique of modernism here is founded on the same repressive hypothesis4 that modernist ideology itself exhibits – (capitalist) modernity engenders social and psychic fragmentation, alienating us from our inner desire for freedom which can now take only masked and distorted forms, thus robbing us of agency. Modernist art, however, in constructing an aesthetic of the fragmentary, does not transcend and redeem fragmentation, but merely extends it, supplying the internal logic of the culture of consumerism. In contrast to this Lukacsian critique, an opposing line of thought, evident in such theorists as Foucault and Bourdieu, calls the whole problematic of repression into question by viewing hegemonic relations as productive of human subjectivity. In this view, whatever desire and agency human beings possess is engendered by mechanisms within the social order itself. Hegemonic relations should be investigated in terms of the forms of subjectivity to which they give rise and by which they are reproduced, without recourse to notions of an originary human desire anterior to the hegemonic order. In this approach, however, the status and nature of resistance become less clear. Can there be real resistance to the hegemonic order, and if so, where does it originate? How and when can the social relations and mechanisms of a given order create in subjects the capacity for resistance to this very order? In this chapter, I propose that it is necessary, on the discursive level, to regard resistance as constitutive of hegemonic relations. In other words, resistance does not originate in a sacred, inviolate site outside of hegemony, but is posited from the outset in the discourses that justify particular relations of order. Such relations are represented as legitimate precisely because they overcome and transform tendencies towards disorder inherent in the subjects within their purview. Resistance, therefore – as a ‘natural’ disposition towards recalcitrance – is not only acknowledged by hegemonic discourses, but required by them to project the ordering effects of hegemonic relations. This means, however, that hegemonic legitimacy is only ever a quasilegitimacy, for the resistance that constitutes it has its own form of authority which is never fully under control. Such resistance becomes political, which is to say, counterhegemonic, when a particular set of resistances inhering in a particular set of relations is recast as legitimate resistance to oppression. The cultivation of resistance required by hegemonic discourses creates the danger, not so much that this resistance will be enacted in a frenzy of disorder, but that hegemonic legitimacy will be undermined when what was formerly tolerated and even revered as discipline comes to be repudiated as tyranny. Resistance is always represented as on the brink of insurrection – thus does
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hegemony carry its insurrection within itself. But this latent insurrection only unfolds as a struggle against the hegemonic order when changing social conditions enable the rise of an opposing principle of freedom that alters the moral valence of a set of resistances by rearticulating them along its axis.5 I will develop this view of resistance and counterhegemony through an analysis of Arabic literary modernism as it emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, focusing on its explicit attack upon traditional social values and its linkage with the revolutionary nationalist ferment of that period. Looking at a supposedly European cultural phenomenon as it developed outside of Europe allows us to disembed it from Eurocentric world-historical narratives, and thereby to isolate features of such phenomena that may be more easily discernible in non-European contexts. In the case of Arabic modernism, the break in aesthetic canons that is effected and its articulation with a range of oppositional positions reveals mechanisms through which resistance turns into counterhegemony. I am specifically interested in the manner in which modernist authors identified the activity of perception as the fundamental site of hegemonic repression, and on this basis, cast their literary enterprise as a practice of freedom enabling the release of primal, socially transformative human energies. They did so by showing authentic perception, as embodied in their art, to be the ultimate site of moral investment. In other words, the self-sacrifice required to perceive truly, liberates humanity from the imposed, habituated modes of perception that sustain domination and stasis. My analysis of modernist techniques, centring on the influential poet Adunis (‘Ali Ahmad Sa’id, 1930–), finds the modernist point of resistance to lie in its attack upon the opposition between reality and representation upheld in the aesthetics of beauty. Modernist techniques aim not at representing reality in an ideal form, but at regenerating reality in the act of perception. I argue that in transferring moral investment from a practice deemed to uphold social domination (aesthetic contemplation), to one envisioned as resisting domination (creative perception), Arabic modernism casts its art as a practice of freedom that redefines a range of social relations as manifestations of tyranny.
Modernity, visuality and Arabic modernism In assessing the meaning and significance of literary modernism in the Arabic context, it is necessary to recall the suggestion made by the Egyptian critic Ghali Shukri in his book on modern Arabic poetry published in 1968. Discussing the influence of T. S. Eliot, he says, ‘Perhaps imported Western techniques are transformed during their interaction with Arabic content into something new that would have never occurred to the original inventors, or to the new audience, and is hidden in the complex process that we call the interaction between the artist and his world.’6 Critics have been confident in identifying a post-World War II Arabic poetic modernism taking
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their cue from the proliferation of literary techniques customarily associated with modernism in the West, most of which have to do with breaking up traditional unities and continuities for the sake of more arresting and difficult aesthetic patterns. These techniques gained currency on the heels of and in conjunction with the emergence of so-called free verse in the early 1950s, which replaced the traditional Arabic poetic verse (bayt) with a line of variable length, thereby opening the structure of poems to greater individual experimentation. This sudden plethora of poetic innovation occurred during a period of political explosiveness in a number of Arab countries, from Egypt to Iraq. There is no doubt a link between these phenomena in that both the literary and political fields were altered by the intervention of social groups that had previously been marginal to these fields. Many of the pioneers of the free-verse movement were politically active, belonging to or associated with revolutionary socialist and nationalist parties. In these respects, there are some contextual parallels with the initial emergence of modernist literary techniques in the volatile landscape of early twentiethcentury Europe.7 Yet the underlying social differences, and the impact of the colonial situation, are decisive in ensuring that the meaning and ideological function of modernism differ in both cases. This is most apparent in the opposing conceptions of modernity to which modernism is linked in the two contexts. There is a key difference between Arabic modernist ideology, as it emerged in the early post-war period, and Western modernist ideology, a difference which helps to shape the counterhegemonic potential envisaged in the Arabic context. It is well known that many of the literary works identified with European high modernism are hostile towards modernity, and even avant-garde groups often rejected much that is normally associated with modern life.8 Arabic modernism, however, at least in the early period, fully embraces modernity as the means of liberating and restituting Arab life, and fully identifies modern poetry and its techniques with modernity. For Arabic modernism, modernity is not simply a set of social processes that alter our way of life. It is rather, a historically culminatory liberation from the shackles that have bound creativity and individuality from earliest times. Modernity is seen as the release of the energy that underlies human achievement and historical movement, the energy that has been repressed in historically decadent Arab society.9 The modern age is characterized by ‘transgression and transcendence’ of all existing limits, due to its ‘undulating essence that cannot be realized completely and finally’.10 There is little conception here, therefore, of a past traditional society in which individuals enjoyed an organic relationship with their world, resulting in psychic and aesthetic harmony. The salient opposition is not the one that lies between a lost wholeness of traditional life and a disunified modern existence. Rather, tradition is seen as a rigid and lifeless structure imposed upon human vitality and, in the past, only occasionally breached by it. Modernity is thus
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wholly identified with the freedom that lies within the human spirit, and becomes thereby a purely moral, utopian category, an ideal state of the psyche and of society. For this reason, the fragmentation of social and psychic life that is normally associated with modernity in Western accounts, even the most heroic and celebratory of them, is assigned in the Arab context to presently existing social conditions, which are identified with the lack of modernity, the persistence of tradition in the age of liberation. Indeed, Ghali Shukri argued that European culture and the European psyche are unified, despite the appearance of fissures created by critiques of modernity, due to the gradual emergence of modernity in Europe as an internal transformation. The Arab modernist, on the other hand, suffers from dismemberment, caught between the historical backwardness of Arab society and the ideals promised by the modern age. Tradition-bound Arab society itself is ruptured by an inveterate disjuncture between a sacralized cultural heritage (turath) and the reality of actual life with which it is in discord. ‘No matter how much the cultural heritage contradicts our daily life it is always right and we are always wrong. For that reason the split between the prophets of modernism in our poetry and the poetic heritage is nothing but the reflection of the historical split between belief and practice.’11 This split, ‘the frightful abyss between self and world’, results in ‘profound spiritual mutilation’. The poetry and discourse surrounding it of the 1950s and 1960s were rife with such depictions of psychic disjuncture, in which the traditional social and cultural order imposes categories of consciousness that disable the proper course of historical development. As Marx puts it, ‘The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living.’12 Society is thrust into modernity by external forces, but incapable of taking on the challenge due to an ossified regime of perception, suffers a widening internal rupture resulting in perverted forms of modern life. To restitute Arab life, to reconcile the internal divisions that prevent forward movement, a new mode of perception is necessary that would enable Arabs to see and thereby release the repressed dynamic force in their world and in themselves. In other words, Arabs must learn to perceive the world in a modern, dynamic manner in order to become agents of the perpetual transformation that modernity inaugurates. To identify this conception of modernity with literary modernism, poets and critics had to show modernist poetic techniques to embody the creative, and indeed destructive, force supposed to lie at the heart of modernity. In other words, they had to show that the process of perception, particularly visual perception, that lay at the centre of modernist techniques, is the site of modern freedom, truth and authenticity. In attributing redemptive moral significance to perception, or aesthesis, and thus downgrading the previous moral sites, virtue and beauty, Arabic modernism does not deviate from the characteristic practice of Western modernisms. And in fact it is precisely in
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this elevation of perception that the counterhegemonic programme of modernism lies. The European modernist assumption is that modern inauthenticity is rooted in the separation and disharmony of human psychic powers, which make it impossible for contemporary individuals to integrate their experience, their sense data, into any sort of meaningful whole, leading to the passive experience of ordinary life as a continuous bombardment of the senses with heterogeneous, opaque stimuli. But modernist literary techniques, as new forms of perception capable of integrating complex experiences into aesthetic wholes, redeem modern life by creating a life of greater intensity than has hitherto been known out of the chaotic, fragmented flux of modern life in which we would otherwise aimlessly float about. In the higher reintegration of the psyche that modernism promises, meaning will come about not out of truths and values that inhere in a fixed universe, but from the creative process of perception itself, which is where our experience of the world originates. Nineteenth-century scientific thought, philosophy and artistic experimentation converged on the conclusion that what we see is not the direct imprint of a fixed external reality upon our retinas, but the product of a creative visual process that organizes meaningless flux into intelligible forms.13 And now that our sensual-interpretive powers have become outstripped by the furious pace of modern experience, resulting in passivity and enslavement, it is up to modernism to reconcile us to our reality once again, to show us how to transform it into something that we can live with.
Reification and the critique of modernism The view that modernist literary techniques arise from transformations in modern conditions of perception is common to both modernism itself and critical analyses of it, to accounts that attribute a revolutionary or critical orientation to these techniques as well as accounts that regard modernism as the cultural arm of capitalist hegemony. These accounts are rooted in the idea that processes of modernization, particularly an ever-deepening division of labour, create division and disharmony in the selves of individuals who must devote themselves to developing specific native capacities at the expense of all others. The modern form of life requires the reduction of individuals to limited aspects of their being, precluding any possibility of the harmonious development of the entire range of individual faculties within a holistic framework and ideal. Modern individuals are therefore internally divided, unable to integrate their thought and feeling, that is, their experience, into a manageable whole. This break-up of internal unity mirrors the break-up of traditional, social and cultural structures that imposed an external unity and meaning on the experience of individuals. Reality – no longer governed by organic traditional structures but fragmented into functional units organized according to laws of efficiency – is no longer intelligible to
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the individual sensorium. This way of understanding the development of modernity, and in particular, the difference between modern and traditional forms of life, has been powerful and prevalent in twentieth-century thinking. And in most accounts, both the nature of modernist literary techniques and the question of their counterhegemonic potential ride on assumptions about modern social and psychic fragmentation. We may consider a sophisticated and powerful theorization of this view, that of Fredric Jameson, which proposes that whereas modernist techniques purport to reintegrate the psyche and the world on an aesthetic basis, they in fact extend into the psyche the processes that shatter and reconfigure social life (reification). They indeed once again enable interior to match with the exterior world of perception, but not by empowering interiority to unify with this world on the basis of internal desire, but rather by ‘colonising’ the psyche so that it obeys the same laws as capitalist reality. At the same time, modernist techniques repress the gap between desire and reality, creating ‘the political unconscious’. Therefore modernism was never inherently counterhegemonic, and indeed was from the outset a product and handmaiden of capitalist rationalization, and ultimately the high priest of consumer culture. Jameson argues that modern processes of breaking up and mechanistically reconfiguring the social relations and practices of traditional society led to the fragmentation of both social and psychic reality. Emphasis on rational calculative abilities makes sensory capacities superfluous, and thus detached from ordinary experience and semi-autonomous. Modernism arises from this phenomenon as what Jameson calls an ‘aestheticizing strategy,’ taking up the cast-off realm of sensory experience as an end in itself. Modernism ‘seeks to recode or rewrite the world and its own data in terms of perception as a semi-autonomous activity’.14 In other words, the aestheticizing strategy takes the social reality of Capitalism as mere material for an exercise in creative perception, thereby distorting and repressing our experience of this reality. In so doing, modernist works rescue us from our traumatic apprehension of the horror of capitalist reality by turning the fragmented bits of this experience that we were unable to synthesize into a utopian fantasy of psychic integration on the aesthetic level. Thus the historical is disguised and made palatable as the psychic in a formula that can now defuse the rising threat of mass politics through its embodiment in the commodity, whose consumption will now become the chief capitalist dynamic. As for the counterhegemonic pretensions of modernism, Jameson ridicules these as the naive view that ‘a change in style will help us to see the world in a new way and thus achieve a kind of cultural or countercultural revolution of its own’.15 Modernism, then, is ‘a final and extremely specialized phase of that immense process of superstructural transformation whereby the inhabitants of older social formations are culturally and psychologically retrained for life in the market system’.16 Yet at the same time, modernism preserves the
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utopian impulse by containing it in a form that appears to gratify it. ‘It is precisely this new semi-autonomy [of perception] and the presence of these waste products [abstract objects such as color and pure sound] of capitalist rationalization that opens up a life space in which the opposite and the negation of such rationalization can be, at least imaginatively, experienced.’17 Therefore, modernism’s ‘intent … is to “manage” historical and social, deeply political impulses, that is to say, to defuse them, to prepare substitute gratifications for them, and the like’.18 The result of this line of thinking is that not only is the modernist artwork a commodity, but so becomes the mind itself. The reified mind recapitulates the commodity as a pleasurable, sutured aesthetic surface containing and hiding a utopian impulse traumatized by reality. This is of course to be expected, since the commodity form is the ultimate embodiment of the logic of reification, in which relations among people appear as relations among things. Jameson’s account shares two basic assumptions with modernist ideology itself: that the utopian desire for freedom is repressed in bourgeois society, and that this repression is effected through fragmentation of social and psychic life. His primary charge is essentially a reformulation of Marcuse’s thesis on the affirmative character of culture – that bourgeois life relegates happiness, human fulfilment, to the ideal, spiritual realm of culture; this realm is constituted as incompatible with practical life, where strife and inequality must reign; the exclusion of aspirations for happiness from practical life ensures the perpetuation of the status quo.19 Jameson’s version shrewdly develops this thesis in terms of the functions that modernism fulfils for the capitalist order – extension of reification into the psyche; substitution of ‘culture’ with consumerist culture as the domain of happiness; recoding and obscuring the ‘real’, that is capitalist social reality and its psychic trauma, in a pleasurable, reconciled form. Jameson is concerned with explaining the historical m