Japan and UN Peacekeeping: New Pressures and New Responses

Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping

In response to the Second Gulf War of 1991, Japan has embarked upon the task of building its role both within the United Nations and in United Nations-sponsored peacekeeping operations. Yet, for a traditionally anti-militarist nation, this has been no easy task, and the nature and extent of Japan’s involvement in peacekeeping operations have proved to be one of the most controversial issues for the Japanese government and its people in the post-Cold War world. This book investigates these developments, from the Japanese reaction to the Second Gulf War, and from the first postwar despatch of troops on peacekeeping operations to Cambodia in 1992, to the responses to events in East Timor and the ‘war on terrorism’. It further analyses the policy-making opportunities and limitations that have both motivated and restricted the Japanese government’s efforts to contribute to global security. With an approach based on political culture and identity, this book demonstrates the current pressures and shifting priorities that confront Japan’s government and its people, as they attempt to carve out a new international role. Hugo Dobson is Lecturer in the International Relations of Japan in the School of East Asian Studies at the University of Sheffield.

Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies/RoutledgeCurzon Series Series Editor: Glenn D. Hook Professor of Japanese Studies, University of Sheffield

This series, published by RoutledgeCurzon in association with the Centre for Japanese Studies at the University of Sheffield, both makes available original research on a wide range of subjects dealing with Japan and provides introductory overviews of key topics in Japanese Studies.

The Internationalization of Japan Edited by Glenn D. Hook and Michael Weiner Race and Migration in Imperial Japan Michael Weiner Japan and the Pacific Free Trade Area Pekka Korhonen

Japan’s Economic Power and Security Japan and North Korea Christopher W. Hughes Japan’s Contested Constitution Documents and analysis Glenn D. Hook and Gavan McCormack

Greater China and Japan Prospects for an economic partnership? Robert Taylor

Japan’s International Relations Politics, economics and security Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes and Hugo Dobson

The Steel Industry in Japan A comparison with the UK Hasegawa Harukiyo

Japanese Education Reform Nakasone’s legacy Christopher P. Hood

Race, Resistance and the Ainu of Japan Richard Siddle

The Political Economy of Japanese Globalisation Glenn D. Hook and Hasegawa Harukiyo

Japan’s Minorities The illusion of homogeneity Edited by Michael Weiner Japanese Business Management Restructuring for low growth and globalization Edited by Hasegawa Harukiyo and Glenn D. Hook Japan and Asia Pacific Integration Pacific romances 1968–1996 Pekka Korhonen

Japan and Okinawa Structure and subjectivity Edited by Glenn D. Hook and Richard Siddle Japan and Britain in the Contemporary World Responses to common issues Edited by Hugo Dobson and Glenn D. Hook Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping New pressures, new responses Hugo Dobson

Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping New pressures, new responses

Hugo Dobson

First published 2003 by RoutledgeCurzon 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by RoutledgeCurzon 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003. RoutledgeCurzon is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2003 Hugo Dobson All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Dobson, Hugo, 1971– Japan and United Nations peacekeeping : new pressures, new responses / Hugo Dobson. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Peacekeeping forces–Japan. 2. Japan–Armed Forces–Foreign countries I. Title. JZ6377.J3 D63 2003 341.5⬘84–dc21 2002151645 ISBN 0-203-39148-9 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-39187-X (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0–415–26384–0 (Print Edition)

To Rae for making it happen

We are too close to what-is-happening, perspective is impossible, later perhaps analysts will say why and wherefore, will adduce underlying economic trends and political developments, but right now we’re too close to the cinema-screen, the picture is breaking up into dots, only subjective judgments are possible. (Rushdie 1981: 419)

Contents

List of illustrations Acknowledgements List of abbreviations

ix x xi

Introduction The remit of this book 1 Why peacekeeping? 2 Why Japan? 3 The structure of this book 5

1

1

IR theory and Japan Making sense of Japan’s foreign policy 7 Realism 7 Liberalism 10 Japan’s foreign policy-making processes and peacekeeping 14 Constructivism 17 Summary 23

7

2

Norms and Japan Introduction 26 Norms 27 Japan and norms 34 Peacekeeping as a norm 41 Summary 47

26

3

The Cold War, 1956 to 1990 Introduction 49 Postwar rehabilitation 49 The 1980s 54 Summary 57

49

viii Contents 4

The Second Gulf War Introduction 60 A brief history of the Second Gulf War 60 The response of the international community 62 Japan’s response 63 Summary 93

60

5

Cambodia Introduction 95 A brief history of the Cambodian conflict 95 Japan’s contribution 99 Summary 118

95

6

Post-UNTAC operations Post-UNTAC 121 The changing norm of post-Cold War peacekeeping 121 Japan’s response 128 Summary 154

121

7

Conclusions New pressures, new responses 156 The existence and importance of norms 157 Measuring norms 159 Summary 167

156

Glossary Bibliography Index

169 170 183

Illustrations

Figures 3.1 Policy-making matrix of Japanese foreign policy during the Cold War, 1956 to 1990 4.1 Policy-making matrix of Japanese foreign policy during the Second Gulf War 5.1 Policy-making matrix of Japanese foreign policy during UNTAC 6.1 Policy-making matrix of Japanese foreign policy during other missions

59 94 120 155

Table 7.1 Taxonomy of changing norms

158

Acknowledgements

With apologies to Karl Marx and his interpretation of history, to a large degree dissertations have to be written twice: once for submission to and evaluation by the examiners (tragedy) and once more for publication (farce). Probably the most painful experience for any newly qualified and over-burdened university lecturer is having the courage and finding the time to rewrite his/her doctoral dissertation. My manuscript sat on a bookshelf gathering dust for more months than I care to mention and it was indeed a humbling experience to confront it, blow away the layer of cobwebs and peel open the pages only to wince at what was written within. I want to thank a multitude of people for their assistance in what has been a sometimes frustrating, but ultimately rewarding, experience. My supervisor in Sheffield, Professor Glenn Hook, deserves the greatest credit for providing the motivation, constructive criticism and deadlines that are so necessary to any postgraduate undertaking. Gratitude is also extended to my examiners, Professors Reinhard Drifte and Ian Gow. In Japan, the late Professor Kamo Takehiko and Professor Takahashi Susumu of the University of Tokyo were kind enough to act as my sponsors and supervisors during the time I spent in Tokyo from September 1996 to March 1999. In addition, I would like to thank Professor Kashiwagi Noboru, Wada Keiko and the Hise Ga¯rusu of the International Centre for Comparative Law and Politics at the University of Tokyo for giving me the opportunity to go to Japan in the first place and then keeping me there. Finally, thanks to my friends in the north – Julie Gilson, James Malcolm, Caroline Rose and Philip Shetler-Jones – for advice, encouragement and alcohol. In particular, thanks go out to Christopher Hughes for all his dependable and sound advice. If this book proves to be of interest or use to the reader, the credit belongs to all these people; if there are any errors in fact or interpretation, the fault is mine. Throughout this book, Japanese names are given in the correct order, namely the surname first and the given name second. Long vowels are expressed in the form of a macron except in the case of commonly used Japanese words and place names such as ‘Tokyo’. North American spelling, for example organization, minimize and so on, is maintained in citations from North American publications; otherwise, British spelling, for example organisation, minimise and so on, is observed. Hugo Dobson Sheffield, July 2002

Abbreviations

ACSA APEC ARF ASDF ASEAN ASEAN+3

Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (forum) ASEAN Regional Forum Air Self-Defence Force Association of Southeast Asian Nations Association of Southeast Asian Nations, plus China, Japan and South Korea BPND Basic Policy for National Defence CGDK Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea CNN Cable Network News DOMREP Mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic DPJ Democratic Party of Japan DSP Democratic Socialist Party EC European Community ECOSOC Economic and Social Council EU European Union FMLN Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional ([El Salvador] National Liberation Front) FRELIMO Frente de la Libertação de Moçambique (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) FUNCINPEC Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif (United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Co-operative Cambodia) GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GCC Gulf Co-operation Council GNP gross national product ILO International Labour Organisation IMF International Monetary Fund IPCHQ International Peace Co-operation Headquarters IR international relations JCP Japan Communist Party JDA Japan Defence Agency JEI Japan Economic Institute

xii

Abbreviations

JICA JOCV JSDF JSP LDP METI MITI MNF MOF MOFA MSDF NATO NDC NFP NGI NGO NHK ODA OECD ONUC ONUMOZ ONUSAL ONUVEN

OPEC PDD-25 PKF PKO PRC PRK RENAMO RRF SCAP SDF SDPJ SNC TNC UK UN UNAMET

Japan International Co-operation Agency Japan Overseas Co-operation Volunteers Japan Self-Defence Force Japan Socialist Party Liberal Democratic Party Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry Ministry of International Trade and Industry multinational force Ministry of Finance Ministry of Foreign Affairs Maritime Self-Defence Force North Atlantic Treaty Organisation National Defence Council New Frontier Party non-governmental individual non-governmental organisation Nihon Ho¯ so¯ Kyo¯ kai (the Japanese national broadcaster) official development assistance Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Opération des Nations Uniés au Congo (United Nations Operation in the Congo) Opération des Nations Uniés au Mozambique (United Nations Operation in Mozambique) Observadores de las Nacionas Unidas en El Salvador (United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador) Observadores de las Naciones Unidas para la Verificacion de las Elecciones en Nicaragua (United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua) Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries Presidential Decision Directive 25 peacekeeping force peacekeeping operation People’s Republic of China People’s Republic of Kampuchea Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance) Rwandese Patriotic Front Supreme Command for the Allied Powers Self-Defence Force Social Democratic Party of Japan Supreme National Council transnational corporation United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor

Abbreviations xiii UNAMIR UNAMSIL UNAVEM II UNDOF UNDP UNDRO UNEF I UNEF II UNESCO UNFICYP UNGOMAP UNHCR UNIFIL UNIIMOG UNIPOM UNITAF UNMOGIP UNOGIL UNOSOM UNPKO UNSC UNSF UNTAC UNTAET UNTAG UNTEA UNTSO UNYOM US

United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone United Nations Angola Verification Mission II United Nations Disengagement Observer Force United Nations Development Programme United Nations Disaster Relief Organisation United Nations Emergency Force I United Nations Emergency Force II United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation United Nations (Peacekeeping) Force in Cyprus United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon United Nations Iran–Iraq Military Observer Group United Nations India–Pakistan Observation Mission Unified Task Force United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon United Nations Operation in Somalia United Nations peacekeeping operation United Nations Security Council United Nations Security Force United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor United Nations Transition Assistance Group United Nations Temporary Executive Authority United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation United Nations Yemen Observation Mission United States

Introduction

The remit of this book The end of the Cold War has raised questions both within and outside Japan as to the future role it will play in international society. In the fields of Japanese foreign, security and defence policies, one of the most salient changes which took place during the 1990s is the now legally permissible despatch abroad of the Japan SelfDefence Force ( JSDF or, more commonly, SDF) in a non-combat role under the aegis of the United Nations (UN) as part of its peacekeeping operations (PKOs or UNPKOs). Due to legislation enacted in the wake of the Second Gulf War of 1991, Japan was able to contribute personnel for the first time to the UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) mission in September 1992, and subsequently to missions in Mozambique (Opération des Nations Uniés au Mozambique: ONUMOZ (UN Operation in Mozambique)), El Salvador (Observadores de las Nacionas Unidas en El Salvador: ONUSAL (UN Observer Mission in El Salvador)), Rwanda (UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda: UNAMIR), the Golan Heights (UN Disengagement Observer Force: UNDOF) and East Timor (UN Assistance Mission in East Timor: UNAMET).1 After ten years of minimal contributions of civilian personnel to PKOs in the 1980s and nearly half a century of emphasis on purely economic contributions to the maintenance of the international system, this change is all the more remarkable. Equally salient is the dramatic change in the attitude of the Japanese public towards the existence and overseas despatch of the SDF. There are a number of reasons for this state of affairs, both internal and external, and it is the purpose of this book to investigate the various reasons for these changes with particular emphasis being placed on the role that the UN has played in promoting, constraining and justifying Japan’s watershed decision to expand its participation in PKOs. The kinds of questions that motivated the writing of this book include: what factors have influenced, encouraged and hindered Japan’s sudden activity in PKOs? How has Japan regarded the UN system and its peacekeeping functions? What kind of role has the UN specifically played in legitimising the despatch of SDF personnel? What kind of role can Japan play within PKOs?

2 Introduction

Why peacekeeping? It is, of course, necessary to provide justification of the topic under examination. Providing justification for the study of peacekeeping, and in the next section Japan, is at the heart of what has termed the ‘microfoundations’ of research; in other words, our motivations for undertaking research (Kohli et al. 1995: 3). The UN’s increase in importance is one noteworthy phenomenon of the post-Cold War period, especially as regards its peacekeeping functions. As Slaughter Burley and Kaysen have written: over the second half of the 20th century the foundations of the existing norm of non-intervention have been shaken . . . The proliferation of domestic insurgencies, rebellions and full-fledged civil wars has superimposed an image of domestic implosion as a major challenge to the stability of the international system. (Slaughter Burley and Kaysen 1993: 9) This instability can be seen in the fact that all of the thirty major armed conflicts fought in 1995 were intra-state wars (Sollenberg and Wallenstein 1996: 15). With acts of genocide and ethnic cleansing in Africa, Asia and Europe, Falk is correct in stressing that the immediate task is to find ‘the will and means to oppose those forms of extremism’ (Falk 1996: 13). Therein lies the importance of peacekeeping specifically, and more broadly, the UN system, in addressing these various manifestation of disorder. And to this end, the UN has attempted to rise to the challenge. During the forty years from 1948 to 1988, the UN established thirteen PKOs. In contrast, fortytwo have been established between 1988 and 2002.2 Former UN Secretary-General and active promoter of peacekeeping during the 1990s, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, has stated that: ‘[t]he world is being changed by powerful forces that no state, or even group of states, has the capacity to manage by itself’ (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 7). The development and refinement of peacekeeping techniques is one of the many methods which can be used to achieve the goal of ‘resituating the sovereign state, making governments less responsive to the priorities of global market forces, and more receptive to the needs and aspirations of the peoples of the world, especially those who are most economically, socially, and politically deprived’ (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 13). To this end, ‘the world is ready for government, or rather it is ready for more international governance than ever before’ (Mandelbaum 1994: 17); and with the expansion of PKOs both in number and nature, ‘the UN has become the all-purpose ambulance service for bleeding countries’ (Krauthammer 1992: 78). This is not to suggest that the UN and its PKOs have not encountered serious problems. Kegley has argued that the UN continues to suffer from certain weaknesses, such as the fear of domination by its most powerful member, the United States (US). In addition, there are criticisms that a renewed UN will need more resources to fulfil increasingly difficult peacekeeping commitments (Kegley 1996). But the organisation has sought to address these problems, reflect upon its successes and failures and, as a result, evolve. As will be demonstrated in

Introduction 3 Chapter 6, the Brahimi Report of 2000 is an example of the constant re-definition, development and continuing relevance of PKOs. Yet trying to interpret these developments in the framework of international relations (IR) theory reveals that the mainstream approach, Realism ‘is fundamentally opposed to the idea of international organization’ (Kegley 1996: 29). Although differences exist among types of Realism and the foci of their analysis (most obviously in its later variant, Neo-realism), emphasis is generally placed upon sovereign states as the main actors in world politics. Realism’s rejection of the concept of global governance and an authority higher than the state plays down at best, or even denies at worst, any role for an international organisation like the UN and its peacekeeping functions beyond that of a tool to be employed by the nationstate. As a result, Realism regards states as having to provide for their own security needs in an anarchical international system. However, as new strains of peacekeeping begin to question the once sacrosanct status of the nation-state and ignore national boundaries, the explanatory power of Realism is on the wane (Kegley 1993; Lebow 1994). In contrast, PKOs are gaining acceptance as a valid, multilateral method of providing security and, in fact, the use of force as part of a PKO comes to mind as one of the few justifiable exercise by states of military power in an interdependent post-Cold War world. It could be argued that, to a certain degree, PKOs have become the new ‘just war’ outlined centuries ago by St Augustine and Hugo Grotius. Events are driving IR scholars to find new paradigms and explanatory models and Kegley (1993) has captured this spirit in stating that: The post-Cold War challenges scholars to resume the search for that hybrid combination of both Realist and idealist concepts around which a neo-idealist paradigm might be organized, and attempt to construct, to borrow a phrase, a “Realism with a human face”. Because a concern for justice arguably would serve states’ interest, should not this principle serve as a springboard for the redirection of theory building in the post-Cold War? (Kegley 1993: 142)

Why Japan? In the case of justifying the study of Japan, most scholars are quick to cite the rapid development and economic growth of Japan since the Second World War. However, this task has been undertaken ad nauseum in the literature pertaining to Japan – outlining Japan’s remarkable levels of gross national product (GNP), status as the largest creditor nation and so on – and need not be repeated here. This is very much an upshot of the shock the West received with Japan’s development into an economic superpower from the 1960s and the vast amounts of wealth that accumulated thereafter in Tokyo during the bubble period of the 1980s. As Williams has stated, ‘in a way true of no Asian nation since the vigorous prime of the Ottoman Empire, Japan looms large today in the practical affairs and speculative cares of the contemporary Westerner’ (Williams 1996: xii–xiii). However, despite this attention, the Japanese experience of government, security and foreign policy has singularly failed to enter

4 Introduction into the West’s consciousness and it is not so widely expounded why Japan matters. After having justified the reasons for concentrating on PKOs in the post-Cold War period, it is now necessary to shed light on the salience of Japan’s experience, both generally in the field of security and foreign policy, and specifically in the sub-field of peacekeeping. Japan is one of the few nations to have renounced its right to belligerency and the maintenance of armed forces with an explicit statement in its Peace Constitution of 1947.3 Despite traditional, Western interpretations of anti-militarism based on Christian ethics, Japan has demonstrated a long-standing commitment to antimilitarism rooted in Japanese society and its experience of the A-bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the firebombing of Tokyo, and the reaction to the colonisation of East Asia by the Japanese Imperial Army. With a societal, not religious, basis for this stance (no Western, Christian country, except for Costa Rica, has ever renounced violence as a state policy so explicitly), Japan is undeniably worthy of attention to ascertain how this seemingly unorthodox position emerged and whether it is sustainable in the post-Cold War world. This assertion is supported by the efforts of policy-making agents throughout the postwar period to challenge this traditional foreign policy stance in an attempt to transform Japan into a ‘normal’ nation with the ability to exercise the military option. Thus, as a result and in contradiction to its anti-militarist declarations, the Japanese government has come to create and expand the SDF in addition to hosting and supporting US bases. As will be seen in this book, during the 1990s, Japan’s contribution to peacekeeping became one of the issues through which this battle was fought out. There is an obvious gap in the literature addressing and evaluating sufficiently the contribution Japan can make to PKOs as a nation having renounced its right to belligerency, in addition to the influence the UN and the practice of peacekeeping can exert in the promotion of Japan’s role in international society. As will be demonstrated throughout this book, the Japanese experience of security in terms of its Peace Constitution and the respect accorded to both societal and international organisations, especially the UN, provides us with new ways in which to think about attitudes towards, and the influence of, peacekeeping, as well as the way we think about foreign policy-making and the role of state and non-state actors in this process. It will become apparent in the following chapters that state and non-state actors within and outside of Japan have sought to limit Japan’s peacekeeping role with reference to traditionally anti-militarist ideals and values, whereas the UN has played a crucial role in justifying the Japanese government’s evolving peacekeeping role, and ultimately its incremental, military role. Thus, by studying the debates in Japan surrounding peacekeeping, this book will shed light on Western ways of thinking about international relations and unearth new centres of power, in line with the contention that ‘one should study Japan to understand the totality of human experience, not because Japan is part of the whole, but because the Japanese example illuminates the whole’ (Williams 1996: 5). Recognising the Japanese political experience as something different from the Western political experience is crucial in differentiating between the subject and the object under observation, and how the two interact with each other. As Japan is one

Introduction 5 of the only states in the world to renounce its right of belligerency in constitutional terms, and its right of collective self-defence, as an interpretation of the Constitution, what Japan can and cannot do within peacekeeping, and the relevance this has for Japan’s broader security stance is highly relevant. In a comparable fashion to Japan, Finland has suffered from restrictions to its military posture resulting from its actions in the Second World War. However, it has carved out a role for itself as one of the world’s leading peacekeepers (Blomberg 1993). Similarly, participation in PKOs has been used by certain elements in Japanese society and government as the justifying factor for overcoming traditional restrictions and establishing a new military role for Japan. For a time in the 1990s, participation in PKOs appeared to be the issue that was the trigger for a wider reconsideration of Japan’s position in, and contribution to, the international community. However, this had both implications for, and was implicated by, Japan’s role within the dominant US–Japanese bilateral relationship in that, on the one hand, a greater contribution to PKOs led to calls for a greater contribution both to peacekeeping and the bilateral security relationship, and, on the other hand, expansion in the remit of the relationship in the 1990s led to an increasingly proactive atmosphere in which Japan’s role in PKOs could be expanded. In this way, Japan is examined because of its capabilities, rather than because it is there. Thus, this book can very humbly be classified as falling into the work of what Williams has called the ‘miracle men’ (studying Japan because it is important), rather than the work of the Everest-ites (studying Japan because it is there), in an attempt to locate the foundations of Japan’s post-Cold War foreign policy (Williams 1994: 146). As a result, a Japan-shaped hole in the discourse of Western IR theory can be filled in and thinking space opened up.

The structure of this book Traditionally analyses of Japan’s foreign, security and defence policy have been concerned chiefly with the bilateral relationship between the Japanese and US governments and, therefore, an imbalance, with too great a focus placed upon interstate relations, has developed. The relationship between the Japanese state and society has been chiefly ignored and, furthermore, so has the influence of international organisations in framing and guiding Japanese foreign policy. While not overlooking the importance of the bilateral relationship, these links, manifested as norms of behaviour, will be the focus of this book with the objective of addressing a related gap in the literature and enhancing our understanding of both the influence the UN possesses in the post-Cold War world and the way in which Japanese foreign policy is shaped in this new era. To this end the first two chapters will highlight the theoretical debates regarding the role of IR theory in understanding Japan’s foreign policy. Chapter 1 will outline the main approaches to Japan’s international relations in the form of Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism. With this final approach in mind, Chapter 2 will discuss the rise in profile of the study of norms and provide an understanding of their evolution and interplay, both in general and in the specific case of Japan. By adopting this framework of analysis, Chapters 3 to 6 will examine Japan’s peacekeeping

6 Introduction experience from its entry to the UN in 1956 through to the present day. In short, by examining and measuring the role of norms of behaviour in constraining and also promoting Japan’s peacekeeping policy, this book will demonstrate the essential importance and utility of norms in analysing Japan’s foreign policy formulation, in addition to highlighting specifically which norms are on the ascendant and which are in decline in terms of influence – issues addressed in the concluding Chapter 7.

Notes 1 For regularly updated information on Japan’s peacekeeping contribution, visit the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) homepage at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/ index.html 2 For detailed and up-to-date information on PKO, visit the UN Department of Peacekeeping homepage at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/view.htm 3 Costa Rica, the Switzerland of the Americas, also confirmed the abolition of its army through Article 12 of its Constitution promulgated in 1949. It retains a Civil Guard with no authority to intervene in national political affairs and there has also been a debate, comparable to that in Japan, as to whether the Civil Guard is a police force or a pseudoarmy, see Bird (1984). Similar to Japan, Costa Rica only recently began to participate in peacekeeping with its first contribution to the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) of 1989 in Namibia.

1

IR theory and Japan

Making sense of Japan’s foreign policy After having outlined the topic under investigation in the Introduction, let us now turn to how Japan’s foreign policy in general, and its peacekeeping contribution specifically, have been understood. This chapter will outline the traditional approaches to the discipline of IR with two objectives in mind: on the one hand, to provide an understanding of the mainstream IR paradigms, which juxtaposes with recent debates on and surrounding the role of culture, identity and norms in the extant literature; and on the other hand, to comprehend how the discourse of IR has evolved in the late twentieth century and how it has attempted to interpret Japan, international organisations and the practice of peacekeeping. After introducing each mainstream approach in turn, these paradigms will be related to Japan’s peacekeeping policy to demonstrate the extent to which they provide us with a degree of understanding, or fail to furnish us with the necessary new perspectives in the light of the end of the Cold War. Chapter 2 will build on this chapter by introducing and discussing the analysis of norms in IR and with reference to Japan.

Realism Realist thinking has a long heritage and can be traced back to the writings of Thucydides on the Peloponnesian Wars (circa 400 BC). However, Realism in modern IR is usually associated with the writings of Morgenthau (1973). Thereafter, and in response to the attacks of Liberals in the 1970s (see pp 00–00), Waltz (1979) attempted to reinvigorate Realism by shifting attention to the structure of the international system and Neo-realism was born. The Neo-realist variant sought to improve the explanatory power of traditional Realism by paying attention to the operational environment, namely the structure of and the distribution of power within the international system in which states operate and state elites make decisions (Brecher et al. 1969). It is argued that the overall structure of the international system influences greatly the decisions a state makes. For example, a bipolar system encourages states to side with one of the two poles; alternatively, a multipolar system allows greater room for manoeuvre in a state’s foreign policy choices. It is questionable and outside the remit of this book as to how much of an improvement Neo-realism was upon traditional Realism but note will be taken of its

8 IR theory and Japan contribution and, although admittedly reductivist, for the sake of clarity the original and more encompassing term, Realism, will be employed from hereon. Realism regards international politics in the light of three major assumptions: first, that states are the main actors in world politics; second, that the use of force is effective in realising policy goals that chiefly revolve around the pursuit of power; and third, that a hierarchy of issues exists in world politics with the security field constituting ‘high politics’ and economic, social and ecological issues constituting ‘low politics’. The world of the Realist scholar is one characterised by the constant threat of violence and, due to this constant threat, political integration and cooperation are seen to exist only for as long as it is deemed to be in a state’s interest. It is believed that the world (and human nature) has always been like this and will continue to be so; ultimately, there is little chance of change and progress within the Realist paradigm. History is cyclical and characterised either by conflict and war, or peace through a balancing of nation-states. States remain reluctant to enter into a system of dependence upon other states as the desire to maintain autonomy is paramount. The oft-repeated Realist metaphor regards states as billiard balls, impenetrable and self-governing, impervious to external stimuli. This emphasis on the state extends further to the exclusion of other actors, such as international organisations. Pentland (1976) describes a Realist scenario where various international organisations represent nothing more than a variety of tools, which the state inspects and assesses for utility in achieving its objectives. The more powerful the state, the more easily it can utilise an international organisation for its own ends. Smaller states, which cannot act freely in a unilateral manner, need to form coalitions in order to make the most of international organisations. Whatever the level of multilateral co-operation, the end goal is to accumulate power (Pentland 1976: 632; Young 1995: 201). Thus, international organisations are simply tools of state policy and one more arena in which states can compete for power. Under the Realist view of the world, the UN is not considered a form, or even an emerging form, of world government with the authority to act as such. Rather, the UN is a product of the states that make up the international system and is a forum for these states to pursue their own interests. Thus, the UN is constrained by states’ interests and will invariably fail in its attempts to influence state behaviour. As Huntington has stated, ‘every international organization at some point finds itself limited by the very principle which gives it being’ (Huntington 1973: 337). Realists have little time for the argument that international organisations can behave as autonomous entities separate from the controls of the nation-state and, in contrast, contend that as the number of international organisations increases, so will the dependence of these organisations upon the resources of particular nations and the consent of the nationstate to enter its borders. Morgenthau wrote that ‘it is the testing of this rational hypothesis against the actual facts and their consequences that gives meaning to the facts of international politics and makes a theory of politics possible’ (Morgenthau 1973: 5). With his own standards in mind it appears that when Morgenthau first advocated Realism the theory was sustainable and highly applicable to the competitive inter-state system in the immediate postwar era. It was coterminous with US aims ‘of [exorcising]

IR theory and Japan 9 isolationism, [justifying] a permanent and global involvement in world affairs, [and rationalising] the accumulation of power’ (Keohane 1986: 9). However, in the postCold War world it no longer provides a usable map of a world in which the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War has ended, ethnic and religious conflicts driven by non-state actors proliferate, and security threats begin to encompass issues such as drugs, AIDS and global warming, which have no respect for arbitrary national boundaries. Looking at this post-Cold War world through Realist eyes, one would expect the number of international organisations to decrease as their functional utility declines with the end of superpower conflict. However, it is adaptation that seems to characterise how international organisations have fared after the end of the Cold War, with their continued existence and even increase in number. As stated above, Realist approaches have in general limited the relevant actors to the unitary state actor. The state is the primary unit of decision-making and the state comprises the official decision-makers, the politicians and the bureaucrats, despite the fact that within the government itself there are a number of actors with their own separate agendas vying to affect the foreign policy-making process. In addition, little attention is extended outwards towards international organisations or inwards towards civil society. However, as Hilsman observed, ‘many more people are involved in the process of government than merely those who hold the duly constituted official positions’ (Hilsman 1961: 215). Thus, the influence of internal and external actors, including international organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) transnational corporations (TNCs), and so on, in challenging and questioning the monolithic state structure and the ‘state-as-rational-actor’ assertion, cannot be overlooked. Realism, Japan’s foreign policy and peacekeeping A Realist approach to Japan’s foreign policy would therefore stress the role of the Japanese state in an international system dominated by the US, and the desire to pursue power (power usually being defined militarily) and balance against any perceived threats in the international system. Thus, any aspect of Japan’s foreign policy would be regarded in relation to, and as merely an adjunct to, the US–Japan bilateral relationship. As regards principal actors, the Japanese state would take precedence over civil society and international organisations. The Neo-realist emphasis on the structure of the international system also sheds light on the behaviour of the Japanese state. In the case of Japan, it can be alleged that the international environment has always exerted an influence upon Japanese political decisions since Japan was first exposed to the West and the consequent Meiji Restoration. It was an international system of Western Imperialism against which Japan was reacting in its attempts to enrich the nation. After defeat in the Second World War, the environment within which Japan was able to promote its economic recovery and development was highly influential in the decisions that were made to maximise Japan’s interests. The dominance of the US after the Second World War enabled Japan to develop economically and reduce its security spending by positioning itself under the wing of the US. The policy direction commonly known

10 IR theory and Japan as the Yoshida Doctrine could not have been contemplated under any other international environment. Simply put, this strategy involved avoiding international commitments and proactivism in order to concentrate on the priority of economic growth by keeping military spending and development to a minimum, and relying to a large extent for its security on the US. The result has been described as a first-rate economy/third-rate politics, economic giant/political dwarf, economism or GNP-ism (Dower 1979). What is more, US hegemony helped to promote the pro-US and anticommunist ruling triad within Japan’s domestic political system of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), bureaucracy and zaikai (business world), demonstrating the strong domestic influence exerted by the structure of the international system and the principal actor within that system. Under the Realist paradigm, Japan’s peacekeeping policy is relegated to the lower reaches of the hierarchy of issues in the international system. Although touching upon security issues, Realists would not regard PKOs as providing a justifiable alternative to the ability of states to provide for their own security. In the case of Japan, where its ability to provide for its own security has been circumscribed constitutionally, Realists look for an explanation of Japan’s recent activism in PKOs to the most powerful state in the international system, namely the US. Thus, Japan’s increased contribution is regarded as a result of US pressure in the bilateral relationship between these two states (Watanabe 1996: 330–2). Alternatively, to the Realist, the Japanese government’s recent activism in PKOs may be regarded as an attempt at self-promotion in the international system, with one eye on a permanent seat in the UN Security Council (UNSC) (Leitenberg 1996a: 37–8; Takahara 1996: 64; Drifte 2000). Moreover, with the emphasis placed upon the primacy of state sovereignty, participation in PKOs is seen as a practice at the beck and call of nation-states. If a nation-state wishes to secure the withdrawal of an operation it can always refer to its sovereign borders. PKOs are, in this light, a practice both brought to life and curtailed by the nation-state, with little ability to exert influence upon the decisionmaking processes within the Japanese state.

Liberalism Liberalism (which also has its own ‘neo-’ variant) critiques the Realist view of IR by questioning its characterisation of never-ending conflict and competition, the emphasis placed on the state and its failure to explain co-operation adequately. Ultimately, Realism has flamboyantly been lambasted as it ‘addresses only questions, the answers to which we already knew, and its explanatory framework is the night in which all cows are black’ (Schroeder 1995: 195). In contrast, Liberal theorists are more interested in discovering why and how states co-operate. They also deny any hierarchy among issues, and thus, military and security issues are consequently no longer the dominant issues, or are interdependent upon other issues. In a number of areas, from economics to ecology, the use of the military to find a solution has been precluded and the fear of military attack has declined generally. In addition, Liberalism has sought to supplement the Realist understanding by

IR theory and Japan 11 highlighting the importance of policy-making and actors beyond the state, placing emphasis both within the black box of the state and upon a variety of international organisations. Liberalism stresses the decline of state sovereignty and the inability of state elites to make their own decisions as they are forced to compromise with a series of governmental and non-governmental, transnational and domestic actors. Keohane and Nye cite the energy crises of the 1970s that were categorised as a foreign policy problem; yet this classification becomes muddied by the involvement of domestic interest groups rendering the issue one of domestic politics (Keohane and Nye 1987: 26). It is contended that non-state actors have become as much a part of foreign relations as they are a part of domestic relations. In other words, these new actors have begun to blur the link between domestic and foreign policy. This will be explored in more detail in the next section but the consequence for IR theory is that the divide between domestic and foreign policy is bridged. The range of government interests has had to become broader and non-governmental, transnational organisations have begun to make decisions that exert a global influence. Domestic policy in one state has, thus, begun to exert an affect on the domestic policy of other states. The variety of channels of communication and the global nature of communications reinforces this trend. As a result, the sovereign state, the central tenet of Realism, has been slowly eroded so that it could be said that ‘the actual content of sovereignty, the scope of the authority of the states can exercise, has always been contested’ (Krasner 1993: 235). International organisations can play a variety of roles in the Liberal paradigm: they have demonstrated the ability to highlight a problem in a given country, like the 1974 World Food Conference in the US, or the 1992 Global Summit in Rio de Janeiro. Moreover, international organisations have brought government representatives together who would not normally come into contact with each other, and NGOs can take the opportunity to form transnational understandings on particular issues. This is because international organisations often act as the venue for an increased amount of transgovernmental policy co-ordination. Face-to-face communications between similar organs of different governments can be promoted within the aegis of an international organisation and in this way international organisations become an arena for fostering co-operation. International organisations can, in fact, affect state strategies by serving as templates for policy choices as demonstrated by the nations of Eastern Europe altering their economic policies in order to gain admittance to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). As a result of the multiplicity of channels of communication, the traditional Realist view that state sovereignty and national boundaries will limit the scope of an issue no longer seems to be an accurate assessment. On the societal and governmental level, co-operation among certain groups across national boundaries can be witnessed as a means to politicise a given problem. With a multiplicity of channels and a variety of actors connecting with each other, the role of centralised government becomes compromised when it attempts to give the impression of a united front against a perceived threat. Simply put, the once allpowerful state has been eclipsed from below on the societal level, and from above on the transnational level.

12 IR theory and Japan The burgeoning independence of a variety of international organisations is not only a recent phenomenon but can be seen in the example of the British East India Company, a TNC that cultivated the Indian subcontinent independently of the British government. What makes the current state of affairs different is the scope and number of these actors. In the post-Cold War world more international organisations have been created but with uncertainty as to where the borderline between state sovereignty and the remit of these international organisations is drawn. With all this in mind, the impact of the Liberal approach has been summarised in the following terms: States do co-operate regularly because it is in their own best interest to do so. Co-operation pertaining to particular sets of issues in international relations is reinforced by social learning and results in specific patterns of behaviour and institutions. International institutions are significant to states’ actions because they provide for an exchange of information and help define areas of common interest; they thus affect the formulation of security concepts and strategies. A growing specialization among units resulting from a division of labour leads to increasing participation of states in joint decision-making and contributes to a transformation of the atomistic structure of the international system. (Haftendorn 1991: 13) This has created a system of interdependence that, as Baldwin demonstrates, has a long and rich history helping to underpin its conceptual clarity. Baldwin draws upon the work of Machiavelli, Montesquieu and Rousseau to illustrate the earliest conceptions of interdependence defined in terms of reliance upon others, and, as a result, in terms of the benefits that a state would rather not spurn by reneging upon a relationship. In the twentieth century, writers such as Ramsay Muir and Sir Norman Angell continued this idea of reliance by painting a world where states would join together to achieve a greater good, like peace or economic growth, transcending their own parochial national interests (Baldwin 1980: 483–4). Thus, it would seem that interdependence is a term which is understood not only as encapsulating a degree of sensitivity to other actors in the international system, but also in terms of a dependence on a certain relationship which, being too damaging to break, tends to persist. Either way, it influences the actions taken by the nation-state (Baldwin 1980: 485). Although explored in greater detail in a later section, Liberalism also touches upon the concept of norms as a product of co-operation and the creation of regimes over time. Young has noted that co-operation within institutions leads to ‘identifiable social conventions’ that can limit or encourage state behaviour (Young 1986: 107). International organisations can serve to create the intersubjective meanings and norms and in this vein March and Olsen have suggested: the core notion is that life is organized by sets of shared meanings and practices that come to be taken as a given for a long time. Political actors act and organize

IR theory and Japan 13 themselves in accordance with rules and practices that are socially constructed, publicly known, anticipated and accepted. Actions of individuals and collectivities occur within these shared meanings and practises, which can be called institutions and identities. (March and Olsen 1984: 749) Multilateralist, Liberal approaches are proliferating with the end of the Cold War. Nobody would dispute the power and potential of the European Union (EU). Even institutions like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), once the object of much concern, have redefined their role in the post-Cold War world. The AsiaPacific region, which traditionally had been the exception to this rule, began for a period with the end of Cold War to embrace this new multilateralism with a wide proliferation, reinvigoration and expansion of organisations from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to the Asia–Pacific Economic Co-operation (forum) (APEC). Simply put, Liberalism sees the world through a lens of co-operation manifested in the growing role of international organisations and a more varied agenda for international politics. Domestic pressure groups will be able to bring internal problems to a global arena. States and other actors will gain access to a variety of international organisations in which they can campaign for an issue to be raised. Non-military issues will no longer occupy the position of low politics they once held in relation to the high politics of security. Liberalism, Japan’s foreign policy and peacekeeping In the case of Japan and its peacekeeping policy, we can see a rigid state structure having to address a variety of demands for a multilateral slant to its foreign policy, particularly in reaction to the UN’s calls for proactivism. With all of this in mind, it would be fair to say that for a number of reasons Liberalism is a progression beyond Realism in looking at the issue of Japan’s peacekeeping policy. Liberalism stresses the abandonment of a hierarchy of issues, and thus, peacekeeping can be regarded as a relevant issue. Furthermore, with the distance put between Realism and Liberalism on the issue of the centrality of the nation-state, and the importance of interdependence as opposed to self-sufficiency, other influential actors, like international organisations, can begin to be included in an analysis. Thus, an analysis of Japan’s peacekeeping policy can move away from a dependence on the explanatory power of the bilateral relationship with the US and the dominance of the Japanese state. Furthermore, peacekeeping is no longer regarded purely as a makeshift security palliative, as Realists would stress, but rather as including economic, humanitarian and social aspects, to which states contribute, not solely out of a desire to promote their own narrow interests, but rather as a result of an obligation to and dependence on others to provide security collectively. Therefore, the Liberal approach is drawing closer to fleshing out the initially narrow picture of the world provided by the Realist approach.

14 IR theory and Japan

Japan’s foreign policy-making processes and peacekeeping Although the chief concern of Liberalism is why and how states co-operate, this approach allows us to think beyond the nation-state and turn to the distinct field of policy-making studies, which seeks to look at the processes inside and beyond the black box of the state. The main strand of the literature on Japanese policy-making stresses the dominant influence of the Japanese political elite, consisting of the LDP, the business world and the bureaucracy (Kataoka 1990; Van Wolferen 1993; Hayes 1994). The Japanese bureaucracy is regarded in much of the literature as playing a central role in Japan’s foreign policy-making process with a related strand of the literature portraying the bureaucracy as being hand in glove with the LDP and the business world, reinforced by the interchange of personnel between the three poles of power (Fukui, H. 1977b: 3–4). During the occupation period the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) held a central role in Japan’s policy-making process due to the close ties it had with the US forces. Under the Yoshida Doctrine, the security relationship with the US was of central importance and MOFA was one of the strongest advocates of it. Thus, MOFA dominated this central policy and even the Japan Defence Agency (JDA) saw its role diminished to a purely operational role at the expense of MOFA. MOFA’s strength was, and still is, its specialised knowledge and ability to co-ordinate disparate opinions; the government of the day is seen to rely upon the bureaucracy for the expertise, specialised knowledge, experience and personnel that the bureaucracy can provide. Other traditions of postwar Japanese politics, like the regular shuffling of ministers, has led to ministers being dependent on their bureaucracy for information. Thus, the dominant role of the bureaucracy in Japan’s postwar political climate is a result of a number of factors, including the historically powerful prewar role of the bureaucracy, and the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers (SCAP) postwar reforms with relations between the ruling triad of the bureaucracy, the LDP, and the business world also strengthened by the common fear of what would happen if the Socialists were to gain power. Moreover, remembering that Japan is a country of few natural resources and the resulting dependency on international trade, it may be said that it would be natural for the zaikai to influence the nation’s foreign policy. Large business associations, like Keidanren ( Japan Federation of Economic Organisations) and Nikkeiren ( Japan Federation of Employers’ Associations), dominate business in Japan and through various consultation bodies attached to the ministries, representatives of these organisations are able to meet members of government and exchange views on foreign policy issues. The LDP, the bureaucracy, and business world are able to work together for the common goal of Japanese economic prosperity. Japan’s recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the 1970s represents an example of this phenomenon (Ogata 1977). The business world has often been held responsible for much of the economic nature of Japanese foreign policy as seen in the payment of reparations to East Asia, and for its power as kingmaker within the LDP, with most prime ministers coming from the Ministry of Finance (MOF) rather than, say, the JDA or MOFA. From the earliest days of the LDP, big businesses came together to support the LDP in return for the promotion of policies favourable to the business world. Despite strong criticism, Keidanren continued to make these

IR theory and Japan 15 election fund contributions, often using scare tactics to ensure payment: ‘If the Red Army mobilized and set fire to your companies next June, you would suffer losses of ¥1 billion or ¥2 billion in no time. We must have the LDP win this election in order to prevent this’ (Masumi 1995: 222). Moreover, the old-boy network of university and marriage ties added to the ability of the business world to influence policymaking. Furthermore, through the process of amakudari (exchange of personnel after retirement), the bureaucracy and the bigger businesses have been able to promote an intimate relationship. Thus, this ‘Japan Inc.’ model portrays the Japanese state as an all-powerful monolith with the LDP, the bureaucracy, and the business world comprising the mutually reinforcing and omnipotent organs of state power. This impression of a monolithic structure of Japanese politics has prospered as the mainstream interpretation. This traditional model of Japan’s foreign policy-making has been challenged but still remains, as Fukui has stated, ‘the single most popular and influential model of policy-making in contemporary Japan’ (Fukui, H. 1977a: 22). However, reality is more complicated once emphasis is placed on other state and non-state actors, and the conception of the bureaucracy as a united monolithic structure, which guides Japanese public policy without disagreement, is challenged. Campbell has demonstrated the cleavages between various ministries: the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and MOF over macro-economic policy, MITI and MOFA over foreign aid and export promotion (Campbell 1984: 297–9). One would expect to see MOFA playing an integral role in the formulation of foreign policy; however, with a strong economic interest in foreign policy, a variety of agencies, ministries, and private organisations all have an interest in the foreign policy-making process and a plurality of influences exist. And MOFA has had to second personnel from other ministries and agencies that have the specialised knowledge to meet the new challenges of interdependence, especially issues such as the environment, drugs, AIDS and so on. The influence of a particular ministry over a certain issue is a great deal more complicated than it may seem at first glance. A single issue like the increase in number of US cars imported may involve MITI, MOFA and the Ministry of Transport; the number of foreign workers in Japan can cut across the jurisdiction of MOFA, the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Justice, if not other ministries. Furthermore, who holds responsibility for the SDF and military issues is a grey area that tends to contribute to a reactive policy. The JDA is responsible for the SDF but does not possess full ministerial status. MOF controls the budget of the SDF. Whereas the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI, formerly MITI) controls military procurement. MOFA is responsible for the policy co-ordination of basic and middle or long-term foreign, national security and UN policy – a duty traditionally denied to the JDA for fear of the erosion of civilian control (Gow 1993). Thus, the concept of a unified, monolithic bureaucracy is far from being an accurate reflection. It may well be this plurality of interests that complicates the policy-making process and leads to frustration on the part of foreign counterparts who receive ‘nothing but promises, promises’ from Japanese bureaucrats and then fail to see anything materialise (Haley 1987: 344). Adding to this plurality, another strand of the literature sees the bureaucracy as

16 IR theory and Japan constitutionally subordinate to the Diet. Some writers have promoted the idea of the LDP being in a dominant position over the bureaucracy. Due to the presence of zoku (policy tribes) with specialised knowledge in certain areas, the LDP has been able to curtail the influence of the bureaucracy in the policy-making process and has developed its own expertise and base of knowledge to conduct policy. A policy tribe has been defined as Diet members who have a considerable amount of expertise and practical experience about a particular area of government policy and enough seniority in the party to influence the ministry responsible for that policy area (Curtis 1988: 114). Politicians do not rely solely upon MOFA for foreign policy information. They tend to refer to other sources, often against the advice of MOFA bureaucrats, like their own ko¯enkai (support groups), or public opinion. Furthermore MOFA is further weakened by its numeric inferiority to other ministries and is often regarded as ranking low in the pecking order of ministries, losing out to other ministries and regularly coming into conflict with other ministries over jurisdictional control. In some ways the bureaucracy can be overcome by the politicians, as was demonstrated by Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei’s avoidance of MOF in raising funds for his own policy objectives (Kakizawa 1977: 53–65) However, with the weakening of ties between the LDP and the bureaucracy, and the increase in the number of career politicians rather than bureaucratic politicians, the power of the bureaucracy over the policy-making process waned. As Pempel has quipped, ‘[j]ust as war is too important to be left to the generals, public policy had become too important to be left to the bureaucrats’ (Pempel 1987: 288). In his oft-quoted examination of Japan’s reactivity in its foreign policy, Calder has highlighted the domestic level and Japan’s political and social structure (Calder 1988). The influence of internal constraints could be witnessed during the 1980s in the fragmented character of state authority, as van Wolferen put it, ‘a complex of overlapping hierarchies . . . There is no supreme institution with ultimate policymaking jurisdiction’ (Van Wolferen 1986–7: 289). These ideas are supported by Cowhey, who put forward the idea more strongly that domestic institutions colour a state’s policy: a country’s rise to great power [status] does not assure a conversion from international free riding. Increased power may make it logical for a country to become a ‘good citizen’ internationally, but its political institutions may not support that position. (Cowhey 1993: 301) Calder states that with the fragmented character of state authority in Japan, decisive action is more difficult to achieve than in countries with a central chief executive. Japanese politics is characterised by factional divisions, a slow process of consensus building, a weakened prime minister who is ‘the custodian of the national consensus, not the creator of it’ and a heavy reliance on the bureaucracy (Pyle 1987). An even more pluralistic view of Japanese politics places emphasis on factors like public opinion, opposition parties, norms and ideas both within and outside of Japan, and divisions within the LDP, bureaucracy and big business in an attempt to explain

IR theory and Japan 17 events which the Japan Inc. model fails to address. Thus, power is diffused, not concentrated in an elite, and policy-making is rendered divisive and often an attempt to build a compromise between various groups, very much in contrast to the rational choice approaches which regard decisions as interest-maximising, rational and the product of individuals. Writers such as Krauss and Michio have characterised Japanese politics as pluralistic by employing the term ‘patterned pluralism’ to describe the various points of reference policy-makers must acknowledge (Krauss and Muramatsu 1987). Nakane has attempted to develop a model of Japanese society somewhere between the two extremes of elitism and pluralism. By placing an emphasis on wa (harmony and consensus) in Japanese society, Nakane (1970) sees the state deriving its power and playing an integral, but not necessarily dominant, role in achieving consensus between various inputs into the policy-making process. The state is the guardian of the public interest and as it cannot use force to achieve its ends must mediate, between the various public and private interest groups in Japanese society without becoming the puppet of either group to achieve the national interest. In this paradigm, the concept of wa is the goal of Japanese policy-making (Nakane 1970). This interpretation begins, as a result, to approach the study of ideas, norms and expectations within Japan.

Constructivism Although Realism and Liberalism shed light on different aspects of IR, it is clear that there are gaps in both approaches that render them both essentially rational, positivist approaches. It is an enormous oversimplification for Realists to claim that states are interested only in the pursuit of power and are in a state of never-ending conflict. Yet Liberalism does not aim to be a critique of Realism and ‘replace one oversimplification with another’, but rather, ‘to encourage a differentiated approach that distinguishes among dimensions and areas of world politics’ (Keohane and Nye 1987: 29). Thus, although it sheds light on new issues and actors, Liberalism still accepts the nation-state as the primary actor in the anarchy of world politics. Moreover, it may recognise norms of international behaviour, but only regulative norms of behaviour and not constitutive ones, a definition that will be discussed in Chapter 2. Furthermore, both paradigms fail to explain change, and especially the end of the Cold War. Thus, the two mainstream approaches of IR are time-bound to this historical period and, as Zacher and Sutton have suggested, ‘Westphalian Realism’ and ‘Westphalian Liberalism’ are more suitable terms for these two main discourses of IR theory (Zacher and Sutton 1996: 18). In challenging these Westphalian paradigms, more critical theories contend that ‘all social reality is subject to historical change, that a normative discourse of understandings and values entails corresponding practices, and that social theory must include interpretation and dialectical critique’ (Fischer 1992: 427). In essence, this means rejecting the ahistoric, overly scientific methods of traditional IR theorists in favour of concentrating on changes in practices, ideas and discourses over time. This stands in direct contrast to Realism and Liberalism which both ignore the possibility

18 IR theory and Japan of social change: the ‘texture of international politics remains highly consistent, patterns recur, events repeat themselves endlessly’ (Waltz 1979: 66). Realists explain this lack of change due to the structure of anarchy using rational, naturalist scientific methods to discover the ‘objective’ laws of international politics; these ‘objective’ laws being that the state is the main unit of analysis and that it behaves in a selfinterested manner tending to balance against other states. More critical IR theorists, however, reject these positivist laws and stress change: ‘the term human nature . . . does not refer to an original or an eternal or a uniform essence . . . new individual and social qualities arise in the historical process’ (Horkheimer 1972: 66). Thus, ‘social events have to be understood by a critical analysis which interprets the discourse of norms and understandings that motivate people to act, which explains the material relations of production, and which undertakes a dialectical study of social contradictions in order to emancipate people for a life of freedom and reason. (Fischer 1992: 430) In this way, critical theorists see the world as a community organised by shared, intersubjective norms, values and understandings that shape human action. For example, state sovereignty is a social discourse dating back to around the time of the Treaty of Westphalia, which has been restated time and time again to make the principle of the nation-state inviolable (Krasner 1993: 235–8). Implied in this is that people possess the ability to change the world for the better by promoting the discussion of new norms like peace, co-operation and exchange as opposed to the Realist paradigm of constant conflict, the balance of power and survival. Furthermore, any research design must include an explanation of how these norms come about, through what kind of discursive practices, and in this way Realists and Liberals are culpable for simply taking the sovereign state as a given without tracing the discourse that led to its acceptance and institutionalisation. With these aims in mind, since the mid-1980s, a new paradigm has joined Realism and Liberalism as the regularly touted ‘usual suspects’ of IR theory: Constructivism (Wendt 1987; Onuf 1989; Wendt 1992; Katzenstein 1996a; Wendt 1999; for a rigourous critique of the constructivist approach, see Zehfuss 2002). The chief contribution of the Constructivist approach lies in its rebuttal of Realist conflict and/ or Liberal co-operation as unquestioned givens. Rather, the structure of international politics is what the constituent parts (more often than not, states) decide to make it. Constructivism regards human nature as neither naturally prone to conflict nor inclined towards co-operation a priori, rather it depends on the socially constructed identities and interests of the actors involved. As Weber states, ‘what states do depends upon what their identities and interests are, and identities and interests change’ (Weber 2001: 60); and, as Berger (2000) suggests: it is incumbent upon the analyst of interstate relations working in the Constructivist paradigm to investigate how the actors in the international system conceive of their interests and their environment, how these conceptions than

IR theory and Japan 19 [sic] translate into concrete defence and foreign policy choices, and how their actions interact to shape actual foreign policy outcomes. (Berger 2000: 411) Constructivism in this sense does not deny Realism and Liberalism as explanations of international behaviour, and in fact Constructivism can complement both paradigms. Rather, it rejects what is taken as given in both theories and attempts to unearth how actors perceive themselves and each other and then behave. Thus, we can begin to examine the norms of behaviour that shape the identities and interests of the actors involved – whether state or non-state. In order to understand how these intersubjective meanings are constructed, it is crucial to examine the history interpreted, language used and the ideas posited in the creation of institutions and norms of behaviour. What is more, in order to understand what has changed in Japanese security and foreign policies, it is necessary to pay attention to how new norms are constructed and how Japanese governmental and societal actors respond to them – a process that will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. Constructivism, Japan’s foreign policy and peacekeeping So, what kind of identities have characterised and shaped Japan’s foreign policy, and what are their origins? The nature of Japan’s foreign policy can be captured by Realism and Liberalism but, by beginning to look at identities, it becomes clear that other factors, including norms of behaviour, have provided motivation for Japan’s foreign policy. The literature repeatedly points to an economic animal that eschews the use of military force to solve global human problems. Again, the metaphors of a first-rate economy, third-rate politics, economic giant, political dwarf, economism or GNP-ism readily come to mind. Equally (as seen earlier), characterisations of Japan as a ‘reactive state’, which responds to crises only in an incremental and piecemeal way, are prevalent. Yasutomo encapsulates the literature on reactivity in the following terms: Japan’s reactivity is portrayed as a congenital defect of the body politic, deeply embedded in the postwar national psyche and the policy process. It constitutes the identity of the Japanese state and nation. This picture argues or implies that reactivity applies to Japan’s entire diplomacy, not just to the political dimension, that it subordinates indigenous motives or interests, de-emphasizes will or choice, and makes few efforts to shape, rather than take the shape of, the environment. This is not the profile of a great power; it is the profile of a dysfunctional state and a passive, stagnant diplomacy. (Yasutomo 1995: 182) Again, this interpretation is rooted in the low-profile, chiefly economic role Japan has played in international politics. In a single sentence this conceptual framework can be summarised as attempting to explain ‘the complex mixture of strategy, hesitancy

20 IR theory and Japan and pragmatism that characterizes Japanese foreign economic policy behaviour in the late 1980s’ (Calder 1988: 518). The main thrust of Calder’s argument is that despite the various fields in which Japanese economic strength manifests itself, the formulation of policy in Japan is still remarkably reactive to external stimulus, especially from the US. Calder’s analysis has two main strands: first, the Japanese state fails to undertake major foreign economic policy initiatives despite the economic power and leverage it possesses; and second, the Japanese state reacts to external demand for activity ‘erratically, unsystematically, and often incompletely’ (Calder 1988: 519). Despite its economic size, population and a history of proactivism before the Second World War, Japan’s behaviour is regarded as more similar to that of a reactive state like Austria or Norway, rather than resembling a proactive middle power like Germany or France. For a variety of reasons, existing both in the structure of the international system and in Japan’s domestic political structure, a more independent policy has never materialised. Other terms have been used to describe Japan’s reactivity, including noriokure (missing the boat), okubyo¯ gaiko¯ (diplomacy of cowardice) and dogeza gaiko¯ (kowtow diplomacy). Essentially they all add up to the same thing, namely, the maintenance of good relations with a majority of states in order to guarantee of access to global markets and raw materials. So, how did this identity of the reactive state come about? The international system borne out of defeat in the Second World War was the system of bipolarity. Under this system two ideological and military blocs faced each other with other states taking their place within a certain bloc, thereby acquiring the economic and security benefits of the bloc leader. Within this system Japan’s place was determined by the signing of the US–Japan Security Treaty in September 1951 bringing Japan into the US-centred collective security system. Furthermore, due to Japan’s lack of natural resources, Japan was forced to receive most of its food, fuel and raw materials from either the US, or states within its sphere of influence. In addition, Japan tended to produce manufactured goods for states within this sphere. This served only to heighten the relationship of dependence between Japan and the US. In other words, the hegemonic role played by the US in the international system following the Second World War precluded the need for an independent Japanese policy. As interests coincided on the issues of a multilateral free trade system and a system of stable exchange-rate mechanisms, Japan was willing to put its faith in US world leadership, minimise its security expenditure, and conduct a foreign policy in a submissive position to that of the US. The Cold War symbolised prosperity and stability for Japan in co-operation with the US, while other states within the Western bloc were willing to tolerate Japan’s closed markets and aggressive export policies for the sake of global security. It is argued that Japan, having demonstrated an excessive adaptation to the favourable Cold War structure of bipolarity, could not begin to adapt its domestic institutions to transformations in the international system in the 1980s and 1990s, and that out of habit Japan has simply continued to play the part of the reactive state following the US. Thus, the relationship with the US has, over time, come to possess strong normative power both regulating and constituting Japanese policy.

IR theory and Japan 21 This strategy adhered to during the postwar period is commonly know as the Yoshida Doctrine. This policy continued unchanged through the 1950s and 1960s despite the fact that Japan gradually achieved international recognition and agreed to various international commitments with admission to the UN, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and a number of other international organisations. Economic growth continued apace while security matters continued to be left to the US under the security treaty. Further policy initiatives ensured this direction of avoiding political-strategic concerns and devotion to a chiefly economic role in the world: the three non-nuclear principles (1967), the three principles of arms exports, the 1 per cent of GNP ceiling on defence spending (1977 to 1986) and an omni-directional foreign policy being the most obvious examples. The result of what is described above is that the only force for change comes from outside Japan. Inoguchi puts it in the following terms, ‘[p]ressure from overseas seems to be the only force that can transcend the framework of Diet operations, strike down the vested interests syndicate, and remodel Japan into a fair society eager to contribute to the international community’ (Inoguchi 1988–9: 58). Moreover, it is argued, repeated pressure from outside does not tend to produce healthy debate on issues and thereby create the appropriate environment for promoting a proactive foreign policy. Building upon this, there is a view that Japan’s identity changed from the 1980s onwards from that of a reactive state to one of a rising state that is seeking to emerge from the cocoon of the Yoshida Doctrine and play a more proactive international role. The literature, which contends that Japan’s identity, once a reactive state, has recently begun to pursue a more proactive foreign policy, yet stopping short of a fullblown political big power, is linked strongly to the idea of relative decline of US hegemony. The Yoshida Doctrine served Japan’s national interest well until the relative decline of US hegemony, shifts in the configuration of the international system, and the changing security environment with the onset of the Second Cold War in the 1970s and 1980s forced Japan to pursue a more independent security policy. The decline in US hegemony could be seen in the withdrawal from Vietnam, the achievement of superpower strategic parity in nuclear weapons and the oil crises of the 1970s. Akaha argues that with the declining ability of the US to stabilise the international system, as seen in Vietnam, Japan was forced to pursue a more independent policy of economic security, encouraged by President Ronald Reagan’s emphasis on burden-sharing. This situation was compounded by the onset of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the appearance of Soviet bases on the Kurile Islands to the north of Japan, the Soviet shooting down of a Korean Airlines plane in 1983, and the military build-up of forces in East Asia, in other words the Second Cold War of the 1980s. Akaha contends that the policy initiatives the Japanese government took in reaction to these developments demonstrated a growing desire to play a more proactive role (Akaha 1991). During the 1980s it was believed, among government circles, that: US military power can no longer provide the security it once did to its allies to strengthen their self-help efforts and particularly in the area of conventional

22 IR theory and Japan forces, and the credibility of the US ‘nuclear umbrella’ can no longer be maintained. (Akaha 1989: 440) Thus the role and identity of a rising Japan, but also a Japan supporting the existing system, developed. Furthermore, with the premiership of Nakasone Yasuhiro in the 1980s, a domestically based call for a more proactive Japanese state became more vocal, ‘the first necessity is a change in our thinking. Having “caught up”, we must now expect others to try to catch up with us. We must seek out a new path for ourselves and open it up ourselves’ (Calder 1988: 525). Japan’s role as a rising state was first witnessed in the 1980s when a more proactive role went by the name of ‘internationalisation’. In a variety of fields, not solely military, Japan’s growing desire to move away from its formerly passive role and undertake a more proactive role was discernible. It is contended that Japan was seemingly aspiring to play a more visible and responsible international role without threatening or challenging the US role as world leader. The decline of military power with the end of the Cold War and the growth in importance of economic power enabled Japan to make a greater international contribution. With high savings rates and a large trade surplus, Japan was in a position to underwrite global public policy undertakings. Sasaki argues that it was not just the economic success of Japan that led it to assume a more proactive role but the subsequent global recession and necessity to restructure the global economy. He also contends that the collapse of bipolarity in the late 1980s contributed to a more independent, proactive role (Sasaki 1991). On a military level, advocates of the rising-state model contend that Japan has displayed an ‘incremental adaptation within an agreed policy framework’ (George Mulgan 1993: 561). Nakasone’s rise to power also heralded the rise of the defence zoku and meant that attention was not paid solely to economic interests. Nakasone was willing to promote Japan as a partner of the US, as seen in the portrayal of Japan as an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ and the removal of the 1 per cent barrier on military spending. With the growth in its economy so the expansion of its military capabilities could be witnessed. The relationship with Washington was strengthened but acquired aspects of an alliance, rather than Japan as the junior partner of the US, with the increase in host nation support. Vis-à-vis the fears of other Asian nations over a growing Japanese military role and the possibility of Japan as the next world leader, advocates of the rising state thesis could justify the expanded role of the SDF as Japan’s growing security role as part of the international community, and not a unilateral, military role. In this light, accusations of an increased role for the SDF or an attempt to project Japan’s military power abroad could be countered with reference to the normative resonance of the UN and internationalisation. With the increased role of the UN as a peacekeeper Japan can be seen to be increasing its international contribution but stopping short of a blatantly independent military and hegemonic role – for the time being at least as this could still be understood as an incremental step towards becoming a ‘normal’ nation with military capabilities. Domestic apathy was cited in Calder’s work as an obstacle to a proactive role, yet by

IR theory and Japan 23 portraying an increasingly proactive role as a contribution to the international good, domestic (and international) fears over the despatch of the SDF can be assuaged. After the Gulf Crisis domestic opposition seemingly quickly evaporated as government-sponsored public education strategies took effect. Even the issue of Article 9 and revision of the Constitution are now firmly on the agenda of public discussion, a trend that before the 1990s would have seemed unlikely. As will be seen later, domestic support for Japanese proactivism is very much in evidence with opinion polls demonstrating the acceptance of Japan’s military role albeit only within the framework of the UN. Finally, Pharr has sought to bring together the opposing strands and has characterised Japan’s foreign policy identity as that of a defensive state that is cautious in character and low risk in practice. By utilising these methods, Japan’s foreign policy: far from being the passive strategy of a reactive state, was a carefully calculated set of actions blending well-timed verbal endorsements of US overall policy, dissociation from any overt role in US interventions, lucrative back stage support within carefully prescribed limits, and a variety of self-containment measures – a blend, in short, that minimized security risk-by-association with the US while reaping maximum economic benefits. (Pharr 1993: 246) In total, these ‘identities’ of Japan can be explained and understood by Realist and Liberal theories, but the important point overlooked by traditional IR theories is that they are informed and constructed by a number of ideals that have over time promoted what Japan should do and limited what Japan should not do: Japan should play a low profile; Japan should not play a military role; Japan should play chiefly an economic role; Japan should live up to its international responsibilities; Japan should not alienate its East Asian neighbours; Japan should work with its most important ally, the US. Chapter 2 examines in turn the constituent parts of these identities: the internationally embedded norms (US bilateralism, East Asianism and UN internationalism and its peacekeeping functions) and domestically embedded norms (anti-militarism) in more detail highlighting how they have shaped the debate on Japan’s contribution to PKOs in the post-Cold War world in order to understand Japan’s contribution to international society.

Summary Each of the traditional IR approaches contributes something to our understanding of Japan and its international relations. However, the traditional characterisations of Japan’s foreign policy identity in the extant literature have failed to recognise fully and in a balanced manner the explanatory power of ideas and norms in Japanese policy-making and appear to be deeply entrenched in Cold War thinking. The reactive state places too much emphasis on the influence of the US and gaiatsu (foreign pressure) and, as a result, asserts that change cannot appear from within

24 IR theory and Japan Japan. Equally, the proactive state approach again falls into the Realist trap of looking to the international system and the most powerful state within that international system in order to understand Japan’s peacekeeping policy. The defensive state attempts to relax this assumption and look within Japan to understand how policy is developed but fails to include a societal element in its analysis and examines only governmental actors. Let us return to the starting point of this book. As will be shown later, a vague but noticeable increase in Japan’s contribution to UNPKO took place from admission to the UN until the eve of the Second Gulf War. From Japan’s first refusals to actively participate in PKOs in the 1950s, through to the despatch of personnel and considerable cash contributions in the 1980s, a shift from passivity to a position slightly closer to proactivism is discernible with this decade representing an important watershed. The period saw Japan develop a degree of independence in its foreign policy that supplemented its relationship with the US as an equal partner, target the UN with the support it commanded at home as an area within which to improve its international contribution, and sponsor independent initiatives. A clear dichotomy exists between its initial policy in the 1950s and 1960s of refusing to involve itself in any issue too controversial, while the Japanese government and MOFA slowly established itself within the organs of the UN (in a fashion more akin to Pharr’s defensive state than Calder’s reactive state) on the one hand, and the attempts at activism of the 1980s on the other hand. The two decades after Japan’s admission to the UN may appear, and have usually been characterised, as reactive in the style described by Calder with Japan subservient to the US, failing to undertake independent initiatives, and adhering closely to the Yoshida Doctrine. Thus, the norm of the bilateral security relationship with the US was of crucial importance in shaping Japan’s identity and defining what Japan would and would not do. To this end, the norm of US bilateralism played the role of both shaping and constraining Japan’s behaviour. Calder’s explanatory model of Japan’s foreign policy to an extent can explain Japan’s policy in this period, with Japan in a position of reliance for its security upon the US. However, Calder’s model fails to explain the instances of Japanese activism in this early period, like gaining non-permanent seats on the UNSC and representation in other areas of the UN, the incremental increase in despatch of personnel, and involvement in conflict resolution in West Irian and Laos. There were other norms at play, as seen in the fact that despite the withdrawal of the US from UN activities in the 1980s, Japan began to play a more active role as a rising state. During this period, Japan – unlike the United Kingdom (UK) in the case of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) – resisted pressure from the US and continued to gradually increase its contribution to the administration of PKOs and the UN as a whole. Thus, gaiatsu was not only resisted, Japan actively stepped up to assume the previous responsibilities of the US. In this light, Calder’s reactive state model fails to provide an adequate explanation. However, the rising state thesis also lacks an understanding of change and tells us nothing about the processes and motivations by which the Japanese government came to assume this more active role. The objective of the remainder of this book is to overcome the short-sightedness

IR theory and Japan 25 of traditional interpretations that centre on the ruling triad and to focus on the marginalised factors such as civil society, opposition parties and the associated norms promoted by and embedded within both Japanese and international society. A number of norms and ideas can be discerned that have shaped Japan’s foreign and security policy and which tend to be ignored in traditional approaches to the Japanese state. For example, Katzenstein has pointed to the uncontested norms of economic security to reduce Japan’s economic vulnerability – a norm that can be regarded as responsible for both Japan’s militarist episode and its postwar policy of aligning itself with the US (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993: 97–100). Furthermore, the Peace Constitution has created a strongly defined and widely understood norm within Japanese society of what is and is not possible in the despatch of the SDF. Rooted in the defeat of the Second World War, anti-militarism has become deeply rooted within Japanese society, seen repeatedly in times of crisis, like the revision of the US–Japan Security Treaty in 1960 and the peacekeeping legislation in the early 1990s, and in an unambiguous opposition to any attempt at militarisation in opinion polls (McNelly 1982: 357; Takeishi 1996). The only way in which this opposition has been compromised is when the despatch of the SDF is under the aegis of the UN; in other words, one norm reinforcing, or piggy-backing upon, another. This norm (like the norm of peacekeeping in the international system outlined in Chapter 2) has been marginalised in the mainstream literature. Thus, an approach is necessary that is pluralist with regard to the relevant actors and ideational factors, recognising both the domestic norms of civil society and the international norms of international society. Chapter 2 will outline such an approach.

2

Norms and Japan

Introduction As raised in Chapter 1, the aim of this book is to examine the oft-described ‘soft’ side of Japan’s participation in PKOs by looking at ideational factors, namely norms, in order to trace the external and internal pressures on the Japanese government and its consequent policy response. Having outlined in Chapter 1 the main approaches to understanding Japan’s international relations in general, and its participation in PKOs specifically, this chapter continues the discussion of norms as introduced to some degree in the Liberal paradigm, but chiefly in the Constructivist paradigm. An approach of this kind improves on Realist and Liberal approaches by examining the identity of actors, something that is not accorded a great deal of attention within both the traditional IR approaches. In spite of the tenets of these approaches, political actors are a great deal more than unitary actors engaged in making rational decisions and, thus, it is necessary to examine the norms that shape the identities of the actors. In this way, the weaknesses of an overtly positivist approach can be overcome and our analytical tools improved. It has been claimed that Japan’s participation in peacekeeping has been overly explained with reference to the Constructivist emphasis on identity and norms, and, as a result, a lacuna exists in the attention paid to the organisational environment (Zisk 2001). Although the emphasis is placed on norms in this book, the existence and importance of other explanatory factors such as agency and structure will not be forgotten. As Barnett states, ‘[t]o concentrate on the ideational to the neglect of the institutional is to ignore the political context in which actors strategize and are potentially organized across a political space and toward a policy outcome’ (Barnett 1999: 16). These are very persuasive arguments in favour of an approach which incorporates and balances the three main traditions outlined above without privileging one over the other (Hook et al. 2001). The structure of the decision-making process and the influence of a variety of state actors in the peacekeeping debate have already been adumbrated (Heinrich et al. 1999: 33–41; Zisk 2001). And with this in mind, this study takes the position that traditional interpretations of IR are not to be rejected out of hand as redundant in the act of throwing the Realist and Liberal babies out with the Cold War theoretical bathwater. The way to improve our understanding of Japan and world politics is to supplement the understanding the traditional approaches have provided with the explanatory power of different factors, such as norms, while still leaving room for

Norms and Japan 27 the consideration of structural and situational determinants of state behaviour. In this way the following problem can be addressed: The end of the Cold War has reminded us once more how naked the emperor of international relations theory is. It will take more than a couple of tailors to provide the necessary clothes. (Jepperson et al. 1996: 72) However, although it is true that a number of identity-centred approaches exist to the study of Japan’s foreign policy and reactivity in participating in peacekeeping activities, these approaches either have not yet applied the debate on norms in IR literature thoroughly to the case study of Japan, and/or have centred on norms as factors only in limiting Japan’s participation, rather than constituting or shaping Japan’s policy. After providing definitions and elaborating a framework for measuring and evaluating the influence of norms, this chapter will continue to introduce the chief norms which have influenced Japan’s international relations, namely antimilitarism, bilateralism, East Asianism and internationalism as manifested both by the UN and its peacekeeping functions in the wake of the Cold War’s end. The way in which these norms affect not only the decisions of actors, but also how they are created and prevail over competing norms is crucially important and provides one of the most interesting areas of growth in the literature on norms. As part of their evolution, however, norms can be accorded some degree of stability, tangibility or ‘embedded-ness’ through institutionalisation in legal documents, historical practice or be manifested in the form of organisations. This is central to understanding how the changes in Japan’s foreign policy and contribution to PKOs were realised. For example, the Japanese government and its people went through a soul-searching process in the 1940s and 1950s that contributed to deciding and defining the norms that would influence its behaviour with a low-profile, chiefly economic and bilateral foreign policy position winning after a competitive process with other norms. This was institutionalised in documents such as the 1947 Peace Constitution, practices like the 1 per cent of GNP limit on military spending, and through membership of a number of the international organisations borne of the postwar Bretton Woods agreements.

Norms The extant literature during the 1990s, not only in IR but also in law, sociology and a number of other disciplines is now peppered with studies of norms, in particular case studies: the decline of piracy, the abolition of slavery and the hunting of whales and elephants (Nadelmann 1990); the PRC’s membership of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Chiu 1992); the development and acceptance of decolonisation (Goertz and Diehl 1992); the evolution of refugee policies in Mexico and Honduras (Hartigan 1992); science policy and the role of UNESCO (Finnemore 1993); the promotion of a modern welfare state and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (Strang and Chang 1993); the norm of racial equality and US

28 Norms and Japan sanctions against South Africa (Klotz 1995); environmental protection and the PRC (Ross 1998); the rights of immigrants in Japan (Gurowitz 1999); introducing norms regarding gender and development in the EU (Elgström 2000); and the clash between the norm proscribing sexual discrimination and the Taliban’s policies in Afghanistan (Verdirame 2001). Japan’s participation in the UN and its peacekeeping duties can be examined in a similar vein. So, a substantial literature with concrete case studies has developed since the early 1990s and has served to promote the study of culture and ideas in shaping identity, expectations and ultimately policy. However, culture and identity are notoriously difficult concepts to define and, thus, with no agreed definition problems exist in utilising the concepts as analytical tools. However, these difficulties can be overcome by examining the constituent parts of culture and identity, namely norms. What is meant by the word ‘norm’? Krasner touches on norms when defining the constituent elements of a regime: Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice. (Krasner 1983: 2) Under this definition of norms and principles, participation in PKOs becomes a sign of commitment to international society from a particular state and a belief in collective decisions. Thus, norms are the basic actions expected of actors in a given issue area. Norms of behaviour often consist of a trade-off between principles and, although bereft of any legal weight, contain a moral weight. The important factor here is a sense of ‘ought-to-ness’ or how an actor should behave. As Ruggie and Kratochwil have shown, ‘norms need not exist in a formal sense in order to be valid’ as actors can ‘exhibit principles and shared understanding of desirable and acceptable forms of social behaviour’ (Ruggie and Kratochwil 1986: 764). Katzenstein has suggested that traditional approaches to the study of Japan’s security and foreign policies, ‘as variants of Realist political thought, both seek causal primacy in the structure of the international state system and the putative effects of that structure on rational state actors seeking to maximize their relative gains in the international system’ (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993: 85). To overcome these heavily positivist approaches, one different area of scholarship can be drawn upon in the form of the role of norms and ideas in foreign policy – the normative context that shapes acceptable and appropriate behaviour which is, of course, itself shaped by historical change. Thus, what is acceptable is altered by time, and consequently interests are affected. What kind of contribution states should make to the international community is a norm that has changed over time. For example, it is not a rule, or a legal norm, that states have to contribute to PKOs. However, as will be argued later,

Norms and Japan 29 peacekeeping has attained with the end of the Cold War the status of a norm, or at least sub-norm or frame (discussed later), in the international system. Goldstein and Keohane’s assert that ‘ideas [which, for the purposes of this study, approximate to norms] serve as road maps’, ‘ideas contribute to outcomes in the absence of a unique equilibrium’, and ‘ideas embedded in institutions specify policy in the absence of innovation’ (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 8–11). This conceptualisation classifies ‘ideas’ into three categories – worldviews, principled beliefs and causal beliefs. Worldviews are regarded as having the widest impact on human thought and action. Examples of worldviews are religions, capitalism or communism, and state sovereignty. Principled beliefs are defined as normative ideas that are worthy of realisation. Examples of these include human rights, abolition of slavery, and environmentalism. In these cases moral authority is important and can be regarded in the same way as military and economic capabilities as a power source (Hall 1997). It is argued that decolonisation was a principled idea that had an enormous impact on foreign policies of both the states fighting for and resisting decolonisation. The final category, causal beliefs, is defined as a consensus among policy elites to address a specific problem, like pollution or financial regulation. The necessity to address a particular problem ensures that decision-making elites will congregate, discuss and introduce policies to alleviate these problems. Of course, these three categories can overlap as is the case with a number of the norms that influence the Japanese government, including the practice of peacekeeping. However, the first two categories of ideas could easily be replaced with the word ‘norm’ as they are essentially ideas promoting how actors ought to behave. In short, a number of scholars have attempted to conceptualise the influence of ideational factors, namely norms, upon decision-making processes. Existence The IR literature has now reached a stage where few would dispute either the existence or the importance of norms. But this was not always the case, as Kratochwil has stated: We understand the international arena largely negatively, i.e., in terms of the ‘lack’ of binding legal norms, of central institutions, of a sovereign will, etc. . . . the conceptual links between order, law, and special institutions remain largely unexamined even for domestic affairs. (Kratochwil 1989: 2) Axelrod (1986) regards norms as standards of behaviour, which, if not lived up to, can result in some kind of punishment. This is a somewhat negative definition of norms – essentially, do (or equally, do not do) this or else – but still of relevance as a constraining or regulative type of norm. Kratochwil’s work, in contrast, is chiefly concerned with contract-making in a legal context and the norms that involve the language of promising. However, theoretical commitments in this discipline can hold for foreign and security policies:

30 Norms and Japan Norms are therefore not only ‘guidance devices’, but also the means which allow people to pursue goals, share meanings, communicate with each other, criticize assertions, and justify actions. (Kratochwil 1989: 11) This is a broader definition than Axelrod’s and allows us to think of norms not only as constraining but also encouraging, or constituting, behaviour. To this end, Katzenstein has defined norms as: social facts whose effects are potentially as important in shaping politics as raw power or rational calculation. Norms typically inform how political actors define what they want to accomplish. Norms help co-ordinate political conflicts (regulative norms), and they shape political conflicts over identity (constitutive norms). To disregard norms and take the interests of actors as given is thus to short-circuit an important aspect of the politics and policy of national security. (Katzenstein 1996b: ix–x) Florini continues the development of the definition and makes the insightful comparison with genetic science. Norms and genes are instructional units that influence the behaviour of the host organisms (Florini 1996). Norms can be of either a domestic or international nature, but both influence the construction of interests and identities. The emphasis is upon how actors ought to behave in reference to a legitimate, not enforced, ideal. Constitutive and regulative norms have been mentioned as types of norms, but a sense of ‘ought-to-ness’ should be added to these two variants, which can encourage and constrain behaviour. Put simply by Finnemore, norms are ‘a set of intersubjective understandings readily apparent to actors that make behavioural claims on those actors’ (Finnemore 1996: 8). There is an associated problem of how do we detect the presence or strength of a norm. However, to this end, there are traces we can follow: ‘norms prompt justifications for action and leave an extensive trail of communication among actors that we can study’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 892). For example, the sending of a thank-you card after receiving a presence would provide evidence of a norm that one ought to thank a relative for a gift, however welcome or unwelcome that gift might be. Equally, in the statements and actions of policy-making agents, one can detect this sense of ought; ‘[t]he manner in which states talk about norms is often just as important, if not more so, than how they act’ (Björkdahl 2002: 13). Thus, by examining both the behaviour and statements of policy-making agents we can confirm the existence of norms and then proceed to trace their development. Evolution Having detected a norm’s existence, it is necessary to examine its growth and evolution – norms are rarely static or permanent and exhibit a life cycle. So, how does a norm become a norm and then become respected and embedded? In the words of Klotz, what is the ‘process by which the discourse of “ought” becomes the

Norms and Japan 31 “is” of behaviour?’ (Klotz 1995: 452). Finnemore and Sikkink suggest that the three stages of a norm’s life cycle are first, norm emergence, second, the arrival at a ‘tipping point’ and thereafter a norm cascade, and third, internalisation (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 896). As ‘norms do not appear out of thin air; they are actively built by agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behaviour in their community’, agency is responsible for the initial emergence and promotion of a particular norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 896). This agency can take a number of forms: individuals, governments, international organisations and so on. The language used to describe these actors also varies from ‘norm proselytism’ to ‘transnational moral entrepreneurs’ (Nadelmann 1990: 481–2). The preferred term here is norm entrepreneurs (Florini 1996). Individuals, government bureaucracies and international organisations have all acted as norm entrepreneurs. For example, Barnett demonstrates how Yitzhak Rabin endeavoured to construct the identities and interests of the Israeli state by creating ‘a cultural space in Israeli politics in which a withdrawal from the [occupied] territories became desirable and legitimate’ (Barnett 1999: 6). As will be shown later, Ozawa Ichiro¯ has promoted the norm that holds that Japan should play an active role in the international community as a ‘normal nation’ instrumentalising both its military and economic power. To this end he has instrumentalised the norm of UN internationalism as a justifying factor – precisely what has been described as ‘domestic “norm entrepreneurs” advocating a minority position [by using] international norms to strengthen their position in domestic debates’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 893). Finally, Finnemore has outlined how an international organisation, UNESCO, broke out of the Realist constraints of state control and acted as the entrepreneur of a norm which ‘held that co-ordination and direction of science are necessary tasks of the modern state’ and was able to teach ‘states the value and utility of science policy organizations’ (Finnemore 1993: 566). It is important to recognise that this collection of actors ‘can engage in practices that attempt to rewrite the cultural landscape, and their motivations for doing so might stem from principled beliefs and/or instrumental gain’ (Barnett 1999: 7). Whether norm entrepreneurs sincerely believe in the norm they are promoting or are using it cynically and strategically is a matter open to debate and perhaps more appropriately a field of inquiry in political psychology. Once emerged and given life by the norm entrepreneur, the norm will find itself in immediate competition with a range of pre-existing norms championed by their own norm entrepreneur and from hereon the norms and their entrepreneurs do battle and build strategies to compete for the hearts of minds of policy-making agents. Strategies of persuasion can involve keeping a competing norm off the agenda, framing the language, symbols, reference points and remit of the debate (a process discussed later), instrumentalisation of other overlapping norms, embedding the norm in a legal document, stressing the punishment and shame associated with norm non-compliance, and so on. To this end, the elements of time and repetition are necessary factors in order to explain how norms change over time and which prevail. Using Florini’s genetic analogy, the ideas of inheritance and competition are important. Like genes, norms can

32 Norms and Japan pass on information and identities previously constructed to the current actor in question. Like a parent to a child, the information that decides how an actor will generally behave is transmitted. Concomitantly, as genes often become warped, die and are replaced, so norms are in competition with each other and differing norms can rise and fall over time. Norms, like mutant genes, find processes by which they can gain permanency and survive. One strategy might be mimicry. For example, through this process incorrect information can enter the mainstream and become institutionalised driving out the original correct information. A good analogy is the tendency people have to misquote. For example, the quotation ‘old wine in new bottles’ is current but incorrect; the original quotation from the Bible is ‘new skins’, not bottles, obvious for anybody aware of their bible but regularly misquoted to the extent that the original citation has almost been lost. Similarly, Hamlet’s line ‘Alas, Poor Yorick! I knew him, Horatio’ is regularly misquoted as ‘Alas Poor Yorick! I knew him well’. Copying and mimicry are vitally important here. Once manifested as policy over time, norms (like genes or misquotations) become institutionalised and written into laws and continue to exert influence on policy, even if the fashion of a particular idea has passed. In order to understand how norms became dominant, it is necessary to trace in detail the process of evolution. After a process of persuasion over time and possible embedding in a legal document, norms can reach their tipping point – a specific point in time at which a majority of individuals have been persuaded or converted to the new norm and are ready to abandon an old norm, akin to Kuhn’s paradigm shift. As will be demonstrated later in this book, the ‘ought-to-ness’ of Japan’s participation in the UN and its peacekeeping activities reached a clear tipping point and thereafter bandwagoning or cascading could be witnessed by uncommitted floaters so that the norm of UN internationalism was, by and large, accepted. The post-tipping point stage is known as internalisation. By this stage the norm has achieved an unquestioned level of acceptance and has become a settled norm at which point ‘any argument denying the norm (or which appears to override the norm) requires special justification’ (Frost 1996: 105). Discussion of concordance with the norm receives little attention and is as good as automatic. The traces of discussion and justification, which allowed us to identity an emerging norm, have all but disappeared by this stage. We have come full circle; the new norm is now the orthodoxy and it will not be long before new emerging norms challenge this orthodoxy and another life cycle begins. Strength During a life cycle which norms exert an influence and which are ignored? This is strongly connected to the strength of a norm and the way that is measured. The power of a particular norm may be limited to a region or extend globally. Thus, norms vary in their influence and their stage of evolution, or the point in their ‘life cycle’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 892). What is more, a norm can be seen as only as strong as the entrepreneur who promotes it. As Nadelmann states, ‘norms emerge and are promoted because they reflect not only the economic and security interests

Norms and Japan 33 of dominant members of international society but also their moral interests and emotional dispositions’ (Nadelmann 1990: 524). The US is a particularly influential norm entrepreneur and is able to persuade a number of other states to adhere to its norms. In other words, it is easier for President George W. Bush to proselytise a war on terrorism persuasively and effectively to a global coalition of states than it would be for the Prime Minister of Israel. How can we measure the strength or ‘robustness’ of a norm? Norms can be assessed based on the three principles outlined by Legro: first, specificity, how well defined and understood a norm is; second, durability, how long a norm has been recognised; and third, concordance, how widely recognised a norm is and thus how legitimate it is (Legro 1997). This gives us a framework by which to judge the strength of a norm and if these criteria are applied to a set of competing norms it should be possible to judge the degree of ‘norm prominence’ and rank the influence of respective norms (Florini 1996: 374–5). This task will be undertaken in Chapter 7. Interaction In addition to the strength of a norm, the degree to which a norm fits with existing norms will have a bearing on its survival (Florini 1996). Thus, a skilful norm entrepreneur will try not to rock the boat too vigorously, rather seeking to gain recognition for a norm through the existing environment created by the pre-existing norms. One strategy for doing this is by the use of ‘frames’. Barnett defines a frame as a persuasive device used ‘to help fix meanings, organize experience, alert others that their interests and possibly their identities are at stake, and propose [often alternative] solutions to ongoing problems’ (Barnett 1999: 25). These devices are the constituent parts of a norm, as Payne states, ‘[f]rames are basic building blocks for the construction of broadly resonant norms and they thereby serve to legitimate normative orders’ (Payne 2001: 39). For example, the norm of sending a thank-you card would be justified by using the frame that the sender would feel hurt not to receive any recognition; the norm that Japan should open its doors to various forms of internationalisation would use the frame that Japan’s low birth-rate necessitates an influx of foreign workers (for this and other frames see Gurowitz 1999: 435); the norm of the non-use of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons would stress the frame that emphasises their destructive and indiscriminate power. These frames are used in the process of norm promotion and imbuing them with a degree of appropriateness, resonance and legitimacy. In this way, norm entrepreneurs battle to frame the debate, set the limits of discussion, reiterate particularly resonant frames and thereby promote their own normative interests. In this battle some norms may fail to dislodge a prevalent competing norm and perish. However, others are more robust. The way in which one norm can replace another norm has been termed the point of ‘critical mass’ or, and the preferred term here, ‘tipping point’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 893). This is the point at which an old, no-longer-convincing norm is replaced by a new norm. For example, nobody today would suggest in all seriousness that women should leave the room after dinner so the men can drink brandy and smoke cigars. However, one hundred years

34 Norms and Japan ago this was accepted practice for a certain socio-economic class in the UK. At some point, the behaviourial norm of gender equality reached, after some entrepreneurial promotion, use of frames and bandwagoning, a tipping point and thereafter became accepted and internalised through copying and mimicry.

Japan and norms So, which norms are relevant to Japan? As stated earlier, this focus on norms does not mean that issues of structure and agency will be neglected. The analysis that follows in Chapters 3 to 6 will rather supplement these traditional understandings with the importance of studying norms (Hook et al. 2001). Rather than looking to the international system or the most powerful state within the system, as a Realist would to explain Japan’s increased contribution to PKOs, a great deal can also be learned by paying attention to the relevant norms of behaviour both within Japan and international society and how they interact with the factors of structure of agency (see in particular Berger 1993; Hook 1996; Berger 1998). As Katzenstein (1993) has stated: most variants of structural analysis take as a given the normative context in which actors define their interests. But structures often embody different norms and thus give different cues as to what actors should do. And in times of change when structures crumble, these norms acquire particular importance in informing actors about the interests they hold. (Katzenstein 1993: 266) Especially when the Cold War structure of bipolarity has collapsed, it is necessary to look to new areas for original viewpoints, one of which is the study of norms, regarding them not as given, but as affected by historical change and informing the decisions of policy-making agents. Anti-militarism One of the most influential domestically embedded norms influencing Japan’s foreign, security and defence policies throughout the postwar period is antimilitarism. It demonstrates a high degree of specificity, durability and concordance. This norm originated in the efforts of intellectuals, social movements, political parties, especially of the left-wing, to give it roots in Japanese civil society and is manifested in the postwar settlement and Constitution of Japan, particularly the Preamble and Article 9: Preamble We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the National Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful co-operation with all nations and the blessings of liberty throughout this land, and resolved that never again shall we be visited with the

Norms and Japan 35 horrors of war through the action of government, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly establish this Constitution. Government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, the powers of which are exercised by the representatives of the people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people. This is a universal principle of mankind upon which this Constitution is founded. We reject and revoke all constitutions, laws ordinances, and rescripts in conflict herewith. We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peaceloving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honoured place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want. We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but that laws of political morality are universal; and that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other nations. We, the Japanese people, pledge our national honour to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources. Article 9 Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. (see Hook and McCormack 2001) The importance of this particular domestic norm as a constraining factor can be seen in the fact that a number of Japanese prime ministers, including Kishi Nobusuke and Sato¯ Eisaku, were broadly in favour of continuing the US–Japan Security Treaty, hosting US bases in Okinawa and expanding Japan’s support for the US war in Vietnam, but were still limited by the domestic, societal norm of anti-militarism institutionalised in the Constitution. In the case of Kishi, he was forced to resign in 1960 after the revision of the treaty, and in the case of Sato¯ , he was heavily criticised for his policy on Okinawa’s reversion in 1972. Anti-militarism in Japan has a durable and deeply social origin, unlike Western anti-militarism, which is rooted in Christianity. Anti-militarism in Western philosophy is rooted in the writings of St Thomas Aquinas and the idea of a ‘just war’. It could be argued that this thinking justified wars if based upon religious conversion of surrounding ‘heathen’ faiths. It is noteworthy that it is only in a non-Christian country, namely Japan, that anti-militarism has been officially adopted as government

36 Norms and Japan policy – reinforcing the non-religious nature of Japan’s anti-militarism. This pacifist thought has also been tied to Marxist and Christian thinking with the thinker Tabata Shinobu stressing the dialectic that the Peace Constitution addresses in improving the general happiness of humankind. Japan’s need for stability and consequent support for anti-militarism can also be seen in financial and geographical terms. It was stated that no developed country more than Japan would be crippled by a nuclear strike. Moreover, no country more than Japan requires peace for the stable functioning of international trade and finance (Baba and Howes 1978). Before the Second World War there was a small, but vocal, tradition of anti-militarism led by thinkers and politicians such as Ando¯ Sho¯ eki, Shidehara Kiju¯ ro¯ and Niitobe Inazo¯ . What is more, the social element and durability of Japanese anti-militarism can be seen in the Ashio copper mine incident of 1903 where pollution from a copper mine supplying the military infected the local water supply and resulted in a number of ¯ ta 1992). However, these early examples of antiprotest marches in Tokyo (O militarism were largely put in the shadows by Japan’s militarism and invasion of East Asia. Yet, defeat as encapsulated by the two atomic bombs, the firebombing of Tokyo, and the American occupation provided the experience which gave this antimilitarist norm meaning in Japanese society as seen in recurrent opinion polls (Hook 1996: 100–28). There is a sense that any expansion of the military in Japanese society will jeopardise the democratic society Japan has become since the Second World War – a particularly prominent theme during the 1960 demonstrations surrounding the extension of the US–Japan Security Treaty. The idea of anti-militarism in one country is still very strong in Japanese society; in other words, although other nations may adopt an aggressive policies and stances, Japan should rise above this and maintain a peaceful approach to the conduct of its foreign policy. An anti-militarist public opinion also stems from a belief that concentrating on economic development and prosperity should shape Japanese foreign policy, ensuring Japan’s economic welfare and leading to a world free from conflict. Japan’s anti-militarist stance has been manifested in both the Constitution of 1947 and the Kyoto school’s interpretation that the spirit of the Constitution is always the same and should not be changed by interpretation due to the whims of particular politicians in power at that time. This norm is reinforced by the SDF Law, several policy documents, and adopted standards, like the 1 per cent of GNP limit on military spending or the three non-nuclear principles ( Japan shall not possess nuclear weapons, produce them or permit their introduction into the nation). These elements that make up Japan’s limited military stance either originated from outside stimulus (for example, the Constitution, which, although accepted by the Japanese people, was a result of the occupation period) or were domestic responses to either external or internal pressures to limit Japan’s military growth (for example, the 1 per cent of GNP spending limit). MOFA has described this postwar period as providing the Japanese people with a ‘psychological cocoon that had protected them from the world at large throughout the postwar years’ (MOFA 1997a). By the 1990s the anti-militarist norm had displayed such high degrees of specificity, durability and concordance and had become so embedded in Japanese society that the ‘postwar military restraints have become the core of the country’s self-image’ (New York Times, 5 May 1992).

Norms and Japan 37 In this light, Japan ought not to contribute to PKOs as it would be the thin end of the militarist wedge. One Japanese scholar, Watanabe Osamu, has interpreted Japan’s recent activity in PKOs (as well as its official development assistance (ODA) contributions) as a step in the development of Japanese neo-imperialism. Watanabe argues that the strength of domestic anti-militarism in Japan against the overseas despatch of the SDF created one of the strongest set of ‘shackles’ (ashikase) against the growth of Japanese neo-imperialism. Moreover, the adoption of the International Peace Co-operation Law (more commonly known as, and hereafter, the PKO Law) in June 1992 is regarded as an important first step in the progression of Japanese militarisation, the incremental revision of the Peace Constitution and the attainment of a permanent seat on the UNSC. Under the name of ‘international contribution’ the Japanese government is seen to be implementing a neo-imperialist policy in line with the bilateral relationship with the US, to which we now turn (Watanabe 1996: 328–34). US bilateralism The US–Japan alliance has often been called ‘the world’s most important bilateral relationship – bar none’ (originally attributed to former US Ambassador to Japan, Mike Mansfield, and thereafter regularly repeated in the extant literature). Despite vocal and violent opposition to the security ties with the US throughout the postwar period, but peaking in 1960 as mentioned previously, it would be foolhardy to downplay the durability and concordance of this arrangement especially in relation to Japan’s national identity and policy-making process. During the Cold War period the US provided for Japan’s security, and a norm developed in Japan’s foreign and security policies that dictated that there was no need or desire to participate in security affairs while attention was being paid to economic recovery and the US could be relied upon. However, US pressure was also in evidence. It was the strong ‘encouragement’ of the US that led to the creation of the National Police Reserve in 1950, converted to a National Safety Force in 1952 and finally assuming the title of SDF in 1954. During this period forty-four Japanese minesweepers were sent to the Korean peninsula to assist the UN forces in mine clearance after a request from the US. This is another area where the norm of antimilitarism clashed with the norm of the role of the US in the international system. Furthermore, US pressure in 1968 was evident when US Ambassador to the UN, George Ball, remarked in Tokyo that the UN’s ability to send observers and armed contingents on peacekeeping missions to the world’s danger spots would be vital to future peace (Leitenberg 1996b: 9). This call for action, as with other cases, was met with immobilist statements on the paramount position of the Japanese Constitution, the anti-militarist nature of Japanese domestic society and the fears of East Asian nations as regards Japanese remilitarisation. However, especially in the late 1970s and early 1980s with the US withdrawal from Vietnam and the intensification of Cold War tensions, the security ties with the US were expanded in scope. As a result, the 1978 Guidelines on US–Japanese Defence Co-operation promoted a joint strategic plan between the SDF and US military in the event of a Soviet attack on Japan. Under the Nakasone administration,

38 Norms and Japan this trend was actively pursued as Japan attempted to shape itself as an unsinkable aircraft carrier as part of the US global strategy against Communism. Despite the shift from Cold War to post-Cold War systems, for the foreseeable future, a strong relationship between the two most important economies in the world seems likely to persist. This is in the interests of the US as ‘there is no more important bilateral relationship than the one we have with Japan. It is fundamental to both our Pacific security policy and our global strategic objectives . . . the lynchpin of US security policy in Asia’ (Department of Defense 1995: 10). And to this end the 1978 defence guidelines were revised in 1997 to include an expanded role for Japan. Thus, despite the end of the Cold War, the bilateral relationship with the US has increased in specificity, durability and concordance, and served to sustain the idea that Japan’s foreign policy should revolve around the US. East Asianism East Asianism is often regarded as a norm that encourages a more regionally based identity for Japan, up to and including a leadership role. After the Meiji Restoration it was the norm for Japan to leave Asia and enter the West (datsua nyu¯o¯ ). The Cold War and the norm of bilateralism reinforced this locating of Japan among the Western capitalist states. Although Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru in his initial speech to the UN aimed to give a degree of specificity to the norm by proposing that Japan would play the role of a bridge between East and West, Japan rarely managed to do this, although on occasions this role has prompted Japan to behave in a proactive manner. One successful attempt was in 1959 when Laos, faced with military incursions from Vietnam, brought the matter to the UN. Japan was seen by the West and the parties to the conflict as an acceptable mediator and a potentially explosive Cold War conflict was averted (Ueki 1993: 350). However, with the end of the Cold War, the East Asianist norm is in the process of increasing in specificity, durability and concordance. This can be seen in a number of multilateral regional projects that have provided the fora for Japan to rediscover its East Asian identity; for example, ARF, ASEAN+3 (ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea) and Japan’s reaction to the East Asian financial crisis. As will be demonstrated later, this has been an important encouraging factor in Japan’s peacekeeping policies. However, the norm of East Asian can also be seen to play a constraining role as a variation of the domestically embedded anti-militarist norm. The attitudes of East Asian nations, especially China and the two Koreas, which suffered most under Japanese imperialism from the end of the nineteenth century, and the way in which these attitudes have been perceived in Japan have reinforced the regulative antimilitarist norm. This has rendered, on the one hand, the nations of the region wary of any sign of Japanese militarism, and, on the other hand, Japan’s foreign policy and policy-making agents reactive to this external stimulus. The areas in which this norm has been most salient have included Japan’s economic penetration of the region resulting in riots during Prime Minister Tanaka’s tour of Southeast Asia in 1974, the controversy over official prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo dedicated to the spirits and memory of Japan’s war dead, and the revision of

Norms and Japan 39 Japanese schoolbooks so that Japan’s wartime aggression in the region was described as an ‘advance’ (shinshutsu) rather than an ‘invasion’ (shinryaku) (Rose 1998). As a result both Japan’s peacekeeping policy and its foreign policy in general has been deeply influenced and rendered reactive by the regulative norm of domestically embedded anti-militarism, the attitudes of its East Asian neighbours and the manner in which Japanese policy-making agents have interpreted these attitudes. Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo’s declaration of the doctrine of rejecting militarisation and promoting heart-to-heart understanding with the nations of Southeast Asia in 1977 is an example of Japan’s caution in dealing with the region. Singaporean diplomat, Tommy B. Koh, encapsulated the importance of both the US and the attitude of East Asian nations, ‘[i]f Japan stopped relying on the US nuclear umbrella and became an independent power, it would destabilize the region’ (International Herald Tribune, 17 December 1991). Only in the 1980s and the 1990s, with the collapse of Cold War structures and the growth in the work of the UN, did Japan’s policy come under the influence of a differing, more constitutive international norm, as will be shown next. UN internationalism The norm of internationalism promotes the resolution of global human problems on a multilateral basis through international organisations such as the UN. Historically the internationalist norm and Japan’s commitment to multilateralism have been regarded as weakly defined in the fields of specificity, durability and concordance, as evinced by Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933, its late membership of a number of postwar international organisations, and the structure of the Cold War international system forcing Japan to act as a lackey of the US in the UN. In this light, Drifte has stated, ‘its [Japan’s] multilateral record is still not on a par with its economic power’ (Drifte 2000: 9). What is more, it has been stated that, in economic terms, the Japanese government lacks a strong commitment to international norms, with no sense of ‘internationalism in the sense of identification with the international community, with human kind as a whole, that is, rather than in the sense of good neighbour punctiliousness about international obligations – which the Japanese have in good measure’ (Dore 1986: 245). Japan’s admission to the UN in 1956 saw the proclamation of the three pillars of Japan’s foreign policy: first, the centrality of the UN; second, Japan would co-operate with the democratic nations of the world; and third, Japan would align itself with the nations of Asia. The year 1956 also saw the creation of the National Defence Council (NDC) charged with the duty of creating national defence policies and plans – its pivotal contribution being the Kokubo¯ no Kihon Ho¯shin or Basic Policy for National Defence (BPND) of May 1957 (Bo¯ei Hakusho 1997: 320). Article 1 of the document stressed the importance of support for UN peace activities. However, until such a time as the UN could function as envisaged at the end of the Second World War, Article 4 called for Japan’s defence policy to be aligned with the US in the event of an external threat. From the point of view of the Yoshida administration, the UN was a mechanism by which the Security Treaty with the US could be justified. If the treaty made reference to the UN Charter and its principles then the Japanese public could

40 Norms and Japan be persuaded into accepting US bases on Japanese soil as a duty under the popular principles espoused in the UN Charter (Yoshitsu 1983: 47–8; see also Hosoya 1981: 23). Thus, although the structure of the Cold War international system and the strength of the US norm was ultimately persuasive in the Cold War period, an embryonic recognition and respect for the norm of the UN’s brand of internationalism was evident from the time of Japan’s admission to the UN and was used by defence planners in promoting the bilateral relationship with the US. This was a similar line to that taken in Article 4 of the US–Japan Security Treaty of September 1951, which stated that: This Treaty shall expire whenever in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and of Japan there have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan Area. (Hook 1996: 200–1) Thus, beyond being a rider for the bilateral relationship with the US, ‘UN-centred diplomacy’ was never defined in concrete terms and the early period of Japan’s membership within the UN was characterised by attempts to establish itself, such as winning elections to a non-permanent seat of the UNSC and increasing its representation within the UN system, while relying on the US for its security needs. However, it can also be argued that a strand of proactivity in Japan has targeted the UN as the forum for Japan’s international contribution. With the end of the Cold War, the UN has been liberated to a degree from the East–West confrontation that did so much to curtail its work: ‘[t]he UN plumbing has been in place for many years, even though nothing was flowing through the pipes’ (Coate and Puchala 1990: 129). The end of the Cold War seemingly has allowed the water to run more freely through the pipes than it ever could and the UN has gained in the norm gauges of specificity, durability and concordance. To this end, the internationalist norm entrepreneur has been Ozawa Ichiro¯ in particular. The frames used to promote this norm point to the need for Japan to become a ‘normal nation’ and thus Ozawa emphasises a new desire to ‘step up to the broad array of global responsibilities ordinarily borne by major nations’ can be witnessed. ‘We have learned that just being a peaceful nation is not much of a philosophy if it is not backed up by a willingness to take action in defence of freedom and peace’ (Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 April 1992). Channelling this participation through the UN provides the Japanese government with a diplomatic panacea in the sense that ‘[c]ontributing to the strengthening of the UN’s peacekeeping and peacemaking functions obviously supplements the US security guarantee for Japan and makes the existence of the latter more palatable to some of Japan’s neighbours’ (Drifte 2000: 57). What is more, the external influence of the Secretary-General as a norm entrepreneur must be taken into account. With the increase in the number of PKOs, Japan appears to be in a position to pick up an ever-increasing cheque and the Secretary-General can, in the way Cox (1969) suggested, play the role of ‘executive head’ and encourage Japan to

Norms and Japan 41 underwrite UN expenses and contribute personnel by offering support for Japan’s UNSC seat bid. Immerman has noted a number of additional catalytic incentives for Japan to participate in the UN, which also add to the degree of concordance with, and thus the strength of, the norm of UN internationalism. First, the idealistic way in which the Japanese population regard the UN. The UN has regularly, since its creation, received high levels of support in opinion polls in Japan and is seen by the Japanese population both idealistically and as a yardstick to measure how Japan stands in the international community (Immerman 1994: 184–6; Ogata 1995: 255; Takenaka 1995: 77–81). Public opinion polls have been interpreted to suggest that the Japanese nation regards the UN as the provider and conduit for their contribution to international peace and security (DiFilippo 2002). This popularity can be seen in government circles if the 1990s plethora of ‘vision’ books by Japanese politicians and the references therein to the UN are taken seriously (Hosokawa 1993; Hashimoto 1994; Ozawa 1994; Takemura 1994; Fukushima 1996: 53–4). What is more, support for UN agencies, like UNESCO, is especially strong in Japan (Ogata 1995: 257). Second, the desire of Japan’s political and business communities to gain recognition for Japan’s postwar economic achievements is mentioned by Immerman (1994). The political and business communities have regularly attempted to acquire status within the UN by maintaining seats on organisations like the OECD and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Third, the LDP and MOFA’s campaign to gain a permanent seat on the UNSC. To this end, MOFA (and particularly the UN Bureau of MOFA) has, during the 1980s and the US withdrawal from much UN work, attempted to increase Japan’s financial contributions and personnel (Immerman 1994; Drifte 2000).

Peacekeeping as a norm As will be demonstrated later, peacekeeping is both a principled idea in Goldstein and Keohane’s (1993) sense in that it was created in the postwar world in the spirit of the UN Charter to eradicate war and poverty, and also a causal belief in so far as it was an attempt, in the face of the East–West stand off, to navigate the UN through the inertia that resulted from unprincipled use of the veto in the UNSC (Durch 1993). The following sections will demonstrate, with reference to Legro’s (1997) criteria for measuring norms, how peacekeeping has progressed to constitute a norm of IR with reference to the above definitions. Especially as the UN itself has increased in relevance with the end of the Cold War, so have its peacekeeping functions. This section seeks to outline the historical process by which, despite not being referred to in the UN Charter and lacking a degree of specificity, peacekeeping has become a recognised behavioural norm of the international system, especially in the post-Cold War world. Specificity Defining peacekeeping is a difficult task: ‘[p]eacekeeping is an uncertain, unpredictable, and unregulated international operation’ (Diehl 1994: 8). Obviously each

42 Norms and Japan peacekeeping operation, like the conflict it is meant to address, has its own characteristics, objectives and degree of success. However, certain continuities, styles and hybrids can be seen and it is by concentrating on this inventory of PKOs that various definitions of peacekeeping undertaken during the Cold War period and into the post-Cold War period can be posited. ‘Peacekeeping is a technique which has been developed, mainly by the UN, to help control and resolve armed conflicts’ (Goulding 1993: 452). The concept and practice of UN peacekeeping evolved on an ad-hoc basis as the UN adapted to the unforeseen circumstances of the Cold War. Nowhere in the UN Charter or in the writings of those who set up the UN system in 1945 does the term ‘peacekeeping’ appear. Under the catholic term of peacekeeping, a variety of functions existed including monitoring cease-fire arrangements, supervising the disengagement of forces from a conflict area and establishing a buffer zone, fact-finding and providing humanitarian assistance. Placing peacekeeping in historical context, the practice was a response to the paralysis the UN security provisions suffered with the onset of US– Soviet stand-off. Peacekeeping was seen as an effective method of containing regional conflict and preventing it from escalating into a direct East–West confrontation ( James 1993: 32). The International Peace Academy has defined the term as ‘the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third-party intervention organised and directed internationally, using multi-national forces (MNFs) of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace’ (Rikhye et al. 1974: 11). This definition is worthy of attention because it de-emphasises the action of enforcement and places the emphasis upon mediation and negotiation. The theoretical underpinning appears to be that violence and conflict can be controlled and limited through non-violent means and through the process of negotiation. Peacekeeping does not solve an issue at the heart of a conflict; it brings an end to the conflict so that a solution to the issue may be found. Peacekeeping’s aim is not to provide solutions to global problems, but to furnish those involved in a conflict with the environment and opportunity to resolve the issues. By examining the actions undertaken by the various UN operations, a certain number of common factors can be identified which are encompassed by and add to the specificity of the term peacekeeping. Goulding and Findlay have outlined a number of principles that help to define peacekeeping (Goulding 1993: 453–5; Findlay 1996: 24–9). First, the consent and co-operation of the parties to the conflict. PKOs require the permission of a particular state to enter the sovereign territory to be patrolled. In contrast, enforcement actions do not. PKOs have respected the concept of state sovereignty as lack of consent would jeopardise the neutrality of an operation and fail to limit hostilities. Consent can be seen as an important factor when Nasser withdrew it in 1967 forcing the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I), supporting Wainhouse’s contention that ‘where cooperation of the parties is not sustained and whole-hearted, a positive result will be difficult to obtain’ (Wainhouse 1996: 557). Second, international backing, especially in the UNSC, is necessary. This is another prerequisite to maintaining an impartial

Norms and Japan 43 role and a non-threatening character. Operations originate within the UN and not with a particular nation and subsequent command is retained within the UN (thus, under this definition the police action in Korea (1950–3) and NATO’s actions in Kosovo (1999) are not categorised as peacekeeping). International backing accentuates a peacekeeping force’s (PKF) attractiveness and facilitates acceptance by member states that may think twice about allowing foreign troops onto their soil. Third, UN command and control is a prerequisite. Under the UN Charter, it is the UNSC (Chapters 6 and 7) and the Secretary-General using his ‘good offices’ (Article 9) which possess the power to instigate a peacekeeping operation; the General Assembly is imbued only with the power of discussing and making recommendations to the UNSC (Article 11). Fourth, the non-use of force has been generally recognised as a characteristic of PKOs (Liu 1992). It has been said that when the first peacekeeping troops were despatched to the Palestine in 1948 they carried revolvers, but no ammunition. Provisions for the non-use of force (except for self-defence) are usually contained within the rules of engagement drafted for each operation. Traditionally, only light weapons have been carried because peacekeepers are sanctioned to use force only in self-defence. This goes hand in hand with peacekeeping being regarded as a confidence-building measure and taking a non-threatening stance. Fifth, the military and political neutrality of the UN between belligerents is a necessary condition. PKOs do not target an enemy, which may be the case in a collective security action. Ideally, there are no judgements made by peacekeeping troops as to who is guilty or not and independence between the policies of each belligerent must be retained (Ko¯ zai 1995: 27). With all this in mind, Goulding (1993) tentatively defines UN peacekeeping as: Field operations established by the UN, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under UN command and control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary. (Goulding 1993: 455) In addition to these characteristics, co-operation from all parties involved is required. Ultimately, this is what distinguishes peacekeeping from enforcement. Peacekeeping involves creating a ‘thin blue line’ separating parties in conflict and creating the atmosphere for negotiation. With the end of the Cold War, the characteristics that have begun to be compromised include the consent of parties involved, the impartiality of UN forces, and the use of force. However, these conditions have been ignored in previous missions and the ‘new-ness’ of this peacekeeping is not necessarily the most salient factor. Operations are case-specific and as former UN SecretaryGeneral Boutros-Ghali noted, ‘peacekeeping has to be reinvented every day’ (UN Document A/48/1: UN Report on the Work of the Organization, 12 September 1993). Thus, although initially lacking in a degree of institutionalisation, in the Cold War period and especially after the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping came to acquire

44 Norms and Japan the recognition and intersubjective understanding a norm requires. Moreover, the practice of peacekeeping can claim a heritage of sorts. Durability Peacekeeping has been called ‘a modern application of an ancient arrangement – that of the use of impartial and non-threatening go-betweens’ (Verrier 1981: 11). The concept of peacekeeping can claim a long history and high level of durability going back to before the creation of modern international organisations (Singer and Wallace 1970). A case can be made that peacekeeping as a concept can be dated back to the Crusades, or the Napoleonic Wars. Although punitive, the collective security action in Shanghai at the end of the nineteenth century against the Boxer Rebellion involved 20,000 US, British, French, Russian, German, Japanese, Italian and Austrian troops. Thereafter, the Saar plebiscite of the 1930s was supported by international troops deployed to prevent rioting and maintain public order. Other examples can be cited in Crete in the twentieth century, the Aåland Islands and the Graeco-Bulgarian Crisis. But whatever the period, peacekeeping has always been placed within the context of international politics as the collective decision of a number of states to come to a troubled state’s aid. Although all these operations were ad hoc in the same way much UN peacekeeping would prove to be, they did not display any co-ordination in military planning and did not have the sanction of an international body to legitimise their actions. This was first seen with peacekeeping undertaken by the League of Nations. After the First World War, a desire to bring an end to the scourge of war led to the creation of the League of Nations and the drafting of Article 10 and Article 16 of the League’s Covenant to sanction collective security actions. Two well-known examples of the League’s operations involved the administration of the Saar between 1922 and 1935 and the organisation of a plebiscite to determine possession between France and Germany (mentioned previously). A similar operation was thereafter undertaken with the city of Danzig coming under the protection of the League. Minor PKOs took place with the League attempting to broker deals over the possession of the city of Vilnius between Poland and Russia and the region of Mosul between Britain and Turkey. A PKF of sorts was even despatched in 1933 – consisting of seventy-five men – which sought to arbitrate the possession of the province of Leticia between Peru and Colombia. However, when the concordance of the Covenant was tested by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, it was found lacking. Articles 10 and 16 sanctioning collective security actions were never enacted as Japan possessed veto power over any decisions. In the case of the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935, severer measures were enacted by the League in the form of sanctions; however, with Britain, France and the US ignoring these sanctions and the idea of an international community for their own national interest and the recognition of Italian domination in North Africa, the League’s attempts at collective security once again came to nought. To summarise, the failure of peacekeeping under the aegis of the League was due to a number of reasons: first, the great powers were unwilling to sacrifice

Norms and Japan 45 their interests for the interests of the international community; second, the necessary unanimous voting structure in the League led to passivity; and third, there were no League troops to undertake PKOs in the unlikely event that a resolution was agreed upon. The UN’s earliest attempts at peacekeeping took the form of observer missions. UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) was the first UN operation that resembled modern peacekeeping as conceptualised later in the UNEF I mission. Despatched in 1948, UNTSO aimed to supervise a truce in the Palestine. A similar operation, UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), was created in 1949 and despatched to the India–Pakistan border. Although not referred to at the time as such, these operations displayed some of the characteristics that define the modern practice of peacekeeping. For instance, they were unarmed in adherence with the principle of the non-use of force. UNEF I first despatched in 1956 can be regarded as a watershed. The objective of UNEF I was to contain the Suez Crisis precipitated by military action taken by Israel, France and Britain against Egypt. This new strategy of ‘peacekeeping’ was to improve the functional role of an observer mission and avoid the hostility of great powers caused by proposing an enforcement action. The mandate for this mission, although sanctioned by the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution (demonstrating further how peacekeeping was an attempt to circumnavigate the East–West confrontation), was given life and specificity by the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, when he outlined the principles which were to shape the development of PKOs until the late 1980s: the involved parties’ consent to the operation, the non-use of force except in self-defence, acceptance of troop contributions from small and middle powers, impartiality and day-to-day control of the operation by the SecretaryGeneral. This mandate has been described as ‘a conceptual masterpiece in a completely new field, the blueprint for a non-violent, international military operation’ (Fetherston 1994: 13). The success of UNEF I can be seen in the phase of activism in the field of peacekeeping that followed. Observer missions continued with UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) in 1958, UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) in 1963, Mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP) in 1965 and UN India–Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM) in 1965. PKOs on the scale of UNEF I were undertaken with the Opération des Nations Uniés au Congo (ONUC: UN Operation in the Congo, mentioned later), UN Temporary Executive Authority and UN Security Force in West New Guinea (UNTEA/UNSF) in 1962 and UN (Peacekeeping) Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1964. This period saw the UN at its most active in the field of peacekeeping until the collapse of the Cold War. The crisis in the Congo between 1960 and 1964 demonstrated the limits of PKOs, came closer to defining what was and was not involved ideally in the act of peacekeeping, and added to its specificity as a norm of international society. The operation resulted in the UN using force to restore order, prevent the secession of Katanga and aid the central government in governing the country. ONUC presents an exception to the peacekeeping rule: an ambiguous mandate; no cease-fire and,

46 Norms and Japan thus, no peace to keep; an internal conflict with undisciplined elements in the Congo like the Congolese National Army; and an eventual revision of the mandate leading to the abandonment of the principles of the non-use of force and impartiality. With the failure of ONUC and the withdrawal of UNEF I in 1967 at Egyptian insistence, UN peacekeeping retired into the shadows with no operations undertaken until 1973 saw a revival of PKOs centred around the Middle East. The UN Emergency Force II (UNEF II) was created in 1973 and despatched to Sinai, soon after UNDOF in 1974 and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 1978 were sanctioned. After this spurt of activity the UN peacekeeping initiatives again took a back seat due to the resurgence of the Cold War with the Reagan administration. Despite the activity in the Middle East (described earlier), there were no PKOs undertaken between 1965 and 1988. Only with the willingness of the US and the USSR to cooperate were demands for PKOs heard once again and the process of acceptance in international society given another boost. The end of the Cold War saw PKOs continue, to an extent, in the same vein with observer missions monitoring cease-fires – what has been termed ‘traditional’ or ‘first-generation’ peacekeeping. However, peace-building and peacemaking elements also came to the fore, two terms that have caused a great deal of trouble as regards their definition. Boutros-Ghali described peacemaking as ‘action to bring hostile parties to an agreement’ and peacebuilding as ‘efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people’ (UN Document A/47/277–S/24111, 17 June 1992). These definitions appear to be similar to traditional peacekeeping, but in practice can be seen in the operations undertaken in Cambodia and East Timor, characterised by nation-building exercises such as election-monitoring and human rights regulation, and in Somalia and Yugoslavia, characterised by enforcement and humanitarian efforts such as assisting refugees. Concordance As Findlay has demonstrated, the level of global concordance with peacekeeping has increased rapidly with the end of the Cold War. A number of states (not only Japan) have begun to actively participate in PKOs including the US, South Korea, China, Germany – in addition to the traditional peacekeepers of Canada, Finland, India and so on. Prior to the UNTAG operation of 1988, twenty-six states had participated in UN-led peacekeeping activities – a figure which rose to seventy-six by November 1994 (Findlay 1996: 2). There is evidently some motive or sense of responsibility for states both old and new, large and small, powerful and weak to make some contribution to PKOs. Seemingly, PKOs have become a norm in international society to which states feel a compulsion to respond. In 1988 the UN’s peacekeepers were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for their traditional peacekeeping activities adding to its acceptance and recognition in international society. The UN was the recipient again in 2001. One major reason for this increase is that the end of bipolarity allowed both the chance of settlement of certain conflicts but also ignited new conflicts. The response has been an expansion in the number, quality and remit

Norms and Japan 47 of PKOs undertaken by both the UN and a steadily increasing number of international organisations. Examining the motives for this increased participation in peacekeeping, altruism can be pointed to in two ways. First, the humanitarian desire exists, as it always has done, to assist a fellow member of the international system, demonstrated in the operations in Somalia. Second, participation in peacekeeping has been regarded by a number of traditional and reliable peacekeepers, such as Canada and Finland, as a norm for responsible members of international society that can enhance a state’s reputation and standing. Realist motivations can also be pointed to. Contributing to peacekeeping can also be inspired by a desire to enhance security. As a means for achieving security in Asia, the ASEAN states championed the UNTAC operation in Cambodia. The issue of security can also be seen in the contributions of smaller states hoping to enhance their reputation in case they need to receive peacekeeping assistance in the future. This is what Findlay has called ‘a down payment on future assistance’ (Findlay 1996: 8). Contributions can also enhance a state’s prestige in furthering its own objectives, particularly in acquiring a coveted permanent seat on the UNSC; all the states currently vying for seats are now contributing to PKOs – Japan, Brazil, Germany, Nigeria and so on. However, there are other illuminating ways to regard motivations in peacekeeping contributions. The state in question may not always be a unified actor and the foreign ministry may often be promoting participation more actively than other state organs. Equally, public opinion is a factor especially in the more humanitarian operations. There is certainly a Realist side to the motivations for contributing to PKOs. Some states may be attempting to profit by UN reimbursements, to acquire more advanced equipment, and to receive free training for their troops. However, no single motive can explain a state’s decision to participate in PKOs. There will always be a mélange of reasons. The important point is that the end of the Cold War has complicated the family tree of peacekeeping operations with new duties extending the remit and specificity of peacekeeping. Moreover, a sense of ‘ought’ exists regarding participation in PKOs so that ‘the days of turning up equipped with only good intentions, blue berets, and a cut lunch are over’ and states have begun to consider their participation more earnestly (Findlay 1996: 1).

Summary To summarise this far, I have outlined an approach to the study of Japan’s contribution to PKOs centring upon the examination of domestic and international norms. I have built upon this approach, on the one hand, by highlighting the extant literature on norms as regards definitions and life cycles, and, on the other hand, by singling out not only the norms pertinent to Japan but also the practice of peacekeeping. Based on these foundations, the following chapters will examine specifically the case of Japan’s participation in peacekeeping operations and how these norms have emerged, interacted and exerted influence. By 1990 and the outbreak of the Gulf Crisis, the situation in Japan was that the traditional norm of anti-militarism was largely intact as was the militarily restrictive nature of relations with the rest of East Asia. As Berger (1986) has stated, ‘as a result of their [ Japan and Germany]

48 Norms and Japan historical experiences and the way in which those experiences were interpreted by domestic political actors, [ Japan has] developed beliefs and values that make [it] peculiarly reluctant to resort to the use of military force’ (Berger 1996: 318). To this end, Japan’s relations with its East Asian neighbours served a similar purpose. The bilateral relationship with the US was equally of great importance but it was possible to begin to see the UN, and in particular its peacekeeping functions, beginning to be established as a new norm of international society in an embryonic form. With the outbreak of the Gulf War (as will be seen in Chapter 4), these norms came into conflict with each other and called Japan’s identity and political culture into question. However, in order to comprehend and contextualise what happened during the early post-Cold War period, it is necessary to trace and understand the debate on Japan’s peacekeeping policy during the Cold War.

3

The Cold War, 1956 to 1990

Introduction Little attention was focused in the extant literature upon Japan’s contribution to UNsponsored peacekeeping activities during the Cold War period. Retrospective interest developed only during the Second Gulf War and the consequent passing of the PKO Law in June 1992 (as will be seen in Chapter 4). However, it would be an oversimplification to characterise the passing of this law as nothing more than an automatic reaction to the demands of Japan’s Gulf War allies, principally the US. The emphasis should, rather, be placed upon the processes that had begun some time previously to shape the environment in which Japan’s reaction to the Second Gulf War took place. To quote Marx, ‘men make their own history, but not just as they please. They do not choose the circumstances for themselves, but have to work upon circumstances as they find them, have to fashion the material handed down by the past’ (Marx 1926: 23). Thus, in addition to outlining Japan’s contribution to peacekeeping during the Cold War, this chapter will also outline the material handed down by the past in the form of Japan’s post-Second World War political culture. Within this operational environment, there are, of course, a number of actors attempting to establish their agendas and ideologies as a norm for the rest of society by the use of frames; thus, this chapter will delineate between competing norms during the Cold War period to uncover which were of influence, and ultimately concur in part with Berger’s assertion in Chapter 2 of Japan’s anti-militarist value system.

Postwar rehabilitation Immediately after the Second World War, during Diet debates on the draft Constitution of 1947, the extent of Japan’s contribution to the UN was raised in the light of the possible need for constitutional revision. Nanbara Shigeru, future President of the University of Tokyo, raised the issue in the House of Councillors in terms of the world community expecting a peace based on justice in which Japan would be expected to participate, especially in the UN’s peace activities (Sato¯ 1993: 13–14; Dore 1997: 57). Sasaki So¯ ichi, also a university professor and member of the House of Councillors, raised the issue in stressing co-operative efforts to attain

50 The Cold War, 1956 to 1990 international peace and the importance of Japan’s active role therein. In both these cases, the Yoshida administration’s reaction was to stress specifically the centrality of Article 9 to Japan’s foreign policy and refused to postulate on how Japan may react upon joining the UN (Sato¯ 1993: 14–15). Debates within the Diet thereafter centred around the question of whether Japan would be forced under UN membership to despatch Japanese troops abroad on missions like that in Korea, or if Japan could fulfil the criteria for membership if it were not to despatch troops on peacekeeping operations. In June 1954 the House of Councillors eventually silenced debate on the issue and approved a resolution preventing the despatch overseas of the SDF (Ogata 1995: 252). All these debates attest to the emergence and existence of (and tensions between) the norms of anti-militarism and UN internationalism. Throughout these debates, the government continually stressed Japan’s right to individual self-defence but not collective self-defence. Thus, the SDF Law, enacted in 1954, contained articles prohibiting the despatch of SDF troops abroad mainly in consideration of what Japan might be obliged to do under the terms of the treaty with the US, although with obvious implications for participation in PKOs. During this period Article 9 was the oft-quoted restricting frame of the anti-militarist norm. For example, upon being questioned by LDP politician Namagi Yoshio, Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo acknowledged the argument for sending troops abroad but insisted that in the case of Japan, due to Article 9 and its denial of the right of belligerence, it would be improper for Japan to contribute and overstep the bounds of the Constitution (Proceedings of the 19th Regular Diet Lower House Committee on Foreign Affairs, no. 16, 13 March 1954: 10–13). This opinion was reiterated by Shimoda Takezo¯ , Chief of the Treaties Division, stressing the despatch of Japanese troops within the limits imposed by the Constitution as being ‘impossible’ (Proceedings of the 19th Regular Diet Lower House Committee on Foreign Affairs, no. 27, 27 March 1954: 9–10). The controversy of Japan’s participation in PKOs at this time can be seen in the divisions within the chief entrepreneur of the anti-militarist norm, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), caused by Sone Eki, the party’s spokesman on foreign affairs. In a 1954 party congress document, he outlined a new direction for Japanese foreign policy that involved a more equal Security Treaty with the US, support for a policy of gradual rearmament, and the participation of Japanese troops in PKOs. These divisions were overcome by the suggestion of a permanent UN armed force to deal with peacekeeping while the issue of Japan’s participation therein was shelved (Stockwin 1968: 67). Upon admission to the UN in 1956 fears were widespread in government, public and media circles about what role Japan would play in security arrangements, and whether the UN Charter would compromise and militarise Japan’s role in the world. The government maintained that the Constitution forbade any despatch of military forces for the purpose of using armed force beyond self-defence of the Japanese homeland and that the UN’s peace activities were a manifestation of this. Soon after admission, Japan served its first term as a non-permanent member of the UNSC and played an integral role in the drafting of the resolution establishing UNOGIL (Yanai 1993: 34). This degree of participation was acceptable; however, an equally impor-

The Cold War, 1956 to 1990 51 tant legal obstacle to Japan’s more active participation was the SDF Law, which required alteration in order to allow the despatch of Japanese troops. During the Cold War period this was impossible due to domestic and left-wing opposition within the Diet (Peek 1985: 258–63). The Constitution, Article 9, and the lack of a legal framework to allow SDF despatch were prohibiting factors (and legal manifestations of the anti-militarist norm) leading to a policy of chiefly financial and minimal personnel contributions to the UN. The opposition parties championing the anti-militarist norm supported co-operation with the UN but regarded the LDP’s motives as being based upon a desire to expand the interpretation of the Constitution. It must be remembered that in this period classic peacekeeping operations involved the carrying and possible use of weapons; a further factor limiting Japan’s participation to the financial sphere. In July 1958 UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, acting as a norm entrepreneur (a role later assumed by a number of UN Secretaries-General), promoted the idea of active Japanese participation by formally inviting the despatch of personnel on the observer mission UNOGIL in the Lebanon – a request channelled through Japanese Ambassador to the UN, Matsudaira Ko¯ to¯ (Yanai 1993: 34; Shinyo 1994: 48; Ogata 1995: 252–3). Despite this official request and the JDA’s initial enthusiasm (Heinrich et al. 1999: 9), the Japanese government was constrained by the anti-militarist norm, the consequent hostile domestic climate and the lack of legal provision for the despatch of Japanese personnel on UN peacekeeping operations – all of which were cited when the government declined the request. However, the following year it did decide to despatch a diplomat to a minor fact-finding mission in Laos – an option of despatching civilian personnel that was repeated in 1971 and 1982 (Peek 1985: 264). At this time Professor Sakamoto Yoshikazu of Tokyo University published his seminal article, ‘The defence structure of a neutral Japan’ (chu¯ritsu nihon no bo¯ei ko¯zo¯), and placed further emphasis on Japan’s relationship with the UN. Acting as a protonorm entrepreneur, Sakamoto envisaged a UN Police Force, similar to that despatched to Egypt during the Suez Crisis, as an alternative to reliance upon the US for Japan’s security needs. This UN-sanctioned MNF of kokusai ko¯muin (international officials) would be stationed in Japan and, unlike the US–Japan Security Treaty, would guarantee a truly independent defence policy and inspire reassurance among the Japanese people (Sakamoto 1959: 42–6). In this way, the idea of reliance upon the UN rather than the US was mooted at this early stage. As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, the end of the Cold War enabled Sakamoto’s ideas of UN-centrism to regain some relevance. In January 1961, rumours began to circulate that the UN had once again approached the Japanese government about the possibility of SDF participation in ONUC (Asahi Shinbun, 18 January 1961, cited in Heinrich et al. 1999: 11). Later that year, Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato contended that despatch of the SDF would be constitutional if the PKO in question was one of policing and maintaining law and order (Ogata 1995: 252). However, due to objections from the opposition parties, the government did not attempt to push the issue. Although 1961 also saw

52 The Cold War, 1956 to 1990 Matsudaira acknowledge that it was inconsistent for Japan to adhere to UN principles and not make its troops available for peacekeeping operations, he was forced by the Diet to withdraw the comment and faced calls from the opposition parties for his resignation (Peek 1985: 265; Saito¯ 1987: 195; Tanaka 1995a: 90; Heinrich et al. 1999: 11–12). Hayashi Suzo¯ , Director-General of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, clarified the government’s position in the wake of Matsudaira’s comment in the following terms: If the UN police activities are conducted in an ideal form, in other words, when a country that disrupted order within the UN system is to be punished, or in the case of establishing a police corps to maintain order, and if a unitary force under the UN is created with the participation of personnel despatched by member countries, then [ Japan’s participation in a force] would not be an act of a sovereign nation. Also there is a possibility of a peaceful police force which does not conduct military activities. These possibilities would not pose problems relating to the First Clause of Article 9. (Tanaka 1995a: 91, cited in Leitenberg 1996b: 9) In reaction to Matsudaira’s backdown, MOFA outlined a UN Resolutions Cooperation Bill in 1966, which stressed Japan’s compliance with UN economic sanctions and its contribution of SDF personnel (Heinrich et al. 1999: 13). However, the bill and the revision of the SDF Law for which it called were not given a great deal of serious consideration by the LDP government of the day faced with an overwhelming anti-militarist public and the lack of consensus within government circles. Nevertheless, even in this period when the norm of anti-militarism was at its strongest, sections of the Japanese government did begin to assume the role of norm entrepreneur by making clear that they wished to promote the expansion of Japan’s role within PKOs and that the Constitution and Article 9 would not be regarded as an impediment. In 1963 the Budget Committee declared: Inspection activities of the UN Forces not accompanied by any military action would lie outside the scope of Article 9; nor would the participation of Japan in an international police force in the true sense of the word be prohibited under Article 9 of the Constitution. (Peek 1985: 263) And in 1966: if Article 42 [of the UN Charter] were to be set in motion, the actions taken would be that of the UN and not military activities of individual Member States, and thus would not amount to the exercise of the belligerent right of each state participating in it. (Peek 1985: 263) Thus, although the strength of the anti-militarist norm is clearly evident as an

The Cold War, 1956 to 1990 53 established and settled norm, equally the importance of UN internationalism as a norm and standard in international society was beginning to emerge and gain some resonance as the Japanese government sought to respond to international expectations. This can be seen in a number of other examples: first, in the case of the Congo, Japan forged a middle road and opposed any radical Third World proposals that singled out Belgium and the Congolese Army for blame, supporting a moderate solution put forward by the US and Britain (Hosoya 1965–8: 35); second, and similarly, with the despatch of the UNFICYP operation, Japan opposed an Asian– African stance that took sides with Greece against Turkey, giving its support to a statement sponsored by Afghanistan which preserved respect and recognition for Cypriot independence, sovereignty and territory; third, Japan sat upon the Special Committee for Peacekeeping within the UN, being appointed in February 1965 by the President of the General Assembly with the aim of undertaking a comprehensive review of financing UNPKOs (General Assembly Resolution 2006 (XIX)/Rev. I, 18 February 1965); fourth, Japan subsequently reported to the 20th and 21st Sessions of the General Assembly in 1966 and 1967 respectively supporting Canada in adopting a broader method of financing peacekeeping operations to include permanent members of the UNSC; at the same time, with Canadian disillusionment with its peacekeeping role in the UNEF I operation, Japan was considered as a likely contender to adopt the role of peacekeeper for the SDF as part of a contribution to the international community (Wakaizumi 1969: 514; Bloomfield 1970: 558; Kirsch 1970: 477); and fifth, subsequent studies regularly appeared suggesting that Japan ought to attempt to despatch the SDF on PKOs, particularly a report in 1970 published by the UN bureau of MOFA and in 1977 by the Nomura Research Institute (Leitenberg 1996a: 11). However, these attempts at widening Japan’s role invariably conflicted with the anti-militarist norm embedded in Japanese society, which sought to maintain Japan’s low security profile and ensure that Japan’s policy vis-à-vis peacekeeping would be minimal by stressing the debt of history. In general Japan’s war experience was a constraining factor: shock of defeat in the Second World War and the occupation, the poverty that followed, the Yoshida Doctrine’s emphasis upon economic prosperity, and a desire not to alienate East Asian neighbours all served to limit the debate on peacekeeping participation within Japan (Takai 1996: 7–10). This early period clearly demonstrates the embedded nature of the anti-militarist norm within Japanese domestic society; thus, for Japan to participate in PKOs at such a time would have been too controversial coming so soon after its defeat in the Second World War and during the prolonged conflict in Indo-China. This ongoing conflict and the structure of the international system, which ensured that Japan would look to the US for its security concerns, were also considerations in constraining the Japanese government in so far that more active participation in PKOs might lead to US requests for greater Japanese participation in the Vietnam War. However, despite these factors, MOFA, the UN, and in particular its Secretary-General, were all beginning to act as norm entrepreneurs seeking to strengthen the specificity, durability and concordance of the norm of UN internationalism, and tout the idea of Japan’s more active participation. Even though the norms of anti-militarism

54 The Cold War, 1956 to 1990 and bilateralism were dominant at this time, they were unable to quash any discussion of UN internationalism, rather managing to ensure that it remained at a minimal level.

The 1980s As mentioned in Chapter 2, the general enthusiasm for PKOs waned in the late 1960s and 1970s. However, the 1980s witnessed an upsurge of interest in peacekeeping in Japan. In 1980 the Japanese government proposed certain guidelines for the reinforcement of fact-finding missions to the Committee on the Charter of the UN and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization. These proposals included the strengthening of articles of the UN Charter regarding the role of the Secretary-General and the constraining influence of the UNSC. Japan’s proposals aimed to see the creation of a subsidiary organ to be despatched on fact-finding missions and an end to the need for UNSC unanimity on the despatch of these factfinding missions. At this time the government also made clear its interpretation of Japanese participation in PKOs: It is impossible to discuss the right or wrong of Japan’s participation in a UN force in general because the so-called UN forces have different objectives and missions. If the objectives and missions of the UN force in question include the use of force, we believe that the Constitution does not allow the participation of the SDF in it. On the other hand, if their objectives and missions do not include the use of force, the Constitution does not prohibit the participation of the SDF. But because the current SDF law does not give such a mission to the SDF, the SDF is not allowed to participate in it. (Tanaka 1995a: 91; Leitenberg 1996b: 10) Although this statement once again denied the despatch of SDF personnel, the Japanese government continued to participate in debates on the improvement of the practice of peacekeeping. Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko¯ addressed the 37th General Assembly in June 1982 proposing ‘the possibility of establishing a mechanism whereby both global and regional military situations could be monitored and made public as deemed proper’, stressing ‘the modalities of co-operation by Member States in peacekeeping operations’ (Ogata 1987: 963). Later that year, the Japanese delegation to the UN proposed a resolution to the General Assembly working closely with nations of the non-aligned movement and established peacekeepers, such as Austria, Egypt, India, Sweden, and Yugoslavia. In reaction to UN SecretaryGeneral Javier Pérez de Cuéllar’s appeal in his annual report highlighting the global insecurity of the time, Japan’s proposal aimed to strengthen the peacekeeping aspects of the UN by creating a small group of experts under the Secretary-General ‘to undertake technical studies regarding the strengthening and expansion of UN peacekeeping functions’ (Ogata 1987: 962). Although the plan for a panel of experts did not materialise, Japan did manage to pass successfully resolution 37/67 in the face

The Cold War, 1956 to 1990 55 of Western major power opposition, which stressed ‘the imperative need to strengthen the role and effectiveness of the UN’ (Ogata 1987: 962–3). The logical conclusion of promoting this kind of proposal was that Japan would be called upon to make a greater contribution. Furthermore, these proposals were made at a time when public opinion was beginning to shift to allow greater participation (including personnel and not just financial aid) by Japan within PKOs (Ogata 1987: 963–5). Before the opening of the 37th General Assembly meeting, both houses of the Japanese Diet unanimously passed a declaration of support for disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, and Suzuki was, thus, fully cognisant of the acceptance of, and support for, the promotion of peace through the UN, as he addressed the General Assembly: I stand here today in this Assembly Hall, representing the collective will of the Japanese people, as expressed in those resolutions. I am convinced from the bottom of my heart that the common aspiration for peace of all peoples of the world is concentrated in this room. Our mission here is to combine our efforts in response to this common aspiration of mankind and to move decisively together on the road to peace. (Ogata 1983: 39) These proposals mentioned above were re-emphasised by Foreign Minister Sakurauchi Yoshio in October 1982 by proposing ‘a system of prior registration and organisation of the personnel and equipment which the member states are ready to contribute to future operations; and the securing of effective financial backing’, and that ‘Japan, for its part, is ready to co-operate more actively in the strengthening of the peacekeeping operations of the UN’ (Ogata 1983: 40). Soon after there was talk in the press and in government circles of Japan revising the SDF Law to allow the despatch of the SDF on election monitoring operations (Mainichi Shinbun, 24 August 1982, cited in Ogata 1983: 40). The Suzuki administration was keen to continue Japan’s long-term commitment to the UN as a global peacekeeper and expand the role of the SDF in PKOs. However, the strength of the anti-militarist norm ensured that any despatch would be highly sensitive and that MOFA would have to skirt around the issue by making diluted proposals such as sending observers to the UN, SDF medical teams and retired SDF members (Chapman et al. 1983: 33–4). Despite the traditional constraints of the anti-militarist norm, the growing importance of the UN to Japanese security and foreign policy was evident and Ogata is correct in surmising that the further increase in Japan’s role was dependent on the UN and in particular the role of the Secretary-General as norm entrepreneur – a theme that will become more evident in Chapter 4 as peacekeeping establishes itself more solidly as a norm with the end of the Cold War and the Japanese government is able to ‘circumvent this [constitutional] barrier to SDF role expansion’ (Chapman et al. 1983: 34). In 1982 both UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar and MOFA continued to play the role of norm entrepreneurs by enthusiastically promoting the establishment

56 The Cold War, 1956 to 1990 of a private panel to report on Japan’s role in PKOs that included UN Ambassador Saito¯ Shizuo, and academics such as Ogata Sadako (Heinrich et al. 1999: 16–17). The consequent report of 1983 promoted a more active and wider role for Japan in PKOs by advocating step-by-step participation in police operations, logistic support, transportation and communications, medical activities, election supervision and the despatch of military personnel on patrol and supervision missions (Saito¯ 1987: 195–6; Ogata 1995: 253–4). It recommended the strengthening of the UNSC and Secretary-General yet with an incremental approach so as not to alienate Japanese public opinion (Peek 1985: 266–8; Tanaka 1995a: 91). This report was immediately the target of criticism from the opposition parties and was contextualised by Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro as ‘merely one view put forward by a private study group’ (Heinrich et al. 1999: 16 – 17). In 1984 Japan again declared explicitly its intent ‘to co-operate with the world body’s mission to be despatched to monitor the partial cease-fire between Iran and Iraq . . . by providing civilian personnel, necessary equipment or financial assistance’ (The Japan Times, 15 June 1984, cited in Peek 1985: 264). However, this avocation was softened somewhat by the subsequent distancing comments made by Foreign Minister Abe Shintaro¯ that ‘Japan will neither attempt to become a major military power nor send numbers of its Self-Defence Forces on overseas peacekeeping missions’ (The Japan Times, 1 October 1984, cited in Peek 1985: 265). In 1988 the UN eventually adopted Japan’s proposals that aimed at encouraging member states ‘to prevent in their international relations the emergence or aggravation of disputes or situations’; encouraging the UNSC ‘[to send], at an early stage, fact-finding or good offices missions or establishing appropriate forms of UN presence, including observers and peacekeeping operations’; and encouraging the Secretary-General ‘to consider using, at as a early a stage as he deems appropriate, the right that is accorded him under Article 99 of the [UN] Charter’ (Ogata 1995: 247). At the same time, the administration of Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru was promoting an International Co-operation Initiative that was founded upon three pillars, including the despatch of personnel and contribution of financial support for the resolution of regional conflicts (Tanaka 1995a: 91). Three missions – the UN Iran–Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) and the UNTAG operation in Namibia – provided an opportunity for the Takeshita administration to expand its participation within PKOs in the light of the above initiative. One civilian was sent to both UNIIMOG and the mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 1988 (Tanaka 1995a: 91). The Japanese delegation to the UN stated the intention to contribute civilian personnel to the election monitoring process in Namibia as early as 1980 (The Japan Times, 28 July 1980, cited in Peek 1985: 264). And a special study group recommended to MOFA that ‘Japan should play a more positive and broader-ranging role in peacekeeping operations’, and UNTAG, with a considerable civilian element, was seen to be the perfect forum for this expansion (Ogata 1995: 253). This came to fruition in 1989 with the despatch of thirty-one electoral observers to Namibia with the duties of monitoring elections and continued with the despatch of a team of six to

The Cold War, 1956 to 1990 57 monitor elections in Nicaragua under Observadores de las Naciones Unidas para la Verificacion de las Elecciones en Nicaragua (ONUVEN: UN Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua). During this period both MOFA and the UN Secretary-General acted regularly as norm entrepreneurs of UN internationalism and petitioned the Japanese government regularly with the aim of soliciting support, aid and personnel by using the frame of contributing to and being a responsible member of international community. Despite politely considering but ultimately rejecting these requests during the immediate postwar period, the Japanese government began in the 1980s to meet requests from the Secretary-General and contributed civilian personnel and financial aid to UNIIMOG and UNTAG operations. Of equal importance was the role played by MOFA within Japan. MOFA has always been in favour of a greater role for Japan in the UN generally, and its PKOs specifically, with the aim of enhancing Japan’s chances of a permanent seat on the UNSC and thereby gaining recognition of its position in international society (Immerman 1994: 184; Heinrich et al. 1999). To this end, MOFA has regularly instrumentalised the norm of UN internationalism as a justifying factor and throughout the Cold War period attempted to increase Japan’s contribution whenever the opportunity arose, although at times was forced to tone down any blatant support for despatch of the SDF on PKOs in consideration of the anti-militarist norm.

Summary As mentioned previously, a slight, but nevertheless noticeable, increase in Japan’s contribution to UN peacekeeping operations took place from admission to the UN until the eve of the Second Gulf War. From Japan’s first flat refusals to participate actively in PKOs in the 1950s, through to the despatch of non-military personnel and considerable cash contributions in the 1980s, a shift from passivity to a degree of activity is discernible. Thus, the Gulf War is far from being the watershed it is usually portrayed as. The period saw elements in Japanese society and government reconsider the country’s relationship with the US, demanded by the constraints of the international structure of bipolarity, and target the UN with the support it commanded at home as an area within which to improve its international contribution, and sponsor independent initiatives. However, Japan’s participation was still limited to non-combat situations and the despatch of civilian personnel due to the strength of the domestically embedded norm of anti-militarism. The characteristics of Pharr’s (1993) model – aversion to risks, low cost and continuity – can all, in varying degrees, be witnessed in Japan’s UN peacekeeping policy and the influence of the anti-militarist norm. Low cost and aversion to risks are seen in Japan’s desire to play the role of mediator within Asia and Japan’s refusal to comply with Hammarskjöld’s request for a greater Japanese contribution in 1958. Continuity is evident in the manner in which Japan concerned itself with steadily establishing itself within the various organs of the UN system gaining admission and representation on ECOSOC, the International Court of Human Justice, and so on. Immerman

58 The Cold War, 1956 to 1990 (1994), despite noting sources of activism, sees Japan as simply trying not to alienate anyone, pay lip service to certain causes, and pay its UN bills on time: a categorisation in keeping with Pharr’s (1993) defensive state model. Examining Japanese delegates’ declarations in the UN in the 1980s, it appears that some Japanese delegates hoped to avoid the institutionalisation of the practice of peacekeeping as a burgeoning norm. They repeatedly expressed their wariness of the despatch of missions after hostilities have broken out, their suspicions regarding adhoc missions, and doubts about voluntary contributions. Alternatively, support was expressed for the creation of a permanent force funded by all member states on an obligatory basis, emphasising the role of the Secretary-General over the UNSC and exhibiting a truly multinational composition. Thus, Japan saw UN peacekeeping in this period as a stopgap measure on the road to a more tangible and well-organised security system. Yet this period can also be seen as a time when the UN, the practice of peacekeeping, the UN Secretary-General and MOFA started to emerge as both norms and norm entrepreneurs. Having previously refused to contribute to PKOs, the Japanese government began, in the face of increasing financial commitments to the UN and calls from within the UN and MOFA, to step up its visible contribution and, thus, the first civilian personnel were sent on monitoring missions during the 1980s. By 1990 and the outbreak of the Gulf Crisis, the situation within Japan was that the traditional norm of anti-militarism was largely intact and restrictive. The relationship with the US was equally of great influence, but it is possible to discern UN internationalism, and in particular its peacekeeping functions, beginning to be established as a new norm of international society in an embryonic form (the policymaking matrix in Figure 3.1 demonstrates the position of a number of actors in response to the interplay of norms, specifically internationalism as characterised by peacekeeping contributions, and anti-militarism as characterised by constitutional revision during this period). With the outbreak of the Gulf War (as will be seen in Chapter 4), these norms came into conflict with each other and called Japan’s traditional identity and political culture into question.

The Cold War, 1956 to 1990 59 Full peacekeeping participation (e.g. peace enforcement)

* UN No constitutional revision

Constitutional revision

* US

* LDP

* Business world

* Public opinion * JSP * JCP Minimal peacekeeping participation (e.g. financial contributions)

Figure 3.1 Policy-making matrix of Japanese foreign policy during the Cold War, 1956 to 1990.

4

The Second Gulf War

Introduction Although the response of the international community to the Second Gulf War of February 1991 can in no way be considered as an example of a reaction to a PKO, any study of Japan’s evolving peacekeeping policy and the role and influence of UN internationalism as a norm in the development of this policy must begin by necessity with an analysis of the Second Gulf War. As was demonstrated in Chapter 3, pressure on Japan to contribute to UN peacekeeping operations was hardly a new phenomenon. Before the Second Gulf War this pressure had resulted only in Japan’s financial contributions to the UN budget and the limited despatch of civilian personnel due to the constraints of the deeply embedded domestic norm of antimilitarism. However, it was in the aftermath of the Second Gulf War that Japan began a process of political, social and legal soul-searching, while traditional norms came into conflict with newer norms, in an attempt to make a ‘visible contribution’ to the international community’s efforts in the Persian Gulf. For this reason, the Second Gulf War is to be the first case study in this investigation of Japan’s international peacekeeping contribution and the interplay of norms.

A brief history of the Second Gulf War Tensions between Iraq and Kuwait are nothing new. The creation of the Kuwaiti state in 1961 was met with Iraqi threats of invasion. This initial crisis was averted by the creation of an Arab League force to protect the newly created Kuwaiti state and was settled by the eventual recognition of Kuwait by Iraq (Lauterpacht et al. 1991). Thereafter relations were characterised by border disputes over the Shatt al-Arab waterway, the islands of Bubiyan and Warba, and disputed Kuwaiti oil-drilling techniques in contested regions. This tense state of affairs again boiled over into aggression in 1973 with a partial occupation of Kuwait by Iraq, whose withdrawal was eventually bought by Kuwaiti cash payments. Faced with the First Gulf War, Kuwait decided to support Iraq against Iran and extended Saddam Hussein’s regime millions of dollars in loans with which to conduct the war. This eventually led to Iraq emerging victorious after the war, but economically and militarily exhausted, and with few of the issues that had caused the war resolved. US estimates put the cost of the war at US$500 billion. Moreover,

The Second Gulf War 61 Kuwait was one of the most vehement in its demands for the repayment of US$10 billion to US$14 billion in interest-free loans (Wall Street Journal, 18 July 1990). Faced with Kuwaiti intransigence over the relaxation of repayment terms, Saddam behaved in a similar fashion and at an Arab Council Co-operation meeting in February 1990 refused to repay the money, alternatively demanding more money from Kuwait in order to rebuild Iraq. In July 1990, Iraq threatened to use force against any Arab oil-exporting state that pumped excess oil and thereby forced the price of oil down creating difficulties for Iraq’s postwar reconstruction – a threat aimed at Kuwait, which was the main offender in overstepping its allocation decided by OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries) agreements. This threat was followed by a build-up of Iraqi troops on the border with Kuwait, possibly with the belief that the US would not intervene in any conflict between fellow Arab states. Iraqi demands of wiping out its war debts and the acquisition of Bubiyan were issued during talks in Jiddah in response to the failure of the talks to produce any resolution of differences. Events culminated in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on the morning of 2 August 1990 with Iraq quickly overcoming any Kuwaiti resistance (New York Times, 4 August 1990). The permanent occupation of Kuwait and the creation of the nineteenth province of the Iraqi state were announced duly. The reaction of the UN and the international community is examined in the next section, but faced with almost universal condemnation and the build-up of a MNF in Saudi Arabia against the Iraqi invasion under the Desert Shield operation, Saddam attempted to link the conflict with Kuwait to the general situation in the Middle East by agreeing to withdraw from Kuwait if Israel agreed to withdraw from the Golan Heights, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Iraqi forces were also strengthened in Kuwait, seemingly with the aim of either consolidating the occupation of Kuwait or continuing Iraqi aggression into Saudi Arabia. It was at this stage in the conflict that Saddam began to move foreign nationals in Kuwait and Iraq to military installations as ‘human shields’ against any military strikes on these bases by the MNF. Eventually the hostage incident passed with their release before Christmas 1990 for reasons that remain unclear. Nevertheless, the Iraqi military build-up in Kuwait continued to frustrate any diplomatic attempt (investigated later) to resolve the dispute peacefully before the UN deadline for Iraq’s withdrawal of 15 January 1991. The Second Gulf War began with the passing of this deadline. The initial stages of the conflict were characterised by the air campaign designed to destroy Iraqi air defences and command and control structures with a massive demonstration of force (in the first twenty-four hours of the air campaign over 1000 sorties were made) and the objectives of preventing Iraqi interference in the MNF’s air operations, grinding down Iraqi air defences in Kuwait, and a sustained attack on the Iraqi field army were largely achieved with minimal casualties in preparation for the ground campaign. Saddam’s policy in reaction to the air war included the use of Scud-B missile attacks on Saudi Arabia and Israel, a threat which was addressed with the use of Patriot missiles but would continue to be a military and diplomatic issue until Iraq’s defeat. As the air campaign ended, the Allied ground offensive began on 24 February

62 The Second Gulf War 1991, postponed by three days due to eleventh-hour diplomatic attempts to broker a deal. The ground offensive, sometimes called the 100-hour war, was a 1990s version of the Schlieffen Plan of the First World War. The MNF shifted to the West, attacked the Iraqi divisions in Kuwait from the rear and western flanks in a swift encircling movement. The strategy was successful in ejecting Iraqi troops from Kuwait and minimised Allied casualties. On 27 February 1991 the multinational troops liberated Kuwait City, but operations were called to a conclusion only after retreating Iraqi troops were bombed back to Iraq in the north. Discussions began on 3 March 1991 between Iraqi and Allied military leaders at the Safwan airstrip with the aim of agreeing a cease-fire. There followed a political process that culminated in a UN-mandated cease-fire in mid-April. At the same time the process of policing and clearing up the polluted battlefield began.

The response of the international community Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was met by near universal condemnation by the international community. On 2 August 1990, President George Bush condemned publicly the invasion and called upon the UN to adopt resolutions demanding Iraqi withdrawal. This occurred the same day with Resolution 660 being adopted by a 14–0 vote with only Yemen abstaining (Bennis and Moushabeck 1991: 376). This resolution called on Iraq and Kuwait ‘to begin immediately intensive negotiations for the resolution of their differences and supports all efforts in this regard’ (for all resolutions relating the Second Gulf War, see The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990–1996, 1996). A few days later US President George Bush met with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the UK in Aspen, Colorado and discussed the possibility of using force against Iraqi aggression in Kuwait. Similarly, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze condemned Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, despite the number of Soviet military advisers in Iraq at that time. The European Community (EC) imposed broad sanctions against Iraq in response to the invasion and a number of states froze Iraqi and Kuwait assets. However, condemnation was not universal and King Hussein of Jordan, mainly due to domestic pressures, cast Saddam Hussein as a leader of the Arab world. On 7 August 1990 the military response began to take shape. After having carefully obtained the agreement of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, Bush ordered the despatch of US troops and aircraft to the Persian Gulf. US ships already in the Gulf were increased in number, Egyptian troops augmented the Saudi and US forces, and were added to by the troops of Australia, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK, with the aim of enforcing the blockade under the Desert Shield operation. Turkey closed oil pipelines from Iraq, leaving Jordan as the only route for Iraqi oil and goods to escape the embargo initiated under UN Resolution 665. The Arab world supported this military build-up with the Arab League meeting in Cairo 9–10 August 1990 where thirteen of the twenty-one member states agreed to send military forces. The military build-up continued with the call-up of US reserves on 8 November 1990, and the despatch of another 200,000 troops to the Gulf with an eye to the

The Second Gulf War 63 possibility of a military solution. However, in these final months before the start of the Desert Storm operation, there was a flurry of shuttle diplomacy with figures such as King Hussein, Kurt Waldheim, Edward Heath, Willy Brandt, Yasser Arafat, Nakasone Yasuhiro, Mikhail Gorbachev and (naturally), UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar all attempting to find some non-military solution to the conflict. On 9 January 1991, Secretary of State James Baker met with Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in Geneva in an attempt to find a last-minute solution as the deadline of 15 January 1991 approached. This three-day meeting achieved little, as did a last-minute meeting with Pérez de Cuéllar in Baghdad on 12 January 1991. All the while the MNF was being assembled and by the 15 January 1991 deadline had reached the level of 700,000 troops comprising twenty-eight nations. However, diplomatic manoeuvres were in evidence, with Gorbachev’s renewed attempts in mid-February to find a solution through his personal envoy, Yevgeny Primakov. The Soviet attempt appeared to meet with success as Iraq responded that it would respect UN Resolution 660. This peace proposal put plans for the ground offensive back by three days to 24 February 1991 in order to assess the seriousness of the Iraqi response. Yet, like the other diplomatic efforts, this also ultimately came to nothing and the ground war began. What followed after the deadline of 15 January 1990 – the air war, and the subsequent 100–hour land war commencing on 28 February 1990 – has already been mentioned and need only be referred to as the culmination of the international community’s efforts to find a solution to the crisis (see Hiro 1992: 56–180). This was the time where the generals took over from the UN, the diplomats and the politicians. After the short land war had been concluded, the international community’s efforts began again with the aim of reconstructing Iraq, Kuwait and the Gulf region. Problems like the transport of refugees, the continuing presence of Saddam Hussein as head of the Iraqi state, and the Kurdish rebellion within Iraq continued; thus, on 28 April 1991 Operation Provide Comfort to assist the Kurdish populations began. In May the UN began to establish its presence in the Turkish border areas where the Kurdish populations were centred, with all humanitarian tasks handed over to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on 7 June 1991.

Japan’s response The shock caused by the Second Gulf War in Japan cannot be overestimated. It set the Japanese nation on a long process of self-reflection regarding its role in the world, made its government and people the target of a range of criticisms of burden-shirking and reactivity, and created a ‘syndrome’ of never wanting to repeat this episode that was cited as a guiding principle of Japan’s reaction to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, almost a decade later. However, Japan’s political response up until Christmas 1990 began with an uncharacteristic burst of activity focused upon the hostage crisis. MOFA busied itself with ensuring that the Japanese nationals in Kuwait were safe and in contact with the Japanese Embassy. The Japanese government was informed on 17 August 1990 that Japanese nationals would not be allowed to leave Iraq, in response to which the government officially complained and termed

64 The Second Gulf War the decision ‘a clear violation of international law which is absolutely unacceptable’ (The Japan Times, 18 August 1990). The government refused to close its embassy in Kuwait City for some months as the crisis proceeded and kept the hi no maru (Japanese national flag) flying outside the building until 29 August 1990. Towards the end of August Iraqi authorities moved all Japanese nationals to Baghdad in accordance with the Iraqi claims to close foreign missions in Kuwait. In reaction to the deteriorating situation, Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki met with Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakamoto Misoji and MOFA officials on 24 August 1990 and as a result declared that Japan would turn to international organisations to secure the release of Japanese nationals (The Japan Times, 25 August 1990). The first hostages, consisting of sixty-nine women, children and sick men, were released at the beginning of September and at the beginning of October Kaifu became the first head of state of an industrialised democracy to meet with a member of the Iraqi leadership, Deputy Prime Minister, Taha Yassin Ramadan in order to secure the release of the hostages (The Japan Times, 1 October 1990). By the end of the month former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro decided to make a visit to Baghdad to attempt to negotiate the release of the remaining hostages, returning at the beginning of November with seventy-four freed hostages. During a Lower House Committee Meeting on Security, Foreign Minister Nakayama Taro¯ stressed that Japan would rely upon the efforts of the UN and in particular, Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar, in attaining the release of the hostages (Proceedings of the 119th Regular Diet Lower House Committee on National Security, no. 7, 5 October 1990: 5–6). The issue was finally resolved in the first week of December with the sudden release of all the hostages. At these early stages in the crisis, the Japanese government reacted in an uncharacteristically proactive manner centred upon the international community. However, this initial burst of activity was soon replaced with the more typical reactivity and immobility. While Japan was attempting to resolve the hostage crisis the package of financial assistance that was to define Japan’s contribution to the Gulf Crisis was delayed. The package was announced eventually on 29 August 1990. However, this was on the same day that Japanese nationals were first forced to appear on television broadcasts, condemned by Sakamoto as a ‘meaningless attempt to give the world an impression that foreign nationals in Iraq are safe’, stressing that this was a problem for the international community and not just for Japan (The Japan Times, 30 August 1990). This package contained, first, an unspecified amount of aid to the MNF, rumoured at the time to be US$1 billion; second, the despatch of government chartered civil aircraft and ships to be used in the humanitarian effort; third, one hundred civil medical experts; fourth, financial aid to Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan; fifth, ¥1.5 billion in aid to Kuwaiti refugees in Jordan; and sixth, a new bill entitled the UN Peace Co-operation Bill to allow the SDF to participate in the international community’s effort (Asahi Shinbun, 30 August 1990). The response of the US, as the leader of the MNF, was both respectful and critical. While describing elements of the package as ‘useful first steps’, it was stressed that ‘we want to see the Japanese flag [in the Gulf area]. This [package of measures] is not what we had in mind’ (The Japan Times, 31 August 1990). Thus, not only the financial contribution, but also the despatch of Japanese personnel became the focus of

The Second Gulf War 65 debate. In response, the limitations of the Constitution were cited by Fujii Kazuo of the JDA’s Policy Bureau when faced with demands for financial, diplomatic and military assistance by a four-man team of visitors from the US: Henry Rouen, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Carl Ford, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Allen Holmes, Ambassador at Large for Burden-sharing, and Carl Jackson, National Security Adviser (Daily Yomiuri, 14 August 1990). Thus, the pressures of the US bilateral norm and the anti-militarist norm were in evidence at an early stage. Thereafter, the debate began in earnest as to what kind of contribution Japan would (or could) make. In order to highlight the importance of the ideas behind what kind of contribution Japan ought to make, the following analysis of this drawn-out debate will be structured upon the norms introduced in Chapter 2. Anti-militarism From the outset, opposition within Japanese society to participation in the war, even through its financial contributions, was highly vocal. A great deal of criticism originated from organisations such as the Japan Trade Union Congress (Rengo¯), the Second World War Victims’ Relatives Association (Wadatsumikai), the Japan Taxpayers’ Association and all opposition parties with the exception of the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). Two female citizens in Kagoshima filed a lawsuit with the district court claiming that aid for the Second Gulf War was unconstitutional. Ishida Ko¯ shiro¯ , chairman of the lay-Buddhist Ko¯ mei Party, regarded the financial package as unclear and, therefore, unacceptable – it was necessary to know whether the contributions would be spent on arms and ammunition or not. The most vocal entrepreneur of the anti-militarists norm, Doi Takako, of the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ), argued along the same lines that if the money were spent on arms this would be against Article 9 of the Constitution. To this end, the SDPJ pledged at its party convention to oppose the government package (The Japan Times, 31 January 1991). In reaction, the government undertook an advertising campaign in an attempt to secure public understanding on the issue. The DSP stood firmly by the government’s decision emphasising Japan’s ‘positive co-operation befitting its status as an internationally minded nation and in accordance with the spirit embodied in the Constitution’ (The Japan Times, 4 February 1991). Government policy as regards financial contributions was to donate the cash directly to the Gulf Steering Council for dispersal, whereas the opposition parties were demanding in the Diet that the government ensure that the money would not be spent on arms. On this issue the government did eventually back down and Kaifu agreed to lodge a request with the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) Fund to prevent the use of Japanese money on arms: a result of the government’s need for the Ko¯ mei Party’s votes in the Diet as well as an expression of the influence of the norm of anti-militarism in Japan. The power of the minority parties was also seen in the government’s decision to raise 40 per cent of the contribution through defence budget cuts as the Ko¯ mei Party and DSP had been opposed to the tax hikes. It was with this approval of the DSP and Ko¯ mei Party that the Lower House approved the Second Supplementary Budget and tax increases on 28 February 1991, and the Upper House on 7 March 1991. By July,

66 The Second Gulf War the government found itself contributing an extra ¥70 billion to help postwar peace efforts in the Gulf through the GCC to make up for the shortfall that occurred with the decline in the value of the yen from the time of the pledge to the actual payment. The influence of the anti-militarist norm was not limited to the opposition parties and extended to the Japanese business community, whose initial reaction was highly cynical of active participation in any punitive action against Iraq. Due to private sector loans extended to Iraq and the plummet in share prices by 1106 points in the first few days after the invasion, MITI and the business community were wary of antagonising Iraq any further with harsh sanctions (The Japan Times, 4 and 7 August 1990). The leading members of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry were gathered for a conference in the mountain retreat of Karuizawa at the time of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and were warned by Kaifu that ‘nobody was able to predict this war at a time of détente between the US and the Soviet Union. There is the fear that it could affect Japan if the conflict is dragged out. Japan must play an active role from now on’ (Abe 1991: 54–5, my translation). However, the reaction to this call was tardy and reluctant. Chairman Ishikawa Rokuro¯ issued a statement minimising concerns for the business community by stressing the co-operation of the two superpowers. When asked to respond to Ozawa Ichiro¯ ’s similar call for activity, the Keidanren chairman, Saito¯ Eishiro¯ , failed to address the issue specifically. The Japanese business community’s apparent lack of interest in the crisis was certainly connected with the minimal dependence on Iraq and Kuwait for its oil supplies, but also was rooted in the traditional postwar adherence to the desire to maintain good relations with the majority of states. However, sections of the business community expressed tentative supportive of the government’s financial contribution. At a Nikkeiren press conference on 17 September 1990, President Suzuki Eiji, stated: I cannot believe that the military situation will be settled. Japan’s crisis management has failed to produce any concrete measures and it is impossible to focus on providing support like private-sector medical assistance and so on. Ought it not be the state that provides the focus? However, there are problems associated with despatching minesweepers to the Persian Gulf. And how about our increasing financial contribution of one billion dollars, then two billion? We need to think more independently. (Abe 1991: 55, my translation) Thus, the financial contribution garnered some support but needed stabilising. Ishikawa suggested that a nationwide Gulf fund should be set up to allow the Japanese population to contribute what they wanted to. Even more active members of the business community appeared to be more than ready to contribute to the Gulf, as seen in Keidanren’s creation of a special fund to provide food and medical aid to refugees in response to a request from Ogata Sadako as UNHCR. Keidanren also supported payment of US$9 billion in extra assistance (Abe 1991: 59). Another issue in the first month of the crisis, which was affected by the norm of anti-militarism, was the visit of Prime Minister Kaifu to the Gulf region that had been

The Second Gulf War 67 planned before the invasion of Kuwait. By the weekend of 11–12 August 1990 the visit was to go ahead, although Kaifu had described the invasion as ‘intolerable’, and Foreign Minister Nakayama had declared he would urge Kaifu to cancel the visit (The Japan Times, 11 August 1990). The US position on Kaifu’s visit was made clear by Clayton Yeutter, the US Agriculture Minister, expressing support for the visit as a symbolic expression of support for the deployment of the MNF in the region (The Japan Times, 13 August 1990). The decision came on 13 August 1990 with Kaifu cancelling his trip and Nakayama taking his place. The reason behind this decision was a desire to keep Kaifu in Tokyo while a response to the crisis was hammered out and fears that Kaifu could be faced with demands from Gulf nations to contribute militarily, which he would have to decline on constitutional grounds. The visit was tentatively rescheduled for October depending on the resolution of the hostage crisis. Thus, at these early stages when only Japan’s financial contribution was under discussion, the specificity, durability and concordance of the anti-militarist norm in regulating and constraining the extent of the government and business community’s financial and diplomatic contribution continued to exert an important influence. The key issue of despatch of Japanese personnel, as included in the government’s package, first manifested itself with demands for Japan to contribute aircraft and ships to help in the transportation of refugees, personnel and weapons. These proposals were met with protests from Japanese unions about the degree of safety in the Gulf region (four Japanese seaman had died in the First Gulf War and fears of repetition were high). With the outbreak of hostilities in the Gulf, Kaifu met with opposition leaders to discuss the despatch of Air Self-Defence Force (ASDF) aircraft to aid the transport of refugees. Doi had referred to the despatch of the ASDF without discussion in the Diet as a ‘fascist act and a denial of parliamentary procedures’ (Japan Economic Institute (JEI ) Report, 5 April 1991). The Japan Communist Party ( JCP) referred to the plan simply as ‘unconditional support for the war’ (JEI Report, 15 February 1991). Again, the DSP expressed support for the plan but opposition was expressed by both the SDPJ and the Ko¯ mei Party on the grounds of the Constitution and the fear that the SDF’s role may escalate into an explicitly military one (The Japan Times, 19 January 1991). Faced with this opposition, the government decided not to despatch the ASDF until such a despatch was requested by a relevant international organisation. And until that time no new ordinance would be introduced to expand the transportation clauses of the SDF Law to include refugees as well as foreign dignitaries. As the refugee crisis passed and with the absence of any request from international organisations for assistance, it was decided that the ordinance based on Article 100 of the SDF Law that would facilitate the despatch of the ASDF would be scrapped (Asahi Shinbun, 17 April 1991). However, continuing opposition based on the durable, traditional norm of antimilitarism existed in several quarters. The SDPJ refused to consider any despatch of the SDF or any other action beyond what the UN called for (Sankei Shinbun, 23 August 1990). Doi stressed that this would be ‘making an open declaration to the world that Japan intends to part with the one thing of which it truly could be proud – adherence to peace’ (JEI Report, 14 September 1990). The SDPJ’s report entitled ‘Points Regarding the Act Creating a UN Peace Organization’ (Kokusai Heiwa Kiko¯

68 The Second Gulf War Secchi Ho¯an Yo¯shi), published on 4 January 1991, outlined the SDPJ’s support only for the despatch of Japanese civilian personnel to assist in a limited definition of peacekeeping (Higashinaka 1991: 35). The Ko¯ mei Party’s position was summarised in an edition of the Ko¯mei Shinbun favouring the despatch of SDF ‘old boys’ limited to electoral, medical and refugee-related duties (Ko¯mei Shinbun, 1 March 1991). The Ko¯ mei Party’s aim was to contribute to PKOs with personnel unconnected with the SDF. The fact that troops participating in PKOs are referred to as ‘peace soldiers’ and ‘soldiers without enemies’ was stressed throughout the media and Diet debates (Yamauchi 1991: 73). The JCP’s position was declared in a letter to SecretaryGeneral Pérez de Cuéllar in March 1991. Although emphasising its support for the non-military aspects of the UN’s work, this letter stressed the importance of the Constitution within the strictest interpretation regarding the very existence of the SDF as unconstitutional (Hasegawa 1991). The JCP’s stance was encapsulated in the report, Lessons from the Gulf War in Bringing about Peace in the Persian Gulf and the World. Although disapproving of legislation to allow the despatch of the SDF because of its perceived militarist overtones, the report did support international contribution based on the Constitution and the UN Charter, rather than the US-led effort (Higashinaka 1991: 26). Citizen groups like the New Japan Women’s Association and the Japan Council of Christianity also opposed any despatch on the grounds of Article 9. Municipal assemblies began to pass resolutions demanding the UN Peace Co-operation Bill’s rejection, including Sapporo, Chiba, Miyagi and Kanagawa prefectures. Public opinion at this time was firmly against any despatch with 21 per cent supporting the proposed bill as opposed to 57 per cent against; moreover 67 per cent of those polled regarded despatch of the SDF abroad as unconstitutional, with only 15 per cent regarding despatch as constitutionally unproblematic (Asahi Shinbun, 3 September 1990). One poll of the Kyo¯ do¯ News Service estimated that half of the electorate was against legislation facilitating despatch and two-thirds generally against the despatch of the SDF due to constitutional reasons, with only 13 per cent in favour. During the 119th regular session of the Diet, debate was polarised between, on the one hand, the opposition parties that criticised the despatch of personnel on the grounds of the Constitution, with extreme views within the JCP against even aid in transportation as an act of war; and, on the other hand, the government and DSP’s position, which was one of support of the role of the UN in the post-Cold War world and the despatch of Japanese personnel on the grounds of co-operation ‘to keep global peace as a member of the international community’ (The Japan Times, 18 October 1990). However, even within the LDP, divisions emerged over the proposed UN Peace Co-operation Bill; particularly the Abe, Miyazawa and Watanabe factions were demonstrably against the legislation, with the large Takeshita and Ko¯ moto factions (the latter being Kaifu’s home faction) strongly in favour of the bill (The Japan Times, 31 October 1990). A similar pattern could be witnessed as regards other issues like the despatch of minesweepers with the Abe and Miyazawa factions the least supportive (Asahi Shinbunsha 1991: 200–4). At this point the debate took a diversion by exploring the possibility of transferring SDF personnel to a newly created peace co-operation team to allow

The Second Gulf War 69 them to participate in operations in the Gulf. The creation of a new category of public servant including 1000 to 2000 members for military, medical and transportation assistance was proposed to avoid violation of the Constitution. This idea, however, was dismissed by Ozawa as too complicated and it was thought that efficiency would be maintained by retaining SDF status and SDF structures. Kurihara Yu¯ ko, chairman of the LDP’s Research Commission on the Constitution, stated that at this time that the Japanese government would be able to despatch the SDF to UN ceasefire monitoring and emergency relief activities overseas. However, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau regarded this as excessive and unconstitutional. The eventual outline of the proposed UN Peace Co-operation Bill stated that the SDF members would be registered with a UN peace co-operation team under direct control of the Prime Minister to ensure civilian control. During deliberations on this first bill, the government officially distinguished on 27 October 1990 between participation in and co-operation with UN military forces. Participation in would involve the despatch of the peace co-operation corps under the command of the UN military force. Co-operation with would be characterised by support activities outside the command of such forces (Sato¯ 1993: 12–13). This distinction would play an even greater role in the subsequent debate about the second bill. The DSP agreed with this plan. However, the SDPJ and the Ko¯ mei Party expressed reservations, although the Ko¯ mei Party began to extend its support with certain conditions attached, including the emphasis on non-military activities, unarmed personnel and SDF participation as individuals not units. This issue of despatching Japanese personnel caused considerable public disenchantment with the Kaifu administration, despite the government using the LDP’s victory in an Aichi prefectural by-election in an attempt to portray public agreement with the bill (The Japan Times, 15 November 1990). Partly due to this, but also due to time restrictions in the Diet, the LDP appeared to give up any chance of passing the bill in the 119th session of the Diet and began by November to start petitioning the opposition parties for support of a new bill. In the face of this pressure, the bill was eventually withdrawn but not before the LDP, Ko¯ mei Party and DSP agreed a three-party accord to introduce new legislation allowing the despatch of Japanese personnel on PKOs. The three-party accord was signed on 9 November 1990 by Ozawa Ichiro¯ of the LDP, Ichikawa Yu¯ ichi of the Ko¯ mei Party and Yonezawa Takashi of the DSP and proposed that the UN would be a central pillar of Japan’s diplomacy, a purely financial contribution was not enough and that the despatch of personnel would be necessary, and that they would co-operate to introduce the necessary legislation. With the failure of the first bill, other plans were mooted as to how Japan should frame its international contribution. The Forum for Foreign Policy Innovation suggested that a peacekeeping unit of private citizens without any government involvement should be established as this would avoid the issue of the Constitution (The Japan Times, 15 December 1990). The SDPJ outlined a bill to create a permanent peace corps for UN peacekeeping limited to non-military activities based on UN resolutions and under the command of the Secretary-General (The Japan Times, 5 January 1991). The LDP’s Miyazawa Kiichi called for the creation of a UN force

70 The Second Gulf War including personnel of each UN member state as public servants as one way to navigate through the Constitution (The Japan Times, 4 April 1991). Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakamoto envisaged the despatch of civilians upon Iraqi acceptance of the UN cease-fire terms, ‘Japan will contribute with UN activities as much as possible and will continue to make active contributions to restoring peace in the Middle East’ (The Japan Times, 5 April 1991). In addressing both houses of the Diet, Kaifu stressed that Japan would do as much as possible in collaboration with international organisations respecting both the UN Charter and the Constitution (120th Regular Diet Lower House Address by Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki, 28 January 1991). This tactic of negating the domestic norm of anti-militarism by instrumentalising the norm of UN internationalism was beginning to become increasingly salient: in other words, Japan’s contribution could be justified as long as it was sanctioned by the UN. Furthermore, with the success of the ground offensive in the Gulf, changes in public opinion could be witnessed. Domestically, opinion polls began to suggest that the Japanese population would support a limited role in PKOs for the SDF: 54 per cent in favour of some kind of role in disaster relief and 30 per cent against. In addition to this, 48 per cent now supported a non-combat peacekeeping role, with 38 per cent against (The Japan Times, 10 June 1991). By the end of August, according to a Jiji press poll, 60 per cent support for some kind of contribution to PKOs existed; however, disagreement emerged over the scope (The Japan Times, 2 August 1991). As regards the opposition parties, a dissident breakaway section of the SDPJ supported SDF despatch on PKOs. Faced with election failure, the SDPJ began to rethink its traditional policies and drafted revisions to recognise the SDF and the right of selfdefence in order for Japan to take some role in the post-conflict international effort in the Gulf (The Japan Times, 21 June 1991). Connected with this, the idea of despatching minesweepers to the Persian Gulf was first mooted soon after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Based on a constitutional interpretation going back to 1987 and the First Gulf War, proposals were made by Watanabe Michio, senior LDP Diet member, that protection of Japan’s oil supply could be incorporated easily within the definition of self-defence. It was further argued that this would also add to Japan’s ‘visible contribution’ and that Japan should consider increasing aid for the MNF in the Gulf (The Japan Times, 1 August 1990). However, disagreement with this plan was to be found not only among the expected quarters of the opposition parties, but also from former Prime Minister Nakasone, who argued that the situation in 1990 was very different from that of 1987 and that Japan should consider its contributions purely within the confines of a strict interpretation of the Constitution (The Japan Times, 2 August 1990). However, the issue was not raised again until after the ground war had been concluded and the postwar reconstruction of Iraq was under discussion by the international community. In March 1991 the government declared its intention to search for a role for the SDF in Iraq’s postwar reconstruction within the framework of the three-party consensus (The Japan Times, 2 March 1991). By mid-March, pressure from the US had begun to be applied again specifically with a request for the despatch of minesweepers to the Gulf. US Ambassador to Japan Michael Armacost urged the despatch of minesweepers to the Gulf at a meeting of LDP Diet members (The Japan

The Second Gulf War 71 Times, 21 March 1991). The LDP sought to gain the support and understanding of the DSP, Ko¯ mei Party and SDPJ but the initial response from the other parties was one of caution with fears that the despatch of minesweepers could lead to a more active role for the SDF (The Japan Times, 14 March 1991). In reaction to these fears, Foreign Minister Nakayama tried his utmost to stress the fact that hostilities were over and that this contribution was part of an international effort, ‘the Japanese government has to be interested in the issue of how to ensure the safe passage of ships in the Gulf’. Watanabe joined in this line of argument by stressing that, ‘it would only be normal to remove dangerous objects. Since many ships bound for Japan pass through the Gulf, it would be a natural action for Japan. And the public would understand it’ (The Japan Times, 15 March 1991). With this in mind the JDA began to make the necessary technical preparations to despatch minesweepers and Kaifu stressed to the Diet the legality of the despatch of minesweepers and Nakayama stressed to UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar the non-military peacekeeping role Japan was ready to assume (Asahi Shinbun, 20 and 25 March 1991). According to one government source it appeared that the government would be able to rely on the support of the DSP; however, the Ko¯ mei Party stood against the despatch and the SDPJ stressed the necessity to prepare new legislation to precede the planned despatch (Yomiuri Shinbun, 20 April 1991). In order to address this problem Kaifu met with the opposition parties in the last week of April and stressed that the despatch was part of an international effort, occurring in peacetime, as part of a duty to maintain oil supplies, but was able to illicit only the support of the DSP with the remaining opposition parties requiring debate in the Diet before any despatch (The Japan Times, 24 April 1991). Opposition was also expressed by domestic civil groups, such as ‘Peace Now! We Won’t Pay Taxes for War’, which filed an injunction with the Tokyo District Court against the despatch of minesweepers. Furthermore, eight members of the Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF) declared their unwillingness to go to the Gulf. The fears of East Asian nations will be examined in a later section but were expressed by the government in Beijing when it urged prudence in resolving the issue, and expressed concern about Japanese actions to Nakasone through Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (Asahi Shinbun, 1 May 1991). Finally, on the night of 24 April 1991 the decision to despatch the minesweepers was made at an extraordinary Cabinet meeting. Four minesweepers (Yurishima, Hikoshima, Awashima and Sakushima), one flagship (Hayase) and a support ship (Tokiwa) were to leave Japan by the end of the week. Captain Ochiai Taosa was appointed commander of the operation only a week before the departure of the task force. On the day before the despatch, faced with protests near the JDA headquarters and even the torching of vehicles, Kaifu underlined to the House of Representative’s Foreign Affairs Committee the peaceful nature of Japan’s actions: ‘it is quite important for those countries [which are capable of contributing to peacekeeping in this area] to co-operate in safety in the region’ (The Japan Times, 26 April 1991). The minesweepers finally left on 26 April 1991 with the farewell address given by ¯ shima Tadamori, Deputy Director-General of the JDA, making pains to characO terise the despatch as part of an international contribution. The JDA and the MSDF were evidently not prepared to take on minesweeping

72 The Second Gulf War duties, seen in the facts that they lacked a precedence upon which to base a decision, and that they had not had the opportunity to train together before being hastily brought together from three bases (Ushiba 1992: 43). Moreover, as Captain Ochiai stated, We knew the Persian Gulf was a very hot place, but that’s about all. We knew nothing about such basic concerns as prevalent winds, current speed, or seabed contours. We didn’t even know what kinds and quantities of mines had been laid. (Ushiba 1992: 44) Furthermore, leave was never properly decided so that whereas other nations’ personnel were granted leave every three months, the MSDF personnel worked straight through without leave. In addition, certain equipment was lacking in comparison to other nations, like computer systems for detecting mines. A hasty departure and lack of preparedness led to some embarrassing mistakes, like the loading of fifty chainsaws onto one minesweeper. The minesweeper episode came to an end on 31 October 1991 with the return of the task force to the port of Kure after having detonated thirty-four mines without incurring any casualties. With the minesweeping aspect of Japan’s contribution resolved, the final details of the International Peace Co-operation Bill (or PKO Bill, as it came to be called) were settled in September 1991 several months after the first bill had fallen in the Diet. A Japan Times editorial was correct in observing that the major issue was the kind of operations Japan could participate in and how this would sit with the Constitution (The Japan Times, 7 September 1991). This was resolved in August and September 1991 within the framework of the three-party agreement and resulted in the drafting of five conditions demanded by the DSP and the Ko¯ mei Party that would have to be met in any SDF despatch on PKOs: ● ●

● ●

●

A cease-fire accord must be reached. Japan’s participation must have the agreement of the parties directly involved in the conflict. The UN force must remain neutral. When the above three conditions are not met, Japanese personnel must withdraw. Japanese personnel can use firearms only to defend themselves. (The Japan Times, 10 September 1991)

The bill stated that Japanese personnel would be allowed to participate in all nonmilitary PKOs, including supervising elections and transporting refugees. Monitoring of cease-fires would be undertaken by members of the SDF and they would be allowed to participate in a UN force separating opposing troops while retaining their SDF status. The use of firearms would be limited to the absolute minimum necessary for self-defence. A limit of 2000 troops was designated as Japan’s uppermost contribution at any time.

The Second Gulf War 73 Dispute arose within the three-party agreement over the necessity of Diet approval each time the SDF is despatched on a PKO. This was a demand from the DSP in order to strengthen the concept of civilian control, and in opposition to the LDP and Ko¯ mei Party’s policy of reporting back to the Diet only upon completion of a mission. This led the LDP to approve the bill on 18 September 1991 and submit it the next day without the primary support of the DSP. The role of the DSP was crucial to the successful passage of the bill, and its objection to the LDP’s demand that Diet approval was unnecessary proved to be one of the major stumbling blocks in the Diet discussion. The Ko¯ mei Party was satisfied with the five conditions as an assurance for civilian control, leaving the DSP in a pivotal position with the deciding votes, at one stage even threatening to sink the bill unless Diet approval was recognised (Asahi Shinbun, 18 November 1991). On 27 November 1991, the bill was forced through the House of Representatives’ Ad hoc Committee on International Peace Co-operation by the LDP and Ko¯ mei Party without the approval of the DSP as the issue of Diet approval had not been resolved. In order to do this, the LDP did concede some ground on the issue of Diet approval by including a clause calling for Diet approval if an operation continues for over two years. Despite this, the DSP, JCP and SDPJ all voted against the bill but to no avail as the LDP called an early vote and railroaded the bill through to the Upper House. Ultimately the bill was sent back to the Lower House for further debate. Debate was also concerned with the specificity of the Constitution and whether it allowed Japan’s participation in a PKF that used force like that witnessed in the Congo operation. An Asahi Shinbun survey of 172 constitutional experts demonstrated that roughly 80 per cent of those experts asked regarded Japan’s participation as unconstitutional, and only 10 per cent expressed support. In the same edition of the Asahi Shinbun, it was reported that the Special Study Group on Japan’s Role in the International Community, commonly know as Ozawa Committee, was considering the participation of the SDF within a UN army as constitutional under the term ‘international security’ (kokusaiteki anzen hosho¯) as different from the ‘right of collective self-defence (shu¯danteki jieiken) (Asahi Shinbun, 18 November 1991). The LDP appeared to regard contribution to PKOs as only one facet and increment of the expansion of Japan’s international contribution. This could be seen in the policy package submitted to the party’s annual convention that called for greater activism in PKOs as well as expansion of overseas development assistance and contribution to fighting environmental problems. In this way, Japan would be in a position to justify any level of contribution to UN-sponsored peacekeeping from election observation to enforcement measures. As regards the Constitution’s stress upon the non-use of force to settle international disputes, the Ozawa Committee’s use of the term ‘international security’ stressed the maintenance of peace – a cause upon which the Constitution was constructed in its preamble and which dovetails with the objective of PKOs as seen in the award of the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize (Mainichi Shinbun, 16 April 1992). As Professor Kitaoka Shinichi, then of Rikkyo¯ University, now of Tokyo University, pointed out, the Constitution was based on the concepts of anti-militarism, internationalism, freedom and democracy, similar to the underpinnings of PKOs (Yomiuri Shinbun, 12 December 1991). In this way,

74 The Second Gulf War the specificity of the anti-militarist norm could be seen to merge with that of the UN Charter. The extent to which public opinion had continued to change by this stage from its traditionally stalwart anti-militarist stance can be seen in a number of opinion polls. The largest trade union in Japan, which is seen as a base of support for the SDPJ, the Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers Union (Jichiro¯), expressed two-thirds support for SDF despatch overseas on PKOs restricted to non-military activities (The Japan Times, 28 February 1992). Public opinion during the debate clearly sanctioned a peacekeeping role for the SDF. A poll published on Constitution Day 1992 demonstrated that 45.7 per cent of people supported a role encompassing medical, election observation and so on, a further 12.1 per cent supported an unarmed ceasefire observation role, while 10 per cent supported an armed role. Alternatively, only 24.4 per cent opposed any kind of despatch of the SDF. Support for the UN remained high at 88 per cent of people polled backing the actions of the UN. Even 38.4 per cent of the SDPJ showed a desire to despatch the SDF on a limited role as opposed to 37.5 per cent opposed (Yomiuri Shinbun, 3 March 1992). Divisions within the SDPJ over the issue of participation in PKOs emerged with the 1992 Upper House elections with SDPJ candidates diametrically opposed to each other and arguing in public over the issue of the SDF’s despatch (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 28 June 1992). Seemingly, with the success of operations in the Gulf and the criticism levelled at Japan for its initial response, the UN had become an arena in which Japan’s military contribution could be justified and coexist with the concordance and specificity accorded to the traditional norm of anti-militarism, something the Ozawa Committee had clearly recognised. However, in order to gain enough votes in the Diet, the LDP eventually was forced to come to some compromise with the Ko¯ mei Party and the DSP in order to pass the bill smoothly before the session finished in June 1992. Thus, the LDP had to give in to the more traditional anti-militarist norm and proposed barring SDF participation in peacekeeping forces until the Diet approved separate legislation allowing for this (The Japan Times, 1 and 27 March 1992). Chief Cabinet Secretary, Kato¯ Ko¯ ji, and LDP Deputy-Chairman, Kanemaru Shin, met with the chairman of Rengo¯, Yamagishi Akira, towards the end of March in an attempt to secure the opposition’s understanding and ensure passage of the bill in the opposition-dominated Upper House where the bill had been shelved and priority given to the budget. Debate began in earnest towards the end of April 1992 with the DSP still refusing to back down over the issue of a mandatory Diet approval of each SDF despatch but ¯ uchi supportive of placing the troops under UN command. The DSP chairman, O Keigo, did appear willing to compromise if the elements of the bill allowing for SDF participation in UN armed forces were frozen. Despite having only fourteen seats in the House of Representatives and ten seats in the House of Councillors, the DSP and its chairman appeared to be playing a highly influential role in the Diet discussions. Equally the Ko¯ mei Party objected to certain issues, chiefly the placing of Japanese personnel under UN command. However, the government came round eventually to the DSP’s demands for Diet approval. In his attempt to secure the successful passage of the bill, Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi was willing to compromise with the centrist parties and modify the LDP line. With the Upper House elections

The Second Gulf War 75 approaching in July 1992, no party, at this stage, wanted to risk alienating the electorate with an aggressive approach to the issue. Rengo¯ also touted its own proposals to set up a force that may include SDF personnel if they are on leave or retired; Diet approval and non-combat missions were also regarded as essential (The Japan Times, 19 March 1992). The SDPJ’s plans continued to develop with the proposal of a 2000-strong corps separate from the SDF taking part in non-military activities and maintaining an unarmed status (Asahi Shinbun, 28 April 1992). However, the role of the SDPJ was marginalised as the LDP, DSP and Ko¯ mei Party through backroom negotiations came closer to a modified bill that could be passed ¯ uchi to suggest that there was a 80 per cent through the Upper House, prompting O likelihood of the bill passing through the Diet by the end of June (Mainichi Shinbun, 13 May 1992). The Ko¯ mei Party’s Ishida Ko¯ shiro¯ and the LDP chairman, Watanuki Tamisuke, did attempt to court Rengo¯ and the SDPJ’s understanding and cooperation for a successful passage of the bill and avoidance of aggressive resistance in the Diet but to little avail as the SDPJ refused to compromise (The Japan Times, 20 and 22 May 1992). As far as the LDP was concerned the centrist parties held the key to successful passage of the bill and the SDPJ and Rengo¯ could be ignored. The real influence seemed to lie with the DSP and the Ko¯ mei Party as they discussed the modifications they would request of the LDP including a freeze on certain military activities and ensuring civilian control through Diet approval (The Japan Times, 27 May 1992). By the end of May, the LDP and centrist parties had refound their understanding and agreed on certain modifications to the bill, including the freezing of the bill’s sections that dealt with participation in the military activities of PKOs, review of the bill three years after its enactment, and the need for Diet approval when these sections are unfrozen (this occurred in December 2001 as will be seen in Chapter 6). Further discussion resulted in an addition to Article 6 of the bill to the effect that the government would seek approval of the Diet if a particular despatch were to be continued over the period of two years. The main issues under debate at the time revolved around whether the SDF or a separate organisation would carry out duties in a PKO, and the use of weapons within these operations. The tri-party consensus sought to resolve the first problem by creating a separate organisation which would avoid the debate over whether the SDF’s existence was constitutional or not – a concession to the SDPJ and the Ko¯ mei Party. However, the idea of a separate organisation was rejected after consideration of the efficiency the SDF could bring to a role, the public support for the SDF after the Gulf War, and the administrative and funding problems for the new organisation. As regards the use of force, a careful study of peacekeeping operations was undertaken by the Diet that contributed to the specificity of peacekeeping as a norm by demonstrating the peaceful and unarmed nature of the vast majority of PKOs respecting concepts such as strict impartiality, recognition of a cease-fire, consent of the parties involved and the non-use of force. It was demonstrated that force was used only when peacekeepers were prevented from completing their duties. The inter-agency committee wondered if Japan would be in a position to withdraw its troops in the event that the level of violence escalated. Again, precedence suggested that other countries had withdrawn their troops (Tunisia from ONUC in 1961, Iran

76 The Second Gulf War from UNIFIL and UNDOF in 1979, and Sweden from UNFICYP in 1987). Thus, with this in mind, the government formulated five guidelines, based on the abovementioned three-party consensus talks of August–September 1991, to regulate the withdrawal of Japanese peacekeepers and provide criteria to follow on occasions when peacekeepers were prevented from fulfilling their duties: ●

●

● ●

●

Agreement on a cease-fire will have been reached among the parties to the conflict. The parties to the conflict will have given their consent to the deployment of a PKO and Japan’s participation in such forces. Strict impartiality will be maintained, not favouring any party to the conflict. Should any of the above guidelines cease to exist, the Government of Japan may withdraw its contingent. Use of weapons will be limited to the absolute minimum necessary to protect personnel’s lives. (Yanai 1993: 41)

These principles were the basis for the successful passage of the bill and efforts were made to explain them to and have them accepted by the UN. These issues also were resolved in discussions between MOFA, the JDA, the Cabinet Councillor’s Office on External Affairs and the National Legislation Bureau of the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office. This inter-agency drafting group, consisting of thirty-three staff members from eleven ministries headed by Nomura Issei, Deputy Director-General of the Treaties Bureau of MOFA, concluded that the use of weapons in self-defence did not contravene the Constitution. As most UN peacekeepers had experienced their lives being put in danger when obstructed from fulfilling their duties, this was seen as another area that was constitutionally defendable. Clause 4, Article 24 of the PKO Law states that ‘the use of small-sized weapons or arms under the provisions of the foregoing paragraphs shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases corresponding to the provisions of Article 36 and 37 of the Penal Code [which deal with self-defence and the necessity of the use of weapons]’. The SDPJ and the minor opposition party Rengo¯ Sangiin, which was linked to Rengo¯, refused to accept this modified bill and demanded further debate on the issue (The Japan Times, 30 May 1992). The bill was eventually revised and submitted to the Upper House at the beginning of June. Initial debate was marked by paralysis as a special Upper House Committee continued to debate through the night while the SDPJ questioned the legality of certain clauses contained in the bill despite LDP calls for a rapid and calm resolution of the bill. The opposition techniques of delaying the passage of the bill included raising no confidence measures in the government and particular members of the government, and the ‘ox-walk’ (gyu¯ho¯) technique of filibustering through delayed voting. These tactics led the LDP to force the bill through an Upper House committee by calling a plenary session vote on the bill – a vote which lasted the weekend of 6–7 June 1992 due to the opposition delaying tactics, including questioning the LDP’s move to call for an immediate vote as compromising the legislative supremacy of the Diet. The bill eventually passed the

The Second Gulf War 77 Upper House in the early hours of 9 June 1992 with the bill sent back to the Lower House for approval of the revisions that the LDP, Ko¯ mei Party, and DSP had agreed. In the Lower House, the opposition used similar tactics by calling noconfidence measures in the government. However, in the face of the LDP–Ko¯ mei Party–DSP consensus there was little the other opposition parties were able to do except delay the passage of what was inevitable. The bill became law on the evening of 15 June 1992 with a vote of 329 to 17 in its favour with the SDPJ boycotting the vote and registering mass resignations, ignored by the government, and with only the JCP voting against it (Mainichi Shinbun, 16 June 1992). Opposition reactions regarded the PKO Law as one step in the beginning of the dismantling of the Constitution, an insult to the name of the UN and the beginning of Japan’s active military participation with the US (Yoshikawa 1992: 60). The SDPJ disagreed with the Ozawa Committee’s interpretation of ‘international security’ and the rationale for despatching the SDF overseas, preferring to regard PKOs and the PKO Law as two very different concepts. Unlike PKOs, the PKO Law had failed to gain the understanding of the Japanese public, the Diet and the other nations of East Asia (‘Interview with Tanabe Makoto’ 1992: 6–7). As far as the SDPJ was concerned, the PKO Law was one incremental step on the road to becoming a military superpower and was a result of political bargaining and compromise by the LDP, Ko¯ mei Party and DSP rather than a deeply considered attempt to contribute to international society. It was with the objective of halting the bill that the SDPJ called for the dissolution of parliament and tried to force an election on the issue. The SDPJ envisaged Japan’s contribution being based on economic and technological ability, as mentioned in the SDPJ resignation statement (‘Interview with Tanabe Makoto’ 1992: 6–7). Yet, ultimately, the opposition parties, in the face of a fluid public opinion questioning its traditional opposition to participation in PKOs, failed to derail the government’s legislation. This was due, not only to the changing attitudes of Japanese society, but also (as will be demonstrated next), because of other norms at play. In particular the emerging norms of UN internationalism and peacekeeping, encapsulated by the Ozawa Committee’s definition of ‘international security’, were able to combat and negate to a degree the traditional norm of anti-militarism in Japan. US bilateralism As stated previously, despite a reputation of reactivity, Japan’s first financial package in reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was introduced rapidly and involved the freezing of Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets, a ban on oil imports, and the suspension of credit and loans to Iraq. In addition, Japan abided by UN resolutions concerning the cessation of trade with Iraq. As regards aid for Middle Eastern nations affected by the invasion, Foreign Minister Nakayama guaranteed aid to compensate for any economic damage arising out of participation with UN sanctions against Iraq (The Japan Times, 22 August 1990). Yet, by mid-August when the traditional reactivity began to set in, enormous pressure from the US had become apparent with President Bush demanding an increase in aid from Japan to Middle Eastern nations, while at the same time praising Japan for respecting and behaving in line with the UN

78 The Second Gulf War resolutions dealing with sanctions (Daily Yomiuri, 15 August 1990). Soon after this request, a government source declared that it was constitutional for Japan to contribute financially to a UN-backed MNF, but stressed the requirement of UN approval (The Japan Times, 16 August 1990). The terms of the package, announced on 29 August 1990, and the US reaction have already been mentioned. US pressure continued when Armacost stressed to a LDP seminar the necessity of increasing Japan’s contribution: a figure of US$2 billion in aid to Egypt, Jordan and Turkey was mooted by the US, in response to which Nakayama cancelled his attendance at the APEC conference in Vancouver so that a revised package of funding proposals could be negotiated. The perceived tardiness of Japan’s financial contribution to the MNF in the Persian Gulf provoked the US House of Representatives into voting 370–53 to withdraw 5000 troops a year from Japan until it began ‘to support their own defence and to support our efforts in the Gulf’ (The Japan Times, 14 September 1990). The Japanese government hastily attempted to deny any link between its financial contribution in the Gulf and US bases in Japan. However, the next day after this demonstration of US will, Sakamoto announced an extra US$1 billion for the MNF and the extension of US$2 billion in aid to Egypt, Jordan and Turkey (The Japan Times, 15 September 1990). Moreover, in reaction to the degree of US pressure, Kaifu took pains to explain to the US public the package of measures Japan would be undertaking by appearing on Cable Network News (CNN). Furthermore, the Japanese embassy mailed explanatory briefs to prominent scholars and media heads to ensure understanding of Japan’s contributions in the package. Thus, the US bilateral norm manifested itself both as criticism and praise in encouraging Japan’s active response. Further expansion of Japan’s financial contribution came in October with US$250 million in loans to Jordan extended in order to tighten up sanctions against Iraq, US$300 million in aid to Turkey to compensate for losses resulting from the Gulf Crisis, and a further US$150 million in loans to finance a World Bank-sponsored industry and trade project in the region (Mainichi Shinbun, 4 October 1990). The Japanese contribution was extended in January 1991 with US$38 million contributed to help alleviate the refugee problem. In these final days before the air war started, US pressure continued with Armacost attempting to determine what assistance could be expected from Japan in the event of the outbreak of military operations and suggesting to Miyazawa and Watanabe that the financial support for the MNF and refugee relief be increased (Asahi Shinbun, 17 January 1991). With the outbreak of hostilities, Kaifu promised to increase Japan’s aid contribution but failed to specify a figure. This figure was specified towards the end of January when the Finance Minister, Hashimoto Ryu¯ taro¯ , and US Treasury Secretary, Nicholas Brady, agreed on an additional US$9 billion to be paid to the MNF. This financial contribution was to be raised through tax increases, mostly through corporate, petroleum and tobacco taxes – the equivalent of ¥10,000 per person (Asahi Shinbun, 23 January 1991). The Japanese government had discovered that the Yoshida Doctrine dictating reliance upon the US to provide for its security was not a feasible policy and was faced with a US seeking to encourage, with varying degrees of pressure, Japan to play a larger role while maintaining the traditional bilateral security structure.

The Second Gulf War 79 However, the likelihood of despatching the SDF at this early stage was remote, as demonstrated by Nakayama’s statement to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia that ‘Japan will do its utmost in terms of extending measures of assistance in co-operation with other countries, but it cannot send the military’ (The Japan Times, 19 August 1990). Kaifu met with Sakamoto and MOFA officials on 22 August 1990 to discuss Japan’s response and the possibility of despatching personnel to aid in transport, medical, and communications’ duties (The Japan Times, 23 August 1990). Soon after this, US pressure was to be witnessed again with Armacost calling for an active and military role for Japan: ‘the importance of [Japan] being involved directly in multinational ventures in the area to support and enforce UN sanctions including direct participation . . . in the region, either through military presence, minesweepers, or other ships, or some form of support’ (The Japan Times, 24 August 1990). US Defense Secretary Richard Cheney called for Japan to participate in a multinational PKF (Yomiuri Shinbun, 14 September 1990). Pressure also came from Canada with Nakayama stressing in reaction to Joe Clark, the Canadian Foreign Minister, that Japan attached the greatest importance to PKOs (Asahi Shinbun, 19 September 1990). At the same time, support for the bill was expressed by the US State Department stressing Japan and Germany’s role in the post-Cold War world (The Japan Times, 24 October 1990). US Vice-President Dan Quayle and a number of world leaders in Tokyo for the enthronement ceremony of the new Emperor in November 1990 used the opportunity to call on Japan to contribute personnel to the Gulf. And in reaction to this, Kaifu addressed US and Japanese policy-makers stressing the ‘unified efforts from the international community’ and the ‘greater emphasis on the role the UN can play [in the resolution of post-Cold War conflicts]’ (The Japan Times, 16 November 1990). The attitude in the US to the despatch of Japanese personnel was one of despair and annoyance that an ally had acted so belatedly and minimally, with phrases such as ‘cynical’ and ‘modest’ employed (Kitaoka 1991: 5). Further soundbites of a critical nature included ‘burden-shirking’, ‘bogus constitutional excuses’ and the ‘belated despatch of four small wooden minesweepers two months after the hostilities ended’ (Woolley 1996: 805–6). A more understanding attitude was seen in the comment that this act constituted a ‘cautious but significant step in [ Japan’s] effort to define an international role beyond that of banker and trader’ (Wall Street Journal, 25 April 1991, cited in Woolley 1996: 807). As shown in the previous section, the business community’s reaction to events in the early stages of the Gulf conflict was divided depending on the interpretation of the Constitution. However, the business community can be seen to have been more susceptible to outside pressure and the fear of jeopardising the good bilateral relationship with the US. This provided the impetus behind Keidanren’s chairman Hiraiwa Gaishi’s statement of 8 April 1991 calling for the deployment of minesweepers to the Gulf under certain conditions including the existence of a cease-fire and the understanding of East Asian nations (Abe 1991: 53). The kind of proactive statement was received generally well by the rest of the business community, notoriously sensitive to outside pressure, and in particular from the US. This sensitivity was witnessed at the US Business Conference in Pittsburgh in July 1991

80 The Second Gulf War where Japanese delegates came under severe criticism for their government’s reaction to the Gulf Crisis (Abe 1991: 53). In line with its reaction to Japan’s overall contribution to the Gulf Crisis, the business community’s reaction to the despatch of minesweepers was tempered by the effect inactivity could have upon relations with the US. Thus, as regards international norms, the bilateral relationship with the US represents a constitutive norm, attempting to create and shape Japan’s identity through the use of gaiatsu and within the bilateral relationship in the direction of participation in and contribution to the international community’s efforts in the Gulf region. In contrast, relations with East Asian nations (as we shall see next), represent a more regulative norm, seeking, like the anti-militarist norm, to limit and curtail Japan’s actions. East Asianism The traditional fears of East Asian nations about any sign of Japanese remilitarisation and their instrumentalisation of the anti-militarist norm were provoked at an early stage in the Gulf Crisis when Kim Dae-Jung, head of the South Korean opposition party for Peace and Democracy in Korea, called upon Japan to state explicitly that it would not contribute military to any MNF (Yomiuri Shinbun, 2 September 1990). In addition, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, declared that: The people of China and some other Asian countries cannot but be concerned over the Japanese government’s plan to despatch members of its SDF to [the] UN peace co-operation corps abroad as that unfortunate part of history remains fresh in our minds . . . It is our hope that the Japanese government will deal with this matter prudently. (The Japan Times, 1 October 1990) These fears were acknowledged and internalised by Foreign Minister Nakayama when he stated that, ‘Southeast Asian countries, which suffered during WWII, have shown a serious interest in [the PKO bill]. It is extremely important to draw up a flawless bill’ (The Japan Times, 20 September 1990). Nakayama took the opportunity at the UN General Assembly meeting in New York towards the end of September to approach representatives of East Asian nations and allay any concern. Kaifu also took pains to mitigate fears in East Asia, ‘Japan has pledged since the end of WWII that it will never become a military power and launch a war of aggression again’ (The Japan Times, 28 September 1990). Kaifu’s statement stressed not only the nonmilitary nature of Japan’s contribution but also the role of the UN and Japan’s responsibilities to the international community – again grafting the norm of UN internationalism onto Japan’s peacekeeping contribution. Throughout this period, press reports in Japan of East Asian nations expressing their fears continued: South Korean Foreign Minister, Choi Ho Yoong, referring to the bill as ‘worrisome’ and Beijing referring to the despatch as a ‘mistake’ (The Japan Times, 20 and 22 October 1990). The Chinese President, Yang Shang-Kun, went as far to say that despatch would cause ‘severe and emotional repulsion’ among the

The Second Gulf War 81 Chinese people (The Japan Times, 28 October 1990). The feelings of the nations of East Asia were articulated in the following terms, the most extreme foreign critics suggest that a SDF overseas peacekeeping despatch could be the precursor to Japanese forces marching abroad under the battle flag of the Rising Sun . . . Most important to all parties is the question of what SDF despatch abroad might indicate about future Japanese military intentions. (Kim 1994: 22, cited in Leitenberg 1996b: 45–6) And with these feelings in mind, MOFA spokesman, Watanabe Taizo¯ , instructed Japanese ambassadors throughout the world to explain to their host governments that any Japanese contribution of personnel would be conducted through the UN. (The Japan Times, 28 October 1990). Hashimoto Hiroshi, Japanese Ambassador in Beijing, met with the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, Qi Huaiyuan, to reassure China that Japan would uphold UN resolutions. Similarly, Yanagi Kenichi, Ambassador in Seoul, stressed that Japan’s action was one of contribution to international society, not a military action. Senior members of the LDP, however, began to express concern about the chances of the bill passing into law, exemplified by Kanemaru’s acknowledgement of East Asian nations’ concerns as he was at that time involved in talks on the state of the Korean peninsula. However, the restrictive nature of this variant of the anti-militarist norm was beginning to be transformed into a more constitutive East Asian norm under the influence of interplay with the norm of UN internationalism. Indonesia’s President Suharto, after listening to Watanabe stress the despatch within the terms of UN resolution, expressed sympathy with Japan’s plans for the SDF (The Japan Times, 5 March 1991). Corazon Aquino declared in talks with Watanabe that the Philippines would not oppose an SDF role as long it was part of UN peacekeeping ( JEI Report, 15 March 1991). Despite originating the infamous quote likening Japan’s participation in PKOs to giving liqueur chocolates to an alcoholic, former Singaporean Prime Minister, Lee Kwan Yew, also expressed understanding for the despatch of the SDF. Even a minority opinion within South Korea was expressed by Choi Chang-yoon, Public Information Minister, that ‘within the UN peacekeeping corps following the Persian Gulf War, I think it is natural that a number of roles will emerge. It would be natural for Japan to take part’ ( JEI Report, 15 March 1991). The Thai ambassador in Tokyo, Birabhongse Kaseusri, stated that ‘despite world-war memories, Southeast Asian countries believe the intentions of the Japanese government are peaceful and constructive . . . It is appropriate for Japan to play a role in UN peacekeeping efforts’ (The Japan Times, 9 March 1991). Certainly Watanabe’s tour of Asia also met with opposition to the SDF despatch, the Chinese Vice-Premier, Wu Xueqian, stated that, ‘if Japan’s proposed international contribution means the despatch of SDF members, Japan should exercise prudence because it would be a sensitive issue’ (The Japan Times, 8 March 1991). However, this opinion was seemingly limited to China and the Korean peninsula. By displaying Japan’s effort as in concert with the UN, the impression of remilitarisation was avoided and opposition was weakened both inside and outside of Japan.

82 The Second Gulf War As the minesweepers made their way to the Gulf, further support was expressed in some quarters for the despatch. President Mahathir did not regard the despatch of minesweepers as an act of belligerence and in fact welcomed the MSDF despatch as Kaifu arrived in Malaysia to begin a tour of East Asian neighbours (Asahi Shinbun, 28 April 1991). The tour continued to Singapore where Kaifu again stressed that the despatch of minesweepers was part of Japan’s international contribution and not a sign of resurgent militarism (Yomiuri Shinbun, 3 May 1991). It was with this desire to preserve an anti-militarist image of Japan’s effort that helicopters were not utilised despite the presence of helipads on both the vessels, Hayase and Tokiwa. At the same time, Nakasone in Beijing had seemed to make progress in dealing with China. Jiang Zemin, Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist Party, expressed understanding at the MSDF despatch of minesweepers as part of the international effort to clear the Gulf sea lanes (The Japan Times, 4 May 1991). During the Diet debate on the PKO Bill, the government endeavoured to reassure not only the opposition parties but also the neighbouring nations of East Asia of the non-aggressive stance of the legislation. To this end Kaifu stated that the law should be implemented ‘after getting consent from all neighbouring countries’ (The Japan Times, 25 September 1991). Furthermore, he envisaged, ‘Asian countries able to discuss ways of joining together to participate in peacekeeping operations and how to divide up those roles’ (The Japan Times, 26 September 1991). At this time, the Ko¯ mei Party’s Ishida was in China reassuring Jiang Zemin that China had nothing to fear from Japan’s participation in PKOs (Asahi Shinbun, 9 October 1991). He also stressed the type of PKOs Japan would participate in, namely the more traditional kind of peacekeeping in line with the Constitution, rather than the enforcement measures seen in the Congo in the 1960s. Kaifu also attempted to stress that the civilian command of SDF troops participating in PKOs would rest squarely with the Prime Minister, not the UN Secretary-General. In reaction to the opposition parties’ references to the concerns of East Asian nations, Foreign Minister Nakayama instrumentalised the UN General Assembly to calm fears of neighbouring East Asian nations. It was stressed that ‘Japan has an obligation to contribute actively to efforts led by the UN to secure and maintain world peace’ ( JEI Report, 27 September 1991). And it was in this light that Nakayama conducted talks with his Korean and Chinese counterparts, Lee Sang Oh and Qian Qichen, to assuage any fears of a resurgent Japanese militarism. Although this regulative norm can be seen to have eroded to an extent in the case of Southeast Asian nations, such as Malaysia, the Philippines and so on, in the case of China and the two Koreas anxiety was still pervasive. In reaction to the passage of the PKO Law, opposition was expressed by South Korean officials fearing the subsequent repeal of the frozen clauses and a consequent resurgence of Japanese militarism. Equally, the Chinese media focused on the Diet debate and urged prudence in the matter (The Japan Times, 12 June 1992; Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 22 July 1992). To an extent, in the case of Southeast Asian nations, the norm of UN internationalism and its peacekeeping functions facilitated the relaxation of misgivings among certain nations concerned that Japan’s contribution take place under the aegis of the UN (or possibly US) rather than unilaterally. Yet the fears of

The Second Gulf War 83 East Asia nations continued to be evident with South Korean Japan specialist Song Yong-son stating: I don’t object to the new US–Japan Security Pact due to the lack of alternatives, but the problem lies in the momentum generated by developments that started with Japan’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations and it will continue with the unshackling of devices put in place to prevent it from becoming a military power. (Korea Times, 26 April 1996) Clearly, this anti-militarist norm, although weakening slightly in its durability and concordance in some Southeast Asian countries, was still instrumentalised especially by China and South Korea to restrict Japan’s contribution, despite references to the norm of UN internationalism and the concrete justification provided by participation based on UN resolutions. After the Gulf Crisis, the subsequent enactment of the PKO Law and with Japan’s participation in the UNTAC operation in Cambodia, the concerns of these nations and Japanese perceptions of them came to the forefront and yet altered in some cases to constitute both a normative tipping point and a newer, more constitutive norm, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 5. UN internationalism and peacekeeping As seen previously, although surprised by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the Japanese government was swift to impose its own economic embargo even before the UNendorsed embargo. Sakamoto announced the freezing of Kuwaiti assets on 3 August 1990 in response to a request from the Kuwaiti embassy in Tokyo, in addition to promising to consider other punitive economic measures in line with the US and European response. A ban on oil imports and the suspension of ¥400 billion in credits and loans to Iraq and Kuwait were among the suggestions. Japan’s response was to be declared once Sakamoto and Vice Foreign Minister Kuriyama Takakazu had talked with Kaifu, who had to cancel his holiday in Gunma prefecture. We have also seen how, at this early stage, US pressure had already come into play with a request for ‘concerted action’ from Japan and the first of many phone conversations between Bush and Kaifu (The Japan Times, 4 and 5 August 1990; JEI Report, 14 September 1990). Kaifu’s commitment to economic sanctions at this stage involved no determined response except to stress that if a UNSC resolution called for sanctions Japan would respond favourably. Thus, generally, the political response from Tokyo was rapid, assertive and in keeping with the response of the international community during this early period of the crisis. Despite the mixed reaction of the business community, the government imposed the ban on oil imports and all other trade with Iraq and Kuwait, suspended financial transactions with both nations and froze ¥400 billion in economic assistance with Kaifu characterising the invasion as ‘unpardonable conduct for a sovereign state’ (The Japan Times, 7 August 1990). In announcing this package of retaliatory measures, Ishihara Nobuo, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, stressed the concept of

84 The Second Gulf War co-operation with the international community. To this end, Japan was seemingly waiting for the UN’s response, which would act as a framework within which Japan would develop its own response. Moreover, Japan’s desire to address the crisis through the UN was further demonstrated by Foreign Minister Nakayama’s announcement with regard to the UN order to cease trade with Iraq: The government of Japan regards as of the highest significance that the international community has decided, through the UN, to combine their efforts to act towards the withdrawal of Iraqi troops and restoration of peace in the region’ (The Japan Times, 8 August 1990). Japan complied with UN resolutions by invoking two provisions under the Foreign Trade Control Law freezing Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in Japan (Asahi Shinbun, 8 August 1990). The government was also careful to cite the UN in its support for the US effort in the Gulf when Prime Minister Kaifu stressed the ‘use of force as an unavoidable last resort by the US and the other countries concerned seeking to push back aggression and to restore peace in accordance with UNSC Resolution 676’ ( JEI Report, 25 January 1991). As mentioned previously, with the outbreak of hostilities, Kaifu promised to increase Japan’s contribution and aid but failed to specify a figure. The eventual figure of US$9 billion was agreed upon at the end of January by Finance Minister Hashimoto and US Treasury Secretary, Nicholas Brady (Asahi Shinbun, 23 January 1991). This contribution, one of the most controversial within Japan, was explained to the public by Prime Minister Kaifu using the UN as a justifying factor: ‘Although the financial contribution needs to be borne by each member of Japanese society, I want the public to understand the necessity of Japan’s international contribution based on the UN’s activities [my emphasis]’ (The Japan Times, 25 January 1991). Foreign Minister Nakayama also justified the contributions to a Lower House Foreign Affairs Committee Meeting with reference to various UNSC resolutions and Japan’s responsibilities to international society (Proceedings of the 119th Regular Diet Lower House Committee on National Security, no. 7, 5 October 1990: 4–5). Kaifu’s plan was to despatch the ASDF based on a broad reading of the SDF Law allowing for the transport of refugees as well as foreign dignitaries, and thus, negating the need for any revision of the legislation. In this way, Japan would be capable of responding to calls from the United Nations Disaster Relief Organisation (UNDRO) and the International Organisation for Migration for aircraft to aid the refugee situation by simply adding a new ordinance to the SDF Law. In Diet debates, Kaifu defended his position, when questioned by Doi and Ishida, by emphasising that Japan’s response would respect both the Constitution and the UN Charter, the transportation of refugees did not constitute a military activity, and that the possibility of despatching the SDF on this duty would still be investigated (Proceedings of the 119th Regular Diet Lower House Honkaigi, 28 January 1991, p. 4). Kaifu still envisaged a role for the US–Japan Security Treaty alongside a UN-centred policy based on Article 10 of the Security Treaty which expresses the hope that the UN would be in a position to secure the peace and security that the Security Treaty aims to provide until that day comes (Kaifu 1991: 33). Similar sentiments of a duty to cooperate with the international community were expressed by Matsunaga Nobuo, an adviser to MOFA, stressing the role of the UN in the post-Cold War world and

The Second Gulf War 85 stating that ‘if [a UN police force] were set up, we should co-operate with it, including by military means. That does not mean renouncing our anti-war Constitution’ (The Japan Times, 7 February 1991). In this way, the amalgamation of the anti-militarist norm and the norm of UN internationalism was becoming increasingly evident. One of the first mentions of despatching Japanese personnel to the Gulf was suggested by Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke with the aim of maintaining the blockade against Iraq. MOFA rejected this suggestion, citing the constraints of the Constitution and pledging to limit Japan’s response to financial contributions (Mainichi Shinbun, 12 August 1990). The issue resurfaced when Terashima Taizo¯ , the SDF’s Joint Staff Council chairman, stated publicly that SDF members were eager to participate in the MNF gathering in the Gulf, ‘we are ready to go abroad anytime and I am confident the SDF is confident [sic] of carrying out whatever missions are ¯ uchi Keigo, leader of the DSP, required’ (The Japan Times, 16 August 1990). O suggested the despatch of the SDF because of the fact that financial contributions were regarded as insufficient by the international community but limited its role to purely non-military matters (Yomiuri Shinbun, 19 August 1990). Within the package of measures in response to the Gulf Crisis announced on 29 August 1990 emphasis was placed not only on the aid to be given to refugees and the medical aspects but also on the logistical support that Japan could offer to the MNF. Kaifu presented this idea in these terms: I believe that, within the framework of international society in the years ahead, it will be necessary to review our existing laws, regulations and systems, to consider what can be done for peace within the framework of the Constitution, and, for instance, and this is my personal opinion, to seriously consider fresh legislation, such as a UN Peace Co-operation Law, with a view to enabling Japan to perform its duties appropriately with regard to co-operating in UN activities for keeping and maintaining peace and for international efforts by the member states in support of those activities. (Yanai 1993: 35) ¯ uchi were in agreement that personnel could, and should, be despatched Kaifu and O and began to plan the legislation to facilitate despatch. Nakayama also seems to have ¯ uchi upon returning from his tour of changed his opinions in line with Kaifu and O the Gulf, stating that ‘it is high time that Japan considered what kind of contributions it can make as a member of the international community and what kind of legislation is needed [to make such contributions]’ (The Japan Times, 25 August 1990). LDP defence-related committees agreed on a more visible effort to contribute to the Gulf and suggested revision of the legislation on the despatch of personnel overseas. Sakamoto also called for a new law to allow Japanese participation in PKOs with an announcement on 5 September 1990 that ‘the government is considering whether and to what extent the SDF should play a role in achieving peace in the Gulf’ (The Japan Times, 6 September 1990). Ishikawa Yo¯ zo¯ , Director-General of the JDA, called for Diet debate to clarify what the SDF was allowed and not allowed to do (The Japan Times, 1 September 1990). Kaifu’s statement demonstrated a certain vagueness but

86 The Second Gulf War also a desire to contribute to the international community particularly through the UN: I have no intention of sending armed personnel [to the Gulf] to join military activities. But Japan, as a major economic power, must fulfil its international responsibilities by providing personnel as well as financial assistance to help peace activities by the UN . . . In the days when Japan was still in the process of rebuilding its war-battered economy, financial contributions alone may have been enough. But now Japan is one of the seven most industrialised democracies and must fulfil its international responsibilities. (The Japan Times, 9 September 1990) Thus, the UN and its peacekeeping activities were clearly playing the role of a constitutive norm enabling Japan to construct a new identity for itself in the pursuit of international co-operation beyond citing anti-militarist constraints. Another argument, or frame, put forward by supporters of a visible Japanese contribution was based on Article 98 of the Japanese Constitution, which states that Japan will honour other international treaties over and above the Constitution as a norm of international society. Furthermore, as Japan had agreed to the UN Charter upon joining the UN, Article 43, stating that each member state will make various materials available to the UN to fulfil its numerous duties, had to be respected. This was raised in a Diet committee meeting by Ito¯ Kenichi, of the Japan International Forum Foundation (Zaidan Ho¯jin Nihon Kokusai Fo¯ramu). He also stated, in answer to the claim that Japan was denied the right to collective self-defence, that, although Japan may have denied this right, it cannot deny the responsibility that Japan’s position in the world has been accorded (Proceedings of the 119th Regular Diet Lower House Committee on National Security, no. 6, 4 October 1990: 12). Similar opinions were expressed that cast Japan as an economic superpower failing to provide the blood and sweat that the US was ready to contribute, Japan’s responsibility to support the emerging international order, and the interpretation of Nishihara Tadashi of the JDA, which the Ozawa Report would later put forward, that the Constitution in focusing on the attainment of peace could sanction various kinds of contribution to PKOs including both non-military and military activities (Proceedings of the 119th Regular Diet Lower House Committee on National Security, no. 6, 4 October 1990: 16). The ill-fated UN Peace Co-operation Bill presented to the Diet allowed the SDF to retain their status and split control between the Prime Minister and the JDA, but would allow the team to participate in various activities deemed necessary by the UN. In defending this bill during the 119th extraordinary Diet session, Kaifu underlined changes in the post-Cold War world, the prominence of the UN and the ‘inevitable cost arising from Japan’s international position’ (The Japan Times, 12 October 1990). To this end Kaifu and the government agreed to recognise a reinterpretation of the term ‘collective defence’, which had since 1981 rejected military co-operation with other nations as unconstitutional. Now, military participation within PKOs based on the UN Charter and its resolutions were seen to fall outside the traditional interpretation of collective defence and were therefore permissible

The Second Gulf War 87 (The Japan Times, 15 and 16 October 1990). Other LDP sources agreed with Kaifu that peacekeeping based on a UN resolution does not constitute collective defence and ‘collective security’ was used as a new post-Cold War term to replace collective defence and allow for a military peacekeeping role in Japan in co-operation with other nations. This thinking could be seen when the Gaiko¯ Seisho (Diplomatic Bluebook) was published in mid-October 1990 with stress placed on the contribution of personnel on PKOs. Ozawa regarded any activity falling under the title of peacekeeping as behaviour working towards peaceful goals in line with the Constitution (Gaiko¯ Seisho 1990; Yomiuri Shinbun, 12 November 1990). Swedish Prime Minister, Ingvar Carlsson, stressed this point in urging Japan to adopt the identity of a nation like Sweden with a pacifist image, but a high profile in PKOs (Asahi Shinbun, 18 March 1991). This was an opinion echoed by UN UnderSecretary-General, Ronald Spiers, in urging Nakayama to adopt a position like Sweden and Canada in contributing actively to PKOs (Mainichi Shinbun, 26 March 1991). And this opinion was once again reiterated by Brian Mulroney, Canadian Prime Minister, by offering to share Canada’s expertise in this area (The Japan Times, 31 May 1991). MOFA concurred with this interpretation with one official stating that ‘the revitalization of the UN will offer a good opportunity for Japan to gain a higher profile in the world political scene’ and thus Japan could begin to orient its foreign policy around the UN rather than the US (Yomiuri Shinbun, 17 July 1991). In a round-table discussion of prominent academics, Diet members and bureaucrats conducted by the magazine, Bungeishunju¯, the overwhelming feeling was that if SDF personnel had to be despatched overseas then the only acceptable way of doing so would be under the UN flag. This would imbue Japan’s peacekeeping contribution with the degree of concordance accredited to PKOs. Yamasaki Taku, acting chairman of the LDP’s General Council, expressed the opinion that, ‘[i]f the multinational troops are re-organized under the UN flag, amending the law will be easier . . . Japan upholds the UN as the cornerstone of its diplomacy and defence; this means that our country has a duty to support UN operations’ (Tahara 1990: 14). Even the Socialists agreed on the centrality of the UN with Doi stating that: Now is the time to make use of the UN. We in the JSP are drawing up a concrete proposal for UN leadership, and we’ll be announcing the main points shortly . . . One of the main roles of the UN is to preserve peace and work out political resolutions of conflicts. The JSP is now considering the establishment of a UN peacekeeping fund. In the event of religious or ethnic conflicts – and we’ll be seeing more of them – the UN would use this money to seek political solutions. Japan, of course, would actively provide a fair share of the funding. (Tahara 1990: 15) Moroi Ken, chairman of Chichibu Cement Company, voiced similar concerns that ‘participation in a UN force is not a matter of our rights; it is a matter of our duties as part of the international community’ (Tahara 1990: 17). Opinion polls appear to have changed as the success of the Gulf campaign became evident. As in the words of one Ko¯ mei Party spokesman:

88 The Second Gulf War There has been a national change of mind in this country. The Gulf War had a strong impact. We watched the war on TV, with newscasters and scholars and pundits talking about what Japan’s role in the world ought to be. And the new consensus that merged is that our strong anti-war pacifism is still there. But, beyond that, shouldn’t Japan have some role in helping the UN preserve peace? . . . How can our country lock itself out of the world and sit here behind the closed door of anti-war pacifism?. (Washington Post, 20 September 1991, cited in Leitenberg 1996b: 17) Indicative of the conflict of norms, despite displaying shades of anti-militarism, elements of the business community demonstrated a degree of hawkishness in their attitude to the despatch of SDF personnel from the SDF to the Gulf, but expressed also support for despatch under the UN flag. The president of Sony, Oga Norio, supported the despatch of troops in the face of foreign pressure: It is being reported in America that its youth is in scorching heat of over forty degrees. This can have a strange effect upon people’s feelings and they are frustrated that the Japanese Diet is dragging its heels. We must consider these young Americans. What ought we to do about the multinational force? We must have the legal mechanisms in place . . . Global public opinion is watching the Diet, and we need to contribute our own sweat. (Abe 1991: 56, my translation) Other members of the business community went as far to promote constitutional revision. The vice-chairman of Keizai Do¯ yu¯ kai ( Japan Association of Corporate Executives), Kaku Ryu¯ zaburo¯ , stated that: Problems have been caused because Japan has failed to change things it ought to have changed. Since 1968, the 100th anniversary of the Meiji Restoration, Japan has been in the black. We should have changed this way of thinking then, but because we didn’t things became warped. We ought to have revised the Constitution but we didn’t. We should possess an army to for the world’s selfdefence against fanaticism. We ought to consider a policy for making some contribution but because we haven’t the world despises us. (Abe 1991: 56, my translation) The chairman of Keizai Do¯ yu¯ kai, Ishihara Takashi, echoed a popular theme of support for PKOs in stating at a press conference on 25 February 1991: For Japan to have a greater say in international affairs, it should use the SDF for its own defence and for the preservation of world peace. We need to contribute people in this way, not just money. It is acceptable for Japan to co-operate in police operations under the auspices of the UN [my emphasis]. (Abe 1991: 60, my translation)

The Second Gulf War 89 A subsequent Special Hearing of the Lower House centred upon the role that the UN could play in the post-Cold War world now it was freed from the constraints of the US-Soviet confrontation. Foreign Minister Nakayama and JDA Director-General Ishikawa emphasised the preventative peacekeeping role the UN could play in the international order and that Japan’s traditional UN-centred foreign policy could now come to fruition (Proceedings of the 119th Regular Diet Lower House Committee on National Security, no. 7, 5 October 1990: 13). The framing of the debate in terms of responsibility to the international community and the nature of PKOs overcame the vocal anti-militarist opposition within and outside of Japan. During further special committee hearings, the instrumentalisation of these frames continued. Kaifu stressed the fact that traditional peacekeeping depends upon a cease-fire being in place and the UN force taking a neutral, independent and non-enforcement stance. These conditions, it was argued, would minimise the danger of a particular PKO and be in keeping with the Constitution and Japan’s traditional UN-centred foreign policy (Lower House Special Hearing on the PKO Bill, no. 3, 25 September 1991: 9). In a subsequent hearing, Nakayama stressed the demands that Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar was making on Japan to release money and personnel to meet the requirements of expanding peacekeeping missions (Lower House Special Hearing on the PKO Bill, no. 6, 1 October 1991: 11). The Diet’s session ended in October 1991 and the debate on Japan’s contribution and the necessary legislation carried over to the next session in 1992. In the mean time, Kaifu was replaced as Prime Minister by Miyazawa Kiichi, a keen supporter of Japan’s participation within the UN, who refused to drop legislation and envisioned Cambodia as the anticipated first despatch for the SDF. Miyazawa stressed the necessity of despatching personnel abroad as part of Japan’s international contribution and emphasised the central role that the UN would play in realising this contribution (The Japan Times, 9 and 13 November 1991). The centrality of the UN was also witnessed in the SDPJ submitting the submission of an alternative bill to the Diet at this time constraining Japan’s contribution to civilian roles including election observation and medical help. SDF personnel were required to first resign their position before participating. Diet approval and UN command were also points that differed in this opposition party’s proposed bill (The Japan Times, 23 November 1991). In February 1992 the Ozawa Committee, reported its findings and the institutionalisation of many of the frames instrumentalised by the government can be seen. The main themes included the end of the Cold War, the importance of the UN, the strengthening of collective leadership, and the role Japan would have to play in the future after the Second Gulf War as one of the main members of the international community, ‘as was evident at the time of the recent Gulf War, it is clear that peace is not brought about by simply advocating it and if the international community does not co-operate together and take action, peace cannot be realised’ (‘Kokusai shakai ni okeru nihon no yakuwari’ 1992: 133, my translation). The report viewed the UN as ‘a forum where through the general will of international society every action taken in the field of security can be realised and legitimised, in this sense the security functions of the UN can be significant’ (‘Kokusai shakai ni okeru nihon no yakuwari’

90 The Second Gulf War 1992: 136, my translation). Within this framework, the report called on the government to strengthen ties with the US, co-operate and strengthen the G7, promote stability in Asia, and actively participate in UN activities. To this end, a distinction was drawn between active and passive anti-militarism in the reading of the Constitution to allow for a more active role within PKOs, rather the passive role Japan had played in the postwar world: So, it can be argued that supposing Japan were to use its forces overseas in these kind of cases [when international co-operative action involving the use of force to maintain or restore peace is taken based upon an international consensus], it would not come under our constitutional renunciation of war and the use of force to settle disputes nor conflict with Article 9. (‘Kokusai shakai ni okeru nihon no yakuwari’ 1992: 140, my translation) Moreover: Japan should not assume its share of this role in the international community just because other countries say so. Rather, in order to realise our ideals contained in the Constitution, we should take on this role as our own duty, and, of course, on the basis of our own judgement. (‘Kokusai shakai ni okeru nihon no yakuwari’ 1992: 141, my translation) On the issue of Japan participating in an armed UN force the report was clear in stating that: As long as the MNF is acting under the authority of the UN and based upon an international consensus, while giving the present financial and material assistance, Japan should also promote the co-operation of personnel in fields that do not entail the use of force, such as medical care, transport, and environmental preservation. Whether Japanese personnel should co-operate in areas that go beyond this should be decided after a careful investigation of the characteristics and functions of the MNF, including the number of countries participating and the nature of the decision-making process therein. (‘Kokusai shakai ni okeru nihon no yakuwari’ 1992: 144, my translation) Essentially, the message of the report was that ‘no nation is responsible to itself alone’ (The Japan Times, 21 February 1992). Under this interpretation, the MNF was regarded as working towards the goal of creating peace and order, the same goal of the Constitution and international co-operation (Matsutake 1991: 134–5). In late January 1992, Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi addressed the UNSC in the spirit of the Ozawa Committee and urged a major reform of the UN’s organisations and functions. Implicit in this was the desire to see Japan become one of the permanent members of the UNSC (JEI Report, 13 March 1992). And later the same month Miyazawa stressed, ‘it is significant for the SDF to respond to expectations

The Second Gulf War 91 from the international community and to demonstrate its ability’ (The Japan Times, 23 March 1992). The UN was regarded in this speech as the logical channel for Japan’s international contribution as an international organisation that commands almost complete agreement across the Japanese political spectrum. However, Prime Minister Miyazawa was unwilling to expand the interpretation of the Constitution to allow the peacemaking role envisaged in the Ozawa Report, stressing Japan’s right to self-defence only (The Japan Times, 22 February 1992). At this time opinion in the international community supporting a peacekeeping role for the SDF was also in evidence. German politicians and academics who were themselves going through a debate on contributing to PKOs supported Japan’s participation even if constitutional revision was necessary. Gareth Evans, head of the Australian Foreign and Trade Ministry at that time, also supported Japan’s planned despatch of the SDF on PKOs (Yomiuri Shinbun, 9 April 1992). UN SecretaryGeneral Boutros-Ghali added his voice to the despatch of Japanese personnel to the UN (The Japan Times, 21 April 1992). The importance of the UN Secretary-General’s statements can be seen in the inaccurate reports stating that Boutros-Ghali had rejected Japan’s projected personnel contribution as unnecessary. Despite the fact that it was later revealed that Boutros-Ghali had made no such claim, reports suggested that it was therefore no longer necessary for Japan to enact peacekeeping legislation (Mainichi Shinbun, 16 April 1992). Article 3, Paragraph 1 of the PKO Law states: ‘UN peacekeeping operations conducted under the control of the UN based on resolutions of the General Assembly or Security Council.’ Therefore, Japan can despatch peacekeeping troops only under the remit of the UN and not any state or international organisation other than the UN. Investigations were carried out as to the viability of participation in non-UN PKOs but it was believed that the UN could guarantee the impartiality of an operation and had an established track record of peacekeeping. MOFA hailed the law as a step to a more visible global role and an improvement in Japan’s role in the UN and the bilateral relationship with the US. Despatch of SDF personnel to the UNTAC mission in Cambodia was the next objective of MOFA. The nations of ASEAN also welcomed the law and urged Japan to play a role in Cambodia. The overall tone of the ASEAN response was encouraging as long as Japan participated within the UN and its resolutions to reduce the fear of resurgence in Japanese militarism (The Japan Times, 17 June 1992). As we have seen, considerable domestic opposition was voiced, but the UN served to act as a legitimising factor if Japan kept its military within the remit of the UN’s mandate. The acting Cambodian government (as will be seen in Chapter 5) in particular urged Japan to quickly implement the law and despatch the SDF to the UNTAC mission. After this stage the debate began to be characterised by the question of the suitability of the case of Cambodia and the necessary preparations for the SDF despatch. Again public opinion had completed a volte-face with 52 per cent supporting the despatch of the SDF to Cambodia and 36 per cent opposing any despatch, although the mood was still predominantly against the non-use of force, with 71 per cent of those polled favouring a non-military role (Asahi Shinbun, 28 September 1992).

92 The Second Gulf War Japan had previously been unable to actively participate within the UN as Sumi Shigeki, First Secretary of Japan’s Permanent Mission to the UN, declared at the 46th Session of the UN General Assembly held in October 1991: The international community owes a profound debt of gratitude to those countries that contribute personnel to UN peacekeeping operations. Japan is deeply grateful for the contributions they have made to the maintenance of world peace and security and is eager to join them in that noble endeavour. My government is studying ways in which it might broaden its participation in peacekeeping activities. (Statement by Sumi Shigeki, Delegation of Japan, on Item 74: Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in all their Aspects. UN General Assembly, 46th Session, Special Political Committee, 29 October 1991) In contrast, with the passage and successful implementation of the PKO legislation, Sumi was able to announce a year later that: The international community owes a profound debt of gratitude to UN peacekeeping operations. When I addressed this Committee last year I announced that my government had been studying ways in which Japan might broaden its participation in this indispensable endeavour. Today I am pleased to inform the members of this Committee that Japan has in fact provided some 700 personnel, both civilian and military, to the operations in Cambodia, in accordance with the recently enacted Peace Co-operation Law . . . The Government of Japan is pleased to join the countries that contribute personnel to UN peacekeeping operations, and intends to co-operate to the maximum degree allowed within the framework of this new law. (Statement by Sumi Shigeki, Delegation of Japan, on Item 75: Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in all their Aspects. UN General Assembly, 47th Session, Special Political Committee, 10 November 1992) Reflecting upon Japan’s response to the Second Gulf War and contribution to international society, the traditional reference points and identities of Japan’s policymaking process appear to have been blurred. Admittedly, the anti-militarist norm remained an influential force and the opposition parties demonstrated their ability to defend and protect this norm of Japanese society. However, the role of the UN as a normative and legitimising factor became integral to any despatch of Japanese SDF personnel, both in justifying it to the Japanese public and opposition parties. The UN and its peacekeeping duties in the post-Cold War era were being promoted by a number of norm entrepreneurs as a new norm of international society, and began to supersede the traditional norm of anti-militarism in its specificity and concordance by merging with it and redefining what kind of overseas despatch was and was not permissible. In failing to recognise this trend, the SDPJ suffered in the polls and

The Second Gulf War 93 eventually changed its security position under the leadership of Murayama Tomiichi (for a review of the reaction of the SDPJ to the Gulf War, see Suito¯ 1991: 14–27).

Summary At the beginning of the Second Gulf War the traditional norms of Japan’s political culture of the Cold War era (as discussed in Chapter 3) were clearly in evidence, namely a durable sense of anti-militarism, widely accepted respect for and reliance upon the US, deference to the concerns of neighbouring East Asian nations over Japan’s perceived remilitarisation, and a vocal minority advocating Japan’s responsibilities to the UN and international society. As would be expected in these circumstances, the Japanese government looked to the US for leadership in the crisis and had to adapt its policies in the light of US criticisms and gaiatsu for a greater contribution, but also with regard to domestic anti-militarism and its East Asian variant. The norm of UN internationalism provided a palliative that appeased all of these other norms and created the framework for a degree of Japanese activism. Kaifu’s strategy of contributing ‘as much as possible, as quickly as possible’, rather than ‘too little, too late’ was implemented while these norms were conflicting with each and resulted in Japan’s incremental role (Washington Post, 17 March 1991, cited in Woolley 1996: 807). Considering the obstacles that stood in Japan’s way and the lack of precedence to refer to, the Kaifu and Miyazawa administrations had done what they could, and possibly even more, by progressively assuming responsibilities, including minesweeping and the passage of the PKO Law. After the success of the Second Gulf War and general acceptance of the role of the UN, the Japanese government was faced with a number of mixed signals from the nations of East Asia and Japanese domestic society regarding their traditional concordance with the antimilitarist norm. Thus, during this period of norm emergence it would be expected that the Japanese government’s policy would be gradual and cautious, rather than rapid and path-breaking. With the rise in profile of the UN, its Secretary-General and the international community in dealing with the crisis, the norm of the UN and its peacekeeping functions developed rapidly from the embryonic stage of the 1980s (demonstrated in Chapter 3) into a liberating and constitutive norm in stark contrast to the regulative nature of the anti-militarist norm. Thus, this chapter has demonstrated how these norms interacted with each other and, in addition, how UN internationalism and the practice of peacekeeping acquired both specificity and concordance within Japan, and as a result were able to act as justifying factors appeasing fears of remilitarisation. It appeared that the norm of UN internationalism could transcend all other norms in importance as the findings of the chief norm entrepreneur of UN internationalism, the Ozawa Committee, recognised. The reason for this is rooted in the constitutive, rather than regulative, nature of this norm, providing Japan with a new field in which to fulfil its perceived commitments to the post-Cold War international community without overtly compromising its traditional anti-militarist identity. Sections of Japanese society began to comprehend the new norm of peacekeeping and adjust

94 The Second Gulf War their traditional anti-militarism accordingly. Moreover, a divide developed between the stalwart opposition of China and South Korea and the acceptance of Southeast Asian nations – this development from Figure 3.1 can be seen in Figure 4.1. If the Cold War period represents the period of defining the existence of norms, then the Second Gulf War represents a period when these norms emerged, came into conflict with each other and the norm of UN internationalism in particular grew in influence to rival the traditionally settled norm of anti-militarism. Chapter 5 will continue to interpret events during the UNTAC operation through the framework of competing types of norms in order to explain how the debate reached a tipping point with the realisation of Japan’s first overseas despatch of SDF personnel since its establishment. Full peacekeeping participation (e.g. peace enforcement)

* Conservative

* Ozawa Report

press

* LDP * DSP * Ko¯mei Party * Liberal press * Public opinion

No constitutional revision

* US * UN * Business world * Southeast Asian nations Constitutional revision

* SDPJ * JCP

* Northeast Asian nations Minimal peacekeeping participation (e.g. financial contributions)

Figure 4.1 Policy-making matrix of Japanese foreign policy during the Second Gulf War.

5

Cambodia

Introduction UNTAC was a watershed for a number of actors involved. For the UN it was the largest PKO mounted in its history, embracing unprecedentedly ambitious plans for the administration of an entire country. Created by UNSC Resolution 745 on 28 February 1992, UNTAC cost around US$1.7 billion to implement and deployed over 22,000 military and civilian personnel from over forty-four countries joined by about 1000 international polling station officers and over 50,000 Cambodian staff (for a more detailed description of the UNTAC operation, see Akashi 1993). For the Cambodian nation it symbolised the desire to end the institutionalised violence of recent Cambodian history and the hope that the reconstruction of the nation could be promoted. For Japan, it was the first despatch overseas of the SDF since its creation and the first true test of the PKO Law. As will be explored in this chapter, Japan’s contribution to UNTAC was built upon the foundations of the traditional norms of Japanese foreign policy (as outlined in Chapter 2). These norms were not only liberating in that they encouraged and shaped policy as constitutive norms, but also constraining in defining what was acceptable and unacceptable as regulative norms. As seen in Chapter 4, the regulative power of the norm of anti-militarism began to wane during and after the Second Gulf War, losing some of its concordance to the norm of UN internationalism. During the UNTAC operation the antimilitarist norm can be seen to have come into further conflict with the norm of UN internationalism with implications for the resulting policy.

A brief history of the Cambodian conflict Cambodia’s history is a long, rich and yet violent one, constituting what Chandler has called a ‘majestic two thousand years of history’ (Chandler 1992: 240). For nearly a century Cambodia was a French protectorate with an intervening but considerably shorter period during the Second World War under Japanese occupation. France conceded independence in November 1953 and Cambodia was subsequently accorded international recognition in July 1954 by the Geneva Conference on Indo-China and admitted to the UN in 1955 (Leifer 1982). In 1970 a right-wing military coup by General Lon Nol overthrew Prince Sihanouk and changed the name of the country from the Kingdom of Cambodia to the Khmer

96 Cambodia Republic. However, the promised stability failed to materialise and civil war followed resulting in the victory of Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge, the establishment of Democratic Kampuchea in April 1975, Sihanouk’s relinquishment of the head of state and the genocide of the killing fields. This soon led Vietnam to invade Cambodia towards the end of 1978 and impose their own brand of communism on the long-suffering Cambodian people with the establishment of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), known after 1989 as the State of Cambodia. By this stage the conflict had acquired regional as well as internal implications as a struggle between Vietnam and China as to who would dominate Indochina. The global implications were seen in the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between the Soviet Union and Vietnam, which was regarded by Beijing and Washington as proof of Soviet expansionist intentions leading to, on the one hand, military intervention by China in northern Vietnam in February 1979 and, on the other hand, a concerted effort by the ASEAN member states to find a diplomatic solution to the problem. The PRK led by Heng Samrin as President and Hun Sen as Prime Minister waged an ultimately unsuccessful campaign against the remnants of the Khmer Rouge hiding along the Thai–Cambodian border, in addition to Sihanouk’s royalist Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif (FUNCINPEC: United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Co-operative Cambodia) and the republican Khmer People’s National Liberation Front led by Lon Nol’s former Prime Minister, Son Sann. With the financial backing of China, Thailand and the West, these factions formed the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) and acquired the privilege of occupying Cambodia’s seat in the UN General Assembly. In a classic Cold War scenario, in opposition stood the PRK supported by Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Through a process of attrition, this confrontation eventually reached a stalemate, thereby facilitating the willingness to come to some kind of settlement. This situation was of course aided by the improvement of external factors, namely the withdrawal of Vietnam in 1989 and the general improvement of Sino-Vietnamese relations. Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union ended financial aid for Vietnam and the PRK. Finally, the US, fearing a return to power of the Khmer Rouge, began to pressurise Thailand and China to rescind their support for Pol Pot. The outcome of all this was a series of attempts throughout the 1980s to resolve the Cambodian conflict based on multilateral efforts. The UN General Assembly convened an international conference in 1980 ultimately failing due to the Soviet Union and Vietnam’s boycott. In 1988 and 1989 Indonesia sponsored the two Jakarta Informal Meetings attended by the four Cambodia factions, the members of ASEAN, Laos and Vietnam. The result of these two meetings was the Vietnamese offer to withdraw from Cambodia, which was subsequently followed by the Paris Conference on Cambodia of July 1989 co-sponsored by France and Indonesia. Progress was made at the conference but it ultimately became deadlocked due to Hun Sen’s refusal to accept any power-sharing arrangements with the Khmer Rouge (Koh 1990: 86). The solution to this deadlock was first mooted by US Congressman Stephen Solarz to Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and hinged on the abandonment

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of any power-sharing arrangements in favour of placing faith in the renewed importance of the UN in the post-Cold War world. Thus, instead of power-sharing, the stress was placed on the UN administration of Cambodia in the run-up to a UNobserved election (Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 April 1989). This was developed by Australia into a document submitted to the February 1990 Informal Meeting on Cambodia and supported by a back-breaking diplomatic effort by Australian diplomat Michael Costello to win the acceptance of the nations attending the meeting. At the same time the Japanese government launched its first ill-fated effort to broker a deal with the Tokyo Conference on Cambodia ignored, and thus doomed, by the Khmer Rouge. The Australian document acted as the basis for the UNSC’s Framework Document for a Cambodian Settlement accepted by all attendants of the Informal Meeting on Cambodia and initiated the creation of the Supreme National Council (SNC) comprising all the factions with the aim of sustaining the peace process through a working relationship (UN Document S/RES/668, 20 September 1990; UN General Assembly Resolution 45/3, 8 October 1990; UN Document A7/RES/45/3, 15 October 1990). With the creation of this body, the attainment of a solid cease-fire and agreement on the scope of the UN administrative role, the Paris Peace Accords were signed on 23 October 1991 by the four Cambodian factions under the umbrella of the SNC, the UNSC Permanent Five, and a number of other states. The four factions pledged through the Accords to maintain the cease-fire, facilitate the cantonment and disarmament of military forces and recognise the SNC as the legitimate authority of Cambodia through the transitional period. The non-Cambodian signatories pledged to remove their troops from Cambodian territory, end military and financial assistance, and recognise the sovereignty, integrity and neutrality of Cambodia. The UN would administer the country until an election (also to be conducted by the UN) could be held and a national government formed. Thus, the Accords hinged on the effectiveness of the interaction between the SNC and the UN, specifically UNTAC and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. This was the most ambitious large-scale PKO in the history of the UN embracing a mixture of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. In detail, UNTAC’s mandate included: first, supervision, monitoring and verification of the withdrawal and non-return of foreign troops; second, cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation of the four Cambodian factions; third, the conduct of a free and fair election; fourth, promotion and protection of human rights; fifth, clearing the country of landmines; sixth, repatriation of Cambodian refugees; seventh, maintenance of law and order, military security and civil administration; and finally, establishment of an economic infrastructure and encouragement of sustained development. UNTAC began to take shape following the appointment of Akashi Yasushi as Special Representative to the Secretary-General and head of UNTAC in January 1992. Lieutenant General John Sanderson of Australia was appointed commander of UNTAC’s military force. Akashi, in particular, was entrusted with extraordinary privileges in retaining the right to decide whether decisions undertaken by the SNC were in keeping with the Paris Peace Accords or not. It could be said that UNTAC was Akashi (Akashi 1993: 188). The operation was sanctioned by the UNSC in

98 Cambodia February 1992 and an election date was set for April–May 1993 with the establishment of a new government for August 1993. A force of 15,900 military personnel was planned with 3600 civilian police and 2000 civilians with 450 UN volunteers taken from forty-six contributing countries swelling the numbers. Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand were the first nations to deploy their troops with full and complete deployment taking longer than expected. To achieve its aims, the UNTAC mission divided Cambodia into several sectors under the respective administration of Bangladeshi, Bulgarian, Dutch, French, Ghanaian, Indonesian, Malaysian, Pakistani, Tunisian and Uruguayan personnel (Fukui, Y. 1993: 118). The creation of UNTAC constituted the first phase of the operation. The cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation of the four factions constituted the second phase complemented by the repatriation of Cambodian refugees, implemented hand in hand with mineclearing in arable land. Furthermore, in preparation for the election, UNTAC’s activities embraced enrolment and registration, in addition to the everyday administration of the country, maintenance of law and order, and protection of human rights. This stage was complicated by the reports of intrusions by Vietnamese troops still present in Cambodia, the intransigence of the Khmer Rouge over this issue, the sporadic attacks on Vietnamese residents in Cambodia, and the consequent failure of Pol Pot to co-operate with the second phase of the peace process. As the situation escalated over the months that followed the Khmer Rouge began a campaign of kidnapping UN peacekeepers. Moreover, violence was not a monopoly of the Khmer Rouge, as the State of Cambodia undertook terror campaigns of drive-by shootings and grenade attacks on opposition party election offices and candidates. Throughout this time the use of force by UNTAC was never ruled out and was most strongly advocated by General Loridon of France. Eventually the peace process proceeded with the disarmament of the three co-operating factions in the face of Khmer Rouge intransigence, so much so that by September 1992, 52,000 troops of the co-operating parties had been cantoned and 50,000 weapons taken into custody. However, this still left a considerable number of trained and armed troops on all sides. On 13 October 1992, UNSC decided to proceed with the election despite the failure to end the civil war and create a peaceful environment, opting to pressurise the Khmer Rouge into co-operation through diplomatic efforts on the part of France, Indonesia, Japan and Thailand. The election campaign began on 7 April 1993, having been postponed due to the poor security situation, lasting until 19 May followed by a cooling-off period and then polling from 23 to 28 May. Khmer Rouge violence continued and fears of an outright attack on the campaign were heightened when in mid-April the Khmer Rouge suddenly closed its office in Phnom Penh and withdrew its representatives. Both the Australian and Japanese governments expressed doubts about a continuing presence in Cambodia. Despite these misgivings and violence, the Cambodian people turned out in millions to cast their votes, thereby allowing the operation to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. In all, close to 90 per cent of those registered to vote came to the ballot box – a remarkable percentage by any nation’s standards – and polling took place in a remarkably free and fair atmosphere, contrasting dramatically with the run-up period to the election. Khmer Rouge soldiers

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surprisingly appeared at election stations and declared support for the new government even if it included Sihanouk. Ultimately, the election was largely free and fair and recognised by the international community as well as the four Cambodian factions. In the aftermath of the election and various political manoeuvrings by the four factions, a Constituent Assembly was formed and a draft Constitution ratified on 21 September 1993. The Constituent Assembly was transformed subsequently into the new National Assembly and UNTAC’s role formally ended. With no one party assuming a majority, a coalition government excluding the Khmer Rouge was formed. With the success of the largest election in Cambodian history and the largest peacekeeping operation undertaken by the international community, UNTAC was an enormous confidence-building measure in the short term to both the Cambodian nation and the UN. This introductory review of recent Cambodian history is, by necessity and without apology, brief and uneven due to the emphasis it places on the UNTAC administration of Cambodia. With this time-chart in mind, however, the subsequent sections will shed light on how the changing norms framed, encouraged and constrained the first participation of Japanese personnel in a PKO. Assessing how Japan’s contribution coloured, and was coloured by, the UNTAC operation provides the remit of this chapter and, in addition, the interplay of norms will be adumbrated with the aim of demonstrating that UNTAC constituted a tipping point in the life cycle of some of these norms.

Japan’s contribution The Japanese government sought to participate actively in the resolution of the Cambodian conflict and the consequent reconstruction of the nation. However, this activism was by no means a recent development. Japan’s relations with Cambodia had always been amicable, although not particularly intimate, since Cambodia’s attainment of independence in 1953. With the Vietnamese invasion of 1978 Japan’s policy was built on the foundations of ASEAN’s policy of opposition to the invasion. However, with the collapse of the Cold War and the more concrete possibility of a solution to the conflict, Japan began to adopt a more salient role in Cambodia’s conflict resolution (Tomoda 1992; Iikura 1993; Takeda 1998). Japan’s efforts to contribute to the international community were initially based on the traditional policy of providing financial assistance. Japan was one of the most vocal nations in favour of providing Cambodia with aid. Between March 1991 and November 1992, Japan provided over US$36 million of aid through bilateral channels and US$70.9 million through international organisations. At the Paris Conference of October 1991 Japan proposed an international meeting on Cambodian reconstruction to take place in Tokyo, which was held in June 1992. Entitled the Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia and chaired by both Japan and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the conference pledged US$880 million in aid. This was praised by Akashi as ‘the most remarkable success that Japan’s diplomacy had in recent years’ (Akashi 1992: 11). Japan appeared to be tying its reputation to that of the UN in seeking to enhance

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both its and the UN’s credibility. As Professor Tomoda Seki of Asia University has stressed, ‘Japan’s aid to Cambodia is becoming a touchstone for Japan which has a slogan of international contribution’ (Tomoda 1993: 32). In addition (as already mentioned), UNTAC was Japan’s first overseas despatch of military personnel since the end of the Korean War as a result of the legislative process outlined in Chapter 4. The International Peace Co-operation Headquarters (IPCHQ) was created as a government agency by the PKO Law to oversee Japan’s contribution and participation, which can be classified into three areas: first, electoral observation monitoring and assistance in the national election that took place from 23 to 28 May. Five national government officers, thirteen local government officers and twenty-three volunteers were sent by the Japanese government charged with fulfilling this mandate; second, civilian police duties to survey local police activities for impartiality and the training of Cambodian police in investigation techniques, to which end seventy-five Japanese civilian police were despatched from October 1992 to July 1993; and third, SDF engineering units were charged with the duty of rebuilding roads, bridges and the transport of supplies. Two contingents, both of 600 men, were sent from September 1992 to April 1993 and March to September 1993 (for more details, see MOFA homepage, http://www.mofa.go.jp/pko/02_2.html). Anti-militarism No issue dominated the debate over Japan’s participation in the UNTAC operation more than the violations of the cease-fire committed mainly by the Khmer Rouge, and the debate over whether this compromised the despatch of the SDF in light of the five principles of the PKO Law. In reaction to one of the many attacks on a UN installation, commonly known as ‘Japan House’ on 12 January 1993, where a number of Japanese officers were regularly resident, then Chief Cabinet Secretary, Ko¯ no Yo¯ hei, stressed that the five principles guiding Japan’s participation were not compromised and that the cease-fire was still in place. Nevertheless, he stressed that the Japanese government would request UNTAC to ensure the safety of Japanese peacekeepers, especially civilian police officers, who were grouped in pairs and regarded as particularly vulnerable as opposed to SDF units, which were organised in groups (Yomiuri Shinbun, 14 January 1993; Asahi Shinbun, 14 January 1993). In the face of the February 1993 full-scale offensive by the Phnom Penh government against the remaining Khmer Rouge factions, the interpretation that the Paris Peace Accords were still intact was maintained by members of UNTAC as well as by the Japanese Prime Minister, Miyazawa Kiichi, and Ambassador to Cambodia, Imagawa Yukio (The Japan Times, 4 February 1993). Foreign Minister Watanabe Michio asserted in conversation with Prime Minister Miyazawa that the Paris Peace Accords were seen to be intact and there was no need to consider withdrawal of Japanese personnel in light of the five principles. Miyazawa thereafter reported this to the Diet (Yomiuri Shinbun, 2 February 1993). A few days later the government even agreed to the measure requested by UNTAC that the Japanese contingent’s area of operations be expanded towards the north of Cambodia but avoiding areas where the Khmer Rouge were known to operate (Yomiuri Shinbun, 10 February 1993).

Cambodia 101 As the violence in Cambodia continued to challenge the Paris Peace Accords and the five principles framing the SDF’s participation, Japanese public opinion began to question the continued stationing of the SDF in Cambodia. Boutros-Ghali’s visit to Tokyo on 15 February 1993 was met with a rally organised by a number of protest groups from the Kanto¯ area urging the government to resist Boutros-Ghali’s call for Japan to increase its peacekeeping contribution in quantity and quality and to withdraw from Cambodia as the cease-fire was in ruins (The Japan Times, 16 February 1993). Furthermore, the issue that brought opposition to participation in UNTAC to a head was the murder of the Japanese UN volunteer worker Nakata Atsuhito along with his Cambodian interpreter on 8 April 1993. While assisting with preparations for the election, Nakata was shot in the province of Kompong Thom by what was at first believed to be Khmer Rouge guerrillas, but subsequently turned out to be an armed officer of the State of Cambodia party (Findlay 1995: 77). In the face of this event, the government was swift to express regret but also to stress that it would not affect the continuance of the mission. In fact, Ko¯ no stressed the resolve that Japan possessed to continue with the mission despite this tragedy (Yomiuri Shinbun, 9 April 1993). In reaction, members of the SDPJ called for the withdrawal of Japanese personnel as the cease-fire was obviously failing to hold due to the noncompliance and terrorism of the Khmer Rouge. In fact, the situation was interpreted by some observers as closer to ‘a state of war’ (The Japan Times, 9 April 1993). According to Japan’s National Police Agency, danger existed in seven of the twentyone areas where Japanese civilian police were stationed (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 13 May 1993). However, other sections of the Japanese government were more restrained. The Ko¯ mei Party’s Secretary-General, Ichikawa Yu¯ ichi, stressed a policy of waitand-see (The Japan Times, 9 April 1993). The government emphasised that although an independent withdrawal was permissible under the five principles, Japanese personnel would stay in Cambodia until the UN regarded the cease-fire as untenable. One of Goto¯ da Masaharu’s first acts upon being appointed Deputy Prime Minister in April 1993, due to the ill-health of Watanabe, was to assure the nation and international community that Japanese personnel would remain in Cambodia and confirmed that Mozambique would be the next destination for Japan’s peacekeepers (The Japan Times, 10 April 1993). All of this was in keeping with Minister of State Nakayama Kazuo’s statement in front of the House of Representatives’ Committee on National Security of 6 April 1993, where he stressed the need to make not only a financial contribution, but also a human contribution to PKOs, and that the SDF was most suited to the task (Proceedings of the 121st Regular Diet Lower House Committee on National Security, no. 6, 6 April 1993: 8). Thus (as will be seen in more detail), the government met anti-militarist dissent among the population with reference to the UN and the internationalist norm, stressing that Japan would withdraw only if the UN decided to withdraw – the regulative norm of anti-militarism being countered by the constitutive norm of peacekeeping under the aegis of UN internationalism. Public opposition to the SDF’s mission was demonstrated in protests outside government buildings demanding immediate withdrawal from Cambodia and suspension of plans to despatch the SDF to Mozambique. The All-Japan Prefectural

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and Municipal Workers’ Union submitted a petition to the Ministry of Home Affairs to ensure that its members would not be despatched to Cambodia to help with the election. The Gunma prefectural government began to advise its staff enlisted to help in the administrative preparations for the election in Cambodia to refuse their despatch (The Japan Times, 16 April 1993). The SDPJ and JCP began to place pressure on Prime Minister Miyazawa in the Diet to withdraw SDF troops from Cambodia and demand that the UN postpone the election from 23 to 28 May as the country was in no peaceful state to maintain a free and fair election. However, opposition was not as vociferous as the debate over the PKO Law highlighted in Chapter 4, mainly due to the electoral losses of the SDPJ in the previous summer’s election and the need to build bridges with the centrist parties. Ko¯ mei Party members took a middle line, recognising that the Khmer Rouge may well have broken the cease-fire, but that a hasty withdrawal of SDF troops should be avoided. Similarly DSP members feared that a hasty withdrawal could lead to the isolation of Japan in the international community (The Japan Times, 14 May 1993). Thus, once again, the norm of anti-militarism was being replaced with international standards of behaviour, particularly through the UN. Throughout this period the government was steadfast in opposing unilateral withdrawal, but supporting the maintenance of the original date for the election, and the improvement of the security situation for Japanese peacekeepers. Miyazawa reiterated this point, both on the domestic stage and the international stage while visiting Australia in talks with Prime Minister Paul Keating (Yomiuri Shinbun, 1 May 1993). At this time even participation within a UN army in the peace enforcement aspects of PKOs was mooted as a possible idea with Foreign Minister Muto¯ Kabun stressing the necessity to investigate the possibility (Yomiuri Shinbun, 18 May 1993). The conflict between the two norms of traditional anti-militarism and commitment to UN internationalism was summed up by the chairman of the LDP’s Research Commission on the Constitution, Kurihara Yu¯ ko, in asking rhetorically whether the government ‘will follow the international community or domestic opinion’ (The Japan Times, 14 May 1993). Moreover, this conflict was demonstrated by disagreement within the government, with Koizumi Junichiro¯ , Minister for Posts and Telecommunications, on the one hand, demanding the withdrawal of Japanese personnel to safer areas, while, on the other hand, Miyazawa and Muto¯ led the damage limitation campaign and attempted to move the debate on to the frozen activities of the PKO Law and investigate the possibility of using weapons faced with the demands of a concrete PKO (Yomiuri Shinbun, 18 and 19 May 1993). The opposition parties demonstrated similar divisions over the issue; for instance, on the one hand, Murayama Tomiichi of the SDPJ opposed any patrols of election stations by the SDF as they may encounter violent resistance by Khmer Rouge troops; on the other hand, Kanzaki Takenori of the Ko¯ mei Party supported the patrols under the PKO Law and Kanda Gen of the DSP regarded participation in these patrols as an inevitable part of a PKO (Yomiuri Shinbun, 22 May 1993). In addition, Ko¯ no sought to expand the remit of the SDF’s use of weapons to include the defence of UN volunteers working at the election stations where the SDF were patrolling, thereby broadening the government’s interpretation of the five principles (Yomiuri Shinbun, 24 May 1993).

Cambodia 103 The government, however, at this time did not react in a knee-jerk fashion to the traditional norm of anti-militarism epitomised by the demands of opposition parties and civil society. Rather, it began to investigate the idea of giving SDF personnel weapons in order to address the unstable security situation in Cambodia in addition to confirming its future and firm participation. Deputy Director-General of the JDA, Hiyoshi Akira, indicated that in light of the turmoil in Cambodia, the SDF may have to be given guns to carry, rather than limiting the possession of guns to personnel engaged in guarding arsenals (The Japan Times, 13 April 1993). The decision was made eventually to equip the second contingent of SDF engineering peacekeepers with weapons when moving around Cambodia, depending on the severity of the situation on the ground, but to leave them unarmed when working on the construction and repair of roads and bridges (Yomiuri Shinbun, 13 April 1993). This was extended a few days later to include the protection of civilians transported to the ballot boxes in their proximity during the election. Moreover, military expansion of the SDF’s role came from within the SDF with their proposal gaining approval from Miyazawa that they be able to form ‘intelligence-gathering units’ to act inside Takeo province. The main aim was to ensure the safety of Japanese civilian election monitors by visiting local election stations every day inquiring as to the state of security (The Japan Times, 22 May 1993). Furthermore, even within the SDPJ there existed support for a more active contribution to the UN. The Action New Democracy group, founded by Yoshioka Hiroshi, promoted the recognition of the expanded military role of the SDF and also the possible participation by it, or a similar organisation, in a UN army in the future (The Japan Times, 23 April 1993). This whole debate was overtaken by events. On 4 May 1993 a second Japanese national, Takata Haruyuki, a civilian police officer, was killed in an ambush by unidentified aggressors in northwest Cambodia. In response to this event, it was reported that several Japanese policemen deserted their posts and requested to be withdrawn (Financial Times, 25 May 1993). This, in combination with the Japanese government’s preference for sending its peacekeepers to ‘safe’ areas and the ‘luxurious camp’ in which they were stationed in Takeo with karaoke and Japanese beer machines, did little to improve the reputation of the Japanese peacekeepers among fellow peacekeepers. Akashi was reported at this time as saying that: I received a message from the secretary-general of the ruling LDP reminding me that the Japanese peacekeepers in Cambodia are still at the kindergarten stage. Even though they may seem to you very cowardly and timid, you have to give them time and experience. (Financial Times, 25 May 1993) Murata Keijiro¯ , Minister of Home Affairs, then on a visit to Cambodia, called on Akashi to move Japanese officers to safe areas – something that had been requested by IPCHQ. While refusing to give Japan special treatment, Akashi did agree to place Japanese election monitors in the relative safety of Takeo province (Takubo 1993: 17–18). He stressed that Japanese peacekeepers could not be given preferential treatment and the Japanese government was free to withdraw its troops if so desired,

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yet he also sought to establish an understanding with Murata to ensure the continued stationing of the SDF (The Japan Times, 11 May 1993). The fear associated with according Japan preferential treatment was that the international community would disregard Japan’s contribution to UNTAC, a fear expressed by MajorGeneral Aoyama Shigeru at the same time as the JDA was readying the SDF for its second despatch to Mozambique (The Japan Times, 11 May 1993). Moreover, despite a degree of uncertainty among the Japanese election monitors on the point of being despatched to Cambodia, there was equally a strong sense of resolve to participate within the international effort to ensure fair and free elections in Cambodia (Yomiuri Shinbun, 11 and 12 May 1993). The degree of internalisation of the anti-militarist norm within certain government circles can be seen in Koizumi’s assertion: Since the Gulf War, the Diet has debated what kind of contribution Japan should make to the international community, but the government never told us that blood would have to be shed. The government said that we need to contribute with our own sweat and that it is no longer sufficient to provide only money and material supplies . . . Japan is different from other countries in terms of its consensus and determination regarding participation in peacekeeping operations. This point must be considered. We should now include withdrawal from PKO activities as one of our options. It’s important to know when to withdraw. If we explain our position to other countries, I think they’ll go along with us. Their PKO contingents probably also sense the same dangers. (Takubo 1993: 17) Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the UNTAC operation, when the Japanese nation began to review its behaviour in Cambodia, a further attitudinal shift took place. The DSP came out in favour of lifting the ban on the use of arms for Japanese peacekeepers but stopped short of support for the creation of a peace enforcement unit as envisaged by Boutros-Ghali (The Japan Times, 21 November 1993). Moreover, both during and after the UNTAC operation, public opinion polls demonstrated a change in people’s thinking about Japan’s contribution to the UN and in particular its peacekeeping functions. This change can be understood as the tipping point whereby the norm of UN internationalism and peacekeeping gained recognition and legitimacy – a process that will become clearer later. By examining opinion polls taken by major daily newspapers and the Prime Minister’s Office, this becomes increasingly salient (the Prime Minister’s Office Public Opinion Poll was established in 1969 and takes place every three years). Immediately before the enactment of the PKO Law, 41.6 per cent of respondents supported SDF participation in PKOs with 36.9 per cent opposed. In addition, 50.3 per cent believed despatch to be constitutionally problematic with 28.2 per cent thinking otherwise (Asahi Shinbun, 12 June 1992, cited in Takahara 1996: 56 – 7). Yet, immediately after the conclusion of the UNTAC mission a Yomiuri Shinbun poll found 55 per cent supportive of the PKO Law (Yomiuri Shinbun, 27 September 1993). A Nihon Ho¯ so¯ Kyo¯ kai (NHK) poll carried out in May 1993 saw 17 per cent of those polled rate highly Japan’s role in

Cambodia 105 UNTAC and 47.8 per cent rate Japan’s role fairly highly, making a total majority of 64.8 per cent holding a positive view of PKOs (Yanai 1993: 65). In January 1994 a Prime Minister’s Office Survey revealed that 22 per cent of pollees believed that international co-operation should be the future area in which the SDF should concentrate. In addition, 5.7 per cent perceived the main purpose of the SDF to be in the area of international contribution. In the same poll 48.4 per cent supported Japan’s participation in PKOs, an increase from 45.5 per cent as polled in 1991. Significantly those opposing Japan’s participation fell from 37.9 per cent to 30.6 per cent over the same time frame (Public Opinion Survey on Self-Defence Forces and Defence Problems, Prime Minister’s Office, January 1994). The UN also became the focus of people’s attention: 53.6 per cent of people thinking that UNSC reform was necessary because it was an anomaly to have the five victorious powers of the Second World War controlling the UN and over 30 per cent of people polled believing it to be an anomaly that Japan was not represented; 52.9 per cent believed Japan ought to be represented on the UNSC with only 14.8 per cent opposed. The second most popular reason was the contribution Japan could make to international peace as a pacifist nation coming after the reason that Japan should make a contribution to the international order as an economic superpower (Public Opinion Survey on the UN Security Council, MOFA, January 1994). In the same poll 41.2 per cent stated their support for the maximum possible contribution to PKOs under the existing constitutional framework; 38.8 per cent agreed with this as long as military contribution was excluded; 16.3 per cent sought constitutional revision in order to improve upon Japan’s contribution. This poll certainly revealed the ‘honourable allergy’ with 60.7 per cent of the 14.8 per cent of people against Japan becoming a permanent member of the UNSC due to the military contribution Japan would be forced to make. Yet, the fact that this is only the majority of a very small minority should not be forgotten. In October 1994 a Prime Minister’s Office Survey on Diplomacy confirmed this trend with findings of 35.2 per cent regarding Japan’s main role in international society to be the support of PKOs, when support for this in previous years had been 28.8 per cent in 1993 and 31.4 per cent in 1992 (Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy, Prime Minister’s Office, October 1994). More importantly, the main field of UN work meriting most importance was seen to be peacekeeping with 66.3 per cent. Japan’s participation thus far was supported by 43.4 per cent with 15.5 per cent supportive of further qualitative and quantitative participation and only 8.6 per cent suggesting that Japan should not participate (Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy, Prime Minister’s Office, October 1994). Connected with this, 56 per cent of the population supported Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC with only 18 per cent opposing it. The percentage of people supporting the pursuit of international peace and stability as Japan’s main task in the UN increased to 67.2 per cent in a Prime Minister’s Survey of April 1995 (Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy, Prime Minister’s Office, April 1995). A further poll in July 1995 found 74.8 per cent regarding PKOs like UNTAC as resulting in concrete improvements, whereas 18.9 per cent failed to see any benefits from UN intervention (Public Opinion Survey on the Role of the Self-Defence Forces, Prime

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Minister’s Office, July 1995). In this poll support for Japan’s future participation in PKOs was estimated at 75.1 per cent with 14.3 per cent opposed, while an even more emphatic 80 per cent supported participation in humanitarian operations with 10.7 per cent opposed. 17.3 per cent regarded international contribution as the main role of the SDF (Public Opinion Survey on the Role of the Self-Defence Forces, Prime Minister’s Office, July 1995). In comparison, a similar poll taken in February 1991 45.5 per cent had agreed with participation and 37.9 per cent opposed participation in PKOs (Public Opinion Survey on the Role of the Self-Defence Forces, Prime Minister’s Office, February 1991). By the time the poll was taken again in January 1994, 48.4 per cent agreed with 30.6 per cent opposed (Public Opinion Survey on the Role of the Self-Defence Forces, Prime Minister’s Office, January 1996). Compared to these figures, the results of the July 1995 poll demonstrate a steady acceptance of peacekeeping among the Japanese population as long as it is under the aegis of the UN. Thus, the antimilitarist norm, traditionally the most strongly held norm within Japanese domestic society, was continuing to be reconstituted in the light of the revival of the UN and its peacekeeping activities – a process that began during the Second Gulf War (as demonstrated in Chapter 4), but reached its tipping point with the UNTAC operation. US bilateralism Similar to the Japanese government’s policy, one of the US government’s objectives was concerned with maintaining a Japanese presence in Cambodia. This was publicly declared after a two-day conference of the US–ASEAN senior officials’ forum calling for all participating nations to ‘maintain their troops and personnel in Cambodia in line with the mandate of UNTAC’ in addition to condemning the violence in violation of the cease-fire (The Japan Times, 18 May 1993). US policy was intrinsically linked with burden-sharing and attempting to shift, not only the financial burden, but also the personnel burden onto allied states. For example, on the financial side, towards the end of September 1993 President Bill Clinton addressed the UN General Assembly with the suggestion that his country’s financial contribution be cut from 30.4 per cent to 25 per cent. In mind was the idea of Japan and Germany in particular taking a greater responsibility for PKOs (The Japan Times, 19 September 1993). US interest also extended to the role that Japan could play in making up the difference in the event of a US withdrawal. The UNTAC operation incurred start-up costs of US$200 million with the US paying its US$60.8 million share and then an additional share of US$184.1 million out of US$606 million estimated by the General Assembly (McHugh and Shinn 1992: 7). With this being the costliest UN operation in its history and the central role of the US government in funding this expansion of the UN’s work, interest developed as to how Japan could assume its burden for maintaining order in the post-Cold War world, especially with the backtracking of the Clinton administration from a promised active peacekeeping policy and ‘aggressive multilateralism’. Due to disillusionment over the deaths of eighteen US soldiers in Somalia in October 1993 and inter-agency conflict between the State Department and the Department of Defense, the resulting declaration of

Cambodia 107 policy was delayed until the release of Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) in May 1994, which demanded that ‘US and UN involvement in peacekeeping must be selective and more effective’ (The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations 1994: 1). Furthermore, with the Republican electoral gains of November 1994 it appeared that US support for peacekeeping would continue to stall; thus, the desire to encourage Japanese participation in peacekeeping was strengthened and plans to this end were put forward, such as the joint training of US and Japanese peacekeepers, shared financial contributions, and technological exchange (Nishihara 1993: 64). In addition, stressing the contribution to PKOs, contributed to the public justification of the Japan–US Security Treaty in a post-Cold War world lacking an obvious enemy. The US was in the position of providing logistical support for Japan in the form of fuel supply ships and planes to assist in the journey to Sihanoukville, Cambodia’s main port. In May 1993, there were reports that the Japanese government had approached the US about the provision of transport and food-supply services to remote areas with Nakayama Toshio, Director-General of the JDA, openly supporting expanded US support for Japan’s contribution to PKOs (Yomiuri Shinbun, 17 May 1993, cited in Nishihara 1995: 166–7). In return, although the Japanese side was constrained in what it could contribute to support the US in the field of PKOs, the private sector in Japan could provide certain airlift and sealift capabilities while the government could continue its despatch of personnel limited to certain roles while supplementing this contribution with financial assistance. It is with this in mind that the US encouraged and pushed Japan in the direction of a more proactive role during and after the UNTAC operation. On the human resource side of the ledger, during the debate in the aftermath of the deaths of Nakata and Takata, William Perry, US Deputy Secretary of Defense, spoke in Tokyo on the need for Japan to exercise leadership in global issues and that the Cambodian operation was a useful step in the right direction. The desire on the part of the US to see Japan playing an active role at times led to exasperation at the soul-searching and debate within Japan. The Yomiuri Shinbun reported one US State Department source as stating that it hoped that Japan would take a greater burden for US troops stationed within Japan, and in the field of PKOs would make more of a human contribution, even to peace enforcement operations, as the majority of US citizens were believed to have no objection to the despatch of Japanese troops abroad (Yomiuri Shinbun, 7 May 1993). According to a Yomiuri Shinbun opinion poll of April 1993 support for Japan’s participation in PKOs among the Western nations reached a mean of 70 per cent (with France at 73 per cent, the US at 71 per cent, the UK at 69 per cent and Germany at 68 per cent – a higher proportion than in Japan itself, polled at 59 per cent support). This showed a steady increase from a poll conducted in 1992 before the UNTAC operation that estimated support among the West as being 66 per cent in the US and 54 per cent in Japan (Yomiuri Shinbun, 30 April 1993). As Professor Tanaka Akihiko of the University of Tokyo has stated, ‘Japan and the US may be depicted as polar opposites with respect to their involvement in the UN’ (Tanaka 1995b: 77). In other words, the US is able to deploy its power unilaterally or with the help of allies in any corner of the globe, yet is not overtly

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interested in the UN or its PKOs. Japan lacks this capability but is engaged with the organisation and its work. However, in a similar fashion to Japan, the US has been inhibited in its involvement in PKOs by domestic factors. Thus, the US attitude to encourage Japan in the field of PKOs in its place but as part of the bilateral relationship is evident and has been recognised and reciprocated by the Japanese side. Previously in 1990 Vice Foreign Minister Kuriyama explained Japan’s future diplomatic strategy: Today, the time when Japan could take for granted an international order sustained by US strength . . . is long past. The two nations . . . are in a position to share the responsibilities for world peace and prosperity together with Western Europe. This is precisely what is meant by global partnership [my emphasis]. (Kuriyama 1990: 23) Thus, the bilateral norm continued to prove to be a constitutive norm in that it encouraged a new defining role for Japan and was based around an equal partnership within an alliance with the US. Certain critics have objected to Japan’s security ties with the US on the grounds that they have inhibited Japan from developing an independent, fully rounded role and, thus, US troops should be withdrawn from Japanese territory (Johnson and Keehn 1995: 103–14). However, it is evident that the US has played a positive and encouraging role for Japan in creating an active, peacekeeping role as long as it is contained within either the UN, or preferably, the framework of relations with the US. Thus, the once restrictive nature of the bilateral norm emphasising reliance upon the US, the bedrock of the Yoshida Doctrine, has slowly eroded and become more constitutive of possible policy options. The US began at this time to regard Japanese participation in PKOs as one form of burdensharing and to this end came to support Japan’s quest for a permanent seat on the UNSC and increased financial contributions. Especially (as already mentioned) in the light of the failure of the Somalian mission and PDD-25, the US was keen to disengage from peacekeeping at a time when Japan was willing to expand its contributions and commitments. To this end, the norm of bilateralism in the postCold War world has encouraged Japan’s expanded peacekeeping and military roles – a theme that becomes even more salient in Chapter 6. East Asianism As seen in Chapter 4, the attitudes of East Asian nations were beginning to alter and polarise with one set of nations, spearheaded by ASEAN, supportive of an active and expanded Japanese role in PKOs and in the region, while China and South Korea continued to be apprehensive of perceived Japanese remilitarisation through participation in PKOs. Yet, even these traditional stalwarts could be seen, in certain circumstances, to be reconsidering their positions and creating a liberating and constitutive norm influencing the Japanese government’s policy. The reaction of East Asian nations was recognised at an early stage by Miyazawa when he stated that:

Cambodia 109 we must recognize that our international role in the building of a global order for peace can only grow larger . . . Among the indispensable underpinnings of our UN-centred efforts for global order are close co-operation with the US and friendly relations with other countries of Asia’. (Bangkok Post, 30 October 1991, cited in Chittiwatanapong 1993: 205) The interplay of the various norms was symbolically encapsulated in the flying of the UN flag next to the hi no maru at the camp in Takeo. Alone, the hi no maru would have caused problems offending the sensibilities of East Asian nations formerly colonised by Japan, so every opportunity was taken to link the UN to the SDF’s despatch. In this light, the nations of ASEAN were strongly supportive of the SDF’s participation in the UNTAC operation and encouraged Japan to maintain its presence despite the threats to the cease-fire by the Khmer Rouge (The Japan Times, 18 May 1993). On 13 May 1993 Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad stressed that Japan could not remain removed from participation in PKOs and would have to do more than contribute financially (Takubo 1993: 18). Previously in April 1991, Thailand’s Foreign Minister Arsa Sarasin had spoken on behalf of the members of ASEAN in stating that Japan’s more proactive role in East Asian security and PKOs was ‘the burden that comes with being a big power . . . Japan should become actively involved, diplomatically and politically, in the search for solutions to regional conflict and tension as Japan is currently doing in the case of Cambodia’ (Chittiwatanapong 1993: 211). This view was reiterated during Prime Minister Kaifu’s visit to Thailand in May 1991 with particular reference to the upcoming Cambodian conflict. Disillusionment with the traditional bipolar international order has led many states of East Asia to look to Japan as a new regional player and encourage proactivity in the field of ODA, conflict resolution, diplomacy and so on. Sections of Cambodian society were also supportive of Japan’s proactive participation in the UNTAC operation. Prince Sihanouk asked the visiting JSP chairman to encourage the despatch of Japanese troops to help clear mines and restore peace (Leitenberg 1996b: 22). Moreover, Premier Hun Sen travelled to Tokyo in March 1992 under the sponsorship of MOFA and encouraged the Japanese government in the following terms: The purpose of my visit is to call on Japan to despatch Self-Defence Force troops, police and administrative officers to work with UNTAC. More than twenty nations have already decided to despatch their troops for UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia. Why doesn’t Japan decide to despatch its troops? We hope that the political parties will co-ordinate their views in order to make it possible to despatch Self-Defence Forces to Cambodia . . . Even if Japan despatches its troops to the UNTAC, no country would associate it with Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere concept which prevailed before and during the war. (Leitenberg 1996b: 22) In addition, the Japanese government agreed to help the Philippines in transporting

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its equipment for participation in UNTAC and for a while MOFA did consider discussing co-operation with the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia in the resettlement of refugees (Leitenberg 1996b: 31; Yomiuri Shinbun, 9 August 1992). The Philippines allowed ASDF planes to use Manila airport for refuelling and other services as Japanese C-130s transported supplies for the Philippines’ peacekeeping contingent. As regards Thailand, U-Thapao Royal Naval Base was made available for the use of ASDF transport planes. Furthermore, Thailand provided training in tropical medicine for Japanese personnel serving in the engineering battalion stationed in Takeo (Yanai 1993: 65). Thus, the establishment of a working relationship with the nations of ASEAN assisted in fostering of mutual understanding. More specifically, the Singaporean attitude was positively encouraging in helping Japan weather the storm of Nakata and Takata’s deaths. In a meeting on 11 May 1993 between the JDA’s Nakayama, and Goh Chok Tong, the Singaporean Prime Minister, the latter made it clear that he believed that the Khmer Rouge was testing UNTAC and if Japan withdrew, confidence in the entire UNTAC operation would be questioned (Takubo 1993: 18). As regards the possibility of SDF withdrawal in the aftermath of the two deaths of Japanese citizens and the attack on the Japanese barracks, Goh Chok stated: ‘the world is watching Japan’s reaction. If it is the only nation to withdraw its troops, then in the future Japan will not be regarded as a nation that can make an international contribution’ (Matsumoto 1994: 188). However, China and South Korea were the main obstacles to region-wide acceptance in East Asia of Japan’s new peacekeeping role, and continued to instrumentalise the anti-militarist norm. As one Chinese official confidentially stated: ‘what we are worried about is not the present but the future. The fear is that the law [regarding PKOs] is a start in a bad direction’ (Los Angeles Times, 8 September 1992, cited in Leitenberg 1996b: 26). Prime Minister Miyazawa visited Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Brunei in January 1993, claiming that the Asia-Pacific region is the focus of Japan’s foreign policy. While this was encouraged in the nations of ASEAN, Foreign Minister Muto¯ met with President Kim of South Korea on 30 June 1993 and was told that although South Korea would not claim compensation, the Japanese government needed to confront its history in a similar way to Germany, investigate the comfort women issue, and review the way history is portrayed in Japanese schools (Xintian 1994: 57–60). In the case of the nations of ASEAN, durable memories of the Second World War have not prospered to the same extent as on the Korean Peninsula and in China (Stubbs 1991: 655–8; Chittiwatanapong 1993: 201–31) and expectations were transferred, to an extent, from the US as regional leader to Japan. Yet, China can be seen to have adjusted slowly its opinion from the outright opposition (as demonstrated in Chapter 4) to a degree of acceptance. Towards the end of May 1993 the Chinese Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, visited Japan and was reported as having praised Japan’s efforts as a positive contribution (The Japan Times, 30 May 1993; Asahi Shinbun, 5 June 1993). Qian expressed on behalf of the Chinese government an understanding of Japan’s peacekeeping dilemma and praised Japan’s contribution to the UNTAC operation as shouldering the responsibility of the international community, although still expressing general reservations about the despatch of SDF personnel abroad (Yomiuri Shinbun, 30 May 1993).

Cambodia 111 Thus, it is clear that Japan’s neighbours were set into two camps with the nations of Southeast Asia not only accepting but encouraging Japan’s expanded role and acting as a constitutive norm, while the traditionally opposed nations of South Korea and China continued to be wary of Japan’s participation, but might begin to consider accepting it within the framework of the UN. Thus, the norm of UN internationalism had continued to evolve reaching the stage of a ‘tipping point’ and was able to overcome the traditionally regulative anti-militarist norm instrumentalised by the governments and societies of South Korea and China. UN internationalism and peacekeeping As already mentioned, prior to the UNTAC operation, the Japanese government had attempted to play an active role in the Cambodian peace process within the framework of the UN. In addition, a number of unilateral initiatives can be pointed to that included sending a senior official to Phnom Penh in February 1990 to discuss a Japanese peace plan with the PRK government; inviting Premier Hun Sen to Tokyo for medical treatment in April of the same year; and then in June, Japan acted as co-host with Thailand for the 1990 conference intended to resolve the conflict. All this activity was regarded by the Japanese government as ‘an unprecedented attempt in Japan’s post-WWII diplomacy’ (Gaiko¯ Seisho 1990: 46). In March 1991, CGDK Premier Son Sann visited Tokyo for talks with Prime Minister Kaifu and Foreign Minister Nakayama. Nakayama met with Sihanouk the next month in Beijing. Japan later became a signatory to the Peace Accords and promoted the appointment of Akashi Yasushi to head UNTAC. The appointment of Akashi was welcomed in Tokyo by Foreign Minister Watanabe: ‘Japan recognizes the importance of a role to be played by the UNTAC to ensure the smooth implementation of the Cambodian peace accord’ ( JEI Report, 14 February 1992). Further co-operation came in January 1992 when Tokyo dropped its insistence on the precondition that the conflict be resolved before ODA could be extended and a pledge of ¥1.1 billion to Cambodian reconstruction followed. The despatch of personnel was recognised by Miyazawa as necessary for the new ground-breaking UNTAC operation: ‘[UNTAC] will have a range of activities unprecedented in UN history. Japan is now striving to make the necessary domestic arrangements to enable it to contribute personnel to peacekeeping operations’ ( JEI Report, 14 February 1992). Akashi’s encouragement prevailed throughout UNTAC. In the early stages of the operation in mid-January 1992 Akashi proposed that Japan provide police support stressing that his own appointment was linked to the weighty international expectations of Japan to provide for the restoration of peace in Cambodia. In his speech to the 126th regular Diet session, Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, Watanabe Michio, highlighted the growing number of PKOs in addition to the development and evolution of new types of operations. In the light of these developments, Watanabe called for ‘greater flexibility’ and ‘further participation in UN peace efforts world-wide’, stressing that ‘I believe this is an issue that Japan, as a responsible member of the international community, must take up with all seriousness’ (The Japan Times, 23 January 1993). A known supporter of an

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expanded military role for Japan was able, thus, to refer to a new norm in the international community in the form of peacekeeping to expand and justify the expansion in the SDF’s role. Further encouragement came from outside of Japan. During his visit to Tokyo in mid-February, Boutros-Ghali praised Japan for its participation thus far and sought to encourage further participation within the framework of the Constitution in a similar interpretation as adopted by the Ozawa Report: ‘Japan, through her [sic] Constitution, and by political chance, has opted for the path of peace and of internationalism. Japan’s support in the new UN will be crucial’ (The Japan Times, 18 February 1993). Encouragement also came from the UNHCR, Ogata Sadako, calling on the Japanese government to despatch SDF personnel even when the five principles of Japan’s participation are not met (The Japan Times, 13 April 1993). As previously mentioned, in reaction to the worsening security situation in Cambodia, the Japanese government began to push for a solution through multilateral methods including an international conference to place pressure on the Khmer Rouge via China (The Japan Times, 17 April 1993). At the same time, within Japan there was a process of recognising what participation in PKOs actually involved – UNTAC can be seen as an initial apprenticeship for learning the lessons of peacekeeping. As Senior Superintendent Yamazaki Hiroto of the National Police Agency stated, ‘a peacekeeping mission is naturally a dangerous task. The UN and the international community had addressed the worsening situation. That is the nature of the UN peacekeeping mission. Japan didn’t realize that’ (The Japan Times, 29 July 1993). Further encouragement came from Akashi Yasushi in meeting the JDA’s Nakayama (The Japan Times, 29 July 1993). Moreover, he stressed to the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan that Japan would need to discard its insular thinking for fear of damaging its international reputation; he stated that ‘there is no free ride in international peace’ (The Japan Times, 30 July 1993). Furthermore (and as seen earlier), the regulative norm imposed by fellow East Asian nations in the light of Japan’s behaviour during the Second World War could be overcome by the goodwill created by participation in PKOs in the East Asian region. In this light, in conversation with Miyazawa after the conclusion of the UNTAC operation, Akashi continued to praise Japan’s role and particularly the part played by Miyazawa describing it as a monumental achievement (kinjito¯) (Asahi Shinbun, 28 July 1993). The worsening Cambodian security situation for Japan reached its nadir in April and May 1993 with the deaths of Nakata and Takata. The loss of life as part of a PKO invariably has negative effects in the contributing nation and the US reaction to events in Somalia in May 1993, where US troops were killed and dragged as trophies through the streets of Mogadishu, can be seen as an extreme example of this that led to the US withdrawal and served to render PKOs unpalatable to Americans for some time (Moeller 2002: 369–90). For the Japanese government and its people, these events in Cambodia meant that the norms of anti-militarism and internationalism came into direct conflict – would the Japanese presence be withdrawn or remain? Thus, it proved to be the tipping point for the norm of UN internationalism and peacekeeping. The government’s position was that although the Khmer Rouge had closed down its offices in Phnom Penh, it had not repudiated the Paris Peace Accords

Cambodia 113 and, thus, Japan’s continued participation in UNTAC was not compromised. This argument was summarised by Genkawa Sachio, an adviser at Hitachi and former general of the GSDF, when he argued that the UN’s record of PKOs clearly pointed to the continuing dangers that exist even if a cease-fire exists (Genkawa and Ushiba 1993). This was one of the many aspects of this new norm of peacekeeping that Japan was having to become used to and grasp the specificity of – an aspect that needs to be fully comprehended in understanding Professor Takubo Tadae of Kyo¯ rin University, when he asked rhetorically, ‘when have UN peacekeeping missions ever proceeded as originally hoped? And even when they have not, why have countries rushed to participate in them?’ (Takubo 1993: 13). By the time of Takata’s death, in all 896 personnel had died in PKOs (the most costly operation being ONUC with 234 fatalities, followed by UNIFIL and UNFICYP). In all, only twelve of the twentyeight PKOs that had been undertaken up to the Japanese deaths in Cambodia had been free of casualties (Takubo 1993: 13–14). In fact, the increased number of fatalities, especially in humanitarian missions, is one of the consequences of the increase in number and the widening remit of PKOs in the post-Cold War world. There were 752 deaths in PKOs during the Cold War period, in contrast to 807 in post-Cold War PKOs, with Africa proving to be the most costly region for peacekeeping in terms of human life (Seet and Burnham 2000). The debate in Japan over the PKO Law, framed as it was by the Gulf War and the anti-militarist norm emphasising what Japan could not do, had lost sight of the fact that participation in PKOs might by its very nature entail sustaining casualties and that a PKO is a dangerous undertaking – it has been said that UN forces have ‘no enemies . . . just a series of difficult and sometimes homicidal clients’ (Urquhart 1987: 293). The Japanese government and its people were ignorant of this, despite the fact that Boutros-Ghali had stated on 13 May 1992 that the UN role in Cambodia would be one of peacemaker and peacebuilder, rather than peacekeeper, shouldering both military and civilian duties (McHugh and Shinn 1992: 1). It was this distinction which divided the Japanese press into two clear camps: as one may expect the Yomiuri Shinbun led the supportive group in stating: We believe that, in view of the objective of making an international contribution, it is a mistake to call for the immediate withdrawal of Japanese civilian police officers and SDF personnel and the halting of the despatch of election monitors to Cambodia. (Yomiuri Shinbun, 5 May 1993, cited in Takubo 1993: 15) The opposing camp was spearheaded by the Asahi Shinbun: Unfortunately, efforts to make an international contribution can involve the loss of lives. The important point is to determine for what purpose and for whom such unstinting efforts are to be made. What also must not be forgotten are the local conditions in the target area and the timing of the despatch. Human lives must not be sacrificed haphazardly in the name of making an international contribution. (Asahi Shinbun, 12 May 1993, cited in Takubo 1993: 15)

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Seemingly, the Asahi Shinbun had not embraced the concept and demands of peacekeeping and continued to cling to a tight interpretation of anti-militarism. More internationalist elements of Japanese government and society, however, did recognise a more evolving and not so absolutist interpretation of anti-militarism. Ogata Sadako called on the Japanese government to overcome the constraints of the five conditions and participate in PKOs involving numerous different aspects within one mission. The government can be seen to have understood this position when, amidst the controversy of the deaths of Nakata Atsuhito and Takata Haruyuki and despite the opposition of various civil society groups, an SDF advance party of six officers arrived in Maputo to make preparations for the SDF’s second despatch of eventually forty-two SDF members charged with transport control operations to ONUMOZ (The Japan Times, 14 May 1993). During this period of national soul-searching combined with the sense of commitment to the international community, the attitude of Nakata Takehito, father of the UN volunteer killed in April, played an important role in justifying the continued existence of the Japanese contribution to the UNTAC operation. Nakata corrected certain misreportings in the Japanese press that, despite his grief, he had not in fact sought to persuade his son from going to Cambodia; moreover, he had his son cremated in Cambodia rather than transporting the body back to Japan in accordance with his son’s wishes, and believed that in giving his life for the ideal of peace his son had provided an example for the rest of the Japanese nation to follow (Nakata 1993). He stated while in Cambodia that ‘my son is alive in all your hearts. We have lost . . . but I believe that . . . he gave his life for the right cause and I hope that peace will come one day’ (Matsumoto 1994: 185). After his son’s death, Nakata Takehito set up the Nakata Atsuhito Memorial Foundation to support the work of UN volunteers, a cause in keeping with his son’s wishes (Yomiuri Shinbun, 28 May 1993). Yanai Shunji, then director of MOFA’s Foreign Policy Bureau, maintained that the issue of whether the cease-fire had collapsed or not had to be examined holistically; although the Khmer Rouge was refusing to participate in the second phase of the UNTAC operation, the operation and peace accords as a whole were being respected and that out of more than forty nations participating in the operation, not one country withdrew its personnel for fear of the peace accords and cease-fire not being in place (Maeda 1996: 26). Thus, it can be seen that the government was making decisions on the basis of the norm of internationalism and the expectations of participation in peacekeeping, rather than the traditional norm of anti-militarism that would have dictated a withdrawal from a dangerous situation involving the use of arms. As Yanai stated throughout the debate on Japan’s contribution to PKOs, a cease-fire ought to be in place and Japanese television tended to give the impression that the SDF would be despatched to a war situation with images of tanks and warships in combat situations. Yet, it was also stressed that PKOs are not wholly safe and that a degree of risk is inherently involved (Maeda 1996: 27–8). Equally Kakizawa Ko¯ ji described PKOs as something that a state had to participate in regardless of whether it liked the idea of PKOs or not – an uncompromising commitment to the standards of international society (Maeda 1996: 38).

Cambodia 115 The deaths of both Nakata and Takata did serve as a steep learning curve and impressed upon the Japanese public the worth, value and demands of the norm of peacekeeping. Especially because both men were not members of the SDF, attention was drawn to the non-military aspects of the work of the UN and its peacekeeping activities. Attention had focused on the military elements of PKOs and the nonmilitary aspects had been overlooked, but with the Japanese deaths in Cambodia the public began to accept the utility of PKOs and the necessity of contributing to them. This can be seen, for instance, in the increase in the number of applicants to the Japan Overseas Co-operation Volunteers (JOCV). The JOCV was created in 1965 and is now under the administration of the Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA), which co-ordinates the implementation of the Japanese government’s ODA programmes. It engages in a variety of activities including education, agriculture, public health and engineering. At the time of the UNTAC operation, the number of applications was, on average, 3500, but in November 1994 exceeded 6300 (Takahara 1996: 59–60). The fact that an amendment to the International Relief Force Bill to include SDF personnel passed by the Diet with few objections demonstrated that the importance of humanitarian relief and non-military aspects of PKOs had an impact upon the Japanese government and people. As long as military exercises were excluded and the ‘honourable allergy’ of the Japanese nation was not compromised, then the new norm of peacekeeping could be supported and established in Japan (New York Times, 2 June 1992, cited in Takahara 1996: 60). A poll of SDF participants in Cambodia demonstrated both the fact that participation in PKOs was a new experience and that a sense of contribution to the international community had developed: 58 per cent of personnel believed it to have been a good thing that they came to Cambodia as opposed to 11 per cent believing it to have been a bad thing; 49 per cent wanted to participate a second time in PKOs, with 19 per cent unwilling to participate again; moreover, 55 per cent wanted to see the SDF participate in PKOs again, with 10 per cent opposed. Most opposition was seemingly based on the meagre sum of ¥16,000 a day paid as a peacekeeping allowance; 59 per cent were dissatisfied with this, with only 11 per cent of personnel happy with the amount (Maeda 1996: 47–9). Further lessons learned from the UNTAC mission were clearly reflected in the Advisory Group on Defence Issues report of September 1994 entitled, The Modality of the Security and Defence Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century (Nippon no Anzen Hosho¯ to Bo¯eiryoku no Arikata: Niju¯isseiki e Mukete no Tenbo¯). Otherwise known as the Higuchi Report after its chairman Asahi Breweries’ Higuchi Hirotaro¯ , it stressed that Japan could not be exempt from contributing to the role of the UN and strengthening its peacekeeping functions: First of all, it is important to regard as active as possible participation in various of multilateral co-operation that are conducted within the framework of the UN with the objective of international security, including with peacekeeping operations, as important duties of the SDF alongside the primary duty of national defence. (Nippon no Anzen Hosho¯ to Bo¯eiryoku no Arikata 1994: 13, my translation)

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Cambodia As regards the circumstances surrounding SDF participation in peacekeeping operations, it is desirable that discussions continue aimed at lifting as soon as possible the regulation in the present PKO Law on the so-called frozen activities of a peacekeeping force. In this regard, as far the use of weapons is concerned, Japan ought to investigate the common interpretation that is recognized by the UN. (Nippon no Anzen Hosho¯ to Bo¯eiryoku no Arikata 1994: 15, my translation)

Thus, on the one hand, the report challenged the traditional, limited interpretation of the role of the SDF as a self-defence force used solely in the event of an attack upon the Japanese homeland and, on the other hand, acknowledged the UN and its peacekeeping activities as a new, constitutive norm in that not only did it require and expect compliance on the part of the Japanese government, but also it could serve to define a new, more multilateral direction in Japan’s security and foreign policies, in addition to the traditional emphasis placed on US bilateralism, both of which continued to expand Japan’s military role. Furthermore, this norm was regarded as possessing the ability to promote transparency, confidence-building initiatives and, thus, security in the Asia–Pacific region through the execution of shared military operations and mutual exchange visits (Nippon no Anzen Hosho¯ to Bo¯eiryoku no Arikata 1994: 16–17). Returning participants also managed to paint a favourable picture of their experience in Cambodia, thereby contributing to the acceptance of participation in PKOs. Fukui Yusuke, SDF Colonel in the Cease-fire Observer Mission of UNTAC, stressed the favourable response he had from Cambodians and other foreign nationals during his time in Cambodia and urged the Japanese government to continue its contribution to PKOs (Fukui, Y. 1993: 120). However, one point that deserves emphasis was highlighted in a press conference given by Akashi, when he alluded to the need to expand Japan’s contribution and for the Japanese public to allow SDF participation within a PKF (yoron ga yuruseba) (Kondo¯ 1993: 5). Thus, despite the influence of UN internationalism and its attainment of a tipping point, the role of public opinion and the durable, regulative norm of anti-militarism was still a factor, although weakened, with which to be contended in any further expansion of Japan’s role. Due to political developments within Japan in June and July 1993, the LDP fell from power for the first time since its establishment in 1955 and a coalition government was formed under Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro. The new Deputy Prime Minister, Hata Tsutomu, foresaw a continued effort by Japan with ‘the ideal of the UN Charter – to maintain peace and stability in the world – [not running] counter to that of the Constitution. We must be determined to sweat and do our utmost to bring about a peaceful world’ (The Japan Times, 11 August 1993). Hand in hand with this policy, Hata envisaged honesty in Japan’s relations with neighbouring East Asian nations about the events of the Second World War and the attainment of a UNSC permanent seat in the near future. Thus, UN-centred policy was further promoted by Prime Minister Hosokawa in addressing the General Assembly when he stressed Japan’s desire to strengthen the nation’s bonds with the international community by quoting the inter-war Japanese internationalist Niitobe Inazo¯ , ‘an international mind

Cambodia 117 is an expansion of the national, just as philanthropy or charity should begin at home’ (The Japan Times, 29 September 1993). Perhaps more bluntly stated, but amounting to the same belief in a new norm of international behaviour, the Director-General of the JDA, Nakanishi Keisuke, stated in the aftermath of the UNTAC operation that if Japan were to go through with a unilateral withdrawal, it would then lose face within the international community (The Japan Times, 18 November 1993). During the UNTAC experience, a number of norm entrepreneurs promoting an active peacekeeping policy for Japan in conflict with the anti-militarist norm can be highlighted. Ozawa Ichiro¯ continued to exert an influence, especially during the early stages of the UNTAC operation when violence erupted, through the Ozawa Report (as mentioned in this chapter and in Chapter 4) and which was still the subject of popular attention. The report stressed a reinterpretation of the Japanese Constitution, as opposed to revision, allowing Japan to contribute to UN military peacekeeping operations in support of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s proposal for more heavily armed PKOs. This more ‘active’ rather than ‘passive’ interpretation of the Constitution was framed solely within, and placed emphasis upon, the UN’s collective security system but excluded the kind of multinational operations like those undertaken in the Second Gulf War and the Korean War; in other words, operations that lacked UN leadership. At this time Mitsuzuka Hiroshi, head of the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council, suggested the insertion into Article 9 of a clause stating that a UN resolution supersedes the provisions of the Constitution in order to clearly delineate the remit of Japan’s actions in a bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC (The Japan Times, 4 February 1993). Within the UN system the contribution of Akashi as a norm entrepreneur must not be forgotten in promoting the UN’s specificity, durability and concordance. Akashi publicly thanked Japan for its contribution, describing it as a considerable pillar supporting UNTAC and taking this historic first step in a new direction for its diplomacy – contrasting starkly with the visible omission of Japan’s name in Kuwait’s public declaration of thanks (Yomiuri Shinbun, 31 May 1993). Not only was Akashi supported by the Japanese government, but also he sought to encourage its contribution by appearing in front of the House of Councillors’ Special Committee on the UN Peacekeeping Support Bill advocating the government use the UN as a conduit for a new post-Cold War diplomacy. Although stated in a different and negative context, the trend of Japan as under the spell of UN internationalism became steadily apparent with the passage of the PKO Law and the despatch of troops to Cambodia (Hiraiwa 1991: 3). However, it was still possible for norm entrepreneurs to run up against the residual influence of a declining norm. In reaction to any embryonic UN absolutism, the reception of Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace and especially the proposed expansion of the remit of peacekeeping and creation of peace enforcement units can be described only as lukewarm (Leitenberg 1996b: 28). Foreign Minister Watanabe addressed the General Assembly in September 1992 as follows: Japan believes that the principles and practices of peacekeeping operations upheld by the UN for more than forty years are still both appropriate and valid

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Cambodia today and will continue to be so in the future. The idea of peace-enforcement units, proposed by the Secretary-General’s report, offers an interesting approach to the future peacemaking efforts of the UN, but requires further study because it is rooted in a mode of thinking completely different from past peacekeeping forces. (UN Document S/1992/132, 22 September 1992)

With Boutros-Ghali’s visit to Japan in February 1993, similar wariness was expressed when the Japanese government refused a request to despatch troops to Somalia for fear of the peace enforcement aspects of the mission. However, the suggestion of Mozambique where ‘I think the situation in Mozambique meets your country’s condition [for sending troops]. There is a solid cease-fire agreement and operations are under way for rehabilitation of refugees’ was welcomed as the next avenue along which Japan could expand its peacekeeping experience (Financial Times, 17 February 1993; Leitenberg 1996a: 20). Japan’s contribution of personnel to UNTAC was certainly neither quantitatively nor qualitatively of particular note. The importance of this decision and why these troop contributions garnered such attention within Japan and East Asia can be understood only with knowledge of the norms that had heretofore guided Japan’s foreign and security policies. By May 1993, Japan had contributed some six hundred troops, forty-one civilians participating in the electoral component of the UNTAC mission and seventy-five police officers attached to the civilian police component out of the 20,000 in Cambodia under UNTAC at that time. When the four norms outlined in each section are understood, then this contribution truly can be seen as ‘a sign of the changing strategic map that Japan for the first time since World War II may now send ground troops abroad’ (Wall Street Journal, 21 June 1992). The interplay between the traditional norms of Japanese foreign policy-making and the rejuvenated norm of UN internationalism became a hugely liberating norm for the Japanese government and its people, particularly in the case of the UNTAC operation. This interplay of norms and the charting of their respective life cycles will continue to be examined in Chapter 6 by focusing on Japan’s subsequent contributions to PKOs.

Summary The final Japanese engineering battalion working within UNTAC returned home and disbanded on 3 October 1993. Greeted by JDA Director-General Nakanishi, the battalion was welcomed and praised in a formal ceremony in Sapporo with Nakanishi justifying its despatch in the following terms: ‘the UN and many countries highly appreciate your activities in Cambodia. It has been a great historical significance as Japan’s personal contribution to the world community’ (The Japan Times, 5 October 1993). In all, Japan sent about 1300 peacekeepers to Cambodia including military observers, civilian police, as well as over 1200 engineering troops. In the aftermath of the operation the Japanese government did begin to seek ways in which the safety of Japanese peacekeepers could be ensured through pre-despatch

Cambodia 119 training but this was a natural reaction for a contributing peacekeeping nation and was never confused with the anti-militarist norm, which would dictate complete withdrawal from PKOs (The Japan Times, 13 November 1993). The UNTAC operation set the tone for the continued consideration and exploration of the extent of Japan’s peacekeeping role. Akashi, having been strongly pitched by the Japanese government for the post of Special Representative to the Secretary-General in UNTAC, in return did a great deal to encourage Japan as a norm entrepreneur during the UNTAC period in its financial, personnel and military contribution ( JEI Report, 14 February 1992). He continued to draw the link between Japan’s responsibility to the international community, a permanent seat on the UNSC and expanded peacekeeping duties: If Japan were given the status of a Security Council permanent member, it needs to act in accordance with its new responsibility because the Security Council is responsible for ensuring world peace and security. If the Japanese people can hammer out a national agreement on this matter, I want Japan to send a contingent of foot soldiers as peacekeepers. (The Japan Times, 4 January 1994) This chapter has demonstrated that a changing mixture of norms was beginning to construct a revised national consensus during the UNTAC operation. Whereas, during the Gulf Crisis and Second Gulf War, policy-making was in a state of flux and a variety of norms competed for attention, with the SDF’s despatch to Cambodia the attitudes of policy-making agents and the norms of domestic and international society began to solidify to the degree that a tipping point can be discerned. This tipping point meant that a broad agreement and consensus had been built around acceptance of the SDF’s participation as long as the Constitution was respected and, even more importantly, activities took place under the aegis of the UN (as seen in Figure 5.1). This was of particular importance as a strategy for placating Japan’s East Asian neighbours, and especially during the controversy over the deaths of Nakata and Takata, for maintaining and justifying Japan’s contribution to the international community. The norms of Japanese foreign and security policy were beginning to constitute Japanese identity rather than regulate it, as had previously been the case. The next chapter will examine how these norms continued to shape Japan’s peacekeeping policy as the government continued to expand and redefine the nation’s peacekeeping profile.

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Cambodia Full peacekeeping participation (e.g. peace enforcement)

* Conservative press

* Ozawa Report * LDP

* UN * US * Public opinion

* DSP No constitutional revision

* Ko¯ mei Party * Liberal press

* Business world * Southeast Asian nations

* Northeast Asian nations * SDPJ

* JCP Minimal peacekeeping participation (e.g. financial contributions)

Figure 5.1 Policy-making matrix of Japanese foreign policy during UNTAC.

Constitutional revision

6

Post-UNTAC operations

Post-UNTAC This chapter will address the peacekeeping missions in which Japan subsequently took part following the watershed UNTAC mission, namely ONUMOZ, UNDOF, ONUSAL and UNAMIR, in addition to its reaction to events in East Timor and the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on New York and Washington. This period represents the process of norm cascade and internalisation, which follows a tipping point, to the extent that contribution to the UN, international society and peacekeeping activities is now regarded as a legitimate action and is imbued with a strong sense of normative ‘ought-to-ness’. From the Second Gulf War of the early 1990s to the ‘war on terrorism’ of the early twenty-first century, this decade demonstrates clearly the life cycle of a norm and the process of norm evolution, which will be explored again in Chapter 7. This chapter will begin with a general introduction to the particular characteristics of each peacekeeping operation and changes in the conceptualisation of peacekeeping before proceeding to examine (as in previous chapters) the influence exerted by the various norms in both constraining and encouraging Japan’s contribution and policy-making processes.

The changing norm of post-Cold War peacekeeping Despite the title attributed to this section, there is still a PKO in progress to which Japan is contributing, namely UNDOF, which originated in the Cold War period. However, looking at UN activities holistically, the increasingly catholic nature of peacekeeping operations is evident. First, there are the ‘traditional’ peacekeeping operations like UNDOF, which entail the observance of a cease-fire and the blue helmets of the UN acting as a ‘thin blue line’ (Rikhye et al. 1974: 112). Second, there are the newer post-Cold War operations typified by UNTAC (see Chapter 5), which are an exercise in nation-building, and continued in Mozambique with election organisation and monitoring. Third, there are humanitarian operations, which have expanded the remit of PKOs to include the provision of relief from persecution, starvation and poverty. Finally, the issue of peace-enforcement and the use of arms beyond self-defence have never been very far removed from the debate, especially considering the situation in both former Yugoslavia and East Timor and, in addition, the demands of the UN’s Brahimi Report for greater commitment and

122 Post-UNTAC operations resolve from the international community. Before examining in more detail how the practice of peacekeeping has changed, it is necessary to outline the nature of the operations to which Japan contributed after UNTAC. ONUMOZ Mozambique gained independence from Portugal in 1975 after a long civil war led by the Frente de la Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO: Front for the Liberation of Mozambique), a Marxist-Leninist group that eventually formed the government and began to receive aid from the Soviet Union. In reaction to this, aid was channelled to the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO: Mozambican National Resistance) by Rhodesia and South Africa. Throughout the conflict between these two opposing camps, estimates of almost 1 million Mozambican deaths, due not only to combat but also to famine and disease, have been made in addition to over 1.5 million people who fled the fighting to neighbouring countries. In a similar situation to Cambodia, a stalemate or ‘lose-lose’ situation developed allowing the possibility of a solution from outside to be adopted. Initially the governments of Kenya and Zimbabwe, and soon Malawi and Botswana, led the way to a diplomatic solution with Italy, the UK and the US subsequently contributing to these efforts. The FRELIMO government and the RENAMO rebels agreed to a general peace agreement in Rome in October 1992 calling for the UN to monitor the implementation of the agreement, provide assistance for the upcoming elections and monitor these elections once a cease-fire had come into effect (UN Document S/24635, 8 October 1992). The two sides were to withdraw, be separated and prepare for the election to be held before October 1993. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali outlined the UN’s duties as involving not only election observation, but also humanitarian aid and planned to appoint a special representative, which was to be an Italian senior staff member of the UNDP, Aldo Ajello (UN Document S/24642, 9 October 1992). As in Cambodia, violations of the cease-fire were again typical occurrences (UN Document S/24719, 27 October 1992). There was a recognised risk involved in the operation due to the instability in Mozambique, with the Secretary-General characterising the danger in the following terms: in the light of recent experiences elsewhere, the recommendations in the present report may be thought to invite the international community to take a risk. I believe that the risk is worth taking; but I cannot disguise that it exists. (The Blue Helmets: a review of UN peacekeeping 1996: 323) The ONUMOZ mandate comprised four interdependent elements: political, military, electoral and humanitarian. Its duties included monitoring and verifying the ceasefire, separating the two parties, ensuring the collection, storage and destruction of weapons, verifying the withdrawal of foreign troops, providing vital infrastructures, and generally promoting the peace process. Demobilised soldiers were provided with humanitarian assistance in readjusting to civilian society. Moreover, technical

Post-UNTAC operations 123 assistance was made available in the organisation of the legislative and presidential election. Furthermore, food supplies were distributed to the civilian victims of the civil war. Preparations for the election proceeded apace with registration taking place in the first two weeks of September and the campaign commencing on 22 September 1994. Demonstrative of the interdependence of each aspect of the operation, the repatriation successfully proceeded with 75 per cent of displaced persons returned and registered for the election. By October, 750,000 soldiers had been demobilised, the cease-fire was intact and Boutros-Ghali reported to the UNSC that Mozambique was ready for the election (UN Document S/1994/1196, 21 October 1994). As a result, but with ONUMOZ still having to ensure that the two factions would honour the results, polling stations opened on 27 October until 29 October 1994 (UN Press Release SC/5922, 27 October 1994 and UN Press Release SG/SM/5456, 27 October 1994). The elections were seen to have been conducted in a fair and organised manner, with the voting rate in some areas reaching as high as 90 per cent, and as a result FRELIMO was returned to power in both the presidential and legislative elections. The Secretary-General’s Special Representative issued a statement after the election declaring the process as ‘characterized by the impartiality, dedication and high professionalism of the electoral authorities’ (UN Press Release SG/SM/5488, 19 November 1994). The UNSC endorsed the results on 21 November 1994, allowing the new parliament and president to be installed and the ONUMOZ mission to be dissolved in December 1994. The ONUMOZ mission was typical of the multi-tasking post-Cold War variant of peacekeeping mission. The electoral and political processes could not have gone ahead without the humanitarian process of clearing landmines and securing financial investment, and the military process ensuring the safe return of Mozambicans and the secure environment in which to conduct elections. The changes in thinking about security in the post-Cold War world and the advocates of a wider definition of security could see their arguments realised in this and similar operations. The UN developed a hybrid of peacekeeping, peacemaking and humanitarian aid to ensure negotiations between a one-party socialist regime and an armed rebellious group for the peaceful resolution of their dispute. By providing a trust fund, the UN was able to encourage RENAMO to transform itself from a militia group into a political party participating within the democratic process. This, in addition to the humanitarian effort, was the major achievement of ONUMOZ. UNDOF The UNDOF operation has its origins in the 1973 war between Syria and Israel. Fighting on the Syrian front was contained by UNSC Resolution 338 of October 22 1973 with the Israeli troops occupying territory around the Golan Heights intruding into Syrian territory – a situation that was characterised by high tensions and sporadic military clashes. In order to address this state of affairs, the US Secretary of State brokered a deal between Israeli and Syrian forces in May 1974. The result of the deal was reported to Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim and the UNSC (UN

124 Post-UNTAC operations Document S/11302 and UN Document S/11302/Add. 1, 24 May 1974). Israel and Syria were to respect the cease-fire on air, sea and land. The sides were to be separated according to an agreed formula ensuring an equal area for both sides with equal levels of armament to be allowed and decided by the military representatives of Israel and Syria. These agreements to disengage and remain disengaged were to be monitored by UNDOF personnel with the aim of providing a stepping-stone to a peace agreement, rather than a peace settlement in itself. UNSC Resolution 350 was adopted on the same day, 31 May 1974, and called upon the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to realise the creation of UNDOF. UNDOF personnel levels were set at 1250 chiefly taken from forces already in the region and originally given a six-month mandate to be extended by the UNSC. Initially troops from Austria, Canada, Peru and Poland made up the core of the force with UNDOF reaching near full-strength by June 1974. The situation has remained relatively stable since this time despite tensions elsewhere in the Middle East. The Polish logistic unit was withdrawn in 1993 and its duties transferred to the Canadian unit. It was this unit that was augmented with the despatch of a Japanese SDF transportation unit in 1996 consisting of forty-five personnel. UNDOF’s activities included originally overseeing the disengagement phase of the operation with the objective of ensuring Israeli and Syrian troops were safely separated. Following this, UNDOF personnel clearly delineated the zones of separation with the establishment of checkpoints and observation points and, thus, began UNDOF’s major task of supervising the area of separation to ensure that no military activity occurred therein through the establishment of twenty-four surveillance observation posts, patrols and the regular inspection of the zones or arms limitation on each side of the area of separation. In addition to this traditional peacekeeping role, UNDOF embraces humanitarian roles in encouraging and overseeing the repatriation of prisoners and the return of bodies, in addition to the exchange of mail and the supervision of reunions of Druze families divided by the zones of separation. In fulfilling these duties UNDOF has incurred a number of fatalities and causalities over the years. However, by the time the SDF was despatched there were no major problems except the occasional straying of shepherds searching for better grazing pastures into the zone of separation – a typical example of the essential peaceful nature of the UNDOF operation in the Middle East (Report by the Secretary-General to the Security Council, UN Document S/1995/952, 28 November 1995). ONUSAL ONUSAL was in operation from July 1991 to April 1995 with the objective of verifying the settlement established between the military government of El Salvador and the radical left-wing group Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) aimed at ending the ten-year civil war, promoting democracy in El Salvador and securing the human rights of its people. Much of the mission displayed the nation-building aspects of the UNTAC mission including addressing human rights’ abuses, demilitarisation and reform of the armed forces, establishing and training a new police force, and reform of the judiciary and electoral system. To this end elections were held and observed by ONUSAL on 20 March and 24 April 1994.

Post-UNTAC operations 125 UNAMIR The UNAMIR operation lasted from October 1993 to March 1996 and was originally set up to monitor the Arusha cease-fire agreement, demobilisation and elections that had been settled in August 1993 between the government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), which had been operating along the Ugandan border. However, Rwanda’s troubles were rooted in long-running ethnic tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi tribes comprising respectively 85 per cent and 14 per cent of the population. Ethnic violence re-erupted with the deaths of President Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi in an unexplained plane crash at Kigali airport in April 1994. The resulting violence between the majority Hutu and RPF-supporting Tutsi tribes resulted in between 500,000 and 1 million victims. In reaction, UNAMIR’s mandate was extended to providing humanitarian assistance to refugees, often in the face of strong opposition from both sides, and assisting personnel of the International Tribunal for Rwanda in their investigations of human rights’ abuses. East Timor At the turn of the millennium, as the remit of international peacekeeping was changing, Japan was involved in another PKO in East Asia, East Timor. Indonesia had incorporated East Timor as its twenty-seventh province in 1975 after Portugal’s withdrawal. However, the UN never recognised this occupation passing Resolution 3458 condemning Indonesia and this soon became a long-running issue between the international community and Indonesia. After many attempts to resolve the issue UNAMET was established in June 1999 to oversee a plebiscite, which would gauge whether the East Timorese would accept some form of autonomy. On 30 August 1999, 78 per cent of East Timorese rejected any form of autonomy within Indonesia and supported a move towards complete independence. Refusing to accept this result, militias with the support of the Indonesian government began a campaign of violence against the independence movement. With the inability, or reluctance, of the Indonesian government to address the massacre, the UN authorised Australia to lead a MNF to bring stability to the region and assist in humanitarian assistance. Thereafter, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established on 25 October 1999 as a fully fledged peacekeeping operation to oversee East Timor’s path to independence through the continuing provision of humanitarian assistance, establishment of a well-trained administration and structures for economic development, and the monitoring of East Timor’s first independent elections held on 10 September 2001 to choose eighty-eight assembly members. 11 September 2001 On 11 September 2001, four planes were hijacked in the US by Islamic fundamentalist terrorists of the al-Qaeda network. Two planes were flown into the World Trade Centre in New York, causing both towers of the building to collapse with an

126 Post-UNTAC operations estimated 3600 dead; one was flown into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and one crashed in Pennsylvania bound for an unknown target. As a result, US President George W. Bush and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair led a predominantly AngloAmerican military effort directed against the Taliban regime of Afghanistan thought to be harbouring the al-Qaeda terrorist organisation and its leader Osama bin Laden suspected of the attack. By November 2001, after weeks of strategic air bombing Osama bin Laden had yet to be found and a refugee crisis had developed. However, the Taliban regime eventually retreated from the capital Kabul, which fell to the USsupported, anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. On 27 November 2001 a UN-sponsored conference on Afghanistan’s political future began in Bonn and the international community began to talk of despatching a PKO to Afghanistan. This meeting was followed up the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan held in Tokyo 21–22 January 2002. Brahimi Report As is already evident, over recent years the norm of peacekeeping itself has evolved and developed. As mentioned in previous chapters, while the post-Cold War world was still emerging, Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace in 1992 set the UN on the road to an enormous expansion of its peacekeeping responsibilities. However, this expansion, both qualitatively and quantitatively, led to both perceived successes (Cambodia) and failures (Somalia) from which lessons have been, and are still being, learned. The result was that a much more robust approach to PKOs was called for and the most salient example of this process was the Brahimi Report of 2000 (The Economist, 5 August 2000; Shetler-Jones 2001; Shimura 2001). The general problems it sought to address can be summarised by Ramesh Thakur’s specific assessment of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) of 2000: The operation suffered the indignity and humiliation of having its military personnel captured by rebel soldiers. Dogged by the perennial problems of poor planning, inadequately equipped and ill-trained troops, patchy communications and leaky command and control, in the end it needed robust British intervention. (Thakur 2001: 115) Officially called the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, the report was the result of the deliberations of a high-level panel of peacekeeping experts from 7 March 2000. The panel was requested by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to undertake ‘a comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects’ and produce ‘a clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations to assist the UN in conducting such activities better in the future’ (Humanist, 1 January 2001). The panel’s self-appointed objective was ‘to send a strong message to the Security Council’ (Atwood 2002: 335). The final report was recommended by Annan and submitted to the General Assembly on 21 August 2000 for approval. It was more widely known as the Brahimi Report after the panel’s chairman Lakhdar Brahimi, former Foreign Minister of Algeria. It was a frank

Post-UNTAC operations 127 and comprehensive report, which reviewed the UN’s peacekeeping record and recommended improvements to bring the practice into line with the realities of the post-Cold War world. By the 1990s, the nature of conflict had changed from interstate to intra-state, often lacking regard for civilian populations, deployed in the face of a humanitarian crisis, equipped with a necessary amount of armed support and sometimes regardless of the agreement of all sides to the conflict. There was no longer a peace to keep but a peace to build. As the report stated, ‘UN operations thus did not deploy into post-conflict situations but tried to create them . . . making peacekeepers and peacemakers inseparable partners’ (Brahimi Report 2000: viii). It was this gap between theory and reality, between traditional and new PKOs, between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, which the Brahimi Panel sought to address. The recommendations of the seventy-three-page report were numerous. While recognising many traditionally defining characteristics of peacekeeping, such as consent and impartiality, as providing the bedrock of operations, the report made a number of recommendations to address intra-state and transnational conflicts. These included the promotion of early-warning mechanisms so that the UN can deploy within thirty days of a UNSC resolution, reasonable and clear aims and objectives, the need for clear and unambiguous rules of engagement, and so on. But for the purposes of concentrating on Japan’s contribution to international peace and security, one of the most controversial recommendations concerned the use of force. The Brahimi Report recognised that peacekeepers in the field often face a different situation from that envisaged by the UNSC and that impartiality is difficult to maintain, if not wrong: where one party to a peace agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms, continued equal treatment of all parties by the United Nations can in the best case result in ineffectiveness and in the worst may amount to complicity with evil. No failure did more to damage the standing and credibility of United Nations peacekeeping in the 1990s than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor. (Brahimi Report 2000: ix) Moreover, it was stated that impartiality should not be seen as a blindfold to humanitarian abuses. The Brahimi Report made a clear distinction between aggressors and victims by stating clearly that, ‘peacekeepers may not only be operationally justified in using force but morally compelled to do so’ (Brahimi Report 2000: 25) and ‘must not apply best-case planning assumptions to situations where the local actors have historically exhibited worst-case behaviour’ (Brahimi Report 2000: 10). Although this is definitely a problematic course of action, after a number of troublesome postUNTAC operations and the kidnapping, torture and murder of UN peacekeepers, the international norm is moving towards acceptance of a considered and justified use of force. Impartiality is being equated with appeasement. To this end, the use of force is increasingly becoming a necessity: ‘when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat them’ (Brahimi Report

128 Post-UNTAC operations 2000: 8). Furthermore, ‘No amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force if complex peacekeeping, in particular, is to succeed’ (Brahimi Report 2000: 8). ‘Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandate professionally and successfully. This means that UN military units must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate’ (Brahimi Report 2000: 10). Ultimately, ‘UN peacekeepers – troops or police – who witness violence against civilians should be presumed to be authorized to stop it, within their means, in support of basic UN principles’ (Brahimi Report 2000: 10). Minor points in the report include the factor of time and the necessity of deploying troops quickly. Hence, the report proposed the establishment of a standing force to overcome problems in differing training experiences, expectations, languages and military customs; encouraged the enhancement of the information-gathering abilities of the UN by including military experts, police experts and information systems analysts; and criticised the employment of peacekeeping personnel on geopolitical grounds rather than based on ability and in its place suggests a sensible and efficacious division of labour based on merit. To this end, an ‘on-call’ list of experienced and qualified military officers carefully vetted by the UN was seen to be necessary. Ultimately, the report proposed a more rigorous and professional approach to the UN’s goals of promoting global peace and development. The UN’s commitment to developing and refining its peacekeeping functions continued with a second independent report commissioned in December 2001. The report, entitled The Responsibility to Protect, was the product of the Independent Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and focused upon issues such as ethnic cleansing, as witnessed in Rwanda and Kosovo (Weinberger 2002: 250–2). Although the report was highly specific and recommended knowledge of and sensitivity towards the local conditions, alongside the Brahimi Report, it does demonstrate the evolving debate and redefinition of multilateral peacekeeping measures in the post-Cold War period.

Japan’s response In concrete terms, Japan’s contribution to each mission was as follows: to support ONUMOZ, Japan despatched five SDF staff officers, three movement control units of forty-eight personnel each on a rota basis, and fifteen electoral observers to Mozambique during the period May 1993 to January 1995. Japan’s contribution to UNDOF was primarily to provide secondary support in the fields of staffing and transportation from January 1996; to this end, two staff officers of the SDF and fortythree SDF transport personnel were despatched (for a review of post-UNTAC operations, see ‘PKO ruporuta¯ ju’ 1995; Japanese personnel are still in the Golan Heights at the time of writing). Japan’s human contribution to ONUSAL numbered fifteen government and private sector representatives despatched to observe the elections held in March and April 1994. In support of UNAMIR, from September to December 1994, a SDF contingent was despatched to provide a variety of humanitarian aid, including medical assistance, water supplies and transportation.

Post-UNTAC operations 129 Japan’s contribution of personnel to East Timor, a formerly occupied territory of the Japanese Empire, was initially conspicuous by its absence at critical times due to the five principles of Japan’s peacekeeping participation remaining unfulfilled. However, in spite of this, the Japanese government despatched a political affairs officer to UNAMET to judge the suitability and fairness of elections and the environment in which they took place. In addition, three civilian policemen were despatched to advise the Indonesian police on their duties during the summer of 1999, and all were unarmed as requested by the UN. Further concrete contributions amounted to the despatch of C-130s in November 1999 to assist in the transport of humanitarian items from West Timor to East Timor. Also JICA’s Takahashi Akira (and thereafter, Suzuki Shinichi) was appointed Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Humanitarian Assistance in Emergency Rehabilitation; in addition, MOFA’s Kamiyama Takeshi was made Senior Civil Affairs Officer of UNTAET and Tomaru Motomi became a civil affairs officer. Japan’s chief contribution lay in the traditional policy of providing financial contributions through the hosting of an international meeting of concerned parties including the UN and the World Bank in December 1999 and the granting of US$130 million to a UN trust fund for East Timor (this amounted to half of the UN-estimated costs of the operation) to encourage other East Asian nations to participate in the MNF under the leadership of Australia; promote East Timor’s rehabilitation and development through projects under the auspices of the UNDP and UNICEF such as water supply system, irrigation, roads, school buildings, power stations; and host a Tokyohosted World Bank and UN conference on East Timor reconstruction held from 15 to 17 December 1999. Also US$52 million was contributed as part of Japan’s assessed contributions to UNTAET. In April 2002, as East Timor approached independence on 20 May 2002, 680 SDF personnel were despatched to replace Bangladeshi peacekeepers and conduct similar activities to those conducted in Cambodia such as road-building and repairs. However, this contribution constituted Japan’s largest despatch of SDF personnel under the PKO Law and first mission since the law was revised in December 2001 to unfreeze the restricted activities and allow an extended interpretation of the use of force (Daily Yomiuri, 8 April 2002). It also differed in that the Japanese peacekeepers were despatched to four locales rather than being concentrated in one base, suggesting an adaptation to the demands of peacekeeping on the part of the SDF. Japan’s reaction to the events of 11 September 2001 was, like other nations, initially one of ‘shock and sympathy’ (McCormack 2001; for a detailed discussion of Japan’s reaction see Hughes 2002). Motivated by genuine sympathy and as a result of US pressure and the Gulf War syndrome – a strong desire not to let the events of the Second Gulf War (see Chapter 4) be repeated – Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro¯ proposed on 19 September 2001 a seven-point plan to provide economic aid and a human contribution. To this end, legislation of a limited term, the AntiTerrorism Special Measures Law, was pushed through the Diet by 29 October 2001 after a remarkably short (in contrast to the debate over the PKO Law in 1992) sixty hours of deliberation to sanction Japan’s contribution. On 9 November 2001 three MSDF ships were despatched for the Indian Ocean to provide logistical support

130 Post-UNTAC operations (Daily Yomiuri, 2 and 10 November 2001). As regards the role of the SDF, it was now able to provide logistical support – medical, transport and supplies – not only for US, but also other nations’ troops in Japanese territory, and foreign territory if consent was obtained, but not in combat zones. SDF ships could also be despatched for intelligence-gathering operations. Since 11 September 2001 Japanese contribution to the international community’s ‘war on terrorism’ has followed a similar trajectory to its policies beforehand. A humanitarian and economic contribution was visible when Japan sent six C-130s to assist with the refugee problem in Pakistan and pledged 20 per cent of the overall cost of the humanitarian actions to assist refugees. Japanese politicians and bureaucrats have been eager to be seen to make a ‘visible’ contribution to the international community and not just the US. As a MOFA official stated: ‘Japan should support the US not because it is our ally, but because doing so would help Japan take firm action against terrorism. If it were another country that was attacked, Japan would have to offer the same kind of support’ (Daily Yomiuri, 20 September 2001). And to this end, Japan’s response was a rapid one aided by the determination not to repeat the events of the Second Gulf War and by the reorganisation of the institutional decision-making processes, especially the Cabinet Secretariat (Shinoda 2002). As regards the impact of the ‘war on terrorism’ upon peacekeeping, it was in this environment that the Japanese government revised the PKO Law on 7 December 2001 to unfreeze the previously restricted activities, such as cease-fire monitoring, and ease restrictions on the use of force beyond that required for minimum selfdefence so that SDF personnel could use arms to protect anybody who came under their ‘control’ – a vague and adaptable term. However, it is not only the above events and operations that have encouraged the Japanese government to reconsider its peacekeeping contribution more actively; other events, such as the revised defence guidelines with the US of 1997, have had implications for the peacekeeping debate and influenced the norms that shape Japan’s foreign policy-making process. The following sections seek to include these events in its analysis of Japan’s participation in the operations outlined above. Although the post-UNTAC operations may be disparate in scale and duties, the continuing evolution and interplay of the norms, outlined thus far, has continued to follow the same trajectory. Anti-militarism Immediately after the UNTAC operation, protests against perceived Japanese militarisation through participation in PKOs continued to be in evidence and continued to instrumentalise the traditional anti-militarist normative frames of respect for the Constitution and Article 9. One protest outside MOFA in February 1993 demanded no further despatch of SDF troops with claims that military force would solve nothing (The Japan Times, 16 February 1993). These protests often equated PKOs with brute military force and failed to be cognisant of the changing nature and remit of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era. As already described, PKOs now involved humanitarian and nation-building aspects as saliently as the

Post-UNTAC operations 131 military aspects. The five principles of Japan’s participation in PKOs that had to be satisfied can be seen as another frame of the anti-militarist norm and instrumentalised as the basis of the Japanese government’s refusal to contribute to certain missions. This was the case when the government responded to a UN request to despatch personnel to work with medical personnel in the evolving PKO on the Iraq–Kuwait border in September 1993, as there existed no consensus or agreement between the warring parties, a condition explicitly stated in the five principles (Asahi Shinbun, 14 September 1993). Again these principles were cited in June 1994 when an unofficial UN request was made for Japanese participation in the UNDOF operation. In addition, it was claimed that Japan would participate in only one PKO at a time and, as troops were committed to ONUMOZ, Japan was in no position to despatch troops (Asahi Shinbun, 2 June 1994). However, in the case of despatching troops to the UNDOF operation, the SDPJ demonstrated how it was now unable to maintain the norm of anti-militarism and preferred to protect its presence in the government by eventually compromising with its coalition government partners over allowing SDF personnel to carry arms, and thereby acquiescing in the coalition’s drawing-up of plans for the SDF’s despatch (Asahi Shinbun, 12 December 1995). After the fall of the LDP in July 1993, the SDPJ joined a broad coalition government of anti-LDP parties under Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro and, as a result, was forced to compromise its position on Japan’s participation in PKOs in line with its coalition partners (The Japan Times, 10 August 1993). Thus, with the advent of coalition politics, compromise became a watchword for the various factions and parties. This was evident in the other coalition government parties urging the SDPJ to accept the submission of a bill to allow ASDF aircraft to be used in the evacuation of Japanese nationals from crisis situations stressing that each coalition member had agreed to maintain the security and foreign policies of the LDP (The Japan Times, 28 September 1993). In reaction, the SDPJ declared it would rethink its position for fear of putting the coalition at risk (Asahi Shinbun, 5 October 1993). The party leaders were pressured by younger members of the government into accepting the bill facilitating the despatch of ASDF aircraft for fear of creating the impression that the SDPJ was unconcerned about the safety of Japanese nationals overseas (The Japan Times, 14 October 1993). The one concession to the traditional norm of antimilitarism was that the SDPJ managed to negotiate guarantees that considerations would be given to restrictions on the type of aircraft to be used and the type of weapons allowed during an airlift (The Japan Times, 28 October 1993). The effect of this period of coalition politics and shifting public opinion on the chief anti-militarist norm-entrepreneur, the SDPJ, was that it was forced into reconsidering and clarifying the party’s position on security affairs. At first, a residual amount of anti-militarism returned to characterise Japanese politics. Prime Minister Murayama stressed that Japan would never participate in the military aspects of UN peacekeeping missions. The SDPJ also sought to suspend the factfinding mission in the Golan Heights after its despatch had been decided (Kyo¯do¯ News Service, File t-950213.063, 10 February 1994). Among the other parties, confusion could also be seen in the Ko¯ mei Party declaring Japan’s participation in PKOs as ‘premature’ while Ozawa Ichiro¯ ’s New Frontier Party (NFP) was (unsurprisingly)

132 Post-UNTAC operations more supportive of participation (Kyo¯do¯ News Service, File t-941031.161, 28 October 1994). In contrast to the NFP and LDP’s clear voicing of its support for the SDF’s participation, Shinto¯ Sakigake and the SDPJ were more wary in expressing their support until further negotiation (Kyo¯do¯ News Service, File t-950428.013, 27 April 1995). The SDPJ’s Central Executive Committee initially expressed its opposition to participation in the UNDOF operation, regarding it as a premature move as the SDF may well become involved in a combat situation (Kyo¯do¯ News Service, File t950512.024, 11 May 1995). However, after further deliberation the committee agreed to the despatch of an army transportation unit with the proviso that it did not participate in transporting ammunition or weapons for other national contingents (Kyo¯do¯ News Service, File t-950830.145, 25 August 1995). Eventually, the stalwarts of Japanese anti-militarism slowly abandoned the most incompatible of their policies and recognised the existence of the SDF and the Security Treaty with the US. MOFA and JDA officials also urged the Murayama administration to reconsider its anti-militarist position in order to promote consistency in Japan’s foreign and security policies. Subsequently, the decision was made to despatch between 200 and 300 SDF troops as engineering, sanitation, and transport units to nations bordering Rwanda. This contribution received further encouragement from Ogata Sadako in meetings with Murayama and the LDP’s Ko¯ no Yo¯ hei. In a similar fashion to the Cambodia mission, Prime Minister Murayama stressed that the SDF would be withdrawn from Zaire if the security situation continued to deteriorate, yet stressed that this despatch was nothing to do with Japan’s bid for a UNSC permanent seat, but was rather an attempt to respond to a call from the international community (The Japan Times, 7 October 1994). Japan’s contribution to humanitarian efforts in Rwanda began with financial aid pledged in response to requests by Boutros-Ghali. In July 1994, Chief Cabinet Secretary Igarashi Ko¯ zo¯ promised an additional $US32.3 million in humanitarian aid in addition to the $US9 million already pledged but stressed that personnel contributions could not be contemplated until a cease-fire was in place, as had been made clear in the five conditions (Kyo¯do¯ News Service, File t-940801.185, 26 July 1994). However, a government fact-finding tour did report from Central Africa that the option of deploying SDF peacekeepers should be kept open, while in the mean time the JDA planned the despatch of 300 SDF personnel to assist Rwandan refugees pending approval by the cabinet (Kyo¯do¯ News Service, File t-940831.028, 30 August 1994; Kyo¯do¯ News Service, File t-940905.086, 2 September 1994). The main issues surrounding the participation of Japanese personnel again proved to be the scope of actions they may take and the deteriorating security situation. The number of peacekeepers in Zaire varied at different times at around the 260 figure and questions were asked about the rights they had to protect other civilians they were assisting. JDA Director-General Tamazawa eventually clarified the situation by stressing that SDF personnel would be withdrawn only if the civil war in Rwanda spread to Zaire, the SDF personnel’s neutrality came under threat and the units were no longer required (Kyo¯do¯ News Service, File t-941004.044, 2 October 1994). These changes to the SDPJ’s credo of anti-militarism had their origins in the report entitled Choices for the 21st Century submitted to the Temporary Party Congress

Post-UNTAC operations 133 in September 1994, which recognised participation in operations like Cambodia and promoted a review of the idea of creating a separate organisation for peacekeeping duties. This position was adopted officially at a party conference in the same month. Pledges were made to maintain the security relationship with the US and to recognise the SDF with over 60 per cent of the party agreeing to these changes. What is more, based on the Shadow Cabinet Security Special Committee, the SDPJ produced the Challenge for Peace proposal (Heiwa e no Cho¯sen), which moved the SDPJ’s stance on security and defence from one of gentei bo¯ei (limited security) to one of saisho¯gen jieiryoku (minimum self-defence). Within this document the debate of whether to despatch the SDF or create a new organisation was raised, but with consideration for both points of view the emphasis was placed on the non-military contribution that should be made by either organisation with the understanding of neighbouring East Asian nations (Gekkan Shakaito¯ 1994: 37). However, at this time rumours began to circulate that the SDPJ was beginning to accept the idea of peace enforcement units (The Japan Times, 13 September 1994). The SDPJ’s new thinking on peacekeeping demonstrates its own internalisation of the norm of UN internationalism and peacekeeping. Participation in traditional operations was now more acceptable, and participation in newer operations, as long as they did not include any military element, was beginning to be promoted (Yomiuri Shinbun, 24 August 1994). This was reiterated in Murayama’s speech to the 31st SDF High Level Chief Meeting (Jieitai Ko¯kyu¯ Kanbukai) that supported active participation in PKOs of the sort so far promoted. Before Murayama had recognised the constitutionality of the SDF, the future of the coalition was in jeopardy over the extent of Japan’s peacekeeping participation. Thus, any role in a possible Macedonian mission was turned down in January 1994, but Zaire was possible by August of the same year. Nevertheless, traces of the SDPJ’s originally antipeacekeeping policy was in evidence with its retraction at a defence affairs meeting in May 1998 of support for the LDP-sponsored legislation to ease the use of arms within PKOs, calling for further discussion with the LDP after having originally approved the proposed legislation (The Japan Times, 13 May 1998). The objective of this reform was to entrust the right to authorise the use of weapons to the SDF’s senior officers, rather than individual peacekeepers. In addition, the remit of Japan’s participation would be expanded beyond missions organised by the UN to include regional security organisations. Moreover, in the field of humanitarian aid, relief could be despatched whether a cease-fire was in existence or not. Thus, the Japanese government would be able to overcome the problems encountered in Rwanda, where no cease-fire existed. The SDPJ’s chief concern was that Japan’s denial of collective self-defence would be compromised and the Constitution violated. The LDP’s Policy Research Council insisted that the legislation was necessary as these changes had been called for by Japanese peacekeepers in the field and, thus, ‘the revision is in keeping with international common sense. Thus, I hope the SDPJ will be able to approve it’ – once again showing the anti-militarist norm slightly altered by the international peacekeeping norm, and also the LDP feeling confident enough that the coalition with the non-Cabinet members of the SDPJ and the Shinto¯ Sakigake would not be broken in submitting this revisionist legislation

134 Post-UNTAC operations which had originally been drawn up in Autumn 1996 (Daily Yomiuri, 26 February 1998). Japanese society was undergoing a process of reassessing its traditional antimilitarism. As seen in Chapter 5, public opinion polls in the aftermath of the UNTAC mission demonstrate a fresh understanding and support for Japan’s peacekeeping role and can be interpreted to represent the process of ‘norm cascade’ and ‘norm internalisation’. The Prime Minister’s Office polls demonstrated a steady increase in support for Japan’s peacekeeping contribution. In May 1997, the Public Opinion Poll on the Self-Defence Forces and Defence Issues was released by the Prime Minister’s Office with the statistic that 64 per cent of those polled agreed with Japan’s participation – the highest ever proportion polled. Compared with the previous poll in 1994, this demonstrated a rise of 15.6 points to take the support rate over the 50 per cent mark for the first time. Opposition to participation in PKOs stood at 13.6 per cent, a drop of 17 percentage points. Related to this, support for the despatch of the SDF on relief missions increased to 78 per cent, whereas 11.9 per cent were opposed – a huge and convincing majority demonstrating a positive image of the SDF which was borne out by the statistic that 80.5 per cent of those polled had a good impression of the SDF with only 11.7 per cent left with a bad impression (Yomiuri Shinbun, 1 June 1997). The process of norm internalisation can be clearly seen in an earlier Yomiuri Shinbun poll of June 1994, which demonstrated that the SDF was beginning to ‘put down roots in the population’ with 53.1 per cent regarding the SDF as constitutional and of the 22.1 per cent which regarded it as unconstitutional 57.8 per cent still regarded the SDF as necessary. Furthermore, 71 per cent supported participation in PKOs to some degree. Yet, there were still misgivings about the unfreezing of the PKF aspects of peacekeeping with 48 per cent preferring to see Japan’s participation continue at its existing rate (Yomiuri Shinbun, 9 June 1994). Subsequent opinion polls continued to demonstrate support for the SDF’s participation in PKOs. Another Prime Minister’s Opinion Poll showed a steady increase in support for some contribution including the despatch of personnel in solving regional conflicts to 38 per cent in 1996, an increase from 35.2 per cent in 1995 and 28.8 per cent in 1994. The important work of the UN, which should be actively supported by Japan, was deemed to be the support of international peace and security by 69.3 per cent, an increase from 67.2 per cent in 1995 the previous year and from 66.3 per cent in 1994. The same poll demonstrated support of the level of contribution made this far as being 46.4 per cent with 23.5 per cent (an increase from 15.5 per cent in the previous poll) seeking a more active role for Japan. In contrast, only 18.3 per cent (a decrease from 25 per cent) wished Japan’s contribution to be as minimal as possible and 5.7 per cent opposed to any participation at all. However, as regards Japan’s role as a possible permanent member of the UNSC (which a considerable minority of 15.7 per cent of those polled opposed) the main reason for opposition was seen to be the military role that Japan would have to play by 23.4 per cent of those polled. Yet, it must be stressed that this was a considerable decrease from 31 per cent with the same opinion in the previous poll (The Prime Minister’s Office Public Opinion Poll on Diplomacy, May 1996).

Post-UNTAC operations 135 Regarding Japan’s role in UNTAC and ONUMOZ, 74.8 per cent responded that results had been achieved with 18.9 per cent believing participation to have achieved little or no result. As regards SDF participation in humanitarian assistance 76 per cent believed they had achieved results with 16.6 per cent failing to discern any substantial results. In reference to future participation, 75.1 per cent approved to various degrees further participation with 14.2 per cent opposed. Humanitarian assistance was slightly more popular with 80 per cent approving and 10.7 per cent disapproving of future participation (The Prime Minister’s Office Public Opinion Poll on the Future Role of the Self-Defence Forces, February 1996). The year 1997 was a prominent one, marking the fiftieth anniversary of the Japanese Peace Constitution, the traditional frame of the anti-militarist norm, and a great deal of debate in the media centred upon its future. The nation appeared to be equally divided over the issue of revision as it was over participation in PKOs. In contrast to the overwhelming support for SDF participation in PKOs, 45.6 per cent supported revision of the Constitution with 43.7 per cent opposed. Generational differences naturally were also evident with people born after the war tending to support revision and those born during or before the war tending to support the present Constitution. Political parties also appeared to be fairly divided with members of Shinto¯ Sakigake and the NFP expressing over 50 per cent support for revision, and Taiyo¯ to¯ , the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and SDPJ members displaying over 50 per cent support for preservation of the status quo; however, sizeable minorities existed opposed to each majority opinion (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 2 May 1997). Thus, although the idea of contribution to international society through the UN was widely supported, the constitutional changes connected to such a proactive policy were still divisive within Japanese society. The press reaction within Japan was mixed with the traditional stalwarts of the Constitution and the anti-militarist norm critical of the further expansion of Japan’s role. During debate over the revised US–Japan defence guidelines (described in more detail later), the Asahi Shinbun stated that: In light of the principles set forth in Article 9, Japan should not supply weapons and ammunition to US warships in international waters, nor should it take actions that would be part and parcel of US military operations. (Asahi Shinbun, 25 June 1997) In contrast, the Yomiuri Shinbun declared: The government’s current views and interpretations of Article 9, established during the so-called 1955 system make it difficult for Japan to provide effective co-operation. The new guidelines offer an opportunity to give a wider interpretation to Article 9 so that the right of collective self-defence can never be exercised. (Yomiuri Shinbun, 26 June 1997) And the Nihon Keizai Shinbun argued that:

136 Post-UNTAC operations As a member of the international community, Japan cannot simply watch on the sidelines in the event of conflict on the Korean Peninsula an in other areas around Japan. We must seriously discuss in specific terms what Japan should do to ensure national security. (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 26 June 1997) Although in specific reference to the guidelines, these editorial opinions were also reflective of Japan’s general contribution to international society. Thus, the media opinions remained solidly compatible with the editorial stance of each particular newspaper, which had prevailed throughout the Second Gulf War and the UNTAC operation. A further challenge to the traditional anti-militarist norm came at this time when the opposition NFP proposed legislation to expand the SDF’s role in UN operations to include participation in a MNF and sought to present it as a bill (The Japan Times, 15 January 1997). However, the NFP position was not solely that of Ozawa, and opposition, led by Akamatsu Masao, a junior party member, supported participation only in non-military activities. Support for Ozawa’s position tended to cut across party divides (with the exception of the JCP) so that the alleged 60 per cent of Diet members supporting constitutional revision failed to follow party lines (The Economist, 3 May 1997). Yet, the importance of the extent of Japan’s participation in PKOs had been demonstrated during the negotiations for the creation of the NFP, with the Ko¯ mei Party against the unfreezing of the PKF aspects of the PKO Law for fear of the reaction of the So¯ ka Gakkai (Yomiuri Shinbun, 29 October 1994). Thus, the weak foundations on which NFP were built were exacerbated by the issue of peacekeeping. Equally, the participation in PKOs that never materialised demonstrates the nature and extent of the PKO debate and the changes in the anti-militarist norm. Hata Tsutomu, Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, rejected a request made by Akashi Yasushi in January 1994 for Japan to contribute a small number of unarmed officers to an observer team in Macedonia, due to divisions in the coalition between hawks and doves (Leitenberg 1996b: 33). Equally, in mid-July 1997, as the security situation in Cambodia deteriorated, the Japanese government sought to evacuate Japanese nationals in Phnom Penh by using ASDF C-130s. Although this airlift never materialised due to the improvement in the situation in Cambodia, it sparked a debate over the appropriate policy. Certain editorials like the Mainichi Shinbun questioned the move: The Prime Minister’s decision to send SDF planes abroad has raised many questions. The apologists may say the operation was just a ‘dud’ that hurt nobody. But how would the Prime Minister respond to the criticism that his hasty decision has just created a lot of confusion? (Mainichi Shinbun, 20 July 1997) In contrast, the Yomiuri Shinbun argued that:

Post-UNTAC operations 137 In certain emergency situations SDF ships may be more effective than SDF planes . . . Given the uncertainty in situations around Japan, it is clear that aircraft are not the only available means of transportation. Relevant legislation should be amended as soon as possible. (Yomiuri Shinbun, 21 July 1997) Contrary to expectations, this period of coalition governments appears not to have strengthened the bureaucracy’s position. In fact, it served to make the decisionmaking process more fractious and pluralist. The proactive position towards the UN and peacekeeping taken by MOFA was in keeping with that of the short-lived Hata administration. From April to June 1994, the Prime Minister and MOFA were both known publicly to be supportive of Japan’s permanent representation on the UNSC. However, with the fall of Hata and the rise of the unholy alliance of the LDP, Sakigake and SDPJ, MOFA’s position weakened considerably. The LDP–Sakigake– SDPJ ‘Study Group for the Deliberation of Japan’s Entry to the UNSC’ reported that the Prime Minister should appoint an advisory committee on the issue of UNSC representation and clearly state that Japan will not participate in UN military actions. Prime Minister Murayama readily accepted the findings of this study group under the chairmanship of Koizumi Junichiro¯ (Kyo¯do¯ News Service, File t-940019.093, 2 September 1994). The SDPJ’s foreign affairs panel soon after confirmed the party’s conditions for entry to the UNSC and stressed the support of China and South Korea before securing entry to this elite group of nations and placed emphasis on the non-military nature of Japan’s contribution (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 10 September 1994). Further divisions could be seen within the coalition, with Sakigake issuing its own position paper on the UNSC issue in protest at Ko¯ no’s speech at the UN General Assembly omitting the condition of UN reform. Foreign Minister Ko¯ no was seen to be torn between MOFA and the traditionally anti-militarist wings of the coalition creating a ‘triangular grid linking the cabinet, the chief party secretary, and the bureaucracy [coupled with a] failure in interparty policy co-ordination in the governing coalition’ (Ahn 1997: 373–5). Furthermore, divisions among all three parties of the coalition were in evidence with a vocal minority within the LDP led by Koizumi attaching similar conditions to UNSC membership as the leadership of the Sakigake and SDPJ. Yet, despite the veneer of unity on the issue and support for harsher conditions attached to UNSC entry even the SDPJ was divided on the issue. An Asahi Shinbun poll estimated that 49 per cent of SDPJ members were opposed to UNSC membership as it promoted big powerism, with 20 per cent supportive and 31 per cent failing to respond (Asahi Shinbun, 6 September 1994). These divisions can also be seen in the genesis of the UNDOF mission. The Golan Heights had first been mentioned as a possible future despatch for SDF personnel in May 1994 as the five conditions for Japanese participation were met and the Middle East would prove to be a new regional experience for Japanese peacekeepers (Yomiuri Shinbun, 1 June 1994). Opposition to the UNDOF participation was voiced by a number of Cabinet members, expressing particular worries about the possibility of becoming embroiled in a long-term peacekeeping commitment and the independent

138 Post-UNTAC operations behaviour of MOFA in deciding the SDF’s next despatch without reference to the government. The government did stress one aspect of its peacekeeping participation: that only one mission would be addressed at a time by the SDF with troops having to return from Mozambique first (The Japan Times, 14 December 1994). This one-at-a-time formula has been maintained by MOFA, as intimated in conversation with a MOFA official. Especially in the aftermath of the Hanshin Earthquake of January 1995, the SDPJ argued for the despatch of SDF troops to be postponed and concentrated upon aiding victims of the quake disaster (The Japan Times, 2 February 1995). However, it was eventually decided by all three government factions in discussion with MOFA and the JDA in March 1995 to send a fact-finding mission to the Golan Heights to explore the SDF’s possible participation (Asahi Shinbun, 15 March 1995). The results of the fact-finding mission were also the cause of debate and concern over the length of the mission and the fact it was a cease-fire observance mission between nations not within a nation – a new direction for Japan; the Home Affairs Minister, Nonaka Hiromu, described the region as the powder keg of the world (The Japan Times, 22 April 1995). The LDP quickly came to the decision to support despatch to the Golan Heights with the SDPJ and Sakigake delaying any decision and stressing further consultation. Yet, eventually the SDPJ did agree to the Golan despatch starting in February 1996 armed with light machine guns, despite initial emphasis on pistols only. Thus, MOFA had to lobby a variety of politicians a great deal more and attempt to create a consensus, sometimes with little result. Thus, coalition politics to a degree brought about immobilism in Japan’s UN policy for a period with bureaucrats forced into a position where they must ‘do the rounds’ and visit each party with the aim of describing the ministry’s objectives and inquiring as to the particular party’s agenda. The ascendancy of the LDP after the 1997 election partly served to surmount this problem; however, with a series of subsequent scandals and the perennial problems of the Japanese economy, the future of the LDP and the stability it could create in Japanese domestic politics were called into question. At the end of the 1990s the LDP-led government was forced to face key issues that continued to challenge the anti-militarist norm, namely revision of the PKO Law and the use of force. The review of the PKO Law, which began in 1995, did make some preliminary reports in September 1996. The Peace Co-operation Department of the Prime Minister’s Office stated in a report to Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryu¯ taro¯ that it believed that the use of arms should be allowed, suggesting that to avoid conflict with the Constitution either a new body should be established or the law cleared up (Asahi Shinbun, 6 September 1996). In a Lower House Budget Committee, Ozawa confronted Hashimoto over security issues with Ozawa backing more active participation in PKOs quizzing Hashimoto over whether Japan would be allowed to enforce UN sanctions and participate in peace enforcement units. Hashimoto maintained the traditional interpretation that Article 9 does not encompass PKOs with an element including the use of force (Daily Yomiuri, 14 October 1997). Similar traces of the old anti-militarist norm can still be noted in the debate of the revised defence guidelines and the necessary legislation. The Cabinet Legislation Bureau decided that when hailing and inspecting ships under UN resolutions, SDF personnel

Post-UNTAC operations 139 would not be allowed to fire warning shots as this would be an aggressive act prohibited by the Constitution (Daily Yomiuri, 29 April 1998). The Mayor of Naha, Ko¯ sei Oyadomari, opposed the US–Japan defence guidelines and the consequent use of Naha port by US forces in the event of an emergency in areas surrounding Japan (Daily Yomiuri, 29 April 1998). This necessary legislation also served to force a rift between the LDP and SDPJ, resulting in a growing animosity between the two parties. Doi claimed that ‘mutual trust among the ruling parties has gone’ (Daily Yomiuri, 30 April 1998). In the case of East Timor, the despatch of the SDF to the MNF was ruled out as outside the legal framework in place for Japan’s participation in PKOs. When the despatch of three civilian policemen was initially criticised as being too few, MOFA officials cited in response the death of Takata Haruyuki in Cambodia six years previously as the reason for the Japanese government’s caution (Asahi Evening News, 15 June 1999). Financial contributions, humanitarian relief activities, post-conflict reconstruction and so on were, however, envisaged as an area in which Japan could participate. To this end, calls were made on Japan to use its economic power to lean on Jakarta as the top aid donor to curtail human rights abuses in East Timor. These calls were accompanied by criticisms levelled by NGOs that MOFA was unwilling to recognise the connection between the Indonesian military and East Timorese militias, the Japanese contribution was not enough, and Japan should review its ODA principles. As regards the nature of Japan’s contribution to the ‘war on terrorism’, although there was a degree of debate, the diminished influence of the anti-militarist norm was evident. Within the governing coalition, the Ko¯ mei Party was vocal in stressing that a UN resolution was necessary to legitimise any despatch, and that assistance should be limited to non-combat zones for fear of the US expanding the range of SDF activities (Daily Yomiuri, 30 October 2001). However, the Ko¯ mei Party, as in the past, was equally concerned about maintaining its position in the coalition government and was satisfied with a time restriction of two years being written into the AntiTerrorism Special Measures Law to allow for a future review of the legislation, and the LDP’s guarantee that it would address the issue of electoral reform in return for the Ko¯ mei Party’s understanding over revisions to the PKO Law. The JCP and SDPJ were completely against assistance but their influence compared to a decade previously was now marginal. The key to avoiding Gulf War syndrome and passing the anti-terrorist legislation in a rapid and uncontroversial manner was gaining not only the support of the Ko¯ mei Party, but also the agreement of the opposition DPJ. The DPJ was divided with conflicting statements from its secretary-general, Hatoyama Yukio, over whether Japan should assist the US outright or under a UN resolution – the latter being necessary otherwise Japan would be exercising its right to collective self-defence. Hatoyama had already declared his desire to revise the Constitution and recognise the SDF (Hatoyama 1999: 263–4). Ultimately party bosses sensed the pressure to be seen to contribute to the international community (Daily Yomiuri, 20 and 21 September 2001). However, former Socialists within the DPJ, led by deputy leader Yokomichi Takahiro, were vocal in their denunciation of Koizumi’s policy of contributing to the US-led ‘war on terrorism’. In return for

140 Post-UNTAC operations supporting any legislation, the DPJ called for restrictions, such as the SDF not being allowed to transport weapons and ammunition or supply them to combat zones; the SDF not being despatched on activities near combat zones; and acquiring Diet approval for despatch rather than the government simply reporting a despatch and securing retrospective approval. By October 2001 the DPJ had stated it was prepared to compromise on the first two conditions in favour of the third (Daily Yomiuri, 13 October 2001; Asahi Shinbun, 16 October 2001). Eventually, the condition that Diet approval must be accorded twenty days after despatch was agreed upon. The decline in influence of the anti-militarist norm and its entrepreneurs is also reflected in opinion polls regarding the ‘war on terrorism’. The Japanese public expressed support for providing rear-echelon logistical support in the effort against terrorism with 87 per cent in favour of either ‘active’ participation, or participation ‘to some extent’ (Daily Yomiuri, 26 September 2001). Thus, opposition to the SDF assuming a military role continued to erode as it did during the 1990s. The knock-on effect of this for Japan’s participation in a broader range of peacekeeping activities, including monitoring cease-fires and disarming warring parties, was that in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks and the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, 44 per cent of Japanese were now supportive of Japan’s participation in the full gamut of activities, whereas only 26 per cent were opposed. This was almost a direct turnaround in opinions from two years previously when 42 per cent of pollees were opposed to SDF participation in the full range of peacekeeping activities and 26 per cent in favour (Daily Yomiuri, 31 October 2001). US bilateralism As mentioned in Chapter 5, the attitude of the Clinton administration to the UN has been to arrange a renegotiation of the formula employed for the calculation of the peacekeeping budget with the objective of lessening the burden of the US so its budget deficit could be addressed. Fears expressed within the US as regards the efficacy of the UN created a vacuum in the UN system for Japan to fill both financially and in more material ways, such as contributing personnel. Fears that the UN is failing to protect US interests as the chief contributor have been expressed in particular reference to the voting system. The one-nation/one-vote system has often allowed smaller states to scupper US plans for reform of the UN. For this reason, the US began a policy of withholding contributions, estimated to be in May 1997 more than $US1 billion (The Times, 12 May 1997). The obvious target was to place more burden on Japan and Germany, a plan which President Clinton outlined in a speech to the UN General Assembly suggesting a reduction from the 30.4 per cent contribution to 25 per cent with Germany and Japan making up the difference (The Japan Times, 29 September 1993). This policy direction continued in July 1994 with the US Senate urging Japan to follow Germany’s example and shed any inhibitions about full peacekeeping participation. The Senate passed a resolution threatening not to support Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC unless it lived up to a full commitment to PKOs, particularly with reference to the possibility of war on the Korean peninsula (The Japan Times, July 1994). A further call was made by Bill

Post-UNTAC operations 141 Richardson, US Ambassador to the UN, that Japan make up the difference when the US cuts its contributions to the UN budget to 20 per cent (The Times, 17 September 1997). Thus, the relationship with the US was becoming increasingly a constitutive norm that encouraged Japan to expand its financial and personnel contributions. However, resistance to US proposals still existed. In September 1994 VicePresident Al Gore continued to call for Japanese assistance and approached the Director-General of the JDA, Tamazawa Tokuichiro¯ , requesting that Japanese SDF troops be allowed to take part in the multinational invasion of Haiti in addition to providing financial aid for reconstruction. Tamazawa stated that he would certainly explore the possibility but stressed the five principles of Japan’s participation in PKOs and the constitutional restrictions (Kyo¯do¯ News Service, File t-940919.062, 16 September 1994). Eventually Ko¯ no was reported as planning to offer President Clinton the financial aid and civilian police for the resolution of the Haiti issue only once stability had been secured on the island (Kyo¯do¯ News Service, File t-940926.161, 18 September 1994). In any event, Tamazawa stated that SDF troops would not be despatched as ‘Haiti will hold elections without help and there will be no request for UN peacekeeping operations and a despatch of personnel’ (Kyo¯do¯ News Service, File t941017.138, 14 October 1994). Thus, not only the nature of the operation, but also the necessity of a request from the UN, were the guiding factors in Japan’s decision not to participate. Nevertheless (as seen in Chapter 5), in the aftermath of the UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), the US had begun to adopt a new peacekeeping policy under the PDD-25 in May 1995, stating that the US must be more selective in its peacekeeping contribution, in addition to encouraging Japanese contribution to PKOs. Thus, peacekeeping has become for the US another area to encourage burdensharing. In the fiscal year 1989, the US share of the UN’s peacekeeping budget was US$29 million and by 1991 had increased to US$107 million. By 1994 it had exceeded US$1 billion forcing the US to introduce a ceiling on contributions to PKOs from the beginning of 1996 in line with its contribution to the regular UN budget (namely, from 31.7 per cent to 25 per cent). The US attitude was that it cannot force Japan to take up the slack, but if Japan were to express the desire to expand its expertise in this direction then the US will readily provide support in the form of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) agreement (Special Briefing Transcription on East Asia Strategy Report 1995; Shinyo 1995: 7–8). In April 1996, in a meeting between Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton, the Japanese government was urged to assume more of the UN burden previously shouldered by the US. However, for Japan to carry this weight, a greater level of representation would be necessary to persuade Japan and this is where the importance of a permanent seat on the UNSC comes into play. A corollary of this is that the US supports a permanent seat for Japan on the UNSC. Thus, Bill Richardson declared a seat for Japan as a sine qua non of any UN reform (The Japan Times, 13 March 1997). US–Japanese co-operation was extended to include the above mentioned ACSA. By this agreement the US would supply Japan with the information and transport aircraft for participation in PKOs and Japan would provide fuel, food, lodgings and

142 Post-UNTAC operations medical care for these operations. This plan was most actively promoted by William Perry, US Secretary of State, in talks with the JDA. What is more, the unveiling of the interim report of the revision of the 1978 Guidelines on US–Japanese Defence Co-operation in June 1997 was an extension of this policy whereby the Japanese government was obliged to extend the full co-operation of the SDF in joint US exercises, save for a war situation. During a conflict Japan would be obliged to conduct minesweeping exercises, repair US battleships and aircraft and join US blockades. In the event of an attack on Japan it was stated that Japan and the US would co-operate in repelling an invader, rather than Japan acting alone at first. This demonstrated a continuing commitment from the US but also clearly expressed a desire to increase Japan’s role and extend the security interest of Japan to a regional level. Peacetime co-operation based on the ACSA was also to be encouraged (‘Tokushu¯ : gaidorain no minaoshi’ 1997). The release of the actual revised guidelines stressed as one of its main points the promotion of PKOs and humanitarian operation when either or both countries are involved. Expanding duties to minesweeping and the evacuation of refugees and non-combatants extends Japan’s range of duties both geographically and qualitatively. A similar policy of expanded peacekeeping duties was evident in Secretary-General of NATO Javier Solana’s praise for Japan’s peacekeeping policy as ‘an important contributor to the international effort in Bosnia’ despite the fact that Japan contributed no personnel there (Daily Yomiuri, 16 October 1997). Essentially the policy was similar to the US in encouraging a proactive role for Japan within the bounds of the bilateral relationship and seeking to lessen the burden upon NATO. On the Japanese side, Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryu¯ taro¯ stressed the centrality of the US to Japan in that ‘our bilateral relationship is growing in importance, offering a foundation for stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region’ (Daily Yomiuri, 25 June 1997). On the US side, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Joseph Nye declared that ‘regional peacekeeping operations aimed at reinforcing UN peace missions will become important in East Asia’, stressing that Japan should thus play a more active role in PKOs and the US would in return support Japan with information and transportation assistance, very much in keeping with the ACAS agreement (Kyo¯do¯ News Service, File t-950310.073, 8 March 1995). The ACSA agreement was revised in line with the guidelines and submitted for Diet approval in April 1998 (Daily Yomiuri, 29 April 1998). Thus, the US has envisaged and encouraged a peacekeeping role for the SDF and Japanese proactivism within the UN; however, this role is very much within the framework of the US–Japan Security Treaty, the revised defence guidelines and the ACAS agreement. As was seen previously with the Higuchi Report, the US has advocated multilateralism but only as an adjunct to bilateralism. The bilateral relationship is expected to continue for the foreseeable future and therefore continue to exert a normative influence, although this may change in nature, especially as the alliance is progressively being aimed at promoting regional stability through multilateral means rather than pointed at any one enemy (Cossa 1997). The US still regards the relationship with Japan as ‘the linchpin of US security policy in Asia’ (Department of Defense 1995). This was reconfirmed with the signing

Post-UNTAC operations 143 of a revised bilateral agreement on mutual logistic support in April 1998 when Madeleine Albright stressed that ‘the US–Japan alliance remains the cornerstone of regional security’ (Daily Yomiuri, 29 April 1998). Moreover, co-operation with the US was expressed by the Japanese government in its support for the revised guidelines and the submission of two bills to the Diet in order to accommodate the guidelines. The bills included legislation allowing for logistical support to US forces, search and rescue operations for injured US personnel outside a combat zone, ship inspections in accordance with UNSC resolutions, and rescue operations of Japanese nationals in a conflict zone. These bills sanctioned the use of weapons in situations where SDF personnel found it unavoidable for their own defence and for the protection of those engaged in operations with them (Daily Yomiuri, 29 April 1998). Thus, the bilateral relationship with the US has sought generally in the field of security, and specifically in the case of PKOs, to encourage an active role for Japan. To this end US pressure for Japan to participate actively in the ‘war on terrorism’ was evident from the beginning. President Bush requested a rapid response from Japan in both economic and human terms and called for efforts to avert any economic downturn as a result of the terrorist attacks when he met with Prime Minister Koizumi in Washington at the end of September. The Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, also publicly encouraged a rapid and active contribution from Japan allegedly asking that it ‘show the flag’ (Daily Yomiuri, 30 October 2001). The National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, informed Koizumi’s special adviser on foreign relations, Okamoto Yukio, that the SDF’s logistical contribution to the ‘war on terrorism’ would help to strengthen the bilateral alliance and regional security (Daily Yomiuri, 1 November 2001). The continuing importance of the US to Japanese foreign policy could be seen in Koizumi’s clumsy but enthusiastic reaction to his first meeting with Bush on 25 September 2001: I’m pleased to say, we are friends. Had a great talk, friendly. And I convey what I am thinking. We Japanese are ready to stand by the US government to combat terrorism. We could make sure of this global objective. We must fight terrorism with a determination and a patience. Very good meeting. Fantastic meeting. (Washington Monitor, 28 September 2001) This enthusiasm was accompanied by Koizumi referring to Bush as akin to Gary Cooper in the Hollywood western, High Noon (Asahi Shinbun, 28 September 2001). As Okamoto has written, the US–Japan relationship remains ‘the essential alliance’ (Okamoto 2002: 59) and because ‘[f]or Japan, the United States is the country’s only ally, Japan concentrates all its attention on smoothing its relations with the United States’ (Okamoto 2002: 63). This was evident in the over-reaction the Japanese government to the events of 11 September 2001 in offering and providing more than the US was actually requesting of Japan, such as the despatch of state-of-the-art Aegis destroyers. However, the flip-side to the strengthening of the norm of bilateralism is that the Japanese government does not want to be seen as blindly following the US and to this end has requested considerable prior warning if the ‘war on terrorism’ is to be expanded to other nations within Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ (Daily Yomiuri, 12

144 Post-UNTAC operations December 2002). As Kimberley Zisk correctly predicted, the revision of the PKO Law essentially came about as a consequence of more general developments in Japan’s security policy and relationship with the US, namely the security milieu in East Asia, the revised guidelines and reaction to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (Zisk 2001: 33). East Asianism Prime Minister Murayama, like his post-Cold War prime ministerial predecessors, also took the initiative in attempting to dilute the influence of Japan’s imperial past in its diplomacy with East Asia. Murayama especially stressed the importance of ASEAN and stated that: we will promote our Asia diplomacy with a strong determination to maintain our pacifist Constitution and never repeat our mistakes by becoming a military power. (The Japan Times, 25 August 1994) In particular Murayama addressed the issues of the ‘comfort women’ and the treatment of the Second World War in Japanese school textbooks. Nevertheless, the watchword of Murayama’s policy was caution and often this softly-softly approach was thrown into contrast with the activism of leaders like Mahathir who strongly advocated a proactive role for Japan in the UNSC (Asahi Shinbun, 29 August 1994). This activism was echoed by the Thai leader Chuan Leepai supporting Japan’s active role as appropriate considering its financial contributions (The Japan Times, 4 September 1994). The chairman of the Philippine Star newspaper recognised the raison d’être for Japan’s existing military strength and stressed that rearmament by Japan was nothing to fear despite the fact he had fought in the Philippine resistance and lost family and friends in the Second World War to Japanese imperialism (Yomiuri Shinbun, 5 July 1995). Thus, a more active role for Japan was seen by the nations of Southeast Asia as a growing reality and something to be encouraged. However, China always sought to ensure that the East Asian nations’ memory of the Second World War remained intact in order to restrict any trace of military activism in Japan by instrumentalising the anti-militarist norm. This was evident with the announcement of the revised US–Japanese guidelines, where the Japanese government favoured an early publication and flew to Beijing in order to assuage the fears of neighbouring East Asian nations. When the US–Japan revised guidelines were released in September 1997 the importance of China was stressed as the two nations both sought to improve bilateral ties with China and despatched advisers to calm fears in Beijing. China was vehemently against the expanded role for Japan stressing the Cold War mentality behind it and the danger of expanding Japan’s role into the East Asian region. Hashimoto’s four-day visit to Beijing in September 1997 was characterised by Chinese fears that Japan would involve itself with the Taiwan dispute. Hashimoto departed with the aim of making ‘efforts to promote relations of trust between Japan and China by keeping in mind lessons learnt from such history. This is the biggest aim of my visit to China’ (The Times, 4 September 1997).

Post-UNTAC operations 145 South Korea, in contrast, was notably taciturn about the guidelines chiefly because in the case of conflict with North Korea, it would benefit from US–Japanese military co-operation. South Korea was not so concerned as long as ‘the Japanese government obeyed the principle of transparency and the Constitution [then] the new guidelines will contribute to Asia-Pacific stability’ (The Japan Times, 30 October 1997). South Korea has generally in the 1990s become more lenient in its dealings with Japanese military and political activism. The government has still expressed doubts to a certain, but softening, degree. Foreign Minister Han Sung Joo informed Ko¯ no that South Korea understood Japan’s desires and position in the international order but refrained from all-out support for Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC (The Japan Times, 7 October 1994). Fears have been expressed in South Korea over Japan’s acquisition of a permanent seat on the UNSC; a group of thirty politicians submitted a proposal to the Korean parliament to overturn the government’s understanding of Japan’s desire to gain a permanent UNSC seat unless apologies, compensation, and the return of cultural treasures to Korea were undertaken by the Japanese side (Asahi Shinbun, 7 March 1995). However, this is an exception and generally South Korea has moved closer in line with the majority of East Asian nations and away from the unyielding line taken by China. With the release of the revised guidelines certain nations like Indonesia and the Philippines were, as had previously occurred, less concerned about the possibility of Japanese remilitarisation. There were reports in July 1995 of Defence and Foreign Affairs officials of Japan and South Korea discussing joint co-operation in the field of peacekeeping with joint training exercises and the mutual use of transport planes (International Peacekeeping News, September–October 1995). Similar reports surfaced over Sino-Japanese relations with a view to improving the bilateral relationship as well as refining peacekeeping skills (The Japan Times, 7 December 1995). These proposals had been previously mooted by Kakizawa Ko¯ ji with his proposal for an Asian Peacekeeping Force under UN auspices (Pyle 1993: 111). This is possibly one area where the traditionally regulative norm of anti-militarism in Japan’s relations with its East Asian neighbours can be turned into an invigorating and constitutive East Asianist norm allowing both sides to redefine their military activities in addition to their own bilateral relations with a new specificity and concordance. Japan’s motives for contributing to operations in East Timor also demonstrates its rising profile in East Asia and desire to construct a stable security regime in the region. In explaining the despatch of SDF engineering units to East Timor in March and April 2002, MOFA cited the fact that ‘as East Timor faces many challenges, Japan as an Asian nation will continue to actively support East Timor’ (MOFA 2002a). This represents a considerable shift from a policy of having previously supported Jakarta economically (JEI Report, 18 June 1993). In a speech given in Singapore during a tour of ASEAN countries on 14 January 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi cited the specific cases of conflict prevention in the region such as Mindanao, Aceh and East Timor and claimed that ‘in co-operation with the countries of ASEAN, we intend to make an even more active contribution to ensure regional stability here in Southeast Asia’ (MOFA 2002b). This demonstrates how the once constraining norm of anti-militarism in its East Asian variant, based upon fear of a resurgent Japanese

146 Post-UNTAC operations militarism and perceived by the Japanese government, has been transformed over the decade since the UNTAC mission into a constitutive, encouraging East Asianist norm. Participation in PKOs is facilitated by the goal of ensuring regional stability through co-operation and encouraged by the attitudinal shift among Japan’s East Asian neighbours, prompting Lieutenant General Winai Phattiyakul, the Thai commander of UNTAET, to state, ‘I expect much from the SDF. I think they are highly capable’ (Daily Yomiuri, 8 April 2002). As regards the US-led ‘war on terrorism’, caution within Japan towards East Asia’s reaction was evident from the outset. Chinese Foreign Ministry official Zhu Bangzao expressed concern and called for caution in Japan’s contribution to the international community (Asahi Shinbun, 22 September 2001). North Korea has been vocal in its criticisms of Japan and has claimed that these actions are ‘putting spurs to establishing a wartime system’ (The People’s Korea, 31 October 2001). However, this was, by and large, the extent of any criticism. Despite anger in China and Korea over continuing textbook controversies and Koizumi’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine to 2001, there has been no similar furore over the issue of Japan’s contribution to the ‘war on terrorism’ and related legislation to enable this (Financial Times, 27 September 2001). South Korean officials have dismissed the assertion of North Korea that this current situation would lead to Japanese remilitarisation as ‘illogical’ (Asahi Shinbun, 22 September 2001). Koizumi visited both countries in October 2001 to improve relations, reassure any concern and gain understanding. To this end, Jiang Zemin expressed that Japan’s position is ‘easy to understand’ (Daily Yomiuri, 10 October 2001). What is more, Koizumi was initially successful in eliciting support from China and South Korea for a co-operative position on terrorism at the ASEAN+3 summit in Brunei in November 2001, although China later performed a diplomatic volte-face on this issue (Daily Yomiuri, 6 November 2001). In contrast to the reaction of Japan’s neighbours in Northeast Asia, the reaction of the nations of Southeast Asia has been, as might be expected, more supportive. For example, Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra declared support for the SDF’s participation in any Afghan PKO stating that nobody would be surprised apart from maybe the Japanese themselves (Daily Yomiuri, 21 November 2001). UN internationalism and peacekeeping With the possibility of Japan participating in the UN’s mission in Somalia, Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Watanabe Michio addressed the 126th regular Diet session in January 1993 with a call to adopt a new flexibility towards the changing nature of peacekeeping operations: ‘I believe that this is an issue that Japan, as a responsible member of the international community, must take up with all due seriousness’ (The Japan Times, 23 January 1993). Thus, the five conditions restricting Japan’s participation were seen to be symbols of an antiquated anti-militarist norm, incompatible with the changing security and peacekeeping demands. With the changing nature of PKOs and the demands this new norm would make on Japan, Watanabe advocated that the government jettison its old anti-militarism for a new set of international norms by which to guide Japan’s foreign and security policies.

Post-UNTAC operations 147 This direction was supported by other government members like Mitsuzuka Hiroshi, head of the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council, who proposed the addition of a clause to Article 9 of the Constitution stressing that a UN decision would supersede the Constitution’s provisions (The Japan Times, 4 February 1993). Although Mitsuzuka’s particular proposals were linked strongly with a Japanese bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC as he had advocated settling the issue of what Japan was and was not in a position to do before joining the UNSC, he did seek to instrumentalise the norm of UN internationalism to this end. To exchange a degree of sovereignty for UN centralism is to dilute the power of the state rather than accumulate power, in this case through representation on the UNSC. This was in contrast to Ozawa’s line that reinterpretation of the Constitution was the key to an expanded participation in PKOs; however, they both stress the centrality of the UN in the Japanese state, rather than the Japanese state in the UN system. Kakizawa Ko¯ ji, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Miyazawa cabinet, summed up the expanded sense of commitment by stressing that ‘our place in the world today has evolved to a point where this country can no longer afford to remain preoccupied only with the affairs of Asia but must raise its sights beyond it’ (The Japan Times, 16 February 1993). Thus, he began to advocate participation in the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) effort in Somalia and ONUMOZ in Mozambique. Kakizawa stressed, unlike Mitsuzuka, not the need to demonstrate what Japan can and cannot do but rather: help dispel the suspicion at home that the passage of the PKO Bill last year was engineered in a hasty, politically-motivated move to send SDF personnel abroad with only Cambodia in mind. The truth is that the International Peace Co-operation Law is an instrument of co-operation for UN peacekeeping operations everywhere in the world and not one of serving Japan’s interests in our part of the world alone. (The Japan Times, 16 February 1993) The position of the new coalition government of Hosokawa was highly supportive of a more active role in PKOs with Hata Tsutomu, as Foreign Minister, stressing the effort that Japan must produce in order to realise peace in international society, ‘we must be determined to sweat and do our utmost to bring about a peaceful world’ (The Japan Times, 11 August 1993). When considered alongside Hosokawa’s speech to the General Assembly (mentioned earlier), which quoted the famed Japanese inter-war internationalist Niitobe Inazo¯ , this demonstrates the administration’s commitment to international society and its standards of behaviour (The Japan Times, 29 September 1993). Furthermore (as mentioned in Chapter 5), the Hosokawa government sanctioned for the first time in two decades the advisory report The Modality of the Security and Defence Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century. This report stressed a new direction for Japan’s foreign and security policy: With this view in mind [the increased importance of the UN in the post-Cold War world] it ought be re-emphasized that contributing actively to the

148 Post-UNTAC operations strengthening of the UN’s functions for world peace, including increasingly improved PKOs, is one of the important pillars of Japan’s security policy. In addition, Japan’s concrete commitment to international trends in dealing with security issues is important in the sense that it is an appropriate role for Japan’s international position . . . The SDF, whose most important task is ensuring Japan’s national security, must not be excluded from this duty. (Nippon no Anzen Hosho¯ to Bo¯eiryoku no Arikata 1994: 11, my translation) Thus, it was recognised that the work of the UN would be a new direction for the SDF to enhance its reputation and expand its activities. The newer aspects of peacekeeping were to be stressed in addition to whatever contribution Japan could make within the constraints of its anti-militarist traditions. The ramifications of further participation would be both internal and external: Rather, giving the SDF the opportunity to participate in UN peacekeeping operations and other activities will serve within Japan to widen the international perspective of the SDF and the JDA as well as secure the public’s understanding of the SDF. Outside of Japan, it will serve to increase transparency in the real image of the SDF and, as a consequence, increase confidence in Japan. (Nippon no Anzen Hosho¯ to Bo¯eiryoku no Arikata 1994: 14, my translation) This emphasis in Japan’s security, defence and foreign policy on the UN and its peacekeeping operations evoke memories of Sakamoto Yoshikazu’s Sekai article mentioned in Chapter 3 and also caused controversy in the US. The report stressed multilateral co-operation under the UN and the US–Japan Security Treaty as the basis of Japan’s security policy in that order. Criticisms from a Clinton administration failing to live up to its declaration of ‘aggressive multilateralism’ accused the report of regarding the bilateral relationship too lightly and gaiatsu was applied in order to reverse the order (Funabashi 1997: 259–75). This episode demonstrated the currency the UN had gained within Japan after the end of the Cold War as a legitimate forum for a proactive contribution to international society, in addition to the fears that any overtly independent policy direction could arouse in the US. As has been demonstrated, the US was keen to promote Japan’s peacekeeping policy as one area of burden-sharing that would serve to strengthen the bilateral relationship. The original orders for despatch on the ONUMOZ mission came in May 1993 at the height of fears over the safety of SDF peacekeepers in Cambodia, although considerably less controversy was created by the threat of conditions in Mozambique with the cease-fire in existence (The Japan Times, 11 May 1993). However, a minor demonstration of some 300 people was organised at Narita airport as the SDF personnel left for Mozambique to replace existing forces (The Japan Times, 23 November 1993). Controversy did occur over the slow pace of the peace process and the need to delay the election. However, within Japan, the term of the UN force was extended with the minimum of opposition. With the formation of a new forty-eightstrong team despatched to Mozambique to replace the first team, JDA DirectorGeneral Nakanishi Keisuke urged a review of the restrictions within the PKO Law

Post-UNTAC operations 149 to allow the bearing of arms to be decided by the force commander and, furthermore, to avoid a unilateral withdrawal of troops in a future operation. The Ko¯ mei Party’s Ichikawa Yu¯ ichi announced his party’s support for unfreezing an article in the PKO Law proscribing the use of weapons. In the review scheduled to start in the summer of 1995, Ichikawa supported reconsidering this freeze in the light of the understanding East Asian nations now displayed for Japan’s participation in PKOs after the Cambodia mission (Yomiuri Shinbun, 30 March 1993). El Salvador became the third recipient of Japanese peacekeepers in March 1994 with fifteen Japanese personnel despatched to observe the presidential election scheduled for March of that year. At the same time, another UN internationalist norm entrepreneur, Owada Hisashi, was appointed as Japanese Ambassador to the UN was widely regarded as an attempt to secure a permanent seat on the UNSC – an accurate appraisal considering MOFA appoints its own officials; however, not a move to be confused with Japan’s participation in PKOs which is characterised more as an attempt to live up to a norm of international society. This undertaking of international responsibility was also evident in Japan’s active role in drafting and becoming a party to the Convention of the Safety of the UN and Associated Personnel in June 1995, as well as contributing US$500,000 to a project aimed at improving the protection of UN volunteers – a direct consequence of the lessons from the UNTAC operation. Moreover, in April 1997 Owada elaborated a plan to the Committee on Peacekeeping Operations for the strengthening of the UN’s peacekeeping activities stressing co-operation with regional organisations, provision of humanitarian assistance and preventative diplomacy (MOFA 1997b). At the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations on 11 April 1997, Japan’s Ambassador to the UN, Owada Hisashi, stressed the importance of the changes in peacekeeping and the role Japan could play in new, multidimensional peacekeeping: In the post-Cold War era, cases are increasing in which the traditional type of UN peacekeeping by itself cannot bring about the desired goal of political stability . . . Japan is convinced that a new innovative approach to peacekeeping is urgently needed and pledges its best endeavour to reshape and re-organize a new paradigm for the UN peacekeeping operations which could function as an effective means for the prevention and the resolution of the conflict in a new international environment. (MOFA 1997b) Owada stressed a multilateral approach bringing together the disparate strategies of cease-fire negotiation, humanitarian assistance to refugees, the stationing of troops, and so on, combined with the promotion of rapid deployment units and co-operation with regional organisations. In the case of Rwanda, the SDPJ agreed to the despatch of medical personnel under the PKO Law with the condition that the contribution was limited to medical work in recognition of the severity of the mission and the necessity to make a contribution as a member of the international community (Asahi Shinbun, 17 August 1994). Ogata Sadako again encouraged the Japanese government to contribute with

150 Post-UNTAC operations claims that ‘we are expecting the general support of financial, material and personnel. Now is a time when the military can make a non-military contribution’ – an opinion echoed by Prime Minister Murayama and Foreign Minister Ko¯ no (Asahi Shinbun, 22 August 1994). Thus, Japan’s first SDF despatch under the humanitarian terms of the PKO Law was inaugurated and the SDPJ continued its redefinition of its postwar security and foreign stances. This was also an option that was preferable to the SDPJ, which, although recognising the existence of the SDF, was not willing to actively despatch it, as was seen in its agreement to the UNDOF operation as long as the SDF was not automatically premised for despatch (Asahi Shinbun, 15 March 1995). Thereafter, government activism with the aim of improving Japan’s peacekeeping contribution was very much in evidence. The JDA decided upon the creation of a peacekeeping office including about seventy staff to collect information on various peacekeeping activities from all over the globe, in addition to assisting in the training of future peacekeepers, which started operations in 1997 (Kyo¯do¯ News Service, File t-950818.033, 1 August 1995). With the debate over whether to participate in the UNDOF operation or not between the three coalition government members, the chief norm entrepreneur, MOFA, stressed that participation was not linked with the attainment of a permanent seat on the UNSC, but with avoiding discrediting Japan’s reputation in the eyes of the world (The Japan Times, 16 May 1995). This commitment to the standards and principles of international society was in evidence when Prime Minister Murayama promised ‘forward-looking consideration’ of Japan’s participation in UNDOF in reaction to fears expressed by Canadian Prime Minister, Jean Chrétien, that Japan was not making a full commitment to international society (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 16 June 1995). Wariness of the SDF’s contribution was expressed by the troops already in the field with UNDOF Force Commander Major-General Johannes C. Kosterf of the Netherlands stating that the SDF would not be welcome, would be highly disruptive, and that UNDOF was functioning perfectly as it was (Kyo¯do¯ News Service, File t-950329.017, 28 March 1994; Kyo¯do¯ News Service, File t-940725.128, 21 July 1994). Encouragement did exist, however, with Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq Shara’s statement to the Japanese fact-finding mission that Japan’s participation would be welcomed (Kyo¯do¯ News Service, File t-950413.032, 10 April 1995). Equally, Israeli Foreign Minister Shamon Peres welcomed Japanese peacekeepers (Kyo¯do¯ News Service, File t-950418.086, 14 April 1995). André Quellet, Canadian Foreign Minister, intimated to Tamazawa Tokuichiro¯ , JDA Director-General, that Canada would welcome Japanese SDF forces in the Middle East and in return would support Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC if Japan lived up its role in the world (Kyo¯do¯ News Service, File t-940725.128, 21 July 1994). Japan did soon after begin to investigate the possibility of despatching troops to the UNDOF mission with a view to replacing the Canadian logistics battalion hit by Canadian peacekeeping cuts and sent a preliminary fact-finding mission. However, significant opposition existed within the Cabinet citing public attitudes and also criticising the manner in which MOFA was behaving without reference to the government stressing that only one PKO would be contemplated at a time and SDF troops would have to return from Mozambique beforehand (Kyo¯do¯ News Service, File t-950103.153, 14 December 1994). Japan’s particular contribution to the UNDOF mission continued as predicted with

Post-UNTAC operations 151 the despatch renewed in July 1997. Kyu¯ ma Fumio, Director-General of the JDA, upon visiting the SDF units in Syria and Israel stated that ‘our forces, which were just newcomers at the start, have now started to build a firm position in UNDOF’ with participation expected at the least until February 2000 (Asahi Shinbun, 29 July 1997). Moreover, in contrast to the cosseted treatment of SDF personnel during the UNTAC operation and the consequent damage to their reputation, during the UNDOF operation they began to receive a considerable amount of praise for their contribution (Kusano 1997: 55–6). Japanese personnel have steadily gained a higher profile within the UN system and have encouraged the Japanese government to act in a more proactive manner. In particular with his subsequent appointment as Special Representative to the Former Yugoslavia, Akashi Yasushi continued to use his position to encourage a more active role from Japan particularly in its despatch of foot soldiers stressing that: If Japan were given the status of a Security Council permanent member, it needs to act in accordance with its new responsibility because the Security Council is responsible for ensuring world peace and security. (The Japan Times, 4 January 1993) The debate about the use of force had been bubbling under for some time encouraged by the experience of SDF personnel in the field throughout the 1990s and the agreement of the revised US–Japan defence guidelines with a slow shift towards acceptance in certain circumstances. A proposal tabled by the IPCHQ in August 1996 sought to revise the PKO Law to allow the use of weapons in line with UN standard practice (Heinrich et al. 1999: 29). Furthermore, one topic of debate when creating the coalition government between the LDP, led by Obuchi Keizo¯ , and Ozawa’s Liberal Party in late 1998 was the issue of SDF participation in a UN army on the basis of UN resolutions and lifting the freeze on restricted peacekeeping activities (Yomiuri Shinbun, 8 December 1998). The LDP’s position was that it would be peculiar if it were only under the guidelines that the SDF were able to transport weapons and ammunition and not in other circumstances, like under a UN army or as part of a PKO (Yomiuri Shinbun, 23 January 1999). A month later, the two sides reached agreement on relaxing the freeze at some time in the near future in order to allow the SDF to participate fully in all UN peacekeeping activities but while still maintaining the traditional interpretation of the Constitution (Yomiuri Shinbun, 8, 14 and 18 January 1999). Other parties began to edge towards agreement with the position taken by Obuchi and Ozawa. Kan Naoto, leader of the DPJ, stated that the SDF should be able to participate at some point in the frozen activities of PKOs and if attacked while in the course of their duties then SDF personnel could be able to retaliate (Yomiuri Shinbun, 11 January and 23 February 1999). What is more, in drafting a new security policy the DPJ agreed upon a call for the lifting of the freeze on restricted peacekeeping activities but with careful consideration and government controls (Daily Yomiuri, 11 and 12 February 1999). Around the same time, the Ko¯ mei Party’s leader, Kanzaki Takenori, declared there to be no problem in relaxing the freeze on the restricted peacekeeping activities (Yomiuri Shinbun, 11 January 1999). By March 1999, the Cabinet had agreed a revision to the PKO Law to allow SDF

152 Post-UNTAC operations commanders to order the use of weapons, rather than it being left to the judgement of individual peacekeepers (Yomiuri Shinbun, 14 March 1999). The LDP also encouraged a relaxation of the principle of a cease-fire being in place, which would have proscribed the SDF’s participation in activities in East Timor (Daily Yomiuri, 11 December 1999). However, the necessity of keeping the three-party coalition together delayed implementation of the revisions despite the recognised need for these measures to be taken in response to the security situation in Indonesia and East Timor (Yomiuri Shinbun, 15 October 1999 and 17 November 1999). However, concretely in the case of East Timor, JDA Director-General Nakatani Gen referred to the possibility of Japanese participation to UN officials in June 2001 when called upon to participate but with the proviso that it protect other participants otherwise risk becoming a negative factor in a mission – a call to respond to the findings of the Brahimi Report. Previous to this in September 1999, specifically in the context of East Timor, Kato¯ Ko¯ ichi stated that Japan should demonstrate some kind of presence but would experience difficulties and more broadly declared that Japan should reconsider the five principles of participation in PKOs in light of the ‘new international climate’ in which they were becoming something of a burden (The Japan Times, 16 September 1999). In East Timor Japan could not remain neutral and, in the philosophy of the Brahimi Report, should not remain neutral. The Ko¯ mei Party decided in October 2000 to review the five principles of Japan’s peacekeeping participation especially in the light of East Timor and especially the principles regarding the use of arms so that when the equipment of those participating has been attacked, and the consent of parties involved. In December 2000, the DPJ called for the scrapping of the freeze on Japan’s participation in PKF and reviewing the five principles in a similar light to the New Ko¯ mei Party (The Japan Times, 8 December 2000). The LDP’s Secretary-General Yamasaki Taku made a similar call in June 2001 while visiting the US to allow participation in a PKF, review the five principles of Japan’s participation in PKOs and for Japanese peacekeepers to use arms to protect other peacekeepers (Japan Policy and Politics, 4 June 2001). Thus, the UN has also been cited as the means by which criticisms of exercising the right to collective self-defence can be avoided in expanding Japan’s role in international security. In a sense Japan has failed to measure up to the developing international norm of peacekeeping (ShetlerJones 2001). But in another sense it is addressing the changing international norm in that a division of labour is materialising. Japan is concentrating on the financial and post-conflict aspects of peacebuilding at which it excels – all in keeping with the Brahimi Report as explained previously. Another example of this was the Japanese government’s offer of March 2002 to train bureaucrats for the approaching independence of East Timor – something the East Timorese government embraced in addition to declaring readiness to drop compensation claims going back to the Japanese occupation during the Second World War. With the parliamentary elections in East Timor on 30 August 2001, Japanese personnel were despatched with fourteen monitors sent from governmental agencies and NGOs, in addition to the almost US$2 million in grants to the UNDP to help monitor the election. There was also talk of East Timorese encouraging Japanese peacekeepers to participate in a UN-administered force to remain in East Timor after

Post-UNTAC operations 153 it gains independence in 2002. Jose Ramos-Horta, in charge of foreign policy in the transitional government, approved in August 2001 talk of a Japanese logistical unit (at the same time as supporting Japan’s case for a UNSC permanent seat) (Asian Political News, 27 August 2001). The Japanese government discussed this with the Indonesian government and gained its approval. Directly before the events of 11 September 2001 and the eventual revision of the PKO Law three months later, there had been rumours that the government were seeking to relax the five principles of the SDF’s participation in PKOs in light of Japan’s peacekeeping experience and the functional demands of peacekeeping as a practice (The Japan Times, 19 August 2001). The continuing power of the UN internationalist norm in justifying the Japanese government’s actions can be seen in the numerous references to the UN within the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (whose official and cumbersome name is ‘The Special Measures Law Concerning Measures taken by Japan in Support of the Activities of Foreign Countries aiming to Achieve the Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations in Response to the Terrorist Attacks which took place on 11 September 2001 in the United States of America as well as Concerning Humanitarian Measures based on Relevant Resolutions of the United Nations’). The law includes the words ‘United Nations’ twice in the title in reference to the aims of the Charter and legitimacy of UN resolutions; it then goes on to mention the UN ten times in similar contexts, while the Basic Plan of 16 November 2001 refers to the UN half a dozen times. Clearly the UN provided a justifying factor in implementing this legislation, which facilitated Japanese assistance not only to the personnel of its long-standing ally, the US, but, more importantly, to the personnel of other nations as part of the international community’s efforts. Issues raised in the Brahimi Report have also impacted on Japan’s reaction to the Afghan crisis. In a NHK interview Yamasaki Taku stated that the issue of the use of arms will need to be discussed at some point and cited revision of the five peacekeeping principles as a topic for discussion (Daily Yomiuri, 25 September 2001). The ruling coalition agreed to include in the legislation a relaxation of restrictions on the SDF’s use of weapons in possibly dangerous areas so that weapons more powerful than machine guns could be used for a variety of duties including guarding SDF facilities, field hospitals and protecting refugees. Yamasaki Taku and Ko¯ mei Party Secretary-General Fuyushiba Tetsuzo¯ went so far as to cite UN criteria on the use of weapons as being the standard which Japan should respect and that ‘it is irresponsible on the part of politicians if we do not take into account the safety of SDF personnel to be despatched’ (Daily Yomiuri, 29 September and 1 October 2001); in addition to the fact that ‘if the SDF cannot protect foreign peacekeeping operators, it may disturb the entire teamwork’ (The Japan Times, 13 November 2001). To this end, Koizumi and Nakatani stated that the use of weapons should be at the discretion of SDF commanders in the field as they adapt to conditions. The DPJ backed away from rejecting any easing of the use of force. In Paragraph 7 of the legislation, it is stated that: Members of SDF units may proportionally use weapons when an unavoidable and reasonable cause exists for the use of weapons to protect the lives and

154 Post-UNTAC operations bodies of themselves, those conducting these activities with them or those who have come under their control whilst implementing the measures. The revisions to the PKO Law were cast by Koizumi as part of Japan’s contribution to a changing practice of international society: ‘it is good to enable [the SDF] to work in a way that is equal to others in international peace activities’ (Japan Policy and Politics, 19 November 2001); furthermore, ‘the revision of the law, which will enable Japan to cooperate with the international community, seems quite sensible to me’; and the flexibility demanded by the Brahimi Report in responding to peacekeeping situations was reflected in Kyu¯ ma Fumio’s statement that ‘the words “under the control” have a very wide range of interpretations, it is like a rubber band’ (Asia Times, 29 November 2001).

Summary In line with the development of post-Cold War peacekeeping and the Brahimi Report, the Japanese government and its people have continued to respond to a number of norms and internalise some (chiefly, UN internationalism and peacekeeping), while rejecting or diluting others (chiefly, anti-militarism). This period represents one of norm cascade and internationalisation among numerous policy-making agents. With the General Election of 20 October 1996 the LDP regained a lot of the ground it had lost in the previous three years winning 239 of the 500 seats available (Inoguchi 1997). The LDP was, thus, able to form a minority government with only informal connections to its former coalition partners Shinto¯ Sakigake and the SDPJ, and the reformist parties were now marginalised and proceeded to fracture in opposition along the lines of old party and personal loyalties. Thus, one predicted effect on the government’s peacekeeping policy might have been that the traditional anti-militarist norm entrepreneurs were now marginalised from the decision-making process, and a conservative climate was established enabling the LDP to influence the direction of Japan’s peacekeeping policy with little reference to other domestic policy-making agents. This was the case to a large extent, but another effect was the revision of the SDPJ’s traditional post-1945 stance on security and foreign policy. As demonstrated in previous chapters, the SDPJ came to be the political personification and chief entrepreneur of the anti-militarist norm, yet has altered its position to such an extent that only the JCP has remained loyal to the norm of anti-militarism. Yet, it would be missing the point to regard this as a simple jettisoning of principles; it would be more accurate to view it as a reconceptualisation of the anti-militarist norm in the light of the importance of the norms of UN internationalism and peacekeeping in the post-Cold War world. Thus, the SDPJ has responded to the norm of UN internationalism through an acceptance of the military means of peacekeeping, incorporating it into their casting of anti-militarism. This is one of the main developments in the influence of norms during the period of coalition politics in Japan, in addition to the steady encouragement and support emanating from the US within the bilateral framework, and the gradually shifting attitude of Japan’s East

Post-UNTAC operations 155 Asian neighbours, as demonstrated in Figure 6.1 and discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. Full peacekeeping participation (e.g. peace enforcement)

* Conservative press * UN

* LDP * Liberal Party * Liberal press

* US

* Southeast Asian

* SDPJ No constitutional revision

* Public opinion nations

* South Korea

Constitutional revision

* China * JCP Minimal peacekeeping participation (e.g. financial contributions)

Figure 6.1 Policy-making matrix of Japanese foreign policy during other missions.

7

Conclusions

New pressures, new responses ‘To state that norms matter is no longer controversial; scholars are now concerned more with how, when and why norms emanate and evolve’ (Björkdahl 2002: 9). This book has sought to contribute to this growing field of study in IR theory by explaining the norms that have informed Japan’s watershed decision to despatch its SDF on PKOs. Moreover, it has attempted to deepen our understanding of how the norms (both the domestically embedded anti-militarist norm and internationally embedded norms, like US bilateralism and East Asianism), which inform Japan’s foreign and security policies, are changing. Furthermore, the preceding chapters have drawn attention to the influence of the norm of UN internationalism and its peacekeeping functions, which have served to act as the intervening variable in influencing, constraining and encouraging state behaviour. Of course, the role of policy-making agents and the structure of the international system in the decisionmaking process are not being denied. Rather, in a similar fashion to the genetic structure of the human body deciding the remit of available actions and eventual outcomes, the norms that have been pointed to in this book create the environment in which politicians and bureaucrats (like genes in relation to their host organisms) make their decisions (Florini 1996). The compliance and respect extended to these norms can be seen in various examples throughout this book and provide these supposedly elusive norms with a tangibility that demonstrates them to be more than exogenously given preferences of policy-making agents. Kratochwil’s definition and clarification of norms in Chapter 2 as ‘guidance devices’ that facilitate the development of intersubjective understandings is supported by the case study of Japan’s developing peacekeeping policy. Through the numerous examples elucidated in this book, we can see that norms of international behaviour do exist and are borne of internal and external sources, promoted by a norm entrepreneur, which can both constrain and liberate the decisions of Japanese policy-making agents. Particularly the sense of ‘ought-to-ness’ has been demonstrated on the part of government, bureaucratic and civil societal actors to contribute something to international society in the security field consummate with Japan’s international economic standing. With the evidence offered in this book in mind, a tentative definition of a norm can be proffered:

Conclusions

157

an intersubjectively understood standard of behaviour rooted either (or both) in domestic or international society. Championed and promoted by an individual or organisation, it is often (but not by necessity) embodied in the form of a treaty, charter, Constitution, and so on, and upon gaining a degree of legitimacy frames the gamut of decisions and actions available to individual decisionmakers in both a constraining and encouraging sense. Only recently has IR theory conceded any attention to norms as influential and explanatory variables. Norms, like those outlined in this book, are capable of influencing, encouraging or limiting the objectives of governments. Thus, state interests are seen to extend beyond simple power maximisation and are not given, but constructed endogenously through these norms. Once this point is established and accepted, the aims and objectives of Japanese policy-making agents also need to be rethought; solely maximising power and wealth is, although a significant and dominant objective for many actors, not a wholly and sufficiently explanatory motive. On the one hand, certain Japanese policy-making agents, motivated clearly by national interest (whether it be a permanent UNSC seat, or the status of a ‘normal nation’ for Japan) have recognised, tapped into and instrumentalised the resonance of these norms; while, on the other hand, a sense of duty and desire to contribute to international society, which has little concrete or immediate gain behind it, has become an influential motivation for other agents.

The existence and importance of norms The ultimate aim of this book has been to demonstrate that not only do norms matter but also they provide an illuminating lens through which to view Japan’s peacekeeping policy. To this end, Japan’s evolving contribution to PKOs was evinced as a suitable example of how norms evolve and proceed through a life cycle. This was achieved by outlining in Chapters 1 and 2 the traditional approaches to IR, examining the literature related to norms in order to settle upon a workable definition, defining the norms that have impacted upon the Japanese government and its people, and building upon this by tracing the development of the particular norm of peacekeeping. Thus, this study has sought to comment not only on Japan but also on peacekeeping as a post-Cold War practice. Chapter 3 then highlighted the oft-ignored period from 1956 to 1990 by setting the historical scene in preparation for the following empirical chapters. Thus, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 examined empirically how these norms have manifested themselves in each case study from the outbreak of the Second Gulf War through to the present time. This conclusion will highlight the main findings of this study by commenting upon the changes that have occurred over this time frame with reference to the literature on norms. What follows will address recognising the existence of norms, the changing nature of these norms and how to measure the changes, the degree of compliance with these norms, specifically the role of UN internationalism in influencing Japan’s foreign and security policies, and the role of various policy-making agents in Japan. In addition, areas that merit further research will be suggested.

158

Conclusions

The preliminary findings on the changing strength of norms are summarised in Table 7.1. However, a broad overview and understanding of the Japanese government’s postwar peacekeeping experience can be achieved by relating the events discussed in Chapters 3 to 6 to Thomas Risse’s taxonomy of norm evolution and the process of norm internalisation (Risse 1999: 538). Risse points to five stages: ●

● ●

●

●

repression, whereby the norm in question is repressed and not even considered to be an option denial, whereby the norm’s existence is recognised but rejected as inappropriate tactical concessions, whereby pressure has accumulated and the options of the government are beginning to be limited prescriptive status, whereby the government is beginning to comply with the norm but in a controlled way rule-consistent behaviour, whereby the norm is fully respected, complied with, and possesses a taken-for-granted quality, a ‘settled norm’ in Mervyn Frost’s (1996) terms.

For Japan, the Cold War was a period of both repression and denial. Peacekeeping as an issue was addressed, but sporadically, and full participation including the despatch of personnel was something of a pipe dream for a number of policy-making agents. The Second Gulf War represents the third stage of tactical concessions. Pressure had accumulated from a number of sources both within and outside of Japan so that the government was obliged to make some concessions. Thereafter, the period from participation in UNTAC through to 11 September 2001 was a stage of prescriptive status, in which political leaders operated a process of ‘controlled liberalisation’ and the foundations of norm obedience were established (Risse 1999: 538). Within this process, the deaths of the UN volunteer, Nakata Atsuhito, and the civilian policeman, Takata Haruyuki, in Cambodia were of particular importance in the Japanese government and its people’s learning process as regards what participation in PKOs involved. Judging by opinion polls at the time, this time can be regarded as a tipping point in so far as thereafter the norms of UN internationalism and peacekeeping were more or less accepted. With the events of 11 September and their aftermath, Japan has reached the stage of rule-consistent behaviour and as the norms of internationalism and peacekeeping evolve, as seen with the Brahimi Report, Japan’s policy evolves with it. Table 7.1 Taxonomy of changing norms Anti-militarism

US bilateralism

East Asianism

UN internationalism and peacekeeping

Specificity

Medium: falling

High

Medium: redefinition

Medium: rising

Durability

Medium

High

Medium

High

Concordance

Medium

High

Medium

High

Conclusions

159

Measuring norms Concurring with Björkdahl (2002), it is not simply enough to identify and describe norms. It is also necessary to explain their origins, which are influential, and how they rise and decline in relevance. In the case of the Second Gulf War, it is clear that a crisis can bring about a drastic change in which traditional norms continue to possess influence. However, it has to be stressed that there is also a more subtle and evolutionary way in which norms can alter. In Chapter 2 it was proposed that examining the changes in norms should centre on the three criteria expounded by Legro (1997): specificity, durability and concordance. Legro’s definition of norms is lacking in that it examines only regulative norms and pays no attention to the idea that norms can liberate, encourage and constitute human action. However, despite this omission, these three criteria are still applicable to the task of highlighting which norms are in the ascendance and which are in decline. Thus, norms that score highly in each of these criteria will be presumed to be influential in character and vice versa. In the case of Japan’s peacekeeping experience, the four identified norms can be measured by these guidelines (see Table 7.1) to attain an understanding of which domestic and international norms matter. Specificity The domestic norm of anti-militarism, with its strong social origins rooted in the experience of the Second World War, is well understood in Japanese society. With a strong tradition going back to the prewar period that challenged Japan’s military enterprise in East Asia, through to the A-bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the firebombing of Tokyo, anti-militarist tendencies have been clearly expressed in opinion polls throughout this period. The specific frames instrumentalised to promote this norm include respect for the Constitution and Article 9, abandonment of the US–Japan Security Treaty and curtailment of the role (if not the very existence) of the SDF. Thus, during the Second Gulf War, the traditional antimilitarist attitudes of Japanese civil society were still largely intact, both reflected in and supported by the political stance of the SDPJ since shortly after the Second World War. So, if this domestic norm and its restrictive nature is widely recognised and comprehended, why has its specificity been classified in Table 7.1 as ‘Medium: falling’? Simply put, this is due to the emerging norm of the UN and its peacekeeping functions. This norm (as is demonstrated later) has been categorised in its specificity as ‘Medium: rising’, and I would suggest that the norms of UN internationalism and peacekeeping are rising at the expense of the domestic norm of anti-militarism. As was seen in Chapter 4, in the aftermath of the Second Gulf War and the failed attempt to pass legislation to allow the despatch of SDF personnel, the Japanese government came under a great deal of criticism from the international community as it became increasingly evident that some kind of contribution of personnel would have to be made. The question for the ruling LDP was how to realise this contribution without provoking the domestic norm of anti-militarism and its restrictive

160

Conclusions

nature. The answer was to avoid a unilateral despatch of SDF personnel within a MNF, but rather to marry an international contribution with the UN system, recently liberated from the confining structure of the Cold War and enjoying a renaissance of sorts. Any contribution that could be justified under the UN Charter could also be justified under the Japanese Constitution because of their common origins. It is necessary to understand how deeply anti-militarist roots have been put down in postwar Japanese society and, as a result, the extent to which the Japanese government has had to use stealth and incrementalism in responding to both international and domestic norms. There has been a clash of international and domestic norms in Japan for the past half-century over the role of the UN in relation to domestic anti-militarism and the dominant normative influence of US bilateralism – a clash seen throughout the empirical chapters. Thus, during the Diet debates concerning the passage of the PKO Law and in dealing with the neighbouring states in East Asia, Japanese politicians and bureaucrats stressed that the contribution of personnel would take place within the framework of the UN. This policy was realised with the first despatch of SDF troops on the UNTAC mission where the terms of the UN’s mandate and the maintenance of a cease-fire were repeatedly referred to – a trend that has continued in attempts (successful and unsuccessful) to revise the PKO Law. In this way, the LDP leadership, eager to expand Japan’s contribution to international society, and in particular the UN with one eye on a UNSC permanent seat, was able to weaken the traditionally stringently recognised norm of anti-militarism by combining it with the resonant norm of UN internationalism and its peacekeeping activities. The norms of UN internationalism and peacekeeping display aspects of an anti-militarist nature but recognise the use of force in achieving the goal of peace. In this way, the LDP leadership could proceed in its goal of making Japan a ‘normal’ state that exercises military power and still overcome the anti-militarist ‘allergy’. For these reasons, the anti-militarist norm is regarded as not having necessarily weakened but having mutated to permit a level of force acceptable to the Japanese government and society of the day and as long as it is mandated by the international community. The three remaining norms, domestic anti-militarism, the bilateral relationship with the US, and the attitude of East Asian nations, have much more of an understood history in Japan and are much more clearly defined and are institutionalised in the Constitution, Article 9, and the US–Japan Security Treaty, and are, thus, legitimised. However, PKOs have shown themselves to be undergoing a process of redefinition in the post-Cold War world leading to a degree of fuzziness in their definition and understanding not only in Japan, but elsewhere in the world – especially the US. In contrast, this lack of understanding of peacekeeping can be seen during the Second Gulf War. Partly because the operation was a UN-sanctioned multinational operation under the leadership of the US and not a traditional PKO, a warped impression of the practice of peacekeeping was created among the Japanese public. Furthermore, the inevitable loss of Japanese life was anticipated and this fear activated the traditional, domestic norm of Japanese anti-militarism with the result that, after the public and Diet debates, the PKO Law could only be passed successfully with the attached five guidelines. Moreover, during the UNTAC operation, the

Conclusions

161

outrage expressed in Japan by the deaths of Nakata and Takata, was partly borne out of a failure to understand the risks of participation in PKOs and the fact that causalities are not uncommon. Due largely to the actions and statements of the volunteer’s father, Nakata Takehito, the furore and clamour to bring back the SDF personnel abated and a deeper understanding of the practice of peacekeeping was attained. Despite the ongoing process of redefining peacekeeping, the globalisation of the practice of peacekeeping has been shown to have progressed in the post-Cold War world and to have gained a near universal acceptance, which is all the more remarkable as peacekeeping as a practice lacks a degree of legitimisation and institutionalisation by not being mentioned anywhere in the UN Charter. It is through a behavioural process of acceptance by a vast majority of states that peacekeeping has gained its current acceptance and understanding. Thus, peacekeeping can be classified as a standard of international behaviour to which states feel an obligation to respond – in other words, a norm. The process of this globalisation of peacekeeping has been a lengthy process, and only recently, with the end of the Cold War, has peacekeeping gained currency and comprehension in both Western and nonWestern societies, most remarkably in Japan in a positive sense, and in the US in a negative sense. Thus, this process has created over time a truly global norm and set of values and is not simply the transplantation of Western values of democracy and free market economics (as a Marxist interpretation would posit). In Table 7.1, as peacekeeping is still undergoing a process of being redefined and comprehended, despite these activities being widely recognised, the specificity grading has been rated as ‘Medium: rising’. Only in December 2001, almost a decade after the initial legislation, did the LDP feel secure enough to attempt once again to challenge the domestic, regulative norm of anti-militarism and revise the PKO Law within an increasingly hawkish political atmosphere. There still exists a certain vagueness in the understanding of peacekeeping generally and Japan’s contribution specifically. Moreover, the process of defining what the SDF can or cannot concretely do in the field is still being debated and it may be some time before a clear consensus is reached. However, although the details may be vague, the sense of making a contribution to international society is clearly understood and has been broadly accepted across party divides (with only the persistent exception of the JCP). As Zehfuss (2002) has argued in relation to the dispatch of German military personnel on international missions, ‘[t]he representation of military involvement abroad as responsibility closed down political space’ (Zehfuss 2002: 233). The same was true in the case of Japan and specifically the reaction of the SDPJ, the traditional anti-militarist norm entrepreneur. This can be seen in the SDPJ’s major policy reversals originating in the report entitled, Choices for the 21st Century submitted to the Temporary Party Congress in September in 1994 and continued through until the New Security Proposals in September 1997. Rather, than confront the despatch of SDF personnel on PKOs as irresponsible, as the SDPJ’s traditional policy position stated, the SDPJ collapsed in the face of reference to the higher authority and collective identity of international society and the need to behave as a responsible member. Equally, the Japanese government and people’s

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reaction to the events of 11 September 2001 demonstrated a consensus of sorts on the necessity of some kind of Japanese contribution to international society, which served to dampen debate, at least in contrast to Japan’s response to the Second Gulf War. The bilateral relationship with the US institutionalised in the US–Japan Security Treaty is clearly understood. The fact that the US has wanted Japan to play a more active role in regional and global security, both multilaterally and within the remit of the bilateral relationship, has been clearly stated in various pronouncements and declarations from the Second Gulf War to 11 September 2001 and beyond. Although not so obvious during the UNTAC mission (certainly when compared to the attitudes of Japan’s East Asian neighbours), it was intersubjectively understood and kept alive through US Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry’s visit to Tokyo in May 1993 in the aftermath of the deaths of Nakata and Takata and the release of PDD-25 in May 1994. Further substance was given to the US–Japan relationship and the encouraging, constitutive norm it has proved to be with the release of the ACSA in February 1995, the revised US–Japan defence guidelines of June 1997, and the support Japan has extended to the US in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The strategy of the US in encouraging Japan to contribute more to the international community is akin to what Wendt has termed ‘altercasting’ (Wendt 1999: 329–31). Namely, in order to encourage the Japanese government in the desired direction of greater contributions to international society, the US policymaking agents approach Japan as if it were a perfectly natural and acceptable thing to contribute to PKOs specifically and regional security more generally. Thus, with this in mind, the relationship with the US has been graded as ‘High’ in the field of specificity (see Table 7.1). East Asian nations have instrumentalised the anti-militarist norm and have made clear their opposition in a comprehensive, almost automatic, reaction to anything that smacks of Japanese remilitarisation. From the time of the Second Gulf War, reaching a height during the UNTAC operation and still evident in recent years, China and South Korea have been the most vociferous opponents of what is perceived not as a necessary international contribution, but as a sign of Japanese remilitarisation. However, states that have come directly into contact with Japan while participating in the UNTAC operation have come to an understanding of Japan’s contribution. Particularly with the encouragement from the Cambodia factions, the working relationship with the Philippines in transportation duties, and the proposed co-operation with Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines in the resettlement of refugees, certain of Japan’s neighbours can be seen to have broken away from their traditional monolithic opposition to a more proactive role for Japan. Especially the ASEAN nations have softened their position on Japan’s peacekeeping role during the 1990s (Singh 2002: 287–95). Thus, in Figures 4.1 and 5.1, the policymaking matrices during and after the Second Gulf War have made a clear distinction between the two camps. Nevertheless, even the stalwart opposition of South Korea has softened in recent years with the proposal of joint exercises between the two nations first appearing in July 1995. Especially in the light of the revised US– Japanese defence guidelines, it is in South Korea’s interests to promote a co-operative

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and less critical relationship with Japan since in the event of a crisis on the Korean Peninsula it will be the US and Japan that are expected to support South Korea. Thus, it is clear that slowly over time the once solid opposition of the nations of East Asia to the rising proactivism of their former colonial ruler has waned and clearly divided with one half constituting a norm that encourages Japan’s further participation. This process is summarised by Onuf: If norms, as rules, guide conduct, then they can, and often do, guide conduct causing the formation of new norms. Every norm has a ‘source’ defined as such by other norms. New norms stem from old norms by way of intervening practice. Spiralling back from source to source, all norms are related, however distantly. (Onuf 1998: 682) For these reasons, the specificity of the regulative anti-militarist norm created by the attitudes of East Asian nations and perceived by the Japanese government and its people has been given a rating of ‘Medium: redefinition’. Durability The obvious victim in the interplay of the norms examined in this book appears to be the norm of anti-militarism, seen in the failure to check the despatch of SDF personnel abroad, the inability to direct debate along the lines of what kind of nonmilitary contribution Japan could make, and the electoral embarrassment of the SDPJ, the self-professed guardians of the Constitution, in the October 1996 Lower House elections. In addition to this, the once monolithic opposition of the Japanese public to any hint of ‘militarism’ has crumbled since the Second Gulf War and Japan’s embarrassment in failing to co-ordinate a meaningful contribution to the USled international effort. Demonstrated in repeated opinion polls, the attitudes of the Japanese public have shifted from a stage of opposing any participation with regularly over 50 per cent voicing their opposition in a variety of opinion polls, to a stage where 71 per cent supported a degree of participation in peacekeeping activities (The Prime Minister’s Office Public Opinion Poll on Diplomacy, May 1996). The reason for this undeniable turnaround in public perceptions, which puts pay to the durability of the anti-militarist norm, can be credited in great measure to the role of the UN. In the opinion polls cited in each chapter the proviso for Japanese participation in peacekeeping activities has always been the leadership and guidance of the UN. Thus, Japanese participation in non-UN missions like that in Haiti has been unthinkable and repeatedly declined by the Japanese government, citing the aegis of the UN as a prevailing standard of any military action undertaken by the international community. The shift in public opinion is also evident in the attitude of Japan’s business world. The initial wariness of the zaikai has also been steadily mitigated since the Second Gulf War. The wariness at that time of organisations like the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Nikkeiren has metamorphosed into the more

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constitutive attitude of organisations like the Kansai Association of Corporate Executives (Kansai Do¯ yu¯ kai) expressed in its report of 1998 entitled Thinking Straight about Japan’s Security: Toward Strategic and Proactive Decision-making and Responsible Action. This report was clear in placing its emphasis upon national, regional and global security: while conducting positive diplomacy in peacetime we must also make steady preparation in peacetime in order to make prompt and accurate judgement in times of crisis. We must think, but not in terms of legal interpretation, what is the best option for this country. (The Japan Times, 31 March 1998) Thus, in similar fashion to civil society, the business community’s representative opinions have gradually changed in line with the work of the UN system and the concept of multilateral security. The durability of the relationship with the US is beyond any reasonable doubt. Already institutionalised in the US–Japan Security Treaty, it has been further strengthened by the revised guidelines and the support expressed for the US after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Despite recurrent doubts expressed, particularly in Okinawa, about the continuing stationing of US troops in Japan, the central position each government accords to the relationship is a prevailing factor. Unlike the domestic norm of anti-militarism, the norm of US bilateralism has demonstrated great resilience and has gone through considerable reinterpretation that has served only to consolidate its central position in Japan’s foreign policy. It thus scores highly in durability. Once again, the UN, and Japan’s relationship with it, has been the beneficiary of developments since the end of the Cold War. Already accorded high levels of support within Japan since admission in 1956, the UN and its peacekeeping functions have been strengthened in their normative power by the metamorphosis undergone by the domestic interpretations of anti-militarism. The UN, now married to traditional Japanese anti-militarism, scores highly in its durability and, for similar reasons, its concordance. However, although an important change in Japan’s postCold War foreign and security policy climate, it would be an oversimplification to regard the anti-militarist norm as waning. A more accurate interpretation would be to link this domestic norm with the international norm of participation in international society institutionalised in the UN and its peacekeeping activities – the strategy employed by Ozawa Ichiro¯ . The UN’s new-found legitimacy in the postCold War world has piggy-backed on the traditional norm of anti-militarism whereby the seemingly contradictory use of force for peaceful ends, ends defined by the UN, has become a new international standard. Concordance With which norms have Japanese policy-making agents felt a duty to comply and what are the frames that have ensured compliance? Concordance, or compliance, is

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strongly linked to the idea of legitimacy and coherence. Franck (1990) has defined this aspect as: a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles or right process. (Franck 1990: 24) The legitimacy of the new norm of peacekeeping is reinforced by a history outlined in Chapter 2. Through this historical development it is evident how for certain states (such as Canada, India, the Scandinavian states and so on) the concept of peacekeeping is clearly understood and this comes across in the high regard for this practice within these states, the level of their contribution, and the respect these nations have earned for their participation and their ability to redefine their security policies in the light of this multilateral norm. In Japan the understanding of peacekeeping, which is a proviso to its consequent concordance, is still developing as was the case at the time of the deaths of Nakata and Takata during the UNTAC operation. In accordance with the traditional norm of anti-militarism, anything that smacked of the dark side of militarism resulted in outcry and demands to recall the SDF. The reaction of the government was to refer to a more clearly comprehended norm in Japan in the form of the UN. As mentioned previously, the UN has traditionally received high levels of support from the Japanese public, and certain policy-making agents knew that the process of learning about SDF despatch on peacekeeping activities could be assisted by making reference to the UN system and international society. Legitimacy and coherence could be acquired for the newer norm by reference to the more traditional norm within which it existed. This is connected to the perlocutionary effect of norms, namely the success of communicating norms and how they are intersubjectively understood. This has been relatively successful in the case of the emerging norm of peacekeeping, due to what Florini (1996) has called an entrepreneurial evolutionary path, which can exist for a norm. Under the aegis of a sponsor like the UN or the US, a practice, like peacekeeping, can gain legitimacy. This is evident in the central role the UN played in justifying Japan’s new proactivism in the field of peacekeeping. It has played the same role, or acts as the frame, for the normalisation (rather than remilitarisation) of the SDF (Frühstück and Ben-Ari 2002: 5–6). This is an important distinction for any policy-making agent to make in order to temper the anti-militarist norms of Japanese society and East Asia and promote the norm of UN internationalism. From the reflections of this belief in opinion polls through to the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council’s proposal to attach greater weight to UN resolutions than the Peace Constitution, the utility of the UN as a means of justifying the end and providing the practice of peacekeeping with legitimisation has been demonstrated in this study. It is also necessary to note the use of frames in achieving and promoting concordance with a particular norm. The frames used by Ozawa included stressing that

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Japan is a ‘normal nation’; Japan must be a responsible member of international society; and Japan must make a human as well as a financial contribution to world peace and stability. In order to promote the anti-militarist norm, Doi Takako instrumentalised frames such as Japan is a peace-loving nation; despatch of personnel is opening the door to remilitarisation; Japan must never repeat the mistakes of its militarist past. In the light of events such as the Second Gulf War and the terrorist attacks a decade later, it is Ozawa’s frames that have greater resonance and have created a sense of what Wendt (1999) has termed ‘collective identity’ – namely, a point of identification beyond pure self-interest that: involves extending the boundaries of the Self to include the Other . . . Collective identity, in short, is a distinct combination of role and type identities, one with the causal power to induce actors to define the welfare of the Other as part of that of the Self, to be ‘altruistic’. (Wendt 1999: 229) Moreover, by going back to the analogy of human genetic make-up, a deeper understanding of Japan’s concordance with the norms highlighted here can be attained. The idea of inheritance has played an important role in deciding which norms have governed the decisions the Japanese government has made. For example, the attitudes of Japan’s East Asian neighbours towards its military role have been inherited throughout the generations to influence those with neither experience nor memory of Japan’s colonisation of East Asia from the Meiji period both in East Asia and Japan alike. Like the information contained in a gene, the information contained in this norm has been that the Japanese state should not take any measure that might lead, however incrementally, to the exercise of military power. In the case of China and South Korea, the inheritance process has been going on for a longer time and has reached a greater level of institutionalisation and communication to the Japanese government. In the case of nations like Thailand and Malaysia, the wartime experience may be quite different, but the strength of the anti-militarist norm has nevertheless been weakened and contested by both the intervening practice of co-operation in peacekeeping, and other norms, like UN internationalism and US bilateralism, carrying different information and instructions from the traditional anti-militarist norm. To expand upon Florini’s (1996) genetic analogy, the law of survival governs which norms prevail. In the case of the states bordering on Cambodia, the immediate desire for a strong UN presence restoring security to the region mitigated the traditional opposition to Japan’s perceived remilitarisation. Two directly opposed norms cannot be followed at once; thus, an old norm is driven out or weakened by a new rising standard of international behaviour, although there may be a period of following polymorphically two separate norms before a new standard is found. This can currently be seen in the case of South Korea. The traditional opposition to Japan’s participation in PKOs is slowly being rejected and the previously inconceivable state of affairs that South Korea and Japan conduct joint military training exercises together has been mooted and encouraged by chiefly US bilateralism, but also facilitated and justified by UN

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internationalism – the two of which have been credited with a higher degree of concordance than the domestic anti-militarist norm and its variant created by the attitudes of East Asian nations and interpreted by the Japanese government and its people. There is also perhaps an argument for legitimacy based upon emulation. Often at times of incomplete information where the logic of a decision is unclear or the available alternatives are not obvious, simple emulation of allies and neighbours is an option. This aspect can be seen in the reverence still held in Japan for the relationship with the US. This study has shown that the relationship still possesses a great deal of normative power within Japanese government circles. However, it is also evident that in the post-Cold War world, where the raison d’être for the relationship has weakened with the disappearance of the Soviet Union, following the US lead or the process of emulation has been evident, especially during the Second Gulf War and in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, where gaiatsu was at its most obvious. As a result an effort has been made to reinvent the relationship with the US through the revised guidelines and its normative power has continued to be in evidence by encouraging a proactive role, within the limits of multilateral institutions or the bilateral alliance, for Japan’s foreign and security policies.

Summary This book has located sources of activity and reactivity in Japan’s foreign and security policy by shifting the focus away from the traditional concepts of Realist material definitions of power towards the inclusion of the norms of international behaviour. It has demonstrated that the UN has been able to provide: a boundedly rational forum for the mounting of innovations [and it is not inevitable for the UN or any other international organisation to] remain the tool their creators have in mind when they set them up – means towards the attainment of some end valued by the creators. Alternatively, international organizations can become ends in their own right, become valued as institutions quite apart from the services they were initially expected to perform. (Haas 1990: 14–15) In addition, as a result of this process over the years since the end of the Cold War, the traditional norms of domestic and internationally based anti-militarism have both weakened and metamorphosed. In contrast, the highly institutionalised, understood and durable relationship with the US has remained by and large a constant throughout the period. However, there are a number of possible future research projects both theoretical and empirical stemming out from this initial work on Japan, norms and peacekeeping. On the theoretical level, it has been shown that norms provide a rich framework for research, which can, even when married with the traditional approaches of Realism and Liberalism, avoid the pitfalls of a purely positivist approach and pay respect to Constructivist interpretations by attempting to measure

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such vague concepts as culture, identity and interests. An approach based on norms possesses explanatory power in a wide variety of fields, but also reclaims the field of security studies, traditionally claimed by the Realists as the area of their explanatory superiority (Katzenstein 1996a). In contrast, sophisticated critiques of the Constructivist approach based on the work of Jacques Derrida demand an equally sophisticated defence (Zehfuss 2002). On the empirical side, as regards Japan’s relationship with the UN, an examination of the role of individuals and epistemic communities in framing Japan’s interaction with the UN as norm entrepreneurs would fill a gap in the extant literature. The role of these non-governmental individuals (NGIs) has a rich background going back to Robert Cox’s idea of the executive head, and has not been addressed in the literature pertaining to Japan, although it was touched upon briefly in this book with reference to the work of Akashi Yasushi, Owada Hisashi and Ogata Sadako. Similarly in the security field, Japan’s changing relationship with its East Asian neighbours, particularly South Korea, will be of great interest if joint military training exercises proceed smoothly. Let us hope that such projects can be undertaken in the future, as all demonstrate that slowly, but surely, Japan is showing signs of realising the preamble to its Constitution: We desire to occupy an honoured place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want. We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but that the laws of political morality are universal; and that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other nations. As Risse states, ‘[i]f states want to become recognized members of international society, they have to accept and internalise these collective understandings [norms]’ (Risse 1999: 529–30). This neatly sums up Japan’s situation as regards its place in the world generally, and its participation in PKOs specifically.

Glossary

datsua nyu¯o¯ dogeza gaiko¯ G7 gaiatsu gentei bo¯ei hi no maru Keidanren Keizai Do¯yu¯ kai ko¯enkai kokusai ko¯muin Nikkeiren noriokure okubyo¯ gaiko¯ saisho¯gen jieiryoku wa zaikai zoku

abandoning the East and joining the West kowtow diplomacy Group of seven major industrialised countries: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and United States foreign pressure limited security Japanese national flag Japan Federation of Economic Organisations Japan Association of Corporate Executives support groups international officials Japan Federation of Employers’ Associations missing the boat diplomacy of cowardice minimum self-defence harmony and consensus business world policy tribes

Bibliography

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Index

Abbreviations: Fig = Figure; PKO = Peacekeeping operation; SDF = Self-Defence Force; Tab = Table; UN = United Nations; UNTAC = United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia; US = United States. Afghanistan, proposal to despatch PKO 125–6, 153 Air Self-Defence Force (ASDF): evacuation of Japanese nationals by 131, 136–7; use during Second Gulf War 67, 84; see also Self-Defence Force (JSDF) Akaha, T., quote 21–2 Akashi, Y.: appointment as head of UNTAC 47; appointment as Special Representative to the former Yugoslavia 151; quote 119; support for UN system 117, 119 An Agenda for Peace 117, 126 anti-militarism 34–7; changes in public opinion 70, 74, 91–2, 104–6, 134–5; despatch of personnel to Second Gulf War 67–9; durability of norm 163–4; opposition to financial support for Second Gulf War 65–7; opposition to use of SDF in UNTAC 100–2, 112–13; protests post-UNTAC 130–1; re-assessment of views 134–40; specificity of norm 159–60; see also East Asia; norms; United Nations internationalism; United States bilateralism Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law 129–30, 139–40, 153; see also

September 11 2001, bombing of World Trade Centre ASDF see Air Self-Defence Force (ASDF) Berger, T. U., quote 18–19 Boutros-Ghali, B., quotes 2, 43, 122 Brahimi Report 3, 121–2, 126–8, 153–4 Cambodian conflict 95; elections 98–9, 102–3; financial aid 99–100, 106, 111; history 95–9; see also UNTAC (Cambodia) Choices for the 21st Century 132–3, 161–2 civilian personnel, suggested use of; during Second Gulf War 67–9; on PKOs 51, 56 Cold War 1956–90: contribution to UN during 1980s 54–7; policy-making matrix 59 (Fig 3.1); post-war rehabilitation 49–53 Constitution of Japan: ‘active’ interpretation 117; Article 9 35; Article 9, proposed addition 147; Preamble 34–5; revision 135–6 constructivism 17–19; approach to Japanese foreign policy 19–23; see also international relations theories Cowley, P. F., quote 16

184

Index

dependence on US post-World War II 20; see also United States–Japan alliance East Asia; concern over Japan’s remilitarisation 80–3, 110, 166; Japan’s role in 38–9; post-UNTAC PKOs 144–6; specificity of norm 162–3; support for SDF use in UNTAC 108–11; see also antimilitarism; norms; United Nations internationalism; United States bilateralism East Timor PKOs (UNAMET & UNTAET) 125; Japan’s contribution 129, 139, 145–6, 152–3 El Salvador, observer mission (ONUSAL) 124; Japan’s contribution 128, 149 elections: Cambodia 98–9, 102–3; East Timor 125, 152–3; El Salvador 124; Mozambique 123 fact-finding missions 51, 54, 56 financial aid: Cambodian conflict 99–100, 106; Second Gulf War 64–7, 77–8, 84 Fischer, M., quote 18 foreign policy: bodies involved in policymaking 14–17; on admission to UN 39–40; policy-making matrix 1956–90 59(Fig 3.1); policy-making matrix during Second Gulf War 94(Fig 4.1); policy-making matrix during UN missions 155; policy-making matrix during UNTAC 120(Fig 5.1); proactive approach 21–23; reactive approach 19–21; Realist approach 9–10 frames 33, 165–6; see also norms Golan Heights PKO (UNDOF) 123–4; Japan’s contribution 128, 150–1 Goulding, M., quote 43 Gulf War see Second Gulf War Haftendorn, H., quote 12

Higuchi Report 115–16, 147–8 historical aspects: Cambodian conflict 95–9; peacekeeping 44–6; Second Gulf War 60–2 Hook, G. D., quote 40 Hun, S., quote 109 interdependence of nation states 12; see also Liberalism International Peace Co-operation Headquarters (IPCHQ) 100 International Peace Co-operation Law (PKO Law) 72–7, 91–2; East Asian fears 82–3; revision 130, 138, 151–2, 154; see also United Nations Peace Co-operation Bill international relations theories 7, 23–5, 156–7; constructivism 17–23; liberalism 10–17; realism 7–10 Iraq, invasion of Kuwait 60–2; see also Second Gulf War Ishihara, T., quote 88 Japan: admission to UN 39; Constitution 34–5; reasons for studying 3–5 Japan Overseas Co-operation Volunteers (JOCV) 115 JSDF see Self-Defence Force (JSDF) Kaifu, T., quotes 85–6 Kakizawa, K., quote 147 Kaku, R., quote 88 Katzenstein, P. J., quotes 30, 34 Kaysen, C., quote 2 Kegley, C. W., quote 3 Keidanren (Japan Federation of Economic Organisations), role in foreign policymaking process 14; see also foreign policy Keizai Do¯ yu¯ kai 88 Khmer Rouge 96–9; opposition to ceasefire 101–2, 109; see also Cambodian conflict; UNTAC (Cambodia) Koizumi, J., quote 104

Index 185 Krasner, S. D. quotes 28, 30 Kratochwil, F. V., quote 29 Kuriyama, T., quote 108 Kuwait, invasion by Iraq 60–2; see also Second Gulf War League of Nations 44–5; see also peacekeeping Lebanon, observer mission (UNOGIL) 51 Lessons from the Gulf War in Bringing about Peace in the Persian Gulf and the World 68 Liberalism 10–13; approach to Japanese foreign policy 14–17; approach to Japanese peacekeeping policy 13; see also international relations theories March, J. G., quote 12–13 minesweepers, use during Second Gulf War 70–2, 82 Miyazawa, K., quote 109 monetary aid see financial aid Mozambique (ONUMOZ) 122–3; despatch of SDF 148–9; Japan’s contribution 128 Nikkeiren (Japan Federation of Employers’ Associations), role in foreign policy-making process 14; see also foreign policy Nobel Peace Prize 1988/2001 46 norms 26–7, 47–8, 156–7, 167–8; case studies 27–8; categories of ideas 29; concordance 164–7; definitions 28, 30, 157; durability 163–4; evolution 30–2, 158; existence 29, 157–8; interaction between 33–4, 93–4; measurement 159; specificity 159–63; strength 32–3; taxonomy of changing norms 158(Tab 7.1); see also peacekeeping norms in Japan see anti-militarism; East Asia; United Nations internationalism; United States bilateralism

observer missions 45; El Salvador 124, 128; Lebanon 51; see also peacekeeping Oga, N., quote 88 Olsen, J. P., quote 12–13 Onuf, N. G., quote 163 ONUMOZ (Mozambique) 122–3; despatch of SDF 148–9; Japan’s contribution 128 ONUSAL (El Salvador observer mission) 124; Japan’s contribution 128, 149 Operation Desert Shield 62; see also Second Gulf War Operation Desert Storm 63; see also Second Gulf War Operation Provide Comfort 63; see also Second Gulf War overview of text 1–6 Owada, H., quote 149 Ozawa, I., 31, 40, 117 Ozawa Committee 73, 77, 89 Palestine (UNTSO) 45 Paris Peace Accords 97, 100; see also Cambodian conflict; UNTAC (Cambodia) peacebuilding 127; definition 46 peacekeeping: as a norm of international relations 41, 161; change in Japanese public opinion 115; definitions 41–2; global concordance 46–7; historical aspects 44–6; increase in Japanese interest during 1980s 54–7; League of Nations 44–5; observer missions see observer missions; principles 42–3; reasons for studying 2–3; understanding of concept by Japanese people 160–2, 165 peacekeeping operations: Afghanistan 125–6, 153; anti-militarist views see anti-militarism; Cambodia see UNTAC (Cambodia); changes postCold War 121–2; characteristics 42–3; civilian personnel, proposed use 51, 56, 67–70; compromise by coalition government on participation

186

Index

in 131–2; consideration of more active role post-UNTAC 111–18; criteria for withdrawal 75–6; division in coalition government on UN Security Council representation 137; East Asian view on increased Japanese participation 144–6; East Timor 125, 129, 139, 145–6, 152–3; El Salvador 124, 128, 149; fatalities during 112–13; Golan Heights 123–4, 128, 137–8, 150–1; increase in public support 70, 74, 91–2, 104–6, 134; international participation 47; international support for Japanese participation 107, 112; lack of understanding of 160–2; Mozambique 122–3, 128, 148–9; Palestine 45; post-UNTAC 121; post-UNTAC, Japanese contribution 128–30; post-UNTAC, protests against Japanese involvement 130–1; post-UNTAC, support for more active role 146–8; Realist views 10; Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (Brahimi Report) 3, 121–2, 126–8; Rwanda 125, 149–50; Social Democratic Party of Japan position 131–4; US pressure for Japanese participation 141–4; US support for Japanese participation 107–8; use of SDF 1, 4–5, 24, 86–93; use of SDF, conditions 72–3; use of SDF during Cold War period 50–3; use of SDF, legislation 73–5; use of SDF post-Cold War period 54–7; widening of Japan’s role 52–3, 55–6, 57–8, 111–12 peacekeeping policy, Japan: Liberalist approach 13; Realist approach 10 peacemaking, definition 46 Points Regarding the Act Creating a UN Peace Organisation (SDJP) 67–8 post-Cold War rehabilitation 49–53; see also Cold War 1956–90 public opinion: anti-militarism 70, 74, 91–2, 104–6, 163–4; increase in support for PKOs 134–5; revision of

Constitution 135–6; role of in expanding Japan’s contribution to PKOs 116; war on terrorism 140 Qian, Q., quote 80 Realism 3, 7–9; approach to Japanese foreign policy 9–10; approach to Japanese peacekeeping policy 10 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Brahimi Report) 3, 121–2, 126–8, 153–4 Rwanda PKO (UNAMIR) 125, 149–50; Japan’s contribution 128, 132 Second Gulf War 60; Air Self-Defence Force aid for refugees 67; despatch of minesweepers 70–2, 82; East Asian concerns 80–3; economic embargo 83–4; financial assistance to UN 64–7, 77–8, 84; history 60–2; hostage crisis 63–4; international response 62–3; Japanese response 63–5; policymaking matrix of foreign policy during 94(Fig 4.1); proposals to use civilian personnel 67–70; US pressure to send military aid 77–80 Self-Defence Force (JSDF): Cambodian conflict 100; Cambodian conflict, poll of participants 115; Cambodian conflict, use of weapons 102; conditions for despatch on PKOs 72–3; conditions for despatch on PKOs, review 152–3; contribution to UNAMET 129; contribution to UNAMIR 128, 132; creation 4, 37; criteria for withdrawal from PKOs 75–6; despatch to ONUMOZ 114, 128; East Asian concerns over despatch 80–3; East Asian support for use in UNTAC 108–111; inclusion in UNDOF 124, 128; international support for use in PKOs 91; legislation to permit use in PKOs 73–5; opposition to use in UNTAC

Index 187 100–2; opposition to withdrawal from UNTAC 102; post-UNTAC, desire for increased role in PKOs 148; postUNTAC, public support 134–5; preferential treatment 103–4; proposals to use during Gulf War 67–9, 85; responsibility for 15; SelfDefence Force Law (1954) 50; use in PKOs 1, 4–5, 24, 86–93; use in PKOs during Cold War period 50–3; use in PKOs post Cold War period 54–7; use of weapons 102, 151–2, 138–9, 153–4 Self-Defence Force Law (1954) 50 September 11 2001, bombing of World Trade Centre 125–6; see also war on terrorism Slaughter Burley, A. M., quote 2 Social Democratic Party of Japan, reconsideration of party position on PKOs 131–4, 154–5 Song, Y., quote 83 structure of text 5–6 Sumi, S., quotes 92 Suzuki, E., quote 66 The Defence Structure of a Neutral Japan 51 The Modality of the Security and Defence Capability of Japan: The outlook for the 21st century (Higuchi Report) 115–16, 147–8 The Responsibility to Protect 128 Thinking Straight about Japan’s Security: Towards Strategic and Proactive Decisionmaking and Responsible Action 164 UNAMET (East Timor) 125; Japan’s contribution 129, 139, 145–6, 152–3 UNAMIR (Rwanda) 125, 149–50; Japan’s contribution 128, 132 UNDOF (Golan Heights) 123–4; Japan’s contribution 128, 150–1; opposition to 137–8 United Nations: admission to 39–40; development 2–3; extent of Japanese

contribution 49–50; fears over Japanese role 50–2; increased Japanese role post-UNTAC 148–51; participation in 40–1; proposals to reduce US financial contribution 106–7, 140–1; widening of Japan’s role during 1980s 54–7; widening of Japan’s role during Cold War period 52–3, 57–8 United Nations internationalism 39–41, 52–3; Cambodia 101–2; durability of norm 164; Japanese role in UNTAC 111–18; post-UNTAC PKOs 146–54; Second Gulf War 93–4; specificity of norm 160–2; see also anti-militarism; East Asia; norms; United States bilaterism United Nations Peace Co-operation Bill 69, 86; see also International Peace Co-operation Law (PKO Law) United States bilateralism 37–8; Cambodian conflict 106–8; durability of norm 164; post-UNTAC PKOs 140–4; Second Gulf War 77–80; specificity of norm 162; see also antimilitarism; East Asia; norms; United Nations internationalism United States–Japan alliance 37–8; East Asian fears 144–6; Japanese dependence post-World War II 20; pressure from US during Second Gulf War 77–80; pressure from US to increase role in PKOs 140–3; pressure from US to participate in war on terrorism 143–4; support for Japanese seat on UN Security Council 141 UNOGIL (Lebanon observer mission) 45, 51 UNTAC (Cambodia): arming of SDF 102; consideration of peacekeeping role post-UNTAC 118–19; costs 106; creation 97–8; mandate 97; preferential treatment for Japanese peacekeepers 103–4; safety of police

188

Index

officers 101, 103; use of SDF 100, 111, 118; use of SDF, East Asian support 108–111; use of SDF, opposition to 100–2; use of SDF, opposition to unilateral withdrawal 102; see also Cambodian conflict UNTAET (East Timor) 125; Japan’s contribution 129, 139, 145–6, 153–4 UNTSO (Palestine) 45

war on terrorism: East Asian views 146; Japan’s contribution 129–30, 139–40; pressure from US to participate 143–4; see also September 11 2001, bombing of World Trade Centre Wendt, A., quote 166 Yasumoto, D., quote 19 Yoshida Doctrine 10, 14, 21