INTERDEPENDENCY OF INSTITUTIONS AND PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURS (MOS STUDIES 2) PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND MOS SYMPOSIUM (LEIDEN 1998)
edited by
A.C.V.M. BONGENAAR
NEDERLANDS HISTORISCH-ARCHAEOLOGISCH INSTITUUT TE ISTANBUL 2000
Copyright 2000 by Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten Witte Singel 25 Postbus 95 15 2300 RA Leiden, Nederland
All rights reserved, including the rights to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form
PREFACE This is the second volume in the MOS Studies series. The first volume, Trade and Finance in Ancient Mesopotamia. Proceedings of the First MOS Symposium (Leiden 1997) appeared in 1999. The series was started in order to publish the results of the postdoctoral research project "The Economy of Ancient Mesopotamia", conducted by R.M. Jas (Free University, Amsterdam), J.G. Dercksen and A.C.V.M. Bongenaar (Leiden University), and financed by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). This project investigates three main features of the Mesopotamian economy: agriculture, institutional production and management, and (interregional) trade. In the years 1997, 1998 and 1999 each of these topics has been the subject of an international symposium. The symposium Interdependency of Institutions and Private Entrepreneurs was held in Leiden on 1lth and 12th December 1998. The present volume contains the revised papers presented on that occasion. Two contributions could not be included, notably M.W. Stolper's paper on institutional connections in three Late Achaemenid entrepreneurial archives (MuraSQ,Kasr and Tattannu), and M. Stol's paper on the state and private entrepreneurs in Late Old Babylonian Sippar, which will be published in another context. The symposium was made possible by the generous financial support received from the Research School of Asian, African, and Amerindian Studies (CNWS) at Leiden University, the Leids Universiteitsfonds (LUF), the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences (KNAW), the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), and the Department of Near Eastern Studies (TCNO) at Leiden University, for which I would like to express my gratitude.
A.C.V.M. Bongenaar January 2000
Interdependency of Institutions and Private Entrepreneurs; Proceedings of the Second MOS Symposium (Leiden 1998) 1 ed. by A.C.V.M. Bongenaar. Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut; Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten [distr.]. (Uitgaven van het Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul; ISSN 0926-9568; 87) ISBN 90 6258 088 2
Printed in Belgium
TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1 G. van Driel Institutional and Non-institutional Economy in Ancient Mesopotamia ....................
5
F. Joann&s Relations entre inter& privCs et biens des sanctuaires B l'kpoque nCo-babylonienne 25 P. -A. Beaulieu A Finger in Every Pie: The Institutional Connections of a Family of Entrepreneurs in Neo-Babylonian Larsa ........................................................................................... 43 A. C.V.M. Bongenaar Private Archives in Neo-Babylonian Sippar and their Institutional Connections .....
73
C. Wunsch Neubabylonische Geschiiftsleute und ihre Beziehungen zu Palast- und Tempelverwaltungen: Das Beispiel der Familie Egibi ............................................... 95 H. Neumann Staatliche Verwaltung und privates Handwerk in der Ur-111-Zeit: Die Auftragstatigkeit der Schmiede von Girsu ...............................................................................119 J. G. Dercksen Institutional and Private in the Old Assyrian Period ..................................................135 J. Renger Das Palastgeschaft in der altbabylonischen Zeit ........................................................153 D. Charpin Les prCteurs et le palais: Les Cdits de miiarum des rois de Babylone et leurs traces dans les archives privCes ............................................................................................ 185 R.M. Jas Old and New Archives from Nuzi .............................................................................2 13 W.H. van Soldt Private Archives at Ugarit .......................................................................................... 229 B.J.J. Haring Outsiders in Charge of Institutional Property in New Kingdom Egypt ..................... 247
W.M. Jongman Hunger and Power: Theories, Models and Methods in Roman Economic History ... 259
INTRODUCTION The symposium Interdependency of Institutions and Private Entrepreneurs was held to investigate the archival documentation dealing with the connections between the Mesopotamian institutions and private entrepreneurs in the widest possible sense of the term. The institutions are the palace, which represents the royal administration, and the temples, whose economies were ultimately controlled by this royal administration. The private entrepreneurs are either individuals outside the institutions, who, for example, lease a certain type of institutional property, or persons inside the institutions, who, for example, provide the commodities needed for the cult. The Mesopotamian cuneiform archives are generally divided into institutional archives and private archives. The institutional archives from temple, palace, and local government often consist of the remnants of a once voluminous administration, sometimes complemented by the correspondence of the officials belonging to the organization. These archives contain information about the management of property, the procurement of commodities, the flow of commodities within the institutions, the management and payment of personnel etc. The private archives, on the other hand, consist of the administration of one individual, one family or one business firm. In most cases these archives contain business accounts and correspondence of the individual1 farnily/business firm in question, sometimes in addition to more personal documents like inheritage divisions, marriage contracts and title deeds of real estate. For most periods of Mesopotamian history, scholars concentrate on either institutional. or private archives (compare the contributions in K.R. Veenhof (ed.), Cuneiform Archives and Libraries, Istanbul 1986), simply because, for certain historic periods, both kinds of archive have not survived. For example, as long as we lack the institutional archives from Assur in the Old Assyrian period, we can only investigate the private archives of the Old Assyrian traders, and not the institutional background of the trade, in so far as it existed. The opposite is true for the palace archives of Ebla and Mari. The lack of (substantial) private archives from these two towns makes it difficult to investigate the private sector. The point of departure of the symposium was the Neo-Babylonian period (ca. 620480 B.C.) when much of Mesopotamia's documented economy is in the hands of the institutions. Analysis of the private archives from this period suggests that in every case some link can be detected between the owner of the archive and one of the institutions. The richness and diversity of the Neo-Babylonian documentation makes it exemplary for earlier periods, during which either the institutional or the private documentation is less well-represented in the sources or is under-published. The purpose of the symposium was, first, to verify the thesis of the relation between the private entrepreneur and the institutions in the Neo-Babylonian period, and to study this relationship in detail. The second purpose was to investigate also for earlier periods the likely importance of this connection. The existence of the link seems evident in many cases in the Old Babylonian period (1894-1595 BC), but there is certainly evidence from other periods as well. The third and final purpose was to answer the question whether there are indications in the written sources for a sector of the economy which had no
2
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
3
connections with the institutions. The dominating position of the institutions in the written evidence is a central problem in the study of the economy of Ancient Mesopotamia. G. van Driel explores several problems relating to these topics in the first contribution of this volume. For certain periods, notably the Ur I11 and the NeoBabylonian period, we are reasonably well-informed about the economic structures of the various institutions but it remains difficult to assess the general degree of institutionalisation. We know too little about the "military parallel structure", which might be considered a third institution in Mesopotamia, and even less is known about the villages which were not owned by the institutions.
exemplary. The existent private archives were clearly discarded by their owners, and, as far as we know, these archives were found together with documents from the discarded temple administration in the precincts of the temple. The most famous example of a Neo-Babylonian family of entrepreneurs, the Egibil Nur-Sin family from Babylon, is the subject of C. Wunsch' contribution. Members of this family were in close contact with the royal palace and acted as business agents for king Neriglissar prior to his accession and for crown prince BelHazzar. Having made money in the trading of commodities, they invested in land and houses in different Babylonian cities.
The Neo-Babylonian period
Mesopotamia before the first millennium
From the archival point of view, the Neo-Babylonian period is an exception. For this period both institutional and private archives are available: two huge institutional archives from the temples Eanna at Uruk and Ebabbar at Sippar, as well as many private archives from different cities. These private archives are all somehow related to institutions, in most cases the local temples. F. Joannbs investigates in his contribution the connections between private interests and the assets of the local temples in Uruk, Borsippa and Dilbat. Outsiders could profit from the local temple administration by the ownership of prebends, by exploitation and management of temple land, and occasionally by theft and fraud. The temple administration, on the other hand, profited from outsiders by using seasonal labour, by the receipt of taxes (tithes) as well as more or less voluntary donations, and relied on "entrepreneurs" for certain commercial activities. The Neo-Babylonian rent farming system is the best known example of the latter. As for the background of these so-called entrepreneurs, two types can be distinguished in the Neo-Babylonian period: on the one hand individuals and families belonging to the old, hereditary urban elite, who often owned prebends and held offices in the local temples at the same time, on the other hand individuals whom we may call nouveaux riches, those who made their fortune by the management of estates belonging to state officials, andlor by trading activities and clever investments, and who, in due course, climbed their way up socially through favourable marriages for their children. A perfect example of the latter is described in P.-A. Beaulieu's contribution about 1tti-hmaH-balii~ from Larsa. This man, without a patronymic (and, thus, not belonging to the local elite), leased land from the royal estates as well as from the Eanna temple at Uruk, he was involved in the trading of commodities with a high official from the Sealand province, and he was possibly a tithe collector for the Ebabbar temple at Larsa as well. His son married into a family with patronymic. The beginning of 1tti-SamaH-balittu's archive is contemporary with the restoration of the Ebabbar temple at Larsa by Nebuchadnezzar II. It is conceivable that he belonged to a group of imported men, protected by the central administration. The private archives from Sippar, discussed in A.C.V.M. Bongenaar's contribution, in most cases belonged to individuals and families of the first type: members of the local urban elite who owned prebends and occupied (higher) functions in the Ebabbar temple at Sippar. Only one private archive, belonging to a certain ISHar-taribi, does not seem to be related to the local temple in any way. Being the holder of a bow fief, he possibly had connections with the palace at Sippar. The documentation from Sippar, however, is not
Eight contributions in this volume describe economic structures, entrepreneurship, and archival difficulties in the older Mesopotamian periods and in the world outside Mesopotamia. Already in the Ur 111 period there is evidence for craftsmen who did not simply receive rations from the central administration in return for their labour, but who seem to have owned independent workshops with slaves working for them (contribution H. Neumann). Instead of rations, craftsmen sometimes received wages, a phenomenon also known from the Neo-Babylonian period. J.G. Dercksen's contribution focusses on the institutional influence of the Old Assyrian city-state on the caravan trade between Assur and Anatolia. Although the system of credit, investments and partnership contracts points to a private character of the trade, the city of Assur in fact defined the conditions under which the trade was practised. Characteristic of the Old Babylonian period is the economic system called Palastgeschaft, whereby members of the local elite, often officials of the palace at the same time, performed activities such as agricultural production or animal husbandry. They had to deliver to the palace a certain amount of what they produced, they kept the surplus as their profit, and were in principle also responsible for the losses. This is the same kind of entrepreneurship one observes in the Neo-Babylonian period, when the temples seem to have taken over the role of the Old Babylonian palaces. In his contribution, J. Renger elaborates on the Palastgeschaj3 and nuances the view that this economic system was a clean break with the household (oikos) economy of the Ur I11 period. The edict of miiarum is the subject of D. Charpin's contribution. With this legislative act the Babylonian kings cancelled the debts of their subjects in order to avoid the bankrupcy of too many entrepreneurs at the same time, and, as a consequence, a collapse of the economic system. The contributions about Nuzi (R.M. Jas) and Ugarit (W.H. van Soldt) show how difficult it is to draw a borderline between private and official. The private documents of military officers from Nuzi were found in the temple there, but it is hard to think of a reason for a possible connection between the local temple and a class of immigrant soldiers. The distribution of text genres in the privates archives from Ugarit is of interest. The archives which contain many state or public documents belonged in all likelyhood to state officials, archives containing cultic texts but hardly any state documents apparently belonged to cultic personnel, and archives with a high concentration of school texts belonged to scribes who probably had schools in their houses. In all these cases, the owners of the archives were in close contact with the institutions.
4
INTRODUCTION
Egypt and Rome
In his contribution about Egypt, B.J.J. Haring reaches the conclusion that no private entrepreneurship in a modern western sense can be detected in documents from New Kingdom Egypt. It is clear that individual officials could profit from the institutions, especially those in the position of supervisor of institutional domains, but he considers these opportunities as administrative or feudal, rather than commercial. Finally, W.M. Jongman's contribution is a bird's-eye view of theories, models and methods in Roman economic history. Of special interest for the scholar in ancient Near Eastern studies is his different approach towards economic subjects by introducing 'parametric' methods, supplemented by a case-study about the food supply of the city of Rome.
INSTITUTIONAL AND NON-INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMY IN ANCIENT MESOPOTAMIA
1. Introduction: the various institutions The subject of this meeting is the relation between the two Mesopotamian institutions, the temple and the monarchy, on the one hand and private entrepreneurs on the other. For someone who is convinced that in all private archives,l (if they merit the designation archive), there are clear signs of a connection between the owners of the archive and one or both of these institutions, this is not a subject which is easily handled. All the more if, as is to be the case here, the discussion is to be restricted to agriculture. For the presence of an archive almost inevitably means that there is always an automatic link between archive and institution. The "entrepreneurs" who are dependent on the existence of the institution for their economic activities are in this perspective little more than hangers-on. If this were true we would indeed have a Mesopotamian economy which is not only dominated by the institutional sphere, but also identical with it. Such a sweeping abandonment of Mesopotamia to an entirely institutional economy is, however, not a priori acceptable, since there are clear signs that the entrepreneur found his niche for the very reason that the institution is by definition unable to manage its own affairs along lines which are regarded as optimal by those who are interested in institutional performance. This suggests that there were at least possibilities for improved profitability. We regard the palace and the temple as the two main types of Mesopotamian institution. Both have a local agrarian base and are incorporated, from the moment somewhere deep in prehistory that the scale of political entities commenced to expand, in a kind of hierarchy. This is for us easily recognisable in the slow blending of the pantheon, which in the long run reflects shifts of the political centre of gravity, locally, regionally and country-wide. The shift of the political centre is the result of economic changes. The early temple is known specifically in its economic aspects and the combined local temples, centrally managed, are the backbone of the local institutional economy, at any rate in the South and down to the Ur III period. But also the local palace, which is, with one exception, only known in later periods, operates in a rank order of merit, not only within a particular state, but also in an international context, where status has immediate consequences in the economic field. What belongs to the sphere of the palace and what does not is in itself not immediately clear. Its status depends greatly on the presence of the king. On replacement a queen of Mari is honourably assigned a role in the palace at Terqa. In the Nuzi world we have the This is even the case with the Old Assyrian archives. Even if the owners are private traders from the point of view of Assur, they are inextricably tied to the various Anatolian palaces, without whose assent they cannot trade.
6
palace in ~ l - i l i n (= i Arrapha?) and local palaces in many localities, of which the one in Nuzi is reasonably well-known. There are at least two queens who have their palacerelated estates, one in the capital and one in Nuzi, but there are more. And there are the "sons-of-the-king" of whom S i l w a - ~ e in ~ ~Nuzi u ~ is well-documented. But is not TehipTilla for society at large not also at x-removed some kind of son of the king, or at least someone with a direct relation to him?2 Estates of members of the royal entourage are easily formed out of possessions pertaining to the palace and they easily return to that institution.3 An Assyrian palace has its $akintu, and what is the status of the bit ridzhi? In Chaldean Babylon the "House of the Crown Prince" has, if we use our imagination a little, a certain institutional identity, which is probably one of the means by which the Babylon Egibi family makes its fortune. The institution of the Simmagir is hardly known to us other than by name, but its mere existence can at least be followed for almost a millenni~rn.~ It is the ramification of Mesopotamian institutions down the social scale which contributes to the blurring of the outlines. The material which allows an insight into the workings of a palace comes, as is well known, from the North, Ebla and Mari, and in the later periods, Nuzi or Nimrud. The Southern palace is as undocumented as the Northern temple. In all cases where documentation exists, the temple is from an economic point of view a tool of the royal administration, which is understandable, if only because the king is in the end responsible for the cult. The temple is also dependent on the political order being maintained by the king. In weak political structures the temple cannot operate properly in its economic respect for two reasons: it cannot maintain its grip on the vital agrarian means of production against outside intruders, its internal structure is not homogeneous enough and its local position, especially from a social point of view not strong enough, to be able to operate without external supervision. The clearest example is the situation in Borsippa in the eighth century.5 The Pre-Sargonic and Ur I11 archives from Girsu and Umma contain a wealth of information on the economy of the temple estates during, in the first case, a period of some 15 years, from Lugalanda to Uru-inim-gina and in the second case some 40, from the middle years of h l g i to the first of Ibbi-Sin. But they tell us little about the social context in a personal sense in which the temple economy functions. In the pre-Sargonic case there is little to choose between the temple of Baba and the estate of Saga wife of the king, and notably, the formal restitution to Baba makes little practical difference, certainly not in the daily run of affairs. In the two Ur I11 cases provincial administration and (combined) estates of the gods are virtually identical, but though we know many of the accountable officials, our knowledge concerning their personal backgrounds is limited to 2
INSTITUTIONAL AND NON-INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMY
G. VAN DRIEL
On Tehip-Tilla being called e k a l l ~ j ucf. K. Deller and W.R. Mayer, OrNS 53 (1984), 103 sub mizlu. The question is discussed by A. Fadhil, Studien zur Topographie und Prosopographie der Provinzstadte des Konigreichs Arrapbe (= BaF 6), Mainz 1983, 47-8. (Ref. R. Jas) 3 The estates mentioned in the Dugabara group of texts mentioned below (8 6.B) belong here and cf. J.-M. Durand, Les documents kpistolaires du palais de Mari 11, Paris 1998, 528-534. What happened in the specific case of Sammetar has been studied by F. van Koppen in his unpublished master's thesis. Acquisition of property in the "shadow of the king" is common, but it poses specific risks. The Simmagir is studied by W. von Soden, ZA 62 (1972), 84-90. The evidence is a mixture of geographical and prosopographical evidence. AHw 1044R, CAD S, 272-3, Zadok, RGTC 8,382, RIA 2, 51L; additionally RA 83 (1989), 154:16. Text re-edited by W.G. Lambert, JAOS 88 (1968), 125-130.
.
7
the facts resulting from their accountability. Only the seals with their insistence on the status derived from being a scribe on the one hand and the patronymic on the other are of some help. The patronymics either suggest a concentration of functions in certain families, or even more interesting, if Pomponio is correct, a kind of "Wahlverwantschaft", thus pointing to the existence of social sub-groups within the organisation.6 That such groups existed is otherwise indicated by the fact that on their seals people declare themselves the servant of someone higher on the social ladder. If R. Mayer is correct,7 this type of statement really meant something and was forbidden by the king, probably because it fostered local loyalties. The documented institutions from Umma and Girsu had operated in independent rival political entities some 200 years before the Ur I11 period and they had had very different political histories in the mean time. That those who staffed them probably regarded them as their own, is more than understandable. Maekawa's reconstruction of the removal of the Ur-Lama family from the highest functions in Lagag suggests local loyalties, especially because there is an interim administration of outsiders before another influential official with local roots is installed.8 Though harder to underpin, but as a matter of fact inevitable in the light of the then recent past, already in the Ur 111 period when local institutions were turned into tools of a central authority, that central authority had to share influence with the locally based "operators" of the institutions. This inevitably leads to friction. This late Third Millennium evidence on the social status of institutional leaders and managers is negligible compared to what is visible in the Neo-Babylonian archives, primarily those from Uruk and Sippar. Far less detailed where the economics are concerned, they are much more informative as to institutional human relations. The permanent, direct, interest of a group of families in possession of functions which give access to income derived from institutional resources means that the central royal administration has to share influence in the running of the institutions with groups of wealthy families, who have their own network of interests. It is especially the central administration which tries to diminish the grip of the local families by appointing royal watch dogs, who involve themselves in the economic functioning of the institutions, and by transferring the gestion of temple affairs to people who farm parts of the institutional assets against a lump sum, a widespread phenomenon in the First Millennium. This frequently has been discussed9 and it effectively contributes to the blurring of the distinction between the institutional and the non-institutional economy. If the temples as institutions are weak because factional interests must be suppressed by outside arbiters, the monarchy is in many respects equally weak, especially in that it depends for its continued effectiveness on a dominant, with few exceptions male, figure. The situation in Southern Babylonia in the first half of the First Millennium illustrates these points well. For both types of institution the Chaldean kings had to rebuild the foundations. Ancient Mesopotamian institutions are administered through a hierarchy of persons, appointed for unlimited periods. They are personally accountable with all they possess, F. Pomponio, ZA 82 (1992), 196. R. Mayer, Seal Impressions of Ur ZII Umrna, Ph.D. Dissertation Leiden 1997, 119-120. Cf. K. Maekawa, ASJ 18 (1996), 107-123 with additions ASJ 19 (1997), 276ff. Cf. the reaction by ~ e i m ~ eASJ l , 19 (1997), 63ff. TCL XI11 182 remains the most illustrative text.
8
G . VAN DRIEL
including wife, children and own person, for the gestion of that part of the institutional economy for which they are responsible. Prebendary offices, from high to low, become the inherited private property of the office-holder.1•‹ This personal responsibility and involvement results in a situation in which the private and the official becomes inseparable, in which an official is expected to profit from his function and is remunerated in a manner which involves him directly in the basic agrarian economic activities of the institution, from managing the domain through exploiting a subsistence lot to acting as a tenant, with varying intensity in the use of institutional assets. All officials become inevitably agrarian producers if part of their remuneration consists of sustenance fields. The private and the institutional blends, again, imperceptibly. The importance of the institutions cannot be underrated. The degree to which a local economy is institutionalised will have to be discussed separately. But there is an important countervailing power which is inbuilt in the Mesopotamian environment. The broad outlines are too familiar to require more than a sketch. Dry-farming in the North and East, irrigation in the alluvium and a wide expanse of not nearly so degraded land as now with diminishing rainfall towards the South, eminently suitable for a way of life based on pastoralism, where desired with an admixture of arable agriculture. This pastoral world is not institutionalised, but is situated geographically in between the two types of agriculture. We are dealing with three elements which the native Mesopotamians never managed to unite in a stable manner on their own. Only in the Persian period, with, perhaps, a prelude under the Chaldeans, can we perceive clear signs of institutional participation in the herding of sheep, the prime method of exploiting the steppe. In this world the step to purely arable based subsistence is easily made by the pastoralist, especially under the pressure of adverse circumstances. Equally important is that intruders arrive not so much as individuals as as tribal groupings under their own leaders. These groupings are integrated in the regional social fabric by assigning them subsistence fields and by incorporating them in military structures. At the end of the Ur 111period these structures became too strong for the political system of the day and they took over the institution-based economy of Mesopotamia, in the process fragmenting, and in the end almost destroying it. The survival of the system is, however, more or less guaranteed by the fact that a nucleus of those interested withdraws to safe places, maintaining a tradition which can be used to pressurise the monarch of the moment to restore what has been lost. The Sippar tablet (King, BBSt 36) is, pia fraus or not, the best information available and with Charpin's migration to the North of the Ur and Uruk "clergy", but not only them, the best authentic illustration of the tenacity of those deriving their income from an institution. The urge to restore in the Chaldean period is well documented, piety is usually given as the reason, but repairing the institutional system helps to stabilise the overall economy and it is a prerequisite for future expansion. We look at the big local religious institutions which have been integrated into regional economic management systems. But there is something else, though traces are 10
I prefer to reserve the term "prebendary office" for those functions to which rights to income are attached which cover both a "remuneration" and that what is required to fulfil obligations related to the cult of the gods. Sustenance fields assigned to persons of all ranks and functions I would not call prebends.
INSTITUTIONAL AND NON-INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMY
9
scant. In the Old Babylonian period we have the private builder of an extension to a UaniS and Sullat temple (CT 6 36a). In the Neo-Babylonian period families in the capital try to retain links with the local cult owned by the family even though the income derived from this source is not really important.11 For us Mesopotamian religion is, at any rate in its economic aspect, institutionalised, but, probably, along the waterline, so to say, there is a lot of private religious entrepreneurship. The street corner chapels in Old Babylonian Ur, not in the area where Charpin's clerge' lived, can, perhaps, be seen as religion in private hands.12 Again it is difficult to draw the line between official and private. In state religion the temple relates to the king as the corner sanctuary relates to its owner in localised religion.13 The question of the income the king derived, as a person, from temple functions requires investigation. There is a kind of "third structure" parallel to palace and temple. It is connected with the palace, and the palace is inclined to avail itself of under-used temple property for this structure. It is the system whereby the government assigns land against military or other obligations. It is best known from the MuraSQarchive, but it is much older, in fact wellknown since Thureau-Dangin's short and to the point introduction to the SamaS-bazir letters.14 This system is extremely flexible and it can be used, and has been used throughout history, to solve the problem of intruders in a sedentary society. It has a clear ethnic aspect and is not restricted to the South. It is the bridge between tribalism and institutional structures. It can be used to formalise the results of a Landnahme or to mitigate the all too incisive consequences of that process. That is the interpretation which can be provided for the policies of early NB kings like Eriba-Marduk and Marduk-apaliddina in the neighbourhoods of the old towns. The Nippur texts recently published by Cole15 illustrate the chaotic situation in Southern Mesopotamia in this period, and the assumption that there was sufficient land for the execution of a policy based on distribution of land is unproblematic. The breakdown of order had made much land available. The question is whether such a policy was feasible during the Ur III period or in Hammurabi's time, when in the South the agricultural cycle had reached a high point preceding collapse. The question is that of the size of institutions compared to "economic space and opportunity in general".
2. The degree of institutionalisation It is, on reflection, hard to imagine that the complete economic and social structure of the South was institutionalised, even in the late Third Millennium when the ideology that made a whole province the legitimate domain of its main god was officially accepted. In 1 Texts from the Napp%u-family archive. VS 5 57-8, 6 89 and 117.
Cf, the two plans UE VIII Plate 124 of the AH site with that on plate 122, EM, where the clerge' had their houses; cf. D. Charpin, Le clerge' d'Ur au sibcle d'@ammurabi, Genbve-Paris 1986, 27ff. and 95ff. l 3 The term "private religion" cannot be employed here, "religion of the chapel" also has wrong connotations. It is "corner shop religion" for which I assume a local, voluntary, following, which has economically spoken, some value. l 4 RA 21 (1924), 3-6. S.W. Cole, Nippur IV: The Early Neo-Babylonian Governor's Archive from Nippur (= OIP 114), Chicago 1996, passim.
10
G. VAN DRIEL
the towns and in settled society as a whole contacts between the institutions and anyone of some means will have been inevitable. With the palace because it represents political power and taxation, with the temple because it represents religion and tithe. But especially because both institutions offer opportunities. They produce or receive goods in such quantity from producers lower down in the institutional structure that there is little room for marketing small scale surplus production, but at particular moments of the agricultural cycle they need so much labour that a possibility arises to supplement meagre subsistence income. The institutional economy requires a certain labour reserve. No landowner can do without surplus labour at the moment he needs it, but he will preferably not sustain such a population for the whole year. The size of the urban institutions needs to be addressed. All talk of these phenomena has little sense if the means to tackle the problem are not present. The degree of institutionalisation will have varied from period to period and the documentation is woefully inadequate, but not entirely hopeless. Though in themselves insufficient, the archaeological map, the BALA map and evidence like the collection of temple hymns can be fleshed out by using the within limits quantifiable institutional archives from Umma and Girsu, though the evidence is not very detailed for the North of the alluvium. It would be too subtle to attempt an adaptation of the Mari and Ebla material to include the central (palace) structures in a truly overall picture. The palace archive from Ebla deals almost exclusively with the "tributes and presents" department, the agricultural side of the Mari palace needs a comprehensive study. But the situation around 2000 BC offers at least some possibilities for an answer regarding the size of institutions - and thereby indicates the scope for the non-institutional. The second possibility is offered by the Neo-Babylonian period, but we will have to strain the evidence even more. The archaeological map, the restoration policies of the Chaldean kings and the Hof- und Staatskalender in its fragmentary state do not together cany the same weight as the earlier BALA map. The main difference between the situation around the middle of the First Millennium and that 1500 years earlier is not so much the documentation as the fact that the long term agricultural cycle is in a completely different stage.l6 Around 2000 it is culminating, certainly so if a politically induced disaster is regarded as merely the final push towards the inevitable decline which is indicated by the inability of the Southern institutions to recuperate from Samsu-iluna's crude policies. In the other case a fresh period of increasing growth started slowly towards the end of Assyrian domination. At that point institutional Southern Mesopotamia again became a tool of the royal economic expansion policy in a world which had been tribalised for over 500 years. The differences in the cycle are rather crucial when the situation of the institutions is considered, but their function in a centrally administered political system stands out all the clearer: they combine local interests with central requirements. The promotion of local interest is hardly visible in the earlier period, but that does not turn its reality into a mirage.
The suggestion that the (Southern) Mesopotamian economy (and urban way of life) goes through a number of cycles, which are more or less recognisable since the Uruk period, cannot be elucidated here. The idea is utterly dependent on the archaeological surveys, that is Adams, with occasional, but vital, bolstering up by textual material, notably that of the Ur I11 and Neo-Babylonian periods. During the meeting W. Jongman qualified the fact that the Mesopotamian agrarian economy is not a stable uniform phenomenon as an element of the longue durte, I yet regard these unstable, geographically shifting developments as a subject worthy of attention.
INSTITUTIONAL AND NON-INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMY
11
The economic nature of the institutions will have remained, or rather will have become, again, very similar. The basics are the same. The institution is a big landowner, with more land than it can cope with. For the production of the basic staple product, barley, it uses teams of men and oxen. Basically an ox team has four oxen, or, in the earlier period, "donkeys", and in the seeding period requires four men, of whom one, probably, can be a boy. In the later period the size of the team is standardised. In the earlier period it is a fairly informal, possibly local, family based structure, an aspect that has not disappeared in the later period, when the size of the institutional team has become an accounting unit with a fixed complement. The team has (more or less) standard sized fields at its disposal on which fixed amounts of seed are used. The relations between the size of the field and the amount of seed are determined by the system of volume measurements obtaining in the respective periods. Though the size of the yield (in both periods expressed as a seed to yield relation, to a certain neglect of other costs), is a matter of heated debate, it is "considerable", but, it is my impression, "more considerable" in the earlier than in the later period. In the documented cases a direct seed to yield relation of one to ten is presumably a more or less guaranteed minimum in the earlier period, but not nearly so generally attained in the second. In the later period the production of dates probably compensates for this negative difference. Barley and dates are by then often used in equal proportions, which is clearly not the case in the earlier period. This probably means that a higher overall productivity per head could be attained. The institution produces a surplus with relatively restricted means, and authorities are keen to expand the production, in both periods. Especially in the earlier period the local, provincial institutional economy, seems ideologically identical with the local divine estate, if we may interpret Ur-Nammu's assignation of provinces to their divine overlords. In this way there is a direct link between the monarch and the backbone of the local economy. In the second period the situation in both Sippar and Uruk remains unclear. There are indications of the existence of "secular", administrative institutions in both towns, but it is difficult to assess their importance. The surplus produced by the institutions does not only sustain the cult, that is the local interests, but is also partially transferred for central purposes. The institutional structure and the surplus make the institution an attractive partner for the central authorities. The structure can be used as a source of organised manpower, while the importance of access to the surplus needs no explanation. The Chaldean restoration politics had more to them than nostalgia for former religious practise.
3. The earlierperiod ("Ur 111 to Samsu-iluna "): the size of the system This attempt rests on two assumptions. The first is that the Ur 111 archives of Umma and Girsu are representative of the two complete provinces, that the ENSI'S administered the entire institutional sector, and that there is, for instance, not a particularly important additional section of the economy directly administered by the (local) royal palace. The second is that we must be willing to transform the local evidence from the period into one institutional map covering the whole country.
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G. VAN DRIEL
The first assumption is based on the idea that the Ur I11 kings confirmed the local heads of the pantheon as formal "owners" of their province,l7 which meant in practise that the management of the total institutional section was transferred, or rather assigned to the local governor. Developments may occur which lead to the emergence of a royal section of the economy, but there are no clear signs that this section was sizeable in the provinces from which we have information. The second is not without risks but it is the only way to use the available evidence for our purpose. The institutions of Southern Mesopotamia are best known from the Tello and Djocha archives. Their strength is the cereal surplus produced on ample land with limited manpower and investment. As in the first millennium, the institutions were restricted in their possibilities to expand the land under direct exploitation, probably due to the limitations imposed by manpower, which would presuppose a reluctance to enter the unfree status which work in the institution implies. The role of indebtedness in maintaining the institutional labour force remains to be investigated, from at least Umma there is a notable number of texts which should be explored. The production of the surplus depends on the use of the seeder plough and its team. The amount of land which can be tilled with this plough can be put at between six and seven BUR, depending on the amount of additional land granted as maintenance land and which was tilled in the well-known extensive manner by the team. Seven BUR is a reasonable practical limit, i.e. 45 ha. The number of plough teams is known with some certainty for Umma and for LagaS. In Umma there are 17318 institutional teams and in LagaS 420,lg these numbers may be increased by some 10 to 20 in each case but that is of marginal importance. In LagaS, numbers of 480 and 600 teams found in certain texts are administrative speculation.20 The 173 teams of Umma at 45 ha each, till 7740 ha, requiring double, 15480 ha, if fallow is included. In LagaS 420 teams need 18900 per annum, or 37800 inclusive of fallow. Umma has only one real urban centre and in ApiSal a more rural district. In LagaS we have institutions based in three or four centres, Girsu, Nina with nearby LagaS and Guabba. The geographical position of Guabba is not known with sufficient certainty, which makes, together with the general uncertainties about the eastern borders, an estimate concerning the total surface area of LagaS a somewhat risky affair. The situation concerning Umma is somewhat better, though it is complicated by the presence of Jidr (WS 4) and the uncertainties about ApiSal. A minimum estimate of 105.000 ha seems reasonable, but this is no more than a minimum. Of these the Umma institutions require, as, stated, 15480 ha. Even if the Umma reed fields cover half the area, a considerable amount of land remains. LagaS is probably much bigger than Umma, but relatively spoken its districts have even fewer institutional teams and therefore even more room for non-institutional agriculture, at subsistence level or otherwise. In the BALAsystem LagaS normally carries a burden of three months to Urnma's one. There is in both provinces all the space needed for military or other groups systematically provided with maintenance land and also for the estates of high ranking persons partially visible in DuSabara or, in the Akkad period, in the Mesag archive.21 l7
Texts published by F.R. Kraus, ZA 51 (1955), 45f, cf. his discussion p. 65f. An attempt at the reconstruction of the economic size of institutional Umma is in press with AfO. l 9 TUT5. 20 Respectively Maekawa, ASJ 9 (1987), 11lf, text 52 and text 53. 21 Cf. below, p.16f.
INSTITUTIONAL AND NON-INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMY
13
The BALA system is a crude tool to measure economic size. Its workings are incompletely known and with present knowledge even in the alluvium important political and economic centres are excluded: Ur, Uruk and Nippur. It can hardly be imagined that, for instance, Ur did not contribute to the (state) cult in the town.22 Each of the three towns possessed at least the potential of the individual LagaS economic districts or of Umma, especially Ur and Uruk rather more than less. Uruk and Ur are, like LagaS and to a somewhat lesser extent also Umma, big provinces. LagaS had to serve, as stated, for three BALA periods against Umma's one. A crude calculation supposes that 420 plus 173 plough teams produce enough surplus, in the field of arable agriculture, for a four month period. Thus 148 plough teams have to provide the surplus, excluding other requirements, needed for one month of the BALA. One team tills 7 BUR (45 ha), and needs another 45 ha for fallow, which for 148 teams gives 13820 ha, an area with a radius of little more than 6.5 krns, virtually a town with its surroundings, a one and a half hour's walk across, if all the land could be used. Discounting for the moment the LagaS towns, Umma and the privileged cities, 15 localities in the alluvium were involved in the B A L A . ~Many ~ of these towns (and probably others), will only have born a share of a month's burden, not only on account of LagaS' triple obligations, but also because towns like 1sim-Sulgi, ASnun and Susa participated (occasionally). If we attribute to these 15 towns on average half the potential we calculated as required for an Umma-Girsu-type month we arrive at a relative strength of 74 teams each, with, inclusive of fallow 13.320 ha, an area with a radius of 4.6 km. Whatever the many flaws of this reasoning, it supports the proposition that the land requirements for arable agriculture of the institutions which formed the economic core of the Ur 111political system were by no means excessive: 253.080 ha including fallow. That includes the 420 teams of LagaS, the 173 of Umma and the estimates for the other BALA towns but not Ur, Uruk and Nippur. An area of 50x50 km, plus, let us say, a quarter of that area for the potential of the privileged cities. The combined institutions use only a small part of the land available. The rural economy is not synonymous with the institutional economy. Not in the North, but also not in the South of the alluvium.
4. The later period: Neo-Babylonian uncertainties If we attempt something similar for the Neo-Babylonian period, we do not have the help of a structure like the BALA. Nor can we propose with as much certainty that local institution(s) are equivalent to the local civil administration. The archives available deal with the daily administrative routine of the temples as a whole, not with economic aspects alone. The Hof- und Staat~kalender,~~ - which is though as a matter of fact a misnomer -, suggests a considerable difference in structure between official Ur I11 and official NB society, but is incomplete. In the list, the high-ranking officials of the central 22 It would be interesting to know how the rebuilding of the Sara temple in Umma was financed. This was obviously a royal project in view of the fact that the occurrence is commemorated in a year name. Neighbours Ur and Umk may have contributed. 23 Agade, Adab, Apiak, Babili, Gudua, HA.A, Isin, Kazallu, KiS, Marad, PUS, Sippar, Suruppak, Urusagrig (Sarrakam), and Ckxuki. 24 E. Unger, Babylon, die heilige Stadt, Berlin 1931, text no. 26 col. IV (p. 285-6).
14
G . VAN DRIEL
administration are followed by eleven high-ranking persons with an in the main tribal background, but among them is the BAR (Sangii) of Der, who seems to act as a regional grandee, on a par with the tribal leaders. The next passage originally mentioned 12 &BAR'S, as far as preserved in tribal areas, especially in Bit-Jakin: Limitu, MadakalSa, Kullabi, Kissik, which might suggest that this tribal area was undergoing a reinstitutionalisation process. Among the places mentioned is Larsa, a town about which the few known facts suggests that it was not exceptionally successful and required support from other institutions, notably Uruk. The final passage in the "Staatskalender" originally listed 9 be1 piqitti's and qgpu's, of whom at any rate the last will have been royal representatives at "institutions". We arrive at a total of 32 "authorities", of whom the ten most important are tribal leaders. We will have to conclude that the Southern "institutions" will have been of local importance only, with the possible exception of Larsa, not thriving, Ur and Uruk, all targets for the royal restoration policy. Where names are preserved it is difficult to locate them, both on the map and in the written sources. Moving to the North we find on the archaeological map first Marad and Nippur, KiS (or rather Uursagkalamma), the triad Dilbat, Borsippa, Babylon with Kutfi and finally Sippar, also to all probability a restoration. The simple list is sufficient to exclude the possibility that so few centres could manage a dominant institutional economy. The size of the personnel of the Sippar temple, the best known in the North, has been cautiously estimated recently by H. Bongenaar: "several times the number of people concerned with the temple worked for it outside". In town we find some 340 as a kind of maximum, that would be any number between 1000 and 2000 for those outside.25 That does not suggest a domineering position. But Sippar, with its iangii in stead of a iatammu, was not, to all probability, a big institution. What is also evident is that central authorities were desperately interested in increasing institutional performance. The institutions had, as earlier, far more land than they could cope with. But this has been discussed too often. Where they can, central authorities use the institutions, as they did earlier, to obtain a share in the regional production, but they needed outsiders to increase the total volume and thereby the share.
5. The status of the village We have reduced the role of the institutions, but not robbed it of its contents, far from it. The institution is a tool of governance par excellence, producing a sizeable surplus. But whether temple or palace, the institution has its limits, probably due to the degree of integration of the different levels of the organisation possible with the means of the time. What is the alternative to the institution in an agrarian society? The strength of the institution is its surplus. It is produced by its plough teams, which constitute the core of the almost invisible institutional village. Are there other villages than those that belong to 25 This would seem somewhat optimistic in view of Jursa's conclusion that Ebabbar could field no more than some 30-40 plough teams, though with a considerable date plantation complement. Herding may have been relatively important. Long after the meeting H. Bongenaar told me that he is convinced that 1000 to 2000 persons seriously overrates the personnel of the temple in the countryside, notably because I include the prebendaries (in the town) in the personnel of which there are several times as many outside, which he does not. His figure is 600-1000. This does not affect my way of reasoning, actually supports it.
INSTITUTIONAL AND NON-INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMY
15
the institutions? In an agrarian society most people will live close to their land and settlements that are exclusively agrarian can be regarded as villages, though it is difficult to draw a line between what is a town and what is a village. The arbitrary distinction that a settlement of more than 10 ha26 can be called a town is no more than that and it does not imply that most inhabitants did not live off the land which is within immediate reach. In view of the fact that most people live in villages the minimal nature of the available evidence is striking. Yet the village is of considerable importance for the inhabitants. The status of the village determines how the villager has access to the land from which he or she lives. A village of which the inhabitants live from subsistence agriculture will not easily appear in the Ancient Mesopotamian documentation. In the third millennium institutional archives the village is not very visible. It is hidden behind the ).DUB or KI.SUR.RA, silo and threshing floor, which are for the bureaucrats of LagaS and Umma the more visible structures in the countryside on which, with the fields, the administration is based. The village behind the DUB and the KI.SUR.RA consists of a number of plough teams of unequal size and structure which each represent a number of families, who more often than not will also be related to one another. Institutional agricultural production is family based, even though that is not explicitly indicated by the texts. The Ur III plough team is not the neat four men construct of the NB period, it is rather what the family can provide in male persons capable of doing work. The unequal strength of Akkad period teams indicates differences in work load, whether this is also the fact for the Ur 111 teams needs investigation. That the nominal workloads differ is certain, but the net effect is not so clear. In the "round tablets"27 too much land, that is much more than the seven BZTR mentioned, means that it cannot be worked and has no yield. The plough team and the village fulfil the important role of coping with the consequences of the fact that every family passes through a natural cycle which affects the relation between the number of workers and non-workers. This is an important fact to which any agricultural society will have to find an answer. The Northern village will not be considered here, it has to wait until spring when the third MOS symposium will deal with Northern agriculture. But in the North the village is much more recognisable than in the South where threshing floors, silo's, plough teams and date plantations hide it. For the question of the institutional versus the noninstitutional agriculture the owner of the individual village is of crucial importance. Though the information is of limited scope, it is evident that not all villages where institutionally owned.
26 27
R.McC. Adams, Heartland of Cities, Chicago 1981, 76. G. Pettinato, Texte zur Verwaltung der Landwirtschaft in der Ur-ZZZ Zeit (= AnOr 4 3 , Rome 1969, with additional material published by K. Maekawa, ASJ 4 (1982), text 20-23.
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G. VAN DFUEL
6. Individual villages A. Sagub: the Mesag estate28 Steinkeller-Postgate 35 locates at least one of the holdings of the Mesag estate in Sagub, which belongs to the LagaS area. The text deals with seed and fodder provided to six persons who can be identified as the heads of plough teams and who return, at least some of them, in BIN 8 182, where seed, fodder and rations of six teams are listed in a sadly damaged text. BIN 8 122, 123 and 131 have been studied by Foster apud Weiss, 119-123.29 The three texts contain summaries which combine land, seed and fodder and personnel costs. Of these texts only BIN 8 123 preserves the complete passage concerned. 28 BUR of land require 56 kor of seed and fodder, that is 2 kor per BUR. In BIN 8 131 54 BUR require 135 kor in seed and fodder, 2,5 kor per BUR. In BIN 8 122 we have 33.1.0 land and 80 kor in seed and fodder, 2.2.0 kor per BUR. In all three cases we can, perhaps, expect that some of the women and all the older girls of the plough team families worked in other estate departments. BIN 8 203 combines 72 IKU of domain land and 18 IKU of sustenance land, in total 5 BUR as the task to be fulfilled by one plough team.30 In Steinkeller-Postgate 35 six heads of teams receive in barley wheat and emrner a total of 105.2.4 kor, which at a rate of 750 S ~ L Aper BUR, the highest amount mentioned as seed and fodder in BIN 8 131, is sufficient for over 42 B ~ J Rof land. This suggests that the actual workload for a plough team is about 7 BUR, which equals the practical obligations of an Ur ID team. However, BIN 8 182 is sufficiently well preserved to notice that an ordinary team consists of four men or three men and a boy plus one woman, but the fourth and fifth teams consist of more people: respectively 5 men, 2 boys and 3 women and 8 men, 1 boy and 2 women. Though the amounts of seed and fodder provided are not generally preserved, the total amounts to 56 k ~ r , of ~ lwhich team 4 received 14 kor and team 6 7 kor. Team 4 is one of the big teams, if we assume that teams 4 and 5 each get 14 kor and the others 7 each, we arrive at the total of 56 kor given. This type of reasoning finds support in Steinkeller-Postgate 35 where out of the six teams numbers one and three receive about double the amount the others get.32 The conclusion must be that six teams together have the capacity of eight. As they use seven kor in seed and fodder combined 28 B.R. Foster, Administration and Use of Institutional Land in Sargonic Sumer (= Mesopotamia 9), Copenhagen 1982, 52-69; S.J. Bridges, The Mesag archive, diss. Yale 1981; B.R. Foster in H. Weiss, The Origins of Cities, Guilford 1986, 109ff; P. Steinkeller and J.N. Postgate, Third-Millennium Legal and Administrative Texts in the Iraq Museum, Baghdad (= Mesopotamian Civilisations 4), Winona Lake 1992, nos 33-45. 29 The personnel varies wildly: BIN 8 123: 56 men, 8 boys capable of work, 26 women and 10 young children, boys and girls. Older girls are not listed. 131: only 22 men, though 24 women, 14 elder boys and 22 smaller boys and girls are included elsewhere in the text. In BIN 8 122 the passage on the personnel is incomplete, but we have 46 men, 19 women, 7 elder boys and an unknown number of smaller children. Not unexpectedly there are more persons than those immediately needed for the teams. The low number of women, unless it indicates high female mortality, suggests employment for another account. 30 BIN 8 144, Mugdan, gives 30 B ~ as R a task for 5 ploughs. Cf. Foster, BiOr 40 (1983), 301-2. This is the amount mentioned in BIN 8 123. 32 The teams cannot be exactly the same: Ur-sipad in Steinkeller-Postgate35 has a double team and in BIN 8 182 an ordinary one.
INSTITUTIONAL AND NON-INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMY
17
per unit it is unlikely that they till more than 40 BUR in BIN 8 122. We must revise our opinion that an Akkad period team tills 7 BUR, based on Steinkeller-Postgate 35, as two of the six teams have double capacity. About 5 B ~ isR the real workload but perhaps we must add the sustenance land of the team itself (and of various supervisors?). The estate directly employs about 32 men and boys and 8 women in the village plough teams. This suggests that there is at any rate a considerable additional female labour force in the village.33 As Foster, Mesopotamia 9,63 has stressed, according to BIN 8 291 Mesag seems to hold in the LagaS area 65.1.1 land qualified as G A N A . S A ~ ~ . and A ~ ~134.2.0 SUKU land, in total 200.0.1 land. If that had to be tilled in the same year it would require 40 teams. With 50% fallow we would still need 20 teams. If this constituted Mesag's private assets he would be a considerable landholder. But there are many difficulties. Foster has analysed BIN 8 122, 123 and 131 apud Weiss. The problem is that the amounts shipped to Akkad (explicitly so BIN 8 122 I1 1) and the amounts SE B.A (in BIN 8 122 and 131) cannot be brought into a meaningful relation. In BIN 8 122 we would have a yield35of 13 plus kor per BUR and in BIN 8 122 almost 35 kor, and delivery to Akkad would amount to a yield of 19 BUR and 23 BUR respectively. Anyhow Mesag's holdings in Sagub makes this village one of the best documented, even though the juridical status of the relationship between Mesag and the village remains unclear.36 NBC 1026937 differentiates between domain land, sustenance land of Mesag and sustenance land of others, including the heads of the plough teams. This is more or less what is found in an ordinary estate but for the fact that the remuneration of the manager, 20% of the domain, is specified separately and not included in the domain. His is not a fixed income but a share which finally depends on the results. B . DuZabara: "private" estates and sustenancefields The activities of Ur-Meme in DuSabara have been considered several times and they can hardly be regarded as strictly private. Ur-Meme manages four estates, those of AmarSin, Lugal-kuzu, Nin-mizida and Sat-~uenin the years SS 1-5.38 At any rate Amar-Sin has disappeared by this time and the possibility that we are dealing with estates that have 33
BIN 8 131 mentions 54 B ~ R which , could suggest 11 teams, as there are 11 men who receive 0.1.2, the number 10 for the second wage category given as a collation by Foster apud Weiss, 122 can hardly be correct as 21 men are anyhow insufficient for the number of teams required, even with the 14 boys (line I1 3'). In BIN 8 122 we would have 46 men in 6.5 teams, and in BIN 8 123 land for 7.5 teams with 58 men and 6 boys. This type of estate had ample manpower. Cf. Foster apud Weiss, 123-4 quoting an unpublished text. Cf. Foster, CRRAI 33, Paris 1987, 57ff. 34 Foster, Mesopotamia 9, 58 "leased"; Steinkeller and Postgate (see note 28): "purchased". 35 Foster estimates the return at 20 times seed plus fodder, but if the texts deal with "real facts" this procedure is not acceptable. It is striking that BIN 8 122 mentions exactly 100 BE. There is something artificial to some of the texts, which puts them in the sphere of "planning". 36 For the various types of seed available to a team cf. Bridges, The Mesag archive, diss. Yale 1981, 475 (NBC 10196). For the various fields BIN 8 184, 188, 191, 194, 195, 196, 199, 201, 248, 291, etc. 37 Bridges, ibidem, 477, quoted Foster, BiOr 40 (1983), 301-2. 38 I regard NATN 480 (SS 8) and NATN 449 (Ni 12 VII IS 2 with NATN 452 Ni 25 VII IS 2) as not belonging to the DuSabara file. NATN 449 contains a frequently occurring Urnma field name.
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G. VAN DRIEL
reverted to the (royal) central administration should be considered. Ur-Meme's title of SABRAand the regular occurrence of DUB.SAR seals, among them that of Ur-Meme's son ~ r - S u m a bsuggest an official status. The name of the son points to Nippur, but a text like TuM NF 1-2 171 (SS 5) situates the holdings of the estates firmly in the Girsu province. TuM NF 1-2 271 (NSGU 209 I1 L 11061,ZA 53, 62-3) belongs to the procedure which settles Ur-Meme's account. Though obviously located in the Girsu ambience, many texts are dated to months belonging to the "Reichskalender", but the texts are published in a context which makes Nippur almost certainly the place of origin. The attribution of certain of the texts to the Drehem and LagaS collections in Istanbul is unproblematic in view of the "rationalistic" procedures applied (and perhaps other problems) in the Istanbul collection. Perhaps we can regard Ur-Meme as an administrator who is put in charge of agricultural estates which suddenly become available and the status of which needed to be sorted out. The importance of the DuSabaraLJr-Memegroup is that it shows that this type of appanage-like private estates is run along the same lines observed in the institutional estates under the responsibility of the ENSI'S of Umma and Lagag, while also indicating the manner in which private and official affairs are inextricably intertwined. Ur-Meme rents land and provides credit. The contracts concerning the renting of land have been studied by F.R. Kraus and H. Waetzoldt.39 In SS 5, when Ur-Meme was still active in the Girsu area, they deal with the renting of the sustenance fields of various people in the dSulpae-field. These persons transfer their fields to Ur-Meme, who is in the position to provide credit,40 and by inference, has at his command the means to exploit the fields even though they are far from his presumed home-base in Nippur. Already in SS 4 he took over two fields of one BUR each from two different persons, who, if we follow TuM NF 1-2 248 also for 246, are scribes. A sustenance field of one B ~ J Ris what is assigned to a scribe of the rank of DUB.SAR GUD, who is over a number of (two) NU.BANDA GUD'S. If these scribes really have an agrarian background it is remarkable that even they prefer to lease their land to someone else. The relation between the leasing of the S u K u fields and the provision of credit by UrMeme is particularly clear in TuM NF 1-2 254 (IX SS 5). As Kraus has pointed out UrMeme here operates in a military context. In PD 927 (XI1 SS 5) the barley provided for twelve persons against the ordinary commercial interest of 33 113% is received by NigBaba, the DUB.SAR BREN.NA, and Niginna, the ENGAR BREN.NA, probably the person who is in charge of the plough team which is responsible for the cultivation of the SUKU fields, is a frequent witness in the Ur-Meme contracts.41 The last months of SS 5 seem to have been difficult for the personnel depending on sustenance fields in the area where UrMeme operated. This gives those capable of providing credit their edge. This is probably a recurrent theme. The availability of credit, however onerous, but therefore with an ever increasing grip, probably also ties the institutional personnel to the institution. 39
WdO 8 (1975-76), 185-205; WdO 9 (1977-78), 201-205. NATN 465, TuM 112 79, TuM 112 45 (XI SS 5 with remark on the restitution), TuM 112 48, PD 924, NATN 476 etc. 41 There is in general little information on the manner in which the cultivation of SUKU fields assigned to vocational groups is organised. The Ubarm archive from $upur-Subula shows some of the practicalities. The DuSabara ENGAR BREN.NAsuggests another type of solution in which this ENGAR with an institution type team could cultivate, for instance, some 18 one-I%E SUKU lots plus his own field if his practical task is put at the "normal" 7 B ~ R . 40
INSTITUTIONAL AND NON-INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMY
19
C . The Larsa "Balmunamhe"villages
T. Breckwoldt has recently discussed a group of texts which deal with barley produced in a group of villages in the neighbourhood of Larsa in the years RS 4 to 13.42 Among these villages are the dimtu of Balmunamhe and a village named after Balmunaae's father (Al-)shin-n~r-mlim. Breckwoldt is not very forthcoming on the status of this group of texts. On p. 70 she seems to suggest that we should consider the possibility that Balmunambe does not act as a private landowner and on p. 77, with a question mark, she suggests that the person addressed by (the plough team manager) $illi-SamaS in the obviously related letters in TCL 17, AbB 1 and 9 is Balmunamhe. The question of the status of the texts has been touched upon by Van de Mieroop43 in his article on the Balmunambe archive, where YOS 8 42 (IX RS 23, later than the administrative texts) is taken as confirming the rights of the Balmunambe family to the dimtu named after him. The text is incomplete, but we must probably accept that Balmun-e is a big landowner. The total number of plough teams is not excessive, and perhaps the most important aspect is not the status of the villages concerned, but the manner in which Larsa plough teams are treated. The tabulated text YBC 5585 (25 I1 RS 10; Breckwoldt, AfO 42-3, 801) lists a total of 11 teams in the villages Dimat-Balmunde, KA.AN, a-sin-n~r-m5tim and Sirimtum, who if we accept the final total given by the text, produce on average just over 202 kor each. This is considerable. YOS 5 181 (XI1 RS 7) mentions the same 11 teams but skips Sirimtum and again suggests a yield of just over 200 kor per team. YOS 5 187, of the same date, tells us that in ~ l - 1 S k u n - ~and a ~l-Abisarethere were in that year four more teams. This land owner employed 15 teams. The Larsa plough teams seem to have been treated differently from what is the (reconstructed) institutional Ur III practise in LagaS and Umma where yields are lower. A small group of texts in YOS 1444seems to set standard targets for individual t e a m ~ : ~ 5 one team has to till 6 BUR and to deliver for each BUR 40 kor of barley. YOS 5 164 (21 V WS 12) is even more exacting: 10 BUR and 480 kor: 48 kor per BUR plus delivery in By Ur I11 standards these targets are considerable, but they give the plough team a certain interest in maximising the yield since a high, but fixed, amount has to be delivered.47 Measured against these standards Ur I11 and NB institutional yields seem low and the desire to improve performance all the more understandable. But we do not 42
T. Breckwoldt, AfO 42-3 (1995-6), 64-88. AfO 34 (1987), 18-9. D. Charpin, BiOr 36 (1979), 198-9: "Archives W". YOS 14 305 mentions payment to the palace. Presumably at the outset of the new agricultural year, rather than just before the harvest. Cf. also Riftin 60 (19 VI ki 2 RS 31): 8 B ~ has R to deliver 300 kor, 37.5 per B ~ Rin, this case with a plough team of six oxen. 47 How is a matter of speculation, one could think of reducing the distance between the furrows thus increasing the amount of seed used. This would probably reduce the yield per furrow somewhat, but it would increase the labour input and probably the overall yield, though the ratio between seed and yield deteriorates. YOS 5 181 and 184 allow per team 45 kor in seed and fodder. The amount of land is not given, but if 40 kor can be delivered from a B ~ of R land the area sown can hardly be much more than 5 BBR, unless the incentive is the possibility of tilling more and delivering only for a stipulated area. In Ur I11 seed and fodder are directly related, here we must conclude that the Larsa oxen are much better fed and probably much more capable of work, all the more so because each team receives 3 kor in tablittu.
43 44 45 46
20
INSTITUTIONAL AND NON-INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMY
G. VAN D R E L
21
know the amount of land really under the plough in the Balmunaae villages, nor the real strength in animals of the teams.
Halballa has recently been the subject of an extensive study by St01.~8He calls the place a town, but the regular invocation of the town of Sippar in the oath formulas suggests that we are dealing with a dependent settlement administratively belonging to "Sippar". The texts derive from private archives "excavated" in Sippar and deal with land and houses which are sold, given as shares or inherited or involved in litigation. Of special interest is the A.GAR.EBLE, as DeKiere has established with certainty a "field consisting of parcels of one ESE each", every time 2.16 ha.49 In itself this points to a division of land, but that will go back to a period before the date of the Old Babylonian texts in our possession, as the field occurs already in MHET 9 (= CT 8 47a) dating to Immerum. Stol, Fs Romer, 421-2 points out that there are indications for activities by the Ur I11 kings, notably Sulgi in this strategically important area, in dike building and accompanying that, the digging of irrigation canals. If we combine the available evidence Halballa could be regarded as a settlement which has changed from a primarily military colony, with soldiers tilling uniform parcels according to their rank, into one which contains a group of well-to-do citizens who have acquired sufficient status to send their daughters to the Sippar gagam, which in itself, presumably, helps to consolidate family possessions. These people are active in the further development of the agricultural potential of the area as canal names like I-/-AkSak-gimil (MHET 1111 81 and 82) and Atappu-Xin-pi-Sin (MHET 1115 606) suggest. There are clear indications of a military presence. CT 6 20a (Si 29) mentions A.SA AGA.US.MES, "fields of the gendarmes" and fields of each time 3 IKu. A "house of the AGA.US'S"also 0ccurs.5~Stol, Fs Romer, 428 suggests that soldiers may have received unused land in the period from which we have the texts. In BM 22703 AGA.USnasifzum are mentioned, who could possibly protest against a decision of the court of burgomaster and elders of ualballa.5l In Halhalla the burgomaster is a rabiiinum. He is, as St01 stresses, also "the man of Halhalla" and he can be the NU.BANDA of Halhalla (p. 435). This means, for me, that we are in the borderland of the tribal, the military and the ordinary, incorporated, settled way of life, exemplified by the naditu-daughters. The AGA.US'Sstill desert. In this village the non-institutional, originally non-sedentary world still impinges on the sedentary "military parallel structure". This still is Rowton's dimorphic society in the heartland of the Babylon kingdom.
The Ubarrum a r ~ h i v e 5tells ~ us something about the practical operation of a settlement consisting of soldiers who are engaged in active service and where the process of splitting up of the holdings is just beginning. Both fulfilment of the duties and the performance of the agricultural work attached to the holding are subject of litigation, conducted before the superiors of the unit concerned. The holder of the sustenance field on which the obligation rests is, like many of his colleagues and especially superiors, about whom we are less well informed, a small scale agricultural entrepreneur and provider of credit. F. The Nippur area in the Kassite period Fig. 34 in Adams' Heartland demonstrates the replacement of a town-based way of life in Southern Mesopotamia by one based on villages in the second half of the Second Millennium. The little that is published from the Kassite period Nippur agricultural archive dealing with a number of villages at not too great a distance of the town suggests an agricultural estate that is managed through the hazannu's from the villages. The coincidence of civil administration and estate management is what would be of interest from the general point of view. The village hazannu seems to play a crucial role in the system.53 It is regrettable that the bulk of the material remains inaccessible.
G. The Neo-Babylonian village The village in the Neo-Babylonian period is almost undocumented. That the Uruk Eanna estate consists of a tight web of villages has been demonstrated in an effective manner by Ms C0cquerillat.5~The expansion of the date culture will have increased the need for a village based way of life even more than the plough team based manner of arable agriculture. For Sippar cf. M. Jursa's valuable collection of material.55 A village based structure of agricultural exploitation must also lie behind the hapu organised way of land holding which provided the MuraSti's with their entrepreneurial opportunities. The only real village archive we possess is that from Satir, published by Joannbs.56 Though few in number, the texts tells us of a village of holders of bow-fiefs, who seem to have considerable freedom in arranging the roster of duties (text 3 1) and who own other land (no. 32), which is not burdened by special obligations. On top of that they are involved in the local temple of Be1 of Satir, to which prebendary rights pertain, which can 52
48 49
M. Stol, Fs Riimer (= AOAT 253), Miinster 1998, 415-445. L. DeKiere, NAPR 10 (1996), 3, where also a field name BURA is treated, and a possible 0.1.3field (with unknown reading) is discussed. All such names refer to a share out of land of some form. 50 Stol, Fs Romer, 428 note 33, where R. Harris' proposition that AkSaja AGA.US is the ancestor of the best documented Hallplla family is registered without further comment. M. Stol, Fs Romer, 444-5.
E. Sollberger, JCS 5 (1951), 77ff; E. Szlechter, JCS 7 (1953), 81ff and B. Landsberger, JCS 9 (1955), 121ff and JCS 10 (1956), 39. 53 The role of the rural hazannu's and gugallu's in general requires more attention. The NeoBabylonian gugallu has a supervisory role regarding (institutional) villages. 54 D. Cocquerillat, Palmeraies et cultures de 1'Eanna d'Uruk (559-520) (= ADFU 8), Berlin 1968, l4ff and, especially, RA 75 (1981), 151-169; RA 77 (1983), 163-168. 55 AfO Beiheft 25, Wien 1995, Anhang p. 199ff, and the observations on, especially, p. 237. 56 F. Joannss, TBBR, 86-107.
G. VAN DRIEL
be farmed out (no. 35). In three texts we find three types of property belonging to members of the military parallel structure who are involved in the local cult. 7. Conclusion
'
1 L
We are reasonably well informed on the institutional way of land holding in Southern Mesopotamia and on the manner in which that provides opportunities for the entrepreneur. We know much less about the "military parallel structure" by which the palace incorporates alien ethnic elements into society and remunerates groups of personnel collectively. The constant presence of aliens is the logical result of Mesopotamia's geographical situation at the hinge of rain-fed and irrigation agriculture where non-sedentary pastoralism has its proper place, and provides a natural counter weight against an institutionalised way of life which produces the surplus on which Mesopotamia's urban society rests. We cannot escape from the reality that much land in Mesopotamia was held against special obligations. The parallel structure has its own entrepreneurs. Those who, to quote St01,5~"go harvesters" probably find their place here, they are probably identical with those who are able to provide credit. The Old Babylonian military who enter into agricultural partnership contracts also belong to this parallel structure. The access to labour is the all-important ingredient. Ethnic aspects may play a role, but the ability to provide credit is at least as important. This requires more study. In the Third Millennium not all documented rural settlements are institution dominated, though in cases like that of Sagub and DuSabara a similarity in structure between the institutional plough team organisation and the organisation of large estates kept by the aristocracy and perhaps returning at a certain interval to the centrally administered royal domain can be surmised, at least. The scattered domains of the aristocracy are locally managed. Mesag possibly owns land but he definitely participates in the exploitation of other men's fields. Ur-Meme is a typical example of a manager of other man's land, as are in their way, in the Achaemenid period the MuraSO's. But UrNuska is more institutional than the MuraSO's, he is a manager who extends his business by leasing land. The MuraSO's operate in a world where the aristocratic estates of members of the dynasty are not the only element determining land use. They operate in a world where ethnic or vocational groups hold land that is assigned to the group by the crown against a combination of services and payments. The MuraSO type entrepreneur takes over the obligations and gets the land free from further burdens. The most notable fact about the manner in which they manage their affairs is that they shift from two-oxen teams to the more institutional four-oxen teams. The type of payment by assignation of land is, of course, of all periods, it is used to maintain an army, and an army has to procreate in order to continue its existence. In assigning land the problem of infiltrating new ethnic groups can be solved by incorporating them in the army. But a system based on the assignation of land invariably changes, loosing its importance, especially if the (military) situation which created it changes. Non-institutional and non-land-division villages will occur in documents if their owners, or owners having a share in them, feel the need to document their property rights. 57
M . Stol, Studies in Old Babylonian History, Istanbul 1976, 99-101.
INSTITUTIONAL AND NON-INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMY
23
This seems to be the case in the North, not discussed here. Such villages may occur in tax or tithe documents, but these are extremely scarce. Other villages may remain totally undocumented, especially in completely tribal areas. The surplus on which Southern Mesopotamian urbanised society rests is produced by plough team based estates which own and operate the teams against little more than "seed and fodder". The role of the agricultural entrepreneur is to expand the plough team system at the margins, thus increasing the surplus. But this production "against seed and fodder" in the institutions and against a share in the yield outside them is not identical with the whole (Southern) agricultural economy. In the military parallel structure the entrepreneur also finds his opportunity in the reducing of the operation costs for the landholders by taking over at cost price the unoccupied land for which service is due. That there is not at the bottom, if not at the base of this all, a simple, but undocumented, subsistence sector is, for me, unthinkable.
RELATIONS ENTRE INTE&TS PRIVES ET BIENS DES SANCTUAIRES A L'EPOQUE &o-BABYLONIENNE
L'Ctude des relations entre intCrCts privCs et biens des sanctuaires B 1'Cpoque nCobabylonienne qui est presentee dans cette communication, dans le cadre du thbme gCnCral de ce colloque: "Interdependance des Institutions et des Entrepreneurs privCsl" envisage un certain nombre de questions telles que l'importance quantitative de ces relations, mais aussi le sens prkdominant dans lequel elles s'ktablissent - de la sphbe privCe vers les temples ou des temples vers les intCrCts prives - et enfin de la forme plus ou moins institutionnalisCe que prennent ces relations et de 1'Cventuelle presence d'entreprises privies tout B fait indkpendantes. Le corpus choisi comme champ d'Ctude de ces relations s'est appuyC sur deux types d'archives Cmanant de lieux differents: celles de 1'Eanna d'Uruk, qui fournissent une documentation homogbne B partir du rbgne de Nabuchodonosor 11, et celles de la rCgion de Borsippa et de Dilbat, qui permettent une approche des entreprises familiales. Du point de vue chronologique, le champ de cette Ctude concerne la pCriode nCo-babylonienne au sens large, des 72meet 62me sibcles av.J.-C. Une analyse rapide de la documentation nCo-babylonienne montre clairement que s'il existe deux grands types d'archives de la pratique, celles des grands organismes, essentiellement les sanctuaires pour cette Cpoque, et celles d'individus ou de farnilles que l'on qualifie d'archives privCes, la frontikre n'est pas Ctanche entre les deux. Plusieurs archives privCes tCmoignent ainsi de fortes connexions entre les activitCs de certains individus et celles des temples2. Il para?t dbs lors lCgitime de postuler une relation forte entre la sphbre Cconomique privCe et la sphbre institutionnelle et de chercher B voir si cette relation s'ktablit de manibre Cquilibrge ou plut6t au profit de l'une des dew. On prksentera donc dans ce qui suit, ce que l'on peut constater des transferts de biens des temples vers les particuliers, puis en sens inverse de ces derniers vers les sanctuaires, pour Ctudier en dernier lieu le degre d'homogCnCitC du groupe socio-Cconomique que constituent les notables urbains qui apparaissent comme 1'ClCment le mieux represent6 de cette sphbre priv6e.
1. Les transferts du temple vers les particuliers On peut distinguer rapidement trois modes de transfert de biens ou de propriCtCs du temple vers des particuliers: le systkme des prebendes, la constitution lCgale de biens Le terme d'entrepreneur a CtC compris ici dans le sens large que h i a donnC M. Stolper dans son Ctude sur les archives de la farnille MuraSQ, celui de criateur et d'animateur d'entreprises Cconomiques, commerciales et financibres, qui a tendance B remplacer l'expression "hommes d'affaires" utilisCe prCcCdemment. Ainsi les archives de Nabs-uSallim et de B&l-sup&-m&urB Uruk (Kessler, AUWE 8), celles d91ddinNabQ B Babylone (Peiser, BV) et celles de RCmQt-NabaB Borsippa (Joannbs, T ~ B R ) .
RELATIONS ENTRE INTER~TSPRIVES ET BIENS DES SANCTUAIRES
fonciers patrimoniaux, et enfin des procCdures plus ou moins illicites d'accaparement de biens des temples. 1.1 Le syst2me des prkbendes L'organisation du systbme des pribendes dans les temples nCo-babyloniens est l'un des meilleurs exemples de participation des intCrCts privCs B la gestion des biens des sanctuaires3. Au dCbut du Ier millhaire, il semble que ce soient surtout les fonctions sacerdotales qui aient valu B leurs detenteurs une part significative des revenus du temple, d'aprbs les ClCments que fournissent plusieurs textes de donations royales (en particulier la Sun-tablet de Sippar et d'autres kudurru). La richesse accumulCe au moment de la mise en place de l'empire nCo-babylonien dCbouche sur un systbme o i ~les prCbendiers reqoivent de manibre rCguli$re une rCtribution, la pappasu, dont le montant est proportionnel B la taille de leur tranche de service (manzaltu). Elle est dans de nombreux cas partie integrante de la fourniture par le TrCsor du temple des produits alimentaires nCcessaires B l'accomplissement du service lid B la prCbende (maiiartu): orge et dattes le plus souvent. Sur cette quantitk initiale une partie sert B la rCmunCration du travail accompli par le prebendier. Ce type de fonction religieuse associe donc deux sortes de revenus: l'un li6 directement au type de travail accompli, l'autre au statut plus gCnCral de membre du personnel du sanctuaire. Le premier parait se situer en amont du processus de preparation des offrandes alimentaires servies aux statues des divinitks; l'autre se situe en aval, et concerne un ensemble plus vaste qui est tout le personnel B fonction religieuse du sanctuaire: il entre dans le vaste systbme de redistribution des offrandes aprbs leur consommation, lors des offrandesjournalibres et des cCrCmonies particulibres. Deux questions peuvent se poser 21 ce propos: un tel revenu represente-t-il autre chose qu'un versement symbolique qui ferait de la prCbende essentiellement un ClCment de prestige, mais dont le bCnCfice rCel serait peu important? Quel est, d'autre part, le degrC d'accomplissement effectif par les prebendiers titulaires, des tgches matkrielles liCes B la prCbende? Pour rCpondre B la premibre question, il faut tenir compte 2 la fois de l'importance de la tranche de service que possbde le prCbendier, mais aussi d'une hiCrarchie interne entre les diverses prebendes, dont on pourrait avoir une idCe plus claire si l'on disposait d'un tableau exhaustif des prix des diverses prCbendes au fil des dCcennies des pCriodes nCo-babylonienne, achCmCnide et sCleucide. Le prix assez ClevC des prkbendes les plus honorables semble indiquer que ce revenu n'est pas negligeable. ll faut d'autre part prendre en considCration le fait que les revenus des prCbendes sont normalement servis en nature, et l'on peut se demander quel circuit suivent ensuite ces divers produits, et s'ils ne servent ainsi qu'h l'entretien alimentaire des prebendiers, ou s'ils sont rernis sur le marchi. La rCponse B la question d'un accomplissement effectif fait entrer en jeu deux phhombnes: le premier est le morcellement des tranches de service, qui est bien connu B 1'Cpoque nCo-babylonienne, et dont les effets sont particulibrement visibles plus tard, B I'Cpoque sCleucide, lorsque certains prdbendiers se retrouvent propriktaires de tranches de 3 La masse de la documentation disponible, la complexit6 de l'organisation des prkbendes, et l'existence de plusieurs Ctudes dCtaillCes qui leur ont Ctt consacrkes font que I'exposC n'en trace ici que les grandes lignes. Voir les mises au point rkcentes, pour Uruk de Kessler, AUWE 8, 71-75, et pour Sippar de Bongenaar, Ebabbar.
27
service exprimees en fractions d'heures. I1 est sfir que leur definition n'entraine pas, pour des raisons de cohCrence, la participation effective B la rCalisation des offrandes. Celle-ci est effectuCe par des spCcialistes, qui sont alors rCmunCrCs par les prebendiers au prorata de leur tranche de ~ e r v i c eLe . ~ second phCnombne dCcoule du statut de bien mobilier ncquis par les prkbendes, qui peuvent faire l'objet de mutations soit dans le cadre familial (succession, donation), soit par des ventes. On peut trouver alors comme possesseurs de prCbendes des femmes, qui n'appartiennent pas normalement B la catCgorie presque cxclusivement masculine des pribendiers. Tout cela aboutit 2 &parer la t&cheeffective like h la prkbende, qui devient l'affaire d'un spCcialiste, rCmunQC alors par le pribendier, du revenu qu'elle procure en tant que bien appartenant B un 1aYc. Dbs la pCriode nCobabylonienne on voit se mettre en place des systbmes de representation avec des contrats de travail, dans lesquels une partie du revenu total de la pribende est attribuC B celui qui en effectue la tiiche matCrielle, tandis que le propriktaire garde le reste des benefices que procure la prCbende. K. Kessler insiste cependant 2 juste titre sur le fait qu'8 Uruk, par exemple, la possession des prCbendes est l'affaire d'un cercle relativement Ctroit de notables, et que cela assure, avec la surveillance que continue B exercer l'adrninistration du temple, la rkalisation effective des tiiches cultuelles.5 1.2 Les biens fonciers patrimoniaux
La possession de certaines prkbendes entra'ine de facto la jouissance de terres. C'est en particulier le cas des prCbendes de jardinier (rub b8ni) du jardin Hallat6. Le cas a CtC CtudiC en dCtail pour Sippar par M. Jursa, qui a pu reconstituer ainsi sur plusieurs generations la localisation et la rkpartition de lopins de terre lies B la possession d'une prkbende de rub b8ni. Ces terres, nominalement propriCtC du temple, semblent avoir CvoluC pour devenir des ClCments de patrimoine dans chacune des familles et sont transmises par le jeu normal des successions: simplement, il semble qu'elles ne puissent &re dCcoupCes, et doivent &re transmises B une seule personne, ou B une fratrie. Le statut qu'acquibrent ce genre de biens est d'autant plus intkressant B Ctudier qu'on les trouve parfois entre les mains de femmes. Comme il n'existe pas dans la plupart des sanctuaires de clergC mixte, mais des fonctions rCservCes soit B des hommes, soit B des femmes, on doit admettre qu'un glissement s'opbre qui fait passer au premier rang le statut de bien patrimonial, et relbgue au second plan celui de bien du temple, qui devient une sorte de droit de propriCt6 Cminent. Le cas est net, par exemple B Dilbat, oh une sCrie de textes permet de voir qu'une parcelle du jardin Hallat de la ville, celle dite "du 305me jour", est achetCe au mois iv de l'an 32 de Darius Ier B un couple par un nommC NabQ-(ah)-ittannu,fils de UraS-ka~ir, descendant de Dabibi. Mais c o m e l'argent qui sert 2 la transaction provient de la dot de Cf. Kessler, AUWE 8, 72: "Der ProzeB der Loslosung des Pfriindenbesitzes vom Pfrundendienst und seine Aufsplitterung in Einzeltage und Tagesanteile, der uns fur die spatbabylonische Zeit so charakteristisch scheint und oft unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Perversion der Kultgedankens gesehen wurde, scheint aber nicht in dem AusmaBe erfolgt zu sein, dalj der kultische Betrieb ernsthaft gestort worden wae." Kessler, AUWE 8, 73. Cf. D. Cocquerillat, "Recherches sur le verger du temple campagnard de 1'Akitu (KIR16 &llat)", WO 7 (1973-74), 96-134.
son Cpouse Andi-Babu, celle-ci fait specifier sur le contrat de vente que la terre est sa propriCtC personnelle et exclusive.
VS 6 157 (11.4- 15) "(Concernant une palmeraie du jardin Hallat.. .), NabQ-(ah)-ittannu,fils d7UraS-ka~ir, descendant de Dabibi, a procCdC B son acquisition au mois de TaSritu de l'an 32 de fille d'Iddin-Nabfi, descendant de Darius (Ier) le roi, des mains de f~na-~sagil-b~let, Nanna'fitu et de son Cpoux Nabti-Sum-ukin, fils de NabQ-zCr-iqiSa, descendant d'Erebi, pour 2 mines d'argent brillant. La tablette concernant la terre agricole de 1 kur 1pi, cette palmeraie du Jardin Hallat du 30kmejour, est scellCe avec I'agrCment de f~ndi-Babu,fille de SamaS-iddin, 1'Cpouse de NabQ-(ah)-ittannu,(sachant que) c'est l'argent de f~ndi-Babuqui a CtC donnC pour (acheter) cette terre agricole. La terre agricole est la propriCtC (exclusive) de fAndi-Babu, fille de SamaS-iddin." Aussi l'estimation forfaitaire Ctablie deux mois plus tard (VS 3 152) pour specifier le montant de la redevance B verser par l'exploitant, cite comme seule propriCtaire de cette parcelle Andi-Babu, de mCme que celles des annCes Dar. 33 (VS 3 153), 34 (VS 3 156), 35 (VS 3 158 et 160)' 36 (VS 3 165). En l'an 36 cependant, le contrat d'exploitation reconduit pour 5 ans avec les m6mes tenanciers l'est par NabQ-(ah)-ittannu, 1'Cpoux d7Andi-Babu(VS 5 110). On constate donc que des terres du temple parrni les plus productives et les mieux situCes entrent d'une certaine manibre dans le patrimoine des particuliers. Leur exploitation en mode indirect fait que l'identitk du detenteur du bien n'est prise en compte que lorsqu'il y a transfert. Comme les prkbendes, le bien foncier peut 6tre vendu, mais il ne peut pas Ctre dCmembrC. On remarque que dans le dossier de Dilbat la prCbende B laquelle est d'habitude rattachCe la jouissance d'une parcelle du jardin gallat n'est pas citCe, m6me dans le contrat d'achat de la terre par Andi-Babu et NabQ-(ah)-ittannu. Soit elle en a CtC dissociCe, et l'on a affaire alors B des terres de statut quasi privC, soit elle est, c o m e la parcelle, exploitke par un tiers, qui en redonne une partie des bCnCfices au titulaire.7 On ne peut affirmer pour autant que ces terres sont devenues la propriCtC dCfinitive des notables urbains: le temple devait conserver un droit de propriCtC Cminent sur elles, et pouvait le faire jouer si I'intCgritC de la parcelle Ctait menacCe. Dans la pratique cependant, on aboutit be1 et bien B un transfert du domaine du temple B des patrimoines privCs. On pourrait citer Cgalement dans ce contexte le cas des bit Sutummu, pibces servant de magasin, inclus dans les dkpendances des sanctuaires, mais attribuCs B des individus qui en ont la jouissance de la mCme manibre que s'ils en Ctaient rkellement propriCtaires. On constate d'ailleurs que les bit Sutummu peuvent Ctre CchangCs ou m6me vendus. Dbs la premibre anne de rbgne de Nabopolassar, un bit Sutummu de prbs de 280 m2 B l'interieur de 1'Eanna est ainsi vendu pour 55 sicles d'argentg; de mCme, en l'an 5 de Darius Ier, deux particuliers Cchangent des bit Sutummu B I'intCrieur de 1'Ezida de Borsippa; l'utilisation des bit Sutummu par des artisans ou des membres de l'administration du
Les textes d'imittu montrent qu'apparemment aucun changement de type de culture n'intervient sur ces terres. Le contrat de mise en culture VS 5 110 semble par contre indiquer que la partie dkvolue 2 des ckrkales ou assimilkes (1. 23) va &re replantke en palmiers et en figuiers. H. Hunger, "Das Archiv des Nabu-uSallimW,Bagh. Mitt. 5 (1970), 193-304, no.1.
temple est illustrCe aussi bien dans 1'Ebabbar de Sippar (CT 2 2) que dans 1'Eanna d'Uruk (YOS 7 78, 88).
1.3 Les procbdures illicites Les archives des temples de nature judiciaire ou patrimoniale, conservant en particulier les justificatifs des droits de propriCtC sur des biens ou des personnes ayant fait I'objet d'une donation, permettent de distinguer des procCdures illicites de transfert de propribtks du sanctuaire B des particuliers. La plus simple, mais qui ne nous intkresse pas directement ici car elle n'illustre que peu le rapport entre fortunes privCes et fortunes du temple est celle du vol. Les archives judiciaires de 1'Eanna d'Uruk sont assez abondantes h ce sujet, surtout pour la pdriode des rkgnes de Cyrus et de Cambyse. Elles permettent de voir que cette pratique n'est pas rCservCe B une catkgorie sociale mais se rencontre aussi chez les notables urbains: si l'on peut Cvoquer la cClbbre affaire de vol d'or servant B la rkalisation des bijoux pour les dCesses, qui met en cause plusieurs orfevres de 1'Eanna sous le rbgne de Nabonide, telle qu'elle a CtC reconstituke par J. Rengerg, un autre exemple appara'it aussi emblkmatique, celui du texte YOS 7 10 oh le fils du chef des prkbendiers boulangers, l'un des membres les plus prestigieux du personnel du temple, est accusC de vol. Cornme le prouvent les tCmoignages de deux esclaves, et surtout de son propre frbre, Iddinaia, fils de LgbgSi-Marduk, descendant d7Egibi, a dCrobC en pleine nuit une pierre prCcieuse dans le bgtiment personnel d'IStar-&-iddin mis B sa disposition par le sanctuaire (bit Sutummu). Ce bijou provenait apparemment de la statue de culte d'IStar d'Uruk, et devait se trouver B la disposition d'IStar-ab-iddin pour une rCparation. Aucune explication n'est donnee B l'acte d'Iddinaia, mais les circonstances prouvent clairement le dClit: celuici a eu lieu pendant la nuit, et la pierre, dissimulCe dans une boite (Saddu) a CtC emmenee dans la maison du Chef des boulangers. Pourtant, cette affaire n'a pas eu de suite, puisque IddinaiaIIddin-Marduk est attest6 dans des documents officiels de 1'Eanna postCrieurs, cornme scribe (YOS 7 106, an 1 de Cambyse), et comrne tCmoin (JCS 28 no.21, an 1 de Bardiya).
YOS 7 10 "NabQ-re~fia,l'esclave de Lgb2Si-Marduk, fils de Ardi-BC1, descendant d'Egibi, qui, sans interrogatoire a fait la declaration suivante B Nabfi-muldn-zeri, Satammu de l'Eanna, fils de N2din, descendant de Dabibi, et B Nabfi-ah-iddin, officier royal, chef de l'administration de 1'Eanna: 'Le 28-ix, Iddinaia, fils de L2bgSi-Marduk, descendant dYEgibi,a volC en pleine nuit B IStar-ah-iddin, fils d'Innin-Sum-ugur, descendant de NabO-Sarhi-illni, une pierre prCcieuse de MarhaSi de l'avant-bras de la Dame d'Uruk, (et) l'a cachCe dans une cassette'. NabQ-lQ-d&, l'esclave de Bgniya, fils de Taribi, en a tCmoign6, et HaSdaia, le frbre d'Iddinaia, a dCclarC dans 1'AssemblCe: 'Sa pierre pricieuse de MarhaSi qui a kt6 volCe dans le bit Sutummu d'IStar-ah-iddin, je l'ai vue dans la maison de mon pbre L2b2Si-Marduk'. TCmoins. Uruk. 1-ii-an 1 de Cyrus, roi des pays."
Cf. J. Renger, "Notes on the Goldsmiths, Jewelers and Carpenters of Neobabylonian Eanna", JAOS 91 (1971), 494-503.
RELATIONS ENTRE I N T ~ ~ T PR S I ~ ET S BIENS DES SANCTUAIRES
Une autre procedure, moins visible, est celle de la fraude. Elle est illustrde, 18 encore, dans les archives de l'Eanna, par le cas emblCmatique de l'oblat Gimillu, fils de Inninah&-usur. Celui-ci a rempli au moins deux charges importantes dans la structure administrative du temple au cours de sa carribre: il a d'abord CtC Responsable des reliquats (dQs) B 1'Eanna (Sa mu&i rebani Sa ~.AN.NA), chargC de dCterminer et de percevoir les arri6rCs dQs au temple, surtout en matibre de production agricole et dyelevage. Dans l'accomplissement de cette fonction, il apparait que Gimillu a plusieurs fois accapark B son profit des ClCments des reliquats qu'il percevait, ou proposC des arrangements avec certains dCbiteurs, qui se faisaient au detriment des intCrCts du sanctuaire. I1 est remarquable qu'il ait rCussi, aprbs une pkriode de rnise B I'Ccart, B revenir au premier plan dans la fonction de Fermier GCnCral, B la fin du rbgne de Cambyse. Cette tiiche ne l'a occupC que deux ans, puisqu'il a ensuite pris la fuite en laissant un arriCrC considCrable. Lors de cette seconde sCrie d'ennuis avec l'administration de l'Eanna, on constate que Gimillu a pris soin d'emporter tous les ClCments Ccrits de gestion de sa Ferme GCnCrale, laissant les autoritks de 1'Eanna dans l'impossibilitk de mener B son terme la campagne de perception des redevances de l'an 2 de Darius Ier (cf. TCL 13 181). Remise dans un contexte plus gCnCral, cette affaire pose le problbme des relations entre le sanctuaire et les Fermiers GCnCraux. Si les risques que courent ceux-ci ont bien CtC mis en evidence, et d'autant plus, c o m e l'a proposC M. Jursa, s'ils sont amenCs B investir une partie de leur propre fortune dans les contrats de Ferme GCnCrale, le risque couru par le sanctuaire existe Cgalement. On peut en effet supposer qu'en laissant au Fermier GCnCral le soin de la gestion directe de l'exploitation des terres et de la perception des redevances, le temple perd une partie non negligeable du contr6le qu'il exerpit auparavant sur le revenu de son patrimoine foncier. La difficult6 que semblent avoir rencontrCe plusieurs Fermiers GCnCraux B remplir les obligations quantitatives de leurs contrats tient en partie au niveau ClevC des redevances qu'ils devaient verser, mais peut-etre bien aussi B l'utilisation B leur profit d'une partie de ce revenu avant le versement au temple. Ce dernier ne pouvait que constater, au moment du compte final, que ces obligations n'avaient pas CtC remplies, sans pouvoir forcement dbterminer la cause du dCficit. Ainsi pourrait s'expliquer l'abandon B la fin du rbgne de Cyrus et au dCbut de celui de Cambyse du systbme mEme des Fermes GCnbales, c o m e B Sippar. Une seconde procedure de fraude est celle qui concerne la main d'oeuvre: 18 encore, plusieurs cas sont attestes de personnes privCes ayant utilisC B leur profit de la main d'ceuvre servile qui Ctait propriCt6 du temple. On peut d'ailleurs distinguer deux cas de figure: le premier est celui du dCtournement pur et simple, oh l'on voit par exemple un fonctionnaire du temple pratiquer ce que le Droit franqais actuel qualifierait d'abus de bien sociaux, en utilisant pour son service propre des esclaves du temple. Au dCbut du rbgne de Nabonide, le scribe de l'Eanna (fupSar Eanna) est ainsi obligC de restituer une dizaine d'esclaves du temple B l'Eanna, et perd ensuite la place Cminente qu'il occupait parmi les hauts administrateurs du temple.1•‹Le second cas de figure est moins net: on constate que certains hCritiers "oublient" d'observer les clauses lies B des contrats de donation d'esclaves souscrits par leurs parents. I1 arrive en effet parfois qu'un donateur privC offre un esclave au temple, tout en obtenant de ce dernier le droit d'en disposer jusqu'B son dCcbs. Lors du partage successoral qui suit la disparition du donateur, le personnel servile qui est propriCtC nominale du temple est rCintCgrC dans le patrimoine au lieu d7EtreattribuC Cf. F. Joannbs, "Un administrateur rend gorge", NABU 1991185.
31
au sanctuaire. Ce phCnombne se produit B chaque mouvement de patrimoine, le plus souvent lors des successions, mais Cgalement pour des constitutions de dot. Le dernier exemple que l'on peut Cvoquer est le cas cCl5bre de Baba-ah-iddin, convaincu de complot contre Nabuchodonosor I1 et condamn6 B mort.ll Le texte du jugement ajoute que son pbre avait accapar6 des terres appartenant B 1'Ezida de Borsippa, et que ce domaine foncier est Cgalement restituC au temple, avant d'etre revendu B des particuliers pour 26 mines d'argent. Le texte lui-meme est donc un cas particulier de titre de propriCtC, puisqu'il justifie par ces CvCnements inhabituels l'inclusion de ce domaine dans les propriCtCs de 17Ezida,puis sa revente et il provient non des archives royales, mais de celles des acheteurs. 11 est probable que le mCme genre d'accaparement foncier a pu se produire, rarement dans un contexte aussi dramatique, et que les temples devaient donc conserver soigneusement un Ctat de leurs biens immobiliers tenu B jour. Plusieurs cas sont connus B Uruk, et qui ne sont pas de simples documents lies B l'exploitation agricole.12 La durCe de ces archives est illustrie par un texte de procbs malheureusement assez ma1 conservC, mais qui montre que 1'Eanna d'Uruk avait soigneusement enregistre toutes les mutations concernant une maison qu'il avait acquise auprbs d'un particulier (cf. BIN 2 134, ci-dessous). I1 est difficile d'estimer l'importance de ce phCnombne B 1'Cpoque nCobabylonienne proprement dite, mais un processus d'accaparement des terres des sanctuaires est clairement CvoquC aux Cpoques prCcCdentes, en particulier dans le premier tiers du Ier millCnaire, alors que le pouvoir royal babylonien Ctait dgliquescent. On retrouve ainsi plusieurs mentions, dans les inscriptions officielles nCo-assyriennes, de restitution de ces terres devenues indQmentprivCes B leur propriCtait-e originel, B l'initiative des rois assyriens, et ce genre d'action est devenu un ClCment idCologique de leur justification B exercer le pouvoir en Babylonie. Au delB du simple phCnombne de vol de biens du temple, qui rCsulte du contraste existant entre l'abondance de terres, de main d'oeuvre servile, de produits rares ou prCcieux dont disposaient les temples B 1'Cpoque nCo-babylonienne, et la situation d'une grande partie de la population, les phCnom&nesde fraude ou d'accaparement traduisent l'existence d'une tension entre intCrCts privCs et inter& des temples. Les familles de notables urbains attachaient manifestement une importance extreme B la prkservation de leur patrimoine, et l'amClioration continue des conditions Cconomiques en Babylonie B partir du 7kme sibcle av. J.-C. permettait B cette catCgorie sociale de conforter sa situation matirielle. Mais dans la mesure oh le stock existant de biens fonciers de valeur ne s'est accru de manibre significative que sous les Perses, il s'est Ccoult au moins un sibcle durant lequel une grande partie des meilleures terres Ctaient bloqutes dans les domaines des sanctuaires. Les terres qualifiCes de "Cinquantenies" (hanSe^)l3qui sont situCes en gCnCral B proximitC immediate des villes et bien desservies par les canaux d'irrigation semblent Ctre la partie des bonnes terres agricoles pCri-urbaines dont la propriCtC aurait CtC reconnue B des personnes privCes aprbs une redklimitation des domaines appartenant aux sanctuaires. Cette reorganisation du regime des terres, qui s'est peut-Ctre l1
Cf. E. Weidner, "Hochverrat gegen Nebukadnezar 11. Ein Grosswiirdentrager vor dem Konigsgericht", AfO 17 (1954-56), 1-5. Cf. Cocquerillat, Palrneraies, et rCcemment, Wunsch, AuOr 15 (1997), 139ff, no.1. Cf. J.A. Peat, "Hun30 Land and the rub hanit", Iraq 45 (1983), 124-127.
accompagnCe d'une forme de recadastration (d'oi~le nom de ces domaines), semble due en grande partie aux rois nCo-assyriens pendant la pCriode de sujCtion de la Babylonie. Leur statut gCnCral de terre privCe fait qu'elles Ctaient susceptibles de mutations B titre gratuit ou onCreux, mais au moment de 1'Ctablissement des contrats, un contr6le de la part de l'adrninistration royale pouvait intervenir, probablement pour Cviter un empiktement sur des terres de sanctuaires. On remarque en effet que deux actes de vente de terres de bani6 de Borsippa prCcisent B la fin du texte que celui-ci doit Ctre Ctabli en prCsence d'un scribe du roi: BE 8 43 (Borsippa, Nbn 3)' 1. 37-38: "NP scellera la tablette en prCsence du scribe du roi et la transmettra (B l'acheteur)" (NP i-na pa-ni-{an) 1 6 ~ u ~ . s Ai dR LUGAL 1M.DUB i-kan!(~~~)-nak-ma i-nam-din) BE 8 44 (Borsippa, Nbn 4), 1. 33-34: "NP fera siCger le scribe du roi sur la tablette" (NP 1 6 ~ u ~ . s Ai dR LUGAL ina! M D U B z.2-ie-ei-ie-eb). Ce texte prCcise d'ailleurs aux lignes suivantes que la terre est vendue pour Cteindre une dette du grand-pbre du vendeur envers le temple de Nab& mais ce n'est pas celui-ci qui s'en est port6 acqukreur. I1 serait sans doute exagCrC de parler d'une "faim de terres" qu'auraient alors connue les familles aisCes des villes. I1 n'en reste pas moins qu'il est significatif de constater que la famille Egibi de Babylone, une fois sa fortune faite, investit de manibre considerable pour se constituer des ensembles fonciers B proximitC de Babylone. Pour ceux qui n'avaient ni le niveau de fortune, ni le cercle de relations de cette famille, il pouvait Ctre tentant d'essayer d'investir de manibre plus ou moins licite les propriCtCs du temple.
2. Les transferts des particuliers vers le temple Y a-t-il, en sens contraire, une captation de la "sphbre privCe" par 1'Cconornie du temple? On constate d'abord que le principal contributeur extCrieur B 1'Cconomie du temple B l'Cpoque nCo-babylonienne reste le pouvoir royal avec son administration. Par ses donations de terres, de matibres ou d'objets prkcieux, de produits rares, de main d'ceuvre issue du butin rCalisC les expdditions rnilitaires, le Roi est le principal investisseur, de loin le plus important. Son r6le ne s'arrCte pas 1B puisqu'il contribue de manibre significative B l'entretien ou B la restauration des bgtiments, et au service matkriel du culte, ce que traduit l'existence d'une cassette (quppu i a iarri) et de magasins (bit 3utummi iarri) royaux dans le sanctuaire. On peut considerer Cgalement qu'une partie de la population sert les intCr8ts des temples, dans la frange de la population libre qui dispose de ressources personnelles insuffisantes. C'est en son sein que se recrutent les exploitants agricoles installCs sur les terres des sanctuaires, avec des degrCs divers de dCpendance. C'est elle qui fournit Cgalement, pendant les pCriodes de crise une partie des nouveaux oblats, qui rejoignent la main d'ceuvre servile du temple, comrne l'attestent des actes de donation d'enfants par leurs parents. Si l'intervention du sanctuaire se fait dans ce cas au nom d'une certaine forme d'assistanat social, prenant en charge ceux qui ne peuvent plus Ctre entretenus par les circuits habituels de solidaritC (les orphelins et les veuves en particulier), la contrepartie est celle d'une dCpendance totale envers le sanctuaire. Le flux de cette main d'oeuvre donnCe au temple semble avoir CtC suffisant pour que le sanctuaire n'ait pas de rCel
problkme de personnel dans son mode normal de fonctionnement. Ce qui ne 1'empCchait pas d'avoir des besoins ponctuels (surtout pour les travaux publics). Mais en associant alors B sa propre main d'ceuvre servile la population rurale dependante qu'il rCmunCrait par des salaires en argent et des rations d'entretien, il arrivait semble-t-il B couvrir ses besoins. On remarque d'autre part que dans un contexte plus gCnCral le sanctuaire dispose pour ses biens d'un statut privilCgiC: le nombre relativement important de documents judiciaires relatant des affaires de fraude ou de vol doit-il Ctre pris comme le signe d'une mauvaise gestion des temples, ou comme l'indice, en sens inverse, d'un contr6le rigoureux et d'une tenue scrupuleuse des archives relatant les antCcCdents de telle ou telle personne? Comme souvent, la rialit6 se situe probablement B mi-chemin: il est symptomatique que 1'Eanna d'Uruk organise une sCance plknibre de son tribunal pour juger deux voleurs de canardsl4, mais par ailleurs, la liste impressionnante des dCtournements cornmis par l'oblat Gimillu, ainsi que sa carribre prouvent que des "trous" existaient dans la vigilance des autoritCs administratives. On notera pour finir que le temple se trouvait en position de force dans ce genre d'affaires, puisque les larcins ou les dCtournements commis B son dCtriment Ctaient susceptibles d'un remboursement au trentuple (conformCment au Code de Hammurabi), soit beaucoup plus que le taux en vigueur dans les affaires entre particuliers. Qu'en est-il alors d'un Cventuel apport de la population libre et disposant d'une autonomie Cconomique? Elle contribue d'abord 21 la prospCritC du sanctuaire d'une manibre institutionnelle,par des versements ou des donations plus ou moins obligCs, mais dont il reste difficile d'Cvaluer l'importance: il apparait que certaines terres agricoles versent une &me (eira) au temple, dont le mCcanisme d'imposition et de rkpartition sont complexes.15 De mCme, les donations pieuses, sous forme d'animaux, de personnes, ou d'objets plus ou moins prCcieux representaient Cgalement une source de revenu pour la plupart des temples. A la diffCrence de la pCriode palbo-babylonienne, les temples nCo-babyloniens apparaissent assez peu dans les circuits financiers: quelques prCts de temples peuvent Ctre identifies, mais ils representent une infime minorit6 des contrats de ce typel6, ce qui tendrait B montrer que le r6le des sanctuaires s'est beaucoup rCduit en ce domaine. Il semble par contre que les sanctuaires aient jouC un r61e assez important comme lieu de dCp6t de valeurs appartenant B des particuliers. Cf. H.H. Figulla, "Lawsuit Concerning a Sacrilegious Theft at Erech", Iraq 13 (1951),95-101. La principale question qui se pose est en effet de savoir s'il s'agit d'une taxe pesant sur n'importe quel type de terre agricole, ou seulement sur celles qui, d'une manikre ou d'une autre, ont appartenu aux temples avant d'entrer dans des patrimoines privCs. De meme, la dime que versent certains tamkdrc estelle perpe seulement lorsque le temple est l'investisseur principal d'une expkdition commerciale ou bien a-t-elle une assiette beaucoup plus large? 16 Leur identification est, de plus, rendue malaisCe par la pratique courante B l'tpoque nCobabylonienne d'utiliser le schCma formel de la reconnaissance de dette (u'iltu) pour des opCrations qui sont en fait d'une autre nature: achat B crCdit, location, estimation forfaitaire, etc. Cependant plusieurs vkritables pr& de temples (VS 3 126, 127, 161; Joannbs, TBBR 66) comportent une clause spCcifiant que le dkbiteur devra faire enregistrer son paiement au moment de 1'CchCance sur le registre officiel du sanctuaire. On peut interprCter cette obligation comme l'indice que le sanctuaire ne pratique que des prets personnalisBs et n'admet pas le systbme de transfert des crkances qui existe B cette Cpoque chez les particuliers: il n'accepte cornme dkbiteurs que des personnes dont il est sClr qu'elles pourront faire face B leurs obligations. 15
On trouve Cgalement le temple comme acheteur, vendeur, ou bailleur de certains biens immobiliers B fonction rksidentielle, comme l'illustre un texte d'Uruk relatant l'histoire compliqute d'une maison qui a CtC B un certain moment la propriCtC de 1'Eanna:
BIN 2 13417 "Ardi-Innin, fils de Sakin-Sum, Kalbaia, fils de Silim-B61, SarnaS-iddin, fils de B61iddin, les petits-fils de B6l-ahhe-iddin, descendant de Gimil-Nanaia ont fait la declaration suivante B NabQ-ah&bullit, le idkin mati: 'En l'an 4 de Nabuchodonosor, BC1-ahhe-iddin notre grand-pkre a donnC pour des dCpenses 5 112 mines d'argent B BC1-ahhe-iddin, fils de Gudadu, descendant de Sin-leqe-unninni, et il a pris dans sa reconnaissance de dette sa maison situCe B la Grand'Porte de 1'Eanna en gage; mais jusqu'h maintenant la main des administrateurs prCcCdents de 1'Eanna est restbe placke sur cette maison, et ils ne libkrent pas cette maison en notre faveur; instruisez notre procbs avec les administrateurs de l'Eanna!'. NabQ-ahhC-bullif,le Sdkin mati, a renvoyC Ardi-Innin, Kalbaia et SamaS-iddin avec Nidinti-BC1, le iatarnrnu de l'Eanna, fils de NabQ-mukin-zsri, descendant de Dabibi, NabQ-ah-iddin, officier royal chef de l'administration de l'Eanna, et les comptables de 1'Eanna devant Imbiya, le Sdkin ?e^mid'Uruk, fils de Nanaia-CreS, descendant de Kidin-Marduk et les juges de NabO-ahhC-bullit, le idkin mati pour instruire leur procks, et les juges ont CcoutC leur affaire. Le idkin {e^miet les juges ont fait lire la reconnaissance de dette de 5 112 mines d'argent de B61-ahh&iddin, fils d7AhheSu,qui a CtC Ctablie B la charge de BC1-ahhG iddin, fils de Gudadu, en l'an 4 de Nabuchodonosor, roi de Babylone, et en vertu de quoi la maison a CtC prise en gage dans sa reconnaissance de dette, qu'Ardi-Innin, Kalbaia et SamaS-iddin ont apportCe devant les juges, ainsi que les tablettes et les contrats des administrateurs prickdents de 1'Eanna c o m e quoi cette maison a CtC donnCe en location, et (comme quoi) le loyer de cette maison est entrC dans (les caisses) de l'Eanna, ainsi que le Registre du TrCsor de la Dame d'Uruk, comme quoi cette maison Ctait inscrite en l'an 25 de Nabuchodonosor, roi de Babylone, en m6me temps que les (autres) biens irnrnobiliers de 17Eanna,la tablette c o m e quoi Sin-iddin, le qipu de 1'Eanna et les comptables de 1'Eanna ont vendu cette maison en l'an 36 de Nabuchodonosor, roi de Babylone, de la part de 1'Eanna B Innin-Sum-u~ur,fils de Nergal-uSallim, descendant de Sin-leqe-unninni - et Iddin-NabQ,le frkre ainC des fils de B61-WC-iddin y figurait comme tCmoin -, ainsi que le contrat c o m e quoi en l'an 39 de Nabuchodonosor, roi de Babylone, cette maison est revenue B 1'Eanna des mains de Innin-Sum-u~ur,et a 6tC baillCe en location par 1'Eanna B [NP1 et NP2], oblats de 1'Eanna. A la suite de quoi le Sdkin @mi[...reste cassC.. .I". Si dans les circuits commerciaux, le sanctuaire semble Cgalement avoir recours B des intermkdiaires privCs, cela s'inscrit dans un contexte plus gCnCral: les temples ne paraissent entretenir de structures Cconomiques que quand ils en ont un besoin permanent. Pour des besoins plus ponctuels, par exemple en matikre de transport, ils font appel B des agents privCs: P.-A. Beaulieu a ainsi montrC qu'en l'an 17 de Nabonide, on trouve toute une sCrie de locations de bateaux par 1'Eanna d'Uruk B des particuliers, dans un contexte l7
Ce texte est repris et comment6 dans F. Joannbs (Cd.), Pratique de la justice en Misopotamie, Presses Universitaires de Vincennes, 21 paraitre en 2000.
tout B fait particulier qui est celui des prkmices du conflit avec Cyrusl8. On voit bien par contre que dans le domaine artisanal, oh le sanctuaire a recours de manikre rCgulihe B certains types de spCcialistes, il dispose de sa propre main d'ceuvre, dont une partie sous forme de prebendiers, le reste Ctant entretenu par des rations et des allocations diverses. Un texte du dCbut du rbgne de Cyrus19 montre que le sanctuaire s'assure 1'exclusivitC des services et des connaissances de ces spCcialistes, par un systkme d'engagement directement copiC sur celui des conventions jurCes (a&) en vigueur dans le domaine politique. Au total, on pourrait conclure de ces diffirents cas B une relative CtanchCitC des deux sphkres que constituent les fortunes privCes et celles des sanctuaires, ce qui est en accord avec la notion de "grand organisme" dCveloppCe par L. Oppenheim, et qui fait des temples et du pouvoir royal des ensembles Cconomiques autonomes. Pourtant, dans sa thkse sur 1'Cconomie agricole de 1'Ebabbar de Sippar B 1'Cpoque nCo-babylonienne20, M. Jursa propose une nouvelle interpitation du systkme des Fermes GCnCrales qui apporte de nouveaux ClCments susceptibles de modifier cette vision des choses. Selon lui, l'un des principaux intCrCts pour les sanctuaires du nouveau systkme de gestion de leurs domaines fonciers que reprdsentent les contrats de Ferme GCnCrale est qu'il implique la fourniture par les Fermiers d'une partie du matCriel d'exploitation. Ainsi le temple se verrait-il dCchargC de la mise sur pied et de l'entretien d'un nombre consequent d'animaux, de travailleurs et d'outils. Quand le poids total de l'investissement que represente ce matCriel d'exploitation reste B la seule charge du propriitaire - en l'occurrence, le sanctuaire les b6nCfices dCgagCs par une mise en culture plus Ctendue ou plus intensive sont annul& par cette charge initiale. En partageant les frais d'investissement et d'exploitation, le temple ferait donc une affaire interessante, mCme si la plus grande partie des bCnCfices va au Fermier GCnCral-entrepreneur. Cependant, le montant assez important de la redevance B verser au temple fait que celui-ci conserve un profit bien supCrieur au coat des investissements qu'il consent. Par rapport au schCma habituel, qui voit dans ces Ferrniers GCnCraux soit des agents de la Couronne, soit des agents du temple, on verrait donc Cmerger un nouveau type de partenaire, qui seraient des entrepreneurs privCs. On disposerait ainsi d'un fil conducteur assez solide pour Ctablir un lien entre les activitCs de certains de ces entrepreneurs privCs au service de la Couronne ou des possesseurs nobles de vastes domaines fonciers (comme les Egibi au service de Nergal-Har-u~urpuis de B61Sar-u~ur,et enfin de Cambyse et comme la famille MuraSO dans la rCgion de Nippur B la fin du 55me sikcle) et celles de Fermiers GCnCraux des temples issus du m6me milieu socio-Cconomique. La situation globale reste certes assez compliquCe dans la mesure oh il est certain que le temple a ensuite adapt6 ce systbme B ses propres rkgles, en faisant de certains membres de son personnel des Fermiers GCnCraux. I1 est probable aussi que des tensions ont pu se produire entre les divers partenaires, c o m e on l'a vu plus haut. Aussi devrait-on plutat parler d'un systbme mixte, mi-privC, mi-officiel, mais il n'en reste pas moins qu'on a 1%un exemple concret d'association entre intCr6ts des temples et intCr6ts privds, qui se fait dans le sens d'une utilisation des possibilitCs d'investissement de ces entrepreneurs par les sanctuaires. Cf. P.-A. Beaulieu, "An Episode in the Fall of Babylon to the Persians", JNES 52 (1993), 241-261, en particulier p. 245-247. Weisberg, YNER 1, no.1. 20 Jursa, AfO Beih. 25.
RELATIONS ENTRE INTERBTS PRIVES ET BIENS DES SANCTUAIRES
3. Qui sont les "entrepreneurs"? En poussant plus loin l'analyse dans cette perspective, on devrait Ctre B mCme de dkterminer s'il existe une difference entre la notabilite urbaine traditionnelle, caractCrisCe par la mention d'un ancCtre connu depuis longtemps, et bien insCrCe dans les structures de gestion du temple ainsi que dans tout l'appareil des pouvoirs locaux, et ces individus ou groupes familiaux en train de constituer leur fortune. De ce point de we, il faut souligner que la mention de "famille Egibi" est relativement trompeuse, car elle fait rCfCrence B un ensemble familial extremement diversifiC, attest6 dans plusieurs villes de Babylonie et sur une trbs longue pCriode, et sans rCelle unite!, alors que les archives privCes qui servent de base B cette dCsignation sont celles d'un rameau individuel, issu des environs de Babylone, ayant constituC sa fortune de manibre tout B fait particulibre. Qualifier ce type d'entrepreneur privC d'homo novus est sans doute anachronique, mais il semble que le dCveloppement de l'empire nbo-babylonien puis le passage sans rupture majeure B l'empire achemdnide aient favoris6 un phCnom5ne socio-dconomique de ce type. La question de savoir s'il a exist6 des "entrepreneurs" venant faire fortune dans le systkme de gestion des temples dCbouche sur l'une des questions preliminaires de cette Ctude: la notion d'intCrCts privCs recouvre-t-elle une unit6 sociale, ou bien doit-on introduire des nuances entre des fortunes locales profondCment insCrees dans la gestion du sanctuaire principal de leur ville et des individus qui interviendraient depuis une source externe? K. Kessler21 a insist6 sur la notion de milieu social homogbne que constituent les prkbendiers d'Uruk: seuls quelques groupes familiaux participeraient B la gestion et B l'administration de l'Eanna, et les phCnomknes de division et de location des prkbendes n'auraient pas de consCquence Cconomique majeure puisqu'elles resteraient en fait aux mains d'un groupe finalement assez restreint. Cette explication peut Ctre vCrifiCe dans d'autres villes: B Borsippa par exemple, les archives de la famille du Bouvier (r2'i alp2) montrent que cette famille dCtient pendant longtemps une part significative de la prkbende correspondante. On a ici un cas d'adequation rCelle entre le nom de la famille et son activitC. A contrario, les archives d'Iddin-Nab0 descendant du Forgeron, B Babylone, illustrent la carribre d'une personne qui associe B des activitks strictement privies (surtout des achats et des locations de maisons dans Babylone), la possession de plusieurs prebendes, et surtout celle de boucher du temple d'IShara. Le nom de fonction de lYancCtre Cponyme de la famille n'a ici rien B voir avec 1'activitC principale d71ddin-NabQen tant que prkbendier. Les deux cas sont cependant proches en ce qu'ils documentent une activitk majeure des divers membres de ces familles, et qui parait constituer une part non negligeable de leurs revenus. Dans le cas des archives de la famille du Bouvier B Borsippa, on remarque d'autre part des participations ponctuelles B des entreprises qui concernent le temple, mais en dehors de la tilche dCfinie par la prkbende. Deux textes au moins montrent que l'un des membres de cette famille a participC au debut du rbgne de Nabonide B des transactions concernant la fourniture en grande masse de briques au temple de NabQ. I1 est alors d'autant plus intCressant de mettre en rapport ce groupe d'archives avec celles de la famille Ea-ilQta-bbi, qui a pratiquC Cgalement cette activitk:
AUWE 8, 72sq.
37
TCL 12 71 "5 sicles d'argent du TrCsor de NabQ, roi de l'univers, representant les briques pour le rempart de Borsippa, (par l'intermediaire) de Zer-Bilbili, fils de NabQ-Sum-iSkun, descendant de IlQta-bilni,sont B la charge de Ardi-BC1, fils de ZCriya, descendant de Baliltu. Les briques correspondent B une reconnaissance de dette de Mur2nu. ArdiBC1 comptabilisera les briques sur le tas de stockage et les donnera B Zgr-Bilbili. Sur 10 sicles d'argent qui lui revenaient, il a dCjB reGu 5 sicles. (TCmoins). 27-vii de l'annCe inaugurale de Nabonide, roi de Babylone."
TuM 213 83 "5400 briques du TrCsor de NabQ, roi de l'univers, (par l'intermkdiaire) de NabQmukk-zeri, fils d'Aplaia, descendant du Bouvier, sont B la charge de Nabfimudammiq, fils de NabQ-ahhe-eriba,descendant de I...], et de son fils SamaS-nilsir. Ils disposeront les briques en piles regulibres, les compteront, et les livreront B NabQmukin-zCri. 11s sont garants l'un de l'autre.
le reliquat d'une prCcCdente reconnaissance de dette. (TCmoins). Borsippa, le 15-x de l'annCe inaugurale de Nabonide, roi de Babylone."
VS 6 64 "10 sicles d'argent du TrCsor de NabQ, roi de l'univers, qui ont CtC remis pour des briques B NabO-bClSunu, fils de NabQ-lC'i, descendant de NQr-Papsukkal, sont B la charge de NabQ-mukin-zCri, fils d' Aplaia, descendant du Bouvier. Selon le rbglement de l'Ezida, il fournira au TrCsor les briques disposCes en piles rCgulibres et jointives. NabQ-mukh-zCri a r e y des mains de NabQ-bClSunul'argent pour constituer des piles rCgulibres et jointives. LB-dessus 2 sicles 114 restent (en commission) B NabQb6lSunu. (TCmoins). Borsippa, le 14-v de l'an 1 de Nabonide, roi de Babylone." Les trois contrats TCL 12 71, TuM 213 83 et VS 6 64 prCsentent un schema trbs proche: comme aucun des individus concern& n'est attest6 par ailleurs avec un titre administratif de 17Ezida,on peut en conclure qu'on est 18 dans le cas d'un recours du sanctuaire, de manibre momentan6e B des circuits privds. Mais les personnes choisies sont par ailleurs connues comme prebendiers du temple. A moins de supposer qu'il s'agisse d'une obligation pesant sur eux (ce qui semble peu probable car on s'attendrait B ce qu'elle soit explicitke), on constate que les intCrCts privCs mis en jeu sont ceux de personnes dCj8 intkgrCes B la structure du temple. Pour recapituler: le temple ne ferait appel aux intCr6ts privCs que lorsque ceux-ci impliquent la possession d'un materiel tout 21 fait particulier (comme les bateaux par exemple), ou lorsqu'il s'agit de personnes ou de familles dCjB admises B participer B la gestion du sanctuaire, par le jeu des prCbendes essentiellement. On peut alors, pour tester la validit6 de cette hypothese, examiner le cas des Fermiers GCnCraux de 1'Eanna: le temple d'IStar n'a-t-il pass6 de contrats qu'avec des individus dCjB liCs B lui d'une manibre ou d'une autre, ou bien a-t-il eu recours B des personnes extkrieures, voire non ~rukCennes?~~ Si l'on ne retient que les gens qualifiCs du titre de $a 22 La thtse d'une intrusion de personnes venant en majorit6 de la capitale dans l'administration de 1'Eanna sous le rbgne de NCriglissar a dCjk CtC proposte par R.H. Sack et rappelCe dans son dernier ouvrage, Cuneiform Documents from the Chaldean and Persian Periods (Selinsgrove 1994).
RELATIONS ENTRE I N T ~ ~ R ~PRIVES TS ET BIENS DES SANCTUAIRES
muhhi siiti Sa Bzlti Sa Uruk, tels qu'ils sont rCpertoriCs dans les ouvrages de D. Cocquerillat23 et de H.M. K i i m n ~ e (voir l ~ ~ tableau en annexe), on observe que sur la quinzaine de Fermiers GCnCraux attestis entre Nabonide et Darius Ier, on trouve trois oblats, donc membres du personnel du temple. La majorit6 des Fermiers GCnCraux sont des notables locaux, qui soit se rattachent B des noms d'ancbtres bien attest& B Uruk (Gimil-Nanaia), soit sont attestis par ailleurs comrne participant au service des prkbendes. 11s Cmanent donc bien du groupe social qui est dCjB implant6 dans les structures du sanctuaire, participe B sa gestion, et en tire bCnCfice. La question se pose cependant de savoir oh placer les tout premiers Fermiers GCnCraux, Sum-uk?n et Kalbaia, membres d'un mCme groupe familial celui des descendants de BBsiya, ainsi que deux autres (Ardiya, fils de NabQ-bh-abi, descendant de RCmOt-Ea et IlC'i-Marduk, fils de NabO-Sum-ukin, descendant de &eru)25. S'agit-il du mCme groupe social de notables urukCens que les autres Fermiers GCnCraux, ou bien s'agit-il dX'entrepreneurs"Venus d'une autre rCgion, trbs probablement celle de la capitale? , de ce La question peut Stre lCgitimement posCe quand on voit que S u m - u ~ nl'initiateur systbme a accompli le dCbut de sa carribre B Babylone, qu'il est intervenu B Uruk au dCpart comme subordonne de Ntriglissar, et que sa premike Ferme lui a CtC octroyCe par Nabonide, et non par les autoritis de 1'Eanna. Ce soutien royal pourrait expliquer pourquoi Sum-ukin obtint de 1'Eanna la fourniture d'un materiel d'exploitation consCquent. Par contre, ensuite, les Fermiers GCnCraux n'obtiennent de matCriel, d'animaux ou de main d'ceuvre du temple que lorsqu'ils appartiennent h son personnel ou qu'ils gbrent les terres exploit6es en faire-valoir direct par 1'Eanna. Les autres Fermiers doivent fournir betail, chanues, semence et laboureurs. S'il a probablement exist6 une forme de compCtition entre certains Fermiers (cf. les clauses de TCL 12 90)' l'antagonisme que dCcble D. Cocquerillat entre les autoritCs de 1'Eanna et les Fermiers GCnCraux est peut-Ctre exagCrC. Vu 1'Ctendue des domaines fonciers du temple, celui-ci manquait trks probablement de moyens pour une exploitation sur un mode intensif de l'ensemble. I1 avait donc avantage B participer B un systbme oil des terres de qualit6 moyenne Ctaient prises en charge par des Fermiers-entrepreneurs qui y utilisaient leur propre matCriel. Le bCnCfice obtenu par la mise en valeur de ces terres allait d'abord aux Fermiers, mais l'ensemble n'en constituait pas moins une source de nouveau revenu pour le temple. Comme l'avait dCjB bien remarquC D. Cocquerillat, il est logique que ces contrats aient donc port6 sur des terres de qualit6 moyenne et non sur les meilleures. Les distorsions qui sont intervenues sont alors probablement dues au fait que certains Fermiers prClevaient d'abord leur benefice avant de transmettre la redevance au temple, et faisaient porter sur cette dernibre les Cventuelles pertes par rapport B la recolte espCr6e. Le cas de Sum-ukin pourrait illustrer la prksence de gens issus de la capitale et qui investissent dans des grandes villes de Babylonie. I1 ne faut cependant pas oublier qu'il apparait B Uruk avec un titre administratif officiel qui est celui de b.21piqitti Sa SarriKa Nergal-Sar-up-26. Dans les trois cas possibles de non-urukkens, on constate par ailleurs une implantation rCelle dans la ville: la famille de Sum-ukin fournit trois Fermiers 23 24 25 26
Cocquerillat, Palmeraies. Kiirnrnel, Familie. Dans ces trois cas, le nom de l'anc&tre6ponyme est peu ou pas du tout attest6 B Uruk. Pour ces attestations, cf. Sack, CDCPP, 38: il relke 7 mentions dont 5 de textes de Yale in6dits.
39
GCnCraux sur une pQiode de plusieurs annCes; quant B IlC'i-Marduk, fils de NabO-Sumukin, descendant de fitem, il est en meme temps exploitant d'une grosse palmeraie selon D. Cocquerillat (Palmeraies, 99: cf. BIN 1 98); de meme, Nergal-n8sir possbde un domaine avec une maison sur le canal Takkiru (AnOr 8 27). Le cas plus gCnCral d'une implantation de gens de Babylone dans des activitCs "provinciales" pourrait d'ailleurs Ctre beaucoup plus ancien puisqu'on le trouve dCjB illustre par le dossier de Siipik-zeri descendant d'Egibi, rksidant B Babylone, qui achbte des terres et des prCbendes B Dilbat sous les rbgnes de SamaS-Sum-ukin et Kandalhu. Les activitCs de Marduk-S2pik-zCri, fils de Bammaia, descendant d'Egibi sont connues par ses propres archives, au sein desquelles sont venues s'intkgrer, par le biais des transferts de titres de propriCtC celles de membres de la famille Bisiya de Dilbat. I1 rachbte un droit de gage sur une palmeraie du garri-Sa-Lagamal de Dilbat vendue par les fils de Lilb%i, descendant de Biisiya, 21 Borsippa en Kandalhu 8 (YBC 11385). En KandaHnu 15, il achkte B Babylone au fils de LgbZiSi, descendant de Biisiya, un terrain en face de la Porte de SarnaS B Dilbat (OECT 10 397); ce terrain avait CtC saisi en Kandalsnu 8 par un nommC Kudurru pour la dette de LiIbilSi, puis est revenu B celui-ci, dont Marduk-Stipik-zCri a assure l'entretien matkriel (OECT 10 397). Un peu aprbs, la mCme annCe, il prend possession B Babylone des biens de la famille de L2biiSi aprbs avoir Cteint leurs dettes et gages divers (OECT 10 12). En Kandalgnu 18, il fait un procbs B Babylone B propos d'une prkbende d'2rib biti dans 1'E'imbianim de Dilbat et en fait annuler la vente prCcCdente B Kudurm (OECT 10 298). Il est mentionni l'annCe suivante comme voisin d'une terre au bord du garriSa-Lagamal, en bordure immCdiate de la ville de Dilbat (JCS 36 n0.21)27. Enfin, lYannCeinaugurale de Sin-Hum-lPSir, il rCgularise une vente intervenue en Kandalgnu 9 suite B un achat par les vendeurs de la terre en l'an 20 de SamaS-Sum-ukin (OECT 10 400)' puis Cchange avec Nildin, descendant de Btl-etCm un terrain B b2tir dans le quartier de la Ville-Neuve de Babylone en SPn-Sar-iSkun 0 (OECT 10 400). Si sa domiciliation principale est manifestement Babylone, c'est B Dilbat que MardukS2pik-zCri rCalise ses investissements en biens immobiliers et mobiliers, et c'est de Dilbat que semblent provenir ses archives. Au total, le modble de l'entrepreneur privC s'appuyant sur une carribre prkliminaire dans la gestion de biens de la noblesse (qu'illustrent bien les Egibi de Babylone) pour investir ensuite dans la participation aux affaires des temples d'autres villes, ne parait pas Ctre trbs rCpandu. On peut probablement rattacher B ce modble Sum-ukin, premier Ferrnier GCnCral de I'Eanna, mais il semble s'agir d'un cas exceptionnel B ce moment de l'histoire de la Babylonie. La tendance majoritaire dans les relations entre intkrets privCs et biens des temples semble bien avoir CtC, B 1'Cpoque nCo-babylonienne, l'utilisation par la notabilitC locale d'une position prCexistante de co-gestionnaires des richesses du clergC pour Ctendre son champ d'intervention et renforcer son patrimoine personnel. La notion de "grand organisme" B tendance autarcique doit donc Ctre modulCe, dans la mesure oh des intCrCts privCs y paraissent nettement actifs B 1'Cpoque nCo-babylonienne. On ne dCbouche pas pour autant sur un modele de formation d'une sphbre privCe
27
M. deJong Ellis, "Neo-BabylonianTexts in the Yale Babylonian Collection", JCS 36 (1984), 1-63.
RELATIONS ENTRE INTERI~TSPRIVES ET BIENS DES SANCTUAIRES autonome, prenant progressivement les commandes de l'tconomie babylonienne en s'appuyant sur un pouvoir royal centralisateur.
4. Annexe: Liste des Fermiers Gknkraux de 1'Eanna (Sa muhhi sQti Sa Belti Sa Uruk) classks par origine Oblats du temple: Be1-gimilanni, fils de M a d h ~ - C r e S ~ ~ Gimillu, fils d'Innin-Sum-ibni Ibni-IStarIIbnaia,fils de Baliiw Notables d'Uruk: Ardi-Innin, fils de Ibni-IStar, descendant de Gimil-Nanaia29 Nab&mudammiq, fils de NabO-Qir, descendant de Gimil-Nanaia30 Sin-ibni, fils de SamaS-mudarnmiq, descendant du Bouvier31 Probablement originaires d' Uruk: Di!punmu Mfirbu, fils de Sam$-iddin NabQ-balassu-Sarri-iqbi Nergal-ipuS Nergal-nii~ir,fils de Nanaia-ibni Probablement non-originaires d'Uruk: Ardiya, fils de NabO-bh-aB, descendant de RCmQt-Ea32 IlC'i-Marduk, fils de NabQ-Sum-ukin, descendant de fitem33 Kalbaia, (descendant de Bfisiya) NabQ-bh-aB, fils de Kalbaia, descendant de Biisiya Sum-ukin, fils de B&zeri, descendant de Blsiya34
28
11 porte le titre de ia mc&i quppi Sa Eanna, mais reprend la Ferme GCnCrale de Gimillu avec les memes structures. 29 11 est Cgalement scribe et reqoit de l'orge en maiiartu;son Mere est scribe au service du temple. 11est citt d2s le rsgne de Nabonide comme caution. 11 est possesseur d'une prCbende dans l'Eanna, pour laquelle il reqoit une ma5iartu; son pbre s'occupait de bibre pour les fetes e55eSu. La famille est connue sur 4 gkntrations; les 3 fils de Sin-ibni sont scribes; lui-meme s'occupe de l'estimation forfaitaire avant de devenir Fermier GCnCral. La famille RCmfit-Ea n'est pas attestke B Uruk. la farnille fitem n'est pas attestke B Uruk, mais I. serait en meme temps exploitant d'une palmeraie. 34 L'un des problsmes est celui de la date de cessation d9activitCsde Sum-ukin: elle pourrait remonter B l'annte 8 de Nabonide et etre consCcutive B une procCdure engagCe contre lui et sa femme par le temple pour accaparement de biens (Cf. V. Scheil, "Une affaire de dCp6tw, RA 14 (1917), 156sq.). On s'expliquerait ainsi que Kalbaia ait dti cCder sa Ferme au mois x de l'an 8 de Nabonide B Nergal-nilsir!
41
Bibliographie
Bongenaar, A.C.V.M The Neo-Babylonian Ebabbar Temple at Sippar: Its Administration and Ebabbar its Prosopography (= PIHANS 80), Istanbul 1997. Cocquerillat, D. Palmeraies et cultures de 1'Eanna d'Uruk (= ADFU 8), Berlin 1968. Palmeraies Joannbs, F. Textes kconomiques de la Babylonie re'cente, Paris 1982. TEBR Jursa, M. AfO Beih. 25 Die Landwirtschaji in Sippar in neubabylonischer Zeit (= AfO Beiheft 25), Wien 1995. Kessler, K. Uruk. Urkunden aus Privathausern. Die Wohnhauser westlich des AUWE 8 Eanna-Tempelbereichs. Teil I. Die Archive der Sohne des Bd-uSallim, des Nabli-uiallim und des BZl-sup$-mubur (= AUWE 8), Mainz am Rhein 1991. Kiirnmel, H.M. Familie, Beruf und Amt im spatbabylonischen Uruk. Prosopographische Familie Untersuchungen zu Berufsgruppen des 6. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. in Uruk, Berlin 1979. Peiser, F.E. Babylonische Vertrage des Berliner Museums, Berlin 1890. BV Sack, R.H. Cuneiform Documents from the Chaldean and Persian Periods, CDCPP Selinsgrove/London/Toronto 1994. Weisberg, D.B. Guild Structure and Political Allegiance in early Achaemenid YNER 1 Mesopotamia (= YNER l), New Havedondon, 1967. Wunsch, C. "Neu- und spatbabylonische Urkunden aus dem Museum von AuOr 15 Montserrat", AuOr 15 (1997), 139-194.
A FINGER IN EVERY PIE: THE INSTITUTIONAL CONNECTIONS OF A FAMILY OF ENTREPRENEURS IN NEO-BABYLONIAN LARSA' P.-A. BEAULIEU(CAMBRIDGE, MA)
The period extending from the eighth to the third centuries BC in Babylonia is documented by a large number of cuneiform administrative and legal documents which were generated either by official institutions, mainly the temple, or by private families. After a long period of neglect late Babylonian archives have deservedly become the focus of scholarly attention, in particular those stemming from larger sites such as Babylon, Borsippa, Sippar, Uruk and Nippur. The purpose of my communication is to examine a private archive from a smaller, largely overlooked site in that period, Larsa, and to address, taking this archive as a test case, the larger question of this colloquium, which is the interdependency of institutions and private entrepreneurs in Babylonia. Since the texts I will discuss were illegally excavated several decades ago, we do not know the archaeological context in which they were discovered. Therefore the term archive applies to this collection of transactions only insofar as they document the business activities of a family of entrepreneurs whose main protagonists were a man named Mi-Sama3-balifu, son of Lib&, and his son ~ r a d - S a m aalso ~ , named Ardiya. We do not know where these texts were found, and it is not even certain that they were stored together as a separate archive in Antiquity. I will nonetheless refer to this group of documents as an archive, that of 1tti-Sarna3-baliifuand his son ~ r a d - S a m a ~ . The number of texts which have survived from the archive of 1tti-Sama3-balafuand his son is not known precisely. The present study is based on 48 texts, of which more than half are unpubli~hed.~ The breakdown by museum is as follows: 32 texts from the Yale Babylonian Collection (with sigla YBC, NBC and NCBT); 12 texts from the Horn Archaeological Museum of Andrews University, Berrien Springs, Michigan; one text from the Royal Ontario Museum, Toronto; one text from the Vorderasiatisches Museum, Berlin; one text from the collection of the Free Library of Philadelphia; and finally one text from the collection of the Princeton Theological Seminary, which is on permanent loan to the Babylonian Section of the University Museum, University of Pennsylvania. There are certainly more texts to be found in the Horn Archaeological Museum of Andrews University. In his dissertation P. Wright states that the collection of that Museum includes
I wish to thank Prof. William W. Hallo, Curator of the Yale Babylonian Collection, for permission to study the tablets preserved at Yale, and Profs. Ake SjGberg, Erle Leichty, and Steve Tinney for permission to include PTS 2127. Special thanks go to Dr. Karen Nemet-Nejat for allowing me to include texts dated to the reigns of Amd-Marduk and Neriglissar which are scheduled for publication in YOS 16. I am also grateful to the participants in the Leiden Symposium, who made several useful remarks and suggestions which I have incorporated in this revised version of my paper. 2 A complete list and description of these 48 texts is provided in the appendix.
44
P.-A. BEAULIEU
"more than 50 unpublished Neo-Babylonian tablets from Larsa9'.3A similar figure was given to me by Prof. J.A. Brinkrnan.4 These texts range from the middle of the reign of Nebuchadnezzar I1 until the end of that of Nabonidus. Fifteen texts dated to the reign of Nebuchadnezzar I1 were included by Wright in his dissertation on L a r ~ aTwelve .~ of them belong to the archive of 1tti-Samas-balatu and his son. Therefore there remains approximately 35 texts from Larsa in that museum dated mostly to the reign of Nabonidus. If the same proportion turns out to belong to our archive, we can expect them to make up a substantial addition to it. I do not know of any significant body of NeoBabylonian texts from Larsa in any other institution. However, some isolated texts may well turn up here and there. Therefore, the present study is probably based on the majority of the texts, at least about two-thirds of them. This will give us a fairly representative picture of the kind of business conducted by 1tti-Sama~-balitu,his family, and associates. The temporal range of the archive is not very extensive, as least compared with the Egibi and Ea-iliita-bani archives. The earliest text, no.1 (Horn 73.2927), is dated to the 10th month (TebEtu) of the 22nd year of Nebuchadnezzar 11. The latest one, no.48 (YBC 3533), is dated to the 8th month (Arahsamnu) of the 8th year of Cyrus. Therefore the archive extends, in its present form, from the end of the year 583 until the end of the year 53 1. This is a temporal range of only 52 years, covering two generations: the father, Ittigarnag-balitu, who probably died in the 1lth or 12th year of Nabonidus, and his son, Arad-Sama~.The sudden drop in the density of the archive after the Persian takeover in 539 might indicate a decrease in the business activities of the family. This is a moot point, however, since the documents which have come down to us do not necessarily represent the entirety of the original archive.6 If there was indeed such a slowdown in their business at that time, it is uncertain whether this should be attributed to poor entrepreneurial skills on the part of Arad-Sama~,to the emergence of new political circumstances, or to the possibility that the assets of the family may have been divided among several heirs after the death of 1tti-Samag-baliiu,creating financial problems for Arad-Sama~.The latter is still mentioned among the witnesses to a marriage agreement drafted at Larsa in the 8th month (Arahsamnu) of the 6th year of Cambyses (OECT 10 130:24)7, which brings us to the end of the year 524, almost exactly seven years after the last known document from the archive. The geographic range of the archive is limited. The vast majority of the texts were drafted in Larsa (39 texts), two in Uruk (text 41: YOS 19 35; text 47: NCBT 585), one in Borsippa (text 18: NCBT 521), and three in smaller sites of unknown location (text 4: Horn 73.2984; text 30: BIN 2 118; text 37: YOS 19 44). In three texts the city name is lost (text 21: NCBT 609; text 22: YBC 3526; text 40: Stigers, JCS 28 no.50). As for their contents, none of the transactions suggests that the scope of the business operations of P.H. Wright, The City of Lursa in the Neo-Babylonian and Achaemenid Periods: A Study of Urban and Intercity Relations in Antiquity (Ph.D. Dissertation 1994), 94143. I quoted this figure in my article OrNS 60 (1991), 6417. Wright, City of Lursa, 134-166. This raises the question of the representativity of the texts we have. It may be argued, as it has been for several other archives, that the interruption of documentation does not mean the end of the institution, family, or business firm which generated them. We may have texts that were stored separately, or discarded in Antiquity, while the rest of the original archive is irremediably lost or still lies somewhere in the soil of Iraq. OECT 10 130: 24. I~R-*~uTu A-,% 3d1 l r ~ ~ l - d r ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ l ,
A FAMILY OF ENTREPRENEURS IN NEO-BABYLONIAN LARSA
45
1tti-Sarna~-baliifu and his family extended beyond the area immediately surrounding Larsa, although some of the harrinu commercial ventures may have involved trade on a longer distance. Of the family of 1tti-Samag-baliiiu we know nothing before the archive comes into our purview, and none of the members of his family appears in the extant documentation with a patronymic.8 From this we may infer that they did not stem from the urban elite which controlled the temple and its economy, notably the prebendal system. The father of 1tti-Samag-baliitu was named Lib&, but nowhere does he appear in his own capacity. The wife of 1tti-Sama&balitu was Nanaya-kuzbu, daughter of Nanaya-iddin; she is mentioned in text 28 (YOS 19 7). They had three children: Arad-Sama~(Ardiya), who succeeded his father at the helm of the business; their daughter, Innin-Etirat, who is mentioned in text 45 (NCBT 518); and another son, Samag-apla-usur, who acts as witness in text 36 (YOS 19 33). 1tti-Samag-baliitu had two brothers: garnag-zer-iddin, who appears in the archive as witness to several transactions and as principal in text 13 (Horn 73.3056); and Silim-ili, who appears as guarantee in text 7 (NCBT 534) and as witness in text 16 (Horn 73.3065). Samas-zEr-iddin had two sons: Samag-kasir, who is scribe of a few transactions; and Samag-abl@eriba, who is scribe of text 29 (BIN 2 113). 1tti-Samas-baliitu and Arad-Sama~also appear a few times as scribes of their own transactions. The family expanded with the marriage of Arad-Sama~into a branch of the Sama~-birifamily. This is indirectly documented by texts 35 (YOS 6 124) and 48 (YBC 3533). Aya-bipat, also known as Hip$ the daughter of Sama~-z5r-u~abgi, descendant of garnag-biri, and of Bdessunu, daughter of Apll, must have married Arad-Sama~around the 9th year of Nabonidus. She had a brother named Sama~-b5ni-alji. The archive provides us with little information on the assets owned by the family. Nevertheless, the available data is sufficient to conclude that they commanded some wealth. Indirect evidence from land cultivation contracts may indicate that they owned arable land in Larsa and its region. According to the herding contract preserved in text 12 (NCBT 871), 1tti-Samag-baliitu owned a hu~jZtusettlement with a flock of at least 40 sheep (line 2: PAP 40 Us.?jI a ' S[d hu]-~u-e-tu4Sd k~-~UTU-TIN A-Szi Sci Irla-ba-9). Text 22 (YBC 3526) alludes to the fact that he built a house in Larsa, possibly on royal land. We also know that ~ r a d - S a m apossessed ~ slaves; four of them are individually known (text 28: YOS 19 7; text 35: YOS 6 124; text 48: YBC 3533; text 45: NCBT 518). There is no evidence that the family controlled prebendary offices in the temple. The fact that the surviving archive does not contain any document relating to the acquisition of assets by the family other than donations of slaves could indicate that the documents we now have are in fact only a collection of discarded documents, a "dead archive". It is difficult to assess the full range of the business activities of 1tti-garnag-bal@u. Over half of the texts are promissory notes on silver, barley, dates and other commodities, which usually give us little or no information on the transactions which lie behind them. Of particular interest is a group of seven texts related to harriznu commercial ventures. 1tti-Samag-baliitu was involved in such commercial activities both as investor (texts 10 and 13: Horn 73.3060 and 73.3056; text 21: NCBT 609) and as trader (texts 14 and 23: The absence of a patronymic means that identification of members of the family, such as brothers and nephews of ltti-Sama3-bal$u, cannot be fully ascertained. There is no firm evidence, for instance, that Sama5-z~r-iddin,son of Lab%, is the brother of ltti-$amas-balafu, or that Sama~-a~la-u~ur, son of 1tti-Samal-baliifu,is indeed his son. These individuals could just be namesakes.
46
P.-A. BEAULIEU
NCBT 627 and 1071; text 25: ROMCT 2 lo), and even once as guarantee (text 7: NCBT 534). While capital investment usually consisted of silver, the purpose of these contracts was to trade in commodities, as was the case with Iddin-Marduk, descendant of Nur-Sin, the well-known businessman based in Babylon. 1tti-SamaS-balafu apparently traded mostly in barley. It is noteworthy that harranu documents disappear from the archives of Ncr-Sin and 1tti-SamaS-balatu at about the same time, around the third year of Nabonidus for the former, in the reign of Neriglissar for the latter. Unless this is purely coincidental, it is unclear how this change should be interpreted. It could reflect the emergence at that time of new factors, such as changing economic conditions, which may have forced the entrepreneurs engaged in that type of activities to abandon them. Another possibility is that it reflects the normal evolution of these family enterprises, which may have relied heavily on harranu commercial ventures to build up capital assets in the first phase of their development, only to abandon them when the financial basis of the firm had become more secure.9 1tti-SamaS-balatu and his son were also involved in the management of agricultural land. It is quite probable that they owned some land and hired farmers to cultivate it (text 17: YBC 3527). There is also evidence, direct and indirect, that they leased land from large institutional landowners, which they in turn subleased to farm laborers. During the reign of Nabonidus they also probably became tax farmers for large landowning institutions such as the Ebabbar temple in Larsa. In this respect their activities were similar, though probably on a considerably smaller scale, to those of the fermiers gLnLraux of the Eanna temple in the neighboring city of Uruk.lo The activities of the family in commercial ventures and as land managers reveal connections with some of the most powerful institutions of Babylonia in the sixth century. It is these connections which must be investigated if we want to fully understand the position of 1tti-SamaS-balifu in the society of his time and the nature of his business. Of the 48 texts considered here, no less than 20 allude to the institutional connections of IttiSarnaS-balatu and his son ~rad-SamaS.We discern contacts at four different levels. Eight texts document connections with the palace, while business dealings involving 1tti-SamaSbalafu and the upper administration of the Sealand province are recorded in four texts. Eight more texts show evidence of connections with the Ebabbar temple of Larsa, one with the Eanna temple of Uruk. In other terms, the family maintained connections with the four most important institutions in the region of Larsa.
1. The Palace First I will discuss the eight texts which mention connections with the palace. The interpretation of this data is by no means easy, so I will begin with the more obvious
According to Shiff, Nik-Sin, 132-135, Iddin-Marduk decided to withdraw from harranu commercial ventures because of the high risks involved in these operations. By then he had enough confidence and commanded enough resources to concentrate on other activities, no longer needing a high return on his investments. Wunsch, Iddin-Marduk, Vol. I, 38-39, by and large concurs with Shiff. One may posit a similar scenario for the business of 1tti-Samas-baliiiu.Such hypotheses, however, will remain largely speculative as long as we do not know how the harranu commercial activities of these families are related to their other business interests. Cocquerillat, Palmeraies; and Joannbs, TEBR, 126-172.
47
A FAMILY OF ENTREPRENEURS IN NEO-BABYLONIAN LARSA
texts, those which reveal the activities of 1tti-Sama5-bali@as lessee and sublessor of royal land. The first one is text 8 (NCBT 1021).
Text 8 (NCBT 1021) obv. 2. 4. 6. 1o.e. rev. 12. 14. 16. u.e.
~ ~ A P ISd N IKI-~UTU-TIN A-Sd Sd Ila-ba-Si it-ti
IDU-NUMUN 1h~~.~~S ,?d. K I ~ ~ 6 I d W s ~ U - G h - ~A-id i i ~ Sd IdR.IAS-TIN-it3 IKI-~UTU-TIN A-Sd Sd Ila-ba-Si IKI-~UTU-TIN rdl-Se-ziza-hi ina d-&-nu IDU-NUMUN u ~ ~ A P IidN IKI-~UTU-TIN it-ti l d ~ ~ ~ ~ ~& - ~ h - S i l K I - d ~ ~ ~e-lat - ~ IuA.L[A] N 'l LUGAL ik-k~-lu-~u MAR AN.BAR id-nu-d l ~ ~ - d ~ ~ ~ 3 I~NUSKU-Gh-Si a-na i-narn-rdin?-nu?-u?l %nu-kin, 1~1-dSfrA I~EN-DO I~U.GUR-DA A-id Sd IDtJ-a ISUM.NA-SES A-id Sd Iba-la-fu ul d ~ IRU ~ - ~ ~~- ~A-Sd U~T U $dS ~ ~ ISUM.NA-SES UD.UW& IT1 Dug U4 10-KAM
-
~
~
~
MU W K A M
1.e.
l d ~ ~ - ~ i ~ . ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ 'LUGAL~T I N . T I R ~ ~ "1tti-SamaS-balifu, son of LiibiiSi, has employed11 his own farm laborer, as well as his gardener Mukin-zzri, who is (also) the gardener of Nusku-uSabSi, son of Ninurtauballif. After the king has taken his share, Mukin-zeri and the farm laborer of IttiSamaS-baliifu will take for themselves half of the newly harvested dates, in equal proportion to Nusku-uSabSi and 1tti-SamaS-baliitu. 1tti-SamaS-ba1iit.u and NuskuuSabHi will give another iron shovel to the farm laborer. Witnesses: MuSallimMarduk, son of Bd-ibni; Nergal-E'i, son of Ibnii; Niidin-ahi, son Baliitu; and the scribe is Sirikti-SamaS, son of Nidin-ahi. Larsa. Month of TaSritu, 10th day, 34th year of Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon."
The transaction recorded in this document is tantamount to sublease. The king, or, more probably, the managers of the royal estates, had leased out a date orchard to IttiSamaS-baliifu and a man named Nusku-uSabSi, who then assigned their own gardeners and farm laborers to cultivate it, providing them with some new tools. After paying the rent to the king 1tti-SamaS-baliifuand Nusku-uSabSi take half of the yield, the other half Dr. Michael Jursa has informed me that an unpublished text from the British Museum belonging to the archive of Bkl-remanni contains a similar usage of the S stem of izuzzu: BM 42508, line 16ff. nukaribbu Sa PN (the creditor, who has the usufruct of the garden) seb6 ina libbi uSazzaz "PN shall employ therein (in the garden) a gardener of his choice".
P.-A. BEAULIEU
48
A FAMILY OF ENTREPRENEURS IN NEO-BABYLONIAN LARSA
making up the share of the cultivators. The term zittu "share" refers in this context to the share of the yield to which the owner of the field is entitled, that is to say, the rent. The next text, no.27 (NCBT 1242), records a similar operation.
Text 27 (NCBT 1241) obv. 2. 4. 6. 8. 1o.e. 10. rev. 12. 14. 16. 18. u.e. 20.
'52l CUR SE.BARSAG.'DU1 i-mit-'tuql 'id SU~.MIN ISES-rial-a-li-du A-iziid Ile-ti-il lfiENpi-qit-'tuql 'id1 Id&n<-hum>-at-kal ina muh-hi 'Iam?l-ma-a ~ - i ziid ha-bu-ut-'ti1 u I~R-ia A-iz.2 id IKT-~[UTU-TI]N ina UD.UNUG~~ ina 'rnuh-hi me?-e?l i-na[m-din-nu]-u ' pu-ut i-[mit-t]u4 id LUGAL ISES-ia-a-li-dunu-ii
A-iri id l d ~ A - ~ ~ - [ ~ ~ ] ~ - i { I d ~ A - S ~ S . [ ~ ~A-iu S ] -id ~ ll d ~ . ~ ~ ~ - ~ I N - i { u 1 6 U M [If]R-ia ~ ~ ~A-izi ~ id ~ l ~ ~ - d ~ ~ ~ - ~ UD.UN[U&]IT1 BARA U4 25-[KAM] [MU X-KAM]l d ~ . ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ A L - ~ ~ ~ [LUGAIL TIN.TIR~ I[o o i]b-ni ma-la gA.L[A] 'ins muhl-hi mai-kdt-tu4 i-nam-din-nu
~
~
"Fifty-two kurrus of barley, the estimated yield owed, as business agent, to Ahiyaalid, son of Let-ili, the commissioner of Hum-atkal, credited against Amm2, son of Nabutti, and Ardiya, son of 1tti-SamaS-baliitu. They will deliver (the barley) in Larsa at the waterworks.12 Ahiya-did guarantees (payment of) the estimated yield to the king. Witnesses: Samag-ahhe-eriba, son of NabQ-mit-uballit;NabO-ahhe-uSallim, son of Nergal-uba1li.f; and the scribe is Ardiya, son of 1tti-SamaS-balatu. Larsa. Month of Nisannu, 25th day, xth year of Neriglissar, king of Babylon. [o o 01-ibni will deliver the entire share (of the owner of the field, i.e. the king) at the storehouse."
I propose to reconstruct the circumstances of this transaction as follows. Uum-atkal was either an administrator working for the royal household, or a private businessman who had leased land from the king. Abiya-alid, his business agent (bd piqitti), had leased or subleased the land out to Arnml and Ardiya, who presumably employed they own laborers to cultivate it. The present document states the amount of the estimated yield owed by Amm2 and Ardiya to Hum-atkal. Ahiya-alid guarantees
collection of the harvest. A portion of the yield will in turn be paid to the king. The word imittu refers here to the expected yield of the field, which was usually assessed in advance, while zittu denotes that part of the yield which returned to the owner of the field as rent. The involvement of the family in the cultivation of royal land is also evidenced by text 5 (Horn 73.2855), albeit in unclear context13, while we learn from text 22 (YBC 3526) that 1tti-Samag-balatu had built a house in Larsa on land which he apparently obtained from the king in tenure.14 Evidence for leases of royal land during the time of the NeoBabylonian empire is sparse, mainly because the only two significant institutional archives which have survived are the temple archives of Sippar and Uruk.15 Some private archives, however, especially that of Iddin-Marduk, descendant of Nur-Sin, indicate that royal land, like temple land, could be leased out to private contractors.l6 Therefore the involvement of 1tti-SamaS-balitu in the development of royal land seems to reflect normal business practices of that period. Next we must consider four texts which refer to the royal workmen/soldiers (~~~ERIN.MES LUGAL)of 1tti-Sama5-bali.fuand Arad-SamaS (text 3: Horn 73.2908; text 23: NCBT 1071; text 39: AnOr 9 14; text 46: NCBT 958). The term ~iibumay be translated "soldier" as well as "workman". One may presume that the latter applies here, but, as will be discussed shortly, this is by no means assured. In all four cases these "royal workmen1 soldiers" appear in the same context, namely, the transaction contains a clause stating that silver has been given to, or received by them. In text 3 (Horn 73.2908) the context is unclear.17 Text 46 (NCBT 958), dated to the second year of Cyrus, is well preserved, but the context is elusive; a royal workman/soldier appears as principal in a transaction recording his receipt of a quantity of silver paid to him by a third party on behalf of AradSam&, who had by then succeeded his father as head of the business.
Text 46 (NCBT 958) O~V.
2. 4. 13 14
'X ~frP K~J.BABBAR I~KUR.GAL-LUGAL-'BRIT A-[$z~ id l ] d ~ ~ ~ . ~~~ ~AEL R ~- N~LUGAL .M ~ES ;[dl '1'1~-~UTU A-Szi id I K I - d u ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ [ina SU.MIN]I~UTU-NUMUN-BA-id A-s'k i d
The king appears in one of the supplemental clauses of the transaction, but the context is partly lost. Here also the context is partly lost. The relevant clause reads as follows: 1. l ~ ~ -A-s'lid i d ~
Il[a-b]a-s'i aa-a 2. Idu~U-tak-lakA 4 [ q d Id[o o 01-ni ki-a-am 3. iq-bi 'urn1-maqaq-qar 'x x1 KAL-ti 4. i d I ~ N A - N ~ G . D U - OLUGAL RI T I N . T I Rina ~ ~U D . U N U G5~. ~r a ~ l - ~ a - b'2a tfil ina 'lib-bil e-te-pu-us', "IttiSamag-baliiiu, son of Liib.bbSi, spoke to Samag-takliik, son of [o o olni, as follows: 'I took possession of the land 'x x1 x x of Nebuchadnezza.,king of Babylon, and built a house on it'.". 1 5 There is at least one document from Babylon, Nbk 115, which alludes to a lease of royal land during the reign of Nebuchadnezzar 11. It is discussed by Dr. C. Wunsch in her contribution to this
volume. See Jursa, Af0 42/43 (1995-96),257-258. This transaction is expressed in the form of a dialogue document, but the operative section is poorly preserved. It is clear, however, that 1tti-Samal-baliiuagrees to give a sum of nine shekels of silver to one Ualdiya. There follows this supplemental clause: 8. ' K U ~ . B A B B As'd R l d ~ ~ - t a - ~ i m - m uA-Sz.2 - r O s'd ~~ I ~ K A - K A M9. 1 6 ~ ~ f ~ - ~id-din-nu, ~ ~ ~ "He ~ - paid s ' the l i silver of Nabfi-talimmu-usur,son of Ba'u-erel, his royal workman/soldier". 17
l 2 The reading of 'me?-e?l, though not entirely certain, is supported by the occurrence of a similar expression in text 40 (Stigers, JCS 28, no.50), edited below: 6. ina UGU A.MES GAL.M[E$]7. i-namdin.
49
~
~
A FAMILY OF ENTREPRENEURS IN NEO-BABYLONIAN LARSA
6. rev. 8. 10. 12. 14.
[ I B ] A - S ~ -a-na ~ S ~muh-hi [llk-d~TUIGI-er 1fim~-kin-ni*~60-~u-~~Ol A-izi $6 I d u . ~ u ~ - s Z T ~ - s u ~ I~UTU-NUMUN-MU ~ - i zid i lla-ba-ii u I%JMBISAG Iim-bi-d30 A-izi id I~UTU-NLJMUN-BA-id A Ikur-ri-i UD.UNU& IT1 SE [U4 x]+I~-KAMMU 2-KAM [Iku-r]ai LUGAL. KUR.KUR "'xl shekels of silver, (which) Amurru-Sar-usur, son of Amurru-ibni, the royal workman/soldier of ~rad-SamaS,son of 1tti-SamaS-balgfu,has received from &ma$zEr-iqiSa, son of IqiSa-Marduk, on behalf of ~rad-SamaS.Witnesses: Anu-Sum-ibni, son of Nergal-tSi-Efir; Sama5-zer-iddin, son of Lab2Si; and the scribe is Imbi-Stn, son of SamaS-zEr-iqiSa, descendant of Kuri. Larsa. Month of Addaru, [o]+l2th day, 2nd year of Cyrus, king of the lands."
in this transaction are unclear, The precise roles of SamaS-zer-iqi~aand ~rad-Sarna~ mainly because of the vagueness of the prepositions ina qati and ana mubhi. It is quite probable that SamaS-zEr-iqiSa is the agent of ~rad-SamaS.The latter could be either creditor or debtor of Amurru-Sar-usur, that is to say, this transaction could record either the payment of an obligation, or the receipt of a loan. More explicit are texts 23 (NCBT 1071) and 39 (AnOr 9 14), which are both interconnected with a third transaction, text 24 (YBC 3541). Text 23 is a promissory note on silver invested in a barranu partnership agreement; 1tti-SamaS-balatu is the junior partner (trader) and creditor of the silver, which is qualified in the supplemental clause as silver which he had paid his royal workmadsoldier. A piece of property belonging to the debtor is pledged as collateral. The name of the debtor, Biniya, son of Bunene-ibni, can be restored from text 39.
Text 23 (NCBT 1071) obv. 2. 4. 6. 8. 10. 1o.e. rev. 14.
6 G ~ NKO.BABBAR id IKI-~~~UTU-TIN [A-iziid] [la-ba-a-[ii] rid1 KASKAL.MIN id I[o o o] 'A-E id1 I d ~ N - S Uina ~ rmuh-&l [[DO-id] A-izi id ldbu-rne-ne-~ZT1 [ina?] 'ITI? ziZ?l K~J.BABBAR'a4 6' G ~ N ina SAG.DU-'SA~ ina UD.UNUG~~ i-nam-din qaq-qa-ru tid a-na i-tu-zi $6 IMU-DU A-id tid I~NA-NUMUN-MU 3 a-na i-tu-z.i id l d ~ ~ ~ - ~ A-izi ~ ~ id~ ~ - a - n i I~UTU-NUMUN-BA-J'~ mai-rka-nul IKI-~UTU-TI~J rlfi~~~l-z.i [id]-nam-ma a-na mu@-h]i [ul] i-ial-lat a-di-[i l ] K I - d ~ [ ~ ~ - ~ l ] ~
~ K ~ J . B A B B Ai-ial-liR - ? ~ ~'m~u1 K~J.BABBAR[o] rid a-na l f i ~ ~ i ~ - ~id-din-[n]u ~ ~ ~ ~ l[o]- i z i [I]r ~ ~ l - [A-$U ~ ~id?I ]d ~ A - ' ~ m u pu-utl ~-~u [e-t&ru] nu-ii [lfilrrnu-kin-nil [ l l r ~ ~ ~ . ~A-izi ~ l id - S Irba-la1-[tu] ~ S IrNUMUN1-ia A-tizi id l d r ~ ~ l - [ ~ hA] -Irxli i [o 01 [DO-a A-izi id IMU-rxl u WMBISAG I~'uTu?-x-x~ A-[hi id] Iba-bi-id A [Ifi]r~AL1-[~fi] ITI~ 'Sul UD.UNUG ~ U4 'LrKAM1 MU^ 1-KA[MLU-~]'SO~ LUGAL TIN.[TIRki]
16. 18. 20. 22. u.e. 24. 1.e.
"Six shekels of silver, belonging to 1tti-SamaS-balilu, son of Lab&, (and to) the harrGnu capital investment of [o o 01, son of BEl-Efir, credited against [Baniya], son of Bunene-ibni. He will repay the silver, namely six shekels, in its principal, in the month of Sabafu(?), in Larsa. (His) piece of land which adjoins the property of Sumukin, son of NabQ-zEr-iddin, and which adjoins the property of SamaS-Sarranu, son of SamaS-zer-iqi~a,stands as collateral for 1tti-SamaS-balalu. No other creditor will have power of disposition (over the collateral) until 1tti-SamaS-balaiu is repaid his silver. This is the silver which he paid his royal workmadsoldier. Sum-[ukin?], son of NabQ-zEr-iddin, guarantees repayment of the silver. Witnesses: Nadin-abi, son of Baliilu; Zriya, son of NabQ-uSabSi,descendant of [o o 01; Ibnb, son of Mu-[o 01; and the scribe is SamaS(?)-'x xl, son of Babiya, descendant of the rub-banf. Larsa. Month of DQzu(?),4th day, 1st year of AmEl-Marduk, king of Babylon." Text 39 is also a promissory note in which roughly the same amount of silver (seven instead of six shekels) is owed by the same Bitniya to 1tti-SamaS-balifu.The silver is again described as a sum that had been paid by 1tti-SamaS-baliifuto his royal workman, but an additional clause specifies that it is credited against Baniya, on which basis one may surmise that Baniya was the royal workmadsoldier in question. A piece of fallow land, which might be identical with the one pledged in the previous text, is put as collateral:
Text 39 (AnOr 9 14; collated) obv. 2. 4. 6. 8. 10.
'7%G ~ N K~LBABBARid 11~1-~UTU-TIN A-izii d Ila-ba-a-ii ina muh-hi IDB-ia A-Szi id <> Idbu-ne-ne-DO ina IT1 SIG4 K~J.BABBAR a4 7 GfN ina U D . U N U G ~i-nam-din ~ qaq-qar lfiki-iub-bu-zi 'x x x1 a-na i-tu-5 i d l d ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ A L - a n - n i 3 a-na i-tu-zi i d ISES-im-me-e a-na i-tu-zi id [MU-DU
P.-A. BEAULIEU
52
mabka-nu $4 IKI-~UTU-TIN a-di IKI-~UTU-TIN K~.BABBAR-~~~ in-ni-tir K ~ . B A B B A Rid a-na I~~ERIN.MES LUGAL!-S~ ina mub-hi-izi id-din*-nu lfimu-kin-ni I~NA-~~~-~~-DING A-id I R id .MES l d [ ~ . ~ ~ ~ - i n a ] - 'A ~*t lJ l~ d* -~ ~~~ -~ * i a r - ~ i - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ S IM[u*]-KAM*A-izi [id] Iba-la-[u I i ~ - ~ l a * ~A-izi -[a id 1 ] ~A 1 6~~ A L - ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ u ~%JM[BISAG 10 o oIrx1-a A-izi id Id[o o o o o A 1 6 ~GU4] ~ ~ ~ uD.U[IWGki IT1 SI]G4*? U4 [x-KAM MU X-KAIM* rest lost on upper edge
1o.e. rev. 14. 16. 18. 20. 22.
A FAMILY OF ENTREPRENEURS IN NEO-BABYLONIAN LARSA 6. 8.
10. 12. rev. 14. 16. 18. 20.
"Seven shekels of silver, belonging to 1tti-Samag-baliiiu, son of Liib?iSi, credited against Biiniya, son of Bunene-ibni. He will repay the silver, namely seven shekels, in the month Simanu, in Larsa. The vacant lot 'x x x1 which adjoins the property of Samag-~arranu,that of Ah-imme, and that of Sum-ukin, stands as collateral for IttiSamag-baliitu until he is repaid his silver. This is the silver which he paid his royal workmen/soldiers, to be credited against him. Witnesses: NabQ-Sarjji-ili, son of [Nergal-ha]-Mi-eir, descendant of NabQ-Sarhi-ili;Sum-ere:, descendant of Baliiiu; $1.112, son of BEl-zei, descendant of the rub-bani; and the scribe is [o o o] son of [o o 01, descendant of the oxherd. Larsa. Month of Simanu(?), xth day, xth year of [o o o, king of Babylon]."
22. 24. u.e. 26.
obv. 2. 4.
[IDO-id u f ] i n a - ~ . ~ A B ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ - i - l a t [ A . M E S -id] ~ ~'Idlbu-ne-ne-DO ~ A1 6 ~ ~ ~ . r ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ 1 [ina hu-ud] 'lib1-bi-% qaq-qar lbki-i~b-~bu-zil [a-n]a i-tu-zi i d l d u ~ ~ - ~ U ~ A L - a n - [ n i ] [A-id id I] r d ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ a-na ~ ~i-tu-[dl - ~ ~ l - [ $ d ]
There is more than sufficient space in the break at the beginning of line 1 to restore the name of Baniya. I presume that Ina-Ebabbar-ilat is his sister. Although 'lib1-bi-$6in line 3 indicates a singular subject, I posit a scribal omission in view of the clear plural verb in line 12: [ild-din-nu-u'.
~
~
-
~
~
~
"[Biiniya and] Ina-Ebabbar-ilat, [children ofl Bunene-ibni, descendant(s) of the potter, of their own free will, have sold (their) piece of fallow land which adjoins the property of Samag-~arranu,son of Samag-z~r-iqiga,and the property of MU-[o 01, son of Silim-BEl, up to the wide alley, the passageway of the people, be it more or less, as much as there is, for the complete price of six shekels of silver, to 1tti-3ama~baliiw, son of Liib2Si. Niidin-ahi, son of Baliitu, bears responsibility for anyone acting illegally and for any claimant that may arise regarding this piece of fallow land. At the sealing of this document. Witnesses: NabQ-kabit-ili, son of Ina-qibi-Bd, descendant of EppeH-ili; Sum-ukin, son of Silim-BEl; NabQ-bunu-Hi~tur,son of Samag-5th; NabQ-ugallim, son of MuSallim-Marduk; Ah-imme, son of Ser2(?); and the scribe is Innin-Sum-uSabgi, son of Iddin-Marduk. Larsa. Month of Arasamnu, 25th day, xth year of Amd-Marduk, king of Babylon."
The next text does not mention royal workmedsoldiers, but it is obviously related to the previous two transactions. Although the object of the transaction is a piece of fallow land (qaqqaru kiiubbfi), the standard Neo-Babylonian formulary for sales of mobilia is used instead of the formulary for sales of real estate. This should indicate that the transaction is not a real sale of land. The piece of land transacted is in fact the one which had previously been pledged to 1tti-Sarnag-balaw by Biiniya, and the price for which it is allegedly sold is equal to the amount of the debt for which it had been pledged. Therefore the transaction simply records the transfer of the pledge from the debtors, Biiniya and his family, to the creditor, 1tti-Sama~-baliiw:l8
Text 24 (YBC 3541)
id IMU-[o]r ~ - i zs'ia" I~i-lim-~EN a-di-i muh-hi ma-la-ku rub-iu]-zi mu-ta-qa WN.MESa-tar u ma-tu ma-la ba-iu-zi a-na 6 GfN K ~ . B A B B A R a-na SAMgum-ru-tu a-na IKI-~UTU-TIN A-izi id Irlal-ba-ii [ild-din-nu-u' [pu-ut lfilsi-hu-ziu lfipa-qir-ra-[nu] [s'a'ina UGU] qaq-qar 16ki-iub-bu-zi [il-l]a-a' ISUM.NA-SES A-iziid Iba-lat 'nu-iil ina ka-nak IM.DUB MU.MES lfimu-kin7I~NA-IDIM-DINGIR.MES A-izi id I i n ~ - ~ i - b i A- ~IDU-~~-DINGIR.MES E~ IMU-DU~ - i zid i Isi-~im-~EN I~NA-bu-un-iu-tur A-izi id l d ~ I~NA-GI A-izi id IGI-~AMAR.UD ISES-im-me-e A-izi $d IEDIN-a' u ~ J M B I S A Gl d i n n i n - n a - ~ ~ - ~ . k - i i [A-SV]zirid ~ M U - ~ UD.UNU& SG [IT1 AP]IN U4 25-KAM [MU X-KAM] l ~ d - d ~ ~ ~ ~ . U D [LUGAL TIN.TI]R~~
53
These texts do not yield any direct information as to the role played by these royal workrnen/soldiers in the business activities of 1tti-Samag-baliitu and his son. In order to clarify their role we must look at other private archives from that period.lg The EgibUNiirSin archive contains several documents related to "royal workrnedsoldiers". Four of them are found among the transactions of Iddin-Mard~k:~O Lab 3 (CM 3b, no.85); TCL 12 76
In addition to the evidence discussed here, transactions involving the ~iibZ-5arriare also found in archive of Sar-taribi, son of Bunene-ibni, from Sippar, discussed in Dr. A.C.V.M. Bongenaar's contribution in this volume, p.89f.
the 20
CM 3b = Wunsch, Zddin-Marduk, Vol.11, text edition.
54
P.-A. BEAULIEU
(CM 3b, no.106); Nbn 103 (CM 3b, no.112); and Iraq 59 (1997), 128 text n 0 . 4 7 . ~In~ Lab 3 a jab Sarri appears as recipient of a sum of silver owed to Iddin-Marduk. In TCL 12 76, a jab iarri takes one third of the share, together with his brothers (also presumably @be Sarri), in the harvest (zittu) of a field they are apparently cultivating. Nbn 103 lays out the terms of the transaction much more explicitly. It is a promissory note on silver in which the creditor is Iddin-Marduk and the debtors are a man and his mother. They put as collateral a date orchard which had already been pledged to Iddin-Marduk. The silver loaned is qualified as follows: 15. K ~ . B A B B A Sa'Ra-na ri-kis-si MURU Sa' ~ ~ E R ~ N . MLUGAL E S Eki, "this is silver for the equipment of workmen/soldiers of the king of Babylon". The same clause appears in the recently published text Iraq 59 (1997), 128 no.47, also a transaction of the Iddin-Marduk/Niir-Sin archive. It is a receipt of silver by a man and his daughter-in-law for the equipment of his son: 5. K~.BABBAR ri-ik-su MURU $6 I~EN-GI6. ~ ~ E R ~ N . MLUGAL, ES "this is silver for the equipment of Bd-uSallim, a royal workman/soldier". The silver received is qualified as the ilku obligation of NabQ-uSallim (1. il-ki 2. $6 I d ~ A - ~ la) well-known , business partner of Iddin-Marduk. These transactions range from the reign of Nebuchadnezzar I1 to that of Nabonidus and are therefore very valuable for comparison with those from the archive of 1tti-SamaSbalatu. Similar transactions are also found in the later Egibi archive, mostly in texts dated to the reign of Darius 1.22 Van Driel has remarked that these transactions seem to anticipate an operation well attested in the MuraSQ archive, which consisted in making loans to landholding tenants, who in turn pledged their piece of property as collaterals.23 These loans were often taken to fulfill military duties connected with the land held in tenure. When the debtors defaulted on repayment of the loan the MuraSQfirm took control of the pledged land. The tenants were allowed to retain use of the land, but now owed rent and other obligations to the firm.24 This allows us to possibly clarify the transactions from the archive of 1tti-$amasbalifu which involve "royal workmen/soldiers", especially the three interconnected transactions recorded in texts 23 (NCBT 1071), 39 (AnOr 9 14) and 24 (YBC 3541). Here also land is pledged twice against quantities of silver loaned to royal workmen1 soldiers by 1tti-SamaS-balitu (texts 23 and 39). These quantities of silver were presumably used to equip royal ~orkrnen/soldiers,~5 or to fulfill other obligations, taxes and services to the crown. In the end ownership of a pledged field is transferred to him, evidently upon failure to repay the loan. Since the formulary for sales of real estate is not used, one may infer that 1tti-SamaS-baliitu does not become the real owner of the field, only the long term holder of the antichresis.26 As is sometimes the case in such transactions, family members of the debtor also appear as principals, in this case, if my
A FAMILY OF ENTREPRENEURS IN NEO-BABYLONIAN LARSA
55
reconstruction is correct, Biniya's sister, Ina-Ebabbar-ilat. The interest of businessmen like 1tti-SamaS-baliitu, Iddin-Marduk, and others in this type of transaction probably lay in the possibility, through gaining control of the pledged fields, of using agricultural yields and manpower to their own advantage. The indebted tenants of the fields were now obliged to pay rent to them in nature, and to fulfill work assignments for them. The profits could serve to finance their other entrepreneurial activities, since it is probable that all aspects of their business were interconnected. The transactions just discussed raise many interpretive problems, and I am aware that several more points need to be clarified. In spite of their difficulties and small number, however, they provide clear evidence that 1tti-$amas'-balam's business activities depended in part on his connections with the royal administration, both in his capacities as land manager (lessee, sublessee and sublessor of royal land) and as tax farmer (provider of credit against pledge to fulfill obligations to the crown). 2. The Sealand Provincial Administration We now turn to the four texts which reveal the existence of business connections between 1tti-SamaS-balim and the upper administration of the Sealand province. The Sanfi official of the Sealand appears as capital investor in two harranu documents preserved in the archive. In text 14 (NCBT 627), which is a promissory note on barley invested in a harranu partnership by NabQ-Sar-usur,the Santi official of the Sealand27, 1tti-SamaSbalitu appears as junior partner, that is to say, trader. In text 7 (NCBT 534), also a promissory note on barley where the Sanz.2 of the Sealand (unnamed) is again the investor and the trader is one Nergal-iddin, 1tti-SamaS-balitu and his brother Silim-ili act as guarantees, the latter of the present transaction, the former of a previous obligation presumably related to the same operations. Two other transactions are very probably related to these harriinu documents. Text 26 (YNER 1 5) records a deposition made by a certain Baniya, son of Dannu-Nergal, before a group of witnesses headed by NabQ-Sarusur, the Sanfi of the Sealand, and Bd-Siizibanni, the qipu of the Ebabbar temple. Baniya, acting as agent for Bel-Stir-NabQ,son of NabQ-mar-Sarri-usur,testifies that he received from 1tti-SamaS-balim a sum of 51 kurrus of barley.28 The creditor, BEl-etir-NabQ, is in all probability identical with the other Bel-Etir-Nab0 who appears, without filiation, in text 16 (Horn 73.3065) as the creditor of a quantity of barley put at the disposal of 1tti-SamaSbalitu (ina pani) and owed to the latter by a third party:
Text 16 (Horn 73.3065; not collated, previous edition in Wright, Diss. no.8) 21 22
Jursa, Iraq 59 (1997), 97-174. They belong to the fourth generation of the Egibi family and are discussed by Dr. C. Wunsch in her contribution to this volume, p. I06ff. 23 van Driel, JESHO 32 (1989), 210-212, who discusses a number of Neo- and late Babylonian transactions involving the ~ i i b - h r r i . 24 This is described in Stolper, Entrepreneurs, 27-28 and 104-107. 25 As pointed out by van Driel, JESHO 32 (1989), 212, not all rikis qabli loans and payments had military purposes since VS 4 139 mentions the rikis qabli for a boatman (16Mh.LAu4). 26 This may be analogous to the operation named "conversion" by Stolper (Entrepreneurs, 105), whereby the pledge, which began as a hypothec, became an antichresis upon failure to repay the loan. This, however, did not extinguish the right of the debtor to redeem his pledge.
O ~ V . 2 GUR 4 BAN SE.BAR ia' l ~ A-Szi S6 Ila-ba-5' ina SE.BAR 2. Sa' IE~-e-t&ru-dNA Sa' ina pa-ni-Szi ina muh-hi 4.
-
d
~
~
~
-
~
~
~
-
27
The text reads: I . r l d ~ ~ l - ~2. lfiMIN-li ~ [ ~ M ~ KUR ~ -tam-ti. ~ ~ The ~ restoration ] NabQ-m[ir-SarriU S U is ~ ]less likely because traces are slightly better for LUGAL than for DUMU, and also because there does not seem to be quite enough space on the tablet to restore m[ir-Sarri-usur]. 28 Edition of this text with collations in OrNS 60 (1991), 61-63.
P.-A. BEAULIEU
56
A FAMILY OF ENTREPRENEURS IN NEO-BABYLONIAN LARSA
Iri-mut (erasure) A-3d id Ia-hu-izi-nu IT1 GU4
6.
who was NabQ-mar-Sarri-usur's successor as Sanfi of the Sealand.30 We see 1tti-SamaSbalitu act as trader for NabQ-gar-usurin text 14 (NCBT 627), dated to the 37th year of Nebuchadnezzar 11. It is therefore not surprising to see NabQ-Sar-usurhead the list of witnesses in text 26 (YNER 1 5), since the deposition probably concerns residual obligations from the partnership established between 1tti-SamaS-balatu and his predecessor some years earlier. A number of questions remain to be answered. Were these ianfi officials acting in a private or an official capacity? Were their investments in these partnerships drawn from their own personal assets, or from the resources at the disposal of the provincial administration? And, accordingly, did the resulting profits accrue to them as personal income, or to the provincial treasury? In the latter case the position of 1tti-SamaS-balitu would be similar to that of many Old Babylonian t a m k i i r u s , who engaged in commissioned trade in order to provide the palatial administration with much needed supplies of staple commodities and raw materials. If these transactions were entirely private, on the other hand, then the type of business conducted by the i a n i i official, IttiSamaS-balifu, and their associates, would be no different from that evidenced by the archive of Iddin-Marduk, descendant of Niir-Sin: the seeking of short term profit in the trading of commodities. From what we know of the function of harranu transactions in that period, I would rather be inclined to assume that the ;and officials were investing privately. The important fact remains, however, that 1tti-SamaS-balim was able to exploit that official connection in order to engage in profitable business operations.
SE.BAR ina SAG.DU-izi 1o.e. rev. 10.
'inal UD.UNU& ina KA ka-lak-ka i-nam-din Ifimu-kin-nu
l d ~ . ~ ~ ~ - i n aA-izi - ~ id t Jl & ~ ~~ ~~ -~s u
12. 14. u.e. 1.e.
I d ~ ~ - ~ U -A-$h D 0 id IN~G.DU l s i - ~ i m A-hi - ~ i~d Ila-ba-ii ~ ~ ~ ~ u ~ M B I S A GI~NA-DU-A A-?zi i d I~AMAR.UD-KAM A %IPA GU4 U D . U N U G ~ IT1 BARA U4 4-KAM 'MU1 39-KAM d ~ A - M ~LUGAL . ~ ~ - ~ ~
"Two kurrus and four satus of barley, owed to Mi-SamaS-balitu, son of Lib2Si, from the barley belonging to Bel-elk-NabQwhich is at his (1tti-SamaS-bala?xy s) disposal, is credited against Rimiit, son of AhuSunu. He will repay the barley in its principal in the month of Ayaru in Larsa, at the gate of the storehouse. Witnesses: Nergal-inatES?-Etir, son of Balissu; Ea-Sum-ibni, son of Kudurm; Silim-ili, son of LibaSi; and the scribe is NabQ-mukin-apli,son of Marduk-ere$, descendant of the oxherd. Larsa. Month of Nisannu, 4th day, 39th year of Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon."
3. The Ebabbar Temple
One additional piece of information must be provided in order to understand how these transactions are related. The earliest transaction is text 7 (NCBT 534), dated to the 33rd year of Nebuchadnezzar 11. The unnamed ianfi official who appears there as investor is in all probability NabQ-mar-Sarri-u~ur,known from an unpublished text to have occupied that function in the 35th year of Nebuchadnezzar IL29 This NabQ-mar-Sarri-u~ur is almost certainly the father of Bel-etir-NabQ, who appears a few years later in texts 16 (Horn 73.3065) and 26 (YNER 1 5), dated respectively to the 39th year of Nebuchadnezzar I1 and the 3rd year of Neriglissar. This allows us to posit that the obligations recorded in these last two documents belong, together with text 7 (NCBT 534), to a stream of interconnected transactions. All the obligations involve barley, and the brother of 1tti-$mag-balitu, Silim-ili, who appears as witness in text 16 (Horn 73.3065), acts as guarantee in text 7 (NCBT 534). Although the term harriinu does not appear in texts 16 (Horn 73.3065) and 26 (YNER 1 5), it is most probable that the obligations they record were pursuant to the barriinu business partnership initiated by 1tti-SamaS-balitu and the father of BEl-etir-NabQ,NabQ-m&--Sarri-usur,when the latter was i a n h official of the Sealand. 1tti-SamaS-baliitu formed a similar business partnership with NabQ-Sar-usur,
29 PTS 2573: 2. I*NA-DUMU-LUGAL-ORI '"IN-~i Sd kurt[a-an-ti], "NabQ-m5r-Sarri-u~ur,the Sanii d ~ A ~ 5. I 6~~ 1 N ~ - uSd ' kurta-an(sic)-ti ~ ~ ~(Date: ~ Nbk~ official of the Sealand"; also 4. I 35111/13). This text is drafted at Babylon. It is a promissory note to repay a sum of silver, the property of the Lady-of-Uruk. The debtor is NabQ-m&--Sani-u~ur.
57
Since the family of 1tti-Sama&balifuresided in Larsa and made that city the base of their business activities, it would be surprising if the Ebabbar temple, the focus of Larsa's civic and religious life, were absent from the archive. Eight texts document connections with that sanctuary and its administration. The four earliest ones, dated to the later years of Nebuchadnezzar I1 and to the reign of Neriglissar, indicate connections between IttiSamaS-balitu and the Ebabbar temple, but do not reveal any business involvement in the affairs of the sanctuary. In text 11 (NCBT 5 17) NabQ-kibsu-Sarri-usur,the qlpu official of the Ebabbar temple, heads a panel of judges who adjudicate a legal dispute in favor of IttiSamaS-balatu. The scribe is Bel-abbe-iqiSa, son of NabQ-kibsu-Sar-u~ur. In text 20 (Horn 73.2642), 1tti-SamaS-balitu and two other individuals assume personal guarantee (bail) for a man, promising to bring him to NabQ-kibsu-Sarri-u~ur, the qipu official of Ebabbar, on a certain date. In case of failure they will pay a quantity of silver, presumably the equivalent of the debt owed by that man. 1tti-SamaS-balitu is the scribe. This type of transaction is frequently attested in the archive of the Eanna temple in Uruk.31 Text 25 (ROMCT 2 10) is a harriinu contract in which 1tti-SamaS-balim is the investor. A certain SamaS-uballit, son of NabQ-kibsu-Sarri-usur,is a witness. If the latter is identical with the qlpu of Ebabbar, it would provide one more hint at the existence of personal connections
~
-
~
~
30 NabO-Sar-u~urand NabO-m5r-Sarri-usur are two distinct individuals who were both Sanii of the ~ Sealand. They occur together once in the same text: YNER 1 5 (lines 1 and 16). 31 According to G. van Driel's recent calculation in his article "The Eanna Archive", BiOr 55 (1998), 74, s.v. 'Bail Protocols', 55 such texts belonging to the Eanna archive have so far been published.
P.-A. BEAULIEU
58
between 1tti-SamaS-balaiu and the upper administration of the temple. Finally text 26 (YNER 1 5), discussed above, is a deposition before witnesses concerning receipt of a quantity of barley owed by 1tti-SamaS-balitu to the son of the former governor of the Sealand, probably in connection with their joint commercial activities. Heading the list of witnesses are Nabfi-Sar-upr, the SanG official of the Sealand, and BEl-Stizibanni, the qlpu of Ebabbar, very probably the immediate successor of Nabfi-kibsu-Sarri-usur in that post. These four texts, while they bespeak the prominence of 1tti-SamaS-balitu, do not offer evidence that he was directly involved in the affairs of the temple. A change apparently occurred during the reign of Nabonidus, however, as evidenced by four texts belonging to the latter part of the archive. Two of them are related to the collection of the tithe owed to the Ebabbar temple. In text 33 (YOS 19 55), dated to the 9th year of Nabonidus, Nidin-abi, the qlpu of Ebabbar, witnesses the receipt of 48 kurrus of dates as partial payment of the arrears of the tithe (eirG) owed to the temple by 1tti-SamaS-balam. The arrears in question totalled 260 kurrus of dates.32
A FAMILY OF ENTREPRENEURS IN NEO-BABYLONIAN LARSA
collect a tithe on royal land leased out to private tenants.33 The latter possibility seems to be the more likely here since we know that 1tti-SamaS-balifu was involved in the cultivation of royal land. A third possibility is that he had become tax farmer (tithe collector) for the temple, and was responsible for collecting the tithe in a given farming area which was under the control of the Ebabbar. This possibility deserves consideration in view of text 47 (NCBT 585), dated to the fourth year of Cyms:
Text 47 (NCBT 585) obv. 2.
Text 33 (YOS 19 55) obv. 2. 4. 6. 8. rev. 10.
12. 14.
ina zi-&ti $6 260 GUR rx ~ hZU.LUM.MA l re-hi-it ei-rr~-zil [id] ina mub-hi IKI-~UTU-TIN A-izi id Ila-ba-ii ina lib-bi 48 'GUR~ Z~.LUM.MAa-na N~G.GA ~UTU ma-hir ina GUB-zu id %uM.NA-SES~ rlsqzl-i-pi i d ~'B.BABBAR.RA l6mu-kin7 ld~~-re-rsu-zil-[a] 'LU SAG LUGAL1 [I]'KI-SIG-~~NA 'A1-% id IdEIN-re-man-nil A Ie-gi-bi P I - ~ U T A-izi U id I~UTU-NUMUN-MUA I~ME.ME-'MU-GIS~ ~ ~ U M B I S AIba-la[-su G A-id id 1 d ~ ~ ~ - r ~ ~ - 6 ~ ~ 1 r ~ QANGA l ~ U T UUD.UNU& [IITI BARA U4 7-KAM MU 9-KAM LUGAL TIN.TIR~~ ~NA-N~.TUK
"From a promissory note of 260 kurrus and x satus of dates, the remainder of the tithe owed by 1tti-SamaS-balatu, son of Lib&, 48 kurrus of dates have been received for the treasury of SamaS. In the official presence of Niidin-&i, the qlpu of Ebabbar. Witnesses: Bel-resti'a, a royal servant; Itti-enSi-NabQ, son of BEl-[remannil, descendant of Egibi; Arad-SamaS, son of SamaS-zer-iddin, descendant of GulaSumu-liSir; (and) the scribe is Balissu, son of SamaS-Sum-usur, descendant of the iangG of SamaS. Larsa. Month of Nisannu, 7th day, 9th year of Nabonidus, king of Babylon." In what capacity was 1tti-SamaS-balitu obligated to pay a tithe to the Ebabbar sanctuary? In that period tithes were not paid only on land which was leased or held in tenure from the temple. As noted by Jursa, the temple apparently also had the right to 32
This text was also edited and discussed in OrNS 60 (1991), 72.
59
1o.e. rev. 10.
20 GUR ZU.LUM.MA N~G.GA '~UTU~ u da-a $4 SU.MIN11~-~UTU A-iziid IKI-~UTU-TIN ina mub-hi l d ~ ~ ~ - ~ U N -A-Zzi ~ Aid ~ - i i I~UTU-DO ina IT1 GAN Z~.LUM.MA a4 20 GUR ina uNUGki i-nam-din rei-ru-zil [id] 'URU? x AN x x1 '2 f ~ [o] l 'lfilmu-kin-ni I~UTU-'TIN-SU-E A-iziid1 INUMUN-id Irnal-din r ~ - i zid1 i A hi-din?-ti?l rbza-qi-bi-d~~ rIba-la-tu ~ - i z$6 i IBA-id-a1 u I~UMBISAG Irx dl-[o]-'zil 'A-izi id1 Ina-din U[NUGIU] IT1 KIN U4 '22'-KAM MU 4-KAM [Ilku-rai LUGAL E~~ u KUR.KUR.MES "Twenty kurrus of dates, the property of SamaS and Aya, through the agency of ~rad-SamaS,son of 1tti-SamaS-balaiu, credited against SamaS-z~r-u~ab~i, son of SamaS-ibni. He will repay the dates, namely twenty kurrus, in the month Kislimu, in Uruk. This is the tithe of 'the city(?) x x x XI and of the canal [o]. Witnesses: SamaSbalissu-iqbi, son of Zeriya; Nidin, son of Ina-qibi-Bd, descendant of Nidintu(?); Balaiu, son of IqiS2; and the scribe is [o o 01, son of Niidin. Uruk. Month of Ululu, 22nd day, 4th year of Cyrus, king of Babylon and the lands."
The position of Arad-SamaS in this transaction appears to be that of an intermediary. He may well be acting as tithe collector for the temple, filling the same position as the i a mubbi eirf of Neo-Babylonian Sippar, who leased the right to collect the tithe on temple land, keeping part of the income and returning a fixed amount to the temple annually.34 Therefore there is a distinct possibility that this was also the role of his father in text 33 (YOS 19 55). Text 38 (PTS 2127) may be related to the same operations. 33 34
See Jursa, AfO 42/43 (1995-96),258a, n.6; and by the same author, Tempelzehnt, 8. On tithe in general, as well as tithe collectors in Neo-Babylonian Sippar, see Jursa, Tempelzehnt.
P.-A. BEAULIEU
60
A FAMILY OF ENTREPRENEURS IN NEO-BABYLONIAN LARSA
Text 38 (PTS 2127)
i-nam-din IBA-id-a r ~ i r . x~x1 ~ ~ ~ A ~ reverse lost
1o.e. 3-6 1 GU4 $u~-ZU-ZU a-na 12 GUR Z~.LUM.MA ina re-& rid inal IGI l ~ ~ A-$d $d Ila-ba-ii a-na $.BABBAR.RAIGI-er ina GUB-zuid IMU-SES lfiqi'-i-pi id B.BABBAR.RA &nu-kin-ni IKI-SIG-~NA A-id id id^^-re-man-ni A Ie-gi-bi u WMBISAG ITIN-su A-$6id A ~ ~ ~ S A N~GUAT U I~UTU-MU-ORI UD.UNU&ITI KIN U4 5-KAM MU I I -KAM d~A-1 LUGAL E~~
obv. 2. 4. rev. 8. 10. 12. u.e. 14.
d
~
~
~
-
~
"One ungelded ox, three years old, received for the Ebabbar temple as payment for twelve kurrus of dates, from the remainder which is at the disposal of 1tti-SamaSbalatu, son of L5biiSi. In the official presence of Nidin-abi, the qipu of Ebabbar. Witnesses: Itti-enSi-NabQ,son of BEl-remanni, descendant of Egibi; and the scribe is Balassu, son of SarnaS-Sum-usur, descendant of the iangii of SamaS. Larsa. Month of Uldu, 5th day, 1lth year of Nabonidus, king of Babylon." The legal operation recorded here is probably a datio in solutum, the handing over of a real estate or mobilia in payment of an outstanding debt. The debt owed by 1tti-SamaSbalatu is in the amount of twelve kurrus of dates, in payment of which he gives an ungelded ox to the temple. The terms of this transaction are reminiscent of YOS 19 55, from which it is separated by less than two years. In both cases the creditor is the temple, 1tti-SamaS-baliitu is the debtor, the thing owed is a quantity of dates, and Nidin-abi, the qipu of Ebabbar, witnesses receipt of the payment. In YOS 19 55, the debt is qualified as "the remainder of the tithe credited against 1tti-SamaS-balafu" (rZbet eiri i a ina mu& PN), while here it is described as "the remainder at the disposal of 1tti-SamaS-balatu" (ina ribi $a ina pani PN). In spite of this difference in terminology, and in spite of the fact that there is no explicit mention of the tithe in PTS 2127, I would consider the possiblity that this text also records payment of the arrears of the tithe owed by 1tti-Samag-balatu, in his quality either as land manager or as tax collector for the Ebabbar temple. Finally one last text must be mentioned, text 40 (Stigers, JCS 28 no.50):
Text 40 (Stigers, JCS 28, no.50) obv. 2. 4.
6.
6 GUR SE.BARN~G.GAd~~~ iu-pel-tu4id SU.MINIKI-~UTU-TIN A-$6 id Ila-ba-ii ina muh-bi IBA-$~-u A-id u'd IDO-a ina IT1 GU4 6 GUR SE.BAR TIL-ti ina UGU A.MESGAL.M[ES]
"Six kurrus of barley, the property of SamaS, in replacement (for an earlier obligation), through the agency of 1tti-SamaS-balitu, son of LiibiiSi, credited against IqiS$ son of Ibnii. He will repay the six kurrus of barley, in their totality, at the great waterworks. IqiSa, the silver 'x x1 (remainder lost)."
~
1tti-SamaS-balitu acts here as agent for the temple. If we accept the notion that he filled the position of tithe collector, then the transaction recorded here might be the replacement of a previous obligation to pay a tithe in dates or silver into a new one in barley. Be that as it may, the nature of the relationship between the family of 1tti-SamaSbalitu and the Ebabbar temple is, insofar as the available texts are representative, fairly clear. They did not belong to the old, hereditary urban elite which controlled the cultic and mundane aspects of the sanctuary, but they eventually gained a foothold in one of the areas of the temple economy that was open to outsiders, land management and tax farming. In this respect their position was very similar to the first fermiers g6n6raux of Uruk, with whom they were exact contemporaries.
4. The Eanna Temple Finally I will turn briefly to text 31 (YOS 19 63), which reveals connections between 1tti-SamaS-balatu and the Eanna temple, the sanctuary of IStar in the neighboring city of Uruk. The destinies of Uruk and Larsa were closely intertwined during the NeoBabylonian period, to the extent that Larsa was dependent upon its larger, more powerful neighbor for many aspects of its administration.35 It is therefore not surprising to see IttiSamaS-bal@ involved in the cultivation of land belonging to IStar-of-Uruk.
Text 31 (YOS 19 63) obv. 2. 4.
6. 1o.e.
6-il-ti i a 2 GUR SE.BAR N~G.GA dibtar id SE.NUMUN id IKI-~UTU-TIN ina qaq-qa-ru id GASA AN $6 ' U N U G ~i-ri-ii ~~ $6 Iina-SUH-SUR A-i6 id l d n a - n a - r a - ~ ~ ? l i d ina 'mu&& I ~ R ~ - ~ A-i6 u T uid r I n l - d u ~ u - ~i-m'-rill ' I l d u . ~ u ~ - pA-$6 ~ p ih rlldna-na-a-~O ina r S u . ~ m l
This is evidenced by many documents from the archive of the Eanna temple in Uruk. See Beaulieu, OrNS 60 (1991), 58-60; "Rituals for an Eclipse Possibility in the 8th Year of Cyrus", JCS 46 (1994), 73-86 (with John P. Britton); "Prkbendiers d'Uruk B Larsa", RA 87 (1993), 137-52; "The Impact of Month-lengths on the Neo-Babylonian Cultic Calendar", ZA 83 (1993) 76-79; and Wright, City of Larsa, passim.
rev. 12. 14. 16. u.e.
20.
A FAMILY OF ENTREPRENEURS IN NEO-BABYLONIAN LARSA
P.-A. BEAULIEU
62
IKI-~UTU-TIN A-id id Ila-ba-ii il-te-lim pu-ut na- 'ie-el id d-il-ti I~U.GUR-PAP na-ii 16mu-kin-nu I~AMAKUD-NUMUN-DO A-$d i d I d ~ ~ - S ~ S . ~1~dS~- ~s u~ - r ~ ~ ~ 5 1 - i q A-id id liul-lum l d ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ - s u - i q - b i A-Sd i d I~IM-DO u ~~UMBISAG ITIN-suA-id id IDUB-NUMUN 'A1 16GAL-Du UD. r ~ ITI1 ~ [o]~ & 'U4 6-KAM MU 4-KAM d ~ A - 1 ~ 'LUG& T I N . T I R ~ ~ ~
"Nergal-nisir, son of Nanaya-ibni, has received from 1tti-SamaS-balitu, son of Lab& full payment of the debt of two kurrus of barley, the property of IStar, which concerns the arable land which 1tti-SamaS-balifuhas farmed on the domains of the Lady-of-Uruk, which is owed to Ina-teS?-etir, son of Nanaya-iddin(?), (and) which is written to the debit of Arad-SamaS, son of 1tti-SamaS-balitu. Nergal-nisir bears responsibility for delivering (the amount of barley). Witnesses: Marduk-zer-ibni, son of BEl-abbe-eriba; SamaS-mudammiq, son of Sullum; NabO-balissu-iqbi, son of Adad-ibni; and the scribe is Balissu, son of Sipik-zeri, descendant of the rab-bani. Larsa. Month of 'xl, 6th day, 4th year of Nabonidus, king of Babylon." This is a complicated transaction involving several parties. The Eanna temple is the owner of the land and 1tti-SamaS-baliim is apparently the lessee or sublessee. The two kurrus of barley received as payment are presumably the rent, or another kind of impost, owed to the temple. had-SamaS appears to be directly responsible for cultivating the land since the obligation is written to his debit. The role of Nergal-nisir and Ina-tS?-efir, however, is not clear. The former could be an agent of the temple responsible for collecting the rent. Ina-teSI-etir could be the lessee or another agent of the temple, the former possiblity being more likely. An any rate, this transaction gives direct evidence of 1tti-SamaS-baliitu's involvement in the segment of the economy controlled by the Eanna temple.
5. Conclusions In spite of its small size, the archive of 1tti-SamaS-baliiu and his son provides ample evidence documenting the interdependency of institutions and private entrepreneurs in the Neo-Babylonian period. They leased land from the royal estates and from the Eanna temple, hired farm laborers to cultivate it, and kept part of the yield as profit. They also provided credit against pledges of land for royal workmen or soldiers obligated to fulfill their obligations to the crown. 1tti-SamaS-balii~was involved with the ianzl official of the Sealand, probably the second-in-rank in the administration of that province, in the trading of commodities, the latter providing the capital and the former his business skills. Later he and his son very probably became tax farmers, specifically tithe collectors, for the Ebabbar temple in Larsa. These activities were probably interconnected and made up their main, and possibly their most profitable business. True, they engaged in commercial
63
ventures that did not, as far as we can judge, depend on institutional support. They also hired herdsmen to tend their own flocks and farm laborers to till their own land. Yet, one may justifiably wonder if their business would have attained any prominence without the institutional support which is so pervasively attested in the archive, being found in nearly half of the documents. This leads us to the question of the beginning and end of the archive. How did the business come into being, and how did it end? The earliest part of the archive, until the accession of Nabonidus, shows mainly connections at the state level. Therefore it seems reasonable to assume that state and political support enabled Itti-SamaS-balifu to start his enterprise. Larsa had been a largely deserted site, with its temple lying in ruins, until Nebuchadnezzar I1 took steps to revive it in the early part of his reign. Is it then merely coincidental that the archive of Itti-SamaS-balifu begins in the middle of Nebuchadnezzar's reign, after the king had carried out his revival project? It may be, but given the political context of that period, is it not more cogent to assume that 1tti-Samasbalafu belonged to a group of "new men", protected by the central and provincial administration, who were encouraged to use their capital and business skills to develop areas which had been left fallow for centuries, and thus to participate in the institutional revival and the resulting economic growth of that period?36 The comparison with the fermiers g&n&rauxof Umk, who appear at about a same time and become more directly involved in the affairs of the temple with the accession of Nabonidus, is instmctive.37 With the accession of Nabonidus the interests of Itti-SamaS-balitu also seem to have shifted from the state to the temple, although connections with the royal administration are still attested at the beginning of the reign of Cyrus (text 46: NCBT 958). It is noteworthy that around the middle of the reign of Nabonidus Arad-SamaS married into a family with a patronymic, the descendants of SamaS-b5ri. One might interpret this as an attempt to penetrate the closed circle of old established families, perhaps with an eye to gaining a foothold in the administration of the temple. As pointed out earlier, there are also some striking resemblances between the activities of Itti-SamaS-balilu and those of IddinMarduk/Nur-Sin and his associates in Babylon.38 Entrepreneurial activities of that type must have been especially sensitive to the vagaries of politics. Therefore it is tempting to link the end of the archive to a general failure of the business in the wake of the changes brought about by the Persian conquest of Babylonia. While documents are relatively numerous for the reign of Nabonidus, the accession of Cyms appears to have coincided with a sudden drop in the business activities of Arad-SamaS.39 Only three documents, the last three transactions attested in the archive, are dated to the reign of Cyrus: one to his second year, one to his 4th year, and one to his
36
Wright, City of Larsa, 194-95, also suggests that 1tti-Sama~-bal&probably began his activities under royal patronage at about the same time as Nebuchadnezzar I1 was restoring Ebabbar. 37 It is particularly instructive to compare the course of the career of Sum-ukin, son of Bel-zgri, who started out under Amd-Marduk and Neriglissar as manager for the royal estates, and then, owing to royal patronage, became fermier g6n6ral of the Eanna temple under Nabonidus. It may also be noted that Sumukin's business as fermier gtniral ultimately failed, so that under Cyrus and Cambyses new individuals are attested in that capacity. 38 These have been perceptively noted by Jursa, Tempelzehnt, 825. 39 This is especially true if one considers that the remaining texts in the Horn Museum are mostly dated to the reign of Nabonidus.
64
P.-A. BEAULIEU
8th ~ e a r . ~The O terms of the last one, text 48 (YBC 3533), appear to leave little doubt as to the fate of the business. It is a promissory note on five kurrus of barley and five shekels of silver owed by Arad-SamaS, who puts his wife's dowry, a slave which had been given to them by his in-laws (text 35: YOS 6 124), as collateral. Thereafter we no longer hear about the business of Arad-SamaS, although, as mentioned earlier, he is still attested as a respectable resident of Larsa in the 7th year of Cambyses. There is of course no conclusive evidence that political changes rather than other factors contributed to the failure of ~rad-SamaS.Nevertheless, given the uncommon degree of dependence of his business upon official institutions, it may well be that he found himself unable to weather the political upheaval of 539 BC.41 As discussed earlier, however, this is valid only if we assume that the documents which have survived typologically and chronologically mirror the original composition of the entire archive. If, on the other hand, they are merely a collection of transactions discarded during the reign of Cyrus because they were no longer relevant to the management of the business, then the conclusions just proposed would need to be revised. The terms of text 48 (YBC 3533), for instance, would only reflect the increased indebtedness of an expanding business, as is the case in the fourth generation of the Egibi family.42 The fact that had-SamaS appears as a respectable citizen of Larsa in a text dated seven years after the last known document from the archive could suggest that his enterprise continued to thrive, but that the documents from this phase of the history of the business have not survived. And finally, the fact that the archive as presently known includes documents dated almost exclusively to the period up to the Persian conquest of Babylonia could be merely coincidental, in which case we may surmise that Arad-Sama5 weathered the political turnover of 539 in the same manner as did the well-established business families of Babylon and Borsippa, such as the Egibis and the Ea-iliita-banis.
40
The MuralfQ archive ends very much in the same manner. A sudden drop in the number of documents to almost none in the year 4171416 is followed by nine years during which we have a trickle of transactions. See Stolper, Entrepreneurs, 23. The new documents published since do not significantly alter this picture. 41 Stolper, Entrepreneurs, 156, posits a similar cause, namely withdrawal of official sponsorship, for the abrupt end of the Muralfa business firm.See, however, Donbaz and Stolper, MuraZ, 12-15, in which a more nuanced opinion is voiced, mainly in response to van Driel's observation that the surviving MuraSQ archive is a "dead archive", a collection of texts put in storage because they were no longer relevant to the operation of the business. 4 2 See Dr. C. Wunsch's contribution in this volume, p.lO6ff. An increasing level of indebtedness, as is also seen in the archive of 1tti-Samag-balaiu and ~ r a d - S a m adoes ~ , not necessarily mean that a business is failing. It can simply reflect the control of larger assets, and therefore the ability to owe larger amounts of credit. It must also be stressed that the transaction recorded in text 48 could also be a disguised labour rental contract, whereby ~rad-Samalfand his wife agree to rent out their slave for a specific amount of time in exchange for a loan of silver and barley which will be used to meet their other obligations.
A FAMILY OF ENTREPRENEURS IN NEO-BABYLONIAN LARSA
65
Provenance Contents Larsa Promissory note on sesame and silver. No interest specified. Creditor: 1tti-SamaS-baliifu,son of Lab2Si. Debtor: NabQ-na'id, son of ha-tESi-etir. Dialogue document. Nbk 25/01/16 Larsa 1 Horn 73.2969 Petitioner: SamaS-zEr-iqiSa, son of SamaS-inaWright, Diss. no.2 tESi-Efir. Granter: 1tti-SamaS-balaw, son of LabBSi. Subject: animal husbandry (unclear). Dialogue document. Nbk 28/03/03 Larsa 3 Horn 73.2908 Petitioner: UaSdiya, son of Nanaya-[o o 01. Wright, Diss. no.3 Granter: 1tti-SamaS-balafu,son of LibiblSi. Subject: unclear (poorly preserved). Note: he (~tti-SamaS-bal~tfu) paid the silver of PN, his royal workman (kaspu Sa PN ~ 6 b SarriSu iddinu). Promissory note on barley. Durn-SaNbk 29/06/24 4 Horn 73.2984 Only principal is to be repaid. lasime Wright, Diss. no.4 Creditor: Ubarya, son of HaSdiya. Debtors: 1tti-SamaS-balafu,son of LabBSi; and Nergal-lE'i, son of IbnB. Scribe: 1tti-SamaS-baliitu, son of Lab2Si. Dialogue document. Nbk 20+/07/08 Larsa 5 Horn 73.2855 Petitioner: Samal-ere$, son of EribSu. Wright, Diss. no.lC Granter: 1tti-SamaS-balii~,son of Lab2Si. Subject: land cultivation (poorly preserved). Promissory note on barley. Nbk 30/10/19 Larsa 6 Horn 73.2981 Only principal is to be repaid. Wright, Diss. no.12 Creditor: Dadiya, son of Niidin. Debtor: NabQ-Sar-usur, son of NabQ-ereS. Scribe: 1tti-Samal-balatu. son of Lab2Si. Promissory note on barley as harranu Nbk 33111/28 Larsa 7 NCBT 534 investment. unpublished To be repaid with 20% interest in two months. Investor: Sunti official of the Sealand. Trader: Nergal-iddin, son of Nergal-uballif. Debtor: NabQ-uSabSi, son of Suzubu. Guarantee: Silim-ili, son of Lab2Si. Note: separate (elat) from previous obligation of Sih-zer-iqiSB, for which 1tti-SamaS-balatu is guarantee.
I Horn 73.2927 Wright, Diss. no.1
Date (ylmld) Nbk 22/10/16
-
P.-A. BEAULIEU 8 NCBT 1021 unpublished (see p.47)
9 NCBT 867 unpublished 10 Horn 73.3060 Wright, Diss. no.5
11 NCBT 517 unpublished
Nbk 34/04/10
Larsa
Nbk 34/06/09
Larsa
Nbk 34/07/29
Larsa
Nbk 34/xx/xx
Larsa
12 NCBT 871 unpublished
Nbk 35/02/03
13 Horn 73.3056 Wright, Diss. no.6
Nbk 35/11/03+ Larsa
Larsa
Contract to cultivate land (sublease). Contrators: 1tti-SamaS-balafu and NuskuuHabSi. Laborers: farm laborer of 1tti-&ma$-balam, son of LiibiSi; and gardener of Nusku-uSabSi, son of ~inurta-uballit,and of 1tti-SamaSbalau, son of LabbSi. Terms: equal shares in the harvest for contractors and laborers after the king has taken his share (elat zitti iarri ikkalii); Unclear transaction (very fragmentary). Mention of house pledged to 1tti-&&a$-balifu. Promissory note on barley as barriznu investment. Only principal is to be repaid. Investor: Rimut-Bel, son of Nadnb. Trader: 1tti-SamaS-balafu, son of LiibiSi. Debtor: RaSi-ilu, son of Sum-ukin. Record of legal decision by judges in civil suit. Head of panel: NabB-kibsu-Sarri-usur, qipu of Ebabbar. Suitors: Zeriya, son of NabO-uSabSi, descendant of Basiya; and 1tti-SamaS-balatu, son of LsbSSi. Defendor: Saknanu, son of Darik-ilu. Subject: loss of a donkey belonging to the suitors. Decision: Saknanu must repay the loss. Scribe: Bel-ahhe-iqiSa, son of NabQ-kibsuHerding contract. Contractor: 1tti-SamaS-balafu, son of LSbiSi (the 40 sheep belong to his h u ~ ~ e t u ) . Shepherd: NabQ-ah-iddin, son of Nab& uSallim. Witness: Samal-zer-iddin, son of Lab& Contract for karrbnu partnership (Lanz, harranu type A). Investment: silver. Investors: Rimut-BEl, son of Nadni(?); and IttiSamaS-balatu, son of LabiSi. Trader: SamaS-zer-iddin, son of LCibiSi. Terms: trader takes 113 of profits. Scribe: 1tti-SamaS-balafu, son of Labs%.
A FAMILY OF ENTREPRENEURS IN NEO-BABYLONIAN LARSA 14 NCBT 627 unpublished
Nbk 37/12/22
Larsa
15 Horn 73.2966 Wright, Diss. no.7
Nbk 38/08/25
Larsa
16 Horn 73.3065 Wright, Diss. no.8 (see p.55f)
Nbk 39/01/04
Larsa
17 YBC 3527 unpublished
Nbk 39/09/25
Larsa
18 NCBT 521 unpublished
Nbk 39/12/10
Borsippa
19 Horn 73.3068 Wright, Diss. no.9
Nbk 39/xx/20
Larsa
21 NCBT 609 unpublished
Nbk xx/10/10?
-
22 YBC 3526 unpublished
Promissory note on barley as harranu investment. Only principal is to be repaid. Investor: iana official of the Sealand. Trader: 1tti-SamaS-balitu, son of LabiSi. Debtors: uaninb, daughter of ganniya; and BEl(?)-husanni, son of Apladad-[o 01. Promissory note on barley and silver (fragmentary). Creditor: [~tti-SamaS-balatu],son of LibbSi. Debtor: [o o o o o 01. Promissory note on barley. Only principal is to be repaid. Creditor: Bel-Etiru-NabO. Agent: 1tti-SamaS-balatu, son of LabiSi. Debtor: Rimut, son of AbuSunu. Witness: Silim-ili. son of LabiSi. Contract to cultivate land. Contractor: 1tti-SamaS-baliitu. . son of LabiSi. Laborer: Samag-zer-ibni, son of SamaS-iddin. Quitclaim in a legal dispute concerning (the purchase price of ?) slaves. Creditor: NabO-reh-usur. Debtor: 1tti-SamaS-balatu, son of LabiSi. Note: debt was paid to Zeriya, son of Beluballit. Promissory note on barley (fragmentary). Creditors: Marduk-zer(?)-[o o] and two others. Debtor: 1tti-Samal-balitu, son of LabbSi. Personal guaranty, (bail) for [o], son of NabQ10 01. Guarantees: SamaS-Sumu-li~ir,son of Marduk; Marduk-zer-ibni, son of NabO(?)-[o 01; and 1tti-SamaS-balatu, son of LabiSi. Beneficiary of guaranty: NabO-kibsu-Sarriusur, qipu of Ebabbar. Scribe: 1tti-SamaS-balatu. son of LabiSi. Legal provisions for purgatory oath (indictment). Plaintiff: 1tti-Samal-balatu, son of LiibiSi. Defendant: Sepe-~abO-asbat. Subject: barley is harranu investment of IttiSamaS-balatu. Record of legal dispute (fragmentary). Plaintiff: 1tti-SamaS-balatu, son of LabiSi. Defendant: SamaS-takl*, son of [o o 01. Subject: house built by 1tti-SamaS-balitu in Larsa on royal(?) land. Note: NabO-kibsu-Sarri-usur, qipu of Ebabbar, is involved (context unclear). ,
20 Horn 73.2642 Nbk Wright, Diss. no. 11 30+/10?/28
Nbk xx/10/10
Larsa
67
P.-A. BEAULIEU
23 NCBT 1071 unpublished (YOS 16) (see p.50f)
Larsa
Larsa
24 YBC 3541 unpublished (see p.52f)
25 ROMCT 2 10
26 YNER 1 5
Yer xx/04/21
Yer 03/06/06
Larsa
Larsa
( (OrNS 60 (1991), 6 1-62)
27 NCBT 1241 unpublished (YOS 16) (see p.48)
Ner xx/01/25
Larsa
A FAMILY OF ENTREPRENEURS IN NEO-BABYLONIAN LARSA
Promissory note on silver as harriinu investment. Only principal is to be repaid. Pledge of real estate. Investor: [o 01, son of BEl-etir. Trader: 1tti-Samas-balatu, son of LiiblSi. Debtor: [Biniya], son of Bunene-ibni. Note: this is silver which he (1tti-SamaS-balatu) had originally paid his royal workman (kaspu Sa ana jib-brriiu iddinu). Guarantee: Sum-[ukin(?)], son of NabO-zeriddin, guarantees repayment of the silver. Sale of vacant lot (qaqqaru kiiubbii). Seller: [Biniya] and Ina-Ebabbara-ilat, children of Bunene-ibni, descendant of the potter. Buyer: 1tti-Samag-balatu, son of LiiblSi. Guarantee (against future claims): Niidin-ahi, son of Baliifu. Note: this is not a true sale. Control of land previously pledged is transferred to 1tti-SamaSbaliitu. Contract for harriznu partnership (Lanz, harriznu type A). Investment: silver. Investor: 1tti-SamaS-baliitu, son of Lab2Si. Trader: LiSiru, son of IqiFI. Terms: both share equally in the profits. Witness: SamaS-iddin, son of NabO-kibsu-Sarriusur. Deposition before witnesses. Witnesses: NabQ-Far-u~ur,S a d official of Sealand; and Bel-Fuzibanni, qipu of Ebabbar. Author of deposition: Biniya, son of DannuNergal. Subject: a quantity of barley owed by IttiSamaS-balafu, son of LiiblSi, was received by Biiniya, acting as proxy for Bel-etir-NabO, son of Nabti-mar-Sarri-u~ur (possibly the previous ianii official of the Sealand). Promissory note on barley (imittu document). Creditor: uurn-atkal. Agent: Ahiya-alidu, son of Leti-il. Debtors: Amm$ son of Nabutti; and Ardiya, son of 1tti-SamaS-balafu. Guarantee: Ahiya-alidu guarantees delivery of the assessed yield to the king. Scribe: Ardiya, son of 1tti-SamaS-baliim. -
b
YOS 19 7 OrNS 60 (1991), 16-69)
Jbn 01/07/30
L
I9 BIN 2 113
iarsa
)O BIN 2 118
Bit-re'i
31 YOS 19 63
Larsa
- -
32 YOS 19 69
Ybn 08/07/03
Larsa
33 YOS 19 55 (OrNS 60 (1991), 72) (see p.58)
Nbn 09/01/07
Larsa
34 BIN 2 119
Nbn 09/04/01
Larsa
35 YOS 6 124
Nbn 09/07/06
Larsa
69
3ift of a male slave. 3enefactor: ~tti-SamaS-balatu,son of LablSi, md his wife, Nanaya-kuzbu, daughter of Yanaya-iddin. Beneficiary: ~rad-garnag,their son. Witness: Sama&zer-iddin, son of LablSi. Scribe: SamaS-kasir, son of Samag-zer-iddin. Promissory note on silver and sheep. interest on silver set at 20% annually. Creditor: Bel-uSezib, son of BEl-efir. Debtor: 1tti-SamaF-balatu, son of Lab$%. Scribe: SamaS-ahhe-eriba, son of garnag-zeriddin. Receipt of dates. Reci~ient:NabQ-uSabSi. From: 1tti-SamaS-. Full payment of obligation in barley. Creditor: IStar-of-Uruk. Agent(?): Ina-teSi-etir, son of Nanaya-iddin. Agent(?): Nergal-na~ir. Debtor: ~rad-SamaS,son of 1tti-SamaS-balafu. Note: obligation related to land leased to IttiSamaS-baliifu, son of LiiblFi, for cultivation. Contract to cultivate land. Contractor: 1tti-SamaS-balatu, son of LiiblSi. Laborers: NabQ-Sarhi-ili, son of Nergal-inatGi-etir; and Sum-ukin, son of Bel-ipuS. Receipt of dates as partial payment of overdue tithe. Recipient: SamaS of Larsa. Debtor: 1tti-SamaF-baliitu, son of Lab% Note: in the official presence of Niidin-ahi, qipu of Ebabbar. Promissory note on dates. No interest specified. Creditor: Bel-aplu-iddin, son of Nabii-remanni descendant of the salt peddlar. Debtor: 1tti-SamaS-balatu, son of LablSi. Gift of female slave as dowry. Benefactors: SamaS-bani-&i, son of SamaSz[er-uSabSi], descendant of SamaS-biiri; and Belessunu, daughter of Apl$ his mother. Beneficiaries: Aya-hipat, daughter of SamaSzer-uSabSi; and had-Sarnag, son of 1tti-SamaSbalafu (Aya-hipat was the wife of AradSama9.
70
P.-A. BEAULIEU
36 YOS 19 33
37 YOS 19 44
Larsa
Nbn 10/6al25
Alu Sa MulezibNabQ
38 PTS 2127 unpublished [see p.60)
Nbn 11/06/05
Larsa
39 AnOr 9 14 [see p.51f)
xxx xx/o3/xx
Larsa
10 Stigers, JCS 28 xxx xx/xx/xx 10.50 [see p.60f)
11 YOS 19 35
Nbn 12111/23
Promissory note on barley. No interest specified. Creditor: NabQ-Suzibanni,slave of [o 01-nasirapli. Debtor: [~rad-SamaS],son of 1tti-Samagbalafu. Guarantee: SamaS-kiisir, son of SamaS-2%iddin. Witness: SamaS-apla-usur, son of 1tti-Samagbalatu. Scribe: SamaS-kasir. son of Samag-zer-iddin. Promissory note on barley. No interest specified. Creditor: 1tti-SamaS-balatu, son of Lab2Si. Debtor: Ki-NabQ, son of Abu-lumur. Guarantee: MuSezib-NabQ, son of Adad(?)iddin. Note: the barley had been stolen by Ki-NabQ. Receipt of an ungelded ox as partial payment for a quantity of dates. Recipient: Ebabbar temple. Debtor: 1tti-SamaS-balatu, son of Lib&. Note: in the official presence of Nadin-ahi, aivu of Ebabbar. Promissory note on silver. No interest specified. Creditor: 1tti-SamaS-balafu, son of Lab2Si. Debtor: Biiniya, son of Bunene-ibni. Pledge: Vacant lot put as collateral. Note: this is silver which he (1tti-SamaS-balifu) had paid his royal workmen, to be credited against him (Biiniya) (kaspu Sa ana jab;SarriSu ina muhhi5u iddinu). Promissory note on barley (fragmentary). No interest specified. Creditor: SamaS of Larsa. Agent: ~tti-SamaS-balitu,son of Lib2Si. ~ e b t o r IqiH2, : son of Ibn2. Promissory note on barley. Only principal is to be repaid. Creditor: Arrabi, slave of NabQ-biini-*i, son of NabQ-remanni, descendant of the salt peddlar. Debtor: ~rad-SamaS,son of 1tti-SamaS-baliim. Note: future promissory notes which will appear in house of creditor belong to AradS amaS.
A FAMILY OF ENTREPRENEURS IN NEO-BABYLONIAN LARSA
12 YOS 19 39
13 YOS 19 59
14 YOS 19 27
15 NCBT 518
16 NCBT 958 unpublished (see p.49f)
47 NCBT 585 unpublished (see p.59)
48 YBC 3533 unpublished
71
I Nbn 14?/02?12 Larsa
'romissory note on barley. \To interest specified. :reditor: SamaS-[o 01; Sin-ili; and Saplk-zeri, lescendant of the rub-banf. lebtor: ~ r a d - S a m a son ~ , of 1tti-SamaS-balitu. Nitness: SamaS-zer-iddin, son of Lab%. Scribe: SamaS-kasir, son of [Samag-zer-iddin]. Zeceipt of barley. Zecipient: SamaS-mudammiq, son of Siipikceri, descendant of the rub-tarbaji. 2onveyor: Anu-Sum-ibni, son of Nergal-teSiJtir. Debtor: paid on behalf of ~rad-SamaS,son of [tti-SamaS-balatu. Witness: SamaS-zer-iddin, son of Liib2Si. Promissory note on silver. Merest set at 20% annually. Creditor: Belessunu, daughter of Aplii [Belessunu was the mother-in-law of AradSamaS). Debtors: ~rad-&mas', son of ~tti-!hma~-bal;fu; md SamaS-biini-ahi, son of SamaS-zer-uSabSi. Scribe: Samag-kasir, son of SamaS-zer-iddin. Fragmentary legal text involving ~rad-SamaS, son of 1tti-SamaS-balafu,and Innin-Efirat, daughter of 1tti-Samag-balafu. Receipt of silver. Recipient: Amurm-Sar-usur, son of Amurmibni, the royal workman (jab-5arri) of AradSamai, son of 1tti-SamaS-baliifu. Conveyor: SamaS-zer-iqiSa, son of IqiSaMarduk. Debtor: paid on behalf of ~ r a d - S a m a ~ . Witness: SamaS-zer-iddin, son of Lab2Si. Promissory note on dates. No interest specified. Creditor: SamaS and Aya of Larsa. Agent: ~rad-SamaS,son of 1tti-SamaS-balatu. Debtor: SamaS-zer-u~ab~i, son of SamaS-ibni.
No interest specified. Creditor: Sh-ibni, son of Amurru-[o o 01. Debtors: ~rad-SamaS,son of 1tti-Samas-balifu, and gip2 (= Aya-ljpat), his wife. Note: Uipgs dowry is put as collateral. Scribe: ~rad-SamaS,son of 1tti-Samal-balatu.
72
P.-A. BEAULIEU
Bibliography
Beaulieu, P.-A. OrNS 60 RA 87 ZA 83
"Neo-Babylonian Larsa: A Preliminary Study", OrNS 60 (199 l), 58-81. "PrCbendiers d'Uruk B Larsa", RA 87 (1993), 137-52. "The Impact of Month-lengths on the Neo-Babylonian Cultic Calendar", ZA 83 (1993), 66-87. Beaulieu, P.-A. and J.P. Britton JCS 46 "Rituals for an Eclipse Possibility in the 8th Year of Cyrus", JCS 46 (1994), 73-86. Cocquerillat, D. Palmeraies Palmeraies et cultures de 1'Eanna d'Uruk (= ADFU 8), Berlin 1968. Donbaz, V. and M.W. Stolper Mu raid Istanbul MuraSd Texts (= PIHANS 79), Leiden 1997. van Driel, G. JESHO 32 "The MuragQs in Context", JESHO 32 (1989)' 203-229. BiOr 55 "The Eanna Archive", BiOr 55 (1998) 59-79. Joannks, F. T~BR Textes e'conomiques de la Babylonie re'cente, Paris 1982. Jursa, M. AfO 42/43 Review of C. Wunsch, Die Urkunden des babylonischen Geschafismannes Iddin-Marduk, AfO 42/43 (1995-96), 255-262. Iraq 59 "Neu- und spatbabylonische Texte aus den Sammlungen der Birmingham Museums and Art Gallery", Iraq 59 (1997), 97-174. Tempelzehnt
Der Tempelzehnt in Babylonien vom siebenten bis dritten Jahrhundert v. Chr. (= AOAT 254), Miinster 1998.
Lanz, H. barrcinu
Die neubabylonischen lprrsnu-Geschiiftsunternehmen, Berlin 1976.
Shiff, L.B. Nfir-Sin
Stigers, H.G. JCS 28
The Ndr-Sin Archive: Private Entrepreneurship in Babylon (603-507 B.C.), (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1987).
"Neo- and Late Babylonian Business Documents from the John Frederick Lewis Collection", JCS 28 (1976), 3-59.
Stolper, M. Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs and Empire. The MuraSC Archive, the MuraSfi Firm, and Persian Rule in Babylonia (= PIHANS 54), Istanbul 1985.
Wright, P.H. City of Larsa
The City of Larsa in the Neo-Babylonian and Achaemenid Periods: A Study of Urban and Intercity Relations in Antiquity, (Ph.D. Dissertation,
Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati, 1994). Wunsch, C. Iddin-Marduk Die Urkunden des babylonischen Geschiiftsmannes Iddin-Marduk. Zum Handel mit Naturalien im 6. Jahrhundert v.Chr., Vol. I und I1 (=
Cuneiform Monographs 3a und b), Groningen 1993.
PRIVATE ARCHIVES IN NEO-BABYLONIAN SIPPAR AND THEIR INSTITUTIONAL CONNECTIONS A.C.V.M. BONGENAAR (LEIDEN)
1. Introduction The site of Abu Habbah (ancient Sippar) in Northern Babylonia has provided us with tens of thousands of Neo-Babylonian and early Achaemenid texts which mainly belong to the administration of the Ebabbar temple (ca. 626-484 B.C.). The majority of these texts was found by H. Rassam as a single find in the temple complex at Sippar in 1881-1882. This entered the British Museum collections, together with texts excavated and purchased from other sites in Babylonia around that time.1 Illicit digs at Sippar resulted in the further dispersal of small groups of texts all over the world. The tablets which constitute what we today call the Ebabbar archive (still to a large extent unpublished) are the remnants of the extensive administration of the temple of S a m a ~and other gods at Sippar. On a daily basis, these gods required food, clothing, and many other goods which the temple personnel provided. The temple personnel, in turn, had to be fed and clothed. For these purposes, the temple owned land and personnel in the countryside in the vicinity of Sippar where crops were cultivated and animals bred. As a consequence, the administration of the temple reflects the organization of the procurement and distribution of the commodities which were needed to maintain the cult as well as the temple p e r s ~ n n e l . ~ Together with this documentation of the temple administration, private archival texts were found at Sippar. Prosopographical investigation has demonstrated that these private archives in most cases belonged to people who can be identified as temple officials and/or prebendaries in Ebabbar. In this paper I will investigate some of the private archives from Sippar and the connections between them and the temple administration. It should be stressed that the results presented here are preliminary. In the first place this is because several private archives from Neo-Babylonian Sippar are currently being investigated by colleagues3 who are able to include a great deal of unpublished material, and who might, therefore, arrive at different conclusions. Secondly, because the largest part of the 'Sippar Collection' in the British Museum is still unpublished, and its contents partly unknown to See C.B.F. Walker and D. Collon, in: L. De Meyer (ed.) Tell ed-DZr 111, Leuven 1980, 93-114, J.E. Reade's introduction to E. Leichty, Tabletsfrom Sippar 1 , xii-xxxvi and van Driel, ZA 79 (1989), 102ff, for the history of the 'Sippar Collection' at the British Museum. For a brief overview of the excavations at Abu-Habbah and the discovery of the archive (including map), see 0. PedersBn, Archives, 193f. A summary of the activities and the organization of the Ebabbar temple can be found in Bongenaar, Ebabbar, 423ff. Notably M. Jursa (Sanga-Sama$archive; see below 4.A), C. Waerzeggers (SFibt-gin&archive; see below 4.C), and R. Da Riva (Ebabbar administration and private archives in the early Neo-Babylonian period).
74
A.C.V.M. BONGENAAR
us. The third reason is even more compelling: we are completely ignorant about the exact find-spots of the individual tablets. We do not know in which order they were found, nor how many different locations at Abu uabbah produced tablets. Ideally, we expect to find institutional archives in institutional buildings (preferably stored according to an administrative system), and private archives in private houses. In practice, both institutional and private archives from Mesopotamia were found in institutional buildings, in private houses, and, when the archive was discarded by its owner(s), in rubbish dumps or re-used in contruction works. Whenever we lack the archaeological context the connection between the tablets is lost, and the only remaining option for a scholar is to reconstruct the archives from their contents. In those cases where the archaeological context is known, however, it is not necessarily clear why documents were kept together, as van Driel has stressed (Fs De Meyer, 182). For our understanding of the texts from the Ebabbar administration itself, knowledge of the archaeological context would probably not be of much help because it is quite clear that we are looking at a "dead" archive here, discarded shortly after Xerxes' second regnal year to which the latest texts are dated. The tablets were stored away because they had lost importance for the temple administration, not for the benefit of later readers.4 This is also true for the private archival documents found with the institutional archive. These were discarded by their owners, temple officials who apparently kept (part of) their private archives in the temple offices. One problem with regard to the find-spot of the private archival texts is more serious. Whereas the majority of the tablets found by Rassam entered the British Museum collections, some nevertheless found their way into other museums and private collections, probably having been kept and sold by people working at Rassam's excavations.5 Groups of texts from illicit digs at Abu-uabbah were also dispersed between several collections. As a result, we are unable to distinguish between private archival texts found together with administrative texts from Ebabbar and private archival texts found in private houses elsewhere at the site.6 Cf. similar observations about the Eanna archive at Uruk by van Driel, BiOr 55 (1998), 60-64. Antiquities collector J. Offord from London, for example, granted some 20 Sippar tablets to the South African Cultural History Museum in 1897. The tablets came into his possession before 1887 when J.N. Strassmaier copied them (Strassmaier, unpub1.m~.11, folio 43013 to 43414). The format and contents of these tablets show a striking similarity with the administrative tablets in the British Museum catalogued by E. Leichty in Tablets from Sippar 1. Offord's tablets, therefore, most probably originate from Rassam's find in 1881-2. Some of the texts "purchased in the East" for the University of Pennsylvania and published by Barton in AJSL 1612 (1900), for example, may have been found outside the temple complex at AbuHabbah. The internal coherence of this archive(?) fully escapes me, but the tablets have in common that they are very poorly written (i.e. certainly not by temple scribes) and hardly mention patronymics of the protagonists. We distinguish two sub-groups. Nos. 7, 8, 11, 12, 14, 19, 22, 25, 26(= BE VIII11 116), 28 and 29 mention f ~ q u b a / ~ r dasi athe creditor of loans of barley, dates, sesame and silver. Texts nos. 13, 15, 18, 21 and BE VIIW 14 may also belong to this group, since they mention two witnesses who often appear in f ~ q u b a ' stexts: NidintuIBGl-lk'i and Iddin-Bd/Bani-zEri (note that Iddin-Bkl/Biini-zeri is also attested as a witness in British Museum text CT 4 32a). Tablets in the second sub-group, nos. 1, 3, 6, 16, 20, 23 and 24, mention a certain RernWNabii-ajalu and his son Samas-iddina as debtor, creditor and lessor of a house. The only connection between these two groups is ArdiaIBiini-zeri, the scribe of a and of nos. 20 and 23 (Samas-iddinal~emiitgroup). The connection with nos. 21 and 22 ( f ~ q u b group) other texts from Sippar in AJSL 1612 is not clear, but if these texts really belong together, two more texts in this group, nos. 10 and 17, prove institutional connections. No. 10, discussed by Jursa, AfO Beih. 25, 62, is a contract for the letting of a gardener's (rub-band) prebend for three days in Ebabbar;
PRIVATE ARCHIVES IN NEO-BABYLONIAN SIPPAR
75
2. Archives and private entrepreneurs at Sippar The lack of archaeological context is one of the reasons why the texts classified as school exercises7, lexical texts, incantations etc. which naturally belong to the archive(s) and which one finds scattered throughout the Ebabbar archive, are often omitted in the reconstruction of the private archives. It is impossible to determine whether they belonged to the library of the Ebabbar temple8 or to one of the private archives.9 My reconstruction of (some of) the private archives from Sippar is purely pragmatic. Confronted with a heap of private archival documents, one can only produce order out of chaos by putting those texts together which, judging from their contents, seem to have belonged to one person or one family. The question "What is an archive?" is not really relevant here. We are looking at documents thrown in the dustbin by their owners. A "real" archive would at least contain property deeds. Such deeds are rare in the private archival material from Sippar. The attribution of a document to one of the (artificial) archives below is sometimes not without difficulty. A simple debt note mentioning creditor A and debtor B, for example, should ideally be attributed to A's archive because with this debt note A could prove his claim on B.1•‹ In practice, however, B could keep a copy as a reminder, the scribe of the text could keep a copy for whatever reason, and descendants of one of the above may have copied the text as a school exercise at a much later date.ll The situation becomes more complex when A, this time as the debtor of another loan, pays off creditor C or some institution with the above-mentioned debt note. In that case, the debt note will be found in C's archive or in the administration of the
no. 17 seems to mention "dates, property of the 'king1". The question remains, of course, whether the AJSL 1612 texts from Sippar should be considered as one private archive. 7 The school exercises of the Ebabbar archive will be published in P. Gesche's forthcoming dissertation. Van Driel, BiOr 55 (1998), 62-63, assumes that the secretarial offices of, for example, a temple must have kept all sorts of reference works, and further, that the training of junior scribes possibly took place in these offices. A separation between "archive" and "library", therefore, would be anachronistic. The same situation would occur in the hypothetical case of the Assyriological Department at Leiden University being excavated hundreds or thousands of years from now. Apart from the remains of the building and perhaps some furniture, the excavators would find three types of documents: documents concerning the management of the department (student administration, policy documents concerning budget cuts etc.), letters (from scholars to their colleagues), and some pages of the Akkadisches Handworterbuch, parts of the Cuneifarm Texts volumes, or last year's examinations. If the archive was not found in situ, the first category would be considered the official (institutional) archive, about the second category one would quarrel whether it belonged to the official archive or to separate private archives, and the third category would be left to those specialized in certain text genres like school exercises, literary texts or lexical texts. Examples of non-administrative texts found in private houses at Ugarit are given by W.H. van Soldt in the present volume, p.229ff. This is only true for as long as the debt is not settled, of course. After payment the debt note was in principle returned to the debtor and smashed. In practice the creditor could keep the debt note and write a receipt of payment for the debtor. In principle only the legally valid copies of such transactions are sealed and thus, discernible from other copies. This requires separate investigation because many old text publications do not even mention the presence of sealings on a tablet. The sealings used in the Ebabbar administration were investigated by MacGinnis, Letter Orders, 164-181.
76
A.C.V.M. BONGENAAR
institution as proof of their claim on B. This kind of transfer will never be detected unless it is explicitly recorded in other texts. In the environment of the Ebabbar temple in Sippar three different entrepreneurial activities can be distinguished. Closest to the temple administration are the prebendaries. These were not employees of the temple12, but they owned a share in temple income in return for the performance of certain services or the delivery of certain commodities related to the cult. Under normal circumstances this was a rather profitable business which the local upper class families were keen to keep to themselves. The work connected with the prebend was in many cases let to a contractor who was given only a percentage of the prebendary income. The prebendaries, however, were also responsible for the 'non-interruption' (la bath) of the offerings, which involved some risk. In times of scarcity of certain commodities they still had to fulfill their obligations to the temple, even if this meant that they had to draw on their own reserves. Business activities in general (often by the same people who held offices in the temple and owned some prebends) may be considered the second entrepreneurial activity in the environment of Ebabbar. They include participation in business ventures (harriinu) for trading purposes or the setting up of small businesses, such as a brewery. Finally, further removed from the temple administration, one finds entrepreneurs who leased the right to collect taxes, field rent, house rent and the like. In return for a fixed amount of silver or commodities annually, entrepreneurs leased from the temple the right to collect certain revenues.13 This practice was not without risk and required a sound financial background on the part of the entrepreneur. 3. Principal families in the temple administration Four families dominated the upper echelon of the Ebabbar temple at Sippar during the period 626-484 B.C. These are, in chronological order: Sange-sippar (or Sang& SarnaS)14, Balihu, SangQ-1Star-~iibili,and Sa-nii~i~u. A fifth family, Siibt-gin& worked its way up during the reign of Darius.15 Private archival documents belonging to descendants of these families were found together with the documents of the temple administration, apparently because temple officials kept (part of) their private archives in their offices at the temple complex.
PRIVATE ARCHIVES IN NEO-BABYLONIAN SIPPAR
77
The Sangfi-sippar family deserves special attention because it is probably the oldest family in first millennium Sippar.16 Named after the highest function in the local temple hierarchy, "Priest (5angli) of Sippar", this family was present when the cult for SamaS was re-established at Sippar long before the first archival texts from the Neo-Babylonian period began to be written. King, Babylonian Boundary Stones no.36 from the mid-ninth century B.C. (Brinkman, PKB, 182ff),records the bestowal of a considerable share in the offerings of the Ebabbar temple at Sippar by the king NabO-apla-iddina to the Sang& Sippar family.17 King, BBSt 36, known as the NabQ-apla-iddina Stone Tablet, is an investiturekudurrulg but it should be noted right away that BBSt 36 is not the original, but a "copy (of the document sealed with) the royal seal of the chancellery" (vi,30-31).19 It narrates the destruction of all representations of the god SamaS at Sippar during the invasions of the Sutians in the eleventh century B.C. Later kings were not able to recover the divine statue, but provisionally installed a sun disk and appointed EkurSum-uSabSi, "priest of Sippar (and) diviner", to office (i,13-23). He received a small allowance of ca. one litre of bread and one litre of beer, as well as the usufruct of a garden in the inner city of Babylon (ii,4-17). The text then suddenly leaps 150 years in history, and king Nabc-apla-iddina (mid-ninth century) is introduced. He was persuaded to make a new divine statue after a descendant of Ekur-Sum-uSabSi, Nabfiniidin-Sumi "priest of Sippar (and) diviner", had found an effigy of the statue of SamaS on the west bank of the Euphrates (ii,l7-iii,ll). From the fact that Ekur-SumuSabSi had received the usufruct of a garden in the inner city of Babylon and the fact that the purification rites for the new statue of SarnaS some 150 years later took place in Ekarzaginna, the temple of Ea at Babylon, we may conclude that SamaS was in exile in Babylon during that period. Although BBSt 36 does not mention this fact explicitly, king NabQ-apla-iddina re-installed the cult and the regular offerings for SamaS in Sippar, and appointed Nab3-nadin-Sumi as the first priest of Sippar after SamaS' return. The remainder of the text is devoted to a precise enumeration of the priest's share in the offerings of the gods SamaS, Aja, and Bunene (iv,47-vi,13). Ekur-Sum-usabgi, like his decendant Nabc-niidin-Sumi some 150 years later, is called PN E.BAR Sippar 1 6 & a in BBSt 36, generally translated as "priest (iangli) of 16 The family name itself is possibly attested earlier, notably in the Middle Babylonian ration list BE 15 168:17 (PN DUMU Sa-an-ge'-e Sippar). However, W.H. van Soldt informed me that one should be
1 2 Many prebendaries occupied offices in the temple at the same time, e.g. the temple administrator (bng6) of Sippar and the scribes in the upper echelon of the temple administration. These offices did not result from the ownership of certain prebends - perhaps with the exception of the Sang6 -, nor did the occupation of a certain office automatically involve the acquisition of prebends. 13 The principle of tax and rent farming in the Neo-Babylonian period has received considerable attention compared to other subjects. For (field) rent farming in Uruk see D. Cocquerillat, Palmeraies, 37ff; for (field) rent farming in Sippar see M. Jursa, AfO Beih. 25, 85ff; and for tax farming see M. Jursa, Tempelzehnt, 19-36. l 4 It is still uncertain whether the family names Sangil-sippar and Sangil-Sama~are fully interchangeable. Whereas many descendants occur with both family names, some branches of the family are only known by one or the other. Prosopographical data of the mentioned families are appended to Bongenaar, Ebabbar, 434-480.
very careful in reading a family name here since the scribe of the text wrote no Personenkeil. The translation "PN, son of the Sangfi of Sippar" should be prefered to "PN, descendant of SangB-sippar". Unlike Gelb, JNES 8 (1949), 34812, I would not call BBSt. 36 a forgery. Some of the conclusions below were reached when Dr. G. van Driel and I read BBSt. 36 and other early Neo-Babylonian kudurru's in summer 1997. Prof. M. St01 was helpful in collecting the secondary literature. Y. Muffs, Legal Papyri, 130: "The most common function of this type of document [kudurru] was the publication of property rights and the insurance of these newly created rights by the magical imprecation written on the boundary-stone (...) However, the kudurru form was later employed simply as a charter which conveyed rights or bestowed exemptions from feudal service (...) In one of these investiture-kudurrus [King, BBSt 110.361, NabB-apla-iddina, the king of Babylon, bestows priestly revenues upon NabB-niidin-Surni, the priest of Sippar". G. Jonker, The Topography of Remembrance. The Dead, Tradition and Memory in Mesopotamia (= Studies in the History of Religions, vol. 68), Leiden 1995, 161, translates: "a copy of a sealed royal administrative (state) document" (GABAN n a 4 ~ LUGAL ~ S ~ i a~ iiprgti).
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Sippar (and) diviner". One may consider an alternative interpretation of this designation, for two reasons. Why should anybody be called Sangii Sippar, "priest of Sippar", when there was no cult left at Sippar, and why should a second (and lower) profession be added to the position of "priest of Sippar"? We suggest the translation "PN, (descendant of the family) SangQ-sippar,(with the profession of) diviner". It seems more probable that both men descended from a family whose members had held the position of priest of Sippar, and that, as a consequence, the family had started to call itself " S a n @ - ~ i ~ ~ aAt r " .a later point, when no cult of Samas remained in Sippar, descendants of this family tried to draw the king's attention in order to have the cult re-installed and to have themselves re-appointed as "priests of Sippar".20 This leads us to the purpose of this text, revealed in vi,14-16: "And in order that (no one else) will make a claim, he (king NabQ-apla-iddina)sealed it, and gave it (to NabQ-niidin-Sumi)for eternity". BBSt 36 could very well be a summary of the original - in view of the historical gap in the text -,written on the family's behalf and focussing on its interests. This stone tablet must have been cherished as a treasure by the family, displayed on the mantelpiece so the speak, although, in reality, it was found in a wooden box in the temple complex. King, BBSt 36 was written around 850 B.C. (NabQ-apla-iddina's31th year), and for the next 200 years archival material - both institutional and private - is rarely extant.21 Is there any evidence for the prominent position of the SangQ-sippar family in the period which provided the bulk of the archival material from Sippar (620-484 B.C.)? Yes and no. Yes, because three successive descendants of the family held the office of "priest (or temple administrator) of Sippar" between Nbp 20 and Ner 2 (606-558 B.C.)22, and no, because these three were preceded by Sangii's of Sippar from other families during the years Nbp 7-18 (619-608 B.C.). Political turbulence in the late Neo-Assyrian period might have caused several shifts in the upper echelon of the Neo-Babylonian temple~.~3 20
The first attempt was made by Ekur-Sum-uSabSi, who persuaded king ~imbar-Sip&(ca. 1026-1009 B.C.) to install a sun disk as replacement for the statue of SamaS as well as to re-establish the regular offerings (King, BBSt 36 i,13-23). After the offerings (and thus, his allowance) were interrupted because of famine, Ekur-Sum-uSabSi made a second attempt, and persuaded king EulmaS-S&n-Sumi (ca. 1005989 B.C.) to grant him an allowance (i,24-ii,17). The third attempt was made by NabO-nidin-Sumi which caused BBSt 36 to be written. The oldest private archival document which can be connected to the Ebabbar temple, Strassmaier, 8e Congres no. 4 from Esarhaddon's third year (67817 B.C.) and written in Babylon, describes a dispute between Sum-iddina, descendant of Sangti-SamaS, and two men, settled by the assembly of the inhabitants of Babylon (cf. Landsberger, Brief, 31). Sum-iddina had sold the "prebend in the sanctuary of SamaS at Sippar, belonging to his father's house" for 2 mina and 11 shekels of silver, but later claimed that he had received only part of the money. The two buyers successfully disputed Sum-iddina's accusation. The unspecified prebend in the text might refer to the temple enterer's prebend which several family members (still) owned at a later date. 22 Notably ~babbara-~adOnu/~Samag?'-apla-usur, his son SamaS-Sum-ukin, and his grandson MuSallim-Marduk; see Bongenaar, Ebabbar, 13 and 27-28 (s.v. Ebabbara-SadOnu and MuiallimMarduk). Evidence for the second person was found recently by C. Waerzeggers (NABU 19981122). 23 In fact, much remains unknown about the early history of the Neo-Babylonian temples. We know, for example, that Ebabbar had a Satammu, "chief administrator" at the end of the Neo-Assyrian empire, whom the first Neo-Babylonian king, Nabopolassar, replaced by a Sang9 of Sippar (Bongenaar, Ebabbar, 11 and 26). The early period of the Ebabbar temple at Sippar is currently being investigated by R. Da Riva.
PRIVATE ARCHIVES IN NEO-BABYLONIAN SIPPAR
79
Perhaps members of the SangQ-~ippar family fought their way back in the position of Sangii of Sippar during Nabopolassar's reign, pointing to NabQ-apla-iddina's donation deed (BBSt 36) in support of their claim. They lost this office again shortly after another turbulent political event: Nabonidus' succession to the throne (556 B.C.). The institutional archives from Uruk and Sippar clearly show that Nabonidus replaced incumbent officials and undertook organisational reforms in the temple hierarchy.24 The SangQ-1Star-~iibi1i family at Sippar benefitted from this at the expense of the SangQ-sipparfamily. From the beginning of Nabonidus' reign, descendants of SangQ-lStar-~iibiliheld the office of Sangii of Sippar and occupied all five (and sometimes six) offices of "College scribe of Ebabbar9'.25Unfortunately, the SangQ-War-~iibili family has left no substantial private archive. Two small groups of texts can be attributed to its descendants. One belonged to the College Scribe NabQ-abbe-Sullim, son of temple administrator (SangLi) MuSGzibMarduk.26 The other belonged to LG$~-ana-nGrdSum-ukin,the father-in-law of College Scribe Marduk-rGmanni of the Sait-gin&family (see below, 4.C)." The last major shift in the temple administration took place during the troubled accession to the throne of the Achaemenid king Darius I, when the SangQ-1Star-~iibili family lost the office of Sangii of Sippar in favour of descendants of $a-na8iSu. Three brothers of the Sa-niiSi8u family, ha-Esangila-lilbur, Guziinu and Nabfi-balassu-iqbi, held the office of Sangii of Sippar during the years Dar 1-28, while their father NabQ-Sumukin became governor (%kin JZmi)of Babylon some time during the first half of Darius' reign. Ina-Esangila-lilbur and Guzinu succeeded their father as governor of Babylon in the second half of Darius' reign. The inheritage division text, published as no. 39 of the 24 25
See Beaulieu, Nabonidus, 115-127, and Bongenaar, Ebabbar, 13+29and 57ff. This College of either five or six scribes in Ebabbar - apparently an innovation by Nabonidus consisted exclusively of SangO-Ktar-~abilidescendants. Until the end of the Ebabbar archive in Xer 2 (4841483 B.C.) only three exceptions can be noted. One finds two descendants of SangO-sippar in the first College of scribes during Nabonidus' reign (to compensate for the loss of power?). In the second half of Darius' reign Marduk-rkmanni from the Sibit-ginC family (see below 4.C) became a College Scribe. His wife was a descendant of Sangfi-Mar-Bibili. 26 This small archive consists exclusively of tablets kept in the collection of Smith College, Northampton, MA, published by C. Gordon. Three of these, Smith College nos. 83 (Babylon; Cyr 4), 86 ([...I; Camb 2) and 91 (Sippar; Dar 14) are promissory notes for dates, field rent (imittu) due to Nab& a&E-Sullim. No. 86 also mentions his brother SamaS-tabni-uSuras creditor and specifies the location of the field as "on the upper N2r-Sarri" (where Ebabbar also owned land; cf. Jursa, AfO Beih. 25, 204f). It is probable that the SangO-lStar-~ibilifamily owned land in the vicinity of Sippar, but another text belonging to this small group, no. 89 (no place name; Dar 14), mentions NabO-abbe-Sullim as the recipient of "dates, property of SamaS, field rent". His official title ("College Scribe") is not mentioned in the text, however, so he may have acted here as an intermediary between the temple and a small tenant. Of the other texts in this archive no. 80 (Nbn 15) is of particular interest because it was written in Bit-gar-Bibili, the business centre of the powerful Egibi and Nur-Sin families during Nabonidus' reign (cf. Beaulieu, Nabonidus, 96-104). It records a loan of 1 mina of silver (for business purposes?) from f ~ a b t ~ ~ s i - a n a - n ~ ~ l I d d i n - Mtoa rNabfi-ae-Sullim duk and his brother ~amd-tabni-usur.Nos. 81, 87 (connection unclear), 95 (debtor: Uabasiru, NabO-a&k-Sullim's brother) and 94 (debtor: Nidinti-Bd, son of Na[bfi-a&e-Sullim]) also belong to this archive. 27 BM 74588=Bertin 2193 (Sippar; Dar lo), a sworn statement about the payment of a debt to L u ~ i ana-nure concerning dates owed to field rent farmer Bulti, BM 74577=Bertin 2402 (Sippar; Dar 18), a promissory note for a good quality garment (t6guzaru babbanitu), owed to Liisi-ana-nure, and Pinches, Peek 7 (Sippar; Dar 22), a contract for the rent of meat prebends in Ebabbar. These texts may have belonged to the private archive of his son-in-law Marduk-remanni.
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Birmingham Museum collections by M. Jursa in Iraq 59 (1997), 121-123, shows that (at least some members) of this family owned prebends in both Ebabbar in Sippar and Esangila in Babylon. The text was written in Babylon, perhaps the primary residence of most family members. Although Sa-n2SiSu descendants frequently occur in private archival texts during Darius' reign, no archives can be attributed to individual members of the family.28
4. Private archives from Sippar Four private archives of the principal families in the Ebabbar administration, mentioned above, will be treated next: two of the Sangfi-sippar (or -3amaS) family (A), the archive of Marduk-b~lHunul/Balihu(B), and the archive of Marduk-rEmannil1Sahitgin$ (C). To these, two other private archives are added: the archive of the scribe AradBEVIAdad-Sam$ (D) and the archive of I3Sar-taribi, whose connection with Ebabbar is uncertain (E). A. Private archives of the Sangli-sippar or Sangti-Sumas'family Although the Sangfi-sippar family lost the office of iangti of Sippar with Nabonidus' accession to the throne, many descendants nevertheless occur in prominent positions in the temple administration after that date. They appear as head of the temple enterers (abu rabli), as overseer of the prebendary bakers of SamaS, as overseer of the prebendary brewers of SamaS, and as (temple) scribes, two of them at the highest level. They also were prominent prebendaries, owning temple enterer's prebends, prebends of the small sanctuaries in Sippar, and baker's and brewer's prebends of SamaS. One private archive possibly belonged to ~uSallim-~arduk/SamaS-Sum-ukin1~angfiSippar, the last iangti of Sippar of that farnily.29 In some cases it is not clear whether the documents belonging to his archive are private or official. In the debt note BM 63818= Bertin 1134, for example, MuSallim-Marduk appears as the creditor of a bubuttu-loan with his filiation (standard in private archival texts) as well as with his title "iangti of Sippar" (standard in official documents). The same is true for Ner 49 in which MuSallimMarduk (with filiation, but without title) is the creditor of six shekels of unsmelted naltar 28 Some scattered documents seem to have belonged to private archives of descendants of $a-nalilu. CT 4 32a (Sippar; Dar 13-XI-20), a clearance document for a slave girl bought by BEI-ittannu/$arnaluballivsa-nililu, Iraq 59 no.44 (Sippar; Dar 22-IX-14), purchase of a slave girl by Bel-ittannu, and JCS 42 no.4 (Alu-la-Bd; [Dar] r23+1-[x]-13+)and TCL 13 199 (Sippar; Dar 26-111-30), loans of barley and silver respectively owed to Bd-ittannu, belong together. Two further texts, written in Babylon, belonged BM 74620=Bertin 21 12, a debt of silver owed to the private archive of &ma$-ibnil~rad-~ula/Sa-na~i~u: by him for which he pledged his prebends in Ebabbar, and BM 74523=Bertin 2564 (published by KohlerIPeiser, Bab. Rechtsl. IV, 19-20; dupi. of BM 55785=Bertin 2565), a deed of donation to his sister. Several private archival texts suggest a close (business) connection with the Balihu family. Four texts concerning a debt restructuring of el-ittannul~na-~san~ila-1ilburlSa-nali~u, for example, probably belonged to the archive of Marduk-bEllunu//Bali~u(see below 4.B) 29 ~ulallim-~ardu~$ama~-lum-ukin belonged to what I have called, provisionally, branch I11 of the Sang6-~ippar(or -$ma$) family (Bongenaar, Ebabbar, 460ff). BEl-remanni/MulebSi-Mardukand Iqila~ardukl~tel-pi-$amal belonged to branch I and branch I1 of this family respectively. Presumably, these branches descend from one common ancestor, dating from long before the Neo-Babylonian period.
PRIVATE ARCHIVES IN NEO-BABYLONIAN SIPPAR
81
gold. The debtor is the chief administrator (s'atammu) of the tempel of Ningal (at Ur?). The final statement in this text, that "silver is given for work on the quay of '...I", suggests an official background. The contract for the purchase of a house in Sippar by MuSallim-Marduk (Sack, Ner 87) and the contracts for the purchase of slaves (Nbk 228 and 236) are certainly private. Title deeds of this kind are rare in the archival texts from Sippar. MuSallim-Marduk also owned (or temporarily had in his possession) "two halves of a baniti-field on the N2r-KiS". This follows from Nbk 330, a promissory note of barley, field rent (imittu), due to him. A second archive belonged to el-remannil~u~eb~i-~arduaan~ii-SarnaS. Some years ago C. Wunsch informed me that a large, unpublished archive of his is present in the Babylon Collection of the British Museum.30 This archive (ca. 150 tablets) will be published by M. Jursa.31 For the moment, I can only assess the family business from the tablets known to me. Bel-remanni is attested in both official and private archival texts for a period of 48 years, from Cyrus' fifth regnal year to Darius' 35th regnal year (534-487 B.C.).32 He was overseer of the prebendary bakers of SamaS for some years, owned prebends of the sanctuary of Adad and Sala, as well as baker's and brewer's prebends of SamaS, and was a scribe of official and private archival texts. In his private archive we find ordinary loans of dates (VS 3 89, AuOr 15 no.13), barley (VS 3 99, 135a, 154 and 208) or silver (BM 75232), which offer very little information because these texts hardly ever mention the purpose of such a loan. More interesting is the promissory note VS 6 121 for 18 litres of "good quality wine from Siihu", owed by MuSEzib-Marduk of the family Sa-naSiSu to Bel-remanni. One can only understand this text by assuming that Belremanni paid (the trader?) MuSezib-Marduk for the import of northern wine. The small quantity perhaps points to personal use by Bel-remanni and his family rather than to business purposes. Another indication of business activities is the rent of a boat by BElremannni and his brother SamaS-nisir (VS 4 145). The rent had to be paid to a third person "by order of the temple administrator (iangti) of Sippar", from which we may deduce that the boat belonged to Ebabbar. A curious text is VS 3 1381139 (discussed by Dandamaev in AoF 22), a promissory note for 86 kor of dates due from Bel-remanni, intended as "rations for the lfigardu,the magi and the palace officials of the barti-house, under the command of the alphabet scribe Bd-etir". It remains to be investigated whether this text reveals business connections with the palace in Babylon, or whether it should be understood within the framework of Bel-remanni's official duties and obligations. In his archive we also find texts relating to the prebends owned by his family. These offer a rare insight into the daily operation of the prebendary system. Ever since the publication of the baker's archive of Bel-supbmuhur from the Eanna temple at Uruk by K. Kessler, Uruk. Urkunden aus Privathausem 1 (= AUWE 8), Mainz am Rhein 1991, 30
See also Wunsch, AuOr 15 (1997), 164-165. Apart from more details about Bel-remanni's prebends and business activities, this archive will hopefully also reveal some information lacking thus far, i.e. connections between the principal families in Sippar through marriages. BM 42336(+42606), mentioned by Wunsch in AuOr 15, for example, records the transfer of 2 minas of silver and 2 slaves as (part of) the dowry of BEl-rEmanniyswife f~ja-!jipat.She was the daughter of MuSEzib-MardukINabQ-nipSWal$u. Just before this ms. went to press, M. Jursa's study of Bel-remanni appeared: Das Archiv des B d rZrnanni (= PIHANS 86), Istanbul 1999. My observations about this archive should be considered onesided. 32 For references see Bongenaar, Ebabbar, 449-450 (+ pp. 181-2,214-5,246,485), and Dandamaev, AoF 22 (1995), 34-36.
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we should be aware of the fact that the official ledgers listing prebendaries and the commodities they received for a certain period differ from the actual daily practice. The private archival texts from Uruk show that prebendaries exchanged shifts all the time, let and sublet their prebends, pledged, sold and bought prebends. The people we encounter in prebendary context in the official administration may therefore be a) prebendaries who performed the duties related to their prebends themselves, b) prebendaries who, in reality, had their prebendary duties contracted out to a second, or even third party who is not mentioned in the texts, or c) contractors who performed the prebendary duties without owning them. The latter, who are called Zpiiiinu in the Sippar texts and riisinu in the Uruk texts, could either be fellow prebendaries, relatives, or subordinates of the owner of the prebend. To date only a few private archival texts from Sippar demonstrate this phenomenon, but M. Jursa informs me that the SangO-SamaS archive contains much new material on this subject. The following example from BEl-remanni's archive shows how complex the daily practice must have been. Cyr 260, written by BE1-remanni, relates to the baker's prebends owned by his family, although neither the word "baker" nor the word "baker's prebend" occurs in the text. The interpretation is based entirely on prosopographical evidence. Cyr 260 states that BCl-remanni (himself a baker's prebendary and future overseer of the bakers) received barley on behalf of Nidintu (his uncle, a baker's prebendary and former overseer of the bakers). This barley was subsequently given for offerings to TaqiS-Gula (another uncle of Bel-remanni, a baker's prebendary and the current overseer of the bakers). Finally, the barley was handed over to Naba-zer-iqiSa, who also appears as the first witness of the text (and who is also attested as a baker's prebendary). The background of this text is thus: Nidintu owned a baker's prebend of SamaS in Ebabbar. In this capacity he was entitled to a certain amount of barley to enable him to prepare the offerings connected with the prebend. He had his nephew Bel-remanni collect the barley and hand it over to the overseer of the prebendary bakers, TaqiS-Gula. TaqiS-Gula, who was a brother of Nidintu (and an uncle of Belremanni), in turn, handed over the barley to Nab9-zer-iqiSa, probably the contractor of Nidintu's prebend who ultimately prepared the offerings. The text was probably written as proof of Naba-zer-iqiSa's receipt of the barley. BEl-remanni's archive offers much more information relating to this topic. BM 42572=Bertin 2753, for example, is a contract for the letting and the subletting of a baker's prebend in the (small) sanctuary of Anunnitu, owned by SamaS-iqi8a of the Sang9-SarnaS family (branch VII of the family). He let the prebend to IqiSa-Marduk (branch II), who sublet it to SamaS-niiSir(branch I), a brother of our Bel-rEmanni.33 The purpose of this, of course, is to make money. Both owners and contractors received part of the prebendary income, while the subcontractor performed the work. In VS 5 109 Bel-remanni himself is the contractor of a brewer's prebend of SamaS (cf. also VS 4 200). A third archive of this family may have belonged to ~ a b n e a / I ~ i S a - ~ a r d u k / S a n ~ 9 SamaS (and his father ~ ~ i S a - ~ a r d u k l ~ t e l - ~ ~This a m awill S ) ;not be discussed in detail here.
33
BEl-remanni's brothers appear elsewhere in his archive. According to VS 4 113, for example, BElremanni paid off a loan of silver due from his brother SamaS-n5$ir,and in VS 4 145 both brothers hired a boat (presumably from Ebabbar) for one month.
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83
B. Private archives of the Balihu family The Balibu farnily ( P ~ K A S K A L + K U R -lived ~ ) ~in ~ Sippar before the beginning of the Neo-Babylonian period. One of the last chief administrators (gatammu) of Ebabbar in the late Neo-Assyrian period was Sula from the Balilp family. From the beginning of Nabopolassar's reign (626 B.C.), members of this family are attested with temple enterer's prebends, possibly in combination with goldsmith's prebends35, and slightly later they also occur with brewer's prebends of SamaS. SamaS-mukin-apli//~alihuheld the position of "head of the temple enterers" (ahu rabfi) of Ebabbar, probably the highest cultic function in the temple hierarchy. At present the texts from Sippar shed insufficient light on the prominent position of the Balily family, perhaps because no descendants of Balibu are as yet known as scribes. Two small private archives, both unpublished, can be attributed to descendants of Balibu. One archive (Dar 22-34) belonged to Marduk-bElSunu/Naba-balassu-iqbi,a grandson of NabQ-nipSari. The latter is well-known in the temple administration. He owned temple enterer's and brewer's prebends of SamaS, was in all likelihood a goldsmith and possibly also one of the five or six 'College Scribes' in the upper echelon of the temple administration (although no records written by him are known). His grandson Marduk-belSunu appears only as a brewer's prebendary in the Ebabbar archive but there is reason to believe that he, like his grandfather and his uncle MuSEzib-Marduk, was a goldsmith and a temple enterer's prebendary. From his appearance in private archival texts from the Ea-eppe8-ili family, another family of goldsmiths in Ebabbar, it might follow that he could have been a goldsmith himself as well.36 He probably inherited part of his grandfather's temple enterer's prebend, but he also obtained a (temple enterer's?) prebend from the Ile'i-Marduk family. BM 74475 (courtesy M. Jursa) settles the dispute about a prebend taken as pledge by Marduk-belSunu twenty years earlier. The (undefined) prebend belonged to Nidintu, descendant of a long line of temple enterer's prebendaries of the Ile'i-Marduk family. Nidintu's sister fRe'indu claimed the prebend back (ana paqiiri isqu ... talliku) but went home empty-handed: " f has ~ no ~ claim concerning the prebend" (mimma ragfitu i a f~~ ina mubhi isqu jiinu). Other texts in his private archive are not very spectacular: ordinary debt notes, the purchase deed of a slave, and once Marduk-bElSunu acted as a guarantor in a promissory note.37 Two texts about a debt-restructuring of a certain BEl-ittannu, descendant of Sa-niiSiSu (and son of a previous 34 For the reading of the family name EN-)d~~~~~~+~~~-li/i = Balihu, alternatively read Sin-Sad?, Balib-na'id, Illat-na'id, BEl-illatu and Ili-tillati, see Bongenaar, Ebabbar,464-465. 35 The temple enterer's prebend, being the most prominent of all prebends, allowed people to enter the inner quarter(s) of the temple. The ownership of such a prebend, in combination with certain crafts, was a prerequisite for being allowed to perform duties in the inner quarter of the temple. Some descendants of Balibu either owned combined temple enterer's + goldsmith's prebends (as one finds in the later Seleucid period), or they were goldsmiths who owned temple enterer's prebends. See Bongenaar, Ebabbar,365366. 36 Notably as witness in CT 4 32a and BM 55784=Bertin 2692-3. Further BM 74550=Bertin 2720-1 discussed below. 37 Debt notes due to him: BM 74593=Bertin 2475 (Dar 09-IV-22), BM 74518=Bertin 2430 (Dar 24XIIa-'22?'), BM 74522=Bertin 2531 (Dar 16-11-24) and BM 74640=Bertin 2454 (Dar 02-IX-[x]); Purchase deed of a slave: BM 74610=Bertin 2738 (Dar VIII-34); Guarantor in a promissory note (of barley, "food rations for the servant girls of the king", due from &ma$-iddindl~mel-~a): BM 74477 (Dx 06-IV-27).
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temple administrator of Sippar), probably also belonged to Marduk-belSunu's private archive. According to BM 74550=Bertin 2720-1, dated Dar 12-VI-33, Bel-ittannu had to pledge all his prebends in Ebabbar to NabQ-bullissu,descendant of Ea-eppeS-ili, for a debt of more than 7 minas of silver. Marduk-belSunu (a partner of NabQ-bullissu?)let these prebends to a contractor for the annual rent of 1 112 minas of silver. With this arrangement BEl-ittannu still could not meet his debts apparently, because two months later BM 74559=Bertin 2718 was written to record that Marduk-b5lSunu "had seized all the allowances of BEl-ittannu" (SUG.HI.Agabbi $a PN ukti1).38 The (unpublished) archive of ArdiaINergal-iddina1Balihu from Sippar was discovered by Dr. P.-A. Beaulieu in the Babylonian collections at Yale University (Catalogue 1, 54-60). Particularities of this archive are given in the table in 95 below.
C. The archive of Marduk-r&anni/B21-uballit/Sa~it-gin2 Perhaps the most promising private archive from Sippar belonged to Mardukremanni, descendant of Sat-gin&or S&it-sattukki, "Oil presser of the regular offerings". It is currently the subject of C. Waerzegger's dissertation, but we may reveal some details here. The S@t-gin& family was initially not one of the principal families in the Ebabbar administration. The family name refers to the profession of its members - they were prebendary oil pressers in Ebabbar - and, like many other families who owned some prebends in Ebabbar, the institutional archive is not particularly revealing about them.39 In Darius' twentieth regnal year Marduk-remanni suddenly appears as a one of the five College Scribes in the temple management of Ebabbar. In the twenty five years prior to his appointment as a College Scribe, only descendants of Sangti-1Star-~iibiliheld this function (cf. note 25). Without knowledge of his private archive one might wonder how someone like Marduk-remanni, who did not belong to the small circle of upper-class families, made a career for himself in the temple hierarchy. The foundation for his success was laid by his father Bd-uballit, who was probably an oil presser's prebendary in Ebabbar, like many family members, and who conducted some trading activities. We are not well-informed about Bd-uballif's activities, except for one clever move: his marriage . was the daughter of Samas-mukin-apli of the Balihu family who held the to f ~ u ' i t uShe
3* Two texts in which BEl-ittannu acts as the guarantor, CT 4 21a (Dar 05-1-19) and Freydank, ArOr 33, 19-21 (Dar 26-X-27), possibly also belong to this "file". 39 From the beginning of Nabonidus' reign the oil presser's (jabit gin;) prebend in Ebabbar seems to have been shared by two families. The S5~t-gin6family performed the services of the oil presser's family the services for every second half prebend for every first half of the month, the &ing~-1Ptar-~5bili of the month (see Bongenaar, Ebabbar, 286-287). As stated above (•˜3),the SangQ-1Ptar-~abili at Sippar benefitted most from Nabonidus' accession to the throne, and it is tempting to suppose that Nabonidus (also) rearranged the prebendary system in Ebabbar in favour of this family, for example by creating new oil presser's prebends (one of the largest oil presser's prebendaries during Nabonidus' reign was the newly installed temple administrator (Sangii) ~ u E z i b - ~ a r d u k / / S a n ~ Q - M a r - ~ i bHowever, ili). we are badly informed about the prebendaries and the prebendary system at Sippar during Nebuchadnezzar's reign. It is too easy to jump to conclusions here.
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important position of "head of the temple enterers" (ahu rabli), one of the highest cultic functions in Ebabbar.40 After Bel-uballit had died, probably in Barz 1 (522 B.C.), Marduk-remanni took over his father's business at the age of ca. 24 years.41 During the first half of Darius' reign Marduk-remanni expanded his wealth and influence. His marriage with f1nb2 of the SangQ-1Star-~5bilifamily (one of the principal families whose descendants held all the offices of College Scribe in Ebabbar) was certainly favourable. In fact, it was probably this marriage which facilitated his appointment to the office of College Scribe in the temple management. Meanwhile his business prospered. In his private archive many debt notes - sometimes written by himself - are present in which Marduk-remanni owed considerable amounts of barley and dates. The debtors are in many cases prominent officials and prebendaries of Ebabbar. In the case of BM 74625=Bertin 2007 (Dar 08VII-04), "the temple enterers of Sama5 collectively" are the debtors of 130 kor (= 23,400 1.) of dates. This probably means that Ebabbar, shortly before the harvest, was obliged to borrow this amount of dates from Marduk-remanni to be able to fulfill the temple's obligations. In his archive one also finds documents concerning the rent of his date grove(s) in a locality called m ~ A ~ / ~ ~ - ~although - S ~ 4no2property , deeds relating to his land are known to me. A large part of his capital, however, seems to have been invested in prebends in Ebabbar. No one (to my knowledge) accumulated as many prebends as Marduk-remanni did (see Bongenaar, Ebabbar, 478). It remains to be investigated whether some of these prebends came into his possession through his wife f ~ n b aor his mother f~u'itu,who might have inherited prebends from their families. D. The private archive of Arad-B2VBZl-uSallidAdad-Sam& Despite the small size of the private archive of the Adad-Sam&family, it perfectly illustrates the private affairs of a local family connected to the temple. Nine tablets can be attributed to this archive, all written at SippareQThe keeper of the archive was probably the scribe Arad-Bel/BEl-uSallirn1Adad-Sam&(active between Ner 1 and Dar 3, i.e. 559519 B.C.), who wrote three of these private archival texts. Although Arad-BEl's exact
40 Nbn 313 (Nbn 06-XII-08) is the marriage agreement of BEl-uballit and f ~ u ' i t uFew . documents of Bel-uballit's business activities remained in Marduk-rgmanni's private archive: Cyr 119 (with retro-act Nbn 212), BM 63848=Bertin 3086 (concerning his business venture with a certain BEl-iddina/Marduk?Pezib) and Graziani, Bard 9. Further evidence is found in the Ebabbar archive: BM 63940=Bertin 1373 and CT 55 754, which show that BEl-uballit bought wool from Ebabbar (probably to sell it elsewhere). 41 The last text mentioning BEl-uballit alive is Graziani, Bard 9 (Barz 29-111-[Ol]). The earliest text which mentions Marduk-rgmanni in a business transaction is ZA 4, Barz 7 (Barz 15-VI-01). Thus, BEluballit probably died between month IV and VI of Barz 1. Marduk-rgmanni's age may be deduced from the date of his parents' marriage agreement (Nbn year 8) and the assumption that he must have been the eldest son because he took over his father's business. He was probably born in Nbn 9 or 10 (546 B.C.). 4 2 M. Jursa suggests the reading Du(r)bissu (NABU 1998169). 43 Notably Nbk 242 (Nbk 10-XII-31), Sack, Ner 100 (Ner 17-11-01), BM 74932 (Ner 08-VI-Ol), Ner 29 (Ner 20-X-Ol), BM 63896=Bertin 1319 (Nbn 07-VI-06), BM 63969=Bertin 1329 (Nbn 13?-IV-07), Cyr 183=Roth, BMA no.19 (Cyr 10-[XI-04), Cyr 255 (Cyr 20-111-07) and BM 64119=Bertin 2937 (undated).
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function in the temple administration is unknown44, he is a well-known scribe of official Ebabbar texts, in particular of the judicial documents from the early Achaemenid period (for references see Bongenaar, Ebabbar, 481-482). In fact, it is not inconceivable that the relatively isolated group of judicial documents belonging to the Ebabbar administration was found together with Arad-Bd's private archive, as well as (copies of) other private archival texts written by him, in which he was not one of the parties involved.'s From texts which seem to belong to the Ebabbar administration proper it is clear that Arad-BEl, apart from being a scribe in the temple organization, conducted some business activities. Nbn 639, dated Nbn 25-VIII-12 and written in Babylon, is an account of the cattle Arad-Be1 and ~abQ-z~r-ibni/SamaS-iddina sold to Ebabbar for the total amount of 6 minas and 57 shekels (= ca. 3 112 kg.) of silver. ~abQ-zer-ibni1SamaS-iddinawas a ploughman of SamaS who later became the chief of the bowmen (rub qaSti).46 It is not clear from Nbn 639, however, whether Arad-Be1 and NabG-zEr-ibni acted as private entrepreneurs (i.e. invested money in cattle to sell to Ebabbar for a higher price), or whether they were sent to Babylon to buy cattle on behalf of Ebabbar (i.e. Ebabbar supplied the money). There is ample evidence of temple officials being sent to Babylon and other cities to acquire merchandise, including sacrificial animals, on behalf of the temples.47 Less ambiguous is Nbn 1016, dated Nbn 23-XU-16, which records the delivery of 71 containers of pure wine (@GESTIN! KO.GA; coll. C. Waerzeggers) and one kor (ca. 180 1.) of raisins by Arad-Bd. Wine and raisins were items typically obtained through long-distance trade with the west, and sold to Ebabbar by merchants. This could mean that Arad-B61 was in contact with merchants who travelled to the west. The private archival texts of the Adaddam2 family record the private affairs of BeluSallim (3 tablets), the business activities of his son Arad-Bd (3), and family documents concerning two more children of BEl-uSallim (3). The earliest text in the archive is Nbk 242, an ordinary loan document recording a loan of 85 shekels of silver owed by BeluHallim/ NabQ-uSabSi1Adad-Sam2to a courtier (Sa-re3 Sarri; coll.). The term of the loan was three months, and the annual interest rate 20% (usual for this period). The possible reasons why such texts can be found in private archives have been discussed in 52 above. There is a possibility that the loan was still unpaid when Arad-BB took over his father's business. Two more texts in the archive concern Bel-uSallimYsprivate affairs. BM 63896=Bertin 1319 from Nabonidus' sixth year and written by his son Arad-Bel, is a lease for the duration of the contract of a certain Arad-Anunnitu, who is rented out to BduSallim by his brother Talimmu. The annual rent of five shekels of silver had to be paid 44 Arad-BE1 was not one of the five or six 'College Scribes' in the upper echelon of the temple administration. He was probably employed in the office of scribes or clerks where the bulk of the administrative Ebabbar texts was written (cf. Bongenaar, Ebabbar, 66). Dar 27 (Dar 18-XII-01) offers corroborative evidence. According to this text Arad-BEVBEl-uZSallimlAdad-Sam&,[SamaZS-idd]ina/Niqudu/ RE'Q-sisC, and BanQnulMuSezib-BelIDabibiwere sent to a location on the Nir-Pallukattu to fetch barley by an order of the temple administrator (bngri) of Sippar. All three are known as scribes. Since they were sent by the temple administrator of Sippar (the highest administrative official of Ebabbar), one may conclude that they were employed by Ebabbar. 45 E.g. ZA 2,168 (=Sack, Ner 84), Dalley, Edinburgh Tablets no. 71, ASJ 15 (1993), 103f, Cyr 368, CT 55 91, CT 55 133 and BM 59564. 46 For references see Bongenaar, Ebabbar, 131-132, and Jursa, AfO Beih. 25, 31 and 22+69. 47 See, for example, Joannks, T ~ ~ B 238-255, R, for officials of the temple Eanna at Uruk sent to Babylon to obtain the "necessities" (hiiihtu) of Eanna.
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partly to Talirnmu, the letter, and partly to Arad-Anunnitu "as wages for the performance of his ilku duty".4* Thus, Bel-uSallim contracted a substitute to buy off his service duty, which implies that he owned land in the vicinity of Sippar. BM 641 19=Bertin 2937, date broken but probably to be dated before BM 63896=Bertin 1319, is a similar lease. In this contract a couple lease their son to BEl-uSallim for the annual rent of two shekels of silver. A crucial text in the archive with regard to the business of the Adad-Sam2 family is Sack, Ner 100. This text, written by Arad-Bd, records that Bel-uSallim and a family member, Marduk-Sum-ibni/Bd-abbe-iddina1Adad-W, deposited half a mina of silver each for a business venture (IzarrZnu). The silver was invested in 20 large storage jars for fine beer (dugdunnu Sa KAS D~G.GA).The beneficiaries of the contract are the respective (future) successors of the family business, notably Arad-Be1 (Bel-uballii's son) and SamaS-z~r-ibni(Marduk-Sum-ibni's brother). The contract furthermore stipulates that Arad-BE1 and Samal-zer-ibni had to pay jointly eight shekels of silver as the rent for a house belonging to Marduk-Sum-ibni. This text tells us that Arad-BEl, a temple scribe, started his own brewery business for which his father supplied the money. Apart from his share in a brewery Arad-Bd owned a flock of sheep and a plot of land. BM 63969 =Berth 1329 is a promissory note for 12 good lambs (kaliirne babbanlitu) born in the eleventh month, owed by NabQ-ile'i to Arad-Bel. These lambs were probably part of the increase of Arad-Bel's flock, which was put at the disposal of (herdsman) NabQ-ile'i.49 Cyr 255, finally, is a contract for the making of bricks on Arad-Bel's premises. It stipulates that Ardia/R~mutlPa!$$iru,the maker of the bricks, will keep a 215 share of the bricks, whereas Arad-BE1 will receive a 315 share. Three tablets in the archive relate to other children of Bd-ugallim. Two of them, BM 74932 and Ner 29 from Neriglissar's first year, concern Bd-uSallim7s daughter (and Arad-Bel's sister) fSikkQor fsikkiiti. BM 74932 records the transfer by Bd-uSallim of "50 shekels of silver, sheep, and slaves which are (written) on the tablet (ina i m ~ of~ ~ ) fSikkQ/~~l-uliallim" to a certain BEl-iddinmergal-uSEzib. The silver, the sheep and the slaves on fSikkQ's tablet obviously belonged to her dowry. The text does not record why Bel-uSallim transferred these, but one can think of two reasons. Either Bd-iddina/Nergal~Sezibwas to become f&kkQ's husband - in which case one should wonder why the word dowry (nudunnli) is not mentioned in the text - or, more likely, Bd-uSallim had to pay off a debt to BEl-iddina/Nergal-uSezib, and, being short of cash, transferred (part of) his daughter's dowry to meet his obligations. In the latter case, BM 74932 should be understood as a reminder to Bel-uSallim to make up his daughter's dowry. It is conceivable that Bd-iddinmergal-uSezib was some sort of business partner of Beluiallim or of Arad-BEl, because a document belonging to Bel-iddina's private archive, 2 A
48 (2 I12 shekels of silver) i d i h ana ilkih. The CAD translates ilku as "services performed for a higher authority in return for land held". In practice, many people bought off this duty, either by arranging a replacement for themselves (which is the case here), or by paying an amount of silver (compare texts nos. 50-54 in DonbazlStolper, MuraSri). For ilku in the Neo-Babylonian period, see Joannks, TTBR,20-23, Joannks, Archives, 151-159, and the contribution of C. Wunsch in this volume, P. 113. 49 The practice of owners (either institutions or private individuals) contracting out their animals to herdsmen is common in the Neo-Babylonian period. The herdsmen had to deliver, among others, 213 of the new-born animals to the owner. See van Driel, BSA 7 (1993), 222ff.
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2, 186 (= Sack, Ner 84), was written by Arad-BE1 (and possibly found in his archive).50 The second text in BEl-uSallim's archive with regard to f & ~Ner , 29 (=Sack, Ner 29)51, is a house rental contract, in which f~ikkuti/B~l-uSallim for the duration of the contract leases "the room facing east, the front room and a storeroom in the courtyard" of the house of NabQ-Sum-ukin for the annual rent of 1 314 shekels of silver. Her father B d uSallim is the first witness of the contract. Finally, there is a marriage agreement in the archive, Cyr 183 (= Roth, BMA no.19), of Bel-uSallim's son (and Arad-Bd's brother) SamaS-aha-iddina, written by Arad-Be1 himself. This small archive reveals the following: Arad-Bel, an official temple scribe and descendant of a local family which owned some land in the vicinity of Sippar, was at the same time a private entrepreneur, as was his father, and probably other members of the Adad-Same family as ~ e l l . Arad-BE1 5~ owned a share in a brewery, set up with his father's money, invested in animals (sheep, and possibly also cattle), inherited (part of) the family's land, and probably traded in merchandise (wine, raisins and possibly bricks). As a trained scribe he wrote some of the family's tablets, such as his brother's marriage contract, but also private archival texts in which he himself or his family members were not among the parties involved. Due to the lack of information about the excavation of the tablets, we cannot determine whether the private archive of the Adad-Same family was found together with the main body of the official Ebabbar archive in the temple complex, or in a private house at Sippar belonging to his family. When more unpublished texts from Sippar become available for study, many more small private archives will probably be attributed to scribes of Ebabbar. Similar to AradBd's case, for example, is the case of Remut-Nab0 of the family Bel-eteru (currently investigated by R. Da Riva), active from at least the years Nbp 12 to Nbk 1, i.e. 615-603 B.C. Like Arad-Bd, Remut-NabQwas a scribe of official Ebabbar texts although his exact function in the temple administration is unknown (for references see Bongenaar, Ebabbar, 495), and like Arad-Bel, he wrote some of the tablets concerning his business activities himself (e.g. Revillout, BOR 1 (1886-7), 118). He was involved in several business ventures (barrinu; MacGinnis, Iraq 56 (1994), 118ff, nos. 2 and 3). RemutNab6 may have kept other private archival texts which he wrote, but in which he is not an interested party, in his personal archive (e.g. CT 55 193 and ZA 4, Nbp 12). Later descendants of the Bd-eteru family often occur in official Ebabbar texts from Nabonidus's reign, but at present not a single private archive of one of them is known.53 50
In ZA 2,186 (= Sack, Ner 84), Bd-iddinamergal-uS5zib and a certain Naba-ilik-paniIIlani-iddina declare that there will be no renewal of litigation between them concerning Nabfi-alik-pani's belongings (udiSu) and BEl-iddina's claim thereupon. Bd-iddina1Nergal-uSezib furthermore occurs as the first witness in BM 63969=Bertin 1329 from had-Bel's private archive (discussed above). is Note that Sack, Ner 29 misinterprets the text. The house of ~abfi-Sum-ukidamaS-Sakin-~umi "built on the plot of Nabfi-bd-Sumli" (ina GI.ME$N-b-S ipug, and not "built with the reeds belonging to N-b-8". s 2 At least one other member of the family was a scribe of official Ebabbar texts, HaSdi/NabCi-a?$pSbullit/Adad-Sam6 (for ref. see Bongenaar, Ebabbar, 486), who cannot be related directly to Arad-Bd. Another member of the family, NabO-Sum-iddinafina, occurs as the creditor of silver in Graziani, Bard no. 20. 53 Several members of the family owned prebends of the sanctuary of S a r r a t - ~ i ~ (Bongenaar, ~ar Ebabbar, 242 and 244ff, S.V.Bd-&a-ittannu, Eriba-Marduk, Sin-ili and SamaS-uballit) and in one case a brewer's prebend of SamaS (Bongenaar, Ebabbar, 210f, S.V.Bel-uballit,), and a cultic singer's prebend (Bongenaar, Ebabbar, 289, S.V. Gimillu). Some of the family members appear as scribes (Bongenaar,
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E. The private archive of Iiiar-taribiBunene-ibni The archive of ISSar-taribi (or h~--taribi)5~, son of Bunene-ibni, is the only coherent private archive from Sippar which cannot be directly related to the temple. This follows immediately from the personal names occurring in the archive. The principals in the texts occur without filiation, and the scribes and witnesses - sometimes with filiation - are not attested outside IHSar-taribi's archive. The frequency of non-Akkadian personal names is another peculiarity of his archive. The tablets belonging to his private archive were previously collected by M. Weszeli (WZKM 86 (1996), 4720 and M. Jursa (Iraq 59 (1997), 1240, to which add Dalley, Edinburgh Tablets no.74, and two unpublished texts brought to my attention by C. Waerzeggers: BM 84101+84265 and BM 84105. ISSartaribi may have been active for fifty years. His name is attested between Nbn 7 and Dar 23 (549-499 B.C.).55 We probably have to picture him as based somewhere in the countryside around Sippar. A key text is Camb 13 (Camb [XI-X-00)in which ISSar-taribi and his brother B d uballit appear as the holders of a bow fief @$BAN) who have to put up a "royal soldier (or workman)" (sub iarri). The s i b iarri was an obligation required from fief holders.56 He possibly also leased field(s) from Ebabbar. Four texts from the Ebabbar archive mention a certain ISSar-taribi in connection with field rent farmer (rub suti) Bulta and the gugallu ("canal inspector") ~imil-SamaS.57 ISSar-taribi was involved in several business ventures (barriinu). BM 74483=Bertin 1818, dated Camb 15-XI-01, is a memorandum concerning 18 112 shekels of silver, given for beer to a third party, and 14 shekels of silver as outstanding assets (ia ina suqu) belonging to the business venture (barranu) of ISSar-taribi and Zabdia/Alla?-~abQ-milki. A few years later these two men owe 4 minas and 15 shekels of silver to KaSidu-SarrauSur (BM 74507=Bertin 1832, dated Camb 25-XIIb-05). ISSar-taribi's investment in a brewery also follows from BRM I 69 (Dar 13-XII-04), a contract for the hire of "five Ebabbar, 485ff, S.V. Bd-rCIBSunu, Eriba-Marduk, Eteliu, Gimillu, 1tti-SamaS-balatu, Liblut, and Sullumu). 54 His name is alternately spelled AN.$AR-,d ~ ~ - S a rd~S-tar-, -, LUGAL-ta-ri-bi and Sd-at-ta-ri-bi (see Bongenaar, Ebabbar, 109; Zadok, Assur 413 (1984), 740. This personal name also occurs in Borsippa, see Joan&, Archives, 268-269 (A 94:4, LUGAL-ta-ri-bi) and 258 (L 4725:12; AN.$AR-ta-ri-bi). 55 CT 55 747 (Nbn 01-1-07) which belongs to the (official) Ebabbar archive, mentions ISSar-taribi (not necessarily the same individual) as a messenger (mir Cipri) of a certain Naba-nasirlSin-it[...I. On behalf of the latter, ISSar-taribi presented one female donkey as a gift (irbu) to Ebabbar. The earliest text from his private archive is BM 74500=Bertin 1702, dated [Cyr] 10-VI-08, which states that ISSar-taibi and B&uballit, sons of Bunene-ibni, have to pay their outstanding rent (rihtu id&) from Cyr 1-07, This might refer to the rent of a house. 56 For the obligation called jab Sarri, see Stolper, Entrepreneurs, 62, van Driel, JESHO 32 (1989), 208ff, Donbaz/Stolper, MuraCG, 79, Jursa, AfO 42/43 (1995-6), 257, and P.-A. Beaulieu's contribution in this volume, p.53f. 5 7 In Dar 414 (Dar VIIYIX-15), ISSar-taribi is among the recipients of barley given for seed. The barley is disbursed by Arad-BE1 and Iddinaja (who could be identical with gugallu Iddinaja; cf. Jursa, AfO Beih. 25, 54). Bulta is also mentioned in this text. CT 56 198 ([Dar] 19) records the delivery of dates to Ebabbar by means of gugallu ~irnil-SamaS.ISSar-taribi (written Sattaribi) and Nidintu deliver 12;3.1.0 dates. CT 56 242 ([Dar]) and Nbn 659 ([Dar?! XI-XI-12)mention in broken context: dates, Bulta rub siiti, and ISSar-taribi. Note that the ISSar-taribi in these texts is not necessarily identical with ISSartaribi1Bunene-ibni in the private archival texts.
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empty old vats without a crack and without bitumen" by him, which he probably used to store beer. Once the vats were repaired with bitumen they could not be used to store beverages anymore. ISSar-taribi had more business partners: Bel-eterulsin-zer-iddina, with whom he jointly invested 2 minas and 40 shekels of silver in a business venture (Revillout, BOR 2 (1887-8), 59, no.96), and a certain fJanana/Gimirhala(?), with whom he owed a debt of silver to a third party (Dalley, Edinburgh Tablets no.74, dated Dar 24X-07). In Camb 7 ISSar-taribi bought a donkey (Weszeli, WZKM 86 (1996), 472f no.2), and in Dar 10 a Bactrian slave girl (Pinches, Records of the Past NF 4 (1890), 1040. His wife f ~ a ' u m mwas ~ also involved in business. She sold barley and wool with a value of 112 mina of silver to her brother-in-law Bd-uballit, in the presence of her husband ISSartaribi and her mother-in-law f ~ u d d u ~(Jursa, tu Iraq 59 (1997), no.41). ISSar-taribi was a real moneylender. Loan documents in general offer little information, but one document in his private archive not only states that "x silver from ISSar-taribi is owed by Bania", but also explicitly mentions that "Bania received the silver from ISSar-taribi" (Revillout, BOR 2 (1887-8), 58, n0.95).5~ISSar-taribi's business activities implied travelling. In a sworn statement written in -'Raq-qa-nu(?)', BM 64167 =Berth 2313 (Dar 20-VII-14), two brothers promised to ISSar-taribi that they would satisfy their debt to him before a certain date.59 A most curious document in his archive, badly broken, is Dar 149 (Dar 22-XII-04), written in Opis. As far as I can see, ISSartaribi and another business parter of his(?), Hinni-ilini, brought a certain [SarnaSl-adannu to trial, presumably because the latter could not meet his debts. The document was written before two judges. This SamaS-adannu recurs in Revillout, BOR 1 (1886-7), 102-103 no.146 (Sippar; Dar 28-IV-12), a sworn statement in which he promises to pay the debt he owes to ISSar-tariii. In the remaining text from this archive, ISSar-taribi sets up a business venture for his son Bd-iddina in a locality called Bit-Silli. ISSar-taribi invests 40 woollen garments (skka-ra-ba-turn) on behalf of his son and his son's business partner Gimillu invests four shekels of silver (BM 74626=Bertin 2498, dated Dar 05-VIII-23).
5. Conclusion The table below summarizes the characteristics of the private archives from Sippar which have been discussed in this ~ a p e r . ~ o Although not all of the private archives from Sippar could be discussed here, the following observations can be made. It is clear from the table that most of the private archives from Sippar (6 out of 8) are directly related to the temple, either because the 58
Other loan documents in his archive are BM 74460=Bertin 1807 (Camb 2), BM 84101+84265 (Dar lo), BM 84105 (Dar l l ) , BM 74576=Bertin 2431 (Dar 20), Revillout, BOR 2 (1887-8), 57, no.97 (--), Revillout, RE 811 (1897), 7f no.1 (--) and no.2 (--). 59 Cf. garim~aqqanuin the vicinity of Uruk (Zadok, RGTC 8, 258), or should we read ' R ~ ~ - ~ d t ! d![SamaS]? The documents belonging to ISSar-tariii's private archive have not been collated by me, and it should be noted that the unpublished Bertin copies nor the published texts from the Revillout collection are very reliable. The present whereabouts of the former Revillout collection are unknown to me. H.D. Baker informs me that at least some of them are in the British Museum. 60 With the exception of IqiSaMarduk-Sum-uaur/Ea-eppeS-ili, a goldsmith in Ebabbar, not discussed here. For the private archival texts in which he appears, see Bongenaar, Ebabbar, 387-388.
PRIVATE ARCHIVES IN NEO-BABYLONIAN SIPPAR
91
archive holder occupied a temple office or because he owned prebends in Ebabbar. No private archives of tax or rent farmers are known at present. The connections between the temple archive and the private archives from Sippar known to us result directly from the fact that (most of?) these tablets were discovered together at the temple complex. We may argue that someone without any connection with the temple would not store his tablets there.
professional scribe temple office I loan documents documents related to the ownership of prebends (let. sublet. sale. ~ledg-e) business activities (harranu, trading activities) property - - - deeds of land and houses circumstantial evidence for the ownership of land or houses (prom.notes for irnittu, house rent, etc.) purchaselsale contracts of slaves, animals documents relating to tax or rent farming 1 marriage agreements, adoption contracts judicial texts
I
-
I
Both the temple archive and the private archives found at Sippar were discarded. In the case of the private archives this means that a) temple officials kept (part of) their private archives in their offices, and after the tablets had lost importance for their personal administration, stored the discarded tablets in the same place as the discarded tablets from the temple administration, or that b) private archival texts entered the temple administration and were discarded together with administrative texts after they had lost importance for the temple administration. Evidence for a) is the large quantity of debt notes (useless after the debt is settled) and property deeds of slaves and animals (useless after they had died) in the private archives, compared to the absence of property deeds of land and houses (which owners would keep under all circumstances). Evidence for b) is
92
A.C.V.M. BONGENAAR
hard to find, but occasionally private archival texts will have entered the temple administration because of settlements of debts with private entrepreneurs outside the organization, or as documentation relevant in a court case. The presence of the archive of ISSar-tariii (above, 4.E) in the temple administration, however, remains hard to explain. Lack of the archaeological context in which the Sippar tablets were found hampers the reconstruction of private archives. Private archival texts found illegally in private houses at Sippar cannot be distinguished from private archival texts found at the temple complex. The archive of Ardia//Balilp, kept in the Babylonian Collection at Yale University, and the "archive" from the University of Pennsylvania (note 6) could have been found in private houses at Sippar. As a result of all the above, the thesis "Where there are institutional connections, documents are required" (van Driel, Fs De Meyer, 192) seems true, but it is impossible to determine whether the thesis "Where there are no institutional connections, no documents are required" is also true. The written documentation from Sippar is one-sided, and this seems to apply to many of the archives discussed during the symposium. Whether or not we may envisage a large-scale private sector at Sippar cannot be judged from the archives found at the temple complex.
Bibliography
Barton, G.A. AJSL 1612 Beaulieu, P.-A. Catalogue 1
"Some Contracts of the Persian Period from the K H Collection ~ of the University of Pennsylvania", AJSL 1612 (1900), 65-82.
Catalogue of the Babylonian Collections at Yale 1: Late Babylonian Texts in the Nies Babylonian Collection, Bethesda 1994. The Reign of Nabonidus, King of Babylon 556-539 B.C. (= Y N E R lo), Nabonidus New HavenLondon 1989. Bongenaar, A.C.V.M The Neo-Babylonian Ebabbar Temple at Sippar: Its Administration and Ebabbar its Prosopography (= PIHANS 80), Istanbul 1997. Cocquerillat, D. Palmeraies et cultures de lJEanna dJUruk (559-520) (= ADFU 8), Berlin Palmeraies 1968. Dandamaev, M.A. "The Ebabbar Temple and Iranian Magi", AoF 22 (1995), 34-36. AoF 22 Donbaz, V. and M.W. Stolper Istanbul Muras'fi Texts (= PIHANS 79), Istanbul 1997. Muras'fi Driel, G. van "The 'Eanna Archive"', BiOr 55 (1998), 59-79. BiOr 55 "Neo-Babylonian Sheep and Goats", BSA 7 (1993), 219-258. BSA 7 Fs De Meyer "Private or Not-so-private: Nippur Ur I11 Files", in: H. Gasche e.a. (eds.), Cinquante-deux reflexions sur le Proche-Orient ancien offertes en hommage 2 Lkon De Meyer (= MHEO 2), Leuven 1994, 181-192. "The MuraSGs in Context", JESHO 32 (1989), 203-229. JESHO 32 "The British Museum 'Sippar' Collection: Babylonia 1882-1893", ZA 79 ZA 79 (1989), 102-117.
PRIVATE ARCHIVES IN NEO-BABYLONIAN SIPPAR Joannbs, F. Archives
TEBR Jursa, M. AfO 42/43
93
Archives de Borsippa. La famille Ea-ilcta-bdni. ~ t u d d'un e lot d'archives familiales en Babylonie du VIIIe au Ve sikcle av. J.-C., Genbve 1989. Textes &onomiques de la Babylonie rkcente, Paris 1982.
Review of C. Wunsch, Die Urkunden des babylonischen Geschaftsmannes Iddin-Marduk, AfO 42/43 (1995-96), 255-262. AfO Beih. 25 Die Landwirtschaft in Sippar in neubabylonischer Zeit (= AfO Beiheft 25), Wien 1995. "Neu- und spatbabylonische Texte aus den Sammlungen der Iraq 59 Birmingham Museums and Art Gallery", Iraq 59 (1997), 97-174. Tempelzehnt Der Tempelzehnt in Babylonien vom siebenten bis dritten Jahrhundert v. Chr. (= AOAT 254), Miinster 1998. King, L.W. Babylonian Boundary-Stones and Memorial Tablets in the British BBSt Museum, London 1912. Leichty, E. Tablets from Sippar 1 Catalogue of the Babylonian Tablets in the British Museum, vol. VI: Tablets from Sippar 1, London 1986. MacGinnis, J. "Harranu Texts from the British Museum", Iraq 56 (1994), 117-121. Iraq 56 Letter Orders Letter Orders from Sippar and the Administration of the Ebabbara in the Late-Babylonian Period, Poznan 1995. Muffs, Y. Legal Papyri Studies in the Aramaic Legal Papyri from Elephantine (= Studia et Documenta VIII), Leiden 1969. Pederstn, 0 . Archives and Libraries in the Ancient Near East 1500-300 B.C., Bethesda Archives 1998. Revillout, R. & V. BOR 1 "Sworn Obligations in Egyptian and Babylonian Law", BOR 1 (188687), 101-104; "A Settlement of Accounts in Nabopolassar's Time", BOR 1 (1886-87), 117-119. BOR 2 "Istar Taribi", BOR 2 (1887-88), 57-59. "Istar Taribi. Deux nouveaux contrats inidits de notre collection", RE 8/I RE 811 (1897), 5-8. Roth, M.T. Babylonian Marriage Agreements 7th - 3rd Centuries B.C. (= AOAT BMA 222), Neukirchen-Vluyn 1989. Sack, R.H. Neriglissar - King of Babylon (= AOAT 236), Neukirchen-Vluyn 1994. Ner Stolper, M. Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs and Empire. The Muras'fi Archive, the Muras'ii Firm, and Persian Rule in Babylonia (= PIHANS 54), Istanbul 1985. Weszeli, M. WZKM 86 "Eseleien", WZKM 86 (1996), 461-478. Wunsch, C. AuOr 15 "Neu- und spatbabylonische Urkunden aus dem Museum von Montserrat", AuOr 15 (1997), 139-194.
94
A.C.V.M. BONGENAAR Iddin-Marduk Die Urkunden des babylonischen Geschiiftsmannes Iddin-Marduk. Zum Handel mit Naturalien im 6. Jahrhundert v.Chr., Bd. I und I1 (=
Cuneiform Monographs 3a und b), Groningen 1993. Zadok, R. Assur 413 RGTC 8
"Assyrians in Chaldean and Achaemenian Babylonia", Assur 413 (1984), 71-98.
NEUBABYLONISCHE G E S C ~ F T S L E U T EUND IHRE BEZIEHUNGEN ZU PALAST- UND TEMPELVERWALTUNGEN: DAS BEISPIEL DER FAMILIE EGIBI
Geographical Names According to New-and Late-Babylonian Texts,
Wiesbaden 1985.
Fiir unsere Fragestellung nach dem Zusammenwirken von Institutionen und privaten Geschaftsleuten ist das Egibi-Archivl exemplarisch geeignet, da es hinsichtlich seines Umfangs von zwei- bis dreitausend Texten (wobei auch sehr fragmentarische eingerechnet sind) und seiner Laufzeit von der Mitte der Regierung Nebukadnezars 11. bis zum Beginn von Xerxes' Herrschaft das rnit Abstand umfangreichste neubabylonische Privatarchiv ist. Das Archiv beinhaltet nicht nur Vermogenstransaktionen und familieninterne Vorgange wie Mitgiftversprechen, Grundstucks- und Sklavenkaufe, Erbteilungen, die immer den Kern von Privatarchiven bilden, sondern auch zahlreiche Geschaftsdokumente, die von der aktiven Rolle der Egibis im babylonischen Wirtschaftsleben Zeugnis ablegen. Ihre Unternehmungen brachten sie zwangslaufig in Kontakt mit Behorden; nicht so sehr von Interesse ist Zahl und Haufigkeit der Belege, sondern vielmehr das, was sich uber den Charakter, die Gestaltung, die Dauer und die Ergebnisse dieser Kontakte herausfinden 1a13t. Es mu13 betont werden, wie beschrankt, zufallig und isoliert die uberlieferten Sachverhalte sind; es ist schwer, aus oft nur beilaufigen und lapidaren Hinweisen verlafiliche Schlusse zu ziehen. Haufig konnen zwar aus vagen Angaben mit Hilfe von prosopographischer Analyse Beruhrungspunkte zwischen verschiedenen Texten gefunden werden, aber selbst dann bleiben die SchluBfolgerungen ziemlich spekulativ. Die durchschnittlich nur ein bis zwei Dokumente pro Monat, die uns zur Verfugung stehen, konnen nur einen Bruchteil der laufenden Geschaftsvorgbge reprasentieren. Des weiteren ist zu fragen, welchem Umstand wir die Aufbewahrung von Akten uber Als "Egibi-Archiv" wird im folgenden ein Korpus von Texten verstanden, das in den siebziger Jahren des vorigen Jahrhunderts bei Raubgrabungen Einheimischer im Gebiet von Babylon in verschlossenen Tonkriigen gefunden wurde und in den Antikenhandel gelangte. Fundzusammenhange und genauer Fundort sind nicht dokumentiert, auch die Zahl der ursprunglich entdeckten Tafeln kann nur geschatzt werden. W.St.Ch. Boscawen, TSBA 6 (1878), 4f. gibt an, es seien drei- bis viertausend gefunden worden. Das Korpus enthalt Urkunden und Briefe eines Zweiges der Familie Egibi uber funf Generationen einschlieBlich angeheirateter Verwandter und Geschaftspartner,bis hin zu Abschriften von Farnilieninternaanderer babylonischer Familien, wenn sie fur geschiiftliche Belange der Egibis interessant waren. Der iiberwiegende Teil der Tafeln befindet sich im Britischen Museum und ist bisher nur unvollstandig publiziert; unpublizierte Texte werden hier mit freundlichen Erlaubnis der Trustees unter der Inventarnummer zitiert. Als Mittel fiir die Identifizierung der urspriinglich zum Egibi-Archiv gehijrigen Texte dienen die Ankaufsnummern der Museen sowie innere Kritierien wie Personen- und Ortsnamen und bestimmte Geschaftstypen. Andererseits sind Hunderte von Personen aus neubabylonischen Texten bekannt, die den Ahnherrennamen Egibi fuhren, ohne mit dem hier behandelten Zweig der Familie direkt verwandt zu sein. Deren Urkunden werden dem Egibi-Archiv nicht zugerechnet.
96
DAS BEISPIEL DER FAMILIE EGIBI
C. WUNSCH
erledigte Vorgange zu verdanken haben und wie z.B. die Prasenz von Verpflichtungsscheinen und Duplikaten im Archiv von Schuldner bzw. Glaubiger jeweils zu bewerten ist. Dies fuhrt zu grundsatzlichen Fragen uber den Charakter von Privatarchiven, Faktoren, die die Archivierung beeinflufit haben, Ursachen fur das Ende der ~ b e r l i e f e r u nund ~ die Grenzen, die jeder Erkenntnis dadurch gesetzt sind - eine Diskussion, die im Rahmen dieses Artikels nicht gefiihrt werden kann. Die Implikationen fiir die Rekonstruktion der Geschaftsvorgiinge mussen jedoch im Auge behalten werden. Der folgende, verkurzte Stammbaum gibt eine ijbersicht uber jene Familienmitglieder, deren gescKaftliche Aktivitaten den Gegenstand dieses Artikels bilden, und soll zur besseren Orientierung dienen:
I Sulaja
(1) 608-582 (18 Npl - 23 Nbk)
(2) 590-543 (15 Nbk- 13 Nbn) (3) 551-521 (5 Nbn - 9 C v )
Iddin-Marduk NabEi-@&iddin I
I
(5) 490-486 (32 Dm - 4 Xer)
konnen. Dank der intensiven Beschaftigung mit neubabylonischen und friihachamenidischen Privaturkunden und Tempelarchiven, die seit einigen Jahren zu beobachten ist und die bereits bemerkenswerte Ergebnisse gebracht hat, offnen sich auch fiir die Interpretation der Egibi-Urkunden neue Perspektiven. Hier soll insbesondere folgenden Fragestellungen nachgegangen werden: Wie ist das Verhiiltnis der Egibis zu Institutionen (Palast und Tempel) im einzelnen zu definieren? Fuhrten sie Geschafte auf privater Basis mit wohlwollender Duldung durch die Institutionen oder handelten sie in deren Auftrag oder als Vertreter in offizieller Amtsausubung? Wurden ihre Geschafte durch die Institutionen aktiv gefordert, weil die Egibis Aufgaben ubernahmen, die von jenen nicht in gleicher Weise erfullt werden konnten? Stellten sie ihnen Ressourcen zur Verfiigung? Welche Gegenleistungen waren dafur zu erbringen, etwa durch im voraus festgelegte Steuern oder in Form von Gewinnanteilen? Wer trug das Risiko, wenn bestimmte Operationen nicht erfolgreich verliefen? Wurden Geschafte "zweigleisig" gefuhrt, etwa indem die Infrastruktur offizieller Unternehmungen gleichzeitig fur private Zwecke mitgenutzt wurde? Waren Mitglieder der Familie in Tempeln oder im Palast auf Verwaltungsebene involviert, etwa als Inhaber offizieller Funktionen, traditioneller Tempelpfriinden etc. und auf welche Weise konnten sie von einem Amt profitieren?
I
I
Nuptaja oo Itti-Marduk-baliitu I
Iddin-NabO I
(4) 521-487 (1 Dm - 35 Dm)
97
Nergal-Sir I
1. Die erste Generation
Mardd-niigir-apli NabB-al&S-bullQ Nergal-uZLzib
I ~idihti- el
Erklkungen: Frauen, Manner, oo Ehepartner, Hauptlinie der Familie Egibi, (1) ... (5) Generationen, die Urkunden hinterlassen haben (die Jahresangaben nach dern Julianischen Kalender bzw. nach Regierungsdaten der jeweiligen Herrscher beziehen sich auf Belege, in denen Vertreter der Hauptlinie als aktive Partei erscheinen; Geburtsdaten sind unbekannt). Die folgende Darstellung bietet eine ijbersicht iiber die Belege, die sich an dern durch die funf Generationen vorgegebenen chronologischen Rahmen orientiek2 Die Situation wahrend der ersten beiden Generationen ist von G. van Driel umfassend behandelt und uberzeugend dargestellt worden;3 dern ist kaum etwas hinzuzufugen. Aufgrund bislang unpublizierter Texte konnen zwar einige interessante Details gewonnen werden, aber es ergibt sich keine Notwendigkeit einer Neu- oder Umbewertung. Fur die dritte, vierte und funfte Generation fehlt bislang eine zusammenfassende Darstellung, wenngleich Anstrengungen zur ijberwindung dieses Mangels unternommern werden (s. unten S. 106). Erfreulicherweise ist einiges neue Quellenmaterial in den Bestanden des Britischen Museums zum Vorschein gekommen, das fur unsere Fragestellung relevante Informationen enthalt. Die oft nur sehr vagen Hinweise gewinnen insbesondere dann an Aussagewert, wenn sie mit dern Befund aus anderen Archiven verglichen werden Zur Genealogie der Familie s. Weingort, Egibi, und Ungnad, AfO 14 (1941-44),57-64. Krecher, Egibi, bietet eine Zusammenstellung der bis 1970 publizierten Urkunden in Regestenform und erleichtert die inhaltliche Erschliehng des Korpus durch einen thematischen Index und zahlreiche Quervenveise. JEOL 29 (1985-86),50-67.
Von Sulaja, dern Vertreter der ersten Generation, liegen nur spiirliche Zeugnisse vor. Fur unseren Zusammenhang ist eine einzige Urkunde relevant, die die Pacht eines koniglichen Grundstuckes in der N2he von Babylon betrifft. So interessant das Faktum an sich ist, so wird seine Bewertung durch starke Beschadigungen der Urkunde und das Fehlen zugehoriger Texte erschwert. Nbk 115 aus dern Jahre 18 Nbk ist in uu~~Eti-Sa-lJa?j?juru~ ausgestellt; ein lokaler Vertreter5 des Distriktverwalters (be1pibati) tritt als Sulajas Verhandlungspartner auf. In dieser Zwiegesprachsurkunde ist von der ijberlassung des Terrains auf unbegrenzte Zeit (ana zimi $&ti)zur Anpflanzung (ana zaqipanziti) von Dattelpalmen die Rede. Wenn mein Verstandnis der Grenzbeschreibung korrekt ist, dann sind 800 Ellen entlang dern Kanal betroffen6 (mit Angabe der Nachbarn bzw. Nachbarfluren). ijber die Breite des Streifens bzw. die genaue GroBe der Flache ist nichts zu erfahren, offensichtlich wird diese durch die Bewasserungsmoglichkeiten limitiert. Es ist von einem halben Anteil (abi zitti) an den In Z. 5 ist kiZd nar bar-ri eS(?)-Su'als Lokalisierung angegeben. Die aus Egibi-Texten aus der Zeit des Darius bekannte Ortschaft Bit-galjburu diirfte sich demgegeniiber siidlich von Babylon auf dern ostlichen Euphratufer befinden (anders Zadok, RGTC 8, 89) und daher nicht mit &~~6ti-Sa-Sja&uru identisch zein. Zu envanen ist ferner, da13 ein als eqel pibat Sarri "konigliche Domane" bezeichnetes Terrain im Gebiet am Neuen Kanal bezeugt ist (5R 67, 1). Sein Name ist @&urn, nach ihm sind also offensichtlich die Siedlung und die umliegende Region benannt, die landwirtschaftlich erschlossen werden soll. €I Damit ist dieser Uferstreifen z.B. erheblich langer als der des grol3ten jemals von den Egibis envorbenen Grundstiickes, 5R 67, 1 vom Akzessionsjahr Neriglissars. Die Flache betragt dort 24 Kur, die Stirnseite am Kanal ist aber nur etwa 300 Ellen lang, wie wir aus zugehorigen Teilungsurkunden wissen. In diesem Areal wurden ebenfalls Dattelpalmen angepflanzt und der Baumstreifen wahrend 30 Jahren von einem DreiBigstel der Gesamtflkhe auf ein Viertel erhoht.
98
C. WUNSCH
Einkunften fur beide Parteien die Rede, allerdings sind die nachfolgenden Details so beschadigt, darj sich die Einzelheiten unserer Kenntnis entziehen. Aus zeitgleichen Urkunden ist ersichtlich, darj spatestens seit Nebukadnezars Regierung der Dattelanbau im Gebiet um Babylon erheblich intensiviert wurde. Unsere Urkunde parjt in einen Kontext von Neulanderschlierjung unter Regie des Palastes, der insbesondere die Kanalarbeiten organisiert, wiihrend die Kultivierungsarbeiten (GroJ3)pachtern uberlassen werden, die dafur entsprechende Ertragsanteile erhalten. Leider sind keine weiteren diesbezuglichen Urkunden uberliefert, die erhellen konnten, unter welchen Voraussetzungen Sulaja die Pacht ubemommen hat, welche Einkiinfte envirtschaftet wurden und wie lange die entsprechenden Verhaltnisse bestanden. Weitere Belege fur Kontakte Sulajas zu Vertretern der Verwaltungshierarchien von Palast und Tempeln gibt es nicht.7
2. Die zweite Generation
Die Kontakte des NabQ-ahhe-iddin (= NAI) zum Palast sind ungleich besser dokumentiert, und zwar bis auf hochste Ebene. Er hat eine Ausbildung als Schreiber durchlaufen, seine Karriere fiihrt bis zum Amt des koniglichen Richters unter Nabonid. Als Schreiber von Gerichtsprotokollen8, die in der Regel eine Partei verpflichten, zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt zu erscheinen bzw. Zeugen oder Urkunden herbeizubringen, damit die Falle verhandelt und entschieden werden konnten, kam er u.a. mehrfach mit Bediensteten des ~eriglissargin Beruhrung. Insbesondere die Kontakte zu NabQ-~abit-
7 Die Anwesenheit eines Richters bei der Abrechnung iiber harranu-Geschafte von Sulaja und seinen Partnern (Nbk 116 aus dern Jahr 18 Nbk - unter der Voraussetzung, da13 unser 5. gemeint ist, da der Ahnherrenname nicht angegeben ist, vgl. die von Krecher, Egibi, 24, diesbeziiglich geaukierten Bedenken) mu13 nicht iiberraschen, galt es doch Rechtsstreitigkeiten vorzubeugen. 8 In Babylon ausgestellt: Nbk 107, eine Abrechnung zwischen Geschaftsparteien betreffend (die Tafel ist gesiegelt, das Stempelsiegel zeigt einen nach rechts blickenden, biirtigen Beter vor Gottersymbolen (Spaten und Griffel, uber denen eine Mondsichel schwebt); es ist weder als das Siege1 des NAI ausgewiesen noch mit dern spater von ihm in seiner Funktion als Richter verwendeten Rollsiegel identisch); Nbk 183: Verpflichtung, Zeugen beizubringen, es geht um einen Streit um den Verbleib eines Poncho mit Gurtel(?); Ner 55: Verpflichtung, zwei Personen zur Abrechnung an die Tiir des PrinzenPalastes zu bringen; Ner 58: Verpflichtung, eine Person vor Nabfi-~abit-q5t5zu bringen. AuBerhalb Babylons ausgestellt: Nbk 266 aus Takretain: Protokoll eines Streitfalles zwischen PN und einem Sklaven des Neriglissar, bei dern Nabfi-$%bit-qate involviert ist; Nbk 363 aus Opis: Verpflichtung, Zeugen beizubringen, es geht um einen Betrag von 21 S Silber; Nbk 365 aus Opis: Verpflichtung, Zeugen beizubringen; es geht um den Tod eines Sklaven, der ersetzt werden soll, unter den Zeugen sind ein Fa-r2S Sarri und der Hafenvorsteher (rub kari) von Opis; Nbk 366 aus Opis: Verpflichtung, Zeugen beizubringen, daR der Schuldner, fur dessen Gestellung geburgt worden war, tatsachlich zum Termin vorgefuhrt worden ist; wenn dies bewiesen werden kann, geht der Burge frei aus, sonst mu13 er zahlen; Nbk 369 aus Opis: es geht um den Verbleib der Mitgift einer gewissen Batfi, ein Nergal-Sarra-u~urwird in diesem Zusammhang erwahnt (wobei unklar bleibt, ob es sich um den spateren Konig handelt), sowie ein Sa-r2S Sarri; Liv 8 aus Opis: Ehevertrag; Nbk 419 aus Opis: Verpflichtung, Zeugen beizubringen, es geht um einen Streit zwei Sklaven des Neriglissar; BM 31493 aus Opis: beh-ifft 14 m 30 S zu Gunsten von Neriglissar. Ich folge der Lehrmeinung, in dern in den Egibi-Urkunden genannten Nergal-Sarra-u$ur/Bd-SumaiSkun den Schwiegersohn Nebukadnezars und spateren Konig zu sehen.
DAS BEISPIEL DER FAMILIE EGlBI
99
qiit.te, der zunachst Majordomo (be1 biti) bei Neriglissar war und zur Regierungszeit Nabonids dern Haushalt des Kronprinzen Belsazar vorstand, sind hier zu erwiihnen.1•‹ Bei NAIs Sklavenkauf Nbk 166 werden der Konig und der Verwalter (.?anr2) des Meerlandes in unklarem Zusammenhang erwahnt, die Urkunde ist daher fur uns nicht weiter aussagekraftig. In Nbk 430, in Sippar ausgestellt (ein Ausnahmefall bei EgibiTexten), ubernimmt NAI11 eine Zahlburgschaft uber 4 m Silber zu Lasten von drei Personen gegeniiber dern Glaubiger, Neriglissar. Das Silber wird als Zehnt (eirfi) von BEl, NabQ und Nergal bezeichnet. NAI ist offenkundig nicht direkt an diesem Geschaft mit den Abgaben beteiligt, aber die Urkunde ist einerseits ein Hinweis auf das Beziehungsgeflecht zwischen den babylonischen Geschaftsleuten, andererseits zeigt sie NAIs Kontakte auf hochster Ebene. Eine weitere Urkunde parjt in diesen Kontext: Nbn 270. Es geht um 45 S Silber vom Zehnt des Bel, NabQ, Nergal und der IStar von Uruk, die dern Kronprinzen Belsazar zustehen und von dessen Majordomo NabQ-@bit-q2tE verwaltet werden. Diesen Betrag zahlt NAI an NabQ-sibit-q5te aus, und zwar im Auftrag eines Schreibers (sepiru) des Belsazar, der fur diese 45 S einen Sklaven gekauft hat. Wir konnen uns vorstellen, darj bei diesem Dreiecksgeschaft NAI den Sklavenkauf finanzierte. Was er im Gegenzug erhielt, ist nicht ersichtlich; vielleicht den in Form von Naturalien fdligen Zehnt? Fur Neriglissar selbst wurde NAI aktiv, indem er in dessen Auftrag Finanzgeschafte abwickelte. Dabei kommt einer Affke besondere Bedeutung zu, die in der Literatur als "Bankrott des NabQ-apla-iddin" bekannt ist.12 Ihre Ursprunge liegen in der Regierungszeit Nebukadnezars, der Vorgang findet zu Ende der Regierung AmelMarduks seinen Hohepunkt und Abschlurj. Ein babylonischer Geschaftsmann hatte betrachtliche Schulden angehauft, die im wesentlichen durch Pfiinder gesichert waren, darunter auch ein Haus von hohem Wert. Neriglissar war am Kauf interessiert und NAI regelte die formalen Aspekte der Angelegenheit in seinem Auftrag: die Auszahlung von Silber an die Glaubiger, die notarielle Beglaubigung des Kaufes usw. Dies alles fand zu einer Zeit statt, als am Hof Intrigen gegen Amel-Marduk gesponnen wurden, die schlierjlich Neriglissar an die Macht brachten. Dadurch hat der Vorgang zweifellos eine politische Dimension, die allerdings allein auf Basis der erhaltenen Urkunden schlecht bewertet werden kann: NAI verhilft Neriglissar zur Anschaffung eines Vermogensobjektes, seine Aktivitaten liegen lediglich im Bereich von finanziellen und juristischen Dienstleistungen. Brisanter w&e es z.B., hatte er ihm Silber geliehen, um bestimmte politische Manover zu ermoglichen und Einflurj zu erkaufen. Aber zu allen Zeiten ist es schwierig, stichhaltige Beweise solcher Einflurjnahme in die Hand zu bekommen, da Initiatoren politischer Ranke gerade vermeiden wollen, kompromittierendes Material zu hinterlassen. Als ein Beweis fur NAIs Rolle als Nbk 266, Ner 55, 58 (siehe Anm. 8). Nbk 41 1 (aus Babylon) betrifft ein Gersteguthaben von 135 Kur beim Majordomo (be1 biti) des Neriglissar, ohne daR wir Naheres wissen. Aus der Regierungszeit Neriglissars liegt mit Ner 39 eine Urkunde vor, laut derer NAI fur eine Forderung eines ungenannten Prinzen (d.h. eines Sohnes des Neriglissar) von 12 m Silber biirgt. Nabfi-$%bit-qitEverwaltet als ldrab biti Sa llhmiirSarri das Vermogen. Laut Nbn 184 hat NAI im Jahre 5 Nbn ein Haus in Babylon an einen Schreiber des Kronprinzen Belsazar vermietet; zur Bedeutung des Vorgangs und vergleichbaren Geschaften s. unten S. 102f. Obwohl die Filiation nicht erhalten ist, wird es sich wohl um einen Egibi handeln, da die Urkunde im Archiv dieser Familie aufbewahrt wurde. Ausfuhrlich bei G. van Driel, JEOL 29 (1985-86), bes. S. 59-62.
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politischer Drahtzieher und "Konigsmacher" kann die erwahnte A f f i e allein somit nicht dienen; er scheint keinen direkten Gewinn daraus gezogen zu haben und Neriglissar durfte ihm deswegen nicht uberma13ig verpflichtet gewesen sein. Dennoch werden wir wohl davon auszugehen haben, dalj hinter der Fassade solider, unanfechtbarer Geschafte auch die sprichwortlichen feinen Faden gesponnen und verknupft wurden, die uns verborgen bleiben mussen. Zweifelsohne haben sich die guten Kontakte bewahrt und ausgezahlt, nachdem Neriglissar an die Macht gelangt war. Aber auch als vier Jahre spater Nabonid den Thron usurpierte, litt NAIs Position keinen Schaden, im Gegenteil. Der erste Beleg fur seine Tatigkeit als koniglicher Richter stammt aus dern Akzessionsjahr dieses Herrschers (Nbn 16). In politisch turbulenten Zeiten mulj NAI klug, weitsichtig und unabhangig genug gewesen sein, um sich den wechselnden Machtverhiiltnissen anzupassen. Sicher spielt dabei eine Rolle, da13 seine Position und sein Einkommen nicht an ein Amt gekniipft waren, dessen Legitimation von der Person des Herrschers abhing. Vielmehr unterhielt er geschaftliche Verbindungen zu Institutionen, die ihrerseits besthdig waren.13 Nur wenige Monate nach der Machtubernahme Neriglissars bot sich NAI Gelegenheit, ein Grundstuck von 24 Kur (ca. 30 Hektar) im Gebiet am Neuen Kanal gunstig zu erwerben.14 Verkaufer sind vier Sohne des ehemaligen Statthalters (Stikin [Cmi)von Babylon, dessen Verbindlichkeiten gegeniiber dern Marduktempel Esagila aus dern Kaufpreis bestritten werden mussen. Mindestens die finanzielle Seite dieser Angelegenheit wird im Interesse von Esagila auf ausdriicklichen Befehl Neriglissars geregelt, aber wir haben auch Grund zur Vermutung, er habe den Statthalter aus dern Amt entfernt. Da nicht dieser selbst, sondern seine Sohne das Grundstuck verkaufen, haben wir vielleicht sogar mit einem provozierten Todesfall zu rechnen. NAI ist zweifelsohne der Nutznierjer bei diesem Vorgang, indem er das Grundstuck zu einem Preis erwirbt, der sogar leicht unter dern liegt, der funfzehn Jahre friiher durch den Statthalter gezahlt wurde.15 Da13 die Gelegenheit gunstig gewesen sein mu13, geht indirekt aus einem weiteren Detail hervor: NAI kann nicht den gesamten Preis aus eigenen Mitteln bestreiten, ohne den Gang seiner Geschafte zu gefithrden. Deshalb mu13 er wohl oder ubel die Hiilfte des Grundstuckes einem Partner uberschreiben, in dessen Handen sie auch verbleibt. Dennoch mu13 festgehalten werden, da13 der Preis im Rahmen dessen liegt, was zur damaligen Zeit fur Grund und Boden rund um Babylon ublich war. Man war insbesondere zu demonstrieren bestrebt, darj alles mit rechten Dingen vor sich ging; allein die Anwesenheit des neuen Statthalters von Babylon und sieben Richtern sowie vier Schreibern beim Ausfertigen der imposanten Urkunde deutet darauf hin. NAI zahlt den Kaufpreis an die Verwaltung von Esagila und 1a13t den Kauf von der hochsten Autoritat beurkunden, scheint aber nicht anderweitig in den Fall involviert. Es fehlen uns leider auch aus dieser Zeit direkte Hinweise auf geschaftliche Verflechtungen mit der Verwaltungshierarchie, etwa darauf, darj Lieferungen im Auftrag, 13 G. van Driel verweist in der Einleitung zu diesem Band auf die Beziehungen der Egibis zum Kronprinzenpalast; vgl. dam die in Anm. 10 genannten Belege und die Ausfuhrungen auf S. 102f. l 4 5R 67, 1. Ausfiihrlich dazu rnit Bearbeitung aller Quellen s. Wunsch, Felder und Gdrten, unter "Das grolje Grundstiick am Neuen Kanal" (im Druck). l 5 6 213 GAR Flache pro S Silber fiir Dattelgarten mit ertragfAigen Baumen (zuvor: 6 GAR pro S), 60 GAR Flache pro S Silber fur Getreidefeld und Neubruch (zuvor: 45 GAR pro S). Da zwischenzeitlich der Dattelanbau erweitert worden war, liegt der Gesamtpreis allerdings beim Weiterverkauf hoher: 21 m 51 113 S gegeniiber 19 m 8 1(ohne Zugabe).
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in Stellvertretung oder rnit Finanzmitteln der Krone organisiert wurden, Kronland bewirtschaftet oder Abgaben eingetrieben wurden; welche Gewinne dabei zu erzielen waren und in welcher Form die Krone profitierte. Selbst was die umfangreichen Lieferungen von Naturalien angeht, die durch NAI organisiert wurden und fur die wir reichlich Nachweise auf der Ebene des Aufkaufs sowie Geschaftsinterna haben, tappen wir im Dunkel bei der Frage, fiir wen sie eigentlich bestimmt waren. Keine Abrechnung rnit institutionellen Auftraggebern oder Abnehmern oder wenigstens Verpflichtungsscheine oder Quittungen uber en gros Lieferungen an Institutionen sind uns erhalten geblieben. Auch wenn ein Teil der Gerste, Datteln und Zwiebeln in kleinen Posten in Babylon direkt vermarktet worden sein mag, so haben wir uns wohl eher den Palast als Hauptabnehmer vorzustellen. Angesichts der enormen Bauprojekte, die von Nebukadnezar und Nabonid unternommen wurden, mu13 es einen immensen Bedarf an Nahrungsmitteln zur Versorgung der Arbeitskrafte gegeben haben. Auch das Heer kommt als Abnehmer in Frage. Da NAIs Lieferanten die Ware stets zum Kanal zu liefern hatten (bei Verzug nach Babylon) und die Egibis Speichergebaude und Transportmittel mieteten bzw. sukzessive erwarben, konnten sie wohl auch grol3e Mengen von Naturalien auf dern Wasserweg an andere Orte transportiert haben, etwa dahin, wo sich der Hof oder die Arrnee im Feldlager befanden.16 NAI hatte bereits als Schreiber von gerichtsbegleitenden Protokollen zur Zeit Nebukadnezars eine offizielle Funktion inne, trug aber keinen Titel; zur Zeit Nabonids trat er als Richter des Konigs bzw. Schreiber von Gerichtsakten in Erscheinung und fuhrte zu diesem Zweck ein Siegel.17 Wenngleich nachgewiesen werden kann, dalj NAI gar nicht so selten die Objekte, um die vor Gericht gestritten wurde, im Nachhinein gekauft hat (ein Umstand, dern wir die Uberlieferung der meisten diesbezuglichen Dokumente im EgibiArchiv uberhaupt zu verdanken haben), so kann ihm dies nicht unbedingt als Zeichen fur korrupte Verquickung von Funktion und Geschaft vorgehalten werden. Man hat im Gegenteil immer sehr auf Einhaltung aller juristischen Formalitaten geachtet und in der Regel Mittelsmhner eingeschaltet. Einen Sonderfall bildet ein Unternehmen rnit zwei Richterkollegenl8, das u.a. Kauf und Verrnietung eines Bootes betrifft, bei dern die Beteiligten rnit Titel genannt werden und weitere Richter als Zeugen erscheinen. Wie so oft ist der Kontext nicht bekannt und die Urkunden sind z.T. beschadigt und nicht recht verstandlich. Nach dern Tod von NAI und einem anderen Beteiligten losen deren Sohne zusammen mit dern dritten Richter die Vgl. etwa die Versorgung des Hofes in Ablmanu durch den Eanna-Tempel, dazu San Nicolb, ArOr 17 (1949), 323-330. l 7 Belege bei Wunsch, Fs Oelsner (im Druck). Es gibt m.W. nur einen Beleg, wo NAI dieses Siegel als Privatperson venvendet: OECT 10 101 (unter der Voraussetzung, daR diese nicht durch eine Beischrift identifizerte Abrollung eines Rollsiegelsegments wirklich von seinem Siegel stammt). NAI rechnet hier rnit einem Partner iiber Hausmiete und riickstandige Zinsen ab, als erster Zeuge erscheint NAIs Richterkollege und Geschaftspartner Nergal-banfinu, seinerseits als Richter ausgewiesen. Um dessen Siegel kann es sich jedoch keinesfalls handeln, da dieses einen kahlgeschorenen Beter zeigt. Zu Nbk 107 vgl. Anm. 8. Nbn 536 (Teilzahlung, den Kaufpreis eines Bootes betreffend), 608 (Bootsmiete), 776 (Auflosung der Verbindung). Es gehort vielleicht auch Moldenke I 23 in einen ahnlichen Zusammenhang, ein Verpflichtungsschein iiber 30 S Silber zu Lasten NAIs. Glaubiger ist der Hafenvorsteher, und es geht um [...I-te-eSa Sarri.
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Verbindung auf. Ein solches Eingreifen der Sohne und Erben, die selbst keine Amtsstrager waren, deutet doch wohl eher auf einen privatgeschaftlichen Kontext, denn auf einen von offizieller Amtsausubung hin. Es bleibt zu konstatieren, darj uns trotz der nachweislich intensiven Kontakte NAIs zu koniglichem Verwaltungspersonal bis auf hochste Ebene und seiner unbestreitbaren geschaftlichen Erfolge, die sich im Erwerb umfangreichen Grundbesitzes und zahlreicher Sklaven manifestieren, die eigentlichen Mechanismen des wechselseitig nutzbringenden Zusammenwirkens rnit der koniglichen Verwaltung weitgehend verborgen bleiben.
3. Die dritte Generation Itti-Marduk-baliitu (= IMB), der nach dem Tode seines Vaters NAI die Leitung der Familiengeschafte ubernahrn, war wie dieser als Schreiber ausgebildet, amtierte aber nicht als Richter. Eher gibt es Grund zu vermuten, er habe sich - zumindest zeitweise - der Gelehrsamkeit gewidmet.lg Die guten Kontakte zum Konigshaus wurden auch unter seiner Leitung gepflegt; erfreulicherweise sind einige Urkunden uberliefert, die Genaueres uber die Natur dieser Geschafte erkennen lassen. Iddin-Marduk, der Schwiegervater IMBs, kaufte im Jahre 11 Nbn (Nbn 58 1 zufolge) die dern Kronprinzen Belsazar zustehenden Einkunfte an Wolle fiir 20 m Silber auf. Wir konnen annehrnen, darj die Egibis dabei vermittelt haben, denn der zustiindige Beamte war der bereits e m a n t e NabQ-siibit-q2tE.Der Palast war an der Rohwolle offensichtlich nicht interessiert,20 er hatte vielmehr Bedarf an Silber. Ob Iddin-Marduk bzw. die Egibis die Wolle lediglich in kleinen Posten verrnarktet, oder in Eigenregie verarbeitet haben, larjt sich nicht in Erfahrung bringen. Letzteres scheint nicht unmoglich, da sie z.B. Sklaven im Weber- und Schneiderhandwerk ausbilden lierjen.21 Mit welcher RegelmaBigkeit die Egibis die Versilberung von Naturaleinkunften des Palastes ubernommen haben, kann nicht abgeschatzt werden, der Beleg uber Wolle ist singular.22 Er wird aber wohl
BM 31071, eine Tafel im Briefformat mit einer Liste von Krautern und Olen (Rezept?), wird als Tafel ( i m ~ f ~des . ~IMB ~ )aus der Farnilie Egibi bezeichnet, des Verehrers (palib) des Marduk. Die Identitat mit dern Sohn des NAI ist wegen des fehlenden Vatersnamens zwar nicht zweifelsfrei nachzuweisen, aber da die Tafel aus einem stark Egibi-haltigen Ankauf der Babylon-Sammlung des Britischen Museums stammt, liegt die Vermutung auf der Hand. In Camb 384, einem Sklavenkauf, wird IMB l%-s'i-pu "Beschworer" genannt. Beides hat wohl eher mit dern "Gelehrten"status als mit offizieller Amtsausubung zu tun. Einen Nachweis fiir eine direkte Verbindung IMBs zu Esagila oder einem anderen Tempel, sei es durch Pfriinden, Funktionen in der Tempelhierarchie etc. gibt es nicht. 20 Das bedeutet auch, dal3 wir wohl nicht mit Wollverarbeitung in Palastwerkstatten zu rechnen haben. Zwar kann Wolle Gegenstand von Rationen sein, allerdings bringt es wenig Vorteile, das Rohmaterial an Arbeiter oder Soldaten auszuhandigen, die untenvegs und getrennt von ihren Farnilien sind. Die Ausgabe von Kleidungsstucken und Decken bzw. Auszahlung von Silber ist demgegenuber sinnvoller. 21 Lehrvertag Cyr 64 (Weberlehre), Camb 345 (Schneiderlehre). Des weiteren sei auf Cyr 325 verwiesen, wo es um die Ausbildung eines Sklaven zum Steinschneider geht. Lehrmeister ist in diesem Falle ein Sklave des Kronprinzen Carnbyses. 22 Dar 182 betrifft zwar Wolle, aber aus dern Aufkommen des E'igikalamma-Tempels. Gleichwohl zeigt dieser Beleg, daJ3 eine Vielzahl von Liefergeschaften aller Art praktiziert worden sein mul3, fur die keine Nachweise vorliegen.
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stellvertretend fur gleichartige Vorgange stehen, uber die uns keine Urkunden erhalten geblieben sind. Eine Verbindung zu Nabfi-~abit-qitEbesteht auch Nbn 688 zufolge. IMB zahlt 1 m 16 S Silber an ihn aus, die ein gewisser BEl-iddin dern Kronprinzen Belsazar aus ungenannten Grunden schuldete und fur die er ein Grundstiick verpfandet hatte. Den Hintergrund bildet ein Immobiliengeschaft: IMB beabsichtigt, das verpfandete Grundstuck zu kaufen; rnit dern Kaufpreis wird die Forderung des Glaubigers befriedigt, damit das Pfandrecht erlischt. Die Egibis hatten eine grorje Zahl von Grundstucken in nur wenigen Jahren erworben und die Gewinne aus ihren Geschaften auf diese Weise angelegt. Bei Hausern war an eine Eigennutzung nicht gedacht. Die Vermietung brachte zwar regelmarjige Einkiinfte, aber noch vorteilhafter war fiir die Egibis eine andere Losung: Der potentielle Mieter gewahrt dern Vermieter ein Geschaftsdarlehen (etwa in Hohe des Kaufpreises) und erhalt das Haus als Pfand zur antichretischen Nutzung. Auf diese Weise halten sich Kapitalzins und Miete die Waage, was regelmaige Zahlungen eriibrigt; das in den Kauf des Hauses investierte Kapital steht fur weitere Geschafte zur Verfiigung, wahrend das Eigentum beim Schuldner (d.h. den Egibis) verbleibt. Es mu13 nicht verwundern, konigliche Beamte als Mieter zu finden, denn auch fiir sie bringt ein solches Arrangement Vorteile: Der an die Egibis zu zahlende hohe Betrag ist nominell ein Darlehen, was ihnen erlaubt, institutionelle Ressourcen zu verwenden, ohne sich offenkundig personlich zu bereicheren. Mietzahlungen werden vermieden, die Laufzeit des Vertrages wird durch 'iibereinkommen beider Seiten geregelt und fur den Fall, darj der Schuldbetrag nicht zuriickgezahlt werden kann, dient das Haus selbst als Sicherheit. Die Anwendung dieser Praxis l a t sich uber drei Generationen verfolgen. Laut Nbn 184 hatte NAI im Jahre 5 Nbn ein Haus fur einen Betrag von 1 m 30 S Silber an einen Schreiber des Belsazar auf 3 Jahre zur Miete antichretisch verpfandet. Der gleiche Vorgang wiederholte sich zur Regierungsszeit des Cyrus, (Cyr 177 vom 5.8.4 Cyr) als NAIs Sohn Iddin-NabG (= IN) das gleiche Haus fiir 1 m 20 S Silber verpfhdete. Der Betrag wurde durch Gabbi-ili-Sarra-u~ur,einen Schreiber des Kronprinzen Cambyses, aus dessen Vermogen angewiesen, und die Formulierung der Reparaturklauseln macht deutlich, darj antichretische Nutzung vorliegt. Ausgezahlt wurde das Silber durch eine Frau, die als Botin der f ~ u d i S ubezeichnet wird. Die Mutter des IMB und Witwe NAIs tragt diesen Namen. Man konnte daher vermuten, darj die Angelegenheit von IMB selbst eingefadelt worden war. IN hatte chronischen Finanzbedarf, Cambyses bzw. einer seiner Bediensteten wollte das Haus nutzen und IMB wartete auf seine Chance, das Erbteil seines Bruders in die Hand zu bekornmen. BM 31343 zeigt den gleichen Beamten, diesmal als Glaubiger von 2 m Silber zu Lasten von IMB. Wiederum ist ein Haus auf zwei Jahre antichretisch verpfandet, die Grenzbeschreibung nennt Gabbi-ili-Sarra-usur selbst als N a ~ h b a r nDie . ~ ~fragmentarische 23
Wahrscheinlich handelt es sich um das gleiche Objekt, das schon in Nbn 9 und 50 aus dern Jahr 0 bzw. 1 Nbn genannt wird: Die Urkunden betreffen ein Hausgrundstuck, das sich zwischen dern des NAI und dern des Kronprinzen befindet. Zunachst war es antichretisch verpfandet, spater zahlt ein Sklave des Kronprinzen Belsazar den Kaufpreis fur dieses Haus an den Verkaufer aus. Wir konnen annehmen, dal3 dieses Gebaude vom Verwalter des Kronprinzen genutzt wurde. Der Kronprinzenpalast diirfte als Institution den Dynastiewechsel unverandert iiberstanden haben, deshalb sollte es also nicht verwundern, auch Gabbi-ili-Sarra-u~urin dieser Funktion als Nachbarn der Egibis zu finden. In der Erbteilungsurkunde der Sohne des IMB (Dar 379 aus dern Jahre 14 Dar) schlieljlich wird vom "Haus neben UaSdajaIGabbi-
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Urkunde BM 36494 handelt vom gleichen Vorgang und stellt entweder ein Duplikat oder einen Verlangerungsvertrag zu BM 3 1343 dar. Das Geschaftsverhaltnis besteht auch wahrend der Regiemngszeit des Darius, wie BM 33118 zu entnehmen ist. Gabbi-iliSarra-uvur ist nunmehr Glaubiger von IMBs Sohn, Betrag und Grundstiicksbeschreibung sind gleich. Interessant ist in diesem Zusammenhang nicht nur die Kontinuitat der Geschaftsbeziehung zwischen den Egibis und dem Konigshaus uber mindestens drei13ig Jahre und drei Generationen hinweg, sondern auch der Umstand, da13 ein und dasselbe, den Egibis gehorende Objekt nach vollig gleichem Muster an den Verwalter des jeweiligen Kronprinzen vermietet wird, sei es Belsazar oder Cambyses, ungeachtet des Dynastiewechsels. Es ist verbluffend, in welchem Grade die Achamenidenherrscher die in Babylon vorgefundenen Strukturen fur sich nutzten. Umgekehrt durfen wir vermuten, da13 die Egibis ihrerseits alles daran setzten, das Netz von Beziehungen zu Beamten, die das Kanal- und Wegesystem kontrollierten, Steuern erhoben und die Lieferungen von Naturalien an Hof und Heer organisierten, also fiir jene Bereiche zust3ndig waren, die das Ruckgrat der Egibi-Geschafte bildeten, intakt und funktionsfalhig zu erhalten, gleichgiiltig, ob die Beamten selbst im Amt blieben. ijber die diesbezuglichen Vorghge hinter den Kulissen ist wiederum nichts Genaues in Erfahrung zu bringen. Mit dem Beginn von Cyrus' Regierung hielt sich IMB fur einige Zeit in Persien auf;24 als einzige Zeugnisse seiner Aktivitaten sind Verpflichtungsscheine uber betrachtliche Silberbetrage zu seinen Lasten uberliefert, zahlbar in Babylon, z.T. zinslos. Sie durften kaum als Anzeichen fur wirtschaftliche Schwierigkeiten im Hause Egibi zu werten sein. Wer, Tagesreisen von seiner Heimatbasis entfernt, als kreditwurdig gilt und keinen Burgen stellen mufi, verfolgt bestimmte Ziele. Auch bei spateren Reisen wurden erhebliche Betrage umgesetzt, mit denen IMB u.a. einige Sklaven erworben hat, aber ob dies das Ziel der Untemehmung oder ein Nebenprodukt ganz anderer Aktivitaten darstellt, ist schwer zu beurteilen. Zweifelsohne mussen IMBs Reisen der Kontaktpflege auf hochster Ebene gedient haben. In einer Reihe von Urkunden werden konigliche Beamte und lokale Verwalter genannt, wobei es meist um Details von Liefergeschaften geht, aber der Kontext nicht ili-liarra-u~ur" gesprochen. Es muR bezweifelt werden, ob das an Gabbi-ili-Sarra-u~urlaut Cyr 177 vermietete "Haus neben BEl-iddinRimutIDek?', das wir auch aus Nbn 184 kennen, mit diesem identisch ist (als weiterer Nachbar wird in Cyr 177 ein gewisser Sipik-zeriiNergal-uliallim/S?n-karibi-ih genannt, wohl weil dessen Bruder den Vertrag schreibt). In BM 31959 (zwischen 1 und 10 Dar zu datieren, wohl um das Jahr 3 Dm), Z. 20-23, erscheint es wiederum, allerdings als Eigentum von IMBs Bruder NergalEtir (= NE): bitu Sa bit B. Sa kkum 2 112 mana kaspi ina pan IMB maSkan iaknu kaspa a4 2 112 mana NE ana MNA inamdinma MNA bitu ina pan NE umaS3ar. Dem ist wohl zu entnehmen, daR das betreffende Haus von IN an seinen zweiten Bruder NE uberschrieben worden war (nicht am IMB, mit dem er offenbar auf KriegsfuB stand: ein Vorgang, fiir den sich Parallelen finden). Aber auch NE war nicht finanzkraftig genug, um das Haus schuldenfrei zu ubernehmen, sondern verpfhdete es seinerseits an IMB. Zwar war dieser als Pfandglaubiger berechtigt, es zu vennieten, und sein Sohn konnte es zu guter Letzt von seinem Onkel erworben haben, aber dennoch halte ich es fiir wahrscheinlicher, dalj es sich um zwei Objekte handelt, die terminologisch als "Haus neben B." bzw. "Haus neben G." geschieden werden. 24 Zusammenstellung und Diskussion der Belege zu IMBs Persienreisen bei Zadok, Iran 14 (1976), 61-78, und Zawadzki, AM1 27 (1994), 123-126, wo insbesondere die wirtschaftlichen Aspekte betrachtet werden. Neues Licht auf die politischen Hintergriinde wirft der Artikel "Les voyages d'Itti-Mardukbalim" von F. JoannBs und Verf. (erscheint in RA). Fur Textbearbeitungen und Interpretation sei auf diese Studie verwiesen.
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immer klar zu bestimmen ist. Auch untitulierte Verpflichtungsscheine sind in diesem Zusammenhang zu nennen.25 Daneben spielen vor allem Quittungen und Forderungen uber ilku oder urZu, ein Oberbegriff fiir verschiedene Dienste und Abgaben, die an die konigliche Verwaltung zu leisten waren, eine Rolle. Die Verpflichtungen umfassen Militiirdienst, Arbeitsdienst (Erdarbeiten beim Kanal- und Mauerbau, Treideln von Booten), daneben geht es auch um Liefemng und Transport von Nahrungsmitteln zu verschiedenen Anlassen. Neben dem Terminus ilku werden auch rikis qabli und panat qa&i erwiihnt, Verpflichtungen, die Inhaber bestimmter vom Konig zugewiesener Felder in Form von Militardienst und -ausrustung zu leisten hatten. Bei den unter ilku subsummierten Verpflichtungen ist selten zu ermitteln, weshalb genau sie geleistet werden mufiten, d.h. ob aufgrund des Status der Person selbst, oder ob sie an den Besitz von Grundstucken, den Zugang zu Bewasserungseinrichtungen, den Konsum von Wasser oder die Nutzung von Kanalen und Anlegestellen fiir Transporte gekniipft waren. Arbeitsverpflichtungen konnten zumindest teilweise durch Zahlungen von Silber oder Stellung von Arbeitskrafien abgegolten werden. Die iiberlieferten Urkunden aus der Regierungszeit Cyrus' und Cambyses' stehen vor allem im Zusammenhang mit Geschaften von IMBs Schwiegervater Iddin-Marduk, die in der zweiten Hiilfte von Nabonids Regierung von den Egibis ubernommen und fortgefiihrt wurden. Ich hatte argumentiert, da13 diese Verpflichtungen aus der Pacht bzw. Bewirtschaftung von Kron- oder Tempelland durch Iddin-Marduk und die Egibis resultieren k0nnten.~6Vereinzelte Hinweise auf hohe Silberbetrage bzw. grol3e Mengen von Naturalien, deren Lieferung im Tempelregister vermerkt werden soll, deuten in die gleiche R i c h t ~ n g . ~ ~ Wiihrend fiir NAI Kontakte zum Statthalter (JZkin gkmi) von Babylon nur im Kontext von Rechtsstreitigkeiten und Rechtsgeschaften, die aus deren Beilegung resultieren, nachzuweisen sind, bei denen der Beamte uber ein Richterkollegium prasidiert hat und NAI entweder als Richter oder Partei auftrat, sind zu IMBs Zeiten auch geschaftliche Verbindungen bezeugt, u.a., wenn Zahlungen von rikis qabli betroffen sind.28 Diese Einzelbeispiele finden ihr Pendant in Texten der nachsten Generation (s. unten S. 113). 25 Nbn 1019: Miete eines Bootes durch IMBs Sklaven, das einem hazannu "Biirgermeister" gehort. Camb 261 hat die Lieferung von Naturalien an den Palast im Auftrag eines Dritten zum Gegenstand. Cyr 270 ist ein Verpflichtungsschein iiber 3 m 16 S Silber zu Lasten eines b-r3i-Beamten des Kronprinzen Cambyses. BM 31202 (6 [CyrlCamb]): Quittung iiber 11 m und Zins, die IMB an den Glaubiger, einen Sa-riS b r r i , gezahlt hat; der zugehorige Verpflichtungsschein ist zu ubergeben. Camb 346: Verpflichtungsschein des IMB uber 10 li zu Lasten eines Sa-r2S Sarri. [Camb 410 betrifft keinen Zehnt, statt Z~.LUM.MA ebru-ri-tu ist gam!-ru-~-tuzu lesen]. 26 Belege bei Wunsch, Zddin-Marduk, Bd I, 53f.+211;dam Jursa, AfO 42/43 (1995-96), 257-259. 27 Nbn 945 (15 Nbn): Ein Tempelangehoriger (Sirku) schuldet IMB 1 m 30 li Silber (zu verzinsen), ein "Register des BEY' wird erwiihnt. Der Betrag macht deutlich, da13 es um Geschafte groBeren Stils gehen muB. BM 31395 ([XI Nbn): IMB ist Schuldner von 140 Kur Datteln, die dem Tempelvermogen (makkziru) des Marduk zustehen und von 2 Personen venvaltet werden, die mit voller Filiation, aber ohne Titel genannt sind. Der Vorgang mu8 ins "Register des BEY' eingetragen werden. 28 Belege fur den Sakin t2mi in richterlicher Funktion bei Rechtsstreitigkeiten aus der Zeit des IMB: Cyr 312 (ein Zusammenhang mit Egibi-Geschaften ist nicht ersichtlich, der Text stammt jedoch aus Egibi-haltiger BM-Samrnlung) und BM 32221 (fragmentarisch, IMB ist Partei, der Sakiin [*mi Zeuge). Sonstige Kontakte: BM 31323 (4 [Cyr?]): Eine Person gibt unter Eid gegenuber IMB Auskunft iiber den Verbleib von Fassern (dannutu), die an den Sakin timi zu iibergeben waren. Camb 276: IMB ist Schreiber, der &kin timi transferiert eine Zahlung von rikis qabli; BM 31389 (5 Camb): IMB zahlt einen
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4. Die vierte Generation Marduk-nii~ir-apli(= MNA), der die Geschaftsfiihrung nach dern Tode seines Vaters zu Beginn von Darius' Regierung ubernahm, hat uns mehr Urkunden hinterlassen als seine Vorganger und sein Sohn, was vor allem durch Archivierungsvorgange sowie Zeitpunkt und Umstande der Sicherstellung des Archivs begrundet ist. Auch die Dokumentation der laufenden Geschaftsvorgange ist vielseitiger, wahrend fur fruhere Generationen die Urkunden eher ergebnisorientiert aufbewahrt wurden. Damit konnten die Urkunden der vierten Generation den Schlussel zum Verstiindnis einiger alterer Texte liefern, allerdings mulj gerade fur unsere Fragestellung konstatiert werden, dalj die relative Haufigkeit von Indizien nicht automatisch zum besseren Verstandnis der Vorgange fiihrt. Eine Zusammenstellung der wichtigsten vor 1970 publizierten Urkunden, die fur unser Thema von Bedeutung sind, findet sich bei J. Krecher, Egibi, 96f. unter $30: "Leistungen von Staats wegen und sonstige Beziehungen zu Funktioniiren der staatliche Verwaltung und Tempelfunktionaren". Bei der Durchsicht der in Frage kommenden Sammlungen des Britischen Museums fanden sich zudem zahlreiche weitere Texte, die zunachst von mir registriert und aufgenommen wurden, dann aber von Kathleen Abraham fur eine ausfuhrliche Publikation gesichtet und aufbereitet worden sind, die als Business and Politics in the Egibi Archive erscheinen soll. Sie hat mich dankenswerterweise vorab eine erste Fassung ihres Manuskripts fur diesen Beitrag einsehen lassen. Mit Rucksicht auf diese Arbeit werden hier einige Themen nur gestreift, auf die K. Abraham ausfiihrlich eingehen wird. Wie fiir die vorangegangenen Generationen ergaben sich auch fiir MNA Kontakte zu Verwaltungsbearnten auf verschiedenen Ebenen im Rahmen der eigenen Geschafte, wenn es z.B. um den Erwerb, Transport und Absatz von Naturalien ging. Zweifellos konnte er dabei auf jenes Beziehungsgeflecht zuriickgreifen, das bereits seine GroBvater aufgebaut hatten. Insbesondere Zahlungen fur die Nutzung von Transportwegen und -kapazitaten finden ihren Niederschlag in den Urkunden.29 Betrag von 10 S aus, bei dern es sich urn rikis qabli handelt, die dern Sakin [Zmi zusteht. Camb 292 und 322 (5 bzw. 6 Camb): IMB kreditiert rikis qabli, die seine Schuldner an die konigliche Verwaltung zu zahlen haben. BM 30229 (5 Camb): Verpflichtungsschein uber 10 m Silber zu Lasten von IMB, zinslos, die in drei Monaten in Anwesenheit des Sakin [?mi zuriickgezahlt werden sollen - es handelt sich um die Restschuld von ursprunglich 25 Minen, die IMB von einem Dritten ubernommen hatte. Leider ist der Hintergrund dieser Zahlung unklar. Der Vater des Glaubigers hatte ein Haus in S ~ n und u Kontakte zu IMBs Schwiegervater, dessen Geschafte sich um Sawnu konzentrierten, daher ist eine Verbindung zum Handel mit Naturalien gut moglich. 29 Exemplarisch seien hier genannt: Dar 268 (10 Dar): MNA zahlt miksu-Abgabe fur ein Boot mit 70 Kur Gerste an den Hafenvorsteher; BM 31347 (x Dar): es geht um miksu fir Boote von 100 Kur Datteln und 50 Kur Gerste bzw. 180 Kur Datteln, die Bit-T5b-BE1 bzw. Til-Gula passiert haben, wobei in der Urkunde eine Relation von 1 BAN auf 1 Kur (3 113 %) angegeben ist; BRM I 81 (26 Dar): ein Sa-r2S Sarri nimmt gimru (Ausgaben bzw. allgemeine Transportkosten) fur 3 16 Kur Datteln auf Anweisung des Gouverneurs von Babylon von MNA entgegen; BM 30591 (Kopie und Bearbeitung s. Abraham, OLA 65, 9; 35 Dar): MNA hat 24.3.2 Kur Gerste an einen Sa-r2S s'arri zu zahlen, die als gimru spezifiziert sind. Zahlreiche unpublizierte Urkunden betreffen kihnliche Vorgange. In Dar 244 (8 Dar) schlieBlich geht es um 240 Kur Gerste, die dern Konig zustehen (makkur Sarri) und die ein Beauftragter des maSennu (d.h. eines Beamten, der sowohl uberregional fur das Bewasserungssystem wie auch im Verwaltungsbereich von koniglichen Domanen zustandig ist, vgl. Jursa, AfO Beih. 25, 181f.),
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Verschiedene Indizien deuten auf die Bewirtschaftung fremden Grundbesitzes durch MNA hin. Mehrere Urkunden, in denen es um Einkunfte eines gewissen Bagasarii geht, eines als rub kiisiri bzw. ganzabara30 bezeichneten hohen koniglichen Beamten, verdienen hier genannt zu werden. Dar 105 aus dern Jahre 4 Dar hat 70 Striinge (pitu) Zwiebeln zum Gegenstand, die als iibiu-Ertragsanteil des B. ausgewiesen sind. Wegen Beschadigungen der Urkunde ist nicht klar, ob und wie die Egibis am Geschaft beteiligt sind. Dar 296 ist besser verstiindlich: Es geht um 170 Kur Gerste, 4 Kur Weizen und 4 Kur Kresse, die den Ertrag des 11. Jahres von den Grundstiicken des B. darstellen und von 2 Personen einzutreiben und abzuliefern waren. Es gab jedoch Schwierigkeiten oder UnregelmaBigkeiten dabei; die betreffenden Nachweise mussen deshalb vorgelegt werden. MNA burgt fur einen der beiden Schuldner, hat also offensichtlich mit dergleichen Geschaften zu tun und kennt den Betreffenden auch anderweitig.31 Moglicherweise ist er der eigentlich Verantwortliche. In Dar 527 aus dern Jahre 21 Dar geht es urn 60 Kur Datteln, imittu-Pachteinkommen eines Grundstiickes am Rab-kiisirKanal, die MNA und seinen Briidern zu zwei Dritteln sowie B. zu einem Drittel zustehen. Laut Dar 53411542 schliel3lich liefert ein Sklave MNAs Datteln an den Verwalter des B. Die Hohe des Betrages ist nicht angegeben, vielmehr ist pauschal von imittu-Pachtauflage fur das 21. Jahr die Rede. Demnach scheint MNA uber 15 Jahre lang an der Bewirtschaftung von Bagasariis Gutern beteiligt gewesen zu sein, wenngleich uns der formale Rahmen dieser Beziehung nicht genau bekannt i ~ t . Aus 3 ~ verschiedenen Texten geht zudem hervor, daB die Egibis selbst Grundbesitz im Gebiet am Rab-kiisir-Kana1 hatten.33
iibernehmen soll. Leider ist nicht klar, ob der fiir die Lieferung verantwortliche Sklave "des Siriktu" rnit einem Sklaven des MNA identifiziert werden kann, da dessen Kurzname sonst Sirkuli oder Sirik lautet; weitere Angaben sind weggebrochen. Die Urkunde, deren Ankaufsnummer zum Kern des Egibi-Archives weist, wurde ansonsten die Verbindung zum koniglichen Haushalt unterstreichen. Allerdings bleibt auch in diesem Falle dunkel, aufgrund welcher Vereinbarung die Gerste geliefert werden mul3: Handelt es sich um Ware, die an den Palast verkauft wurde (etwa um Rationen fur Arbeitskrafte beim Kanalbau bereitzustellen), um Einkunfte aus der Bewirtschaftung koniglicher Domanen oder um Abgaben oder Steueraufkommen, die der koniglichen Verwaltung zustehen? In allen diesen Fallen k i e der maSennu als Kontaktperson in Frage. "Obervenvaker" bzw. "Schatzmeister". Aufgrund unserer Belege ist anzunehmen, dal3 beide Begriffe dasselbe Amt bezeichnen, s. Dandamayev, Bagasaru (mit Zusammenstellung der einschlagigen Texte und Transliteration und Ubersetzung von Dar 105, 527 und 542) und Stolper, Entrepreneurs, 88, sowie Bongenaar, Ebabbar, 136f. zur Funktion des rab kajiri nach Sippartexten. 31 Laut D a r 466 z.B. kauft der Betreffende in MNAs Auftrag und mit dessen Geld einen Grundstucksanteil des Bruders des MNA. Der Mittelsmann wurde offensichtlich eingeschaltet, weil die Beziehung zwischen den Briidern nicht die beste war. 3 2 Van Driel, Entrepreneurs, 222, rechnet dieses Dossier dern von ihm auf S. 215 beschriebenen "third type of entrepreneurship" zu: der Ubernahme von Ressourcen oder Rechten, die zu Gutern hoher Beamter oder Mitgliedern der koniglichen Familie gehoren. 33 Ein Grundstuck in Bit-Rab-k&r am TupaSu-Kana1 wird in BM 41434 (BOR 2, 3f.) mit Duplikat BM 41316 (Wunsch, AfO 42/43 (1995-96), Nr. 5) genannt. Da es offensichtlich MNA und seinen Briidern gemeinsam gehorte (wie Dar 527 nahelegt, denn der betreffende Ertragsanteil von MNA und seinen Brudern konnte sich auf eben dieses Grundstuck beziehen), war es wohl entweder ererbt oder zu Beginn von Darius' Regierung aus Mitteln des ungeteilten Familienvermogens erworben worden; ein Kaufvertrag ist jedoch nicht uberliefert. MNA ubertragt zunachst seinen Anteil an diesem Grundstuck an seine Ehefrau, diese wiederum an ihre Tochter laut BM 33997 (Nr. 8); was aber auf Drangen MNAs
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Auch Beziehungen MNAs zu Verwaltungsbeamten verschiedener Tempe1 sind dokumentiert. Demnach haben die Egibis bestimmte Einkommensrechte gegen Pauschalzahlung erworben, waren aber sicher auch direkt bei der Bewirtschaftung von Tempelland involviert. Ein Dossier betrifft die Teilpachtabgabe (SibSu) an Zwiebeln, die auf Tempelland von Esagila im Gebiet von Sabrinu von Pachtern angebaut werden.34 Fur das Jahr 11 Dar (sowie einen Restbetrag aus dern vorhergehenden?) hatten MNA und sein Bruder dieses Einkommensrecht fur den bemerkenswert hohen Betrag von 42 112 m Silber erworben. Als Vertragspartner auf Seiten des Tempels wird der Beamte Saddinnu erwahnt, der wahrscheinlich als Agent eines Generalpachters auftrat.35 Leider sind wir uber die Details der Vereinbarung nicht infonniert, weil uns nicht das eigentliche, zwischen MNA und der Tempelverwaltung abgefaljte Dokument vorliegt, sondern eine andere (zudem beschadigte) Urkunde, die die Beziehungen zwischen MNA und einem am Geschaft beteiligten Dritten regelt. Dieser wird von MNA und seinem Bruder zu einem Drittel am antizipierten Gewinn (Sal-$6 zitti(HA.LA) ina u-tur, D a r 315:9) beteiligt, wofur er vermutlich den Hauptteil der eigentlichen Arbeiten zu erledigen hatte, denn von einer Kapitalbeteiligung seinerseits ist nicht die Rede. Aufgrund dieser ~berlieferungslage bleibt unklar, in welchem Malje die Egibis uber das Einziehen der Abgaben hinaus bei der Bewirtschaftung des Tempellandes eine Rolle spielen. Noch sechs Jahre spater spielen Forderungen des besagten Saddinnu in Hohe von 3 m 45 gegenuber MNA eine Rolle. Was, unbefangen betrachtet, auch als Zeichen von Kontinuitat bzw. regelmaljiger Vertragserneuerung36 gewertet werden konnte, erscheint im Lichte einiger neuer Dokumente eher als Indiz, dalj dieses Unternehmen vielleicht nicht vom erwunschten Erfolg gekront war. In der Zwischenzeit hatten sich namlich weitere Forderungen summiert, so dalj MNA u.a. ein Grundstuck als Pfand bestellen muljte. Mit TCL 13 193 liegt aul3erdem eine Forderung eines Sa-r2S Sarri uber 45 m Silber zu Lasten von MNA vom Ende des 16. Jahres vor, bei der neben Richtern auch der hohe Verwaltungsbeamte Sa-r2S Sarri b d piqitti von Esagila als Zeuge erscheint. MNA war demnach zu diesem Zeitpunkt mit erheblichen Verbindlichkeiten belastet.37 ---
ruckgangig gemacht wird: DT 233 (Nr. 9). Zumindest belegen diese Urkunden, daR wir vom Eigentumsrecht der Egibis an einem Grundstuck(santei1)in diesem Gebiet auszugehen haben. Was den Drittelanteil des B. betrifft (in Dar 527 als ina libbi SalSu zitti h B. formuliert), so geht aus keiner der genannten Urkunden explizit hervor, worauf er sich grundet. Ein Pachtverhaltnis zwischen B. als Eigentiimer und den Egibis als Pachtern, die ihrerseits unterverpachten, ist daraus ganz sicher nicht abzuleiten; ein bloRer Drittelanteil fur den Verpachter ist bei Dattelkulturen keinesfalls ublich. Wenn sich andererseits hinter dern Anteil des B. auf dern Grundstuck der Egibis lastende Abgaben, Steuerriickstande oder Forderungen aufgrund antichretischer Verpfandung verbergen wiirden, wiire dieser Sachverhalt in der Urkunde env5hnt worden. 34 Dar 315, 453, 472 sowie unpublizierte Texte. Zur Interpretation vgl. van Driel, JESHO 32 (1989), 215, und die Bemerkungen von Jursa, AfO 42/43 (1995-96), 258. Fur eine ausfiihrliche Behandlung sei auf K. Abraham Studie verwiesen. 35 Jursa, Af0 42/43 (1995-96), 258. 36 Van Driel, JESHO 32 (1989), 215. 37 Die Teilung des von Vaters Seite ererbten Vermogens zwischen MNA und seinen zwei Briidern im Jahre 14 Dar (vgl. D a r 379), bei der MNA die Halfte des Gesamtvermogens verblieb, mag zum finanziellen Engpal3 beigetragen haben. Allerdings w k e umgekehrt auch zu envagen, ob geschaftliche Schwierigkeiten, verbunden mit einem gesunden MiBtrauen der Briider gegeniiber MNAs Geschaftsstil, nicht auch die Teilung befordern halfen. Beachtlich ist in jedem Falle die um das Jahr 16 Dar zu
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Im Jahre 17 Dar wurde die Angelegenheit schlieljlich bereinigt, wobei sich MNA allerdings von mehreren Vermogensobjekten trennen muBte: Ein Haus in Babylon, auf den eindrucksvollen Betrag von 50 m 4 213 S Silber taxiert, wurde dern Tempelvermogen von Esagila einverleibt.38 Dieser Vorgang belegt eines mit Sicherheit: MNA haftete gegenuber Esagila mit seinem personlichen Eigentum, was die Annahme, er habe als Vertreter oder auf Rechnung dieser Institution gehandelt, als ausgeschlossen erscheinen 1aBt. Wenn das Eintreiben der Sibiu-Abgabe kein erfolgreiches Unternehmen war, so hatte er die Verluste zu tragen. Aus dern 13. Jahr existiert mit Dar 359 eine Urkunde uber 51 Kur Datteln, die in einem Zusatzvermerk als Zehnt (eM) des Be1 bezeichnet werden. MNA ubergibt sie als harriinu-Geschaftseinlage einem Partner zu halbem Gewinnanteil auf drei Jahre. Die Urkunde ist im Tebet (10. Monat, d.h. zwei Monate nach der Ernte) ausgestellt. Es bleibt unklar, wieso MNA uber diese Datteln verfiigen kann. Die Vermutung liegt nahe, er habe sie dern Tempe1 pauschal abgekauft, oder sie wurden - wie auch immer - zu seinen Gunsten verrechnet. Wegen des Termins ist auch an Restforderungen des Tempels zu denken, die zunachst noch eingetrieben werden muljten. Was mit den Datteln geschehen sollte, ist in der Urkunde nicht angegeben - zum Verkauf allein jedenfalls bedurfte man des juristischen Konstruktes einer harriinu-Gesellschaft nicht.39 Vielleicht war die Verarbeitung der Datteln beabsichtigt.40 Im Fragment Dar 342 (12. Jahr) geht es um Einkommen (makkiru) des BEl. In diesem Zusammenhang werden sieben Pachter von Dattelgarten, die vermutlich bei Salyinu liegen, e r ~ a h n tIn . ~Dar ~ 338 ist von Datteln im Wert von 5 m Silber die Rede, deren Kaufpreis auf Anweisung MNAs ausgezahlt wird, wobei der Verwalter (piihiitu) beobachtende Haufung hoher Forderungen. So ist beispielsweise mit BM 33936 (Kopie: Abraham, OLP 28 (1997), 83) mit Duplikat Liv. 25 (16 Dar) ein Verpflichtungsschein zu Lasten MNAs uber 23 m Silber uberliefert. Den Betrag hatte der Glaubiger auf MNAs Anweisung hin an Zababa-iddin//A&utu, den Gouverneur (?akin [Cmi) von KiS, gezahlt. Die Hintergrunde sind nicht ersichtlich, da jeglicher Kontext fehlt. Die Urkunden signalisieren zumindest enorme wirtschaftliche Aktivitat. Moglicherweise hat MNA auch versucht, Zahlungen an den Tempel, so lange es irgend ging, hinauszuschieben, um seine Ressourcen andenveitig einzusetzen. 38 BM 33935, Z. 8: bitu Suati ana makkur Esagila innaplu. Diese Formulierung erinnert an jenen Fall zu Beginn von Neriglissars Regierung, als das groBe Grundstuck am Neuen Kana1 wegen Schulden des fruheren Sakin [Zmis beim Esagila-Tempe1verkauft werden muBte; allerdings traten damals die Egibis als Kaufer auf. Ein Glaubiger MNAs namens Anu-mukin-apli, dern er 64 m 14 1 Silber schuldete, und an den das Haus urspriinglich verkauft werden sollte, erhielt stattdessen zwei landwirtschaftlicheGrundstiicke (2 Kur Dattelgarten, 4.3.2 Kur Getreidefeld) und 10 Sklaven. Ein weiterer Verpflichtungsscheindes Anu-mukinapli zu Lasten der Egibis uber 16 m 24 S aus dern 17. Jahr konnte den Restbetrag betreffen; wiederum sind mehrere Grundstiicke verpfandet. 39 Zu Sinn und Zweck solcher Gesellschaften und ihrer Beurkundung siehe die grundlegende Arbeit von Lanz, barr&nu, bes. S. 133-147. 40 Laut Dar 280 begriinden MNA und ein anderer Partner eine Gesellschaft mit je 50 Kur Datteln Einlage; ein Haus und Gerate werden von MNA zur Verfugung gestellt. Offensichtlich sollten die Datteln verarbeitet werden. Auch Dar 305 deutet in diese Richtung: Der gleiche Partner zahlt erhebliche Summen Silbers an MNA und gibt Fasser zuruck, wohl im Zusammenhang mit einer Zwischen- oder Endabrechnung. 41 Die stark beschadigte Urkunde weist mit Ankaufsnummer sowie dern (beschadigten, aber signifikanten) Ortsnamen auf das Egibi-Archiv, wie bereits von van Driel, JESHO 32 (1989), 215 vermutet.
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des genannten Ortes involviert ist. Die Urkunde BM 30233 aus dem Jahr 31 Dar hat einen Betrag von 50 Kur Datteln von Sahrinu zum Gegenstand, deren Lieferung an Esagila im Register des Be1 einzutragen und gegenuber MNA nachzuweisen ist. ijber die Hintergriinde kann jeweils nur spekuliert werden. Sahrinu war bereits ein Zentrum der Geschafte von MNAs GroBvater mutterlicherseits, I d d i n - M a r d ~ kin , ~ dem ~ sich die Familie Egibi ebenfalls etablierte. Was mit Aufkaufgeschaften begonnen hatte, schloB bald auch die Organisation der Bewirtschaftung grorjerer Flachen ein. Ob MNA selbst etwa als GroBpachter DattelgMen des Tempels unterverpachtet hatte, entzieht sich unserer Kenntnis: diesbezugliche Vertrage sind nicht uberliefert. In D a r 437 aus dem 16. Jahr erscheint MNA als Schuldner einer kurzfristigen zinslosen Forderung uber 2 m 40 S Silber, die bei Verzug zu verzinsen wiiren. Bei der Ausstellung dieses Verpflichtungsscheines waren drei Personen anwesend, die als SZpiru "Aufseher" von Esagila bezeichnet werden. Wegen der Rolle der Sapirus im Pfrundenwesen43 konnte man an die iibernahme bestirnmter Lieferverpflichtungen von Naturalien als Schuldgrund denken, die im Rahmen von Pfrundendiensten benotigt wurden, wenngleich grundsatzlich andere Szenarien vorstellbar sind. Allerdings gibt es nach wie vor keinen Anhaltspunkt dafir, daB die Egibis selbst Pfriindendienste ausgefuhrt und fur andere ubernommen oder an geeignete Personen weiterdelegiert hatten. Die fur Privatarchive anderer, traditionell mit verschiedenen Tempeln verbundener Familien typischen Pfrundenkaufe und Werkvertrage fehlen ebenso wie Hinweise auf Tempelpfrunden, die als Vermogensobjekte bei Erbteilungen oder Mitgiften berucksichtigt w~rden.~~ Um den Gerstezehnt von Feldern des Nergal-Tempels vom Jahre 21 Dar geht es in D a r 533. Diese Liste nennt Ortsnamen samt Angabe der Verantwortlichen; dabei erscheinen u.a. Orte und Personen, die fur Egibi-Geschafte signifikant sind, allerdings ohne daB Familienangehorige selbst erwahnt werden. Die Zahlenangaben, soweit erhalten, summieren sich zu 284 Kur, was einem Wert von mindestens 5 m Silber entsprache, wenn man den Idealkurs voraussetzt. Gelegentlich sind Rinder Gegenstand von Urkunden, sie werden gekauft (Dar 282: ein Tier) oder gegen einen halben Anteil an Jungtieren verpachtet (Dar 257 und 348). Laut Dar 392 mu8 die Lieferung von 14 Tieren gegenuber MNA nachgewiesen werden, um mit einer erheblichen Forderung uber Naturalien (30 Kur Gerste, einem Restbetrag von ursprunglich 70 Kur, und 200 Kur Datteln) verrechnet zu werden. Auch Dar 413 erlaubt gewisse Ruckschlusse auf den Kontext: Es handelt sich um einen Verpflichtungsschein uber 28 Kur Gerste, in dessen elat-Klausel von Rindern auf Halbpacht (ana zitti) die Rede ist. Der Schuldner quittiert zudem fur Saatgut und Futter. Dar 509 betrifft eine MNA zustehende Forderung uber Rinder nebst Naturalien, entsprechende Lieferabrechnungen sind vorzulegen. Die ijbernahme bzw. Lieferung von zwei Rindern durch einen Sklaven des MNA ist Gegenstand von BM 31976, Vertragspartner sind ein Bote
DAS BEISPIEL DER FAMILIE EGIBI
des abarakku45 und ein Tempelbauer des Nergal. Dar 307 schlieljlich liefert, wenn zu Recht mit MNAs Aktivitaten in Verbindung gebracht, einen Hinweis auf die Bewirtschaftung von A ~ k e r l a n d Diese . ~ ~ Belege, so schemenhaft die erkennbaren Konturen auch sein mogen, passen in einen Kontext von GroBpacht von Landereien, wobei dahingestellt bleiben muB, ob es sich im jeweiligen Falle um Tempel- oder Kronland oder um Privatbesitz handelte. MNA hat Saatgut geliefert und Zugvieh zur Verfugung gestellt bzw. kreditiert und konnte vermutlich auch uber entsprechende Arbeitskrafte verfugen. Es fehlen uns aber wiederum jene Dokumente, die kliiren konnten, in welche juristische Form diese Unternehmungen gekleidet waren, d.h. entsprechende Vertrage, die zwischen MNA und der Administration abgeschlossen wurden. Haufig haben MNA oder seine Agenten Zahlungen geleistet bzw. quittiert oder bestimmte Betrage kreditiert, die in einem Zusatzvermerk als ilku, rikis qabli, (piinat) qaSti etc. spezifiziert werden, also Abgaben betreffen, die an die konigliche Verwaltung zu leisten waren. Selten wird explizit erkkt, warum diese Verpflichtungen bestanden und welche Rolle die Egibis im System der Erhebung von Abgaben spielten. Verschiedene Aspekte konnen jedoch anhand kleiner Dossiers veranschaulicht werden. Der Fall eines gewissen BEl-iddin und seiner Familie wurde bereits von G. van Driel besprochen.47 Bd-iddin war Inhaber von Bogenland, an dessen Besitz eine rikis qabli genannte Verpflichtung zum Militar- bzw. Arbeitsdienst geknupft war, die aber auch durch Silber bzw. Stellung und Ausriistung eines Ersatzmannes abgegolten werden konnte. Mindestens seit dem Jahre 11 Dar war BEl-iddin auf ein Darlehen angewiesen, um seinen Verpflichtungen nachzukommen, wofur sein Grundstuck als Pfand diente. In den folgenden Jahren werden weitere Zahlungen fur die Stellung eines Ersatzmannes (kutallzitu) und f i r Rationen fur Arbeitskrafte erwahnt, zugleich ist die Lieferung von Naturalien durch Bel-iddins Frau und Sohn dokumentiert, wodurch ein Teil der Schuld abgetragen wird. ~ b e sechs r Jahre hinweg laBt sich dieses Verhaltnis verfolgen. Vergleichbare Falle sind bereits fruher im Archiv bezeugt: Nbn 103 zeigt MNAs GroBvater Iddin-Marduk als Glaubiger von 1 m Silber, die fur die rikis qabli der ~ ~ e S gezahlt wurde. Schuldner sind auch hier Ehefrau koniglichen Truppen ( 1 f i ~ ~ f LUGAL) und Sohn eines wohl aufgrund von Dienstpflichten Abwesenden, dessen Grundstuck als Pfand dient; Nbn 344 betrifft einen ahnlichen Fall. Die Verschuldung eines Abgabepflichtigen bei antichretischer Verpfhdung des betreffenden Versorgungsgrundstuckes kann zu einer chronischen Abhangigkeit vom Glaubiger fuhren, der dann faktisch, aber ohne Eigentumer zu sein, in den GenuB der Pachteinkiinfte kommt. Diese Erscheinung ist in spaterer Zeit in den Urkunden des MuraSO-Archives haufig zu
45
-
42 43 44
Wunsch, Iddin-Marduk, Bd. I, 22f., vgl. auch die Wertung bei Jursa, AfO 42/43 (1995-96), 259. Fur Sippar detailliert bei Bongenaar, Ebabbar, KapitelIII.1. Vereinzelte Erwahnungen von Pfrunden bzw. Diensten in unpublizierten Texten und in nicht eindeutig bestimmbarem Zusammenhang werden von K. Abraham ausfiihrlich dargestellt und diskutiert werden.
111
BM 31976 (Bertin 2639): 3f. l h A G ~ l Ga-ba-rak-ku u PN ~UENGARSd d ~ . Die~ glossierte ~ ~ . Schreibung ist bemerkenswert, da das Logografnm sonst offenbar mSennu gelesen wurde. 46 Dar 307 (BM 31433 = 76-11-17,1160, Tafelnummer bei Strdmaier zu korrigieren), Z. 4: ~ ~ N U M U... NSd i*-nu* @APIN ki MN. 47 JESHO 32 (1989), 211f. BEl-iddin, Sohn des NabB-zEra-uSabSi, sowie seine Ehefrau f ~ u n n a bund i beider Sohn Nergal-uballit sind in Dar 308, 400, 430, 438, 452, 459 sowie BM 31026 (Bertin 2318) bezeugt. Andere Beispiele im Zusammenhang mit Kreditierung von rikis qabli sind Dar 164 und 167 (ebenfalls mit Grundstiickspfand).
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beobachten,48 deutet sich aber schon im Rahmen der Egibi-Aktivitaten an, wie das Beispiel eines gewissen Nergal-nasir aus der Zeit des Cambyses leh1-t.~9 MNAs Rolle erschopfte sich jedoch nicht in der kurz- oder langfristigen Kreditierung der genannten Abgaben und der Verwertung der daraus resultierenden Einkiinfte, die vornehmlich in Naturalien bestanden haben durften. Vielmehr enthalten die Texte sowohl Hinweise auf Kontakte zu den verantwortlichen Beamten, insbesondere dern Gouverneur (iiikin gEmi) von Babylon und seinen Bevollmachtigten (s. unten), als auch auf ilkuZahlungen etc., die im Auftrag Dritter von MNA getatigt oder entgegengenommen werden,50 was eine direkte Involvierung in den ProzeB der Abgabenerhebung impliziert. Es finden sich jedoch keine Indizien, die auf eine Funktion der Egibis als Steuereintreiber im Auftrag der Krone hindeuten; nie werden sie durch Amt oder Titel qualifiziert. Dieser Befund l e g die Vermutung nahe, sie konnten das Recht zum Einziehen dieser Abgaben gegen (Tei1)zahlung vorab erworben bzw. gepachtet haben - eine Praxis, die beispielsweise bezuglich des Tempelzehnten fur Uruk und Sippar belegt werden kann.51 Die uberlieferten Egibi-Dokumente wurden dann allerdings nur jene Vorgange reprasentieren, die auf der Ebene zwischen Steuerpflichtigem und Steuerpachter vor sich gingen, wiihrend uns zum Nachweis dieser These die Abrechnungen mit der Krone selbst fehlten. Wir kennen weder einen Vertrag, der typologisch den Generalpachtvertragen aus dern Eanna-Archiv vergleichbar ware, noch Verpflichtungsscheine oder Quittungen, die die Pauschalzahlung einer Steuerschuld an die Krone ausdriicklich vermerken. Ein Text, TCL 13 19652 aus dern Jahre 26 Dar, deutet in die beschriebene Richtung. Er betrifft Einkommensrechte (irbu) im Zusammenhang mit einer Brucke samt Anlegestelle. Diese fallen in die Zustandigkeit des Gouverneurs von Babylon, der sie an MNA und andere Personen (die u.a. als "Briickenwachter" m a j ~ 6 giiri r fungieren) delegiert hat - was durch ina piin zum Ausdruck gebracht wird. MNA seinerseits verpachtet dieses Einkommensrecht, wobei tenninologisch in der Tat von ana sziti "gegen Pachtabgabe" die Rede ist. MNA erscheint hierbei in einer Mittlerfunktion: nicht als Vertreter der Institution selbst, sondern offensichtlich auf eigene Rechnung handelnd. Es finden sich aber auch Hinweise, daB MNA selbst Verpflichtungen unterlag, die in den allgemein als ilku definierten Bereich fallen. So zahlt im Jahre 35 Dar der S o h des MNA den Anteil seines Vaters an rikis qabli an MNAs Bruder aus.53 Dieser familien48 49 50
Stolper, Entrepreneurs, 104-107 mit Beschreibung der Konsequenzen. Vgl. van Driel, JESHO 32 (1989), 212 und Wunsch, Iddin-Marduk, Bd. I, 51f. Z.B. Dar 156: MNA zahlt einen Betrag an PN (der den Dienst versieht?) im Auftrag von PN2 (dem Dienstpflichtigen) fur aliiku ana pani farri "Dienstantritt beim Konig". TCL 13 197 und 198: jeweils Zahlung von ilku fur einen bestimmten Zeitraum an MNA im Auftrag einer bestimmten Person durch einen Dritten. In Dar 206 geht es um die Verrechnung eines hohen Betrages, der auf Anweisung des Gouverneurs von Babylon wegen rikis qabli gezahlt wurde. Dar 220 und 481 betreffen ebenfalls Zahlungen eines Dienstpflichtigen an seinen Ersatzmann (van Driel, JESHO 32 (1989), 212 weist auf die Kontinuitat und Langlebigkeit dieses Dienstverhaltnisses hin), ohne dal3 die Egibis selbst genannt werden. Die Tafeln haben sich aber zweifellos in ihrem Archiv befunden. Jursa, Tempelzehnt, insbesondere ab S. 21 (ausfuhrlich mit friiherer Literatur). 52 Besprochen bei San Nicolb, ArOr 4 (1932), 189 (Z. 8-14); Moore, NBAD, Nr. 196 (Bearbeitung) sowie Krecher, Egibi, 346f. 53 BM 33928 (Bertin 2554) mit Duplikat BM 33957. In Dar 328 (12 Dar) geht es um eine imittuForderung uber Datteln von einem Grundstuck "einschliel3lich(?) bit &ti ("Handhaus")" zu Gunsten von MNA, ausgestellt in Duru-Sa-kki, einer Ortschaft, in der MNA laut Dar 321 mit Duplikat TCL 13 190 ein Grundstuck erworben hat, das er laut BM 41743 (Wunsch, Felder und Garten, Nr. 203) verpachtet.
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113
interne Vorgang konnte anzeigen, dalj ein Grundstuck in Gemeinschaftsbesitz von MNA und seinen Briidern, sei es ererbt oder aus Mitteln des Familienvermogens gekauft (oder eventuell gemeinsam gepachtet), dieser Abgabenart unterlag. Keine der Pacht- oder Kaufurkunden erwahnt jedoch, daB dergleichen Verpflichtungen auf den jeweiligen Feldern oder Dattelgarten lasten.S4 Daher ist zu fragen, ob ilku etc. wirklich nur landwirtschaftliche Grundstucke betraf. M. Jursa vermag in einer Arbeit uber das aus Sippar stammende Archiv des Bel-rsmanni, die in Kurze erscheinen wird, diese Frage zu kliiren.55 Das Archiv enthalt eine Reihe von Verpflichtungsscheinen und Quittungen, die von ilku- oder qaitu-Verpflichtungen handeln und typologisch denen verwandt sind, die im Egibi-Archiv vorkommen. Jursas prosopographische Analyse erhellt, daB die Abgabepflichtigen der alteingesessenen, rnit dern Tempe1 verbundenen stadtischen Oberschicht angehoren. Bezuglich ihrer "Bogendienste" sind sie in Zehnergruppen eingeteilt, fur die ein Mitglied als primus inter pares verantwortlich zeichnet; wahrscheinlich wechselt diese Funktion. Die Zehnergruppen haben je einen Bogenschutzen zu stellen bzw. entsprechende Zahlungen zu leisten. Jursa kommt zu dern SchluB, da13 als Hintergrund fur diese Abgaben eine Besteuerung stadtischen Grundbesitzes als wahrscheinlich anzusehen ist. Die Bedeutung dieser Analyse fur das Verstandnis der Egibi-Texte liegt auf der Hand. Insbesondere solche Dokumente, in denen es um Zahlungen MNAs im Auftrag Dritter geht, konnten sehr wohl vor einem M i c h e n Hintergrund zu sehen sein. Es sind aber aul3erdem innerhalb der Egibi-haltigen Sammlungen des Britischen Museums undatierte Listen uberliefert, die im Lichte der BEl-remanni-Urkunden an Aussagewert gewinnen. In ihnen wird festhalten, welche Personen in bestimmten Ortschaften oder Hausern wohnen (aiiblaibu), z.T. mit Zahl und Alter der Familienangehorigen.56 Auch Mitglieder der Familie Egibi werden darin genannt, sowie einige Orts- und Personennamen, die aus dern Kontext von Egibi-Geschaften bekannt sind und somit eine Verbindung herstellen. Die angesichts der Archivstruktur naheliegende Vermutung, alle diese Texte seien zeitlich in die Generation des MNA einzuordnen, wird erst durch prosopographische Feinanalyse gesichert werden konnen, wenn einmal alle potentiellen Egibi-Texte entsprechend aufbereitet vorliegen. Es fragt sich, welchen Zweck die Erfassung der Personen in solchen Mustemngslisten gehabt haben konnte. Da verschiedentlich der Begriff qaitu "Bogen(dienst)" auftaucht und Funktioniire wie mas@ giiri "Briickenwachter", dajjdu "Aufseher", und maiennu "Verantwortlicher fur die Bewassemng" erwahnt werden, liegt es nahe, einen Zusammenhang mit der Organisation landwirtschaftlicher Arbeiten oder der Erhebung von Abgaben herzustellen, sei es aufgrund von Pachtverhaltnissen oder Dienstpflichten, die an den Besitz bestimmter Grundstiicke gekniipft waren. Auf welche Weise genau die Dar 335 handelt von imittu-Pachtauflage von einem 50-er Feld im gleichen Gebiet, die MNA zusteht und von einem anderen ubernommen wird. Hier wird man vielleicht von Unterverpachtung auszugehen haben. 54 Diese Tatsache verwundert auch nicht, wenn wir von der Annahme ausgehen, daB rikis qabli zunachst mit Versorgungsfeldern verkniipft war, die Militiirdienstpflichtigenzugeteilt worden waren und die zwar mit Pfandern belastet, aber nicht verkauft werden konnten. 55 Michael Jursa hat mir das einschlagige Kapitel vorab zur Verfiigung gestellt, wofiir ihm herzlich gedankt sei. 56 BM 30435, 31 122, 31 193, 31297,31459, 31463, 314661131482, 31551 sowie verschiedene kleine Memoranda.
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Egibis dabei involviert waren, so darj diese Tafeln ins Familienarchiv gelangten, entzieht sich leider unserer Kenntnis. Ihre Verbindung zum Gouverneur von Babylon durfte dabei aber von Bedeutung gewesen ~ e i n . ~ ~ Abgesehen vom Tempelarchiv von Sippar, wo gelegentlich der Gkin t2mi von Babylon genannt wird, ist das Egibi-Archiv die beste Quelle fur Informationen uber dieses Amt und seine Inhaber. Die Urkunden machen deutlich, daB dieser Funktion& fir die Erhebung der Abgaben und die Bereitstellung von Truppen und Arbeitskraften zustiindig war. In diesem Zusammenhang geht es nicht nur um militarische Operationen, sondern auch um die Nahrungsmittelversorgung und die Erhaltung des Kanal- und Wegenetzes. Damit kontrolliert er jene Bereiche der Infrastruktur, die fur die Geschafte der Egibis von entscheidender Bedeutung sind. Was den Charakter der Beziehungen betrifft, so spricht der Brief CT 22 74 (BM 33077) eine deutliche Sprache. Der Text kann allerdings nur aufgrund seiner Ankaufsnummer und prosopographischer Analyse dern Egibi-Archiv zugeordnet werden. Ein gewisser GGzGnu, der vermutlich als Gouverneur von Babylon zu identifizieren i ~ t , 5kanzelt ~ MNA (alias Sirku) ab: Sirku habe ihm gemeldet, bestimmte Truppen seien ihrn (G.) zugeteilt worden, aber nun wurden sie von einem anderen Befehlshaber mit Beschlag belegt. Er solle diesem keineswegs noch mehr Truppen herausgeben. Er (Sirku) verfuge uber genugend Truppen, er solle seine (G.s) Leute in Ruhe lassen. GGzinu wirft Sirku aurjerdem vor, sich gegenuber dern anderen Befehlshaber nicht stark genug engagiert zu haben. Er sei schlierjlich sein Wortfiihrer.59 Dieser Brief - vorausgesetzt, die Protagonisten sind richtig bestimmt worden, - la& MNA nicht in einem blorjen Abhangigkeitsverhaltnis von GGzGnu erscheinen, sondern deutet an, dab beider Tatigkeiten ineinandergriffen und MNA wichtige organisatorische Aufgaben fur ihn wahrnahm. Dem entsprechen Hinweise in den Urkunden, wonach MNA Transporte organisierte, uber Arbeitskrafte verfugte, Boote mietete, Rationen fur Besatzung und Treidler zur Verfiigung stellte, und zugleich auf den Gouverneur bzw. die Zweckbestimmung "nachlfir Elam" verwiesen wird.60 Es liegt die Vermutung nahe, diese Verflechtung der Egibi-Geschafte mit dern Tatigkeitsbereich des Gouverneurs habe sich bereits zu Lebzeiten IMBs entwickelt, was auch dessen Reiseaktivitaten in einem neuen Licht erscheinen l a t .
s7 Dieses Thema wird ausfihrlich von K. Abraham behandelt werden. Ebeling, NBB, 45 geht davon aus, dal3 es sich bei G. um den iiangci von Sippar handelt. In der Tat hatte er dieses Amt inne, bevor er ab 25 Dar Gouverneur von Babylon wurde, vgl. Bongenaar, Ebabbar, 9. Die Fakten, um die es im Brief geht, gehoren eindeutig in den Amtsbereich des Gouverneurs; damit kann dieser Brief in die Zeit ab 25 Dar datiert werden. Teilubersetzung in CAD S, 335, s.v. mar sisi, vgl. auch van Driel, JESHO 32 (1989), 207 und Joannks, T ~ B R24f. , 59 Z. 12f.: at-ta pi-ia i t - t i 3 iid-ak-na-a-ta. 60 Z.B. Dar 154: Ein gewisser Ku~urajasol1 im Auftrag MNAs gegen Lohn mit den Wagen(truppen) des iiiikin [Zmi nach Elam reisen. Unklar bleibt, ob es sich um einen militiirischen Einsatz handelt, fur den MNA einen Ersatzmann stellen muBte. In Dar 411 wird ein Betrag von 30 F genannt, der auf Rechnung des MNA fiir "Arbeit am Konigskanal von Elam" gezahlt wurde. Dar 572: MNA hat Kosten, fur Lohn und Verpflegung von drei Personen, die nach Elam gehen, an denjenigen zu zahlen, der sie fur ihn ausgelegt hatte. D a r 577: Teilquittung uber 10 S Silber, der Restbetrag von 20 S ist an den Beauftragten des Siikin ??mi nach der Ruckkehr aus Elam zu zahlen. In unpublizierten Urkunden sind weitere Belege zu finden.
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5. Die funfe Generation Von Nidinti-Be1 sind nur wenige Urkunden uberliefert und er tritt uns, abgesehen von Urkunden, die die Mitgift seiner Ehefrau betreffen, nur dann gegenuber, wenn er im Auftrag seines Vaters Lieferungen tatigt und Zahlungen entgegennimmt. Erwahnung verdient die Tatsache, darj sein Schwiegervater ein Hausgrundstuck in Babylon neben einem Haus des Konigs besitzt61 - in gewisser Weise schlierjt sich hier der Kreis, wenn wir an NAIs Verbindung zu Neriglissar und die Vermietung des Hauses neben dern Kronprinzenpalast denken.
Mitglieder der Familie Egibi unterhielten vielfaltige Kontakte zu Vertretern auf verschiedenen Ebenen der koniglichen Verwaltung und der Tempeladministration. Auf lokaler Ebene ergaben sich diese Kontakte zwangslaufig im Rahmen der Geschafte mit Naturalien, deren Aufkauf, Lagerung, Transport und Vermarktung das Ruckgrat der Egibi-Unternehmungen bildete. Sie betrafen den Zugang zu Bewasserungseinrichtungen, Wasserwegen und Hafenanlagen und die Miete von Schiffen und Speichern. Fur die Nutzung der Infrastruktur waren Abgaben und Gebuhren bzw. Mietzahlungen an die konigliche Verwaltung zu entrichten. Diese Kontakte waren durch Notwendigkeiten im Geschaftsablauf vorgegeben; sie sind eher durch die Abhangigkeit der Egibis von den betreffenden Einrichtungen, denn durch ein Wechselverhaltnis gepragt und unterschieden sich nur im Umfang, nicht im Charakter von denen anderer Geschaftsleute. Fur Aufkaufgeschafte von Gerste, Datteln und Zwiebeln, die in der Form von harriinu-Gesellschaften organisiert waren, liegen Begrundungsurkunden, Zwischenabrechnungen, Gewinnzuweisungen und Auflosungsvertrage vor, in denen zwar allgemeine Abgaben erwahnt werden, die aber keinen Hinweis auf irgendeine Teilfinanzierung oder anderweitige Beteiligung durch Institutionen enthalten. Die erwirtschafteten Gewinne wurden in Sklaven und Grundstiicken angelegt, zwischen den Gesellschaftern geteilt und gingen in deren Familienvermogen ein. Gleichwohl muB angenommen werden, darj Institutionen, insbesondere die konigliche Verwaltung, als Abnehmer fungierten. Parallel zu diesen Geschaften entwickelte sich jedoch ein Beziehungsgeflecht, bei dern die Egibis eine Mittlerfunktion zwischen der Verwaltung einerseits und den Produzenten und anderen kleinen Geschaftsleuten andererseits ubernahmen, sei es, indem sie Steuern und Abgaben, die andere zu zahlen hatte, kreditierten, oder indem sie ein bestimmtes Steueraufkommen pauschal beglichen und das Einziehen der entsprechenden Forderungen ubernahmen. Dieses Arrangement war beiderseits vorteilhaft; den Beamten ersparte es vie1 Aufwand beim Eintreiben der Abgaben und garantierte, darj eine bestimrnte Summe zu einem festgesetzten Termin verfugbar war. Die Egibis wiederum erhielten die der Verwaltung in Naturalien zustehenden Ertragsanteile direkt von den Produzenten geliefert, konnten diese Kontakte gleichzeitig fur Aufkaufgeschafte nutzen,
BM 33981 (Wunsch, AfO 42/43 (1995-96), Nr. 13): 6f.: "sein Haus in der Mauergasse neben dern Grundstuck des Konigs und neben dern Haus des PN ..."
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DAS BEISPIEL DER FAMILIE EGIBI
117
gewahrten Kredite bei Zahlungs- bzw. Lieferriickstanden und konnten entsprechende Zinsertrage erwarten. Diese Geschafte bargen immer ein gewisses Risiko, das in erster Linie die Egibis zu tragen hatten, da sie mit ihrem Vermogen fur Forderungen der Krone oder der Tempelverwaltung hafteten, wie aus den Generalpfandklauseln der entsprechenden Urkunden hervorgeht. Bei normalen Ernten lohnten solche Unternehmen sicher den Aufwand, und auch in wirtschaftlich angespannten Zeiten mu8 ein gewisser Spielraum bestanden haben, etwa indem Forderungen von Silber in Naturalien und umgekehrt zum aktuellen Kurs in jeweils gunstiger Richtung umgerechnet wurden oder Grundstiicke unter der Bedingung von Zinsantichrese gepfandet wurden, was im Notfall bis zur Pfandverwertung fuhren konnte. Problematisch mul3te es jedoch werden, wenn etwa durch MiBernten die als Abgaben zu erbringenden Ertragsanteile vie1 zu gering ausfielen oder die Produzenten generell - egal, aus welchen Griinden - wirtschaftlich iiberfordert und verschuldet waren. Unsere Beispiele belegen einerseits die Langlebigkeit mancher Forderungen von Institutionen gegenuber Geschaftsleuten, womit vermutlich temporiiren Schwierigkeiten Rechnung getragen wurde, andererseits aber auch energisches Durchgreifen bis zur Konfiszierung von Irnrnobilien, wenn deren Zahlungsmoral zu wunschen iibrig lieB. Auf lange Sicht murjten die Institutionen ein Interesse haben, ein zwar moglichst hohes Steueraufkommen mit geringem eigenem Aufwand zu erzielen, aber gleichzeitig zu verhindern, darj die mit der Arbeit betrauten Geschaftsleute sich zu sehr auf Kosten der Abgabepflichtigen bereicherten, so darj dadurch das wirtschaftliche ~ b e r l e b e nder Produzenten gefaihrdet wurde. Darj dieser schwierige Balanceakt uber mehrere Jahrzehnte mehr oder weniger erfolgreich praktiziert wurde, macht die ijberlieferung aus dem EgibiArchiv deutlich. Es bleibt zu fragen, ob die ijbernahme einer bestimmten Steuer- oder Generalpachterfunktion immer freiwillig erfolgte und von vornherein Gewinn versprach. Sie konnte auch ein willkommenes Mittel gewesen sein, allzu schnell und offensichtlich reich gewordene Geschaftsleute zu schropfen. Was die Kontakte der Egibis zu Neriglissar und den Verwaltern mehrerer aufeinander folgender Kronprinzen verschiedener Dynastien angeht, so ist in erster Linie die Kontinuitat dieser Beziehung durch drei Generationen und politisch turbulente Zeiten bemerkenswert, wenngleich uber den konkreten EinfluB dieser Verbindung auf die Geschicke der Farnilie Egibi nur spekuliert werden kann.
within the Ancient Near East. Festschrift E. Lipinski (= Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta 65), Leuven 1995, 1-9. "SuHan in the Egibi Texts from the Time of Marduk-ni~ir-apli",OLP 28 OLP 28 (1997), 55-85. Bongenaar, A.C.V.M
A bkurzungen Camb (nach Jahreszahl): Cambyses; Cyr (nach Jahreszahl): Cyrus; Dar (nach Jahreszahl): Darius; m: Mine (= 60 S, etwa 500 g); Nbk (nach Jahreszahl): Nebukadnezar 11.; Nbn (nach Jahreszahl): Nabonid; Ner (nach Jahreszahl): Neriglissar; Npl (nach Jahreszahl): Nabopolassar; H: Schekel (= 1/60 m, etwa 8 g); Xer (nach Jahreszahl): Xerxes
Krecher, J
Literatur
Abraham, K. OLA 65
"The End of Marduk-na~ir-apli'sCareer as Businessman and Scribe: New Evidence from Unpublished Egibi Texts from the British Museum", in: K. Van Lerberghe-A. Schoors (Hrsg.), Immigration and Emigration
Ebabbar
The Neo-Babylonian Ebabbar Temple at Sippar: Its Administration and its Prosopography (= PIHANS 80), Istanbul 1997.
Boscawen, W.St.C. "Babylonian Dated Tablets, and the Canon of Ptolemy", TSBA 6 (1878), TSBA 6 1-78. Dandamayev, M.A. "Bagasafi ganzabara", in: M. Mayrhofer u.a. (Hrsg.), Studien zur Bagasarii Sprachwissenschaft und Kulturkunde. Gedenkschrift fur Wilhelm Brandenstein (1898-1967), Innsbruck 1968, 235-239.
Driel, G. van JEOL 29
"The Rise of the House of Egibi. NabQ-a&-iddina", JEOL 29 (198586), 50-67. "The MuraHQs in Context", JESHO 32 (1989), 203-229. JESHO 32 Entrepreneurs "Agricultural Entrepreneurs in Mesopotamia", in: H. Klengel-J. Renger (Hrsg.), Landwirtschaft im Alten Orient (= BBVO 18), Berlin 1999, 213223. Ebeling, E. Neubabylonische Briefe (= Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Akademie NBB der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Klasse, N.F. 30), Munchen 1949. Evetts, B.T.A. Inscriptions of the Reigns of Evil-Merodach (B.C. 562-559), Neriglissar Ner (B.C. 559-555) and Laborosoarchod (B.C. 555) (= Babylonische Texte, Heft 6B), Leipzig 1892. Joannbs, F. Textes kconomiques de la Babylonie re'cente, Paris 1982. TEBR Jursa, M. Rezension zu C. Wunsch, Iddin-Marduk, AfO 42/43 (1995-96), 255AfO 42/43 262. AfO Beih. 25 Die Landwirtschaft in Sippar in neubabylonischer Zeit (= AfO Beiheft 25), Wien 1995. Tempelzehnt
Egibi
Der Tempelzehnt in Babylonien vom siebenten bis dritten Jahrhundert v. Chr. (= AOAT 254), Munster 1998. Das Gesch2iftshaus Egibi in Babylon in neubabylonischer und achamenidischer Zeit [unpublizierte Habilitationsschrift], MunsterIW. 1970.
Lanz, H. Die neubabylonischen ?p.rrSnu-Geschiifsunternehmen,Berlin 1976. barrhu Liv (mit Textnummer) siehe Straflmaier Moore, E.W. Neo-Babylonian Business and Administrative Documents, Ann Arbor NBAD 1935. Ner (mit Textnummer) siehe Evetts San Nicolb, M. "Parerga Babylonica 111-V", ArOr 4 (1932), 179-192. ArOr 4 "Zur Verproviantierung des kgl. Hoflagers in Abanu durch den EannaArOr 17
118
C. WUNSCH Tempe1 in Uruk", ArOr 17 (1949), 323-330.
Stolper, M. Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs and Empire. The MuraSii Archive, the Muras'ii Firm, and Persian Rule in Babylonia (= PIHANS 54), Istanbul 1985.
StraBmaier, J.N. Die babylonischen Inschriften im Museum zu Liverpool nebst anderen Liv aus der Zeit von Nebukadnezzar bis Darius. [Actes du sixi&mecongrks international des Orientalistes tenu en 1883 B Leide. Deuxibme partie], Leide 1885. Ungnad, A. "Das Haus Egibi", AfO 14 (1941-44), 57-64. AfO 14 Weingort, S. Das Haus Egibi in neubabylonischen Rechtsurkunden, Berlin 1939. Egibi Wunsch, C. Iddin-Marduk Die Urkunden des babylonischen Geschaftsmannes Iddin-Marduk. Zum Handel mit Naturalien im 6. Jahrhundert v.Chr., Bd. I und I1 (=
Cuneiform Monographs 3a und b), Groningen 1993. "Die Frauen der Farnilie Egibi", AfO 42/43 (1995-96), 33-63. "Die Richter des Nabonid", in: J. Marzahn-H. Neumann (Hrsg.): Assyriologica et Semitica. Festschriftfur Joachim Oelsner (= AOAT 252), Miinster 1999 [im Druck]. Felder und Garten Das Egibi-Archiv. 1. Die Felder und Garten [im Druck]. Zadok, R. Geographical Names According to New-and Late-Babylonian Texts, RGTC 8 Wiesbaden 1985. "On the Connections Between Iran and Babylonia in the Sixth Century Iran 14 B.C.", Iran 14 (1976), 61-78. Zawadzki, S. "The First Persian Journey of Itti-Marduk-balitu", AMI 27 (1994), 123AMZ 27 126. AfO 42/43 Fs Oelsner
STAATLICHE VERWALTUNG UND PRIVATES HANDWERK IN DER UR 111-ZEIT: DIE AUFTRAGSTATIGKEIT DER SCHMIEDE VON GIRSU
Der handwerklichen Produktion als der zweiten wichtigen Produktionsform nach der Landwirtschaft kam im Rahmen der 0konomie des neusumerischen Reiches von Ur eine grol3e Bedeutung zu. Zum einen diente das Handwerk der Herstellung von Geraten, vor allem fur die landwirtschaftliche Produktion, zum anderen war es von entscheidender Bedeutung bei der Befriedigung von Luxusbedurfnissen der mit Palast und Tempe1 verbundenen Oberschicht. Hinzu kamen wichtige Anwendungsbereiche aulSerhalb des Ackerbaus und der Luxusgiiterherstellung, wie z.B. Militih-, Transport- und Bauwesen sowie die Schiffahrt. Die dominierende Stellung des Staates in der Ur 111-Okonomie fuhrte zu einer Konzentration eines bedeutenden Teils der handwerklichen Produktion im Bereich der Palast- und Tempelwirtschaft. Dabei ist allerdings zu beachten, dal3 das Handwerk im Dienst der verschiedenen Verwaltungs- und Wirtschaftseinheiten in den einzelnen Stadten und Provinzen des neusumerischen Reiches nicht nach einem einheitlichen Prinzip organisiert war. Dies griindet sich vor allem auf die unterschiedliche okonomische Stellung dieser Stadte im Wirtschaftsgefiige des Reiches, was unter anderem auch in engem Zusammenhang mit ihrer jeweiligen politischen und kultischen Bedeutung sowie den verschiedentlich wirkenden Traditionen zu sehen ist. Ein Teil der Produktion erfolgte in staatlichen Werkstatten, die organisatorisch und verwaltungsmal3ig in die Wirtschaftseinheiten der Palast- und Tempelijkonomie eingebunden waren. So lafit sich in Ur, der Hauptstadt des neusumerischen Reiches, ein zentrales 'Handwerkerhaus' nachweisen, das in erster Linie fur die Luxusgiiterherstellung fur den Konigshof und die Hauptheiligtiimer zustbdig war. Man geht gewil3 nicht fehl in der Annahme, wenn man die Organisation des Handwerks im Rahrnen eines derartigen 'Handwerkerhauses' mit der Rolle von Ur als Konigsresidenz in Verbindung bringt.1 In der Provinz LagaS war ein Teil der handwerklichen Produktion in die Administration einzelner Tempelwirtschaften einbezogen, und es lassen sich dariiber hinaus Handwerker auch in Webereien, Muhlen und Werften nachweisen. Die Kontrolle uber die Produktion sowie die Koordination der einzelnen Teilbereiche des Handwerks erfolgte dabei durch die zentrale Provinzverwaltung.Wahrscheinlich fiihrte die staatliche Administration damit traditionelle Organisationsprinzipiender 0konomie des Stadtstaates von LagaS weiter und machte sich diese z ~ n u t z eIn . ~Umrna wurden die wirtschaftlichen Aktivitaten der Provinz zentral organisiert, ohne sich allzusehr auf einzelne Tempelwirtschaften zu stutzen.
Vgl. Loding, Craft Archive; Neumann, Handwerk, 35-71. Vgl. Neumann, Handwerk, 92-97.
120
H. NEUMANN
Entscheidende Funktionen scheinen dabei von wenigen Familien ausgeubt worden zu sein.3 Die soziale Stellung der im Rahmen der staatlichen Wirtschaft tatigen Handwerker war differenziert. Ein Teil der Arbeitskrafte gehorte zum unmittelbaren Personal der Palast- und Tempelwirtschaft, was durch die Tatsache gekennzeichnet wird, dal3 sie Empfinger von Rationen und Gersteversorgungen waren. Dariiber hinaus erganzte die staatliche Verwaltung ihr eigenes Arbeitskraftepotential durch die zusatzliche M i e t e von qualifizierten Handwerkern, die fiir ihre Dienste einen Lohn ausgezahlt bekamen.
1. Die Schmiede von Girsu und ihre Partner in der Provinzialverwaltung
Fur die Palast- und Tempelwirtschaft .waren aber offensichtlich auch Handwerker tatig, die Auftragsarbeiten ausfiihrten, ohne in das Personal der staatlichen Wirtschaft eingegliedert zu sein. In besonderer Weise wird die Praxis der Auftragsvergabe seitens der staatlichen Administration an freie Handwerker m.E. durch jene Texte beleuchtet, die sich auf die T a t i g k e i t einiger Schmiede (simug) in Girsu beziehen. Bei den entsprechenden Handwerkern handelt es sich vor allem um Ur-Ningizzida (Ur-dNin-gizzi-da) und Nabasa (Na-ba-sa6), die sich keiner bestimmten Wirtschaftseinheit zuweisen l a ~ s e n Zwar . ~ wird Ur-Ningizzida in dem T e x t CT VII 46 (BM 17772) Rs. 8f. im Zusammenhang m i t einem Kupferkauf erwiihnt, wofiir der s ~ ~ ~ - ~ N ~ ~ -verantMAR.KI wortlich zeichnete (Rs. 13f.), jedoch durfte dieser Vorgang eher auf den Import des Kupfers uber den Hafenort Guabba zuriickzufiihren sein, was die Erwahnung des sagad ~ i n - M A R . K Ivielleicht bedingt hat.5 Die Abrechnung sagt daher nicht unbedingt e t w a s uber den ortlichen Tatigkeitsbereich des simug Ur-Ningizzida aus, zumal als Exportgut und Grundlage fur den Kupferkauf Wolle von Lu-Ningirsu - sicher identisch m i t dem gleichnamigen Sabra-C - ausgegeben wurde (Vs. 1-9), so dal3 es sich bei CT VII 46 (BM 17772) um eine Abrechnung der Zentralverwaltung fiir den s ~ ~ ~ - ~ N ~ ~ - gehandelt MAR.KI haben durfte und mit dem Vermerk bgu-Ur-d~in-giz-zi-da-simug ba-a-gar "auf die Sollrechnung des U., des Schmieds, wurde es gesetzt" nur der (abrechnungspflichtige) Verbleib des gekauften Kupfers buchhalterisch erfal3t wurde.6 Es scheint daher eher, d& die durch Ur-Ningizzida und (spater) durch Nabasa reprasentierten Schmiede7direkt mit der zentralen Provinzverwaltung zu tun hatten, worauf auch die Vermerke bezuglich der Vgl. Neumann, Handwerk, 113-143. Zu den diesbeziiglich relevanten Texten vgl. bereits Fish, MCS 1; Limet, Me'tal, 181-184; Jones, JCS 15, 115f.; Neumann, Handwerk, 98-106; Lafont,forgerons. 5 Zum Text CT VII 46 (BM 17772) vgl. Limet, Me'tal, 80f.; GrCgoire, province, 55 und 125ff.; MGuabba A R . Kvgl. I ebd. 52ff. Snell, Ledgers and Prices, 109 mit Anm. 96. Zur Rolle des s ~ ~ ~ - ~ N ~ ~ - in Dalj Schmiede von Girsu offensichtlich auch als Bergleute tatig waren und somit zum Teil auch direkt in die Kupferbeschaffung (aus Kimag) involviert waren, zeigt der Girsu-Text TCTI I1 3859, in dem von 100 Arbeitskraften die Rede ist, die als simug-b-sag-ba-al-me "Schmiede, die im Gebirge graben, sind sie", bezeichnet werden (Z. 3); vgl. im einzelnen dazu Lafont, Fs Limet. Zur Bedeutung von bgu(A.KA) als Buchhaltungsterminus im Sinne von "eine ausstehende Rechnung" vgl. Englund, Fischerei, 72 Anm. 242. Zum Schmiedehandwerk in der Provinz LagaS, das sich nicht mit der Tatigkeit von Ur-Ningizzida und Nabasa in Verbindung bringen laOt, vgl. Neumann, Handwerk, 97f.; zu den entsprechenden prosopographischen Gegegebenheiten vgl. ebd. 103 Anm. 557; 202 (Nachtrage).
DIE AUFTRAGSTATIGKEIT DER SCHMIEDE VON GIRSU
121
Auftraggeber und Abnehmer in den Empfangsquittungen f u r Materialien einerseits und fertiggestellte Gerate andererseits hinweisen (s. dazu unter 4.). , ~als simug in den Urkunden von 3 Ur-Ningizzida, Sohn eines gewissen A ~ i d aist 42?9-& 4 nachweisbar.10 Nabasa scheint sein Nachfolger gewesen zu sein, da er in den Texten fiir die Jahre SS 4-1s 1 mit einiger Sicherheit in derselben Funktion wie UrNingizzida bezeugt ist.11 Moglicherweise lag der Beginn seiner Tatigkeit fiir die staatliche Verwaltung aber bereits im Jahre SS 3,12 wobei die friiheste Erwiihnung des Nabasa aus dem Jahre AS 1 datiert, und zwar in der Gerichtsurkunde I T ' 11923 (= NG 11 207), 9 (s. dazu unter 5.). Nach seinem Siegel war Nabasa Sohn eines gewissen Ur-Ningizzida,l3 und man darf wohl mit Recht annehmen, daB letzterer der gleichnamige Schrnied gewesen ist. Nabasa ubernahm also spatestens gegen Ende der Lebenszeit seines Vaters dessen
8
Vgl. sein Siegel: ~r-*Nin-giz-zi-da(simug) 1 dumu-A-zi-da (Berens 38; 46; Limet, Me'tal, 279 Nr. 1 [vgl. Lafont, DAS, 110 zu Nr. 27dl; ebd. 280 Nr. 3 [vgl. Lafont, DAS, 110 zu Nr. 30~1;ebd. 281 Nr. 5? [vgl. Lafont, DAS, 110 zu 28d]; ebd. 287 Nr. 16? [vgl. Lafont, DAS, 111 Anm. 18 zu Nr. 374~1;MVN XI 10; ITT V 6870). Vgl. dazu unten Anm. 18. l o Vgl. CTBM 11 21749 (5 42lAS 6NIII); ITT V 6763, 4 (9 42lAS 6); CT VII 5-6 (BM 12934) IV 13f. (3 44); 46 (BM 17772) Rs. 8f. (S 48); CTBM I1 17936 (AS 11111); 18571 (AS I N ) ; Lafont, forgerons, 128 (BM 14930), 3 (AS IN); SAT 1360, 3 (AS IN); Lafont, forgerons, 128 (BM 14772), 5 (AS 11X); ITT I1 923 (= NG I1 207), 10 (AS 1); SNSAT 238, 4 (AS 3lVI); TUT 284 (= SVS U1, 312), 5f. (AS 3lXIa); CTBM I 14933 (AS 3); TUT 280 (= SVS Ill, 311), 5f. (AS 4IIV); SAT I 357, 5 (AS 4NI); Berens 38, 3 und Siegel (AS 4); Lafont, forgerons, 128 (BM 14766), 3 (AS 5lXII); Limet, Me'tal, 279 Nr. 1 (= DAS 27), 5 und Siegel (AS 7 N I [so nach Kollation Lafont, DAS, 311); TLB I11 157, 5 (AS 7 N I [so nach der Hulle TLB I11 1581); Limet, Mttal, 282 Nr. 6, 5 (AS 7NII); Lafont, forgerons, 129 (BM 16418), 5 (AS 7lXI); HSS IV 134, 3 (AS 7); Orient 16,98 Nr. 148,4 (AS 7); ITT 11 3569, 4 (AS 8NI1); TCTI I 951, 4 (AS 8); Limet, Me'tal, 287 Nr. 16 (= DAS 374), 4 (AS 9NII); TLB 111 61, 4 (AS 9NIII); AAS 194, 3 (AS 9); ITT V 6870, 5 und Siegel (AS 9); Limet, Me'tal, 281 Nr. 5 (= DAS 28), 6 und Siegel? (AS 9); ebd. 282 Nr. 7 (= DAS 373), 4 (AS 9); SAT I 356,6 (AS 9); TCTI I1 2563, 4 (AS 9); Lafont, forgerons, 127 (BM 14661), 8 (SS MI); CTBM I1 19174 (SS 11IV); ITT V 6890, 4 (SS 11x1); CTBM I1 21110a (SS 1); DAS 306, 4 (SS 1); ITT 111 5212, 9 (SS 1); 6380, 11 (SS 1); Limet, Me'tal, 280 Nr. 3 (= DAS 30), 5 und Siegel (SS 1); ebd. 283 Nr. 8 (= DAS 43), 4 (SS 1); ebd. Nr. 9 (= DAS 15), 3 (SS 1); TCTI 1982, 5 (SS 1); I1 2571, 5 (SS 1); 2684, 4 (SS 1); TEL 20, 6f. (SS 1); CTBM I1 18268 (SS 2); 22133 (SS 2); DAS 309,4 (SS 2); Limet, Me'tal, 279 Nr. 2 (= DAS 42), 4 (SS 2); ebd. 284 Nr. 10 (= DAS 387), '4' (SS 2); SAT I 361, 5 (SS 2); TLB 111 156, 6 (SS 2); MVN XI 135 (= MCS 1, 46), 4 (3s 3N); 10 (= MCS 1, 46), 6 und Siegel (SS 3NI); Berens 46, 5 und Siegel (SS 3); HSS IV 135, 3 (SS 3); 136, 4 (SS 3); Lafont, forgerons, 127f. (BM 14741), 4 (SS 3); Limet, M t t a l , 284 Nr. 11, 4 (SS 3); MVN XI Text V, 4 (5s 3); CTBM I1 18258 (SS 4NI); Limet, Me'tal, 280 Nr. 4 (= DAS 14), 5 (SS 4); MVN IX 157, 5' ([xll I[V]); SNSAT 236, 3 ([x]/XI); TUT 97 (= SVS Ill, 102-104) I11 9f. (Dne.). Vgl. T ~ 21, L 21 (vgl. Neumann, Handwerk, 101 Anm. 542) (SS 4); DAS 326, 3 (SS 5); ITT 111 6244,7 (3s 6); Limet, Me'tal, 285f. Nr. 13, '8' (SS 7fiV); ITT 111 5019, 4 (SS 7lXII); Berens 55, 48$( 7); CTBM I1 19381 (SS 7); ITT I11 5209, 4 (SS 7); 6366, 7 (5s 7); Limet, Me'tal, 285 Nr. 12 (= DAS 307), 4 (SS 7); OrAnt. 18, 238 Nr. 20 (= MVN X 244), 4 (SS 7); TCTI 1788, 3 (SS 7); TLB 111 159,5 (Ss 7); ITT v 6791,4 (SS 8nx); CTBM m 19502a (SS 8); DAS 335, [41 (SS 8); ITT II 691,3 (SS 8); T ~ 22, L 4 (SS 8); TCTI I1 2729, 5 (SS 8); DAS 16, 4 (SS 9); 17, 4 (5.5 9); RTC 309 (= DAS 308), 4 (SS 9); SAT I 359, 6 und 8 (SS 9); TCTI 1646, 3 (SS 9); TEL 23, 5 (SS 9); 24, 5 (SS 9); MVN VII 277 (= ITT IV 7878) Vs. 3 (vgl. Neumann, Handwerk, 101 Anm. 542) (IS 1); NFT 185 (A0 4210), 17 (OD.);RA 79, 35 Nr. 28 (= Bab. 7, 68 Nr. 2), 6 (Dne.); TCTI I 896 IV 2 (Dne.). Falls CTBM I1 21631 (SS 3) hierhergehorig. l 3 CTBMII 19381 (SS 7).
H. NEUMANN
122
Aufgaben im Bereich des staatlich initiierten und kontrollierten Schmiedehandwerks.14 Irgendwann nach dem Jahr IS 1 scheint sich ein weiterer Wechsel bei den fur die Palastund Tempelwirtschaft von Girsu tatigen Schmieden vollzogen zu haben, da seit IS 4 ein gewisser Ur-Ningirsu (Ur-d~in-gir-su)- offensichtlich in der Nachfolge von Nabasa als der zustandige simug in den Texten erscheint.15 Als Vorganger des Ur-Ningizzida darf der Schmied NigirSakug (Nigir-521-k6S) gelten, dessen entsprechende Tatigkeit fur die Jahre S 32-5 44 bezeugt ist.16 Aus all dem ergibt sich folgende Chronologie der Tatigkeit der genannten Schmiede fur die Palast- und Tempelwirtschaft in Girsu: NigirSakuS Ur-Ningizzida Nabasa Ur-Ningirsu
3 32-3 44l7 S 42?18-SS 4 SS 4-1s l? IS 47-1s 5?19
Wahrend als Rohstofflieferanten fiir die Schrniede mehrere Personen in den Texten erscheinen, werden als Lieferanten von reparaturbedurftigen Geraten bzw. als Empfanger der fertiggestellten Geratschaften in der Regel nur drei Personen in den Texten genannt: Lugal-TiraS, Lugalimrua und UrSugalamma (s. dam unter 2. und 3.). Damit wird deutlich, darj letzgenannter Personenkreis speziell fur die Aus- bzw. Einlieferung von Metallgegenstbden verantwortlich war und in dieser Funktion gegenuber den Schmieden die zustandige staatliche Verwaltung reprasentierte. Als Partner des Ur-Ningizzida ---
l 4 DaB der handwerkliche Beruf des Vaters auch durch dessen mannliche Nachkommen ausgeiibt wurde, ist mehrfach belegt und diirfte uberdies die Regel gewesen sein. Vgl. Neumann, Handwerk, 108 mit Anm. 592; 125 (und 205) mit Anm. 699; 129 mit Anm. 729; 153. l 5 Vgl. SNSAT 246 (= Lafont, forgerons, 127 [BM 14493]), 4 (IS 4NII); 247, 3 (IS 4); 250 (= Lafont, forgerons, 128 [BM 14916]), 5 (IS 5N); Lafont, forgerons, 127 (BM 13779), 3 (IS 5); Limet, Me'tal, 286 Nr. 14, 7 (IS 5). Derselbe Ur-Ningirsu vielleicht auch in SNSAT 85, 4 (AS 3 N ) (U. ist hier Empfanger von Silber als Kaufpreis fir Kupfer)? Zwar wird in keinem dieser Texte Ur-Ningirsu als simug "Schmied" bezeichnet, jedoch legt die Identitat der in den Urkunden deutlich werdenden Funktionen des Ur-Ningizzida bzw. Nabasa einerseits und des Ur-Ningirsu andererseits den entsprechenden handwerklichen Beruf des Ur-Ningirsu nahe. Vgl. Lafont, forgerons, 128 (BM 14784), 4 (S 32lIII); RA 62, 10 Nr. 15,7 (5 36); CTBM I1 19080 (S 41); 19097 (3 44); 22374 (Dne.). l 7 Zu beachten ist, daB in der Gerichtsurkunde ITT I1 923 (= NG 11 207), 2-14 aus dem Jahre AS 1 NigirSakuS, Ur-Ningizzida und Nabasa zusammen erwiihnt werden. Vgl. dam unten unter 5. Da NigirSakuS seine Titigkeit fiir die Verwaltung vielleicht S 44 beendete, konnte man vermuten, dal3 das Datum der Texte CTBM I1 21749 und ITT V 6763 (s. oben Anm. 10) eher fiir AS 6 als fur S 42 steht, so dal3 sich dam der Ubergang von NigirSakuS zu Ur-Ningizzida im Jahre S 44 vollzogen hatte. In SAT I 355, 8 (S 48) wird ein gewisser Ur-Dumuzi in einer Funktion erwahnt, die mit der von UrNingizzida identisch gewesen zu sein scheint (Ubernahme von zu reparierenden Geraten; Partner in der Verwaltung ist Lugal-TiraS; s. dazu sogleich). Haben wir es hier mit einem weiteren Schmied zu tun, der parallel zu Ur-Ningizzida fur die Administration tatig war, zumindest gegen Ende der Regierungszeit des Sulgi? Vielleicht auch schon AS 3 belegt; s. oben Anm. 15. WZhrend der Ubergang von Ur-Ningizzida zu Nabasa eindeutig erscheint, bleiben das zeitliche Ende der Tatigkeit des Nabasa sowie der Ubergang von letzterem zu Ur-Ningirsu unklar, wobei auch unsicher ist, wie lange Ur-Ningirsu seine Tatigkeit als simug ausubte.
DIE AUFTRAGSTATIGKEIT DER SCHMIEDE VON GIRSU
123
fungierte zunachst Lugal-Tirag (Lugal-Ti-ra-%),20 bevor dieser dann offensichtlich in den Jahren AS 3 bzw. 4 durch Lugalimrua (Lugal-im-ru-a) abgelost wurde.21 Lugalimrua war Schreiber (dub-sar) und Sohn des 'Inspektors' (nu-bhnda) Ur-Baba.22 Was die Dokumentation seiner Transaktionen rnit dem Schmied Ur-Ningizzida betrifft,23 so l 8 t sich diese bis in das Jahr SS 4 ~erfolgen,~4 wobei Lugalimrua in seiner Funktion durch andere Angehorige der Administration vertreten werden konnte.25 Mit dem Wechsel der Schmiede in der Mitte der Regierungszeit des Konigs Su-sin war zugleich auch ein Wechsel des zustandigen Verwaltungspersonals verbunden. So trat im Jahre SS 4 an die Stelle des Lugalimrua der Schreiber Urgugalamma (Ur-Su-ga-lam-ma),26 der 20
Zu Lugal-TiraS vgl. SAT I 355, 6 (5 48; Partner auf der Handwerkerseite ist hier allerdings ein gewisser Ur-Dumu-zi; vgl. oben Anm. 18); CTBM I1 17936 (AS 11111; statt Lu-TiraS, wie ebd. S. 91 angegeben, lies gewifi Lugal-TiraS); 18571 (AS I N ) ; Lafont, forgerons, 128 (BM 14930), 5 (AS I N ; vgl. auch ebd. S. 129); SAT I 360, 5 (AS I N ) ; CTBM I1 19958 (AS 4; vgl. die folgende Anm.). Mit ziemlicher Wahrscheinlichkeit diirfen wir in besagtem Lugal-TiraS den gleichnamigen Schreiber und Sohn des Namu sehen; zu seinem Siegel vgl. Fischer, BagM 28, 167 Nr. 41. 21 Vgl. die Erwiihnung des Lugalimrua als Empfanger fertiggestellter Sicheln in TUT 284 (= SVS Ill, 312), 7 (AS 3lXIa) sowie den Text CTBM 11 19958 (AS 4), dessen Inhalt ebd. S. 155 folgendermal3en wiedergegeben wird: "Surplus of metal implements (ba-zi) passing from Lugal-tirag to Lugal-imrua". 22 Vgl. das Siegel des Lugalimrua: Lugal-im-ru-a I dub-sar I dumu-ur-d~a-ba&u-bknda (MVN VI 272 [= ITT IV 7279; S 441; CTBM I1 19958a [AS 41; TCTI I 951 Siegel 2 [AS 81; Limet, Me'tal, 282 Nr. 7 [= DAS 373, Siegel b) ebd. S. 1111 [AS 91; ebd. 283 Nr. 9 [= DAS 15, Siegel a) ebd. S. 1091 [SS 11; CTBM I1 2lllOa [SS I]; 21024 [SS 51). Vgl. auch Neumann, Handwerk, 102 Anm. 549; Lafont, forgerons, 122. 23 Vgl. in diesem Zusammenhang auch die pisag-dub-ba-Etikette HSS IV 134 (AS 7; vgl. auch Fish, MCS 1,46), die sich auf Abrechnungen (dub-gid-da) von Ur-Ningizzida und Lugalimrua bezieht. 24 Vgl. in diesem Zusammenhang TUT 284 (= SVS Ill, 312), 7 (AS 3lXIa); TUT 280 (= SVS Ill, 311), 7 (AS 4lIV); SAT 1357, 4 (AS 4NI); CTBM I1 19958a (AS 4); Limet, Me'tal, 279 Nr. 1 (= DAS 27), 4 (AS 7 N l [so nach Kollation Lafont, DAS, 311); TLB I11 157, 4 (AS 7 N I [so nach der Hiille TLB I11 1581); Limet, Me'tal, 282 Nr. 6, 6 (AS 7NII); Lafont, forgerons, 129 (BM 16418), 4 (AS 71x1); CTBM I1 22897 (AS 71x11; Partner auf Handwerkerseite nicht angegeben); HSS IV 134,4 (AS 7; s. oben Anm. 23); Orient 16, 98 Nr. 148, 5 (AS 7); TCTI I 951, 5 und Siegel (AS 8); TLB 111 61, '5' (AS 9NIII); AAS 194, '4' (AS 9; vgl. die Bemerkungen zum Text bei Neumann, Handwerk, 103 Anm. 555); Limet, Me'tal, 281 Nr. 5 (= DAS 28), 6 (AS 9); ebd. 282 Nr. 7 (= DAS 373), 5 und Siegel (AS 9); SAT I 356, 5 (AS 9); TCTI I1 2563, 5 (AS 9); Lafont, forgerons, 127 (BM 14661), 7 (SS 1111); CTBM 11 19174 (SS 1AV); 21110a (SS 1); DAS 306, 5 (SS 1); ITT 111 5212, 8 (SS 1); 6380, 10 (SS 1); Limet, Me'tal, 280 Nr. 3 (= DAS 30), 4 (SS 1); ebd. 283 Nr. 8 (= DAS 43), 5 (SS 1); ebd. Nr. 9 (= DAS 15), 5 und Siegel (SS 1); TCTI I 982, 4 (SS 1); I1 2571, 4 (SS 1); 2684, 5 ($3 1); T ~ 20, L 5 (SS 1); CTBM 11 18268 (SS 2; statt Lugalimma, wie ebd. S. 102 angegeben, lies gewiB Lugalimrua); 22133 (SS 2); DAS 309, 4 (SS 2); Limet, Me'tal, 279 Nr. 2 (= BAS 42), 3 (SS 2); ebd. 284 Nr. 10 (= DAS 387), 5 (SS 2; vgl. die Kollation Lafont, DAS, 103); SAT I 3 6 1 , 4 (SS 2); TLB I11 156, 5 (SS 2); MVN XI 135 (= MCS 1,46), 3 (SS 3N); 10 (= MCS 1,46), 4 (SS 3NI); Berens 46,4 (SS 3); HSS IV 135, 4 (SS 3); 136, 5 (SS 3); Lafont, forgerons, 127f. (BM 14741), 5 (SS 3); Limet, Me'tal, 284 Nr. 11, 5 (SS 3); MVN XI Text V, 5! (SS 3; s. die folgende Anrn.); Lirnet, Me'tal, 280 Nr. 4 (= DAS 14), 4 (SS 4); vgl. auch unten Anm. 26 und 55. 25 Vgl. MVN XI Text V, 5!f.: [mu-Lugal-im-r]u-a-Si:1 ~ r - ~ [ S u l - ~ a Su ] - iba-ti. : In Lafont, forgerons, 128 (BM 14766), 4 (AS 51x11) und Limet, Me'tal, 287 Nr. 16 (= DAS 374), 3 (AS 9NII) erscheint ein gewisser Ur-Baba anstelle von Lugalimrua. Dabei kann es sich sowohl um den Vater (s. oben Anm. 22 und Lafont, forgerons, 129) als auch urn einen Sohn des Lugalimrua (vgl. Neumann, Handwerk, 101 Anm. 547; 102 Anm. 549) gehandelt haben. Der Partner von Ur-Ningizzida in SNSAT 238 (AS 3NI) ist unklar.
124
H. NEUMANN
nach seinem Siegel Sohn eines gewissen Ur-Ningizzida ~ a r . Partner ~7 des UrSugalamma waren die Schmiede Nabasa28 und (nachfolgend) Ur-Ningirsu,29 d.h., im Gegensatz zum Wechsel von Ur-Ningizzida zu Nabasa scheint bei Ur-Ningirsu kein gleichzeitiger Wechsel des fur die Arbeit der Schmiede zustandigen Verwaltungspersonals erfolgt zu sein. Auch fiir UrSugalamma ist die Vertretung durch andere Verwaltungsfunktioniire bezeugt.30
2. Die Verteilung der Rohstoffe und Materialien an die Schmiede Die Handwerker erhielten die zu verarbeitenden Rohstoffe und Materialien von der staatlichen Verwaltung, wobei die Schmiede als direkte Empfanger in den Texten erscheinen. Zu unterscheiden ist dabei zwischen dem Empfang von Rohstoffen, wie Kupfer, Zinn und shlsu-GAN3 ,32 sowie dem Empfang von beschadigten bzw. abgenutzten Gegensttinden (ba-zi-ir), die von den Schmieden in einen gebrauchsfahigen Zustand zu bringen waren.33 Vor allem letzteres ist haufiger bezeugt, was verstandlich wird, wenn man bedenkt, da13 Kupfer und andere Metalle ja erst aus Gebieten au13erhalb Mesopotamiens importiert werden mul3ten, so da13 man der Reparatur schon vorhandener Metallgerate besondere Aufmerksamkeit entgegenbrachte. 26 Dabei ist allerdings zu beachten, daR nach: Lafont, forgerons, 128f. (BM 16159) UrSugalamma noch im Jahre SS 7 Geratschaften (35 urudual)von Lugalimrua ubernommen hatte, was als interner Verwaltungsvorgang (vgl. auch Lafont, forgerons, 129) vielleicht im Zusammenhang mit der Funktionsubernahme des UrSugalamma gesehen werden kann. 27 Vgl. DAS 17 Siegel a (ebd. S. 109) und Limet, Me'tal, 279 Nr. 2 (= DAS 42), Siegel b: Ur-iu-galam-ma / dub-sar / dumu-Ur-d~in-giz-zi-da1 ugula-[ 1. Die Annahme von Lafont,forgerons, 125 Anm. (5), der Vater des Schreibers UrSugalamma konnte mit dem gleichnamigen Schmied (und Sohn des Azida) identisch sein, ist trotz der ebd. vorgebrachten Argumente m.E. nicht sehr wahrscheinlich. 28 Vgl. TEL 21, 22 (SS 4); ITT I11 6244, 6 (SS 6); Limet, Me'tal, 285f. Nr. 13, '9' (SS 7lIV); Berens 55,5 (SS 7); CTBM I1 19381 (5s 7); ITT I11 5209,5 (SS 7); 6366, 6 (SS 7); Limet, Me'tal, 285 Nr. 12 (= DAS 307), 5 (SS 7); OrAnt. 18, 238 Nr. 20 (= MVN X 244), 5 (SS 7); TCTI I 788, 4 (SS 7); CTBM I1 19502a (SS 8); DAS 335, '5' (SS 8); TCTI I1 2729, 4 (SS 8); TBL 22, 5 (SS 8); DAS 16, 5 (5s 9); 17, 5 (SS 9); RTC 309 (= DAS 308), 5 (SS 9); SAT I 358, 5 und 7 [mit Hulle (vgl. Sigrist et al., Catalogue 11, 192 zu BM 21111[a]) SAT I 359, 51 (SS 9); TCTI I 646, 4 (SS 9); TBL 23, 6 (SS 9); 24, 8f. (SS 9; vgl. unten Anm. 30); MVN VII 277 (= ITT IV 7878) Rs. '1' (IS 1); VI 396 (= ITT IV 7417), 4 (Dne.; Partner auf Handwerkerseite nicht erhalten). Vgl. im vorliegenden Zusammenhang auch die pisag-dub-ba-Etiketten DAS 326 (SS 5) und TLB I11 159 (SS 7), die sich beide auf Abrechnungen (dub-gid-da) von UrSugalamma und Nabasa beziehen. Nach CTBM I1 18258 (SS 4 N I ) hatte Urs'ugalamma allerdings zunachst wohl noch mit Ur-Ningizzida zu tun. Vgl. auch unten Anrn. 55. 29 Vgl. SNSAT 246 (= Lafont, forgerons, 127 [BM 14493]), 5 (IS 4NII); 250 (= Lafont,forgerons, 128 [BM 14916]), 6 (IS 5N); Lafont, forgerons, 127 (BM 13779), 4 (IS 5); Limet, Me'tal, 286 Nr. 14, 8 (IS 5). 30 Vgl. TBL 24, 8-10: mu-Ur-Su-[ga-lam]-/ma-[@ I kISib-~b-&r-su~~; ebenso SAT I 358, 7f.; vgl. auch Neumann, Handwerk, 103 Anm. 558. Zum nach wie vor schwierigen Problem der Identifizierung von siilsu-GAN vgl. die bei Neumann, Handwerk, 72f. Anm. 351 notierte Literatur sowie Englund, Fischerei, 28f. Anm. 99 (auch zur Lesung [SVSU-hk]). 32 Zu den Belegen vgl. Neumann, Handwerk, 100 Anrn. 537. Um Metallabrechnungen im Rahmen der Tatigkeit des simug NigirSakuS scheint es sich bei CTBM I1 19080 und 19097 zu handeln. 33 Vgl. dam sowie zum Textfomular Lafont, forgerons, 120.
DIE AUFTRAGSTATIGKEIT DER SCHMIEDE VON GIRSU
125
Wie bereits angedeutet, erscheinen als Rohstofflieferanten in den Texten mehrere Personen, bei denen es sich in der Regel um Kaufleute gehandelt haben durfte,34 wobei es aber Ausnahmen zu beachten gilt.35Die reparaturbedurftigen Gerate (in den Texten stets mit Gewichtsangabe notiert) wurden dagegen von den Verwaltungsfunktioniiren LugalTiraS, Lugalimrua und UrSugalamma an die Handwerker a u ~ g e g e b e nAls . ~ ~Empfhger der Rohstoffe und Materialien erscheinen in den Texten Ur-Ningizzida und Nabasa.37 In speziellen Fallen wurden den Schmieden noch andere qualifizierte Handwerker zur Seite gestellt, wenn deren Mitwirkung zur Erledigung zusatzlicher Aufgaben sich als notwendig erwies.38
3. Die Lieferung der hergestellten Geratschafen an die staatliche Venvaltung
Bei den von den Handwerkern an die staatliche Verwaltung abgelieferten Geratschaften handelte es sich vornehmlich um landwirtschaftliche Gerate, wie Hacken, ~ x t e Sicheln, , und zwar zum Teil in betrachtlichen GroBenordnungen. Neben der Herstellung bzw. Reparatur dieser und weiterer Metallge~-iite~~ scheint auch das Plattieren von Mobelteilen mit Kupfer bezeugt zu sein, was auf die Tatigkeit der (genannten) Schmiede im Bereich der Luxusguterproduktionhinweisen konnte.40 Die friihesten Ur III-Texte aus Girsu, die die Einlieferung von Metallgeraten durch einen Schmied belegen, stammen aus den Jahren 32 sowie 36 und betreffen die Tatigkeit des simug NigirSak~H.~* Am haufigsten bezeugt ist die Einlieferung von neu 34 Vgl. Neumann, Handwerk, 101 Anm. 543. Zu ahnlichen Verhaltnissen in Umma vgl. Neumann, AoF 20, 84 mit Anm. 105. 35 Vgl. etwa CTBM I1 19381 (ebd. S. 138: "Surplus of copper from UrSugalamma to NabaSa"); vgl. auch oben Anm. 15 zu SNSAT 85. Vgl. auch die Bemerkungen oben Anm. 5 zu TCTI I1 3859. 36 Vgl. Lugal-TiraS: SAT I 355. Lugdimrua: Berens 46; CTBM I1 22133; ITT I11 5212; 6380; Lafont, forgerons, 127 (BM 14661); ebd. 129 (BM 16418); Limet, Me'tal, 279 Nr. 1 (= DAS 27); ebd. Nr. 2 (= DAS 42); ebd. 280 Nr. 3 (= DAS 30); ebd. Nr. 4 (= DAS 14); ebd. 281 Nr. 5 (= DAS 28); ebd. 287 Nr. 16 (= DAS 374; Ur-Baba agiert in Vertretung des Lugdimrua; s. oben Anm. 25); MVN XI 10 (= MCS 1, 46); 135 (= MCS 1, 46); SAT I 356; 357; 361 (statt ba-15, wie in der Umschrift ebd. S. 135 angegeben, lies in Z. 3 gewilj ba--id); TCTI I 982; I1 2571; TEL 20; TLB I11 156; 157. UrSugalamma: I T ' I11 6244; 6366; MVN VI 396 (= ITT IV 7417); SAT I 358; TCTI I1 2729. 37 In SAT I 358, 6 wird ein gewisser Lu-Girsu als Empfhger der Geratschaften notiert. Nach dem handelte er dabei Vermerk auf der Tafelhulle SAT I 359, 8f. (mu-Na-ba-sag / kiSib-L~-&r-su<~~>) eindeutig in Vertretung des Nabasa. Vgl. etwa ITT V 6870, wonach dem Schmied Ur-Ningizzida ein tibira "'Bildhauer"' fur zwei Tage ~ u~duha-bh-da ~ mu~ zur Seite stand, wohl zum 'Beschriften' der Gerate (Z. If.: 1 tibira u4-2-82 / u sar); vgl. auch Neumann, Handwerk, 101 Anm. 547; Waetzoldt, NABU 19951117. 39 Vgl. dazu im einzelnen Lafont, forgerons, 121f. sowie Neumann, Handwerk, 102 Anm. 551. Bezuglich der landwirtschaftlichen Gerate ( ~ ~ ~ ~ b a - bund h - duNdug~rlo); a vgl. jetzt auch Civil, Farmer's Instructions, 71 und 90. 40 Vgl. Neumann, Handwerk, 102 Anm. 552 zu Limet, Me'tal, 287 Nr. 15, wobei einschrankend bemerkt werden mulj, daB sich der Text prosopographisch nicht in den vorliegenden Zusarnmenhang einordnen l a t . 41 Vgl. Lafont, forgerons, 128 (BM 14784) (S 32lIII); RA 62, 10 Nr. 15 (3 36). Die Einlieferung wird begrifflich durch mu-DU "Eingebrachtes, Eingang" wiedergegeben, ohne dalj ein Empfanger genannt wird. mu-DU auch in RA 79, 35 Nr. 28 (= Bab. 7, 68 Nr. 2), 7 (Lieferung des Nabasa; Empfanger nicht genannt).
~
126
hergestellten bzw. reparierten Geraten dam fir Ur-Ningizzida und Nabasa, in geringerem Malje schliel3lich fur Ur-Ningirsu. Empfanger der Geratschaften waren in der Regel Lugal-TiraS, Lugalimrua und UrH~galarnma,"~ die ja auch das Arbeitsmaterial an die Schmiede ausgeliefert hatten.43
4 . Die Kontrolle der Produktion und die weitere Verteilung der hergestellten Geratschaften Die Kontrolle der Produktion erfolgte in der Regel durch das Abwiegen der an die Schmiede ausgegebenen Rohstoffe und Materialien sowie der fertiggestellten Gerate bei deren Einliefemng. Von besonderer Bedeutung sind in diesem Zusammenhang die Empfangsquittungen fur die hergestellten bzw. reparierten Gerate, in denen fast . ~ ~ hinaus durchgangig der Vermerk ba-18 "es wurde dargewogen" zu finden i ~ tDariiber sind Abrechnungen uber die bei der Herstellung von Bronze verwendeten Materialien sowie uber die dabei eingetretenen gewichtsmaigen Verluste e r h a l t e ~ ~ . ~ ~ Erwiihnt werden mussen hier auch die giri-Vermerke in den Empfangsquittungen sowohl fur die reparaturbedurftigen als auch fur die fertiggestellten Gerate.46 H. Limet hatte diese Notierungen (giri-PN) als Kontrollvermerke aufgefaljt und sie mit der gewichtsmaljigen Kontrolle des Materials in Verbindung gebracht.47 Allerdings ist dabei auffdlig, da13 in den Texten relativ viele Personen im Zusammenhang mit der Ein- bzw. Ausliefemng von Geraten in der Verbindung glri-PN genannt und deren Siegel (bzw. die
42
DIE AUFTRAGSTATIGKEIT DER SCHMIEDE VON GIRSU
H. NEUMANN
Vgl. Lugal-TiraS: CTBM I1 17936 (s. oben Anm. 20); 18571; Lafont,forgerons, 128 (BM 14930); SAT I 360 (statt ba--ir, wie ebd. S. 135 in der Umschrift angegeben, ist gewiR ba-18! zu lesen). Lugalimrua: AAS 194 (vgl. oben Anm. 24); CTBM I1 18268 (s. oben Anm. 24); 19174; 21 110a; 22897; DAS 306; 309; HSS IV 135; 136; Lafont, forgerons, 127f. (BM 14741); Limet, Me'tal, 282 Nr. 6; ebd. Nr. 7 (= DAS 373); ebd. 283 Nr. 8 (= DAS 43); ebd. Nr. 9 (= DAS 15); ebd. 284 Nr. 10 (= DAS 387); ebd. Nr. 11; MVN XI Text V (vgl. oben Anm. 25); Orient 16,98 Nr. 148; TCTI I 951; I1 2563; 2684; TLB I11 61; TUT 280 (= SVS I/1, 311); 284 (= SVS Ill, 312). UrSugalamma: Berens 55; CTBM I1 18258; 19502a; DAS 16; 17; 335 (Z. 5: [Ur-Xu-ga-lam-mla); ITT I11 5209; Lafont, forgerons, 127 (BM 13779); Limet, Me'tal, 285 Nr. 12 (= DAS 307); ebd. 285f. Nr. 13; ebd. 286 Nr. 16 (= DAS 374); MVN VII 277 (= ITT IV 7878); OrAnt. 18,238 Nr. 20 (= MVN X 244); RTC 309 (= DAS 308); SNSAT 246 (= Lafont,forgerons, 127 [14493]); 250 (= Lafont,forgerons, 128 [BM 149161); TCTI I 646; 788; T ~ L 21; 22; 23; 24 (vgl. oben Anm. 30). 43 Andere Empfanger der Geratschaften in Lafont,forgerons, 128 (BM 14766) ( ~ r - ~ ~ avgl. - boben ~ ; Anm. 25); MVN IX 157 (Ur-gb-en-na). Keinen Empfanger (s. auch oben Anm. 41) nennen CTBM I1 21631 (vgl. aber oben mit Anm. 12); 21749; ITT I1 691; V 6791; Lafont, forgerons, 128 (BM 14772) (Z. 6: C [ ba]-an-ku4; vgl. den Kommentar ebd. 129); vgl. auch TUT 97 (= SVS I/1, 102-104) I11 410. In SNSAT 238 ist der Empfanger nicht erhalten; weder Lieferant noch Empfanger in TEL 25. 44 Vgl. auch Lafont, forgerons, 120f., der auf die alternative Verwendung von mu-DU verweist, so daB ba-18 "serait donc associ6e B 1'idCe d'une 'entrCe' des objets". 45 Vgl. die bei Neumann, Handwerk, 104 Anm. 560 zitierten Texte (mit Literatur); Waetzoldtt Bachmann, OrAnt. 23,9f. Vgl. auch Lafont, forgerons, 128 (BM 14722), 3f., wonach im Zusammenhang mit einer Geratelieferung (24 uNduba-zi)"der betreffende Verlust nicht abgezogen wurde" (izi-gu7-bi/ nu-h-zi). 46 Vgl. zum folgenden bereits Neumann, Handwerk, 104-106 sowie Lafont,forgerons, 123-125 (auch zu einigen prosopographischen Zusammenhangen;vgl. dam aber auch oben Anm. 27). 47 Limet, Me'tal, 182.
127
ihrer Vertreter) auf den Tafelhiillen abgerollt sind.48 Mehrfach erscheint in dieser Funktion ein gals-dub-ba "Rechnungsfuhrer", wobei namentlich Nani und Gudea erwahnt werden.49 Dariiber hinaus nennen die Texte den Provinzstatthalter (Cnsi), 'Prafekten' (Sabra[-C]), einen sa12-dug "Katasterleiter" bzw. "Buchfuhrer", einen 'Stadtaltesten' (ab-ba-uru) sowie einen 'Vorsteher des Getreidemagazins7(KA-guru7) in der Verbindung giri-PN.50 Ferner vermerken die Texte verschiedene Schreiber.51 Die 48
Dabei ist auch zu beachten, daR giri-PN mit HSib-PN wechseln kann; vgl. Lafont, forgerons, 127 (BM 14661), 10f. rnit Hiille 4'f.; Limet, Me'tal, 282 Nr. 7 (= DAS 373), 6; MVN XI 135 (= MCS 1, 46), 7f. 49 gals-dub-ba ohne PN: ITT I1 691,4; V 6791,5; RTC 309 (= DAS 308), 7; TCTI I1 2729, 7; TEL 22, 7; 23, 8. Na-ni @al3-dub-ba): CTBM I1 19174; HSS IV 136, 7; ITT 111 5209, 8? (vgl. Neumann, Handwerk, 104 Anm. 563); 6244, 8; 6366, 8; Lafont, forgerons, 127 (BM 14661), 11 (Hiille 4': HSibPN); ebd. 127f. (BM 14741), 7; ebd. 129 (BM 16418), 7; Limet, Me'tal, 279 Nr. 1 (= DAS 27), 9; ebd. Nr. 2 (= DAS 42), 6; ebd. 283 Nr. 8 (= DAS 43), 7; ebd. Nr. 9 (= DAS 15), 6; ebd. 284 Nr. 10 (= DAS 387), 6; ebd. Nr. 11, 8; MVN XI 135 (= MCS 1, 46), 7 ([&Sib-PIN); OrAnt. 18, 238 Nr. 20 (= MVN X 244), 7; Orient 16, 98 Nr. 148, 7 (dub-sar); SAT I 361, 7; TCTI I 646, 6; I1 2684, 7; TLB 111 61, 7. Gh-dB-a (dumu-La-ni; $al3-dub-ba):TLB 111 157, 7 mit Siegel 3 (vgl. Neumann, Handwerk, 104 Anm. 563). 50 Vgl. Cnsi: Limet, Me'tal, 286 Nr. 14, 10; SNSAT 246 (= Lafont, forgerons, 127 [BM 14493]), 7; vgl. auch ITT I11 5209, 1 (uNdugurlo-~nsi). ~ & ~ ~ i n - g i r(dumu-11-11-@lo; -su Sabra-6): AAS 194, '5' mit Siegel 2 (dub-sar); Limet, Me'tal, 279 Nr. 1 (= DAS 27), 7 (Sabra-6) mit Siegel a (dub-sar); MVN XI Text V, 8!; Orient 16, 98 Nr. 148, 8; TLB 111 157, 8 (Sabra-6) mit Siegel 1 (dub-sar). Nam-mah (Sabra): SAT 1357, 7. Ur-dLama (dumu-Irll-gulO; Sabra-6): CTBM I1 21110a, Siegel 2 (dub-sar); DAS 17, 7 (Sabra-6) mit Siegel c (dub-sar); 309, 6; ITT 111 5212, 11; Lafont, forgerons, 127 (BM 14661), 12 rnit Siegel 2; Limet, Me'tal, 279 Nr. 2 (= DAS 42), Siegel c; TCTI I1 2571, 7 mit Siegel 2; 2684, 8 (vgl. Urd ~ a m aohne Filiation und Funktionsbezeichnung, dessen Identitat nicht zu ermitteln ist: Lafont, forgerons, 127f. [BM 147411, 9; HSS IV 135, 6; SAT I 356, 10; TCTI 1982, 8; TBL 20, 12; vgl. auch unten Anm. 52 zu ~ r - ~ ~ adumu-Ur-GAR). rna ~r-gisgigir (salz-dus): SAT I 355, 10. Gh-dB-a (ab-ba-uru): TCTI I 788, 5. L6-gi-na (KA-guru7): MVN XI 135 (= MCS 1,46), 8 (HSib-PN). 51 Vgl. A-zi-da (dumu-SeS-SeS; dub-sar): Limet, Me'tal, 279 Nr. 1 (= DAS 27), Siegel c; ebd. Nr. 2 (= DAS 42), Siegel a; ebd. 280 Nr. 4 (= DAS 14), Siegel a; ebd. 283 Nr. 8 (= DAS 43), Siegel a; ebd. Nr. 9 (= DAS 15), Siegel b; ebd. 284 Nr. 10 (= DAS 387), Siegel a. Ba-zi (dumu-SeS-SeS; dub-sar): AAS 194, Siegel 1; Berens 46, 9 rnit Siegel d; CTBM I1 2lllOa, Siegel 1; DAS 306, 7; HSS IV 135, 7; ITT I11 5212, 13; 6380, 14; Limet, Me'tal, 281 Nr. 5 (= DAS 28), 9 mit Siegel b; ebd. 282 Nr. 6, 8; ebd. Nr. 7 (= DAS 373), 7 (Z. 6f.: HSib-PN 1 h Ba-zi dub-sar) rnit Siegel c; MVN XI 10 (= MCS 1, 46), 9 mit Siegel 4; Text V, 9!; SAT I 355, 13; 356, 8; 360, 8; SNSAT 238 (Hiille), 7; TCTI I 951 Rs. 3' rnit Siegel 3; 982,7; 11 2571, 9 mit Siegel 1; T ~ 20, L 10f.; TLB I11 156, 8. Gh-dB-a ( d u m u - ~ t i - ~ ~ a - babaa, ba-uru; dub-sar): Berens 46, 6 rnit Siegel b. L6-ba-glr (dumu-Ba-zi; dub-sar): DAS 16, 8 mit Siegel b; 17, 6 mit Siegel b. L6-ba-glr ( d u m u - ~ r - ~ h l - ~ adub-sar): -b; Limet, Me'tal, 280 Nr. 3 (= DAS 30), 7 rnit Siegel b; ebd. 287 Nr. 16 (= DAS 374), 6 mit Siegel b; TCTI I1 2563, 8 rnit Siegel 1. L6-ba-glr (ohne Filiation): Berens 55, 8; DAS 335, 8; Limet, Me'tal, 285 Nr. 12 (= DAS 307), 7; ebd. 285f. Nr. 13, 12; MVN VII 277 (= ITT IV 7878) Rs. '3'; TCTI 1788, 6. Lh-dDumu-zi (dumu-U~--~~a-bag; dubsar): CTBM I1 19502a, Siegel 2; DAS 309, 7. Lugal-giskim-zi (dumu-~6-d&S-bar-b;dub-sar): Limet, Me'tal, 280 Nr. 3 (= DAS 30), 9 mit Siegel a; TCTI I1 2684, 9. L6-kal-la (dumu-Ur-d~anSe;dub-sar): SAT I 358, 9 mit Siegel; TEL 24, 11. L~i-~Nin-Subur ( d u m u - ~ b - ~ ~ a - bdub-sar): ag; TCTI I1 2563, 9 rnit Siegel 2. Ur-dHendur-sag (dumu-Ur-ba-gk dub-sar): Limet, Me'tal, 279 Nr. 1 (= DAS 27), 8 mit Siegel b. Ur-dNanna (dumu-LC-dulo-ga; dub-sar): Limet, Mktal, 281 Nr. 5 (= DAS 28), Siegel c; ebd. 283 Nr. 9 (= DAS 15), Siegel d; ebd. 284 Nr. 10 (= DAS 387), Siegel c; MVN XI 10 (= MCS 1, 46), Siegel 1; TCTI I1 2571, Siegel 3. ~ r - ~ N a n g (dub-sar): e SAT I 357, 8. Ur-+gar (dumu-SeS-SeS?; dubsar): AAS 194, '6' (vgl. Neumann, Handwerk, 104f. Anm. 566); CTBM I1 19502a, Siegel 1; DAS 306, 8; 335, 7; ITT I11 5212, 12 (glri-Ur-ni9-gar -SeS-SeS); 6244, 9; V 6791, 6; Limet, Me'tal, 280 Nr. 3 (= DAS 30), 8; ebd. 281 Nr. 5 (= DAS 28), 10 mit Siegel a; ebd. 282 Nr. 6, 9; ebd. 283 Nr. 9 (=
128
DIE AUFTRAGSTATIGKEIT DER SCHMIEDE VON GIRSU
H. NEUMANN
Stellung der meisten anderen in der Verbindung @i-PN notierten Personen innerhalb der Verwaltungshierarchie l a t sich dagegen nicht eindeutig bestimrnen.52 Bei der insgesamt relativ groaen Anzahl von beteiligten Personen erscheint es doch zweifelhaft, in diesen die verantwortlichen 'Kontrolleure' der Produktion zu sehen. Hinzu kommt die Tatsache, dal3 der giri-Vermerk sowohl in den Empfangsquittungen fur die zu reparierenden als auch fur die fertiggestellten Gerate erscheint. Es scheint daher, dal3 es sich bei den in Verbindung mit giri genannten Personen, die zum Teil ja auch ihr Siegel auf der Tafelhulle abrollten, eher um die eigentlichen Auftraggeber bzw. Abnehmer der hergestellten Gerate handelt. Besonders deutlich wird dies m.E. bei dern in Limet, Me'tal, 287 Nr. 15 (prosopographisch nicht hierhergehorig) beschriebenen Vorgang, wonach ein gewisser Lubimu u.a. Metallgerate in Empfang nahm, derselbe Lubimu aber in &L 20, 9 in der Funktion eines 'Verantwortlichen' (giri) notiert ist.53 Von besonderer Bedeutung ist in diesem Zusammenhang auch das Fragment ITT III6546, das u.a. Nani, Bazi und Urnigar54 als Empfanger von Metallgegenstanden vermerkt.55 Dies scheint deutlich darauf hinzuweisen, da13 der @ri-Vermerknicht die Kontrolle der Produktion, sondern vielmehr die weitere Verteilung der im Auftrage der zentralen Provinzverwaltung fertiggestellten Geratschaften betrifft. Die Vielfalt der in der Verbindung Dri-PN erscheinenden Personen deutet dabei auf die unterschiedlichen Bereiche innerhalb der Palast- und Tempelwirtschaft hin, wofur die einzelnen Verwaltungsangestellten
stellvertretend als Auftraggeber der Reparaturen bzw. als Abnehmer der von den Schmieden fertiggestellten Gerate in den Texten genannt werden.56 Inwieweit damit eine gleichzeitige Kontrolle durch die Abnehmer der Gerate dokumentiert wird, l a t sich nicht entscheiden, ist jedoch grundsatzlich nicht auszuschliel3en.
5. Die Schmiede von Girsu in privatwirtschaflichem Kontext Im vorliegenden Zusammenhang gewinnt nun die aus dern Jahre AS 1 stammende Gerichtsurkunde ITT I1 923 (= NG I1 207) an Bedeutung, da sie jene Schrniede, fur die eine umfangreiche Handwerkstatigkeit im Rahmen der staatlichen 0konomie bezeugt ist, in einem privatrechtlichen Kontext zeigt, der Ruckschlusse auf ihre soziale Stellung und den entsprechenden okonomischen Hintergrund erlaubt. Bei ITT I1 923 (= NG II 207) handelt es sich um eine Sammelurkunde, in der u.a. ein Rechtsstreit protokolliert ist, in den die bereits bekannten Schrniede NigirSakuS, Ur-Ningizzida und Nabasa involviert waren (Z. 2-14): INigir-en-nu ki-Lugal-kh-zu-simug-ta Nigir-S8-k6S simug ba-na-gi-in 16 gin kkbabbar nam-irl 1-Si3 Lugal-kh-zu in-1Ca Na-ba-sa6 ~r-d~in-giz-zi-da nam-6im-h kh ki-Nigir-S8-MS-ta Lugal-kh-zu ba-na-gi-in Ur-tur maSkim
-
DAS IS), 7 mit Siegel c; ebd. 284 Nr. 10 (= DAS 387), 7 mit Siegel b; ebd. 285 Nr. 12 (= DAS 307), 8; ebd. 287 Nr. 16 (= DAS 374), 5 mit Siegel a; HSS IV 135, 8; MVN XI 10 (= MCS 1, 46), 8 mit Siegel 3; SAT I 356, 9; TCTI 1646, 7; 951 Rs. 4'; I1 2571, 8 mit Siegel 4; TLB I11 61, 8; 156, 7. Urd ~ u n - g a(dumu-Erin-da; l dub-sar): Berens 55, 7; DAS 16, 7 mit Siegel a (nu-bhnda-gu-za-16); ITT 111 5209, 7; 6366, 9; 6380, 13; Lafont,forgerons, 127 (BM 14661), 10 (Hiille 5': US[ib-PIN) mit Siegel 1; ebd. 129 (BM 16418), 6 mit Siegel 1; Limet, Me'tal, 279 Nr. 1 (= DAS 27), 6; ebd. 282 Nr. 7 (= DAS 373), 6 (USib-PN) mit Siegel a; Orient 16, 98 Nr. 148, 8; RTC 309 (= DAS 308), 8; TCTI I 951 Rs. 2' mit Siegel 1; I1 2563, 7 mit Siegel 3. Vgl. auch Limet, Me'tal, 280 Nr. 4 (= DAS 14), Siegel b (Lugal-[ ] / dub-sar / dumu-lb-d~in-gfr-su). ] / dub-sar 1 dumu-lb-d[x(x)]) und c (L&[ 5 2 A-ab-ba: SAT I 355, 11; 360, 9. ~ n i m ! ? ( ~ ~ ) - ~ ~ a - b a ~MVN - i . d aXIb ~ Text : V, 7! (identisch mit dern gleichnamigen Sabra? Vgl. Neumann, Handwerk, 98 mit Anm. 529). Lb-bi-mu (vgl. aber unten mit Anm. 53): TBL 20, 9. Lb-da-da-ga: Berens 46, 8; MVN XI 10 (= MCS 1, 46), 5. L6-digir-ra: TBL 23, 9. Lugal-amar-gal: SAT 1355, 12. Lugal-ki-gal-la: Lafont, forgerons, 128 (BM 14930), 8; SAT I 360, 7. ~ 6 - ~ U t TCTI u : I1 2729, 8; TEL 22, 8. Nam-zi-tar-ra: T ~ 24, L 12; TUT 280 (= SVS Ill, 31 I), 'lo1. dNanna-kii: Lafont, forgerons, 127 (BM 13779), 6. NbdBa-ba6: MVN VII 277 (= ITT IV 7878) Rs. 4. geg-kal-la: Lafont, forgerons, 127 (BM 13779), 7; SNSAT 250 (= Lafont, forgerons, 128 [BM 14916]), 9. ur-ab!-ba: Lafont,forgerons, 128 (BM 14930), 7. U ~ ~ B a - (dumu-Ba-zi): ba~ ITT V 6763, 6 (vgl. dazu die Bemerkungen bei Neumann, Handwerk, 105 mit Anm. 569f.). ~ r - ~ ~ a (dumu-Ur- b a ~ GAR): SAT 1361, 8. u r - d ~ u m u - z iOrAnt. : 18, 238 Nr. 20 (= MVN X 244), 8. Ur-6-ninnu: SNSAT 250 (= Lafont,forgerons, 128 [BM 14916]), 8. Ur-dLama (dumu-Ur-GAR): ITT I11 6380, 15; MVN XI 10 (= MCS 1, 46), 10. ur-dNin-gir-su: Lafont, forgerons, 127f. (BM 14741), 8. d ~ t u - b a r - r a Berens : 46, 7 mit Siegel c. Unklar folgende Belege: CTBM I1 18571 (nach ebd. S. 111 "2 gir-officials mentioned"); Limet, Mktal, 284 Nr. 11, 7 (~r-d[x]);ebd. 285f. Nr. 13, 11 (Ur?-[~(x)]);MVN IX 157, 7'lo' (1. ~ r - ~ [ x ] r x2.l ;L6-[ 1; 3. L[b- 1; 4. L[6- I). 53 Lubimu war wahrscheinlich Schreiber; vgl. das Siegel von ASJ 3, 159 Nr. 125: Lb-bi-mu / dub-sar / dumu-~r-~~~-alim. 54 Vgl. oben mit Anm. 49 und 51. 55 Vgl. Neumann, Handwerk, 106 mit Anm. 574. Vgl. auch Limet, Me'tal, 250 Nr. 19 (AS 7), wonach jemand (PN nicht erhalten) Gerate (umdugurlo)von Lugalimrua in Empfang nahm. In DAS 404, 3f. (IS 2) erscheinen Ur-NanSe und Ur-Lama ( g r i - ~ r - ~ ~ a -als b aEmpfanger ~) (vgl. oben Anm. 50f.) von Geratschaften ( ~ ~ ~ ~ h a - b h die - d avon ) , UrSugalamma ausgeliefert wurden.
129
"Nigirennu ist Lugalkuzu, dern Schmied, ab- (und) NigirSakuS, dern Schmied, zugesprochen worden. Da13 16 Sekel Silber fur die Sklaveneigenschaft Lugalkuzu gezahlt hat, haben Nabasa (und) Ur-Ningizzida beschworen. Das Silber wurde zu Lasten des NigirSakuS dern Lugalkuzu zugesprochen. Urtur (war dabei) Kommissar." Der Gegenstand des hier dokumentierten Gerichtsprozesses war dernnach ein Sklave, der vormals von NigirSakuS an den Schmied Lugalkuzu fur 16 Sekel Silber verkauft worden war, was durch (die Schmiede) Nabasa und Ur-Ningizzida beeidet wurde. Im Ergebnis des Prozesses, dessen Hintergrund allerdings nicht ersichtlich ist, sprach man den Sklaven wieder dern Verkaufer zu, wobei dieser den Kaufpreis an Lugalkuzu zuruckzuzahlen hatte.57 AuBer der auch anderweitig belegbaren Tatsache, daB
s6 Vgl. in diesem Sinne auch Lafont, forgerons, 124 sowie andeutungsweise bereits Jones, JCS 15, 116. 57
Vgl. dazu auch Falkenstein, Gerichtsurkunden11, 350.
130
H. NEUMANN
Handwerker offensichtlich Sklaven besitzen konnten,58 ist in vorliegendem Fall vor allem die Hohe des Kaufpreises interessant, da der Betrag von 16 Sekel Silber als Sklavenpreis doch recht betrachtlich ist.59 A. Falkenstein hat wahrscheinlich nicht zu Unrecht vermutet, darj es sich bei dem Sklaven um eine im Schmiedehandwerk ausgebildete Arbeitskraft handelte, was durch die als Prozerjparteien fungierenden Schmiede nahegelegt wird.60 Dies wurde jedoch bedeuten, darj die hier erwahnten Handwerker eigene Sklaven in ihren Werkstatten beschaftigten, was den privaten Charakter ihrer handwerklichen Tatigkeit deutlich werden l a t .
Eingedenk der prosopographischen Zusammenhange zwischen der soeben behandelten Gerichtsurkunde und den das Schmiedehandwerk dokumentierenden Verwaltungstexten 1 s t sich nun vermuten, darj letztere die entsprechenden Transaktionen zwischen Vertretern der zentralen Provinzverwaltung in Girsu und freien, nicht durch aurjerokonomischenZwang in den Arbeitskraftebestand der Palast- und Tempelwirtschaft eingegliederten Handwerkern betreffen, wobei die Schrniede eigene Werkstatten betrieben haben durften und darin wohl auch Sklaven beschaftigten. Uber die zentrale Administration erfolgte die weitere Verteilung der von den Schmieden gelieferten Gerate an die einzelnen Bereiche der staatlichen Wirtschaft, aus denen die jeweiligen Produktions- bzw. Reparaturanforderungen gekommen waren. Die in der Regel als gesiegelte Hullentafeln ausgefertigten Urkunden wurden staatlicherseits archiviert,61 wobei auf den entsprechenden pisag-dub-ba-Etiketten nur die Vertreter der zentralen Verwaltung und deren Partner auf der Handwerkerseite vermerkt sind.62 Die den staatlichen Verwaltungs- und Wirtschaftseinheiten zuzurechnenden Funktionstrager (giriPN) blieben hier unerwiihnt, da diese im Rahmen der Abrechnungs- und Kontrolltatigkeit der zentralen Administration bezuglich der an die (freien, nicht in die Palast- und Tempelwirtschaft eingebundenen) Handwerker vergebenen Produktions- bzw. Reparaturauftrage ohne Bedeutung waren. Fur die Charakterisierung der sozialen Stellung der genannten Schmiede ist zudem bedeutsam, da13 sich fur die entsprechenden Handwerker keine Rationentexte nachweisen lassen. Zwar konnte dies durchaus auch mit dem aerlieferungszufall erkliirt werden, jedoch ist das angesichts der umfangreichen Dokumentation aus dem Bereich der staatlichen Administration von Girsu nicht sehr wahrscheinlich. Einzig der Text SNSAT 236 scheint auf eine zwecks Entlohnung in Silber umgerechnete Arbeitsleistung des Schmiedes Ur-Ningizzida Bezug zu nehmen.63 Danach standen dem Handwerker fur Vgl. Neumann, Handwerk, 155. Der Kaufpreis fiir eine mannliche Person betrug im Durchschnitt ca. 10 Sekel Silber; zu den entsprechenden Preisangaben in den neusumerischen Kaufurkunden vgl. Steinkeller, Sale Documents, 135-138. 60 Vgl. Falkenstein, Gerichtsurkunden I, 88. Vgl. in diesem Zusammenhang auch die Bemerkungen bei Lafont, forgerons, 123. 6 2 Zu den pisag-dub-ba-Etiketten vgl. oben Anm. 23 und 28. Vgl. auch die pisag-dub-ba-Etikette Lau 162, in der sich u.a auf die Inspektion (der Tatigkeit) von Schmiedehandwerkern bezogen wird (Vs. 2: gbrum-aka-simug). 63 Vgl. zum Text auch Englund, Fischerei, 196f. (mit leicht abweichender Interpretation). 59
DIE AUFTRAGSTATIGKEIT DER SCHMIEDE VON GIRSU
131
einen Arbeitsmonat 113 Sekel Silber zu. Geht man von der ublichen Tarifhohe von 4-5 Korn (He) Silber bei der Miete von Arbeitskraften in der Ur 111-Zeit a ~ s , dann 6 ~ wurden dem Handwerker ca. 12-15 Tage Handwerkstatigkeit seitens der Verwaltung ~ergutet.6~ Insgesamt darf man also mit guten Grunden annehmen, darj die hier in Rede stehenden Verwaltungstexte aus Girsu Vorgange dokumentieren, die sich auf die Auftragsvergabe der staatlichen Verwaltung an die Schmiede, die ansonsten nicht in die Palast- und Tempelwirtschaft eingebunden waren, beziehen. Da13 dabei die staatliche Administration der wichtigste und gewirj auch entscheidende Auftraggeber fur die Handwerker war, steht aul3er Zweifel. Dies ergibt sich bereits aus den Potenzen und Bedurfnissen der sich im Bereich der institutionellen Haushalte konzentrierenden wirtschaftlichen Einheiten. Die Auftragstatigkeit diente den Handwerkern dabei nicht nur einfach der Existenzsicherung bis hin zur Akkumulation von Vermogen, sondern durfte letztlich sogar die entscheidende Voraussetzung fiir die Produktionstatigkeit der Schmiede uberhaupt dargestellt haben. Andererseits war gerade die Inanspruchnahme von Produktionskapazitaten auljerhalb der Institutionen fur die Administration okonomisch durchaus sinnvoll und - nicht zuletzt mit Blick auf die Entlohnung - effektiv. Insofern bedingten staatliche Okonomie und privatwirtschaftliches Handeln im Produktionssektor einander. Dabei ist im vorliegenden Zusammenhang interessant, darj die Auftragstatigkeit von (freien) Handwerkern sich nicht nur fur das Schmiedehandwerk von Girsu nachweisen lafit, sondern z.B. auch fur die Schmiede in Umma und Nippur, die Goldschmiede und Steinschneider, aber auch fur den Bereich der Leder- und Filzverarbeitung und fur die Topferei belegbar ist.66 Naturlich setzte die offensichtlich haufiger anzutreffende Praxis der Auftragsvergabe fur handwerkliche Tatigkeiten an Bereiche aurjerhalb der staatlichen Administration die Existenz eines freien Handwerks in der Ur 111-Zeit voraus. Derartiges ist m.E. angesichts der neusumerischen Belege fur die Miete von qualifizierten Arbeitskraften gegen Zahlung eines Lohnes sowie auf Grund der uberlieferten Hinweise auf Werkvertrage im Rahmen des Rechts- und Wirtschaftsverkehrs zwischen Privatpersonen, nicht zuletzt auch und gerade im Bereich der Luxusguterproduktion, wohl kaum noch zu bezweifeln.67
64 65
Vgl. dazu Neumann, Handwerk, 154 mit Anm. 879. Die naheren UmstHnde der Entlohnung sind zwar nicht ersichtlich, jedoch handelt es sich im vorliegenden Fall auf Grund der Terminologie (6 = idu) nicht um eine Ration, sondern um die Vergiitung einer tatsachlich erbrachten Arbeitsleistung in Silber, so daR der Bezug auf die Miettarife gewilj berechtigt ist. Die in Vertretung erfolgte Siegelung durch einen Lederarbeiter (a6gab) erklkt sich wahrscheinlich aus einem notwendig gewordenen Zusammenwirken von spezialisierten Handwerkern verschiedener Berufsausrichtung (vgl. auch oben mit Anm. 38). 66 Vgl. dazu im einzelnen (mit Literatur) Neumann, AoF 23, 255f. mit Anm. 6-11 sowie zusatzlich Zettler, Metalworkers. 67 Vgl. Neumann, AoF 23. Skeptisch in dieser Hinsicht allerdings Renger, AoF 20, 107 Anm. 72, und AoF 23, 218f.
132
H. NEUMANN
Abkiirzungen
Zu den Abkiirzungen vgl. die Listen bei Neumann, Handwerk, 9-18 und 199. Zusatzliche Abkiirzungen sind: SAT = Sumerian Archival Texts, Bethesda I: M. Sigrist, Texts from the British Museum (1993). SVS = Studi per il Vocabolario Sumerico, Rom. I: G. Pettinato - H. Waetzoldt, G. Reisner, Tempelurkunden aus Telloh (1985).
DIE AUFTRAGSTATIGKEIT DER SCHMIEDE VON GIRSU Neumann, H. AoF 20 AoF 23 Handwerk
Renger, J. AoF 20 Literatur
Civil, M. Farmer's Instructions The Farmer's Instructions. A Sumerian Agricultural Manual (= Aula Orientalis Supplementa 5), Barcelona 1994. Englund, R.K. Organisation und Venvaltung der Ur 111-Fischerei (= BBVO lo), Fischerei Berlin 1990. Falkenstein, A. Gerichtsurkunden Die neusumerischen Gerichtsurkunden, 1. Teil: Einleitung und systematische Darstellung; 2. Teil: Umschrift, Ubersetzung und Kommentar, Miinchen 1956. Fischer, C. "Siegelabrollungen im British Museum auf Ur-111-zeitlichen Texten BagM 28 aus der Provinz LagaS. Untersuchung zu den Verehrungsszenen", BagM 28 (1997), 97-183. Fish, T. "The Smith at Lagash", MCS 1 (1951), 46-48. MCS 1 Grigoire, J.-P. La province me'ridionale de l'e'tat de Lagash, Luxemburg 1962. province Jones, T.B. Rezension zu H. Limet, Me'tal, JCS 15 (1961), 114-116. JCS 15 Lafont, B. "Les forgerons Sumtriens de la ville de Girsu", in: J. des Courtils, forgerons J.-Ch. Moretti und F. Planet (Hrsg.), De Anatolia Antiqua. Eski Anadolu, I., Traveaux et recherches de I'Institut Frangais d ' ~ t u d e s Anatoliennes, Paris 1991, 119-129. "L'extraction du minerai de cuivre en Iran 5 la fin du IIIe Fs Limet mill6naire", in: 0. Tunca und D. Deheselle (Hrsg.), Tablettes et images aux pays de Sumer et d'Akkad. Me'langes oflerts iz Monsieur H. Limet (= APHAO Mtmoires I), Likge 1996, 87-93. Documents administratifs sume'riens provenant du site de Tello et DAS conserve's au Muse'e du Louvre, Paris 1985. Limet, H. Le travail du me'tal au pays de Sumer au temps de la IIIe dynastie Me'tal d'Ur, Paris 1960. Loding, D. A Craft Archive from Ur, (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Craft Archive Pennsylvania 1974).
AoF 23
Sigrist, M. Catalogue I1
133
"Zu den Geschiiften des Kaufmanns Ur-Dumuzida aus Umma", AoF 20 (1993), 69-86. "Zum privaten Werkvertrag im Rahmen der neusumerischen handwerklichen Produktion", AoF 23 (1996), 254-264. Handwerk in Mesopotamien. Untersuchungen zu seiner Organisation in der Zeit der III. Dynastie von Ur (= SGKAO 19), Berlin, 1987l und 19932. "Formen des Zugangs zu den lebensnotwendigen Giitern: Die Austauschverhiiltnisse in der altbabylonischen Zeit", AoF 20 (1993), 87-114. "Handwerk und Handwerker im alten Mesopotamien. Eine Einleitung", AoF 23 (1996), 21 1-231. (mit H.H. Figulla und C.B.F. Walker) Catalogue of the Babylonian Tablets in the British Museum 11, London 1996.
Snell, D.C. Ledgers and Prices Ledgers and Prices. Early Mesopotamian Merchant Accounts (= YNER 8), New Haven/London 1982. Steinkeller, P. Sale Documents of the Ur-111-Period (= FAOS 17), Stuttgart 1989. Sale Documents Waetzoldt, H. "DUB.NAGAR in Ebla: <<MeiBel, Stemmeisen, Beitel>>, nicht NABU 19951117 <>", NABU 19951117. (mit H.G. Bachmann) "Zinn- und Arsenbronzen in den Texten aus OrAnt. 23 Ebla und aus dem Mesopotamien des 3. Jahrtausends", OrAnt. 23 (1984), 1-18. Zettler, R.L. Metalworkers "Metalworkers in the Economy of Mesopotamia in the Late Third Millennium B.C.", in: N.F. Miller (Hrsg.), Economy and Settlement in the Near East: Analyses of Ancient Sites and Materials (= MASCA Research Papers in Science and Archaeology Suppl. to Vol. 7), Philadelphia 1990, 85-88.
INSTITUTIONAL AND PRIVATE IN THE OLD ASSYRIAN PERIOD* J.G. DERCKSEN (LEIDEN)
The Old Assyrian trader was an entrepreneur, a person doing business with the aim of making a profit. In refuting claims that the tamkiirum would have been a state official, K.R. Veenhof noted: "The traders and merchants one meets in the OA texts act like private businessmen (...) whose activities may have been regulated by public law and controlled by official bodies like the karum, but not as public trustees or state officials."l With regard to possible state influence, he wrote on another occasion: "It seems more likely that the "state" as such was not directly involved, but profited from the revenues of the florishing trade carried on by basically private entrepreneurs and firms."2 Also in the view of N. Yoffee the influence of the Assyrian government on the way business was conducted was very limited. He writes: "The trade was entrepreneurial.That is, Assyrian family firms, sometimes in partnerships so as to increase available capital and extend credit, did not profit from the monopolization of any resource; rather, they profited from the organizational know-how of getting goods where they were plentiful and exporting them to where they were scarce. (...) The government did not establish or organize or guarantee the trading ventures."' The definition of private as "carried on by an individual independently rather than under institutional or organizational direction or support" does therefore only partly apply to the Old Assyrian merchant. The use of the term private to describe a sector of society in ancient Mesopotamia which would be opposed to a public or state sector, is in itself debatable.4 A distinction between institutional and non-institutional is better suited for the Mesopotamian context and it has been stressed that a distinction between both sectors is rarely clear-cut.5 While there is agreement about the merchant's non-institutional status, the degree to which the city-state influenced this trade, and thus the merchants, is disputed. Veenhof accepts some state influence, as emerges from the citation given above, and also implied in: "The Assyrians seem somehow to have monopolized its (i.e. tin) -
*
I would like to thank the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) for enabling me to write this paper as part of its Middle Eastern Studies Programme (MOS). Veenhof, Aspects, 352 note 467. "Prices and Trade. The Old Assyrian Evidence", AoF 15 (1988), 246. Civilizations of the Ancient Near East, Vol. I11 (1995), 1393. Cf. P. von Moos, "Die Begriffe 'offentlich' und 'privat' in der Geschichte und bei den Historikern", Saeculum 49 (1998), 161-192. An example of the existing confusion of the term private is also apparent in the introduction to Ulshofer, Privaturkunden, 12, where A.M. Ulshofer divides the text material into Geschaftsbriefe, Rechtsurkunden and Private Wirtschafturkunden; cf. the remarks by K.R. Veenhof, JESHO 40 (1997), 303. See, for example, Garelli, Marchands, 106: "Gardens-nous, par example, de parler de 'commerce privC' et de 'commerce d'Etat', c o m e de confiner telle ou telle fonction dans des attributions strictes" and G. van Driel, Fs De Meyer, 192, "The title Private and not-so-private suggests that borderlines are difficult to draw."
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import into Anatolia from Mesopotamia through the institution of a well-administered, efficient caravan ~ystem."~ In the following pages we will discuss the evidence for non-institutional business and the role played in this trade by the city-state of Assur. Furthermore, since Anatolia is the destination of the Assyrian caravans, due attention will be given to the organization and role of the local palaces in Anatolia and their interaction with the Assyrian traders.
The main institutions in Assur The political institutions of the Old Assyrian city-state, the city assembly, the 'house of the city' and the royal palace, have been discussed by M.T. Larsen.7 The sources describing activities of these institutions are royal inscriptions, letters and other documents chiefly dealing with commercial matters, found in the debris of houses inhabited by Assyrian merchants in Kiiltepe, Alishar, and Boghazkoy. Although most of the documentation was found in Anatolia, part of it refers to events in and originates from Assur. Dozens of these texts were written by the city's administration, the city assembly, itself. The situation is therefore not as hopeless as might seem, but the discovery of more texts written by the 'house of the city', the palace, and especially by functionaries of the temples in Assur, is bound to alter our perception of the way they functioned. Until then, we will have to work largely from the one-sided perspective of the Assyrian trader. Involved in the trade are the city assembly (durn) and the 'house of the city' (bet dimlbet limim) on the one hand, and temples on the other. Little is known of the role played by temples in Assur except for the loans they granted (ikribu), the votive offerings they received, and the storage facilities they offered to merchants.8 The city assembly and the 'house of the city' exercise a strong influence on the way trade is conducted. The assembly establishes the wider political framework for the citystate. It also decides on specific measures involving issues of trade and individual merchants. It enables Assur's merchants to travel through foreign countries and to conduct trade there by concluding sworn treaties (miimitum) with the rulers of these countries.9 The stipulation contained in a draft treaty (kt n/k 794) according to which no Akkadian (i.e. from Mari and Babylonia) merchants were allowed to cross the ruler's territory on penalty of death indicates that the 'free movement of traders' postulated by D. Charpin and J.-M. Durandlo is hardly compatible with Old Assyrian practice. The city's 6 7
Civilizations of the Ancient Near East, Vol. I1 (1995), 865. See Larsen, City-state. A detailed analysis of the economic role of the institutions in Assur will appear in my forthcoming study Old Assyrian Trade and Society. See Dercksen, Ikribu. 9 See, in addition to the evidence discussed by P. Garelli in Les Assyriens and M.T. Larsen in CityState, for examples of such treaties J. Eidem, "An Old Assyrian Treaty from Tell Leilan", Marchands, diplomats et empereurs (Fs Garelli), Paris 1991, 185-207, and kt n/k 794 edited by S. C e ~ e nand K. Hecker, "Ina miitika eblum. Zu einem neuen Text zum Wegerecht in der Kiiltepe-Zeit", Vom Alten Orient zum Alten Testament (Fs von Soden, AOAT 240), Neukirchen-Vluyn 1995,31-41. l o "On rappellera d'abord que la pCnBtration des marchands palto-assyriens ktait ipso facto indtpendante de la puissance militaire d'ASSur. Elle existait suite B une idkologie propre B l'kpoque: normalement, des marchands n'6taient pas des mationauxn mais jouissaient d'un statut d'immunitC", MARI 8 (1997), 379.
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intervention in commercial matters may be exarnplified by the case where merchants have been fined for trading in (Anatolian) sapdinnum- andpirikannum-textiles.llKt 79/k 101 contains a reference to a ruling prohibiting the sale of gold by Assyrians to non-Assyrians (Akkadians, Hurrians, Amorites).12AKT 3, 73, mentions a verdict by the city assembly that appears to prescribe that one-third of the purchase may consist of tin.13 In view of the (temporary) short supply of this commodity, its meaning is that not more than one-third of the money a merchant wants to spend on purchases may be used on tin. By contrast, the 'house of the city' formed the centre of trade, being the office of the year eponym, the limum, which collected (only?) trade-related taxes and fines imposed for various reasons - but also sold goods (including slaves) seized from families indebted to it. Its commercial role was pivotal by selling merchandise to traders and buying imported items from foreign merchants travelling to Assur, especially from the Akkadians bringing the valued products of the South-Babylonian textile industry, or the caravans from the southeastern mat Sapiltim carrying tin.14 The 'house of the city' functioned as a centre where goods could be bought in the various shops (beturn), and as a kind of bank granting credit and borrowing money. Information is lacking how the 'house of the city' purchased the goods and what has been said above remains an assumption for the time being. There are, however, several letters mentioning the sale by this institution of commodities such as meteoric iron, lapis lazuli, textiles, and even barley.15 The role of the palace during this period is obscured by the fact that it is mentioned only a few times in the text material at our disposal. Reading the royal inscriptions, one gains the impression that the role of the king and the palace were overriding. The IriSuminscription, for instance, mentions the possibility to obtain a rubisurn Sa ekallim or palace attorney,l6 while according to those texts explicitly concerned with granting permission to obtain such legal assistance, it was the city assembly which decided in this matter. As suggested by M.T. Larsen, the ruler acted as the assembly's chairman and his influence appears to have been less than implied by his title.
1
VS 26,9, see Veenhof, Aspects, 126ff. The recently published text I 434 contains a strong argument in favour of reading (with J. Lewy) sapdinnu instead of saptinnu. The sign Df is only used for di in this text, whereas TI stands for ti. The name of this textile, on which see Veenhof, Aspects 170, is written with Df. l 2 Text published by H. Sever, Ankara Universitesi DiZ ve Tarih Co@afya Fakiiltesi Dergisi 34 (1990), 262. See for a discussion of this document Veenhof, Stele, 1733f, and Dercksen, Copper, 163. ~ Sa-li-is'-ta'm ~] AN.[NA] 25 i-Sa-li-mu AN.NA 26 la' i-ba-Sf , AKT 3, 73, 23 i-na df-in ~ - [ l i m 24 "By verdict of the city (of Assur) one is allowed to buy tin for one-third. There is no tin"; cf. no. 74: ... h[a-r]a-num Sa ma-at Sa-pi-i[15-t]imb-da-at ii a-nu-kam s'i-mi AN.NA li-la' i-ba-fi Su-ma AN.NA ~ ~ l2 12 T ~ G . H L.A ha-ra-num Sa ma-at Sa-pi-ils-tim lo e-ta-ar-ba-am ma-la' l1 df-in ~ - 1 i m a-Sa-a-ma,"The caravan from the Lower Country is delayed and there is here no trade in tin. In case the caravan of the Lower Country arrives, I shall buy tin and textiles in accordance with the verdict by the city ." l 4 See the commentary to no. 73 in AKT 3, p. 119. See Larsen, City-state, 198f and the letters CCT 3, 22b and CCT 4, 24a. Both letters have been edited in Michel, Innaya, as nos. 2 and 5. Published by K. Balkan and B. Landsberger, "Die Inschrift des assyrischen Kijnigs IriSum gefunden in Kiiltepe 1948", Belleten 14 (195O), 219-268. See for a recent edition of the passage RIMA 1, 21 line 55. On the rabisum see Larsen, City-state, 175ff. and Veenhof, Miete, 182.
*
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The merchandise exported abroad was mainly bought in Assur, presumably from the 'house of the city'. A small percentage of the woollen textiles exported was home-made by Assyrian women for whom this was a source of income.l7 The caravan trade was essential for the economic life of the city and it provided an important stimulus for local craftsmen. There was a constant demand for donkeys which were bought in a locality named the gigamlum, outside the city, where they were bred. Local leather workers manufactured shoes and boots for the caravan personnel, largely travelling on foot, equipment for the donkeys, and bags for packing. The local manufacturing of textiles has been mentioned above. The scattered evidence does not allow an educated guess regarding the degree to which these items were possibly produced or sold within an institutional context. One reference in an unpublished text (Rendell) mentions a walker (a5lakum) handling a textile made by an Assyrian woman, suggesting, at least in this instance, the work of an independent craftsman. The persons involved in commerce After the evidence for institutional involvement in the trade between Assur and Anatolia, presented in the preceding section, we will now turn to the question who the non-institutional entrepreneurs were. The traders were part of the urban elite and were organised in family firms. As a result, the business relations were based largely upon family ties. Men would start working in their father's firm and gradually acquire enough capital of their own to start a new branch. The core of their capital was formed by the naruqqum or sack, in which wealthy merchants and money-lenders from Assur invested a large sum of money for a fixed period. The 'sack carrier' rewarded his investors by giving them a share in the profit.18 A trader was personally responsible for losses and debts and in the worst case his possessions were seized and sold. Many of these well-todo families made one of their daughters a gubabtum-priestess.lg Like other Assyrian women from this mercantile milieu they often remained involved in the business of their relatives. We do not know whether the merchants fell under an obligation to perform, at least under normal circumstances, some form of (military) service to the city. The word for the itinerant trader, tamkarum (DAM.GAR), is the general designation for the Assyrian merchant. In a recent article devoted to the term tamkarum, P. Garelli considers him an authorized agent.20 Apart from the general term ~ubiirum"boy, servant" for the junior personnel, only the term SamallGJum is known as a subdivision of the hierarchical structure within the firms.21The word urnmeanurn designates the investor, often a wealthy merchant living in A s ~ u rK.R. . ~ ~Veenhof convincingly demonstrated that
Cf. Veenhof, Aspects, 103ff. and Iraq 39 (1977), 114-115; Michel, Inniiya I, 80-82. l 8 See for a detailed description of this institution Larsen, Partnerships, and the article "Naruqqu-
Vertrage" in RZA 9 (1999), 181-184. Compare also Veenhof, Credit and Dercksen, Financing. See for this function Hirsch, Religion, 56f. The word gubabtumlugbabtum is occasionally written logographically NIN.DINGIR. 20 Archivum Anatolicum 3 (1997), 130: "... et des mandataires, les tamkiiru, c'est-&-dire des interm6diaires agr&s, qui n'6taient pas des agents officiels". On this employee see Larsen, Partnerships, 126f. 22 Cf. Dercksen, Financing, 86f.
139
'the office of a tamkarum' (bet tamkarim) in Anatolia and Assur, where one could borrow money, was not a state institution but a form of entrepreneurial a~tivity.~3 The karum of Assur as the organization of tamkaru's is absent from the texts but may have existed. Like the karum, an UGULA DAMGAR in Assur is still unattested for the Old Assyrian period. However, a wakil tarnkire or 'overseer-of the-traders' of Assur occurs in a text found at Mari and published as ARM 26, 342, and is contemporary with level Ib in Kanish. According to this text, this person had been acting as a diplomat and negotiated the granting of trading facilities in K ~ a n aThe . ~ presence ~ of an 'overseer-ofthe-traders' during this period has been seen as an indication of a reorganisation of the commercial structure at Assur initiated by SamSi-~ddu.~S There is in fact a person who is identified as the 'overseer-of-the-traders' of SamSi-~dduin a letter edited as AbB 8, 15, but acting within a military context. In our opinion, there is no reason to deny this functionary the status of a royally appointed official,26 who, because of his skills, might be assigned a military task. The absence of commercial texts dealing with temples, apart from those referring to ikribii, hampers a better understanding of the role they played in Old Assyrian society. We have to limit ourselves therefore to reviewing the activities of some of their functionaries known by name. The administrator (sangtim) of ASSur's temple,27 Eldi son of Ikunum, became year-eponym for year KEL 91 during the reign of S a r g ~ nThe . ~ ~sole reference to his commercial activities forms "a tablet about 8 minas of silver of the house of Eldi the sangtim" (BIN 6,241:8-9). A number of kumrum-priests29occur in a secular context. Manuba, priest of ASSur, has merchandise sold for him in Anatolia. He receives 15 shekels of silver for one textile (CCT 6, 27b:4'); another text mentions 1 mina for 6 minas of tin belonging to him (TC 3, 203:6). Another priest of AHSur, IStar-pilab, owes 35 shekels of silver to PSu-ken, but this may be situated in Anatolia (CCT 6, 20b:12'). A clear reference to commercial activities is contained in TC 3, 129, mentioning purchases being made in the "house of the kumrum-priest of Suen", which, in my view, refers to a kind of shop that may have been located within the 'house of the city': "He came to the city (of Assur) but did not bring anything into my house. This criminal is staying in a ' s t o r a g e r ~ o mat ' ~the ~ New House and is making purchases as he desires in the house of the priest of S ~ e n . " ~ l 23
Veenhof, Modern Features, 351, and Credit, 66ff. ARM 26, 342, l 6 ... %GULA DAM.GA[R d ~ - i u r ] kl i7 Su-ru-ub-tam a-na ~ i - k u r 'ri-Sel-ri-ib - ~ ~ ~ l 8 i d ~ - i u r kka-lu-iu i l9 i-nu KU-ra-nu-a-mak ui-ta-l[a]l-la-at,"The 'overseer-of-the-traders' of Assur brought a delivery to ASkur-Addu and the whole of Assur is acquiring (trading rights) for itself in the very town of Karana (as a result)." 25 Larsen, City-state, 220 note 3. Cf. D. Charpin and J.-M. Durand, MAR1 8 (1997), 374. 26 As done by D. Charpin and J.-M. Durand, MAR1 8 (1997), 374. 27 See Hirsch, Religion, 23 ad "S. 56, Zu Anm. 288 und 292". 28 KEL means Kiiltepe Eponym List. 29 See Hirsch, Religion, 55f. and 22f. "Zu S. 55". 30 On Old Assyrian huriurn see C. Michel, Zmmobilidres, 288 with note 8 r u n e sorte d'entrepcit ou de magasin"), and Dercksen, Copper, 70. K. Deller discussed the word in his article "Koche und Kiiche des ASSur-Tempels", BUM 16 (1985), 353ff. 5' ... a-na A-limki 6' i-li-kam-ma . a-na 8-ti-a mi-ma 7' la' ri-$6-ri-ba-am i-na fi e-ii-im 8' inu &-ur-ii-im ra-gug-um iu-ut 9' 6-ii-ib-ma i Si-ma-am lo' i a li-bi&. i-na fi ku-um-ri-im l l ' Sa Shin . ii-ta-a-am-ma.
z4
140
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A certain gubitum, bearing the title lapputi 'um or 'lieutenant'32, participated with dthe kumrum-priest of Adad in a trading society as appears from VS 26, 32, where he claims that an amount of gold and silver which had just arrived in Assur, belonged to "our tamkirum Ah-Salim". The temple of ASSur as a place for safekeeping occurs in TC 3, 68:24, where a kumrum appears to act as keeper.33The conclusion one can reach on the basis of these references is that temple personnel, like any other person holding an official function, could and did engage in trade in a non-institutionalcontext. This applies also to the Assyrian royal family. According to kt j k 201, published by K. Balkan (OLZ 60, 152), king Puzur-AHSur I1 sealed a package containing 15 minas of tin. A group of texts, discussed by M.T. Larsen (City-State, 133f.), deals with the case involving a man named Asqiidum. This person had been entrusted by king &num with a considerable amount of merchandise but, after the accession of Sargon, still had not delivered the proceeds therefrom. Both father and son asked the merchant PuHu-ken to help them recover this money. The king specifies in KTS 1,30 what kind of merchandise his father had entrusted to Asqiidum: 125 minas of tin, 30 kutinu-textiles, 5 minas 5 shekels of very fine lapis lazuli and a lump of iron weighing 11 shekels, besides two donkeys to carry this valuable transport. PuSu-ken seized five minas of silver from Asqudum and borrowed another ten which he sent to Assur. This apparently is recorded in CCT 6, 27b:13-17, where two nZpi5u-packages destined for the king in Assur are listed. The first containing 15 minas of silver, sealed by "me" and Asqudum, the second containing five minas being the proceeds of tin belonging to the king's father. The king, when engaging in commerce,34 had to cooperate with merchants. The contact between Sargon and PiiSu-ken demonstrates that important merchants like the latter maintained direct links with the palace. Similar to the structure of a family firm, the king employed his own servants in and to Anatolia. According to KTS 1, 30, Asqudum had already "caused the death" of two royal servants (&tirum) and deprived them of their silver. Nevertheless, a third person, identified by the name of ISar-bdi, is at that moment staying with Asqudum. PiiSu-ken receives the appropriate order to take this servant along. It is tempting to identify Asqiidum with his namesake bearing the title "slave of the palace" in KTS 1,55b (wardum i a ekallim), as done by Larsen (City-State, 132). Royal princes are attested spending some of their time in Anatolia. Sargon's sons Adua (kt j/k 201:12) and Ezi (kt 9 1 k 477a:3; KEL 75), probably also Aduda, occur as witnesses in documents drawn up in Anatolia. Sargon's eldest son Puzur-ASSur, the crown-prince, sent five textiles, listed in OIP 27, 58:24. In kt c/k 512:5-9, Sargon's grandson Ili-bani has a debt of 14 minas of silver, contracted in year KEL 83 which falls within the 40 year reign of Sargon (KEL 55-94). Ili-b5ni is therefore called the "son of Puzur-ASSur, son of the waklum". In a situation in which his grandfather was king, to be succeeded by his father after whom Puzur-ASSur's eldest son Nariim-Suen was to become king of Assur, the best thing for Ili-bini was to earn a living as a merchant. 32 For the first word ("lieutenant") see Larsen, City-State, 156-158. This gubitum is probably the same person mentioned in Dalley 13:9 as the owner of 3 113 talents of copper. 33 See Dercksen, Zkribzi, 86-88. 34 Cf. Garelli, Marchands, 199; Larsen, City-State, 213.
INSTITUTIONAL AND PRIVATE IN THE OLD ASSYRIAN PERIOD
141
The answer to the question why the king of Assur engaged in trade himself, at least in the documented cases of Ikiinum and Sargon, might be that, like other Assyrians, he wanted to have his share in the lucrative trade with Anatolia. As a consequence, he would sooner or later experience a merchant's anxieties, among other things caused by unreliable business partners, and make an appeal to other merchants. It is evident that the king enjoyed limited prestige as soon as he acted outside his official role as steward of the god ASSur or head of the city a~sembly.3~ Whereas Ikunum (according to Pa. 18) used to call PiiSu-ken "my son", Sargon respectfully addresses the merchant as "my father". At the same time he retains his dignity by hiding himself behind the royal title waklum. He also sends PuHu-ken a (valuable) girdle (iakkukum); the rather extraordinary thing is that the king mentions this gift on the envelope of his letter. Another method to put some soft pressure on the addressee is the use of the phrase "if you love me", in general used in letters to both men and women who are either relatives or close associates of the speaker. The fact that Sargon twice employs this phrase in his letter to PiiSu-ken (Pa. 18) is not a surprise. We can only doubt whether pious feelings were aroused in the merchant's heart when the king promised he would pray on his behalf "before ASSur and his god" (mabar ASur u ilia akarrabakkuniiti, AKT 2, 22: 19-20 and VS 26, 73: 12-14), an activity often promised by or requested from women staying in Assur.36 The fragmentary evidence on goods sent to Anatolia and proceeds returned suggests that the king acted on the level of the average merchant. AKT 2,22 mentions a transport of 150 textiles, while according to kt n/k 1389,37 ASSur-tiib is bringing 29 minas of silver belonging to the waklum. The Assyrian institutions in Anatolia: the kirum Secured by the treaties concluded with local rulers, the city of Assur possessed about 30 official trading posts or colonies in important Syrian and Anatolian towns which were called karum and (the smaller settlements) wabartum. J. Lewy's notion of an Assyrian dominated Anatolia which he labelled 'Halys Assyria' (for instance in HUCA 27, 21), with its government at Kanish, is now obsolete.38 As is also apparent from the so-called 'Statute Texts' detailing the rules for convening the kiirum assembly,39 its members consisted of "big" and "small" men, the rabi 'iturn and ~abburiitum.The plenary session representing the whole community was accordingly called the "kirum, small and big" (kirum saber rabi). The kirum-office or bit kirim was the colony's administrative centre, consisting of rooms where the assembly could meet, offices and storagerooms.40 35 Cf. Garelli, Les Assyriens, 199. 36 On the verb karabum see K. van der Toorn, Family religion in Babylonia, Syria and Israel, Leiden 1996, 113. Cf. further Hirsch, Religion, 69 with note 372, and Larsen, City-State, 120 with note 40. 37 See S. Ceqen, Archivum Anatolicum 2 (1996), 12 note 6. Larsen, City-State, 80. 39 See Larsen, City-State, 283ff. 40 Cf. Larsen, City-State, 194; Dercksen, Copper, 168ff. For an architect's view of this office see E. Heinrich, "Kaufmannshaus und bit kiirim", in: E. Neu and C. Riister (eds.), Festschrift Heinrich Otten, Wiesbaden 1973, 89-98. K. Hecker's doubt about the secular character of bet &rim, expressed in ZA 70 (1980), 188 note 6, is unnecessary. The word Sf-ga-ri-im(Sa ASSur) in Pa. 1:8, which he tentatively reads 8! k&-ri-im,making it a temple of ASSur, is a rare spelling of ASSur's Sugariaum emblem, see Hirsch,
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The building housing the karum-office may have been located in the upper city of Kiiltepe, close to the palace.41 This office had its own archive where its official correspondence was kept. Also the accounts individual merchants or enterprises (ellaturn) had with the colony, its debts and claims, and the accounts of deliveries by or to the local palace would be stored there.42 Proof for such an archive can be found in TPAK 1, 193, mentioning the loss of a karum document and the subsequent search for it among the "tablets of the plenary kiirum" (at the office?) by four or five persons.43 It appears that an Assyrian merchant living in a colony or having a pied-&-terrethere, automatically was a member of the local karum. Depending on his social status, he was either a "big" or a "small" man. The "big" men were the awilii Sa nikkassi who were charged a yearly contribution called datum, which was a considerable amount of silver (circa 12-20 minas) and gave them certain privileges, such as the exemption from paying Saddu'atum-tax in Anatolia. The term awilum Sa nikkassi, lit. "man of the accounts", occurs in KTP 19 (Larsen, City-state, 284) and its meaning is further illustrated by kt 92lk 200.44 Such a merchant possessed an account (qatum) with the karum, often that of Kanish, which was credited by payments in silver or otherwise, partly in response to Sitapkum. The accounting of the karum appears to have taken place once or twice a year to determine how much of the datum had been paid. The chief concern of the colonies was the protection of the Assyrian trade. They influenced the way it was conducted to an even greater extend than the city authorities in Assur did. This results from the precarious position in which the Assyrians had to operate in Anatolia.45 The colonies were faced with local palaces eager to profit from the rich trade but who, for various reasons, could turn hostile, and at the same time with Assyrian merchants who sometimes violated the terms agreed upon with the Anatolians.46 The chief colony was that of Kanish. To bring some measure of standardisation in the level of charging interest it had fixed a rate of interest of one-and-a-half shekel per mina per month, which amounts to 30 per cent per year (kima awat karim, in accordance with the stipulation of the karum).47 This non-compulsory but frequently used rate is attested in loans in silver and copper. Other rates, both higher and lower than 30 per cent, were charged at the discretion of the creditor. A kiirum put pressure on insolvent local officials by forbidding trade with them. Such was the case with a rabi simmiltim indebted to a Religion, 65f. and 7 , additions to page 6. On OA oaths see C. Michel, "Homrnes et femmes pr&tent serment ii 1'Cpouqe palCo-assyrienne", in: S. Lafont (ed.), Jurer et rnaudir: pratiques politiques et usages juridiques du serment duns le Proche-Orient ancien, Paris 1996, 105-123. Women swear by the huppum of Iltar, men by the patrum ( G ~ Ror ) SugariZum of Allur, the last two denoting a type of dagger. The ideogram for S. appears to be GI&GAG.EN.GAL, which occurs in two texts referring to the City Assembly taking a decision before this emblem in the hamrum in Assur ( I 765: l', kt c k 1010:4). Cf. Veenhof, Bullae, 651. 4 2 C. Michel suggests that even copies of private judicial texts, such as the protocols of lawsuits, may have been kept there ("Quelques rCflexions sur les archives rCcentes de Kiiltepe", in S. Alp and A. Siiel (eds.), Acts of the IIIrd International Congress of Hittitology, Ankara 1998,431). 43 Cf. C. Michel, RA 89 (1995), 24. 44 See the forthcoming study mentioned in note 7 above. 45 For an outline of Assyrian life in Anatolia see K.R. Veenhof, "The Old Assyrian merchants and their relations with the native population of Anatolia", in H.-J. Nissen and J. Renger (eds.), Mesopotamien und seine Nachbarn, BBVO 111, Berlin 1982, 147-160. 46 See, for example, the case of smuggling, discussed in Veenhof, Aspects part 4. 47 Veenhof, Stele, 1723 and 1736.
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certain f i n u m . The verdict reads: "No one shall sell a single textile of whatever quality to the rabi simmiltim. He who sells will pay all the silver the rabi simmiltim owes to E n u m " (EL no. 273). Reflecting a particular situation in the trade of copper, CCT 4,27a contains the prohibition to bring poor quality copper to the town of Turhumit to exchange it there for copper of better quality.48The authority of the colony was exerted to assist its members, for instance by supporting an attorney (rabi~um)sent from Assur,49 and notably in the case of a conflict with local Anatolian authorities. The colonies had jurisdiction over the Assyrian community. Appeal cases were brought before the city council in Assur. The karum as an institution borrowed from merchants. The need for money could be caused by higher or unexpected expenses and/or lower tax revenues. Kayseri 1746 refers to a planned repayment of debts by the colony "here". Alternative payment is mentioned in I 707, where 10 textiles occur as the price for 9 shekels of meteoric iron bought by the colony. The karum also engaged in trade for unspecified reasons. Note the transfer of textiles to the palace (see below) and the sending of silver (15 113 minas) $a kkrim to Assur (KTS 2, 7:47) or a transport including 5 kutanii ia kirim to Kanish (CCT 1, 39a:3). &tapkum, litt. "to deposit jointly", was a mechanism to raise funds for the pursuit of business at the initiative of the karum.50 It is often introduced with the sentence "when Sitapkum takes place at the kirum-office". Several texts mention the possibility to participate in such an activity by depositing the number of textiles or amount of silver it had fixed to the karum-office. Wool is occasionally mentioned as the objective of Sitapkum. In such cases, existing Assyrian firms were employed, like that of PGu-ken. In TC 3, 90:24, however, the palace is involved: "when there arose a possibility to deposit jointly 9 textiles per share, I brought 10 textiles up to the palace". Compare further VS 26, 141, stating "When they gave 50 textiles to the palace I deposited 2 Siirum-textiles as my father's share. Limum-functionary was Uraya. Total of 9 Siirum-textiles." This could mean the karurn delivered 50 textiles to the palace and individual merchants could participate in this, as in TC 3, 90. One should also consider TC 2, 16 where the karum owes (habbul) 213 kutanu's to the palace; now the karum is demanding (umam ZtarSiiniati) some of its members to contribute a number of textiles, Kunilum and colleagues are charged 26 each. This amount cannot result from arrears in the payment of taxes by individual merchants, rather it reflects direct trade with the palace. As one would expect, karum members were held responsible for debts by the karum, for example towards the palace. The community of (Assyrian) traders presented a welcome gift to the queen of the neighbouring city of WQSuSana on the occasion of her visit to Kanish. This follows from KTS 1, 50c (edited in Ulshofer, Privaturkunden no. 126; cf. Larsen, City-state, 343): "When the queen of WahSuSana entered (the city or the karum?) I gave one kutanum and one Surum (as my contribution) for the gift (niSJum). I shall charge (the karum) at the accounting (for) 45 shekels (of silver). The karum-eponym(s) (accepting my deposit) were the son of Pappdum and his associates." See Dercksen, Copper, 155. See Larsen, City-state, 175 note 48. See J.G. Dercksen, OLZ 92 (1997), 507 and especially the forthcoming study mentioned in note 7 above.
48 49 50
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A few dozen 'official' texts are known, including letters exchanged between colonies. The find-spots of these texts can only be established when they were excavated after 1948 during the official Turkish excavations. A letter sent by karum Kanish to that of PuruShattum, kt v/k 89,51 seems to have been found among the texts belonging to Salimabum and his sons Ennum-ASSur and Dan-ASSur. We know that Ennum-ASSur was a &rum-eponym during KEL 1lOlii, other dated texts mentioning him stem from KEL 105, 108, and 109. It is possible that this letter by the colony was written in several copies and that one of these ended up in Ennam-ASSur's house. He would then have stored this official document in his private archive, perhaps together with other documents pertaining to his office as a limum. Another example is formed by two texts published as kt 83/k 117 and 284,52 which were sent by the kcrum of WabSuSana to that of Kanish. Some 200 texts were reportedly found in a house in the lower city from level I1 in 1983,53 and both texts may have been found there, again in an otherwise private context. Certainly found in a private house was the archive of Kulia son of Alabum. This man acted as the envoy (iiprum) of the Kanish colony. Five documents written by this colony in which Kulia is mentioned by name or title are among the texts of which Salih C e ~ e npublished a number in Belleten LXI. These official documents, as well as the tablet containing the eponym list, were found among Kulia's own texts dealing with his commercial business. This must reflect the usual situation, in which kiirum officials kept the documents relating to their office at home. One expects that a duplicate of the official documents was kept in the archive of the karum-office. The functionaries of the kiirum, such as the limum, week-eponym (hamuitum), secretary (tupiarrum), and iiprum, were appointed among the merchants resident in the colony. The offices presumably were held only for a limited period. That of hamuitum was held by one or two persons and their period in office was used as a calendaric device (week-eponymy). A week-eponymy consisting of two persons was often made up of business partners. The actual function of a hamuitum is unclear. K.R. Veenhof suggested a connection with the official and private settling of accounts.54There are indications that one had to pay some fee for it (AKT 3, 92, see below). Other kiirum officials mentioned by name are the limum, the berum, and the ersum. The last two appear to be low-ranking officials. The secretary of the kiirum (?upiarrum Sa kiirim) convened the primary assembly (kcrum ~ a b e rabi) r and divided its members into groups to solve a dispute according to the so-called 'Statute Text~'.5~ He was, in Larsen's words, "a truly 'bureaucratic' official in Weber's sense, the neutral, salaried man who was responsible for the technical aspects of the judicial procedure".56 The secretary must have been the highest person in authority after the kiirum's assembly, representing the colony and travelling to other cities to collect taxes (CCT 5, 7b:4). Compared to him, the limu's of the kiirum are rather office employees. The tupiarrum represents the local authorities at the wabartum of Tuhpia, and assigns a person fined by the city of Assur for nearly one talent of silver to a guarantor Giinbatt~,Kcrum, 109ff. Giinbatt~,Karum, 113 and 115. 53 AJA 88 (1984), 443. 54 Veenhof, Hamuiturn, 25-26. See Larsen, City-State, 284-286. Larsen, City-State, 304ff. 52
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according to I 478. The secretary is also involved in the searching of houses.57 He executes a verdict by the karum by seizing, or assisting a plaintiff in seizing, a number of outsiders who will enter the house of the other party to search for a document.58 This happens, for example, in I 580: "The secretary seized us in accordance with the verdict by the ktirum of Kanish and we entered the house of Imdilum son of Sii-~abanand we checked the tablets ..." (three persons are identified at the end of this protocol as ialiitum, the group of three). A similar action is described in kt alk 457, situated in the kiirum of Habhum. Over twenty persons are known as scribe, identified by the addition of the word DUB.SAR after their name, the best attested among them is Adada.59 They appear as witness, debtor, or as the transporter of consignments of money or of tablets. Only the last activity may be connected with some official function which included travelling between cities. Unclear is whether all functioned as kiirum secretary at one time or another. It appears more probable that such persons had enjoyed a bureaucratic education that qualified them for the post, but what their function was is not documented. The limum-officialrepresented the kiirum as a legal person.60He frequently occurs in a context where merchandise is deposited on an account (qatum) at the kiirum-office, but he was also responsible for borrowing money on behalf of the colony. In the latter case usually three limu's acted together and sealed the document.G1The envelope of TPAK 1, 44, a letter which the full assembly of the kiirum of Kanish sent to that of Turbumit, contains the sealings by eight pers0ns.6~Notwithstanding the phrase "seal-(impression, KISIB)of the kiirum of GN" on such documents, there was no official kiirum-seal, and its representatives employed their own, private, seals for this purp0se.6~We cannot determine with certainty that in the case of TPAK 1, 44 all eight were a limum, and the secretary may have applied his seal as well. Serving as a limum did not prevent a merchant from depositing on his own account as emerges from CCT 1, 28b: "I deposited n textiles at the kiirum-office during our
s7 Naddudum, Larsen, City-State, 305 note 48. A house search by the local ruler occurs in kt nlk 1318 (S. C e ~ e n ,Uluslararasz I. Hititoloji Kongresi Bildirileri, 153):6, 8: "Here, we, as well as the karum, feared the searching of houses". A creditor suggests in ATHE 34: "If he is not seen in the marketplace, then make the secretary of the colony search the house of S I - ~ a ,daughter of Suen-dada!", translation by Larsen, City-State, 305. For such a karum verdict see VS 26, 116 (= EL no. 274). 59 A list of scribes can be found in Larsen, City-State, 304 note 46. For scribes and scribal education during the Old Assyrian period see Larsen, City-State, 305; K. Hecker, "Schultexte vom Kiiltepe", Studies Nimet OzgiiF, 281-291; C. Michel, "Les enfants des marchands de KaniS", in: B. Lion, C. Michel, P. Villard (eds.), Enfance et e'ducation duns le Proche-Orient ancient, KTEMA 22 (1997), 102. A relatively high degree of literacy may be postulated for the Assyrian merchants. Larsen, City-State, 333ff. Three persons acting for the karum occur in: BIN 4, 103; CCT 1,4; kt elk 56; TC 3,213. 62 Number of different seal-impressions and hence of persons on official documents: 7, EL no. 278 (Rosenberg 1) kunuk karim Turbumit; 6, VS 26, 116a kunuk karim KaniS; VS 26, 115 [kunuk] karim Wa&iana saber rabi; 5?, KTS 2, 60 [kunuk karim Kanlii saber rabi; 4 or 5, TPAK 1, 194 kunuk karim Kanis' saber rabi; 3+x, CTMMA 1, 97 kunuk karim Turbumit ~ a b e rrabi; 3, ICK 1, 26 kunuk kiirim Puruibattim. 63 For the use of private seals see B. Teissier, Sealing and Seals on Texts from Kiiltepe Karum level 2 (= PIHANS 70), Istanbul 1994,45.
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eponymy" although a different interpretation of ina limini is possible ("our limum is Inniiya") . The transfer by three limum-officials in Kanish of ten documents to the attorney of the dead Itur-il is recorded in BIN 4, 103. They applied their seals to the coffers carrying these documents. Eight of these are letters (naipertum), either written by the Kanish colony or sealed by it and these texts will have been kept in the archive at the kiirumoffice. Two remaining documents about claims by ASSur-fib will have been stored elsewhere. The application of a private seal by representatives of the colony in order to certify the contents is also practised when money was sent to Assur to pay debts towards the 'house of the city'. The iiprum or envoy acted as official messenger or 'diplomat' for the colonies in their relations with the Anatolian rulers and between the colonies themselves.64 As in the case of the tupiarrum, it is unclear whether those employed as envoys served the colony on a permanent basis.65 One trader is credited at the karum-office for the expenses ,~~ that a merchant could incurred on a mission to PuruSl_lattum(ana i i p r ~ t i m ) suggesting temporarily function as a karum's envoy. The scribe Ikuppia acts as the envoy of the karum of WahSuSana according to kt 83lk 117.67He alone is dispatched to Kanish, while two pairs of envoys are sent to PuruShattum.68 The use of a kiirum-envoy (iiprum) for non-official purposes is mentioned as the origin of a debt to the colony of Kanish: "Here, the kiirum has seized four of your slavegirls. They say: 'Bring one and a half mina of silver, the costs for envoys and one mina for your bamuitum, and free your slave-girls.' We argued: 'Let the ersu-officials sell the man's house for the bamuitum.' But they said: 'No, bring the silver."'69 This text also demonstrates that a colony, like the authorities in Assur, did enforce payment by the seizure of property belonging to the debtor. The Assyrians and the Anatolian palaces Anatolia was politically divided into a number of city-states (Kanish, Mama, PuruSl_lattum,WahSuSana etc.). The legal basis for undisturbed commercial contact with Assyrian traders was formed by the sworn treaties concluded between each ruler and the city of Assur represented by its envoys (iipru i a dim) and the kiirum of Kanish. The institution called 'palace' is represented by the ruler (rubii 'um) and the queen (rubiitum). The (higher) palace personnel, the tiriit ekallim, are distinguished from the palace proper. The officers with whom the Assyrians dealt mostly were the rabi sikkitim (general?), the ala@innum, the rabi simmiltim, the 'chief of the (royal) warehouses' (rabi buriatim), the 'chief of the horses' (rabi sisiJ2) and the 'chief of the strong room' (rabi maggartim). They had their own household (b2tum) which acted as trading partner to the
64
65 66 67 68
69
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Sometimes called mar iiprim, AKT 2, 13:24; kt glt 3.552, 54; TPAK 1, 203% Larsen, City-state, 280. Naster (unp.):15-16. C. Giinbattl, 34. Uluslararasl Assiriyoloji Kongresi (Ankara 1998), 479-480, plate 139. A pair of envoys occurs further in BIN 6, 8; BIN 6, 120; KTP 6; KTP 10. AKT 3, 92:33-38.
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Assyrians. Another term for their possessions might be alum or estate, which occurs in a number of texts.70 The importance of the rabi sikkatim in the palace hierarchy is apparent from his influence in judicial matters. He was the Anatolian officer who could provide an Assyrian with a native attorney ( r a b i ~ u r n )in ; ~another ~ text his influence could lead to the release of a prisoner. More than forty titles of Anatolian functionaries are known at present. Only two of these are formed by the addition of an Assyrian ending to a local, in both cases Hurrian, word, i.e. alabbinnum and iinabilum.72 The rest are Assyrian, being either an existing title borrowed from Mesopotamia, as rabi sikkatim; a translation of a local title; or a new one. The native titles in the 'Kanishite' language are unknown due to the strong Assyrian influence, and even the king bears an Assyrian title. A large number of local dignitaries are 'chief' (rabi) over a professional group in the service of the palace, whilst others belong to the military establishment. The Assyrian language and cuneiform writing were used in the local administration and in the correspondence of the local rulers.73 Multilinguicity, or at least an adequate knowledge of each other's language, enabled the Assyrian merchants to communicate with their Anatolian counterparts without interpreters, these were mainly reserved for more demanding ~ituations.7~ The Anatolian rulers obtained a considerable portion of the raw materials and luxury items they desired, though lacked in their own realm, by means of trade. Hence, the Assyrian merchants dealt primarily with the palace and, alongside it, with the local officers and their households. This accounts for the access that Assyrian traders had to the local court, whether in a small group or in the company of a kirum delegation (as in BIN 6, 23). Local itinerant merchants, whether in the service of the palace or operating independently of it, are not mentioned as such, but they may be hiding behind a few references to partnerships (tappa 'uttum). Commercial activity among Anatolians appears to have been largely confined to the lending of money and cereals.75 Such native entrepreneurs were called nuJii'um by the Assyrians and not tamkarum.76 We do not 70
In KTS 1, 48b, two partners settle accounts and agree that one of them will collect 2 minas 41 shekels of silver ina alcini. The same word occurs in KTH 15:lO-11 (much copper was lost either in the palace or ina cilani) and KTK 106 (silver is bound to ... and alaniiunu). The last example is rendered "and their estates" by CAD All, 386b. 7 l KTK 20:29; TC 3, 271 in Ulamma; a native attorney named Kala occurs in AKT 2, 13:s. 7 2 The Sinahilum, whose title means "second (to the king)," is regarded by K.R. Veenhof as a kind of vizier, presumably only in smaller towns, see Veenhof, Status, 524. 73 See G. Giinbatt~,Belleten LI (1987), 9-10, for an example of local administrative documents in Assyrian, and Balkan, Letter, for a diplomatic letter exchanged between two Anatolian kings. 74 There is even a 'chief interpreter' rabi targumann2, BIN 6, 193:l. See F. Starke, WO 24 (1993), 31 on the derivation of the word targumannum. 75 Cf. Veenhof, EniSrum; Donbaz, AiZd. Some texts mention payments due by a palace to an Anatolian, perhaps because that person, as a trader, had supplied goods. See EL no. 209:7-11, where payment remains uncertain; TC 2,71:24, where silver due by the palace ([K~.BABBAR Aa f i . ~ ~ ~ - lisi m ) listed as one of the securities for the debt. 76 This distinction is also made when Anatolians and Assyrians occur in the same text, as in kt 881k 1050 referred to in BiOr 49 (1992), 793-794. However, kt 891k 371 (V. Donbaz, Studies Nimet OzgiiC, 139, pl. 29, 1-2, 2a-b), dealing with Kanishites only, mentions the word tamkarum for the native 'creditor'.
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know whether Anatolian rulers included the subject of trade in the sworn treaties they drew up with each other, either in a possible local tradition or, in its absence, elaborating the example given by the Assyrians. It is therefore uncertain whether we have to consider the political fragmentation of Anatolia a hindrance for the local merchants in comparison with their Assyrian counterparts, for whom the crossing of borders was unproblematic by virtue of the treaties concluded with the rulers. The Assyrians clearly had the advantage of possessing the infrastructure necessary for long-distance trade, but we do not know how the Anatolian networks operated. Whatever the role of Anatolian traders may have been, it is a fact that Assyrians acted as intermediaries. The way in which local officials obtained 'mules' (perdum) and meteoric iron (aii'um, amiitum) will illustrate this. Assyrian merchants bought the 'mules', according to KTS 2, 28, from a palace which may have bred these animals. Other Anatolians ordered a perdum-equid, for instance I;Iuharimataku in C 1 (see below), or a certain Kadala, who, according to kt t/k 1,77 paid almost two minas of silver in advance for a single perdum, which the Assyrian merchant bought near the town of Saladuar. The Assyrians also played a crucial role in providing meteoric iron to wealthy Anatolians, like the general of WabSuSana. This commodity was not only imported from Assur, but also discovered in Anatolia itself. The often repeated view that the trade in meteoric iron was subjected to severe restrictions in Anatolia is, in our opinion, a longstanding misconception, recently repeated by T. Bryce in his otherwise excellent study.78 A transport of textiles and tin arriving in a city was brought to the palace in order to be cleared.79 The king had the right to levy a tax of five per cent on the textiles and to select circa ten per cent at a special price. On tin he levied a tax of two minas per talent. In AKT 3, 19, nine persons are listed, presumably the owners of the 300 kutanu- and 300 pirikannu-textiles "which we sold to the palace". Payment for the textiles bought as preemption, was transferred to the kiirum-office where the merchants could collect their due. The Assyrians joined in the existing Anatolian practice of gift exchange as one of the instruments to promote a good relationship and remain in a ruler's favor. Apart from diplomatic results, exchanging gifts was also commercially important. Receiving an erbum or 'gift' usually entailed a reciprocal activity by the recipient.80 A local gentleman by the name of uubarimataku writes to his Assyrian friend in text C1: "Now the ruler is offering me no less than two offices, that of alahhinnum and that of iinahilum, and I have promised the ruler a gift, a big one".81 Envoys of the karum of Turbumit bring the ruler of Tarnnia an erbum when they want him to take an oath (kt f/k 183). According to TC 1, 39, merchandise is offered for sale partly as an erbum and partly as normal trading goods: "I (= ISme-ASSur) am in Tubpia. As you (= Itiir-il) instructed me, I brought the ruler a raqqutum- and a lubziium-garment, furthermore, I brought 10 textiles and (some) a$iJumiron (to the palace). (The ruler) returned the textiles and the aii 'um to me, but accepted the 77 78
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H. Sever, X. Turk Tarih Kongresi. Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler, ii cilt, Ankara 1990, pl. 290. The Kingdom of the Hittites, Oxford 1998, 33: "smuggling of valuable items out of Anatolia also sometimes occurred, for example the illegal export of the rare and precious meteoric iron." This appears to go back on K. Balkan, Fs Guterbock 1974, 30. Cf. also Larsen, City-state, 245. On the question of meteoric iron see K. Reiter, Die Metalle im Alten Orient, 379ff. 79 See Larsen, Procedures, 155ff. Cf. on erbum L.L. Orlin, Assyrian Colonies in Cappadocia, Den HagParis 1970, 118 note 19. C. Gunbatti, Archivum Anatolicum 2 (1996), 30, interprets erbum as goods ordered by the palace. Veenhof, Status, 518.
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erbum. He said: I cannot take it. I received [x] minas of copper [...I for the erbum I gave him." The same persons are involved in kt 8% 27,g2 a letter sent by the ruler of Tubpia to Itiir-il: "( ...) ISme-ASSur brought me amiiturn-iron and 1 kutanum as an erbum. For his erbum I gave him 100 (minas) of Tubpia-copper, but he refused to accept it and I left it for him in Sumea's house." Individuals belonging to the palace and other wealthy Anatolians put forward special requests (eriitum) to a trader, including fine garments and linen textiles.83 The wish is sometimes motivated as in BIN 4,45, where the alahhinnum (of PuruShattum) annuls the purchase of 130 textiles "because the wedding will not take place7'.84 The negotiated price for the merchandise was normally paid by the palace indirectly by transferring it to the local karum-office. The means of payment accepted by the Assyrians are diverse, silver and copper are most common, but as the local economy rested on agriculture, barley, wool, and sheep are also well attested. At harvest time a palace in a smaller city and, presumably, all estate holders, would be occupied to such a degree that normal business was i m p ~ s s i b l eOften . ~ ~ the Assyrians received a bond called igwtum which gave them a legal right to the proceeds of the merchandise due to them.86 A perhaps not uncommon event is related in kt a/k 583, where the palace and its entourage owe 24,000 minas of copper to an Assyrian for some years.87 Their latest offer is payment in fields and orchards worth at least twenty minas of silver. Financial losses occurred as well. One merchant (CCT 2, 25)88urges his partners to assemble all goods which arrived with two caravans in the city and bring it into the palace in order that the tax will be levied simultaneously. They must watch the goods to avoid any irregularity (iillatum) from happening. A palace could detain an Assyrian for smuggling, for indebtedness, but also for political reasons.89 Perhaps to make an example of him, one palace confiscated the smuggled goods and imprisoned the well-known merchant PCiSu-k6n (ATHE 62).90 The palace could also confiscate a trader's possessions or demand a guarantor. This appears to be the background in TC 3,75, where the karum of Kanish designated someone to act as guarantor to the palace: "Speak to Inniiya, thus (says) Dada: as for the fact that I am kept back here, I am staying in a ... We went to the ruler and the iinahilum up to ten times and I said: 'My lord, let me depart!' but he replied: 'The envoys (of the karum of Kanish) have given you as a guarantor to the palace'."91 82 83
C. Gunbath, Archivum Anatolicum 2 (1996), 36 no. 1. E.g. in kt 8 9 k 252 (see note 86 below, p. 330): "The palace wants linen textiles (kitiitum). The ruler said: write down what you want me to pay for it." A queen requests thin textiles (2 kutant? qatnzitim rubiitum terris'i, kt d k 211; 1 lubGs'am pasiam u 1 kutanam qatnam rubiitum tCriSanni, kt nlk 388). 84 Michel, ZnnZlya no. 116 with the note to line 36 on p. 162. 85 BIN 4, 39: kima ebziriununi u iimum kasci, "As it is their harvest time, trade is paralyzed". g6 See Veenhof, Zjurtum, 31 Iff. 87 Dercksen, Copper, 202. 88 Michel, InnGya no. 168. 89 Cf. the text edited in C. Michel and P. Garelli, "Heurts avec une principaut6 anatolienne", WZKM 86 (1996), 277-290. 90 See Veenhof, Aspects, 307f. TC 3,75:1-13, a-na I-nu-a qi-bi-ma urn-ma Da-da-a-ma a-di s'a a-na-kam kd-al-a-ku-ni i-na nu-du-lih-tim wa-65-ha-ku a-di' 10 a-nu ru-ha-im u' if-nu-hi-li-im ne'-li-ma um-ma anu-ku-ma be-li a-ta ha-ra-nam lo dl-nam um-ma Su-ut-ma l1 ki-ma q6-ta-tim l2 ti'-ip-ru E.GAL
*
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Palaces assisted Assyrian merchants by providing them with guides and (armed) escorts (riidi'um). This may be part of the assistence they were bound by treaty to provide, comparable to the extradiction of thieves. The Assyrian authorities had the power to put murderers and thieves to death,92and it is likely they had some kind of prison of their own.93 Other forms of support by the authorities to Assyrian traders are the renting of wagons as a means of transportg4(TC 3, 3) and making storage facilities available to them. Such assistence may have already existed for local merchants, about whom we are poorly informed. A maknakkum i a ekallim, a sealed storeroom at the palace, occurs in CCT 4,7c:5 and I 626: 1-2.95 The Assyrian institution charged with maintaining relations with the local palace was the local or near-by k&um or wabartum. On a higher level the central karum of Kanish or the city of Assur itself could intervene, employing their diplomatic envoys (iipru). After the murder of two Assyrians in Luhuzatia, the wabartum of KuSarra went to the palace to demand assistance.96 If a conflict arose between an individual merchant and members of the palace the Assyrian would apply to the Assyrian authorities for intervention. Kt b k 9597 contains a plea for private intervention to obtain the release of two Assyrians held by a palace. The addressee of this letter is urged to go to the palace, accompanied by another person, and speak "one flattering word" to the gentlemen there and give a few textiles to the rabi simrniltim.
INSTITUTIONAL AND PRIVATE IN THE OLD ASSYRIAN PERIOD
of the merchants often coincided and, as Garelli once observed,98 by enriching themselves the traders contributed to the wealth of their city.
Bibliography Balkan, K. Letter Dercksen, J.G. Copper Financing
Donbaz, V. AS2d Driel, G. van Fs De Meyer
Conclusion
The institutional influence by the city-state represented by the city assembly and the 'house of the city', on the caravan trade between Assur and Anatolia was great. They defined the conditions under which trade was practised. The city appears to have regulated the sale of merchandise in Assur and the trade in certain commodities. By monopolizing the export of tin to Anatolia and establishing a trading network, it laid the basis for the city's commercial success during this period. By contrast, the system of credit, long-term investments (naruqqum), and other forms of partnership contracts were largely outside of institutional interference. If one takes into consideration that the class of wealthy merchants constituted one of the political groups in the city-state, it is clear that the division between private and institutional is not easy to make. The interests of the city and
13 i-di-nu-ni-kd.Edited as Michel, Innaya no. 61. The word in line 5 is usually taken as a geographical name, see RGTC 4, 86, which seems unlikely as the writer already declared he is "here". Line 12 is rendered "envoys of the palace" by Garelli, Les Assyriens, 343, and Veenhof, Status, 524. 9 2 K. Balkan, Fs Giiterbock,31 note 16; kt b/k 471, l 7 fa-ri-qi a-na l 8 du-a-ki-im f i . ~ ~ ~ - l l il9r nidi-ni-a-ti'. g3 With Reimschnieder, who in JESHO 20, 116, thinks the karum did have such a prison. M.T. Larsen, Fs Lubor Matous' 11, 120, assumes the karum could only hand people over to the palace. 94 Cf. Dercksen, Copper, 64ff. 9 5 J. Lewy, HUCA 27, 19 note 82, renders fa ekallirn in CCT 4,7c:5 "a palace official". 96 Kayseri 1830, see K. Hecker, 1995 Yzlz Anadolu Medeniyetleri Miizesi Konferanslarz (Ankara 1996), 150. 97 K. Balkan, OrNS 36 (1967), 410.
151
Garelli, P. Les Assyriens Marchands Giinbatti, C. Kiirum Hirsch, H. Religion Larsen, M.T. City-state Partnerships Procedures Michel, C. Zmmobili2res
Znniiya Ulshofer, A.M. Privaturkunden Veenhof, K.R. Aspects 98
Marchands, 106.
Letter of King Anum-hirbi of Mama to King Warshama of Kanish, Ankara 1957. The Old Assyrian Copper Trade in Anatolia (= PIHANS 75), Istanbul 1996. "On the Financing of Old Assyrian Merchants", in J.G. Dercksen (ed.), Trade and Finance in Ancient Mesopotamia (= PIHANS 84), Istanbul 1999, 85-99. "The Silver of the Gods. On Old Assyrian ikribii", Archivum Anatolicum 3 (1997), 75-100. "The Business of Aged, an Anatolian Merchant", AfO 35 (1988), 4863. "Private or not-so-private: Nippur Ur I11 Files", in: Cinquante-deux re'flexions sur le Proche-Orient ancien offertes en hommage i? Le'on De Meyer (= MHEO 11), Leuven 1994, 181-192. Les Assyriens en Cappadoce, Paris 1963. "Marchands et tamkGrzi assyriens en Cappadoce", Zraq 39 (1977), 99107. "More examples of correspondences between kiirurn's", Archivum Anatolicum 1 (199% 107-115. Untersuchungen zur altassyrischen Religion (= AfO Beiheft 13/14), Graz 1961. The Old Assyrian City-state and its Colonies, Copenhagen 1976. "Partnerships in the Old Assyrian Trade", Zraq 39 (1977), 119-145. The Old Assyrian Caravan Procedures, Istanbul 1967. "ProprittCs immobilibres dans les tablettes palCo-assyriennes", in: K.R. Veenhof (ed.), Houses and Households in Ancient Mesopotamia (= PIHANS 78), Istanbul 1996, 285-300. Znniiya dans les tablettes pale'o-assyriennes. I1 Edition des textes, Paris 1991.
Die altassyrischen Privaturkunden, Stuttgart 1995. Aspects of Old Assyrian Trade and its Terminology, Leiden 1972.
152 Bullae
Credit
EniSrum
&7amuStum Zjurtum
J.G. DERCKSEN "On the Identification and Implications of some Bullae from Acemhoyiik and Kiiltepe", in Studies in Honor of Nimet OzgiiE, Ankara 1993, 645-657. "Silver and Credit in Old Assyrian Trade", in J.G. Dercksen (ed.), Trade and Finance in Ancient Mesopotamia, Istanbul 1999 (= PIHANS 84), 55-83. "An Ancient Anatolian Money-Lender. His Loans, Securities and Debt-Slaves", in: B. HruSka, G. Komordczy (eds.), Festschrift Lubor MatouS, Budapest 1978, volume 11, 279-3 11. "The Old Assyrian hamus'tum-period: a seven-day week", JEOL 34 (1995-96), 5-26. "Old Assyrian isurtum, Akkadian e@rum and Hittite GIS.HUR", in T.P.J. van den Hout and J. de Roos (eds.), Studio Historiae Ardens.
Ancient Near Eastern Studies Presented to Philo H.J. Houwink ten Cute (= PIHANS 74), Istanbul 1995, 311-332. "Miete. C. Altassyrisch", RIA 8 (1994), 181-184. Miete Modern Features "'Modern Features' in Old Assyrian Trade", JESHO 40 (1997), 336Status
Stele
366. "Status and Offices of an Anatolim Gentleman. Two unpublished Letters of ~uharimatakufrom karum Kanish", Studies in Honor of Tahsin Ozgiig, Ankara 1989, 515-525. "'In accordance with the words of the stele': evidence for Old Assyrian legislation", Chicago-Kent Law Review 70 (1995), 17171744.
DAS P A L A S T G E S C ~ F TIN DER ALTBABYLONISCHEN ZEIT J. RENGER(BERLIN)
0. Einleitung Der Begriff Palastgeschaft geht auf F.R. Kraus zuriick, der in seinem Buch Ediktl erstmals von "Geschaften des Palastes" oder kurz "Palastgeschiiften" sprach. Die Sache selbst war bereits 1941 Gegenstand der Untersuchung von P. K o ~ c h a k e r Einzelne .~ Palastgeschafte sind seit 1958, dem Jahr, in dem das Buch von Kraus erschienen ist, von verschiedenen Autoren im ganzen oder teilweise aufgrund der Urkunden behandelt worden. Dabei ist die Verbindung zu dem Phanomen Palastgeschaft, so wie es Kraus definiert hat, oft nicht rnit der notwendigen Deutlichkeit hergestellt worden. Nur Kraus selber ist auf das Thema in der Folge zuruckgekommen: In seiner Arbeit uber die Viehhaltung,3 seinem Aufsatz Palast4 und schlieljlich in seiner neuen Monographie Verjfkgungen.5 Eine erneute Beschaftigung mit dem Thema erscheint mir aus zweierlei Grunden dringend erforderlich. Einmal sind nicht alle Palastgeschafte, die uns aus den Urkunden bekannt sind, beschrieben, zum anderen aber scheint mir die Bedeutung des Palastgeschaftes als ein charakteristischer modus operandi einer altorientalischen Wirtschaft bisher nicht in ausreichendem Malje gewurdigt worden zu sein. Ich glaube, dal3 das Palastgeschaft seinen bestimmten Platz in der Entwicklung wirtschaftlicher Organisationsformen im Alten Orient hat. Es erscheint in der Nachfolge der die Wirtschaft der Ur-III-Zeit bestimmenden Organisationsform der oikos-Wirtschaft. Diese ist gepragt durch die Tatsache, da13 die gesamten wirtschaftlichen Aktivitaten des Staates in Form von Einzelhaushalten organisiert und hierarchisch gegliedert der Person des Herrschers unterstanden. In der altbabylonischen Zeit dagegen beobachten wir, wie der Staat, genauer der Palast, sich bemuht, wirtschaftliche Operationen an individuelle Entrepreneure zu vergeben und sich dadurch von der tatsachlichen Durchfuhrung wirtschaftlicher Operationen zu entlasten. Dieses Prinzip, das sich rudimentar oder ansatzweise bereits in Einzelfallen in der Ur-III-Zeit beobachten laat, hat sich im babylonischen Raum bis in die Spatzeit gehalten. Hervorragende Beispiele sind die
F.R. Kraus, Ein Edikt des Konigs Ammi-Saduqa von Babylon, Leiden 1958. P. Koschaker, "Zur staatlichen Wirtschaftsverwaltung in altbabylonischer Zeit," ZA 47 (1942), 135ff.; zu zahlreichen Aspekten der Palastwirtschaft im altbabylonischen Ur vgl. M. van de Mieroop, Society and Enterprise in Old Babylonian Ur, Berlin 1992. F.R. Kraus, Staatliche Viehhaltung im altbabylonischen Lande Larsa, Amsterdam 1966; dazu weitere Beitrage in BSA 7 (1993). F.R. Kraus, "Der 'Palast', Produzent und Unternehmer im Konigreiche Babylon nach Harnmurapi (ca. 1750 - 1600 v.Chr.)," in: E. Lipinski (Hrsg.), State and Temple Economy in the Ancient Near East, Bd. 11, Leuven 1979,423-434. F.R. Kraus, Konigliche Velfiigungen in altbabylonischer Zeit, Leiden 1984.
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Generalpacht, die uns aus Urkunden aus Uruk aus der Zeit Nabonids bekannt ist. Ein anderes Beispiel bietet das Archiv der MuraSQ-Familieaus dem achienidischen Nippur. Untersuchungen zur Wirtschaft ~ g ~ p t e zur n s Ptolomaer-Zeit zeigen, dal3 sich dort ein ahnliches weite Teile der Wirtschaft umfassendes System nachweisen laat, das in seiner Struktur zu einem direkten Vergleich mit dem Palastgeschaft einladt. Sollte ein derartiger Vergleich zeigen, dal3 es sich hierbei um mehr als blol3e Zufdligkeiten handelt, stellt sich die Frage nach der grundsatzlichen Bedeutung, die diesem Phtinomen fur die antike Wirtschaftsgeschichte zukornmt. Dabei gilt es etwa zu kl&en, inwieweit bestimmte Formen und Grundbedingungen der Staats- und Wirtschaftsstruktur mit der Existenz des Palastgeschaftes korrelieren.
I I1
selbst bezeichnen eine bestimmte Gruppe solcher Entrepreneure als "Ertragsbringer" (n2i biltim). Die Wahl des Terminus Entrepreneur scheint mir gerechtfertig im Lichte der klassischen wirtschaftshistorischen Definition, die auf die Verwendung des Wortes in historischem Bezug zum franzosischen Merkantilismus zuriickgeht, und den der Okonom I.M. Kirzner folgendermden definiert: " ... By the seventeenth century the term was used to designate the risk bearer, typically 'a person who entered into a contractual relationship with the government for the performance of a service or the supply of goods. The price at which the contract was valued was fixed and the entrepreneurs bore the risks of profit and loss from the bargain'."7
1. Zur Definition Ich beschranke rnich auf zwei Zitate. Das erste habe ich selbst 1984 gegeben? " ... economically viable activities of institutional households tended to be granted to members of the Clite or upper classes as franchises, a form of economic management termed by F. R. Kraus as 'Palastgeschaft'. The overriding purpose was to relieve institutional households of the high cost of maintaining a large laborforce that was in many cases in fact only needed for seasonal work."
F.R. Kraus hat in seinem oben erwahnten Aufsatz Palast, 431 die folgende Definition gegeben: "Die Wirtschaftspolitik des 'Palastes' hat offenbar das Ziel, sich einen eigenen Produktions-, Absatz- und ijberwach~ngsap~arat zu sparen, Risikos zu vermeiden oder zu vermindern und mit relativ wenigen Verantwortlichen einfache, genau festgelegte Beziehungen zu unterhalten. Der Preis, den die Krone dafur bezahlt, ist vermutlich eine bewul3te Beschrankung der von ihren Mittelsmannern verlangten Leistungen auf weniger als das mogliche Maximum. Aus der Zeit des Ediktes lassen sich jedoch keinerlei Verhaltniszahlen dafiir beibringen. Der Zweck dieser Politik scheint es zu sein, den Mittelsmannern die Moglichkeit zu eigenem Gewinn zu gewiihren, vielleicht, um sie dadurch personlich an den ihnen ubertragenen Aufgaben zu interessieren, sicher aber, um sie in den Stand zu setzen, die Risikos zu tragen, die der 'Palast' auf sie abgewdzt hatte. Gelingt ihnen das nicht mehr, so nimmt der Staat mit Riickstandserlassen, wie unser Edikt sie enthdt, das Defizit auf sich."
Die typischen Elemente eines Palastgeschiiftes sind: 1. Der Palast ubertragt die Durchfuhrung wirtschaftlicher Aktivitaten einem Entrepreneur. 2. Der Entrepreneur tragt das Risiko. 3. Das Palastgeschaft wird vertraglich, d. h. per Rechtsurkunde, vereinbart und enthdt die folgenden, wichtigen Stipulationen: 4. Diese regeln: a) die Leistungspflicht des Entrepreneurs, die b) entweder fest nach Menge etc. fixiert ist, oder proportional a priori vereinbart ist und im Leistungsfall durch Schatzung (Sukunnfim) ermittelt wird. Aber Kirzner betont auch, dal3 letztendlich der Staat das Risiko ubernahm, wenn der Entrepreneur in Schwierigkeiten geriet, denn der Staat war auf die fortdauernden Dienste des Entrepreneurs angewiesen.
2. Die Hauptfomen des Palastgeschliftes
In Zusammenhang mit dem Palastgeschaft wird des ofteren von Mittelsmannern gesprochen. Ich selbst und andere tendieren irnmer mehr dam, den Begriff 'Entrepreneur' zu verwenden. Als deutscher Ausdruck empfehlen sich auch 'Mittelsmann' oder 'Konzessionar'. Eine wortliche mersetzung Unternehmer steht zu sehr in der Gefahr Assoziationen zu modernem Unternehmertum zu wecken. Die altbabylonischen Texte
Drei hauptsachliche Formen des Palastgeschaftes lassen sich unterscheiden: - Palastgeschafte, die auf landwirtschaftlicherProduktion oder Viehhaltung beruhen, - Palastgeschafte, in denen es um das Ausbeuten naturlicher Ressourcen geht, und schliel3lich - Palastgeschafte, deren Aufgabe im Bereich der Dienstleistung liegen, die teilweise mit den beiden zuvor genannten Formen von Palastgeschaften verbunden sein konnen. Zur ersten Gruppe gehort der Getreideanbau, die Dattelpalmkultivation und der Anbau von sonstigen Feld- und Gartenprodukten, wie Olsaaten, Zwiebeln usw. Bei der Herdenhaltung geht es zunachst um die Wollerzeugung und in zweiter Linie um das Bereitstellen von Schlachtvieh. Bei der Rinderhaltung steht die Versorgung institutioneller Haushalte mit Arbeitstieren im Vordergrund, wahrend die Produktion von Milchprodukten eine zweitrangige Rolle gespielt zu haben scheint Unter den Palastgeschaften, deren Zweck auf die Ausbeutung natiirlicher Ressourcen gerichtet ist, ist der Fisch- und Vogelfang in den Kanalen und Horen (Hors) am besten
"Patterns of Non-institutional Trade and Non-commercial Exchange in Ancient Mesopotamia at the Beginning of the Second Millennium B.C.," in: A. Archi (Hrsg.), Circulation of Goods in Non-Palatial Context in the Ancient Near East, Roma 1984, 64.
I.M. Kirzner, Perception, Opportunity, and Profit. Studies in the Theory of Entrepreneurship, Chicago 1979, 39.
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urkundlich bezeugt. Ebenfalls in diesem Zusamrnenhang zu nennen ist das Gewinnen von Schilfrohr und das Ziegelstreichen. Bei den Dienstleistungen, die mittels Palastgeschaft erbracht werden, steht der "VerschleiB,"~d. h. die Verteilung, von landwirtschaftlichen Produkten und dern Ertrag des Fischfangs im Mittelpunkt der urkundlichen ijberlieferung. Eine wichtige Rolle spielte auch die Speicherung und der Transport von Gerste. Ebenfalls als Palastgeschaft organisiert ist das Bereitstellen von Arbeitskraften fur saisonale Arbeiten.
3. Landwirtschafliche Produktion und Herdenhaltung 3.1 Die landwirtschafliche Produktion Landwirtschaftliche Produktion als Teil des Palasteinkommens wahrend der altbabylonischen Zeit ist ein Aspekt der komplexen Sozialorganisation dieser Periode. Wesentliches Charakteristikum ist die Tatsache, d& ein grol3er Teil - wenn nicht die Mehrheit - der Bevolkerung ihren Lebensunterhalt aus ihnen vorn Palast zugeteilten Versorgungsfeldern bestritten hat, wofiir sie dern Palast zu regelmmigen Dienstleistungen verpflichtet waren. Es scheint, als ob der Palasthaushalt oder die Palasthaushalte entweder direkt oder indirekt landwirtschaftliche Nutzflachen von uns unbekannter GrolSe kontrollierten. Entsprechend den Bewirtschaftungsformen und ihrer jeweiligen juristischen Ausgestaltung la& sich das vorn Palast kontrollierte Land in drei Typen oder Organisationsformen einteilen: 1. Die Versorgungsfelder, die an eine Vielzahl von Personen oder Personengruppen vergeben wurden und die dafiir zu bestimmten Dienstleistungen zugunsten des Palastes verpflichtet waren (A.SA.SUKU = iukzisum), 2. Felder, die auf einer Pachtbasis vergeben wurden (A.SA G I ~ U N= eqel biltim), und schliel3lich 3. Felder, die der Palast zu seiner Verfugung hielt (eqlum i a rki ekallim ukallu) und je nach Bedarf als Versorgungsland oder als Pachtland vergab oder aber die unter besonderen vertraglichen Formen von iEakkum-Bauern ("Staatspachtern" 1 landwirtschaftlichen Entrepreneuren) bestellt wurden. Diese drei Organisationsformen sind bereits aus der prasargonischen Periode und der Ur-111-Zeit, wenn auch unter anderen Namen, wohlbekannt. Die aul3erordentlich verwickelten Beziehungen und Verpflichtungen verschiedener Gruppen der Bevolkerung gegeniiber dern Konig und dern Palast werden zusatzlich durch zahlreiche Ausdriicke beleuchtet, die im Edikt des Konigs Ammi~aduqa(1646 - 1626 v.Chr.) genannt werden: naii biltim, muik2num, rediim, ba'irum, ilkum a @ n Sa Babili u naweiu. Letzte Klarheit ist hier aber noch nicht erreicht, wie auch die unterschiedliche Einteilung des Palastlandes zeigt, die Kraus vornimmt.9 Im vorliegenden Kontext des Palastgeschaftes interessiert nur das vorn Palast kontrollierte und von ihm zur
Dieser Ausclruck wird von Kraus gebraucht. Kraus, Palast, 430; s. dam auch Renger, Patterns, 63.
DAS P A L A S T G E S C H ~IN DER ALTBABYLONISCHEN ZEIT
157
Bewirtschaftung vergebene Land. Die Rolle privaten Feldeigentums spielt in diesem Zusammenhang keine Rolle.lo 3.1.1 Einzelheiten zu den Bedingungen, unter denen vorn Palast kontrolliertes Land bewirtschaftet wurde - Gersteanbau Die Bedingungen, unter denen das vorn Palast kontrollierte Land bewirtschaftet wurde, richten sich im einzelnen nach der jeweiligen vertraglichen Ausgestaltung der Bewirtschaftungsform (Versorgungs- oder Pachtland) bzw. den Vereinbarungen, die zwischen Palast und Bewirtschafter getroffen worden sind. Im Falle der Versorgungsfelder bestand die Gegenleistung des Inhabers eines Versorgungsfeldes in Dienstleistungen. Diese konnten z.B. im Militiirdienst bestehen, wozu entsprechende Bestimmungen im Rechtsbuch des Hammurapi Naheres ausfuhren.11 Weitere Einzelheiten entnehmen wir dern Archiv des Ubiirum, uber das B. Landsberger ausfuhrlich gehandelt hat.12 Ein weiteres Archiv, das in diesem Zusammenhang zu nennen ist, ist das des Lipit-Ea.13 Die zweite grolje Gruppe von Empfhgem von Versorgungsfeldern sind die Funktioniire und Bediensteten des Palastes und zwar in allen vorstellbaren Rangstufen, soweit sie nicht ihre Versorgung in Form von Naturalrationen erhielten. Aber auch andere Personen und Personengruppen wie Hirten, Fischer oder Handwerker konnten Versorgungsfelder erhalten. Ein verhaltnismafiig detailliertes, wenn auch meist nur episodisches Bild uber die Probleme, die sich im Zusammenhang mit der Zuteilung und Bewirtschaftung derartiger Versorgungsfelder ergeben konnten, vermitteln die Briefe Hammurapis an seinen Bevollmachtigten Sarna~hazir,den er nach der Eroberung Sudbabylonienseingesetzt hatte. m e r die vorn Palast gegen Abgabe verpachteten Felder wissen wir verhiiltnismal3ig wenig, soweit es um quantitative Aussagen geht. Die Ausgestaltung des Pachtverhiiltnisses scheint im grol3en und ganzen dern der privaten Pacht entsprochen zu haben. Die juristischen Formen der Pachtvertrage sind in der Dissertation von G. Mauer dargestellt worden.14 Alle bis dahin bekannten Pachtvertrage sind irn Appendix listenartig aufgefuhrt und ermoglichen so einen leichten ijberblick. Allerdings behandelt die Arbeit nicht die wirtschaftlichen, genauer landwirtschaftlichen, Bedingungen, die die Pacht von Feldem bestimmten. Dies war wohl auch nicht Aufgabe der Arbeit. Fur eine Beurteilung der Feldpacht in altbabylonischer Zeit aus wirtschaftshistorischer Perspektive sind derartige Untersuchungen allerdings eine wesentliche Voraussetzung. Von ganz Fiir Einzelheiten s. J. Renger, "Das Privateigentum an der Feldflur in altbabylonischer Zeit" in: Das Grundeigentum in Mesopotamien (= Jahrbuch fiir Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Sonderband 1987), Berlin 1988, 49-67; Ders., "Zu den Besitzverhaltnissen am Ackerland im altbabylonischen Uruk," AoF 22 (1995), 157-159; Ders., "Institutional, Communal, and Individual Ownership or Possession of Arable Land in Ancient Mesopotamia from the End of the Fourth to the End of the First Millennium B.C.," Chicago Kent Law Review 7111 (1995) (= Symposium on Ancient Law, Economics & Society, Part 11), 269-319. CH 027-31. l 2 B. Landsberger, "Remarks on the Archive of the Soldier Ubarum," JCS 9 (1955), 121-131; Addenda in JCS 10 (1956), 39. J. Renger, "Zur Bewirtschaftung von Dattelpalmgiirten warend der altbabylonischen Zeit," Fs Kraus, 290-297. G. Mauer, Das Fomzular der altbabylonischen Bodenpachtvertriige, Diss. Miinchen 1980.
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entscheidender Bedeutung bei der Ausgestaltung der Pachtverhdtnisse scheint mir die Frage nach der Hohe der Pachtabgabe zu sein. Bekanntlich mussen wir unterscheiden zwischen einer festgelegten Abgabenmenge pro verpachteter Flacheneinheit und prozentualer Abgabe auf den Ertrag. Bei der im vorhinein festgelegten Abgabemenge pro Flacheneinheit spielen naturlich bestimmte Vorstellungen uber zu erwartende Durchschnittsertrage eine Rolle. Beim Festsetzen der prozentualen Abgabe ist es entscheidend, welche zusatzlichen Leistungen vom Pachter zu erbringen bzw. nicht zu erbringen waren. Unklar ist bisher, ob die Erntevorausschatzung (imittum) "auf dern Halm" mit anschlieflender Festlegung der tatsachlich abzuliefernden Menge bei der Feldpacht in der altbabylonischen Zeit eine Rolle gespielt hat. Das System selbst sieht vor, da13 uber den abzuliefernden Betrag im AnschluB an die Schatzung eine Schuldurkunde zu Lasten des Pachters ausgestellt wird. Das System ist aus dern Bereich der Gartenpacht aus der altbabylonischen Zeit wohlbekannt, wie unten zu zeigen sein wird (3.1.3). Fur Felder konnen wir das Verfahren urkundlich bisher nur aus der neubabylonischen Zeit nachweisen. Eine besondere Form der Pacht in der altbabylonischen Zeit stellt die sogenannte Neubruchpacht dar, uber deren vertragliche Bedingungen die entsprechenden Paragraphen des Rechtsbuches des Hammurapi Auskunft geben. Sicher enthalten diese Paragraphen allgemeine Grundsatze, die fur alle Arten von Pachtverhaltnissen gelten, unabhangig davon, ob sie zwischen Privatleuten oder institutionellen Haushalten und individuellen Pachtern abgeschlossen worden sind. Irn groBeren Zusammenhang der Interpretation und des daraus sich ergebenden Verstiindnisses des Rechtsbuches des Hammurapi glaube ich, dal3 die dort enthaltenen Abschnitte uber die Neubruchpacht eine besondere Form des Verhaltnisses zwischen Palast und Individuum darstellen. Eine Bewertung der Umstande und der Motive, die Verpachter und Pachter veranlassen konnten, das schwierige Unterfangen der Neubruchpacht auf sich zu nehmen, erlaubt meines Erachtens nur den einen SchluB, daB wir es hier mit Zwangspacht zu tun haben. Kein Bauer kann einen Anreiz darin sehen, bisher unbebautes Feld unter schwierigsten Bedingungen und in Erwartung niedrigster Ertrage freiwillig zu pachten, es sei denn er sei landlos oder in sonstiger Weise in seinen Existenzmoglichkeitenbedroht.15 Besondere Bedingungen scheinen mir bei der dritten Art des vom Palast kontrollierten Landes zu bestehen. Es handelt sich hierbei um das vom Palast in Reserve gehaltene Land (eqlum i a rZi ekallim ukallu). Es wurde, wenn es nicht als Versorgungsland oder Pachtland vergeben wurde, vom Palast entweder in eigener Regie bestellt oder in grol3en Parzellen an spezielle "Staatspachter" (landwirtschaftlicheEntrepreneure) ENS^ 1 iiiakkum) vergeben. Bei diesen ENS^ 1 iiiakkum handelt es sich nicht um gewohnliche Bauern, sondern in dern oben definierten Sinn um Entrepreneure. Vieles, was die Urkunden erwiihnen, bleibt uns entweder noch unverstandlich oder bereitet Schwierigkeiten, wenn es darum geht, ein geschlossenes Bild der Verhaltnisse zu entwerfen. Ein Schlaglicht auf die Tatigkeit der ENS^ wirft ein Brief Hammurapis an den
l 5 CH $44, s. dazu auch J. Renger, "Hammurapis Stele 'Konig der Gerechtigkeit'. Zur Frage von Recht und Gesetz in der altbabylonischen Zeit," WO 8 (1975-76), 228-235, bes. 231-233; s. auch H.P.H. Petschow, "Die • ˜ Q 45 und 46 des Codex Hammurapi. Ein Beitrag zum altbabylonischen Bodenpachtrecht 7 4 (1984), 181-212. und zum Problem: Was ist der Codex Hammurapi?"
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bereits oben erwahnten Beauftragten SamaShazir, dessen wesentliche Teile folgendermaBen lauten:l6 "Nunmehr sende ich Euch die Tafel betreffs des Feldes, der Pflugrinder und der 'Staatspachter' (landwirtschaftliche Entrepreneure) ENS^), die dern Arwi'um zugewiesen worden sind, belastet mit der Abgabe von 10.800 Gur Gerste, 450 Gur Saat- und Futtergerste und 4 Minen Silber der Kaufleute, die zum Zwecke der Durchfuhrung der von den ENS^ erwarteten Bewirtschaftung (iiiakkutum) gegeben sind und fur die der Imdi-Enlil eine Abgabeverpflichtung gegenuber dern Palast eingegangen ist." Mehrere Fakten werden durch diesen Brief beleuchtet. Zunachst handelt es sich um eine erstaunlich hohe Menge an abzuliefernder Gerste. 10.800 Gur entsprechen einer Menge von 1630 Tonnen Gerste, fur deren Erzeugung 68 Tonnen Saat- und Futtergetreide zur Verfugung gestellt werden. Die zweite entscheidende Auskunft des Briefes betrifft die Tatsache, daB vom Palast denen, die die Felder bewirtschaften sollten, Pflugrinder sowie Saat- und Futter-Gerste zur Verfiigung gestellt wurden. Unklar bleibt uns, worum es bei den "vier Minen Silber der Kaufleute" geht. Eine weitere wichtige Auskunft des Briefes bezieht sich darauf, daB die Abgabeverpflichtung einer bestimmten Person (hier dern Imdi-Enlil) als Schuldverpflichtung auferlegt ist. Diese Bemerkung des Textes stellt die Verbindung mit einer Gruppe von Texten her, die Birot und Ellis17 publiziert haben und wo ebenfalls eine einzelne Person, niimlich ein gewisser ElmeSum fiir die Abgabe des Gersteertrages aus der Tatigkeit der ENS^ verantwortlich ist. Auch in diesen Texten ist in fur uns unklarem Kontext von Pflugrindern die Rede. a e r den Anteil der ENS^ am erwirtschafteten Ertrag der von ihnen bebauten Felder wissen wir nichts Konkretes. Die Angaben in den von Birot und Ellis publizierten Texten erwahnen zwar Versorgungsanteile, die sich zwischen 3% und 25% des Ertrages bewegen, gaben aber keinerlei Auskunft dariiber, wie sich diese Betrage errechnen lassen. Das angebaute und abgelieferte Getreide scheint von bestimmten Personen, die uns in der Person von Imdi-Enlil und ElmeSum bekannt sind, gesammelt worden zu sein. Moglicherweise waren sie auch fur die Speicherung verantwortlich und haben auf Anweisung von dern gespeicherten Getreide Lieferungen gemacht. Die Speicherung scheint allerdings ein eigenes Palastgeschit gewesen zu sein. 3.1.2 Weitere landwirtschaftlicheProdukte ~ b e rdie Bedingungen rechtlicher und tatsachlicher Art, unter denen landwirtschaftliche Produkte wie 0lsaaten (Sesam), Zwiebeln, Legurninosen usw. erzeugt und dern Palast abgeliefert wurden, ist uns fast nichts bekannt. Unser Wissen dariiber, da13 derartige landwirtschaftliche Produkte Teil der abzuliefernden landwirtschaftlichen Produktion waren, entnehmen wir dern Paragraphen 15 im Edikt des Konigs Ammi~aduqa,wo diese als Nebenprodukte (~ehhertum)bezeichnet werden und wo davon AbB 4 23. 17 M. Birot, Tablettes; M. deJong Ellis, "An Agricultural Adminstrative Archive in the Free Library of Philadelphia," JCS 29 (1977), 127-150, bes. 139ff. l6
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die Rede ist, daB sie Gegenstand von Pachtabgabe (miksum) waren. Dariiber hinaus erwahnen die ~okumente,die sich mit der urnwandlung von Naturalabgaben an den Palast in Silber beschaftigen, neben Datteln auch Zwiebeln und 01 (s. auch unten unter 5.1.2.2). 3.1.3 Die Dattelkultivation als Palastgeschaft
Die rechtlichen und tatsachlichen Bedingungen, die fur die Kultivation von Dattelpalmen gelten, lassen sich einer grol3en Zahl von Rechts- und Verwaltungsurkunden entnehmen. Die Urkunden stammen sowohl aus Nord- als auch aus Sudbabylonien und erstrecken sich uber eine Zeitspanne vom Beginn des 18. bis zum Ende des 17. Jahrhunderts. Neben einer bedeutenden Zahl von Einzelurkunden lassen sich drei groBere Archiv-Komplexe isolieren. Es handelt sich einmal um das Archiv des ,$arnaShazir, das aus Sudbabylonien stammt und sich in die Zeit Hammurapis datieren la&. Ein weiteres umfangreiches Archiv wird in der Literatur mit dern Kennwort "Ja~rurumiapliim" bezeichnet. Es stammt im wesentlichen aus der Regierungszeit Samsuilunas und umfdt im ganzen uber 400 Urkunden. Das dritte Archiv, als Archiv des Lipit-Ea bereits Gegenstand von Untersuchungen, stamrnt ebenfalls aus der Zeit des Samsuiluna. Als Herkunftsort kommt der Ort Kunnum in der Nahe von Dilbat in Frage. Das Archiv ist moglicherweise mit dern Jabrum-SaplQm-Archiv zu verbinden.18 Die Kultivation von Dattelpalmen ist Gegenstand einer ausfuhrlichen Monographie von B. Landsberger, The Date Palm and its By-products According to the Cuneiform Sources. In dieser Arbeit ging es Landsberger in erster Linie um die Kliirung von Begriffen. Insofern ist die Arbeit eine lexikographische Untersuchung. Dariiber hinaus war Landsberger besonders daran interessiert, festzustellen, welche Nebenprodukte (Palmwedel, Bast usw.) als zusatzliche Abgaben neben den Dattelabgaben von den Personen abzuliefern waren, die die Dattelgiirten kultivierten. Die rechtlichen Umstande der Dattelpalrnkultivation in der altbabylonischen Zeit, die ich als Palastgeschaft bezeichnen mochte, hat Landsberger in einem Appendix von wenigen Seiten behandelt.19 Dabei sind zwar die wesentlichen Elemente der vertraglichen Beziehungen zwischen Garteneigentumer und dem, der den Garten kultivierte, deutlich herausgestellt worden. Die Tatsache aber, d d es sich bei der Dattelpalmkultivation um ein Palastgeschit neben vielen anderen handelte, ist nicht mit der wunschenswerten Deutlichkeit gesagt worden. Auch Kraus hat die Kultivation von Dattelpalmen in seinen Arbeiten uber das Palastgeschaft stets beiseite gelassen, ganz offensichtlich darum, weil sie im Edikt des Konigs Arnrnisaduqa, von dern seine Untersuchungen immer ausgingen, nicht vorkornrnt. Ich selbst habe in Zusammenhang mit meinen Betrachtungen zum Archiv des Lipit-Ea einige grundsatzliche Bemerkungen zur Dattelpalrnkultivation als Palastgeschaft gemacht.20
*
Die Texte des Samaibazir-Archivs sind in TCL 11 publiziert; zum J&rurum-SapKim-Archiv s. I. Braune, Das Jahrurum-?apllim-Archiv, MA These Berlin 1988; zum Lipit-Ea-Archiv s. Renger, Fs Kraus, 290-297. Landsberger, Date-Palm ,56-61. 20 S. Renger, Fs Kraus, 290-297; im iibrigen ist die Dattelpalrnkultivation auch in den $59-65 des Rechtsbuches des Hammurapi geregelt.
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Am besten l a t sich das Wesen der Dattelpalrnkultivation als Palastgeschaft anhand des Archivs des SamaShazir darstellen. Sachlicher Hintergrund der Texte ist die Vergabe von Dattelgarten des Palastes an Gktner ( N U . ~ ~ ~ K von I RLandsberger I~ als contractor bezeichnet) zur Bewirtschaftung. Die Urkunden des Archivs beleuchten nur einen Teil des Vorganges, n b l i c h die Abschatzung des zu erwartenden Ertrages - ausgedriickt in Mengen von griinen, unreifen Datteln (uhinnum) und normalerweise im funften Monat vorgenommen - und die Festsetzung der zu leistenden Abgabe - ausgedriickt durch SU6.LUM / suluppum "reife Dattel", wobei die abzuliefernde Menge entweder die Halfte oder zwei Dritteln des Schatzbetrages betrug. Ablieferungstermin war in der Regel der siebte Monat. Das Schlusselwort fur die Abschatzung ist S u k u n n h (sumerisch N~G.GAR). Interessanterweise ist in diesem Archiv keine Rede von den oben erwahnten Nebenabgaben in Form von Palmblattern, Bast usw., wovon in anderen altbabylonischen Urkunden betreffend die Dattelpalrnkultivation haufig die Rede ist. Die Giirten, die vom Verwalter der dern Palast gehorenden Dattelpalmkulturen, Sama~hazir,an einzelne "Gartner" oder Kultivatoren vergeben wurden, waren von unterschiedlicher GroBe und lagen in einer Vielzahl von Orten. Wir kennen GiirtnerKultivatoren, die in ein und demselben Jahr mehrere, an verschiedenen Orten gelegene, GLten zur Pflege ubernahmen. Einmal wird einer der Giirtner-Kultivatoren als General bezeichnet. Aus alldem ziehe ich den SchluB, daB es sich bei diesen "GartnerVKultivatoren nicht um berufsmaBige "Giirtner", sondern um Entrepreneure in dern oben bezeichneten Sinne handelt. Die eigentliche Arbeit an den Dattelpalmen nahrnen nicht sie selber vor, sondern lieBen sie von Untergebenen oder Lohnarbeitern ausfihren. In diesem verstanden, Sinne hat auch Landsberger das Wort Giirtner ( N U . ~ ~ ~ /Knukaribbum) IRI~ wenn er dafur die englische Ubersetzung contractor gewahlt hat. In anderem Zusammenhang spricht Landsberger von den Siikinum, die nicht "GLtner", sondern Entrepreneure gewesen seien. Er nimmt damit eine sachliche Gleichsetzung mit dern 1 nukaribbum vor. Das Wort iiikinum allerdings ist bisher nur Begriff Nu.giS~1~16 zweimal in altbabylonischer Zeit belegt. Die Urkunden des SamaShazir-~rchives berichten uns nur uber die Verpflichtung des Gartner-Entrepreneurs zur Abgabe einer bestimmten Menge reifer Datteln (SU6.LUM / suluppum) nach der Ernte. Die Hohe der Abgabe wird ca. 5 Wochen vor der Ernte durch Schatzung bestimmt (Sukunniim) und betrug die Halfte oder zwei Drittel des zu erwartenden Ertrages. Eine Urkunde nennt ausdrucklich die beiden Personen, die die Schatzung der zu erwartenden Dattelernte vorgenommen haben. Es heifit: "(Menge [gemessen in gur] von) Datteln ... die PNl und PN2 geschatzt / festgesetzt haben." In anderen Urkunden tauchen sie als Zeugen auf und werden mit ihrer Funktion Obergartner (SANDANA / Sandanakkum) bezeichnet. Dies ermoglicht es uns, auch andere derart bezeichnete Zeugen als diejenigen zu identifizieren, die die Schatzung der zu erwartenden Ernte vorgenommen haben. Aufgrund der geschatzten Menge noch ungeernteter am Baum hangender griinen Datteln (uhinnurn) wurde der abzuliefernde Betrag an reifen Datteln (suluppum) bestimmt und in Form einer rechtsverbindlichen Urkunde niedergelegt. Dabei bediente man sich haufig der Form eines fiktiven Darlehensvertrages, der folgenden Wortlaut hat : x Gur (am Baum hangende) griine Datteln (uhinnum) ihr Halbbetrag betragt x Gur reife Datteln (suluppum) Schatzung (Sukunniim) betreffend den Garten des Samag?jazir
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hat von Sarna~bazir dem Eigentiimer des Gartens PN empfangen. Im Monat VII wird er die reifen Datteln abliefern. (Es folgen die Zeugen). (TCL 11 184) DaB es sich um eine fiktive Schuldurkunde handelt, scheint mir schon deshalb klar, weil es wenig Sinn ergibt, in einer Situation, die deutlich nicht die des Verbrauchsdarlehens ist, unmittelbar vor der Ernte ungeerntete, also am Baum hangende Datteln, zu borgen und nach der Ernte abgeerntete Datteln zuriickzuzahlen. Neben den fiktiven Darlehensvertragen wird die durch die Schatzung festgelegte Abgabeschuld in zwei weiteren Urkundentypen niedergelegt. x Gur (am Baum hangende) griine Datteln der Zwei-Drittel-Betrag an reifen Datteln betragt x Gur Schitzung des Gartens des SamaShazir. Giirtner-Entrepreneur:PN. (Nachdem) der 30.Tag des 6.Monats verstrichen ist wird er die reifen Datteln abliefern. (Es folgen die Zeugen). (TCL 11 150) Der dritte Typ lautet dmlich:
x Gur griine (amBaum hangende) Datteln zwei Drittel davon sind: x Gur reife Datteln
... Schatzung betreffend den Garten des Sama~bazir. Dem Sama~bazirwird sie (d.h. die Datteln) PN, der Giirtner-Entrepreneur, herbeibringen. Im Monat VI wird er die reifen Datteln ... abliefern. Dieses sind die Datteln, die PN2 (SANDANA) und PN3 (DAMGAR)(als abzuliefernd) festgesetzt haben. (Es folgen die Zeugen). (TCL 11 169) Ich halte es fur bemerkenswert, daB die urkundlich fixierte Abgabeschuld nicht als Pachtabgabe bezeichnet wurde, sondern man sich des Formulars der Schuldurkunde oder der Lieferungsverpflichtung bediente. Da13 diese Beobachtung sich nicht nur auf das Archiv des SamaSbazir erstreckt, sondern allgemein gultig ist, hat bereits Landsberger festgehalten und dabei auf Ausnahmen verwiesen: TLB 1 Nr. 20+196 und Riftin Nr. 42. Man mag sich allerdings fragen, ob andere Verpflichtungen, die sich aus der Vergabe eines Dattelpalmgartens ergeben - bestimmte Fragen der Pflege der Dattelpalmen und der erwarteten Sorgfalt im Umgang mit den Palmen, oder die Frage der Nebenabgaben (Palmzweige, Bast usw.) - in Pachtvertragen geregelt sein konnten, die uns, was das SamaSbazir-~rchivbetrifft, nicht erhalten sind. In diesem Bereich sind weitere
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Untersuchungen erforderlich. Die wesentlichen Elemente der Dattelpalmkultivation in der Form des Palastgesch3ftes werden hiervon aber nur in Einzelpunkten tangiert.
3.2 Die Viehhaltung als Palastgescha$ Bei der Viehhaltung bestand das Interesse des Palastes je nach der Art der betroffenen Tiere an einer moglichst umfassenden Verwendung der Tiere und der Verwertung der von ihnen gelieferten Produkte. Bei der Haltung von Rindern ging es im wesentlichen um zweierlei: Einmal um das Bereitstellen von Pflugrindern fur die Landwirtschaft der grol3en institutionellen Haushalte und zum anderen um das Gewinnen von Milchprodukten, also hauptsachlich Butter und Kase, woruber die Texte der altbabylonischen Zeit allerdings keinen AufschluB geben. Bei der Schafhaltung stand ganz eindeutig die Wollgewinnung im Vordergrund. Daneben wurde das Einsammeln der Haute und Sehnen von gefallenen Tieren als eine eigenstihdige Form des Palastgeschaftes / Susikkum). betrieben (s. dazu 6.3). Verantwortlich hierfur war der Abdecker (su.sr.1~ Die Haltung bzw. die Verpachtung von Palast- oder Tempelherden geschah in folgender Weise, wie sich aus den Urkunden betreffend die Viehherden aus Larsa zeigen la&. Eine Herde von etwa 1800 Schafen unterstand einem Oberhirten A (NA.GADA 1 niiqidum). Diese Herde wurde von ihm in drei Teilherden von je etwa 600 Schafen an Hirten (SPA I r2'fim) ubergeben. Diese wiederum teilten ihre Herden in Einheiten von je 200 Schafen auf, die einem Unterhirten ubergeben wurden. Diese Unterhirten waren fur das tatsachliche Huten der Schafe verantwortlich. Ein besonderes Merkmal dieser Art der Aufteilung einer Gesarntherde in drei Verantwortungsebenen ist nun die Tatsache, daJ3 der Oberhirte A selbst eine der 600 Tiere umfassenden Herde in der Funktion eines Hirten selber zu betreuen hatte und auch auf der untersten Verantwortungsebene zustandig fur eine der kleinen Herden von 200 Tieren war. Es spricht nichts dafiir, daB der Oberhirte A tatsachlich rnit den Tieren auf die Weide zog. Man darf vielmehr annehmen, dal3 er hierfiir einen untergebenen oder gemieteten Hirten verwendete. Der Sinn der Einbindung des Oberhirten auch auf den beiden unteren Verantwortungsebenen bestand offensichtlich darin, ihn selbst die Probleme der von ihm abhangigen Hirten und Unterhirten dadurch erfahren und erleben zu lassen, dal3 er gleiche Verantwortung wie sie zu tragen hatte. ijber die tatsachliche Durchfuhrung der Herdenhaltung und die damit verbundenen rechtlichen und tatsachlichen Probleme erfahren wir einmal aus den Paragraphen 264-268, 261 und 267 des Rechtsbuches des Hammurapi, die sich auf die Herdenhaltung beziehen (normalerweise als privatrechtliche Regelungen verstanden, von mir als Palastgeschaft, das "altem Brauch" folgt) und aus einer groBen Zahl von Verwaltungsurkunden aus Larsa, auf die sich die ausfuhrliche Untersuchung Viehhaltung von F.R. Kraus stutzt. Die daruber hinaus bekannten verstreuten Hutevertrage und Verwaltungsurkunden, die sich auf die Herdenhaltung beziehen, sind in diesem Zusammenhang von untergeordneter Bedeutung. Das wesentliche Prinzip aufgrund dessen die Hohe der zu erwartenden Abgaben und Ertrage aus der Herdenhaltung berechnet wurden, beruhte auf Erfahrungen uber die naturliche Geburts- und die Mortalitatsrate einer Herde im Verlaufe mehrerer Jahre. Aufgrund dieser Erfahrung hat man bei Schafherden eine jahrliche Zuwachsrate zugrunde
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gelegt, nach der auf 100 Mutterschafe 80 Jahrlinge k ~ m t n e n . Das ~ l heifit, dal3 nach dern Wurf der Lammer zu Beginn des Jahres am Ende eines Rechnungsjahres 80 Jahrlinge iibrigbleiben, die dann in die Herde eingestellt und in den Folgejahren mit beriicksichtigt wurden. Fur die Hirten bedeutete dies, daB sie alle Jahrlinge, die sie uber die geforderten Zuwachsraten hinaus am Leben erhielten, in ihre private Herde einstellen konnten. Unterschritten sie die vorgegebenen Zuwachsraten, so mul3ten sie die Differenz aus ihrer Privatherde begleichen. Dieses Risiko des Hirten wurde nur zum Teil dadurch gernildert, daB man ihnen eine Mortalitatsrate von 15% auf die in der Herde befindlichen Mutterschafe zugute hielt und sie auch von der Verantwortung fiir durch hohere Gewalt verendete Tiere befreite. Letzteres wird unter anderem im Rechtsbuch des Harnmurapi geregelt. Trotz dieser Begrenzung des Risikos des Hirten in den zwei genannten Fallen stellte die geforderte Zuwachsrate von 80% einen enormen Druck fur die Hirten dar. Auch die geforderte Abgabemenge von Wolle pro Schaf lag mit 2 Minen (ca. 1 kg) pro Schaf um 25% uber dem, was in der neubabylonischen Zeit (1 112 Minen = ca. 750 g) gefordert wurde. a e r die abgegebene und eingesammelte Wolle und deren Verbleib wird weiter unten gesprochen. Nur wenige Texte aus der altbabylonischen Zeit beziehen sich auf die Haltung von Rindern. Irn Rechtsbuch des Hammurapi werden die gleichen Bedingungen fur Schafwie fiir Rinderherden zugrunde gelegt. Auch das Prinzip, die Ertrage einer Herde aufgrund der Erfahrungen uber die durchschnittliche Vermehrungsrate zu berechnen, gilt auch fur die Rinderherden. Ein gutes Beispiel bietet ein Text der Ur-111-Zeit, den I.J. Gelb erstmals bearbeitet hat.22 Im Text ist eine Geburtsrate von 1 Kalb pro 2 Kuhen pro Jahr zugrunde gelegt, was in etwa unserem Wissen iiber die Fruchtbarkeit von Rindern im Alterturn entspricht. Der Text - bei dern es sich aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach urn einen Schultext handelt, der das Wachsen einer Rinderherde simuliert - wird angenommen, daB die Kalber je zur Hdfte mannlich bzw. weiblich sind. Man lernt im ubrigen aus diesem Text, dal3 Kuhe im alten Mesopotamien in der Regel erstmals im 5. Jahr kalben. Aufgrund dieses Textes lernen wir auBerdem, dal3 pro Kuh und Jahr ca. 4 Liter Butter und 6,3 Liter Kase erwartet wurden. 4. Palastgeschiifte betreffend die Ausbeutung oder Ausnutzung naturlicher Ressourcen
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4.1 Fisch- und Vogelabgabe In der Ur-111-Zeit waren den groBen institutionellen Haushalte Fischer zugeordnet, die verpflichtet waren, regelmal3ig bestimmte Mengen an Fisch abzuliefern.23 Im Prinzip hat sich daran in der altbabylonischenZeit nichts geiindert. Der entscheidende Unterschied ist der, daI3 die Fischer nun nicht mehr zum Personal eines institutionellen Haushaltes (Tempe1 oder Palast) gehorten, sondern vom Palast Versorgungsfelder erhielten. Ihre Dienstleistung bestand in der Abgabe bestimmter Mengen von Fischen und Vogeln, die sie in den Kanalen, den Horen und den Kustengebieten fingen. Da Fische besonders leicht verderben, wurde die Abgabeverpflichtung in einen bestimrnten Betrag von Silber umgewandelt. Die Fischer besorgten aber anscheinend diese Urnwandlung der gefangenen Fische in Silber nicht selber, sondern lieferten die Fische an Mittelsmanner, die sich dafur verpflichteten, die von den Fischern geforderten Silberabgaben an den Palast abzufuhren. Dieser Vorgang spiegelt sich in einer Anzahl von Rechtsurkunden wider, die in Ur gefunden worden sind und deren inhaltliche Interpretation wir K. Butz ~erdanken.~~ Ein wesentliches Problem, das sich im Zusarnmenhang mit dern Fischfang und der Fischabgabe verbindet, hangt mit der Haltbarkeit der Fische unter den klimatischen Bedingungen des Irak zusammen, auch wenn dies nur fur die wiirmere Jahreszeit gilt. Untersuchungen von R. Englund fur die Ur-111-Zeit und fruhere Perioden legen die Vermutung nahe, dal3 die Fischer selber zumindest einen Teil ihres Fanges sofort nach der Anlandung getrocknet haben. Trockenfisch aber ist haltbar. Eine zweite Gruppe von Dokumenten, die uns uber die Tatsache der Fischabgabe informieren, gehoren zu dern Typ des Palastgeschiiftes, das sich rnit dern "VerschleiB" der abgelieferten Produkte befal3t und wird weiter unten ausfiihrlich behandelt (s. dam unter 5.4.2)
4.2 Schilfrohrgewinnung und Ziegelstreichen Fur diese beiden Arten des Palastgeschaftes stehen uns nur wenige Urkunden zur Verfugung. Eine weitere Erorterung, die im wesentlichen nur in MutmaBungen bestehen konnte, halte ich deshalb hier fur nicht angebracht.25
~ b e diese r Art des Palastgeschaftes haben wir nur eine beschrankte Kenntnis, die sich auf die Abgabe von Fischen und Vogeln, die Rohrernte und das Ziegelstreichen bezieht.
---
21
--
Sowohl in den Urkunden der neubabylonischen Zeit als auch in denen der archaischen Periode aus Uruk (Ende 4. Jahrtausend v. Chr.) lag diese Rate bei 66 213% bezogen auf die Mutterschafe. M.W. Green, "Animal Husbandry at Uruk in the Archaic Period," JNES 39 (1980), 1-35. 22 I.J. Gelb, "Growth of a Herd of Cattle in Ten Years," JCS 21 (1967), 64-69; s. dazu auch R.K. Englund, in: H.-J. Nissen, P. Damerow, R.K. Englund (Hrsg.), Fruhe Schrift und Technik der Wirtschaftsvenvaltung im alten vorderen Orient, Berlin 1990, 139-144.
23 24
R.K. Englund, Organisation und Verwaltung der Ur III-Fischerei, Berlin 1990. K. Butz, "Fischabgabe und Feldabgabe in Fischen und Vijgeln an den Nanna-Tempe1 in Ur in altbabylonische Zeit? Ein Versuch," AfO 26 (1978-79), 30-44. 25 S. W. Sallaberger, "Zum Schilfrohr als Rohstoff in Babylonien," in: B. Scholz (Hrsg.), D e r orientalische Mensch und seine Beziehungen zur Urnwelt (= Beitrage zum 2. Grazer Symposion), Graz 1989, 31 1-330; siehe auaerdem die Beitrage zum Thema in BSA 6 (1992).
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5. Dienstleistungen
167
Das Archiv des Sep-sin und verwandte Texte sind der Gegenstand von drei Untersuchungen: Erstmals 1941 hat Koschaker die damals bekannten Urkunden, in denen Sep-sin, Aufseher der Kaufleute von Larsa, vorkommt, in seiner Untersuchung "Zur staatlichen Wirtschaftsverwaltung in altbabylonischen Zeit"26 behandelt. 1982 hat sich Karin Reiter den Urkunden des Sep-sin und des Balmunamhe gewidmet und dabei zusatzliche, seit Koschakers Arbeit neu publizierte Urkunden verwenden konnen.27 M. St01 schlieBlich hat ebenfalls im Jahre 1982 eine Arbeit "State und Private Business in the Land of Larsa"28 vorgelegt, in der er 42 bisher unpublizierte Urkunden verwenden konnte. Allerdings betreffen nicht alle von ihnen die Tatigkeit des Sep-sin als Aufseher der Kaufleute (UGULADAM.GAR.MES 1 wakil tamkiirq.
Bei der Behandlung der zurn Archiv des Sep-sin gehorigen Urkunden muB man meines Erachtens streng zwischen den Urkunden unterscheiden, in denen Sep-~^in als Aufseher uber die Kaufleute von Larsa bezeichnet wird und die aus der Zeit zwischen dern 21.IX. des Jahres Hammurapi 36 und dern 9.IX. des Jahres Hammurapi 42 stammen. Alle spateren Urkunden nennen den S ~ p - ~ohne i n Titel. Die Funktion eines Aufsehers der Kaufleute von Larsa wird von anderen Personen wahrgenommen, z.B. &ma$-yiildi. Um aber die von Sep-sin getatigten Geschafte in ihrer gesamten Tragweite verstehen zu konnen, ist es notig, alle Urkunden zu beriicksichtigen, die sich mit dern VerschleiB von Datteln, Fischen und anderen Produkten durch die Kaufmannschaft von Larsa beschaftigen. Der von St01 in seiner eben erwahnten Arbeit zusammengestellte Katalog der einschlagigen Urkunden ist die Basis fur die folgenden Ausfiihrungen. Die wesentlichen Fakten hat M. Stol in seinem Beitrag dargelegt. Ich kann rnich deshalb auf die entscheidenden Punkte beschranken. Die in den einzelnen Garten geernteten Datteln wurden von einem iandanakkum (SANDANA) genannten FunktionL, den wir gemeinhin als ''Oberg2irtner" bezeicKen, eingesammelt. Er lieferte die Datteln an das karum29 ab. Dies geschah meist in der Weise, da13 sie direkt einem UGULA.NAM.~ ("Aufseher uber eine Gruppe von Funf ') ubergeben wurden. Diese Personen (d.h. "die Funf ') werden in den Texten auch als DAM.GAR (tamkarum) "Kaufmann" bezeichnet. Ihre Aufgabe war es, die Datteln in Silber zu venvandeln. Die ganze Operation, d.h. die Aufsicht und Koordination dieses Vorgangs, der eine ganze Anzahl von derartigen uGULA.NAM.5 umfaBte, oblag dern Aufseher der Kaufleute, bp-sin. Die einzelnen UGULA.NAM.~ scheinen, wie St01 festgestellt hat, jeweils feste Mengen von ca. 250 Gur (ca. 37 Tonnen) zurn "VerschleiBen" erhalten zu haben. Die einzelnen UGULA.NAM.~ wurden dafur mit einem Silberbetrag belastet, den sie dern Palast schuldeten. Er betrug in der Regel ein Drittel des administrativ festgesetzten Wertes der Datteln. Das bedeutet, dal3 den UGULA.NAM.~, d.h. also den VerschleiBern, eine Gewinnmarge von ca. zwei Drittel des Warenwertes vom Palast zugestanden wurde. Das eingegangene Silber wurde schliefllich von Sep-~in,dern Aufseher uber die Kaufleute, also dern verantwortlichen "Leiter" des kiirum von Larsa an den Palast abgeliefert. Dieses Operationsschema spiegelt sich in den Urkunden wider. Im Palast wurde genau Buch gefiihrt uber die erwarteten Abgaben und Forderungen der Produzenten. Die Urkunde Boyer HE 111 notiert den Ursprung der einzelnen Produkte und verpflichtet Sep-sin durch ein fiktives Darlehen, den Gegenwert der Produkte in Silber zu einem bestirnmten Zeitpunkt zuriickzuzahlen. Die einzutreibenden Mengen an Datteln wurden in einem "gesiegelten Dokument des Konigs" an das karum ubermittelt und konnten direkt an die Eintreiber der Datteln, also die Sandanakkum, weitergegeben werden, die sie als Autorisation fiir ihre Sammeltatigkeit verwendeten. a e r die Zuweisung der Datteln zurn Zwecke des VerschleiBens an die UGULA.NAM.5 durch Sep-sin wurden Quittungen ausgestellt, in denen die VerschleiBer den Empfang der Datteln quittierten. Desgleichen stellte Sep-~inden VerschleiBern eine Quittung uber die empfangenen Silberbetrage aus. Eine Reihe von Urkunden allerdings zeigen, daB das Silber auch direkt von den VerschleiBern an einen Beauftragten des Palastes gelangen konnte (Stol, JCS 34, Nr. Iff).
26 27
29
5.1 Das "VerschleiJen" - das Venvandeln abgelieferter Produkte in Silber Die Natur einer ganzen Reihe von abgelieferten Produkten - Datteln, Gemuse, Fische und anderes mehr - bringt es mit sich, da13 der Palast kein Interesse daran haben konnte, diese Produkte in natura in groBen Mengen zu empfangen. Sie sind zurn Teil leicht verderblich oder stellen Probleme hinsichtlich der Lagerung (etwa bei Datteln) dar. Aber ebenso wie im Falle der Produktion wollte der Palast vermeiden, selber mit dern in Empfang-Nehmen, Lagern und Verteilen belastet zu werden. Er vergab deshalb diese Operation ahnlich wie im Falle der Produktion an Mittelsmanner, die diese Guter einzusammeln, einzutreiben oder in Empfang zu nehmen und dafur an den Palast eine vorher festgelegte Summe Silbers zu zahlen hatten. Denn nur an Silber und Getreide war der Palast interessiert, da beide Produkte verhdtnismid3ig einfach im Austausch gegen andere Produkte gegeben werden konnten. Daruber hinaus hatten beide - wie uns die Urkunden in vielfdtiger Weise dokumentieren - den Charakter des allgemein akzeptierten Wertmessers, denn Getreide konnte neben Silber auch als Zahlungsmittel fungieren. Der ProzeB des Umsetzens von Gutern in Silber, das "Versilbern", wird - mit Kraus - als "VerschleiBen" bezeichnet, ein Ausdruck, der aus dern Osterreichischen gelaufig ist. a e r den ProzeB des "VerschleiBens" informieren uns zurn einen der Paragraph 11 des Ediktes des Ammiyaduqa und zurn anderen zwei Gruppen von Urkunden, die gemeinhin als die Archive des Sep-sin und des Utul-IStar bekannt sind. Im folgenden sollen die Vorgange, wie sie sich aus diesen beiden Archiven ergeben, dargestellt werden. Die Ergebnisse dieser detaillierten Beschreibung sollen miteinander und mit den Bestimmungen des Paragraphen 11 des Ediktes des Konigs Ammiyaduqa verglichen werden. 5.1.1 Der Entrepreneur
in
5.1.1.1 Das 'ofizielle ' Archiv des Szp-~in
Koschaker, ZA 47 (1942), 135-180. K. Reiter, Untersuchungen zum Archivwesen der altbabylonischen Zeit dargestellt an den Brief-, Rechts- und Venvaltungsurkunden des S @ - ~ i nund Balmunamhe, MA These Berlin 1982. 28 Stol, JCS 34 (1982), 127-230.
Das karum ist die Organisation der mit dern Beschaffen und Verteilen von Giitern betrauten Entrepreneure (tamkiirum) und gleichzeitig Bezeichnung der Lokalitat(en), in denen diese Aktivitaten konzentriert sind.
168
J. RENGER
Zwei Dokumente beleuchten den Vorgang der Ablieferung des Silbers von Sep-~in, dern Aufseher uber die Kaufleute, an den Palast bzw. seinen Beauftragten. Der ausfiihrlichere der beiden Texte lautet in h r s e t z u n g Duplikat einer gesiegelten Tafel des Konigs (betreffend) ein Talent (und) 40 Minen Silber gehorig zum Silber, das aus den VerschleiBoperationen des &rum von Larsa fiir das Jahr Harnmurapi 40 stammt. Geliefert von Sep-sin, dern Aufseher uber die Kaufleute von Larsa. Verantwortungsbereich des Marduk-nisir, des "Sohnes" des Generals. (Bestimrnt) fiir den Palast, gehorig zum Silber der Neujahrsabgabe des Landes Emutbalum, das dern Sama5-lamassa~u zum Eintreiben zugewiesen worden ist . (gesiegelt von Sama8-lamassa~u)(JCS 3 1 (1979), 140 No. 13) Der genannte Betrag von einem Talent und 40 Minen Silber entspricht nach den in den Texten des Sep-sin-~rchivsgenannten Preisaquivalenten einer Menge von 12.000 Gur (ca. 1800 Tonnen) Datteln. Der Text informiert uns auBerdem dariiber, da13 ganz offensichtlich von seiten des Palastes zwei Personen oder Verwaltungsebenen eingeschaltet waren. Zum einen handelt es sich um den - offensichtlich in Larsa oder einem anderen Ort Sudbabyloniens stationierten Beamten - namens Marduk-nitsir, der in diesem und anderen Texten / Sakkanakkum) bezeichnet wird. Ob es sich hierbei als "Sohn des Generals" (SAKKANA um eine naturliche Kindschaft handelt oder ob mit dern Ausdruck "Sohn des Generals" ein administratives Abhangigkeitsverhaltnis bezeichnet werden soll, lafit sich nicht entscheiden. Auf jeden Fall war Marduk-nisir der verantwortliche Beamte des Palastes vor Ort, genauer in der sudlichen Provinz. Samas'-lamassa~u,der aufgrund unseres Textes mit dern Eintreiben (Suddunum) des Silbers der Provinz Emutbalum betraut war, scheint ein hoher Beamter gewesen zu sein. Nach St01 handelt es sich hierbei um den zabardabbum. Auch er scheint im sudlichen Distrikt stationiert gewesen zu sein. Das von ihm eingesammelte Silber wurde durch Mittelsmwer zum Hof nach Babylon gebracht. Neben Datteln spielen im Archiv des Sep-sin vor allem Fische eine wichtige Rolle. Das System des "VerschleiBens" gleicht im wesentlichen dem, das auch fur die Datteln gilt. Verantwortlich fur das Einsarnmeln des Fanges und das Abliefern der Fische ist ein UGULA MAR.TU, eine Art Militiirbefehlshaber, dern die Fischer unterstanden. Die Fischer erhielten vom Palast Versorgungsfelder. Ihre Verpflichtung gegenuber dern Palast bestand im Fang und im Abliefern von Fischen. Diese Fischabgabe, N ~ G . K ~ ~ . (etwa Ku~ naptzn nuni "Fischmahlzeit") genannt, 1aBt etwas von dern Ursprung dieser Abgabe erahnen: Es ging um die Versorgung der koniglichen Tafel oder das Bereitstellen von Fischen fur die Gottermahlzeiten. In der altbabylonischen Zeit in Ur und Larsa war diese Lieferungsverpflichtung aber bereits in eine Silberforderung umgewandelt worden. Der Palast erwartete von den Fischern nicht mehr Fische in natura zu erhalten, sondern einen bestimmten Gegenwert in Silber. Auch hier ubernahmen Kaufleute (DAMGAR)oder das kzrum, das heifit die Korporation der Kaufleute, den "VerschleiB." Dies ergibt sich aus dern Archiv des Sep-s^m.Moglicherweise bestehen zwischen den Vorgangen, wie sie im Sep-sin-~rchivzugrunde liegen und denen, die uns aus den Rechtsurkunden aus Ur
DAS PALASTGESCHmT IN DER ALTBABYLONISCHEN ZEIT
169
bekannt sind (s. oben 4.1), gewisse Unterschiede. Denn in den Urkunden aus Ur l a t sich ein UGULA MAR.TU nicht erschlieljen.
5.1.1.2 Private Geschafie des Sip-sfn Unter den Urkunden, die St01 in seinem Katalog (JCS 34 (1982), 132ff) aufffuhrt, findet sich eine groBere Zahl von Texten, in denen Sep-sin nicht mit seinem offiziellen Titel UGULA DAM.GARerscheint, sondern ganzlich ohne Titel oder hochstens mit dern Titel DAM.GAR. Hinzu kommen noch weitere, bisher unpublizierte Texte. Sie stammen meist aus der Zeit vor oder nach der Periode, in der Sep-sin Vorsteher der Kaufleute von Larsa war. Auch aus der Zeit, in der er das Amt des Vorstehers der Kaufleute von Larsa ausubte, kennen wir eine Reihe von Texten, in denen Sep-~innicht mit diesem offiziellen Titel bezeichnet ist. In den meisten Fallen handelt es sich um Darlehens- oder Schuldurkunden, die in unterschiedlicher Weise formuliert sind. Man mochte vermuten, daB diese Texte zum Bereich der privaten Geschafte des Sep-sin gehoren. Dies gilt in besonderem MaBe fur Silberdarlehen, die er fur Gemeinschaftsunternehmungen (NAM.TAB.BA) alleine oder zusammen rnit anderen Personen gegeben hat. Die Existenz der eben erwahnten Texte stellt auch ein Problem fur die ArchivRekonstruktion dm. Denn die besagten Urkunden stammen aus einem Zeitraum zwischen dern Jahre Rimsin 46 und dern Jahre Samsuiluna 5, das heiBt aus einem Zeitraum von 32 Jahren, namlich von 1776-1744 v.Chr.: Es geht vor allem um die Frage nach dern urspriinglichen Aufbewahrungsort aller den Namen Sep-sin tragenden Urkunden. Es wiire zuviel des Zufalls, wenn man annehrnen sollte, d& die Raubgraber in Larsa sowohl das offizielle Archiv des kiirum als auch das Privathaus des Sep-sin angeschnitten haben sollten. So mu13 man eher damit rechnen, dal3 sich alle Sep-sin-~rkundenan einem Platz befunden und dann durch Raubgraber und Handler ihren Weg in verschiedene Sammlungen und Museen gefunden haben. Grundsatzlich gilt, was sowohl die Ausgrabungen im altbabylonischen Tell ed-Der (Ur-Utu-Archiv) und im neubabylonischen Uruk erbracht haben: Die Archive von Funktionaren von Tempe1 und Palast, die sich in deren Privathausern gefunden haben, enthalten neben den Urkunden, die ihren eigenen Farnilienangelegenheiten (Kaufurkunden, Erbteilungsurkunden usw.) betreffen, auch solche, die ihre privaten Geschafte (vor allem Darlehen, Pachtvertrage usw.) beurkunden, und schlieBlich Urkunden, die rnit ihrer offiziellen Tatigkeit zu tun haben. Insofern ist es nicht uberraschend, daB wir neben den Urkunden, in denen S e p - ~ i nals Vorsteher der Kaufleute von Larsa vorkommt, sich in gleichem Fundzusammenhang auch solche befunden haben konnen, die lediglich seine individuellen Geschafte reflektieren. Das Bemerkenswerte im Falle des Sep-sin ist es, daB diese privatgeschaftlichen Urkunden im wesentlichen aus Zeiten stammen, in denen er nicht das Amt eines Vorstehers der Kaufleute bekleidete. Daraus den SchluB zu ziehen, er sei wahrend dieser Zeit offizieller verantwortlicher Tatigkeit von derartigen Privatgeschaften ausgeschlossen gewesen, ist eine Vermutung, der es nachzugehen gilt. Interessant an den Urkunden, die sich auf private Geschafte des Sep-sin beziehen bzw. beziehen konnten, ist die Tatsache, daB hier Silberdarlehen die weitaus groBte Zahl darstellen. Silberdarlehen aber haben direkt nichts mit dern VerschleiBgeschiift zu tun. Sie dokumentieren ein Stadium, in dern die Uberschiisse oder Gewinne aus dern Palastgesch8ft fiir Zwecke privater wirtschaftlicher Tatigkeit verwendet wurden.
170
J. RENGER
5.1.2 Der Entrepreneur Utul-ZStar 5.1.2.1 Das Archiv des Utul-ZStar Am Beispiel des Archives des Utul-IStar hat F.R. Kraus erstmals in seinem Buch Edikt die wesentlichen Zuge des Palastgeschaftes beschrieben. Spater hat Yoffee dieses Archiv im Rahmen seiner Untersuchung The Economic Role of the Crown in the Old Babylonian Period30 behandelt. Das Material, das ihm zur Verfugung stand, war inzwischen erheblich durch die Publikation neuer Texte angewachsen. Dariiber hinaus schlol3 er in seine Betrachtung auch Urkunden ein, die den Utul-IStar insofern nicht in seiner offiziellen Position zeigen, als er ohne seinen Titel erscheint. Die letzte Beschaftigung mit dern Archiv des Utul-IStar stammt von Charpin.31 Er bezieht sich im wesentlichen auf die Arbeit von Yoffee, ist aber in der Lage, eine Reihe von bisher unpublizierten Urkunden zu verwenden, die Rivkah Harris32 sporadisch und auszugsweise zitiert hat. Dariiber hinaus venvendet er eine Reihe einschlagiger Briefe, die er prosopographisch an das Utul-IStar-Archiv anschlieBen konnte. Aufgrund all dieser Urkunden und Briefe hat Charpin die Rolle der Kaufleute des Palastes und des Tempels beschrieben und dabei funf Phasen der Operation unterschieden. Im folgenden werde ich mich im wesentlichen seiner Darstellungsweise anschliel3en, dabei aber versuchen, die zwei zugmnde liegenden Typen von Palastgeschaft deutlich zu machen. Die erste Phase, die uns in den schon erwahnten Briefen faBbar wird, bildet den AbschluB des ersten Palastgeschaftes: der mit der Herdenhaltung verbundenen Wollproduktion. Nach dern jiilxlichen Auftrieb der Herden werden die Schafe gerupft und die Wolle gesammelt und im bit akitu, dern Neujahrsfesthaus versiegelt, von wo sie zum "VerschleiB" an die Kaufleute weitergeleitet wird. Die Briefe aus Babylon - leider ohne Adressat und Absender - informieren einen Verantwortlichen der Palastadministration in Sippar, da13
DAS PALASTGESCHUT IN DER ALTBABYLONISCHEN ZEIT
den VerschleiB der Wolle verantwortlich sind. Ein weiterer Brief (AbB 7 Nr. 163) nennt ausdriicklich den UGULA DAM.GAR (Vorsteher der Kaufleute) IlSu-ibni(Su) als die verantwortliche Personlichkeit unter den Kaufleuten. Die nachsten drei Phasen lassen sich sehr deutlich und klar anhand einer Reihe von Urkunden dokumentieren. Als Beispiel zitiere ich zunachst die Urkunde BM 80644:34 31 516 Minen und 2 113 Schekel Wolle gewogen mit dern Gewichtsstein [des Gottes SamaS (?)I, ihr Silberwert betragt 6 113 Schekel und 7 112 Korn, gehiirig zur Wolle des Palastes, welche IlSu-ibni, der Vorsteher der Kaufleute, im Palast in Empfang genommen hat. Verantwortungsbereich des Utul-IStar, des Schreibers. Von IlSu-ibni, dern Vorsteher der Kaufleute, haben Warad-Ibari und SamaS-bani, die Sohne des Etel-pi SamaS, sie (d.h. die Wolle) erhalten. Zum Zeitpunkt, da der Palast das Silber verlangt, werden sie es dern Boten des Palastes bezahlen. (Es folgen zwei Zeugen) Datum (Die Tafel ist gesiegelt mit dern Siegel des Warad-Ibari) Mehrere Urkunden dieses Typs sind bekannt. In einem weiteren Typ ist nicht eine bestimmte Menge Wolle Gegenstand der Urkunde, sondern ihr Gegenwert in Silber. Ein Beispiel dafur ist die Urkunde BM 8 1591:35 1 Schekel Silber ... Gegenwert fur 6 Minen Wolle, gehorig dern Palast, Verantwortungsbereich des Utul-IStar, des Schreibers, welche Utu-Sumundab, der Richter, in Empfang genommen hat. (Diese Wolle) hat von Utu-Sumundab, dern Richter, dern Sohn des IlSu-ibni, Jawirab, der Sohn des Ekur-rabi, erhalten. Zum Zeitpunkt, da er (Utu-Sumundab) es verlangt, wird er (Jawir&) dem, der ihm die Urkunde prasentiert, das Silber bezahlen. (Zwei Zeugen) Datum Nicht zu identifizierendes Siegel ("'religiose Inschrift" I Gebetslegende)
"die Wolle, welche den Kaufleuten geliefert werden soll, in Empfang genommen und im Akitum versiegelt worden ist und dort bereitliegt. Im Auftrage des Hochwohlgeborenen (awilum) schreibe ich Dir. Hiermit schicke ich den Boten (NA.A$.BAR) zu Dir. Sowie er bei Dir eingetroffen sein wird, nimm den Rest des fur die Wolle noch zu zahlenden Silbers, welches Du noch nicht vollstiindig abgerechnet hattest (Sa la tugammaruma la taiqulu) und komm mit ihm (dem Boten) zu mir nach Babylon."33 Im Vorgriff auf das noch zu Erlauternde mochte ich die Vermutung aufiern, daB der Angeredete aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach Utul-Istar ist, der fur den WollverschleiB in Sippar verantwortlich ist. Der zitierte Brief zeigt ebenfalls deutlich, da13 die Kaufleute fur 30
(= BiMes S ) , Malibu 1977.
"Marchands du palais et marchands du temple & la fin de la Ire dynastie de Babylone," Journal Asiatique 270 (1982), 25-65. Ancient Sippar. A Demographic Study of an Old Babylonian City (1894-1595 B.C.), Leiden 1975. 33 AbB 7 Nr. 161 in der Ubersetzung von F.R. Kraus; s. dazu auch die Briefe AbB 2 Nr. 172 bzw. AbB 7 160f. und 163f.
171
Beide Urkundentypen zeigen deutlich, dafi die von den Hirten abgelieferte Wolle sich zunachst in der Verfugungsgewalt des Palastes befand. Verantwortlich war Utul-IStar. Von ihm wurde die Wolle an das karum (die Kaufmannschaft von Sippar) gegeben.
35
Charpin, Journal Asiatique 270, 32. Charpin, Journal Asiatique 270, 33.
172
J. RENGER
Verantwortlich war hier u.a. IlSu-ibni, der Vorsteher der Kaufleute. Von ihm ging die Wolle an die VerschleiBer, die auf Aufforderung das erloste Silber an den Palast, genauer an dessen Beauftragten (NA.AS.BAR) zu zahlen hatten. Bei dern zweiten Urkundentyp ist wie schon oben angedeutet - nicht die Wolle Gegenstand der Vertragsurkunde, sondern der dafur erwartete Silberbetrag. Ein Wort zum Typ der das VerschleiBgeschaft begriindenden Vertrage: Es handelt sich durchweg um Vertrage des Subanti-Formulars. Schuldner ist der VerschleiBer, von dern in den meisten Fallen auch die Siegelabrollung auf der Tafel erhalten ist. In den meisten Fallen treten die Schuldner nicht alleine, sondern in Gruppen von mindestens zwei Personen auf. Glaubiger sind neben dern Vorsteher der Kaufleute (IlSu-ibni), auch andere Personen, deren Verbindung mit der kiirum-Administration sich nachweisen 1aBt. Aus vielerlei Griinden halte ich es fur wichtig, sich der Tatsache bewuBt zu sein, daB es sich bei diesen Urkunden nicht um Kaufurkunden handelt. Die von Charpin36 verwendeten Termini (ventes, ventes de laine B crkdit bzw. paiement de la laine achetke B credit) werden m.E. dern Charakter des zugrunde liegenden Sachverhalts nicht gerecht. Der Terminus S& (akkadisch Simum) hat hier die Bedeutung "Gegenwert, ~quivalent," wie das fiir Simum auch in anderen Kontexten gut bezeugt ist, und so auch von Charpin in seinen ijbersetzuqen widergegeben wird. Die Verfasser der Urkunden haben bewuBt nicht das Formular der Kaufvertrage, sondern das der Schuldurkunde gewahlt. Darin kornrnt auch ihre Bewertung des dokumentierten Geschaftes zum Ausdruck. DaB diesen Schuldurkunden nicht gewohnliche Darlehen zugrunde liegen, legen einige weitere typische Merkmale nahe. Die Texte nennen in der Regel zwei, hochstens drei Zeugen. Dies ist eine charakteristische Erscheinungsform, die wir auch von anderen aus dern Bereich der Verwaltung stammenden Urkunden kennen, die sich des Formulars der Schuldurkunde bedienen. Auch die administrative "Vorgeschichte," die in den Urkunden genannt wird, ist auBergewohnlich und erk1ib-t sich nur im Zusarnmenhang mit administrativen Erfordernissen. SchlieBlich fallt noch eine ~ ~ B e r l i c h k eauf. i t Die Urkunden sind ihrer Form nach quadratisch, mit graden Randern, die Platz fur die Siegelabrollungen bieten. Sie sind - wie ich mich im British Museum uberzeugen konnte Pseudo-Hullentafeln.37 Charpin hat in seinem Aufsatz eine wichtige Frage angeschnitten, narnlich die nach der Herkunft der Briefe und Urkunden des Utul-War-Archivs. Wie sich aus den Museumsnummern mit groljer Wahrscheinlichkeit ergibt (sie alle gehoren zu der Sammlung 91-5-9 des British Museum), wurden sie in Sippar gefunden. Wenn man die Angaben, die dariiber zur Verfiigung stehen, zugrunde legt,38ist ihre eigentliche Herkunft der Stadtteil Sippar-Jalyurum. Die Briefe sind ganz offensichtlich in Babylon geschrieben und nach Sippar geschickt worden. Die Urkunden sind in Sippar selbst verfaBt. Man kann nun einen Schritt weitergehen und fragen, ob sie aus dern Bereich der Palastadministration oder aus dern Bereich des karum stammen. Zunachst ist es Charpin, Journal Asiatique 270, 28. S. dazu auch C. Wilcke, "Zwei spat-altbabylonische Kaufvertrage aus KiS. Mit zwei Exkursen. A: nudunncim und niiitum; B: Quasi-Hiillentafeln und kanikiitltuppiit ummatim," in: G . van Driel et al. (Hrsg.), Zikir Sumim. Assyriological Studies presented to F.R. Kraus on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday, Leiden 1982, 426-483. 38 S. dam C.B.F. Walker und D. Collon, "Hormuzd Rassam's Excavations for the British Museum at Sippar in 1881-1882," in L. De Meyer (Hrsg.), Tell ed-Der 111,Leuven 1980, 93ff. und CT 52 (1976), Preface. 37
DAS PALASTGESCHUT IN DER ALTBABYLONISCHEN ZEIT
173
bemerkenswert, dal3 wir es mit Schuldurkunden zu tun haben, deren gemeinsamer Nenner die Verbindung des Glaubigers mit dern karum ist. Da es sich offensichtlich um die Originale handelt, konnen wir nur annehmen, daB der Vorgang, der zugrunde liegt, erledigt ist, ohne daB die Schuldurkunde vernichtet worden ware. In einem Fall (Waterman Nr. 30) hat man ganz offensichtlich durch kreuzweises Durchstreichen des Textes die Urkunde als ungultig oder erledigt gekennzeichnet. - AbschlieBend ein Wort zu der Bemerkung von C h a r ~ i n ,wonach ~~ die Abrechnungsurkunden (documents comptables), die der letzten Phase des Palastgeschaftes (Phase 5) beizuordnen sind, in Babylon verfaBt worden seien und dann - wegen des Fundortes Sippar - nach Sippar gebracht worden seien: Den Angaben Charpins40 zufolge sind es die Texte BM 80905, BM 80997, CT 48 72, und CT 8 2b. Es handelt sich um Quittungen, die dern IlSu-ibni und dern Utu-Sumundab, beide Vertreter des kiirum von Sippar-Jahrurum, das Abliefern bestimmter Silbersummen quittieren. Der logische Aufbewahrungsort fur derartige Quittungen ist das Archiv des Schuldners. Dieser ist im konkreten Fall der verantwortliche Vertreter des karum, der zusammen mit seiner Organisation fur das VerschleiBen und das Abliefern des Silbers an den Palast in Babylon verantwortlich ist, wie der eingangs zitierte Brief zeigt. Dal3 es h l i c h e Mechanismen des VerschleiBens nicht nur in Sippar sondern auch an anderen Orten des Konigreichs Babylon im 17. Jahrhundert v.Chr. gegeben hat, erhellen Texte, die den abi jiibim, "Vater der Truppe," namens Marduk-muballit, betreffen. Yoffee spricht in diesem Zusammenhang von einem "bureau of wool accounts."41 Den gleichen Terminus venvendet er auch im Zusarnmenhang mit Utul-Istar. Hinter dieser Bezeichnung verbirgt sich mehr als bloB ein Name. Eine Vorstellung vom Funktionieren der Palastwirtschaft und der Palastadministration in Form von Buros oder "Fachabteilungen" deutet auf ein Verstandnis hin, daB eher von modernistischen biirokratischen Vorstellungen gepragt ist, als von Einsichten, die antike Strukturen zugrunde legen. Meines Erachtens ist der organisatorische Rahmen der Palastwirtschaft der altbabylonischen Zeit weiterhin von den Strukturen der oikos-Wirtschaft der Ur-111-Zeit beeinflufit. Der entscheidende Unterschied besteht darin, daB in der altbabylonischen Zeit von der Struktur des oikos nur die administrative Seite ubriggeblieben ist. Die Durchfiibng wirtschaftlicher Operationen sowohl im Bereich der Produktion als auch im Bereich der Vorratshaltung und Verteilung ist Aufgabe von Entrepreneuren, den Akteuren des Palastgeschiiftes.
5.1.2.2 VerschleiJprodukte nach den Urkunden aus dern Utul-Iztar-Archiv Wie schon angedeutet, scheint das wesentliche VerschleiBprodukt unter der Jurisdiktion des Utul-I6tar Wolle gewesen zu sein. Das gilt so lange, als man die Anzahl der Texte, in denen vom VerschleiB von Wolle die Rede ist, zum Gegenstand einer quantitativen Beurteilung macht. Beriicksichtigt man andere Kriterien, etwa den Wert der in einem bestimmten Zeitraum in den Texten genannten VerschleiBprodukte oder Objekte,
40 41
Charpin, Journal Asiatique 270, 38 unten. Charpin, Journal Asiatique 270,29. Yoffee, BiMes 5, 13-21.
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J. RENGER
dann gebuhrt vom Wert her den Rindern der erste plat^.^^ Neben Rindern und Wolle wird in zwei Fdlen Sesarn im Utul-IStar-Archiv als Verschleiljprodukt genannt.43
Ebenso wie im Archiv des Siip-sin geben uns die Texte aus dern Archiv des UtulIStar keinen direkten Hinweis darauf, auf welche Weise das VerschleiBen der vom Palast dern kiirurn ubergebenen Produkte erfolgte. Allerdings konnte das Produkt "Wolle" die Richtung weisen, in der zu suchen ist. Wolle ist der Rohstoff fiir das wichtigste Exportgut Babyloniens, Textilien. Die Frage stellt sich, wo Textilien in groljeren Zahlen fiir den Fernhandel hergestellt worden sein konnten. Man mochte Textilmanufakturen oder Ergasterien vermuten. Hinweise auf Ergasterien (nuparum) finden sich - auljer in Texten aus dern Konigreich Mari - nur spiirlich.44 Auf einen anderen Weg weisen uns die Texte BAP 4 und Edzard ed Der 45. Danach werden 01 bzw. Wolle, die aus dern Palast stammen und der Verantwortlichkeit des UtulIStar unterstehen, dafur verwendet, Sklaven zu erwerben. Auch hier befinden wir uns wiederum an der Schnittstelle zwischen Fernhandel und der Befriedigung interner Bed~rfnisse.~5 Ein letzter Fall eroffnet eine andere Perspektive: Nach dern Text CT 8 30~46wurden im ganzen 47 Schekel Silber, die zum Silber des SamaS-~em~el gehoren, welches den Gegenwert fur Wolle darstellt, auf Anweisung des Ibni-Marduk, des S A ~ ~ . D U B . B A Beamten an IlSu-ibni, den Vorsteher der Kaufleute, gegeben, urn dafur 4 Pflugrinder fur die "Staatspachter" (landwirtschaftlicheEntrepreneure) ENS^ / iiiakkum) der Felder des SamaS zu erwerben. Wenn man weilj, dalj der Palast uberschussige Tiere aus seinen Rinderherden dern kiirum zum Verschleilj ubertmg, andererseits aber der SarnaS-~ern~el fur seine eigenen landwirtschaftlichen Operationen darauf angewiesen war, Pflugrinder zu beschaffen, kann man die Vermutung wagen, dalj die Palastgeschafte unter anderem auch dazu dienten, einen Ausgleich zwischen den Bedurfnissen einzelner institutioneller Haushalte zu schaffen. Der ijberschulj des einen entsprach dern Bedurfnis des anderen. Statt nun den Ausgleich auf direktem Wege zwischen diesen Haushalten zu bewerkstelligen, wurde auch hier die Organisation der Kaufleute (karurn) zwischengeschaltet. Dies ist die klassische Situation des Palastgeschaftes.
DAS PALAsTGESCH~TIN DER ALTBABYLONISCHEN ZEIT
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5.2 Der Tempelhaushalt als Partizipant am Palastgescha~ Wie das zuletzt genannte Beispiel andeutet, war das Palastgeschaft nicht dern Palast ausschlieljlich vorbehalten, sondern auch andere institutionelle Haushalte, das heiljt vor allem die Tempe1 bedienten sich ebenfalls dieser Art okonomischer Operation. Charpin hat die einschlagigen Belege aufgefuhrt und besprochen.47 Seinen Ausfuhrungen ist nichts hinzuzufiigen.
5.3 Die Frage des Einheitspreises Charpin hat sich hierzu im einzelnen geauiul3e1-t.~~ Zunachst scheint nur die Tatsache der vorherigen Festsetzung des ~quivalentsfur die Wolle fur einen "VerschleiJ3"vorgang zu sprechen nicht fur ein eigentliches Kaufgeschaft, es sei denn, man akzeptierte einen uber fast 20 Jahre konstant bleibenden Einheitspreis am "Markt." Naher liegt meines Erachtens die E r k l h n g , dalj es sich bei dern durchschnittlichen Preis von 10 Schekel Silber pro Talent Wolle49 um ein vom Palast festgelegtes Wertverhaltnis zwischen Silber und Wolle gehandelt habe, ein Wertverhdtnis, wie es etwa in den sogenannten Tarifen des 18. Jahrhunderts zum Ausdruck kommt. In diesem festgesetzten Wertverhdtnis zwischen Wolle und Silber konnte sich auch der Gewinn fur die am Verschleilj der Wolle Beteiligten verbergen. Konkret hiel3e das, da13 fur eine bestimrnte Menge Wolle ein Betrag in Silber grundsatzlich festgelegt war, der dern Kaufmann einen Gewinn aus seiner Tatigkeit garantierte. ijber die Hohe eines solchen Gewinnes konnen wir im Falle des Utul-IStar-Archivs keinerlei Angaben machen, sondern nur auf die Praxis verweisen, die uns aus dern Sep-sin-~rchivbekannt ist: Den Verschleirjern wurde die zu verschleiljende Ware zu einem Drittel ihres "tatsachlichen" Wertes uberlassen oder in Rechnung gestellt.50 Hinweise uber die Gewinnspannen von Entrepreneuren im Mittelalter und in der Zeit des Merkantilismus lassen selbst diese Gewinnspanne von 66 213% gering erscheinen, wenn man sie mit den dort genannten Spannen von 200% vergleicht.
5.4 Die Unterschiede zwischen den Archiven des Sipsin und des Utul-Iitar Beide Archive beleuchten die Rolle der Kaufmannschaft (kiirum) beim "Verschleiljen" von Produkten, die dern Palast als Abgaben geliefert werden. Die hauptsachlichen Produkte im Archiv des $ep-sin sind Datteln und Fische, im Archiv des Utul-IStar ist es vor allem Wolle. In beiden Archiven ist ein Vorsteher der Kaufleute Sep-sin im einen Fall und IlSu-ibni(Su) im Archiv des Utul-IStar - die fur die Organisation des Verschleiljens verantwortliche Personlichkeit. Den Verschleilj selber
42 43 44
Charpin, Journal Asiatique 270, 39f zu AbB 7 37, YOS 13 354 und 530. Charpin, Journal Asiatique 270, 42 zu BM 80997, 80905 (s. oben 3.1.2). J. Renger, "Handwerk und Handwerker im alten Mesopotamien," AoF 23 (1996), 21 1-231, bes. S.
oorr
LDJI.
45
Dazu generell Renger, Patterns, und Ders., "Formen des Zugangs zu den lebensnotwendigen Giitern: Die Austauschverhaltnisse in der altbabylonischen Zeit," AoF 20 (1993), 87-114 (mit ausfihrlichen Venveisen auf wirtschaftshistorischeund sozial-anthropologischeLiteratur). 46 Charpin, Journal Asiatique 270, 51f.
47
Charpin, Journal Asiatique 270, 49ff. Charpin, Journal Asiatique 270,54. Dieser Wert entspricht dern administrativen Aquivalent der Ur 111-Zeit, s. dazu Renger, Patterns, 94; das Rechtsbuch von Eschnunna (LE) verzeichnet in $1 ein Verh'altnis von 1 Schekel Silber zu 6 Minen Wolle, d.h. ebenfalls 10 Schekel fiir ein Talent. Charpin, Journal Asiatique 270, 30f. und 52f. (das Aquivalent 10 Schekel Silber fiir 1 Talent Wolle blieb unverandert zwischen der Zeit Hammurapis und Ammi~aduqas). S. oben unter 5.1.1.
48 49
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J. RENGER
ubernahmen - so scheint es - Kaufleute (DAM.GAR) aus den beiden k6rum. Auch die Abliefemng des Silbers an den Palast kann nach Ausweis beider Archive auf zwei Wegen erfolgen, einmal uber das kirum oder aber direkt an Beauftragte des Palastes. Im letzteren Fall wird der VerschleiBer buchhalterisch entlastet. Die wesentlichen Unterschiede zwischen den Archiven des Sep-s?n und des UtulIStar lassen sich in drei Punkten zusarnrnenfassen: 5.4.1 Zunachst fallt auf, dal3 im Archiv des Utul-IStar die zum VerschleiS bestimmte Wolle vom Palast ubernommen wird, wiihrend im Archiv des Sep-sin Datteln und Fische vom Obergiirtner (SANDANA) oder die Fische vom Militibefehlshaber (UGULAMAR.TU) von den Produzenten weg eingesammelt und an das karum geliefert wurden. Es kann sich hierbei um einen tatsachlichen strukturellen Unterschied im System des VerschleiBprozesses handeln. Aber auch eine andere Erklarung erscheint mir moglich: Die Wolle, die von groBen Viehherden starnmt, wurde in einer vom Palast organisierten Operation gewonnen und gestapelt und dann weitergegeben. Eine zwischengeschaltete Instanz in Form eines "Eintreibers" erscheint hier von der Sache her nicht geboten. Anders liegt der Fall bei Fischen und Datteln, die anscheinend von Einzelpersonen oder kleinen Personengruppen gefangen oder geerntet wurden und in der Tat das Einsammeln durch eine verantwortliche und mit Autoritat ausgestattete Person notig machten. Man kann sogar einen Schritt weitergehen und sagen, daS es fur die Kaufmannschaft (karum) sehr aufwendig gewesen wire, bei den einzelnen Produzenten die zu verschleiBenden Produkte muhsam einzutreiben. SchlieBlich mogen auch zeitliche und regionale Differenzen (Sep-sin: I. Halfte 18. Jh., Sudbabylonien; Utul-IStar 2. Halfte 17. Jh., Nordbabylonien) fiir die zu beobachtenden Unterschiede verantwortlich sein. 5.4.2 Nach Ausweis von Urkunden aus dem Archiv des Sep-sin wurden den Kaufleuten die Datteln oder Fische zu einem Drittel ihres tatsachlichen Wertes ubergeben. Nur mit diesem Betrag waren sie belastet und verpflichtet, diesen an den Palast oder seine Beauftragten in Form von Silber abzufiihren. Wie der Ausgangswert zustande kam, sagen die Texte nicht. Nichts deutet darauf hin, da13 hier Mechanismen des "Marktes," wie etwa Angebot und Nachfrage, eine Rolle gespielt hatten. Ich vermute eher - und habe das an anderer Stelle bereits ausgefiihrt51- daB hier der genuine Platz der sogenannten Tarife, wie wir sie etwa aus den ersten Paragraphen des Rechtsbuches von ESnunna kennen, ist. Nach Ausweis der Urkunden aus dem Archiv des Utul-IStar wurde die zu verschleiBende Wolle den Kaufleuten zu einem festgelegten Satz (SAM) ubergeben. Wenn man den Kaufleuten einen Gewinn aus ihrer Tatigkeit zugestehen will, muB man davon ausgehen, daB der fur die ihnen iibergebene Wolle festgesetzte Satz in Silber niedriger war, als der Betrag, den sie im Zuge des VerschleiBprozesses gewinnen konnten. Welche Gewinnoder Erlosspannen in diesen Filen moglich waren, bleibt uns verborgen. 5.4.3 Kraus hat in seiner zusammenfassenden Darstellung des Palastgeschaftes52 als eins der Motive fur den Palast, wirtschaftliche Operationen an das Sep-sin zu vergeben, 51 S. dazu Renger, Patterns, 91-94 und Ders., "Zur Rolle von Preisen und Lijhnen im Wirtschaftssystem des alten Mesopotamien an der Wende vom 3. zum 2. Jahrtausend v. Chr. Grundsatzliche Fragen und Uberlegungen," AoF 16 (1989), 234-252, insbesondere S. 247f. Kraus, Palast, 43 1.
DAS PALASTGESCH@T IN DER ALTBABYLONISCHEN ZEIT
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die Absicht genannt, sich auch burokratische Arbeiten zu ersparen. Dies trifft fur die Vorgange, die das Archiv des Sep-s?n beleuchtet, nicht zu. Eine Reihe von Urkunden zeigen eindeutig, daS der Palast in Babylon - ganz zu schweigen von den ortlichen Administratoren in Sudbabylonien - genau dariiber Buch fuhrte, wer zu welchen Abgaben verpflichtet war. Ein gutes Beispiel dafur sind neben einzelnen Urkunden, die sich in der von M. St01 besorgten Zusammenstellung finden, der Brief des Balmunarnhe (AbB 9 13). Anders scheint es sich zur Zeit des Ammisaduqa in Nordbabylonien verhalten zu haben. Unter den Urkunden des Utul-IStar-Archivs finden sich keine, die darauf hindeuten, dal3 der Palast uber Einzelforderungen gegenuber Produzenten Buch fuhrte. Lediglich die Ablieferung von Silber an den Palast in Babylon wurde den Vorstehern der Kaufleute und anderen offiziellen Vertretern der Kaufmannschaft von Sippar durch Quittung bestiitigt. 6. Weitere Palastgeschiifte F.R. Kraus hat sich in seinen Beitragen zum Palastgeschaft53 nur zu den Palastgeschaften geauljert, die sich direkt aus dem Edikt des Konigs Ammisaduqa erschlierjen lassen. Ich habe im Vorhergehenden auch andere Operationen genannt, die mir die Voraussetzungen zu erfullen scheinen, die sich aus der Definition fur das Palastgeschaft ergeben. Dazu gehoren vor allem die Dattelkultivation und der Fisch- und Vogelfang. Weitere Palastgeschafte - uber die von Kraus und oben behandelten hinaus lassen sich meines Erachtens nachweisen. Vor allem das Rechtsbuch des Hammurapi enthalt meines Erachtens eine Reihe von Bestimmungen, die sich besonders gut und einleuchtend im Kontext eines Palastgeschafteserklien lassen. 6.1 Palastgeschafte als Gegenstand von Regelungen im Rechtsbuch des Hammurapi Eine derartige Interpretation des Rechtsbuches des Hammurapi bemht auf folgenden Oberlegungen, die ich in anderem Zusammenhang behandelt habe.54 Dort ging es mir vor allem damm zu zeigen, daB ein groBer Teil der im Rechtsbuch des Hammurapi geregelten Rechtsmaterie das Verhaltnis zwischen Herrscher bzw. Palast und Untertan betrifft. DaB eine ganze Reihe der Bestimmungen, die sich im Rechtsbuch des Hammurapi finden, sich auch auf Rechtsgeschafte zwischen privaten Individuen anwenden lassen (etwa im Falle von Pacht und Miete) steht auBer Frage, sollte uns aber nicht den Blick dafur verstellen, daB eine groBe Zahl anderer Regeln sich - wie eben gesagt - einleuchtend nur erklaren lassen, wenn man davon ausgeht, daJ3 hier ganz konkret rechtliche Tatbestande aufgefuhrt sind, in denen es um die Beziehungen zwischen Herrscher bzw. Palast und Untertan geht. Zu den Bestimmungen, die sich zwanglos auf Palastgeschafte beziehen lassen, rechne ich etwa die Paragraphen 42-56 (Feldpacht), die Paragraphen 57-58 und die Paragraphen 264-68 (Herdenhaltung), die Paragraphen 59-65 (Dattelpalmkultur), die Paragraphen 120121 (Getreideverwahrung mit Preistarif). Einzelheiten lassen sich fur einzelne dieser Bestimmungen bei Betrachtung der entsprechenden Palastgeschafte (etwa Dattelpalm-
54
Kraus, Palast und in seinem Buch Velfiigungen. Renger, WO 8 (1975-76), 228-235.
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J. RENGER
kultur, Herdenhaltung) anhand des oben gesagten leicht entnehmen. Fur andere dieser Geschafte geben uns Urkunden und Briefe ein wenig zusatzliche Auskunft.
6.2 Balmunamhe Ein kleines Beispiel fur eine palastgeschaftliche Regelung oder Situation bietet der Brief AbB 9 Nr. 13. Er ist an den uns wohlbekannten Balmunamhe gerichtet. Nach allem, was man uber Balmunamhe weil3, war er kein Beamter oder Funktionar des Palastes, sondern seine Aktivitaten weisen ihn eher als einen DAM.GARaus.55 Dalj er nicht vollig unabhangig vom Palast agiert hat, legen meines Erachtens die Falle nahe, in denen von ihm abgeschlossene Vertrage mit privaten Individuen von einer auffallend grol3en Zahl von Angehorigen des Palasthaushaltes bezeugt wurden. In die gleiche Richtung deutet der Brief AbB 9 Nr. 13, in dern Balmunamhe aufgefordert wird, sich Gerste von der Gersteabgabe (SE GUN) des PN ausliefern zu lassen (Siijia, entspricht Sumerischem BA.ZI).Sollte keine Abgabegerste des PN mehr vorhanden sein, solle er sich von der Abgabegerste des PN2 (SUKKAL)Gerste ausliefern lassen und diese dann zum Palast bringen. Der Terminus Abgabegerste SE GUN des PN erinnert sofort an den Terminus GUN Elmegum in den Texten Nr. 1-12 von Birot, Tablettes. Dort scheint ElmeSum diejenige Person gewesen zu sein, die die von den ENS^ angebaute und abgelieferte Gerste sarnmelte und bis auf Abruf speicherte. Diese Speicherung scheint mir iibrigens nach dern oben Gesagten ein weiteres Palastgeschit zu sein worauf sich die Paragraphen 113- bzw. 120f. des Rechtsbuches des Hammurapi beziehen. Der Sinn beider Palastgeschafte, des Speichergeschaftes und des Transportgeschaftes, ist klar: Das geerntete Getreide wurde dezentral gespeichert und konnte jederzeit nach Bedarf, ohne da13 der Palast eigenes Personal und Transportmittel bereithalten muhte, uberall dorthin geliefert werden, wo es gebraucht wurde. Die klassischen Bedingungen des Palastgeschaftes sind damit erfiillt. 6.3 Das Palastgeschiift mit dem Abdecker Verbunden mit der Herdenhaltung ist das Geschaft des Abdeckers. Seine Aufgabe war es, von gefallenen Tieren - vor allem den Schafen - die Haute, die Sehnen und die Wolle der Kadaver einzusammeln und im Palast abzuliefern. Kraus hat dieses Palastgeschaft eingehend dargestellt.56 Der Abdecker (SU.SI.IG,akkadisch NuslNikkum) wird im Edikt naher als SU.SI.IG mdim bezeichnet. Dadurch kommt zum Ausdruck, da13 ihm fiir seine Tatigkeit ein bestimmtes regional einzugrenzendes Gebiet zugewiesen war. Kraus weist darauf hin, da13 es sich bei ihm weniger um denjenigen handelt, der die Tatigkeit des Hautens und sonstigen Verwertens der Tierkadaver eigenhhdig vornimmt, sondern um eine Person, die das Einsamrneln der verwertbaren Teile eines Tierkadavers zu organisieren, zu beaufsichtigen und zu verantworten hat. Wie das Edikt deutlich macht, hatte er bestimmte Quoten abzuliefern. Diese stehen naturlich in einem bestimmten Verhaltnis zur Grolje der Herden des Palastes, die ebenfalls in Form eines Palastgeschaftes von Herdenverwaltern und Hirten betreut wurden. Bekanntlich wurden 55
M. van de Mieroop, "The Archive of Balmunme," AfO 34 (1987), 1-29.
56
Kraus, Verfigungen, 350-393.
DAS PALASTGESCH~FTIN DER ALTBABYLONISCHEN ZEIT
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ihnen bestimmte Hochstzahlen von gefallenen Tieren zugestanden. Dies bildet die Grundlage oder den Ausgangspunkt fur die Tatigkeit des Abdeckers. Einer Reihe von Urkunden entnehmen wir, da13 der Abdecker den Empfang von Kadavern urkundlich quittiert.57 Es handelt sich um kleine Urkunden in der au13eren Form einer "Tonplombe" oder eines "Anhangers," englisch "docket" oder "tag,"58 die mit dern Siege1 des Abdeckers gesiegelt sind. Er bescheinigt - so ergibt die Diskussion von Kraus - den Hirten, aus dessen Herde die Kadaver kommen, deren Empfang. Mit Hilfe dieser Quittungen konnen die Hirten ihrerseits bei der Jahresabrechnung Rechenschaft uber ihre Herde ablegen. Interessant ist die Urkunde BM 81650, die folgende Situation widerspiegelt: "Zur Zeit der Einsamrnlung der gefallenen Tiere, welche die Staats'hirten' gems der ihnen zugestandenen Fallmarge deklarieren durften, waren offenbar weniger Kadaver eingeliefert worden, als deklariert werden durften. Fur die an der deklarablen Anzahl noch fehlenden Kadaver stellte der betreffende Staats'hirt' dern Abdecker eine Schuldurkunde, eben unser kanik NN Nusikkim aus. Lieferte er die ausstehenden Kadaver nach, so wurde das piih kanikim vorgenommen, der "Austausch gegen (seine) Schuldurkunde." Letztere wurde zuruckgegeben oder vernichtet, der Abdecker stellte dern Staats'hirten' eine Quittung wie die in ... [BM 816501 vorliegende, aus! Mit anderen Worten, um seine Ablieferungsquote zu erfiillen, lie13 sich der Abdecker per Urkunde ein Lieferungsversprechen von einem Hirten geben, da13 dieser ihm eine bestimmte Anzahl von Kadavern liefern werde. Ganz offensichtlich war der Palast bereit, bei der Abrechnung mit dern Abdecker eine derartige Urkunde zunachst anzuerkennen und die tatsachliche Ablieferung von Hauten, Sehnen und Wolle der gefallenen Tiere abzuwarten."59 Im ubrigen bestatigen die Urkunden die Bestimmungen und Auskunfte, die der Paragraph 12 des Ediktes des Konigs Ammi~aduqauns an die Hand gibt, vor allem die Tatsache, dalS den Abdeckern bestimmte territorial definierte Bereiche fur ihre Tatigkeit zugewiesen waren. Einige weitere Urkunden und vor allem Briefe zeigen uns den Abdecker als den Organisator und Verantwortlichen einer bestimmten Tatigkeit, die von ihm unterstellten Personen tatsachlich ausgefuhrt haben. Dazu konnten auch einzelne Personen "dienstverpflichtet" werden, mit anderen Worten, ihre Dienstpflicht gegenuber dern Palast durch die Tatigkeit beim Abdecker ableisten.60 6.4 Das Palastgeschaft des Sa nawCm Dieses Palastgeschaft, das von dern fur die Sommenveidegriinde Verantwortlichen (Nu n a w h ) durchgefuhrt wurde, bleibt uns in jeglicher Beziehung unklar. Zwar kann man vermuten, da13 diese Person und sein Geschit mit der Herdenhaltung zu tun hatte, sicher ist dies aber nicht. Kraus, VerjZgungen, 372 ff. Kraus, Vefigungen, 371. s9 Kraus, Verfiigungen, 375. 60 Fiir weitere Einzelheiten und eine zusammenfassende Beurteilung zum Geschaft des Abdeckers vergleiche Kraus, Verfiigungen, 389-393.
57
180
DAS PALASTGESCH~TIN DER ALTBABYLONISCHEN ZEIT
J. RENGER
7. Der Paragraph 11 des Ediktes des Konigs Ammi~aduqa und der ProzeJ des "VerschleiJensJ'
181
konnten und der fiktive Weg uber das kcrum sich nur aus der Schuldurkunde rekonstruieren l%t. ~hnlicheF i l e sind uns auch aus dern Archiv des Utul-IStar bekannt.
Der Paragraph 11 des Ediktes des Ammi~aduqa bietet noch manche Verstehensschwierigkeiten,wie das auch Kraus in seinem Kommentar formuliert hat. Der Paragraph regelt File, in denen "der 'Kaufmann' keine Waren erhalt, sondern riickstandige Forderungen des 'Palastes' an 'Ertragbringer', welche der 'Palast' ihm abtritt. Uber diese Waren, auf welche er nur ein Anrecht erwirbt, stellt der Kaufmann dern 'Palast' eine Empfangsbescheinigung genau in der Form aus, in welcher er sonst uber empfangenes Kaufgut quittiert. Aus diesen Quittungen ... geht also nicht hervor, ob der Kaufmann wirklich das darin angegebene Kaufgut in natura vom 'Palaste' erhalten hat oder ob er nur in einer oder der anderen Form eine Anweisung darauf bekommen hat. Das Edikt setzt dann weiter voraus, daB der Kaufmann auch vom Betreffenden (?) 'Ertrag' nicht die Waren sondern eine "gesiegelte Urkunde" bekarn. ... Ich kann mir darunter nur eine Schuldurkunde vorstellen, welche der noch immer nicht zur Bereinigung seiner Ruckstiinde fahige 'Ertragsbringer' anstelle der von ihm verlangten Leistungen dern Kaufmanne ausstellte, der Kaufmann, der somit statt Ware nur einen nicht lieferungsfahigen Schuldner des 'Palastes' wider Willen hat ubernehrnen mussen, kommt dadurch in die Lage, dern 'Palaste' Guter als empfangen quittiert zu haben, welche er in Wirklichkeit nicht empfangen hatte."61 Kraus bemerkt weiter,62 daJ3 die "gesiegelte Urkunde des 'Ertragsbringers' eine von diesem friiher dern 'Palaste' ausgestellte sein" konnte, welche der 'Palast' dern Kaufmanne statt Waren gegen Quittung uberlat. Der Hintergrund dieses Paragraphen ist der folgende: Der Kaufmann - wobei es sich moglicherweise nicht etwa um den Vorsteher der Kaufleute, sondern um den unmittelbar mit dern VerschleiBen betrauten Kaufmann (DAM.GAR) handelt, wie ich es oben am Beispiel der Archive des Sep-sin und Utul-IStar dargestellt habe, wird hier uber seine Verpflichtung zum VerschleiB im Palast befindlicher Waren auch mit einer Operation betraut, die an der Schnittstelle zwischen dern Palastgeschaft, das die Produktion und dem, das den "VerschleiB" betrifft, angesiedelt ist. Im Archiv des Sep-sin waren fur das Eintreiben der Ertrage aus der Produktion besondere Mittelsmanner (SANDANA) oder Militarbefehlshaber (UGULA MAR.TU) zustandig. Es fragt sich nun, ob zur Zeit des Ammi~aduqader Palast mit mehr oder weniger sanftem Druck die Kaufleute zusatzlich mit dern Eintreiben (Suddunum) von Ruckstiinden (ribbcitum) belastete. Der Paragraph 11 des Ediktes bestatigt uns uberdies Prozeduren, wie sie uns aus den Urkunden wohlbekannt sind: Schuldurkunden dienten der Fixierung einer zu erbringenden Abgabeschuld, sei es eines Produzenten, sei es eines VerschleiBers. Sie spielen aber auch uberall dort eine Rolle, wo Waren direkt von einer Person an eine andere Person oder Institution gingen, ohne daB der iiblicherweise dafiir vorgeschriebene Weg eingehalten wurde. Als Beispiel sei etwa daran erinnert, daJ3 es uns vom Archiv des Sep-sin bekannt ist, daB Waren direkt vom Produzenten an den VerschleiBer gehen
62
Kraus, Verfiigungen, 227. Kraus, Veijiugungen, 396 (Nachtrag zu S. 227).
Ich hatte eingangs den Unterschied zwischen der Ur-111-Zeit und der altbabylonischen Zeit hinsichtlich der beherrschenden wirtschaftlichen Strukturen derart bestimmt, daB ich fur die Ur-111-Zeit auf das - soweit wir sehen konnen - allumfassende System der oikos-Wirtschaft verwiesen hatte, und fur die altbabylonische Zeit das Palastgeschaft als die gegenuber der Ur-III-Zeit anzusehende Neuerung genannt hatte. Die ausfuhrliche Beschreibung des Palastgeschaftes in seinen einzelnen Facetten darf uns allerdings nicht dariiber hinwegtauschen, dalj wir hiermit moglicherweise nur einen Teil der Wirklichkeit fassen. Jedem, der die Rechts- und Verwaltungsurkunden und die Briefe der altbabylonischen Zeit kennt, werden sofort Beispiele einfallen, die ihn entweder an das Ur-111-zeitliche oikos-System erinnern oder aber solche Beispiele, die er mit privatwirtschaftlichen Kategorien erkliiren mochte. Diese Widerspriiche gilt es aufzukliiren. Zunachst muB man sich daruber Rechenschaft abzulegen, in welcher Weise unsere Kenntnis des Palastgeschaftes ortliche oder zeitliche Komponenten enthalt, die fur eine Gesamtbeurteilung von Bedeutung sein konnen. Das gleiche gilt sicher auch fur den Aspekt privater wirtschaftlicher Aktivitaten. Beginnen wir mit den letzteren, den privaten wirtschaftlichen Aktivitaten. Ich schlielje hier zunachst diejenigen aus, die in Beziehung zum Palastgeschaft selbst stehen konnten, und die in irgendeiner Weise mit dern VerschleiBprozeB zu tun haben konnen. Generell mochte ich festhalten, dal3 fiir unsere Vorstellungen uber private wirtschaftliche Tatigkeit in der altbabylonischen Zeit seit der Zeit, seit der uns Rechtsurkunden der altbabylonischen Periode bekannt sind, das Axiom gilt, die altbabylonische Zeit unterscheide sich von der vorhergehenden Ur-111-Zeit dadurch, daB die bis dahin vorherrschende Staatswirtschaft von einer reinen Privatwirtschaft abgelost worden sei. Dieses Axiom ist nur selten in Frage gestellt worden. Erst neuerdings hat man gelernt und akzeptiert, daB man in der altbabylonischen Zeit viele Verwaltungsvorgange mit den Mitteln der Rechtsurkunde fixiert hat. Diese unterscheiden sich in ihrem Formular in keiner Weise von Urkunden, die private Individuen benutzten, wenn sie gegenseitig Rechtsgeschafte abschlossen. Ich habe oben im Zusammenhang mit dern Archiv des SamaQazir auf solche Falle hinweisen konnen. Aber auch die Vorstellung, das Privateigentum an der Feldflur sei eines der konstitutiven Elemente des altbabylonischen Wirtschaftssystems gewesen, erweist sich bei naherem Hinsehen als in entscheidenden Punkten revisionsbedurftig. Ich habe nachgewiesen, daB im sudlichen Babylonien unter der Dynastie von Larsa bis zur Zeit Rimsins und aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach noch daruber hinaus, das Privateigentum an der Feldflur keine oder nur eine hochst untergeordnete Rolle gespielt hat.63 Auch fur Nordbabylonien ergibt sich, daB die Verfugung uber privates Eigentum an der Feldflur einer Reihe von Restriktionen unterlegen hat und auch quantitativ die VerauBerungen von Feldern nicht so bedeutend waren, als daB man von einem regelrechten Handel mit Feldgrundstucken sprechen konnte. 63
Siehe dam die oben Anrn. 10 genannte Literatur.
182
J. RENGER
Staatliche Aktivitaten, oder genauer Aktivitaten des Palastes, im wirtschaftlichen Bereich lassen sich aus einer ganzen Anzahl von Archiven erschliefien, die vor allem die Situation im sudlichen Babylonien bis hin zur Zeit des Rimsin beleuchten. Ein wesentliches Handicap in der Beurteilung besteht darin, daJ3 die meisten dieser Archive noch nicht ausfuhrlich genug untersucht worden sind. Vieles, was an oikos-Wirtschaft erinnert, kommt darin zum Vorschein. Andererseits erkennen wir aber auch - wie die Untersuchungen von F.R. Kraus und K. B ~ t z uber 6 ~ die Viehwirtschaft im Konigreich Larsa zeigen - dal3 das Prinzip des Palastgeschaftes zur Zeit des Rimsin zumindest in Teilbereichen der Palastwirtschaft eine markante Rolle spielte. So wird man im Sinne einer historischen Perspektive zumindestens soviel feststellen konnen, da13 die Tendenz auf das Palastgeschaft hin - und von der oikos-Wirtschaft weg - die entscheidende Beobachtung ist. Wenn man es recht betrachtet, hat sich die Brauchbarkeit des Systems in neubabylonischer und achbenidischer Zeit irnmer noch bew2u-t. Andererseits sind viele der burokratischen Methoden, die das Palastgeschaft auszeichnen, keine Innovationen der altbabylonischen Zeit. Vor allem das Mittel der Vorausschatzung von Feldertragen (Schatzung auf dem Halm) oder die Berechnung des Wachstums einer Herde waren bereits in der Ur-111-Zeit und friiher wohlbekannt. Auch die notwendigen praktischen Kenntnisse mathematischer Art beruhen auf langer und guter Tradition. Vollig im dunklem tappen wir noch, wenn es darum geht, die Ursachen fur die Abwendung von der oikos-Wirtschaft und das sich Zuwenden zum System des Palastgeschaftes zu suchen. Lediglich eine gewisse Koinzidenz mit der historischen Entwicklung lafit sich feststellen. Inwieweit aber die Umgestaltung des politischen Systems im Zuge nomadischer Einwanderungen und Staatenbildungen im sudlichen Mesopotarnien dam gefiihrt haben, sich von dem solange praktizierten System der oikosWirtschaft abzuwenden und stattdessen das Palastgeschaft zu bevorzugen, ist Stoff fiir Hypothesen. Zu diesen gehort auch die Moglichkeit, da13 Erfahrungen mit dem patrimonialen oikos-System der Ur-HI-Zeit auch dessen Schwachstellen demonstriert und dadurch die Suche nach anderen Losungsmoglichkeiten gefordert haben.
Bibliographie Birot, M. Tablettes
Tablettes kconomiques et administratives d'kpoque babylonienne ancienne consewkes au Muske dd'Artet d'Histoire de Genkve, Paris 1969.
Charpin, D. Journal Asiatique 270 "Marchands du palais et marchands du temple B la fin de la Ire dynastie de Babylone," Journal Asiatique 270 (1982), 25-65.
Koschaker, P. Z4 47
"Zur staatlichen Wirtschaftsverwaltung in altbabylonischer Zeit, insbesondere nach Urkunden aus Larsa," ZA 47 (1942), 135-180.
Kraus, F.R. Edikt
Ein Edikt des Konigs Ammi-Saduqa von Babylon (= Studia et docurnenta
ad iura orientis antiqui pertinentia 5), Leiden 1958. 64
S. Kraus, Viehhaltung und K. Butz, "Konzentrationen wirtschaftlicher Macht im Konigreich Larsa: Der Nanna-Ningal-Tempelkomplex in Ur," WZKM 65/66 (1973-74), 1-58.
DAS PALASTGESCHm IN DER ALTBABYLONISCHEN ZEIT
183
"Der 'Palast', Produzent und Untemehmer im Konigreiche Babylon nach Hammurapi (ca. 1750 - 1600 v.Chr.)," in: E. Lipinski (Hrgb.), State and Temple Economy in the Ancient Near East, Bd. I1 (= OLA 6), Leuven 1979, 423-434. Verfiigungen Konigliche Verfugungen in altbabylonischer Zeit (= Studia et documenta ad iura orientis antiqui pertinentia ll), Leiden 1984. Viehhaltung Staatliche Viehhaltung im altbabylonischen Lande Larsa, Amsterdam 1966. Landsberger, B . Date Palm
The Date Palm and its By-Products According to the Cuneiform Sources (= AfO Beiheft 17), Graz 1967.
Renger, J. Fs Kraus
"Zur Bewirtschaftung von Dattelpalmgkten warend der altbabylonischen Zeit," in: G. van Driel et al. (Hrgb.), Zikir Sumim. Assyriological Studies presented to F.R. Kraus on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday, Leiden 1982, 290-297.
Patterns
WO 8
Stol, M. JCS 34 Yoffee, N. BiMes 5
"Patterns of Non-institutional Trade and Non-commercial Exchange in Ancient Mesopotamia at the Beginning of the Second Millennium B.C.," in: A. Archi (Hrsg.), Circulation of Goods in Non-Palatial Context in the Ancient Near East (= Incunabula Graeca 82), Roma 1984, 31-123. "Hammurapis Stele 'Konig der Gerechtigkeit'. Zur Frage von Recht und Gesetz in der altbabylonischen Zeit," WO 8 (1975-76), 228-235. "State and Private Business in the Land of Larsa, JCS 34 (1982), 127230. The Economic Role of the Crown in the Old Babylonian Period (= Bibles
5), Malibu 1977.
LES P&TEURS ET LE PALAIS: LES EDITS DE M ~ ~ A R UDES M ROIS DE BABYLONE ET LEURS TRACES DANS LES ARCHIVES PRIVEES
miiar mdtim iarrum iikun dipdr hurdjim ana mdtim iiii u malt mcitim imsi "Le roi a promulguC la 'restauration' du pays: il a lev6 la torche d'or pour le pays et a mis fin au deuil du pays"1 La proclamation par les rois babyloniens d'une mtiarum affectait les rapports du palais avec ses agents, dont les arri6rCs Ctaient remis; mais le roi intervenait aussi dans les relations entre particuliers, en dCcidant la remise des dettes non commerciales.2 La comparaison dedeux lettres de Sippar qui ont trait h la m&meaffaire est sur ce point trks instructive. Tandis que la premikre rappelle le moment oh "la miiarum a CtC instaurCe",3 1 AbB 12 172%'-10'. Pour la symbolique de la "torche en or", voir les deux attestations publiCes par Finkelstein, "Some New misharum material and its implications", Me'l. Landsberger, 236 et le comrnentaire de Kraus, SD XI, 70, confirm6 par ce troisibme exemple. W. H. van Soldt a traduit la fin de la 1. 10' "and has cleansed all of the land". On pourrait voir ici 1'Ccho de l'expression hubullam mescim "'laver' les dettes" qu'on trouve dans les textes cappadociens (cf. SD XI, 104-105). Mais mali matim me semble une curieuse fason de dire; on attendrait plut6t matam kalaSa imsi; cf. d'ailleurs - dans un contexte analogue - nepiiriitim kalaSina imsi "il [= le roi d'Alep] a 'lavt? toutes les ergastules" en A.3192+ (AfO 34, 41 n. 39). Or ma12 dCsigne les cheveux sales ainsi portis en signe de deuil, qu'on lave lorsqu'on met fin B celui-ci (aux ref. du CAD MI1 174a, ajouter ARMT XXVIl2 397:18). L'expression est attestCe collectivement B propos du pays dans une apodose de la sCrie Summa izbu: matum ma-li-a-am i-nu-US-ii"le pays portera les cheveux sales (i.e. prendra le deuil)" (YOS 10 56 i 14). Le roi qui proclame une mtiarum met donc symboliquement fin au deuil de son pays. Pourquoi ce deuil? On pourrait penser que le pays est plongC dans l'affliction du fait de la mauvaise situation Cconomique B laquelle le roi remCdie en proclamant une miSarum. I1 me semble toutefois beaucoup plus vraisemblable que l'on ait affaire B une miiarum consCcutive B l'avbnement d'un nouveau roi: celui-ci, en proclamant la miiarum, met fin au deuil que le pays observait depuis le dCcb de son pr6dCcesseur. Or la lettre AbB 12 172, qui n'avait pu &re datCe par son Cditeur (AbB 12, 137 n. 172b), est dCsormais situCe par R. Pientka pendant le rbgne d'Abi-ebb (Die spataltbabylonische Zeit: Abieshu bis Samsuditana. Quellen, Jahresdaten, Geschichte (= Imgula 2), Miinster 1998, 326 n. 39). La mifarum CvoquCe par cette lettre serait donc celle de l'avbnement d'Abi-ehh. La proclamation d'un deuil B la mort d'un roi ttait surtout jusqu'h prCsent attestCe en Syrie: voir l'exemple de la cour de KarkemiS B la mort d'Aplahanda (deuilsipittum CvoquC dans ARMT XXVI11 no. 281; commentaire p. 560), ainsi que la mention du deuilbidirtum B la cour d'Alep B la mort de Yarfm-Lim (ARMT XXVIII no. 17). On voit donc, en plus de ses implications Cconomiques, la charge Cmotionnelle trbs forte que comportait la proclamation des Cdits royaux de miSarum, au moins lors de l'avbnement d'un nouveau roi. Voir mon Ctude sur "Les Cdits de 'restauration' des rois babyloniens et leur application", C1. Nicolet (Cd.), Du pouvoir duns l'antiquite': mots et re'alite', Paris-Genbve 1990, 13-24. AbB 13 89: 17 ki-ma mi-Sa-ru it-?[a-ak-nu].
LES PR~TEURSET LE PALAIS: LES ~ D I T SDE M ~ ~ A R U M
l'autre indique: "quand le roi a aboli les dette~".~ L'insistance mise dans la seconde lettre sur un aspect particulier de la miiarum royale, B savoir l'abolition des dettes, s'explique ais6ment: l'affaire a trait B un certain Tutu-n2sir qui avait fui Sippar pour Cchapper B ses crkanciers, et qui revint dans sa ville suite B la mesure royale. La question se pose de savoir si les interventions du souverain dans ce domaine, motivees par le souci de protCger les plus pauvres, n'eurent pas B la longue un effet inverse B celui qui Ctait souhaitk: lorsqu'on s'approchait d'une mfSarum, les crianciers auraient refust de prster. J. J. Finkelstein a le premier suggCr6 que le caractkre B ses yeux rCgulier des Cdits de miSarum devait avoir eu une incidence de ce genre sur le rythme de la vie Cconomique et il concluait: "If our hypothesis proves valid, the years immediately preceding a misharum should show a low rate of frequency in transactions in general, higher interest rates, lower sales prices for real estate, etc. (the risk to the potential buyer and creditor being then much greater)".5 La documentation publike depuis lors n'a pas confirm6 ce caractbre rCgulier des Cdits de miiarurn6 et il semble bien que ceux-ci certainement souhaitCs par les dCbiteurs - prenaient en gCn6ral les crCanciers par surprise.7 Surtout, on peut constater que dans certaines archives qui nous sont parvenues, le nombre de crCances augmente B mesure que l'on se rapproche d'un Cdit royal, contrairement B l'hypoth'ese de Finkelstein. La ddmonstration peut en Ctre faite B trois reprises dans l'histoire de la premikre dynastie de Babylone: au moment oiI Harnrnu-rabi conquit le royaume de Larsa (annCe 3 I), puis lors de l'avbement de Samsu-iluna et enfin en l'an 8 de Samsu-il~na.~ On peut mCme, sur la base de ce phenomkne, postuler en l'an 28 de Samsu-iluna l'existence d'une miiarum non encore explicitement documentee.
AbB 11 113:8' ki-ma Sar-rum hu-bu-ul-li-i it-bu-ku. Voir pour ce texte Kraus, SD XI, 82 $B. A-$6. J. J. Finkelstein, Mil. Landsberger, 233-246, en particulier p. 246. 6 Le problkme de la ptriodicitC des mesures de miSarum a donnC lieu B un large dtbat (les rkf. qui suivent ne prktendent pas B I'exhaustivitC): F.R. Kraus, "Ein Edikt des Konigs Samsu-iluna von Babylon", dans Me'l. Landsberger, 225-231; J.J. Finkelstein, "Some New misharum material and its implications", Mil. Landsberger, 233-246; G. Komor6czy, "Zur Frage der Periodizitat der altbabylonischen MiSarum-Erlasse", dans Societies and Languages of the Ancient Near East. Studies in Honour of I. M. Diakonoff, Warminster 1982, 196-205; R.F.G. Sweet, "Some Observations on the Edict of Ammi~aduqaprompted by Text C", L.T. Geraty & L.G. Herr (td.), The Archaeology of Jordan and Other Studies Presented to Sigfried H. Horn, Berrien Springs 1986, 579-600; H. Olivier, "The Periodicity of the mds'arum Again", W. Claasen (Cd.), Text and Context: Old Testament and Semitic Studies for F. C. Fensham (= JSOTSup 48), Sheffield 1988, 227-235; D. Charpin, "La miSarum B I'avbnement de Samsu-iluna", NABU 1988176; S.J. Lieberman, "Royal 'Reforms' of the Amurrite Dynasty", BiOr 46 (1989), 241-359; D. Charpin, "L'andur6rum B Mari", MARI 6, 1990, 253-270, B complCter par les deux notes de B. Lion, "ARM XXVII, 2: trace d'une andurhrum au dCbut du rkgne de Zimri-Lim?', NABU 19931111 et "Andurhrum de printemps B Mari ou B Burundum?', NABU 19971116. Pour le rythme de la proclamation des miiarum par Samsu-ilunapendant son rkgne, voir ci-dessous $4.4. Noter cependant la lettre TCL I 15, qui selon 13interprCtationde Kraus, SD XI, 74 et n. 167, ttmoignerait - sur le mode ironique - de l'anticipation d'une mis'arum par un crCancier anxieux de rCcupkrer son argent avant que le roi n'annule les crtances, 2 un moment manifestement imprtvisible. L'hypothbse qui avait Ctt pr6sentCe dam ma note sur "L'application des Cdits de mis'arum: traces documentaires" (NABU 1992176) peut Etre aujourd'hui confirmte par la publication de nouveaux textes.
187
Dans son magistral ouvrage Konigliche Verfugungen, le regrettC F.R. Kraus avait Crnis l'hypothkse qu'une miiarum ait CtC proclamke dans l'ancien royaume de Larsa aprks sa conquCte par Hammu-rabi de Babylone.l0 Les pikces rCunies par Kraus ne concernaient que l'annulation de ventes de biens-fonds. Quelques documents rCcemment publies permettent de confirmer sa proposition et de montrer que 17Cditroyal porta Cgalement sur la remise des dettes. I1 s'agit d'abord de TEBA III 5.11 Ce texte indique qu'une cr6ance datCe de l'an 59 de Rim-Sin portant sur 4 mines d'argent prCtCes par Ibbi-Sin B Apil-Kittim n'a pu stre brisCe parce qu'elle n'Ctait pas disponible, mais qu'elle est destinke B Ctre bride (sous-entendu le jour oiI on la retrouvera).12 I1 n'y a a priori rien dans ce texte qui indique l'application d'une mesure royale, notamment pas d'allusion explicite B un dCcret royal (simdat iarrim); en outre, la somme pr8tCe est assez ClevCe (4 mines d'argent), ce qui peut faire douter qu'on ait affaire B un pr& de nCcessitC, seul cas de remise des dettes. Toutefois, un rapprochement s'impose avec CT 48 15 (datC de Hammu-rabi 13) oh - contrairement B notre document - il est fait explicitement allusion B un dCcret royal (~imdatiarrirn 1. 5):13 le crdancier ayant perdu son titre de crCance, celui-ci n'a pu Ctre brisk "selon le dCcret du roi" (ina ~imdatiarrim). On dressa donc pro&-verbal de l'acte symbolique effect&: la destruction d'une motte de terre en lieu et place de la tablette disparue. Ainsi le dCbiteur ne risquait-il pas qu'on lui rCclame plus tard le remboursement d'un prCt remis par la mesure de gr2cce royale. TEBA III 5 porterait donc Cgalement sur une crCance annulCe par un Bdit royal. Le document fut remis au dkbiteur14pour le protCger: son creancier n'ayant pas produit sa crCance pour qu'elle soit dCtruite conformCment B 1'Cdit royal, il fallait Cviter que par la suite ce document perdu ne puisse Ctre utilisC contre lui. Or TEBA 111 5 date du -/i/Hammu-rabi 32, plus d'un an aprbs la conquCte babylonienne de Larsa.ls I1 semble donc qu'Hammu-rabi ait proclam6 dans le courant de I'annCe 3 1 ou au plus tard au tout debut de l'annCe 32 une miSarum "classique", avec annulation des dettes et des ventes.
Cf. ma note sur "La miSarum d7Hammu-rabiaprks la conquEte de Larsa: un nouvel indice", NABU 19911102. F.R. Kraus, SD XI, 58-62. M. Anbar & M. Stol, "Textes de I'Cpoque babylonienne ancienne III", RA 85 (1991), 13-48, en particulier p. 17 no. 5 (BM 17155). BM 14155: (1) [ail-Sumpi-up-pi (2) k z 4 MA.NA K~.BABBAR (3) [Ra C ~ C ~ S U ' E(4) N a-pil-ki-it-tim (5) i-qi-pu (6) ti-up-pu ci-ul qci-ru-um-mu (7) d-ul ih-he-pi (8) td-up-pu (9) a-na he-pe-e nu-di (10) fa MU 30-KAM (11) i-si-inki (12) BA.AN.DIB (13) IT1 BAR.ZA.GAR(14) MU UGNIM 2s'-nun-na (15) SU BA.AN.S~G "au sujet de la tablette de 4 mines d'argent qu'hbi-Sin a prEtCes B Apil-Kittim, (cette) tablette n'6tant pas disponible n'a pu Etre brisCe. (Cette) tablette est destinCe B &trebrisbe, qui date de la '30e annte aprks qu'Isin a CtC prise' (= Rim-Sin 59)". Pas de tkmoins; date = -li/Hammu-rabi 32. Je me sCpare des Cditeurs de ce texte sur un point: 1. 5, qihpum me semble porter sur I'argent, non sur la tablette. voir la citation de ce texte (sous la cote BM 82064) par I.J. Finkelstein, Me'l Lundsberger, 244. l4 Noter d'ailleurs qu' Apil-Kittim se retrouve comme crkancier en BM 14209 (= TEBA I11 6). du m a 32, ce qui semble bien montrer que ce sont ses archives qui ont CtC retrouve'es par les fouilleurs clandestins. Le premier texte de Larsa postkrieur B la conquhe babylonienne date du 28IxiilHa 30 (D. Arnaud, Syria 53 (1976), 62 no. 92 [L.74.214]).
*
188
D. CHARPIN
LES PR~TEURSET LE PALAIS: LES EDITS DE M ~ ~ A R U M
Cette conclusion doit Ctre mise en relation avec un phCnombne que l'on observe dans diverses archives: l'existence de plusieurs crCances qui prCcbdent de peu la date de cette mis'arum, c o m e le monte le tableau suivant:
R6f6rence AUCT IV 44 AUCT V 49
DCS 103 A UCT IV 20 AUCT IV 80
Contenu R e p de 9 sicles d'argent par SamaS-b%zir,de Dad8 et Sin-uselli. IntCrEt moratoire PrCt de 7 213 sicles d'argent S U . L A B [. ..]lX;hXlm-Sin 59 Amurrum-tayyfir, par Sin-uselli, B rendre le 3Olix 1l/ix/Hammu-rabi 3 1 PrCt de 113 mine 112 sicle d'argent SU.LA B Nor-EStar par Warad-Sin 3 l/xii/Harnmu-rabi 3 1 PrCt de 10 sicles d'argent B int6rCt par Dad8 et Sin-uselli B Sin-bC1-ili, ii rendre au mois iii lO/iv/Hammu-rabi 32 Resu d' 1 sicle d'argent par Lipit-Amurum de Sin-uselli, sur les 5 516 sicles qu'il lui doit; Dad2 tCmoin
"Et autre chose, voici (ce que dit) Sama~:'Hammu-rabi, roi de Kurd%,t'a tenu des propos menteurs et sa main, c'est ailleurs qu'elle se trouve. Ta main le saisira et, dans son pays, tu dois laisser libre cours B un (Cdit de) restauration (andurdrum). PrCsentement, le pays tout entier est donnC B ton pouvoir. Lorsque tu prendras la ville et que tu laisseras libre cours B l'(Cdit de) restauration, ainsi, ta royautC sera Cternelle'."
Date 4liMm-Sin 59
Ce dernier texte devrait permettre de prCciser la date de la proclamation de la miarum: celle-ci serait intervenue vers le milieu de l'an 32 (soit au moment mCme oti les Babyloniens occupaient le palais de Mari).16 Nous n'avons aucune attestation de cette mis'arum en dehors de l'ancien royaume de Larsa: il semble donc qu'on puisse cataloguer cet Cdit dans la sCrie des mis'arum proclamdes B l'avbnement d'un roi. Hammu-rabi n'a pas purement et simplement annex6 le royaume de Larsa: il s'est posC comme successeur de Rim-Sin. Cette faqon de voir est confirmCe par le mode de datation. On sait en effet qu'un certain nombre de documents de Larsa sont datCs de Hammu-rabi ii partir de la prise de Larsa: MU KI-n Hammu-rabi LUGAL (uR.sAG).~~ Or M. Anbar a montrd que le point de dCpart de ce comput n'est pas l'an 31 de Hammu-rabi, mais l'an 32: "I1 s'avbre qu'on a considCrC la 32e annCe c o m e la veritable premibre annCe de Hammurapi B Larsa".18 Cette observation est confirmCe par la date de la proclamation de la mis'arum. Cet exemple de proclamation d'une mis'arum dans un royaume juste aprbs sa conqucte ne me parait pas exceptionnel. Si l'on relit en effet la lettre de l'dpilum de ~ a m a ~ B Zirnri-Lim, on voit de meme le lien qui est fait entre la conquCte de Kurd2 envisagCe dans le document et la proclamation d'une andurdrumlg:
Cela repose toutefois le problkme de TEBA I11 5, puisque celui-ci, qui aurait CtC rCdigC suite B 1'Cdit de mis'arum, est datC du mois i de I'an 32. Cette question sera reprise plus bas avec d'autres cas semblables ( 5 3.6). l 7 Voir M. Anbar, RA 72, 119 no. 5:lO. LOC.cit., p. 117. ARMT XXVVl 194: (32) ti 5-ni-tam um-ma-a d ~ ~ ~ (33) - mIha-mu-ra-bi a LUGAL kur-daki (34) [s]&-ar-ra-timit-ti-ka i[d-bu-ub](35) ti qa-as-su' a-Sar ia-n.6-[em](36) [flu-ak-nu-atqa-at-ka i-[ka-ia-su'] (37) D i-na li-bi ma-ti-[Su](38) [aln-du-ra-ra-amtu-wa-[US-ia-ar](39) lia-n[u-u]m-mama-a-tum k[a-luh](40) i-na qa-ti-ka nu-ad-nu-[at](41) [kli-maa-la-am ta-?a-ab-[ba-tu-ma](42) [aln-du-ra-ra-amtu-waUS-Sa-r[u](43) [ak-ke]-embr-ru-ut-ka [da-ri-[at].Voir mon commentaire dam MAR1 6,268.
189
Le dieu SamaS enjoint clairement au souverain de Mari de s'emparer du royaume de Kurdb, une conqdte lCgitime Ctant donnC la tra?trise de son roi Hammu-rabi, et sitat aprbs sa victoire de proclamer une andurdrurn dans le pays conquis.
Les archives de SS'in-usellirCv61ent une autre "pointe" dans la courbe des prets que cet individu consentit: les dernibres annCes de Hammu-rabi. On relbve en effet dans AUCT IV une s6rie de six crCances qui datent de 1'extrCme fin du rbgne de Hammu-rabi:
Contenu PrCt d' 1 sicle d'argent B Ili-iddinam, B rendre au mois iii AUCT IV 8 lO/x/Hammu-rabi 41 Prct d'1'0.5 GUR de grain B intCr2t B Lu-Bawa, B rendre au mois iii AUCT IV 25 2lviii/Hammu-rabi 42 PrCt d'1 112 sicle d'argent et de 0'3.0 de grain B intifit, B Ili-iqis'arn, B rendre au mois iii PrCt de 4 112 sicles d'argent et de 2'1.0 GUR de 2O/viii/Hammu-rabi AUCT IV 24 grain B intdret B Lisi-iddinam et Haliyatum, B rendre 42 au mois iii AUCTIV 11 -Iflammu-rabi 42 Pr6t de 1,l.1 GUR de grain et d' 1 sicle d'argent B intCrt B Etel-pi-Ea, B rendre au mois iii AUCTIV 12 -/x/Hammu-rabi 42 PrCt de 1'1.1 GUR de grain et 1 sicle d'argent B intCrCt, B Etel-pi-Ea et Ali-niSOa, B rendre au mois ...
Date R6f6rence AUCT IV 21 -/xi/Hammu-rabi39
ill
On ajoutera B cette sCrie les prets effectuCs par une certaine Kfim-m%tum,Cpouse d' A p i l - i l i S ~ : ~ ~
R6f6rence AUCT V 6
20
Date -/x/Hammu-rabi 41
Contenu Pr2t de 2 GUR de grain B intCret ii Mano, B rendre B la moisson
Aux textes publiCs dans AUCT IV, avec empreintes de sceau, doivent &treajoutCs ceux ? paraitre i dans AUCT V, sans empreintes. Le dossier de Kfim-mhm, comme d'autres, a CtC malencontreusement coup6 en deux (cf. RA 87, 1993, p. 185-187). Pour KGm-mhm c o m e 6pouse d'Apil-iliSu, voir AUCT IV 9. J'ignore le statut exact de cette femme, mais il se pourrait qu'elle soit une sorte de religieuse, comme en temoignent son nom ("Le pays est tien") et la prksence frCquente dans les actes oh elle pr&te des divinitks d~~~~~ et d ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ .
190
AUCT IV 7 AUCT IV 9 AUCVTV 1 AUCT V 7 AUCT V 9 AUCT V 3 AUCT V 5 AUCT V 8
D. CHARPIN
PrCt d' 1 GUR (de grain) B ~ r n d - S a met ~ iautant B Iltani, B rendre B la moisson PrCt de 1,3.2 GUR de grain B intCrCt B Piqqulalum, B rendre B la moisson Pret de 2 GUR de grain B intCrCt B Amat-S?n, B rendre B la moisson Pret d' 1 GUR de grain B int6rCt B Sin-imguranni, B rendre B la moisson PrCt de 2 GUR de grain B intCrCt B Awil-ili, B rendre B la moisson PrGt d'l GUR de grain B intCrCt B Saqut-sin, B rendre B la moisson PrCt d' 1,2.3 GUR de grain B intCrCt B M&-er~etim,B rendre B la moisson PrCt dc 3 CUR de grain B int6rEt B Damiqtum, B rendre B la moisson
On sait que la mtiarum proclamCe par Samsu-iluna lors de son avknement est ant6rieure au mois vii de l'an Hammu-rabi 43:211,s criances non encore remboursCes B cette date remontent B quatre ans pour les plus anciennes, mais la plupart avaient CtC contractCes moins d'un an auparavant.22 3. La mih-um de 1'an 8 de Samsu-iluna Le texte de 1'Cdit publiC par Kraus23 est datC du mois iii de l'an 8 de Samsu-iluna.24 Or dans plusieurs archives, on note l'accumulation de crCances datCes des mois qui prdckdent. 21
Cf. D. Charpin, "La miSarum B l'avknement de Samsu-iluna", NABU 1988176 et 1'Cdition du texte SAOC 44 22 dans D. Charpin, "Un quartier de Nippur et le problbme des Ccoles B 1'Cpoque palCobabylonienne", RA 83 (1989),97-112, en particulier p. 106-107. RCcemment, E. Woestenburg a situC de manibre trks prCcise la most de Hammu-rabi juste avant le 3lvi bisMa 43, car le texte MHET I113 355, ainsi date, comporte un serment par Samsu-iluna (AfO 44145 (1997198), 350). 22 On peut se demander si les archives du marchand Warad-Sin, un Assyrien install6 B Sippar, ne contiennent pas au moins une tablette liCe B la miiarum de I'avknement de Samsu-iluna. En effet, le texte BM 97188 (C. Walker, "Some Assyrians at Sippar in the Old Babylonian Period", AnSt 30 (1980), 1522) rCcapitule 14 pr&ts,dont la nature est soigneusement enregistrke: on y diffkrencie notarnrnent les pr&ts-tadmiqtum, non remis par l'Cdit, des pr&tsB intCrCt (MAS d ~ ~annulCs ~ ) par , la miSarum. Or l'une des crCances est datCe de 1'Cponymie de Habil-k&num(1. 47-48), que K.R. Veenhof a proposC de situer entre Ha 42 et Si 2 ("The Sequence of the 'Overseers of the Merchants' at Sippar and the Date of the Year-Eponymy of Habil-kenum", J E O L 30 (1987-88), 32-37; voir Cgalement mes "Notices prosopographiques, 3: les 'prCvbts des marchands' de Sippar-Amnbnum", NABU 199019; noter que les attestations datCes de ce Warad-Sin se situent entre Ha 42 et Si 8: K.R. Veenhof, Mil. Garelli, 297). 23 F.R. Kraus, "Ein Edikt des Konigs Samsu-iluna von Babylon", Me'l. Landsberger, 225-231, repris dans SD XI, 154-159. Un deuxitme manuscrit, malheureusement lui aussi trbs fragmentaire, NBC 8618, a kt6 publiC rkcemment par W.W. Hallo, "Slave Release in the Biblical World in Light of a New Text", M d . Greenfield, 79-93. 24 J'avoue ne pas comprendre la raison pour laquelle W.W. Hallo consid&reque la premibre andurdmm de Samsu-iluna, commCmorCe dans le nom de l'an 2, ne donna pas lieu B la rCdaction d'un Cdit: "It now becomes at least conceivable that the vague 'release' commemorated in the name of the king's second
LES PR~TEURSET LE PALAIS: LES ~ D I T SDE M~SARUM
191
3.1 Awtliya, le r3'ibhum On constate dans les archives de cet individu l'existence d'une sCrie de cr6ances concentrkes dans les mois pr6cCdant la proclamation de la mt?arum: on peut interprCter le phCnomkne comme l'indice que, conformCment B l'Cdit, ces crCances n'ont jamais CtC recouvrCes.25
Date R6f6rence AUCT IV 78 -/iii/Samsu-iluna 7 YOS 12 223 -/v/Samsu-iluna 7 YOS 12 221 22/vii/Samsu-iluna7 YOS 12 240 -/vii/Samsu-iluna7 YOS 12 245 -/ix/Samsu-iluna7 YOS 12 246 -/ix/Samsu-iluna 7 YOS 12 254
ll?/x/~amsu-iluna7
YOS 12 255
17/x/Samsu-iluna7
YOS 12 259 20/x/Samsu-iluna 7 YOS 12 265 8/xi/Samsu-iluna7 YOS 12 268 20/xi/Samsu-iluna 7 YOS 12 269 26/xi/Samsu-iluna 7 YOS 12 270 27/xi/Samsu-iluna 7
Contenu Avoir de 30 S ~ L Ade sesame sur Kabiya, B rendre dans 5 jours Avoir de 44 S ~ L Ade stsame sur Sin-bani, B rendre lors de la rdcolte de sCsame Avoir sur Aliyfim, portant sur les services de deux attelages R e p de 0,2.4 de grain par Ahum-waqar, B rendre lors de la moisson PrCt de 0,1.2 de grain, valeur de moutons, B ElmeStum, Cpouse de Ekur-nl~ir,B rendre en grain lors de la moisson PrCt de grain, valeur d'huile, B Awiliya, B rendre en grain lors de la moisson PrCt de 0,1.0.2 d'huile, valant 6 GUR de grain, B IrTbam-Sin, B rendre en grain Pret de 30 SLAde dsame ana ze^rdni B Sin-rCmCni, B rendre en sesame lors de la moisson Double avoir de pois chiches ana ze^r&niau dCbit de M&-ersetim et Geme-Asalluhi PrCt de l,l.4.4 de sCsame B Huzalum; clause ezub; B rendre en s6same lors de la moisson PrCt de sesame B rendre en grain lors de la moisson; clause ezub PrCt d'huile B Yagunum, B rendre en grain lors de la moisson PrCt de sesame B Awiliya et Uuzalatum, B rendre en grain lors de la moisson; clause ezub (cf. YOS 12 246)
year was not translated into the specific legislation of the Edict until his eighth year, at which time it was circulated widely in the entire kingdom, including Sippar and Lagaba. That the Edict of the eighth year was entirely discrete from the edict commemorated in the name of the second is a conceivable alternative, but a less likely one, given allusions to an edict in two letters from the Lagaba archive" (Me'l. Greenfield, 82). Que ces lettres citent 1'Cdit de l'an 8 de Samsu-iluna n'empCche pas qu'un premier Cdit ait BtC proclam6 B l'avknement du roi. L'argument de W.W. Hallo est en outre d'autant plus faible qu'une de ces deux lettres, YOS 15 38, date bien de Samsu-iluna 8 mais ne fait pas explicitement allusion B 1'Cdit (voir infra n. 36); l'autre, NBC 631 1 (voir infra n. 40), cite bien un Cdit, mais rien ne prouve qu'il s'agisse de celui de l'an 8 plutbt que de l'avtnement de Samsu-iluna. 25 Voir D. Charpin, "La Babylonie de Samsu-iluna B la lumibre de nouveaux documents", BiOr 38 (1981),517-547, spkcialement p. 535 archives L.
LES P R ~ E U R SET LE PALAIS: LES BDITS DE M ~ ~ A R U M
HE 211
3?/v/Samsu-iluna 826
PrCt de sesame B Kabta-nfiri, la cabaretibre (sBbitum); clause ezub; B rendre en sesame lors de la moisson
Bien que ces archives soient issues de fouilles clandestines, on peut Climiner l'explication d'un tel regroupement chronologique par une "catastrophe" qui aurait rnis fin B la couche dans laquelle furent dtcouvertes ces archives;27 en effet, elles ont manifestement la mCme provenance que les "archives A"28, qui se poursuivent jusqu'h la fin du rbgne de Samsu-iluna.
AUCT IV 65 [. ..]
193
PrCt de 4 GUR de grain B intCrCt B Balifum, B rendre au mois iii
3.3 Le dossier d'lli-u-samai de Lagaba Ces archives, issues de fouilles clandestines et conservCes B Yale,3O comportent une grande sCrie de requs.31 A titre d'exemple, on citera NBC 8798:32
3.2 Nabi-Sin On trouve Cgalement une accumulation de cr6ances anterieures B la miiarum de l'an 8 de Samsu-iluna dans les archives d'un certain Nabi-Sin, disperdes entre la Bibliothbque Nationale et Universitaire de Strasbourg, la Yale Babylonian Collection et Andrews University.29
RCfCrence DCS 105
Date Contenu 301xiJSamsu-iluna 1 R e p par Baziya de 2 sicles d'argent, B rendre en grain au mois iii YOS 12 148 81viiJSamsu-iluna5 PrCt de laine B Nabi-iliSu, B rendre en grain au mois ... lll.
DCS 106
12+lx/Samsu-iluna R e p par Sin-muSallim de 3 GUR de grain prCtC B 6 intCrCt, B rendre au mois iii 11viiJSamsu-iluna7 PrCt d'1 sicle argent B intCrCt B Mar-Amurmm, B DCS 107 rendre au mois iii YOS 12 234 21viiJSamsu-iluna 7 PrCt d'argent B intCrCt B Inbi-iliSu, B rendre au mois
...
lll
YOS 12 235 31viiJSamsu-iluna7
PrCt de 2 sicles d'argent B inter& B Immer-ili, B rendre au mois iii AUCT V 24 31viiJSamsu-iluna7 PrCt B Immer-ili d' 1 GUR de dattes h intCrCt, B rendre aprbs la moisson AUCT IV 13 llix/Samsu-iluna 7 PrCt d'argent B int6rCt DCS 108 20lix/Samsu-iluna 7 PrCt d' 112 sicle d'argent B intCrCt B ApilSa, B rendre au mois iii YOS 12 292 [...]I[. ..]/SamsuR e p de 46 S ~ d'huile A par Ili-ma-a@ iluna 8
26 27
Pour la date tardive de cette crkance, voir infra 5 3.6. Voir B ce sujet les remarques de M. Civil, "Ur I11 Bureaucracy: Quantitative Aspects", McG. Gibson & R.D. Biggs, The Organization of Power: Aspects of Bureaucracy in the Ancient Near East (= SAOC 46), Chicago 1987, 43-54, spkcialement p. 46. 28 Voir BiOr 38 (1981), 536. 29 Cf. BiOr 38 (1981), 530 archives D. Une Cdition complbte du lot d'archives a CtC prCparCe pour le tome 2 des DCS, B paraitre.
Le tableau d'ensemble se prCsente ainsi:
RCf. Date Contenu no.23 (NBC 8819) 12lviii/Samsu-iluna 2 R e p de 0,2.0.4 S ~ L Ade grain par SamaSmuballit no. 17 (NBC 8589) 30IiilSamsu-iluna 6 EnumCration de parties d' araire; sceau de Marduk-ni3sir R e p de 0,056 SiLA de bikre par BClSunu no. 12 (NBC 8798) llvi/Samsu-iluna 7 R e p de 0'4.1.6 S ~ de A bibre par BClHunu no. 13 (NBC 8554) 151viJSamsu-iluna7 no. 18 (NBC 8779) 91viiJSamsu-iluna7 R e p de O , O S .3 S ~ L Ade bikre par Marduknasir no.19 (NBC 8750) 22lviii/Samsu-iluna 7 R e p de 0'0.1.6 S ~ L Ade bibre par Marduk&sir R e p de 0'0.2 de bibre par BClSunu no. 14 (NBC 8786) 9IixlSamsu-iluna 7 Requ de 0'0.2 de bibre par Marduk-nasir no.20 (NBC 8785) 6lx/Samsu-iluna 7 R e p de 0'0.2.2 S ~ L Ade bibre par Mardukno.2 1 (NBC 8588) 7ldSamsu-iluna 7 niisir R e ~ ude 0'0.2 de bibre par Marduk-nQir no.22 (NBC 8795) 71dSamsu-iluna 7 A bibre par BClSunu no. 15 (NBC 8796) 191dSamsu-iluna7 R e p de 0,l. 1.3 S ~ de de bibre par BClSunu no. 16 (NBC 8775) 301xiJSamsu-iluna 7 R e p de 0'01. 1.1 S~LA On y ajoutera maintenant deux bulles: 33 87.160.652 (l4lvilSamsu-iluna 7): r e p de 40 S ~ L Ad'aromates par BClSunu d'Ili-uSamaS
-
0. Tammuz, Lugaba, 243-254. Des r e p s de ce genre sont be1 et bien des crCances: cf. DCS 103, oh la tablette est formulCe cornme un requ (SU.TI.A) alors que I'enveloppe se prCsente cornme un contrat de pret avec verbe conjuguC (SU BA.AN.TI); voir B ce sujet moll compte rendu de A. Skaist, OBLC, dans AfO 44145 (1997198), 347b. 32 0. Tammuz, Lagaba, 243 no. 12. 33 0. Tammuz, "Old Babylonian Bullae in the Israel Museum", NABU 1994152. 30
194
D. CHARPIN
- 87.160.653 (13/vi/Samsu-iluna 7): r e p de 40 S ~ L Ad'aromates par BClSunu d'Ili-uSama~ 3.4 Le dossier de Marduk-muballit de Lagaba Les textes de Lagaba de la collection Nies comportent un dossier constituC autour de la personne de Marduk-muballif. Parmi les textes affCrents B ce personnage, on note dix crCances, qui ont CtC publikes par 0 . Tammuz de manikre typologique,34 et non chronologique, ce qui est pourtant beaucoup plus signifiant, comme le montre le tableau suivant:
RWrence Date no.53 (NBC 8570) lli/Samsu-iluna 5 no.49 (NBC 8874) 13lxi/Samsu-iluna5 no.46 (NBC 8564) 201iUSamsu-iluna 6 no.55 (NBC 8571) 191iv1Samsu-iluna7 no.54 (NBC 8744) 171v1Samsu-iluna7 no.51 (NBC 8568) 1llvi/Samsu-iluna 7 no.50 (NBC 6798) 5/xi/Samsu-iluna7 no.52 (NBC 6752) llxii/Samsu-iluna 7
no.47 (NBC 8768) 20lxii/Samsu-iluna 7 no.48 (NBC 6827) l/vii/Samsu-iluna 8
Contenu PrCt B Tiib-waSabSu de 3 GUR de grain B pour 2 mois, B rendre dans 2 mois PrCt B 11i-u-SamaS d'112 sicle d'argent B intCrCt, B rendre B la moisson PrCt B Ea-tukulti de 2 GUR de grain, B rendre dans 1 mois PrCt B Ubiirum de 1,0.2.1 GUR de grain B intkrCt, B rendre B la moisson Pr2t B Ubiirum F. Irra-nilsir de 1 GUR de grain et et 112 sicle d'argent B intCrCt, 21 rendre B la moisson PrCt B B Samas-nar-mltim F. SamaS-niisir de 3 GUR de grain B intCrCt PrCt B Imdi-Sin F. Huzalum de 7 GUR de grain et 2 sicles d'argent B intCrCt, B rendre B la moisson PrCt B Serum-ili F. NQr-Kabta de 3 sicles d'argent et 2 GUR de grain B intCrCt, B rendre B la moisson PrCt B uuzalum de 114 de sicle d'argent B inter&, B rendre B la moisson PrCt B Huzalum F. Immerum d'l sicle d'argent et 2 GUR de grain B inter&, B rendre B la moisson
0. Tammuz a ainsi comment6 la repartition des textes des archives de Mardukm~ballif:~~
"The archive of Marduk-muballif has many dated texts that form a sufficent basis for discussion of the circumstances and time of its deposition. The terminus ante quem for the time of the deposition is Samsuiluna 8, because the archive includes dated 34
35
0. Tammuz, Lagaba, 302-319 "File 2: Loans". 0. Tammuz, Lagaba, 478.
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texts from that year. Most of the texts are from Samsuiluna 7. The fact that there are few from Samsuiluna 8 shows that the segment of the archive is not the product of catastrophe but a 'dead' segment that was discarded by Marduk-muballif as part of his regular bureaucratic practice." I1 est vrai que ces archives ne contiennent pas que des crbances, mais la date "choisie" par Marduk-muballif pour faire le mCnage me parait difficilement liCe B "ses habitudes bureaucratiques rCguli&res": car le dCbut de l'an 8 de Samsu-iluna est prCcisCment le moment oh un Cdit de miSarum fut promulguC par le roi.. . Cette conclusion me semble confirmCe par une lettre qui appartient aussi aux archives de Marduk-muballit, et qui apporte un Cclairage qu'on peut qualifier de sensationnel sur le phCnomkne ici CtudiC:36 "Dis B Marduk-muballif: ainsi (parle) Sagil-mansum. Que Sama.3 et Marduk te fassent vivre! Ouvrez en presence d'Apila le coffre des tablettes scellCes (qui est) sous ma responsabilitk: la tablette scellCe (portant sur) 1 mine 1 112 sicle d'argent et ... d'or des annCes Sarnsu-iluna 6 ' 7 et 8, (soit) de 3 annCes, r e p s par Un Tel et Un Tel, qui a CtC livrCe au guzaltim Munawwirum pow qu'il les fasse rembourser - ainsi est-ce Ccrit -, cette tablette scellCe, fais-la moi porter B Babylone!" On voit donc comment une sCrie de crkances (dCcrites 1. 10-11 comme narnharti annanna u annanna37) CchelonnCes sur trois ans, soit les annCes 6, 7 et 8 de Samsuiluna, ont fait l'objet d'un accord avec un certain Munawwirum: celui-ci, en tant que mui?addinum, c'est-&-dire jouant plus ou moins le r81e d'un huissier moderne,38 a dG recevoir les crCances et s'est chargC de les recouvrer. Le total se montait B plus d'une mine d'argent, et la transaction avec Munawwimm a fait l'objet d'un contrat en bonne et due forme. Bien que la lettre ne le dise pas explicitement, il est Cvident que suite B la miiancm du mois iii de l'an 8 de Samsu-iluna, l'affaire est annulCe; d'oh la demande de Sagilmansum que le contrat avec Munawwirum lui parvienne B Babylone. Parmi les tablettes de Lagaba conservCes B Yale figure enfin une lettre qui prCsente l'intCr2t considkrable de faire explicitement allusion au texte de 1'Cdit de Samsu-iluna,39 NBC 63 1 36 0. Tarnmuz, Lagaba, 285-286 no. 39 = YOS 15 38 (NBC 6290): a-nu d ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ - m u (2) -ba-li-if qi-bi-ma (3) um-ma SAG.~L.MA.AN.SUM-ma (4) d~~~ d d ~ li-ba-al-li-tli-ka ~ (5) giplsAN ~ ka-ni-ki ~ . R M E ~ 0 .Sa~ 1 Sa qd-ti-ia (6) ma-bar a-pil-a pi-te9-e-ma (7) ka-ni-ik 1 MA.NA 1 1/2 GIN K ~ . B A B B A(8) MU ALAM S~TD.DB(9) MU giSTU~UL SU.NIRd M[U]KI.LUGAL.GUB (10) h? MU 3-KAM nam-bar-ti (11) an-nu-an-na d an-nu-an-na (T.12) ia a-na mu-nu-wi-rum (13) GU.ZA.LA(R.14) a-na Su-du-nim(15) naad-nu ki-a-am h-be-er (16) ka-ni-kam iu-a-ti (17) a-na ~ ~ . D I N G I R (18) . R Ah-bi-lam. ~~ I1 s'agit certainement de documents formul6s comrne SU.TI.ANP. 38 Pour un t6moignage analogue sur le r6le des guzalCm, voir TSKP 127 (S. Sanati-Muller, "Texte aus dem SinkaSid Palast. Dritter Teil. Metalltexte", BUM 21, 182): 22 112 MA.NA 113 G ~ N15 S E K ~ B A B B A Ria g i p 1 s M.SU ~ ~ GU.ZA.LA.ME.ES it-ta-bil-ma a-na giplsAN 1 GU.TA.& ik-ka-mi-is"22 112 mines 1/3 sicle 15 grains d'argent du coffre place sous la responsabilit6 des g. ont 6t6 pris et rassembl6s dam un coffre de 1 talent". 39 J'avais signal6 le rapprochement de cette lettre avec le texte de l'tdit B W.W. Hal10 (cf. Me'l. Greenfield, 82 n. IS), qui l'a cit6e partiellement et commentke avant sa publication par 0. Tammuz, "Two Small Archives from Lagaba", RA 90 (1996), 121-133, sp6cialement p. 125-126. 40 NBC 6311: (1) a-na a-wi-lim Sa d ~ (2) 8-ba-al-la-tli-iu ~ (3) qi-bi-ma ~ (4) um-ma ~ a-wi-il. ~ d ~ ~ ' ~(5) ~ d~~~ - m da*AMAR.UTUli-ba-al-li-tli-ka(6) Ipu-i-li~AR (7) ma-ah-ri-iaki-a-am i5-ku-un um-
196
LES PR~TEURSET LE PALAIS : LES EDITS DE M ~ S A RUM
D. CHARPIN
"Dis B l'homme que Marduk fait vivre: ainsi pale Awil-Sin. Que SamaS et Marduk te fassent vivre! Le musicien PQ-ilia dCpos6 en ces termes devant moi: 'J'ai donn6 mon champ B bail et il m'a donnC 2 sicles d'argent en prCt. I1 a rassemblC et emport6 le grain qui se trouvait dans mon champ mais ne m'a pas donne le loyer de mon champ.' Voila comment il a dCposC devant moi. C o m e tu le sais, en fonction de l'ordonnance royale, celui qui a fait rembourser (un prCt) et l'a pris doit le rendre. I1 est ordonnb de ne pas poursuivre la maison d'un soldat, d'un pecheur ou de toute autre personne accomplissant le service-ilkurn (du roi). En voyant ma tablette, rends B son propriCtaire le grain que tu as fait recouvrer et que tu as pris. Est-ce ainsi que toi, tu accomplis ce que (prescrit) 1'Cdit de mon seigneur? En son absence, tu me prives de grain." L. 19: ce passage permet de conclure que le musicien (NAR)appartient B la catCgorie des ilkurn a@rn (voir la littkrature rassembl6e B ce sujet par Kraus, SD XI, 246). L. 15-20: citation, sans doute libre, de 1'Cdit de Samsu-iluna 8, qui n'est toutefois pas conserve B cet endroit. Comparer avec la lettre de Samsu-iluna TCL XVII 76 (Ccrite B l'avhement de Samsu-iluna) et 1'6dit d'Ammi-saduqa, $15; cf. respectivement SD XI, 66-67 et 178. I1 est vraisemblable que le destinataire - non nommC - de cette lettre n'est autre que Marduk-muballit. Celui-ci prCta 2 sicles d'argent au musicien Pu-ill, qui donna en gage un champ, cultivC ensuite par Marduk-m~ballif.~~ Au moment de la moisson, Mardukmuballit emporta la totalit6 du grain. Normalement, si l'on considbre que la situation correspond B celle du $ 49 du Code de Hammu-rabi, Pu-ili aurait dO rCcupQer la totalit6 de la moisson, puis rembourser le prCt et son intCret ainsi que les frais de mise en culture du champ. On peut penser que Marduk-muballif estima qu'il ne resterait rien B Pu-ili et qu'il se servit lui-meme. Mais entre-temps, le roi promulgua une rniiarurn: la dette de Puili Ctant remise, celui-ci ne devait plus B Marduk-muballit que les frais de mise en culture de son champ. Cette lettre permet donc de comprendre pourquoi les contrats de louage de champ Ctaient touchCs par la rniiarurn: ils Ctaient souvent implicitement accompagnCs d'un prCt.42 En tkmoigne aussi a contrario le contrat de louage de champ A 0 9080,
ma Su-ma (8) A.SA-i a-na G ~ . U N ad-di-iS-iu-ma (9) 2 2 GIN K ~ . B A B B A R a-na hu-bu-lim (10) id-di-namma (I 1) Se-a-am Sa i-na A.SA-ia ib-ba-Su-li (12) i-si-ip-ma it-ba-a1 (T.13) GU.UNA.SA-ia li-ul id-di-nam (R.14) ki-a-am ma-ah-ri-ia iS-ku-u[n](15) ki-ma ti-du-li (16) i-na si-im-da-at be-li-ia (17) Sa li-h-ad-dinu-li-ma il-qli-li (18) li-ta-ar (19) a-na fi AGA.US SU.PES 2 il-ki-im ah-hi-i-im (20) la h-sli-li-um qa-bi (21) tup-pi i-na a-ma-ri-ka (22) Se-a-am b tu-Sa-ad-di-nu-li-ma(23) te-el-qli-ti a-na be-li-Su te-e-er (24) at-ta-a-ma Sa si-im-da-at be-li-ia (25) ki-a-am te-te-pu-US(26) i-na la wa-as'-bu-ti-Su(T.27) Se-a-am tama-US-Sa-a'.L'interprCtation des 1.24-25par une interrogative B sens ironique m'a CtC suggCrCe par K.R. Veenhof. 41 Noter qu'on possbde un contrat du m6me genre dans les archives de Marduk-muballit, NBC 8556 (0. Tammuz, Lagaba, 322 110.58): (1) 4,O.O. SE.GUR .@BAN kar-ri (2) S A G ~ . U N A.SA ( 3 ) KI d ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ - m (u4 )-I&-za-lum b a - l i -(T.5) i ma-hi-ir (R.6) IT1 SIG4.A U4 30-KAM (7) MU sa-am-su-i-lunu (T.8) @TUKULSU.NIR BABBARXA. On voit que le texte est libel16 cornme une avance sur le loyer du champ. Buzalum est par ailleurs connu comme d6biteur de Marduk-muballit (Lagaba, 110.47 et 48, voir tableau supra). 42 Ainsi, les archives d7Awiliya($ 3.1) comportent-elles, en plus des crCances annultes, un texte de location de champ, datC du 20IiilSamsu-iluna 8 (YOS 12 286).
197
conclu au mois vi de l'an 8 de Samsu-iluna, et qui porte sur la tranche l'indication qu'il a CtC rCdigC "aprbs 1'Cdit" (warki ~irndatirn).43
R6f6rence AUCT V 33
Date -/x/Samsu-iluna 4
Contenu PrCt B Etel-pi-Lisi de 213 sicle 15 grain d'argent B intkret, B rendre au mois iii PrCt B ~l^i-u-SamaSd' 1 GUR de grain B interst, B AUCT V 16 [. ..I/[. ..]/Samsurendre au mois iii iluna 6 d' 1 GUR de grain B intCrCt, B AUCT IV 14 7/vi/Samsu-iluna 7 Pret B ~illi-Sama~ rendre au mois iii AUCT V 15 14/ix/Samsu-iluna7 PrCt B SamaS-liwwir de 2 GUR de grain B intCrCt, B rendre au mois iii I1 existe encore d'autres cr6ances isolCes anterieures de quelques mois B la rniiarurn de l'an 8 de Samsu-iluna.
3.6 Quelques crkances trop tardives.. L'Cdit de Samsu-iluna est date du mois iii de l'an 8. Or, dans les archives examinCes ci-dessus, on constate l'existence de crCances postdrieures de quelques mois 21 cette date:
R6f6rence Lagaba no.48 HE 211
Date l/vii/Samsu-iluna 8 3?/v/Samsu-iluna8
CrCancier Marduk-muballif Awiliya (BiOr 38, 536 n. 15)
Or les archives de ces deux personnages ne comportent aucune autre crCance posterieure. On a donc l'impression que ces deux cr6ances font partie du lot qui fut annul& ce qui thkoriquement est contraire au fonctionnement de la rniiarurn: les prCts annul& sont ceux pass& avant la date de promulgation de 1'Cdit. I1 en va de meme pour les archives de Sin-uselli au moment de la conquete de Larsa par Hammu-rabi: la crCance AUCT IV 80 date dulO/iv/Hamrnu-rabi 32, alors que TEBA 1115 montre que la rniiarurn fut sans doute applicable dbs le mois i de Hammu-rabi 32 (voir ci-dessus $ 1). Ces cas sont difficiles B e ~ p l i q u e rmais , ~ ~ trop peu nombreux pour remettre en cause le schCma qui se dCgage des donnCes rassemblCes ci-dessus. 43
J'avais jadis signal6 cet inCdit B F.R. Kraus, qui l'a comment6 dans SD XI, 69. Le texte appartient aussi aux archives d'Awiliya (cf. BiOr 38,536 et n. 15). 44 Se pourrait-il que des cr6anciers aient fait Ccrire de nouvelles crkances fictives postQieures B la miSarum pour rCcup6rer des pr& annul& par le roi? 11 aurait fallu pour cela le consentement du dkbiteur. Mais cela pourrait expliquer pourquoi on ne trouve pas de clauses de type prosbol en Babylonie, alors qu'elles sont attestdes, B la m8me Cpoque, en Syrie (voir mon article sur "L'andurdrum 2 Mari", MAR1 6 (1990), 253-270, en particulier p. 262-263 et 266). Mais les crkances de ce genre, du fait m6me qu'on les a retrouvhs avec les autres, antCrieures B la miSarum, n'auraient en dkfinitive jamais CtC rembours6es.
198
LES PR~TEURSET LE PALAIS: LES ~ D I T SDE M ~ ~ A R U M
D. CHARPIN
4. La rm^Sarum de l'an 28 de Samsu-iluna
AUCT V 44
16/iiilSamsu-iluna 28
Kraus avait soulignC que le contrat de Nippur fragmentaire PBS 812 226 avait trait B une m%arum, en raison de la mention "du fait que le roi a annul6 les tablettes d'kchange des biens immobiliers".45 La date du texte, qui comporte un serment par Samsu-iluna, est perdue et Kraus estima que les indications prosopographiques Ctaient insuffisantes pour proposer une datation de 1'Cdit auquel ce texte fait allusion. I1 avait toutefois indiquC que l'acheteur Sin-aham-iddinam est attest6 cornme tCmoin dans un texte de Samsu-iluna 26 et dans un autre de Samsu-iluna 29.46 Or, plusieurs lots d'archives montrent une accumulation de crCances qui s'arrCtent brutalement au mois v de l'annCe 28 de Samsuiluna. La plupart d'entre elles appartiennent aux archives d'Ibni-Amurrum et de Dad& mais on en trouve aussi quelques autres avec des crCanciers diffirents.
AUCT V 28
201iiUSamsu-iluna 28
BBVOT 1 37 22/iii/Samsu-iluna 28
YOS 12 5 19 25lidSamsu-iluna 28
BBVOT 1 47 lO/iv/Samsu-iluna 28 4.1 Le dossier d'Zbni-Am~rrurn~~
AUCT V 45
10/iv/Samsu-iluna28
Huit textes publiCs dans BBVOT 1 (nos. 37,40,41,43,45,47,48 et 52) forment un dossier de crCances oii le prCteur est un certain Ibni-Amurrum; ces textes datent de la fin du r&ne de Samsu-iluna, pCriode actuellement ma1 documentde. Deux autres pi2ces du dossier se trouvent B Yale (YOS 12 519 et 521) et huit autres B Andrews U n i ~ e r s i t y . ~ ~ On remarquera le regroupement chronologique de ces dix-huit crCances, du milieu de Samsu-iluna 26 au milieu de Samsu-iluna 28:
YOS 12 521
25/iv/Samsu-iluna 28
BBVOT 1 43 3/v/Samsu-iluna 28
AUCT V 43
R6f6rence Date BBVOT 1 40 4/ivlSamsu-iluna 26 (et non 27) BBVOT 1 48 1l+lii/Samsu-iluna 27 AUCTV 31 [...]/Samsu-iluna 28
Contenu PrCt d'1 sicle d'argent B intCrCt B Mk-Sippar, B rendre dans un mois PrCt d' 1 112 sicle d'argent B Ninna PrCt d' 112 sicle 10 grains d'argent B M2r-EStar, "nonobstant sa tablette scellCe" PrCt de 1 113 sicle et 12 grains d'argent B AUCT V 41 [...]/Samsu-iluna 28 Tafibum, pour (acheter) des plates-uhOlum BBVOT 1 41 [...]liii/Samsu-iluna28 PrCt d' 1 sicle 20 grains d'argent B Isidare, pour (acheter) des dattes et du sCsame PrCt d' 1 [sicle d'argent] B ~illi-SamaS-bCliya, AUCT V 46 l/iii/Samsu-iluna 28 pour acheter des dattes, B rembourser en dattes selon le cours qui prCvaudra apr& la rCcolte BBVOT 1 45 15/iii/Samsu-iluna28 PrCt d'1/6 de sicle d'argent B Apil-Amurrum, pour (acheter) des dattes
BBVOT 1 5 1 10/v/Samsu-iluna28 BBVOT 1 52 1l/v/Samsu-iluna 28 AUCT IV 16 14/v/Samsu-iluna28
45 46 47
PBS 812 226: (10) aC-ium Car-ru-urn (up-pa-at (1l)pu-ha-at I%MESih-p[u]-6. Kraus, SD XI, 75 n. 169. Voir d6jB mon compte rendu de BBVOT 1 dans RA 88 (1994), 78-81. Je n'ai pas relev6 d'indice qui permettrait de localiser ce lot d'archives, B part l'indication K I . B A L . M A S . D A ~aprbs ~ le nom de l'emprunteur en AUCT V 43:5. 48 Pour la complCmentaritk entre les collections de Yale et de Andrews University, voir mon compte rendu de AUCT IV dans RA 87 (1993), 185-187.
PrCt d' 1 sicle d'argent B [...I, pour (acheter) des dattes et du sCsame PrCt de 0,2.3 de grain B Tugabum, pour (acheter) des dattes, B rembourser en dattes selon le cours qui prCvaudra aprbs la rCcolte PrCt d' 1 sicle d'argent B BClSunu, pour (acheter) des dattes et du sCsame, B rembourser en dattes et en shame selon le cours qui prCvaudra aprks la rCcolte PrCt de 516 sicle et 3 grains d'argent B Habi-a& pour acheter du sCsame, B rembourser en sesame selon le cours qui prdvaudra aprks la rCcolte PrCt d'112 sicle d'argent B Ibni-[ ...I, pour (acheter) des dattes PrCt d' 116 sicle d'argent B Rabat-Sin et BClXunu, pour (acheter) des dattes PrCt de grain B Kinum-babil pour acheter du sCsame, B rendre en sCsame au mois vii selon le cours qui prCvaudra PrCt d' 1 sicle d'argent B Marduk-n2sir pour des achats, B rembourser en sesame et en dattes selon le cours qui prCvaudra aprbs la rkcolte PrCt d71/6 sicle d'argent B Ibni-Marduk pour (acheter) des dattes Requ d'argent par Inbi-iliSu PrCt d'argent B Abum-waqar, pour (acheter) du stsame PrCt de 0,1.2 GUR de grain B AlabariS(?), pour (acheter) des dattes, B rembourser dans deux mois selon le cours qui privaudra
On trouvera en annexe B cet article une transcription complkte de ce lot de crCances. La majorit6 d'entre elles (quatorze sur dix-huit) sont des prCts d'argent pour acheter du sCsame (BBVOT 1 52; YOS 12 519 et 521)' des dattes (AUCT V 16; 28; 43; 45; 46; BBVOT 1 45; 47) ou les deux (A UCT V 44; BBVOT 1 41; 37; 43). Peut-Ctre une mauvaise moisson49 contraignit-elle les gens B anticiper sur la rtcolte des dattes et du sCsame, plus tardive que celle des cCrCales.50 Ce serait en raison de cette mauvaise moisson que Samsu-iluna aurait dCcidC une m%arum. 49
-
10/v/Samsu-iluna28
199
On sait que celle-ci avait lieu aux mois i et ii sous Samsu-iluna; cf. I. Neumann & R.M. Sigrist, "Harvest Dates in Ancient Mesopotamia as Possible Indicators of Climatic Variations", Climatic Change 1 (1978), 239-252, spkcialement le tableau I1 p. 247 dont les donnCes seraient aujourd'hui B compl6ter. Noter par exemple ci-dessus dans le tableau du 5 3.4 le pr&tde grain no.53, du l/i/Samsu-iluna 5, h rendre dans deux mois, ce qui signifie aprbs la moisson et de m&mele no.46, du 20IiilSamsu-iluna 6, un prEt de grain B rendre dans un mois, ce qui signifie sans doute que la moisson n'avait pas encore eu lieu au moment du pr&t. 50 Pour la substitution des dattes aux c6rCales c o m e signe de crise Cconomique, cf. T. Gomi, "On the critical Economic Situation at Ur Early in the Reign of Ibbisin", JCS 36 (1984), 21 1-242.
LES PR~TEURSET LE PALAIS: LES GDITS DE MEARUM 4.2 Dadifils de Kubbulum Dans les archives de cet individu, habitant I ~ i n , ~ onl retrouve une trentaine de crCances qui datent du mois x de l'an 22 au mois v de l'an 28 du rbgne de Samsu-iluna?
R6f6rence NBC 9699 NBC 9726 NBC 8642 NBC 9583 NBC 8801 NBC 8584 BIN7 196 NBC 9297 NBC 8577 NBC 9490 BIN7 199
BIN 7 200
NBC 9690 NBC 6329 BIN 7 198 NBC 9795 NBC 9617 NBC 9810 NBC 6830 BIN 7 201
NBC 9467
Date 22?/ii/~amsu-iluna? ?/?/Samsu-iluna 22 14/x/Samsu-iluna22 lO/xi/Samsu-iluna 22 23/xi/Samsu-iluna 23 lO/xii/Samsu-iluna 22 2 l/xii/Samsu-iluna 23
Contenu "Loan of silver; sealed" LLLoan of barley; sealed" "Receipt of silver; sealed" "Loan of barley; sealed" "Loan of silver; sealed" "Receipt of aromatics, porridge, etc.; sealed" PrCt d'1 sicle d'argent B Ili-eribam, B rendre en grain selon le cours aprbs la moisson "Loan of silver for five days; sealed" "Promissory note-beer; sealed" "Record concerning barley; sealed" PrCt de 2 GUR de grain sans intCrCt B AbuSina, B rendre B la moisson PrCt de 2 sicles d'argent pour acheter du grain B Iddi, B rendre en grain selon le cours aprbs la moisson "Receipt of foodstuffs" "Loan of silver to be repaid in barley; sealed" PrCt d'argent B AWSfigiS et Taribatum, B rendre en briques au mois iii selon le cours aprbs la moisson "Loan of silver for purchase of barley, to be repaid in barley; sealed" "Delivery of barley; sealed" "Receipt of barley and silver from several persons" "Receipt of beer and silver; sealed" PrCt de [x] sicles d'argent, B Sin-imguranni, B rembourser sous forme de travail agricole (iakikum) "Receipt of barley and silver"
51 Curieusement, les cr6ances BIN VII 200 et 205, qui appartiennent B ce lot, ont CtC 1ocalisCes B Zabalam par A. Skaist, OBLC, 90 et 92. 52 Je n'avais pas signal6 ce cas, parallkle B celui d'Ibni-Amurmm, dans mon compte rendu de BBVOT 1 (RA 88 (1994), 78-81). Pour les archives de cette farnille, habitant Isin, voir F.R. Kraus, "Nippur und Isin nach altbabylonischen Rechtsurkunden", JCS 3 (1951), 51-55, avec en appendice p. 227 l'ajout des donn6es provenant des trois textes du Louvre publi6s par Jean dans RA 26 no. 1 , 2 et 3; voir Cgalement ma communication sur "ImmigrCs, rCfugiCs et dCportCs en Babylonie sous Hammu-rabi et ses successeurs", CRRAZ 38, Paris 1992, 207-218, en particulier p. 209. Les inCdits de Yale sont cit6s d'aprks le catalogue de G. Beckman, Old Babylonian Archival Texts in the Nies Babylonian Collection, Catalogue of the Babylonian Collections at Yale 2, Bethesda 1995, 2 n. 13. L'intdit du Louvre fait partie du lot que je dois publier (voir ma note sur "1IVki = Isin, un argument musCographique", RA 74 (1980), 180).
20 1
"Loan of silver and barley; sealed" PrCt d'l sicle d'argent B intCrCt, B Sin-idinam, B rendre aprbs la moisson "Tablet and fragment of case-loan of silver; NBC 9561 20/x/Samsu-iluna 27 sealed" PrCt de grain et d'argent 21 intCrCt B ~illi-Sama~, B BIN 7 203 4/xi/Samsu-iluna 27 rendre aprbs la moisson BIN 7 205 22/xii-bis/Samsu-iluna PrEt de 516 mine 12 sicles de cuivre B Belfinum et Sin-begalli, B rendre dans 10jours 27 Pr& de grain B intCrCt, B Ubar-lulu, B rendre aprbs A 0 11132 S/iii/Samsu-iluna 28 la moisson. La tablette Ctait encore dans son enveloppe, au sceau de Ubar-lulu, ainsi libellCe: lka-ni-ik 21 1'0.0 SE.GUR 3ia u-bar-lu-lu "Receipt of barley from several persons" NBC 98 13 6/iv/Samsu-iluna 28 "Loan of barley" NBC 9832 6?/iv/~amsu-iluna28 NBC 9692 23?/v/Samsu-iluna28 "Receipt of beer; sealed" "Receipt of silver; sealed" NBC 9478 ?/v/Samsu-iluna 28
NBC 9226 ?/ix/Samsu-iluna27 BIN 7 202 lO/x/Samsu-iluna 27
Au vu des seules archives de Dad& on pourrait penser que l'accumulation des crkances s'explique par le fait que les archives s'arretent B ce moment prCcis,53 qui correspond B l'arrgt de la documentation Ccrite B l'Cpoque palCo-babylonienne B Isin? on aurait donc un exemple dii au facteur "~atastrophe".~5 Mais le rapprochement avec le cas dYIbni-Amurrum6tudiC plus haut laisse envisager une autre explication, que confirment d'autres archives.
4.3 Autres crbances
I1 existe en effet Cgalement dans les archives d'autres personnages des regroupements de crCances CchelonnCes entre l'an 26 de Samsu-iluna et le mois iv de l'an 28 de Samsuiluna56. Archives d'lliu-ibniiu: YOS 12 477 lO/xi/Samsu-iluna 26 YOS 12 5 14 i/iii/Samsu-iluna 28
prCt d'huile B Taribatum, B rendre en grain prCt de grain B Ipqatum, B rendre en dattes
Archives de Marduk-ntiu, barbier du roi: YOS 12 500 30?/xii/Samsu-iluna 27 prCt de grain B inter& B Ibbi-Sin PrCt de grain B Sin-damiq, B rendre en sCsame YOS 12 526 12/?lSamsu-iluna28 s3 NBC 6761, oh Dad2 fils de Kubbulum achkte un champ, daterait de Samsu-iluna 34 (CBCY 2, 2 n. 2 et p. 42), ce qui me parait bien tardif, puisqu'il y aurait un "blanc" de cinq ans dans les archives de Dad& et qu'on ne connait aucun autre texte palCo-babylonien d'Isin aussi tardif. 54 Cf. BiOr 38 (1981), 518 n. 3. Voir ci-dessus 5 3.1 et n. 27. 56 Les indications ci-dessous ne prktendent nullement 2 l'exhaustivitk. Ce qui est significatif, c'est que l'on ne posstde aucune autre crCance de ces trois individus.
202
YOS 12 520
22IivlSamsu-iluna28
Autres archives: YOS 12 515 22/iv/Samsu-iluna 28
pret de grain B Annum-piSa pret d'argent B inter& par MU.DINGIR.MU B Tir-zum-na-tu-tu(?)
En fonction du principe dCgagC ci-dessus, il faut d6sormais supposer que Samsuiluna a dCcrCtC un Cdit de miiarum dans la seconde moitiC de l'an 28 de son rbgne (il est significatif que les crdances les plus rkcentes, tant dans les archives d'Ibni-Amurrum que dans celles de Dad& datent du mois vS7). Le placet AbB 7 153 mentionnant 1. 12 le nom de l'an 24 du roi Samsu-iluna, Kraus avait estimC que ce texte "nach, aber offenbar nicht lange nach dem Jahre Samsu-iluna 24 (Vs. 12) geschrieben ist" (AbB 7, 128 n. 153 b); il me parait dtsormais certain que ce texte date de l'an 28 de Samsu-iluna. Le dossier rCuni ici montre que la miiarum en question portait non seulement sur les terrains (cf. PBS 812 226, cite plus haut n. 45, ainsi que AbB 7 153), mais aussi sur les prets.58
4.4 Le rythme des miSarum sous le r2gne de Samsu-iluna Outre les mfiarum de l'avbnement et de l'an 8, celle de l'an 28, dont on vient d'Ctablir l'existence, a CtC prCcCdCe par une autre en l'an 17, comme l'a montrC Le rbgne de Samsu-iluna (1749-1712) a donc comportC, brillamment E. Woe~tenburg.~~ dans 1'Ctat actuel de nos connaissances, quatre proclamations de miiarum: la premibre lors de son avbnement, la seconde sept ans plus tard (Samsu-iluna 8), la troisibme neuf ans plus tard (Samsu-iluna 17) et la quatribme onze ans plus t a d (Samsu-iluna 28). Lors de l'avhement d'Abi-eSuh, onze ans sYCtaientCcoulCs depuis la dernibre miiarum de -
57
LES PR~~TEURS ET LE PALAIS: LES ~ D I T SDE M~SARUM
D. CHARPIN
-
-
Le prCt d'argent et de grain B intCrCt BIN I1 82 est date du l0lixlSamsu-iluna 28, mais il semble isolC, donc difficilement signifiant. 58 I1 n'est pas exclu que I'archive de Puzzurum dtcouverte B Terqa soit B mettre en rapport avec la m2Sarum de l'an 28 de Samsu-iluna. Ces textes datent en effet du rtgne de Yadih-abum, qui fut vaincu par Samsu-iluna en l'an 27 de son rbgne (cf. nom de l'an 28). Or les recherches rCcentes B Terqa font penser que la ville passa alors pour un moment sous le contrble direct du roi de Babylone (0. Rouault, "Cultures locales et influences extCieures: le cas de Terqa", SMEA 30 (1992), 247-256, spCcialement p. 252). On pourrait penser que I'arrgt des archives de Puzzurum serait lit B la conqu&tebabylonienne, mais les observations archCologiques ne vont pas dans le sens d'un lot d'archives conservC tel quel dans une maison dCtruite par le feu (G. Buccellati, TFR 1, xii: les enveloppes avaient CtC ouvertes et les tablettes cassCes volontairement, et non suite B la chute du toit). On peut alors se demander si, en dCpit des clauses standard d'irrtvocabilit6, les achats effectuCs par Puzzurum ne furent pas annults par la miSarum de Samsu-iluna, qui se serait appliquCe dans la rCgion de Terqa conquise quelques mois auparavant, c o m e ailleurs dans son royaume. Dbs lors, le pr&tTFR 1 no. 7, retrouvC coup6 en deux, ne serait pas un exemple de crtance remboursCe c o m e l'a cru G. Buccellati (TFR 1, viii), mais un cas oh un dkbiteur aurait r e p les morceaux d'une crCance annulCe suite B une mRarum. Celle-ci aurait donc fait de Puzzurum b la fois un perdant (ses acquisitions immobilibres) et un gagnant (sa dette envers S a m a ~annulte), mais il aurait beaucoup plus perdu que gagnt, puisque le total des sornmes versCes pour ses terrains est de 2 112 mines 6 112 sicles, alors que sa dette n'Ctait que de 5 112 sicles! 59 Voir son commentaire de MHET IV3 no. 462 dans AfO 44/45 (1997/98), 355; il s'agit d'un procbs portant sur une maison de 2 SAR, qui contient une allusion h la dCcision royale, datCe de Si 17, de proc6der B la restitution des immeubles alien& par les soldats-rzdfim, les bd'irum et les autres prestataires de service (ilkum ahfim).
203
Samsu-iluna. On notera de m2me que la mfiarum de l'avbnement de Samsu-iluna Ctait postCrieure de 11 ans B la dernikre connue de Harnmu-rabi, promulguCe en I'm 32. Sur un demi sibcle, on a donc le rythme: 11-7-9-11-11. Autrement dit, pendant cette pCriode, l'intervalle entre deux mfiarum fut de 9+2 ans (la valeur moyenne Ctant de 9,8 et la valeur modale de 11 ans).
5. Conclusions On voit donc qu'assez souvent les crCances annulCes par la mfiarum, au lieu d'etre d6truites, furent conservCes par les creanciers, quoique dCsormais dCpourvues de toute valeur. Cela nous permet de constater 1'opportunitC des mesures de remise des dettes dCcidCes par les souverains: m2me si la majorit6 des prets avaient 6tC conclus dans les mois prtcCdant la mfiarum,60 on constate B chaque fois que d'autres crCances impayCes remontaient B plusieurs annCe~.~l Par ailleurs, les archives de Sin-uselli offrent un exemple particulibrement interessant, puisqu'on voit que ce crCancie@ fut affect6h deux reprises par une miiarum: celle qui suivit la conqu2te babylonienne de Larsa en l'an 32 de Hammu-rabi, puis celle que proclama Samsu-iluna onze ans plus tard, juste aprbs la mort de son pbre.63 Manifestement, le risque encouru ne dCcourageait pas les preteurs dans leur activitC d ' u ~ u r i e r s On . ~ ~remarquera que certaines de ces crkances ne sont pas explicitement formulCes comme un pret B intCret. Mais si les prets annulCs par les Cdits de mfiarum Ctaient avant tout des prets B intC1-et,6~ c'Ctait plus gCnCralement tous les prets de nCcessitC qui Ctaient annulCs par le souverain. 60
Certains cas sont particulitrement Cloquents quant B la situation des dibiteurs. Le dossier de Marduk-muballit de Lagaba ( 5 3.4) offre ainsi l'exemple d'Ubkum, qui en l'an 7 de Samsu-iluna emprunta un GUR de grain le 19Iiv (no. 55), donc environ deux mois seulement aprts la moisson. Le 171v (no. 54), il empruntait B nouveau 1 GUR de grain et 112 sicle d'argent. La rCmission des dettes par le roi dfit lui procurer un grand soulagement, m&mes'il ne fut que momentank. 6 Le tableau est le suivant: date de la crCance la plus ancienne dClai date de la miiarum Rim-Sin 59 3 ans - Ha 32 (Hamrnu-rabi B Larsa) - avbnement de Samsu-iluna Hammu-rabi 39 4 ans Samsu-iluna 1 7 ans - Samsu-iluna 8 - Samsu-iluna 28 Samsu-iluna 22 6 ans 62 I1 s'agit B peu prts certainement du tamkdrum fils de Ssp-~in;voir B son sujet ma notice dans BiOr 38 (1981), 531 archives E 5, B propos d'YOS 12 290. 63 Lors de la discussion de ma communication B Leiden, E. Woestenburg a signal6 un autre cas analogue fourni par les archives d'Adayatum encore inCdites (conservCes au BM), oh l'on trouve tgalement deux "pics" de crCances en Hammu-rabi 42 et Samsu-iluna 7. 64 Pour I'idCe que les pr&tsh I'Cpoque palto-babylonienne Ctaient pratiquCs B des taux usuraires, voir M. Van de Mieroop, "Old Babylonian Interest Rates: Where they Annual?", K. Van Lerberghe & A. Schoors (Cd.), Immigration and Emigration within the Ancient Near East, Festschrift E. Lipinski, Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta 65, Leuven 1995, 357-364. 65 Une lettre de Sippar le montre clairement: "En ce qui concerne le document scellC que tu rn'as montrC, j'ai rapport6 au gouverneur de Sippar que je l'avais vu et il m'a dit ceci: 'Puisqu'on peut lire "intCrt", sa tablette est invalide.' Prends cette tablette, viens ici et montre-la au gouverneur de Sippar." AbB 2 173: (5) US-Sum ka-ni-ki-im (6) Sa tu-ka-al-li-ma-an-ni (7) ki-ma a-mu-ru (8) ma-bar Sa-pir Z I M B I R ~(9) ~ 8-Sa-an-ni-ma (R.lO) um-ma Su-8-ma (11) iS-tu-ma si-ib-tu (12) i-Sa-6s-su-8(13) ?up-pa& he-pi (14) ?up-pa-am Su-a-ti (15) le-qi-a-am al-kam-ma (16) ia-pir Z I M B I R ~(17) ~ ku-ul-li-im. On ne
204
D. CHARPIN
LES P&TEURS ET LE PALAIS: LES ~ D I T SDE M@ARUM
Pourquoi ces crCances furent-elles conservCes? On a vu en effet que, normalement, les crCances annulees suite B une miiarum devaient Ctre detruites. La difficult6 principale pour fournir une explication certaine du phCnomkne vient du fait que nous n'avons affaire qu'8 des archives issues de fouilles clandestines.66 Une chose semble cependant assurCe: ces crCances, annulees par 1'Cdit royal, lorsqu'elles furent conservCes, le furent dans les archives des crdanciers, comme en tCmoignent les concentrations que nous avons pu repCrer. On pourrait songer au cas moderne des emprunts russes, pieusement conservCs dans certaines familles de gCnCration en gCnCration, bien que les chances de remboursement soient des plus faibles67.. . Ce qui est nCanmoins ktonnant, c'est qu'on connait quelques cas oh le d6biteur obtint la remise d'une tablette precisant que la crCance n'a pas CtC dCtruite, mais qu'elle est dksormais invalide. Outre CT 48 1568et TEBA 1115,69 on peut citer ici le texte de Sippar BE 611 103;70 ce document montre l'impact de la miiarum de l'an 1 d'Ammi-saduqa sur les relations entre un dCbitew (Warad-Sin), qui avait empruntC 60 GUR de grain, son crdancier (Marduk-muSallim) et un intermediaire. Aprks recours aux juges de Babylone, puis B ceux de Sippar, les trois personnages parvinrent B un accord. Le texte s'achhe ainsi:71 "Si le r e p scellC de 60 GUR de grain (empruntCs par) Warad-Sin fils d'Etirum apparait dans le coffrelpanier (piiannum) de Marduk-muSallim fils d'Utul-EStar, il sera brisk". Cette clause resemble tout B fait B celle qu'on trouve dans certains contrats de vente, oh une clause stipule que le titre de propriCtC antCrieur n'a pu Ctre retrouvk et remis au nouveau propriCtaire.72 On voit donc que, contrairement 8 ce qui Ctait normalement prCvu, bien que le prCt ait CtC annulC, la crCance ne fut pas dCtruite; mais Warad-Sin Ctait protCgC par le document qui lui fut remis. Autrement dit, le statut des crCances Ctait analogue B celui des titres de proprittk: quand ils perdaient leur valeur, ils Ctaient normalement remis au nouvel ayant droit.73 Si tel n'Ctait pas le cas, l'acheteur ou le
dCbitew pouvait se faire Ctablir un document stipulant que I'ancien titre de propriCtC ou la crCance ne lui avait pas CtC remis ou n'avait pas CtC dCtr~ite.7~ I1 faut pour finir signaler l'existence d'une etiquette de panier B tablette ainsi libellee: "panier de tablettes annulCes, B dCtruire7'.75 I1 s'agit en l'occurrence d'apports et d'arriCrCs, donc de tablettes de comptabilitC dont les donnCes ont d6 gtre incorporkes dans un rkcapitulatif, et qui n'avaient de ce fait plus de valeur. On peut penser que les crkanciers avaient entreposC leurs cr6ances dans un panier de ce genre, mais que les tablettes ne furent finalement pas dCtruites.76 Le present travail s'est limit6 aux cas qui me sont apparus les plus clairs, sans prCtendre nullement B 1'exhaustivitC. Une recherche plus complkte devra donc &re entreprise, visant B classer chronologiquement toutes les crCances qui nous sont parvenues:77 si les observations qui prCckdent sont justes, on devrait obtenir une courbe marquant des "pointes" dans les mois qui prkcbdent la proclamation d'une miiarum, soit une situation exactement contraire B celle que Finkelstein avait suggCrCe. L'inversion s'explique aiskment: Finkelstein avait raisonn6 sur l'ensemble des contrats conclus, alors qu'il ne faut prendre en considCration que les contrats de prCt qui nous sont effectivement pawenus et qui correspondent aux crCances non recouvrkes. Dbs lors, ce genre de dossier devient extrgmement intdressant pour l'histoire Cconomique: dans les archives des creanciers, les crCances qui pr6ckdent immkdiatement la proclamation d'une miiarum nous fourniraient une indication approximative du niveau normal de leur activitC de prCteur.78 On doit enfin rappeler que le phknomkne ici CtudiC n'est pas propre au royaume de Babylone, puisqu'on peut aussi lYappr6hender,par exemple, dans le royaume d'ESnunna. En effet, les archives de Gidiinum retrouvCes par des fouilleurs clandestins B Tell Harmal contiennent de nombreuses cr6ances. Or elles datent du rkgne de Narh-Sin d'ESnunna, qui a cCl6brC dans un de ses noms d'annCe une remise de dettes: "AnnCe oh Narh-Sin
74
comprend toutefois pas trbs bien, si le contrat de prCt B intCrCt est dCtenu par le crtancier, pourquoi ce dernier doit se rendre Sippar, alors qu'il sait d'avance que son titre ne vaut plus rien; il semble cependant que les crtanciers Ctaient tenus de produire leurs criances afin qu'elles soient dttruites. 66 On peut espCrer que la publication des archives d'Ur-Utu retrouvCes par la mission De Meyer B Tell ed-D&r permettra de corriger cet inconvtnient. K. van Lerberghe et M. Tanret ont indiqu6, lors du symposium de Leiden, qu'on a retrouvC dans sa demeure quelque 400 crCances sur une ptriode de 35 ans, avec un schCma chronologique analogue B celui qui est ici dicrit. 67 Rappelons que l'accord conch il y a quelques annCes (sous le gouvernement d'A. JuppC) avait fix6 le montant que la Russie devait rembourser aux Cpargnants franpis B ... 1%du montant des crCances originelles (calculC en valeur constante). Cet accord n'est toujours pas entrt en application (juin 1999). 68 Voir ci-dessus n. 13. 69 Voir ci-dessus n. 12. 70 L'Cdition et le comrnentaire de ce texte par H. Olivier, "The Effectiveness of the Old Babylonian mCarum Decree", JNSL 12 (1984), 108-113, est malheureusement B corriger sur de nombreux points. BE 611 103: (40) ka-ni-'ikl 60 SE.GUR 1 ~ - dDUMU ~ ~e-ti-rum ' ~ (41) ~ i-na giplSAN d [ ~ ~ ~ mu-Sa-lim (42) DUMU Li-tul-eS4-tdri-l[i-a-a]m-mahe-pi. 72 Voir B ce sujet ma contribution "Transmission des titres de propriCtC et constitution des archives privtes en Babylonie ancienne", CRRAI 30, Leiden 1986, 121-140. 73 Comrne on l'a signal6 supra n. 58, il est possible que l'archive de Puzzurum B Terqa offre un exemple de crCance annulee, dCtruite et remise au dkbiteur.
205
.
~
]
~
~
-
YOS 12 224 me semble offrir un bon exemple de ce type de document: (1) (up-pu si-eh-tum Sa SIG4 la-ba-nim (2) 2 S E . G U R ~ ~ . K USa~ d ~ ~ ' ~ ~ - ~ ~ ( 3~) e-li . ~nu-bi-i-li-Su ~ - w e (4) - di-Su-u' i (5) i-na qa-ti d ~ ~ ' ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ . ~(6) ~ i-la-am-ma - w e - d (7) i - be-pi i m sh-ar (8) a-na nu-bi-2-lf-Su(R.9) Li-ul ir-ra-gu-um (4 tCmoins et date: 18/v)/Samsu-iluna 7) "La tablette invalide portant sur les briques B mouler et la moisson (B faire), (crCance) que Sin-tappa-wCdim possbde sur Nabi-iliiu, si elle est produite par Sin-tappa-wCdim, elle doit Ctre brisCe (et considCrCe comme) fausse: on ne rCclamera rien B Nabi-iliSun. Sin-tappa-wCdim devait avoir pr&tCde l'argent B Nabi-iliiu B rendre sous forme de travail; l'argent a dfi Ctre remboursC, mais le crCancier n'ayant pu produire sa crtance, Nabi-iliSu est protCgt par cette tablette qui lui est remise. 75 giplS~N1M.SAR.RA sf-hi-a-tumZI.RE.DB (YOS 5 58: 1-3); ce texte a CtC signal6 par K.R. Veenhof, "Cuneiform Archives. An Introduction", CRRAI 30, Leiden 1986, 1-36, spkcialement p. 18 n. 76. LB encore, il est trbs regrettable que ce document n'ait pas CtC retrouvC lors de fouilles rkgulihres: normalement, les documents correspondants ont dii Ctre retrouvks B proximiti. y6 I1 n'est pas possible de supposer que les crtances invalidkes par une miiarum aient CtC regroupCes dans un panier par une autoritC chargCe de les dttruire, car les regroupements de crkances repCrCs correspondent presque tous B des lots d'archives dont on possbde d'autres ClCments. 77 Malheureusement, le travail de A. Skaist, OBLC, ne permet pas de proctder rapidement B une enquCte de ce genre, vu la f a ~ o ndont la documentation a t t t rkpartie dans l'ouvrage. 78 Cette observation a Ctt formulCe par M. Tanret lors de la discussion de ma communication B Leiden. I1 faut toutefois la nuancer en remarquant que nous ne possCdons que les crCances qui n'ont pas CtC remboursCes.
LES PRETEURS ET LE PALAIS: LES BDITS DE M ~ ~ A R U M
(roi de 1'Univers) a brisk les tablettes (du pays)".79 La succession des noms d'annCe de Nar2m-Sin nous est inconnue, mais il est clair que les cr6ances doivent Ctre antCrieures.80 Une telle situation n'est pas non plus limitCe B la pCriode palCo-babylonienne: ainsi, le grand nombre de crCances (non recouvrCes) qui datent de l'an 1 de Darius I1 dans les archives des MuraSfi pourrait, selon G. van Driel, s'expliquer par une remise de dettes. 81
207
AUCT V 31 [AUAM 73 28051 Pr6t dY1/2sicle 10 grains d'argent B M2r-EStar, "nonobstant sa tablette scellCeW. [...]/Samsu-iluna 28. (2) KA KISIB.A.NI NU.ME.A (3) a-na Z~.[LUM] (4) KI ib-ni(1) 112 G ~ NK~.BABBAR ~ (5) I~uMU-ei~-tdr ~ ~ (R.6) SU . BA.AN.TI ~ (7) IT1 ~ [. .. U4 x+] 10-KAM (8) [MU sa-am-su-i-lu-nu] LUGAL (9) A . A G . G A - d ~ ~ . ~ i ~ . ~ ~
d
6. Annexe: les cr&ancesd'lbni-Amurrum82
BBVOT 140 [ A 0 5448831 Pr6t d' 1 sicle d'argent B intCr6t B Mk-Sippar, B rendre dans un mois. 4liv/Samsu-iluna 26. "Empreinte anCpigraphe sur la tranche droite". (1) 1 G ~ N K~J.BABBAR(2) MAS GLNA [email protected](3) KI i b - n i - d ~(4)~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ l ~ u ~ u (5)- SU~BA.AN.TI ~ ~ (T.6) ~ 'a1-na ~ ~ IT1E 1-KAM (7) [K]~J*.~BABBAR*~ li*$a-ab (8) IGI be-el-iu-nu KA.KI (9) [IG]I a-bi-ia Uq 4-KAM (11) MU sa-am-su-i-lu-na LUGAL.E (T.12) (10) IT1 [SU.NUM]UN.A JJUR.SAG GAL KUR MAR.T[U] (13) 1 113 NINDA 4 K8S B ~ ~ R . D A . B ~ 4) Ce Mk-Sippar est tCmoin en YOS 12 520: 10. 7) Je n'ai pas not6 de parallble B cette formule, dont la lecture me semble relativement sfire.
BBVOT 1 48 [ A 0 54541 Pr6t d' 1 112 sicle d'argent 21 Ninnfi. 1l+/ii/Samsu-iluna 27. Pas d'empreinte de sceau.
2) Pour ce type de notation qui prCcise qu'un pr6t a dCjB CtC consenti au m6me dkbiteur et n'a pas encore CtC rembourd, voir la formulation en akkadien ezub p i kanikiiu, qu'on trouve par exemple dans les archives d'Awiliya (cf. BiOr 38 (1981), 535). Nous ne poss6dons apparernment pas cette crCance ant6rieure.
A UCT V 41 [AUAM 73 28101 Pret de 1 113 sicle et 12 grains d'argent B Taribum, pour (acheter) des plantes-u@lum. [. ..]lSamsu-iluna28. ~ Ita-ri-bu~ . ~ ~ (1) 1 113 G ~ N12 SE K~J.BABBAR(2) a-na li-bu-li (3) KI i b - n i - d ~(4) um (5) SU BA.AN.TI (R. 6) IT1 [... Uq x-KAM] (7) MU [sa-am-su-i-lu]-na LUGAL (8) A.AG.GA-~EN.L~.LA
BBVOT 141 [ A 0 54461 Pret d ' l sicle 20 grains d'argent B Isidar6, pour (acheter) des dattes et du &same. [x]liii/Samsu-iluna 28. Pas d'empreinte de sceau.
(1) 1 G ~ N20 SE K~J.BABBAR(2) a-na ZU.LUM(3) 2 SE.GlS.1 (4) KI i b - n i - d ~ ~ ~ . ~ (5) [I]ril-si-da-re-e (T.6) [SUB]A.AN.TI (R.7) IT1 [SIG4.A U41 [XI-KAM(8) MU [sa-a]m-su-[i-lu-n]a LUGAL.E (9) ~AG.AG.GA ~EN.L~L.LA~
AUCT V 46 [AUAM 73 26051 Pr6t d' 1 [sicle d'argent] B ~illi-$ama~-b6li~a, pour acheter des dattes, B rembourser en dattes selon le cours qui prCvaudra aprbs la ricolte. l/iii/Sarnsu-iluna 28. 79
MU (d)na-ra-am-30(LUGAL K I S ) [up-pa-tim ([up-pa-at ma-tim) ib-pu-li; voir F.R. Kraus, SD XI, 93-94. 80 Noter que le problBme signal6 plus haut au $ 3.6 se pose aussi pour les archives de Gidbnum, ob trois crCances portent la mention wa-ar-ki na-ra-am-30 LUGAL KIS Dp-pa-tim ih-pu-li (BIN VII 75:12-13) et wa-ar-ki [up-pa-at ma-tim dna-ra-am-30ib-pu-li (BIN VII 76:21-24).Noter que I'enveloppe de cette dernihre cite la clause sous forme d'un nom d'annbe: (21) MU dna-ra-am-30 (22)[up-pat ma-tim (23) ibpu-li. A l'inverse, en YOS 14 20, c'est la tablette qui porte 1. 21 le nom d'ann6e MU [up-pa-tim ib-pu-u', alors que l'enveloppe a la clause EGIR d n a - r a - a m - d ~[up-pa-tim ~ ' ~ ~ u-he-pu-Li. G. van Driel, "Continuity or Decay in the Late Achaemenid Period: Evidence from Southern Mesopotamia", H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg (Cd.), Achaemenid History I, Leiden 1987, 159-181, spCcialement p. 175-6. 82 Je remercie R. M. Sigrist, qui m'a autorisC B utiliser les textes de AUCT V avant leur publication, ainsi que Madame BCatrice AndrC-Salvini, grbce B qui j'ai pu collationner les tablettes conservCes au
Louvre. 83
Corriger le catalogue de BBVOT 1, qui porte A 0 5445.
(1) 1 [ G ~ K~J.BABBAR] N (2) a-[nu SAMZ ~ . L U M (3)] KI i b - n i - [ d ~ ~(4)~ Isi-li.~~] d ~ ~ ~ - b e - l i(T.5) - i a SU BA.AN.TI (6) u ~ . B u R u ~(R.7) ~ . S KAR ~ ~ ib-ba-ai-iu-a (8) Z ~ . L U M~.AG.[E] (9) IT1 SIG4.A Uq 1-KAM (10) MU sa-am-su-i-[lu-na LUGAL] (1 1) A.AG.G[A-~EN.L~.LA] (12) [x] x x [...]
BBVOT 145 [ A 0 54501 Pr6t d' 116 de sicle d'argent B Apil-Amurrum, pour (acheter) des dattes. 15/iii/Samsu-iluna 28. Pas d'empreinte de sceau. (3) KI i b - n i - d ~(4) ~ la-pil~ . ~ ~ (1) IGI-6-GALK ~ . B A B B A R(2) a-na Z ~ . L U M ~(5) ~.SUR ~ (T.6) SU ~ BA.AN.TI . ~ ~ (7) IT1 [S]IG4.AU4 15-KAM (8) MU sa-am-su-i-lu-na LUGAL (9) A.AG.GAd ~ ~ . ~
d
f
LES PRBTEURS ET LE PALAIS: LES BITS DP. M~.$ARUM
AUCT V 44 (AUAM 73 24881 PrCt d'1 sicle d'argent B [...], pour (acheter) des dattes et du s6same. 16liiilSamsu-iluna 28. (1) 1 GIN K ~ . B A B B A R(2) a-nu Z ~ . L U M(3) d SE.GIS.I(4) KI i b - n i - [ d ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ] (lacune) (R.1') IT1 SIG4.A U4 16-KAM (2') MU sa-am-su-i-lu-nu LUGAL.E (T.3') A.AG.GA~ E N . L ~ . L A
A UCT V 28 [AUAM 73 25161 PrCt de 0,2.3 de grain B Tugabum, pour (acheter) des dattes, B rembourser en dattes selon le cours qui prevaudra aprks la rkolte. 20/iii/Samsu-iluna28. (1) 0'2.3 SE (2) a-na ZU.LUM (3) KI i b - n i - d ~(4) ~ ltu-ga-bu-um ~ . ~ ~ (5) [SU B]A.AN.TI (T.6) [U4.BUR]U14Z ~ ~ . L U(7) M[KAR i]b-ba-as"-s'u-li (R.8) [ Z ~ . L U M ~.AG.E] (9) IT1 SIG4.A U4 2O+[x-KAM] (10) MU sa-am-su-i-b-na LUGAL (T.ll) [ A ] . A G . G A - d ~ ~ (12) . ~ i ~ia-di-a-bu-urn-ma .~A
(1) 112 [GIN K~J.BAB]BAR(2) [a-na Z ~ . L U M (3)] 'u* SO*.OIS*.I*~ (4) K I [ilb-ni[ d ~ ](5)~lib-ni-drxl ~ . ~(R.6) ~ SU BA.AN.TI (7) ITI SU.NUMUN.A U4 10-KAM (8) MU sa-am-su-i-lu-nu LUGAI, (T.9) A.AG.GA
AUCT V 45 [AUAM 73 24381 Pret d' 116 side $argent B Rabtit-Sin et BClSunu, pour (acheter) des dattes. lOliv/Samsuiluna 28. (I) 101-6-Gk K ~ . B A B B A R(2) [a-nu] ZULUM(3) [KI ib~-ni-~MAR.~u (4) [b-]a-bu-utd ~ (5) [d? ~ be-el]-iu-nu ' ~ UGULA ~ MAR.TU (R.6) SU BA.AN.TI (7) IT1 SU.NUMUN.A U4 10-KAM (8) MU sa-am-su-i-lu-na LUGAL (T.9) A.AG.GA ~EN.L~L.LA
YOS 12 521 PrCt de grain 2 IGnum-babil pour acheter du sesame, B rendre en shame au mois vii selon le cours qui pr6vaudra. 25IivlSamsu-iluna 28.
BBVOT 137 [ A 0 54411 PrCt d'l sicle d'argent B BCls"unu,pour (acheter) des dattes et du dsame, ii rembourser en dattes et en sQame selon le cows qui prkvaudra aprhs la rkolte. 22liiilSamsu-iluna 28. (1) 1 GINK ~ ~ . B A B B A(2) R a-nu ZU.LUM P SE.GIS.I(3) KI i b - n i - d ~(4) ~ Ibe-el~ . ~ ~ &-nu KA*.KI* (5) SU BA.AN.TI (T.6) U4.BURU14 Z ~ . L U M(7) d [SE].GIS.~ (R.8) KAR ib-ba-S[u]-'dl (9) ZU.LUM d SE.GIS.~ (10) ~.AG.E (I I) IGI LU.DINGIRSA,(GA).DUB.BA (12) IT1 SIG4.A U4 22-KAM (13) MU sa-am-su-i-lu-na LUGAL.E (T.14) A.AG.GA ~EN.LIL.LA (15) ia-di-a *-bu-urn-ma Sceau: b[e]-el-[iu-nu] 1DUMU za-ak-[. ..] I fR sa-am-s[u-i-lu-nu]
YOS 12 519 PrCt de 516 sicle et 3 grains d'argent 2t Uabil-a@, pour acheter du sksarne, B rembourser en sCsame selon le cours qui prkvaudra aprks la r6colte. 25liii/Samsu-iluna 28.
1'2.4 GUR SE.GUR me-s'e-qum! (2) a-na SAM,$E.GIS.I(3) KI i b - n i - d ~(4) ~ Iki~ . ~ ~ nu-um-ha-biz (5) DUMU d ~ ~ ' ~ ~ - m u - p a -(6) b i -SU i r BA.AN.TI (7) i-na IT1 D U ~ K O (R.8) ka-ra-at i-ba-as'-& (9) SE.GIS.'I~.AG.E (10) IGI i - b i - d ~DANGAR ~'~~ (11) ITI SU.NUMUN.A U4 25-KAM (12) MU sa-am-SU-i-h-nuLUGALE (13) A.AG.GA
I DUMU d ~ ~ ' ~ ~ - m u - i1a1~- d~ i m ~ Sceau: d~U'EN-mu-~a-hi-ir p&redu dibiteur)
~
BBVOT 1 43 [A0 544584] PrCt d ' l sicle d'argent B Marduk-nlir pour~desachats, B rembourser en dsame et en dattes selon le cours qui privaudra aprks la recolte. 2lvlSamsu-iluna 28. "Empreintes sur toute la surface de deux sceaux dont l'un (inscrit B deux lignes) est aujourd'hui illisible". - n a - S (4) i-ir (1) 1 G ~ NK ~ . B A B B A R(2) K1 ib-rGdMAR.Tu (3) [ d ~ ~ ~ ] ~ . ~ ~ ~ A*.GAL* [a-nu] SAM.MES?(T.5) [SU BA.AN.TI u4.BURUl4] (R.6) [SE.GI]S.Id ZU.LUM (7) (8) 1.AG.E KI*.LAM* AL.GUB.A.KAM? (9) IGI in-bi-i-li-iu (10) IGI d ~ ~ . ~ f L - n a - $ i - i r (1 1) IT1 NE.NE.GAR Uq 2-KAM (T.12) MU sa-am-su-i-lu-nu LUGAL.E (13) A.AG.GA d ~ ~ . ~ f(14) ~ NAM.K~.ZU . ~ A -NAM.A.G~.BI.DA! ~ ~ ~
(1) 516? G ~ N 3 SE K ~ . B A B B A (2)Ra-nu SAMSE.GIS.~ (3) KI ib-nkdMAR.~u(4) Ihabiz-a-hi (5) DUMU i-nu-Sa-me-wu-slim (6) [S]U BA.AN.TI (7) [ u ~ . B u R u ~ ~ ] . S ~ ~ SE.GI~.[~] (R.8) KLLAM AL.GU[B!.BA] (9) SE.GIS.I EAG.E (10) IT1 SIG4.A U4 25-KAM(1 1) MU A.AG-~EN.L~L.LA (12) ia-di-a-bu-urn (13) P muti-8UR.SAG Sceau: ba-biz-[. ..] / DUMU i-nu-;a-me-[. ..] I iR d[. ..I
~(donc -sceau ~du
A UCT V 43 [AUAM 73 22201 Pret d' 1/6 sicle d'argent B Ibni-Marduk pour (acheter) des dattes. 10lvISamsu-iluna 28.
BBVOT 1 47 [A0 54531 PrCt d' 112 sicle d'argent B &mi-[...], pour (acheter) des dattes. 10/iv/Samsu-iluna 28. Pas d'empreinte de sceau.
(1) 101-6-GAL K ~ . B A B B A R(2) a-nu Z ~ . L U M(3) K1 i b - n i - d ~(4) ~ lib-ni~ . ~ ~ d ~ (5) KI.BAL.MAS.DA~~ ~ (R.6) ~ SU BA.AN.TI ~ (7) [ITI] . NE.NE.GAR ~ U4 10- ~ KAM (8) [MU sa-alrn-su-i-lu-na [LUGAL] (T.9) [A.AG.GA *E]N.LL.LA 84
Corriger le catalogue de BBVOT 1, qui porte A 0 5448.
~
LES PR~TEURSET LE PALAIS: LES ~ D I T SDE MIS'ARUM
BBVOT 1 5 1 [ A 0 54571 Requ d'argent par Inbi-iliSu. 10/v/Samsu-iluna28. (1) IGI-4-GALK ~ J . B A B B A R( 2 ) S A M X.UA (3) SU.TI.Ain-bi-2-li-s'u ( 4 ) KI ib-ni~ (R.5) [IT11 ~ 'NE.NE1.GAR ~ Uq . 10-KAM ~ (6) [M]U ~ A.AG.GA d ~ ~ . ~ f L . ~ ~ -
d
BBVOT 1 52 [ A 0 54581 Pr& d'argent B Abum-waqar, pour (acheter) du sCsame. 1l/v/Samsu-iluna 28. Pas d'empreinte de sceau.
(1) [x] GIN K ~ J . B A B B A R(2) 'a1-na SE.GIS.~(3) SU.TI.A a-bu-um-wa-qar (4) KI ib-ni~MAR.TU (R.5) IT1 NE.NE.GAR U q '1 1'-KAM (6) [M]U 'A~.AG.GA-~EN.L~L.LA-KAM
AUCT IV 16 [AUAM 73 24691 Pr$t de 0,1.2 GUR de grain B AlabariS(?), pour (acheter) des dattes, B rembourser dans deux mois selon le cours qui prkaudra. 14/v/Samsu-iluna28. (1) 0,1.2 S E (2) a-na ZU.LUM(3) KI ib-nLdMAR.Tu (4) Ia-la?-ba-ri-is' (5) S U BA.AN.TI (T.6) a-na IT1 2-KAM (7)ka-ra-at (8) i-ba-as'-s'u-d (R.9) Z ~ . L U MI.AG.E (10) IGI d n a - b i - u m - f i .(1 ~~ 1)~IGI u-bar-rum DUMU ha-ab-lum (12) IT1 NE.NE.GAR Uq 14-KAM (13) MU sa-am-su-i-lu-na (14) ia-di-ha-bu-um (15) d mu-ti-HUR.SAG T.: N A ~ . K I S I Bu-bar-rum
Abre'viations fie'quemment utiliskes dans cette contribution: AUCT IV = M . Sigrist, Old Babylonian Account Texts in the Horn Archaeological Museum. Andrews University Cuneiform Texts IV, Berrien Springs 1990. AUCT V = M . Sigrist, Old Babylonian Account Texts in the Horn Archaeological Museum. Andrews University Cuneiform Texts V, Berrien Springs, B paraitre (Je remercie M. Sigrist pour m'avoir communiquC son manuscrit avant sa publication et m'avoir autorisi B citer les textes dont j'avais besoin). BBVOT 1 = D. Arnaud, Altbabylonische Rechts- und Venvaltungsurkunden.Berliner Beitrage zum Vorderen Orient Texte 1, Berlin 1989. CRRAI 30 = K.R. Veenhof (td.), Cuneiform Archives and Libraries. Papers read at the 30e Rencontre Assyriologique Internationale Leiden, 4-8 July 1983 (= PIHANS 57), Leiden 1986. DCS = D. Charpin & J.-M. Durand, Documents cune'iformes de Strasbourg conserve's & la Biblioth2que Nationale et Universitaire, tome I, Paris 1981. Lagaba = 0. Tamrnuz, Archives from Lagaba, Ph. Diss., Yale University 1993. Me'l. Greenfield = Z. Zevit, S. Gitin & M. Sokoloff (Ed.), Solving Riddles and Untying Knots. Biblical, Epigraphic, and Semitic Studies in Honor of Jonas C. Greenfield, Winona Lake 1995. Me'l. Landsberger = H.G. Giiterbock et Th. Jacobsen (td.), Studies in Honor of Benno Landsberger on his Seventy-Fifth Birthday, April 21, 1965 (= Assyriological Studies 16), Chicago 1965.
21 1
MHET IIl3 = L. Dekiere, Old Babylonian Real Estate Documents from Sippar in the British Museum Part 3: Documents from the Reign of Samsu-iluna, Mesopotamian History and Environment Texts IIl3, Ghent 1995. OBLC = A. Skaist, The Old Babylonian Loan Contract. Its History and Geography. Bar-Ilan Studies in Near Eastern Languages and Culture, Bar-Ilan 1994. ~ ~ ~ SD XI = F.R. Kraus, Konigliche Verjiugungen in altbabylonischer Zeit. Studia et Documents ad iura Orientis antiqui pertinentia XI, Leiden 1984. TFR 1 = 0. Rouault, Terqa Final Reports 1. L'archive de Puzurum (= Bibliotheca Mesopotamica 16), Malibu 1984. YOS 12 = S. I. Feigin, Legal and Administrative Texts of the Reign of Samsu-iluna (= Yale Oriental Series 12), New Haven & London 1979.
OLD AND NEW ARCHIVES FROM NUZI1 R.M. JAS (AMSTERDAM)
Introduction
Nuzi is a small city in the poorly known kingdom of Arraphe.2 The citadel (kerbu, ca. 200x200 m) is dominated by a large palace (60x180 m) in the middle, a temple north of it, with three, rather distinct3 neighborhoods grouping themselves around these institutions. Of the lower city of Nuzi (URU Sa babinu4), which expanded for at least another 200 meters, only two complexes in the north, containing among others the houses of Tehip-tilla and S i l w a - t e ~ ~have u ~ , been excavated. On the whole the city makes a planned impression. From all areas come archives.5 The most exciting Nuzi publications of recent years have been the three volumes of Excavations a t Nuzi 9 containing Lacheman copies of a great number of texts from the southwestern and eastern residential areas, followed by Martha Morrison's attentive studies of this extremely rich material.
1 Grateful appreciation to Jeanette Fincke for going through a draft of this paper with her usual accurate insight and thus saving me from many mistakes. Those remaining obviously are mine. Martha T. Roth, editor-in-charge of the CAD, kindly allowed me to study the early SMN transcriptions in the dictionary's collection. 2 See Fincke, RGTC 10, 36 for the handful of facts. The only other site within Arraphe that has been excavated is Tell al-Fakhar (= ancient Kurruhanni). Texts from the capital Arraphe (= Al-ilani) come from illegal digs in modern Kirkuk, 13 kilometers northeast of Nuzi. For the little that is known about Tell Mahiiz (= ancient TurSa) see Cbrdoba, AoF 24 (1997), 352-365. 3 M. Novak's study of the function of the houses in the different neighborhoods of Nuzi (Bagh. Mitt. 25) can be summarized as follows: There are three neighborhoods: * The Southwestern Section (SWS) which borders (separated by Road 4) on the SW-wall of the palace. The number of rooms in most houses seems relatively constant and the families living in them appear to be of similar composition and social status. People living in SWS were less prosperous than those living in NWR, or even in NES. Cylinder seals were found in a single room only. * The Northeastern Section (NES) which is slightly more luxurious than SWS but distinctly poorer than NWR. Mixed population: different levels of wealth, social class, and family size. The people who lived in NES belonged to a different social class than those in SWS and NWR. Cylinder seals found in six rooms. * The Northwestern Ridge (NWR). The most prosperous and prestigious neighborhood of Nuzi. The temple is situated here. Rich houses with extremely large audition rooms and luxurious inventories. A highly differentiated population, wealthy but with gradations. It is more similar to NES than to SWS, but of a much higher social level. Cylinder seals in nine rooms. This is attested in TurSa (Fincke, RGTC 10, 417) where it is regarded as part of the libbi dim. For a recent overview see Lion, RA 89 (1995), 77-88, and the preface to Lacheman, HSS 16, for more details.
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In addition, a highly welcome study by M. Novak on the typology of houses in Nuzi has now appeared, which begs to be combined with the archival contents of these houses.6 To be able to do this one first needs a complete list of room numbers and the tablets found in them. A general remark on the room numbers in publications of Nuzi texts and in Starr's excavation report needs to be made here.7 We know of 122 rooms in which between 6500 and 7000 tablets and fragments were found.8 Not counted are the rooms Lacheman mentions in HSS 16 on p. vii but thus far have not reappeared in publications of Nuzi texts (= A 24, 25, 32). Three schools in handling these numbers can be distinguished. * One: the pessimistic school, accepting that room locations for Nuzi tablets are in general unreliable. If you want to change a room location - go right ahead. Support for this practice are several joins consisting of fragments with different room numbers, and a large amount of texts without any room number whatsoever. Reasons for this unreliability are the changing of the grid during the excavations and carelessness in packing, transport and unpacking. * Two: the optimistic school. This is mainly, and very enthusiastically, represented by A.H. Friedmann,g who takes room numbers at face value and is most convincing in his treatment of the Silwa-te~~up tablets that, according to the excavators were found in the palace, but given the verdict 'wr. Rm. loc.' by later scholars who prefer to move them to Silwa-te%up's house outside the citadel. I agree with Friedmann that finding a tablet of a mar iarri inside the palace is nothing unusual, even though he keeps an archive at home as well.10 As we will see later, other members of the royal family kept their documents there also. * Three: the supple school. M.A. Morrison. Only possible if you have an excellent knowledge of Nuzi texts and of the ways in which the American collections were formed.ll As a Lacheman student, M.A. Morrison moreover has access to the best Descriptions of houses in Nuzi texts are collected and studied by Zaccagnini, Rural Landscape, 3945. Nuzi scholars are passionate about these room numbers. K. Deller once remarked "Man fragt naturlich nach dem Grund, warum dieses wertvolle Textmaterial dem Leser der gedruckten Ausgabe vorenthalten, ja ihm nicht einmal rnitgeteilt wird, in welchem Room diese SMN-Texte gefunden worden sind. Es ist fur den in Restdeutschland an Nuzi-Texten arbeitenden sehr frustrierend, auf Schritt und Tritt zu erfahren, dal3 diese Tafeln nicht fur ihn ausgegraben wurden, wahrend gleichzeitig US und SU ihre Astro- und Kosmonauten miteinander kooperieren lassen." (Deller, WO 9 (1978), 298). A high estimate but, coming from the expert M.P. Maidman (PMB 5, 154) probably correct. A list of Nuzi texts compiled by me for the M.O.S. project, including a large group of published texts from the capital, consists of 4571 numbers. The remainder, as EN 1011 and 2 show, does not entirely consists of just bits and pieces. In the unpublished Ph. D dissertation Economic Geography and Administration at Nuzi, Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion (Ohio) 1982. l o The two PilmaSSe texts HSS 14 506 ( A ~ S 295) and HSS 14 526 ( A ~ S375) from R 76 (on the S see Lacheman, HSS 16, vii) are a good example. Both W. Mayer (Nuzi-Studien provenance of A ~ 375 I, 193) and G. Wilhelm want to move these texts to Silwa-te8Sup7shouse. It should be pointed out that both texts deal with the same shepherd and could therefore have been kept (temporarily?) at the palace on purpose. Regarding this issue, the pessimistic school can now quote Maidman, SCCNH 2 (1987), 348-349: "We are left with the disquieting conclusion that JENu material from Chicago has infiltrated the SMN
OLD AND NEW ARCHIVES FROM NUZI
215
printed source for room numbers in Nuzi: E.R. Lacheman's unpublished Harvard University Dissertation from 193512, so probably she knows best of all what she is talking about. She hardly ever fails.13 Such a small, well excavated city with an equally high density of tablets from institutions and private houses seems perfect for helping the organizer of this symposium find answers to some of the questions he asks himself in his invitation. Even more so, because we have a few private archives that were excavated during a controlled dig and come from two types of institutional buildings: the palace and the temple. In the secondary literature on this topic, however, the conclusions reached on basis of the Nuzi texts are cautious. C. Zaccagnini, for example, states: '[ ...I the amount of published texts belonging to private archives is very high and, as is well-known, their typology is extremely rich; on the contrary, the evidence pertaining to interactions between palace administration and private household-economies - regardless of their economic dimensions - is very scarce, especially as concerns the dynamics of fiscal mechanisms: it is no surprise, for instance, that it is still a matter of debate what is to be meant with the Nuzian ilku and what exactly denote the many terms that refer to the social status of people in the kingdom of Arraphe [...].'I4 M.A. Morrison, in her study of the southwest archives arrived at the conclusion that '[..I it is conceivable that the individuals of the southwest archives were connected with the palace as R.F.S. Starr suggested, but the nature of that connection is not clear.'lS In her even more thorough study of the eastern archives,l6 more optimistic sounds are heard. Group 19 comes out as the most promising. On p. 128 M.A. Morrison remarks: 'Most of the individuals of Group 19 were personally involved in business whether it be banking or trading. Some of the merchants had a direct connection with the palace, others had no official connection but a commercial relationship with the palace, hence a vested interest in its activities.'l7 Later on she summarizes 'As for the area as a whole, it is very clear that the people of the eastern area were not poor. Instead, the principal figures were officials or private citizens with considerable resources. Most were connected in some way with the palace bureaucracy or the royal farnily.'18 E.R. Lacheman's views on the matter have also been influential. In his study of the palace in Nuzi he writes 'Je crois que toutes ces donnees nous permettent de dire une fois de plus que nous avons ici B faire B des individus qui, quoique employ6 par le palais, sont cependant libres de conduire leurs affaires personnelles.'19 He arrived at the following collection in Cambridge and that perhaps this "migration" goes two ways. The archeological data implicit in the catalogue numbers in both cities are thus thrown open to some doubt. Thus the number of factors potentially complicating our reconstruction of Nuzi society has grown by one." 'The Nuzi Collection of the Harvard Semitic Museum,' a paper presented at the XVLe RAI in Harvard by Jeanette Fincke (forthcoming) contains a wealth of information on this matter. l 2 SMN 2151-3760: Selected Cuneiform Texts from Nuzi in the Haward Semitic Museum. A rare example: SMN 3657 = EN 912 118 from G 73 does not belong to the eastern archives as suggested in SCCNH 4 (1993), 19. See below on the archive of Ila-niSu son Hapira. 1 Zaccagnini, Circulation of Goods, 141. Morrison, SCCNH 2 (1987), 197. l 6 Morrison, SCCNH 4 (1993), 3-130. l 7 Morrison, SCCNH 4 (1993), 128. Morrison, SCCNH 4 (1993), 129. Lacheman, CRRA 19,361.
2 16
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conclusion 'I1 s'en sort de cette b r b e Ctude de ces textes que le roi de Mitanni et le roi dYArrapheavaient une certaine autorite sur les affaires privCes des habitants de Nuzi. Mais la paucitC des textes indiquerait une autoritC assez limitCe.'20 In recent times this view has been expressed by M.P. Maidman in the following words: 'Such noninterference in the private sector's real estate dynamic must be considered a hallmark of Nuzi society'.21
The palace After a short overview of what the palace in Nuzi has been understood to represent we will first discuss the "private" texts of f~ulpun-najaand a few other persons that were found in the palace. Next we will study the G group of texts, found in or near the temple. Within this group it is possible to distinguish a few hitherto unnoticed, small private archives, without obvious links to the temple.22 To start with the palace,23 which is bigger than the neighborhoods south and east of it combined. This complex has recently be reinterpreted by M.P. Maidman as "government house" that functioned as seat of the local municipal government led by the mayor.24 M.P. Maidman's argumentation is based on the fact that Nuzi had no king and therefore the term palace is wrong. Evidence for why he wants the mayor to live in the palace is not given. It is true that W. Mayer quotes a Nuzi letter in his catalogue of the palace texts from hrki-tilla to the mayor of Nuzi and Anzugallim, but this tablet (Mayer Cat. 561 = SMN 1260 = HSS 15 222) was published without its Room Location. The famous tablet HSS 15 125 with royal instructions to the mayor was found in C 28, and not in the palace where you would expect it to be found had the mayor lived there. On the other hand, a royal decree with instructions to the palace personnel was, logically, found inside the palace.26The size of the building, and the geographical range of the documents it generated is also problematic. Mayors, generally, were responsible only for one city and the few villages within reach. The Nuzi palace administration deals with many more cities clearly proving it was a provincial center of importance that played a pivotal role in
OLD AND NEW ARCHIVES FROM NUZI
collecting taxes27 and providing food and equipment both to the army and to palaces in other cities of the kingd0m.~8 We prefer to stick to the old theory of Nuzi as a socie'te' ~ a l a t i a l e . ~The g palace in Nuzi is one of the palaces of the king of A r r a p l ~ ewhich , ~ ~ was run by a queen and a Sakin biti during his absence.31 Many texts from the Nuzi palace administration contain references to visits of the queen of Al-ilani to Nuzi to visit the royal baby's raised in the palace's nursery. This system is quite similar to the Sakintu system in the Neo-Assyrian period: queens and iakintu's manage the palace together when the king is on campaign, fulfilling his religious duties, or residing el~ewhere.3~ At all times, the king was kept informed about what the palace personnel was doing, which sometimes made him sent direct orders from Al-ilani. This is proven by a royal letter33 stating that minummt? ni.Gt ekalli Sa ina Nuzi aSbu lu awilu lu sinniStu 'any palace personnel who reside in Nuzi, male and female should produce twenty shekels of (combed) wool each, which immediately should be brought to ~l-il%ni.'3~ The merchant In Nuzi the merchant is the best attested link between palace and private entrepreneurs: merchants in Nuzi could be as easily employed by the palace as by private citizens.35 The family archive of Pula-kali and the merchants from the Eastern Archives is known best, thanks to M.A. Morrison's recent study.36 What was found of it in Nuzi probably only represents a small part of the archive, since the home of the family is known to have been the city of TupSarriniwe. For our purposes today the summary of this family's activities given by M.A. Morrison37 deserves to be quoted in full. 'Though some of the characters are DAMGAR'S who work for the palace, the most active representatives, the Pula-hali family, appear to be private merchants. Whether the sons of Pula-bali were L~.DAM.GAR's or not, the 27 28
Lacheman, CRRA 19,364. Maidman, PMB 5, 156. 22 Not much is known about the management of the IStar and TeSXup temple in Nuzi. 23 The texts from the palace have been studied by Mayer, Nuzi-Studien I (& the review by Zaccagnini, Or.NS 51 [1982]). The follow-up volume on the C and D texts from the arsenal never appeared. After Mayer (Nuzi-Studien I, 1I), the close connection of these texts to the palace texts has been stressed by Fadhil, BaF 6, 257 (on the D texts) and 21 (on the C texts). The seal of the $akin biti appears on D texts as well, which is further proof for a close connection with the palace. 24 Maidman, PMB 5, 155 and CANE 2,934 and 935f. 25 See Cassin, pouvoirs locaux, 98-117. 26 AASOR 16 51 = Mayer Cat. 330 = SMN 533(!) from room R 76 (see Lacheman, HSS 16, vii n. S 711. A new translation by Martha T. Roth in Roth, Law 5). G. Wilhelm gave the text the A ~ number Collections, 194-5. 20
217
The iSk2ru lists from the palace are the best proof for this function. Kariina, Lubdi, TaSenniwe, TurSa, TemtenaS, Ularnme, Silliawe and Zizza are all attested in the D texts. 29 Cassin, pouvoius locaux, 98, with earlier literature. 3O Al-iliini, uurazina rabfi, Karana, Kurruhanni, Lubdi, TaSenniwe, TurSa, TemtenaS, Ulamme, Silliawe and Zizza also had a palace. 3 A. Fadhil gives evidence for at least five queens (Al-iliini, Lubdi, Nuzi, TaSenniwe and Zizza), see Fadhil, BaF 6, 110 and 182f. 32 On the Sakintu see Rollin, BSOAS 53 (1990), 123-24. SMN 683 = HSS 9 3 addressed to Eblip-apu (not found in the palace but in A 34). It would be nice if the recipient of this letter was identical to Eblip-apu, mayor of Nuzi, since this would be additional evidence for mayors living outside the palace. 34 Textile industry involved many palace slaves. See W. Mayer's list in Nuzi-Studien I, 169-176. 35 See Zaccagnini, Iraq 39 (1977), 171-189 and M.P. Maidman's reaction in Bi.Or. 37 (1980), 187189. Note that in Fincke, RGTC 10, 413-414 the merchant is listed among the Trager offentlicher Amter. 36 Morrison, SCCNH 4 (1993), 95-114. Momson, SCCNH 4 (1993), 109.
2 18
R.M. JAS
OLD AND NEW ARCHIVES FROM NUZI
219
mixing of their texts with those of people who had a connection with the palace suggests a close relationship of the individuals who conducted the private business with those who worked for the state. Thus, while some LU.DAM.GAR'S worked exclusively for the palace, others did not. Some mixed palace and private activities. Others participated at various stages in the trading process. The overall view of Arraphean commerce is that of a complex network of financial interests in which the private and state sectors coexists and overlap.'
Prarmen-naja From the Nuzi palace (room K 32), in addition, we have three private documents of queen f~armen-naja.~G
Private archives in the palace
Private archives in the temple
Prulpun-naja W. Mayer has published a catalogue of the f~ulpun-najatexts.38In the meantime, only a few additional texts have been published.39 Ever since this archive was published by R.H. Pfeiffer and E.A. Speiser in AASOR 16 (1936) it has remained somewhat of a mystery. E.A. SpeisefiOfollowed his remark 'how private family archives of this type had come to be placed in the mound district of Nuzi, we cannot determine for the time being' with the likely explanation that 'it is possible that the family of Tulpun-naja had close official connections [...I.' Recently, 0. PedersCn41 had similar problems explaining the presence of this private archive in Room N 120 of the palace. K. Dellefl2 nevertheless, has long ago established that fTulpun-naja was the daughter of fseltun-naja and an entu priestess.43It is a well-known fact this profession was closely linked with the royal family.44 In this light, the presence of f~ulpun-naja'spersonal archive in the palace becomes a lot less remarkable. The find spot of her private documents among the official palace administration is still interesting, although I am convinced this mixing of tablets should not be confused with mixing private affairs with state business. Overall, also in Nuzi, J.N. Postgate's theory that 'in the later Assyrian empire there did exist the concept of "state business" as distinct from the king's private affairs'45 seems more in accordance with the facts.
This group has not received adequate attention. Many new texts from the temple area49 have been published in EN 9, but as far as I can see nobody has tried to answer E.R. Lacheman's question what these private documents were doing in the temple.50 The following G texts have been published.
Mayer, Nuzi-Studien I, Nrs. 189-219. EN 913 468 = SMN 2071 (no Rm loc.); EN 911 127 = SMN 2088+2682 (N 120); EN 912 27 = SMN 2193 "Group 17 S 113" (on this wrong room number see Morrison, SCCNH 4 (1993), 19 n. 35); EN 911 500 = SMN 2239 (N 120). 40 In Pfeiffer and Speiser, AASOR 16,75-6. 41 PedersCn, Archives, 19, Morrison, Women's Records, 184 and Maidman, CANE 2, 944 do not bring up the archaeological context of f~ulpun-naja'sarchive. 4 2 Deller, W 0 9 (1978), 304. 43 See also Fadhil, BaF 6, 251; Dosch, HSAO 5, 52 and Miiller, HSAO 7, 113. In the Cumulative Catalogue to EN 9 in SCCNH 5 (1995), 92 EN 911 30 from N 120 is mentioned, an adoption of Tul-[ ...I daughter of Meli[ ...I. Jeanette Fincke has joined this text in the meantime and edited it in SCCNH 9 (1998), 190-1 where she reads f~ulpun-najadaughter of Melia. In AASOR 16 23:4 (Mayer Cat. 197) f~ulpun-naja'sfather is Erwi-Sarri. Does this really mean we have to reckon with two f~ulpun-naja'sin the palace? 44 Deller and Fadhil, Mesopotamia 7. 45 Postgate, Economic Structure, 193. See ibid. 200 for the family and near relatives of the king as components of the palace sector. 39
Utbp-tae The archive of Uthap-tae son Tarmia, previously located in the palace47, belongs to the Eastern Archives in~tead.~g
1. SMN 3584 2. SMN 3585 3. SMN 3586 4. SMN 3587 5. SMN 35885l 6. SMN 3589 7. SMN 3590 8. SMN 3591 9. SMN 3593 10. SMN 3594 11. SMN 3595 12. SMN 3596 13. SMN 3597 14. SMN 3598 15. SMN 3599 16. SMN 3600 46
= =
= = = = = = = =
= = =
= = =
G 29 EN 913 407 EN 913 227 EN 913 259 EN 911 155 EN 911 444 EN 913 57 EN 913 221 EN 913 58 HSS 15 32 EN 913 2 16 EN 911 5 HSS 16 188 EN 913 220 EN 913 483 EN 913 222 EN 913 223
HerSi son Qaniku Kirip-Seri son Hut-teSSup Sekaru and Eblip-apu [URu Hamena(S)] Kirip-Seri son Hut-teSSup Kirip-Seri son Hut-teSSup Itti-Sarri son Turari Kirip-Seri son Hut-teSSup Kirip-Seri son Hut-teSSup list of 60 Hanigalbateans f&rkuja daughter ItMp-ukur Sekar-tilla son Urhija Ilaja son Hapira Kirip-Seri son Hut-teSSup ?
Kirip-Seri son Hut-teSSup Kirip-Seri [son Hut-teSSup]
HSS 14 110 = Mayer Cat. 41 and HSS 14 112 = Mayer Cat. 42. Add now the fragmentary EN 913 52 + EN 1011 21. 47 EN 912 152 = Mayer Cat. 226; EN 912 322 = Mayer Cat. 227; EN 912 363 = Mayer Cat. 228; EN 911 351 = Mayer Cat. 229; EN 912 450 = Mayer Cat. 230. 48 Morrison, SCCNH 4 (1993), 19. 49 See Lacheman, HSS 16, vii: '6) the Temple Area (Cf. Starr, ibid. vol. 11, Plan 13) is delimited by streets 5, 6, 7 and 8, in squares G and H. Tablets were found in G 29, 53 and 55 and H 15, most of them in bad condition. In G 29 and 53 we have mostly contracts of Qirib-sheri, son of Hut-teshup and of Ilaya, son of Hapira.' Note that the room number G 23 assigned to EN 913 259 in SCCNH 5, 113 does not exist. The SMN number of this text (3586) points rather to G 29 where both SMN 3585 and 3587 were found. 50 Lacheman, CRRA 19,367. Room Location taken from a transcription of this text kept in the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago (dated 12110132).
220
R.M. JAS
17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.
SMN 3601 = SMN3602 = SMN 3603 = SMN 3604 = SMN3605 = SMN 3606 = SMN 3607 = SMN 3609 = SMN 3610 = SMN 361 1 = SMN 3613 = SMN 3614 = SMN 3615 = SMN3616 = SMN3617 = SMN 3618+2648 SMN 3619 = SMN 3621 = SMN 3622 = SMN 3623 = SMN 3624 = SMN 3625 = SMN 3626 =
40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46.
SMN 3627 SMN3628 SMN 3629 SMN 3630 SMN 3631+ SMN 3632 SMN 3645
1. 2. 3. 4.
SMN 3650 SMN 365 1 SMN 3652 SMN 3665
= = = =
= = =
=
= = =
EN 913 182 EN911302 EN 9/3 402 EN 911 448 HSS1949 EN 913 5 1 EN 911 424 EN 913 215 EN 911 37 EN 911 404 EN 913 217 EN 913 202 HSS 19 92 HSS158 EN913263 to P 460-466 EN 913 61 HSS 19 100 EN 913 55 HSS 16 466 HSS 19 81 HSS 19 139 HSS 14 9
?
Uzimpalitu Enna-pali son Kuntanu Kinzi son Tib-Sarru (var. of T5b-Sir-beli) Uzimpalitu MuSaja son E [...I Zilip-apu son Zinkuja Utljap-tae son Zike HaSip-tilla son Kelia fSurkuja daughter ItMp-ukur Sar-teSSup son [x] armour Kirip-Seri [son Hut-teSSup]
Itti-Sarri son Turari Ilaja son Hapira MinaS-Suk son Enna-mati list of men: seal Herri son Nanip-ukur Arip-Sarri Kittu son Tarmija letter from Akija, the sukkallu (see Mayer, NuziStudien I, 125) Kirip-Seri [son Hut-teSSup] EN 913 229 Kinzi son Tib-Sir-bdi EN91364 EN 913 179 Kirip-Seri [son Hut-teSSup] Ilaja son Hapira HSS 15 56 EN 1012 105 Kinzi [son Tib-Sir-bdi] EN 913 442 statement of six men belonging to ? EN 911 242 MinaS-Suk son of Enna-mati
G 53 EN 911 133 HSS 16 467 EN 913 63 EN 913 180
G 73 HSS 19 84 = EN 912 118
1. SMN 3656 2. SMN 3657
=
3. 4. 5. 6.
= HSS 19 85 = HSS 19 143 = HSS 19 124 = HSS 19 123
SMN 3658 SMN 3659 SMN 3660 SMN 3661
Ilaja son Hapira Akip-taSenni son Kirip-Seri
Wantari 78 ANSE grain in Hinzuri = (MaylJune) Kirip-Seli son Un-te5Sup Kanaja Utbap-tae son Zike (does not belong with the Eastern Archives as suggested in SCCNH 4, 19) Ilaja son Hapira (var.) MinaS-kk [son Enna-mati] Kirip-Seri [son Hut-teSSup] Ilaja son Hapira Hupita son Hamanna
OLD AND NEW ARCHIVES FROM NUZI
7. SMN 3662 8. SMN "3663 9. SMN 3666 10. SMN 3670 11. SMN 3671 12. SMN 3673 13. SMN 3674 14. SMN 3676 15. SMN 3677 16. SMN 3680
HSS 19 125 ~npub.5~ EN 9/1 48 HSS 16 144 HSS 15 284 HSS 16 435 HSS 16 436 HSS 16 437 HSS 15 10 HSS 19 44
Ilaja son Hapira MinaS-Suk son Enna-mati Kirip-Seri [son Hut-teSSup] Sekar-tilla son Akianni Ilaja: administrative wool for palace personnel? people from Sumela (hapax) lists 11 PN's sealed by Tarmija and Sirnika-atal Mul-teSSup son Kinzia
Kiripderi(S) son H u t - t e S S ~ p ~ ~ Attested family members: One brother: tjaiS-teSSup (SMN 3588) and two sons: Akip-taSenni and Hanie (SMN 3602). Akip-taSenni acts as a witness in SMN 3658, a text from MinaS-Suk son Enna-mati. Kirip-Seri uses three scribes: Utbap-tae son En-Sukm wrote the following eight texts: SMN 3585, 3587, 3590, 3597, 3599, 3600, 3627, 3629. Taika wrote two texts: SMN 3591 and 3666. Ebli-teSSup wrote SMN 3617 and 3659. Toponyms that occur regularly: Ittume, Hamena and Kipri. Contents: G 29: SMN 3585 = statement about a real estate tidennutu SMN 3586 = fragmentary real estate tidennitu? SMN 3587 = tidennutu enslavement SMN 3588 = fragmentary lawsuit with Kaja son SaS-tae SMN 3590 = real estate tidennutu SMN 3591 = sale adoption: 1 ANSE of field in Kipri SMN 3597 = real estate tidennutu 2 ANSE of field in the ugiru of Ittube SMN 3599 = real estate tidennutu x ANSE 4 APIN of field in Kipri SMN 3600 = real estate tidennutu SMN 3602 = statement about a loan of grain SMN 3617 = real estate tidennutu: (x)+23 ANSE of field SMN 3627 = real estate tidennutu SMN 3629 = real estate tidennutu G 73: SMN 3659 = sistership document. No patronym, but his brother is the first witness (for HaiS-teja = HaiS-teSSup, compare NPN 264) and the text was written by Eui-teSSup in Kipri. SMN 3666 = sale adoption: x ANSE of field in Kipri.S4 5 2 Jeanette Fincke points out to me EN 913 517 (no Rm. loc.) has the same SMN number. On a transcription of SMN *3663 kept in the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago (dated 12/14/32) the SMN number was changed from 3563 into 3663, which is unfortunately of little help since SMN 3563 has been published as HSS 15 9 (F 25). SMN *3663 from G 73 was written in Al-ilini by TurarteSSup son Ith-apibe. 53 On his status see Deller, WO 9 (1978), 304 (possibly a rakib narkabti). Compare also Dosch, HSAO 5, 58 and Miiller, HSAO 7, 62. 54 Correct the catalogue entry of EN 911 48 in SCCNH 5 (1995), 94 to Kerip-Sen [son But-teSHup].
222
R.M. JAS
OLD AND NEW ARCHIVES FROM NUZI
SMN 3719 = EN 911 260 This tidennzitu enslavement was published without a Room Location but definitely belongs to this archive. For a translation see B.L. Eichler, YNER 5, 115 No. 14.
MinaH-Huk son Enna-mati G 29: SMN 3622 = EN 913 55 SMN 3645 = EN 911 242
* Uncertain
G 73:
EN 913 63 = SMN 3652 (G 53) is a text of Kirip-Seli son Un-teSSup written by TurSenni, who is not attested as a scribe elsewhere in this archive. Although it is possible we have a garbled spelling of Kirip-Seri son Hut-teSSup here, it is perhaps better to keep the text separate for the time being.
Ila-nigufilaja son Hapira (GALIO= emantuhlu 'commander of ten') * literature: Zaccagnini, Assur 2 (1979), 11-12: 'important personnage banigalbatken rksidant B Nuzi; 13: actif B Nuzi B l'kpoque de la quatribme gCnkration; 14: La fonction de ces personnes hanigalbatkennes dans le contexte de l'administration arraphCenne n'est pas clairement dkfinie. Je ne crois pas qu'on puisse songer B un contr8le exerck par le roi de Mitanni dans les affaires internes de Nuzi. I1 est plus raisonnable de penser que ces fonctionnaires-originaires de Hanigalbat-se soient insCrCs dans les structures bureaucratiques de Nuzi B titre personnel, et en tant que tels exerqaient leurs fonctions, de la m2me faSon que les autres dkpendants de l'administration.' Dosch, HSAO 5,44-45: certainly a riikib narkabti, but as a foreigner not listed in the regional lists), atuhlu official and Hanigalbatean. Contents: A 34: HSS 5 4 F 24: SMN 3479 = HSS 19 7 G 29: SMN 3596 = HSS 16 188 SMN 3601 = EN 913 182 SMN 3621 = HSS 19 100 SMN 3630 = HSS 15 56 G 73: SMN 3657 = EN 912 118 SMN 3660 = HSS 19 124 SMN 3662 = HSS 19 125 SMN 3671 = HSS 15 284
(statement concerning a debt of 5 minas of tin) (will) (adm.: personnel and grain rations) (real estate tidennutu) (daughtership document) (adm.: personnel and grain rations) (statement concerning a debt of 14 minas of tin) (statement concerning the sale of a slave woman) (statement concerning the sale of a slave woman) (list of guards)
Attested family members: his wife fSeltu, four sons Hutip-teSSup, Silwa-teSSup, Zike and Tamar-tae, and one daughter fUnuS-kiaSe. He acts as a witness (Ila-niSu son Hapira) for Ilanu son Taiukki (= riikib narkabti) in HSS 5 18:34 and in SMN 5 = HSS 9 100:34 (Ilaja son Hapira; both texts from A 34) and for Tarmija son Huja in SMN 2522 = HSS 16 321:23 (Group 18 A S 151). Receives barley in SMN 2586 = HSS 16 461:2 ([Illaja son Hapira; text sealed by Tarmi-teSSup the hazannu). His texts were written by Kase (HSS 5 4); Simanni- dad) (SMN 3479); Sin-SadOni (SMN 3601); MuS-teSSup son Hupita (SMN 3657 and 3660) and Akap-urhe SMN 3662. He appears to be associated with MinaS-Suk son Enna-mati and Hupita son Hamanna.
SMN 3658 = HSS 19 85 SMN "3663 = unpub.
223
(sale adoption) (fragmentary statement concerning the woman AwiS-kip&e) (marriage document) (fragmentary stament concerning a slave woman; text written in Al-ilini)
Attested family members: two sons: HutiS-Simika (SMN 3658) and Subtadu (who acts as a witness for his brother in SMN 3658). His daughter-in-law is mentioned in the palace text: SMN 1169 = HSS 16 63 = Mayer Cat. 131, in which f~upennaja,daughterin-law [kallatu] of MinaS-Suk, receives barley. His scribes are Mug-teSSup son Hupita (SMN 3658) who also wrote for Ilaja son Hapira and who wrote a few more texts from the G area: SMN 3605 from G 29, and SMN 3661 from G 73 (a Hupita son Hamanna text), and Turar-teSSup son Ith-apihe (SMN "3663). Toponyms: Al-iliini (SMN "3663) and Hamena.
* professional links Akip-taSenni son Kirip-SeriS acts as a witness for MinaS-Suk in SMN 3658:34. MuS-teSSup son Hupita, the scribe of SMN 3658, also wrote the Ilaja son Hapira texts SMN 3657 and SMN 3660 (G 73), which is additional proof SMN 3657 = EN 912 118 does not belong to the Eastern archive^.^^ There are more links with Ilaja son Hapira. In SMN 3596, gupita son Hamanna, the father of MinaS-Suk's daughter-in-law fNupennaja56 seems to be an officer either of the same rank as Ilaja, or of a slightly lower rank. For Hupita's own archive, see below. These links may be proof that in Nuzi colleagues preferred to own property in the same area, and to marry into each others families.
fsurkuja daughter Itwp-ukur G 29: SMN 3594 = EN 913 216 (real estate tidennutu) SMN 3614 = EN 913 202 (real estate tidennutu) Her scribe is Uthap-tae (SMN 3594). Toponym: the road to Zukirwe (?). She occurs in the Kirip-Her%text: SMN 3600 1.e. SE.MES-s~i ;a fsur-ku-ia.
Itti-garri son Turari G 29: SMN 3589 = EN 913 57 (sale adoption) SMN 3619 = EN 913 61 (sale adoption) Scribe: Akip-taSenni son TeSSup-atal 55
As has been suggested by Morrison, SCCNH 4 (1993), 19. See SMN 3658. Note that in SMN 3601 Ilaja son Uapira, by receiving a piece of land in tidenncltu becomes Hupita's neighbor and that in SMN 3479 Uupita witnesses Ilaja's will. 56
R.M. JAS
224
OLD AND NEW ARCHIVES FROM NUZI
Toponyms: Instead of Zz-zi probably just read Nu(!)-zi (same scribe wrote both texts in the city gate of Nuzi; delete Izzi from Fincke, RGTC 10, 126);57 perhaps also Kipri (SMN 3619:6).
Profession: atublu (SMN 3108 = HSS 14 37); GAL.10 (SMN 3008 = HSS 16 90); riikib narkabti in the unpublished SMN 308862 (a list of 15 riikib narkabti's). Most of C 19 and C 28 belongs to his sphere. A. Fadhi163 has established that "Die Texte aus C 19 handeln von der Verproviantierung der von feindlichen Truppen bedrohten oder belagerten Siidstadte des Reiches (ApenaS, Durubla, Zizza, Erbabhe und Teliperra)." These C 19 texts are among the latest Nuzi texts we know64 and are characterized by the division of the troops into "left" and "right." He uses the following three scribes: Akkul-enni (SMN 31 17); Akap-Senni (SMN 3386); Wur-teSSup (SMN 3576).
Hupita son Hamanna58 Only one text. This can be merely accidental or it might be due to the fact he was an iilik ilki instead of a riikib narkabti. He is of Hanigalbatean origin. He is known from the Ilaja son Hapira, and MinaS-Suk son Enna-mati archives, with whom he had close links. Occurs also in JEN 1025 where he owns a field next to Tarmitilla son of hrki-tilla. The witness in line 50 is IlaniSu son Hamanna, the gatekeeper, which, in all likelihood, is his brother.59 G 73:
SMN 3661 = HSS 19 123
Contents: C 19: 3020 3045 3053 3057 3058 3062 3066 3089 C28: 3102 3117 3137 3 148 D 6: 3386 F26: 3576 G29: 3615
(statement in court; lawsuit concerning the payment for a slave)
Utbp-tae and son(?) Known from a few G texts, but otherwise predominantly based in C60, the wealthy residential area further north, two small archives from military officials, possibly father and son, remain to be mentioned. A) Utbap-tae son Zike S 151: 2514 = C 28: 3091 = 3097 = no Rm. loc. 3109 = C 28: 3 111 = G 29: 361 1 = G 73: 3656 =
EN 911 425 HSS 19 96 EN 911 43 1 EN 911 396 EN 913 492 EN 911 404 HSS 19 84
(lawsuit about a horse with Hutia) (pays bride-price) (lawsuit about a horse with Hutia) (lawsuit about 3 horses with Urbi-teSSup) (statement of Atija) (lawsuit. gutija and EriS-kcnu occur) (marriage document)
HSS 14 27 HSS 14 16 EN 911 430 HSS 14 14 HSS 14 12 HSS 15 122 HSS 14 13 HSS 19 119 EN 911 434 EN 911 436 EN 911 445 HSS 14 19 HSS 19 133 EN 913 84 HSS 19 92
(letter to Apa; copy?) (letter from HaSip-tilla) (lawsuit about a donkey with TeSSuja) (royal letter to gar-te%up GAL. 10) (letter to Mitbarma; copy?) (letter to unknown; same topic as 3057?) (letter from Hutip-uraSSe) (price of a horse) (lawsuit with Arip-Sarri son Kun[...I) (lawsuit with Palteja) (lawsuit about the price for a horse) (royal letter) (lawsuit about a run-away slave) (exchange of sariam's) (daughtership document)
Although the relationship between A (Utbap-tae) and B (gar-teSSup) cannot be established directly, both the difference in generation (A 34 [generation 11-111] vs. C 19 [generation IV-V]) and the unpublished SMN 3088 listing Sar-teEup son Uthap-tae's among 15 rakib narkabti's make the assumption B son A quite likely.
His profession, again, is "commander of ten" GAL.10 (emantuhlu) and he is a riikib narkabti (HSS 13 6:24, from A 34).61 The two family members we are entirely certain about are his brother Kuzzarija ( E N 15525) and his son Hupita (SMN 3656). gar-teSSup is not mentioned in his texts, but he could have been another (the best known) son. His scribes are Amumi-teSSup (SMN 3097 and 3 109); Nirari son Taja (SMN 3091); Taja: (SMN 361 1); &X&~S-DINGIR.SAG (SMN 3 111) and Sebel-teSSup (SMN 3656).
Conclusion The groups of texts put together here for the first time65 are private documents of military officers mixed with the odd administrative document. Some, if not all of these officers came from Hanigalbat and there are indications they preferred colleagues as neighbors and marriage candidates for their children. The answer to the question why these texts were found in the temple can not be given. No parallels are know to me. The Neo-Assyrian temple archive from Balawat contains private documents, but these
B) gar-teSSup son Utbap-tae Literature: Dosch, HSAO 5, 12 n. 33.
Miiller, HSAO 7,56 rejects Nuzi and prefers Izzi as well. See Dosch, HSAO 5, 8 1. See Dosch, HSAO 5, 82. 124 texts in all carry C numbers. See Dosch, HSAO 5, 19 and 45.
225
I
62
A transcription of this text is kept in the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago. It is quoted in Fincke, RGTC 10, 146, 338 and 339. 63 64 65
Fadhil, BaF 6, 21. Dosch, HSAO 5, 12. None of them occurs in the list of 41 archive holders in Fadhil, BaF 6, 351.
R.M. JAS belonged to clergymen. The Middle-Assyrian texts from Tell Rimah were found in secondary context in both the temple and the palace area, which is of course the easiest way out for the Nuzi texts as well. The apparent links this group has with the C texts could point us in the right direction: these rich people may very well have lived on the wealthy Northwestern Ridge. Again, it would be premature to assume strong links between the military and the temple on the basis of the find spot of these texts alone.
OLD AND NEW ARCHIVES FROM NUZI Maidman, M.P. Bi.Or. 37 CANE 2 PMB 5
Bibliography Cassin, E. pouvoirs locaux "Heur et malheur du hazannu (Nuzi)", in Lespouvoirs locaux en Mhopotamie et duns les rLgions adjacentes, Brussels 1982, 98-1 17. Cdrdoba, J.M. "Auf den Spuren des Mittani-Staates und der Hurriter. Tell Mahuz AoF 24 (Iraq) am Kleinen Zab. Anmerkungen zu einem Projekt", AoF 24 (1997), 352-365. Deller, K. Review of Barry L. Eichler, Indenture at Nuzi (New Haven 1973), W O WO 9 9 (1978), 297-305. DeIler, K. and A. Fadhil Mesopotamia 7 "NIN.DINGIR.RA / ENTU in Texten aus Nuzi und Kurrulyttmi", Mesopotamia 7 (1972) 193-213. Dosch, G. Zur Struktur der Gesellschaft des Konigreichs Arraphe (= HSAO 5), HSAO 5 Heidelberg 1993. Eichler, B.L. Indenture at Nuzi (= YNER 5), New Haven 1973. YNER 5 Fadhil, A. Studien zur Topographie und Prosopographie der Provinzstadte des BaF 6 Konigreichs Arraphe (= Baghdader Forschungen 6), Mainz am Rhein 1983. Fincke, J. Rkpertoire Ge'ographique des Textes Cune'iformes, Band 10: Die OrtsRGTC 10 und Gewassernamen der Nuzi-Texte, Wiesbaden 1993. Friedmann, A.H. Economic Geography and Administration at Nuzi, Ph. D. dissertation Diss. Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion (Ohio) 1982. Lacheman, E.R. "Le palais et la royautk de la ville de Nuzi: les rapports entre les CRRA 19 donntes archtologiques et les donntes kpigraphiques", CRRA 19, Paris 1974, 359-371. SMN 2151-3760: Selected Cuneiform Texts from Nuzi in the Haward Diss. Semitic Museum, Ph. D. dissertation Harvard University 1935. Excavations at Nuzi VII: Economic and Social Documents (= HSS 16), HSS 16 Cambridge, MA 1958. Lion, B. "La fin du site de Nuzi et la distribution chronologique des archives", RA 89 RA 89 (1995), 77-88.
SCCNH 2 Mayer, W. Nuzi-Studien I
227
Review of C. Zaccagnini, "The Merchant at Nuzi" (Iraq 39 [1977], 171ff), Bi.Or. 37 (1980), 187-189. "Nuzi: Portrait of an Ancient Mesopotamian Provincial Town", in J.M. Sasson (ed.), Civilizations of the Ancient Near East, Volume 2, New York 1995, 931-947. ""Privatization" and Private Property at Nuzi: The Limits of Evidence", in M. Hudson and B.A. Levine (eds.), Privatization in the Ancient Near East and Classical World (= Peabody Museum Bulletin 5), Cambridge, MA 1996, 153-176. "Nuzi Notes 2. A Tale of Two Cities", SCCNH 2 (1987), 345-349. Nuzi-Studien I. Die Archive des Palastes und die Prosopographie der Berufe (= AOAT 205/1), Kevelaer and Neukirchen-Vluyn 1978.
Morrison, M.A. Women's Records (reply to a paper by K. Grosz), in B.S. Lesko, Women's Earliest Records From Ancient Egypt and Western Asia, Atlanta 1989, 184. "The Southwest Archives at Nuzi", SCCNH 2 (1987), 167-201. SCCNH 2 "The Eastern Archives of Nuzi", SCCNH 4 (1993), 3-130. SCCNH 4 Miiller, G.G.W. Studien zur Siedlungsgeographie und Bevolkerung des mittleren HSAO 7 Osttigrisgebietes (= HSAO 7), Heidelberg 1994. Novak, M. Bagh. Mitt. 25 "Eine Typologie der Wohnhauser von Nuzi", Bagh. Mitt. 25 (1994), 341-446. PedersCn, 0. Archives and Libraries in the Ancient Near East 1500-300 B.C., Archives Bethesda 1998. Pfeiffer, R.H. and E.A. Speiser One Hundred New Selected Nuzi Texts (= AASOR 16), New Haven AASOR 16 1936. Postgate, J.N. Economic Structure "The Economic Structure of the Assyrian Empire, in M. T. Larsen (ed.), Power and Propaganda (= Mesopotamia 7), Copenhagen 1979. Rollin, S. BSOAS 53 Review of T. Kwasman, Neo-Assyrian Legal Documents in the Kouyunjik Collection of the British Museum (Rome 1988), BSOAS 53 (1990), 123-24. Roth, M.T. Law Collections Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, Atlanta, Georgia 1995. Zaccagnini, C. Assur 2 "Les rapports entre Nuzi et &inigalbatn, Assur 2 (1979), 1-27. Circulation of Goods "Transfers of Movable Property in Nuzi Private Transactions", in A. Archi (ed.), Circulation of Goods in non-palatial Context in the Ancient Near East, Rome 1984, 139-159. Iraq 39 "The Merchant at Nuzi", Iraq 39 (1977), 171-189.
228
R.M. JAS
Review of Mayer, Nuzi-Studien I. Die Archive des Palastes und die Prosopographie d e r Berufe (Kevelaer and Neukirchen-Vluyn 1978), Or.NS 51 (1982), 276-281. Rural Landscape The Rural Landscape of the Land of Arraphe, Rome 1979. Or.NS 51
PRIVATE ARCHIVES AT UGARIT* W.H. VAN SOLDT (LEIDEN)
Introduction
The Tell Ris e~-Samra,the site of ancient Ugarit, has been a very rich source of inscriptional material, nearly all of which has been found in regular excavations. Therefore, it gives us a rare opportunity to study a Late Bronze Age III site (ca. 13301175) and its society in many of its aspects.l It would, however, be a mistake to think that the texts show us all facets of daily life at Ugarit: texts have only turned up in the palace and in a relatively small number of private houses. In fact, most private houses, although rich in material culture and often inhabited by persons whose profession would have justified some sort of administration (like the many craftsmen working in the city), have not produced a single text. Therefore, the question which will occupy us here most of all is the raison d'Ctre of the archives which have been discovered in some of the private houses at Ugarit. First, however, a few words about the archives found in the royal palace. Five major archives were discovered in this Late Bronze Age building, among which a clear distribution of genre and, consequently, of language and script can be established.2 The large majority of administrative texts, mainly in Ugaritic, were found in three wings of the building, the so-called western, eastern and southwestern archives. Some were discovered in the south wing of the central archive. Most of these texts are lists which mention persons or groups of persons (towns and guilds) who receive rations or pay taxes, etc. As far as they can be dated the administrative texts stem from the last fifty years of the city's e~istence.~ These documents were apparently considered ephemeral in content and did not deserve to be kept for a long time. Juridical texts concerning local matters, in particular those dealing with land transfers, were found almost exclusively in the north wing of the central archive. With the exception of a few texts, possibly translations, in Ugaritic4they were all written in Akkadian. Texts written outside Ugarit dealing with the city's relations with foreign powers were kept in the southern archive. These include treaties with the Hittite kings as well as verdicts passed by their viceroys over Syria, the kings of Carchemish. The juridical texts dealing with local affairs, the treaties and the verdicts from Carchemish, all written in Akkadian, were considered important enough to be kept on file for a long time, at least from the beginning of the Hittite domination (ca.
*
Abbreviations used in this paper are taken from the list provided by Ugarit-Forschungen(UF). For a recent popular account of the city and its remains, see M. Yon, La cite' d'ougarit sur le tell de Ras Shamra, Paris 1997. For a description of the textual remains of the palace, see SAU 49f. See also my forthcoming contribution to the Handbook for Ugaritic Studies. 3 For the principles of selection for tablets to be filed, see SAU 140f. RS 15.111 (KTU 3.2), RS 16.382 (KTU 3.5).
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W.H. VAN SOLDT
230
Juridical texts: Administrative texts: Schooltexts:
1330 BC). State letters, on the other hand, are only preserved from the last half of Ugarit's existence, which suggests that they were apparently not considered worth keeping. Their distribution shows a similar lack of regard: letters to Ibiranu and his(?) queen Taryelli were found in the eastern archive, letters dated to the time of 'Arnrni~tarnru I1 in the south wing of the central archive. Moreover, many letters to and from the kings of Ugarit and the governor (sakinu) of the city were retrieved from private houses,5 which will now be discussed in some detail.
The two international juridical texts and the international letter are possibly intrusive. This leaves us with a large number of administrative texts, a few letters and some miscellaneous texts. Almost all texts are written in Akkadian. Their contents are very similar to the administrative texts from the palace archives and deal with the same topics. Although some smaller texts could refer to the private affairs of ~abni-Sa~Su? most texts are unmistakably concerned with the affairs of the city. In particular, the many lists of towns parallel similar lists from the palace and deal with the same things: taxation, places of residence of certain peoplelo and the like. We can thus safely conclude that YabniSapSuYsarchive was in fact an extension of the palace archives, which he apparently was allowed to keep at home. His status as chief-administrator may have given him this prerogative.
The private archives 1. The so-called 'Southern Palace' South of the royal palace the excavators found a large building which they called the 'small palace' or 'southern palace' in view of its dimensiom6 Tablets were uncovered in two rooms of this house, 203 and 204,7 they were almost all written in Akkadian and almost all administrative. A letter found in room 204 provides information on the owner of this house, his profession and the scribe he employed: lum-ma ~nir-~AG l d D U ~ . ~ A ~ - 2a-na r u m Pna-he'-3-gal-mu SES D ~ G . G A -3i a 1 6 ~ ~ ~ . SAR-rum Sa PD&~UTU WA.TAMGAL 4qi-bi-ma, "Thus (says) Nir-Nabd the scribe, speak to NabeHi-Salmu my good brother, the scribe of ~abni-SapSuthe chief-administrator: (. ..)" (PRU 6, no. 18).
1 86 1
2. The house of RaSap-abu I
To the east of the royal palace a large residential area was uncovered, in which three archives were found. The first one contained only a small number of texts, which provide us with the name of the owner and his profession: RaSap-abu the overseer of the harborAU"KAR = akil Ma 'badi).ll town Ma'hadu ('%JUGLA
The name NabeSi-Salmu is not Ugaritic and can only be explained as a slightly distorted form of the well-known Akkadian name NabiS-Salmu. The addressee was probably not a native Ugaritian, but had come from Mesopotamia. In view of the many Assyrianisms, both in ductus and language, in the texts found in this archive one can safely assume that NabiS-Salmu was a native Assyrian, who for some reason had entered the service of the owner of the house. As for the owner himself, his name is spelled logographically (PDZT-~UTU), which can only be explained as Yabni-SapSu. This is confirmed by a Ugaritic letter found in the same room, in which a certain Talmiyanu (tlmyn) writes to a ybnn.8 The latter is a hypocoristicon of a name beginning with Yabni- and should probably be read Yabninu. This Yabninu may well be the same person as our Yabni-SapSu. Even more important is the title which Yabni-Sap~uhas, Satammu rabd, "chief-administrator", which suggests that he had close ties with the palace administration.
We have the following documents: Internationaljuridical texts: (1) 10 Juridical texts: Administrative texts: 9 Medical texts: 1 4 Schooltexts:
The archive itself contains the following documents: International letters: I(?) Letters: 5 International juridical texts: 2
For example, PRU 6, nos. 125, 145, 146. See, for example, PRU 6, no. 78, discussed in AOAT 250 (Fs Loretz), 1998, 777f. Compare also the list of foreigners from various harbor towns, some of whom are said to have slave-girls (PRU 6, no.
I will come back to this phenomenon at the end of this paper. See SAU 149f. with literature. For a drawing of the house, see UF 23 (1991),340. RS 19.102 (KTU 2.64).
The juridical and administrative texts form the most important groups. The first comprises a few private land sale documents with RaSap-abu as buyer,l2 one such text in which his father-in-law is the buyer,13 two adoption contracts with RaSap-abu as adoptive father,l4 and two texts written by the scribe Ili-malku, which have no obvious links with the RaSap-abu family.l5 In both documents a sakinu transfers real estate from one owner
79). Ugaritica 5, If.; SAU 160f.;for UNKAR = Ma'hadu, see U F 28 (1996), 675f. Ugaritica 5, nos. 4, 5, 6, possibly also no. 8. Ibid.,no. 1. l 4 Ibid.,nos. 2 & 3. The texts are similar in content. l 5 Ibid.. nos. 9 & 10.
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to another,l6 the texts probably have to be dated to the reign of Niqmaddu I117 or slightly later. Why these tablets were kept in this house remains obscure. The administrative texts are almost all written in Akkadian and give little information about their purpose. There is one long list of persons from different towns who owe amounts of silver for various raw materials18 and one receipt in which RaSap-abu is mentioned with his profession and the name of his mother.lg The other texts do not provide enough information. A few schooltexts, both syllabic and alphabetic, suggest some form of scribal training in this building. There is one medical text in Ugaritic, which contains prescriptions for sick horses.20 In conclusion, Ragap-abu was an important official in the local bureaucracy, the overseer of the harbor, Ma'hadu. This may explain the presence of the long list of debtors mentioned above,21which appears to exceed private needs. The juridical texts are almost all relevant to the owner and his family. The few schooltexts are not enough to assume that a school once existed in this building. 3. The house of the 'Lettre" To the east of the house of RaSap-abu was a house that contained a small library of lexical and literary texts. The name of the owner is not known, the three letters found in his house are addressed to different people.22 Contents of the archive: Letters: Juridical texts: Administrative texts: Lexical texts: Rel./Lit. texts:
3 (1) (belongs with the RaSap-abu texts) 1 10 4
The high proportion of lexical and literary material suggests that a school was housed in the building. Especially interesting is the high percentage of exercise tablets.23 Of the three letters one has lost its address,24 the second is addressed to three different people (two of the names are broken)25 and the third is a letter from the governor (sakinu) to the king of Ugarit.26The last text shows that state documents were apparently also kept in this archive. In no. 9 it is Irib-ilu the MASKIM(sakinu) of Raqdu, in no. 10 'Abdi-malku. The reasons for this have been given in SAU 27f. Ugaritica 5, no. 12. Ibid., no. 13. RS 17.120 (KTU 1.85). Ibid., no 12. SAU 164. SAU 163f. RS 17.327 (KTU 2.35). RS 17.451 (PRU 6, no. 12). RS 17.455 (PRU 6, no. 3).
PRIVATE ARCHIVES AT UGARIT
23 3
4. The house of ~ a'anu p One of the largest archives found in Ugarit was located in a house to the northeast of the houses of RaSap-abu and the 'LettrC' . Since the archaeological finds and most of the textual material have still not been published, much is unclear about the findspots of the tablets and the extent of the house.27 According to a few letters the house probably belonged to a certain R a p ' a n ~ . ~ ~ The contents are: International letters: Letters: Juridical texts: Administrative texts: ~ex/Schooltexts:~~ Literary texts: Religious texts: Misc.
Rap 22 32 11 24 224
Outside Rap 3 6 3 4 11
Total 25 38 14 28 23 5 2? 2
The texts found outside the house probably belong to the same archive. Conspicuous is the great number of lexical texts and the absence of literary texts. Apparently, the building served as a school where students studied the vocabulary of Sumerian and Akkadian but hardly practiced their knowledge in c0ntext.3~ The juridical texts provide hardly any clues for the status of the owner. However, in one text31 Rap'gnu is quoted and the same name is borne by the scribe at the end of the tablet. If these persons are one and the same, Rap'anu possibly held the position of a scribe. This would make the presence of a school in his house understandable. It would also explain why so many international letters were recovered here.32 It is in this house that, for example, the correspondence with AlaSiya-Cyprus was found. From these data Nougayrol concluded that Rap'anu must have been a scribe of high rank, who had access to state documents which can be regarded as sensitive material.33 The (relatively) few administrative texts also point in this direction; we find lists of towns,34 personnel lists,35 and the like, text genres which we know so well from the royal palace. The conclusion seems clear: Rap'anu appears to have been an important scribe who trained scribes in his house and who wrote letters for the city's elite. However, he also wrote letters as well as juridical texts for ordinary citizens, or employed scribes (advanced 27
SAU 165f. For the published texts, see Ugaritica 5, 41f. Ugaritica 5, nos. 53-55. Schooltexts are simple scribal exercises like lists of personal names (both alphabetic and syllabic), alphabets, and the like. ALASP 7, 1995, 179. Ugaritica 5, no. 88. Ugaritica 5, nos. 20-50. Ibid., 42. On the status of the letters, see the end of this paper. For example, KTU 4.693. Like, for example Ugaritica 5, no. 95 and KTU 4.692.
28 29
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W.H. VAN SOLDT
students?) who did this work for him. He also kept records which can be regarded as an extension of the palace bureaucracy. Rap'anu thus combined his public duties with his private affairs.
5 . The 'Tablet-House' (Maison-aux-Tablettes) In 1959 the excavators opened up an area east of the residential area described above, which they called 'Ville S ~ d ' . They 3 ~ found houses which had once been inhabited by artisans, like gold and bronze smiths, sealcutters, sculptors and others.37 In the middle of this area there was an open square and on the south side of it were the remains of a large building. In the northern part of this building several rooms with large concentrations of tablets were discovered. Many of the tablets had probably been stored on an upper storey. Contents of the rooms:38 International letters: Letters: Juridical texts: Administrative texts: Lex/Schooltexts: Literary texts: Religious texts:
3 7 3 10 54 3 3
In view of the large percentage of lexical texts, it seems clear that the building served as a school. The religious and literary texts also formed part of the school curriculum.39 One of the teachers mentioned in the colophons could be the owner of the house. However, of the three teachers known by name one is attested as a teacher in two other sch0ols,~0the other two occur only once and just remain possible candidates.41 Note that in the house of Rap'inu several teachers are attested, but Rap'anu himself is not among them.42 The international letters are directed to the king and queen of Ugarit,43 the domestic letters are almost all damaged and do not provide the name of the possible owner of the house. Several of these letters may actually be regarded as international letters: there are at least two which were written by city governors (iakin mati or sZkinu)44 and one seems to
36 See the literature in SAU 182f.; the architecture in this new residential area has recently been published by Callot, Ras Shamra-Ougarit 10 (1994). 37 Callot, ibid., l87f. Taken over from SAU 190, column headed by 'Total'. 39 ALASP 7, 1995, 176f. and 207. 40 Gamir-Haddu, see ALASP 7, 1995, 181,211. 41 Ibidem. 42 Ibidem. 43 All three remain unpublished, RS 22.216 is a letter from the GAL DUBSAR to the king of Ugarit, in which the latter is addressed as "my son", RS 23.23 is a letter from the king of Amurru to the king of Ugarit, and RS 23.33 is a letter from 'the king' (probably of Carchemish) to the queen of Ugarit. 44 RS 22.347 and 22.419, the latter probably comes from Siyannu.
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have been addressed to the king by a man who calles himself his 'brother'.45 Another letter was sent to the %GULA.KALAM.MA by a certain Ili-hamatu. The former could be the owner of the house.46 Note, however, that this title occurs in Ugarit only in this text. This high official is, of course, well-known from Emar, where he probably was the Hittite governor.47 Last but not least, there is a letter which was written by a certain Ewri-taSali to a [...]Se-adal.48 The writer starts out in Akkadian but switches time and again to Hwrian, a language he apparently understands better.49 The administrative texts are a mixed group. There are six labels, five in Akkadian, one in Ugaritic. Three list quantities for certain individuals,50 two others materials for the town of Nanu'u.51 The only one in Ugaritic mentions "seven supervisors-of-ten from Huri-~ubG'i.52The other administrative texts include a list of towns and professions with quantities,53 a genre well-known from the palace and other private archives and lists of personnel,54 which in view of their length clearly exceed the needs of the owner's administration. Moreover, some of the names also turn up in the palace texts and else~here.~~ In surnmarv. - from the textual remains of the 'Tablet House' is .. the picture we get quite similar to the one deduced for the house of Rap'inu. The owner probably was an important official who may also have been a scribe. In his house apprentice scribes were taught to write in Akkadian as well as in Ugaritic56 and state letters and documents belonging to the state bureaucracy were written either by him or by scribes in his service. Connections with the palace are clear from the available evidence.
6 . The house of the Hurrian Priest On the southern slope of the acropolis the remains of a house containing two major archives were discovered. The northeastern part of the house consisted of two small rooms standing apart from the rest of the building.57 The largest concentration of texts was found in the western room, which was filled with almost only alphabetic texts in both
45
RS 23.491, the reading LUGAL in line one is not certain. SAU 190. See Flemming, UF 24 (1992), 66 and Beckman, "Emar and its Archives", in M.W. Chavalas (ed.), Emar, Bethesda 1996, 5 (with previous literature). 48 The first two signs of the name are unclear to me. 49 SAU 364, J-b. 50 RS 22.07, 22.30 and 23.360, see UF 21 (1989), 381 nos. 38,40 and 44. 51 RS 22.31 and 22.32, see ibid., 382, nos. 41 and 42. 5 2 RS 22.08 (KTU 4.712) :39, see ibid., 381 no. 39. 53 RS 22.233, quoted in part by Lackenbacher, RSO 11, 1995, 35, where SUM-me is, of course, ar,me, the town of 'Armde, see Dietrich & Loretz, UF 5 (1973), 82 and see UF 28 (1996), 682. 54 RS 23.22+35 and 23.79. Also RS 22.348 (KTU 4.715) and probably RS 22.407 (KTU 4.716). 55 The best example is formed by the sons of Qiqilunu, who are attested in four other texts, one from the Acropolis, one from the northwest area and two from the palace, see SAU 38 (c) and BiOr 46 (1989), 647. 56 For Ugaritic, see the alphabet RS 23.492 (KTU 5.19). 57 See SAU 194f.
46 47
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Ugaritic and Hurrian. Since the large majority of the texts is cultic in nature58 (liver models, rituals, incantations, etc.) the room was interpreted by the excavators as a cella.59
7. The library of the LamaStu tablets
The contents are as follows:60 Letters: 2 Administrative texts: 10 Lex/Schooltexts: 3 Religious texts: 56 Liver models (uninscribed): 15
In the same building as the archive of the 'Hurrian priest' we find another large concentration of tablets.69 It was discovered in a room to the southwest which, however, had suffered from centuries of erosion causing many of the tablets to slide down the southern slope of the acropolis.70 The texts discovered in this archive were of a completely different nature than the ones found in the cella of the 'Hurrian priest'. Unlike the latter, the texts from this archive were practically all written in syllabic script and their contents very much resemble the ones found in the house of Rap'anu and the Tablet House.
The religious texts provide no clues as to the identity of the owner of the house, although one may surmise that he must have had a cultic function. Whether he was a scribe and wrote the texts himself cannot be ascertained. However, from the colophons of the library of the high priest of Baal (see below) it is clear that priests could be teachers as well. The administrative texts give little information. There are three well preserved texts in Ugaritic, one is a list of households,61 a second a list of people who owe 0i1.6~The third one is of more interest: it is a list of herdsmen with their assistants63 for which text we have five parallels (with partially the same names) in the palace archives.64 This text appears to belong to the palace administration. There is one syllabic text, a list of various items which may have been used in the cult.65 The two letters, both written in Akkadian, are too broken to be of much help. One preserves part of its address and gives the name of the sender, a certain 'Abdi-'Anati.66 Since the town of Siyannu is mentioned several times and also the town Mulukku, a Ugaritic town close to the border with Si~annu,~7 it is possible that 'Abdi-'Anati is the king of Siyannu known from several other sources.68 In view of the large number of texts pertaining to the cult the house probably served as a cella and its owner probably was a priest. That he had connections with the palace is demonstrated by the list of herdsmen and, if my assumption on the identity of the sender is correct, by the letter of the king of Siyannu, 'AbdGCAnati.Whether the owner was in any way connected with one of the major temples of Ugarit remains unknown.
For the most important texts, see Pardee, RSO 4. Courtois, Ugaritica 6, 91; RSO 4, 5f. 60 SAU 199. RS 24.289 (KTU 4.727). 6 2 RS 24.292 (KTU 4.728). 63 RS 24.301 (KTU 4.729). 64 SAU 35 (3). 65 RS 24.290, unpublished. 66 RS 24.273, unpublished. 67 See UF 29 (1997), 701f. RS 17.123 (PRU 4, 230), 17.235+ (PRU 4, 71), 17.366 (PRU 4, 69), 17.380+ (PRU 4, 80). Cf. UF, 11 (1979), 21 and Na'aman, also 16.170 (PRU 3, 91). For the spelling with d N I ~ .see~ Astour, ~ ~ ~ UF 22 (1990), 254.
These contents are:71 International letters: Letters: Juridical texts: Administrative texts: Lexical texts: Literary texts: Religious texts:
1
5 5 9 35 8 13
From the number of lexical texts it is clear that a school for teaching Akkadian was housed in this part of the building. The literary and religious texts also belong to the school curriculum: unlike the religious texts found in the archive of the 'Hurrian priest' they were all written in Akkadian. Among the religious texts we count the Ras Shamra version of the LamaStu-incantations, which gave the archive its name. The only teacher known from the colophons is Gamir-HadduT2 who is also attested as a teacher in the house of Rap'hu and the Tablet House.T3 The only international letter was found on the southern slope. It was written by either the king or the governor (Sakin mriti) of Sidon and addressed to the governor of Ugarit. The name of the latter is br0ken.7~ The private letters give hardly any clues about who the owner of this archive may have been. One letter was written by a woman called Ad-Heba to the sakinu,75 there is a letter to the queen from another lady which, however, was found at some distance from the archive,76 and one to the king from a certain Piba-ziti.77 The other letters are too broken. Of course, one could suggest that the archive belonged to the governor of Ugarit,
59
69
SAU204f. SAU 209f. and fig. 24. 71 Included are the texts found around the archive room proper, see SAU 208f., the column under 'Total'. However, it is uncertain that indeed all these tablets once formed part of the same archive. 72 SAU 20, no. 19. 73 See the remark to the Tablet House, above. 74 Lines 3-4 probably read: 3[a-naPx-]x-na kin KUR 4[s'aUTUli-g]a-ri-it qi-bi-ma. What is preserved of the second sign of the name in line 3 looks like ME. A restoration -z]e- or -z]e'-, which would give us the name of the well-known sakinu 'Uzzenu, is unlikely. RS 25.131, see Lackenbacher, Fs Sjoberg, 318 and 320. 76 RS 25.138, ibid. 318f. The letter is not included in the total given above. 77 RS 25.461, ibid., 317f.
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the siikinu, as two letters were addressed to him. However, letters to and from the governor have turned up in other private archives as well78 and are therefore better regarded as state letters. Unfortunately, the situation is not much better with regard to the few juridical texts recovered from the building. One text79 deals with the case of a certain 'Ammi-lab'u, who appears to have been evicted from the house of his brother, although the text is too damaged to be sure about the exact contents. Another text80 deals with a certain Sirnraddu who 'cleared' his son Yaplutanu. A third one concerns a dispute between a gidmiyanu and some people from the town of Zaranu. The remaning texts are too broken. Not included here is an adoption contractgl in which a certain Rap'anu adopts a man called 'Abi-malku in the presence of the mayor (hazannu) of Ugarit. All juridical texts have lists of witnesses. Finally, the administrative texts mainly consist of lists of people arranged according to different principles. The first two texts82are long lists of persons and towns on fourcolumned tablets. Each name is followed by a number which, according to subscripts and entries refer to amounts of emmer (Z~Z.AN.NA)probably owed by the persons and towns listed. The texts state at the beginning that the amounts are due for a certain month. In one of them this is the month of U i y a r ~the ,~~ others4 begins with the month of Gunu, but has more months on the reverse. Similar texts are known from the palace and other private archives. Two other texts85 give lists of persons who owe (in the first one86) and receive (in the second87)grain and flour (mainly Z~D.KAL.KAL= & ? i l t ~ ~The ~ ) .other texts are too damaged to be of much help. Nevertheless, the well preserved texts clearly belong to the palace bureaucracy and parallel similar texts found in other private archives (see the archives described above). The only alphabetic texts9 from this area was found too far from the archive proper to ensure that it belongs with the other texts, even though it was discovered among a few lexical texts. It is a list of people who receive one jar of foodstuff per person. In summary, the so-called library of the LamaStu-tablets presents a picture familiar from the other private archives discussed so far. The owner probably was an important official, possibly a professional scribe, who trained apprentice scribes in his house and who also had state documents as well as records belonging to the palace bureaucracy in his archive.
Like the Tablet House and the house of Urtenu; for the latter, see below. RS 25.137, unpublished. RS 25.423, unpublished. RS 25.134, found to the north of the building, see SAU 650. RS 25.132, unpublished, and RS 25.455A+B, published by Arnaud, SMEA 32, 1993, 128. RS 25.132. RS 25.455A+B. RS 25.136 and 25.428, both unpublished. RS 25.136. RS 25.428. see UF 21 (1989), 381 note 35. For z~D.KAL.KAL, RS 26.156 (KTU 4.746).
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239
8. The library of the high priest on the acropolis
The first house with tablets that came to light in Ugarit was the library adjacent to the temple of the god Baal on top of the so-called acropolis, the highest point on the tell. Since the system of recording findspots was slowly developed during the first ten campaigns many findspots of tablets from the early excavations remain uncertain.90 It is in this house that the literary and many of the religious alphabetic texts were discovered. However, the archive also contained a number of syllabic texts, part of which belong to the school curriculum. As far as one can make out, the alphabetic texts come mostly from the western part of the house, whereas the lexical texts were probably located in one or more rooms on the eastern side.91 The contents are:92 International letters: Letters: Administrative texts: Lex/Schooltexts: Literary texts: Religious texts:
1 12 22 17 22 35
The name and position of the owner of this large building are clear from a number of inscriptions on objects and from colophons to literary texts. A few objects, axes and hoes made of bronze to be dated to ca. 1200 BC?3 carry inscriptions which identify the high priest (rb khnm) as their owner. In one instance his name is added, h r p , which we can vocalize Uarasinu,94 Harusenni95 or [email protected] The colophons to the literary texts give another name: atn prln, to be vocalized 'Attenug7 purulinu, "'Attenu the divinerV.98The date of this 'Attenu depends on the dating of the literary alphabetic texts. The king Niqmaddu mentioned in the colophons could be Niqmaddu 11, who lived around 1330, but also Niqmaddu 111, who lived around 1200.99 If 'Attenu indeed lived around 1200, then hrpz must have lived shortly before or after him. The only international letter is one addressed to Ibira, probably king Ibirinu of Ugarit, and sent by a certain Niqmepac, probably the king of Alalah.100 90 SAU 213, with literature. See also A. Rosengren Petersen, "Where Did Schaeffer Find the Clay Tablets of the Ugaritic Baal-Cycle?', Scandinavian Journal of the Old Testament 8 (1994), 45f. The author was not yet aware of the existence of SAU and Cunchillos' article in Sefarad 49 (1989), 37f. 91 SAU 218. 92 SAU 217. 93 SAU 213, 220. g4 RS 8.145:ll (Syria 18 (1937), 246); RS 24.299:ll' and RS 25.132 ii 14'. Or Harusenni, Syria 15 (1934), 138:11 and 22. 96 RS 15.109+ r. 13 (PRU 3, 102) and l5.155:13 (PRU 3, 118). Although he does not mention the vocalization, Bordreuil, Fs Loretz, 1998, 132 appears to opt for this solution. g7 A vocalization 'Attiinu is also possible. 'Att5nu is attested only once, 'AttEnu occurs frequently. 98 U F 21 (1989), 365f.; ALASP 7, 1995, 187f. 99 The latter option is now defended by Bordreuil and Malbran-Labat, CRAIBL 1995,447-448. l o o See SAU 215f.; I. Mirquez Rowe, WZKM 87 (1997), 192 and 204 note 47, and Arnaud, SMEA 37, 1996, 47f.
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W.H. VAN SOLDT
There are three private letters in Akkadian, two of which preserve their full address. One is a letter to the governor (sakinu),lol the name of the sender is broken. As remarked above,l02 letters to the governor were found in a number of private archives and should be considered state documents. The other letter is from a certain Belubur,l03 in view of the Assyrianisms in this text probably an Assyrian.lo4The addressee, Ili-malku may very well be the scribe who wrote the Ugaritic literary tablets.lO5 Among the alphabetic letters we encounter one to the high priest,lo6 the owner of the house. The only other letter which is well preserved was sent by a certain Ewri-darri (iwrdr) to a Pilsiya (plsy). The other texts are too damaged. Of the administrative texts only a few remain undamaged. The clearest of these is a list of towns with quantities,lO7 which is similar to lists found in the palace and most of the private archives. Possibly, the text specifies quantities of commodities to be delivered to one of the temples on the acropolis. A text consisting of only four lines mentions workteams for the two most important groups of priests, the khnm and the nqdm.108 The lexical texts give us no names of teachers, but the apprentice scribe who copied the Ugaritic literary texts deserves to be mentioned, Ili-malku (ilmlk). It is from his colophons that we know the name of the high priest, the same one who owned the house with its archives (see above). Thus the archive found in the house of the high priest is not very different from archives found in other private houses. The lexical texts show that there was a school in the building in which scribes were trained to write Akkadian and Ugaritic. The archive stands out among the others for its Ugaritic literary texts, for which we hardly have any examples from other archives.109 The letters to Ibiri(nu) and the sakinu show that stafe documents were kept here and the one economic text listing place names is part of tJie bureacratic system familiar from the palace. In view of the colophons to the Ugaritic literary texts the high priest 'Attenu apparently was a scribe himself, at least one who could write Ugaritic. However, he may also have dictated the texts from memory. 9. The house of Urtenu The tablets found in 1973 in a heap of rubble on the south side of the tell proved to be part of an archive the rest of which came to light during regular excavations started in 1986.11•‹The total number of tablets recovered so far is more than 500, the biggest archive ever discovered at Ras Sharnra. Most texts were written in Akkadian but there are some alphabetic texts as well. The most interesting of these is the literary text written by l o l RS 1.[56],Syria 10 (1929),pl. 7611;cf. Malbran-Labat, RSO 11, 35. l o 2 See the LamaStu-archive, no. 7. lo3 RS 6.198,Syria 16 (1935),189. lo4 See SAU 28 (b). lo5 For a different view, see Freilich, SEL 9 (1992),21f. lo6 RS 1.18 (KTU 2.4). lo7 RS 2.01 (KTU 4.27). l o 8 RS 3.320 (KTU 4.29). log Only in the house of Urtenu a tablet written by Ili-malku has turned up, see below. l o SAU 221;Bordreuil, RSO 7, 1991,7f.;Bordreuil & Pardee, RSO 11, 1995,27f.;Lombard, ibid.,
227f.;Yon, CRAIBL 1995,427f.;Bordreuil & Malbran-Labat, ibid.,443f.
PRIVATE ARCHIVES AT UGARIT
24 1
Ili-malku (ilmlk) the scribe known from the colophons on the literary tablets found in the house of the high priest (see above). Since almost all the texts discovered since 1986 are still unpublished I will limit myself to the texts published in RSO 7 (1991). contents: l l International letters: Letters: Juridical texts: Treaties: Administrative texts: Lex/Schooltexts: Literary texts: Religious texts: The name of the owner is now certain thanks to tablets found in recent years. The letters excavated in 1973 had already shown that Urtenu was a good candidate and this was confirmed by the new texts.1l3 The most interesting group of texts is that of the international letters, which form a large percentage of the total. Only in the house of RapJinu was the percentage as high. One of the most intriguing letters is the one dealing with the battle of Nibriyal14 of which, unfortunately, the name of the sender is broken; the addressee may well have been Ibirinu,ll5 king of Ugarit. Other letters were sent by the Hittite king116 and his viceroy, the king of Carchemish.l17There are also letters from the kings of TarbundaSSa, QadeS and USnatu,ll8 from Beirut and Sidonllg and also two letters from Mesopotamia, one from Mari, the other from Babyl0nia.12~A long letter in Ugaritic was formerly understood to deal with the affair around cAmmi~tamru11's divorce from the Amorite princess. In RSO 7, however, this theory has been all but rejected.121 New letters from various cities have been found since 1986.122 Just like in the house of RapJbu, Urtenu had a sizable portion of the correspondence with foreign kings in his house. Here should also be mentioned the treaty fragment found here.123 It is an edict from HattuSili I11 to Niqmepac, which has parallels in texts from the southern palace archive.124
SAU 222. Including the alphabetic text written by Ili-malku. 113 Arnaud, RSO 7, 65f.;Bordreuil & Pardee, RSO 11, 1995, 31; Bordreuil & Malbran-Labat,
CRAIBL 1995,444f. l 4 RSO 7,no. 47. Ibid.,95. Ibid.,no. 12. Ibid.,nos. 6-9. l 8 Ibid. nos. 14-16. l 9 Ibid.,nos. 37 and 38. 20 Ibid.,nos. 47 and 40. 121 RSO 7,no. 88 (KTU 2.72). 22 Bordreuil & Malbran-Labat, CRAIBL 1995,445. 123 RSO 7,no. 1. 124 Ibid.
242
The letters are our main source for the identification of the owner and his family (see above). They also include letters from private individuals to the king and queen of Ugaritl25 and letters between citizens.126 The administrative texts consist of several syllabic and a few alphabetic texts. Among the former there is a text listing quantities of grain received from various persons for the month giyaru,l27 a parallel to the texts encountered in the LamaHtu-archive (see above) and a long list of towns which have to deliver personnel.l28 There is also a text which lists boats belonging to the king of Carchemish that are no longer able to sail because of old age.129 The alphabetic texts include several lists of personnel. Of special interest is a list of priests who receive(?) jars of oil(?),l30 for which we find parallels elsewhere with the same persons.l3l One such text was found in the p a l a ~ e , l 3another ~ one in the northwest133 and a third one in the house of ~abni-Sa~Hu.l3~ These examples show that the administrative texts found in this house were part of the state bureaucracy and were not written for private use. The lexical texts attest to the existence of a school in the building. No names of teachers are preserved. Whether Urtenu was himself one of the teachers in this school can therefore not be ascertained. The few religious texts include one in Ugaritic which has become rather famous: the ritual pertaining to the ancestor cult.135More texts have been found since the publication of RSO 7.136There are also a few fragments with Akkadian texts which appear to be magical or astronomical in n a t ~ r e . 1 ~ ~ The picture that emerges from this account fits what had already been deduced for the previously discussed private archives. The owner of the house, Urtenu, seems to have been an important personality, whose house served as a school, and who kept part of the state bureaucracy and a fair number of state letters in his archive. He was in regular contact with people in Emu138 and his son served as a messenger for the queen.139 The frequent references to the god Ea in his correspondence with Emar perhaps indicate that he was a scribe himself. 140
RSO 7, nos. 17-19. Ibid., nos. 20-25. Ibid., no. 2. Ibid., no. 4. Ibid. no. 5. Ibid., no. 87 (KTU 4.761). Heltzer, The Internal Organization of the Kingdom of Ugarit, Wiesbaden 1982, 133f.; SAU 34, UF 21 (1989), 370f. 132 RS 16.126B+ (PRU 3, 199). 133 RS 1l.715+ (KTU 4.69). 34 RS 19.86A (KTU 4.633). 135 RSO 7, no. 90 (KTU 1.161). 136 Bordreuil & Malbran-Labat, CRAIBL 1995, 444. 137 Ibid., nos. 44 and 45. Arnaud, RSO 7, 65f. 39 Bordreuil & Malbran-Labat, CRAIBL 1995,444. 140 For example, RSO 7, no. 315; no. 35:4(!), and cf. no. 36:7-8, where both Ea and Nab6 are mentioned. See SAU 221. 125 26 27 128 129 130 131
PRIVATE ARCHIVES AT UGARIT
W.H. VAN SOLDT
243
Summary and conclusions A short survey of the most important characteristics of the private archives should help us to build up a general picture. First, an overview of the owners and their professions. Archive
Profession
Owner
1. Southern Palace ~abni-SapSu(Yabninu)
3. Lettr6 4. Rap'5nu 5. Tablet-House 6. Hurrian Priest 7. LamaStu 8. High Priest 9. Urtenu
?
Rap'inu ?
chief-administrator (Satammu rabz2) overseer of the harbor (akil Ma'badi) (scribe?) scribe ?
priest(?) (scribe?) high priest scribe(?)
? ?
'AttEnu & Brsn Urtenu
As far as can be made out, the owners of the private archives were important persons who sometimes held important positions in the state bureaucracy. Here follows an overview of the sorts of documents found in their archives. Archive 1. Southern Palace 2. RaSap-abu 3. Lettr6 4. Rap'inu 5. Tablet-House
Private docs.
+ + + + (+I49
'Public' docs.141
+ + + + +
School texts (+)143
+ + + +
Cultic texts142 -
(+144) +145 -
141 These are documents which deal with subjects of more than domestic importance, like letters to and from the king and his governor and administrative texts belonging to the state bureaucracy. 142 These are texts which played arole in the temple cult of Ugarit. 143 The only schooltext is an alphabet, RS 19.31 (KTU 5.12). 144 It is not clear whether the religious texts found in the archive (Ugaritica 5, nos. 16 and 17) were meant to be used in the cult or just served as a scribal exercise. I have assumed that they had the same function as the literary texts in other archives: to practice Akkadian words in context. 145 There is at least one text which was probably meant to be used in practice, the so-called Ugaritic pantheon (RS 20.24, Ug. 5, no. 18), for which there are parallels in Ugaritic. Another text which may not have been just a scribal exercise is the short incantation against an eye disease, RS 20.26 (Ug. 5, no. 19). 146 The private letters can be regarded as documents that possibly concern the owner.
W.H. VAN SOLDT
244
6. Hurrian Priest 7. LamaStu 8. High Priest 9. Urtenu
-147
+I48
(+ly
+ + +
+ +
PRIVATE ARCHIVES AT UGARIT
(+149)
+ + +
+ -
+ +
As is clear from this table all archives contained documents belonging to the 'public' sector and almost all of them had at least a few schooltexts. Most of them also had a number of private documents. Only archives attached to some religious institution show a considerable number of cultic texts (the house of the Hurrian priest and the library of the high priest). Three genres of texts are conspicuously absent from the private archives: the treaties,l51 the internationaljuridical texts152and the legal texts concerning land transfer supervised by the king153 As I have tried to show elsewhere,l54 the only texts which were kept on file from the beginning of the historic period at Ugarit are precisely these categories. They were all stored in archives in the royal palace, the land transfer texts in the northern wing of the central archive, the treaties and international juridical texts in the southern archive. Their importance can be inferred from both the fact that they were kept inside the palace and the fact that they survived most other documents. For the other genres of what we could call 'state' or 'public' documents the picture is quite different. The international letters and administrative texts were preserved for not more than ca. 50 years and mainly date to the last phase of the historic period.155 That these texts were apparently of less importance to the state bureaucracy probably helps to explain why so many of them were found in private archives all over the city. A last point I would like to make concerns the nature of the administrative texts discovered in Ugarit. As observed by Heltzer "the only conclusion that can be reached is that there was no independent cultic organization in Ugarit, and that the personnel belonged to the royal dependents, as did the other professionals."l56 Heltzer's conclusions seem to be corroborated by the distribution of the texts: in houses with concentrations of cultic texts there are no administrative texts which can clearly be demonstrated to belong to a separate temple bureaucracy, rather, they are part of the state bureaucracy as we know it from the texts found in the palace. Similar regimes seem to have existed in other peripheral sites as we11.157
Thus, we can conclude that in Ugarit the private houses in which archives have been found all appear to have belonged to persons who either had an important function in the state hierarchy, or who served as priests in the temple, or who worked as scribes and had schools in their houses. As we have seen, some of these functions could be combined in one person. The texts found in their houses show that in some way or another they all had links with the state bureaucracy. Thus, the observation made by van Driel in a publication on Ur I11 files at Nippur: "Where there are institutional connections, documents are requiredl58" appears to be valid for the private archives at Ugarit as well.
147 No text from this archive can be demonstrated to pertain to the owner's private affairs. 148 The administrative texts and perhaps the letter from 'AbdLCAnati, possibly the king of Siyannu. 149 There are two texts with alphabets: RS 24.281 (KTU 5.20) and RS 24.288 (KTU 5.21) and one
possible lexical text (RS 28.58). 50 Possibly some of the juridical texts and letters. 1 However, there is one fragment of a treaty from the house of Urtenu, see above. 152 The few texts found in the southern palace are probably intrusive, the findspot of the text in the house of Ra'sap-abu is not beyond doubt. 53 Texts supervised by the queen and governor are sometimes found outside the palace, compare the two texts from the house of Ra'sap-abu mentioned above, and the text which mentions queen A'sdada (RS 22.02, see SAU 18f.). 154 SAU 140f. 55 Ibid. 56 The Internal Organization of the Kingdom of Ugarit, Wiesbaden 1982, 138f. 57 Heltzer, ibid.
245
Cinquante-deux re'flexions sur le Proche-Orient ancien (Fs De Meyer), Leuven 1994, 192.
OUTSIDERS IN CHARGE OF INSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY IN NEW KINGDOM EGYPT
1. Introduction
1.1 The Egyptian society in the New Kingdom The period dcmarcated for discussion in the following pages, the New Kingdom (ca. 1550-1100 BC), offers the advantage of a relatively rich source of information when compared with the rest of Pharaonic history. The period covered by the New Kingdom (about 450 years) was, of course, long enough to witness major changes in its social and economic history, but the structure of the Egyptian society during this entire period is characterized, and can be distinguished from other periods, by a number of elements. The most important of these elements are: (1) the strong centralization of governmental power and its direct influence on regional and local administration, (2) the great ideological, economic and administrative importance of temples, and finally (3) the importance of a permanent army due to intensive colonization and warfare abroad. (1) In the Late Middle Kingdom, a system of highly centralized government administration curtailed the power of semi-autonomous local rulers. The administrative titles and departments of the new government system can still be detected in New Kingdom copies of a text describing the duties of the "vizier" Q'ty), who was the head of government administration during the entire timespan between the Early Dynastic and the Persian periods. This text, usually referred to as the "Duties of the Vizier" (standard edition: Van den Boorn, Duties) shows the direct control by the highest government officials on regional and local affairs, especially in matters of land property and agriculture. The vizier (of which there were two, one in the north of Egypt and one in the south, during most of the New Kingdom) was called "head of the civil government" by Van den Boorn. "Civil" implies %on-religious" and "non-military", but it should be noted that even in religious and military affairs, the viziers had their (probably limited) responsibilities. Some viziers bore the title "overseer of priests of Upper and Lower Egypt", a title otherwise reserved for the high priest of the god Amun of Thebes. As for the military tasks, the "Duties of the Vizier" stipulates that the vizier was to decide which troops were to follow the king on his journeys, and which were to stay behind in the residence. (2) A major part of the written evidence available for the reconstruction of the New Kingdom society consists of temple inscriptions and administrative records which are closely connected with temple administration, and this circumstance certainly influences any attempt at a description. Even with the necessary reserves, however, there can be no doubt about the great economic and administrative power of the temples built in the more important urban centres. The omnipresence and vast extent of temple domains testified to by numerous texts (notably the Harris and Wilbour papyri of the Twentieth Dynasty)
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B.J.J. HARING
have made the degree of autonomy of temples with regard to government administration a central issue in every discussion of the Egyptian economy during the New Kingdom (e.g. Kemp, Temple and Town; Janssen, OLA 6; Haring, EU XII, 392-396; Warburton, OBO 151, 312 and 313). On the one hand, the temples' own sources of income covered virtually the entire range of economic resources available in the Nile Valley and outside (with the important exception of incense: see Warburton, OBO 151, 305), and the main benefit of their produce seems to have been for the temple staff in the form of privately held temple fields, wages, or food offerings redistributed among priests following religious service. On the other hand, the interrelations between temple administration and the outside world were manifold: temples were founded by the king, were subject to inspections by officials of the royal treasury, and were partly supervised by officials who were not priests or temple functionaries. Temple estates incorporated royal domains whose products were collected by the king's representatives, and provided incidental services and food deliveries to people outside their own organizations. These interrelations leave virtually no room for a supposed "religious government" (cf. O'Connor, Social History, 208 and 21 1) or for the temples as a "branch of government administration" (Kemp, Temple and Town; Janssen, OLA 6). (3) The expulsion of the Asiatic rulers of northern Egypt (the Hyksos) by the kings of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Dynasties was followed by the rapid expansion of the Egyptian empire in the Near East and Nubia. The new territories not only required their own administrative apparatus (which may have been independent from the office of the vizier), but also an extensive army occupying and defending the newly conquered areas, penetrating the adjoining regions, and waiting for new exploits at their home bases. The social and economic importance of a permanent army in Egypt manifests itself in land holdings of soldiers (including foreign mercenaries), veterans and their families, and in the supervision of governmental and temple resources by military officials. 1.2 Archives and the character of Egyptian documentation We might reasonably expect to find evidence for economic activity by private individuals in personal business archives. However, ancient Egyptian archives, whether private or institutional, are hard to reconstruct. Egyptian (hieratic) business documents, which were written with ink on papyrus and on ostraca (pottery sherds or pieces of limestone), have only survived when stored in dry conditions, that is, outside the Nile Valley. The Egyptian desert has supplied us with a wealth of papyri and ostraca from different periods, yet texts of economic purport are scarce since they were mainly kept in houses and administrative centres situated in the fertile areas. Substantial remains of administrative archives recovered from the remains of a few temples and settlements situated in a dry desert environment (some royal funerary temples of the Old Kingdom at Abusir, the Middle Kingdom settlement of El-Lahun, the New Kingdom settlement of workmen at Deir el-Medina, temples and settlements of the Graeco-Roman period in the Fayum Oasis) are lucky exceptions. However, since most of this material has been collected without the recording of its precise archaeological context (i.e. without specification of rooms or strata), the character of these archives ('official' or 'private'?) remains very uncertain.
INSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY IN NEW KINGDOM EGYPT
I
249
The situation is not any different even for the principal source of New Kingdom business documents, the west bank of the Nile opposite Luxor, ancient Thebes. The settlement of necropolis workmen at the site nowadays called Deir el-Medina, which was excavated systematically from the beginning of this century until the 1950s, has yielded several thousands of hieratic ostraca, as well as a substantial amount of papyrus fragments, but the exact location of individual texts is usually unknown. Yet the corpus of documents from this site contains some important indications for the existence of private archives. The excavator Bernard Bruykre noted the finds of hieratic ostraca and papyri in workmen's houses, though unfortunately without being more specific as to which texts were found where. Exceptional cases are (1) a papyrus archive belonging to a family of necropolis employees, which was found in one of the local tomb chapels. This archive includes some well-known literary and religious texts, correspondence of the necropolis carpenter Manakhtef, and probably some legal texts (the Chester Beatty and Deir elMedina papyri); (2) correspondence of necropolis scribes living at the end of the New Kingdom (the so-called Late Ramesside Letters). The texts that can be ascribed to the keepers of such archives are letters (the same is true for the well-known archive of the mortuary priest Hekanakhte, from the early Middle Kingdom). Although these letters may contain references to private economic activity by the keepers (with or without being related to their official tasks), these are not the prime concern of the archives as a whole. Scattered remains of institutional archives, i.e. papyri relating to temple or government administration, hardly provide us with references to the personal economic activity of employees. They usually present us with a rigid picture of administrative hierarchy, although official status or duties may very well be a 'cover-up' for private economic motives (see the example of the Wilbour Papyrus below, 3 2.4, and cf. Warburton, OBO 151,75, note 174). As for the recording of private economic and judicial matters: the possibility should be kept in mind that many transactions and arrangements were made, and conflicts settled, without any text being drawn up. Oral statements in the form of oaths, and the presence of witnesses who could be consulted in later stages of a legal process might have been sufficient in many cases. Indeed, even the texts themselves may hint at oral testimony as the ultimate resort in legal disputes. One famous example is a tomb inscription of Mes, scribe of the temple treasury of the god Ptah in Memphis under Ramesses 11. This text, recording a legal dispute about land owned by Mes's family for over two and a half centuries, effectively demonstrates that written evidence was far from reliable: the documents submitted by the opposing parties gave contradictory information, and it would appear that the official registers of the royal treasury and granary had been tampered with. The oral testimonies then performed played a vital role in the proceedings (Gardiner, UGAA IVl3, 29-32). The modest role of texts in legal matters is further illustrated by the relatively abundant documentation from Deir el-Medina, where litigants seldom had recourse to written evidence (McDowell, EU V, 7). The lack of uniformity in text composition and the fact that many legal texts actually render oral statements (explicitly announced as such) suggest that the function of legal documents was hardly more than that of an aide-mkmoire. Yet the community of workmen at Deir el-Medina was one in which the degree of literacy was above the average. The question needs to be asked how many texts recording private business may we reasonably expect to retrieve with this documentary background in mind. The character of the documentation of private economic activity in New Kingdom Egypt as described here makes it sufficiently clear
250
B.J.J. HARING
that we should be glad for every reference, no matter how small, that we have. The overall picture remains dramatically incomplete.
2. Suwey of shared interests of institutions and private individuals The prominence of governmental and religious institutions in the economy of the Egyptian New Kingdom has been universally acknowledged. This cliche', however, has not prevented Egyptologists from observing and analyzing economic actions by private individuals. Whereas we can only speculate about the extent of private economic activity that was entirely independent from the institutional sphere and its documentation, it is certain that there were many ways in which individuals could gain from institutional production and transactions. The evidence for outsiders cooperating with temples or government departments as private entrepreneurs, however, is slender. It is extremely doubtful, for instance, that professional tradesmen existed who were not in the service of these institutions or of individual officials. Therefore, it seems much more useful to present a survey of the ways in which private individuals could gain from the economic activity of institutions, than to concentrate exclusively on activities we would be inclined to label "commercial". 2.1 Productive personnel This category of individuals would seem to require little attention in the quest for private entrepreneurs, since the organization of institutional production in New Kingdom Egypt appears to have been characterized by the rigid requirement of daily, monthly or annual quota. Examples are the 200 "sacks" (over 15,000 litres) of grain required annually from temple cultivators, and the 500 units of firewood required monthly from woodcutters in the service of the royal necropolis. But just how rigidly were such quota kept to, and how heavy did they weigh upon the producers? Egyptian literary texts leave no doubt that the institutional cultivator had a hard life, and could expect a harsh collection of quota even though his crop had been reduced by natural causes to almost nothing. The highest number of sacks supervising authorities could obtain from one aroura (2,756 m2) of (basin?) land was 10 sacks, or 768.8 litres, according to late New Kingdom sources (P. Valenqay, P. Wilbour). In order to procure his quota, the cultivator would therefore have had to work at least 5 112 hectare, but if his fields were situated on "high land" (by far the most common category), the yield would have been only 5 sacks per aroura, and the cultivator would have to work no less than 11 hectare. What we do not know is if the cultivator was assisted by other institutional workforce, or if he had to produce his quota alone or with the help of his family. Nor do we know if he was paid wages, or if his production included the grain necessary for the upkeep of his family. But even with all of these uncertainties, agricultural temple workforce would seem to be the last category of people among whom we might hope to find "private entrepreneurs". The situation of craftsmen employed by temples or government may have fared much better. Indeed, we know that the artisans of the royal necropolis who lived in the village of Deir el-Medina, when not working at the royal tombs and their equipment, produced furniture and burial items which they sold to people from the same village or from
INSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY IN NEW KINGDOM EGYPT
25 1
outside. Their situation, however, was a privileged one in more than one way: the royal treasury provided them with food and other daily requirements, and the work at the royal tombs does not seem to have been continuously intensive. We can only guess whether temple craftsmen also produced extras which they themselves could sell in the local market (that part of their production was sold by the temples is certain; see below, 5 2.2), but it is assumed that they were in a position to do so (Eyre, OAS 68, 199 and 200).
2.2 Trade and transport The sale of temple products is known through a number of New Kingdom documents. Papyrus Boulaq 11, for instance, records the sale of beef, wine and other commodities, possibly temple offerings, to or through the agency of "traders" (iw1y.w) (Castle, JESHO 35, 257 and 258). It is clear that these people were professional traders, but there is, as yet, no evidence for traders as private entrepreneurs. Instead, they are often said to belong to temples or to high officials. This topic has been dealt with extensively in a number of studies (Janssen, Ship's Logs, 100-104; Castle, JESHO 35,250-253; Romer, SAK 19,268-284). As employees of temples or private households, their task seems to have been to trade surplus products against precious and durable materials, especially metals (gold, silver and copper). The way they did this is perhaps exemplified by a "ship's log" recording the trading of garments for oil by a ship's crew (P. Turin 2008 + 2016: Janssen, Ship's Logs, 72 and 73, 101; Castle, JESHO 35, 251), and is further illustrated by a Theban tomb scene showing ships mooring at the river-bank, where the sailors engage in small-scale barter (TT 217: James, Pharaoh's People, 250-253). Other documents mention traders, who were in the service of army commanders, as recipients of objects stolen from tombs by inhabitants of the Theban necropolis (Castle, JESHO 35, 251). If entrepreneurship is the correct interpretation of such examples of professional trade, it is the temples and army commanders who were the entrepreneurs, and not the traders themselves. Records of the royal necropolis administration frequently mention food deliveries from the nearby temples to the workmen of Deir el-Medina (Haring, EU XII, 256-263). It is nowhere stated that these deliveries were paid for. Nor is there any mention of payments for the hire of temple cattle by necropolis workmen (ibid., 254-256). Evidence for paid service by temple workmen for outsiders comes from a later period. The stela of prince Shoshenk (Twenty-first Dynasty) records the service of temple workmen in a private funerary cult, in exchange for which amounts of silver were paid to the treasury of the temple of Osiris at Abydos (stela Cairo JE 66285: Blackman, JEA 27, 85 and 86). A passage in the Great Harris Papyrus, a document recording temple donations and the production of temple estates during the reign of Ramesses 111, mentions "silver, being items and/of(?) people's produce, given to the divine offering (= the Theban temple estates)" (P. Harris I 12b, 2; var. in 32b, 5; 51b, 10; 69,4). It seems possible, in the light of what has been said above, that the sale of products and services of temple personnel is referred to here, although different explanations have been offered by myself and by other authors (Grandet, BdE CIXl2, 61 and 62: the value of services and objects; Haring, EU XII, 182: the value of unspecified products; Warburton, OBO 151, 259: the work of silver smiths).
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Although institutions had their own ships, the transport of products from their estates sometimes seems to have required the use of privately owned ships. According to the decree of king Haremhab, a ship made by a "commoner" or "free man" (nmh.y) might be at the disposal of Pharaoh, but the king prohibited the abuse of such a ship by his functionaries (Kruchten, De'dt, 28-56; Castle, JESHO 35, 248; on nmh.y "free man" or a person of lower status and more or less independent from institutional administration, see Romer, AAT 21,412-451). Administrative papyri from the late New Kingdom mention the use of fishermen's boats for the transport of grain from royal or temple domains (P. Geneva D 191 and P. Turin 1895 + 2006: Castle, JESHO 35, 248 and 249). The sailors were paid for their trouble with a part of the grain cargo; from these and other documents it is clear that such payments usually amounted to about one tenth of the grain transported (Janssen, BSEG 18). 2.3 Outsiders as holders of institutional resources Two clear examples of individuals as the holders and main beneficiaries of institutional resources (land, cattle and personnel) are the so-called apportioning temple fields and private temple donations. The Wilbour Papyrus, recording a land survey carried out in the fifth regnal year of king Ramesses V (1 141 BC), records a number of royal and temple fields in Middle Egypt, which are classified in the document according to the type of domain they belonged to: (1) non-apportioning domains, which were directly exploited by the institutions, i.e. worked by institutional cultivators (see above, 5 2.1); (2) apportioning (or shared) domains, which consisted of plots held by private individuals (who might belong to any social or professional class of the society) who paid a small share of the crop to the owning institution, usually a temple. I have commented on the latter type of domain elsewhere (Haring, CNWSP 67, 82-86). Such apportioning fields probably remained within the same family for generations, or perhaps they could be sold, while the modest "temple tax" paid by the holders probably left ample possibilities to lease their fields out to be cultivated by others. People choosing the latter option might be called "absentee landlords" (Eyre, URAA 11, 133), but the answer to the question if they were "private entrepreneurs" as well partly depends on how they acquired such fields (inheritance or purchase?). For the temples, meanwhile, the status or activities of the holders of their apportioning fields was of little importance, as long as they received their taxes. A more elaborate agreement between temple and private individual was the donation of land or other assets (cattle, personnel) to a temple in order to sustain a private statue cult. The records of such agreements often stipulate that the donor remains in charge of the items given during his lifetime (his authority being expressed by the preposition r ht "under the authority of'; see below), and that his heirs might take over this role after he has died. Other texts mention (funerary) priests as the administrators of such donations. In either case, some individual(s) (the donor, his heirs or priests) would benefit by receiving offerings paid from the donation and redistributed after the offering cult for the statue. It is tempting to see this practice as an attempt to safeguard one's personal property by having it incorporated in a temple's administrative framework, while reserving the access to the resources donated or their produce for a specified individual. The priests officiating in such private statue cults, when also in charge of the assets donated, might
INSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY IN NEW KINGDOM EGYPT
I1
have had considerable possibilities for personal enrichment. Indeed, donation texts sometimes express the fear that priests would take more than their rightful share (e.g. Haring, EU XII, 10 and 11).
2.4 High level supervision of institutional resources The estate of a large New Kingdom temple required an extensive administrative apparatus, the structure of which was probably the same for every temple. At the head of the temple administration stood a high priest (who was usually called the "first god's servant", although the high priests of the most important temples often had their own specific titles). The high priest shared his authority over land and personnel with a temple steward ("overseer of the house"), and to the same administrative stratum belonged overseers of cattle and the overseer of the temple treasury. The Egyptian word for "overseer" (im.y-r) was an archaic one, and temple functionaries bearing titles composed with this word were probably seldom to be seen around the temples themselves, where they were represented by their agents, deputies and scribes (Haring, EU XII, 225-230). They were high state officials, as becomes apparent from their honorific title "king's scribe" (s; nswt). Among them we find royal secretaries, functionaries of the royal treasury, tax assessors and even viziers. Their authority may have been a nominal one only, and their position as temple supervisors just an additional source of income, although their titles ("overseer of the house/treasury/cattle of temple so-and-so") suggests that they belonged to the temple staff. Quite similar to these high and indirect authorities seems to be the role of various outside officials and priests supervising the agricultural domains and cattle of temples and of royal institutions such as mooring-places, "harems" and khato (the latter word refers to a type of royal domains incorporated in temple domains and presumably administered by the temples). The lists of the Great Harris Papyrus mentions temple personnel "under the authority" (r ht) of army generals, stewards and a vizier. The Wilbour Papyrus presents us with an even greater range of functionaries, from residence and army officials to local mayors and priests, as having authority over non-apportioning (i.e. directly exploited) institutional domains. Yet these people do not always bear titles associating them with the institutions in question. That they belonged to the same level of administration as the nominal temple supervisors mentioned in the previous paragraph becomes apparent from the use of the word sr.w "officials" for both groups of functionaries. What we have here is in fact a universal system of Ramesside institutional management. It was not restricted to the agricultural regime, but we also find it, for example, in the organization of personnel working within the temple enclosure walls, and with mining expeditions. Just like the overseers mentioned in the previous paragraph, these officials were represented on the spot by agents, deputies, scribes and cultivators. The authority of these lower administrators is indicated by the preposition m &. t "inlthrough the hand of '. The reason for including this administrative phenomenon in the present discussion is that placing agricultural domains under the authority of (external) officials may have been an additional or even a major source of regular income for the officials. This possibility has already been mentioned in passing by Egyptologists (see, for instance, Menu, Re'gime juridique, 55; Rimer, AAT 21, 339 even regards the responsibility expressed by r bt and m &.t as virtual ownership), but to my knowledge it has never been studied in detail,
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although its importance is generally acknowledged for Graeco-Roman Egypt. An alternative explanation is that the control of temple domains by external officials protected the interests of the Crown (Castle, JESHO 35, 242 and 243). The two explanations are certainly not mutually exclusive. I have suggested elsewhere that this system of supervision might be explained by Eric Wolf's concept of "prebendal domain" (Haring, EU XII, 286; see Wolf, Peasants, 51-53). This means that officials were rewarded for their services with the right to levy tribute or taxes. This phenomenon shows some similarities to the practice of tax-farming (although there remains the essential difference that prebendal domain was of an administrative character, while tax-farming was explicitly commercial). Indeed, it is generally recognized that high Egyptian functionaries used their authority to require extra production (Eyre, URAA 11, 127-133; Warburton, OBO 151, 100-103; cf. also the requisitioning of ships mentioned above, 2.2). Royal decrees explicitly protected temple property against interference from outside (especially the conscription of workforce), which we know to have been all too frequent. A fortress commander in the Delta, at the end of the Nineteenth Dynasty, boasted of making his people produce double to ten times the amounts required (Bilgai stela), and the pragmatic and unjust conscription of workforce is the subject of many letters copied as scribal exercises. No text explicitly states that an official had the right to make requirements from the workforce under his authority for his own benefit. Still, the possibility that he had such a right cannot be dismissed out of hand. Some evidence suggesting that the officials in the Wilbour Papyrus actually drew part of their income from agricultural domains under their authority may be provided by the document itself (keeping in mind, of course, that the section of the Nile Valley covered by the text is at best representative for the conditions in Middle Egypt). The areas under the authority of external officials are usually quite modest, so that the administrative responsibility for the fields in question may have been to the advantage of the supervising officials, rather than to that of the owning institutions. Clear examples are the small domains of little more than one hectare belonging to major urban temples and placed under the authority of the chief archivist of the royal treasury, royal granary administrators, a stable-master of the residence and an (army?) deputy (Gardiner, Wilbour Pap. vol. I11,26, 5 56; 48, •˜ 121; 51, 5 s 124 and 125; 80, 212; 81, $0 215 and 217; 87, •˜ 229).' Royal domains (khato) of about 5 hectare were placed under the authority of standard-bearers of the residence, local mayors, an overseer of priests, and a cattle overseer of a royal memorial temple (ibid., 45, $3 113-115; 77, 202; 78, 204). It is important to realize, however, that the authority over institutional domains as expressed by ( r ) bt was not primarily in the hands of outsiders. The authority over most royal domains was held by the "chief taxing master", who also appears in other documents as an official particularly responsible for khato (Gardiner, Wilbour Pap. vol. ID, 76 and 77, $5 200 and 201). The most substantial domains of the urban temples were supervised by their own priests or high priests (ibid., 22, •˜ 51; 26, 58; 48, 122; 52, 127; 61, •˜ 146; 80 and 81, 8 214; 83, 3 220), but also by temple stewards and overseers of cattle, who were more or less "outsiders" as has been explained above (ibid., 22, 52; 46, •˜ 117; 47, •˜ 120; 56, $5 135 and 136; 61, 5 149; 63, $ 152; 79, $5 208-210; 87, $ 230; 94, •˜ 240). Agricultural domains of provincial temples were supervised by their own priests (ibid., 40 and 41, @ 9 1 and 92; 66, $9 163(?) and 164; 98, •˜ 253; 99 and 100, $9 The areas are given in the document in amura (2756 m2, or roughly 114 hectare).
INSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY IN NEW KINGDOM EGYPT
256 and 259; 103, $4 264 and 265; 104, $5 268 and 270). Some of these priests, however, also had authority over local khato-domains (ibid., 45 and 46, 116; 78, $5 205-207). Many of the officials listed had other sources of income as well. The Wilbour Papyrus often mentions the same people as holders of private plots, for which they had to pay a small amount of the crop to a temple. In addition, a different text on the same papyrus (text B) mentions many of them as supervisors of other khato-domains (which is also expressed by ( r ) bt; see Gardiner, Wilbour Pap. vol. 111, 109-133). It remains difficult to say how exactly ancient Egyptian officials and priests were rewarded for their services, but the above speculations suggest that many different ways to secure income were open to them. 3. Conclusion The discussion on the previous pages leads to the conclusion that no private entrepreneurship in a modern western sense can be detected in documents from the Egyptian New Kingdom. There were, however, many ways in which individual functionaries could benefit from institutional production, transactions and transport. A special case is the supervision of institutional domains by officials belonging to the institutions or by outsiders. Such an opportunity to make personal profit, however, should be called "administrative" or even "feudal'', rather than "commercial". Literature Blackman, A.M. "The Stela of Soshenk, Great Chief of the Meshwesh", JEA 27 (1941). JEA 27 83-95, pls. X-XIIA. Boom, G.P.F. van den The Duties of the Vizier. Civil Administration in the Early New Kingdom Duties (Studies in Egyptology). London-New York 1988. Castle, E.W. "Shipping and Trade in Ramesside Egypt", JESHO 35 (1992), 239-277 JESHO 35 Eyre, Ch. "Work and the Organization of Work in the New Kingdom", in M.A. OAS 68 Pnw.11 - .. --- (ed.). , ,, Labor in the Ancient Near East (= American Oriental Series 68), New Haven 1987, 167-221. "Feudal Tenure and Absentee Landlords", in S. Allarn (ed.), Grund und URAA I1 Boden in Altiigypten (Rechtliche und ~ozio-bkonomischeVerhaltnisse). Akten des internationalen Symposions Tubingen 18.-20. Juni 1990 (= Untersuchungen zum Rechtsleben im Alten Agypten 11), Tubingen 1994, A
Gardiner, A.H. UGAA IVl3
The Inscription of Mer A Contribution to the Study of Egyptian Judicial Procedure (= Untersuchungen zur Geschichte und Altertumskunde Aegyptens IV, 3), Leipzig 1905.
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Wilbour Pap. The Wilbour Papyrus, vols. I1 (Commentary) and I11 (Translation), London 1948. Grandet, P. Le Papyrus Harris I (BM 9999) (= Bibliothbque d7EtudeCIX), 2 vols., BdE CIX Cairo 1994. Haring, B.J.J. Divine Households. Administrative and Economic Aspects of the new EU XI1 Kingdom Royal Memorial Temples in Western Thebes (= Egyptologische Uitgaven XII), Leiden 1997. "Access to Land by Institutions and Individuals in Ramesside Egypt CNWSP 67 (Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties; 1294-1070 BC)", in B. Haring and R. de Maaijer (eds.), Landless and Hungry? Access to Land in Early and Traditional Societies. Proceedings of a Seminar held in Leiden, 20 and 21 June, 1996 (= CNWS Publications 67). Leiden 1998, 74-89. James, T.G.H. Pharaoh's People Pharaoh's People. Scenes from Life in Imperial Egypt, London 1984. Janssen, Jac. J. "The Cost of Nile-Transport", Bulletin de la Socikte' d ' ~ ~ ~ ~ t o l o ~ i e , BSEG 18 Genbve 18 (1994), 41-47. Two Ancient Egyptian Ship's Logs. Papyrus leiden I350 verso and Ship's Logs Papyrus Turin 2008+2016, Ph.D. Dissertation Leiden 1961. "The Role of the Temple in the Egyptian Economy During the New OLA 6 Kingdom", in E. Lipinski (ed.), State and Temple Economy in the Ancient Near East, Bd. I1 (= OLA 6), Leuven 1979, 505-515. Kemp, B.J. Temple and Town "Temple and Town in Ancient Egypt", in P.J. Ucko, R. Tringham, G.W. Dimbleby (eds.), Man, Settlement and Urbanism, London 1972, 657-680. Kruchten, J. Le De'crbt dJHoremheb. Traduction, commentaire e'pigraphique, De'crbt philologique et institutionnel (UniversitC Libre de Bruxelles. FacultC de Philosophie et Lettres LXXXII), Brussels 1981. McDowell, A.G. Jurisdiction in the Workmen's Community of Deir el-Medina (= EU V Egyptologische Uitgaven V), Leiden 1990. Menu, B. Rkgime juridique La rkgime juridique des terres et du personnel attache' & la terre duns le Papyrus Wilbour (= Publications de la FacultC des Lettres et Sciences Humaines de 1'UniversitC de Lille, Institut de Papyrologie et d ' ~ ~ ~ ~ t oI).l oLille ~ i 1970. e O'Connor, D. Social History "New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period, 1552-664 BC", in B.G. Trigger, B.J. Kemp, D. O'Connor and A.B. Lloyd, Ancient Egypt. A Social History. Cambridge 1983. Romer, M. Gottes- und Priesterherrschaft in iigypten am Ende des Neuen Reiches. AAT 21 Ein religionsgeschichtliches Phanomen und seine sozialen Grundlagen (= Agypten und Altes Testament. Studien zur Geschichte, Kultur und Religion Agyptens und des Alten Testaments 21), Wiesbaden 1994.
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"Der Handel und die Kaufleute im alten Agypten", Studien zur altagyptischen Kultur 19 (1992), 257-284.
Warburton, D.A. State and Economy in Ancient Egypt. Fiscal Vocabulary of the New OBO 151 Kingdom (= Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis 151), Fribourg 1997. Wolf, E.R. Peasants (Foundations of Modem Anthropology Series), Englewood Peasants Cliffs, New Jersey 1966.
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HUNGER AND POWER: THEORIES, MODELS AND METHODS IN ROMAN ECONOMIC HISTORY1
The days have not long gone when the Roman Empire was much admired, and was even compared positively to the modern world. Indeed, the Roman Empire was a large and powerful state, the only world-empire in European history, and probably the largest state ever at its time. Ranging from Hadrian's bleak and foggy Roman wall in northern England to the scorching heat of the Arabian desert, it encompassed almost the entire civilized world, with one telling exception, that of the Chinese Empire. At its peak in the first century A.D., the Roman Empire had a population of some sixty million people, or perhaps even a bit more. No modern state ever became as large as that until Russia and the USA in the 1870's. Rome was not only exceptionally large, however, it was also powerful and long lasting. Roman armies rarely lost a battle. As a large political unit, Rome lasted some seven hundred years in the West, and another thousand in the East. For our ancestors, who never questioned the virtue of empire, Rome was a state to admire. Rome was not only admired because it had been large and powerful, or as a source of legal and military doctrine. It was also admired as a cultural role model. Indeed it had harboured an unbroken literary tradition of a millennium in the West and two in the East. That tradition became the solid foundation for European literary culture. Similarly, Roman architecture, for example, was both aesthetically and technically highly sophisticated, and there was and remained a lot of it. To Renaissance men the remains were a constant reminder of the splendour of ancient Rome. The Roman Empire had been adorned by thousands of cities, with often splendid public and private buildings. The modern traveller to Turkey, Spain or North Africa may still be amazed by the number of Roman urban sites, and by their magnitude. Indeed, the Roman Empire was a world full of cities, both large and small. Of large cities, the city of Rome stands out in all of European history: with its one million inhabitants in the early Empire, it was only surpassed by London around 1800, when England was well into the earlier stages of the Industrial R e v ~ l u t i o n .Carthage, ~ Alexandria and Antioch, moreover, had a joint population of another million. In A.D. 1500 there were four European cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants, and together they had 450,000 inhabitants. In the Roman Empire, however, at least almost two million people had lived in very large cities with hundreds of thousands of inhabitants. That was about 3 percent of the population of the Empire. Even in 1800 only 3.3 percent of the 1
Some of this research was made possible by a grant from NWO, the Netherlands Organization for Research. For the population of the city of Rome: Keith Hopkins, Conquerors and slaves, Cambridge 1978, 96-8. For London: E.A. Wrigley, 'A simple model of London's importance in changing English society and economy 1650-1750' in: Ph. Abrams and E.A.Wrigley (eds.), Towns in societies. Essays in economic history and historical sociology, Cambridge 1978, 295-309.
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population of Europe were living in cities with more than 100,000 people. The Roman world, therefore, was a world of exceptionally large cities. It was also a world of many cities. Administratively, there were 43 1 cities in Roman Italy, and a few thousand in all of the Roman Empire. Jan de Vries has counted that in the period 1500-1800 the number of European cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants grew from 154 to 364.3 Interestingly, urban growth seems most marked in periods of economic crisis rather than growth.4 De Vries estimates that over the same period smaller cities (5000-9999) in all of Europe increased from 363 to 544.5 Comparing these tentative data to the even more tentative data from classical antiquity is obviously hazardous, but tempting: Roman urbanization seems to have been significantly larger and more pervasive than that of medieval or maybe even early-modern Europe. Earlier in the twentieth century Roman achievement greatly impressed Michael Rostovtzeff, the leading economic land social historian of the ancient world at the time: 'We may say that as regards comfort, beauty, and hygiene, the cities of the Roman Empire, worthy successors of their Hellenistic parents, were not inferior to many a modern European and American town.'6 Such a high standard of living presupposes, of course, that production was highly developed and modern. That, indeed, was what Rostovtzeff believed: it was possible by 'the formation of a city bourgeoisie, of a class of landowners, traders and industrialists, who resided in the city and who developed an energetic business activity on capitalistic line^.'^ This modernist view, as it is now called, was the dominant paradigm in the first half of the twentieth century, legitimized by the towering authority of Rostovtzeff. There always was a darker side to Roman life, however. The Roman passion for cruelty in war and peace makes it hard to think of them as our cultural ancestors.8 The even higher frequency of death by natural causes really makes the Roman past a strange land. The standard of living of the mass of the population was and remained low. From the 1950's onwards the man who was already in 1954, in the words of Arnaldo Momigliano, 'the best living social historian of Greece' started to chip away at Rostovtzeff's optimistic reconstruction of Greek and Roman life: Moses Finley argued that the ancient world did not have economic growth. Ancient cities were critically different from those in medieval and early-modern Europe. To develop this argument he returned to earlier theorists of historical change and development such as Werner Sombart and, in particular, Max Weber. Finley could use their concept of the 'consumer city' to argue that in antiquity urbanism did not lead to economic growth and development. The consumer city did not really pay for its food: the urban elite owned much of the countryside, and received rents in kind or in money (to buy food). Urban manufacture was not for external markets, but largely for the consumer needs of the urban elite. Such urbanism did not generate growth and development. Consumer cities were parasites on Jan de Vries, European urbanization 1500-1800,London 1984,33. De Vries, European urbanization, 40. De Vries, European urbanization, 67. M . Rostovtzeff, The social and economic history of the Roman Empire, 2 vols, Oxford 1957 (2nd ed. rev. by P.M. Fraser), 143. Rostovtzeff, Roman Empire, 93. Keith Hopkins, Death and renewal, Cambridge 1983, ch. 1 and 4. K.M. Coleman, 'Fatal charades: Roman executions staged as mythological enactments' in: Journal of Roman Studies L X X X (1990), 4473.
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the country. The producer city, on the other hand, paid for its food from the export of manufactures to the countryside, and to faraway markets. The relationship between town and country was that of a division of labour, beneficial to both. The economic modernization of Europe, in this view, was due to the historic emergence of producer cities. Finley argued that whereas, indeed, medieval and early-modern cities were mostly producer cities, ancient cities were not. In antiquity, and unlike the medieval and earlymodem world, town and country were politically integrated: the city did not end at the city gate, but included the surrounding countryside. Therefore, 'ancient cities on the whole, counted farmers, whether working or gentlemen farmers, as the core of their citizenry.' The urban elite was a land-owning elite. Unlike the medieval bourgeoisie, in antiquity 'the strong drive to acquire wealth was not translated into a drive to create capital; stated differently, the prevailing mentality was acquisitive, but not productive.'9 Entrepreneurial zeal and economic rationality are not, therefore, universal qualities. The ancient city lacked the culture of econornic rationality and innovation. Trade and industry were held in low esteem and remained quite small. Geographic division of labour was limited, and manufacture was largely for local consumption. The economy never became a system of integrated markets. As a result, the economy did not grow. Methodologically, Finley argued that the absence of an integrated system of markets, and the absence of an economic mentality preclude the use of modern economic theory. The economy was embedded, and what we need is sociology and politics rather than economics, to put it bluntly. -
Intellectual debts
Finley's primitivist - as it is now usually called - view of the ancient economy has obvious intellectual roots in the history of other social sciences, and shows similarities with debates in near eastern history. The debate on the ancient economy particularly resembles the so-called formalist - substantivist debate in economic anthropology. From the 1950's Karl Polanyi and his pupils argued that pre-modern economies are fundamentally different because they are not market economies. They are integrated by other means, such as reciprocity and redistribution. Without markets, they argued that there is no economy in the formal sense, but only in the substantive sense that material needs must be satisfied. The economy, therefore, is embedded, and modern economic theory does not apply. One of the young scholars in the informal research group around Karl Polanyi at Columbia University was a young Moses Finley. He disagreed quite sharply with what Polanyi wrote about the ancient world, but the intellectual debts are obvious. Antiquity played some role in Polanyi's view of Trade and markets in the early empires, but the ancient Near East played a bigger role. Part of the research agenda of our fields was set some fifty years ago, in New York. Just as economic anthropology saw its debate between substantivists and formalists, the publication in 1973 of Finley's The ancient economy marked the beginning of such a
M.I. Finley, The ancient economy, BerkeleyILos AngelesLondon 1999 (3ndrev. ed.), 144.
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debate in ancient history, between what were called primitivists and modernists.10 On the primitivist side were Finley and others who believed that in antiquity trade and markets played a quite minor role, and on the modernist side those who believed that antiquity had quite a bit of trade. The first thing that we need to note, of course, is that unlike in economic anthropology, the debate in ancient history has had little interest in theory or method. Finley had warned that the issue was not simply one of facts, and yet that is what the discussion has almost solely been about. Economic anthropologists conceived their debate as a theoretical one between formalism and substantivism. Ancient historians thought of their debate as one on how primitive or modern the ancient economy really was. Perhaps because of this, the debate among ancient historians has gone stale. Modernists have countered Finley with examples of what, in their view, are indisputable examples of trade and (sometimes indirect) elite involvement in it, primitivists have challenged these examples, and pointed to what they think are undeniable signs of underdevelopment and a lack of market structures. Neither side has succeeded to persuade the other: '... no new weapon is lethal; and none of the battles is finally decisive,' is how Keith Hopkins described it already fifteen years ago.11 Younger scholars have moved to more exciting battlefields, and many of the big guns are falling silent. In my view only a complete overhaul of current controversy and polemic can rejuvenate the study of the ancient economy. To do that, we need to change our terms at all levels of the debate, from the highly abstract to the practical and concrete. At the highest level of abstraction we need new theory. I want to argue that we need to take the potential of modem economic theory far more seriously. At an intermediate level, I think we need new models. In particular, I think we need to update our implicit model of the comparative history of European economic growth and development. Finally, I think we need to expand the recent development and use of parametric methods for validation. We can only get out of the current impasse if we step back and question the intellectual architecture of what we are doing, and attempt paradigmatic change. In this paper I want to show how that could be done at each of these levels of theory, models and methods. I want to discuss the general possibilities at each level, and finally conclude with a concrete example of what this may mean in the particular case of the urban food supply.
Economic theory Primitivist ancient historians have echoed Polanyi's contention that modern economic theory is not universally valid, but contingent on the presence of a system of price-making markets. When there are no such markets, economic behaviour, they argue, is governed by the value systems of social groups rather than the logic of economic rationalism leaving modern economic theory powerless. Strangely enough, primitivist ancient historians have not been alone in their aversion to modern economic theory: their O Three important surveys of the debate are Jean Andreau, 'Vingt ans aprks L'Pconomie antique de Moses I . Finley' in: Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales L/5 (1995), 947-960; Ian Morris, 'The Athenian economy twenty years after the ancient economy' in: Classical Philology LXXXIX (1994), 351-366; and Ian Morris, 'Foreword' in: the updated edition of M.I. Finley, The ancient econonmy, BerkeleyiLos AngelesiLondon 1999. Keith Hopkins, 'Introduction' in: Peter Garnsey, Keith Hopkins and C.R. Whitttaker (eds.), Trade in the ancient economy, London 1983, ix-xxv, ix.
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modernist colleagues have not embraced it either. They have countered Finley with examples of what are - to them at least - clear signs of trade and markets, but they have not questioned his rejection of modern economic theory. I can only explain such a curiously inconsistent position by the dominant naively positivist tradition of the discipline.12 As a result, almost none of the debate on the ancient economy is informed by any economic theory. Instead, it has mostly been empirical: how much trade was there, how important were concrete markets?l3 After a while, and without conclusive victory for either side, that becomes boring; indeed, many younger ancient historians have moved on to greener pastures. In my view, ancient historians have ignored modern economic theory at their peril.14 They have been wrong to accept Polanyi's caricature of what modern economic theory does and presupposes. My argument consists of three parts. First I want to argue that Polanyi was wrong to insist that the satisfaction of material wants is a necessary part of a substantive definition of economic theory. Economic theory does not have favoured ends. The 'homo oeconornicus' who wants ever more material goods is not a part of economic theory. Second, as to means, I want to argue that the ever calculating 'homo oeconomicus' is equally unnecessary for economic theory to apply. Third, I want to argue that modern economic theory does not presuppose any particular institution, such as money or concrete markets. For an economist, none of my arguments are new or controversial, but they are worth repeating.15 There can be no doubt that the provision of some material wants is the subject of economic science. The provision of other material wants, however (the traditional examples are water and air), is outside the reach of economics if the supply of these goods is unlimited.16 Conversely, the provision of many immaterial goods is within the realm of economics. Surely, the economic - or other - value of a Picasso is not in the mere canvas and paint. The core notion in economics is that of scarcity (there are not enough Picasso's for all of us); economics has a lot to say about the allocation of scarce resources to achieve immaterial ends. Those resources do not need to be material or monetary either. Life is short, and man's most precious good. Spending time on one thing usually excludes doing something else at the same time. That matters for our understanding of the subsistence peasant. His choices in the allocation of his limited time between, for example, improving drainage or irrigation facilities, extra ploughing, weeding, building -
12 The alternative would be to believe in a collective laziness on the part of ancient historians favouring a point of view that does not require them to learn something which is indeed not always easy to learn for a humanist. 13 L. de Ligt, Fairs and markets in the Roman Empire, Amsterdam 1993 and Joan M. Frayn, Markets and fairs in Roman Italy, Oxford 1993 are two recent monographs. Elio Lo Cascio (ed.), Mercati permanenti e mercati periodici nel mondo romano. Atti degli Incontri caprese di storia dell' economia antica (Capri 13-15 ottobre 1997),Bari 1999 for a recent edited volume. l 4 I have argued this at much greater length in my The economy and society of Pompeii, Amsterdam 1988. Precise and complete argument and bibliography may be found there. 15 The classic argument is Lionel Robbins' justly famous An essay on the nature and significance of ~ ed.). The argument is elaborated at great length and with economic science, London 1935 ( 2 0 rev. admirable precision in a book that remains unsurpassed and should have been translated fifty years ago: P. Hennipman, Economisch motief en economischprincipe, Amsterdam 1945. If it is not, as is the case with clean water and clean air, their provision is a matter for economics. The example also shows that the popular opposition between 'the economy' and 'the environment' is conceptually false and misleading.
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storage space, or leisure, can be analysed usefully by modern economic theory. Restricting the economic to the material is neither helpful, nor an accurate representation of the power of economic theory. Therefore, it is nonsense to say that some ends are economically rational, and others not. For some, the definition of economic rationality has been in the deployment of means. Here 'homo oeconomicus' is that strange man who constantly compares all his alternatives to make the best economic choice. In the footsteps of Weber and Sombart, Polanyi argued that such introspective calculation is not universal, but the product of a particular historical development, the emergence of a commercial bourgeoisie. The emergence of such economic rationality is witnessed in the rise of modern bookkeeping. Therefore, ancient historians have argued with some passion about the limitations of ancient boo&eeping.17 Indeed, people in the past were different, but are we ourselves really going about our own lives as constantly calculating and utility comparing consumers? 'There is no more reason to assume that modern man walks around with indifference curves in his head than that ancient Romans did so.'18 It has been argued that indeed ancient historians have been too demanding on ancient bookkeeping: the famed double-entry bookkeeping is neither necessary nor sufficient for calculations of business income and capital.19 The second part of the primitivist argument is that modern economic theory assumes such introspective calculation. For a long time it did to some extent. Of course, it was an uneasy assumption, about modern man as much as about people long dead. The argument always was that it was justified as long as it could predict actual behaviour quite well. It certainly worked better than the opposite assumption, that people tried to minimize their utility, and did so without making up their mind at any time. In any case, the more recent development of so called 'revealed preference analysis' does away with any introspective a~sumption.~O Rationality is reduced to the assumption of transitivity: an economic subject must not prefer A to B in one situation and B to A in another.21In short, Polanyi and others were wrong to believe that economic theory makes assumptions about rational action which are only met in some societies, and not in others. Finally, primitivists argue that modern economic theory is powerless in the absence of some institutions, and the market in particular. It is true that concrete markets play a different role in some societies than in others.22Equally, geographical division of labour may vary significantly between economic systems. That is not at stake here. The issue is whether economic theory is less powerful if concrete markets and division of labour are less evolved, and my argument is that modem economic theory presupposes no particular institutions such as the market. This is so because in economic theory the market is no
THEORIES, MODELS AND METHODS IN ROMAN ECONOMIC HISTORY
more than the abstract point of interaction between supply and demand.23 In my earlier example of the subsistence peasant who needs to allocate his scarce time, there is a market for labour. It is a peculiar market, because the same peasant represents both supply and demand, but it is a market nonetheless. There is exchange, but not with others. Similarly, there is a produce market, where the peasant is both consumer and producer. Modern price theory is well equipped to analyse this peasant's behaviour. In my view, therefore, early economies can be analysed and understood usefully with modern economic theory. Not because these early economies are quite similar to the modern world (I don't believe they are), but because modern economic theory does not presuppose that they are. The substantivist rejection of modern economic theory is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of modem economic science. Economics is indeed an excellent tool to demonstrate that the past really was a strange land. Comparative models It has been the virtue of scholars like Sombart, Weber or Polanyi that they have given a framework to the comparative analysis of economic systems, and economic development. They appreciated that societies differed from one period to the next, or from one country to another. Sombart and Weber had their inspiration in German theories of the stages of economic history (such as Hauswirtschaft, Stadtwirtschaft and Volkswirtschaft). Polanyi's systems of economic integration (reciprocity, redistribution and the market) were not supposed to represent successive stages of historical development, but still seem quite suited to historical comparison. What unites Finley, Sombart, Weber or Polanyi is that they share a particular model for social development and modernization. Underneath their differences they are united in the belief that Europe owes its modernization to the rise of commercial towns, the growth of an economically rational bourgeoisie, and the dominance of the market as an institution. In the footsteps of Adam Smith, they believed that '... the commerce and manufactures of cities, instead of being the effect, have been the cause and occasion of the improvement and cultivation of the ~ountry.'2~ Finley then went out to understand why all this did not happen in antiquity. His model of the ancient economy, therefore, was very much a model of what antiquity was not. The ancient economy was not a system of integrated markets. Trade and markets were of only limited importance because, unlike later, antiquity did not have an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie.
... the
citizen-Clite were not prepared, in sufficient numbers, to carry on those branches of the economy without which neither they nor their communities could live at the level to which they were accustomed. The Clite possessed the resources and the political power, they could also command a large personnel. They lacked the will; that
l7
Finley, The ancient economy, 110-1, 116-7, 118; R.H. Macve, 'Some glosses on "Greek and Roman accounting"' in: P.A. Cartledge and F.D. Harvey (eds.), Crux. Essays presented to G.E.M. de Ste. Croix on his 75th birthday, Exeter 1985; Dominic W. Rathbone, Economic rationalism and rural society in third-century A.D. Egypt, Cambridge 1991 . Jongman, Pompeii, 45. l 9 Macve, Accounting, 257. 20 J.R. Hicks, A revision of demand theory, Oxford 1956. A convenient introduction can be found in A.W. Stonier and D.C. Hague, A textbook of economic theory, London 1972 (4th edition), 52. Although he may change his mind, that is a different matter. 22 De Ligt, Fairs and markets and Frayn, Markets and fairs.
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23
Douglas C. North, 'Non-market forms of economic organization: the challenge of Karl Polanyi' in: Journal of European economic history VI (1977), 703-716 favours a transaction cost analysis of the logic of different institutional arrangements. 24 Adam Smith, An enquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, Oxford 1976 (The 'Glasgow' edition, eds. R.H. Campbell, A.S. Skinner and W.B. Todd), 111, iv, 18 1 p. 422.
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is to say, they were inhibited, as a group (whatever the responses of a minority), by over-riding value~.~5 Finley's explanation was ultimately a cultural explanation. The trade that there was, was done by those who did not join in the traditional values of citizenship. They were people of low status and relatively limited means, such as freed slaves. Thus, the vast capital owned by the elite was not turned into productive use.26 Surprisingly, Finley's critics have never questioned his underlying model of the comparative history of Europe. They have argued that there was more trade in antiquity, that sometimes the elite were indeed involved, and that markets played a bigger role, but that was it. They argued that ancient cities were not consumer cities, but they never questioned that medieval and early-modern cities were producer cities. Personally, I have not been convinced by most of their counter examples against the consumer city model for antiquity, but the problem is more fundamental than the facts: what if they were right? What if the Roman Empire had vastly more trade? Does that mean that antiquity harboured the beginnings of the modern economic development of Europe? No ancient historian seems prepared to defend that position anymore. Rostovtzeff's belief that Roman antiquity was hardly different from the modern world as he knew it showed him as a less than acute observer of early twentieth-century life.27The large social changes of the rest of the twentieth century have made the gap between the Roman past and the western present evident to all. Finley's critics have been wrong to accept his terms of the debate. The more trade there was, the harder it becomes to explain the demise of the ancient world. Finley's critics have also been wrong because the commercialization model of European economic development has lost much of its intellectual standing. Robert Brenner and others have drawn our attention to the importance of agricultural change, and rural property relations in particular.28Others have even gone further, and abandoned the view that the economic transformation and modernization of Europe was viewed as a long process of many centuries. Once again, the Industrial Revolution has become both industrial and rev~lutionary.~~ The similarities between different periods of European preindustrial history may be larger, therefore, than the differences. Among ancient historians, no one has insisted more on these similarities and the need for a tmly comparative history 25
Finley, The ancient economy, 60. 26 For banking and capital supply see Jean Andreau's excellent La vie financiPre duns le monde romain. Les mktiers de maniers d'argent (ive s i k l e av. J.-C.), Rome 1987, and, more briefly, his Banking and business in the Roman world, Cambridge 1999. Richard Duncan-Jones has recently demonstrated that money stock (much of it gold) in the Roman Empire was enormous: Money and government in the Roman Empire, Cambridge 1994, esp. 168. See also Keith Hopkins, 'Rome, taxes, rents and trade' in: Kodai. Journal of Ancient History VINII (1995/6), 41-75, 45-8. This was mostly hoarded money, not used as capital. C.f. my 'De betovering van Moses Finley' in: Lampas XXXI (1998), 336-350, 346-7 for the argument that the high liquidity was necessary to cope with the high and unpredictable incidence of death. 27 For more elaborate argument see my 'An orientation to the economy' in: Pedar W. Foss and John J. Dobbins (eds.), Pompeii and the settlements under Vesuvius, London (forthcoming). 28 Robert Brenner, 'Agrarian class structure and economic development in pre-industrial Europe' in: Past and Present LXX (1976), 30-75. 29 E.A. Wrigley, Continuity, chance and change. The character of the industrial revolution in England, Cambridge 1988; Jongman, De betovering van Moses Finley.
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than H.W. Pleket.30 More than anyone else, this has made him the champion of a preindustrial history with antiquity in it, and which, with the possible exception of a few places such as Holland, only ends sometime in the eighteenth or early nineteenth century. Indeed, I think medieval or early-modern Europe was no more developed than the Roman Empire. Differences there were, however, but they may be much harder to link to stages in a process of development. After all, Rome really did surpass medieval and earlymodern Europe in many respects. Why did this achievement not lead to real modern economic growth? I want to argue that ancient historians have been wrong to concentrate so much of their debate on the narrow problem of trade and traders. From a comparative historical point of view, it really matters much less than they think. To understand underdevelopment, elite mentality may be much less relevant than food supply, technology in agriculture or transport, or demography. Life near subsistence depended significantly on the narrow margins of nature. It also depended on the high but unpredictable incidence of death. As Richard Saller has shown recently, due to high levels of mortality, of all agricultural land in Roman Italy about a third was held by under-age orphans.31 That land was controlled by their guardians, who needed to play safe to avoid accusations of fraud. Underneath a surface of continuity we find an ever continuing renewal of the actual people who occupied the positions of power and property. A much richer account of Roman underdevelopment is possible than the one-dimensional discussion of trade and traders. Similarly, Roman achievement should be liberated from its association with trade. After all, Rome was a truly exceptional state, incomparable to anything in medieval or early-modern Europe. It is precisely the connection with Roman state activity that seems to explain much of the most spectacular achievements. There is much more to Roman urbanism, for example, than trade and industry. To give Rome its rightful place in European history and not treat it as either a primitive precursor to the medieval world or as almost interchangeable with medieval and early-modern Europe, we need a richer and far more wide-ranging account - of both misery and glory.
Parametric methods The difficulties of decisive empirical validation have also contributed to the impasse in the debate on the ancient economy. Proof is always a slippery commodity, but particularly so when sources are few and far between. Mostly, Finley's argument had been based on his readings of the literary sources, with an admixture of some epigraphy and some archaeology. That was perfectly acceptable for his own argument. After all, for Finley the crucial variable was elite mentality. He acknowledged that a more thorough analysis of the epigraphical data was necessary to see what the elite actually did. Indeed, my own very first efforts in ancient history were in this area. Others have gone further, and have tried to give counter-examples of members of the elite who were indeed
30
H.W. Pleket, 'Wirtschaft' in: F. Vittinghoff (ed.), Handbuch der Europaischen Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte I , Stuttgart 1990,25-160 for the most substantial statement of his views. Richard P. Saller, Patriarchy, property and death in the Roman family, Cambridge 1994, 189-90. I think no other book of the 1990's has done more to transform ancient history.
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involved in trade and rnan~facturing.~~ As I said, I have often not been c0nvinced.3~The real difficulty, however, is that none of these counter-examples can ever make a real case. How many examples do we need to believe that they represent the tip of the iceberg, rather than some anomalies reported, for example, because they are precisely that. Our documentation is never remotely good enough for this type of inductive argument. We need new methods to restrict our flights of fancy. The last few decades have fortunately seen some quite spectacular examples of the possibilities of a new kind of methodology for validation, which I shall call parametric. It transforms 'truth' to a range of probabilities, restricted by physical constraints, and by the probable values of other variables. The pioneer of this methodology has been the Cambridge ancient historian and Finley pupil Keith Hopkins, followed later by people like Richard Saller, Walter Scheidel, and myself.34 Hopkins' 1966 article 'On the probable age structure of the Roman population' revolutionized the study of Roman demography. After an exhaustive study of vast numbers of Roman funeral inscriptions he concluded against previous scholarship that they were quite useless for demographic analysis. The life tables which could be constructed from the epitaphs were clearly and undoubtedly demographically impossible. Hopkins could say that with such confidence because he compared them with United Nations model life tables. These are a set of life tables representing the typical age-specific incidence of death in populations at different levels of life expectancy at birth. Life expectancy at birth varies significantly between societies. The age specific incidence of death for each level of life expectancy, however, follows a remarkably similar pattern from one society to another. The model life tables represent much of this collective experience of past world populations. The life tables from Roman epitaphs were so at variance with any of the model life tables that one can confidently say that they are demographically impossible. What they represent instead, is the age specific incidence of commemoration, a cultural practice that varies significantly with age. when Hopkins concluded that the model life tables had demonstrated that his data were not good enough for demographic analysis, he also accepted - and subsequently exploited to the full - the logical consequence: if model life tables are the standard by which the quality of data is judged, then model life tables may just as well stand proxy for real data.35 In subsequent research he used model life tables as a demographic frame of John D' Arms, Commerce and social standing in ancient Rome, Cambridge (Mass.) 1981; William V. Harris (ed.), The inscribed economy. Production and distribution in the light of the instrumentum domesticum (= Journal of Roman archaeology suppl. VI), Ann Arbor 1993 to mention some of the best exmles. 33 Walter 0. Moeller, The wool trade of ancient Pompeii, Leiden 1976 is the worst example. For Finley's own comments on this type of arguments: The ancient economy, 193-4 in the final chapter ('further thoughts') he added to the second edition. 34 Keith Hopkins, 'On the probable age structure of the Roman population' in: Popul~tionStudies XX (1966), 245-64; Keith Hopkins 'Taxes and trade in the Roman Empire (200 B.C.-A.D. 400)' in: Journal of Roman Studies LXX (1980), 101-25 and Keith Hopkins, Death and renewal, Cambridge 1983 or, recently, Keith Hopkins, 'Christian number and its implications' in: Journal of Early Christian Studies VI (1998), 185-226 are good examples of Hopkins' style of argument; Saller, Patriarchy; Walter Scheidel, Measuring sex, age and death in the Roman Empire (= Journal of Roman Archaeology suppl. 21), Ann Arbor 1996; Jongman, Pompeii. 35 Interestingly, the recent brilliant empirical research by Roger S. Bagnall and Bruce W. Frier, The demography of Roman Egypt, Cambridge 1994 roughly confirms with Egyptian census data the validity
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reference for his innovative research on social mobility in the Roman senatorial elite. My own work on social stratification and political succession within the elite of the town council of the city of Canusium employed similar methodologies.36 Model life tables allow us a simulation of the past, precisely because man's demographic experience is so horribly constrained by the rule of the Grim Rea~er.3~ At prevailing levels of life expectancy at birth of 20-25 years, death is everywhere, and reproductive capacities are taxed almost to the full. For the city of Rome, for example, a life expectancy at birth of 20 years may be quite optimistic. It implies that every year a twentieth of the city's population would be replaced. Thus every year some 50,000 corpses had to be disposed of, often in pits, puticuli, together with dead animals and household refu~e.~g Elsewhere, I have argued that urban excess mortality in Italian cities, and in Rome in particular, was such that not even all of rural Italy was enough to provide the immigrants that were needed every year to maintain the urban population.39 Demographically too, Rome was the capital of a world empire. In a similar argument, Scheidel has recently demonstrated that the often-held view that Roman slaves did not reproduce themselves in large numbers is demographically impo~sible.~O The power of the Grim Reaper has perhaps become most dramatically visible in Richard Saller's Patriarchy, property and death. Underpinning a subtle analysis of legal and literary sources for the role of the father in the Roman family is an innovative demographic simulation of the possibilities and probabilities. Clearly, few Roman sons needed to be worried that their fathers would continue to dominate their lives into adulthood. It was the orphan rather than the powerful paterfamilias who was the dominant figure in Roman family relations. This research in Roman demography has graphically enriched our perspective of Roman life. It has underscored the fragility of life for everyone, and the bewildering social consequences. I think we are only beginning to see the first fruits, but already I believe this has been the biggest advance in ancient history of the last two or three decades. It has widened our perspective on poverty and underdevelopment, and given us the tools to understand many social relations. It has also introduced a new category of 'facts', to help us where validation by quotation of written sources was impossible or meaningless. In the end, the method has been so fruitful precisely because life had so much to do with bare survival. It was fruitful because life was demonstrably governed by nature. Pre-industrial man was a highly mortal mammal. The constraints of nature have also become visible in the study of agricultural production and food supply. Here, comparative data on agricultural production have given us a fair idea of the order of magnitude of Roman productivity per hectare, and of the problems involved. Again, this was possible because agriculture is a human adaptation to primarily biological processes. Different adaptive strategies allow a surprisingly great of the reconstruction of Roman demography from model life tables. Logically, that is not proof, but it is certainly comforting. 36 Jongman, Pompeii, 317 ff. 37 T.G. Parkin, Demography and Roman society, Baltimore 1992 for an excellent general introduction. Hopkins, Death and renewal, ch. IV for graphic detail. 39 Willem Jongman, 'Het romeins imperialisme en de verstedelijking van Italie' in: Leidschrift VW1 (1990), 43-58. 40 Walter Scheidel, 'Quantifying the sources of slaves in the early Roman empire' in: Journal of Roman Studies LXXXVII (1997), 156-169.
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variation in production levels, undermining any simplistic environmental determinism. In this context, the concept of the family life cycle has been particularly usef~l.4~ During the life of a family unit, different amounts of food are necessary, when, for example, there are no or only young children, when children are old enough to eat a lot, or when they have left the household. Similarly, family labour availability varies over time. When children are growing up, peasants may need to rent more land for a number of years, intensify their production (by increasing cropping frequency), or both.42 Thus, outputs per unit area are unlikely to have remained the same over the family life cycle. Some periods are critical: the years when children are already eating quite a bit, but not yet working, are a difficult period.43 Peasants are guided by the social and cultural wish to have a family and care for it. At the same time, however, it has become clear that human action in this area can be viewed and understood as a rational interaction with nature. The logic is that of biological processes. Archaeologists like Paul Halstead and ancient historians like Peter Garnsey, Tom Gallant and Robert Sallares have given us not only more precise estimates of agricultural productivity, but also shown us the mechanisms which are responsible for those levels, and the occasional failures to reach them.44The attention to variability, risk and crop failure has given a new dimension to our understanding of the fragility of life in the distant past. Survival in every year is far more important to a peasant than wealth in some years, and starvation in others. On the demand side, it has been Hopkins who argued that we do not need ancient sources to know how much food people needed. His construction from modern F A 0 data of a minimum subsistence ration for ancient man (250 kg wheat equivalent per person per year) has given us a fixed point to evaluate incomes of rich and poor, or relative costs.45 It has allowed me to use minimum subsistence cost for one average Roman as a unit of account in an otherwise floating universe of monetary prices of unknown purchasing p0wer.~6For calculation purposes I have equated this minimum Thomas. W. Galant, Risk and survival in ancient Greece, CambridgeIOxford 1991, 11-33. Galant, Risk and survival, 88 for a graph. Changing to a different combination of factors of production creates, however, the inevitable problems of declining marginal returns. Economics remains a dismal science. For an exposition of the disadvantages of intensification: Jongman, Pompeii, 85-91. At the time I did not realize how much actual combinations at individual farms could differ from one another. My Ricardian theoretical framework can cope very well, however. 43 Galant, Risk and survival, 81 for a telling graph. 44 Paul Halstead, 'Traditional and ancient rural economy in Mediterranean Europe: plus Fa change' in: Joumal of Hellenic Studies CVII (1987), 77-87; Peter Garnsey, Famine and food supply in the GraecoRoman world, Cambridge 1988; Peter Garnsey, Food and society in classical antiquity, Cambridge 1999; Galant, Risk and survival; Robert Sallares, The ecology of the ancient Greek world, London 1991. 45 Hopkins, Conquerors and slaves, 56; C. Clark and M. Haswell, The economics of subsistence agriculture, London 1967 (3rd ed.); L. Foxhall and H.A. Forbes, 'Sitometreia: the role of grain as a staple food in classical antiquity' in: Chiron XI1 (1982), 41-90 for a thoughtful survey with a bias in favour of ancient sources. 46 Jongman, Pompeii, 195-6; The still quite popular method to compare prices over long periods of time by expressing them in precious metal is totally illegitimate. When prices double over a century, and the silver content of a coin has halved, prices expressed in grams of silver have not risen. See R. Baehrel, Une croissance: la Basse-Provence rurale (fin du mie siicle - 1789), Paris 1961. Using the method to convert ancient prices to modern prices is even more meaningless and misleading. Modern inflation calculation uses a basket of representative (usually consumer) goods, and follows their prices over time. For ancient societies we cannot do that, but since subsistence food was so important, with the price of cereals we can approximate the basket of modern statisticians.
27 1
subsistence ration for a year with 115 sestertii. The estimate for subsistence needs also gives a means to judge the productive capacity of agriculture. Since people lived so close to bare subsistence, an estimate of what was needed just to survive provides a good approximation of the actual consumption pattern of the mass of the p0pulation.~7After a grim scientific analysis of malnutrition in the ancient world using skeletal remains and the like, a sombre Garnsey concluded: 'accounts of the diet and health of ancient classical societies have generally been unrealistically favourable.'4* When Cicero claims that 100,000 sestertii were a modest annual income (Stoic paradoxes 49), that shows the enormity of his social snobbery, and the vast social in equal it^.^^ Most of this new research on the supply of food, and the demand for it, relies more on comparative data and research from the natural sciences than on Varro, Cato or Columella. As with the new historical demography of antiquity, the literary sources are judged by the extent to which they conform to comparative and scientific data. Indeed, we have always had every reason to be somewhat suspicious. First, our literary sources wrote for an elite audience interested in estate management. That is quite different from the experience of the subsistent peasant. Second, our literary sources are prescriptive and intent on improvements. They are likely to have exaggerated the advantages of their methods. The - -- new facts of ancient history come to life when they are integrated into explicit models. Here, what matters is that we can often exclude some possibilities. Our assumption or estimate about one variable has an often inevitable consequence for another variable. If, to use a recent example, we want to believe that there were and remained many slaves in Roman Italy, and that their rate of natural reproduction was very low, we must assume that huge numbers of slaves were imported annually. In this particular example, that has indeed been assumed by W.V. Harris.50When Scheidel actually did the demographic sums, he observed that the numbers were impossibly large.51 Scheidel concluded that slaves reproduced themselves in significant numbers.52 What matters is that we may be uncertain about any of the variables in the model, but together all our assumptions must make sense. If we believe that slave mortality was high, and their rate of natural reproduction low, we must assume that they were imported. If that is impossible, we must accept that their mortality was lower, or their natural reproduction higher. What we assume about one variable influences what we can assume about another. It is what Keith Hopkins has called a compatibility theory of truth.53
42
I 47
Another emerging field in the study of ancient standard of living is that of disease, uniting the study of food and demography, with such old favourites as infectious diseases and epidemics. It is a movement away from the study of ancient medicine as a science to the study of ancient man's bad health. Interesting examples Garnsey, Food and society, 43-61; Sallares, Ecology, passim and Scheidel, Sex, age and death, 139-163. 48 Garnsey, Food and society, 60. 4 9 The minimum property census required of a Roman senator implies an annual income which was 520 times subsistence: Jongman, Pompeii, 196. Rich Romans were really rich. William V. Harris, 'Towards a study of the Roman slave supply' in: J.H. D'Arms and E.C. Kopff (eds.), The Seabome commerce of ancient Rome: studies in archaeology and history, Rome 1980, 117140 esp. 118. Scheidel, Sources of slaves. 5 2 An alternative within the constraints of the model would be to assume that there were fewer slaves. 53 Hopkins, Conquerors and slaves, 2 n. 4.
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Hunger and power: the urban food supply In the last part of this paper I want to illustrate my arguments with an analysis of the urban food supply, particularly of the city of Rome.S4 The Roman Empire was an unusually urbanized society, often surpassing medieval or early-modern European levels of urbanization (the city of Rome, for example, is unique in European pre-industrial history).55 That is important because urbanization is often viewed as a sign or even engine of economic modernization. The economic underpinnings of this urbanization are clearly relevant for a comparative historical assessment of Roman economic achievement. How could Roman society sustain such a large urban population? The free distributions of grain to some 200,000 people of the city of Rome have excited many ancient historians. As a practical achievement, these distributions impressed people in later times. Ideologically, however, many historians objected that free food only made the poor lazy. During the last few decades, such conservatism has been out of favour, to be replaced by a debate on the extent of the free market in the urban food supply. Primitivists like Finley stressed the redistributive nature of the distributions, and the small size of the market. Modernists underscored that the distributions were not enough, and that a sizeable free market remained.56 Thus, the urban food supply, and the grain distributions in particular, came to occupy an important place in the debate on the nature of the ancient economy. Following on the enormous population growth of the city of Rome (from about 250,000 in 225 B.C. to about a million two centuries later) a system emerged of public distributions (frumentationes) of grain, mostly acquired as tax in kind, largely from northAfrica, and somewhat later also from Egypt. The magnitude of thefrumentationes clearly justified the ideological intensity of earlier accounts. The frumentationes were an important institution. The controversy about the role of the state and the place of the free market qualify Rome's food supply as a major arena for polemic between primitivists and modernists. If material needs of such magnitude could be satisfied without much of a market, Polanyi may have been right, after all. First, therefore, I want to discuss the relative importance of the state and the commercial market. The contributions of the state and of trade in the food supply of Rome have been a bone of contention between primitivists and modernists. Primitivists have pointed to the large role of the state, whereas modernists have reminded us of the substantial contribution from the private sector. Curiously enough, however, there is little room for controversy about the facts. Some of them are uncontroversial because they are universally agreed upon. About other facts there is no such consensus, but here Some of these arguments are elaborated at greater length in Willem Jongman and Rudolf Dekker, 'Public intervention in the food supply in pre-industrial Europe' in: Paul Halstead and John O'Shea (eds.), Bad year economics: cultural responses to risk and unceruinty, Cambridge 1988, 114-26. For the most recent survey, with almost up to date bibliography, see my lemma 'cura annonae' in: Hubert Cancik & Helmut Schneider (eds.), Der Neue Pauly. Enzyclopadie der Antike, Band 111, StuttgartIWeimar 1996, 234-6. For bibliography add: Catherine Virlouvet, Tessera frumentaria: les proc6dures de distribution du ble' public ci Rome ci la fin de la Rt?publique et au d6but de Z'Empire, Rome 1995. 55 Above, p. 1-2; Jongman, Pompeii, 74 ff. for a survey on European urbanization. 56 Geoffrey Rickman's excellent The corn supply of ancient Rome, Oxford 1980, is the most detailed and comprehensive account - with a modernist bent. 54
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controversy is quite pointless because we can probably never really know the truth about them. What is uncontroversial is that in its mature form, from the late first century B.C., and after some initial ups and downs, the system provided for the distribution of free monthly rations of 33 kg each to about 200,000 free adult male citizens in the city of Rome. That was generous on two accounts. First, 200,000 recipients were a large number. In a city with perhaps almost a million inhabitants, and perhaps 300.000-350,000 slaves, the number of free adult males is unlikely to have been much more than 200,000.57 The lengthy scholarly discussion about the criteria for admission to the frumentationes seems quite unnecessary, therefore: almost every free adult male citizen qualified.58 The rations were also generous because 33 kg per month was enough to feed almost two people each at subsistence level, rather than just the primary recipient.59Thus, the frumentationes were given to almost all free adult males, and covered some two-thirds of the subsistence needs of the entire free population. The choice to give such large rations to a restricted number of people (and expecting them to share) clearly reflected both the practical difficulties of distribution, and the ideological centrality of adulthood and maleness in Roman society. It underscored that the adult male was the real Roman citizen, and it underwrote his power in the family. The extent of the remaining private market for cereals depends, therefore, on two things: the ways in which slave owners acquired the food for their slaves (did they buy it in the market?), and our estimate of the standard of living of the mass of the population. C.R. Whittaker, one of the leading primitivists, has suggested that slave owners in the city are likely to have fed their slaves from their own nearby estates, wherever possible.60 There is some evidence to support this model, and it seems to make sense. However, there is also some evidence for the view that slave owners bought the grain for their households in the market. Indeed, it seems perfectly plausible that some did so, at least some of the time. Our problem is that reality is likely to have been somewhere in between these two extremes, but that we have no way of knowing where precisely. Moreover, this is unlikely to have been the same in every year. When their harvests failed, slave owners must have bought more food in the market instead. The second part of the private food market was to supplement the diet of the free population. Here, the problem is that we do not know with what they supplemented the wheat which they obtained from thefrumentationes. If they were poor and their diet was If Rome had a free population of both sexes and all ages of about 600,000, the number of men over the qualifying age of eleven must have been 150,000 at most. This calculation makes the normal assumption with model life tables of a stationary population without migration. It also assumes an unrealistically high life expectancy at birth of some 25 years. If we lower life expectancy and raise the qualifying age (14 is also a possibility), the number of those qualifying within the population of 600,000 is even smaller (closer to 100,000), because there will be more children. This may be the reason why later extensions were not so difficult to implement. For model life tables see: Ansley J. Coale and Paul Demeny, Regional model life tables and stable populations, New YorMLondon 1983 (2nd ed.), 284-5. Although it makes little difference for now, clearly there is some incompatibility between cherished beliefs. I will return to this elsewhere. Most recently Virlouvet, Tessera frumentaria. s 9 Of estimated subsistence needs of about 250 kg wheat equivalent, some 200 kg would be for basic food. 60 C.R. Whittaker, 'Trade and the aristocracy in the Roman empire' in: Opus IV (1985), 49-76,58.
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very basic, the wheat was probably largely supplemented by more grain bought in the market; if they ate a bit better, they perhaps bought some legumes and dairy products instead of cereals, and more wine. Paradoxically, therefore, modernists who want to argue for a significant private market in cereals must assume the lower standard of living, while primitivists who want to argue against a large private grain trade must do so by assuming a higher standard of living for the masses, and some private trade in other less basic foods. The later addition of distributions of oil, wine and pork may indeed indicate that these were part of the expected diet. Again, however, the problem is that reality will have shown great variety in standards of living, between families of different prosperity, between families in different parts of the farniliy life cycle, and from one year to the next. And again, the problem is that we cannot infer the prominence of a social phenomenon from data that merely prove the existence of it. The prominent contribution by the state in the food supply of the city of Rome cannot be denied. The vast majority of citizen families received all or almost all their wheat for free. Large families needed some more, and singles had wheat to spare. The system provided only rough justice, but socially and politically that was important enough, and much appreciated. What we cannot deny either, however, is that the city of Rome had a real market for food, including cereals. There were large private dealers, private warehouses, and market prices, and all of this was interconnected with the world at large. Modernists are wrong to play down the importance of the state in Rome's food supply, and primitivists are wrong to suggest that the prominence of the state shows that Rome was not a market economy. In order to understand and explain what happened, we need to go beyond the old primitivist-modernist dichotomy and create an analytical framework for the co-existence of the market with public distributions and controls. If there was relatively little room for a free and uncontrolled market in subsistence food, that was not because of a primitive anti-market mentality. There really was enough of a market for that to be untrue. The explanation for the role of the state should be economic and political, rather than cultural and intellectual.
Explanations from nature to history
Thus, the food supply of the city of Rome offers interesting possibilities for conceptual and methodological advances, and for a new type of discourse in ancient economic history. In particular, I want to illustrate the possibilities of the new theories, models and parametric methods that I have advocated. To do so, I want to begin with biological constraints, and argue that the urban food supply was indeed precarious, and could not be taken for granted. People were living near bare subsistence, and nature played the sometimes macabre tune. Second, I want to argue that modem economic theory provides the best analytic framework to understand the nature of the problem and to identify possible solutions. Such economic analysis shows that an unrestrained free market could not guarantee a secure urban food supply: public intervention was unavoidable. Third, I want to argue that the models which are chosen in a particular society reflect the nature of society at large, and are best understood in a comparative historical perspective. Until modern times, urbanization was not due to the unfettered freedom of the food market, but to intelligent restraints on market forces (which we can understand best, however, with modem economic theory).
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Historically, the supply of basic foods has always been volatile. In Mediterranean farming conditions, the culprit is (lack of) precipitation. From one year to the next, precipitation in the critical growing season varies greatly, with devastating effect. In an average year, the Mediterranean (and the eastern Mediterranean in particular) has only just enough rain for cereal agriculture, and almost no year is an average year. For ancient Athens, Garnsey has calculated that cereal harvests failed in at least one year in f0ur.6~In Mediterranean conditions, agricultural output varied enormously from one year to the next, and truly bad harvests occurred frequently. When it did not rain, and harvests were bad, farmers could not do much but wait for the next year. Thus, in the short run, the supply of agricultural output is given (the harvest is what it happens to be). Agriculture is not like making cars: in any particular year realized output shows only a tenuous relationship with planned output. Agriculture is also different because its products are of vital importance. Without food, humans die. In the modern industrial world, that does not happen often. It does, however, happen only too often in developing countries. In the pre-industrial past, starvation always was a looming danger, and sometimes a tragic reality. The mass of the population always lived close to bare subsistence.62 Most people were desperately poor, and had to spend the largest part of their consumer budgets on food, and subsistence food in particular. Even so, their diets were poor, and they suffered many food deficiency illnesses.63 In bad years, they could not realistically consume less. The economics of market intervention
Much of the explanation for these horrors is, of course, in the niggardliness of nature. Historians of ancient societies can do worse than getting to know the physics and biology of agriculture and of human survival. For an understanding of the interaction between these forces, we need economic theory, however. The apocalyptic scene that is unleashed by the forces of nature is multiplied by the forces of the market. Since in the short run agricultural output is given, it cannot respond much to higher prices (in the jargon of the economist: the price elasticity of supply is low, or even near zero). On the demand side, moreover, things were similarly bleak. Demand for food decreased only little when prices went up. People living near subsistence needed what they needed, and not much less, whatever the cost. In the jargon of the economist it is said that the priceelasticity of the demand for subsistence food was very low. Higher prices were not a strong incentive for the poor to eat less than they needed to survive. Nature was tough, and the joint operation of these low elasticities of supply and demand transformed even smallish reductions in physical output into large increases of agricultural prices. Examples abound, not only from classical antiquity, but also equally from medieval and early-modern Europe. In the seventeenth century, the statistician Gregory King estimated that a 10 percent lower output gave 30 percent higher prices, that 61
Garnsey, Famine, 10 with all of that chapter for a wealth of comparative data. Hopkins, Models, ships and staples, 91 for early twentieth century data on the variability of wheat yields in countries that were once part of the Roman Empire. 6 2 Jongman, Pompeii, 78-9 for a survey. 63 Garnsey, Food and society, 43-61.
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a 20 percent lower output raised prices by 80 percent and that a 30 percent lower harvest increased prices by a staggering 450 percent.@ If in normal years the poor spent some three-quarters of their incomes on food, it is hard to conceive how they could survive such bad harvests.65 Without some intervention the poor could adapt to market forces only by a change in body weight.66 Clearly, people were well advised to do something to protect themselves. For peasants, the first thing they could do was try to prevent bad harvests. Not every crop is equally susceptible to drought. Average rainfall during the growing season in Attica (and many other parts of the East Mediterranean), for example was so low that many peasants did not normally grow wheat (which needs about 300 mm of precipitation), but grew barley instead (which only needs about 200-250 mm).67 With wheat, moreover, the softer high gluten breadwheats were a riskier crop than the harder wheats unsuitable for leavened bread. Thus, the Roman taste for eating fine leavened bread rather than a waterbased porridge could only spread beyond the elite when they had secured a steady grain supply from conquered Sicily (and landed Sicilians with the risk).68 A second strategy was crop diver~ification.~g Some crops do best in a wet year and others in a dry year. Cultivating some of each spreads the risks. A similar effect may sometimes be obtained from cultivating different fields. Fields at low altitudes may have slightly different microclimates from fields at higher altitudes. Within limits, peasants can favour production strategies that reduce the variability of the physical output. When disaster strikes, however, it often strikes hard. To stabilize food availability efforts to stabilize output may not have been enough. The first remedy that comes to mind is to bring food from where there is plenty to where there is not enough. The Mediterranean has many climatic zones and microclimates, and drought rarely strikes everywhere with the same intensity. The problem is, however, that transport was not easy under pre-industrial c~nditions.~O Land-transport in particular was hard and therefore expensive. Using the prices of the Diocletian's Edict on maximum prices A.H.M. Jones once calculated that a wagonload full of grain doubled in price every 300 miles, whereas shipping wheat the 1250 miles from Alexandria to Rome only added 16 percent to the
64 Wilhelm Abel, Agrarkrisen unddgrarkonjunktur, Hamburg/Berlin 1978 (3'* ed.), 23. 65 The graph in Herman Van der Wee, The growth of the Antwerp market and the european economy,
Louvain 1963, vol. 111, 92 f. is a chilling demonstration. 66 Hopkins, Models, ships and staples, 90. 67 Peter Garnsey, Famine and food supply, 17, 89-119, esp. 102; Dominic Rathbone, 'The grain trade and grain shortages in the Hellenistic East' in: Peter Garnsey and C.R. Whittaker (eds.), Trade and famine in classical antiquity, Cambridge 1983, 45-55, 46 ff.; H.N. Le Houerou, 'Plant sociology and ecology applied to grazing lands research, survey and management in the Mediterranean basin' in: W. Krause (ed.), Application of vegetation science to grassland husbandry (= part XI11 of Handbook of vegetation science), The Hague 1977,211-74,214-233. 68 Jongman and Dekker, Public intervention, 119. 69 Galant, Risk and survival, 36 ff. 70 It is interesting to note the observation in Rathbone, The grain trade that wheat, the cereal with the highest caloric contribution per kg, was the preferred traded cereal. Compare that to the subsistence peasant's preference for barley under dry conditions.
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price.71 The precise figures have rightly been questioned, but the argument still ~tands.7~ When Antioch was ravaged by a famine 'it required the forcible intervention of the emperor Julian to have grain brought in from two inland districts of northern Syria, one fifty, the other a hundred miles away.'73 Bringing in food from outside was difficult, and therefore expensive. In such conditions, the only incentive for traders was if prices were much higher. As an alternative to imports in times of famine, people could store food in good years, to eat in bad years. Thus, storage may be viewed as a means of transporting food over time, rather than space. With some difficulty and with some deterioration in their quality, cereals may be stored from one year to the next. Storing them for much longer periods rapidly makes them unpalatable. Thus, Roman granaries, horrea, were meticulously constructed (and at great expense) to keep the wheat dry and as safe from mice as possible.74 The immense granaries at Ostia, Portus and in the city of Rome are clear testimony to the necessity to store large quantities, and of the unparalleled resources and determination of the Roman state.75 What is clear from these examples is that each of these measures is inconvenient and demands a - sometimes high - price. A more stable output, for example, may demand that farmers grow crops, which, on average, do not have the highest yields. Growing different crops on different fields may be inconvenient. Obtaining food from elsewhere was expensive, and so was storing it. And yet, all this is what farmers did. When modern historians or western experts in the third world look at traditional farming practices, they often suggest that improvements are possible. What many failed to see is that such improvements may indeed increase average yields, but at the price of greater risk. Much traditional farming behaviour, which looks quite irrational at first sight, makes sense after all. Running a risk is unattractive, so it is worth paying a price to avoid it. Economically, there is nothing wrong with an aversion to risk.76 A more stable income gives greater utility than an income which, on average, is the same, but varies more from one year to the next. Analytically, the argument is that, as with so much, income too has a declining marginal utility. Each additional unit of income gives less pleasurelutility than the previous unit (extra income is more useful if you have little of it than if you have a lot of it). Therefore, sacrificing an extra unit of income in a good year is more than compensated by having more in a bad year. Intuitively this makes sense, in particular near subsistence. There really is little point in having a higher average income, but die from starvation roughly every ten years.
7 I A.H.M. Jones, 'The economic life of the towns of the Roman Empire' in: A.H.M. Jones, The Roman economy. Studies in ancient economic and administrative history (ed. P.A. Brunt), Oxford 1974, 35-60, 37. 7 2 Jongman, Pompeii, 140-1 for a survey of the criticism. Finley, Ancient economy, 33-4. 7 4 Geoffrey E. Rickman, Roman granaries and store buildings, Cambridge 1971. Significantly, the only real parallel comes from China: P.E. Will, Bureaucratic et famine en Chine au l g e sikcle, Parismhe Hague 1980. 76 To the economist, risk may have a numerical probability, uncertainty not: F.H. Knight, Risk, uncertainty and profit, BostonINew Y ork 1921.
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Historical models
Finally, we need to investigate historical coping mechanisms. Natural disaster may be the beginning of these chains of events, but their impact varies significantly between societies, and within societies. It will not surprise anyone that the rich rarely starved, but there is much more than that. Historically, the major change has been the emergence and growth of the market for food, a process closely associated with the growth of towns. As consumers, farmers then still suffered from higher prices in times of scarcity, but as producers they could now begin to profit. The low elasticities of supply and demand transformed small changes in physical output into large price hikes. Therefore, unless a crop failed completely, farmers could be better off after small harvests. For urban consumers (and other buyers in the market) the situation was the opposite. Even small reductions in the harvest of any particular year pushed the price of subsistence food out of reach for the mass of the urban population. The impact of crop failures was multiplied by the workings of the market. Towns were a dangerous place to be. Successful urbanization was only possible if the urban food supply was relatively secure, even when harvests had failed. Ironically, it was the high price of food in times of scarcity that mobilized help. Even at prevailing high transport costs, it paid for traders to bring in supplies from far away. Similarly, only high prices could persuade speculators to release stocks. Understandably, traders and speculators were often blamed for a famine, even if, analytically, they were part of the solution rather than part of the problem. In the end, the root of the problem was the unpredictability of nature, the high cost of storage and transport (through a low price elasticity of supply), and the generally low standard of living. Famines were no conspiracy, but still demanded action. Without that, urban populations could not survive. That was understood by all city authorities from antiquity, through medieval times and into early-modern Europe.77 Price controls were not the solution: they discouraged traders from releasing stocks or from bringing in outside supplies. What was needed was more food in times of scarcity. Public storage was one expensive and complex - solution. Another was that of subsidies, to buy outside supplies at market prices, and make them available at more affordable prices. In medieval and early-modern Europe, the primary policy of urban authorities was to support the urban population with financial subsidies (even if they also kept emergency stocks). Rather than store large quantities of actual food, authorities stored money to buy food in times of famine, and distribute that food at lower and more normal prices. By and large, and increasingly so, the grain trade succeeded to supply Europe's cities, even in times of famine.78 What was necessary for this to succeed was that authorities were willing and able to underwrite their citizens' purchasing power. In the Roman Empire too, each of these measures was indeed sometimes taken by authorities. Sometimes maximum
It was only in the eighteenth century, when a truly integrated international grain market was beginning to emerge, that market intervention was first abandoned. The results were not yet as beneficial as claimed, and protests sounded evenvhere: L.A. Tilly, 'The food riot as a form of political conflict in France' in: Journal of Interdisciplinary History I1 (1971), 3-59. 78 F. Braudel and F Spooner, 'Prices in Europe from 1450-1750' in: Cambridge Economic History of Europe IV, Cambridge 1967,392 ff., 464 ff. noted a gradual convergence of European grain prices, clear proof of increased market integration. 77
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prices were set, stocks were released, or food was bought from outside.79 What strikes us, however, is the haphazard and occasional nature of the arrangements. A pivotal role was usually played by individual benefactors from the elite, sometimes as magistrates, but sometimes at least allegedly as no more than private citizens. Of course, releasing grain from their own stocks or bringing it from outside bought them prestige. In the city of Rome, it was not enough for the Emperor to subsidise the purchase and distribution of outside supplies in bad years. The capital of the Roman Empire was so large that it needed secure outside supplies in good times and in bad times, and it needed stored supplies to supplement these external supplies when harvests had failed. At a very minimum, and assuming a quite high consumption of more luxurious food than grain, demand for cereals in the city of Rome was some 150,000 tons annually.80 If farmers could produce a surplus of a third, to grow this quantity of wheat for Rome in a two field system required at least 2,000,000 hectares = 20,000 sq. km of agricultural land.81 It has been estimated that Roman Italy had about 100,000 sq. km of agricultural land.82 Of course, these are only rough figures, but such exercises in counterfactual imagination serve to demonstrate the magnitude of the problem.83 At least a fifth of Italy would have had to serve the appetite of Rome. In practice every area with some means of relatively easy sea or river transport (i.e. Sicily and the western coastal areas) would have had to feed Rome. There would not have been food for other urban life in these parts. Emperors also needed to control such supplies. Roman Italy was exempt from taxation, so if emperors wanted to have Italian grain, they had to buy it. Even at the best of times, that would have been a complex and arduous task. After a harvest failure, it would have been nearly impossible without starving the rural population. Both administratively and politically it was far more attractive to use the tax grain which had become available from the provinces. Even in bad years, provincial peasants and landowners could be squeezed more effectively to the benefit of the capital. Transporting this grain too was quite a job, but more easily organized, since it only concerned a small number of ports of departure. Indeed, over time, the shippers became increasingly subservient to the state. With taxes in kind from the provinces as the main source for Rome's food supply, the capital was a true beneficiary of Roman imperialism. Emperors also needed to do something to protect the city against bad years. Provincial grain growers could be extorted quite a bit, but obviously, when harvests failed (almost) completely even the word of the emperor carried little weight.84 To buy 79
See e.g. Onno van Nijf, 'Het dagelijks brood: prijsinscripties in Ephese en andere steden' in: Lampas XXXI (1998), 321-335. This assumes that the free urban population consumed no other grain than the 200,000 x 400 kg = 80,000 tons that were distributed for free, and that the slave population consumed 350,000 x 200 kg = 70,000 of grain. 81 The assumption of a two field-system is conventional, but may be unrealistic so close to an enormous urban market (but then, so is the assumption that the land would not have been diverted to more profitable crops). Net yields of 400 kg per cultivated hectare seem realistic (Jongman, Pompeii for arguments and comparative data). 82 Jongman, Pompeii, 67. 83 Robert W. Fogel, Railroads and American economic growth: essays in econometric history, Baltimore 1964 for the paradigmatic counterfactual analysis in history. 84 Thus, the inconvenience of shipping grain from far away Egypt was more than compensated by the stability of supplies from irrigation agriculture.
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emergency food on the free market was not attractive for emperors, however. The city of Rome represented the largest part of the free market. In bad years large subsidies to purchase grain for a hungry capital would have driven up prices, without adding much to the stock of available grain. It may also have starved the inhabitants of other cities similarly struck. For the city of Rome, only large-scale storage remained as a viable option - and that is what happened. When Septimius Severus died, he had seven years of grain in the stores.85 Citizens in Rome could now protest that the grain was stale.
Vindicating the pas2 The example of Rome's grain supply shows the overwhelming importance of the biology of human life, and the potential for quantitative modelling of such parameters. Often, it was through intervening natural variables that social factors shaped people's lives. More than optimistic modernism, it was gloomy primitivism which first began to tell this story of the exploitation, hunger and disease of life at the mercy of nature and the rich. More than Finley appreciated, however, that story has many subplots from natural history. For much of human history, man lived by bread alone, and sometimes not even that. The logic of subsistence in such stagnating economies was the economic logic of survival in nature. People remained poor and economies stagnated because nature was unyielding, and not because cultural and institutional barriers hampered an innate potential for economic growth. Historically, modern economic and demographic growth is unprecedented - and an experiment with as yet unknown results. The example of the urban grain supply also shows that we may view people's behaviour as governed by strategic choices. As historians from the modern world we may reconstruct the logic of their situation and the options they had. Once we rid ourselves of the misconception that modern economic theory assumes that the past really was very much like the present, we have gained a powerful analytical toolbox. An appreciation of the ever-looming presence of environmental risk removes the stigma of irrationality from the third-world peasant, and from our ancestors. The tensions between man's desire for a better life and the niggardliness of nature have found different solutions in different societies and different periods. Indeed, it is precisely these differences which give a comparative analysis its greatest strength. Contrary to the often-heard contention that comparative history needs similar situations (and is rarely possible, therefore), a successful comparison depends on selective and preferably well-defined differences. It is the historian's equivalent to the scientific experiment where only one variable is changed at the time. The institutional shape of solutions adopted in different periods and different societies illustrates and reflects the differences in natural and economic conditi0ns.~6An economic analysis of the low price elasticities in the market for subsistence food in early societies shows that urbanization 85 86
Hist. Aug., Vit. Sev., VIII, 5, XXIII, 2; Vit. Elag., XXVII, 7. In Douglas C. North, Structure and change in economic history, New York 1981 a book worth reading for every institutional historian. Institutions are viewed as instruments of economic change. Particularly useful are those institutions which bring private and public rates of return in line with each other. The corrollary of this view is that economic modernization has a long history. Others, such as E.A. Wrigley, Continuity, chance and change now view Europe's economic modernization as a quite sudden break with the past.
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was quite impossible without some public intervention in the urban food supply. Comparative history gives us the tools to understand and appreciate why particular institutions were chosen for the purpose. It also encourages us to go beyond abstract generalizations, and appreciate the complexity of history at a particular time and place. In the final analysis, the frumentationes in the city of Rome serve to show that in world history, ancient Rome was unique.
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