«
Private Pensions Series
Supervising Private Pensions INSTITUTIONS AND METHODS
Supervising Private Pensions
Private pensions are long-term contracts that comprise a sizeable share of workers’ income. Pensions operate in markets subject to potential failures stemming from asymmetric information, adverse selection and moral hazard. Government intervention is crucial to design regulations to protect the interests of participants, avoid systemic crises, and guarantee the financial and actuarial sustainability of the private pension system. Regulations have to be implemented by supervisory institutions, which must be insulated from political pressures – from either the government or the pension industry – and endowed with reasonable resources and enforcement capacities. Supervisory agencies’ procedures for market engagement should be constantly improved and updated to follow market dynamics and ensure compliance with regulations. Institutional structures and methods vary widely throughout the world and this is the first book intended to analyse and compare international experiences on these issues.
OECD's books, periodicals and statistical databases are now available via www.SourceOECD.org, our online library. This book is available to subscribers to the following SourceOECD themes: Emerging Economies Finance and Investment/Insurance and Pensions Transition Economies Ask your librarian for more details of how to access OECD books online, or write to us at
[email protected]
INSTITUTIONS AND METHODS
No. 6
-:HSTCQE=UV[^\W:
INSTITUTIONS AND METHODS
Supervising Private Pensions
This volume offers detailed and comparable information on the supervisory agencies, institutional design and methods in over 40 countries in the OECD area, Latin America, Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia. It is a valuable and practical contribution for policy makers who wish to benefit from pension supervision experiences across countries.
Private Pensions Series
www.oecd.org ISBN 92-64-01697-X 21 2004 03 1 P
No. 6
Histo.fm Page 1 Friday, November 26, 2004 9:09 AM
1SJWBUF1FOTJPOT4FSJFT
4VQFSWJTJOH1SJWBUF 1FOTJPOT */45*565*0/4"/%.&5)0%4
/P
03("/*4"5*0/'03&$0/0.*$$001&3"5*0/"/%%&7&-01.&/5
Histo.fm Page 2 Friday, November 19, 2004 10:55 AM
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
Pursuant to Article 1 of the Convention signed in Paris on 14th December 1960, and which came into force on 30th September 1961, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) shall promote policies designed: – to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of living in member countries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus to contribute to the development of the world economy; – to contribute to sound economic expansion in member as well as non-member countries in the process of economic development; and – to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis in accordance with international obligations. The original member countries of the OECD are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The following countries became members subsequently through accession at the dates indicated hereafter: Japan (28th April 1964), Finland (28th January 1969), Australia (7th June 1971), New Zealand (29th May 1973), Mexico (18th May 1994), the Czech Republic (21st December 1995), Hungary (7th May 1996), Poland (22nd November 1996), Korea (12th December 1996) and the Slovak Republic (14th December 2000). The Commission of the European Communities takes part in the work of the OECD (Article 13 of the OECD Convention).
© OECD 2004 Permission to reproduce a portion of this work for non-commercial purposes or classroom use should be obtained through the Centre français d’exploitation du droit de copie (CFC), 20, rue des Grands-Augustins, 75006 Paris, France, tel. (33-1) 44 07 47 70, fax (33-1) 46 34 67 19, for every country except the United States. In the United States permission should be obtained through the Copyright Clearance Center, Customer Service, (508)750-8400, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923 USA, or CCC Online: www.copyright.com. All other applications for permission to reproduce or translate all or part of this book should be made to OECD Publications, 2, rue André-Pascal, 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France.
FOREWORD
Private pension supervision has been one of the core activities of the OECD Working Party on Private Pension (WPPP) and of the International Network of Pension Regulators and Supervisors (INPRS). The area of private pensions is particularly dynamic due to the accelerated process of financial innovation. Pension supervisors are constantly required to assimilate new trends on the design of financial products, financial market structure, investment alternatives and governance in order to strength supervisory institutions and strategies oriented to ensure compliance with regulations and protect the interests of the participants. In this respect, supervisors can benefit from a continuous process of exchange of experiences’ exchange, and from the identification and dissemination of good practices and standards-setting promoted by the OECD and INPRS. In the December 2002 meeting of the WPPP, the OECD delegates approved a proposal to study the institutional structures for pension funds supervision. An informal task force was established to orient the work and discuss pension supervisory methods in selected OECD countries. During the July 2003 meeting of the WPPP, preliminary reports were discussed and revised for the end of 2003. In the meantime, OECD and INPRS conferences with specific panels on pension supervision were organised in Hyderabad, India (May 2003); San Jose, Costa Rica (July 2003); Prague, Czech Republic (December 2003); Manila, Philippines (April 2004) and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (May 2004) as part of a strategy to engage nonmember countries in the discussion of this subject. The World Bank has also collaborated in this process by designing a distance learning course on pension supervision, conducting research on supervisory methods and providing the two country reports on Hong Kong, China and Bulgaria. This book on pension supervision, released under the Private Pension Series no. 6, brings together selected articles prepared by supervisors and pension experts and discussed in the above mentioned conferences. It includes both the regional perspective and country cases aiming to provide valuable inputs for policy makers and experts on the international comparative experience regarding pension supervision. It was prepared by Mr Vinicius Carvalho Pinheiro from the OECD Financial Affairs Division. The views expressed are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the WPPP, the Insurance Committee, member and nonmember countries.
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS: AN INTRODUCTION by Ambrogio Rinaldi.............................................................................9 Supervisory structures.........................................................................10 Supervisory methods...........................................................................13 Further work........................................................................................17
II.
SUPERVISORY STRUCTURES FOR PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS IN OECD COUNTRIES by Vinicius Carvalho Pinheiro ...........................................................21 Background .........................................................................................21 Institutional framework of private pension fund supervision .............21 Organization of the Supervisory Agency............................................41 Conclusion ..........................................................................................62 Annex II.1. Primary supervisor for pension funds......................67 Annex II.2. Questionnaire on supervisory structure for private pension funds.........................................70 Annex II.3. Distribution of supervisory responsibilities.............75
III.
SUPERVISION OF PENSION FUNDS: THEORY AND PRACTICE by Richard Hinz ..................................................................................77 What is pension supervision?..............................................................77 Rationale for the supervision of private pensions ...............................78 Distinctive features of funded pension systems ..................................81 Primary elements of pension fund supervision ...................................83 Characteristics of supervisory systems ...............................................90 Factors associated with different styles of pension supervision .........92
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
5
IV.
INTEGRATED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS by Edgardo Demaestri and Gustavo Ferro ..........................................97 Introduction.........................................................................................97 The regulation of financial intermediaries and pension funds ............99 Integrated or specialized supervision? ..............................................105 Analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of consolidating pensions under an integrated regulator ........................................110 Specific aspects of pension regulation ..............................................117 Extending the analysis of advantages and disadvantages of integrated supervision, taking into account the peculiarities of pension funds ................................................128 Conclusion ........................................................................................132
V.
THE EXPERIENCE OF CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ON FINANCIAL SUPERVISION by Tibor A. Párniczky .......................................................................139 Changes of supervisory agencies ......................................................140 Functions and responsibilities...........................................................141 Legal mandates of the supervisor......................................................142 Political and institutional independence ...........................................143 Financing ..........................................................................................144 Transparency.....................................................................................146 Human resources...............................................................................147 Organisation......................................................................................148 Conclusions.......................................................................................149
VI.
SUPERVISORY AGENCIES IN LATIN AMERICA by Ana Patricia Morera Martinelli.....................................................153 Introduction.......................................................................................153 General comments on the pension systems.......................................154 Efficacy and efficiency of the superintendencies of pensions ..........162 Main functions of the Superintendencies..........................................174 Conclusions.......................................................................................176 Annex 1. Mission and vision of the superintendencies of pensions..............................................................180
6
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
VII. PRIVATE PENSIONS SUPERVISORY METHODS IN AUSTRALIA by Greg Burner ..................................................................................183 Introduction.......................................................................................183 Types of superannuation entities.......................................................184 Supervisory framework.....................................................................185 Organisation and management of APRA..........................................187 Supervisory methods: entry requirements.........................................191 Supervisory methods: on-going supervision.....................................197 Supervisory examination ..................................................................203 Compliance enforcement and sanctioning ........................................207 Conclusion ........................................................................................211 Annex VIII.1. Explanation of some terms used to describe various arrangements and structures ..............212 Annex VIII.2. Divisional structure of APRA ...........................215 Annex VIII.3. APRA key result areas and key performance indicators .....................217 Annex VIII.4. Disclosure requirements ....................................219 Annex VIII.5. Annual reporting requirements to commence from 1 July 2003 ............................................222 Annex VIII.6. PAIRS/SOARS..................................................225 VIII. PRIVATE PENSIONS SUPERVISORY METHODS IN HUNGARY by Erdos Mihály ................................................................................227 Institutional framework, market structure and general approach to supervision...............................................................................227 Entry requirements............................................................................231 On going supervision ........................................................................237 Compliance, enforcement and sanctioning .......................................243 Conclusions.......................................................................................245 IX.
PENSION FUND SUPERVISORY METHODS IN IRELAND by Mary Hutch...................................................................................247 Introduction.......................................................................................247 Supervisory framework.....................................................................248 The Pensions Board ..........................................................................249 Entry requirements............................................................................251 On going supervision ........................................................................254 Compliance enforcement and sanctioning ........................................262 Conclusions.......................................................................................264
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
7
X.
PENSION FUNDS SUPERVISORY METHODS IN MEXICO by Isaac Voulin..................................................................................269 Introduction.......................................................................................269 Summary of the supervision scheme ................................................271 Supervision scheme ..........................................................................272 Conclusions.......................................................................................278
XI.
SUPERVISION OF PRIVATE PENSION PLANS IN THE UNITED STATES by Morton Klevan, Carol Hamilton and David Ganz........................279 Introduction.......................................................................................279 Department of labour supervisory, compliance and enforcement structure............................................................282 IRS supervisory, compliance and enforcement structure..................294 The supervisory role of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation ..................................................................300 Conclusion ........................................................................................301
XII. THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE SUPERVISORY REGIME OF RETIREMENT INCOME PROVISION IN THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA by Bozhidar Parvanov .......................................................................303 Overview of the Bulgarian pension system: Institutional framework and market structure..............................303 The organization and scope of authority of the Supervisory Agency ..........................................................310 Entry requirements............................................................................314 On-going Supervision .......................................................................316 Compliance enforcement and sanctions............................................318 Conclusions.......................................................................................320 XIII SUPERVISION OF PRIVATELY MANAGED, DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSION SCHEMES IN HONG KONG by Hong Kong Mandatory Provident Fund Authority (MPFA) ........323 Overview of the private pension system ...........................................323 General information about the financial system and culture ............325 Summary of supervisory practices in Hong Kong ............................330 Organization and scope of authority of the Supervisory Agency: ....331 Entry requirements and administration:............................................334 On-going supervision:.......................................................................336
8
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
I.
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS: AN INTRODUCTION by Ambrogio Rinaldi*
In many countries, an ageing population and high (and growing) public spending on social security programmes have led to structural reforms of the pension system. Privately-managed plans, both occupational and personal, play an increasingly important role in supplementing state-run mandatory schemes and in compensating the reduction in benefits they will be able to secure to beneficiaries. Public confidence in the fair and correct functioning of privately-managed plans is a crucial prerequisite for assuring political consensus for pension structural reforms. Appropriate regulation and effective supervision of private pension plans are crucial factors to reinforce confidence, protect beneficiaries and guarantee the financial security of pension plans. Regulation of private pensions has thus received increasing attention in recent years. OECD has played a leading role in this area, first in the context of a research project on ageing societies and then through the activity of the Working Party on Private Pensions (WPPP), established in 1999. Since then, a set of principles and guidelines has been developed, setting standards for appropriate regulation, for the protection of the rights of members and beneficiaries and for the governance of pension plans and funds. Guidelines on further profiles of private pensions are currently being examined and will be issued in the near future. In July 2004, the OECD Council issued a Recommendation on core principles of occupational pension regulation, that is based on the work developed so far in the WPPP. There has been little work until recently, however, in the specific field of supervision. Even amongst those responsible for pension fund supervision in *
Chair of the OECD Working Party on Private Pensions and Director, Covip, Italy.
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
9
different countries, their knowledge of supervisory structures, strategies and practices put in place elsewhere is limited. This is in contrast to other fields of financial intermediation (i.e. banking, insurance, etc.) where the development of cross-border activity and the need for a level playing field has encouraged, since the 1970s, agreement on a set of rules leading to similar regulations and supervision between countries. Although cross-border activity in the area of pension funds is still limited, ensuring and maintaining confidence in the proper functioning of private pensions is increasingly viewed as a public policy priority. As such, knowledge of other countries’ supervisory frameworks is an important opportunity to identify good practices and to learn from other countries’ experiences. In 2002, the OECD Working Party on Private Pensions initiated work in the field of supervisory structures and methods. A detailed questionnaire on supervisory structures was completed by OECD Delegations. In addition, a small, informal task force was set up to examine supervisory practices and methods. The work of this taskforce has been undertaken jointly by the International Network of Pension Regulators and Supervisors (INPRS), an informal worldwide network established with the support of OECD. This partnership has made it possible to extend the scope of the analysis to a much larger group of countries. This book brings together the work accomplished so far on supervisory structures and institutions, and supervisory methods and practices. The first six chapters part contains survey papers that offer a comparative analysis of different profiles of supervisory structures and methods in OECD countries, and/or in specific regions or groups of countries. The following chapters second part contains five seven “country-case-studies” describing in detail the supervisory structure and methods put in place in the five different countries. It provides a wide variety of situations as well as different "styles" of supervision. The authors of the papers are, in almost all cases, officials personally involved in defining strategies and/or carrying out day-to-day managing day-byday operations in national supervisory agencies. This book represents, therefore, a unique, first-hand source of information on how pension fund supervision is organized and conducted across countries. Supervisory structures The Fifteen principles for the regulation an supervision of private occupational pension schemes, approved by the OECD WPPP in 2000, contain the following principle concerning supervisory structures:
10
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
Effective supervision of pension funds and plans must be set-up and focus on legal compliance, financial control, actuarial examination and supervision of managers. Appropriate supervisory bodies, properly staffed and funded, should be established in order to conduct when relevant off and on site supervision, at least for some categories of funds and in particular when problems are reported. Supervisory bodies should be endowed with appropriate regulatory and supervisory powers over individual plans, in order to prevent mis-selling cases arising from irregularities in the distribution and expenses methods. On the basis of the information that has been collected, it is possible to be confident that in almost all OECD countries the institutional design of supervision is very much in line with the above stated principle. However, two main observations can be made. First, while the requirements identified in the principle are all very important, other features of supervisory structures should also be considered as crucial, such as: x
the provision for a well-defined mission statement for the supervisory authority. This should be accompanied by sufficient financial means and a not too detailed legal definition of specific tasks and controls to be performed. An appropriate mission statement provides for adequate flexibility, allowing the supervisor to effectively adopt a risk-based approach and concentrate his activity and resources on the factors that are most important for the protection of beneficiaries and the security of funds;
x
the recognition of the need for co-operation and for information sharing arrangements between different supervisory authorities, or between departments within the same authority in the case of integrated supervisory structures;
x
the design of the governance of the supervisory authorities. In the composition and the functioning of the governing boards, while it is crucial to ensure operational independence and professional expertise, it is also important to provide for accountability mechanisms, not only with respect to the government and/or the Parliament, but also to the interested parties from the pensions industry. In fact (as well as the top managers of the supervisory authority), representatives of employers, trade unions and the financial industry are sometimes included in the governing boards.
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
11
Secondly, the findings presented here show a large degree of diversity between national institutional structures of the private pension funds supervision in OECD countries as a function of different factors. These include the institutional history of supervision, the political and administrative organisation of the state (federal, unitary, centralised, decentralised); characteristics the pension scheme (mandatory, voluntary, occupational, personal, defined contribution or defined benefit); and market structure (number of funds/plans, type of fund/plans, market concentration degree). Three private pension supervisory structure models have been identified: (i) a specialised pension model, with one or more agencies dedicated exclusively to pension fund supervision; (ii) a partially integrated model, with one agency responsible for insurance and private pension supervision; and (iii) an integrated model, with one institution responsible for the overall financial sector supervision, including banks, securities, insurance companies, and pensions funds, and sometimes also banks. None of these three models currently holds a general position of dominance. In the 28 countries examined in the paper by Carvalho-Pinheiro, there is an even spread of these three models (Table II.2). In several of the country replies quoted in both this study the mentioned paper and the one by Demaestri and Ferro, several arguments are presented in favour of integration. These include the expansion of financial conglomerates, economies of scale and scope in supervision, avoiding the problem of overlapping authority, consistency between supervisory objectives in different sectors, and efficiency of information flow. Arguments in favour of specialisation are related to the specificities of private pension arrangements with important social profiles and specific tax treatments, which require a different approach regarding the supervision of their risks and their relations with members. This seems particularly to be the case as regards occupational schemes, where the role of employers and often of trade unions is crucial, and the pension fund frequently is a non-profit institution that serves as an intermediary between its members and financial markets. In fact, there are countries with integrated agencies for the financial sector that maintain separate, segregated agencies for occupational pension plans (Japan, Sweden and the UK). A single case (Australia) is also reported as having two agencies competent for all financial sectors/intermediaries (included pension funds), and functions specialised by objectives (prudential supervision vs consumer protection). More recently, also the Netherlands decided to adopt a similar model. 12
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
The observed diversity suggests that the final objectives of supervision (protection of members, security of funds and plans) may (and probably should) be sought by means of different institutional frameworks in different countries as a function of the institutional context and the structure of the pension system. This finding is in line with the conclusion already reached by other OECD studies (Lumpkin, 2002) for the supervision of the financial services industry. In fact, when the peculiarities of pension funds are considered, the case for a variety of different possible approaches to supervisory institutional design seems even more convincing than in the case of the financial industry stricto sensu. Supervisory methods The OECD WPPP initiated work on supervisory methods by establishing a small, informal task force in 2002. Two meetings, in December 2002 and June 2003, were held under the joint aegis of OECD WPPP and the INPRS. The work aimed to review and describe supervisory procedures used in different countries in order to improve mutual knowledge and provide international comparative information, with the possibility of identifying good practices. The objective to set standards and define guidelines seemed too far away and was not considered during this first stage. It was decided to produce a set of country-case-studies that would cover a variety of situations and possible approaches to supervision. The comparison of country cases would show how different practices and techniques are used in different situations and would lead to the identification of regularities, and possibly "good" practices as a function of circumstances. The focus of the analysis was the operational management of the supervision in the context of its customization to the market, legal framework and supervisory structure. It was agreed to give attention to the operational and day-to-day aspects of the management of supervision, and to the changes in the supervisory methods that occur in response to changes in the economic conditions, legal framework, government philosophy, supervisory structure, and/or market conditions. The primary attention was put on occupational pension plans, although treatment of personal pension plans was demanded where such schemes are important. On the other hand, the scope of the study excluded insurance contracts as such (although they may be used in both occupational and personal pension plans) in so far as the supervision on insurance is a topic that already receives attention in other contexts.
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
13
Despite their potential and actual diversity, national supervision systems were to be analysed using as a reference the model proposed by the Basle Committee for the entire financial sector, that comprises three components: ex ante, on going and ex post supervision. Authors from five countries volunteered to produce and actually delivered their own case-studies: Australia, Hungary, Ireland, Mexico and United States. Other two case-studies (Bulgaria, Hong Kong) were later added in collaboration with the World Bank. The seven country papers are reproduced in this book. The country papers offer a synthetic, introductory description of their approach and of the main elements of the actual organization and management of supervision (i.e. reactive vs. proactive, risk-based, etc.). Primarily as a function of the institutional and market context, the general approach to supervision and its organization and procedures varies significantly. Countries characterized by a very large number of pension funds (Ireland, United States) – have a reactive approach, while countries with a smaller number of funds (Mexico, Hungary) are able to choose a proactive stance. A mixed reactiveproactive approach is followed by Australia, the country (among those covered in the country papers) that shows most distinctly a risk-based approach. As regards ex ante supervision, the necessary entry requirements are described: licensing procedures, registration processes and any other methods of restricting and controlling entry in the private pension market. A description is also given of the procedures and documents required for licensing and registration of the fund and of the internal rules related to corporate governance. Where relevant, requirements for pension fund managing companies, and minimum capital and reserve levels are also considered. Moreover, the bureaucratic requirements to qualify for tax advantages are examined. In countries where the number of schemes is large, these rely on registration and self-compliance, while countries with a small number of entries can afford detailed licensing procedures. It should be noted that licensing procedures are required where funds or fund managing companies compete on the retail market offering personal plans (e.g. Mexico, Hungary). On the other hand, the need for a prior authorization is not obvious in the case of occupational plans, where fund members are not offered any alternative vehicle for their supplementary pension and there is no risk of mis-selling practices. On-going supervision, i.e. the organization and the day-by-day conduct of the oversight of fund operations, was requested to be a central topic of country
14
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
studies. In particular, country studies provide a description of the mix of instruments and techniques that are used in order to collect information and to check the compliance with regulation: off-site monitoring, on-site inspections, meetings and interviews with pension funds’ directors and managers, contacts with external and internal auditors and actuaries (whistle-blowing), complaints from members/beneficiaries. In countries characterized by a reactive approach, whistle-blowing is the main source of information for supervision. For example, actuaries and auditors in Ireland have a statutory duty to report the supervisor of any irregularities they encounter. In general, this source of information may be very effective and reliable for supervisory purposes, as it is entrusted to well-trained professionals who are in the best position to detect problems at an early stage when they arise. However, recent developments in another country (the United Kingdom) which relies very much on whistle-blowing, suggest that there might also be pitfalls. This is the case when regulations do not offer the possibility to discriminate between futile and serious irregularities, thus exposing the supervisory authority to the risk that whistle-blowers exaggerate reporting, blowing the whistle also when there is no material danger for members or beneficiaries. In countries where pension funds are relatively recent, reliance on frequent (even daily), electronically-based flow of information is observed. This is the case of Mexico, Hungary and Bulgaria. In the case of Mexico, the approach tries to address the problem of building confidence in the initial stage of the system. The Mexican country paper, in fact, declares the intention to gradually ease direct control, allow a degree of self-regulation, and make fund managers more responsible. Specific attention is addressed to on-site inspections, their periodicity and the way subjects to be inspected are identified, time and resources allocated. Although the power to make on-site inspections is considered essential in all country studies, the actual utilization varies. Ireland (where the balance between the number of funds or plans to supervise and the staff available is less favourable) has not used this instrument so far. Hungary is planning to reduce on-site inspections in favour of off-site monitoring which is less resource intensive and often just as effective. Country studies focus also on the way the supervisory authority processes and analyses the data, and the criteria it uses to evaluate performance of supervised pension funds/plans (i.e. rating, informal methods, etc.). In a riskbased approach, such as the one followed in Australia, the analysis of data is central to the assessment of risks that characterize the activity of the fund; the
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
15
estimates that are thus created are then supplemented by the assessment – judgemental in nature – of the ability of the pension fund to manage its risks. The papers provide information on compliance assistance programs that are incorporated into the supervision process in order to assist funds in understanding the requirements and facilitating compliance. Countries with a large number of funds tend to rely more on communication and guidelines made available to trustees and fund administrators. Reliance on communication and advice prevents the emergence of problems and is generally considered an effective way to save resources otherwise to be spent on ex post investigation and remedial action. Finally, country studies describe compliance enforcement methods and sanctioning. Administrative remedies, punitive or compensatory sanctions, are described, as well as civil monetary penalties and criminal sanctions, and the intervention and liquidation procedures. In countries with a reactive approach, correction mechanisms are very important, as supervisory action typically starts when the irregularity has already occurred. In mature systems such as the United States corrective measures often take the form of voluntary compliance, aiming more to remedy the consequences of the failure to comply with rules than to punish the misbehaviour. This approach favours a cooperative stance between the supervisory authority and the pension entities, although it requires a high level of integrity of the financial and administrative environment, and the credible threat of effective and timely penalties/redress mechanisms should voluntary compliance not occur. Richard Hinz, former Chairman of the OECD WPPP, presents an original methodological framework for evaluating the characteristics of private pension supervision with a view to obtaining initial observations on the way in which the supervision is organised and conducted, and how it relates to the environment in which it operates. He identifies six primary elements of pension fund supervision – licensing, monitoring, communication, analysis, intervention and correction. The manner in which different systems implement the basic elements defines what may be viewed as the "style" of pension supervision. He then lays down the scale of intensity of private pension supervision along a spectrum of attributes and identifies the factors that influence the degree of intensity of supervisory oversight. He argues that mandatory systems require more intensive supervision due to greater reliance on pension for subsistence, whereas more developed economies with a large number of funds and with high per capita GDP seem to lower the intensity of supervision. This correlates with a stronger social safety net, better capacity of the population to exercise individual oversight, and greater reliance on communication and market-based competition to create discipline in the market. Financial market development 16
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
and an effective “rule of law” facilitate less intensive supervision as more financial products enhance competition and allow greater reliance on market forces. The respect of rule of law implies greater reliance on negotiation processes and litigation, thus diminishing the need for public intervention. As a final summary, a large diversity of supervisory methods and practices is observed, even within the small sample of country case studies conducted so far. If a single common ground has to be identified, one could point to the need to organize supervision in such a way that there is consistency between the endowment of resources available for supervision and the extent of tasks entrusted with the supervisor, which is primarily a function of the number of funds and plans to be supervised, but it is also connected with the regulatory approach. In cases where the need to build confidence in private pension system is the main concern, and the financial environment is not fully developed, there is a tendency for supervisory authorities to carry on a sort of monopoly in the exercise of regulatory and supervisory powers. In this case, the centralization of controls is felt to be necessary, and the flow of information requested and collected by the supervisory authority may be very detailed and frequent. This approach often goes hand-in-hand with quantitative limits set on pension funds' investments. In cases where the financial and the private pension systems are more mature, controls tend to be decentralized to parties that are closer to the entities to be supervised and are therefore in a better position to appreciate specificities of a single plan or fund and the materiality of potential threats to the interest of members and beneficiaries (this is consistent with the trend for a risk-based approach that makes efficient use of scarce supervisory resources). Supervisory functions are therefore distributed in the system and their effectiveness depends largely on the appropriate functioning of the “regulatory space” as a whole and not only on the way the supervisor is able to perform his tasks. In such a context, more flexible rules are provided for (as the prudent person approach to pension funds’ investments), and self-regulation and appropriate governance of pension funds are central elements of the supervisory strategy. Further work Contributions collected in this book represent a unique, first-hand source of information on how supervision of pension funds is organized and conducted across countries. However, this should be considered as a starting point. Mutual understanding and recognition of national regulatory and supervisory frameworks continue to have a long way to go, as does the careful identification of good practices and eventually the elaboration of guidelines.
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
17
In the future, several international fora will be involved concurrently in the analysis of regulatory and supervisory systems for pension funds. This is already the case in several instances. The International Organization of Pension Supervisors (IOPS), established in July 2004 as an evolution of the OECD-connected INPRS, constitutes a natural forum for the continuation of the analyses collected in this book. The discussion that took place in the INPRS Technical Committee between 2002 and 2003 led to an agreed solution on the way to define the scope of the new organization and to differentiate it from the OECD WPPP. IOPS will be an institutional-based organisation with members coming from supervisory agencies and not countries. It will focus on supervision and regulatory issues linked to supervision. It will be a world-wide organization, with regional committees put in place. The European Union also became active in the field of private pensions, adopting a directive concerning the supervision and the activity of occupational and professional pension funds. In the context of the so-called Lamfalussy approach to financial regulation in the European Union, committees were created to co-ordinate work between the competent ministries (EIOPC) and the supervisory authorities (CEIOPS) of member states competent in the field of insurance and of occupational pensions. In the framework of CEIOPS, a permanent working group on occupational pensions was established. The International Association of Pension Fund Supervisors (AIOS) will continue to constitute an important forum for supervisory institutions from countries where, as in Latin America, pension systems are based on mandatory personal pension plans. The OECD WPPP, while focusing more on policy and regulatory issues, will also continue to consider supervision within the scope of its activity when it is linked to regulatory issues. The activity of the above-mentioned fora will certainly stimulate rapid progress in mutual understanding of supervisory structures and practices and in cooperation between competent authorities of different countries. A degree of specialization between the different fora will certainly emerge. Co-operation will be favoured by the fact that in most cases the same national institutions are represented in the diverse fora. Let me conclude this introduction pointing out the topics regarding pension fund supervision that I foresee as among the most useful to analyse in the future. In my view, the three following topics deserve particular attention.
18
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
x
Risk-based supervision is already receiving increasing attention by supervisory authorities in many countries. It is a way to concentrate scarce resources on the factors with the largest expected impact on members’ interests. It goes hand-in-hand with a more proactive stance with respect to the funds most at risk. Risk-based supervision is already standard practice in other fields of financial intermediation (i.e. banking, insurance). It is not obvious, however, how methods and tools that are used in these fields can successfully be applied to private pensions, especially in the case of occupational schemes. One example is capital requirements, as the non-profit nature of most pension funds may change their impact fundamentally with respect to the case they are applied to profit-making financial intermediaries.
x
In many countries, there is the intention to ease or abandon quantitative limits to pension fund investments and substitute them with the prudent person approach. While pros and cons of the two different approaches have been discussed at length, it is less obvious how supervisory authorities will manage the transition between the two approaches, in terms of day-by-day supervisory practices, including the development of appropriate skills of the supervisory staff.
x
The general trend in favour of defined contribution schemes implies the diffusion of member-directed schemes, as it is fair that those who bear the risk of investments are also offered the possibility to make choices on their risk profile. However, even in the case where adequate information is supplied to them, the actual ability of pension fund members to make knowledgeable choices may be inadequate anyway Therefore there is an urgent need to empower fund members with effective programs improving their financial literacy, as well as to keep offered investment options as simple as possible. In particular, the risk of allowing the mis-selling of high-cost pension products to workers that do not fully perceive those costs and do not in fact need unduly sophisticated products should be minimized. Also, the provision of carefully designed default options in all cases where fund members are not able or willing to make their choices is going to be a crucial element in the design of a successful framework. In my view, the development of supervisory practices that help minimize the risk of ill-based individual choices will be one of the most challenging tasks for private pension supervisors in the coming years.
Mutual exchange of information on the experience gained by pension fund supervisory authorities in different countries in addressing these issues will be very helpful.
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
19
II.
SUPERVISORY STRUCTURES FOR PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS IN OECD COUNTRIES by Vinicius Carvalho Pinheiro*
Background The study of the supervisory structures for private pension funds is a core activity of the OECD Working Party on Private Pensions (WPPP) and the International Network for Pensions Regulators and Supervisors (INPRS). This study develops a comparative analysis of the institutional environment of private pension funds supervision. It begins with a review of the different types of organisational arrangements according to market structure and the relationship between regulatory and supervisory agencies1. It then proceeds to analyse the operational independence, governance, accountability and enforcement capacities of supervisory agencies as well as the internal organisation of the latter. This analysis focuses on the primary supervisors as identified in Appendix 1. The information presented is based on the responses to a questionnaire on supervisory structures for private pensions (Appendix II.2) provided by twenty OECD countries (Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom). The responses provide a unique cross-country comparison of the information available on this issue. Further information from other OECD countries, collected from different sources, is also provided. The information is updated until 2003. Institutional framework of private pension fund supervision Private pensions are long-term contracts that compromise a sizable share of the worker’s income and operate in markets subjected to failures related to asymmetric information, adverse selection and moral hazard. Government *
OECD Consultant seconded by the Brazilian Government.
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
21
intervention is crucial to design regulations oriented to avoid systemic crisis and to guarantee the financial and actuarial sustainability of the private pension system. Regulations have to be implemented by supervisory institutions, which ought to be properly staffed and financed, insulated from political pressures — from either the government or the pension industry — and endowed with reasonable enforcement capacities. Objectives and functions The main objective of the private pension supervision is to ensure compliance with regulations in order to protect the interests of the members and safeguard the stability of the system. These elements are presented in the stated missions of the majority of the surveyed supervisory agencies, as listed in Table II.1. Table II.1. Selected OECD Supervisory Agencies’ Stated Missions APRA (Australia)
“…to establish and enforce prudential standards and practices designed to ensure that, under all reasonable circumstances, financial promises made by institutions we supervise are met within a stable, efficient and competitive financial system”.
OSFI (Canada)
“…to safeguard policyholders, depositors and pension plan members from undue loss”.
FSA (Denmark)
“…maintain confidence in the financial sector - both in relation to society and to the individual person - by: ensuring that financial legislation is observed. This includes the prevention of offences that may arise in specific areas, for instance the areas of solvency and liquidity; participating in the elaboration of financial legislation, and collecting and publishing information relating to the financial sector”.
BaFin (Germany)
“…to ensure that the interests of the insured are adequately safeguarded and that liabilities under insurance contracts can be met at all times (…). The objective of legal supervision is the proper operation of insurance business including observance of the supervisory provisions, provisions concerning the insurance contracts and any other provisions concerning the insured as well as of the legal bases of the operating plan.”
HFSA (Hungary)
“…to facilitate the smooth operation of the financial markets and promote the protection of clients of financial organizations, and their consumers; to maintain and strengthen confidence in financial markets; to contribute to the transparency of the markets, provide for the improved awareness of consumers and to the regulation of fair competition in the market.”
FSA (Norway)
“ensure that the institutions it supervises operate in an appropriate and proper manner in accordance with law and provisions issued pursuant to law and with the intentions underlying the establishment of the institution, its purpose and articles of association”
22
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
FME (Iceland)
“...to ensure that these (parties subject to official supervision) are in accordance with laws, regulations, rules and by-laws governing such activities, and that they are in other respects consistent with sound and proper business practices.”
Pension Board (Ireland)
“…to promote the security and protection of members of occupational pension schemes and contributors to Personal Retirement Savings Accounts, in accordance with the Pensions Act, 1990; to promote the development of efficient national pension structures; to promote a level of participation in the national pension system which enables all citizens to acquire an adequate retirement income; and to provide information and authoritative guidance to relevant parties in support of pension security, structures and participation”.
COVIP (Italy)
“…aiming at the safe and transparent management of pension funds and at the appropriate functioning of the supplementary pensions system”.
CONSAR (Mexico)
“…to protect the interest of the workers and their beneficiaries by an efficient management of their retirement savings.”
PVK (Netherlands)
“…to ensure that insurers and pension funds fulfill their obligations to policyholders, pension scheme members and pension recipients.”
KNUiFE (Poland)
“…to protect the interests of members of the funds and members of the employee pension plans.”
Finansinspektionen (FI) (Sweden)
“…promotion of financial stability and efficiency in the financial sector and promotion of consumer protection goals.”
Source: Replies to the OECD Secretariat questionnaire. In most cases, the quotations are legal provisions or mission statements.
In most surveyed countries, the stated mission is defined in the legislation and is the basis for the organisation of the supervisory agency. It provides guidance for the institutionalisation of values and the creation of corporate culture. A clear definition of objectives and mission is also important for the delimitation of tasks between agencies and for designing supervisory functions. The objective “protecting the plan member’s interest and safeguarding the stability of the system” effectively means assuring compliance with regulations to mitigate risks and to guarantee that liabilities under pension contracts are met. Additional concerns arise when pension funds are set up. If plans use existing financial products as funding vehicles, then financial sector supervisors can normally be relied upon to provide adequate protection. The risks involved in private pension activities are mainly related to the inadequate organisational structure and operation of the pension fund, mismanagement, inaccurate actuarial and asset evaluation, investment portfolio, annuity fund and liquidity mismanagement, improper accounting, high SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
23
administrative costs and market structure. External risks related to the functioning of financial and insurance markets, to economic performance and to political stability should also be considered. In order to implement mission statements effectively, it is necessary to establish functions and design an institutional framework with one or more agencies to operate them. Typical supervisory functions include implementing regulation related to: licensing/registration; qualification for tax benefits; compliance to governance rules; contributions and regularity of payment; membership and portability (enrolment process, transfers and compliance); benefits eligibility; financial literacy; conditions and access to plans; investments, asset allocation, performance, minimum capital and reserves; custodian procedures; financial, actuarial and accounting methods; administrative costs, fees and marketing; disclosure procedures; and merger and liquidation processes. Governments organise institutional structures designed to implement supervisory functions according to the administrative organisation of the state, the distribution of competencies between different levels of government and between institutions, the development of financial markets and services, the features of pension plans and the nature of the regulatory approach applied to these schemes. Political organisation of the state In federative or decentralized countries, the action of the central supervisory agency may be quite limited. The Canadian Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institution (OSFI) is responsible for only 8% of the country’s regulated pension plans, covering 10% of plan membership. Almost all of Canada’s provinces have separate local agencies that are responsible for provincially regulated pension plans within their jurisdictions. The Australian public servants’ superannuation schemes are not implemented under the same rules and supervisory procedures as are applied to the private sector. They are subject to Commonwealth, State or Territory government supervision under their enabling acts. A federative agreement requires these funds to comply with the spirit of the general regulation. In the US, states also have federative autonomy to regulate and supervise pension funds for their public servants. In Sweden, Finansinspektionen (FI) is the primary supervisory agency for all financial institutions, including “friendly societies”2, but excluding the pension foundations3 which are monitored by the parties to the agreements.
24
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
County administrative boards may supervise occupational plans sponsored by employers seeking to establish a pension foundation according to the region where they are located. Since there are twenty four counties in Sweden, the rules of supervision and practices can vary significantly. Institutional and functional structure Private pension supervision involves complex interactions between social security, tax, financial and insurance sectors. Generally, pension fund supervisors are located in an institutional environment, including social and economic institutions such as Ministries of Finance, Labour and Social Security, Central Banks or other financial sector supervisory authorities. Tax authorities also supervise private pensions since they are often in charge of granting tax exemptions. However, with the exception of a few countries (e.g. US), tax authorities are not responsible for prudential supervision or for protection of members and beneficiaries’ rights. Supervisors customise their organisation and activities to suit the complexity of the pension fund industry. According to OECD taxonomy, pension funds may support public or private pension plans. From a functional perspective, pension plans may also be mandatory or voluntary, defined contribution (DC) or defined benefit (DB), and occupational or personal. A description of the main characteristics of the surveyed countries’ private pension schemes is provided in Appendix 2. Similarly, the structure of supervisory authorities should adequately address the institutional form of the pension funds, designing procedures for autonomous and non-autonomous funds, as well as for group, collective, related members, and individual pension funds. It is also necessary to distinguish between two main legal forms of autonomous pension funds: pension entities and separate accounts. Pension entities can be trusts, foundations or corporate entities that own and may control the pension fund on behalf of the plan members. They are the most common type of autonomous pension fund in OECD countries. Separate accounts, on the other hand, are autonomous pension funds without legal personality or capacity that are managed by financial institutions (sometimes special-purpose institutions, pension fund managing companies). Generally, the institutional structure of private pension supervision can be classified into three main approaches according to the extent to which the authority responsible for pension supervision is also competent to supervise other financial institutions: (i) specialized pension model, with one or more agencies dedicated exclusively to pension fund supervision; (ii) partially
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
25
integrated model, with one agency responsible for insurance and private pension supervision and (iii) integrated model, with one institution responsible for the overall financial sector supervision, including banks, securities, insurance companies and pensions funds. Table II.2 shows how OECD country supervisors currently fit into this classification.
Table II.2. Private Pension Funds Supervisory Structures in OECD Countries Integrated (Banks, Securities, Insurance Companies, Pension Funds) Australia
Partially Integrated (Insurance Companies and Pension Funds)
Specialized (Pension Funds)
Belgium(*)
Ireland
Austria
Czech Republic
Italy
Canada
Finland
Japan
Denmark
Luxembourg
Mexico
Germany
Netherlands (**)
Slovak Republic
Hungary
New Zealand
Sweden
Iceland
Poland
Switzerland
Korea
Portugal
United Kingdom
Norway
Spain
United States
Turkey (*) A new integrated agency starts to operate in 2004. (**) The country is in process to consolidate the financial supervision. Source: Replies to the OECD Secretariat questionnaire and INPRS database.
Historically, in many countries, private pension supervision has been based either on insurance/financial/pension arrangements linked either directly or indirectly to Ministries of Finance or on specialised arrangements under Ministries of Labour, Social Security and/or Social Affairs. Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States all organise their supervision around specialised supervisory authorities. This model is characterized by the segregation of supervisory functions and the fragmentation of supervision for different private pension schemes or products. Generally, distinct agencies conduct the supervision of occupational and personal plans and there are more than three institutions involved in the overall process, which reinforces the necessity for effective co-ordination and co-operation mechanisms.
26
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
In Ireland, the Pension Board is the primary supervisor for occupational schemes, whilst personal pension plans are overseen by of the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment. Japan follows the same model. The Pension Board, linked to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, supervises most of the occupational pension funds and another agency is in charge of voluntary plans. The Financial Service authority in Japan and the Central Bank in Ireland are also involved in the process related to custodian and investment procedures. In Italy, COVIP (Commissione di vigilanza sui fondi pensione) is the primary pension fund supervisor. It supervises all the new pension funds (closed and open) set up under the new legislation and the pre-1993 “old” autonomous and non-autonomous pension funds internal to undertakings other than banks and insurance companies. The Bank of Italy and the Institute for Private Insurance Surveillance (ISVAP) supervise pension plans instituted as book services respectively within banks and insurance companies. As part of its general supervisory powers, ISVAP also supervises life insurance products that can serve as individual pension plans. In Mexico, the supervisory functions for personal mandatory plans are divided between the National Institute of Social Security —Instituto Mexicano de Seguridad Social (IMSS) — and the National Commission for Retirement Savings System – Comision Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro para Retiro (CONSAR). IMSS performs supervisory functions related to: contributions and regularity of payment; membership and portability; benefits eligibility conditions and access to plans. CONSAR is responsible for licensing; compliance with regulations on governance; asset allocation; financial, actuarial and accounting methods; disclosure, merger and liquidation. The Ministry of Finance is in charge of supervising personal voluntary pension plans. In the United Kingdom, occupational pension funds are subject to surveillance by the Inland Revenue, the Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority (OPRA), the Pension Compensation Board, the Department of Social Security and the Financial Service Authority (FSA). The United States has several agencies in charge of the supervision of private pension occupational schemes. The US Department of Labor, Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration (PWBA) primarily supervises the protection of employee benefit rights and fiduciary obligations for corporate and multiemployer voluntary pension plans. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) provides protection for the termination of defined benefit schemes. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS), overseen by the United States Department of Treasury, operates and supervises the tax treatment related to pensions and, in that role, is responsible for the registration (tax qualification) of pension plans.
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
27
The partially integrated perspective is in use in a number of OECD countries, namely Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Turkey. They have combined the supervision of insurance and pension funds under an integrated agency which is separated from other financial supervision tasks, or which resides in a specific department of the Ministries of Finance, Labour or other ministries. In all these surveyed countries, occupational and personal plans, contracted out under voluntary or mandatory basis, are under the oversight of the same agency. However, in Poland, one possible form of a voluntary occupational pension plan is to establish an agreement with an investment fund. The pension plan is registered by the insurance and pension supervisory body, but the fund itself is supervised by the Securities and Exchange Commission In Portugal, the Netherlands and Spain, both occupational and personal voluntary pension plans, as well as insurance companies, are supervised by a single agency: the General Directorate for Insurance and Pension Funds (Dirección General de Seguros y Fondos de Pensiones), under the Ministry of Economy in Spain, and in the Netherlands by the Pensions and Insurance Supervisory Authority (Pensioen & Verzekeringskamer), an independent Dutch agency with specialised departments. In Portugal, the Portuguese Insurance Institute (Instituto de Seguros de Portugal – ISP) is a public autonomous body linked to the Ministry of Finance. In Poland, there are only voluntary occupational pension programs, which can be established in a form of agreement with life insurance companies, investment funds or in a form of separate employee pension fund. Under certain circumstances, personal (individual) contracts with life insurance companies (unit linked products) or with investment funds, for purposes of practice, may be considered as a personal pension operation but the law does not distinguish them as a separate legal institution. The pension funds are overseen by the Commission of Insurance, and Pension Fund Supervision (KNUiFE). Recently, some OECD countries have adopted an integrated supervisory perspective in their financial sector, reforming their supervisory framework to build a unified supervisory authority. This process started during the 80’s and in early 90’s in Scandinavian countries (Norway in 1986; Denmark in 1988; and Sweden in 1991) and in Canada in 1987. These countries had unified their previously specialised agencies in order to adapt the institutional regulatory and supervisory structure to the market structure dominated by financial conglomerates delivering banking, insurance and pensions services and products.
28
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
In recent years, Australia (1998) has adopted an integrated approach as part of the pension reform process. Nonetheless, agencies which integrate the supervision of all of the financial sectors into a single organization do not necessarily embrace all of the supervisory functions. Australia has an integrated sector model, but the supervisory functions are divided between the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) and the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC). APRA is responsible for licensing and prudential supervision of the plan and pension fund rules and investments. ASIC is responsible for pension fund market conduct. Korea (1999) has also unified its supervisory agencies in a package of measures to strengthen the financial system after the 1997 economic crisis. This pattern was followed by Iceland (1999), which has several financial conglomerates in the market structure and therefore implemented a unified agency. Hungary established the integrated Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (HFSA) in April 2000, consolidating the supervision of banks, credit institutions and co-operatives, financial enterprises, investment funds and service providers, insurers, health and income replacement funds, as well as mandatory and voluntary pension funds. Since 2001, Austria has also established a similar agency in order to adapt the supervision structure to fit the shape of the market, (banks and insurance companies hold the control of several pension funds). Germany was the last OECD country to adopt this integrated model in 2002. The integrated approach has been proposed as a way to adapt the supervisory framework to the development of financial conglomerates and to address the blurring of differences across financial products. Experts in different products working together in a unified agency would improve the risk assessment taken over by financial conglomerates. Some surveyed countries argue that the main advantage to moving to a single supervisor is the adoption of an integrated supervisory approach. According to the Australian Delegation’s response to the questionnaire: “the integrated nature of APRA enables its approach to supervision to be more holistic with a view to the operation of the superannuation industry within the context of the broader financial services sector”. For the Hungarian Delegation, integrated supervision has led to a comprehensive control activity – “(…) within this framework, different business lines and transactions can be assessed with the involved partners at the same time. This integrated approach allows for consolidated supervision. The legal
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
29
and supervisory arbitrage of the market players could be limited”. The consolidated supervision can standardize actuarial, accounting and financing parameters for financial entities, thus avoiding differences and inconsistencies of supervision between financial sector as well as addressing discrepancies between regulatory issues. Nonetheless, Hungarian Financial Services Authority (HFSA) representatives remind us that “an effective integrated supervision requires a coherent and well-developed institutional culture.” Another argument for financial integration is related to economies of scale and scope, and to the simplification of the system. The Canadian Delegation replied to the questionnaire affirming: “the simplicity of this system reduces the regulatory cost and burden, while encouraging compliance and new entry”. In fact, the consolidation of various specialized agencies may decrease the overall supervisory administrative cost, thereby increasing efficiency. The integration of supervisory procedures may reduce and simplify the amount of documents usually sent by entities to supervisors; eliminate duplications and authority overlapping; optimise licensing procedures and facilitate the integration between off-site monitoring and on-site supervision. Furthermore, integration would enable the use of joining supporting services that are multiplied in various institutions in the specialised model. A single complaint-handling regime and a single compensation scheme can be established. This would save scarce government human and material resources and reduce operational burden over supervised entities Additionally, financial supervision decisions require the on-line availability of strategic information. The specialised model may delay data consolidation or reduce the quality of the information, since they are collected and recorded in fragmented databases under different labels. The agencies’ integration may improve the information provision efficiency to avoid systemic crisis, identify illegal procedures and safeguard the credibility of the system. Others consider that actual integration is not a prerequisite to achieve these objectives. The Italian Delegation reports, for instance, “problems due to the separation of supervisory activities over the financial sector between many different bodies may be overcome with a timely and open exchange of information and an effective cooperation”. The effectiveness of the integrated approach to financial supervision is a controversial issue which does not benefit from any conclusive evidence. Proponents of financial integration argue that a single agency would work with greater efficiency at a lower cost for supervisors, pension funds and other supervised financial institutions due to “economies of scale and scope, reduction in the reporting requirements, consistency in the treatment of different sectors, capacity to solve conflicts, accountability, and capacity to 30
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
implement a risk-based supervision model”.4 Nonetheless, Lumpkin (2002) argues that the effect on costs of the reduction in the number of supervisory agencies remains unclear and the question of whether the organisational structure of supervision needs to mirror the structure of the financial system remains controversial.5 The arguments against integration and in favour of the specialised model for private pension supervision are based on the differences between the pension service and product business and other financial business. Pensions are long-term contracts with specific tax treatments and social aspects, which would require a different approach regarding the supervision of their assets, liabilities and risks. This seems to be the case as regards occupational schemes where employment relationship must be considered and where the employer frequently serves as an intermediary between members of the pension plan or fund and the financial institution. The Italian Delegation reports that a specialised agency can better concentrate expertise and knowledge on the pension funds sector. They raised the following point: “the supervision on pension funds is carried out from a distinct perspective with respect to the supervision of other financial intermediaries, in order to fully take into account their differences from other financial intermediaries (contractual pension funds are on the buying side of the market for financial services; they are non-profit organizations; they are run on a parity basis by employers and trade unions and their establishment is part of the system of industrial relations).” In the case of Swedish pension foundations, it is reported that “the number of supervisory authorities (one for each county) may lead to very diverse supervision, but also to flexibility.” In the case of Latin American reforms, Demarco et al. (1998) mention that a new specialised agency might be more effective than other arrangements. The authors justify their position in relation to the lack of tradition on the supervision of new products, suspicion on the lack of transparency in preexisting agencies and the absence of experience on supervising complex interactions which combine capital markets, insurance and social security.6 For the Mexican Delegation, the institutional and the functional specialisation are considered an advantage. According to Mexico’s reply: “since CONSAR does not oversee the payment process nor the eligibility of the retirees, it can focus its efforts on the surveillance of specific processes of the pension system. CONSAR has developed state–-of–the–-art technology to oversee the pension funds operation.”
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
31
The particularities of pension fund supervision may explain why Japan, Sweden and the United Kingdom have created unified financial services authorities, excluding the supervision of the occupational pension funds and maintaining segregate agencies dealing with it. In Japan, the Financial Services Authority is in charge of the personal pension plans and the Pension Bureau oversees, for the most part, the occupational scheme. Similarly, the British Financial Services Authority, created in 2000, oversees the marketing of personal pensions, including stakeholder pensions, with particular emphasis on promotion, selling and advice. The specialised agency (OPRA), established in 1995, is the primary supervisor of most of the regulations of the occupational and personal pension schemes. In Sweden, one of the pioneers of the financial services authority consolidation, the responsibility to supervise the pension foundations remain with the county supervisory boards and the FI oversees only the mutual benefit companies offering insurance solutions similar to life insurance. Moreover, there is a crucial distinction in these countries between the organisational integration of supervisory institutions and the functional integration of supervision procedures. The existence of an integrated supervisory authority does not necessarily imply consolidated supervision. More generally, it should be noted that in most integrated and partially integrated models, the supervision of pensions is actually conducted by a specialised department/division. In the Netherlands, there is an on-going initiative to reform the supervisory framework by building an integrated agency, but maintaining a specialised approach for the pension funds supervision. In March 2003, the Dutch Parliament decided to merge the Central Bank, responsible for banks and investment institutions, and the Pension and Insurance Supervisory Board (PVK). The integrated agency will be overseen by the Finance Minister, and the pension supervisory body will be politically accountable to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, which is legally responsible for the implementation of the Pension and Savings Fund Act. The latter will have extensive powers on the budget process and on the appointment of the governing board for pension supervision. Specialised agencies can co-ordinate their activities in order to achieve economies of scale, greater efficiency, and eliminate overlapping duties.7 Therefore, it is important to look beyond the institutional structure of supervision and analyse the distribution of responsibilities and functions not only between authorities and within authorities, but also the co-ordination and co-operation mechanisms between agencies or between departments in the same agency.
32
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
A complete survey on the distribution of supervisory responsibilities between agencies is provided in Annex 3. Generally, unified agencies, as for example in Canada, Germany and Sweden, comprise all the supervisory functions related to pension funds, excluding the qualifications for tax benefits, which falls under the responsibility of the tax authorities. On the other hand, in countries with specialized agencies, like Ireland, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States, the functions and responsibilities for pension fund supervision are divided between several agencies. Australia is an exception because it has adopted an integrated institutional approach for all financial sectors, but the supervisory functions are divided in three specialized agencies. Co-ordination with other regulatory and supervisory authorities The surveyed countries reported various levels and arrangements for cooperation, co-ordination and information sharing, as shown in Table II.3. In both specialized and integrated model countries, the procedures vary from informal arrangements and regular meetings to legal provisions establishing obligations to agencies. Agreements or memorandums of understanding are also important as are flexible instruments to promote exchanges and co-operation. The participation of other agencies’ representatives in the governance structure of the supervisory agency, e.g. in Australia, Germany, Iceland and Poland, is the most complex instance of institutional co-ordination. Table II.3. Co-Ordination, Co-operation and Information Sharing Mechanisms between Supervisory Agencies in Selected OECD Countries
Australia
Canada
Czech Republic
Memorandums of Understanding with ASIC, Commonwealth Treasury, Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA – Australia’s central bank, ATO, Motor Accidents Authority of NSW (MAA), Private Health Insurance Administration Council (PHIAC) and ACCC. Regular liaison meetings. Legal mandate for information sharing procedures. Governance structure includes members from other agencies. No explicit formal co-ordination/co-operation arrangements. There is a legislated committee (Financial Institutions Supervisory Committee - FISC) made up of senior representatives of federal financial regulatory agencies with a mandate to share information in respect of financial institutions Co-operation and sharing information agreement between Securities Commission and the Czech National Bank. Sharing information agreement between the Ministry of Finance, Securities Commission and the Czech National Bank.
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
33
Germany
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland Italy
Japan
Mexico
Netherlands New Zealand Norway
Poland
Portugal Spain
34
No explicit formal co-ordination/co-operation arrangements. Legal mandate for information sharing procedures. BaFin’s governance structure includes members from other agencies. Co-ordination and co-operation agreements between the HFSA and The National Tax Authority; Hungarian National Bank; Directorate of Consumer Protection; National Health Insurance Fund; Central Administration of National Pension Insurance. No explicit formal co-ordination/co-operation arrangements. Regular consultative meetings. Legal mandate for information sharing between Central Bank and FME. FME’s governance structure includes members from Central Bank. No explicit formal co-ordination/co-operation arrangements. Legal mandate for information sharing with other agencies. Legal provision for cooperation and sharing information between authorities according to their respective tasks in order to strengthen the supervisory activity and to avoid duplications. In particular, COVIP and ISVAP cooperate in the analysis of the contracts arranged by pension funds with insurance companies for the payment of annuities and the coverage of biometric risks. No explicit formal co-ordination/co-operation and information sharing arrangements, but the rules of each supervisory agency are clearly divided. No explicit formal co-ordination/co-operation arrangements. Sharing information in regular meetings official gazette and annual report. Council of Financial Supervisors co-ordinate the co-operation and sharing information on the No explicit formal co-ordination/co-operation arrangements. Information is treated as public documents. The FSA has no explicit formal co–ordination/co–operation arrangements with other domestic supervisory agencies, but there are regular meetings with the Ministry of Finance, the Competition Authority, and the Central Bank and (to some extent) the consumer protection authorities and the central tax authorities. Moreover, there is a general Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Central Bank and the FSA. KNUiFE ’s governance structure includes members from other agencies. Legal mandate for sharing information between KNUiFE, National Bank of Poland, Securities and Exchange Commission. National Council of Financial Supervisors (CNSF - Conselho Nacional dos Supervisores Financeiros) Legal mandate for co-ordination, co-operation and information sharing arrangements.
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
Sweden
Turkey
UK
Legal provisions on exchange of views with other authorities on matters decided by a county administrative board that may affect the operations of the other authority. In the case of the Finansinspektionen, there are also provisions regarding exchange of views with the Central Bank in case of systemic or other crises. Legal mandate for co-ordination, co-operation and information sharing between the Undersecretariat of Treasury and the Capital Markets Board and. Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) Memorandum of understandings and direct co-operation between OPRA, FSA, Revenue and Pension Ombudsman. Legal mandate for information sharing.
Source: Replies to the OECD Secretariat questionnaire.
Australia is a good example in terms of issuing co-operation, co-ordination and information sharing statements. The Memorandums of Understanding signed by various government agencies announces information-sharing activities amongst the various bodies and the division of supervisory activities. This reduces duplication and compliance costs for the industry as well as achieves effective enforcement and compliance outcomes for the industry and the agencies involved. There is a legal obligation for information sharing, and regular liaison meetings are held between APRA and other financial supervisory and industry bodies. Furthermore, APRA’s Board includes ex officio members from other supervisory authorities. Canada is an interesting case of federative co-ordination. In the absence of formal explicit national arrangements, provincial and federal supervisors have organised an inter-jurisdictional association of pension supervisory authorities — the Canadian Association of Pension Supervisory Authorities (CAPSA). It discusses pension regulatory issues of common interest and develops policies aimed at simplifying and harmonizing pension laws in the country. Although there are no formal co-ordination/co-operation arrangements between supervisory agencies, there are regular consultative meetings among federal supervisory agencies, and there is co-operation and information sharing among federal and provincial regulators through CAPSA. In addition, under the legislation, the Minister may enter into agreements with the appropriate authority of a designated province respecting the administration, application and enforcement of pension legislation, and the establishment and operation in Canada of an association of pension supervisory authorities. In the Netherlands, the Council of Financial Supervisors coordinates the actions of PVK, Dutch Central Bank and the Netherlands Authority for Financial Markets. The mission of this council is to coordinate the creation and implementation of consistent rules, regulations and policies in cross-sector areas
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
35
of financial supervision — areas such as integrity supervision, consumer affairs and financial conglomerates. In Portugal, the National Council of Financial Supervisors (Conselho Nacional dos Supervisores Financeiros (CNSF) institutionalizes and organizes co-operation between the three financial supervision authority representatives: ISP, the Bank of Portugal (banking supervisor, and Securities Market Commission), – and the Securities Market Commission (Comissão do Mercado dos Valores Mobiliários, CMVM ), which is the securities supervisor). The aim of this body is to allow better communication of relevant information that will permit the coordination of future action and the elimination of conflicts of authority, lacunae in regulations and multiple uses of own funds. Additionally, it is important to mention the efforts to internationalise cooperation, co-ordination and information sharing between agencies from different countries, and strengthening the national capacity to supervise international financial conglomerates. For example, the Scandinavian countries’ financial service agencies have agreements to conduct supervision of financial companies operating in their territories. Regulatory responsibilities of pension supervisors In most countries surveyed (Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom), the main regulator is the relevant ministry (generally the ministry of finance or of social affairs). The only exceptions are the integrated agencies in Canada and Denmark and the specialised Irish agency, which are primarily both supervisors and regulators of the private pension system. In some countries, although the main regulatory power is assigned to the ministries, supervisory agencies hold complementary and supplementary responsibilities on regulations. In Italy, the legislation entrusts the regulatory powers to COVIP, the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of the Economy. COVIP regulates: accounting procedures and balance sheet schemes; disclosure and transparency; benchmark in the investment performance evaluation; criteria for selecting and appointment of asset managers by contractual pension funds. It also participates in the establishment of standard contracts for asset management and for the relationship between pension funds and insurance companies for the provision of annuities and biometric risks coverage. Finally, it may issue guidelines on all aspects related to the conduct of pension funds. The Portuguese ISP is also responsible for enacting subsidiary regulations and
36
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
often presents proposals to the Minister of Finance, which holds the primary regulatory responsibility. In Iceland, the Financial Markets Authority (FME) is endowed with regulatory capacities and it is authorised to issue general directive requests regarding the activities of the parties subject to supervision. The Swedish FI has delegated powers (provided by law or decree) to issue regulations aimed at covering technical details and guidelines. In Australia, APRA is considered to be the main regulator of the superannuation system, despite its not having direct responsibility for supervisory legislation. This function rests with the Federal Department of Treasury. APRA both regulates entities in the superannuation sector and develops the administrative practices and procedures to be applied in performing that regulatory role. This includes the development of regulatory and supervisory policies and relevant prudential standards. Consequently, APRA is perceived by the Australian financial sector as both a supervisory and a regulatory body. Similarly, the Government Actuary in New Zealand has statutory powers to regulate the superannuation scheme. Germany, Hungary, Mexico, Poland and the UK reported quite limited regulatory powers. In the case of Hungary, when asked if the supervisory authority is satisfied that its powers are adequate in enabling it to fulfill its statutory responsibilities, the HFSA declared that it “would like to have the authority to write and develop decrees”. The Dutch PVK applies existing regulation but has its own powers in the form of Regulations, Policy Rules and Recommendations. In Norway, the Ministry of Finance is the main regulator of pension funds. In general, all regulations regarding (the activities of) pension funds are issued by the Ministry. The FSA has only limited regulatory powers. For example, it can issue supplementary regulations regarding pension funds’ asset management. In the Czech Republic, Japan, Spain and Turkey, however, the relevant ministry (the main regulator) is also the main supervisor. In general, the main regulator should be consulted or involved in important supervisory initiatives. In most of the surveyed countries (Canada, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States) the supervisory agencies, whether independent or not, are generally accountable to (or supervised by) the relevant governmental ministry. Ministers are also frequently responsible for the designation of members of the supervisory board. If main regulatory and supervisory functions are generally performed by different institutions in OECD countries, it is clear that they are interrelated, each category being to some extent involved in the work of another.
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
37
Private pension fund supervision and market structure The private pension market structure and the resources available for supervision vary widely. The supervisory costs are related to a large extent to the regulatory and supervisory approaches, as well as to the characteristics of the pension system. Given the pension scheme’s particularities and the institutional diversity, it is difficult to compare accurately the agencies’ performance indicators. For example,, the survey shows the cases of Mexico, where 170 employees are in charge of 11 pension funds, and New Zealand, where 808 funds are overseen by three persons (Table 3). This discrepancy is explained mainly by the differences in the regulatory and supervisory approaches. Mexico adopts quantitative regulations with pro-active supervision. The pro-active model is a labor-intensive and more expensive approach. It requires a frequent activities overview, involving high administrative costs on reporting, recording, monitoring, disclosure and evaluation. In this model, the administrative costs are sensitive to the number of participants. As the Mexican pension scheme is mandatory for all private workers, the system covers some 29.4 million participants, the second largest number of participants in all of the surveyed countries. New Zealand implemented a prudential self-supervision approach. The Government Actuary runs the registration regime and the pension funds trustees hold the responsibility for nearly all of the supervisory functions, assuring compliance with government rules, regularity of payment, membership and portability, benefits eligibility conditions and access to plans investments, asset allocation, performance, minimum capital and reserves and custodian procedure, administrative cost, fees and marketing, merger and liquidation process. The entire supervisory structure was built under the principles of trustees’ freedom of action, responsibility and transparency. Trustees are required to act in the best interests of the scheme members and beneficiaries at all times, in accordance with the trust deed and general law. Nonetheless, a recent report indicates that too much flexibility could cause problems for beneficiaries, and more regulation and standardization would be required on the funding adequacy of the defined benefit schemes, actuarial valuation assumptions and disclosure.
38
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
Table II.4. Supervisory agencies’ resources and size of the market (2001/2002) Country
Number of Employees
Number of plans/funds
Participants (thousands)
Assets (¼ELOOLRQ
-
249 262 funds/plans
24 800
281.5
OSFI - PPPD (Canada) (2)
20
1 195 plans
557
56.1
OSIPF/MF (Czech Republic) (3)
20
14 funds
2 473
1.7
FSA (Denmark) (3)
15
80 funds
720
32.2
BaFin (Germany) (4)
29
156 funds
3 402
70.7
HFSA (Hungary) (5)
-
100 funds
3 407
3.2
FME (Iceland)(6)
APRA (Australia) (1)
7
82 funds
228
7.7
Pension Board (Ireland)
34
99 987plan s
630
44.0
COVIP (Italy)(7)
60
534 funds
1 907
27.7
Pension Bureau (Japan) (6)
30
1 807 funds/plans
14 116
692.6
CONSAR (Mexico)
170
11 funds
29 421
40.8
Government Actuary (New Zealand)
3
808 funds
701
5.1
FSA (Norway) (2)
80
140 funds
264
11.6
KNUIFE (Poland) (3)
208
14.4
ISP (Portugal) (3) DGSFP (Spain) OPRA (UK)
17 funds
11 060
412 funds
323
29
917 funds
6 448
49.3
260
103 588 plans
40 000
1 050.0
61
0.4
(1) APRA has 472 employees for all financial sector supervision. (2) Employment information refers to pension fund supervision. Plans, participants and assets information refers to federal plans. (3) Employment information refers to insurance and pension funds supervision. (4) Employment information refers to pension fund supervision. (5) HFSA has 541 employees for all financial sector supervision. (6) Employment information refers to pension fund supervision. In addition to Pension Bureau, 8 Regional Bureaus of health and welfare are in charge of supervision of pension funds in each region. (7) Information on assets, funds/plans and participants refers to those funds/plans supervised by COVIP. Source: Replies to the OECD Secretariat questionnaire DAFFE/AS/PEN/WD (2002)26 and OECD database.
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
39
Risk-based prudential supervision is the only way to deal with a large number of small funds as is the case in Australia, Canada, Ireland and the UK. In Australia, 246 670 funds (99% of the total) have less than five members and supervision is primarily conducted by the tax authority, although there is an ongoing initiative to increase APRA’s supervisory capacity over small pension arrangements. Supervisory structures and methods: integration of on-site and off-site supervision Countries with a single supervisory agency for all financial sectors reported more integration with regard to off-site and on-site supervisory procedures. Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany have fully integrated both types of supervision. In Italy, Mexico, Spain and UK, where the supervisory agencies are partially integrated or specialized, there are different departments dealing with this the permanent exchange of information and with staff. In Ireland, Japan and New Zealand, there is no regular on-site supervision, but this could change should the need arise. Czech Republic is the only country with a partially integrated agency that reports having completely integrated on and offsite supervision. In Poland, the Inspection Department, linked to the Office of the Insurance and Pension Funds Supervisory Commission, performs on-site inspection of both insurance companies and pension funds. The Investments Department and the Supervisory Department pursues off-site supervision over both insurance companies and pension funds. There is no formal integration of on-site and offsite supervision but these same departments cooperate closely. Moreover, the internal structure of the Office changed in January 2004, with separate departments for life insurance companies, non-life insurance companies, and for mandatory pension funds and voluntary pension plans. These departments will perform both on-site and off-site supervision. Each institution supervised by APRA has a dedicated person who is responsible for choosing the most appropriate supervision strategy and building a strong working knowledge of the institution they oversee. The supervision strategy for each institution is designed to project the intensity of supervision required to attend to the issues identified by the risk assessment processes. How long such supervision lasts will vary according to the institution’s overall risk profile. In addition to on-site and off-site reviews, APRA’s supervisors liaise with external parties that have detailed knowledge of individual institutions, such as external auditors, actuaries and administrators. Supervisory actions are directly linked to specific areas of concern or areas that require further scrutiny, and which have been identified by APRA’s risk assessment processes. This 40
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
framework promotes a more precise concentration of resources on those institutions that exhibit greater risk and subsequently require more intensive supervision. In Hungary, participants involved in on-site and off-site supervision are divided into departments. The Inspection Department conduct the off-site inspections, continuously examining documentation and other relevant information provided by the funds. The on-site inspections are conducted by the Supervisory Department for Pension Funds. The integration of the on-site and off-site inspections is wide. The information gathered during off-site inspections is used while planning the on-site inspections. Most staff members are involved in both types of supervision. Integration of on-site and off-site supervision is rather straightforward as information flows easily between the two. In Norway, the responsibilities for on–site and off–site supervision are allocated to separate sections within the FSA’s Finance and Insurance Department. However, the supervisory activities are integrated and, in general, persons from two or three sections participate in the on–site inspections. This is the case especially for on–site supervision of pension funds. COVIP conducts annual programs of on-site examinations defined by both the inspection unit and the supervisory units, indicating types and number of inspections to be conducted. Besides the annual plan, on-site inspections may be urgently set up as a result of information collected during ordinary off-site supervisory activity. On-site exams may be general or focused on specific aspects. They are prepared by a thorough off–site analysis of the information and documentation available in order to minimize the costs and length of the on-site inspections. They are ordinarily executed by specialized staff together with staff of the supervisory unit that is responsible for the monitoring of the fund to be inspected. Organization of the Supervisory Agency In order to protect the interest of the members and safeguard the long-term stability of the system, supervisory agencies must be properly staffed and financed, insulated from political pressures exercised by the government or the pension industry, and endowed with reasonable enforcement capacities. This section analyses the degree of financial, political and operative independence of the supervisory agency as well as the mechanisms used to avoid principal-agent problems.
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
41
There are many types of supervisory agencies and their characteristics vary widely. They differ in size, function, rationale for creation, funding, legal and organisational status, internal governance structure, accountability mechanisms and reporting. Legal status The majority of OECD countries’ supervisory authorities are autonomous bodies, created and regulated by law and that provide institutional stability. According to the features of the national administrative legislation, they can be non-departmental public bodies, such as the United Kingdom’s Occupational Pension Regulatory Authority (OPRA), institutes, superintendence, agencies, commissions or boards. They are created as isolated institutional structures with complete or partial legal identity. Dependent structures, on the other hand, are vertically integrated into the Ministries as secretaries, departments or directorates linked to Central Banks, Ministries of Finance, Labour, Social Security, Social Affairs or other ministries. This is the case of the Czech Department of Insurance and Pension Funds under the Ministry of Finance and the Pension Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. Only five countries have formally dependent supervisory structures: Czech Republic, New Zealand, Japan, Spain and Turkey. The formally independent agencies have a different governance structure, a distinct control environment and some management autonomy. In OECD countries, they have been created to improve efficiency and effectiveness of government entities focusing on client needs. These agencies may have more policy independence and continuity, incorporating the private sector and civil society in the decision making process. In Australia, APRA is a statutory authority with the legal status of a corporate body with perpetual succession that has relative autonomy from the Commonwealth Government. APRA is the unique agency that is ultimately accountable directly to the Parliament and to regulated industries. APRA regularly consults with industry regarding its prudential supervisory approach and levying structure, however it is not strictly accountable to these industry groups and entities. APRA is accountable to the Commonwealth Parliament via the following means: (i)Regular appearances before parliamentary committees, Senate estimates hearings and an annual review by the House of Representatives Committee on Economics, Finance and Public Administration; (ii) Annual financial and performance audits conducted by the Australian National Audit Office; and (iii) tabling of an annual report in the federal Parliament.
42
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
Table II.5. Legal Status and Accountability of Selected OECD Supervisory Agencies Legal Status
Accountable to:
APRA (Australia)
Statutory authority formally independent
Commonwealth Parliament and supervised industries
OSFI (Canada)
Office of the Government of Canada formally independent
Ministry of Finance
OSIPF
Body formally dependent
Ministry of Finance
FSA (Denmark)
Government body formally independent
Minister for Economic Affairs
BaFin (Germany)
Federal institution formally independent
Ministry of Finance
HFSA (Hungary)
Legal entity formally independent
Parliament
FME (Iceland)
State authority formally independent
Minister of Commerce
PENSION BOARD (Ireland)
Statutory Body formally independent
Ministry for Social and Family Affairs
COVIP (Italy)
Autonomous public institution formally independent
Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of the Economy
PENSION BUREAU (Japan)
Public body formally dependent
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
CONSAR (Mexico)
Public entity formally independent
Ministry of Finance
PVK (Netherlands)
Independent governmental agency
Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment
Gov. Actuary / ISU (New Zealand)
Public body formally dependent
Ministry of Economic Development.
FSA (Norway)
Government agency formally independent
Ministry of Finance
KNUiFE (Poland)
Public entity formally independent
Council of Ministers
ISP (Portugal)
Public body formally independent
Ministry of Finance
DGSFP (Spain)
Public body formally dependent
Ministry of Economy
FI (Sweden)
Government agency formally independent
Government
UT (Turkey)
Public body formally dependent
Ministry of State
OPRA (UK)
Non Departmental Public Body formally independent
Prime Minister
(Czech Republic)
Source: Replies to the OECD Secretariat questionnaire.
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
43
The German BaFin operates within the ambit of the Ministry of Finance as a legal body which is functionally and organisationally separate from the Ministry in its decision-making and the exercising of its functions and powers. BaFin’s independence and accountability is addressed in its enabling legislation. The Ministry of Finance exercises supervisory control via an Administrative Council and is required to ensure that BaFin executes its tasks according to the law and in an effective and adequate way. For this purpose, in exceptional cases, the Ministry may give instructions to the agency. Regularly, BaFin consults the Ministry regarding new regulations, guidelines or other fundamental policy matters. However, the independent legal status of the supervisory agency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to guarantee its institutional insulation and autonomous operation. There are several institutional mechanisms that can be used to avoid or, at least minimise, external interference — both from the government and from the pension industry — in the control of compliance with regulations. These mechanisms are related to the financing of the agency, human resource policy, criteria to nominate and remove directors, mandate, constraints to the movement of the workforce from the government to the market and vice versa, disclosure and enforcement capacity. Financing In the majority of surveyed countries, supervisory agencies are financed exclusively by levies charged to supervised entities. This is the case of some formally independent agencies as APRA (Australia), OSFI (Canada), HFSA (Hungary) and ISP (Portugal). There are also many countries with mixed arrangements combining general budget and fees paid by private sector as CONSAR (Mexico) and OPRA (UK). Formally, dependent public bodies are always funded by the general budget. COVIP is the only case of a formally independent agency that depends exclusively on the government transfers, but they plan in the near future to activate a contribution from the pension industry. The Italian Delegation reported that “a levy on pension funds is needed because public funds are not sufficient to carry out effectively the required tasks”. In Sweden, both FI and county administrative boards are financed indirectly by the private sector because levies on supervised entities are part of the general revenue and the supervisory agencies receive resources from the general budget. Public budgets are political allocations of resources made under fiscal constraints. Sometimes this process can limit the ability of the supervisory agency to remain up to date technologically and professionally with developments in the private pension market. A market-oriented approach to the
44
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
financing of the supervision is likely to be more effective in guaranteeing resources for the agency and avoiding political pressure from the government. Moreover, the private pension fund supervision is a service often provided to high-income groups. Under these circumstances, the general budget financing would appear as a perverse cross-subsidy transfer imposed on all taxpayers. According to basic principles in public finance, those who benefit should be the ones who pay the taxes. Therefore, the direct or indirect participation of the pension industry covering the expenses of the supervisory activities could be identified as a good practice.
Table II.6. Financing the Supervisory Agency General Budget
Mixed (Government and Supervised Entities)
Supervised Entities
Czech Republic Italy Japan Spain Turkey
Mexico New Zealand Sweden United Kingdom
Australia Canada Denmark Germany Hungary Iceland Ireland Netherlands Poland Portugal Norway
Source: Replies to the OECD Secretariat questionnaire.
When the financing is exclusively based on private fees, however, there is a “captured agency” risk. Supervised entities affected by agencies’ decisions and policies could influence the budgetary process bargaining which shapes supervisory procedures and policies primarily to their benefit at the expense of the participants or government. In order to avoid the supervisory “capture” it is important to have a well defined budget implementation process so as to avoid interference by the pension industry in the supervisory activities, conflicts of interests, and to ensure that their independence is not compromised by any funding arrangements. In Australia, levies imposed on institutions regulated by APRA are determined through a consultative process between APRA, ASIC, ATO, industry and the Commonwealth Treasurer, although the latter ultimately
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
45
determines the fees. Levies are spread across all the supervised industries — banks, credit unions, building societies, general insurance, reinsurance, life insurance, friendly societies, and superannuation funds, and are paid into the Commonwealth Consolidated Revenue Fund. The overall budget for APRA is determined by its Board in consultation with the Commonwealth Treasurer and takes into account the resources required to conduct effective supervision for the forthcoming year for each industry under supervision. In Hungary, the HFSA supervisory fee is calculated out of the payments of the members and employers’ contributions and is regulated by law. The HFSA budget is determined by the budgetary law and submitted to Parliament. The frame numbers are calculated by the HFSA, according to the documentation accepted by the Government, relating to the planning of the central budgetary system. In Canada, OSFI is financed by a levy on plans based on the number of plan members, with a set minimum and maximum amount payable annually. In Poland, the financial annual plan of the supervisory body is included in the state budget, but the cost is completely covered by the entities supervised. The Portuguese ISP is financed by fees charged on the undertakings subject to its supervision. The agency is also financed by incomes from the sale of assets and from services provided, as well as from rights over the former, by returns on assets and income from its activities, returns on financial investments, subsidies, donations or contributions from Portuguese or foreign entities, costs of proceedings for infringements and breaches of regulations and by any other income or return to which it is entitled under the law, under a contract, or in any other manner. In Norway, the costs of supervision are distributed among the various groups of financial institutions according to the extent of the supervision based on the size of the institution’s total assets at the beginning of the year. Nonetheless, the Ministry stipulates for each year a minimum and a maximum amount which can be levied on the individual institution in each group. Levying shall be carried out by FSA, but shall be approved by the Ministry.” Supervisees also finance the Dutch PVK through an apportionment system. Pension funds and insurance companies pay a statutory contribution according to size and the PVK budget requirements. Annually, PVK’s Governing Board, based on the Executive Board’s proposal, submits a budget for the approval of the Ministries of Finance and of Social Affairs and Employment. Criteria for nominate directors Besides the appropriate funding, the criteria used to nominate agency directors, establish their mandates and regulate the relationship between them
46
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
and the private sector, are also issues relevant to the analysis of the institutional independence of the supervisory authority. In some countries, directors are nominated by political authorities and can be replaced without any restrictions. In other jurisdictions, the names of the directors have to be submitted to Parliament or to specific councils. They are required to have experience, an established reputation, a university degree and mandates that protect them from political pressure. Table II.7. Supervisory Agencies: Appointing Directors WHO APPOINTS?
LEGAL SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
MANDATE
Australia
Federal Treasurer
No
5 years
Canada
Governor in Council
No
7 years
Czech Rep.
Minister of Finance
No
No
Denmark
Prime Minister
No
No
Germany
President
No
No
Hungary
Parliament upon Prime Minister proposal
Yes – high academic qualification in relevant fields (political sciences, law, economics, state administration, finance and accounting) and at least five years of managerial (executive) working experience acquired in a financial organization or in public administration in the regulation or controlling of financial organizations, or equivalent working experience acquired abroad.
6 years
Iceland
Board
Yes – a university degree and extensive knowledge and experience in the financial market
4 years
Ireland
Board and Minister of Social Affairs
No
5 years
Italy
Government
Yes – members of the Board must be chosen among experts in the field and be of undisputed integrity and independence
4 years
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
47
WHO APPOINTS?
LEGAL SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
MANDATE
Japan
Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare
No
No
Netherlands
Royal decree upon Minister of Finance and Minister of Social Affairs and Employment proposal
Yes – members of the Boards should be independent, have confidence of the supervised institutions and have outstanding ability in the field of finance, management and socioeconomics.
6 years for Governing Board and 5 years for Executive Board
Mexico
Ministry of Finance
Yes – have renowned experience in economics, finance, law or social security. Have no money or family links with the shareholders, the first or second-tier employees of the industry participants subject to CONSAR’s supervision. Must have never been prohibited to trade or work in the Mexican financial system or in the government and be recognized as a highly ethical person.
No
New Zealand
Ministry of Economic Development
Yes – must be an actuary.
No
Norway
Formally the King in Council, but in practice the Ministry of Finance
No
6 years (renewable for more 6 years)
Poland
Prime Minister
Yes – minimum four years experience in financial, insurance or banking sector of industry and proper educational background as a mathematician, lawyer or economist. It refers only to the Chairman of the Commission (KNUiFE). The other members of the Commission are representatives of public bodies (Minister of Finance, Minister of Social Affairs, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office for Protection of Competition and Consumers).
5 years
Portugal
Council of Ministers
Yes – recognized ability, independence and competence.
5 years
48
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
WHO APPOINTS?
LEGAL SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
MANDATE
Spain
Ministry of Economy
Yes – public servant with high qualification
No
Sweden
Swedish Government
No
6 years
Turkey
Prime Minister
Yes – public servant with minimum 12 years
No
UK
Board
No
No
Source: Replies to the OECD Secretariat questionnaire.
In Australia, Canada, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Hungary, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland and Sweden, the supervisory agencies’ heads have mandates ranging from four to seven years. Mandates are important institutional tools to avoid political interference and instability in the agencies and assure policy continuity. The appointment can be terminated during the mandate, generally for reasons as set out in the regulations; these include misbehaviour, incapacity, corruption and conflicts of interests. In Germany, the mandate is not defined in legislation, but since the nominated persons are political civil servants, a removal from office is possible only within the narrow restrictions of sections. Normally, the head retires on grounds of age. Removal because of disciplinary proceedings is also possible. In other countries, the decision concerning the permanence of agencies’ directives falls within the discretionary powers of the high officials. In general, formally dependent agencies are more vulnerable to political instability. Human resources and procurement policies Supervisory agencies need the flexibility to operate human resources policy in order to be able to pay competitive salaries, in line with those paid by pension funds, or at least competitive with other agencies. It is fundamental that the agency is able to compete with pension fund managers for scarce human resources. Furthermore, it would be desirable to have some flexibility in the procurement procedures. This issue is related to the legal status of the supervisory body and to the type of work contract given to employees. Departments linked to Ministries are generally less independent than separated agencies.
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
49
APRA is a case of complete autonomy regarding human resources policy and procurement procedures. The Board determines the terms and conditions of appointment, although this is subject to general public service guidelines. Private sector remuneration is constantly monitored to ensure that the authority’s remuneration is competitive. APRA has reached a remuneration level comparable with the general private and public sector and is currently addressing parity with the finance market. APRA is not required to follow the procurement guidelines of the Federal administration, but they are considered on a reference basis. Table II.8. Pension Fund Supervision Agencies in Selected OECD Countries: Human Resources and Procurement Policies Autonomy to define salaries
Autonomy to contract and fire staff
Autonomy on procurement procedures
Australia
Yes
Yes
Yes
Canada
Partial
Partial
No
Czech Republic
No
No
No
Denmark
Yes
Partial
No
Germany
Partial
Partial
No
Hungary
Partial
Partial
Partial
Iceland
No
No
No
Ireland
Partial
No
No
Italy
Partial
Partial
No
Japan
No
No
No
Mexico
Partial
No
No
New Zealand
No
No
No
Norway
Partial
Partial
Partial
Poland
Partial
Partial
Partial
Portugal
Yes
Yes
Yes
Spain
No
No
No
Sweden
Yes
Yes
Yes
Turkey
No
No
No
United Kingdom
Yes
No
No
Source: Replies to the OECD Secretariat questionnaire.
50
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
The ISP (Portugal) also has total autonomy to manage human resources policy as long as it is in line with the budget approved by the Minister of Finance. Private sector workers’ rules are applied to the labour contracts and the agency is not required to follow the procurement procedures of the national administration. The FSA of Norway has the autonomy to define salaries (within limits set by the budget), and to contract and fire staff without prior approval from the Ministry of Finance. However, FSA employees are in legal terms “ordinary” state employees, and the FSA cannot take actions contradictory to acts and agreements of civil service. Italy, Mexico and Poland are examples of partial autonomy for human resources policy. In Italy, COVIP has autonomy to define policy concerning the level of salaries and the structure of careers for its employees. However, the level of salaries for the different qualifications is linked to other public authorities. In Mexico, the Ministry of Finance sets the level of salaries, but the career structure of the employees depends on each department of CONSAR. General rules concerning all civil servants apply to the supervisory authority on hiring, firing and salaries. In Poland, the Minister of Finance shall specify the rules of KNUiFE employees’ remuneration taking into consideration salary levels paid in the supervised institutions. Agencies with financial and human resources management autonomy are able to pay higher salaries compared to the private sector or, at least, they are able to offer similar or better employment term and conditions. It means that they have more capacity to recruit and retain qualified workers. Except in the case of Ireland, all autonomous agencies financed by levies on the supervised agencies reported relative good salary conditions compared to the private sector. Despite its autonomy, the Irish Pension Board is subject to the pay scales that operate within the public sector. In the last year, a benchmarking exercise has been completed in order to correct distortions. Although not specific to the Pension Board, it has recommended increases in the salary scales to ensure a level of parity with the private sector. The Italian COVIP, although formally independent is financed by the general budget. It also reported that the terms and conditions of employment currently offered are, in general, lower than those available to employees in the private sector. This agency has a certain degree of autonomy in defining the level of salaries and the structure of the careers of its employees. However, the level of salaries for the different qualifications is linked to other public services. In Canada, OSFI offers terms and conditions of employment similar to those of the Government, which, in some instances, are more generous than the private sector (e.g. vacation and other types of leave, maternity benefits, etc.). But,
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
51
unlike private sector employers, public agencies are not in a position to offer any type of at-risk compensation plans (e.g. stock option or profit-sharing) that could have a significant impact on the direct compensation. In the Danish Financial Services Authority (Finanstilsynet), the level of remuneration is largely determined by collective agreements between the Ministry of Finance and the relevant trade unions of civil service employees. Finanstilsynet may design its own structure of careers for its employees, within the limits set by these agreements. Autonomy of human resources policy provides more flexibility and dynamism to design and implement training programs informing staff of new supervisory technologies and approaches. APRA has training programs reflecting a risk-based supervision approach. In Canada, OSFI conduct a training program oriented to encourage the use of the skills needed to implement a risk-focused approach to supervision; ensuring that supervisors receive the knowledge required to keep pace with recent and expected changes in the Financial Services Industry; integrated training program with on-the job responsibilities; and fostering an environment for self-directed learning. In Italy, there are regular training initiatives set up together with other supervisory authorities. However, most of the supervision skills are developed directly in the field as methods and procedures are still in the process of being established. Occasional staff movements from private to public sector, and vice versa, are desirable to exchange experiences and views between supervisor and supervised. It is necessary, however, to establish strict regulations on information disclosure and conflict of interests. These regulations are likely to be more effective than prohibitions. It is also interesting to have a mixed composition of staff, combining personnel from other agencies, from the private sector as well as public servants from the supervisory field. In Australia, there are no restrictions on movement into the superannuation industry. However, there are provisions on confidential information disclosure. Ninety per cent of employees leaving APRA join the private financial sector. Thirty per cent of APRA’s staff was previously employed by its organizations which preceded it, including the Insurance and Superannuation Commission. The remainder of the staff is drawn from within the finance sector (e.g. banking, superannuation, insurance), accountants, graduates and other government agencies such as ASIC and the ATO.
52
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
Table II.9. Staff of Supervisory Agencies: Private Sector X Public Sector Terms of employment: public x private sector
Restrictions for movements from public to private sector
Frequency of movements from public to private sector
Australia
Similar
No restrictions, but penalties for inside information disclosure
Frequently
Canada
Agency
Yes – one year of prohibition to work in supervised entities
Occasionally
Czech Rep.
Private sector
No
Rarely
Denmark
Similar
No restrictions for movement, but penalty for inside information disclosure
Occasionally
Germany
Agency for middle management and private sector for high level
No
Occasionally
Hungary
Agency
No
Occasionally
Iceland
Similar
No
Never
Ireland
Private Sector
No
Rarely
Italy
Private Sector
No
Rarely
Mexico
Similar
No
Occasionally
NZ
Private Sector
No
Occasionally
Norway
Private Sector
No
Occasionally
Poland
Similar
Yes – one year of prohibition for the chief management to work in supervised entities
Occasionally
Portugal
Similar
No
Rarely
Spain
Private sector
No
Rarely
Sweden
Agency salaries are lower, but its terms of employment are often better
No
Rarely
Turkey
Private Sector
No
-
UK
Similar
No
Rarely
Source: Replies to the OECD Secretariat questionnaire.
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
53
In Canada, former employees shall not, within a period of one year after leaving the office, accept an appointment to a Board of Directors of, or employment with, an entity with which they had official dealings during a period of one year immediately prior to their departure. They shall not make any representations for, or on behalf of, any other person or entity relative to OSFI. Occasionally, there are former supervisors employed by pension industry. The main source of recruitment for the pension supervisory group is the industry, with the exception of the policy role, which is often filled by public sector employees, and actuarial expertise, which comes from actuarial consulting firms and the insurance industry. In Italy, COVIP’s staff comes from other supervisory authorities (5%), government departments (50%) and the private sector (45%). BaFin operates under an open recruitment policy and the staff is mainly from the private sector. In the past, the main source of the HFSA’s staff was the public sector (other supervisory agencies, Ministry of Finance, government departments).Today, however, the number of staff coming from private sector is increasing. There is also a growing number of new entrants to the labour force who choose HFSA to be their first employer. This can be considered as a comparative advantage for entry afterwards into the private labor market. In Norway, the salaries are, for most professionals, higher in the private sector than in the public sector. This largely explains why movements from public to private sector are quite frequent (that is, occasional). There are no restrictions on such movements, but civil servants are legally obliged not to reveal inside information after having left office. Dispute settlement procedures Generally, in formally dependent agencies, superior authorities, such as Ministers or Vice-Ministers, have direct power to approve, revise, cancel, pursue or intervene in any act of the supervisory body linked to the ministry (Table II.9). In some formally independent agencies, such as OSFI (Canada) and BaFin (Germany), Ministers have the final authority on some matters related to public policy. For example, OSFI’s Superintendent is required to report to the Minister on the administration of statutes falling within OSFI’s jurisdiction. He is responsible for providing certain approvals and taking specified action under these statutes. In certain instances, ministerial approval or action is required when operating decisions have public policy implications. In BaFin, the Minister of Finance exercises his authority indirectly though the Administrative Council.
54
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
Table II.10. Who Can Revise Agencies’ Decisions and Acts? Australia
Administrative Appeals Tribunal and Federal Court
Canada
Minister of Finance
Czech Republic
Court of Justice
Denmark
Court of Justice
Germany
Minister of Finance and Administrative Council
Hungary
Court of Justice
Iceland
Appeals Committee
Ireland
Court of Justice
Italy
Court of Justice
Japan
Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare
Mexico
Appeals Committee and Court of Justice
Netherlands
Court of Justice
New Zealand
Court of Justice
Norway
Ministry of Finance
Poland
Administrative Court
Portugal
Court of Justice
Spain
Court of Justice
Sweden
Administrative Court or Swedish Government (depending of the type of decision)
Turkey
Ministry of State
United Kingdom
Court of Justice
Source: Replies to the OECD Secretariat questionnaire.
APRA (Australia) has substantial powers for perform its functions. Although ultimately accountable to the federal government, APRA’s operations, including day-to-day supervision of superannuation entities, is largely independent from the government. In the event that the Commonwealth Government disagrees with APRA’s policies, the dispute may be settled by agreement with the Commonwealth Treasurer, and failing this, by order of the Commonwealth Governor-General. In certain circumstances, APRA may only act with the Treasurer’s written consent. Powers to grant financial assistance to funds also resides with the Treasurer. The legislature has the power to change the agencies’ procedures through amendments to the regulations and disallowance of associated regulations under which APRA operates, as well as
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
55
those it administers. The Minister may also give directions on the performance or exercise of its functions or powers. In addition, certain decisions are defined as “reviewable decisions”. A person affected by a “reviewable” decision may request reconsideration of the decision. If APRA confirms or varies the decision upon receipt of such a request, the decision is reviewable by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. Federal Courts may also review an administrative decision made by APRA. In Portugal, all supervisory powers are delegated by legislation to ISP and no superior authority can revise its procedures and decisions. The FME (Iceland) has considerable powers in its supervisory operations. Firstly, the FME decides which supervisory projects are executed in the pension fund market as well as which methods are used in the execution of these projects. Secondly, the FME has unlimited access to information, data and valuables from pension funds. Thirdly, the FME has various effective resources under its supervision, such as the permission to grant a certain time period to a pension fund in order to rectify a situation considered to be unsatisfactory, to call and direct a Board meeting of a pension fund, to subject a pension fund to daily fines if it does not respond to the demands, and to announce general directive requests. However, the Minister of Finance grants operating licenses for pension funds, confirms changes of pension funds statutes, and appoints a special supervisory party of a pension fund based on FME’s recommendations. Supervised parties may refer FME’s decisions regarding their rights and responsibilities to a special Appeals Committee. Rulings of the Appeals Committee are final at the administrative level and cannot be referred to the Minister of Commerce. The Mexican CONSAR has technical autonomy and executive faculties to take decisions regarding the participants of the pension system. Such is the case of an administrative intervention of a pension fund, a removal of license, etc. The agency must report to the Ministry of Finance about the decisions it takes in a timely fashion. In Italy, almost all supervisory powers are delegated to the supervisor authority that holds the responsibility for final approval of actions. In some cases (applications of sanctions and pension funds, compulsory winding-up, for example) the Ministry of Labour, according to COVIP’s recommendations, adopts the action. The agency is entrusted with reasonable capacities to fulfil its statutory responsibilities. However, sanctioning is now restricted to certain specific irregular behaviour and should be extended to a wider range of cases. Some ex ante authorizations could be overcome and more generous funding should be provided for.
56
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
Governance boards In agencies with a high degree of financial, political and operational independence, it is important to design mechanisms to mitigate principal-agent problems. Institutional independence may incite the people who are placed in control over resources to use these resources to feather their own nests at the expense of those whose interests they are supposed to be serving. The most effective mechanisms implemented by the countries that have been surveyed are related to the establishment of boards, auditing and disclosure policies. As public institutions, pension supervisory agencies are submitted to external auditing. In all of the surveyed countries, the national audit offices periodically review the financial statements. Additionally, parliaments may require further examination. The majority of the surveyed countries are governed, advised or supervised by boards (Box 9). These boards include high-level authorities, officials from other agencies, representatives of members and supervised entities and from Legislative and Judiciary Branches. They are important institutional locus for external surveillance of the agencies’ activities and performance, co-ordination with other government areas, social control and priorities setting. The agencies without boards are those formally dependent on the ministries, excepting Canada, and are governed by single directors. Some agencies adopt governing boards with extensive strategic decisionmaking power on the development of policies, requesting and providing information, ensuring commitment to core values and compliance with legal and financial requirements. They may even appoint the agencies’ directors. Frequently, ministers are responsible for designating board members. There are also administrative boards involved directly in the agency’s management and advisory boards that do not have any decision-making power. In Australia, following the introduction of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Amendment Act 2003, APRA has between three and five executive members who oversee the operation of APRA and who are appointed by the Governor-General on the advice of the federal Treasurer. The new regulations changed the composition of APRA’s board, which used to comprise nine members, with representatives from the private sector, RBA and ASIC. In Denmark, the Minister for Economic Affairs sets up the Financial Business Council. It is comprised of eight members appointed for four years: a chairman; deputy chairman; a representative for Denmark National Bank; a consumer representative; a representative for commercial interests; a
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
57
representative for the mortgage-credit institutions; a representative for Danish banks and a representative for insurance companies and pension funds. The Financial Business Council makes decisions regarding supervisory matters of general public importance or that entail significant consequences to financial undertakings and financial holding companies. It also advises the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority on issuing regulations and assists the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority on its disclosure activities. Table II.11. Governance of Supervisory Agencies Agencies oversighted by boards
Agencies without boards
Denmark
Australia
Germany
Czech Republic
Hungary
Canada
Iceland
Spain
Ireland
Japan
Italy
New Zealand
Mexico
Poland
Netherlands
Turkey
Norway Portugal Sweden UK Source: Replies to the OECD Secretariat questionnaire.
In Germany, the Administrative Council monitors the BaFin’s management and supports the execution of its duties. The President is obliged to keep the Administrative Council regularly informed of the conduct of his management activities. The Administrative Council consists of the Chairman and his Deputy, who is seconded by the Federal Ministry of Finance, and 19 representatives from public and private institutions. BaFin also possesses an Advisory Board comprising 24 members. In Hungary, the Supervisory Council is an advisory body with 15 members. The President of the HFSA chairs the sessions and appoints the council members based on consultations with the Minister of Finance for onethird of members and with the professional associations for two-thirds of members representing the supervised entities. The members of the council are 58
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
professionals with outstanding theoretical knowledge and practical experience. The Supervisory Council comments on the issues related to HFSA’s strategic and regulatory role and development. The members are appointed for a period of three years. In Iceland, the FME has a Board of three members appointed by the Minister of Commerce for a term of four years. One board member is appointed on the recommendation of the Central Bank. The Minister appoints the Chairman of the Board and decides on the members’ remuneration. The Board should orient the focus of the Financial Supervisory Authority’s work and monitor its activities. Major decisions are presented to the Board for approval or rejection on a majority-voting basis. A special consultative committee composed of representatives from the supervised parties operates in conjunction with the FME. The committee is an arena for parties under supervision, including pension funds, to further their views on the procedures and operations of the supervisory agency. The consultative committee does not have decisionmaking power. The FME’s executives hold meetings with the consultative committee at least twice a year. In Ireland, there is a Representative Board of 17 members. While all its members are appointed by the Minister for Social and Family Affairs, the Board must be comprised of representatives nominated by trade unions, employers, the Government, industry and beneficiaries. Decisions tend to be taken on a consensus basis. In Italy, the COVIP’s Board includes the Chairman and four members. They are appointed by decree of the President of Italy, subject to the advice of the competent Parliamentary Commission, in accordance with the decision adopted by the Council of Ministers and with the designation made by the Ministry of Labour in agreement with the Ministry of the Economy. The decisions of the COVIP Board are taken by majority. The Dutch PVK has a Governing and an Executive Board composed of at least three members and five at the most. Each appointment is made for a period of five years. The Executive Board takes decisions by majority voting. There are no specific criteria of representation. In Mexico, there is an Administrative Council with representatives of other official authorities dealing with social security and the financial sector. In Poland, there is a board of members with a Chairman and two deputies. In Poland, according to the new Act on Insurance and Pension Supervision and the Ombudsman for the Insured, which came into force since 1 January 2004, the Commission shall be under the competence of the Ministry of Finance. In
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
59
Sweden, the Finansinspektionen (FI) board consists of up to twelve members without any specific criteria of representation. The members are appointed by the Swedish Government. In the county administrative boards, the board consists of nine members under the same conditions as FSA. In Norway, the Board of the FSA is comprised of five members. In addition, the Central Bank is represented in Board meetings by an observer. The FSA Board members are appointed by the government (i.e. the Ministry of Finance) for a term of four years. The decisions of the Board are made by majority vote. In order to be able to make decisions at least three Board members have to present in the meeting. The rules of procedure have been established for the activities of the FSA’s Board. These rules (last revised in June 2003) comprise, inter alia, a detailed list of matters to be considered by the Board. In the UK, there is a board with a Chairman and nine other part time members broadly representative of employees, employers and sections of the pensions industry. The members are appointed by government Ministers. Decisions should be taken on majority basis, but usually they are taken by unanimity.
In Portugal, the ISP has a Consultative Committee and an Audit Committee. The Consultative Committee works on matters related to strategic guidelines and co-ordination with other agencies. The Audit Committee controls the financial management of the ISP. It analyses the budget, annual report and annual accounts. Both bodies may take decisions on a majority basis. Disclosure policies Supervisory agencies should work in a completely transparent environment, frequently reporting their main actions and activities, providing disclosure of information to members, enterprises and pension fund administrators. Agencies may disclose information to the general public on a regular basis. All surveyed countries produce annual reports regarding the agencies’ activity, statistics and analysis of the pension fund sector. This information is available on websites containing press releases, publications, penalties applied, lists of managers disqualified, guidance, and reports of board’s meetings. OSFI (Canada) prepares an annual report on its operations to the Minister, who should present it to each House of Parliament (House of Commons and Senate). Additionally, each year OSFI must present its Report on Plans and Priorities that provides increased levels of detail on a business line basis and 60
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
contains information on objectives, initiatives and planned results, including links to related resource requirements over a three-year period. The report is tabled in Parliament by the President of the Treasury Board. OSFI also submits an annual report on the administration of the Pension Benefits Standards and the statistics regarding the total allocation of invested pension assets, the distribution of plan membership and assets by plan type, and the source of funds of federally registered plans. Finanstilsynet (Denmark) is required to submit a report on its activities once a year. The agency discloses notifications, technical assumptions, decisions, executive orders and directives to entities and recommendations made. BaFin (Germany) publishes an annual report, a monthly official bulletin containing legal and administrative principles, circulars, guidance notes, and other information transmitted directly to the entities. The Government Actuary (New Zealand) also prepares an annual report to Parliament, which is available on line and in paper form for interested parties. Statistics are available during the year for interested parties. In Sweden, FI and the county administrative board have to submit annual and semi-annual reports to the Swedish government. While observing confidentiality policies, the HFSA (Hungary) is entitled to disclose some of its resolutions in the Financial Gazette and on Internet. In the Financial Gazette, the HFSA regularly (quarterly and annually) discloses the list of entities holding operating licenses issued by the HFSA, as well as the list of foreign supervisory authorities with which the HFSA has concluded cooperation agreements based on mutual recognition. The agency also prepares annual and quarterly reports. The FME (Iceland) discloses an annual account as well as an annual report of its main activities in each financial sector. Once a year, representatives of parties undertaking supervision activities are invited to a meeting where the main activities as well as trends and outlooks in each market of the financial sector are recapitulated. The website contains news and press releases, descriptions of activities, information on consumer services, complaints committees for financial issues, reports and discussion papers. The agency publishes annual pension fund yearbook containing information from the annual accounts of pension funds and special report on pension funds investments for the respective year. The Norwegian FSA submits an annual report on its (supervisory) activities. The annual report contains separate chapters covering the individual supervised sectors. COVIP (Italy) statistical data are regularly collected by COVIP on a quarterly and yearly basis. For each fund, the information collected is mainly
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
61
referred to in the following categories: members, contributions, NAV, performance of pension funds and portfolio managers, asset allocation, income and expenditures. COVIP produces an annual report describing the structure and the most important features of the private pension system, along with the regulatory and supervisory activity carried out during the previous year. In addition, the principal statistical information is made available quarterly on the website. ISP (Portugal) elaborates an annual report published in the Official Journal and also a quarterly review. Conclusion This survey reviewed the different types of institutional organisation of the private pension funds supervision in OECD countries. It argues that supervisory structures for pension funds are a function of the state political and administrative organisation (federalism, unitary, centralised, decentralised); characteristics the pension scheme (mandatory, voluntary, occupational, personal, DC or DB); market structure (number of funds/plans, type of fund/plans, market concentration degree) and regulatory and supervisory approach (qualitative, prudential, quantitative, self-supervision, re-active, proactive). Three private pensions supervisory structure models have been identified: (i) specialised pension model, with one or more agencies dedicated exclusively to pension fund supervision; (ii) partially integrated model, with one agency responsible for insurance and private pension supervision; and (iii) integrated model, with one institution responsible for the overall financial sector supervision, including banks, securities, insurance companies and pensions funds. In countries with integrated financial authorities (Austria, Germany, Hungary), the main arguments in favour of integration are related to the economies of scale and scope, authority overlapping, consistency between supervisory objectives in different sectors, efficiency and transparency of the information flow and institutional adjustment to the expansion of financial conglomerates. Nonetheless, there are countries with unified agencies for the financial sector and segregated agencies for occupational pension plans (Japan, Sweden and the UK). In addition, there are countries with integrated agencies and specialised functions (Australia) and countries where the power of the unified agency is limited by federalism (Canada). In countries with specialised agencies, the survey showed some institutional fragmentation with several agencies sharing the responsibility of the pension supervision according to the product and function (Italy, Mexico and the US). The main argument in favour of specialisation is the particularity of the private pension contracts with 62
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
specific tax treatments and social aspects, which would require a different approach regarding the supervision of their assets, liabilities and risks. This seems to be the case as regards occupational schemes where employment relationships must be considered and where the employer frequently serves as an intermediary between the plan or fund members and the financial institution. This survey also showed that different specialized institutions can cooperate and co-ordinate their activities in order to achieve economies of scale, greater efficiency and eliminate overlapping duties as long as they are clearly defined. In this sense, both integrated and specialised models could achieve the same results in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. Despite the diversity and complexity of the national institutional structures, the first “good practice” raised in the discussion is that the private pension supervisory framework should be clearly designed. Each agency involved in the process should have a well-defined mission statement, objectives and responsibilities. Co-ordination, co-operation and information sharing arrangements should be encouraged in order to avoid authority overlapping, promote economies of scale and scope, and improve the overall information quality and availability. The survey also showed that supervisory agencies should be properly staffed and financed, insulated from political pressures coming from the government or the pension industry, and endowed with reasonable enforcement capacities. Several institutional features that could contribute to the design of the supervisory agency were also analysed. Preferably, institutions should possess operational independence, with autonomy and resources to conduct a human resources policy that can offer salaries (including benefit rights and other social packages) and terms of employment that are competitive to those in private sector. Moreover, supervised entities should participate in the financing of the supervisory agency though a transparent budgetary process. The heads of the agencies should be appointed for a pre-defined term. Situations which could lead to early termination should be specified in a transparent manner. Additionally, supervisors should be endowed with adequate powers and its decisions may be ultimately revoked only by them or by administrative and judicial courts. Regulations should address conflicts of interest situations and employment of former supervisors in the private sector should be protected against disclosure of confidential information and create mechanisms to avoid the capture of the agency.
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
63
It is also important to design institutional mechanisms to avoid principal– agency risks. Supervisory agencies should be overseen by boards with representatives of all the sectors involved or affected by the supervisory process (government, entities, participants) and should frequently disclose their actions, as well as information on the private pension system.
NOTES
1.
In this text, the term “supervisory agency” is used in a broader sense to qualify the institution directly responsible for the supervision, including department, directorate, superintendence, secretariat, authority, nondepartmental body, commission and all other specific national legal denominations.
2.
These institutions are a kind of mutual benefit society offering insurance solutions similar to traditional life insurance.
3.
These institutions are pledges for employer’s pension commitment. Founded by employers their sole purpose is to safeguard pensions. The sponsor holds all responsibilities, including financial risks related to asset allocation and decisions on the amount and periodicity of the contributions.
4.
Rocha, R., Richard Hinz and Joaquim Gutierrez (1999), p.11.
5.
Lumpkin, S. (2002), pp. 84-85.
6.
Demarco, G. and R. Rofman, with E. Whitehouse (1998), pp. 3-4.
7.
See Lumpkin, S. (2002), pp. 85-92.
64
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Chapman, Keith, (2002) “Supervision of Private Pensions – an Australian Perspective”, OECD Private Pension Series – Regulating Private Pensions Trends and Challenges, 2002. (OECD, Paris). Demarco, G. and Rofman, R with Whitehouse, E, (1998) “Supervising Mandatory Funded Systems: Issues and Challenges”, World Bank Social Protection Discussion Paper no. 9817, December 1998. (Washington). Laboul, André, (1998) “Private Pensions Systems: Regulatory Policies”, OECD Working Paper AWP 2.2. 1998. (OECD, Paris). Lumpkin, Stephen A, (2002) “Supervision of Financial Services in the OECD area”, OECD Financial Markets Trends, no. 81, April 2002. (OECD, Paris). Hungarian Financial Service Authority, (2002) “Hungarian Financial Service Authority Annual Report 2001”, May 2002. (Budapest). Iwry, J. Mark, (2002) “Regulation and Supervision of Private Pensions in the United States”, Paper prepared for the Second Conference on Private Pensions in Brazil, May 2002. (São Paulo). OECD, (2002) “Draft Methodology for the Assessment of the Observance of Basic Principles for Regulation of Private Occupational Pension Schemes”, Document presented to the Working Party on Private Pensions, July 2002. (OECD, Paris). OECD (2002), “Revised Taxonomy for Pension Plans, Pension Funds and Pension Entities”, Document presented to the Working Party on Private Pensions, July 2002. (OECD, Paris). OECD (2001), “Supervision on Private Pensions”, Document presented to the Working Party on Private Pensions, July 2001. (OECD, Paris). OECD (2000), “Comparative Regulation of Occupational Pension Plans”, Document presented to the Working Party on Private Pensions, June 2000. (OECD, Paris). OECD (2001), “Further Work on Supervision”, Document presented to the Working Party on Private Pensions, December 2001. (OECD, Paris). OECD (2001), “Functional Responsibilities of Private Pensions Regulatory and Supervisory Authorities in Authorities in OECD Countries”, Document presented to the Working Party on Private Pensions, June 2001. (OECD, Paris).
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
65
Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority – OPRA (2002), “Protecting Pensions”. Annual Report 2001/2002, March 2002. (London). Parniczky, Tibor (2002), “Structure of Supervision”, OECD Private Pension Series – Regulating Private Pensions Trends and Challenges, 2002. (OECD, Paris). Parniczky, Tibor (2001), “Supervision of Private Pension and the Hungarian Case Implementation of Private Pension Supervision”. OECD Private Pension Series – OECD Private Pensions Conference 2000, 2001. (OECD, Paris). Pelc, Pawel (2002), “Polish Model Supervision of Funds”, OECD Private Pension Series – Regulating Private Pensions Trends and Challenges, 2002). (OECD, Paris). Queisser, Monika (1998), “Réglementation et contrôle des caisses de pensions: les principles et la pratique”, AISS Revue Internationale de Sécurité Sociale, vol 21, 2/98. 1998. (AISS, Geneva). Rocha, Roberto, Hinz, Richard and Gutierrez, Joaquim (1999), “Improving Regulation and Supervision of Pension Funds: Are there Lessons from the Banking Sector?”, World Bank Social Protection Discussion Paper no. 9929, December 1999 (Washington). Servenay, Christian (2001), “Selected Supervisory and Regulatory Issues”. OECD Private Pension Series – OECD Private Pensions Conference 2000, 2001. (OECD, Paris). Srinivas, PS, Whitehouse, Edward and Yermo, Juan (2000), “Regulating private pension funds’ structure, performance and investments: cross-country evidence”, World Bank, July 2000. (Washington). USDOL - PWBA (2002), “2001 Annual Performance and Accountability Report”. USDOL-PWBA, February, 2002. (Washington). Yermo, Juan (2002), “Pension Fund Governance”, OECD Financial Markets Trends, no. 81, April 2002 (OECD, Paris). Villegas-Caballero, Carmen (2000), “Introduction to Institutional Investors in Latin America”. OECD Proceedings - Institutional Investors in Latin America, 2000. (OECD, Paris). Vittas, Dimitri (2002), “Policies to Promote Saving for Retirement: A Synthetic Oveview”. World Bank Social Protection Discussion Paper no. 9929, March 2002. (Washington).
66
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
Annex II.1. Primary Supervisor For Pension Funds Supervised private pensions schemes Australia
Canada
(1)
Occupational and personal, both mandatory and voluntary plans (voluntary and compulsory superannuations funds) Occupational voluntary plans
Czech Republic
Personal voluntary plans
Denmark
Occupational mandatory plans and personal voluntary plans Occupational and personal voluntary plans Occupational and personal, both mandatory and voluntary plans
Germany
Hungary
Iceland
Occupational mandatory plans and personal voluntary plans
Pension funds supervisory agencies
Primary supervisor
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) Australian Tax Office (ATO) Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) Provincials Pensions Supervisory Authorities Ministry of Finance / Office of the State Supervision in Insurance and Pension Funds (MF/OSIPF), Securities Commission (SC), Depository Banks (DB) Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MLSA) Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA)
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) for all superannuations funds
www.apra.gov.au
Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) for federal pension plans
www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca Provincials Pensions Supervisory Authorities for pension plans Ministry of Finance / Office of the State Supervision in Insurance and Pension Funds (MF/OSIPF)
Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA)
www.ftnet.dk Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin)
Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin)
www.bafin.de Ministry of Finance (MF) Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (HFSA) Tax Authority (TA) Ministry of Finance (MF) Financial Supervisory Authority (FME) Internal Revenue Directorate (IRD)
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (HFSA)
www.pszaf.hu Financial Supervisory Authority (FME)
www.fme.is
67
Supervised private pensions schemes Ireland
Italy
Japan
Mexico
Occupational and personal voluntary plans
Occupational and personal voluntary plans
Occupational and personal voluntary plans
Personal mandatory and voluntary plans
Pension funds supervisory agencies Pension Board (PB) Revenues Commission (RC) Central Bank (CB) Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (DETE)
Pension Funds Supervision Commission (COVIP) Stock Market and Securities Commission (CONSOB) Bank of Italy ISVAP Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) / Pension Bureau Financial Services Agency (FSA) Ministry of Finance (MF) National Commission for the Retirement Saving System (CONSAR) Mexican Institute of Social Security (IMSS)
Primary supervisor Pension Board (PB) for occupational pension plans
www.pensionsboard.i e Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (DETE) for personal pension plans Pension Funds Supervision Commission (COVIP) for occupational and personal
www.covip.it Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) / Pension Bureau for occupational plans
www.mhlw.go.jp National Commission for the Retirement Saving System (CONSAR) for mandatory personal pension plans
www.consar.gob.mx
Netherlands
New Zealand
68
Occupational, voluntary plans (some industry-wide plans are mandatory) Personal, voluntary plans Occupational and personal voluntary plans
Pension and Insurance Supervisory Commission (PVK) Dutch Central Bank and the Netherlands Authority for Financial Markets Gov. Actuary at the Insurance and Superannuation Unit (ISU) of the Minister of Economic Development
Ministry of Finance (MF) for voluntary personal pension plans Pension and Insurance Supervisory Commission (PVK)
www.pvk.nl
Gov. Actuary at the Insurance and Superannuation Unit (ISU)
www.isu.govt.nz
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
Norway
Poland
Supervised private pensions schemes
Pension funds supervisory agencies
Occupational and personal voluntary plans (Occupational plans are mandatory if a plan is established by his/her employer) Occupational voluntary plans and personal mandatory and voluntary plans
Financial Supervisory Authority – Kredittilsynet Ministry of Finance
Occupational and personal voluntary plans Occupational and personal voluntary plans
Portuguese Insurance Institute (ISP)
Primary supervisor Financial Supervisory Authority – Kredittilsynet
www.kredittilsynet.no
Commission of Insurance and Pension Fund Supervision (KNUiFE)
Commission of Insurance and Pension Fund Supervision (KNUiFE)
www.knuife.gov.pl Portugal
Spain
Portuguese Insurance Institute (ISP)
www.isp.pt General Directorate for Insurance and Private Pension Plans (DGSFP)
General Directorate for Insurance and Private Pension Plans (DGSFP)
www.dgsfp.mineco.e s/dgsfp Sweden
Occupational mandatory and personal voluntary plans
Finanasinspektionen (FI) County administrative boards
Turkey
Occupational and personal voluntary plans
UK
Occupational and personal, both mandatory and voluntary plans
Ministry of Finance (MF) Under-secretariat of Treasury (UT) Capital Markets Board (CMB) Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority (OPRA) Financial Service Authority (FSA) Inland Revenue (IR)
Finanasinspektionen (FI) for friendly societies County administrative boards for pension foundations
www.fi.se Under-secretariat of Treasury (UT) Capital Markets Board (CMB) for pension mutual funds Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority (OPRA)
www.opra.gov.uk
(1) In Canada, the OSFI is responsible for federal pension plans. Provinces have separate provincial agencies that are responsible for provincially regulated pension plans within their jurisdiction - Columbia Pension Standards Branch (www.labour.gov.bc.ca/psb/); Alberta Labour, Employment Pensions (www.tras.gov.ab.ca/business/pensions/); Saskatchewan Justice, Pension Benefits Branch (www.saskatchewan.gov.sk.ca/pensions/); Manitoba Pension Commission (www.gov.mb.ca/labour/pen/); Financial Services Commission of Ontario (www.ontarioinsurance.com); Régie de Rentes du Québec (www.rrq.gouv.qc.ca); New Brunswick, Office of the Superintendent of Pensions (www.gov.nb.ca); Nova Scotia Pension Regulation Division (www.gov.ns.ca/enla/pensions/) and Newfoundland /Labrador Insurance and Pensions Division (www.gov.nf.ca/gsf/cca/ip).
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
69
Annex II.2. Questionnaire on Supervisory Structure For Private Pension Funds
1. Supervision of Private Pension Funds: Functions and Responsibilities 1.1. What bodies/agencies are involved in the supervision of private pension funds? 1.2. Which of these agencies is the primary supervisor? Does it differ by type of plan (occupational vs. personal, mandatory vs. voluntary)? 1.3. Please identify the institutional body responsible for the following functions related to the supervision of pension funds: a) Licensing/registration b) Qualification for tax benefits c) Compliance to governance rules d)
Contributions and regularity of payment
e) Membership and portability (enrolment process, transfers and compliance) f) Benefits eligibility conditions and access to plans g) Investments, asset allocation, performance, minimum capital and reserves h) Custodian procedures i)
Financial, actuarial and accounting methods
j)
Administrative cost, fees and marketing
k) Disclosure procedures referring to members and beneficiaries, potential members and accounts l)
70
Merger and liquidation process
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
1.4. Please describe any explicit co-ordination and co-operation arrangements between pension fund supervisors and other supervisory bodies, including those in charge of banking, insurance and securities supervision. 1.5. What provisions exist for the pension fund supervisory agency to share information with other parties (e.g. central bank, other supervisors)? 1.6. Does the primary pension supervisor have any regulatory authority? If yes, please describe? If not, what entity is the principal regulator? 1.7. Does the pensions supervisory body produce any statistics and/or research? If yes, what types of information and studies are produced and how are they made available? 1.8. What are the main problems and the main advantages of the supervisory framework? 1.9. Is there any on-going initiative to reform the supervisory framework? If yes, please describe it and provide the justification for the proposed changes. 1.10. Please provide available information concerning supervised entities for the year 2001: a) Number of participants (active workers, beneficiaries and dependents) of the supervised pension scheme b) Number of supervised pension funds or plans, by type c) Fund revenues of the supervised entities in domestic currency. d) Reserves of the supervised entities in domestic currency. 2. Political, Institutional and Operational Independence of the Supervisory Body 2.1. What is the legal status of the supervisory body? 2.2. Does the supervisory authority have a board that oversees the operation of the authority? If yes, what is the composition of the Board? (e.g. number of members, criteria of representation) How are the members appointed? How are decisions taken (unanimity, majority voting, qualified majority voting, etc.)?
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
71
2.3. To whom or to what institution is the supervisory authority ultimately accountable to? What are the main means of reporting the authority’s activities? 2.4. How is the supervisory body financed? 2.5. Who determines the overall budget? 2.6. Is the pension industry required to contribute to the financing of the costs of supervision? 2.7. Do the funding arrangements limit the independence?
supervisory agency’s
2.8. Do the funding arrangements provide the supervisory body with sufficient resources? 2.9. How is the head of the supervisory body (and the other directors) appointed? 2.10. Are there any minimum professional requirements for the head of the supervisory body? 2.11. How is the head (and the other directors) of the supervisory body removed? 2.12. How long is the mandate of the head of the supervisory authority? 2.13. Are there any restrictions for the movement of professionals from the supervisory body into the pension industry? Is there a minimum period between the departure from the supervisory authority and subsequent hiring by the supervised entity or pension plan? 2.14. How often are pension fund supervisors employed within the pension industry once they leave their service as supervisors? (Never, rarely, occasionally or frequently?) 2.15. Does the supervisory authority have autonomy to manage the human resource policy concerning the level of salaries and the structure of careers for its employees? 2.16. How do the terms and conditions of the employment currently offered by the supervisory authority compare with those available to staff in the private sector?
72
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
2.17. Is the supervisory body under to the same rules on hiring and firing employees applied to the federal administration? 2.18. Is the supervisory body under the same procurement procedures applied to the federal administration? 2.19. Which national authorities, if any, control and audit the activities of the supervisory body? 2.20. Does legislation delegate all supervisory powers to the supervisory body or does a superior authority retain final approval of certain actions (e.g. intervention in a pension fund, removal of license, etc)? 2.21. Can any superior administrative authority change the decisions and procedures of the supervisory body? 2.22. Please describe the disclosure policy of the supervisory authority (e.g. annual reports, releases, etc). 2.23. Is the supervisory authority satisfied that its powers are adequate in enabling it to fulfill its statutory responsibilities? 3. Organisational Structure and the Performance of the Supervisory Agency. (Please address the following questions to the primary supervisor. If the supervisory authority is not specialised, please address the following questions to the department of the authority that supervises pension funds) 3.1. How many directorates/departments/units in the supervisory authority are in charge of the supervision of pension funds and what are the main tasks of each one? Please provide the organizational chart of the agency. 3.2. What is the total number of staff employed by the supervisory authority? 3.3. In broad terms, what proportion of the staff is involved in: a) Front-line supervision activities (e.g. on-site and off-site supervision, licensing, enforcement, intervention and termination b) Supervisory support functions (e.g. statistics, studies, legal and economic analysis) c) Corporate services (e.g. administration, human resources, budget, etc) 3.4. How many actuaries are working in the supervisory body?
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
73
3.5. How many lawyers are working in the supervisory body? 3.6. How is the integration of off-site and on-site supervision managed? 3.7. How much was the annual budget of the supervisory body for 2001? Please provide the information in domestic currency. 3.8. Is there any participation of pension fund industry’s representatives or members’ representatives in the supervisory structure? If so, how does it operate? 3.9. Does the supervisory agency have a stated mission statement and/or statement of values? 3.10. What has been the main source of supervisory staff? (e.g. other supervisory agencies; other government departments, private sector) 3.11. Does the agency have flexibility and capacity to establish its own corporate culture? What steps has the agency taken to promote it?
3.12. What training programs have been established to develop supervisory skills of the staff?
74
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
75
OSFI
MF / OSIPF
FSA
BaFin
HFSA
MF
Canada
Czech Republic
Denmark
Germany
Hungary
Iceland
COVIP, BI, ISVAP, CONSOB
Italy
Automatic
TA
IRD
HFSA
TA
TA
MF / OSIPF
CCRA
ATO
b
COVIP
PB
FME
HFSA
BaFin
FSA
MF / OSIPF
OSFI
ATO
ASIC
c
na
PB
FME
IRD
HFSA
BaFin
FSA
MF / OSIPF
OSFI
ATO APRA
d
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
PB
Ireland
FME
APRA
Australia
a
COVIP
PB
FME
HFSA
BaFin
FSA
MF / OSIPF
OSFI
ATO APRA
e
COVIP
PB
FME
HFSA
BaFin
FSA
MF / OSIPF
OSFI
ATO APRA
F
COVIP
Na
FME
HFSA
BaFin
FSA
MF / OSIPF
OSFI
APRA
g
COVIP BI
Na
FME
HFSA
BaFin
FSA
MF / OSIPF
OSFI
APRA
h
COVIP
PB
FME
HFSA
BaFin
FSA
MF / OSIPF
OSFI
APRA
i
COVIP CONSOB
CONSOB
PB
FME
HFSA
BaFin
FSA
MF / OSIPF
OSFI
ASIC
k
COVIP
Na
FME
HFSA
BaFin
FSA
MF / OSIPF
Plan Sponsor
ASIC
j
COVIP
PB
FME
HFSA
BaFin
FSA
MF / OSIPF
OSFI
APRA
l
Supervisory responsibilities related to the implementation of regulation on: a) licensing/registration; b) qualification for tax benefits; c) compliance to governance rules; d) contributions and regularity of payment; e) membership and portability (enrolment process, transfers and compliance); f) benefits eligibility conditions and access to plans; g) investments, asset allocation, performance, minimum capital and reserves; h) custodian procedures ; i) financial, actuarial and accounting methods; j) administrative cost, fees and marketing; k) disclosure procedures referring to members and beneficiaries, potential members and accounts; and l) merger and liquidation.
Annex II.3. Distribution of Supervisory Responsibilities
76
DGSFP
FI
UT
OPRA
Spain
Sweden
Turkey
UK
IR
MF
TA
TA
KNUiF E
TA
na
MF
MHLW
b
OPRA
UT
FI
DGSFP
KNUiFE
FSA
Na
CONSA R
MHLW
c
OPRA
UT
FI
/DGSFP
KNUiFE
FSA
Trustees
IMSS
MHLW
d
OPRA
UT
FI
DGSFP
KNUiF E
FSA
Trustees
IMSS
MHLW
e
Industrial Tribunals
UT
FI
DGSFP
KNUiF E
FSA
Trustees
IMSS
MHLW
F
OPRA
CMB
UT
FI
DGSFP
KNUiF E
FSA
Trustees
CONS AR
MHLW
g
na
CMB
FI
DGSFP
KNUiFE
FSA
Trustees
CONSA R
FSA
h
OPRA
CMB
UT
FI
DGSFP
KNUiF E
FSA
Trustees
CONS AR
MHLW
i
FSA
UT
FI
DGSFP
KNUiFE
FSA
Trustees
CONSAR
MHLW
j
OPRA
CMB
UT
FI
/DGSFP
KNUiFE
FSA
Trustees
CONSAR
MHLW
k
OPRA
CMB
UT
FI
/DGSF P
KNUiF E
FSA
Trustees GA
CONS AR
MHLW
l
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
Supervisory responsibilities related to the implementation of regulation on: a) licensing/registration; b) qualification for tax benefits; c) compliance to governance rules; d) contributions and regularity of payment; e) membership and portability (enrolment process, transfers and compliance); f) benefits eligibility conditions and access to plans; g) investments, asset allocation, performance, minimum capital and reserves; h) custodian procedures ; i) financial, actuarial and accounting methods; j) administrative cost, fees and marketing; k) disclosure procedures referring to members and beneficiaries, potential members and accounts; and l) merger and liquidation.
FSA
KNUiFE
GA
New Zealand
Poland
CONSAR
Mexico
Norway
MHLW
Japan
a
III.
SUPERVISION OF PENSION FUNDS: THEORY AND PRACTICE by Richard Hinz *
What is Pension Supervision? There are a variety of activities undertaken by public agencies to establish the security and stability of private pension funds. These may be divided into two primary categories: (1) The creation of a legal basis and set of rules that govern their structure and operation and (2) The oversight of these institutions and enforcement of compliance with the rules. The first of these activities is essentially an organizational and rule making function. The foundation of any pension scheme typically involves a law that defines the basic framework and minimum standards of conduct. In some instances this involves the invention of an entirely new type of institution with certain distinctive features that qualify it to manage retirement savings, an approach characteristic of pension companies created in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe. In others, an existing legal or institutional framework is adapted to provide the characteristics required for a pension fund. The most prevalent example of this is the utilization of the long established canons of trust law as the foundation for pension funds in Anglo-Saxon countries. These can be roughly grouped under the heading of “regulation” or “rule making”. They involve a range of functions including: the enactment and periodic amendment of statutes, the establishment of case law, the interpretation and application of statutory or other legal foundations to specific circumstances or in the depth that may not be addressed in statutes and the issuance of guidance or application of the law to specific individual circumstances. These activities may be initiated by the relevant authority or occur in response to specific cases in dispute or requests from pension funds. Regulation may be legislated, issued as decrees or be conducted through structured (and sometimes negotiated) administrative procedures. Regulation encompasses all of the *
Senior Economist, the World Bank
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
77
actions having the common objective of delineating the form, rules and standards that will define permissible organizations and activities, essentially establishing the parameters within which institutions will be required to function. The second category of activities that determine the character and operation of pension funds are “supervisory”. These monitor the activities of pension funds to ensure that they remain within the requirements of the regulatory framework, essentially enforcing compliance with the rules. Supervisory activities have a similar breadth of variation depending on the regulatory and legal environment, policy choices and a variety of other factors. In general they may be defined as encompassing any activity that is primarily concerned with ensuring that the requirements and limitations imposed on pension funds are adhered to. There is rarely a clear line of demarcation between the two sorts of activities. Often the same public agency is responsible for both the regulation and supervision of pension funds, with one part of the organization engaging in rule making and interpretive activities while another separate unit enforces compliance. In some instances, however, usually where the regulatory framework is oriented toward standards of conduct rather that structural or outcome requirements, the interpretation and enforcement of the rules may occur simultaneously. This may happen when a supervisor must reach judgments about whether specific behaviour falls within a standard and enforce compliance in a single action. Although some of the theoretical literature on financial supervision distinguishes between two types of supervision (enforcement of the rules and more general monitoring of the behaviour of firms) both are encompassed within the general definition of supervision. Rationale for the Supervision of Private Pensions Two concepts merit discussion as a predicate to considering the characteristics of pension supervision. These are (1) the rationale for strong oversight and control of pension funds and (2) the distinctive features of private pensions that may determine how this is undertaken. Pension supervision is a recent endeavor in most countries and consequently there has been relatively little literature that sets forth a theoretical foundation. There has, however, been extensive consideration of the underlying rationale for the regulation and supervision of other financial institutions, most notably banks. A reasonably complete understanding of the theoretical basis for private pension supervision can be derived from the selective application of the concepts relevant to the regulation and supervision of these other financial institutions.
78
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
In general, supervision is deemed to achieve welfare gains by correcting for several types of risks and deficiencies that characterize private pension funds. There are four closely related concepts that provide this rationale: market imperfections and failures, asymmetrical information, moral hazard and efficiency derived from competition. Supervision is generally justified as a mean to correct for the inability of markets to function effectively and equitably or to achieve the degree of discipline and participant protections required to support privately managed retirement savings. This inability originates from several characteristics of the products and nature of the markets. At the broadest level, markets are perceived to be unable to fully reflect the social costs and risks of pensions in their pricing structure. The potential for the failure of pension savings products has a number of secondary consequences and social costs due to the presence of alternative social insurance programs. In addition, a lack of confidence in private retirement savings institutions may lead to diminished savings and greater reliance on publicly financed programs with associated negative fiscal and macro-economic consequences. The complexity and long-term nature of pension products also limits the capacity of pure market mechanisms to provide the necessary discipline. Pension savings products are very hard to value by consumers at the point of purchase because of their complex structure. This is especially true of defined benefit or annuity arrangements. However, even for defined contribution products, the presence of tax incentives, restrictions on liquidity, complex restrictions on permissible investments and a range of other factors make the products more opaque than transparent for the average consumer. In addition, many pension products represent incomplete contracts with many contingencies attached when the purchaser is faced with decisions to buy and sell, a characteristic that impedes pricing as an effective form of market discipline. Private pensions are also not commonly purchased in a direct or voluntary transaction with open price competition but as the result of a public mandate or through an intermediary. Many countries now require all wage and salary workers to purchase pension products through a limited set of highly regulated institutions. In other countries, access to the pension market comes through choices that are pre-selected by an employer or trade union. Both of these structures severely impede the capacity for transparent price competition and market discipline by limiting the choices and direct interaction of consumers with sellers.
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
79
The primary origin of these market imperfections is generally perceived to be the problem of asymmetrical information. This is a circumstance in which the seller of the products has more information about the products value than the buyer and the incentive as well as the means to utilize this information to an advantage. The purchasers of pension products typically have little capacity or knowledge about them. For example, the typical participant in a pension fund is not able to effectively consider the potential value of a particular portfolio strategy in relation to its risk or the long-term implications of a level of administrative charges and expenses. The vast majority of person entering retirement cannot reliably estimate the present value of an annuity contract much less distinguish the effects commissions, loads or other charges. Asymmetrical information can also manifest itself in problems of adverse selection. The sellers of pension products may exploit their advantage to selectively market products with an inherent mortality risk to individuals they may consider to have shorter life expectancies. They may also direct their marketing to naïve groups that may be unable to discern hidden expenses or structure the products to impose risks that are not commensurate with the returns provided. A primary consequence of asymmetrical information is high potential for moral hazard, when one party to a transaction has an incentive and the ability to engage in behaviour that is adverse to the interest of the others. For pensions, as for most other financial products, the most prevalent type of moral hazard problems are principal-agent issues. Pension funds that accumulate and invest retirement savings over long terms typically function on a fee basis, making them the agents of the fund members. Although some systems impose coinvestment and capital adequacy requirements these only partially address the problem. Asset managers may have the incentive to engage in risky behaviour inconsistent with the interests of fund members to maximize their potential future earnings, or may simply have incentives to divert funds from their beneficial owners. Supervision provides monitoring and evaluation that compensates for both asymmetries of access to information but also the capacity for meaningful analysis and interpretation. Another significant source of moral hazard is the presence of public guarantees for pension funds. The presence of guarantees may make purchasers of pension products indifferent to excessive risk taking on the part of fund managers because that risk is transferred to the broader public. Guarantees are often essential to the introduction and acceptance of private pensions but necessitate regulation and supervision to compensate for the high moral hazard potential they create.
80
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
Supervision by public institutions is also perceived as a type of public good that improves the efficiency of the operation of a private pension system with benefits that accrue to the society at large. Intensive individual monitoring and analysis of the activities of pension funds could theoretically compensate for the problems arising from asymmetrical information and moral hazard but would be prohibitively expensive. This would be likely to limit the capacity of employers or other organizing intermediaries to achieve economies of scale in the purchase of investment products and so impose losses in efficiency. Effective supervision creates conditions in which individuals are willing to engage in long term contractual savings arrangements that limit the likelihood that they will become wards of the state in old age, providing a collective social benefit. Supervision on a common basis by a public institution also can be seen as overcoming inherent impediments to the introduction of a market in private pension products and enhancing the efficiency of that market. Faced with a high potential for moral hazard and principal agent risk consumers would be likely to engage in the market solely on the basis of sound rules if there were no mechanism to monitor and enforce compliance. Supervision serves both as the essential catalyst to overcome this hurdle and as an instrument to confine the behaviour of market participants to a defined corridor that creates the basis for price competition. Principal agent problems and other forms of moral hazard could be overcome through private warrantees or other forms of insurance. These however would simply price the moral hazard and pass this on to consumers as rents on capital or risk premiums on insurance contracts at a higher individual costs than collective public oversight. Distinctive Features of Funded Pension Systems The second important issue is consideration of the distinctive feature of pension funds and how these may affect the way in which supervision is conducted. In essence private pensions are simply one type of financial intermediary. They collect small amounts of money from a large number of individuals, assemble this into large pools of capital, manage the investment of these pools within risk, return and liquidity parameters and distribute the proceeds in accordance with the specific agreements with the investors. This is a description that could apply to banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, credits unions or any number of other institutions that perform the same elemental functions. Privately managed pension funds, however, are distinguished in a number of ways from other institutions performing what on the surface may appear to be identical purposes. Most of these differences contribute significantly to the need for a greater emphasis on supervisory activities for pensions.
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
81
Most basic among these is the level of security that is required for pension funds. In contrast to other similar intermediaries, pension funds typically reach far deeper into the socio economic strata than other types of financial institutions. Many privately managed systems are mandatory. Although there are issues regarding the effectiveness of the imposition of the mandate, a system which reaches 50% of the formal sector workers in a developing or transition economy involves a greater proportion of the population than any other financial institution except perhaps banks. This means that pension systems bring individuals with relatively low levels of experience or sophistication into complex financial transactions that the typical member of a pension fund is only marginally equipped to understand or effectively monitor. Moreover, pensions more typically afford far fewer, if any, choices that would permit reliance on competitive market forces to adjust for differences in security, assuming that this sort of trade-off is feasible or desirable. Occupational arrangements typically involve an employer making unilateral decisions about eligibility and levels of participation, establishing the terms of the plan and selecting the asset management procedures on behalf of workers. Mandatory public arrangements generally offer no more than a handful of alternatives which, due to the design and regulatory constraints are often indistinguishable from one and other to even an astute analyst. Unlike mutual funds, savings products of banks or endowment life insurance products, (especially in circumstances in which there are very small or non existence social security systems providing broad old age income support) pensions involve savings that are essential to subsistence or even survival in old age rather than discretionary savings to facilitate consumption or income smoothing. In many of these circumstances pension savings represents the exclusive financial or any type of asset that will be accumulated during the lifetime of most workers, a circumstance that affords little capacity to manage or absorb risks From the perspective of the individuals who rely on these arrangements for old age income, all of these factors combine to raise the need for the security of pension system to be well above that of financial institutions performing what are otherwise similar functions. This heightened need for security is reinforced in the public domain by the implicit public investment in private pension system through preferential tax treatment, the provision of guarantees and the potential fiscal exposure through the establishment of social assistance programs and support for the indigent elderly. Most funded pension systems are afforded a consumption tax treatment to provide incentives for participation in retirement savings arrangements and to 82
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
maximize the accumulation of capital in these funds. This typically involves excluding both contributions to pension funds and the earnings on investments from taxable income when the contribution is made. This tax-deferral represents, for a successful or a mature system, an enormous public investment. Many countries with fully developed funded pension systems have accumulated asset levels that exceed 100% of their current GDP. These assets will usually be taxed at a lower rate after the person retires, therefore implying an investment in deferred taxes that may be equivalent to several years of other public expenditures, the loss of even a portion of which may have severe consequences. Fiscal exposure also originates with public guarantees of private systems. The loss of funds in a private system, regardless of the cause, may trigger immediate and significant increases in the expenditures of pension guarantee programs. Even without an explicit public guarantee of pension funds the fiscal consequences of an insecure system will manifest themselves in greater costs for social assistance and income support for the elderly. The relationship of pension security and public financial exposure leads in both directions. A system that is perceived as secure and reliable can also enhance private savings to a level that will significantly curtail future expenditures in these areas as well. Finally, due to all of the factors discussed in the foregoing sections, private pensions will typically have very complex systems of rules and regulations. The complexity of these rules is due both to the need for security and to the attempt to balance security with efficiency and costs by introducing what are subjective and situational standards into the regulatory framework. The more mature private pension systems are those founded in Anglo-Saxon trust law rely substantially on procedural standards and relationship specific restrictions on conflicts of interest, in part to avoid the rigidities and associated costs of simpler restrictions. This type of approach requires a significant degree of monitoring and supervision to implement. All these factors combine to impose the need for a very high level of security for private pension funds. This security is derived from the interaction of the two primary elements used to manage risks in pension system, regulatory systems that establish the structure and rules within which funds will operate and supervision in which funds are monitored and compliance enforced. Primary Elements of Pension Fund Supervision All system of pension fund supervision are derived to some extent from the underlying nature of the pension arrangements and consequently will vary
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
83
considerably in their form and organization. There are, however, a number of common elements that are characteristics of virtually all supervisory programs that can define the essential components of these programs and provide an organizing framework for considering the way that the underlying characteristics of the pension system are related to the nature of the supervision. These basic elements may be organized into six major categories as outlined below. Licensing Licensing activities restrict and control entry to the pension market through procedural requirements and criteria. These are most commonly applied to pension funds or the entities that are permitted to operate funds but can also be extended to individuals who perform important functions in the pension system, for example trustees, or to firms or individuals to become qualified to provide services, such as the qualification of actuaries to evaluate defined benefit plans. The modalities in which this function is exercised differ widely across different systems but in essence they all make use of a set of predetermined criteria to establish an entry barrier or select a limited number of entrants. Although licensing is generally directed toward managing the risk of incompetent or unqualified entrants to the market or to insure against the results of negligent or risky behaviour by imposing capital or bonding requirements it may also have the purpose of limiting competition or ensuring economies of scale in pension markets. Licensing can also be seen as a mechanism to ensure public confidence in the private pension system by applying transparent standards and establishing security to warrantee the integrity of funds. Licensing is differentiated among pension systems by the restrictiveness, depth and periodicity. Some systems have virtually no entry barrier while others have very complex and strict standards applied by the supervisor. Licensing can be incident to all participants before they enter the market, only to some participants, depending on their size or the structure of their assets, or to none of the participants. Also, in cases where licenses are issued, they can be issued only once, for the life of the supervised entity, or they can follow a process of renewal with a yearly or potentially even greater frequency. Monitoring Monitoring activities collect information to enable the supervisor to track the status and actions of the pension funds within his jurisdiction. Monitoring commonly takes the form of required submissions of information on a regular basis in the form of periodic reports to the supervisor, and it also includes a
84
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
range of other reporting requirements or more active forms of information collection. The common function is the provision of information that will either provide the basis for judgments or actions by the supervisors, or through its provision or disclosure make the activities of the pension funds more transparent. Potential recipients and user of monitoring include supervisors as well as the members of funds. Monitoring activities can be defined in terms of both the scope and content of the information that is collected as well as the mode of collection. Common types of information collected include financial statements, schedules of transactions, information on individuals responsible for important aspects of fund operations (trustees, administrators, Boards of Directors), actuarial analyses and information on the sponsors of pension funds or owners of Pension Companies. Monitoring is often a passive activity on the part of the supervisor in which information is required to be submitted by the relevant institutions or individuals. It may also be a pro-active function in which the supervisor goes on site to collect specific or supplementary information periodically. Supervisors may also monitor the media for information, have regular exchanges of information or consultations with other supervisors, and have regular programs of meetings with pension funds to collect information. An important form of monitoring is establishing venues for individuals or fund members to communicate with the supervisor and to request scrutiny of a particular fund or activity. A strong distinctive type of this is the so called ”whistleblower” requirements of some systems which assign responsibility to certain individuals or parties to report knowledge of improprieties to the supervisor. Some monitoring systems also use independent third parties such as auditors or credit ratings to produce or verify information. Monitoring varies in terms of the type, scope and depth of the information that supervisors seek to utilize, as well as the parties who provide the information and the periodicity of the collection of information. Communication Supervisors engage in a full range of activities to communicate with pension funds. These are essentially the complement to monitoring activities in which the flow of information is from the supervisor to the funds making it very difficult to cleanly separate the two in many instances. Supervisors may communicate with the funds through the provision of regular reports on the industry, by announcing their priorities and compliance strategy, or by publicizing compliance actions. They may also engage in interactive
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
85
communication by placing inspectors on site and engaging in daily communication, by meeting regularly with the funds to discuss issues of mutual interest or through more formal processes in which changes in the activities of the funds are suggested and issues resolved through negotiation. Supervisors may also undertake programs of outreach, education, and training to enhance the knowledge of the legal requirements or operation of pension systems. Supervisors may also seek to communicate with a range of parties including fund managers, service providers, members, and the public. Communication activities of supervisors have a wide range of goals and objectives. Some communication programs may have the purpose of informing pension funds about the intent and nature of the supervisor’s activities to maximize the capacity for cooperation and make the interactions with fund more efficient. Others are intended to advance the understanding of the regulatory structure as well as rights and responsibilities of funds and their members to facilitate compliance with the rules or to advance the exercise of individual rights of action by members. Communication may also be intended to leverage resources and establish a climate of deterrence among funds by publicizing the enforcement actions of the supervisor. Basic types of communication by supervisors are: Disclosure is a means of communication with the public. Supervisors make public a portion of the information they receive, process, or issue, in publications and individual disclosure notes. Disclosure programs are typically designed to provide the basis for individuals to scrutinize the activities of pension funds to support private rights of action, to ensure that funds are exposed to scrutiny to provide a deterrent to prohibited actions or to enhance competition among funds. The utilization and reliance on disclosure and the nature of these programs are key indicators of the degree to which supervisory systems are reliant on indirect forms of compliance enforcement and market forces rather than directive interventions. Outreach and education activities are communication efforts undertaken by supervisors to raise the awareness of the operation and requirements of pension systems. These may be directed to the public and members of the pension funds to educate them about their rights and responsibilities under the law, or to the industry to raise the awareness of compliance issues or understanding of the supervisor standards or operations. These may take the form of publications, websites, or regular programs of consultation with the industry, on an individual or collective basis. Similar to disclosure, the nature and extent of outreach and education programs are indicative of the underlying style and approach of supervision. Systems with few efforts to interact in this 86
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
manner will typically have be more directive in nature, relying nearly exclusively on action by the supervisor, while programs with extensive outreach and education activities place greater weight on the role and action of third parties in the supervisory process. These types of programs are also a form of preventive rather than remedial supervision because their ultimate goal is to educate practitioners about how to remain in compliance and to deter problems by enhancing the capacity of third parties to provide oversight. Training. In some countries, the supervisor also provides more formal training to ensure that the managers of pension funds are adequately prepared, or as a specific requirement prior to some form of licensing or entry control. This may be general training on the laws or a response to significant changes or on specific areas of fund operation such as: risk-management and investment practices, criteria to evaluate third-party service providers; and compliance with technical regulatory requirements. Communication is differentiated among pension systems by the scope and purpose of the activities. Supervisory systems that impose strong controls and have little reliance on external or market processes are very directive in their communication with funds regarding compliance issues, and they are likely to engage in few activities designed to facilitate compliance or enhance deterrence. Systems with more procedurally oriented standards or a greater reliance on external processes will engage in a more interactive communication process, and they will have far more extensive outreach and education programs that support more negotiated settlement of compliance issues and rely on deterrence and third party actions to support direct compliance activities. Analysis The manner and extent to which supervisors analyze and evaluate the information they receive from pension funds is usually closely linked with the system’s legal and regulatory approach. Legal frameworks that are based on quantitative standards lead supervisors to extensive measurement efforts that compare funds’ financial status and activities to normative standards. This often involves complex calculations of individual funds that may be undertaken as frequently as daily. Pension system founded in the Anglo Saxon tradition of trust law tend to be more oriented toward comparative analysis, and hence follow a less frequent process of evaluating funds over longer periods against benchmarks or the behaviour of the entire industry. The analysis in these systems
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
87
may also be less focused on the outcome of financial decisions than the process of decision making or in determining relationships among the various parties involved in managing the assets and affairs of the funds. Measurement and analysis elements of supervision can therefore be evaluated on the basis of the purpose, frequency, and intensity of the activity. Systems that are very intensive and proactive undertake analysis very frequently, with the intent to discern as soon as possible, if not in advance, when the fund may drift outside an established standard of behaviour or to engage in a specific action that may represent a violation of the requirements. These attributes may also be associated with risk based approaches to supervision, in which complex algorithms or “scoring” systems based on extensive calculations may be the basis for decisions about supervisory interventions. At the other end of the spectrum, we find systems that are oriented toward keeping funds within a loosely and often situational or relative set of standards. Here analysis is far less frequent or intensive. This represents an approach that relies more on external or market forces, or in some circumstances on the presence of extensive regulation and oversight of other aspects of financial market operation. Intervention All supervisory programs are continually faced with decisions about whether and how to intervene in the operation of pension funds. There is considerable overlap across the different functional elements of supervision. It is often difficult to separate intervention from some of the key aspects of the communication with the funds. Interventions may take the form of explicit requirements for the fund to take or desist from engaging in certain activities that carry the force of law and must be complied with immediately. In other systems they may be in the form of findings that are presented to the funds for a response. The process of intervening in these circumstances is likely to be in the nature of negotiations in which issues are resolved or a process of litigation through the civil courts where the ultimate resolution is reached through a judicial process A key issue that defines the nature of interventions is the force of authority is given to the supervisor and the nature of the process through which interventions occur. In some countries, the supervisor simply has the authority to intervene when a finding is made that a fund is, or may be, approaching noncompliance. Fund managers may in some cases be provided with very little if any recourse to negotiate or appeal. In other countries, the supervisor has little
88
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
capacity to unilaterally impose sanctions and instead intervenes through a far less directive process. Of consultation, notification and perhaps negotiation. The most basic and important feature of the notification of compliance process is the manner in which individual funds are notified by the supervisor when they are deemed to be out of compliance with legal requirements. This can range from regularly scheduled interaction that may occur as often as daily in some countries, to formal notices, or in some cases there are simply directives from the supervisor to the fund to make changes. The manner of this sort of intervention and the nature of the process that follows, whether it is completely directive or a form of negotiated settlement, is perhaps the aspect of the supervisor’s activities that most defines the nature and style of supervision. Another key variation is the involvement of third parties in interventions. Some systems require that all actions be taken through the courts. Others establish a formal process of appeal to a specially constituted group that imposes a formal, although similar, type of check on the authority of the supervisor. Interventions by supervisors are therefore differentiated partially by the degree to which they are pro-active or occur only after conclusive evidence of non-compliance is established. They are also distinguished by the extent to which they are directive and represent the unilateral exercise of authority to which there is little or no appeal, or conversely are a process of negotiation and adjudication. Correction As is the case with any form of compliance enforcement, the ultimate and perhaps most important element of pension supervision is the capacity to take corrective action. Although this element of the program may seem conceptually difficult to separate from intervention, the range of types and purposes of corrective action may vary across supervisory systems that are otherwise quite similar. This variation in the type of corrective actions that a supervisor may take, however, makes it an important element to evaluate on its own. There are essentially three types of corrective actions: punitive, remedial, and compensatory. Supervisory programs may engage in all three types or may be limited exclusively in their authority to only one. Punitive actions are designed to impose penalties on the funds for actions deemed adverse to interests of members. They are distinguished by both form and intent. Penalties are usually fines that are paid to the supervisor and may be retained by the authority or become part of public revenues. Their intent is to establish deterrence and punish behaviour outside of the standards.
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
89
Remedial actions are those taken by a supervisory authority to remedy the consequences of failure to comply with the law. These are essentially a way to reverse the outcome of non-compliance. Remedial sanctions may simply be requiring the fund to return to a prior status or to cease certain actions. In some cases, this may involve financial sanctions limited to any direct result of negligence or malfeasance by responsible parties. They may also be applied to correct for abuses of favoured tax status afforded to pension funds or harm suffered by parties that may have been involved in transactions with the funds. The primary intent of these corrective actions is to rectify any direct negative outcomes and prevent a recurrence. There is of course a deterrent effect of this but it is more indirect. Compensatory corrective actions go beyond the remedial outcomes and seek to compensate aggrieved parties for both the direct and indirect effects of violations. Rather than simply reversing the outcomes, these are intended to compensate affected parties for the direct and indirect consequences of actions determined to be inappropriate. Compensatory damages will typically follow remedial actions and effectively compensate for any damages. These types of actions have a strong deterrent intent, but they also have the purpose of ensuring that harm is minimized. Corrective activities of supervisory are distinguished by the degree to which they are solely focused on remedial outcomes, correcting problems as they occur, or whether they extend into the arena of compensation and punitive provisions that attempt to establish a more self-enforcing regime of deterrence. Characteristics of Supervisory Systems The manner in which these common activities are implemented varies considerably among the many different countries with funded private pension systems. Some countries engage in very intensive supervision programs in which they interact on a daily basis with the funds. Others interact directly with the funds only on an exception basis when there are indications of problems or to advance a specific policy agenda. The manner in which different systems implement the basic elements defines what may be viewed as the “style’ of pension supervision. Supervision styles can be considered as reflecting a set of attributes that represent different positions along a spectrum of attributes rather than choices between discrete alternatives. A set of five attributes represented as scales can be used to define the nature of the various approaches to supervision. This approach is useful because it both describes the full range of the attributes that are observed among supervisory systems but also because it does
90
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
this in a manner that evaluates the elements in relation to the degree to which they represent interventions to address market imperfections or to directly secure the interests of pension fund members. These descriptive scales essentially seek to differentiate on the basis of the depth, intensity, periodicity and intent of the supervisors activities.
Restricted Pro-Active Intensive Directive Corrective
Open Reactive Exception Negotiated Deterrent
The scales are defined by their end points that may be described as follows: Restrictive systems are those that impose high entry barriers in which the supervisor requires the submission and validation of extensive information prior to the licensing or approval of the operation of pension funds and entry into the market is restricted to a small number of entities that meet rigorous standards. Open systems are those in which there is no or minimal involvement of the supervisor in assessing the qualifications of funds and entry to the market is open to all entities that represent that they meet the qualifications established in the law and regulations. Pro-active systems are those in which the supervisor intervenes on a regular basis in order to pre-emptively address violations of standards or to prevent what is perceived to be undesirable behaviour. Pro-active systems typically involve high intensity monitoring and regular intensive interventions by the supervisor. Reactive systems are those in which the supervisor intervenes on a very selective basis and only in response to specific circumstances. These type of systems typically involve supervisory actions that are compensatory in their intent in that they are designed to rectify the consequences of a violation of the standards or requirements after it occurs. Intensive systems are those in which there is a high frequency of regular communication and interaction between the supervisor and the pension funds. These interactions can be in the form of both the collection of information or other monitoring activities or in the imposition of requirements for remedial or preventive actions.
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
91
Exception systems are those in which the supervisor infrequently interacts with the pension funds or only does so on an exception basis when specific circumstances trigger the need to take some action. Directive systems are those in which the supervisor has, and frequently exercises the authority to unilaterally require action or to impose sanctions on the pension funds. It references both the scope of the authority but also the manner in which it is exercised. Negotiated systems are those in which the supervisor engages in a process of proposing actions and negotiating resolution to issues. This may be in the form of the nature and scope of the authority provided to the supervisor, its degree of independence, the availability of venues for the appeal of supervisory actions or in requirements for the supervisor to enforce compliance through judicial processes or litigation. Corrective systems are those in which supervisory authority and methods are primarily oriented to preventing or correcting problems and enhance the security of the system through a reliance on direct actions. Deterrent systems are those that primarily seek to establish a credible deterrent presence through their actions rather than being comprehensive in addressing every incident. These are systems that rely on selective interventions to establish the parameters of acceptable activity by funds and to achieve compliance by the potential threat of sanctions rather than their direct application. Factors Associated with Different Styles of Pension Supervision There are many different ways in which pension supervision programs are organized and managed to achieve these common objectives. The most important of these are the environment and context in which the pension system operates and the basic design and characteristic of the system. Mandatory pension system that operate in developing countries or those with relatively under developed financial systems are typically more directive and intensive in their approach, as is characteristic of the systems in Latin America. Pension systems that operate on a voluntary basis in environments with highly developed financial markets are typically less intensive and exception based, relying on interventions by exception and establishing a climate of deterrence as is typical of the systems in the Anglo-American countries such as Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Examples of supervisory system in transition economies that fall between these two models such as Hungary are also present. A review of the supervisory methods and programs from this
92
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
range of these styles yields observations about some of the basic relationships between context and pension supervision. Increasing levels of per capita GDP and the depth of capital markets are generally negatively correlated with the intensity of supervisory practices. The first of these, a broad proxy for overall economic development, provides more of a reference point than explanatory power because of its’ linkage to all of the other potential influences examined. More developed countries nearly always have commensurate development of financial markets and legal institutions and are much more likely to be able to support voluntary pensions or rely on employers to manage occupational programs. The relationship to capital market development, however, provides some insights into the conditions required for supervisory systems to leverage various forms of other primary market oversight and formulate their activities as a form of tertiary supervision. This results in the focus on monitoring and exception only interventions observed in these settings. It also enables supervisors to rely on private third party monitoring mechanisms such as auditors and actuaries. The legal environment exerts a similar influence on the supervisory methods. Conditions in which there is a strong reliance on rule of law and the integrity of governance in public and private institutions create the capacity to relax licensing and other entry barriers and rely on indirect and less frequent forms of monitoring and intervention. Conversely, environments characterized by lower respect for the rule of law require more intervention by public authority. An important factor in this process is likely to be the ability to rely on disclosure of information and private rights of action as a significant adjunct to compliance enforcement by public authorities. The capacity to utilize third parties and rely on private actions through a process of civil justice, perhaps even simply the presence and confidence in a commercial code of conduct and private adjudication is a likely common attribute to both the economic and legal factors at play in this process. Environmental factors exert similar influence on the structure of the pension system that also dictate the form and intensity of supervision. Countries with mandatory individual systems are associated with very restrictive and intensive approaches to supervision. Not coincidently these same countries have systems with a very small number of funds. Countries with strong rule of law and governance have occupational arrangements with a large number of funds. The ability to overcome the agency and moral hazard challenges required to sustained employer managed systems are directly linked to the ability to supervise these in a less pro-active manner. No doubt the imperative to limit regulatory burden and compliance costs in a voluntary system are key factors that strengthen this relationship.
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
93
Taken together these factors suggest the relationship of context and supervision illustrated schematically below:
Figure 1 Intensity of Supervision
This suggests that the conditions shown on the horizontal axis interact to influence the nature of the supervisory style observed on the different countries. Countries with higher levels of per capita income and financial market development are associated with stronger rule of law, governance institutions, voluntary pension system and occupational sponsorship. These factors combine in a variety of ways that lead to supervisory systems that are more open, less pro-active and function in a less directive manner. These factors both influence and reflect the underlying nature of the pension system. The degree to which these factors will enable supervisory systems to function in a less intensive manner however is broadly influenced by the underlying legal and cultural environment as is depicted by the parallel lines for two basic types of legal systems. An equivalent set of conditions in a civil law 94
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
environment is likely to lead to more intensive style of supervision than might be present in the alternative. This is both because the common law system are associated with countries that have more developed capital markets and voluntary occupational systems but also because they are more conducive to flexible regulatory regimes, negotiated processes and perhaps most importantly the capacity to utilize third parties and private rights of action as compliance enforcement tools. This framework provides some useful observations about the general nature of these relationships and potentially enables policy makers to assess where they may reside along the range of certain characteristics of the environment that the supervisory system will function. There are, however, key limits to the applicability of thee relationships that may shift significantly the position that a given country may otherwise be expected to occupy. One of the most important of these is the legal culture and tradition. Countries have adopted an Anglo Saxon common law may be far more conducive to more open and less directive systems than might otherwise be anticipated by the economic conditions. Conversely very highly developed countries with a civil code tradition may be constrained in their ability to adopt the more negotiated systems and reliance on private rights of actions that such a model would predict In addition, such a model is relatively static and may provide more insights into the relevance of the initial conditions for a pension system than the dynamics of its evolution. At this point the experience with the way in which supervisory systems evolve with the conditions around them is far too limited to offer any assessment about whether countries will maintain these relationship as their economies and pension systems develop. These relationships provide a useful framework, some relevant points of reference, and valuable insights into the importance of prevailing conditions on the design and implementation of private pension supervision. This illuminates the extent to which the intensity and form of supervisory activities are a function of the matching of methods to environment, directing attention to the this matching process rather than the formulation of normative models in the formulation of guidelines for best practices. By doing so, it provides a useful starting point for the introduction of new systems in the continuing reform process and some guideposts for existing supervisors to consider their future course.
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
95
IV.
INTEGRATED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS by Edgardo Demaestri * and Gustavo Ferro *
Introduction This study analyzes the cost and benefits of integrating the supervision of pensions with that of other financial activities and services. The literature has dealt with the integration of the supervision of banking, insurance and securities markets (Llewellyn, 1999, Demaestri and Guerrero, 2003), the joint supervision of insurance and pensions (Davis, 2001), the supervision of pension funds (Shah, 1997, Srinivas et al., 2000, Demarco et al., 2000, Rocha et al., 1999, OECD Working Party on Private Pensions, 2002 and 2003), and the separation of banking supervision from central banking (Demaestri and Guerrero, 2003). This study seeks to expand on these issues, focusing on the integration of pension regulation. In particular, it seeks to make a conceptual contribution with respect to the reforms in financial supervision and pension systems in Latin America. The subject is an important one. The financial problems afflicting pay-asyou-go pension systems have led to the promotion of complementary private capitalization schemes (both voluntary and mandatory) or substitutive ones (mandatory). The reforms that began in Chile in 1980 have been applied in a score of Latin American countries and “transition economies”. Discussion on pensions is also a key theme in Europe and the United States. At the same time, the amount of resources intermediated by pension systems is substantial. In 2000, close to 30% of financial assets of the countries belonging to OECD were accumulated in pension funds.1 *
This paper was prepared by Edgardo Demaestri and Gustavo Ferro while they were Senior Economist and Consultant, respectively, in the Infrastructure and Financial Markets Division (IFM/SDS) of the Inter-American Development Bank. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Inter-American Development Bank.
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
97
Numerous countries have integrated financial supervision.2 There are integrated regulators in Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, the Maldives, Malta, Nicaragua, Norway, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden, the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom. Countries that are considering or are actively involved in switching to an integrated approach include Finland, the Netherlands, Switzerland and South Africa. Most of these integrated entities regulate banking, insurance and securities (Demaestri and Sourrouille, 2003). Some of them also regulate pension funds (i.e. Australia, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, the United Kingdom and Sweden). The approach adopted here is conceptual and analytic. A methodology is proposed to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of integrating pension supervision,3 paying attention to the specific nature of private pension systems in Latin American countries. This methodology involves the analysis of the relative efficacy and efficiency of integrated and specialized approaches with respect to the achievement of three objectives of financial regulation: i) consumer protection ii) systemic stability and iii) the efficiency of the financial system.4 Following this introduction, Section 2 looks at the literature to discern why financial intermediaries in general and pension funds in particular require regulation, focusing the discussion about the need to address market failures and to provide merit goods. Section 3 summarizes the discussion over the advantages of integrating supervision of different financial intermediaries in relation to banking, insurance and securities. Section 4 presents a methodology and uses it to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of integrated as opposed to specialized supervision of pension funds. Deepening the analysis on pension markets and specificities of financial intermediaries working in them, Section 5 examines the goals and instruments for regulating pension funds. A distinction is drawn between the “reactive” regulatory systems in operation in OECD countries that focus mainly on prudential regulation and problem solving, and the “proactive” systems common in Latin America and some East European countries which regulate along prudential lines, but are more intrusive with regard to the structure and performance of the industry. Section 6 extends the use of the methodology for analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of integrating pension fund supervision by considering the peculiarities of intermediaries in the pension market. The study ends with some concluding thoughts.
98
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
The regulation of financial intermediaries and pension funds Without an analytical grasp of the logic and goals of regulation, any institutional structure may seem ad hoc and arbitrary. This section discusses the reasons that justify the regulation of financial intermediaries, the objectives, the risks involved and the generic forms that this takes, along with some specific aspects that relate to the regulation of pension funds. Regulation of financial intermediaries In the discussion about the regulation of financial intermediaries, key questions include whether financial markets are different from other markets, whether market failures are relatively pronounced, and whether there are forms of government intervention that improve the functioning of markets and impact positively on overall economic performance. The main functions of financial markets are to transfer resources from those who save to those who borrow; to mobilize capital; to assist with the selection of investment projects; to oversee performance; to transfer, share and spread out risk; to register transactions; and to manage the means of payment. Financial markets not only deal with inter-temporal transactions but basically with risk and information. In the view of some authors, financial products and contracts are different from other goods and services, particularly because consumers determine quality and place a value on a product within an environment of information asymmetries. Others, however, argue that financial products are not so different from other products, stressing that the principal protection for consumers against the risky behaviour of firms is similar to that of other industries: competition, reputation, dissemination of information and legal redress in case of damages. Following Stiglitz (1994), seven failures or characteristics of financial markets can be identified that may justify government intervention in terms of welfare economics. a)
Monitoring by financial markets has some elements of a public good.
b)
Externalities in the evaluation of projects.
c)
Externalities associated with financial crises.
d)
The possibility of market loss because of information problems.
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
99
e)
The existence of imperfect competition arising because of the specialized information that each intermediary has on its client base.
f)
The financial risk market being incomplete.
g)
The financial education of retail consumers could be considered a merit good.
Looking at each in more detail: a) Economic performance depends on the efficiency with which capital is allocated. Financial markets take part in monitoring the activities of those responsible for the management of firms, and this contributes to the more efficient allocation of resources. Monitoring is a public good. For instance, if a lender does something that reduces the chances of a default on the part of a debtor, this benefits all lenders, and vice-versa. As with any public good, there is sub-optimal production on the part of the market. Improved supervision by the relevant authority is likely to be beneficial where the financial system does not adequately oversee financial intermediaries. b) Being able to see that another lender is willing to allocate funds in similar projects is an information signal that underscores the potential for investment. It has an externality for the next investor. Some externalities spread out from one market to another; for instance, problems in credit markets can affect stock markets and vice-versa. c) The bankruptcy of a financial intermediary can have wider effects. Its essential asset is its information capital, which is not readily transferable; such information can be dissipated. To offset this failing, the government may be able to supply insurance protection. However, this can alter people’s conduct by reducing the incentive for the ensured to proceed with due caution (moral hazard). d) Effective transaction costs in small financial markets (securities) or new ones (pensions) can be so high that they limit transactions or result in the loss of such markets. The market cannot make the dissemination of information or its production at low cost mandatory. Private markets cannot manage the social risks associated with macroeconomic disturbances. While it is possible to distribute risk within generations, only government intervention can distribute transfers between generations. Financial transactions also imply incomplete contracts whose value is determined largely by the behaviour of the provider after the point of purchase. All this can lead to opportunistic behaviour.
100
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
Regulation and effective collective monitoring can reduce transaction costs and raise welfare. e) Each intermediary has specialized information on its client base. At the extreme, each can monopolize a specific market. Consumers can delegate the task of monitoring to a regulatory agency. There are good reasons based on efficiency grounds to delegate monitoring and supervision to a regulatory agency. There are potential economies of scale to be achieved through authorization, supervision and collective monitoring of intermediaries. An additional role for regulation is to establish minimum standards and therefore to encourage poor quality intermediaries to leave the market. Regulation can provide a guarantee that market participants will observe certain minimum standards (Llewelyn, 1999). f) Many risks remain uninsured, resulting in incomplete financial risk markets. g) The financial education of retail consumers of financial services can be considered a merit good. Information asymmetries can be more harmful for the party that is least informed. In that regard, there are a number of reasons why it is rational for consumers to demand regulations: i) lower transaction costs where a regulator is used to collect and disseminate information, ii) provision of a reasonable degree of safety in financial transactions, iii) past experience of bad behaviour by financial firms, iv) high net-worth exposure because of the financial transaction, v) timely prevention of problems is cheaper than dealing with them subsequently through a new contract, and vi) they can take advantage of economies of scale in monitoring. Regulation can be of good or bad quality. If it is good quality, the costs of its implementation and the degree of distortion it introduces will be less than the damage caused by imperfections or failures in the system. In this respect, what matters is how institutions and markets operate in practice. Similarly, regulatory design should not lose sight of the structure of incentives facing firms; market discipline must be made to work. Regulation has the potential to improve the functioning of markets with failures, but this depends on the quality of the regulation5. Objectives, risks and generic forms of financial regulation Following Demaestri and Guerrero (2003), the correction of financial market failures is connected with achieving three essential objectives of financial regulation:
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
101
a) Protection for consumers of financial services b) Systemic stability c) Efficiency of the financial system. The first objective refers to the combination of information asymmetries and long-term and often sporadic decisions by not very sophisticated consumers. Intermediaries can affect the wealth of their customers since firms can go bankrupt or can operate imprudently, negligently, incompetently or fraudulently. The goal of systemic stability is important because financial systems are unstable. They are subject to runs, bouts of panic, manias and bubbles. The instability of financial systems translates to the wider economy and financial crises have a high cost. The efficiency of the financial system impacts on the real economy through investment evaluations, risk management, and the provision of a payments system. If the sector works efficiently, it is to be expected that there will be better investment decisions, improved risk management and more effective mechanisms for payments. In Latin America, promoting the efficiency of the system has to do with the elimination of distortions, problems of scale and the inefficient use of financial intermediaries for purposes of redistribution. If the costs are excessive, a net burden is placed on the real economy which regulation can help alleviate. Regulation may prevent three types of risks (Srinivas, Whitehouse and Yermo, 2000): agency risk; systemic risk; and investment risk. Agency risk relates to incompetence, negligence or fraud, problems that may arise in any relationship that involves delegation (in this case, from consumers to intermediaries). Systemic risk is especially evident in banking, where a crisis can lead to contagion and possible disruption of the payments system. Although safety nets can help reduce systemic risk, they also create potential for moral hazard among consumers and financial firms. Securities firms, pension funds and insurance companies generally keep liquid assets, and the adjustment of positions is less complicated than for bank assets. Banks fund themselves short-term, whilst other financial institutions have long-term liabilities. As the assets of most nonbank financial institutions consist principally of publicly quoted securities, their market value and disposal value differ little. In banking, it is much more
102
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
difficult to value assets, whilst the value of liabilities is exogenously determined (a deposit has a face value that has to be respected). Investment risk refers to the probability of capital loss. It has a component that can be reduced through diversification, taking advantage of the fact that there are assets whose risk is negatively correlated with others. However, there is also a risk component that cannot be reduced by diversification: macroeconomic risk. These risks can be dealt with through two generic types of regulation: x
Prudential (solvency, institutions).
x
Conduct of business (how firms conduct business with their customers).
safety
and
soundness
of
financial
Prudential regulation is required because of the imperfect information available to the consumer, problems of agency inherent to the nature of financial institutions, and because the behaviour of a financial firm after consumers have dealt with it could affect the value of the contract signed. The incompetence, negligence or dishonesty of an intermediary may reduce the value of contracts to the detriment of the consumer. There are arguments that justify prudential regulation of financial firms when the institution has a fiduciary role, when consumers are not in a position to judge the safety and solvency of institutions, when the post-contractual behaviour of an institution affects the value of contracts, and when the cost of risk-taking by a financial firm can be transferred to others. Regulation of conduct of business focuses on obligatory reporting requirements, the encouragement of honesty and integrity on the part of firms and their employees, the degree of competence expected, fair business practice, and the ways in which products are sold. General issues on pension fund regulation6 Private pension funds are a way of organizing the pension system, which in turn forms part of the social security system. Social security involves those actions that society undertakes to confront problems of need caused by the biological diminution of human capital as a consequence of old age, invalidity, death and the survival of dependents, accidents at work, sickness and unemployment. The pension system covers those ’claims’ related to old age, invalidity and the survival of dependents. There are four characteristics of a pension system in so far as it is adopted as a mandatory solution to such
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
103
problems, thus replacing the more traditional system of voluntary arrangements (family support, charity, and voluntary savings). It is considered a merit good. In modern societies, resort to the family or charity is considered inappropriate or insufficient, and the argument is made that voluntary savings would not be sufficient to substitute for a general and compulsory scheme. Pensions-related savings may also constitute an important part of personal assets. The mandatory nature tends to avoid the risk of ’adverse selection’7 that occurs in a free access market with participants with different event risks. This risk would raise the cost of insurance because it would tend to make the system bear the worst risks. x
A mandatory system reduces moral hazard, by which individual pension savings would diminish if people think that the state will subsidize them in the future.
x
Individual behaviour (short-sightedness, incapacity to perceive personal risk or lack of information) can involve making pension savings mandatory.
Taxonomy of financial services Why should pension funds be considered alongside other financial intermediaries? Table IV.1 presents a taxonomy of different financial intermediaries, identifying the sort of business that each conducts, the specific type of contracts involved, the terms over which assets are realized and liabilities called in, and the types of risk involved. Notwithstanding the specificities of the business, contracts, terms and risks involved, financial services — pension funds included — have some similar characteristics: i) they have similar associated risks, although their degree depends on the sort of intermediation undertaken, ii) they have similar overall objectives although these differ in specifics, and iii) they are affected by similar sorts of market failure.
104
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
Table IV.1. Taxonomy of Financial Services Intermediary Banking
Insurance
Securities
Pensions
Main business
Contracts
Loans and investments from deposits.
Fiduciary.
Management of investment portfolios. Liabilities determined actuarially.
Fiduciary
Capture of investment funds (primary market). Risk management (secondary market).
Fiduciary, through commissions (brokers).
Management of investment 1 portfolios.
Heterogeneous assets.
Protection with premiums.
Maturity
Risk involved
Long-term assets. Short-term liabilities.
Credit, term and market risks. Important systemic risk.
Short-term assets. Long-term liabilities.
Protection through the pooling of risk. Possibility of catastrophic risks.
Short and long-term.
Underwriting or best effort (primary market). Trading (secondary market).
On their own account, through spreads (dealers). Fiduciary through 2 commissions.
Medium systemic risk. Short-term assets. Long-term liabilities.
Agency risk. Significant 3 market risk. Medium systemic risk.
1. This contemplates two extreme varieties and combinations between them: a) obligations that are actuarially defined (under defined benefits); b) obligations that result from the manager’s best efforts (under defined contributions). 2. The fact that pensions are a merit good has led to differentiated tax treatments and the promotion of mandatory participation. 3. This risk can only be distributed between generations. Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
Integrated or specialized supervision? The main factors (evaluated in Demaestri and Guerrero, 2003) that have driven integrated financial supervision in various countries are: x
financial innovation (new products and greater complexity);
x
the rise of financial conglomerates;8
x
the quest for regulatory coherence;
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
105
x
gray areas in the attributions and powers of specialized regulators; and
x
growing globalization in the provision of financial services.
In this section, the arguments are examined with reference to specialized versus integrated regulation, and, thereafter, there is a brief examination of the international experience of regulatory integration. Advantages and disadvantages of integrated and specialized regulation9 Although the need for coordination between regulators is clear, some institutional frameworks restrict information flows between them. At the very least, the institutional system should encourage regulators to share information and promote coordinated actions between the different agencies involved. At one extreme, there could be a single combined regulator, although integration may not be justified in all cases. It is important to recognize the differences between intermediaries, the nature of their business, the type of contracts they produce, the maturity of their debts, and the sorts of risk involved. Demaestri and Guerrero (2003) suggest a methodology and analyze the advantages and disadvantages of both approaches, linking these to the core objectives of financial regulation as well as the situation of countries in Latin America. Table IV.2 summarizes the expected strengths and weaknesses of an integrated approach.10 Having identified the factors that drive integration, the similarities and differences that persist among intermediaries and the pros and cons of integration, the main arguments in favour of integrating regulation in Latin America can be summarized as follows: a. economies of scale and scope; b. prevalence of financial conglomerates and the lack of clearly defined boundaries between products; c. competitive neutrality; d. transparency and accountability; and e. the coherence of the regulatory framework.
106
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
Table IV.2. Pros and cons of integrated supervision Pros (of integration) 1) Financial products are increasingly difficult to distinguish. Specialized regulation can deal in a heterogeneous way with similar products, duplicating regulation and causing loopholes in consumer protection.
Cons (arguments for specialization) 1) Intermediaries differ in terms of their business, activities, and risks. 2) It may result in excessive risk taking among the public if the spectrum of risk between one sort of intermediary and another disappears.
2) Filling loopholes, correcting inconsistencies and eliminating overlapping regulation. It avoids regulatory arbitrage and use being made of ’gray areas’.
3) To avoid the ’Christmas tree effect’, (the number of heterogeneous and secondary objectives to be fulfilled by a regulatory 1 agency).
3) Segmented regulation can result in closed clusters where information is not shared (Bureaucratic Leviathans).
4) To avoid the Leviathan (danger that a mega-regulator turns into an omnipotent bureaucracy).
4) With segmented regulation, each regulator can monopolize certain activities. From the point of view of regulatory capture, it is no worse to have a unified regulator who concentrates regulatory activity.
5) Reduce the chances of regulatory capture. To capture a number of regulators may be more difficult (and expensive) than to capture just one, if there is competition between them. 6) Possible political economy reasons.
1. In Latin America, it is common for financial regulators to be involved in many heterogeneous activities with regard to financial regulation. Therefore, the objective of consumer protection may be ignored. Source: Own elaboration on the basis of Demaestri and Guerrero (2003).
a) Economies of scale There are economies of scope in regulation if the joint costs of regulating two or more financial activities simultaneously are less than the sum of the costs of regulating each financial activity separately. There are economies of scale if, for a single financial activity the average cost of regulation and supervision falls as the volume of that activity increases. Integration helps both types of economies to be achieved. For instance, a sole agency can be more efficient in eliminating overlaps in requests for and the processing of information. Integration also encourages the development of a single system of supervision based on risk. Regulatory resources can be directed towards those business areas that involve higher risks to the goals of financial regulation. The costs subject to savings that arise from regulation can be classified thus: (i) Institutional cost (the costs of running regulatory agencies); (ii)
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
107
Compliance costs (the costs imposed on firms through regulation); (iii) Structural costs (such as excess burdens, stifling of innovation). The savings on institutional costs can be achieved by i) establishing a limited and clearly defined set of objectives; ii) budgeting the consolidated supervisory activities at an amount that is lower in real terms than the total of the costs of differentiated activities in previous years; iii) developing joint administrative, information and technology and other support functions; iv) recruiting and retaining qualified personnel; v) using specific know-how in special areas; and vi) achieving efficiencies in the deployment of staff with expert intellectual capital. Compliance costs can be reduced by means of i) introducing a single system for dealing with information requests for regulated firms; ii) having a single database for the registration, authorization and operation of firms; iii) establishing a consolidated set of rules; iv) introducing a centralized system for managing complaints and claims, and v) creating a single system for compensation. Structural costs are those arising from the design of each specific intervention. Minimizing them contributes to the quality of regulation. b) The importance of financial conglomerates and the blurred boundaries between products The growth in financial conglomerates requires that that the risk of the group be assessed on a consolidated basis and that its supervision is comprehensive. Supervision on an individual basis of the different institutions that make up a group is ineffectual. A centralized regulator is in a better position to achieve the aims of consumer protection and systemic stability. c) Competitive neutrality Specialized regulation means that firms with the most diverse range of products will have a more onerous supervisory burden. There are also more incentives for regulatory arbitrage. d) Transparency and accountability Unification provides an opportunity to strengthen control mechanisms in the legal and regulatory framework. A single system for dealing with complaints can be introduced, as can mechanisms for improving powers of investigation and discipline. Internal procedures can be established to ensure that enforcement is
108
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
seen to be fair, including a separation of functions between the staff who investigate a case and those who make decisions related to enforcement actions. e) Coherence in the regulatory framework A single regulator with clear and consistent objectives facilitates coherent supervision that focuses on the relevant risks. Coherence also helps in the adoption and adapting of internationally accepted standards and codes of practice. International experience in integrated regulation11 This conceptual analysis is borne out in practice. In the ten countries with integrated supervision studied in Demaestri and Sourrouille (2003) — Australia, Canada, South Korea, Denmark, Iceland, Japan, Norway, the United Kingdom, Singapore and Sweden —all regulate banking and insurance. Except Australia and Canada, they also regulate securities. In Australia, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, the United Kingdom and Sweden, a variety of pension funds are also regulated. Responsibilities involved, albeit to varying degrees, are prudential policy and regulation, market performance, information dissemination, and payments systems. The United Kingdom, Sweden and Iceland cover the majority of these functions. Among the regulatory objectives are the building of confidence, the setting of standards for sound practice, the introduction of timely correctives, and the promotion of competition, equity and honesty. The powers that regulators have at their disposal include the licensing of financial entities, the establishment of norms and standards, the preparation and enactment of regulations, the removal of directors, the removal of auditors, the withdrawal of licenses, the suspension of operations, the imposition of penalties, and the transfer of engagements. The unified regulator in the United Kingdom encompasses all these regulatory powers, whilst the rest of the agencies studied have at least some of them. Most agencies cover their costs from contributions from the industry they regulate and have the right to set their own budgets, although some require government approval. This enhances their degree of autonomy from government upon which they depend functionally in many instances. The agencies mostly report to an executive board, although in some cases directly to government. In all cases where there is an executive board, this is appointed by government.
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
109
There is no standard structure. Supervisory agencies may organize themselves so that their structure corresponds to an ’institutional’ model of integration in which they maintain divisions that relate to different types of institutions. On the other hand, they can adopt a ’functional’ organization whereby regulation is geared principally to correct specific market failures. The first of these is easier to implement, but tends to preserve the identities of their predecessors. Because of their importance, the following three issues require special attention. a) Conglomerates In most countries, conglomerates are limited exclusively to carrying out financial activities. In all the cases studied, capital adequacy requirements are set as well as limits to the excessive exposure to risk by the group as a whole. The integrated agencies in Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom have special divisions to supervise conglomerates, whilst elsewhere institutional units do so. b) Risk evaluation The objective of determining risk for banking and insurance is something that is common to most countries. Analysis for determining risk includes credit risk, market risk and operational risk. The aim of the agencies is to have a system that is applicable to all institutions. c) Crisis management All the supervisory agencies that were subject to analysis are able to intervene to resolve a crisis in an institution within their purview. In most of the countries looked at, the central bank or finance ministry also takes part in crisis management, in particular where systemic risk is present. Analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of consolidating pensions under an integrated regulator This section presents and applies the methodology proposed in Demaestri and Guerrero (2003) so as to evaluate whether it would be appropriate to integrate pensions under a unified financial regulator. The overall goals of regulation have been identified as consumer protection, systemic stability and promoting the efficiency of the financial system. Achievement of these goals is facilitated and strengthened by certain regulatory practices that can be considered sound in both contexts (integrated or
110
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
specialized regulation) or that are particularly associated with the integration approach. The best practices that are applicable in both contexts include: x
With respect to the three goals: i) introduction of a group of limited and well-defined obligatory objectives, including the three core ones discussed here; and ii) depoliticization, financial autonomy, and the achievement of high technical capacity. The work of supervision is eminently technical and it is necessary to build up high-quality human capital and to provide it with training and continuity. Those in charge should have legitimacy (for example by means of legislative scrutiny of appointments and overlapping periods for political renewal) and a reasonable amount of autonomy (both political and financial). Political autonomy should bring stability, whilst giving the legislature the power to remove officials in instances of corruption through procedures that are simple, transparent and pre-determined. It should also involve rules and procedures to undertake investigations and disciplinary actions, maintaining the separation of these two functions.
x
With respect to consumer protection, i) the legislation should specify that the regulator has a mandate to educate the public with regard to the risks and benefits of different types of financial contract, and ii) the operational procedures for regulation and the method for dealing with complaints and claims should be published.
In turn, the integration of supervision is associated with the following sound practices: x
With respect to systemic stability: i) employ a mechanism for information dissemination that involves the central bank, so as to reduce the costs of separating out banking supervision from the monetary authority; and ii) devise systems for particularly rapid dissemination in times of crisis.
x
With respect to the goal of the efficiency of the system: i) budgeting of the savings arising from the fusion of regulatory roles; and ii) setting as an objective a single risk-based system of supervision in which regulatory resources go to those areas where risk is highest.
Overall objectives of financial regulation The goal of consumer protection is always relevant, both because of the meritorious nature of some financial contracts and the externalities derived from financial intermediation for the economy as a whole. It is especially relevant when the savings being administered are of a compulsory nature (as in the case
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
111
of pensions), are of long-term maturity (as in the case of pensions and life insurance), or where the participants are small-scale consumers of financial services. Owing to the small scale of the latter, they are less likely to acquire the information and specific knowledge required or their participation may only be sporadic, which also is a disincentive to systematically acquiring the necessary information. The mandatory nature of participating in pension schemes is designed to avoid adverse selection, (participation in insurance for old age only of “bad risks”). Here there is a trade-off in which moral hazard is present. When participation is compulsory and there are few alternatives that involve any real choice, consumers of financial services may have little incentive to understand what they are doing and therefore levels of caution may be undermined. In such specific cases monitoring has a social value. The goal of systemic stability has specific applicability in certain sectors and regions. It is to be expected that it is more important in banking and securities, where the chances of systemic crisis is greater and where the potential for negative externalities on other intermediaries and the rest of the economy is also likely to be significant. It is also more important as a goal in countries like those of Latin America, where macroeconomic instability is a more distinctive feature than in more developed economies. In the case of pensions, a systemic crisis may affect those with savings, but more directly those cohorts caught up in the period of the crisis. The longer the terms, the easier it is to isolate the risk from those cohorts that are furthest away in terms of time from accessing the benefits.12 The goal of efficiency is particularly relevant for emerging economies like those of Latin America. Both the quality of intermediation and the economic and institutional context is better in developed countries. This is also the case of the level of competition in the financial industry, and there is a presumption (usually borne out by empirical evidence) that financial markets work more efficiently. In developing countries it is expected that the degree of efficiency will be less and that the objective of improving the efficiency of the system has greater importance. This is because more efficient financial intermediaries and markets allocate capital better, evaluate projects in a more efficacious manner, and therefore contribute more towards raising overall productivity in the economy. Additionally, there is a question of scale. In emerging countries, intermediaries work with lower transaction levels, which implies higher costs than, would be the case in developed countries. Efficient financial intermediaries nurture good practice and improve the workings of economic institutions. The example of pensions in Chile is well known. Initially, when accumulated capital was scarce, most funds were invested in government bonds. As the accumulated funds continued to expand, a better functioning capital market came into being with a greater diversity of vehicles for savings. 112
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
Table IV.3. Efficiency and efficacy of the integrated and specialized approaches to supervision in meeting the core goals of financial regulation in Latin America Integrated vs. Specialized Approaches Issues
Goals
Efficacy Banking, Insurance and Securities
1. Less risk of Consumer moral hazard protection Systemic stability
+/-
Efficiency
Banking, Banking, Banking, Insurance, Insurance Insurance, Securities and Securities and Securities and Pension Pension Funds Funds +/-
+
+
+
+
+
+
+/-
Efficiency of the system 2. Less chance of regulatory capture
Consumer protection
+
+
-
+/-
-
+
+
+
+
Consumer protection
+
+
+
+
Systemic stability
+
+
+/-
+/-
Efficiency of the system
+
+
+
+
Systemic stability Efficiency of the system
3. Absence of Consumer ’Christmas protection Tree Effect’ Systemic stability Efficiency of the system 4. Less chance of bureaucratic Leviathan
Consumer protection Systemic stability Efficiency of the system
5. Achieving Consumer economies of protection scale and Systemic stability scope Efficiency of the system 6. Treatment of financial conglomerates
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
113
Integrated vs. Specialized Approaches Issues
Goals
Efficacy Banking, Insurance and Securities
7. Greater competitive neutrality
Consumer protection Systemic stability Efficiency of the system
8. Greater Consumer transparency protection and Systemic stability accountability Efficiency of the system
+
Efficiency
Banking, Banking, Banking, Insurance, Insurance Insurance, Securities and Securities and Securities and Pension Pension Funds Funds + + +
+/-
+/-
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
Source: Columns ’Banking, Insurance and Securities’ from Demaestri and Guerrero (2003). The column “Banking, Insurance, Securities and Pension Funds” elaborated by the authors.
Analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of integrating pension supervision At this point we turn to presenting the main results from the analysis of integrating pension supervision into the framework of joint supervision of banking, insurance and securities. Using the methodology proposed and applied by Demaestri and Guerrero (2003), we start from the results identified by these authors (in relation to the relative efficacy and efficiency of reaching the main goals of financial regulation under an integrated system of supervision and a specialized one) and extend the analysis to considering the impact of adding pension supervision. Table 4 summarizes the main conclusions reached. In each case, the results are grouped in columns, following the criteria set down by Demaestri and Guerrero (2003) (for banking, insurance and securities) adding a new column that includes pension funds. A plus sign (+) indicates advantages of this approach in achieving a set objective, whilst a minus sign (-) indicates that the opposite approach would be better. A (+/-) sign indicates ambiguity where neither approach seems better. It is worthwhile making clear that these results are strictly qualitative in character and may not be free from a degree of subjectivity. Also, the Table IV.3 does not give a weighting as to the relative importance of each question or goal. This will depend on the institutional context and other features of the country under 114
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
analysis. Nor does it bring together empirical evidence as to the relative weight that each one of these and the results presented may have in specific situations. 1) Less risk of moral hazard. Discussion on this refers to the goals of consumer protection and systemic stability. In the case of the former, there is ambiguity in terms of efficacy when pensions are excluded. There do not appear to be conclusive arguments that change this finding when pensions are included. For this reason, the ambiguity remains. With regard to systemic stability, it is clear that the integrated approach is better when pensions are excluded. This result is strengthened when pensions are added. This is because the overall contribution of the pension system depends on the stability of that system, as well as the stability of banking and securities markets. In the case of banking, this is the payments system and a safe monetary refuge in times of crisis. In the case of securities it is because investment portfolios are based on publicly quoted instruments. On the other hand, the smooth working of the pension system reduces the chances of parafiscal rescue operations. 2) Less likelihood of regulatory capture. This affects both the efficacy and efficiency with respect to consumer protection. An integrated approach (without considering pensions) gives better results in reducing the chances of regulatory capture, both with respect to efficacy and efficiency. If pensions are included in the analysis, the result does not change. A bigger and more powerful regulator is more difficult (expensive) to capture (corrupt) than various smaller ones (even though once captured and corrupted the danger could be greater)13. Similarly, it could be more efficient (cheaper) to try to control against eventual capture in the case of a unified regulator than would be the case of various specialized supervisory agencies. 3) Absence of the “Christmas Tree Effect”. The superiority of integration remains with regard to efficacy in the case of consumer protection when pension funds are included. For this, it is of key importance that the goals and activities of the regulator are properly attuned to these intermediaries. The consolidation of supervision provides the possibility of refining goals, avoiding secondary objectives and maintaining the focus on the core ones. 4) Less chance of building a bureaucratic Leviathan. This has to do with the efficiency of the system. The relative advantages of both systems are ambiguous, both with regard to efficacy and efficiency when pensions are excluded. The inclusion of pensions increases the doubts about integration. The risk of creating a bureaucratic Leviathan increases when the supervision of pension funds is included.
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
115
5) Achievement of economies of scale and scope. When pensions are not included, there was a definite benefit in terms of efficacy and efficiency. Savings on resources increase, as do the chances of reducing the regulatory burden on the private sector. The superiority of integration is maintained or further enhanced by the incorporation of pensions. 6) Treatment of financial conglomerates. In this and the following two items all three goals of financial regulation are affected. Before including pensions, the integrated approach was more efficacious. In relation to efficiency, there were also advantages, although the result was ambiguous for systemic stability. When pensions are included, the results were the same. 7) Greater competitive neutrality. The results were similar to the preceding item since the problems are closely connected. The result was ambiguous for efficacy without pensions, but not for efficiency when systemic stability was considered. Adding pensions made no difference to the results. 8) Greater transparency and accountability. The advantages of the integrated approach were clear before pensions were added, as well as afterwards. In sum, the most conclusive results for the integrated approach are to be found with 5) achievement of economies of scale and scope; 6) treatment of financial conglomerates; 7) greater competitive neutrality; and 8) greater transparency and accountability. The only comparative advantage of the specialized approach refers to 4) the bureaucratic Leviathan. Ambiguous results remain on some points that were present before pensions were included in the analysis: 1) Less risk of moral hazard (consumer protection); 6) treatment of financial conglomerates (systemic stability); and 7) greater competitive neutrality (systemic stability). One way of evaluating the relative importance of these ambiguities about the integration of specific regulators is to assess the importance of each goal with respect to the activities that each of the intermediaries under its supervision carry out. A preliminary analysis suggests that consumer protection is particularly relevant for pensions, but is relatively less important for banks and insurance, and even less so for securities. Systemic stability is especially important in banking as well as in securities, and somewhat less so for insurance and pensions. The goal of the efficiency of the system is relevant in insurance and pensions, more relevant in banking, and less so in the case of securities. (Table IV.4).
116
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
Table IV.4. Primacy of Core Goals in the Regulation of Different Intermediaries Core goals
Banking
Securities
Insurance
Pensions
Consumer protection (important in both developed and emerging economies).
Medium importance
Relatively low importance
Medium importance
Relatively high importance
Systemic stability (important in both developed and emerging economies).
Relatively high importance
Medium importance
Relatively low importance
Relatively low importance
Efficiency of the system (important in emerging economies).
Relatively high importance
Relatively low importance
Medium importance
Medium importance
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
Consideration of the relative importance of each goal to each intermediary allows us to re-examine the ambiguities identified above. For instance, if we take into account the ambiguities found with respect to less incentive for moral hazard, the discussion should highlight consumer protection. From Table IV.4 we can see that this is something that is especially important for pensions, and of somewhat less importance for banking and insurance. With regard to the treatment of financial conglomerates and to competitive neutrality, ambiguities were to be found in systemic stability, a goal that has particular importance in banking. Specific aspects of pension regulation In the previous section, the integration of pension fund regulation was analyzed in the context of the discussion over regulatory integration of other financial services (banking, securities and insurance). So as to continue the study of this issue, taking into account explicitly the supervision of pension funds, this section now aims to analyze pension fund regulation. First, it explores the existing arrangements with respect to private pensions. Then it examines the objectives and instruments of pension regulation (owing to its importance a sub-section is dedicated to investment regulation). Finally, it considers the approaches followed for pension regulation. The private pension fund industry An explicit purpose of reforms to the state pay-as-you-go systems and the establishment of private pension funds have been to build financial security for
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
117
those who have retired. This has involved making use of professional intermediaries to achieve higher rates of return consistent with prudent levels of risk. Supervision of pension funds involves multifaceted connections between the social security system and financial markets, especially that of insurance.14 This is because pensions are long-term contracts frequently based on tax incentives and subject to eligibility criteria set down in social security legislation. In accordance with the taxonomy of the OECD, pension funds can be public or private, mandatory or voluntary, with defined contributions or defined benefits, and occupational or personal. It is helpful to classify pension funds by their governance structure into four types, as does Rocha et al. (1999): x
Accounts in banks or insurance companies.
x
Participation in insurance company funds.
x
Accounts with pension fund administrators.
x
Foundations, trusts and mutual arrangements.
Most of the pension schemes that exist in Latin America come under one of these headings, particularly the last two. Accounts in banks and insurance companies are common in developed countries. A fund member has an insurance contract to provide for his pension. These funds have defined benefits and are treated more or less as a deposit, although many carry additional restrictions and performance conditions. In some cases, the only distinction between pension accounts and other types of deposit is the tax status of the account (income tax exemption up until the pension funds are withdrawn). The quality of corporate governance and administration depend basically on the quality of the institution and the regulatory framework in force for banks and insurance companies. There is no clear segregation of assets with respect to other products on offer. Participations in insurance company funds are allowed in some OECD countries. This type of fund is set up with a separate profit-making firm with shareholders and plan participants. There is a board of directors, but those buying into the fund are not represented on it unless they are also shareholders. The fund is constituted separately from other accounts. However, this type of fund also has the problem of the lack of any segregation of assets (between participants and shareholders). Pension fund administrators are the only form of pension provision allowed in the majority of Latin American countries that have private pension systems. Brazil is the most notable exception here. They operate basically as 118
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
mutual funds without the right to vote. They have defined contributions, although the regulatory framework frequently imposes some performance conditions on the asset administrator. The quality of the governance and intermediaries depends basically on the legal and regulatory framework incumbent on the administrators. Transfers between funds are usually allowed, although restrictions and penalties may apply. In relation to the two previous categories, they tend to be more transparent and there is a clear segregation of assets since the assets of the funds have to be maintained separately from those of the administrator. A major problem that has arisen in most countries has been the high cost of administration, in part owing to the marketing techniques used, illegal sales practices and excessive transfers of those affiliated from one administrator to another. Regulation and supervision have tried to tackle these problems, but only to a limited degree of success. Foundations, trusts and mutual arrangements are very common in OECD countries. Normally they are occupational, but may also be open. They can be both with defined benefits and defined contributions. The problem of agency is normally mitigated by three factors. First, employer management is usually a member of the plan and has an interest in how it is managed because it includes its own retirement pensions. Secondly, employers habitually compete in the labour market offering a package of benefits and lose competitiveness if the value of the benefits on offer fall owing to poor fund administration. Third, the boards of directors of many occupational funds with defined contributions represent both employers and employees, encouraging the alignment of investment policies with the interests of the members of the plan. In the case of plans with defined benefits, the employer normally guarantees the defining of the benefit and also makes contributions into a guarantee fund. This provides an incentive for the employer to interest himself in the performance of the fund, since poor performance will increase his costs. Goals and features of pension regulation (what to regulate?) In general terms, the regulation of the pension industry is guided by the same regulatory objectives of other financial segments. However, the regulatory framework for pension funds involves consideration of their special features in covering social objectives, namely the provision of retirement income. They are considered as a merit good, and for this reason attract tax advantages. Participation tends to be mandatory so as to avoid moral hazard.15 Finally, pension schemes have a degree of regulation that, depending on the circumstances, is either more reactive or proactive. Insurance and pensions to some extent have a shared logic with respect to liabilities and coverage. In life insurance companies, the portfolio is made up of
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
119
assets to cover obligations to policyholders plus the capital of the company. Debts depend basically on actuarial calculations based on mortality tables and assumptions about the return on assets. Errors in such assumptions and calculations are sources of risk. Sometimes, life insurance companies have faculties to issue their own debt in order to fund themselves. The risks they run concern their projections of mortality, the discontinuation of policies, their liquidity and investment (Davis, 2001). Pension funds with defined benefits are similar in their logic to insurance contracts. There exists a category of actuarial risk, even though if participation is mandatory there is no risk of the policy being discontinued. On top of the actuarial risks, there is the risk that increases in the real incomes of the participants may increase the replacement rate (income after retirement/income while in work) that is required. By contrast, funds with defined contributions have as an objective the maximization of returns subject to a given risk, reaching the highest possible replacement rate. Investment risks are present in both forms of pension fund, but only those with defined benefits can be transferred to the net worth of pension fund shareholders In this way, the schemes with defined benefits have similarities to life insurance companies, and those with defined contributions to mutual funds. Other differences are that pension funds do not necessarily have a capital base like an insurer, for whom excess returns on portfolios turn into profits for life insurance companies (Davis, 2001). Pension funds are subject to risks that are common to other financial intermediaries: investment risks, agency risks and systemic risks. The objectives of regulation have to do with how best to confront these risks. Investment risks have elements capable of being diversified and market elements (macroeconomic) that cannot be diversified. An appropriate degree of diversification of a portfolio will tend to eliminate the risk that is diversifiable, whilst maintaining market risk. One of the key aims of regulation is to encourage the diversification of portfolios. Funds are almost exclusively occupied in strategies to optimize their portfolios, focusing on diversification, selection and exploitation of premiums, rather than seeking profit from the spreads between rates or the administration of exposure to liquidity. Regulators have to ensure that the potential for diversification in a portfolio is exploited to the full extent. Non-diversifiable or market risk arises with pensions because the efficient allocation of risk between generations cannot take place (current generations cannot negotiate with those that have not yet been born). This can only be
120
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
reduced by dividing up the risk and to share in the returns to investors over the long term. One of the ways of diluting non-diversifiable risk in pensions is through a “multipillar” or “multitier” system. Other ways to deal with it are to introduce the definition of benefits, to offer guarantees with respect to yields or minimum benefits, and to introduce variable annuities or a sequence fixed annuities. Agency risk appears when the interests of fund administrators and managers are not properly aligned with the interests of fund members. It may arise from incompetence, inefficiency, negligence or fraud. Agency risks appear because transactions take place between parties with different levels of information, leading to problems of moral hazard and adverse selection (hidden actions and characteristics). Interventions to limit agency risks take the form of prudential regulations and guarantees applied to financial markets and intermediaries. They include the following objectives: x
To avoid fraud arising from the manipulation of accountancy and auditing standards through the dissemination of information and rules against insider trading.
x
To reduce over-exposure to specific risks by requiring minimum levels of diversification with regard both to the issuer and the instrument.
x
To mitigate conflicts of interest by placing limits on self-investment.
x
To limit market powers by restricting concentration in the ownership of shares.
Finally, systemic risks arise out of the nexus between the pension industry and the rest of the financial system (and the economy as a whole). While pension funds are not subject to systemic runs and consequent bankruptcies, they can still suffer the effects of a financial crisis through other channels. In particular, they can experience rapid falls in the nominal and real value of their portfolios. The calming effect of having holdings over long periods can generally be taken for granted, although it should be recognized that fluctuations in asset prices can lead to differences in average returns and renewal rates among cohorts with the same level of income. Evasion or avoidance (elusion) of contributions is also a possible consequence. They can fall victim to negative externalities from other areas of the financial system and economy. Investment in capital markets depends crucially on possibilities of safe exit from liquid monetary markets. Following Demarco et al. (1998), the following are typical components of pension fund regulations:
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
121
a) Criteria for licensing and authorization. b) Rules on governance. c) Rules concerning the segregation of assets and independent custody. d) External auditing and actuary. e) Requirements regarding dissemination of information. f) Regulations about investments. g) Guarantees, minimum capital and reserves. h) Regulations regarding costs and commissions. a) Licenses: those systems that use the trust/foundations impose more lax rules and rarely require minimum levels of capital or reserves. They seek to minimize costs and barriers to entry so as to attract participants. In Latin American the requirements are higher and minimum capital is required. In the United States, no specific license is required for occupational pension funds. These are built on the basis of contracts between private parties and do not have to receive approval from state authorities. The only action that resembles a license is the request to the tax authorities for preferential tax treatment. Although this is normally conceded, it is discretional. Many other OECD countries fit into this category (Demarco et al., 1998). b) Rules on governance: the same provisos apply as in point 1. c) Segregation of assets: the degree of segregation differs according to the typology of pension funds. In Latin America, it tends to be at its highest. d) External auditing: This is required in all countries, though its scope varies a great deal. Auditors should inform the regulators of problems that they find and are legally responsible if they fail to do so. External actuaries fulfil a similar role in schemes with defined benefits or defined contributions with guarantees. e) Requirements on information dissemination. OECD countries, with the occupational and closed systems, tend to be comparatively less demanding than new mandatory systems. f) Regulations about investments: there are two criteria: the ’rule of the prudent man’ (OECD), versus ’quantitative and draconian’ (Latin America). The first is minimally intrusive in the formation of a portfolio, whilst the second typically includes limits in the holdings of the issuer, types of instrument, risk,
122
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
concentration of ownership and asset type. Owing to its importance, this point is dealt with below. g) Guarantees, minimum capital and reserves. It does not make a lot of sense to refer to the concept of capital in relation to funds constituted as trusts, foundations or those with defined contributions. If a fund has an explicit obligation to produce minimum returns, then it becomes essential to impose capital requirements commensurable with the obligation. Some countries have introduced schemes with guarantees, but these imply that thought is given to viability, costs and incentives. Relative guarantees are usually far from ambitious and do not appear to create financial problems of moral hazard. However, they are blamed for herding behaviour in those countries where they are adopted. Absolute guarantees raise more substantial problems about sustainability and incentives. h) Regulations regarding costs and commissions: these are a common feature in Latin America and the countries of Eastern Europe. Systems based on trusts generally do not explicitly regulate charges. The systems that typify the OECD have lesser marketing costs. In the new schemes in Latin America and Eastern Europe, competition for participants is left to a group of providers with incentives to win over participants from other operators. As investment regulation (as we shall see) leaves little scope for the differentiation of portfolios, the need of administrators to differentiate their products generates substantial costs in marketing, advertising, direct sales and commercial networking (Ferro, 2003). Investment regulations In the OECD countries, the criteria adopted for regulating investments are more lax than in the new private pension systems of Latin America. Although there are important variations between them, the OECD countries (of which the purest examples are the United States and United Kingdom) tend to rely on a form of asset regulation that has an important self-regulatory component (the rule of the prudent man). Portfolios are not subject to limitations; rather there is a general obligation for those administering investment portfolios to work with prudence, aptitude, probity and responsibility. Fund managers are expected to use fund resources with the same diligence that they would use their own money (the incentive so to do increases when fund managers, as employees, contribute to the same fund). There are those who operate their own portfolio selection, and those that subcontract to mutual funds. The ’rule of the prudent man’ is more common among pension funds than life insurance companies. Only the United States, United Kingdom and Holland use ’the rule of the prudent man’ for both institutions. Canada, Finland, Italy and Japan use it only
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
123
for pension funds. In Germany and Switzerland neither follow the “prudent man”. (Davis, 2001). The other way of regulating assets involves quantitative controls, with ceilings for different types of asset and their distribution across a portfolio, floors for risk qualification, etc. It is common to employ differential treatments. These tend to be favourable in the case of public sector bonds, but less so in the case of foreign assets. Almost all the regulatory systems in Latin America include five types of limits on assets: x
Ceiling on asset types.
x
Ceiling on ownership concentration.
x
Ceiling by issuer.
x
Ceiling on the proportion of certain instruments within a portfolio.
x
Floor for risk qualification.
The limits on investments are established because of the existence of possible conflicts of interest. These limits are fixed by type of asset, by issuer, and by category of risk (established by the regulatory agency or private risk assessment agencies). With regard to asset type, some OECD countries (Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland) set portfolio limits of one sort or another. In others (Canada, Denmark, the United States, Ireland, Holland and the United Kingdom) there are no quantitative restrictions. However, funds are obliged to invest on the basis of prudence. The limits by issuer are designed to avoid investment concentration and the risk associated with it. Limits on risk are designed to avoid assets of poor credit quality. Finally, the fourth limitation prohibits investment in assets in companies with close ties to the administrator (Shah, 1997). With quantitative regulations, attention is focused on the investment itself. This is related to the continental legal tradition. The 'rule of the prudent man' focuses on the process by which an investment is made. The proof (of good performance) is the behaviour of the asset manager, the institutional investor and the process of decision-making. The rules governing decision-making tend to be accompanied by the presumption (explicit or implicit) that the diversification of investments is a key indicator of prudence (Davis, 2001). In regulatory contexts of 'the prudent man', it tends to be the case that the distribution of shares within a portfolio is relatively important (and pension
124
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
funds hold a major proportion of total shares in the economy, a third in the case of the United Kingdom). Shares tend to have a higher return and more marked volatility than assets with a fixed yield. Consequently, these portfolios tend to perform better on average than those subject to quantitative regulations. Quantitative regulations include limits on building up portfolios with assets considered illiquid (like real estate) or relatively volatile (like shares). At the same time, the bias towards public sector bonds is connected with the introduction of a capitalization system to replace or complement a pay-as-yougo system. This means that resources from the latter will be quickly capitalized whereas the obligations contracted by the pay-as-you-go system will be maintained possibly for a generation. This involves a fiscal gap and the idea is that this can be filled through public debt acquired by the new private administrators. In fact, the regulatory suasion exerted by regulators on pension administrators to invest in public debt has no additional justification at all.16 With regard to foreign assets, the limits imposed on investing abroad provide domestic protection to those in need of funds by limiting the universe of options for local pension funds to domestic assets. Advantages and disadvantages of the two schemes The ’prudent man’ approach implies greater institutional development, selfregulation, good practice, and the ability to settle disputes in the courts. It is superior in as much as the ultimate goal of a system of capitalization is the management of portfolios that generate savings for use in old age. A portfolio with a higher yield results in a higher pension. Quantitative regulation in countries where capital markets, institutional practices and the court system are weaker imposes stricter controls, especially if the number of intermediaries involved is small. However, it has undesired effects since the optimization of risk/yield in portfolios will not square with what models for portfolio selection in the financial economy would recommend. Portfolios are chosen from a sub-optimal universe, with greater risk per unit of yield or lower yield per unit of risk. By eliminating or severely restricting certain asset classes from selection, it reduces the chances of finding assets with the opposite correlations that are needed to achieve adequate diversification17. At the same time, where there is quantitative asset regulation, the attempt to achieve greater uniformity while seeking greater regulatory control over the industry. In this sense, policy becomes "a contributor, an administrator, and a fund". This makes it harder to take advantage of differences in affiliates’ preferences that could otherwise have been the case if every administrator was allowed to offer, for example, an aggressive fund (better for young people and
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
125
those less risk-averse) alongside a more conservative one (designed more for older and more risk-averse people). Is it possible to determine the net superiority of any one system? Both systems have strengths and weaknesses. There is a degree of consensus in the literature on the extent to which experience, institutional improvement and the passage of time lead to a shift from quantitative regulation towards ’prudent man’, easing the restrictions on assets, allowing more shares and foreign assets in portfolios, and offering a wider range of options to participants. It is extremely unlikely that regulators can systematically undertake the task of estimating the frontier of efficiency for portfolios any better than professional fund managers without restrictions. The regulation that seeks to encourage optimal portfolio performance implies very strict control being exercised over private investment administrators, with the state taking on a major responsibility for the results. A rather less ambitious objective than direct controls on investments might be simply to set a maximum limit to the risk of a fund portfolio.18 Even so, this is not an easy way to regulate the risk of a portfolio overall. Regulators in practice may try to restrict altogether investments in certain types of securities, or to limit them to a certain proportion of investments allowed. Under such restrictions, portfolios would be built up with interestbearing securities and which are highly correlated. By eliminating the possibility of combining less correlated assets, most of the opportunities for reducing risk and increasing returns would also be eliminated.19 If regulation prevents the selection of certain assets on the basis of their individual risk, the possibilities for reducing risk across a portfolio are eliminated. Additional restrictions that concentrate investment in even more highly correlated assets mean that the frontier is shifted further away from the region of maximum efficiency, the opposite of what is desired. Similar undesired effects arise by restricting assets such as stocks of companies where the capital is highly concentrated in few owners or that are affected by low rotation.20. Once again, such restrictions as they are tightened remove investments disproportionately from the frontier of efficiency, perhaps even making it impossible to build up an efficient portfolio.
126
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
Why do regulators impose limits on investments? It is possible that the use of these sorts of restrictions arises from the extension of prudential regulation for banking or insurance (which correctly stressed the need for adequate solvency and liquidity to cover a predetermined level of liabilities) and extrapolating them to pension systems with determined contributions whose aim is to optimize the trade-off between risk and return. However, this sort of extrapolation is mistaken. Restrictions do not necessarily produce a ceiling on risk. On the contrary, they can cause a disproportionate loss of anticipated income, while it is by no means clear that the portfolios that result would be less risky. Problems of agency may require strong prudential regulation in less developed markets and may justify direct intervention in investments. If this is the case, a similar sort of regulation should be brought to bear on mutual funds and insurance (Shah, 1997). However, here the specificities of the pension industry come into play. The higher volumes involved, as well as the mandatory nature of pensions, may be factors that explain the setting of limits. However, the optimal choice between yield and risk is thus abandoned with quantitative portfolio regulations, because apparently it is more important to deal with agency risk arising from the mandatory nature of participation, the meritorious character of pension provision and the scale that the system acquires with the passage of time and the build-up of assets. Schemes for pension regulation (how to regulate?) Supervision of pension funds can, in general terms, be characterized by two basic models (Demarco, Rofman and Whitehouse, 1998): proactive or reactive. The basic difference between these two styles of supervision arises from the way the industry is organized. In developed countries, there are a greater number of funds, less intrusive practices in occupational pension systems, a higher level of development in both capital markets and legal systems, asset administration through other financial intermediaries that are already highly regulated (banks, insurance companies, securities firms), and well developed practices of independent auditing. This is not the situation in Latin America. The reactive approach, applied principally in developed countries, is based on self-regulation with much less detailed prescriptions from the regulators. The proactive model is associated with systems that are based on a small number of open funds like those that operate in the majority of Latin American countries. The regulators adopt a more interventionist stance. In general, the proactive
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
127
approach involves detailed regulation of most of the activities of pension fund administrators. The reactive approach is associated chiefly with occupational systems organized as trusts and foundations. Typically, they are voluntary pension systems and ones based on employment. There are a large number of funds operating and higher levels of competition. They focus mainly on corrective measures. The regulator intervenes only when problems emerge, operating more in a remedial capacity. The system is based on trust that other participants will carry out monitoring and that will act upon it when the rules are broken. It presupposes a certain level of institutional development (audits, courts, etc) to help reinforce the exercise of market disciplines. Extending the analysis of advantages and disadvantages of integrated supervision, taking into account the peculiarities of pension funds As made clear above, the justification for regulating financial intermediaries stems from market failures or from the fact that certain products or sub-products of financial intermediation are merit goods. The more ’special’ or ’unique’ the intermediaries or their activities seem to be, the more reasons there appear to be to have specialized supervision. Similarly, the more similarities there appear to be between different sorts of business, contracts and financial intermediaries, the more the reasons to have an integrated system of supervision. What specific characteristics do pension funds have vis-à-vis other intermediaries that might justify the need for specific analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of integration over and above those for intermediaries dealt with above? Parting from the analysis in the previous section, some peculiarities can be identified on the basis of these four aspects:
128
x
Importance of regulatory objectives (Need to protect a captive and not very sophisticated consumer of what is considered a merit good).
x
Legal status of pension funds. (Pension funds involve contracts that combine insurance with closed mutual funds or with high exit costs).
x
Taxonomy of the funds (Regulatory treatment of private funds, mandatory and with individual personal accounts).
x
Ways in which funds are regulated (Shift emphasis from conduct of business regulation towards reactive prudential regulation).
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
In what follows, the methodology proposed in Demaestri and Guerrero (2003) is used to analyze these aspects with a view to the efficacy and efficiency of the integrated versus those of the specialized approaches in achieving the core objectives of pension supervision and that of other financial services. Table 6 summarizes the main findings. Once again, it is worth making it clear that the analysis is basically qualitative and that consequently it does not involve empirical measurement of the relative importance of the aspects under consideration or of the regulatory objectives involved.21 The first objective relates to market failures and the substantive regulatory goals relative to mandatory participation, pensions as a merit good and the fact that consumers of financial services are relatively unsophisticated. This is important for the core goal of consumer protection and relates to the efficacy and efficiency of regulation. An integrated agency with adequate legal powers and highly qualified staff would appear to be more efficacious than a specialized agency with less reach and more specialist staff. However, it could be argued that a specialized regulator could put more determination into protecting small-scale savers, who are captive and ill informed, than could a mega-regulator. The latter may have wider powers but has not only to concern himself with the protection of small-scale clients, but also has to protect savers, investors and consumers of financial services that are provided by more complex institutions that may eventually turn into conglomerates. Given these two arguments, the efficacy of the integrated approach is rated as ambiguous (+/-). However, with regard to efficiency, the correction of this ambiguity would be less costly under an integrated system. The costs arising from introducing changes in an integrated entity (including among key objectives the protection of pension fund contributors, the allocation of trained staff for supervisory functions) would be less than those arising from the need to analyze and control the chances of regulatory arbitrage and supervising appropriately how pension funds are managed within financial conglomerates. The second aspect relates to the legal profile of pension funds. Internationally, pension funds take a range of forms, from those that are not very specific, such as trusts, foundations and mutual arrangements, participation in insurance companies to those that are highly specific, such as individual accounts in fund administrators. If the veil of the legal formality is removed, we see that the funds are basically contracts that combine savings with insurance in mutual funds, where participation is either compulsory or voluntary but where the cost of withdrawal is high. Analysis of the advantages or disadvantages of integration rests on the efficacy with which the core goal of consumer protection can be achieved. An integrated agency that regulates securities, banking and insurance would be better placed to regulate mutual funds than a specialized one. For reasons of scale, then, to avoid regulatory arbitrage and to
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
129
cope with the activities of multi-intermediary and multi-product conglomerates, it would be better to have an integrated regulator that takes charge of pension funds as well. The third aspect has to do with the taxonomy of the funds as to whether they are private, mandatory, and personal and have defined contributions. Here, the core goal of consumer protection is in play with regard to the efficacy of the approach adopted. This combination approximates to that of the pension fund administrators, the form most common in Latin America. The main exception to the rule is Brazil where occupational funds predominate. It was mentioned in the previous point that the juridical form a pension fund takes makes no difference to the need to have integrated or specialized supervision. But as before, it is more efficacious for consumer protection to have a powerful integrated agency with a purview over all financial intermediaries where highly qualified staff can be amassed. In the specific instance of plans with defined benefits, a point arises with respect to systemic stability. With defined benefits, there is a potential for a parafiscal rescue if private funds are hit by a crisis. Here there is an argument similar to that of having a lender of last resort for banking. With respect to systemic stability, the system gains in efficiency when there is integrated financial supervision. The way in which funds are regulated (prudential or conduct of business, proactive or reactive) is related to the efficiency of the financial system. Performance regulation is justified in situations where the institutional development is poor and the proactive approach suits those situations where the system is organized in pension fund administrators (few intermediaries). However, both performance regulation and the proactive approach (which are related to one another) can be seen as transitional towards the point at which institutions work better, experience of systems is built up and markets and instruments become more fully developed. At that point, it would be preferable to move towards forms of self-regulation, promoting the exercise of market discipline and supervising those areas where market failures persist. If supervision has to pass through a period of performance control and has to be proactive, it would seem more efficacious to have an integrated agency. However, since this is a transitional phase, it might be more efficient to pass through it with a specialized entity that would then disappear. Nevertheless, this type of regulation is costly. Taking into consideration both of these lines of argument, the efficiency of integration is ranked as ambiguous.
130
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
Table III. 5. Efficacy and efficiency of the integrated approach to supervision in achieving specific goals of pension regulation in Latin America Issues
Goals
Efficacy
Efficiency
Integration of Banking, Insurance, Securities and Pension Funds
Integration of Banking, Insurance, Securities and Pension Funds
1) Regulatory objectives: Need to protect a captive unsophisticated consumer for a good considered meritorious
Consumer protection Systemic stability Efficiency of the system
+/-
2) Legal profile: Pension funds involve contracts that combine insurance with closed mutual funds or with high exit costs
Consumer protection Systemic stability Efficiency of the system
+
3) Taxonomy of the funds: Regulatory treatment of private funds, mandatory and with individual personal accounts
Consumer protection Systemic stability Efficiency of the system
+ (with defined contributions)
4) Forms of regulation: Shift emphasis from proactive performance regulation to reactive prudential regulation
Consumer protection Systemic stability Efficiency of the system
+
+ (with defined benefits)
+
+/-
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
Table IV.5 summarizes the main results of the qualitative analysis undertaken on the advantages and disadvantages of integrating pension supervision regarding the four specific issues raised about: i) the importance of regulatory objectives, ii) the legal profile of pension funds, iii) the taxonomy of the funds, and iv) the way in which funds are regulated. They emphasize the greater efficacy of the integrated approach to supervising pension funds with respect to achieving the goal of consumer protection, the legal profile of the funds and their taxonomy (especially funds with defined contributions), and with respect to increasing the efficiency of the system, the ways in which funds
SUPERVISING PRIVATE PENSIONS – ISBN-92-64-01697-X © OECD 2004
131
are regulated. Table IV.5 also shows the greater efficiency of the integrated approach to supervision relative to consumer protection vis-à-vis regulatory objectives, and to systemic stability vis-à-vis questions associated with the taxonomy of funds. On the other hand, ambiguities are revealed with regard to the advantages and disadvantages of integration versus specialization. One of these relates to the efficacy of integration with respect to regulatory objectives. The other relates to the efficiency of integration with regard to the goal of systemic stability regarding the forms of private pension fund regulation. Once again, it is worth making it clear that this is basically a qualitative analysis and consequently it does not present an empirical evaluation of the relative importance of the issues selected nor the supervision goals under consideration. It is therefore not possible to reach a definitive conclusion about the predominance of positive evaluations (+) over ambiguous ones (+/-). Nevertheless, from the point of view of qualitative analysis of the matters summarized in Table IV.5, we can conclude that the integrated approach to financial supervision is superior when we look at aspects specific to pension supervision. Conclusion This study aimed to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of integrating pension supervision with other financial activities and services (banking, insurance and securities). We aimed to contribute conceptually to the implementation of reforms in financial supervision and in pension systems in Latin America. An analysis was undertaken of the advantages and disadvantages of integrated versus specialized supervision, with emphasis on the specific nature of private pension systems and the situation in Latin American countries. Taking into account a number of aspects related to financial supervision, we analyzed the relative efficacy and efficiency of integration in light of the quest for three core objectives: i) protection for the consumers of financial services; ii) systemic stability; and iii) development of the efficiency of the system. The analytical approach was basically qualitative, and consequently there was no quantification of the issues discussed, and no opinion given a